The Oxford history of Islam

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THE

OXFORD

HISTORY of I S L A M

EDITED

BY

John L. Esposito OXFORD UNIVERSITY

PRESS

OXTORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Oxford Athens Cape Town Karachi Nairobi

Auckland

Chennat

Bogota

Dar es Salaam

Kuala I u m p u r Paris

Hew York

Bangkok

Delhi

Madrid

Sao Paulo

Buenos Aires Florence

Melbourne

Singapore

Taipei

Calcutta

H o n g Kong

Mexico City Tokyo

Istanbul

Mumbai

Toronto

Warsaw

utul asioemttd lumponip in Berlin

lhadan

Copyright ISBN 0-19-510799 i (alk. piper) I , Islam--History, BPS0 095 1999 297.09

[. Hsposito, John. 1 99-13219

dc21

99-1*219 Design by P O L L E N

9 8 Printed in Hong Kong on aiid-free paper

For H a s i b Sabbagh Builder of bridges of steel and of mutual understanding and I s m a i l R. a l - F a r u q i scholar and pioneer in Muslim-Christian dialogue

CONTENTS Introduction i.\ CHAPTER

ONE

M u h a m m a d and the Caliphate POLITICAL

HISTORY

OF

THE ISLAMIC

EMPIRE

UP

TO

THE

MONGOL

CONQUEST

Fred M. Donner I CHAPTER

TWO

F r u i t o f t h e Tree o f K n o w l e d g e THE

RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN

FAITH

AND

PRACTICE

IN

ISLAM

Vincent J. Cornell CHAPTER

THREE

Law a n d Society THE

INTERPLAY

OF

REVELATION

AND

REASON

IN

THE

SHARIAH

Mohammad Hashim Kamali 107 CHAPTER

FOUR

Science, M e d i c i n e , a n d T e c h n o l o g y THE

MAKING

OF A SCIENTIFIC

CULTURE

Ahmad Dallai CHAPTER

FIVE

Art and Architecture THEMES

AND

VARIATIONS

Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom 21c CHAPTER

SIX

Philosophy and Theology FROM

THE EIGHTH CENTURY

C E .

TO

THE

PRESENT

Majid Fakhry 269 CHAPTER

SEVEN

Islam and Christendom HISTORICAL, FROM

CULTURAL,

THE SEVENTH

TO

AND

RELIGIOUS

THE FIFTEENTH

INTERACTION CENTURIES

Jane L Smith CHAPTER

EIGHT

Sultanates a n d G u n p o w d e r E m p i r e s THE

MIDDLE

EAST

Ira M. Lapidas Ï47 vii

CONTENTS CHAPTER

NINE

T h e Eastward J o u r n e y o f M u s l i m K i n g s h i p ISLAM IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST

ASIA

Bruce B. Lawrence

395 CHAPTER

TEN

C e n t r a l Asia a n d C h i n a TRANSNATIONALIZATION, ISLAM1ZATION, AND ETHNICIZATION

Dru C. Gladney

433 CHAPTER

ELEVEN

I s l a m i n A f r i c a t o 1800 MERCHANTS,

C H I E F S , A N D SAINTS

Nehemio Levtzion

CHAPTER

TWELVE

Foundations f o r Renewal and R e f o r m ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

IN T H E EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH

CENTURIES

John Obert Vbll

CHAPTER

THIRTEEN

E u r o p e a n C o l o n i a l i s m a n d t h e Emergence o f M o d e r n M u s l i m States S.V.R. Nosr

549 CHAPTER

FOURTEEN

The Globalization o f Islam THE RETURN

OF MUSLIMS

TO THE WEST

YvonneYa2beck Haddad

6oi CHAPTER

FIFTEEN

Contemporary Islam REFORMATION

OR REVOLUTION?

John L.EspositO

64? Chronology 691 Select Bibliography 697 Contributors 708 Image Sources 710 Index 7»

Introduction

John L . Esposito

A l t h o u g h Islam is the youngest o f the m a j o r w o r l d religions, w i t h i .2 b i l l i o n f o l lowers, Islam is the second largest and fastest-growing r e l i g i o n i n the w o r l d . To speak o f the w o r l d o f Islam today is to refer n o t o n l y t o countries that stretch f r o m N o r t h Africa to Southeast Asia b u t also t o M u s l i m m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s that exist across the globe. Thus, for example, Islam is the second or t h i r d largest r e l i g i o n i n Europe and the Americas. Both the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West have experienced the i m p a c t o f Islam politically, culturally, and demographically. Events i n the c o n t e m p o r a r y M u s l i m w o r l d have led to an explosion o f interest and scholarly w o r k o n Islam and the M u s l i m w o r l d . M u c h o f this w o r k i n r e l i g i o n , history, and the social sciences has c o n t r i b u t e d t o w a r d the redressing o f earlier imbalances o f coverage and stereotyping. The Oxford History of Islam is part o f this process. The c o g n i t i v e , i d e o l o g i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and d e m o g r a p h i c m a p o f the M u s l i m w o r l d c h a n g e d d r a m a t i c a l l y i n the second h a l f o f the t w e n t i e t h century. M o d e r n nation-states e m e r g e d f r o m centuries o f European c o l o n i z a t i o n , often as a result o f successful independence movements. However, contemporaryM u s l i m h i s t o r y challenged the expectation that m o d e r n i z a t i o n w o u l d result i n the progressive w e s t e r n i z a t i o n and secularization o f societies. Secularization o f society has n o t p r o v e d a necessary p r e c o n d i t i o n for social, e c o n o m i c , and political development.

ix

X

INTRODUCTION

Islam today is the d o m i n a n t symbolic and ideological force i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , i n f o r m i n g social institutions (education, clinics, hospitals, social welfare services, and banks) and politics. I n contrast to the expectations o f only a few decades ago, Islam (Islamic symbols, ideology, organizations, and institutions) has reemerged as a significant force i n public life. Mainstream Islamic organizations have become major social and political actors i n society. The reassertion o f Islam produced n e w Islamic republics i n Iran, Sudan, andAfghanistan. At the same time, Islamic movements emerged as the major o p p o s i t i o n i n Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Yemen, Tunisia, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine/Israel, Kaslirnir, Central Asia, and elsewhere. Radical Islamic movements have used violence i n attempts to destabilize and topple governments and attack M u s l i m elites as w e l l as Western governments and interests. O f equal importance, M u s l i m s are a significant presence i n the West.

INTRODUCTION

XI

In the 1950s and 1960s large numbers o f M u s l i m s emigrated to Europe and America as laborers, students, and professionals. Today they are a significant m i n o r i t y , addressing issues o f identity (assimilation or integration), values, p o l i t ical and social participation, and pluralism i n Western secular societies. The Oxford History of Islam is designed to provide ready access to the history o f Islam. W r i t t e n for the general reader but also appealing to specialists, o u r goal is to present the best o f scholarship i n a readable style, c o m p l e m e n t e d by a r i c h use o f illustrations. Technical terms have been severely l i m i t e d and diacriticals o m i t ted. The approach to understanding Islam and M u s l i m history and c i v i l i z a t i o n is interdisciplinary, relying o n historians o f Islamic r e l i g i o n , history, art, and science as w e l l as social sciences. C o n t r i b u t o r s represent different disciplinary perspectives and include scholars f r o m diverse national and religious traditions. As w i t h The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, it has been especially i m p o r t a n t to include M u s l i m as w e l l as n o n - M u s l i m scholars. W M e it is not possible to cover this topic exhaustively i n a single volume, The Oxford History is comprehensive i n its coverage. The first part o f die book provides an overview o f the origins and development o f classical Islam: its faith, community, institutions, sciences, and art. It also surveys the liistoric encounter o f Islam and Christianity, critical to w o r l d history and to relations between the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West. The M o n g o l invasion and destruction o f the Abbasid e m p i r e i n the thirteenth century appeared to b r i n g to an end Islam's p h e n o m e n a l expansion as faith and as empire. Instead, as seen i n the next chapters, the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries saw a p e r i o d o f sultanates and empires, extending f r o m T i m b u k t u to Mindanao. Sultanates f r o m Africa to China and Southeast Asia emerged alongside great e m p i r e s — t h e O t t o m a n and Safavid empires i n the M i d d l e East and the M u g h a l i n South Asia. W i t h i n each, Islam expressed itself i n diverse ways and flourished

as b o t h a faith and a c i v i l i z a t i o n . However, by the eighteenth century,

across the M u s l i m w o r l d the fortunes o f M u s l i m societies were i n decline. The next group o f chapters tracks the domestic and international challenges faced by premodern and m o d e m M u s l i m societies, i n particular movements o f Islamic renewal and reform. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed the rise o f premodern reform movements f r o m Africa to Southeast Asia, m d u d i n g theWahhabi, M a h d i , and Sanusi, w h i c h responded to internal causes o f stagnation and decline. By the nineteenth century, m u c h o f the M u s l i m w o r l d faced an external threat, the onslaught o f European colonialism. The colonial legacy and the history of M u s l i m responses to the political, economic, and religious challenges o f European i m p e r i alism i n the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have had a p r o f o u n d impact o n M u s l i m societies and u p o n relations between the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West. The final chapters o f the b o o k provide perspectives o n the c o n t e m p o r a r y landscape. The resurgence o f Islam i n the late t w e n t i e t h century has been a test i m o n y to the vitality o f Islam. At the d a w n o f the twenty-first century, Islam is

Xii

INTRODUCTION

indeed a global presence chat blurs o l d distinctions between the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West. Islam is t r u l y a w o r l d r e l i g i o n , necessitating coverage o f b o t h Islam and the West and Islam in the West. Islam is t o be f o u n d n o t o n l y i n the m o r e than çc M u s l i m countries o f the w o r l d b u t also i n significant M u s l i m m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s i n Europe and America as w e l l as such diverse countries as China, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. As a result, Islam and M u s l i m history have played a n d continue t o play a dynamic and m a j o r role i n w o r l d history. I w i s h t o especially acknowledge m y colleagues, the c o n t r i b u t o r s t o this v o l u m e , w h o have been responsive t o m y requests for revision and additions. I a m i n d e b t e d t o James Piscatori ( O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y ) , Tamara Sonn (College o f W i l l i a m and M a r y ) , and John O. Voll (Georgetown U n i v e r s i t y ) for their invaluable assistance. Natana DeLong-Bas, m y senior research assistant, was especially helpful i n gathering the chronology. Sheila Blair and Jonathan B l o o m were a pleasure t o w o r k w i t h , invaluable i n i d e n t i f y i n g the many illustrations t o be f o u n d i n this volume. Jean Esposito, as always, was there w i t h advice and encouragement.

T H E O X F O R D H I S T O R Y of

ISLAM

CHAPTER

ONE

Muhammad and the Caliphate P O L I T I C A L H I S T O R Y OF T H E I S L A M I C E M P I R E UP T O T H E M O N G O L C O N Q U E S T

Fred M . Donner

Islam as a r e l i g i o n and c i v i l i z a t i o n made its entry o n t o the w o r l d stage w i t h the life a n d career o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d i b n A h d A l l a h (ca. 5 7 0 - 6 3 2 ) i n western Arabia. After his death, a series o f successors called caliphs claimed political a u t h o r i t y over the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . D u r i n g the p e r i o d o f the caliphate, Islam grew i n t o a religious tradition and civilization o f w o r l d w i d e importance. A p r o p erly h i s t o r i c a l v i e w o f Islam's appearance and early d e v e l o p m e n t ,

however,

demands that these processes be situated against the cultural b a c k g r o u n d o f sixth-century Arabia and, m o r e generally, the Near East.

Historical Setting The Near East i n the sixth century was d i v i d e d between t w o great empires, the

(Left) Pilgrims to Mecca

Byzantine o r Later Roman Empire i n the west and the Sasanian Empire i n the east,

worshiping around the

w i t h the k i n g d o m s o f H i m y a r i n southern Arabia and A x u m i n the H o r n o f Africa

Kaaba, the cubical stone

constituting smaller players i n the political arena. This Byzantine-Sasanian rivalry-

structure covered with cloth,

was merely the most recent phase i n a l o n g struggle between Rome and Persia that

which stands in the middle

had lasted for m o r e than five h u n d r e d years. The t w o empires n o t only raised c o m p e t i n g claims to w o r l d d o m i n i o n , they also represented different cultural traditions: the Byzantines espoused Hellenistic culture, w h i l e the Sasanians looked to ancient Iranian and Semitic cultural traditions and rejected H e l l e n i s m as alien.

1

of the Masjid al-Haram in Mecca. Muslims revere the Kaaba as the House of God and direct their prayers toward it five times a day.

2

THE OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

This cultural antagonism was specifically exacerbated by religious rivalry; i n the t h i r d and f o u r t h centuries the Byzantine emperors had declared themselves c h a m pions o f Christianity, w h i c h itself had been heavily i m b u e d w i t h Hellenistic c u l ture, whereas the Sasanian Great Kings espoused the I r a n i a n faith k n o w n as Zoroastrianism (Magianism) as their official r e l i g i o n . O n the eve o f Islam, r e l i gious identities i n the Near East, particularly Greek o r Byzantine Christianity and Zoroastrianism, had thus acquired acutely political overtones. A l t h o u g h both the Byzantine and Sasanian empires espoused official religions, neither empire had a religiously homogeneous p o p u l a t i o n . Large populations o f Jews were scattered t h r o u g h o u t the Near East; they were especially numerous i n such cities as Alexandria, Jerusalem, A n t i o c h , Hamadan, Rayy, Susa, the Byzantine capital at Constantinople, and the Sasanian capital at Ctesiphon. Many m o r e Jews were setded i n places like Tiberias i n Palestine and i n southern Mesopotamia, where Jewish academies c o n t i n u e d a l o n g tradition o f religious learning and c o n t r i b u t e d to p r o d u c i n g the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmuds (the authoritative bodies o f Jewish tradition) d u r i n g the f o u r t h , fifth, a n d sixth centuries. Christians were numerous, perhaps the m a j o r i t y o f the Near Eastern p o p u l a t i o n i n the sixth century", b u t they were d i v i d e d i n t o several sects that differed o n points o f theolThe great church of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul was built

ogy. Each sect viewed itself as the t r u e or o r t h o d o x

("right-confessing")

Christianity a n d dismissed the others as heterodox. The Byzantine (or Greek

by the Byzantine emperor

O r t h o d o x ) faith, the official c h u r c h o f the Byzantine Empire, was w i d e l y estab-

Justinian in the sixth cen-

lished i n Greece, the Balkans, and a m o n g the large Greek-speaking populations o f

tury. It was transformed into

Anatolia (Asia M i n o r ) . I n Syria-Palestine

a mosque after the Ottomans

c h u r c h was m a i n l y l i m i t e d to the towns. A few Byzantine Christians were even

conquered Constantinople in 1 4 5 3 , and the minarets were added then.

a n d Egypt, however, the Byzantine

f o u n d i n the Sasanian Empire, mainly i n Mesopotamia, but their p o s i t i o n was precarious. Christians f o l l o w i n g the teachings o f Bishop Nestorius (Nestorianism)

M U H A M M A D

AND THE CALIPHATE

3

had been forced to leave the By zantine Empire after Nestorius was deposed for heresy by the C o u n c i l o f Ephesus i n 431. They had to take refuge i n the Sasanian Empire, scattered w i d e l y between Mesopotamia, Iran, and the fringes o f Central Asia. A n o t h e r Christian sect, the Monophysites, had been declared a heresy by the C o u n c i l o f Chalcedon i n 451, but M o n o p h y s i t i s m was nonetheless the creed o f most i n d i g e n o u s Christians o f A x u m , Egypt, Syria-Palestine,

Mesopotamia.

A r m e n i a , and Iran, particularly i n the countryside. Zoroastrians were f o u n d m a i n l y i n Iran and southern Mesopotamia; few lived outside the Sasanian Empire. C o m m u n i t i e s o f all three religions (Christianity, Judaism, and Z o r o a s t r i a n i s m ) — w h i c h are called the scriptural religions because they shared the idea o f a divinely inspired, revealed scripture—were also found i n Arabia. The Byzantines and Sasanians fought many wars between the f o u r t h and sixth centuries i n an effort to secure and extend their o w n territories. They competed w i t h particular intensity for key border zones such as upper Mesopotamia and Armenia. They also tried to seize key towns f r o m one another to gain control over, and therefore to tax, the lucrative " O r i e n t trade." This commerce b r o u g h t southern Arabian incense, Chinese silk, Indian pepper and cottons, spices, and other goods f r o m the Indian Ocean region to die cities o f the Mediterranean basin. The Byzantines and Sasanians also attempted to gain the advantage by establishing alliances w i t h lesser states i n the r e g i o n . The most i m p o r t a n t o f these client states was the Christian k i n g d o m o f A x u m , w i t h w h i c h the Byzantines established an uneasy alliance. Both Byzantines and Sasanians also f o r m e d alliances w i t h tribal groups w h o lived o n the Arabian fringes o f their territories. Arabia was wedged between the t w o empires. The Sasanians established a series o f protectorates over tribes and small states o n the east Arabian coast and i n O m a n , whereas the Byzantines b r o u g h t tribes o n the fringes o f Palestine and Syria i n t o their o r b i t . Arabia occupied a strategic p o s i t i o n i n relation to the O r i e n t trade, a fact that led b o t h empires to intervene decisively i n its affairs d u r i n g the sixth century. I n 52c the Byzantines persuaded A x u m to invade and occupy the k i n g d o m o f H i m y a r i n Yemen and its i m p o r t a n t trading ports, thus b r i n g i n g the Red Sea trade to the I n d i a n Ocean securely w i t h i n the Byzantine o r b i t . I n 57c, however, the Sasanians, i n v i t e d by the Himyarites, sent an e x p e d i t i o n to oust the A x u m i t e s f r o m Yemen, w h i c h for the next several decades was a Sasanian province ruled The Sasanians, rulers of Iran a n d adjacent areas in the centuries before I s l a m ,

p'\

111

m i n

ffi'itiiiiEüti •;

I IIIIII M i l l '

J l l j m i j r ' i i !'• I

maintained their capital at Ctesiphon, near present-day Baghdad. The main room of their palace was a giant iwan, a barrel-vaulted space,

'ft-

under which the ruler sat.

c

4

T H E OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

by a governor appointed by the Great King. Some t i m e later, the Sasanians i n a u gurated the last and greatest o f the Sasanian-Byzantine wars by l a u n c h i n g a series o f assaults o n Byzantine t e r r i t o r i e s farther n o r t h . Between 611 and 620 the Sasanians seized most o f Anatolia, all o f Syria-Palestine, and Egypt f r o m the Byzantines. But i n the next decade the Byzantine e m p e r o r Heraclius regained these territories, and i n 628 he was able t o conquer the Sasanians' Mesopotamian heartlands, depose the Great K i n g , and install another, m o r e docile king. These dramatic events f o r m e d the political backdrop t o the career o f Islam's Prophet M u h a m m a d i n the western Arabian towns o f Mecca and M e d i n a . A l t h o u g h distant from the m a i n centers o f h i g h civilization i n the Near East, .Arabia was n o t isolated. The Arabian peoples were aware o f and affected by p o l i t i cal, economic, and cultural developments i n the more h i g h l y developed surrounding lands o f the Near East. Trends i n religion i n particular resonated i n various parts o f Arabia. Many religions had established themselves i n Arabia o n the eve o f Islam. Christianity was well-established i n parts o f eastern Arabia along the Persian G u l f coast and i n O m a n as w e l l as i n Yemen. The Yemeni city o f Najran i n particular later became famous because o f the m a r t y r d o m o f Christians there d u r i n g the sixth century. Christianity had also spread among some o f the pastoral nomadic tribes that occupied the northern fringes o f the peninsula, where i t bordered o n Syria and Mesopotamia, and may also have been current among some pastoral groups farther south, i n n o r t h e r n and central Arabia itself. Judaism was similarly widespread; important Jewish c o m m unities existed i n the string o f oasis towns stretching southw a r d along the n o r d i e r n Red Sea coast o f Arabia, i n c l u d i n g the towns o f Khaybar andYathrib (later called Medina, the Prophet Muhammad's adoptive home). Jews were also found i n eastern Arabia and especially i n Yemen. Zoroastrianism was far less widespread i n Arabia than either Christianity or Judaism, but a small f o l l o w i n g existed, particularly i n parts o f eastern Arabia and O m a n , where the Sasanian Empire had established protectorates among the local populations. Arabian communities o f all Uiree scriptural religions—Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism—sometimes maintained contact w i t h their co-religionists i n the lands surrounding Arabia, where these religions were m u c h more firmly established. For example, bishops from lower Mesopotamia were sent to Yemen, and .Arabian Jews ma)- have had some contact w i t h the great academies o f Jewish learning i n Mesopotamia. In a d d i t i o n t o the scriptural religions, Arabia also was h o m e t o a host o f local animist cults, w i n c h attributed d i v i n e powers t o natural objects—the sun, the m o o n , Venus, certain sacred rocks o r trees, and so o n . These cults seem t o have been late vestiges o f the animist religions once widespread a m o n g the peoples o f the ancient Near East, such as the Babylonians and Canaanites. A l t h o u g h anim i s m still existed in Arabia i n the sixth century, i t was being supplanted by the scriptural religions i n many areas. The r e m a i n i n g strongholds o f these animistic cults were i n central and western Arabia, especially i n t o w n s such as Taif and

MUHAMMAD

A N D THE CALIPHATE

C

Mecca, w h i c h contained sanctuaries (harams) w i t h i n whose confines members o f the cult were f o r b i d d e n to fight and had to observe other rules o f the c u l t — a feature that made such harams i m p o r t a n t centers for markets and for social transactions o f all kinds. I n Mecca the cultic center was a cube-shaped b u i l d i n g called the Kaaba, embedded i n w h i c h was a m e t e o r i c black stone a r o u n d w h i c h cult members p e r f o r m e d circumambulations to gain the favor o f the cult's dieties. The religious, cultural, economic, and poUtical environment i n Arabia and the Near East was thus a very complex one. Before examining Islam's rise, however, i t is i m p o r t a n t to note a feature o f the Near Eastern landscape that profoundly i n f l u enced the course o f the region's history, i n c l u d i n g its history d u r i n g the early Islamic centuries. There are extensive tracts o f agriculturally marginal land i n the Near East; these marginal lands consist either o f arid steppe and desert, as i n m u c h o f Arabia, or o f semiarid mountainous terrain, as i n parts o f Iran and Anatolia. I n these regions settled life, particularly larger towns and cities, tended to be w i d e l y scattered and i n some cases virtually nonexistent. Some such areas, however, could sustain thinly scattered populations o f pastoral nomads o r mountaineering peoples l i v i n g i n small settlements and relying o n a m i x t u r e o f subsistence agriculture and herding. These nomadic or m o u n t a i n e e r i n g peoples were often outside the effective c o n t r o l o f any state, and they organized themselves pohtically i n kinship-based entities (tribes) or i n larger confederations o f tribes. I n many cases they also had strong martial traditions, apparently rooted i n such diverse factors as their skill w i t h r i d i n g animals and a culturally based attitude o f superiority toward nonpastoralists o r lowlanders. The result was that for several m i l l e n n i a the history o f the Near East was marked by the repeated i n t r u s i o n o f powerful pastoral nomads or m o u n tain tribespeople i n t o the richer, settled lands and towns belonging to the various states o f the region. Sometimes diese intrusions were merely raids along a state's borders, usually undertaken w h e n a state was n o t strong enough to defend a district effectively. D u r i n g other intrusions, however, nomads or m o u n t a i n tribes toppled the r u l i n g dynasties o f m o r i b u n d states and supplanted the rulers w i t h members o f their o w n group, w h o became a new r u l i n g dynasty—-usually settling d o w n i n the state's heartlands i n the process, but keeping a power base i n the marginal region from w h i c h they had come. This process o f periodic i n t r u s i o n by peoples f r o m the marginal regions i n t o the state--dominated areas o f the Near East is one o f the m a i n themes i n the area's history.

The Prophet Muhammad and the Nascent Community of Believers The h i s t o r i a n , w h e t h e r M u s l i m o r n o n - M u s l i m , w h o wishes t o w r i t e about the life o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d faces grave problems o f b o t h d o c u m e n t a t i o n a n d interpretation. The first r u l e o f the h i s t o r i a n is t o rely whenever possible o n c o n -

6

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t e m p o r a r y documents-—yet for the life o f the Prophet these are virtually nonexistent. Fortunately, many accounts p r o d u c e d w i t h i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n later times provide us w i t h copious i n f o r m a t i o n about the Prophet. W h e n deali n g w i t h such accounts, however, the h i s t o r i a n must t r y t o i d e n t i f y and set aside those features that reflect n o t the Prophet's life and times b u t later attitudes and values o f all kinds that have been interpolated i n t o the story o f his life b y subsequent w r i t e r s , w h e t h e r consciously or unconsciously. This is never an easy task, and a significant measure o f honest disagreement inevitably emerges a m o n g historians engaged in the w o r k o f evaluating the r e p o r t e d events and p r o v i d i n g a sound i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e m . The b r i e f sketch o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d ' s life and career that follows is d r a w n largely o n the basis o f the t r a d i t i o n a l narratives, but the choice o f traditional materials selected, and the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f their overall m e a n i n g , reflect m a i n l y the author's general concerns as an h i s t o r i a n interested i n questions o f social and p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n and i n the e v o l u t i o n o f religious movements. Little is k n o w n w i t h certainty about the Prophet M u h a m m a d ' s early life. H e was b o r n M u h a m m a d i b n (son o f ) A b d Allah i n the small western Arabian t o w n o f Mecca some t i m e a r o u n d 570 c.E. (traditional accounts differ o n the date). H e belonged to the H a s h i m clan, one o f the smaller segments o f the tribe o f Quraysh that d o m i n a t e d Mecca. A t an early age M u h a m m a d was orphaned and came under the guardianship o f his paternal uncle, A b u Talib, head o f the H a s h i m clan, Mecca was the site o f an i m p o r t a n t pagan shrine, the Kaaba, d u r i n g M u h a m m a d ' s y o u t h . The Quraysh tribe served as guardians and stewards o f the cult o f H u b a l , centered o n this shrine. The tribe was also involved i n trade; although they p r o b ably dealt m a i n l y in h u m b l e goods such as hides, their commercial activity gave t h e m contact w i t h m u c h o f Arabia and the s u r r o u n d i n g lands, and i t p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h a measure o f experience i n the organization and management o f people and materials. T r a d i t i o n a l sources portray M u h a m m a d as having been a p r o m i s i n g and respected y o u n g m a n w h o participated i n b o t h Mecca's cultic activities and its commerce. He also seemed to have had an i n w a r d , contemplative side, however, w h i c h expressed itself i n his periodic w i t h d r a w a l to secluded spots for p r o l o n g e d periods o f m e d i t a t i o n and reflection. It was d u r i n g such a retreat, i n about 610, that he began to have religious experiences i n the f o r m o f visions and sounds that presented themselves as revelations f r o m God. These experiences initially so terrified h i m that he sought comfort f r o m his first wife, Khadijah, but the visions occurred again and slowly M u h a m m a d came to accept b o t h the message itself and his o w n role as God's messenger. The revelations, c o m i n g to M u h a m m a d as sonorous utterances, were eventually collected to f o r m the Quran (sometimes spelled " K o r a n " i n earlier English w r i t i n g s ) , w h i c h is sacred scripture for Muslims.

To M u h a m m a d and. to all w h o have since followed his message, the Q u r a n is l i t -

In the first centuries of Islam,

erally the w o r d o f G o d , God's o w n eternal speech.

many fine manuscripts of the

The message M u h a m m a d received i n these revelations was a w a r n i n g that only t h r o u g h devotion t o the one and only God a n d through righteous observance o f the revealed law could people attain salvation i n the afterlife. Some revelations thus

Quran were copied on parchment in the distinctive angular script known as Kufic and embellished with gold

emphasized the oneness and omnipotence o f God, Creator o f the w o r l d and o f chapter headings. everything i n i t , including h u m a n k i n d . Others warned that the Last Judgment was near; and then those w h o had lived righteously w o u l d be sent to heaven and those w h o had lived evil lives w o u l d be sent to eternal damnation i n hell. Other revelations laid out the general guidelines for a righteous existence. These included w o r ship o f the one God and rejection o f idols and false gods; regular prayer; almsgiving and charitable treatment o f the poor, w i d o w s , orphans, and other unfortunates; observance o f strict modesty i n dealing w i t h the opposite sex, a n d o f h u m i l i t y i n all one's affairs; the need t o w o r k actively for the g o o d and to stand u p against evil w h e n one sees i t ; and many other injunctions. Still other revelations retold stories o f earlier prophets (among t h e m Abraham, Moses, David, and Jesus) w h o , like M u h a m m a d , had been charged w i t h b r i n g i n g God's t r u t h to their people, and w h o provided for Believers inspiring models o f righteous conduct: as the Quran put i t , "Surely i n this there is a sign for y o u , i f y o u believe," Many aspects o f M u h a m m a d ' s message were conveyed i n concepts a n d sometimes i n w o r d s that were already familiar i n Arabia. I n part, this was what made M u h a m m a d ' s message comprehensible to his first audience. The ideas o f

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m o n o t h e i s m , a Last Judgment, heaven and hell, prophecy and revelations, and the emphasis o n intense, even m i l i t a n t , piety were widespread i n the Near Eastern scripturalist religions i n the sixth century. I n this sense Muhammad's message can be seen as an affirmation and refinement o f certain trends among the scripturalist religions o f the late antique era, perhaps as an effort at their reformation. To adherents o f the pagan cults o f western Arabia, however, i n c l u d i n g M u h a m m a d ' s fellow tribespeople o f Quraysh, his message came as a b l u n t repudiation o f all they stood for. He proclaimed their p o l y t h e i s m as incorrect and p r o f o u n d l y sinful, an affront to the one God's unity, i n itself sufficient t o c o n d e m n t h e m eternally to hellfire. He made i t clear that i n their behavior, they failed i n many ways to meet God's demands for h u m i l i t y , for modesty, for charity for the less fortunate, and especially

for

pious

dedication

to G o d

h i m s e l f t h r o u g h regular

prayer.

M u h a m m a d p o i n t e d o u t that the tribe's pagan ancestors, even his o w n grandfathers, were similarly destined for p e r d i t i o n — a n idea certain to generate outrage i n a tribal society that h i g h l y revered ancestors. The Quraysh were aghast. M u c h o f M u h a m m a d ' s prophetic career, f r o m the t i m e he began p u b l i c l y preaching i n about 613 u n t i l his death i n 632, was consumed w i t h w a r d i n g off and eventually o v e r c o m i n g the o p p o s i t i o n o f his o w n t r i b e , the Quraysh. H i s early followers i n c l u d e d some close relatives, such as his paternal cousin, A l i i b n A b i Talib (ca. 6 0 0 - 6 1 ) , as w e l l as a few p r o m i n e n t Meccans o f leading clans, such as U t h m a n i b n Affan (ca. 575-656) o f the Umayya clan. H e was also j o i n e d at first by many people o f l o w e r social stature i n Mecca—clients, freed slaves, and individuals o f lesser clans o f Quraysh—perhaps because their weaker family ties made it easier for t h e m to act i n accordance w i t h their conscience. As his f o l l o w i n g grew, however, the o p p o s i t i o n and abuse by the r e m a i n i n g Quraysh h a r d ened; c o n d i t i o n s became so bad for some that M u h a m m a d arranged for a n u m b e r o f t h e m to take refuge w i t h the r u l e r o f A x u m i n perhaps about 615. His situation i n Mecca became critical w i t h the death, i n close succession, o f his w i f e Khadijah and his uncle A b u Talib, i n about 619; almost simultaneously, he had lost his m a i n source o f e m o t i o n a l support and his m a i n protector, because A b u Talib, although he never embraced the Prophet's message, had nonetheless used the solidarity o f the H a s h i m clan to defend M u h a m m a d . As M u h a m m a d ' s situation worsened, he began to l o o k to other t o w n s i n western Arabia for supporters. It was a r o u n d 620 that M u h a m m a d w o n over a few people f r o m Yathrib, an oasis t o w n about 250 miles ( 4 0 0 k m ) n o r t h o f Mecca. For some years the p o p u l a t i o n o f Yathrib, w h i c h i n c l u d e d t w o p r e d o m inantly pagan tribes and a n u m b e r o f Jewish tribes, had been r i v e n by intractable internal strife. C )ver the next t w o j cars m o r e people ot Yathrib agreed u 11 ibserve the Prophet's message, u n t i l finally a large delegation o f people f r o m Yathrib

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9

agreed t o f o l l o w his teachings a n d invited h i m t o c o m e t o Y a t h r i b as arbiter o f their disputes a n d de facto r u l e r o f the t o w n . M u h a m m a d gradually sent his beleaguered followers f r o m Mecca t o safety i n Y a t h r i b . f o l l o w i n g t h e m h i m s e l f and taking u p residence i n 622.Yathrib henceforth came t o be k n o w n as Medina ( f r o m the Arabic madinat al-nobi, " t h e Prophet's c i t y " ) . The Prophet's move (the hijra, e m i g r a t i o n ) t o M e d i n a m a r k e d the b e g i n n i n g o f a n e w chapter i n his life and that o f his followers. They were n o longer a small, oppressed religious g r o u p i n Mecca; they were n o w an a u t o n o m o u s r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y o f Believers that d o m i n a t e d the oasis o f Medina. M u h a m m a d ' s hijra t o M e d i n a i n 622 was thus the b e g i n n i n g o f Islam's l o n g life as a political force, a fact s y m bolized by the selection o f that year t o serve as the first year o f the Islamic era. D u r i n g his roughly ten years i n Medina ( 6 2 2 - 3 2 ) , M u h a m m a d consolidated his control over the town's disparate p o p u l a t i o n , and he extended Medina's power and influence i n Arabia. W h e n M u h a m m a d first arrived, Medina was still full o f smould e r i n g rivalries: between the town's t w o m a i n Arab tribes; between the muhajirun ("emigrants," the Believers w h o h a d emigrated to Medina f r o m Mecca or elsewhere) and the ansor ("helpers," Muhammad's first followers i n Medina, w h o had invited h i m and his Meccan followers to find refuge w i t h them); and between some o f Medina's Jews and the n e w Believers. W h i l e some o f Medina's Jews appear to have supported M u h a m m a d , those w h o challenged M u h a m m a d ' s claim t o prophecy, and i n some cases cooperated w i t h his political enemies (or whose leaders d i d ) , were handled harshly i n a series o f confrontations—exiled w i t h loss o f

R. J. Burtons nineteenthcentury drawing of Medina with the Mosque of the Prophet in the center. The Prophet settled here in 622. and his new house became the first mosque in Islam and later served as his place of burial.

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their lands, enslaved, or executed, depending on the case. Beyond Medina the most determined opponents o f Muhammad's efforts to extend his influence and his message were his erstwhile fellow citizens, the Quraysh o f Mecca. Mecca and Medina became locked i n an intense struggle to w i n over other towns and groups o f nomads, a struggle in w h i c h Mecca, w i t h its established commercial and tribal tics, initially appeared to have the advantage M u h a m m a d , however, launched raids against Meccan caravans, seizing valuable booty and hostages, and, more important, disrupting the commercial lifeblood o f Mecca. After a series o f raids and battles against the Quraysh that seem to have been indecisive i n their results (at Badr in 6 2 4 ; U h u d , 625; and Khandaq, 627), M u h a m m a d negotiated a truce w i t h the Quray sh at Hudaybiya i n 628. I n exchange for some short-term concessions, the truce gave M u h a m m a d and his followers the right to make the pilgrimage to Mecca's shrine, Kaaba, i n the f o l l o w i n g year. The treaty also gave M u h a m m a d a free hand to subdue one o f Mecca's key allies, the oasis o f Khaybar n o r t h o f Medina, whose large Jewish population (some o f them refugees from Medina) was hostile to the Prophet. This done, i t was relatively easy for M u h a m m a d to t u r n o n Mecca itself, w h i c h submitted virtually w i t h o u t bloodshed i n 630. Aware o f h o w dangerous the Quraysh could be i f their o p p o s i t i o n continued, and w i s h i n g to w i n their support, M u h a m m a d was careful to spare their pride. He tied t h e m to his movement by awarding many o f their leaders important commands and positions o f authority. W h i l e M u h a m m a d was engaged i n his struggle against Mecca, he was also slowly w o r k i n g to b r i n g more and m o r e n o m a d i c groups and towns w i t h i n Medina's orbit, either as loose allies or as full-fledged members o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers. I n d o i n g so, he used the appeal o f his religious message, promises o f material gain, or, o n occasion, o u t r i g h t force to b r i n g recalcitrant groups under Medina's sway. His conquest o f Mecca opened the way for victorious campaigns— w i t h the help o f the Quraysh—against the other m a i n t o w n o f western Arabia, Taif, and against the remaining groups o f powerful nomads i n the region. By this t i m e Muhammad's position as the most powerful political leader in western Arabia had become apparent to all, and tribal groups that had until then tried to h o l d Medina at arm's length n o w sent delegations to tender their submission. By Muhammad's death in 632, his c o m m u n i t y had expanded—more by religious persuasion and political alliance than by force—to include all o f western Arabia, and he had made fruitful contact w i t h some groups i n the n o r t h e r n Hijaz, N e j d , eastern Arabia, O m a n , and Yemen.

Early Expansion of the Community and State U p o n Muhammad's death i n 632, the y o u n g c o m m u n i t y o f Believers faced a set o f difficult challenges. The first and most basic challenge was to resolve the ques-

MUHAMMAD

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t i o n : Were the Believers to f o r m a single p o l i t y under one leader even after M u h a m m a d ' s death, or were they to b e l o n g t o separate c o m m u n i t i e s , each headed by its o w n political leader? I n the end the Believers chose t o r e m a i n a single c o m m u n i t y and selected the Prophet's father-in-law and staunch supporter, A b u Bakr, to be his first successor. A b u Bakr and subsequent successors as leaders o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y are k n o w n i n Islamic tradition as caliphs ( f r o m the Arabic khalifa, m e a n i n g "successor" or "representative"). A b u Bakr and the Believers i n Medina faced a second i m m e d i a t e challenge. A l t h o u g h the t o w n s o f Medina, Mecca, andTaif and the nomadic groups between t h e m were for the most part quite steadfast i n their support o f A b u Bakr, many groups i n Arabia that had once tendered their submission to M u h a m m a d t r i e d to sever their political or religious ties w i t h M e d i n a once the Prophet was dead. Some claimed that they w o u l d remain Believers b u t contended that they d i d n o t owe the tax that the Prophet had collected, w h i c h A b u Bakr c o n t i n u e d t o demand. Other groups gave n o assurances that they w o u l d remain Believers. I n still other cases religious leaders arose c l a i m i n g t o be prophets themselves. Against these threats, A b u Bakr acted quickly and decisively i n w h a t is usually called the Apostasy (or Ridda) wars, d u r i n g w h i c h he sent armed bands o f Believers to the m a i n centers o f o p p o s i t i o n i n Arabia: Yemen, N e j d , andYamama. By maki n g shows o f force first among wavering tribes, these campaigns picked u p allies as they proceeded, and grew large e n o u g h to defeat the m o r e serious opponents, such as the "false p r o p h e t " Musaylima o f Yamama. These campaigns were f o l lowed by incursions i n t o O m a n and n o r t h w a r d t o w a r d the Arabian fringes o f Syria and Mesopotamia (what is n o w Iraq). I n 634, at the end o f t w o years o f camp a i g n i n g , A b u Bakr and the Believers o f Medina had b r o u g h t the entire Arabian peninsula under their c o n t r o l , opening the way t o further conquests that w o u l d , w i t h i n a few m o r e decades, make the Believers the masters o f a vast empire. This was possible partly because the almost ceaseless m i l i t a r y activity o f the Ridda wars p r o v i d e d the setting i n w h i c h the loosely organized war parties f o r m e d at the b e g i n n i n g o f the Ridda wars began t o assume the character o f a standing army, w i t h a core o f devoted supporters ( m a i n l y t o w n s m e n o f M e d i n a , Mecca, andTaif) leading a larger mass o f allies d r a w n f r o m a w i d e variety o f Arabian tribes. It also represented the d o m i n a t i o n o f the pastoral and mountaineer populations o f Arabia by the e m b r y o n i c n e w state i n Medina, w h i c h was headed by an elite g r o u p c o m posed almost exclusively o f settled t o w n s m e n . The Ridda wars b r o u g h t the Believers to the very doorsteps o f the Byzantine and Sasanian empires, but they also d i d m o r e . The emergence i n Arabia o f a state where n o n e h a d been before, one that c o u l d harness the m i l i t a r y potential o f the Arabian p o p u l a t i o n , made i t possible for the Believers to organize campaigns o f conquest that penetrated the great empires a n d wrested vast territories f r o m

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t h e m . The great wave o f early conquests was the m a i n w o r k o f the second caliph, U m a r i b n al-Khattab (r. 6 3 4 - 4 4 ) , w h o m A b u Bakr u p o n his deathbed selected to lead the Believers. The conquests were further c o n t i n u e d d u r i n g the first years o f the reign o f the r i i i r d caliph, U t h m a n i b n Affan (r. 6 4 4 - 5 6 ) . The caliphs launched one set o f offensives against the Byzantine-controlled territories o f Palestine and Syria, h o m e to many Arabic-speaking tribes (part o f the p r i m a r y audience to w h i c h the Q u r a n had been addressed). These incursions elicited defensive reactions f r o m the Byzantine authorities i n Syria, against w h o m several battles were f o u g h t . Eventually, the Byzantine emperor Heraclius sent a large army f r o m Anatolia to secure Syria against the threatening Believers, b u t to n o avail; his force was decimated at a battle along theYarmuk valley (east o f the Sea o f Galilee) i n 636. Most o f the countryside and towns o f Syria and Palestine fell to the Believers shortly thereafter; the o n l y exceptions were some coastal t o w n s such as Ascalon and T r i p o l i , w h i c h h e l d o u t for years longer because the Byzantines c o u l d supply t h e m by sea. F r o m Syria the Believers sent campaigns i n t o n o r t h e r n Mesopotamia, A r m e n i a , and against the Byzantine frontier i n southern Anatolia. A n e x p e d i t i o n a r y force f r o m Syria also wrested the r i c h province o f Egypt f r o m the Byzantines, c o n q u e r i n g the c o m m e r c i a l and cultural h u b o f Alexandria i n 642. At the same time as the offensives i n Syria and Palestine, the Believers were faced w i t h i m p e n d i n g clashes w i t h the Sasanian Empire i n w h a t is n o w southern Iraq. The early contacts o f the Believers w i t h the Arabic-speaking pastoral nomads o f this r e g i o n , and their increasing boldness i n penetrating Iraq's interior, had caused the Sasanians to m o b i l i z e their armies to resist t h e m , b u t they fared n o better than the Byzantines. I n a great batde i n 637 at abQadisiyah ( m o d ern Kadisiya) i n southern Iraq, the Sasanians were decisively broken, o p e n i n g the r i c h alluvial lands o f Iraq to occupation by the armies o f the Believers. F r o m southern Iraq the Believers sent campaigns i n t o Khuzestan and Azerbaijan, and others pursued the fleeing Sasanians i n t o the Iranian highlands. Gradually the m a i n t o w n s o f western Iran, and w i t h t i m e areas farther east, fell to the Believers. By the m i d - 6 c o s the Believers r u l i n g f r o m Medina had loose c o n t r o l over a vast area stretching f r o m Yemen to A r m e n i a and f r o m Egypt to eastern Iran. A n d f r o m various staging centers i n this vast area, the Believers were organizing raids i n t o areas yet further afield: f r o m Egypt i n t o Libya, N o r t h Africa, and Sudan; f r o m Syria and n o r t h e r n Mesopotamia i n t o Anatolia; f r o m A r m e n i a i n t o the Caucasus region; f r o m lower Mesopotamia i n t o many unconsolidated districts i n Iran and eastward t o w a r d Afghanistan and the fringes o f Central Asia. A n i m p o r t a n t feature o f the early expansion o f the Believers was its quality as a religious m o v e m e n t , b u t this was colored by the presence o f the state. The caliphs and their followers believed, o f course, i n M u h a m m a d ' s message o f the

M U H A M M A D

AND THE CALIPHATE

I J

need to acknowledge God's oneness and to live righteously i n preparation for the i m m i n e n t Last Day. They saw their m i s s i o n as jihad, o r m i l i t a n t effort to combat evil and to spread M u h a m m a d ' s message o f m o n o t h e i s m and righteousness far and w i d e . But their goal seems to have been to b r i n g the populations they encountered i n t o submission to the righteous order they represented, n o t to make t h e m change their r e l i g i o n — n o t , at least, i f they were already m o n o t h e ists, such as Christians and Jews. For this reason the early Believers collected t r i b ute f r o m conquered populations but generally let t h e m w o r s h i p as they always had; o n l y pagans and at times Zoroastrians appear to have been coerced i n t o embracing Islam o r had their places o f w o r s h i p sacked. The astonishing extent a n d r a p i d i t y o f this process o f expansion a n d c o n quest can o n l y be u n d e r s t o o d i f the nature o f the expansion i t represented is recognized. It was, first a n d f o r e m o s t , the expansion o f a n e w state based i n M e d i n a . The r u l i n g elite of this state were m o s t l y settled t o w n s m e n o f Mecca, M e d i n a , and Taif, w h o c o m m a n d e d g r o w i n g armies c o m p o s e d m a i n l y o f pastoral n o m a d s f r o m n o r t h e r n and central Arabia o r m o u n t a i n e e r s f r o m Yemen. It was n o t an expansion o f n o m a d i c o r m o u n t a i n e e r i n g peoples as such. The state-sponsored q u a l i t y o f the expansion is reflected i n a significant measure o f centralized d i r e c t i o n o f the expansion m o v e m e n t by the caliphs a n d their circle, w h o appear to have c o o r d i n a t e d strategy between various fronts, as w e l l as i n certain bureaucratic i n s t i t u t i o n s that were established d u r i n g the early conquests. The i n s t i t u t i o n s i n c l u d e d the c r e a t i o n o f a regular p a y r o l l (diwan) for the soldiers, as w e l l as the g a t h e r i n g o f the e x p e d i t i o n a r y forces i n distant areas i n t o t i g h t l y clustered g a r r i s o n settlements that became the nucleus o f n e w cities: Kufa and Basra i n s o u t h e r n M e s o p o t a m i a , Fustat i n Egypt, and s o m e w h a t later, M a r v i n northeastern Iran (651)

a n d Qayrawan i n Tunisia

( 6 7 0 ) . These garrisons h e l p e d the Believers live apart f r o m the vast conquered p o p u l a t i o n s they r u l e d , and so to avoid assimilation; later, as cities, these garrisons w o u l d be a m o n g the m o s t i m p o r t a n t centers i n w h i c h early Islamic c u l ture was elaborated. The consequences o f the conquests were m o m e n t o u s . They established a large new empire i n the Near East, destroying the Sasanian Empire completely and occup y i n g i m p o r t a n t parts o f the Byzantine Empire. Moreover, the leadership o f this new empire was c o m m i t t e d to a n e w religious ideology. N e w economic structures were created w i t h the demise o f the o l d r u l i n g classes and the rise o f a new one, consisting at first largely of people o f Arabian o r i g i n . Property and wealth—as w e l l as political p o w e r — w e r e redistributed o n a grand scale. Most i m p o r t a n t , the newly emergent state provided the political framework w i t h i n w h i c h the religious ideas o f the r u l i n g Believers, w h o were but a small part o f the p o p u l a t i o n , could gradually spread a m o n g the conquered peoples. The many captives taken d u r i n g

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the conqtiests came to be integrated i n t o the tribes and families o f their captors as clients (mmvali), a fact that facilitated this transformation.

The Early Caliphate and the Question of Legitimacy It was w i d e l y accepted i n the early c o m m u n i t y o f Believers that M u h a m m a d could have n o successor i n his role as Prophet. But the early Believers decided that someone should succeed M u h a m m a d as t e m p o r a l head o f the c o m m u n i t y . The first d o c u m e n t a r y references call the leader o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers n o t caliph but amir al-mu minin ( " c o m m a n d e r o f the Believers"), and this may be the

Interior of the Great Mosque at Qayrawan in Tunisia. Founded in the late seventh century, the mosque owes much of its present aspect to extensive rebuilding by the Aghlabid governors in the ninth century

M U H A M M A D

AND THE

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IC

o r i g i n a l t e r m for the heads o f the c o m m u n i t y , replaced only some t i m e later by the t e r m caliph, w h i c h was seen as synonymous but had the advantage o f being f o u n d i n the Quran. Whatever i t was called, c o m m u n i t y leadership was at first i n f o r m a l a n d personal, m u c h like t r i b a l leadership. O n l y gradually d i d the caliphate acquire greater prestige and formality, as the o r i g i n a l Islamic state grew i n t o a far-flung e m p i r e d u r i n g the early conquest era. A l t h o u g h the first t w o caliphs, A b u Bakr and Umar, appear to have enjoyed widespread support among the Believers, dissension arose under the t h i r d caliph, U t h n i a n . The reasons for this discontent probably included practical concerns, such as a tapering o f f i n the ready supply o f conquest b o o t y for i n d i v i d u a l soldiers, o r feelings that newly conquered lands outside the garrison t o w n s were not being made available for settlement by the soldiers and were instead being d o m i n a t e d by wealthy families. But they also seem to have involved perceptions that U t h m a n was n o t r u l i n g w i t h the fairness and disdain for private gain that most p i o u s Believers expected o f t h e i r c o m m a n d e r . U t h m a n was accused ( w h e t h e r rightly, i t may never be k n o w n ) o f favoring his relatives w h e n m a k i n g i m p o r t a n t and sometimes lucrative appointments, o f d i v e r t i n g monies f r o m the treasury, and o f other transgressions, some fiscal, some m o r a l . This dissension grew i n t o a violent u p r i s i n g , w h i c h culminated i n the m u r d e r o f the caliph i n 656. These developments began the complicated series o f events k n o w n as the First C i v i l War ( 6 5 6 - 6 1 ) , w h i c h was a struggle for leadership o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers waged by the p r o m i n e n t heads o f several families w i t h i n the Prophet's tribe, the Quraysh. This is a chapter o f the u t m o s t i m p o r t a n c e i n Islamic history, because this is w h e n the m a i n subgroups o r sects that have con¬ stituted the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y u p to the present day first emerged. After Uthman's m u r d e r the people o f M e d i n a , i n c l u d i n g some o f the c o n spirators, recognized as the next caliph Ah' i b n A b i T a l i b — c o u s i n and son-in-law o f the Prophet, therefore a m e m b e r o f his clan, the H a s h i m . Ali's acclamation as caliph was opposed by significant segments o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers, h o w e v e r — i n particular by U t h m a n ' s k i n s m e n o f the U m a y y a d clan, led by M u a w i y a h , and by leading members o f some other Quraysh families, i n c l u d i n g the Prophets favorite w i f e , Aishah, and t w o o f M u h a m m a d ' s early supporters, Talha i b n Ubaydallah and al-Zubayr i b n a l - A w w a m . The b i d for power by Talha, al-Zubayr, and Aishah was t h w a r t e d w h e n their forces were decisively defeated at the "batde o f the camel" near Basra i n southern Iraq by the supporters o f Ali (shial Ali, Arabic for "party o f A l i . " often referred to simply as the Shia o r Shiites). A l i and his backers established their base i n the garrison t o w n o f Kufa. They eventually felt strong enough to march n o r t h w a r d along the Euphrates River, i n t e n d i n g to take the war to Muawiyah's base i n Syria. Armies o f the t w o sides met at Siffin along the m i d d l e Euphrates, near the frontier o f Syria

16

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and Iraq, but many o n b o t h sides were uneasy about launching an attack against m e n w h o also considered themselves Believers, and w h o u n t i l recently had been their o w n comrades-at-arms. Skirmishing gave way, after many days, to a battle that was broken o f f w h e n A l i and M u a w i y a h agreed that the matter should be setUed by arbitration rather than fighting and w i t h d r e w to Kufa and Syria, respectively, to await the arbiters' decision. Eventually neither side was satisfied w i t h the arbitration results, and a p e r i o d o f desultory raiding between Syria and Iraq ensued. D u r i n g the p e r i o d o f arbitration and thereafter, Ali's situation was weakened by the w i t h d r a w a l f r o m his camp o f some militant pietists, w h o came to be k n o w n as Kharijites ( f r o m the Arabic khawarij, possibly meaning "seceders"). Some o f t h e m may have broken w i t h A l i because they feared that i f he reached an a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h M u a w i y a h , they w o u l d be called to account for their participation i n the m u t i n y against U t h m a n . Others may have fell that Ali's agreement to arbitrate revealed an i m p i o u s lack o f trust i n God's ability to render a just verdict between the t w o rivals o n the battlefield. As they said i n their battle cry, " O n l y G o d has the r i g h t to decide." A h was forced to massacre many Kharijites i n a batde at Nahrawan i n eastern Iraq, an event that shocked many and d i d little to advance his cause, because many Kharijites were r e n o w n e d for their piety. The First C i v i l War finally came to an end i n 661, w h e n a Kharijite assassin killed A l i (another was t h w a r t e d before he c o u l d assassinate M u a w i y a h ) . Shortly thereafter, the m a j o r i t y o f Believers agreed to recognize M u a w i y a h as caliph, perhaps less because they t h o u g h t h i m the ideal r u l e r than because, after five years o f t u r m o i l , they yearned for stability and u n i t y a m o n g the Believers. Muawiyah's r e c o g n i t i o n as caliph marks the b e g i n n i n g o f the Umayyad caliphate (661—750). D u r i n g his t w o decades as caliph, M u a w i y a h relied o n careful d i p l o m a c y and strong governors, especially i n Iraq and the east, to m a i n t a i n an uneasy peace i n the c o m m u n i t y . He kept discontented Shiite supporters o f Ali's family under cont r o l , and either subdued small uprisings o f rebellious Kharijites or forced t h e m to take refuge i n frontier zones, beyond the effective reach o f the caliph's agents. The relative stability o f his reign enabled the M u s l i m armies once again t o embark o n raids and campaigns o f conquest against n e i g h b o r i n g areas. But the issues that were at the heart o f the First C i v i l W a r — h o w leaders o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers were to be selected, and above all w h a t were the criteria for leadership—remained unresolved. It is hardly surprising that a n e w wave o f internal t u r m o i l , the Second C i v i l War (680—92), broke out u p o n Muawiyah's death. The Second C i v i l War was a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the first, because the same groups were involved, at the remove o f one generation. The Umayyads, whose h o l d o n the caliphate f r o m their capital i n Damascus was being challenged, were represented first by Muawiyah's sonYazid (r. 6 8 0 - 8 3 ) ,

a

n

d t h e n , afterYazid's early

death and a p e r i o d o f confusion w i t h i n the Umayyad family, by another relative,

MUHAMMAD

A N D THE CALIPHATE

I7

the caliph A b d al-Malik i b n M a r w a n (r. 685-705-). The Umayyads faced w i d e spread o p p o s i t i o n . F r o m Ali's o l d s t r o n g h o l d i n Kufa, the Shiites, w h o claimed that the caliphate s h o u l d belong to someone o f Ali's family, rallied first a r o u n d Ali's younger son, al-Husayn. After al-Husayn and his family were massacred i n 680 by U m a y y a d t r o o p s at Karbala i n I r a q , the Shiites c o n t i n u e d to resist Umayyad r u l e i n Kufa under the leadership o f a charismatic leader n a m e d alMukhtar, w h o claimed to be acting i n the name o f one o f Ali's sons. A b d Allah i b n al-Zubayr ( 6 2 4 - 9 2 ) , son o f that al-Zubayr whose b i d for the caliphate had been so quickly ended i n the First Civil War, established himself i n Mecca and was recognized by many i n the empire as caliph. His determination and broad support made his resistance to the Umayyads as formidable as his father's had been ephemeral. Meanwhile, several groups o f Kharijites took advantage o f die political disarray prevailing i n the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers to establish themselves i n various parts o f Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. I n the end, after a dozen years o f bitter strife, A b d al-Malik and his ruthless lieutenant, al-Hajjaj ibnYtisuf, were able to pacify first Iraq, then Arabia, and to b r i n g die w h o l e empire under Umayyad control. The road the Umayyads had f o l l o w e d to victory, however, was littered w i t h

The golden dome of the shrine at Karbala in Iraq marks the burial site of the Prophet's grandson Husayn

m a n g l e d dreams, m e m o r i e s o f w h i c h w o u l d haunt the dynasty's future and c o n -

and his family, who were

tribute to its downfall. Yazid's generals, i n the first unsuccessful efforts to subdue

murdered by the Umayyads

A b d Allah i b n al-Zubayr i n Mecca, had ruthlessly crushed an u p r i s i n g i n Medina w h i l e en route, and had even laid siege to the sacred precincts i n Mecca, i n the

in 680. This act of martyrdom marks the beginning of the separation of Shiites as a

process starting a fire that destroyed part o f the Kaaba. The Shiites had seen their

political party and distinct

hopes dashed, b u t the pitiless slaughter o f Ali's son al-Husayn and his family at

subgroup within the Islamic

Karbala p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h an act o f m a r t y r d o m o f m y t h i c a l p r o p o r t i o n s .

community.

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N u r t u r i n g the m e m o r y o f this m a r t y d o m deepened their hatred o f the Umayyads and started a process whereby the Shiites began to feel themselves to be n o t merely a political party but a distinct subgroup w i t h i n the Islamic c o m m u n i t y . I n the course o f w o r k i n g out the differences w i t h i n their o w n house, the Umayyads had even managed to set some Syrian tribes against others i n a way that w o u l d later u n d e r m i n e their efforts to b u i l d a cohesive army o n these tribal groups. The i m p o r t a n c e o f the t w o civil wars goes far b e y o n d their i m m e d i a t e p o l i t ical impact, however. These c i v i l wars represented the arena i n w h i c h Believers first openly debated the ways i n w h i c h a u t h o r i t y to lead the Islamic c o m m u n i t y could be legitimately claimed. Kharijites h e l d that true piety and impeccably righteous behavior were the only qualities that p r o v i d e d true l e g i t i m a t i o n i n an Islamic context. Others, notably the Alids and their Shiite supporters, w h o contended that o n l y a m e m b e r o f Ali's family or o f the Prophet's clan o f H a s h i m should h o l d power, argued that legitimacy was essentially genealogical. Still o t h ers—such as the Umayyads-—claimed that the consensus o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers (jarruia, or c o m i n g together) was the most i m p o r t a n t element i n establishing a legitimate c l a i m to head the Islamic c o m m u n i t y . Later, some ( i n c l u d i n g the Umayyads)

w o u l d argue that their very ascent to p o w e r was

an

expression o f God's w i l l and therefore legitimate i n its o w n r i g h t . These claims and counterclaims w o u l d be raised repeatedly i n the centuries ahead. It is therefore d u r i n g the c i v i l wars that the m a i n sectarian subdivisions o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y first emerged: the Shiites, the Kharijites, and (retrospectively, t h r o u g h an ephemeral g r o u p k n o w n as the M u r j i a ) the Sunni or o r t h o d o x m a j o r i t y sect o f Islam, w h i c h came to be defined as m u c h as anything by their rejection o f the central beliefs o f the Shiites and Kharijites. A l l members o f these subgroups w i t h i n the Islamic c o m m u n i t y justify their particular identity o n the basis o f their differing readings o f the events o f the c i v i l wars, particularly the first war. The c i v i l wars are thus the lens t h r o u g h w h i c h radiates the spectrum o f groups m a k i n g u p the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . The ideal o f a politically u n i f i e d c o m m u n i t y o f Believers (ummafi) headed by a caliph eventually became unrealizable i n practice, as the empire came to span thousands o f kilometers and the c o m m u n i t y to embrace m i l l i o n s o f people. Nonetheless,

the i n s t i t u t i o n o f the

caliphate (and indeed, the caliph h i m s e l f ) played an i m p o r t a n t role because i t stood as a symbolic e m b o d i m e n t o f M u s l i m religious unity. For this reason the i n s t i t u t i o n was retained l o n g after it had ceased to have real political meaning.

Apogee of the Caliphal Empire (700-950 C.E.) The age o f the first conquests and the civil wars ( r o u g h l y 6 3 0 - 7 0 0 C.E.) had seen the establishment o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers as a loosely organized political

M U H A M M A D

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ig

entity headed by the first caliphs. The early c o m m u n i t y and state had been united ( w h e n they were u n i t e d ) n o t so m u c h by institutional structures, most o f w h i c h were still e m b r y o n i c , but m a i n l y by i d e o l o g y — t h a t is, by the Believers' convict i o n that they were engaged i n a c o m m o n effort to establish, i n God's name, a n e w and righteous regime o n earth. The d e p t h o f this c o n v i c t i o n underlay the intensity w i t h w h i c h the Believers had disagreed over the legitimacy o f various rivals for the caliphate d u r i n g the c i v i l wars; but their c o m m i t m e n t to a c o m m o n cause also enabled the Believers to come together once again as a single political u n i t after the wars. By the end o f the second war i n 692, the Believers had embraced more clearly than before their identity as Muslims—that is, as a monotheist confession f o l l o w i n g the teachings o f M u h a m m a d and the Q u r a n , and for this reason distinct f r o m other monotheists such as Jews o r Christians. D u r i n g the t w o and a half centuries that followed the second w a r (ca. 700-ca. 950 C . E . ) , the rudimentary institutional structures o f the early c o m m u n i t y o f Believers fully matured, providing the caliphs w i t h the irhlitary and administrative machinery needed to contain the divisions that have reverberated d o w n through the subsequent history o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y since the civil wars. The p e r i o d o f 700 to 950, then, represented the apogee o f the caliphal empires—an age o f political and c o m m u n a l expansion, great institutional and cultural development, and economic g r o w t h . The Umayyad dynasty was overt h r o w n i n 750 C . E . by a military uprising organized by the Abbasid family, descen-

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dants o f the Prophet Muhammad's uncle al-Abbas i b n A b d al-Muttalib (ca. c66-ca. 653), resulting i n a shift o f the i m p e r i a l capital eastward f r o m Damascus, i n Syria, to Iraq, where the early Abbasids founded a new capital, Baghdad. But several keyaspects o f the evolution o f the caliphate and the empire continued under b o t h the late Umayyad and the early Abbasid caliphs, and for this reason, despite the change o f r u l i n g dynasty, i t is fair to v i e w the p e r i o d o f 700 to 950 as a single phase i n the history o f the caliphate and o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y . The most basic fact about this p e r i o d is that the caliphal empire and the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y continued to expand. The early conquests had g r o u n d to a halt d u r i n g the Second C i v i l War, as the Umayyads and their rivals devoted m i l itary resources to fighting each other. After the war, however, the Umayyads i n a u gurated a second phase o f i m p e r i a l expansion (the first h a l f o f the e i g h t h century). Some o f the conquests sponsored by the later Umayyads were m o t i vated by a desire to extend Islamic rule. For example, expansion seems to have been the objective o f the great ( i f unsuccessful) campaigns by land and sea against Constantinople, the capital o f the Byzantine Empire (669, 6 7 4 - 8 0 , and 716—17), as w e l l as the annual s u m m e r raids i n t o Byzantine border territories (a The mighty land walls of

p o l i c y c o n t i n u e d under the Abbasids u n t i l the m i d d l e o f the n i n t h c e n t u r y ) . The

Constantinople, built in the

caliphs also doubtless h o p e d to a f f i r m their legitimacy a m o n g M u s l i m s by spon-

centuries preceding the rev-

soring such campaigns o f j i h a d against n o n - M u s l i m states. The incentive for

elation of Islam, protected the city against repeated invasions, including the unsuccessful Arab campaigns

launching other campaigns, however, seems to have been the desire to benefit f r o m the seizure o f booty, particularly captives w h o c o u l d be e m p l o y e d or sold as slaves; this may have been the case w i t h many raids i n N o r t h Africa organized

in the seventh and eighth

by the later Umayyads. The throngs o f recruits w h o participated i n these cam-

centuries.

paigns were, o f course, responding to a w i d e range o f m o t i v a t i o n s — f r o m zeal

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to spread the faith or the hope o f attaining m a r t y r d o m o n the battlefield (and hence eternal salvation), to lust for b o o t y or hope o f f i n d i n g new lands to settle, to a simple thirst for adventure. W i t h o u t the organizing activity o f the caliphs and their governors, however, most o f these campaigns w o u l d not have occurred. Whatever the motivations, the scope o f the second phase o f conquests was astonishing. I n N o r t h Africa the M u s l i m s , w h o d u r i n g the c i v i l wars had stayed close to their strong points, such as the garrison t o w n o f Qayrawan, finally dislodged the last Byzantine outposts, such as Carthage, and pushed all the way to the Atlantic coast o f Morocco. The local Berber p o p u l a t i o n began to embrace Islam, and some were d r a w n i n t o the expansion process. I n 711 general Tariq i b n Ziyad led an a r m y consisting largely o f Berbers across the Straits o f Gibraltar (named after h i m ) i n t o Spain. Other troops, Berber and Arab, p o u r e d i n and w i t h i n a few b r i e f years seized the southern and eastern t w o - t h i r d s o f the Iberian peninsula f r o m the faltering Visigothic k i n g d o m , w h i c h vanished, leaving small, i m p o v e r i s h e d Christian k i n d g o m s o n l y i n the n o r t h e r n mountains. F r o m Spain the M u s l i m s sent raids across the Pyrenees i n t o the Languedoc and adjacent regions o f France, reaching the h i g h water mark o f their expansion i n the west somewhere near the Loire r e g i o n , w h e r e i n 732 they were defeated by the Frankish ruler Charles Martel. A l t h o u g h the M u s l i m s held several cities i n southern France for a f e w decades, ultimately their conquests there were ephemeral; by the late e i g h t h century they seldom ventured n o r t h o f the Pyrenees. D u r i n g the n i n t h century theAbbasids' governors o f Tunisia, the Aghlabids, raided Sicily (starting i n 827), southern Italy, and the French and Italian Rivieras, and established over m u c h o f Sicily a M u s l i m political presence that endured u n t i l the arrival o f the N o r m a n s i n the mid-eleventh century. In the east, U m a y y a d governors launched renewed campaigns f r o m their garrisons i n Khurasan ( i n northeast I r a n ) , particularly M a r v and Balkh, i n t o the regions beyond the Oxus River o n the fringes o f Central Asia. Between 70c and 713, Bukhara i n Transoxiana, the region o f Fergana and its capital, Shash ( m o d ern-day Tashkent), the r i c h district o f K h w a r i z m ( m o d e r n - d a y K h o r e z m ) south o f the Aral Sea—all located i n w h a t is n o w k n o w n as Uzbekistan—and m u c h o f Sogdiana, i n c l u d i n g its capital at Samarqand, were b r o u g h t i n t o the Umayyad Empire. Despite numerous rebellions and efforts by local groups to o v e r t h r o w M u s l i m r u l e d u r i n g the early n i n t h century, these areas remained forever after part o f the Islamic w o r l d . M e a n w h i l e , between 711

and 713, the caliphate was

establishing its first permanent f o o t h o l d i n Sind ( p a r t o f the Indus River valley); the teenage c o m m a n d e r o f M u s l i m troops, M u h a m m a d i b n al-Qasim, marched t h r o u g h southern Iran to conquer and establish an initial base at D a i b u l , the m a i n city i n the Indus delta. F r o m i t he conquered other major cities i n the region n o w k n o w n as Pakistan, i n c l u d i n g the religious center at M u l t a n and the p o l i t i c a l cap-

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ital o f Sind, Brahmanabad (where the city o f Mansura w o u l d later be built u n d e r the Abbasids). These first M u s l i m colonies i n Sind lived o n , but little about t h e m is d o c u m e n t e d , and they were doubtless almost c o m p l e t e l y

autonomous.

Nevertheless, recent archaeological evidence suggests that they m a i n t a i n e d ties o f trade, at least w i t h other parts o f the Islamic w o r l d such as Iran and Syria. D u r i n g the expansion o f the caliphal empire, the Islamic c o m m u n i t y itself spread beyond the empire. Whereas the spread o f the empire was carried out m a i n l y by armies, the spread o f the Islamic faith beyond the caliphate's borders was usually the w o r k o f merchants and pious preachers. Kharijite merchants f r o m N o r t h Africa, for example, appear to have been the first t o b r i n g Islam to the populations o f subSaharan West Africa. The m a i n spreading o f die Islamic community, however, took place w i t h i n the caliphal empire itself. In many parts o f the empire, even i n those conquered early o n , such as Egypt or Iran, the population remained predominantly n o n - M u s l i m for centuries. W i t h time, m o r e o f these conquered peoples embraced Islam; estimates suggest that i n the Near Eastern provinces Muslims became the majority only after about 800 C.H. I n other words, d u r i n g the golden age o f the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates Muslims were still a m i n o r i t y i n the lands diey ruled. The empire's conquered populations were gradually w o n over to Islam for various reasons. Forced conversions were rare, but i n some cases the i m p o s i t i o n o f higher taxes o n n o n - M u s l i m s may have created an economic incentive for embracing Islam. For the most part, however, the gradual Islamization o f the empire's p o p ulations was part o f a complex transformation o f the w h o l e social environment, involving many factors that i m p i n g e d simultaneously o n the individual and the family; economic and political advantage, social mobility, linguistic and cultural affinities, marriage and kinship requirements, and, above all, the intrinsic appeal o f Islam as a belief system. A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t feature o f this p e r i o d was c o n t i n u i n g r i v a l r y f o r the caliphate itself, that is, for supreme p o l i t i c a l power i n the empire. O n the p r a g matic side there were g r u m b l i n g s or actual uprisings directed against established caliphs, and various measures (such as t r a n s f o r m i n g the a r m y ) were taken by the caliphs themselves to safeguard their power. But the ideological struggle over the m e a n i n g o f the caliphate and the legitimacy o f various contenders' claims to i t also c o n t i n u e d unabated i n this p e r i o d . A l t h o u g h the U m a y y a d caliph A b d alMalik and his successors were able to b u i l d a fairly f i r m support base f o r t h e m selves after the Second Civil War, they nonetheless faced widespread o p p o s i t i o n . The l o n g - s t a n d i n g o p p o s i t i o n o f the Shiites and Kharijites c o n t i n u e d . The Umayyads used garrison troops to c o n t r o l numerous small Kharijite insurrections as w e l l as m o r e serious uprisings such as that m o u n t e d by the A l i d leader Zayd i b n A l i i n Kufa i n 740. But the Umayyads were also opposed by many n e w converts to Islam, most o f t h e m mawali, o r clients, o f Arab tribes, w h o felt that

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their conversion s h o u l d have e n t i t l e d t h e m t o equal treatment w i t h other M u s l i m s , particularly the lower rate o f taxes that Arab M u s l i m s enjoyed. A n u m ber o f pious M u s l i m s backed the n e w converts i n this c l a i m , however, or felt that the Umayyads had discredited themselves i n some other w a y by their earlier actions. Such concerns may have u n d e r l a i n the obscure qadaiiyya m o v e m e n t ( o n the surface, a debate over the degree to w h i c h God's o m n i p o t e n c e l i m i t e d h u m a n independence and responsibility) that plagued the last decades o f U m a y y a d rule. O n a m o r e m u n d a n e level, the later Umayyads faced a crisis as agricultural lands were abandoned i n the t w o richest provinces o f the e m p i r e , Egypt and Iraq. The f u l l reasons f o r this p h e n o m e n o n are n o t k n o w n — i t was probably linked i n part to the conversion to Islam o f the indigenous peasantry—but whatever the causes, this abandonment disrupted the flow o f taxes and i n some cases was reversed o n l y t h r o u g h draconian measures that f u r t h e r enhanced the Umayyads' reputat i o n f o r harsh and unjust rule. The Umayyads were n o t b l i n d to their opponents' varied claims, and they made serious efforts t o establish themselves as legitimate heads o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y and rulers o f the state. They encouraged scholars to gather and c o m p i l e reports about the o r i g i n s o f Islam (the Prophet's life and career, the history o f the earlyc o m m u n i t y , and so o n ) . I n this way, the Umayyads played a central role i n establishing a M u s l i m identity, because the o r i g i n story a f f i r m e d that the Islamic c o m -

The Dome of the Rock in Terusalem is the third holiest site in Islam. Built over the remains of Solomon's temple, the structure is thought by many Muslims to mark the spot from which Muhammad began his night journey to heaven.

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m u n i t y they led was the direct descendant o f Muhammad's o w n , and diat i t f o l l o w e d his teachings and those o f the Q u r a n — p r o p o s i t i o n s to w h i c h Muslims still adhere. The Umayyads also asserted their legitimacy by continuing the ancient trad i t i o n o f royal patronage for sumptuous religious buildings, notably the D o m e o f Rock i n Jerusalem and the Umayyad mosque i n Damascus—two o f the first o u t standing examples o f Islamic architecture. The Umayyads' support for campaigns o f expansion and conquest also helped bolster their claim to b e i n g legitimate rulers o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y . Despite these efforts, however, o p p o s i t i o n to the Umayyads intensified d u r i n g the second quarter o f the e i g h t h century. At the same t i m e divisions w i t h i n their Syrian-based a r m y — t h e product o f clashes d u r i n g the Second Civil War and r i v a l r y over royal patronage—made the army an increasingly unreliable support for the U m a y y a d regime. Yet i t was just at this t i m e that ceaseless campaigning o n the Byzantine frontiers and stubborn internal o p p o s i t i o n made firm support indispensable. The Alids and their Shiite supporters proved especially t r o u b l e some to the Umayyads, f o m e n t i n g numerous uprisings i n the last decades o f Umayyad r u l e . Eventually, i t was another branch o f M u h a m m a d ' s f a m i l y (the Abbasids), however, that f i n a l l y o v e r t h r e w the Umayyads and o c c u p i e d the caliphate i n 750. U n l i k e the Alids and their Shiite partisans, the Abbasids had patiendy organized an u n d e r g r o u n d o p p o s i t i o n movement and b u i l t u p a secure p o w e r base before r i s i n g i n open revolt. Moreover, w h e n they organized their rebelhon against the Umayyads f r o m the province o f Khurasan i n northeastern

Courtyard of the Great Mosque in Damascus, founded in the early eighth century. The walls were once entirely covered with glittering mosaics, largely covered with whitewash in this photograph taken in the early

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Iran, the Abbasids carefully kept secret their o w n identity as claimants to the caliphate, rallying supporters instead i n the name o f "the family o f M u h a m m a d . " This vague appeal enabled t h e m b o t h to avoid detection by the Umayyads and to w i n the backing o f many a m o n g the Shiites ( w h o naturally assumed that the movement was i n favor o f an A l i d ) and o f m a n y other d i s g r u n t l e d groups w h o yearned for m o r e righteous leadership than they thought the Umayyads had p r o vided. O n l y after decisively defeating U m a y y a d armies i n several battles i n Iran and Iraq, and k i l l i n g the caliph and many U m a y y a d princes, d i d the Abbasid leader A b u 1-Abbas al-Saffah c o m e o u t i n the open and receive the oath o f allegiance as caliph. For several t u r b u l e n t years the Abbasid caliphs al-Saffah (r. 7 5 0 - 5 4 ) and A b u Jafar a l - M a n s u r (r. 7 5 4 - 7 5 ) c o n s o l i d a t e d t h e i r p o w e r against r i v a l s w i t h i n the Abbasid family, d i s g r u n t l e d A l i d s , and f o r m e r p o w e r f u l s u p p o r t ers s u c h as the Abbasids' agent A b u M u s l i m , w h o had largely engineered the r e b e l l i o n i n Khurasan. By about 756, however, the Abbasid dynasty's p o w e r was securely established, and the Abbasids w e r e to o c c u p y the caliphate f o r the r e m a i n d e r o f its existence (that is, f r o m 750 u n t i l 1258), a l t h o u g h after about 950 t h e i r real p o w e r was severely c u r t a i l e d by a succession o f secular p o w e r h o l d e r s . The first Abbasids c l a i m e d to be s t a r t i n g the caliphate anew, p u r g i n g i t o f the evils o f t h e i r U m a y y a d predecessors. Shortly after c o m i n g to p o w e r , the second A b b a s i d c a l i p h , al-Mansur, f o u n d e d a n e w i m p e r i a l capital at Baghdad, o n the T i g r i s River i n I r a q , t o s y m b o l i z e this break w i t h the i m p i o u s U m a y y a d past. M a n y Islamic r u l e r s o f later p e r i o d s w o u l d f o l l o w this precedent by f o u n d i n g n e w capitals to s y m b o l i z e the start o f w h a t they c l a i m e d to be a n e w era. Even the Abbasids' overthrow o f the Umayyads d i d not end the struggle over the caliphate, however. The Shiites sdll believed that only an A l i d could legitimately lead the c o m m u n i t y , so they were usually n o more favorably disposed to the Abbasids than they had been to the Umayyads. The complex relationship between these t w o branches o f the Prophet's family, the Abbasids and the Alids, is a central theme o f Abbasid history (and o f many historical texts w r i t t e n i n this and later periods). The reverence that many early M u s l i m s felt for the family o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d , indeed for the entire H a s h i m clan, led some Abbasid caliphs, such as al-Mansur and al-Mahdi (r. 775-85), to favor their A l i d contemporaries by i n c l u d ing t h e m at court, seeking their advice, and otherwise t r y i n g to w i n their support. Other Abbasids, such as H a r u n al-Rashid (r. 7 8 6 - 8 0 9 ) , were suspicious o f the Alids, w h o m they assumed to be conspiring f o r the caliphate. For their part, the Alids were also divided i n dieir attitude toward the Abbasids, w h i c h naturally varied i n some measure w i t h the Abbasids' policies toward t h e m . Some A l i d s — s u c h as the brothers I b r a h i m and M u h a m m a d i b n A b d Allah ( d . 762-763) and al-

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Husayn i b n A h ( d . 786), and their m o r e radical s u p p o r t e r s — c o u l d not let go o f the idea that the)- were m o r e entitled to r u l e than the Abbasid "upstarts," and rose i n rebellion,

p a r t i c u l a r l y i f the

reigning

Abbasid had taken a h a r d l i n e t o w a r d them.

Others,

such

as

Jafar

al-Sadiq

(702/3—76c), were m o r e prudent i n deali n g w i t h the Abbasids and advanced a special A l i d claim to r u l e i n terms o f a strictly r e l i g i o u s leadership. By the late e i g h t h century, i f n o t earlier, some Shiites h a d developed a clearly articulated concept o f the imamate (the office o f the i m a m , or head o f the c o m m u n i t y ) , w h i c h posited The Abbasid capital at Baghdad, founded in 762 as reconstructed on the basis of medieval descriptions. The

that o n l y an A l i d i n a certain l i n e o f descent f r o m the Prophet's c o u s i n and

caliph's palace and mosque stood in the center of a vast

s o n - i n - l a w A l i i b n A b i Talib c o u l d r i g h t -

esplanade surrounded by shops and residences.

f u l l y c l a i m leadership o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . The social upshot o f this was a

gradually hardening sense a m o n g the Alids' Shiite supporters that they f o r m e d a distinct, separate g r o u p w i t h i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , identified w i t h the f o r tunes o f the A l i d imams. This sense o f Shiite separateness f r o m w h a t was b e c o m i n g the Sunni m a j o r i t y i n the Islamic c o m m u n i t y begins to be visible by the b e g i n n i n g o f the n i n t h century at the latest; f r o m that t i m e o n , Shiites and Sunnis often appear as rival social and political factions i n the life o f Baghdad and many other places i n the Islamic w o r l d , independent o f the existence i n a particular historical m o m e n t o f an A l i d claimant to power. F o l l o w i n g the abortive rebellion o f al-Husayn i b n A l i i n the Hejaz i n 786, some Alids and their supporters seem to have decided that the Abbasids were too p o w e r f u l near the empire's centers o f p o w e r to be challenged there, and they established small, independent states i n inaccessible regions, such as the w i l d m o u n t a i n c o u n t r y south o f the Caspian Sea, i n Yemen, or in the far western reaches o f N o r t h Africa. F r o m these n e w bases, and f r o m u n d e r g r o u n d movements secretly organized i n the heart o f the e m p i r e , the Shiites eventually m o u n t e d m o r e effective challenges to Abbasid rule. This struggle for the position o f caliph also raged w i t h i n the r u l i n g dynasty (whether Umayyad or Abbasid), because there was n o clear tradition or rule o f succession. Many caliphs f o u n d themselves confronted by insurrections m o u n t e d by, or i n the name of, their o w n brothers, uncles, or other close relatives. Powerful

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factions i n the army, bureaucracy, caliphal court, and caliphal family (the different mothers o f t w o rival half-brothers, for example) lent their support to the claimant w h o m they t h o u g h t w o u l d best serve their o w n interests. Some caliphs, r e m e m bering their o w n close call at accession, hoped t o spare their offspring the same tribulations and drew u p detailed wills laying out the exact order o f succession o f several sons. Such arrangements seldom worked o u t as intended, however. A major example o f this was the bitter civil w a r that broke out f o l l o w i n g the death o f the Abbasid caliph H a r u n al-Rashid i n 809. Despite the fact that al-Rashid had made strenuous efforts to regulate the succession, al-Rashid's son M u h a m m a d a l - A m i n (r. 809-813) was o v e r t h r o w n by his brother a l - M a m u n (r. 813-33), w h o had been governor o f Khurasan. U n d e r l y i n g the dispute was a long-lasting tension between Baghdad and Khurasan, w i t h pro-Baghdad and pro-Khurasan factions i n the army, the court, and the landed aristocracy backing either a l - A m i n or a l - M a m u n . A l - M a m u n ' s attempt to govern the empire f r o m Marv, his capital i n Khurasan, aroused great discontent, and i n 819 he moved his court to Baghdad. By then, however, the civil war's disruptive events had done m u c h to u n d e r m i n e the Abbasids' legitimacy. These included not o n l y the l o n g siege o f Baghdad and its inhabitants and the execution o f a l - A m i n but also al-Mamun's effort to w i n Shiite support by backing, for a t i m e , an A l i d as his heir-apparent—only to d r o p h i m f r o m succession later, w h e n the idea proved a political embarrassment. This episode exacerbated tensions between Sunni backers o f the Abbasids and the Shiites, b o t h o f w h o m felt victimized i n ways that caused people to question Abbasid legitimacy. Abbasid legitimacy was also u n d e r m i n e d by clashes w i t h a religious elite increasingly jealous o f its r i g h t to interpret nascent Islamic law. By the n i n t h cent u r y religious scholars expert i n the Quran and the sayings o f the prophet had come to feel that they—not the caliphs—should be the final arbiters i n matters o f law. The mihna, or i n q u i s i t i o n , instituted by the Abbasid caliphs between 833 and 8 4 8 — w h i c h revolved a r o u n d a theological d o c t r i n e k n o w n as Mutazilism and focused o n the question o f whether the Quran text was created or eternal—was i n part an effort by the caliphs to enforce their claims to legal absolutism. The m a i n result o f this episode, however, was to make heroes out o f A h m a d i b n Hanbal (780-855) and other religious scholars i n Baghdad w h o had led the opposition.

Development of the Caliphal Army and Administration This p e r i o d ( 7 0 0 - 9 5 0 ) was also marked by i m p o r t a n t developments i n key i n s t i tutions o f the caliphate and the M u s l i m empire, particularly the army and the i m p e r i a l bureaucracy. The later Umayyads t r i e d to b u i l d a potent n e w army based o n the Arab tribes o f Syria, w h i c h they tied to their interests t h r o u g h

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lavish caliphal patronage. The early Abbasid armies, by contrast, relied especially o n soldiers f r o m Khurasan (often settlers o f Arabian o r i g i n ) w h o m the

first

Abbasids had r i d d e n to power. A l t h o u g h the Arabian and Syrian tribes that c o n stituted the core o f the Umayyad army were n o t completely swept away, i t was the Khurasanians and their descendants—the abnu al-dowla, or "sons o f the revol u t i o n , " n o w mostly settled i n I r a q — w h o d o m i n a t e d the Abbasid m i l i t a r y establishment for almost a century after the Abbasids' accession i n 750. But b o t h the Umayyad and early Abbasid armies were composed m a i n l y o f ordinary m e n w i t h ordinary social ties (that is, to their families, tribes, places o f o r i g i n , and so o n ) . I n many cases, soldiers were only o n d u t y part t i m e or were recruited by the army as auxiliaries as occasion demanded. Despite their loose structure and lack o f professional t r a i n i n g , such armies enabled the Umayyads and Abbasids to extend the empire's borders, quell dissident movements, and launch the annual s u m m e r raids against the Byzantines i n Anatolia. This pattern o f loose army organization was gradually replaced d u r i n g the n i n t h century by a n e w m o d e l b u i l t a r o u n d smaller, h i g h l y trained corps o f f u l l t i m e professional soldiers (ahulams), w h o lived and w o r k e d as tight cadres and w h o often had few permanent ties to the rest o f society (many were n o t even m a r r i e d ) . The change began w h e n the caliph a l - M u t a s i m (r. 833—42) assembled a b o d y g u a r d o f mercenaries—many

b u t not all o f t h e m slaves (mamluks) o f

Turkish o r i g i n , or recently freed slaves. The idea was that such soldiers w o u l d be completely loyal to the ruler w h o had raised i h e m to power, because they had few ties to the families, tribes, or institutions o f the capital and central lands o f the empire. Because these mercenaries were professionally trained, they were m o r e effective i n the field than other recruits, and they came to f o r m an increasingly large segment o f the army. They helped secure a l - M u t a s i m against p o t e n tial rivals and enabled h i m to impose m u c h tighter c o n t r o l over the provinces o f the empire (especially over their taxes). To reduce frictions between the Arabicspeaking p o p u l a t i o n o f Baghdad and the soldiery, w h o often d i d not even speak Arabic, al-Mutasim constructed an e n o r m o u s new capital at Samarra, r o u g h l y sixty-five miles (one h u n d r e d k m ) n o r t h o f Baghdad o n the east bank o f the Tigris. The vast scale o f the new capital offers some i n d i c a t i o n o f the size o f his army, and o f the wealth he was able to collect i n taxes to pay for i t . The g r o w t h o f the professional army c o n t i m i e d under al-Mutasim's successors al-Wathiq (r. 8 4 2 - 4 7 ) and al-Muta\vakkil (r. 847-61). Moreover, governorships o f i m p o r t a n t provinces were increasingly assigned to key commanders i n the n e w army rather than to the caliph's k i n s m e n or other civilian notables, and more traditional units o f the army were sidelined. Eventually, this m i g h t y m i l i t a r y machine got o u t o f h a n d , however, p r o v i n g itself m o r e effective as an agent o f factional politics than as a force o f i m p e r i a l defense. I n 861 army commanders

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conspired to assassinate the caliph a l - M u t a w a k k i l , ushering i n a decade o f chaos d u r i n g w h i c h m i l i t a r y factions fought a m o n g themselves for supremacy and for d w i n d l i n g revenues, m a k i n g and u n m a k i n g f o u r caliphs i n Samarra i n the process. M e a n w h i l e , the empire's affairs outside I r a q were neglected; many provinces were left o n their o w n , and n u m e r o u s rebellions sprang u p , some o f w h i c h seized entire regions and established virtually independent states, w h i l e others threatened to seize Baghdad itself. Under the late Umayyads and Abbasids the i m p e r i a l administration also underwent significant changes, aimed at creating a u n i f i e d bureaucracy under caliphal oversight that c o u l d manage the e m p i r e — a n d particularly its taxes—more effectively. Talented administrators such as A b d a l - H a m i d ibnYahya ( d . 750) and I b n alMuqaffa ( 7 2 0 - 7 5 6 ) oversaw the first efforts to professionalize the bureaucracy, i n c l u d i n g the development o f a new; l u c i d Arabic prose style. The Abbasids' rise to power b r o u g h t an increase i n the prominence o f individuals and families hailing f r o m Iran, especially Khurasan, not only i n the army b u t also i n the caliphal court and i n governmental institutions generally, i n c l u d i n g the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The viziers or heads o f this administration, such as the famed viziers o f the Barmakid family, were h i g h l y educated, and as heads o f a vast bureaucracy, they often held great power i n the Abbasid government. At its height a r o u n d the m i d - n i n t h century the Abbasid a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was composed o f a large n u m b e r o f separate departments (divvans), staffed by thousands o f clerks or secretaries (kuttub) w h o ran this administrative machinery. The administration dealt w i t h assessment and c o l lection o f land taxes f r o m the various provinces, w i t h incomes f r o m state lands and confiscated property and w i t h other kinds o f i n c o m e , as w e l l as w i t h disbursements to the army and to administrators and others o n government salary. It included a treasury that balanced receipts and expenses, an accounting office, an intelligence service, a chancery office to handle official correspondence, and a department for the caliph's special court o f appeal (mcizalim). Eventually, the costs o f r u n n i n g such a vast bureaucracy outstripped revenues, however. Struggles arose between the caliphs and their increasingly petulant army commanders and troops for c o n t r o l o f the bureaucracy and the revenues i t c o u l d provide. I n a few cases, p o w e r f u l army chiefs actually secured appointments as viziers—usually w i t h disastrous results because most m i l i t a r y m e n lacked the extensive scribal training, i n everything f r o m tax assessment and accounting to literature and c o m p o s i t i o n , required o f an effective vizier. After the chaos o f the 860s, the caliphate enjoyed a temporary resurgence o f power because several caliphs had close ties to the army chiefs. W i t h the help o f some cooperative viziers, they were able to p u t d o w n the most threatening rebellions. The caliph a l - M u t a d i d (r. 8 9 2 - 9 0 2 ) was able to regain c o n t r o l over Iraq, n o r t h e r n Mesopotamia, Al-Jazirah, n o r t h e r n Syria, and parts o f western Iran.

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Other areas o f the e m p i r e — i n c l u d i n g m u c h o f A r m e n i a , Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran, N o r t h Africa, and Y e m e n — w e r e effectively a u t o n o m o u s under their "govern o r s " or local dynasties, however, and made little or no real financial or m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n to the caliphate. But even areas that were under Abbasid c o n t r o l at the b e g i n n i n g o f the tenth century n o w consisted o f a mosaic o f units headed by p o w e r f u l governors, tribes, or local families, and they were weakly integrated w i t h the caliphate. A vigorous and skillful caliph such as a l - M u t a d i d c o u l d rely o n t h e m for support, but w h e n the caliphal g r i p weakened again these areas also could venture to stand o n their o w n . The caliphal g r i p weakened decisively after 908, and the next forty years i n Baghdad were marked by continual i n f i g h t i n g o f bureaucratic and army factions for control o f the caliphs and whatever revenues c o u l d be raised by his bureaucracy, c u l m i n a t i n g i n a m i l i t a r y takeover i n 932. Thereafter the Abbasid caliphs had n o trustworthy units to rely o n , and key army factions ensured that the civilian bureaucracy paid t h e m first. The intensity o f the struggle was exacerbated by a general shortage o f money, generated by disarray and extravagance i n the bureaucracy, loss o f revenues f r o m independent provinces and recalcitrant tax farmers, and an unfortunate decline i n the agrarian p r o d u c t i v i t y o f Iraq itself, f o r m e r l y the caliphate's financial m a i n stay. To cope w i t h the revenue shortage, the Abbasids began to rely o n an i n s t i t u t i o n called iqw (loosely translated as "fief," although the t e r m had a w i d e and variable range o f meanings). Iqta was a k i n d o f administrative shortcut whereby a general or soldier was given the right to collect tax revenues directly f r o m a certain district. The advantage i n the short t e r m was that the troops were paid even i f the treasury was empty, and the relevant parts o f the bureaucracy c o u l d be eliminated. The disadvantages, however, particularly the potential for abuse o f the peasantry and loss o f administrative oversight, were significant. As a result o f these developments the once p o w e r f u l Abbasid caliphs were l i t tle m o r e than figureheads by the 940s, endowed w i t h symbolic religious authority, b u t lacking real political or military power or financial resources o f their o w n . That power and access to resources had passed to p o w e r f u l m i l i t a r y figures, especially the one w h o c o u l d occupy the coveted p o s i t i o n as the caliph's commanderi n - c h i e f (amir al-umara). As the power o f the caliphate was choked off, leaders o f the r e g i o n a l and local polities that emerged c o m p e t e d against one another for c o n t r o l o f Baghdad and the privilege o f being the caliph's "protector." The most n o t e w o r t h y o f these protectors were the chiefs o f the p o w e r f u l B u y i d family o f northwestern Iran ( w h o played this role f r o m 94c to 1055) and the sultans o f the Turkish Seljuk dynasty ( w h o d o m i n a t e d Baghdad f r o m 105c

u n t i l the m i d -

t w e l f t h c e n t u r y ) . F r o m the m i d - t e n t h century u n t i l the M o n g o l s ended the caliphate i n 1258, the Abbasid caliphs were recognized as overlords i n many parts o f the Islamic w o r l d , but only i n a symbolic sense. O n l y o n a few occasions d i d

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theAbbasids succeed i n regaining, albeit briefly, some o f their lost power. Knowledge o f the caliphs' eventual demise, however, must not overshadow the many positive achievements that t o o k place d u r i n g the age o f the i m p e r i a l caliphate. The expansion o f the empire created the p o l i t i c a l haven i n w h i c h the n e w faith o f Islam established itself a m o n g n e w populations f r o m Spain to India. Moreover, the i m p e r i a l caliphate gave b i r t h to a sophisticated and richly varied new civilization i n Eurasia, culturally the most advanced o f its day. This cultural genesis was linked to a n o t e w o r t h y process o f u r b a n i z a t i o n that took place d u r i n g the early Islamic centuries; a l t h o u g h u r b a n life i n the Mediterranean basin had declined sharply i n late antiquity, the early Islamic era saw a revival o f urban centers and o f the commerce and culture usually associated w i t h t h e m . The early m i l i t a r y garrisons o f the first conquest days—Kufa, Basra, Marv, H i m s , Fustat, Qayrawan—soon grew i n t o bustling t o w n s t o w h i c h M u s l i m s o f divergent c u l tural backgrounds, especially n e w converts, were d r a w n . I n the government offices, private salons, and marketplaces o f such t o w n s , as w e l l as o f the i m p e r ial capitals o f Damascus and Baghdad, a new Islamic literary culture i n Arabic began to crystallize—all the m o r e remarkable because before the rise o f Islam, Arabic had no t r a d i t i o n o f w r i t t e n literature. Poetry, grammar, Quranic studies, history, biography, law, theology, philosophy, geography, the natural sciences— all were elaborated i n Arabic and i n a f o r m that was distinctively Islamic. The social base supporting tins new Arabic-Islamic culture was to a certain extent bipartite. The religiously inclined cultivated such fields as Quranic studies, prophetic traditions, religious law, and theology, w h i l e topics such as history, philosophy, and statecraft were sponsored particularly by the scribes o f the imperial bureaucracy, w h o were often learned i n Sasanian and other traditions o f statecraft. Poetry, from the start the soul o f the Arabic literary tradition, was cultivated by botii groups i n religious and secular varieties. The full development o f Arabic-Islamic literary culture continued long after 950, o f course, but its foundations were laid, its first remarkable monuments completed, and many o f its distinctive genres and forms were first established d u r i n g the age o f the imperial caliphate. The caliphs also presided, w i t t i n g l y or n o t , over economic developments that had global repercussions. The vast extent and relative stability o f the empire over almost t w o centuries—as w e l l as the c o n t i n u o u s c i r c u l a t i o n w i t h i n i t o f soldiers, administrators, p i l g r i m s heading to or f r o m Mecca, and scholars w i s h i n g to study w i t h r e n o w n e d teachers—helped to keep routes open and made i t easier for merchants to travel far and w i d e . The rise o f Arabic as a c o m m o n w r i t t e n language made it easier for merchants f r o m distant parts o f the empire to c o m m u nicate. Moreover, merchants i n the Islamic domains i n this era were usually unencumbered by duties or the need f o r special travel documents. M e a n w h i l e , the rise o f large cities created a base o f d e m a n d for a variety o f products, as w e l l

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as centers o f culture. I n its heyday i n the early n i n t h century, Baghdad appears to have been a city o f about a m i l l i o n inhabitants—a staggeringly large size for preindustrial t i m e s — a n d had to i m p o r t even its basic f o o d supplies f r o m sources some distance away. Some l u x u r y goods i n d e m a n d i n Baghdad, particularly a m o n g the political and commercial elites, were b r o u g h t f r o m halfway a r o u n d the globe. Baghdad grew to a size unmatched by other cities, but smaller cities also c o n t r i b u t e d to the economic b o o m . The flourishing p o r t city o f Siraf, o n the eastern coast o f the Persian Gulf, symbolizes one d i m e n s i o n o f this c o m m e r c i a l activity. It was a key transit p o i n t for foodstuffs c o m i n g f r o m O m a n , as w e l l as textiles and other goods entering the caliphal domains f r o m east Africa, I n d i a , and beyond. In the other direction hoards o f Abbasid gold coins f o u n d around the Baltic Sea are silent reminders o f a once-thriving commercial connection that helped revitalize the economy o f n o r t h e r n Europe and may have helped stimulate the n i n t h century revival o f culture and economy c o m m o n l y called the Carolingian renaissance. The discovery o f N o r t h African coins i n Abbasid-period archaeological sites i n Jordan, or Iraqi (or Chinese) ceramics f o u n d i n Egypt, attest to yet other dimensions o f this thriving commerce. It is appropriate to think o f m u c h o f Eurasia i n this p e r i o d as a single, vast economic body, o f w h i c h Abbasid Baghdad i n particular was the heart, p u m p i n g the commercial lifeblood that kept the system alive. Iraq's prosperity i n particular, w i t h its r i c h tax base and t h r i v i n g commerce, was an i m p o r t a n t element c o n t r i b u t i n g to the political power and cultural brilliance o f the h i g h caliphate. W h e n Iraq's agrarian prosperity began to wane i n the tenth cent u r y — a result o f such varied factors as deterioration o f vital irrigation works, salinization o f the soil, and sheer administrative mismanagement—the caliphs f o u n d themselves increasingly unable to pay the bills o f their enormous government operations. This i n t u r n sparked the infighting among military and administrative factions that characterized the long decline o f Abbasid power.

Local Autonomy, Decentralization, and Regionalism Through I I O O The capture o f Baghdad by the Buyids in 94 c, and their reduction o f the caliphs to little more than figureheads, was merely the climax o f a long process o f change that saw ever more parts o f the Islamic empire gradual!) slip be) o n d the caliphs' real control. The emergence o n the former empire's terrain o f autonomous or independent political u n i t s — w h a t some historians call a " c o m m o n w e a l t h " o f regional M u s l i m states, united by their participation i n an emerging Islamic culture—makes tracing the political history o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y after about 900 C E . m u c h more difficult than i t is for earlier periods, w h e n there existed a single main center o f polit-

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teal power. This section mentions some o f the m a i n political units that emerged and gives a general idea o f their significance and o f larger patterns o f political and cultural evolution o f w h i c h these units were part. Given the nature o f communications and travel i n preindustrial times, many provinces o f the Islamic empire, particularly those distant f r o m the capital at Damascus or Baghdad, enjoyed a significant measure o f a u t o n o m y even at the apogee o f caliphal power. The caliphs i n Damascus or Baghdad simply d i d not have the means to keep lands as far away as Ifriqiya or Khurasan, not to m e n d o n Spain or India, under close supervision. The caliphs therefore had to rely o n strong governors to manage distant provinces. It was taken for granted that provincial governors w o u l d operate w i t h a good deal o f autonomy, and the caliphs were usually w e l l satisfied i f governors recognized their overlordship, contributed to the caliphal treasury, and put additional military units at their disposal w h e n they were needed. One important measure o f truly centralized control under such conditions, however, is whether governors, despite the great independence o f action they w i e l d e d w i t h i n their provinces, could effectively be replaced by the caliphs. I n this regard, i t is notew o r t h y that the Umayyad and early Abbasid caliphs engaged i n frequent (sometimes almost annual) rotation o f their governors. Even provinces i n w h i c h the governorship was granted for Ufe or made hereditary, however, c o u l d remain loyal to the caliphs and offer m e a n i n g f u l support i n the f o r m o f tax revenues, m i l i t a r y backing, and diplomatic support. The first province to be definitively detached f r o m the caliphate was Spain. After the Abbasids overthrew the Umayyad caliphs and slaughtered many o f their k i n s m e n , one U m a y y a d prince w h o escaped made his way to N o r t h Africa, and i n 756 he invaded Spain. It then became an independent state under Umayyad rulers, w h o at first called themselves simply amir ( c o m m a n d e r ) . Eventually, i n 929, the greatest o f the Spanish U m a y y a d rulers, A b d al-Rahman I I I (891-961 ) , assumed the title o f amir al-mu'minin (caliph), i n defiance o f the Abbasids and o f the Ismaili Fatimids, w h o were closer and m o r e dangerous rivals. D u r i n g the n i n t h to the twelfth centuries a splendid and distinctive Islamic culture developed i n Spain, enshrined i n m a j o r w o r k s o f Arabic poetry and prose literature, i n signal c o n t r i b u t i o n s to Islamic philosophy, theology, and law, and i n m a j o r a r c h i tectural m o n u m e n t s such as the Great Mosque o f Córdoba and A b d al-Rahman's palace complex at Medinat al-Zahra. Many Christians and Jews i n Islamic Spain began to adopt their rulers' Arabic language and culture, and i n t u r n made their o w n c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o the culture's b r i l l i a n c e . The great Jewish

philosopher

Maimonides, for example, w h o composed works i n b o t h Arabic and Hebrew, was as m u c h a product o f Islamic as o f Jewish culture. The Umayyads i n Spain faced significant challenges, however. Tension a m o n g Arab settlers, Berber settlers, and local converts (muwallads) sometimes resulted i n

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armed clashes. Some Christians steadfastly resisted b o t h acculturation and assimi l a t i o n , and tensions between M u s l i m s and Christians sometimes ran h i g h . Disaffected elements—whether Christian or M u s l i m — o f t e n d i d not hesitate to call o n the Christian k i n g d o m s o f n o r t h e r n Spain or even o n the Carolingians beyond the Pyrenees for aid, and this e m b r o i l e d the Umayyads i n persistent r a i d i n g and warfare along their n o r t h e r n borders. The p o w e r f u l strongman Abu A m i r al-Mansur ( c o m m o n l y k n o w n as A l m a n z o r ) , w h o came to p o w e r as protector o f a y o u n g caliph and remained i n c o n t r o l o f affairs u n t i l his death i n 1002, The Great Mosque of Córdoba, founded in the late eighth century, was repeat-

cam-

paigned tirelessly i n the n o r t h , using a new army composed o f Berber recruits. After Almanzor's death, however, the caliphate fell u n d e r dispute a m o n g various claimants, backed by d o m i n a n t families i n the m a i n cities o f Islamic Spain.

edly enlarged to meet the

Finally, i n 1031,

needs of the expanding

caliphate altogether, ushering i n the era o f the " p e t t y k i n g s " ( m t i M al-tmvoif i n

Muslim population.The

Arabic, reyes de taifas i n Spanish), d u r i n g w h i c h Islamic Spain was d i v i d e d i n t o an

ingenious system of two-

unstable aggregation o f c o m p e t i n g city-states: Seville, Córdoba, Toledo, Badajoz,

tiered supports allowed builders to create a forest of supports using the short

the leading families decided to abolish the Spanish Umayyad

Saragossa, Valencia, Granada, and others. A l t h o u g h the c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g these local rulers was partly responsible for

stubby columns from

the brilliant cultural flowering o f Islamic Spain d u r i n g the eleventh century, the

Visigothic buildings.

same c o m p e t i t i o n , played out on the political plane, sapped the economic and m i l -

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itary strength o f each o f the petty kings, w h o often raided one another's territories or agreed to pay tribute to Christian k i n g d o m s o f n o r t h e r n Spain w h e n threatened w i t h attack. The era o f the petty kingdoms thus helped to make possible the relentless expansion o f the Christian k i n g d o m s o f n o r t i i e r n Spain at the expense o f the Islamic south that began w i t h the u n i o n o f Castile and Leon i n the late eleventh cent u r y — w h a t is k n o w n i n later Spanish historiography as the reconquisto. The first landmark i n the reconquista occurred i n io8c, w h e n Toledo fell to the astute and dynamic king o f Castile and Léon, Alfonso V I . The petty kings, recognizing that they were too weak to avoid suffering Toledo's fate, yet too divided by petty jealousies to agree o n any one o f t h e m as ruler o f t h e m all, invited the p o w e r f u l ruler o f the Almoravids i n Morocco, Yusuf ibnTashfin, to cross the Strait o f Gibraltar and lead their defense against Alfonso i n 1086. Thus began the p e r i o d o f A l m o r a v i d and Almohad d o m i n a t i o n , w h i c h delayed for m o r e than a hundred years the expansion o f the Christian kingdoms i n t o Islamic Spain. Parts o f N o r t h Africa also became independent o f the caliphate, i n fact or i n p r i n c i p l e , at an early date. U n l i k e Spain, w h i c h had a prosperous agrarian base and boasted numerous t h r i v i n g cities even i n early Islamic times, most o f N o r t h Africa was t h i n l y populated by pastoralists or marginal f a r m i n g c o m m u n i t i e s , and there were few large towns. U n d e r the Umayyad caliphs (before 750) the M u s l i m garrison center at Qayrawan—situated i n I f r i q i y a , the most fertile part o f N o r t h Africa, m o d e r n Tunisia—replaced Byzantine Carthage as the center o f government, and it l o n g remained the nucleus b o t h o f caliphal a u t h o r i t y and o f Islamic o r t h o d o x y i n N o r t h Africa. Even t h o u g h all o f N o r t h Africa was theoretically subject to the caliphate, vast areas, especially those m o r e distant f r o m Qayrawan, remained effectively outside the c o n t r o l o f the caliphs and their gov-

The Ribat at Monastir in

ernors. Moreover, d u r i n g the seventh and e i g h t h centuries, many Berbers were

Tunisia, founded at the end

w o n over to Kharijite Islam by Kharijite merchants, preachers, and refugees fleeing oppression i n their earlier centers i n Iraq and O m a n . Their egalitarian and puritanical variety o f Islam, w i t h its emphasis o n pious "bearers o f religious k n o w l e d g e , " seems to have struck a sympathetic c h o r d a m o n g the Berbers, i n w h o s e t r a d i t i o n a l beliefs h o l y (sometimes m i r a c l e - w o r k i n g ) m e n played a

of the eighth century, is one of a series of fortress/ monasteries established to protect the North African coast and extend Muslim power to Sicily.

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p r o m i n e n t r o l e . The Kharijites established n u m e r o u s small states i n L i b y a , Tunisia, and Algeria d u r i n g the e i g h t h and n i n t h centuries, such as that o f the Rustamids o f Tahert. Because many Kharijites were heavily involved i n commerce, they seem to have been the first to carry Islam across the Sahara to the peoples o f the western Sudan ( m o d e r n Chad, Niger, and M a l i ) . Other refugees f r o m Abbasid rule also f o u n d shelter i n die difficult m o u n t a i n terrain o f N o r t h Africa, i n c l u d i n g the A l i d prince Idris i b n A b d Allah, w h o fled after the abortive A l i d rebellion i n the Hejaz i n 786 and established a small state i n Morocco, w h i c h his successors r u l e d f r o m their n e w capital at Fez. By the late eighth century m u c h o f N o r t h Africa beyond the outskirts o f Qayrawan was a checkerboard o f independent tribes and small states that tendered neither recognition n o r taxes to the caliphs i n Baghdad. I n 800 C E . the Abbasid caliph H a r u n al-Rashid resorted to recognizing his governor, I b r a h i m i b n al-Aghlab, as hereditary governor o f Ifriqiya ( " A f r i c a , " as the province o f N o r t h Africa was then called) i n exchange for an agreed annual tribute. This arrangement had the advantage o f b r i n g i n g at least some revenue to Baghdad and o f preserving the appearance o f Abbasid rule. D u r i n g the century o f their rule the Aghlabid governors were often criticized by the strictly o r t h o d o x p o p u l a t i o n and religious scholars o f Qayrawan for their abuses o f power. Partly to quell such c r i t icism, they struggled m i g h t i l y against the Kharijite states a r o u n d t h e m , built mosques and i r r i g a t i o n w o r k s , and sponsored naval campaigns against Sicily, leadi n g to the establishment o f M u s l i m rule o n that island. Aghlabid Qayrawan also The Aghlabid basins at Qayrawan were among the

developed as a major center for theology and law, but m u c h o f N o r t h Africa nevertheless remained effectively beyond Aghlabid rule. Their r u l e was b r o u g h t to an

many waterworks built in

abrupt halt by the rise o f the Ismaili Fatimids i n Ifriqiya d u r i n g the first decade o f

the mid-ninth century by

the tenth century.

the rulers of present-day Tunisia. Water from aqueducts flowed into the smaller basin where the silt was

F r o m the t i m e o f its conquest i n 6 3 9 - 4 2 , Egypt was an i m p o r t a n t part o f the Islamic empire. The " p r o v i n c e " o f Egypt i n c l u d e d N o r t h Africa and Spain u n t i l these were split o f f to f o r m a separate province i n 70c. Despite a steady flow o f

deposited; the clear water

Arabic-speaking settlers t o Egypt, the local Copts ( M o n o p h y s i t e Christians)

then flowed into the adjoin-

remained the m a j o r i t y o f the p o p u l a t i o n f o r at least several centuries, and they

ing larger basin from which

l o n g remained i m p o r t a n t as administrators for their M u s l i m rulers. The ancient

it was distributed to the city.

city o f Alexandria c o n t i n u e d t o be a m a j o r trade e m p o r i u m , but the M u s l i m s

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developed their new g a r r i s o n t o w n o f Fustat ( O l d Cairo), w h i c h was f r o m the start the province's administrative center. By the n i n t h century Fustat was b e g i n n i n g to develop as an i m p o r t a n t economic and Islamic cultural center. The r i c h f a r m l a n d o f the N i l e valley made Egypt a m a j o r source o f revenue f o r the Umayyad and early Abbasid caliphs. Despite its i m p o r t a n c e , however, Egypt slipped o u t o f the effective grasp o f the Abbasid caliphs w h e n they were overw h e l m e d by m i l i t a r y factions i n Samarra and Baghdad; for most o f a century after 868, Egypt was virtually independent o f the caliphate u n d e r autonomous m i l i tary governors (the Tulunids, 8 6 8 - 9 0 5 , and the Ikhshidids, 935-69) or p o w e r f u l financial administrators (especially die Madharai family i n the early tenth century). D u r i n g this t i m e Egypt's economy seems to have suffered f r o m m i s management o f the tax system. But also d u r i n g this p e r i o d Egypt began to emerge, for the first t i m e since the Roman conquest almost a thousand years earlier, once again as an independent state. Egypt t o o k another giant step i n this d i r e c t i o n w h e n the Fatimid caliphs, c o m i n g f r o m I f r i q i y a , conquered it i n 969 and made i t the seat o f their caliphate shortly thereafter. M u c h o f n o r t h e r n and central Arabia was the preserve o f local pastoral n o m a d i c groups, over w h i c h the caliphs i n Baghdad often had m i n i m a l c o n t r o l . The caliphs d i d , however, endeavor to keep the h o l y cities o f Mecca and Medina, i m p o r t a n t for symbolic and cultic reasons as the focus o f the annual pilgrimage, firmly

under their governors' supervision, and to keep open the m a i n p i l g r i m -

The great Mosque at Sanaa in Yemen was founded in early Islamic times and repeatedly restored and repaired. The Sulayhids. adherents of Ismaili Shiism who ruled Yemen from Sanaa and Dhu Jibla from 1014 to 1138, were one of the many dynasties that established local control as the

age roads t h r o u g h tribal t e r r i t o r y f r o m Syria and Iraq. Southern Arabia (Yemen,

power of the Abbasid caliphs

Hadramawt, and parts o f O m a n ) was only loosely held by the caliphate even i n

declined.

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the best o f times. Under the Umayyads and early Abbasids, governors were regularly dispatched to Yemen, but generally they had little influence beyond the capital at Sanaa. Yemen's r u g g e d terrain was mostly d o m i n a t e d by various tribal chiefs, w h o often resided i n m o u n t a i n top castles and c o n t r o l l e d local market towns. Kharijism and particularly Shiism o f various varieties took h o l d at an early date a m o n g some groups i n this natural refuge zone. After the m i d - n i n t h century, as the p o w e r o f the Abbasid caliphs declined, local dynasties o f diverse o r i gins became established i n various centers, particularly Sanaa i n the m o u n t a i n s and Zabid along the Red Sea coast. Commerce w i t h the I n d i a n Ocean basin was an i m p o r t a n t clement i n the economic life o f the m a i n coastal towns, such as Sohar, A d e n , and Zabid. The rise o f local and regional a u t o n o m y o n the Iranian plateau occurred i n very diverse ways and at different times i n different parts o f Iran. The first trend t o w a r d autonomy (not yet independence) can be seen i n the career o f the Tahirid family, w h i c h rose to p r o m i n e n c e i n Abbasid service d u r i n g the c i v i l w a r o f 809-13. D u r i n g the m i d d l e o f the n i n t h century the Tahirids were recognized as hereditary governors o f m u c h o f eastern I r a n , centered o n the r i c h province o f Khurasan and i n c l u d i n g adjacent provinces

such as Sistan and m u c h

of

Transoxiana, w h i c h they governed by c o - o p t i n g i m p o r t a n t local families. The Tahirids ( w h o also h e l d i m p o r t a n t posts i n Baghdad and elsewhere) remained loyal to the Abbasid caliphs and consistently delivered considerable revenues to the caliphal treasury, i n exchange for w h i c h the Abbasids allowed the Tahirids virtually free rein i n their provinces. T a h i r i d d o m i n a t i o n o f eastern Iran was b r o u g h t t o an end a b r u p t l y i n 873 w h e n their capital N i s h a p u r ( i n the p r o v i n c e o f Khurasan) was conquered by the Saffarids o f Sistan, whose attitude t o w a r d the caliphate was as aggressive and hostile as the Tahirids' had been supportive. The r u g g e d and i m p o v e r i s h e d p r o v i n c e o f Sistan, t h o u g h conquered early by the M u s l i m s , had been o n l y m a r g i n a l l y integrated i n t o the caliphal e m p i r e . D u r i n g the U m a y y a d and early Abbasid periods, K h a r i j i t e bands and other local rebellions kept the r e g i o n t u r b u l e n t . The f r e e b o o t i n g Saffarid leaders, r i s i n g i n this context, expanded their c o n t r o l first i n t o Khurasan and western Afghanistan, t h e n i n t o the provinces o f K e r m a n ( i n southeast I r a n ) and Fars ( i n southwest Iran). By the 870s they had seized Khuzestan ( i n southwest Iran) and parts o f southern Iraq and came close t o o v e r t h r o w i n g the Abbasids i n 876, w h e n they were f i n a l l y t u r n e d back by the caliph's armies o n l y a few days' m a r c h f r o m Baghdad. For many years thereafter, however, the Saffarids r e m a i n e d p o w e r f u l and essentially i n d e p e n dent o f the caliphs, w h o were forced to recognize the Saffarids as " g o v e r n o r s " o f their h o m e province o f Sistan, as w e l l as o f Fars and K e r m a n ( u n t i l at least 898), and even awarded t h e m key posts i n Baghdad. A f t e r about 9 0 0 the

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Saffarids were restricted t o Sistan, as they were supplanted i n m u c h o f eastern Iran by the Samanids, a " l o y a l i s t " dynasty o f governors w h o had risen f r o m the w r e c k age o f the f o r m e r T a h i r i d d o m a i n s . The Samanid family came to prominence as subordinates o f the Tahirids, for w h o m they governed key towns o f Transoxiana. W h e n the Saffarids seized Khurasan, the Samanids retained control over Transoxiana. By about 900 the Samanids had reconquered Khurasan i n the name

of

the

Abbasids, w h o recognized them as governors, and extended their control over m u c h o f northern Iran, K h w a r i z m

(modern

K h o r e z m ) , and further east I n Transoxiana and Afghanistan as w e l l , paying special attention to w a r d i n g o f f depredations i n t o settled districts b y the n o m a d i c Turkish tribes o f Transoxiana. Like the Tahirids, the Samanids r e m a i n e d loyal t o the Abbasids, b u t they never c o n t r i b u t e d revenues to the caliphate and were, i n effect, an i n d e pendent state. They prospered especially because o f the lucrative trade i n slaves,

The tomb of the Samanids at Bukhara is one of the earliest mausolea to survive in the Islamic lands. It covers the graves of several mem-

captured a m o n g Turkish tribes l i v i n g o n

bers of the Samanid family, governors of Khurasan and Transoxiana

the f r i n g e s o f t h e i r d o m a i n s . M a n y o f

for the Abbasid caliphs in the early tenth century.

these slaves were trained i n m a r t i a l skills and sold as mercenaries or used to staff t h e i r o w n b u r g e o n i n g army. But the Samanid p e r i o d also saw the conversion o f parts o f Transoxiana's T u r k i s h p o p u l a t i o n t o Islam by i t i n e r a n t merchants and missionaries, and the b e g i n nings o f the peaceable m i g r a t i o n o f T u r k i s h converts i n t o Samanid d o m a i n s to settle. To manage their domains, the Samanids established an extensive bureaucracy, based o n the Abbasid m o d e l and staffed by cadres o f h i g h l y literate scribes. As earlier i n Abbasid Baghdad, the h i g h l y educated administrators i n the Samanid bureaucracy c o n t r i b u t e d to the development o f their m a j o r cities—Nishapur, Bukhara, Samarqand—as i m p o r t a n t centers o f Islamic culture. I n the Samanid case, however, this blossoming o f Islamic culture was not o n l y i n Arabic but also, for the first t i m e , i n Persian. This was a m o m e n t o u s development i n the history

40

T H E

O X F O R D

HISTORY

O F

ISLAM

Mahmud of Ghazna crossing the Ganges, as portrayed in the Compendium of Chronicles composed and illustrated for the Ilkhanid vizier Rashid al-Din in the early fourteenth century.The Ghaznavids,Turkish military governors for the Samanids, were renowned in later times as the hrst to extend Muslim power into northern India

o f Islamic c i v i l i z a t i o n , w h i c h u n t i l t h e n had been elaborated exclusively i n Arabic. The development o f a Persianate variant o f Islamic culture broke this m o n o p o l y and opened the way for the development o f other Islamic languages i n later times, such as O t t o m a n Turkish and U r d u . ( A l l the Islamic languages, however, adopted a m o d i f i e d f o r m o f the Arabic script, closely i d e n t i f i e d w i t h Islam's sacred text, the Q u r a n , as the s y m b o l o f their religious i d e n t i t y ) The Samanids patronized such r e n o w n e d Persian poets as R u d a k i and F i r d o w s i , whose Shahnameh (Book of Kings), or Persian national epic, emphasized the " e t e r n a l " struggle between Iran, w h i c h was settled and agricultural, and Turan (the Turkish steppe), w h i c h was pastoral. This epic p o e m echoed the tense conditions o n the steppe f r o n t i e r over w h i c h the Samanids themselves r u l e d w h i l e saying little about the e c o n o m i c

interdependence

b e t w e e n settled people and pastoral

nomads that typified this frontier. I n the end the Samanids fell to just such a " T u r a n i a n " threat. The QaraKhanids, a confederation o f Turkish peoples l i v i n g east o f the Jaxartes River were the first p o l i t i c a l g r o u p i n g o f the i n n e r Asian steppe to be led by M u s l i m rulers. Crossing the Jaxartes, they entered Transoxiana f r o m the east, defeated the Samanids, and seized the province i n 999. Khurasan and parts o f Afghanistan

M U H A M M A D

A N D

T H E

C A L I P H A T E

4]

r e m a i n e d i n the hands o f the Samanids' Turkish m i l i t a r y governors o f Ghazni, w h o thus began their existence as an independent state. The Ghaznavids were a m o n g the first to regularly call themselves sultans, a Quranic w o r d that f r o m the tenth century was used t o refer to an Islamic secular m o n a r c h . (Other terms that came to be used i n this way were the Persian shah and the Turkish khan.) The Ghaznavid sultans, a l t h o u g h they m a i n t a i n e d a c u l t u r e d c o u r t that patronized some i m p o r t a n t authors ( i n c l u d i n g , i n his later years, F i r d o w s i ) , b u i l t a m i l i tary regime i n t e n t o n raising revenue t h r o u g h taxation and raiding. They frequently descended f r o m Afghanistan i n t o n o n - M u s l i m parts o f Sind ( m o d e r n Pakistan) to seize the r i c h b o o t y available there, particularly f r o m its many H i n d u temples. A f t e r 1040,

w h e n they lost Khurasan to the Seljuks,

the

Ghaznavids were l i m i t e d to Afghanistan and increasingly t u r n e d their attention to Sind. As a result o f this r e o r i e n t a t i o n , they c o n t r i b u t e d significantly to the spread i n India o f Sunni Islam, w h i c h had u n t i l then been restricted to relatively small c o m m u n i t i e s that were remote f r o m the rest o f the Islamic w o r l d . Some areas o f the Iranian plateau were f r o m the start beyond effective caliphal c o n t r o l because o f their difficult terrain, and they remained so even w h e n the caliphs were p o w e r f u l . The m a i n case o f such inaccessibility was the jungle-like r e g i o n along the slopes o f the Elburz M o u n t a i n s s o u t h o f the Caspian Sea (Daylam, Gilan, Tabaristan, Mazandaran). Here local chieftains, w h o at best paid l i p service to the caliphs, struggled w i t h one another for primacy. This area, like Yemen, served as a natural refuge zone and received several fugitive A l i d princes, w h o helped convert m u c h o f the p o p u l a t i o n o f Daylam, at least, to Shiism. This area also served as the initial base for the w a r l o r d Mardavij ( d . 93c), w h o made a s h o r t - l i v e d attempt to restore an Iranian m o n a r c h y and Zoroastrianism, and then for the Shiite B u y i d family, w h o emerged f r o m Mardavij's entourage to gain power i n m u c h o f central Iran—parts o f Daylam, Jibal, and the r i c h province o f Fars. By 94c one o f the B u y i d chiefs, A h m a d i b n Buyeh (later k n o w n as M u i z z al-Dawiah), had m o v e d his troops i n t o Iraq and taken possession o f Baghdad, where he was recognized by the Abbasid caliph as commander i n c h i e f (amir alumara). I n the process the caliphs were effectively reduced to figureheads, having significant religious a u t h o r i t y but usually little real power. The Buyids prevailed i n central and w e s t e r n Iran and i n central and s o u t h e r n Iraq for m o r e than a century, and i n t h e i r heyday they managed to exert their c o n t r o l also over O m a n , across the Persian G u l f f r o m Fars, and over M o s u l ( A l - M a w s i l ) and n o r t h e r n Iraq. T h e i r d o m a i n s , however, were not a u n i fied state b u t rather a loose confederation o f h o l d i n g s called appanages, each granted to a d i f f e r e n t m e m b e r o f the B u y i d family. A t times, a single B u y i d c h i e f was unquestionably head o f the f a m i l y — t h e most notable example b e i n g the ascendancy o f A d u d al-Dawlah (r. 9 4 9 - 8 3 ) — b u t

most o f the t i m e the

42

THE OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

B u y i d brothers and cousins were i n sharp c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h one another t o e x t e n d their appanages at the expense o f their relatives, or to oust t h e i r relatives a n d take over t h e i r appanages. The B u y i d princes w h o h e l d appanages i n I r a n usually established close relations w i t h the local l a n d h o l d i n g classes, w h i c h p r o v i d e d a s o l i d financial basis f o r their essentially m i l i t a r y d o m i n a t i o n . The m o s t prosperous o f the B u y i d appanages

was Fars, w h i c h had a

solid agrarian base and significant c o m m e r cial activity. Its capital at Shiraz also was h o m e to an extensive bureaucracy, a vestige o f Abbasid times, and an i m p o r t a n t c o u r t that sponsored a b r i l l i a n t l i t e r a r y c u l t u r e (always, despite the Buyids' Iranian o r i g i n s , i n A r a b i c ) . Other I r a n i a n appanages o f the B u y i d c o n f e d e r a t i o n , particularly Jibal and its

capital

Rayy,

were

relatively

stable

a l t h o u g h less w e l l developed than Fars. Baghdad under the Buyids, by c o m p a r i son, was an appanage o f q u i t e a different The Gunbad-i Qabus in northeastern Iran marks the grave of Qabus bin Washmgir, ruler of the focal

character. The presence o f the caliph and his court gave Baghdad great prestige and made i t

Ziyarid dynasty, who died in 1012. The flanged shaft

important as a center o f Arabic-Islamic c u l -

soars 52 meters above the artificial hillock on which

ture, b u t i t also meant that the Buyids and

it stands.

their Daylamite troops had to manage, and sometimes face the o p p o s i t i o n of, the t u r b u lent factions i n the Turkish army there. Moreover, the c o n t i n u i n g decline o f Iraqi agriculture deprived the Buyid amir i n Baghdad o f the k i n d o f agrarian base that c o n t r i b u t e d to the viability o f B u y i d appanages i n Iran and southern Iraq. The B u y i d era i n Baghdad proved to be o f great significance for the development o f Shiite culture, however. A l t h o u g h the Buyids were often o n g o o d terms w i t h the Abbasid caliphs, whose presence under their protection provided t h e m w i t h valuable Islamic legitimacy, as Smites they allowed Baghdad's large Shiite p o p u l a t i o n for the first t i m e to openly observe the major Shiite holidays. For the same reason Shiite scholarship entered its first great f l o w e r i n g d u r i n g the B u y i d p e r i o d , w h i c h saw the p r o d u c t i o n o f major w o r k s i n Shiite law, theology, and other disciplines. The Buyids f u r t h e r extended the use o f iqta, an i n s t i t u t i o n that had o r i g i n a t e d

M U H A M M A D

A N D

T H E

CALIPHATE

4
ab) t o the presence o f the " H i d d e n I m a m . " A l Ahsai's student, Sayyid Kazim Rashti, c o n t i n u e d this teaching i n Karbala and developed this i n t o a relatively f o r m a l school w i t h a n u m b e r o f followers. One o f his students was a y o u n g merchant f r o m a prosperous f a m d y i n Shiraz, M u h a m m a d A l i . A l t h o u g h this student d i d not have the extensive t r a i n i n g o f one o f the ulama, he came t o be recognized as possessing special spiritual qualities. W h e n Rashti died i n 1844, a n u m b e r o f younger ulama w h o were Rashti's students recognized M u h a m m a d A l i as Rashti's successor and as the Bab, or " t h e Gateway o f the Age to the H i d d e n I m a m . " The Bab gained g r o w i n g ulama and popular support f o r his claims, w h i c h he expanded to include the claims o f receiving special d i v i n e inspiration f o r the d e f i n i t i o n o f prophetic revelation f o r the n e w age. The Bab gained a relatively large popular f o l l o w i n g i n a time w h e n man)" people were expecting dramatic events o f a cosmological character. His v i s i o n was not a m o d e r n i z i n g v i s i o n but a traditional messianic message p r o c l a i m i n g a new society o f the r u l e o f God's designated agent o n earth, b u t i t appealed to many i n a t i m e o f great change i n Iranian society. H e was arrested and executed i n 1850, and w i t h his death the medieval messianic phase o f the movement came t o an e n d . O n e o f his followers, M i r z a Hussein A l i N u r i , w h o later became k n o w n as Baha Allah (1817-92), redefined the message o f the n e w age i n m o r e cosmopolitan and universalistic terms, however, and by the end o f the nineteenth century the Shiite messianic revolt o f the Bab had become the m o d e r n Bahai faith, w i t h followers i n many different parts o f the w o r l d . In the large states i n the central parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d there were n e w style r e f o r m efforts, w h i c h began the process o f the m o d e r n i z i n g reforms o f the slate systems. Parallel t o these m o r e secular r e f o r m efforts, however, there were major movements o f Islamic renewal that also aimed at the creation o f new styles o f institutions for state and society. These movements were both culminations o f

530

THE OXFORD

HISTORY

OF ISLAM

developments that h a d been i m p o r t a n t i n the eighteenth century a n d also the beginnings o f i m p o r t a n t Islamic initiatives i n the n e w contexts o f g r o w i n g European-controlled m o d e r n i t y .

Frontier Revivalism in Transition In the frontier regions o f the M u s l i m w o r l d , the issues o f Islamic renewal were also those o f transition. The movements o f the eighteendi century that w o r k e d to create more clearly Islamic societies that were free f r o m syncretism and compromise reached a enhninating phase o f activism and sometimes jihads. These movements also became involved i n the interactions w i t h g r o w i n g European d o m i n a t i o n i n many areas, however, and provided foundations for responses to Western expansion. It is clear f r o m the experiences o f movements from West Africa to Southeast Asia that Islamic renewalism was not simply a response to European imperialism but was an already established dynamic o f Islamic history diat became involved i n the process o f confronting the new conditions o f the nineteenth-century m o d e r n w o r l d . One o f the m a j o r figures i n the development o f movements that shaped Islamic life i n many different regions was A h m a d i b n Idris (1749 o r 1750-1837). He was a scholar w h o was b o r n i n Morocco, where he received his early educat i o n . This i n c l u d e d t r a i n i n g i n the standard Islamic disciplines i n the great mosque school o f Q a r a w i y y i n . It was the era o f Mawlay M u h a m m a d (r. 1757-90) and Mawlay Sulayman (r. 1792-1822), rulers c o m m i t t e d t o s u p p o r t i n g active reforms that encouraged study o f basic w o r k s rather than secondary c o m m e n taries ( w i t h special emphasis o n the study o f the h a d i t h ) and that opposed the more extreme versions o f popular veneration o f " h o l y m e n " or marabouts. Ibn Idris began his life as an active Sufi w i t h affiliation to the Shadhiliyyah, a tariqah o f major i m p o r t a n c e i n N o r t h Africa. I b n Idris left M o r o c c o a r o u n d 1798 and spent the rest o f his life i n the eastern Arab w o r l d . For m u c h o f that time he was a teacher i n Mecca and M e d i n a , a l t h o u g h he traveled briefly t o upper Egypt. I n 1828 he was forced t o leave Mecca, possibly as a result o f disputes w i t h the ulama i n the sanctuary cities, and settled i n Yemen, w h e r e he d i e d . He was a w e l l - k n o w n spiritual guide w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f Sufism but was also a p r o m i n e n t and controversial scholar o f the hadith. I n his teaching he emphasized the importance o f i n d i v i d u a l piety a n d fear o f God and the responsibility o f the i n d i v i d u a l believer to strive t o understand the Q u r a n and the Sunna. I b n Idris strongly opposed strong adherence t o i n d i v i d u a l schools o f Islamic law and w o r k e d t o create a m o r e u n i f i e d f o u n d a tion for faith and action based o n fear o f G o d rather than legal rules. As a teacher i n Mecca, i b n Idris came i n t o contact w i t h students f r o m many d i f ferent parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d . H e d i d not establish his o w n independent and

hOUNDATlONS

FOR RENEWAL

A N D

REFORM

53 1

separate tariqah, but he taught a m o r e general Sufi path that was a synthesis o f his devotional guidance a n d other existing orders. It was o n l y later that o n e o f his sons, A b d a l - A l , f o r m a l l y established the A h m a d i y y a h - I d r i s y y a h as the t a r i q a h o f A h m a d i b n Idris. However, many o f his students established orders that were t o play i m p o r t a n t roles i n different parts o f the

Muslim world.

Among

the most

important o f these orders is the Sanusiyyah i n Libya and N o r t h Africa, the Khatmiyyah i n Sudan, and other orders i n East Africa. By the end o f the nineteenth century his prayers were translated i n t o local languages and were w e l l k n o w n i n places as far apart as Bosnia, India, and Southeast Asia. I b n Idris lived i n a t i m e w h e n European influence was g r o w i n g i n the central M u s l i m lands, and he traveled i n Egypt i n the days o f the reforms o f M u h a m m a d A l i . There is little trace i n any o f his w o r k s o r activist piety o f an explicit response t o the West, however. His life and thought were w e l l w i t h i n the long-established traditions o f renewal

a n d r e f o r m . H i s students,

t h o u g h , were actively involved i n the p o l -

The zawiya of Sayyid Ahmad al-Tijani in Fez is the center for propagating

itics o f faith i n the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h century

the teachings of the Tijaniyya order, a Sufi brotherhood with many

and faced the choice o f opposing or w o r k -

adherents in the Maghreb and West Africa. Its founder Ahmad al -Tijani

ing

with

westernizing

reformers a n d

European powers. Like K h a l i d al-Baghdadi

{1737- 181c) was instrumental in bringing revivalist Sufism to the region, and the order became an effective vehicle for organizing efforts to reform society and enforce a stricter adherence to Islamic law and practice.

and others i n this era o f transition, i b n Idris represents b o t h a c u l m i n a t i o n and a prologue i n the development o f movements o f renewal and r e f o r m i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . Other Sufi orders were also i m p o r t a n t parts o f the movements o f renewal and r e f o r m i n the era o f transition. A h m a d al-Tijani (1737-1815) was another N o r t h African scholar w h o established an i m p o r t a n t tradition o f activist Sufism. He was b o r n i n southern Algeria and studied i n Fez before he w e n t o n pdgrimage t o Mecca. W h i l e o n pilgrimage, he became affiliated w i t h some o f the i m p o r t a n t revivalist teachers o f the t i m e , especially those associated w i t h the Knalwatiyyah

532

THE

OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

order, such as M a h m u d al-Kurdi i n Cairo and A b d al-Karim al-Samman i n Medina. W h e n al-Tijani returned to Algeria, he began to have distinctive v i s i o n ary experiences that gave special character to the devotional practices that he f o r mulated as the basis for a new order, the Tijaniyyah. The litanies o f the order are believed to have been taught to al-Tijani directly by the Prophet M u h a m m a d i n al-Tijani's visions. I n these visions al-Tijani was also instructed to break ties w i t h other orders, and followers o f the Tijaniyyah path were restricted to affiliation w i t h only the Tijaniyyah. At the t i m e such exclusivity was rare a m o n g tariqahs. In devotional practice the Tijaniyyah was a s i m p l i f i e d path that d i d away w i t h many o f the complex prayer requirements and chains o f a u t h o r i t y and authorization. It opposed many o f the practices associated w i t h t o m b visitations and the veneration o f holy m e n that w e r e c o m m o n i n N o r t h A f r i c a . The

order

became an effective vehicle for o r g a n i z i n g efforts t o r e f o r m society and to enforce a more strict adherence to Islamic law and practice. As al-Tijani's f o l l o w i n g grew, O t t o m a n authorities i n Algeria compelled h i m to leave and he settled i n Fez. M o r o c c o at that t i m e was under the rule o f a r e n e w a l - m i n d e d sultan, Mawlay Sulayman, w h o w e l c o m e d al-Tijani and p r o vided h i m and his order w i t h support and patronage. The Tijaniyyah i n return p r o v i d e d an i m p o r t a n t source o f support for the sultan i n his campaigns to l i m i t the power o f the marabouts and the sharifs (descendants o f the Prophet). Mawlay Sulayman was h i m s e l f an i m p o r t a n t representative o f the renewalist t r a d i t i o n , c o m m i t t i n g the state to a m o r e activist role. A l t h o u g h he is o f t e n identified as sympathetic to the Wahhabis, and is quoted as saying that he was " M a l i k i i n law but H a n b a l i [sometimes q u o t e d as " w a h h a b i " ] i n d o c t r i n e , " he was n o t as extreme as M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhab i n his o p p o s i t i o n to Sufi concepts and practices. As a result, the Tijaniyyah provided an i m p o r t a n t expression o f this style o f renewalism. A l t h o u g h the Tijaniyyah order was closely i d e n t i f i e d w i t h governmental structures and was sometimes an i m p o r t a n t force for social stability, it also p r o v i d e d the means for organizing effective o p p o s i t i o n . Al-Tijani's w o r k was an i m p o r t a n t transition. H i s tariqah was presented and conceived w i t h i n older traditions o f piety and renewal, but d u r i n g the nineteenth century it became a vehicle b o t h for jihad o p p o s i t i o n to European i m p e r i a l expansion i n Africa and for w o r k i n g w i t h the new i m p e r i a l rulers. Sufi orders were also laying the foundations at this rime for later jihad opposition to imperial expansions. Followers o f Shaykh Khalid al-Baghdadi spread the Khalidiyyah-Naqshbandiyyah orders i n t o such regions o f the Caucasus as Dagestan and Chechnya, where Islam itself was expanding at the same time as Russian i m p e rial conquest was intensifying. I n the early years o f the nineteenth century these activities d i d not create < >pen militant < >ppi isition but rather laid the organizational foundations for m i d c e n t u r y jihads. Shaykh Ismail a l - K u r d u m i r i , a follower o f

FOUNDATIONS

Khalid,

was

active

FOR RENEWAL

A N DREFORM

533

in

Shirvan ( w h i c h n o w forms a

part

of

northeastern

Azerbaijan) i n the 1810s but was forced to leave w h e n the Russians t o o k c o n t r o l o f the khanate i n 1820. I n Dagestan, Russian p u n i t i v e expeditions a n d economic policies created problems and disruptions for die general populace, w h i l e i n Chechnya

pro-

grams o f setding Cossacks o n Chechen lands and m i l itary

sanctions

created

additional hardships. Many o f the local rulers s u b m i t ted to Russian rule as a way

Iman Shamil, who led the Muslims of Dagestan and Chechnya in their resistance to Russian rule, posed for this fiercely formal portrait around 1890.

o f preserving some o f their o w n positions, so that the political estabhshment was increasingly discredited. I n this context the message o f the rencwalist Naqshbandiyyah order had strong p o p ular appeal, a n d the movement grew under the leadership o f M u h a m m a d a l Yaraghi, a student o f Shaykh Ismail. A l t h o u g h there were many uprisings against Russian rule, w h i c h the Russians attributed to al-Yaraghi's followers, there were few organized jihad efforts at first. Al-Yaraghi's first concern was t o establish respect for and adherence to Islamic law and to r e f o r m local practice. In this context the message was that it was p e r m i t t e d t o submit t o Russian rule until the conditions were appropriate for a victorious jihad. The Russian victory i n 1829 over the Ottomans changed the situation, however, as many local rulers prepared to surrender t o the Russians. I n 1829 a gathering o f tariqah leaders under the leadership o f the i m a m o f Dagestan met t o organize what was to become thirty years o f militant resistance to Russian expansion under a series o f imams, i n c l u d i n g the most famous, i m a m Shamil (1798-1871). M o r e m i l i t a n t movements developed i n this era o f transition i n a n u m b e r o f areas. I n Southeast Asia the renewalism o f such eighteenth-century teachers as Tuanku N a n Tua i n Sumatra laid the foundations for m o r e activist revivalism at the b e g i n n i n g o f the nineteenth century. A m o n g the most i m p o r t a n t o f the resulting groups was the Padri movement. I n 1803 a small g r o u p i n c l u d i n g a f o r m e r student o f Tuanku Nan Tua, Hajji M i s k i n , returned f r o m a p i l g r i m a g e t o

Çj4

THB

OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

Mecca. Their pilgrimage experience had c o n f i r m e d their conviction o f the need for m o r e explicit adherence to the fundamentals o f Islam. The results o f their first efforts at r e f o r m were l i m i t e d , and soon Padri leaders established '•$w>

JM,-

c o n t r o l over certain villages, w h i c h were reorganized as B

special separate c o m m u n i t i e s i n w h i c h popular religious customs were f o r b i d d e n , the inhabitants w o r e distinctive c l o t h i n g , and Islamic practice was enforced. The Padri villages engaged i n jihads against nonadherent villages and the local monarchy, and by 1819 they seemed poised to gain f u l l control over the Minangkabau r e g i o n . At that t i m e , however, the D u t c h had returned to Southeast Asia f o l l o w i n g Napoleon's defeat and w o r k e d t o establish c o n t r o l i n Sumatra and other m a j o r islands. The r e m a i n i n g leaders o f the local m o n a r c h y and anti-Padri v illage leaders q u i c k l y accepted D u t c h sovereignty and j o i n e d the D u t c h i n fighting Padri c o n t r o l . The relationship between the rise o f the Padri m o v e m e n t and the expansion o f European states is complex. I n many ways the Padri movement can be viewed as a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f long-established renewalist traditions.

In nineteenth-century Sumatra, leaders of the local monarchy joined the Dutch in opposing the revivalist

However, the socioeconomic

context o f village life i n

Sumatra was being changed significantly already i n the

Padri movement based in coffee-growing villages.

eighteenth century. Later that century the d e m a n d for

Following the Padri War of 1821-38, the Dutch retained

coffee i n the w o r l d market expanded rapidly and p r o -

administrative control, and the Great Mosque in the

v i d e d n e w w e a l t h f o r the c o f f e e - g r o w i n g areas o f

capital Kota Raja on the north coast was built under their auspices.

Sumatra. The more f o r m a l Islamic school-centers had p r o v i d e d i m p o r t a n t regulation for the developing trade networks. W h e n the Padri movement developed, some o f

its i m p o r t a n t centers were coffee villages, and this may have p r o v i d e d the econ o m i c resources necessary f o r the establishment o f the independent renewalist village c o m m u n i t i e s . I n this way, a l t h o u g h the early goals were w i t h i n the older renewalist traditions, the context was new. Soon, however, the early renewalist jihad became the Padri War o f 1821-1838, a war o f anti-imperialist resistance as w e l l as a j i h a d . In Java the restoration o f D u t c h rule f o l l o w i n g the hiatus o f the Napoleonic era was a t i m e f o r a similar c o m b i n a t i o n o f Islamic revivalism and a n t i - i m p e r i alism. D u r i n g the eighteenth century some o f the o l d princely states, b u i l t o n a c o m b i n a t i o n o f local traditions o f d i v i n e rule and Islamic concepts, had been supported by the D u t c h East India Company i n their rivalry w i t h the ulama,

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whose ideas were m o r e i n accord w i t h the cosmopolitan, m o r e standard articulation o f Islam. By the b e g i n n i n g o f the nineteenth century, some D u t c h officials had begun t o establish a m o r e centralized c o n t r o l , and these trends were emphasized w h e n the British took c o n t r o l o f Java i n 1811 and f u r t h e r strengthened w h e n the D u t c h returned to Java i n 1816. As the D u t c h i m p o s e d increasing taxes and controls o n court elites and the peasantry alike, discontent grew and reached a breaking p o i n t i n 1825. D i p o N e g o r o (ca. 1785-1855), a prince w i t h a reputat i o n for piety and mysdc v i s i o n , came i n t o conflict w i t h a D u t c h official and a major conflict broke o u t . A m o n g his early and strongest supporters were the leading ulama, w h o l e d h i m t o assume the role o f head o f the c o m m u n i t y o f faith, and the conflict rapidly took o n the character o f a jihad. I n this conflict, often called the Java War o f 1825-1830, the D u t c h tended t o identify Islam as the basis for o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e m , and the w a r took o n the tone o f being an antiimperialist j i h a d . D u t c h m i l i t a r y superiority, and eventually divisions a m o n g the resistance, b r o u g h t an end to the war after m u c h loss o f life and property. One i m p o r t a n t consequence o f the w a r was that renewalist, ulama-defined Islam became i d e n t i f i e d w i t h o p p o s i t i o n t o f o r e i g n r u l e . T h e D u t c h , i n response, w o r k e d t o associate the o l d court elites w i t h their r u l e , leaving cosmopolitan Islam as the ideology o f revolt and g i v i n g added strength t o the processes o f Islamization o f social life a m o n g the peasantry. M i l i t a n t movements o f renewal also w^ere an i m p o r t a n t part o f this era o f transition i n West Africa, w h e r e the well-established t r a d i t i o n o f reformist jihad reached a c u l m i n a t i o n i n the movement o f U t h m a n d a n Fodio

(1755-1817).

T h r o u g h o u t Hausaland, as was c o m m o n elsewhere i n West Africa, Islam was an increasingly i m p o r t a n t part o f society, and the political systems reflected the efforts t o c o m b i n e M u s l i m and local traditions. As the n u m b e r and importance o f M u s l i m scholars i n these societies grew, their ability to challenge the validity o f the synergistic systems strengthened. Dan Fodio was b o r n i n t o a Fulani f a m ily o f M u s l i m scholars i n the Hausa k i n g d o m o f Gobir, i n the n o r t h e r n r e g i o n o f m o d e r n Nigeria. He received a standard education and became associated w i t h the r e n e w a l - m i n d e d teacher Jibril i b n U m a r and w i t h the Q a d i r i y y a h order. He began a career as an itinerant scholar i n 1774 and taught f o r a w^hile i n the court o f Gobir. H e insisted o n a m o r e explicit adherence t o Islamic practices and was strongly critical o f compromises w i t h local cultural traditions and practices. H e c o m b i n e d a knowledge o f M u s l i m law (and clear loyalty t o the M a l i k i legal school) w i t h a strong sense o f mystical experience w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f Sufism. Dan Fodio was a talented w r i t e r o f b o t h scholarly literature and popular poetry, and he soon gained a substantial f o l l o w i n g . W h e n the ruler o f G o b i r attempted t o place restrictions o n dan Fodio and his followers, an open conflict resulted. The teacher left G o b i r t e r r i t o r y and estab-

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lished a separate c o m m u n a l society i n w h i c h dan Fodio was recognized as the i m a m and head o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . H e also became the c o m m a n d e r o f the believers i n a jihad declared against the Hausa states i n 1804. M u c h o f the actual leadership o f the m i l i t a r y campaigns and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was i n the hands o f dan Fodio's brother, Shaykh Abdallah, and dan Fodio's son, M u h a m m a d Bello, w h o succeeded his father as commander o f the believers i n 1817.

By 1808 the

jihad had defeated most o f the major Hausa states and continued to expand i n t o the Lake Chad region and other areas. The state established by dan Fodio is k n o w n as the Caliphate o f Sokoto, w h i c h he led as " c a l i p h , " w i t h his brother c o n t r o l l i n g the western t e r r i t o r i e s and his son the eastern lands. In m a n y ways the Sokoto state was still a s y n thesis of Islamic and Hausa m o n a r c h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , b u t Islamic law had a substantial and h i g h l y visible role in d e f i n i n g p o l i c y and the legal system. The j i h a d state represented a significant phase i n the Islamization o f society i n West A f r i c a i n w h i c h M u s l i m scholars and teachers gained a p r i m a r y role i n the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f the p u b l i c dimensions o f c i v i l society, and the state system was changed f r o m a basically Sudanic m o n a r c h y that tolerated Islam to a f o r m a l l y Islamic state that c o n t i n u e d to use some o f the f o r m s and customs o f the earlier Sudanic-Hausa monarchies. This l a i d the basis f o r m u c h o f state and society i n m o d e r n West A f r i c a . In b o t h the large central states o f the M u s l i m w o r l d and the societies o n the frontiers, significant changes were taking place i n terms o f adaptations o f basic institutions and perspectives to new conditions. Such changes can be viewed as being a n o r m a l part o f the dynamics o f the history and development o f great societies. Movements o f Islamic renewal had l o n g been a part o f M u s l i m historical experiences. These changes can also be seen w i t h i n a m o r e global framew o r k , however. T h r o u g h o u t the m a j o r societies o f the w o r l d , there were significant transformations taking place. I n all major urban societies the basic structure o f the sociopolitical order was i n a process o f transformation involvi n g b o t h local and global factors. The victory o f Western industrial-imperial societies i n global rnilitary and p o l i t ical terms focused attention o n the influence and impact o f the Western models o n die rest o f the w o r l d . However, the movements o f Islamic renewal i n the era o f transition at the beginning o f the nineteenth century show that there was still a strong development o f institudonal alternatives that were emerging w i t h o u t direct i n f l u ence ofWestern models or attack. There were many efforts to reformulate the way state and society should operate, ranging f r o m the efforts o f U t h m a n dan Fodio and Sayyid A h m a d Barelwi to create new Islamic societies to the more reformist and less radical Sufi affiliations developed by Ahmad al-Tijani and A h m a d i b n Idris. The European expansion efforts tended to o v e r w h e l m and preempt these efforts, so that

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the context o f M u s l i m renewalism was transformed d u r i n g the nineteenth century, but the traditions o f Islamic renewal d i d not disappear.

The Warrior-Defenders of the Faith The M u s l i m w o r l d faced the m i l i t a r y powers o f European i m p e r i a l expansion i n many different areas. I n the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century an i m p o r t a n t part o f the M u s l i m response took the f o r m o f jihads organized by m o r e traditional movements o f Islamic renewal. Many o f these early movements had begun as efforts o f r e f o r m w i t h i n society and were o n l y later d r a w n i n t o conflict w i t h European forces. By m i d c e n t u r y , however, n e w movements o f Islamic revival developed i n direct response to European attack, a l t h o u g h the older type o f e v o l u t i o n f r o m movements o f local renewal to jihads defending against i m p e r i a l expansion c o n t i n u e d to be i m p o r t a n t . Some o f the most effective efforts o f m i l i t a r y o p p o s i t i o n to European expansion were these m o v e ments, w h i l e the n e w l y m o d e r n i z e d armies o f the larger M u s l i m states proved to be m u c h less o f an obstacle to the European forces. The e m e r g i n g w a r r i o r - d e f e n d e r s o f the M u s l i m w o r l d were n o t L u d d i t e opponents o f n e w technologies or methodologies. W h e n m o d e r n weapons were available, they were used by the renewalists. The strength o f these movements, however, came f r o m their abilities to m o b i l i z e large numbers o f people i n organizations w h o s e formats were familiar. Most frequently, the n e w defense groups were Sufi tariqahs i n structure, i n their self-definition, and i n their leadership. A n additional source o f strength for these movements was that they were able t o use the tactics o f guerrilla warfare o f a m o d e r n style l o n g before these had been m o r e f o r m a l l y defined by M a o Zedong. Militant j i h a d movements were not as i m p o r t a n t a factor i n the large central M u s l i m states as they were i n other parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d d u r i n g the n i n e teenth century. Significant movements o f explicitly Islamic r e f o r m d i d develop i n the central O t t o m a n lands. However, they were not actively advocating jihads, n o r were they w i t h i n m o r e traditional organizational formats that provided a basis for militant renewal movements i n other parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d . Instead, this r e f o r m i s m that developed i n the second half o f the nineteenth century w o u l d later be called "Islamic m o d e r n i s m . " Major governmental r e f o r m programs i n the central lands o f the O t t o m a n Empire were p r i m a r i l y efforts i n m o d e r n i z a t i o n using Western models and inspiration rather than being actions o f Islamic renewal and were part o f the rulers' o n g o i n g activities to strengthen the empire. Movements diat sought to affirm a historical identity or tradition often developed i n nationalist rather than religious forms. Nationalism among the n o n - M u s l i m peoples w i t h i n the O t t o m a n Empire developed as an early and p o w e r f u l force o f o p p o -

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sition. Later i n the century nationalist sentiments also were manifested among Muslims i n the empire w h o advocated significant change, eitiier demanding recogn i t i o n o f their rights as citizens w i t i r i n the empire or independence. I n this way assertions o f identity and demands for political r e f o r m among Arabs i n the O t t o m a n Empire began to be articulated i n nationalist terms by the end o f the century. D u r i n g W o r l d War I , w h e n there was a significant revolt against Ottoman rule i n Arab lands, even t h o u g h i t was led by the Grand Sharif o f Mecca, the movement was k n o w n as the "Arab Revolt" and made n o claims o f offering a program o f Islamic renewal. Although the Grand Sharif suggested that he m i g h t be named caliph, this was a political proposal rather than a statement of advocacy for a program of Muslim revival. I n Egypt the dynasty established by M u h a m m a d Ali achieved a h i g h degree o f autonomy w i t h i n the O t t o m a n Empire and was actively reformist i n policy, but its p r o g r a m was based o n westernization rather than Islamic renewal. Late i n the century, similarly, the emergence o f a movement o f Egyptian nationalism sometimes made appeals for popular support i n Islamic terms, but i t was p r i m a r i l y a nationalist movement i n more secular and Western terms than an Islamic movement. I n Qajar d o m a i n s , g o v e r n m e n t a l r e f o r m was also i n the f r a m e w o r k o f attempting t o m o d e r n i z e i n the Western m o d e . Outside o f the movement o f the Bab, there was little p o p u l a r m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r e x p l i c i t l y Islamic m o t i v a t i o n s o f r e f o r m or societal transformation. By the end o f the century n e w Iranian n a t i o n alism was b e g i n n i n g to emerge as a synthesis o f m o r e traditional groups w i t h those created by the economic a n d cultural changes o f the m o d e r n era. The o p p o s i t i o n t o the Tobacco Concession o f 1890 and the Constitutional Revolution o f 190c—06 were crucial parts o f the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f Iranian politics b u t i n many ways were not basically movements o f Islamic renewal. M i l i t a n t movements d i d develop i n the t h i r d m a j o r central M u s l i m state, the M u g h a l sultanate o f I n d i a , and this reflected the m i l i t a n c y and renewalism o f the transitional era, w h i c h i n many ways were parallel to the m o v e m e n t o f Sayyid A h m a d Barelwi. A student o f Barelwi, T i t u M i r (1782—1831), r e t u r n e d t o h i s h o m e o f western Bengal and gathered a g r o u p o f followers, w h o f o r m e d a separate c o m m u n i t y distinguished by dress and dietary restrictions. T i t u M i r emphasized strict adherence t o Islamic law and soon came i n t o conflict b o t h w i t h the Sufi orders and the local landlords, w h o feared his ability t o arouse and organize their peasant tenants. After he declared a j i h a d , he was k i l l e d i n 1831 by the m i l itary forces sent t o suppress his u p r i s i n g . Similar t o some other movements o f the t i m e , T i t u M i r attempted t o create an alternative society. A m o r e significant and broad-based m i l i t a n t m o v e m e n t developed i n eastern Bengal under the leadership o f Hajji Shariat Allah (1781-1840), w h o was b o r n i n Bengal and had lived and studied f o r an extended p e r i o d o f t i m e i n Mecca. W h e n he r e t u r n e d t o Bengal, he organized an e f f o r t t o impose a stricter obser-

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vance o f the faraid (religious duties), and his m o v e m e n t became k n o w n as the Faraidi. He gained a large n u m b e r o f followers, especially a m o n g the peasants and w o r k e r s , w h o were increasingly oppressed by B r i t i s h plantation owners and H i n d u landlords. F o l l o w i n g his death i n 1838, his son, D u d u M i a n (1819-62) gave the m o v e m e n t a m o r e explicitly c o m m u n a l organization w i t h a h i e r a r c h i cal administrative organization. The Faraidi clashed w i t h authorities, and D u d u M i a n was jailed a n u m b e r o f times. The more exphcitly Islamic movements that resulted i n militant o p p o s i t i o n to existing conditions and the declarations o f jihads were n o t p r i m a r i l y aimed at combatting the expansion o f British control i n India. They d i d involve conflict w i t h British authorities, however. The largest uprising to be specifically chrected against the British i n the nineteenth century was the great revolt i n 1857, sometimes called the Sepoy Mutiny. The cumulative pressures o f British policies helped to create conditions w i t h i n w h i c h g r o w i n g Indian frustration expressed itself i n a w i d e spread revolt against British authorities i n w h i c h M u s l i m s and H i n d u s joined together. The British crushed o p p o s i t i o n severely and f o r m a l l y abolished the M u g h a l sultanate, as w e l l as b r i n g i n g an end to the administration o f the British East India Company. A w i d e spectrum o f M u s l i m leaders participated, but the u p r i s i n g d i d not assume the character o f a unified jihad. Despite the fact that manyBritish officials continued to believe that there was a major threat to British rule

The Qajar palace in Tehran, seen here in a photograph taken by W. L. Schnaider around 1913, symbolized the old regime in Iran. In the late nineteenth century reformers attempted to modernize the country following Western models. During the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah (r. 1896-1907), they demanded political reforms, including a new constitution.

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f r o m M u s l i m militants, the events o f 1857 marked the end o f the era o f potentially effective jihad movements i n South Asia u n t i l w e l l i n t o the twentieth century Warrior-defenders o f the faith were m o r e active i n a n u m b e r o f the M u s l i m world's f r o n t i e r areas. A l t h o u g h the movements c o n t i n u e d t o be i n s p i r e d by renewalist traditions, many came t o be increasingly involved i n efforts o f o p p o sition t o expanding European c o n t r o l and less concerned w i t h the p u r i f i c a t i o n o f local practices. Some movements were direct continuations o f earlier renewal movements, w h i l e others represented new organizations or traditions. In a number o f areas, Sufi orders provided a framework for some o f the most effective resistance t o European imperial expansion. I n the Caucasus r e g i o n the foundations laid b y Naqshbandi shaykhs earlier i n the century opened the way for leaders t o organize j i h a d o p p o s i t i o n to Russian i m p e r i a l rule as the Russians attempted to consolidate control i n the region. A series o f active imams inspired the peasants i n the region, especially i n Chechnya and Dagestan, t o rise i n jdiad against the Russians. These imams continued the dual emphasis o f fighting the foreigners and insisting o n rejection o f local religious customs, replacing t h e m by a more strict adherence to Islam. I n this way the Naqshbandi h o l y wars were an important part o f the Islamization process o f the societies as w e l l as a significant deterrent to imperialist expansion. The jihads began i n the 1820s and reached their peak o f effectiveness under the leadership o f I m a m Shamil, w h o led the w a r effort f r o m 1834 u n t i l 18C9. A l t h o u g h the movement was defeated and its leaders kdled or i n exde, the Naqshbandiyyah and activist Islam remained a force i n the region. There was another u p r i s i n g i n 1877, and i n the i n t e r i m p e r i o d between the collapse o f the czarist state and the establishment o f C o m m u n i s t rule at the end o f W o r l d War I , the Naqshbandiyyah established a short-lived imamate. The l o n g - t e r m impact is reflected i n the fact that a portrait o f I m a m Shamil continues to have a place o f h o n o r i n offices o f officials i n post-Soviet Dagestan. The Q a d i r i y y a h tariqah developed along parallel lines i n the Caucasus and was at times i n alliance w i t h the Naqshbandiyyah order; at at other times they were competitors f o r influence a n d support. The Q a d i r i y y a h was b r o u g h t t o the r e g i o n by Kunta H a j i Kishiev, w h o was b o r n i n Dagestan and lived i n Chechnya. H e j o i n e d the order w h i l e o n p i l g r i m a g e , and o n his r e t u r n i n 1861, after the defeat o f I m a m Shamil, he advocated acceptance o f Russian r u l e and was less puritanical i n his devotional path. H e gained a large f o l l o w i n g i n a r e g i o n that was exhausted by decades o f fighting, and Q a d i r i teachers successfully c o n t i n ued the process o f the conversion o f the Ingusheuans (people w h o l i v e d i n a region n o r t h o f the Caucasus Mountains and west o f Chechnya), whose conversion was completed b y the 1870s. The Russian rulers feared the rapidly g r o w i n g tariqah, however, and arrested Kunta H a j i , w h o died i n p r i s o n i n 1867. The m e m bers o f the Q a d i r i y y a h took an active role i n the major revolt o f 1877, j o i n i n g

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w i t h the Naqshbandiyyah. A l t h o u g h advocacy o f a j i h a d was abandoned, b o t h orders were major forces, w i t h Q a d i r i influence strongest i n Chechnya and the Naqshbandiyyah strongest i n Dagestan. French i m p e r i a l expansion i n N o r t h Africa i n the first h a l f o f the nineteenth century f o u n d its most effective o p p o n e n t i n a leader o f the Q a d i r i y y a h tariqah, the a m i r A b d al-Qadir (1808-83 )• The French invaded Algeria i n 1830 and rapidlyconquered the coastal cities, b r i n g i n g an end to O t t o m a n rule i n the country. A b d al-Qadir's father, Sidi M u h y i a l - D i n al-Hasani, was the head o f the Q a d i r i y y a h i n the r e g i o n , and he declared a j i h a d against the European invasion. A b d al-Qadir assumed leadership o f the resistance and soon w o r k e d t o establish a M u s l i m state i n w h i c h he t o o k the title o f the c o m m a n d e r o f the believers. The n e w c o m m u n i t y was t o be a state organized i n the traditions o f renewalism as w e l l as an army engaged i n j i h a d . The c o m b i n a t i o n o f the state organization and the Sufi f o u n dations f o r loyalty created an effective vehicle f o r m o b i l i z i n g tribal o p p o s i t i o n to the French as w e l l as creating a n e w m i l i t a r y force. A b d al-Qadir and the French alternated between open w a r and negotiations. A t one p o i n t i n the conflict i n 1837, there was a treaty that p r o v i d e d m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n f o r the French r u l e i n die urban areas and A b d al-Qadir's a u t h o r i t y i n some i n t e r i o r areas. Hostilities restimed, however, a n d the French

finally

defeated A b d al-Qadir's forces i n 1847. A b d al-Qadir w e n t i n t o exile, finally sett l i n g i n Damascus, w h e r e he d i e d . Most effective resistance t o the French ended w i t h the defeat o f A b d al-Qadir, but there were some significant o p p o s i t i o n movements after 1847. There were a n u m b e r o f movements led by people c l a i m i n g messianic authority, w h i c h were rapidly

suppressed.

I n this

turmoil

a recently

established

t a r i q a h , the

Rahmaniyyah, played an i m p o r t a n t role. I n 1870-71 the various movements o f local discontent were b r o u g h t together i n a major u p r i s i n g w h e n a local a d m i n istrator, M u h a m m a d a l - M u q r a n i , w o r k e d w i t h leaders o f the Rahmaniyyah order i n eastern Algeria to oppose French rule. After the defeat o f the o p p o s i t i o n forces, the French confiscated large amounts o f land and w o r k e d to complete the process o f the destruction o f Algerian M u s l i m society. The c o m b i n a t i o n o f renewalist r e f o r m o f M u s l i m society w i t h a j i h a d against foreign c o n t r o l w i t h i n the organizational f r a m e w o r k o f Sufi orders c o n t i n u e d t o be one o f the most visible modes o f Islamic r e f o r m i n many areas o f the M u s l i m w o r l d i n the nineteenth century. The l o n g t r a d i t i o n o f such r e f o r m movements i n West Africa continued w i t h great strength t h r o u g h o u t most o f the century. The successors t o U t h m a n dan F o d i o i n the j i h a d states maintained an advocacy o f renewalism but n o w w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f an established state structure. This meant that w h e n Great Britain established control i n N i g e r i a , the leaders o f the dan Fodio t r a d i t i o n represented states that came t o an agreement w i t h the B r i t i s h

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rather than creating a new jihad m o v e m e n t . I n the Senegambia r e g i o n , the Tijaniyyah order was a vehicle for a m a j o r renewalist jihad. Al-Hajj U m a r Tal (1794-1864) c o m b i n e d many important lines o f renewalism. He was b o r n in Futa Toro, the heartland o f die o l d jihad tradition, and went o n a pilgrimage i n 1826 to Mecca, where he was initiated i n t o the Tijaniyyah. O n his r e t u r n to West Africa he stayed i n Sokoto, where he m a r r i e d a granddaughter o f Utlrman dan Fodio. W h e n U m a r arrived back i n his h o m e l a n d . he began an major effort to oppose compromises w i t h local religious customs and to create an authentically Islamic c o m m u n i t y . He created an army that used French weapons and gained a large following. He declared a jihad i n 1852, conquered Futo Toro, and established a new jihad state o f w h i c h he was the commander o f the believers. U m a r used the hierarchical organizational principles as well as many o f the theological concepts o f the Tijaniyyah order in creating his movement. Ulnar's new state soon came i n t o direct conflict w i t h the French i n the Senegal River valley. H e was defeated h i i860 and signed a treaty w i t h the French. I n Ms r e f o r m activities he came i n t o conflict w i t h M u s l i m groups along die Niger valley, especially facing the Qadiriyyah order led by the Kunta family, w h o had emerged as a major force by this time. A coalition o f forces opposed to U m a r defeated and killed h i m i n 1864. However, he had established a strong enough political system so that Ms son succeeded h i m as ruler o f a smaller state centered around HamdallaM i n the Niger bend region, w h i c h lasted u n t i l the French conquest o f the area i n 1893. The vitality and appeal o f the renewalist message, as w e l l as its viability i n the context o f nineteenth-century West A f r i c a , are s h o w n by the n u m b e r o f other jihad movements that were relatively successful. Each movement built on a base o f reformist mission and w o r k e d to establish a separate and authentic alternative c o m m u n i t y . For example, Ma Ba ( 1 8 0 9 - 6 7 ) , a teacher i n Gambia, declared a j i h a d against the political leaders o f his area t o establish an Islamic state. H e was aided by Lat Dior, a local ruler w h o had been deposed by the French and w h o c o n t i n ued the efforts to expand the Islamic state after Ma Ba's death i n 1867. These and other smaller jihad efforts resulted i n the effective conversion o f the W o l o f people t o Islam and hastened the Islamization o f society. I n many ways the final phase o f the older jihad t r a d i t i o n i n West Africa came w i t h the career o f Samory Ture (ca. 1830-1900), w h o was b o r n i n Guinea and spent his early fife as a merchant w o r k i n g in the area's trade networks. He t h e n became a soldier and a student i n a small jihad state established by a local c o m mander, M o r e - U l e Sise, and i n 1845

he succeeded Sise as the state's leader.

Samory transformed the state i n t o a m a j o r conquest e m p i r e i n the 1870s a n d 1880s. He created as m o d e r n an army as was possible at the t i m e and established M u s l i m teachers as officials i n his conquered territories t o ensure compliance w i t h Islamic law. He actively destroy ed non-Islamic religious sites and cult s y m -

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bols. H e came i n t o conflict w i t h the French and came to an agreement w i t h t h e m that caused h i m to shift his state to the east i n the upper Volta r e g i o n . I n the 1890s, however, Samory f o u g h t w i t h b o t h the French and the B r i t i s h , was defeated i n 1898, and died i n exile i n

1900.

In the 1890s British and French m i l i t a r y expansion b r o u g h t European c o n t r o l to all o f the areas o f western and central Africa. The existence o f an independent African-ruled state i n any f o r m was no longer possible. The long tradition o f the jihad states came to an end as Samory was defeated, the last o f the followers o f alHajj U m a r Tal were conquered, and the territories o f the Sokoto caliphate were occupied by the British. For t w o centuries, however, the c o m b i n a t i o n o f a renewal mission, opposition to local non-Islamic customs, and defense against foreign rule provided a h i g h l y successful format for the efforts to create alternative, authentically Islamic communities and states. For a time these jihad states were m o r e effective than virmally all other alternatives i n resisting European expansion. In Southeast Asia m u c h o f the region had already come under European control by the midcentury, and even the earl)' nineteenth-century warrior-defenders had been engaged i n major and-imperialist jihads. D u r i n g the second half o f the century, i n broad terms, there was a significant development o f greater involvement i n activities o f M u s l i m piety. M u c h o f this was related to the impact o f European expansion. The opening o f new transportation facilities meant that many more people went o n the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the expansion o f m o d e r n means o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n meant that many more Muslims i n Southeast Asia had access to the w o r l d o f Islamic learning. A significant c o m m u n i t y o f scholars f r o m Southeast Asia developed i n Mecca, and p i l g r i m s studied w i t h these scholars and became affiliated w i t h major tariqahs. O n their return home, the orders provided structure for renewalist activities. These developments created a larger audience o f support for M u s l i m renewalism, although this d i d not inevitably involve jihad. The D u t c h d i d face significant revolts representing the o p p o s i t i o n o f the M u s l i m scholar class and peasants, how evcr, w h i c h was expressed i n terms o f r

renewalist Islamic opposition to b o t h the D u t c h and those local elites w h o w o r k e d w i t h the i m p e r i a l rulers. I n western Java there was a major u p r i s i n g against the Dutch in 1888 i n w h i c h the Qadiriyyah tariqah played a m a j o r role. One o f the longest jihads was the wars i n Acheh, i n n o r t h e r n Sumatra, w h i c h lasted f r o m 1871 to 1908. By the end o f the nineteenth century the D u t c h began to i m p l e m e n t policies that sought to w o r k w i t h less m i l i t a n t ulama rather than v i e w i n g all M u s l i m movements as threats to D u t c h rule. This helped to b r i n g an end to the era o f jihads o f the o l d renewalist style. By the early twentieth century o p p o s i t i o n to the D u t c h began to take o n a more nationalist and less religious tone. One o f the last traditionally conceived jihads organized by Sufi leaders against the European i m p e r i a l powers was i n Somalia. I n the late nineteenth century the

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Somalis faced a n u m b e r o f challenges. The Ethiopian empire was expanding, but more i m p o r t a n t , i n the "scramble for A f r i c a " i n the late nineteenth century Italy, France, and Great B r i t a i n all h o p e d t o gain c o n t r o l o f Somali t e r r i t o r i e s . Territories o f various Somali clans were being conquered by these forces, but the Somalis had n o centralized organization to develop effective o p p o s i t i o n . Somali society was held together by a shared language and poetic traditions and structures o f clan relationships rather than by a more unitary state. The major ties that transcended clan loyalties were affiliations to Sufi orders, the largest o f w h i c h was the Q a d i r i y y a h . It was Sufi organization that provided the basis for the Somali battle against i m p e r i a l expansion at the end o f the nineteenth century. The

leader o f the j i h a d i n Somalia was M u h a m m a d A b d a l l a h

Hasan

(1864—1920), a scholar w h o c o m b i n e d knowledge o f Islamic law- and activist Sufism w i t h a great poetic talent that made his message readily accessible to all Somalis. He was b o r n i n n o r t h - c e n t r a l Somalia i n t o a family w i t h some reputat i o n f o r Islamic learning and piety. He received a standard M u s l i m education, travehng as a y o u n g man to such regional centers o f Islamic learning as Harer and M o g a d i s h u . I n 1893—94 he w e n t o n a pilgrimage and studied for a t i m e i n Mecca and Medina. W h i l e there he came i n t o contact w i t h Shaykh M u h a m m a d i b n Salih al-Rashidi, w h o initiated h i m i n t o his n e w l y established order, the Salihiyyah. This order was part o f the broader cluster o f tariqahs f o l l o w i n g the t r a d i t i o n o f A h m a d i b n Idris and helped to c o n f i r m i n M u h a m m a d Abdallah Hasan a sense o f renew alist m i s s i o n . M u h a m m a d Abdallah Hasan returned to Somalia i n the late 1890s and began a campaign o f o p p o s i t i o n to local practices o f veneration o f holy m e n and other activities, such as the use o f tobacco, coffee, and qat (whose leaves are chewed as a s t i m u l a n t ) , w h i c h were not i n accord w i t h a strict interpretation o f Islamic fundamentals. He w o r k e d to p r o m o t e a life o f strict piety and began the process o f establishing a separate c o m m u n a l association that was tied together w i t h i n the f o r m a t o f the Salihiyyah order. This b r o u g h t h i m i n t o conflict w i t h another i m p o r t a n t , n e w l y established tariqah i n Somalia, the U w a y s i y y a h , a branch o f the Q a d i r i y y a h organized by Shaykh Uways al-Barawi (1847-1909). Uways had left his h o m e l a n d o f southern Somalia for a pilgrimage and study and received extended i n s t r u c t i o n i n the Q a d i r i y y a h at the center o f that order i n Baghdad. The Uwaysiyyah believed i n the importance and efficacy o f the m e d i a t i o n o f h o l y m e n , and the traditional practices o f t o m b visitation were an i m p o r t a n t part o f the devotional life o f the Uwaysiyyah. Uways was also w i l l i n g to w o r k w i t h the rulers o f the day, especially the sultans o f Zanzibar, but he also made some a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h Italians. By the 1890s the Uwaysiyyah was a large and influential order along the East A f r i c a n coast. The Uwaysiyyah clashed w i t h the Salihiyyah i n many different ways, and some o f this was reflected i n

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exchanges o f hostile poetry, because Uways was also a talented poet. The rivalry reached a climax w h e n a g r o u p o f members o f the Salihiyyah attacked an agricultural settlement that Uways had established and m u r d e r e d the shaykh i n 1909. By the time o f the k i l l i n g o f Shaykh Uways, the p r i m a r y war i n w h i c h M u h a m m a d Abdallah Hasan was engaged was a j i h a d against European imperialism. In 1899 he had declared a jihad against the British, Italians, and Ethiopians. For a short p e r i o d o f truce, his control was recognized i n 1905 by the British and the Italians, but fighting soon resumed. The c o m m u n i t y that was given recognition by the truce arrangement emphasizes the similarity o f the Salihiyyah's efforts w i t h other jihad groups i n w o r k i n g to create alternative societies i n w h i c h the message o f Islam was comprehensively applied. The jihad soon resumed and continued diroughout W o r l d War I , although the shaykh was unable to benefit f r o m potential German and Turkish support. After the war i n 1920 the British m o u n t e d a major m i l itary campaign that crushed the movement, and M u h a m m a d Abdallah Hasan died in die same year i n a h i d i n g place to w h i c h he had fled. His jihad had succeeded i n slowing European expansion i n die H o r n o f Africa for almost t w o decades.

The Spectrum of Renewal in the Nineteenth Century There were significant movements o f renewal and r e f o r m i n the nineteenth century that were n o t i n the f o r m a t o f the tariqah-oriented movements o f j i h a d . There was a b r o a d spectrum, w h i c h ranged f r o m messianic movements and c o n tinuations o f earlier r e f o r m to expressions o f Islamic r e f o r m w i t h i n the n e w c o n texts o f the m o d e r n era. There was virtually n o part o f the M u s l i m w o r l d that d i d n o t experience some m a j o r renewal and r e f o r m effort. The c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the Wahhabi t r a d i t i o n o f absolutist renewalism was the strongest l i n k to earlier movements. A l t h o u g h many o f the n i n e t e e n t h - c e n m r y movements, like that o f Sayyid A h m a d Barelwi i n India, were identified as W a h h a b i , the o n l y m o v e m e n t that was a direct c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the w o r k o f M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhabi was the reestablishment o f the Wahhabi-Saudi state i n central Arabia. F o l l o w i n g the destruction i n 1818 o f the state established by i b n A b d al-Wahhab and i b n Saud, there were still many people i n central Arabia w h o remained loyal to the Wahhabi cause. I n the m i d d l e o f the century descendants o f i b n Saud reestablished a Saudi state as a small p r i n c i p a l i t y i n N e j d for a t i m e , b u t die f a m i l y was d r i v e n i n t o exile by the end o f the century. The f o u n d a t i o n remained, however, to enable A b d al-Aziz i b n Saud to return i n 1902 a n d restore the Wahhabi-Saudi political system as the m o d e r n k i n g d o m o f Saudi Arabia. W i t h i n this f r a m e w o r k , the concept o f an absolute renewalism that rejected most Sufi practice, demanded strict adherence to a literal interpretation o f Islamic law, and rejected m u c h o f the culture o f m o d e r n Western society c o n t i n u e d to be called the " W a h h a b i "

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m o d e o f renewal and had c o n t i n u i n g influence. The messianic m o d e o f renewal is usually associated w i t h the concept o f the mdhiii, the divinely designated leader w h o w i l l come and f i l l the w o r l d w i t h justice at a t i m e ordained by God. The c o m i n g o f the m a h d i i n the "Last Days" is most frequently identified w i t h Shiite eschatology, but throughout Islamic history there have been been Sunni mahdist movements as well. The best-known m o d e r n mahdist movement began i n the 1880s and was led by M u h a m m a d A h m a d (1844-85), the Sudanese m a h d i . The Sudanese mahdist movement had many o f the characteristics o f other activist Sunni renewalist movements. The m a h d i began his career as an active m e m b e r o f a Sufi order and began to preach against the excesses and n o n Islamic practices o f many o f the people i n his society. At that time Egypt r u l e d Sudan as a result o f M u h a m m a d Ali's conquests. The m a h d i opposed the oppressive Egyptian rule and soon came into direct conflict w i t h Egyptian forces. By 1885 the mahdi's army conquered K h a r t o u m , and a new mahdist state was established i n w h i c h there was a demand for strict adherence to Islamic law as interpreted by the mahdi and then by his successor, Khalifah Abdallahi, w h o ruled Sudan f r o m

1885

until the country was reconquered by an Anglo-Egyptian army i n 1898. A l t h o u g h most other e x p l i c i t l y mahdist movements were relatively small i n the nineteenth century, many jihad movements i n c l u d e d some significant elements o f mahdist expectations. There were strong mahdist themes, for example, i n the movements and teachings o f U t h m a n dan Fodio and al-Hajj U m a r T a l i n West Africa. The success o f the Sudanese m a h d i was w i d e l y k n o w n i n the M u s l i m w o r l d and helped to give strength to the belief that the late nineteenth century, w h i c h was the e n d o f the t h i r t e e n t h Islamic century, was a time o f messianic importance. Mahdist messianism remained an i m p o r t a n t part o f the perspective o f renewal even after the era o f the Sufi-based j i h a d movements had passed. In some areas Islamic renewal efforts and concepts were only part o f the m o t i vation for movements o f M u s l i m activism d u r i n g the nineteenth century. I n China a number o f movements resulted i n the establishment o f M u s l i m states. I n Yunnan a M u s l i m state was proclaimed and maintained f r o m 1856 to 1873, w h i l e a M u s l i m revivalist m o v e m e n t i n the tradition o f the Naqshbandi " n e w teaching" provided the basis for a state i n Shaanxi and H i , w h i c h received r e c o g n i t i o n f r o m Great Britain and Russia d u r i n g the 1870s. It was suppressed by Chinese i m p e r i a l forces, and i n the 1880s diplomatic agreements between the Russian and Chinese empires completed the d i v i s i o n o f M u s l i m Central Asian lands. I n the nineteenth century Islam provided a basis for organizing revolts against oppressive social c o n d i t i o n s i n places as distant as Brazil. D u r i n g the first half o f the century large numbers o f slaves were b r o u g h t directly f r o m West Africa to work i n mines and plantations i n northeastern Brazil. M u s l i m slaves were dhectly involved i n at least t w e n t y revolts i n Bahia province, where most o f the M u s l i m

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slaves had been sent. The most serious o f these was i n 1835 and was explicitlyled by M u s l i m teachers. A l t h o u g h the older traditions o f M u s l i m r e f o r m and renewal had been remarkably successful i n p r o v i d i n g a basis for activist efforts t o hasten the Islamization o f society and for jihads against c o r r u p t and f o r e i g n rulers, the era o f the old-style tariqah-jihad and other older formats for renewal and revolt had passed. Such movements had flourished i n the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but general historical conditions were being transformed by the end o f the nineteenth century. I n region after region the ability t o organize movements i n the o l d formats disappeared as European i m p e r i a l control was firmly established and also as the socioeconomic c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s themselves changed. N e w types o f associations were needed t o provide effective vehicles for mass m o b i l i z a t i o n or for persuasion o f the intellectual elites. The long-standing heritage o f renewal and r e f o r m was n o t disappearing, however. It was, instead, b e g i n n i n g to find new formats and modes o f expression that c o u l d be effective i n the conditions o f the m o d e r n w o r l d . Similar transformations had taken place i n earlier eras o f great societal change. Older concepts o f c o m m u n i t y and c o m m u n a l identity were being challenged by the new ideas o f " n a t i o n , " " n a t i o n a l i s m , " and other ideals. Similarly, the older understandings o f reason and r e l i g i o n , o f science and faith, appeared to require new forms o f articulation w h i l e a f f i r m i n g the fundamental t r u t h o f the Islamic heritage. The older traditions o f renewal and r e f o r m provided i m p o r t a n t resources for the many n e w movements and ideologies that were being developed by Muslims i n many parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d by the nineteenth century. The active affirm a t i o n o f pan-Islamic ideals by Jamal a l - D i n a l - A f g h a n i (1839-97)

a n f

l the

development o f Islamic m o d e r n i s m i n many different f o r m s by M u h a m m a d A b d u h (1849-190.5-) i n Egypt, Sir Sayyid A h m a d Khan (1817-98) i n India, and Ismail Gasprinskii (1851-1914) i n Russia reflect the vitality o f the aspiration f o r Islamic renewal at the b e g i n n i n g o f the t w e n t i e t h century Even i n more secular nationalist movements that developed w i t h i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , there was a strong element o f Islamic renewalist i n s p i r a t i o n . Such movements represent a new era and new ways o f expressing the aspirations o f Islamic renewal. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were an i m p o r t a n t era o f major movements o f Islamic renewal and r e f o r m . These movements had distinctive characteristics, w h i c h made t h e m effective i n the conditions o f the t i m e . By the end o f the nineteenth century, however, b o t h local and global conditions had been transformed. The desire for renewal i n M u s l i m societies d i d n o t end, but the effective ways o f manifesting that aspiration changed. The b e g i n n i n g o f the twentieth century marked the end o f one great era i n the history o f movements o f renewal and r e f o r m and the b e g i n n i n g o f another.

CHAPTER

THIRTEEN

European Colonialism and the Emergence of Modern Muslim States

S.V.R. Nasr

There are today more dian fifty M u s l i m states, extending f r o m the Adas Mountains in the West to the Malay Archipelago i n the East, and f r o m Sub-Saharan Africa to the steppes o f Central Asia. They include some o f the most populous countries i n the w o r l d , such as Indonesia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, as w e l l as some o f the smallest, such as the Maldives and the Comoros. Some are strong states w i t h effective government institutions; others, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, enjoy only a precarious existence. Some, like Mali and Bangladesh, are poor; others, like Libya, Brunei, Turkmenistan, and Saudi Arabia, are endowed w i t h great natural wealth; still

(Left) Islam is a common

others, like Malaysia—the world's seventh most exporting country i n 1997-—owe

thread in die politics of

their wealth t o successful industrialization. Some M u s l i m states are ethnically u n i f o r m ; others include sizable ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities. Nearly the entire spectrum o f social, economic, ideological, institutional, and political expres-

Muslim states and is often crucial in overcoming the ethnic nationalism mat is a legacy of the colonial era.

sions are represented i n these states. From the Islamic Republic o f Iran to secular

Although ethnic rivalries

republics i n the Arab w o r l d or Indonesia, f r o m monarchies i n the Arab w o r l d ,

continue, they can be over-

Malaysia, N i g e r i a (where monarchies rule over provinces), and Brunei, to democ-

shadowed by a sense of

racies i n Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Malaysia, M u s l i m states include great diversity i n politics and the workings o f governments. Despite this diversity, a c o m m o n thread also exists i n the politics o f M u s l i m

Islamic community, as in the celebration of Id by rival factions during the Afghan civil war, following the

states. The most obvious is Islam, not o n l y as a faith but also as a source o f i d e n -

expulsion of the Soviet army

tity and an i m p o r t a n t factor i n social relations and politics. Islam has l o n g been

in 1989.

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i m p o r t a n t t o M u s l i m politics. It has played a role i n the struggles for liberation f r o m colonialism i n Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the M i d d l e East. I n various stages o f the colonial era, Islamic forces, thinkers, and political leaders have played an i m p o r t a n t part i n shaping M u s l i m politics. Liberation f r o m c o l o n i a l i s m was elaborated as an Islamic m o v e m e n t , f r o m Sayyid A h m a d Shahids (1786-1831) u p r i s i n g i n I n d i a i n 1826 t o the a n d - i m p e r i a l i s t undertakings o f Iran's M i r z a Hasan Shirazi (1815-94)

a n d Shaykh Fadlullah N u r i

( ' 8 4 3 - " 9 0 9 ) o r Central Asia's I m a m Shanul (1796-1871), Algeria's A m i r A h d a l Qadir ( 1 8 0 8 - 8 3 ) , Somaliland's M u h a m m a d i b n A b d i l l e Hasan (1864-1920), Sudan's M a h d i ( d . 1885), Iran's j a m a l al-Din a l - A f g h a n i (1838-87), o r the Tijani jihads ( h o l y wars) i n West Africa between the 1780s a n d the 1880s (the Sokoto caliphate o f U t h m a n dan Fodio [c. 1754-1817] and the revolt o f al-Hajj U l n a r Tal o f FutaToro [c. 1794-1864]). Other "Islamic" movements have i n c l u d e d Malaya's H i z b u l Islam (Islamic Party), India's Jamiat-i U l a m a - i H i n d (Party o f U l a m a ) , Iran's Shiite ulama i n the 1920s, Libya's Sanusiyyah ( l e d b y U m a r Mukhtar, Anticolonialists in the Muslim lands have often invoked Islam in their struggle for liberation from

1858-1931), o r Egypt's M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d . The M u s l i m leaders o f various intellectual endeavors d u r i n g the colonial p e r i o d have i n c l u d e d M u h a m m a d Iqbal (1877-1938), A b u l - K a l a m Azad (1888—1958), and India's Mawlana Husain A h m a d M a d a n i (1879-1957) and Mawlana A b u l - A l a M a w d u d i ( 1 9 0 3 - 7 9 ) , later

imperialism. Chechnya's war

o f Pakistan. These movements and thinkers were a m o n g the first to organize an

of liberation against Russia

i n d i g i n o u s anticolonial m o v e m e n t . They articulated anticolonialism i n the l a n -

in 1996 is one of the most

guage o f the j i h a d , relating struggles for l i b e r a t i o n t o Islam—a p o w e r f u l para-

recent examples. It left

digm

much of Grozny, the capital, in ruins.

that continues

today t o be relevant

to M u s l i m

struggles

against

i m p e r i a l i s m , most lately i n the Afghan jihad against the Soviet U n i o n i n the 1980s

E U R O P E A N C O L O N I A L I S M A N D T H E E M E R G E N C E O F M O D E R N M U S L I M STATES

and Chechnya's w a r o f liberation against Russia i n

Ç ÇI

1996.

In this the Islamic movements were the precursors to the later nationalist uprisings. I n Indonesia the efforts o f M a s j u m i (Majlis Sjuro M u s l i m i n Indonesia, the consultative c o u n c i l o f Indonesian M u s l i m s ) w o u l d play an i m p o r t a n t role i n nationalist anticolonialism efforts and early state f o r m a t i o n i n Indonesia. Later, Islam influenced the values and the goals o f p o l itics, and i n recent years Islamist movements have redefined the nature o f politics and laid claim to control o f the state. The continued political importance o f Islam, its r e l evance to the struggle against colonialism i n particular, has prevented secular nationalism f r o m completely d o m inating politics i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . This has i n t u r n made state f o r m a t i o n , and its relation to precolonial and colonial eras, complex and at times problematic. Another feature that M u s l i m states share is the fact that w i t h o u t exception, they are developing states; namely, for the most part they have emerged d u r i n g the course o f the t w e n t i eth century and have been closely tied to the efforts o f their societies to advance and industrialize. In so d o i n g , they share i n the historical legacy, cultural m i l i e u , and

The French ruled vast territories in Africa and Asia.

o f t e n the p o l i t i c a l and social problems that c o n f r o n t

This engraving from the February 1894 edition of Le

development i n the T h i r d W o r l d . M u s l i m states have

Petit Journal shows a French view of their flag being

responded to the challenges before them differently, just

raised in Timbuktu in Mali.

as size, geographic location, and economic e n d o w m e n t have also meant different patterns o f development. The legacy o f colonialism is key i n explaining both the diversity and the u n i t y o f different experiments w i t h state formation in the M u s l i m w o r l d . Just as Islam, ethnic identity, social characteristics, and other indigenous religious and cultural factors can explain the commonalities between M u s l i m states—and conversely, economics, ideology, and leadership can explain divergences—colonialism too can explain the points o f convergence and divergence i n experiences w i t h state formation across the M u s l i m w o r l d . M u s l i m have lived w i d i nearly all the colonial p o w ers. I n m u c h o f Africa, Asia, and the Arab w o r l d , the British and the French r u l e d over vast M u s l i m territories. The Dutch ruled over territories that later became Indonesia, and the Germans, Spanish, Portuguese, and Russians held M u s l i m t e r r i tories i n East Africa, the Philippines, Malaya (what is n o w k n o w n as Malaysia), the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Israel's control o f the West Bank and Gaza Strip may be seen as the last and only o n g o i n g colonial relationship in M u s l i m lands. A l t h o u g h

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the defining characteristics o f colonialism were at w o r k i n all o f these locales, there were differences i n h o w colonial powers approached their colonial mandates, even differences i n h o w the same colonial powers exerted power and influence i n different territories. There are thus fundamental similarities between various M u s l i m polities as there are particularities, w h i c h have their roois i n history, and more important, w i t h the experience o f each colonial territory. This chapter identifies colonialism's legacy for the development o f the M u s l i m states i n the twentieth century. It discusses the c o m m o n legacy that M u s l i m states share as a result o f their experiences w i t h colonialism and explains h o w colonization also accounts for d i f f e r i n g patterns of development by l o o k i n g at i n d i vidual experiences w i t h colonialism. The colonial era lasted less than a century, but it forever changed all aspects o f geography, the economy, social relations, and politics i n the areas that it r u l e d .

Shaping the Modern Muslim World: Colonialism and State Boundaries The colonization o f M u s l i m territories began w i t h the rise o f European empires, the conquest o f India, and the scramble for Africa i n the nineteenth century. Its last phase included the division o f the Arab territories o f the O t t o m a n Empire after W o r l d War I . The colonial era ended after W o r l d War I I , w h e n Britain and then France w i t h d r e w f r o m the majority o f dieir colonial territories. M u s l i m states began to emerge i n earnest f r o m 1947

o n — a l t h o u g h some, such as Iran or

Afghanistan, had always remained independent, albeit nominally. The emergence o f M u s l i m states involved negotiated withdrawals o f colonial powers, as was the case i n Malay a, India, and the Persian G u l f emirates, as well as brutal and bloody wars o f independence, as i n Algeria. The decolonization also occurred i n spurts, as European powers sought to protect their economic interests f o l l o w i n g their political and military withdrawals i n a changing global environment. Iran i n 1953 and Egypt i n 1956 were examples o f the reassertion o f colonialism, w h i c h nevertheless marked the gradual yet effective end o f direct European rule over Muslims. By the mid-1970s most M u s l i m territories, f r o m Sub-Saharan Africa to Southeast Asia, had gained independence f r o m colonialism and constituted either independent M u s l i m states or parts o f independent n o n - M u s l i m states. Still, the legacy o f colonialism continued to shape and reshape their polities, economies, and societies. The impact o f colonialism went far beyond the relationships o f economic and political imperialism dial theorists o f the Left have amply elaborated u p o n . Colonialism also survived i n the forms that stale ideologies, political visions, and institutions o f the new stales took. The impact o f colonialism was circumspect, but it was nevertheless pervasive. It was a manifestation o f the historical continuity between a past f r o m

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Afghanistan was created as a buffer state between the British Indian and Czarist Russian empires, both of which sought to control Central Asia's access to the Indian Ocean in the south. Colonial intervention left a powerful legacy in the region, including the dependence of Afghan governments on colonial powers, as depicted in a Punch cartoon of 1878.

w h i c h the new states sought to distance diemselves and dieir independent existences. The M u s l i m w o r l d today is a collection o f nation-states. A l t h o u g h Islamic u n i t y continues to animate politics across the M u s l i m w o r l d and has been a central d e m a n d o f Islamic movements, the u n i t y o f M u s l i m states does n o t extend beyond the l i m i t e d mandate o f the Organization o f Tslamic Conference, an i n t e r national organization o f M u s l i m states that is m o d e l e d after the U n i t e d Nations. The concept o f a t e r r i t o r i a l state is o f relatively recent o r i g i n i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . I n the p r e m o d e r n era M u s l i m s were conscious o f ethnic, l i n g u i s t i c , a n d regional differences a m o n g t h e m , but politically they were u n i t e d u n d e r first the caliphate and later empires and sultanates, whose s h i f t i n g boundaries represented n o t the borders o f nation-states as the t e r m is u n d e r s t o o d today, b u t the w r i t o f rulers w h o r u l e d i n the name o f Islam. The idea o f a M u s l i m t e r r i t o r i a l state, m u c h like the idea o f n a t i o n a l i s m , is thus an i m p o r t f r o m the West. The

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The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is the major force for unity among the diverse collection of nation-states in the modern Muslim world. Modeled after the United Nations, it has cc members, whose heads of state meet every three years in different countries to review conditions in the Muslim world and consider international political developments.

i n c l u s i o n o f the concept o f the t e r r i t o r i a l state i n t o M u s l i m politics and the actual boundaries o f M u s l i m states are b o t h products o f c o l o n i a l i s m . This is not to say that ethnic affiliations and national identities were absent i n the M u s l i m w o r l d before the advent o f colonialism. Such sentiments were always strong. For instance, Iranians f r o m early o n viewed themselves as distinct f r o m Arabs and Turks, and Shiism i n h a n i n m a n y ways became a m a r k o f its national identity, separating Iranians f r o m the S u n n i Turks, Arabs, and T u r k m e n a r o u n d it. Similar distinctions between Arabs and Berbers, Arabs and Turks, or Malays and Javanese have also been p r o m i n e n t . Ethnic nationalism and its association w i t h a nation-state, however, is new to the M u s l i m w o r l d and has its o r i g i n s i n the colonial era. It was t h e n that nationalism as a p r i m a r y f o r m o f political i d e n t i t y — o n e that is n o t subservient to Islamic identity b u t supersedes it absolutely and is associated w i t h a t e r r i t o r i a l state m o d e l e d after those i n the W e s t — g r e w roots and became a part o f M u s l i m p o l i t i c a l consciousness. For this reason tensions have existed across the M u s l i m w o r l d between c o n ceptions o f the nation-state—-associated w i t h the relatively m o r e recent n a t i o n -

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alist political i d e a l — a n d the Islamic ideal o f the ummah (holy c o m m u n i t y ) , w h i c h continues t o u n d e r g i r d the M u s l i m political ideal. The concept o f the u m m a h calls M u s l i m s n o t only t o u n i t e across national boundaries b u t t o place Islam above all other political allegiances i n their everyday lives. The scope o f tensions between the state and its cidzens over this issue has depended o n the extent t o w h i c h the state has been w i l l i n g t o accommodate Islamic

consciousness.

Whereas Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Malaysia have sought to b r i n g about h a r m o n y between n a t i o n h o o d and the ideal o f the u m m a h , Turkey, Pahlavi Iran, Tunisia, Algeria, and Indonesia have consciously sought t o assert the p r i macy o f the nation-state over the u m m a h . Also i m p o r t a n t i n this regard is h o w strong the n o t i o n o f nationalism is. I n states w i t h strong national identities, such as Turkey, I r a n , and Egypt, the state has asserted its prerogatives m o r e forcefully, as is also the case where large n o n - M u s l i m m i n o r i t i e s reside, such as Malaysia o r Nigeria. Conversely, i n places such as Pakistan, where national identity is weak, the ideal o f the u m m a h holds greater sway. M u s l i m states gained independence i n territories that were delineated by the colonial powers. They largely accepted the shapes i n w h i c h they were b o r n as w e l l as the fact that states w o u l d be b o u n d by international borders i n t o distinct sovereign entities. Expansionism d i d occur, however: Morocco's claim t o Western Sahara, Indonesia's t o East Timor, Turkey's t o n o r t h e r n Cyprus, Iran's to Bahrain u n t i l the m i d - 1970s, Syria's t o Lebanon, and Iraq's t o Kuwait. These claims were put f o r w a r d i n the name o f nationalism and o n behalf o f a nation-state, as defined and legitimated by international norms. M u s l i m states, by and large, have not challenged the division o f the territories o f the Islamic empires, and by i m p l i c a t i o n , the Islamic w o r l d by colonial powers or the criteria used by those powers i n determ i n i n g new borders. M u s l i m states have not sought to reconstruct the u m m a h but only t o expand the boundaries o f nation-states. The reality o f those borders have been accepted, although where they he has o n occasion been contested. The only exceptions t o this general rule have been the ideologies o f Arab nationalism and Islamism. Arab nationalism, w h i c h was a widely popular political ideal i n the 1960s and has been a general political and cultural thrust since then, has i n p r i n ciple questioned the division o f the Arab w o r l d into t w e n t y - t w o states. Even i n this case, t h o u g h , the rhetoric o f unity, beyond yielding a number o f symbolic unification pacts—-most notably the U n i t e d Arab Republic, consisting o f Egypt and Syria between 1958 and 1961 and the Arab League—never effectively undermined the division of Arab lands by colonialism. Only N o r t h and South Yemen siiccessfuily united and then not i n the name o f Islam or Arab nationalism but o f Yemeni nationalism. Even Jordan, a state that was created arbitrarily by England w h e n A m i r Abdullah, its first king, was given a fixed stipend and six months to see i f die idea worked, has stood the test o f time. Furthermore, Arab nationalism was n o t an

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Islamic ideology, arid i n that sense it d i d not seek to reverse the division o f M u s l i m lands so m u c h as i t d i d the division o f Arab ones. Islamist movements too have argued for the unity o f all Muslims above and beyond their national identities and to accept the reality o f the u m m a h i n lieu o f nation-states. I n practice, however, Islamist movements have conducted their politics i n accordance w i t h the territorial reality o f the M u s l i m w o r l d . The Islamic Party (Jamaat-i Islami) organizations o f Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are thus independent o f one another, as are the M u s l i m Brotherhood organizations f r o m Nigeria and Senegal to Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. I f and w h e n state boundaries have given way, i t has n o t been because o f lack o f resolve h i statehood, but rather because o f the ability o f a larger expansionist state to o v e r w h e l m a smaller neighbor. Kuwait has remained independent o w i n g to outside assistance; others have not been as fortunate. For example, Western

The region of Kuwait has been governed since the early eighteenth century by shaykhs of the al-Sabah clan.The modern nation was one of the Gulf states created by British oil interests in the region. The first well in Kuwait was drilled at Bahrah in

1956.

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Sahara was forcibly u n i t e d w i t h M o r o c c o , as was East T i m o r w i t h Indonesia. Iran annexed some small islands i n the Persian G u l f that i t took f r o m the U n i t e d Arab Emirates i n the 1970s. The emirates continue to demand the r e t u r n o f the islands, and the struggle for independence f r o m M o r o c c o , led by the Polisario m o v e m e n t , has been waged unabated; the chapter o n an independent Western Sahara is far f r o m closed. Consequently, the colonial d i v i s i o n o f M u s l i m territories, i n p r i n c i p l e as w e l l as along the lines that were initially i n t r o d u c e d , have been largely accepted by the successor M u s l i m states and have been instituted i n t o the international syst e m . The legacy o f c o l o n i a l i s m here has not been free o f tensions, however. First, m a n y o f the divisions were problematic. Some were carried o u t arbitrarily to accommodate local colonial officials w i t h o u t regard to their i m p a c t o n peoples and resources. Other divisions reflected the needs o f colonial powers to resolve d i p l o m a t i c tensions a m o n g themselves. I n many cases colonies were thus created to satisfy d i s g r u n t l e d European allies or to serve as buffers against expansionist ones. The p o s t - W o r l d War I plans for the d i v i s i o n o f the O t t o m a n Empire were made to appease France, Italy, and Greece. The need to protect I n d i a f r o m Russia m e a n w h i l e led to the creation o f Afghanistan, as similar concerns about France after 1798 led to British occupation o f Egypt, w h i c h i n t u r n w a r r a n t e d British c o n t r o l o f Palestine after W o r l d War I . Strategic decisions and economic interests finally led to the creation o f n e w colonial territories, w h i c h m o r e o f t e n than n o t became the bases for future states. British interests i n Persian G u l f o i l led to the creation o f Kuwait and a similar attempt at creating "Arabistan" o u t o f Iran's Khuzestan province i n the early t w e n t i e t h century. Decades later, similar econ o m i c considerations led Britain to encourage B r u n e i not to j o i n Malaysia. Local political considerations led to further divisions. France created Lebanon o u t o f Syria to f u l f i l l its desire to create a Christian-Arab state; and Britain created Jordan to accommodate A m i r A b d u l l a h , w h o had f o u g h t o n the side o f the British i n W o r l d War I and whose f a m i l y felt betrayed by the d i v i s i o n o f the Arab lands o f the O t t o m a n Empire between European powers. H o w c o l o n i a l i s m actually w o r k e d and w h a t its i m p r i n t s were have shaped M u s l i m s ' perception o f their identities and politics and separated the path that various M u s l i m states have taken since independence. Early o n , t h r o u g h the aspiring new elite that the c o l o n i a l rulers trained i n European languages and ways to create a machinery o f government, the d i v i s i o n o f M u s l i m territories took shape. As perceptions o f w h o m the elite w o u l d control and w h a t the possibilities and l i m i t s before t h e m were became entrenched, c o m m i t m e n t s to borders t o o k f o r m . These c o m m i t m e n t s

b u i l t o n existing ethnic identities,

articulating visions o f nationalism that w o u l d give greater m e a n i n g to those

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boundaries. A bureaucrat i n Kuala L u m p u r or Damascus eventually developed a vested interest i n "Malaysianness" or "Syrianness," for example, lest his p o w e r r e m a i n l i m i t e d as that o f a provincial f u n c t i o n a r y i n a larger Malay or Arab entity. It was such feelings that i n later years d o o m e d the Egyptian-Syrian u n i t y pact o f 1958-61. Iraqi and Syrian bureaucrats, w h o under the Ottomans w o u l d operate i n the same ambient p o l i t i c a l , social, and literary culture, n o w developed ties t o different European traditions and languages and helped to finalize their "separateness." The varied administrative and p o l i t i c a l experiences thus helped t o consolidate parochial nationalisms at the cost o f m o r e universal ones. The c o l o nial experience, and the arenas o f operation that it presented the new elite, u l t i mately laid the foundations o f states w h e r e none had existed before. In the Malay w o r l d the same process forced a separation between Malaysian and Indonesian identities and between M u s l i m Malay and n o n - M u s l i m Malay identities as w e l l . Bureaucrats and politicians i n British Malay and the D u t c h Indies came to v i e w the diverse cultural, linguistic, and religious arena o f respective B r i t i s h and D u t c h territories as t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and administrative arena, whereas the possibility o f a Malay arena i n c l u d i n g the Malay parts o f Indonesia and Malaysia, or a Muslim-Pattani r e g i o n i n Thailand and M i n d a n a o i n the Philippines, and excluding the n o n - M u s l i m and non-Malay parts o f b o t h became an u n w o r k a b l e idea. Boundaries o f colonialism and the differences i n cultural and historical experiences and developments that it engendered determined the shape o f future states and polities. A u n i t e d Islamic Malaya w o u l d not emerge because its peoples were r u l e d by different c o l o n i a l authorities. Conversely, Borneo, and briefly Singapore, w o u l d become part o f Malaysia because all were r u l e d by the same British colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Colonialism thus helped to define the borders o f states and their realities i n contradistinction to other c o n ceptions o f independence and statehood. N e w states often appropriated existing ethnic identities or semblances thereof, such as "Iraqiness" or "Syrianness," and at other times c o n t r i v e d n a t i o n h o o d , as i n the cases o f Jordan or Malaysia, to produce nationalist ideologies that c o u l d sustain state f o r m a t i o n . The process also entailed sublimating c o m p e t i n g ethnic identities and preventing t h e m f r o m developing i n t o nationalisms. Iran, Iraq, and Turkey have sought to prevent Kurdish i d e n t i t y f r o m asserting itself as a n a t i o n alism. Iran sought to integrate Kurds i n t o an Iranian nationalist identity, and Turkey depicted t h e m as " M o u n t a i n Turks." The success of experiments w i t h state f o r m a t i o n often depended o n h o w successful the development o f national c o n sciousness was. That, i n t u r n , depended o n the strength o f the ethnic identity that f o r m e d the basis o f nationalism. Over t i m e , ethnic and t e r r i t o r i a l definitions became the boundaries for national i d e n t i t y f o r m a t i o n s ; they grew roots and developed as a secular and d o m i n a n t f o r m o f p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y i n lieu o f m e m ories o f a u n i t e d Islamic w o r l d i n history. Colonial powers had perhaps never

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meant for the t e r r i t o r i a l demarcations to have the lasting effects that they had, but i n reality these boundaries became embedded i n the f u t u r e states. T e r r i t o r i a l divisions have also been a source o f tension between various M u s l i m states that claim mutually exclusive rights to the same territories. Jordan and Syria, for example, early after independence b o t h set their eyes o n reconstit u t i n g larger Syria, w h i l e Jordan also m a i n t a i n e d a c l a i m t o Palestine a n d M o r o c c o to Mauritania and parts o f Algeria; Syria and Turkey have contested sovereignty over Alexandretta (iskenderun); Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al Arab channel; Egypt and Sudan over waters o f the N i l e ; Pakistan and Afghanistan over the D u r r a n d line; Pakistan and India over Kashmir; Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Saudi Arabia and the U n i t e d Arab Emirates, over b o r d e r l i n e oases and o i l fields; Libya and Chad over their border regions; and Iran and the U n i t e d Arab Emirates over the Tunbs and A b u Musa islands. I n some cases the very existence o f some M u s l i m states have been challenged by neighbors that view the M u s l i m states as artificial constructions o f c o l o n i a l i s m . Syria's claims to Lebanon, Malaysia's to B r u n e i ( u n t i l recently), Iraq's to Kuwait, and Morocco's to Western Sahara are examples. Borders p r o d u c e d the shape o f the states but d i d not guarantee their viability. Colonial authorities d r e w boundaries but d i d little to u n i f y the peoples that fell w i t h i n those boundaries i n t o a national culture. At times they d i d exactly the opposite; namely, the colonial powers sought to m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l by encouraging c o m p e t i t i o n between ethnic, linguistic, religious, or tribal g r o u p i n g s . The t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n o f M u s l i m lands thus remained unchallenged, but it went hand i n hand w i t h national c o n f u s i o n and the fracturing o f the future national society. Unresolved tensions between peoples and regions that were i n c l u d e d w i t h i n the same state, but never consolidated i n t o one n a t i o n , have resulted i n challenges to state boundaries. Confessional tensions i n Lebanon; ethnic and religious clashes i n N i g e r i a , Pakistan, and Malaysia; and the Kurdish p l i g h t i n Iran, Iraq, and Turkey are examples o f the many problems inherent i n state f o r m a t i o n o n the basis o f colonial t e r r i t o r i a l demarcation. Still, none o f these problems has been a result o f attempts to reconstitute " I s l a m d o m . " I n fact, the preponderance o f nationalism i n M u s l i m political consciousness is so pervasive that Pakistan, w h i c h was created i n the name o f Islam, d i v i d e d along ethnic lines i n 1971

into

Pakistan and Bangladesh. A l t h o u g h fraught w i t h problems, the t e r r i t o r i a l c o n ception and reality o f M u s l i m states continues today i n the colonial m o l d .

The Modern Muslim State and the Ideological Legacy of Colonialism Many M u s l i m states today view the transformation o f society, its development and modernization, to be their principal a i m . As a result, they have been concerned

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European colonialists often believed that they had a paternal responsibility for their subjects. The British spoke of the "white man's burden" and the French "la mission civilatrice," as shown in this cover from the October 1891 edition of Le Petit Journal. A "friend of France" was assassinated by Moroccan chieftans who thought he had made a secret deal with the colonial rulers.

Turkey to pre-revolution Iran, f r o m socialist Indonesia t o the revolutionary Arab states. To a lesser extent, this has also been the case i n Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Arab emirates and monarchies. The state's

concerns

w i t h music, dress, popular beliefs, and the cultural o u t l o o k o f Muslims has perforce made the issue o f cultural change, and its implications for development, and the extent o f state control o f society central to politics. This is a legacy o f the colonial state, n o t the consequence o f emulating the Western m o d e l o f the state. The i d e o l o g y o f c o l o n i a l i s m was r o o t e d at some level i n the b e l i e f that European powers had a paternal responsibility for their subjects. This meant that

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n o t o n l y were they o b l i g e d to protect and manage t h e m b u t also to strive to better t h e m . Evelyn Cromer, a British colonial administrator, saw colonialism as an exact process o f management o f colonial subjects, w h o were incapable o f r u l i n g over themselves. C o l o n i a l i s m p r o v i d e d a " g o v e r n m e n t o f subject races," w h i c h managed their affairs and as such also changed t h e m " f o r the better." N o t i o n s o f the " w h i t e man's b u r d e n " or la mission avilatrice clearly captured the essence of this belief. French colonialism was m o r e attached to such goals than was British colon i a l i s m . French colonial administrations sought to change their vassal p o p u l a tions m o r e aggressively, v i e w i n g the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the superior French culture to the locals as a noble and necessary objective. But the B r i t i s h accepted cultural diversity m o r e easily and thus operated t h r o u g h local cultural institutions and beliefs, rather than seeking to simply supplant t h e m . Still, to varying degrees all colonial administrations pursued cultural change and charged t h e n p o l i c y makers and institutions w i t h the duty to realize this change. These efforts were t i e d to colonialism's claim to be d o i n g g o o d for the people, as the colonial order tied development and advancement to westernizing cultural change. The postcolonial state, often r u l e d by those w h o served i n the colonial administrations, remained true to the colonial ethos and its views o n cultural change. The postcolonial M u s l i m state has therefore m o d e l e d itself after the colonial one and thus seeks to change society according to blueprint that leads to its claim to u n l i m i t e d authority. The M u s l i m state has been r u l e d by a westernized elite that has internalized the vision o f the colonial state, w h i c h is dissociated f r o m local social institutions and values, at least i n its p u b l i c p o l i c y choices. The bluep r i n t that is propagated as the state's agenda f o r progress is thus deeply rooted i n colonialism's ideologies, f r o m the volksraod i n the D u t c h Indies to the Raj i n British India and the Bulo Matari (literally, "crusher o f stones," a t e r m used to refer to the colonial state i n Africa) i n Sub-Saharan Africa. The c o n t i n u i t y between the colonial and postcolonial eras has created a disjuncture between w h a t the states have v i e w e d as the proper course o f developm e n t and the values that M u s l i m society holds near and dear; between h o w the state envisions the society and h o w M u s l i m s v i e w themselves and their goals. Whereas the state f o l l o w e d a secular vision o f development, the society has been deeply r o o t e d i n Islam. The disjuncture between the secular nationalism o f Kemalism i n Turkey, Pahlavi rule i n Iran, or the National Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale, FLN) i n Algeria and popular perceptions o f politics attests to this fact. State policies have therefore created social tensions and u l t i mately p o l i t i c a l crises. I n Iran and Algeria these tensions translated i n t o serious challenges to state a u t h o r i t y I n Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, and Indonesia they have produced significant Islamic o p p o s i t i o n to the state. The i d e o l o g y and p o l i t i c a l programs o f c o n t e m p o r a r y Islamist

movements

across the M u s l i m w o r l d have been shaped i n response to this disjuncture.

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Islamists have questioned the state's agenda and p u t f o r t h alternative visions o f sociopolitical change, w h i c h they c l a i m b o t h i n c l u d e Islam and p r o m o t e develo p m e n t , w h i l e a n c h o r i n g state policy i n society's Islamic values. This line o f a r g u m e n t is reflected i n the programs o f diverse Islamic m o v e m e n t s f r o m Malaysia's Islamic party (Partai Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS), to the Jamaat-i Isiami i n Bangladesh and Pakistan, Afghanistan's H i z b - i Isiami, Turkey's Welfare (Refah) Party, Tajikistan's Islamic Renaissance Party ( H i z b - i Nahzat Isiami), the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d i n Sub-Saharan and N o r t h Africa and the Arab Near East, Indonesia's Muhammadiyyah movement

or its ulama m o v e m e n t

(Nahdat

al-Ulama),

Tunisia's Islamic Tendency Movement ( M o u v e m e n t de la Tendance Islamique, also k n o w n as the Renaissance or Ennahda Party, later k n o w n as H i z b al-Nahda), Morocco's Justice and Benevolence party ( a l - A d l wal-Ihsan), to Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique de Salut, FIS). The Islamic Republic o f Iran has f o l l o w e d such a policy since 1979. and the state i n Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Sudan, and even Saudi Arabia have i n c o r p o r a t e d some o f the Islamists' demands i n t o their policy making. I n this sense Islamism has emerged not as a rejection o f development but as a consequence o f the disjuncture between the state's v i s i o n o f society and h o w i t s h o u l d be developed and the society's perception o f itself and its goals. Similar tensions between state p o l i c y and national aspirations have also existed. Colonial administrators generally v i e w e d themselves as the most capable representatives o f the aspirations and hopes o f the local populations and the most efficient vehicle for the advancement and progress o f their subjects. I n fact, nationalist liberation struggles often began w i t h challenges to this claim; local elites f r o m M u h a m m a d A h Jinnah o f Pakistan, Sad Zaghlul o f Egypt, A b u a l Kalam Azad o f I n d i a , and O n n Jafar and T u n k u A b d u l - R a h m a n o f Malaysia, or activists f r o m Gamal A b d e l Nasser o f Egypt, A h m a d Ben Bella o f Algeria, and Sukarno o f Indonesia began to question w h e t h e r colonialism c o u l d possibly manifest local aspirations and i f indigenous leaders were n o t clearly better suited to do so. These nationalist figures f o r m e d parties f r o m the Istiqlal (Freedom) party i n M o r o c c o to the Neo-Destur ( C o n s t i t u t i o n ) party i n Tunisia, the W a f d (Delegation) i n Egypt, the A l l - I n d i a M u s l i m League i n I n d i a , and the U n i t e d Malays N a t i o n a l Organization ( U M N O ) i n Malaysia. Many o f these parties c o n tinued after independence, f o r m i n g the basis for politics i n the new states. Still, that the colonial administrations v i e w e d themselves as representing local interests vested colonialism w i t h a m i s s i o n — h o w e v e r d u b i o u s — o f serving the development o f the local populations. That the nationalist elite challenged this c l a i m o f c o l o n i a l i s m , and the nationalist struggle was animated by the c o m p e t i t i o n for the r i g h t to represent local aspirations, made the task o f development central to the mission o f the M u s l i m states that succeeded colonialism. The post-

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colonial M u s l i m state thus became even m o r e openly tied to the goals o f develo p m e n t , w h i c h has since independence become the measure o f the state's success or failure and the most i m p o r t a n t

O F M O D E R N M U S L I M STATES

Le Petit Journal ' • L, Fu it 1d»1-jfl li'.T Un -iaa d t lv

U MH Jamil!

5

M 1p i,W lBti. IJu•n !> •» !'." K,.—n ,.» .~t lüuirLii M FM i»ul W liI t'ia* al«•» Jn•rn n*..tart,»11M . SUPPLEMENT ILLUSTRE

g,

d e t e r m i n a n t o f its legitimacy. As a result, u n d e r m i n i n g colonialism's legitimacy, f r o m Java to A l g e r i a , meant rejecting its claim to serving local interests and p r o p o s i n g a superior agenda for progress. Nationalism and development efforts were therefore j o i n e d and became the bedrock o f the struggle independence under Sukarno, Nasser, and the Algerian FLN, a m o n g others. B e y o n d a n c h o r i n g state f u n c t i o n and l e g i t i m a c y i n the goals o f development, state's

colonialism

view

of

the

affected

the

development

process and its c o n c o m i t a n t processes o f social change. C o l o n i a l i s m was disd a i n f u l o f local c u l t u r a l beliefs and practices. It v i e w e d local religions as i n f e r i o r t o C h r i s t i a n i t y — a b e l i e f that

Colonialists often looked down on local practices. Muslims

u n d e r g i r d e d its support o f m i s s i o n a r y

were seen as prone to violence, and Muslim doctrines such

activities—and archaic

and

local

harmful

customs to

as

progress.

A l t h o u g h c o l o n i a l administrations t o l erated many local beliefs and practices

as jihad were used as evidence of Islam's hostility to progress.This French magazine cover from 1906 illustrated the French view of an Algerian urging his followers to wage holy war against the oppressors.

and d i d not always seek to change t h e m , there was never any d o u b t that they were not h e l d i n h i g h esteem. Whereas the earliest officers o f the B r i t i s h East I n d i a C o m p a n y adopted I n d i a n ways i n Bengal, w i t h the c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f B r i t i s h r u l e over I n d i a all s u c h practices w e r e eventually a b a n d o n e d , and instead the local recruits i n t o the bureaucracy were made to adopt B r i t i s h ways, at least i n the p u b l i c sphere. At the height o f the e m p i r e figures such as Thomas Babington Macaulay i n I n d i a or Evelyn Baring C r o m e r i n E g y p t — k n o w n f o r t h e i r p a t r o n i z i n g attitudes t o w a r d the local cultures—set the tone for evaluati n g and characterizing local customs and mores. Macaulay once said of the c u l tural w o r t h o f the East, " [ A ] single shelf o f European books [ i s ] w o r t h the w h o l e literature o f India and A r a b i a " ; and C r o m e r o p i n e d , " T h e European is a

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close reasoner . . . he is a natural l o g i c i a n . . . . The m i n d o f the o r i e n t a l [ A r a b ] , Some European colonialists

o n the other h a n d , like his picturesque streets, is e m i n e n t l y w a n t i n g i n s y m -

were interested in local cul-

metry. His reasoning is o f the m o s t slipshod d e s c r i p t i o n . . . [ t h e y ] are s i n g u -

ture. Major Gayer-Anderson,

larly deficient i n the logical faculty."

an Englishman who lived in Cairo from 1935 to 1942, for

Islam received p a r t i c u l a r l y harsh c r i t i c i s m f r o m c o l o n i a l rulers. M u s l i m s

example, joined together

resisted c o l o n i a l i s m i n Africa and South and Southeast Asia. For this they were

two medieval houses that he

seen as p r o n e to violence and less likely to be c o n t r o l l e d , changed, or converted.

restored and furnished in

Islam was therefore viewed as a challenge to b o t h c o l o n i a l c o n t r o l and efforts

traditional style. Known as

t o t r a n s f o r m the local population's life and t h o u g h t . Such Islamic doctrines as

the Bayt al-Kritliya, the house is now maintained as the Gayer-Anderson

j i h a d , polygamy, strict obedience to religious law (shoricih), and the tendency t o i n t r o d u c e Islamic values t o p u b l i c l i f e were seen as evidence o f Islam's hostility

Museum by the Islamic sec-

to progress. These criticisms shaped colonial attitudes f r o m M o r o c c o to Malaya;

tion of the Egyptian

they also shaped the broader intellectual and academic interest i n Islam t h r o u g h

Antiquities Organization.

the w o r k s o f early scholars o f Islam w h o were t i e d to c o l o n i a l administrations,

E U R O P E A N C O L O N I A L I S M A N D T H E E M F R G E N C E O F M O D E R N M U S L I M STATES

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such as W. W. H u n t e r i n India or Snouck H u r g r o n j e i n the D u t c h Indies. I n t i m e , their scholarship w o u l d become entrenched i n Western attitudes t o w a r d Islam and i n t u r n w o u l d c o n d i t i o n M u s l i m attitudes t o w a r d the West and therefore w hat the West has i n store f o r Islam. The impact o f all this was to instill a sense o f i n f e r i o r i t y a m o n g many local elites and rising bureaucrats. Even those w h o rejected colonialism were deeply influenced by the persistent denigration o f their cultural, religious, and social values. A l t h o u g h reactions varied f r o m a c c o m m o d a t i o n to rejection o f the colonial culture, all reactions showed the mark o f colonialism's successful assertion o f its c l a i m to civilizational superiority. I n India, for instance, Sayyid A h m a d Khan's r e f o r m m o v e m e n t — w h i c h w o u l d produce many o f M u s l i m South Asia's f u t u r e leaders—sought to u p l i f t the M u s l i m s by accepting many precepts o f Western t h o u g h t and social values. O t h e r movements o f revival and r e f o r m showed to varying degrees, explicitly as w e l l as implicitly, the impact o f grappling w i t h colonialism's assertion o f its cultural s u p e r i o r i t y . Most expressions

of

Islamic t h o u g h t i n the postcolonial p e r i o d , f r o m Islamic m o d e r n i s m to Islamism, thus i n some f o r m were (and still are) concerned w i t h addressing w h a t is seen as the p r o b l e m o f Western cultural superiority. Various proponents o f Islamic m o d e r n i s m — f r o m its earliest exponents o f Egypt's M u h a m m a d A b d u h to the Young O t t o m a n s i n Turkey, the Jadidis i n Central Asia, the Aligarh movement i n India, to its m o r e recent advocates, the M u h a m m a d i y y a h movement i n Indonesia, Malaysia's Sisters-in-Islam, Pakistan's T u l u - i Islam ( D a w n o f Islam), Iran's A l i Shariati or A b d u l - K a r i m Surush, Egypt's Hasan Hanafi, Algeria's M u h a m m a d A r k o u n , Pakistan's Fazlur Rahman, Syria's M u h a m m a d Shahrur, Malaysia's Kassim A h m a d , or India's Asghar A l i E n g i n e e r — have all sought to grapple w i t h the p r o b l e m o f Islam's decline o n the one h a n d and Islam's a c c o m m o d a t i o n i n m o d e r n society o n the other h a n d . The t w o issues are interconnected, and for the modernists these issues involve interpreti n g Islam i n terms o f d o m i n a n t Western values. Islamists f r o m Mawlana Sayyid A b u l Ala M a w d u d i to Sayyid Q u t b ( 1906-66) to the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i ( 1902-88) have also been animated by the same c o n cerns. U n l i k e the modernists, the Islamists have not sought to interpret Islam i n terms o f d o m i n a n t Western values—at least n o t explicitly. Rather, they have sought to assert Islam's d o m i n a d o n , to interpret m o d e r n i t y according to Islamic values. Discussions o f the Islamic state, Islamic economics, or the Islamization o f k n o w l e d g e all have this goal i n m i n d . Both the m o d e r n i s t and Islamist interpretations as intellectual endeavors have failed. Islamism, however, has proved p o l i t ically potent, whereas m o d e r n i s m has failed o n that account as w e l l . I n the political arena those w h o i n h e r i t e d the colonial state were even more directly influenced by colonialism's ideological vision. The bureaucratic, military.

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and p o l i t i c a l elite w h o constituted the r u l i n g order i n M u s l i m states at the e n d o f the colonial era were often educated i n colonial educational i n s t i t u t i o n s , w o r k e d for the c o l o n i a l order, and were deeply influenced by the i d e o l o g y and vision o f the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Consequently, this elite core believed that the task o f development, to w h i c h it was utterly c o m m i t t e d , was o n l y possible i f those aspects o f the local culture that were deemed to be regressive were d i s carded and replaced w i t h progressive Western ones. Thus, n e w states—and i n t e r estingly also Iran and Turkey, w h i c h were n o t direct colonies but subject to similar ideological pressures—initiated changes i n script, dress, and customs and sought to secularize society and culture and to adopt Western mores, laws, a n d practices. They targeted Islam, its values, institutions, and role i n public life, blaming i t for the ills o f society and p r o m i s i n g that secularization w o u l d pave the way for m o d e r n i z a t i o n . I n these efforts they were supported by those segments o f the p o p u l a t i o n that had already been affected by colonialism and had to varying degrees adopted Western ways, as well as by those w h o accepted the state's p r o m i s e — f o r the t i m e being at least—that secularization and westernizing c u l tural change w i l l b r i n g about development. As a result, secularization and westernization became embedded i n the developmental ethos o f the n e w states. The postcolonial M u s l i m state therefore emerged i n the m o l d o f the c o l o n i a l o n e — d e v e l o p m e n t - o r i e n t e d i n a i m , hostile to Islam, and m o d e r n i z i n g and weste r n i z i n g i n practice. The ideology that g u i d e d the e v o l u t i o n o f the postcolonial state, however, was n o t u n i f o r m across the M u s l i m w o r l d . Some M u s l i m states remained allied w i t h the west and f o l l o w e d capitalist economic policies; others gravitated t o w a r d the Soviet U n i o n and the N o n - A l i g n e d Movement and adopted socialist practices. A l t h o u g h these ideological positions produced different h i s i< irit al experiences and levels o f industrialization and political change, the developmental goal and westernizing direction o f state f o r m a t i o n was largely the same across the M u s l i m w o r l d . I n short, a l t h o u g h i n foreign and economic p o l i c y m a k i n g , states may have been distinguished according to their c o m m i t m e n t s to capitalism or socialism, t o the West or the Soviet bloc, i n domestic politics the fundamental issue was the same: secular development at the cost o f Islamic identity o f society.

Patterns of Development M u s l i m states are also distinguished by the pace w i t h w h i c h they pursued develo p m e n t . Some arrived at their independence m o r e developed than others. For example, Turkey was more advanced economically and politically than the Arab territories o f the O t t o m a n Empire. Some Arab states, such as Egypt and Syria, were m o r e developed than others, such as Yemen or O m a n . Some M u s l i m states

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developed m o r e quickly, because o f greater international aid, natural resources, or their size and the possibilities o f trade. After the o i l price hike i n the 1970s, the Arab monarchies thus outpaced the Levant states (Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon) and Egypt i n development. But, Iran and Egypt were better able t o use international aid and assistance i n their development programs i n the 1960s a n d the 1980s, respectively. Larger states were better able t o m o b i l i z e resources to push ahead w i t h development. Smaller states proved m o r e versatile i n r e s p o n d i n g t o changes i n the international economic trends, however. Whereas Indonesia i n i tially advanced faster i n industrialization than Malaysia, since 1980 Malaysia has outpaced Indonesia i n that regard. The centrality o f the western m o d e l t o the e v o l u t i o n o f the M u s l i m states has been i m p o r t a n t t o their poUtics. Given the legacy o f the struggle against colon i a l i s m , any development m o d e l that looked t o the west and p u r p o r t e d t o westernize ran the risk o f m o b i l i z i n g political o p p o s i t i o n and cultural resistance. Such reactions tended t o escalate w h e n and i f the promises o f development failed t o materialize, as i n Nasser's Egypt, o r were deemed as t o o costly i n terms o f c u l tural sacrifices, as was the case i n Pahlavi Iran. I n the 1960s and the 1970s resistance t o , and the c r i t i q u e of, state-led development strategies d r e w o n secular ideologies that were themselves o f western o r i g i n . Socialist M u s l i m states thus had liberal oppositions; m o r e notably, capitalist states had vociferous leftist o p p o sitions. I n these cases the o p p o s i t i o n objected t o close alliances between the r u l i n g elites and the west but d i d n o t oppose the development agenda itself Rather, they favored p u r s u i n g development based o n another western ideology. Since the late 1970s, a different f o r m o f critique o f state-led development has surfaced i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . Islamist movements n o w question some o f the foundational principles o f the postcolonial state, most notably that development is predicated o n secularization and begins w i t h accepting the qualitative superio r i t y o f western civilization values; thus, development must necessarily entail replacing some Islamic values i n favor o f western ones. I n the Arab w o r l d Islamists have rejected the arguments o f Arab nationalists regarding the "backwardness" o f Islam and the s u p e r i o r i t y o f socialism, just as i n Iran and Turkey Islamists have refuted similar arguments presented by Kemalism and the Pahlavi state's nationalist rhetoric. Interestingly, secular M u s l i m states such as Malaysia and Indonesia also subscribe t o a similar line o f reasoning. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir M u h a m m a d has been at the forefront o f the m o v e m e n t t o defend Asia's r i g h t t o live by its o w n values, rejecting the universality o f western social, legal, and h u m a n rights values. The Islamist o p p o s i t i o n has also challenged the w i s d o m o f the state's i n d u s trialization policy. I n Algeria, Nasser's Egypt, and Syria, inefficiencies caused by socialism and centralized economic p l a n n i n g produced poverty, u n e m p l o y m e n t ,

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a b r e a k d o w n i n social services, u r b a n i z a t i o n , and a decline i n standards o f l i v ing. I n Pahlavi Iran, post-Nasser Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia, capitalist econ o m i c development produced i n c o m e disparties, c o r r u p t i o n , u r b a n i z a t i o n , and rapid cultural change. Islamism has not specifically rejected development, b u t as Islamism challenged the ideological u n d e r p i n n i n g s o f developmentalism and adopted the cause o f the p o o r and the d i s g r u n t l e d , i t became a p o i g n a n t c r i t i q u e o f development strategies. I n Malaysia, Islamist forces d i d not initially discuss state economic strategies directly, but they criticized the state f o r n o t f a v o r i n g Malays. I n Iran, the Islamist revolutionaries criticized economic development f o r its westernization and the i n c o m e disparities i t generated, and they proposed greater state control of the economy. In Algeria and Turkey, conversely, the FIS and the Refah party favored open economies and less government c o n t r o l . The FIS actually became a force i n the b u r g e o n i n g private markets that p r o v i d e d c o n sumer goods to the p o p u l a t i o n and as such became a critique o f the state's heavy industrialization strategies that had denied the p o p u l a t i o n those basic goods a n d instead produced c o r r u p t i o n and p r o m o t e d socialism. The Refah party m e a n w h i l e was strongly tied to small merchants and the business c o m m u n i t y . I n all these cases Islamism has for the most part criticized the ideological u n d e r p i n nings o f development. It has proposed its o w n development strategies as alternatives to those i m p l e m e n t e d by the state. As such, those Islamists w h o c o n f r o n t socialist and state-controlled economies favor greater market reforms, whereas those Islamists w h o are i n o p p o s i t i o n to capitalist development favor greater state c o n t r o l o f the economy. Still, i t is by challenging the ideological legitimacy o f the development process i n the secular state that Islamism poses the most f u n damental challenge to state development strategies. The Islamist o p p o s i t i o n also challenges the validity o f the state's attempts to c o n t r o l the role o f Islam i n the p u b l i c arena. Since their independence, manyM u s l i m states have sought to regulate Islam i n public life. I n Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran, for instance, the state t o o k over the management o f religious e n d o w m e n t s . I n Turkey the state also took over the schools that train preachers and Islamic scholars. I n Malaysia and Egypt preaching i n mosques n o w requires a license, a n d i n Malaysia the state has gone to great lengths to establish a n a t i o n w i d e n e t w o r k o f mosques that are r u n by state-appointed prayer leaders. F r o m Algeria t o Indonesia, Islamic law was replaced by c i v i l codes i m p o r t e d f r o m the west, and Islamic courts were disbanded. I n some states, such as M o r o c c o , Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Malaysia, the state has shied away f r o m an o u t r i g h t secular image and has couched its policies i n Islamic language and s y m b o l i s m , g o i n g so far as to speak for Islam. Still, the intent o f state policy clearly has been i n the direct i o n o f secularizing change, and the c o n t r o l and marginalization o f Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n s , thus l i m i t i n g the role o f Islam i n public life.

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Islamism has p u t f o r w a r d a political p l a t f o r m that is n o t h i n g short o f a reject i o n o f b o t h the reality and the intent o f the secular state's penetration o f s o c i e t y — the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the c o l o n i a l establishment's programs o f c o n t r o l and transformation o f society to serve coloniahsm's a i m o f i m p r o v i n g the lot of the local peoples. I n this regard, Islamism has served as an i m p o r t a n t source o f resistance to the expansion o f state p o w e r and as the focal p o i n t for the rallying o f those social forces that resist state d o m i n a t i o n . This f u n c t i o n began i n Turkey, Iran, and Egypt i n the early part o f the t w e n t i e t h century. Since the 19COS i t has gained m o m e n t u m , as ulama and Islamist groups across the M u s l i m w o r l d have been at the forefront o f o p p o s i t i o n to land r e f o r m and nationalization o f industries, and o f course to state d o m i n a t i o n o f education, commerce, charities, and religious endowments. The scope o f Islamist resistance to state power is so broad that it undermines the entire raison d'être o f the postcolonial M u s l i m state, as it denies the state the r i g h t to change society and to do so based o n the same presuppositions that guided the colonial state. The legacy o f the colonial state has been so deeply entrenched i n the postcolonial M u s l i m state that Islamism itself has not been able to avoid the tempta-

A f e w c o l o n i a l i s t s w e r e s m i t t e n b y t h e l o c a l c u l t u r e , s u c h as H a r r y St. J o h n P h i l b y , b e r e d as a n e a r l y W e s t e r n e x p l o r e r o f A r a b i a . I n 1925 cal officer, s e t t l e d i n J i d d a , a n d c o n v e r t e d

1930s

remem-

P h i l b y g a v e u p h i s p o s t as B r i t i s h

to Islam, t a k i n g the n a m e A b d a l l a h . By the

politi-

early

he had become a confidant o f the Saudi Arabian k i n g A b d al-Aziz and was a l l o w e d to

t r a v e r s e a n d p h o t o g r a p h p r e v i o u s l y u n k n o w n a r e a s o f t h e r e g i o n , r e c o r d i n g s u c h s i t e s as palace o f Sultan A l i .

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[ i o n o f c h a m p i o n i n g developmentalism. A l t h o u g h Islamism rejects the cultural assumptions o f c o l o n i a l i s m and the secular state's r i g h t to transform social relations, i t accepts the ideal o f social advancement, albeit according to Islamicn o r m s and w i t h o u t westernization. I n so d o i n g , Islamism portends to float an alternative p a r a d i g m for development, w h a t Malaysia's PAS calls " d e v e l o p i n g w i t h the u m m a h . " Islamism also, therefore, seeks to m o l d the i n d i v i d u a l and to regulate his o r her music, dress, private beliefs, and cultural o u t l o o k — a l l as a prelude to its v i s i o n o f d e v e l o p m e n t — a n d to change the d i s t r i b u t i o n

of

resources i n society. One can therefore conclude that Islamism t o o is concerned w i t h development and predicates the process o n t o p - d o w n social e n g i n e e r i n g — the hallmark o f the colonial state and its successor. Islamism's o p p o s i t i o n to state power, therefore, emanates f r o m the ability o f the secular state t o use i t to f u r ther its secularist agenda. I n effect, resisting state a u t h o r i t y is tied to Islamism's rejection o f state-sponsored secularization. I n fact, i n Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan, once Islamist forces were i n a p o s i t i o n to c o n t r o l p o l i c y m a k i n g , they c o n t i n u e d w i t h the expansion o f the state's p o w e r and reach and extended the c o n t r o l o f the state over private life, r e l i g i o n , and education. I n essence, the p u b l i c debate i n the M u s l i m w o r l d — b e t w e e n secular a n d Islamist forces-—has focused o n i d e o l o g y alone and has largely i g n o r e d the p r o b l e m o f the g r o w i n g size o f the state, w h i c h was a legacy o f c o l o n i a l i s m , and the reach o f its p u b l i c policies, w h i c h is e m b e d d e d i n the p r o g r a m s o f b o t h the state a n d its Islamist o p p o s i t i o n . M u s l i m societies—as have m a n y other d e v e l o p i n g societies—have become stuck w i t h the n o t i o n o f a large a n d i n t r u s i v e state, a n d the ideal o f d e f i n i n g M u s l i m s has become central to all p o l i t i c a l discourse. The b o n e o f c o n t e n t i o n is n o t the state's r i g h t t o manage d e v e l o p m e n t b u t the goal a n d content o f its policies. I n short, whereas the i d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n — t h e degree t o w h i c h society is secularized o r Islamic i d e n t i t y is accepted as a part o f n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y — - a n d p o l i c y content o f develo p m e n t a l i s m have been debated and f o u g h t over i n the M u s l i m state, the m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l legacies o f c o l o n i a l i s m have r e m a i n e d intact. A l l conceptions o f the M u s l i m s t a t e — f r o m capitalist to socialist to I s l a m i s t — v i e w the p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n o f the state t o be t o p - d o w n social t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , w i t h the a i m o f realizing d e v e l o p m e n t . The Islamist c o n c e p t i o n however, has entailed a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f this grand v i s i o n o f the state's role and f u n c t i o n i n that i t n o l o n g e r accepts that the West is the sole r e p o s i t o r y o f the values that s h o u l d g u i d e the state i n t r a n s f o r m i n g society i n its greater w i s d o m . The Malaysian Islamic y o u t h m o v e m e n t , A B I M ( A n g k a t a n Belia Islam Malaysia, the Islamic Y o u t h Force o f Malaysia), f o r instance,

d i r e c t e d its energies at i n f o r m i n g

the

Malaysian development agenda o f Islamic values, and m a n y o f its m e m b e r s pursued this goal by e n t e r i n g i n t o g o v e r n m e n t service.

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The Economic Legacy of Colonialism M u s l i m countries, m u c h like other T h i r d W o r l d countries, initially v i e w e d develo p m e n t , especially i n the economic sphere, to be a matter o f setting i n m o t i o n a set o f processes that w o u l d

culiTLinate

i n industrialization, g r o w t h , a n d w e a l t h .

They were supported i n this v i e w by Western theorists w h o characterized econ o m i c development as a matter o f reaching the " t a k e - o f f " p o i n t , as Europe had f o l l o w i n g the Marshall Plan i n the

t9COS.

M a n y M u s l i m states sought to shortcut

the process by assigning t o the state a greater role i n m a n a g i n g the economy. I n this they were influenced by the examples o f the Soviet U n i o n under Stalin and such T h i r d W o r l d leaders as Jawaharlal N e h r u o f India. This vision o f development closely paralleled prevalent conceptions o f political development that saw successful sociopolitical change to be a matter o f completing a set o f processes, identified to have been key i n the European experience. It also sat w e l l w i t h the predilections o f die new states, w h i c h as successors to the colonial state viewed progress as a t o p - d o w n and state-managed process. A l t h o u g h scholars debated over the n u m b e r and sequence o f die stages involved, they were i n agreement that the ideas d r a w n f r o m the European example were readily applicable to the developing w o r l d and that development was a linear cause-effect process. W h e d i e r in the political arena or i n the economic one, however, developing states, including M u s l i m states, defied die logic o f modernization theory. States were able to b r i n g about social change and economic g r o w t h but d i d n o t replicate western models o f the state and the economy. Rather, h y b r i d polities and economies emerged, reveali n g uneven development across sectors, classes, regions, and areas o f the polity. Disappointments were often blamed o n state leaders and their p o l i c y choices. The elusive nature o f development eventually led many to argue that perhaps the developing state c o u l d n o t reproduce the European experience because the T h i r d W o r l d society and e c o n o m y was n o t the same as the p r e m o d e r n European one. M o d e r n i z a t i o n theory n o w argued that the T h i r d W o r l d state was hampered i n its desire for development by cultural and social obstacles. Religious beliefs, social mores, customs, a n d the fractured society o f the T h i r d Worlders were held accountable f o r h o l d i n g back the state—suggesting that Christianity and weste r n values accounted for the historical achievements o f the west. This " d u a l c u l tures" thesis was a reiteration o f the g u i d i n g belief o f the colonial state, w h i c h had also v i e w e d the u p l i f t i n g o f the colonized to be a matter o f the passing o f their cultures and religions and their replacement w i t h a western value s y s t e m — a task that was possible o n l y i f the c o l o n i a l state saw to i t — w h i c h i n t u r n , at a f u n d a m e n t a l and " m o r a l " level, justified colonialism. Islam was, and continues to be, a favorite target o f the advocates o f this thesis. F r o m the first versions o f the " d u a l cultures" thesis to its recent incarnation

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i n the "clash o f c i v i l i z a t i o n s " argument, this approach has p o i n t e d to various aspects o f I s l a m — f r o m its theology to its law, its rituals, and its \iews o f the economy, societal relations, w o m e n , and m i n o r i t i e s — a s responsible for lackluster development i n M u s l i m countries. M a n y M u s l i m leaders b o u g h t i n t o this m y t h , w h i c h reinforced the legacy o f c o l o n i a l i s m that had already shaped state attitudes toward M u s l i m society and the Islamic faith. F r o m Sukarno o f Indonesia to Ayub Khan o f Pakistan, the Shah o f Iran, Bathist leaders i n Syria and Iraq, to Suharto o f Indonesia and H a b i b Bourgiba o f Tunisia, state leaders sought to m a r ginalize Islam and to p r o m o t e secular conceptions o f society and politics. I n the 1960s the anomalies i n the T h i r d W o r l d experience w i t h development w e r e explained i n a d i f f e r e n t manner. T h i r d W o r l d intellectuals and leftist thinkers i n the West posed a " d u a l economies" thesis i n place o f the " d u a l c u l tures" one, g i v i n g shape to w h a t came to be k n o w n as the dependency theory. It was argued that T h i r d W o r l d societies were not the same as p r e m o d e r n European ones because the latter had simply been undeveloped, whereas the T h i r d W o r l d societies had been m a n g l e d and d e f o r m e d . C o l o n i a l i s m had damaged T h i r d W o r l d economies

by d i s t u r b i n g the balance between

economic

sectors.

C o l o n i a l i s m had been premised o n u s i n g the colonial territories as a source o f cheap raw materials and a market for European products. It had therefore encouraged the development o f raw materials and discouraged industrial developments. The economies o f colonial territories had become unnaturally dependent o n raw materials and had not developed i n d u s t r i a l sectors. I n fact, c o l o n i a l i s m had systematically eliminated the traditional artisan classes that i n Europe had evolved i n t o the industrial sector. As Egypt grew m o r e and more c o t t o n , or Java and Africa agricultural c o m m o d i t i e s , for example, the export crops and raw materials d o m inated their economies. The dual dependency o n European markets for the raw materials and the European industries f o r final products led to absolute dependency, w h i c h enriched the West and i m p o v e r i s h e d the developing w o r l d . T h i r d W o r l d economies typically had overdeveloped raw materials export sectors and underdeveloped indigenous manufacturing. U p o n independence, M u s l i m economies displayed these characteristics

of

dependency. C o t t o n d o m i n a t e d i n Egypt, c o t t o n and jute i n Pakistan, coffee and spices i n East Africa and Java, c o t t o n and sdk i n Syria, o d i n the Persian Gulf, and r u b b e r i n Malaysia. Economies o f the M u s l i m states had become tied to the f l u c tuations o f the w o r l d economy, i n w h i c h they produced the lowest value-added products and consumed finished goods. T h e i r products were subject to greater p r i c e f l u c t u a t i o n and e m p l o y e d m i n i m a l t e c h n o l o g y ; w h a t they c o n s u m e d employed far m o r e technology and had m o r e stable prices. The pattern o f i n t e g r a t i o n o f these economies i n t o the global economic order also influenced the development o f infrastructure, urban development, and the like. Ports became

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d o m i n a n t i n colonial territories. I n the M u s l i m w o r l d such cities as Karachi and Beirut emerged, sometimes i n places w h e r e n o m a j o r p o p u l a t i o n center had existed before, and soon overshadowed the older cities o f the interior. F r o m Zanzibar i n East Africa t o Malacca and Penang i n Malaysia, ports became the centers o f wealth and power i n the colonies. Lines o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , roads, railways, and p o p u l a t i o n movements f o l l o w e d the directions i n w h i c h raw materials and finished goods f l o w e d . I n many cases the overdevelopment o f the export sector l e d t o the emergence o f "enclave" economies that were largely divorced f r o m the local economy. The o d sector i n the Persian Gulf, f o r example, clearly had such a characteristic. To some extent, patterns o f economic change led to large-scale m i g r a t i o n t o m e t r o p o l i t a n centers as traditional patterns o f f a r m i n g and the balance between urban and rural economies were altered. Colonial agricultural policy led t o r u r a l poverty, w h i c h i n Java, Egypt, and Algeria broke d o w n r u r a l economies and led to f l i g h t t o urban centers. Later economic policies o f such M u s l i m states as Iran and Egypt w o u l d o n l y encourage this tendency. I n some instances u r b a n develo p m e n t occurred i n the interior. Lyallpur (later Faisalabad) i n Pakistan o r Kuala L u m p u r were n o t ports, but they developed because o f the n e w economic relations that were spawned by colonialism. For the T h i r d W o r l d , development was therefore n o t a matter o f s i m p l y setting i n m o t i o n a set o f cause-effect economic processes u n t i l " t a k e - o f f " w o u l d be reached but o f r e m e d y i n g the destructive effects o f the relationship o f dependency Development w o u l d have t o b e g i n b y u n d o i n g the impact o f colonialism. I n many M u s l i m states, such as Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, and Algeria, the state saw its role i n the economy i n exactly such terms, as one o f correcting the i m b a l ances that were p r o d u c e d by colonialism. State-led industrialization thus became a means o f b r i n g i n g about patterns o f economic change that the society and the e c o n o m y were incapable o f achieving o n their o w n . I n Pahlavi Iran and Pakistan the state saw its role as merely corrective; i n socialist states, such as Sukarno's Indonesia, Nasser's Egypt, o r the FLN's Algeria, the state saw its role as m o r e f u n damental. Development thus f o u n d an additional justification as the state became the i n s t r u m e n t f o r correcting biases i n the e c o n o m y — e x p e d i t i n g development but also m a k i n g sure that development w i l l happen. Remedying the ills o f colon i a l i s m became a justification f o r states t o veer society away f r o m Islam by d i v e r t i n g attentions away f r o m questions o f faith and i d e n t i t y t o ones about i m p e r i a l i s m and its consequences. W h e r e state control o f economy progressed unchecked, i t stifled market forces to the l o n g - r u n d e t r i m e n t o f the economy. It achieved i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and weaned the economy away f r o m its dependency o n the export o f agricultural products o r raw materials, but i t d i d n o t produce viable and self-sustaining

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Under the impact of colonialism and with the discovery of oil, small fishing villages, such as Kuwait City, were transformed into major centers of wealth and power. Often dependent on such exports as oil, these ports exemplified the enclave economy that was largely divorced from local concerns.

industrialization. I n many cases, as i n Egypt under president A n w a r Sadat, Iran u n d e r Ayatollah A l i Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Indonesia u n d e r Suharto, o r Tunisia under Ben A l i , the state n o w relaxed its c o n t r o l o f the economy. Suharto and Ben Ali's r e f o r m s were m o r e far-reaching, i n v o l v i n g p r i v a t i z a t i o n a n d r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f the economy, and have thus proved m o r e m e a n i n g f u l t h a n Sadat's infitoh or Rafsanjani's liberalization initiative. The belief that c o l o n i a l i s m had thus produced fundamental imbalances i n local economies added f u r t h e r w e i g h t to the state's v i e w that i t had the d u t y to oversee development. Whereas initially its f u n c t i o n was to hasten development, n o w its p r i n c i p a l role was to first correct the problems caused by c o l o n i a l i s m — a n d later by i m p e r i a l i s m — a n d t h e n to see t o r a p i d development. W h e r e state leaders accepted the logic o f dependency theory, the role o f the state i n the society a n d e c o n o m y thus expanded and f o u n d f u r t h e r justification. Beyond the general ways i n w h i c h c o l o n i a l i s m accounts for w h a t M u s l i m states have come to view economic development to be, and the reasons develo p m e n t has proved to be an elusive goal, the colonial experience t h r o u g h its everyday policies and practices gave shape to the economies i n w h i c h i t operated. Land-tenure policies i n Java d u r i n g the D u t c h p e r i o d and i n Syria and Algeria, the settlement o f tribal lands and the conversion o f forests i n t o arable land i n Punjab, patterns o f capital investment, choice o f c r o p , and the like were i n s t r u mental i n shaping local economies. Whereas dependency theory underscored

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those legacies o f colonialism that all developing and M u s l i m economies share, these m o r e parochial differences i n colonial policies and practices explain w h y Algeria was different f r o m M o r o c c o and w h y b o t h were different f r o m Syria. I n Algeria, for instance, a large p o r t i o n o f the l a n d — t h e best and the most p r o d u c t i v e — w a s o w n e d by the European settlers. I n Syria the l a n d r e m a i n e d i n the hands o f local landowners. I n Algeria, u n l i k e Syria, the French settlers' (colons) presence and a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f land broke d o w n r u r a l relations and created a strong racist-imperialist order that then decided the pattern o f resistance politics. French p o l i c y also led to wide-scale pauperization o f the Algerian society w h e n i t became independent. A t independence, Algeria had the lowest n u m b e r o f professionals—administrators, doctors, engineers, and the l i k e — o f any other Arab colony or mandate. Most Algerian social and e c o n o m i c relations had been dismantled by the French r u l e i n the nineteenth century. Whatever n e w structures replaced t h e m were then weakened d u r i n g the w a r o f independence. The flight o f the settlers d u r i n g and after the w a r o f independence w e n t hand i n hand w i t h w a n t o n destruction and flight

o f capital. Thus, French impact o n the n e w state was p r o f o u n d , a l t h o u g h

n o t only i n continuities between the colonial and postcolonial states b u t also i n the abrupt break w i t h the past. The local social structure was i m p o r t a n t i n these different outcomes but so was

A goal of colonialism was to

the t i m i n g o f the colonial settlements. Syria was controlled by France, n o t as a

extract material wealth from

colony but as a mandate—a temporary arrangement under the supervision o f the League o f Nations to see to Syria's eventual independence. This, c o m b i n e d w i t h the fact that the French arrived i n Syria after W o r l d War I w h e n colonialism's hey-

the local economy. I n Java and Sumatra the agricultural system set up by the Dutch was designed to transform

day had passed, meant that there was very little enthusiasm i n France f o r l o n g -

these areas into large-scale

t e r m investment i n Syria. The meager capital o u t f l o w f r o m France to Syria

producers of spices and

therefore to a g o o d degree accounts for differences i n the shape o f agrarian relations and land o w n e r s h i p i n Algeria and Syria under the same colonial power. I n some instances colonialism benefited t h r o u g h direct extraction o f material

exotic agricultural goods. On this coffee estate in Sumatra around 1 9 0 0 , for example, female pickers labor on lad-

w e a l t h f r o m the economy, w h i l e i n other cases i t helped t r a n s f o r m the economy

ders with European overseers

and earned its profits t h r o u g h taxation o f the higher o u t p u t and income. I n the

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first case, o f t e n witnessed i n Java or Africa, colonialism c o u l d i m p o v e r i s h , d a m age, and disturb the local economy and culture, whereas i n the second case colon i a l i s m c o u l d produce tangible developments. I n Java the agricultural system set u p by D u t c h c o l o n i a l administrator van den Bosch a i m e d t o convert Java i n t o a large-scale producer o f spices and exodc agricultural e x p o r t c o m m o d i t i e s . Large tracts o f land and u p w a r d o f 56 percent o f the p o p u l a t i o n were p u t to the service o f the Dutch agricultural interest. Production o f f o o d s t u f f declined, and spices and coffee replaced t h e m . A peasantry emerged that lacked e c o n o m i c a u t o n o m y and the ability t o sustain itself. Dependent o n the D u t c h for e m p l o y m e n t , this peasantry became increasingly squeezed by the local elite that c o n trolled it and by the vagaries o f the global economy. It thus became exceedingly weak and poor. I n Africa, French colonialism extracted surplus, whereas i n the Levant i t sought to accrue w e a l t h by e n r i c h i n g local agriculture. The British Empire, w h i c h was at its core mercantile, d i d not rely o n European settlers but benefited f r o m customs and taxes. In many instances colonialism also invested i n infrastructure that later became central to economic progress. I n India, Malaya, and Egypt the British b u i l t roads, railways, and ports; i n Punjab they also b u i l t canals, an infrastructure for a g r i cultural development, and even some degree o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g activity. Many roads across the M u s l i m w o r l d were b u i l t by the colonial powers. I n some c o u n tries, such as I n d i a , the taxation system was i n t r o d u c e d , institutionalized, and given its place i n the m o d e r n economy by the colonial establishment. I n those developments that infrastructure has made possible, or otherwise i n h i b i t e d , colonialism has influenced economic change i n M u s l i m states.

The Social Impact of Colonialism Colonialism had a p r o f o u n d impact o n b o t h the social stratification and the cohesion o f M u s l i m societies. The e c o n o m i c impact o f colonialism p r o d u c e d n e w classes and altered the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r a m o n g the existing ones. For instance, i n N o r t h A f r i c a French settlers emerged as a d o m i n a n t social and econ o m i c class. I n India the British created and maintained a feudal class t h r o u g h w h i c h the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u l d c o n t r o l the r u r a l masses, and i n the D u t c h Indies the colonial agricultural policy reinforced the social p o s i t i o n o f the local elite. I n urban areas mercantile and commercial interests tied to the colonial trade policies gained i n stature, as d i d the emerging bureaucracy that was trained by and w o r k e d for the colonial administration. The rise o f these n e w social groups c o i n c i d e d w i t h the relative decline o f artisans, small-scale agricultural producers, and i n some cases the traditional elite. The p o l i t i c a l consequences o f this process were m o m e n t o u s . I n I n d i a , for instance, the decline o f

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the o l d elite tied to the M u g h a l c o u r t was i m p o r t a n t i n the Great M u t i n y o f

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and i n the tensions between M u s l i m s and the British Raj i n the f o l l o w i n g cent u r y o f colonial r u l e . The rise o f mercantile classes and an e m b r y o n i c m i d d l e class i n the f o r m o f educated functionaries i n the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n also changed the structure o f local politics. Emphasis gradually shifted f r o m the t i m e - h o n o r e d patterns o f exertion o f a u t h o r i t y to the politics o f nationalism and the struggles o f liberat i o n , w h i c h ultimately ended colonialism. The n e w nationalist elite were often tied to and emerged f r o m the colonial order's educational, bureaucratic,

and

social institutions; f r o m the m e t r o p o l i t a n centers rather than the h i n t e r l a n d .

The buildings of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Ranking Corporation dominated the crowded waterfront of Singapore, the most important city in the Riau Archipelago, traditional home to the Malay people. Completed in 1892, the bank offices stood until 1919, when they were demolished

Their points o f reference and their ideas came f r o m the colonial culture and d i d

to make way for new

not p u r p o r t to assert traditional notions o f authority.

premises.

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Such social developments as the entrenchment o f feudalism, where and w h e n it occurred, proved t o have a l o n g - t e r m effect o n social development i n M u s l i m societies. The political f u n c t i o n that landowners p e r f o r m e d i n n o r t h e r n India allowed them to develop strong class interests and tied their economic roles to political ones. Their power and position therefore remained unaffected i n the postcolonial state, i n Pakistan, where feudalism remains a pillar o f the political system, a legacy o f colonialism's social policy. I n the Persian G u l f similar trends were evident i n the entrencliment o f the power o f tribal chieftains, w h o also served as means o f social control for the colonial establishment and i n t u r n used colonial patronage and policies to fully entrench their sociopolitical positions and i n many cases to evolve i n t o monarchies. Across the Persian G u l f independence has only marginally changed the political role o f these traditional forms o f authority. Colonialism also affected local societies by encouraging and strengthening m o d e r n i z i n g trends. Colonial rulers across the M u s l i m w o r l d encouraged e d u cation and invested heavily i n educational institutions. Such institutions as the University o f Punjab and the University o f Malaya were established to educate those w h o w o u l d eventually r u n the machinery o f colonialism. Over t i m e these institutions p r o d u c e d generations o f M u s l i m leaders and influenced intellectual developments i n M u s l i m societies. They also helped to create the n e w m i d d l e classes and to p r o v i d e space for this n e w class to develop roots. The colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n also encouraged the sons o f the elite, and later p r o m i s i n g m i d dle-class y o u t h , to study at m o d e r n educational institutions or i n Europe. The Atchison College i n Lahore was established for the sons o f chiefs, princes, and landlords and the Kuala Kangsaw Malay College i n Malaya for r e c r u i t i n g sons o f Mala) aristocrats i n t o the bureaucracy. Over t i m e they also became the t r a i n i n g g r o u n d for c h i l d r e n o f the rising bureaucratic elite. Others went to school i n Eton and H a r r o w i n England and studied at O x f o r d and Cambridge, or i n Paris and Amsterdam. The name Pakistan is alleged to have been coined at C a m b r i d g e ; M u h a m m a d Iqbal, the e m i n e n t M u s l i m poet-philosopher o f South Asia, was educated at C a m b r i d g e and Heidelberg universities as w e l l as i n law at the Lincoln's I n n i n England, w h e r e M u h a m m a d A h Jinnah, w h o led the Pakistan m o v e m e n t , also received his law degree. Many leaders in the N o r t h African l i b eration movements were students i n the French schools i n N o r t h Africa and at the university i n Paris. A similar trend was also evident i n the military, whose officer corps came f r o m the colonies but wdiose education occurred i n Europe at such places as Sandhurst or Saint Cyr, or i n officer schools modeled after European m i l i t a r y schools and staffed by European officers, such as the Quetta Staff College i n Pakistan. The colonial administration had hoped that western education for the o l d elite and those i n positions o f power w o u l d create an affinity between t h e m and the colonial elite.

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This view had gained currency after the colonial establishment encountered the first wave o f resistance t o its p o s i t i o n by traditional chiefs and religious leaders. Over time, however, those educated i n m o d e r n ( " w e s t e r n " ) subjects proved to be equally u n c o m p r o m i s i n g foes. The n e w leadership educated i n western ways employed European ideals t o question the m o r a l i t y o f c o l o n i a l i s m , however, whereas the o l d elite had relied o n Islam to resist colonialism. I n the end the f o r mer approach proved m o r e potent, as it paved the way for independence. The impact o f the colonial education i n the intellectual realm was equally p r o f o u n d . T h r o u g h the educational system many indigenous thinkers became aware o f western literature and p h i l o s o p h y Some even w r o t e and t h o u g h t i n western languages. F r o m Indonesia t o M o r o c c o a great deal o f intellectual activity has o c c u r r e d i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h a n d t w e n t i e t h centuries i n D u t c h , French, a n d English; and an even greater a m o u n t o f intellectual activity has occurred i n the genre o f western intellectualism, but i n local languages. N e w f o r m s o f literature and literary activity, such as novels o r free-verse poetry, began t o surface i n the 1920s and the 1930s. I n I n d i a , so p r o f o u n d was the impact o f western t h o u g h t that the bulk o f the p r o d u c t i o n o f its literary geniuses i n the late t w e n t i e t h cent u r y is i n English. The p o l i t i c a l ramification o f this was t o shape M u s l i m intellectuals f r o m N o r t h Africa t o Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Indonesia i n the image o f western intellectuals. First J. S. M i l l o r Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and i n time JeanPaul Sartre and Albert Camus, became models for dissenting intellectuals, just as L e n i n , Fidel Castro, M a o , o r Che Guevara captured the i m a g i n a t i o n o f m o r e m i l itant activists such as the Marxist Fidaiyan-i Khalq (the People's Devotees) o f Iran, activists i n the Parcham (Flag) and Khalq (People) Parties i n Afghanistan, c o m m u n i s t activists i n Yemen or Turkey, c o m m u n i s t guerilla factions i n Malaysia, M o r o freedom

fighters

i n the s o u t h e r n P h i l i p p i n e s , a n d m e m b e r s o f the

C o m m u n i s t Party o f Indonesia (PKI). The n o t i o n o f political c o m m i t m e n t a m o n g intellectuals and o p p o s i t i o n t o the state thus grew roots. Many such intellectuals congregated i n L o n d o n a n d Paris and interacted w i t h European intelligentsia, w h i c h reinforced this trend. The impact o f this f o r m o f intellectual activity o n Algeria, the Arab w o r l d , and Iran has been p r o f o u n d . It undergirded Arab socialism and was an i m p o r t a n t source o f power for the revolutionary m o v e m e n t i n Iran. The leadership o f the FLN and Iran's A l i Shariati were members o f the same left-of-center circles i n Paris and shared i n the elaboration o f " T h i r d W o r l d i s m " (tiermondisme), w h i c h they then exported to their countries o f o r i g i n . N o t all educational endeavors were motivated by the needs o f the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , however. Colonial rulers as w e l l as voluntary organizations, such as Christian missionary movements, sought to hasten the advancement o f the local populations by educating t h e m . Catholic a n d Protestant colleges i n the Levant, such as A m e r i c a n University i n Beirut or St. Joseph's College i n Lebanon,

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and Roberts College i n Turkey and the Forman Christian College i n Lahore (some o f w h i c h later lost their Christian character), are examples i n this regard. The impact o f these undertakings o n the y o u t h culture or o n the u p l i f t i n g o f women's status was even m o r e p r o n o u n c e d . H i g h schools, such as the A m e r i c a n College i n Tehran, and women's schools, such as the Iran Bethel school i n Tehran or the K i n n a r d College i n Lahore, i n t r o d u c e d m o d e r n education to precollege students and to w o m e n i n general. M u s l i m s themselves w o u l d eventually adopt many o f the educational principles o f these i n s t i t u t i o n s , thus creating a m o m e n t u m for m o d e r n education and the development o f the m o d e r n m i d d l e classes. I n India the Jamiah-i N i z a m i y a h ( N i z a m i y a h U n i v e r s i t y ) and the Fawqaniyah schools sought to incorporate m o d e r n education i n t o the Islamic traditional c u r r i c u l u m s o f h i g h school students i n Hyderabad, whereas the A n g l o - O r i e n t a l College at Aligarh sought to do the same at the university level, and N a d w a t u l - U l a m a i n a seminary setting. After independence, Western e d u c a t i o n w o u l d be w i d e l y adopted i n India to shape the postcolonial society. Another i m p o r t a n t legacy o f colonialism involves its implications for national u n i t y o f later M u s l i m states. Colonial territories d i d little to u n i f y the peoples that fell w i t h i n those territories and thus d i d not result i n national societies or p r o duce national cultures. Colonial administrations were p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h protecting the boundaries o f their colonies against encroachment o f other colonial powers and lessening the burden o f r u l i n g over the colonies. The first c o n cern led t h e m to emphasize the sanctity o f the borders o f the colony, w h i c h accounts f o r the fact that the map o f the M u s l i m w o r l d is largely die one that was o r i g i n a l l y d r a w n by the colonial powers. The second concern obviated the possibility o f the consolidation o f lasting national identities. Colonial boundaries were often d r a w n i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h other colonial powers. Therefore they d i d not take i n t o account the d i v i s i o n o f groups o f the peoples or the inclusion o f ethnically, linguistically, or religiously diverse populations w i t h i n the same borders. I n many ways colonial demarcations o f territories helped to create n a t i o n ally diverse states rather than homogeneous ones. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, I n d o nesia, and N i g e r i a are all examples o f this p h e n o m e n o n . This p r o b l e m was c o m p o u n d e d by the colonial administrations' reliance o n divide-and-rule policies to reduce the b u r d e n o f governance. I n India the British p o i n t e d to India's d i v e r s i t y — w h i c h was painstakingly detailed i n their census r e p o r t s — t o argue that only the British c o u l d b r i n g order and cohesion to such a fundamentally divided land. Diversity was thus a necessary justification for the continuation o f colonialism. The consequence was that diversity gradually developed roots and f o u n d a life o f its o w n . It was also politicized and made center stage. I n the same vein, the British also went to great lengths t o show that Islam's roots were not i n India and therefore India had been previously r u l e d by outsiders;

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I

thus i t f o l l o w e d that it should not be strange that India w o u l d once again be r u l e d by outsiders. M u s l i m rule i n India clearly had many m o r e indigenous sources o f support than the British Raj. Still, the m y t h persisted and eventually shaped the M u s l i m s ' v i e w o f their o w n history i n India as w e l l as the H i n d u views o f it. The H i n d u nationalist rhetoric o f today echoes the British argument that Islam and M u s l i m s are outsiders—Turkish, Persian, and Arab invaders. Similar arguments were made by the British i n Egypt, again to try to give legitimacy to British rule. Here too the arguments eventually grew roots. One often hears that Gamal A b d e l Nasser was the first Egyptian ruler o f Egypt since the pharaohs. Colonial administrations also encouraged rivalry among diverse ethnic, l i n guistic, and religious communities. Such rivalries preoccupied the various c o m m u n i t i e s , d i v e r t i n g their attention f r o m the question o f c o l o n i a l i s m . It also encouraged them to curry favor w i t h the colonial establishment i n their struggle w i t h their rival communities. In India, British authorides actively sowed dissension among Muslims and Hindus. Some argue that the r u m o r that the M u g h a l emperor Babur had built a mosque o n top o f the b i r t h place o f the H i n d u god Ram i n Ayodhya were first circulated by the British to break d o w n M u s l i m - H i n d u c o m i t y i n northern India. The British also played o n tensions between Sikhs and Muslims. It was Sikh soldiers f r o m Punjab w h o broke the back o f the m u t i n y i n L u c k n o w ( i n northern India) i n i8c8, avenging the hardships that their c o m m u n i t y had suffered under the M u g h a l emperor Aurangzeb. The British policy culminated i n the great debate a m o n g Indian Muslims d u r i n g the interwar p e r i o d . Whereas some Indian Muslims advocated standing w i t h Hindus i n a c o m m o n front against British Imperialism, others, f r o m the M u s l i m League to religious activists, questioned j o i n i n g i n a c o m m o n cause w i t h Hindus. The British used the M u s l i m ambivalence to pressure the naüonalist movement. A l d i o u g h they d i d not stave o f f independence, the Indian subcontinent was eventually split between Muslims and Hindus. In short, the colonial policy deliberately manipulated diversities to strengthen the r u l e o f the state, to keep various c o m m u n i t i e s busy w i t h rivalries and c o n frontations, and to play the broker w i t h the antagonists. I n the process c o l o n i a l society became increasingly fractured. Hence, some conceptions o f the postcolo¬ nial state, such as a u n i t e d India, Malaya ( i n c l u d i n g Singapore), or Syria ( i n c l u d i n g Lebanon), were never viable; and those states that became viable have w i t h i n t h e m , to varying degrees, disintegrative tensions. Civil wars i n Sudan or Iraq and tensions between c o m m u n i t i e s i n Malaysia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and Chad, to name o n l y a few, are i n good measure products o f colonial rule. The colonial policy toward religious minorities has been even more significant. European powers always maintained close relations w i t h religious and ethnic minorities, especially w i t h religious minorities. First, European powers viewed themselves as the protectors o f Christian minorities. The O t t o m a n Empire under

There are more than n o million Muslims in India. They constitute one of the largest Muslim populations in the world, roughly equal to that of Pakistan and Bangladesh, though the partition of British India in 1947 was meant to separate the groups along religious lines. Muslims in Delhi, the capital of India, gather here for prayer celebrating the end of Ramadan.

pressure eventually conceded such a status to them. France thus became the p r o tector o f the Catholic Maronites i n die Levant, Russia o f the O r t h o d o x c o m m u n i ties; f o r lack o f a better candidate, Britain chose the Druze despite Druze protestations. European protection provided the religious minorities w i t h considerable power, elevating their social standing and altering their relations w i t h the d o m i n a n t communities. The Europeans w o u l d eventually demand o f the Ottoman Empire and Iran the same capitulatory privileges—exemption f r o m prosecution by local c o u r t s — f o r their allies a m o n g the m i n o r i t i e s that they themselves enjoyed. As the local populations began t o rebel against colonial rule, they came to view the m i n o r i t y communities as "collaborators." This label was o f great importance i n the future o f relations between the minorities and the d o m i n a n t communities i n states that were b o m o f struggles against colonialism. I n some cases the differences were so hreconcilable diat they led t o secessionism. Singapore separated f r o m Malay sia, and Lebanon rejected rejoining Syria. The idea o f protection o f m i n o r i ties at times became a central a i m o f the colonial powers. I n the case o f France's rule over Syria, this idea translated i n t o the French policy o f creating a Christian Arab state i n the f o r m o f Lebanon. I n addition, because the minorities were often better

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represented i n commercial affairs, it meant that they dealt w i t h the Europeans first and then more frequently. The minorities were incorporated i n t o the European commercial networks f r o m w h i c h they benefited materially and developed vested interests. Christian communities i n die Levant and Anatolia, Parsis i n India, and Copts i n Egypt are examples o f this. The commercial links also helped to alter the balance o f power between the d o m i n a n t communities and their minorities. It also gave the t w o communities radically different views o f colonialism. M i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s , w h i c h had enjoyed o n l y l i m i t e d privileges and d i d n o t v i e w themselves as i n c l u d e d i n M u s l i m societies, saw o n l y o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r gain i n c o l o n i a l i s m . Their reaction to c o l o n i a l i s m was therefore very different f r o m that o f the d o m i n a n t c o m m u n i t y . For example, m i n o r i t i e s saw the o p p o r t u n i t y for the generation o f w e a l t h i n c o m m e r c i a l alliances w i t h the colonial powers, social u p l i f t by r e l y i n g o n the colonial regime, and advancement by taking advantage o f w h a t c o l o n i a l educational systems had to offer. Christians i n the Arab Near East, Anatolia, and Iran embraced European values and ideals and subscribed to the ideologies o f c o l o n i a l i s m . Such ideological c o m m i t m e n t , for instance, t h o r o u g h l y t r a n s f o r m e d the Parsi r e l i g i o n i n I n d i a and gave the Maronites o f Lebanon a sense o f "Europeanness." This was also because o f the fact that they m o r e readily enrolled i n m o d e r n schools and therefore m o r e easily j o i n e d the c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and i n greater number. I n some cases, as i n A f r i c a , Indonesia, or I n d i a , Christian m i n o r i t i e s emerged t h r o u g h the c o n version o f local populations. I n these cases the m i n o r i t y ' s dependence o n colon i a l i s m and the majority's disdain were all the greater. Even i n i 8 ç 8 , Sayyid A h m a d Khan p o i n t e d to this p r o b l e m i n India. There H i n d u s , w h o w e r e n o t a m i n o r i t y i n n u m b e r but had been subservient

to

M u s l i m s for centuries, were j o i n i n g the administrative institutions o f the British Raj m o r e rapidly than M u s l i m s , w h o viewed British education w i t h disdain. One consequence o f this was that m i n o r i t i e s became better represented i n the f u t u r e political and intellectual leadership o f their societies. I n Africa, f r o m N i g e r i a to Eritrea, n o n - M u s l i m s have been p r o m i n e n t i n national politics. I n Senegal the most i m p o r t a n t nationalist leader, and later the president o f the country, was Leopold Sedar Sengor, a Christian. Arab nationalism as an intellectual c u r r e n t — f r o m the w r i t e r George A n t o n i u s to the ideologue M i c h e l A f l a q — w a s d o m i n a t e d by Arab Christians, w h o also d o m i n a t e d i n the bureaucracy and political i n s t i t u tions i n that r e g i o n . A disproportionately h i g h n u m b e r o f the early leadership o f the Palestinian Liberation Organization were Christians, as were some o f its most radical leaders, such as George Habash and N a y i f Hawatma. A l t h o u g h relations between colonial powers and Christian m i n o r i t i e s were m o r e fecund and w i t h greater significance for later developments, similar trends were also evident i n relations w i t h other religious and ethnic m i n o r i t i e s . I n Syria

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the French maintained close ties w i t h the Alawis, and i n India the British w i t h the Ismailis. D o m i n a n t M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s tended t o v i e w such relations w i t h greater alarm than relations between colonialists and n o n - M u s l i m m i n o r i t i e s , because they were tantamount t o altering not only the balance o f power between social groups but between o r t h o d o x y and those i t sought t o exclude. O f t e n the d o m i n a n t c o m m u n i t i e s suspected the colonial h a n d i n all religious schisms, especially those that arose d u r i n g colonial rule. I n d i a n M u s l i m s have viewed the A h m e d i y a as a creation o f the British, just as Iranians have depicted Bahaism i n similar terms. I n recent years these sentiments have been echoed i n the charge i n some quarters that all schisms are the w o r k o f the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Such views o w e d t o colonial administrations' r e c r u i t m e n t a m o n g the m i n o r i t i e s as w e l l as t o m i n o r i t i e s ' greater participation i n the colonial educational system, b o t h o f w h i c h had the effect o f e m p o w e r i n g the m i n o r i t y , weste r n i z i n g its c u l t u r a l o u t l o o k , and allying i t w i t h the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I n India i n 1931,1.2 percent o f the p o p u l a t i o n were literate i n English but o n l y 0.9 percent o f the M u s l i m s were. I n Syria this trend eventually led t o the d o m i n a t i o n o f the c o u n t r y by Alawis, w h i c h continues i n President Hafiz al-Asad's rule. A particularly i m p o r t a n t legacy o f colonialism is the representation o f particular communities i n the police and m i l i t a r y forces. The colonial powers often recruited a m o n g the m i n o r i t i e s for the local army and police forces. N o t o n l y were the m i n o r i t i e s m o r e closely allied w i t h the colonial order, b u t they were m o r e likely to be w i l l i n g to engage and t o suppress members o f the d o m i n a n t c o m m u n i t y — w i t h w h i c h they d i d not identify and against w h i c h they may have borne a grudge. M i n o r i t i e s were also less likely t o respond t o the religious call for rebellion and j i h a d . The legacy o f the Great M u t i n y o f 1857

a n

d

m

e

M u s l i m Sepoy

army's siege o f L u c k n o w d o m i n a t e d m u c h o f the colonial t h i n k i n g i n the t w e n tieth century. Hence, the Syrian army was largely composed o f Alawis, and the British army i n India o f Punjabis, M u s l i m as w e l l as Sikh. Here Punjabi Muslims had a different relationship w i t h the British than those o f the M u g h a l territories. Consequently, die national armies that were b u i l t o n the basis o f the colonial army tended t o be composed o f a large n u m b e r o f minorities. This has been o f i m p o r tance i n many M u s l i m states f r o m N i g e r i a to Syria. I n Jordan a variation o f this scenario u n f o l d e d , where t r i b e s m e n — a n d not m i n o r i t i e s — w e r e recruited i n t o the Arab Legion t o control the urban and r u r a l populations o f western J o r d a n — the Palestinians. The o n l y exception t o tins general rule were the Shiites, w h o m the colonial powers never incorporated i n t o an alliance and w h o m i n the 1920s and the 1930s served as the m a i n source o f o p p o s i t i o n i n Iraq to British rule. The Shiites were therefore not p r o m i n e n t i n British colonial armies i n the Near East. Elsewhere the c o l o n i a l powers actually created ethnic o r religious diversity, w h i c h produced the same conditions as previously o u t l i n e d . I n Algeria, French

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settlers t o o k over large tracts o f land and numbered close to t w o m i l l i o n at the t i m e o f independence. They left Algeria after independence. I n East Africa and South Africa, I n d i a n and Malay labor, w h i c h was i m p o r t e d to w o r k o n c o l o n i a l projects, remained to f o r m i m p o r t a n t c o m m e r c i a l c o m m u n i t i e s f r o m Kampala and

Mombasa

to

Zanzibar,

Dar

es

Salaam,

Cape T o w n , and

Durban.

" A f r i c a n i z a t i o n " campaigns i n East Africa eventually ended i n the mass expulsion o f South Asians f r o m Uganda and their marginalization i n Kenya and Tanzania. H o w the issue w i l l be resolved i n South Africa remains to be seen. I n Palestine the B r i t i s h facilitated the settlement o f European Jews f o r p o l i t i c a l and h u m a n i tarian rather than economic reasons. That policy c u l m i n a t e d i n the creation o f the stale o f Israel i n 1948. I n Sind, i n the late nineteenth century, Punjabi w o r k ers were b r o u g h t i n to w o r k for the B r i t i s h . Their presence fueled resentments a m o n g Sindhis, w h i c h continue to animate ethnic politics i n Pakistan. H o w economic considerations led to the movements o f populations, and the implications o f these movements for the successor states, is best reflected i n the case o f Malaysia. Here the British negotiated concessions for land and mines w i t h local chiefs but b r o u g h t i n Chinese and I n d i a n migrant labor, w h o eventually f o r m e d large communities. These " m i n o r i t y " c o m m u n i t i e s developed the same c o m m e r c i a l , rehgio-cultural, and political alliances that colonial rulers had established w i t h m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s elsewhere. The Chinese and Indians as a result became financially and politically m o r e advanced than the indigenous Malays, w h o s e p o l i t i c s were c o n t r o l l e d by chiefs and centered i n r u r a l areas. The University o f Malaya, most commercial and social institutions, and the staff o f the colonial establishment were dominated by Chinese and Indians. The power o f the " i m p o r t e d " m i n o r i t i e s led to m a j o r civil strife i n Malaysia i n 1969 and continues to be a major p o i n t o f contention i n Malaysian politics. After three decades o f affirmative action policies to benefit the burniputra ("sons o f s o i l " ) 80 percent o f private sector wealth is still controlled by the Chinese and Indians. The ethnic dilemmas c o n f r o n t i n g postcolonial M u s l i m states thus have their roots i n the colonial era. A l t h o u g h ethnic consciousness is by n o means u n i q u e to the T h i r d W o r l d or t o M u s l i m states, the particularities o f the p r o b l e m — d i v i s i v e national societies, weakness o f national identity, imbalances i n the wealth, education, and power o f m i n o r i t y and majority c o m m u n i t i e s — a r e u n i q u e to the postcolonial state.

The Institutional Foundations of the Postcolonial State A n i m p o r t a n t , and yet u n t i l recently ignored, legacy o f colonialism is the manner i n w h i c h i t has given f o r m to the institutional foundations, and thus the parameter o f politics, o f the postcolonial state. Independence ended the sovereignty o f European powers over their territories; i t d i d not, however, produce states de novo.

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The postcolonial state inherited the machinery o f the colonial state, and to varying degrees, f o l l o w e d the m o d e l o f the colonial state. I n such cases as India, the c o n t i nuity between the t w o was quite conspicuous. M u h a m m a d A l i Jinnah first became the governor-general o f Pakistan, and the India Act o f 193c was the law o f the land u n t i l the Constitution of 19C6 was promulgated some nine years after independence. Elsewhere the continuity is less apparent, as i n Algeria or Libya. Still, even i n these countries the maimer i n w h i c h the state works and relates to social forces has m o r e i n c o m m o n w i t h the colonial era than state leaders w o u l d a d m i t . Ideological continuities generally have been easier to discern. The rhetoric o f state leaders may also have had a hand i n c o n f o u n d i n g the relations between the colonial and postcolonial states. It has become increasingly evident, however, that the postcolonial state, all protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, has been less a seed planted at independence and more a later g r o w t h i n an o l d tree—new branches o n the t r u n k that grew d u r i n g the colonial era. Even w h e n h i g h politics o f the state may have sought to chart new courses, at its foundations the state ineluctably f o l l o w e d i n the footsteps o f the colonial era. Colonialism accounts for more i n postcolonial states than previously assumed. Policy choices, the way those choices have been i m p l e m e n t e d , and h o w the state has d e v e l o p e d — all o f this has occurred i n a framework that was conceived and entrenched d u r i n g colonial rule. A l t h o u g h the a i m and the general structure o f authority o f colonialism was m u c h the same f r o m Indonesia to Nigeria, there were i m p o r t a n t variations i n h o w the colonial administrators actually r u l e d over their vassal populations. These variations account for differences among the experiences w i t h state f o r m a t i o n after independence. Colonial administration exerted authority directly as w e l l as i n d i rectly, through local elites, chiefs, and mercantile forces. I n Algeria and Libya colonial rule was direct, w h i l e i n Morocco, Tunisia, Malaya, Java, and India it used local elites to a good extent. I n Java the numerical weakness o f the D u t c h led them to rely o n local elites and chiefs to manage the labor supply. The consequence was to entrench the sociopolitical position o f the intermediary elite, to create dependencies between the peasantry and the elite, and also to p e r m i t extensive exploitation and impoverishment o f the masses i n die process o f generating a labor supply. In India a t h i r d o f the p o p u l a t i o n were r u l e d , n o m i n a l l y at least, by some 2co maharajas ( H i n d u princes and kings) and nawabs ( M u s l i m princes and kings) as w e l l as the N i z a m (hereditary r u l e r s ) o f Hyderabad (a state that was larger than France) and the Aga Khan. These princes had little real a u t o n o m y and were carefully controlled by British political officers, but they w i e l d e d m u c h a u t h o r i t y over their populations. The relations between the subjects o f the princes and those w h o lived under direct British r u l e was very different, however. T h r o u g h the princes the British w-ere able to c o n t r o l a large part o f India w i t h the least a m o u n t o f p o l i t i c a l cost. Even i n those territories i n w h i c h British r u l e was

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direct, landowners, traditional elites, and local chiefs and grandees were used to bolster British rule. B e g i n n i n g i n 1861, landlords were i n d u c t e d i n t o the largely h o n o r i f i c advisory body called the Viceroy's C o u n c i l and allowed to dominate local p o l i t i c s — t h i s lasted u n t i l the i n t e r w a r p e r i o d . A symbiotic relationship then developed between the princes and local elites and the British, whereby the British agreed to the social status o f the local elites and the elites i n t u r n p r o v i d e d local support and social c o n t r o l for the British. This pattern o f p o l i t i c s made

the local elites i m p o r t a n t p o w e r

brokers,

entrenched their sociopolitical positions, and encouraged t h e m to favor the cornpar tmentalization o f the policy i n place o f a u n i f o r m national p o l i t i c a l arena, w h e r e i n they c o u l d w i e l d power by c o n t r o l l i n g segments o f the p o l i t y and negotiate for its support w i t h the center. The patronage o f the British often allowed the institutional power and reach o f the princes and local elites to increase, w h i c h made i t m o r e difficult f o r the nationalist elite to penetrate their d o m a i n and later

The British occupied Kabul in 1880 as part of the second Anglo-Afghan war.They

for the state to c u r b i t . For instance, British policy i n India gave the l a n d o w n i n g

installed Amir Abd al-

class tremendous p o w e r over the peasantry, w h i c h helped to consolidate the c o n -

Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901)

t r o l o f the landowners over the r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n . I n Pakistan this trend has been most evident. The l a n d o w n i n g class has not only w i e l d e d tremendous p o w e r i n the country, c o n t r o l l i n g politics at all levels, but i t also has successfully resisted

as ruler. With substantial annual subsidies and technical assistance from the British, the "Iron Amir" con-

l a n d r e f o r m . The l a n d o w n i n g class therefore controls p o l i t i c a l support i n its

solidated power over the

estates and is i n a p o s i t i o n to bargain w i t h the center. I n the Persian G u l f e m i -

entire country.

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rates British policy helped t o strengthen tribal chiefs, and i n Malaysia the local kings. The power o f the m o n a r c h y i n the Persian G u l f emirates and i n B r u n e i is to a large extent a result o f these colonial policies. Similar trends also characterized relations between the B r i t i s h and t r i b a l chiefs i n East Africa and N i g e r i a , w i t h a similar i m p a c t o n state f o r m a t i o n . A l t h o u g h French colonial rule was generally centralized, i t too at times f o l l o w e d policies similar to British colonialism. Where and w h e n the French used the intermediary role o f the local elites, however, i t had less to d o w i t h the efficacy o f this approach and more w i t h limitations to centralized colonial rule or the perceived importance o f the colony to France. Lisa Anderson has w r i t t e n that i n Tunisia, because the protectorate was not very i m p o r t a n t to France, the French let local institutions o f power persist and used the local mercantile classes as the means o f pushing i n t o the countryside. A local bourgeoisie thus emerged that helped to strengthen the colonial state and i n t u r n benefited f r o m the strengthening o f that state. U n d e r the Neo-Destur party i n Tunisia, state consolidation followed the pattern first established under French rule and thus involved f o l l o w i n g the French pattern o f extending the state's reach i n t o untapped areas and extending Tunis' admmistrative reach. I n M o r o c c o , similarly. General Lyautey conceived o f the French role as recognizing Moroccan political culture and accepting the social mores o n w h i c h it was based. H e saw France as a protector, best served i f it w o r k e d Tripoli, Libya, was occupied by the Italians in 1912, as the Ottoman Empire's hold over the region weakened. The Italians constructed Westernstyle buildings and insisted on segregating settlers from locals, especially in economic matters, and so no local elite developed to take over once the Italians departed after World War I I .

t h r o u g h the existing political, cultural, and social institutions. I n A l g e r i a and Libya u n d e r French and Italian rules a d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n emerged. There the c o l o n i a l state d i d n o t seek to operate t h r o u g h local elites as m u c h as i t sought to establish the p a r a m o u n t role o f the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and to r u l e t h r o u g h the settlers. It can be argued that M o r o c c o , Tunisia, and later Syria were exceptions to French rule, w h i c h typically had a penchant f o r centralization that may have been embedded i n France's o w n political culture. That M o r o c c o and Tunisia were protectorates and Syria later o n l y a mandate may have made these territories less attractive or central t o the French scheme o f e m p i r e , and thus led to less investment i n centralized r u l e and greater reliance o n local

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forces. That France came to v i e w Algeria as a part o f France—a sentiment captured i n a famous saying o f the t i m e : "France is cut by the Mediterranean as Paris is cut by the Seine"—encouraged r u l i n g it directly, b o t h because that was acceptable to the settlers and because centralized rule w o u l d guarantee greater integ r a t i o n i n t o France. French rule i n Algeria was n o t only interested i n economic gain b u t also i n the integration o f Algeria i n t o France. It is i m p o r t a n t to note that to the extent to w h i c h French c o l o n i a l i s m i n Algeria was engaged i n economic gain, i t was m a k i n g such gains t h r o u g h the large numbers o f French citizens w h o had settled the best land i n Algeria, and n o t the local p o p u l a t i o n , the mercantile classes, or the emerging bourgeoisie. Political compromises, necessary for facilitating e c o n o m i c gains f r o m the local economy, were thus n o t necessary i n Algeria. A l l compromises involved the economy o f the settlers, whose leaders were distinctly hostile to all Algerian political expressions. It is also arguable that i n Algeria, France f o u n d only a weak local power structure, one that c o u l d be easily overcome and one that w o u l d n o t have been a suitable basis for colonial authority. It was thus q u i c k l y replaced w i t h direct administration. In Libya, by contrast, the Italians had a different attitude, although they followed similar policies. Italy's m a i n concern was not managing the economy but proving its o w n primacy. Hence, they too saw n o need to forge political alliances w i t h local elites that w o u l d facilitate extracting economic gain f r o m the local economy. Italy, i n fact, insisted o n segregating the settlers and the locals, especially i n economic matters. Therefore n o local bourgeoisie emerged, and the local population was not tied to the expansion o f the colonial state, whereas i n Tunisia nationalist leaders had established their ties o f patronage to the population as part o f the expansion o f the colonial state. The colonial state had thus facilitated the emergence o f a Tunisian power structure centered i n an urban bourgeoisie that had penetrated die rural areas at the back o f the colonial state; Libya, by contrast, had n o viable local state elite to take over f r o m Italy, because n o expansion o f the local state involving the local bourgeoisie had happened. The urban Libyans had not developed any ties o f patronage beyond their immediate locales because they had not had any reason to venture beyond t h e m . Italian rule i n Libya was absolute and led to little local instit u t i o n budding. At independence, Libya thus lacked a stable state machinery and was n o t able to continue i n the footsteps o f the Italians. Libya actually had to create a state. The colonial legacy gave Libya its independence and shape but not a viable state. The Libyan state was at the outset an ad hoc one, w h i c h lacked continuity and penetration o f society and had little authority It relied heavily o n the w r i t o f the monarchy, w h i c h made it viurierable. The monarchy's collapse and the rise o f the absolutist and arbitrary rule o f M u a m m a r Qaddafi occurred i n this context. Differences between h o w colonial powers conceived o f their a u t h o r i t y and h o w this a u t h o r i t y had to be i m p l e m e n t e d had t o d o w i t h t w o issues: h o w best

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to maxirnize economic gain f r o m the colony, and whether the colonial power had a political-cultural agenda i n m i n d . I f economic gain was the p r i m a r y motive, and this gain was n o t tied to a large settler p o p u l a t i o n , i t was likely that colonial administrations w o u l d appeal to local elites for political support or create c o n d i tions for the rise o f a mercantile and bourgeois elite. Both o f these elite groups w o u l d develop vested interests i n the colonial state and w o u l d eventually become tied to the w o r k i n g s o f the parent state centered i n Europe. Both groups w o u l d therefore be i m p o r t a n t to the future w o r k i n g s o f the successor state. W h i c h g r o u p w o u l d eventually d o m i n a t e — t h e landowners i n Pakistan or the bourgeois elite i n T u n i s i a — w o u l d depend o n their relative power d u r i n g colonial rule. W h e r e and w h e n colonialism saw its e c o n o m i c gain i n a settler c o m m u n i t y , or saw the purpose o f colonialism as p r o v i n g the political and cultural supremacy o f the parent state, i t was less likely to r u l e t h r o u g h the local elites or support the rise o f a local elite. I n such cases, as i n Algeria and Libya, the colonial state w o u l d lack any serious local components that w o u l d have ties to the colonial a d m i n i s tration and have vested interests i n its p o w e r and reach. The postcolonial state i n such cases w o u l d be weak and vulnerable, lacking i n a social base and strong econ o m i c and political institutions. Beyond the structure o f c o l o n i a l a u t h o r i t y , h o w the c o l o n i a l state exercised that a u t h o r i t y a n d h o w i t was perceived by the local p o p u l a t i o n was o f great importance

t o later state d e v e l o p m e n t s .

The

c o l o n i a l state, u n l i k e

the

European state, was f r o m i n c e p t i o n based o n segregation o f Europeans f r o m locals i n law, e c o n o m i c relations, a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l matters, and social life. It was n o t based on the European c o n c e p t i o n o f c i v i l societies b u t o n centralized a n d nonrepresentative bureaucracies that r u l e d by force a n d e n c o u r aged as w e l l as managed social d i v i s i o n s . As a result, mass-based parties are a r a r i t y i n M u s l i m states. The U n i t e d Malays N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n i n Malaysia or the Neo-Destur i n Tunisia are examples o f genuine party organizations. The N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n Front i n A l g e r i a or Bath parties i n Syria and I r a q to a l i m i t e d extent have served as g e n u i n e parties. Elsewhere, however, personalized r u l e has been the order o f the day. Nasser's Arab Socialist U n i o n never evolved into

a genuine

(Resurrection)

party, a n d

the

Shah's e x p e r i m e n t

with

the

Rastakhiz

party or the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i ' s w i t h the Islamic Republic

party d i d n o t a m o u n t to m u c h . The essence o f the colonial state became giving shape to those agencies and institutions that w o u l d assume d o m i n a t i o n . U n b o u n d by constitutional limitations and citizenship rights, the colonial state had broad powers to act, and it d i d so viewing itself as b o u n d to the " s u p e r i o r " European values. It acted o n reasons o f state (those o f Europe), w h i c h i n the eyes o f the local population w ere condescending r

and paternal, unaccountable, and by nature avowedly transformative rather than

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1

managerial. These are exactly the attitudes that w o u l d become a part o f the developmentalist ideology o f the postcolonial state. The postcolonial state and its nationalist elite had rejected the colonial state's right to rule their populations and to represent their interests, but they never rejected the colonial state's views o f the state's f u n c t i o n i n the colonial territories. I n many regards the postcolonial state became an indigenization o f the colonial state. The o p p o s i t i o n to the state i n the M u s l i m w o r l d today, although couched i n Islamic rhetoric, i n large measure reiterates these original nationalist complaints about the colonial state. Just as the nationalist elite rejected colonialism's claim to represent local aspirations i n transf o r m i n g society, the Islamist opposition similarly questions the r u l i n g regime's claim to represent popular aspirations i n pursuing secularization and development. Generally speaking, the c o l o n i a l state's goal was to establish d o m i n a t i o n , to ensure legitimacy as w e l l as security (internal and external), to m a i n t a i n a u t o n o m y first f r o m the local society but eventually also f r o m its parent state i n Europe, and to extract economic surplus. These aims were achieved as the colonial state devised and refined its i n s t i t u t i o n a l setup. That i n s t i t u t i o n a l setup i n t u r n determ i n e d the w o r k i n g s o f the successor states, the nature o f relations between the state and society w i t h i n t h e m , and the paradigm that governs their politics. The institutional setup is perhaps the most pervasive legacy o f c o l o n i a l i s m . The colonial state was by nature h i g h l y centralized and dependent o n a core o f i n s t i t u tions (such as the police, the military, and the bureaucracy) that served as the repositories o f its a u t h o r i t y . That a u t h o r i t y guaranteed the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f European d o m i n a t i o n and extraction o f resources to the advantage o f the European power. Some i n s t i t u t i o n s , such as the bureaucracy, were n o t designed p r i m a r i l y to enforce order but to efficiently manage the r u n n i n g o f the m a c h i n ery o f government and the economy. Other institutions, such as the judiciary, were intended to help w i t h the management o f order w i t h i n a legal f r a m e w o r k , but their character had m o r e t o do w i t h European traditions than w i t h the f u n c tions they had to p e r f o r m . Still, the confluence o f the activities o f the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the coercive instruments o f the colonial state constituted an i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure that allowed a small European m i n o r i t y to r u l e over vast territories w i t h the help o f local agents, and to manage the e c o n o m i c flow o f goods and resources between c o l o n i a l territories and Europe. So i m p o r t a n t were these institutions that they eventually constituted the basis o f the postcolonial state and thus determined the character o f that state and the nature o f its relation w i t h the society. I n many ways states such as Pakistan are replicas o f the colonial state, not only i n the manner i n w h i c h they are set u p and f u n c t i o n , but m o r e i m p o r t a n t i n h o w they envision their o w n roles. The m i l i t a r y and the police are perhaps the most evident examples o f the i n s t i t u t i o n a l and ideological c o n t i n u ity o f colonialism.

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Military, Police, and Civilian Bureaucratic Institutions T h r o u g h o u t colonial territories, local armies and police forces were trained to support the colonial state. This was by and large a very successful undertaking, enough so that I n d i a n soldiers fought i n European battlefields d u r i n g b o t h w o r l d wars, and the elite Himalayan Gurkha soldiers continue to fight battles for the British, the last instance being d u r i n g the Falkland Islands war i n 1982. The Sepoy M u t i n y o f 1857, w h e r e i n M u s l i m and H i n d u soldiers i n n o r t h e r n India rose i n rebellion against their English officers, was not repeated o n that scale, at least n o t u n t i l the time o f independence, w h e n armies i n Egypt and Syria took to a n t i i m p e r i a l i s m . Recruitment a m o n g m i n o r i t i e s and deployment o f soldiers i n alien c o m m u n i t i e s to some extent accounted for the facility w i t h w h i c h c o l o n i a l administrations created and managed their militaries. Sikh soldiers thus p r e d o m inated i n units that kept order i n H i n d u and M u s l i m areas, w h i l e i t was Baluch troops f r o m western Pakistan, w h o opened fire o n Sikh worshipers i n Julianwala Bagh i n the Amritsar Massacre i n 1919. Still, the power o f colonial militaries came f r o m the discipline and esprit de corps that intensive trainhig had instilled i n the soldiers and m o r e i m p o r t a n t , i n the officer corp. The colonial armies had internalized the military ideas and political values o f the colonial administration. To the extent to w h i c h they f o u n d a role i n state f o r m a t i o n i n later years, they d i d so w i t h the benefit o f their colonial outlooks. Even in Algeria the m i l i t a r y has remained one o f the most Francophone institutions i n the country. More i m p o r t a n t , the colonial legacy determined their attitudes toward politics. Colonial militaries were generally unnaturally large, far larger than the size o f the local economies warranted. Colonial militaries were based o n the economic and political interests o f the European power; they were not conceived, armed, or trained based o n the economic and techno logical abilities o f the colonial territory. The size and power o f the military itself was the most important legacy that postcolonial states had to deal w i t h . M u s l i m states thus inherited omnipotent militaries, far too large f o r their relative p o p u l a t i o n sizes and economic capacities. Furthermore, the militaries had fought alongside the colonial rulers r i g h t u p to the time o f independence. Their attitudes t o w a r d the struggles for independence and those w h o led those struggles were not necessarily sympathetic. Military and police forces had clashed w i t h and arrested politicians; they had viewed the champions o f the independence struggles w i t h the same cynicism and disparaging glare that their superior European officers had. The Indonesian generals thus remained w a r y o f Sukarno and lost n o time i n deposing h i m w h e n the threat o f c o m m u n i s m p r o vided them w i t h the pretext to do so. The same may be said o f those w h o w o u l d lead coups i n Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Sudan, They w o u l d remain preoccupied w i t h order and show impatience w i t h the politics o f the masses.

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I n the n e w states the officers w h o had served the c o l o n i a l order and the politicians w h o had f o u g h t for independence had to share i n the task o f state form a t i o n . The relationship between the m i l i t a r y and the civilian order was often d e t e r m i n e d by this reality. Even i n the Arab w o r l d and Sub-Saharan Africa, w h e r e left-leaning j u n i o r officers overthrew senior officers o f the o l d school to j o i n the anti-imperialist struggle, they d i d n o t resolve the inherent tensions between the

Local armies and police forces were usually trained to support the colonial stale. One of the few instances when they rebelled was the Sepoy Mutiny of 1 8 5 7 , in which Muslim and Hindu

m i l i t a r y and civilian orders. These tensions i n Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Syria even-

soldiers in northern India

tually led to m i l i t a r y takeovers. The military's disdain for politicians and their

rose in rebellion against

perceived r i g h t t o interfere i n politics to restore order were i n g o o d measure

their British officers.

legacies o f the colonial era—whose m i l i t a r i e s , w i t h f e w exceptions, were n o t meant for external war b u t for preservation o f internal order. These legacies were internalized by the rank-and-file o f the colonial armies and became a part o f their postindependence ethos. The officers i n most colonial settings, and even i n the O t t o m a n Empire and Iran, were m o r e educated than the average p o p u l a t i o n , and at the institutional level militaries had been m o r e exposed to Western ideas. They

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therefore v i e w e d themselves as better equipped i n leading the n e w states to development and progress. The c o m b i n a t i o n o f their belief i n their greater capab i l i t y to oversee development—a v i e w that i n the 1950s was shared by Western p o w e r s — a n d their disdain for politicians, w h o m were seen as demagogues, often set m i l i t a r y leaders o n a path o f c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h the p o l i t i c a l elite. I n this the m i l i t a r y leadership filled the shoes o f the f o r m e r colonial rulers as they c o m peted w i t h the nationalist leaders for the r i g h t to represent and t o deliver o n the aspirations o f the local p o p u l a t i o n . M u c h like the military, the bureaucracy also served as a pillar o f the colonial order. Trained and m o l d e d i n the ethos o f the colonial culture, bureaucrats i n the empire's service shared and f o l l o w e d the values and p o l i t i c a l o u t l o o k o f the European rulers. Because they controlled the machinery o f the colonial state, they ineluctably occupied a central role i n the postcolonial order. Politicians had o n l y l i m i t e d success i n c o n t r o l l i n g t h e m , lest they disrupt the entire w o r k i n g s o f the state. As a result, the bureaucracy had a m a j o r role i n state f o r m a t i o n i n the postcolonial era and i n creating continuities between the ethos and m o d e o f operat i o n o f the state before and after independence. I n Pakistan, for instance, soon after independence i n 1947 the bureaucracy eclipsed the p o l i t i c a l elite i n m a n aging the country. Political leaders M u h a m m a d Ah" Jinnah (1876—1948) and Liaqat A l i Khan (1895—19C1) were replaced at the h e l m after 1951

by senior

bureaucrats G h u l a m M u h a m m a d (1895-1956) and Iskandar Mirza (1899-1969), w h o had risen t h r o u g h the ranks o f the bureaucracy under the British. The power o f the bureaucracy varied across colonial territories, depending o n the extent o f the investment that colonial rulers had made i n their administrative institutions. For example, the I n d i a n Civil Service was exemplary i n its efficient f u n c t i o n i n g and elaborate structure, b u t the bureaucracies i n the Arab Near East and Libya were generally undeveloped. The power and efficiency o f the bureaucracy was a double-edged s w o r d . It c o u l d serve as a major source o f resistance to effective exertion o f a u t h o r i t y by the political elite, and i t could infuse the n e w states w i t h the political values o f the colonial order. Still, the same power and efficiency was often an asset i n m o b i l i z i n g resources for development. Over the years the standards by w h i c h colonial bureaucracies operated declined; some even lost their independence and preeminence. As a result, their political role and their cont r i b u t i o n to socioeconomic change have been d i m i n i s h e d . The j u d i c i a r y presents a very d i f f e r e n t case. To b e g i n w i t h , i t is o f primaryi m p o r t a n c e t o s t u d y i n g f o r m e r B r i t i s h colonies, w h e r e the c o l o n i a l state c o n sciously p r o m o t e d a system o f justice m o d e l e d after Britain's and gave i t a u t o n o m y to f u n c t i o n w i t h i n the structure o f the c o l o n i a l order. As a result, Britain's colonial subjects developed a strong respect for the judiciary, and its i n d e p e n dence f r o m the w r i t o f the executive b r a n c h became embedded i n the struc-

EUROPEAN

C O L O N I A L I S M A N D THE EMERGENCE

O F M O D E R N M U S L I M STATES

£95

ture o f the p o s t c o l o n i a l state. In Pakistan, for example, the j u d i c i a r y has defied the executive b r a n c h over the years to assert the p r i m a c y o f the law and the c o n s t i t u t i o n . It v o t e d against the m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t o f General A y u b Khan w h e n he banned the Islamist party (Jamaat-i Lslami) i n 1964; and i n 1993

the

j u d i c i a r y r u l e d against President G h u l a m Ishaq Khan for having dismissed the g o v e r n m e n t , and they ordered the g o v e r n m e n t r e s t o r e d — a n d i t was. That A y u b Khan and G h u l a m Ishaq Khan abided by the w r i t o f the j u d i c i a r y showed that the judiciary's i n s t i t u t i o n a l power, as conceived o f by the colonial state, has become i n s t i t u t e d i n the postcolonial state. I n 1996 P r i m e M i n i s t e r Benazir Bhutto's attempts to r e i n i n the j u d i c i a r y a n d to assert the executive

branch's

supremacy over i t was one o f the p r i n c i p a l reasons cited by President Faruq Leghari i n dismissing Bhutto's government. Similarly, i n Malaysia the j u d i c i a r y has rendered a n u m b e r o f verdicts against the government. W h e n a power s t r u g gle e r u p t e d i n the r u l i n g party, the U n i t e d Malays Nationalist Organization, i n 1986-88, a g o o d deal o f the w r a n g l i n g occurred t h r o u g h the i n t e r m e d i a r y o f the courts. Despite Prime M i n i s t e r M a h a t h i r M u h a m m a d ' s success i n c u r b i n g the powers o f the j u d i c i a r y i n 1988-89, the courts c o n t i n u e to enjoy a certain degree o f autonomy. N o t i n every postcolonial stale—even a m o n g those that had been B r i t i s h colonies—can

this degree o f judicial a u t o n o m y and power be seen. I n Malaysia,

for instance, since 1988 the a u t o n o m y and powers o f the j u d i c i a r y have been significantly reduced t h r o u g h legislation and s t r o n g - a r m tactics by the governm e n t . W h e r e and w h e n the j u d i c i a l branch has been weak i n the new states, i t was m o r e likely that a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and arbitrary r u l e became the order o f the day. The manner i n w h i c h the colonial state established and then i n s t i t u t i o n a l ized the d i v i s i o n o f powers between the various branches o f government thus had a great bearing o n the internal politics o f the successor states. British colonies generally tended to be less dependent o n centralized r u l e and m o r e emphatic o n the a u t o n o m y o f the various state agencies f r o m the executive b r a n c h . As a result, f o r m e r British colonies f r o m Pakistan to Malaysia have been m o r e likely t o have pluralist f o r m s o f government and m o r e benevolent and o p e n a u t h o r i tarian regimes. These colonies tend to v i e w legal and constitutional issues m o r e seriously as frameworks for managing b o t h political and social relations. The judiciary also had the effect o f instituting particular patterns o f political activity i n the body politic o f the colonial society, w h i c h continued to domhiate the postcolonial scene and by the same token to allow legislations and the courts to become avenues for political activism. The judiciary's autonomy and respect for the law under British rule often led to resistance to colonial rule and die use o f l e g a l channels to assert nationalist aspirations. For instance, i n 1913

M u h a m m a d A h Jinnah

helped to push t h r o u g h the Mussalman Wakf ( M u s l i m Endowments) Validating Act

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to protect M u s l i m endowments and thereby l i m i t the penetration o f Indian society by the British. Similar efforts in Southeast Asia had the same effect, delineating the boundaries o f M u s l i m society and tiiereby protecting M u s l i m cultural life against colonial control. I n Malaya the British compensated the local kings for their loss o f political control by giving them the final say o n all cultural and religious matters. As a result, control over Islamic law and its implementation became an important marker o f monarchical authority. The local Icings have guarded their prerogative w i t h great vigilance, w i t h the result that in Malaysia all issues pertaining to Islamic law fall under the jurisdiction o f state governments. In effect, Muslims used the law and the courts o f the colonial order to l i m i t state power. Many o f these laws d i d not stand after independence, however. For instance, f r o m 1959 o n w a r d the state o f Pakistan has systematically reduced the scope o f private religious e n d o w m e n t s and increased the state's c o n t r o l o f t h e m , and since 1980 the federal center i n Malaysia has stripped the sultans o f some o f their legal powers. Still, the legacy o f M u s l i m legal efforts against colonial rule has continued to influence the u n f o l d i n g o f politics. First, the law and the courts have remained i m p o r t a n t to the resolution o f p o l i t i c a l disputes. Second, the same issues that once protected M u s l i m society i n the colonial order and were thus p o l i t i c i z e d — s u c h as the endowments—have c o n t i n u e d to serve as determinants i n struggles between the state and the society. That the postcolonial state succeeded the c o l o n i a l state made this c o n t i n u i t y easier. Pakistan may have done away w i t h the s p i r i t o f Jinnah's law o f 1913, but the fact that endowments are still a contentious issue is p r o o f o f the c o n t i n u e d salience o f the avenues that were used by local p o l i t i c a l leaders i n keeping the colonial state at bay. O n a different level, h o w the colonial state interacted w i t h society has been i m p o r t a n t to the w o r k i n g s o f the postcolonial state and h o w i t has i n t u r n interacted w i t h M u s l i m societies. Colonial rule was often made possible by m a n i p u lating divisions w i t h i n society. Colonial rule thus accentuated social divisions and helped to institute t h e m by treating different c o m m u n i t i e s differently, i n the eyes o f the law, at the p o l l i n g b o o t h , and i n h o w resources were allocated. Separate electorates or patronage handed out along l i n g u i s t i c , ethnic, or religious lines thus encouraged politics o f identity at the cost o f the development o f u n i f o r m c i v i l societies. I n I n d i a this encouraged the emergence o f the A l l - I n d i a M u s l i m League i n 1906,

w h i c h l o b b i e d w i t h the British for separate electorates f o r

M u s l i m s and H i n d u s . I n Malaysia the same trend o f events led each c o m m u n i t y to f o r m its o w n party. At the t i m e o f independence i n 1957, Malays gathered under the U n i t e d Malays National Organization, w h i l e the Indians rallied b e h i n d the Malaysian I n d i a n Congress and the Chinese b e h i n d the Malaysian Chinese Association. I n essence, elections i n the colonial p e r i o d p r o v i d e d a critical p o l i t ical framevvork that shaped the conception o f c o m m u n i t i e s o f their relation to p o w e r at the center as w e l l as their o w n identity and self-definition.

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The postcolonial state leaders, many o f w h o m came f r o m a m o n g the colonial bureaucracy and military, often f o l l o w e d i n the footsteps o f their predecessors. Stale leaders i n South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, or the Arab Near Hast w o u l d c o n tinue to manipulate social divisions even as they spoke o f national unity. That the political leadership after independence inevitably belonged to one social g r o u p made the task o f m a n i p u l a t i n g social divisions all the m o r e difficult. There have been few cases i n w h i c h the state has risen above the politics o f identity o r has been able to u n d o colonialism's divisive impact. Malaysia succeeded b u t d i d so o n l y after the separation o f Singapore and the ethnic riots o f 1969. Other p o l i ties across the M u s l i m w o r l d continue to operate o n the belief i n the inherent d i v i s i o n o f society—a legacy o f colonial rule. The nationalist rhetoric often belies the reality o f everyday politics i n w h i c h c o m m u n a l , tribal, or ethnic i d e n tities supersede national ones. I n the same vein, rules and procedures i m p l e m e n t e d by the colonial state to control local populations, especially d u r i n g times o f war, had an i m p o r t a n t effect o n d e f i n i n g relations between the state and society i n later years. For instance, restrictions placed o n free expression d u r i n g W o r l d War I and again d u r i n g W o r l d War I I i n India and the Arab Near East, o r d u r i n g the emergency (the suspension o f c i v i l liberties) d u r i n g the wars i n Malaya, set the precedent for later a u t h o r i t a r i a n practices. Clauses i n Pakistan's c o n s t i t u t i o n s o r i n Malaysia's Internal Security Act o f i960 that restrict i n d i v i d u a l rights or give the state extraordinary powers often have their roots i n w a r t i m e British restrictions, such as the Rowlett Act o f 1919,

the India Act o f 1935, and emergency rules and laws i n

Malaya. Especially because W o r l d War I I i m m e d i a t e l y preceded independence, the structure o f relations between the state and society d u r i n g the war had a greater impact o n the politics o f the independent states than the character o f state-society relations d u r i n g colonialism's earlier years. Across the M u s l i m w o r l d the W o r l d War I I p e r i o d was one o f direct assaults by the colonial state o n c i v i l l i b erties. Restrictions o n personal freedoms, the press, the r i g h t to due process and free association, the r i g h t to protest, and the like altered the nature o f state-society relations. That independence f o l l o w e d shortly thereafter, and before the w a r t i m e regulations c o u l d have been rescinded and the nature o f state-society relations restored to its pre—war status, p r o f o u n d l y affected the exercise o f p o w e r and state a u t h o r i t y i n the postcolonial state. The w a r strengthened the colonial and postcolonial states, weakened social institutions that c o u l d have kept the state at bay, and strengthened pluralism. Relations o f patronage between state and society d u r i n g the colonial era also have left an indelible m a r k o n future states. I n areas that were deemed strategically i m p o r t a n t to c o l o n i a l rulers, such as n o r t h w e s t I n d i a , or where c o l o n i a l i s m arrived late and thus was unable to d o m i n a t e completely, c o n t r o l was secured t h r o u g h generous relations o f patronage between the colonial state and the local

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populations. Northwest India—the

t e r r i t o r y that w o u l d

later

constitute

Pakistan—bordered o n Afghanistan and t h r o u g h o u t the colonial era had been a source o f concern to the British. N o r t h w e s t India was also the area f r o m w h i c h the I n d i a n army drew most o f its soldiers. As a result, the British asserted their c o n t r o l over this region t h r o u g h patronage, w i t h the colonial state p r o v i d i n g the local economy and political elite w i t h financial support. I n Malaya a similar situadon held w i t h the rural Malay p o p u l a t i o n , w h o d i d not benefit directly f r o m the financial activities o f the colonial establishment, but whose loyalty was purchased t h r o u g h patronage given to the rural power structure. I n the Arab lands o f the O t t o m a n Empire, colonialism arrived late after the first w o r l d war. As a result, colonialism was never able to establish the k i n d o f state that r u l e d over India or Algeria. The temporary presence o f European powers i n the region, moreover, was often justified by strategic imperatives rather than c o m merce. As a result, the power relations were anchored not so m u c h i n direct exertion

o f p o w e r — a l t h o u g h the French i n Syria often used force—as i t was i n

entangling the local p o p u l a t i o n i n the web o f the colonial state's patronage. I n Syria, for instance, the French were unable to attract settlers to the colony because o f the temporary nature o f the mandate system. The colonial economy and society therefore lacked the distinct settler d o m i n a t i o n that was the mark o f French rule over N o r t h Africa. The colonial establishment therefore dealt direcdy w i t h local landowners. The emerging relationship was one o f state support for local agriculture, w h i c h i n t u r n the French hoped, w o u l d establish French control over rural Syria. The absence o f setders and the patterns o f colonial despotism that were associated w i t h the French allowed t h e m to develop a very different k i n d o f colonial relationship i n Syria. As W o r l d War I I neared, the colonial establishments i n the Arab Near East became more dependent o n securing their h o l d , and m i n i m i z i n g the costs o f control o f the r e g i o n , by generously supplying patronage to the p o p u l a t i o n . The consequences o f state patronage, especially so close to independence, was to determine the pattern o f later state-society relations. The state i n such cases emerged as paternalistic, and the society came t o view patronage as a f u n c t i o n o f the state. The d o m i n a t i o n o f the public sector i n the Arab Near East and the state's extensive patronage networks, w h i c h took shape under the ideological banner o f Arab socialism, thus had its roots i n the character o f the colonial state. I n Malaysia the relations o f patronage led the Malay p o p u l a t i o n to remain aloof f r o m c o m mercial activities and instead to rely o n the state to guarantee its economic and social standing. The links o f patronage between the d o m i n a n t party, the U n i t e d Malays National Organization, and the political structure o f rural Malaysia is very m u c h based o n the colonial structure o f authority. I n Pakistan the relations o f patronage had i n part to do w i t h the relative weakness o f the Indian nationalist

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Congress party i n those regions—especially i n Punjab—and after independence laid the foundations for the rise o f a large and paternalistic state. A l t h o u g h ideological factors and policies adopted by r u l i n g governments have also been i m p o r t a n t i n the eventual d o m i n a t i o n o f the state over society, and g r o w t h i n the size o f state patronage, it is arguable that the existence o f such relations d u r i n g colonial rule may have greatly facilitated such outcomes.

Elsewhere,

w h e r e strong links o f patronage d i d not exist, such as i n Iran i n the Qajar and Pahlavi eras, the state emerged as far weaker. I n Iran, i n fact, i m p e r i a l i s m was very i m p o r t a n t to keeping the Iranian state weak t h r o u g h o u t the nineteenth century. There is evidence that the British may have looked favorably o n the rise o f the Pahlavi state as a means o f shoring up state power to prevent Iran's collapse before an expansionist Russia. Even there, t h o u g h , the British support was short-lived. Soon after the rise o f Reza Shah Pahlavi to power, the British fell o u t w i t h h i m and eventually insisted that he abdicate and leave Iran o n the eve o f the second w o r l d war. As a consequence, the Iranian s t a t e — u n t i l the f o r m a t i o n o f the Islamic Republic i n 1979—did n o t develop the k i n d o f c o n t r o l and therefore power that characterized the states where colonialism had spawned strong relations o f patronage and c o n t r o l . Colonial institutions, policies, and attitudes toward governance determined the trajectory o f state developments i n the postindependence era, leaving a strong intellectual, legal, and institutional legacy i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . M u s l i m states developed i n the shadow o f colonialism, and their developments, modes o f operation, and politics cannot be f u l l y understood w i t h o u t considering the c o n t i n u ities between the pre- and postcolonial eras and the manner i n w h i c h colonialism determined fundamental attitudes t o w a r d politics, society, and governance.

CHAPTER

FOURTEEN

The Globalization of Islam T H E R E T U R N OF M U S L I M S TO T H E WEST

Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad

Since the early 1970s, western Europeans and N o r t h Americans have become increasingly concerned about an apparent change i n the nature and patterns o f h u m a n m i g r a t i o n . For some this change threatens to alter the ethnic and religious c o m p o s i t i o n o f their nation-states, their democratic and capitalist traditions, and their liberal social values. The e m i g r a t i o n and settlement o f M u s l i m s f r o m m o r e than seventy nations to the West has been o f some concern. For those i n the West w h o believe i n the p u r i t y o f race, civilization, and culture, or i n a supersessionist

(Left) Many types of

"Judeo-Christian" w o r l d v i e w , tills movement o f M u s l i m s is a

mosques and community

menacing threat to w h a t they believe to be a homogeneous Western society. For

centers have been built in

others it increasingly represents a significant demographic shift that posits a major cultural challenge, the precise consequences o f w h i c h are unpredictable and unforeseen, because they require a variety o f adjustments by b o t h the host countries and the new i m m i g r a n t s .

America to serve the large and varied Muslim community there. One of the most elegant is the Islamic Center of New York. Designed by the

U n t i l recently many Europeans and N o r t h Americans tended to identify Islam w i t h the Arabs. M o r e knowledgeable scholars added parts o f Asia and Africa to the abode o f Islam. Other scholars were reluctant t o admit that not o n l y is Islam a universal r e l i g i o n w i t h adherents t h r o u g h o u t the globe, but that i t has increasingly become part and parcel o f the West. I g n o r i n g "the facts o n the g r o u n d , "

architectural firm Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, and located on 96th Street on Manhattan's tony Upper East Side, it attests to the presence of an international

they persist i n t h i n k i n g o f M u s l i m s as displaced persons t e m p o r a r i l y residing i n

community of Muslims in

the West, w h o w i l l one day pack u p and r e t u r n to where they came f r o m or to

the metropolis.

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" w h e r e they belong." Still others, w h o for religious or p o l i t i c a l reasons w i s h away these M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s , have become m o r e s h r i l l i n declaring their presence a threat.

The Encounter of Islam with the West The M u s l i m encounter w i t h "the West" dates back to the b e g i n n i n g o f Islam's expansion. As Arab armies spread t h e i r h e g e m o n y over m a j o r parts o f the Byzantine Empire in Southwest Asia and N o r t h Africa, large segments o f the Eastern Christian churches

(Byzantines, Jacobites, Copts, Grcgorians,

and

Nestorians) came under their c o n t r o l . This close encounter generated a variety o f experiences, r a n g i n g f r o m peaceful coexistence and cooperation to m u t u a l vilification and armed conflict. It also helped craft a corpus o f polemical literature w r i t t e n by b o t h M u s l i m s and Christians, each seeking to demonstrate and p r o c l a i m the t r u t h and superiority o f their o w n r e l i g i o n . Each g r o u p faulted the other for basing their faith o n falsified scriptures as w e l l as p r o c l a i m i n g errant doctrines. The M u s l i m d e p i c t i o n o f the Christian " o t h e r " and the Christian d e p i c t i o n o f Islam have inevitably been forged by the historical context i n w h i c h they were conceived. M u s l i m expansion f r o m N o r t h Africa i n t o western Europe was stopped at Poitiers i n 732, but the Ottomans i n the East kept p r o b i n g Europe's defenses for several centuries u n t i l they were halted after the failure o f the siege o i Vienna i n 1683. European areas that came under M u s l i m jurisdictions i n Spain, Portugal, Sicily, and southern France between the e i g h t h and the fifteenth centuries experienced a t h r i v i n g cultural revival that became a m a j o r influence i n the transmission o f civilization that sparked the European Renaissance. The fall o f Grenada i n 1492 b r o u g h t M u s l i m r u l e i n western Europe to an end. A significant n u m b e r o f the Ottomans continued to live i n eastern Europe, where some o f the i n d i g e nous p o p u l a t i o n converted to Islam i n Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Serbia. The recent dramatic transplantation o f Muslims i n t o western Europe and N o r t h America has thus been called "the new Islamic presence." Other scholars, n o t i n g the fact that Islam has m o d i f i e d the religious c o m p o s i t i o n o f western Europe and become its second largest r e l i g i o n , have begun to talk about "the new Europe." The second m a j o r M u s l i m encounter w i t h " t h e West" was w i t h Catholic Christianity d u r i n g the crusades and the Reconquista. A l t h o u g h the crusades took place at the p e r i p h e r y o f the Islamic empire and seem to have been c o n cerned w i t h c o n t a i n i n g and weakening Eastern O r t h o d o x y as m u c h as Islam, the bloody story o f the crusaders sacking A n t i o c h and Jerusalem and slaughtering all the inhabitants is increasingly depicted i n today's Islamic literature as one o f Western w a r r i o r s consumed w i t h Christian hatred, bent o n eradicating M u s l i m s

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arid u s u r p i n g their l a n d . Similarly, the leaders o f the I n q u i s i t i o n , a r m e d w i t h the assurance o f Christian t r u t h and v i r t u e and i n an effort to "de-Islamize" Spain, offered M u s l i m s the options o f conversion to Christianity, expulsion, or execut i o n . I n the process they all but eliminated the M u s l i m presence i n western Europe, as the last M u s l i m s were expelled i n 1609. This phase provides an image o f a West n o t so m u c h interested i n g u i d i n g Muslims away f r o m their errant ways or debating the efficacy or t r u t h o f their beliefs as m u c h as eradicating t h e m . Polemics shifted f r o m issues o f errancy o f doctrines and supersession to m u t u a l declarations o f kufr ( u n b e l i e f ) and apostasy, hence sanctioning violence as a means o f restoring t r u t h . The t h i r d encounter is marked by Western colonial expansion i n t o M u s l i m terr i t o r y f o l l o w i n g the fall o f Grenada i n 1492. I n this phase M u s l i m s have encountered the West as a t r i u m p h a n t , c o n q u e r i n g , and i m p e r i a l presence. The colonial experience that initially pitted various European powers against one another i n their quest to subjugate M u s l i m s and m o n o p o l i z e their economic

resources

lasted u n t i l after the end o f the second w o r l d war. By its end Europeans were able t o create imaginary lines i n the sand, parceling out M u s l i m territories i n a v a r i ety o f schemes, carving u p the three Islamic empires (the O t t o m a n , Safavid, and Mughal)

i n t o w h a t is today some f i f t y

nation-states

(members

of

the

Organization o f Islamic Conference). Meanw hile, m o r e than o n e - f o u r t h o f the M u s l i m s i n the w o r l d continue to live under non-Islamic rule. The colonial experience appears to have left a mark o n the consciousness o f those w h o were colonized. Islamist literature increasingly depicts the West as obsessed w i t h c o m b a t i n g Islam o n all fronts. The West is often portrayed as marshaling its forces to launch a m o r e pernicious attack under the guise o f " c i v i l i z i n g " the M u s l i m s and liberating t h e m f r o m "backwardness" and

economic

dependency, as seeking to subvert the influence o f Islam o n society by p r o m o t i n g the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f certain secular values as the f o u n d a t i o n o f political, economic, ideological, cultural, and social institutions. D u b b e d as a " c u l t u r a l attack" (al-qham aJ-thaqaft), it is seen as a multifaceted attack launched by colonial bureaucrats and their w i l l i n g cadre o f orientalists and Christian missionaries ( b o t h Catholic and Protestant). These bureaucrats and missionaries struggled to cast d o u b t about Islam by propagating the superiority ofWestern culture t h r o u g h such colonial institutions as schools, hospitals, and p u b l i s h i n g firms, whose goal was to separate the M u s l i m s f r o m Islam. The current encounter, still i n progress, is a b y - p r o d u c t o f W o r l d War I I . W h i l e this encounter has been c o n d i t i o n e d and shaped d u r i n g the t h i r d quarter o f the twentieth century by the heritage o f the postwar relationships between c o m m u n i s m and capitalism, it is also marked by t w o distinct features. The first is the assumption o f w o r l d leadership by the U n i t e d States w i t h the consequent

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creation and e m p o w e r m e n t o f the state o f Israel and the i n v e n t i o n o f the "JudeoC h r i s t i a n " w o r l d v i e w . The second is the e m i g r a t i o n and settlement o f M u s l i m s and their acquisition o f citizenship i n the West, i n western Europe, as w e l l as i n such established regions o f European m i g r a t i o n as Australia and N e w Zealand, Canada, Latin America, South Africa, and the U n i t e d States.

Muslim Communities of the West A l t h o u g h there are n o reliable statistics o n the n u m b e r o f M u s l i m s currently living in the West, a 1986 estimate placed about twenty-three m i l l i o n M u s l i m s i n Europe. The m a j o r i t y lived i n the Balkans and southeastern Europe; they were Slavic converts and remnants o f the Turkish expansion i n t o Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Bosnia or o f the westward m i g r a t i o n o f Tatars i n t o Finland and Poland. M o r e recent M u s l i m sources speculate that the current estimate

of

M u s l i m s i n western Europe (Austria 100,000; B e l g i u m 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 ; D e n m a r k 6 0 , 0 0 0 ; France 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ; Germany 2 , ç o o , 0 0 0 ; Greece 150,000; Ireland 5,000; Italy 500,000; L u x e m b o u r g 1,000; the Netherlands 4 0 8 , 0 0 0 ; N o r w a y 22,000; Portugal 15,000; Spain 4 5 0 , 0 0 0 ; Sweden 100,000; Switzerland 100,000; and the U n i t e d K i n g d o m 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) and the Americas (Canada 200,000; Latin America 2 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 ; and the U n i t e d States 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) may be as h i g h as 17.4 m i l l i o n . The c o m p o s i t i o n o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s i n various nations o f western Europe is i n part a b y - p r o d u c t o f earlier relations established between European nations and the M u s l i m w o r l d as w e l l as the European expansion i n t o M u s l i m t e r r i t o r y d u r i n g the nineteenth and t w e n t i e t h centuries. It is also c o n d i t i o n e d by the predatory political, economic, and cultural relationships that were developed d u r i n g the colonial p e r i o d . Thus the first significant g r o u p o f M u s l i m s to settle i n France i n the t w e n t i e t h century were N o r t h African and Senegalese mercenaries w h o were recruited to fight i n French colonial wars, i n c l u d i n g a g r o u p that was the vanguard o f the A l l i e d troops that liberated Paris f r o m Nazi occupation. A significant n u m b e r o f harkis, Algerian soldiers w h o f o u g h t w i t h the French colonial government to suppress the Algerian revolution, settled i n France after 1962 to avoid reprisals. I n Germany early settlers were Tatars and Bosnians, many o f w h o m enlisted i n the German army. In the Netherlands the first significant M u s l i m m i g r a t i o n came f r o m its colonies o f Indonesia and Surinam, and in Britain they were f r o m South Asia and Africa. The m a j o r i t y o f Muslims in western Europe, however, were recruited as temporary guestworkers to relieve the shortage o f manual labor d u r i n g the p o s t - W o r l d War I I economic reconstruction. The host European countries had the f u l l expectation that i m p o r t e d f o r e i g n laborers were a transient c o m m o d i t y , and that once their contracts expired, they w o u l d r e t u r n to their homelands. Since then a large n u m b e r o f asylum seekers

THE G LO BALI Z AT ION OF ISLAM

6oc

and refugees f r o m Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, and Kashmir have a u g m e n t e d the n u m b e r o f M u s l i m s i n the West. The o i l boycott that was declared d u r i n g the Arab-Israeli war i n 1973 precipitated an economic

depression

and widespread u n e m p l o y m e n t i n Europe.

Consequently, European economies u n d e r w e n t a dramatic r e s t r u c t u r i n g that decreased the demand for unskilled labor, as more emphasis was placed o n service industries w h i l e manufacturing jobs were exported to Asia. These changes exacerbated the u n e m p l o y m e n t p r o b l e m i n the ranks o f the guestworkers. Several European nations, i n c l u d i n g Germany, France, and the Netherlands, eager to shrink the ranks o f the u n e m p l o y e d and to expedite foreign laborers o n their way home, offered financial incentives for their repatriation. A few took advantage o f the offer, but the majority—faced w i t h the prospects o f unemployment i n their home c o u n try and the lack o f future access to the European labor market—decided to stay, pref e r r i n g the u n e m p l o y m e n t and welfare benefits o f l i v i n g i n Europe. This inadvertently led to a substantial increase i n the number o f Muslims i n Europe, as various governments later allowed family reunification. The policy o f t h i n n i n g f o r eign labor thus backfired, swelling the ranks o f Muslims w i t h unemployed dependents, straining social services as w e l l as the educational systems i n the settlement areas. I n the process the M u s l i m s were transformed f r o m a collectivity o f migrant,

The largest concentrations of Muslims in western Europe

predominantly male laborers to i m m i g r a n t families, f r o m sojourners to settlers,

live in former imperial

and f r o m transients to citizens. The passage o f legislation i n the 1970s i n most

powers. Britain, for example,

European countries that virtually halted labor m i g r a t i o n has led to the creation o f

is host to many Muslims

M u s l i m m i n o r i t y communities, w h o increasingly appear to have become a permanent fixture i n western European nations. The e m i g r a t i o n o f M u s l i m s d u r i n g the last quarter o f the t w e n t i e t h century to Europe and the Americas is part o f the w o r l d w i d e m o v e m e n t o f people f r o m

from the Indian subcontinent, such as these Pakistani Muslims crossing a snowystreet after prayer in the mosque in Bradford.

6o6

THE OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

east t o west and f r o m south t o n o r t h i n search o f higher education, better econ o m i c o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and p o l i t i c a l and religious freedom. Other emigrants are refugees, often the b y - p r o d u c t o f Euro-American m i l i t a r y o r political activities. This movement also includes a smattering o f those opposed t o the authoritarian regimes that dominate the M u s l i m landscape. The largest M u s l i m concentrations i n western Europe are i n f o r m e r i m p e r i a l powers: Britain and France. As an econ o m i c powerhouse that attracts many i m m i g r a n t s , Germany also holds a large M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n . Each European n a t i o n has a particular relationship w i t h its i m m i g r a n t s , w h i c h has been influenced by its colonial legacy, its historical m e m ory, and its traditional perception o f its f o r m e r subject people. Each n a t i o n is i n the process o f developing policies and models for the treatment o f its newest citizens, w h o p u t the nation's self-perception o f liberal traditions and religious t o l erance to the test. The British m o d e l , f o r m a l i z e d by the creation o f the C o m m o n w e a l t h , perm i t t e d citizens o f the m e m b e r nations o f the C o m m o n w e a l t h and the colonies to reside i n the British Isles. The m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s i n B r i t a i n , f o r Most of the Muslims living in Scandinavia, as elsewhere in northern Europe, were recruited to work as laborers

example,

came f r o m the I n d i a n s u b c o n t i n e n t

(Indians,

Pakistanis, and

Bangladeshis) and Africa. As m e m b e r s o f the C o m m o n w e a l t h , they enjoyed the privileges o f citizenship and were granted equal political and c i v i l r i g h t s , a p r i v -

in the 1960s and 1970s.

ilege n o t available t o M u s l i m s in the rest o f Europe. Most o f the M u s l i m i m m i -

Sweden's liberal policies

grants are lower class laborers, except f o r a small n u m b e r o f professionals and a

towards the settlement of

small g r o u p o f wealthy Arabs f r o m the G u l f o i l - p r o d u c i n g states w h o m a i n t a i n

refugees has meani that there is a sizable number of Muslims from various countries there, as reflected in the

l u x u r y homes i n L o n d o n . M o r e recently, conflicts i n various M u s l i m countries have increased the ethnic m i x o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n B r i t a i n . Muslims i n France are predominandy o f M a g h r i b i ( N o r t h African) o r i g i n ( f r o m

congregation worshiping in

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), w h o have mostly come after W o r l d W a r II. They also

the mosque at Uppsala.

include Muslims from such various M u s l i m states as Nigeria, Iran, Malaysia, Bosnia,

THE

G L O B A L I Z A T I O N OF ISLAM

607

Turkey, Senegal, M a l i , and Pakistan. M o r e than 30 percent o f M u s l i m s i n France are second generation. Because Germany has had extensive diplomatic relations w i t h M u s l i m nations since Charlemagne, a small number o f Muslims have lived i n Berlin since 1777. A M u s l i m cemetery still i n use b y the Turks was opened at C o l u m b i a D a m i n 1798 w h e n the O t t o m a n envoy to Germany, A l i Aziz Effendi, died. W h e n a M u s l i m society that was organized i n Berlin i n 1922 w i t h members f r o m forty-one nationalities attempted to construct a mosque, however, it faded because o f a shortage of funds. The g r o w t h o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y in Germany, however, is a twendeth-century p h e n o m e n o n , the result o f the guestworkers' decisions not t o return to their homelands. The M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n i n the Netherlands and B e l g i u m is p r e d o m i n a n t l y made u p o f Turkish and Moroccan i m m i g r a n t s w h o were recruited as laborers i n the 1960s and 1970s. I n the Netherlands i t also includes a substan-

Muslims, who were a significant presence in Sicily in medieval times, have immigrated to Italy in large numbers in the last two

tial number o f i m m i g r a n t s f r o m S u r i n a m , the

decades. Students were followed by laborers. There are now suffi-

f o r m e r D u t c h colony that w o n its indepen-

cient numbers to require a large congregational mosque in Rome,

dence i n 1975. The pattern f o r Scandinavian

the heartland of Catholicism.

nations is similar except f o r F i n l a n d , w h i c h has a tiny m i n o r i t y o f Tatar traders and craftspeople w h o have lived there since the nineteenth century, w h e n it was part o f the Russian Empire. Their n u m b e r has recently increased because o f the i n f l u x o f Somali refugees w h o arrived by way o f Moscow. I n Sweden and Denmark, M u s l i m labor m i g r a t i o n came i n the late 1960s m a i n l y f r o m Turkey andYugoslavia. Smaller n u m b e r s have come f r o m M o r o c c o , Pakistan, and Egypt. I n the 1980s Sweden's hberal policies toward the settlement o f refugees augmented the numbers o f M u s l i m s by a steady i n f l o w o f Iranians, Lebanese, Kurds, and Palestinians. Labor m i g r a t i o n t o N o r w a y began a decade later than labor m i g r a t i o n t o other western European countries. The largest n u m b e r o f migrants in N o r w a y are f r o m Pakistan, w i t h small contingents f r o m Turkey, M o r o c c o , Iran, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and India. The m a j o r i t y live around the capital, Oslo. M u s l i m emigration to southern Europe came a decade after e m i g r a t i o n to western Europe, w h e n the southern economies began t o prosper and they changed

608

THE OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

f r o m labor-exporting to l a b o r - i m p o r t i n g nations. The first significant number o f Muslims began emigrating to Spain i n the 1970s. M u s l i m s had a presence i n Sicily as early as the seventh century, however, and d o m i nated the island between the n i n t h and the eleventh centuries. Vesdges o f their history can be seen all the way to northern Italy, wdiere a small M u s l i m m i n o r i t y continued t o five u n t i l the nineteenth century. M u s l i m emigration to Italy is a recent phenomenon that has taken place d u r i n g the past t w o decades, spearheaded by students f r o m Jordan, Syria, and Palestine w h o decided t o settle. They were followed by the labor migration f r o m other parts o f die M u s l i m w o r l d . M o r e recently,

illegal

immigrants,

mostly

Bosnians,

Albanians, and Kurds, have been trying t o settle i n Italy, to the consternation o f the other members o f the European U n i o n . In Western nations w i t h a tradition o f European immigration—the America, African Americans make up the largest convert community to Islam; estimates show that between one and two million African Americans are Muslim.

United

and Australasia

States,

Canada,

(Australia

Latin

and N e w

Zealand)—the suitability o f Muslims for citizenship was questioned i n a variety o f ways and eventually somewhat resolved. This has n o t necessarily lessened the prejudice against their presence. The d o m i n a n t

characteristic o f the M u s l i m population i n N o r t h America is its diversity, w h i c h is apparent i n national o r i g i n and class as well as i n political, ideological, and theological c o m m i t m e n t . The M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n the U n i t e d States and Canada is composed o f several generations o f M u s l i m people w h o have emigrated in a quest for a better life, beginning i n the mid-1870s w i t h groups f r o m Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. A small n u m b e r o f displaced people came f r o m eastern Europe after W o r l d War I . The repeal o f the Asian Exclusion Act in the 1960s i n the U n i t e d States and the m e m b e r s h i p o f Canada i n the British C o m m o n w e a l t h brought a large number o f i m m i g r a n t s f r o m Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. The majority o f those immigrants initially admitted were the educated professionals (doctors, scientists, and engineers) recruited t o fill the needs o f the technological industry. Immigrants continue today t o come f r o m all over the w o r l d , i n c l u d i n g displaced people seeking refuge for political, ideological, o r religious reasons. Muslim immigrants f o u n d freedom i n western Europe and N o r t h America not only to practice but also to propagate their faith. They have taken advantage o f this opportunity and created a variety o f missionary outreach activities i n various c o u n -

THE

GLOBALIZATION

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609

tries. They have also created a corpus o f literature geared toward proselytizing. A substantial number o f Europeans and Euro-Americans have converted to Islam, including an estimated fifty diousand Germans and one hundred thousand N o r t h American " A n g l o s " : Christians, Jews, and agnostics, the m a j o r i t y o f w h o m are w o m e n . The largest convert community, however—estimated by various scholars at anywhere between one m i l l i o n to t w o m i l l i o n — i s African American. Their conversion initially came d i r o u g h the teachings o f the Nation o f Islam, headed by Elijah M u h a m m a d and promulgated by his disciple M a l c o l m X, w h o initially p r o m o t e d a racist theology o f black supremacy, a m i r r o r image o f the teachings o f the Ku Klux Klan. The movement developed i n the urban U n i t e d States as a response to the racism encountered by African Americans w h o emigrated f r o m the cotton fields o f the South to the industrial N o r t h . Their relegation to particular w o r k i n g and l i v i n g spaces in the ghettos consolidated new forms o f w h i t e supremacy and oppression. Observers estimate that more than eighty nations i n Africa, Asia, and eastern Europe are represented i n the mosque c o m m u n i t y o f the U n i t e d States and that these many groups constitute one

ummah

(Islamic n a t i o n ) , yet they b r i n g w i t h

t h e m a variety o f traditions and practices as w e l l as a kaleidoscope o f doctrines and beliefs fashioned over t i m e i n alien contexts. Members o f the c o m m u n i t y are initially surprised at the discrepancy between the ideals they have appropriated and the reality o f their differences. Their similar experience o f the West is f o r g i n g some o f them i n t o a c o m m u n i t y o f believers engaged i n a process o f creati n g a sense o f solidarity t h r o u g h c o m m o n traditions and seeking c o m m o n g r o u n d i n their quest to provide a c o m f o r t zone where they can fashion a better future for their c h i l d r e n .

Western Immigration Policies H a n Entzinger has identified three European models for the i m m i g r a t i o n o f non-Europeans. The first is the guestworker m o d e l , adopted mostly i n Germanic countries (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland), i n w h i c h the presence o f the i m m i g r a n t s is considered temporary i n perpetuity. The government does n o t expend any effort to integrate t h e m or their families i n t o the new e n v i r o n m e n t , regardless o f the fact that their c h i l d r e n are b o r n and raised i n these countries and d o not appear to have any desire to be repatriated. The second is the assinv ilationist m o d e l that is p r o m o t e d i n France. This m o d e l insists that i f the i m m i grants seek to become French citizens, they must eschew their f o r e i g n cultural, religious, political, and ideological allegiances and accept and assimilate i n t o the already existing consensus o f reality and p o l i t y o f the prevailing system, shedd i n g all alien characteristics. The French policy o f Gallicization expects that the end result o f i n t e g r a t i o n is that r e l i g i o u s practice is p r i v a t i z e d , w h i l e each

6 10

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

M u s l i m w o u l d become socially and economically assimilated. The t h i r d m o d e l is the ethnic m i n o r i t y m o d e l prevalent i n a variety o f fashions i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , the Netherlands, Belgium, L u x e m b o u r g , and the Scandinavian nations. This m o d e l recognizes that the i m m i g r a n t has an alternative cultural identity that can be preserved and accommodated w i t h i n the larger context. In Canada the government has been p r o m o t i n g the idea that it is a m u l t i c u l tural society, p r o v i d i n g funds for new i m m i g r a n t s to create ethnic organizations, maintain ethnic cultures, and teach their distinctive languages. The propagation o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m as a national m o d e l was adopted i n the hope o f c i r c u m venting the separatists a m o n g the French Quebecois. Questions are currently being asked about w h e t h e r these efforts have gone too far i n creating m u l t i p l e identities, and whether the ramifications o f m a i n t a i n i n g ethnicities p o r t e n d a balkanized Canada, because m o r e than co percent o f the populations o f Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are foreign b o r n . In the U n i t e d States " A n g l o c o n f o r m i t y " was perceived as the n o r m t h r o u g h the nineteenth century. Later scholars defined the U n i t e d Slates as a m e l t i n g pot u n t i l i t was discovered that there were too many unmeltables. I n the

19.COS

Will

Herberg p r o m o t e d the idea o f an America w i t h equal religious conglomerates: Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. There are currently t w o paradigms that are c o m p e t i n g for a d o p t i o n ; b o t h are controversial, and b o t h have their devoted advocates and detractors. The first is p r o m o t e d by Christian fundamentalists, some i n the Jewish c o m m u n i t y , and a large n u m b e r o f politicians. It identifies America as g r o u n d e d i n Judeo-Christian values. Its critics note that besides i n f r i n g i n g o n the idea o f separation o f r e l i g i o n and state, this m o d e l tends t o m a i n t a i n the current power structure, c o n f i n i n g Buddhists, H i n d u s , M u s l i m s , and a host o f other faiths and values to the periphery. The second m o d e l advocates a pluralistic society that celebrates difference. This has raised the fear o f the d i v i s i o n o f America according to ethnic identities, or "grievance groups," w i t h the potential loss o f a cohesive identity shared by all Americans, one that is c o m mensurate w i t h the demands o f the o n l y superpower i n the w o r l d . The situation o f M u s l i m s i n western Europe and N o r t h America, however, is by no means static. N e w legislation that constrains and manipulates i m m i g r a t i o n and citizenship laws has been adopted at a fast pace since the 1970s by Western countries i n an effort to stem the tide o f i m m i g r a t i o n . They are d r i v e n by a v a r i ety o f factors. Some countries are governed by economic necessities, given the fact that h i g h labor costs and technological innovation i n the West have reshaped European and N o r t h American economies. At the same time, most o f these c o u n tries are experiencing a great deal o f pressure o n the resources o f the welfare state because they have an aging p o p u l a t i o n . They are also influenced by political c o n siderations, given the dramatic rise i n racist tendencies i n a n u m b e r o f nations.

THE

GLOBALIZATION

OF

ISLAM

6l

I

I n Britain the government issued the first measures restricting i m m i g r a t i o n in 1962,

but the restrictions d i d n o t apply to those w h o held British passports,

w h i c h included citizens o f the C o m m o n w e a l t h . As the flow o f i m m i g r a n t s d i d not abate, the government f o u n d i t necessary to institute additional measures i n 1968. As a consequence, those seeking t o emigrate had to prove that they had connections to a f a m i l y i n Britain before they were allowed i n t o the country. I n 1976 the Race Relations Act recognized ethnic c o m m u n i t i e s and their r i g h t t o be different, thus p r o v i d i n g rights for M u s l i m s by p r o h i b i t i n g indirect d i s c r i m i n a t i o n based o n race. It d i d not provide f o r equal rights based o n religious affiliat i o n , however. In the U n i t e d States several measures have been taken to restrict M u s l i m i m m i gration. The quota system has recently been revised to favor w h i t e European i m m i g r a n t s , especially f r o m Ireland a n d eastern Europe. There are reports that the U.S. Department o f State has given instructions to its consular offices overseas n o t to accept people w i t h an Arab background.

Muslims and the Challenge of Life in the West M u s l i m s have emigrated to Western nation-states that have a fully developed m y t h o f national identity, w h i c h has been inculcated i n the citizens over t w o centuries t h r o u g h schools and codified t h r o u g h legends and a particular reading o f history. This identity has shaped several generations o f Europeans and Americans t h r o u g h the cauldron o f t w o w o r l d wars. It has been celebrated i n literature, art, music, and dance. The nation-states have fashioned distinctive identities based o n collective assumptions, p r o m o t i n g a particular w o r l d v i e w that includes a core o f values and attitudes that are taken for granted as unique to a superior West. At the same t i m e , the process o f nation b u i l d i n g has delineated what is considered alien, strange, and w e i r d . I m m i g r a n t s have also been shaped i n their h o m e countries by the particular events and perceptions o f their generation. Most o f the adults among t h e m have a p r e - f o r m e d distinctive i d e n t i t y not o n l y o f their tribe, village, t o w n , or city b u t also o f a national i d e n t i t y instilled by the schools and the institutions o f the state f r o m w h i c h they emigrated. This i d e n t i t y provides the i m m i g r a n t s w i t h a particular understanding o f w h o they are and what their relationship is to the state i n w h i c h they live; it therefore conditions their understanding o f events and reality. I m m i g r a n t s also b r i n g a p r e f o r m e d understanding o f Western culture based o n a particular interpretation o f the shared heritage between the M u s l i m w o r l d and Europe, one that is particularly focused o n the recent experience o f c o l o n i a l i s m and neocolonialism. These perceptions are enhanced and shaped by Western movies and television, w h i c h tend to depict Western society as i m b u e d

6 I 2

T H E OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

w i t h drugs, violence, racism, and pornography. M u s l i m s w h o come f r o m societies that favor strong family solidarity are repelled by w h a t they see as a degenerate Western society consumed by premarital and extramarital sex, burdened by a h i g h rate o f divorce and births to u n m a r r i e d w o m e n , latchkey kids, and fragile family bonds. They c o n d e m n Western values as lacking i n the responsibilities o f parents and c h i l d r e n t o w a r d one another, and they believe that Western society puts too m u c h emphasis o n i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m and not enough o n c o r p o rate responsibility. The f o r m a t i o n o f M u s l i m m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s i n the West by choice became problematic to some M u s l i m intellectuals, especially those f r o m India, where " m i n o r i t y n e s s " involves the survival o f Islam under n o n - M u s l i m rule. The late Mawlana A b u l Ala M a w d u d i , w h o traveled all over Europe, the U n i t e d States, and Canada, admonished M u s l i m s to avoid integration i n t o their new e n v i r o n ment or to leave lest they lose their souls i n the West's w a y w a r d ways. Other scholars have insisted that such opinions are m i s g u i d e d because the proper interpretation o f Islamic law allows Muslims to live outside the abode o f Islam, as long as they have the freedom to practice and propagate their faith. Still other scholars are o f the o p i n i o n that M u s l i m presence i n the West provides t h e m w i t h an unprecedented o p p o r t u n i t y to f u l f i l l their Islamic d u t y to propagate the faith. I n the process they not o n l y obey God's c o m m a n d m e n t to call people to Islam, they also help to redeem Western society f r o m its evil ways and to restore it to the w o r s h i p o f G o d . The e m p o w e r m e n t o f M u s l i m s overseas and the propagation o f the Islamist ideology as normative f o r the w o r l d s h o u l d supersede personal gain. For Zain e l - A b e d i n , the founder o f the Institute for M u s l i m M i n o r i t y Affairs i n Jidda, Saudi Arabia, the greatest challenge the M u s l i m s face i n the West is the loss o f i d e n t i t y i n an alien social and ideological context. The fear is that i n its eagerness to fit i n , the m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t y reluctantly but steadily gives up its cherished values, w h i l e the hostile environment slowly but surely chips away at its core beliefs. To protect the c o m m u n i t y f r o m disintegration, A b e d i n determ i n e d that it was necessary to p r o m o t e Islam as an ethnicity and i n the process erect ramparts not o n l y to keep the aliens out b u t , m o r e i m p o r t a n t , to h o l d the M u s l i m s i n . He was aware that this was n o t an easy task given the diversity o f the c o m m u n i t y . He thus identified i m p o r t a n t ideological constructs as w e l l as behavioral distinctions as indispensable markers o f the cultural d i v i d e . He therefore called for the creation by consensus o f a particular body o f ideals, values, aspirations, goals, and doctrines. W h i l e crucial i n setting the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y against other w o r l d v i e w s , the ideals i n themselves are not sufficient, n o r is such a task easy, because M u s l i m s must "squarely c o n f r o n t the reality o f the m o d e r n secular, m u l t i n a t i o n a l state." W h d e m a i n t a i n i n g the unquestioned p r i m a c y o f allegiance t o Islam, M u s l i m s i n the West thus need to determine the proper atti-

THE GLOBALIZATION O F ISLAM

6 I 3

tucle t o w a r d the n e w social reality i n w h i c h they live. Also to be d e t e r m i n e d is the nature and extent o f their c o m m i t m e n t to and participation i n the n e w envir o n m e n t . In the process they must clearly i d e n t i f y the ideological constraints that impede full participation i n the e c o n o m i c and social spheres, f u l l y cognizant o f the consequences o f adhering to a precise and ideologically exclusive stance. They also need to "see h o w some o f the political and social effects o f this stance can be softened and m i t i g a t e d and learn to live w i t h those that cannot." There must be an i n d i v i d u a l as w e l l as a corporate willingness to pay the price for the decision to live o n the social, p o l i t i c a l , and economic margins o f society. Abedin p r o m o t e d the idea o f fashioning Islam as an ethnicity defined by relig i o n , admittedly a rather difficult task because most i m m i g r a n t s have been fashioned by the nation-state f r o m w h i c h they came and identify w i t h its causes and feel particular allegiances to ethnic and linguistic preferences and racial origins. The West thus becomes a laboratory i n w h i c h a new m o d e r n identity is to be fused, one that fosters particular behavioral patterns and promotes a c o m m o n language, distinctive customs and traditions, and recognizable styles o f dress and f o o d , among other cultural distinctions. These are easier to i d e n t i f y and particularize than the effort to inculcate ideas because they are more tangible. At the same time, Abedin was aware that ethnicity could be very divisive, given the diversity o f migrant groups. The difficulty is i n d e t e r m i n i n g whose language, customs, or behavior is more Islamically legitimate. Abedin was aware o f the d i l e m m a his recommendations posed for M u s l i m s because o n a very i m p o r t a n t level, ethnicity itself is un-Islamic. A l t h o u g h cultural distinction promotes cohesion and functions as a barrier to being absorbed or assimilated i n t o a m u l t i c u l t u r a l society, it may also veer f r o m the t r u t h o f Islam, w h i c h affirms that "physical traits, cultural traditions, dress, f o o d , customs, and habits are subordinate or subsidiary to their m a i n doctrinal identity, that G o d created differences i n people i n order to facilitate recognition, that the true identity is determined by the manner i n w h i c h a person or g r o u p o f any race, colour or physical type approaches the business o f l i v i n g , uses his faculties, selects ends and means for his w o r l d l y endeavours." Khalid Ishaque o f Britain is under n o illusion that the host societies are about to accept an ideological m i n o r i t y that seeks to m a i n t a i n its self-respect by p r o m o t i n g c o m m i t m e n t s and priorities that are deliberately incompatible w i t h those o f the host culture. Thus the c o m m u n i t y must realize that suffering is not o n l y inevitable, but it is to be w e l c o m e d i n some cases because it provides the o p p o r t u n i t y to demonstrate the c o m m i t m e n t to a higher cause and walk i n the footsteps o f the early M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , w h o were persecuted for their faith, under the leadership o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d i n Mecca. Ishaque notes that M u s l i m s w h o choose to live i n nations that are not governed by Islamic law should realize that they must assume certain obligations. W h i l e accepting adversity, they

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must constantly endeavor to establish a relationship w i t h the m a j o r i t y that w i l l foster an atmosphere conducive to the propagation o f Islam, i n w h i c h the larger society is receptive to the M u s l i m solutions to the problems o f h u m a n i t y By the 1990s there began to be a shift i n the perspective o f leaders o f the Islamist m o v e m e n t o n this issue. Azzam a l - T a m i m i o f B r i t a i n , f o r example, recently identified the rcalit) facing Muslims l i v i n g in the

Wesl as a state o f

cri-

sis. H e feels that the options fostered for M u s l i m s i n the West i n the 1970s have not succeeded. His assessment is that a l t h o u g h not all o f the obstacles i n the relations o f M u s l i m s and n o n - M u s l i m s i n Western societies are b r o u g h t about by M u s l i m s , the more dangerous and d i f f i c u l t ones are the consequences o f M u s l i m perceptions and behavior. Some M u s l i m s erroneously seek to overcome these obstacles by m e l t i n g i n t o Western culture and abandoning some or all o f dieir Islamic identity. Others insist o n avoiding these obstacles by resorting to isolat i o n and h i d i n g i n cocoons, w h i c h some fear c o u l d eventually f o r m ghettos s i m ilar to those occupied by the Jewish c o m m u n i t i e s i n previous centuries. For al-Tamimi this discrepancy i n dealing w i t h the crisis led to the sundering o f relations between the generations. O n the one hand is the generation o f the fathers, mothers, and grandparents, w h o have an e m o t i o n a l and cultural tie to the o r i g inal h o m e l a n d , w h o h o l d o n to the same customs and traditions whether or not they accord w i t h the new e n v i r o n m e n t . O n the other hand is the generation o f the c h i l d r e n and g r a n d c h i l d r e n , w h o have n o e m o t i o n a l ties to the homeland and find little o f value i n those customs, w h i c h are seen as counterproductive, an i m p e d i m e n t to progress i n the society i n w h i c h they have been b o r n . The new M u s l i m presence i n Europe has made some Europeans more self-consciously reflective about being European. I g n o r i n g the history o f i m m i g r a t i o n into Europe over the centuries, the tendency o f scholars and politicians is to depict European nations as unique, cohesive, and integrated societies w i t h distinguislung pre-formed and established characteristics. The presence o f Muslims w h o are able to exercise their political rights i n Britain as citizens and the possibility o f granting citizenship to these M u s l i m immigrants and their children i n Germany, France, and odier European countries has become a contentious matter. At the same time, the recent encounter has also made M u s l i m immigrants more reflective about their identity, as a g r o w i n g number have become more self-consciously M u s l i m . Many w h o w o u l d not have entered a mosque i n their homelands have become acdve i n the mosque movement i n the West and are increasingly defiriing the mosque as the center around w h i c h M u s l i m life should revolve. They seem to seek refuge i n relig i o n , r u m m a g i n g t h r o u g h tradition for i d e n t i f y i n g proper belief, and eager to Islamize behavior, demeanor, and lifestyle as w e l l as to erect cultural boundaries. For a g r o w i n g n u m b e r o f M u s l i m s , strict adherence to ritual practice i n the adopted c o u n t r y marks the boundaries o f distinction. A n n o u n c i n g the need for a

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clean space for daily prayer, die act o f praying, refraining f r o m eating pork and improperly slaughtered meat, and lasting d u r i n g the m o n t h o f Ramadan have become i m p o r t a n t self-delineated boundaries that help the M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t feel secure, distinct, and outside the bounds o f p o l l u t i o n . For some, c o n f o r m i n g to Islamic p r o h i b i t i o n s has become a conscious act o f witness o f a distinctive faith despite public r i d i c u l e and a demonstration o f steadfastness and perseverance i n the face o f social obstacles. For others the act o f a f f i r m i n g uniqueness itself has become an i m p o r t a n t a f f i r m a t i o n o f the need to u p h o l d their identity despite the pressure to change and to abandon the faith. It is a declaration that not o n l y is d i f ference n o r m a l , but i n a most i m p o r t a n t way i t is divinely designed, approved, and sanctioned. Some M u s l i m s w i l l not associate w i t h other M u s l i m s w h o d o not practice these rituals. Those M u s l i m s are deemed as being outside the pale. Inculcating this message i n M u s l i m children is a mechanism to keep them w i t h i n the fold. Thus for some, the r i t u a l is Islam and Islam is the ritual.

Institutionalization: The Creation of the Mosque Culture The m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m m i g r a n t laborers i n the West—whose p r i m a r y focus was the c o u n t r y they left b e h i n d , where they h o p e d to r e t u r n w i t h e n o u g h assets to restart their lives—demonstrated ver)" little interest i n establishing Islamic institutions. Once they decided to settle and raise families i n the West, their concern centered o n m a i n t a i n i n g their c h i l d r e n in the faith and creating space for c o m m u n a l activities. Their i n i t i a l efforts to b u i l d mosques were generally hampered by lack o f funds. I n Europe the early mosques were constructed either by or for diplomats or by the Ahmadiy yah movement i n Islam, w h i c h sought to convert western Christians to Islam by i n i t i a t i n g a mosque-planting p r o g r a m i n Europe and N o r t h America. Most o f the M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s i n the West today came f r o m Islamic states i n w h i c h the government organizes, subsidizes, and administers religious institutions. I n most o f these states civic organizations, especially p r i vate Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n s , are deemed suspect and a potential source o f undermining

the government's

legitimacy. F u r t h e r m o r e , the m a j o r i t y o f the

i m m i g r a n t s are Sunnis, w h o believe that there is no clergy in Islam; thus the creation and maintenance o f Islamic institutions i n the West is a n e w experience for the m a j o r i t y o f the M u s l i m diaspora c o m m u n i t y . There is n o consistent m o d e l or pattern i n the West f o r the establishment o f mosques. Each European and N o r t h A m e r i c a n nation-state, i n its efforts to p r o vide for f r e e d o m o f religious faith and practice, appears to have particular p o l i cies that g o v e r n the f o r m a t i o n , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and the tax-free status o f religious organizations. Every M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n the West is thus predisposed to organize itself w i t h i n the j u r i d i c a l boundaries o f the place o f emigra-

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t i o n . The nature and f o r m o f its i n s t i t u t i o n s are dependent o n w h a t the host country's legal system recognizes as the j u r i s d i c t i o n o f M u s l i m authority. The space as w e l l as the nature o f the organizations that can be developed are constrained by the legal parameters o f the relationship between the state and religious i n s t i t u t i o n s i n each nation-state as w e l l as the policies that each state has t o w a r d the i m m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t y . This has challenged the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y t o ascertain that i n the process o f taking advantage o f or adjusting t o these laws, the i n s t i t u t i o n s created i n the West are g r o u n d e d i n Islamic precedent and prescriptions. M u s l i m s thus face a variety o f legal statutes that govern the establishment o f c o m m u n i t i e s and regulate the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f buildings. I n the Netherlands, for example, there is a difference i n the k i n d o f j u r i s d i c t i o n that the g o v e r n m e n t has i n regulating associations and foundations. The executive o f an association

is elected by the m e m b e r s h i p o f the g r o u p a n d is

accountable t o t h e m for changes i n policies, w h i l e the executive o f a f o u n d a t i o n can appoint h i m s e l f or herself. I f the leader i n any way contravenes the statutes, the m e m b e r s h i p can protest o n l y t h r o u g h the c o u r t system. Thus, w h i l e i n the 1970s the t r e n d f o r M u s l i m s i n The founding of mosques is a key

the Netherlands was to incorporate themselves as foundations led by

method of reinforcing Muslim identity.

i n d i v i d u a l leaders, the need f o r m o r e democratic f o r m s o f o r g a n i -

The mosque is often marked by a tall minaret, the signpost of Islam in the cityscape.The glass-fronted mosque at Kingsland Road, Hoxton, London, has a three-story pencil-thin minaret modeled on those found in traditional Ottoman mosques.

zation became evident i n the 1980s as m o r e groups i n c o r p o r a t e d themselves as associations. Both western Europe and N o r t h America have the expectation that the organizational unit for religious c o m m u n i t i e s w o u l d be an i n s t i t u t i o n similar t o the c h u r c h . Thus, for example, i n Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands the host governments, as w e l l as concerned

c h u r c h groups, encouraged the establishment o f M u s l i m prayer centers and r e l i gious services. Part o f the incentive was the need t o develop leadership and t o locate interlocutors w h o represent the group. Also operative was the g r o w i n g apprehension o f the potential for the g r o w t h o f Islamic fundamentalism a m o n g the marginalized guestworkers. This eventually led t o arrangements w i t h the Turkish and M o r o c c a n governments t o supervise the c o m m u n i t y ' s religious affairs. Both M o r o c c o and Turkey w e l c o m e d the o p p o r t u n i t y i n an effort t o blunt the g r o w t h o f fundamentalism and t o curtail its dissemination i n their countries by r e t u r n i n g laborers. M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s i n the U n i t e d States began b u i l d i n g mosques d u r i n g the Great Depression, w h e n they realized that they were n o t r e t u r n i n g " h o m e " soon. They held annual conventions t o p r o v i d e a venue f o r celebrations and an o p p o r t u n i t y for t h e i r c h i l d r e n to meet suitable marriage partners. W o m e n were

THE

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very active i n mosque activities and i n f u n d - r a i s i n g . By 195-4 there were

6 I 7

fifty-

t w o Islamic mosques and centers that were m e m b e r s o f the Federation o f Islamic Associations o f the U n i t e d States and Canada. I n 1957, f o r example, a m o s q u e was b u i l t i n W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., f i n a n c e d a n d f u r n i s h e d by various M u s l i m nations t o serve the d i p l o m a t i c c o m m u n i t y . By 1998 the M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n i n the W a s h i n g t o n m e t r o p o l i t a n area h a d g r o w n t o about 5 0 , 0 0 0 , a n d it is n o w served b y m o r e than 30 mosques and centers that cater t o different ethnicities, nationalities, and ideological preferences. W i t h the reopening o f the doors o f i m m i g r a t i o n and the repeal o f the Asian Exclusion Act i n the 1960s, the makeup o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n b o t h countries changed dramatically. The n e w i m m i g r a n t s were scandalized by the compromises made by those w h o preceded t h e m i n integrating i n t o the society, and they set o u t t o create their o w n ideological mosques w i t h connections t o the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d o f Egypt and the Jamaat-i Island o f Pakistan. The dramatic g r o w t h i n the n u m b e r o f mosques and Islamic centers i n Europe and N o r t h America since the 1970s is indicative o f the r a p i d g r o w t h o f the M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n that they serve i n the West. This g r o w t h is also m o r e directly affected by other factors, such as the availability o f funds f o r such p r o jects. Raising funds locally was an f o r m i d a b l e task, given the fact that most o f the i m m i g r a n t s were p o o r a n d c o n d i t i o n e d t o have governments p r o v i d e f o r t h e i r religious needs. B o t h f o r e i g n d o n o r s and European governments stepped up t o the task. I n the 1980s there was a concerted d r i v e t o organize M u s l i m s i n t o congregations and t o establish i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Europe and N o r t h A m e r i c a . This mosque m o v e m e n t was spurred by a confluence o f a variety o f interests, including M u s l i m governments

f l u s h w i t h cash ( i n c l u d i n g Saudi A r a b i a ,

K u w a i t , Libya, and the U n i t e d Arab Emirates) and eager t o support the nascent M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s i n the West. Also actively s u p p o r t i n g such efforts were various Christian d e n o m i n a t i o n s and Islamists. A f e w European

governments—

Most people assume that mosques must have domes and minarets, but actually they can be built in any style or reuse existing structures. This Islamic center in Evansville, Indiana, was a

the Netherlands, Sweden, N o r w a y , a n d France—also p r o v i d e d funds f o r the

church that has been con-

c o n s t r u c t i o n o f Islamic centers a n d mosques. T h e estimated n u m b e r o f

verted to Muslim purposes.

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mosques, Islamic centers, and prayer halls c u r r e n t l y i n the West i n c l u d e 2,000 i n Germany, 1,450 i n the U n i t e d States, 1,000 i n France, 600 i n B r i t a i n , 350 i n the Netherlands, 300 i n Spain, 200 i n Italy, 200 i n B e l g i u m , 100 i n Canada,

100

i n D e n m a r k , 40 i n N o r w a y , 4 0 i n Switzerland. 40 i n Austria, and 35 i n Sweden. The i d e o l o g i c a l mosques established i n b o t h Europe and N o r t h A m e r i c a have been able to p r o v i d e a religiously based sense o f solidarity i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y that is capable o f transcending ethnic, l i n g u i s t i c , and national divisions. They have been able to integrate a diverse m e m b e r s h i p that is generally disenchanted w i t h the leadership o f the c o u n t r y left b e h i n d and therefore lacks the c o m m i t m e n t to preserve its national identity. These c o m m u n i t i e s generally believe that n a t i o n a l i s m and e t h n i c i t y are " u n - I s l a m i c , " and they are also opposed to the c u l t u r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n o f music, dance, art, celebrations, o r other f o r m s o f e n t e r t a i n m e n t that serve to b i n d people o f the same ethnic o r national b a c k g r o u n d . In man) places, the professionals

w h o belonged to the ideological mosques

were unable to cater to the needs o f the new i m m i g r a n t s . Policies o f family r e u n i fication w h i c h b r o u g h t large contingents o f relatives (aunts, uncles, and grandparents f r o m the subcontinent), as w e l l as the g r o w t h o f the refugee p o p u l a t i o n fr< >m southern Lebain >n, Iraq, Palestine, S unalia, Kashmir, and Afghanistan, have b r o u g h t to the West a substantial n u m b e r o f people w i t h little or no education. This chain m i g r a t i o n has led to the s p l i n t e r i n g o f the mosque p o p u l a t i o n i n t o distinctive g r o u p s that i d e n t i f y by nationality, ethnicity, or language. I n the process this has also made it possible for M u s l i m s to re-create the sectarian, i d e ological, and theological divisions that exist overseas; thus the development o f mosques or centers persist that identify as Barelwi, Deobandi, Jamaat-i Island, A h l i H a d i t h , Shiite, Ismaili, A h m a d i y y a , A l a w i , Tableeghi, Tahrir, or H i z b o l l a h or affiliate w i t h one o f the various Sufi organizations. A l t h o u g h some o f these groups have reestablished themselves i n different parts o f Europe, o n the w h o l e the European patterns have been different, given the fact that the M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n was recruited f r o m specific countries. Ethnic The Dar al-Islam Foundation Islamic Center Village was built in Abiquiu, NewMexico, in 1980-1981. Designed by the renowned Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy, the mosque is the centerpiece of a complex that includes a school, a clinic, a shopping center, and other public buildings.

b a c k g r o u n d s have therefore generally d e t e r m i n e d the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the mosques

in Europe. In B e l g i u m , L u x e m b o u r g , and Germany the Turkish

mosques are m o s t l y under the supervision o f the Directorate o f Religious Affairs i n Ankara, Turkey (Diyanet Baskanligi). The second largest organization is the

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In Europe, ethnic background has generally determined who attends which particular mosque.The mosque on Shearbridge Road in Bradford, England, is a converted church, and most of the Muslims gathered for Friday prayer are originally from Pakistan, as shown by their distinctive clothes.

Sulaymanci, w h i c h runs Q u r a n schools. Also operating a m o n g the i m m i g r a n t s are the politically active M i l l i Gorus and the apolitical Risale-i N u r m o v e m e n t , w h i c h is n o w a t t e m p t i n g a reconciliation o f r e l i g i o n and science. A l t h o u g h mosques and Islamic centers cater t o about 10 t o iç percent o f the M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n i n the West that is involved i n organized r e l i g i o n , they meet other needs as w e l l . The mosque functions as a social center, w h e r e the c o m m u n i t y meets for a variety o f events that help to cement relationships and to p r o vide c o m m u n a l celebrations. It has become the center f o r Islamic knowledge and education, where Islam is taught to the next generation and w h e r e people can reflect o n Islam's meaning i n the new environment. The mosque has also become an island o f sanity w h e r e people's h u m a n i t y is respected, a haven o f security w h e r e their self-esteem is restored, w h e r e they can find respite f r o m the harassment, d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and h u m i l i a t i o n o f the social environment. It is a venue f o r the sharing o f experiences, the ratification o f n o r m s , and the validating o f values, a place where people's i d e n t i t y is a f f i r m e d i n the c o m m u n i t y o f friends and famil) and. most i m p o r t a n t , m tin- compan) o f fellow believers. As such, the mosque has become a center f o r the c o n f i r m a t i o n as w e l l as the dissemination o f shared social and cultural values, where c o m m u n i t y is forged and f o r m a l i z e d , w h e r e c o m m o n concerns and visions are shared and reaffirmed. The mosque

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Mosques function as social and community centers for the whole Islamic community. Women crowd the entrance to the mosque in Regent's Park, London, for the prayer to celebrate the end of the fast of Ramadan.

structure has become the p r i m a r y s y m b o l n o t o n l y o f the presence o f Islam i n the West but o f its permanence and its future. Its cupolas and minarets are f i x tures i n the Western urban skyline, set i n stone, tile, b r i c k , steel, or concrete. It is the place w h e r e the demarcation line between the c o m m u n i t y and its surr o u n d i n g culture are located and emphasized, or w h e r e they are carefully negotiated and f o r m a l i z e d . A l t h o u g h the message preached i n the mosque may vary according to the leadership's ideological c o m m i t m e n t , there is a consensus a m o n g some r e l i gious leaders that Islam is the antidote to w h a t ails Europe and N o r t h A m e r i c a . They present Islam as the d i v i n e l y sanctioned alternative to what prevails i n the degenerate society i n w h i c h many M u s l i m s consider themselves l i v i n g . Islam stands i n c o n d e m n a t i o n o f Western culture, w h i c h is depicted as hedonistic and m o r a l l y depraved, w i t h dysfunctional families, people h o o k e d o n d r u g s , sexual i m m o r a l i t y , meaningless lives, and psychological disorders. Islam offers a m o r a l order and p r o m o t e s a collective responsibility that keeps the y o u t h f r o m b e i n g lost. Islam calls f o r an equitable and just society, obedience t o parents and respect f o r elders; it restores the a u t h o r i t y o f the parents and provides a sense o f purpose i n life.

THE GLOBALIZATION

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The Development of Umbrella Organizations The f o r m a t i o n o f Islamic umbrella organizations that are independent o f the state is a recent p h e n o m e n o n i n the experience o f M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s . Such o r g a n i zations are the n o r m i n the West, as governments and civic institutions expect to deal w i t h a recognized national leadership, a religious hierarchy; simply p u t , i t is the Western way o f o r g a n i z i n g r e l i g i o n , and M u s l i m s are pressed to r e f o r m u late themselves accordingly. Another factor has been the interest o f foreign-based organizations such as the M u s l i m Brotherhood o f Egypt and the Jamaat-i Island o f Pakistan. The students w h o adhere to the teachings o f these organizations f o r m e d the M u s l i m Student Association, w h i c h helped to establish several h u n dred mosques o n U.S. and Canadian campuses. They later reformulated t h e m selves i n t o the Islamic Society o f N o r t h America (ISNA). A m o r e conservative g r o u p split f r o m ISNA and f o r m e d the Islamic Circle o f N o r t h America. Also involved i n the process are foreign governments w h o seek c o n t r o l o f the mosques to manage their affairs and to keep their ideologies i n c o n f o r m i t y to those advocated overseas. Saudi Arabia established a European office o f the M u s l i m W o r l d League i n Belgium and t w o offices i n N o r t h America ( i n N e w York and Toronto) i n an attempt to supervise the mosque's leadership and its message by r e c r u i t i n g mosques t o register as members o f the C o u n c i l o f Masajid i n Europe or N o r t h America. Both M o r o c c o and Turkey have also been involved i n staffing mosques that are being established f o r their expatriates i n Europe. M u s l i m s w h o have experienced m i n o r i t y status i n other countries appear to be at the forefront i n i t i a t i n g organizations. The Surinamese, for example, were the pioneers i n f o r m i n g Islamic associations i n the Netherlands. They had the experience o f the D u t c h methods i n Surinam. They k n e w the language and c o u l d negotiate their way i n the state bureaucracy as w e l l as i n the society. They emphasized cultural identity and obtained subsidies f r o m public funds and f r o m the M i n i s t r y o f Welfare, Health, and Culture. Other groups that were successful i n creating effective organizations were the A h m a d i y y a and the Ithna Ashris o f Indian b a c k g r o u n d , w h o had the earlier experience o f being a m i n o r i t y g r o u p i n East Africa. Efforts to organize umbrella organizations that transcend ideological c o m m i t m e n t , theological particularities, ethnic allegiances, and personal rivalries have not been t o o successful. This is not for lack o f trying. For example, the Federation o f M u s l i m organizations i n the Netherlands functioned between

197c

and 1981. W h e n i t began to sink, its staff f o u n d e d the M u s l i m I n f o r m a t i o n Center i n the Hague. I n 1979 the Federation o f Turkish and Cultural Associations was f o r m e d ; i t i n c l u d e d eight local Turkish organizations and cooperated w i t h the Directorate o f Religious Affairs i n Ankara. A n o t h e r Turkish organization, the

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Islamic Center Foundation (representing seventeen local groups), was inspired by the Suleymanci movement i n Turkey and had no government connection. The U n i o n o f M o r o c c a n M u s l i m Organizations, representing forty groups i n the Netherlands, was f o u n d e d i n 1978. The Netherlands Islamic Society f u n c t i o n e d between 1973 and 1982, serving the Surinamese c o m m u n i t y ; i t was t h e n taken over by the Foundation for the Welfare o f M u s l i m s i n the Netherlands. N a t i o n a l M u s l i m u m b r e l l a organizations that were representative o f more than one g r o u p included the M u s l i m Organizations i n the Netherlands Foundation, w h i c h was established by Turks and Moroccans i n 1981. A Surinamese initiative that sought the inclusion of other nationalities was the Netherlands Islamic Parliament, established i n 1982. Most o f these organizations failed because o f lack o f funds and the proper staff necessary to create coalitions.

Islamic Education The highest p r i o r i t y for most M u s l i m parents i n the West is p r o v i d i n g Islamic instruction for their c h i l d r e n . Where that was not available, some o f the earlyi m m i g r a n t s i n the U n i t e d States, eager that their c h i l d r e n acquire religious values, Education is an important way to create and reinforce feelings of solidarity in the Muslim community. Although the central place

sent them to Christian Sunday schools. Those M u s l i m parents w h o were c o n cerned about the values that were t h o u g h t to be propagated i n public schools sent their children to Catholic or Baptist schools. W h a t parents often object to is the i n t r u s i o n o f school officials i n t o what they perceive to be parental prerogatives.

of Islamic education in

They are concerned about the school's inculcation o f cultural patterns that are

America is still the home,

antithetical to the parents' traditions and the Islamic faith. Many object to m i x i n g

many children attend pri-

o f boys and girls i n class, coed g y m and s w i m m i n g classes, sex education, and

mary schools run by

counseling by school officials that promotes rebellion against the parents' values.

mosques or Islamic centers. More than one hundred

The central place for Islamic education continues to be the h o m e , although i n

such primary schools are

the U n i t e d States and Canada religious instruction is increasingly being carried o u t

licensed in various states.

i n more than fifteen hundred Sunday schools, y o u t h groups, and retreats r u n by

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623

the various mosques and Islamic centers. More dian one hundred Islamic religious day schools have been licensed by various states. The m a j o r i t y provide p r i m a r y education. The most famous h i g h school is

the

Saudi

Academy

in

northern

V i r g i n i a ; 9 c percent o f its graduating class goes to college. Religious schools f o l l o w the required local c u r r i c u l u m and supplement it w i t h Islamic studies and Arabic language classes. A m o n g the converts i n the African American c o m m u nity, Islamic education is

considered

crucial for the proper instruction o f c h i l dren. The N a t i o n o f Islam under the

Islamic instruction is the highest priority for most Muslim parents in the West. These boys and girls, wearing traditional dress and headscarves, are

leadership o f Elijah M u h a m m a d estab-

attending Arabic class at the Islamic School in London. Opened in April

lished about one hundred schools that

1998, the school was the first state-funded Islamic school in Britain.

he named Universities o f Islam. These were closed in 1976 by Warith Deen M u h a m m a d , Elijah's son and successor. It was after a protracted process o f re-educating the membership in the Sunni faith and retraining the imams and teachers that Warith Deen reconstituted some o f the schools as Sister Clara M u h a m m a d Schools. In Britain the Queen is officially the head o f the c h u r c h , and there is no pretense o f separation o f c h u r c h and state. The 1944 Education Act required that the school day should begin w i t h a Christian-inspired assembly or collective prayer, w h i l e a l l o w i n g parents w i t h alternative religious beliefs to w i t h d r a w their c h i l dren f r o m participating i n Christian activities. A 1988 law made religious instruct i o n obligatory. M u s l i m requests for parity w i t h other religious groups i n B r i t a i n , such as Jews and Catholics, w h o receive state f u n d i n g to support the operation o f their religious schools, have been denied. Instead they have been offered a compromise that allows M u s l i m students to go to single-sex schools. I n several inner-city schools i n Britain 80 to 90 percent o f the student body is M u s l i m . Several confrontations occurred i n the 1970s over school u n i f o r m s that required girls to wear short skirts. Girls w h o d i d not c o m p l y wdth the regulations were expelled f r o m school, and i n some cases parents took their daughters o u t o f school over the issue. A M u s l i m liaison c o m m i t t e e was f o r m e d i n Bradford to negotiate w i t h the educational authorities about issues i m p o r t a n t to M u s l i m s . C o m p r o m i s e s w e r e eventually w o r k e d o u t , a l l o w i n g M u s l i m girls to wear trousers as l o n g as the trousers match the colors o f the school u n i f o r m . Girls are generally allowed to put o n headscarves and they can wear tracksuits for p h y s i -

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cal education classes. Several schools have tried to organize separate s w i m m i n g classes for boys and girls and allow M u s l i m students to wear s w i m m i n g suits in the shower. The first state M u s l i m school i n Britain opened i n early 1998 i n L o n d o n . A second stale M u s l i m school was scheduled to open i n B i r m i n g h a m i n September 1998. In the Netherlands about 60 percent o f Moroccan and Turkish students w h o attend either parochial or p u b l i c school receive religious education that is subsidized by the g o v e r n m e n t . Because C h r i s t i a n i t y is taught i n confessional schools, and rabbis and ministers teach religion i n state schools, M u s l i m s sought to have i m a m s hired as instructors o f Islamic education. A l t h o u g h i n s t r u c t i o n i n Islamic tenets was legally guaranteed i n the state schools, the law required that i t must be taught i n D u t c h , w h i c h few o f the i m a m s mastered. I n 1986 the Diocesan Catholic school board i n Breda denied requests f r o m a f e w Catholic schools to be a l l o w e d to give Islamic i n s t r u c t i o n . I n 1988

the C o u n c i l o f

Churches i n the Netherlands w r o t e a letter to the Association o f D u t c h m u n i c i palities concerning this issue. A l t h o u g h Muslims were appreciative that their c h i l d r e n , w h e n attending Christian schools, were being educated in an atmosphere i n w h i c h G o d is revered, they were apprehensive about efforts at conversion. I n 1988 t w o Islamic schools were opened i n Rotterdam and Eindhoven; the latter was associated w i t h a Protestant school, and the one i n Rotterdam was connected to a public school. For different reasons b o t h M u s l i m s and n o n - M u s l i m s had reservations about the venture. Questions were raised about w h e t h e r there were e n o u g h students to justify the dedication o f an entire school to one g r o u p . Fear was expressed that such a school w o u l d impede i n t e g r a t i o n , and serious questions were raised about the lack o f qualified M u s l i m teachers. By 1992 there were more than twenty Islamic schools in the Netherlands, however: 1 (Forts to make r o o m for Islamic i n s t r u c t i o n i n Christian schools appear to have f o u n d e r e d , as Christians began to question w h e t h e r that was their responsibility. The only exception was the Juliana van Stolbergschool, w h e r e i n i t i a l experiments a l l o w i n g the i m a m t o provide i n s t r u c t i o n in D u t c h eventually led to the school's b e c o m i n g an interreligious p r i m a r y school w i t h its o w n board composed o f b o t h Christians and M u s l i m s . The question o f w h o decides the content o f Islamic education exists i n all Western nations. I n Germany, for example, the government agreed that the Turkish consulate w o u l d provide religious instruction i n Turkish. The c u r r i c u l u m , p u b lished i n Turkey, strives to foster devotion to Turkey and Kemalism as well as nationalistic sentiments to a foreign nation. The c u r r i c u l u m continues to be structured as i m p o r t e d Islam taught by i m p o r t e d teachers w h o d o not understand the German c o m m u n i t y and the daily issues o f life that the children face. Questions are raised about whether this k i n d o f instruction w i l l impede the integration o f

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62C

the Turkish c o m m u n i t y i n t o the German body politic that calls for tolerance and integration o f all groups. Several European countries, i n c l u d i n g B e l g i u m , Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands, are n o w s u p p o r t i n g imams i m p o r t e d f r o m Turkey, Morocco, and elsewhere to provide i n s t r u c t i o n i n Islam to the M u s l i m student population. I n the Netherlands imams were recruited to serve the i m m i g r a n t s i n their o w n language and inculcate them i n their particular culture. By the m i d d l e o f the 1980s there were an estimated 120 foreign i m a m s (seventy Turkish, forty Moroccan, and ten Surinamese, i n c l u d i n g the Ahmadiyya). I n the U n i t e d States, w h i c h constantly r e a f f i r m s the separation o f r e l i g i o n and state, various state and federal officials have h i r e d and credentialed i m a m s f o r service as chaplains i n the p r i s o n system. The chaplaincy office o f the U.S. a r m e d services has also c o m m i s s i o n e d f o u r i m a m s as chaplains and are i n t r o d u c i n g a novel idea i n t r a i n i n g a w o m a n to be an assistant chaplain. I n the Western context the i m a m ' s leadership, social r o l e , and f u n c t i o n have been enhanced and t r a n s f o r m e d to parallel that o f the priest or the rabbi. H e is n o t merely the leader o f prayer as overseas; rather, he has increasingly become expected t o f u n c t i o n as a spiritual leader i n a n o n - M u s l i m e n v i r o n m e n t , an educator and teacher p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n o n h o w to live an Islamic life. H e presides over w e d d i n g s and funerals, serves as a chaplain i n hospitals, jails, and the m i l i t a r y . He provides counseling for y o u t h and the t r o u b l e d i n his c o n gregation and has become the representative o f the M u s l i m s as w e l l as t h e i r spokesman to the larger c o m m u n i t y , a propagator o f the faith i n dialogue w i t h n o n - M u s l i m s , and the ambassador t o the host c u l t u r e , a t t e m p t i n g to b u i l d bridges to other f a i t h c o m m u n i t i e s . The M u s l i m s are h a r d pressed t o f i n d i m a m s adequately e q u i p p e d f o r such a role. F o r e i g n - b o r n and - t r a i n e d i m a m s have o f t e n failed to provide the c o m m u n i t y w i t h the k i n d o f leadership that makes M u s l i m s c o m f o r t a b l e i n t h e i r n e w homes i n the West. They have generally insisted o n replicating f o r e i g n c u l tural standards and constraints as n o r m a t i v e for all times and places. They have displayed l i t t l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the pressures y o u n g p e o p l e face i n the Western e n v i r o n m e n t and have little sympathy w i t h those w h o advocate that r e l i g i o n s h o u l d pertain o n l y to the area o f belief and not t o c u l t u r e . A f e w M u s l i m leaders have raised the issue o f w h e t h e r i t is t i m e to start t r a i n i n g i m a m s f r o m a m o n g the i m m i g r a n t s and their c h i l d r e n . The q u e s t i o n is w h e r e the n e w breed o f i m a m s w o u l d get their education. Efforts t o o p e n schools f o r the t r a i n i n g o f i m a m s i n the U n i t e d States and B r i t a i n have been m e t w i t h skepticism f r o m those w h o suspect particular theological advocacy o n the part o f the leadership. They also have been c o n d e m n e d by those w h o believe that any c o m p r o m i s e or adjustment t o the Western e n v i r o n m e n t is t a n t a m o u n t t o rejection o f the f a i t h .

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Interfaith Relations Efforts t o create a context for interreligious dialogue and i n t e r f a i t h activities i n the West generally have been initiated by Christians and Jews and have been a source o f M u s l i m suspicion, focused particularly on the goals and purposes o f such ventures. Several Christian umbrella organizations i n the West, i n c l u d i n g the Conference o f European Churches and the C o u n c i l o f Bishops' Conferences i n Europe, sponsored a joint project focused o n Islam in Europe. The W o r l d Council o f Churches i n Geneva opened an office that deals w i t h interfaith issues; it has engaged overseas M u s l i m scholars for several decades. The National C o u n c i l o f Churches i n the U n i t e d States finds itself hamstrung by its bureaucratic structures w a i t i n g f o r the f o r m a t i o n o f a comprehensive Islamic umbrella organization that brings together the various groups. O n l y then can the organization initiate o f f i cial dialogue w i t h M u s l i m s o n the national level. M u s l i m s have taken note that the proclaimed u n d e r l y i n g principles for establ i s h i n g relationships w i t h people o f other faiths by these organizations and by the Vatican differ i n their perception and treatment o f Jews and M u s l i m s : Judaism often receives a m o r e amicable treatment. Because o f this, M u s l i m s have often demonstrated a great reluctance to participate. The suspicion is that dialogue and other interfaith activities are a n e w phase i n Christian efforts to convert M u s l i m s or that they have a h i d d e n agenda a i m e d at u n d e r m i n i n g Islam. Also operative is the prevailing M u s l i m belief that Islam provides all pertinent i n f o r m a t i o n about Judaism and Christianity, thus there is n o need for M u s l i m s to learn anything more about these t w o religions. Some M u s l i m s refuse to appear at a c h u r c h unless i t is to i n f o r m Christians about Islam's virtues and m o r a l values. Others take interfaith activities as an o p p o r t u n i t y to preach Islam. They disseminate a variety o f publications w r i t t e n by overseas scholars w h o have n o understanding o f the Western context or the protocols f o l l o w e d i n i n t e r f a i t h activities, or w h o d o not package their material i n the Western i d i o m . I n fact, some o f the material disseminated—such as the videotapes o f dialogues by A h m a d Deedat and Jimmy Swaggart's "Is the Bible the W o r d o f God?" M u s l i m literature that attempts to prove that the Bible prophesied the c o m i n g o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d , or the w r i t i n g o f converts f r o m Christianity c o n d e m n i n g their f o r m e r faith—have had the opposite effect o f deepening the misunderstandings between the t w o religious c o m m u n i t i e s . Interfaith efforts have also been hampered by Jewish suspicion o f ChristianM u s l i m collaboration that does not include t h e m , by the reticence by some evangelical Christian participants w h o see Muslims as the agents o f the Antichrist, and by those Muslims w h o see any cooperation or collaboration between Muslims and people o f other faiths as bordering o n i n d u l g i n g i n kufr, or abandoriing the faith.

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The Jewish c o m m u n i t y for m o r e than half a century has been able to organize and maintain interfaith relations w i t h various Christian groups. Generally speaking, i n the U n i t e d States the Jewish c o m m u n i t y has stipulated up front that such activity is conditional o n the acceptance o f the state o f Israel as a genuine expression o f Jewish expectations. Criticism o f Israel and its policies toward Palestinian Christians and Muslims is characterized as being anti-Semitic. Interfaith activities are thus perceived by some Muslims as a ploy to provide a protective shield over the c o n t i n u ing dispossession o f the Palestinian people. In Sweden, w h e r e interfaith activities are supported by the state, a m o r e trusting m i l i e u has been achieved. F r o m the b e g i n n i n g , a priest, a rabbi, and an i m a m held public dialogue sessions t o w h i c h they were invited by churches, universities, and the media. Their first j o i n t project was a study o f fundamentalism. I n August 1994 they went o n a peace mission t o Sarajevo. I n 1996 they f o u n d e d the N o r d i c Center for Interreligious Dialogue, for w h i c h they received donations f r o m the government of Göteborg. The center has nine board members, three f r o m each faith c o m m u n i t y . Its c o m p o s i t i o n does not represent the n u m e r i c a l strength o f the c o m m u n i t i e s , because there are twelve thousand Jews, mostly around Stockholm, and t w o h u n d r e d and fifty thousand M u s l i m s , w h i l e the m a j o r i t y o f the rest o f the p o p u l a t i o n has Christian roots. M u s l i m efforts are directed t o w a r d n o n - M u s l i m s . They d i s t r i b u t e publications d e m o n s t r a t i n g Islam's virtues and m o r a l values. I n Sweden, as elsewhere, members o f the M u s l i m Brotherhood have taken the initiative i n actively p r o m o t i n g dialogue, w h i l e the Salafiya groups are opposed to any dialogue and vehemently oppose i n v i t i n g n o n - M u s l i m s , w h o are deemed apostate, to the mosque. I n B r i t a i n , the U n i t e d States, and Canada, the i n i t i a l M u s l i m response to interfaith overtures is being reconsidered. The theme o f the 1970s and 1980s, founded o n the conviction that the message o f Islam is p o w e r f u l and persuasive enough that all Westerners w i l l see the light and convert to Islam, appears to be w a n i n g . What M u s l i m s are seeing instead is actually an increased antipathy t o w a r d Islam o n the part o f many Westerners. This has led to a serious reassessment o f the role o f M u s l i m s and Islam i n the West. Such reflection is taking i n t o account the reality that the M u s l i m s o f the West have vital interests that can best be tackled t h r o u g h cooperation w i t h the larger c o m m u n i t y Azzam al-Tamimi o f Britain has identified these interests as f o l l o w s : h e l p i n g to address such problems as racism and the deterioration o f m o r a l i t y i n Western societies by participating i n this society and t r y i n g to influence the decision makers; spreading Islamic daivo (the call to Islam) i n a manner that is comprehensible to Western society; and t r y i n g to alleviate the conditions o f M u s l i m s overseas caused by imperialist policies o f Western governments by w o r k i n g w i t h those w h o are nonaligned i n the West to help pressure their governments.

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A few M u s l i m i n d i v i d u a l s and congregations are b e g i n n i n g t o see the value o f p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n i n t e r f a i t h d i a l o g u e . M e a n w h i l e , serious questions

con-

t i n u e t o be raised about the goals a n d consequences o f i n t e r f a i t h a c t i v i t y f o r believers o f all faiths. There is c o n c e r n that such p a r t i c i p a t i o n involves r i s k , because it may weaken the r e l i g i o u s c o m m i t m e n t o f those i n v o l v e d s h o u l d they f i n d v i r t u e i n the faiths o f others. They q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r the openness to the other may strengthen tolerance o f fanaticism, i n the process s a c r i f i c i n g the t r u t h , or w h e t h e r the c o m m i t m e n t to i n t e r f a i t h d i a l o g u e creates an alternative r e l i g i o u s c o m m u n i t y at the expense o f b e l o n g i n g t o the participant's o w n . It f u r t h e r poses the question o f w h e t h e r such activity provides an atmosphere that presupposes permissiveness

and relativism because the c o m m i t -

m e n t is to p l u r a l i s m .

The Concern for Security The discourse s u r r o u n d i n g the current experience o f M u s l i m s i n the West has revolved around t w o issues deemed o f paramount importance by b o t h Muslims and the nations i n w h i c h they have sought to live: security and cultural coherence. That M u s l i m s i n western Europe chose to become permanent

residents

rather than m i g r a n t laborers, and t o become citizens w h e r e possible i n some European countries and N o r t h America, has increasingly become a p r o m i n e n t concern o f many Westerners. M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s and their c h i l d r e n have come to the realization that they have to cope w i t h the prevalent p r e - f o r m e d stereoDuring the revolution in Iran in 1979. an imam led a demonstration in support of Ayalollah Khomeini outside

types, h o n e d over centuries o f conflict and c o m p e t i t i o n . They also have to deal w i t h the increasing rhetoric o f d e m o n i z a t i o n and prejudice. I n the U n i t e d States some conservative commentators and pundits have created such controversies.

the Iranian embassy in

This rhetoric often holds M u s l i m s i n the West and Islam as the r e l i g i o n respon-

London.

sible for the acts o f irresponsible individuals overseas.

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The Islamic r e v o l u t i o n i n Iran i n 1978-79 was a major catalyst i n refocusing Western attention o n Islam's perceived potential threat. It tapped i n t o a heritage o f Western suspicion and fear o f Muslims. The hostage taking, made intimate by its exposure o n television, f o l l o w e d by the attack o n Islam's holiest shrine i n Mecca by w h a t was depicted as M u s l i m fanatics, has resurrected the long t r a d i t i o n o f associating M u s l i m s w i t h violence and jihad. I n 1980 the violence came h o m e to Europe w i t h the b o m b i n g o f a synagogue and an assassination attempt o n an Iranian i n Paris. This was followed by the assassination o f the French ambassador i n Beirut i n 1981, a b o m b explosion i n the Paris-Toulouse train, and a shootout i n Paris. Fifty-eight French soldiers were killed i n Beirut o n October 23, 1983. A parallel attack o n the same day k i l l e d 241 American marines w h e n trucks packed w i t h explosives were driven i n t o their headquarters there. A c o u ple o f years later several French citizens were taken hostage. D u r i n g 198c and 1986 several bombs exploded i n Paris. The headlines i n the press were no longer about events far away b u t about the w o u n d e d and the dead d o w n t o w n . Europeans began to fear what the M u s l i m s next d o o r could d o to t h e m . The Muslims were depicted as the obscurantist sinister enemy, ruthless followers o f a religion that promotes violence and b l i n d adherence to tradition. Similar attitudes have been f o r m e d i n the U n i t e d States as a consequence o f terrorist acts that have resulted i n the death and injury o f American citizens. These include the bombings o f Pan A m flight 103 i n 1988 and the W o r l d Trade Center i n N e w York i n 1993, the murder o f t w o Central Intelligence Agency employees i n Washington, D C , i n 1993, and the discotheque b o m b i n g i n Germany i n 1986. Such acts have heightened fears o f Islamic fundamentalism as being driven by irrational people w h o place no value o n h u m a n life. The fatwa (legal o p i n i o n ) by the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i sanctioning the death o f Salman Rushdi for defaming the Prophet M u h a m m a d i n his Satanic Verses and die debates that followed reaffirmed these perceptions. The press depicted Islam as antiliberal, antimodern, anti-intellectual—the epitome o f what is not "West."The b u r n i n g o f Rushdi's book in Britain created fear i n the British public that Muslims i n their midst were intolerant and averse to freed o m o f thought. Some Muslims i n Britain sought what they perceived to be parity o f treatment. They wanted the implementation o f the British blasphemy law that w o u l d at least ban the book's circulation. They f o u n d out that the law d i d not cover Islam but protected only the official state religion: Anglicanism. It brought home to many M u s l i m s that their concerns are considered to be outside the pale, h i the United States, Muslims noted that some books, i n c l u d i n g Little Black Sambo, are kept out o f libraries because they offend certain segments o f the society, but the same sensitivity was not shown to Muslims i n the case o f Satanic Verses. Muslims consider some segments o f the Western press to be extremely biased against t h e m , p r o v i d i n g unfavorable spin about issues that are o f paramount

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importance for the welfare o f M u s l i m s in the w o r l d . The press generally c o n demns Islamists because they espouse an anticolonial r h e t o r i c , that by d e f i n i t i o n is anti-West. They also c o n d e m n the West for its silence o n the shedding o f M u s l i m b l o o d i n Chechnya, Kashmir. Palestine, and Bosnia and for its u n q u a l i fied support o f Israel. As v i c t i m s o f hate speech and hate crimes, i n c l u d i n g assault, murder, and the b u r n i n g o f mosques i n b o t h Europe and N o r t h America, M u s l i m s ' apprehension about their security and their future has increased. They are convinced that Westerners d o not value M u s l i m life as they d o their o w n . H o w else c o u l d they have stood by i n 1992 w h i l e tens o f thousands o f Bosnians were v i c t i m s o f ethnic cleansing? I n 198c several mosques and Islamic centers were vandalized and threatened i n different parts o f the U n i t e d States ( i n San Francisco and Orange County, California, i n Denver, Colorado, i n Quincy, Massachusetts, and i n D e a r b o r n , M i c h i g a n ) . Also i n 198c t w o pipe bombs exploded i n the South West mosque i n H o u s t o n , Texas, d u r i n g the celebration o f the e i d , an Islamic holiday. N o one was h u r t because the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y had gathered i n a different place, because o f the expected presence o f thousands for the celebration. Various Arab o r g a n i zations also received death threats at this t i m e . These acts were b r o u g h t to the attention o f a few U.S. legislators, w h o included mosques w i t h the other religious institutions being protected i n the Hate C r i m e Bill that was signed i n t o law i n 1988.

A l t h o u g h the law became effective i n 1990,

r e q u i r i n g the Justice

D e p a r t m e n t t o collect and p u b l i s h i n f o r m a t i o n o n hate c r i m e s , i t has n o t deterred the g r o w i n g acts o f vandalism against mosques and Islamic institutions. There appears to be a correlation between overseas events and the rise in the n u m b e r o f hate crimes i n the U n i t e d States. Mosques and Islamic centers increasingly are targeted d u r i n g heightened periods o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the West and M u s l i m nations. In several European countries housing discrimination as well the l o w income level o f the M u s l i m laborers, many o f w h o m are n o w o n welfare, has confined them to particular residential areas that have become virtual ghettos o f foreign residents. Some M u s l i m s d o not speak the language o f the countries i n w h i c h they dwell or have not had a chance to meet or interact w i t h a single European, even after l i v i n g for more tiian twenty years i n Europe. In France the spectacular rise o f the far right d u r i n g the 1980s is partly a consequence of a xenophobic platform that projects all problems facing French society o n the presence o f i m m i g r a n t s . A l t h o u g h at first it was dismissed as being p r o m o t e d by a racist fringe, its p r o p o nents gained crcdibihty, given France's economic recession and the g r o w t h o f u n e m p l o y m e n t . A consensus is slowly emerging that the i m m i g r a t i o n o f N o r t h Africans presents a special set of issues that previous immigrants d i d not pose for French society: Their African o r i g i n and Islamic faith have become the issue.

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I

Several European p o l i t i c a l parties have become vocally a n t i - M u s l i m . These i n c l u d e the Front Nationale i n France, the Vlaams Blok i n B e l g i u m , and the Republikaner i n Germany. The C e n t r u m p a r t i j o f the Netherlands is less p o w erful than s i m i l a r a n t i - i m m i g r a n t parties o f western Europe. It has o n l y one o f 150 m e m b e r s i n the second chamber o f Parliament. A l t h o u g h attacks o n asyl u m centers and Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the Netherlands have increased, they d o n o t m a t c h w h a t occurs i n n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s . Since 1991,

w h e n Frits

Bolksteini o f the conservative liberal party raised some u n c o m f o r t a b l e issues about the presence and i n f l u e n c e o f ethnic m i n o r i t i e s o n D u t c h society, there has been m o r e o p e n p u b l i c debate o n i m m i g r a t i o n i n the Netherlands. I n 1993 there was m o r e p u b l i c expression o f x e n o p h o b i a and panic about the rate o f i m m i g r a t i o n ; the issue o f w h e t h e r the Netherlands can accommodate

any

m o r e people was raised. The public discussion o f w h a t d o w i t h the M u s l i m s i n Europe and the threat they pose t o its security, as w e l l as the accompanying violence against M u s l i m life and property, has been disconcerting. For many M u s l i m s the massacre o f 200 Algerians i n Paris i n 1 9 6 1 , i n the 1993 k i l l i n g o f an Algerian i n Paris, and the image o f German hooligans b u r n i n g a hostel for Turkish i m m i g r a n t s in Solingen i n 1993—has left an indelible mark. As a consequence, M u s l i m s i n the West have generally favored keeping a l o w profile for security reasons. They see themselves as the latest v i c t i m s o f c h a u v i n i s m and xenophobia. The M u s l i m s i n the West have thus become the new villains o n the block, j o i n i n g Jews, gypsies, Italians, and African Americans i n being reviled.

The Cultural Divide The scramble to identify the next threat to Western democracies that ensued after the fall o f c o m m u n i s m has n o t yet abated. Islam and M u s l i m culture have been depicted by certain interests i n the U n i t e d States as the next challenge, i f not the enemy challenging the West. It is accused o f being a religion that is devoid o f integrity and progressive values, a religion that promotes violent passions in its adherents, a menace to c i v i l society, and a threat to the peace-loving people o f the w o r l d . M u s l i m s are often cast as b l o o d t h i r s t y terrorists, whose loyalty as c i t izens must be questioned because they are perceived to be obsessed w i t h the destruction o f the West. Samuel H u n t i n g t o n ' s p u b l i c a t i o n o f "The Clash o f C i v i l i z a t i o n s " i n Foreign Affairs, p r o m o t i n g a thesis that the next conflict w i l l not be between nadon-states or ideologies but civilizations, appears to have gained support a m o n g some p o l icy pundits. His thesis has r e c o n f i r m e d to M u s l i m s that colonialism is n o t over, because it has echoes o f themes heard since the nineteenth century. O n the sur-

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face it appears as a rehash o f a c e n t u r y - o l d m y t h that undergirded European hegemonic policies j u s t i f y i n g wars o f colonial expansion and missionary c r u sades d u r i n g the nineteenth century under the r u b r i c o f "civilizational m i s s i o n , " " w h i t e man's b u r d e n , " or Manifest Destiny. It posited the superiority o f European m a n , the acme o f h u m a n c i v i l i z a t i o n , w h o w i l l i n g l y assumes the burden o f shari n g his values and achievements w i t h the rest o f the backward w o r l d . I n the process, this m y t h justified the ransacking o f the cultures o f the conquered people and c o n f i n i n g M u s l i m achievements to ethnological museums or the dustb i n o f history. M e a n w h i l e , the i m m i g r a n t s b r i n g w i t h t h e m a different u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f their c u l t u r e . Many believe that they have been v i c t i m s o f Western c u l t u r a l hegemony. For t h e m the preservation o f distinctive culture is the last l i n e o f defense against total o b l i t e r a t i o n . Battered by Western weapons o f d e s t r u c t i o n , overcome by Western scientific achievements, and reduced to vassal states, M u s l i m s have been a t t e m p t i n g to resist by h a n g i n g o n to Islamic c i v i l i z a t i o n as the last bastion o f h u m a n d i g n i t y and w o r t h , a means o f galvanizing people and keeping t h e m f r o m total d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . Consequently, c o n f o r m i t y to Islamic c u l t u r e , t r a d i t i o n s , and n o r m s is n o t o n l y a source o f p r i d e i n M u s l i m c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o h u m a n c i v i l i z a t i o n , it has become a d i v i n e i m p e r a t i v e , a cure f o r w h a t ails M u s l i m society and the w o r l d . It is p r o m o t e d as possessing redemptive powers. Public performance o f the rituals o f Islam and m a i n t a i n i n g a distinctive c u l t u r e has thus b e c o m e a vehicle o f healing. Deviating f r o m the consensus o f w h a t is p u b l i c l y considered n o r m a t i v e by the m a j o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n i n w h i c h the i m m i g r a n t s live is not backwardness; rather, it is a w i l l f u l act o f coherence and an o p t i o n o f a m o r e m e a n i n g f u l reality. I n the process, f o r some, r i t u a l has b e c o m e an i n s t r u m e n t o f protest against a society that continues to treat Islam as an alien r e l i g i o n w h o s e adherents are fixated i n the seventh century.

Islamic Law Many M u s l i m leaders in the West w o u l d like to see Western states recognize Islamic law as a body o f public law, w h i c h w o u l d provide parallel legal status for Muslims w i t h those o f other religions. In a few instances Muslims i n the West have been able to negotiate some accommodation o f their particular traditional, c u l tural, and religious needs regarding burial practices. A m o n g the early immigrants, the fear o f being buried a m o n g the "unbelievers" led to repatriating corpses to the country o f o r i g i n . The acquisition o f cemeteries dedicated to Islamic burials i n the West have all but put an end to this practice i n the U n i t e d States, Canada, and many parts o f w estern Europe, although some families repatriate the dead for

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emotional reasons. Furthermore, despite laws to the contrary, i n some instances M u s l i m s have been able t o prepare the corpse for burial i n accord w i t h Islamic tradition and have been allowed to

use

shrouds

in

place

of

coffins. A few mosques i n western Europe and N o r t h America have even b u i l t r o o m s o n the premises for the ritual washing o f the dead. I n other

places

exceptions have been made i n v i o l a t i o n o f z o n i n g laws. For example,

some

mosques

in

B r i t a i n that d o n o t meet the specifications o f religious areas, such as adequate parking space, have been legalized to accommodate the needs o f the p o p u l a t i o n .

Eating meat thai has been slaughtered according to correct ritual practice has become increasingly important for many Muslims in the West as a means to distinguish themselves from Westerners and maintain their cultural identity. This shop in Manningham, England, advertises that it uses ritually slaughtered (halal) meat for the kebab it sells along with fish and chips.

D u r i n g the 1984 general election i n Britain, Muslims demanded recognition o f the shariah i n matters o f personal status law: marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Although law i n Britain covers all citizens regardless o f their religious affiliation, some consideration to M u s l i m legal traditions appears to have been made i n at least t w o divorce cases i n w h i c h the husband had to pay the specified amount i n the marriage contract rather than to f o l l o w British custom. I n several cases, i n b o t h the U n i t e d States and Canada, the family courts have recognized the Islamic marriage contract as a legal document, equivalent to a prenuptial agreement, whose stipvdation for setdement i n the case o f divorce is approved by the courts. Eating halal f o o d (meat f r o m animals that have been properly slaughtered and contains

n o p o r k b y - p r o d u c t s ) has assumed

a vital s y m b o l i c d i m e n s i o n .

A l t h o u g h early i m m i g r a n t s f o l l o w e d the fatwa by the Islamic

modernist

M u h a m m a d A b d u h sanctioning the eating o f meat killed for Christians and Jews, mosques are increasingly disseminating i n f o r m a t i o n and raising consciousness, declaring that eating such f o o d is un-Islamic. The i m m i g r a t i o n o f M u s l i m s f r o m the subcontinent since the late 1960s and the g r o w t h o f the Islamist ideology a m o n g i m m i g r a n t s have p u t a great deal o f emphasis o n dietary laws to keep M u s l i m s f r o m m i x i n g socially w i t h n o n - M u s l i m s . I n the U n i t e d States, A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n M u s l i m s have a t r a d i t i o n o f using dietary laws as boundaries around

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the c o m m u n i t y . I n Bradford, England, t w o M u s l i m butchers were f i n e d 3,500 pounds i n 1986 for operating outside the parameters governing the slaughter o f animals. This brought a strong reaction f r o m the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , but w h e n the Bradford Council for Voluntary Services allocated special funds to take care o f the dietary concerns o f M u s l i m s , other people i n the c o m m u n i t y objected. The c o u n c i l proposed that meat sandwiches w o u l d be served o n separate platters and f o o d containing alcohol w o u l d not be served to M u s l i m s . A n ethnic m e n u and halal meat w i l l , whenever possible, be p r o v i d e d by the catering services hired by the council. They also proposed in-service t r a i n i n g i n ethnic cooki n g for all council cooks. W h i l e issues o f diet and proper space for worship and burial are being negotiated and resolved by government institutions, the g r o w i n g public debate concerns the consequences o f the M u s l i m presence for liberal societies i n the West. The focus is most recently on the role o f w o m e n i n Islam, w h o i n Western perception are considered to be oppressed. Such views have been reinforced by televised reports about the treatment o f w o m e n i n revolutionary Iran and in Afghanistan under the rule o f the Taliban and by the vocal rejection o f the universal values for w omanhood as r

p r o m o t e d by the U n i t e d Nations. The issues range f r o m abortion, female genital m u t i l a t i o n , and sexual orientation to wearing the veil. The issue o f w e a r i n g the hi job (headscarf) took o n national significance i n France w hen several female students were banned f r o m w e a r i n g t h e m o n the g r o u n d s that such dress is t a n t a m o u n t to p r o s e l y t i z i n g , a proscribed activity i n the secular schools o f France. The debate that f o l l o w e d i n the French press d w e l l e d o n related issues. Is the hijab a cover f o r the persecution and repression o f w o m e n ?

Is i t the M u s l i m standard raised to challenge the French

Tricolor? Is it a means o f s n u b b i n g a hospitable French society by an ingrate p o p u l a t i o n f l a u n t i n g its reactionary customs i n the m i d s t o f the center o f Western civilization? For M u s l i m s the ban was seen as an a n t i - M u s l i m act because Christians are allowed to wear crucifixes and Jews yarmulkes, b o t h o f w h i c h s h o u l d similarly, u n d e r the circumstances, be i n t e r p r e t e d as acts o f propagating a f a i t h . The issue o f the hijab has surfaced u n d e r different r u b r i c s i n other Western nations. For example, i n Canada feminists c h a m p i o n e d

the

b a n n i n g o f headscarfs, w h i c h they depicted as a s y m b o l o f oppression. Young M u s l i m w o m e n w h o d o n n e d the scarf insisted that it was an act o f obedience to a d i v i n e i n j u n c t i o n and was therefore protected u n d e r f r e e d o m o f r e l i g i o n . Some M u s l i m w o m e n viewed wearing the In jab as an instrument < it liberation f r o m being a sex object. I n the U n i t e d States the C o u n c i l o n A m e r i c a n - I s l a m i c Relations reported that there was a co percent increase i n 1996 i n the n u m b e r o f incidents o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against w o m e n w h o wear the hijab.

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Muslims and Politics in the West Regardless o f their g r o w i n g n u m b e r s i n Europe and N o r t h A m e r i c a , and their increasing wealth i n the U n i t e d States and Canada, M u s l i m s are aware that they have little political power to influence the government, the m e d i a , or the elites i n the West. They have very f e w channels o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n to p o l i c y makers i n the societies i n w h i c h they live. A variety o f factors hamper effective partic­ i p a t i o n i n the political process, i n c l u d i n g the lack o f experience i n participat­ i n g i n political activities, the fear o f the consequences o f political i n v o l v e m e n t , and the lack o f experience i n grassroots organizations or c o a l i t i o n b u i l d i n g . M u s l i m s also lack seasoned leaders and efficient organizations that are able to forge coalitions w i t h other groups to b r i n g about change and to influence leg­ islation. This is generally ascribed to a lack o f experience i n Western-style democracy, w h i c h is based o n c o m p r o m i s e , w h i c h many M u s l i m s believe to be tantamount to abandoning the principles o f justice and t r u t h . There are exter­ nal factors as w e l l ; a m o n g t h e m is their belief that M u s l i m s i n the West are o f t e n shunned by political candidates and parties as a perceived liability, because their participation m i g h t antagonize the Jewish lobby. Democratic presidential can­ didates have t u r n e d d o w n A r a b - A m e r i c a n endorsements for fear o f alienating Jewish support. The issue o f participation i n the political process is n o w being debated w i t h i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . Can a M u s l i m participate i n the r u n n i n g o f a kuffar (unbelievers) society? Should they vote for representatives w h o are accountable to various interests? W o u l d such participation lead to defending the freedom to engage i n things Islamically prohibited? Ali Kettani, a N o r t h African consultant to the Saudi government on M u s l i m m i n o r i t y affairs, has called for Islamic p o l i t ­ ical representation: " O t h e r w i s e , M u s l i m politicians w o u l d be p u t i n office by n o n - M u s l i m forces and w o u l d consequently be used to subjugate the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . " The political interests o f the i m m i g r a n t generation are generally focused o n the countries left b e h i n d . The second generation demonstrates m o r e interest and savvy i n local politics. Younger Muslims i n Britain, for example, are increasingly involved i n British politics. Their interests focus o n antiracist and antideportation organizations. They have also w o r k e d o n campaigns for legisla­ t i o n to a l l o w family reunions and to fight police violence. In B i r m i n g h a m , M u s l i m political participation is mostly aimed at the local level. I n 1982 the first M u s l i m labor representative to the w a r d was elected. The f o l l o w i n g year the n u m b e r increased by t w o , and by 1987 the first M u s l i m w o m a n was elected. Many M u s l i m s i n Britain vote for the Labour Party because many are laborers and w o u l d therefore benefit f r o m the party's programs. I n

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1984 a M u s l i m charter appeared r e c o m m e n d i n g that M u s l i m s vote for those w h o w o u l d support their agenda concerning schools, sex education, M u s l i m personal laws, and provisions for M u s l i m s i n state schools. N o t h i n g came o f i t ; nor has the call for the establishment o f a M u s l i m parliament. I n Britain local authorities r u n social services, h o u s i n g , leisure, and c o m m u n i t y services, public health p r o grams, and economic, urban development, and equal o p p o r t u n i t y programs. Most M u s l i m concerns are tackled o n the local level. I n 1993 there were twelve M u s l i m councilors o f 117 i n B r i t a i n , all members o f the Labour Party. In the Netherlands consultative ethnic m i n o r i t y councils were established i n various areas, especially i n the major cities where immigrants congregate: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague, and Utrecht. The councils are recognized by the authorities as representing the community, thus they have to be consulted o n matters o f interest to minorities. Under the minoriries policy, immigrants were extended new rights in the 1980s that included such matters as providing for proper Islamic burial rites and halal slaughtering o f animals, to the consternation o f animal rights advocates. They were allowed to be employed i n the civil service, except for positions in the police and the armed forces. A l t h o u g h they maintain their foreign citizenship, immigrants were granted the right to vote i n local elections but could not participate i n provincial or national elections. D u r i n g the local elections o f 1986 and 1990, a few foreigners were elected to municipal councds. I n the U n i t e d States initial political activity came as a result o f the Arab-Israeli conflict. A m e r i c a n government support for the state o f Israel, conjoined w i t h a press that is generally considered by M u s l i m s as acting as a gatekeeper suppressi n g any reports that w o u l d show Israeli policies i n a negative l i g h t w i i i l e p r o m o t i n g w h a t is considered a defamation o f Arabs, led to the development o f Arab political action groups. Their activities have generally centered around three areas: p r o v i d i n g accurate i n f o r m a t i o n to the A m e r i c a n p u b l i c about Arab culture, history, and r e l i g i o n ; challenging and correcting the prevalent negative stereotypes o f Arabs and Arab Americans; engaging w i t h U.S. p o l i c y makers w h o seek a m o r e equitable and balanced American policy i n the Arab w o r l d , especially i n regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The American-Arab University Graduates was f o u n d e d i n 1967 by professionals, university professors, lawyers, and doctors, a large n u m b e r o f w h o m had participated i n the Organization o f Arab Students, w h i c h flourished on U.S. campuses i n the late

19COS

and early 1960s. The tar-

geting o f Americans o f Arab background by the N i x o n administration gave the impetus to the f o r m a t i o n o f the National Association o f Arab Americans, organized i n 1972 and m o d e l e d after the pro-Israeli lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Its a i m was to create access to members o f the U.S. Congress and to e x p l a i n the issues f r o m an Arab perspective, w h i l e educating Arab Americans about the political process.

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The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, modeled after the A n t i -

Muslims in the West are

Defamation League o f the B'nai B'rith, was established in 1980 to fight racism,

increasingly beginning to see

prejudice, and discrimination against Arabs in the U n i t e d States. Founded by-

the usefulness of participat-

James Aburezk, a former U.S. senator f r o m South Dakota, it continues to be the largest grassroots Arab organization i n the U n i t e d States, w i t h chapters i n various parts o f the country. Its efforts focus o n issues o f interest to the c o m m u n i t y , f r o m

ing in interfaith dialogue and political activities that promote common causes. In 1988, for example, the

seeking to halt the production and distribution o f movies that vilify Arabs and

Muslim Political Action

Muslims by Walt Disney Productions to helping immigrants unjustly targeted for

Committee hosted the

deportation by the U.S. I m m i g r a t i o n and Naturalization Service. It has sought apologies f r o m television anchor Dan Rather and former secretary o f state Henry Kissinger for defamation and ethnic slurs, filed legal suits to stop certain advertisements that traded o n racist sentiments, and more recently advocated the l i f t ing o f the U.S. ban o n travel to Lebanon and o f the siege o f Iraq. The Arab American Institute (AAI) was established in 1984 by James Zoghby, w h o was active i n Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign i n 1988. Zoghby was appointed as

Reverend pesse Jackson when he ran for President.

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national co-chair o f the campaign and was able to raise $700,000 for Jackson's campaign. The AAI encourages participation i n the political system and is eager to get Arab Americans to r u n for office. The institute establishes D e m i >cratic and Republican clubs i n various parts o f die country. All Arab A m e r i c a n organizations include b o t h Christians and Muslims. I n the 1980s several M u s l i m political action committees were f o r m e d , i n c l u d i n g the A m e r i c a n M u s l i m C o u n c i l , the C o u n c i l for American-Islamic Affairs, and U n i t e d M u s l i m s o f America. Their w o r k generally parallels that o f the Arab A m e r i c a n organizations. They restrict their activities to M u s l i m rather than .Arab concerns and cast a w i d e r net o f interest, i n c l u d i n g the fate o f M u s l i m s i n Cyprus ( K i b r i s ) , Kashmir, Bosnia, Kosovo, Bulgaria, and Somalia, a m o n g other locales. These political action committees have been recognized as representative institutions o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . The leadership has been i n v i t e d to the W h i t e House for Islamic celebrations; they have also cosponsored petitions and issued statements w i t h n o n - M u s l i m political and religious organizations.

The Muslim Presence: Positing a Challenge for the West The M u s l i m presence i n western Europe and the Americas has posited a challenge and raised concerns that need to be addressed by b o t h the i m m i g r a n t s and the host nations. These issues t o u c h o n such social and cultural matters as s h i f t i n g demographics, race, class, r e l i g i o n , and ethnicity and challenge the very premise o f democracy itself, because they i m p i n g e o n areas o f p o w e r sharing, law, e d u cation, and public policy. M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s i n the West are noted for their diversity. Their experiences o f the West vary according to w h a t beliefs, perceptions, and c o n d i t i o n i n g they acquired before their emigration as w e l l as the envir o n m e n t i n t o w h i c h they settled. Their experiences and their responses are c o n d i t i o n e d by the reasons the) chose to emigrate, their educational backg r o u n d , and their social class, as w e l l as the historical relationship between their country o f o r i g i n and the nation i n t o w h i c h they have m o v e d . This relationship is also influenced by die policies o f the host c o u n t r y : whether it welcomes foreigners and grants t h e m citizenship r i g h t s , its perceptions o f Islam, and its national policies governing the relationship between r e l i g i o n and state. M u s l i m identity i n the West is influenced by the dynamic interaction between the variety o f conscious and unconscious perspectives that the i m m i g r a n t brings and the context i n w h i c h he or she settles. It is also the b y - p r o d u c t o f the c o m promises w i t h the host culture that become necessary to lead a coherent life. The i m m i g r a n t ' s perspective is dependent o n the background f r o m wdiich he or she comes, the class, the experience o f social m o b i l i t y , the level o f e d u c a t i o n , whether he or she is a settler, a refugee, or a sojourner. It is also fashioned by the

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political identity and the religious perspective o n w h i c h the i m m i g r a n t was raised. These factors are constantly renegotiated and refashioned i n a society that is perceived and experienced as racist and a n t i - M u s l i m , w i t h certain sectors i n i t engaged or exclusively dedicated to demonize or fan d i s t o r t i o n and fear. It also makes a difference w h e t h e r the i n d i v i d u a l sees h i m s e l f or herself as a b o r n M u s l i m , a born-again M u s l i m , or a convert; or w h e t h e r he or she is defined by ethnic o r i g i n , nationality, place and language o f o r i g i n , and by religious affiliat i o n (Sunni, Shii, A h m a d i , Wahhabi, A l a w i , Druze). A l t h o u g h some M u s l i m s c o n t i n u e to contemplate the o p t i o n o f r e t u r n i n g to their homelands as a safety valve s h o u l d c o n d i t i o n s become intolerable, their c h i l d r e n , b o r n and reared i n the schools o f the West, are caught i n the m i d d l e : The West is their h o m e l a n d . They are b i c u l t u r a l , w i t h an i n t i m a t e experience and k n o w l e d g e o f the West, as w e l l as an i n t i m a t e experience o f their parents' culture as r e m e m b e r e d and reinvented i n the West. For the i m m i grants the struggle to m a i n t a i n their i d e n t i t y and t o preserve i t f r o m disappearing i n t o the Western culture appears to be an o n g o i n g project. They are increasingly challenged and changed, as their c h i l d r e n are b e c o m i n g m o r e i n d i g e n i z e d i n t o Western culture. This has b r o u g h t about n e w interpretations by a few d a r i n g people w h o attempt to be relevant t o the n e w reality i n w h i c h they find themselves. The q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r they can develop a rational means o f m i n o r i t y j u r i s p r u d e n c e to guide t h e i r lives i n the West. I f i t is develo p e d , the next q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r the M u s l i m s i n the m a j o r i t y nations w i l l recognize such j u r i s p r u d e n c e as authentic and v a l i d . M e a n w h i l e , some Western authors have c o n t i n u e d to q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r Muslims are w o r t h y o f citizenship i n a democratic nation or whether their presence w i l l put their particular stamp o n Europe and America, forever changing the West as i t is k n o w n . Some European scholars fear that M u s l i m s ' presence i n a m u l t i c u l t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t w i l l erode Europe's u n i q u e i d e n t i t y and make it s i m ilar to what exists i n the U n i t e d States or Canada. Still others deny that Muslims are a variable that w i l l make a difference i n reshaping Europe. They d o not see any difference i n the impact o f their presence than w h a t has happened i n earlier migrations o f poorer populations, such as the Poles and Italians. It is clear f r o m the shrill tone o f some o f those engaged i n the debate about whether Muslims belong in the West that they are fully aware that M u s l i m s have become p a n and parcel of the West. Still to be addressed is the M u s l i m demand f o r accountability f o r Western i m p e r i a l i s m , as w e l l as the demand that the West come to terms w i t h Islam and recognize its equal status w i t h Christianity and Judaism as a legitimate m o n o t h e istic r e l i g i o n . W i l l the p l u r a l i s m and democratic principles espoused by b o t h Europe and N o r t h America make r o o m for a different culture and allow its m e m -

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Louis Farrakhan, [he current

bers to operate w i t h respect and dignity? Once again, the M u s l i m presence chal-

leader of the Nation of

lenges Europeans not only t o reflect o n their self-assured perceptions o f their l i b -

Islam, has much of the

eralism, p l u r a l i s m , democracy, and tolerance; it has also challenged Europeans to

charisma of Malcolm X {192C-1965), the enormously influential Black Muslim leader. In October 1995

think o f ways that they can guarantee the M u s l i m s f r e e d o m o f r e l i g i o n and the r i g h t to propagate their faith and enjoy the culture o f their choice. M u s l i m s c o n tinue to ask w h e t h e r Western democracies are liberal enough to include Islamic

Farrakhan organized the

input i n t o the national consensus, or w i l l there be an insistence o n a Judeo-

Million Man March on

Christian culture. W i l l Western pluralism or m u l t i c u l t u r a h s m be flexible enough

Washington, D.C.. and hun-

to provide for Islamic i n p u t i n t o the shaping o f the future o f Western society?

dreds of thousands of Muslims and non-Muslims raised their hands in unity on the mall, vowing to renew their commitments to family, community, and personal responsibility.

O r w i l l M u s l i m s continue to be marginalized, ostracized, studied, and evaluated, always judged as lacking, always the " o t h e r " ? Finally, w i l l the juggernaut o f assimilation that has reshaped Europe and N o r t h America i n a long process o f secularization, m o d e r n i z a t i o n , and liberalization be able to reshape M u s l i m s to the extent that they can dissolve i n t o the Western m i x , abandoning their distinctive identities, practices, and cultures? Or w i l l they opt for integration, h o l d i n g o n to their distinctive identities and preferences, at the same time participating i n the political and social life o f their adopted countries, demanding equal rights, and p r o p o r t i o n a l representation as a distinct group? The questions arc not o n l y concerned w i t h what w o u l d happen to the M u s l i m s w h e n

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they choose between assimilation, integration, or separation, b u t , more i m p o r tant, the questions are also concerned w i t h the manner i n w h i c h M u s l i m s ' integ r a t i o n , assimilation, or separation w o u l d affect the fabric o f Western society. W h a t k i n d o f a society w i l l Europe and America become as a consequence o f the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the new m i x o f peoples and cultures w h o a f f i r m a vibrant r e l i g i o n that they insist transcends borders and supersedes all other claims to truth?

CHAPTER

FIFTEEN

Contemporary Islam R E F O R M A T I O N OR R E V O L U T I O N ?

John L. Esposito

The t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y has been one o f the m o s t d y n a m i c , explosive, a n d i n n o v a t i v e i n Islamic history. W i t h i n a span o f a f e w centuries M u s l i m societies have passed f r o m s u b j u g a t i o n t o European i m p e r i a l i s m to n a t i o n a l i n d e pendence, f r o m remnants o f medieval e m p i r e s t o m o d e r n nation-states, f r o m a transnational b u t s o m e w h a t r e g i o n a l l y f i x e d c o m m u n i t y to a g l o b a l c o m m u n i t y n o t o n l y o f M u s l i m - m a j o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s i n A f r i c a , the M i d d l e East, and Asia b u t also o f s i g n i f i c a n t M u s l i m - m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s i n Europe a n d the U n i t e d States.

(Left) The many faces of contemporary Islam include not only the more visible reassertion of Islam in

A t every stage the predictable has p r o v e n unpredictable: m i g h t y European colonial powers were o v e r t h r o w n , artificially d r a w n nation-states emerged and engaged i n nation b u i l d i n g , the desert G u l f sheikhdoms discovered o i l and expe rienced rapid development, a remote and quiescent M u s l i m Southeast Asia has produced an Asian tiger i n Malaysia, and the secular presuppositions and expec-

Muslim politics but also the revitalization of Muslim piety and spirituality.These adherents of the Sufi Naqshbandi order at the Islamic Institute in Cairo

tations o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n theory were swept aside by an Islamic tide that seemed

represent one of the major

to c o m e o u t o f n o w h e r e and challenged m u c h o f the M u s l i m w o r l d , f r o m N o r t h

mystical orders in Islam. Not

Africa to Southeast Asia t o the West.

only did they play an impor-

The h i s t o r y o f c o n t e m p o r a r y Islam is a story o f challenge a n d response, t e n s i o n a n d c o n f l i c t , atavism a n d c r e a t i v i t y o r renaissance, retreat

and

tant role in reformist and anticolonialist movements throughout the Islamic

advancement, r e l i g i o u s and i n t e l l e c t u a l r e t r e n c h m e n t , r e f o r m a t i o n and revo-

world in the past, they also

l u t i o n . It has been d o m i n a t e d by t w o m a j o r struggles: the f i r s t , the wars o f

do so today.

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In the twentieth century

independence at the t u r n o f the t w e n t i e t h century, w h e n m u c h o f the M u s l i m

many of the old stereotypes

w o r l d s t r u g g l e d to free i t s e l f f r o m d o m i n i o n by European p o w e r s ; and the

and assumptions about Islam

second, i n the latter h a l f o f the century, the i n t e r n a l battle over r e l i g i o - c u l t u r a l

and the Islamic lands have been reversed. Mighty European colonial powers

i d e n t i t y and i n t e g r i t y associated w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y Islamic r e v i v a l i s m a n d the reassertion of Islam i n t o p u b l i c life.

have been overturned. This drawing shows the pomp and circumstance surrounding the entry of the Prince of Wales at Baroda during his visit to India.

Islam, European Colonialism, and Modernity: Renewal and Reform The nineteenth and twentieth centuries proved to be a period o f major transform a t i o n i n the history o f Islam: a t i m e o f h u m i l i a t i o n and subjugation, independence and r e v o l u t i o n , revival and r e f o r m . Islamic history had witnessed the emergence o f Islam, its rapid and dynamic expansion, the spawning o f vast Islamic empires and sultanates, and the florescence o f a rich and varied Islamic civilization, but European colonialism seemed to b r i n g it all to a crashing halt. The age o f European expansion, penetration, and dominance (euphemistically called the Age of Discovery by Europeans) began i n the sixteenth century but came to f r u i t i o n i n

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the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the nine¬ teenth century the balance o f power had clearly shifted t o w a r d Europe. European governments (Great Britain, France, Spain, Russia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy) extended their political influence or d o m a i n internationally. The emergence o f the West as a d o m i n a n t global power proved a military, political, economic, and ideological challenge to H i n d u , Buddhist, and M u s l i m societies i n Asia, Africa, and the M i d d l e East. By the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y m u c h o f the M u s l i m w o r l d f o u n d itself subjugated t o European i m p e r i a l powers, demonstrating its p o l i t i c a l , economic, and m i l itary impotence and challenging the veracity o f Islam itself. W h y had Europe (that is, C h r i s t e n d o m ) p r o v e d t r i u m p h a n t ? Was i t the s u p e r i o r i t y o f its science and technology

or o f its r e l i g i o n a n d culture?

Many

M u s l i m s h a d long believed that their historical success and florescence were due to the t r u t h o f their faith and

Major changes to the Middle East in the twentieth century have resulted from the discovery of oil. The first well was drilled at Masjid-i Sulaiman in Iran around 1908. A gusher with wooden derrick was typical of the

mission, b u t w i t h the p o l i t i c a l , economic, and m i l i t a r y

period when precautions taken to control the flow of oil

success o f European i m p e r i a l powers at h a n d , w h a t

were not always adequate.

were M u s l i m s n o w to conclude? For several centuries M u s l i m s i n diverse circumstances had recognized the decline i n their c o m m u n i t i e s as a result o f b o t h internal (domestic) and external ( f o r e i g n ) threats and had i n i t i a t e d various revival and r e f o r m movements. A sense o f c o m m u n i t y disintegration and the c o r r u p t i o n o f " t r u e I s l a m " generated revivalist movements i n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

(Wahhabi,

M a h d i , Fulani, Padri, and others) that stretched across the M u s l i m w o r l d f r o m Africa to Southeast Asia. M u s l i m responses to European colonialism and i m p e r i alism were c o n d i t i o n e d b o t h by the source o f the threat and by Islamic tradition. They ranged f r o m h o l y w a r to e m i g r a t i o n and n o n c o o p e r a t i o n to adaptation and cultural synthesis. Faced w i t h Christian European d o m i n a n c e o f the M u s l i m w o r l d , some M u s l i m s concluded that the only proper responses were those o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d w i i e n he faced o p p o s i t i o n and rejection: to fight (jihad, struggle) i n defense o f Islam or to emigrate (hijra) as M u h a m m a d and his early followers h a d done w h e n they w e n t f r o m Mecca to M e d i n a i n 622 C . E . M i l i t a n t resistance i n Africa, the M i d d l e East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, however, proved i m p o t e n t i n the face o f the European's m o d e r n technology and army weapons. A l t h o u g h e m i g r a t i o n was possible for some, i t proved impractical for many. Some religious leaders counseled cultural isolation, w i t h d r a w a l , and n o n cooperation, to resist the Western threat to their Islamic way o f fife. Others, r a n g -

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ing f r o m secular to Islamic modernists, pursued a path o f a c c o m m o d a t i o n t o harness the West's scientific and technological p o w e r t o revitalize the c o m m u n i t y and to regain independence.

Modernist Responses: The Limits and Legacy of Islamic Modernism For M u s l i m rulers i n the O t t o m a n Empire ( M o r o c c o , Egypt, and I r a n ) , the West's power was based u p o n its superior technology and weapons. These they set o u t to acquire. Their focus was p r i m a r i l y m i l i t a r y and bureaucratic: to create a strong m i l i t a r y and central a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I n the nineteenth and early t w e n t i e t h centuries students were sent to Europe to study languages, science, and politics; European experts were b r o u g h t i n ; translation bureaus and p r i n t i n g presses were i n t r o d u c e d to make technical i n f o r m a t i o n m o r e accessible. This was accompanied by m o d e r n i z a t i o n o f education, law, and the economy. N e w universities and curricula were created a n d m o d e r n c u r r i c u l a were i n t r o d u c e d to a l l o w student to acquire the k n o w l e d g e necessary to m o d e r n i z e . European legal codes became the basis for legal reforms, and Islamic law was restricted to personal status or family law (marriage, divorce, inheritance). M o d e r n economic systems and i n s t i t u t i o n s were established. The state increasingly asserted its r i g h t to regulate and administer religion, creating ministries o f religious affairs and e n d o w m e n t s

(waqf, sg.; awqaf, p i . ) that

attempted to control previously autonomous organizations and institutions, m c l u d i n g Sufi orders, mosques, shariah courts, and religious schools and endowments. Change was mandated by the state and i m p l e m e n t e d f r o m the top by a small political elite. Thus, the m o d ernization process introduced by rulers was not concerned w i t h political liberalization and greater local autonomy but rather w i t h strengthening regime power and control t h r o u g h a m o r e centralized administration and

modernized military

and security

apparatus.

Reform was imposed f r o m above, a t o p - d o w n rather than b o t t o m - u p process, w i t h a n a r r o w base o f support. Issues o f authority, legitimacy, security, and popular participation w o u l d continue to become significant issues Oil is found in many regions of the Middle East. Shaykh Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah is about to turn a silver valve wheel inaugurating the first cargo of crude oil for export from Kuwait on June 30.

1946.

in the contemporary Islamic revival movement. The reformist spirit o f the times was especially evident i n the emergence f r o m Egypt to Southeast Asia o f

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an Islamic m o d e r n i s t m o v e m e n t that called for a " r e f o r m a t i o n " or reinterpreta¬ t i o n (ijtihad) o f Islam. Responding to the p l i g h t o f M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s and the intellectual and religious challenge o f the West, Islamic m o d e r n i s m sought to bridge the gap between conservative religious scholars (olim, sg.; ultima, p i . ) , characterized as c l i n g i n g (taqlid, f o l l o w i n g o r e m u l a t i n g ) b l i n d l y to the past, and the Western-oriented secular elites, regarded as u n c r i t i c a l i n their i m i t a t i o n o f the West and insensitive to Islamic t r a d i t i o n . The ulama's static sanctification o f Islam's classical o r medieval f o r m u l a t i o n and their resistance to change were blamed for the backwardness and p l i g h t o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y . Islamic m o d ernists o f the nineteenth and early t w e n t i e t h centuries, like secular reformers, were o p e n to a c c o m m o d a t i o n and assimilation; they w i s h e d to produce a new synthesis o f Islam w i t h m o d e r n science and learning. Thus, they distanced t h e m selves f r o m the rejectionist tendency o f r e l i g i o u s conservatives

as w e l l as

Western-oriented secular reformers w h o restricted r e l i g i o n to the private life, and they looked to the West to rejuvenate state a n d society. As Europe d u b b e d its age o f i m p e r i a l i s m and conquest an Age o f Discovery, Islamic reformers m i g h t have called their quest o r m i s s i o n one o f "rediscove r y " — r e d i s c o v e r y and r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f the r i g h t f u l place o f reason and science i n the Islamic t r a d i t i o n . They argued that Islam and m o d e r n i t y , revelation and reason, were indeed compatible. I n contrast to earlier seventeenth- and eighteenth-century revivalist movements, w i t h w h i c h they shared the desire f o r renewal and r e f o r m , modernists d i d n o t s i m p l y w i s h to restore the beliefs and practices o f the past. Rather, they asserted the need to reinterpret and reapply the principles and ideals o f Islam to f o r m u l a t e n e w responses to the political, scientific, and cultural challenges o f the West and o f m o d e r n life. Most modernists c o m b i n e d a quest to rejuvenate the Islamic c o m m u n i t y w i t h an anticolonialist agenda, the ultimate goal o f w h i c h was national independence. Jamal a l - D i n a l - A f g h a n i and M u h a m m a d A b d u h pioneered modernist visions a n d agendas i n the M i d d l e East, as d i d Sayyid A h m a d Khan a n d M u h a m m a d Iqbal i n South Asia. Despite some distinctive differences, each argued that Islam was a dynamic, progressive r e l i g i o n that was made stagnant by the forces o f history and the mind-set o f many ulama. They i d e n t i f i e d the sources o f M u s l i m weakness and asserted the c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f religion and reason and science. They reclaimed the glories o f Islamic history, r e m i n d i n g M u s l i m s that a l t h o u g h they were n o w weak, they had once been strong, spawning vast Islamic empires a n d an Islamic c i v i l i z a t i o n whose wonders i n c l u d e d m a j o r achievements i n science, medicine, and philosophy. Reformers set o u t to initiate a r e f o r m a t i o n , to b o l d l y redefine o r reconstruct Islamic belief and t h o u g h t , to r e f o r m Islamic theology and law. At the same t i m e , they emphasized M u s l i m p r i d e , unity, and solidarity to face the p o l i t ical and c u l t u r a l threat o f European c o l o n i a l i s m .

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Jamal a l - D i n al-Afghani (1838-97), b o r n and educated i n Iran and then British India, traveled t h r o u g h o u t m u c h o f the M u s l i m w o r l d and to Europe. A l - A f g h a n i believed that M u s l i m s c o u l d repel European c o l o n i a l i s m not by i g n o r i n g or rejecting the sources o f its strength—science and t e c h n o l o g y — b u t by reclaimi n g and reappropriating reason, science, and technology, w h i c h , he maintained, were integral to Islam and had spawned Islamic c i v i l i z a t i o n . He emphasized that Islam was b o t h a r e l i g i o n and a c i v i l i z a t i o n , an i d e o l o g y that p r o v i d e d the raison d'etre for M u s l i m s b o t h as i n d i v i d u a l s and as a sociopolitical c o m m u n i t y . A l Afghani's critique o f the status q u o , call for m o d e r n reforms, and advocacy o f constitutionalism and parliamentary government to l i m i t the p o w e r o f rulers made h i m popular w i t h many o f the younger educated generation, w h o had traditional u p b r i n g i n g s but were attracted by m o d e r n reforms and calls for national independence. M u h a m m a d A b d u h (1849-1905-), a disciple o f a l - A f g h a n i and a r e f o r m m i n d e d Egyptian religious scholar, differed f r o m the conservative o u t l o o k o f many other ulama. Focusing o n religious r e f o r m , he advocated significant legal, social, and educational change. Thus, A b d u h argued that a l t h o u g h the religious observances o f Islam w*ere i m m u t a b l e , the social aspects o f Islamic law c o u l d be r e f o r m e d i n such areas as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. H e argued that the Quranic ideal was monogamy, not p o l y g a m y ; he supported w o m e n ' s education and m o d e r n i z e d the c u r r i c u l u m at al-Azhar University, a major international center and t r a i n i n g g r o u n d for M u s l i m religious scholars. Sayyid A h m a d Khan (1817-98) surveyed the abysmal state o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n India (defeated, powerless, and demoralized) after the Sepoy M u t i n y o f 1857,

w h i c h resulted i n f o r m a l British colonial r u l e and the end o f

M u s l i m d o m i n a n c e i n the I n d i a n s u b c o n t i n e n t . For A h m a d K h a n , M u s l i m s needed to change the way they saw and responded to the m o d e r n w o r l d ; he devoted his life to religious, educational, and social r e f o r m . Like al-Afghani and A b d u h , he called for a b o l d " n e w t h e o l o g y " or reinterpretation o f Islam and the acceptance, n o t rejection, o f the best i n Western t h o u g h t . H e insisted that he was r e c l a i m i n g "the o r i g i n a l r e l i g i o n o f Islam, w h i c h God and the messenger have disclosed, not that r e l i g i o n w h i c h the ulama and preachers have fashioned." His interpretation o f Islam was g u i d e d by his belief that Islam was compatible w i t h reason and the laws o f nature and therefore i n perfect h a r m o n y w i t h m o d e r n scientific t h o u g h t . The Q u r a n and Sunna o f the Prophet (the customs and practices o f the Prophet that became the example f o r all M u s l i m s ) were interpreted f r o m this perspective. A h m a d Khan was q u i c k to d i s t i n g u i s h between literal and metaphorical or allegorical meanings o f the Q u r a n w h e n addressing issues o f e v o l u t i o n , angels, and miracles. H e called for a critical reassessment o f the hadith (prophetic traditions), challenging their h i s t o r i c i t y and authenticity.

Ci > \ T I M P O R A R Y

İSI \ M

6.( 9

A h m a d Khan c o m b i n e d theory vvith practice, seeking t o i m p l e m e n t his ideas and train a n e w generation o f M u s l i m leaders. His p r o l i f i c w r i t i n g was accom­ panied by his leadership i n many educational reforms: a translation society t o make Western t h o u g h t m o r e accessible, the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f their o w n journals, and the f o r m a t i o n o f the A n g l o - M u h a m m a d a n O r i e n t a l College (later renamed A l i g a r h M u s l i m U n i v e r s i t y ) , w h i c h was m o d e l e d after Cambridge University. M u h a m m a d Iqbal ( 1877-1938), the poet-philosopher o f the I n d i a n subconti­ nent, judged the c o n d i t i o n o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y as one o f five centuries o f " d o g m a t i c s l u m b e r " as a result o f the b l i n d f o l l o w i n g o f t r a d i t i o n , and he called f o r the " r e c o n s t r u c t i o n " o f religious t h o u g h t to revitalize the M u s l i m c o m m u ­ nity. Educated i n England and Germany, where he earned a law degree and a doc­ torate i n philosophy, Iqbal c o m b i n e d m o d e r n Western p h i l o s o p h y (that o f Nietzsche, Bergson, Hegel, and Fichte) w i t h his Islamic t r a d i t i o n and constructed a m o d e r n , d y n a m i c , Islamically i n f o r m e d w o r l d v i e w . Iqbal distinguished between eternal, i m m u t a b l e principles o f Islam (shariah) and those regulations that were the p r o d u c t o f h u m a n interpretation and thus subject to change. I n contrast t o the ulama, w h o m he charged h a d halted the dynamic process that o r i g i n a l l y produced Islamic law and instead were content t o merely perpetuate established traditions, Iqbal believed that M u s l i m s must once again reassert their r i g h t t o reinterpret and reapply Islam t o changing social conditions. H e reinterpreted o r redefined ijtihdd ( i n d i v i d u a l interpretation) and ijma (consensus), suggesting that the r i g h t t o interpret Islam for the c o m m u n i t y be transferred f r o m the ulama t o a national assembly o r legislature. This collec­ tive o r corporate consensus w o u l d then constitute the authoritative consensus o f the c o m m u n i t y . Iqbal a d m i r e d the dynamic spirit, intellectual t r a d i t i o n , and technology o f the West b u t c o n d e m n e d its European c o l o n i a l i s m , the e c o n o m i c e x p l o i t a t i o n o f capitalism, the atheism o f M a r x i s m , and the m o r a l bankruptcy o f secularism. He believed that Islam p r o v i d e d its o w n r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l alternative for M u s l i m soci­ eties, and thus he t u r n e d t o the past t o "rediscover" the principles and values nec­ essary t o reconstruct an Islamic m o d e l f o r m o d e r n M u s l i m society w i t h Islamic versions o f democracy and parliamentary government. Thus, for example. Iqbal concluded that the centrality o f such beliefs as the equality and b r o t h e r h o o d o f believers made democracy a political ideal i n Islam, w h i c h , a l t h o u g h historically unrealized, remained a d u t y for M u s l i m s i n the t w e n t i e t h century. The M u s l i m doctrine o f God's oneness (tanhid, m o n o t h e i s m ) — t h a t is, Allah's role as creator, sustainer, and judge o f the universe—Iqbal believed, i m p l i e d that God's w i l l

o r l a w governed

every

aspect o f life. T h i s , c o m b i n e d

with

M u h a m m a d ' s role as Prophet a n d head o f state, led Iqbal t o m a i n t a i n that the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y is a r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l state governed by Islamic law. It was this

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b e l i e f that led Iqbal to call for an a u t o n o m o u s M u s l i m state or slates i n I n d i a , for w h i c h he came to be regarded as one the founders o f the m o d e r n state o f Pakistan. For some t i m e Islamic m o d e r n i s m remained p r i m a r i l y an intellectual m o v e m e n t a m o n g a small elite sector o f society. Failure t o produce an effective organization or movement w i t h a leadership cadre, systematic

program, and

institutional support

resulted i n the d i f f u s i o n o f the m o d e r n i s t m o v e m e n t i n m a n y directions. Moreover, m o d e r n i s t s were vulnerable t o c r i t i c i s m that their reforms often resulted i n a r e d e f i n i t i o n o f Islam i n l i g h t o f Western criteria and therefore a m o u n t e d to a westernization or Europeanization o f Islam. The legacy o f Islamic modernists, however, was The mosque built by late sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin I I I

substantial, i n f l u e n c i n g the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the

(r. 1950-67) in the lagoon in Brunei is one of the largest in

M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y and its attitude t o w a r d the West.

Asia.The substantial income from oil exports since the 1930s

Their v i s i o n i n s p i r e d M u s l i m

allowed the ruler of this tiny island on the northwest coast

activists f r o m A l g e r i a to Indonesia to emphasize

of Borneo to address the disaffection of his poorer subjects

educational r e f o r m s that i n c o r p o r a t e d a m o d e r n

through an extensive social welfare system and the promotion of Islam.

intellectuals

and

c u r r i c u l u m , legitimated legal and social change, and c o n t r i b u t e d to the f o r m a t i o n o f anticolonial i n d e pendence movements.

Reformers

r e k i n d l e d the

spirit o f M u s l i m unity, solidarity, and autonomy, restored M u s l i m p r i d e i n Islam's intellectual and scientific heritage, and generated m o d e r n ideological i n t e r p r e tations o f Islam that i n c o r p o r a t e d m o d e r n concepts, disciplines, and institutions f r o m textual c r i t i c i s m to nationalism, parliamentary g o v e r n m e n t , and democracy. Thus, Islamic modernists i n t r o d u c e d and r e i n f o r c e d a change-oriented mind-set that rejected the b l i n d f o l l o w i n g o f t r a d i t i o n and accepted the necessity as w e l l as the legitimacy o f reinterpretation and r e f o r m . O f equal significance, these Islamic modernists reasserted the r i g h t o f laity as w e l l as ulama to interpret Islam.

Nationalist Movements and the Emergence of Modern States The first h a l f o f the t w e n t i e t h century was d o m i n a t e d by t w o interrelated issues: nationalism and independence, and the creation o f the m o d e r n state. Between W o r l d Wars I and I I , M u s l i m s increasingly pressed for an end to colonial r u l e . Independence movements sprang u p and i n some places, such as Algeria, l o n g ,

CONTEMPORARY

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6 c i

b l o o d y wars were f o u g h t before achieving autonomy. To v a r y i n g degrees, d e p e n d i n g o n local populations a n d contexts, Islam and M u s l i m i d e n t i t y played a role i n nationalist struggles. I n I r a n the ulama j o i n e d w i t h secular forces a n d pressed for reforms to l i m i t the shah's power. I n the Tobacco Protest (1891-92) they used mosques as sanctuaries for protestors and fatwas (legal o p i n i o n s ) to oppose the selling o f tobacco concessions, fearing that the shah's propensity to sell concessions for railroads, b a n k i n g , and tobacco c o m p r o m i s e d Iran's i n d e pendence by m a k i n g it economically dependent o n Europe. Similar concerns i n f o r m e d o p p o s i t i o n i n the [95,0s to o i l concessions. F r o m 190c

to 1911

the

ulama i n Iran supported a constitutional revolution i n an attempt to circumscribe the shah's power. I n N o r t h A f r i c a , Islamic r e f o r m e r s had been a m o n g the founders and leaders o f early nationalist organizations a n d p o l i t i c a l parties emphasizing resistance to French r u l e a n d the dangers o f cultural assimilation and advocating independence and national i d e n t i t y based o n an Arab-Islamic heritage. Allal al-Fasi led Morocco's Independence party (Istiqlal), A b d al-Aziz T h a l b i was a f o u n d e r o f Tunisia's Constitutional party (Destour), a n d A b d a l H a m i d Ben Badis organized the Association o f Algerian Ulama. I n the I n d i a n subcontinent the M u s l i m League used Islamic symbols and M u s l i m nationalism as the ideological t o o l i n m o b i l i z i n g support for its d e m a n d for a separate M u s l i m h o m e l a n d , Pakistan. Both the f o r m a t i o n o f m o d e r n states and independence movements i n the M u s l i m w o r l d were the products o f European colonialism whose legacy had p r o f o u n d l o n g - t e r m negative consequences. Colonial powers, c o n t r o l l i n g or i n f l u encing the selection o f leaders, configured and reconfigured the borders o f many countries, and created other countries such as Jordan. The breakup o f the O t t o m a n Empire, the creation by Great Britain and France o f mandate countries i n the M i d d l e East ( i n c l u d i n g Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and K u w a i t ) , the division o f South Asia i n t o India and Pakistan, and the division o f Southeast Asia i n t o Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Indonesia are examples o f an often-calculated attempt to create states that w o u l d foster o r at least n o t threaten European interests. Similarly, the first kings o f Jordan, Syria, and Iraq were defeated and displaced Hashimites o f the Hejaz (what is n o w western Saudi Arabia). The result was the image o f a m i l i t a n t , imperialist West, whose artificially d r a w n states u n d e r m i n e d M u s l i m u n i t y and whose appointed or approved rulers had little legitimacy. The creation o f the Jewish state o f Israel was viewed as the placement o f a Western colony i n the M i d d l e East, f u r t h e r u n d e r m i n i n g M u s l i m unity. This legacy w o u l d continue to have p r o f o u n d effects t h r o u g h contemporary times. By the

19COS

most M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s had gained independence, a l t h o u g h

i t w o u l d n o t be u n t i l 1962 that Algeria d i d so. M o d e r n state f o r m a t i o n varied c o n siderably. The end result was a varied spectrum o f patterns. At one end, Mustafa

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Kemal ( k n o w n as Ataturk, "Father o f the Turks") established a t h o r o u g h l y secular state, f o r m a l l y e n d i n g the caliphate, suppressing or m a r g i n a l i z i n g religious institutions, and replacing t h e m w i t h European-based laws and institutions. At the other e n d , Saudi Arabia was created as a self-styled Islamic state, w i t h the Q u r a n as its c o n s t i t u t i o n and the shariah its law. The vast m a j o r i t y o f states fell somewhere i n between these t w o poles. They became " M u s l i m states" i n that the m a j o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n was M u s l i m , and they incorporated Islamic provisions, such as the requirement that the head o f state be a M u s l i m and that there be some reference to the shariah as a source o f law. Many M u s l i m states, such as Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, t u r n e d to Western models o f political, legal, economic, and educational d e v e l o p m e n t . I m p l i c i t i n t h e i r developm e n t was the p r e v a i l i n g p a r a d i g m that equated m o d e r n i z a t i o n w i t h the progressive westernization and secularization

of

societies. A l t h o u g h the late decades o f the t w e n t i e t h century were characterized by the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f Islamic activist movements, their patriarchs a n d m o d e l s were t o be f o u n d i n the 1930s and 1940s. Two remarkable i n d i v i d u a l s established m a j o r Islamic movements i n the M i d d l e East and South Asia d u r i n g this p e r i o d . Hasan al-Banna i n Egypt and Mawlana A b u l Ala M a w d u d i i n India seized the banner o f Islam to create the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d and the Jamaat-iIslami (Islamic Society) respectively. Both were critical o f Western

secular-oriented

elites, the r i g i d conservatism o f the ulama, a n d the " w e s t e r n i z e d I s l a m " o f Islamic modernists. I n contrast to earlier Islamic modernists, they c h a m p i o n e d the self-sufficiency

o f Islam and were far m o r e critical

o f the West. Islam, they asserted, was a selfsufficient

alternative

capitalism,

Mustafa Kemal, commonly known as Ataturk, "Father of

M a n d s n i i

the Turks," established a thoroughly secular state in ^ , . , , ., , . ,? , Turkey i n 1922. He is shown here with his wire seated beside him in a Western-style portrait, taken the year

i n particular w r o t e prolihcally, attempting ' delineate a comprehensive Islamic sys-

TT

after

the establishment of the Turkish republic.

m

d

s o c i a l i s m

r

1

.

to A b u l

A

b

Mawdudi r

0

t o

tern, encompassing

such topics as Islam

CONTEMPORARY

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6cj

and government, nationalism, democracy, economics, r e v o l u t i o n , w o m e n , and the family. In contrast to Islamic modernists, al-Banna and A b u l Ala M a w d u d i emphasized organizational development to i m p l e m e n t their visions o f an Islamic state and society. A l t h o u g h they have been d u b b e d "fundamentalists" and equated w i t h a retrogressive v i s i o n , they were i n fact m o d e r n i n their o r i e n t a t i o n and organizat i o n . Both m e n w i s h e d neither to escape n o r to r e i m p l e m e n t a seventh-century past; they d i d n o t w a n t to reject m o d e r n science and technology. Rather, al-Banna and A b u l Ala M a w d u d i sought to reapply Islamic doctrine and values to the c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d and thus respond to the challenge

o f m o d e r n i t y . They

denounced the westernization and secularization o f M u s l i m societies. A l t h o u g h bitter opponents o f the W e s t — f r o m European colonialism and secular nationalism to the cultural penetration o f the West—they d i d not reject but rather valued m o d e r n science and education. Many members o f the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d and the Tamaat-i-Islami were m o d e r n professionals (teachers and university p r o fessors, physicians, lawyers, scientists, engineers) w h o established m o d e r n i n s t i tutions (schools, clinics, cottage industries, p r i n t i n g presses, p u b l i s h i n g houses) and used m o d e r n technology. Both the M u s l i m Brotherhood and the Jamaat shared a c o m m o n ideological w o r l d v i e w : First, w as the belief that Islam was a comprehensive way o f life and that the u n i o n o f religion and the state (din vva dawk) was the God-ordained Islamic ideal. Second, the separation o f r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s , a Western

secular

artifact

adopted by M u s l i m societies, was

the cause o f

Muslim

decline. T h i r d , restoration o f the u n i t y and a u t o n o m y o f M u s l i m societies r e q u i r e d a r e t u r n to " t r u e I s l a m " and thus i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the shariah,

the

blueprint for

Islamic society. Finally, this Islamic r e v o l u t i o n was the required struggle o f all true Muslims.

The

Muslim

B r o t h e r h o o d and the Jamaat

The University of Riyadh. Saudi Arabia, was founded by Saud I I I ibn

d i f f e r e d i n their organiza-

Abd al-Aziz (r. 1952-64). It is one of many universities and other insti-

t i o n a l approaches,

however.

The B r o t h e r h o o d was a p o p -

tutions founded by Muslim rulers in the twentieth century to overcome the perceived technical and financial superiority of the West and modernize education, law, and the economy.

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ulisi m o v e m e n t that recruited f r o m all sectors o f society, w h i l e the Jamaat took a m o r e elitist path, seeking t o attract and train a n e w leadership cadre: m o d e r n , educated, but Islamically o r i e n t e d m e n . W h i l e the B r o t h e r h o o d espoused a bott o m - u p approach, the Jamaat's was t o p - d o w n . The desire t o t r a n s f o r m society invariably led t o involvement i n politics and confrontation w i t h the state. Activists and authoritarian regimes accused each other o f instigating violence. Activists were arrested and their organizations suppressed. Al-Banna was assassinated i n 1949, and some M u s l i m Brotherhood leaders w h o i n the face o f state repression espoused a m o r e n h l i t a n t revolutionary path were executed, i m p r i s o n e d , o r d r i v e n u n d e r g r o u n d i n Egypt under the Arab president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-70) i n the 1960s. By the end o f the 1960s most believed that the Brotherhood had been successfully suppressed. The 1970s and 1980s w o u l d witness its resurrection, however, and the extent to w h i c h violence and repression radicalized many w h o became the founders o f radical, violent revolutionary movements. A l t h o u g h Abul Ala M a w d u d i was condemned t o death and at times the Jamaat was threatened w i t h suppression, the Jamaat was able to participate w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l system m o r e freely than the Brotherhood, and as a result it d i d n o t experience the same degree o f alienation and radicalization. Liberal and r e g i o n a l n a t i o n a l i s m and socialism w e r e the p r e d o m i n a n t i d e ologies o f n e w l y emergent M u s l i m states. Nationalist ideologies based o n c o m m o n t e r r i t o r y , history, and language became typical means f o r n e w regimes and rulers t o create a c o m m o n i d e n t i t y and m o b i l i z e p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . T h o u g h p r e d o m i n a n t l y secular i n o r i e n t a t i o n , ideologues o f t e n f o u n d i t necessary t o assert some l i n k ( h i s t o r i c a l , r e l i g i o u s , o r l i n g u i s t i c ) w i t h t h e i r Islamic past. By the late 1960s, Arab nationalism and socialism had become the p r e d o m i nant i d e o l o g y ushering i n a n u m b e r o f revolutionary regimes i n Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. I n time they w o u l d prove vulnerable, however. The case o f Nasser, the enormously popular Egyptian leader, is particularly instructive. Nasser was part o f a m i l i t a r y c o u p against the government o f K i n g Farouk. A l t h o u g h supported by the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d , Nasser crushed its expectation that v i c t o r y w o u l d usher i n an Islamic government, o p t i n g instead f o r a m o r e secular socialist o r i e n t a t i o n . W h e n a frustrated B r o t h e r h o o d engaged i n active o p p o s i t i o n , Nasser m o v e d q u i c k l y t o contain and repress it. V i o l e n t clashes and assassin a t i o n attempts o c c u r r e d i n 1954 a n d 196c. Thousands

were arrested a n d

B r o t h e r h o o d leaders—among t h e m the m i l i t a n t ideologue o f Islamic revolution, Sayyid Q u t b ( 1 9 0 6 - 6 6 ) — w e r e executed. By the late 1960s Islamic critics at h o m e ( c h i e f a m o n g t h e m the M u s l i m Brotherhood) and Saudi Arabian policy abroad led Nasser t o seek Ms o w n brand o f Islamic legitimacy. He nationalized Cairo's al-Azhar University, the venerable bastion o f o r t h o d o x y and training g r o u n d for Muslims all over the w o r l d . He created a j o u r n a l , The Pulpit of Islam, w h i c h featured p r o m i n e n t religious scholars and

CONTEMPORARY

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intellectuals w h o legitimated Nasser's Arab socialism i n the name o f Islam. Nasser's Arab socialist-popuhst critique o f Saudi Arabia a n d other G u l f monarchies as feudal was countered by Prince (later K i n g ) Faisal's developm e n t o f a p o l i c y that emphasized Saudi Arabia's regional and global Islamic leadership. The Saudi government countered Nasser's appeal t o Arab socialism w i t h a pan-Islamic ideology diat i n c o r p o rated Arab nationalism and appealed t o the entire Islamic c o m m u n i t y (urnmah), declaring themselves the patrons o f Islam and custodians o f the holy cities o f Mecca and Medina. Nasser'sArab nationalism and socialism were condemned as "un-Islamic." By the late 1960s and early 1970s events t h r o u g h out m u c h o f the M u s l i m w o r l d reinforced a sense o f the failure o f m a n y m o d e r n M u s l i m states and societies. The Israeli rout o f the c o m b i n e d Arab forces o f Egypt, Syria, and Jordan i n the 1967 Six-Day War, accompanied by the massive Arab loss o f t e r r i t o r y (Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem), was devastating. B o t h secularists and Islamists reeled f r o m the shock and apparent utter impotence o f the A r a b - M u s l i m w o r l d i n w h a t came to be called "the catastrophe." Fought i n the name o f Arab nationali s m and socialism, the disastrous defeat discredited Arab nationalism, i n f l a m e d passions against Israel and A m e r i c a n n e o i m p e r i a l i s m (given America's p r o m i n e n t role i n the creation o f Israel and its substantial support d u r i n g the 1967 w a r ) , and served as Colonel Gamal Abd al-Nfasser came to power in Egypt in 1952

a p r i m a r y catalyst for an Islamic resurgence. The loss o f Jerusalem stunned the M u s l i m w o r l d a n d assured

that h e n c e f o r t h the l i b e r a t i o n o f

as part of a military coup against the government of the profligate King Farouk. Nasser's socialist orientation

transformed

his erstwhile allies, the Muslim Brotherhood, into militant

Palestine and Jerusalem were global Islamic issues.

opposition. Nasser and the Brotherhood became locked in a

Similar signs o f f a i l u r e — t h e Pakistan-Bangladesh

round of violent confrontations.

c i v i l w a r o f 1971

(which witnessed

the secession

of

East Pakistan, n o w Bangladesh, and the fadure o f M u s l i m nationalism, Pakistan's f o u n d i n g i d e o l o g y ) , the Lebanese c i v i l w a r o f the m i d - 1970s, and Malay-Chinese riots i n Kuala L u m p u r i n 1969—signaled the military, political, economic, a n d cultural failures o f M u s l i m societies and c o m m u n i t i e s . Lebanon, whose capital Beirut was p o p u l a r l y called the "Paris o f the M i d d l e East," was t o r n by a c i v i l w a r

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i n the m i d - 1970s that shattered the mosaic o f a Christian-doniinated confessional state (a nation o f Christian, M u s l i m , and Druze c o m m u n i t i e s ) . Disenchantment w i t h the "failures" resulting f r o m f o l l o w i n g the West ( b o t h its models o f development and its role as an ally) produced an i d e n t i t y crisis, characterized by a quest f o r a m o r e i n d i g e n o u s , authentic identity o n w h i c h t o base national d e v e l o p m e n t . F r o m Cairo t o Kuala L u m p u r , M u s l i m societies i m b u e d w i t h a r i c h Islamically i n f o r m e d cultural heritage experienced a revival that saw a greater emphasis o n their Islamic identity, history, culture, and values. Islam h a d always been present i n these societies. However, the secular d r i f t o f many societies seemed reversed as Islam became m o r e p r o m i n e n t and visible i n personal and p u b l i c life. In many ways the Iranian revolution o f 1978-79 was die denning m o m e n t that signaled and symbolized f o r many the contemporary resurgence o f Islam. For a Western w o r l d and modernizing elites i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , blinded to the resurgence o f Islam i n M u s l i m politics by a secular predisposition and definition o f m o d ernization, the specter o f Iran's Islamic revolution was unthinkable. That a m i g h t y shah o f Iran, w i t h oil wealth, formidable military and security forces, and Western support, could be toppled by a popular revolution led by the Ayatollah Ruhollah K h o m e i n i ( 1 9 0 0 - 8 9 ) , at that time exded in France, seemed impossible. Subsequent events reinforced fears o f a militant radical Islamic resurgence, popularly referred to as "Islamic fundamentalism."

Political Islam Islam reemerged as a potent global force t h r o u g h o u t the 1970s and 1980s. M u c h o f its impact i n the 1970s went unnoticed, however. It was the Iranian revolution that shattered the secular bias and expectations o f modernization and development theories and cast a light o n the significant changes that had already been taking place i n many M u s l i m societies throughout the 1970s. Ironically, its most potent manifestations o f the Islamic resurgence, both i n the 1970s and i n later decades, occurred i n those societies regarded as the most " m o d e r n " o r m o d e r n i z i n g , those possessing a well-trained, Western-oriented, secular elite: Iran, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Turkey, and Algeria. F r o m Cairo t o Kuala L u m p u r , the resurgence o f Islam manifested itself i n personal and public life, i n piety and politics. Many became m o r e religiously observant i n prayer, fasting, dress, a n d behavior. Greater emphasis o n piety a n d spirituality were also reflected i n the revitalization o f Sufism—Islamic m y s t i c i s m — b o t h w i t h i n the M u s l i m countries and abroad. M a j o r Sufi leaders and such orders as t h e Naqshbandi were t o be f o u n d not o n l y i n M u s l i m countries f r o m Egypt t o China but also i n Europe and the U n i t e d States, w h e r e they c o n tinue t o f u n c t i o n as effective missionaries o f Islam. At the same t i m e , govern-

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merits and o p p o s i t i o n i n countries as diverse as Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia increasingly appealed to Islam to enhance their legitimacy and m o b i lize popular support. Islamic ideology, rhetoric, symbols, actors, p o l i t i c a l parties, and organizations became p r o m i n e n t fixtures i n M u s l i m politics and society. Libya's M u a m m a r Qaddafi and Sudan's Jafar N u m a y r i seized power i n the late 1960s; they d i d so i n the name o f the Arab socialism o f Nasser, w h o m they a d m i r e d . By the early 1970s, w i t h the discrediting o f Arab socialism after the 1967 w a r and Nasser's death i n 1970, b o t h Qaddafi and N u m a y r i t u r n e d to Islam to buttress their Arab nationalism, legitimate their seizure o f power, and broaden their base o f s u p p o r t . Each r e i n f o r c e d his Islamic i d e n t i t y and image. B o t h e m p l o y e d a heavy does o f Islamic rhetoric and p o s t u r i n g . N u m a y r i published Why the Islamic Way, a n d Qaddafi issued his Green Book, in w h i c h he delineated his " T h i r d Way" or Islamic alternative to Western capitalism and Soviet M a r x i s m . Both i n t r o d u c e d Islamic laws, regulations, and taxes. Their interpretations o f Islam domestically and internationally varied significantly, however, i n f l u e n c e d by their distinctive personalities, local experiences (domestic policies), and international ambitions. N u m a y r i , having been betrayed by Sudan's c o m m u n i s t party, i n c o r p o r a t e d the p h i l o s o p h i e s o f Hasan Turabi (leader o f Sudan's M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d ) i n t o his government and assumed an a n t i c o m m u n i s t , pro-Western profile. He became an A m e r i c a n ally and the o n l y major Arab leader n o t to break relations w i t h Egypt over than President A n w a r Sadat's s i g n i n g o f the Camp David Accords. I n contrast, Qaddafi c h a m p i o n e d a radical populist-socialist message and played an international audience m o r e effectively. H e denounced the conservative monarchies o f the Arab w o r l d , used Libya's abundant o i l revenues and the draw o f Islam to compete w i t h Saudi Arabia for influence and leadership 7

i n the Arab and broader Islamic w o r l d , and supported revolutionary movements internationally f r o m Ireland's I r i s h Republic A r m y to the southern Philippines's M o r o N a t i o n a l Liberation Front. Similarly, w h e n Sadat (1918-81) succeeded the charismatic and e n o r m o u s l y p o p u l a r Nasser, he used Islam to enhance his legitimacy, distance h i m s e l f f r o m the left, and garner popular s u p p o r t . Sadat appropriated the title "the Believer president," relied o n a heavy use o f Quranic references and Islamic symbols i n speeches and at public gatherings, and cast the 1973 Arab-Israeli w a r as a j i h a d . H e attempted to co-opt Islamic organizations; for example, he p e r m i t t e d the o u t lawed and i m p r i s o n e d M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d , suppressed by Nasser, to f u n c t i o n i n society and fostered the g r o w t h o f Islamic student organizations o n u n i v e r sity campuses to b l u n t the p o w e r o f Nasserites and leftists. Pakistan's Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928—79), a secular socialist w h o came to power after the 1971 civil war w h e n Pakistan splii into Pakistan and Bangladesh, turned to Islam to strengthen ties w i t h the o d - r i c h states o f the Arabian G u l f and to counter his Islamic critics ( i n particular, the Jamaat-i-Islami). Under President Bhutto,

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The Afghan civil war continued after the Soviet withdrawal in February 1988. Here, a group of mujahideen (Muslim militias) rest during a lull in the heavy fighting with government troops over the city of Jalalabad, which was a vital link in the black-market arms trade from Peshawar, Pakistan, through the Kunar valley to Afghan guerrillas.

Pakistan became a host t o numerous international Islamic conferences. Legislation was introduced t o restrict alcohol use, g a m b l i n g , and the frequenting o f n i g h t clubs, as well as to l o w e r bank interest and to impose Islamic taxes (zakah and ushr). Bhutto renamed o r "Islamized" his secular socialism, calling it the equality o f the Prophet. Reflecting the g r o w i n g Islamic climate, i n 1974 Pakistan hosted an international Islamic conference at the Badshahi mosque, one o f the great mosques o f South Asia, at w h i c h Qaddafi preached and Sadat attempted to mediate between Pakistan and Bangladesh i n the name o f their c o m m o n Islamic brotherhood. During the 1970s and 1980s Islam proved an effective source for opposition and popular protest i n such countries as han, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, as well as i n Egypt and Lebanon. I t was used to legitimate the overthrow o f the shall o f han and o f President Bhutto o f Pakistan, as well as to legitimate the i m p o s i t i o n o f Islamic forms o f government by the Ayatollah Khomeini and clergy o f h a n , General M o h a m m a d Zia-ul-Haq (1924-88) and the army i n Pakistan, and the Taliban i n Afghanistan. Islamic symbols, slogans, ideology, religious leaders, organizations, and i n s t i tutions played i m p o r t a n t roles i n the organization and mass m o b i l i z a t i o n o f p o p ular support f r o m diverse sectors o f society. I n Iran clerical and lay leaders such as the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i and A l i Shariati (1933-77) became the p r i m a r y ideologues o f a popular r e v o l u t i o n that b r o u g h t together clergy, intellectuals, stu-

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dents, journalists, and m e n and w o m e n f r o m diverse classes, professional backgrounds, and p o l i t i c a l positions under the banner o f Islam. In Pakistan, Bhutto's appeals to Islam so incensed religious and secular leaders and parlies that a broad-based o p p o s i t i o n , the Pakistan N a t i o n a l Alliance, representing a cross section o f the p o l i t i c a l spectrum, m o b i l i z e d under the banner o f Islam, p r o m i s i n g an Islamic system (nizom-i-islom) o f government. The l i b e r a t i o n o f Afghanistan f r o m Soviet occupation i n 1979 d i d not b r i n g peace to this w a r - t o r n country. The struggle o f brave A f g h a n mujohidcen ( M u s l i m militias) against the occupation o f their country by an "atheist" Soviet army had captured the support and sympathies o f many i n the West and the M u s l i m w o r l d alike. I n contrast to the West's fear o f the Islamic resurgence or "Islamic f u n d a m e n t a l i s m " i n I r a n and the M i d d l e East, Afghanistan's M u s l i m m i l i t i a s were seen as f r e e d o m fighters whose jihad received substantial aid f r o m the U n i t e d States, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. The m u j a h i d e e n v i c t o r y d i d not b r i n g peace, however. The c o m m o n Islamic identity that had served to m o b i l i z e and inspire, to u n i f y the m i l i t i a s i n their j i h a d against the Soviet U n i o n , was n o w eclipsed by Afghanistan's age-old tribal, ethnic, and religious d i f f e r ences and rivalries, p r i m a r i l y between the Sunni and Shiite branches o f Islam. Afghanistan, a predominantiy Sunni country, had enjoyed a fragile unity, offset by the realities o f its multiethnic tribal society (Pathans, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Persian-speaki n g Shiites i n the west). The leadership vacuum created by the Soviet defeat n o w unleashed a factional power struggle. Having driven out the Soviets i n 1989 and defeated the c o m munist regime o f Najibullah i n Kabul i n 1992, the mujahideen Islamic government then fell prey to a bloody internal power struggle as mujahideen leaders (or perhaps more accurately, warlords) vied for supremacy, resulting i n more deaths and devastation than its liberation had cost. Two major groups came to the f o r e f r o n t : H i z b - i - I s l a m i , led by Gulbudeen Hekmatyar, and Jamaat-i-Islami, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. M u c h o f Afghanistan, i n c l u d i n g Kabul, was caught i n the rivalry and crossfire between these t w o groups. After almost eighteen years o f c i v i l w a r i n Afghanistan, a seemingly endless state o f carnage and chaos was abruptly reversed. As i f o u t o f n o w h e r e , a band o f students (toliban) f r o m the miidrcisas (colleges whose p r i m a r y purpose is die teaching o f Islamic law and related religions subjects) appeared i n late 1994 and w i t h i n t w o years swept across the country. D e n o u n c i n g all the warlords and representing no

A In Afghanistan, the Taliban government requires women to wear a full veil that allows them to see only through a screened area in front of their eyes.

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ouiside interests, they claimed the mantle o f m o r a l leadership as representatives o f the Afghan m a j o r i t y w h o were victims o f the internecine warfare. A l t h o u g h i n i tially portrayed as y o u n g students f r o m the madrasas w i t h n o rmlitary backg r o u n d , i n fact they were a force o f mullahs and taliban, religious leaders and students. The mullahs were p r i m a r i l y veterans o f the Afghan-Soviet war w h o had returned t o the madrasas after the Soviets' departure. Their leader, M u l l a h Omar, reflected this older generation. M u l l a h Omar had been a student o f Islam before j o i n i n g M o h a m m a d N a b i M o h a m m a d i ' s Islamic R e v o l u t i o n a r y M o v e m e n t (Harakat-i-inqilabi-i-Islami). D u r i n g the 1980s O m a r f o u g h t against the Soviet occupation, losing an eye and b e c o m i n g deputy c o m m a n d e r o f the movement. I n 1994 he launched the Taliban campaign to restore stability and order and to establish an Islamic state. Because little was k n o w n about the Taliban and they were portrayed simply as y o u n g students f r o m religious schools, inexperienced i n w a r fare and p o o r l y armed, they were initially not taken seriously. I n t i m e they proved to be a formidable force, however, feared by warlords but embraced by ordinary citizens, w h o captured Kabul and controlled three-fourths o f the country. A l t h o u g h initially hailed as liberators w h o secured t o w n s , made the streets safe, and cleaned u p c o r r u p t i o n and graft, the Taliban's strict f o r m o f Islam soon became an issue f o r some. The Taliban subscribed to a very conservative, p u r i tanical interpretation o f Islam. Their doctrines are close t o those o f Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi r e l i g i o u s establishment

and Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Is!ami.

As Sunni

M u s l i m s , they denounced their Shiite o p p o s i t i o n as infidels. W h e n they captured the A f g h a n capital Kabul after a two-year battle, the Taliban not o n l y restored law and order but also sought to create or impose a m o r a l shariah-governed society, m a n d a t i n g their brand o f Islamic r e f o r m . They segregated the sexes outside the h o m e , closed girls' schools, r e q u i r e d that w o m e n be f u l l y covered i n p u b l i c , and banned w o m e n f r o m the workplace. They also banned television, cinema, and music, ordered m e n t o g r o w beards and pray five times a day, and i n t r o d u c e d the hudud punishments ( p u n i s h m e n t s for certain crimes as prescribed b y the Q u r a n and h a d i t h , such as a m p u t a t i o n for theft, death for murder, stoning for adultery). In Egypt, after i n i t i a l periods o f support, b o t h the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d and the Islamic student organization (the Gamaa Islamiyya) became m o r e vocal i n their criticisms o f the Sadat government d u r i n g the late 1970s. Radical underg r o u n d groups w i t h such names as M u h a m m a d ' s Y o u t h , Takfir wal H i j r a , and Islamic Jihad, c o m m i t t e d t o the o v e r t h r o w o f the Sadat government and the i m p o s i t i o n o f an Islamic government, sprouted and began their guerilla w a r against the regime, g o v e r n m e n t officials, m i n o r i t i e s , and other M u s l i m s . I n 1981 Sadat, a N o b e l p r i z e w i n n e r f o r his negotiated peace (the Camp David Accords) w i t h Israel's p r i m e m i n i s t e r Menachem Begin (1913-92), was assassinated by the m i l i t a n t g r o u p Islamic Jihad. In Lebanon demographic changes prompted Muslims, both Sunni and Shhte, to

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1

call for a redistribution o f power i n a state whose political system had been based o n the proportional representation o f Lebanon religious communities (Christian, Sunni M u s l i m , Shiite M u s l i m , and Druze, i n that order). A p r o m i n e n t Shiite leader. I m a m Musa Sadr, established the Movement for die Dispossessed (and subsequently its militia, AMAL, Lebanese Resistance Battalions). In the aftermath o f die Iranian revo l u t i o n , the hanian-inspired, -trained, and -funded Hi/.boliah (Party o f God) undertook its militant struggle w i t h the Israeli occupation and the Christian (especially Maronite) dominance o f Lebanon. I n b o t h cases—AMAL and Hizbollah—Shiite belief and ritual were reinterpreted, though not h i precisely the same ways, to supp o r t social and political movements o f protest and r e f o r m . For Hizbollah the goal was the creauon o f an Islamic state. For A M A L the object was a more equitable redist r i b u t i o n o f political and economic power w i t h i n Lebanon's mulliconfessional state.

Anatomy of a Revolution: The Islamic Republic of Iran Iran captured the headlines and imaginations o f many t h r o u g h o u t the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West, so m u c h so that many w o u l d come to view Islam and Islamic revivalism t h r o u g h die lens o f the Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran. A seemingly m o d e r n , enlightened, and invincible shah was o v e r t h r o w n by a movement led by an ayatollah i n exile i n France. Intellectuals, merchants (bazaaris), students, and j o u r nalists as w e l l as clergy mobilized under the banner o f Islam. Islam was not o n l y a rallying cry for its supporters but also a symbol o f protest for all w h o opposed the shall, whatever their political or religious beliefs. Islamic symbols, rhetoric, and institutions provided the infrastructure for organization, protest, and m o b i lization o f a coalition o f forces calling for r e f o r m and i n the end f o r r e v o l u t i o n . Iran seemed a textbook candidate for successful m o d e r n i z a t i o n and developm e n t , the most u n l i k e l y prospect for r e v o l u t i o n . O u t w a r d l y , the goal o f the W h i t e Revolution, the a m b i t i o u s m o d e r n i z a t i o n p r o g r a m o f Shah M o h a m m a d Reza Pahlavi (1919-80), was to b r i n g Iran i n t o the t w e n t i e t h century w i t h i n a matter o f decades. O i l wealth, the best equipped military i n the M i d d l e East ( w i t h the exception o f Israel), close tics w i t h the U n i t e d Stales, Europe, and even Israel, and a w e l l - t r a i n e d elite c o n t r i b u t e d to the image o f Iran, i n the w o r d s o f U.S. President J i m m y Carter, as " a n island o f stability" i n the M i d d l e East. Beneath the surface, however, was g r o w i n g discontent. A l t h o u g h the shah's m o d e r n i z a t i o n p r o g r a m d i d improve the l o t o f many, the benefits o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n tended t o favor disproportionately a m i n o r i t y of m o d e r n elites and urban centers. Economic, educational, and m i l i t a r y reforms were n o t accompanied by political liberalization. Traditional merchants (bazaaris) and religious leaders (ulama), l o n g m u t u a l l y supportive and connected t h r o u g h m a r riage and business relationships, were alienated by the shall's religious and econ o m i c reforms. State control o f religious affairs ( t h r o u g h the courts, endowments.

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and education) and a tilt toward Western markets and the corporate sector threatened their interests, authority, and power. M a n y m o d e r n , educated academics, professionals, and journalists increasingly expressed concerns over the excessive dependence o f Iran o n the West (economically and m i l i t a r i l y ) , w i t h its negative religio-cullural impact. Some m o d e r n , Western-educated intellectuals like Jalal al¬ e - A h m a d and A l i Shariati spoke o f the dangers o f "Westoxification," an excessive dependence o n the West that threatened to r o b Iranians o f their independence and cultural identity. These were issues that resonated across many sectors o f society. Early i n his r u l e , the shah w o r k e d o u t a tacit agreement and a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h m a n y o f Iran's leading clerics. H o w e v e r , some clerics, like R u h o l i a h K h o m e i n i (later the ayatollah) f r o m Q u m , exiled first to Iraq and later France, were less c o m p l i a n t . I n the mid-1970s, as the voices o f discontent increased, gov-

By the 1970s in Iran, there was widespread discontent with the authoritarian rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Shiite Islam offered the broadest basis for a mass movement, and many people united to support Ayatollah Khomeini, as in this demonstration in Tehran in February 1979.

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e m i n e n t security forces m o v e d q u i c k l y to contain and repress m o u n t i n g o p p o sition. By the late 1970s, w i t h widespread suppression o f dissident intellectuals, politicians, journalists, liberal nationalists, socialists, and Marxists, Shiite Islam (Iran's religious and cultural heritage and therefore the r e l i g i o n o f most Iranians) offered the most i n d i g e n o u s broad-based basis f o r a mass m o v e m e n t . Shiite Islam p r o v i d e d a c o m m o n set o f symbols, historic identity, and v a l u e s — an i n d i g e n o u s , n o n - W e s t e r n alternative. Shiite belief p r o v i d e d the basis f o r an ideological f r a m e w o r k for o p p o s i t i o n and protest against oppression and injustice. Clerical and lay intellectuals, such as the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i and Ali Shariati, reap propria ted Shiite history, beliefs, and rituals to support and sustain r e l i giously legitimated o p p o s i t i o n to the shah's regime. After an early revolutionary history, Shiite Islam had developed doctrines that enabled i t to survive and coexist in a Sunni-dominated w o r l d . N o w reformers t u r n e d to Shiite Islam's early revo l u t i o n a r y p e r i o d as a base f o r their r e f o r m i s t and r e v o l u t i o n a r y ideology. M e m o r i e s o f a persecuted, dispossessed, and d i s i n h e r i t e d remnant's struggle and m a r t y r d o m took o n m o d e r n meanings. The paradigmatic Shiite event—the mart y r d o m o f the caliph Ali's righteous son al-Husayn (the Prophet's grandson) by the forces o f the " e v i l " Sunni Umayyad r u l e r Yazid at the battle o f Karbala i n 680—was n o w likened to the oppression and injustice i n f l i c t e d u n d e r the shah, the new Yazid. The m u l l a h mosque n e t w o r k enabled the clergy and Iran's t h o u sands o f mosques to serve as centers for organization, propaganda ( d i s t r i b u t i o n o f audiotapes and flyers), and m o b i l i z a t i o n . A l t h o u g h the o p p o s i t i o n u n i t e d u n d e r the u m b r e l l a o f Islam i n a c o m m o n p u r p o s e — o p p o s i t i o n to the shah and the desire f o r a m o r e independent, i n d i g e nously rooted m o d e r n i t y — i t encompassed heterogeneous political and religious groups. They ranged f r o m secularists to Islamic activists, f r o m liberal democrats to Marxists. Similar differences existed a m o n g the clergy and senior ayatollahs, as w o u l d later b e c o m e m o r e evident. N o w h e r e was the d i v i s i o n

among

Islamically o r i e n t e d activists m o r e p r o n o u n c e d than i n the t w o most p r o m i n e n t ideologies o f the r e v o l u t i o n : the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i , a traditionally madrasatrained cleric, and A l i Shariati, w h o c o m b i n e d a traditional religious education w i t h a Sorbonne doctorate. A l t h o u g h banners d e p i c t i n g each were juxtaposed i n many homes and i n protest marches, their interpretations o f Islamic identity and ideology were i n fact quite different. K h o m e i n i , a m e m b e r o f Iran's Shiite r e l i gious hierarchy, p r i v i l e g e d ulama leadership and t r a d i t i o n ; A l i Shariati called for a b o l d reinterpretation o f Shiite Islam to recapture its early revolutionary message. He c r i t i c i z e d the religious establishment f o r its a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h the state ( w h a t he called Safavid Islam) and its betrayal o f the true m e a n i n g and legacy o f early Shiism ( A l i d Islam) w i t h its radical c o m m i t m e n t to social justice. The r e v o l u t i o n o f 1978—79 b r o u g h t together a diverse cross section o f lay and clerical leadership, social and economic classes, political parties, and guerilla

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groups. W i t h the passing o f their c o m m o n enemy, the shah, differences o f v i s i o n and ideology ( b o t h religious and socioeconomic)

surfaced almost i m m e d i a t e l y

after the r e v o l u t i o n . The struggle between moderates and militants became evident. Rather t h a n r e t u r n i n g to t h e i r mosques and madrasas, the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i and many o f his clerical disciples m o v e d q u i c k l y to consolidate their power and c o n t r o l o f government. The Islamic Republic's first p r i m e minister, M e h d i Bazargan,

and president, A b o l Hasan

Bani-Sadr. a l t h o u g h i n i t i a l l y

approved by Ayatollah K h o m e i n i , were d r i v e n f r o m office. Bazargan resigned i n N o v e m b e r 1979

and Bani-Sadr fled Iran after being impeached i n 1981.

The

ulama consolidated their power and set about f u l f i l l i n g the t w i n goals o f i n s t i tutionalization and export o f the r e v o l u t i o n . The n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the Islamic Republic was a m i x t u r e o f m o d e r n Western and Shiite religious institutions that incorporated m o d e r n political language and such institutions as those o f a republic, parliamentary government, o r the executive, legislative, and j u d i c i a l branches. The o v e r r i d i n g concept o f state, however, was the n o t i o n o f government by the ftiqih or legal expert (wilayut al-faqth, guardianship o r rule by the jurist). W h i l e many, i n c l u d i n g moderate or liberal intellectuals and ulama, expected the ulama to r e t u r n to their mosques and schools and at best advise the government o n Islamic matters. K h o m e i n i and the bulk o f more m i l i t a n t and conservative ulama believed i n a clerically g u i d e d state. At the apex o f government it was the Ay atollah K h o m e i n i , the supreme authori t y assisted by other clergy, w h o d o m i n a t e d the branches o f government and its organizations i n a clerical state or theocracy. Voices o f dissent, lay and clerical, were i n t i m i d a t e d or s i l e n c e d — f r o m secularists a n d leftists to Islamically o r i e n t e d intellectuals such as Bazargan and Bani-Sadr. Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, an early protégé o f the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i w h o had h e l d a n u m b e r o f senior government positions i n c l u d i n g foreign minister, was executed f o r an alleged plot to assassinate K h o m e i n i . Dissident clergy, i n particular those w h o refused to accept K h o m e i n i ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Islam, w h i c h had y i e l d e d his d o c t r i n e o f " r u l e by the j u r i s t , " were h o u n d e d and harassed by f e l l o w clerics. Many were silenced; the Ayatollah M u h a m m a d Kazem Shariatmadari, a senior ayatollah revered for his k n o w l e d g e and piety, was even defrocked i n

1982.

Institutionalization o f the r e v o l u t i o n at h o m e was accompanied by its export abroad. The p r o m o t i o n and spread o f Islam and Iran's "Islamic r e v o l u t i o n " was a foreign policy goal o f the K h o m e i n i government, explicitly stated i n the exhortation o f Iran's c o n s t i t u t i o n : " t o perpetuate the r e v o l u t i o n b o t h at h o m e and abroad." Both preaching and propagation o f the faith (throxigh d i s t r i b u t i o n o f publications, conferences, and f u n d i n g o f religious institutions abroad)

were

c o m b i n e d w i t h c o n f r o n t a t i o n a n d a r m e d s t r u g g l e . At the same t i m e , the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i and other government officials, as w e l l as Iran's radio broad-

CONTEMPORARY

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66c

cast "Voice o f the Islamic R e v o l u t i o n , " called o n the M u s l i m s of the G u l f and t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d to rise u p and o v e r t h r o w "oppressive, u n - I s l a m i c " governments. G u l f states were c o n d e m n e d because o f the nature o f their govern ments ( m o n a r c h y was dismissed as " u n - I s l a m i c " ) and because o f their close ties w i t h America, w h i c h was often referred to as " A m e r i c a n I s l a m , " that is, o f f e r i n g a f o r m o f Islam acceptable to the West. In Iran, as t i m e passed political and ideological divisions deepened not o n l y between those w h o were f o r and against the r e v o l u t i o n but also a m o n g supporters o f the revolution. Differences o f religious i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and class interests d i v i d e d rather than u n i t e d the Islamic Republic's debate over economic and social r e f o r m . The m a j o r i t y o f the parliament favored a social r e v o l u t i o n that i n c l u d e d state c o n t r o l o f the economy and controls o n the private sector and free enterprise, to improve the c o n d i t i o n o f the urban poor, farmers, and villagers. Merchants, w h o had been m a j o r financial supporters o f the r e v o l u t i o n , and landowners, i n c l u d i n g many clerics, strongly opposed these measures and l o b bied senior clerics. The C o u n c i l of Guardians, clerical experts o n Islamic law w h o d e t e r m i n e d whether legislation was Islamically acceptable, consistently blocked such legislation. The Ayatollah K h o m e i n i , w h o c o u l d have broken these deadlocks, chose not to intervene. D u r i n g the p o s t - K h o m e i n i p e r i o d economic policy and ideological differences c o n t i n u e d to affect Iran's development. Ineffective economic policies fed g r o w i n g discontent and d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t , leading many to look back l o n g i n g l y to the relative prosperity o f the shah's rule. Iran's Islamic i d e n t i t y seemed m o r e w r a p p e d u p i n debates over w o m e n ' s dress and conduct i n society than i n i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f effective political and economic policies. Yet, despite w h a t some v i e w e d as Iran's r i g i d " f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , " w i t h i n the state's ideological l i m i t s and controls Iran d i d conduct parliamentary and local elections; w o m e n were able to f u n c t i o n i n society ( t o vote and h o l d elected office, t o w o r k , t o p u b l i s h magazines that advocated women's r i g h t s issues); and strong differences o f o p i n i o n were debated i n parliament and i n the press. This stood i n sharp contrast to the m o r e restrictive policies o f many o f Iran's G u l f neighbors. The 1980s were d o m i n a t e d by fears o f "radical Islamic f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , " the spread o f Iran's Islamic revolution, o r the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f extremist u n d e r g r o u n d m i l i t a n t organizations bent on destabilizing and t o p p l i n g entrenched governments. Both M u s l i m andWestern governments feared a d o m i n o effect, the spread o f revolutionary Islam leading to " o t h e r Irans." The fear seemed verified by events: eruptions i n Saudi Arabia's o i l - r i c h eastern province, w h i c h w as heavilyr

populated by its Shiitc m i n o r i t y ; disturbances i n Kuwait and Bahrain; Iran's significant support for militant Shiism i n Lebanon, such as H i z b o l l a h (Party o f G o d ) and Islamic Jihad; and the attempt by K h o m e i n i t o t u r n the Iran-Iraq w a r i n t o a jihad and m o b i l i z e a revolt by Iraqi Shiites. At the same time, m i l i t a n t groups like

666

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Islamic Jihad and H i z b o l l a h were responsible f o r the assassination o f the Egy ptian president Sadat i n 1981 and a rash o f hijackings across the M i d d l e East and i n South Asia. For a secular-oriented West the specter o f the spread o f revolutionary Islam seemed b o t h retrogressive and a threat to Western allies and interests ( o d and trade). The reality was i n fact far m o r e complex. Iran proved far m o r e effective as a source o f i n s p i r a t i o n rather than e m u l a t i o n . There were n o Iranian-inspired or - f u n d e d revolutions. Shiite disturbances d i d n o t lead to the fall o f governments. K h o m e i n i was n o t able to m o b i l i z e the Iraqi Shiites i n a w a r i n w h i c h ancient rivalries (Arab versus Persian), and m o d e r n Iraqi and Arab nationalism In the 1980s many governments, both Muslim and

proved stronger than c o m m o n religious affiliation. Indeed, even after the defeat o f Iraq i n the G u l f War i n M a r c h 1991, the Iranians d i d n o t h i n g to encourage the

Western, feared that Iran's

emergence o f a Shiite republic in the south o f a devastated Iraq. Moreover, as t i m e

Islamic revolution would

passed, the failures and excesses o f the Iranian government became a source o f

spread. Their worst fears

disillusionment to many o f its initial admirers.

were realized in the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, and Ayatollah Khomeini's

As a result, few noticed or distinguished between the violent extremists w h o w i s h e d to seize power a n d populist p o l i t i c a l and social movements that quietly

attempt to mobilize a revolt

p u r s u e d change f r o m below, f r o m w i t h i n t h e i r societies, like the M u s l i m

by Iraqi Shiites against

B r o t h e r h o o d s o f Egypt and Jordan, the Islamic Tendency M o v e m e n t

Saddam Hussein.

renamed H i z b al-Nahda, the Renaissance Party o r Ennahda), the Jamiy ai al-Islah

(later

CONTEMPORARY

İSI.AM

667

( R e f o r m Society) i n K u w a i t , the Jamaat-i-Islami i n Pakistan or A B I M and PAS i n Malaysia, and the Jamat al-Nasr (Society for V i c t o r y ) i n N i g e r i a .

Islam and Democracy By the late 1980s and 1990s the t w o faces o f Islamic activism became evident: ( 1 ) anti-Western

radical

revolutionary

governments

(in

Iran,

Sudan,

and

Afghanistan) and movements ( j i h a d groups i n the M i d d l e East and the Gamaa Islamiyya i n Cairo, f o r example), seeking to o v e r t h r o w regimes i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , and ( 2 ) a host o f Islamic movements f u n c t i o n i n g w i t h i n mainstream society to foster social and political change. F r o m Egypt to Indonesia, Islamic movements and organizations created alter­ native educational, medical, legal, and social services (schools, clinics, hospitals, y o u t h centers, and legal aid societies, for example), p u b l i s h i n g houses, and finan­ cial institutions. Islamists held p r o m i n e n t positions and participated i n profes­ sional associations and unions. I n countries and areas w i t h large populations and p o o r economies ( i n w h i c h there was often poverty, h i g h u n e m p l o y m e n t , and a lack o f adequate h o u s i n g and social services)—such as Egypt, Algeria, the West Bank and Gaza, a n d Indonesia—Islamically motivated educational,

economic,

and social welfare institutions (many t h o u g h not all Islamist i n orientation) p r o ­ vided an alternative to state services, w h i c h were o f t e n inadequate, too expensive, or nonexistent. Regimes regarded t h e m as an i m p l i c i t critique o f the state's fail­ ure to provide for its citizens. For example, w h e n earthquakes devastated parts o f Egypt and Algeria, it was the Islamists (the M u s l i m Brotherhood and the Islamic Salvation Front), n o t the state, that were the first o n the scene, p r o v i d i n g needed relief. A n embarrassed and somewhat threatened Egyptian government under President H o s n i Mubarak subsequently banned nongovernmental organizations f r o m responding t o such disasters. Social activism has always been part o f the r e d e f i n i t i o n o f the n o t i o n o f davva, the call to Islam. W h i l e the p r i m a r y d e f i n i t i o n o f dawa has been o f preaching and spreading God's w o r d and c o m m u n i t y (calling all to " t h e straight p a t h " o f Islam), i t has also i n c l u d e d the call to M u s l i m s to return to Islam, to become m o r e religiously observant. To these understandings has been added the i n s t i t u t i o n a l ­ ization o f Islam's teaching that M u s l i m s are socially responsible and accountable. The Islamic r e q u i r e m e n t to p r o m o t e social justice has been coupled w i t h the v i e w o f Islam as a total way o f life and provided the rationale for the g r o w t h o f social welfare agencies or organizations, the creation o f organizations that relate the r e l i g i o n o f Islam to the needs o f society. The social welfare organizations dis­ cussed above are k n o w n as Islamic call societies, as are the m y r i a d o f relief agen­ cies that have been created for Palestine, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Afghanistan. The t e r m has also been p o l i t i c i z e d by governments as w e l l as o p p o s i t i o n movements.

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Libya's Jamiyyat al-Dawa has served as a f o r e i g n p o l i c y t o o l , disseminating Qaddafi's religious and political ideas and p r o v i d i n g funds for schools, mosques, and hospitals. The Iraqi Islamic call society H i z b al-Dawa al-Islamiya was founded i n o p p o s i t i o n t o m i l i t a r y and political leader Saddam Hussein's r u l e . A notable sign o f the mainstrearning o f Islamic revivalism o r activism was the emergence o f Islamists as leaders i n professional associations and trade unions. Their presence underscored the extent to w h i c h the strength o f Islamic revivali s m was n o t s i m p l y due t o its attractiveness t o the p o o r and uneducated b u t i n fact to a m o d e r n educated but Islamically o r i e n t e d elite. The strength o f Islamists i n professional associations o f physicians, lawyers, engineers, journalists, a n d teachers reflected the extent t o w h i c h M u s l i m societies n o w had an alternative sector o f society alongside the traditional Islamic and m o d e r n Western-oriented sectors, and an alternative elite t o the Western secular elite. As the Soviet U n i o n a n d eastern Europe were swept along by the wave o f democratization i n 1989—90, the M i d d l e East a n d the broader M u s l i m w o r l d showed signs o f modest change i n response t o political unrest i n Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, M o r o c c o , a n d Pakistan. A l t h o u g h some M u s l i m radicals, hke secular nationalist radicals, rejected any f o r m o f parliamentary democracy as westernizing and i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h Islam and local M u s l i m traditions, many, i f n o t most, Islamic intellectuals and activists t r i e d t o c o m e t o terms w i t h the idea and the process. Islamic movements i n Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Pakistan chose t o f u n c t i o n w i t h i n the political system and participate i n electoral politics. The m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m countries have been r u l e d by a u t h o r i t a r i a n governments buttressed by m i l i t a r y a n d security forces. Few rulers have held elective office; most have been kings or m i l i t a r y or e x - m i l i t a r y officers. W h e r e parliaments a n d political parties have existed, they have generally remained s u b o r d i nated to the r u l i n g government or party. W h i l e some M u s l i m countries, such as Pakistan and Turkey, have held elections, the m i l i t a r y have also h a d significant influence o n pohtics. I n the late 1980s and early 1990s several m a j o r events l e d to an o p e n i n g o f the political system, ushering i n political liberalization a n d democratization. A m o n g the most i m p o r t a n t were n u m e r o u s e c o n o m i c crises and " f o o d r i o t s , " the fall o f the Soviet U n i o n a n d liberation o f eastern Europe, and the G u l f War. Countries as diverse as Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Algeria responded by o p e n i n g their political systems, enabling Islamists t o participate i n electoral politics. To the surprise o f many, Islamists and Islamic parties emerged as the leading o p p o s i t i o n i n Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan. I n Algeria they seemed poised t o come t o power. In Pakistan opposition t o Zia u l - H a q i n the 1980s had been coorchnated i n the Movement for the Restoration o f Democracy, w h i c h included secular as w e l l as r e l i gious (Islamic) parties. I n October

1990 elections Zia ul-Haq's democratically

CONTEMPORARY

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669

elected successor, Benazir Bhutto, was defeated by a coalition that

took

the

name

the

Islamic

Democratic

Alliance.

T h r o u g h o u t this p e r i o d such groups as the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamiyyat U l a m a - i Pakistan, and the Jamiyyat U l a m a - i Islam called for the restoration o f democracy and participated i n national and provincial elections. Egypt and Jordan, l o n g regarded as having moderate p r o Western governments, i n t r o d u c e d p o l i t i c a l reforms to alleviate the g r o w i n g o p p o s i t i o n due to deteriorating e c o n o m i c conditions and h i g h u n e m p l o y m e n t and to defuse the threat o f " f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . " B o t h c o u n t r i e s attempted to keep Islamic moderates separated f r o m militants—-a k i n d o f cont a i n m e n t p o l i c y — a n d to avoid radicalization.

President

Mubarak o f Egypt distinguished m o r e sharply than his pre-

Islam has been effective in mobilizing opposition

decessor, A n w a r Sadat, between p o l i t i c a l dissent and direct

and popular protest against governments. In 1977

challenges t o the state's authority. Islamic groups such as the

General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq deposed Zulfikar

M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d were a l l o w e d to participate i n p o l i t i -

Ali Bhutto, a secular socialist, with the support of

cal and e c o n o m i c life and to express t h e n criticism o f gov-

the Jamaat al-Islam; he then instituted an Islamic

e r n m e n t policies. As early as 1941,

form of government.

the B r o t h e r h o o d h a d

accepted p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n electoral p o l i t i c s . Six

Brothers

( i n c l u d i n g Hasan al-Banna, its f o u n d e r ) contested the parliamentary election o f 1945. but n o n e was successful i n an election that was seen by many as c o r r u p t . F r o m the r e v o l u t i o n i n

1952

to the post-Sadat p e r i o d i n the

1980s, the

B r o t h e r h o o d either boycotted elections or, m o r e o f t e n , was p r o h i b i t e d f r o m o p e r a t i n g o p e n l y as a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . I n 1984,

however, w h e n the

B r o t h e r h o o d was allowed to contest parliamentary elections, a l t h o u g h n o t as a political party, i t f o r m e d an alliance w i t h the N e w W a f d party and w o n twelve seats. I n 1987 i t created an "Islamic alliance" w i t h the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberals a n d increased its parliamentary strength to t h i r t y - t w o seats. I n Jordan, K i n g Hussein i n i t i a t e d a process o f political r e f o r m i n N o v e m b e r 1989, f o l l o w i n g serious r i o t i n g i n A p r i l o f that year after government-announced increases i n the price o f major c o m m o d i t i e s . Parliamentary elections were h e l d for the first t i m e i n t w e n t y - t w o years. Islamic candidates, c a m p a i g n i n g w i t h slogans such as "the Q u r a n is o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n " and " I s l a m is the s o l u t i o n , " scored an upset,

taking t h i r t y - t w o

o f eighty

parliamentary

seats. The

Muslim

B r o t h e r h o o d w o n t w e n t y seats, w h i l e twelve went t o other Islamic candidates. The B r o t h e r h o o d also d i d w e l l i n local elections. I n 1990 i t w o n n i n e o f ten seats i n a local c o u n c i l election i n Zarqa, the second largest t o w n i n Jordan, and f o u r o f nine scats i n m u n i c i p a l elections i n Rusaifah. I n January 1991, given its parl i a m e n t a r y s t r e n g t h , the B r o t h e r h o o d received five cabinet

positions—the

M i n i s t r i e s o f Education, Religious A f f a i r s , Justice, Social D e v e l o p m e n t , a n d

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Health. Moreover, a M u s l i m Brother was elected speaker o f the parliament. Islamic organizations i n Tunisia a n d Algeria j o i n e d w i t h their f e l l o w citizens d u r i n g the 1980s i n pressing f o r a

m u l t i p a r t y system

a n d representative

elections.

Governments i n b o t h countries h a d a record o f r i g o r ously c o n t r o l l i n g Islamic movements. H a b i b Bourguiba's thirty-year r e i g n as president i n Tunisia was characterized by a Western secular o r i e n t a t i o n that excluded r e l i g i o n f r o m p u b l i c life. I n the 1980s he i m p r i s o n e d and threatened

t o execute

leaders

o f the Islamic

Tendency

M o v e m e n t . After seizing p o w e r f r o m Bourguiba i n 1987, Z e i n A b i d i n e Ben A l i , the p r i m e m i n i s t e r o f Tunisia, p r o m i s e d democratization and h e l d parliamentary elections i n A p r i l 1989. However, despite the fact that the Islamic Tendency

M o v e m e n t r e n a m e d itself H i z b a l -

Nahda (the Renaissance Party) to c o m p l y w i t h Ben Ali's insistence that n o single g r o u p should m o n o p o l i z e the c l a i m t o be Islamic, the government d i d n o t p e r m i t i t to participate as a legal p o l i t i c a l party. H i g h i n f l a t i o n , g r o w ing u n e m p l o y m e n t , a n d increased poverty proved t o be critical issues. Islamic candidates w o n 14. c percent o f the vote n a t i o n w i d e and a s t u n n i n g 30 percent i n such cities Most Muslim rulers in the twentieth century have been kings or military or ex-military officers, like

as Tunis, Gabes, and Sousse. I n N o v e m b e r 1989 Ben A l i reneged o n his earlier promises t o recognize H i z b a l -

King Hussein of Jordan, shown here just before leav-

Nahda as a p o l i t i c a l party, a n n o u n c i n g that he w o u l d n o t

ing Amman i n 1970. In 1989, after riots in response to

allow any party t o c o m b i n e r e l i g i o n and politics. The

reported increases in the price of major commodities.

M i n i s t r y o f Education r e i n t r o d u c e d a decree f r o m the

Hussein instituted political reforms, and parliamentary elections were held for the first time in twentytwo years.

B o u r g u i b a p e r i o d that banned the w e a r i n g o f Islamic headdress b y w o m e n i n schools a n d offices.

Student

demonstrations, strikes, i m p r i s o n m e n t o f H i z b al-Nahda leaders, and the closing d o w n o f its newspaper, al-Fajr, signaled the onslaught o f the regime's attempt t o destroy the group. The Tunisian government's shift t o a m o r e hardline policy t o w a r d Islamic activists was influenced by events i n Algeria. I n what had long been regarded the most m o n o h t h i c , single-party political system i n the Arab w o r l d (dominated by the National Liberation Front, or FLN), President Chedli Ben Jadid introduced greater political pluralism f o l l o w i n g the bloody antigovernment riots i n October 1988. This included recognition o f the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Isiamique d u Salut, FIS), N o r t h Africa's first legal Islamic political party, led by Ali Abbasi al-Madani. The

C O N T E M P O R A R Y

I S L A M

67

I

government o f Ben Jadid, faced w i t h such intractable economic difficulties as a 2c percent u n e m p l o y m e n t level, foreign debt o f some S20 b i l l i o n , and f o o d shortages, felt constrained to concede these reforms. Islamic groups flourished as Algerian state socialism failed to resolve the c o u n try's social a n d e c o n o m i c problems. The FIS, w i t h a national organization and an effective mosque a n d social welfare n e t w o r k , emerged as the largest Islamic party and one o f the strongest o p p o s i t i o n parties. I n the June 1991 m u n i c i p a l elections, the first m u l t i p a r t y elect i o n i n Algeria since independence i n 1962,

the FIS

scored a s t u n n i n g victory, capturing 54 percent o f the vole, w h i l e the FLN garnered 34 percent. This success was partly explained by the boycott o f t w o m a i n o p p o s i t i o n parties and by a v o t i n g abstention rate o f r o u g h l y 4 0 percent. But also c o n t r i b u t i n g to the FIS v i c t o r y was an electoral system that allowed husbands to vote by p r o x y for their wives and that awarded 51 percent o f the seats o n a c o u n c i l to w h i c h e v e r g r o u p secured

the

largest n u m b e r o f votes. The FIS w o n a m a j o r i t y o f votes i n all the m a j o r cities: 64 percent i n A l g i e r s , 71 percent i n O r a n , and 72 percent i n Constantine. The Algerian government m o v e d q u i c k l y to discredit a n d c o n t a i n the FIS victory. Funds to FIS-controllcd municipalities were cut o f f to l i m i t their effectiveness i n office, scheduled p a r l i a m e n t a r y elections were postp o n e d , FIS leadership fal-Madani a n d A l i Belhadj, a p o p ular A l g e r i a n preacher) were i m p r i s o n e d , and v o t i n g districts were redrawri to favor the FLN i n f u t u r e parliamentary elections. W i t h these measures i n place and w i t h n o access to an FLN-controlled media, the defeat o f the FIS i n parliamentary elections appeared assured. O n December 26, 1991, Algeria held the first m u l t i party parliamentary elections i n its thirty-five-year history. W i t h .5-9 percent o f eligible voters casting ballots, the FIS scored another victory i n the first o f t w o rounds. It

Ali Abbasi al-Madani (b. 1931) is leader and official spokesman of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Saint, FIS), the first legal Islamic

w o n 48 percent o f the vote, 188 o f 231 parliamentary

political party in North Africa. A professor at the

seats, twenty-three votes short o f a majority. The FLN f i n -

University of Algiers with a doctorate from the

ished w i t h sixteen seats. I n t w o government-controlled

University of London, he became active in the 1980s

democratic elections, the FIS had w o n and n o w seemed poised to control the parliament, w i t h an expected vict o r y i n the second r o u n d o f elections scheduled for

during the clashes between the state and Islamic students and was a founding member of the FIS. Following the FIS victory in the June 1991 municipal elections, he was arrested by the government and remains in prison.

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T H E O X F O R D HISTORY O F ISLAM

January 16,

1992.

O n January 12 the Algerian m i l i t a r y i n a de facto coup seized power to prevent the FIS f r o m w i r m i n g their democratic victory. Their rationale was that the FIS was an antidemocratic " r a d i c a l " Islamic m o v e m e n t that w o u l d use the ballot box to "seize" power. Once i n power, it was asserted, the FIS w o u l d hijack democracy, taking c o n t r o l o f the government. The Algerian m i l i t a r y ' s message, a i m e d i n part at the West, was unmistakable and c o u l d be encapsulated as f o l l o w s : "The governments i n power are w o r t h preserving. For n o matter w h a t their shortcomings, r a n g i n g f r o m political exclusion to severe h u m a n rights violations, they f o r m the o n l y barrier against fanatics w h o w a n t to c o n f r o n t the West." A c c o r d i n g to this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , local f o r m s o f a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m are regrettable, but they are the only road t o w a r d Western-style political p l u r a l i s m . The m i l i t a r y takeover was f o l l o w e d by a m o v e to suppress the FIS, w h i c h precipitated a v i r t u a l civil war i n w h i c h m o r e than seventy-five thousand Algerians ( i n a c o u n t r y o f t w e n t y - n i n e m i l l i o n ) lost their lives. The m i l i t a r y and security forces m o v e d quickly, arresting FIS leaders and i m p r i s o n i n g m o r e than

fifteen

thousand members i n detention camps, closing d o w n their institutions, and seizi n g their properties and funds. As government repression and violence m o u n t e d . Islamists responded b o t h defensively and offensively. The military's c r a c k d o w n saw many i n the FIS move f r o m a nonviolent legal o p p o s i t i o n to a combative, and i n some cases revolutionary movement. The FIS split i n t o a moderate g r o u p and a more m i l i t a n t w i n g , the Islamic Salvation A r m y . The spiral o f government and Islamist violence and counterviolence swept across Algeria's cities and countryside as the battle raged between government security forces and those i n the FIS w h o f o r m e d their o w n m i l i t i a , the Islamic Salvation Army. Moreover, b o t h the security forces and the Islamists also spawned radical m i l i t i a s , the m i l i t a r y ' s eradicateurs and the A r m e d Islamic G r o u p (GIA). A n extremist guerrilla g r o u p , the GIA, rejected any attempt at a p o l i t i c a l solution or c o m p r o m i s e , demanded an Islamic state, w a g e d a w a r ( j i h a d ) o f t e r r o r i s m against all opponents ( p r o - g o v e r n m e n t , Islamist, or n o n c o m m i t t e d ) . Like other radical movements i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , the G I A d i v i d e d their w o r l d i n t o " t r u e believers" (those w h o fully accepted their views and agenda) and unbelievers (kafirs), M u s l i m and n o n - M u s l i m alike. They c o n d e m n e d the FIS for its moderat i o n and k i l l e d m i l i t a r y and civilians ( i n c l u d i n g leading secularists, journalists, and schoolchildren), combatants and noncombatants alike. For rulers i n the Gulf, response to the strength and threat o f Islamic political activism was complicated by the fact that many o f t h e m were Sunni rulers w i t h significant Shiite populations. I n Kuwait, for example, a l t h o u g h the regime had attempted to enhance its legitimacy by p e r m i t t i n g parliamentary elections since

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1963, the e m i r t w i t e dissolved the National Assembly, i n 1976 and 1986, i n the

The conflict between gov-

face o f open c r i t i c i s m o f government action. W h e n Islamists and other political

ernment and Islamists has

g r o u p s d e m a n d e d r e i n s t i t u t i o n o f the N a t i o n a l Assembly, the

government

responded w i t h a c r a c k d o w n o n pro-democracy leaders and permanently disbanded the National Assembly. In the p o s t - G u l f War p e r i o d , Kuwait's r u l i n g al-

been particularly violent in Algeria. The imprisonment of many leaders of the Islamic opposition has

Sabah dynasty, overseeing the country's reconstruction, faced increasing demands

spawned extreme guerrilla

for " d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n . " The G u l f War strengthened

and

groups that have provoked

impelled Kuwait's Islamists, as the m a j o r i t y o f citizens, to rally behind the gov-

the government to equally

e r n m e n t — a p o s i t i o n that c o n t r i b u t e d to their c r e d i b i l i t y i n p o s t - G u l f War par-

violent reactions.

sectarian relations

liamentary elections i n 1992. Islamists w o n 2c percent o f the vote, h o l d i n g eight to ten seats i n parliament, w i t h a total o f eighteen deputies backed by Islamic groups. A l t h o u g h these Islamists s u p p o r t e d i n p r i n c i p l e the a p p l i c a t i o n o f shariah, what that meant for each i n reality differed markedly. The Saudis for many years assiduously avoided the creation o f a parliamentary body. In times o f crisis kings often promised one, but they d i d not introduce such a body. In 1962, on the heels o f considerable internal unrest. C r o w n Prince Faisal promised the p r o m u l g a t i o n of a Constitution that w o u l d allow the creation o f

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The spiraling violence in

regional and national assemblies. Shortly after the seizure o f the Grand Mosque o f

Algeria's cities and country-

Mecca by a group o f militants in November 1979, C r o w n Prince Fahd announced

side has caused many deaths

a "basic law o f governance," w h i c h w o u l d include provision for a consultative

on both sides. Women in Ait Said village in the Kabylie region mourn at the funeral of a young militiaman.

assembly (majlis al-shura). To rally popular support at h o m e i n its w a r w i t h Iraq i n 1990-91. the House o f Saud i n November 1990 again promised a consultative assembly whose members w o u l d be appointed by the k i n g ; there was n o i n t e n t i o n to introduce elections or to p e r m i t political parties. Saudi Arabia's K i n g Fahd, forced to balance demands for political participation f r o m b o t h religious leaders and technocrats and the traditional concentration o f power w i t h i n the Saudi elite, created an appointed consultative c o u n c i l i n M a r c h 1991, w h i l e emphasizing that Islam was i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h democracy. A cross section o f society, f r o m intellectuals and technocrats to w o m e n and Islamists, pressed for greater political participation and socioeconomic reforms. W h i l e the religious establishment remained supportive, younger and m o r e m i l i t a n t ulama and Islamists c o n t i n u e d to voice their o p p o s i t i o n and press their demands. Just w h e n the government's crackdown against religious dissidents and its policy o f containment seemed to have silenced its critics, b o m b attacks against U.S. m i l i tary installations occurred i n N o v e m b e r 199c and June 1996. The shock o f these acts o f violence, attributed to u n d e r g r o u n d Islamic groups, coupled w i t h the broader challenge f r o m militant Islamists, led to a closing o f ranks between p o l i t ical and religious elites.

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The Compatibility of Islam and Democracy M u s l i m discourse o n polidcal liberalization and democratization has embraced a broad spectrum o f positions, f r o m M u s l i m secularists w h o w i s h to separate r e l i g i o n f r o m politics and Islamic reformers w h o have reinterpreted Islamic traditions in support o f m o d e r n elective forms o f government to those Muslims w h o reject democracy. Indeed, i n contemporary M u s l i m politics Islam has often been used to legitimate democracy and dictatorship, republicanism and monarchy. W h i l e some Islamic leaders i n the past spoke o u t against Western-style d e m o c racy and a parliamentary system o f government, this negative reaction w~as o f t e n part o f the general rejection o f European colonial influence, a defense o f Islam against f u r t h e r dependence on the West rather than a wholesale rejection o f democracy. For other M u s l i m s , Islam is totally self-sufficient, w i t h a divinely mandated system, based o n divine sovereignty and sacred law (shariah), w h i c h is i n c o m p a t i b l e and irreconcilable w i t h n o t i o n s o f p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d c i v i l law. Still other M u s l i m s insist that M u s l i m s s h o u l d generate their o w n f o r m s o f political participation or democracy f r o m w i t h i n Islam; they have n o need to l o o k to Western f o r m s o f democracy. The spectrum o f those M u s l i m s w h o believe that Islam and democracy are i n c o m p a t i b l e has been b r o a d and diverse. I n Iran d u r i n g the Constitutional M o v e m e n t o f 1 9 0 5 - 1 1 , Shaykh Fadlallah N u r i , i n debates over the constitution's f o r m u l a t i o n , argued that one key democratic i d e a — t h e equality o f all c i t i z e n s — is " i m p o s s i b l e " i n Islam. He maintained that unavoidable and insurmountable inequalities exist, such as those between believers and unbelievers, the r i c h and the poor, husbands and wives, the healthy and the sick, and the learned jurist and his followers. Neither is i t possible for a legislative b o d y to exist; N u r i believed that "Islam does n o t have any shortcomings that require c o m p l e t i o n . " Sayyid Qutb, the great theoretician o f the M u s l i m Brotherhood w h o was executed by die Egyptian regime i n 1966, strongly objected to any n o t i o n o f popular sovereignty as incompatible w i t h God's sovereignty. A l t h o u g h Q u t b stressed that the Islamic state must be based o n the Quranic principle o f consultation, he also believed that shariah is so complete as a legal and m o r a l system that no further legislation is possible. I n addition, he believed that for one group o f people to legislate for others was contrary to the equality and absolute dignity o f believers. Mawlana A b u l Ala M a w d u d i , founder o f the Jamaat-i-Islami, c o m b i n e d parts o f N u r i ' s and Qutb's perspectives and yet subtly differed f r o m t h e m . A b u l Ala M a w d u d i held that Islam constitutes its o w n f o r m o f democracy, but he concentrated o n the relationship between divine and popular sovereignty. A r g u i n g that

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democracy as c o m m o n l y understood is based solely o n the sovereignty o f the people, A b u l Ala M a w d u d i concluded that Islam is "the very antithesis o f secular Western democracy." For this reason his critics charged that he was an "absolutist" or "doctrinal purist." Yet he w e n t o n to argue that i f democracy is conceived as a l i m i t e d f o r m o f popular sovereignty, restricted and directed by God's law, there is n o i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y at ah. H e used the t e r m theodemocracy t o describe this alternate view. This argument has resonance i n the current w o r l d o f M u s l i m p o l i t i c a l activism. For example, the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the Islamic Republic o f I r a n , w h i c h m i g h t have been expected s i m p l y to r e a f f i r m the absolute sovereignty o f G o d , makes reference to both divine a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty. Principle 2 o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n

acknowledges

that G o d has " t h e faculty t o rule and i m p l e m e n t the d i v i n e l a w " a n d that there is a "necessity t o obey H i s orders." Yet Principle 1 indicates the h o l d that the idea o f popular sovereignty has o n m o d e r n Iranian M u s l i m consciousness. It notes that the Republic's government was "endorsed by the Iranian nation by an affirmative vote o f 98.2 percent of the m a j o r i t y o f eligible voters." Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), the founder of the Jaamat-i-Islami, had a far-reaching impact on Muslim thinkers and activists throughout the Islamic world.

This r e c o g n i t i o n o f the central importance o f p o l i t i c a l participation is further delineated i n other articles i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n that a f f i r m that the people should p a r t i c i pate " i n d e t e r m i n i n g their p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , a n d social destiny" (Principle 3). Furthermore, the Republic

should p r o v i d e f o r a popularly elected national consultative assembly (Principle 62) and for p e r i o d i c referenda o n issues that are submitted " d i r e c t l y to the people f o r a j u d g m e n t " (Principle 59). M o r e conservative voices i n the M u s l i m w o r l d c o u l d also be heard i n the 1980s and 1990s, however. I n 1982 Shaykh M u h a m m a d M u t a w w a l i al-Sharawi, a p r o m i n e n t Egyptian religious leader a n d popular preacher w h o s e w r i t i n g s a n d television broadcasts enjoyed an audience t h r o u g h o u t the Arab w o r l d , created controversy b y saying that Islam a n d democracy are incompatible and that shura (consultation) does n o t mean simple d o m i n a t i o n o f the m a j o r i t y I n Algeria i n the early 1990s the popular preacher A l i Belhadj, one o f the FIS leaders, accepted participation i n elections b u t echoed the refrain that democracy is a JudcoChristian concept a n d s h o u l d be replaced w i t h inherently Islamic principles o f governance. H e f o u n d the concept o f m a j o r i t y rule objectionable because issues

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7 7

o f r i g h t and justice cannot be quantified; the greater n u m b e r o f votes does not translate i n t o the greater moral position. K i n g Fahd o f Saudi Arabia, l o n g regarded as a c o n servative m o n a r c h and an ally o f the West, declared that democracy is a Western i n s t i t u t i o n f o r e i g n t o Islam, w h i c h has its o w n f o r m s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n : " [ T ] h e democratic system prevalent i n the w o r l d is not appropriate i n this region. The election system has n o place i n the Islamic creed, w h i c h calls f o r a gove r n m e n t o f advice and consultation and for the shepherd's openness to his flock, and holds the r u l e r f u l l y responsible before his people." Yet, increasingly, many M u s l i m s have accepted the n o t i o n o f democracy, a l t h o u g h they have different

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been a period of transformation, as shown by this Moroccan woman, who wears traditional dress as she exercises her right to vote.

o p i n i o n s about its precise meaning. M u s l i m interpretations o f democracy generally b u i l d o n the well-established Quranic concept o f consultation, but these interpretations vary i n the degree to w h i c h "the people" are able to exercise this duty. Some argue that Islam is inherently democratic, n o t o n l y because o f the p r i n c i p l e o f consultation but also because o f the concepts o f independent reasoning (ijtihad) and consensus (ijma). The attempt to generate Islamic f o r m s o f democracy is based o n a reinterpretation o f traditional concepts and institutions. Consultation or political deliberation and c o m m u n i t y consensus have been reinterpreted to support parliamentary democracy, representative elections, and political parties. Thus, for example, the consultative assembly or g r o u p (majlis al-shura) that selected or elected a n e w caliph has been transformed and equated w i t h a parliament or national assembly. As M u h a m m a d Asad noted i n The Principles of State and Government in Islam f 1980) : The legislative assembly—majlis dl-shura—must be truly representative o f the entire community, both men and women. Such a representative character can be achieved only through free and general elections; therefore the members of the majlis must be elected by means of the widest possible suf frage, including both men and women. I n Tunisia the g r o u p H i z b al-Nahda accepted the democratic process and sought to become a legalized political party. This c o m m i t m e n t to pluralist p o l i tics reflected the t h i n k i n g o f its leader, Rashid al-Ghannoushi. He c o m b i n e d the criteria o f Islam w i t h that o f democracy to c r i t i q u e the Tunisian government and to serve as a p l a t f o r m i n H i z b al-Nahda's appeal for popular support. For alGhannoushi, democracy, popular sovereignty and the role o f the state ("The state

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is n o t s o m e t h i n g f r o m G o d but f r o m the people . . . the state has to serve the benefit o f the M u s l i m s " ) , m u l t i p a r t y elections, and constitutional law are all part o f a " n e w Islamic t h i n k i n g " whose roots and legitimacy are f o u n d i n a reinter¬ pretation o f Islamic sources. I n a f f i r m i n g H i z b al-Nahda's c o m m i t m e n t to the democratic process, al-Ghannoushi c h i d e d the West for not p r o m o t i n g its d e m o cratic ideals: " W h i l e the West criticizes Islamic governments for not being d e m o cratic, it also supports governments w h o are n o t democratic and are keeping Islamic movements f r o m developing their ideas." There are differences between Western notions o f democracy and Islamic traditions. A l t h o u g h the great m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m s today w o u l d subscribe to the idea that shura (consultative g o v e r n m e n t ) is central to the Islamic state, the proper relationship between popular and d i v i n e sovereignly is a subject o f dispute. Most M u s l i m s w o u l d accept that the d i v i n e w i l l is supreme, and, i n theory, that God's law is i m m u t a b l e and cannot be altered b y h u m a n desire or w h i m . Yet, at the same t i m e , by the insistence o n the need o f rulers to consult and to r u l e on the basis o f consensus, M u s l i m s effectively concede that some f o r m o f p o p ular participation is r e q u i r e d . Questions about the specific nature and degree o f participation r e m a i n unanswered. W h i l e some M u s l i m s debate w h a t to call such a system, M u h a m m a d Natsir, f o r m e r Indonesian p r i m e m i n i s t e r and o n e - t i m e leader o f the Islamically o r i e n t e d M a s j u m i party, c o m m e n t e d , " I s l a m is n o t one h u n d r e d percent democracy, neither is i t one h u n d r e d percent autocracy. Islam is . . . Islam." I n many places today p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and democratization have become a l i t m u s test by w h i c h b o t h the openness o f governments and the relevance o f Islamic groups are certified. A l t h o u g h democracy is n o t entrenched i n m o d e r n Islamic political t h o u g h t and practice, i t is a p o w e r f u l s y m b o l o f legitimacy. It is used b o t h to legitimate and to delegitimate precisely because i t is seen to be a universal g o o d . A major hurdle facing Islamic movements today involves their willingness to t o l erate diversity w h e n i n power. Some i n the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West believe that Islamic movement participation i n electoral politics is merely tactical and that once diey are successful these Islamists w o u l d impose an intolerant, m o n o l i t h i c order o n society. This issue was raised by die electoral v i c t o r y o f Algeria's FIS part)'. Despite the fact that its leader, Ali Abbasi al-Madani, a f f i r m e d his acceptance o f democracy in the face o f accusations that he had opposed die democratic process i n the past, some o f the FIS's m o r e impatient voices—such as that o f the popular preacher A h Belhadj—unhesitatingly questioned whether democracy can be Islamic. The record o f Islamic experiments i n Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Sudan raised serious issues about religious tolerance. I n b o t h Pakistan and Iran the belief that d i v i n e sovereignty naturally sets l i m i t s o n the popular w i l l has, i n practice, led to a restriction o n the rights o f m i n o r i t i e s and w o m e n . This is seen i n the

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Jamaat-i-Islami's traditional hostility toward the A h m a d i y y a h (a nineteenth-cent u r y messianic m o v e m e n t that has been criticized by the Jamaat and others and declared a n o n - M u s l i m m i n o r i t y i n Pakistan) and advocacy o f the separation o f the sexes. I n Pakistan, Z i a - u l - H a q distinguished between democracy, w h i c h was presumably Western and objectionable, and "shurocracy" (consultative governm e n t ) , w h i c h was Islamic and desirable. H e used Islam to legitimate martial law and banned political parties as un-Islamic. I n Iran the government proved i n t o l erant o f the religious movement Bahai and its other political opponents. In Sudan the military governments o f b o d i Jafar al-Numayri and Omar al-Basliir, i n association w i t h the M u s l i m Brotherhood, exacerbated die civil war by being unresponsive to c r i t i c i s m f r o m the p r e d o m i n a n t l y n o n - M u s l i m southerners (Animists and Christians) that i m p o s i t i o n o f the shariah discriminates against t h e m . These examples raise serious questions about the willingness ofTslamically oriented governments to tolerate dissent and to respect the rights o f w o m e n and minorities. At the same tune, the role o f the military i n Algeria, the Tunisian government's suppression o f its Islamic o p p o s i t i o n , and Egypt's c r a c k d o w n o n the M u s l i m Brotherhood to "restore democracy" by denying Islamists that w h i c h they earned or proved capable o f w i n n i n g i n electoral politics have been equally problematic. The result i n Algeria was a civil war that claimed the lives o f m o r e dian seventy-five thousand people. Tunisia crushed its Islamic o p p o s i t i o n ( H i z b al-Nahda) a n d President Hosni Mubarak o f Egypt no longer clearly distinguished between violent

The twentieth century has been a period of major religious, political, and social transformation as Muslim governments have responded variously to calls for democratization. Pakistan has an elected government, housed in these buildings in Islamabad.

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underground movements like the Gamaa Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad and the M u s l i m Brotherhood, w h i c h functioned nonviolendy w i t h i n society. All took control o f the electoral system, banned or marginalized their Islamic opposition and indeed any significant opposition, and rigged or manipulated elections. For example, i n 1993 President BenAli ofTunisia w o n reelection by 99.91 percent o f the vole, and President Mubarak o f Egypt took 94 percent i n the 199c elections.

Issues and Prospects for the Future Twentieth-century M u s l i m history reveals a p e r i o d o f major religious, political, and social transformation. A m i d the diversity o f events and issues, fundamental questions emerge regarding religious interpretations and the authority o f the pasi. A m o n g them are Whose Islam? and What Islam? Both questions occur at the juncture o f tradition and m o d e r n i t y , for contemporary M u s l i m societies incorporate the simultaneous presence and interplay of past, present, and future. "Whose Islam?" Historically, rulers (caliphs and sultans) were the protectors o f Islam and the ulama; by s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n , they were the guardians and interpreters o f Islam. I n the second h a l f o f the t w e n t i e t h century, rulers as diverse as m o n archs ( K i n g Fahd o f Saudi Arabia and King Hassan o f M o r o c c o ) , m i l i t a r y leaders ( M u a m m a r Qaddafi, M o h a m m a d Z i a - u l - H a q , Jafar a l - N u m a y r i , and O m a r alBashir), e x - m i l i t a r y leaders ( A n w a r Sadat), and religious leaders and students (the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i and the Taliban) have overtly used Islam to enhance their legitimacy and to m o b i l i z e popular support. The ulama have also played a significant role i n the c o n t e m p o r a r y M u s l i m w o r l d . The Ayatollahs K h o m e i n i , Shariatmadari, M u t a h a i r i , and others o f Iran, Abul-Qasem K h o i o f Iraq, I m a m Musa Sadr and Shaykh Fadlallah o f Lebanon, M u h a m m a d al-Ghazali andYusuf Q a r d a w i , and many p o p u l a r preachers across the M u s l i m w o r l d have been significant clerical voices, f r o m masters o f theology and law to social and p o l i t i c a l activists. W h i l e some w i s h to continue that legacy i n the t w e n t i e t h century, however, many i f not most reformers and activists have i n fact been lay rather than clerical. The Islamic m o d e r n i s t m o v e m e n t and its legacy p r o d u c e d generations o f reformers (lay and clerical) f r o m Egy pt to Indonesia: Jamal a l - D i n a l - A f g h a n i , M u h a m m a d Iqbal, Sayyid A h m a d K h a n , Chiragh A l i , Allal al-Fasi, A b d a l - H a m i d Ben Badis, M u h a m m a d Natsir, Prof Hamka, M u h a m m a d Asad, many o f w h o m often f o u n d the ulama a m o n g their sharpest critics. The m a j o r founders o f neorevivalist movements, f r o m the p i o neers (Hasan al-Banna, Maw lana Abul Ala M a w d u d i , Sayyid Q u t b ) to present-day movements, are i n large part n o n - u l a m a or w h a t some m i g h t call the new ulama or intellectuals. Laity or n o n - u l a m a are the backbone o f the second and t h i r d generation o f M u s l i m intellectuals and activists across the M u s l i m w o r l d , a m o n g

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t h e m : Sudan's Dr. Hasan Turabi and Sadiq a l - M a h d i ; Tunisia's Rashid a l Ghannoushi, Iran's A l i Shariati and A b d u l K a r i m Sorush; Algeria's Dr. A l i Abbasi al-Madani; Pakistan's Professor K h u r s h i d A h m a d ; Turkey's Dr. N e c m e t t i n Erbakan; Jordan's Dr. Ishaq Farhan; Egypt's Dr. Hasan Hanafi, K a m a l A b o u l Magd, M . Selim al-Awa, and Fahmy H o w e i d y ; Indonesia's Dr. N u r c h o l i s h M a d j i d , A b d u r a h m a n W a h i d , and Dr. Deliar Noer; and Malaysia's M o h a m m a d Kamal Hassan, Osman Bakar, and A n w a r I b r a h i m . They have also included w o m e n , such as Egypt's Zaynab al-Ghazali and Heba Raouf Ezzat, Pakistan's M a r y a m Jameelah and Riffat Hassan, Malaysia's Khalijah M o h d . Salleh, America's A m i n a W a d u d , and others. Both laity and the ulama w r i t e prolifically o n Islamic d o c t r i n e , law, politics, science, and economics. A l t h o u g h there is notable cooperation a m o n g some o f these activists, many continue to challenge the a u t h o r i t y o f the ulama as the sole o f p r i m a r y guardians o f faith and belief. Emphasizing that there is n o o r d a i n e d clergy in Islam and that c o n t e m p o r a r y problems require a variety o f experts and specialties (economics, medicine, science, and so o n ) that are beyond the ulama's m o r e traditional areas o f expertise, they a f f i r m a m o r e inclusive n o t i o n o f the religious scholar or expert. As Hasan Turabi has c o m m e n t e d : "[B]ecause all k n o w l e d g e is d i v i n e and religious, a chemist, an engineer, an economist, a jurist are all ulama." Despite their c o m m o n Islamic o r i e n t a t i o n , they display a diversity o f intellectual positions and orientations. The second question is "What Islam.''" W h a t interpretations o f Islam? Islam, like all religious traditions, has been subject to multiple interpretations t h r o u g h o u t history. Islamic tradition is the product o f text and context, sacred scriptures (the Quran and Sunna o f the Prophet) and sociohistorical contexts, divine revelation and h u m a n interpretation. The key issue is the relationship o f tradition to modern i t y or postmodernity. Is the process o f Islamization or re-Islamization to be based o n a process o f restoration or reformation, a reapplication o f classical Islamic doctrine, or a reconstruction o f Islamic drought that draws inspiration f r o m the past b u t formulates new responses to the challenges and realities o f a rapidly changing world? The issue is not change but rather h o w m u c h change. H o w m u c h change is necessary? H o w m u c h is permissible? W h a t is the Islamic rationale for change? Thus, for example, although Iran was often characterized as a fundamentalist state led by a medieval, anti-Western religious figure, its government and constitution incorporated many m o d e r n concepts and institutions-—including that o f a republic, elected parliament, president, and p r i m e n r i n i s t e r — w i n c h have no clear precedent i n Islamic history. There are f o u r discernible orientations t o w a r d change: secular, conservative (or

t r a d i t i o n a l i s t ) , neorevivalist

(or

f u n d a m e n t a l i s t ) , and

neomodernist.

Secularists advocate the separation o f r e l i g i o n and politics. W h i l e their critics sometimes characterize or dismiss t h e m as nonbelievers w h o represent a small

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westernized elite sector o f society, secularists counter that they are M u s l i m s w h o believe that r e l i g i o n should be restricted to private or personal life (prayer, fasti n g , personal m o r a l i t y ) . They charge that those w h o m i x r e l i g i o n and politics d o so for political rather than religious ends. The three religiously oriented positions, a l t h o u g h d i f f e r i n g i n distinct ways, nevertheless overlap because they are orientations rather than fixed, m u t u a l l y exclusive positions. W h i l e each o r i e n t a t i o n may advocate a r e t u r n to Islam, they differ i n their presuppositions, interpretations, and methods, The conservative o r traditionalist p o s i t i o n is that o f the m a j o r i t y o f mainstream ulama, w h o believe that Islam is expressed quite comprehensively and adequately i n classical f o r m u lations o f Islamic law and doctrine. A l t h o u g h change can and does occur, the o r i entation o f conservatives to past practices severely l i m i t s substantive change. Conservatives are reluctant to distinguish between revealed, i m m u t a b l e principles and historically c o n d i t i o n e d laws and institutions that were the product o f h u m a n reason and experience. The h o l d o f tradition is especially reflected i n those w h o i n p r i n c i p l e are open to reinterpretation but reflexively c l i n g to past practices w h e n faced w i t h specific changes. They see n o need to go back to the Q u r a n o r Sunna to develop answers to new m o d e r n problems or questions. N o r are they interested i n a broad-based r e f o r m u l a t i o n or reinterpretation that alters or replaces traditional Islamic laws. Thus, conservatives emphasize the f o l l o w i n g o f past traditions o r practices and are w a r y o f any i n n o v a t i o n that they regard as " d e v i a t i o n " (bida), the M u s l i m equivalent to Chrisdan heresy. W h e n change does occur, i t is gradtial and by way o f exception i n areas clearly n o t covered by any legal precedents. Conservatives believe that i t is n o t the law that must change but a society that has strayed f r o m God's path. Thus, a l t h o u g h many ulama acquiesced to statei m p o s e d m o d e r n , Western-inspired legal systems, i t was a temporary compromise rather than an internalized change. I n the 1980s a n d 1990s the climate and politics o f Islamic revivalism led man) ulama f r o m Egypt and Iran, to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, to challenge m o d e r n reforms and call for the i m p o s i t i o n o f traditional f o r m u l a t i o n s o f Islamic law. However, even i n these cases, beneath the ostensible unity, there has been a diversity o f o p i n i o n and practice reflecting different c o m m u n i t i e s (Sunni and Shii), schools o f Islamic law (Hanafi, Hannah', Jafari, M a l i k i , and Shafii), and local customs o n such issues as women's dress and education and sexual segregation. Thus, General Zia ul-Haq's call for r e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f Islamic law i n Pakistan set o f f sharp differences and conflict between Sunni a n d Shiite and a m o n g c o m p e t i n g schools o f Sunni religious t h o u g h t . Iran's mullahs, w h i l e abrogating the shah's reformist family protection act and advocating a return t o Islamic law, also bitterly criticized Afghanistan's Taliban i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f Islamic l a w

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Neorevivalists or Islamists, often popularly referred to as "fundamentalists," share m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h conservatives or traditionalists. They t o o emphasize a r e t u r n to Islam to b r i n g about a new renaissance. A l t h o u g h they respect classical f o r m u l a t i o n s o f Islam, they are less w e d d e d to t h e m . Neorevivalists claim the r i g h t to go back to Islam's o r i g i n a l sources, t o reinterpret and reapply t h e m to contemporary society. Like conservatives, they attribute the weakness o f the Islamic w o r l d p r i m a r i l y to the westernization o f M u s l i m societies, the penetration o f its f o r e i g n , " u n - I s l a m i c " ideas, values, and practices. I n contrast to conservatives, however, they are m u c h m o r e flexible i n their ability to adapt to change. At the same t i m e , neorevivalists have taken issue w i t h the Islamic m o d e r n i s m o f M u h a m m a d A b d u h and M u h a m m a d Iqbal, w h i c h they believe succ u m b e d to the West and produced a westernized Islam, i n their insistence that Islam is fully capable i n and o f itself to be the sole basis for a M u s l i m renaissance. Neorevivalists have produced a host o f Islamic p o l i t i c a l and social movements and organizations that protest and challenge the p o l i t i c a l and religious establishments i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , and they are often sharply critical o f the West. The leadership cadre is often lay rather than clerical, graduates and professionals trained i n the m o d e r n sector rather than i n seminaries. They are thus m o r e likely to be educators, journalists, scientists, physicians, lawyers, or engineers than ulama. The earlier d i v i s i o n o f elites i n many M u s l i m societies i n t o m o d e r n secular or traditional (the u l a m a ) — b a s e d

o n the b i f u r c a t i o n o f education i n m o d e r n ,

Western-oriented schools and i n t r a d i t i o n a l Islamic or religious schools—is c o m p l e m e n t e d today by a h i g h l y educated but m o r e Islamically oriented sector o f society, an alternative elite. The contemporary revival has also p r o d u c e d a newgeneration o f Islamic reformers: n e o m o d e m i s t s , w h o seek to b r i d g e the gap between the traditionally and the secularly educated. They too are activists w h o l o o k to the early Islamic p e r i o d as e m b o d y i n g the n o r m a t i v e ideal. A l t h o u g h they overlap w i t h neorevivalists or Islamists, w i t h w h o m they are often g r o u p e d , neomodernists are m o r e flexible and creative i n their t h o u g h t . After an early traditional

education,

many

obtain

degrees

from

Western-oriented

national

universities or at m a j o r universities i n the West. They emphasize the importance o f "Islamic m o d e r n i z a t i o n and development." This n e w sector has produced a diverse g r o u p o f leaders and intellectuals. Islamic neomodernists d o not reject the West i n its entirety; rather, they choose to be selective i n approach. They w i s h to appropriate the best o f science, technology, m e d i c i n e , and intellectual t h o u g h t but to resist acculturation or the assimilation o f Western culture and mores, f r o m secularism and radical i n d i v i d ualism to the b r e a k d o w n o f the f a m i l y and sexual permissiveness. The goal is thus to learn f r o m the West but not to westernize M u s l i m society. The distinc-

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t i o n is d r a w n between the rejection o f change ( m o d e r n i z a t i o n ) and the u n c r i t ical, indiscriminate, b l i n d i m i t a t i o n o f the West. Contemporary Islamic reformers or neomodernists

also stress the need to

renew Islam b o t h at the i n d i v i d u a l and the c o m m u n i t y levels. They advocate a process o f Islamization or re-Islamization that begins w i t h the sacred sources o f Islam, the Q u r a n and Sunna o f the Prophet, b u t that also embraces the best i n other cultures. They see themselves as engaging i n a d y n a m i c process that is as o l d as Islam itself. M u c h as early M u s l i m s interpreted and applied Islamic p r i n ciples and values to their times and adopted and adapted political, legal, and econ o m i c practices f r o m the cultures they had c o n q u e r e d , the

neomodernist

reformers w i s h t o b r i n g about a n e w Islamic renaissance (nahdo) p u r s u i n g a s i m dar selective, self-critical path. They distinguish between God's revelation and h u m a n interpretations, between that part o f Islamic law w h i c h is eternal and that w h i c h is contingent and relative, between i m m u t a b l e principles and regulations that were h u m a n constructs c o n d i t i o n e d by t i m e and place. I n contrast to neorevivalists, neomodernists are m o r e creative and w i d e - r a n g i n g i n their reinterpretalion o f Islam and less tied to traditional interpretations o f the ulama. For this reason, they are often accused o f " d e v i a t i o n i s m " by the ulama, w h o charge that neomodernists lack the necessary t r a i n i n g and credentials to interpret Islam.

Contemporary Muslim Societies: Old and New Realities Islam i n the t w e n t i e t h century has been associated w i t h r e f o r m a t i o n and revol u t i o n . Political and intellectual movements responded to the challenge o f European c o l o n i a l i s m , achieved independence, and established m o d e r n M u s l i m states and societies. I n the last decades o f the t w e n t i e t h century, a second struggle emerged. This Islamic resurgence signals b o t h the failures o f M u s l i m societies and deep-seated, unresolved religio-cultural issues, as M u s l i m s continue to struggle w i t h the meaning and relevance o f Islam i n the w o r l d today. The issues have extended f r o m textual c r i t i c i s m and interpretation o f the Q u r a n and Prophetic traditions to the role o f r e l i g i o n i n state and society. This resurgence has yielded a variety o f questions, f r o m the nature o f the state and Islamic law to pluralism and the status and rights o f w o m e n and m i n o r i t i e s . A l t h o u g h the Quran and Sunna o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d r e m a i n normative for most M u s l i m s , questions o f interpretation, authenticity, and application have become contentious items. Some Muslims see little need to substantially redefine past approaches and practices; others strike out i n t o n e w territory. Some M u s l i m scholars distinguish the eternal, i m m u t a b l e principles and laws i n the Quran f r o m those prescriptions that are contingent responses to specific contexts. Other scholars distinguish between the Meccan and Medinan suras (chapters): the Meccan

CONTEMPORARY

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685

chapters are regarded as the earlier and m o r e r e l i g i o u s l y b i n d i n g texts; the Medinan are seen as p r i m a r i l y political, concerned w i t h Muhammad's creation o f the M e d i n a n state and therefore n o t universally binding. Still other M u s l i m scholars have distinguished between the Quran's eternal principles and values, w h i c h are to be applied and reapplied to changing sociopolitical contexts, and past legislation that was p r i m a r i l y intended for specific historical periods. A l t i i o u g h the example o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d has always been normative i n Islam, f r o m earliest times M u s l i m scholars saw the need to critically examine and authenticate the enormous number o f hadith (Prophetic traditions), to distinguish between authoritative texts and pious fabrications. I n the twentieth century a sector o f m o d e r n Western scholarship questioned the historicity and authenticity o f the hadith, maintaining that the hulk ol the Prophetic traditions were w r i t t e n m u c h later. Most M u s l i m scholars and some Western ( n o n - M u s l i m ) scholars have taken exception w i t h this sweeping position. Many ulama continue to unquesnoningly accept the authoritative collections o f die past; other M u s l i m scholars have i n fact become m o r e critical i n their approaches and uses o f hadith literature. N e w approaches to the study and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Islam's sacred sources have been accompanied by similar debates over the nature o f Islamic law, the shariah. As n o t e d , many ulama continue to equate the shariah w i t h its exposition i n legal manuals developed by the early law schools. Other M u s l i m s — f r o m Islamic m o d ernists such as M u h a m m a d A b d u h , Sayyid A h m a d K h a n , and M u h a m m a d Iqbal to Islamic revivalists and neomodernists—have distinguished between those laws based o n clear texts o f the Q u r a n and hadith and those that are the p r o d u c t o f h u m a n interpretation and application, the product o f reason and custom. Some express this d i s t i n c t i o n as that between the eternal law o f God (shariah) and its h u m a n interpretation and application (iiqh) by early jurists. The d i s t i n c t i o n is often articulated i n terms o f the classical d i v i s i o n o f law i n t o a Muslim's duties o r obligations to God (ibadat, w o r s h i p ) and his or her duties to others (muamtilut, social obligations). The f o r m e r (for example, the performance o f the Five Pillars o f Islam, the essential beliefs and practices) are seen as u n c h a n g i n g ; the latter are contingent u p o n historical and social circumstances. C o n t e m p o r a r y M u s l i m discussion and debate over the role o f Islam i n state and society reflect a broad array o f questions: Is there one classical m o d e l o r many possible models for the relationship o f r e l i g i o n to political, social, and econ o m i c development? I f a new Islamic synthesis is to be achieved that provides c o n t i n u i t y w i t h past t r a d i t i o n , h o w w i l l this be accomplished, i m p o s e d f r o m above by rulers and the ulama o r legislated f r o m below t h r o u g h a representative electoral process? Legal r e f o r m remains a contested issue i n many M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s . Many emerging M u s l i m states f o l l o w e d a pattern o f i m p l e m e n t i n g Western-inspired

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legal codes. The process o f legal change d i d n o t reflect widespread social change so m u c h as the desires o f a small secular-oriented sector o f the p o p u l a t i o n . Governments imposed reforms f r o m above t h r o u g h legislation. The process, c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , and tensions i n h e r e n t i n m o d e r n i z a t i o n p r o g r a m s i n most M u s l i m societies were starkly reflected i n f a m i l y law (marriage, divorce, and inheritance) reforms. Family law, w h i c h is regarded as the heart o f the shariah and the basis for a strong, Islamically o r i e n t e d f a m i l y structure and society, was the last area o f law to be touched by reformers. Even then, u n l i k e most areas o f law that i m p l e m e n t e d Western-inspired legal systems and codes, M u s l i m family law was not displaced or replaced but instead subjected to selective r e f o r m . Officials often employed an Islamic m o d e r n i s t rationale, i n an ad hoc and haphazard mariner, to provide an Islamic facade and legitimacy. Family law ordinances were d r a w n u p and i m p l e m e n t e d by the state, not by the ulama, p i t t i n g rehgious leaders against b o t h secular and Islamic modernists. The ulama tended to object to any tampering w i t h Islamic law, m a i n t a i n i n g that ( 1 ) they and they alone were the qualified experts i n Islamic doctrine and law; ( 2 ) the law was sacred and unchangeable; and (3.) modernists were u n d u l y i n f l u enced by the West and thus family law reforms were simply an illegitimate attempt to "westernize" God's law. However, the government imposed reforms that were ultimately accepted, albeit reluctantly. M o d e r n i z i n g elites accommodated the force o f tradition i n their unwillingness to directly challenge or invalidate classical Islamic law. Thus, v i o l a t i o n o f the law d i d not render an act invalid, only illegal. Moreover, punishments i n the f o r m o f fines and i m p r i s o n m e n t f o r m e n w h o ignored reforms that l i m i t e d their r i g h t to polygamous marriages or to divorce were often m i n i m a l . The contemporary resurgence o f Islam triggered the ulama's reassertion o f the authority o f the past, as they called for a r e t u r n t o the shariah and sought to repeal family law reforms and reassert classical, medieval f o r m u l a tions o f M u s l i m family law. I n m o r e recent decades, the debate over w h e t h e r the shariah should be part o f or the basis o f a country's legal system has become a sensitive, and at times contentious, issue. I f i t should be, to w h a t degree? Does Islamization o f law mean the wholesale r e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f classical law, the development o f n e w laws derived f r o m the Q u r a n and Sunna o f the Prophet, or s i m p l y the acceptance o f any law that is n o t contrary to Islam? W h o is to oversee this process: rulers, the ulama, parliaments? As I r a n , Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia demonstrate, the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f shariah has n o t f o l l o w e d a fixed pattern or set interpretation even a m o n g those d u b b e d conservative or fundamentalist. For example, w o m e n i n Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan u n d e r the Taliban cannot vote or h o l d public office. I n Pakistan and Iran, despite other strictures and problems, w o m e n vote, h o l d political office i n parliaments and cabinets, teach i n u n i v e r s i -

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ties, and h o l d responsible professional positions. However, Islamization o f law has underscored several areas that have proved particularly problematic: the hudud (punishments as prescribed by the Q u r a n and h a d i t h for certain crimes, such as alcohol c o n s u m p t i o n , theft, f o r n i c a t i o n , adultery, and false witness) and the status o f n o n - M u s l i m s (dhtmmi), m i n o r i t i e s , and w o m e n . A l l involve the question o f change i n Islamic law. A l t h o u g h many traditionalists and neorevivalists or fundamentalists call for the r e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the h u d u d punishments, other M u s l i m s argue that they are n o longer appropriate. A m o n g those w h o advocate i m p o s i t i o n o f the h u d u d (for example, a m p u t a t i o n for theft or stoning for adultery), some call f o r its immediate i n t r o d u c t i o n and others argue that such punishments are contingent upon the creation o f a just society i n w h i c h people are not driven to steal i n order to survive. Some critics charge that although appropriate relative t o the t i m e p e r i o d i n w h i c h they were i n t r o d u c e d , h u d u d punishments are unnecessarily harsh i n a m o d e r n context. A l t h o u g h many Muslim

rulers and governments

t r y to avoid d i r e c t l y

addressing the issue o f the h u d u d , Prime M i n i s t e r Mahathir M o h a m a d o f Malaysia, advocate o f a m o d e r n i z e d Malaysia w i t h a moderate, tolerant Islam, directly criticized the c o n servatism o f his country's ulama, their legal o p i n i o n s (fatwas), and religious courts. I n a d d i t i o n , he refused to allow the Malaysian state o f Kelantan, the o n l y state controlled by PAS (the Islamic Party o f Malaysia), an Islamic o p p o s i t i o n p o l i t i c a l party, t o i m p l e m e n t the h u d u d . The r e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f Islamic law has often had a partic-

it*

iiiieesigiVieV

fcfc. iiiiilïïïgBBBgE! "'»»•tum:

ularly p r o n o u n c e d negative impact o n the status and role o f w o m e n and m i n o r i t i e s , raising serious questions

about

w h e t h e r i t constitutes a setback i n the gains made i n many societies. D u r i n g the postindependence p e r i o d , significant changes occurred i n many countries, broadening the e d u cational and e m p l o y m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s and enhancing the legal rights o f M u s l i m w o m e n . W o m e n became m o r e v i s i ble i n the professions (as teachers, lawyers, engineers, p h y s i cians) and i n g o v e r n m e n t . A d m i t t e d l y ,

these changes

affected only a small p r o p o r t i o n o f the p o p u l a t i o n and varied f r o m one c o u n t r y or region t o another, influenced by religious and local t r a d i t i o n s , economic and educational d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d g o v e r n m e n t leadership. The

contrasts

could be seen f r o m Egypt and Malaysia to Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Parliament House in Kuala Lumpur is one of the government buildings in the constitutional monarchy of Malaysia. Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad and former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim have advocated a modernized state with a moderate, tolerant Islam.

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One result o f contemporary Islamic revivalism has been a reexamination o f the role o f w o m e n i n Islam, and at times a bitter debate over dieir role i n society. M o r e conservative religious voices among the ulama and Islamists have advocated a return to veiling and sexual segregation as w e l l as restricting women's education and e m p l o y m e n t . M u s l i m w o m e n are regarded as culture bearers, teachers o f f a m ily faith and values, whose p r i m a r y roles as wives and mothers l i m i t or exclude part i c i p a t i o n i n p u b l i c life. The i m p o s i t i o n o f r e p u t e d Islamic laws by some governments and the policies o f some Islamist movements reinforced fears o f a retreat to the past: i n Afghanistan, the Taliban enforcement o f veiling, closure o f women's schools, restriction o f w o m e n i n the workplace; i n Pakistan, General Zia ul-Haq's r e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the h u d u d p u n i s h m e n t s and a law that counted women's testimony as hah that of men's; greater restricdons on w o m e n i n the Islande Republics o f Iran and Sudan; the murderous brutahty of Algeria's A r m e d Islamic Group toward unveiled or m o r e westernized professional w o m e n . I n fact, the picture is far m o r e complex and diverse, revealing b o t h o l d and new patterns. M u s l i m w o m e n i n the t w e n t i e t h century had t w o clear choices o r models before t h e m : the m o d e r n westernized lifestyle c o m m o n a m o n g an elite m i n o r ity o f w o m e n or the m o r e restrictive t r a d i t i o n a l " I s l a m i c " lifestyle o f the m a j o r ity o f w o m e n , w h o lived m u c h the same as previous generations. The social Women are active partici-

impact o f the Islamic revival, however, p r o d u c e d a t h i r d alternative that is b o t h

pants in modern Islamic

m o d e r n and f i r m l y rooted i n Islamic f a i t h , identity, and values. M u s l i m w o m e n ,

society. Many have not

modernists, and Islamists have argued o n Islamic grounds for an expanded role

returned to wearing tradi-

for w o m e n i n M u s l i m societies. D i s t i n g u i s h i n g between Islam and patriarchy,

tional dress, but have

between revelation and its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the (male) ulama i n patriarchal set-

adopted new forms that are both modest and stylish, like the one displayed by these

tings, M u s l i m w o m e n have reasserted their r i g h t to be p r i m a r y participants i n redefining their i d e n t i t y and role i n society. I n m a n y instances, this change has

mannequins in a shop in

been symbolized by a r e t u r n to the w e a r i n g o f Islamic dress. This has n o t s i m -

Cairo.

ply meant a wholesale r e t u r n to traditional Islamic f o r m s o f dress, however. For

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ISLAM

689

some i t is the d o n n i n g o f a head scarf (hijab); others f r o m Cairo to Kuala L u m p u r have adopted n e w f o r m s o f Islamic dress, modest but stylish, w o r n by students and professionals. I n i t i a l l y p r o m i n e n t p r i m a r i l y a m o n g u r b a n middle-class w o m e n , this new m o d e o f dress has become m o r e c o m m o n a m o n g a broader sector o f society. For m a n y i t is an attempt to c o m b i n e religious belief and values w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y levels o f education and e m p l o y m e n t , to subordinate a m u c h - d e s i r e d process o f social change to i n d i g e n o u s , Islamic values and ideals. The goal is a m o r e authentic rather than s i m p l y westernized m o d e r n i z a t i o n . Islamic dress has the practical advantage o f enabling some w o m e n to assert their modesty and d i g n i t y w h i l e f u n c t i o n i n g i n p u b l i c life i n societies i n w h i c h Western dress often symbolizes a more permissive lifestyle. It creates a protected, private space o f respectability i n c r o w d e d u r b a n environments. For some it is a sign o f f e m i n i s m that rejects what they regard as the tendency o f w o m e n i n many M u s l i m societies to go f r o m being defined as sexual objects i n a m a l e - d o m i n a t e d t r a d i t i o n to being exploited as sexual objects Western-style. Western f e m i n i s m is often seen as a l i b e r a t i o n that has resulted i n a n e w f o r m o f bondage to dress, youthfulness and physical beauty, sexual permissiveness and e x p l o i t a t i o n , a society i n w h i c h w o m e n ' s bodies are used to sell every f o r m o f merchandise f r o m c l o t h i n g to automobiles and cellular phones. Covering the body, i t is argued, defines a w o m a n and gender relations i n society i n terms o f personality and talents rather than physical appearance. Contemporary M u s l i m societies reflect b o t h the o l d and the n e w realities. Traditional patterns r e m a i n strong and are i n d e e d reasserted and defended by those w h o call f o r a m o r e widespread r e t u r n t o t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m s o f Islamic dress and sexual segregation or seclusion ( p u r d a h ) i n public life. At the same t i m e , however, M u s l i m w o m e n have also become catalysts for change, e m p o w e r i n g themselves by entering the professions, r u n n i n g f o r elective office and serving i n parliament ( i n countries as diverse as Egypt and I r a n ) , b e c o m i n g students and scholars o f Islam, c o n d u c t i n g their o w n w o m e n ' s study groups, and establishing w o m e n ' s professional organizations, journals, and magazines. Women's o r g a n i zations f r o m Egypt and Iran to Pakistan and Indonesia—such as W o m e n L i v i n g U n d e r M u s l i m Laws, based i n Pakistan but international i n m e m b e r s h i p , and Malaysia's Sisters i n Islam—are active internationally i n protecting and p r o m o t i n g the rights o f M u s l i m w o m e n . The s i m u l t a n e o u s call f o r greater p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and f o r m o r e Islamically oriented societies has n o t o n l y had a negative impact o n n o n - M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s , but it has also sparked a lively discussion and debate a m o n g M u s l i m intellectuals and religious leaders over the status o f n o n - M u s l i m s i n an Islamic state. The t r a d i t i o n a l d o c t r i n e o f n o n - M u s l i m s as "protected p e o p l e , " enabling m a n y to practice their faith and h o l d positions i n society, was advanced

690

T H t

OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

relative t o its times and t o the t h e n far m o r e exclusive approach o f Western C h r i s t e n d o m . By m o d e r n standards o f p l u r a l i s m and equality o f citizenship, however, it amounts to second-class status. M o r e conservative M u s l i m voices c o n t i n u e t o celebrate and defend this d o c t r i n e , w h i l e other M u s l i m s f r o m Egypt t o Indonesia have advocated a r e d e f i n i t i o n o f the status o f n o n - M u s l i m s , i n terms o f their r i g h t to f u l l and equal citizenship, w h i c h w o u l d enable an egalitarian and pluralist society o f M u s l i m s and n o n - M u s l i m s . This is reflected i n debates i n Egypt over w h e t h e r the Copts can serve i n the a r m y or should have to pay a special tax and similar discussions about issues o f r e l i g i o u s and p o l i t i cal p l u r a l i s m i n countries such as Lebanon, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Ironically, questions o f citizenship and the exercise o f political rights have become increasingly significant for Muslim m i n o r i t y communities i n the second half o f the twentieth century. At no time in history have M u s l i m minorities been as numerous and widespread. Both the sw elling numbers o f M u s l i m refugees and the m i g r a t i o n o f many Muslims to Europe, Canada, South America, and the U n i t e d States, where Islam is n o w the second or t h i r d largest r e l i g i o n , make the issue o f m i n o r i t y rights and duties w i t h i n the majority c o m m u n i t y an ever-greater concern for Islamic jurisprudence. Can M u s l i m m i n o r i t y c o m m i m i t i e s accept full citizenship and participate fully political!)' and socially w i t h i n n o n - M u s l i m majority c o m munities that are not governed by Islamic law? What is the relationship o f Islamic law to civil law? W h a t is the relationship o f culture to religion? Are Muslims w h o five i n the U n i t e d States American Muslims or Muslims i n America? H o w does one distinguish between culture and r e l i g i o n , that is, between the essentials o f Islam and its cultural (Egyptian, Pakistani, Sudanese, Indonesian) expressions? The history o f Islam i n the contemporary w o r l d , as t h r o u g h o u t m u c h o f history, continues to be one o f dynamic change. M u s l i m societies have experienced the effects o f rapid change, and w i t h it the challenges i n religious, p o l i t i c a l , and economic development. M u s l i m s continue to grapple w i t h the relationship o f the present and future to the past. Like believers i n their sister traditions, Judaism and Christianity, the critical question is the relationship o f f a i t h and t r a d i t i o n to change i n a rapidly changing and pluralistic w o r l d , As Fazlur Rahman, a d i s t i n guished M u s l i m scholar, observed i n Islam and Modernity (1982), M u s l i m s need " s o m e first-class m i n d s w h o can interpret the o l d i n terms o f the new as regards substance and t u r n the new- i n t o the service o f the o l d as regards ideals."

CHRONOLOGY

ca. 5 7 0 B i r t h o f P r o p h e t

670

Muhammad

M u s l i m conquest o f northwest Africa

6 8 0 - 6 9 2 Second M u s l i m c i v i l w a r — H u s a y n , son

610 M u h a m m a d r e c e i v e s c a l l t o P r o p h e t h o o d

o f A l i . leads r e b e l l i o n against U m a y y a d

61; M u h a m m a d begins p u b l i c preaching i n Mecca:

C a l i p h Yazid a n d is m a r t y r e d , c r e a t i n g p a r a -

first e m i g r a t i o n o f M u s l i m s t o Abyssinia,

d i g m o f protest a n d suffering f o r Smiles

a l t h o u g h M u h a m m a d remained i n Mecca t o c o n t i n u e p r e a c h i n g against p o l y t h e i s t s

691

619 D e a t h s o f M u h a m m a d ' s w i f e , K h a d i j a h , a n d

D o m e o f ihe Rock completed i n Jerusalem b y Caliph A b d a l - M a l i k

uncle, A b u Talib, leaving M u h a m m a d w i t h -

705-715 Great U m a y y a d Mosque o f Damascus

o u t a p r o t e c t o r ; M u h a m m a d t r i e s t o leave

built

Mecca

711 B e r b e r c o n v e r t s t o I s l a m cross S t r a i t s o f

621 M u h a m m a d ' s f i r s t c o n t a c t w i t h M e d i n a

Gibraltar and enter southern

622 M i g r a t i o n (hijru) o f e a r l y M u s l i m s t o M e d i n a ;

e x p a n d i n g Islam i n t o Europe

I s l a m l a k e s f o r m o f p o l i t i c a l state; f i r s t y e a r

7 J 2 C h a r l e s M a r t e l d e f e a t s M u s l i m s at B a t t l e o f

o f Islamic calendar.

Tours, France, h a l t i n g e x p a n s i o n o f I s l a m

624 Battle o f B a d r — M u s l i m s o u t n u m b e r e d , b u t

into Europe 7 4 4 - 7 5 0 T h i r d M u s l i m c i v i l w a r a n d defeat o f

v i c t o r i o u s : serves as s y m b o l f o r M u s l i m s o f divine intervention and

guidance

Umayyads b y Abbasids

62c Battle o f U h u d — M u h a m m a d a n d M u s l i m s

750-850 Consolidation o f Abbasid M u s l i m e m p i r e

attacked and defeated by Meccans 627 Battle o f the T r e n c h

in Iraq, western Iran, Khurasan,

—Muhammad and

M e s o p o t a m i a , Egypt, and Syria by caliphs

M u s l i m s v i c t o r i o u s over Meccans a n d bedouin mercenaries: M u h a m m a d

a l - M a h d i , H a r u n al-Rashid, and a l - M a m u n

consoli-

750-1258 Ahbasid caliphate—height

dates l e a d e r s h i p i n M e d i n a

patronage o f art and culture, b o o m i n g

m a k e pilgrimage t o Mecca

trade, c o m m e r c e , agriculture, a n d i n d u s t r y

650 M u h a m m a d o c c u p i e s Mecca Death o f M u h a m m a d ; A b u Bakr becomes

756

Emirate o f Córdoba f o u n d e d by Umayyad

762

B a g h d a d f o u n d e d as A b b a s i d c a p i t a l

765

Death o f sixth Shiite I m a m and founder o f

first

prince Abd

Caliph 651-661

Reign o f (he Four Rightly G u i d e d

Caliphs—normative p e r i o d f o r Sunni Islam 654

succession d i s p u t e d , t r e a t i n g s p l i t b e t w e e n

Khattab becomes second Caliph

Sevener a n d T w e l v e r S h i i t e s

6 j 8 M u s l i m s occupy Jerusalem

767

6 4 4 C a l i p h U m a r i b n a l - K h a i t a b stabbed.

Dies

Mughal

select successor, s e l l i n g p r e c e d e n t f o r

Empires

7 8 6 - 8 0 9 H a r u n al-Rashid caliph

Uthman ibn

(legendary

e x p l o i t s r e c o u n t e d i n The Thousand and One

A f f a n becomes t h i r d C a l i p h ; Q u r a n is c o l -

Nights), h e i g h t o f A b b a s i d

l e c t e d a n d p i n i n final f o r m a t d u r i n g r e i g n

795

of Uthman

caliphate

Death o f M a l i k i b n Anas, f o u n d e r o f M a l i k i s c h o o l o f law, d o m i n a n t i n I s l a m i c A f r i c a

6 5 6 C a l i p h U t h m a n i b n A f f a n assassinated; A l i i b n

9 t h century-1962 Z a y d i i m a m s r u l e Yemen 801

AbiTalib becomes f o u r t h Caliph

Death o f Rabiah a l - A d a w i y a h . female Sufi mystic credited w i t h fusing asceticism w i t h

656—661 A i s h a l e a d s M u s l i m o p p o s i t i o n f o r c e s

love o f G o d

again f o u r t h C a l i p h . A l i . A l i v i c t o r i o u s .

8 1 9 - 1 0 0 5 Samanid dynasty rules Khurasan a n d

First instance o f M u s l i m c a l i p h i n v o l v e d i n

Transoxiana

m i l i t a r y a c t i o n against o t h e r M u s l i m s 820

C a l i p h A l i i b n A b i T a l i b assassinated; M u a w i y a ibn A b i Sufyan founds U m a y y a d dynasty

661— 750

Death o f A b u Hanifa, founder o f Hanafi school o f Islamic law, d o m i n a n t i n O t t o m a n a n d

one week after a p p o i n t i n g c o m m i t t e e t o

661

al-Rahman

Jafari s c h o o l o f I s l a m i c l a w , Jafar a l - S a d i q ;

Death o f C a l i p h A b u Bakr; U m a r i b n a l -

o r d e r l y transfer o f caliphate.

o f Islamic

c i v i l i z a t i o n , d e v e l o p m e n t o f I s l a m i c law,

628 Treaty o f H u d a y b i y a h p e r m i t s M u s l i m s t o

632

Iberia,

Death o f M u h a m m a d al-Shafu. founder o f S h a f i i s c h o o l o f I s l a m i c law, d o m i n a n t i n A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g areas o f e a s t e r n

U m a y y a d caliphate-—Arab m i l i t a r y aris-

tocracy

Mediterranean

69

I

692

CHRONOLOGY

850 C a l i p h a l - M a m u m establishes " H o u s e o f

Venerable, A b b o t o f Cluny

W i s d o m " (Bayt a l - H i k m a h ) i n Baghdad,

1169—1252 A y y u b i d d y n a s t y r u l e s E g y p t

responsible f o r translating m a n u s c r i p t s

1171

f r o m o t h e r languages a n d c u l t u r e s i n t o

1187 S a l a d i n defeats F r a n k s at B a t t l e o f H i t t i n a n d

Arabic

Saladin conquers Egypt, restoring S u n n i rule recovers Jerusalem f o r I s l a m

8 3 3 - 9 4 C E m e r g e n c e o f r e g i o n a l states w i t h i n

1191 C o n s t r u c t i o n o f Q u w w a t a l - I s l a m M o s q u e i n

Abbasid territories (present-day Iraq, western I r a n , Khurasan, Egypt, and Syria) 836 A b b a s i d c a p i t a l t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m B a g h d a d t o

Delhi 1198 D e a t h o f p h i l o s o p h e r I b n R u s h d

(Averroes)

1206-1370 M o n g o l s r u l e Central Asia 1206-1555 D e l h i sultans

Samarfa 855 D e a t h o f A h m a d i b n H a n b a l , f o u n d e r o f H a n b a l i

1220—1260 M o n g o l i n v a s i o n s o f M u s l i m t e r r i t o r i e s

s c h o o l o f I s l a m i c law, d o m i n a n t i n Saudi

1225 A l m o h a d r u l e r s a b a n d o n

Arabia and p r o m i n e n t a m o n g fundamentalist

1227-1363 Chaghatayids i n Transoxiana,

groups

Spain

Semirechye. a n d eastern T u r k e y

867— 1480 S a f f a r i d s r u l e S i s t a n

1241 D e a t h o f S u l t a n I l t u t m i s h

868— 9 0 5 T u l u n i d d y n a s t y i n E g y p t a n d S y r i a

1250-1517 M a m l u k dynasty i n Egypt a n d Syria

8 7 4 T w e l f t h I m a m goes i n t o o c c u l t a t i o n ; e n d o f

1256—1336 M o n g o l I l k h a n i d s r u l e Persia 1256—1483 Q a r a m a n i d s r u l e c e n t r a l A n a t o l i a

direct r u l e o f Shiite I m a m s 929 A n d a l u s i a n c a l i p h a t e f o u n d e d b y A b d a l 9 3 4 - 1062 B u y i d d y n a s t y r u l e s i n w e s t e r n I r a n , Iraq, and Mesopotamia 9 3 5 - 9 6 9 I k b s h i d i d dynasty rules Egypt a n d Syria 969-1171

1258 M o n g o l s sack B a g h d a d 1260

Rahman I I I

F a t i m i d dynasty rules N o r t h Africa,

M a m l u k s d e f e a t M o n g o l s at A y n J a l u t

1261-1517 A b b a s i d c a l i p h a t e i n C a i r o ca. 1280 E r t u g r u l b e g i n s O t t o m a n e x p a n s i o n 1281-1924 O t t o m a n E m p i r e 1292 M a r c o P o l o v i s i t s A c h e h i n n o r t h e r n S u m a t r a 1295-1304 Ghazan—first M o n g o l K h a n t o convert

Egypt, and Syria

to Islam

977-1186 Ghaznavids r u l e Khurasan, Afghanistan.

1297 D e a t h o f a l - M a l i k a s - S a l i h i n S a m u d r a

and n o r t h e r n India E n d o f 10th c e n t u r y - 1 2 1 5 G h u r i d dynasty

1326 O t t o m a n s take B u r s a

E a r l y 11 t h c e . n t u r y - 1 1 4 7 A l m o r a v i d d y n a s t y i n

1334 D e a t h o f first Safavid m a s t e r , Safi a l - D i n I s h a q I 3 4 i O t t o m a n s cross S t r a i t s o f G a l l i p o l i ; I b n

N o r t h A f r i c a and Spain 1009

Fatimid Caliph a l - H a k i m orders destruction

B a t t u t a h visits Sumatra Death o f Sultan M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q

o f C h u r c h o f the H o l y Sepulchre i n

1351

Jerusalem

1370-1405 Conquests o f Tamerlane 1389

O t t o m a n s d e f e a t S e r b i a n s at B a t t l e o f K o s o v o

1394

T a m e r l a n e b u i l d s s h r i n e o f A h m a d Y a s a v i at

1 0 3 8 - 1 1 9 4 S e l j u k d y n a s t y r u l e s I r a q a n d Persia

1400

Founding o f Melaka

1041-1186 S e l j u k s u l t a n s r u l e K i r m a n

1407-1506 T i m u r i d s r u l e Herat

1058-1111 A b u H a m i d a l - G h a z a l i , t h e o l o g i a n , l e g a l

1444

Last a n t i - O t t o m a n E u r o p e a n c r u s a d e

'453

Ottomans capture Constantinople

1030

Death o f Sultan M a h m u d o f Ghazni

1031 E n d o f A n d a l u s i a n c a l i p h a t e 1037 D e a t h o f p h i l o s o p h e r I b n S i n a ( A v i c e n n a )

Turkestan City

scholar, a n d m y s t i c w h o i n t e g r a t e d Sufism into mainstream Sunni thought 1071 B a t t l e o f M a n k i z e r t — T u r k i s h n o m a d s d e f e a t Byzantine e m p e r o r a n d enter A n a t o l i a 1071-1178 D a n i s h m e n d i d s r u l e C e n t r a l a n d e a s t e r n

Java 1488-1528 Rule o f Sultan M a h m u d Shah o f 1491 G r a n a d a — l a s t M u s l i m s t r o n g h o l d i n S p a i n — falls t o C h r i s t i a n r u l e r s F e r d i n a n d a n d

1078-1117 S e l j u k d y n a s t y r u l e s S y r i a P o p e U r b a n I I calls f o r c r u s a d e against I s l a m

Isabella 1500— 1599 S h a y b a n i d s r u l e

at C o u n c i l o f C l e r m o n t 1099

Crusaders capture Jerusalem and establish

12th

c e n t u r y Sufi orders begin t o p r o v i d e o r g a n i -

Latin K i n g d o m zational f r a m e w o r k f o r social

1478 I s l a m i c c o n q u e s t o f M a j a p a h i t k i n g d o m i n

Melaka

Asia 1071 —1243 S e l j u k d y n a s t y r u l e s i n A n a t o l i a 1095

d e f e a t e d at V a r n a

Samarqand

1 5 0 1 - 1725 S a f a v i d d y n a s t y i n Persia 1511 P o r t u g u e s e c a p t u r e M e l a k a ; M a h m u d S h a h sets

movements

1130-1269 A l m o h a d d y n a s t y i n N o r t h A f r i c a a n d Spain 1143 F i r s t t r a n s l a t i o n o f Q u r a n i n t o L a t i n c o m m i s s i o n e d t o R o b e r t o f K e t t o n by Peter t h e

u p n e w capital elsewhere i n archipelago and v a i n l y tries t o recapture c i t y u n t i l he dies 1511 —1659 S a a d i a n d y n a s t y r u l e s M o r o c c o 1514 O t t o m a n s d e f e a t Safavids at B a t t l e o f Chaldiran

CHRONOLOGY 1517 O t t o m a n c o n q u e s t o f E g y p t , S y r i a . M e c c a , a n d Medina 1510 O t t o m a n s c a p t u r e

693

1722 A f g h a n s seize I s f a h a n , b r i n g i n g e n d t o S a f a v i d rule i n Iran

Belgrade

• 7 3 6 - 1 7 9 5 A f s h a r i d s i n Persia

1520-1566 Süleyman theMagnificent ruler, h i g h point o f Ottoman Empire

1737-1815 A h m a d a l - T i j a n i , f o u n d e r o f T i j a n i y a h Sufi order, m a j o r n e o - S u f i o r d e r i n

1510-1857 M u g h a l E m p i r e i n I n d i a

M o r o c c o , w h i c h i n s p i r e d West a n d N o r t h

1514 D e a t h o f S h a l l I s m a i l o f S a f a v i d d y n a s t y 1516 B a t t l e o f P a n i p a t . b e g i n n i n g o f M u g h a l r u l e

A f r i c a n j i h a d a n d resistance m o v e m e n t s 1745 B e g i n n i n g o f W a h h a b i m o v e m e n t i n A r a h i a

1516-1858 M u g h a l e m p e r o r s r u l e S o u t h Asia

1747-1842 D u r r a n i s r u l e Afghanistan

1519 F a i l e d siege o f V i e n n a b y O t t o m a n s

1 7 5 0 - 1 7 9 4 Z a n d s r u l e Persia

1554 O t t o m a n o c c u p a t i o n o f B a g h d a d

1754-1817 U t h m a n d a n F o d i o , l e a d e r o f n o r t h e r n

1535-1536 Death o f Bihzad, master o f Herat school

1556-1605 Akbar rules India, h i g h p o i n t o f Mughal Empire

1757-1790 Sultan M u h a m m a d i b n A b d a l l a h r u l e r o f M o r o c c o ; encourages revival o f Islamic

1 5 6 4 - 1 6 2 4 Shaykh A h m a d S i r h i n d i , advocate o f I s l a m i c state a n d s o c i e t y i n I n d i a 1571 B a t t l e o f L e p a n t o — E u r o p e a n s

N i g e r i a n r e f o r m i s t o p p o s i t i o n t o Hausa states

of painting

s c h o l a r s h i p a n d s t u d y o f hadith 1774 T r e a t y o f K u c h u k K a y n a r j a — - R u s s i a n s

block O t t o m a n

advance i n t o M e d i t e r r a n e a n

1 7 7 9 - 1 9 2 4 Q a j a r s r u l e Persia

1574 S i n a n b u i l d s S e l i m i y a m o s q u e i n E d i r n e

1785-1868 M a n g i t s r u l e C e n t r a l Asia

1583 B r i t i s h n e g o t i a t e first t r a d e t r e a t y w i t h

1785-present

Ottoman Empire

N a q s h b a n d i y y a h m o v e m e n t leads

a n d - R u s s i a n resistance i n Caucasus

1 5 8 8 - 1 6 2 9 S h a h A b b a s r u l e r o f Persia, h i g h p o i n t o f Safavid E m p i r e

1 7 8 6 - 1831 S a y y i d A h m a d B a r e l w i , l e a d e r o f j i h a d m o v e m e n t i n I n d i a against S i k h s a n d

1599-1785 Janids i n B u k h a r a

British

1 6 0 3 - 1 6 2 9 Safavids b u i l d M a y d a n o f I s f a h a n 1605

Death o f E m p e r o r A k b a r

1606

Treaty o f Z s i t v a T o r o k — Habsburgs recognise

1 7 8 7 - 1859

M u h a m m a d A l i i b n al-Sanusi o f Libya.

f o u n d e r o f Sanusiyyah t a r i q a h a n d I s l a m i c

Ottoman rule i n Romania,Transylvania, and H u n g a r y

state 1789-1807 Sultan Selim I I I rules O t t o m a n Empire and tries t o i m p l e m e n t Tanzimat reforms;

1613-1645 Rule o f Sultan A g u n g i n second

resisted d u e t o w e s t e r n i z a t i o n i n h e r e n t i n reforms

Mataram dynasty 1631 D e a t h o f M i r D a m a d . f o u n d e r o f I r a n i a n school o f illuminationist philosophy 1 6 3 1 - p r e s e n t Filali ( A l a w i ) dynasty i n M o r o c c o 1639 T r e a t y o f Q a s r S h i r i n — p e r m a n e n t b o r d e r s o f

1792 T r e a t y o f Jassy—Russians c o n s o l i d a t e c o n t r o l o f G e o r g i a , B l a c k Sea, a n d R o m a n i a ; b e g i n ning o fOttoman reforms 1 7 9 4 - 1 8 6 4 J i h a d state i n area o f p r e s e n t - d a y

Mali

a n d Senegal

I r a q a n d I r a n established

1798 F r e n c h o c c u p a t i o n o f E g y p t u n d e r

1643 T a j M a h a l n e a r l y c o m p l e t e d 1658-1707 Aurangzeb rules M u g h a l E m p i r e ,

Napoleon; M u h a m m a d A l i comes to

i m p l e m e n t i n g r e l i g i o u s r u l e o f ulama a n d

power, initiating period o f r e f o r m o f

I s l a m i c basis f o r c h a r a c t e r o f state a n d s o c i -

political and economic structures along Western

ety 1696

take

c o n t r o l o f B l a c k Sea f r o m O t t o m a n s

lines

19th c e n t u r y E u r o p e a n i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n i n t h e

Russia takes A z o v i n C r i m e a

18th c e n t u r y Rise o f n e o - S u f i s m a n d r e n e w e d

Muslim world

i n t e r e s t i n hadith s c h o l a r s h i p as m e a n s f o r

1803-1837 Padri m o v e m e n t i n Sumatra

m o r a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f society; A k h b a r i vs.

1809—1903 S o k o t o

U s u i i debate over p r o p e r source o f g u i d -

1 8 1 7 - 1898 S i r S a y y i d A h m a d K h a n , l e a d e r o f

ance f o r I s l a m i c c o m m u n i t y

Islamic modernist m o v e m e n t i n India

1702-1762 S h a h W a l i A l l a h o f D e l h i , I n d i a , leader

1818- 1845 F a r a i d i o f B e n g a l o p p o s e s H i n d u s a n d British

o f Islamic revival i n India 1703 E d i r n e I n c i d e n t i n O t t o m a n E m p i r e

caliphate

-Shaykh

al-Lslam Feyzullah dominates g o v e r n m e n t

iH 1 9 - 1 9 7 . 3 B a r a k z a i s i n A f g h a n i s t a n 1 8 2 2 - 1 8 9 5 A h m a d C e v d e t Pasha S h a y k h a l - I s l a m

a n d g r a n d v i z i e r s ; h i g h p o i n t o f ulama i n f l u -

o f O t t o m a n Empire formulates civil code

ence o v e r a f f a i r s o f state; o u s t e d b y

c o m b i n i n g Islamic legal p r i n c i p l e s w i t h

Janissaries a n d l o w e r - l e v e l r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s and students 1707 D e a t h o f E m p e r o r A u r a n g z e b

n e w l e g a l ideas a n d

influencesTanzimat

1 8 2 5 - 1 8 3 0 D i p a n e g a r a leads r e v o l t i n lava 1830 F r e n c h i n v a d e A l g e r i a ; A b d a l - Q a d i r , l e a d e r o f

694

CHRONOLOGY Q a d i r i y y a h t a r i q a h . leads r e s i s t a n c e u n t i l 1847

1837 D e a t h o f A h m a d i b n I d r i s , f o u n d e r o f

o f caliphate

Idrisiyyah

1924

Islamic

modernism

1925-1979 Pahlavi dynasty i n I r a n 1926

1927 T a b l i g h i I s l a m f o u n d e d b y M a w l a n a

a n d f o u n d e r o f I s l a m i c state 1849— 1905 M u h a m m a d A b d u h . I s l a m i c

modernist

a n d reformist and c o f o u n d e r o f Salanyyah

M u h a m m a d Uyas 1928

c o m b i n i n g Russian a n d M u s l i m e d u c a t i o n

g i o n o f state e l i m i n a t e d i n T u r k e y 1952 K i n g d o m o l S a u d i A r a b i a f o u n d e d o n basis o f alliance between r e l i g i o n and politics w i t h

t o achieve m o d e r n i z a t i o n

sharíaas l a w

1 8 5 6 - 1 8 7 3 Y u n n a n leads r e b e l l i o n against C h i n e s e r u l e a n d t r i e s t o e s t a b l i s h M u s l i m state

1933-1977 A l i Shariati, ideologue o f I r a n i a n revo­

1862—1867 J i h a d i n Senegal l e d b y M a Ba against French

l u t i o n o f 1979 1941 ] a m a a t - i I s l a m i f o u n d e d i n I n d i a / P a k i s t a n b y Mawlana Abu al-Ala M a w d u d i

1865-1935 Rashid R i d d a , c o f o u n d e r o f Salahyyah m o v e m e n t i n Egypt a n d I s l a m i c

modernist

1943

movement

N a t i o n a l Pact o f L e b a n o n a g r e e d u p o n , a s s u r ­ i n g d o m i n a n c e o f C h r i s t i a n Arabs i n p o l i t i ­ cal process based o n n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y

1 8 7 3 - 1 9 0 8 U l a m a - l e d resistance t o D u t c h o c c u p a ­

i n 1932 census; p r e s i d e n t o f c o u n t r y t o b e

tion ofAcheh

Maronite Christian, p r i m e minister Sunni

modernist

w h o developed ideology f o r f o u n d a t i o n o f

M u s l i m , a n d speaker o f c h a m b e r o f

Pakistan

deputies Shiiie M u s l i m : o t h e r key g o v e r n ­ ment positions distributed proportionally

D e o b a n d i s c h o o l f o u n d e d t o c o m b i n e hadith

along confessional lines

studies a n d Sufism 1 8 7 6 - 1909

Sultan A b d u l h a m i d I I rules O t t o m a n

1947

P a k i s t a n f o u n d e d as state f o r M u s l i m s o f

1948

State o f I s r a e l dec l a r e d

1949

Religious education r e i n t r o d u c e d i n Turkish

E m p i r e a n d p u r s u e s p a n - I s l a m i c i d e a l as caliph 1 8 7 9 - 1 8 8 2 U r a b i r e v o l t against E u r o p e a n

influence

India

i n Egypt, l e a d i n g t o B r i t i s h o c c u p a t i o n and

s c h o o l s as e l e c t i v e c o u r s e ; H a s a n a l - B a n n a

later rise o f n a t i o n a l i s m i n Egypt

assassinated b y E g y p t i a n p o l i c e

1891-1892 Tobacco Protest i n I r a n — u l t i m a a n d

1950

m e r c h a n t s o p p o s e d t o Shah's g o v e r n m e n t g r a n t i n g tobacco concessions t o Europeans; sets p a t t e r n o f c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n

Religious education m a n d a t o r y i n Turkish schools unless parents object

1951 I d r i s i b n a l - M a h d i , g r a n d s o n o f M u h a m m a d

two

ibn A l i al-Sanusi, becomes k i n g o f n e w l y

s o c i a l classes l a t e r u s e d d u r i n g 1979 I r a n i a n

created Libya, h i g h l i g h t i n g leadership and

revolution

nationalistic roles o f Sanusiyah l a r i q a h

1897-1975 Elijah M u h a m m a d , leader o f N a t i o n o f

1952 G a m a l A b d a l - N a s s e r seizes p o w e r i n E g y p t

I s l a m m o v e m e n t i n U n i t e d Slates 1898

M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d f o u n d e d i n E g y p t byH a s a n a l - B a n n a ; r e f e r e n c e t o I s l a m as r e l i ­

m o v e m e n t i n Egypt 185-1-1914 I s m a i l G a s p r i n s k i , s p o n s o r o f s c h o o l s

1876

I s l a m i c law r e p l a c e d b y S w i s s - a n d I t a l i a n based system i n T u r k e y

1883- M u h a m m a d A h m a d , M a h d i o f S u d a n

1 8 7 5 - 1938 M u h a m m a d I q b a l , I s l a m i c

O t t o m a n / T u r k i s h c a l i p h a t e a n d shariah c o u r t system abolished by Muştala K e m a l Atatürk

movement

1838-1897 Jamal a l - D i n a l - A f g h a n i , father o f

1848-

1919-1925 K h i l a f a t m o v e m e n t i n I n d i a i n s u p p o r t

a n d t r i e s t o e s t a b l i s h I s l a m i c state

under banner o f pan - Arabism and Arab

M a h d i s t state o f S u d a n d e f e a t e d b y B r i t i s h ; R a s h i d R i d d a b e g i n s p u b l i s h i n g ul-Manur i n

socialism, s u p p o r t e d b y shaykhs o f a l - A z h a r 1954

M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d f o u n d e d i n Sudan,

E g y p t — j o u r n a l becomes leading publica­

advocating Islamic p o l i t i c a l a n d social o r d e r

t i o n f o r Islamic r e f o r m i s t ideas

v i a a d o p t i o n o f I s l a m i c c o n s t i t u t i o n based

1 8 9 9 - 1 9 2 0 M u h a m m a d A b d a l l a h H a s a n leads

o n the Q u r a n and i n t r o d u c t i o n o f Islamic

resistance t o B r i t i s h i n S o m a l i a

law

1905-1911 C o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v o l t i n I r a n places l i m ­

1908

1956

Pakistan adopts c o n s t i t u t i o n d e c l a r i n g itself

its o n Shah's p o w e r ; l o c a l r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s

an Islamic Republic w i t h a M u s l i m head o f

play key r o l e i n o p p o s i t i o n t o Shah

state a n d based u p o n I s l a m i c p r i n c i p l e s :

Young Turk revolution i nOttoman

Empire

I s l a m i c r e s e a r c h c e n t e r d e e m e d necessary for r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f M u s l i m society o n

1912 M u h a m m a d i y a f o u n d e d i n S o u t h e a s t Asia t o

I s l a m i c basis

p r o m o t e e d u c a t i o n a l a n d social r e f o r m 1919—1924 E n d o f O t t o m a n E m p i r e f o l l o w i n g

1965

C r a c k d o w n o n M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d i n Egypt

W o r l d War I and creation o f Turkish

a f t e r Nasser accuses t h e m o f p l o t t i n g t o

Republic

assassinate h i m

CHRONOLOGY 1966

E x e c u t i o n o f Sayyid Q u t b , p r o m i n e n t w r i t e r

1979

f o r M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d w h o gave m o v e -

1967

f o u n d e d ; A m e r i c a n Embassy seized by m i l i t a n t s u p p o r t e r s o f K h o m e i n i p r o t e s t i n g U.S.

Egypt

ties t o shah; seizure o f G r a n d M o s q u e o f

A r a b - I s r a e l i w a r — A r a b forces r o u t e d by

M e c c a by m i l i t a n t s l e d b y M a h d i i n S a u d i A r a b i a ; S h i i t e r i o t s i n Eastern P r o v i n c e o f

secular p o l i c i e s l i k e n a t i o n a l i s m a n d s o c i a l -

Saudi Arabia, c a l l i n g f o r fairer d i s t r i b u t i o n

ism and sparking Islamic revival

o f o i l w e a l t h a n d services; l i b e r a t i o n o f Afghanistan

M n a m m a r Q a d d a f i seizes p o w e r i n L i b y a ,

1980

a l - N u m a y r i seizes p o w e r i n t h e S u d a n : a l -

tant Tanzim al-Jihad; H a b i b Bourguiba o f

s u m m i t conference c o m b i n i n g p a n -

Tunisia cracks d o w n o n Tunisia's Islamic Trend Movement

O r g a n i z a t i o n o f the Islamic Conference first o f f i c i a l p a n - I s l a m i c

1982

institu-

p t i t d o w n o p p o s i t i o n m o v e m e n t l e d by M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d ; Israel i n v a d e s

ernments

L e b a n o n f o r s e c o n d t i m e ; massacre o f

d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n d e p e n d e n t state o f

i n h a b i t a n t s o f Sabra a n d S h a t i l l a i n L e b a n o n 1983

B a n g l a d e s h ( f o r m e r l y East P a k i s t a n )

courts; c o m m i s s i o n established by G u l f states t o s t u d y a n d d e v e l o p u n i f i e d c o d e o f shariah l a w

and p o l i t i c a l party, rejecting capitalism and s o c i a l i s m a n d p r o m o t i n g I s l a m as a n a l t e r native p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c

1987

system

intifada d e c l a r e d i n Palestine;

Benazir B h u t t o elected p r i m e m i n i s t e r o f P a k i s t a n , first e l e c t e d f e m a l e h e a d o l state

w i t h Egypt r e c o v e r i n g s o m e o f t e r r i t o r y

i n M u s l i m w o r l d ; e n d of I r a n - I r a q W a r ;

l o s t t o Israel i n 1967

M T I ( M o u v e m e n t d e la T e n d a n c e

war; Arab oil embargo

against W e s t s h o w s A r a b s t o b e w o r l d e c o -

I s l a m i q u e ) b e c o m e s Tunisia's l e a d i n g o p p o -

nomic power

sition group, p e r f o r m i n g impressively i n national

M u s a al Sadr f o u n d s M o v e m e n t o f t h e 1989

elections

D e a t h of A y a t o l l a h R u h o l l a h K h o m e i n i , f i r s t

social and p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m i n Lebanon

ruler of Islamic Republic o f Iran and

favoring redistribution o f power and

a u t h o r o f d o c t r i n e o f vilayat-i faqih; H a s h e m i

resources t o i n c l u d e Shiite m a j o r i t y o t h e r -

Rafsanjani elected president o f I r a n :

wise excluded; m i l i t a n t w i n g develops i n t o

Ayatollah SayycdAli Khamenei becomes

AMAL.

faqih; O m a r Hassan a l - B a s h i r seizes p o w e r

Outbreak o f civil war i n Lebanon, resulting i n radicalization o f Shiite p o p u l a t i o n ; M u a m m a r Q a d d a f i o f L i b y a p u b l i s h e s The Gteen Book, o u t l i n i n g h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Islam and the w o r l d Z u l f i k a r AB Bhutto's g o v e r n m e n t i n Pakistan o u s t e d by G e n e r a l iiia u l - H a q , w h o i n t r o duces Islamization

1978

1988

"Operation Badr"—second Arab-Israeli war,

Disinherited, a populist movement for

1977

HAMAS

f o u n d e d i n r e s p o n s e t o intifada

b y N e c m e t t i n E r b a k a n ; g o a l is I s l a m i c state

1975

C r a c k d o w n o n Tunisia's Islamic T r e n d m o v e m e n t by H a b i b B o u r g u i b a g o v e r n m e n t :

N a t i o n a l Salvation Party f o u n d e d i n T u r k e y and Islamization o f Turkish life

September Laws i m p l e m e n t e d i n Sudan, r e i n t r o d u c i n g Islamic laws and military-

A B 1 M ( M a l a y s i a n League o f M u s l i m Y o u t h ) f o u n d e d i n M a l a y s i a as m i s s i o n m o v e m e n t

1974

H a f i z a l - A s a d o f S y r i a levels c i t y o f H a m a t o

tion for cooperation a m o n g Islamic gov1970-1971 E a s t - W e s t P a k i s t a n c i v i l w a r r e s u l t s i n

1973

A n w a r a l - S a d a t o f E g y p t assassinated b y m i l i -

against I s r a e l a n d t o o r g a n i z e a n I s l a m i c

founded-

1972

Hhibollall founded i n Lebanon; Islamic Jihad Brotherhood

1981

Islam ism w i t h Arabism

1971

o c c u p a t i o n b y Soviet

f o u n d e d i n Palestine by M u s l i m

Aqsa M o s q u e i n Jerusalem b u r n e d , l e a d i n g K i n g Faisal o f S a u d i A r a b i a t o c a l l f o r jihad

from

U n i o n , l a r g e l y d u e t o e f f o r t s o f mtijuhidin

later i m p l e m e n t i n g o w n version o f Islamic state as " T h i r d U n i v e r s a l A l t e r n a t i v e " ; Jafar

1970

Iranian R e v o l u t i o n - Islamic Republic o f Iran

m e n t r a d i c a l , m i l i t a n t t o n e , b y Nasser i n

Israel, leading t o Arab d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h

1969

695

Disappearance o f Musa al-Sadr d u r i n g t r i p t o Libya, giving h i m popular " h i d d e n i m a m "

i n Sudan

tied to N a t i o n a l Islamic Front;

FIS ( I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n F r o n t ) i n A l g e r i a sweeps m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s ; T u n i s i a r e f u s e s t o a l l o w Renaissance p a r t y ( f o r m e r l y M T I , o r M o u v e m e n t d e la T e n d a n c e I s l a m i q u e ) to participate in elections i n order to keep r e l i g i o n a n d p o l i t i c s separate 1990—1991 Persian G u l f W a r results

from

Iraq's

invasion o f Kuwait 1990 Islamists w i n 32 o u t o f 80 seats i n J o r d a n i a n

status a m o n g Shi is o f L e b a n o n ; I s r a e l

Parliament and m e m b e r o f M u s l i m

invades L e b a n o n ; Pakistan a n n o u n c e s c r e -

B r o t h e r h o o d is e l e c t e d speaker o f n a t i o n a l

a t i o n o f shatiah c o u r t s

p a r l i a m e n t ; FIS ( I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n F r o n t ) w i n s

696

CHRONOLOGY m u n i c i p a l a n d regional elections i n Algeria,

w a r ; Refah (Welfare) p a r t y w ins m a y o r a l

c o r n i n g t o p o w e r t h r o u g h d e m o c r a t i c process,

elections i n m o r e t h a n a dozen m a j o r cities i n Turkey, i n c l u d i n g A n k a r a a n d I s t a n u l

rather than revolution 1991

FIS ( I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n F r o n t ) w i n s p a r l i a -

N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y t o m a k e i t s leader,

m e n t a r y elections i n Algeria 1 9 9 2 I r a n i a n elections place conservatives

1 9 9 5 ; R e f a h ( W e l f a r e ) P a r t y w i n s e n o u g h seats i n

in con-

trol o f parliament, marginalizing h a r d - l i n ers a n d p a v i n g w a y f o r l i m i t e d liberalization o f political participation and dissent; all m o s q u e s i n Egypt placed u n d e r

N e c m e t t i n E r b a k a n , T u r k e y s first Islamist prime minister 1 9 9 5 D a y t o n Peace A g r e e m e n t f o r r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e Bosnian conflict 1 9 9 7 M o h a m m a d K h a t a m i elected president o f

g o v e r n m e n t c o n t r o l ; m i l i t a r y p r e v e n t s FIS

I r a n , o p e n i n g d o o r t o U n i t e d States f o r c u l -

(Islamic Salvation Front) f r o m c o m i n g to

t u r a l , scholarly, a n d e c o n o m i c exchanges;

p o w e r i n Algeria, cancelling results o f

Algeria resumed parliamentary

democratic parliamentary

a l t h o u g h FIS ( I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n F r o n t )

elections;

elections,

A l g e r i a n g o v e r n m e n t c r a c k d o w n o n FIS,

barred f r o m participating; alternative

l e a d i n g t o c i v i l w a r w h i c h has c l a i m e d o v e r

Islamic movement MSP (Movement o f

100,000

lives

1 9 9 3 B o m b i n g o f W o r l d Trade Center i n N e w York City; t i e d t o Shaykh U m a r A b d a l - Rahman 1 9 9 4 Baruch Goldstein (Jewish setder) k i l l s 2 9

S o c i e t y f o r Peace) w i n s s e c o n d h i g h e s t n u m b e r o f votes 1 9 9 8 Refah party declared u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d b a n n e d f r o m p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y a n d assets

w o r s h i p e r s at M o s q u e o f t h e P a t r i a r c h i n

seized b y state; d e p u t y p r i m e m i n i s t e r a n d

H e b r o n , p r o v o k i n g s u i c i d e b o m b i n g s by

leader o f A B I M , A n w a r I b r a h i m , r e m o v e d

Qassam Brigade ( m i l i t a r y w i n g o f H A M A S ) ; Taliban, c o m p o s e d o f religious leaders a n d

f r o m p o w e r i n Malaysia 1 9 9 8 I n c r e a s i n g v i o l e n c e i n K o s o v o leads t o i n t e r -

students, appears i n Afghanistan, c l a i m i n g

n a t i o n a l s a n c t i o n s against t h e Y u g o s l a v i a n

m a n t l e o f m o r a l leadership a n d e n d i n g c i v i l

(Serbian) government

SELECT

CHAPTER

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ONE

CHAPTER

Hor a Heft survey o f t h e N e a r Eastern b a c k g r o u n d

TWO

B o o k s have a habit o f g o i n g o u t o f p r i n t w i t h a l a r m ¬

against w h i c h I s l a m e m e r g e d , c o n s u l t Peter

i n g f r e q u e n c y i n t h e field o f l s l a m i c s t u d i e s . W h a t

B r o w n ' s The World of Late Antiquity ( L o n d o n : H a r t o u n .

f o l l o w s is a s h o r t l i s i o f w o r k s t h a i m i g h t h e l p i h e

Brace, J o v a n o v i c h , 1971). A sensible t r e a t m e n t o f

reader w h o is i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e issue o f l s l a m i c

t h e l i f e o f the P r o p h e t M u h a m m a d , w l i i c h m a n -

f a i t h a n d practice a n d its relevance to i h e fields of

ages t o a v o i d the e x t r e m e s o f e i t h e r u n d u e s k e p t i -

l a w a n d eth.es. W o r k s q u o t e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r are

c i s m o r c r e d u l o u s a p o l o g e t i c that m a r m a n y

also l i s t e d b e l o w .

w o r k s , is F. E. Peters' Muhummud and the Origins of Islam

M u h a m m a d A h u l Q u a s e m ' s The Ethics oful Gha7ali:A

( A l b a n y , N.Y.: S U N Y Press. 1 9 9 4 ) . T h e best r e c e n t

Composite Ethics in Islam ( D e l m a r , N e w Y o r k : Caravan

s u r v e y o f early I s l a m i c h i s t o r y i n i h e mashriq is

B o o k s . 1978)

f o u n d i n H u g h Kenned)''s The Prophet and the Age of the

a l - G h a z a l i ' s e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s . A l t h o u g h t h i s b o o k is

Caliphates:The Islumic Near Fust from [he Sixth to the Eleventh

o u t o f p r i n t , i t can be f o u n d i n m a j o r u n i v e r s i t y

Centuries ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1986). For t h e I s l a m i c

a n d p u b l i c l i b r a r i e s . C h a p t e r t h r e e o f V i n c e n t J.

West, see J a m i l M . A h u n - N a s r ' s A History of the

C o r n e l l ' s Realm of the Saim. Pmver and Authority in

Maghrib in the Islamic Period ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e

Moroccan Sufism ( A u s t i n , T e x a s : U n i v e r s i t y o f Texas

U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1987)

Press, 1998)

o n N o r t h A f r i c a . O n Spain,

is t h e sole s o u r c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n

A b u - 1 Abbas al-Sabti a n d h i s t e a c h i n g s i n the

see t z h e m a n y v a l u a b l e essays i n Salma K h a d r a

E n g l i s h language. Charles l.e G a i Eaton's Mum and the

J a y y u s i . e d . . The Legacy of Muslim Spain ( L e i d e n ,

Destiny of Man ( C a m b r i d g e : I s l a m i c Texts Society.

N e t h e r l a n d s : E. J. B r i l l , 1991). A c o n c i s e r e v i e w o f d e v e l o p m e n t s i n I r a n f r o m the e l e v e n t h t o the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s is f o u n d i n the relevant c h a p t e r s of D a v i d M o r g a n ' s Medieval Persiu, 1 0 4 0 - 1 7 9 7 ( L o n d o n :

1994)

is o n e o f i h e best i n t r o d u c t i o n s t o I s l a m f o r

the g e n e r a l reader, especially w i t h r e g a r d 10 d i e relationship between faith and practice. A l t h o u g h M a j i d F a k b i y ' s Ethical Theories in Islam ( L e i d e n a n d

R o u t l e d g e . 1988); a m u c h f u l l e r t r e a i m e n t is p r o v i d e d b y t w o r i c h v o l u m e s o f t h e Cambridge History of Iran: v o l u m e 4, From the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs, a n d

N e w Y o r k : E. J. B r i l l , 1991)

focuses m o s t l y o n p h i l o -

s o p h i c a l ethics, its c h a p t e r o n s c r i p t u r a l m o r a l i t y contains useful i n f o r m a t i o n o n ethical principles

v o l u m e ç. The Suljuq and Mongol Periods ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 197c a n d

is i h e besi s o u r c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n

i n the Q u r a n a n d the h a d i t h . R i c h a r d M . Frank's

1968,

" K n o w ledge a n d Taqlid:The F o u n d a t i o n s o f

respectively).

R e l i g i o u s Belie! i n Classical A s h a r i s m . " Journal of ihc

A readable o v e r v i e w o f the early spread of I s l a m In

American Oriental Society 109:1

(January-March

1989),

A n a t o l i a , associated w i t h t h e a r r i v a l o f the T u r k s , is

3 7 - 6 2 , p r o v i d e s t h e classical I s l a m i c j u s r i f i c a U o n

C l a u d e Cahen's Pre-OttomunTurkey ( N e w Y o r k :

f o r m a n y o f t h e t h e o l o g i c a l assertions m e n t i o n e d

T a p l i n g e r , 1 9 6 8 ) . T h e m o r e a m b i t i o u s reader may-

above. A l t h o u g h T o s h i h i k o b u t s u ' s Ethico-Religious

l o o k to M a r s h a l l G. S. H o d g s o n ' s m a g i s t e r i a l The

Concepts in the Quran ( M o n t r e a l : M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y

Venture oflslum, 3 v o l s . ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y of

Press, 1966) is n o w o u t o f p r i m , i t s h o u l d be

C h i c a g o Press, 1975); a l t h o u g h i t is n o t a l w a y s easy

s o u g h t i n m a j o r u n i v e r s i t y a n d p u b l i c l i b r a r i e s as

to read, this w o r k remains ihe m o s t intellectually

the best source o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n Q u r a n i c e t h i c s .

s t i m u l a t i n g synthesis o f the e n t i r e t y of M u s l i m h i s -

Cod and Man in [he Koran: Semantics of the Koranic

t o r y a n d c i v i l i z a t i o n , a n d i t is especially s t r o n g o n

Weltanschauung ( N e w Y o r k : A r n o Press, 1980)

t h e p e r i o d s c o v e r e d i n t h i s chapter. A n i n t e r e s t i n g

a n o t h e r classic w o r k b y l z u t s u . I i is especially v a l u -

recent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f I s l a m i c

able f o r its c h a p t e r o n t h e e t h i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p

c u l t u r e is f o u n d i n R i c h a r d B u l h e t ' s IslomTbcVtew

beiw-een G o d a n d m a n i n I s l a m a n d ils d i s c u s s i o n

from the Edge ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press.

o f i h e t e r m islam a n d the c o n c e p t o f r e l i g i o n .

1994). For readers w h o have d i f f i c u l t y g r a s p i n g the

Sayyid Q u i b ' s In ihe Shade o( [he Quran, trans. M . A d i l

realities of r e m o t e p e r i o d s of h i s t o r y , because they

Salahi a n d A s h u r A . S h a m i s ( L o n d o n : M W H

is

have lift le sense o f w h a t l i f e i n p r e m o d e m t i m e s

Publishers. 1979). is t h e E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n o f the

w a s actually l i k e . Patricia C r o n e ' s Pre-Industrial

t h i r t i e t h part of Q u i b ' s Fi Zilal ul-Quran, w h i c h was

Societies ( O x f o r d : Basil B l a c k w e l l . 1989) is highly-

p u b l i s h e d after t h e a u t h o r ' s d e a t h i n 1966. A b u

recommended.

Bakr Siraj a d - D i n ' s Book of Certainty ( C a m b r i d g e :

697

698

SELECT

B I B I I O G RAP H Y

I s l a m i c Texts Society; 1992) is o n e o f t h e best d i s -

a n d e n h a n c e d e d i t i o n o f t h i s w o r k is f o r t h c o m i n g

c u s s i o n s i n any l a n g u a g e of t i n - Q u r a n i c c o n c e p t s

f r o m t h e I s l a m i c Texts S o c i e t y S u h h i M a l i i l i a s s a n i ' s

o f t h e " k n o w l e d g e o f c e r t a i n t y , " t h e " e y e o f cer-

Fulsolut of-TashriThe Philosophy ol Jurisprudence in Islam,

t a i n t y . " a n d t h e " t r u t h o f c e r t a i n t y " Finally, F r i t h j o l

trans, f a r h a t Z i a d e h ( L e i d e n , N e t h e r l a n d s : E.J.

S c h u o n ' s Undemanding Islam ( B l o o m i n g t o i i , I n d i a n a :

B r i l l . 1961), p r o v i d e s c o n c i s e a n d r e l i a b l e i n f o r m s

W o r l d W i s d o m B o o k s , 1994). t h e E n g l i s h transla

t i o n o n t h e s o u r c e s , s c h o o l s , a n d legal m a x i m s o f

t i o n o f Comprendre L'lslam {Paris. 1976). p r o v i d e s o n e

I s l a m i c law a n d d r a w s i n t e r e s t i n g c o m p a r i s o n s

o f the best o v e r a l l c o m p a r i s o n s o f t h e Q u r a n i c

w i t h R o m a n law T h i s h o o k also p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l

w o r l d v i e w w i t h that o f C a t h o l i c C h r i s t i a n i t y . T h i s

h i h l i i i g r a p h ) 1 it A r a b i c w o r k s o n t h e s u b j e c t . N o d

h i g h l y i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t r o d u c t i o n t o I s l a m is n o t suit-

J, C o i i l s o n ' s Islamic Survey*: A History of Islamic Law

able f o r every reader, h o w e v e r

( E d i n b u r g h , S c o t l a n d : E d i n b u r g h U n i v e r s i t y Press.

C o p y r i g h t s i n A r a b i c p u b l i s h i n g are o f t e n loosely

1964)

a n d Joseph Schacht's An Introduction to Islamic

e n f o r c e d . I n a d d i t i o n , classic w o r k s o f I s l a m i c

Law { O x f o r d ; C l a r e n d o n P u s s . 1964) pros i d e use-

s c h o l a r s h i p may be r e p r i n t e d ( o f t e n f r o m t h e same

ful i n f o r m a t i o n o n the history o f Islamic law a n d

o r i g i n a l ) i n m o r e t h a n o n e c o u n t r y as a service t o

l e a d i n g s c h o o l s a n d j u r i s t s . Schacht's b o o k also

the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . F o r reasons s u c h as these,

c o n t a i n s b r i e f chapters o n f a m i l y law, i n h e r i t a n c e ,

e d i t i o n s o f t h e Q u r a n a n d p r o p h e t i c r a d i i h are

p e n a l law. a n d c o n t r a c t s N o e l J. C o u l s o n ' s Succession

usual!) c i t e d g e n e r i c a l l y i n b i b l i o g r a p h i e s , l e a v i n g

in the Muslim Family ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e

o u t t h e m e n t i o n o f p u b l i s h e r a n d date. F o r e x a m -

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971) p r o v i d e s a d e t a i l e d treat

ple, t h e v e r s i o n o f M u s l i m i b n a l - H a j j a | a l -

m e n t o f b o t h t h e S u n n i and Shine laws o f i n h e r i -

N'isaburi's Sahib Muslim used f o r t h i s c h a p t e r ( t h e

tance Reliable i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e sources a n d

s o u r c e o f the H a d i t h o f G a b r i e l discussed i n t h i s

v a r i o u s b r a n c h e s o f I s l a m i c law c a n be f o u n d i n

c h a p t e r ) w a s c o p i e d f r o m an u n s p e c i f i e d o r i g i n a l

A b d u r R a h i m ' s Principles of Muhammudun Jurisprudence

a n d p u b l i s h e d ai a n u n s p e c i f i e d date i n B e i r u t b y

( L o n d o n : Luzac & C o . , 1911).

Dar al K u t u b al A r a h i y y a . A p p e n d e d t o t h e text is a

A h m a d V o n D e n f f e r ' s Ulum al-Our'an. lniroduction to the

c o m m e n t a r y o n Sahih Muslim by t h e f a m o u s Shafiite

Sciences ol the Qui an {Leicester. E n g l a n d : I s l a m i c

j u r i s t A b u Z a k a r i y a al-N'avvawi ( n j j - 7 7 ) . S u c h

F o u n d a t i o n , 1985) o f f e r s g e n e r a l b u t c o n c i s e i n f o r -

c o m m e n t a r i e s are o f t e n u s e f u I f o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e

m a t i o n o n t h e Q u r a n Said R a m a d a n s Islamic La» Tts

m a j o r i t y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a n o r m a t i v e text . T h e

Scope and Fuuity, 2nd e d . ( n . p , . 1970) is l u c i d o n t h e

o t h e r Arabic w o r k s cited u i this chapter were p u b -

sources o f law a n d ijtihad a n d has u s e f u l i n f o r m a -

lished w i t h full attention t o c o p y r i g h t regulations.

t i o n o n s u c h subjects as n a t i o n a l i t y a n d c i t i z e n s h i p .

A b u M u h a m m a d i b u A h i Zayd a l - Q a y r a w a n i ' s Ma:n

A n o t h e r r e l i a b l e w o r k o n these a n d s u c h o i l i e r

al-Risuiuh [ t e x t of t h e treatise] (Rabat, M o r o c c o :

t h e m e s as w a r . peace, a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l law is

M i n i s t r y o f E n d o w e d Properties and Islamic

M u h a m m a d H a m i d u l l a h ' s Muslim Conduct of State.

A f f a i r s , 1984) w a s W r i t t e n b y a l - Q a y r a w a n i w h e n

2nd e d . ( l a h o r e . Pakistan: Shah M u h a m m a d

he w a s o n l y seventeen years o l d . C o m p o s e d as a

Ashraf. 1955). M u h a m m a d Iqbal's Reconstruction of

response t o an e a r l i e r S h i i t c c r e e d , i t is t h e m o s t l y

Religious Thought in Islam ( r e p r i n t , L a h o r e . Pakistan:

w i d e l y k n o w n S u n n i c r e e d i n N o r t h a n d West

A s h r a f P r i n t i n g Press, 1983) is a classic a n d p r o -

A l r i c a . Q u o t a t i o n s f r o m A b u - l - A b b a s al-Sabti came

v i d e s c o n c i s e i n f o r m a t i o n a n d t h o u g h t f u l analysis

f r o m Y u s u f i b n al Zayyat al Tadili's al Tashawivuf ila

o n t h e salient aspects o f I s l a m a n d t h e Shariah.

rijalal

Jamal J. Nasir's The Islamic Lai* of Personal Status

tasawvvuf no akhbarAbi-I-Abbas al-Sabti [ I n s i g h t

i n t o the m e n o f Sufism a n d i n f o r m a t i o n o n A b u - l -

( L o n d o n : G r a h a m & T r o t m a n . 1986) is d e t a i l e d a n d

Abbas al-SabriJ, e d . A h m e d T o t i f i q (Rabat,

r e l i a b l e o n f a m i l y l a w . T h e r e are several o t h e r g o o d

M o r o c c o : C o l l e g e o f Letters. M o h a m m e d V

w o r k s o n I s l a m i c p e r s o n a l law. i n c l u d i n g Asaf A .

U n i v e r s i t y . 1 9 8 4 ) . T h i s w o r k , first p u b l i s h e d i n the

Fyzee's Ou[lines of Muhammadcn Law. 4th e d . ( D e l h i :

early

thirteenth

c e n t u r y , is o n e o f the oldest

O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1974) a n d D. F. M u l l a ' s

sources o n t h e f o u n d e r s o l t h e M o r o c c a n Sufi tra-

Principles of Mohomedun Low. 16th e d . ( B o m b a y , I n d i a :

dition.

T r i p a t h i Private L t d . . 1968). J o h n L . Esposito's Women in .Muslim family Law ( N e w Y o r k : S) racuse U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982) p r o v i d e s a l u c i d o v e r v i e w o f m o d e r n r e f o r m s o f M u s l i m f a m i l y law i n E g y p t

CHAPTER

THREE

A useful b i b l i o g r a p h y o f English and Arabic w o r k s o n I s l a m i c law c a n be f o u n d i n M o h a m m a d F l a s h i m K a m a l i ' s Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 2nd e d . ( C a m b r i d g e : I s l a m i c Texts Society. 1991 ) . T h i s b o o k also p r o v i d e s a n e x t e n s i v e t r e a t m e n t o f the sources of I s l a m i c law a n d legal t h e o r y . T h e t h i r d revised

a n d Pakistan. A u s e f u l collec t i o n a n d extracts o f t h e s t a t u t o r y laws o f v a r i o u s M u s l i m C o u n t r i e s , w i t h special r e f e r e n c e t o m o d e r n r e f o r m s , c a n be f o u n d i n T a h i r M a h m o o d ' s Family Lai> Reform in the Muslim World ( N e w D e l h i : I n d i a n l a w I n s t i t u t e . 1972). H e r b e r t J. Liebesny's Low of the Near and Middle East

SELECT ( A l b a n y : N o v Y o r k U n i v e r s i t y Press. 197c)

is also

i n f o r m a t i v e o n ttta a p p l i e d aspects o f the Shariah

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699

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N o r m a n J. A n d e r s o n ' s Law Reform in the Muslim World ( L o n d o n : A t h l o n e Pess, 1976)

provides background

i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e m o d e r n r e f o r m s o f the S h a r i a h in various M u s l i m countries.

CHAPTER

FOUR

T h e latest a n d m o s t successful a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e a

M o h a m m a d H a h s i m K a m a l i ' s Freedom of E.tpression in

c o m p r e h e n s i v e o v e r v i e w o f A r a b i c science is

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Astronomy.Theoretical and Applied, s o l . 1, Mathematics and

the legal a n d m o r a l p c r s p e c l i v e s o f I s l a m . K a m a l i ' s

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a r t i c l e , "Siyasah S h a r i y y a h o r the Policies o f I s l a m i c

Sciences, s o l . 3. M a n y o f the t o p i c s discussed i n t h i s

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t h i s e n c y c l o p e d i a , especially i n the c o n t r i b u t i o n s

the subject, a l t h o u g h b r i e f references t o t h e s u b j e c t

by Régis M o r e l o n , G e o r g e Saliba, a n d R o s h d i

can also be f o u n d i n A n d e r s o n ' s Law Reform. M o r t c z a

Rashed. C.C. G i l l i s p i e . e d . . Dictionary ofScientilic

M u l a f i h a r i ' s Junsprudemc and lis Principles. E n g l i s h

Biography, 16 vols, ( N e w Y o r k : S c r i h n e r ,

t r a n s . , M o h a m m a d Salman Taw h e e d i ( E l m h u r s t ,

c o n t a i n s u s e f u l e n t r i e s o n several A r a b scientists.

N e v v Y o r k T a h r i k c T a r s i l e Q u r a n , I n c . , 1982). p r o -

F o r u s e f u l i l l u s t r a t i o n s , see Seyyed H o s s e i n Nasr,

vides concise i n f o r m a t i o n o n Shii jurisprudence.

Islamic Science; An Illustrated Study ( We sterli a m , E n g l a n d :

Usef u l i n f o r m a t i o n o n Shii legal t h o u g h t a n d i n s t i -

W o r l d o f I s l a m Festival P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y L t d .

t u t i o n s can also b e f o u n d i n H o s s e i n M o d e r r e s s i

1976); p h o t o g r a p h s by R o l a n d M i c h a u d .

Tahaiabai's An Imreduction 10 Shii law.A Bibliographical Study ( L o n d o n : Ithaca Press, 1984).

O n t h e o r e t i c a l a s t r o n o m y the closest w o r k t o a syst e m a t i c o v e r v i e w o f the r e f o r m t r a d i t i o n i n A r a b i c

I b n Q a y y i m al Jawziyya's al Turuq al-Hukmiyya hl-Siyasa

a s t r o n o m y is G e o r g e Sali t u . A History of Arabic Astronomy: Plunetary Theories during the Golden Age of Islam

al Shuri>-ya (Methods of Judgmeni in a Shariuh-Oriented Policy) ( C a i r o : al-Muassasa a l - A r a b i > ya lil-Tabaa, 1961)

1970-80).

is a w o r k o l a u t h o r i t y o n s e n t e n c i n g p o l i c y

a n d m e t h o d s o f j u d g m e n t , especially \\ i t h i n t h e

( N e w Y o r k ; N e w York U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1994). O t h e r c o l l e c t i o n s o f s p e c i a l i z e d studies w i t h u s e f u l g e n e r a l o v e r v i e w s i n c l u d e E. S. Kennedy .

general f r a m e w o r k of Siyasa s h a r i a h . A b u I s h a q

" C o l l e a g u e s a n d F o r m e r S t u d e n t s . " i n eds. D a v i d A .

I b r a h i m al Shatibi's al Muuuluuu! h usul ul Ahkum

K i n g a n d M a r y H e l l e n K e n n e d y , Studies m thr Islam»

(Concordances in the Essentials of Shariah Rulings), e d .

E.vact Sciences ( B e i r u t . L e b a n o n : A m e r i c a n U n i v e r s i t y

Shay k h A b d A l l a h D i r a z ( C a i r o : al M a k t a b a al

o f B e i r u t . 1983); a n d J u l i o Samso. Islamic Astronomy

T i j a r i y y a a l - K u b r a , n . d . ) , is w i d e l y k n o w n l o r its

and Medieval Spain ( A l d e r s h o t , E n g l a n d : V a r i o : u m

pioneering c o n r r i h u i i o n to the philosophy o f

R e p r i n t s . 1994) . I n a d d i t i o n , t i t l e s o f é d i t i o n s ,

I s l a m i c law a n d m a r k s a d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e h a l -

t r a n s l a t i o n s , a n d studies o f i m p o r t a n t classics o l

l o w e d t e x t u a l i s t r e a d i n g o f the sources of s h a r i a h

A r a b i c a s t r o n o m y can he f o u n d i n t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y

that h a d h i t h e r t o d o m i n a t e d I s l a m i c j u r i s t i c

o l H a s h e d , e d . , Encyclopedia of the History of Archie Science

t h o u g h t . M u h a m m a d A m i n i b n A b i d i n . Majmuah

i n e n t r i e s u n d e r E. S. K e n n e d y . G e o r g e Saliba. D a v i d

Rasail Ibn Abidin [ c o l l e c t i o n o f treatises by I b n

K i n g . R é g i s M o r e l o n . a n d J a m i l Ragep

A h i d i n J ( U h o r c , Pakistan: Stihayl A c a d e m y .

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is a reliable b o o k ( 2 sols, i n o n e ) o f H a n a f i l a w o n selected issues that stands o u t m o r e f o r its l u c i d i t y rather U i a n its o i i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n . T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y Egy p t i a n s c h o l a r Shay k h Y u s u f a l - Q a r a d a w i ' s Madkhol li-Durasat al Shariah al-tslamiyya ( a n e n t r y t o the study o f shariah) (Cairo: Maktaba Wahba, 1990) p r o v i d e s a c o n c i s e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e s h a r i a h a n d c o n t a i n s many o f t h e a u t h o r ' s o w n r e s p o n s es t o c o n t e m p o r a r y j u r i s t i c issues A n d lasdy, t h e O t t o m a n M e j e l l e o f 1876, s i o n , i n a b o u t 1,8co

w h i c h is a c o d i f i e d s-er

articles, o f the H a n a f i l a w o f

c i v i l transac t i o n s is a g e n e r a l w o r k o f reference that is w i d e l y accepted i n the c o u r t s o f s h a r i a h t h r o u g h o u t t h e M u s l i m w o r l d . A n E n g l i s h translat i o n o f t h i s w o r k is p r o v i d e d b y C. R.Tyser, The

O n p r a c t i c a l a s t r o n o m y Ay d i n S a y i l i , The Observaiory in Islam ( A n k a r a , T u r k c y : T u r k T a r i h K u r u m u B a s i m e v i , i 9 6 0 ) , r e m a i n s a classic. Several studies o n i n s t r u ments, timekeeping, and astronomical coniputa t i o n s are c o n v e n i e n t l y c o l l e c t e d i n D a v i d K i n g ' s Astronomy in the Smice of Islam ( A l d e r s h o t , E n g l a n d : V a r i o r u m R e p r i n t s . 1993); i n K i n g , Islamic Mathematical Astronomy ( L o n d o n : V a r i o r u m R e p r i n t s . 1986); a n d i n K i n g . Mamie Mathematical Instruments ( L o n d o n : V a r i o r u m R e p r i n t s , 1987). I n t h e past t w o decades t h e w i d e - r a n g i n g research o f R o s h d i Rashed has b e e n i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a d v a n c i n g scholars' u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the various disciplines o f A r a b i c m a t h e m a t i c s . Rashed has p r o d u c e d several c r i t i c a l e d i t i o n s , t r a n s l a t i o n s of, a n d c o m m e n taries o n A r a b i c m a t h e m a t i c a l l e x i s i n the

70O

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discussion

o f t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f sciences see I b n K h a l d u n , The Mugaddimuh ( I n t r o d u c t i o n [ t o the Science o f H i s t o r y ] ) , trans. F. R o s e n t h a l , a b r i d g e d N . J, D a w o o d , p. 371

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CHAPTER

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Charles A d a m s ' Islam and Modernism in Egypt ( L o n d o n : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1933)

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high-

l i g h t s t h e Shii t e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o p h i l o s o p h y a n d c o n t a i n s a d e t a i l e d b i b l i o g r a p h y M a j i d Fakhry's A History of Islamic Philosophy, 2nd e d . ( L o n d o n a n d N e w Y o r k , L o n g m a n s a n d C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1983) is the s t a n d a r d w o r k o n t h e subject i n E n g l i s h . I t has b e e n translated i n t o n u m e r o u s l a n guages. A l s o see Eakhry. trans.. The Quran ( R e a d i n g , P a . : G a r n e i P u b l i s h i n g , 1997). L. G a r d e t a n d M , M . A n a w a t i ' s Introduction a la thenlogie musulmane (Paris: V r i n , 1948)

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perceptive and authoritative account o f Islamic theological and political developments in m o d e r n CHAPTER

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FIVE

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and Laiv, trans. A n d r a s a n d R u t h H a m o r i ( P r i n c e t o n , N.J.: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1981). o r i g i n a l l y

i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e arts o f the I s l a m i c l a n d s f r o m

w r i t t e n i n G e r m a n , c o n t i n u e s t o be o n e o f the

t h e i r b e g i n n i n g s t o t h e present A m o r e s c h o l a r l y

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a p p r o a c h can he f o u n d i n the t w o - v o l u m e set f r o m

M a l c o l m H . K e r r ' s Islamic Reform ( B e r k e l e y :

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E t r i n g h a u s c n a n d O l e g Grabar's The A n and

t h o u g h t f u l presentation o (Islamic m o d e r n i s m and

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M u h a m m a d A b d u h ' s r o l e i n its d e v e l o p m e n t

J o n a t h a n M . B l o o m . The Art and Architecture of Islam;

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the Crusades ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e a n d K c g a n Paul,

I n s t i t u t i o n Press. 1980) is a c o l l e c t i v e w o r k w i t h

L t d . . 1969) c o n t a i n s e x t r a c t s f r o m t h e w r i t i n g s o f

b e a u t i f u l l y i l l u s t r a t e d articles o n the m a i n f o r m s o f

M u s l i m historians, chroniclers, and biographers

O t t o m a n art a n d a r c l i i i e c t u r e . Sheila Blair a n d

that d e a l w i t h battles b e t w e e n C h r i s t i a n s a n d

J o n a t h a n B l o o m , The Art and Architecture of Islam,

M u s l i m s i n die Crusades.YvonneY.

Haddad and

1250-1800 ( N e w H a v e n , C o n n . : Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y

W a d i Z. H a d d a d . eds.. Christian-Muslim Encounters

Press, 1994)

( G a i n e s v i l l e : U n i v e r s i t y Press o f F l o r i d a ,

I s l a m i c arts f o r o u r p e r i o d . E c r n a n d Braudel's The

199c)

p r o v i d e s p r o c e e d i n g s of a c o n f e r e n c e o n r e l a t i o n s

is t h e best s i n g l e v o l u m e survey o f

Mediterranean and the Meditenanean World, 2 v o l s . , t r Sian

between M u s l i m s and Christians i n historical and

R e y n o l d s ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d R o w , 1972)

c o n t e m p o r a r y perspectives, i n c l u d i n g s c r i p t u r e ,

classic study o f the g e o g r a p h y a n d c u l t u r e , t h e

c o n t a c t s , r e g i o n a l s t u d i e s , a n d t h e o l o g i c a l reflec

societies a n d e c o n o m i e s , a n d of the great

t i o n s . M a r s h a l l G. S. H o d g s o n ' s TheVenture of Islam. 2

H a b s b u r g - O t t o m a n s t r u g g l e f o r the c o n t r o l o l t h e

v o l s . , The Classical Age of Islam, v o l . 1, a n d The Expansion

M e d i t e r r a n e a n i n [he s i x t e e n t h c e n i u r y Soraya

is a

702

SELECT

BIBLIOGRAPHY

F a r o q h i . Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia

N e w Y o r k U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1991), is a h e l p f u l Sin

( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984)

g l e - v o l u m e h i s t o r y o f the Jewish m i n o r i t y u n d e r

e x m i n c s the O t t o m a n pros inces a n d the C h a n g i n g

O t t o m a n r u l e . Peter E Sugar, Southeastern Furope under

b a l a n c e ' o l social a n d e c o n o m i c p o w e r b e t w e e n

Ottoman Rule. 1354-1X04 (Seattle. W a s h . : U n i v e r s i t y o f

capital a n d s m a l l cities.

W a s h i n g t o n Press, 1977). i s c r i t i c a l t o u n d e r s t a n d ­

N e i l G o f f m a n . Izmir and the lountine World. 1550-1650 (Seattle, W a s h . : U n i v e r s i t y of W a s h i n g t o n Press, 1990)

studies t h e g r o w i n g f o r e i g n t r a d e o l I z m i r i n

the seventeenth c e n t u r y a n d t h e p o l y g l o t c o m m u ­ n i t i e s that a s s e m b l e d t h e r e G o d f r e y G o o d w i n . A History of Ottoman Architecture ( L o n d o n : T h a m e s a n d H u d s o n , 1971) is a c o m p r e h e n s i v e survey o f the p r e m i e r r o y a l art. A n d r e w Hess. The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Si xieenth-Century I hero African Frontier ( C h i c a g o , 111.: U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1978) e x p l o r e s the c u l m i n a t i o n o f d i e c e n t u r y

long

struggle for the control o f the Mediterranean w i d i d e e p i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e r o l e of sea a n d l a n d p o w e r i n these wars.

emergence o l nationalism and mosenients for i n d e p e n d e n c e i n the Balkans. Speros V r y o n i s , Jr.. The Decline ol Medieval Hellenism m Asia Minor (Berkeley. C a l . : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1971) is d i e best case study o f t h e processes b y w h i c h Christian populations were converted t o İslam

İm m a n t l e I W a l l c r s t e i n ' s The Modern World

System. 3 v o l s . (San D i e g o . C a l . : . A c a d e m i c Press, 1974- 8 9 ) , is a g r a n d l y c o n c e i v e d c o m p a r a t i v e study o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the g l o b a l e c o n o m y a n d a n i m p o r t a n t theory a b o u t h i s t o r i c a l process. Stuart Cary W e l c h . A King s Book of Kings.Thr Shah-numeh of ShuhTahmasp ( L o n d o n . 1972). is a n elegant w o r k

H a l i l Inalcik's The Ottoman EmpireTheClassicalAae, 1300-1600, tr. N . l l / k o w i t z a n d C. I m b e r ( I n n d o n , 1973)

i n g t h e e c o n o m i c a n d social basis f o r t h e e v e n t u a l

o n t h i s m o s t e x q u i s i t e o f Persian i l l u s t r a t e d m a n u ­ scripts.

is the classic w o r k o n O t t o m a n i n s t i t u t i o n s .

H a l i l I n a l c i k a n d D o n a l d Q u a i a c r t ' s An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Fmpire, 1300-1914

CHAPTER

( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994) is

For g e n e r a l texts see Joseph E. S c h w a r t z berg's A

a c o l l e c t i v e a n d a u t h o r i t a t i v e appraisal o f O t t o m a n

Historical Atlas of South Asia for South Asid ( C h i c a g o :

NINE

e c o n o m y a n d society. H o u r i I s l a m o g l u - I n a n ' s State

U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1978) a n d R o b e r t L

and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire ( L e i d e n , E. ] . B r i l l .

C a n f i e l d . e d . . Turko-Persia in Historical Perspeitiic

1994)

probes the A n a t o l i a n c o u n t r y s i d e t o b r i n g

n e w i n s i g h t s i n t o the s t r u c t u r e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f O t t o m a n r u r a l e c o n o m y a n d society

Cemal

( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1991). For l e x i s o n S o u t h Asia see R i c h a r d Eaton's " K e n í e m b e r i n g / I m a g i n i n g Persia; M e d i e v a l

Kafadar's Between Two WoridsThe Construction ol the

Deccani M i g r a n t s and die Iranian H o m e l a n d , "

Otromun Sttite (Berkeley, C a l . : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a

paper d e l i v e r e d at i h e R o c k e f e l l e r W o r k s h o p 3 o n

Press. 1995) e x p l o r e s the c h a n g i n g h i s t o r i o g r a p i n ­

" S o u t h A s i a n I s l a m a n d the Greater M u s l i m W o r l d "

eal perspectives o n t h e o r i g i n s o f t h e O t t o m a n sys­

at N o r t h C a r o l i n a State U n i v e r s i t y i n R a l e i g h , N . C . .

t e m . B e r n a r d Lewis's Istanbul and the Civilization ol the

f r o m 2 2 - 2 5 M a y 1997. S i m o n D i g b y ' s " T h e Sufi

Ottoman Empire ( N o r m a n . O k l a . : U n i v e r s i t y o f

S h a y k h a n d d i e Sultan: A C o n f l i c t o f C l a i m s t o

O k l a h o m a Press. 1963) a f f o r d s a c o n v e n i e n t i n t r o ­

A u t h o r i t y i n M e d i e v a l I n d i a , " Iron 28 ( 1990);

d u c t i o n t o the largest c i t y of t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n i n

7 1 - 8 1 , p r o v i d e s a m a p r study o f c o n t e s t e d sources

the s i x t e e n t h a n d seventeenth c e n t u r i e s . Sayyid

o f a u t h o r i t y i n sultanate I n d i a . M i l o C. Beach's The

H u s a y n Nasr. " T h e S c h o o l o f I s f a h a n . " A H i s t o r y o f

Imperial Image: Paintings for ihe Mughal Court

Muslim Philosophy, I I , e d . M . M S h a r i f ( W i e s b a d e n ,

( W a s h i n g t o n . D C : Freer Gallery. 1981) e x a m i n e s

1966, p p 904— j i ) i s a b r i e f a n d i n s i g h t f u l i n t r o ­

the r a n g e o f r o y a l p a t r o n a g e f o r p o r t r a i t art e x a l t ­

d u c t i o n tn Iranian I l l u m i n a t i o n i s t philosophy.

ing the emperor d u r i n g M u g h a l India. M i l o C

Leslie Peirce. The Imperial HaremWomen and Sex in the Ottoman Fmpire ( N e w Y o r k , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, •993)- breaks new g r o u n d i n h e r s i u d y o f the r o l e of w o m e n 111 the O t t o m a n f a m i l y a n d p o l i t i c a l sys­ tems. R i c h a r d R e p p , Mufti of IstanbuhA Study in the Development cif ihe Ottoman Learned Hierarchy ( L o n d o n , U t h i c a Press, 1986), c h r o n i c l e s t h e e m e r g e n c e a n d d e s e l o p m c n i o f the o f f i c e o f t h e S h a y k h a l - I s l a m o r c h i e f M u f t i o f the O t t o m a n Empire. Roger M . Savory. Iran under the Sdfuvids ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980), is i h e best o n e - v o l u m e h i s t o r y o f Safavid I r a n . S t a n l b r d J. Shaw. The lews of the Ottoman Empire and ihe Turkish Republic ( N e w Y o r k :

Beach's Mughal and Ra/pul Puinting. v o l . 3. of The Nov Cambridge History of India ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 19911 c o m p a r e s t h e m a l e r i a l e v i ­ d e n c e f o r assessing the a c h i e v e m e n t s o f Rajput artists a n d t h e i r s o m e t i m e r i v a l M u g h a l c o u n t e r ­ parts C a t h e r i n e B. Ashcr's Architecture of Mughal India, v o l . 4 o f The Nov Cambridge History of India ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1992) is the firsl systematic o v e r v i e w o f b o i h the p o l i t i c a l a n d the c u l t u r a l i d e o l o g i e s that i n f o r m M u g h a l p a t r o n a g e o f m o n u m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e s . J o h n F. R i c h a r d s ' The Mughal Empire, v o l . 5 o f The Nov Cambridge History of India ' C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e

SELFCT U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993) p r o v i d e s a valuable synthe¬

BIB! IOGRAPHY

Etlinic R e l a t i o n s . " Central Asian Survey 16:4 (1997,

sis o l t h e v a r i e d , o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g s c h o l a r s h i p o n

4 6 1 - 8 6 ) , o u t l i n e s recent t r e n d s i n trade a n d p o l i t i -

the m a j o r i n s t i t u t i o n s o f M u g h a l I n d i a .

cal r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n C h i n a a n d C e n t r a l A s i a , w i t h

For texts o n Southeast Asia see A n t h o n y H . J o h n s '

p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o the ways i n w h i c h e t h n i c

" I s l a m i n t h e Malay W o r l d , " i n eds. FA. Israeli and A

tics across t h e b o r d e r s i n f l u e n c e e c o n o m i c a n d

H . J o h n s , Southeast and Fast Asia. v o l . 2 o f Islam in Asiu

e n e r g y trade. R o b e r t Ekvall's Fields on the Hoof: Nevus of

( J e r u s a l e m : T h e M a g n c s Press. 19B4), 115-61. Ros.s

Tibetan Nomadit Bisionulism ( N e w Y o r k : H o l t .

L. D u n n ' s The Adventures of IbnButtuiu ( B e r k e l e y :

R i u e h a r t . a n d W i n s t o n , 1968) is a classic l e x t , w r i t -

U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1989) i s t h e p r e m i e r

ten b y a f o r m e r medical missionary w h o lived f o r

t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e m o s t w i d e l y c i t e d traveler i n t h e

several years o n t h e Gansu T i b e t a n f r o n t i e r , gives

p r e m o d e r n phase o f A f r o - E u r a s i a n Islamicate h i s

first-hand i n f o r m a t i o n o n the transformation of

t o r y . M . B. H o o k e r , e d . Islam in South-Last Asia ( L e i d e n , N e d i e r l a n d s : F. J. B r i l l . 1981) i n c l u d e s essays b y several c o n t r i b u t o r s b u t t h o s e b y Roy F. E l l e n a n d A. Day are es|>ecially u s e f u l . L e o n a r d Y Andaya's TheWorld of Muluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period ( H o n o l u l u : U n i v e r s i t y o f H a w a i i Press, oflers a comprehensive view o f the f o r m a -

1997) tion

o f I n d o n e s i a o n its f u r t h e s t Pacific f r o n t i e r .

Barbara W a t s o n A n d a y a a n d L e o n a r d Y Andaya's A History of Molaysia ( L o n d o n : M a c m i l l a n . 1982) is t h e best o v e r v i e w h i s t o r y o f I n d o n e s i a ' s s m a l l e r b u t c r u c i a l n o r t h e r n n e i g h b o r . James SiegcTs Shadow and SoundThe Historical Thought of a Sumutran People ( C h i c a g o :

T i b e t a n p a s t o r a l i s m i n the face o f e x p a n d i n g C h i n e s e i n f l u e n c e . Joseph Fletcher's Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia, ed. Bearrice Forbes M a n z ( H a m p s h i r e , E n g l a n d : V a r i o r u m Press, 199c) is a n invaluable collection o f ihe w o r l d ' s leading authori t y o n China's h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h I s l a m i c C e n t r a l Asia. A n d r e w D. W F o r b e s ' Warlords and Muslims in Chinese CcmralAsiu ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1986) is t h e d e f i n i t i v e w o r k o n X i n j i a n g p o l i t i c s d u r i n g t h e Republican p e r i o d , 1910-40. H e r h e n F r a u k e a n d D e n i s T w i t c h c t t ' s Alien Regimes and Border States (907-1368). v o l . 6 o f Cambridge History of China ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m h r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y -

U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1979) traces b o t h d i e

Press, 1994) is t h e m o s t d e f i n i t i v e c o l l e c t i o n o f

t r a n s o c e a n i c d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d t h e local p a t t e r n s

historical discussions of China's relations w i t h its

o f i n f l u e n c e that shaped c u r r e n t - d a y S u m a t r a .

b o r d e r i n g p e o p l e s a n d states a n d i t s d o m i n a t i o n b y m a n y o f t h e m . D r u C. G l a d n e y ' s Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic ( C a m b r i d g e .

CHAPTER T E N

Mass ; H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1996) is t h e lead

T h o m a s Barfield's The frrilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and

i n g w o r k o n contemporary islam and ethnic

China ( C a m b r i d g e : Basil Blackvvell, 1989) is a

p r o b l e m s f a c i n g c o n t e m p o r a r y C h i n a . Peter

sweeping o v e r v i e w o f China's four-thousand-year

H o p k i r k ' s The Greot Gume.The Struggle lor Empire in

h i s t o r y o f i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n sedentary a n d

CcntrulAsia ( N e w Y o r k a n d T o k y o : K o d a n s h a

nomadic empires, a r g u i n g thai inicracuons were

I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 1994) is a p o p u l a r s u r v e y o f

s y m b i o t i c a n d c y c l i c a l . L i n d a Benson's The Hi

C h i n e s e . R u s s i a n , a n d B r i t i s h r i v a l r i e s as t h o s e

Rebellion:The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in

powers attempted to divide u p the region i n the

Xinjiang, 1944-1949 ( A r m o n k . N.Y.: M . E. S h a r p e .

late n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . J o n a t h a n N . L i p m a n ' s

1990)

i s the d e f i n i t i v e w o r k d e s c r i b i n g t h e i l l - f a t e d

familiar Strangers:A History of Muslims in Northivesr China

U i g h u r - i e d r e b e l l i o n that h e l p e d d e f i n e t h e issues

(Seattle: U n i v e r s i t y o l W a s h i n g t o n Press. 1998) i s

f a c i n g C h i n a as i t s o u g h i t o i n t e g r a t e t h e X i n j i a n g

an o v e r v i e w o f m o r e m o d e r n d e v e l o p m e n t s .

r e g i o n i n i o t h e People's R e p u b l i c . C y r i l E. Black,

M o r r i s Rossabi's Chinu and Inner Asia from 1368 lo the

L o u i s D u p r e e . Elizabc-ih L h d i c o i t West, D a n i l e C.

Present Day ( L o n d o n : T h a m e s a n d H u d s o n , 1981) is

M a t u s 7 e w s k i , Eden Naby. a n d A r t h u r N . W a l d r o n ' s

an invaluable o v e r v i e w o f China's relations w i t h

The Modemi/aUon of Inner Asiu ( A r m o n k . N . Y . : M . E.

C e n t r a l Asia f r o m t h e e n d o f t h e M o n g o l E m p i r e

Sharpe, 1991) i s a g e n e r a l o v e r v i e w o f issues f a c i n g

u n t i l t h e f o u n d i n g o l t h e People's R e p u b l i c .

c o n t e m p o r a r y d e v e l o p m e n t i n C e n t r a l Asia,

A n n e i n a r i e S c h i m m e l ' s Mystical Dimensions of Islam

e m p h a s i z i n g p o l i t i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l cliflerences i n

( C h a p e l H i l l : U n i v e r s i t y o f N o r t h C a r o l i n a Press.

the r e g i o n a n d t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t e x t . James P

197c)

p r o v i d e s a g e n e r a l o v e r v i e w o f t h e Sufi

D o r i a n , Brett H . W i g d o r t z , a n d D r u C. G l a d n e y ' s ,

o r d e r s that p e r v a d e n o t o n l y t h e M u s l i m w o r l d

" C e n t r a l Asia a n d X i n j i a n g , C h i n a : E m e r g i n g

b u t C e n t r a l Asia a n d C h i n a as w e l l . D e n i s Sinor,

Energy. E c o n o m i c , a n d E t h n i c R e l a t i o n s . " Asia-Pacific

e d . . The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia

Issues 31 ( M a y , 1 - 8 ) p r o v i d e s an u p - t o - d a t e

( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1990)

o v e r v i e w o f the issues p l a g u i n g C h i n a a n d C e n t r a l

is [ h e m o s t a u t h o r i t a l i v e o v e r v i e w o f C e n t r a l

A s i a n r e l a t i o n s t o d a y James F D o r i a n , Brett

A s i a n h i s t o r y available f r o m t h e p a l e o l i t h i c era 10

W i g d o r t 7 , a n d D r u Gladney's " C e n t r a l A s i a n a n d

the M o n g o l e m p i r e i n the t h i r t e e n t h century.

X i n j i a n g , C h i n a : E m e r g i n g Energy. E c o n o m i c , a n d

7 0 4

SELECT

CHAPTER

BIBLIOGRAPHY e x c e l l e n t i n t e r p r e t i v e essay that h e l p s to place e i g h -

ELEVEN

A c o l l e c t i o n of d o c u m e n t s d a t i n g f r o m t h e first t o t h e

teenth- and nineteenth-century movements i n a g l o b a l perspective.

n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s is g a t h e r e d i n G.S.P F r e e m a n - G r e n v i l l e ' s East African Coast: Selected

J o h n L. F s p o s i t o . e d . The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern

Documents ( O x f o r d . U K : C l a r e n d o n Press. 1962). A

Islamic World ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press. is the essential g e n e r a l r e f e r e n c e w o r k f o r a l l

d i s c u s s i o n o f the O r o m o o r Galla c o n t r i b u t i o n t o

1995)

I s l a m i n E t h i o p i a can be f o u n d i n M o h a m m e d

o f the specific p e o p l e a n d g r o u p s m e n t i o n e d i n

Hassen's The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History, i c j o - i S c o

this c hapter. Joseph F. Fletcher's Studies on Chinese and

( C a m b r i d g e . U K : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press,

Islamic Innei Asia, V a r i o r u m C o l l e c t e d Studies series

1990). M e r v y n H i s k e l t ' s A History of Hausa Islamic Verse

( B r o o k f i e l d . V t . : V a r i o r u m , 1995)

( L o n d o n : S c h o o l o f O r i e n t a l a n d A f r i c a n Studies,

tant c o n t r i b u t i o n t o i h e s t u d y o f the

197c)

N a c | s h b a n d i y y a h o r d e r a n d the g e n e r a l d e v e l o p -

traces w r i t t e n Hausa l i t e r a t u r e f r o m its

m e n t o f M u s l i m societies i n C e n t r a l Asia. M a r s h a l l

b e g i n n i n g s t o the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . A d e t a i l e d site r e p o r t o f t h e e x c a v a t i o n o f Shanga. inc l u d i n g n e w e v i d e n c e a b o u t the early d e v e l o p m e n t o f Sw-ahib c i v i l i z a t i o n , can be f o u n d i n M a r k H o r t o n ' s The Archeology of a Muslim Trading Community on the Coast of East Africa ( N a i r o b i . Kenya: T h e B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e i n East A f r i c a , 1996). J o h n O. H u n w i c k ' s Shonu in Songhai ( L o n d o n : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press f o r the B r i t i s h A c a d e m y , 198c) is t h e i c x t . transla l i o n , and historical i n t r o d u c t i o n to "The

Replies"

b y al M a g h i l i . N e h e m i a L e v t / i o n ' s Ancient Ghana and Mali ( L o n d o n : M e t h e u n , 1973)

is t h e o n l y f u f

b o o k - l e n g t h s t u d y o f the early e m p i r e s o f west S u d a n ; the same author's Islam in West Africa: Religion. Society,and Politics to 1800 ( L o n d o n : V a r i o r u m ,

1994)

is a c o l l e c t i o n o f essays o n those t o p i c s .

G. S. H o d g s o n ' s The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times, v o l . 3 o f TheVenturc of fslam:Conscience und History in a World Civilization ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press. 1974), t h e t h i r d v o l u m e o f an e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t interpretation o f Islamic history , p r o v i d e s i m p o r t a n t b r o a d e r perspectives f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g the d y n a m i c s o f e i g h t e e n t h - a n d nineteenth-century Islamic history. Ira M . L a p i d u s ' A History of islamic Societies ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1988)

is a u s e f u l s u r -

vey of evenis i n a l l p a r t s o f t h e M u s l i m w o r l d , w h i c h a d d e d b r e a d t h t o the c o v e r a g e i n t h i s c h a p ter. N e h e m i a L e v t z i o n a n d J o h n O. V b l l , eds.. Eighteenth Century Renewal and Reform in Islam (Syracuse, N . Y . : Syracuse U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1987)

R. S. O ' F a h e y a n d Jay S p a u l d i n g ' s Kingdoms of the Sudan ( L o n d o n : M e t h e u n , 1974)

is a v e r y i m p o r -

is a h i s t o r y o f the three

is a c o l l e c -

t i o n o f essays o n specific m o v e m e n t s of r e n e w a l i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . B. G. M a r t i n ' s Muslim

k i n g d o m s o f the S u d a n , the Sinnar. the W a d a i , a n d

Brotherhoods in Nineteenth-Century Africa ( C a m b r i d g e :

t h e D a r f u r . R a n d a l l L. P011 w e l l s ' Horn and Crescent:

C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976)

Cultural Changes and Traditional Islam on the East Africcn

s t u d y o f the m a j o r m o v e m e n t s o f I s l a m i c r e n e w a l

Coast, 800—1900 is a c o m p r e h e n s i s e analysis o f the

i n A f r i c a i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . R. S. O'Faliey's

h i s t o r y o f I s l a m o n the east A f r i c a n coast. Elias N .

Enigmatic Saint:Ahmad ibn Idris and the Idrisi Tradition

Saad's Social History ofTimbuktu ( C a m b r i d g e , U K :

( E v a n s t o n . I I I . : N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i v e r s i t y Press,

C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1983)

is a c o m p r e -

1990)

is a t h o r o u g h

is 1 p a t h - b r e a k i n g s t u d y o f o n e o f the m a j o r

hensive history o f T i m b u k t u u p to the nineteenth

r e n e w a l i s i figures a n d h i s t r a d i t i o n . Fazlur

century.

Rahman's "Revival and R e f o r m i n Islam." i n vol. 2 o f The Cambridge History of Islam, e d . R M . H o l t a n d Others ( C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1970)

CHAPTER

TWELVE

Rifaat A l i A b o u - E l - H a j ' s Formation ol the Modern StaicThe Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (.Albany: Slate U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w Y o r k Press, 1991)

is an

i m p o r t a n t r e i n t e r p r e tat i o n o f d i e e v o l u t i o n o f t h e O t t o m a n p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t . A z i z A h m a d ' s Islamic Culture in the Indian Emiionmeni ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press. 1964)

pp.

6 3 2 - 5 6 . is an i n f l u e n t i a l d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e b r o a d e r t r a d i t i o n o f r e n e w al i n I s l a m i c h i s t o r y . J o h n O b e r t Voll's " R e n e w a l a n d R e f o r m i n I s l a m i c H i s t o r y : Tajdid a n d Islah." i n Voices of Resurgent Islam, e d . J o h n L. Esposito ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983). p p . 3 2 - 4 7 , is a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the r e n e w a l i s i t r a d i t i o n by i h e a u t h o r o f t h i s chapier.

c o n t a i n s h e l p f u l essays o n the m a j o r

m o v e m e n t s o f I s l a m i c r e n e w a l i n S o u t h Asia. C h r i s t i n e D o b b i n ' s Islamic Revivalism in a Changing

CHAPTER

Peasant Economy:Central Sumatra. 1784-1847 ( L o n d o n :

S a i d A . A r j o m a n d ' s " C o n s t i n i l i o n s and Struggles for

C u r z o n Press, 1983)

is a n essential w o r k f o r u n d e r

s t a n d i n g t h e P a d r i m o v e m e n t a n d the b r o a d e r c o n text o f r e v i v a l i s m i n Southeast Asia. R i c h a r d

M

THIRTEEN

P o l i t i c a l O r d e r : A Study i n the M o d e r n i z a t i o n o f R e l i g i o u s T r a d i t i o n s , " Archives Europccnes de Sociologie. 33:1

(1992, p p . 3 9 - 8 2 ) . p r o v i d e s an e x c e l l e n t

Eaton's Islamic History as Global History ( W a s h i n g t o n ,

c o m p a r a t i v e analysis o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l debates a n d

D.C.: A m e r i c a n H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n . 1990}

p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s across t h e M u s l i m w o r l d .

is a n

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7 0 c;

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t i o n i n the A r a b w o r l d . C l e m e n t H e n r y M o o r e ' s

the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 2 t i d e d . , ( N e w Y o r k :

Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia

Verso, 1991), presents a p r o v o c a t i v e e x a m i n a t i o n o f

( B o s t o n : L i t t l e . B r o w n . 1970) discusses t h e r e l a t i o n

t i l e m a n n e r i n w h i c h n a t i o n a l i s m is c o n s t r u c t e d i n

b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d state f o r m a t i o n i n N o r t h

r e s p o n s e t o p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c interests.

A f r i c a . O n S o u t h A s i a . H a r n z a A l a v i ' s " T h e Stale i n

R u p e r t E m e r s o n ' s From Empire to Nation:The Rise of Self-

P o s l c o l o n i a l Societies: Pakistan a n d B a n g l a d e s h . " i n

Asserliun of Asian and African Peoples ( C a m b r i d g e . M A :

K a d i l c e n G o u g h a n d H a r i P S h a r n i a . eels.,

H a r v a r d , i 9 6 0 ) is a n i n d e p t h analysis o f t h e e v o -

Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia ( N e w Y o r k :

lution o f anticolonial nationalism and the manner

M o n t h l y R e v i e w Press. 1973. p p . 1 4 5 - 7 3 ) p r o v i d e s

i n w h i c h i t u n f o l d e d at the e n d o f t h e c o l o n i a l era.

a c o m p e l l i n g analysis o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e

N i k k i K e d d i e , " T h e Revolt o f I s l a m , 1700 t o 1995:

c o l o n i a l legacy f o r slate f o r m a t i o n i n S o u t h Asia.

Comparative Considerations and Relation t o

Jama! M a l i k ' s Colonizing Islum: Dissolution of Traditionul

I m p e r i a l i s m . " Comparative Sludies in Society and History,

Institutions in Pakistan (New* D e l h i : M a n o h a r , 1996)

j 6 : j ( f u l y 1994. p p . 4 6 3 - 8 7 ) , p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l

details t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h Pakistan has dealt w i t h

overview of the role o f colonialism and i m p e r i a l -

t h e r o l e o f I s l a m i n society. C. A . Bayly, Rulers,

i s m i n t h e genesis o f Islamic a c t i v i s m . Joel S.

Townsmen and Bazaars: Nonh Indian Society in the Age of

M i g d a l , Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society

British Expansion, 1770-1870 ( N e w Y o r k : C a m b r i d g e

Reunions and State Capabilities in ihe Third World

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983) is a t h o r o u g h analysis o f

( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press) presents an

the n a t u r e o f t h e i m p a c t o f B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l i s m o n

overarching conceptual treatmeni o f the relation

I n d i a . T h o m a s M e t c a l f ' s Land, Landlords and ihe British

b e t w e e n t h e r e l a t i v e p o w e r s o f p o l i t i c a l leaders a n d

Raj:Northem India in the Nineteenth Century ( B e r k e l e y :

i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h o s e o f s o c i a l forces i n t h e

U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1979) discusses t h e

process o f state f o r m a t i o n . O n A f r i c a , C a t h e r i n e

i m p a c t o f B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l i s m o n social s t r u c t u r e i n

B o o n e , "States a n d R u l i n g Classes i n P o s l c o l o n i a l

S o u t h Asia. H i s Ideologies of ihe Raj ( N e w Y o r k :

A f r i c a : T h e E n d u r i n g C o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f Power," i n

C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1994) e x a m i n e s t h e

Joel S. M i g d a l , A n d K o h l i , a n d V i v i e n n e S h u t , eds..

w o r l d v i e w s that u n d e r p i n n e d t h e c o l o n i a l a d m i n

Stole Power and Social Forces ( N e w Y o r k : C a m b r i d g e

i s t r a t i o n o f I n d i a a n d t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r later

U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1994, pp. 1 0 8 - 4 0 ) , discusses t h e

slate d e v e l o p m e n t i n S o u t h Asia. Ayesha Jalal's The

i m p o r t a n c e o f the c o l o n i a l legacy t o p o s t - c o l o n i a l

Slate of Manial Rule:The Origins of Pakistan's Political

state d e v e l o p m e n t . Frank F u r e d i . CoIonialWars and the

Economy of Defence ( C a m b r i d g e :

Politics of Thiid World Naiiontilism ( L o n d o n : L B . T a u r i s ,

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1990) is a d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n of

1994)

relates r e s o u r c e m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r c o l o n i a l

Cambridge

t h e c o n t i n u i t i e s b e t w e e n t h e B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l state

conflicts to ihe development o f T h i r d W o r l d

a n d Pakistan, a n d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s l i n k a g e

n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t s . C r a w f o r d Y o u n g ' s The African

foT Pakistan's p o l i t i c s . S e y y e d V a h Reza Nasr's

Colonial State in Comparative Perspective ( N e w H a v e n : Yale

" P a k i s t a n : State, A g r a r i a n R e f o r m , a n d

U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1994) e x p l a i n s state f o r m a t i o n i n

I s l a m i z a t i o n . ' ' International Journal of Politics, Culture and

A f r i c a i n the c o n t e x t o f the c o l o n i a l legacy o f that

Society, 10:2 ( W i n t e r 1996. p p . 2 4 9 - 7 2 ) e x a m i n e s

c o n t i n e n t . O n the A r a b w o r l d , P h i l i p S. K h o u r y ' s

the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n state f o r m a t i o n , f e u d a l i s m ,

Syria and the French MandateTbe Politics of Arab Nationalism.

a n d I s l a m i z a t i o n i n Pakistan

I9JO-I94C ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press.

W i l l a r d A H a n n a ' s Seguel to Colonialism The 1957-1960

1987)

is a c o m p r e h e n s i v e e x a m i n a t i o n o f F r e n c h

O n Southeast A s i a ,

Foundations for Malaysia ( N e w Y o r k : A m e r i c a n

c o l o n i a l p o l i c i e s a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t h e Levant.

U n i v e r s i t i e s F i e l d Staff, 1965) e x a m i n e s t h e c o n t i -

W i l l i a m R o g e r L o u i s ' The British Empire in the Middle

n u i t i e s b c i w e e n t h e c o l o n i a l a n d p o s l c o l o n i a l states

Eosi. 1945-1951 ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press.

i n M a l a y s i a . A n t h o n y M i l n e r ' s The Invention of Poliiics in

1984)

provides a similar account o f British colonial

Colonial Malaya ( N e w Y o r k : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y

p o l i c i e s i n t h e M i d d l e East. Lisa A n d e r s o n ' s The State

Press. 1994) e x a m i n e s the e m e r g e n c e o f M a l a y

and SocialTtansformution in Tunisia and Libya: 1H30-1980

n a t i o n a l i s m a n d its r o l e i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e

( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1986) i s an

M a l a y s i a n state i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e p o l i t i c s a n d

e x c e l l e n t c o m p a r a t i v e analysis o f the d i f f e r i n g

c u l t u r a l I m p a c t o f c o l o n i a l i s m . G e o r g e T. K a h i n .

i m p a c t o ! c o l o n i a l i s m o n f u t u r e state f o r m a t i o n i n

Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia ( I t h a c a . N Y :

L i b y a a n d T u n i s i a . G i a c o m o L u c i a n i , e d . . The Arab

C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1952) is a classic s t u d y o f

Stale ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1990)

t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t a n d early slate f o r -

c o n t a i n s a n u m b e r o f useful studies o f the n a t u r e

mation i n Indonesia

a n d f u n c t i o n i n g o f the A r a b state. M a n f r e d H a l p e r n ' s m The Politics of Social Change in Middle East and North Africa ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1963), p r o v i d e s a n o v e r v i e w o f early state f o r m a CHAPTER

FOURTEEN

Barbara C. A s w a d a n d Barbara Bilge's Family and Gender

706

SELECT

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Among Amrrıcun Muslims: issues Fating Middle Eastern

policies, citizenship rules, e c o n o m i c s , and interna­

Immigrants and Thru Descendants ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : T e m p l e

t i o n a l linkages o n i m m i g r a n t a n d i n d i g e n o u s

U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1996)

M u s l i m s i n Eastern a n d W e s t e r n E u r o p e . R i c h a r d

covers p r a c t i c a l issues fac­

i n g f a m i l i e s a n d m terg c u e r a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t as w e l l

Brent T u r n e r ' s Islam in the African-Amer i can Experience

as q u e s t i o n s o f i d e n t i t y , c o m m u n i t y i n v o l v e m e n t ,

( B l o o m i n g i o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1997)

gender, a n d the needs o f y o u t h a n d the elderly.

s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n 10 the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of

M a n i a s GardcH's In the Name of Elijah Muhammad: Louis

the roles o f i n d i s i d u a l s . r e l i g i o u s g r o u p s , a n d t h e

Fairukhan and the Nation of Islam ( D u r h a m . N C : D u k e

r e l i g i o n o f I s l a m i n s h a p i n g the A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1996)

M u s l i m identity.

provides a unique and

is a

u n p r e c e d e n t e d v i e w o f the e n i g m a o f L o u i s F a r r a k h a n , weav i n g t o g e i l i e r i n f o r m a t i o n I r o m a n i m p r e s s i v e c o l l e c t i o n o f d o c u m e n t s that have n o t b e e n treated b y o t h e r scholars. I n The Muslims of America ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press.

1991)

Y v o n n e Yazbeck H a d d a d b r i n g s t o g e t h e r studies i n the r e l i g i o n o f I s l a m as i t is e x p e r i e n c e d i n a v a r i et) o f c o n t e x t s i n N o r t h A m e r i c a . T h e w o r k addresses the h i s t o r y , o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d c h a l l e n g e s t o I s l a m i n N o r t h A m e r i c a , the w r i t i n g s of M u s l i m i n t e l l e c t u a l s , a n d the p r o s p e c t s o f t h e M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n the U n i t e d States a n d C a n a d a . D a v i d H o r r o c k s a n d Eva K o l i n s k y ' s Turkish Culture m German Soc iety Today (Pros i d e n c e . R l : B e r g h a h n B o o k s , 1996)

addresses the c o n d i t i o n o f T u r k i s h

g u e s t w o r k e r s i n G e r m a n y , as w e l l as t h e c u r r e n t s i t ­ u a t i o n o f m i n o r i t i e s i n G e r m a n society. It p r o v i d e s a u n i q u e f o c u s o n issues o i i d e n t i t y . I n Muslim Minorities in t he World Today ( L o n d o n : M a n s c i l . 1986), M . A h Kcttani examines the p o s i t i o n o f m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s in their struggle to maintain a M u s l i m way o f life. T h e a u t h o r p r o m o t e s a n o r m a ­ tive p a t h i n m a i n t a i n i n g Islamic identity i n a n o n Muslim environment. I n Islamic Britain: Religion. Politics, and Identity Among British Muslims ( L o n d o m T a u r i s . 1994), P h i l i p L e w i s p r o ­ vides an o v e r v i e w o i t h e status o f M u s l i m c o m m u ­

CHAPTER

FIFTEEN

M o h a m m e d A r k o u n ' s Rethinking Lslum: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : West v i e w Press. 1994)

provides a b o l d and provocative critique o l

b o t h Western and t r a d i t i o n a l Islamic

scholarship

that presents a v i s i o n o f I s l a m that c h a l l e n g e s that w h i c h is prevalent t h r o u g h o u t m u c h o f t h e M u s l i m w o r l d . M u h a m m a d Asad's The Principles of Stan and Government in (slum (1961; r e p r i n i . G i b r a l t a r : D a r a l - A n d a l u s , 1980)

p r o v i d e s a n early a n d i n f l u ­

e n t i a l analysis o f the basis f o r a m o d e r n I s l a m i c state. J o h n J. D o n o h u e a n d J o h n L. Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982)

is a c o l l e c t i o n o f M u s l i m

w r i l i n g s that reficcts the d i v e r s i t y o f M u s l i m voices i n d i e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . Farid Esack's Quran. Liberation.and Pluralism ( O x f o r d : O n e s s o r l d P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1997)

is a creative a n d c h a l l e n g i n g

analysis o f t h e r o l e o f I s l a m a n d t h e M u s l i m c o m ­ munity in

fighting

a p a r t h e i d . T h i s event b e c o m e s

t h e take o f f p o i n t f o r the a u t h o r l o e x p l o r e t h e t r a ­ ditional M u s l i m altitude toward pluralism and to advocate a r e r e a d i n g o f Q u r a n i c texls l o s u p p o r t a m o r e inclusive, pluralistic vision. J o h n L. E s p o s i t o . e d . . Voices o i Resurgent lslum ( N e w Y o r k :

n i t i e s i n B r i t a i n , hased o n w e l l researched

O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983)

fieldwork

t i o n o f studies o f m a j o r t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y I s l a m i c

f r o m the i n d u s t r i a l cities i n t h e c o u n t r y ' s

provides a collec­

center, i n c l u d i n g B r a d f o r d . K a t h l e e n M . M o o r e ' s oJ-

r e f o r m e r s a n d activists, w i t h a c o l l e c t i o n o f

Mughtarihun: American Law and the Transformarion of Muslim

M u s l i m acliv ist w r i t i n g s o n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e

Life in the United States ( A l b a n y : Slate U n i v e r s i t y o f

I s l a m i c r e v i v a l , the I s l a m i c state, law. a n d social

N e w York Press. 199c)

r e f o r m . J o h n L. Esposito's The Islamic Threat: Myth or

explores the influence o f

A m e r i c a n law o n M u s l i m l i f e against the b a c k d r o p

Reality.' ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press,

o f l i b e r a i c o m m i t m e n t s t o the ideals o f p l u r a l i s m

is a s t u d y o f the h i s t o r y o f I s l a m a n d t h e W e s t that

a n d religious tolerance i n America. J o r g e n N i e l s e n ' s Muslims in Western Europe, s e c o n d e d i ­ t i o n ( E d i n b u r g h , U K : E d i n b u r g h U n i v e r s i t y Press, 199c)

is a n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o M u s l i m l i l e i n c o n t e m ­

p o r a r y W e s t e r n E u r o p e . I t p r o v i d e s an o v e r v i e w o f the history, development, and current conditions o f M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s i n France, West G e r m a n y , die U n i t e d K i n g d o m . B e l g i u m . H o l l a n d . Scandinavia, a n d S o u t h e r n E u r o p e . I n Muslim Communities m the Nov Europe ( B e r k s h i r e , Ithaca Press, 1996), t h e e d i t o r s , G e r d N o n n e m a n . T i m N i b l o c k .

1995)

focuses o n c o n t e m p o r a r y M u s l i m p o l i t i c s a n d t h e f u t u r e o f M u s l i m - C h r i s t i a n r e l a t i o n s Is t h i s rela­ t i o n s h i p o n e o f c o o p e r a t i o n o r c o n f l i c t ? J o h n L. E s p o s i t o a n d J o h n O. Voll's Islam and Democracy ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1996)

gives an

analysis of ihc- n a i u r e o f d e m o c r a c y a n d M u s l i m r e a c t i o n s a n d responses t o issues o f p o l i t i c a l p a n i c i p a i i o n a n d d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n , w i t h case s i u d i e s that span the M u s l i m w o r l d , f r o m A l g e r i a a n d Egypt t o Pakistan a n d M a l a y s i a . Dale E i c k c l m a n a n d James P Piscatori's Muslim Politics

a n d B o g d a n S z a j k o w s k i , have g a t h e r e d a c o l l e c t i o n

( P r i n c e t o n . N.J.: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press,

o f essays that address t h e e f l e c l s o f g o v e r n m e n t

presents an analysis o f the d i v e r s e p o l i t i c s o f I s l a m

1996)

SELECT i n M u s l i m l i f e . T h e w o r k is especially e f f e c t i v e i n its e x a m p l e s , w h i c h are d r a w n I r o m across t h e

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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e r n i s m and f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . F a z l u r R a h m a n ' s Islam and Modérait/

(Chicago:

M u s l i m w o r l d . Y v o n n e Y . H a d d a d ' s Contemporary Islam

U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1982)

and the Challenge of History ( N e w Y o r k : S U N Y Press.

a n d p r e s c r i p t i v e s t u d ) o f the h i s t o r y o f I s l a m i c

1982)

p r o v i d e s a study o f che w a y s i n w h i c h A r a b

is a d e s c r i p t i v e

i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m a n d e d u c a t i o n , w h i c h seeks t o set

M u s l i m s have d e f i n e d a n d r e d e f i n e d the m e a n i n g

out a m e t h o d o l o g y for reinterpretation and

o f f a i t h a n d h i s t o r y i n r e s p o n d i n g t o the c h a l l e n g e s

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o f the n i n e t e e n t h a n d t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s . D e l i a r

Beliefs and Practices, v o l . 2 o f The Contemporary Period ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1993)

N o e r ' s The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia ( L o n d o n : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1973)

provides

an analysis of t h e o r i g i n s , causes, leaders, a n d ideas o f modernist movements i n Indonesia f r o m

1900

t o 1942. Seyyed H o s s e i n Nasr's Traditional Islam in the ModernWorid ( L o n d o n : K P I , 1987)

is a s t u d y of t h e

historical role a n d e n d u r i n g significance o f t r a d i tional

I s l a m b y a l e a d i n g M u s l i m scholar, Nasr

seeks t o d i s t i n g u i s h t r a d i t i o n a l I s l a m f r o m m o d -

is a study o f M u s l i m

p e r c e p t i o n s o f a n d responses to t h e m o d e r n w o r l d , w i t h special e m p h a s i s o n the r e l e v a n c e o l t h e Q u r a n a n d M u h a m m a d . J o h n O.VoH's Islam: Continuity cind Chdngr rn the ModernWndd ( N e w Y o r k : Syracuse U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994)

provides an

excellent study o f the role o f Islam i n m o d e r n M u s l i m h i s t o r y , d i s t i n c t i v e f o r its g e o g r a p l i i c coverage.

comprehensive

CONTRIBUTORS

Conquests a n d Narratives of Islamic Origins.The Beginnings of

The Editor

Islamic Historical Wnting a n d he has w r i t t e n m a n ) articles o n early a n d m e d i e v a l I s l a m i c h i s : o r y .

J o h n L . E s p o s i t o is professor o f r e l i g i o n a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs a n d f o u n d i n g d i r e c t o r of the C e n t e r f o r M u s l i m - C h r i s t i a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g at the E d m u n d

M a j i d F a k h r y is e m e r i t u s professor o f p h i l o s o p h y at

Walsh S c h o o l o f F o r e i g n Service at G e o r g e t o w n

the A m e r i c a n U n i v e r s i t y o f B e i r u t ; h e is c u r r e n t l y a

U n i v e r s i t y . E d i t o r i n c h i e f o f the Oxford Encyclopedia of the

v i s i t i n g research associate at G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y

Modern Islamic World, h i s o t h e r b o o k s i n c l u d e Islam:The

H i s E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e A History of

.Straight Path:The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality. ; Islam and

Islamic Philosophy; Ethical Theories in Islam;A Short Introduction

Dernocracy ( w i t h J o h n V o l ! ) ; islam and Politics; Islam in Asia;

to Islamic Philosophy Theology and Mystinsm; Philosophy. Dogma

Women in Muslim family Luiv; Political Islam: Radicalism,

and the Impact of Greek Though in Islam; and The Qu'run:A

Resolution, or Reform.'; a n d Muslims on the Americanization Path

Modern English Version. H e has also p u b l i s h e d m a n y

1

(withYvonne Haddad).

works i n Arabic .

The Authors

D r u C. G l a d n e y is c n r r e n t l y Dean o f A c a d e m i c s at the Asia-Pacific Center; he is n o w o n leave f r o m his p o s i -

S h e i l a B l a i r a n d J o n a t h a n B l o o m are a w i f e - a n d - h u s -

t i o n as p r o f e s s o r o f A s i a n studies a n d a n t h r o p o l o g y at

h a n d t e a m o f scholars w h o have j o i n t l y a n d i n d i v i d u -

the U n i v e r s i t y o f H a w a i ' i at M a n o a . H e has w r i t t e n

ally w r i t t e n m a n y b o o k s a n d articles o n v a r i o u s

the a w a r d - w i n n i n g b o o k Muslim Chinese:Ethnic

aspects o f I s l a m i c art a n d a r c h i t e c t u r e . Together t h e y

Nationalism in the People's Republic, a n d is also d i e a u t h o r o f

have w r i t t e n The A n and Architecture of Islam: 1250-1800

Ethnic Identity in China.Thc Making of a Muslim Minoriiy

a n r Islamic A i t ; Sheila Blair has w r i t t e n Islamic Inscnpiions

Nationality a n d Dislocating China; Muslims, Minorities, and Other

anci J o n a t h a n B l o o m is w o r k i n g o n Paper Before Print.

Sub-Altem Subjects: he is the e d i t o r o f Making Majorities:

T h e y are n o w b o t h at w o r k o n a b o o k t o a c c o m p a n y

Composing die Naiion in Japan. China. Korea, Malaysia, Fin.Turkey,

a

f o r t h c o m i n g PBS series o n I s l a m i c c i v i l i z a t i o n .

and the United States.

V i n c e n t J. C o r n e l l is an associate professor o f r e l i g i o n

Y v o n n e Y a z b e c k H a d d a d is professor o f t h e h i s t o r y o f

a n d A s i a n a n d A f r i c a n languages a n d l i t e r a t u r e at D u k e

I s l a m a n d C h r i s t i a n - M u s l i m r e l a t i o n s at G e o r g e t o w n

U n i v e r s i t y H e has w r i t t e n TheWay of Abu Madyan a n d

U n i v e r s i t y a n d past p r e s i d e n t o f the M i d d l e East

Realm of (he Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism. H e is

Studies A s s o c i a t i o n . She is the a u t h o r o f Contemporary

c u r r e n d y w r i t i n g a b i o g r a p h y o f the N o r t h A f r i c a n

Islam and the Challenge of History a n d is c o - a u t h o r o f The

S u f i A b u al-Hasan a l - S h a d h i l i a n d is c o l l a b o r a t i n g w i t h

Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection; IslamicVblues in

Professor J o h n N i k d i s i , d e a n o f t h e law s c h o o l at

the United Staies:A Comparable Study; a n d Mission to America:

Loyola U n i v e r s i t y i n N e w O r l e a n s , o n a casebook o f

f ire Islamic Sectarian Communities in North America. She has

I s l a m i c law.

e d i t e d Muslims of Amenta a n d c o - e d i i e d islam, Gender and Social Change; Islamic Impact; Muslims on the American i/at ion Path.'; a n d Christian-Muslim Encounters.

A h m a d D a l l a l is an associate p r o f e s s o r o f A r a b i c a n d Islamic studies at S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y . H e w r i t e s o n t h e h i s t o r y o f I s l a m i c science a n d m o d e r n I s l a m i c

M o h a m m a d H a s h i m K a m a l i is professor o f law at

t h o u g h t . H e is t h e a u t h o r o f An Islamic Response to Greek

the I n t e r n a t i o n a l I s l a m i c U n i v e r s i t y i n Malaysia. H e

Astronomy, a n d his articles have b e e n p u b l i s h e d i n Arabic

has also s t u d i e d a n d l a u g h i I s l a m i c l a w i n A f g l i a n i s t a n ,

Science and Philosophy; Journal of the American Oriental Society:

E n g l a n d , Canada, a n d the U n i t e d States. H e is the

National Journal of Middle East Studies: a n d o t h e r p u b l i c a -

a u t h o r o f Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence a n d freedom of

tions.

Expression in Islam, a m o n g o t h e r w o r k s .

F r e d M . D o r m e r is professor o f Near Eastern h i s t o r y

I r a M . L a p i d u s is e m e r i t u s professor o f h i s t o r y a n d

i n the O r i e n t a l I n s t i t u t e o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o ,

f o r m e r c h a i r o f the C e n t e r f o r M i d d l e Eastern Studies

w h e r e he is also p r o f e s s o r o f N e a r Eastern h i s t o r y a n d

at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a at Berkeley. H e is t h e

c h a i r o f the d e p a r t m e n t o f N e a r Eastern languages a n d

a u t h o r o f A History of Islamic Societies: Muslim Cities in the

c i v i L z a t i o n s . H e is the a u t h o r o f The Early Islamic

Later MiddleAge; a n d Middle Euslern Cities.

708

CONTRIBUTORS

709

B r u c e B . L a w r e n c e is professor o f h i s t o r y o f r e l i g i o n

Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution:The Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan

a n d I s l a m i c studies at D u k e U n i v e r s i t y , w h e r e h e also

a n d Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism. H e special-

serves as c h a i r o f the d e p a r i m e n i o f r e l i g i o n . H e has

izes i n the relations b e t w e e n state a n d society i n

w r i t t e n e x t e n s i v e l y o n b o t h the p r e m o d e m a n d t h e

M u s l i m c o u n t r i e s a n d i n the r o l e o f Islam i n p o l i t i c s .

m o d e m phases o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l I s l a m . H i s special interests are I n d o - P e r s i a n S u f i s m a n d the c o m p a r a t i v e

Jane I . S m i t h is p r o f e s s o r o f I s l a m i c studies at

s t u d y o f r e l i g i o u s m o v e m e n t s . H i s latest w o r k is

H a r t f o r d Seminary and co-director o f the M a c d o n a i d

Shattering the Myth: Islam BeyondViolence.

C e n t e r f o r the Study o f I s l a m a n d C l i r i s r i a n - M u s l i m

N e h e m i a L e v t z i o n is F u l d a n d B a m h e r g e r Professor

Councils o f Churches i n interfaith dialogue. H e r most

o f the H i s t o r y o f t h e M u s l i m Peoples at H e b r e w

recent b o o k is Islam in America; she is e d i t o r o f t h e j o u r -

U n i v e r s i t y i n Jerusalem. H e is f o r m e r p r e s i d e n t o f the

n a l The Muslim World a n d an associate e d i t o r o f t h e

O p e n U n i v e r s i t y i n Israel, a n d h e is c u r r e n t l y c h a i r o f

f o r t h c o m i n g Encyclopedia ofWomen in the Muslim World.

Relations. She is active i n the N a t i o n a l a n d W o r l d

the C o u n c i l f o r H i g h e r Education's P l a n n i n g a n d B u d g e t i n g C o m m i n e e t h e r e . A m o n g his p u b l i c a t i o n s

J o h n O b e r t V o l I is professor o f I s l a m i c h i s t o r y at

are Muslims and Chiefs in West Africo:A Study of Islam in the

G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y a n d associate d i r e c t o r o f

Middle Vol ta Basm in the Pre-Colonial Period; Ancient Ghana and

G e o r g e t o w n ' s Center f o r M u s i i m - C h r i s t i a n

Mali; a n d Islam in the West: Religion. Society and Politics to 1800.

U n d e r s u n d i n g . H e is past p r e s i d e n t o f t h e M i d d l e East Studies A s s o c i a t i o n . H i s p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e

S.V. R. N a s r is a n associate professor o f p o l i t i c a l science

Islam:Continuity and Change in the Modern World a n d . w i t h

at the U n i v e r s i t y o f San D i e g o . H e has w r i t t e n The

J o h n Esposiio, Islam and Democracy .

IMAGE

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( 1990.61 ) , 383 T h e James F. B a l l a r d C o l l e c t i o n , G i f t o f James F. B a l l a r d .

( 4 9 9 7 . 1 7 6 ) ; S e y y e d V a l i N a s r : bjb;

L i b r a r y , C a i r o : 234; N a t i o n a l L i b r a r y . C o p e n h a g e n : Christine Osborne:

37,

\i2.

62. 69, 8 2 . 83, 85,

Bibliothèque

N a t i o n a l e , Paris: 84.

354; B e r n a r d O ' K a n e :

135.

140,

145,

U n i v e r s i t y of O x f o r d : 4 9 9 ; P o p p e r f b t o : 534, 155,

182,

228,

239,

256,

380; P u b l i f o t o : 315;

G e o g r a p h i c a l Society. L o n d o n : 3, 17,

103,

115.

587.

652.

637;

430;

ç ı 8 , 527.

504,

539,

569.

Suleymaniye Mosque Lihrary. Istanbul: 276;Topkapi

2 ç ı , 333.

263,

336;

79, Royal

588; P r i n c e S a d r u d d i n A g a K h a n :

109; T i m S m i t h : 113

( B H R U ) , 605,

619,

633;

Palace L i b r a r y . I s t a n b u l : 2 4 9 .

S i a a i s b i b l i o t h e k z u B e r l i n - Preussischer K u l t u r b e s i t z - O r i e n t a b t e l l u n g : 192; 221,

620.

6 7 0 ; J o s e p h i n e P o w e l l : 2o. 39, 4 2 , 55.

S i a a t l i c h e M u s e e n z u R e r l i n - P r e u s s i s c h e r K u l i u r b e s i t z , M u s e u m l i i r I s l a m i s c b e K u n s t : 237, Petersburg:

414;

508.

Pitt Risers M u s e u m ,

R e u n i o n des M u s é e s N a t i o n a u x : 242.

Scala: 287; R o b e r t S e l k o w i t z : 78, 653: L i n d a S h u a i b : Stalıl: 6 2 2 ,

655.

1922.

National

1, 3 0 2 ; T r i s h O ' R e i l l y :

209, 420. 480. 496. 498,

679. 68 7; P i e r p o n t M o r g a n L i b r a r y . N e w Y o r k : 358; James Peacock: 4 2 9 ,

167;

26ı,

364;

C Jolie 376; 262;

Stale H e r m i t a g e M u s e u m , Si

264; T h y s s e n - B o r n e m i s z a F o u n d a t i o n . L u g a n o : 6 8 ; U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y , I s t a n b u l :

2od; F o t o Vasari: 6 0 7 ; C o u r t e s y o f t h e T r u s t e e s o f t h e V i c t o r i a a n d A l b e r t M u s e u m . L o n d o n : 4 6 , Estelle W h e l a n : 290: C a r o h n e W i l l i a m s : 4 7 9 ,

487.

710

I16.

311 ;

INDEX

A

Ahdulhaniid I I . Sultan. paii-IsUnnsinol.

"Abbasi." as epithet for Re?a, 369 al-Ablus i b n Abd al-Mutıalib. Abbasid descendants of, 20, 130 Abhasicls. agricultural development under, 19b. b9j, Alids and. l ( ; a p o l o gisıs of, 263: architecture and m of.

699

426.427- 428. Japanese occupation at, 430. Marco Polo i n . 695; renevsalisi

Abdullah.Amir. k i n g of Jordan. 356, 557

movements i n . 519 520; role i n Asian

Abdul-Rahman.Tuiiku. as Malay sian

irade. ¡ « 9 . 4 2 ? ; ulaitia led resistance

leader, 562

10 Diuch in, 699

d Ahedln.2ain.ini prcservaiiuii o f M ushil 11 den n 1 y. bi 2 - b 13

Acre. Crusader conquest o i . ( b ; Mongol capture of, 323

243. 244.260. 693: black flag of, 239;

aNııüou.prior 10 praying. 78.79. 112. 147

a* caliphs, 11, 24-25, 2b. 28,29.

Ada! sultanate, wars ss ith Ethiopia. ; o i

"abode o f Islam." 324

JO-JI. I * , 33, ¡ 6 . 37. î 8 . 39, 42.48.

adat (mdigenous norms). 424, 423, 427

"abode ol trace," 324

al-Adaw iy ah, Rabiah. as teniale Sufi mys­

58, 39. 134. 159. ibo.162, (64. 181,

"abode o f war." 324

210.132. 2J7.177. 278, 284, 333,

abortion. Muslim views o n . 634

Aden, as trade center. 38

154. i ç 8 . 3bj. 482.492. 693: decline

Ahn al-Ala ibn 7uhr. as Arab physician.

adjudication. Islamic law o n . 131

of. 3 2 . 4 İ . 4 4 . 4 8 . I I Ç . 3 Î 9 . J i ' - l s i . 354. İ S İ . ii*>. İ i " - î i 9 , i * » : Egyptian comrol by. b93. 693; Ismaih challenge of, 44 49; legacy IL> Ottoman Frnpire, 371; Mongol overthrow o l , ( 9 . 6 0 ;

tic, 693

îoç

Adriatic Sea, Ottoman trade mules o n .

Abu al-Ala Mawdudi. Mawiana Say yid. as Islamist. 299-300. çbç. bi 2, 652-653. 654, 67b, 700

Adudi hospital IBaghriad). 208

Abu Rakr al-Asamm; as (irsl caliph. 11.

Nesiorian physicians of, 200. 271;

12. 15, 112, 692; Mutazilie followers

political system of. 348; rclugccs from

of. 14b

rule of. 35. 3b; regional suiesof. 693: Sunni supporters of, 339; Umayyad conquest by. 19-20. 24. 25. 34, 692 Abhas I, as Safavid ruler. 193. 364. 370. 439. s 09. tx>7 Ahhas I I , as Safavid ruler, 180 Abd ai-AI. as Islamic reformer. 331 Abd a l - A / i / . Shah, as islamic reformer. Abd al-Hauiid ibnYahya, as Islauut adminisiraioi, 29 Abd al-Haiuid ll.Sutian. pan-Islamic policies of. 517 Abd AUa. Khoja. as Central Asian Sufi Ahdallah, Shaykh, as dan Fodio's hroiher, Abdallaiu. Klialifah. as malidisl succes­

Abu Daud al-Sijisıaııi, Sunan of, 75 Abu Hanifah al-Nuinan ibnThabil, as early jurist. 94 95. 113. 124. 126-127. 128. 693

sor. 346

Ahu Jafar Muhammad al Kulayni, Slıiiıe

Abd al-Malik i b ı ı M a n v a n . 142. 223-224, 32 2; as caliph. 17. 22. 224.

Abu Jafar Muhamniad ibn Hahiiyah,

raids of. 12. civil war of. 549.638, 639; colonialism i n . 353; creation o l , 557: Durrani rule of, 698; Ghaznasid

Ahul-Hudhayl, as Mutaziliie, 279 Abu Mansur Bakhlikin. silk saddlecloth Ahu Marwan ibn Zuhr.as,Arabphysi Abu Musa Islands. United Arab Emirates' claim lo, 359

cer. 409 Abdul), Muhammad, as Islamic mod ernisl. 293. 298, 299. çfaç, 633, fi47, b 8. 4

astronomer. 168. 191 ArabAnti discrim i nation Coinmiuee. 6J7 AbııTalib, Ah I b n , as Muhammad's uncle and guardian, b, 8, 691

300-301 Abd an-Nabi, as Mughal religious ntfi

b»3. b 8 . 699 t

modernist. 298. 547. 550. (147. 648.

Abul Hasau-Qazwini. Sayyid. as Ishraqi

Aburezk, James, as founder o f American

Abd al-Ra/iq, Ali. as Islamic secularist.

man. 48

Abul-Fazl. Akhnrnnmefi o l , 407,409

Abu Nasr Mansur ibn Iraq, as early

54. I N . 318. ¡ 1 9 - 3 2 0 . 693.694

al-Afdal ibn liadr. as Egyptian military

Afghanisiau; Baxakzais i n . 698: caliph

sioned by, 21b, 224. 263. 313, 691

Abd al-Rahman i l l . as Umayyad caliph.

454

Abu I-Ahhas al Saffali, as caliph. 23

Ahu Muslini, asAbhasid agent. 23

sor, 51

441.

Afaqiyya Snnsiil, i n China

680. 699; Salah movement o l . 299

Sliiiie hadnh of. 7i

277; Dome o f die Rock commis­ A b d a l Mumu», as Ibn Tumart's succes­

Afaq. Khoja. as Naqshbandi Sufi. 451.

al-Afghani. Jamal al-Din; as Islamic

cian. 205

S

148 149

Afar peoples, as MusUms. 501

Abu I las h i m , as Mutaziliic. 2 Ho

of. 225

Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr. as caliph. 17.

Quranic r u l es o u , 122

Aegean Sea. Ottoman control of. 388

Mogadishu ruler. 502

Abul-Mawahib dynasty, o f Kilvva. 304

«6

2b

Abu Batr i b n Muhammad, as

philosopher. 29b

leather. 451

adultery: Islamic prohibition of, 93. 687; advice, sincere, as Quranic principle.

hadith of, 75

İV-S18

J»9 Adud al-Dawiah. as Buy i d ruler. 42. 232

Abu Zayd. in Mmjamui, 2 j

regime i n . 40-41. 54. 356, 694: Ilanafi school i n . 114; H u b 1 Islam. 5*11. Islamic modernism i n . 682; jihad against Soviet U n i o n , 330- 551. bbo; KhvvariTmshah conquest ot, 38, n u l l taut activists i n , 579; minorities i n . 679: Muslim refugees f r o m . 603. 618; as Muslim siaie. 552; nomad invasion into, 351; relief agencies i n . 668; •evo­ lutionary movements i n . 667. SafTarid control o l . 38; shariali implementa­ tion i n , 151. 686—687; Soviet Union expelled btm, i + g . cs"0. 659, (>6o, 702;Talihan i n , 91,466. 658. 6 8 j . 687, b8fi, 703-704; treatment o f women i n . 634.687. b8K;Turkish uymaqs i n , 370

4

Abyssinia, early Islam i n . 306. 691

Afghans, defeal o l Safavids by, 170, 697

Achacinenid style, o f governance. 396

Ailaq. Michel. s8j

A c h f h (Sumatra); appeals (0 Ottomans

Africa; Christian iniimnlics i n , 583;

f r o m . 582; Islam i n . 1B9.422 424.

7"

colonialism In. 464. 576; trench ler-

7

I2

INDEX

riiories i n . 551; Islamic militancy i n . 475- 47Í>. S ° !

In- 4 7 S - 5 ° 7 . 5 ' ° -

]

601; islamúanon of. 306-507; mosques i n , 4.5.475. 479. 480, 487. 49' • 497- C03- 5 ° 4 - S°s": Muslim incursions into. 316; Muslim migrants f r o m . 604. 606; "scramble" for. 344. 552; trade route w i t h China. 438 African-American Muslims. 608. 609. 640: c h i l d education of. 623: dietar)*

.Ahmad Baba. asTimbuklu scholar, 484. 485

242.243

Ahmad Cevdet Pasha Shaykh al-Islam. as Islamic reformer, 698-699

African Americans, as racism victims.

Alexandretta (Iskenderun). Syria's and Turkey's claim to, 539

501-302.307 Ahmad i b u Huych. conquest o f Baghdad

Alexandria; as ancient cultural center. 269. 271; apostolic sect of. 309; caliph

by. 4 ' - 4 2 Ahmadiyyah-ldrisyyah. as tariqah o f I b n

control of. 12; Jews i n . 2: as trade center, 36. 389

Idhs. 331 621.

Alexis I . role in Crusades. 5 1 7 Alfa. Karamoko. jihad of. 519

625.638. 679 Ahmad Khan, Sayyid. as Islamic m o d -

631

Alexander the Great. 269.410: in South Asia, 396

Ahmad Gran, jihad against Ethiopia of.

Ahtnadiyyah movement. 615. 618,

laws of. 633-634

center. 389. 390; woodworking i n .

Al-Fo|r I Tunisian newspaper|, 670

" A f i i c a n u a i i o n " campaigns, 585

ernist. 297. I99. 347. 563, 583.

alfas, as Islamic sc holars. 486

Africans, migrations 10 Central Asia. 437

647-648,680,685,698

AlfonsoVI, King o l Castile and Leon. 35.

Afshars. defeai o f Safavids by. 570, 697 afterlife, Senndiaii Buddhist notion of.

AhmadYasavi. shrine of. 229. 230. 263.

algebra; Arabic discipline of,

Ahmed HI. Sultan. 511

441

Ahmediya. 584

Agoinsi rhe [odihsomr Heresy of the Sect of the

ahong. as Muslim Chinese leader. 447

313

Ahrun. medical handbook of. 2oo al-Ahsai. Shaykh Ahmad. Shaykhiyyah

Aga Khan, 386 Aga Khan Foundation, resioranons by,

movement of, 529

Europe. 187 algehrak geometry: Arab contribution to. 189 Algeria, civil war i n . 680. 703; colonial

Aluiramazda, as Zoroasrrian god, 80

209

157.

184-188. 194, introduction into

Agagrirs ( N i g e r ) , mosque at. 475 Sumiera (John o f Damascus),

50 Alfonso VII, King o f Castile, ; i

26s, 695

armies of. 592: colonialism i n , 563.

Agarc-nes. as name for Muslims. 311

al-Aimma. Aha. astrolabe made by. 180

573. 386. 588. 590. 598: earthquake

Aga th ad aim on, 294

Air (Asben), as salt source, 495

aid to, 667; economic development

Age o f Discovery, as European

air navel, by islamic women. 118-119

i n , 573. 574. French control of.

euphemism for colonialism. 644. 647 Aghlabids: as early Islamic governors, 21. 36; Great Mosque rebiuding by.

Aishafi; on Muhammad's character. 96.

588-589; French settlers i n , 584-585;

105: as Muhammad's wife. 15, 143:011

intellectual activity i n . 579; Islamic

w o m e n in mosques, I J 8 , 140

aniicoloniabsiu i n . 550; Islamic con

[4; overthrow of. 45; Sicilian raids of.

Aix. Muslim pirate raids of, 316

sens i n . j 6 : Islamic law- replacement

21

Ajmer (India); Chishti shrine in,

i n . 568; Islamic modernism i n . 565,

-

Aght amar (Armenia), Church o f the Holy Cross o n , 52 aging population, o f Europe and North

402-4O3. 408.413; Jahangir residence

656. 668. 681. Islamic pobiics i n . 668. 670-672. 678. 703, 704; Islamic

i n . 410.413

Salvauon From i n , 562: Islamism i n ,

Akbar; depiction o l . 412: as Indo Muslim ruler, 597,404.405-410.411,

567, 568, 667; jihad I n . 563; land

agnostics. Islamic conversion of, 609

412,414, 420, 696, 697; lineage ot,

ownership i n , 575; Malik: school i n .

Agra: as Mughal capital. 407.408. 410;

405. 409.412; monumental a n of.

113; military i n . 679; Morocco's claim

409-410.419

to. 539; Muslim insurgents i n . 94;

Amenta, 610

Ta| Mahal i n , 416 Agra Fon, Shah Jaban s imprisonment i n . 418 agricultural altemanves, of Cenural Asia. 439

Muslim migrants f r o m . 606: Muslim

Akbununidi (Abul-Fazl). 407. 409 akhbans, as mujtahiri opponents. 369

refugees f r o m , 6 0 ; ; national activists

Alchbarj school o l Shiism. 515-516. 529;

of. 562. 650: National Liberation From i n , 561. 563; narionhood-

debate with Usuli school. 697 akbis, as Sufi charitable group, 372

ummah disharmony i n , 555. Ottoman

Akillu. as Tuareg chief, 481

c o n n o l of, 342, 374. 541 ¡ as postcolo¬

agronomy, i n early Islam. 210. a l l , 213

Alamgir. See Aurangzeh

nial stale, 586; rural economy of,

Agung. Sultan: Java mosque of. 428.429;

Alawi Musbms, 618,638.697

violence i n , 674; war o f independence

agriculture, i n Ottoman Empire, 387. j 88

i n Mataram dynasty. 697 Ahainad Madam. Mawlana Husain. as Islamic modernist, 550 .Mil al Hadith (Tradinonists), fiqh legal diought of. 111 Ahl al-Ray (Raoonahsts). fiqh legal thought of. 112 Ahl af-Suiinah wal-Jamaa. as people of the Sunna. 89

Alhania: Islamic converts i n . 602. 604:

Algerians. Paris massacre of, 631

refugees from. 605

Algiers, French conquest of, 541

of. 262; hlamic architecture of, 215;

A l b e m . as Itahan architect. 217

muqarnas of. 264

Al-Bilod [Saudi newspaper], b b 4

Albuquerque-, Afonsade. Melaka capture

by, 4lt>

Ahmad, perceived as pruphct. 307

alcohol consumption. Islamic p r o h i b i -

Ahmad. Khurshid. as Islamic modernist, 681 Ahmad, Muhammad, mahdisi movement of. 346. 699

tion of. 93. 94. 123. 134. 140,

Alhazan. as early mathematician and physicist. 171,

alchemy, i n early Islam. 198

662

algorithm, source o f name. 188 The Alhamhra: ambiguous architecture

211

Ahb Hadith Muslims. 618 Ahmad. |alal al e. as Iranian intellectuarl.

of. 552, 575, 604. 650-651

Lann Caibolics i n . 385: Muslim albarelli. as medicinecontainers, n o .

571:

173. 190. 191.

192-193

Alha/ans problem. 192 142,

230. 634.687; by non-conforming Muslims. 488.491 Aleppo: atabeg stales of. 56. Fatimid

Ali, Chlragh, as Islamic modernist. 680 Ali. Muhammad; Egyptian dynasty of. 538. 698: as Rashti's successor. 529 Ah, Sultan, palace of. 569 Ali (Ah IbnAbiTalib). assassination of.

power i n , 46; Hamdanids of. 43;

692; as fourth Caliph. 15. 16, 663,

Mirdasids of, 43; as Ottoman trade

692, as herediiary i m a m . 44; as

INDEX Muhammad's cousin and KM in-law. 26.44. n 2 , 259; perceived reincarna­

AMAL (Lebanese Resisiance Battalions). 661, 702

7 I 7,

Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental College (Aligarh),649

tion of. 363; as "rightly g u i d e d "

amanat. Quranic rulings o u . 138-139

Anglo-OrieniaJ College (Ahgarh). 580

cahph. 112; sayings of. $68. 369; t o m b

American-Arab Anti -Discrimination

anicomsm [absence o f hguresj. i n

as holy site. 559. 368. 515 Alids. 18. 22. 24, 2C. 26, 36, 41, 44, 6 6 ; ; Abbasids and, 25 Ahgarh movement (India), as Islamic modernism, 565 Ahgarh Muslim University. 649 Ali Jinnah, Muhammad; English educa rion of. 578: as Pakistani leader. 562. 586. 594, C95-C96 Ali Pasha. Muhammad, conquest o f Sudan by. 500 Ali Qapu (Isfahan), 36b, 367 al-Islam, Shaykli, as Ottoman law expert, 379. J80.381 al Allaf. Abul-Hudhay'l. as Mutazllite the­ ologian, 278 Allah; d e f i n i t i o n of, 76; islamic belief i n singularity of, 70, 517; lack o l representations o f . 230; M u h a m m a d as messenger of, 77;

Committee. 637

Islamic a n . 222, 230-236

American Arab University Graduates. 636

animals, cruelty to, Islamic proliihinon of. 133. H 4

American College (Tehran). 580 "American Islam," as bile for Gulf siaies, 664

animal sacrifice, during pilgrimages, 83-86 Animists. inArabi* and Sudan. 4 - 5

American Israel PublicAiiairs Committee, 6;6

Anisi, as calligraphcr. 248 Ankara. U i g h u r separatists i n , 466

American Muslim Council, 638

An-Najaf (Iraq). Ah shnne al, 359

American University (Beirut). 579

ansar (helpers), 9

Ainida; aiaheg stales of. 5b; Marwanids

Ansan. Shayh Murtacia. as legal scholar, 516

in,4i al-Amih. as Shine scholar. 295 al-Amin, Muhammad, overthrow of. 27 amir; faqu compared to. 404, Umayyad

.Antalya (Turkey). Ottoman trade route through. 389 Anihropomorpbists, 279 Antichrist; al-Hakim viewed as. 335;

rulers as, 5 4 Amir A l l . Sayyid. as Islamic modernist.

Muhammad viewed as, 322. 626 Aııtı-Defam at ion League (B'nai B n t h ) .

297-199 amir a l - m u ' m i n i n ; Ibn llafs as. 52.60: Ubayd Allah as, 45

*37 Antioch; aposiolic sect of. 309:Crusader

revealed books o f . 88. subordina

Amritsar Massacre, Baluch troops i n , 593

l i o n t o . 299

Amsterdam, Uighur separatists i n , 466

anti Semmsm, 627; in early Spain. 344

amulets. African trade i n . 485. 506

anti W s t e r n i s m . Islamic. 301

analogical reasoning, as source o f shari-

.Anton i us. George, 583

Allah. Hajji Shanat, as Bengali Islamic reformer, 559-440 All-India Muslim League. 562. 596 Almojot (Ptolemy); Arabic rranslaiionsof. 163, 272; description of, 171-172, 232: influence o n Arabic astronomy. 162. 164, 165. 167. 168 d Manai [reformist journal]. 700 Almanzor. 5 « al-Mansur, Abu Amir

ah, 119. 122. 126

conquest of, 56. 339, 602; |ews i n . 2

Aniitn. Farah. 298

Anatoha. as early name for Inner Asia.

Anuslurvan. Gundisliapur academy lounded by, 270-271

«9 Anatolia: caliph raids and control of, 12. 28; Christians i n . 583; early carpels f r o m . 246; Greek Orthodox faith i n . Islamic conversion of, 372-373.

Anushtakin al-Dirbari. as Faiimid army man. 48 Apollin. as purported Islamic deiry, 326. 3*7

Almaric I , King of Jerusalem, 339

392, Islamic culture i n . 60, 371;

Almaty (Kazakhstan), 445; air service to.

Ottoman accepiance of Jews f r o m .

433; as trade center, 436; U i g h u r sepa­

386; Ottoman control of, 342.372.

ratists i n . 466

371. 377. 3801^87. 388, 391:

Almohad mosque (Seville), 305

"appearances." theophanic. 65

Qaramanid rule of. 693: Safavid

al Aqib, asTimbuktu qadi. 483

Almohad(s); as l a l i p h , 60; decline of,

Empire i n . 363; Seljuk rule i n . 54. 33,

Aqit family, asTimbuktu qadis. 483.485

35^.353.371.694

Aqqoyunlu rulers. 148

31. 32. 695; i n N o r t h Africa, 694; rev ivalisi movements of. 49. 50-51. 52-33. 176; i n Spain. 35. 253. 285. 320. 342. 694 Ahnoravids;Almohad rivalry w i t h , 51; i n

anaromy studies, in early Islam,

Andalusia: Arab medicine in, 204-205.

Arah American Insııtuıe (AAI), 637-738

317-321, 344, 345; Clirisuan shrines

movements of, 49-50, 52-53. 176; i n

i n . 334; Chrisuan takeover o l , 51.

southwestern Sahara, 476;Wolof as

341-342. 344; early astronomers m .

possible descendants of. 490

171, 175. 181; early irrigation i n , 198; end o f caliphate of. b 9 ; as Islamic 4

required by Islam, 73, 82, 103;

cultural area. 5;. 318.413; in Islamic

Shah ah r u l i n g o n . 109. 134

empire, 50. 329,694; Feripaielicism i n , 284-289 Anderson. Lisa. 588

Unrepresenlcd Nations and People's

Andkhui, early Clunesc missions to, 440

Organization. 467

Andromachus. as Greek doctor. 199

Alpetkin, IsaYusup. as Uighur nalionalist. 467 Altlshahr. Naqshbandi Sufism founded i n . 453

al-Aqsa Mosque (Jerusalem). 116, 243. Aquinas. St Thomas. 289. jo2

political collapse o l . 51: revivalist

Alpcckin, Erkin. as leader o f

Seljuk domains, 56, 57

Anawau. George. 298 2 i i ; Christian-Muslim relations i n ,

AlpArslan. as Seljuk sultan, 55. 56

appanages; o f Buyids, 42, 56; o f Great

I13. 314. 339. arson of. 701

205-207

Islamic Spain. 35, 320, 342.694;

alms; Quranic rules o n , 120, 145. 147.

Apostasy wars. 11, 76

Andromeda, depicuon of, 233 angels, o f Allah, 83. 88.95 Angkatan Bella Islam Malaysia (AB1M), 570. 701.704

Allishar, Naqshbandi rulers of, 521

Anglo-Afghan War. 587

alyans, 391

"Anglo conformity." i n Uniied Slates. 610

Arab Americans, organizations of, 636-638 Arab Christians. 310; in Lebanon. 700. Ottoman churches of. 3B5; relations w i t h Crusaders. 340; role i n Arab nationalism, 583 Arah civilization; Islam's transcendence of. 69-70; science i n . 157 arabesque motifs; detail of, 240; i n Islamic a n . i n . 236-246. 155. 258. 411.416; principles of. 138 Arabia. Abbasiddecline i n . 43; early Christians i n , 306: early jews i n , 306; early religions i n . ; . 4: Indian Muslims viewed as invaders f r o m , 581; Islamic converts I n . 10. 22-23. 76; Islamic reform i n . 545; Muslim slave irade w i t h . 504; national identity

714

INDEX

oC 554- 556; Ottoman Empire i n . 57J. 374. 388, 389: Shafii school i n , 114: trade expeditions of, 1-4. 589. 475. 501; Umayyad control of. 27-28 Arabic; adoption by Christian d h i m m i s , I j i . African speakers o l . 504; o n Chinese export ware. 458; o n Chinese

Ark o l the Covenant, klswa compared 10 lent of, 220 Arkoun. Muhanunad. as Islamic m o d ernist, 565 Armed Islamic Group (GL\). of .Algeria.

assimilaiionisl model, of immigration. 609—610 Association o f Algerian Ulama. 651 Assyrians. Armenian Church of. 585 astrolabe, as Muslim Uivennon, 169. 180. 181

672,688 Armenia; caliph control of. 12. 30;

astrology, use i n early Islam. 161-162 astronomy ; in early Islam. / 8 . 155.

mosques. 459. 460; language classes

Clmsnaniiy i n . 1. 55; Faiiinid army

for. 623; lexicons i n , 158, 189; literary

unns from. 48; Kurdish misai states

works i n . J49. i c o , s(8; new prose

İ U . 4 Î . 55, 56;Tiirkmen i n , 54. 55,

162, 163. 164; eastern reform tradition

style of. 29. plays on words i n , 266;

3S2. ï 5 3 . 37"

of. 174-175, 176-177; instruments for.

of Quran, translation of, 70. role in Islamic cullure. 60, 358; scientific translations into, 159-160. 162. 163. 164. 191, 331 , 69J; scientific works

Armenian Church, 111 Ottoman Empire. Armenians; i n Central Asia. 472; i n earlyChang an, 442 armillary sphere. Muslin design of. 182

f o r m of. 40. 223. 2 2 6 . 228. 241. 495;

an. Islamic

spread 10 N o r t h Africa. 48; use i n

anısaıı classes, elimination by colonial­

color i n . 246

ism.

Sec Islamic an

572

al-Asad, H a l ı / , as Syrian president, [84,

.Arabic alphabet, lexicon of, 189 Arabic numerals, o r i g i n of, 184 Arab-Islamic empires, 349. 550 .Arab-Israeli War. 701, Arab poliiical

164. 168, 180. 181. 182: practicaf problemsof. 177 183; theoretical.

385-386

i n . 157-158, 159, 166. 168; script

South Asian Islam, 396; words for

161-183. 184. J ' î . 27" ; early texts o n .

/02 Asad. Muhammad, as Islamic modernist, 677.680

169-177; translated texts o n . 159; western reform iradihon of, 176 aiabeg. as guardian of pruices, 56-57, 354-35s Aiaturk Str Kern a I. Mustafa Atchison College ( U h o r e ) . 578 atomic theory, o f al Baqillani. 281 Allartn Madrasa (Fez), 257 al-Attas, Muhammad Naguih. 298 Auribuusts. 279

Ascalon. caliph offensives againsi, 12

Augusunian-Avicennan party. 289

action groups ailer. 636; as a jihad.

Ascelcpius. 294

Aurangabad (Deccan). 418

657; o i l bo) cott of. 605

al-Asliari.Abu al-Hasan. as founder o f

Aurangzeb; as Mughal emperor.

"Arabman," creation o l , 547 Arab League. 556

Asharism, 280-281, 289 Asharism, 280. 281-282. 283. 284, 289.

Arah Legion, jordanian tribesmen i n , 584

290, 302. 303 Asliitiyani. Mirzah Mahdi. as Ishraqi

Arah monarchies, dcvelopmenl of. 567 Arab Near Easl. postcolonialism i n . 597. 598

philosopher. 296 Ashkenazi Jews. Ottoman acceptance o l . 386

Arabo-IVrsian civilization.Turkmen as pan of. 353

Ashmad. Kassim. as Islamic modernist. S65

" Arah Revolt." 538

al-Ashrafi. Arghun Shah. Quranic m a n u ­

Arabs, in early Chang an. 442; Islam identification w i t h , 601 Arab Socialist U n i o n , 390 .Arafat, role in pdgramages. 85.86. 87.

script of, 2422 Ashtiyaui. Sayyicl Jalal. as Ishraqi philosopher, 296 Asia; French territories i n . 551. Islam in. 6oi. So? also individual countries

94

417

418, 420. 514, 581, 697; l o m b o l ,

417.418 Australia, Muslims i n , 604, 608 Austria: Islamic mosques and centers i n . 618; Muslim guest workers i n . 609; Muslims i n . 604: Ottoman opposition by. 37+ authoritarian govenunenis. o f Muslim countries. 668 Avempace. Set i b n Bajjah Averrocs, as Islamic philosopher, 173. 274. 279, 286 289. 290. 298, Î 0 2 , 303. 333. 314. 695 Avitenna. as Muslim philosopher-physi cian, 170. l8t, 204—205. 272,

Aragon. Iberian rule by, 320

Asia Minor. Greek territories i n . 439

275-276. 279. 281. 283, 293. 296.

Archimedes. Arab research based o n .

Asian Exclusion Act o f 1960s (U.S.).

302.333.334. 694 al-Awa. M. Scllm. as Islamic modernisi.

repeal of, 608.617

193-194 architecture; Islamic. Set Islamic archileilure. o f Mughal emperors.

Asian tiger, in Malaysia. 643 Asia-Pacific Economic Council. China and.467

409-420 Ardabil (Iran). 59, 363, 439

Al-AVilu IWI-AJWIIHI ( a l - B i r u m ) , 169-170

Arians, ; i o

Askıya Uawud. asTimbuktu ruler, 483

Aristotelian Averroisi ihescs. 289

Askiya Ismail. asTimhuktu ruler.

Aristotelian! sin. Islamic reaction against.

483-484 Askiya Muhammad, as Muslim king o f

191 .Aristotle, 64. 118, 269. 270, 274. 276.

Songhay. 478. 482 -483. 492. 496

681 Awdaghusi (Saliara), as early uade ren­ ier. 476 Avvliya. N i / a m ad-Din. at Indian siihan. 403,404 "axial community." moral

responsihibly

of. 96 A x u m ; Christianity i n . 3: k i n g d o m of. 1. 8

277. 279, 283, 284, 28 , 293. 322.

Askiyas. generosity 10 scholars. 485

Aya Sofia Mosque. 581, 384

331. 332; Alexander the Great and.

Atoka the Magnificent, i n South Asia.

ayatollahs, objections to Nadirs Shiism,

S

396; as astronomer. 163, 172, 175-176. 176; color theory of. 247; Islamic commc-iuaries o n , 284. 286.

Ï96 Assar, Muhammad Qasim. as Ishraqi philosopher. 296

289. 290; physical iheory of, 170. [92, assassinaoon; of Ali ihnAbiTallb, 16. 212; rediscovery of, 305; Syriac trans

692; of Anwar Sadat. 660. 666. 702;

lationsof, 271. 334

of Hasan al-Banna. 701 : o f Nizam al¬

arithmetic. Arah development of. 183-184. 189. 212 AnlhiTirlnil (Dlopliaiilus). 185

Mulk. 282; o f Umar ibn al-Khatiab. 15, 16, 692 Assassins. 49, 56. 39. 277

5'5 Ayn Jalui Ran le. Mongol defeat at, 39. 695 Ayodha (India), mosque buill 011 Hindu site i n . 581 Ay yubids. 290. 339. 340; Fgyptian rule by, 695: Syrian dorniuaUon by. 57 Azad. Abul Kalani, as Islamic modernist. «0

INDEX Azerbaijan: caliph control of, 12. j o ;

Bahrain; extremist activities i n . 665:

Kurdish tribal Mates i n . + j ; S>ljuk c o n ­

Iranian expansion to, 55b; Maliki

trol of, j s T u r k m e n migration i m o .

school i n , 114

54

Bahrain C.ui. as Sasaman king. 248

Wiar. as calligraphic. 248

Bdhnim Cur in tht (Jictn ftruliun. as painting

Al-A/har Mosque (Cairo), 46, 117

by Shayki. 24R, 249

Al-Azhar University (Cairo): Chinese

al-Bapuri. as modern theologian. 29;

7 i5

Raradaeus. Jacobus, as founder o f Jacobite church, ; i o liaraka ( d o ine blessing), j b t . 408.494 Rarakzais. i n Afghanistan. 698 barbari. as name lor Muslims, 321 Barelwi. Sayyid Ahmad, as Islamic reformer. 328, 53b, 538. 345. f*)8

Muslim srudcius at. 457; Islamic stud­

llakar. Osman, as Islamic modernist. 6H1

Barelwi Muslims. bi8

ies at. 151. 281. 298, 300. 301, 494.

Rakhushu family, as phy sitians to

al-Barmaki. promonon o f Hellenic stud­

647; nationalization o l , r.54

Ahbasids, 200, 271

ies by, 271

al Aziz, as f a i i m i d caliph. 47

al-Kakri. as early African traveler. 47b.

Barmakid family. inAbbasld govern

al Azi?. Abd. 569, 652: falsvaol, 525

489 al-Bakri, Mustafa, role i n Khalwatlyyah

al-Barnawi, Muhammad i b u al I Ian ^ b d

al-Aziz Laravsi.Ahd. as Islamic secularist. i°'

order. 513

al-Aziz Thalbi.Abd, as Tunisian national­ ist. 651 al-Azm. Sadiq. as Islamic secularist, 301 Azov (Crimea). Russian conquest of. 697

al-Balabakki, Qusta i h n Luqa; as early

Basmil nomads, as Uighur allies. 464

191

Basra (Iraq); African slave domination

ThtRuliinccofAction (al-Ghazab), 283 S38-3J9. 34"

Tbc Bah. as Islamic relormer. 529, c,j8

Balearic Islands. Al moras i d control of, 51

babas (Suh holy m e n ) . ¡ 7 1 . 375

Balkan peninsula: Creek Orthodox faith

Bab Mardum Mosque (Toledo), convert­ ed to church, 545

bath, prior 10 pray ing, 78

389. 391 Turkish takeover ot, 342.

inscription, 221 metic of, 184: as astronomers, ibi

al-Balklii. Abul-Qasim, as Muianlite, 280

Bath parties (Syria and Iraq), 590

Balkh (Iran); Islamization of. 442:

al-Baitaiti. Abu Abd Allah Muhammad

mosque decoration i n , 257-238, 139; Umayyad campaigns I r o m . 21

Kadajoz. as Islamic city-state. 34

Baltic Sea. Abbasid trade i n . 32

Badakhsi, Mullah Shah. Dara Shikoh as

Baluch uoops (Pakisian), in Ainritsar

disciple of. 417

Massacre, 592

Badaivi.Ahd al-Rahman. as Islamic m o d ermst. 298

Balyan, Krikor, mosque designed by. 524 Bambara, Islam i n . 48b. 488

Badr. ISartle of, 10, 691

Bangladesh;colonial annies of, 392:cre­

Badr al-Jamali. as Egy plian military gov­

230. 231 Baihist leaders (Sy ria and Iraq), secular izaiion policy of. 572

604

Babylonians-animist cults o l . 4: a r i t h ­

nationalists i n . 112 al-Basri. al-Hasan. as Qadari. 277,278 bathhouses, Islamic archiieciure of, 218,

in, 580; Ottoman trade centers i n ,

4

Islamic theology i n , 278, Mutazilism in. 278; Ottoman control of. 389;

Muslims i n , b04; Ouoman judiciary

Babtir. Abul-Qasim. Nezamim manu­ script of, 2 8

of. 43; Islamic louquesl of, l ; i , 13. it,;

in. 2, Islamic conversion i n , 373;

Babur. as Mughal emperor, 405, 408. 581

Baby Ionian language, in trilingual

al Rahman. SecHajinnai al Bashir. Omar. (179, b8o. 703

mathematician. 185, optic studies of.

Baldwin. King o f die Latin Kingdom, B

ment. 29

i b n j a h i n . as early astronomer, ibb Baltic o f Ayn falut, Mongol defeat at, 59. 695 Ratile o f Badr.

10.1

Battle o f Chaldiran. Safavid defeaı ai, 696 Battle ol ("hansa. Humay aıı's dcleat at. 407 Rattle o l H i l t i n . b g ;

ation of. cbo, b55, 637, 7 0 i ; e m i

Haille o l Kirina.478

grams f r o m . bo5. bob. bo8; Islamic

Bailie o f Kosovo ( 1389), 37;. b g i

Badshai Mosque (Lahore), 6;, 657

modernism i n , 682; Islamic Party of,

Baulc o f Lepanlo, bgb

Baghdad; Ahhasid oterihrow i n , 37. 42,

53/, as modern Muslim stale. 549;

Batdc o f Mankizen. 694

46, 59; Buyid capture and control of.

Muslim population of, 582; nation

Bailie o f PaiUpat. as Mughal beginning,

J2.42.47; decline of, 59; early

h o o d - u m m a h harmony i n . 555

ernor. 48

astronomy i n . 181. 191; as early m e d ­ ical center. 198. l o o . 202, 208. 271: early military control of, j $ i ; a s

Bani Sadr, Abol Hasan, as banian presi­ dent. 664 al Banna. Hasan: assassination o l .

696 Bailie o f Plassey. C13 Bailie o f the Camel. 15 Bailie of the Trench, 10.691

Islamic capital. 20, 25. 2b, 28. 29. 50,

701700; Islamic movements of, 652.

RatllcoITours. 692

31. 33. 36, J7. j 8 , 277. 693; as Islamic

653, (169. b8i. 700

Battle o f U h u d . 10, 691

cultural center. 59. do. 160, 164, [69. in.

168,

357. Khurasan rhalry w i t h .

bannai (huilder's technique), 219

Haye/il, as Ottoman sultan, 5/9

Banqiao Chinese Sulism. 456

Rayezit I I , Sultan. 208

27; Mongol conquest of. 59. 695;

Banii.Arjumand. SrrMumtaz Mahal

Bay o f Bengal, role in Sino-Indian trade,

Mota/ilism i n , 278, 280; Ottoman

Bai HI I lammad family, as Maghreb

occupation of, 380,696; Seljuk c o n ­ trol of, 55, 58 al-Raghdadi, Abd al-Latif; as.Arah aiiacomisi. 107; as Asharttc cheologian. 281. 302 Baghdad Kiosk. olTopkapl Serai. 377 Baginui. Islamic rulers o l . 4 9 ; Rahai faith, 584. Shiism o r i g i n o l , 529 Raima. Muhammad's meeting w idi, 30b AI-Buhiiliul-kibr (Al SamawalalMaghribi), 1877 Bah man id empire. ufDecean.404

rulers, 51

420 Bayı al-Hikma, translations f r o m , Joo

Rami Hilal, as Muslims. 499

Bayı al Kritliya [Cairo museuinj. 364

Rami Marin nomads, conquest o f

bayyinat ("bayylnat"). 65

Morocco by. 32 Banu Musa brothers, as early scientists. 160,

194

Kanu Qaynuqa, Muslim battle againsi, 2J6 Baptist Church. Muslims i n schools of. 622 al-BaqiUani.Ahu Bakr: ami-Christian polemics of. 332; as.Ashrarile. 281

lîazargaıı. Mehdi, as Iranian prime m i n ­ ister, 664 Beacon Tower Mosqyc (Guangzhou|. 44Î bedoums;oI Arahia. 501; tents used by. 22o Begin. Menachim. b6o Beijing; as Muslim cultural center. 438; Muslims i n , 443. 445. 454

7

ı6

INDEX

Beirut; ambassador's assassination i n . 629: civil war effects o n . 655; as port

courtier. 398; scientific texts of. 156.

botany, m early Islam, 207. 210-212, 213

168. 169. 398

hotos (soothsayers), 428

Bishkek (Kyrgyzsiant. as trade center. Beishan Chinese Sufism. 456

4J6

Beja (Nubia). Islam i n . 498

al-Bistami. as early philsopher. 294

Bckiashi Sufi order, role i o O l r o m a n

al-Bitru)i.Abu Ishaq. as Andalusian

Empire. 372. 380 Belgium; anil Muslim poliucal p i n y c m . 631; ethnic m i n o r i t y model of.

astronomer. 175

Bourguiha. Habib; secularization policy of, 57!, as Tunisian president. 670. 702, 703 Brabant. Siger de, 289, 302 Bradford Council for Voluntary Services

hlack, use in Islamic art. 258, 259

(Great Britain 1, r u l i n g on Islamic-

Black Sea; Ottoman control of. 374. 388.

foods. 634

610. Islamic mosques and centers i n .

389, 391,698;Russian control of.

Brahmagupta. as Indian philosopher. 272

618; Muslims i n . 604. 607: Muslim

392. 698

Brahmanabad. early Muslim conquest

World league office i n . 621 Belgrade, Ottoman conquest oi, 696 Belhad|. All, o n democracy and Islam. 677. 678 "The Believer president," as tide for Sadat, 657 Believers; "commander of." 14-13; as Muhammad's early followers. 9. 11-13. 60 Bello. Muhammad; o n African Islam. 494.495: as dan Fodio's son, 536 Ben . \ l i . Zein Abidine. Tunisian policies of. 374, 670. 680 Ben Badis. Abd al-Hamid. as Algerian nationalist. 651.680 Ben Bella. Ahmad, as national activist. C&2 benefits, class! ficanon of, 135-136 Bengal; British colonialism i n , 363; Islamic reform i n . 338-339 Ben ladid.Chedli. as Algerian president. 6;. Benv>n. 1 inda. 469 Benrusuf Madrasa (Marrakesh). 125

Black Stone, embedded in Kaaba. 85, 259 black supremacy. Nation o f Islam and, 609 "blocking the means." as Shariah ruling. '23

of, 22 Brazil. Muslim slaves i n , 546-547 bricks, use in Islamic architecture. 229. 230. 243-244 246, 233 British hasi India Company, colonialism

blood circulation. .Arab discovery of, 205

of. 563; emergence and decline of,

bloodletting, in early Greek medicine.

522, 525. 539; Mughal Empire and,

201. 203 blue (color). Islamic connotations of. 259 Blue Mosque (Tabriz), decorative motifs in. 255.256 Bobrinsk) Bucket, as Islamic art object. 221-222, 253, 261-262, 163 bodily cognitions, o f Ibn Khaldun. 293 Boethius o l Dacia. 289. 302 Bogomils. Armenian Church of, 383 Bolkstelni. f r i t s , on Dutch ethnic minoriıies, 6 ; i Bonan.Turkic-.Altaic language of. 443 Bonneval, Cornre de. as Ottoman adviser. 5ti hookmaking. as Islamic art f o r m . 218. 232.234, 239.241

5"3. 514 British Malay, diversity i n . 558 brotherhoods, o f Sufis, 360. 448.485. 494.512.522 Brunei; creation of. 651; Malaysian claims to, 557, 559; as m o d e m Muslim stale, 349; monarchy i n . 588; social welfare system of, 650 Buddha. Central Asian images of. 441 Buddhism. 438; in Central Asia, 434; colonialism effects o n , 645; dissem­ ination by Silk Road, 440. 441. influence o n U i g h u r s . 464: i n South Asia, 396; " W i i t e Lotus" rebellion of. 451 Buddhisls. as penpheial U.S. group, 610 Bukhara; Chinese pilgrimages to, 454;

bequests. Quranic rules o n , 120

Book of Cause (Produs o f Athens). 270

early Chinese missions to. 440. as

Berbers. Islamic conversion of. 21. 34,

Book of Healing (Avicenna), 275

Islamic cultural center. 39. 244. 357.

3 i - l 6 . 45. 46. 48. 49. 50. 51. 314.

Book of Instruct 1011 (al-Masudi), 329

520. 521; Janids in. 697; musalla i n ,

317, 480. 692; language o t . role i n

Book of RrİKitlut (Ibn H a r m ) . 289-290

Islamic culture. 60. national i d e n t i ­

Book ot Reckoning, men's deeds record­

ty of. 354; as Saharan traders. 473. 495

ed in. 223 Book of theCategories ol Millions (Ibn Ahmad).

Bergson. Henri-Louis, 297. 649 Book olVindıcuııon (al-Khayyat), 278

beys (warrior chieftains). 371, 391

book painting, Persian. 255

Bhutto, Benazir; defeat of. 595. 669; elec­

Books of Setts (Ibn H a r m ) . 332

Bhutto. Zulfikar A h . as Pakistani leader. 657, 658, 669. 702 Bibi La Maqbara. as Mughal tomb. 419 The Bihle. Arabic translations of, 331; fig-

Bula Matari. in colonial Sub-Saharan

tice. 497 bom-again Christians, Muslim failh company) to, 69 Borneo, as part o f Malaysia. 538

Usuh leader. 516 Bihzad. as Persian painter. 248. 250. 251. 696 Rilad al -Sudan. African Islam i n . 475; as eaily uade center. 476 al-Birgili. as early theologian, 293 al-Birum; as early astronomer. 168. 169-170. 191. i94;asGhaznavid

66-67, 74-75

bori spirits. inAfrican pre-Islamic prat

Islamic interest i n , 330, 626

Bihhaham. Aga Muhammad Baqir, as

astronomer, 171 al-Bukhari, Sabih.Sunna hook of, Bulala clan, in Karcm, 492

born-again Musbins, 639

bihah scripr. o f Deccan Quran. 403

ar, 512

Bordeaux. Muslim takeover of, 314

u r i l representations of. 230. 232; bicukuralism.ofWfcsiern Muslims, 639

al-Bukhan. Murad. as Naqshhandi schol­ al-Bukhari. Sadr ai-Sharia. as early

beveled style, o f Islamic an. 260. 261

tion of, 703

101; o n Silk Road, 440; (Imayyad cono-ol of, 21

B o m u (Nigeria); Islam in, 493-494, 496. 506; Muslim traders i n . 488 Bosnia; Dayton ftace Agreement for. 704; i b n Idris prayers used i n . 531: Muslim migrants f r o m . 605. 606; Muslims i n . 472, 47;, 604, 638. Muslim victims i n , 6 ; o ; relief agen ties i n , 668 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as m o d e m Muslim state. 549 Bosnians, i n Germany, 604

Africa, 561 Bulgaria; Islamic converts i n . 602, 604; Muslim refugees from. 605, 638, Ot Ionian churches of. 385; Ottoman conquest of, 373 bumiputra (sons o f the soil). Malaysian affirmative action for. 585 Burban ad-Din, Detcan prosperity and, 403 burial pracnccs.ofMuslims. 109. 632 -633, 634, 636 Bursa; Ertugrul'sconquest o f 375, 695; Ottoman judiciary i n . 380; as Ottoman trade center. 389. 390 Buiroji [Sadi p o e n ] , 250 Buyids, as caliph protectors. 30. 32. 41.

INDEX 47.48, 168. (81, 208, 232, 693;

ing of.

oust-

43. 46

32

al Ruzjani, Ahu al-Wafa, as early

H*

Buzurgimhr, as ftrrsian sage, 294 Byzantine Fmpire. 1. So,

caliph offensives against, 11, 12, 13, Christianity i n .

2 . 310-311. 602;

246,

247. 383; f r o m Ottoman Empire,

383; from Safavid Empire, 365. ;66 Carthage, Muslim conquest of. 21. ¡5

Crusades and. 337, 338; decline of,

cartography, use for Mecca location. 179

342,

canograpy, i n early Islam, 183. 185

372, 374, 694; decorative art of.

234; decorative w r i t i n g i n , 222. 22;;

Castile; Iberian rule by. ;2o; Islamic-

legacy to Ottoman Empire. 371. 390;

Chrisnan rivalry i n . 51; Ijeon union

linguistic conversion of, 138-139;

w i i h , 35

M u s l i m incursions i n t o . 315. 316. philosophical eclipse i n .

¿02;

270-271.

Chaldiran. Battle of, 696 Chang an. early foreigners i n . 442 Chang an (Xi an); Buddhist an i n , 441; as Han dynasty capital, 45-1. on Silk Road, 440 Chansons de Gcstc. depiction o f Islam in.

321.325, 326-327. 328. 338

Charlemagne. 326. 607; M u s l i m o p p o nents of, 315; relations w i t h Hanin al-

655

Sasanian wars w i t h , 3.4, 312;

Categories (Aristotle), 271. 272

Turkmen invasion of, 53

Catherine the Great, support o f Sunni

Rashid,

scholars hy, 520

317, 334-335

chauvinism. Muslims as victims of. 631 cheating. Islamic disapproval of. 95

Catholic Church. 310. 334; in America.

C

Chaldean religion, 269

chaplains, imams as, 625

"the catastrophe." as t e r m for Six-Day War.

695

Chakedon. early Clinstians i n . 310, ; n

carpels; Islamic. 215. 220, 246; lenoned.

235. 313-314;

Chagatays. as inner Asia rulers. 357 Chaghatayids, territories control led by.

carpet pages, o l Islamic manuscripts,

astronomer. 168, 191

28;

Carolingian renaissance. Abbasid role i n ,

7i 7

Chec hens, i n Central Asia, 472

Cadi/, Christian takeover of, 51

610; attitude o f h u m i l i t y i n , Bo. doc-

Caffa, Ottoman trade w i t h . 3B9

trine changes i n . 89; in early Spain,

Mushm separatists i n . 471;

Cairo; al-Shahi's t o m b i n , 107; Citadel of,

344; Muslim encounters w i t h . 602,

victims i n . 6;o; revivalist Sufi orders

57: as Islamic capital, 46; as Islamic

603; Mushins i n schools of, 622, 624;

in- 532, 533. 540m341; war againsi

cultural center.

Muslim-stale colleges of. 379

49. 59,60, 357.

312,

514; Islamic decoration i n , 229, 2;8;

Caucasus; caliph raids i n . 12; Furopean

Chechnya; M u s l i m refugees f r o m , 605. Muslim

Russia of. 550, 551 chemistry, in early Islam, 198

Islamic medicine i n , 97. 207. 213;

colonies i n . 551; Kurdish tribal states

child custody. Quranic rules o n , 120, 63;

madrasa i n , 99; Ottoman judiciary i n .

i n , 43; M o n g o l conquest of. 58;

children; Islamic education for.

380

Qadiriyyah movement i n . 540-541;

622-625;

Turkmen in, 35

6,5

caliphate; as agent o f poliucal and cul-

o f M u s l i m immigrants,

614.

luial change, 39-61, army and

cavalry, in Otioman armies. 377

Children's Crusade. 337

administration of.

celali rebelbons. in O t i o m a n Empire.

China: art motifs of. 239: caliphate trade

31;

early,

27-32;

demise of,

empire o l .

14-27;

18-27;

Mongol destruction of.

58-59;

Muhammad and, 1-61;

rivalry i n . 2 2 ;

sultans as descendants o f 382: symbolic importance of, 354 caliphs, 11. 71. 89, 340, i n Africa, 492; "rightly guided," 112,692

400.

The Cambridge Hilton

0 1£

camels, i n Central Asian transport, 437 Camp David Accords. 660

Islamizatioii of,

of.

439,440, 695;

M u s l i m monarchs

of. 396; Umayyad campaigns into. 21 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); m u r -

Canaanites. animist cults of. 4 Canada; headscarf debate i n , 634, interfailh activities i n , 627; Islamic mosques and centers i n . 618, 621; multicultural ism i n , 610; M u s l i m edu690

Ç46;

Central Eurasia, o f Si nor, 439

Camus, Albert, 379

Muslims i n .

Islamic modernism i n , 565; Islam i n , 520; Mangn rule of. 698. Mongol rule

Cambridge University, 578, 649

60S, 639.

early

471; European colonies i n . 551.

433,47' • 5'o.

(Sinor). 438-439

622-623;

97

CennalAsia. SeeolsoInnerAsia;Chinese

Islamic anticoloniahsm i n . 550. 323-324

arfy Inner Asia

cation In,

Central America, o p e n - d o o r practice i n .

countries i n . 439; edinic groups of. 241.

401

Calvin. John, views on Islam,

Centaurus, constellation of, 167

Danishmendid rule of, 694;

mosque adornment by. 458; as 216-217. 2t8.

ment of. 471; early religions i n , 442;

cemeteries, M u s l i m , 607. 632

relations w i t h . 468-472, 546;

calligraphy; in China. 217; Chinese Islamic an f o r m ,

w i t h . 32; Central Asia military agree-

392

604.

Cantonese, dialects of, 468 Cape Town (South Africa); Indian and Malay immigrants i n . 5H5; Islam i n ,

der o f employ ees i n . 629: schisms and,584

Central Mosque (China). Kuwaiti donations to. 461 Cencrumpartij (Netherlands), as antiM u s l i m political party. 6;i ceramics, as Islamic an f o r m . I l l . 2CI, 2S1. 3*5

ceramic tiles, 215. 221 Ccrdanna (Pyrenees), M u s l i m ruler of,

506

capitabsm, M u s l i m view of. 653 caravans, in Central Asia. 44O caravanserais, Islamic architecture of. 218 Carolingian Empire.

315. 316-317

315

certainty, modalities of, 64-72 Chad; Islam i n . 36.492; posicolonial tensions i n . 581 chador. as Islamic women's dress. 141

early trade w i t h Europe. 4;?; ethnic minorities i n . 443. 465; ethnic problems of,

463.466:

frontier closure t o

nomads. 331, Islamic renewal i n . 546; Islam i n ,

433-473.

See also l l n i Muslim

Chinese; mosques i n ,

443.445. 447.

454.4S8.459-46o, 461,462. 463.

466; Most Favored Nation status of. 468;

Mughal trade w i t h ,

420,421;

M u s l i m visit to emperor of. 81, Naqshbandi movement in, 512-513, 521; as oil importer, 433, 466.467.

469:painong treatises of, 217. 235: relations w i t h Central Asia,

433-437.

439-440. 468; w o r l d trade of, 470 China Islamic Association,

447,460

China National Petroleum Corporation, 469

Chinese, i n Malaysia, 585, 596 Chinese M u s l i m Association. 457 Chinese M u s l i m Educational Foundation. 457 Chinese M u s l i m Federation. 457 Chinese Muslim General Association. 457 Chinese M u s l i m Mutual Progress Association. 457 Chinese MuslimYoung Students Association, 457 Chiraghi D i h l i . Nasir ad-Din. as Indian sultan. 403. 404 Chishn. M i n n ad-Din, as Indian sultan.

7 i 8

I N D t X

402-403. 404.40R. 409.411 Chıshti saints; in early India. 402. 405. 409. lombs Of, 418. 419 Chisluiya. spimnal influence of, 40J, 404.409,410 chiton, as Greek dress, 236

civil wars; o l Muslims. 092; postculonial. 581 "clash o l civilizations" argument, Islam and. 572 "The Clash o l Civilizations" (Huntington), 631-632

c h o k e , doctrine of. 71. 72

cleanliness, fiqh rulings o i l . 110. i n

Christendom. Islam and. 305-345, J72.

"clear evidence." o f God's presence

507. 6o2, 62(l. 6 4 i

(Quran). 64

ChriSlian Arabs. Sor Arab Christians

Clement l.Si.. as theologian. 271

Christian fundameniahsis, Judco-

clinics, mobile. 208

Christian values of, 610 Christianity; apostolic sects of. J09; o f

"closure o f the gale o f qtihad." 113, 116 Cluny; Arabic manuscripts i n . 333;

By /antines, 80.170; colonialism and,

monasteries in, 320; pilgrimages

563, 571, 58 J, doctrine of. 72; In early

sponsored by, 535

Africa. 501. m early Nuhia, 499; early sects of. 2. 1; in Egypt. 49; Greek thought and. 2(19. 270. 27*1; Islam

coeducation. Muslim objections to. 622. 623 coffee: as Muslim states eicpon. 572. 575.

Conduct of iht Solitary ( I b n Bajjah). 285 Conlerence o l B w u f M i n Churches. 626 Confucianism. 459 conical valves. Arab invention of, 194 consensus, in Islamic legal theory. 144. •4Ç. 149. "s2,290 consensus o f the learned, as source o f 1

Shariah. Il8. 123 conservative (traditionalist) changes, i n Islam. 682 Constanluie I, 312: as Christian convert. Îİ0 Constantinople. Srrulso Istanbul: apos­ tolic seel of. 309: as Byzantine capual. 20; daily life In, 511 ; early church council i n . 310. Jews i n , 2; Ottoman conquest of, 314. 3 4 I - S 4 2 , İ 4 İ - İ4S". 374. 388.69*

compared to. 77, 86, 88,89. 266. 270.

C76; Ottoman trade i n . 189. 390;

r I III III III l l 111 Movement. 673

297. 298. 299. İOO. İ J 2 . ICO. 6J9.

Salihiyyah opposition to, 544;

Constitutional party (Destour).ot

690; Islamic polemics agamsi.

Sumairan rradc in. 534. 575

330-332. 602, 603; medicsal Muslim

coins.calligraphy o n . 223-224

views of. 329—332; minorities i n ,

Cold War. 4 3 ;

381-584; missionary movements of.

"collaborators." minority communities

579; as monotheism, 19, 305; in

as, 582

Spain, J4, 33. 320; universal beliefs

collective rights, Islamic concept o f 98

of. 348

colonialism, agricultural policies of. 573;

Christians; Abbasi d acceptance of. 358;

army and police forces i n . 584; eco­

Arahizcd. Ui Andalusia. 319. "hora-

nomic impact of. 371-376; effect o n

again." 69; conversion 10 Islam. 318.

Muslims. 580. 603, 611. 644-646.

319. 320, 609; inicrlaith relations

698; ideology of, 5110-566; m o d e r n -

with Jews. 62/; inlcrfanb relations

day. 631—632; modern Muslin slates

with Muslims. 626; in Islam. 583.

and. 349-599; social impact o f

679: Islamic schools of. 624; in

576-5R5

lehanon, 66o; medieval Muslim views of. 329 -3 32. as Middle Eastern minorities. 339; as missionaries in Islam. 336, 379=380, Muslim dress

color, exuberant use i n Islamic an, 222, 246-260. 267 Columbia Dam. Muslim cemetery at. 607

Tunisia, (62. 388, 651 Constitutional Revolution of 1905—ob. Iranian opposition to, 538 contemporary islam. 643 690 contracts and transactions; 1 laubali n i l i n g o i i . 129. Islamic law o n . 1 ï J ; Shafii ruling o n . 128 control mechanisms, Arab invention of. 194 conversion, forced, o f Spanish Muslims. 144 convicts, i n Cape colony, as early Muslims, 506 Copernicus. Nicolaus. Arabic model use by. 1/4. >7S copper. .African sources of. 495 Copts; as adnillustrators tor caliphs. 36: as Egy ptian Christians, 58;, 602. bgo

stipulations for. 308, ( W o m a n man­

The Commeniaior, Aviccnna as, 286

power tas o n . 377; as pilgrims.

commerce, caliphaie contributions to. 32

of. 51. 320; as Islamic cullural center.

Î î 4 " î i 6 ; support of mosque move­

c o m m o n wealth, o l regional Muslim

bo, 204, 357: Islamic takeover o l . 34,

ment by. 617 chrysanthemum motif, in Chinese an, 219 churches; mosques remodeled f r o m . i ' o . 339, 345, from remodeled mosques. 305 Church o f the Holy Cross (Aghi amar). Ç2 Church o f the Holy Sepulchre (Jerusalem). 312; destruction of, 333, 694: Saladin's return of, 339 cilihane. as O n u n u n lax method. 587 Cirrhon (Java), mosque i n . 429. 430 Citadel o f Cairo, 57 citizens' rights and duties. Quranic rules o n , 120 civilian bureaucratic mstitunons. o f posieolonial slates, 392-399 "civilization a I mission," o f missionaries, 6ll civil liberties, colonial state effects o n , s97 civil transactions, fiqh rulings o n . 110, 113

siaies. 32 communism, Muslim encounters w i t h . 603

Cördoha. 3;. 34: Christian reconqnest

318, 319-320. 342, 345:Muslim scholars i n . 284: Umayyad enliraie ot. 693

communist acnvists. ui Muslim siaies. 579

Corporealisls. 279

Communist Party (China), Muslim rela­

TfieCurrcit Answer to Those Whu Hose Chunpnl

tions w i t h . 461.462: Uighur recogni tion by. 465

the Religion al Christ ( I b n Tayini y ah). 332 cosine function, in.Arab mathematics, 162

Communist Parly o f Indonesia (PKI), 579

cosmology, i n Greek philosophy, 277

community, individual vs., 144 150

conon. as Muslim stales export. 572

Comonis; Islam i n , 503; as modern Muslim slate. 549 Companions o f the Prophet. 74. 75. 83. 96. 119, 179, 290: Quranic and Snnna

cotton textiles. 218 Coulson. Noel, 117 C o n n u I (or American-Islamic Affairs.

638

rulings suspended by. 139. 140; textu

Council of Bishops' Conferences. b2b

al uiterpretations of. I l l — I I I ,

Council oi Chalcedon. 3

120-121. 128

Council ol Churches i n the Netherlands.

compass hones. Muslim design of. 181 Compendium of Chronicle., 40 complimentary interests, i n shariah, 135-136

614 Council o f Clermont. Crusades estab­ lished by. 337. 694 Council o f Hphesus. ;

ComprendreI'lslam (Schuon). 72

Council o f Guardians (Iran). 665

concubines, slaves as. Quranic proscrip­

Council o f Masajid, 621

tion of, 478

Council o f Nicaea. 310

INDEX C o u n c i l rm A m e r i c a n - I s l a m i c R e l a t i o n s , report o n i n c i d e n t s involv i n g hijab.

S3i-S"36. 341-34'. 546. 698 D a n h u a n g . o n Silk R o a d . 440 D a n i f l l . T h o m a s , 313

c o u r t , o f O n o m a u leaders. (75 C o u r t o f the L i o n s , i n the A l h a m h r a . 264

D a n i s h m e n d ids. T u r k m e n sultanaie of,

55.694

7 I 9

Dependency Theory, colonialism and.

574-475 d e r v i s h e s . 410 I V s c a n e s . R e n e . 187 desirabilities. 111 s h a r i a h , 135-136

covenant of U m a r , 50H

D a n t e , 286

D e r e m l i n i s t s . 278, 279

C r i m e a ; O t t o m a n c o n q u e s t o l . 374. 577;

" D a r a l - l s l a i n . " I n d i a l i a n i s h e d f n i m , 323

D e v a g i r i . r e n a m e d Davsiatabad. 402

R u s s i a n control of, 392 C n m e a n s . i n C e n t r a l A s i a . 471 c r i m e s , Q u r a n i c r u l e s o n . 110 C r i s i o d e l a Lu7. C l l u r c h of, as r e m o d ­ e l e d m o s q u e . 345 Cntrrionul KnoivWor ( a l G h a z a l i ) . 283

D a r a l - I s l a m Foundation Islamic Center Village ( N e w M e x i c o ) . 618 D a r a S l t i k o h , d e p i c t i o n of. 418. as S h a l l Jehan's successor. 416-417 D a r es S a l a a m . I n d i a n a n d Malay i m i u i grants i n . 585

" d e v i a t i o n i s m . " o f u e o m o d e r i l i s t s . 684 d e v s h i r m c . as O t t o m a n m a n p o w e r tax,

177 d h i k r . S u h adaptation of. 360 d i i i m m i s ; Arabic a d o p t i o n hy. 331; C h r i s t i a n s as. 507 309. ; i 1. 312. 313,

C r o a t i a , Latin Cat holies i n . 385

Darftir. I s l a m i n . 47s. 300. 306

C r o m e r , Kvclyn R a r i n g . 1st Earl of, 299,

D a r i u s I . K i n g of'FVrsia. 221, 396

d h o w s , o f Lası Africa. 5 0 ;

D a n i s h M u h a m m a d , as m a n u s c r i p t

D i a h a ( M a l i ) , as " l o w n o f A l l a h . " 480

561. Sf>i cxosshatchlng, i n I s l a m i c art, ibo C r u s a d e r s , 224. 243; advance i n N e a r Hasi. cfa; i n A n a t o l i a , 55; as Assassins' target. 177; m e d i e v a l M u s l i m v i e w s

artist, 138 D a u r a n i , R a b i a , A u r a n g r e h ' s l o m h for.

419 davva (call 10 I s l a m ) . 4 4 . 4 6 . 6 2 7 ; o f

of. 529; p i l g r i m s c o m p a r e d to, 355;

I s m a i l i s . 49. s o c i a l a c t i v i s m role i n .

Saladin's defeat of. 57. v i e w s o l

667

M u s l i m s . j22; v i o l e n c e of. 323 C r u s a d e s . 309. 316, 321. (»94. 696: M u s l i m encounters w i t h . 602-603; o p p o s i t i o n to. 32;; p r o p a g a n d a ibr. 325. 328. p u r p o s e of. 337-341 C t e s i p h o n , as Sasanian capital, 2. 3

dialectic, i n I s l a m i c p l u l o s o p h y . 277 Dialogues ( P l a t o ) . 272 dietary r e s t r i c t i o n s , o l M u s l i m s . 615.

655-634.636 al D i m a s h q i . G h a y i a n . as Q a d a n . 277

a l - D a i v l a , Fakhr, as B u y i d ruler. 181

a l - D u i . Badr. as M o s u l n-gent. 354 a l - D i n , Shay kh Safi. as Persian m y s t i c .

Davsiatabad. as D e l h i Sultanaie capital.

402.403 a l - D a t w s a n i . Jalal a l - D u i . as I s l a m i c p h i l o s o p h e r , 297 Day. A . 430

Cultural Relations an ibeKansu Tibeiun Burdcr

D a y l a m : a r m y u m t s from. 4?. 48. 331: c o n v e r s i o n to S h i i s m . 41

C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n ( C U u i a ) ; cfFcct o n

Day ( i f J u d g m e n t , 75.88. 284.416

M u s l i m s , 461; r e p r e s s i o n s of. 468

Day o f R e s u r r e c t i o n , for d e c e a s e d

culture, transcendence o l . in Islam.

diabetes, early A r a b treatise o n . 202

a l - D a w l a . K a n z , 499

t u e r d a s e c a , i s ille m e t h o d . 236

(EkvaU).447

316. 319; status of. 687

M u s l i m s . 109. 290. 296, 41;

J63 d i n a r s , decorative w r i t i n g o n . 223-224 a l - D i n a w a r i . A b u H a n i f a . as Persian botanist, 211 a l - D i n A y b a k . Q u t b . as D e l h i ruler. 228 a l - D i n I s h a q . Safi. »193 a l - D i n Qajar. Nasır, as I r a n i a n s h a h , 515 a l - D i n S h a h . MuzatTar. as I r a n i a n ruler.

539 D i o d o r e o t T a r s u s , as t h e o l o g i a n . 271

Day 1011 Peace A g r e e m e n t . 704

D i o p h a n t i n e analysis, 189. 212

c u s t o m , as legal s o u r c e . 123

DtAnima ( A n s t o U e ) , 284

D i o p h a i u u s . as G r e e k m a t h e m a t i c i a n .

C y p r u s . I s l a m i c takeover of, 314,

debts. I s l a m i c law o n . 131

69-70

M u s l i m s i n . 638:Turlcish e x p a n s i o n to.

si 6

Dectan peninsula. I n d o - M u s l i m rule ol.

401.402 Decisis Treatise ( A v e r r o e s ) , 286

185 d i o p t r i c s , c r e a t i o n b y I B n Sahl, 191-192 D i o s c o r i d e s . Matma Medico, of. 202, 210,

211-212, 213

C y r u s , as Persian e m p e r o r , 396

d e c o l o n i a l i z a t i o n . i n M u s l i m territories.

D

Deedat. A h m a d . 626

D a g c s i a n . revivalisi Sufi o r d e r s i n . 532.

definitive r u l e s , o f s h a r i a h . 136, 137

d i s c o t h e q u e b o m b i n g ( G e r m a n y ) . 629

de I j i m o y . G h i l l e h e r t . d e s c r i p t i o n s o f

Discounts ( T i t u s o f Bostra), 271

5S2

ill.

54°.S4i

D a g u u i b a . Islam i n , 489 D a l d a k K c b i r . A r a b trade i n , 501 D a i b u l . M u s l i m c o n q u e s t of. 21 al Dakhw-ar. M u h a d h d h a b a l - D i n .

207-208 Dalai L a m a . U i g h u r s u p p o r t b>. 467 D a m a s c u s ; a s t r o n o m y studies i n , 164, 174. i 8 i ; a s c a l i p h capital, 16. 20. 31. 33. 314; as center o l p h i l o s o p h y J90. 301: early C h r i s t i a n s i n . 310; as early m e d i c a l center. 207. 2 o 8 ; F a t i n u d p o w e r i n , 4b: as I s l a m i c c u l t u r a l t e n ter, 60.236-237. 357.692; m i g r a t i o n to Persia. 270: M u s l i m c o n q u e s t of. 311-312; as N a q s h h a n d i tenter, 512; n a t i o n a l identity of, 5 5 8 : O t t o n i a n j u d i c i a r y i n . 380. O t t o m a n trade route t h r o u g h . 389; role i n C r u s a d e s . 339 D a n d a n c j a n , G h a z n a v i d defeat a i , 34 d a n Hodio, U t h m a u . j i h a d of. 497, 519,

M u s l i m s by. 336 D e l h i ; C h i s h t i patron of. 403; M u s l i m r u l e of. 228. 3 9 9 . 4 0 0 - 4 0 1 , 4 0 3 . 408. 409: Q u w w a i a l - I s l a i u M i » q u o i n .

228, 399. 400. 401695 D e l h i Sultanate, m e m b e r s of. 399-400,

401. 402. 404,422. 695 d e m o c r a c y . Islam a n d . 667-680; I s l a m ' s Incompatibility w i t h . 6 7 5 680 DemocTatic Party; A r a b A m e r i c a n s i n .

D i p a n c g a r a revolt, i n Java. 699 Directorate o f R e l i g i o u s Affairs, as s u p e r ­ v i s o r o f T u r k i s h m o s q u e s . 618.621

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; agaiıısı Arabs. 637; against M u s l i m labor m i g r a n t s , 630 DivnminaliiRS ol Farcies and Religious Creeds (Ibnlla7m).289 D i v a n - i K l u s s . as S h a h fehan palace. 259 d i v i n e i n s p i r a t i o n , o f I s l a m i c sages, 66 d i v i n e rights. I s l a m i c c o n c e p t of, 98 d i v o r c e ; Hanafi r u l i n g s o n . 131. H a n b a l i r u l i n g s o n , 132; I s l a m i c law o n , 117, 118, 132, 646; law r e f o r m s o n . 150.

b i 8 ; refusal o f Arab A m e r i c a n

647, 686; M a l i k i r u l i n g s o i l , 127, 132;

e n d o r s e m e n t s . 635

M u s l i m a b h o r r e n c e of, 612. Q u r a n i c

D e n g X i a o p i n g , separatist c r a c k d o w n s

by. 472.47J D c n i a n k o b e dynasiy. o l F u i a T o r o . 489.

49« D e n m a r k ; I s l a m i c m o s q u e s a n d centers i n . 618; M u s l i m s i n , 604. 607 D e o b a n d i M u s l i m s , 618. 699

r u l e s o n , 120; S h a h i r u l i n g s o n . 132; s h a r i a h r u l i n g s o n . 134. 633 d i w a n s . 13. 29 D i y a r b a k i r ( T u r k e y ) . SeeAmida D j c n n e ( M a l i ) , I s l a m i n . 486. 487 D N A evidence, o f Neolithic migrations to C h i n a . 437

J20

INDEX

"dogmatic slumber." as Iqbal descrip-

Eastern Orthodox Church, Crusades as weakeners of, 602

lion o f l s l a m . 649

Eastern Turkestan Foundation. Uighur

Dolam, as Uighurs, 46; Dohnabace palace-. as Ouoman edifice. 4iJ Dome o f the Bock (Jerusalem); as Islamic architecture, 215, I16. 224. 226, 2(3, 264-265; as Islamic holy site. 23, 312, 31;. 692; mosaic decora

support by. 467

tomb i n , 455 Dongxiang. Turkic-Altaic language of.

Tulunid dynasty i n . 694; Wafd (Delegation) of. 562; women's status

East Timor. Indonesian expansion to,

i n . 688

556.557 "EasiTurkesian Republic," olTurkic nationalists. 465.468-469

Egy ptian-Syrian unit pact o f 1958-61, 558 eighteenth cennny. Islamic movements i n , 509-547

Ecclesiastical History (Eusebius). 271

Ekvall. Robert, o n Chinese Muslims. 447

economics; colonial legacy of, 571-576;

Hamue. i n trilingual inscription. 222

Islamic. 124; Quranic rules o n . 120 economy, state control of. 573-574

441

573; Seljuk rule i n . 351. 353; Shafii school i n . 114, shariah i n , 151. IÇ2;

East Indies. Irano-Islamic culture of. 357

Eaton. Charles, 104

tion of, 266 Don gta Township (China), Ma Hualong's

389. 499, 538, 696; rural economy of,

Dorian, James P. 468

Edessa. role in Crusades. 56, 339

dress; in early Islam. 220; o f Iranian

Edirne; Ottoman acceptance o f Jews

Elburz Mountains, local chieftains o i , 41 Elements (Euclid). 165. 190 Elrmenb ofThenlogy (Produs o f Athens). 270

w o m e n . 665; of Islamic w o m e n . 141.

f r o m , ;86, Ottoman judiciary i n . 380.

Empcdodes, 294

623. 634, 659. 660.663, 677, 682.

as Ottoman trade center, 389;

enclave economies, i n Muslim srates.

688. 689: o f Musfims. 623. 656: o f

Sclimiye mosque at. 347.696

Muslim school children. 623-624;

Edirne Incident, in Ottoman Empire, 697

required for early Christians, 308: o f

education; colonial encouragement of.

Sufis. 220.256; ofTuareg men. 480 drugs; Muslim abhorrence of. 6i2. 620;

378, 383; missionary schools, 579-580; o f Muslims, 622-625 Effendi. Ah Aziz, as Ottoman envoy to

shariah ruling o n . 122 Drii7e. 49, 65. 639; British protection of.

Germany, 607 Egypt; Abbasid stale i n . 693.695. ancient

582; i n Lebanon, 660

religion of. 269; Ayyubid rule of, 695,

"dual nılnıres" thesis. Islam and.

British rule o f 557. 581, 699;

s7'-57 = "dual economies" thesis. 371

Byzantine loss of. 311. 316;

Dudu Mian, as Bengali Islamic reformer.

Christianity i n . 3.47, 501; colonial armies of. 592; colonial benefits to.

54P Dungans See H i n Muslim Chinese

578; control by Saladin, 57, dccolo-

Dunhuang. Buddhist art i n . 441

niahzation o f 552: development of,

du Pnnt.Alexandre.poemon

566-567, 568; earthquake aid to, 667; economy of. 574; exports of, 572;

Muhammad by. 325. 326 Durban. Indian and Malay immigrants

Fatimid rule of, 46, 47. 56, 57. 351. 693; fiqh encylopedia project of. 150.

i n , 585

151; French occupation of. 698;

Durrand line, Pakistan's and

Iksfudid dynasty i n . 37. 694. Islamic

Afghanistan's claim to. 559 Durranis. Afghanistan rule by. 698

art In, 261; Islamic conquest and con­

Dutch. Set also The Netherlands; Javanese

trol of. 12. 13. 22. 23. 30, 36-37. 43.

rule by. 534. 535. 543. 374. 575.

376;

46.475. 483. 693: Idamic culture i n .

i n Melaka. 426.427; Ottoman opposi­

60; Islamic law i n , 150; Islamic m o d ­

tion hy. 374: i n PadriWar. 534; in

ernism i n , 299, 550, 565. 646-647.

spice trade. 389: war withAchinese,

654,656, 681.682; Islamic movement

424. 54!

i n . 550; islamic opposition to state i n ,

Dutch East India Company, emergence of. 522. 534 Dutch Indies; colonialism i n . 365, 576; diversity i n . 558 Du Wenxiu. as Chinese Muslim rebel leader. 455-456

561; Islamic political panics i n , 668; Islamism i n . 567. 568. 569, 667. 668; Khalwaiiyyah order i n , 513, niahdist opposition i n . 546, Maliki school i n . 114; Mamluk dynasty of. 57.292.340. 15 . 334. 356. 695; as member cif J

573.

574

endowmem(s); i n colonial states. 596. Hanafi ruling o n , 126. Maliki ruling on,125 "energy Silk Route," 470 Engineer, Asghar A l l . as Islamic m o d ­ ernist. 565 engineering, i n early Islam. 193—198 England. Sec Great Britain Enneads (Plotinus). 270. 272 Enizinger, Hans, immigrarion models of.

609 Ephesus, early church council i n . 310 EpisdeonFtttWill (al-Basri), 277 The Epistles of the Brcibrm of Purity (Avicenna), 275,277 equality. Quranic rules o n . 120 equant center, in astronomy. 172, 174 Erhakan. Necmettin, as Islamic m o d ­ ernist. 681. 702. 704 Frttigrul, as founder o f Ottoman dynasty, 373.695 essential interests, in shariah. 135—136 Ethical Traits and Modes of Conduct ( I b n Hazm). 289 ethics, in Greek philosophy, 277 Ethiopia; Christianity i n , 501; Islamic reform i n , 544; |ihad against, 501-502. 507 ethnic changes, m early- Middle East, 353 ethnic dashes, i n Central Asia, 472 ethnic cleansing, in Bosnia. 630 ethnicizanon; i n Central Asia. 434-435. 4j6, 437: in Muslim w o r l d . 554, o f

dwarfs, as Tang dynasty eniertainrrv. 442

United Arah Republic. 556. military

Dyula traders, in Africa. 487. 488. 489

takeovers til. 593; mosque control by.

E

Muslim Brotherhood of, 557. 617,

Eion, 578

621, 655, 660. 666, 669. 675, 679.

Euclid: Elements of. 165. 190. 272;theo-

703; Muhammad Ah's rule i n , 538: earthquakes. Islamic aid for victims of. e ¿7 fası Africa; "Africanization" campaigns

680. 700. 701; Muslim insurgents i n , 94; Muslim migrants from. 607; as

i n . 585. European colonies i n . 551;

Muslim slate. 652; Mustapha

exports of, 572; Indian and Malay-

M a h m o u d Society i n , 97; Napoleon's

immigrants i n , 585; Islam i n ,

invasion of, 392: national identity of.

503-506, 544-545; Shafii school i n .

555: nationalist leaders of. 562;

114; iribal chiefs i n , 588

Ottoman control o l . 372. 374. 385.

Silk Road peoples. 462- 468 edinic minority model, o f immigration. 610

rcmsof, 165, 190, 192.212 Eudes o f Aquitaine; Muslim alliance of. 315; Muslim defeat of. 314 Eulogius, Bishop ofToledo. 319 Euro-Americans, conversion to Islam. 609 Europe; early irade centers of. 390;

INDEX imperial expansion o f 510. 522,

525,

178; fic|h ridings o n . n o ; Q u r a i i i c

1

72

of. 116; shariah comparison w i t h ,

5361—537. S+o; as market for colonial

rules o n , 120, 142, 147, i n Ramadan.

108-109. i i o ; T i m b i i k t u scholars of.

products. 572; medieval. Islamic

83-84,92—93. 102. 134, 615; shariah

481

influence o n , 332-354; medieval

ruling o n . 109.

134

Fiqh Academics, i n Saudi Arahia and

Muslim views of. 329-332: Muslims

fatalism. Islamic doctrine and. 71. 72. 88

i n . 602. 604. 614. 643. 690. 692;

Fatehpur Sikri, as Mughal capital. 407.

Ottoman Empire i n . 372

Mecca. 151 Firdaws madrasa (Aleppo), 294 Firdowsi. Gliaznavid panonagc of. 41.

408,409,411

Europeans, conversion 10 Islam. 609

Fath Ali Shah, portrait of, 216

Eusebius,

Lathy, Hassan, as Egyptian architect, 618

firmans, o f Ottoman sultans, 383

Fanma; as A l l s w i l e , 45; as Muhammad's

First Civil War. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19

271

Evangel, as Allah's revealed book, 88 Evansville (Indiana), Islamic center in, 617 ev idence. Quranic rules o n . 120

397-398; Slmhnameli of, 40. 398

daughter. 130; as sister o f 8th Shiite

first pillar o f l s l a m , 77

i n u m . 302

Fi Sundial-Shams, as astronomy text. 165

Fatimids. 34, 36, 117, 694; as caliphs. 37.

existentialism. 303

49, 60, 229, 277, 351,498,694; cul-

expiations. Islamic law o n . 134

tural advances of. 49: decline i n rule

exports, f r o m Muslim slates. 572-573

of, 48, 339; origin of, 45; white color

Exposition (Averroes). 288

1

associated w i t h , 258

Exposition of (he Methods of Proof Concerning Religious Beliefs (Averroes), 286

fatwa (legal r u l i n g ) , 117.

ment. 467, 470-471

101.

102, 105, 452, 499; al-Sabti's interpretation of, 104; as unchanging, 685 Fi Zilal nJ-Quran ( Q u l b ) , description o f .Allah's jjowcr i n , 70

1 28. 131; o f

Ayatollah Khomeini. 629. o n eating

Exxon, role i n Asian oil and gas develop-

Five Pillars o f l s l a m , 77-87, 88. 92.

un-Islamic food. 635: o f Shah Abd alAziz. 325. 528

FIcrcher. Joseph, on Chinese Muslims. 438. 440. 445. 446, 449. 432, 454-455.457 floral ornamentation, in Islamic an. 400

eye, early medical treatise o n . 200-201

Fawqaniyah schools (Hyderabad), 580

" f o o d riots," i n Muslim countries. 668

"eye o f certainty" (Quran). 64,

al-Fazari. Muhammad ihn Ibrahim, as

foods. Arab dictionary of, 211

104

early astronomer. 162

Forbes. Andrew D W , 465

F

Feast o f the Sacrifice, 63

Eadlallah N u n . Shaykh. on human

Federation o f Islamic Associations o f the

inequalities. 675. 676; as Lebanese

the Netherlands. 621

Faisal. King o f Saudi Arabia, 654, 674. faith; i n Islam, 63- 105: as shariah value. 147 Falkland Islands war. Gurkha soldiers i n . false witness, Islamic liudad for, 687 686 family solidarity, Muslim emphasis of,

al Fansuri, H a m / a h , as Sufi poet and 520

al-Farabi.Abu Nasr. as early Islamic plulosopher, 271, 274-275. 279.

281,

284-285. 286, 302. 311 Faraidal-Usul (Morieza al-Ansari). as Sbii 117

Faraidi movement, 539. 698 Farrvvll Message (Ibn Ba||ah). 285

fourdi pillar of Islam. 83-85 Frante;Algenan uivasion of, 699; antiMuslim political party o m . 631; colo-

festival prayers, 94

nial ideology of. 361. 576. 582.

Fez. as Islamic capital. 36. 31. 337.481, 532

588-589. 598. 645; Galhcization policy of. 609; headscarf debate i n . 634; imperialism o f 551.651: international trade of. 390; Islamic mosques and

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. 649

centers in, 618, medieval Muslim

Fidaiyan-Klialq (People's Devotees), o f

views of, 329; Middle Eastern coun-

Iran, 579

faqir (spiritual slave). 402,404

buildings. 262

Ferghana horses, trade i n . 440

conquest of. 492,493

fann. as Arabic for art. 2i6 renewalist. 298. 423,

Fergana, Umayyad control of, 21;

Fe//an (Libya); Islam i n . 475:Ottoman

fanaticism. Muslims and. 628,629

"Founding Sunna," 121

Four Journeys (al Shirazi). 295

under. 344. 696

484;Ti|aniyya order i n , 531.

612. 618. 620. 684. 686

Foundation for the Welfare of Muslims

fountains, for ahiution. 79; i n Islamic

w o m e n . 89; i n the West. 689 Ferdinand H o f Aragon, Christian Spain

Uzbeks i n , 472

128. 150, 646; reform of,

Fort Jesus (Mombasa). Portuguese loss

in the Netherlands, 621

Associations, 621 fenunism, effect o n sums and role o f

701

shariah rulings o n , 134 Forman Chrisnan College (Lahore). 580 of. 521

Federation ofTurkish and Cultural

democracy and Islam, 677

lawbook.

United States and Canada. 617 Federation o f Muslim Organizations i n

u lama, 680 Fahd. King o f Saudi Arabia. 674. 680; o n

family law, 117.

forbidden; Islamic concept of, 93, 94;

tries created by, 651; Muslim advances

fideism. 89

into, 2t, 314. 316; Muslim guestwork

Fields of Gold (al-Masudi). 3*9

crs i n . 605; Muslim mercenaries of.

fifth pillar o f l s l a m . 84-87

604. Muslims i n , 604, 605. 606-607.

"the fifth" tithe, as Shiite requirement.

614; Muslim xenophobia in, 630: North African expansion of, 541.

83 Al filahaal-Nabatiyya (Nahatean agriculture), 210

575;

occupation u f Egypt by, 698; support of mosque movement by, 617

al-Farghani, as early astronomer. [64

Filah dynasty (Morocco), 697

Francis o f Assist. St.. 98; as ptigrun, 336

Parhan. Ishaq. as Islamic modernist. 681

finance and hanking, Islamic laws of.

Franks; medieval Muslim views of. 329;

al-Farisi. optic studies o l . 192—193 Farouk. King o f Egypt. 654. 655 Farrakhan. Louis, as leader of Nation o f Islam, 640 Ears ( I r a n ) ; B u y i d control of, 41,42: Saffarid control of. 38 al-Fasi,Allal. as Islamic modernist. 651. 680 fasting; astronomic calculations for, 177,

141.

H2

linger reckoning, as Arab numeration system, 183-184 Finland,Tatars i n , 604. 607 fiqh. Hauafi. 124; history of, 110-119: as Islamic law interprelation, 90-93. 107-110. 136. 481, 685; Ki la b al-Mutism o n . 110; Maliki, 127. proposed encyclopedias o n . 150-151; revivification

Rashid al-Dln's history of. 350; territory ruled by, 314 Frashustra. as Persian sage. 294 Friday congregational prayer, 94 Friday mosques, i n Africa. 481 FromHereWeBegin (Khalid), 301 From National party (France), as aniiMushm political party, 631 Fulam movement, 645

7

2 2

INDF.X

Ful be state (Guinea), 486,489, 491.494, 49* FulfuldY. as Futa T o m language. 4 9 ° fundamentalism; Hanhah school o f l a w i n . 693; Islamic. 7 4 . 1 9 9 - J O I . 616, f.27. 633. 656. 659.669. 682. 683:

geography, in early Islam, 177. 182-183

glassware, as Islamic an f o r m . 2bo

geometric motifs, i n Islamic art, 222.

glazed revetment, i n Islamic decoration.

243. 258. 267 geometry, Arab development Off, 183-184,189, 193,2i2 Georgia; Russian control of. 698; Safav id Fmpire i n . 36î;Türk-men posser i n ,

radical, 635 Fun] dynasty, o f Sudan. 499, 500. 506 fuqaha (Islamic law experts), 480.481.

48S Fusıaı. Islamic conquest o f 13. 31, 37,

54. 55. 35'. İ 7 '

Fuiajallon, jihad state o l . 519 FutaToro: jihad i n . 342. 330: militant

101-102; Quran as word of, 67; three

Germany : ann M u s l i m political party of. Muslim nauons. 607: imperialism of. 551. islamic concern i n , 609; Islamic

qucsi of, 489

schools i n . 624: medieval Muslim views of. 329. M u s l i m guesiworkers i n . 605. 607.609; Muslims i n . 604. 606. 614 al-Ghafiqi. Ahu Jafar. as Arab physician,

75. 76. 119 Gagik. King o f Armenia. 52 Galen: Arab disagreements w i t h . 203, 203, 207; Arahic translations of. 272, 333; as Greek physician. 199; humoral

205. 211 Ghaji. Mai A h . as Bornu caliph, 492,496 al-Ghalib.Ahdallali. madrasa founded hy, 125

sysicm o( pathology o £ 201. influence

GhalzaiAlghans, Isfahan seizure by. 370

on Arab medicine. 210,

Ghana. Islam i n . 476.479

212

Galhciralion policy, for French u n m i grants, 609-610 Gallipoli.Turkish takeover of. 342, 373, 695 Gamaa Islamiyya, as militant group, 660, 667. feSo Gambia. 491; jihad in. 542 gambling. Islamic prohibition of. 93. '14.230 Gandhara. Buddhist a n i n . 441 Gansn (China); Jahnyya Suhsm i n . 455; Klio|a Alxl.Alia i n . 431; Kho|a Afaq i n , 431; Kbuffiya Snfism i n . 454; Muslims in- 434- 443- 444- 448. 454: o n Silk Road. 440

al-Ghannouslu, Rashid, as Islamic m o d ­ ernist. 678. 681 al-Ghazali. Abu H a m i d . as great Islamic theologian, 104, 269, 281, 282-284, 286, 288, 289. 290, 291, 293, 295, 297. 302. 694 al-Ghazali, Muhammad, as contc-mpory ulama. 680 Gba/an. M a h m u d . Sultan, as Islamic convert. 695 al-Ghazi. Ahmad lhrahım. Set Ahmad Gran gliazi ( h o m i e r w a r r i o r ) , as Ouoman ideology. 375.381 Gha/na, Indo-Muslmi rulers of.

Gao, Islam i n . 476.478. 486

397~398: as Islamic cultural center,

garden paradise. Quranic promise of.

117.

236, 258, 266. 324. 416

İ98

Ghaznavids: as cultural pairons. 357:

gardens, i n Mughal tombs. 408.411.

Ghurid displacement o l . 399: as gov¬

414-414.416.419 "garment ol 1 onset ration." for pi Ig rams

ernors for Samanids. 40. 41. 56. 228,

10 Mecca. 84-85.87 Gasprinski. Ismail, as Islamic modernist, Ç47-699 Cannula. Darius I's victory over. 222 Gaul ier.Wa İleri us, poem o n Muhammad by. 525-526 Gayer-.Anderson Museum (Cairo). 564 Gaza.,Arab losses i n , 655; Islamism i n , 667 gears, Arab invennon of. 194 Gedimu, as Chinese traditional Muslims.

229. 351; military regimesoi. 54. 55. 297. Î 5 6 . 694 ghettos. Islamic coiiuiuinilics likened In. 614. 630 Ghiyas u d - D i n T u g h l n q . as I n d o - M u s l i m ruler, 401 - 4 0 2 Ghoibradeh. Sadeq. as Khomeini u p p o nent. 664 ghulams. as professional soldiers. 28 Ghurid dynasiy. 297. 399.405. 694 Ghuzz peoples, conquest o f Seljnks hy, 352

445. 446, 447-448.450. 451.456.

Gilan. local chieftains of, 41

458,459.461,462

glaciers, alongXiklun.ikau Desert, 441.

Genghis Khan; conquests of, 58-59: descendants of. 59.405 genual mutilation (female). Muslim views o n . 634

center. 495 God. Islamic view of. 70. 71.72. ly pes o f knowledge o l . 63

mosques and centers i n , 618; Islamic

Gabriel, as Muhammad's mediator. 73.

Gohir; Islamic renewal i n . 535; as trade

Germans, in Central Asia. 471. 472

Mushms i n . 491, s"i9:Tcngdla's con-

G

Gobi IX'sert. 440

Gerard o f Cremona, 302

631; early dıplonıaııc relations w i t h

4(>

>SS glohahzation of Islam. 6OI-641

442 Gladney.Dru C, 468 glass mosaics, use in Islamic archiieclure. 226. 253. 255

Godfrey of Bouillon, in First Crusade.

338 gold. African trade i n . 47. 53.476.486. 488. 492. 498.500; use in islamic art. 221 Goldslein. Raruch. mosque bomhing by, 7°3 gong (Chinese tribute). 440 Gon|a peoples, as Islamic converts. 489 The Gospel; Arabic translations o l . 530, Quranic m e n t i o n of. 306 government, in Islam. 135.658 govenunent affairs. Quranic rules o n , 120 governors, in Islamic empire. 30, 33 gradualiry, sharıah o r i c ı ı i e d polity of, 140-144 Granada; Christian takeover of. 696; as Islamic city -state. 34. 51 Grand Islam Mosque ( U r u m q i j , 463 Grand Mosque (Mecca): militant seizure of. 674.702; pilgrimages l o . 85. 86; prayers said in direcnon of, 77 Great Britain; in Central Asia. 433. colo­ nial ideology of, 561. 576. 581. 584-588,645; colonial judiciary of. 594-595; ethnic m i n o r i t y model of. 610; imams 111, h25; i m m i g r a t i o n restrictions of. 611: unperialism of. 551: Indian rule by, 528. 539. interfauh activities i n , 627; international trade of. 389. 390: Islamic mosques and centers i n . 618.619.620.633; Islamic schools i n , 623-624; Middle Easiern cocmiries created by. 651; Muslims i n , 604. 605, 606. 614; Muslims in jioliiics of. 635; Ottoman competition f r o m . 391; as SoudiAsian power, 528 Great Depression, mosque building dur ing. 616 Great Game. 433; new, 437. 471. 4 / 1 - 4 / 5 ; rivalries of. 464. 465 Great Mosque; in C_rdoha. 33. 34, 238-239, 240, 253. 285. 318; i n Damascus. 24. 236. 266. 290, 692; i n Kota Raja. 534; i n Mahdiyah (Tunisia), 45; in Qayrawan (Tunisia). 14. in Sanaa (Yemen). 37: atTouba (Senegal). 491 Greal M u t i n y o f 1857. 577. 584 Great Sel|uk domains. 55; appanages i n , çh. decline of. 58 Greece, legacy of. i n South Asia. 396;

INDEX

723

Muslims in, 604; Ottoman conquest

130, 132-135. 147, Islamic reform

281.284. 332.359, 332, 682. 693;

of. 373

and. 530.685.698: Islamic theology

principles of. 129. 131. 143

Greek, Arabic translations o f classics til.

and. 301; Malik), 127; modernist

Han Chinese; as major nationality, 465,

352-354; scientific works i n , 158, 159;

views o n , 648: scholars of, 207. 280.

469; relations w i t h Muslim m i n o n

Arabic translations of. 1 6 0 - i b i . 185,

484, 519. 520, 697; secularism and,

lies. 436,447; Russian policies affect­

191. l o o , 171 Greek Orthodox Church. 2. 110. 522. 339; ill Ottoman Eiupiie. 385 Greek philosophy. 269. 27j;Arabic trans lationsof. 269, 271-272, ¡ 0 1 , «02

300: o f Shiitrs, 75; Sufism combined w i t h studies of, 699; types of, 120; Zabid scholars of, 512 Hadith o f Gabriel; five pillars o f Islam i n .

ing, 437; trade w i t h Fiiropc. 437 I Ian dynasry. political policy of. 433, 435.419.44° Handy ToNes (Ptolemy), 163

77-87. 92, t o t ; Islamic creed i n ,

Hang7bou (China), Muslims i n . 462

75-90.98; islamic imponance of,

H a n o u u x . Gabriel. 299

168: independent, i n Ottoman states.

75-77; six pillars o f faith i n , 87-90;

happiness, as goal o f human activity,

J78; medieval Muslim views of. J29

text of, 75 -76

Greeks: as early astronomers, 161, 162,

green; as color ol Muhammad's flag, 259; as turban color o f Muhammad's descendants, 2 20

I ladramawt; caliphate of. 37; Islamic spread f r o m . 503. 504, 505 Halsid dynasty, i n Ifriqiya, 52, 60

274. 29J Iwams. 5 hardship, Quranic ruling o n , 135, 138 harems, i n Ottoman c o u n , 375

Theorem Honk (Qaddafi). 657. 702

Hofr puykor (Nezemi). 24S

Harcr. as Islamic learning center. 544

"greeting" formula, i n Muslim prayers.

Hagia Sophia. 2

a l - H a n n . 84; Mooonul of. 84, 215. 234

Hainan. H u i Muslims i n , 443

harkis (Algerian soldiers), 604

Gregorians. 601

82

Hajar. 85.86

Harmons of Reason ıinıf Tradition ( Ibn

Gn-nada, Muslim loss o l , 602, 603

Hajirmai, as critic o f Bomu rulers.

"grievance groups," eihiut minorities as. 610 Guangdong; Cantonese dialects o l . 468; KhojaAbd Alia i n , 451 Guangxi. KhojaAbd Alia i n . 451 Guangzhou, mosque i n . 4 4 ;

494-495 al-Hajjaj i b n Maiar. as stiennc translator. 163 al-Hajjaj ibnYusuf. role i n Umayyad conirol o f early Islam. 17 baj) (pdgrimage); o f Chinese Muslims,

guerilla warfare: atArmed Islamic

446, 447, 457. 458; as fifth pillar o l

Group (Algeria). 672. 673; o f

Islam, 84 '87; fiqh rulings o n . 110:

Egyptian underground. 660; i n

requirements for, 84-87, 101. 102.

Iranian resolution. 6 6 ; ; o f Islamic

427; shariah ruling o n , 109. 134

warrior-defenders, 537

hap-a. o f Muhammad to Medina. 9

Taymiyah), 2909 al-Harrani. Abu al-Faraj A b d a l Latif i b n Abd al-Muntin. as Hanbab jurist, 207 Harrow, 578 Harun al Rashid; asAbhasid caliph. 25. 27, 36. 160, 271, 272. 693; Charlemagne's relations w i t h . 317, 334-3JS Hasan. Muhammad Abdallah, as leader of Sonialian jihad, 544, 545, / o o e x i l ; Hasan. Sultan, madrasas huili by, 114 al-HasanAli Ibn Yunus.Abu.as early

guestworkers; immigration model for,

al Hakim; asCordoban caliph. 48, 175,

609: Muslim migrants as. 604. 60c.

284: as Faiimid caliph. 47. 335.694:

al-Hasan al-Tusi, Shiiie hadith of. 75

608, 616

mosque of, 254-255. 283: revered in

al-Hasani, Sidi Muhyi al-Din, as leader o f

Guinea, jihad i n . 542 Guizhou; KhojaAbd Alia In, 451: Muslims i n . 443 Gujarat (India); Mughal leaders of. 406. Oltoman trade ties w i t h . 189 Gulf War, 668: Khomeini's role i n . 663-666 Gunbad-i-Qabus. as grave o f Qabus bin Waslimgir, 41 Cundishapur academy, as center for sci­ ence and medicine, 270 Gundissalinus. 289 Gunpowder Empire, o f Ottomans. 377

Druze faith. 49 halal Idod. Muslim requirement for. 635-634.636 Halife-i Ru-i Zemin (caliph o f the w o r l d ) , as Sulcyman title. 382

French Qadiriyy a, 541 Hasanuyids. tribal stales of. 43 Hashim clan. Muhammad as member of. 6. 8, 18 Hashimiles, displacement of. 652

al-Hallaj. as early mystic. 294

Hassan. King o f Morocco. 680

Hall o f thcAbcncerrajes, in the

Hassan, Mohammad Kamal, as Islamic

Alhambra. 264 Hall o f the Two Sisters, i n the Alhambra, 264 Hama. Syrian attack o n . 702 Hamadan/Hamadhan; Jews i n . 2; Scfuk control of, 55, Uibal states i n , 43

Gur-i Mir, asTimur's tomb, 351

HAMAS, founding of, 703

Gurkhas, as elite soldiers, 592

Hamdallabi. Qadiriyy ah siale i n . 542

Gypsies; Armenian Church o f 383; as

Hamdanids; conquest o f Syria by. 48.

racism victims. 631

astronomer. 167-168

modernist. 681 Hassan, RifTai. as female modernist, 681 Hate Crime Law o f 1988. 630 Hanin, Baıdc of. Crusaders' defeat at, 57, ÎÎ9 Hausaland; Islam i n . 535. 536: before the jihad, 495-500; Muslim traders i n . 490;Toronkawa of. 488 Hawaitua. Nayif. 583

351; as Fan m i d enemies. 46: i n Iraqi

Haydar Mosque (Tadjikistan), 108

politics. 43

hay fever, early Arab treatise o n , 202

H

Hamdullah, Sliay kli. as calligrapher, 64

headscarf See hijab (headscarf)

Habash, George, 583

Hami. lslamiranon of, 442

heavenly bodies, motion of, 163. 164.

Habash al-Hasib. trigonometric func­

Hiinka. Prof. as Islamic modrrnist. 680

tions of, 165, 166 Habsbtirg emperors, Ottoman opposi­ tion by. 374. 392 hahus, as revenue source, 241 hadith. 276. 283. 284, 290, 350. 660: o f Chinese Muslims, 449; definition of. i n ; o n idols. 231; insiructions for Muslims i n . 69. 74-75, 8 j , 92. 96.

Hanafi, Hasan, as Islamic modernist. 365.681 Hanafi school o f law. 94, 113, 114. 117. I 22. 123, I49. 276, 682, 693; Ol H l l i

165.168, 170 Hebci, Muslims i n . 443 Hebrew Bible: prophets of. as Allah's messengers. 88. Quran compared to. 73.88

Chinese Mushms. 447; Mrjfllt as c o d i ­

Hegel. G W F_. 297. 649

fication of, 150; principles of, 124,

Heidelberg University. 578

126. 128. 129. 137. 147

Hcjaz: Abbasids i n . 48. Islam i n . 481;

Hanbali school o f l a w . 95. 114, 207, 280,

rebellion i n , 26, 36

7^4

INDEX

Hekmaıyar. Gulbudectı. as leader o f H i / h - i - l s l a m , 659 Hellenism, Byzantine espousal of. T Hellenistic period; astronomy i n . 162. 171-174. Stcilsn Ptolemy; malhematİLs i n , 189; medical legacy of, 199. 200. 201, 202; optics i n . 191-193 Henan. Muslims i n . 441 Heraclius. 4. 12 Herat; early Chinese missions to. 440: school o f painting i n , 365,696; Tımtırid rule of, 365, 696 Herberg, W i l l , o n U.S. religious con­ glomerates, 610 Herman die German, 289, 302 Hnmrneutirji (Aristotle). 271, 272 Hermes. 294 Herodotus, on Central Asia, 438-439 Herod the Great. Solomon's Temple built by. 314 Hexi corridor, o f Silk Road. 440 Hezhou (China); Muslim shrine in, 448: Naqshhandi Sialism i n . 4 5 ; , 434 "Hidden I m a m . " o f Shiism. 71. 5 Î 9 . 701 al-Hifnavri. Muhammad ıbn Salim. Islamic renewal order of. 313 hijab (headscarf), as female Muslim dress. 623. 634. 689 hijackings, by Islamic militants, 666 Hijaz. Muhammad's community i n . 10 hi|ra (emigrate). 645. 691 Hilal al-Din. as founder o f ClUnese Qadariyyas. 431 Hilahan invasion. 48. 49 Hddeberl oiTburs. views o n Islam. 325 Hilla. Mazyadids o f , 4 ] Eimialay as. oases near. 441 Huns. Islamic conquest of. çı Hımyar. k i n g d o m of. 1, 5 Hindu arithmetic, 184 H i n d u i s m . Islam and. 399, 314. 339 Hindu Rush, nomad invasion of, 353 Hindus; coloniabsm eflects o n . 643; as converts to British Raj. 383: dissension with Muslims, 581; in early Chang an, 442; as peripheral U.S. group. 610 Hindustan. Islam spread to. 396.402 Hippocrates. Arab medicine and. 201, 210 hisab a l j u m m a l (sentence arithmetic). 183-184 hisba, 134 Hı-ı.'iır Ji lu Phılusopbe Musulmont (Badawi), 298 Historw it Muhomctr (Hddeben ofTours), 325 history, [hn Khaldun's philosophy of. I91 History of Alexander the Gitot. Islamic translanons of. 337. 384 H i m n . Banlt of. 693 Hızb al Dawa al-lslamiya (Iraq). 668 H i / b al-Nahda (Tunisia). 362,667.670. 677-678. 680

I l i r b - i Islamı. o l Afghanistan, 361. 639

Hııngronje. Snoııck. as colonialist schol­ ar, 365

Hizbollali Muslims; in Lebanon. 702; militancy of, 61B. 661.663.666 Hizbul Islam (Islamic Party), o f Malaya. 5ÇO

Huns, i n Inner Asia. 439.440 H u n t e r . W W . a' colonialist scholar, 565 Huntington. Samuel, o n c i vibrational conflicts, 631

Hodgson. Marshall. Prrsiarwit corned by. 396

Husain, Shaykh.as Ajmer shrine custodi­ an. 410,413

Holy Land, early Christian visitors to, 354-336

Husay n . SalavidShah. madrasa built by. 115

holy men; Berber tradiuon of. 532; i n Islamic Africa. 500.304, 303. 307,

al-Husayn ihn Ali. as assumed Muslim ruler. 26; Iranian veneration of. 368.

530. 3 32. 344: i n Islamic Middle Last,

515. 663, massacre of. 17, 509,692

350; i n Mughal courts. 414; as posiAbhasidleaders. 358:0!Sufis. 371;

Hussein. King of Jordan, pohucal reform of. 669-670

Turkish endow ments for. 362 Hong Kong; Chinese reunification w i t h .

Hussein, Saddam: i n GulfWar. 666; opposition to, 668

473: trade w i t h Xinjiang. 470 Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (Singapore). 377 H o r n of Africa. Islam i n . 475. 301-502; jihad against Europeans i n . 545 hospitals, in early Islam, 202, 208-209, 245. 271 House of God IMeeca). pilgrimages 10, 87 House o f W i s d o m . philosophical transla­ tions of. 272. 331, 693 Howeidy. Fahmy. as Islamic modernist. 681 Huai Sheng Si (Chinese mosque). 443 Iluasi Chinese Sufis. 454 Hubal cult. 6 H u d . as Arab prophet. 88 hudad punishments. 660. 687. 688 Huday biya,Treaty of, 10,692 H u i Muslim Chinese, 442. 443-444. 464.466; i n Central Asia. 471 : dress of. 456.459. Han Chinese compared to. 443-444. modernist reforms of, 443. 457-462; numbers of. 462; orga­ nizations of. 457-458, 4462; periodi­ cals of. 438. rebellions of. 450. 4 ( 5 . religious orders w i t h i n . 4 4 5 - 4 4 6 , Russian policies affecting. 437; irades of, 443 al-Hujwari. A h n l H a s a n , as Islamic philosopher. 297 h u k u m (Islamic code). 424.425, 427 Hulagu. as science patron. 182 Huûlegü. invasion o f Iran and jibal by .

59 hitman, as Persian lot an. 216 human dignity. Quranic doctrine of. 147 human rights, Islamic concept of, 98 Humayan. as Akhar's iadier. 405.406. 407, t o m b complex of. 407-408. 409,410. 411. 415 Hunayn ibnlshaq al-!badi; as early physician. 200 201 ; optic smdies of. 191 ; as translator, 160, 163. 272. 333 hiiner. as Turkish lor an, 216 Hungary: Latin Catholics i n , 385; Ottoman conquest of. 374. 697; Ottoman trade svith. 389

I fyderabad, Hawqauiyah schools of, 580 hydrodynamics, Arab studies o n . 194 hy drology; early Arab research o n . 196

1 Iberian peninsula; Christian reconqucst of. 344, 345; Muslim conquest 0!. 21. 692 Ibn Abd al Aziz, Umar. advice to son, 142 Ibn Abd Allah, Ibrahim, as Muslim ruler. 25 Ibn Abd Allah. Idris. Islamic Moroccan stale of. 36.43 Ibn Abd Allah. Muhammad See Muhammad; as Abd ruler, 25, 698 Ihn Abdallah, Sultan Muhammad, as Moroccan ruler. 698 Ibn Abdallah al-Rashidi. Abd al-Rahman. Bobrinski Bucket ordered by. 221 I b n A b d al-Wahid, Muhammad, Bohrinski Buckei formed hy, 221 Ihn Abdılle Hasan. Muhammad, antiimperialist mnvcmeni of, 550 Ibn.Abi Bakral-Ziihri. Abu Abdallah Muhammad, as early geographer, 476 Ihn Ahidin. as Hanafi jurist. 126-127 Ibn Abi Dııad, Ahmad, as Mutazilite the­ ologian, 278 Ihn A b i Zay d al-Qay ravvani. Abu Muhammad. Islamic law treatise of. 90. 104 Ibn Abul-Husaynal-Zanjani. Rashid al Din Azizi, Bobrinski; Bucket given to. 221 Ibn A d i , Yahya, as Jacobite Clırıstian scholar. 331 Ibn Aftan. UÜunan

Sec Umar ibn,Affan

Ihn Analı, Jabir, as early astronomer, 175 Ibn Ahmad, Masud, Bobrinski Buckei designed by, 221 Ibn Ahmad. Qadi Said, o n European peoples. 329 Ibn al-Aghlah. Ihrahim, as governor o f Ifriqiya, 36 Ihn al-.Arabi. as Is amic mystic. 368. 381. 415

INDEX Ibn at-Bavs wab. as Quranic lalhgrapher. 118. 241 Ibn al-Bay lar, Diya al-Din, as early physi­ cian, 207, 211-212 Tbn al-Bitriq, Sard of Stents of. 272 Ibn al Hajjaj al Nisaburi. Sunna book of, 74"75

Ibn Masawayh.Yuhanna, as Nesiorian physjrian. 160. 191. 200 Ibn Mugla. as calUgrapher. 241

127. 369. 647; "closure o f ı l ı r gate of." 115. tie,; in modern times. 124.

revelations, j o b Ibn Ftushd

SrrAverroes

I b n al-Jaz/ar, i s physician. 205

Ihn Sahl.Abu Sad al-.Ala. optic studies of.

Khattab lator, 29. 27 i Ibn al Muqaffa, Muhammad, as Arah iranslaior, 271 Ibn al-Mutanur. Bislir. as Mutazililc the­ ologian. 278. 279 Ibn a l - \ a f i s . Ala al-Din AU. 205-207. 208 Ibn al-Qasim, Muhammad, as Muslim commander, 21 Ibn al-Safiar. as early astronomer. 17; Ibn al-Sayigh,Ahii fUkribnYahya See Ibn Bauah I b n al-Shatir. as early astronomer. 171. "74-t7i. '7 I b n al-Zayn. Muhammad, as early metal­ worker. 2C1

191-192 Ibu Said, o n Islamic Kanem. 492 Ibn Salih al-Rashadi. Muliammad. as founder o f Salihiyyali, 544 Ibn Saud.Abd al-Aziz, resioration o f Wahhabi-Saudi state by. 545 Ibn Saud, Muliammad, al Wahhab's alliance w i t h . 317. 545 IbilSina SceAvice-nna Ibn Sulay man. Hasan, as Kilwan sultan. S

o2

IbnTariq.Yaqub. as early astronomer. 162 IhnTashlin.Yusuf. as Almoravid rider, 15. 49-50 IbnTaymiyah.Taqi al-Din: anti-Christian polemic of. 332; as lateralis!, 289, 290-291. 293, 297 IbnTaymiy y ah, Ahmad, Islamic renewal and. 512

Ibn Anas, Malik, as jurist. 74. 280

IbnTufayl. Abu Bakr. as physician

Ibn Aia.Wasd. asQadari. 277. 278

philosopher, 175, 28; 266

Ibn IJahr al Jahiz. Amr, as Mutazilite theologiau, 2/8. 331 Ibn Bajjali. as philospher-physician, 175, 284,286 Ibn Bakhtishu. bestiary of, J J S Ibn Rait Utah. African travels of.

view of. 649 ijiihad (juristic reasoning), 117, 126,

Ibn Nannah al-Himsi. as translator. 272

Ibn Safwau, Jahn, as Deiemunisi. 278

Ibn al Muqaffa, Abdullah, as Arab trans

ijma (conse)isus). 369, 677; modernist

Ibn Nawfal.Waraqa.on Muliammad's

Ibn al-Haytharn. SaAlha/an Ibn al-Kliattab. Uniar. See Umar ibn al-

72Ç

IbnTughluq. Muhammad, as Indo¬

649.677; in Shiism. 516; as source o f shariah. 119. m - 1 2 2 . 123 Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood], m China. 450.458 Iksbidid dynasty, i n Egy pt and syna. 37. 694 iktiyar. as doctrine o f choice, 71,72 Ili (China). Naqshbandi order i n , 546 Ilkhanid Mongol regime, i n Iran. 234. 235- 352. 695 illegal immigrants. Muslims as. 608 illumination, i n Islamic manuscripts. 241 illumination is! philosophy. 697 Ihuimish. Shams al-l>in. as Indo-Mushm ruler. 397,400-401.402,410,420. 695 Ilyas, Mawlana Muhammad.Tabhghi Islam founded by. 700 imamate: ismail 1 notion of, 49: Sliiite concept of. 26. 44, 60. 75.94.95, 115. 121,296 nil am liar is, as Husayn and Hasan shrines. 368 Imami. as Shiitc quietest wing, 44 imams. 628; In Africa. 492; in Dutch

Muslim ruler. 397.401. 402, 404.

Muslim schools. 624,62Ç: funtrinns

405.695

of, 625; i n interfaith activities. 627.

IbuTulun. Ahmad, mosque commis­ sioned by, 237, 238 IbnTumart. Muhammad, as founder o f

opposition in European expansion by. 540; public intcresl ruling o n , 143; Safavid shrines of. 368. in US. Muslim schools. 625

478-479. 495. 504. 691; Asian travcl-

Almohad movement, 40

ogue of, 42c, 422.425; as early travel­

Ihn U b a y d . A m r . i s Q a d a r i . 27/

Imamzada Sayyid AU (Iran). 72

er. 404

Ibn Umar, Abu Bakr. Jolof king as possi­

imamzadehs. as imam shrines, 368

I b n Dunama.Ali Gliaji, as Bornu ruler, 492 Ihn I l i f t , Muhammad, control o f Ifriqiya by, 52 Ibn Hanbal. Ahmad, as early jurist. 95. 114. i 2 9 - r j o . 278. 280, 291. 359. 693 Ibn Harh. (afar, as Mutazilile theologian. 278 Ibn Hassan al-Tusi. Muhammad, as Shine mujtahid, 117 Ibn ilayyan. Jabir. as early akhemist. 198 Ibn l l a z m ; anr-Chnsiiai) polemic o l . 332;as Islamic Literalist, 2B9-290

ble descendant of, 490 Ibn Umar, Jibril. as dan Fodio's teacher. 535 ibn Umar Aqit, Mahmud. as T i m b u k t u qadi, 483

cies alfcenng. 609-611; mosque zations for. 621 -623: Western c o m ­

Ibrahim, Anwar, as Islamic modernist, 681.687. 7 ° 4 Id al-Fitr. as post-Ramadan least. 178. 482.549

munities of, 604-609 immigration policies, in the West. 609-611 incarnation. Christian doctrine of. 332

Idgah Mosque (Kashgar). 466

İnce Minareli, i n Konya. 53

al ldrisi. Abu Abd Allah Muliammad. as

Incoherence of the Incoherence (Avcrroes). 288

European countries. 329

European culture and peoples. J50

lenges for. 611-615; immigration p o l i ­ cullure of. 615-620: umbrella organi­

Ibn Idris. Ahmad, as Islamic reformer.

Ibn MahmudAqit. Umar, as Timbuktu

immigrant Muslims, 601—641 • chal­

Ibrahim, i s Prophet, 63, 82. 86, 88

early geographer, i 8 j , 185. 476; o n

list, 157.191-295. 298. 316:00

İ m i n Minareı (Turfan). 442

Ibn Zamrak. i s court poet. 264

Ibn Hilal.Ali. Srr Ibn al Bawwah 510-531. 536.699 Ibn Khalduiu as Arab philosopher-sc ien-

iman (revealed laith), 63,424

Idrisiyyah movemenr. 699 al tfram.on AskiyaMuhammad. 4 8 2 - 4 8 ; Ifriqiya; Almohad control of. 51, 52; Islamic control of. 33. 35. 36. 37. 46. 48; Sunni population o l . 45

Incoherence of [he Philosophers (al-Gha/ali). 283, 286 Independence party (Istiqlal), of Morocco. 562. 651 independent reasoning, in Islamic legis­ lation. 112-114, '52 India: All India Muslim League of, 562;

iuurmrnai. as Berber holy men. 53

Briush rule of, 528. 539. 552;

disan (active virtue), 98. I O O - I O I . 103

Chnsnan minorities i n , 583; colonial

Ibn Majjah al Qazwini, Sunan of. 75

Ihyu tilumal-din (al-Ghazali). 269

benefits to. 578; colonialism i n . 564.

Ihn Masarrah. as Islamic philosopher.

al l]i. Adiid al-Din. as early theologian.

qadi. 483,485 Ihn Majid. as early nautical scientist, I 8 J

284

29J. 197

580-581. 586, 597;colonial patronage In, 597 598; decolonialization of,

726

INDEX

55;. diversity i n . 580; early medicine

policy 111. 572: Shafu school i n . 114;

in. 2oi; economy of. 471 ; English lit­

ulama movement 111. 562

eral) i n . 584: fiqh and shariali acade­ mies i n . 151; ühaznavid rule of. 694;

Indus RiserValley. Muslim campaigns i n . 21

refugees f r o m . 605; as Muslim stale. 549. 542. 554. 652; national identity of. 554. 555.560. 651; Ottoman Empire i n . 372. parronage i n . 599:

İfan Idris prayers used i n . 531; Irano

Jnloij al Maysur (Bello). 494

qanai irriganon i n . 197; n-voluiionary

Islamic culture of. 357: Islamic anti-

inlitah. o l Sadat, 574

movements i n . 667, 699, 700. 702:

colonialism i n . 550; Islamic

inheritance; fiqh rulings o n . n o ; Islamic

Safavid painting of. 365: Salavid rule

modernisin i n . 547, 550, 648; Islamic

laws o n , 151, 635, 646. 647. 686.

of, 363.697; Sasaman cultural

Party of. ÇÇ7; Islamic philosophy i n .

Quranic rules o i l , 120; Sunni law o n .

espousal of, 1; Shah o f See Pahlavi.

297; islamic reform i n . 54c. 697;

lio

Islam i n . 21. J l . 32. 31.40, 41 . 6 0 . 595-404; Ismailis i n . 46; jihad move­ ment i n . 698; Khilalal movcmeni in, 700; modern education i n . 580; Muslim migrants from, 607, 608: Muslim population of. 582, 611; Muslim slave irade w i t h . 504; Muslims viewed as outsiders i n . 581;

inlay w o r k , as Islamic art f o r m . 221. 242. 253.411.414.411114 Inner Asia Sw ulso Central Asia; earlycountries i n . 439 Inquisition. efleci o n Muslims. 603. enforcement o f Mutazihsm by 89 Insiitute for Muslim Minority Affairs. 612

Mohanunad Rcza. Shall o f Iran; shariah implementation i n . 151. 686—687: Shiism i n . 72. 94. 366-371. 509. 550. 663. 664: slruggle withTuran, 40, Sufis i n . i 5 9 ; T i m u r i d period i n . 352; Turkish rule i n , 54. 353. 363; ulama role i n . 680; women and minorities in. 679; women's dress code i n , 141; women's rights and status i n . 654. 687. 688

nationalist leaders o l . 562. 652; native

uitellect. as sfiariah value. 147

rulers of, 586; Ottoman competition

Intentions of the Philosophers (al-Ghazali |. 283

Iran Beihel school (Tehran), 580

f r o m . 391. Rarsis i n . ç 8 j ; Persianate

inlerfaith relations, of Muslims,

Irani.Yak Banu-yi. as Ishraqi plutoso-

Turk conquest of, 397; as postcolonial state. 581, 586; Shiism i n . 528; Silk Road to. 441; social changes i n . 576-577. 578;Wcstcrn influence o n , 579 India Act o f 1784, C2t India Act o f 1935, 586. (97

626—631. 637 Internal Security Ac 1 o f i960 (Malaysia). 597 International Islamic University o f Islamabad. Islamic law research ai, 151 International Islamic University o f Malaysia. Islamic law research at. 151

pber. 296 Iranians, in early Chang an. 442 Iran-Iraq War. 637. 705 Irano-lslamic culture, i n early Middle * *

357

Irano-lslamic language, development of. 117

Indian Civd Service, 594

intifada, in Palestine. 703

Indian Nationalist Congress, 599

Iqhal. Muhammad, as Islamic m o d ­

Bath party- of. 390; Ruy id dy nasty of,

ernist. 297. 299. 530. 578,647.

43, 693; civil war i n . 581. 654, early

649-650.680,683.685.699

military control o l , 351; expansion of,

Indian Ocean. Islamic commerce o n , 58; Ottoman fight for. 189; Portuguese commerce o n . 521; rise o f British and Dutch empires i n . 322 Indians, as early astronomers. 161, 162, 168. in early Chang an. 442: as early

iqca; i n early Middle Kasl. 352. 356; as

Iraq, 16,697; Abhasid decline i n . 43. 58.

556: Greek studies i n . 271. Hizh al

lax t o l l e i t i o n method, 30, 42-41. 56.

Dawa al-Islamiya of, 668, Islamic con­

57. J77

trol of. 23. 29. 32. 15, 238. 515.693;

Iran. 697. See oho Pahlavi Iran; Abbasid

Islamic culture i n . 60; Islamic law-

mathemancians. 168-168; 111 Great

state i n , 695; annexation o f Persian

Britain. 605. 606; in Malaysia, 585.

G u l f islands, 557; Buy id control i n .

559; as mandate couniry. 651; military

596

42. 694. Buyid ousting from. 43;

takeovers i n . 593; Muslim refugees

individuality, shariali's focus o n . 146

caliph control of. 12. 22. 25. 29. 30.

f r o m . 605.618; as Muslim stale. 652;

Indo-Aryan period, in South Asia. 590.

76. 180. Christians i n . 3, 583; decolo­

national identity of, 558, 580,

n i z a t i o n of, 552; development of.

Oitoman coiurol of, 189; in Persian

567. 571; early military control of.

GulfWar. 701: Salfarids i n , 38; secu­

351; economy of, 574; European pro­

larization polity i n , 572; Seljuk rule

197 Indo-European Tadjik language, o f Chinese Muslims. 4 4 j Indonesia; activist movements i n . 667; Christian minorities i n . 58;; colo

tection o f minorities In, 582; expan­

in. 54, 55. 153, 694; Shiism i n . 666;

sion of. 556: Ilkhanid Mongol regime

siege of. 637; Sdk Road ihrough. 440;

mal army of. 592; communist

in, 234. 235. 352. 695; intellectual

guerilla factions i n , Ç79; creation of.

activity i n . 579; interest in Central

feci; cultural activity i n . 579. devel­

Asia. 455; Islamic anticoloniahsm m.

opment of. 567, 568. 573; economy

550. 566: Islamic culture i n . 60. 357.

of, 374; expansion of. 556. (57;

Islamic decoration i n , 229, 239. 245.

Islamic anticoloniahsm i n , 531; Islamic art i n . 2 22: Islamic law replacement i n . 5(18; Islamic m o d ­ ernism i n . 565, 656, fe8ı; Islam i n . 4(0, 431; Masjumi party i n , 678; as m o d e r n M u s l i m slate. 549. Muhammadiyyah movement i n . 97. 562; M u s l i m intellectuals of, 579; M u s l i m migrants f r o m . fe04. nation­ al activists of. 562: national identity of. 558. 560. 380: n a ı i o u f ı o o d u m m a h disharmony i n , 555, 561; pluralism i n , 690; secularization

changes i n . 150; Kurdish identity i n ,

ulama role i n . 680 Ireland: Muslims 111. 604; U.S. emigra­ tion of.fei1 Irish Republitan Army. Qaddafi's support of. 657

2 6 2 , Islamic modernism i n , 565. 681,

"Iron Amir." o l Kabul. 587

682; Islamic poUtlcs i n . 703: Islamic

imgarion engineering, i n early Arab

renewalism i n . 514. 525-526. 518. 656; Islamic Republic of, 562. 661-667; Islamic revolunon i n . 152.

countries. 196-198 Isabella of Castile. Cltristian Spain under. 344.696

629. 661; Islamisni i n , 568. 569.570:

Isadore of Seville, writings o n Islam, 322

Khwariznishah conquest of, 58;

isami. as Dctcani historian. 401,402.

Kurdish identity i n , 559; local and regional autonomy i n . 38. mibtant activists i n . 579; militaries of. 59J,

403-404 fsfahan; early Chinese missions 10. 440; Ghal/ai Afgahn seizure of. 370. 697;

Mongol tonquesl o f 58, 59, 352. 363;

Islamic culture o^ 60. 295, 357;

Muslim intellectuals of. 579; Muslim

Maydan-i Shah of, 366, 697: observa­

migrants I r o m . 606.607; Muslim

tory at. 181-182: as Safasid capilal.

INDEX 365, 376; Stljnk control o f 55; Shiisiu

s37-S4s: worship in, astronomy and.

in. 366

'77

727

replacement of. 568; research o n . 151: rUsulnh as treatise o n . 90. 128; scholas-

al-Isfahani. poetry collection of. 354

islam, meaning o l word, 66, 6 / , 77,424

tic contributions to. 124-130: schools

Ishaq; as Ibrahim's win. 8b; as srientic

Islam. Sdularnm.dnJ tic PJiiluwphy of ihc Finnic

at, 94-95. secularism and, 300. shari-

translator, 163 Ishaque. Khalid. o n Muslim imnugranr com murti tic's, 613—614 al-Ish b i l l . Abu al-Abbas. Ixitanical ircalise of. 212 Isliraqi movement, i n tarsia. 293-296. i02. i O ! Islam; activist movements i n . 667; i n Africa, 475-307; ancr-srral reUgion coexistence w i t h . 427; aniiiolonial movements i n , 551. 650: in Asia, 69, 195 473-astronomy i n , 161-183. 184;

(al- Atlas). 298 Islamabad, air service to. 435

lslam as expert in, 380: society and.

hlum and Modernity I Rahman), 690

107-153: virtue concept in, 96;

Iblum and the Principle, of Government (Ahd al-

Wahhahism and. 545

Kaziq). 300 Mum and the Problems of Ciiiliiation ( Q u i b ) . 300 "Islamdom," efforts 10 reconstitute, 559-560 al-lslam Feyzullah. Shaykh, In fcdirne Incident, 697 "Islamic Alliance." o f Muslim

in Central Asia. 510: change move-

Rroiherhisod and Socialist labor Party,

ments i n . (#2;Christcndnm and.

669

105-345. 572. 507: Chrisnan converts

ah concept of. 91. 135; Shavkh al-

Islamic architect!.ire. 215-267; ambiguous

Islamic Law Conference (Paris. 1951). 150 Islamic modernism. 295. 299-301, 537, 547. 565, 6 4 ; ; al-Afghani as founder o f 699; critics of. 652; law reform and. 686. limits and legacy of. 646—650: proponents of. 565, 680 Islamic Movement, ; o o Islamic Party (Jatnaat i Islam) organizations. 557,362 Islamic Pari) (Parrai Islam Sc-Malaysia. PAS), o f Malaysia. 562, 570. 687

to, 3!2; Christianity compamd to, 77,

designs in. 262; color use in, 253; early

86,88: chmnology of. 691-704; colli

period (if. 193-198; figurai depictions

dogma interaction w i t h , 277-281 • o f

nial criticism of. 564; contemporary.

in, 231-232. 236; as mosl important an

history, 291; interaction with theolo-

643-690; converts to. 609.639; creed

form, 218; o f Mughal emperors, 255,

gy. ; o i - 3 0 ; ; m o d e r n period of.

o f (Hadilhof Gabriel), 75-77;

159.409-420, in Gunman Empire,

296- 299; in Muslim Spain, 284-289;

Crusade effects o n . 338; culture of.

347; weaiberuig o£ 233

systematic writings i n . 272-274

60—61; decentralization and regional-

Islamic an. 2i5-267:absrract motifs i n ,

Islamic philosophy, 170. 269-30;;

Islamic Renaissance Party ( I l i z b - i Nah/al

ism of. 32-43: democracy and.

220; anitonism in, 222. 230-236;

667-680; dissemination by Silk Road.

arabesque motifs i n , 2 2 2, 236-246;

441, dogma of. 108. i t i . 120; early

calligraphy as. See calligraphy. color

constitutional principles o f 676;

Christian slews of, 336; early expan

i n , 222. 246 260. 267. definition of.

esiabhshmcni of, 515. 599, 702. 703.

sionof, 10-14, 306-309: education

215-222; geometric motifs i n . 222.

i n . 578-580; empires of, 349. 603. See

236—246. 267; Safavid painting as,

also Mughal Empire; Ottoman Empire:

365, 370: w i l l f u l ambiguity i n . 222,

Safavid Empire; encounter w i t h

250-167

Western thought, 297; ethics of. 95— 105; expansion into Christian territories, 309-317, 350. 602-603; faith and practice i n , 63-103; fundamental-

lslamicaic, use m describe Asian rcli gious siaies, 397,401 Islamic call societies, as relief agencies, 667-668

Islami). ofTajikistan. 561 Islamic Republic o f Iran. See ulsti Iran;

women's status i n . 688 Islamic RepubUt o l Sudan, women's sta tus in. 688 Islamic Republic party, c f Ayatullah Khomeini, 590 Islamic Research Academy (Cairo), 151 Islamic Revolution, 115 Islamic Revolutionary Movement. 660

ism i n , 74, 299-301, 616.653. 656.

Islamic Center Foundation (Turkey). 62 2

Islamic Salvation Army (Algeria). 672

659, 665, 669, 683: future propsecis

Islamic Center o f New York, 601

Islamic Salvation Front (Front lslamique

of, 680; globalization of, 601 -641;

Islamic Circle of North America, 621

de Salut. LIS), as Algerian relief

gunpow der empires of, 347-391;

Islamic culture; preservation of. 632; i n

agency. 562, 568, 667, 671

influence on medieval Europe, 35 2-354; languages of. 40; law of. See Islamic law; medieval Christian views of. 321-328; in Middle East. 347-391: Middle Period of. 63. 66; militancy o l . 13, 20, 47;, modernism i n , 116, 152, 547: mysticism i n . See Sufis: Siihsm; nascent law of. 27; nationalist move ments i n . 650—656; non-Muslims i n , 385-386,583. 690; orthodoxies of. 89; Ottoman role i n expansion of. 3 7 5 - 3 7 6 ; » political forte. 656—661. political history of, 1 -61: i n public

Spain, 54 Islamic Democratic Alliance (Pakistan). 669 Islamic Jihad, as militant group. 660. 665, 666,680, 702 Islamic law, 90-95. 350; adaptability and change i n . 135; i n colonial states, 596; current status o l . 150 151; develop mem of. 149. 693; duality of, 1 0 7 - n o ; five values of. 93; i n Hadidi o f Gabriel. 76. history of. 110-119;

672, 676.

678. 70J. 704 Islamic science. 155-214, 270. 334; astronomy. 161-183. 'R4;eultural context of, 156-161; engineering and technology. 193-198; history of, 156; medicine, 198-210. 170; optic*, 191-193. translation movement i n , 15-9—160. 163. 164, 185. zoo, 270 Islamic Society o f North America ([SNA), 621 Islam icTendency Movement

individual vs. community i n .

(Renaissance or Ennahda Pari)). i n

144- 145; modernism and. 649-650,

Tunisia. 562. 666. 670. 702. 703

life, 568; rapid spread of. 311-312;

681; moral valuation m , 93; Muslim

reformist organizations i n . 97; renew-

immigrants and, 612. 690;

al and reform i n , 509-547- rituals of.

Naqshhandi emphasis o n . 520: i n

Islamic theater, replarrmem w i t h scripture, 459 Islamic theology. 269-303. 3;2:A1-

94; in Safavid Empire. 370 -371; Six

Ottoman Empire. 385, 512,646:

Ghazali as greatest theologian, 269; as

Pillars o f Faith of. 87-90; in South

Ottoman sultans as executors of.

by-product o f Islamic philosophy:

Asia, 510; in Southeast Asia. 510;

382-38;; recognition by Western

269: fundamentalism in, 299-301;

stereotypes o f 644; sultanaies of.

states. 632-634; reform of. 686; rein-

Greek translation use i n , 271: interac-

347- 391; violent dcpicuons of.

t r o d u t i i o n of, 687; in renewal move

tion w i t h phdosopb). ¡ 0 1 - 3 0 3 ; m o d

324—32;; warrior-defenders of.

ments, 514, 535. 538. 648;

emlsm i n , 299-301: modern period

7

28

IN

DFX

of. 296-298; secularism i n . 299-101

Jatar al-Sadiq, as sixth Shine i m a m . 95.

al-Jawziyyall. Ibn Qayyim. as 1 lanbali

Jafan school o f jurisprudence. 93. 682.

al-Jizari. lhn al Razazz, machines of.

jurist and Literalist. 132. 143. 289. 291

Islamic Youth Force ot Malaysia (AB1M). ¡.7°. 701.

704

Islamism. 565. 567. 667; political plaif o r m of, 569; postcolonial develop-

192-191. 195, 196.

693 Jahangir; depiction of, 417; as Mughal

ment and. 569-570; professionals

emperor. 407.410.411; N u r Jalian as

i n . 668; support o f mosque move

svife of. 238.411. 414; Sufi courtiers

inent by, 617; women's rights i n , 688 Islamist movements, 562. 614 Islann/ation; in Central Asia. 4 1 4 , 4 3 7 : inlerpretanons of. 681 Ismail. Sliah; as cultural patron. 365: Safavid reign of. 1 6 1 - 1 6 4 . 6 9 6 Ismail. Shaykh, C J J

of. 4"S fahan Shah. Nezami manuscript of. 248 jahhya (precon version disbelief), 4*4 Jahriyyas; branch orders of, 456; as

Prophet, 8;. 86

Chinese Sub order. 449,452. 431, jahr (remembrance), Jahriyya Sufi use 184

Jakhanke. as African Islamic scholars.

Ismaihs, 281. (84.618; as activist Shiiies. 4 1 . 277: as challenge to.Abbasids.

Jerusalem; apostolic sect o í 309; Arab loss of. 635; Crusader capture of. 56, l l 8 , 602, 694; early Christians 111.

313.

holy siies of, 311, 112; Jews i n , 2; Muslim occupation o f (638), 692; Jesus, 330; death and resurrection of.

454-4SS.436.462

Jai Singh observatory (Jaipur). 182.

al-Jazuli. as Mortsccan Sub. 486

Saladin's conquest of. 37, 695

of. 455

Ismail I ; Nezami manuscripr of. 24S; as

198

al-J¿zirah, caliph connol of, 29

312. Islamic intercessory role for. 88; as one substance w i t h God. 310. Quranic description o l , 306-307 Jews; Abbasid acceptance of, 338; in America. 610; conversion 10 Islam.

4S8.489 Jamaat-i Islami; Mawdudi as founder of.

318, i n early Chang an, 442; i n early

700; of Pakistan and Bangladesh. 91.

Near East, 2.4. 9; i n early Spain. 344:

w i n g of. sot Fatimids; in India and

562. 595. 617. 618. 621. 652.657. 667.

in Egy pt. 49; ghettos of, 614; interfaiili

Pakistan. 297

669. 675; Rabbani as leader of. 639;

relations w i t h Christians, 627; inter-

Isodddc ( f t x p h y r y ) , 271,272

Taliban compared to. 660; worldvicw

faith relations w i t h Muslims, 626;

Israel; colonialism of, 551; creation of,

of. &51

4 4 - 4 9 ; i n Eqypt. 49. 276; Faiimid

Islamic conversion of. 609; as Middle

Jamasp. as Persian sage. 294

Eastern minorities, 359: as monothe-

of Lehanon by. 702; Saudi jihad

Jamat al-Nasr (Nigeria). 667

isms, 19, 305; Ottoman acceptance of.

against. 701; In Six-Day War. 655; sup-

JaiubLchiis. as Ncoplatonist, 270

385. 386; as racism victims, 631;

port for. 630

Jamcelah, Maryam. as female modernist,

slaughter by Crusaders. 338. 339

585. 604.627, 6 t 2 , 6 5 5 . 700, invasion

al-Israeli, Ibrahim ibnYaqub, visit to Europe by. 329

JibaJ; Buyid control of, 41. 42: Scljuk

68i lames I , King o f England. 410

Israch-PI.O repprochcmeni, 472

Jami. hiaiiond Zuiaykha o d . 250

Istanbul. StralsoConsiantinople;

al-fcimidfi. 298

control of. 55.Turkmen migration inlo, 34 Jihril i h n Umar. as Qadiriy yah leader.

Ouoman judiciary i n . 380; Ottoman

Jamiah-i Nizamiyah (India). 580

rebuilding of. 376, 385, provisioning

(ami a! MabuJi m l G h l M Ii Ilm ul-Miqui (Al-

of. 388. 391. Uighur separatists i n ,

S19

Marrakushi). 180 kimi d-Tirmidhi. asSunan tollecnon. 75. 77

466 "Is the Bihlc the Word o f God?" ISwaggart), 626

Jamiai-iUlaina-i H i n d (Pari) o f Ulama). o f India. 550

Istifan ibn Basil, as translator. 211 Istiqlal (Freedom) party, o f Morocco, 562. 651

ft (ami li-Mufnidiir ill - .Adwiyn «nl-Agidlliyil

64 c. Islamic mosques and centers i n ,

Jamiyyat Ulama-i Islam (Pakistan). 669

618; Muslim incursions into. 315;

Jamiyyat Ulania-i Pakistan. 669

Muslim migrants to. 608; Muslims i n ,

Janids, i n Bukhara, 1197

604

Janissaries, in Ottoman armies. 377.

Islamic art. 221.

¡ 8 0 . 390- J92, 697 Japan. Chinese relations w i t h . 457; inter-

Ouoman trade center. 390

Japanese, in early Chang an. 4 4 2

586;

o f 514. 586; exports o f 572; Islam i n .

translations of. 271,

333

Jaddis (Central Asia), as Islamic m o d enlists. 56; Jade Gate, on Silk Road. 440 Jafar. O n n , as Malaysian leader. 562

389.424,428.429-431,696; landtenure policies i n , 574; M u s l i m slave trade svirh. 504: national identity o l . 534. rural economy of, 573 Java War of 1825-1830. as jihad. 535 Jawhar. consolidation o f Faiimid rule by. 45. 46

532;

againsl Russia. 531: ofSafavids. 363;

Jackson, [esse, Muslim suppon lor. 637 312

534; Middle East groups of, 667;

334; role i n Islamic reform. 510.

Jassy. Treaty of. 698 Dipanegara revolt i n . 699: Dulch rule

Jacobites, 331,602; Greek studies and

sion. 13. 20. 519. 537: Java War as.

teenth century. 523. 526; o f

J Jacobite church. 310.

n o ; againsl French,Algiers. 541; in India. 698; as Islamic militant mis-

Ottomans, 375. 382; PadriWar as.

Jarrahids. o l Palestine. 4 1 , 4 6 lava: colonialism i n . 563,575. 576.

550: against Fnropean imperialism,

Muslim fanaticism and. 629: m nine-

al-Jarjari, as Fatimid vizier. 48

Izmir. Ottoman judiciary i n . 380: as

564; against Crusaders, 338; o f dan Fodio.497. 519, 535-536. Í 4 ' - Í 4 2 . 533. 545. 547. 550: fiqh rulings o n .

est in Central Asia. 433 243

519.

555-536. 543. 697: inAlgerla, 563: India, 528. 539; colonial criticism of.

Jamiyyai al-Dawa (Lihya). Libya. 668

ivory; African trade i n , 300; use in

550. Ç51. 659; of African Muslims. 475- 476.490. 495. 506.

Arab-Israeli War as, 657; in British

Italy; colonial ideology ot. 5B8-589,

«11.4*4

645; in A c h t h . 541: o f Afghanistan,

211-212 Jamiyai al-fslah (Kuwait), 667

I l i i u i d al-Dawla. Mughal t o m b of. 258.

jihac (holy w a r ) . 76. 102.485. 509.

[medical d i a i o n a r y o f l b n al-BaytarJ.

Italians, as racism victims. 631

IthnaAshari Shiism. See Twelver Shiism

Jidda, O u o m a n trade route thniugti, 389

o f T i t u Mir. 538: use to oppose buropeau expansion. 540; i n West .Ahita. 519. 515, 536542 Jilw ah, M i r / a Abul. as Ishraqi phi loso pher. 296 Jin dynasry. relations vviih Central Asia, 440 Jingdezhcn (Cliina). porcelains made at. 4J8 linns (Muslim gcrucs), 95,497

INDEX jirya, as Mughal lax. 419 John o f Damascus, views on Islam, p i , 3 « . 323 Johns.A.H.,449 John the Baplisi. as Allah's messenger. 88 Jolof. as West African kingdomf, 490 Jordan; Abbasid sites i n , 32; creation of.

Kadizadeli movement, ami-Ottoman natumof, 381-382 Kadizade Mehmed, reform movement of, 381 kahila. as Ottoman lew ish community. 386 Kairouiyyui mosque (Fez). 79

729

Kemal. Mustafa, secular Turkish siatc of. 651. 652. 700 Kemalisin, inTurkey. 561. 567. 624 Kenya; "Africanization" campaigns i n . 585; Islam i n . 503, 505; postcolonial tensions i n . 581 Kerman ( I r a n ) ; Saffarid control of. 38;

556, 557; development of, 567; Hanafi

Kake Fitri, Mai Idris's conquest of. 493

school i n . 114; Islamic political parties

al Kalanı Azad.Abu, as Indian leader. 562

Keuani, Ali, as Saudi consultant. 635

i n . 668. 669-670. 701; Eslamism i n ,

kaiam (dialectic), i n Islamic phdosophy.

Khadijah. as Muhammad's first wife. 6.

668, 681; monarchy of. 651-652; M u s l i m Brotherhood of. 557, 666, 669-670, 703; M u s l i m migrants

277, 280, 289, 303 Kdlild »0 Dirnnn. Islantic translations of, 357

f r o m . 608; as Muslim slate. 556, 559:

Kalyan minaret (Bukhara). 244. 521

national identity of, 558; Shafii school

Kampala. Indian and Malay immigrants

in, 114; tribesmen i n Arab l egion of, 584

i n , 585 Kananj, Humayan's defeat at. 407

al-Juhai, as Mutazilile, 280

Kailem (early Chad). Islam i n , 492-495

fudaism. j . 269. {50. Islam compared

Kano. Islam i n . 493-497. 306

to, 77. 86. 88, 327, 639, 690: universal

Kana Chronicle, 495.497

beliefs of, 348

kanutis (legal codes), o f Ottoman sul­

Judeo-Christian worldvicw ; in America, 610. 640; Muslims and. 601, 604. 77 Judgment Day. Book of Reckoning revealed o n , 2 I J judiciai system, of Ottoman Empire. 580-381 judiciary, colonial legacy of. 594 al-Juhani. Mabad. asQadari. 277

tans, 383 Kaniiri society. Islamic scholars i n , 494 Karabalghasun (Mongolia); Kyigyz c o n ­ quest ot. 464; as Uighur k i n g d o m , 465 Karachi, as port city. 573 al-Karaji. Abu Bakr Muhammad, as early mathematician. 185-186. 187

Iukun, attack o n Kano by. 497

Karakalpaks. i n Central Asia. 471

Juliana vail Stolhergscbool. Islamic

Kara-Khiiai.Transoxiana conquest by, 58

instruction i n , 624

Karakoram lUghway. 435

Scljuk control of, 54-55

8, 306. 691 al-Khafri, Slums al-Din. as early astronomer. 177 Khabd. Khahd Muhammad, as Isfamic secularist. 501 Khabd al-Baghdadi. Shaykh, as Islamic reformer. 526-527, 532, 533 Khahdi movement, i n Islamic reform, 526-527 Khahdi yy ah-Naqqshbandiy yah orders, spread of, 532 al-Kbalili. as early astronomer, 181 al-Khalil ibn Ahmad, as Arab lexicogra­ pher. 189-190 Khalil Sultan. Nezami manuscript of. 248 Khaljis. i l l Delhi Sultanate, 399-400 Klialq (People) Party (Afghanistan). 579 Khahvaiiyyah order. Islamic renewal by. 5'3. 531-SJl Khamenei, Ayaiollah Sayyed, as faqih i n Iran. 703

Jupiter, Ptolemy's model for, 172, 173

Karam,Yusuf as Islamic m o d e m i s i , 298

khan, as term for secular monarch. 41

Jurcheu. Chinese occupation by, 439

Karhaia. Battle of. 663: Husayn shrine at.

Khan. Amir, as Pathan chief. 528

jurisprudence. Islamic. Set Islamic law

17. Î 5 9 , 509. 515: pilgrimages to, 368;

Khan. Asaf. as Nur Jahan's brother. 411

juristic preference, as source o f shariah.

Shii renewalism i n . 521

Khan.Ayuh; military government of.

119. 12; juristic reasoning, o n social change. 121-122 al-Jurjaiii. Aj-Sharif, as early theologian, 193.297 justice; Islamic concept of, 98. Quranic rules o n , 120 Justice and Benevolence party (al-Adi w a l l h s a n ) , o f Morocco, 562 Justinian. 2; closure o f Athens school by, 270 jute, as M u s l i m states export. 572 a] Juwayni. as Ashante. 281, 282 [uybari shaykhs, as Naqshbaudiyyah. 521 al-Juzjani. Abu Ubayd. as early astronomer. 171

Karlowtiz.Treary of, 510 Karluk nomads, as Uighur allies. 464 Kasam. Ahmad. Set M a k h d u m - i A z a m Kashani, Muhsin Fayd, as Ishraqi philosopher. 296 Kashgar; "EastTurkesian Republic" i n ,

Kaaba: asnonical alignment of. 179:

Turkish endowmenls for, 362

M u s l i m cemetery i n . 433; new trans­

Kharijism, 38,49. 279: Berber conver­

portation links to, 471; as uadc center. 4İ5. 4Î&.441 Kashmir, bridal party i n . i i 3 ; M u s l i m refugees f r o m . 605. 618. 6;8: M u s l i m vienms i n . 63O; Pakistan's and India's claim to, 559; relief agencies i n , 668

sion 10,45; Sunni repression of, 53 Kharijites, 16, 17, 18, 22. 35: community boycotting by, 146; Islamic proselytiz­ ing by. 35-36 Khatami, Muhammad, as Iranian presi­ dent. 704

Katsina. Islam i n , 497

Khatmiyyah order, o f Ibn Idris, 531

Kaykaus. Sultan, t o m b of. 228

khattars (water conduits), 196

Kayor. as state o f the WJIOI. 490

Khay bar oasis, 10

Kazakhs, in Central Asia, 471

al-Khayyam, Umar. as early mathemati­

tary agreement w i t h . 471; Chinese o i l

Black Stone embedded i n . 259; idols

agreement w i t h , 433. 469; ethnicizarton i n . 436; Islamizationof. 520;

ages to. 10. 85. 86. 87, 102; as Islamic-

Russian policies affecting. 437. 472;

sacred site, 1.5. 10, 17, 78, 86, 108

Slavs and Germans i n , 472;Turkic-

Kaana (Mall). Islam i n . 487

Altaic language of. 4 4 ; . 445: Xinjiang

Kabul; British occupation o l . 5S7;Talihan

trade w i t h . 468.469. 470

control of. 660

kbanaqas; as Sufi residences. 360. 367; Khandaq. 10

removed f r o m , 231; Islamic p i l g r i m

Kadisiya, 12

missal by, 595 Khan. Liaqat Ali. as Pakistani leader. 594

465, 469. Islamizauon of. 442, 466,

Kazaklisian. 434. 435. 466: Chinese m i l i ­

K

595. secularization policy of. 572 Khan, Ghulam Ishaq, government dis­

al Kazeruni. Shay kli Abu Ishaq. asSuh preacher. 359

cian, 187. 188 al-Khayyat. Abu Husayn, as Mutazilitc theologian. 278. 280 al-Khazani. Abd al-Rahman, sialics research of. 194 al-Khidr (Green One), as Islamic sage. 66 Khilalal movement (India), 700 Khirbat al-Mafja, as Umayyad palace. 2;i khirqa. Sufi adaptation of, 360

730

INDEX t6. 17. 31; Rationalists i n . 112

Khitan. Chinese occupation by. 439

Kissinger. Henry, ethnic slurs of. 637

K h o t h o (Gaochang), as Uighur city, 464

kisvva. as Kaaba veil. 220

kufic script, use for Quran, 7. 229. 242

Choi, Abu] Qasem. t t Iraqi ulama, 680

Kniib ul-Aohuni (al Istahani), 354

Ku Klux Klan. 609

Khomeini.Ayatollah Ruhollah. 628. 680,

Kitab al-Ashr MJJJIJI h al-Ayn (Hunayn i b n

701. 703; h t t w i on Salman Rushdie 664-665; Iranian support of. 628. J

i

Kulibalı. Bakarı, as Islam convert. 487 Kulibali, Biton. as Segou founder, 486-487

Kitab UI-HOMI ifi dl-Tibbul-Munsiiri (al-Razi).

of. 629: government control by. 662-663;

Ishaq). 200

Ishraqi Shute. 296; as

Islamist. 565. 590.656. 658 Khosrow I, Emperor o f Persia See

203 Kitubul-Hind (al-Biruni), 398

450, 452. 453. 454. 456". 4i>l. 462 al-Khu|andi. Abu Mahmud Hamid. as

al-Kuntl. Sidi al Muklitar; as Qadiriyyah

Kilabd-Istihar.492

leader. 519: revivalist menemeni of.

Kiliihal-jabnvul Miiqubulu (al-Khwarizmi).

486

as first work on algehra. 157. 184-185.

Anushirvan KhuByyas. as Chinese Sufi order. 449.

Kunta family, as Qadiriyyah. 519. 542

Knominiang (KMT) government; Muslim oppression by. 453; Uighur

186

recognition by. 465

Kitah d-Kamil fi al-Sinm al Tihbiya (alMajusi), 203

al-Kurani. Ibrahim ibn Hasan, as Kurdish

Kitab d Mabsut (al-Sarakhsi). 110

earlyastronomer, 168, 181. 191 Khuldabad. as Chishu t o m h complex.

Kitab al-Mdoki (al-Majusi), 203

mystic.451.455 al Kurdi. Mahmud. as Islamic revivalist,

KiIoM-Mono/ir (Alba/an). 190. 191. '93

418.4'9 k h u l ' k h u k (divorce), legal rules o n .

Kitab nl-Nabat (al-Dinawari). 2n

53 i Kurdish peoples; etlinic plight of. 559; as

Kilab d-Tasnf li man Ajua an d-Talif [medical

118. 127 Khurasan: Abbasid power i n . 28. 29. 693. Baghdad rivalry w i t h . 27;

"MountainTurks." 559, as Muslim

encyiopedia], 204

migrants. 607; as Muslims. 55. 36. 57.

Kitabd Tibbd Mansun (al-Razi), 202

451. i n Ottoman slates. J78, 527

Ghaznavid regime i n . 54, 56. 694;

Kilab fi d-judan •',„ H.; Is: (al-Razi). 202

Kurdistan, 526

Islamic control of, 33. 38.40;

Kitab ft |m«imi llmd-Xujum (al-Farghani).

al- Kurdunun. Shaykh Ismail, as Islamic

Kliwar izti ishah conquest of. 58; M o n g o l conquest of. 58. 400: Saffarid control ot". 38. 39; Samanid dynasty

164 Kitab fi Marifutal-Hiyd d Hondas) yyo (al Jazari), 196

reformer, 532-53; kuttab. as Abbasid clerks. 29 Kuwait; donation lo Chinese mosque.

of, 693; Scl]iik control of, 54-55, 56,

Knub Miiunul-Hikmci (al-Khazani), 194

401; extremist activities in, 665; bqh

57-58. 35" ; Turkmen migration into.

KitabSu»ord-lWiwikihal-Thabi(a (al-Suh),

encyiopedia project of. 150; indepen­

54. 399; Umayyad campaigns

from.

21. 24-25 K h u r r u m , Prince Sir Shah Jchan

dence of. 557; Iraqi claims ro. 556,

166, 167

559; Islamic politics of. 673; Jamiyai

knights; as Christian heroes, 328; role in

al İslah of. 667; Maliki school i n . 114;

Crusades. 338

KhuisiJ Bibi v s. Muhummud Amin. 118

knowledge, three types of, 64-66, 70

as mandate country, 651; o i l exports

Khuzcstan (Iran); caliph control of. 12;

"Lnovsledge by presence" (Quran). 66

of. 556. 574; i n Persian GulfWar. 703;

Saffarid control of. 38 Khuzestan province. "Arabistan" crearion from, 557 al-Khwara/mi.Abd al-Rahman SeeAnisi Khwarizui; astronomy 111. 191; Mongol conquest of. 58; Samanid control of. 39. 54; Umayyad control of. 21 al Khwarizmi; algebra and trigonometry development by. 157. 184-187. 188. i89:as early astronomer. 163; time­ keeping test of. 180 Khwarizmsliahs, Near East empire of. 58 Khyber. Christians i n , 306 Kiev, Ouoman trade w i t h . 389 Kilij Arslan II.Sultan. 55 Kilwa (Tanzania);AhuI Mawahib dy nasty of. 504: early Edam i n . 503 al-Kindi.Yaqub ibn Ishaq al-Sabah; as early philosopher, 273. 274. 278. 285. 287, 331, 333; optic treatises of. 191 King Abdul Aziz University (Saudi

63*. 77 kola nuts. African sources of. 486. 495. 497

Konya (Anatolia); Ince Minareli i n . 53; Islamic culture of, 60; Ottoman Trade

Koran. Set Quran Koreans; i n Central Asia. 472: i n early Chang an. 442 Koosedag, Rattle of, Mongol victory i n . (9 Kosovo; Battle o f (1389). 373. 695; Muslims i n . 638: violence u i (1998). 704

guage of. 443. 445; Uighars and, 466 Kyrgvzstan: Chinese mdnary agreement w i t h , 471: new transportation bnks to, 471 L labor migrants. Muslims as. 604. 605. 608.6;o Labour Patty (Great Britain). Muslini councilors i n , 635-636 al-Lahiji. Fayaz. as Ishraqi plUlosopher. 296 iahore. as Islamicale center. 399. 41B

Kraton. near Yogyakarta mosque, 430

laity, as Islamic modernists. 681

Krgy zstan. Xmpang trade w i t h , 468, 469

lake Chad, Muslim kingdoms along.

578 Kuala Lumpur, economic development of. 573; Malay-Chinese riots i n . 655;

Kirina. Bat lie of. 478

national identity o l , 558, 656

ment. 540

cies allecting. 437;Turkic-Altaic lan­

Kotoko. Mai Idris's conquest of, 493

Kinnard College (Lahore), 580

Kishiev, Kunia Haji. in Qadiriyyah mnve-

Karabalghasun by. 464. Russian p o l i ­

Koprulu family, as Ottoman viziers. 511

Kuala Kangsaw Malay College (Malaya),

al-Kirmani. 2K4

Kyrgyz; in Central Asia. 471; conquest o f

route through. 589; Seljuk rule i n . 55

Islamic Economic Research of. 151

Kiiiuan, Seljuk sultans of. 694

Kvvixarafa. attack on Kano by. 497

Kong peoples, as islamic converts. 489

Kuala Kangsar. Islam i n . 420

Quranic intriptions i n . 227

Kuwait Parliament, 135

Koli Beile, as Uighur leader, 464

Arabia). International Center for King Khalid International Airport.

suppon o f mosque movement by. 617

"knowledge o f certainly" (Quran), 64.

Kubravsiyyas. as Chinese Sufi order. 449. 461 Kuchiik Kaynarja.Treaty of. 698 Kufa (Iraq); Islamic conquest of, 13. 15.

491.493. 536 lake Van, Byzantine defeat near. 55. Church o f the Holy Cross o n , 52 "la mission civilairice." as colonial pater­ nalism. 56a. 561 LamuArchipelago. Islam i n , 504, 505 land tenure policies, i n Java, 574 languedoc. Muslim raids of. 21 lao jiao (old teachings). o f Chinese Islan. 462

INDEX i l Laqani. as carl) theologian, 293

life, as sharlali value, 147

lasNavas dcTolosa (Spain). Almohac!

Light o f lights; o f al-Shirazi. 295; of'al

defeat at, 51

Suhrawirdi, 294

731

al-Madani, Ali Ahbasi, as Algerian politi­ cian, 671. 678,681

Lincoln's Inn, 578

Madharal family, as Eg) jilian administra­ tors. J /

Last Judgment, Muhammad's idea of. 8

lineage, as shanah value. 147

madhi. IbnTumart as. 51

latchkey kids, Muslim disapproval of, 612

linen textiles, 218

madhist movements. 546

lat Dior, Gamhian jihad of. 541

I intao, Naqshbandi Sulism i n . 453

Madjid, Nurcbolish. as Islamic m o d ­

Latin; Arahic translations o f classics i n ,

Liiucia (China); as center oi Qadanyya

last Day. Muslim hclicf of. 88. 346

i l l —312. 314; scientific translations

Sufism. 431, 458; as Chinese "little

into. 139-160, [62, [63, 164, 166. 186 Latin America. Muslims i n . 604. 608

Mecca.' 453; Khoja Abd.'Vila i n , 431 I inxia H u . Autonomous Region

Latin Catholics, i n Ottoman t m p i r e , 383 Latin Kingdom o f Jerusalem. 338. 340-341,343. 694 I .u 1 1 1 Scholasticism. 303

Eg) I". 491. 4 9 4 ;

414

218. 228, 257; as Islamic school, 36,

Linzia. Naqshbandi Sufism i n . 453 261

l a w o f Family Rigliis (Turkey). 130

Li Peng, 433.469

Law 11CPersonal Status, i i i Egypt and

Lipton. llavidA.,467

Syria, 150

I ilerabsm. i n Islamic philosopy. 289

Lo»s (Plato). 171

Literalists, 278, 289

League o f Nations, 573

literary culture; Arabic-Islamic. 31; i n

"leap o f faith." o f believers. 69

298 madrasa(s); architecture of. 357; i n

(China), Huasi Chinese Sufism i n .

lion-headed birds, as Islamic an motif.

lass, o f Islam Set Islamic lass

ernist. 681 Madkour. Ibrahim, as Islamic modernist.

Shira/,42

i s

Islamic an f o r m .

57.99- ""4.115. '25. 207. 213. 269, 292, 294. 359; in Konya. 53; o f Ottomans. 379-380; as source o f Tabban, 659-660 Magii. kamal About, as Islamic m o d ­ ernise. 681 al-Maghih, Muhammad ihn.Abd Karim. i s Maghriebi reformer. 485,496 Maghreb; BenYusuf Madrasa i n . 125;

leases. Quranic rules o n , 120

little Black sumbn. library ban o n , 629

Berber rebellion i n . 45; black color

Lebanon; ban on travel to. 637;ChrUtian

Mull. Ramon, views o n Islam. 323

avoidance i n . 259; French Muslims

rule i n . 340, 557; civil war i n . 633,

loans, Quranic rules o n . 120

f r o m , 606; Islamic revivalism in,

701; confessional tensions i n , 339;

I.odi, Sikiiidcr. as Afghan king. 408

4 9 - Ç 3 ; Islam movement f r o m , 475,

crearion of. 337. 582.631; develop­

Iridis, N o r ü i India rule by, 400

485.486;Tijaniyya order i n , 531 ; tile

ment i n . 367; Hanafi school i n , 114;

logic, in Greek philosophy, 27t, 272.

Hizhollah founded i n , 702: Islamic

¿83

modernism i n , 6;6, 660; Israeli inva

logocentric perspective, u l Quran. 76

sions of. / o l ; Muslim migrants f m m .

l o n g Match. ofCliinese Communists.

607, 608, 618; Muslim relugccs f r o m .

461

mosaics of. 256 Magiamsm. Stt Zoroastrianism "magnification" act. i n Muslim prayers, 78,81.102 Magnus. Albert us. 302

605; national identity of, 380; plural-

loplyk, as Uighurs. 465

Maguzawa. i n Hausaland. 497

Ism i n . 690; as postcolonial stale. 581:

Lop Nor. as oasis city, 441

nl-Mahani. Abu AbdAllah Muhammad

Shiism i n , 660. 661, 700; Syrian

Lorichs. Melchior. Istanbul drawing of.

expansion to, 336, 559; ulama role i n . 68o

577 loms motif, i n Chinese art, 239

legal reform, in Muslim srates. 686

Louis I, King of Aquitaine. 326

Leghari, Faruq. Bhutto dismissal by. 395

Inuis XVIII, F.mperor o f France. 511

Leon. Castile union w i t h , 35

l ou I a n . as oasis city. 442

Lepanto. Bat do of. 696

"lowering o f the gaze," o n opposite sex.

L( Prut Journal. 331. 360. 563 The Levanı; Christian missionaries i n .

114 loyang. Buddlusl art i n . 441

379; Christians i n . 383; colonialism

l ucknow mutiny o f 1858.581. 584

in. 376; development of, 367;

Luddites, 337

Maronites i n . 382; Ouoman control

lunar calendar, of Islam. 177-179

of, 388-389 Uao dynast), relations w i t h Central Asia. 44°

Luther. Martin, views on Islam, 323-324 Luttrell. Geoffrey, 327 Luxembourg; etluuc m i n o r i t y model of. 610; Islamic mosques and centers i n ,

liberalization initiative, o f Rafsanjani.

618; Muslims i n , 604

574 liberlarianisiu. o f Mutazilah, 281

lyallpur (Faisalabad). economic devel­ opment of. 573

libraries, in early Islam. 173. 215. 218. 285

Lyautey, General, o n French role i n Morocco. 588

I ı by a cahph raids o f 1-. Islamic conseris i n . 36; Islamic movement i n , 550; Italian control of. 388-589; Jamiyyat al-Dawa of, 668; lack o f bureaucracies i n . 594; land claims of. 559; military takeovers i n . 593. 654. 701; as modern Muslim state. 349; as

mahdi. as Islamic millenarian figure, 44, 88. 546. 550,645 al-Mahdi; as Abbasid cahph. 25.693. as first Faiimid cahph. 45 al-Mahdi. Idris i b n . as long o f Liby a. 701 al-Mahdi, Sadiq, as Islamic moderuisi, 681 Mahdi movement. 645. 699. 702 Mahmud. Zaki Najib. as Islamic m o d ­ ernist and secularist. 298. 301 Mahmud I I . Sultan, we-sienii/ing reform Of. Ç23- S2S Mahmud o f Ghazna, as lndo Muslim ruler, 40. 397"199- ^94 Mahmud Shah, o f Melaka. 423-426.696 mahomeries, 327 Mahomet (Mahon), as purported Islamic deity 326, 327, 345 Ma H o t i g k u . asYihewani leader, 461 nialirams (characters). 494 al-Mahri, Sulayman. as early nautical sci­

M Ma Ba. Gamhian jihad of. 542. 699 Ma Bufang. asYihewani leader. 460-461 Macauly. l o r d , o n Easierti culiurc. 563-364

postcolonial stale, 586, 588;

Macedonia, Ouoman control ot, 373,

Saiiusiyyah order i n , 531. 701: sup

19' Madagascar. Islam i n , 503

port of mosque movement by. 617

i b n Isa, as early mathematician. 187 maharajas, as Indian rulers. 586

entist. 183 Ma Hualong. as Northwest Hui rebellion leader, 455 mahzar (decree), o f ShaykliMubarak. 409 Mai Idris Aiawma, as Bornu caliph.492. 491. 49^

732

INDEX

Maimonides. U n k and Jewish culture

Malay sian Cltiiiese Association. 596

OC İ 4 Mair. Victor. 437

Malay sian Indian Congress. 596

Majapahit Kingdom ( j m ) , Islamic con­ quest of, 696 Majlısı. Muhammad Baqir. as Ishraqi philosopher. 296 majlisi al-shura (consultative g r o u p ) , 677 al-Majriti, Maslama. as early astronomerphilosopher, 173. 284 al-Ma|usi.Ali ı b n Abbas, medical treatise ut, 203, 204 Mahasıb (Morteza al-Ansari). as Shii law book, 117 Makassar (Sulawesi). 427 M a k h d u m - i A / a m , Naqshbandi order founded by. 433, 321 Makhdumzada Sufism. i n China. 453 Malabar coast, role S i no Indian trade, 420. 421 Malacca, as p o n city, 373 Malacca (Melaka) St ran. as Sino-Indun trade link, 420 Ma laichi, as founder o f Khufiyya Sutism, 4 54 Mala). Islamic king of. 477.478 Malay; dyadic reading of. 430: Islamic anticolonialism in, 550; Islamic w r i l ings i n . 297- 298; as language o l Melaka, 426.427 Malaya: colonial benefits to. 578, colo­

al-Mansur.Abu (afar. asAbbasid caliph, 25.272 Mansura (Sind). Muslim founding of, 22

Malaysian League o f Muslim Youth

Mansuri hospital (Cairo). 208

(ABIM). 570. 701, 704 Malazgirt. Seljuk defeat at. 55

Mao Zedong, guerilla warfare of. 537

Malcolm X. as leader o f Nation o f Islam.

map-making. Srr cartography Maqolid Mm d-Hoyu (al-Biruni), 191

609. 640 Maldives, as modem Muslim state. 549

Muqomal (al-Hariri). 84. 215. 234

Mali; Islam i n , 3b. 476. 478-480, 489.

al-Maqrizi. on Islamic Kanem. 492

490. 495: jihad state i n , 698, Muslim

marabouts, in Morocco, 531

migrants from. 607

Ma rag ha observatory. 174. "8". 182.

Malik, Imam. 142

Marathas, Aurangzeb's conflict w i t h , 418

Mabk ibil Anasal-Asbahi. as pjrly- jurist.

Marbat (Oman). MusUm graves at

95. 113, 123. 127. 128, 280, 693 Maliki school o f law. 90.95. 113,

mosque of . 109 114.

117. I1J- H i . 149- 332. Î 3 2 . 6 8 2 . 693: importance in Qadinyy ah movement, 5 I 9 . 333: principles of. 127. 128.

129.

131; scholars of. 478. 484

424.

Malik-Shah, as Seljuk sultan, 56, 182, 282 Malinkc. as people o f Malı. 47S, 480 mallamati (rural scholarship). 494 Ma M i n g - h s i n , Naqshbandi movement 321

Mamluks ( N o r t h Africa), 269. 290; an works of. 241. 242. 251; conquest o f 501. 695: conquest o f Makuria by.

Malay sia; Brunei and, 537: communis! guerilla factions i n , 579; creation o l .

Mardin, atabeg stales of. 56 Marka, M u s l i m - o w n e d slaves of, 488 Maroniie church, development of, 310 Maromtes; Armenian Church of, 383; "iiiropcanncss" of. 5B3; trench pro­ tection of, 582; in Lebanon. 661. 700 marquetry, as Islamic an f o r m . 242-243 Almovand capital. 50: al-Sabti as

Sufism. 454-455, 456

Eg)'P' by. 57. 292. 340. 352- 354. 336.

trade. 420

41E Marco Polo, 422.440. 695

Marrakesh; Almohad seizure of, 51; as

Ma M i n g x i n . as founder nf Jahriyya

patronage i n . 598; Islamic law i n . 596

Malay s, i n early Chang an, 442

marble screens, i n Mughal tombs, 411.

Marinids. in Morocco. 256. 291

t-95

of. Ç'2-513. 319,

marble, use i n islamic buddings, 253

Mardavij, as Iranian warlord. 41

al-Malik Salih, as tide for Mcrah Silu.

nialism i n , 564, 581. 58b; colonial Malay peninsula, role in Sino-Indian

183.

184

mabk. as title for ruler. 355

499; conquest o f Syria by. 695; as

patron sainl of. 98. 100.

ioi:Banu

Marin seizure of. 52; fuqaha deportn o n to. 485: as Islamic cultural center. 53. 484 al-Marrakuslii.Abu Ali. as early

mercenaries, 38. Mongol defeat by.

astronomer. 180 marriage; of early Mushms and

59- &9S

Christians. 308, 319; fiqh ridings o n ,

Mamluks ( N o r t h India), 399. 410 al-Mamum; asAbbasid caliph. 27, 693;

n o , ii3;Hanafi rulings011. 124,

126;

631: decolonialization of, 552; devel­

"House o f W i s d o m " of. 272. 331. 693;

Hanbali rulings o n , 129. 132; Islamic

opment of. 5(17, 568; ethnic and reli­

as Mutaziliie. ¡ 8 0 . promonon ot

laws o n . 151, 478. 646.686: law-

gious clashes in, 559; European

Hellenic studies by, 271. 278; science

reforms o n , 150, 647; Maliki ridings

colonies i n . 551; export economy of.

studies in rule of. 159

o n , 127. 132: Muslim customs o l . 616;

t6o, 164,

181

S 7 . 373: independence of, 596;

Maneh 11 dynasty. Sec Qing dynasty

Quranic rules o n . t2o, 137; Shafii r u l ­

h i ami c law i n , 596; Islamic law

Manchus. Chines: occupation by. 439.

ings o n , i28-i29;shariah rules o n .

1

research i n . ı ; ı ; Islamic modernism

440

•49. 63s: temporary ( m u t a h ) . 130

in. 565. 681; Islamic Party of. 562.

Mande. as Malinkc language. 478

Mars. Ptolemy's model for. 172.

687. Islamic politics of. 704. Islam i n .

Mandingue; as African uadcrs, 495;

Marseille. Musbm piraie raids of, 316

69. 424. 426-429. 643; Islamism i n .

Dyula as, 489

568; judiciary of. 595; minority c o m ­

Mtmb al-Huvunun (Ibn Bakhtishu). 358

munities i n . 585; Muslim migrants

Mangits, as Central Asian rulers. 698

f r o m . 606: national identity of, 554, 558, 560; nationalist leaders of, 562;

Manicheanism. 280.434; influence o n Ulghurs, 464

nationhood ummah harmony in.

Manichcana, in earl) Chang an. 442

555- Ç70; patronage i n . 598; plural­

Maııilesı Destiny, nf missionary c r u ­

ism i n . 690: posicolonial problems

sades. 632

i n . 581; posicolonial state leaders of.

Mankizen. Batileof. 694

597; Shafii school i n . H4;shariah

Mansa Musa, as Muslim king o f Mali.

court i n , 151, slate conirol o f Islamic public life 111. 568; United Malays National Organization of. 562;

478 Mansa Sulayman. as Muslim king o f Mab, 478

w o m e n modernists i n . 681. women's

al-Mansur, asAbbasid caliph. 162.492

organizations i n . 689; women's slams

al-Mansur. Abu Amir (Almanzor). as

in. 688

Spanish caliph. 34, 320

173

Marshall Plan. 571 Martel. Charles. Musbm defeat by, 21, 314.692 m a r u f (virtue), in Islamic law, 96. 98 Mars (Iran); Islamic conquest of. 13, 27, 31. 54; Umayyad campaigns f r o m , 21 Marwanids. tribal states of, 43 Mane. Karl. 71 Marxism, 301, 303, 579. 649, 653. 657, 663 Marxist policies, role in eihnici/aiion of Central Asia, 436, 437 Mary theVirgin, Muhammad's descrip­ tion of. 306. 307 Mtisuil fi dl-Tibb 111 Mumdimin (Hunayn ibn Ishaq), 200

INDEX \l.ı-ıı,":. as Shıite tomb, 368

mechanical engineering, in early Islam,

Ma Shouqian. as Muslim CTtincse hisloriaii, 458 Mashriq.Turkish entrance inio,

194-196

41-58

of. 50

Messengers; of Allah. 88; consciousness

213; in Suleyiuaniye complex. 380 medicine; in early Islam. 124.

Masrauda tribe. IbnTumart as member

Ottoman Empire in. 372; SelpikTurks in. 351 ; Turkmen in. 353

medical schools; in early Islam. 207,

Masjumi party (Indonesia), 551, 678

733

160.

of truth of. 66 messiamsm. in Islamic renewal move­

198-210, 213, 271. 334,Galen legacy

ments. 546

of. 201. 202; Hellenistic heritage of.

metallurgy, in early Islam. 198

Mason. K.. 317

199, 271, 334; translated texis on. 159.

metahvorking, in early Islam, 215,

al-Masudi, as early Arab trascler. 3 Î 9 .

271.272.334 medicines. Arab dictionary of. 211: con­

504 Masud III. Sultan, minaret cuuimis

tainers for, 210. 2ii

sioned by. 228. 229

Medina. 4. 48; Christians in. 306; early

maştık Mel aya. as Melaka saying. 428

Islam in. 11. 12, 13, 15. 140, 143,

MaTai Baba. as KhufiyyaSufi. 454

280, 307; early Sufism in. 451; as

Mataram dynasty. SultanAgung of. 697

Islamic holy city. 37. 427; Muhammad

materialism. Islamic rejection of. 300

in, 9. 60. 87. 95. 96, 110, 119.

Maimo Mafica (Dioscoridcs). 202. 210.

301.674. 691; Ottoman control of.

144,

142.

382. 389, 696; Ottoman judiciary in,

211-212, 213 Malhanawi lexis. ofTurkish mystic, 453

380; renewalisl scholarship in. 522;

mathematics; in early Islam. 183—191; of

suras (chapters) of, 685; Traditionists in, M2; inVVahhabi-Saudi state. 517

Plato. 274: translated lextson, 159 Mauretania. Qadiriy jab movement in,

Medinan consensus, 113. 127.

128

Medina! al-Zahra.Abd al-Rahman's

S'9

palace al. 34

Mauriiania. Morocco's claim 10, 559 mausoleums, of Mughal rulers. 402.411 massali, Islamic captives as. 14. 22 MaWaidu, inYihewani movement. 458. 4S9

31; Khalwatiyyah order in. 513; Onoman conquests in, 374. 385, 388 Mediterranean Sea; Muslim pirates in. 316; Ottoman trade routes on. 389. 390; Silk Road to. 441

Masvtana lalluddin. 455

Mehmed II, 386; as art patron, 383-384;

Mass lana Makhdum. influence on

Constantinople takeover by. 342. 343.

Khuffiya Sufis. 454

374. 376. 377

M aw I ay Muhammad, as Islanuc reformer. 530 Maw ley Sulayman, as Islamic reformer. 3jo.532 AI-MmvsiMnl-hicjhiyyd, as fiqh encylopedia. "SO

347-391; Islamic anticolonialism in, 550: Islamic movements in. 652; Islam i ration of, 347-391; mandate countries of. 651; societal structures "middle nation." moral responsibihey of. 96 migrant workers. Muslims as, 604, 605. 608. 609, 615 mihna. asAbbasidinquisinon. 27;ofalMumnn, 278 milestones, calligraphy on, 223 militancy of Islam, 13, 20, 475, 476, Stt olso jihad

renewalisl movement. 519. 533. 537.

427-428.696

538

Melbourne. Uighur separatists in, 466

mihtary industries, in early Islam. 198 military institutions, of postcolonial

332

-_-: c Memorial Mosque to the Prophet (China), 443 Menelaus theorem, 190, al-Biruili's use of. 169 menhuan. as Sufi orders. 448. 449, 459,

"43

middle classes, til Muslim states. 578. 580 Middle East; gunpowder empires of.

Edam; against other Muslims. 692; as

melting pot. United Slates perceived as.

Mecca, 4, 5. 8,48. 185. 655; Christians

Michael the Scot, 289. 302

Melaka. Islam in. 389.424.425-426.

Mazandaran. local chieftains of 41

meat consumption, caliph ruling on.

Meyerbof^ Max, 205

Meknes. Islam in. 484

Melling. Antoine Ignace, 511

measles, early Arab ireatise on, 202

Empire, 372. 381 Mexico, open-door practice in, 97

(holy war): warrior defenders of

Melchitcs. 310. 331.

Mazyadids, of Hilla, 43

Mevlei i Sufi order, role ill Otloman

490. 491. 513. 519. 579

Maydan 1 Shah, in Isfahan. 366.697

46!

Mfleurok)o,ici) (Aristodc). 284

Motur. as Hanafi law condificanon. 150

maralını, as caliph court of appeal, 29 Ma /.henwu. as Naqshbandi Shaykh.

metaphysics, Neoplatonic, 282 Metaphysics (Aristode). 272. 282

of 348-350

Mediterranean area; Islamic culture in,

Mauryan dynasty, of Asoka. 396

221.

251.253.260. 337. 365

461

states, 592-599 military officers, foreign education of. 578-579 M i " . I S..379 "millet system." of non Muslim Ottomans, 386 Mini Gorus, as Muslim immigrant group. 619 Miltion Man March. 640

mental illness, early treatment of. 208

Minah, role in pilgramages, 85. 86

FiqhAcademy in. 151; Grand Sharif of,

Merah Silu. as Sainudran king, 424

Minangkabau (Sumatra). Islamic renew­

Ottoman revolt of. 538; Ibn Idris as

mercantile classes, in Muslim states, 577

teacher in. 530-531; Islamic scholar­

merchants (bazaaris); alienation hyShah

in. 30b; early Islam in. 11, 13. 17,

140;

al in. 520 minarets; in Muslim architecture. 228.

ship in. 543: Kaaha in. 1. 5;

oflran. 661; as carriers of Islam. 480.

229. 244, 378,400, 410.416.419.

Muhammad in. 110. 119. 30(1. 613,

485.486 as critics of Khomeini 665

475. 524,3s symbol of Eslam.

645.691.692: Muhammad's birth in.

Mercury. Ptolemy's model for. 173

b; Muhammad s raids against. 10.

Mérida (Spain). Christian takeover of. } i

minbars (pulpits), woodcarved. 242.

Ottoman control d£ 382, 389, 696;

Merv. on Silk Road, 440

pilgrimages to. 10. 31. İ 7 . 4 9 - 63. 75.

Meskhetian Dirks, in Central Asia. 472

143.246.339 Mindinao (Philippines), diversity in.

84-87. 102. 312.427.457-478. 484¬

Mesopotamia; atabeg stales in. 56-57:

244-245. 616

558

499. 518. 528; prayers said indirec­

Buyid dynasty of. 694; cabph control

tion of, 179. 312; renewahst scholar

of. 12. 13, 29, 351, 693; Ctuistiiury in.

ship in. 522; suras (chapters) o f 685:

3;control bySaladin. 57;early Islam

mining, in early islam, 198

Traditionistsin. ii2;mWabbabi-Saudi

in. 11. 331. 351, 353; Jews in. 2.4:

minorities; In colonial army and police

sıaıe, 517

Mongol conquest of. 59. 357.

miniatures, as Mughal art form. 410. 411.414-415.417

forces. 584; in Islanuc countries. 679.

734

1 MDEX

684. 687: in Malaysia, 484 minority communities, o f Muslims. 611

8. 13. '9. 305;Quranic dextrine of.

605.615. 619. 620. 632. importance 10

146-147.517

immigrants, 619-620; as important

miracles, attributed 10 Sufis, 360. 361

Montreal, foreign populations of. 610

Islamic art f o r m , 218; 111 India. 399.

M i r Damad, as Shiile scholar. 295, j68,

m o o n . e a r l y A r a b s m d i e s o n . [65, 177

403: i n Iran, 663; u i Java. 428,429,

Moors, as name for African Mushms.

430. preaching licenses for. 568;

«97 al-Mirdar.Abu Musa. as Mutazjlite the­

repair by Aurangzcb. 418-419; in

J2I.322 Moral Rıundctrion ol ihr Islamic Moianmi ( Abul

ologian. 278

morality, i n Islamic law. 108. 109.

m i r i . Ottoman lands as, 387 M i r Sayyid A h . as Persian painter, 219

111.

134. '35- "40. 147-148

M i r r a . Iskandar, as Pakistani leader. 594

moral valuation. In Islanuc law. 93

Mislikar, Muhammad, as Ishraqi

Moristos, as name lor Spanish Muslims,

philosopher, 296

344

Miskin. Hajji, in Padri movement. iJI-534

Rome. 607: rooms for preparation o l dead i n . 633; f r o m Safavid Empire.

ala Masvdudi), 300

Mirdasids, o f Aleppo. 45

365. 3 6 6 ; as sites o f instruction, r re.; in Sweden. 606.Turkish endowments for. 362; i n United States. 617 Most Favored Nauon status, o f China, 468

Morocco; Chnsnanity i n . 501 ; colonial­

Mosul, aiabeg stales of, 56. 354; Buyid

ism i n . 564. 386; cultural activity i n ,

control of, 42; Hamdanids of. 43; as

579: expansion of. 556; Filab dynasty

Islamic cultural center. 357; Uqaylids

632; Muslim conversion by. 603;

of, 697; foreign mosque staffing by,

of. 43

Muslims as. 608

621 ; French control oC, 588. 651,

Modier u f t h c Book, o f Quran. 280, ¡ 8 7

Islamic architecture i n . 253: Islamic

m o t i o n . Arab mathematical analysis of.

missionaries; early Christians as. ; Ji>.

Mitsubishi, role i n .Asian o i l and gas

associations of. 622; Islamic law-

development, 470-471 Miyan Mir. Dara Shikoh's veneration of,

485. 486, 677; Islamism i n . 668;

4'7.4'8 Mizjaia (Yemen). JahnyyaSuhsm found­

Isiiqlal (Freedom) parly of, 562; Justice and Benevolence party of. 462;

ed i n . 444.455 al-Mizjaji. az-Zayn ihn M u h a m m e d A b d al-Raqi. Ma Mingxin's teacher, 455 M i / j a j i family, as Naqshbandi teachers,

land ownership i n . 575; Maliki school i n . 113; Muslim conquest of, 21 ; Muslim migrants f r o m . 606.607. 616, 624; nationalism i n , 651 ; neo-Sufism

ill modernism. Islamic

changes i n . 150: Islam i n . 475.484,

Sec Islamic m o d ­

ernism Mogadishu (Somalia). Islam i n . 501. 502. 504. 544 Mohamad. Mahtahir. o n hudad puhishment, 687

in, 697; Otioman control of. 342. 492; Saadian dynasty o l . 696. state control of Islamic public fife 111. 568; Western Sahara united w i t h . 557; Zayyanid dynasty of, 52 M o r o National libération From (Philippines), 579; Qaddah's support

"Mohametons." 526

of. 657

Mohammadi. Mohammad Nahi, as

M o n c / a A l a m al-Huda. Seyyed. as Shiitt

leader o f Islamic Revolutionary

mujlahid, 117

Mosement. 660 M o h d . Khalijah. as lemale modernist.

Morte/a al-Ansari. as Shute mujtahid, 117

Moluccas, Islam i n . 422.426-429

mosaics, use i n Islanuc architecture.

ill

mortgages. Quranic rules o n , 120 226. 253.255-156

Mombasa. Portuguese loss of, 521 monasteries. 309; along Silk Route. 440; Muslim hospitality i n . 308: Muslim

Moscow. Ottoman trade w i t h . 389 Moses, revelations of. Muhammad's rev­ elations compared 10, 306

pirate raids of. 316

mosque culture, o f Muslim immigrants.

Mongolia. H u i Mushms i n . 443

615-620

Mongolians, i n early Chang an, 442 Mongols; Baghdad sacking by. 59. 695; caliphate destruction by, 30, 58-59. 60. 61; Central Asia control by, 439. 440, 695; Chinese occupation by, 439;

Mosque o f Shaykh Lutfallali (Ldalıaıı). 366 Mosque o l the Patriarch (Hebron). b o m b i n g of. 703

conquests of, 58-59. 357.400.401.

Mosque o f the Prophet (Medina), 9

695; ellect o n Muslim w o r l d , 59, 353.

mosques; i n Africa. 45. 475. 479. 480.

165 mountain peoples. Islamic leadership of. 362 Mouvemcni de laTendcnte Islamique ( M T I ) . inTunisia, 703 Movement for die Dispossed (Lebanon). 661, 702 Movement for ihe Restoration o f Democracy (Pakislan), 669 Mov ement o f Society lor Peace (.Algeria), 704 Mozambique; Islam i n , 505, 521-522; Portuguese expulsion f r o m . 505. S2I-J22 Mozarabs. as Iberian Arahizcd Christians, 319.3*0 muamalai (social obbgalions). changes i n . 684 Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan. as founder o f Umay yad dynasty. 15. 16, 313.692 Mubarak, 1 iosni; banning o f NGOs by. 667: as Egyptian president. 669. 680 Mubarak. Shaykh, mahzar o l , 409 mud-brick, use in African mosques, 4 / 9 . 488 mudejars. Christian tolerance of, 342. 344, Iberian rebellions of, 320 muezzin, call 10 prayer by, 244 a l - M u h d . A h u And Allah, as Shute m u | tahid. 117 muftis (legal consultants), 131. 512, o f Ottoman sultans, 379. 380 Mughal Fmpirc; decline of. 325, 527. 577; early Indian rulers of, 405—408,

557, 363.402; history of. 235-236.

487.491. 503. 504. 505: arcbiiecturc

330. 434: as Islamic scholars. 297;

of. 253. 357; arson and vandalism of.

Indian archiiecmre eif, 258, 259,

legacy to Ottoman Empire, 371,

630; astronomical alignment 0!. [79;

409-420: Indo-Timurids of, 405;

Mamluk defeat of. 59.695: Middle

m Brunei. 650: built by Ottoman sul

Islanuc lavs in. 693; Islanuc renewal

Eastern regimes of. 352. 353:as

lans, 347. 378. 379; in CcntralAsia.

in, 513-514. 516. 538: Muslim nation-

nomadic chieftains. 3:5: Satavid lega

442; in China, 4 4 3 , 4 4 5 . 4 4 7 . 4 5 4 ,

states f r o m . 603

cy f r o m . 370

391;

411, 422.423. 427, 528: in India, 696;

458,459-460,461.462.463.466;

muhaiirun, 9

monogamy, modernisi sanction of. 648

conversion 10 churches. 310. 339.

Muhammad; al-Tijani's visions f r o m .

Monophysitism. 3. 310. 3 i i ; i n O t t o m a n

144. 345;F.gyptian control o l . 703;

532: al Arafat. 85: caliphate and. 1 -61:

established by Muslim Student

death of. 8. 10, 66. 74. 76. 296, 304,

Association. 621 ; 111 Great Britain.

692; depictions of, 233-256. 325.

Empire. 385 moniiiheism. Muhammad's teaching o f

I N D F. X early believers o f 5-14; early life of, 6,691; as final Prophet o f Islam, 66,

Muradi famdy. as Naqshbandi scholars. 512

73c;

al Mutadid, as caliph, 29. 30 Mutahari. Murtada, as Ishraqi philoso-

j o ; , 615, 6 4 ; , 691: interaction with

Mnrad TV, as Ottoman sultan, 377

Christians, 306, 307; niedies'al

Murcia (Spain), Christian takeover o l . 51

Christian views of. 321-328; as mes-

murder. Islamic prohibition o f 93, 137

muiakallimum. 183

senger o f Allah. 77. 82. 88: mosque

Murjia, as Islamic separatists. 18

al Mmasim. Mamhik army of. 28

and l o r n b o f (Medina). 8/; as M u s l i m

murshids (devotees), Safavid followers

al-Mutaw-akkd;asAbbasidcabph, 28. 29,

role model. 73-74. 96; night |Oumey

as, 363,

pher, 296.680 mutah (temporary* marriage). 130

366

210-211. 278. 309. 331 ; opposition to

f o m Mecca, 265-266, public preach

musalla (idgab), 101

lug of. 8; religious visions of, 6-8, 90.

Musa (Moses), as Prophet. 55

108. 119, 121, 223; submission 10 God

Musaylima.as"falseprophet," i t

mutawatir, as t y p r o f h a d i t h . 120. 121

by, 96: successors of. 66. 71: traditions

musket firepower, o f Ottomans. 377

o f 65.67

Muta/ilism. 27. 89. 146, 2/9. 283, 290.

m u s l i m ; meaning o f w o r d , 67; as "sub-

M u h a m m a d . Eli|ah, as leader o f Nation o f Islam. 609.623.699 Muhammad. Ghulam, as Pakistani Muhammad.Mahathir, as Malaysian Islamist and leader. 567 M u h a m m a d . W a n i h Deen. as Elijah Muhammad's successor, 623 Muhainmadiyyah movement (Indonesia): as Islamic modernism. 56c; social welfare projects of. 97. 700 Muhammad's Youth, as Egypi underground group, 660 muhaqqaq scripi, use i n Quranic callig

Christians by, 309

301 : decline o l . 280-281 ; five princi-

mitter" to God, 77 Muslim Brotherhood organizations. 70, 91,462, 550, 557. 562. 617. 6 2 l , 627. 652. 655. 657, 669, 675, 679. 680.

leader. 594

Mutarihsra of. 280; treatment o f

701, 702, /03; changes faun, 666: creation of. 700; professionals i n . 653: as relief agency. 667. wurldview of. 653-634 Muslim Information Center (the Hague). 621 Muslim League. 581. 651 : fiqh academies of, [51

ples o f 278; founding of, 278 Muivtifkic|d( (al-Shalihi), 137 muwallads, as Spanish Islamic converts. 34 Al-MuHutto (The Straight Path), as w o r k o l fiqh. 127 Muadalilah, as pilgrims' camp, 85 Myriokephalon. Byzantine defeat al. 55 mysticism. 270, 284, 294 Scr also Sufis; Sufism,Timbuktu scholars o l . 484 TIK Mysticism of Harrtztifial Farueiri.Meaningjrvl hjwiaict of Happiness in Islam (Al-Attas).

Muslhn Organ 1 rat ions i n the Netherlands Foundation. 622

298

Muslim Pattani region, diversity i n . 558

H

muhdath, 283

Muslim ftihncal Action Committee, 637

al-Nabati. Abu al-Abhas. as early phar-

muhiasib (markei controller). 133. 134.

Muslims; African Americans as. 608.

raphy. 235

209-210; creation by Aurangzeb, 419

609; " b o r n again," 639; in Chinese

macologist, 211 Nadir Shah, as Islamic

reuewalist,

al M u i r r , as Faiimid caliph. 4 5 - 4 6

population. 433.435: contemporary

Mu i77 al-Dawlah Ser Ahmad ibn Buyeh

societies of. 684-690: conversions of.

Nadwatul Ulama (India), 580

Mujaddidi order, o f Naqshbandiyya.

624; cultural divide affecting,

al-Nahw i.Yahya, Galen's treatise of, 199

631-632; dissension w ith Hindus and

Nairobi, Islam i n , 505

Sikhs. 581, 583; diversity of, 638-639;

Napf. Shii renewalism i n . 522

early esiablisltmcnt of, 19; education

Al-Nujat (Avicenna). 275. 276

of. 622-625: lntcrfaith relations of.

Najbullah. communist regime o f

514. 526, 527 mujahidin, in Afghan civU war, 658, 659, 702 mujtahids, as Islamic |urists. n o , 112, 115. 117, 122, 140.

369

mukatalii, Ottoman lands is. 387 m u l k . as Ottoman private property, 387 mullahs. 111 Afghanistan, 659-660 MullaSadra. Sn al-Sliira/i. Sadr al-Oui Mulla Shah, i s Sufi saint, 418 Multan (Pakistan), early M u s l i m con quest of, 32 multiculturahsm; i n Canada, 610; in the West, 640 multinational corporations. i n Central Asia. 4 J I . 4 7 » muluk al-iawa. as Spanish era o f petty kings. 34 Munilaz Mahal.Taj Mahal constructed lor. 415 M u n i c h , Uighur separatists i n , 466 munkar (vice), in Islamic ethics. 97. 98 Muntaiiri.Ayalollali. as Ishraqi-Shiile, 296 Muqaddmw (Ibn Klialdun). 157 muqarnas (niches), as archirectural f o r m , 245-246. 262-265.157 al Mnqrani, Muhammad, opposition to French Algeria. 541 Mnrad I , as Ottoman sultan. 376

626-631. 637; migration of. 605-606,

5I4-S'S

Afghanistan of. 659

690; m i n o r i t y communities of, 612,

Najran. Christians i n . 4. 306. 307

690; under non-Islamic rule, 603;

Nanchuan Chinese Sufism, 456

perceived as "backward,*' 603; as

Napoleon; defeat of, 534; French occu-

peripheral U.S. group. 610; proselytizing by, 608-609,612, 615, 627: security concerns for. 628-631 : slaughter by Crusaders. 338. 339, serotypes o l .

pation o f Egypt under. 698 Naqshbandi, Baha ad D i n . Sufi order founded by, 432-453 Naqshbandi Sufi order, 455; i n A n n -

628;Weslern politics and. 635-638

Russian resistance. 698: i n China. 448.

Muslim states; concept of. S 5 Î - 5 4 4 . 652;

450. 441. 452-454. 546; Chistiya and.

development patterns i n . 566; emer-

4to; i n India, 514; Islamic renewal

gence of, 650-656; intcllccnial activi-

fused on, 412-513, 517-418; Khalidi

ty i n . 579; iniernational aid to. 467;

hranch o l . 527. 533; opposition to

number and description of. 549; post-

European expansion. 540. 541 ; origin

colonial, 561, 566; socialism i n . 567

of, 452-453, 520: Ottomans recruited

Muslim Student Association, 621 Muslim World League, foreign offices of. 621 MussalmanWakl (Muslim Endowments)

by. 526, persecution of, 367, 453 Narbonnc, Muslim defeat at. 314 al-Nasafi. as early theologian. 293 al-Nasai. Sunan of, 75

Validating Act of 1913, Ali [innah's

al-Nasir, as Iraqi caliph, 58

support of. 595-596

Nasir al D i n . militant movement of, 490

Mustafa I I . as Naqshhandi supporter. 512 al-Musiansir. Set Hakam II Mustapha M a h m o u d Society (Cairo), medical care provision by, 9 / Mustering intd Res mice lion (al-Shirazi), 295

Nasr. Sayyed Hossain, as modern Persian philosopher. 297 Nasrids. as rulers of Granada, 51 Nasser. Gamal Abdel, as Egy puan ruler, 562, 563, 567. Ç68, 573, 581, 590-

736

INDEX

8 t 4 - * S J . 65*. 657, 701 National Association of Arab Americans.

tğt

The Netherlands Islamic Society. 622

Uniicd States, 626 National Islamic f r o m . 70J nationalist movements, i n Islam. 650-636 National Liberation Front (Front de

Dialogue (Sweden), 627 norias (waier-whccls). in early Arab

618

Naıional Council o f Churches in thi-

Nordic Cenier lor Lnterrrhgious

Ness Mexico. Islamic CenterVillagc in,

countries, 197-198

Ness Persian, development of, 2 26 New Testament; as Allah's revealed book. 88; Quran compared to, 73, 89

Normandy, dukes o f as Cltrisrians. 335 Normans, i i N o r t h Africa; Almohads i n . 52, 694;

NewWafd Party (Egypt). 669

Almoravid dynasty i n , 694: Arab

New York City: Islamic Center of. 6ot;

medicine i n , 204-205. caliph con­

Muslim World 1 eague office in. 621

Liberation Nanonak-. FIJsiJ. i n

Ness Zealand. Muslims in, 604. 608

trol of. 12. 30, 32, 35. 329. 692; early

Algeria. 561. 573, 579, 590. 6 7 1 - 6 7 Î

Nczami, color motifs in poetry ol, 248

astronomers i n , 171, 175; Faiimid

N'Gazargamu. as Islamic Kanem capital.

dynasty i n , 4 5 . 4 8 . 4 9 . 694; French-

National Pact o f Lebanon. 700 National Salsation Party (Turkey). 702 Nation of Islam. 609. 640. 699: schools r u n by, 625 Natsir. Muhammad; on Islam and

educaied liberation leaders of, 578;

49 .494 2

680

Nietzsche, Friecirich, 649

f r o m , 602, M t i s l i m immigrants

Niger. Islatıl in, 36,475

nasvabs. as Indian rulers. 586

Nigeria; British control ol. 540-341.

Naymans. m early Iran. 352

colonial armies of. 591; dan Fodioas

al-Nazzam. Ibrahim, as Mutazılıtc the­

reformist in, 698; ethnic and religious

f r o m , 630; M u s l i m i me Hernials o l . 479; M u s l i m settlers i n , 604, nation alism i n , 631", Ottoman Empire i n , 572; qanat irrigation i n , 197;

dashes in, 559; Islam m. 482. 488,

Near East; Christians i n . 483; Islam i n , 60

519; Jamal al-Nasr of, 667; as modern

Necessary Being; o f al-Shirazi. 295: o f

Muslim state, 549: Muslim

of. 129

Kharwatiyyah order i n . 513; Maliki jurists i n , 95, 125: M u s l i m expansion

natural gas. Chinese imports of. 470

Negro Africans, mcdievai Muslim views

Ismail missionary w o r k i n , 4 4 - 4 5 .

\icomachnw Fthits (Arislollc). 272 Mcomachus of Gerasa. 276

Avicenna. 294

art i n , 222; Islamic culture i n . 60;

Nicolas of Cusa, view s on Islam. 323

democracy. 078; as Islamic modernist,

ologian. 278.279-280

Islamic architecture i n . 255; Islamic

N'golo Diara. as Djenne ruler. 487

Brotherhood of. 557. Muslim

Sanusiyyah order i n , 531; Sufism i n , S3«» N o r t h America. MuslUu migration to.

migrants from. 606: national identity

602

of. 555. 380; postcolonial tensions in.

Northwest H u i rebelhon. 435

N e h r u . Javvalıarlâl. C71

581; prominent non-Muslims in. 583:

Norway: Islamic mosques and centers

N c j d ; Muhammad's community i n , 10,

tribal cluefs in. 588

11; Saudi slate i n . (45 neocolonialism, effects o n Muslims, 6t 1 Neo-Destur (Constitution) party, o f Tunisia. 562. 588. (90 neo ijrihad. 117. 150 neomodemist changes, in Islam. 682. 683-684,685 Neoplatonism, 269-270. 281, 283. 283. 286, 368: Islamic. 274-277. 281-284. 290, 293, 295. 302. 303; rehitation of.

295

The Nde. Egypt's and Sudan's claim to.

Neopythagorcanism, Islamic, 274-277 ments, i n Islam, 680-681. 682, 683. 687 Neo-Sufism. rise of. 697 Nestorianism, 2-3. 312, 323. 531; i n China. 442; influence o n Uighurs, 464; spread of. 310 Nestorians; in Byzantine Empire. 60 2; as physicians, 200, 271: translations by, 3J3

Tlie Netherlands Str also Dutch; antiMuslim political parry o f 631; ethnic minority model of. 610; imperialism of, 551, 645; international trade o t Strr under n i n t h , Islamic associations i n . 616. 621, 62 2; Islamic mosques and centers i n , 618; Islamic schools i n . 624-625; Muslim gurstworkers in. 605. 607; Muslims i n . 604: Muslims in councils of. 636: support of mosque menemeni by, 617 The Netherlands Islamic Parliament. 622

of mosque movement hy. 617 Nubia; Arab defeat i n . 498; Edam i n .

559

498-499

Nimatullatu Sub order. Safavid persecu­

al-Numayn. Jafar. as Sudanese leader.

tion of. 367

656-657.679. 680. 701

nineteenth century. Islamic movements

Nur al-Din; hospital of. 245; m i n b a r o l .

in. 509-547

245- 339

Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. Muslims in. 443.461 Nishapur (Persia):declineof,

N u n hospital (Damascus). 208 Nur Jahan; Indian tomb constructed hy. 258; as (ahangir's w i f e . 411,415

59;as

Islamic cultural center. 39. 282. 357;

neorevisahst (fundamentalist) move­

160,

111,618; Mushms i n . 604. 607; support

"night journey." of Muhammad, 312

Nusretiye Mosque. 524

Saffarid conquest of. 38 Nucon adminisnation, Arab-Americans as iarget of, 636 Niya, as oasis city. 442 Nizam ai-Malik, statecraft handbook of.

O .41 Oununııl-Musudı (al-Binini), 168 oases: around Tak)imakan Desert. 441. 464. 465. Saudi Arabian claim to, 559 obligation; Islanuc collective ruling o n .

Nizam al Mulk, assassination of. 282 Nizam-i Jedid, as Ottoman "New Systeni," 511 Nizainiyah school. 282 Nizamiyah University (India), 580 Nizam of Hyderahad. 586; restoration ol Mughal tomb by. 418, 419 Noah's ark. Mughal trade depicted as, 421

121—122; shariah rulings o n . 134 observatories, in early Islam. 155. 168. 174. 181-182. 183. 184, 271 Oghuz tribesmen (Turkmen); migra­ tions of. 44. 351. 371; Sanjar's over­ throw by, 58 oil boycott, of Arab Israeli War, 605, 702 o i l invesanents. o f China. 433,466. 467. 468

Noer, Debar, as Islamic modernist, 68t

oil portraits. 2t6

nomads. Islamic leadership of, 361:

o i l reserves, o f Brunei. 630: o f Iran. 661;

Middle Eastern invasion of, 331. 352.

o f Kuwait. 556. 574. 646; o f Libya.

353. 361; tents used by. 22o-22t

657; o f Muslim stales. 572, 574. 666;

nomocentnt perspective, of Hadiih of Gabriel. 76. 90 Non-Abgned Movement, in postcolonial Muslim states, 566

in Persian Gulf. 557. 572. 573. 606. 64J, 645; role in Arah economic dcvelpmerii, (¡#17, o f Saudi Arabia. 159- 702

INDEX Old Persian, in Trilingual inscription. 222 Oman; Buy i d com rol of. 4;. Christianity i n . 4; development of, 566-567;

737

ters of. 388-390. tdama influence i n .

tion policy i n , 572: shariah imple-

697; world conquests of. 371-374

mentation i n . 152, 686-687, VW

Oiioman-Habsburg wars. 372.374

social developments i n , 578; state

Ouomans.asari patrons, 383; elite class

control o f Islamic pubUc life in, 568;

Hanbah school i n , 114; Islamic con-

of. 383, fierce reputation of, 375:

women and minorities i n , 679;

rrol o l , 10, i l , 37; Kharijitc refugees

Hanifi school adoption by. 113; sue

women modernists i n , 68:; women's

f r o m . 35;.Sasanianpn>reciorate i n , j ;

cess at, ¡73

organizations i n , 689, women's rights

as rradp center, 32

Ot toman Turkish language, development

Omanis, in East Africa. 505. 506. 507, 521.522

of, 40 Outremer, as name for Crusader con-

Omar, Mullah, as leader of Afghan Taliban. 660 Omnia Optra Amiu'du Cum Commmtanis

quests, 339

3"6

Ozen o i l held (Kazahstanj. Chinese

Palestine; British control of, 557;

riglus lo. 433

Byzantine loss o£ 311; caliph offen-

"Operanon Badr," as second Arab-Israeli war. 702

Pakistan Nan o nal Alliance. 658 Palermo (Sicily), Muslim takeover of,

Oxford University. 578

4irrruis Codiuhfiisis, 287

i n , 687 Pakistanis, i n Great Britain. 605. 606

sives against. 12.76; Christian rule i n . P

340; early Christian visitors to,

ophthalmology, i n early Islam. 205

Padishah, as Ottoman title. 383

314

Opinions of the Inhabitants of tor Virtuous City

Padri movement; jihad of. 520; as

of. 43; Jewish senlement of, 585;

(al- Farahi). 274 optics; Alhazan's thesaurus o n . 190, early Arab ss-orfc o n , 191 -193 oral traditions, o f Islamic Africa. 490. 49'

renewalist ellurt. 533-534; in

Jordan's claim io, 559; Muslim

Sumatra. 698

Brotherhood of, 557, 702; Muslim

Padri War of 1821-1838, 534

migrants f r o m , 607. 608; Muslim

Pages o f Abraham, as Allah's revealed

refugees f r o m . 605. 618; Muslim victims i n . 630; relief agencies i n . 668;

book. 85

Organization of Arab Students. 636

Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza. Shah o f Iran.

Organization o f Islamic Conference

599, 661, 700. Stc dsn Pahlavi Iran,

(OIC). 141, 553, 354. 603,701

discontentment w i t h . 663. 699. 700,

Oigonon (Arisiode). 271. 272. 275

702;overthrow of. 658; secularization

"Oriental w i s d o m . " o f Asiceiuia. 293

policy of. 572. 651. 661

Orient trade, early rivalry for. 3 - 4 O r o m o people, o f early Ethiopia. 502, S°7 Orontes River, water-wheels o n . 197 orthopraxy, as f o r m o f Islam. 89. 90 Osh (Kyrgyzsian). new transportation

336; intifada i n . 703; Jarrahids

f^ahlavi Iran; development of. 567,

Shalii school i n . 114: tribesmen i u control of, 584 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). early Christian leaders of. 583 Pamirs. 441, 442.452

568,

Pan A m flight 103, b o m b i n g of. 6I9

700, economic development i n . 573:

Paiupat. Battle o f (1526), 696

nation hood - u m i n a h d i s h a r m o n y i n .

pan-Islamic ideology, 547, 654, 699. 701

555. 561; patronage i n . 599;White

Pannonia. as Inner Asia province, 439

Revoluuon o f 661

Panthay Hui Muslim rebellion. 455. 699

Pakistan. 466; Civil war of, 655. 701;

paper making, i n early Islam. 198

colonial armies of, 592. as colonial

Paraniesvara, as Islam convert, 425

slate replica. 591. 594. creation of.

Parcham (Elag) Parly (Afghanistan), 579

Cliristians as. 602, Muslims depicted

560, 586, 650, 651, 700; divorce law

Paris. Algerian massacre i n , 631; bomb

as. 640

i n . n8;economicdevclopmenl i n ,

links to. 471 The "other"; Muslim depiction of

Ottoman Empire. 365,422. 695; Arab

573; ethnic and religious clashes i n ,

territories of. 566; architecture of,

559; ethnic politics i n . 585; exports

explosions i n . 629; liberation by Muslim mercenaries. 604 Park. Miingo. o n Segou Muslims.

347. 384; art i n . 239, 547; astronomy

of. 572; fiqh and shariah academies

i n . 155; British trade treaty w i t h . 697;

i n . 151; Hanafi school i n . 114; Iqbal

Parsis. in India, 583

Christian muiorities i n . 581-582;

ideology for. 699; Islamic antitolo-

"Party uf A l i . " 15. 18

colonialism i n . 598; crisis and change

nialism i n , 550; Islamic law i n . 150,

Pasai (Samudra). Islam i n . 424. 425.426

682; Islamic modernism i n . 565, 656,

Pase (Sumatra), Ibn Battuiah's stay i n .

i n , 390-393; cultural achievements of, 347-348; cultural precursors of, 358; decline of, 115, 378. 390. 391-393. 510. Ç27, 552, 588. 651. 700; division of. 557. 651. 700; economy of. 386-390; growth of, 142, 347. 602. 695: Islamic law i n . 693; Islamic reform i n . 511-313. 515. 516. 517. 525, 525-526. 4 i 2 , 537-538, 700: judicial system of. 380-381; leadership concepts of, 382 -386. 390-391; Mai ldris Alawma's relations w i t h . 492; m i l i larics of, 593; Muslim states f r o m , 603: non-Muslims i n , 3 8 5 - 3 8 6 ; o r i ginsof. 371—375; reform fflnrts of. 510-511: renewal of, 393; slave system

658, 668. 679. 681. 682. Islamic

487-488

421

Movement i n . 300: Islamic Party of.

pashas. 39j;oITimhukni,48s,

557; Islamic philosophy i n , 297; as

Pashuuis. i n Afghanistan. 659

Islamic Republic, 701; Islamism i n .

Passarovit7. Treaty of. 511

562, 568, 570. 668; islamization of,

Pate (Kenya). Muslim iradeli of, 504.

702; Jamaat-i Islami of, 91, 595. 617.

486

504

618. 6 I I . 652,657.660, 667, 669.

paternity. Quranic rules o n , 120

679, 700. judiciary i n . 595. 596;

Paihans. i n Afghanistan. 659

Karakuram Highway 10. 434.

patronage, by colonial powers. 597-598

landowning class i n . 587. 590. m i l i -

Pazyryk (Siberia). early carpets from.

tary politicians i n . 668. 669: as m o d -

246

ern Muslim state. 549; Muslim

Peacock Throne, 5'5

conquesi of. 21; Muslim migrants

peasant lands, in Ottoman Empire. 387.

f r o m . 607. 608, 619; Muslim popula-

39'-392

of. 5/6-377, 391; societal structures

tion of, 582; national identity of. 560;

Penang. as port city, 573

of. 348-330; stale apparatus of,

nation h o o d - u m n u h harmony i n .

peony m o t i f in Chinese an. 239

375-382; SuSsmin. 526; sultans

555; origin o f name. 578; patronage

People o f t h e Book; Christian lolerance

regarded as caliphs i n . 354; trade cen-

i n . 59l"-599: plurahsm i n . 690. post-

of. 342. 344. Muslim tolerance of.

colomal tensions i n , 581: seculariza-

319, 344; as Quranic name for

738

INDEX reforms on, 150

ratists i n . 472

Christians ami Jews, 306, 307 People's Republie o f China. Sec oko China; etluiic problems of, 463; Muslims i n , 435,461

philosophy; Greek. See Greek philosophy; Islamic

Set Islamic philosophy

Philosnphy of Ibn Rushd ( A n t t m ) ,

porcelains, as Chinese export ware for

Phoenician religion. 269

Pen palet icism. in Muslim Spain.

physics, in Greek pftilosophy, 277

of. Ottoman patronage. 383

Mushms. 438.439 pork consumption. Islamic" p r o h i b i t i o n

Physics (Aristotle), 284

Persia; Afsharids i n . 697; arts and culture 384;

Pickens. Claude, o n Chinese Sufi orders,

liul an Muslims viewed as invaders

pietra dura, as type o f inlay. 258. 259 pdgrimages; to Acheh tombs. 423: to

293-296; Islamic culture development

Bukhara, by Chinese Muslims, 454; to

i n . 39-40. 33. 60. 337; legacy t o

Holy Land, by Christians. 334

Ottoman Empire. 371 ; Ottoman rival-

339; toKarbala, 368; to Mecca, 10, 31,

255;

of, 93. 94. 5=5 pornography. Muslim abhorrence of, 612

449.457

f r o m . 58] ; Ishraqi movement i n ,

ry w i t h , 327; painting i n , 231,

300 poor tax, required by Islam, 75, 82. 102

298

Pépin, defeat o f Muslims by. 314 184-289. 293,296

polytheism. Islamic rejection of, 280,

336,

Porphyry ofTyre; as Neoplatoiiisi. 270, 271; translations o f 272 [sorts, importance i n Muslim stales. 572-573 Portugal; chronicles o f Islamic Africa of,

37.49. 63,75, 84, 102. 344; hy

489; Eas 1 African conquests by. 521;

Qajar rulers of, 698: rivalry w i t h

African Muslims, 468. 482.484. 492.

expulsion from Mozambique. 505;

Roman Empire. 1 ; Safavid dynasty of,

499. 506; by Chinese Muslims, 454;

Iberian rule by. 320; imperialism of,

696; Seljuk rule of, 694; Silk Road

by Indian Muslims, 528; Islamic

551, 645: Islamic Christian rivalry i n ,

through, 440; Zand rule of. 698

renewal by. 518-519. 528; Quranic

51; Islam i n , 602; loss o f EasiAfrican

Persian; Arabic translations into, 357;

rules o n , 120; Safavid deemphasis of,

lands by. 521-522; Mclaka conquest

cultural influence of, 357, 338; literary-

367, 368; shariah ruling o n . 109:

by. 425.426; Muslims i n . 604; spice

works i n . 349, 350. role i n Islamic

white garments w o r n for, 259; 10 Sufi

conquest of North India, 397; role in

shrines, 361 ; to Yemen, by Chinese

South Asian Islam, 396; scientific works i n , 158. 139 Persianate influence, in South Asia. Ï 9 6 - Ï 9 7 . 3 9 9 . 4 0 O . 420 Persianate Turks, conquesr o f North India by. 397 Persian Gull; commercial activity i n , 32; oil exports f r o m , 372, 373, 643. 637; oil reserves i n . 437; social develop-

trade of, 374. 389 postcolonial state, institutional foundations of. 585-591

Muslims, 454 Pillars o f Islam, 77-87, 102

ftstaior Arwlyrirs (Aristode). 271

pirates, early Muslims as. 316

pottery, as Islamic art f o r m , 217. 220,

Pir Budak. Nezami manuscript of. 249 Pires.Tomre. Asian travelogue of, 422,

96

425 Pkmnary Hypoiheit (Ptolemy). 1163 planets; ancient studies o n , 161,

225-226, 250, 260. 264 practice. Islamic importance of, 88, 89,

164;

Ptolemy's models for, 172

pragmatism, sliariah-orienied policy of. 140-144 prayer beads, as hajj souvenir. 499

ments i n , 378; wealthy Arabs f r o m .

Plasscy. Battle o f 513

pray er carpel, 67

S°£

Plato, 269. 270, 273-274. 277. 291, 294;

prayers; ethical interpretation of, 102;

Arabic translations of. 272, 334;

fiqh ridings o n . n o ; movements i n ,

of, 532: Islamic political activism m,

Islamic commentaries o n , 287; vision

78-79; Quranic rules o n . 120,

673; Khomeini's criUcism of, 663;

o f the intellect of. 65

147: required by Islam, 66, 75, 77—78,

Persian Gulf emirates; decoloniahzation

shariah studies i n . 702: rribal rulers in. 587-388 Persian Gulf War. 703 Persian lady, as Ishraqi phdosopher, 296 Persian m i n i attires. 215

Ploiinus. 279; Arabic translations of. 272; as founder o f Neoplatonism, 269-270.274.277 pluralism; in Islam, 640; in the West. 640

Persians, as early astronomers, 162

Parties (Aristode). 271. 275

personal injury. Maliki rulings o n , 127

poetry; in Arabic-Islamic tullure, 31. 34:

personal reasoning, as Islamic law' p r i n ciple, 149-150 personal status. Islamic law on, 150 Peter [Melchuc bishopj. Christian w r i t ings of, 332 Peier the Hermit o f Amiens, role i n Crusades, 337 Peter the Venerable, writings on Islam, 322-323, 334. 694 phalanx lactlcs, o f Ottomans. 377 Phanariot Istanbul Greek merchants, as Ottoman elite, 385 pharmacolog), in early Islam, 204-205, 208, 109, 210-211 Philby. Harry St. John, as Islanuc convert, S&9 PhUipll (of Spain),Ottoman treaty w i t h . 374 Philippines; diversity i n , 558; M o r o freed o m fighters i n . 579; Muslim sepa-

in China, 217 Poitiers (France); Muslim expansion stopped at. 602: Muslim takeover of. 314 Poland; Ottoman trade w i t h , 38g;Tatar expansion into, 604 police institutions, o f postcolonial states. 592-599

94. 108, 134. 148. 242.427,433,445, 479, 615; ritual differences i n . 89; said in direction o f Mecca, 179; as second pillar o f Islam, 77; shariah rulings o n , 134: time limits of, 180 precious stones, use i n Islamic art. 221 primary schools, for U.S. Muslims. 622 Prince of Wales, Indian ceremony lor. 644 The Principles of Stotr iind Govrrnmeni in Ijlctrn (Atari), 677 Prior Andy tits (Anslode), 271, 272 prisoners, medical care of. 208 privatization, o f M u s l i m economy, 574 Proclus til Athens, as Neoplatonist. 270

Pofisario movement, in Morocco, 557

Prolcgomenii (Ihn Khaldurt). 293

political regimes, i n early Middle East,

properly, as shariah value. 147

349. 358 politics: i n Muslim w o r l d . 553; Western Mushms and, 635-638 Politics (Aristotle). 272. 286-287 poll tax; required o f Latin K i n g d o m

137,

"prophethooet," i n Islamic philosophy, 173 Prophet Muhammad. See Muhammad Prophets; consciousness o f truth of. 66; ride inheritance by, 130

MusUms, 341 ; required o f People o f

proportioned script, o f Arabic, 241

the Book, 307, 308, 312

proselyli/ing. hy Muslims. 6o8-fiog,

polygamy; colonial criticism of. 564; modernist nonsuppon of. 647, 686 polygyny; Islamic law o n . 117, 129; law

612, 615, 626. 627 prosneusis point, in planetary m o t i o n , '73

INDFX

739

prostration, during Muslim prayers. 80

Ai-Qumim fi nl Tibb (Ibn Sina). 204. 204

Protestant Church: i n America, 610:

knowledge o f God in. 63. 64; Lann

al-Qaradawi.Yusuf; on f i q h . i 4 2 ; o p i n

translation of. 323, 334. 694; legal r u l

Islamic schools of, 6(4; missionaries

i o n on female air oavel of. 118-119

uigs of, m ; literary studies ol] 31;

Qara-Khanids; as nomadic chieftains.

of, 603 Psalms. Quranic mention of, 506 Psalms o f David, as Allah's revealed book, 88

logorenuic perspective of. 76; m o d -

355; Samanid defeat by, 40;

ernist iiuerprelations of, 648. 684.

Transoxania control by, 351, 357

685; as Muhammad's revelations, 6 - 7 ,

Qaramanids, Anatolian rule of, 695

73, 80; as Saudi Arabian conslitution,

Ptolemy; AuiuyrM 1 if. 5rt Almuyrsi. as Greek Qaiaqoyunlu rulers, o f Azerbaijan and asoonomcr. 162-164, •6f '66, 167. >

Iran. 248. 255

168. 170-176, 190, 192; influence on

Qaravsiyyin. mosque school of. 530

Arab science. 212. 273

Qardawi.Yiisuf. as contemporary ulama,

public interesl, legal rulings o n , 119.

ism and. 300; solidarity ruling of. 146; as source of shartal 1. 119-124, l

pumps, Arab mvention of, 194 Punch, 553

Timbuktu schools of, 484. transla-

of, 351

tions of. 323, 334, 694; use in Islamic prayers. 80. 81; vices forbidden hy, 93:

Qarniatis; as Faiimid enc-mies. 46; as

walnut box for, 379; o n wooden

Ismailis. 44. 45

Punjab: colonial benefits to, 578, economy of. (74; Mughal leaders of. 406. 409; patronage i n . 599

tablets. 484

Qasr Sturin.Treaty of. 697 Qassam Brigade, suicide bombings of.

Quraysh tribe, Muhammad as member of, 6.8, 10. 15

703

Punjabis, ui Brinsh colonial armies, 584

qat, Salihiyyali opposition to. 544

purdah, traditional pattern of. 689

Qatar: claim t o o i l fields. 449: Hanbali

PtrrGcwl (Proclns o f Athens). 270 Pure [and Buddhism, origin o l . 442 "pure riglu o f C o d , " Islamic religious 135

purgative use, in early Greek medicine.

school i n . 114; Islamic bank i n , 145

al-Qusliji.Ala al-Din. as early astronomer. 171 Qutb, Sayyid; execution of, 701; as Islamic fundamentalist. 70. 299. 300.

Qayrawan (Tunisia); bedouin sacking of. 48; Greal Mosque at. 14; Islamic r o n -

565, 654. 675, 676. 681

quesi and control of, 13, 21. 31, 35,

Qutb Minar, as ntinaret. 400. 401

36. 49; Sunnis i n . 45

Quwwai al-Islam mosque (Delhi), 228,

Qazvin, rise to prominence, 49

201 P> renées, Muslim incursions into, 21. Pythagoras, 276. 294 Pythagoreanism, 269 treatise, 188

i 9 0 ; a s d i r e c r i o n o l Mecca. 78. 169,

R

177. 179

Rabliani. Rurhannddin. as leader o f

Qadariyyas, 451.452 Qing dynasty; Chinese Islam at end o l , 4 5 / , 464; relations w i t h Centra] Asia.

Q

440: Sufi reforms during, 449, 453.

Qabusbin Washmgir. grave of. 41

455. 4 i 6 . 521

qada. 88

Qinghai; Huasi Chinese Sufis i n , 454;

qadar. 71. 88. 277

Khuffiya Sufism i n . 454; Mushms i n .

Qadaris, I77-278

443

Qaddafi. Muammar. as 1 ibyan leader. 589. 656-647, 668, 680, 701. 702

Q o m , Shiism i n . 366. 368 quadranis, Muslim design of, 181

qadi-askars. of Ottoman judiciary, 380

Ouuilriporitus (Prolemy), 272

al-Qadir. Abd; ami-imperialist move-

Quaraysh tribe, perseculion of Muslims

ment of, 540; as leader o f Qadiriyya.

by, 306 Quebecois. separatism of. 610

54".699 qadi (religious pidgej, 371. 480.484.

Quetta Staff Col I el e (Pakistan). 378 quietisi w i n g . o f Shiites. 44

485.492.502 Qadiriyyah Sub order. 13. 417. 519. 4J5. 440, 441,inCaucusus. ( 4 0 - 5 4 1 ; « !

399.400.401.695

q i N a . determination of. 179-180. 181.

Qi Jingyi. as founder of Clunesc

Py thagorean theorem, in al K h w a r i / m i

35. 136; teacfung of, 142; texts of, use

in Islamic architecture, 224, 227—230:

680 Qarluq people, Qara Khanid leadership

1*5. 144. i 4 Ç - ' 4 & The Pulpit u! Islam | Muslim journal |, 654

obligations as, 134.

642; schools for sniily of. 619; seculai

Q u m (Iran), as theological center. 302 Quran. 12. 15. 19. 40. 325, 330. 350.

Jamaat i Islaini. 649 Race RelauonsAci o f 1976 (Greai Britain), 611 racism:against arabs, 637; Muslim abhorence of. 612; rise i n , 610 radicalism. Islamic. 301 Rafsanjmi. Ayatullah Ali Akbar 1 lashemi. as presidcni o f Iran. 574, 703 Rahman. Fazlur. as Islamic modernist, 565.690 al-Rahman, Shaykh Ulnar Abd. role i n WorldTradc Center bombing, 703 Rahrnaniyyah. 111 Algerian resistance. Hi al Rahman Khan, Amir Abd. as Kabul ruler, 587 al-Rahman Singkch. Abd. Shattariyyab movement of. 520 rainbows, early Arab studies o n . 193

China. 449. 4 5 0 . 4 5 1 . 4 5 - 4 5 Ï . 456;

681. 682; in African Arabic script. 495.

mosques of. 462: numbers of, 462;

Aurangzeb s copies of, 418; calligraph-

opposition 10 French expansion of,

ic manuscripts of. 215. 2i8. 232,

Ra|asdnn. Mughal control of, 409 Ramadan observance, 234- 235. 427; by

1

Raj: in colonial British India. 561, 581. 586-587: M u s l i m tensions w i t h , 477

541, 699: in Somali uprising, 444; in

233-234. 239.403; o f Chinese

Southeast Asia. 520: in uprising

Muslims. 449. Christians described

African Muslims, 479,481.482; lunar

against Dutch, 543

i n . 306-307; collection and final for-

calendar and. 178, prayers al end o l .

al Qadisiyah. Battle of. 12

mal of. 692; copying of. 64. 403;

94. 101. 582. 62o: required by Islam.

Qaitbay. Sultan, 268

description o l . 118. 119-120; figural

75- *3-84. 92-93. '02. 147. 615:

Qajar. parronage i n . 599

representation and. 230: as God's

shariah rulings o n . 134

Qa]ars; defeat of Salavids by. 370; as

book. 73. 88. 282. 284; importance of

Rang Mahal ( A i m e d Palace), as Shah

529, 539. 69R; as Islamic reformers.

w r i t i n g i n . 223; interpretations of, 27. 136—140; Islamic law i n , 90, 92;

al Raniri, N u r al Din, as Malaysian the-

5Ï8

Islamic philosophy and. 273. 277,

Iranian leaders, 314, 515, 525, 526.

qanats, as early irrigation systems, 196. '97

[ehan patace, 259 ologian, 298

280. 288, 290, 297, 301-303. lews

Raphael, 287

and Clirisiians mentioned i n , 306;

Rashidal D i n ; as Ilkhanid vizier, 40;

740

INDEX

Mongol history by. 255-236, 330 Rasfiid Rida. Muhammad, as Islamic Rashli, Say yid K a / i m . i n Shaykbiy yah movement. 529 Rasiakhiz (Resurrecrinn party. Iran), 590 Rather, Dan, ethnic slurs of. 637 lationnation. in i h e Q u r a n , 139

education, 699; imperial conquests of. S32. 533. 5Si • 5SÎ- 645. 697: Islamic

275

modernism in, 347; jihad opposition

Rhodes. Islamic takeover of. 314 Rihat. at Monastir (Tunisia). 35

10, 530; Muslim migrants f r o m . 607;

Richard I . K i n g o f b n g l a n d d . 327

Orthodox protecnon by, 582;

Richtholen. Ferdinand von. 438,440

Oitoman opposition by, 374. 392; Silk

Ricoldo da Momecroce, views o n Islam.

Road 10, 441; uade w i t h Central Asia. 433.435,436.Xinjiang uade w i d i .

m

ranonahsm. rise of. 345 Rationalisis. fiqh legal thought of.

112.

128

Ridda. Rashid. as Islamic mtsdermsi. 699 Kiddaw-ars, 11

Rayy. Buyid control of, 42. 168; Jews i n . 2: as scientific cenicr. 168, 181.

educanon i n . combined w i t h M u s l i m

Reza. as Safavid court painter, 370 Rhetoric (.Aj-istode), 271.

jurist, 117

114.

revivalism Soe renewal and revivalism

191.

202 al-Ran. Abu Bakr. as early physicianphilosopher. 198. 201-203. 273-274. 281 al-Ra/i. Fakhr al-Din. as early theolo­ gian. 293.297. 302 razaas, in Medina. 307

Rusiamids, ufTahcrt, 36,45

Riegl. Alois, o n arahesquc, 238 "rightly guided" caliphs, 112.

468 Russians, in Central Asia. 471

149.692

Risnkih. as Lslamic law treatise. 90.

128

Risolat Huyy ibnlaq/an (ihnTufayl).

S Saadian dynasty, o f Morocco. 696 Saadi [Persian p o c i j . 103

285-286 Risale-i N u r movement. 619

Sab. Hasan, as Islamic seculanst. 301

ritual pollution, bath required for, 78

al Sabah. Ahmadal-Jabir. 646

riiual practice. Musbm adherence to.

al-Sabah clan, as rulers o f Kuwait, 556, 673

614-615.632

Rccojniiinns (St. Clement), 271

Riyadh, asWahhabi-Saudi capital, 517

Sahlans. as People ol the Book. 307

Recoiiquista. in i i t h century Spain. 35.

Robert of Chester, algebra w o r k translat­

Sabian rabies, 166

50, 602 Ratiiui ruction of Rdijtious Thought in Idom (Iqbal). 297 Red Fort, 417; as Mughal architecture. 219 Peel Guards (China), mosque destruc­ tion hy, 461 Refali Parry, olTurkey, 562. 568. 704 Reformation. 323 reformist legislation. 127 Kmitjrjonof the Christians (al-Kindi), 331 re-lslamization. as contemporary move­ ment. 684 religion. Muhammad o n . 148 religion of the H u i ( H u i jiao), o f Cuinese Muslims, 444

Sabra, massacres i n . 702

ed by. 187 Robert of Ketton, Quran translation by. Roberts College (Turkey). 580 rock crysial; carvings made of. 46. 260: use i n Islamic art. 221 Roger I I , King of Sicily, 183,

183

702; as Egyptian leader. 574. 660,669,680

religious experiences, role i n Islam. 69 toward. 381-583 religious obligations, shariah rulings o n . '34

al-Sadiq, Jafar, as early Shii jurist, 122.

32£ Mehmed IT as head of. 342; Ottoman heirs to. 371. 374. 385; rivalry w i t h frrsia.

1; trade w i t h Cluna. 437

Romania; Islamic converts i n , 602, Ottoman conquest of. 374. 377.697;

Romanian church, in Ottoman Empire, Rome; apostolic sect of. 309. medieval Muslim views of. 329

6+4-646.668; four types of. 682; i n

RuleofFourQiiantiiies, 191

Iran. 661. in the Maghreb, 4 9 - 3 3 .

Rumfa. Muhammad, as M u s l i m Kano

Warraq). 331

431.

509,315, 525. 695, 696; cultural achievemenis of. 347-348, 383. 384, 516,

696. 697; o f Iran. 180, 248. 295,663, 696; Islam i n . 370-371. 514-515. 516;

362. 363-366; tribal resistance i n .

rubber, as Muslim states export, 572

"rule by the jurist," o f Khomeini. 664

Kepi) to rheThret Setts of the Christians (al-

Safavid Empire. 334. 374. 376. 405.

Muslim stales from. 603; rise of. 351.

597

r u k u , 80. 81

688-689

reformist.

660-661. 680, 702

Rowlcit Act o f 1919.

renewal and reform in Islam, 509-347,

RcntHol of Arabic Though! ( M a h m u d ) . 298

71. 529. 702; as Lebanese

Rousseau. Jean-Jacques. 479

renaissance (mahda), Islamic. 684

530-537; women's status and.

366-367 ai-Sadr. Musa; "hidden i m a m " status of ,

legacy to modern Iran. 370-371;

Rossabi. Morris, 465

Rudaki, as Persian poet. 40

eries. 516-522; in transition.

sadr. as ulama-shih intermediary.

697; decline of. 370. 514, 515.

385

Ren;issance. Islamic influence o n , 602

486; on M u s l i m frontiers and periph­

657.

Roman Empire; Inner Asia and. 439.

control of. 392, 698

religious minorities, colonial policy

Sadat, Anwar, assassination of, 660, 666.

Roman de Mahomet (Alexandre dn Poni).

Ottoman trade w i t h . 389; Russian

Muslims, 623

pher. 296

Roman Catiioficism Sir Catholic Church

religious belief. Quranic notion of. 67 J4«

Sabzevan. Haji H j d l . as Ishraqi philoso­ sacrificial feast, ai end o f Ramadan, 479

religious tonununines, in Middle Fast. religious day schools. f o r V * s t e m

al-Sabri. Ahud-Abbas. as Sufi social crit­ ic. 98. iciO-102, 104

J23. JJ4. 694

ruler, 492, 496 al-Rumi, Jalal ad-Din. as Turkish mystic. 453 Rum Seljuks. 55. 59. 22B; as ancestors o f Ottoman Empire. 352

378; nirhans worn i n . 220 SafTarids; Nıshapı.r conquest by. 38; as Sistan rules, 693 Sahara; Islam i n , 475. trade routes across. 475- 476.478.480. 481.488. 492. 49S The Sahrl. Islam in, 476.478 Sahih al-Bulthuri. 66 Sahih Muslim. 74-7;. 84, 88 Said. Fdward, 438 Saifawa dynasty, in Kanem, 492.496

Rushdi. Salman, fatwa against. 629

St. Joseph's College (Lebanon), 579

Russia. Seealso Soviet U n i o n ; Afghanistan

Saint Cyr. 578

Republican Party. Arab Americans i n . 638

as buffer to. 557. Chrchnyan war

Kcpubic (Plato). 272. 287

against. 550, 551. Chinese military

influence of, 404 409; M u s l i m vener­

Repihlikaner (Germany), as anti-

agreement w i t h , 471. 546: control o f

ation of, 444. 448. 449, 452, 455,

Crimea and Romania by. 392. 698.

456.459.462,494

Miislim political parry. 631

saints, Ac hell incili» of. 425; early Indian

ix n i x Saladin; a* Crusader's opponent, 327, J28, 339; Egyptian control hy, 48, 57. 695; Jerusalem conqucsi by, 24J, 695 Salafiyyah movcmeul, as modern

Sanskrit, astronomy works in. 168

699

628-631

founder of Sanusiyy all tariqali. 698, 701:

tions M fables, 326, 327-328; as name for Muslims. 321, 322. 323. 326

98 salam. 82

Saragossa. as Islamic city scale. 54

Salars; conversion to Islam. 4 5 3 , 4 Ç 4 ,

Sarah, as Ibrahim's wife. 86

Turkic-Altaic language of, 443 sales, Quranic rules on. 120

al-Sarakhsi, Shams al Adin, hqh exposi­ tion of. 110

511,

523, 525. 698 Selimiye, as Otioinan complex. 376 Selimiye Mosque, as Islamic archiiecSeljukTurks; Buyid ousting by. 43. 48. 55. as caliph jtrotectors, 30, 182, con­ quest of Abhasid Empire hy. 35i;eon-

Saliba, Jamil, as Islamic modernist. 298

Sartre. Jean-Paul. 579

Salih, as Aralı prophet. 88

Sasanian Empire, 1—3, 31. 248; astrono­

Salihiyyah order: clash with

Selim III. Sultan, Islamic reforms of,

mre, 215. 696

Sarajevo, as Ottoman trade center. 389

salai. as Islamic prayers, 77. 78.429

Sclim, Sultan; conquest of Egypt by. 499. mosque built for, 215. 347. 696

Saracens; Christian view s of. 336; depic­

salah (social virtue), in Islam ethics, 97,

TıKSducüonofYusul [Bihzad paiming], 240 Segoti (Mali), Islam in. 486.487

Sanusiyyah order; of Ibn Idris. 531. in Libya, 550, 698

Salah al-Din Ay yv b. SaSaladin

T

security concerns, for Western Muslims.

al-Samisi. Muhammad Ali ibn, as 7D0

Muslim reform, 299,445,454, 617.

74

quest of Armenia by, 5 2; decline of, 352; in early Iran. 367. Inner Asia and,

my in. i62;Byzanunrwarswuh. 3.4.

439; institutions of, 47- 333. 379:

Uwaysiyyah. 544-545; origin and

¡ 1 2 ; caliph raids against. 11; decora­

invasions by. 371; as Iraqi rulers, 44,

principles of. 544-545

tive writing m. 223;Gundishapur

55. 353. 694; Islamic conversion of.

Salim. Prime. Sccjahangir

academy of. 270. Islamic desmieiion

362; Jerusalem takeover by. 337; lega­

Salim, Shaykh: Akbar's visit to, 407. 408;

of. 13, 312; linguistic conversion of,

cy 10 Ottoman Empire, 371.

158-159: Zoroastrianism in, 2

migration inio Mashriq. 54-55;

lomb of. 409.411 Salleh. Khalijah Mohd, as female mod emist, 681 Salonica, Ottoman acceptance of Jews

Sa 1 unicVerses (Rtishdi). latwa on, 629

Mongol defeat ol. 59; as nomadic:

Saturn; Muslim studies on. 182:

chieftains. 355; as Persian rulers. 694:

Ptolemy's model for, 172,

of Rum. 55. 352

173

Saudi Arabia. 651.654; claim to oil

from, j86

391;

Scmirechye, Chaghatayids in. 695

salt. African sources ol. 495

fields. 559; extremist activities in, 665;

Semitic culture. Sasanian espousal of. ı

Samanids; as cultural patrons. 40, 357;

Tiqh Academy in, 151; founding of.

Senegal; Islam In. 476, 491; jihad sıaıe in. 698. 699; Muslim Brotherhood of.

defeat of, 40, as Iranian governors. 39.

700: Hanbali school in. 114. 693:

54. 56. 35'. 357- 398-J99- ^93

interest in Central Asia. 433; Islamism

337; Muslim mercenaries from. 604;

in. 562: as modern Muslim slate. 549.

Muslim migrants f rom. 607; promi

Samaritans, as People of the Book, j o / Samarqand, early Cluncsc missions to. 440; Islamic conquest of. 21; as Islamic cultural renter. 39. 60.

157.

520. 421; Shaybanid rule of. 696; on Silk Road, 440; asTimurid capital. 352. 357 Samarra; Ahbasid overthrow in. 37; Islamic an in. 231-232. 237. 238, 243, 260, 261; as Islamic capital, 28. 693 al-Samawal al-Maghribi. ibn Abbas, as early mathematician, 187 Saminids. architecture of. 244 al-Samman. Abd al-Karim. as Islamic revivalist, 532 al-Samman. Muhammad ihn Abd alKarim. Islamic renewal order of. 513 Sammaniy yaii order. Islamic renewal in. 5'3 SamoryTure, Guiuean jihad of. 542, 543 Samudra. Islam in, 389.424-425.426. 427-428, 695 Sanaa (Yemen): Great Mosque at, 37; Islamic control of. 38

652; nationhood ummah harmony in, 555; offices of Muslim World League of. 621. parajudicial groups in,

states in, 419. 442; Muslim traders

93; philosophy proscription in. 303;

in, 488; Qadiriyyah movement in,

shariah implementation in. 151. 686-687; stale control ° f Islamic pub lie life in, 568; support of mosque movement by. 6i7;Wahhabism in, 74. 89, 545: women's riglus and status in, Sacdi dynasry (Arabia). Wahhabism as Sand III ibn Abd al Aziz, university rounded by. 652 Sawakin. Ottoman control of, 500 Sayyuds. Nonh India rule by. 400 Scandinavia; eilinic minority model of, 610; Muslim guestwtirkers in. 606. 607

481.483 Sanjar. Muizz ad-Din. as sultan of Kb. ur usan, 57-58 Sankore, Muslim scholars of, 481, 483

system. [83- 184 386

593 Scptemher Taws (Sudan). 702 Serbia, Islamic converts in, 602 Serbian Empire, defeat of. 373. 695 Serindian Buddhism, origin of. 441

Schnaider.W L.. 339

Seven er Shiism, 693

Th Middle Fast. 350. 359. 360-361 .

Sfiafii rejection of, t28;solidarity r u l -

of. 572; Fatimid loss of. 48; Fatimid

363. 364; i n Ottoman Empire. 3/2.

ing of, 146; as source o f shariah, 108.

rule of. 46, 351, 693; French rule of,

377.178. 379- 381. 383; poetry of.

119-124, 135,

423: Safavid persecution of, 567;

136

(82. 588, (98; Greek siudies i n . 271 ;

Sunni Islam. 18. 26. 27,45, 207. 290.

Ikshidid dynasty i n . 37.694; Islamic

639; Asharism i n , 280. 303; Catherine

an i n , 215, 254, 245; Islamic culture

the Great's suppon of. (20: i n China.

in. 60; Islamic law i n . 150; Islamic

29c-296.646; i n Africa. 492.494; in

447. 452; i n earl) Iran, 366, 367. (14.

modernism i n . [6(; islam i n , 331;

China. 446. 448-457; integration i n

515; in Egypt. 49.281.695; o f Gulf

Islamism i n , (67. 654; land owner-

Sunni thought. 694, Islamic renewal

State leaders. 673; in India. 41; law of.

ship i n . 57(; Mamluk contnil of, 695:

based o n , (12. 517 5'8, 519, 320,

91. 9(, 10/, 359, 682-683; '

a- mandate- country, 651 ; as member

Sj0-c31.c-.fe. (37. (38. 54fe:

Lebanon. 660, 700; madrasas of, 114.

mosques and centers of. 6t8; i n

i n the Maghreb. 53. malidist movc-

takeovers i n . 593: Mongol conquest

Mughal empire. 407, 408.409. 412.

meni of, 546, marriage law of. 130;

of, 59; Mushm Brotherhood i n . 547,

social movements of, 694 Sufism. 63. 104. 274. 283. 283. 286. 293.

—

n

of United Arab Republic, 556, military

418; neo-Sufism. 697; i n Ottoman

Nation o f Islam as part of. 623; prayer

702; Mushm migrants f r o m . 608; as

Empire. (26; replacement by

requirements of. 94: repression o l

Muslim state. 652; Naqshbandi schol-

Wahhabism, 89. 291; in Southeast

Shiism by, 53. 55. 56; revivalist move-

ars i n . 512: national identity of. 558.

Asia. 297. 298. 402.4O4. i n

ments of. 49; Rightly Guided Caliphs

(80; non-Muslims I n . 385; Ottoman

T i m b u k t u , 485, 486, as Uighur fac-

of. 692, Safavid persecution of. 367;

conquest of, 696; Ottoman trade

tion. 466

Seljuk members of. 55. 162. 367;

f r o m . 389; as pos[colonial state. 581 ;

Suharto, policies of. 572, 574

Shiite Islam and. 297. 359. 554.659.

secularization policy i n . 472; Seljuk

al-Suhrawardi. Shihab at D i n . as philos

660; Sufism and, 361: Sufism intcgra-

rule i n . 54, 56. 351, 353, 37t. 694;

tionn into. 694,Turkmen as members

Shahi school i n , ti4;Tulunid dynasty

pher-mystic. 293, 294. 295, 303, 368 suicide bombuigs. by Qassam Brigade. 703 Sukarno. Achmed, as national activist. (62, (63. (72. (73.(92

i n , 694

of. (5: Uighur bchef in, 466 Suruiis; early religious groups of. 359;

Syriac; pltilosphical lexis i n , 301 ; scien-

Western immigrants as. 615

tific translations inio, 160- 16t. 200;

SunYal sen. 447

translations into Arabic. 333

Sulawesi, Islam i n . 422, 426, 430

Sural al-Eaiihah, 80

Syrianus, as Neoplalonist, 270

Sulayhids. as rulers olYemen, 37

surgery, in early Islam. 204. 204. 208

Syria-Palestine. Clirlstinity i n . 3

Sulaym tribe, banishment t o l f r i q i y a , 48

Surinam; Dutch control of. 621: Muslim

Suleyman, 393; aid to Melaka hy. 427: as

immigrants from. 604. 607. 621, 622.

T

625

al-Tabari. Ah i b n Said Rabban. medical

"caliph o f the w o r l d . " 376; court of. 376; gold regalia of, 384-585. rule as

surrender, as meaning o f islam, 66, 67

high point o f Ottoman Empire. 696:

Surush, Abdul-Karim. as Islamic m o d -

• work on Dome o f ihe Rock commissioned by, 226-227 Sulcymanci movement. 622: Quran schools o l . 619 Su ley 1 nam ye complex (Istanbul), 376 Sultanate Era (950-1500). 351-353 sulun(s), as cultural patrons, 379:

ernist. 565 Susa, Jews i n , 2 Suwari, al Hajj Salim. as early African Muslim. 489 al-Suyuti, Jalal al-Din. as Egyptian Sufi teacher, 482-483,485,492 Swaggarl. Jimmy. 626

Gha/navids as, 41; as quasi-divine

Swahili. Muslim speakers of. 504-505

being. 385; Seljuk. 54; slave military

swastika, i n Islamic a n . 410

corps of. 3(5. 377-378; as Ode lor

Sweden; interfaith activities i n , 627;

ruler, 3(5.422 Sumauguru. king o f Soso, 478 Sumatra. Dutch connol of, 534, 543. 57C. Islam i n . 422. 428. 430, 520; Padri movement i n . 698 al-Sumatrani. Shams al-Din. as Malaysian theologian. 298

Islamic mosques and ceiiiers i n , 618;

Tabatabaii. Muhammad Husayn. as Ishraqi philosopher, 296 Tahlceghi Muslims. 618 Tablighi Islam, 700 Tabriz, as Safavid capital, 290/ IbdhJuiD (al-Ttisi). 177 Tadmekka (Sahara), as early uade cenier. 476 al-Taftazani. Sadr al-Din. as Islamic philosopher and theologian. 293, 297, 33'

Muslims i n , 604. 6o6, 607: support of

Tahert, Rustamids of, 36

mosque movement by. 617

Tahirids, as Iranian governors, 38. 39

Sw it/erland; Islamic mosques and t e n -

Tahmasp. Shall, 364

ters i n , 618; Muslim guesrworkcrs i n .

Tahrir Muslims. 618

609: Muslim incursions Into, 315;

Taif (Arabia), 4. 10, 11,

Muslims i n , 604

Taiping rebellion. 440

sun, Piolemy's model for. 172

syllogism, theory of. 290-291

Sunan, compilers of, 75

synagogues; b o m b i n g of, 629; in

sundials, use for prayer timekeeping. 180

Ottoman Empires. 386; o f Saracens i n

Sundiata. as Mali ruler, 478

tables. 327

The Sunna. 497, 682; authoritative books

treatise of. 201 Tabaristan, local chieftains of. 41

Syria;Abbasid state i n . 43. 693;Alawis of,

13

Tajikistan. 434; Chinese miliiary agreement w i t h . 471 ; Chinese uade w i t h . 470; Islamic Renaissance Party of. 562; Xinjiang trade w i t h , 469 Tajiks; in Afghanistan. 659; i n Central

of, 74~7(: description of, 121; empha-

583-484; Bath party of. 580.

Asia. 471 : clash with Meskhetian

sis o n practice i n , 90, 96; Hebrew-

By2antine loss of. 311, 316: caliph c o n -

Turks, 472

Bible and New Testament compared

trol of. 11.12.15. 16, 27. 29. 76. 351.

10. 88; importance of. 74. 89, 105;

693; Christian rule i n , 340; colonial

interpretation of, 137; Islamic law and. 92. 93.95. 97. 104, 108, 10; as Islamic paradigm o f behavior. 73;

armies of. 592: control by Saladin. 47;

Taj Mahal. 697; Aurangreb's copy of. 419; early depiction of. 513; Mughal architecture o l , 215. 248.411,415-416

development o f 566-567. early

lakbir (magnification). 78, 81, 82

Christians i n . 309: as early medical

Takedda (Niger), as copper source, 495

INDEX i A h r (chargeof belief);againstHausa rulers. 497: against Sonni A l i . 482 Taklir wal Hi|ra, as Egypt u n d f r g r o u n d group, 660 Takhmakan Desert, 4 - 7 . 440. 441,442, 464 Al-Tolunilti fi Sfiadi d-Todhkira (al-Khalri).

74Ç

4 2 - 4 3 . 47, 76. 140; levied by

481-489,494.496;Tuareg conquest

Egyptian pashas. 500. levit-d by

of. 480. 481

Mughal emperors, 406, 419; levied by Ottomans. 386, 38/, 58B; levied by Selj uks. 56 Tayan.Turhan, o n Uighur rights, 466. 47Ï

timekeeping,

in early Islam. 180-181.

213 Timur; Ak bar's descent f r o m . 414; c o n ­ quests of. 353. 356. 357, 395. 695; downfall of. 363. 365. Genghis Kahn

technology, in early Islam, 193-198

lineage o l , 405; Gur-i Mir t o m b of.

Takrur (Senegal). Islam i n . 476.489

Tehran. Qajar palace i n , 539

352; palace of. 255; shrine built hy.

Tallia i b n Uhayadallali. as early

Telli ( M a l i ) , mosque i n . 479.488

177

Muhammad supporter, 15 Taliban. o f Afghanistan. 91.466. 658. 659, 680, 683, 688, 703-704; as fun­

Tcuipier. Etienne. 289. 303 Temple Mount (Jerusalem), as Islamic holy site, 313

130 Timurids; as Herat rulers, 696; legacy to Ottoman Empire, 371; Safavid legacy from, 370

damentalist group. 466; treatment o f

Tcngella. as early Senegambia leader. 489

Tinmallal (Morocco), mcssque at. 50

women under. 6-4. 687

Tcngella. Koli. Deruankohe dynasty of.

al-Tirmidhi. Sunan collccnon of, 75

tali I, 107

489.490

tithing,

required by Islam, 83

Taliqani.Ayatollah. as [shraqi-Shute. 296

tents, o f early Islam, 220-221

T i n Mir, as Bengali Islamic reformer. 538

Tamerlane. SrrTlmur

Teresa, Mother, 98

T i t i s o f Bosira, i s theologian, 271

al-Taminii. Arzam: as Islamist. 614; o n

terrorist acts; by Armed Islamic Group.

tobacco: Ahmad Baha's r u l i n g o n . 485;

Muslims i n die West, 627 Tang dynasty. 443. 464, foreign popula­ tions i n , 442; frontier closure to

672, Muslims and. 629. 631 Tervagent (Tervagan), as purported Islamic deity, 326

nomads by. 351, M u s l i m visit to China

testimony. Quranic ruling o n , 156

i n . 81; pohtical policy of. 4 3 3 , 4 I i .

lexnle industry', i n early Islam. 193-198.

44° tangenl function, in Arab mathematics. 162 Tanukh tribe. Hamdanids f r o m , 41 Tanzania: "Africanization" campaigns i n . 383; early Islam i n , 303; posicolonial tensions i n . 581 Tanzim al-Jihad. Sadat's assassination by. 702 Tanzimat reforms; o l Ahmad Cevdet Pasha, 699; o f Selim in, 698 Taoism, effects o n Serindian Buddhism, 44' Taqi al-Din, as early mechanical engi­ neer. 198 Taqi al-Din observatory (Istanbul). T8; taqltd. 1(1 taqwa, as responsibility to God, 67, 93-103 Tdnkh d-Sudan, 475,490 Tarim basin; energy resources i n , 469; Naqshbandi order founded near, 4(3. Uighurs as indigenous to, 464,463, 467 ranqahs (brotherhoods). o f Sufis. 36c. 451.453.485. 494. 5'2. 5 3 ° . 53' • 533. 540. 541.543.S45. 700 Tariq ibn Ziyad, Gibraltar conquest by. 21 Tadub al-Aflok (al-Jii7|ani), 171 Ta Shih. as Muslim visitors to China, 81 Tashkent (Uzbekistan). 21. 443. 468.as trade center, 436 Tatars: in Central Asia. 471; in Germany. 604; migration to Finland. 604. 607; Turkic-Altaic language of. 443. 44f taxation system, colonial introduction of, 376 taxes; Islamic, i n Pakistan. 657; levied by caliphates, 28, 29, 30, 34. 36, 38.

218-220, 224, 247. S«also carpets Thabit i b n Qutra; as early astronomer and mai hemati d a n . 163. 165-166. 180. 187; optic studies of. 191 Thailand, diversity i n . 558; H u i Muslims m . 443 Thrueietiis (Plato). 270 theft. Islamic prohibition o l , 93, 137. [43 Theodore o f Mopsuestia, as theologian. 27' theology, Islamic. S « Islamic iheology Theology of Anstodt, 272 Tliessaloniea,Turkish takeover of. 342 Thessaly, Ottoman control of, 391 t h i r d pillar o f Islam, 85 " T h i r d Universal Alter native." o f Qaddafi. 701 T h i r d World; colonialism effects o i l . 572: economic development i n , 573; Muslim states i n . 551, 571

Salihiyyah opposition to. 544 Tobacco Protest ( I r a n ) . 538. 651. 699 Todar Mai. as Mughal tax officer. j.ci- 407 Toghnl Beg. as Seljuk sullan, 55. 56 Tokolar scholars, o f Senegal. 490 Toledan Tibles. in astronomy, 175 Toledo; Christian reconquest of, 333; conquest by Alfonso V I . 35; as Islamic city-stale, 34; M u s l i m takeover of, 314 tombs; Muslim veneration of, 456, 517; Quranic inscriptions o n , 218 Topkapi Palace, as site o f Ottoman court. 375. 376. 377.523 Torah; as Allah's revealed book, 88, Quranic mention of, 306 Torodbc (Senegambia). as Islamic schol­ ars. 490 "Torodo is a beggar," as Senegal m a x i m . 490 Toronkawa (Senegambia). as Islamic scholars, 490, 496 Toronto; loreign populations of, 610; M u s l i m W o r l d League office i n , 621

" T h i r d W o r l d i s m . " 579

Tcitt, Baron dr, as Ottoman adviser. 511

TheThomand and One Nights. Hanın al-

Tours, Battle of. 692

Rashid's exploits i n , 693

t r i d c ( s ) ; in Centra! Asia. 435.437. 468.

Thrace. Turkish takeover of, 342

469. maritime. 501; of M u s l i m

Tianjin, Musfims i n . 443

Chinese. 443; role in spread o f Islam.

Tian Mian mountains, 434. oases near, 44'

S95.477.4B8.4B9. S ° i . s22 trade centers, in Islamic empire. 32, 36.

T i a n W u . as JahriyyaSuli, 455

38.47; i n Ottoman Empire. 386-390;

Tiberias (Palestine). Jews i n . 2

i n Safavid Empire. 365-366; i n Sahara.

Tibet; Chinese relations w i t h , 467,472; U u i Muslims i n , 443 "tides." o f Muslims inco Clima, 44s al-Tijani. Sayyid Ahmad, as Islamic reformer, 531-532, 536, 607 Ti)aniyya Sufism. 531. 531. 542. 530. 697 tiles, arcliitectural use of. 253. 255, 526 Timones (Plato). 272. 273 Ulnars, as Ottoman land grants. 377, 378,387 T i m b u k i u ; French rule o l , 551. Islam i n .

53 Traditionisis. 278, 279. 280. 281; fiqh legal thought of. 112. 115. 114. 117. 128 transactions. Islamic laws of, 152 Tirdi* tridental Wisdom (al-ShirazI). 295 uanslation movement, in Islamic sti encc. 159-160. 163. 164. 185, 2oo. 271.693 transnational 1 nation, in Central Asia. 434.437

INDEX Transoxania. Chaghatayids in, 695

Turke>. Chaghatay ids in, 695; commu nisi activists i n . 579; development

Uhayd Allah, as self-declared imam. 45

Irano-lslamii culture in. 347. Kara-

i n . 566; expansion of. 556; foreign

Uganda. "Africanization" campaigns in.

Khiui conquest ol. 58;

mosque staffing by. 621; Hanafi

Khwarizmshah conquesl of, 58;

school in, 114: interest in Central

Uhud.Bauleof. 10.691 Ilighuristan, 435. 464. 463,466;

Transoxiana; government of. 38, 39:

S85

Mongol conquest of, 58, 353,400: as

Asia, 434; Islamic associations of,

part of Great Seljuk domains, 55.

621-622; Islamic law in. 140.

Samamd control of. 351,

693;

Islamic modernism in. 565. 656,

Timurid period in, 352,

353;

681; lslamism in. 568. 569. 702:

ethnicization of. 462-468; as

Islamist government of. 152.

Muslims, 435.442.443- 445¬

Turkmen in. 34

700.

566;

N'aqshbandi rulers of. 521 Uighurs: Chinese policy toward, 473.

Transylvania, Ottoman rule of, 697

Kemal ism i n . 561. 567, 624;

464-465; rebellion of. 440: resent­

Treaty of Muday biy ah. 10.692

Kurdish identity 111, 559, military

ment of Han Chinese by. 471; Russian

Treaty of Jassy. 392, 698

politicians i n , 668; Muslim intellec­

policies affecting. 437; separatist

Treaty of Karlowirz, 510

tuals of. 579; Muslim migrants

Treaty of Km link Kaynarja, 698

from. 607. 616, 624; nanonal ideu-

Treaty of Passarovitr,

tiı> " I . £53-, 560; nationhood-

311

org nidations of. 466 Ukraine; Ottoman conquesl of. 374; Xinjiang uade with. 468

Treaty of Qasr Shirin. 697

umtnah disharmony in, 455.

Treaty of /.sitvaTorok, 697

Refah Party of. 562, 568. 704; reli­

151; m.Africa, 488. 492.494.495.

Trench. Battle of the. 691

gious education in, 700. 701; shari-

497, 506; Enrich rivalry with.

tribal chiefs, m Muslim states. 588

ah court abolished in, 700; Welfare

33-4-535. 543; In early Middle East.

tribal organizations, in early Middle E m ,

Party of. 562

! . 148, 349. 35'. lis". J63 tribal peoples; Islamic leadership of, 362; in Ottoman Empire, 373, 377; in Safavid Empire. 370 191

The Trinity, of Christianity. 303. 306. i°7.33' conquest of 36; Islam in, 473. Oltoman conquest of, 492 •'truth of certainty" (Quran). 6 5 - 6 6 . 6 7 Tuanku NanTua; Padri movement and. 533:asShaitany yahleader. 520 Tuareg [Berber tribe|. 480. 486 Tughluqs. North India rule hy. 400 Tukoz.Ahmet. Uighur support hy. 467 "tulip craze." 511 ernist movement,

465. use in Soudi Asian Islam. 396 Turkic peoples, in Central Asia. 434, 463.

565

Tulunid dynasty, in Egypt and Syria. 37. 43. 694 Tunbs islands. United Arab Emirates' claim to. 559 Tunikabuni, MirraTahir. aslsliraqi philosopher. 296

ulama movement (Nahdai al-Ulama). of

Turkish Republic, creation of. 700 Turkmen, in Central Asia. 471. migrauons of. 54-55. 59. 363; national

Turko-Persiau culture; in early Middle

562. 588. 651: secularization policy in. 572. 656 Turabi. Hasan, as Sudanese modernist. 657. 681 Turan. Iran's struggle with, 40

text made for. 167 Umar. as king of Kano, 496

422,430

Umar ibn al Khallab; assassination ol.

Turko-Persian-Islamicate culture, of Turks; Anatolia takeover by, 342; as chief­ tains. 344;in early Chang an.442; entrance into Mashriq, 53-58; inde­

362; as name lor Muslims. 321.

322.

144.

312-313.692 UmarTal, al-Hajj: defeat of, 543; as and. 546; revolt of. 550 Umayyad Mosque (Damascus). 310 Umay yads. 8. 15; agricultural develop­ ment under, 196; architecture and

al-Turutj ül-Hultmiyyıah (Methods of

244.

13. 16. 27, 28. 29. J3. 35. 37. 38. 60. 142. 149. 175, 200. 2 i i ,

143

al-Tusi. Nasir al-Diu. as early astronomer. 174. 177. 182. 183, 19]

al-Tusi. Sharaf al-Din. as early mathe­ 174

Twelver Sluism. 44. 47. 366. 368. 516. 693; Islamic associations of. 621 tyeddo (Kayor military). 491

277.

284. 313. 692; campaigns of, 21, 28: coinage of, 223. medical transla­ tions commissioned by. 200; over­ throw' of, 19-20, 25, 34. 112.

matician. 187-189, 190 Tusi couple, in astronomy.

an of. 216. 224. 231. 244. 253.

260; as caliphs. [6-17, 18. 19. 22.

city-state, 464,465

171.

Caliph. 12. 15. 76. 139- 14O, 143.

leader ofTijamyyah. 542; madhism

353.

Turpaii; Islamization of. 442: as Uighur

Judgment),

692; covenant of, 308; as "rightly guided" cahph. 75. 112; as second

South Asia. 397-404.403. 418

323, 324. national identity ol, 554; as

Neo-Destur (Constitution) party of.

Ulughberg ibn Shahrukh. astronomy

East. 357: in early Southeast Asia. 421.

Sunni. 454

hood-ummah disharmony in. 555;

183

Uljaym. Muhammad Khudabanda. dlus irated Quran of, 234

as modem Muslim slate. 549

590; economy of. 374; Islamic con­

Muslim migrants from. 606; naliun-

Indonesia, 562 Ulegh Beg observatory (Sainarqand). 182,

identity of. 554 Turkmenistan; Chinese trade with, 470.

verts in, 3(, 36; islamic law changes

668. 681. Maliki school in, 113;

529:asSonniAlifavorites.

rights and. 688-689

Turkish mosques, in Europe. 618

Islamic conversion of. 39. 351.

Movement in. 362. 702; lslamism in.

525,

481; views on hadith, 685; women's

60

Tunisia; Aghlabids as governors of, 21;

677-678. 679. 680. IslamicTendcncy

650; in Mughal Empire. 697, in Ottoman Empire. 379. 380. 515; as Safavid Empire. 367, 369: Shii. in Iran.

pendent, in Ottoman slates, 378;

in, 150; Islamic politics in. 670-671.

682. 683. 684. in Islamic Southeast Asia. 424. 428. laic mterprciors and.

Turkish language, role in Islamic culture,

Dinis. Ottoman conquest of, 374 Believers in. 13; colonial rule in. 5B6.

664; Islamic law and. 686: Islamic

post-Abbasid leaders. 358. 361. in

i *

Tutko-Egyptian regime, in Sinnar. 500

Tulu-i Islam (Pakistan), as Mamie mod­

149.

modernism and. 469. 647. 680. 681.

Muslims, 443 Turkic languages; Persian classics Trans­

Turkish khanat. downfall of. 464

Tripoli; caliph raids against. 12; Crusader

ulaina. 119. 120. 123. 135, 140. 147.

350, 359; in India. 550: in Iran. 661.

Turkic-Altaic languages, of Chinese

lated into. 357; use by Uighurs. 464.

trigonometry; m early India, 161, in early Islam. 165. 166. 168. 181, 190.

561.

692;

in Spain. 45. 60. Sunni supporters of, 339; treatment of Christians by. 3©9 umbrella organizations, lor Muslim

INDEX i m m i g r a n t - . 611

-61c

Uwaysal Barawi, Sliaykh. 544-444

ummah (holy c o m m u n i t y ) . 18,654; 609

uymaq I tribal units), i n early Iran, 363, Uzbekistan, 434; Chinese iradc- w i t h ,

J85 Union o f Moroccan Muslim Organizations (Netherlands), 622 Untied Aral) Emirates, claim to » d fields.

Wafd (Delegation), in Fgypt. 562

21: cthmcization i n . 436; Russian

al Wahhab. Muhammad ibu Abd. as

policies affecting. 437;Ta]iks i n .

founder of Wahhab ism, 114, 291.

47t: Turkic -Altaic language of. 443.

51B. 523.528.332. 545

517,

Wahhabi-Saudi state. 317, 545

Uzbeks; in Afghanistan, 659, in Central Asia. 4/1; clash w i i h Kyrgyz. 472

support o f mosque movement by. 617

Wadud. Annua, as female modernist. 681

470. 4468; early M u s l i m control of.

445

459: Iranian annexation of islands I r o m , 557; national identity of, 560;

W Wadai. Islam in. 475. 500,506

370

Unlate Armenians. Armenian Church of,

SU

of. S44-S4S

Uncovering the Hidden (al H u j w a r i ) . 297

UniledAzab Repuhhe, 556

Wahliabisiii. 446.458. 638. 645. 697; i n China. 450, 459; i b n Hanhal's follow ers i n . 114. 517: principles of. 291;

United Malays National Organi7ation ( U M N O ) . 562. 590. 595- 59*. 59«

V

renewalisi movements based o n . 518.

Valencia; Christian reconquest of, 41, 320; as Islamic city-state, 34

United Muslims of America. 638 Utuled Nations. 55;. 544; universal val-

Vah. Shaykli Nimamllah. shrine of. 360 Vancouver, foreign populations of, 610

ues for w o m e n of. 634 U S Department of Siaic.Arab immigra-

van den Bosch, as Dutch colonial adiiiuiVarna, crusade defeat at, 696

Service, unjust immigrant deportation

Vatican; Arabic manuscripts I n , 333; treatment o f Muslims by, 626

by. 637 United Slates: interest in Central Asia.

vegetal designs; i n By zantine an. 236; i n

433; inierfaith activinesin. 627;

Islamic art. 236. 239, 240. 248. 243.

Islamic female modernist i n . 6Hi;

260. 400. 401.410, 411,

416

veiling, by Muslim w o m e n , 634, 659.

Islamic mosques and centers i n . 617-618. 621; Muslim education i n .

688

622-623; Muslim migrations to. 611,

Venice, luxury trade of, 388. 389

690; Muslims i n . 604. 608,6t6. 639.

Venus, Ptolemy's model for. 173

643

viceregency, as moral responsibility. 96. 104. 105.

Universities o f Islam. 623

145

Viceroy 's Council. Indian landlords i n ,

University o f Algiers. 671 University o f Damascus, tiqh enrylopedia project of. 150

587 vices, prohibited hy Quran. 93,96,97

University of London. 671

Vieiuia. Ottoman siege of. 372, 374, 392.

University o i Malaya. 578: Chinese and Indian domination o i , 585

510. 602. 696 viUyal-i faqih. as Khomeini doctrine.

University oi Punjab, 578

703

University o f Riyadh (Saudi Arabia). 652

Vincent o f Beauvais. v iews o n Islam. 314

Unrepresented Nations and People's

Vindication of the Use of the Science of Solum (al-

Organization, Uighur leadet of. 467

Ashari). 280 violence; Islamic espousal of. 301;

Uqaylids. o f Mosul. 43 Urabi revolt, i n Egypt, 699

Muslim abhorrence of, 612

Urban LI. call for Crusades by. 337,694

Virgin Mary. Catholic doctrine of. 89

a l - U r d i . Muayyad al-Din. as early

virtue, in Islam ethics. 97,98 virtuous City (Al-Farabi), 285

174

"ThcVirtuous Forerunners," o f die

Urdi lemma, i n astronomy. 174 U r d u , development o l . 40

532. 545; Suhsm replacemenr by. 89. 532, 445;Taliban compared to. 660 Wahid. Ahdurahman. as Islamic m o d ernisr, 681 Walata. islam i n . 481 Wali Al|ah, Shah, as Islamic reformer.

sirator. 576

utin policy of, 611 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization

astronomer. 171.

ttrçugc pmoresuue dc Consluntinuplr I M e l l i n g ) .

Uwaysiyyah order, o r i g i n and principles

purpose of, 555. 557. i n United Stales,

747

Prophet. 74

518, 523. 525. 527-328. t>97 al-Walid, Khalid i b n . 310.

311

al W a l i d l , 313 al-Walid ibuYazid. 310: Umayyad palace of, 231 Walliullab, Shall, as Indian philosopher. 297 Wall Disney Productions, Arabs and Muslims depicted i n , 637 Walter of Compiegne. views o n Islam. 325 Wangara; as Islamic traders. 488.495; in Kaisina, 497 Wang Lequan. "steel Great Wall" of, 472 waqt. as Islamic revenue source. 182. 209. 241. 381. 387, 646 Waqqas.Abu. mosque attributed to. 443 war. sliariah rulings o n , 134 Warlord onrj Muslims in Chinese Cmlrd Asia (Forbes), 465 al-Warraq, Abu Isa. anti-Christian polemic by, 331 warrior-defenders of Islam, 337—545 Washington, D.C.; mosque i n , 617; Uighur separatists i n , 466 water control Ser hydrology: irrigation engineering water wheels, in early Arab countries. 197-198

Urtuqids. atabeg stales of. 56

Vishnu, mosque pillar of. 399.400

waterworks, budt by Aglilabids. 36

U n i m q i ; bombings i n , 462-463; as

Visigothie kingdom. Islamic use o f

al-Wathiq, as al-Mutasim successor, 28

Main Uighur tow n, 463; new trans

remains f r o m , 243; Muslim conquest

Waison, W i l l i a m , 437

portaiion links lo, 435,471: as trade

o f Spain f r o m , 21

welfare assistance, i n early Ulam. 144

Visigoths. 314

center, 435.436 Usuli school o f Shi ism. 36% 515. 525. 529; debate w i t h Akhbari school, 697 usury; Islamic law o n , 93, 132, 134,

138,

145; Quranic rules o n , 120 Utliman ibiiAiTan. 8; assassination of. 15, 16, 692:as"rightly guided" caliph. 112.489; as third Caliph, 12, 15,692 Uttar Pradesh. Mughal control of, 409

Welfare (Refah) Party, ofTurkey, 462, 468

Vlcte. Francis. 189

welfare slates, pressures OU. 610

Viuuvius. as Roman an lute. t. 217

The West; antipathy toward Muslims u i .

viziers, in Farimid Fgypt, 48

627; challenges to Muslims i n ,

Vlaams Blok (Belgium), as anti-Muslim

611-614; immigration policies i n .

political party. 631 "Voice of the Islamic Revolution," as Khomeini radio program. 664-665

609-611; Islamic modernism and. 686; Islamic mosques and centers i n . 617-619; Muslim communities i n ,

volksraad, 111 colonial Dutch Indies. 561

604-609; Muslim criticism of, 612.

voussoirs, i n Islamic buildings, 253, 254

620. 653; Muslim migrants to, 605.

INDEX

748

618-641; Muslim return to, 601-641.

World Bank, loans to China. 467

Chinese pilgrimages 10.454;

national identity of. 6t t; pluralism in,

World Council of Churches, 626

Christians in, 4, 306; communist

640

WorldTrade Cenier (NewYork), bomb-

activists in, 579; development of.

555. Si*.. 542. 550, 697: Islamic renewal orders in, 513, 319, 530.

536;

566-567: Islamic culture in, 60.

ing of. 629, 703

West Africa, holy war tradition in. 519.

WorldTrade Organization, China and. 467

Islamic reformers in. 530; Islamic

World War 1; Arah territory division

spread from. 503, 504; Ismadi move-

Qadiriyyah mnvrmenl in. 519;

after, 552. 557. French colonialism

meni in, 4 4 - 4 5 , 46; Muhammad's

Tijaniyya order in. 531

after. 575; jihads during. 545; Muslim

community in, 10. 11,

migration after, 608; Ottoman divi-

Naqshbandi Sufism in. 454, t i l ;

sion after. 557. 700; restrictions on

nationalism in. 556; as natural refuge,

free expression in. 597; revoli against

41; Onoman control of, 374.

Ottomans in. 53B; Russian

389; Zaydi imam rule of, 693:

West Bank;Arab losses in. 655: Islamism in. 667 westernizing reforms, in Ottoman Empire. 513.

525

557.

World War II; Muslim siaie emergence

559

"Westoxihcation." Iranian perception of, 661 white ¡color). use in Islamic an, 139 Wlutehead.Affred North, 297

458: Chinese preferential treatment

ters after. 603-604, restrictions on

of, 460,461; mosques of, 462; num-

worship; liqh rulings on, 110,

bers of. 462: religious principles of.

Yinchuan (China), mosque in 460, 461 Yining (Cul|a); "EastTurkestan Republic"

261-262. ScrakiMalligraphy

in. 465.469: ethnic riot in. 466 yogi, Achinese sultan in duel with. 428

6;2

While Revolution (Iran). 661

X

Why [hi IsloinicVViiy (Numayr). 657

xenophobia. Muslims as victims of, 630.

Wigdortz. Bren H . . 468

Yogyakarta (Java), mosque at. 428. 429,

Xindianzi Chinese Sufism. 446

willful ambiguity, in Islamic a n . 222,

Xinjiang. 434, 463. 464.465. 466;

250-267 Wisdum ul Illumination (al-Suhrawardi),

430 Yohannesl. emperor of Ethiopia. 402

631

Wilts. Ivor, on African Muslims. 489

York (England). Arabic manuscripts in.

is!

Afaqiyya Sufism in. 453: Han

Yotkan. as oasis city. 442

Chinese in, 469; KhufTiya Sufism in.

Young Ottomans (Turkey), as islamic

454. Makhdumzada Sufism in, 453;

29Í. 2 9 4 - 2 9 ! witnesses. 136.

461-462

in:

Quranic description of. 120

"white man'5 burden." as colonial pater nalism. 560, 561.

after. 552, 650, Muslim-West encoun-

writing. Islamic an of, 222—230,

Buddhists, 4Si

Yihewanl Muslims; in China. 450. 454.

free expression in, 597

"White Lotus" rebellion, of Chinese

388.

Zaydiyya Shiism in. 44

Communism after, 540

Western Sahara. Moroccan claims ro,

26;

mummies found in. 437; Muslims

142

modernists.

in. 431. 414. 443. 4 5 ' . 4*8. 473;

"witnessing" formula, in Muslim

name origin of, 440; Naqshbandi

prayers, 82 Wolof. Islamizaiion of, 490-491, 542

Sufism in. 453; new transportation

woman, as U.S. chaplain. 625

links to, 471; Russian settlers in, 469.

women, air travel by. n 8 - i i 9 ; d i s c r i m i -

separatists in, 472. irade with Central

modernist support. 647; in Muslim

Xinjiang Production and Construction

states. 580. 687, 688; feminism's

Corps (XPCC). as alleged employer of

effects on status uf. 89; financial affairs

prison labor, 467

of, 149; importance in Ottoman soci-

against. 704; Muslim migrants from. 607; Muslims in, 604 Yunnan; Islamic renewal in. 546; Khoja Abd Alia in, 451; Muslims in, 443. 459; Panlhay Hui Muslim rebellion in.

462,463.465.467

455.699 Yusuf. Muhammad, as Naqshbandi Sufi,

Xin )iao (new teachings), of Chinese Islam. 462

Islamic dress of, [41. 634. 659. 665. 670. 677, 682, 688; as Islamic mod-

440 Yugoslavia: international sanctions

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

ety. Í 7 5 - J 7 6 ; in Iran. 665; in Islam, 6J4. '•'il- as Islamic converts. 609;

Empire. 700 Yuan dynasty, relations with Central Asia.

Asia. 468. 470

nation against. 634; education of

Xuanhuagang. as Jahriyya center. 455

565

Young Turk revolution, in Ottoman

453 Yusuf and Zuloykhtt [Jami poem], Bihzad's painting of, 250-251

ernists. 681; in Islamic polines, 395, 6*9. 703; legal rights of, 687-688; in

Y

Z

Muslim fund-raising. 616—617; as

Yakub Beg rebellion. 465

al-Zabidi, Muhammad Mintada. as

Muslim politicians. 635; non-Muslim,

Yamama. Muhammad's community in,

marriage to Muslims. 149; organizations lor. 689: prayer requirements for, 94. Quranic rulings on. 126,478;

10,

11

Yang Huaizhong. as Muslim Chinese scholar. 462

Naqshbandi scholar. 512.

514

Zabid (Yemen); Islamic renewalism in. 514. 52i: Jahriyya Sufism founded in. 454. 455: as trade center. 38

Yaqub, Abu Yusuf. asCordoban caliph. 2B6

Zaghul, Sad, as Egyptian leader. 562

62o. slandering of, 122; status of,

Yaqub ibn Kilhs. is Fatimid vizier, 48

al -Zahir. as Fan mid cab ph. 47

687-688; as Sufi mystics. 693;Talihan

Yaqub Sultan. Nezami manuscript of, 238

al-Zahiri, Dawud ibn Ah. as early yurist. 114

requirements for, 659. 660. voting

yaquin, 63

Zahiri school of law. 114. 123. principles

rights of. 687; as witnesses, 136, 688

al-Yaraghi. Muhammad, as Islamic

separate mosque area tor, 138,

139.

Women's Living Under Muslim Laws

Yarmuk, Battle of. 312

f Pakistan), 689 women's rights, m Islamic countries.

242 wool textiles, ;i8

Yathrib. 4, 8-9. Sec olio Medina; Muhammad in. 8 - 9

665. 679.6B7 woodcarving. as Islamic an form.

reformer. 533

221.

Yazid: as Muawiyah's successor. 16. 692; as Sunni Umayyad ruler, 663 Yemen; caliph control of. 30. 37. 38:

of. 129, 137.

[40

ZahMsm, 289 al-Zahrawi, Abn al-Qasim, medical encylopedia of. 204 Zahriyya madras (Cairo), 292 Zakariyah, Fuad, as Islamic modernist. 298-299 Zallaqa, Baideof. 50

INDEX Zatuzam, role i n pilgranuges. 86

Zaydiyya, as Shiite variant, 44

Zands. defeat o f Saiavids by. 370: Persian

Zayyanid dynasty, in Morocco. 52

rule of, 698 Zangids, atabcg stiles of. 56 -57,

354

Zanj (East Africa): African slave domina­ tion o f 43. early Muslims i n . 504 Zanzibar: Indian and Malay immigrants i n , 584; old dispensary i n . 209; as port city. S73 Zanzibar sultanate, establishment of. 3-0?. 306. 307 Zarqallu (al-Zarqiy al). as early astronomer, 175

749

Zirids; independence o f 48, as Muslim Berbers. 46

Zen Buddhism, o r i g i n of, 442

Zitouna Mosque (("anhage).

Zhang Qian. alliance against I lu its, 439.

Zoghby.Jim. in Jesse Jackson 's cam­

440 Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammatl, as Pakistani leader, 648. 669, 679. 680. 688. 702 ol-ZijoI-Dimashqi (Habaslıal-Hasih), as astronomy text, 165 al-Zij di-Hakimi al-Kabır (al Hasan Ali Ibn Yunus). 167-168

191

paign. 637-638 Zoroastrianism, 2. 3,4, 13, 41, 80; Ahbasid acceptance of. 338: universal beliefs of, 348 Zomastrians; conversion to Islam, 359: i n early Chang an. 442; as People o f the Book, 307

ol-Zij al Mtrrntohan. 164

ZsitvaTorok,Treaty of, 697

al-Zijal-Sabi (al-Battani). 166

al-Zuhayr i b n al-Awwam. as early

zawiya. o f al-Tijani, 331

Zij al-Snub, as Indian astronomy text. 162

Muhammad supporter. 15, 16, 17

Zayd i b n AM. uprising started by. i i

Zij al-Sindltind (al-Khwarizmi). as astron

Zungharians, control o f CentralAsia by.

Zaydi imams, as Yemeni rulers. 693

my text, 163

440