The United States and Cambodia, 1969-2000: A Troubled Relationship

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The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000

Beginning with the restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cambodia in 1969, this book is the first to systematically explore the controversial issues and events surrounding the relationship between the two countries in the latter half of the twentieth century. The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000 traces how the secret bombing of Cambodia, the coup which overthrew Prince Sihanouk, and the American invasion of Cambodia in 1970 led to a brutal civil war followed by the savagery of the Khmer Rouge “killing fields.” Clymer carefully examines the American role in these tragic events before analyzing the American response to the Vietnamese invasion in 1978 that finally drove the Khmer Rouge from power. The book highlights how hostility to the government installed by the Vietnamese led the United States to attempt to undermine it by assisting the Cambodian resistance forces. It closes with an examination of the key role the United States played in the United Nationsassisted settlement of the Cambodian problem in the early 1990s. The companion volume to this book, The United States and Cambodia, 1870–1969, explores from the first American relations with Cambodia, through the Cold War era, up until the late 1960s. Based on extensive archival research in the United States, Australia, and Cambodia, this is the most comprehensive account of the United States’ troubled relationship with Cambodia and will be of enormous interest to scholars of Southeast Asia, U.S. diplomatic history and U.S. foreign policy. Kenton Clymer is Chair of the History Department at Northern Illinois University, USA and was formerly Professor of History at the University of Texas at El Paso, USA. He is the author of Quest for Freedom: The United States and India’s Independence (1995) and other books that focus on American relations with Asia.

RoutledgeCurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia

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12 Japan’s Postwar Economic Recovery and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1948–1962 Noriko Yokoi

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13 Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975 Beatrice Trefalt

3 The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya 4 The Australia-Japan Political Alignment 1952 to the present Alan Rix 5 Japan and Singapore in the World Economy Japan’s economic advance into Singapore, 1870–1965 Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi 6 The Triads as Business Yiu Kong Chu 7 Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism A-chin Hsiau 8 Religion and Nationalism in India The case of the Punjab Harnik Deol 9 Japanese Industrialisation Historical and cultural perspectives Ian Inkster 10 War and Nationalism in China, 1925–1945 Hans J. van de Ven 11 Hong Kong in Transition One country, two systems Edited by Robert Ash, Peter Ferdinand, Brian Hook and Robin Porter

14 Ending the Vietnam War The Vietnamese communists’ perspective Ang Cheng Guan 15 The Development of the Japanese Nursing Profession Adopting and adapting western influences Aya Takahashi 16 Women’s Suffrage in Asia Louise Edwards 17 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1922 Phillips Payson O’Brien 18 The United States and Cambodia, 1870–1969 From curiosity to confrontation Kenton Clymer 19 Capitalist Restructuring and the Pacific Rim Ravi Arvind Palat 20 The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000 A troubled relationship Kenton Clymer 21 British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, 1957–70 ‘Neo-colonialism’ or ‘disengagement’? Nicholas J. White 22 The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead

The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000 A troubled relationship

Kenton Clymer

First published 2004 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2004 Kenton Clymer All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Clymer, Kenton J. The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000 : a troubled relationship / Kenton J. Clymer. p. cm. – (RoutledgeCurzon studies in the modern history of Asia; 18) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. United States–Foreign relations–Cambodia. 2. Cambodia–Foreign relations–United States. 3. United States–Foreign relations–1945–1989. 4. United States–Foreign relations–1989– I. Title. II. Series. E183.8.C15C573 2004 327.730596’09’045–dc22 2003018367 ISBN 0-203-35848-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-41541-8 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–32602–8 (Print edition)

To John McAuliff and Bill Herod

Contents

Acknowledgments Abbreviations used in notes Map of Cambodia

1

ix xi xiii

Prologue

1

Richard Nixon and Cambodia: diplomatic relations and bombs

4

2

Sticking with Lon Nol

43

3

Dénouement: Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, and the fall of Cambodia

86

4

Jimmy Carter, human rights, and Cambodia

113

5

Toward a new beginning

138

Conclusion

171

Notes Bibliography Index

174 214 218

Acknowledgments

All authors accumulate numerous intellectual debts as they prepare their books. I am no exception. The book’s inspiration goes back to 1988 when John McAuliff, director of the U.S.–Indochina Reconciliation Project, invited me to join a group visiting Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Taking place at a time when few Americans were in any of these Indochinese countries (an American trade embargo on Vietnam and Cambodia was still in place), the trip stimulated my interest in seriously exploring American involvement with Cambodia. Though intensely interested in what were then important current developments in the relationship, I was determined to put the relationship in its larger historical perspective. I am most grateful to John for the invitation and for his subsequent insights about Cambodia and American involvement there. I am also deeply grateful to Bill Herod, who in 1989 as director of Indochina Project, then a program of the Fund for Peace in Washington, D.C., invited me to work with him during the summer of 1989. I learned much about contemporary issues affecting U.S.–Cambodian relations and the legislative process and wrote my first article on U.S.–Cambodian relations using the project’s collections. Bill subsequently has served with a number of organizations in Cambodia itself, including the American Friends Service Committee, and kindly hosted me there on several occasions. The materials in the AFSC library in Phnom Penh were helpful. Bill was instrumental in obtaining permission for me to do research in the Cambodian National Archives. To John and Bill this book is gratefully dedicated. Several scholars of Cambodia – especially Ben Kiernan, David Chandler, Craig Etcheson, and Steve Heder – have generously responded to inquiries and read draft chapters, papers, and articles. Several non-Cambodian specialists have also commented on various parts of the manuscript, including Pamela Sodhy, Bradford Perkins, Carl T. Jackson, David H. Anderson, Zhai Qiang, Anne L. Foster, Shelton Woods, David Schalk, Cary Fraser, Gary Hess, Ross Marley, Nick Cullather, and Charles Ambler. The anonymous readers for Routledge provided valuable insights that improved the manuscript. To all of them I express my gratitude, while relieving them of any responsibilities for errors of fact or interpretation or other flaws in the book. Australian Ambassador Noël St. Clair Deschamps flew from Melbourne to Canberra so that I could interview him for parts of two days. His memory of

x Acknowledgments persons and events in the 1960s was extraordinary, and he also gave me some relevant documents and articles. I am most grateful to him. Ambassador Charles Twining took time from his busy schedule for an interview in Phnom Penh, while Ambassador Kenneth Quinn critiqued portions of my manuscript and responded to numerous inquiries. Sorya Sim of the Cambodian Documentation Project in Phnom Penh graciously shared with me many relevant documents from the project’s collection. Sally Benson discussed recent Cambodian developments and shared documents with me. Carlos Cartlidge, who served in Vietnam with the Special Forces, discussed his experiences with me and shared photographs of Khmer Serei soldiers. While teaching in Germany in 1992–3 my able assistant, Volker Depkat, photocopied numerous clippings for me. Cindy Flores, a student at the University of Texas at El Paso, brought my attention to articles about the Khmer Rouge. The late Ruth Arrowsmith sent me many newspaper clippings of value. David Hackett answered my computer questions. To all these people I express my most profound gratitude. No history books can be written without the use of archives and libraries. In the United States I am most grateful to the staffs at National Archives II (and particularly to archivist Milt Gustafson), and at the Lyndon B. Johnson, Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy Carter Presidential Libraries. Similarly the staff at the Christian and Missionary Alliance Archives in Colorado Springs was most helpful. I was ably assisted in Cambodia by Lim Ky at the Cambodian National Archives. I want to especially single out Gay Hogan of the National Archives of Australia for her dedicated assistance during my three visits to Canberra. I am grateful for her help and for her continued interest in calling my attention to relevant materials. I am also grateful to the several funding agencies that helped defray the costs of research. These include the National Endowment for the Humanities, which graciously provided both a Summer Stipend and the year-long Grant for College Teachers; the Rockefeller Foundation which invited my wife and me, as well as Sorya Sim, to spend a month at the foundation’s beautiful Bellagio Study Center in Italy where I wrote the first draft of the chapter on the Carter administration; and Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library which provided a travel grant. The University of Texas at El Paso, my academic home when most of this book was written, assisted me in numerous ways, most notably with a year-long Faculty Development Grant. The university’s excellent history department was always supportive of my research. A Fulbright grant to teach at the University of Indonesia in 1990–1 allowed me to gain Southeast Asian perspectives on the intense efforts to arrive at a settlement in Cambodia, including reading the considerable coverage of the events by the Jakarta Post. An earlier version of Chapter 4 appeared previously as “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia,” Diplomatic History 27 (April 2003), 145–78, and is incorporated here in revised form with permission. Finally, I am as always grateful to my wife Marlee, who has not only lived with this project for years but read draft after draft, assisted with research, and gave me encouragement along the way.

Abbreviations used in notes

Carter Papers CIA CINCPAC CMAA CNO CO DCC EXAF FO Ford Papers FRUS Hutchinson Papers JCS Johnson Papers NAII NAA NAC Nessen Papers NPM NSC OCB OF PSF

Jimmy Carter Papers, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA Central Intelligence Agency Comander in Chief, Pacific Christian and Missionary Alliance Archives, Colorado Springs, CO Chief of Naval Operations Country Documentation Center of Cambodia records, Phnom Penh, Cambodia External Affairs Office (Canberra, Australia, unless otherwise indicated) Foreign Office Gerald R. Ford Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office) Edward Hutchinson Papers, Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX National Archives II, College Park, MD National Archives of Australia, Canberra National Archives of Cambodia, Phnom Penh Ron Nessen Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives II, College Park, MD National Security Council Operations Control Board Official File President’s Secretary’s File

xii Abbreviations RG SNF SS USDS WHCF WHO

Record Group Subject Numeric File Secretary of State U.S. Department of State White House Central File White House Office

50 miles

Figure 1 Map of Cambodia

0

100 km

Mo unt ains

Bay of Kompong Som

SIHANOUKVILLE (KOMPONG SOM)

4

Sre Ambel

KOH KONG

5

6

Kompomg Kirirom Speu

KOMPONG SPEU

Kep

Kampot

KAMPOT

3

13

Kratie

TAKEO

Dak Dam

VIETNAM

Sen Monaram

MONDOL KIRI

Lamphat

Andaung Pich Boung Long

RATANAKIRI

Vouensai

LAOS

Snoul Kompong Cham Moream Tiek Mimot Koh Oudang Rokor 7 Scatum Phnom PREY VENG Penh Anlong Kres Prey Veng Kompong Trach KANDAL Neak Luong SVAY Thlork 1 RIENG TaeyBavet Takeo Prey Tuol Svay Rieng Chantrea Svay A Ngong

Kompong Trach

Pich Nil Pass

Stung Treng

STUNG TRENG

Siempang

KRATIE

KOMPONG CHAM

Kompong Thom

KOMPONG THOM

KOMPONG CHHNANG

4

12

PREAH VIHEAR

Thbeng Mean Chey

Cheom Ksan

Kompong Trabek

Kompong Chhnang

Pursat

PURSAT

Kompong Som (Sihanoukville)

Koh Tang

rda mo m

Krong Koh Kong

Ca

Samlaut

Moung Roessei

Tonle Sap (The Great Lake)

Siem Reap

Angkor

SIEM REAP

Phnom Koulen

Preah Vihear

Sap

50

Gulf of Siam

Pailin

10

BATTAMBANG

Battambang

Sisophon

Poipet

BANTEAY MEANCHEY

Ampil

Anlong Veng

le

0

4

Samrong

THAILAND

ng ko Me

National capital Province capital Town, village Highway numbers

n To

Bassac

Prologue

This book examines Cambodian–American relations during the last third of the twentieth century, a period that saw Cambodia nearly destroyed. It was a period where American policy mattered – and often with very negative consequences. The United States has taken a significant official interest in Cambodia only since World War II, but informal contacts reached back into the nineteenth century. Cambodia itself has a much longer history than has the United States. Though now a small Southeast Asian country, a thousand years ago it was the most powerful kingdom on mainland Southeast Asia. Its capital at Angkor included the most magnificent buildings anywhere in Southeast Asia – or for that matter in the world. Up to one million people lived in the immediate vicinity, and the Angkorean monarchs exercised power far and wide. But by the fifteenth century the empire, under pressure from the Siamese to the west, the Vietnamese to the northeast and the Chams to the south, declined. Angkor was largely abandoned, and the Cambodian court moved south, establishing a new capital in the vicinity of Phnom Penh. In the nineteenth century the kingdom was so weak that it was in many respects a vassal of the more powerful Vietnamese and Thais. The French entered Cambodia in the midnineteenth century and made it a part of French Indochina, the other parts consisting of Laos and the three Vietnamese divisions of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina.1 Since the Americans were great seafarers in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century it is not impossible that Americans called at Phnom Penh at an early date. But the first American known to have visited the kingdom was Frank Vincent, Jr., an adventurer who in 1871–2 explored the recently “discovered” Angkor, traveling there by boat, horse, bullock cart, and elephant. His immensely popular account of his adventures, published as The Land of the White Elephant in 1872, is still available.2 Only a handful of American adventurers followed Vincent into Cambodia for the rest of the century, but in the twentieth century tourism increased, and many Americans joined the pilgrimage to Angkor, now made easier with the development of automobiles and good roads. Others came as big game hunters, and a few engaged in trade. They were joined in 1923 by missionaries from the Christian and Missionary Alliance, the only Americans actually to live in

2

Prologue

Cambodia for any length of time. Their presence was small, however, and in the years before World War II relatively insignificant. There was no American diplomatic presence in the kingdom, although representatives from the consulate in Saigon sometimes traveled to Cambodia and filed reports. What these early contacts did, however, was to create an image of Cambodians as none too capable beings living under a comic opera court. This was, of course, a commonplace western image in those days of most nonwestern lands, all of which were apparently populated by ignorant, lazy natives. There were, of course, some countervailing images, but this was the generally accepted stereotype. Most thought it was good that the French were there to maintain order and, more importantly, to bring modern civilization to a backward land. And it must be presumed that when the United States began to take an official interest in Cambodian developments in the late 1940s these images affected American perceptions and policies. Official interest developed in the wake of World War II. There were essentially two issues. The first involved the anticolonial pressures and revolutions that engulfed much of the colonial world in the wake of the war. In the case of Indochina, Franklin Roosevelt, taking issue with the often expressed view that colonialism was needed, rebuked the French by saying that the people of Indochina were worse off after 100 years of French rule. There were thus some pressures to get the French to retire from the area, if not immediately then after a period of transition. Americans so inclined often cited the American decision to free the Philippines after nearly a half century of tutelage as a good example for European colonial powers. But this tendency soon had to compete with another development: the beginning of the Cold War that pitted the United States and its allies against the perceived dangers of international communism. Though anticolonial sentiment continued to inform American policy, anticommunism generally overwhelmed it in the battle of ideas and in the formation of policy. When the United States established diplomatic recognition of Cambodia in 1950, it did so not so much to contest French colonialism as to protect Southeast Asia (and its own interests) from communist expansion. The Americans did recognize that continued French rule might alienate the populace, however, and so they urged the French to make concessions. But they feared armed resistance against them and were very uncomfortable when in 1953 the King, Norodom Sihanouk, whom the French first installed in 1941, led a “royal crusade” to oust his former patrons. Despite American fears Sihanouk succeeded, and by 1954 Cambodia was genuinely independent. The United States upgraded its diplomatic presence to an embassy. Thereafter relations with Sihanouk (who abdicated his throne so that he could take a more active part in politics and who effectively controlled the country for the next 16 years) were often marked by controversy. Part of it could be traced to Sihanouk’s anger at condescending treatment from American ambassadors and the American press. But fundamentally the United States

Prologue 3 could never quite find an acceptable way to accommodate to Sihanouk’s insistence that his country would follow a neutral, non-aligned path. As the war in neighboring Vietnam heated up in the 1960s, it became even more difficult for the two countries to maintain close ties. Sihanouk had always thought that American intervention in Vietnam had been a mistake, and in 1963 he ended all American aid. In 1964 there was a violent demonstration at the American embassy, and the following year, after another such demonstration, the Prince broke relations. The immediate cause was a cross-border air attack on a Cambodian village – one of hundreds of such raids over the past several years. For the next four years there were no diplomatic relations. The Australian embassy and its distinguished ambassador, Noël St. Clair Deschamps, handled American affairs in Phnom Penh. Despite the lack of ties, Deschamps had plenty to do as the quickly escalating war in Vietnam often spilled over into Cambodia. In January 1968 there were serious discussions between an American representative, Chester Bowles, and Sihanouk, about improving relations. Sihanouk credited Lyndon Johnson with keeping the real hawks at bay, including those in the military who had long wanted to invade his country to destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese sanctuaries there, and he hoped to reestablish relations while Johnson was President, rather than with the “wicked” Richard Nixon, as he once described the incoming President. But it was not to be. Instead, in one of those interesting international ironies, it was Richard Nixon, who had long been sympathetic to military desires to go into Cambodia, who made the concessions necessary to restore relations – although that did not prevent intensive American bombing of Cambodia and an invasion. The stage was set for tragedy.3

1

Richard Nixon and Cambodia Diplomatic relations and bombs

We have reported over recent months the instances of military leaks, particularly from MACV in Saigon, which have apparently been designed to impede the process of resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cambodia. Report from the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C., July 1969 American and South Vietnamese forces are entering Cambodia to destroy “the headquarters for the entire communist military operation in South Vietnam.” President Richard Nixon, speech to the nation, 30 April 1970 It was never our plan to capture COSVN. We didn’t expect it and it would be a stroke of luck if we did. General John Vogt, 12 May 19701

On 21 January 1969 Richard Nixon became President and continued the effort to improve relations with Cambodia. He was excited when on 31 January the new ambassador from Singapore, who was close to Sihanouk, told him that the Cambodian leader had “warm feelings” for him, and Nixon in turn expressed his warm regard for the Cambodian leader.2 About the same time William Rogers, the new secretary of state, advised the President that Southeast Asians would view a resumption of relations as indicating that Sihanouk now thought the United States would prevail in Vietnam. An embassy in Phnom Penh would also allow for better intelligence collection. Significantly, Rogers rejected Department of Defense objections (the department feared that a resumption of relations would limit its options in Cambodia) on the grounds that renewed relations would inhibit “only major new military actions of a kind which I do not think we should take in any case.”3 The new National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, concurred. The President immediately wrote to Sihanouk that he hoped for progress in resolving differences. Sihanouk quickly let the Americans know that if they restored diplomatic relations, he would not use a border incident as an excuse to break them off again – one of the fears that the Americans had. He even made comments that some interpreted as an invitation to the United States to attack areas of Cambodia where concentrations of Viet Cong were (though Australian Ambassador Noël St. Clair Deschamps, who had repre-

Richard Nixon and Cambodia

5

sented American interests in Cambodia during the previous four years, thought this misconstrued Sihanouk’s intent).4 The lack of an acceptable American declaration recognizing Cambodia’s current borders, Sihanouk indicated, was the sole impediment to renewing relations. Nixon determined to move ahead. Acting on instructions, Deschamps informed Sihanouk that the United States would issue a border declaration if this would contribute to a lasting improvement in relations. Cambodia would have to understand that border incidents might occur even after the resumption of relations, although the United States would try to avoid them and would consult with the Cambodian government on ways to resolve them.5 Although the state department did not anticipate an immediate resumption of diplomatic relations, it is significant that Nixon had set a course toward normalization without first getting concurrence from the Thais and South Vietnamese, whose hostility to any border declaration had not diminished. When Sihanouk explained that he did not expect all border incidents to cease, nor did he expect the Americans actually to help demarcate the border, important obstacles were removed. As a goodwill gesture Sihanouk quickly released four Americans whose aircraft had recently been shot down.6 Also, Cambodian armed forces moved against the Viet Cong, especially in Prey Veng and Svay Rieng Provinces. Along the border, South Vietnamese and Cambodian officials consulted in a friendly manner on how they might deal with the Viet Cong. Therefore, on 2 April Nixon approved the issuance of a border declaration that read: “In conformity with the United Nations Charter, the United States of America recognizes and respects the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia within its present frontiers.” Sihanouk was delighted. Because the Americans saw the border declaration in part as a test of Sihanouk’s attitudes and actions, they did not want to rush toward diplomatic relations. Some problems did in fact emerge. Within two weeks of the American declaration, reports surfaced that Sihanouk was no longer happy with it because certain American officials had let it be known that the border declaration meant very little. Citing published reports to this effect, Sihanouk said that he was rejecting the declaration.7 A few days later he raised the level of National Liberation Front (NLF – the Viet Cong) and East Germany representation in Phnom Penh to that of an embassy. Administration officials were inclined to blame the reversal entirely on Sihanouk. He had suddenly come to realize the extent of Vietnamese communist control of northeastern Cambodia and of his powerlessness to do anything about it, they surmised. Therefore he had no choice but to distance himself from the United States again and find a new modus vivendi with Hanoi. Others, like Deschamps (back in Canberra after having been replaced as ambassador) thought it more likely that Sihanouk was playing domestic politics and that the United States should not respond but watch and wait.8 Observers in Phnom Penh could not easily explain Sihanouk’s reversal. “There is no one reason or set of reasons generally accepted as explaining

6

Richard Nixon and Cambodia

rejection of United States declaration,” reported the Australian embassy after surveying both diplomatic and Cambodian opinion.9 Deschamps may have been correct that Sihanouk’s complaints about the border declaration were intended mostly for a domestic audience, but as the Americans surmised the Prince may also have been dismayed at how deeply entrenched the Vietnamese were in northeastern Cambodia. He may also have misjudged the prospects for a quick end to the war in Vietnam at the Paris peace talks, and he certainly encountered Chinese and North Vietnamese diplomatic pressure. Important as these factors may have been, Sihanouk was clearly irritated at the glosses certain Americans put on the declaration, as well as with general American press reporting about Cambodia.10 Leaks from American officials about the meaninglessness of the declaration were possibly deliberate, intended to derail the reconciliation. “It is a pattern which has occurred frequently in the past, whenever an improvement in U.S.–Cambodian relations has appeared a possibility,” Senator Mike Mansfield (D–MT) wrote to the President.11 Mansfield (and Sihanouk) had genuine cause for concern. As the senator stated, it was a pattern that had occurred frequently in the past. Just when relations were improving, a major border incident or other disruption occurred that threatened to (and sometimes did) thwart efforts at reconciliation. Deschamps also saw this pattern. There was, he recalled, a “hydra-headedness” to American policy. “You’ve got so many institutions involved in foreign affairs, and more or less in rivalry and not always in cooperation.” Asked to respond to the observation that every time there was an important potential breakthrough in efforts to improve relations there was a major bombing incident, he responded, “Exactly … That’s exactly what I mean by hydra-headed. The different institutions were working against each other instead of as a team.”12 Elements in the American military establishment – most likely military intelligence officers – disliked this incipient rapprochement, just as they had disliked similar efforts in the past, and it is probable that they tried to derail the improvement. Hard evidence of this is not easy to find. But in addition to assertions by Mansfield and Deschamps, officials in the Australian embassy in Washington, who had close contact with American officials, believed this to be the case. “We have reported over recent months the instances of military leaks, particularly from MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] in Saigon, which have apparently been designed to impede the process of resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cambodia,” reported an embassy official in July 1969.13 The military’s disagreement with efforts to improve relations may explain, at least in part, the several cross-border incursions and bombing raids that took place in March and April. These, as well as published reports that defoliants had been used in Cambodia and that small teams of Americans were covertly going into Cambodia and occasionally kidnapping villagers, would undoubtedly have angered Sihanouk.14 Potentially the most damaging military leak came on 9 May when William Beecher’s very accurate story about secret B-52 raids on Cambodian territory

Richard Nixon and Cambodia

7

appeared in the New York Times. Beecher, who had a reputation as a Pentagon ally, was later appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. By some accounts his disclosure of the bombing was intended to help the Nixon administration by showing that it was getting tough.15 But at the time the Nixon administration was almost apoplectic about the leak, and it is at least equally plausible that military officials in Saigon leaked the story to derail improving relations with Phnom Penh. Beecher himself stated that his information came from military sources, and state department officials believed that, despite the story’s Washington dateline, it was “almost certainly leaked by MACV in Saigon.” As a consequence of the leak, the state department deliberately avoided informing American authorities in Saigon about its most recent effort to assuage Sihanouk. Even before that American message reached Sihanouk, however, two leaks about defoliant usage in Cambodia threatened to vitiate “the chances of this message having any useful effects in Phnom Penh.”16 A little later Newsweek repeated the charge that the United States was bombing Cambodian territory, and United Press International (UPI) reported that teams of unmarked American helicopters were penetrating up to ten miles inside Cambodia seeking out Vietnamese communist targets. The leaks, whether intended to disrupt the pending rapprochement or not, slowed the movement but did not derail it. Mansfield played an important role (according to the state department) in convincing Sihanouk not formally to reject the border declaration. Having been assured by Rogers that no responsible American officials had attempted to undermine the border declaration, Mansfield made a speech on the Senate floor praising the administration’s Cambodia policy, condemning “diversionary” interpretations of the border declaration that came from unofficial sources outside of the executive branch, and assuring the Cambodians that the administration stood behind the border declaration.17 On 22 May, in a further effort to reassure the Cambodians, the United States informed Cambodian officials that there had been no official American statements “contradicting, expanding, or expressing reservations to” the declaration.18 This satisfied Sihanouk, who was perhaps influenced as well by an increasing number of armed clashes between Cambodian and Vietnamese communist forces, and on 11 June the Cambodian government informed the United States that it was now prepared to resume diplomatic relations. For reasons that are not entirely clear the United States did not immediately respond to Cambodia’s offer. The Americans may have been mulling over as an alternative interim step sending an American representative to be attached to the Australian embassy. But on 27 June the United States accepted the Cambodian proposal and proposed 2 July as the date for formally resuming relations.19 There were some nervous moments that the arrangement might unravel when American military officials in Vietnam announced that American artillery and aircraft would attack Vietnamese targets in Cambodia. But Sihanouk overlooked this provocation, and Thay Sok, who was already in the United States where he was attached to the French embassy, immediately took over as

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Cambodian chargé d’affaires. On 21 July Lloyd M. Rives, who had served previously in Hanoi and Vientiane as well as in Africa, was named American chargé in Phnom Penh. On 15 August Rives reopened the American embassy. After a hiatus of over four years, diplomatic relations had been restored, causing one relieved Australian official to comment, “Amen.”20 The Australians, and some in the state department, still feared that provocative leaks from American military sources in Vietnam could derail the improving relations. In fact in July when a story appeared indicating that the United States was preparing claims against Cambodia for damages, the Australian embassy in Washington reported that it was “another MACV leak.” “What else?” wrote an External Affairs official on the telegram. There were in fact many provocations that Sihanouk could have used to reverse course, but he chose to ignore or minimize them and indeed seemed more concerned at Vietnamese communist activity in his country. The Prince did not have high expectations, however. As the Australian embassy put it, Sihanouk’s views were “soberly expressed, without illusions and indicate[d] a rather cool but not unfriendly attitude towards the impending establishment of U.S. diplomatic mission.”21 Less than a week after Rives arrived in Phnom Penh, Mansfield came to Cambodia. Sent by Nixon to symbolize the new relationship, Mansfield was received almost as a chief of state. The atmosphere, reported Rives, was “extremely cordial.” In a toast Mansfield said that American military force would be used on the Asian mainland only in the most extreme situations.22 The bilateral relationship, it appeared, had gotten off to a good start. The United States’ major hope in restoring diplomatic relations was that it could gain an advantage over its enemies in South Vietnam who used Cambodia as a sanctuary and as a transit point for supplies.23 In this sense, for the Nixon administration Cambodia truly was a “sideshow,” a term journalist William Shawcross made famous. Even so, to a certain extent there was a confluence of interests. Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory angered Sihanouk. The Cambodian government even published a map of Vietnamese inroads into the country, and armed clashes took place between the Cambodian military and the Vietnamese. At the same time the Americans believed that Sihanouk had made a deal with the Viet Cong allowing them to import arms through the port of Sihanoukville, provided none of the weapons got to the Cambodian communists, the Khmer Rouge. According to one well-placed American, Sihanouk subsequently ordered General Lon Nol not to release Chinese arms to the Viet Cong, but “the Vietnamese … then bribed Nhiek Tioulong to release the arms.”24 All of this illustrates how Sihanouk had to maneuver carefully in a web of conflicting pressures. His larger goal was to ensure his country’s survival, to try to keep it from becoming further enmeshed in the violence in neighboring Vietnam, and to gain international acceptance of his country’s boundaries. To the United States, these were not the primary concerns.

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B-52 attacks Even as Sihanouk and Nixon were seeking to improve their bilateral relationship, Nixon ordered B-52 strategic bombers to hit Cambodia in highly secret raids that continued for over a year. They were not officially acknowledged until 1973. Because the motives of the two countries in seeking to improve their relationship were only partially coincident, the secret bombing of Cambodia was not as anomalous as it appears at first glance. Just how extensively the Vietnamese communists used Cambodian territory had long been a matter of considerable dispute. Officials in Saigon almost invariably concluded that the enemy’s use of Cambodia was extensive and growing, that Sihanoukville had become the enemy’s major source of armaments, that Cambodian officials were involved in the arms trade, and that the United States ought to respond with military action.25 Generally speaking the state department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were more skeptical of the military’s claims, as were the Australians. And even within the Pentagon there had been disagreement. Late in the Johnson administration, for example, Major General William Depuy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) told Australian diplomats in confidence that he concurred in MACV’s assessment but acknowledged that the evidence “would not stand up in a court of law,” while Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford and Paul Warnke “preferred not to accept these reports and … played them down.”26 The Johnson administration tried to arrive at some degree of consensus on the issue at an important conference of intelligence experts and American and Australian military attachés in Bangkok in December 1968. The most important person at the Bangkok meeting was James Graham, a CIA expert on evaluating intelligence data. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State G. McMurtrie Godley, Graham “was the soundest and most knowledgeable expert on this subject and … his view would be accepted, even if he disagreed with [MACV Commander General Creighton] Abrams.”27 Prior to the Bangkok meeting, the military had engaged in a campaign to publicize its views of the Cambodian situation. With increasing frequency, stories appeared in the American press about Vietnamese communist use of Cambodian territory. The most significant of these was a column by the widely read, well-informed, hardline columnist Joseph Alsop. The day before the Bangkok conference opened (certainly not a coincidence), Alsop, writing from Saigon, reported that Abrams had told the President that “the enemy gets all of his supplies from Cambodia.” Johnson, he stated, reacted “as though stung by a wasp.” Reflecting the military’s scorn for those who disagreed with them, Alsop wrote that “one of the leading Washington analysts [Graham?] has therefore been sent” to Southeast Asia, “no doubt to conduct the study against the facts, which is usual in such cases.”28 Graham brought with him a skeptical mind. At the Bangkok meeting he indicated his objectivity when he told the group that his mission was one of establishing the facts with respect to the “movement of arms through Cambodia, if there is such a thing!” He certainly heard opinions that differed from those of

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MACV. The Australian services attaché stationed in Phnom Penh told the Bangkok meeting that he believed that the amount of supplies getting to the enemy through Cambodia was “very considerably less than is alleged.”29 Just what Graham ultimately concluded remains classified. But it is probable that his final report differed from MACV’s conclusions in some important respects. In one conversation Graham indicated that the evidence of clandestine arms shipments through the port of Sihanoukville was inconclusive, and he was skeptical of claims that large amounts of arms had reached the enemy in South Vietnam from Sihanoukville. He nevertheless agreed that there were significant enemy base areas in Cambodia and that arms were getting to the Vietnamese through Cambodia; but he felt that infiltration through Laos remained a possible source for these arms, despite MACV claims that that route had been stopped.30 A further indication that Graham did not confirm the military assessment was Johnson’s unwillingness to authorize additional military actions against Vietnamese bases in Cambodia in the two weeks he remained in office. Further suggesting that the report was not to the military’s liking, the following February Godley commented to an Australian diplomat that MACV remained “unrepentant despite the Graham Mission.”31 In sum, by the time the Johnson administration left Washington, no consensus had been reached within the government on the extent to which the Vietnamese communists used Cambodian territory. Not surprisingly, therefore, when the new administration took office Earle Wheeler, chairman of the JCS, renewed his request to attack enemy bases in Cambodia. On 9 February Abrams recommended a single, intensive attack lasting about one hour on what he asserted was the headquarters of the enemy’s Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Unlike Johnson, Nixon was predisposed to believe MACV’s assessments. He came into office wanting to wipe out the sanctuaries. When Kissinger told him that little had been done to destroy enemy concentrations in Cambodia, Nixon was angry and approved Abrams’ request. Postponed twice, the initial secret B52 raid took place on 18 March.32 Abrams promised that the raid – OPERATION BREAKFAST – would completely destroy the target. A joint American–South Vietnamese reconnaissance team that went in immediately afterwards soon found out that this was not the case. Enemy automatic weapons fire nearly wiped it out, and a second team refused orders to go in.33 Post-strike analysis concluded that the bombing had resulted in numerous secondary explosions, suggesting that many munitions had been destroyed. But military officials subsequently admitted that they had seen “no evidence of enemy attempts to evacuate the area since Operation BREAKFAST and there has been no significant change in the enemy order of battle.” The area remained “a lucrative target” and warranted “restrike.”34 Obviously the attacks had not destroyed COSVN. The failure of the raid to accomplish its objectives did not stop the military from recommending additional strikes in new areas. On 9 April the JCS recommended that standing authority be granted to use B-52s to attack enemy forces

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retreating into Cambodia. Two days later they recommended intensive strikes on two more base areas: 609 and 353. No mention was made of possible COSVN headquarters in these areas. And while the Chiefs did envisage only “minimum risk to Cambodian civilians,” they did expect some casualties. They estimated that 196 Cambodians lived in Base Area 609, while 1,640 lived in Base Area 353. The areas were not heavily populated, but they were not, as Henry Kissinger stated in 1973, “unpopulated.” Similarly, Nixon lied to the American people when he told journalists in August 1973 that “no Cambodians had been in it [the area bombed] for years. It was totally occupied by the North Vietnamese Communists.”35 In fact, the Cambodians living in these “unpopulated areas” were terrified. The governor of Ratanakiri, interviewed in 1999, recalled that in his village during the bombing “a great number of villagers were seriously affected by the bomb fragments,” that they “could not endure the tragedy,” and that most of them therefore fled their homes. A Viet Cong defector put it more dramatically: “To the Cambodian villagers, these bombings brought an incomprehensible terror,” he wrote.36 For more than a year, the B-52s secretly bombed targets in Cambodia. Only a few sympathetic members of Congress were informed.37 As late as April 1973 administration officials testifying before congressional committees denied that there had been any bombing of Cambodia prior to May 1970. But in fact from 18 March 1969 through 26 May 1970, B-52s flew 3,875 sorties and dropped 108,823 tons of bombs on Cambodia.38 The bombing had little lasting impact on the ability of the other side to wage war. COSVN was not destroyed, and the Vietnamese communists moved deeper into Cambodia. By July French officials in Phnom Penh were reporting that the area of Cambodia under control of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had actually increased; roads which had been traveled without difficulty only a few weeks earlier were now closed.39 The Australians concurred. An American government report that appears to have been written early in 1970 noted that in 1969 between 55,000 and 70,000 North Vietnamese troops infiltrated into South Vietnam through Cambodia, which was nearly 60 percent of the total infiltration during that year. The sanctuaries, the report noted, “pose a continuing threat to South Vietnam’s internal security that progress in pacification or Vietnamization cannot eradicate.”40 In December 1969, ten months after the bombing began, the head of Cambodia’s military intelligence approached the American military attaché to say that on a recent trip to Stung Treng and Ratanakiri “he had been shocked at extent of Vietnamese Communist/Pathet Lao infiltration in the area.”41 Clearly the bombing had not diminished the presence of the enemy in Cambodia; on the contrary the Vietnamese communists now controlled even more of Cambodia. The bombing had little impact on the war in Vietnam, but it had ominous consequences for Cambodia. Many who fled the bombing joined the Khmer Rouge. As the governor of Ratanakiri recalled, they wanted “to establish a struggle movement to coincide with the propagation of top Khmer Rouge

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leaders,” while Truong Nhu Tang, the Viet Cong defector, wrote that the bombing drove “the more militant into the ranks of the Khmer Rouge” and left “the rest increasingly sympathetic toward the Americans’ enemies.” All told, as journalist Arnold Isaacs put it, the bombing, “was upsetting the delicate balance on which peace in Cambodia rested.”42 But there were few protests from Phnom Penh, and the question arises whether Sihanouk acquiesced in, or even approved of, the bombing. Those few representatives who were informed about the secret bombing were apparently told at the time that Sihanouk “had approved of the bombing,” and once it became public in 1973 administration officials claimed on several occasions that this was the case.43 General Wheeler, Admiral Thomas Moorer, Henry Kissinger, and Richard Nixon all made the same claim.44 Documents preserved in the Nixon papers prepared by (or for) Kissinger stated unequivocally that Sihanouk “privately … consented to US bombing in Cambodia.” And in 1975 a paper produced by officials in the Gerald Ford administration stated the bombing was kept secret “at Sihanouk’s insistence.” These papers falsely implied that there had been consultation with the Cambodian leader.45 In contemporary papers, as well as in his memoirs, Kissinger cites three specific pieces of evidence to support his assertions of Sihanouk’s complicity: (1) over a year before the strikes, Sihanouk privately told Chester Bowles that he would not object to “hot pursuit in uninhabited areas”; (2) on 13 May 1969, two months after the first strikes, Sihanouk said that he had not protested the bombing because he had not heard about it and that he would make no protest unless Cambodians were killed or their property destroyed; (3) in August 1969 Sihanouk commented to Mansfield (who was unaware of the B-52 raids) that he would not protest bombings that affected only the Viet Cong.46 What have scholars and other informed observers concluded? The journalist Stanley Karnow, who had interviewed Sihanouk at the end of 1967, finds Kissinger’s case compelling. Sihanouk “shut his eyes to the bombing,” Karnow wrote, and even provided information to the Americans about Vietnamese communist bases. Others are not so certain. Shawcross argues that the Prince’s alleged acquiescence was “at least questionable.” Historian David Chandler doubts that Sihanouk granted “permission to conduct a full-scale program of bombing.” Australian scholar Justin J. Corfield contends that Sihanouk “welcomed the restoration of full relations, in spite of the bombing, not because of them [sic].” Jeffrey Kimball, in his recent study of Nixon and Vietnam, writes, no one has yet deciphered what Sihanouk really thought, but it is not likely that he welcomed large-scale invasions or sustained B-52 raids, which would plunge his country into chaos. The fact remains that he was not officially asked for permission to bomb; nor did he give it.47 What in fact do we know about Sihanouk’s attitudes toward American military actions in Cambodia? We know that American and South Vietnamese

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attacks on Cambodian territory in earlier years had infuriated the Prince and in May 1965 led to a complete break in diplomatic relations. Six months later, when the United States gave its military commanders limited rights of hot pursuit into Cambodia, Sihanouk objected.48 We know that for the next several years Cambodia protested hundreds of cross-border raids, overflights, and other incursions into Cambodian territory by American and South Vietnamese forces. At the same time, we know that Sihanouk was increasingly unhappy with Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of his territory. In 1967 he blamed the Samlaut rebellion in Battambang Province, which he brutally repressed, on the “Khmer Viet Minh.” Sihanouk then cautiously began to court the United States, during which he made some ambiguous statements about possible American actions against communist forces in Cambodian territory. The first such expression came in December 1967 when Sihanouk told Karnow that if American forces entered “uninhabited regions of our country” and if “limited combat breaks out between American and Vietnamese forces, both illegally in Cambodia, it goes without saying that we would not intervene militarily.”49 Presidential aide Walt Rostow read Sihanouk’s words to mean that “he herewith gives U.S. (repeat) U.S. [but not South Vietnamese] troops a green light to drive Communist forces out of uninhabited Cambodian areas.” Karnow retrospectively agreed – as long as the hot pursuit took place in uninhabited territory.50 But it was not quite that clear. In the same statement in which he said he would not intervene militarily if American troops engaged their Vietnamese enemy in uninhabited areas of Cambodia, Sihanouk said he would nevertheless protest the American presence on his territory, and “if serious incursions or bombings are committed against our border regions inhabited by Cambodians – or by Vietnamese residing in Cambodia who depend upon us for protection,” then, he said, he would protest and strike back as strongly as possible.51 And in a press conference at the end of December 1967, Sihanouk specifically denied that his comments to Karnow meant that he would tacitly allow Americans the right of hot pursuit into Cambodian territory.52 Nor, he told Ambassador Deschamps on December 31, would he even discuss the matter of hot pursuit with an American envoy, who was soon to arrive in Phnom Penh.53 Sihanouk repeated these positions in interviews with the New York Times, the Toronto Star, and the Chicago Daily News. He would not authorize American reconnaissance flights over Cambodia. He would not agree to American patrols entering Cambodia. He would retaliate if American forces entered Cambodia and encountered Cambodian forces. He would never authorize any invasion of his territory by any forces whatsoever or for any reasons whatsoever. Clarifying his comments to Karnow, he stated, I simply said that our army would not intervene if a battle was taking place in remote areas, uninhabited and difficult to control, between American forces and North or South Vietnamese forces infiltrated without our knowledge and in violation of the promises made by the National Liberation Front and the RDVN [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] to respect our

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At a press conference on 7 January 1968 Sihanouk stated again that he would not discuss hot pursuit with an American envoy. “On the right of hot pursuit, which he rejected,” reported the Australian embassy, “Sihanouk said United States was the wolf and Cambodia the lamb, and latter would avoid discussing what sauce he would be eaten with.”54 Three days later when Chester Bowles met Sihanouk, however, the Prince expressed a conditional willingness to have American forces attack Vietnamese Communist forces inside Cambodia. Contrary to what he had told Ambassador Deschamps, he did discuss the question of hot pursuit: In a general discussion of the likelihood of increasing use of Cambodia by VC/NVA forces, Prince said that he would not mind if US engaged in hot pursuit in unpopulated areas. He could not say this publicly or officially but he would be glad to have this kind of US help in solving his problem. If US engaged VC/NVA on Cambodian territory, both would be guilty of violating Cambodian soil, but VC/NVA would be “more guilty.” He said “You would be liberating us from the VC.” He said he wanted US to force the VC to leave Cambodia and in cases of hot pursuit in remote areas where no Cambodian population would be unaffected, he would “shut my eyes.”55 Bowles subsequently termed Sihanouk’s comments “an amazing reversal.”56 Although he had said much the same thing to Karnow, Sihanouk’s virtual invitation to Bowles for the Americans to engage in hot pursuit in uninhabited areas was more explicit. Thus in his memoirs Henry Kissinger correctly quotes Sihanouk as telling Bowles that he was “not opposed to hot pursuit in uninhabited areas” and that, in such cases, he would “shut my eyes.”57 But a willingness to look the other way if the Americans ventured temporarily into uninhabited areas of Cambodia while pursuing fleeing Vietnamese forces cannot reasonably be construed to mean that Sihanouk approved of the intensive, ongoing B-52 bombing raids – raids that had nothing to do with “hot pursuit” and which (despite retrospective administration claims) were not confined to uninhabited areas. In any event, no one asked him. Nor does Kissinger point out that in the same conversation with Bowles in which Sihanouk invited hot pursuit in certain situations, the Prince stated that the root of the problem was American disregard of the Geneva Accords (in particular the failure to hold elections in 1956), which had led to the war in Vietnam. He blamed the United States for driving the Vietnamese communists into Cambodia and urged the Americans to stop the war in Vietnam immediately.

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In sum, at the end of 1967 and early in January 1968 Sihanouk had made it clear that he would not respond militarily if the United States clashed with Vietnamese forces in uninhabited areas of Cambodia, and his comments to Bowles seemed to encourage American military incursions in such areas. This did indeed represent something new. But Sihanouk remained as committed as ever to demanding that all powers respect his territory, and the question of B-52 attacks (which were not closely related to the concept of hot pursuit in any event) was never discussed with him. Although relations between the United States and Cambodia were not very warm for the rest of 1968, Sihanouk did become increasingly agitated at the presence of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops on Cambodian territory. In the first weeks of 1969, Sihanouk’s verbal assaults on the Vietnamese communists and the Chinese increased. Although North Vietnam had recognized Cambodia’s boundaries, he said in February 1969, it “continues to send its partisans to penetrate our country in increasingly greater numbers.” He feared that they intended “to stay for good.” Later he complained that he could not even visit parts of his own country because the Vietnamese occupied it.58 The Americans were encouraged. For those Americans (and South Vietnamese) who wanted to take aggressive actions against enemy forces in Cambodia, Sihanouk’s remarks at a press conference on 6 March – 12 days before the first B-52 attacks – provided, they thought, an invitation to bomb areas of Cambodia where the Viet Cong were present. As South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Chanh Thanh asked an American official later, when were the Americans going to “take Prince Sihanouk up on his invitation?”59 Actually Sihanouk’s statement was really a condemnation of American bombing of populated areas, not an invitation to bomb areas where there were Vietnamese communists.60 Then on 28 March Sihanouk explicitly rejected reports that he would allow the bombing of Cambodia. Responding to a UPI report that the American military had recommended B-52 attacks on Cambodian territory and to reports that he “would not be opposed to bombing by the Americans directed against communist objectives inside Cambodia’s frontiers,” Sihanouk responded angrily, “How could a head of state, placed in the situation we are in, agree to allow his country to be bombed?” He would, he stated, “always oppose, up to the limit of his capacity, any bombing of Cambodian territory, whatever the pretext may be.”61 Kissinger does not mention Sihanouk’s remarks on 28 March. He does, however, maintain that on 13 May Sihanouk for “all practical purposes invited us to continue” the bombing. At the press conference, Sihanouk (who interestingly refers to a “report about several B-52 bombings,” presumably a reference to William Beecher’s accurate report about the secret bombings which had appeared in the New York Times on 9 May) said he had not protested the attacks “because I have not heard of the bombings.” No Cambodian had informed him about them, he said, and the Vietnamese would not do so because that would prove that they were on Cambodian territory. He would protest only if Cambodians were injured.62

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Sihanouk did indeed make the statements Kissinger cites, although the news conference, which took place in a provincial area and was broadcast in Cambodian, was intended for a domestic audience. His remarks reflected his anger at Vietnamese use of his territory (he had, after all, lost control to them over a section of northeastern Cambodia the size of a province), and the Americans could reasonably conclude that Sihanouk would not protest attacks on Vietnamese forces in remote areas of Cambodia, as long as no Cambodians were injured or their property damaged. But in the same statement Sihanouk “categorically” denied that “he has ever allowed U.S. bombing of his territory” and insisted (as Kissinger acknowledges) that he would not permit violations of his territory “by either side. Please note that.”63 Sihanouk also discussed the bombings with his friend Mike Mansfield, who arrived in Phnom Penh in August 1969, shortly after diplomatic relations had been restored. Sihanouk pointed out to Mansfield that Cambodia had not protested bombings that affected only the Viet Cong and did not injure Cambodians, and he strongly urged the United States to avoid injuries to Cambodians. At the same time, he urged the United States, once again, to leave Vietnam, which of course would have meant the bombing would end. Although Kissinger sees the comments to Mansfield as confirming his view that Sihanouk knew of and approved the bombings, when the bombing became public knowledge in 1973 Mansfield commented publicly, and then wrote to Sihanouk directly, that “any suggestion that you were in accord, tacit or otherwise, with the several thousand secret bombing raids on your country and had so informed me was completely incomprehensible to me.”64 In sum, Sihanouk was never asked to approve the B-52 bombings, and he never gave his approval. He steadfastly insisted on respect for Cambodia’s integrity and sovereignty. He strongly protested American and South Vietnamese border incidents that resulted in injury to Cambodians and Cambodian property. He sought the American border declaration in part to limit border raids and attacks. Though he said that he did not expect that all border raids would end and that he would not use them as an excuse in the future to break relations, he hoped they would diminish. Nixon’s initial letter to him on 14 February encouraged him, for the President wrote that he shared the Prince’s desire to make “every effort … to localize the conflict in Vietnam” and promised to “exercise the utmost restraint.”65 And in instructions to Ambassador Deschamps to be conveyed orally to Sihanouk, the United States pledged that its forces would “do their best … to avoid incidents which might cause casualties or damage in Cambodia.”66 Sihanouk responded that he was encouraged to learn of Nixon’s desire for the belligerents to “display the utmost restraint … with a view to circumscribing the theatre of war to the national territory of Vietnam.”67 Deschamps, who probably knew Sihanouk’s mind as well as any Westerner and who continues to be in close touch with him, stated emphatically that the Cambodian leader did not know about the bombings in advance. “No, no, no, no, very definitely not,” he said.68

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Sihanouk did acknowledge that his army of 35,000 was unable to control the frontier, and those Americans who wanted to bomb Vietnamese forces in Cambodia could take comfort in some of his remarks that suggested he would look the other way. Given his anger at the Vietnamese abuse of his territory and his belief that they were also supporting his domestic opponents, the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk shed few tears over their casualties. He did, after all, renew relations with the United States, even as the bombing was well underway and, as Nixon pointed out, invited the American President to visit Phnom Penh.69 But the retrospective defenses of the American bombing seize on Sihanouk’s occasional remarks about looking the other way and generally ignore the larger context of his ultimate goals, which was to keep the violence away from Cambodia and retain his country’s independence and neutrality. And while he did not want the United States to withdraw entirely from Southeast Asia, he saw nothing positive to be gained from continued American military involvement in Vietnam. An immediate departure would be best, he thought.

Border incidents, clandestine incursions, and defoliation Although (with one exception), Sihanouk did not protest the B-52 bombings, he protested numerous other instances of American and South Vietnamese incursions. In the first four months of 1969, Cambodia formally protested 109 incidents – 21 more than during the same period in 1968.70 Also complicating the relationship were the numerous clandestine operations. Reconnaissance patrols had existed for some years but were systematized in May 1967 and given the code named OPERATION SALEM HOUSE. Initially teams of six to eight Americans and South Vietnamese operating under strict limitations sought tactical intelligence in the northeastern tip of Cambodia. Subsequently, the operations (renamed DANIEL BOONE) expanded to encompass the entire Cambodian–Vietnamese border region, and the teams operated up to 20 miles inside Cambodia. The previous requirement that each mission have approval from Washington was dropped, and helicopters were authorized to infiltrate the teams. Beginning in October 1968, the number of missions increased sharply. For the first time, the teams were authorized to use anti-personnel mines, and the limitations on the number of Americans who could be included were eliminated. Increasingly there were casualties and contact with civilians and Cambodian military personnel. Covert incursions increased significantly after Nixon took charge. In the first four months of 1969 alone there were at least 188 missions, several of which the Cambodian government protested.71 During all of 1969 there were 454 missions; 558 took place the following year. This compared with 99 in 1967 and 387 in 1968.72 Several Americans and South Vietnamese died, and at least 15 helicopters were lost. These operations, thought Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, were of only “marginal” value. But the JCS – who refused to provide “an adequate evaluation of the SALEM HOUSE

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program” to the state department – declined to end the missions. They considered the DANIEL BOONE missions useful in gathering information about enemy troop movements. By the time they were ended in 1972, at least 1,885 missions had been undertaken; 27 Americans died, and the families of those killed were not told that they had been in Cambodia.73 Tensions between the United States and the Cambodians also resulted from defoliation of trees and crops. From time to time there had been complaints about the dropping of “yellow powder” over areas of Cambodia, and at times defoliation (RANCH HAND) operations in Vietnam had resulted in unintentional drift of herbicide into Cambodia. But the most dramatic incident occurred in April 1969 when herbicidal damage occurred over an area of approximately 270 square miles. According to the Cambodians there were additional defoliation operations on 9, 12, and 14 May which “nearly doubled over the area affected up to 8th May.”74 The Cambodian government was especially concerned with damage to about one-sixth of this area, where fruit and rubber trees were most affected. In response to Cambodian protests, the United States offered to send a scientific team to investigate and, indicative of the generally improving relations, Cambodia for the first time accepted American investigators. In July four American scientists entered the field. Their findings confirmed Cambodian allegations. Damage near the border was the result of the drift of herbicidal Agents Orange and White, which had been sprayed on South Vietnam when the meteorological conditions were not good. But plantations much deeper inside Cambodia had been sprayed and had suffered severe, though not irreparable, damage.75 The defoliation was deliberate, perhaps in part related to military attempts to undercut efforts to improve Cambodian–American relations. An official American report acknowledged that the areas that were defoliated “ran in regular straight lines and the surrounding jungle was not affected.”76 When Rives arrived in Phnom Penh shortly thereafter, the herbicide issue was “the most important one” he had to confront, and he suggested an immediate partial payment pending a final settlement.77 The state department thought Rives alarmist and did not immediately agree to a payment, but there was no question that the United States would pay damages, which the state department tentatively estimated to be $8.6 million, $5 million of which would go to France since the affected plantations were French owned. By the end of the year the Cambodian claim had jumped to $12.2 million. The military denied that it was responsible for the defoliation, and the irrepressible and imaginative Martin Herz (a foreign service officer whose book about Cambodia had angered Sihanouk) surmised that the Vietnamese communists might have done it. “Both we and the Cambodians [may] have been the victims of a deliberate, well-planned and exceedingly well-executed communist provocation,” he wrote.78 No one else shared Herz’s views, however. Almost surely the defoliation resulted from some secret American operation. In July 1971 Senator Frank Church (D–ID) charged that Air America, the CIA contract airline, had done it. His source, Church wrote, was “an individual who is in a position to know.” Queried about this, Ambassador to South Vietnam

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Ellsworth Bunker denied Air America’s involvement, but he acknowledged that some American airplane, as yet unidentified, might have been involved.79 If it was not a CIA operation, some other American intelligence agency was probably responsible. In 1973 the legal affairs branch of the state department determined unequivocally that the United States was legally responsible to pay “reparations and compensation” to Cambodia for all the defoliation damage.80

New beginnings? The restoration of relations in July 1969 and Senator Mansfield’s visit seemed to mark a chance for a new beginning. “The United States and Cambodia are at a threshold that offers an opportunity to make a clean beginning,” wrote Mansfield.81 Unfortunately, such optimism was premature. After his visit, in fact, the number of Cambodian protests about American violation of Cambodian territory and airspace increased. In October alone Cambodia protested a “rather staggering” 83 separate incidents. In view of this impressive total, wrote Rives, “it appears some credit should be given Cambodia for restraint.” He hoped such incidents could be reduced.82 The most serious incident occurred on 16–19 November when American planes and artillery repeatedly attacked Dak Dam (located 4 miles inside Cambodia), the Cambodian military post located there (which was destroyed), and neighboring villages, including Bu Chric which was hit by B-52s. (This appears to be the only time the Cambodian government specifically protested the use of B-52s.) The American action was triggered when enemy artillery fire, located near the town, hit the Special Forces camp at Bu Prang, located inside Vietnam some 5 to 6 miles from Dak Dam. When American planes tried to suppress the artillery fire, Cambodian forces responded with anti-aircraft rounds. The American pilots then attacked the anti-aircraft guns and, in so doing, inflicted substantial casualties on Cambodian military personnel. At least 25 Cambodians died, and a number of animals, civilian and military buildings (including a school house), and vehicles (including an ambulance) were damaged or destroyed.83 It was, as Marshall Green informed Rogers, “the most serious border incident yet in number of Cambodian casualties, [and] it is among the few involving significant losses among Cambodian Army personnel.”84 This was not the first time Dak Dam had been attacked. In fact on six separate days in October, American and South Vietnamese helicopters had attacked the town with rockets and machine guns, and Rives had asked for an investigation. This new incident resulted in protests within the American bureaucracy. At the United Nations, Ambassador Charles Yost objected to the repeated incursions into Cambodia. If there were a Security Council debate, he wrote, it would be highly embarrassing, for Cambodia would be able to demonstrate “that over period of several years we have repeatedly inflicted significant casualties on Cambodian civilians as well as military.” This would have a “damaging effect” on American public opinion which was “already in a brittle and sensitive state over Mylai affair and other aspects of our operations.”85

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The Dak Dam attack upset Rives. Several months earlier he had privately expressed the fear that such incidents would occur – and that they might be part of a deliberate effort by American military forces to undercut improved relations. “Rives is obviously perturbed – as we here have been before him,” reported the Australian ambassador at that time, “by the possibility that the United States military authorities in Viet Nam will follow a policy towards Cambodia which was different to that of the White House and the State Department.”86 Now he told the state department that he did “not quite see what I am expected to say to the RKG in justification Nov. 16 and Nov. 17 attacks” since the Americans’ own photographic evidence showed that a Cambodian military post, along with a school and an ambulance, had been destroyed and numerous Cambodian soldiers killed.87 Fearing that another break in relations was possible, he strongly suggested that the President send a personal message to Sihanouk expressing his distress over the incident.88 There was no presidential message, but the United States did express its official regrets and sent solatium payments. Much to Rives’ irritation, the border incidents continued. Between 26 November and 17 December Cambodia protested over 40 incidents. On 10 December Rives learned that three days earlier 300 artillery rounds had been fired into Cambodia – the largest ever in a single day. Rives was especially upset by a new, if smaller, attack on Dak Dam, which was “particularly dangerous in view past history.”89 Yet another significant diplomatic irritant concerned the Cambodian decision in October 1969 to end the activities of the International Control Commission (ICC). The decision mystified the Americans, who were initially uncertain what it meant. Often the United States had complained that the ICC had spent most of its energy investigating allegations of American and South Vietnamese violations of Cambodian sovereignty while being dilatory about Viet Cong and North Vietnamese activities in the country. Bunker, who had to investigate the border incidents, considered the ICC “totally useless” and was not overly disturbed at its possible demise. But on the whole the United States regretted the Cambodian decision.90 In 1968 the United States had made attempts to invigorate it, anticipating that it would be useful in verifying Vietnamese communist operations in Cambodia. Also, the withdrawal of the Canadian ICC team would be an intelligence loss for the United States. The Americans tended to believe that Sihanouk’s decision represented a tilt toward the Chinese communists and the North Vietnamese. The Prince, Rives wrote, continued to believe in the inevitable victory of the Viet Cong and North Vietnam in South Vietnam and in the inevitable dominance of Communist China throughout Southeast Asia. Therefore, he has played up to these powers in the hope of winning their friendship now, in preparation for the future. It also seems likely that Sihanouk was responding to Chinese pressure, and since he needed the Chinese to restrain the Vietnamese he asked the ICC to leave.91

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In sum, by the end of 1969 the United States and Cambodia still maintained diplomatic relations. But the border incidents persisted; Cambodians continued to die in bombing raids and clandestine operations; the B-52s continued to take their toll, helping to destabilize Cambodia, driving the enemy deeper into Cambodia, and giving aid and comfort to Sihanouk’s most bitter enemies, the Khmer Rouge. And Sihanouk appeared to be reverting to his earlier view that the Vietnamese communists would prevail in Vietnam and that China would be the dominant outside power. Relations between the United States and Cambodia had cooled. The new year did not bring any immediate improvement in relations. The Cambodian government effusively welcomed two American scientists, E. W. Pfeiffer of the University of Montana’s Biology Department and Professor Arthur Westing of Wyndham College in Vermont, who, with two French colleagues, observed defoliation damage and criticized the American bombing of Dak Dam. (Westing chaired the Herbicide Assessment Commission of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.) Also, in the first week of January alone the Cambodian government filed seven protests about border incidents. Shortly thereafter the Cambodians protested additional incidents of herbicide damage. In February the government accused American or South Vietnamese helicopter crews of killing three Cambodian motorists on Highway 7, and Cambodian forces captured another U.S. naval vessel that had strayed into Cambodian waters on the Mekong River. In sum, border incidents, some involving fatalities, continued to plague Cambodian–American relations. There was no significant warming of relations until Lon Nol and Sirik Matak ousted Sihanouk in March 1970 when the Prince was out of the country.

The coup In March 1970, while Sihanouk was out of the country, Sisowath Sirik Matak and Lon Nol ousted him. Sihanouk’s dismissal (which followed constitutional forms, rather than a blatant military coup d’état) immediately produced much speculation as to its causes. From the beginning, Sihanouk claimed that the United States – and in particular the CIA – was responsible. Antiwar critics, the North Vietnamese, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese made similar claims. Nixon and Kissinger maintained that the Americans had nothing to do with it and were, in fact, caught completely by surprise. “We had no role in the change of Government,” Nixon told Indonesian President Suharto in May 1970. At the end of June he told the American people that the “government had no advance warning of the ouster of Sihanouk.” Kissinger even theorized that the revolt was partly instigated by Sihanouk himself so that he could demonstrate to the Soviet Union and China that he had a right-wing opposition and that he needed to be placated so that he could remain in control of Cambodia.92 What have scholars concluded? Closest to the Kissinger/Nixon view is Evelyn Colbert, a Southeast Asian scholar who, from 1962 to 1968 was Chief of the Southeast Asia Branch of the Far Eastern Division of the state department’s

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Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). She emphasizes that Sihanouk had restored diplomatic relations and was taking an increasingly hard line toward the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. There was, therefore, no American motive to replace him.93 But most others see at least some American involvement. Historian Ben Kiernan clears the CIA but implicates “sections of the U.S. military establishment and the Army Special Forces.” Although allegations that the coup plans received approval at “the highest level of the U.S. government” have not been corroborated, Kiernan concludes, “it is clear that Lon Nol carried out the coup with at least a legitimate expectation of significant U.S. support.”94 Wilfred Deac attributes Sihanouk’s ouster to internal factors and states that the Americans and others “were taken by surprise” and that “it was not in the American interest to upset the Cambodian status quo.” But some Americans had foreknowledge of the coup, and “U.S. military mid-operating levels, including an air force general, did encourage Khmer counterparts to depose the prince.” Other Americans promised their Cambodian contacts American support if Sihanouk were replaced.95 Shawcross credits internal factors for Sihanouk’s ouster and states that “no direct link between the United States government and Sihanouk’s usurpers before the coup has been established.” But he presents considerable circumstantial evidence – including the testimony of two CIA agents – that the United States was aware of the coup ahead of time and may have played a supporting role. He is particularly persuasive in arguing that the United States “had always found the Sihanouk regime inadequate” and that Cambodians who wanted to remove Sihanouk had no reason to doubt that the United States would welcome such a move.96 Chandler also emphasizes internal factors but suspects that there was at least one CIA agent (and possibly more) in the small American embassy in Phnom Penh who had reestablished contacts with old friends, including Sirik Matak, the coup leader.97 Milton Osborne believes that the CIA was not responsible for the coup but adds that “the involvement of some American intelligence services is now beyond dispute” and that Sihanouk, though wrong about the CIA, “could, with justification, point to the incontrovertible evidence that other American agencies knew of the plotters’ plans.”98 Historian Jeffrey Kimball finds no direct evidence of White House or CIA involvement but thinks that military intelligence officials were involved.99 The most recent and most thorough analysis of Sihanouk’s ouster comes from Australian scholar Justin J. Corfield. Corfield identifies three groups of conspirators which, to a certain extent, overlapped. Two of the groups consisted of Cambodians who were dissatisfied with Sihanouk’s rule (and Corfield’s greatest contribution is his detailed account of the Cambodian plotting). But the United States was also “a driving force” behind Sihanouk’s ouster. “The evidence that the US and her allies were involved in the plot is now overwhelming,” he concludes.100 In sum, although the precise degree of American involvement remains murky, most scholars have concluded that, at the very least, some military intelligence agents are culpable.

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Whatever the specific American involvement in the coup, it can be said that there were a number of factors that probably led certain Americans to push for a change of leadership in Cambodia. The American military had chaffed at Sihanouk’s constant protests over border incidents, his acquiescence at the presence of Vietnamese soldiers who sought sanctuary, and his complicity (so they believed) in conveying supplies to the enemy. Military leaders had even drawn up plans for an invasion of Cambodia in 1967 and 1968 and were upset that Lyndon Johnson would not approve them. With Nixon’s election, they pushed even harder and soon received approval for the B-52 strikes and stepped up intelligence operations inside Cambodia. For a time in 1969 as Sihanouk himself worried about the presence of Vietnamese communist troops in Cambodia, he cut off their supplies. But there were reports, apparently accurate, that shipments resumed later in the year.101 On the political side, Sihanouk appeared to have moved back closer to the North Vietnamese; in September 1969 he had attended Ho Chi Minh’s funeral in Hanoi, and North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong was scheduled to visit Phnom Penh early in 1970.102 For those looking for evidence of Sihanouk’s move toward the communist bloc, the publication in Sangkum in September 1969 of an East German document listing the names of 3,000 alleged CIA agents would have been convincing evidence.103 Sangkum helpfully pointed readers to the names of those agents who had served in Cambodia. Critics would also have noted Sihanouk’s warm reception of the antiwar American scientists early in January. They might also have pointed out that shortly thereafter, after Sihanouk left Phnom Penh in January 1970 for medical treatment in Paris, there were reports that he would return via Prague, Moscow, and Peking. Furthermore, Sihanouk was making it very difficult for the Americans to persuade Cambodians to support the American viewpoint. The embassy was unable to place news stories in local publications, to show movies or encourage Cambodians to visit the U.S. Information Center, largely because of Cambodian government directives.104 In sum, as Nixon’s chief of staff H. R. Haldeman put it retrospectively, Lon Nol’s ouster of Sihanouk “was all right with us”105 – a comment that contradicts those who contended that there was no motive for replacing Sihanouk. Those who were predisposed to think that the American military situation in Vietnam would improve if there were a change of leadership in Phnom Penh could find reasons to support their perspective. With Sihanouk’s position in Cambodian politics unraveling at this time, and with his major opponents, especially Sirik Matak, being amenable to American influence and support, an opening was there for those who wished to push Sihanouk out.106 The presence of Americanfinanced, anti-Sihanouk Khmer Serei forces available in South Vietnam to assist a new government provided an additional incentive to support a coup. None of this proves American involvement. But there were reasons why some Americans – most likely military intelligence personnel – might have assisted in Sihanouk’s ouster. And there are hints in the diplomatic correspondence of a possible American role or at least of a foreknowledge of the events.

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The arrival in Cambodian waters of the American transport ship Columbia Eagle carrying bombs and other munitions shortly before the coup led to suspicions at the time that it was on a secret mission to bolster the anticipated coup. The Secretary of Defense’s office did send a telegram to the Commander in Chief of American Forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC), military authorities in Thailand, and the U.S. embassy in Bangkok stating mysteriously that it was “of utmost importance that there be no discussion of what may or may not have occurred on the Columbia Eagle in order to safeguard national interests and to protect the rights and safety of individuals.”107 But this is hardly firm evidence that the ship was involved in supporting the coup plotters. In fact, the ship was carrying the munitions to Thailand for use in American planes when two antiwar crewmen hijacked the vessel, forced most of the crew to abandon ship, and directed it to Cambodia where they promptly requested political asylum. As one of the hijackers lightheartedly put it later, “President Nixon tells the world he wants to de-escalate the war, so we thought we’d help him a bit.” Although the hijackers appear to have been given political asylum, they were still in custody when the government changed. One of them served five years in a California prison; the other escaped in Phnom Penh and may have fled to Ratanakiri Province where he married a local woman, took up farming, and joined the Khmer Rouge.108 For his part, the exiled Prince never ceased to believe that he had been the victim of an American-sponsored coup. In 1979, Kissinger met Sihanouk in Beijing and assured him that the United States had had nothing to do with the coup. “You must believe that we were favorable to your returning to power and that we did not like Lon Nol. We liked you.” “Thank you very much,” Sihanouk responded. “I want you to believe it,” Kissinger pressed on. “Excellency,” Sihanouk replied, “let bygones be bygones.” “No. No. No. I want you to say that you believe me,” Kissinger insisted. To which Sihanouk replied, “I apologize. I cannot say that I believe you.”109

Assisting Lon Nol The person in whom the United States now professed considerable faith – Lon Nol – was a problematic leader for modern times. A proud Khmer, Lon Nol identified with and accepted traditional folk beliefs, including astrology and the occult, associated with what he called the “Khmer-Mon” people. In September 1970 his government officially encouraged the use of a number of occult practices to achieve military victory. Lon Nol himself was thought to believe that he personally had the power of divination. According to an official American embassy assessment, as time passed Lon Nol’s reliance on “mystical sources” embarrassed many educated Cambodians.110 Nevertheless, from the outset the United States sought to bolster the Lon Nol–Sirik Matak regime. “I believe it is important that we take positive actions and not let things develop haphazardly,” Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird

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wrote. To this end he wanted a CIA communications post established in Cambodia at once.111 Whether or not the United States had played a role in Sihanouk’s ouster, it clearly approved of the new government and was going to throw its full weight behind it. A major concern for both the United States and the new Khmer Republic was to get the Vietnamese communist troops out of Cambodia. To this end the United States for a time sought to build support for various international solutions. The first to emerge was a proposal to reactivate the ICC. The United States pushed the issue with the Soviet Union, arguing that it was in the mutual interests of the United States and the USSR to have a truly neutral Cambodia. But Hanoi stated that reestablishing the ICC would be a hostile act. Consequently, although the matter continued to be raised from time to time, nothing came of it. More attention went into efforts to arrange international conferences which, the United States thought, might bolster the new Cambodian government. A French proposal for a conference elicited limited support, a New Zealand one even less. Much more significant was an Indonesian proposal for a conference of Asian nations that would try and “prevent Cambodia from being turned into a second Vietnam,” as one Indonesian newspaper put it.112 Some thought (perhaps correctly) that the Indonesian initiative was a way of expressing Asian displeasure at not having been consulted by the French. The French were in turn contemptuous of the Indonesian effort, and several other countries, among them Malaysia and Japan, were also skeptical. But Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik forged ahead with considerable energy, engaging in what the Australian ambassador to Indonesia termed admiringly “excellent broken field running.”113 The Indonesian proposal elicited strong behind-the-scenes support from the United States. Now was the time, the state department cabled its embassies in Asia, “to encourage Asian resolve toward such initiative.”114 On 28 April invitations went out to 19 Asian countries to attend a conference on 11–12 May. But an Asian conference could not promise success, partly because the North Vietnamese wanted no part of it, and some American officials felt that more was required, and at once, if the new government were going to survive. In particular, they looked for ways to send it arms and supplies. Rives and the state department were initially opposed, arguing that France was a better choice as an arms supplier and that American assistance would lend credence to the view that Lon Nol was an American client. Congressional opposition to American aid quickly developed as well, with Mansfield, J. William Fulbright (D–AR), and Jacob Javits (R–NY) among others speaking out on the issue. But despite opposition, Nixon was determined to provide assistance. The administration quickly offered the Cambodian government 1,500 AK-47s, presumably weapons captured in South Vietnam.115 Angry when news about the arms had leaked to the press, the administration established a new channel for correspondence about “U.S. involvement in military assistance to Cambodia.” Only top-level officials would see communications sent via this NODIS/KHMER channel.116 Soon, unmarked airplanes landed at Pochentong airport delivering several thousand weapons, primarily captured

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AK-47s but also M-1 and M-2 carbines. These deliveries were explained as a South Vietnamese operation but it was an American action. In fact, when James Lowenstein and Richard Moose, staff members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, visited the region later (after the American invasion of Cambodia had begun), General Nguyen Van Manh, the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff “and one of the half dozen or so most important officers in the Vietnamese armed forces,” told them that South Vietnam had nothing at all to do with shipments. Lowenstein and Moose went to unusual lengths to be sure that Manh had understood the question. He had.117 Later at MACV headquarters they were told reluctantly that some of the AK-47s might have come from American supplies, but they were rebuffed when they tried to learn about the source of the M1s and M-2s which, in fact, came from both American and South Vietnamese stocks; those from South Vietnam were to be replenished. The United States also assisted the new Cambodian government by allowing Khmer Krom soldiers (ethnic Cambodians who lived in Vietnam) serving in U.S. Special Forces camps to go to Cambodia to fight on the side of the Cambodian government.118 Once in Cambodia they were to be integrated into Lon Nol’s army as the 43rd, 45th, 47th, and 48th brigades. Ostensibly volunteers, some of the Khmer soldiers were surprised when they stepped off the plane and discovered that they were in Phnom Penh.119 As in the case of the weapons, the United States tried to make this appear to be a South Vietnamese operation. But General Manh insisted that his government had not ferried the Khmers to Phnom Penh. In fact, the Vietnamese may have helped the 47th brigade get to Phnom Penh. But the U.S. Special Forces shipped at least the 43rd and 45th.120 The use of the Khmer Krom troops embarrassed the United States. These soldiers had conducted clandestine operations into Cambodia and some, perhaps most, were Khmer Serei, a group that the United States had regularly denied supporting. Charges soon began to circulate these were American mercenaries. In important respects, the critics were right. Government officials in Washington were embarrassed to discover that the Khmer soldiers were not part of the South Vietnamese military but were instead “advised, equipped, supported and paid by US Special Forces.”121 To distance the United States from the Khmer troops, the state department then suggested that they be transferred to ARVN (the Army of the Republic of Vietnam), or, if that could not be done, that their salaries be placed in an escrow account while they were fighting in Cambodia, with allotments being paid to their dependents. The Cambodian government, it was hoped, would pay them subsistence allowances. But the embassy officials and General Abrams in Saigon quickly nixed that idea. The Khmers could not just be transferred to the South Vietnamese army which, in any case, would not accept them. Those who did not volunteer to be transferred to Cambodia remained under American command, and those who volunteered were paid in full and given bonuses by the United States. Once in Cambodia the United States paid them for three days, and then they were entirely separated from the United States military, although the United States continued to send supplies for them.122

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The United States also wanted other countries to assist Lon Nol. Nixon appealed personally to Australian Prime Minister John Grey Gorton, for example. But the most interesting (and most secret) effort involved Indonesia. Within two weeks of Sihanouk’s overthrow, the United States encouraged Indonesian officials to give strong support to the Cambodian government. In fact, the Indonesian government, particularly the military and President Suharto, were following events in Cambodia with deep concern. After all, in 1965 Suharto’s accession to power resembled Lon Nol’s. When American Ambassador Francis Joseph Galbraith visited Suharto on 1 April, he found the President “as animated and intensely interested” in Cambodia as he had ever seen him. Two nights later the highest-level Indonesian intelligence officials spent the entire evening discussing Cambodia. It was evident, thought Galbraith, that they wanted to assist Cambodia, even with arms.123 Foreign Minister Malik, who was trying to organize the international conference, opposed providing aid, as did Indonesia’s ambassador to the United States Sudjatmoko. But on 15 April Suharto stated that Indonesia would not only provide small arms but also would bring Cambodian troops to Indonesia for training – provided the United States would secretly replenish the arms. On 24 April representatives of the Indonesian intelligence service OPSUS informed American officials that they were moving ahead with plans to train Cambodians “in special forces techniques both in Indonesia and Cambodia” and to assist Lon Nol’s efforts to establish effective liaison with the Thais and South Vietnamese. They were also examining Cambodian requests for arms. The Indonesians had substantial stocks of AK-47s and M-1 carbines, but they were also well informed about American shipments of AK-47s to Cambodia and questioned whether additional AK-47s were really necessary.124 Nixon assured the Indonesians that the United States would replenish armaments supplied to the Cambodians. But, although Suharto had in principle approved aid and planning continued (indeed Suharto told Ambassador Galbraith that “military assistance for Cambodia was an absolute requirement” and put intelligence officer Benny Murdani in charge of the Cambodia project), for the moment he held back, not wanting to take action that might undercut Malik’s conference on Cambodia.125 Thus by the time of the American/South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the United States had not yet secured Indonesian assistance to Lon Nol’s government.

The invasion Yet another option for assisting the new Cambodian government was to employ American and South Vietnamese troops directly. The military had of course long urged the use of such troops to “clean out” the Cambodian sanctuaries, and, after the coup, cross-border attacks by South Vietnamese forces escalated. The administration initially opted for caution, however, and the state department urged President Nguyen Van Thieu to stop such operations “until the matter can be considered and coordinated at the highest levels.”126

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In mid-April a state department intelligence analysis of possible communist reactions to cross-border military operations provided a mixed picture. On the one hand, the communists had attempted to pressure the new Cambodian government into allowing them to operate unmolested. They had done this in part by expanding and consolidating their “zones of influence.” Expansion of the zones was likely to continue if South Vietnamese border operations were restricted. On the other hand, “extensive, intense and regular South Vietnamese operations into Cambodia” might provoke them to move directly against the Lon Nol–Sirik Matak regime. They would certainly expand their operational zones significantly, give full support to indigenous “liberation movements,” and generate international pressure from the Soviet bloc against the Cambodian government. The report was, thus, prescient. Read retrospectively, in fact, the report vaguely predicted that large-scale cross-border operations would increase the chances of a Khmer Rouge victory in Cambodia.127 But Abrams and the JCS wanted military action. And on 20 April the President told Haldeman that he would personally “take over responsibility for the war in Cambodia.” Two days later, concerned at reports that the North Vietnamese were about to take Phnom Penh, frustrated at the Senate’s failure to confirm his two nominees for the Supreme Court, anxious to assert his personal authority, angry at various perceived enemies, and perhaps spurred on by repeated viewings of the movie Patton, Nixon approved final planning for a South Vietnamese attack into the Parrot’s Beak area of Cambodia.128 Nixon’s original plan called for an invasion on 25 April. But Kissinger thought Nixon was moving too precipitously (although in principle he supported an invasion), and there was a slight delay. On 27 April the state department ordered Rives, who had not been consulted, to inform Lon Nol that on 28 or 29 April the South Vietnamese army, with the full “understanding and backing” of the United States, would move into the Parrot’s Beak to destroy Vietnamese communist bases. Lon Nol, who had also been kept in the dark, was given three ways of responding publicly. He could say that he had requested the action, or that he had been informed in advance and had no objections, or that he regretted the operation but understood why it was being initiated.129 The President was also now thinking about committing American troops to the operation, primarily to destroy the ever elusive COSVN. Laird and Rogers had been frozen out of the planning and were livid when they found out. In a meeting with the President, Rogers objected to not being consulted and faulted Kissinger for not giving Nixon an accurate picture of the probable consequences.130 It would cost “great US casualties w/ little gained,” he stated. COSVN, he stated correctly, was “not [a] permanent location, not a supply base,” and an operation against it would “not be a crippling blow.” Laird was also angry, though apparently more on procedural grounds than for fear of the consequences. He strongly objected to the operation being directed by Kissinger’s Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) rather than his office. It was an unconstitutional arrangement, he told the President.

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In the face of concerted opposition (“R. & L. reiterated their various arguments several times”), Nixon seemed to backtrack. The problem, he said, was that the South Vietnamese invasion of the Parrot’s Beak would be inadequate by itself. It had to be combined with another operation. If an attack on COSVN was undesirable – and if Abrams so agreed – another target could be selected. But any alternative, Nixon insisted, would require the use of American troops. And if an alternative target was selected, there would probably be a lesser payoff with casualties just as high if not higher. Laird and Rogers continued to protest. In the end Rogers said he would support the President’s decision, but he felt (as Haldeman recorded it) that “all these decisions are made w/o adequate consultation & he doesn’t like it.” After the meeting Nixon ordered Kissinger to postpone the invasion for 24 hours. The President wanted to confirm Abrams’ views about going after COSVN with American troops and was willing to change the target. But he was committed to two operations, one involving American troops. According to Haldeman, Kissinger saw the matter largely as one of presidential authority. “I think [he] would go ahead even if plan is wrong,” wrote Haldeman, “just to prove P. can’t be challenged.” Abrams soon reaffirmed his support of an invasion to destroy COSVN, and shortly thereafter B-52s pounded the sanctuaries.131 On 30 April at 9.00 p.m. (Washington time), Nixon told the nation that American and South Vietnamese troops were entering Cambodia and going after “the headquarters for the entire communist military operation in South Vietnam.” Destruction of COSVN was the campaign’s major immediate objective.132 Soon 44,189 ARVN and American troops (a slight majority American) were fighting in the Parrot’s Beak (primarily a South Vietnamese operation) and Fish Hook (primarily an American operation) areas along the Cambodian border. Later, after COSVN was neither found nor destroyed, the administration would make a concerted effort to insist that it had not been a primary target.133 As the last American troops were pulling out of Cambodia at the end of June, Kissinger claimed that the United States invaded because the communists had determined to topple the new Cambodian government and use the entire country as a base for their operations in Vietnam.134 To be sure, Nixon had been concerned about reports that the North Vietnamese were moving on Phnom Penh and in his speech had claimed that they were encircling the Cambodian capital. But contemporary American assessments of enemy intentions, based in part on captured documents, found little evidence of a North Vietnamese aim to overthrow the Cambodian government and take over the country militarily. White House officials went to extraordinary lengths to measure the public response to Nixon’s speech. They compiled reports of newspaper editorials, carefully watched and evaluated television news broadcasts and commentaries, made note of all congressional reactions, sought out the opinion of business and labor leaders, and kept track of the telephone calls, letters, and telegrams that poured into Washington. Much of the opinion was bitterly critical of the invasion. White House officials, including the President himself, went to unusual lengths to try and reverse the trend and generate support. For example, on 2 May Haldeman

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recorded a large number of presidentially approved initiatives. The President wanted to frame the debate entirely in terms of getting “behind our troops.” He wanted the Gallup Poll to change its question on Cambodia so that the results would be more positive. He wanted to distribute the results of friendly polls. He was concerned with an upcoming CBS “Man on the Street” poll and hoped to influence the question the network would ask. He wanted to follow through on previously vetted actions to organize a recall campaign for Governor Edmund Brown of California if the governor called for Nixon’s impeachment. It was time for Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and other “inflammatory types” to attack the Senate doves, he said, charging them with “knife in the back, disloyalty, lack of patriotism.” There were times, he stated in one of his periodic displays of masculinity, when you had “to step up hard sometimes – not flinch.” Finally, he saw advantages in student rage: “never underest[imate] value of turning the student thing to our advantage esp[ecially] if they get rough.”135 The administration attempted to mobilize right-wing groups such as the Young Americans for Freedom, to have supportive senators keep tabs on doves, to generate letters and telegrams of support from (among others) the Reverend Billy Graham’s mailing list, and to get astronaut Frank Borman on the Ed Sullivan Show. Ross Perot’s help was sought. Haldeman plotted to withdraw Department of Defense research monies from universities where dissent was strong. Nixon was particularly insistent that all cabinet secretaries, under secretaries and assistant secretaries speak out in support. (Getting cabinet support proved difficult. Nixon was angry that none of the cabinet secretaries had called him after the speech to offer him their support, and in a fit of pique he ordered that they not be allowed to use the White House tennis courts.)136 The administration was also intensely interested in the foreign reaction. Every diplomatic post in the world was asked to report official and media reaction to Nixon’s speech and the military action. As a result, voluminous reports were compiled, many of them not comforting to the administration. In all major European countries there was strong criticism of the American action. The British Labour government managed to prevent a condemnation of the United States in Parliament, but many in the party were unhappy at the government’s course. Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart was humiliated at Oxford University and not permitted to speak. Prime Minister Harold Wilson faced a similar situation in Manchester, though he managed with difficulty to finish his speech. In Germany Willie Brandt refused to establish diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol government, and no high-level German official of either major political party would publicly support the United States. The French government was almost palpably hostile. The Scandinavian countries all distanced themselves from the United States. In Yugoslavia, a country favored by the United States because of its split with the Soviet Union, the reaction was especially bitter. Marshall Josip Broz Tito hurriedly recognized Sihanouk’s government in exile, and demonstrators smashed the windows of the USIS building in Belgrade. Venezuelans were uncomfortable, as were Mexicans. In Iran, where Vietnam had scarcely been discussed, Cambodia was the subject of much debate, all of it unfavorable to the United States.

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Non-communist countries of East and Southeast Asia were more supportive. The Thais exhibited “near euphoria.” Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines thought the action was “great, great, great,” though his Foreign Secretary, the eminent Carlos Romulo, was much more reserved. Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew feared that the United States might be tempted to pull out too quickly. The Malaysian government concluded that the Lon Nol administration served its interests better than Sihanouk and passively favored the American action. The Australian government was supportive, but there was much opposition in the country. The Indians were critical. Over 50 members of the Indian Parliament went to the American embassy to express their “horror and outrage at [the] invasion of Cambodia.”137 Particularly important to the administration was the reaction of the Indonesian government because of the planned international conference. The United States tried to reassure Indonesia that the military action in Cambodia did not violate Cambodian sovereignty and in any event made the conference even more important than before. Publicly Indonesian officials “deplored” or “regretted” the action, and a number were strongly opposed in private as well. Foreign Minister Malik, however, privately expressed understanding for the decision. He explained that he had to be critical in public to maintain Indonesia’s credibility for the forthcoming conference. To Ambassador Galbraith this was understandable and even commendable. He urged the administration not to respond strongly to Indonesian verbal attacks. Most important, President Suharto privately supported the American effort. As he told Nixon personally in May, the U.S. action was “essential and important.” If Cambodia went communist, he said, it would become “the base for subversion and infiltration” in the region and would threaten Indonesia.138 In the meantime opposition among Americans to the administration’s Cambodian action intensified. On the day of the invasion, Senator Fulbright and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee demanded to know on what legal basis American forces were being sent into Cambodia and whether the administration planned to consult Congress. By 7 May at least 50 senators had come out in opposition to the President and only 21 had voiced support. Even Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D–WA), a respected hawk who had supported all other acts of escalation, opposed the Cambodian invasion. New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller likened the move to “dropping a match into a powder keg.”139 In the House, John B. Anderson (R–IN) introduced a resolution reaffirming the constitutional requirement for the President to consult with the Congress on questions of war and peace. By 15 May, 78 representatives had become co-sponsors of a bill to cut off all funds used “to finance the operation of any American combat or support troops in Cambodia or Laos.”140 A little later the Senate rejected an amendment reaffirming the President’s responsibility to protect Americans anywhere in the world, “including enemy-occupied Cambodia,” an action that led House Minority leader Gerald Ford (R–MI) to comment that the Senate’s action was a “defeat for American fighting men.”141

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The most visible dissent was seen on the nation’s campuses, many of which exploded in anger. Nixon called student demonstrators “bums” (he claimed, without being entirely convincing, that he was quoted out of context). On 4 May National Guardsmen killed four student demonstrators at Kent State University, setting off an enormous negative reaction around the country and the world. American students in Israel, for example, demanded that the embassy fly the flag at half staff. A number of respected university administrators agreed with their protesting students. Among them was University of Hawaii President Harlan Cleveland, a foreign policy specialist himself, who charged that this was “the only American military enterprise in modern history to be undertaken without the explicit request or permission of the Government whose territory and neutrality are violated.” There was “revulsion” on campus against this decision, he wrote to Nixon.142 The country seemed to be about to be torn apart. Demonstrators took over a portion of the Peace Corps offices in Washington and issued a manifesto calling for withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Some members of the Peace Corps itself joined in opposition to the President’s actions. Two hundred and fifty Foreign Service officers and state department officials signed a letter of protest to Secretary Rogers.143 There was fear of a military coup in Washington. Because Nixon had incited hatred, argued columnist Pete Hamill in the New York Post, the President was as “responsible for the Kent State slaughter as he and the rest of his bloodless gang of corporation men were … for the pillage and murder that is taking place in the name of democracy in Cambodia.” Hamill wondered if Nixon felt his manhood was at stake, wondered if he was lashing out at all of his enemies, people who had given him no respect over the years. “Is he proving his masculinity at the expense of Asian peasants?” Hamill mused. “Is he showing what a macho he can be by unleashing the ugliest barroom instincts in [Vice President Spiro] Agnew, [Attorney General John] Mitchell, National Guardsmen and the American populace?” Hamill was correct about the administration’s extreme rhetoric and its behind-the-scenes attack tactics. On 3 May, to take just one example among many, Nixon met with the “attack group” and told them not to be apologetic. “No defensiveness from WH. … Don’t worry about divisiveness,” he said. “We’ve created division, drawn the sword. Don’t take it out, grind it hard.”144 After Kent State some administration figures, including Charles McWhorter and Rogers, urged Nixon to tone down the rhetoric.145 In response, Nixon was conciliatory during an important press conference in early May. But if the rhetoric was momentarily lowered, behind the scenes the administration retained its “enemies” mentality. It soon undertook a major campaign to discredit student leaders. Among other things, Haldeman ordered Lyn Nofziger to get a column written claiming that the student disturbances were the result of Cuban-trained outside agitators. “This project is to be given top priority,” Haldeman stated.146 Publicly, however, the Nixon administration liked to give the impression that the President relished opposing views. As Haldeman wrote to Herb Klein asking him to rebut the opposite impression in a Tom Wicker column, “you can …

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point out examples of how strongly the President’s advisers have taken positions without any fear of being overruled and that many of them have been overruled and have come right back with another position – not being ruffled a bit.”147 But in fact there was an enormous effort to discourage dissent within the administration. Each cabinet officer, for example, was asked to detail how specifically he and his subordinates were defending the Cambodia operation. The most celebrated example of internal dissent was that of the Secretary of the Interior, Walter Hickel, who criticized the administration’s response to the students. Asked about this in his press conference, Nixon spoke highly of Hickel. “He is courageous. That is one of the reasons I selected him for the cabinet,” he stated, “and one of the reasons I defended him very vigorously before this press corps when he was under attack.” However, Hickel’s dissent was not viewed as “courageous” but rather as traitorous. And the administration’s private response was much the same as toward others it considered its enemy: he was to be discredited and driven out. It was “clear that Hickel was too big for his britches,” Nixon said to Haldeman the day before the news conference. “Be extremely cold – don’t invite to anything.” Some of his cabinet colleagues were to “give him hell.” Returning to the topic a little later, Nixon went on: “start a quiet job chopping Hickel[:] screwed everything up – behind the scenes encourage his enemies – build as incompetent – build pressure on him.” A week later Nixon ordered Haldeman to “get someone to mobilize anti-Hickel ltrs.”148 A few weeks later Hickel was gone. Meanwhile, administration spokespersons made every effort to publicize the invasion’s achievements. They recited endlessly the numbers of arms and ammunition captured (Haldeman ordered that the number of rounds of captured ammunition, rather than tonnage, be reported), tons of rice seized (which was ostentatiously given to refugees), number of structures destroyed, and so forth. The numbers were impressive and doubtless caused the enemy some hardship for a period of weeks or months. But the incursions had not destroyed COSVN nor the ability of the other side to continue the war. The invasion also brought Cambodia itself directly into the war for the first time – and with devastating consequences. Prior to the invasion, the Vietnamese occupied limited, if perhaps growing, parts of Cambodia, especially along the frontier with Vietnam. Now they had driven deeply into Cambodia, had isolated Phnom Penh, and were within a few miles of the capital. Some observers thought they could take the city at any time. They threatened other major interior cities, such as Kompong Cham, and in June temporarily took over the airport at Siem Reap, the gateway to the ancient capital, Angkor. If they succeeded in keeping Siem Reap, the Cambodian government feared, they might make it the capital of Sihanouk’s government in exile, a move that (given the symbolic significance of Angkor to Cambodia) might have debilitating psychological consequences. Administration officials always denied that the invasion was responsible for spreading the war into Cambodia’s interior because, they said, the enemy had moved deeper into Cambodia prior to the invasion. But no less an authority than

34 Richard Nixon and Cambodia Lon Nol disagreed. Among the consequences of the invasion, he told visiting Americans, was that “the enemy was unfortunately forced deeper into Cambodia.” Nor did documents captured during the invasion provide much evidence to support the administration’s assertions. Some documents indicated that the Vietnamese did plan to expand the sanctuaries and exercise control over the population in the sanctuaries. But nothing showed a plan to move deeply into Cambodia; there was no plan “to seize Phnom Penh or any other specific objective not adjacent to sanctuaries after formation of Lon Nol government or at any other time.”149 In any event the situation was so desperate that Lon Nol himself requested, and received, asylum in Singapore for his family, despite state department efforts to talk him out of it. On 9 June, with the announced withdrawal of all American forces from Cambodia less than three weeks away, the American embassy prepared an estimate of what the situation in Cambodia would be like after the Americans withdrew. The overall tone was pessimistic. Except for a few small pockets, the government would not be in control of the country east of the Mekong River or north of Prey Veng Province. The area west of the Mekong River – north of a line running from Kompong Cham to the great lake (the Tonle Sap) – was also controlled by the Vietnamese communists. Southern border provinces would probably remain in friendly hands but would require the presence of ARVN troops. Western and southwestern areas of Cambodia would be subject to “increased disturbances.” In sum, as a result of the invasion a very substantial part of the country was now subject to enemy control – a dramatic change from the pre-invasion situation. Nor was the embassy certain that the government could survive at all. Certainly, without substantial foreign assistance, all was lost. “If other immediate assistance is not forth-coming,” the embassy concluded, “there will remain nothing for diplomacy to deal with.”150 But reports of Cambodia’s weakness infuriated President Nixon. “The line that ‘Cambodia is doomed’ must be stopped,” he said on 15 June. Nixon insisted that all that could be done to save Cambodia be done, regardless of the consequences. “We have been thinking too defensively,” he stated. In essence, Nixon had changed the American mission from one in which Cambodia was a “sideshow” to protect the American withdrawal from Vietnam and assist Vietnamization, to one in which the preservation of a non-communist Cambodia was a goal in itself.151 Nixon ordered direct assistance to Cambodia even before the invasion and without clear legal authority to do so. By the end of June, the United States and the South Vietnamese had provided nearly 30,000 rifles and sub-machine guns (including captured weapons), nearly 9,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and 9,907 radios to Cambodia, with more supplies in the pipeline.152 Soon trucks and aircraft including helicopters arrived. Nixon also urged South Vietnam to keep its troops in Cambodia after the Americans withdrew and, in certain situations, to provide support to Cambodian military operations – in the event, for example, that Phnom Penh was threatened. The United States was also willing to support South Vietnamese operations with American aircraft, if required.

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South Vietnam was cooperative, but the United States had less success in getting other countries to support the new government in Cambodia. Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Taiwan all provided only small amounts of aid or training. But the United States had high hopes that Indonesia and Thailand would provide more meaningful assistance. With respect to Indonesia, the United States continued to support Malik’s efforts to arrange an international conference. The invasion momentarily stopped the momentum in that direction, and there remained considerable skepticism in any event. No communist government accepted an invitation, nor did the major neutralist governments in the region, such as India and Burma. From Singapore came disparaging, condescending comments about Malik and his allegedly poor preparation. Even the Indonesians began to have second thoughts. With no major neutral countries in attendance, many Indonesians were uncomfortable at being closely identified with the West. Such feelings were doubtless intensified when Hanoi accused Indonesia of being an American puppet and Malik of being a CIA agent. The United States did not expect the projected conference to bring peace to Cambodia immediately. But it saw two important benefits that might emerge from it: the creation of a neutral observer group to replace the defunct ICC in Cambodia, and a follow-up mechanism for continuing consultation among the conference participants. Not wanting to be seen as influencing this conference of Asian nations, the United States nevertheless made its views known behind the scenes. In the end, the conference did not send a neutral observer group to Cambodia. But the conference did demand the withdrawal of all foreign forces in Cambodia, urged respect for Cambodia’s territorial integrity and neutrality, and called for the reactivation of the ICC and the convening of a new international conference. The foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Japan were charged with working with the Geneva co-chairs, other countries, and the United Nations to implement the conference’s recommendations and work for the end of the war in Cambodia.153 Although the conference did not accomplish as much as the United States had hoped, most observers nevertheless thought it was an important success. Singaporeans, despite their initial contempt, came away “deeply satisfied with the results.” Among the most enthusiastic observers was the American ambassador in Jakarta. “In sharp contrast to the grave misgivings which they had on arrival,” he reported, “high-powered delegations which attended conference on Cambodia departed Jakarta with general feeling that they had – somewhat to their surprise – participated in something which may have historic significance.” For the first time Asian countries were coming together to deal with Asian problems and propose Asian solutions. “Malik’s willingness to risk his own position domestically, as well as Indonesia’s non-alignment, appears more than vindicated by the successful outcome,” Galbraith concluded.154 Despite some doubts, the state department and President Nixon both agreed that the Jakarta conference was important – “one of the best things which has occurred recently,” Nixon stated.155

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Richard Nixon and Cambodia

Whatever the judgment about the Jakarta conference, international diplomacy did not offer a short-term solution, and with the very survival of the Lon Nol government in doubt the United States once again sought Indonesian military assistance. The Indonesian government remained split over this question, but the Americans were optimistic. If Indonesia was not yet persuaded that arms were immediately required, they were going ahead with plans to train Cambodians in special warfare techniques (both in Indonesia and Cambodia) and to send advisors to Cambodia.156 The Indonesians continued to hedge on weapons, though they seemed willing to supply them if the United States would commit itself to major military assistance to Indonesia. Suharto said as much to Nixon when he visited Washington in May.157 The United States did agree to increase substantially the aid it provided to Jakarta, and Suharto in turn dispatched Indonesian State Secretary H. Alamsjah to tell Kissinger that “the Indonesians were prepared to send sufficient weapons to Cambodia to equip 10 battalions.” Only three persons in Indonesia knew of this offer: Suharto, Alamsjah, and Galbraith. Kissinger and Alamsjah agreed that the details would be worked out when an Indonesian military mission arrived in a few weeks.158 Indonesian arms thus looked hopeful. But meanwhile attention turned to reconfiguring a factory in Bandung, Indonesia, to produce AK-47 ammunition for use in Cambodia. The Indonesians had apparently raised this possibility during Suharto’s visit to Washington,159 and in June the Indonesians invited American technicians to visit the plant to determine the feasibility of the project. But before they arrived, Indonesian officials stalled. Would it not be better to wait until after the Lusaka Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in September, they asked.160 The effort to delay the visit of the technicians was part of a larger problem of second thoughts that Indonesian officials were having about Indonesian assistance of any kind to Cambodia. Malik feared that such aid would jeopardize Indonesia’s status as a non-aligned power, would have a negative impact on his diplomatic efforts to address the Cambodian problem, and would kill a possible rapprochement with the Soviet Union (a rapprochement that he hoped would result in a resumption of delivery of much needed spare parts for Russian arms and machinery). He convinced Suharto to delay sending the Indonesian military mission to the United States and put off the arrival of the American technicians. There was still support in high Indonesian circles, particularly among the military, for assisting Cambodia. But it was increasingly clear that the Indonesians expected considerable, probably unrealistic, assistance from the United States in return. Their expectations were “running high” and they were “impervious to our cautionary remarks,” reported Galbraith. Suharto seemed to be leaning toward providing assistance, but “his decision will probably depend upon his assessment of the quid pro quos involved.” Unfortunately, Galbraith concluded, “I doubt if our quo would be adequate to his quid.”161 The American technicians did eventually inspect the Bandung facility and another munitions plant then under construction in Turen and concluded

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pessimistically that it would take two to three years for the Bandung factory to be converted to produce AK-47 ammunition, while the Turen plant, which was not yet operational, would take even longer to convert and could produce even less than the Bandung facility.162 The Americans had hoped that the conversion would take considerably less time. In addition, while the Americans were willing to cover the costs of conversion of that portion of the Bandung plant that would be reconfigured to make AK-47 ammunition, the Indonesians wanted the United States to revamp the entire plant. Further dampening American hopes for Indonesian assistance, meetings between Kissinger and General Sumitro (who arrived unannounced on 26 June) were inconclusive. Both sides agreed there was no point in having a larger, official Indonesian military mission come to Washington for the moment. But despite the hemming and hawing, in the end Indonesia did provide some military aid to the Lon Nol government. It hosted a Cambodian military mission in July, and followed up with its own military mission to Cambodia later in the month to assess the situation. The Indonesians also secretly trained some Cambodian troops, something which became public in August 1971. They also very secretly sent a team of five military advisers, headed by a major general, to Cambodia, an operation so secret that as late as October 1971 there had never been any contact between the Indonesian advisers and American officials in Phnom Penh.163 By the end of 1971 they had trained only about 60 Cambodians, according to American sources,164 though in 1972 they offered to train an additional 200.165 More significantly, in exchange for M-16 rifles, the Indonesians sent, very secretly, a number of AK-47 rifles, ammunition, and related equipment to the Americans for transshipment to the Cambodians. There were at least five such shipments. The fifth took place in November 1970 when the Indonesians provided the Americans with 1,770 AK-47s, over 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, and some related equipment in exchange for 5,880 M-16 rifles and 54,214 magazines. The AK-47s went to the American base at Cam Ranh Bay where they were subsequently transferred to the Cambodians. It was later reported that the United States was secretly manufacturing AK-47 ammunition for the use of Cambodian forces. But in fact the United States was getting the ammunition from Indonesia. Perhaps this is what an intelligence report meant when it stated that “in 1971, at American urging, Djakarta provided weapons assistance to FANK [Forces Armées Nationales Khmères, the Cambodian government’s army].”166 Still, Indonesian aid was limited and secret, and the Americans may well not have informed Lon Nol that Indonesia was the source of some of the AK-47s. In sum, despite Suharto’s rhetoric about how crucial it was to stop communist expansion in Cambodia, Indonesia’s limited aid was motivated as much by a desire to modernize the Indonesian armed forces as it was to assist Lon Nol. American hopes to use Indonesia as a significant source of military supplies and the training of Cambodian troops were not to be realized. Other avenues would have to suffice.

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More predictable assistance came from Thailand, although in the end Thai support, like Indonesia’s, was less than was anticipated. Thai assistance took various forms. Early in June 1970 the Thais, with the required American approval, loaned five T-28 aircraft to the Cambodian air force. The Thais hoped that the United States would promise to replace any planes that were lost in the war, but they loaned the planes and agreed to train eight pilots even before receiving assurances. The Thais also cooperated in removing several nonflyable Cambodia T-28s to the American air base at Udorn for repair at the CIA’s Air America facility. While the early battles raged in Cambodia, the Thais also spoke of sending in their own troops. One possibility was to reassign Thai troops serving in South Vietnam (the Black Panthers) to Cambodia. The Cambodian government requested the troops, and the Thais proposed using them, initially to help protect the capital. Lon Nol and Sirik Matak even told a Newsweek correspondent that they were on the way. But neither the South Vietnamese nor the Americans supported removing the Black Panthers from Vietnam. “This will be very disturbing because of their [Thai] desire to provide some quick support for the Cambodians,” the American ambassador wrote.167 Although the Black Panther option came to naught, the United States still hoped that other Thai troops could be sent. Although it was official Thai policy to prevent a communist victory in Cambodia, a major consideration for the Thais (as for the Indonesians) was financial, and much attention was given to creative ways of having the United States fund Thai operations. Ambassador Leonard Unger was especially imaginative in suggesting how the United States could indirectly provide funds. The Americans could, for example, fund student housing for hill tribes, provide building materials for schools, water pumps for housing, food for dependents of Thai counterintelligence troops, and so forth. American funds would thus not be spent directly for operations in Cambodia but would be “trade-offs,” allowing the Thais to free up funds for such operations.168 Soon attention focused on inserting 4,000 to 5,000 Thais into western Cambodia, with additional forces to be sent to Siem Reap and perhaps Phnom Penh. In fact, the prospect of sending troops into Cambodia deeply divided the Thai government and the larger society. A rare public discussion of the matter at Chulalongkorn University resulted in 3,000 students “filling all seats, packing aisles and sitting on available floor space.” Military leaders made the case for armed assistance, while others spoke in opposition. Student reaction was “overwhelmingly opposed to the use of Thai troops.” Not surprisingly, when Lon Nol visited Bangkok shortly thereafter, he did not get any specific promises of assistance. It was another dead end. In spite of initial euphoria and promises of assistance, regular Thai troops did not enter Cambodia–though apparently some irregular volunteer units did, since the United States incurred a financial obligation for each death or severe injury of Thai volunteers.169 A more promising source of troops were Thai-Khmers (many, perhaps most, of them Khmer Serei). The United States agreed to pay for the training of several thousand. On 23 July Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn announced

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that 3,000 Thai-Khmer would go to Cambodia. But in fact they apparently went to Laos instead.170 Despite these disappointments, Thailand provided more assistance to the Lon Nol government than any other Asian country (except for South Vietnam). The Thais trained thousands of raw Cambodian recruits; provided at least 361 technical advisers (including a radio liaison team stationed in Phnom Penh), nine patrol boats, and clothing and equipment kits for 50,000 soldiers; with American approval, they transferred American-supplied military equipment to the Cambodian armed forces. They also conducted reconnaissance flights over Cambodia and, after the Americans withdrew their troops, flew combat missions in direct support of Cambodia troops. The Americans (who observed many of these strikes from their own observation aircraft) were highly impressed with the accuracy of the Thai attacks.171 Directly or indirectly, the United States paid for much of the Thai assistance through its Military Assistance Programs to Thailand and Cambodia, including “trade-off ” arrangements that Ambassador Unger had urged.172 In the end, the assistance provided by third countries was of some political significance but, except for that from South Vietnam and to a lesser extent Thailand, militarily unimportant. As an American embassy report put it in May 1972, it “has had only a very marginal impact on FANK capabilities and operations.”173 With the withdrawal of American forces on 30 June 1970, Lon Nol was concerned whether direct American assistance would continue. He need not have worried. At the end of August Nixon sent Vice President Agnew to Phnom Penh to symbolize the continuing American commitment. The administration wanted to support a Cambodian army of 65,000 by increasing military assistance to Cambodia from $8.9 million in fiscal year (FY) 1970 to an initial $40 million in FY 1971. Despite objections from the Office of Management and Budget, Nixon signed the order. Because Congress had not appropriated these funds, the administration had to reallocate funds approved for assistance to other countries. Admitting that this “seriously jeopardizes MAP [Military Assistance Program] objectives and can complicate bilateral relations in many countries,” the administration determined that funds for Cambodia were more important. So large cuts were made around the globe with Greece, Turkey, and Taiwan absorbing the largest cuts, though Latin American programs suffered the greatest percentage cutbacks. The reductions brought forth anguished cries from American ambassadors around the world who expressed “shock,” “deep regret,” and “utmost concern.”174 But the administration was determined to provide the assistance to Cambodia. In the weeks immediately after the withdrawal, the Americans also continued to pay for the training of Khmer Krom troops in South Vietnam and assisted with their insertion into Cambodia. Indeed, American Special Forces officers were in charge of the training at at least one camp, Lon Hai.175 The Americans also sent a “psyops” radio team to Phnom Penh to help Radio Phnom Penh, funded military training centers in Cambodia, sent a team of technicians to

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Richard Nixon and Cambodia

service the T-28 aircraft, and provided tens of thousands of M-1 rifles and AK47 magazines. CIA director William Colby visited Phnom Penh to advise the Cambodian government on pacification strategies. Soon the United States would provide a number of C-47 airplanes. Although American support in the summer and early fall of 1970 must have reassured Lon Nol, there were those within the Nixon administration who questioned whether the United States should continue its assistance, particularly after the initial $40 million was nearly all spent by mid-September. Neither Rogers and Laird shared the view that Cambodia’s future was of much consequence to the United States, particularly if the administration was unable to convince Congress to approve a supplemental appropriation bill. There were even suspicions, probably well founded, that Laird in particular “wanted to wash his hands of Cambodia” even though he was publicly supporting a supplemental appropriation. An aide reported all of this to Kissinger.176 Despite some internal doubts, there was no real debate within the administration about whether the survival of Lon Nol’s government was important to the United States. Options that suggested otherwise, Kissinger reported to the Senior Review Group, had one major problem: “the President believes the opposite.” Therefore the debate was over means and not ends.177 The most extreme option, proposed by General William Westmoreland, called for American forces to move into Cambodia and Laos. This was not given serious consideration, but the administration adopted the next most aggressive (and expensive) strategy, which was to continue to build up the Cambodian armed forces while having South Vietnamese forces defend the Cambodian government and one-half of its territory, if necessary. This was to be funded by a supplemental appropriation along with what the assistant secretary of defense called “some devious procedures.”178 In November Nixon asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation of $255 million for Cambodia, of which $100 million would be used to replace the “borrowed” funds from other MAP programs, $85 million would be for additional military assistance, and $70 million for economic aid. If the appropriation was not forthcoming, Nixon’s operatives were determined to do whatever was needed to get the funds somehow – “Operation Scrounge” they termed it – and they were willing to violate regulations if needed.179 Meanwhile the American embassy staff in Phnom Penh had increased, with the assignment of several military personnel. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan “Fred” Ladd who, despite embassy objections, reported directly to the White House and MACV, headed the MAP staff. By mid-August he had five full-time personnel (including two other lieutenant colonels) and five additional part-time staff, including the embassy’s air and naval attachés. They coordinated the delivery of military supplies and informally advised the Cambodian military. Later, as the American commitment grew, a Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT) replaced the MAP. Ambassador Emory Swank and the state department had strongly resisted the establishment of a MEDT, arguing that a small augmentation of the current embassy staff was sufficient to administer and

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monitor Cambodian military aid. On the other hand, the JCS wanted up to 110 personnel, with most of them assigned to Phnom Penh. Eventually Laird, who had the final say, established a MEDT team of 60 persons but determined that only 10 (soon raised to 16) could be assigned inside Cambodia. In March 1971 he raised the total to 113. As with Ladd, the precise authority of the MEDT chief vis-à-vis the ambassador became a source of controversy between the defense and state departments. Even more indicative of the growing American involvement in Cambodia was the direct air support provided to Cambodian forces. This represented a departure from the initial American mission. “U.S. air in Cambodia has the mission of interdicting the movement of supplies and men relevant to the war in Vietnam,” Henry Kissinger stated on 30 June as the last American troops were pulling out of Cambodia. “It is not assigned the task of close air support.” Increasingly, however, Americans flew combat missions supporting Cambodian troops. For example, on 24 July American fighter bombers struck enemy positions around Siem Reap, causing considerable damage to North Vietnamese structures and supplies. The strikes encouraged Nixon. While the results of strategic strikes were questionable, the President noted, tactical strikes seemed to bring results. There should be more of them, he wrote.180 There were. Two weeks later several American correspondents traveled with Khmer Krom units into battle near Skuon, where they observed American spotter planes directing American fighter bombers strafing and dropping bombs and napalm on enemy positions. The forward air controller on the ground was a Cambodian trained by the American Special Forces “whose radio technique and slang were flawless.” The American actions “directly conflicted with President Nixon’s statement that USAF was only flying interdiction missions against VC supply routes in Cambodia and not giving direct aid.” The Cambodian commander on the ground acknowledged that the actions were flown in “direct air support for my battalions.”181 During the month of August alone, the Americans flew 611 fighter and 189 gunship sorties, some reaching as far as Phum Thkov, which was well east of Siem Reap and not far from the Thai border. American helicopters also transported Cambodian troops from Phnom Penh to Kompong Thom. The same month there were at least 234 B-52 attacks, bringing the total of B-52 sorties since April to 1,484.182 In September another milestone was passed when some American planes were authorized to conduct operations anywhere in Cambodia, though with restrictions. American forward air controller (FAC) aircraft were still limited to certain parts of Cambodia, with Vietnamese or Thai FACs allowed to operate elsewhere. When Senate staffers visited Cambodia in late November and early December, an American officer told them that the description of American air operations in Cambodia as interdiction mission was simply “camouflage.”183 In sum, the war had been spread to Cambodia. The United States had now acquired another weak government to defend, a government that controlled perhaps one-quarter of the country. At the end of October enemy shells fell on Phnom Penh. “The local hospitals are filling up,” a missionary recorded in his

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diary. All highways from Phnom Penh had been cut, except for Route 1 to Saigon. By the fall of 1970 the original rationale for intervention in Cambodia (that American actions were entirely related to the war in Vietnam and that there was no intention of becoming involved directly on behalf of the new Cambodian government) no longer held. As Lloyd Rives advised the incoming ambassador, Emory Swank, the first American objective in Cambodia was to see that the country remained “independent and neutral.”184

2

Sticking with Lon Nol

Anyone who depends on handouts becomes a creeper rather than a tree. Singapore President Lee Kuan Yew, referring to Lon Nol1

During the night of 8–9 November 1972, lightning struck the Phnom Penh stupa, causing the top section to collapse. This was widely regarded as an ill omen for the Cambodian Republic. But Lon Nol had an alternative reading of the event. It signified the end of the Cambodian monarchy, the reelection of Richard Nixon, and the survival of the republic, he thought. “We hope he is right,” reported Ambassador Emory Swank.2 But it was the skeptics who were right. Lon Nol was always optimistic about his prospects, an optimism that U.S. embassy officials had come to share by the end of the 1970s. The government had survived, despite deep pessimism and military setbacks in the weeks immediately following the coup. As a result comedian Bob Hope, then in Bangkok, sent a telegram to the White House saying that President Nixon deserved a medal for bravery. On 31 December 1970 Lon Nol informed Nixon that “popular feeling” was increasingly opposed to the enemy and that “the Khmers are now succeeding in tipping the scales as completely as possible in their favor.” With American planes decimating reinforcements coming in over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Prime Minister predicted that his own forces would take back regions of the country currently in the hands of the Vietnamese communists.3 The Prime Minister’s optimism was premature. A few days after his prediction, enemy forces attacked a convoy on the Mekong River that was transporting petroleum supplies to Phnom Penh, sinking two or three barges and other craft. This brought the stocks of various petroleum products in the city to a “critical point,” according to the American embassy. There were no supplies of kerosene and fuel oil left at all.4 Fighting was also picking up in various parts of the country. Thanks to heavy American military cover, a new convoy made it up the Mekong to Phnom Penh without incident. But on 22 January 1971 Viet Cong saboteurs infiltrated Pochentong airport and blew up virtually the entire Cambodian combat air force, including MIGs, helicopters, T-28s and C-47s. All told, 39 Cambodian aircraft were destroyed, and another nine suffered major damage. Ten South Vietnamese planes were also destroyed, while an American

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Sticking with Lon Nol

C-47, belonging to the embassy’s defense attaché, suffered major damage. The Viet Cong may have lost three soldiers, but 50 Cambodian military personnel died and some 300 civilians, mostly military dependents, were wounded. It was a devastating attack – “the most psychologically sobering experience for the population since my arrival last September,” Swank reported.5 Though these events temporarily sobered Lon Nol, within a few days he had recovered his usual aplomb.6 But it was hard to see why “deterioration” did not appropriately describe the trend in Cambodia. Foreign Minister Kuon Wick told Malaysian officials that Lon Nol was “overly optimistic and militarily inept” and that he should be kicked upstairs to some kind of figurehead position. The day before, unknown to Kuon Wick, Lon Nol had suffered a stroke and was soon taken to Tripler General Hospital in Hawaii for treatment.7 Despite these setbacks, the Nixon administration was determined to portray American involvement in Cambodia as a great success. Nixon himself told Agnew, Kissinger, and Pat Buchanan that there was no reason to be defensive on Cambodia, that press attacks were “unfair, irrelevant & inaccurate & conflicting.” Administration opponents, he raged on, had a vested interest “in seeing us fail cause they predicted we’d fail.” A few days later he told Kissinger that they should not have “a soft-handed defense[;] have to whack the opponents on patriotism – American lives – etc.” The next day the President acknowledged that he had “not gotten over success to people[;] have to make it very simple … have to estab[lish] success of Cambodia[;] public doesn’t see it as success[.] They’ve only heard TV – and it’s all unfavorable.”8 Part of the problem, Nixon surmised, was Kissinger, whose briefings had been less than spellbinding. “You’re a slsman [salesman], not a prof.,” Nixon lectured his National Security Adviser. “Maybe K. can’t do the briefings,” Nixon mused the next day. He had “not been a success in getting across our p[oin]ts re foreign policy success.” What they needed, he thought, was “a cold man who understands & sees all in terms of news leads.” Or perhaps, as Nixon told Alexander Haig, the problem was that Kissinger’s staff had “all turned left. Must examine staff closely. Watch for traitors.”9 To counter the negative public image of Cambodia, the Nixon administration (among other strategies) engaged the conservative Scaife–Mellon Foundation to write an article detailing the successful Nixon policy in Cambodia. The article, tentatively entitled “Cambodia – One Year Later” and ostensibly written by a professor (rather than someone inside the administration), was to appear in a Sunday newspaper supplement. The NSC approved the draft article, and White House operative John Marsh was charged with planting it. They also considered getting a government official to write a similar piece for the influential journal Foreign Affairs.10 When pessimistic press reports continued to appear, some citing government officials, Nixon was incensed. Thus when Terence Smith of the New York Times wrote a story headlined “U.S. Aides See Situation in Cambodia Deteriorating,” Nixon demanded to know who the aides were. The administration’s desire to demonstrate success in Cambodia could not alter the facts on the ground,

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however. B-52s had to be used to relieve beleaguered Cambodian forces trapped in the Pich Nil Pass on Route 4, the important road linking Phnom Penh with the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville), and the Cambodian army continued to be ineffective.11 In effect admitting that the situation was critical without saying so, the administration did all that it could do to prevent Cambodia’s collapse. For fiscal year (FY) 1971, it managed to pry $185 million in aid for Cambodia out of a reluctant Congress, raided MAP funds intended for other countries in order to get matériel to Cambodia, and waived legal requirements so that it could purchase 600 trucks for use in Cambodia from American subsidiaries in Australia. It put considerable pressure on Australia and South Korea to train Cambodian troops. Over strong state department objections, the administration assigned more military personnel to the American embassy, while the chief of the MEDT, Brigadier General Theodore Mataxis, deliberately sidestepped the chief of mission and imported materials that he wanted – even when the ambassador specifically vetoed them. (High-level state department officials attempted, unsuccessfully, to have Mataxis replaced.)12 Skirting the law, Americans provided informal advice and training to Cambodian forces, took in military supplies in the attaché’s helicopter, and evacuated wounded government troops back to Phnom Penh. Most important, the United States extended its already extensive air support of Cambodian forces to cover all Cambodian territory. Not surprisingly, the percentage of sorties over Cambodia soared. In 1970, 8 percent of American sorties in Southeast Asia were over Cambodia. In 1971 the figure was 14 percent.13 Politically, the United States did what it could to support Lon Nol’s government, playing down potentially damaging reports and refusing to encourage coup attempts while Lon Nol was recovering in Hawaii. When the Cambodian leader returned to Phnom Penh on 12 April, a crowd greeted him warmly and Swank hoped his return would produce political stability.14 Despite these efforts, both the Department of Defense and the American embassy in Phnom Penh were privately becoming pessimistic about Cambodia’s future. For one thing, there was no strong political leadership. Lon Nol, while he had made a considerable recovery from his stroke, was still seriously incapacitated. His doctors ordered him to work no more than one hour per day, and in May he had to accept temporarily a figurehead position in the government. For another, the military situation continued to be problematic. A defense department study of the military situation, completed in early June 1971, was “moderately pessimistic.” Though it did not foresee an imminent crisis or even heavy enemy attacks before 1973, it suggested that the communists’ strategy of protracted war might be successful because they had been busy organizing the countryside. Other studies found “widespread dissatisfaction with the government” and “considerable support” for Sihanouk and the communists in rural areas. The Senior Review Group meeting in Washington reviewed these studies and predicted deterioration in the military situation, complaining especially about the lack of aggressive leadership in the Cambodian army – precisely the same complaint that Americans sometimes lodged against South Vietnamese forces.15

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Reports of endemic corruption and some scathing evaluations of the current government only deepened the gloom. Sim Var, Cambodia’s ambassador to Japan, commented that the present cabinet looked like it had been “picked from the street,” that the National Assembly “lacked maturity,” and that Lon Nol’s entourage was “corrupt.”16 Embassy officials did not accept such reports at face value, but their own considered analyses were scarcely less damning. One, completed in July 1971, concluded that the government was “characterized by corruption and inefficiency” and had failed to “institute meaningful changes” since its inauguration in March 1970. There was no leadership, even as the military and economic situations continued to deteriorate. There was little interest in pacification, and anti-Americanism was growing.17 Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge army (the Front Uni National de Kampuchea, or FUNK) grew at an alarming rate. It was thought to be only a nuisance in 1970, but Sirik Matak estimated that by August 1971 it numbered 15,000, a figure which the American embassy also used. But the actual figures may have been much higher. By the end of the year the Cambodian government’s intelligence service estimated the number at 20,000 which, it thought, would probably grow at some undetermined date to 50,000. Swank described the report as “sobering.”18 American military intelligence analysts thought Khmer Rouge strength was already considerably higher. In August 1971 they estimated it at somewhere between 35,000 and 50,000. One CIA analyst, Sam Adams, thought the number much higher, estimating it at between 100,000 and 150,000 by June 1971.19 Whatever the precise figure, the Khmer Rouge was no longer just a nuisance, and while the military situation might not be critical in 1971, the future looked ominous. By late November 1971 the American embassy was saying that there was no hope that the government could completely expel the Vietnamese communists and regain control over all of Cambodia. “In reality,” stated the embassy’s lengthy annual review of Cambodian developments, “the most the Khmer leadership can expect is to obtain a reasonable bargaining position.”20 The American military’s response to this deterioration was to try to build up the Cambodian military at a frantic pace. Little attention was given to pacification. In July, for example, CINCPAC submitted a military assistance proposal for FY 1972 to the Department of Defense that planners estimated would cost between $480 and $600 million – this at a time when the current funding was $185 million and Congress was increasingly skeptical of the value of aid to Cambodia. At the same time the Department of Defense wanted to increase the number of in-country MEDT personnel to 91 – up from the currently authorized figure of 23.21 Swank and the state department, on the other hand, thought that the United States should keep as low a profile as possible in Phnom Penh. Thus the great increase in military personnel was not something that they wanted. As Fred Ladd, Swank’s Counselor for Military–Political Relations once put it, increasing the in-country MEDT team would be “like helping a thirsty baby by shoving a fire hose down its throat.”22 Swank and Ladd wanted to provide aid, but they

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thought the defense department’s approach was wrongheaded. For example, there was little reason to provide lots of helicopters when there were few Khmer pilots available. In addition to genuine philosophical differences over how the United States should best relate to Cambodia, there were serious turf wars, with the state department insisting that the ambassador, as chief of mission, had control over all aspects of American relations with Cambodia, including military assistance, while the military officials, feeling that they were running a war, believed they should be the primary actors. General Mataxis was the symbol of this problem. His primary allegiance, as he construed it, was to the military, and so on occasion he ignored or evaded Swank’s express wishes. Perhaps his most notorious act of insubordination (in state department eyes) was his decision to import assault rifles (AK-47s and UZIs) as well as sidearms for MEDT personnel – despite the ambassador’s specific prohibition against them.23 The bureaucratic and philosophical differences led to strong exchanges, even between Secretaries Rogers and Laird, which eventually found their way into newspaper and magazine reports. An article in Newsweek, for example, discussed the “bitter dispute” between civilians and military personnel over involvement in Cambodia. One civilian official asserted that “within a year the Pentagon will have taken over our operations in Cambodia and Swank and all the other civilians will be sitting on the sidelines just like the civilians in Saigon.”24 A few days later the President himself expressed his concern about a divided team, and thereafter accommodation seems to have improved. The news that Mataxis would retire in January and be replaced by an officer whom the state department liked contributed to the new calm. When Brigadier General John Cleland took over as chief of MEDT, relations seemed to be smoother. Swank agreed to substantial increases in the number of MEDT stationed in Cambodia, for example. (Early in 1972 the number increased to 77.) But it was clear that there still remained serious differences. In May 1972, for example, a military official told Frank Tatu of the state department that Cleland was responsible only to CINCPAC.25 If the state and defense departments often found themselves at odds, they both believed, along with the White House, that Congress provided inadequate appropriations for Cambodian assistance. They also disliked the congressional prohibition on the use of American advisers and restrictions on the number of Americans in Cambodia at any one time. Consequently, considerable efforts went into trying to convince Congress to increase funding and reduce restrictions. At first there was apparent success, for it looked as if for FY 1972 Congress would approve $340 million for Cambodia, including $200 million for military assistance – up from $185 million the previous year. But in the end the Cambodian MAP program for FY 1972 was tentatively set at $179.7 million. According to the Pentagon, this would fund a Cambodian force of only 180,000, rather than the 220,000 planned. However, because Cambodia was the top priority, the administration was determined to provide $200 million one way or another. When the time came for

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Swank to inform Cambodian officials of the actual amount to be provided ($200 million rather than the $179.7 million tentatively approved), he was told that “for Congressional reasons such assurance will have to [be] given only at high-levels GKR [Government of the Khmer Republic] and on closely-held basis.”26 Swank resisted these apparently devious tactics that were, he wrote, “tantamount to a resort to subterfuge, if I may put it bluntly, in our relations with Congress.” His own reputation for candor with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had, he felt, been helpful, and he did not want to compromise it. The department should “apprize the appropriate committee chairmen on a confidential basis” of how they intended to fund operations in Cambodia. An even better course, he thought, was simply to live with the lower level of funding or, if necessary, cut MAP programs for other countries even more deeply.27 But the state department reassured Swank by pointing out that in previous years shipping charges of goods intended for Cambodia had been paid for out of MAP funds, whereas it was perfectly legal not to include the cost of packing and shipping of the goods to Vietnam. Only the Vietnam–Cambodian portion of these charges needed to be included. In any event, the appropriations process lingered on for many more weeks. Toward the end of the year two developments in Cambodia increased antiwar sentiment in Congress and contributed to the pressures to cut aid. The first was Lon Nol’s effort to reassert his personal control. Democracy was no longer appropriate for Cambodia, he pronounced, and he began to rule by decree. Though not technically accurate, the popular understanding in the United States was that Lon Nol had abolished the National Assembly and assumed dictatorial powers. His actions resulted in biting commentaries from such media luminaries as Eric Severeid and Marvin Kalb. More devastating for Lon Nol and his supporters in the Nixon administration was the disastrous Chenla II military campaign, which began in August 1971. Designed to reopen Route 6 to Kompong Thom, and personally organized and directed by Lon Nol himself, who “brushed aside the concerns of the naysayers” including Americans and some Cambodians who warned him of serious deficiencies in his blitzkrieg plan, the campaign turned into an utter disaster in November as communist forces cut the government forces to pieces. Over 3,000 of Cambodia’s best troops were killed and thousands more wounded, while 15,000 others fled in disarray, leaving their weapons behind. General Sak Sutsakhan called it “the greatest catastrophe of the war.” It would in fact be the last major offensive that Lon Nol’s army took. Also for the first time large numbers of refugees, many escaping allied bombs and artillery during the Chenla II campaign, streamed in panic along the roads or made do in makeshift camps, getting little if any assistance from the authorities, and just trying to stay out of the fighting. “The situation has deteriorated considerably in several areas,” noted missionary Merle Graven, with fighting even on the outskirts of Phnom Penh itself.28 Swank properly put the blame for the Chenla II defeat squarely on Lon Nol. “Not only were the important decisions his,” he wrote in a scathing assessment,

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“… he also reverted to his habit of giving specific instructions to individual brigade commanders, bypassing normal chains of command and presuming to make tactical decisions without adequate knowledge of the military situation.” All of Swank’s frustrations about Lon Nol came out in his report. “Lon Nol is in fact unrealistic about his country’s capabilities,” he concluded.29 In the end, and after much delay, in March 1972 Congress appropriated only $170 million in MAP assistance for Cambodia. But due to a decision not to include most packing and shipping charges, the actual amount available for arms and munitions increased over the previous year. Whether this procedure was well understood in Congress is doubtful, however. Perhaps Swank was correct in his initial judgment, that this was a “subterfuge.” In any event, Nixon contributed to this sense by invoking executive privilege and denying to appropriate Senate and House committees planning documents related to MAP funding for Cambodia for FYs 1972 and 1973, something which no previous administration had done.30

Diplomacy Even as Congress debated the foreign aid bill, the Cambodians were tempted to see what kind of a deal the other side might offer them. Aware that the United States was withdrawing its combat troops from Vietnam even while negotiating with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to end the fighting, and privately concerned that Nixon’s new opening to China might be detrimental to Cambodian interests, Lon Nol endeavored to contact his opponents. Efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the Cambodian crisis were by no means new. Within weeks after American troops withdrew from Cambodia following the brief invasion in 1970, attempts to reach a political settlement were made. In September 1970 the Nixon administration itself considered making a public proposal for an Indochina-wide ceasefire in place to be followed by an international conference that would arrange for the withdrawal of all external forces. Swank was ordered to get Lon Nol’s approval of the draft proposal. It turned out that the Cambodians had a number of reservations. In particular, they were suspicious of the proposed international conference. For one thing, they, like Sihanouk before them, liked the clauses of the Geneva Conference of 1954 that guaranteed Cambodian sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. But Nixon’s proposal did not specifically reaffirm the Geneva Accords. Furthermore, they preferred direct negotiations with the North Vietnamese for the withdrawal of their forces, rather than placing their country’s fate in the hands of a new international conference whose orientation was not clear. Finally, they would not attend any meeting where Sihanouk’s government was represented.31 Swank thought the Cambodian reservations had merit, and some modifications resulted. Nixon would refer to the Geneva Accords, and references would be omitted that might seem to allow for the participation of Sihanouk. On 7 October 1970 Nixon made a televised address to the nation along these lines.

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Though in the end Nixon’s proposal did not achieve results, it is clear that the Khmers were also very nervous about the central point as well: the ceasefire in place. As Lon Nol put it in a personal letter to Nixon the following May, because his government had no effective control over the northeastern portion of the country, a ceasefire in place “would cause an effective division of the country,” and he pleaded with the President to find “a solution which will not be to our disadvantage.”32 Perhaps because of their doubts about Nixon’s proposal, some important Cambodians wanted to sound out Sihanouk about possible terms. Son Sann, in particular, who had served in previous Sihanouk administrations, received encouragement from “senior officials and notables” (apparently including Sirik Matak and Cheng Heng) to contact Sihanouk. In Paris Son Sann met with several of Sihanouk’s supporters. A number of younger officials were “very able men” but they “put on the mask of ideology” whenever he spoke to them. Older men like Sarin Chhak listened attentively. But nothing resulted from these contacts. Son Sann hoped to return to Phnom Penh and then go on to Moscow, Berne, and Prague, where he wanted to meet with former Prime Minister Penn Nouth, the only person worth speaking to, he thought. But when Son Sann returned to Phnom Penn in July, Lon Nol gave him “no encouragement at all.” No negotiations could take place until the Vietnamese withdrew entirely from Cambodia, he was informed. Arguing in religious terms, Lon Nol told Son Sann that victory was certain since “the conflict has become a religious war and the reign of Buddha is to last another 2,500 years.” Although Son Sann had become a devout Buddhist since the death of his son in 1969, Lon Nol’s attitude left him discouraged. He cashed in his unused airline tickets. Nevertheless, Son Sann intended to pursue his contacts when he returned to Paris in August. Asked about the American attitude toward such contacts, Swank responded that the United States had “a sympathetic and positive interest in any serious attempt to contribute to peace.”33 Nothing seems to have eventuated from these talks, doubtless in part because the Khmer Rouge also had little interest in negotiating a settlement. Nixon’s impending and historic visit to Beijing offered a new possibility for negotiations or at least soundings. A number of rumors surfaced that Sihanouk wanted to meet with Nixon when the President was in China. In September 1971, for example, Sihanouk apparently told several people that he would be willing to speak with Nixon. He promised a policy of neutrality and non-alignment once he was back in power.34 Later in the month Sihanouk met for an hour with Malcolm MacDonald, the former U.K. Commissioner General for Southeast Asia. Although there was no specific mention of a possible meeting with Nixon, Sihanouk reiterated his desire for a non-aligned, coalition government. At the same time the Pakistani ambassador in China intimated that the Chinese also wanted such a government, rather than a communist one, in Cambodia, “partly because they would prefer the country to be run by him [Sihanouk] than to see an unbridled spread of North Vietnamese influence.”35

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Sihanouk, meanwhile, continued to send out signals of his desire for a meeting. In an interview in December with the Italian weekly L’Europeo, Sihanouk displayed an “obvious eagerness” to meet with President Nixon during his Peking visit.36 Sihanouk’s most direct approach to the United States came in January 1972 when he let it be known that “should the President wish to speak to him, he would be pleased to come to Peking.” He would not, he added, see Kissinger in Nixon’s place.37 The chances of a Nixon–Sihanouk meeting were probably diminished when in February Sihanouk’s government rejected Nixon’s new peace proposals for an Indochina settlement. Put forth on 25 January 1972, the “new” proposals were virtually the same as Nixon had outlined the previous October. In the end no Nixon–Sihanouk meeting took place, although there are indications – including a statement by Sihanouk himself – that the Chinese attempted to arrange such a meeting, only to have Nixon veto it.38 It is unfortunate that the United States declined to engage the Prince. To be sure, any agreement with Sihanouk would almost certainly have resulted in the end of the Lon Nol government. But perhaps an arrangement could have been made that would have kept the Khmer Rouge at arm’s length; the results for Cambodia would have been better. Even though there was a sense by then, as Ambassador Swank put it in 1987, that “the Cambodians were doomed,”39 no one in the administration was willing to say so out loud. Despite the public advice of those like Senator Mansfield, who urged that Sihanouk be restored, there was no political will in the administration to forge a solution short of retaining the Lon Nol government. When rumors surfaced in the summer of 1972 that preparations were underway to return Sihanouk to Cambodia, Nixon personally informed Lon Nol that the United States had nothing of the sort in mind. Shortly thereafter, when the Soviet chargé in Phnom Penh asked Swank whether the United States was trying to forge a compromise with Sihanouk, Swank replied that American policy was actually moving in the opposite direction. Restoration of the monarchy and of Sihanouk, said Swank, was something most Khmers did not want, and there was nothing more than “a remote possibility” of it ever happening.40 As the United States continued to negotiate with the Vietnamese communists, as Nixon prepared for his historic trip to China, and presumably as the full force of the Chenla II disaster began to hit home, Lon Nol himself began to look for a way out. The first hint of this came to the Americans’ attention at the end of 1971 when rumors circulated that the communists had attempted to contact the government about possible peace terms. Evidence for this was in the very low level of military activity and in “veiled comments of local Soviet officials.”41 Although the state department tended to doubt the veracity of such reports, they continued to surface. A flurry of rumors appeared late in January 1972 that North Vietnam, using various communist embassies in Phnom Penh as intermediaries, was proposing a ceasefire in exchange for the government agreeing that the North Vietnamese could have uncontested access to their former sanctuaries and could resume shipment of supplies through Kompong Som (Sihanoukville). An alternative rumor was that the Cambodians had initiated the soundings.

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American embassy officials tended to dismiss a possible Cambodian initiative, since both Lon Nol and Sirik Matak privately denied making one. They put more credence on the former possibility, adducing a number of reasons as to why the Soviets and other communist countries might have an interest in promoting a settlement. The embassy was frankly uncertain about what was going on and concluded that, while “soundings” of some sort probably had been made, no formal negotiating proposal has been presented. In any event, Swank considered discussions between Cambodian government and communist representatives “natural” under the circumstances, though he did not attribute much significance to them.42 A few days later Sirik Matak issued a public denial that any government official supported the idea of partitioning Cambodia to achieve a compromise settlement. At almost exactly the same time that Sirik Matak was making his denial, an intelligence report surfaced that a Lon Nol emissary had approached the Indonesians to see if they would serve as intermediaries with the North Vietnamese. The terms being discussed, the report stated, included a nonaggression pact in return for “North Vietnamese use of the logistics corridors in northeastern Cambodia.” Swank took this report to be “probably accurate.” An even more creditable report about the same time stated that Major General Kang Keng, a trusted associate of Lon Nol, had approached Soviet embassy officials to see if they could serve as intermediaries. Swank now had to admit that this was “an arresting development.” Upon reflection, however, Swank stated it was logical for the Cambodians to develop a negotiating position, given the uncertainties of external assistance in the months ahead. “They see the example of our private talks with Hanoi and Peking,” he wrote, and thus had “an understandable motivation to do some exploring themselves.”43 Although the state department thought Swank’s analysis “cogent,”44 the White House took a very different view of these contacts. With the President’s personal approval, it became the position of the United States that it could not “visualize any mutually agreed modus vivendi between Hanoi and Cambodia” that would not threaten Vietnamization, weaken the Khmer Republic, and “shake general confidence amongst our friends on the Indochinese peninsula.” Reestablishment of the sanctuaries would be “an enormous setback” to American aims. Swank was therefore ordered to express the “deep concern” of the United States about these purported soundings and, in essence, to stamp them out.45 Swank’s account of his hour-long conversation with Lon Nol required 12 pages of single-spaced text. In the conversation Lon Nol insisted that the overtures had come from the Soviet Union, not from him. But Swank was not fully convinced. “I think it plausible to conclude that Lon Nol was not being fully candid with us,” Swank reported. Using his diplomatic skills, the ambassador kept the conversation pleasant throughout, and the two men parted on friendly terms. “We want his cooperation, not his enmity,” Swank explained. But the point had been made, and made clearly. If Lon Nol wanted continued American

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support, he must stop all contact of this sort. “We will continue to watch this very closely,” Swank concluded.46 It may be only a coincidence, but two weeks after the American démarche the lull in military activity came to a sudden end when a rocket attack on Phnom Penh killed over 100 persons.47 The Cambodian government’s efforts, however fitful they were, to discuss a political settlement that would allow the Vietnamese to retain sanctuaries and transportation corridors for supplies, indicated that the military situation had worsened in 1972. A report in March, for example, concluded that the enemy could create “absolute havoc” without much difficulty and could take Phnom Penh “any time they wish to do so.”48 Though Swank thought the report unnecessarily pessimistic, his own dispatches included disheartening news. Only a few days after reading the report, for example, he reported that the Cambodian army had given up three more outposts on Route 1, and the important city of Svay Rieng remained cut off by land. For the rest of the year, American C-130 aircraft had to drop food and ammunition into the beleaguered town. It was quite clear by this point that the FANK (Forces Armées Nationales Khmères, the Cambodian government’s army) was not winning the war. This was evident in a lengthy interagency review, chaired by an official in the Department of Defense, which in April 1972 produced NSSM-152, a lengthy analysis of the Cambodian situation. FANK would be able to hold Phnom Penh for the next 18 months, the analysis concluded, but the enemy would “continue to make gains” in the countryside. FANK lacked good leadership, and Lon Nol interfered “at all levels.” Even more troublesome, Cambodia’s military strategy was unrealistic, the army’s tactics flawed, and its administration “chaotic.” Furthermore, the Cambodians knew little about unconventional warfare, their psychological warfare program was “very limited,” their intelligence capabilities “only marginally effective,” and the highly touted “general mobilization” almost invisible.49 Nor did the political future look bright. Given his serious medical condition, Lon Nol could leave the scene at any moment, and there was no successor in sight. Political instability would inevitably affect the war effort negatively. In a particularly telling admission, the group conceded that “while they had justifiable complaints under Sihanouk, the Khmer were by and large protected from the ravages of war. Now the war has been brought to the countryside and to the capital city.” Keeping up enthusiasm for the war, which had already diminished, would be more and more difficult as the resistance became increasingly “Khmerized.” While the administration tried to find points of optimism, the future looked bleak indeed.50 Six weeks later CINCPAC Commander Admiral John McCain, a strong supporter of Lon Nol who had been solicitous of the Cambodian leader during his hospital stay in Hawaii and who had done his best to encourage him, acknowledged that even with massive American assistance “there are no military means whereby the GKR, with its limited technical skills, leadership potential, management capabilities, and manpower base,” could defeat a North Vietnamese force intent on destroying it. In just the past two months, he stated,

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FANK had failed “to maneuver their force properly or apply the power of their combat support.” Continuing his devastating critique, McCain contended that FANK’s efforts even prior to the Chenla II disaster had been mostly ineffective. Then in April and May 1972 (after NSSM-152 had been completed) FANK units surrendered at Kompong Trach and Kampot. Morale declined, and “entire companies surrendered and battalions retreated without discipline.” FANK units refused to hold their positions during rocket attacks. In addition, they abandoned a series of towns along Route 1 and found themselves (ten battalions) encircled in Svay Rieng. Near Kompong Thom, McCain went on, “light enemy pressure” resulted in the abandonment of four FANK outposts.51 Some FANK units reportedly even collaborated with the enemy. Then, in August, for the first time the enemy began to use tanks near Kompong Trabek. They cut Route 1 in three places and isolated several FANK units. The use of tanks unnerved the normally upbeat Lon Nol. He began to write directly to President Nixon pleading for more support. Between 3 and 10 August he wrote five lengthy letters – at least one of them handwritten – to Nixon. Swank thought that this was a poor way for Lon Nol to expend his limited energy, but Nixon encouraged this practice, feeling that this helped the Cambodian President deal with his anxieties. Adding to the sense of gloom, from time to time enemy rockets rained down on Phnom Penh, sometimes aimed accurately at defense targets but often killing civilians and further eroding the already fragile morale. On 6 May 28 persons died and 96 more were wounded when 112 rockets and other ordinance landed near the Ministry of National Defense. Sappers also infiltrated the airport and the city, launching attacks against bridges, airplanes, and other convenient targets. Eventually the embassy had to forbid American families with children from coming to Phnom Penh. The situation became so precarious that later in the year Lon Nol himself asked the Australians if he could send his three young sons to Australia to study. A moment of optimism occurred in May 1972 when FANK troops retook the Siem Reap airport and attempted to surround the enemy in Angkor, but ultimately they did not have the strength to do so. By August FANK was back on the defensive in the Angkor area, and the renowned French archaeologist B. P. Groslier, who had attempted to continue his work at the ruins, feared that in desperation the army would employ heavy weapons and destroy the priceless monuments. Furthermore, FANK’s failure to reopen Route 1 and the enemy’s successful blockading of Route 5 to Battambang resulted in severe rice shortages in the capital, leading in September to riots and looting of Chinese shops. Soldiers perpetrated much of the violence until Lon Nol confined them to their barracks. By the middle of September American officials were not certain that Lon Nol could retain the loyalty of the army, as the military leaders increasingly questioned his judgment. “The underlying thread of this discontent,” concluded American chargé Thomas Enders, was “concern that Lon Nol may be losing the war.”52

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The American government responded to this situation by reassuring Lon Nol that he retained solid American support; and they took various measures to try and turn the situation around. American planes, including on occasion B-52s, continued to assist Cambodian troops, but the Americans hoped that FANK would become much more aggressive. Perhaps, they told Lon Nol, he could offer special incentive pay to FANK forces that performed well and improve housing conditions for soldiers’ families. In the fall a high-level American delegation arrived in Cambodia to develop recommendations on reorganizing FANK to make it more effective – a delegation whose very presence was, according to the state department’s legal office, a clear violation of the law forbidding Americans to advise the Cambodian government.53 The Americans also attempted to find ways around congressional restrictions on the number of official Americans who could be in the country at any one time and on the number of third-country nationals who could be paid with American funds. But none of these efforts seemed to make much difference. Meanwhile the internal political situation was deteriorating. Students, who had once strongly supported Lon Nol, became discouraged when the democratic reforms they expected did not materialize. On 27 April 1972 military police fired on demonstrating students, hitting at least 20 of them, and the American embassy reported that the populace sympathized with the students. More demonstrations and strikes ensued. Lon Nol, who in March had successfully maneuvered to eliminate Sirik Matak from power, then announced that he would hold presidential elections in which he would run. To his surprise a number of other candidates announced, and two, In Tam of the Democratic Party and Keo An, reputed to be a Sihanoukist, refused to withdraw. In the end, the official figures showed that Lon Nol received about 54 percent of the vote; In Tam, who actually won the election in Phnom Penh, received 24 percent; and Keo An, who was popular in the countryside (despite an apparent reputation of being “wildly impractical and unbalanced,” according to a later American embassy assessment54), received a remarkable 21 percent. Thousands of people simply declined to vote, and in any event the vote was rigged. Had the election been fair, In Tam or possibly even Keo An would have won. One scholar insists that Lon Nol actually received less than 20 percent, and perhaps only 15 percent, of the vote. William Harben, the American embassy’s political officer, documented a number of electoral irregularities, though Swank refused to forward his report to Washington.55 Clearly Lon Nol’s government was in trouble. Even the highly inflated official election figures demonstrated, as an embassy telegram put it, “widespread dissatisfaction with the government.”56 After the presidential elections, the political situation continued to unravel as the two major opposition political parties announced that they would not contest the elections for the National Assembly scheduled for September because the new electoral law ensured a substantial majority for the pro-government party. Shortly thereafter assassins attempted to set off two claymore mines as a fourvehicle convoy made its way along a street near the royal palace in Phnom Penh.

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The target was Son Ngoc Thanh who was, at this point, a Lon Nol ally. Only one of the mines detonated, missing Thanh but injuring four persons in another car. There was in sum a great malaise among the population, if not quite yet a sense of defeatism. In the fall of 1972 more than ever the United States urged national unity. All Cambodian leaders agreed in principle; but in practice unity was difficult to achieve. Lon Nol, for example, blamed Sirik Matak for the military failures, the student riots, and alienation of the Buddhist monks. For a time it looked as if a rapprochement of sorts was in the works. But on 5 October the government closed down Sirik Matak’s newspaper because it published an article that the government found offensive. Lon Nol’s “ability to govern” was not enhanced, thought the Americans.57 Little came of their pleas for unity. Meanwhile Lon Nol was losing international support. Embassies in Phnom Penh began evacuating dependents and lowering their level of representation. In August the conference of foreign ministers from non-aligned countries in Georgetown, Guyana, seated Sihanouk’s government instead of Lon Nol’s. Stung by this development and “fearing an international trend against it, and for Sihanouk,” the Cambodian government determined to send low-level “goodwill” missions to nearly 70 countries, mostly in Africa and Latin America, where they hoped to build up international support. The United States discreetly assisted this effort by trying to determine in advance whether the teams would be welcome and by providing advice to the teams once they arrived.58 The goodwill missions were part of an effort to create a more favorable impression of the GKR prior to a vote on who would represent Cambodia at the United Nations. Lon Nol himself, in yet another letter to Nixon, appealed for American support. The President assured him that the United States was doing all it could to prevail on the credentials’ question.59 Whether or not the goodwill missions were responsible, in the end the Phnom Penh government retained the Cambodian seat without much difficulty. Meanwhile, in Cambodia things only got worse even as the Vietnam War peace negotiations in Paris began to bear fruit. Indicative of the dangerous situation even in the capital, the American ambassador (or chargé in his absence) rode to work in a heavily armored car. Inside the car was a military policeman armed with an UZI and a pistol. Behind was a second car carrying three Cambodian military policemen armed with M-16s and pistols. Two military policemen on motorcycles rode alongside. The protection was needed. On 24 September the American chargé, Thomas Enders, was riding in this fashion to the embassy when a large bomb made of plastic explosives was detonated near his car on a major Phnom Penh thoroughfare. Had Enders been in a regular car, he would have been killed. As it was he escaped unharmed, although one of the motorcycle policemen died at the scene, as did a civilian cyclist. The Viet Cong and Cambodian communists were blamed, but in retrospect William Harben, chief of the American embassy’s political section, suspected that the brother of Lon Nol, Lon Non, who had a reputation for viciousness and, as head of Cambodia’s covert intelligence operations was familiar with terrorist techniques,

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was behind it.60 It is possible that Harben was right, for the United States generally considered Lon Non’s influence detrimental. As Marshall Green put it a few weeks later, “Lon Non appears to stand athwart practically everything we are trying to accomplish in Cambodia in terms of unity of purpose and national solidarity.”61 If Lon Non was responsible, he may particularly have disliked American pressure to attain an honest count of the number of Cambodian soldiers and in other ways reduce corruption. Or he may simply have objected to American support for his political enemies in Cambodia. In any event, there was much violence in Phnom Penh. All told, by the time of the assault on Enders, 27 terrorist attacks had taken place during the year in the capital. That number was soon to increase. Early in the morning of 7 October – the second anniversary of the creation of the Khmer Republic – Viet Cong sappers penetrated the northern defenses of Phnom Penh and infiltrated the capital. Achieving total surprise, they destroyed or captured the bulk of a FANK company’s much prized M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs). (FANK had only two such companies.) Equally important, they destroyed the key bridge across the Tonle Sap River. (The bridge was not restored until 1994, largely with Japanese funding.) The government could take some comfort in the fact that the Cambodian army swiftly rallied, American planes were in action within 15 minutes, and most of the raiders were killed or captured. But the raid was nevertheless devastating. The incoming chief of staff, Sosthene Fernandez, called it “a disaster.” Enders fully agreed. “Given the strategic importance of the Tonle Sap bridge, the key role the APC’s play in sustaining morale in FANK field operations, and the gross negligence displayed, the term is altogether apt,” he reported.62 The future looked bleak. A week after the demoralizing attack on Phnom Penh the American embassy reported that it was now clear that the government could not “hold the countryside in the center of their country, and maybe cannot hold all of the LOC’s [lines of communication], without a larger and more effectively structured force than they now have.”63 Although there was no dramatic change for the rest of the year, the situation in Cambodia had clearly deteriorated dramatically since the coup that placed Lon Nol in power. In January 1973 the state department spelled out the situation in stark terms in a document intended as background reading for Vice President Spiro Agnew, who was about to visit Phnom Penh. He would find a different country than the one he had first visited in 1970, the department wrote. The government now controlled no more than one-third of the country, perhaps only one-fourth. Furthermore, “the high morale and national dedication present at the time of your first visit has largely disappeared into one of war-weariness, ineffectiveness and considerable corruption.” Lon Nol’s base of support was “very narrow,” most other Khmer leaders having withdrawn from the government. The military leadership has “not been effective.” Economically, the country was “not in good shape.” There were no exports to speak of, and Cambodia was almost entirely dependent on the United States for trade. The United States was even supplying rice – this to a country which had almost always been self-sufficient in that commodity.

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The state department paper also challenged the long-standing American position that the Khmer Rouge were mere puppets of the Vietnamese. With “little assistance from the NVA/VC” the Khmer Rouge had launched large-scale attacks simultaneously in as many as seven different parts of the country. Although the government army was much larger and better equipped and was able, with considerable air support from the United States, to withstand these attacks, it seemed powerless to defeat the insurgency. This, the Vice President was to be informed, was due to “poor leadership, particularly at the highest level; current factionalism within the top military leadership which is intensified by the divisive role of Lon Nol’s brother, Lon Non; [and] corruption and a dramatic decline in morale at all levels.”64 Before the state department’s briefing paper reached the Vice President, it went to Henry Kissinger, who changed it in significant ways. In contrast to the state department’s view that the Khmer Rouge were by now largely independent of the North Vietnamese, the Vice President was informed that Hanoi controlled most of the “indigenous Communist military and political apparatus in Cambodia.” Kissinger’s unwillingness to acknowledge that the Khmer Rouge were not dependent on Hanoi – something even in 1975 he would not fully accept – was a major misreading of the Cambodian situation. As William Shawcross put it in 1978, “from Kissinger’s refusal to accept that the Khmer Rouge could seriously distrust the Vietnamese communists stems much of the subsequent, continuing disaster.”65 Kissinger’s rewrite did acknowledge that the enemy controlled “most of eastern and northeastern Cambodia and substantial areas in other parts of the country,” but government forces also controlled “a substantial part of the country, including the richest rice producing areas, and a majority of the population.” Gone were statistics estimating government control at only one-third to one-fourth of the territory. Furthermore, the Cambodian army, though it had numerous problems, “has been generally successful in keeping open vital lifelines to Phnom Penh and in protecting most of the important population centers.” Gone also were references to the dramatic deterioration that the Vice President would see when compared to his earlier visit in 1970. There were no references at all to declining morale or the pervasive war-weariness that the state department had identified. Nor was there any mention of Cambodia’s dependence on the United States for rice and trade. In sum, Kissinger’s revision of the state department paper suggested that the country had some important problems and still required American assistance to survive, but it was not in desperate straits. “Despite all of its difficulties and shortcomings, the Cambodian Government does manage to function,” the Vice President learned. “Most of the country has been spared the ravages of war, since most of the fighting has been along lines of communication, and U.S. air strikes have been conducted in largely unpopulated areas.”66 The state department’s view was the more accurate one. The situation was so precarious that the embassy recommended that the plane that brought Agnew to

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Phnom Penh return to Saigon, or perhaps circle in the air during the Vice President’s visit. If it were to stay on the ground at Pochentong airport, it might be attacked.

The Paris Peace Accords – but no talks with Sihanouk Meanwhile in the fall of 1972 there were expectations that the fighting in Vietnam would soon end, as Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho negotiated seriously in Paris. The basic American negotiating position with respect to Vietnam, put forward in the previous May even as Nixon was ordering renewed intensive bombing of North Vietnam (OPERATION LINEBACKER), was a ceasefire in place and the return of prisoners of war, after which the United States would withdraw its troops. In September 1972 Secretary Rogers told Cambodian diplomats that these peace terms applied to all of Indochina, not just Vietnam. But unfortunately, he stated, the communists did not appear interested in serious peace negotiations, and he did not expect any progress for the next two months. Actually there had already been significant progress in the Paris negotiations, where the North Vietnamese had dropped their long-time demand that the United States overthrow the Thieu government. After intensive negotiations, most issues were resolved by 12 October. Cambodians were at no point involved in the negotiations directly. Only after the draft agreement was concluded did American officials inform the Cambodians about the specific provisions affecting them. In late October, having initialed an agreement with Le Duc Tho in Paris, Henry Kissinger was dispatched to Indochina to get South Vietnamese concurrence. On 22 October he flew to Phnom Penh where, for three hours, he discussed the agreement with Lon Nol and other Khmer leaders. The main provision affecting Cambodia was an article that called for an end to military actions and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. It contained no specific deadline. It is not clear how much detail Kissinger shared with the Cambodians, though he certainly informed Lon Nol that the agreement contained a provision for the withdrawal of foreign troops because he asked Lon Nol to call for a cession of hostilities just as soon as the fighting ended in Vietnam to give the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong a chance to withdraw. A few days after Kissinger’s visit, Lon Nol wrote another of his periodic letters to the President. It made no reference to Kissinger’s visit and spoke only in vague generalities.67 Two weeks later he told a New York Times reporter that Kissinger had not informed him in any detail about the Paris agreement. It was probably no coincidence that three days after the Times story, Alexander Haig, Nixon’s Deputy National Security Adviser, and John D. Negroponte of the NSC showed up in Phnom Penh to discuss the tentative peace accords with Lon Nol and Prime Minister Hang Tun Hak. The agreement did not yet specify when hostilities in Cambodia would cease but the Americans told the Khmer leaders that they would press the North Vietnamese on this issue at the next meeting. Nixon planned to guarantee the enforcement of the agreement, in part by

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keeping “a massive air and naval presence in the area” which, after an agreement was reached with Vietnam, would be “even more at your disposition.” The American MAP program would also continue.68 The Cambodian government wanted the agreement to provide for the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops, the evacuation of all sanctuaries, the removal of all arms caches, a prohibition on the North Vietnamese taking Khmers with them for training in North Vietnam (which had happened after the Geneva Conference of 1954), and a requirement that North Vietnam use its influence with the Khmer Rouge to end hostilities in Cambodia. The Americans responded that they doubted they could get the North Vietnamese to agree to the last three of these items. But they did encourage the Cambodians to improve their own bargaining position by taking the offensive militarily to open as many lines of communication as possible prior to a ceasefire. Beyond that, the United States counseled caution. Not only would immediate military efforts to establish control over enemy-occupied areas be counterproductive in a political sense, but they risked humiliating defeat. Better to wait until the North Vietnamese had withdrawn according to the peace agreement, the Americans thought, before expanding government control. But for the moment all of this was academic. South Vietnamese President Thieu had refused to sign the peace agreement, despite great pressure from Kissinger, and Nixon had ordered his National Security Adviser back to the conference table. Difficult negotiations continued into December, but a settlement was not reached, and Nixon resorted to another round of intensive bombing in North Vietnam – the infamous Christmas bombings, or LINEBACKER II. Actually, the prospect of a peace settlement in Vietnam was unnerving for the Cambodian government (as indeed it was for Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge). The government feared that the American departure from Vietnam would inevitably lead to decreasing American support, if not abandonment. Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge feared North Vietnamese and Chinese pressure to accept a ceasefire and negotiated agreement. In any case the Lon Nol government never put all of its negotiating eggs into the Paris talks. In addition to urging the Americans to get acceptable terms for Cambodia in Paris, the Cambodians again attempted to contact the North Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge to see whether a negotiated settlement of the war was possible. Shortly before Kissinger arrived in Phnom Penh, Cambodian premier Hang Thun Hak privately told at least two reporters that the government was talking to Khmer Rouge leaders. A few days later the Washington Post and the New York Times quoted him as saying that the cabinet had agreed “in principle” to negotiate with the Khmer Rouge.69 Although the Cambodian government quickly challenged these reports, saying that its only contacts were with Khmer Rouge military commanders whom it hoped to entice to rally to the government, it was in fact seeking a political settlement. As they had some months earlier, government officials asked the Soviet embassy for assistance in contacting the Khmer Rouge. When these did

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not initially succeed, Lon Nol asked the Americans to intervene with the Soviets to help. Swank considered the Cambodians’ efforts reasonable and hoped that the United States would not discourage such attempts. Given the advanced state of American negotiations with the North Vietnamese, the United States could hardly object to Cambodian efforts to explore a negotiated settlement as well. Soon the Cambodian government authorized Son Sann to resume his efforts to find a peaceful settlement. He was given implicit authority to contact officials in the Sihanouk government in exile (the Gouvernement Royal d’Union Nationale de Kampuchea, or GRUNK) in Paris.70 In December rumors surfaced that Chinese representatives were in Phnom Penh to talk with the Lon Nol. Swank did not dismiss the rumors out of hand. The Chinese did want a political settlement in Cambodia as a way of reining in the North Vietnamese. Giving some credence to the story, only a few days later government officials apparently made contact in Kratie with Khmer Rouge representatives to probe their attitudes toward reconciliation. But in the end nothing came of these efforts. Meanwhile Sihanouk himself, despite his fiery public rhetoric, was dropping numerous hints again that he would like to meet with American officials. As early as September 1972 he said (in contrast to earlier statements) that he would be glad to meet with Kissinger. About the same time a spate of newspapers reported that the United States was interested in working out a solution that would bring Sihanouk back to Phnom Penh. Agence France Presse (AFP) reported that Sihanouk was “euphoric.”71 It is not impossible that there was some American consideration given to a negotiated settlement at this time involving the Prince. There surely was some informed speculation about this. For example, late in October Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak asked Lon Non how his brother would react if China asked the United States to support a Cambodian settlement involving a role for Sihanouk.72 But, although Senator Mansfield was pushing for just such a settlement, the bulk of the evidence suggests that the Nixon administration had committed itself to the Lon Nol regime. Despite the government’s poor prospects, the United States was not about to turn back toward Sihanouk. Sihanouk, the American officials thought, was finished. He ought to retire to a nice villa in France, they said. That the Americans never seriously contemplated discussions with Sihanouk at this time is evident in their complete disregard of the Prince’s efforts later in the fall of 1972 to open communications. On 23 October Sihanouk told the AFP that he would speak to the Americans “without conditions.” A little later the Algerians reported that Sihanouk wanted to negotiate with the United States.73 Perhaps the most serious effort to get negotiations going came from the French, who offered to help the Americans establish a private channel of communications with Sihanouk. In December similar offers from Sihanouk to talk with the Americans surfaced in Guyana and Mauritania. Not only did the United States decline to pursue these soundings, but it did so vigorously and contemptuously. There would be no response to any of them. To be sure, it would have been

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politically difficult for the Americans to turn to Sihanouk. But the United States had no treaty obligations to the current Cambodian government and was not in theory tied to any particular personality; it might have been possible to separate Sihanouk from his murderous allies the Khmer Rouge who, the Prince well knew, had no long-term use for him or the monarchy. During the latter stages of the Vietnam peace negotiations, the Chinese indicated to Kissinger that they would be willing to arrange a meeting with Sihanouk. Kissinger acknowledged it was possible to arrive at a solution that would take Sihanouk’s concerns into consideration. “Whoever can best preserve it [Cambodia] as an independent neutral country” would be acceptable, Kissinger told the Chinese. However, he did not envisage negotiations directly between Sihanouk and the United States but rather among the Khmer parties themselves. Only after a ceasefire in Cambodia might the Americans talk with Sihanouk.74 The lack of American diplomatic imagination was unfortunate. As William Shawcross put it eloquently in 1978, “but for the contempt with which Henry Kissinger always dismissed him, Sihanouk – who understood the nature of the Khmer Rouge – might have been able to avert the dark savagery which has been visited upon his people since April 1975.”75 Finally on 27 January 1973 the final peace accords to end the war in Vietnam were signed. With them came some optimism that the fighting in Cambodia might also stop. Cambodia badly needed peace. However, the Paris Accords were vaguer about Cambodia than about Vietnam and Laos. Article 20 called upon the parties to respect Cambodia’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutrality, as had been delineated in the Geneva agreements of 1954. It required all foreign countries to end their military activities in Cambodia and withdraw their troops; foreign countries were also not to use Cambodia to encroach on the sovereignty or security of other countries, and Cambodia was to settle its own internal affairs without foreign intervention. There was, however, no timetable nor a specific agreement for a ceasefire. In this circumstance, the Americans wanted Lon Nol to declare a unilateral ceasefire and insist on a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, but he was not to take provocative actions against their positions for the time being. He would continue his efforts to seek a negotiated settlement with the insurgents. The United States would temporarily halt the delivery of military supplies and air support. But it would quickly resume both if the fighting began again, in which case American air support would be used initially only against Khmer Rouge positions, thus not impeding any Vietnamese withdrawal. The United States also wanted to see the ICC, which had ceased operations in Cambodia in 1969, restored. In compliance with Article 5 of the accords, the United States quickly shut down training facilities in Vietnam, returning some Khmers to Cambodia and transferring others to Thailand for further training. The peace settlement in Vietnam, along with Lon Nol’s unilateral ceasefire declaration, temporarily put the insurgency on the defensive, politically. On 26 January Sihanouk, Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan and Sihanouk’s Prime Minister Penn Nouth signed a statement (broadcast on 30 January) welcoming

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the ceasefire in Vietnam and asserting that they too cherished peace. The next day Sihanouk reiterated his willingness to meet with Kissinger. This relative moderation may have been due in part to pressure from the North Vietnamese. Although in Paris they had told Kissinger frankly that they had little control over the Khmer insurgents and were unable to deliver a ceasefire in Cambodia (there had even been fighting at times between the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese), they, and the Chinese as well, attempted to moderate Khmer Rouge intransigence and encourage a negotiated settlement. As Sihanouk put it on 29 January (the day Lon Nol’s ceasefire went into effect), “our friends told us our adversaries are accusing us of bellicosity at a time when peace is being built and we would find ourselves isolated while Lon Nol launched his peace campaign.” Sihanouk also said his side would decrease its military activities and offer a general amnesty, though Lon Nol and his “clique” would have to go into exile. Ominously, however, Sihanouk admitted that he had not yet gotten approval for his proposals from the insurgent leaders in Cambodia (except for the proposal to speak with the United States), adding that Khieu Samphan had the last word. There was, nevertheless, some momentary optimism among the Americans. “With the GKR preempting the peace issue,” Swank cabled, “Sihanouk has obviously felt increasingly isolated by Indochinese developments he vainly opposed, and is clearly angling for some appearance, if not the reality of bilateral talks with the U.S.” As Swank presciently observed, “He may be out in front of the in-country group as he seeks to keep his hand in, but the joint January 26 statement to which Khieu Samphan subscribed also represents a substantial softening of the CNPLAF line.” On the other hand, a later statement (28 January) by Khmer Rouge Minister of the Interior Hou Youn, Minister of Defense Khieu Samphan, and Minister of Information Hu Nim (available to the Americans only on 2 February) took a much harder line and confirmed Swank’s suspicion that Sihanouk was “well out in front of the in-country insurgents.” Although the Khmer Rouge leaders asserted that they too desired peace, they insisted that the United States must completely withdraw all support from the Lon Nol regime, which must then be dissolved. Although the rhetoric was less harsh than previous Khmer Rouge statements, its substance was the same. They would fight on to victory.76 There was, then, clearly a difference of opinion in the insurgent ranks. Sihanouk called for negotiations with the United States and a decrease in military activity. The hardliners had little desire for a ceasefire and wanted to press their military advantage. That the North Vietnamese basically agreed with Sihanouk and made some attempts to get the Khmer Rouge to negotiate eventually widened the growing gulf between the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese. The Chinese, too, continued to urge moderation.77 But the United States never made any attempt to exploit this rift by trying to arrange the talks for which Sihanouk had asked. On the contrary, as Swank told journalist Stanley Karnow, “the reimposition of Sihanouk’s rule is not an acceptable political solution for the majority of the Khmer nation.” Foolishly lumping

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the Chinese, the North Vietnamese, and the insurgents together, Swank told Karnow that until they all moved away from “their current intransigent stance, the possibility of even beginning meaningful negotiations on Cambodia is remote.” As it was, Sihanouk withdrew (for the moment) his offer to meet with Kissinger because, as he informed Baltimore Sun reporter Eddie Wu, “the US government has refused any meeting with him and had refused to have any dialogue with his government. Under these circumstances, he said, the war in Cambodia would continue.” Swank summed it up this way: “Sihanouk tried in late January to lead in-country insurgents off their hard line on continuing the war, and got reeled in.”78 The Chinese, however, who were at this point not wedded to the Khmer Rouge, believed that direct negotiations between Sihanouk and the United States should take place and might result in a genuinely independent and neutral Cambodian state led once again by the Prince. “Why can’t you accept to have negotiations with Norodom Sihanouk as head of state?” Zhou Enlai asked Kissinger, who was in Beijing. “How can we, when we recognize one government, engage in a direct negotiation with Sihanouk?” he said. “This is out of the question.” Zhou, however, kept pushing. Both France and the Soviet Union had managed to maintain ties with both sides, he pointed out. Furthermore, Lon Nol – an opportunist who over the years had personally benefited from both the communists and the Americans – was not worthy of support, he said. Finally, he pointed out, a major flaw in Kissinger’s position was that Sihanouk would never negotiate with those who overthrew him. But the Chinese leader did not convince Kissinger.79 Nothing might have come of an American effort to begin talks, but, as Kissinger put it later in another context, by urging the talks and offering to act as the intermediary, Zhou was putting his personal prestige on the line. He probably would not have done so if he had thought that direct talks between Kissinger and Sihanouk could not succeed, and it is unfortunate that such talks were not attempted before the Khmer Rouge hardliners became even stronger. As the perceptive American consul in Hong Kong put it a little later, “the longer hostilities continue, the less Sihanouk – and by extension Peking – will have to say about a solution.” Instead, the hardliners would be in charge.80 Interestingly, although there were no American talks with Sihanouk or the Khmer Rouge, there were a few contacts between Lon Nol’s government and the insurgents that did not involve the United States. On at least two occasions (one in January 1973, the other on 13 February) Dr. Mok-Lean, acting at the behest of Cambodian Prime Minister Hang Thun Hak, arranged meetings near Kirirom, an insurgent-controlled region, with GRUNK officials Hou Youn, Khieu Samphan, and Hu Nim. Hou Youn apparently took the lead in the discussions. He was reportedly very anti-Vietnamese (as well as anti-Sihanouk), sought a “third way” between capitalism and communism, and was not interested in fighting a prolonged war with other Khmers. He hoped to get negotiations going but distrusted the Lon brothers and Sirik Matak. Eventually, he felt that negotiations would have to take place in a neutral country such as

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Burma and involve the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. Hou Youn was in fact a relatively moderate Khmer Rouge leader, who was eventually shot when he criticized the Khmer Rouge’s forcible evacuation of Cambodia’s cities after their takeover in 1975.81 When Lon Nol declared his unilateral ceasefire, Washington Evening Star writer Henry Bradsher stated that the gesture would be “funny if it were not pathetic.”82 This was not quite accurate. It, together with the Paris Peace Accords, had momentarily discombobulated the Khmer Rouge. As Sihanouk realized, it put the onus for continued war on GRUNK’s side. But Bradsher was right fundamentally. As a Western diplomat said, the ceasefire declaration was a “brilliant propaganda” move because it made the other side look bad even when the government itself was not strong enough to launch offensive actions of its own. The Khmer Rouge were actually correct when they denounced the ceasefire as a “coverup” to mask the regime’s “lack of offensive capacity.”83 Those who wanted negotiations soon lost out; the talks with Hou Youn led nowhere. The fighting resumed in a major way on the night of 7–8 February 1973 when Khmer Rouge forces attacked all sides of the FANK perimeter around the besieged city of Kompong Thom. For the first time since the Paris Accords, the Cambodians requested, and received, tactical American air support. Ten days later the American embassy reported that Kompong Thom had become very largely a city of refugees (about 40 percent of the population), along with military personnel and their families. Supplies were very low, with only a two-day supply of gasoline to power the communications center and the hospital. The military garrison had perhaps one week’s worth of ammunition left. The lone doctor was so busy he could not attend to refugees. The airport had been closed since 8 December 1972. Morale was understandably low, and some refugee families had been allowed to leave to go back to their homes in enemy-controlled territory. (The airport was reopened in March 1973, but the city was still surrounded and besieged.) Enemy attacks spread to other regions of the country. Even with little or no assistance from the North Vietnamese (the Lon Nol government could not discover any evidence that the Vietnamese were involved in any of these new actions), the Khmer Rouge once again attacked a variety of targets, interdicting highways and the Mekong River corridor. The FANK response was “lackluster.”84 At the end of February 1973 the American embassy reported that even commanders refused orders to fight. After tactical air strikes, they seldom followed up on the ground. Furthermore, little seemed to have been done about payroll padding and other forms of corruption within the military. All in all, the embassy rated FANK’s battlefield performance “poor.” But when a trusted Cambodian associate tried to alert Lon Nol to the seriousness of the situation, he found the marshal “resolutely optimistic.”85 Nor was the Cambodian government cause helped, in American eyes, by Lon Nol’s lack of interest in broadening his government. Although the marshal always agreed in principle to do this, little happened. In Tam, appointed a special adviser to the government, soon resigned when Lon Non became his

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superior. All in all, Lon Nol made little progress in gaining back a high level of support. The fraudulent elections had demonstrated his government’s weakness, and little had been done to change the situation. In sum, the situation did not look bright. As Swank understated it in a 12-page cable assessing the situation, “we must recognize the possibility that time is not necessarily on the side of the GKR.”86 Furthermore, the embassy had little to suggest by way of improving the situation. Although Lon Nol was an invalid who was “isolated from contact with the people” and had not provided forceful leadership, the Americans in Phnom Penh saw no alternatives. “The dearth of leadership and organizing ability among the Khmer continues to be a major drawback in the prosecution of the war effort and in rendering our assistance effective,” they concluded. Negotiations were a possibility; the option the embassy officials analyzed with particular care was one that would put the Lon Nol government and GRUNK on an equal footing. To do so might avoid a “prolonged and debilitating war.” Another possibility was to follow up on French suggestions that both Lon Nol and Sihanouk bow out. Both ideas had merit, embassy officials thought. But in the final analysis, the risks were too great for the Americans to support either possibility. This left embassy officials with only two recommendations for the moment. They supported withholding the economic aid promised to North Vietnam in the Paris Accords as long as Hanoi did not respect the agreement, including the provisions relating to Cambodia. And they urged additional pressure against the Vietnamese by increasing the bombing of the logistical network in Cambodia. Together with additional tactical air and B-52 strikes against the insurgency, this pressure might improve the bargaining position vis-à-vis Hanoi and the Khmer Rouge, resulting eventually in a tacit or explicit reduction of hostilities.87 It was not a cheery conclusion or one that promised results. That same day (6 March) the enemy sank another munitions barge – the second one in a month – resulting in the loss of $2 million in MAP-supplied ammunition. In Washington, state department officials read Swank’s reports with increasing concern and began to consider the dramatic possibility of removing Lon Nol. They thought that they had “to do something about Lon Non,” but they were not sure what. What, they asked the ambassador, would he think if Lon Nol traveled abroad on the recommendations of doctors (“which we could arrange”) for medical attention and rest?88 Swank was not yet ready to recommend such a drastic measure – in effect a soft coup. A better alternative, Swank thought, was to insist that Lon Nol appoint Sirik Matak Vice President. This would bring into the government a competent and respected administrator and counter Lon Non’s influence. It would not be a panacea, Swank quickly acknowledged. Sirik Matak did not have widespread popular appeal, and Lon Non, who would resist Matak’s appointment, “could prove to be a ruthless and malevolent opponent of our interests and position here.” Still, Swank offered to speak to Lon Nol along these lines. He hoped he would be able to invoke President Nixon’s name to add extra weight to the American insistence that Sirik Matak be appointed.89

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But if the ambassador was not yet ready to recommend that Lon Nol be forced to leave, he came to believe that Lon Non had to be removed from the political scene. The ambassador was willing to threaten to withdraw American aid to accomplish this. The state department agreed that Lon Non had to be removed, and it was prepared to have Swank confront Lon Nol about this. But it would not agree to threaten the withdrawal of American assistance. What state department officials hoped would happen was that Lon Nol would insist on seeking additional medical treatment in the United States. In return for arranging this, the United States would insist that Lon Nol leave the government in the hands of a “group of executors, to include Sirik Matak” and that Lon Non leave the country at the same time. The United States was even willing to have Lon Non appointed ambassador to Washington.90 Swank pointed out that the American unwillingness to threaten a withdrawal of aid left only his powers of persuasion to convince Lon Nol, whom he described as a “willful and obstinate man” who would not do anything he considered to be against his own interests. Nevertheless he thought it important to put in writing American concerns directly to Lon Nol.91 The day after Swank’s proposed approach to Lon Nol, two dramatic events occurred that threatened to upset American calculations. Late in the morning of 17 March three of Lon Non’s agents entered a meeting of striking university teachers at the Faculty of Pedagogy, where they assailed a teacher who was denouncing the government. The crowd locked the agents in a room, but then 50 plainclothesmen (also from Lon Non’s forces) who had been waiting outside forced their way in and threw hand grenades into the crowd, killing two persons and wounding eight. Then at 1.20 p.m. that same day a Cambodian Air Force pilot, So Photra, stole one of the American-supplied T-28 airplanes from Pochentong airport and dropped two bombs on the Chamcar Mon palace compound, Lon Nol’s official residence. One of the bombs landed in a military compound of wooden barracks. A third bomb hit the nearby Chrui Changwar peninsula, causing casualties, while a fourth landed in a flooded area on the northwestern outskirts of the city causing no damage. At least 43 people, most dependents of military personnel, died in the attack. Lon Nol and members of the government’s inner circle escaped harm. The plane then flew away from Phnom Penh toward insurgent-controlled areas. Swank reported that “Lon Nol’s prestige and authority are now at stake as never before” as Cambodians and foreigners alike looked to see whether he would be able to meet the challenges posed by these events.92 Initially both the embassy and the government assumed that So Photra was acting on behalf of the insurgents. “It seems probable that the enemy got to him,” Swank reported, and Lon Nol went on the air to assert that the enemy had bribed him.93 Because So Photra was either the husband or (more likely) the boyfriend of Princess Botum Bopha, one of Sihanouk’s daughters, Lon Nol concluded that this was a royalist–communist plot to take over his government, and he responded by suspending civil rights, prohibiting meetings on the street of more than five people, requiring anyone (including foreigners) who planned to

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leave the country to have their papers revalidated, incarcerating or placing under house arrest at least 16 members of the royal family and grounding a number of pilots of royal birth, arresting former presidential candidate Keo An who had once suggested that Sihanouk ought to be allowed to return as a private citizen, firing Air Force Commander So Satto and placing him under house arrest, arresting leaders of the teachers’ strike, closing newspapers and hauling editors before military courts, and, potentially the most serious of all, placing Sirik Matak under house arrest and cutting off his telephone. Lon Nol told the Indonesian ambassador that “he had tolerated dissent long enough and would tolerate it no longer.”94 A few days later an unsuccessful attempt was made, probably by Lon Non’s forces, to assassinate Tep Kunnah, a close associate of Sirik Matak. Swank and other embassy officials tried to moderate Lon Nol’s actions. They pointed out that the bombing was probably not a plot after all but the actions of a single disaffected and unbalanced air force captain who had washed out of pilot training for lack of discipline. Swank continued to harp on the need for Lon Nol to implement reforms, broaden his political base, and increase his popular appeal by, for example, arranging personal contacts and meetings with students, teachers, soldiers, and police. But Swank had to admit that there was now no more point in urging the President to appoint Sirik Matak as Vice President – not that Sirik Matak helped matters by telling New York Times reporter Henry Kamm that Lon Nol wanted to bring about a military dictatorship and that Sihanouk had more support in the country than the President. The events of 17 March had overtaken the planned American démarche. When opportunities arose, however, Swank continued to suggest that Lon Non might want to leave the country.95 But by now the ambassador’s representations of this sort were beginning to irritate some in the White House. Brent Scowcroft of the NSC staff, for example, called the state department to say that, “if he has not already been so instructed, Ambassador Swank should be asked to refrain from giving further advice to Lon Nol about the internal political situation in Cambodia and to take a more relaxed attitude.”96 A telegram was to be prepared to this effect, but if it was, it has not yet come to light. Swank’s behavior in the coming weeks suggests that White House concerns did not affect his approach, for if anything Swank’s intercessions with the Cambodian government became even more urgent. Thus, for example, two days after Scowcroft’s intervention, Swank met with a prominent member of Lon Nol’s political party and told him that Lon Non’s absence “from the republic would be the optimum solution,” and he again suggested his appointment as ambassador to Washington. It was hard to see how the ambassador could have been any more intrusive, and, perhaps a bit concerned, he asked if the state department approved of his conversation and asked for permission to be equally frank with Lon Nol if necessary.97 One official was immediately supportive. G. McMurtrie Godley, ambassador to Laos, congratulated Swank on “your efforts to bring Lon Nol to his senses and broaden his government.” Godley, who was planning to visit Swank and

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Cambodian leaders in Phnom Penh soon, encouraged the ambassador to use his name and the forthcoming visit as a means of moving the Cambodian government in the desired direction.98 For the next week a series of devastating reports poured into the state department beginning with an embassy assessment of Lon Non that, when telegraphed to Washington on 31 March, consisted of seven sections totaling 22 pages. Lon Non, the report stated, was a man of “unusual energy and initiative” who unfortunately applied those qualities toward furthering his own personal ambitions “restrained neither by good political judgement nor moral scruples.” He was “an inadequate administrator” and “a poor and probably dishonest manager of men and materiel.” In a particularly biting criticism of Lon Non’s military abilities, the report stated that he was “by Cambodian standards, a poor commander” who “sought maximum exposure to publicity and minimum exposure to the enemy.” He could not be trusted with American-supplied equipment and had, in fact, been cut off from those supplies. He was a political agitator who was behind the student strikes of 1972 that led to Sirik Matak’s resignation as Prime Minister-designate, and he had been involved in the recent disturbances at the Faculty of Pedagogy that left two persons dead. The Australians reported that he used an assassination unit called the “Republican Security Battalion” which drove around in a fleet of yellow Hondas. The purpose of all of this was to keep his brother in power and further his own interests. The report concluded, Those who dislike and fear Lon Non, among who must be counted many if not most of the best military and civilian leaders, are aware of this. Increased reliance upon Lon Non has thus decreased to a dangerous level Lon Nol’s ability to rely on others.99 Meanwhile, things seemed to be falling apart in Cambodia. The embassy’s weekly report dated 3 April described “a somber week” in Cambodia, in which troops refused to fight and soldiers looted market stalls in Phnom Penh. The Mekong River corridor remained closed to convoys, since the government controlled no more than 30 percent of the river between Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese border, and elsewhere enemy forces made advances. The one bright spot was the advance by Brigadier General Norodom Chantarangsey, who had developed about the only successful pacification program in the entire country and whose forces had recently occupied the Kirirom Plateau, an area under enemy control since 1970. But typical of the country’s internal politics, Lon Nol ordered Chantarangsey to withdraw from Kirirom because he did not want a potential rival to be successful when other FANK units were doing so poorly.100 In Washington reports of troops, and even commanders, refusing orders to fight were particularly troubling, and the state department asked to what extent this could be attributed to the political situation. Swank responded that the lack of military aggressiveness was not entirely a new phenomenon, but the growing realization that the enemy was no longer the Vietnamese (whom the Cambodians were more willing to fight) but fellow Khmers contributed to it.

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There was also a considerable let down after the initial euphoria of the unilateral ceasefire and the end of the fighting in Vietnam. Furthermore, some units were becoming dependent on American air strikes and would not fight when the aircraft were not available. But the political factor was an important consideration as well. Respect for Lon Nol had decayed, and, as the Minister for Defense told Swank, “many FANK soldiers do not now really know for what or for whom they are fighting.” Defeat was perhaps in sight. “We are asking ourselves whether we are not observing a deterioration of FANK effectiveness which could gather danger momentum,” Swank reported.101 Significantly, Swank’s report was read at the White House. The state department’s Cambodia experts were, if anything, more pessimistic than embassy officials in Phnom Penh. In their “Country Program Memorandum” they began by pointing out that most North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combat troops had withdrawn from Cambodia (which, if true, put American operations there on a shaky legal and political foundation). All main force units had pulled out, and only about 7,000 combat troops remained (although there were as many as 20,000 administrative and logistical personnel still there). Thus the war in Cambodia was very much a civil conflict. As for the Cambodian government, it had “a narrow base of support, is unpopular and is generally ineffectual.” Lon Nol was “incapable of developing a competent team to cope with increasing military, political and economic difficulties.” Corruption was rampant. FANK was poorly led, lacked discipline, and increasingly refrained from combat. The democratic experiment in Cambodia had failed, and (a particularly galling point) “most informed Khmer” believed that Lon Nol’s government was worse than Sihanouk’s had been. The group that had banded together to overthrow Sihanouk had disintegrated. Lon Non employed “assassination, bribery and slander” to eliminate almost all capable leaders from the government. And in a chilling conclusion, the report stated that even if there were a change in political leadership, “it may now be too late to reverse the negative trends which have gained considerable momentum.” The officials were equally pessimistic about the future of the Cambodian military. Although FANK had received huge amounts of arms and supplies, was estimated to have an actual strength of about 150,000 men on any given day, and had made some progress in consolidating understrength units and reducing phantom soldiers, weaknesses in such intangible areas as leadership, morale, and discipline offset what progress had been attained. “We see no reason to believe that the downward trend in the intangible factors will be reversed in the foreseeable future,” the report concluded.102 Scowcroft’s directive for Swank to “take a more relaxed attitude” seemed foolish indeed. The flurry of negative reports demanded action at the highest levels, and Nixon dispatched Alexander Haig to Phnom Penh for a first-hand assessment of the situation. Stopping first in Vientiane, where Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma told him emphatically that Lon Nol had to broaden the base of his government and bring back In Tam and Sirik Matak, Haig arrived in Phnom Penh on 10 April. Though details of the Haig visit are unaccountably sketchy,

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Haig apparently told Lon Nol that the United States would cut off all economic and military assistance unless he brought opposition leaders into the government and ended Lon Non’s activities.103 The threat – which the state department had previously told Swank it would not use – worked. A few days after Haig’s departure it was announced that Lon Non would depart on a three-month trip to France and the United States. In addition the current Hang Thun Hak government resigned. The real test, however, was whether Lon Nol would follow through by forming a new government in which opposition figures would have real authority. If he failed to do so or if the opposition leaders refused to participate, Swank reported, “the survival of the republic could be in real jeopardy.”104 But after intensive negotiations, agreement was reached, and on 24 April 1973 Lon Nol announced that Cheng Heng, Sirik Matak, In Tam, and he had agreed to form a High Political Council that would rule by decree for six months. The National Assembly would be suspended during that time. This was very largely a victory for the opposition, whose demands Lon Nol – under strong American pressure – had accepted. It might even be characterized as an American-driven soft coup, since Lon Nol’s power had been dramatically reduced. On the other hand, as Senate staffers Moose and Lowenstein observed, now that Lon Nol had done what the United States demanded, he had every right to expect continued American military support, support which, all observers agreed, was the only reason his government had so far been able to survive.105 Nevertheless, as the military situation worsened some officials recommended taking a step that had been heretofore resolutely rejected: negotiating with Sihanouk. As the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Porter wrote, “sometimes we must think the unthinkable.” In fact, it might be better to negotiate now (through Hanoi and Beijing) rather than later when the situation might well be worse, he thought. “I am not advocating that we pick up Sihanouk,” Porter wrote in a covering letter, “but I do think we must not build a wall around the possibility that we might have to.” He suggested a Laotian-type settlement be looked at.106 German and Algerian officials also urged the Americans to treat with Sihanouk. The Algerians were particularly compelling, in retrospect, saying that the United States “could prevent his [Sihanouk] becoming a prisoner of the Khmer Rouge or dependent upon the Chinese.”107 But the administration remained unwilling to alter course, and neither Germany nor Algeria received a positive response. In contrast to Porter, state department official William H. Sullivan thought there was little point in trying to work out a solution involving Sihanouk. He had already said as much to Kissinger on 30 March, pointing out a number of drawbacks, including Sihanouk’s inbred anti-Americanism, his antagonism toward all of his neighbors, the hostility of the Khmer Rouge (which he mistakenly stated were under North Vietnamese control), and the fact that the Prince could never again regain the respect of the Cambodian military. But the main reason not to negotiate Sihanouk’s return, he said, was that it would appear to the international community that Lon Nol had lost his struggle against the communists and the United

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States would have suffered a loss of prestige by appearing to capitulate. Adding to these considerations, Sullivan asserted that the North Vietnamese would never accept Sihanouk.108 Kissinger agreed with Sullivan. Aside from hesitating to abandon the Lon Nol regime on whom the United States had staked its reputation, Kissinger concluded that Sihanouk was already a Khmer Rouge prisoner. “Sihanouk understood that the Khmer Rouge and Hanoi were determined to block” attempts to return him as head of state, Kissinger wrote in his memoirs. And even though the Prince of course hoped that this would not be the case, “he was too weak to abandon the only base he had – whatever his convictions. … So much for the argument that it was American opposition that prevented the return of Sihanouk to power in Cambodia,” Kissinger concludes.109 The flaw in Kissinger’s assertion is that he had repeatedly refused Sihanouk’s offers to negotiate directly with him and so could not be certain how much freedom of action the Prince enjoyed. Kissinger did continue to tell the Chinese privately that the United States was not committed to any particular Cambodian leader and encouraged negotiations between Sihanouk’s representatives and “other forces”; and on 24 April, again using “one of its most highly sensitive channels,” the United States reiterated to China its willingness to work toward a solution for Cambodia that would include “all political forces, including those of Prince Sihanouk.” But the Americans were not yet willing to meet with Sihanouk or his representatives.110 Shortly thereafter Sihanouk, who had recently returned from a visit to the “liberated areas” of Cambodia and was feeling that he had strengthened his influence with the insurgents, stated unequivocally that he would “negotiate directly with President Nixon or his representative.” He said he had “received carte blanche from the GRUNK/FUNK forces to negotiate with the United States.”111 The United States again did not respond. If it had, it might have found out just how much leeway Sihanouk had, whether he really was a prisoner of the Khmer Rouge at this point, and whether it was possible to lure him away from the most radical insurgents. In sum, Kissinger’s assertion that it was not American opposition that prevented Sihanouk’s return to power in April 1973 is unproven. Later (nearly two years later), when Kissinger changed his mind and agreed to meet with Sihanouk, it was too late. Meanwhile the military situation became increasingly difficult. Communist forces again cut Route 1 and recaptured territory along the Mekong River that they had lost only a few weeks before. Mekong River convoys again stopped, and the United States had to airlift fuel to the capital. By late April enemy troops surrounded Phnom Penh, which was well within artillery range. Bombs and shells became a part of daily life in the capital. As Wilfred Deac writes, “The enemy seemed to be everywhere.”112 American embassy officials told the Korean defense attaché that it would be prudent to send dependents out of the country quietly. With the Khmer Rouge pushing in on Phnom Penh from all directions, the Americans unleashed the air force.113 The bombing was so close to Phnom Penh

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that the force of the explosions damaged buildings in the city itself. It caused “major damage” to a gate at the Christian and Missionary Alliance mission’s compound, for example. By late July the state department felt compelled to urge all civilians to leave. The Americans feared the consequences when the bombing ended on 15 August as Congress had required. “This is the most pessimistic report I have ever gotten in many contacts with the State Department regarding this situation,” wrote an Alliance official. “There were no tempering, optimistic statements.” Early in August a political officer at the American embassy in Phnom Penh told missionaries to “get out immediately.” Representatives of the Seventh-day Adventists did leave, as did the Pentecostals, while the Alliance mission evacuated most women personnel and debated daily whether the men should leave as well.114 In the end the Alliance men did not leave, and in fact the calls to leave Phnom Penh turned out not to be immediately necessary, for the most intense bombing in military history finally stopped the FUNK advance and prevented an insurgent victory in the summer of 1973 (something which Sihanouk frankly admitted publicly on several occasions). In September the Alliance women returned. Still, if the bombing prevented an immediate takeover of Phnom Penh, the GKR appeared at the time to be on the brink of defeat anyway. To the surprise of many, the Khmer Republic survived for nearly two more years. But it was nevertheless a losing cause. Even if the bombing had continued, it is unlikely that the GKR would have survived in the long run. Furthermore, the intense bombing may also have undercut relatively moderate forces within the revolutionary movement and strengthened the hand of the radical Pol Potists, thus ensuring extreme outcomes (such as the evacuation of the cities) when the revolutionaries triumphed in 1975.115 The increased bombing also caused difficulties for the administration at home. Despite safeguards, there were horrendous civilian casualties. In one incident, for example, some 250 civilians were killed or wounded in a B-52 attack near the Vietnamese border town of Chau Doc. “It is simply impossible to use heavy ordnance in the countryside without some civilian casualties,” reported the American embassy. Ironically an official in the American embassy in Saigon later reported that the same area could now be hit again; there was no danger of civilian casualties since all civilians had either been killed or driven out.116 The casualties, and the many refugees who fled to avoid the bombing (news reports stated that 8,000 to 12,000 new refugees had arrived in Phnom Penh as a direct result of the bombing) resulted in strong criticism. Senator Edward Kennedy (D–MA) scheduled hearings on the problems of war victims in Cambodia. Estimates of the number of civilians killed by the American bombing run as high as 150,000.117 The bombing produced two other areas of concern. Its very justification was now problematic. The original justification – that the bombing protected the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam – no longer held since the last American troops had departed on 28 March 1973. Now the administration claimed that the bombing must continue to force the North Vietnamese to

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respect the Paris Accords. The conflicts in Cambodia and Laos were so interrelated to the war in Vietnam “as to be considered parts of a single conflict,” the administration argued. Because the fighting in Cambodia threatened the settlement in Vietnam, the air operations in Cambodia should be viewed not as a commitment to Cambodia per se but rather as “a meaningful interim action to bring about compliance” with Article 20 of the accords.118 Central to the administration’s legal argument was the contention that the Khmer Rouge were creatures of the North Vietnamese – created, led, and sustained by them. For example, in testimony before the generally friendly House Armed Services Committee, White House legal counsel Fred Buzhardt argued that bombing the Vietnamese communists was legal because they were violating Article 20. What then, asked one representative, was “the justification for bombing the non-North Vietnamese” with whom the United States had no agreement which could be broken? Buzhardt responded that “the combat forces of the local Khmer and NVA are so intermixed, coordinated in their attacks, that it is impossible to distinguish on a day-to-day basis.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dennis J. Doolin put it even more starkly. He agreed that the Khmer insurgents were “directed and controlled and organized by the North Vietnamese” and testified that “if it were not for the North Vietnamese leadership, North Vietnamese advisers and cadres, North Vietnamese heavy weapons support and logistic support there would be no Communist insurgency in Cambodia outside of the capability of the Government to handle it. … If the North Vietnamese were to go home you would have no conflict in Cambodia,” he stated. Congressman Gerald Ford (R–MI) made the same point in a letter to his fellow Republican legislators. “Cambodia is not experiencing a genuine civil war but a classic Communist insurgency controlled and supported by Hanoi,” he wrote.119 But such a view was long outdated. At the Paris peace talks Le Duc Tho contended that he could not control the Khmer Rouge, a statement that Kissinger in his memoirs acknowledged was accurate. In fact, according to a later JCS report, most Vietnamese communist forces withdrew from Cambodia in May 1972, well before the Paris peace agreement.120 By the spring of 1973, the United States was estimating that the Khmer Rouge had about 50,000 combat troops (although the actual number was probably closer to 200,000)121 – far more than North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combat forces in Cambodia. State department reports also indicated that much of the insurgency was strongly anti-Vietnamese and that most of FANK’s encounters were with the insurgents. This in fact was given as one reason why Lon Nol’s forces, not wanting to fight fellow Khmers, were not being aggressive. In sum, by this time Hanoi did not control the Khmer Rouge. As the JCS put it later, by early 1973 the Khmer Rouge “by and large, were responsible for their own war effort,” an assessment with which the state department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research agreed.122 By June 1973 the Khmer Rouge were in the process of driving out the remaining North Vietnamese troops, as well as ethnic Vietnamese civilians. But this did not change Kissinger’s mind. “Even after I

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returned to Washington in May 1974,” recalled Kenneth Quinn, who had been reporting about these developments from the field, “I could not convince top policy officials that there had been a fundamental change in the situation.”123 Whatever the relationship of the North Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge, some North Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia. Was this a violation of Article 20 of the Paris Accords? The accords required all foreign countries “to put an end to all military activities in Cambodia,” to withdraw all military personnel, and to “refrain from reintroducing into” Cambodia “troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.” In other words, the agreement required both a North Vietnamese withdrawal and an end to American military actions in Cambodia. It set no timetable, however, and so the North Vietnamese were technically no more in violation of the Paris Accords than was the United States. In May Secretary Rogers, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, agreed that this was the case which, as White House aide William E. Timmons put it in a memorandum to President Nixon, undercut the “Administration’s rationale for continued air operations.”124 A related matter of concern to legislators was the increasingly deep involvement of the American embassy in Phnom Penh in directing the air strikes. To many in Congress this was a violation of American law that prohibited the presence of American advisers in Cambodia. Opponents of the administration believed that the embassy’s intimate involvement also violated various other laws that made it clear that the United States had no commitment to defend the Cambodian government.125 Pressure was growing for a legislative end to American involvement in what was increasingly a Cambodian civil war. Early in May the administration lost a number of key votes in the House. The Addabbo amendment, which prohibited the administration from transferring any funds between categories in the supplemental appropriations bill, carried. (The administration had wanted to transfer a small portion, $25 million, to fund air operations over Cambodia.) Another amendment prohibiting using any funds in the same bill for combat in Cambodia also carried easily, 224–172. It was increasingly clear that it was only a matter of time before Congress cut off all funds for military actions in Cambodia. Adding to the administration’s frustration, the new political arrangement to which Lon Nol had agreed under American pressure was not functioning well. For one thing, the High Political Council had difficulty agreeing on a Prime Minister, and Swank intervened directly to insist that the council act. After further American interventions, the members eventually settled on In Tam. Next the council considered transforming itself into a full-fledged ministerial government, which threatened to overturn the whole concept of the council. “I am still hopeful a sense of the absolute necessity of making progress will prevail,” Swank wrote in some despair. Then for about two weeks the council seemed to function well. But late in May the new Prime Minister, In Tam, complained bitterly to Swank that Lon Nol was attempting to regain his power. He regularly bypassed In Tam and, most importantly, was attempting to keep all military affairs under

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his personal control. Swank tried to encourage In Tam, but ten days later the ambassador found him in “a despondent and helpless frame of mind.” Lon Nol was increasingly ruling by himself.126 Members of the government, and other prominent Khmers, began to feel that it would be good if Lon Nol would leave for medical treatment. Having received other reports confirming Swank’s gloomy telegrams, the state department found the situation “disturbing and disappointing.” The high hopes of the Americans that the new Cambodian council would bring a sense of unity had been dashed. The department had little to offer as to how the situation might be improved. Swank was instructed only to keep emphasizing the dire necessity of unity.127 By mid-July In Tam indicated that he wanted to resign, and the Americans were clearly hoping that Lon Nol might decide to seek medical treatment abroad for his paralysis. With a difficult military and political situation and the likelihood that Congress would soon legislate an end to the American air war, the possibility of a negotiated settlement warranted renewed exploration – although at the same time the weak position of the GKR led to calls to delay negotiations until the situation improved. The latter point was brought home when in May Son Sann found little support from Lon Nol for his efforts to begin discussions with Sihanouk’s government. Even Swank, who liked Son Sann and thought that he would eventually play an important role in any negotiations that did develop, urged him to delay any peace initiative until the GKR was in a stronger position. The United States, for its part, was giving more serious consideration to a settlement that might involve Sihanouk’s return in some capacity (although it was still unwilling to speak with the Prince or his representatives directly). On several occasions in May 1973 Sihanouk again made it clear that he was willing to negotiate with the United States. On 6 May in a lengthy and revealing interview with Stanley Karnow in Beijing, Sihanouk stated that he had offered to reconcile with the United States if the United States would deal with his government and end its intervention in Cambodian affairs. But the previous February, he said, Nixon had not let Kissinger see him when he came to Peking. Sihanouk said he had proposed meetings as early as 1972 and had repeated the proposal in 1973 but to no effect. He would still be willing to meet with Nixon or Kissinger or with his friends Averell Harriman and Mike Mansfield, he stated.128 Shortly thereafter Sihanouk left for a trip to Africa and Europe, where he hoped to gain the political support of a number of countries. At virtually every stop in Africa he repeated his willingness to negotiate with American officials. In Senegal he offered to negotiate directly with the United States. In Guinea he told Sékou Touré that he had no current complaints against the United States, and Touré, who was also friendly with the United States, offered to help bring about negotiations. In Rabat, Morocco, Sihanouk proposed “direct and bilateral negotiation to end the unjust war.” The result, he said, playing on Nixon’s own rhetorical approach to peace in Vietnam, would be “a peace with honor.”129 In Mauritania, where the American ambassador condescendingly reported that Sihanouk “giggled his way” through the airport ceremony, the Prince repeated

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that he would not negotiate with Lon Nol but only directly with the United States. More significantly, Sihanouk asked Mauritania’s President Ould Daddah to pass a note to President Nixon stating that if Nixon would negotiate with him, he would reestablish diplomatic relations with Washington and make “generous arrangements” for the present Cambodian leadership in Phnom Penh (the “major criminals” – fewer than ten – would have to leave Cambodia but no Cambodian blood would be shed). Daddah, for his part, was “particularly struck … by the Prince’s lack of rancor about the past and [the] realism with which he faced [the] future.”130 The United States responded negatively to all of Sihanouk’s offers. The American position continued to be that Sihanouk would have to negotiate with the GKR. Furthermore, the administration took an almost contemptuous attitude toward the offers of African leaders to assist in reaching a settlement, probably because the Nixon–Kissinger administration had little interest in Africa or respect for its leaders. Later Kissinger told a group of high-level advisers, “the idea that we had to communicate with Sihanouk through Mauritania was absurd.”131 Instead of negotiating directly with Sihanouk, the United States tried once again to negotiate a settlement indirectly – in this case with Hanoi. On 23 May 1973 in Paris Kissinger proposed to the North Vietnamese an end to the U.S. bombing of Cambodia, a withdrawal within 60 days of all American and North Vietnamese personnel, and a ceasefire to last 60 days during which negotiations would take place among the Cambodians. The North Vietnamese agreed only that both sides would do their best to bring about a peaceful settlement. To Kissinger, this meant that nothing would happen. Nothing did. In August Kissinger told Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew the reason that nothing had happened was that the Watergate scandal had so weakened the administration that it was unable to bomb North Vietnam for a week, as planned. Had the bombing taken place, Kissinger said, North Vietnam would unquestionably have agreed to a temporary settlement in Cambodia.132 Such a statement was speculative in the extreme. It assumed North Vietnamese control over the insurgency and that North Vietnam would have succumbed to such pressure. More likely, nothing would have happened in any case since the proposal did not include negotiations between Sihanouk and the United States. Vietnam would not have acted after a week of bombing, there would have been strongly negative domestic and international reactions, and Sihanouk would never have agreed to negotiate with the GKR.

Negotiations with Sihanouk? Four days after Kissinger’s approach to Hanoi, however, the United States significantly modified its position. To Huang Hua, the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, Kissinger proposed a 60- to 90-day ceasefire, during which the United States would withdraw its personnel and arrange for Lon Nol to leave Phnom Penh for medical treatment in the United States. Discussions would then

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take place between Sihanouk and the GKR. And for the first time the United States would engage in “some discussions” with Sihanouk’s representatives. The proposed discussions would take place in Beijing with lower-level American officials in the newly opened United States liaison office. At the end of the process the United States “would not oppose the return of Prince Sihanouk.” Two days later Kissinger reiterated his proposal to Ambassador Huang Zhen, the newly appointed head of the Chinese liaison office in Washington. Both Chinese officials pointedly reminded Kissinger that Premier Zhou Enlai had previously told the Americans that Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge were willing to negotiate directly with the United States.133 This was the first time the United States had proposed any discussions with Sihanouk or his representatives. On 4 June, according to Kissinger’s memoirs, China “was now prepared to: ‘communicate the U.S. tentative thinking to the Cambodian side’ ” once Sihanouk returned from his African and European tour.134 Kissinger chose to interpret the Chinese action in very positive terms. Zhou, he wrote in his memoirs, “had clearly committed himself to a compromise that preserved key elements of the Lon Nol structure,” and he would not have agreed to act as an intermediary unless he thought a settlement probable. Furthermore, Kissinger stated, Zhou privately wanted the American bombing to continue since this was his major bargaining chip with the Khmer Rouge. Zhou could tell them that he could bring about an end to the bombing in exchange for negotiations. “In mid-June,” Kissinger recalled, we believed for better or worse that we were on the homestretch. We could envisage a cease-fire, Sihanouk’s return, and then Sihanouk’s dealing with existing political forces so as to give himself room to maneuver between them and the Communists. We nearly made it, with all that it would have meant for Cambodia’s future.135 On 19 June Kissinger went a step further. If a ceasefire was in effect later in the summer, he would personally meet with Sihanouk “for political discussions.”136 But the optimism soon faded. Sihanouk returned to Beijing on 6 July. On the same day the Chinese handed Kissinger a note strongly complaining about rumors, allegedly from the Lon Nol “clique,” that there would soon be negotiations between the GKR and GRUNK, with the United States and China acting as intermediaries. “In spreading such utterly groundless assertions, the Lon Nol clique harbours ulterior motives, widely attempting to confuse public opinion and forestall the settlement of the Cambodian question,” the note read. China considered this development “extremely disadvantageous to seeking a settlement of the Cambodian question.”137 Then on 16 July Sihanouk announced that the Khmer Rouge would not negotiate, and two days later the Chinese government informed Kissinger that they had not conveyed the American proposal to the Prince after all. Sihanouk, they said, was enraged at the American bombing and the intensified American support for Lon Nol. It was “obviously inappropriate”

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to give him the American plan. Rather, it was up to the United States to make the necessary policy changes.138 At a high-level meeting the next day (19 July) in Kissinger’s office, the National Security Adviser concluded that China was “opting-out … of any involvement in negotiations for a Cambodian settlement.” The Chinese position was a “complete reversal.” Kissinger was bitter. “This is the first time in the development of our new relationship that the Chinese word has not counted,” he angrily told the Chinese.139 But according to his memoirs, Kissinger, while upset with the Chinese, believed that the real cause of the impasse was not Chinese untrustworthiness but congressional ineptitude. In cutting off funds for American military actions in Cambodia, Congress had ended the prospect of fruitful negotiations, he believed. Kissinger had frantically tried to prevent a bombing halt. In desperation he had even agreed to end the bombing on a date certain (1 September), provided the date could be kept secret so that he could retain his bargaining ability. But Congress, seething with anger about the recent revelations of the secret bombing of Cambodia, finally legislated an end to American military actions. On 29 June Nixon was forced to sign legislation that would end the bombing on 15 August. Kissinger maintains that the imminent termination of the bombing not only ended his own bargaining power but privately enraged Zhou Enlai, who learned about the legislation from a visiting congressional delegation, headed by Senator Warren Magnuson (D–WA). Since China had publicly criticized the bombing, Zhou’s growing agitation when Magnuson told him that the bombing would soon end mystified the delegation. But Kissinger claimed to understand: “Zhou saw emerging before him his geopolitical nightmare: an Indochina dominated by Hanoi and allied with the Soviet Union, brought into being by an obtuse superpower that did not deign to give its own diplomacy a chance to succeed.” The Premier had lost leverage with the Khmer Rouge. Up to this point, Zhou could tell the Khmer Rouge that he could gain an end to the bombing in exchange for negotiations, Kissinger contends. But now the Khmer Rouge could simply wait out the remaining weeks of American bombing. “There was no way for even the best-intentioned Chinese leader to ask the Khmer Rouge to forgo the total victory we had handed them,” Kissinger writes.140 Kissinger’s interpretation of the Chinese actions is open to question. Unfortunately, Chinese accounts of their policy toward Cambodia and their interaction with the Americans over Cambodia have not been published, and thus any interpretation cannot be definitive. But the contemporary American documents cast some doubt on Kissinger’s memoir account. For example, the Chinese commitment to pass along American thinking to Sihanouk may not have been as firm as Kissinger contends. William Burr argues that the Chinese statement about this was actually more equivocal, that what they said was that, after Sihanouk returned, China “can communicate” (not “was prepared to: ‘communicate’,” as Kissinger put it) the American position. To be sure on 6 July, Chinese Ambassador Huang Zhen stated unequivocally (at least according to the

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American record), “now that Sihanouk has returned to Beijing, we will hand over your thinking to him.” But a little later in the same conversation, when Kissinger pleaded with Ambassador Huang to mention American thinking to Sihanouk, he responded, “I can only report. It depends thereafter on my Government.”141 More significantly, it is not certain that the revelation that the bombing would soon end was the cause of Zhou’s visible agitation at the congressional action. In the 19 July meeting (called to discuss the Chinese note of 18 July which indicated that they would not pass along the American negotiating proposal to Sihanouk), Richard Solomon made the point that Zhou was angered at the delegation’s “attempt to engage him with the Congress against the President.” In other words, Zhou’s irritation may not have been about the end of the bombing per se but rather his being placed in a position where he would have to agree with a congressional delegation against the President.142 Most fundamentally, Kissinger’s assertion that Zhou wanted the bombing to continue because it gave him leverage with the Khmer Rouge, and that the decision to end it was the fundamental reason for China’s refusal to pass along the American position to Sihanouk and in general to cool its relations with the United States, is debatable. Kissinger may well have exaggerated China’s interest in helping the United States achieve a settlement on terms acceptable to the Americans. At one point Kissinger even argued that Sihanouk also secretly approved of the bombing because, as with the Chinese, it gave him some leverage with the Khmer Rouge.143 China and Sihanouk had always condemned the bombing, and to assert that they privately liked it because it gave them leverage with the Khmer Rouge is speculative and probably wishful thinking, Kissinger’s way of demonstrating the wisdom of his own approach which an allegedly shortsighted, ignorant Congress had thwarted. Nor were Kissinger’s aides as convinced as he was that the Chinese decision not to pass along the American negotiating position to Sihanouk resulted from the bombing cut-off. Lawrence Eagleburger suggested that press leaks about the Sino-American discussions and Kissinger’s forthcoming trip to China might also have provoked the Chinese. Perhaps they felt they had been used, that the rumors had been deliberately floated “to obtain a 45-day extension of the bombing.” Winston Lord and Peter Rodman thought perhaps Kissinger was overreacting, that the Chinese note’s language was really not so harsh and that the positions it stated on Cambodia were really not new. “They had always been abusive to us on Cambodia in their public statements,” Rodman argued, and Kissinger, in a seeming reversal, admitted that “he was sure the Chinese didn’t like the bombing.”144 Kissinger himself did argue at the time that the decision to terminate the bombing was “the decisive thing” in the new Chinese position, but he also suggested that it probably represented a fundamental calculation that Watergate had so injured the President that he could no longer “provide firm support in matters affecting their [Chinese] security,” that they were therefore questioning the value of their improved relations with the United States, and

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that they wanted “to provide themselves with a little more flexibility, particularly with respect to the Russians.” Solomon was skeptical, noting that other evidence pointed to continuing good relations rather than the basic shift that Kissinger saw. Eagleburger summed it up this way: “we were simply not going to be able to answer Mr. Kissinger’s question as to why the Chinese had behaved in this way.”145 Kissinger may also have misinterpreted the Chinese note as indicating that they were canceling or postponing his planned visit to Beijing. Earlier the Chinese had invited Kissinger to suggest a date for a visit, and he had proposed 6 August, with a public announcement to be made on 16 July. But there was never any confirmation of the 6 August date, and 16 July came and went without any announcement. “The Chinese had to know that this delay in replying, and the turn-around on Cambodia, meant a postponement,” Kissinger told his colleagues. It was “a conscious decision. … To cancel a Kissinger trip was a major international event. It had to be a major decision for them.” But Peter Rodman pointed out that the Chinese note they were discussing was a response to an American note asking about Cambodia, not about the trip to Beijing. They were two separate issues, and Kissinger should not confuse them. “We had linked the trip with Cambodia,” Rodman said.146 In fact, within hours of the end of this meeting a Chinese note arrived proposing that Kissinger come to Beijing on 16 August, the day after the bombing was scheduled to end. Kissinger preferred to regard this as a slap in the face and refused to go. “If I go now, he [Sihanouk] will have to kick me around,” Kissinger said told Lee Kuan Yew. Conceivably Kissinger missed another chance to settle the Cambodia imbroglio, for at about the same time that he was deciding not to go to Beijing, Zhou was apparently writing to the Vietnamese, telling them that “the Americans want to settle the Kampuchean question” and were prepared to speak with Sihanouk. Zhou urged the Vietnamese to follow up: “At present, given the American desire to pull out of Kampuchea, if one could win over a number of people in Lon Nol’s ranks that would be advantageous.”147 If this account is accurate, China did not end its diplomatic activities because of the American bombing halt but in fact momentarily increased them. In any event, when Kissinger finally did go to China in November, Zhou’s moderating influence had lessened because the radical Gang of Four had by then eclipsed his power. Kissinger’s case that the end of the bombing halted promising discussions is also called into question by the fact that the administration at the time apparently did not inform appropriate congressional committees (or anyone in Congress) about any “progress” in negotiations. In March 1975 the state department released a brief account of various negotiating efforts; it included the allegation that the bombing halt had thwarted promising discussions. But John Sparkman (D–AL), who chaired the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (and who appears to have been angered at this effort to blame Congress), and Senator Clifford Case (R–NJ) told President Ford that in 1973 they were unaware of any negotiations.148 And in a press conference Assistant Secretary of

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State Philip Habib had to acknowledge that “key members of Congress” were not informed. “How could these folks who did what they did do anything else had they not known that these negotiations were under way?” asked a reporter. It was a pertinent question, but Habib did not respond.149 Regardless of whether Kissinger is correct that congressional action to end the bombing stopped all hope of a negotiated settlement in the summer of 1973, he is on particularly shaky ground when he defends the administration’s negotiating record in previous months. The United States, he writes, had “agreed with the desirability of a neutral Cambodia ruled by Sihanouk. Our diplomacy had for six months painstakingly put the pieces in place for such an outcome.” Furthermore, Kissinger states, if the United States had made the same proposal in February that it made late in May (that is, parallel discussion between the Khmer parties, on the one hand, and between the United States and Sihanouk, on the other), the Khmer Rouge would have vetoed it. In any event, “such a compromise proposal had not been made once but several times since the beginning of the year; it had been consistently rejected,” he states.150 In fact, it is not at all clear that the United States had for six months been working for Sihanouk’s return. If true, this meant that Kissinger had been working for Sihanouk’s return from the very moment the United States had signed the Paris Accords in January. But for most of this six months’ period the United States had given unswerving (albeit sometimes frustrated) support to the Lon Nol government. As the situation worsened in the spring of 1973, some American officials did begin to think about the “unthinkable” – a possible Sihanouk return to Phnom Penh. But there is no evidence that Kissinger and Nixon were among them – unless, of course, it came about through negotiations between Sihanouk and the GKR, which was unlikely. Furthermore, Kissinger’s claim that his compromise proposal “had been made not once but several times since the beginning of the year” is not true. The United States had no objection to negotiations among the Khmers, but it was not until 27 May 1973 that the administration said the United States itself would engage in “some discussions” with Sihanouk’s representatives – and then only with low-level American diplomats in Beijing and as a part of a parallel negotiation in which Sihanouk would negotiate with GKR representatives (something the Prince had consistently refused to do). But despite the conditions, this was nevertheless the first time the United States had expressed a willingness to have any discussions with Sihanouk’s representatives, and this explains why the Chinese for the first time explored the possibility of assisting the United States. Only in July did Kissinger himself agree to meet with Sihanouk later in the summer, and then only if a ceasefire was already in place. Indeed, early in August Kissinger indicated to Lee Kuan Yew that he was not that eager to be involved in bringing Sihanouk back to Phnom Penh. “Our present strategy is that if someone brings him back, we’ll be delighted to deal with him,” Kissinger told the Singaporean. “But we don’t want to be the ones to do it. With no military force there, we don’t want to overthrow our friends.”151

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In sum, Kissinger’s diplomacy always offered too little and was too late and too secretive. Perhaps the National Security Adviser was correct in stating that if he had tried to arrange a meeting between Americans and Sihanouk in February, the Khmer Rouge would have blocked it. But we will never know because it was not tried. Sihanouk continued to seek a meeting for months thereafter. By the time Kissinger finally did express a willingness to meet him, the Congress (which was not informed of the negotiating efforts) had taken matters into its own hands, the GKR appeared to be on its last legs, and the more radical Khmer Rouge had more power in the revolution than they had previously enjoyed. On 21 October 1973, while he was floating in his swimming pool in California, Nixon informed Kissinger that he was naming him secretary of state. Both recognized that this was a confession of Nixon’s weakness as the Watergate affair continued to undermine his Presidency. He had never wanted a strong secretary of state, but there was no other way for Kissinger to retain any authority with the rest of the government.152 Shortly thereafter Lon Nol congratulated him and commented that he hoped Kissinger’s forthcoming trip to Beijing would “help end the bloodshed in Cambodia, bring the parties to the negotiating table, and bring a more secure peace.”153 In fact, after the August debacle the Nixon administration’s interest in negotiations had cooled. Certainly there was no effort to rethink the current American negotiating stance. Thus when French President Georges Pompidou traveled to China in September, for example, he was informed of the American position and was urged to encourage the Chinese to try and get a dialogue going among the Khmers. In October Kissinger reiterated the American position to the North Vietnamese, who also seem to have wanted a negotiated settlement at this point. Kissinger expressed a willingness to “discuss variations” of the American proposal and suggested the two sides meet in December. But the American position remained what it had been in June: an immediate provisional ceasefire, withdrawal of U.S. military personnel, and discussions among the Cambodians.154 The United States had no interest in speaking directly with Sihanouk. Instead of rethinking its negotiating stance, the Nixon administration determined to support the GKR to the limit. “I won’t delude you – the congressional action is a tragedy,” Kissinger told Lee Kuan Yew in August, “but this Administration will do everything at the edge of legality to support Phnom Penh.” He had broken off discussions with the Chinese, he said, because he did not “want them to think we are too eager.”155 Nixon’s decision to relieve Swank early in September 1973 was another sign of the administration’s determination to pursue as aggressive a course in Cambodia as possible. Not only had Swank wanted a relatively inconspicuous American presence in Cambodia, but he had grown increasingly disenchanted with the war. As he told a farewell press conference on 4 September, the war was “losing more and more of its point and has less and less meaning for any of the parties concerned.”156

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A month after Swank left Cambodia, Kissinger told GKR Foreign Minister Long Boret that the administration had reversed the “low-profile” policy. “Our policy now is to help to the maximum extent possible,” he said. “There will never be negotiations in Cambodia unless you are strong.” Long Boret need pay no attention to rumors that he would meet with Sihanouk when he went to Beijing in November, Kissinger added. “I am going to Peking but I have no intention of talking to him in Peking or in the foreseeable future.”157 Because of his renewed emphasis on support for the GKR instead of negotiations, Kissinger quickly put aside suggestions from others that he rethink his position. A few days after he spoke with Long Boret, for example, he dismissed an offer of assistance from the first American diplomatic representative in Cambodia, Edmund Gullion, then the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Gullion traced Sihanouk’s anti-American sentiments to the Eisenhower–Dulles administration which had treated him as “a truant schoolboy.” Since Gullion had known Sihanouk before these humiliations, the former diplomat thought he might be helpful, perhaps in some unofficial capacity, in arranging a settlement involving Sihanouk.158 Kissinger thanked the former diplomat for his offer of assistance but gave no indication that he was prepared to follow up on it; nor did he. A more significant offer of assistance came about the same time when Senator Mansfield sent Kissinger a cable he had just received from Sihanouk. Mansfield had previously informed the Prince that he would be going to Beijing soon and would welcome the opportunity to visit him, if possible. Sihanouk responded that he would be very pleased to see Mansfield and included a specific proposal for peace. Kissinger could have taken advantage of Mansfield’s impending trip to see how much room for maneuver Sihanouk had by this point. Instead, he warned Mansfield not to become involved. “It is also evident from the Prince’s message that he seeks to involve you as a friend in direct negotiations with our government,” he wrote. “I am pleased to note,” he added almost contemptuously, “that in your letter … you made it very clear to the Prince that the executive Branch of the United States Government has the responsibility in a situation of this kind.” Furthermore, a month later when Kissinger went to Beijing himself he belittled Mansfield to the Chinese leaders. When Zhou Enlai asked him why Mansfield favored allowing Sihanouk to return, Kissinger replied incorrectly that he was “an isolationist in the classic tradition. He is a true isolationist from the Middle West. Secondly,” Kissinger continued, “he has a sentimental attachment to Prince Sihanouk which is not related to reality and is not reciprocated in any way.” When Zhou returned to the subject of Mansfield’s forthcoming visit (something which obviously interested the Chinese), Kissinger said, “it could help us if he does not receive too much ammunition from the Chinese side on Cambodia.” Mansfield was, he said, “singleminded.” Zhou said he understood.159 It is hard to say what the administration really expected to accomplish by its own singleminded support for the GKR. To be sure, in September FANK had surprised everyone with a successful defense of the important city of Kompong

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Cham – although the Khmer Rouge forces took 15,000 people with them as they retreated. Phnom Penh also had a breathing spell for a time, as fighting virtually ended, but most major highways remained interdicted. Nor was the political situation much better. In Tam, the new Prime Minister, continued his threats to resign from time to time, as Lon Nol plotted to regain his lost power. Eventually in December he did resign. Still, the High Political Council did manage to function; Thomas Enders, the American chargé d’affaires, virtually ordered the Council about what to do and forcefully discouraged potential coups d’état. GKR Air Force Lieutenant Pech Lim Kuon was one of many Cambodians who disliked Lon Nol’s leadership. On 19 November he climbed into his T-28 and dropped four bombs on the royal palace. Lon Nol and his entourage were unhurt, and Kuon flew his plane to Kratie, where he defected to the Khmer Rouge. (He later served as a helicopter instructor for the victorious Khmer Rouge, before he stole a helicopter in 1976 and defected to Thailand.)160 Internationally, the GKR continued to lose support. The non-aligned movement seated Sihanouk’s government, and it looked almost certain that the United Nations General Assembly would do the same. After intense lobbying, however, the United States managed – somewhat to its surprise – to prevent that. The GKR kept the U.N. seat for the time being. Even though the GKR managed to survive for the rest of the year (and indeed for an additional 16 months), which surprised almost everyone, Kissinger later wrote that he knew Cambodia was doomed after the summer of 1973. Why, then, did he not acknowledge defeat and save Cambodia the additional agony that it had to endure in 1974 and 1975, before the Khmer Rouge finally took over? Why did he not try to work out some arrangements with Sihanouk which might, at least, have given some power to non-Khmer Rouge elements before the Khmer Rouge had complete control of the insurgency? He may have believed that Sihanouk was in fact a complete prisoner of the Khmer Rouge (although he never tested this proposition by attempting to meet with him). But perhaps the most candid answer was given to Zhou Enlai. Why, the Prime Minister asked Kissinger in November 1973, did he persist in supporting Lon Nol who headed a government with which the United States had no treaty obligations? “I will speak frankly,” Kissinger replied. “Our major problem with Cambodia is that the opponents of President Nixon want to use it as an example of the bankruptcy of his whole policy. So if there is a very rapid collapse, it will be reflected in our other policies. That,” he said, “is our only concern.”161 Several thousand more Cambodians would have to die because Nixon’s political enemies might benefit if the war ended too soon and Nixon’s other policies might suffer as a result. The Cambodians did not forget. When Nixon died in 1994, a newspaper published in Cambodia put it this way: “Though many Cambodians may now be inclined to forgive and forget, few tears will be shed here for Richard M. Nixon.”162

3

Dénouement Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, and the fall of Cambodia

The obstacle to Sihanouk coming back is the Communists, not us. Henry Kissinger to a congressional delegation recently returned from Indochina, 5 March 19751 When I was in Congress, I was known as a Hawk, and I can’t change now that I am in the White House. Gerald Ford, 27 June 19762

On 7 January 1974 American chargé Thomas Enders informed Ambassador to Vietnam Graham Martin that he was receiving “daily representations” from his family to get out of Phnom Penh.3 His family’s concerns were understandable. In the previous ten days at least 29 rockets had hit Phnom Penh, killing over 20 people. The day before Enders’ message to Martin, an assassination squad had tried to kill FANK’s commander-in-chief, and a large Khmer Rouge force began to assault the capital’s perimeter. Over 100 persons died in the shelling that accompanied the assault. The situation became so serious over the next several days that fistfights broke out in the French embassy to obtain the limited number of airplane tickets out of Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge also attacked Kampot and Oudang, the latter the symbolically important former royal capital. Half of Kampot’s civilian population fled into the countryside to escape the shelling. After horrific fighting, Oudang fell to the besiegers late in March.4 Despite this situation, Enders kept telling his family that things were not as bad as they seemed. In some important respects this was shown to be a correct assessment as the year progressed. Although the Khmer Rouge controlled most of the countryside, the government was holding its own militarily and even made some limited gains. It eventually pushed the enemy back from Phnom Penh, repulsed the attack on Kampot, and managed to hang onto Prey Veng and Kompong Cham. In July government forces liberated 14,300 people from Khmer Rouge rule near Neak Luong and recaptured the devastated Oudang in July. Security around the Great Lake, the Tonle Sap, improved to the point that badly needed agricultural commodities could be shipped to Phnom Penh.

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Nevertheless, the overall military situation was no better than a stalemate, as the U.S. military acknowledged. FANK, though it had more firepower than the Khmer Rouge and completely controlled the air, was unable to launch largescale offensive operations. It had little chance to retake significant amounts of territory that were under the insurgents’ control. The Americans were well aware of the various FANK weaknesses, including pervasive corruption. But they nevertheless believed that it was strong enough to prevent a defeat. Henry Kissinger hoped that the military situation was sufficiently favorable that they could get negotiations going.5 But the Watergate investigations, which in August would force Nixon to resign and be replaced by Vice President Gerald Ford, increasingly occupied the President’s time (despite Kissinger’s urging, for example, Nixon chose not to take the time to receive the newly appointed ambassador to Cambodia, John Gunther Dean) and made it difficult to forge any new paths. Almost nothing was done to explore negotiations during the first several months of 1974. By April the chances of a successful negotiation seemed even less, as Khieu Samphan, with Chinese support, pushed Sihanouk aside to become the opposition’s leading spokesperson. It may be, as French diplomat Etienne Manac’h believed, that Chinese policy changed because the Americans showed no interest in negotiations with Sihanouk.6 Khieu Samphan visited China, where he was given “the red carpet treatment,” while Sihanouk’s role during the visit was “very modest.” Sihanouk, characteristically, acknowledged that he “knew where the power was” and that the Khmer Rouge could “bump him off any time.” Shortly thereafter China facilitated an 11-nation tour for the Khmer Rouge leader in which Sihanouk “found himself relegated to a role similar to that of an extra.”7 Negotiations were not necessarily out of the question, though, for it may be that in return for their support for the Khmer Rouge, the Chinese expected an openness to a negotiated settlement. In June Ambassador Dean told the administration that time was working against the United States, and efforts to find a peaceful solution were urgent.8 Graham Martin, the normally hardline ambassador to Saigon who fancied himself “one of the best intelligence officers this government ever had,” agreed. In June he recommended via a back channel to Kissinger personally that he seek a solution involving Sihanouk. “We are running out of time,” Martin told the secretary of state. Sihanouk knew that he had no future with the Khmer Rouge, Martin stated, and there was no hope whatsoever of trying to negotiate with Khieu Samphan. Sihanouk, however, still had a following among the peasants who had become disenchanted with the Khmer Rouge’s brutality. Therefore, a solution involving Sihanouk, Sirik Matak, and General Sosthene Fernandez ought to be attempted. It had to be worked out with the USSR and China, Martin insisted, and while it certainly would be difficult, it would be easier to accomplish than the successes that Kissinger had just achieved in the Middle East.9 Domestic discontent with the Lon Nol government probably also played a role in the ambassadors’ assessment that time was short. On 4 June 1974, for example, students seized the minister of education and his deputy to demand the

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release of a number of students in custody. When the military police attacked, several students were killed or wounded. Whatever the immediate cause of the incident, reported an American missionary from Phnom Penh, “there is an increasing hostile feeling toward the present leadership with the same reoccurring accusation of corruption.”10

No negotiations with Sihanouk Unfortunately, the administration did not share the ambassadors’ sense of urgency. For the rest of the summer, whenever the possibility of negotiations was discussed the American position remained unchanged. While not wedded to Lon Nol, willing to accept a role for Sihanouk as the result of negotiations and indeed to accept any solution negotiated directly by the Khmer parties, the United States would not itself agree to propose that Lon Nol leave, nor would it agree in advance to a coalition government. Indeed, the Martin proposal does not seem to have had any serious consideration until September when W. Richard Smyser, a senior staff member of the NSC, informed Kissinger that the staff disagreed with it. “There seems little reason to talk to Sihanouk or any Cambodians on the other side before the U.N. credentials fight,” he wrote.11 Since the fight over who would represent Cambodia at the U.N. would not end until late November or early December, Martin’s proposal (if Kissinger accepted the NSC advice) – based on the ambassador’s assessment that time was of the essence – would not even be considered until many months after it was first put forward. Additional pressure for negotiations came from the JCS. In a lengthy report on the Cambodian situation completed late in August, the chiefs concluded that the United States should continue its support of the GKR at current levels “while simultaneously undertaking, as a matter of urgency, an intensive diplomatic campaign to effect a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement.”12 However, the military leaders had no more influence than the ambassadors. The NSC disparaged any suggestions that might call for a basic rethinking of the American approach. “It is rather a worthless paper,” wrote one official, referring to the chiefs’ analysis, adding that the only reason to forward it on to the secretary of state was to protect him if defense department officials asked him about it.13 Sometime in the summer ( just when is not clear from the currently available materials), John Gunther Dean floated another idea. Could not an international conference on Cambodia be called, he asked? The state department was supportive but the National Security Council – in a pattern that was becoming increasingly apparent – expressed reservations. If the conference included Viet Cong representatives, that would have the effect of destabilizing South Vietnam, a price not worth paying, thought Smyser. In addition, Smyser objected to the apparent willingness of the state department to dump Lon Nol. “At the first hint of a meeting, everybody at State wants to scuttle our friends,” he complained. Smyser further complained that Dean kept changing the rationale of holding a conference, the reasons ranging for assuaging Congress to actually producing

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peace. Nor did he fully accept Dean’s prediction of chaos if a conference was not held. In any event, the administration’s objective should be peace; a conference might conceivably be an instrument, but it should not be an end in itself. In fact the administration followed up on Dean’s ideas, at least to a limited extent, for it discussed a possible conference with two countries that had relations with GRUNK. How serious these approaches were, however, cannot be determined from the available documentation.14 Whether or not a conference was the solution, Dean desperately wanted what he called a “controlled solution” as quickly as possible. An uncontrolled solution, in which American assistance would end, the embassy shut down and personnel withdrawn while the GKR and FANK simply disintegrated, would, he stated in memoranda to Kissinger in September, have a devastating impact on the U.S. image that would have ramifications well beyond Indochina. He suggested the respected Lieutenant General Saukham Khoy as a possible transitional leader whenever it became appropriate for Lon Nol to step aside.15 The ambassador, who was in Washington at the time, returned to Cambodia believing that he had convinced everyone that “we would never again be in a stronger position” to negotiate and that the future would probably see the situation worsen. But he was mistaken about how influential his views were. The administration, while concerned, did not think the Cambodian situation sufficiently serious to change course. “I think we should not undertake diplomatic initiatives right now,” stated Kissinger.16 Furthermore, Kissinger basically disliked Dean’s efforts to insert himself into the negotiation process. The NSC’s sniping at the Department of State’s approach continued as Kissinger prepared to travel to Beijing. “State’s approach conveys the impression of a weak U.S. position and would only encourage the other side without achieving any positive results,” an NSC official informed Kissinger. Because Sihanouk had “virtually no influence” on the Khmer Rouge, he added, there was no point in contacting him, directly or indirectly. Instead, he urged Kissinger to tell the Chinese that the United States would not “abandon our allies in Phnom Penh” while at the same time encouraging negotiations among the Khmer parties. Dean’s idea of an international conference might be tried, but only if all other approaches failed. All in all, the NSC did not share Martin’s, Dean’s, or the Joint Chief ’s sense of urgency.17 Meanwhile, the annual, bitter fight was underway as to who would represent Cambodia in the United Nations General Assembly. This was important symbolically, as well as in terms of international assistance that might be provided to the GKR. The GRUNK had increased its international respectability to the point where more countries now recognized it than the GKR, and few gave the Phnom Penh government little chance of prevailing at the United Nations. The Japanese, for example, were “bearish” and would not expend much energy to produce a contrary result unless there was some big power movement toward negotiations. The state department’s International Organizations Bureau opposed a plan to have Kissinger send personal letters to 25 governments that might change their position on the grounds that it was a waste of political

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capital. In October Smyser accused the state department “of doing so little on this issue that it is almost embarrassing to contemplate,” and he urged Kissinger (who agreed) to demand daily reports from relevant bureaus about what they were doing on this question.18 In this context Ambassador Dean thought he saw a possible compromise that would further his idea of an international conference. By early November it was beginning to look as if the GKR might retain its seat in the General Assembly (the GKR eventually prevailed by a two-vote margin). But Dean suggested that the United States support a resolution keeping the Cambodian seat vacant in return for Chinese assistance in arranging a Cambodia conference. By keeping the U.N. seat vacant, GRUNK would be on a more equal footing with the GKR and would therefore be more likely to negotiate, thought Dean. The United States would benefit by getting real negotiations started, “an achievement,” argued the ambassador, “beside which the question of the U.N. seat pales into relative insignificance.” Dean also made the radical proposal that he be authorized to meet directly with GRUNK officials, including Khieu Samphan, This was something which GRUNK had publicly advocated on various occasions. A meeting could be arranged in Laos, he contended.19 Whether any of these proposals for new approaches to peace in Cambodia would win out, as against the NSC’s status quo attitude, depended very much on Henry Kissinger, who late in November was in China for talks. In Beijing Kissinger went further than before in willingness to dump Lon Nol and accept a government headed by Sihanouk. Although he told Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping that “we do not simply abandon people with whom we have worked,” he in essence proposed a Sihanouk-dominated coalition government and made it clear that Lon Nol would not be a part of it. The coalition would emerge from a peace conference “whose practical result would be the return of Sihanouk, the transformation of the existing structure in Phnom Penh, and the participation of the resistance forces.” In sum, Kissinger had moved slightly beyond his previous positions but had made no fundamental changes, and indeed his statement to Deng that the Khmer insurgents were still under Hanoi’s control was outdated, as Deng pointed out in no uncertain terms.20 Deng gave no hint that he would follow up on Kissinger’s suggestion of a peace conference that would result in bringing Sihanouk back to Phnom Penh as part of a coalition government. Instead he told Kissinger that his information about Hanoi’s involvement in Cambodia was completely erroneous. “There is not a single Vietnamese soldier fighting in Cambodia,” he told Kissinger. There was no meeting of the minds. The Chinese “took their standard line on Cambodia indicating no interest in involving themselves in an effort to achieve a negotiated settlement,” Kissinger personally informed South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.21 Aside from being more forthright in his willingness to facilitate Lon Nol’s removal following a peace conference, Kissinger had not put forward any new American ideas about how to settle the Cambodian war. He had not proposed direct talks with Sihanouk, offered state department-suggested concessions to get

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a conference going, or proposed keeping the United Nations seat vacant in exchange for Chinese help in arranging a settlement. Nor had he authorized Dean to try to get discussions going with GRUNK officials. None of these proposed solutions might have worked. But they were not attempted. Instead, the administration continued to push hard to obtain additional funds to support the GKR, hoping that eventually the GKR would be strong enough to demonstrate to the other side that it would have to negotiate. Given the war-weariness in both Cambodia and the United States, the ever present problem of corruption in the Cambodian military, and the concomitant growing congressional unwillingness to continue, much less increase, funding for Cambodia, the administration’s approach was unlikely to succeed. In September the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prepared a bill that provided $347 million in aid to Cambodia, with a cap of $200 million in military assistance. This was some $200 million less that the administration had requested. Furthermore, the bill lowered the number of American personnel authorized to be in Cambodia. Even more damaging (from the administration’s point of view), for the first time the President was prohibited from supplementing the appropriation by drawing down stocks in the defense department and transferring them to Cambodia and from transferring funds among various Cambodian accounts.22 Furthermore, whereas in recent years the administration had been able to charge the very substantial shipping and handling costs to other accounts, now they would have to come out of the Cambodian appropriation. The administration feared that the funding levels being considered would seriously damage the American negotiating position. Even when raised to $377 million (but with military assistance kept at the $200 million level) and with a limited drawn down authority restored (up to $75 million in the case of Cambodia), Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council feared that this level of funding “would probably insure Cambodia’s defeat.” By the end of December 1974 the administration had already obligated all but $6.3 million of the $200 million budgeted for military assistance, and the President was forced to order that the $75 million in draw down authority be used to continue supplying the Cambodian government.23 The administration soon decided that it would have to ask for additional aid for Cambodia. The only questions involved the amount and the timing of a request. On 28 January 1975 Ford sent a message to Congress requesting elimination of existing ceilings on economic and military assistance to Cambodia and an additional appropriation of $222 in military assistance. In an effort to persuade Congress to go along with this request, the President discussed the issue with a bipartisan group of senators and representatives. In the course of the discussions, Kissinger hinted that efforts to seek a negotiated settlement were underway. “We can’t discuss it in this broad a group,” he said. There were in fact indications that the United States had by now begun to modify its long-standing refusal to speak with Sihanouk or Khmer Rouge officials. According to an administration source, in December 1974 an unsuccessful attempt was made through an unidentified neutral country to open a channel to

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Khmer communists. Also in December and again in January 1975 the United States “concurred” in a French initiative to open a dialogue with Sihanouk. According to a later administration summary of negotiation efforts, at first the Prince agreed to receive an emissary but later backed away.24 The French initiative dated from Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s accession to the Presidency in May 1974.25 The new President, wanting to act as a statesman, wondered if his government might be able to play a constructive role in settling the Cambodian problem. His ambassador in Beijing, Etienne Manac’h, thought that the best option was to get Sihanouk back to Phnom Penh prior to a Khmer Rouge military victory. That would require that the United States arrange for Lon Nol’s departure and for massive demonstrations in favor of the Prince’s return. The Chinese, Manac’h thought, might go along since they were leery of a complete communist victory in Cambodia that might ultimately result in aligning the country with China’s nemesis, the Soviet Union. Giscard signed on to the scheme. The Chinese seemed willing to go along, as long as a Khmer Rouge victory was not imminent, although their position was hedged and ambiguous. On 25 November Sihanouk told Manac’h that he agreed with the plan but insisted that it had to be kept secret. If the United States removed Lon Nol, he was prepared to return to Phnom Penh and establish a government of national unity. The Khmer Rouge would dominate but would not have complete power. Giscard told the Americans that he wanted to discuss Cambodia with them when he met with Ford in Martinique in mid-December for a previously scheduled summit meeting. The United States had no objections. At the conference Giscard presented his proposed solution, which Ford and Kissinger appeared to like. But the final communiqué – which should not have said anything at all about Cambodia if the parties wanted to keep the matter secret, as Sihanouk had demanded – urged that the two Cambodian parties negotiate with each other. Drafted by Kissinger’s staff, it appeared to be a complete rejection of Giscard’s proposal. Although this snafu was most likely the result of a hurriedly drafted communiqué that was not reviewed by any French Asian experts, Kissinger retrospectively blamed the French. “I think maybe the French screwed us in December,” he told the President shortly before the Khmer Rouge moved into Phnom Penh. Wherever the blame lies, the effect on Sihanouk was devastating. He had no choice but to condemn French meddling in Cambodian affairs. When Manac’h next saw the Prince, he was depressed because his hopes of fashioning a moderate solution, something like Yugoslavia in eastern Europe, would not happen. Now there would only be force; something akin to Stalinist Albania would be the result, he feared.26 Although Kissinger had shown some interest in the French plan, the administration had no interest in Dean’s suggestion, also made in December, that the ambassador meet with Khieu Samphan. Dean proposed that he get in touch with Khieu Samphan through Lao Foreign Minister Phoumi Vongvichit with whom the ambassador was on good terms.27 Dean’s efforts to inject himself into the negotiating process only continued to irritate the administration. “Dean’s

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desire to play a key role in initiating negotiations continues unabated,” William Stearman had written to Kissinger only two weeks earlier. “Unfortunately, his persistent and sometimes indiscreet advocacy of his views on a compromise settlement could cause problems if continued.” Dean was not given the permission he requested.28 Dean nevertheless sent a series of increasingly angry telegrams back to Washington virtually demanding movement toward negotiations. On 4 February he informed the state department that GKR officials realized that only the United States, in whom they had placed their trust, could bring about peace. “I must state very frankly that the Khmers of this side are waiting, and waiting desperately, for us to get involved,” he said. The administration talked about getting additional funding, which was all well and good. But what the Cambodians wanted to know was “what we were doing to make the further financing of the war unnecessary. … They are certainly not holding us back, and if they are not, who or what is?” he continued. “I must say I do not have the answer to these questions.” Later the same day, after reviewing the deteriorating military situation and pointedly recalling that the previous September he had called for “a controlled solution” as quickly as possible, he reiterated his recommendation that the United States contact the insurgents “so that we can have some voice in working out the terms of the denouement.” It would be unworthy for the United States to simply withdraw and leave the Khmers to their fate, he stated.29 Two days later, Dean’s frustration overflowed. It appeared that the administration was not going to try to find a solution to the war at least until the dry season campaign ended the following August. This was foolish, he told the state department. The Cambodian government might well not survive until then, and even if it did it would probably be in a weaker situation than currently. Sihanouk had made it perfectly clear that he would only talk to Americans on the single condition that Lon Nol leave, something that Dean thought could be easily arranged. It might be true, as the state department pointed out, that Sihanouk would not be able to get support from his Khmer Rouge colleagues to negotiate – in which case the United States ought to try to separate Sihanouk from the Khmer Rouge. “If we could wean Sihanouk away from the Khmer Rouge,” he wrote, “it would be a brand new ball game in Cambodia.” Thus he urged “in the strongest possible terms” that the United States “undertake immediate direct contact” with the Prince. If the effort failed, no one would be the worse. “But if we decline to make the effort now we are wasting precious time, and I am afraid that we have precious little time left in Cambodia.” In more normal times, Dean went on, it would be appropriate for him to resign since he disagreed with Kissinger’s policy so fundamentally. Given the dire circumstances, he had decided not to take that step. But he did want to register his “profound disagreement with what appears to me to be Dept’s reasoning, i.e. that we will be in a better position for negotiations some months from now or that developments will have occurred in the US or in Cambodia which will shed a kinder light on our five year effort in Cambodia.”30

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The United States modifies its position Although Dean’s telegram provoked an angry reaction from Kissinger himself who told the ambassador to “resist the urge to read the department lectures,” in fact Dean’s angry representations appear to have moved the administration for the first time to try and make direct contact with Sihanouk. Dean was not alone in his recommendation. Kissinger’s assistant, William L. Stearman, now also urged Kissinger to try to sound out the Prince using British intermediaries. If this proved successful, the American liaison office in Beijing could follow up with direct discussions.31 In any event, the day after Kissinger’s strong telegram to Dean, the secretary informed the ambassador that the Americans were going to try to contact Sihanouk. Dean was to inform Lon Nol and assure the Cambodian leader that nothing would be discussed with Sihanouk without informing him. The ambassador quickly informed the Cambodian President who, according to Dean, looked relieved that the Americans were finally going to try and speak to the Prince. Thereafter, Dean’s dispatches were more measured. But when he had heard nothing more for ten days, even as the military situation continued to deteriorate, he could contain himself no longer and proceeded to give Kissinger his advice on how to conduct talks with Sihanouk. Above all he wanted the United States to throw its entire support behind Sihanouk, “not reluctantly but willingly.” The United States should help prepare the way for a peaceful transition and do what it could to feed the country once a new coalition government was in place. He and all key officials in the American mission were willing to stay on, “even under the most difficult circumstances … ,” he concluded, “if it would help bring about such a denouement to the Khmer conflict.” The next day he complained about being kept in the dark. Unless he and Lon Nol were kept informed, he wrote, “I think it will be difficult for us to keep the situation here glued together even long enough for any kind of a political settlement to be negotiated by the other side.”32 Unfortunately, Sihanouk did not, or could not, respond to the American effort. It is likely that his unhappy experience with the French intervention, which had put the Khmer Rouge on their guard about Sihanouk, immobilized him. Had the United States tried to talk with Sihanouk in the months, and even years, earlier, when he had clearly indicated his willingness to meet with the Americans, or even if it had carefully and discreetly followed through on the French proposal the past December, the story might have been different. But the United States never attempted to contact Sihanouk directly until February 1975, when the Khmer Rouge were on the brink of a military victory. There was never a sufficient sense of urgency at the highest levels. Dean had it right, even though Kissinger told the President that the ambassador had “gone wild and is writing for the record.”33 By February the military situation was desperate. The Khmer Rouge, with Chinese help, had blocked and mined the Mekong River. Lloyds of London stopped issuing insurance to river convoys at any price, and virtually none were now attempting the deadly journey. Oudang fell back into enemy hands, and

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the front around Phnom Penh was in danger of collapsing, with fighting taking place only a few miles from the city. When rockets fell on a market on 18 February, a missionary clinic “was turned into a bloody mess.” In January some missionary families had began to leave, and on 23 February, after being briefed by military officials, the president of the Christian and Missionary Alliance ordered the organization’s missionaries to depart within five days. Shortly thereafter an American military official told the missionaries that he was glad they were leaving. The situation, he said, was “on a downhill trend and beyond the point of retrieving.”34 Sir Robert Thompson, who had often advised the American government about developments in Vietnam, visited Cambodia in March and arrived at equally pessimistic conclusions. Lon Nol “seemed out of touch with reality,” and FANK commander Sosthene Fernandez “appeared harassed and depressed,” he informed the Americans. If the Mekong were not opened soon (and he doubted FANK’s ability to do that), the end was in sight. “It is an agonizing situation with a possible tragic ending,” Thompson reported. “In view of KC [Khmer communists] behaviour in the countryside it could end in massacre. … Any means of avoiding a bloodbath should be urgently sought.”35 By this time it was clear to Dean that the end was near. In a moving telegram Dean reported that an enemy breakthrough around the Phnom Penh perimeter was now a “distinct possibility.” FANK did not have the means to clear the Mekong, and military and civilian morale was at “an all-time low.” Even if the Congress approved additional assistance, it was doubtful that it would do much good. If an “uncontrolled solution” was to be avoided, Dean wrote, “we must establish contact with Sihanouk despite all the obstacles in the way so that he can return to Cambodia while there is still an army, navy, airforce and government in being in Phnom Penh.”36 Some Cambodian officials themselves made desperate attempts to contact the other side. Hang Thun Hak, for example, tried to make contact with Sihanouk through his son who was visiting Bangkok. Hang Thun Hak, who had protected the Queen Mother after Sihanouk’s ouster and had accompanied her to China in 1973, was also in indirect contact with Khmer Rouge leader Hou Youn. Apparently with the support of Prime Minister Long Boret, he also explored with Dean the idea of getting a message to the other side saying that Lon Nol and others in the GKR administration who had been singled out as major “traitors” by the Khmer Rouge would step down, if this would get talks going. Dean wanted to associate himself with this effort, but the state department shot him down. “You are clearly moving beyond the limits of instructions on negotiations,” the ambassador was told. He was to do nothing more than report. “U.S. initiatives for negotiations are to be strictly controlled from Washington.”37 In fact, the administration had given up on negotiations, even those that might provide for the kind of “controlled solution” that Dean wanted, at least until Congress voted additional assistance and the GKR made it through the dry season. Talk of negotiations in the immediate future was little more than a

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public relations maneuver. “As to diplomatic initiatives,” stated one unsigned NSC paper, “we must do what we can to satisfy Congress. But, as you know, better than anyone, there is no way to get anything meaningful started until midsummer when the KC fall back to lick their wounds.”38 But if administration officials had virtually written off negotiations, they did want to demonstrate to the country and to the Congress that they had not been remiss in trying to negotiate. Consequently they released a paper listing a number of occasions from 1970 to 1975 when they had tried to get negotiations started. This, they hoped, would increase the chances of getting additional assistance to Cambodia through the Congress. However, to some extent the effort backfired. In particular, the charge that the bombing halt in 1973 had thwarted promising negotiations produced a skeptical response. “That’s [a] pretty serious charge just to hang out there,” one reporter commented to Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib, who had called a press conference to go over the report with journalists. Could he provide more details? Ambassador Swank, the reporter recalled, had once characterized the contacts as “normal diplomatic talks” and not “negotiations.” But Habib refused to provide details. He would not even say with whom the negotiations took place.39 The charge that congressional action in 1973 thwarted promising discussions also angered members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. When a group of Senators met with President Ford, Senator John Sparkman (D–AL), who chaired the committee and who said he could not recall being informed about the negotiations at the time, complained to the President about these apparent efforts to blame Congress for the Cambodian debacle. Subsequently he wrote to the state department demanding details about the negotiations and specific evidence that the bombing halt thwarted them.40 In addition, skeptical reporters noted that, although the statement argued that the United States had engaged in a “sustained and continual effort,” in fact nothing was listed from August 1973 until October 1974 – a period of 14 months. Habib could only reply that the report did not include all conversations. Reporters were also skeptical of administration claims that American officials had tried without success to contact Sihanouk in February 1975. The Prince seemed to have contacted many Americans and had offered to meet with the United States, noted one. Habib could respond quite correctly that “in his recent statements” Sihanouk had not agreed to meet with American officials.41 But had the reporters pressed him, Habib could not have denied that the Prince had made such an offer numerous times in the past several years, only to have the United States refuse. Indeed, Mansfield made precisely that point in March. The senator, who had received a letter from Sihanouk and offered to go to China again to try and contact Sihanouk, observed with some bitterness (in the words of one White House correspondent) that “Sihanouk has not been contacted for four years despite the fact that Kissinger has been in China several times.”42 The administration was, however, uninterested in having Mansfield try to negotiate with Sihanouk.

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Although the Americans thought negotiations unlikely to take place now, the one initiative which momentarily aroused some excitement in Washington came toward the end of March when Sihanouk appealed to President Ford (in a letter delivered to the U.S. liaison office in Beijing by the French ambassador) requesting that the United States intervene to get his films and other personal cultural effects out of Phnom Penh. The United States agreed to do what it could and hoped that this might lead to talks with Sihanouk about a peaceful solution. But when George Bush, head of the liaison office, asked for a personal meeting with the Prince, Sihanouk refused to discuss political matters. The incident reflected Sihanouk’s understanding of the destructive nature of his Khmer Rouge allies and his inability by this point to do anything to stop them. The United States nevertheless saved at least some of Sihanouk’s films.43 Meanwhile, the administration continued to hope that Congress would approve additional emergency aid for Cambodia. Congress had not provided any new funding, and the shipment of military supplies – which were being funneled into Phnom Penh in an emergency airlift – would have to end sometime in April. (Food supplies could go on for a few more weeks.) The administration argued that the funds were necessary to keep FANK fighting. If only the GKR could make it through the dry season, it continued to argue, negotiations would take place and a peaceful, if not very satisfactory, solution would be worked out, hopefully involving Sihanouk and some members of the current government. This was not an easy position to sell. Did not a lot of the American assistance end up on the black market in Phnom Penh, asked the critics? Would not more money only prolong the blood-letting? As Senator Mansfield put it late in February, he was “sick and tired of pictures of Indochinese men, women and children being slaughtered by American guns with American ammunition in countries in which we have no vital interests and which are not tied to our security or our welfare.” Even with the new funds, and even if the GKR survived to the rainy season when fighting would recede, the Cambodian government would be (as Dean had long maintained) considerably weaker than it was when all of the previous unsuccessful attempts at negotiations had been made. As one reporter put it to Ron Nessen, the White House Press Secretary, given Kissinger’s obsessive reluctance to bargain from a weak position, what reason was there to believe that any new attempt at negotiations would be successful? “I don’t think anyone, even your Embassy there, is suggesting that the Cambodians are going to have any renewed strength,” the journalist said. “It has not been any problem for them to wait for one dry season after the next for God knows how many years already.” … Why is there going to be any more pressure on them to negotiate after we get to this wet season than any other? New York Times columnist Tom Wicker called the administration’s efforts to get additional aid “a shabby proposition.” It would be far easier and more honest,

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he wrote for Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to “go on television and try to sell the Brooklyn Bridge.”44 Actually the NSC privately agreed that, even if the GKR survived to the end of the dry season, this would still “offer little prospect of the GKR regaining the overall initiative and would allow the KC to further consolidate their control over most of the country.” Even so, the administration did have some reason, however tenuous, to think negotiations might take place if the GKR survived the dry season. Nhiek Tioulong, who was related to Sihanouk by marriage and who was then living in Paris, was reportedly told that the Prince would break with the Khmer Rouge if they did not permit him to negotiate once the dry season ended and if they were not yet in control of Phnom Penh. It was a slim hope but, as Brent Scowcroft’s assistants wrote, the information “may be of use in dealing with Congress by demonstrating the very real possibility of negotiations if the GKR gets through the dry season.”45 In any event, the administration was committed to finding additional assistance, and Ford went to great lengths to persuade the Congress. Its most successful approach was to convince an unenthusiastic congressional leadership to send a bipartisan fact-finding mission to Vietnam and Cambodia. Evenly divided between supporters of aid and those who opposed it, the members of Congress who went were all moved by the tragedy they encountered in Phnom Penh, and most returned willing to provide some additional aid.46 But despite immense efforts, Congress recessed without taking action. Congress would not resume deliberations until 7 April. Even as the debate on aid continued, the thought of replacing Lon Nol seemed increasingly attractive. Lon Nol’s departure might contribute to getting Congress to enact emergency aid, since many members saw him as incompetent and an impediment to a settlement. Lon Nol’s departure might also improve Khmer morale. A number of influential Cambodians were carefully trying to arrange his exit. But the state department was resolutely opposed to this kind of pressure on Lon Nol. Dean was only to listen and report and not take any position on the possible removal of the chief of state. When Cambodians discussed this with Dean, they were mystified at the neutral attitude of the Americans who, over the years, had not been at all shy about telling the Khmers exactly what they wanted them to do. “For the last two years we have done everything for the Khmer except blow their noses for them,” Dean wrote. Under the circumstances, he reported, to do nothing would probably be interpreted as supporting Lon Nol’s position.47 In this case the state department’s caution proved to be the right policy, for instead of the United States, the Japanese and ASEAN states made it clear to Lon Nol that he must go. Dean was then allowed very cautiously to nudge the Cambodian leader. For a time Lon Nol balked (despite his own repeated assurances over the years that he would step aside if circumstances required it), but after requesting (and presumably getting) $1 million from what must have already been a nearly barren Cambodian treasury to provide for his needs abroad,48 the Khmer leader left Phnom Penh for Indonesia. He subsequently

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flew to the United States, where he planned to settle in Maryland. By the time he left, advanced Khmer Rouge elements were only two and one-half miles from Phnom Penh. Dean hoped against hope that Lon Nol’s leaving would allow for a negotiated transfer of power, preferably to Sihanouk who would retain some acceptable members of the GKR. But administration officials in Washington had no illusions. “There is no hope of talks with the communists,” stated CIA director William Colby. “They will see Lon Nol’s departure as weakness and will push harder.” Kissinger agreed. “The Khmer Rouge will negotiate only unconditional surrender,” he stated. “When Lon Nol leaves, it will demoralize the country. Long Boret will try to carry on but will fail.”49 By this point this was an accurate assessment, but if Kissinger had engaged Sihanouk in talks earlier the outcome might have been different. Meanwhile the embassy began quietly planning for an emergency evacuation. On 10 February spouses began to leave Cambodia, and on 14 February the embassy posted a letter urging non-official Americans to leave. The time for activating “Operation Eagle Pull,” the contingency emergency airlift out of Phnom Penh, was reduced from 48 to 24 hours. There was much discussion about how many persons were to be evacuated. If Khmer officials, embassy employees and their families were taken out, along with American diplomats, third-country nationals, personnel at other embassies for whom the United States had responsibilities, and the Americans from voluntary organizations, the figure came to well over 3,000. Eventually the estimated number of people to be evacuated was trimmed back to something under 1,200, although Dean acknowledged that even this figure was little better than a guess. The preferred plan was to evacuate people by fixed wing aircraft. But the airport was already suffering from sporadic shelling and was constantly in danger of being closed. The helicopter alternative posed its own logistical problems. In Washington the NSC also came up with several possible scenarios, ranging from a gradual evacuation in small groups to a last-minute emergency departure only when defeat was imminent. None of these options was very good, and all entailed significant risks. In the final analysis, however, the NSC staff favored an evacuation when the airport was about to be closed, either by shelling or by a Cambodian mob, and when it was apparent that no more aid could be brought in. It would mean the total abandonment of Cambodia. On 31 March they urged Kissinger to suggest this to President Ford.50 On the same day, Dean wrote that the situation was falling apart. American military officials in Phnom Penh predicted that FANK would probably collapse sometime between 6 and 17 April, and anti-American sentiment was on the rise. The airport could be closed at any time, as FANK had not been able to disrupt enemy positions nearby. (On 22 March, for example, two American planes were hit on the runway, and the airlift of vital supplies had to be temporarily canceled.) Therefore, Dean asked permission to move a small number of Americans and third-country nationals out of Phnom Penh gradually, followed by the evacuation of about 200 more by fixed wing aircraft. The rest would leave

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by helicopter. He was soon given permission to begin a gradual, quiet evacuation of some personnel. In this way 130 Americans, 577 Khmers, and 297 thirdcountry nationals were flown out prior to the final evacuation. But the military situation continued to crumble. On 1 April intelligence sources reported that the enemy intended to make an all-out push on the capital and was bringing in troops from outlying areas to accomplish this. Two days later it was reported that the Khmer Rouge had captured a number of American 105 mm Howitzers near Neak Luong, which would soon increase the pressure on the airport. On 5 April Dean was granted authority to call for Eagle Pull with only three hours notice if necessary. On 7 April Sihanouk sent telegrams to Cyrus Eaton and Senator Mansfield warning the Americans to shut down their embassy at once. The Khmer Rouge had deliberately not taken the airport, Sihanouk said, to allow for an American departure. While the administration was pressuring Dean to withdraw as many people as possible, it hoped to postpone a final departure as long as possible. The initial reason for this was to allow for Congress to act on the administration’s aid request. If the embassy was abandoned, there was no possibility of a favorable vote. “We have two nutty Ambassadors,” Kissinger stated, referring to Dean in Phnom Penh and Martin in Saigon. “Dean wants to bug out,” he told President Ford. Kissinger’s comments were egregiously unfair to Dean but indicated the administration’s current desire to keep an American presence in Phnom Penh a little longer.51 But the next day CIA director Colby told the NSC that Cambodia could not last more than a week, and the following day the administration ordered an evacuation early on 11 April. Dean reported that he could not implement an evacuation that soon but would be ready at first light on 12 April (Phnom Penh time). In the meantime there were some last-minute contacts with Sihanouk’s representatives in Beijing. This train of events seems to have been put in place by Richard Solomon who on 2 April suggested to Kissinger that the United States try to leave a diplomatic remnant in Phnom Penh, and that this might be something that Sihanouk would favor. Could not the United States pass a message to Sihanouk in Beijing asking if he would like to have an American presence in the city, he asked. If Sihanouk was responsive, then the United States could also approach the Chinese.52 Solomon’s ideas seem to have been approved, for George Bush wrote a letter to Sihanouk, and at least one meeting (and probably more) took place between Phung Peng Cheng, Sihanouk’s Chief of Cabinet, and American diplomat John Holdridge. On 10 April Phung Peng Cheng told Holdridge that it was important to reach a solution before the fall of Saigon (which was also imminent), that Sihanouk could not do anything while he was in China but that he did not want “the Red Khmer to take over the country completely,” and that the Prince wanted FANK kept intact. Bush interpreted this as “a veiled appeal to the U.S. to get Sihanouk back into Phnom Penh somehow before the GKR forces crumble and the Red Khmer take over completely so that the Prince can exercise some power on his own.”53 The American response was to ask Sihanouk to request transportation to Phnom Penh from the Chinese. If

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this could be arranged, the United States would facilitate a ceasefire so that the Prince could land safely in the capital. Unfortunately, nothing came of these late contacts with Sihanouk, and the military situation in Cambodia did not improve. At 5.00 p.m. on 10 April Dean reported that the northern defenses of the capital were disintegrating and that it was likely that the airport would not be usable the next day. Many 105 mm artillery rounds had already fallen on the airport and were aimed at the area where American C-130 aircraft were to be loaded. It was time for a helicopter evacuation. The previous day Dean had told Acting President Saukham Khoy and Foreign Minister Long Boret that if the last-minute effort to arrive at a political solution with Sihanouk failed, there would be an evacuation. The Americans would take with them a limited number of Khmers if they wished to go. They would have no more than two hours’ notice, and one of their trusted aides should come by the ambassador’s residence at 6.30 a.m. to hand carry a note back to them. Both Cambodian leaders fully understood what was being conveyed to them. The next day at daybreak the first of 36 large helicopters carrying 360 marines left the USS Okinawa in the Gulf of Thailand for the flight to Landing Zone Hotel (a soccer field adjacent to the unfinished luxury Cambodiana Hotel) to pick up the assembled Americans and Cambodians. While they were on their way, Dean met with Saukham Khoy and Long Boret. Saukham Khoy was not certain if he would go with the Americans and thought that “mostly women and children of Khmer VIPs would take advantage of our offer.”54 Fewer people wanted to leave than was expected. In the end this final evacuation included about 82 American citizens, 159 Cambodians, and 35 persons of other nationalities.55 Among them was Saukham Khoy. Former Prime Minister Sirik Matak chose not to come. “I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people which has chosen liberty,” he wrote in an eloquent, if not entirely accurate, letter to the departing ambassador. You have refused us your protection and we can do nothing about it. You leave and my wish is that you and your country will find happiness under the sky. But mark it well that, if I shall die here on the spot and in my country that I love, it is too bad, because we all are born and must die one day. I have only committed this mistake of believing you, the Americans.56 (Sirik Matak was in fact one of the first victims of Khmer Rouge vengeance, as were Long Boret and Lon Non, who also chose not to leave.) The evacuation went smoothly. The Cambodians who crowded around the soccer field were curious, not hostile. There was no American gunfire. But toward the end of the operation Khmer Rouge guns opened on the field. At least one Cambodian boy watching the spectacle was killed. No Americans or others being evacuated were injured, though at least two of the departing

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helicopters suffered damage from ground fire.57 The American presence in Cambodia was now gone, and the killing fields were about to begin.

The Mayaguez affair Except for one final drama. On 12 May at about 2.15 p.m. (local time – 3.15 a.m. in Washington) a Khmer Rouge gunboat approached an American merchant ship, the SS Mayaguez, which was steaming from Hong Kong en route to Sattahip, Thailand. The ship was approximately 7 miles from the Cambodian island of Poulo Wai, well within the 12-mile territorial waters that the Cambodians claimed (although the United States did not accept this claim). The ship sent out an SOS message that was heard in Jakarta by John Neal of the Delta Excursion Co. Neal monitored communications from the ship for another hour and 45 minutes, until communications ceased. Khmer Rouge sailors took command of the ship and Cambodian gunboats began escorting the captured vessel toward the Cambodian island of Koh Tang. Washington got the news shortly after 5.00 a.m. Washington time from the American embassy in Jakarta, and the President learned about it at about 7.40 a.m. from the CIA. But the seriousness of the situation seems not to have been immediately apparent. At a 9.15 a.m. meeting with Kissinger and Deputy National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, the President discussed the forthcoming political campaign before the Mayaguez affair was mentioned. (In the course of the conversation, Ford observed that Ronald Reagan “would be a disaster” if elected; Kissinger agreed, observing that the Californian governor and former actor was “incompetent.”) At 10.37 the JCS ordered reconnaissance aircraft to search for the vessel, but only at an NSC meeting that noon did Ford seem to realize that the situation might require a major decision. At the meeting it was decided to demand the release of the ship. A note to this effect went to China and to the Cambodian embassy in Beijing. It was not until 9.16 p.m. that evening that an American plane located the Mayaguez being escorted by the Cambodian gunboats. The plane that discovered the ship was hit by Khmer Rouge fire but sustained only minor damage.58 The President and his advisers discussed what the response should be in light of the War Powers Act (which put restrictions on the President’s ability to commit troops without congressional approval) and the prohibition against military actions in Indochina; they concluded that under the circumstances they had a right to take military action. This decision to engage the Cambodians quickly and with military force if the crew was not immediately released reflected in particular the administration’s deep desire to avoid another Pueblo incident. (In January 1968 North Korea seized this American military ship and held the crew for several months as hostages.) At 2.25 a.m. (Washington time) on 13 May an American reconnaissance plane found the Mayaguez anchored at Koh Tang Island. Orders were then issued to prevent the ship being taken to the Cambodian port of Kompong Som. At 6.04 a.m. the ship’s crew was transferred to a Cambodian gunboat and taken to the island.

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That evening the Mayaguez crew boarded a Cambodian gunboat to be taken to Kompong Som. Fortunately, even as American planes were attacking and destroying some Cambodian patrol boats, the boat with the Mayaguez crew on board made it to shore unharmed – thanks only to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger who refused to implement literally a presidential order to stop any boats leaving the island.59 Early in the morning (Washington time) of 14 May, American planes sank at least one Cambodian gunboat and damaged four others. Planning went forward to employ substantial airpower to engage the Cambodians. These include possible use of the B-52s based on Guam which could be used to attack Kompong Som, while other planes from carriers would be used for tactical strikes. But the most fateful decision was to authorize marines from the USS Holt to seize the anchored Mayaguez, while other marines, brought in by helicopter from Thailand, would engage the Khmer Rouge on Koh Tang. This decision had already resulted in one tragedy: 23 American soldiers had died when their helicopter crashed in Thailand. There was opposition to these military actions. “Why are we going into the mainland of Asia again when we practically have the boat in our custody?” Senator Mansfield asked the President directly. Senator John McClellan (D–AR) asked Ford if he could not wait a while before invading Koh Tang. (Ford said he would be negligent if he waited.) Carl Albert (D–MT), the speaker of the house, told the President that “the charges on the Floor are that you have violated the law,” while Senator Robert Byrd (D–WV) complained that Ford had not consulted the congressional leaders before attacking the mainland.60 The assault nevertheless began at 5.42 a.m. (local time) on 15 May. The marines quickly secured the Mayaguez, and the Holt towed the ship away. But the landing on Koh Tang did not go easily. Given the considerable distance between the American air base at U Tapao, Thailand, and Koh Tang (about 190 nautical miles) and the limited number of helicopters available, only one-third of the landing force could be brought in in the initial landing. Two helicopters were quickly shot down, and the marines who landed encountered fierce resistance. Four hours after the landing on Koh Tang, the Cambodians released the Mayaquez crew from Kompong Som. They were taken to an American warship, the USS Henry B. Wilson, on a Thai fishing vessel flying a white flag. But the bombing of Kompong Som and the Ream naval base continued (despite Schlesinger’s objections – he may have been responsible for countermanding orders to employ the B-52s), as did the fierce battle of Koh Tang where the Khmer Rouge soldiers fought bravely and well. Eventually the Americans dropped a huge, 15,000 lb bomb on the center of the island, which may have affected Khmer Rouge morale but did not break their ranks. The Americans were ready to evacuate by now, but the Cambodians made this very difficult and dangerous. Had they pressed their attack, they might have driven the Americans into the sea, but they were apparently reluctant to leave their concealed positions and open themselves to air attacks. They did, nevertheless, shoot down additional helicopters which were trying to evacuate the

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hard-pressed marines. In the end, 15 American soldiers died in the battle. In all probability three additional marines were left behind, only be to killed by the Khmer Rouge over the next several days.61 Including those killed in the helicopter crash in Thailand, more Americans died in the rescue attempt than Mayaguez crew members were freed. American bombing of the Cambodian mainland destroyed several Cambodian buildings, and nine Cambodian boats were destroyed as well. Despite the losses, Ford considered his response to the Mayaguez affair a great success. And, despite the doubts of some prominent political leaders, public opinion seems to have been very much on his side. As a military action, however, the Koh Tang operation was a very near thing, complicated, ironically, by the use of modern communications technology which actually increased friction in the chain of command and interfered with battlefield actions.62 Furthermore, the bombing of Kompong Som put the Mayaguez crew in great danger, and little attention was given to a possible diplomatic solution, partly out of fear of another Pueblo incident but also because Kissinger wanted a strong military response to restore American “credibility.”63

The Khmer Rouge take over The red, red blood splatters the cities and plains of the Cambodian fatherland, The sublime blood of the workers and peasants, The blood of revolutionary combatants of both sexes. That blood spills out into great indignation and a resolute urge to fight. 17 April, that day under the revolutionary flag The blood certainly liberates us from slavery. (Cambodian national anthem under the Khmer Rouge) With Phnom Penh in its death throes, Gerald Ford might have exploited the opportunity to blame Congress and others for the outcome. One of Ford’s most important legacies to the country’s future was that he did not give in to the temptation to assign blame, as Kissinger surely would have. Instead he followed the counsel of Senator Mansfield, majority leader of the senate. “We paid a high price for our participation in the Indo-China tragedy in men and money,” the senator said. Acknowledging the complicity of six administrations, Mansfield told his colleagues that “this is not the time for either the Executive or the Legislative Branch to be pointing the finger. If there is any blame to be attached, and there is a great deal,” he stated, “we must all share in it. None of us is guiltless.” To this Ford responded simply, “I accept my wise friend’s counsel.”64 With the fall of Phnom Penh on 17 April, the administration correctly feared a bloodbath. Over the previous months the administration had received various intelligence reports of conditions in areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge which varied from unpleasant to savage. In February 1974 foreign service officer Kenneth M. Quinn (who later served as ambassador to Cambodia from 1995 to

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1999) completed an especially thorough analysis of Khmer Rouge rule in areas of southern Cambodia which they controlled. This was a particularly valuable study because in this area the Khmer Rouge (or Khmer Krahom – krahom means “red” in the Khmer language) had broken with other insurgents (the Khmer Rumdoah) who were loyal to Sihanouk. How the Khmer Krahom operated in the area they controlled, therefore, provided a reliable basis for projecting what would happen in the larger society if an unadulterated Khmer Rouge regime materialized.65 Based on interviews with refugees, other reports from American and South Vietnamese sources, and a lengthy interview with a former Khmer Rouge leader in Kampot Province who had fled to Vietnam after three and a half years as village chief, Quinn was able to identify a number of characteristics of Khmer Rouge rule. Among other things they tried to eliminate completely any vestiges of Cambodian royal society. To do this they destroyed most government schools and offices, eliminated any references to “royal” in their governmental arrangements, and even changed the names of provinces and districts, substituting numbers for names. They then began a program of land reform, set up cooperative stores, and outlawed colorful dress. Once they had defeated FANK in the spring of 1973 they accelerated efforts to communize the society and began a vitriolic anti-Sihanouk campaign. The Khmer Rouge took various steps to control the population. They required passes to travel outside of the villages; to go outside of the local district required higher-level approval. Patrolling was constant, and repeat offenders were executed. A secret police apparatus was also in being, though not much was yet known about it. Local residents were also indoctrinated and “re-educated” through intimidation and terror. Residents were required to attend propaganda sessions at night. Young men and women were removed from their homes for intensive political training, from which they returned condemning religion, traditional ways, and parental authority. To obliterate class lines, educated or wealthy individuals were forced into agricultural labor. For those who refused to conform, terror was employed. Harsh punishment was “widespread” and the death sentence was “relatively common” for those who attempted to flee, questioned Khmer Rouge policies, or were accused of espionage. Those arrested usually just disappeared. Because the jail was in malaria-infested mountains, those sent there for any length of time were likely to die. In addition to suppressing dissent, Khmer Rouge terror was intended to break down “traditional social and communal bonds” and to leave individuals “alone to face the state.” They changed traditional approaches to religion, marriage, and certain customs. Marriage was actually forbidden for the time being so that all energies could be devoted to the war. When it was allowed again, the minimum age was to be raised to 25 and elaborate marriage ceremonies were to be prohibited. Traditional dancing was totally forbidden, as was “the singing of religious and folk songs.” All ethnic festivals were outlawed, and religious activity, Theravada Buddhism in particular, came under attack, with faith in the revolution being the substitute – although the pagodas had not yet closed. Monks were

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forced to perform manual labor, stripped of their robes and, if recalcitrant, sent to reeducation centers. Some monks who refused to support Khmer Rouge policies were tortured to death. The practice of Islam – the religion of the Cham minority – was totally forbidden, and Chams were not allowed to practice various customs mandated by their religion. Economically, the Khmer Rouge attempted to level the condition of the people. They confiscated mechanized transportation (motor scooters and motorized sampans, for example), along with material goods, houses, furniture, family heirlooms, and so forth. Anyone caught trading illegally was subject to stiff penalties. Finally, in a chilling presentiment of what was to come, Quinn reported that the Khmer Rouge were engaged in “a program of population relocation and the creation of uninhabited buffer zones around areas they controlled.” The results were harsh: In many cases, families were forced to abandon all their possessions, except for basic necessities. Others reportedly committed suicide rather than face the loss of all their worldly possessions. Stories carried back by those people who had survived earlier relocations told of people dying en route and forced labor after arrival. As a result, even in areas of Kompong Trach where villagers could take all their possessions with them, fear grew and village officials fled rather than carry out the directives from higher headquarters. To counter this, district level cadre and soldiers were sent to enforce these movement orders. They also resorted to terror. The most obvious popular reaction to Khmer Rouge policies was flight. Despite the knowledge that those who tried to escape would be killed if captured, about 28,000 fled to South Vietnam in 1973 and another 20,000 to 25,000 fled to GKR-controlled territory within Cambodia. According to Quinn, the most important motivation for fleeing was the forced relocation, though restrictions on trade, forced sales of crops, religious persecution, and the verbal attacks on Sihanouk were also factors. There were some acts of rebellion, particularly by armed insurgents loyal to the Prince. Many were killed in the fighting, and some pro-Sihanouk people were executed. But overall active opposition to Khmer Rouge rule was insignificant. Quinn’s careful analysis depicted a totalitarian society that could be chillingly brutal, though the picture he presented was not one of totally unmitigated savagery. He noted, for example, that some of the Khmer Rouge practices were not uncommon in other Southeast Asian societies. Subsequent reports, many of them in mainstream American newspapers, focused on savage repression. “Thousands had been killed for not toeing the Khmer Rouge line,” reported the Washington Post in November 1974, the story based on a refugee account. Columnist Jack Anderson reported in March 1975 that the Khmer Rouge had killed ten refugees in a camp, of whom six were children. “They were brutally murdered by knife and bayonet,” Anderson reported. The Chicago Tribune reported that whole families were killed and victims had to

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dig their own graves. Similar reports appeared in other newspapers and in various government reports and captured documents. To the administration, reports of this sort (which were circulated to administration officials including the President and Vice President) settled the question about whether there would be a bloodbath once the Khmer Rouge won.66 In the final weeks of the GKR’s existence, reports of Khmer Rouge outrages were used to try and secure additional assistance from Congress. Khmer Rouge terror was “perhaps unparalleled since the Nazi era,” read one document intended to influence public and congressional opinion. The evidence of Communist terrorism is massive … .The fate of all Cambodians is now at stake. The evidence is clear that a large-scale blood bath – far larger than anything thus far in the war – would surely be the Communists’ policy following a Communist victory in Cambodia.67 When the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh in victory in 17 April, they executed many people, including Long Boret and other GKR officials. A French priest, François Ponchaud, traveled around Phnom Penh on 19 April and “saw many dead bodies along the road” and “many bodies floating in the Mekong River in front of the palace.”68 The new rulers also emptied the city, driving the people into the countryside. Even those in hospitals had to leave, regardless of their condition. The Americans quickly had reports, albeit initially unconfirmed ones, about these developments.69 On 6 May President Ford told reporters that the government had hard evidence of the execution of 80 to 90 former officials, along with their spouses. Although such reports and prognostications were accurate, there was considerable skepticism about them at first. This was not entirely surprising since Khmer Rouge brutality had surprised even many Cambodians initially. “When the Communists seized control of Phnom Penh on April 17 my first reaction was relief that the fighting was finally over,” recalled one GKR soldier. “With my comrades-in-arms, I planned to give the victors a hearty welcome.” He was surprised and disappointed, he said, at the ruthless behavior that ensued.70 Those Americans who had opposed American actions in Vietnam and Cambodia were among the most skeptical of administration claims of atrocities. They knew that refugee reports, the source of most such stories initially, were often inaccurate or exaggerated. But more to the point, they had grown cynical of anything the government claimed to be true in relation to events in Southeast Asia. Given the many instances when Johnson and Nixon administration officials had lied to the public (the memory of the administration denying that it was bombing Cambodia was still fresh, for example), there was an inclination to disbelieve administration claims. Prior to the fall of Phnom Penh, many antiwar activists suspected that such reports were intended only to pry additional funds from a reluctant Congress (which was partly true), while they could reasonably argue that more assistance to what they believed was a corrupt, unpopular, and inept Lon Nol regime would only prolong Cambodia’s agony.

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Even after the fall of Phnom Penh, skepticism continued. Some of the administration’s allegations were based on confidential intelligence sources that were not revealed. Given the Vietnam War-induced distrust in governmental statements, the critics doubted statements about Khmer Rouge atrocities, especially on the scale being reported. Was this not just a post-hoc effort to discredit the antiwar movement? For example a minister living in Los Altos, CA, challenged Ford’s charge that the new rulers of Cambodia had executed 80 officials. Another writer acknowledged that Phnom Penh had been evacuated and that hardships had resulted, but she claimed that there had been no choice. “There were 3 million hungry, desperate refugees in that city,” many of whom were slowly dying of starvation because there was no food available. With “no way to support the people in Phnom Penh,” they had to be moved into the countryside where there was food. The administration’s condemnation of the removal of people from Phnom Penh, she contended, was nothing more than an attempt “to assuage our guilt” over American bombing of the country which had left it ravaged and destitute.71 This skepticism was also reflected in some contemporary scholarly works. Gareth Porter and G. C. Hildebrand’s monograph, “The Politics of Food: Starvation and Agricultural Revolution in Cambodia” (later published as Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution) is perhaps the best example. Completed in September 1975 for the Indochina Resource Center in Washington (a churchsponsored research organization with an antiwar posture), the work included a foreword by respected Cornell University historian George McT. Kahin, coauthor of an early account of American involvement in Vietnam. “The Politics of Food” examined the evacuation of Phnom Penh in some detail and challenged the administration’s view that this was “an act of ideological fanaticism, carried out without legitimate purpose and without concern for human lives.” On the contrary, the authors argued that when the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh, they found a city without food or public services, a lack of sanitation, the people malnourished and subject to epidemic disease. This required immediate attention. “All the evidence indicates that the decision to disperse the population of Phnom Penh and other cities to the countryside was grounded in urgent and practical considerations,” they wrote. It was primarily a “question of feeding the population.” Eyewitness accounts, they asserted, also demonstrated that the evacuation was not carried out with great hardship to the people. On the contrary, the authorities provided assistance to those who could not easily walk. Nor were the days strenuous. Refugees had plenty of chance to rest, and they were not mistreated.72 As for the explosive charge that the communist forces had emptied the hospitals and forced doctors and patients alike to join the exodus, regardless of their condition, the authors argued that the Khmer Rouge policy “was actually aimed at saving lives and giving the best possible care to the sick and wounded.” The new medical system they introduced was, they stated, much better than the one the communists found when they entered Phnom Penh. To be sure, many evacuees died in the weeks after dispersion. But this was because the population had

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already been weakened by starvation and disease, and some deaths were therefore to be expected. Thus, blaming the Khmer Rouge misplaced the responsibility for this situation. It was really the “legacy of the U.S. policy in Cambodia” that “caused starvation and disease,” not the Khmer Rouge.73 Porter and Hildebrand’s account was based on genuine research and does contain important information on the state of the country the Khmer Rouge inherited. It is also worth pointing out that the Khmer insurgency was not entirely unified and that not all of the new rulers were satanic. Thus, for example, a French nurse, who was caught in Phnom Penh at the time of the takeover and was forced into the countryside along with the Khmers, reported that she met two groups of insurgents in the forest. The “Khmer Rouge … were violent,” she recalled, but the “Khmer Liberation Army” was “much kinder.” Khmer Rouge border guards also allowed the Cambodian husband of another French nurse to cross into Thailand with her, despite the fact that he had no French passport. And, although the Khmer Rouge explanation for the evacuation, which Porter and Hildebrand accepted – that is, that a dire food shortage required it – does not hold up, a secondary justification – that security considerations were important – is not without some substance. In fact, the evacuation of the cities completely broke up all CIA spy rings in Cambodia.74 Nevertheless Porter and Hildebrand accepted much too uncritically and naively Khmer Rouge statements and documents. The Khmer Rouge regime was one of the most brutal in memory, and comparisons with Nazi Germany or Stalin’s terror were apt, even if the American administration did sometimes publicize atrocities to serve their own policy and political interests. Yet “The Politics of Food” reflected, in an extreme sort of way, the lack of trust in the American government, something that several administrations had brought on themselves through misstatements and outright lies. As New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis put it in 1977, “When Henry Kissinger cries for Cambodia, there is room for skepticism.”75 In addition to being brutal, the Khmer Rouge regime of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was one of the most isolated in the world. With DK having serious ties only to China and North Korea, the United States had little knowledge of internal developments, though reports from New Zealand and Australian representatives in China and North Korea provided some limited insight, including knowledge of technical assistance agreements between the DK and those countries. The United States was also undoubtedly aware of Sihanouk’s unhappy relationship with the Khmer Rouge. In September 1975, for example, Sihanouk told the German Foreign Minister that he “was not sanguine about his longer-term prospects of seeing eye-to-eye with the Khmers Rouges.” The next month ten of Sihanouk’s staff in Beijing chose to settle in Paris rather than go back to Phnom Penh. It was a wise decision, although the Prince was forced to condemn them as traitors. Although ostensibly sharing power with the Khmer Rouge, the Americans thought that Sihanouk might well “tire of this charade.”76

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Despite the new regime’s terror and its xenophobic outlook, the United States debated whether to try to establish contact with DK. In September the Americans, urged by China, considered approaching the DK delegation at the United Nations to see if bilateral relations could be improved. Kenneth Quinn thought the approach premature and not in American interests. Since China had not helped the Americans to get negotiations going to end the war in Cambodia and had not been helpful in resolving the Mayaguez incident, he saw little reason to work with China now. An American approach to the DK at this point might also encourage Sihanouk to remain with the government longer than he otherwise would, Quinn thought. Furthermore, given the administration’s strong condemnation of Khmer Rouge brutality, it would be embarrassing to be in contact with the regime.77 Quinn’s objections were not persuasive, however, and on 2 October Philip Habib approached the DK representative to the United Nations, Sarin Chhak, while a high-level state department official met Sihanouk at the airport when he arrived in New York to attend the United Nations meeting. It is not clear what Habib’s meeting accomplished, but it must not have been entirely without results, for two weeks later NSC official Thomas J. Barnes suggested to Kissinger that he take up with the Chinese the issue of 125 Cambodian refugees residing at Camp Pendleton who wanted to return to Cambodia. This “could serve as a useful follow up to Assistant Secretary Habib’s approach to Sarin Chhak,” Barnes wrote. It would also “be a good test of whether the Chinese are sincere in wanting us to develop this relationship, and of whether the Khmer are prepared to take small steps in helping us” and might result in “a new relationship.” Kissinger discovered that China did in fact want the United States to improve relations with DK, and while the United States was not willing to establish diplomatic relations with the Phnom Penh regime, Kissinger let the Chinese know that he favored a Chinese presence in Cambodia to counter the Vietnamese.78 It seems likely that the subsequent decision in 1976 to allow limited humanitarian assistance to DK (the administration approved a license to allow a humanitarian organization to provide $50,000 in malaria medicines to DK, assistance that the Khmer Rouge never acknowledged)79 reflected the whispered, scarcely articulated view that the DK served American interests by containing a newly unified Vietnam, toward which the United States was hostile. Thus, when in July 1976 the Australians reported that the Cambodians had approached them about establishing diplomatic relations, Kissinger was intrigued. Though he found the Khmer Rouge “dreadful” and “loathsome,” the secretary of state thought “it might be a good idea. Anything that would help to contain Vietnam would be good,” he stated.80 Kissinger foreshadowed what would become American policy for the next fifteen years: supporting antiVietnamese elements in Cambodia, even if that meant supporting the “loathsome” Khmer Rouge. Meanwhile more and more reports surfaced about the nature of the DK. At the end of March 1976, for example, the American embassy in Bangkok sent to Washington a detailed account of life under the Khmer Rouge, based on extensive

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interviews with Cambodian refugees living in Thailand.81 Fierce anti-intellectual sentiment characterized the Khmer Rouge at the local level (despite the fact that the national leaders came from French-educated intelligentsia). This resulted in the educated often being given the hardest work assignments, if they were not executed first. Medical doctors were also subject to execution, while Buddhist wats were closed and the monks put to work in the fields. Working conditions were harsh, and travel remained very difficult. In some areas, children were taken away from their parents and raised separately. Still, the report acknowledged (much to the researchers’ surprise) that food was now more available; in some places there was a more relaxed attitude about marriage and sexual contact; limited education for children had begun (though it was mostly political indoctrination, with teachers themselves being nearly illiterate); and in some places a friendly relationship between the people and the soldiers had developed. But if there was more to eat, it came at the very high price of backbreaking, forced labor, and the almost complete lack of personal freedom. Furthermore, terrifying executions (usually using hoe handles or other blunt instruments) continued in many places, most often based on a person’s past rather than his or her behavior, with the bodies seldom buried. Xenophobia also continued to characterize the regime, with Thai communists and some Chinese advisers being the only foreigners allowed in. The refugees reported seeing almost no Vietnamese. Furthermore, during evening study sessions Khmer Rouge leaders railed at the CIA whose agents were said to have infiltrated the country. “Even if Americans were not present among them,” the people in Varin were told, “American ideas were, and these were dangerous, so everyone must be on guard against them.” Some Americans may have learned about Khmer Rouge atrocities as early as April 1974 from a story in the Washington Star News and in the Chicago Tribune in July. In 1975 Henry Kamm’s reports in the New York Times detailed Khmer Rouge atrocities, based on refugee accounts. In 1976 François Ponchaud’s wellinformed articles appeared in the French newspaper Le Monde. But more Americans undoubtedly read a major Time magazine exposé, which appeared at about the same time as a summary of the Bangkok report was passed on to President Ford. Also based largely on refugee reports, Time focused on the regime’s “savagery” and included graphic drawings of the way in which executions were carried out. The article was less nuanced than the longer embassy report and concluded that a genocide was in progress. Some citizens were so stirred by the report that they urged the President to speak out about the horrors in Cambodia.82 Time also published a brief excerpt from a forthcoming book by Reader’s Digest editors Anthony Paul (among the last journalists to leave Phnom Penh) and John Barron, Murder of a Gentle Land: The Untold Story of Communist Genocide in Cambodia. Based on hundreds of interviews with refugees on the Thai border, the book was certainly the most widely read contemporary account of the horrors of the Khmer Rouge. And if it was sensationalistic and provided little context, including almost nothing about what had happened in Cambodia during the five

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years preceding the Khmer Rouge victory, it was very influential and even became the basis for congressional hearings into Cambodian developments in 1977.83 Despite the extreme nature of Khmer Rouge rule and the outrage that resulted from the sensational revelations in major media outlets, there was little stomach to take strong action. Although the administration issued condemnations, it was not willing to do more. “In view of our past involvement in Cambodia,” wrote one American official, “we are not in a position to take an effective lead in bringing about an inquiry into this situation.” Perhaps part of the determination not to press for stronger action was the scarcely discussed, disturbing possibility that the Khmer Rouge just might serve American interests because of their fanatically anti-Vietnamese attitudes. But regardless, the American public wanted nothing more to do with Southeast Asia. Even administration pleas for the admission of Cambodian refugees sometimes met with resistance. In February 1976, for example, Representative Joshua Eilberg (D–PA), who chaired the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, complained to the President about the pressures being exerted to admit 11,000 Meo and Khmer refugees. Symptomatic of the suspicions fueled by the war in Vietnam, Eilberg was suspicious of Scowcroft’s comments that the United States should admit the Khmers “because of promises we made to them.” What exactly were these promises, Eilberg demanded to know.84 Beyond urging the admission of refugees, supporting international organizations that chose to undertake investigations, and wishing private humanitarian organizations who worked to alleviate conditions in Cambodia well, the Ford administration declined to go.85

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Jimmy Carter, human rights, and Cambodia

I hoped and believed that the expansion of human rights might be the wave of the future throughout the world, and I wanted the United States to be on the crest of this movement. Jimmy Carter

A foreign policy that placed the defense of human rights at its center characterized the administration of Jimmy Carter – at least rhetorically. “As President,” Carter wrote in his memoirs, “I hoped and believed that the expansion of human rights might be the wave of the future throughout the world, and I wanted the United States to be on the crest of this movement.”1 Most popular and scholarly commentators have been critical of Carter as a foreign policy leader, but his devotion to human rights, the degree to which he made it a central aspect of American foreign policy, and the successes he had bringing about real changes abroad figure prominently in recent efforts to rehabilitate the former president’s reputation. Thus historian Douglas Brinkley writes that Carter’s “insistence that human rights be a cardinal principle in global governance” was one of the president’s greatest accomplishments. By the end of Carter’s administration “human rights had permanently entered the diplomatic parlance of American foreign policy.” Political scientist Robert A. Strong agrees, arguing forcefully that Carter’s accomplishments have been woefully underappreciated, including his achievements in human rights. “President Carter advanced the cause of human rights on the American political agenda and in the world community,” he states.2 Unquestionably Carter gave more prominence to human rights than any recent previous administration. Several of his high-ranking officials, including civil rights veterans Patricia Derian and Andrew Young, sought to elevate human rights considerations in policy making, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was sympathetic. According to Brinkley, in fact, human rights was the “paramount” consideration in determining American policy.3 Even Carter’s critics acknowledge that he cut aid to the brutal military junta in Argentina, for example, and by some accounts saved thousands of lives as a result. The United States also prevented the Dominican military from aborting a free election and persuaded Indonesia to release 30,000 political prisoners.4 Yet in the case of the murderous

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Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia human rights considerations hardly entered into the administration’s calculus, despite the fact that Carter himself characterized the Pol Pot regime as the “worst violator of human rights in the world today.” Not surprising, Carter scarcely mentions Cambodia in his memoirs, nor do revisionist scholars discuss his policy toward that country.5 The administration’s failure to elevate human rights concerns in its policy toward Cambodia can be attributed to several factors. After the recent traumas caused by the debacle in Vietnam, most Americans wanted to forget about Southeast Asia. There was also a sense that the United States could exert no influence on the secretive and xenophobic Khmer Rouge regime. Major issues of more immediate importance to the United States also deflected attention from Southeast Asia: forging a new Panama Canal treaty, trying to bring an end to the Israeli–Palestinian problem, responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and dealing with the Iranian hostage crisis, for example. But in the final analysis old-fashioned geopolitical considerations, in particular the desire to oppose the perceived expansion of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia at the expense of America’s new friend, China, won out over human rights in Carter’s Cambodia policy. In a final irony, after the Vietnamese drove the Khmer Rouge from power at the end of 1978, the United States secretly supported efforts to resuscitate and sustain their remnant military forces. For this, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, with Carter’s at least tacit approval, bears primary responsibility. When Carter took office in January 1977, he immediately addressed issues remaining from the Vietnam War. The new President pardoned those who had resisted the draft and began the process (ultimately abortive) of restoring diplomatic relations with Vietnam. But Cambodia received little attention. The decision in 1977 to approve three licenses to ship DDT to Cambodia to ease the country’s problem with malaria (the shipments being made through DK authorities in Hong Kong but never officially acknowledged), may have been simply a matter of humanitarian concern, although providing the aid might also reflect the belief by some officials – first adumbrated by Kissinger in the previous administration – that DK served American interests by helping to contain Vietnam. In any event, no policy initiatives were taken in 1977 to try to mitigate, if not end, the terror.6 The administration’s inattention to the tragedy in Cambodia soon caused a growing number of people to point out that the administration’s silence belied its rhetoric about the centrality of human rights to its foreign policy. I am especially amazed that you, with your important policy of defending human rights, have not found it “proper” to speak up in defense of thousands of defenseless Cambodians who are being brutally beaten to death for merely having existed in the middle class wrote one citizen to the President.7 Outrage at the lack of response to the disturbing developments in Cambodia was also reflected in congressional opinion. Norman Dicks (D–WA), for

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example, implored Carter to condemn the Khmer Rouge whose atrocities, he wrote, rivaled “those perpetrated in Nazi Germany during World War II, and which make human rights violations in Chile, Uganda, and the Soviet Union pale by comparison.”8 Such sentiments resulted in the first congressional hearings on Cambodian developments since the victory of the Pol Pot forces in 1975. In May 1977 the Subcommittee on International Organization of the House International Affairs Committee heard from four witnesses: Reader’s Digest editor John Barron; scholar Gareth Porter; and former foreign service officers Peter A. Poole and David Chandler, both of whom had previously served in Cambodia. Porter defended the Khmer Rouge decision to evacuate the cities; Poole and Chandler offered cautious assessments of the situation and thought past American military actions were substantially responsible for bringing the Khmer Rouge to power. But beyond agreeing that some humanitarian assistance (such additional shipments of DDT, along with food and medicine) might be helpful, none of the witnesses initially offered any suggestions on how the United States could significantly change the Cambodian situation, and all except Barron opposed strong public condemnation. “You have no specific recommendations for the U.S. policy which you would put forward as a means of ameliorating or encouraging moderation in the regime there,” committee chairman Donald M. Fraser (D–MN) stated in apparent frustration.9 The witnesses’ testimony appalled Representative Stephen Solarz (D–NY). Although Solarz, who was quickly becoming the leading congressional authority on Cambodia, agreed that the American bombing of Cambodia had been “contemptible,” what was now happening in Cambodia was “one of the most monstrous crimes in the history of the human race.” To stand by and say nothing betrayed “a kind of implicit racism.” If the victims were white, he went on, the United States would not be talking “about sending DDT to the offending nation in an effort to ameliorate the situation.” The situation was so horrendous and unprecedented, Solarz thought, that it required “an exceptional and maybe extraordinary response on our part,” and he suggested looking at an international boycott or even an international police action.10 That these hearings took place suggested that the administration was not providing leadership in responding to the Cambodian holocaust, and in July the committee – keeping some heat on the administration – heard from Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke and a Khmer-speaking foreign service officer, Charles Twining, who had been watching the Cambodian situation from Bangkok (and who would later serve as the first American ambassador to Cambodia when relations were restored in 1993). Both testified about the flagrant DK human rights violations, including systematic executions that numbered in the tens or hundreds of thousands. But neither Holbrooke nor Twining thought that the United States could do much to change the situation. Both agreed that the United States should publicly condemn the government’s actions, though neither thought it would do much good. “I am not sure that the Cambodian leadership would care a hoot about what we or anyone else would have to say,” Twining remarked. He doubted that

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even the Chinese, who had provided the Khmer Rouge with diplomatic, technical, and material support, could influence DK behavior. In the end the committee, noting the Carter administration’s “high priority” given to “human rights conditions around the world,” approved a resolution urging the administration to work with other nations to bring about an end to the “flagrant violations of internationally recognized human rights now taking place in Cambodia.”11 But little happened. However, by the end of 1977, presumably in response to growing pressure, the administration had decided to take more interest. Early in 1978, after an NSC review Brzezinski called for a more aggressive American posture. The United States “should do more to call attention to Cambodian violations of human rights and generate international condemnation” of the Cambodian government, he said. On 17 January 1978 Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher publicly condemned DK, but the state department once again insisted that it had “no leverage to affect the human rights situation in Cambodia.”12 Such expressions of impotence did not assuage the critics. On 28 February 1978, for example, Solarz wrote directly to the President condemning the flagrant violations of human rights, and Carter then directed Brzezinski to prepare “a strong condemnation of Democratic Kampuchea.” Brzezinski in turn ordered the state department to draft a statement.13 The state department’s draft, which was completed one day late, was inadequate. It unaccountably focused on Indochinese refugees and made no distinctions among Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as generators of refugees. “For balance” the draft also included a condemnation of the human rights practices of Vietnam and Laos (which hardly compared to the draconian measures in force in Cambodia). The NSC staff rewrote the statement, largely eliminating the “balancing” comments about human rights abuses in Vietnam and Laos. But it still began with the statement that “since 1975, more than one-third of a million people have fled their homes in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.” Brzezinski considered the NSC draft “too timid” and rewrote parts of it himself. Thus, instead of referring to people fleeing “the loss of basic political and economic freedoms,” the National Security Adviser substituted simply “mass murder.” Instead of the Cambodian government merely being “certainly among” the world’s worst violators of human rights, DK became simply “the worst violator of human rights in the world today.” Instead of the government “causing unparalleled misery,” it was accused “of inflicting death on hundreds of thousands,” and perhaps one to two million people, because of “genocidal policies without parallel since the days of the Holocaust.”14 For reasons that are not yet clear, the final version, issued on 21 April 1978, was not quite so strong. All references to countries other than Cambodia remained out, thus focusing attention just on Cambodia, and the condemnation of Cambodia as “the worst violator of human rights in the world today” remained. Refugee allegations of “hundreds of thousands” of deaths also survived, but the suggestion that one to two million people had perished because

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of genocidal policies was removed. The term “genocide” did, however, survive in a subsequent section that called attention to a recent Canadian House of Commons resolution condemning the “acts of genocide” in Cambodia. Even in this slightly watered-down version, the condemnation of Cambodia earned Carter much applause, and the President soon asked for recommendations on ways to encourage a change in Cambodia.15 However, attention soon focused mostly on the plight of the Cambodian refugees who had managed to escape to Thailand. (There was virtually no interest, it might be noted, in the tens of thousands of Cambodian refugees for whom Vietnam was caring.)16 Leo Cherne, head of the International Rescue Committee, was especially important in calling attention to the plight of the refugees. The immediate concern of the refugee advocates was to get approval to allow the approximately 15,000 Cambodian refugees to resettle in the United States. Despite initial resistance from the administration, by September both houses of Congress had passed sense of the Congress resolutions urging that the refugees be allowed in, and in October the Dole–Solarz bill sailed through Congress authorizing their admission. The special refugee legislation did not, however, address the plight of the millions of Cambodians still living under the Khmer Rouge government. Although some, like Senator George McGovern (D–SD), eventually called for armed intervention to end the suffering in Cambodia, most of those who wanted stronger action believed that the most effective way was to have the United States persuade China, the Khmer Rouge’s only real ally, to end Cambodia’s reign of terror. In 1978 this seemed more realistic than it had the previous year since the Carter administration hoped to establish full diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). “Hope you have had (or will have) a chance to mention the impact around the world of the Khmer Rouge behavior to the PRC,” one of Brzezinski’s friends wrote to him. “Surely they have an interest in moderating it.”17 Carter himself instructed Brzezinski to read his statement of 21 April 1978 condemning DK to the Chinese, which the National Security Adviser apparently did in May. But again it was congressional opinion that pushed for stronger action. In July a bipartisan group of 18 congressional representatives urged Carter to make Cambodia a part of the discussions aimed at normalizing relations with China. Pointing out that the United States had already indicated its willingness to cooperate with the Chinese on regional problems, the legislators urged that China be asked to reciprocate. “Cambodia provides the most visible area for such a demonstration,” they wrote, “and the clearest avenue where our government can most fruitfully act to reduce the horrendous misery of the Cambodian people.”18 The representatives’ suggestion did not commend itself to Brzezinski. The National Security Adviser was fiercely anti-Soviet and a strong proponent of improving relations with the Soviet Union’s bitter antagonist, China. Just as he would soon end talks on restoring relations with Vietnam because he feared normalization with Vietnam might complicate negotiations with China, so too

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he did not want to make China’s intervention with Pol Pot a condition of normalization. The state department explained why. “We believe … it would be a serious mistake to inject the Cambodian human rights violations into future US–PRC bilateral negotiations on normalization,” Assistant Secretary of State Douglas J. Bennet wrote to the representatives. To do so, he went on, would “seriously complicate this process without significant positive impact on the situation in Cambodia.”19 To give first priority to the geopolitical advantages inherent in normalizing relations with China, however, belied the Carter administration’s insistence that concern for human rights was the primary determinant in its foreign policy. To many, the policy of seeking to normalize relations with China without calling on its government to pressure the Khmer Rouge seemed hypocritical. China was the only country in the world that might be able to influence a regime that Carter himself had accused of being the world’s worst violator of human rights. By not linking the two issues, American policy appeared to be based purely on realpolitik calculations and, in particular, a desire to play the China card in the strategic battle with the Soviet Union. Among those to sense this immediately were former antiwar activists Jane Fonda, Tom Hayden, Sam Hurst, and Fred Branfman who complained to Carter that Brzezinski’s policy was “undercutting peace in Cambodia and the concern for human rights there that you have formally announced.” They went on, Mr. Brzezinski’s attempt to revive the Cold War with the Soviet Union gives tacit support to the brutality in Cambodia by regarding Cambodia as part of the Chinese “sphere of influence.” Brzezinski wants to ally with China and Cambodia in mounting pressure against the Soviet Union.20 The activists’ analysis was insightful. Even Carter found Brzezinski’s fascination with China irritating at times. “Zbig,” the President jotted on one of Brzezinski’s papers advocating a delay in normalizing relations with Vietnam, “you have a tendency to exalt the PRC issue.”21 But Brzezinski held firm. He regarded the establishment of full diplomatic relations with China as his crowning achievement, but there was no respite for Cambodia. Relief for Cambodia finally came in December 1978 when Vietnamese troops (along with some Cambodians who had taken refuge in Vietnam) invaded Cambodia and drove the Khmer Rouge regime out of Phnom Penh. Soon Pol Pot controlled only a small part of the country near the Thai border, as well as some refugee camps inside Thailand. The Vietnamese installed Heng Samrin as the Prime Minister of the new government, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Several months after the invasion, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong told a visiting group of Americans representing Church World Service (the overseas relief and development arm of the National Council of Churches) that Vietnam had acted to “salvage a nation … We have brought that nation from death to life,” he said.22 Vietnam’s motives were actually considerably more complex. Among them were disagreements over the

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border between Vietnam and Cambodia (which had led to episodes of armed conflict between the two countries over the past three years), fear of encirclement by China, and anger at Cambodian raids into Vietnam that had killed thousands of villagers.23 But regardless, Vietnam ended the murderous rule of the Khmer Rouge. Despite the distrust that most Cambodians historically had for the Vietnamese, on this occasion their hereditary enemy was their liberator. As Sihanouk himself put it many years later, “If they [the Vietnamese] had not ousted Pol Pot, everyone would have died – not only me, but everyone – they would have killed us all.”24 The Carter administration did not see it that way, however. Only a couple of months before the invasion the Americans had been close to normalizing relations with Vietnam, only to have Brzezinski stop the process. After it was clear that the United States was backing away from normalizing relations, Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union (something it had carefully refrained from doing up to that point) and prepared to drive the Khmer Rouge out. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, the United States condemned the act, arguing hypocritically that it could not in principle “condone or support the use of military forces outside of one’s own territory.” Even the Khmer Rouge regime’s “unparalleled crimes,” the Americans told the Vietnamese, did not justify a “military invasion violation of Kampuchean sovereignty and replacement of that government by force.”25 To the Carter administration and especially to Brzezinski, the Vietnamese action had the deleterious effect of expanding Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Pol Pot’s regime was despicable but it was allied with China, which the United States now supported. It quickly became American policy, as Brzezinski put it in a note to Carter, “to get Vietnamese troops out of Cambodia.”26 The diplomatic calculus quickly became more complicated, for during his visit to Washington at the end of January 1979, China’s Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping asked Carter how the United States would respond to “a punitive strike against the Vietnamese.” Brzezinski had expected something of this sort and was worried that Vance would persuade Carter to pressure China to desist. But Carter’s response was acceptable to Brzezinski. Carter personally told Deng that there were a number of disadvantages to taking such action, and he urged him not to do it. But, as Brzezinski put it, Carter “did not lock the United States into a position which could generate later pressures to condemn China in the UN.”27 Feeling little pressure from the United States to desist, China massed 170,000 soldiers on the border who on 16 February 1979 invaded Vietnam. At that point, Carter sympathized with the Chinese, for he reportedly told the NSC that “the Soviet-backed … Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia gave the Chinese little choice but to invade Vietnam.” This remained at the heart of the American view of Indochina. As one official put it, “the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea is the root cause of the tensions in the region.”28 Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Chinese invasion Brzezinski met almost daily with the Chinese ambassador and provided him with intelligence reports on Soviet

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troop deployments. Thus, as historian Qiang Zhia writes, “the US was secretly assisting China as it delivered its ‘punishment’ to Vietnam.”29 As these developments unfolded, nothing indicates that the administration gave any thought whatsoever to trying to prevent Pol Pot from resuming his murderous rule. What would happen to the Cambodians if the Vietnamese withdrew? The question was not raised. Legitimate questions of international law served as a basis for U.S. criticism of Vietnam’s action. But the real concern of the United States was geopolitical. Soviet influence in Southeast Asia appeared to have been expanded at the expense of China’s. From such a perspective the fact that Pol Pot’s forces had not been completely destroyed cheered the administration. Carter told Deng Xiaoping that “the Kampucheans seem to be doing better than expected as guerilla fighters.”30 And at a meeting of the Special Coordination Committee on 18 February CIA director Stansfield Turner stated, in response to an inquiry from Brzezinski, that “there was no retrogression in the ability of the Pol Pot forces to hold their own.”31 Presumably this intelligence pleased the National Security Adviser. In any event, Brzezinski went out of his way to see that nothing interfered with the new relationship he had established with China. He succeeded in preventing Vance from blocking or postponing a planned visit to China by Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal and fought off attempts by Senator Christopher Dodd (D–CT) and others to postpone Ambassador Leonard Woodcock’s arrival in China until such time as the Chinese withdrew their troops from Vietnam. Once again it was up to Congress to try and force action on behalf of the Cambodians. On 22 February 1979 Solarz and eight other members of Congress called the administration on its failure to address the issue of the possible return of the Khmer Rouge to power. “The need to prevent the restoration of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia seems to have been overlooked by the Administration,” they wrote. If the Vietnamese withdrew from Cambodia without an international force of some kind in position, they stated, “the genocidal Pol Pot regime” would reestablish itself in Phnom Penh, and the suffering of the Cambodian people would continue, as would regional instability.32 The administration responded that it did not disagree with many of the representatives’ sentiments, and it may be that Vance asked the Chinese whether they would support an international conference on Cambodia.33 But there is little evidence that the Carter administration devoted much energy trying to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning. This was evident on 1 March 1979 when Holbrooke, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia but said nothing about how the Khmer Rouge would be prevented from resuming control if they withdrew. It was left to Solarz to make the point that the administration had no plan to prevent Pol Pot returning to power if the Vietnamese left.34 The administration’s major goal was to get the Vietnamese to leave Cambodia because their presence there, and the regime they had installed and supported, represented in the administration’s view a gain for Soviet influence in the region at the expense of the Chinese. From this perspective, keeping

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Pol Pot’s forces in the field where they could fight the Vietnamese was in the administration’s interest, despite the embarrassment of supporting, if only indirectly, a man who had perpetrated mass murder and produced immense suffering in Southeast Asia. The interest of ordinary Cambodian people was of little concern.

Refugees and famine Meanwhile the plight of the hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees continued to attract attention. Tens of thousands of Cambodians were fleeing to Thailand to escape the Khmer Rouge and the continued fighting in their country. But the simultaneous exodus of large numbers of “boat people” from Vietnam complicated the international situation of the Cambodian refugees. Sometimes rescued half dead on the high seas by merchant vessels or American warships, frequently suffering from horrific attacks by pirates and marauders before reaching Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, or elsewhere (where they were forced to live in often wretched refugee camps, if they were not actually pushed back out to sea), the plight of the boat people was an embarrassment to Vietnam. A great outcry to assist the boat people arose. The folksinger Joan Baez urged the administration to mobilize the Seventh Fleet to rescue those at sea and offered to organize a concert to benefit the refugees. It was more comfortable for the American government to focus attention on the boat people than on the “land people” (the Cambodian refugees). Not only were they more immediately visible, but it was easy to blame the government of Vietnam directly for causing the problem.35 But the “land people” could not be ignored altogether. Stories about their harrowing lives under the Khmer Rouge and traumatic accounts of escape through minefields into Thailand began to appear in American publications, and letters from ordinary citizens and from members of Congress urged a substantial commitment to alleviate their suffering. When in June 1979 Thailand forced about 45,000 Khmers back into Cambodia with tragic results, there was a strong outcry. “I cannot bear to think that either I personally or the American people can sit back silently while this tragedy continues,” wrote a businessman from New York. Carter unconvincingly blamed the PRK and the Vietnamese for the tragedy, but the United States did in fact respond to this need by working with the Thai government and voluntary organizations to deliver food and other relief supplies to the border, where they were simply left to be picked up by needy refugees on the Cambodian side. The government provided $325,000 to Catholic Relief Services and another $300,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for this purpose. In addition, the United States encouraged Thailand to allow those refugees who had been forcibly repatriated to return to Thailand by assuring them that the United States would relocate up to 10,000 of them in the United States.36 Attention to the Khmers soon increased dramatically when reports of imminent famine inside Cambodia itself began to appear. It was estimated that tens of

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thousands, perhaps as many as 200,000, were starving every month. A Church World Service delegation in Phnom Penh summed it up soberly in October 1979: Rice rations, where available, are minimal. Food production is abysmally low. No one is sure what percentage of arable land is currently planted, but some estimates go as low as 5 percent, while none surpass 20 percent. Thus the prospects of rice and other food production are dismal. In such conditions infant mortality appears to be high, though reliable statistics are unavailable. We saw few children under the age of five. The need for basic foodstuffs is massive, as is the need for medicines, mosquito netting, and in time, immunological vaccines. The present trickle of assistance through international relief agencies, principally UNICEF and ICRC working jointly, and a few other agencies, is minuscule in the face of appalling need, and prospects of delivery and distribution of foodstuffs on a large scale are not heartening. Factories that process food, such as fish processing plants, are inoperative, with machinery out of repair. Schools are only beginning to function. There are few teachers, and there is a complete dearth of the most basic elements such as paper and supplies. There is a dearth of manpower for reconstruction, and the administrative infrastructure of the nation is extremely fragile, lacking basic necessities throughout.37 The Carter administration had largely ignored warnings of impending famine, including those from its own ambassador in Thailand as early as April.38 But in late July Vance told a congressional committee that he was “particularly concerned about the Kampucheans, who now face a serious threat of famine.”39 Even with the apparent emergency now acknowledged, however, the Carter administration was hardly in the forefront of the relief effort. It criticized the Heng Samrin regime (and its Vietnamese supporters) for insisting that all aid be channeled through the PRK which, it claimed, was hindering distribution. But what most concerned the United States was that food shipments through Phnom Penh might be diverted to Vietnamese soldiers or be used in other ways to bolster the PRK. The failure to get aid into Cambodia generated heated criticism. Late in September, for example, the New York Times chastised both the United Nations and the Carter administration’s dilatory approach and support of Pol Pot. Pointing out that both the British development agency Oxfam and the American Friends Service Committee had managed to send some food into Cambodia, the newspaper commented, “evidently it is not impossible to help the starving.” Perhaps the United Nations and the United States should find the way. Shortly thereafter, UNICEF and ICRC reached agreement with the PRK on how to import and distribute food and relief supplies.40 Within the United States government, efforts to get food into Cambodia itself were centered in the Presidential Commission on World Hunger, headed by Sol

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M. Linowitz. Although the Cambodian famine had not been a part of the commission’s original mandate, by October 1979 Ambassador Linowitz and others thought that they could not ignore the world’s most pressing hunger problem. In response to the commission’s efforts, as well as an appeal by leaders of prominent relief agencies, Vance recommended that the United States commit $7 million to support an expected joint appeal from UNICEF and ICRC for $100 million to fund an international relief effort inside Cambodia for six months. “I believe the United States … should without delay make an initial commitment to the UNICEF/ICRC effort,” he implored the President.41 In view of the need, $7 million was a small commitment, and members of the President’s Commission on Hunger began to urge Linowitz to call on the President to commit $30 million. Jean Mayer, the President of Tufts University and vice chairman of the commission, termed the existing relief effort “wholly inadequate – financially, logistically, and diplomatically” and called on the United States and other countries to increase their efforts.42 Others spoke up as well. Theodore M. Hesburgh, President of the University of Notre Dame and chairman of the Overseas Development Council, called together leaders of several religious denominations and humanitarian organizations to discuss the Cambodian situation and urge a substantially higher commitment. Pressure on the administration also came from Senator Edward Kennedy (D–MA), who chaired the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Immigration and who was considered likely to challenge Carter for the Democratic nomination in 1980. Kennedy chastised the administration’s “past indifference” to the Cambodian situation. The United States, he complained, was “more concerned with which dictator … sits in the United Nations than with the many children dying in the nation they purport to lead.”43 Kennedy’s contentions that the administration lacked a sense of urgency, was unduly concerned with the geopolitical situation, and was insufficiently concerned with the humanitarian tragedy were well taken. Faced with the mounting pressure, the administration finally decided to undertake a major effort on behalf of the suffering Cambodians. On 23 October 1979 Carter met with congressional leaders to get their assent to a large increase in funding for Cambodian relief; then at Carter’s personal request, Hesburgh and about 35 other religious and humanitarian leaders joined him at the White House. The President told them that he was directing that an additional $3 million in aid be made available immediately to UNICEF and the ICRC, and that he was going to urge the Congress to approve sending another $20 million in commodities to Cambodia, “subject only to assurances that it will reach the needy.”44 All told, the administration was now proposing to spend $30 million (which included the $7 million already requested) for Cambodian relief, with an additional $9 million going to Catholic Relief Services and United Nations programs that were assisting Cambodian refugees in Thailand. Hesburgh and the others were gratified, and the next day they issued a press release supporting Carter and urging the Congress, as well as the public, to increase assistance to Cambodia, a country which, they said, “has already lost

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half of its former population of eight million.”45 In addition to announcing more aid, Carter sent letters to other major donor countries urging them to increase their own contributions. He also formed an interagency working group to coordinate relief efforts, naming former Senator Dick Clark (D–IA) to head the group. Carter also issued a proclamation calling on all Americans to contribute generously to Cambodian relief and designating each Saturday and Sunday until Thanksgiving as times when Americans might contribute through their houses of worship. All in all, it was a major administration effort. Even Sihanouk’s wife, Princess Monique, the former head of the Cambodian Red Cross, was impressed. From Beijing she wrote to praise “la générosité du peuple américain et … l’action magnifique de son président.”46 Important as the administration’s new commitment was, it still lagged behind public opinion on the issue. After Senator John C. Danforth (R–MO) gave a “chilling report” to his colleagues about his recent visit to Phnom Penh where his delegation saw Cambodians “literally dying before our eyes,” Congress approved an additional $30 million “with unanimous whoops of approval.” Congress had almost doubled the amount requested by the administration.47 Even with enthusiastic public support for assistance, just how forthcoming the United States would be in allowing funds to be spent inside Cambodia (as opposed to along the border) remained uncertain. Politics still mattered. For example, on 10 October, two days after Vance had urged the President to provide more assistance to Cambodian relief, Bill Herod, representing Church World Service, testified before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs that the Treasury Department had not yet approved the organization’s request (made the previous June) to send $100,000 worth of mosquito nets to Cambodia to help prevent malaria. And on 29 October syndicated columnist Jack Anderson alleged that state department officials had “deliberately sabotaged” the relief effort insofar as it applied to aid being provided to those inside Cambodia itself. Lower-level officials, especially those at the “East Asian desk,” were allegedly most culpable, he charged, though the larger problem was the “deep-seated anti-Vietnam bias in the State Department.”48 Anderson may have exaggerated state department obstructiveness, but his insight that anti-Vietnamese sentiment informed American policy toward the region was on the mark. The President’s Commission on World Hunger acknowledged the political impediments to adequate relief when on 5 November it called on all countries, including the United States, to put aside their political concerns. The United States should provide assistance “irrespective of existing legislative or foreign policy restraints, and, where necessary, those constraints should be removed by immediate Congressional or administrative action,” the commission recommended.49 In sum, although the administration had taken important steps to increase assistance to Cambodia, its willingness to address the tragedy in a forceful fashion remained in doubt. Even someone as knowledgeable as Dennis J. Doolin, who from 1969 to 1974 served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

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East Asian and Pacific Affairs, felt this way. In a handwritten letter to Carter, he urged the President to “stop studying the problems and agonizing over it and do something.” Although the letter was not entirely fair to Carter or the administration, it nevertheless demonstrated, as a member of Vice President Walter F. Mondale’s staff put in a letter to Carter’s chief of staff Hamilton Jordan, “that there is little sense of the Administration having acted decisively. On moral, humanitarian and political grounds, it should be otherwise.”50 Shortly thereafter Holbrooke told the influential Far Eastern Economic Review that the United States would “subordinate all political considerations” to getting food to the Cambodian people.51 But political factors remained important nonetheless. By late November 1979 those within the administration who wanted a strong public policy of blaming Hanoi, the PRK, and the USSR felt emboldened (probably because the Iranian hostage crisis had distracted attention from the Cambodian tragedy). Brzezinski led the charge. The NSC staff drafted a militant statement, accusing Vietnam, with Soviet backing, of “conducting a war of conquest” in Cambodia, a war designed, “regardless of human cost,” to put its “puppet regime” in control “of the entire country.” Because the Vietnamese were denying the relief agencies access to hundreds of thousands of Cambodians, they would “carry a heavy burden before history for this callous and inhuman disregard of human life, bringing a new version of genocide to their tragic victims.” Brzezinski sent the draft to the state department, telling Vance that they would “be under great criticism if we do not react more publicly to the Soviet–Vietnamese impediments to more massive aid to Cambodia.” He hoped the secretary of state would agree and issue the draft statement.52 In fact it took ten days to issue the statement that Brzezinski wanted, indicating significant internal disagreement. Vance seems not to have gone along with the draft. It was, after all, hard to sustain the charge that the Vietnamese, who had rescued the country from the real perpetrator of mass murder, Pol Pot, were themselves guilty of genocide. There were, in fact, conflicting views within from the administration. About the same time that Brzezinski demanded a strong condemnation of Vietnam, for example, the state department issued a “fact sheet” concerning the situation in Cambodia. The “fact sheet” painted a dire situation in a country that had suffered from “war, genocide, famine, and epidemic disease,” a situation that had resulted in “a brutalized and dying race.” Three million people were in danger of starvation. The problem was a “transport and communication infrastructure destroyed.” The department urged aid “by all possible routes.” Not once did the report mention Vietnam or the Heng Samrin government.53 Even NSC officials sometimes spoke in nuanced terms. At a press conference announcing the appointment of Victor Palmieri as ambassador at large for refugee affairs, for example, NSC official Matt Nimitz called attention to the problem of distribution of supplies within Cambodia. Food was piling up, truck convoys were not being allowed to deliver the food to the countryside, and so forth. At the event Lincoln Bloomfield demurred, stating that there had been “some opening up

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inside Kampuchea.” Goods were coming in via the Mekong River, the number of daily relief flights to Phnom Penh had been increased from one to four; the number of international officials on the ground had also increased. The problem was still “very bad,” Bloomfield acknowledged, but there were signs of movement, and Nimitz too agreed that some food was being distributed. The problems were both logistical and political, he said.54 But Brzezinski was intolerant of ambiguity. He preferred propaganda. Thus on 3 December he again ordered the state department to explain what it was doing to publicize Vietnamese efforts to deny food to needy Cambodians. To the CIA he was even blunter. The Agency was directed “on an urgent basis” to publicize as widely as possible the Vietnamese “starvation policy.” Not surprisingly the official White House “Statement on Kampuchea,” issued on 6 December 1979, reflected Brzezinski’s tough approach. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia had brought to that country “a new wave of oppression, hunger and disease,” the statement read. The Vietnamese and the Heng Samrin authorities had “deliberately blocked and obstructed” the flow of aid to Cambodia, exacted taxes on relief goods (“in effect imposing a surcharge on human survival”), diverted relief supplies to the military, and even mined fields so that the crops could not be harvested. In keeping with this strongly anti-PRK approach, the American embassy in Bangkok may have deliberately spread false rumors that rice seed distributed inside Cambodia by Oxfam had been poisoned – or at least so Oxfam officials claimed. The Bangkok embassy, charged Oxfam official Joel Charny, was guilty of providing “deliberate disinformation” about the situation inside Cambodia.55 Brzezinski’s views prevailed within the administration, but they did not go unchallenged. Influential columnist Mary McGrory immediately responded that “if the Carter administration put as much effort into feeding the Cambodian people as it does into trying to discredit the Cambodian government, the famine would be over in a month.” All agreed, McGrory stated, that distribution of food was inadequate and that people were starving as a result. The difference lay in how one assessed the causes. While the administration charged that the PRK was “deliberately starving the Cambodians for political purposes,” she wrote, international relief administrators blamed “the inexperience of the green and jumpy young managers of Cambodia and the total absence of any technology, beginning with telephones, trucks and railway lines.”56 McGrory’s column correctly portrayed the views of many relief workers on the ground. Officials with Oxfam, UNICEF, the ICRC, and other relief organizations involved in work inside Cambodia all disagreed, in varying degrees, with the administration’s assessment. New York Times correspondent Henry Kamm, whose dispatches often highlighted the shortcomings of the PRK and Vietnamese, reported that relief administrators in Phnom Penh were “satisfied with the distribution.”57 Oxfam was even more critical of the American statement. Malcolm Harper, Oxfam’s leader in Phnom Penh, stated that he could find no evidence to support the Carter administration’s claim of political interference with the distribution of food. Similarly, Kirk Alliman, of Church World

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Service and a member of the President’s Commission on World Hunger, reported “dramatic improvement” in the distribution of aid since October.58 Reports from the field also cast doubts on the accuracy of American claims that Soviet assistance was virtually nonexistent. Charles Twining recalled speaking with a Russian who had been in Phnom Penh as early as February 1979 to bring in “some urgent supplies.”59 The USSR did not channel its supplies through the international relief agencies, but it did provide equipment and food independently, which was reported in the American press (although often buried in other stories with other focuses). Kamm, for example, in a story about Cambodian authorities blocking aid supplies, reported that, contrary to the American view, Vietnamese soldiers were helping distribute rice and that some corn had been provided by the USSR. In addition, both ICRC and UNICEF officials pointed out that over 200 Soviet trucks arrived in December and that they, along with the trucks recently imported by the international relief organizations, would speed up delivery of food and other relief supplies.60 Others complained that not only did the United States distort the situation inside Cambodia, but American policy itself contributed to the inadequate distribution of supplies. For example, the United States funneled aid into Cambodia only through UNICEF and the ICRC because those organizations had permission (albeit unwritten) not only from Heng Samrin but also from Pol Pot to distribute supplies in the areas they controlled. But the United States refused to work with Oxfam because that organization had reached an agreement only with Heng Samrin. Furthermore, the critics pointed out, by focusing on aid on the border, the United States was in effect encouraging Cambodians to flee toward the border where they could get food. Oxfam America’s director complained that the United States could dramatically improve the logistics situation inside the country by supplying additional equipment for unloading ships at Kompong Som, for example, but had refused to do so. The critics also complained, quite correctly, that the United States employed a double standard when it came to monitoring the distribution of supplies. Inside Cambodia, the United States insisted that no aid whatsoever get to the Vietnamese troops and that monitoring mechanisms be in place. But along the border aid was simply left for people to come and retrieve, with much of it taken back into Cambodia where it could be used by military forces, including those of Pol Pot. Even when relief operations became more systematized and aid was delivered to the refugee camps, much of it ended up in the hands of various warlords and military forces, including the Khmer Rouge. One UNICEF survey documented that 87 percent of the food aid in one sector of the border was misappropriated. In other words, the United States used inadequate monitoring of aid delivered inside Cambodia as an excuse to limit assistance there but was unconcerned about the lack of monitoring along the border, even if some of the aid got to Pol Pot’s forces.61 Such criticisms did not deter the administration from implementing policies that reflected its strongly negative views of the PRK and its Vietnamese supporters. The administration continued to disparage the internal relief effort,

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instead focusing attention on the plight of the refugees along the Thai border, whose presence it continued to blame largely on the PRK and Vietnam. Brzezinski hoped to undertake highly publicized, dramatic efforts to provide food in this area.62 Although there was unquestionably a need for food along the border, Brzezinski’s intentions were at least as much political as they were humanitarian. For the most part he would be feeding people who were not under PRK control. Efforts to get assistance deeper into Cambodia, including PRK-controlled areas, such as with truck convoys from Thailand, were designed in part to embarrass the PRK (although it is also true that Senator Danforth and his colleagues had suggested such a “land bridge” after their visit to Cambodia in October 1979). All in all, the administration had thrown down the gauntlet to Heng Samrin and his Vietnamese and Soviet supporters. On 20 December 1979 Brzezinski curtly asked Vance to “let us know what additional measures the Department intends to take to put more pressure on the Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh.”63 Though couched in terms of getting vitally needed food to starving Cambodians, administration pressures on the PRK had political motivations. The critics continued to attack the administration’s approach. Kirk Alliman stated that for the Carter administration “the Vietnam War is still not over.”64 Alliman continued his criticism on the Public Broadcasting System’s influential McNeil–Lehrer News Hour and with an important letter to the New York Times. Representing Church World Service, Alliman had traveled widely in Cambodia and had heard nothing to support allegations that there were any significant delays in distributing food. He himself had seen food being distributed in several locations, he said, and together with Harry Labouisse of UNICEF Alliman attributed imperfections in the distribution system to well-meaning but inexperienced local authorities rather than any deliberate policy. Alliman’s assessment was not without force. As a CIA report stated a few weeks later, Pol Pot’s executions effectively wiped out the whole leadership class; the ranks of those over 20 years old are thin; the life expectancy has been shorted so drastically that the adult population will in any event decrease further over the next two decades. Under these conditions, how could the society function in anything like a normal way? Therefore, Alliman stated, attempting to pressure the PRK, the Vietnamese, and the Soviet Union served “no useful purpose.” The better approach, he insisted convincingly, was “to make positive contributions to the people of Cambodia through quiet, creative diplomacy and full cooperation with relief efforts” – exactly the opposite approach from Brzezinski who wanted dramatic, showy efforts to force food into Cambodia from the Thai side.65 A more caustic critic was columnist Jack Anderson, who continued to attack the administration’s Cambodia policy in his widely read column. On 12 January 1980, for example, he again wrote about the “cynical saboteurs” in the state

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department and (a new addition) the NSC who were determined to “use the Cambodian horror to score Cold War propaganda points.” The only significant diversion of food and other relief supplies, he contended, was along the Thai border, where corrupt Thai officials siphoned off as much as 50 percent of the food to sell at a good profit, and where Pol Pot’s “ ‘fat sadistic’ soldiers” stole food intended for civilians. One Capitol Hill source told Anderson’s reporter, Lucette Lagnado, that the United States was “sabotaging the relief effort.”66 Such attacks irritated administration officials. Lincoln Bloomfield charged that Alliman blithely ignored the fact that there was a war going on. Bloomfield’s description of the military conflict is significant. Ignoring the fact that the Vietnamese had invaded partly because of the Khmer Rouge provocations, including attacks on Vietnamese villages that had killed tens of thousands of people, and that the invasion (whatever its motivation) had liberated the Cambodians from a murderous government, Bloomfield wrote that the Vietnamese were “attempting to crush a predecessor Communist regime.” Thus the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge were seen as equally evil. As for Anderson’s column, Bloomfield wrote that it was “absolutely poisonous,” and he recommended barring Lagnado from contact with anyone in the White House. As for the congressional source who had told her that the administration was sabotaging the relief effort, he wrote that he would be interested in meeting that person “on a dark street.”67 Perhaps the critics eventually had some impact on the administration, nevertheless. Bloomfield, despite his impatience with Alliman and his contempt of Anderson, acknowledged that some relief supplies sent to Phnom Penh were getting distributed and that Oxfam and Church World Service were getting supplies in.68 Also, in its carefully worded report to President Carter, the Presidential Commission on World Hunger stated that logistic arrangements for getting supplies into Cambodia were now “adequate.” Within Kampuchea distribution remained inadequate, the commission reported, but it blamed this on inadequate infrastructure, including poor transportation and handling facilities. In what might have been perceived as a criticism of Brzezinski’s condemnation of the PRK, the commission stated that stories of mismanagement threatened to reduce the public’s willingness to support assistance to Cambodian relief.69 Carter’s new Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Victor H. Palmieri, also took a more balanced view than the NSC. Palmieri told the press that the famine had been temporarily checked in Cambodia, partly by the successful border feeding program which, he said, was effective to a distance of 200 to 300 miles inside Cambodia, partly by the recent harvest, and partly by the international agencies operating in Phnom Penh; the PRK itself had also distributed Russian corn. Based on his discussions with international relief workers, Palmieri reported that distribution of supplies within Cambodia had improved. Barges of food were now coming up the Mekong, Laotian airplanes were about to begin flying supplies to outlying regions, and so forth. In sum, he saw a variety of reasons for problems with distribution and made no attempt to demonize the PRK or its Vietnamese supporters.70

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A few days later Palmieri made many of the same observations, while also making some additional pointed recommendations, in a formal report to President Carter. With new supplies moving up the Mekong on barges, truck convoys coming from Kompong Som, and plans to fly food to provincial capitals, UNICEF officials believed that “the ice jam is breaking up” and that more food would soon be distributed within Cambodia, Palmieri told the President, although the international officials were still unable to monitor effectively the distribution of supplies. Among Palmieri’s recommendations were continued international pressure to increase distribution inside Cambodia, using chartered barges and aircraft (probably from communist countries) within the country; “full demilitarization” of the food distribution stations along the border; “rehabilitation of agricultural production in Kampuchea … despite some probable diplomatic gains by the Heng Samrin authorities from this process”; a clear decision to make it a major American objective to try and return most of the Khmer refugees to “a recovering Kampuchea” and “avoiding diplomatic or resettlement policy and actions which will inhibit or delay this and make more onerous consequences inevitable.”71 In the weeks ahead, private organizations continued to question the accuracy of American evaluations of the situation inside Cambodia. Thus on 13 March 1980 Paul McCleary wrote to President Carter asking for an appointment for a delegation of six executives of American private voluntary organizations who had recently returned from an extensive visit to Vietnam and Cambodia, where they had met with government officials and the staffs of various international relief agencies. As they traveled overland into Cambodia they reported seeing truckloads of food, as well as the actual distribution of food in Cambodian villages. The delegation soon met with Rosalyn Carter, where some members questioned American policy.72 Even Ambassador Morton L. Abramowitz in Thailand apparently did not believe that problems with distribution of supplies inside Cambodia resulted primarily from deliberate obstruction. “Phnom Penh’s distribution system operates near capacity,” he reported to the state department. It was “hobbled by terrible transportation systems, inexperience, and Vietnamese/Heng Samrin priorities.”73 Despite the criticisms from within and without, at the highest levels administration officials continued to argue that Vietnam remained the “principal impediment” to relief efforts, and this was likely to continue for the foreseeable future. They contended that there was little reliable information from within Cambodia about the relief program there but that what food had been delivered was largely from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, with only a small amount coming from the international relief effort. Most of the food supplied through UNICEF and ICRC remained undistributed, they contended. More positive assessments from Oxfam and Church World Service were attributed to “their fund-raising and/or in some cases their political sympathies” – an analysis that was unfair to these groups and ignored the possibility that the government’s own estimation was colored by different “political sympathies.”74 As for Palmieri’s recommendations, it appears that Brzezinski disapproved them.75

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Still, reports from the voluntary organizations, Ambassador Palmieri, the President’s Commission on World Hunger, and Ambassador Abramowitz did affect the public posture of the administration and seem to have convinced some high-level officials that there had been improvement in the distribution of relief aid inside the country. Thus in an important address to the Council on Foreign Relations on 2 April, Holbrooke acknowledged that there was a debate about how much food had been diverted and stockpiled within the PRK, while international agencies were reporting that “food is now getting out to the provincial capitals.”76 But if the administration had been forced to acknowledge that logistical problems, inexperienced officials, and an infrastructure destroyed by the Khmer Rouge were at least partially, and perhaps primarily, responsible for the delays in distributing food; and if they had to agree that the situation had improved in recent weeks with more food getting through, this did not change the political calculus. Although the United States might have to funnel some assistance through Phnom Penh because of the immensity of the humanitarian disaster and domestic pressure, it remained American policy to force the withdrawal of the Vietnamese and, with them, the government they had installed in Phnom Penh. In sum, the administration would accept some challenges to its view of the relief situation, but it would not accept suggestions that it change its basic policy toward the region. Thus, for example, in his address to the Council on Foreign Relations, Holbrooke painted the Vietnamese in the darkest of colors. Some aid was now getting through, but the Vietnamese had “done nothing to facilitate this” (a judgment at odds with reports emanating from all of the international relief agencies which said that the Vietnamese were distributing at least some aid). American policy, Holbrooke said, was to end Soviet military involvement in Vietnam, end Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia, and replace the Heng Samrin regime with one that represented the will of the people. This was precisely the same policy enunciated a year earlier. But just as then, it failed to address how this could be accomplished without running into the danger that the Khmer Rouge would reassert their terroristic rule over Cambodia.77

US aid to the Cambodian resistance A further indication of American priorities was evident in the nascent effort to build political and perhaps a significant military resistance to the forces of the PRK and Vietnam. Because many documents remain classified, the details of this effort are not all known. But Sihanouk was one important key. After his ouster in 1970 the Prince had thrown his support to the Khmer Rouge resistance. But he knew that in the final analysis the insurgents would have no use for him; when they were finished with him they would “spit me out like a cherry stone,” as he once put it.78 During Khmer Rouge rule Sihanouk had been in effect their prisoner, and several members of his family died at their hands. He had no trouble breaking with them after their defeat in 1979. He welcomed the

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Vietnamese invasion that drove them from power, but he had no love for the PRK. Therefore the Carter administration looked favorably upon the Prince’s aspiration to replace Heng Samrin and once again lead his country. Consequently the Americans maintained contact with Sihanouk almost from the moment the Vietnamese pushed the Khmer Rouge out of Phnom Penh. Ambassador Leonard Woodcock visited regularly with him in Beijing, and when Sihanouk came to Washington he met with officials from the state department and the NSC. In December 1979 Robert Oakley, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, met Sihanouk in Paris for a two-hour discussion and delivered a letter from Vance. Shortly thereafter Ambassador Abramowitz met with China’s military attaché in Bangkok. Exactly what they discussed remains classified, but possible American “representations to Sihanouk” were apparently talked about, since Carter wrote “we should do this” on that portion of Abramowitz’s report.79 It is likely that Carter wanted to encourage Sihanouk, who had only a very small armed force loyal to him, to cooperate with the remnant Pol Pot forces as a way of resisting the PRK and Vietnamese, for on 14 January 1980 Vance wrote a personal memo to Carter in which the secretary of state did not think (as apparently Carter did) that the United States should urge Sihanouk “to cooperate with the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime as long as Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge henchmen continue to control that regime.” Chinese efforts to have the DK change its image had resulted in only cosmetic changes, Vance pointed out, and therefore if Sihanouk were to ally with DK, “he would undermine his ability to rally support among Kampucheans and his prospects of being eventually accepted by the Vietnamese as an alternative to Pol Pot and Heng Samrin.”80 Still, it is clear from the Vance memo that Sihanouk had become the American candidate to replace Heng Samrin. His position of opposition to both DK and the PRK appeared to coincide with the public American posture. Therefore, he “deserves our continued diplomatic and political encouragement,” wrote Vance. Sihanouk’s value was political rather than military, Vance insisted. He could “reinforce international pressure on Hanoi to cut what will likely be protracted losses in a wasting guerrilla war.” Carter seems to have been convinced. “This is very true, & very important,” he wrote in the margin. Sihanouk had apparently asked for more than political support, however. As Vance put it, “we have been unresponsive … to his suggestions that we provide covert military assistance to Kampuchean resistance forces that accept Sihanouk’s leadership.” To do so, Vance stated, would “enmesh us again in an Indochina scenario without a visible end, would pose severe domestic and international costs, and probably in the end reduce our influence over the eventual outcome.”81 Vance thought it unwise to provide covert military assistance to Sihanouk’s (very limited) forces, much less have the Prince make common cause with Pol Pot. But the NSC was more open to these possibilities. In March 1980 the NSC asked the CIA to prepare a study on the current state of DK forces in

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Cambodia. Three days later Holbrooke told a Senate subcommittee that the Khmer Rouge would survive the dry season fighting and would probably “emerge with roughly 20,000 troops able to operate effectively in western Kampuchea and to a lesser extent through the country.”82 By publicizing this (Holbrooke’s testimony was quickly published and distributed as a public document), the government may have wanted to indicate to Vietnam that it faced significant resistance which the United States was at least tacitly backing. Although the administration courted Sihanouk, the Prince’s views were not entirely in accord with those of the United States. Despite his dislike of the Vietnamese, he knew better than to equate their influence in Cambodia with Khmer Rouge rule. “The fate of the Cambodian people is, it appears,” he wrote to Carter in April 1980, “much better than that known under the yoke of the Khmer Rouge.” Furthermore, Sihanouk was very concerned about the insecure position of refugees along the Thai border. They were at the mercy of various Cambodian war lords, to whom the people were “humiliated slaves.” But what must have been particularly embarrassing to American officials was Sihanouk’s charge that aid supplies along the border were not being equitably distributed but were instead diverted away from the starving people. “The humanitarian aid (that of UNICEF, the Red Cross, etc.) which was destined for them has been in large part diverted by those ‘war lords,’ by the [Thai] ‘government,’ and by the Cambodian ‘resistance,’ protected by China and Thailand,” he wrote.83 By May 1980 Vance, who served as a cautionary force in the administration, was gone, having resigned in protest over the attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran. Brzezinski was pleased. Vance, he informed Carter, had never spoken out strongly on behalf of Carter’s policies, and “the people around Cy continuously conspired either to dilute your policy or to divert it into directions more to their own liking.” Brzezinski suggested that some of them be reassigned.84 With Vance gone Brzezinski became an even more dominant figure in the administration, which meant that Cambodia would be viewed even more completely through a geopolitical Cold War lens. Carter’s anger at the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan earlier in the year hardened the administration’s approach to any issue that involved the Soviet Union. “Softer” approaches, such as an emphasis on human rights or a willingness to accept ambiguity in Vietnam or Cambodia, were of little consequence. This was seen in two interrelated issues that came to a head in the summer and fall of 1980: the perennial question of who would represent Cambodia in the United Nations, and the issue of whether to give support to – or encourage others to support – the remnants of the Khmer Rouge in their resistance to the PRK. In 1979 the United States had reluctantly voted to allow DK to retain the United Nations seat – this despite Sihanouk’s plea that the seat be kept vacant. Within the administration Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Patricia Derian had argued passionately against the vote, as had Donald McHenry, who represented the United States at the United Nations, and others. Those who favored seating DK argued that a government imposed by a foreign

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invasion was illegitimate, and that it was consistent with international law and practice to seat the predecessor government. But the more important reasons were frankly political: it was important to resist the extension of Vietnamese (and therefore Soviet) power, and the United States did not want to alienate China and America’s friends in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), who also opposed Vietnam’s actions in Cambodia. “We made the only decision consistent with our overall national interests,” wrote Vance. It was, however, an embarrassing posture clearly at odds with Carter’s professed devotion to human rights. As Bloomfield put it, “the technical grounds for our role have proved extraordinarily difficult to explain to the concerned lay public.”85 Now the issue was about to emerge again. And despite Brzezinski’s dominance of the foreign policy agenda, this time there was even more sympathy within the administration for a change in policy. In the state department Richard Holbrooke advised the new secretary of state, Edmund Muskie, that it was premature to decide the credentials question. Within the NSC, Bloomfield argued forcefully for keeping the U.N. seat vacant on the grounds that neither the PRK nor DK had a legitimate claim to represent Cambodia. “There is just too great a gulf between our expedient policy [of supporting DK representation] on the one hand, and the moral posture frequently enunciated by the president, featuring frequent denunciations of the Pol Pot–Khmer Rouge regime as the most genocidal since Adolph Hitler,” he wrote to Brzezinski. If Pol Pot actually controlled Cambodia, he went on, then “we would have to hold our nose and accept its technical legitimacy.” But the Khmer Rouge controlled almost no territory and, according to U.S. intelligence reports, had “virtually no political support within Kampuchea.”86 But Roger W. Sullivan, another of Brzezinski’s assistants at the NSC, disagreed. Calling Holbrooke’s position “indefensible,” Sullivan wanted the United States to stand staunchly behind ASEAN and China. Any hint of American wavering, he said, would be read by all parties as indicating that the United States had decided to accommodate itself to Vietnamese rule in Cambodia. For the time being, Sullivan prevailed. Although a formal decision was not yet taken on American policy toward the Cambodian U.N. seat, at a forthcoming ASEAN meeting Muskie would “not signal a change in our position.”87 With the U.N. vote scheduled for three months later in September 1980, important humanitarian and religious organizations lobbied furiously for a change in American policy. The National Council of Churches, the United Church Board for World Ministries, the United Church of Christ, and the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy, among others, sent letters to Carter and other administration officials admonishing them not to vote again to seat the Khmer Rouge. All of them threw back at Carter his famous words that the Pol Pot regime was the “worst violator of human rights in the world.” Even more significant, politically, was the position of the International Rescue Committee. The IRC’s executive committee voted unanimously to support an open seat at the U.N., despite the fact that its executive director, Leo Cherne, was a strong administration supporter.

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Public outrage at a possible U.S. vote to seat the Khmer Rouge also resulted in strong protests by some members of Congress. John Edward Porter (R–IL), for example, argued that the American position had only made the Vietnamese more intransigent and had interfered with the relief effort inside Cambodia. Edwin B. Forsythe (R–NJ) asked how the United States in good conscience could “lend even the most minimal support” to DK.88 Within the administration Sam Brown, a Carter appointee who directed ACTION (the domestic peace corps), sent in last-minute appeals to the President and Secretary Muskie imploring them to reconsider the decision to support the Khmer Rouge at the U.N. “It is wrong substantively and can only further alienate many people who are already concerned about the consistency in U.S. policy,” he wrote. “This decision is the most fundamental test of our commitment to human rights. In a broader sense, it is a test of the morality and integrity of all our actions abroad.”89 The NSC did not forward Brown’s letter to the President, nor did Brzezinski sign a proposed reply to Brown that had been prepared for him. A few days later the United States joined ASEAN and China in voting again to seat the Khmer Rouge in the United Nations. The United States also continued to support the Khmer Rouge with humanitarian assistance. Everyone knew that the Khmer Rouge survived only because of food they received from the international community, aid which the Thais in particular insisted they must have, but aid which the United States also supported. The feeding program along the border unquestionably resuscitated the Khmer Rouge (and also helped build up the less important, non-communist resistance groups), thus paving the way for much stronger armed resistance against the PRK during the 1980s. The best humanitarian argument in favor of this was that one could not simply ignore the thousands of civilians, including children, in the Khmer Rouge camps. But the United States and others might have attempted to pressure the Thais to disarm the Khmer Rouge. “I have asked myself a thousand times whether that is what we should have done,” said Ambassador Abramowitz in 1980. Abramowitz listed a number of reasons why disarming the Khmer Rouge had not been pursued, including that the Thais and the Chinese were friends of the United States and had far greater interests in Southeast Asia than the United States. But the primary reason was that “we thought the Vietnamese were wrong in Cambodia.”90 Instead of disarming the Khmer Rouge, the Carter administration secretly supported Thai and Chinese efforts to provide military assistance to them. The Chinese had determined to rebuild the Khmer Rouge almost from the moment they were driven out of Phnom Penh. Just exactly when the United States decided to lend its support is not yet clear. But by the early summer 1980 the policy had been in place for some time, for in June Roger Sullivan became alarmed that some state department officials were urging that the United States vote against the Khmer Rouge at the United Nations and distance itself from ASEAN and Chinese policy on this issue. “There is confusion over our policy toward Pol Pot and his resistance forces,” Sullivan wrote to Brzezinski. Sullivan indicated that Brzezinski had long encouraged the Thais and Chinese to provide

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enough support to the Khmer Rouge to make life difficult for the Vietnamese. But, Sullivan went on, the state department now appeared to favor a new policy of opposition “to the DK forces.” As a result the Chinese and the Thais were “particularly confused and alarmed.” If the United States now intended to discourage “the Thais from cooperating with China in support of Pol Pot forces, then we are moving from a difference of tactics to a conflict of major interest,” Sullivan wrote. He urged Brzezinski to make it clear to the Chinese that we do not seek to discourage the Thais from supporting the DK resistance forces. On the contrary, as you told [Thai Foreign Minister] Sitthi [Savetsila], we do not want the Vietnamese to consolidate their control if we can prevent it and, if we cannot prevent it, we want it to be a protracted and expensive business for them. The next day Brzezinski, Muskie, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown agreed that the United States was “not against military aid by the Chinese to the Cambodian rebels.”91 The revelation that the United States actually wanted the Chinese and Thais to assist the Khmer Rouge with military assistance as a means of putting pressure on Vietnam lends support to those who charged at the time that the United States helped structure the international relief effort in such a way that it intentionally helped the Khmer Rouge. One of the first to make this charge was British journalist John Pilger. Writing in the British journal New Statesman, Pilger asserted that American officials on the border were there to “oversee the distribution of Western supplies … to … the Khmer Rouge” who had “been rested and fattened by Western aid” and were now ready to fight again. The Khmer Rouge benefited from food deliveries; the Red Cross patched up their wounded; the Thais transported them to Cambodia to fight. The purpose of assisting the Khmer Rouge was to destabilize both the PRK and Vietnam. As long as Vance had been secretary of state, Pilger wrote, American policy had been relatively cautious. But with his resignation, the Americans were now fully behind China’s policy in Indochina which included restoring the Khmer Rouge to power. Pilger’s argument that Americans were on the border to see that food reached the Khmer Rouge was unfair, and he exaggerated when he argued that the entire border feeding program was intended to be a “magnet” to attract Cambodians and thereby destabilize the PRK. He was also wrong on some of his facts. But he was right on target when he argued that, American protests to the contrary notwithstanding, the monitoring of aid distribution was actually better in Phnom Penh than it was on the border, where it helped sustain the Khmer Rouge; he was also correct that for strategic reasons the United States really did want to see the Khmer Rouge resuscitated. And he was remarkably prescient in stating that he thought the United States would insist that the Khmer Rouge be cleaned up and come back in “in the guise of a ‘non-aligned’ coalition.” Two years later the United States helped engineer the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), a “coalition” controlled by the Khmer Rouge.92

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Administration supporters resented this kind of criticism. Leo Cherne termed one critical piece “poisonous.”93 But the Carter Administration had decided to encourage China and Thailand to support the Khmer Rouge remnants (even to supply them with weapons) and to use Pol Pot’s forces as a counter to the Vietnamese who had liberated Cambodia from their clutches. Although the administration could not ignore the humanitarian outcry and thus did provide some assistance through the PRK (under strict guidelines), its fundamental orientation was geopolitical, as the critics charged. The United States was engaged in a worldwide struggle with the Soviet Union, which had raised international tensions to boiling point by invading Afghanistan. Carter had responded with his boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games. The Soviet Union supported Vietnam, and thus the administration – and in particular Brzezinski – viewed the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as an extension of Soviet influence detrimental to the interests of the United States and its allies. While piously condemning the Vietnamese invasion on the principle of non-interference, it was the geopolitical factors that really mattered. (Within a few months of the Vietnamese invasion the United States had welcomed Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda, for example, which overthrew another genocidal dictator, Idi Amin.) Brzezinski’s proudest accomplishment was the normalization of relations with China and the subsequent American tilt toward Beijing. China, which was engaged in a bitter ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, had supported the Khmer Rouge (in spite of Pol Pot’s murderous policy toward the ethnic Chinese living in Cambodia) and, like the United States, viewed Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia as an unacceptable extension of Soviet power. Unable to remove the Vietnamese by persuasion or force, the Chinese, working with the Thais, set about resuscitating the Khmer Rouge in the hope that they would eventually be able to force the Vietnamese out. The United States explicitly encouraged them and, at the very least, assisted the Khmer Rouge with relief aid.94 From time to time and place to place, the defense of human rights was a significant feature of Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy. But it was not a primary consideration for National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and to the extent that Carter allowed Brzezinski to formulate foreign policy, the defense of human rights faded as a central administration concern. Nowhere was this more clearly seen than in Cambodia.

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I feel we have a good relationship compared with the last two decades in which we seemed to be enemies. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, 1999

In August 1981 the Southeast Asia Resource Center (formerly the Indochina Resource Center) devoted the tenth anniversary edition of its journal, Southeast Asia Chronicle, to the debate over developments in Kampuchea. The organization, which had its origins in the antiwar movement, acknowledged that differences among its members were “deep and sharp.” Basically, the editor stated, it came down to whether one emphasized the immediate welfare of the Cambodian people (in which case one supported the Vietnamese occupation of the country), or the consequences that a long-term Vietnamese occupation would have on national sovereignty (in which case one would oppose the Vietnamese).1 However one responded, people associated with the Resource Center thought in terms of what would be best for the people. By contrast officials in the new Ronald Reagan administration displayed almost no concern for Cambodia (or other third world countries) and the people who lived there, per se. Rather they sought to create an international environment that would best benefit the United States, its allies, and the survival of its political values and economic system. This was not, of course, in itself unusual. “Realist” scholars and practitioners from George Kennan onward have always emphasized the pursuit of national interest, enlightened or otherwise. What set the Reagan administration’s foreign policy apart was, as conservative columnist Charles Krauthammar put it in 1985, that it turned “on its head … accepted thinking on geopolitics.” Unlike earlier realist administrations, Reagan scorned containment as a defeatist strategy, just as had some Republicans (but not Eisenhower himself) in the 1950s. As James M. Scott puts it, earlier administrations sought to prevent communist expansion, while the Reaganites “emphasized cure.” They would liberate areas under Soviet, or Soviet-proxy, domination.2 Consequently Reagan’s foreign policy evinced a hard-edged, crusading mentality (an approach condemned by traditional realists). This was the essence of what became known as the “Reagan Doctrine.” American actions thus might result in instability, violence, and suffering in the short run. But in the long run the

Toward a new beginning 139 United States would benefit from a diminished Soviet threat. As Reagan administration official Peter W. Rodman entitled his insightful book about the Cold War in the third world, to the administration defeating Soviet communism was “more precious than peace.” The Reagan Doctrine’s single-minded approach almost required a lack of interest in, or even awareness of, regional realities; it disparaged nuance and displayed almost complete indifference to human rights (except insofar as this issue could be used to criticize the USSR), or any of the “softer” elements that often are a part of foreign policy formation, even in “realist” administrations. The administration’s crusade was worldwide. In April 1981 Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, put it well in an address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. “The challenge,” he stated, “is global in character, and what we do in Asia will be consistent with our efforts elsewhere.” It followed that the United States would oppose “Vietnamese hegemony” in Southeast Asia, including that country’s “aggression against and occupation of Kampuchea.”3

Aid to the resistance continues Thus the Reagan administration would continue the Carter–Brzezinski policy of supporting the Cambodian resistance groups, though perhaps in a more systematic way. American aid centered on the non-communist resistance elements. Several of these had united late in 1979 to form the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPLNF), headed by Son Sann who had served in several Sihanouk governments in the past. Sihanouk himself led a smaller group, the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), which was founded in March 1981; its armed forces were the Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS).4 Together these groups were usually designated as the Non-Communist Resistance (NCR). The KPNLF had perhaps 12,000 soldiers, while 3,000 were loyal to Sihanouk. Some American support to the NCR was political and symbolic. The United States assisted Sihanouk and Son Sann when they traveled abroad. American embassies provided contacts and sought diplomatic support for the NCR around the world.5 All resistance forces also benefited from American assistance to the border camps in Thailand. (For fiscal year 1982 this amounted to about $18 million.) Whether the United States provided additional material support, including perhaps military aid, to the resistance prior to 1982 is a matter of dispute. (It has been particularly difficult for researchers to obtain documents relating to this question.) The matter was undoubtedly discussed. Carter reportedly turned down a request from Sihanouk to fund an army of 100,000, but in March 1981 Reagan’s CIA director William Casey argued that the United States should provide weapons to the NCR. The conventional wisdom, based on public testimony of administration officials, is that Casey’s advice was rejected and that no aid was extended until late 1982 when Son Sann and Sihanouk, responding to pressure from the United States, ASEAN, and China, joined the Khmer

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Rouge to form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). With the NCR now a part of an internationally recognized government, the United States could provide assistance more comfortably. Casey presumably continued to argue for military aid, while the state department remained opposed, fearing that this would help the Khmer Rouge and hinder the prospects for negotiations. The result of this internal debate was a compromise: the United States would provide covert, non-lethal aid to the NCR, channeling it through Thailand.6 By one account the United States provided $4 million shortly after the coalition was formed. Although American aid was ostensibly for non-lethal purposes, there were reports that the United States paid for at least one shipment of military supplies sent by Singapore in 1982 and that the CIA provided logistics and ammunition experts to evaluate the military needs of the NCR. In August 1984 Nayan Chanda of the Far Eastern Economic Review, the first journalist to uncover the covert aid program, reported that even non-lethal assistance could be used to obtain weapons. The NCR could simply trade it for military supplies from Thailand and Singapore, for example. Or if American funds were used for nonlethal aid, this freed up ASEAN funds to purchase weapons. State department officials termed American aid of this sort “fungible.” In addition, American aid to Thailand for use along the border had little American oversight. The Thais could use the funds as they pleased, including for sending weapons to the resistance forces.7 Finally, American military aid to Thailand increased substantially – by 1985 it had tripled to nearly $100 million – leading to speculation that the United States was replenishing Thai stocks provided to the Cambodian resistance. In sum, American aid, directly or indirectly, contributed to the military strength of the NCR. As one ASEAN official told Paul Quinn-Judge of the Christian Science Monitor (who was one of the first journalists to report on a possible American role in supplying the NCR), the General Accounting Office was “not likely to come out here and audit the KPNLF.” If the funds went for guns and ammunition, he stated, the United States would “probably not object, although it would probably prefer not to know.”8 Nevertheless, ostensibly American aid was non-lethal, and some in Congress, notably Stephen Solarz, the best-informed representative on the Cambodian situation, began to think that overt, lethal assistance might be the better course. In 1982 he questioned Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge carefully, noting that the KPNLF wanted military assistance. At hearings the following year he invited Son Sann to give unofficial testimony and vigorously explored the idea of giving the NCR lethal assistance, asking why the United States could provide military assistance to the Nicaraguan contras and the mujahedeen resistance in Afghanistan but not to the NCR. Military assistance, he thought, might help get the Vietnamese out of Cambodia, although the congressman was quick to add that he did not want the withdrawal of the Vietnamese to be followed by the return of Pol Pot. That, he stated, “would probably be worse for the Cambodian people than what they have now.” Perhaps, he thought, military assistance to the NCR would help strengthen the non-communists vis-à-vis the Khmer Rouge

Toward a new beginning 141 and thus help prevent a Khmer Rouge return whenever the Vietnamese left.9 Solarz’s flirtation with providing military aid did not then convince the administration to change its policy. In September 1983 when Reagan met both Sihanouk and Son Sann, he reaffirmed his “continuing support” for the NCR which, he said, was “fighting against Vietnamese troops and the Vietnamese government in Phnom Penh,” but he did not promise any military assistance.10 However, ASEAN increasingly pressured the United States to provide military aid, in part to balance China as the dominant supplier of the resistance movement and in part to “counterbalance growing Soviet military power in the region.” Singapore evidently delayed the shipment of arms to the KPNLF for several months to pressure the Americans. China, too, which had been sending some supplies to the NCR, urged the United States to absorb more of the burden.11 The Reagan administration responded to the pressure with a policy review, but in the end it did not change course. Despite its reputation as a “Rambo” administration, intervening far and wide to stop perceived Soviet adventurism in the third world, the wounds of the Vietnam War were still too fresh to permit a more forceful policy in Indochina. The administration would continue to support the NCR politically and with limited covert, non-lethal assistance (thought to have been about $12 to $15 million per year). In addition to the covert assistance to the NCR, American actions also benefited the Khmer Rouge. They certainly benefited from overt American assistance along the Thai border, something that Holdridge acknowledged in his testimony to the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs in 1982. Solarz who seemed genuinely surprised to learn that any American aid went to the Khmer Rouge, responded angrily that this was unacceptable. “It is not in our interest to encourage support for the Khmer Rouge in any way, shape, manner or form,” he lectured Holdridge. When Holdridge protested, Solarz threatened to seek a legislative remedy. The aid continued nevertheless. By one account, from November 1983 to March 1985 some 85 percent of American funds for food relief along the border went to the Khmer Rouge army.12 But beyond the covert, non-lethal aid to the NCR and the border relief programs which benefited all resistance groups, including the Khmer Rouge, the administration was unwilling to go. Except, perhaps in deeply secret ways. Although the administration acknowledged that the Khmer Rouge benefited from border relief funds, it adamantly denied providing them with military assistance. “It bears repeating – one can’t say it often enough,” Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul D. Wolfowitz stated, “that we give no support of any kind to the Khmer Rouge.”13 The majority of scholars and other writers find little evidence to support accusations of American complicity in providing military supplies to the Khmer Rouge. But there are a number of “anomalies,” as Craig Etcheson puts it, suggesting the possibility, perhaps even the probability, that there was unreported American assistance to the Khmer Rouge. In November 1980, for example, Reagan adviser Ray Cline visited a Khmer Rouge camp in Cambodia. “Presumably, it would not have been necessary for a senior aide to President-elect Reagan to travel to a guerrilla encampment on the other side of

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the world in order to tell Pol Pot that he would not be receiving any assistance,” observed Etcheson. Another anomaly involved the respected Congressional Research Service which informed Jonathan Winer, counsel to Senator John Kerry, that the Reagan administration had provided about $80 million to the Khmer Rouge between 1981 and 1986, the amounts diminishing each year. When the state department disputed this, the Congressional Research Service said it could not replicate the figures, and Winer himself later retracted his report – though in doing so he noted significantly that until 1985 it was not illegal to aid the Khmer Rouge.14 Stories persist of secret American connections with the Khmer Rouge, and former state departments, military officials, and missionaries occasionally make assertions of American support.15 Given the lack of substantiating documentary evidence, these assertions cannot be proven, though it is at least suggestive that scholars who have tried to obtain relevant documents through the Freedom of Information Act for the years 1981 to 1985 have been singularly unsuccessful, whereas they have been able to obtain documents before 1981 and after 1985.16 But perhaps the most persuasive indication that the United States may have supported the Khmer Rouge prior to 1985 was U.S. Public Law 99–83, which made it illegal to spend any funds to bolster the Khmer Rouge’s military capacity. This was part of the legislation that ultimately allowed lethal assistance to the NCR; it was introduced in the House by Solarz.17 Why, one might ask, was such a law needed if aid had not been getting to the Khmer Rouge? Even more significantly, one section of the act “deobligated” funds already “obligated but not yet expended” to promote the Khmer Rouge’s military capabilities. Though not entirely conclusive, the passage of this law suggests, as Etcheson puts it, “that the United States has in fact provided military assistance to the Khmer Rouge, and that the conventional wisdom about U.S. policy toward the Khmer Rouge is wrong.”18 In any event, any military aid provided to any elements of the resistance was very secret. The official policy was that all covert aid was non-lethal and that none of it went to the Khmer Rouge (except from the border relief programs). And by 1985 Solarz in particular had concluded that the United States should supply lethal aid to the NCR and should do so openly. Aid was needed, he argued, to help persuade the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia, to build up the NCR as a creditable counter to the more powerful Khmer Rouge, and to show American support for ASEAN. He convinced the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs to support legislation authorizing $5 million in overt aid to the NCR. The aid would be channeled through the Thais who could, if they chose, use the funds for lethal assistance. Solarz’s subcommittee acted without hearings, but in February and March 1985 the Solarz proposal was the subject of spirited debate before the full Committee on Foreign Relations. Wolfowitz testified that other countries should supply whatever military assistance was required. Solarz, however, refused to accept administration assurances that the NCR was already getting all the aid it could use effectively from other sources.19

Toward a new beginning 143 Speculatively, one of Solarz’s concerns was that he might have known about deeply secret CIA efforts to support the Khmer Rouge in the early 1980s – aid that would have been consistent with the visceral anti-Vietnamese feelings of Brzezinski and Casey – and that he wanted this brought into the open and stopped. Covert assistance to the Khmer Rouge might also explain why the Reagan administration was reluctant to support an overt aid program to the ineffective NCR.20 In any event, siding with the administration (though certainly not because he supported covert aid to the Khmer Rouge) was Representative Jim Leach (R–IA) who introduced an amendment limiting NCR assistance to humanitarian aid. He objected to lethal aid on a number of grounds. Though sympathetic to the NCR, Leach, like Wolfowitz, argued that no clear need for military aid had been demonstrated. ASEAN and China could – and, being on the front line, should – supply whatever military requirements existed. More significantly, Leach argued that a greater U.S. role would make a Vietnamese withdrawal and a negotiated settlement more difficult. The $5 million would have no military effect, would “taint the operation as a U.S. military reengagement in Indochina,” and would “involve the United States in a military operation over which we have virtually no control.” Furthermore, routing the aid through Thailand was bad for the United States, he argued, because of the lack of accountability. But Solarz had the votes. The committee rejected Leach’s call for caution 24–9 and approved instead the Solarz plan by a convincing vote of 24–5. In its final form, the legislation allocated $5 million each for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 for Thailand to be used “for appropriate assistance (which may include military assistance) to the noncommunist resistance forces in Cambodia.” Thus, as James M. Scott has written, the initiative passed from the executive branch to the legislative. The vote pleased ASEAN and Son Sann, who said, “The tap is open, and even if in the end only a drip comes out, I will be happy. Perhaps later we will receive water.”21 Although the state department saw no immediate need for military assistance, passage of the Solarz amendment did provoke a debate within the administration, with Casey continuing to argue for military support. For the moment the administration refrained from providing overt military aid, although it ultimately came to appreciate the flexibility of the Solarz legislation. This modification in attitude was important when the Senate took up the matter later in the year and may have ensured final passage of the lethal aid provision. While the lethal aid proposal was making its way through the legislative process, there was for the first time a meaningful public debate on the question. Solarz and Leach began the public discussion by presenting their contrasting views in side-by-side columns in the Washington Post. Among the few to support Solarz publicly were Marvin Ott, then a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and author and Vietnam veteran Al Santoli. But Leach’s critical perspective was more commonly echoed in the public debate. Both the New York Times and the Washington Post, for example, expressed skepticism about lethal aid, as did prominent historian David P. Chandler who complained that

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American policy was “encouraging Cambodians to kill each other” while failing to recognize that the Vietnamese dominance in Cambodia could be advantageous. Most religious and humanitarian organizations that supported work in Cambodia or the refugee camps opposed the Solarz amendment, and 21 of them signed a circular letter to all congressional representatives strongly objecting to military assistance. Many of the critics feared that much of the $5 million in aid would, as former Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke put it, “end up going to Pol Pot and his people.”22 In the Senate, meanwhile, there were no hearings on Cambodian policy. But Senators Robert Dole (R–KS), Robert Kasten (R–WI ), Jeremiah Denton (R–AL), and Nancy Kassenbaum (R–KS ) introduced an amendment on the floor identical to the Solarz provision. The limited discussion that the amendment engendered revealed considerable ignorance about Cambodian developments. But on 15 May 1985 the Senate approved lethal aid by a voice vote.23 Apparently the critical reaction to the proposal from important newspapers and by humanitarian organizations had had little impact. Before the full House of Representatives took up the measure, the public debate intensified. Solarz himself again made the case for assistance in an op-ed column in the New York Times. But as before, much of the public comment was critical. Helen R. Chauncey, a professor at Georgetown University, answered Solarz in the Times, arguing that most of the funds would end up in the hands of the NCR’s Khmer Rouge allies. In Hackensack, New Jersey, the home of Representative Robert Torricelli (D–NJ), a co-sponsor of the Solarz bill, the local newspaper The Record attacked the pending legislation on grounds similar to Chauncey’s. “Mr. Solarz is so furious over Vietnam’s late-1978 invasion that he is willing to side with the devil against it,” the paper editorialized insightfully. The Reagan administration was in bed with the Khmer Rouge, the paper maintained, and the Solarz–Torricelli bill made things much worse. Its passage would be “a disaster.”24 Other critics included Dith Pran, whose struggle to survive during the Pol Pot years was chronicled in the film The Killing Fields. Pran stated that “giving U.S. weapons [to the Khmer resistance] is like pouring gasoline on a fire. … Cambodia needs humanitarian relief – not military aid.” In a thoughtful piece, former diplomat David Newsom raised a number of questions about the Solarz approach, while Robert H. Johnson, a former member of the state department’s Policy Planning Staff, urged caution. Commitments to insurgent groups posed a number of dangers, he stated, including identification with groups whose goals were not entirely in line with American objectives.25 In July the drama moved to the House. Unlike in the Senate, the debate was unusually well informed and passionate. In response to earlier criticism, Solarz announced that he had deleted the provision providing for Thai administration of the aid. But he and his supporters continued to argue that giving the administration the option of sending lethal aid would “send a very strong signal to the Vietnamese” that the United States supported the resistance movement, thus enhancing the prospects of a political settlement as Vietnam weighed the cost of

Toward a new beginning 145 continued occupation. Those opposed to the Solarz amendment argued that the money would be ineffective (especially given Vietnam’s demonstrated capacity to persist against its enemies for years on end) and would tend to reinvolve the United States in an area of the world it had only just left under painful circumstances. Interestingly, neither side addressed directly the question of what effect such assistance might have on the Khmer Rouge. Might lethal aid help make the NCR stronger than the Khmer Rouge and thus, once the Vietnamese withdrew, put them in a position to challenge the perpetrators of genocide? Or might additional aid only assist the Khmer Rouge, as Holbrooke had argued, who were undoubtedly the strongest element in the resistance?26 In the end, Solarz prevailed by a vote of 288–122. Reagan signed the bill on 8 August. For the first time, overt aid to the Cambodian resistance had been authorized, with the administration having the option of providing lethal or non-lethal assistance. The actual authorization to spend the funds, made on 19 December, directed the President to spend no less than $1.5 million and no more than $5 million for the NCR. As Nayan Chanda put it in the Far Eastern Economic Review, Congress had gone “Rambo,” a phenomenon best understood in the context of events in 1985. It was a year of international frustration for the United States, with a number of terrorist attacks, revelation of an extensive Soviet spy network in the United States, and, in the pre-Mikhail Gorbachev years, renewed fears of Soviet expansion. Congress had lashed out in response. The vote put the administration in a difficult position. Although the administration was on record opposing lethal aid, Leach feared that, given its ideological commitment to resisting communism anywhere in the world, it would in the end be forced to approve military assistance out of concerns for consistency. “My own guess,” Leach stated, was that the amendment would “give license to the forces in American society that want to ideologize our foreign policy. Pat Buchanan, and not George Bush” would now be in charge of American policy in Southeast Asia. The administration had at the last moment shifted its position and supported the Solarz amendment, though without great enthusiasm.27 But its apparent timidity on the lethal aid question led to attacks from ideological militants within the Republican Party, just as Leach feared. Thus Newt Gingrich (R–GA) criticized the state department for “repudiating the very firmness, the very aggressiveness, the very willingness to take on communism.”28 Despite such criticism, however, the administration, moved in part by a desire not to jeopardize the slowly improving relationship it had developed with Vietnam on the question of the Missing in Action American soldiers (MIAs), decided to expend the funds for non-lethal assistance only. (Due to budgetary ceilings the actual amount expended was $3.5 million.) For the next three years Congress appropriated annually approximately the same amount of money for the NCR and continued to give the administration the option of including military aid. Covert aid, presumably non-lethal, continued as well at about $12 million annually.29 Probably because the administration stuck with its

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decision to provide only non-lethal assistance, the issue attracted little congressional or public attention – although at times the distinction between lethal and non-lethal aid was, as Solarz himself once put it, “a distinction without a difference.”30

Negotiations In the meantime, conditions were developing that would eventually lead to a negotiated settlement. Since 1985 there had been a number of contacts among the Vietnamese, ASEAN, the CDGK, and the United States. None of these had produced significant progress. The Vietnamese refused to deal with the Khmer Rouge, for example, and insisted that negotiations take place with the PRK. But Vietnam was beginning to moderate its positions. Its occupation of Cambodia was costly, in both human and economic terms. The United States and ASEAN were blocking aid from international agencies. The Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev’s reformist leadership, was no longer a certain source of assistance, having announced in 1985 that it could no longer afford to support Vietnam at current levels. And finally, the PRK itself was increasingly in charge of Cambodia and demonstrating that it might be able to withstand an assault from the Khmer Rouge on its own, if it had to. Vietnam had already withdrawn some troops from Cambodia and announced early in 1988 that it would withdraw all of its troops by the end of 1990. Serious negotiations began about the same time. In December 1987 Sihanouk met for the first time with PRK Prime Minister Hun Sen at the Prince’s Paris residence; the two leaders met again in January 1988.31 This began the “formula seeking” phase of the conflict, as the parties searched for a way to bring peace to Cambodia.32 In July 1988 representatives of the PRK and the three factions who constituted the CGDK met in Indonesia for what became known as the first Jakarta Informal Meeting ( JIM) although the meetings actually took place in Bogor, Indonesia. No agreements were reached, but the issues were defined, and there was forward movement. Sihanouk and Hun Sen met again during these meetings and scheduled another meeting for October (it actually occurred in November). Furthermore, Cambodia was the subject of serious discussions between China and the Soviet Union, as well as among the ASEAN states. The possibility of a Vietnamese withdrawal, movement toward a settlement in Cambodia, and renewed criticism that the United States was supporting the Khmer Rouge – either intentionally or inadvertently, including its support of the Khmer Rouge as the appropriate claimant of Cambodia’s U.N. seat – led the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs to hold hearings in June and July 1988.33 The focus of the hearings was how to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power. “I tremble with fear,” Solarz said, “not only for the people of Cambodia, but for the entire world, for what it would mean to mankind, if the Khmer Rouge were ever to come back to power again.” The committee expressed concern that the ASEAN countries and China were more interested in getting the Vietnamese out than in preventing the Khmer Rouge from returning, and since the United States generally deferred to these

Toward a new beginning 147 powers it was, the critics charged, also culpable. Representative Chester G. Atkins (D–MA) in particular charged that the administration considered the return of the Khmer Rouge a “subsidiary” concern. Instead of standing forthrightly against the Khmer Rouge, Atkins charged, the administration pursued a policy of “wink and blink and nod.” While Atkins and other critics thought the United States should distance itself from the NCR because it was allied with the Khmer Rouge, Solarz argued that, on the contrary, the NCR might be “the last best hope of preventing the Khmer Rouge from returning to power” and wondered if it could benefit “from increased materiel support.” Although a defense department witness responded that the amount of assistance currently provided was “approximately correct,” Solarz was, as always, not persuaded. It was “essential,” he argued, that the NCR “be in a position to make a credible effort to prevent the Khmer Rouge from seizing power, which does come out of the barrel of a gun.”34 During the hearings, Reagan administration officials indicated that they were considering asking for substantial funding increases for the NCR to encourage a settlement and also to help prevent a Khmer Rouge return to power. By October they had decided to request an immediate increase in overt, non-lethal aid to at least $10.5 million, with a further increase to perhaps $15 million the following year. Reagan chose to announce the administration’s intentions at a meeting with Sihanouk on 11 October 1988. It was the Prince’s first visit to the Reagan White House. There was support in Congress for the new initiative. But efforts to increase the overt funding fell afoul of embarrassing disclosures about the covert program. Although Nayan Chanda had broken the story about covert aid in 1984 and persons conversant with Southeast Asian affairs were generally aware that such aid was being provided (state department denials notwithstanding), little had subsequently appeared about the matter. During his stay in Washington, however, Sihanouk hinted publicly that he was receiving covert military assistance. Chanda’s Far Eastern Economic Review placed the figure at $35 million – far higher than previously thought – and added that the aid was non-lethal only if narrowly defined, for under new arrangements American funds could be used to purchase weapons from Southeast Asian countries. More damaging to administration plans, the Review revealed that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence had uncovered corruption connected with the distribution of the covert assistance. Within a week, both the Washington Post and the New York Times reported that Thai officials, and perhaps businessmen, had stolen at least $3.5 million. (The newspapers also placed the covert aid at between $12 and $18 million, well below the Review’s $35 million figure.) The scandal ended administration efforts to provide dramatically higher levels of funding for the NCR. Overt aid did, nevertheless, increase. In January 1989 the newly installed George Bush administration allocated the entire $5 million authorized (thus representing an increase from the $3.35 million actually spent in previous years) and requested $7 million for fiscal year 1990. Thus the Thai scandal limited, but did not kill, proposals to increase assistance to the NCR.

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As the Bush administration took office, the pace of international diplomacy on Cambodia intensified. An important new element was Chatichai Choonhavan, a flamboyant general who in August 1988 became the first elected Prime Minister of Thailand in a dozen years. Chatichai, intent on turning Indochina from a battlefield to a marketplace, as he liked to put it, quickly softened his country’s hardline approach to the PRK (which in 1989 changed its name to the State of Cambodia [SOC]) and Vietnam. On 25 January 1989 he invited Hun Sen to Bangkok for direct talks, thus giving a considerable boost to the PRK/SOC’s claims of legitimacy. Chatichai’s change of policy irritated the United States, which “disparaged him and criticized his policies.”35 In February 1989 the parties gathered again in Bogor. Again, no agreement was reached, although the points of difference were further defined. Shortly thereafter the PRK/SOC announced that Vietnam would withdraw its troops by the end of September, 1989 – a year earlier than previously expected – even if a political settlement was not achieved. The next major development occurred in May 1989 when China and the Soviet Union discussed Cambodia at an important summit meeting (which coincided with the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstration). Hun Sen and Sihanouk also met again in Jakarta, where Son Sann joined them. Sihanouk no longer demanded the dissolution of the SOC, and he and Hun Sen (but not Son Sann) reached several agreements which tended toward marginalizing the Khmer Rouge.36 The next month Hun Sen and Sihanouk met in LaCelle-Saint-Cloud near Paris, shortly before a month-long conference in Paris of the Cambodian parties organized by France and Indonesia. Indicative of the conference’s significance, for the first time representatives of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (the Perm 5), the ASEAN states, India and Canada (former ICC members), Zimbabwe (representing the Non-Aligned Movement), and U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cueller took part. Much to the distress of the organizers, the Paris conference failed to achieve a settlement. One possible reason for the conference’s failure was the Bush administration’s determination to provide increased lethal aid for the NCR, something it had tried very hard to do in the weeks prior to the Paris meeting. Although a major argument in favor of lethal aid had been that it would pressure Vietnam to withdraw, now that Vietnam had announced its intention to do just that (an announcement which met with some skepticism but was taken seriously by Solarz and others) the administration was nevertheless more determined than ever to secure such assistance. This apparent inconsistency was due in part to increased pressure from the NCR itself. In March Ranariddh had requested lethal aid, apparently for bargaining purposes. Solarz quickly supported NCR requests. The representative, who had recently returned from a whirlwind trip to China and Southeast Asia, asked the administration to supply military aid to the NCR immediately, even suggesting as much as $30 million – an increase of over 400 percent. With a Vietnamese withdrawal apparently assured, Solarz’s justification for lethal aid became to prevent the Khmer Rouge from regaining control. “History will not forgive us if we fail to do everything in our power to keep the Khmer

Toward a new beginning 149 Rouge from once more turning Cambodia into an Asian Auschwitz,” he wrote. Military assistance to the NCR would also signal American unwillingness to accept Hun Sen’s government “as an accomplished fact.” Since the SOC was the most promising bulwark against the Khmer Rouge, Solarz’s twin objectives appeared at odds. It was hard to see how dismantling the SOC would help keep the Khmer Rouge out. Non-lethal aid had considerable support, but lethal aid was, as it always had been, much more controversial, and opposition soon developed to Solarz’s initiative. Senator Claiborne Pell (D–RI), who chaired the Foreign Relations Committee, introduced legislation prohibiting assistance to any group that was in any way associated with the Khmer Rouge – language which clearly included the NCR since it was formally associated with the Khmer Rouge in the CGDK. (Pell later withdrew his amendment when Senator Alan Cranston [D–CA] asked to hold hearings on assistance to the NCR. However, Cranston and Mark Hatfield (R–OR) joined Pell in writing to Bush to oppose aid to the NCR.) As in 1985, there was a spirited public debate, with most articulated opinion opposed to sending military aid to the NCR. The Washington Post and the New York Times, for example, both objected. The Post termed the idea “far-fetched,” while the Times, which had supported non-lethal assistance, insisted that sending lethal aid was “the last thing the United States should be doing.”37 Dith Pran repeated his opposition and was joined by Channg Song, a former Minister of Information in the Lon Nol government. Perhaps the weightiest testimony against aid came from westerners with recent, first-hand experience in Cambodia, including representatives of religious and humanitarian organizations, journalists like Elizabeth Becker, and John Pedler, a former British diplomat with extensive experience in Southeast Asia. Eight humanitarian organizations that had a presence in the refugee camps, for example, appealed to Vice President Dan Quayle not to send military aid. Pedler, asked by several voluntary organizations to survey conditions in Cambodia, probably spent more time inside Cambodia than any other westerner (except for a few relief workers) during this period. Besides touring the country extensively in 1989, he met with Hun Sen and other SOC officials, as well as with leaders of the NCR, including Ranariddh and Son Sann. His lengthy, informed, and sensitive report (completed in April 1989), along with subsequent updates, protested efforts to provide military assistance. The arguments against lethal aid to the NCR, if now familiar, were often compelling. It would invite shelling of the refugee camps and increase civilian casualties and strengthen the NCR’s Khmer Rouge partners. More fundamentally, those who wanted a political solution without a role for the former perpetrators of mass murder hoped for an agreement between Hun Sen and Sihanouk that would freeze the Khmer Rouge out. Noting the several meetings between the two leaders, they wanted the United States to foster a cooperative dialogue, something the United States had always resisted. Part of the debate focused on the character of the SOC and its Prime Minister, Hun Sen. Those who favored military aid asserted that the regime was

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nothing more than a Vietnamese puppet government, with little if any support among the people. More extreme advocates of military assistance even equated the SOC and the Khmer Rouge (something which one still sees), charging that Hun Sen and other SOC leaders, who were Khmer Rouge before they defected, had a record of human rights abuses comparable to that of the Khmer Rouge. Opponents of lethal aid argued that the PRK had emerged as a government in its own right, was effectively in control of almost all of Cambodia, and brought the full range of normal services to the people. Its record on human rights was not nearly as good as it should be, but after ten years in power it bore no resemblance to the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime. It was difficult to know precisely how much support it enjoyed, but the restoration of a functioning civil society, a growing economy increasingly oriented toward private enterprise, the restoration of basic family life and of Buddhism as the state religion, and perhaps above all its fierce opposition to the return of the Khmer Rouge, suggested it governed by more than coercion. As syndicated columnist Georgie Anne Geyer put it in February 1989, “for the first time since 1975 when the Khmer Rouge took over, Cambodia is alive, a decent country.”38 To attempt to dismantle this government, opponents of lethal aid argued, was folly when the almost certain successor would be the Khmer Rouge. The Bush administration did not find such arguments convincing and inclined toward providing lethal aid. Initially it tried to limit public consideration of the matter by attempting to secure munitions covertly. Though covert non-lethal aid had been approved (apparently routinely) for many years, the request for direct covert lethal aid was new, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence refused to give its approval, arguing that an important policy change of this nature deserved public debate. In response, on 30 May 1989 the administration sought congressional support for covert lethal aid, insisting that such assistance would strengthen Sihanouk’s hand in negotiating with the PRK and the Khmer Rouge. It was a startling development, the public debate of a covert program. For a time it appeared the administration had lost. One state department source commented in mid-June that Under Secretary for State Robert M. Kimmitt had been “running into brick walls” whenever he discussed the matter with members of Congress. So the administration would turn instead to diplomacy. “Lethal aid, covert and overt, is dead,” said one knowledgeable senatorial aide.39 At the end of May the administration, after a review of its Cambodia policy in the context of the looming Paris conference, did in fact place renewed emphasis on a diplomatic settlement, a change that some observers considered highly significant. But it had not given up its fight for lethal aid. Vice President Quayle, the administration’s point man on this issue, urged Congress to slay the “ghosts of Vietnam” by voting for lethal aid, while Solarz continued to urge Congress to increase overt aid to $30 million.40 Perhaps because most public discussion of lethal aid had been in opposition to it, congressional opponents believed that they had won the fight. On 10 July

Toward a new beginning 151 the New York Times commended Secretary of State James A. Baker for backing away from lethal aid and pushing instead for a coalition between Hun Sen and Sihanouk.41 Ten days later a senior senatorial aide stated unequivocally that lethal aid would not be approved. Senator Charles Robb (D–VA), not previously identified as someone with a deep interest in Cambodia, had intended to introduce an amendment providing for lethal aid, but, the aide said, had counted the votes and had decided to withdraw the measure. Later that same evening, however, in a complex parliamentary maneuver, Robb reintroduced his amendment. He argued that passage would strengthen Sihanouk’s hand at Paris. Senator Cranston objected, saying that military assistance “would derail the fastmoving peace process that bears real hope.”42 But after a spirited, sometimes angry, sometimes irrational debate (Senator Malcolm Wallop [R–WY], for example, accused Cranston of preferring Pol Pot to Sihanouk), the Senate approved lethal aid by a surprisingly comfortable margin of 59–39. The legislation did not contain any specific dollar amount.43 Democratic leaders were furious at Robb, but they had underestimated the administration’s determination to prevail on this issue. Although the legislation approved by the Senate never became law, as the Paris conference opened both houses of Congress were now on record in support of lethal assistance. Passage of the Robb amendment allowed the administration to approach the Senate Intelligence Committee and again seek approval for lethal aid. Whether the possibility of lethal aid would enhance the prospects of successful negotiations soon met its first test. Shortly after the Senate and the House went on record in support of such aid, the Paris conference opened. There was a great deal of hope that this conference would finally end the strife in Cambodia. The foreign ministers of several states addressed the conference, including Secretary Baker, who condemned the Khmer Rouge in unusually strong language. A senior state department official stated that Baker’s remarks “should be interpreted as a clear signal that the United States will penalize Prince Sihanouk if he persists in advocating an alliance with the Khmer Rouge.”44 But in the end the conference failed to produce a settlement. Did the administration’s efforts to obtain congressional approval for lethal aid contribute to the failure? Had it made the NCR less willing to compromise, as the critics charged? Doubtless the reasons for the conference’s failure were complex. The United States tried unconvincingly to blame Hanoi and Hun Sen. In fact, the primary cause of the failure was Sihanouk’s unwillingness to separate himself from the Khmer Rouge, much to the embarrassment of lethal aid supporters, and American acquiescence in Sihanouk’s position. Although, at Jakarta only a month before, the Prince had in effect agreed to break from the Khmer Rouge if they proved to be intransigent, he now reneged. Perhaps, as historian Ben Kiernan wrote in a biting assessment, Sihanouk “lost his nerve” and demonstrated that he was “a genuine puppet of the Chinese and the Khmer Rouge.”45 Official Peter Rodman disparagingly termed these developments “Snooky Shock” and recalled that “it was a public relations disaster.” Proponents of lethal

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aid had insisted that such aid was necessary to allow the NCR to stand up to its Khmer Rouge partners and would enhance the prospects of successful negotiations. But the critics appeared to be right: there was even less flexibility on Sihanouk’s part than before. Sihanouk, the New York Times editorialized, caused the conference to break down by insisting on a role for the Khmer Rouge, something that Hun Sen rightly rejected. Senator Byrd, a strong opponent of lethal aid who chaired the Appropriations Committee, then blocked any military aid, and the disheartened administration “made no further effort to salvage lethal aid for the non-Communist resistance.”46 Shortly after the conference, Vietnam withdrew its last forces from Cambodia – although it later had to return for one last offensive against the Khmer Rouge. Efforts to secure lethal assistance, which perhaps contributed to Sihanouk’s decision to renege on his previous commitments to break with the Khmer Rouge, may thus have doomed the Paris conference. U.S. officials may have come “home from Paris depressed, even bitter at the temperamental prince whose leadership we had been championing,” as Rodman wrote.47 But this overlooks the administration’s unwillingness to support his moves away from the Khmer Rouge, despite its strong criticism of the Khmer Rouge. According to knowledgeable sources, at Paris Sihanouk refused to break with China and its Khmer Rouge protégés and instead ally with Hun Sen because he lacked international – and especially American – support. “The United States opposed the alliance because it would have legitimatized the Hun Sen government … ,” stated one well-informed observer. “Sihanouk looked around him in Paris and got cold feet.” The American refusal to back Sihanouk’s break with the Khmer Rouge, “more than any other single factor, doomed the conference,” as two critics of American policy put it. The New York Times termed the administration’s policy “bankrupt and immoral.”48 Thus, the tentative change in American policy proved to be momentary and illusory. The United States continued to champion the NCR, to vote to seat the CGDK in the United Nations, to go along with China, to prevent international aid from reaching Cambodia, and to oppose all attempts to legitimatize Hun Sen’s government. The United States was willing to include the SOC as part of the proposed quadripartite interim government, but Hun Sen had little interest in an arrangement that would dissolve his government prior to elections. Critics pummeled the administration’s position, particularly during a congressional hearing in September. And over the next several months the United States did cooperate in efforts to find a formula to end the conflict. The first significant American involvement in this process was not by the administration, however, but by Solarz, who in October 1989 conferred with Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans who was seeking some formula for administering Cambodia prior to an election. The following month Evans presented his plan, which drew in part from the ideas of Solarz and Sihanouk. The foreign minister proposed “a sort of UN trusteeship for Cambodia” in which the United Nations would provide an interim authority while preparing for elections, thus getting around the problems that a quadripartite authority posed. It also avoided dismantling

Toward a new beginning 153 Hun Sen’s government but made it clear that the SOC would not be entirely in charge of developments leading up to an election.49 The Evans proposal set in motion new thinking about how a settlement might be reached. The Bush administration was helpful in urging a serious collaboration among the Perm 5. Beginning in January 1990 representatives from the Perm 5 met monthly to discuss options for settling the Cambodia problem. Although their initial meetings were stormy,50 the Perm 5 representatives eventually agreed to try to bring about a comprehensive settlement, end outside military assistance, and involve the United Nations to assure sufficient internal security to allow a “neutral political environment.” Rather than rely on some combination of existing structures, the Perm 5 began to consider establishing a “Supreme National Council” that would be the repository of Cambodian sovereignty during the transition period.51 The Cambodians themselves discussed these ideas at a third meeting in Jakarta in February 1990 (JIM III) and at Tokyo in June, but there was no final breakthrough. The CGDK did not want the SOC to survive intact prior to an election (even if it was partially supplanted by some kind of United Nations authority), and Hun Sen continued to see no reason why he should relinquish power prior to an election, since his government controlled most of the country. Nor did he want to have any settlement that gave the Khmer Rouge any significant role. Although the administration was now more involved in seeking a political solution, its continuing support for the NCR and its reluctance to endorse a Hun Sen–Sihanouk coalition provoked considerable criticism. “From every objective point of view, we are allied with the genocidal Khmer Rouge,” wrote one critic in the New York Times. Former senator and secretary of state Edmund Muskie visited Cambodia late in 1989 and returned to argue that the United States should support Hun Sen. Elizabeth Becker, one of the very few western journalists to have visited Cambodia when the Khmer Rouge were in power, agreed, particularly now that it was clear that the Vietnamese troops had left. Columnist Mary McGrory thought American policy “idiotic and ruinous.” Even some bona fide conservatives joined in the attack. Michael Horowitz, a former Reagan administration official, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Hun Sen should not be forced to turn over substantial authority to the United Nations prior to an election.52 Particularly important criticisms emerged in April 1990 from two popular news outlets: Time magazine and ABC news. Time correspondent Stanley W. Cloud concluded that American policy was illogical and inconsistent. How could the United States recognize the Khmer Rouge as legitimate (by voting for them at the United Nations), while at the same time saying that they should not be allowed to return to power? How could the United States “criticize the Khmer Rouge record and yet reserve its bitterest invective for Vietnam’s use of force to oust Pol Pot?”53 Peter Jennings Reporting from the Killing Fields, broadcast on 26 April, probably had an even greater impact. The ABC documentary appeared to confirm

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another of the critics’ charges – that there was close military coordination between the NCR and the Khmer Rouge; and it revealed the existence of an American intelligence unit in Thailand that appeared to have ties to the Khmer Rouge. On film Sihanouk virtually admitted that the United States had given him arms. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon stated that the United States did supply weapons for the NCR, then said he had misspoken. In sum, the documentary appeared to demonstrate that many of the critics’ assertions were valid. It is likely that the Jennings documentary was a major factor in changing American policy. One knowledgeable critic believed that it was “probably one of the most effective documentaries that has even been made” because it both bolstered ongoing congressional opposition to the policy and developed new centers of opposition. New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis called it a “superb television documentary.” A recent scholarly account characterizes the Jennings report as “perhaps the most significant media event of the Bush period.”54 The documentary angered the Bush administration and its supporters. The Wall Street Journal lashed out at the program in a slashing editorial, which the President’s press secretary endorsed. A spirited debate in the newspaper’s letters columns followed. Solarz himself responded to Lewis’s column. Nevertheless, defenders of the policy grudgingly acknowledged the program’s importance. Charles Twining, long-time Cambodia hand and the first American ambassador in Cambodia once the United States restored relations with that country in 1993, found the program deceptive but acknowledged that it “could have fueled discussion.” Peter Rodman, who served as Bush’s deputy assistant for foreign affairs, considered the documentary “overwrought” and “tendentious” but admitted that it and Senator Muskie’s observations “had their effect on Congress.” Richard Solomon bitterly disparaged the broadcast but acknowledged that it led to persistent congressional attacks on administration policy.55 The following year the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Human Rights gave the documentary its first prize award for international reporting. In sum, the critics had a powerful case. Faced with the contradictions in American policy and the growing public and congressional pressures, the administration began to consider changes. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney opposed change, but Baker was more open to new approaches. Back in November, as the criticism was mounting, the administration made one small concession: for the first time it stated that the Khmer Rouge had committed genocide. Then on 24 May President Bush, hinting that a change was coming, stated that he was “uncomfortable” with a policy that assisted the Khmer Rouge in any way; the whole policy was under review.56 But for the moment, the policy held. The pressures only increased. On 9 June human rights groups in Minnesota held a mock trial for the Khmer Rouge, during which Cambodians testified to the horrors of life under the Khmer Rouge. Two days later Senators George Mitchell (D–ME) and Bob Kerrey (D–NE) attacked the administration’s Cambodia policy, Mitchell calling it “incredible” and “unsupportable.”57

Toward a new beginning 155 To be sure, support for the administration’s policy was not entirely dead. On 27 June Solarz again persuaded a majority of his colleagues in the House to continue providing $7 million in aid for the NCR. But the very next day the Senate Intelligence Committee voted to end all covert assistance to the resistance forces, and final approval of even non-lethal overt aid was in doubt.58 Newspapers as disparate as the Minneapolis Star Tribune and the El Paso Times took the administration to task for a policy that benefited the Khmer Rouge, as did journalists William Shawcross and Nayan Chanda.59 Then early in June 1990 Sihanouk defied the Khmer Rouge and, in a meeting with Hun Sen in Tokyo, accepted a two-sided arrangement. Rather than giving each of the four factions equal representation, there was now to be a Supreme National Council (SNC) that would consist of an equal number of representatives from the SOC and the combined opposition. The Khmer Rouge would still be represented but not on an equal basis with the SOC. Ultimately, however, Sihanouk had to repudiate this agreement when he could not persuade the Khmer Rouge and China to accept it.60 Although the United States had not yet changed its policy, it was beginning to shift course. The state department and the CIA were now urging direct U.S. talks with Hun Sen and advocated encouraging Sihanouk to join with Hun Sen. A further indication that the administration was seriously considering a change came on 13 July when it accepted an offer from the SOC to cooperate in efforts to locate American MIAs from the Vietnam War. Negotiated in Beijing by Kenneth Quinn and Sok An, Hun Sen’s principal adviser, taking this step initially provoked strong resistance among some administration officials who feared it would bestow political legitimacy on the SOC and Hanoi. But Quinn argued passionately for the agreement and found support from Solomon, Under Secretary Robert Kimmitt, and Baker. Although on the surface this was a humanitarian undertaking, it had important political implications. As Representative Atkins, a passionate critic, put it, “I am just delighted they are sending over this team.”61 The seemingly dramatic shift finally came on 18 July 1990 when Baker, apparently having overcome opposition from Scowcroft and Cheney, announced that the United States would no longer recognize the CGDK, would open negotiations with Vietnam, and would provide humanitarian aid to the SOC. The primary goal now became to keep the Khmer Rouge from taking power, a goal which, Baker acknowledged, the United States had not been able to achieve with the former policy. The United States would no longer defer to the ASEAN countries and China on Cambodian matters. Not surprisingly, the ASEAN governments were “stunned,” and China also objected strongly (despite American efforts to limit criticism of the recent Tiananmen Square massacre), as did the NCR. Sihanouk termed the policy reversal “a fantastic reward for the SOC, a government that has betrayed its country.”62 The reasons for the reversal were complex. At the highest level they reflected the ending of the Cold War and a tentative joint Soviet–American approach to

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third world problems. (Not insignificantly, Baker made the announcement in Paris where he was meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevernadze.) Closer to home the growing domestic criticism of the administration’s policy threatened to result in legislation that would seriously constrain administration options.63 There was also fear that the United States would be blamed if the Khmer Rouge managed to regain power, which seemed a distinct possibility in 1990 because of recent battlefield gains.64 Rodman expressed well the administration’s dilemma. “Our trying to ride two horses – opposing both Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge – was a risky gamble,” he recalled as he acknowledged the apparent contradictions in American policy. “How could we possibly overthrow the one without removing the main barrier to the dominance of the other?”65 In effect the administration was acknowledging that the critics had mounted a persuasive attack on long-standing American policy that stretched back to Brzezinski, and perhaps to Kissinger. As the critics charged, the United States, while opposing the Khmer Rouge rhetorically, was in effect supporting them. From the beginning, American funds helped sustain them on the Thai border. The United States also supported Chinese and Thai efforts to resuscitate the Khmer Rouge militarily as a means of countering the Vietnamese and their Cambodian allies. The United States provided covert aid to the Khmer Rouge’s non-communist allies, and possibly to the Khmer Rouge themselves; later it provided overt funds to the NCR and looked the other way when the NCR coordinated its military activities with the Khmer Rouge. On the diplomatic front, the United States followed the lead of ASEAN and China and always voted for Khmer Rouge representation at the United Nations. In terms of a peace settlement, the United States insisted that the Khmer Rouge have a role equal to the other “factions” – in particular the PRK/SOC – in whatever governmental structure emerged. It demonized Hun Sen and the PRK/SOC to such an extent that, as one Asian diplomat put it, “it came to the point that any move Hun Sen made, no matter how positive, was immediately discounted in Washington as a trick of the Vietnamese. … It has been obsessive and counterproductive.”66 Briefly stated, geopolitical reasons related to the Cold War and the desire to undercut Soviet influence anywhere in the world explained most aspects of American policy. In pursuit of this goal the United States wanted to align with China against the Soviet Union and its perceived clients – Vietnam and the PRK. But there was also an emotional component. Successive American administrations found it hard to forgive Vietnam. As columnist William Pfaff put it, “The United States government has been punishing Communist Vietnam’s leaders for having defeated the United States in the Vietnam War.”67 Now, however, Baker was apparently repudiating a failed policy and instead giving “the Khmer Rouge the isolation it deserves,” as the Christian Science Monitor put it.68 But despite appearances to the contrary, Baker’s move did not represent a complete reversal of American policy. Although the administration had withdrawn support for the CGDK and was willing to talk to Vietnam, it still supported the NCR, wanted to see it prevail in any elections, and hoped to

Toward a new beginning 157 continue funding it. Thus Baker’s move was, in part, a tactical change only. Consequently, the critics remained unconvinced of the administration’s sincerity. “We’re still courting disaster in Cambodia,” said Senator Bob Kerry (D–NE), while scholar Michael Vickery termed the new American posture “an obvious finesse of domestic criticism.”69 Indicating extensive unease, 66 senators wrote to President Bush urging the administration to engage in discussions not just with the Vietnamese (as the administration had already agreed to do) but with the Hun Sen administration. This was actually something that Baker was willing to do, and he immediately announced that the administration was considering such talks. But he faced internal opposition, most notably from Scowcroft. Intensive discussions to devise a framework for peace soon overshadowed concerns about speaking directly with Hun Sen. On 27 and 28 August 1990 the big powers drafted a framework document to serve as the basis for negotiations among the Cambodians. It urged the parties to agree to the long-discussed SNC – “a unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, national sovereignty would be enshrined” – to prepare for an election. It fudged the question of bipartite or quadripartite representation by saying that it should be “composed of representative individuals with authority among the Cambodian people … acceptable to each other,” and it urged that Sihanouk be made SNC president. The document also called for a ceasefire and the creation of a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to monitor the ceasefire and other military matters. Principles for elections were promulgated, along with provisions to protect human rights.70 The fact that all Perm 5 powers could agree on the document was itself remarkable and, as the Jakarta Post put it, clearly showed “that as far as the Cambodian conflict is concerned, the Cold War is definitely over.”71 Shortly thereafter U.S. diplomats in Laos met with SOC officials, and U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia John Monjo shook hands with Hun Sen himself, the photograph appearing on the front page of the Jakarta Post. The Monjo–Hun Sen encounter symbolized how much had changed so quickly in American diplomacy. At Jakarta in September the peace process advanced significantly when the parties accepted the Perm 5’s framework document, agreeing on an SNC headed by Sihanouk that would delegate to the United Nations “all powers necessary” to implement the agreement and conduct fair elections. This was a concession from Hun Sen, but, similar to the Tokyo agreement, the conference also agreed that Hun Sen’s government could nominate six of the 12 members, the other six being divided equally among the three other factions – a division of power that China was no longer blocking.72 Despite the important steps taken by the Perm 5 and at Jakarta (and the results of the conference produced almost universal praise), a ceasefire had not been achieved, and agreement on details proved difficult, including the precise powers of the United Nations, the SNC’s composition, and under what circumstances Sihanouk could chair the new structure. Indeed, the first attempted meeting of the SNC, held in Bangkok only a week after the Jakarta conference, ended in failure. The group did not convene again until December, when it met in Paris.

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As for the United States, it continued to play a positive role by announcing that, for the first time in 15 years, it would provide aid to Cambodia. However, this was not an administration initiative. Rather, in 1990 Congress had passed an emergency appropriation to assist Cambodian children “in areas controlled by the Phnom Penh government.” Congress appropriated $5 million for this purpose, but the administration spent only $2 million, which went to UNICEF and World Vision programs. The administration was upset when it learned that UNICEF funds went for immunization programs administered by the SOC’s Minister of Health. Nevertheless, expenditure of these funds symbolized continuing American willingness, if grudging, to advance its new relationship with Hun Sen’s government.73 Furthermore, Cambodia sent its legendary classical Cambodian dance troupe (painstakingly reconstructed after the Khmer Rouge days) to the United States. This, however, ended in tension. Encouraged by Cambodian–American groups opposed to the SOC (notably those associated with Son Sann’s KPNLF), a few of the dancers asked for political asylum, and the state department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, over Phnom Penh’s objections, then interviewed the remaining dancers to see if they were departing voluntarily from the United States.74 The estrangement was only temporary, however, and about the same time as the dance troupe was performing to sell-out audiences (which included large numbers of Cambodian-Americans), the Khmer Rouge ambushed and murdered some 50 persons on a train 100 miles south of Phnom Penh, reminding the world of the group’s brutality and the probable consequences should they ever again regain power. To many (though not yet to the U.S. government), backing Hun Sen’s SOC seemed a reasonable alternative. Despite the new American contacts with the SOC, it still remained American policy to dismantle Hun Sen’s government, if this could be done without ensuring a Khmer Rouge victory. In fact the United States hoped to enlist Vietnam in such a quest as part of the price for ending the U.S. economic embargo and diplomatic isolation of that country.75 In addition to pressuring Vietnam, the American strategy was to give the United Nations as much power as possible in Cambodia, even as Hun Sen wanted the international body’s role limited to providing humanitarian assistance and helping to organize elections. When the Cambodians proved unable to achieve a ceasefire or advance toward a political settlement, the Perm 5 again stepped into the process and in November proposed a comprehensive peace plan, which gave the United Nations sweeping powers, including the right to take over Cambodian ministries. A large contingent of United Nations troops would also be sent to the country. The Khmer Rouge, which like the United States favored an extensive and intrusive U.N. role, applauded the plan, leading critics to fear that the United States and other members of the Perm 5 were intent primarily on ending Hun Sen’s government. Although Hun Sen and the other Cambodian leaders accepted many aspects of the plan, the Prime Minister refused to have his government and his armed forces dismantled. “We would be better off isolated than dead,” he said.76 He also tried to insert a reference in the text about preventing the

Toward a new beginning 159 “genocidal regime” from returning to power. For the moment, progress toward a peace settlement stalled. In February 1991 Hun Sen suffered a setback when a military coup in Thailand ousted Chatichai, who had been friendly to the SOC. Now the new military government demanded that the Khmer Rouge have a place in the Cambodian government, and shortly thereafter China announced that it was once again sending military supplies to the Khmer Rouge, something it had previously suspended. China made the announcement on the eve of Richard Solomon’s visit to Beijing, where he met with Sihanouk and other resistance leaders. Also present was Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev. “We are trying to bridge the differences and bring the process to a conclusion,” Solomon said. In fact, however, what Solomon and the United States wanted was for Hun Sen to accept the Perm 5 proposal.77 Perhaps due in part to these developments, plus some modest gains made on the battlefield, the Phnom Penh government announced that it was willing to reopen the deadlocked negotiations. The United States responded with an important effort to reassure Phnom Penh and Hanoi that it understood and shared their concerns about a possible Khmer Rouge return (Kenneth Quinn had made this point in his initial meeting with Vietnamese officials in August 1990) and dramatically announced that it had suspended all aid to the NCR due to reports that it was cooperating with the Khmer Rouge.78 The United States dispatched American consultants to Phnom Penh to assess Cambodia’s humanitarian needs. At the same time, the United States tried to enlist Hanoi’s assistance in pressuring Phnom Penh to accept fully the Perm 5 plan. It laid out its famous “road map,” promising a gradual lifting of the economic embargo and ultimately a resumption of normal diplomatic relations if Hanoi would help secure Phnom Penh’s agreement to the Perm 5 plan. In an important step, the United States also opened an MIA office in Hanoi. “It’s still a painfully slow process,” said one Cambodia analyst, “but these shifts do put some pressure on Hanoi and Phnom Penh to accept the plan.”79 Nevertheless, the third SNC meeting in June 1991 resulted in little progress. Phnom Penh’s insistence on strong measures to prevent a Khmer Rouge return to power was not met, and no agreement was reached. Hun Sen did meet Sihanouk outside of the SNC structure (Sihanouk had never been formally made a part of the SNC due to disagreements over how the council should be structured) and agreed that the Prince should chair the SNC, with Hun Sen to be vice chair and the council to be expanded by two members, to 14. But Sihanouk could not persuade the Khmer Rouge to accept even this. French Foreign Minister Alain Vivien blamed the Khmer Rouge for a lack of interest in ending the fighting. Critics of American policy felt that the United States was partly to blame. As one contributor to the New York Times put it, what foreign policy objective justified support for China’s resuscitation of the Khmer Rouge and the U.S. refusal to condemn genocide forthrightly?80 The future looked bleak for a Cambodian settlement.

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But soon thereafter important progress occurred. Sihanouk joined the SNC – not as chair but as a simple member; in June 1991 the SNC then met again in Pattaya, Thailand, and reached a number of agreements, thanks largely to the sagacious leadership of Sihanouk (who was finally elected to chair the SNC). The United States praised Sihanouk for his “wisdom” and “moral influence.” Later in July the SNC convened in, of all places, Beijing, indicating that the Chinese leadership was being more conciliatory. The parties agreed about representation at the United Nations (Hun Sen was appointed one of the delegates) and, more importantly, agreed to stop the arms flow and to allow the United Nations to monitor a ceasefire (which had been in place for about two months on a voluntary basis). The only major issue yet to be resolved involved disarming the factional armies. That issue was settled in August, when the parties agreed that 70 percent of the armed forces would be demobilized, and the remaining 30 percent would regroup and disarm under U.N. supervision. Sihanouk was so pleased with the outcome of the meeting that he “led the dinner orchestra in renditions of his original Khmer and French love songs.”81 Suddenly Cambodia’s future looked bright again. None of these recent developments, it might be noted, owed much to the United States. The Bush administration, uncertain about the domestic political consequences of conciliation with Vietnam and aid to the SOC, was mostly on the sidelines, repeating the mantra that the Perm 5 plan had to be accepted and implemented in every detail. Only after Sihanouk charged the Americans with being obstructionist did the United States reluctantly accept the compromises reached by the Cambodian parties.82 The stage was now set for the momentous final agreement reached in October 1991 at the Paris conference. The SOC ceded considerable power to UNTAC, which took on the role of monitoring the ceasefire, demobilizing and disarming the factional armed forces, repatriating refugees in the border camps, de-mining large areas of the country, ensuring that human rights were protected (a provision that was inserted at the insistence of the United States), and preparing for the elections to take place in April 1993 that would determine who would lead the country in the postwar era. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar described the U.N. undertaking as “probably the most important and most complex in the history of the United Nations.”83 The final settlement resulted from years of discussions and negotiations among the Cambodian parties, the Perm 5, Indonesia, Australia, France, and Japan. No party got everything it wanted. Hun Sen thought the United Nations had too much power. On the other hand, American and Chinese efforts to dissolve the SOC were not successful. The quadripartite plan also was essentially abandoned in favor of a solution which gave the SOC representation equal to the other three parties combined. References to genocide were removed,84 and the Khmer Rouge remained a party to the peace settlement. But they did not have representation equal to Hun Sen’s, and they, along with the other factions, were required to demobilize or disarm under U.N. supervision. The whole

Toward a new beginning 161 process, which concluded with the Paris Accords, appeared to have achieved a remarkable settlement.85 The Americans played a role in bringing about the settlement and shaped it in important (and arguably negative) ways, but they were not the determining factor. The most important American contribution was the “Baker shift” in July 1990, in which the United States withdrew support for the CGDK and made some gestures in support of Hun Sen and the Vietnamese. This reflected in part a new team in the state department that was not so wedded to the policies of the past. However, the shift also resulted from external pressure, and the Bush administration was not fully committed to the new course. Although it did put more emphasis on preventing the Khmer Rouge from returning to power, it still desired a solution that would also result in the dissolution of the SOC. Thus Baker himself acknowledged that what had changed were the tactics, not the goal. Partly one senses that the President and others in high positions in the administration had not gotten over the defeat in Vietnam. It was galling to them to reconcile with Vietnam and its supposed client in Phnom Penh. The administration was also uncertain of the domestic political ramifications of a rapprochement with Vietnam. The changing international situation (as the Cold War ended and the Soviet–Chinese rift began to heal) was an important contextual factor in the final settlement, and the Cambodian parties themselves (including at crucial points Sihanouk himself), plus the Indonesians, crafted the compromises needed to bring about a settlement. Many Americans, even those who had been critical of the American approach, hoped that the accords offered a chance to end Cambodia’s suffering. “Cambodians haven’t had hope in two decades,” editorialized the Minneapolis Star Tribune, a newspaper that had been consistently critical of American policy. “The nations of the world should do everything possible to sustain the hope this treaty creates.”86 But the agreement did not meet with universal praise. Many of those associated with non-governmental organizations that had worked for years in Cambodia or on the Cambodian issue criticized the accords, primarily because they included the Khmer Rouge in a significant way. The peace process gave the Khmer Rouge a “political legitimacy they haven’t earned,” a Church World Service representative told a journalist, whereas they weakened Hun Sen’s government too much.87 Those who shared such views soon founded the Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge (CORKR). Such misgivings lingered for months and years. A related criticism was that the accords were not fundamentally intended to advance the good of the Cambodians. As the respected Cambodian journalist and government official Khieu Kanharith put it, “The U.N. plan was mapped out not for the Cambodian people but to please the superpowers.” A Hun Sen–Sihanouk alliance might have done that, for example, but the big powers, including the United States, had discouraged that prospect. To this day Hun Sen is very resentful of the Perm 5’s insistence on including the Khmer Rouge.88

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Diplomatic relations restored In any event, with the settlement in place the United States proceeded to improve its relations with Cambodia. It promised to end its economic embargo against the country (even while maintaining its embargo against Vietnam), support aid projects, and open a liaison office in Phnom Penh. Charles Twining opened the liaison office on 11 November 1991 (the same day that the first contingent of lightly armed United Nations troops entered Phnom Penh). But the administration was slow to lift the embargo, resulting in congressional criticism, and skepticism remained about ultimate American intentions. During Senate hearings in March 1992 John Kerry criticized the administration for working to include the Khmer Rouge in the settlement and undermining Hun Sen’s government. “Many of us … thought we should have been dealing more directly with Hun Sen some time ago,” he reminded Solomon. When Solomon responded that such a position would have meant “reinvolvement in a guerrilla war,” Kerry replied that those who had proposed lethal aid to the NCR were the ones who had actually involved the United States in a guerrilla war.89 Fifty-six senators and 247 representatives then signed a letter to President Bush seeking assurances that the United States would do all it could to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power. In view of past American policy and the horrendous record of the Khmer Rouge, such skepticism of American policy was understandable. But it may be that over the long run the settlement and subsequent American policy contributed to the Khmer Rouge’s eventual demise. “What the Khmer Rouge feared most was contamination of their cadre and population with materialism and independent views,” Ambassador Quinn recalled. Thus by including language in the Paris agreement that all zones must be open, the parties may have put the Khmer Rouge on the road to ultimate extinction.90 Following this premise, during the period when the peace agreement was being implemented (1991–3) the United States shaped its assistance programs to give priority to constructing roads in rural areas where the Khmer Rouge were operating. Opening up the countryside to outside influences would undermine the Khmer Rouge. “If we neglect the countryside and put all of our resources in Phnom Penh,” Charles Twining said, “then the Khmer Rouge can come back again.” This policy was not coordinated with Hun Sen, but the two governments shared the goal of thwarting the Khmer Rouge. No official American would have any dealings whatsoever with any Khmer Rouge officials, even those on the SNC, said Twining.91 The United States also contributed substantial funds to the U.N. operations in Cambodia (it had agreed to pay 30 percent of the cost), some of which were aimed at keeping the Khmer Rouge in line. And at least on the surface, the United States warmed to Hun Sen’s government. Hun Sen cooperated fully on the M.I.A. issue, and when Hun Sen himself came to the United States in March 1992, he met with congressional committees, enjoyed a luncheon with (among others) Solarz and Twining, was entertained at dinner by Solomon, and met with other officials. “In the Administration and Congress,” reported the New

Toward a new beginning 163 York Times, “there is an increasing sense that the young Prime Minister has evolved into a statesman.”92 Meanwhile the Khmer Rouge showed increasing signs that they would not comply with the agreements. Their obstruction led to renewed calls to bypass them altogether, to hold elections without them and, if necessary, to arm the government to take on the rebels.93 Others disagreed, arguing that isolating the Khmer Rouge would only promote their cause.94 However, as it became clear that the Khmer Rouge were going to repudiate their commitments, many of those who had urged a cautious approach changed their minds. At the end of November 1992 the United Nations Security Council banned the export of oil to the Khmer Rouge and the import of lumber from their zones and threatened to take further action, if the rebels continued to refuse to abide by U.N. agreements. The Khmer Rouge responded by abducting U.N. personnel. Although Khmer Rouge behavior exasperated and angered the United States, this did not translate into political support for Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). Although they no longer demonized them, the Americans still opposed the CPP and hoped that in the election the two non-communist parties would prevail. Reports began to circulate of serious human rights violations by the SOC.95 Further efforts to discredit Hun Sen’s government involved charges that, while Hun Sen was generally an honorable figure, hardline communists who surrounded him limited his power, and he did not have full control of the SOC’s security forces. It was alleged that Vietnam still maintained too much influence.96 In sum, while not as bad as the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen and his government were pictured as corrupt, brutal, and still under the Vietnamese thumb. In any event, after a “scathing verbal attack” on UNTAC (to say nothing of actual deadly attacks on U.N. personnel and ethnic Vietnamese),97 the Khmer Rouge definitively opted out of the electoral process – a disastrous choice that completely discredited them. When the elections were held on 28 May 1993, almost 90 percent of eligible voters defied Khmer Rouge threats by taking part. The turnout was “beyond our wildest expectations,” stated an American U.N. election official. The election was peaceful and impressive, evidence enough of the Cambodians’ deep desire to end the interminable conflict. Some speculated that the Khmer Rouge remained quiescent because they feared that the United States would intervene militarily if they tried to disrupt the elections.98 The United States had become reconciled to a CPP victory as voters chose representatives to a constituent assembly, which was to write a new constitution for the country, and had announced ahead of time that it was prepared to accept the results. It was surprised, and pleased, when Sihanouk’s FUNCINPEC emerged with 45.47 percent of the vote to 38.22 percent for the CPP. In terms of seats in the assembly, FUNCINPEC received 58 to the CPP’s 51. Other parties garnered 11. At first the CPP, in a state of shock, threatened not to accept the results. One CPP supporter (Sihanouk’s son, Prince Chakrapong) attempted to organize a secessionist movement in several provinces.99 Then on 3 June (well before the

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official vote tally was announced on 10 June), Sihanouk announced that he was forming an interim government, with himself as Prime Minister and commander of the military, and with Ranariddh and Hun Sen as Deputy Prime Ministers. The CPP quickly accepted this arrangement, but FUNCINPEC was ambivalent, while Ranariddh himself angrily rejected his father’s proposal. Although Sihanouk seems to have announced this move after encouragement from French, Russian, and Japanese officials, the United States objected. Reportedly outraged by the American position, Sihanouk nevertheless backed down. But within two weeks a similar arrangement had emerged. The new Constituent Assembly restored Sihanouk as Chief of State (after first declaring his ouster in 1970 to have been illegal), and Sihanouk in turn proposed an interim coalition government in which Ranariddh and Hun Sen would co-chair the Council of Ministers. Subsequent negotiations led to a government structure in which the CPP and FUNCINPEC shared power, with two minor parties also being allowed to name four ministers. Despite its opposition to Sihanouk’s original proposal, the United States supported this very similar arrangement. Although such an arrangement was not envisaged in the Paris Accords, it represented a Cambodian solution that brought about a measure of stability, further isolated the Khmer Rouge, and established the conditions that would bring in significant amounts of international assistance.100 The United States professed that it would not interfere in internal Cambodian affairs, but the new Bill Clinton administration did make its views known, particularly on the question of Khmer Rouge participation in the government. When Sihanouk attempted to open a dialogue with the Khmer Rouge, the United States protested, telling the Prince that it would not support his government, or provide aid, if the Khmer Rouge were given a role in the new government – a point Madeleine Albright (then ambassador to the United Nations) made clear during a visit to Phnom Penh on 6 July 1993. American interference upset Sihanouk. “I am more and more angered by these incessant warnings from the Americans, which have made me even more ill than I was in the recent past,” he said. So that he would not be forced into a mental asylum, Sihanouk said, he would cancel a proposed meeting with Khieu Samphan. Responding to strongly negative reactions from Cambodians and ASEAN, the Americans backed off some, saying that limited Khmer Rouge participation might be acceptable, and shortly thereafter Sihanouk authorized talks with DK officials.101 The United States also pressured Thailand to cut its ties to the Khmer Rouge. Indeed, one official told a congressional committee that Thailand had replaced China as the guerrillas’ most important backer. These comments angered Thai officials, who refused an American request to allow reconnaissance flights along the border to track Khmer Rouge activities.102 In September the Constituent Assembly approved a new constitution, and Sihanouk was once again crowned King, a position he had abdicated in 1955. He quickly named Ranariddh first Prime Minister and Hun Sen second Prime

Toward a new beginning 165 Minister. In most respects, the new constitutional government was the same as the interim one. Two days later an emotional Yasushi Akashi, the head of UNTAC, bade farewell to Cambodia. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia was over. By the end of the month the United States had opened an embassy and appointed Charles Twining as the first American ambassador to serve in Phnom Penh since John Gunther Dean left under emergency conditions in 1975. In many respects the efforts to achieve a settlement of the Cambodian imbroglio had achieved truly remarkable results. The major powers, the Security Council, ASEAN, and the international community in general had agreed on a plan to end the conflict. They had entrusted the United Nations with an enormous post-Cold War task: to organize an election and rebuild a country. They had ended outside support of various Cambodian factions (probably the strongest argument for including the Khmer Rouge in the peace process, since otherwise China would probably not have agreed to stop supporting the rebels). In the end, the Khmer Rouge, probably sensing a humiliating defeat at the ballot box, had rejected the process and isolated themselves, thus preparing the groundwork for their ultimate demise. The Cambodian people valiantly rejected them. And in the end, a coalition of Hun Sen and Sihanouk’s forces emerged, eventually giving the country needed stability. Not that the UNTAC experience was perfect. No one had ever been through such an experience before, and there were many problems. The United Nations did not have experienced people to deal with such matters as visas or customs or even to monitor human rights. Despite Akashi’s protests, some of those sent knew nothing of Cambodia and its people.103 Some of the peacekeeping troops abused the population. If in the end the UNTAC mission was generally positive, such a result was attained at the cost of forcing the SOC to turn over much of its authority to the United Nations during the transition period and incorporating the Khmer Rouge into the process. Proponents of the latter approach, such as Kenneth Quinn, make a strong case that including them ultimately led to the group’s dissolution. “This effort to destroy the Khmer Rouge is perhaps the only instance in which the U.S. has been intimately involved which has led to the complete destruction of a terrorist organization,” he points out. But at the time the critics accurately indicated that the coalition government that emerged after the elections “never required the inclusion or appeasement of Khmer Rouge leaders.”104 Indeed some prominent scholars thought the entire U.N. operation actually strengthened the Khmer Rouge, despite that group’s decision not to contest the elections. The alternative of the international community uniting behind the SOC, perhaps encouraging an alliance between Hun Sen and Sihanouk, was rejected. In any event, the United States fully supported the new government. When Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord visited Cambodia in December 1993 he commented that “what has happened here since my last visit [in May] has been a great inspiration and a great hope.”

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One continuing American objective was to prevent a return to the killing fields. When the Khmer Rouge threatened in 1994, some urged the United States to coordinate a multilateral effort to provide training and equipment to the Cambodian military. The United States had already provided funds to help integrate Khmer Rouge defectors into the Cambodian military and was providing some equipment and instructors for military construction. In light of the renewed Khmer Rouge offensive the Americans spoke with Australia, France, and Indonesia about joining together with the United States to provide more assistance, including munitions.105 Though it did not in the end send lethal aid, the United States sent 44 military advisers to assist in non-lethal areas. The United States also protested Thailand’s continuing contacts with the Khmer Rouge. “We want the Khmer Rouge to be cut off,” the American ambassador to Thailand stated.106 Ultimately the Americans hoped that, with their assistance, Cambodia would become a “peaceful, stable, progressive” country.107 The United States therefore opposed efforts to weaken or topple the government, beginning with Prince Norodem Chakrapong’s abortive effort to overthrow the government in July 1994 (although Twining may have been involved in negotiations to arrange for Chakrapong’s exile).108 With strong support from Senator John McCain (R–AZ), Congress considered granting Cambodia Most Favored Nation trade status. (Congress, however, delayed granting Cambodia that status until 1996.) The Americans also supported Cambodia’s efforts to join ASEAN. (Membership was approved in 1997 but delayed until 1998 due to Hun Sen’s “coup” in July 1997.) Probably the most important American contribution in the years after the elections was its economic aid, much of which continued to be aimed at constructing, reopening, repairing, and de-mining roads in areas where the Khmer Rouge continued to operate. Such projects were coordinated with Hun Sen’s government. One of the more historically significant was the reconstruction of the American highway (Highway 4) from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville. Such efforts did not immediately end the Khmer Rouge threat. For much of 1994, the situation seemed bleak. The rebels made impressive military gains and recaptured their stronghold of Pailin, largely because of corruption and incompetence on the part of the government’s military which had taken the city only a month before. The rebels also captured, and sometimes executed, civilians (including Americans and other westerners). In September Sihanouk himself warned tourists not to come to his war-torn country. But by the end of the year conditions had brightened considerably. Visitors to the capital remarked on the palpable change in attitudes and the increase in business activity since spring. Ambassador Twining was especially optimistic, noting the increase in economic activity, and not just in Phnom Penh. “Drive down to Kampot … or drive down to Sihanoukville, or drive down to Svay Rieng, or drive up to Kompong Thom,” he suggested. Homes were being built in areas that had been insecure only a few months before. On the road to Battambang “there was more traffic … than I have seen ever. And that shows that there’s something happening.”109

Toward a new beginning 167 Optimistic predictions are always dangerous in the Cambodian context. Twining was careful to note that important problems still remained, in particular the critical need of bringing needed services to the people who had lived in Khmer Rouge areas. There remained the possibility of a disaffected populace developing once again. But Twining’s optimism has proved to be largely warranted. In December 1995 Cambodia hosted an international Ramayana festival at Angkor Wat. For several days, dance troupes from India and all countries of Southeast Asia performed the traditional Hindu epic on a floodlit stage in front of Cambodia’s national symbol. The event symbolized Cambodia’s return to health. Although the Khmer Rouge continued to cause problems for some time to come, they never again regained the strength they had momentarily shown in 1994. Indeed, they soon began to implode. The new American ambassador, Kenneth Quinn, who arrived in 1996, continued to work closely with the Cambodian government to help repair roads and de-mine areas in Khmer Rouge zones. Considerable attention was devoted to upgrading Highway 10, which went to Pailin. That same year Khmer Rouge units near Pailin revolted against Pol Pot when Nuon Chea and other Khmer Rouge leaders ordered them to end their commercial contacts with the Thais – thus vindicating the American decision to insist on opening Khmer Rouge zones to outside influences.110 In 1996 the first significant defections of Khmer Rouge troops to the government began. In June 1997 Pol Pot ordered the assassination of his former deputy and colleague in murder, Son Sen. The next month the Khmer Rouge leader was arrested by his own people and subjected to a show trial, witnessed by Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent Nate Thayer. The next spring Pol Pot died, reportedly despondent at the demise of his movement. After some last internecine battles, the Khmer Rouge ceased to exist. Politically, the Cambodian government has persevered, though with numerous serious strains. The Khmer Rouge also figured in this development. Prior to their collapse, thousands of Khmer Rouge had negotiated surrenders with the government. But Ranariddh in particular had courted the Khmer Rouge for support as he prepared for general elections scheduled for 1998, which angered Hun Sen. In June 1997 the dispute became violent when fighting between military units loyal to the rival factions took place on the streets of Phnom Penh. One rocket landed in Quinn’s garden.111 (This led to an American fiasco of sorts when both Hun Sen and Ranariddh asked Secretary of State Madeline Albright to cancel a planned trip to Cambodia. Although they had initially wanted her to come and welcomed her idea of spending two days in the country, they rejected her revised plan to only meet with them briefly at the airport and not come into the city due to security concerns.)112 On 4 July Ranariddh went to Paris, and the following day fighting again broke out between forces loyal to both leaders. Who fired the first shot remains in dispute; American officials believed that neither side intended to ignite a military conflict. Still, the events were commonly portrayed as a Hun Sen coup, a belief strengthened when two high-level FUNCINPEC officials were murdered. Hun Sen

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denied that his actions amounted to a coup. He remained committed, he said, to the existing governmental structure and invited FUNCINPEC to name a replacement for Ranariddh. Sihanouk refused to condemn Hun Sen or support Ranariddh, and in mid-July FUNCINPEC member Ung Hout replaced Ranariddh. “This is enough to show the world that there has been no coup d’état,” Hun Sen commented.113 The United States reduced its embassy staff and temporarily suspended aid to the country but nevertheless “judged the coup cautiously,” given Ranariddh’s efforts to gain Khmer Rouge support.114 Like most other countries, the United States came to accept Hun Sen’s action as a fait accompli. Instead of intervening strongly, the United States supported ASEAN’s efforts to resolve the crisis, while encouraging Hun Sen to allow open elections. Serious factional fighting continued in parts of Cambodia for several months. Lending some credence to Hun Sen’s allegations about Ranariddh (whom he threatened to put on trial if he returned to the country), the royalist forces made common cause with the remnants of the Khmer Rouge. On the other hand, about 100 political opponents of the government were killed over the next several months. Hun Sen’s supporters were widely suspected of committing the crimes, a suspicion that deepened when no one was arrested. The civil conflict was resolved in a peculiarly Cambodian way: in March 1998 Ranariddh was tried in absentia and convicted of arms smuggling and plotting a coup. He was sentenced to 35 years in prison and ordered to pay a $50 million fine. Then by prearrangement, his father the King pardoned him, thus allowing him to come back to Cambodia and contest the elections scheduled for July. According to Quinn, the United States played an important behind-the-scenes role in the settlement.115 The question for the United States and other countries was whether the elections would be fair and free. Given the ruling party’s entrenched position, its control of the media, and acts of intimidation, some observers doubted that genuinely impartial elections could be held. Some of the critics were themselves not impartial, since they had long disliked Hun Sen. More objective observers, like the respected Sidney Jones of Human Rights Watch, however, agreed with Hun Sen’s critics that the CPP was making it difficult for other parties to organize – a conclusion based on interviews done in Cambodia from February to April 1998.116 At the end of March Ranariddh himself threatened to pull out of the elections. As a result, the United States continued to suspend aid, even for such popular programs as narcotics interdiction. It also cut back funds intended to help with the election process. But there were other voices as well, particularly as the official time for opening political campaigns approached. European Union officials thought a fair and free election possible. And by June there was considerably more optimism. On 8 June Kassie Neou, a long-time opponent of Hun Sen who had been appointed vice-chairman of the National Election Committee (NEC), informed his followers that the NEC had “taken several important steps recently to do its best to ensure free, fair, credible and peaceful elections.” He urged the United

Toward a new beginning 169 States to increase its funding of the election process. The next day Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth told a Senate subcommittee that “fair and free elections could conceivably be held.”117 On 26 July 1998 a large number of international observers watched 94 percent of eligible Cambodians turn out to vote. The CPP received 41.2 percent to FUNCINPEC’s 31.5 percent. Another opposition group, the Sam Rainsy party, received 14.2 percent. Had the opposition united (as a leading member of the United States Congress had passionately urged them to do), they would probably have been able to control the new government. Some news reports were critical of the election process. But most of the international observers thought the elections themselves were reasonably fair and represented a genuine expression of Cambodian opinion. Even observers from organizations critical of Hun Sen, such as the International Republican Institute (which has previously determined that the campaign was “fundamentally flawed”) acknowledged that the “voting process was relatively orderly and peaceful.”118 Kassie Neou, who had resigned from the NEC, considered the election legitimate. “The skeptics were wrong about the Cambodian elections,” he wrote. They “were conducted according to international standards for free and fair polls.”119 The CPP had won a plurality but did not have enough seats to organize a government on its own. Even so, at first the opposition parties protested the elections and threatened to boycott the opening of the new National Assembly, thus denying the body a necessary quorum. For several days in August and September thousands of opposition followers gathered in a park to protest the elections. On 7 September there was a grenade attack on Hun Sen’s house, after which government forces dispersed the demonstrators. Some people were killed. Despite opposition protests, discussions began in September on forming a coalition government, and by mid-November differences had been resolved. Hun Sen became the sole Prime Minister, Ranariddh became president of the National Assembly, and several opposition figures received amnesty. The CPP and FUNCINPEC agreed to share power over the interior and defense ministries, and the other ministries were divided between them. As for the United States, the Bill Clinton administration accepted the election results, nominated Kent Wiedemann as the new American ambassador (a person opposed by both Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy), and restored aid. ASEAN postponed admission of Cambodia to the organization, but admitted the country the following year. At the end of the year Khmer Rouge leaders Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea surrendered to the government. The Khmer Rouge barely existed. The last holdout, the notorious “butcher” Ta Mok, was captured in March 1999. That was the end of the Khmer Rouge. Despite the demise of the mass murderers, Cambodia is still impoverished and is troubled with corruption, drug trafficking, human rights problems, uncounted land mines, environmental degradation, HIV/AIDS, and other social problems. It may, therefore, be too much to say that it now approximates that

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“peaceful, stable, progressive” country that Ambassador Twining hoped would emerge. But the elections did bring about political stability and created a climate for economic growth. For the first time in 30 years, Cambodia was at peace. Though beset by great challenges, Cambodia seems to be on the slow road to recovery – and this time it is doing so with the support of the United States. “I feel we have a good relationship,” Hun Sen told a reporter in March 1999, “compared with the last two decades in which we seemed to be enemies.”120

Conclusion

Cambodia seared itself into American memory during the war in neighboring Vietnam when, in April 1970 Nixon ordered American soldiers to join with South Vietnamese troops in an invasion of that country. The stated purpose was to destroy the Vietnamese communists’ headquarters that were thought to be there. The invasion reinvigorated the antiwar movement, led to numerous demonstrations on campuses around the country, and left four students dead at Kent State University and another two at Jackson State, all shot by National Guard troops. It was one of the most traumatic events of a traumatic war. For Cambodia the invasion brought that country fully into the Vietnam War for the first time and also fed an incipient civil war between the Khmer Republic and the revolutionary Khmer Rouge. By the time the Khmer Rouge marched into Phnom Penh in victory in April 1975, half a million people (out of a population of somewhat more than seven million) had died. But the suffering did not end. It had hardly begun. For the Khmer Rouge turned Cambodia into a giant slave labor camp, murdering hundreds of thousands, while hundreds of thousands more died from overwork, starvation, and disease. It is now thought that between 2.2 and 2.5 million people died in the Cambodian holocaust1 before Vietnamese troops ended their murderous rule early in 1979. The American role in these developments was truly a troubling one and not always (or even mostly) an honorable one. From 1970 to 1975, the great failure of American policy was the refusal to negotiate directly with the exiled Sihanouk, who was now the titular head of the antigovernment rebellion. The Americans mistakenly assumed that Sihanouk’s day was over. The American government may or may not have been involved in the Prince’s overthrow in 1970, but administration officials were not displeased when it happened and moved to shore up the successor administration. The new government proved to be ineffective at best, and over time its army proved unable to defeat the rebels, even with substantial American and South Vietnamese assistance. On the contrary the rebels advanced more or less steadily throughout this period. Rather than accept the hopelessness of this situation and try to return Sihanouk who, though sometimes irritating to the Americans, was no communist

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and had nothing in common with his Khmer Rouge allies (aside from their mutual hatred of the GKR), the Nixon and Ford administrations stood doggedly by Lon Nol. Until 1975 administration officials refused to negotiate directly with Sihanouk, despite the Prince’s numerous offers and despite advice from their own embassy in Phnom Penh. When they finally agreed to talk, it was too late. President Jimmy Carter, an honorable man whose foreign policy accomplishments deserve more credit than they are sometimes given, nevertheless betrayed his commitment to human rights when it came to Cambodia. His administration encouraged the resuscitation of the “world’s worst violators of human rights in the world today” after the Vietnamese had driven them out. The Reagan and Bush administrations pursued much the same course, seeing the greater evil in Vietnam’s continuing influence in Cambodia. In the final analysis, they supported the Khmer Rouge, at least indirectly. Eventually, under considerable public and international pressure, Bush partially moved away from the longstanding policy and began to put more emphasis on preventing the Khmer Rouge from ever returning to power in Cambodia, though his administration never fully accepted Hun Sen’s legitimacy. Since the elections organized in 1993 under United Nations auspices, relations have improved significantly. The Clinton administration restored diplomatic relations in 1993 and ended the long-standing trade embargo. Furthermore, after some hesitation Clinton supported the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act of 1994 that put the United States firmly behind efforts to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice. For the rest of the decade American officials worked hard to establish some kind of international tribunal. In 1998 Clinton even issued an executive order for the forcible apprehension of Pol Pot. Often these measures had the support of Hun Sen. By the end of the century, relations between the two countries were better than they had been during most of the time when Sihanouk ruled the country. There is still considerable animosity to Hun Sen in conservative circles, however, and whether relations will continue to improve under the George W. Bush administration is uncertain. On 30 April 2003 Senator Mitch McConnell (R–KY) told Secretary of State Colin Powell that “lawlessness and impunity” were the CPP’s “hallmark,” and he urged the state department to “to seize every opportunity to strengthen the hand of the democratic opposition” in the elections scheduled for July.2 McConnell also thought that, given the nature of the Cambodian government, an international tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge was pointless. Although the Bush administration had initially shown less obvious interest in establishing an international tribunal (one of several factors that contributed to the effort stalling), it was in fact quietly supportive of the idea. McConnell’s opposition, however, forced the administration to announce that it was “disassociating” itself from a United Nations resolution to establish a tribunal, arguing that the matter should be delayed until after elections scheduled for July 2003.3 However, the United States did not attempt to derail the resolution, and the American “disassocation” may be only temporary.

Conclusion 173 Still, the ultimate course that the administration will pursue toward Hun Sen’s Cambodia remains unclear. Some officials view most communist-successor governments, including Hun Sen’s, with suspicion, and the more zealous among them advocate regime change. The bilateral relationship may therefore regress. But it has come a long way since the 1980s when the United States was funding armed resistance to Hun Sen. Hopefully both countries will adopt reasonable approaches so that the relationship can continue to be friendly and constructive. Cambodia, having endured so much, deserves no less.

Notes

Prologue 1 Those interested in the history of Cambodia should begin with David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia (3rd ed.; Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002). 2 Frank Vincent, Jr., The Land of the White Elephant: Travels, Adventures, and Discoveries in Burma, Siam, Cambodia, and Cochin-China (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1872). The book was republished by White Lotus Press in Bangkok in 1988. 3 On the history of American relations with Cambodia to 1969, see Kenton Clymer, The United States and Cambodia, 1870–1969: From Curiosity to Confrontation (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

1 Richard Nixon and Cambodia 1 Memorandum for the Record, “Remarks by Henry A. Kissinger to Senators and Representatives, on the Cambodian Decision,” 12 May 1970, NPM, NSC Files, Box 585: Cambodia Operations (1970), folder Cambodia: HAK Meeting with Senators and Representatives 5/12/70, NAII. 2 Richard Nixon to Henry Kissinger, 1 February 1969, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 2, folder Sihanouk Correspondence (1). Memorandum of Conversation, Monteiro and G. McMurtrie Godley, 6 February 1969, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, File POL 15–1 CAMB 1969, NAII. 3 William P. Rogers to Nixon, 5 February 1969, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 2, folder Sihanouk Correspondence (1). 4 Nixon to Norodom Sihanouk, in Rogers to U.S. Embassies Bangkok, Saigon, and Vientiane, 15 February 1969, Tel. 24759, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1930, File Political Affairs & Rels. CAMB–US 1/1/69, NAII. Leonard Unger to SS, 19 March 1969, Tel. 3327, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1930, File Political Affairs & Rels. CAMB–US 1/1/69, NAII. 5 “Oral Approach Made by Australian Ambassador,” attached to Rogers, Memorandum for the President, 26 March 1969, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1802, File Political Affairs & Rels. 32–1. CAM–US 1/1/69, NAII. [Misfiled in Cameroon file.] 6 Unger to SS, 13 March 1969, Tel. 3016, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1931, File POL 31–1 CAMB–US 1/1/68, NAII. The crewmen were initially captured by Viet Cong forces, who turned them over to the Cambodians. They were not mistreated. 7 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 4 May 1969, Tel. 732, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 17, NAA. Rogers, Memorandum

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18 19 20

21

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for the President, 5 May 1969, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1804, File POL 32 CAMB, 1/1/68, NAII. Edwin Cronk to SS, 5 May 1969, Tel. 2396, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1930, File Political Affairs & Rels. CAMB–US, 1/1/69, NAII. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 11 May 1969, Tel. 776, Series No. 1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 17, NAA. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 20 May 1969, Savingram 33, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/2/1 Part 22, NAA. Mike Mansfield to Nixon, 2 May 1969, NPM, WHCF: Subject Files, CO Country Files, folder CO 26 Cambodia, 6/1/70. Kenton Clymer, Interview with Ambassador Noël St. Clair Deschamps, 19–20 June 1999, Canberra, Australia; transcript in Oral History Institute, University of Texas at El Paso, and in the Australian National Library, Canberra. C. G. Woodard to the Secretary EXAF, 21 July 1969, Memo 867/69, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3106/11/161 Part 19, NAA. Canadian Delegation Phnom Penh to EXAF Ottawa, 15 May 1969, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3106/10/1/2/1 Part 10, NAA. Taylor Branch, “The Scandal That Got Away,” [MORE] Magazine, October 1973, 17. Woodard to Australian Embassy Phnom Penh, 23 May 1969, Memorandum 24/69, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 17, NAA. Mansfield, remarks in the Congressional Record, 8 May 1969, attached to USDS Memorandum of Conversation, Zivko Knezevic and Thomas J. Corcoran, 16 May 1969, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1930, File Political Affs & Rels, CAMB–US, 1–1–69, NAII. Rogers to U.S. Embassy Bonn, 12 June 1969, Tel. 95796, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1931, File POL 17 CAMB–US, 1–1–68, NAII.; Rogers to Nixon, 21 June 1969, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1929, File POL 32 CAMB, 1–1–68, NAII. Handwritten note, “President approved according to Tony Lake 6/26/69,” in Rogers to Nixon, 21 June 1969, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1929, File POL 32 CAMB 1–1–68, NAII. Handwritten note by Mr. Pocock on Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 15 August 1969, Tel. 1509, Series No. 1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 19, NAA. Eldon Erickson, an administrative officer, had preceded Rives to Phnom Penh to begin making arrangements to reopen the American mission. Woodard to Secretary EXAF 21 July 1969, Memo 867/69, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3106/11/161 Part 19, NAA. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to Australian Embassy Washington, 26 July 1969, Tel. 231, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/1611, Part 18, NAA. G. B. Feakes to Australian Embassy Washington, 8 August 1969, Tel. 607, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 19, NAA. Lloyd M. Rives to USDS, 8 September 1969, Airgram A-9, Declassified Documents Series. Mansfield’s remarks are attached to the airgram. USDS to U.S. Embassy Rangoon (for Mansfield), 15 August 1969, Tel. 137895, Declassified Documents Series 1980040100177. U. Alexis Johnson to David Packard, 25 July 1969, S/S 11485, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1931, File POL 31–1 CAMB–US, NAII. Ellsworth Bunker to USDS, 10 July 1969, Airgram A-358, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1935, File POL 32–1 CAMB–VIET S, 1/1/69, NAII Woodard to Secretary EXAF, 31 July 1969, Memorandum 911/69, Series No. A1838/280, Control symbol 3016/10/1/2/1/ Part 11, NAA. For example, Australian Embassy Saigon to EXAF, 7 July 1969, Tel. 1667, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 11, NAA.

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26 Australian Embassy Washington to EXAF, 14 November 1968, Tel. 5782, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 8, NAA. 27 Australian Embassy Washington to EXAF, 11 December 1968, Tel. 6303, Series No. 1838/387, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 16, NAA. 28 Joseph Alsop, “LBJ Jolted by Abrams’ Report of Arms Flow from Cambodia,” Washington Post, 4 December 1968. Alsop also reported that Abrams had asked for permission to conduct military operations against “ten or more” major North Vietnamese base areas in Cambodia. 29 Australian Embassy Bangkok to EXAF, 6 December 1968, Tel. 2330, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 9, NAA. 30 Australian Embassy Saigon to EXAF, 8 December 1968, Tel. 3162, Series No. 1838/357, Control Symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 3, NAA. 31 Australian Embassy Washington to EXAF, 9 February 1969, Tel. 759, Series No. 1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 10, NAA. 32 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 241. 33 William Shawcross, Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Destruction of Cambodia (rev. ed.; New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 19–20, 25–6. 34 Earle G. Wheeler to Secretary of Defense, 11 April 1969, CM-4101–69, Declassified Documents Series. 35 Wheeler to Secretary of Defense, 9 April 1969, JCSM-207–69, Declassified Documents Series. Wheeler to Secretary of Defense, 11 April 1969, CM-4101–69, Declassified Documents Series. Kissinger, quoted in Shawcross, Sideshow, 28. Nixon, presidential news conference, 22 August 1973, quoted in Impeachment Inquiry Staff Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, “Statement of Information Concerning the Bombing of Cambodia,” Hutchinson Papers, Box 35, folder Statement – Concerning the Bombing of Cambodia. 36 Sour Bun Sou, “One Aspect of Negative Effect of American Bombing. …” 4 January 2000, unpublished manuscript, DCC. Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong Memoir (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 182. 37 Among those who apparently were informed were Senators Richard Russell, John Stennis, and Everett Dirksen, and Representatives Leslie Arends, Mendel Rivers, Gerald Ford, and Edward Hebert. 38 Department of Defense, “Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations in Cambodia and Laos,” 10 September 1973, 15, Ford Papers, Ford Congressional Papers, Robert Hartmann Files, 1965–1973, Subject File, Biographies (GRF), Box 1220, folder Cambodia 1973. 39 Feakes to Australian Embassy Saigon, 17 July 1969, Tel. 523 (1299 to EXAF), Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 11, NAA. 40 “Hanoi’s Use of Cambodia in the Vietnam War,” Hartmann Papers, Box 38, folder Cambodia (1). 41 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 23 December 1969, Tel. 2129, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 21, NAA. 42 Sour Bun Sou, “One Aspect of Negative Effect of American Bombing.” Truong Nhu Tang, Viet Cong Memoir, 185. Arnold Isaacs, Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 195. See also Ben Kiernan, “The Impact on Cambodia of the U.S. Intervention in Vietnam,” in Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives (New York: Armonk, 1993), 216–29. 43 Gerald R. Ford, quoted in “Laird Says Congress Need Data Pipeline,” Washington Post, 1 August 1973, A16. Aside from brief news reports in May and June 1969 (which were quickly forgotten), the bombings first became public in May 1973 when in his farewell news conference Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson referred to the secret bombing of Cambodia. Remarkably, no one picked up on his comments. In July 1973 during hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee, General

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55

177

George Brown, who had been nominated to be Air Force Chief of Staff, acknowledged that B-52s had bombed Cambodia. Shortly thereafter Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger confirmed the bombing. “Chronology of Publicity on ‘Menu’ Operations,” NPM, NSC files, Box 11 (HAKOF), folder Cambodia: Cambodia Bombing, NAII. Impeachment Inquiry Staff Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, “Statement of Information Concerning the Bombing of Cambodia,” 28–30, Hutchinson Papers, Box 35, folder “Statement – Concerning the Bombing of Cambodia.” Impeachment Inquiry Staff Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representative, “Statement of Information Concerning the Bombing of Cambodia,” 55–57, 72, Hutchinson Papers, Box 35, folder Statement – Concerning the Bombing of Cambodia. “Sihanouk’s Role in Cambodia Bombing 1969–1970,” and “Cambodian Bombing,” NPM, NSC files, Box 11 (HAKOF), folder Cambodia – Cambodian Bombing. “Cambodian Perspectives,” March 1975, Ford Papers, Robert K. Wolthius Files, Box 1, folder Cambodian Fact Sheet; Evacuation of Phnom Penh. “Sihanouk’s Role in Cambodia Bombing 1969–1970,” and “Cambodian Bombing,” NPM, NSC files, Box 11 (HAKOF), folder Cambodia – Cambodian Bombing. Kissinger, White House Years, 250–1. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 1983), 592. Shawcross, Sideshow, 28. David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 241–42. Justin J. Corfield, Khmer Stand Up! A History of the Cambodian Government 1960–1975 (Melbourne: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), 48. Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1998), 132. Dana Orwick to USDS, 24 January 1966, Airgram A-636, RG 59, CFPF 1964–1966, Box 1967, folder General Reports & Statistics, 1/1/64, NAII. Published Sihanouk Interview, Washington Post Co., clipping, Johnson Papers, NSF–Country File–Vietnam, Boxes 92–94, folder Vietnam/Cambodia 5E (1) a. My emphasis. Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 28 December 1967, Johnson Papers, NSF–Country File–Vietnam: 5-E (1) a 5/66–1/68, Cambodia, Boxes 92–94. Karnow, Vietnam, 590. Clipping, Published Sihanouk Interview, Washington Post Co., Johnson Papers, NSF–Country File–Vietnam, Boxes 92–94, folder Vietnam/Cambodia 5E (1) a. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 29 December 1967, Tel. 1220, Series A/1838/357, Control Symbol 250/10/7/12 Pt. 1, NAA. FBIS 05 Bulletin, 7.00 p.m., 31 December 1967, Johnson Papers, NSF–Country File–Vietnam, Boxes 92–94, folder Vietnam/Cambodia 5E (2) a, 5/66–1/68. Deschamps to EXAF, 2 January 1968, Tel. 4, Series A/1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/9/4 Part 9, NAA. EXAF to all posts, 5 January 1968, Savingram A.P. 003, Series A/1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/9/4 Part 9, NAA. Text of interview, attached to John P. Walsh to Rusk, 5 January 1968, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1801, folder POL 15–1 1968, NAII. Martin (Hong Kong) to SS, 6 January 1970, Tel. 3840, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1801, folder POL 15–1 1968, NAII. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 8 January 1968, Tel. 34, Series A/1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/9/4 Part 9, NAA. Unger (for Bowles) to SS, 10 January 1968, Tel. 8561, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 2610, folder POL 7 US–Bowles 1/1/67, NAII. In a supposedly verbatim account, Sihanouk stated, We don’t want any Vietnamese in Cambodia. … We don’t mind if you go into unpopulated areas. You will both be guilty. The Viet Cong more so, and we will

178

Notes protest to both. We don’t want you to stay in Cambodia and we don’t want the Viet Cong to stay. We will be very glad if you solve our problem. We are not opposed to hot pursuit in uninhabited areas. You would be liberating us from the Viet Cong. For me only Cambodia counts. I want you to force the Viet Cong to leave Cambodia. In unpopulated areas, where there are not Cambodians, – such precise cases I would shut my eyes. … We have no objection to your coming into unpopulated areas. “Notes on Discussions between the Bowles Mission and Prince Sihanouk at Phnom Penh, January 10, 1968,” NPM, NSC files, Box 11 (HAKOF), folder Cambodia – Cambodia Bombing, NAII.

56 “The Bowles Mission to Cambodia January 8–12, 1968,” RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 2609, folder POL 7 US–Bowles 1/1/68, NAII. 57 Kissinger, White House Years, 250. 58 Bunker to SS, 7 February 1969, Tel. 2529, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder POL 15–1 CAMB, NAII. Australian Embassy Washington to Australian Embassy Phnom Penh, 26 April 1969, Tel. 108, Series A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 17, NAA. 59 Bunker to SS, 5 April 1969, Tel. 6520, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1930, folder Political Aff & Rels CAMB–US 1/1/69, NAII. 60 Canadian EXAF to Canadian Embassy Phnom Penh, 7 March 1969, Tel. Y192, Series A8183/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 10, NAA. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 11 March 1969, Tel. 379, Series A8183/280, Control Symbol 3016/10/1/2/1 Part 10, NAA. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 19 March 1969, Savingram 21, Series A8183/357, Control Symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 3, NAA. Unger to SS, 19 March 1969, Tel. 3327, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1930, folder Political Affairs & Rels CAMB–US 1/1/69, NAII. 61 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 1 April 1969 [misdated 1 March 1969], Series No. A1838/357, Control Symbol 250/10/7/12, NAA. 62 Kissinger, White House Years, 251. A FBIS translation of the press conference is included in NPM, NSC files, Box 11 (HAKOF), folder Cambodia – Cambodia Bombing, NAII. 63 FBIS translation of the press conference, NPM, NSC files, Box 11 (HAKOF), folder Cambodia – Cambodia Bombing, NAII. Kissinger, White House Years, 251. The comment about Cambodia having lost control over portions of northeastern Cambodia came from Cambodia’s finance minister Yem Sarong. Feakes to EXAF, 21 May 1969, Tel. 850, Series No. 1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 18, NAA. 64 Australian Embassy Washington to EXAF, 8 September 1969, Tel. 5878, Series No. 1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 19, NAA. Mansfield to Sihanouk, 6 September 1973, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 2155, folder POL 15, CAMB, 8–30–73, NAII. 65 Nixon to Sihanouk, in Rogers to U.S. Embassies Bangkok, Saigon, and Vientiane, 15 February 1969, Tel. 24759, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1930, File Political Affairs & Rels. CAMB–US 1/1/69, NAII. 66 Rogers to U.S. Embassies Bangkok, Saigon, and Vientiane, 15 February 1969, Tel., 24759, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1930, folder Political Aff & Rels, CAMB–US, 1/1/69, NAII. 67 USDS to U.S. Embassy London, 26 February 1969, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder POL 15–1, CAMB 1969, NAII. 68 Interview with Ambassador Noël St. Clair Deschamps. 69 Sihanouk extended the invitation to Nixon in a letter dated 31 July 1969. See John Holdridge to Kissinger, 4 August 1969, with attachments, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 2, folder Sihanouk Correspondence (2).

Notes

179

70 USDS to U.S. Embassies Phnom Penh, Saigon, 21 November 1969, Airgram CA6265, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1935, folder POL 32–1, CAMB–VIET S, 1/1/69, NAII. 71 “Appendix A: Intelligence Operations,” attached to Wheeler for the JCS to Melvin Laird, 9 April 1969, Declassified Documents Series 1979100100157. 72 Department of Defense, “Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations in Cambodia and Laos,” NPM, NSC files, Box 11 (HAKOF), folder Cambodia: Cambodia Bombing, NAII. After the withdrawal of American forces from Cambodia following the invasion in April 1970, the missions were supposed to be composed entirely of South Vietnamese personnel. 73 Marshall Green to the Acting Secretary of State, 26 September 1969, 14728, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder POL 23 CAMB, 1967, NAII. Wheeler for the JCS to Laird, 9 April 1969, Declassified Documents Series 1979100100157. Department of Defense, “Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations in Cambodia and Laos,” NPM, NSC files, Box 11 (HAKOF), folder Cambodia: Cambodia Bombing, NAII. On 9 May 1973 the Secretary of Defense directed that the next of kin be informed of the actual location of the deaths. 74 Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to Australian Embassy Washington, 29 May 1969, Tel. 375, Series No. A1838/361, Control Symbol 589/21/3/1 Part 1, NAA. 75 Charles E. Minarik et al., “A Report on Herbicide Damage to Rubber and Fruit Trees in Cambodia,” included in Bunker to USDS, 16 July 1969, Airgram A-371, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder POL 23 CAMB, 1967, NAII. Elliot Richardson to U.S. Embassy Saigon, 29 July 1969, Tel. 125538, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder POL 23 CAMB, 1967, NAII. 76 Australian Embassy Washington to Australian Embassy Phnom Penh, 11 June 1969, Tel. 170, Series No. 1838/2, Control Symbol 250/10/7/12 Part 4, NAA. The state department’s Cambodia desk officer, Thomas Corcoran, showed the confidential report to Australian diplomats. 77 Rives to SS, 28 August 1969, Tel. 32, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1931, folder POL 17 CAMB–US, 1/1/68, NAII. 78 Martin F. Herz to William H. Sullivan, 31 October 1969, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder POL 23 CAMB, 1967, NAII. 79 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 4 August 1971, Tel. 141273, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27–10 CAMB, NAII. Bunker to SS, 7 September 1971, Tel. 14311, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27–10 CAMB, NAII. 80 “Memorandum Concerning the Defoliation of Rubber Plantations and Other Agricultural Property in Cambodia,” enclosed in George H. Aldrich to Green, 6 April 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27–10 CAMB, NAII. 81 Mansfield’s report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in Australian Embassy Washington to EXAF, 22 September 1969, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 20, NAA. 82 Feakes to EXAF, 8 September 1969, Tel. 1634, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 19, NAA. Rives to SS in Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to Australian Embassy Washington, 29 November 1969, Tel. 943 (U.S. Tel. 202), Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 21, NAA. Rogers to U.S. Embassy Saigon, 2 December 1969, Tel. 200422, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1935, folder POL 32–1, CAMB–VIET S, 1/1/69, NAII. 83 Rogers to U.S. Embassy Saigon, 26 November 1969, Tel. 198182, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1935, folder POL 32–1, CAMB–VIET S, 1/1/69, NAII. The official American military report on the incident is attached to T. J. Hanifer to Laurence G. Pickering, 12 January 1970, MACJ3–06, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1935, folder POL 32–1, CAMB–VIET S, 1/1/69, NAII.

180

Notes

84 Green to Rogers, 26 November 1969, 18443, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1931, folder POL 31–1, CAMB–US, 1/1/68, NAII. 85 Yost to SS, 5 December 1969, Tel. 4438, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder POL 23 CAMB, 1967, NAII. Yost requested that his protest be passed along to Henry Kissinger, though it appears not to have been. 86 Feakes to EXAF, 8 September 1969, Tel. 1634, Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 19, NAA. 87 Rives to SS in Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to Australian Embassy Washington, 25 November 1969, Tel. 913 (to EXAF 1989), Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 21, NAA. 88 Rives to SS in Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to Australian Embassy Washington, 25 November 1969, Tel. 926 (to EXAF 2007), Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 19, NAA. Rives to SS, 9 December 1969, Tel. 231; Bunker to SS, 12 December 1969, Tel. 24572, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1935, folder POL 32–1, CAMB–VIET S, 1/1/69, NAII. 89 Rives to SS, 11 December 1969, Tel. 236, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder POL 15–1, CAMB 1969, NAII. Rives to SS, 29 December 1969, Tel. 274, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1935, folder POL 32–1, CAMB–VIET S, 1/1/69, NAII. 90 Bunker to SS, 14 October 1969, Tel. 20643, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1804, folder POL 27–14, CAMB, 2–1–68, NAII. 91 Rives to USDS, 11 December 1969, Airgram A-82, RG 59, SNF 1967–1969, Box 1803, folder POL 2 CAMB, 1–1–68, NAII. Australian Embassy Phnom Penh to EXAF, 23 October 1969, Series No. A1838/280, Control Symbol 3016/9/4 Part 13, NAA. 92 Norodom Sihanouk, My War with the CIA: The Memoirs of Prince Norodom Sihanouk (New York: Pantheon, 1972). Memorandum of Conversation, Suharto and Nixon, 26 May 1970, enclosed in Alexander M. Haig to Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., 3 June 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 6/1//70, NAII. Richard Nixon, “Cambodia Concluded: Now It’s Time to Negotiate. A Report to the Nation by Richard Nixon President of the United States June 30, 1970,” 8. Kissinger Background Briefing, 16 May 1970, enclosed in Rogers to various posts, 20 May 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155D, folder POL 27 CAMB 5/19/70, NAII. 93 Author’s interview with Evelyn Colbert, January 2000, Washington, D.C. At the time of Sihanouk’s dismissal, Colbert had become director of INR and was therefore less directly involved in Southeast Asian matters. 94 Kiernan, “The Impact on Cambodia,” 219–21. 95 Wilfred P. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970–1975 (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1997), 59–66. 96 Shawcross, Sideshow, 112, 122. 97 Chandler, Tragedy, 190. Personal communication with David Chandler, 8 June 2000. Deac contends that there were no CIA agents in Cambodia prior to Sihanouk’s ouster. Road to the Killing Fields, 62–3. 98 Milton Osborne, Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 202, 215. 99 Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 198–9. 100 Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, 52–3. 101 Rives to SS, 7 January 1970, Tel. 13, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2153, folder POL 7 CAMB, 1–1–70, NAII. Shawcross, Sideshow, 116. 102 Rives to USDS, 5 February 1970, Airgram A-32, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155, folder POL 14 CAMB, 8–16–71, NAII. 103 “Les Agents de la CIA dans le Monde,” Sangkum (September 1969), 54–62, in Series No. A1838/334, Control Symbol 3016/11/161 Part 20, NAA.

Notes

181

104 Rives to USDS, 5 February 1970, Airgram A-32, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155, folder POL 14 CAMB, 8–16–71, NAII. 105 H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the White House (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1994), 143. 106 Corfield makes a strong case that Sirik Matak was “the major plotter.” Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, 54. 107 Secretary of Defense to CINCPAC, COMUSMACHTAI, and U.S. Embassy Bangkok, 15 March 1970, NPM, NSC Files, Box 588, Cambodian Operations (1970), folder Highjack & Detention of Columbia Eagle (Cambodia), NAII. 108 AP dispatch, “Columbia Eagle,” NPM, NSC files, Box 588, Cambodia Operations (1970), folder Hijack & Detention Columbia Eagle (Cambodia), NAII. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 64. 109 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 273. I am grateful to columnist William Pfaff for calling this quotation to my attention. See William Pfaff, “Cambodia Invasion Reminder of U.S. Political Use of Military,” Chicago Tribune, 23 April 2000. 110 Emory Swank to USDS, 25 May 1972, Airgram A-78, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2153, folder POL 2 CAMB, 1–1–72, NAII. This dispatch was entitled, “The Anthropological Lon Nol.” 111 Laird to Rogers, 31 March 1970, in possession of Julio A. Jeldres. I am grateful to Ambassador Jeldres for sharing this important letter with me. 112 Antara, quoted in Francis Joseph Galbraith to SS, 23 April 1970, Tel. 2872, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 4/1/70, NAII. 113 U.S. Embassy Jakarta to SS, 26 April 1970, Tel. 2931, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 4/1/70, NAII. 114 Rogers to U.S. Embassies Bangkok et al., 23 April 1970, Tel. 61076, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155B, folder POL 27 CAMB–US, 4/20/70, NAII. 115 The 1500 AK-47s are referred to in Rives to SS (for Green), 16 April 1970, Tel. T555, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 1694, folder DEF 12–5 CAMB 1/1/71, NAII. “Cambodia to Get Rifles from U.S.,” New York Times, 23 April 1970, 1. 116 USDS to U.S. Embassies Bangkok, Jakarta, Phnom Penh, and Saigon, 23 April 1970, Tel. 61378, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155J, folder POL 27 CAMB–KHMER 4/20/70, NAII. 117 Berger to SS, 11 May 1970, Tel. 7237, NPM, NSC Files, Box 589: Cambodian Operations (1970), folder CAMBODIA NODIS/KHMER CHRON VOL II (thru 25 May 70), NAII. 118 Rogers to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 25 April 1970, Tel. 62423, NPM, NSC Files, Box 589: Cambodian Operations, folder CAMBODIA NODIS/KHMER, NAII. Bunker to SS, 29 April 1970, Tel. 6516, NPM, NSC Files, Box 588: Cambodian Operations, folder CAMBODIA NODIS/KHMER, NAII. Shawcross, Sideshow, 131. 119 Rives to SS, 2 May 1970, Tel. 704, NPM, NSC Files, Box 589: Cambodian Operations (1970), folder CAMBODIA NODIS/KHMER, NAII. 120 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 30 March 1972, Airgram A-49, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 12 CAMB 2–5–71, NAII 121 Berger to SS, 5 May 1970, Tel. 6853, NPM, NSC Files, Box 589: Cambodian Operations (1970), folder CAMBODIA NODIS/KHMER, NAII. 122 Rogers to U.S. Embassy Saigon (for Bunker or Berger and Abrams), 4 May 1970, Tel. 67434, NPM, NSC Files, Box 589: Cambodian Operations (1970), folder CAMBODIA NODIS/KHMER, NAII. Berger to SS, 5 May 1970, Tel. 6835, NPM, NSC Files, Box 589: Cambodian Operations (1970), folder CAMBODIA NODIS/KHMER, NAII. 123 Galbraith to SS, 4 April 1970, Tel. 2358, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155B, folder POL 27 CAMB–US 4/1/70, NAII.

182

Notes

124 Galbraith to SS, 15 April 1970, Tel. 2645, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155B, folder POL 27 CAMB–US 4/10/70, NAII. Galbraith to SS (for Assistant Secretary Green), 24 April 1970, Tel. 2920, NPM, NSC Files, Box 589: Cambodian Operations, folder CAMBODIA NODIS/KHMER, NAII. 125 USDS to U.S. Embassy Jakarta, 24 April 1970, Tel. 61607, NPM, NSC Files, Box 589: Cambodian Operations, folder CAMBODIA NODIS/KHMER, NAII. Eliot to Kissinger, “Daily Report on Cambodia No. 4,” 29 April 1970, NPM, NSC Files, Box 590: Cambodian Operations (1970), folder CAMBODIA NODIS/KHMER, NAII. 126 Unger to SS (for Green), 6 April 1970, Tel. 4057, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155B, folder POL 27 CAMB–US 4/1/70, NAII. 127 Intelligence Brief INRB-94, 13 April 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2817, folder POL 27 VIET S 4/1/70, NAII. 128 Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 152. Shawcross, Sideshow, 134–9. 129 Rogers to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 27 April 1970, NPM, NSC Files, Box 590: Cambodian Operations 1970, folder CAMBODIA NODIS/KHMER, NAII. 130 See Haldeman’s handwritten notes of a meeting with Rogers, Laird, Kissinger, and the President in the Executive Office Building, 27 April 1970, in NPM, Haldeman Handwritten Notes, Box 41, folder H. Notes April–June ’70 [1 April–5 May 1970], Part I, NAII. 131 Rives to SS, 5 May 1970, Tel. 746, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155C, folder POL 27 CAMB 5/5/70, NAII. This telegram includes a report from Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers James Lowenstein and Richard Moose. 132 “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia. April 30, 1970,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), 407. 133 Memorandum for the Record, “Remarks by Henry A. Kissinger to Senators and Representatives, on the Cambodian Decision,” 12 May 1970, NPM, NSC Files, Box 585: Cambodia Operations (1970), folder Cambodia: HAK Meeting with Senators and Representatives 5/12/70, NAII. Kissinger Background Briefing, 16 May 1970, enclosed in Rogers to various posts, 20 May 1970, Tel. 76725, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155D, folder POL 27 CAMB 5/19/70, NAII. 134 Kissinger, Press Briefing, 30 June 1970, p. 6, NPM, NSC files, Box 586, folder Cambodia – White Paper, Final Report, 3 June 70, NAII. 135 Haldeman Handwritten Notes, 2 May [1970], NPM, NSC Files, Box 41: folder H. Notes from April to June ’70 [1 April–5 May 1970], Part I, NAII. 136 Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries, 161–2. 137 Rogers to Nixon, 15 May 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155C, folder POL 27 CAMB 5/15/70, NAII. Henry Byroade to SS, 1 May 1970, Tel. 3955, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155B, folder POL 27 CAMB 5/1/70, NAII. Kenneth B. Keating to SS, 5 May 1970, Tel. 5251, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155C, folder POL 27 CAMB 5/1/70, NAII. 138 Galbraith to SS, 1 May 1970, Tel. 3116, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155B, folder POL 27 CAMB 5/1/70, NAII. Memorandum of Conversation, Suharto, Nixon, Kissinger, 26 May 1970, enclosed in Haig to Eliot, 3 June 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 6/1/70, NAII. 139 J. William Fulbright to Rogers, 30 April 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155D, folder POL 27 CAMB 5/30/70, NAII. Christopher Emmet, “The Missing Element in the Cambodian Debate” (typescript), n.d., Ford Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Box 1970, folder Foreign Affairs. 140 H. Res. 1000 – Cosponsors, Hartmann Papers, Box 38, folder Cambodia (2). Ten Republicans were among the 78 signatories. 141 Statement by Gerald R. Ford, 11 June 1970, Hartmann Papers, Box 38, folder Cambodia (3).

Notes

183

142 Harlan Cleveland to Nixon, 4 May 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155D, folder POL 27 CAMB 5/13/70, NAII. 143 Manifesto, “Liberation, Not Pacification,” Hartmann Papers, Box 38, folder Cambodia (1). Nixon took a personal interest in the careers of those who had signed the letter of protest. Though he doubtless would have sacked them all if he could have, their careers do not seem to have suffered permanently. See Rogers to Nixon, 4 December 1970, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 1, folder Cambodia: Foreign Service Officers letter of Protest, 12/4/70. 144 Pete Hamill, “The Last Press Conference,” New York Post, 5 May 1970, in NPM, Haldeman Files, Box 116, folder Cambodia, NAII. Haldeman Notes, 3 May 1970, NPM, Haldeman Handwritten Notes, Box 41: folder H. Notes from April to June ’70 [1 April–5 May 1970], Part I, NAII. 145 Charles McWhorter to John Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Herbert Klein, Leonard Garment, and Bud Keogh, 6 May 1970, NPM, Haldeman Files, Box 116: Staff Members and Office File, folder H. Notes from April to June ’70 [1 April–5 May 1970], Part I, NAII. Haldeman to Nixon, 8 May 1970, NPM, Haldeman Files, Box 116: Staff Members and Office File, folder Cambodia Part III, NAII. 146 Haldeman to Lyn Nofziger, 14 May 1970, NPM, Haldeman Handwritten Notes, Box 60: Office & Memoranda Files: Alpha Name, folder May–June 1970 N–Z, NAII. 147 Haldeman to Klein, 14 May 1970, NPM, Haldeman Handwritten Notes, Box 60: Office & Memoranda Files: Alpha Name, folder May–June 1970 H–M, NAII. 148 Haldeman Notes, 7 May, 13 May 1970, NPM, Haldeman Handwritten Notes, Box 41, folder H. Notes April–June ’70 [6 May–30 June 1970], Part II, NAII. 149 Rives to SS, 8 June 1970, Tel. 1171, NPM, Box 589, NSC Files: Cambodia Operations (1970), folder Cambodia: NODIS/KHMER, CHRON Vol. III, NAII. Nickel to SS, 19 June 1970, Tel. 9704, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155E, folder POL 27 CAMB 6/18/70, NAII. 150 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 9 June 1970, Tel. 1176, Nixon Papers, Box 589, NSC Files Cambodian Operations (1970), Folder Cambodia: NODIS/KHMER, CHRON Vol. III, 26 May–10 June, NAII. At almost exactly the same time, COSVN officials analyzed the situation from their perspective and arrived at similar judgments. Department of Intelligence Information Report 6 028 0864 70, 18 September 1970, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Staff: Files, (1969), 1973–1996, Box 1, Country File, folder Cambodia – Institutional (2), Ford Papers. 151 “Washington Special Actions Group Meeting with the President,” 15 June 1970, in Kissinger to U. Alexis Johnson, David Packard, Thomas H. Moorer, and Richard Helms, 17 June 1970, NPM, NSC Files, Box 13, folder Cambodia, NAII. See also Rogers to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 18 June 1970, Tel. 95725, NPM, Box 589, NSC Files: Cambodia Operations (1970), folder Cambodia: NODIS/KHMER, HAK Copy, CHRON Vol. III, NAII. 152 Abrams to Wheeler, 24 June 1970, Tel. 0241233Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155K, folder CAMB–KHMER 6/12/70, NAII. Kissinger to Nixon, 30 June 1970, NPM, NSC Files, Box 581, folder Actions on Cambodia, Vol. V, NAII. 153 Galbraith to SS, 15 May 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 5/16/70, NAII. 154 Cross to SS, 21 May 1970, Tel. 1018, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 5/20/70, NAII. Galbraith to SS, 18 May 1970, Tel. 3599, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 5/16/70, NAII. Galbraith to SS (for Green), 18 May 1970, Tel. 3601, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155D, folder POL 27 CAMB 5/16/70, NAII.

184

Notes

155 Rogers to Nixon, 22 May 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 5/20/70, NAII. “Washington Special Actions Group Meeting with the President,” 15 June 1970, in Kissinger to U. Alexis Johnson, David Packard, Thomas H. Moorer, and Richard Helms, 17 June 1970, NPM, NSC Files, Box 13, folder Cambodia, NAII. 156 “Talking Points,” in Green to the Acting Secretary of State, 27 May 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 5/20/70, NAII. Galbraith to SS (for Green), 20 May 1970, Tel. 3661, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155K, folder POL CAMB–KHMER 5/14/70, NAII. 157 USDS to U.S. Embassy Jakarta, 30 May 1970, Tel. 83304, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155K, folder POL CAMB–KHMER 5/14/70, NAII. Memorandum of Conversation, Suharto, Nixon and Kissinger, 26 May 1970, enclosed in Haig to Eliot, 3 June 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 6/1//70, NAII. Rogers to U.S. Embassy Jakarta, 6 June 1970, Tel. 87970, NPM, Box 590, NSC Files: Cambodia Operations (1970), folder Cambodia: NODIS/KHMER, HAK Copy, CHRON Vol. III, NAII. 158 Memorandum of Conversation, H. Alamsjah, Kissinger, Holdridge, 27 May 1970, enclosed in Haig to Eliot, 3 June 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 6/1/70, NAII. Memorandum of Conversation, Suharto, Nixon, Kissinger, 28 May 1970, enclosed in Haig to Eliot, 3 June 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 6/1/70, NAII. 159 Memorandum of Conversation, Alamsjah, Kissinger, Holdridge, 27 May 1970, enclosed in Haig to Eliot, 3 June 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2372, folder POL 7 INDON 6/1/70, NAII. 160 Purnell to SS (for Green), 9 June 1970, Tel. 4241, NPM, Box 589, NSC Files: Cambodia Operations (1970), folder Cambodia: NODIS/KHMER, CHRON Vol. III, NAII. 161 Galbraith to SS, 2 July 1970, Tel. 4949, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155K, folder POL 27 CAMB–KHMER 7/1/70, NAII. 162 Purnell to SS, 9 July 1970, Tel. 5114, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155K, folder POL 27 CAMB–KHMER 7/1/70, NAII. 163 Swank to SS, 9 October 1971, Tel. 5090, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB 8/1/71, NAII. The United States did, however, stay in contact with the Indonesian training effort through unspecified “special channels.” See U.S. Embassy Jakarta to SS, 18 May 1972, Tel. 4805, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1694, folder DEF 19–9 INDON–CAMB, 1/1/70, NAII. 164 Report, “FANK after Chenla II,” enclosed with Corcoran to Green, 24 January 1972, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1693, folder DEF 1–8 CAMB 1/1/70, NAII. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Note, “Indonesia: The Frustrations of Indochina Policy,” 23 February 1972, REAN-24, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155J, folder POL CAMB–INDIA, NAII. 165 SS to White House, 30 August 1970, Tel. P 301920Z, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1996, Box 2, Country file, folder Cambodia–NSSM 99 (1). 166 CINCPAC to JCS and Secretary of Defense, 19 November 1970, Tel. P 190341Z NOV 70, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155L, folder POL 27 CAMB–KHMER 10/6/70, NAII. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Indonesia: The Frustrations of Indochina Policy.” 167 Unger to SS, 12 June 1970, Tel. 1232, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155K, folder POL CAMB–KHMER 6/12/70, NAII. Unger to SS, 10 June 1970, Tel. 7135, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155K, folder POL CAMB–KHMER 6/6/70, NAII. 168 Robert C. Brewster, Memorandum for the Record of a telephone call from Haig, 18 June 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155E, folder POL 27 CAMB 6/18/70, NAII. Unger to SS, 20 June 1970, Tel. 7610, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155K, folder POL CAMB–KHMER 6/12/70, NAII.

Notes

185

169 Unger to SS, 14 July 1970, Tel. 8770, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155K, folder POL 27 CAMB–KHMER 7/1/70, NAII. Unger to SS, 14 July 1970, Tel. 8775, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155L, folder POL CAMB–THAI, NAII. Unger to SS, 26 April 1972, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/21/72, NAII. 170 Unger to SS, 25 July 1970, Tel. 9271, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2153, folder POL 7 CAMB 1–1–70, NAII. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 84. 171 U.S. Embassy Bangkok to SS, 7 August 1970, Tel. 9931, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155K, folder POL 27 CAMB–KHMER 8/1/70, NAII. 172 Unger to SS, 23 May 1970, Tel. 6296, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155K, folder POL CAMB–KHMER 5/14/70, NAII. 173 Swank to SS, 20 May 1972, Tel. 3074, SNF 1970–1973, Box 1694, folder DEF 13 CAMB, 1/1/70, NAII. 174 Rogers to U.S. Embassies Athens, Ankara, Tehran, and Jidda, 29 July 1970, Tel. 121485, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 1852, folder DEF 19 US–CAMB 6/1/70, NAII. Ronald I. Spiers to U. Alexis Johnson, 21 August 1970, enclosed in Eliot to Kissinger, 21 August 1970, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 1852, folder DEF 19 US–CAMB 6/1/70, NAII. 175 James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, “Cambodia: December 1970,” Congressional Record – Senate, 16 December 1970, S 20290. 176 K. Wayne Smith to Kissinger, 14 September 1970, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 2, folder Cambodia – NSSM 99 (1). 177 Transcript, Senior Review Group Meeting, 15 September 1970, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 2, folder Cambodia – NSSM 99 (1). 178 Smith to Kissinger, 14 September 1970, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 2, folder Cambodia – NSSM 99 (1). Transcript, Senior Review Group Meeting, 15 September 1970, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 2, folder Cambodia – NSSM 99 (1). 179 Transcripts, Senior Review Group Meetings, 15 September 1970 and 16 October 1970, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 2, folder Cambodia – NSSM 99 (1). 180 Kissinger, Press Briefing, 30 June 1970, p. 3, NPM, NSC files, Box 586, folder Cambodia – White Paper, Final Report, 3 June 70, NAII. Kissinger to Nixon, n.d., “U.S. Tactical Air Strikes in Cambodia,” NPM, Box 587, NSC Files: Cambodia Operations (1970), folder Air Support in Cambodia, NAII. Nixon’s comments are in a handwritten note on the memorandum. 181 Rives to SS, 6 August 1970, Tel. 1870, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155F, folder POL 27 CAMB 8/1/70, NAII. 182 Rives to SS, 16 August 1970, Tel. 2015, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155F, folder POL 27 CAMB 8/15/70, NAII. Kissinger to Nixon, 14 September 1970, NPM, NSC Files, Box 587, NSC Files, folder Air Support in Cambodia, NAII. Attachment to Laird to Kissinger, 16 August 1970, NPM, NSC Files, Box 581, folder Actions in Cambodia, Vol. VI, NAII. Impeachment Inquiry Staff, Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, “Statement of Information Concerning the Bombing of Cambodia,” 92, Hutchinson Papers, Box 35, folder Statement – Concerning the Bombing of Cambodia. 183 JCS to CINCPAC, [2 September 1970], Tel. unnumbered, NPM, NSC files, Box 587, folder Air Support in Cambodia, NAII Lowenstein and Moose, Cambodia: December 1970. 184 Diary Entry, Merle Graven, 31 October 1970, RG 809 – Cambodia, Box 4, folder 10, CMAA. Rives to SS (for Swank), 18 August 1970, Tel. 2037, RG 59, SNF

186

Notes 1970–1973, Box 2155M, folder POL 1 CAMB–US, NAII. An American map dated 10 October 1970 indicates that the Cambodian government controlled about 25 percent of the country. Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, (1969) 1973–1996, Box 2, Country file, folder Cambodia – NSSM 99 (2).

2 Sticking with Lon Nol 1 U.S. Embassy Kuala Lumpur to SS, 7 February 1973, Tel. 472, NPM, NSC Files, Box 952, folder Vice-President’s SEA Visit, 28 Jan.–10 Feb. 1973 [3 of 3], NAII. 2 Emory Swank to SS, 11 November 1972, Tel. 7801, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155A, folder POL 15–1 CAMB. 6–22–72, NAII. 3 Lon Nol to Nixon, 31 December 1970, enclosed in U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 6 January 1971, Airgram A-4, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155F, folder POL 27 CAMB 1/1/71, NAII. 4 Swank to SS, 7 January 1971, Tel. 72, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155F, folder POL 27 CAMB 1/1/71, NAII. 5 Swank to SS, 22 January 1971, Tel. 280, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155F, folder POL 27 CAMB 1/1/71, NAII. Figures on the number of planes destroyed and damaged are from Secretary Rogers’ report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Rogers to Fulbright, 16 February 1971, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB 2/1/71, NAII. Wilfred Deac states that no Vietnamese planes were damaged, but Rogers reported otherwise to the Senate committee. Wilfred Deac, Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970–1975 (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1997), 99. 6 Swank to SS, 25 January 1971, Tel. 328, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155F, folder POL 27 CAMB 1/1/71, NAII. 7 Jack W. Lydman to SS, 10 January 1971, Tel. 548, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2154, folder POL 7 CAMB 1/1/71, NAII. 8 Haldeman Notes, 29 January 1971, 8 February 1971, 9 February 1971, NPM, Haldeman Handwritten Notes, Box 43, folder H. Notes Jan.–March ’71, Part I [1 Jan. 1971–15 Feb. 1971], NAII. 9 Haldeman Notes, 8 February 1971, 9 February 1971, NPM, Haldeman Handwritten Notes, Box 43, folder H. Notes Jan.–March ’71, Part I [1 Jan. 1971–15 Feb. 1971], NAII. Haldeman Notes, 19 February 1971, Box 43, folder H. Notes Jan.–March ’71, Part II [15 Feb. 1971–10 March 1971], NAII. It is possible that the comments about Kissinger’s staff are Haig’s rather than Nixon’s. The notes are not entirely clear on this point. 10 Robert C. Odle, Jr. to Haldeman, 19 February 1971, NPM, Haldeman Files, Box 74, Alpha Names Files A–Z, February–March 1971, folder Robert Odle Files, Feb. 1971, NAII. No such article appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1971 or 1972. 11 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 21 October 1971, Tel. 5328, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1693, folder DEF 9–3 CAMB, 1/1/70, NAII. Swank to SS, 25 November 1971, Tel. 6031, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155M, folder POL 1 CAMB–US, NAII. 12 Stearns to SS, 9 July 1971, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1854, folder DEF 19–9 US–CAMB, 1/1/71, NAII. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 107. Irwin to SS, for Green and Thomas Pickering to U. Alexis Johnson and Ronald I. Spiers, 24 May 1971, Tel. 3597, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1853, folder DEF 19–8 US–CAMB, 1/21/71, NAII. 13 US Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 25 June 1971, Tel. 3101, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1854, folder DEF 19–9 US–CAMB, 1/21/71, NAII. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 97–98,104–5.

Notes

187

14 Swank to SS, 12 April 1971, Tel. 1740, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2154, folder POL 7 CAMB 7/1/71, NAII. 15 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 5 June 1971, Tel. 99718, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB, 5/1/71, NAII. Irwin, USDS, to Swank, 9 June 1971, Tel. 101807, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155L, folder POL 1 CAMB–US 6/9/71, NAII. 16 Memorandum of Conversation with Sim Var, 13 July 1971, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to USDS, 13 July 1971, Airgram A-101, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155J, folder POL CAMB–INDIA, NAII. 17 Some Observations on the Political Situation in Cambodia, enclosed in Thomas Enders to USDS, 15 July 1971, Airgram A-109, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 12 CAMB 2–5–71, NAII. 18 Swank to SS, 7 January 1972, Tel. 103, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB 1/1/72, NAII. 19 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 12 August 1971, Tel. 147225, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2154, folder POL 7 CAMB 6/1/71, NAII. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Note, “Cambodia: Communist Political Efforts – Progress and Problems,” 16 August 1971, REAN-43, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB 8/1/71, NAII. Sam Adams, “Vietnam Cover-up: Playing War with Numbers,” Harper’s, May 1975, 72. Because of his estimates respecting both the Viet Cong and the Khmer insurgents, Adams was progressively isolated within the Agency and eventually resigned. He contended that there was strong political pressure to keep the numbers unrealistically – and dishonestly – low. 20 Swank to SS, 25 November 1971, Tel. 6031, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155M, folder POL 1 CAMB–US, NAII. 21 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 3 July 1971, Tel. 120357, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1852, folder DEF 19 US–CAMB 1/1/71, NAII. 22 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 3 July 1971, Tel. 120357, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1852, folder DEF 19 US–CAMB 1/1/71, NAII. 23 Enders to SS, 26 July 1971, Tel. 3640, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1853, folder DEF 19–8 US–CAMB 5/8/70, NAII. The telegram was addressed to Swank, who was then in Washington. It is probable that Swank was able to recover the weapons. 24 Newsweek, quoted in USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 14 October 1971, Tel. 188137, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1852, folder DEF 19 US–CAMB 1/1/71, NAII. 25 Francis J. Tatu to Edward L. Peck, 2 May 1972, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1853, folder DEF 19–8 US–CAMB, 1/21/72, NAII. 26 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 22 January 1972, Tel. 12694, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1853, folder DEF 19–8 US–CAMB 1/21/72, NAII. 27 Swank to USDS (for Green), 25 January 1972, Tel. 489, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1853, folder DEF 19–8 CAMB 1/21/72, NAII. 28 Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 114–17. David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 214. Diary entry, Merle Graven, 23 November 1971, RG 809 – Cambodia, Box 4, folder 10, CMAA. 29 Swank to SS, 6 December 1971, Tel. 5771, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files (1969) 1973–1996, Box 2, Country File, folder Cambodia – NSSM 152 (1). Swank doubtless drew his conclusion in part from interviews conducted by the embassy’s military attaché’s conducted with Cambodian military officials who strongly criticized Lon Nol’s leadership. See Defense Attaché Cambodia to General Bennet, 6 December 1971, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 2, folder Cambodia – NSSM 152 (1).

188

Notes

30 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 4 March 1972, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1854, folder DEF 19–9 CAMB 1/1/70, NAII. Nixon to SS and the Director, United States Information Agency, 15 March 1972, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1852, folder DEF 19 US–CAMB 1/1/71, NAII. The total MAP funds worldwide were $500 million. 31 Swank to SS, 3 October 1970, Tel. 2604, in SS to USOFF LIMERICK, 4 October 1970, Tel. 163397, Ford Papers, NSC Convenience Files, Copies of Materials from the U.S. Embassy, Saigon: 1963–75 (1976), Box 9, folder NODIS-CHEROKEE: From SECSTATE, Sept. 13 1970 to Dec. 16, 1970 (2). For an analysis of the Nixon peace proposal, see Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 233–6. 32 Lon Nol to Nixon, 22 May 1971, in U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 27 May 1971, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1852, folder DEF 19 US–CAMB 1/1/71, NAII. 33 Swank to SS, 25 July 1971, Tel. 3606, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB 5/1/71, NAII. 34 Memorandum of Conversation, John Boyd and Mark Pratt, 22 September 1971, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30 CAMB, NAII. 35 Theodore L. Eliot to Kissinger, 7 October 1971, and attached British telegram, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB 7/1/70, NAII. 36 U.S. Embassy Rome to SS, 14 December 1971, Tel. 7829, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155L, folder POL 30–2 CAMB 1/2/71, NAII. 37 Beam to SS, 21 January 1972, Tel. 638, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155L, folder POL CAMB–US 1/32 [sic]/72, NAII. 38 Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 290. Memorandum of Conversation, Green, Son Voeunsai, and Rives, 11 September 1972, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1694, folder DEF 13 CAMB 1/1/70, NAII. Ker Chhieng, who defected from the insurgent movement in 1973, also stated that “President Nixon refused to see Sihanouk when the President visited China.” Swank to USDS, 6 February 1973, Airgram A-21, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB 2–2–73, NAII. 39 Quoted in Chandler, Tragedy, 213. 40 Swank to SS, 25 August 1972, Tel. 5584, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB 1/1/72, NAII. 41 U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 1 January 1972, Tel. 630, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155M, folder POL CAMB–USSR, NAII. Nixon’s letter to Lon Nol is in SS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 23 August 1972, Tel. 153893, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27–14 CAMB 7/1/70, NAII. 42 Swank to SS, 4 February 1972, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB 1/1/72, NAII. 43 Swank to SS, 24 February 1972, Tel. 1068, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155M, folder POL CAMB VIET N, NAII. 44 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 25 February 1972, Tel. 32371, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155M, folder POL CAMB–VIET N, NAII. 45 Telegram to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, attached to R. T. Curran, Memorandum for the Record, 6 March 1972, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB 1/1/72, NAII. 46 Swank to SS, 10 March 1972, Tel. 1420, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27–14 CAMB, NAII. When the story came out the next month, the state department disingenuously denied that it had warned the Cambodian government not to accept Soviet assistance in arranging a peace settlement. SS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 17 April 1972, Tel. 55193, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/21/72, NAII. 47 Despite the strong American intervention, some desultory discussions between the Cambodians and the Soviet embassy continued. But they were apparently nonproductive, “somewhat aimless dialogue,” according to Swank. Swank to SS, 25

Notes

48 49 50

51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69

189

May 1972, Tel. 3210, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155M, folder POL CAMB–USSR, NAII. Swank to SS, 27 April 1972, Tel. 2472, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155M, folder POL 1 CAMB–US, NAII. “Cambodia: Military Assessment,” NSSM-152, 20 April 1972, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser: NSC Staff for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 2, folder Cambodia – NSSM 152 (3). “Cambodia: Political Stability and Prospects for Change and Implications for the Military Situation,” NSSM-152, 24 April 1972, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser: NSC Staff for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 2, folder Cambodia – NSSM 152 (5). CINCPAC to JCS, 1 June 1972, Tel. 7738, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/21/72, NAII. Enders to SS, 17 September 1972, Tel. 6191, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155A, folder POL 15–1 CAMB, 6–22–72, NAII. Elizabeth G. Verville to William H. Sullivan, 2 October 1972, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 1854, folder DEF 19–9 US–CAMB, 1/1/70, NAII. Chandler, Tragedy, 221. Swank to USDS, 20 February 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/15/73, NAII. Justin J. Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!: A History of the Cambodian Government 1970–1975 (Melbourne, Australia: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 150–1. Swank to USDS, 20 February 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/15/73, NAII. Swank to SS, 12 June 1972, Tel. 3657, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2153, folder POL 2 CAMB, 1–1–72, NAII. Enders to SS, 5 October 1972, Tel. 6766, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 12–8–70, NAII. USDS to various posts, 7 September 1972, circular telegram 163558, RG 59, SNF 1970–1973, Box 2154, folder POL 7 CAMB, 9/1/72, NAII. Nixon to Lon Nol, 12 September 1972, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155A, folder POL 15–1 CAMB, 6–22–72, NAII. Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, 174. USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh (Green for Swank), 10 January 1973, Tel. 5088, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155L, folder POL CAMB–US, 1/3/73, NAII. Enders to SS, 7 October 1972, Tel. 6812, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 7/1/72, NAII. Enders to SS et al., 15 October 1972, Tel. 7008, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1693, folder DEF 1–8 CAMB, 1/1/70, NAII. Briefing Paper, “Cambodia: Issues and Talking Points,” enclosed in Theodore L. Eliot Jr. to Kissinger, 27 January 1973, NPM, NSC Files, Box 952, folder VicePresident’s SEA Visit, 28 Jan.–10 Feb. 1973 [1 of 3], NAII. William Shawcross, “The Third Indochina War,” New York Review of Books, 6 April 1978, 16. “Cambodia Background,” enclosed with Kissinger to Spiro Agnew, 30 January 1973, NPM, NSC Files, Box 952, folder Vice-President’s SEA Visit, 28 Jan.–10 Feb. 1973 [2 of 3], NAII. Lon Nol to Nixon, included in U.S. Embassy to SS, 26 October 1972, Tel. 7298, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155A, folder POL 15–1 CAMB, 6–22–72, NAII. Memorandum of Conversation, Lon Nol, Hang Tun Hak, Alexander Haig, Emory Swank, Thomas Enders, and John Negroponte, 12 November 1972; included in Negroponte to Haig, n.d., Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files (1969), 1973–1976, Box 15, folder Lon Nol (1) [Cambodia]. SS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 24 October 1972, Tel. 193463, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155G, folder POL 27 CAMB, 7/1/72, NAII.

190

Notes

70 Enders to SS, 15 November 1972, Tel. 7911, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27–14 CAMB, 7/1/70, NAII. 71 Enders to SS, 12 September 1972, Tel. 6057, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2153, folder POL 2 CAMB, 7–31–72, NAII. 72 Lydman to SS, 1 November 1972, Tel. 3835, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2154, folder POL 7 CAMB, 11/1/72, NAII. 73 Enders to SS, 24 October 1972, Tel. 7265, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2153, folder POL 2 CAMB, 7–31–72, NAII. William Eagleton to SS, 2 November 1972, Tel. 1898, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155L, folder POL CAMB–US, 1/32 [sic]/72, NAII. 74 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 1414–15. “Cambodian Negotiations–1973,” Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 1. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 16–17. William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York: The New Press, 1998), 103. 75 William Shawcross, “The Third Indochina War,” New York Review of Books, 6 April 1978, 22. 76 Swank to SS, 2 February 1973, Tel. 979, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB, 2/2/73, NAII. Swank to SS, 3 February 1973, Tel. 1005, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/15/73, NAII. 77 Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930–1975 (London: Verso, 1985), 360–1. David L. Osborn to SS, 9 February 1973, Tel. 1326, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB, 2/2/73, NAII. 78 Swank to SS, 13 February 1973, Tel. 1319, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB, 2/2/73, NAII. Osborn to SS, 13 February 1973, Tel. 1425, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 27–14 CAMB, 11/30/72, NAII. Swank to SS, 22 February 1973, Tel. 1605, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155J, folder POLITICAL AFF. & RELS, CAMB–A, NAII. 79 Memcon, Zhou Enlai, Henry Kissinger et al., 16 February 1973, Burr, ed., Kissinger Transcripts, 103–9. 80 Osborn to SS, 15 March 1973, Tel. 2532, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 27–14 CAMB, 11/30/72, NAII. 81 Swank to SS, 24 February 1973, Tel. 1702, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB, 2/2/73, NAII. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 417, 422–3n30. Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 33, 230n26. Hu Nim also fell out of favor with the Pol Pot regime and was incarcerated in the infamous Tuol Sleng where, like the other prisoners there, he confessed under torture and was killed. Of the three, Khieu Samphan alone survived. 82 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 1 February 1973, Tel. 19738, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 27–14 CAMB, 11/30/72, NAII. 83 The White House to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, 15 February 1973, NPM, NSC File, Box 592, folder Vice-President’s SEA Visit, 28 Jan.–10 Feb. 1973 [1 of 3], NAII. USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 1 February 1973, Tel. 19738, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 27–14 CAMB, 11/30/72, NAII. 84 Swank to SS, 22 February 1973, Tel. 1614, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/15/73, NAII. 85 Swank to SS, 27 February 1973, Tel. 1799, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1693, folder DEF 1–8 CAMB, 1/1/70, NAII. 86 Swank to SS, 6 March 1973, Tel. 2027, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 1–25–73, NAII.

Notes

191

87 Swank to SS, 6 March 1973, Tel. 2027, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 1–25–73, NAII. 88 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh (Green to Swank), 8 March 1973, Tel. 43233, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 1–25–73, NAII. 89 Swank to SS (eyes only for Green), 9 March 1973, Tel. 2141, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 1–25–73, NAII. 90 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 15 March 1973, Tel. 47710, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155A, folder POL 15–1 CAMB, 1–3–73, NAII. 91 Swank to SS, 16 March 1973, Tel. 2355, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 1–25–73, NAII. 92 Swank to SS, 17 March 1973, Tel. 2436, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/15/73, NAII. 93 Swank to SS, 17 March 1973, Tel. 2436, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/15/73, NAII. In June So Photra was part of an official GRUNK delegation, headed by Sihanouk, which visited Belgrade. 94 Swank to SS, 20 March 1973, Tel. 2507, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2153, folder POL 2 CAMB, 1–2–73, NAII. Keo An, members of the royal family, and most other political prisoners were released at the end of May. There were rumors that some of the student-teacher strike leaders were executed and that others fled to the maquis. 95 For example, Swank to SS, 24 March 1973, Tel. 2659, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155L, folder POL CAMB–US, 1/3/73, NAII. 96 Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., “Memorandum for the Record,” 26 March 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL CAMB–US, 3/15/73, NAII. 97 Swank to SS, 28 March 1973, Tel. 2857, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155A, folder POL 15–1 CAMB, 1–3–73, NAII. 98 G. McMurtrie Godley to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh (eyes only for Swank and Marshall Green), 28 March 1973, Tel. 2280, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 1–25–73, NAII. 99 Swank to SS, 31 March 1973, Tel. 3016, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155A, folder POL 15–1 CAMB, 1–3–73, NAII. 100 Swank to SS, 3 April 1973, Tel. 3107, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/15/73, NAII. 101 Swank to SS, 3 April 1973, Tel. 3110, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 1693, folder DEF 1–8 CAMB, 1/1/70, NAII. 102 “Country Program Memorandum (Cambodia),” enclosed in Rives to Green, 4 April 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/15/73, NAII. 103 This account of Haig’s discussion with Lon Nol comes from a report by Richard Moose and James Lowenstein. On the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, they happened to be in Phnom Penh when Haig visited. See “Report on the Air War in Cambodia,” 27 April 1973, enclosed in Arthur H. Hummel to William Rogers, 28 April 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 4/1073, NAII. 104 Swank to SS, 17 April 1973, Tel. 3651, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155A, folder POL 15–1 CAMB, 1–3–73, NAII. 105 “Report on the Air War in Cambodia,” 27 April 1973, enclosed in Hummel to Rogers, 28 April 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 4/1073, NAII. Although the United States was doubtless the leading outside factor in bringing about this new arrangement, the governments of Laos, Thailand, and Indonesia had all strongly urged Lon Nol to broaden the base of his government. 106 William J. Porter to Green, 9 April 1973, and attached memorandum, “Note on Cambodian Situation,” RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/15/73, NAII.

192

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107 Eagleton to SS, 17 April 1973, Tel. 909, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB, 2/2/73, NAII. 108 William H. Sullivan to Porter, 10 April 1973, and attached memorandum, “Extract from 3/30/73 Memorandum to Dr. Kissinger, Negotiations with Sihanouk,” RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/15/73, NAII. 109 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 346. 110 “Cambodian Negotiations – 1973,” Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 1. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 350. 111 Osborn to SS, 27 April 1973, Tel. 4141, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB, 2/2/73, NAII. 112 Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 159. 113 During the last half of February, the United States had flown 299 tactical air sorties and 65 B-52 strikes. In the first half of March tactical sorties increased by over 250 percent, while B-52 strikes quadrupled. In the last half of March there were 2,944 tactical air sorties and 928 B-52 attacks. Approximately the same rate was maintained for the rest of April. In all, from 27 January to 30 April the United States planes flew 12,136 combat sorties and dropped 82,838 tons of bombs. (In comparison, from 30 October 1972 through 27 January 1973, the Americans conducted 2,092 sorties and dropped 15,114 tons of bombs.) Figures in Lowenstein and Moose, “Report on the Air War in Cambodia,” 27 April 1973, enclosed in Hummell to Rogers, 28 April 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 4/10/73, NAII, and from testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dennis J. Doolin before the House Armed Services Committee, 8 May 1973 (H.A.S.C. No. 93–10), 5, 10. Copy in Ford Papers, Vice-Presidential Papers, Box 138, folder Cambodia. 114 Merle E. Graven, Report on Conditions, 17 July 1973; T. G. Mangham, Jr., to L. L. King, 25 July 1973; [Merle E. Graven ?] to T. Grady Mangham, 7 August 1973, all in CMMA Records, RG 809–Cambodia, Box 4, folder 14, CMAA. 115 Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 348, 391. 116 Swank to SS, 2 April 1973, Tel. 3066, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 3/15/73, NAII. Barnes, U.S. Embassy Saigon, 26 April 1973, Tel. 7278, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 4/10/73, NAII. For other examples of civilian casualties caused by the bombing, including many personal recollections, see Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 350–7. 117 Ben Kiernan, “The Impact on Cambodia of the U.S. Intervention in Vietnam,” in Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives (New York: Armonk, 1993), 225. 118 “Presidential Authority to Continue United States Air Combat Operations in Cambodia,” enclosed in Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., to John M. Dunn, 26 April 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 4/10/73, NAII. 119 Hearing Before the House Armed Services Committee, 8 May 1973, (H.A.S.C. No. 93–10), 14–17. Copy in Ford Papers, Vice-Presidential Papers, Box 138, folder Cambodia. “What is the Real Situation in Cambodia?” enclosed in Gerald R. Ford and Elford A. Cederberg to Congressional Republicans, 8 May 1973, Ford Congressional Papers, Robert Hartman Files, 1965–1973, Subject File, Biographies (GRF), Box 1220, folder Cambodia 1973. 120 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 10. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Cambodia Assessment,” enclosed in Robert N. Ginsburgh to the Secretary of Defense, 28 August 1974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (2). David Chandler states that by the fall of 1972, three of the four North Vietnamese divisions in Cambodia had withdrawn to Vietnam. Chandler, Tragedy, 226. 121 Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 166.

Notes

193

122 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Cambodia Assessment,” enclosed in Robert N. Ginsburgh to the Secretary of Defense, 28 August 1974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (2). Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note REAN-23, “Sihanouk and the Khmer Insurgents – all for one and one for all,” 17 May 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB, 2/2/73, NAII. 123 Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 356–9. Kenneth Quinn, e-mail message to the author, 30 December 2002. 124 William E. Timmons to Nixon, 10 May 1973, NPM, Haldeman Files, Box 281, Staff Member and Office Files, folder L. Higby-Misc [Misc. Correspondence, 1972–1973], NAII. 125 For a convenient description of how the embassy was involved, see Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 160–1. For a more detailed account, see Lowenstein and Moose, “Report on the Air War in Cambodia,” 27 April 1973, enclosed in Hummell to Rogers, 28 April 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155H, folder POL 27 CAMB, 4/10/73, NAII. 126 Swank to SS, 11 May 1973, Tel. 4552, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 12 CAMB, 2–5–71, NAII. Swank to SS, 10 June 1973, Tel. 5722, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 1–25–73, NAII. 127 USDS to US Embassy Phnom Penh (Acting Secretary for Swank), 15 June 1973, Tel. 116934, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 1–25–73, NAII. 128 David Bruce to USDS, 18 May 1973, Airgram A-8, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB, 2/2/73, NAII. 129 Stuart W. Rockwell to 30 May 1973, Tel. 2454, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB, 2/2/73, NAII. 130 Richard W. Murphy to SS, 31 May 1973, Tel. 452, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 27–14 CAMB, 11/30/72, NAII. 131 USDS to U.S. Embassy Conakry, 19 May 1973, Tel. 96590, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 27–14 CAMB, 11/30/72, NAII. Murphy to SS, 16 June 1973, Tel. 480, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 27–14 CAMB, 11/30/72, NAII. Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Scowcroft et al., 19 July 1973, in Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts, 152. 132 Memorandum of Conversation, Lee Kuan Yew, Henry Kissinger et al., 4 August 1973, Ford Papers, NSC Convenience Files, Copies of Materials from the U.S. Embassy Saigon: 1963–75 (1976), Box 10, folder Memcon Singapore 4 August 1973 (1). 133 “Cambodian Negotiations – 1973,” Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 1. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 351–2. 134 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 352. 135 Kissinger, The White House Years, 352–5. 136 Ibid., 354. “Cambodian Negotiations – 1973,” Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 1. 137 The note is quoted in full in Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Huang Zhen et al., 6 July 1973, in Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts, 140. 138 Ibid., 147. 139 Ibid., 148. Kissinger, The White House Years, 679. See also Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Scowcroft et al., 19 July 1973, in Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts, 152. Brent Scowcroft actually made this statement to Han Xu, the Deputy Chief of the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington. Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts, 147. 140 Kissinger, The White House Years, 363–4. 141 Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts, 147, 141–2.

194

Notes

142 Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Scowcroft et al., 19 July 1973, in ibid., 149. 143 Ibid., 150. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid., 149–51. 146 Ibid., 148–51. 147 Kissinger, The White House Years, 678. Memorandum of Conversation, Lee Kuan Yew, Henry Kissinger et al., 4 August 1973, Ford Papers, NSC Convenience Files, Copies of Materials from the U.S. Embassy Saigon: 1963–75 (1976), Box 10, folder Memcon Singapore August 4, 1973 (1). Zhou Enlai to the Vietnamese government, August 1973, Archives of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, quoted in The Chinese Rulers’ Crimes Against Kampuchea ([Phnom Penh]: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of Kampuchea, 1984), 55–6. I am indebted to Sorya Sim for bringing this publication to my attention. 148 Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, Sparkman, Case et al., 6 March 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 10, folder 6 March 1975 – Ford, Senators John Sparkman, Clifford Case, Hubert Humphrey. 149 The Habib press conference is recorded in SS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 5 March 1975, Tel. 49889, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 150 Kissinger, The White House Years, 361–2. 151 Memorandum of Conversation, Lee Kuan Yew, Kissinger et al., 4 August 1973, Ford Papers, NSC Convenience Files, Copies of Materials from the U.S. Embassy Saigon: 1963–75 (1976), Box 10, folder Memcon Singapore 4 August 1973 (1). 152 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 3–4. 153 Oral remarks of Cambodian ambassador Um Sim, in Richard T. Kennedy to Kissinger, 28 August 1973, NPM, WHCF: Subject Files CO Country Files, Box 14, folder CO26 Cambodia, 1/1/73, NAII. 154 Thomas R. Pickering to Brent Scowcroft, Cambodian Situation Report Nine, 7 September 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 8–30–73, NAII. Scowcroft to Graham Martin, [5 November 1993], Tel. WH 32709, Via Martin Channel, Ford Papers, NSC Convenience Files, Copies of Materials from the U.S. Embassy, Saigon: 1968–75 (1976), Box 6, folder Washington to Saigon, 4 Sep. 1973–10 Jan. 1974. 155 Memorandum of Conversation, Lee Kuan Yew, Kissinger et al., 4 August 1973, Ford Papers, NSC Convenience Files, Copies of Materials from the U.S. Embassy Saigon: 1963–75 (1976), Box 10, folder Memcon Singapore 4 August 1973 (1). 156 Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 180. In 1975, in a particularly dishonorable action, Secretary of State Kissinger could find no assignment for Swank in the department. 157 Memorandum of Conversation, Long Boret, Kissinger et al., 4 October 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 8–30–73, NAII. 158 Edmund A. Gullion to Kissinger, 17 August 1973, RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155I, folder POL 30–2 CAMB, 2/2/73, NAII. Gullion’s letter unaccountably did not reach Kissinger until October. 159 Draft letter, Kissinger to Mansfield, [15 October 1973], RG 59, SNF 1970–73, Box 2155, folder POL 15 CAMB, 8–30–73, NAII. Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Zhou et al., 13 November 1973, in Burr, ed. The Kissinger Transcripts, 203. Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Zhou et al., 14 November 1973, in Burr, ed. The Kissinger Transcripts, 208. Kissinger did agree that Mansfield was “a fine and decent man.” 160 Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 181–2. 161 Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Zhou et al., 13 November 1973, in Burr, ed. The Kissinger Transcripts, 203.

Notes

195

162 “Few Tears for Richard Nixon in Cambodia,” The Cambodia Daily, 25 April 1994. The publisher of this newspaper was Bernard Krisher, whose article in Newsweek in 1965 was the ostensible cause of the break in diplomatic relations.

3 Dénouement 1 Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, Kissinger, Congressional Delegation et al., 5 March 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9, folder 5 March 1975 – Ford, Kissinger, Congressional Vietnam Delegation. 2 Memorandum of Conversation, J. Malcolm Fraser, Ford, Kissinger et al., 27 July 1976, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 20, folder 27 July 1976 – Ford, Kissinger … Fraser. 3 Enders to Graham Martin, 7 January 1974, Tel. 747, Ford Papers, NSC Convenience Files, Copies of Materials from the U.S. Embassy, Saigon: 1968–75 (1976), Box 7, folder Saigon to Washington, 7 Jan. 1974–3 Dec. 1974. 4 Wilfred P. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970–1975 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), 185–99. 5 Kissinger, “Schedule Proposal,” 22 March 1974, NPM, WHCF: Subject Files: FO Foreign Affairs, Box 21, NAII. 6 William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (rev. ed.; New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 336. 7 Ambassador Bryce Harland, New Zealand Embassy Beijing, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 10 April 1974, in DCC. Cross to SS, 28 May 1974, Tel. 5974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC Vietnam Information Group: Intelligence and Other Reports, 1967–1975, folder Cambodian Communist Terrorism 1973–75 (3). 8 Dean refers to his June assessment in a later telegram, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 6 February 1975, Tel. 2287, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Country File Cambodia, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (2). 9 Graham Martin to Kissinger, 21 June 1974, Tels. 0622 and 0617 (Martin Channel), Ford Papers, NSC Convenience Files, Copies of Materials from the U.S. Embassy, Saigon: 1968–75 (1976), Box 6, folder Saigon to Washington, 12 Jan. 1974–21 Nov. 1974 (3). 10 A. Eugene Hall to W. W. Kerr, 6 June 1974, RG 809–Cambodia, Box 4, folder 15, CMAA. 11 W. Richard Smyser to Kissinger, 6 September 1974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (1). 12 “Cambodia Assessment,” attached to Robert N. Ginsburgh to the Secretary of Defense, 28 August 1974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (2). The chiefs did not say with whom the Americans ought to negotiate. 13 Jim B. to Les [Aspin?], 18 October [1974], Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (3). 14 Smyser to Kissinger, 13 September 1974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (1). SS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 4 March 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (2). 15 Dean refers to his memoranda to Kissinger in two later telegrams, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 4 February 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser,

196

16

17 18

19

20

21

22

Notes Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-EXDIS (1), and U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 17 February 1975, Tel. 2947, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (2). Dean recalled his feelings in a later telegram, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 6 February 1975, Tel. 2287, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (2). Memorandum of Conversation, Adam Malik, Ford, Kissinger et al., 25 September 1974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, Box 6, folder September 25, 1974 – Ford, Kissinger … Malik. William L. Stearman to Kissinger, 20 November 1974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (4). SS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 10 August 1974, Tel. 175286, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE–EXDIS. Smyser to Kissinger, 27 August 1974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (1). Smyser to Kissinger, 3 October 1974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (2). Dean to U.S. Legation Peking, 25 November 1974, Tel. 15663, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (1). Dean refers to the proposal to meet with GRUNK officials in a later telegram, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh to SS, 30 January 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (2). He indicates that he gave a detailed memorandum about this to Philip Habib on 8 December 1974, but it is likely that he discussed it informally before that time. It is however not certain that Kissinger knew about it prior to his discussions with Chinese leaders. Memorandum of Conversation, Deng Xiaoping, Henry Kissinger et al., 27 November 1974, 3.36 p.m.–5.45 p.m., RG 59, Policy Planning Staff (Director’s Files), 1969–77, Box 371, “Secretary Kissinger’s Talks in China, 25–29 Nov. 1974,” NAII. In his own report of the conversation to the President, Kissinger did not indicate that he had expressed to Deng a willingness to abandon Lon Nol. Scowcroft to Ford, 28 November 1974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft Files, (1972) 1974–77, Temporary Parallel File, Box A1, folder Kissinger Reports on USSR, China & Middle East, China 11/25–29/74 Kissinger Trip (3). Memorandum of Conversation, Deng Xiaoping, Henry Kissinger et al., 27 November 1974, 3.36 p.m.–5.45 p.m., RG 59, Policy Planning Staff (Director’s Files), 1969–77, Box 371, folder Secretary Kissinger’s Talks in China, 25–29 Nov. 1974, NAII. SS to U.S. Embassy Saigon, 6 December 1974, Tel. 267950, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 21, folder Vietnam – State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE-NODIS (1). “Foreign Assistance Act,” n.d., Ford Papers, William E. Timmons Files, Box 4, folder Legislative Interdepartmental Group Meetings. Kissinger to Ford, n.d., Ford Papers, William E. Timmons Files, Box 3, folder Legislative Interdepartmental Group Meetings.

Notes

197

23 Richard T. Kennedy to Scowcroft, 16 December 1974, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (4). Joseph J. Sisco to Ford, 31 December 1974, Declassified Documents Series 1994030100664. 24 Memorandum for the Record, Ford, Rockefeller, James R. Schlesinger, George Brown, bipartisan Congressional leadership, 28 January 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8, folder 28 Jan. 1975 – Ford, Kissinger, Rockefeller, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership. “Summary of Negotiating Efforts on Cambodia,” Nessen Papers, Box 12, folder Indochina–Cambodia. 25 This account of the French intervention is taken from Shawcross, Sideshow, 335–43. The documentary record, not available to Shawcross, confirms his analysis of the initiative. 26 Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, 11 April 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 10, folder 11 April 1975 – Ford, Kissinger. Shawcross, Sideshow, 343. 27 Dean to SS, 30 January 1975, Tel. 1851, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (2). 28 Stearman to Kissinger, 13 January 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (6). Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 6 February 1975, Tel. 26972, Ford Papers, NSA: Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams: From SECSTATE-NODIS (1). 29 Dean to SS, 4 February 1975, Tel. 2113, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-EXDIS (1). Dean to SS, 4 February 1975, Tel. 2129, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-EXDIS (1). 30 Dean to SS, 6 February 1975, Tel. 2287, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (2). 31 Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 7 February 1975, Tel. 28530, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE-NODIS. Stearman to Kissinger, 7 February 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser: NSC Staff for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 12, folder Indochina Chronological File, 1–15 February 1975. 32 Dean to SS, 18 February 1975, Tel. 3041, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (2). Dean to SS, 19 February 1975, Tel. 3063, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (2). Kissinger responded with a summary of what the administration had been doing over the past several months to bring about a negotiated settlement, telling the ambassador that in light of these efforts “lectures on the subject of pursuing a negotiated settlement are inappropriate.” Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 21 February 1975, Tel. 39172, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE-NODIS (1).

198

Notes

33 Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, 20 February 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 9, folder 20 February 1975 – Ford, Kissinger. 34 “Supplement to the Report called ‘Cambodian Medical Services Program’,” 5 March 1975, RG 809–Cambodia, Box 4, folder 15, CMAA. A. Eugene Hall to T. G. Mangham, Jr., 1 March 1975, RG 809–Cambodia, Box 4, folder 15, CMAA. 35 Wolfgang Lehman to Scowcroft, 17 February 1975, Tel. 0668 Via Martin Channel, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Backchannel Messages, 1974–1977, folder Martin Channel 2/75–Incoming. 36 Dean to SS, 26 February 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (2). 37 USDS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh (Habib to Dean), 8 March 1975, Tel. 52773, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE-NODIS (2). 38 “U.S. Policy on Cambodia,” 10 March 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files (1969) 1973–1976, Box 12, folder 8–12 March 1975. 39 SS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 5 March 1975, Tel. 49889, DCC. 40 John Sparkman to Robert S. Ingersoll, 7 March 1965, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (10). The state department’s response, if any, has not yet come to light. 41 SS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 5 March 1975, Tel. 49889, DCC. 42 Records of Press Briefing with Ron Nessen, 13 March 1975, 165, Nessen Papers, Box 7. 43 Sihanouk to Ford, n.d., Ford Papers, WHCF: Subject File, Box 10, folder CO 26 Khmer Republic, Executive. George Bush, U.S. Liaison Office Beijing, to Sihanouk, 27 March 1975, in DCC. SS to U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh, 30 March 1979, Tel. 71749, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE-NODIS (2). For a contrary view of Sihanouk’s letter, see Deac, To the Killing Fields, 218, who terms the letter “frivolous and incredibly egocentric” and asserts that “Sihanouk slapped the proffered hand” that offered him “a face-saving way out of the Cambodian morass.” 44 New York Times, 27 February 1975, 3. “Discussion on Cambodia with Ron Nessen and Members of the Press,” 10 March 1975, Nessen Papers, Box 12, folder Indochina–Cambodia. Tom Wicker, “Cambodian Disaster,” New York Times, 25 February 1975, 35. 45 Stearman to Kissinger, 19 February 1975, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Far East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 24, folder Washington Special Action Group Meeting, 27 February 1975. Draft memorandum, Scowcroft to Ford, enclosed in Smyser and Stearman to Scowcroft, 10 March 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser: NSC Staff for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 12, folder Indochina Chronological File, 8–12 March 1975. 46 Sihanouk disparaged the congressional delegation’s fear of a bloodbath when the Khmer Rouge took over. The people would quickly rally to Khieu Samphan, he predicted, and instead of a bloodbath there would be “a carnival, with music, flowers and songs.” “Interview with Prince Norodom Sihanouk,” Le Monde, 7 March 1975, translated by Indochina Resource Center/Berkeley, DCC. 47 Dean to SS, 19 March 1975, Tel. 5021, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE-NODIS (4).

Notes

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48 Dean to SS, 26 March 1975, Tel. 5669, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (5). 49 NSC Meeting, 28 March 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC Meeting File, folder NSC Meeting 28 March 1975. 50 Smyser and Stearman to Kissinger, 31 March 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 2, folder Cambodia (3). 51 Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, 8 April 1975, Ford Papers, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973–1977, Box 10, folder 8 April 1975 – Ford, Kissinger. 52 Richard Solomon to Kissinger, 2 April 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 3, folder Cambodia (14). 53 George Bush to SS, 10 April 1975, Tel. 83 (Voyager Channel), Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 3, folder Cambodia (15). 54 Dean to SS, 12 April 1975, Tel. 6134, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 4, folder Cambodia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE-NODIS (6). 55 Ford to Speaker of the House of Representatives, 12 April 1975, Ford Papers, Buchen Files, 1974–1977, Box 64, folder Vietnam–Evacuation: Cambodia. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 7, states that there were 84 Americans and 203 others. 56 Deac, Road to the Killing Fields, 6. 57 An excellent account of the evacuation is ibid., 3–10. 58 “Interview of President Ford by Hugh Sidey,” 15 May 1975, Ford Papers, Ron Nessen Files (White House Press Secretary’s Office), Box 26, folder High Sidey, “Time.” “Chronology of Events of the Mayaguez Incident,” Ford Papers, National Security Advisor, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files (1969) 1973–1976, Box 13, folder 16 May 1975. Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, 12 May 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, folder 12 May 1975 – Ford, Kissinger. Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, folder 14 May 1975 – Ford, Kissinger, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership. 59 John F. Guilmartin, Jr., A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1995), 55–6. The subsequent account of the battle is taken primarily from Guilmartin’s detailed work, as well as from “Chronology of Events of the Mayaguez Incident.” 60 Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Scowcroft, the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, 14 May 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11, folder 14 May 1975 – Ford, Kissinger, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership. 61 Phelin Kyne and Chea Sotheacheath, “Tragedy of Errors: The Mayaguez Incident Remembered,” Phnom Penh Post, 12–25 May 2000, 8–9. 62 Guilmartin, A Very Short War, 155–66 and passim. 63 Shawcross, Sideshow, 483. 64 Statement of Senator Mike Mansfield, enclosed in William T. Kendall to Max Friedersdorf, 7 April 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 3, folder Cambodia (15). Ford, draft speech, enclosed in Scowcroft to Lawrence Eagleburger, 8 April 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 3, folder Cambodia (15).

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65 The information in this and the following paragraphs comes from Kenneth M. Quinn, “The Khmer Krahom Program to Create a Communist Society in Southern Cambodia,” 19 February 1974, enclosed in Lehman to USDS, 20 February 1974, Airgram A-008, DCC. 66 Information in this paragraph comes from “The Khmer Communists’ Systematical Use of Execution and Terror: Why Cambodians Flee from the Khmer Rouge,” enclosed in Stearman to Scowcroft, 13 March 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affair Staff: Files (1969) 1973–1976, Box 13, folder 13–21 March 1975. 67 “The Current Communist Role in Cambodia,” in Sven Kraemer to Robert Wolthius, 17 March 1975, Ford Papers, Robert Wolthius Files, Box 1, folder Cambodia Fact Sheet, Evacuation of Phnom Penh. 68 Extracts from a letter from E. Eugene Hall to Christian and Missionary Alliance Headquarters, 14 May 1975, RG 809–Cambodia, Box 4, folder 15, CMAA. 69 For example, Indochina Task Force, Situation Report 34, 19 April 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 25, folder WSAG, 20 April 1975. 70 Pam Moeun, “My Break for Freedom,” Alliance Witness (14 January 1976), 16. 71 Ralph D. Hyslop to Ron Nessen, 15 July 1975, and Hyslop to Quinn, 5 May 1976, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files (1969) 1973–1976, Box 1, Country Files, folder Cambodia. Clipping, Julia Kringel, letter to the editor, n.d., Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, (1969) 1973–1976, Box 1, Country File, folder Cambodia. 72 Gareth Porter and G. C. Hildebrand, “The Politics of Food: Starvation and Agricultural Revolution in Cambodia” (Washington: Indochina Resource Center, September 1975), 19–23. The monograph appears to have been published in a typescript format. A copy is in the DCC. A condensed version was later published in Indochina Chronicle (February/March 1976), 2–19. Later in 1976 the entire monograph was published as Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976). I have chosen to quote from the first version, even though it is less available, because it was completed in September 1975. 73 Porter and Hildebrand, “The Politics of Food,” 24–8. 74 Extracts from a letter from E. Eugene Hall to Christian and Missionary Alliance Headquarters, 14 May 1975, RG 809–Cambodia, Box 4, folder 15, CMAA. Shawcross, Sideshow, 372. 75 Quoted in Sheldon Neuringer, The Carter Administration, Human Rights, and the Agony of Cambodia (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1993), 18. 76 Roger Brown, Australian Embassy Beijing, to Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 24 September 1975, Memo 865, DCC. Georges Biannic, “Embassy in Peking Denounces Sihanouk Entourage,” Agence France Presse dispatch, 25 October 1975, DCC. Draft Memorandum, Kissinger to Ford, n.d., enclosed in Thomas J. Barnes to Kissinger, 26 September 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 1, folder Southeast Asia (5). 77 Kenneth M. Quinn to Kissinger, 1 October 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 3, folder Cambodia (19). 78 Thomas J. Barnes to Kissinger, 16 October 1975, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 3, folder Cambodia (19). Gareth Porter, “Vietnamese Policy and the Indochina Crisis,” in David P. Elliott, ed., The Third Indochina Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 78–9. 79 Douglas J. Bennet, Jr. to Romano L. Mazzoli, 31 January 1978, Carter Papers, WHCF–CO 81, Box CO-40.

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80 Memorandum of Conversation, J. Malcolm Fraser, Ford, Kissinger, et al., 27 July 1976, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 20, folder 27 July 1976 – Ford, Kissinger … Fraser. 81 Whitehouse to USDS, 31 March 1976, Airgram A-74, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 3, folder Cambodia (23). In July a similar report went to the NSC. See Thomas J. Barnes to Scowcroft, 15 July 1976, Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974–1977, Box 1, folder Southeast Asia (7). 82 Time, 26 April 1976, 4–7. (In some editions of the magazine, the story is on pp. 8–11.) On the response of citizens, see, for example, Thomas Turner to Ford, 11 May 1976, Ford Papers, WHCF: Subject File CO 21–CO 26, folder CO 26 – Khmer Republic. 83 William Shawcross, “The Third Indochina War,” New York Review of Books, 6 April 1978, 18. 84 Scowcroft to Joshua Eilberg, 24 February 1976, and Eilberg to Ford, 26 February 1976, Ford Papers, WHCF: Subject File, Box 66, folder ND 18–2/CO1 Refugees/Indochina 1/30/76–3/21/76. 85 Roland E. Elliott to Thomas Turner, 16 June 1976, Ford Papers, WHCF: Subject File CO 21–CO 26, Box 10, folder CO 26 – Khmer Republic.

4 Jimmy Carter, human rights, and Cambodia 1 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 144. 2 Douglas Brinkley, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The ‘Hands on’ Legacy of our Thirty-Ninth President,” Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 520–2. Robert A. Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 262. 3 Brinkley, “Rising Stock,” 520–2. 4 Joshua Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), 7–17, 197–200. But see also David Sheinan, “The Cost in Blood: Human Rights in U.S.–Argentine Relations, 1977–1980,” paper presented at the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations meeting, 22 June 2000, Toronto, which argues that Carter’s policy toward Argentina was not based primarily on human rights considerations and did not, in any event, have much effect on the Argentine regime. 5 Neither Strong nor Brinkley mentions Cambodia. Carter’s policy toward Cambodia has received relatively little attention. Other accounts include Sheldon Neuringer’s short book, The Carter Administration, Human Rights, and the Agony of Cambodia (Lewistown, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), Michael Haas, Cambodia, Pol Pot, and the United States: The Faustian Pact (New York: Praeger, 1991), and most recently, Christopher Brady, United States Foreign Policy Towards Cambodia, 1977–92 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 13–49. See also Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 95–9. 6 The DDT shipments are mentioned in Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., to Romano L. Mazzoli, 31 January 1978, Jimmy Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA; Ambassador Charles Twining, interview with the author, Phnom Penh Cambodia, 27 December 1994; and Peter A. Poole in testimony before a House Subcommittee. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Human Rights in Cambodia: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organization, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 3 May 1977, 3. See also Neuringer, Carter Administration, 27. 7 Kristen Lund to Carter, 11 June 1977, Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40.

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8 Norman D. Dicks to Carter, 24 March 1977, Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40. 9 Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Human Rights in Cambodia: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organization, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 3 May 1977, 14. 10 U.S. Congress, Human Rights in Cambodia: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organization, 3 May 1977, 95th Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 32, 47. According to Ambassador Charles Twining, Solarz, “more than any other individual I’m aware of,” was responsible for mobilizing public opinion around the Cambodia issue. Author’s interview with Charles Twining, 27 December 1994, Phnom Penh. 11 U.S. Congress, Human Rights in Cambodia: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organization, 3 May 1977, 95th Congress, First Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 15, 24. Although there were no hearings in the Senate, in November Senator Robert Dole (R–KS) and others introduced a similar resolution denouncing human rights abuses in Cambodia. S. Res. 323, 4 November 1977, 95th Congress, 1st Session, copy in Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40. 12 Paul B. Hentze to Theodore Shackley, 9 January 1978, Carter Papers, National Security Affairs, Staff Materials, Horn/Special, Box 1. Bennet to Mazzoli, 31 January 1975, Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40. 13 Christine Dodson to Pater Tarnoff, 14 April 1978, Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40. 14 Draft statements on Cambodia, Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40. 15 “Human Rights Violations in Cambodia.” Statement by the President, 21 April 1978, Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40. Brzezinski to Cyrus Vance, 28 April 1978, Carter Papers, Vertical File, Cambodian Directives. 16 In his testimony before the House Subcommittee in July 1977, however, Richard Holbrooke did volunteer that the flow of refugees into Vietnam was larger than the flow into Thailand, and Twining acknowledged that they were well treated. “The Vietnamese only ask the Cambodians to stay out of politics. … Otherwise they are free to work, they are free to go to new economic areas, they are free to do more or less what they want.” U.S. Congress, Human Rights in Cambodia: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organization, 3 May 1977, 95th Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 17–18. 17 John Richardson to Brzezinski, 30 May 1978, Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40. 18 Michael Harrington et al. to Carter, 6 July 1978, Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40. 19 Bennet to Hanley et al., 17 August 1978, Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40. 20 Jane Fonda et al. to Carter, 28 August 1978, Carter Papers, WHCF-CO 81, Box CO-40. 21 Carter’s comments on Brzezinski to Carter, 13 October 1978, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 42, folder Weekly Reports 9/78–12/78. 22 Eugene L. Stockwell, “Record of Conversation with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” 26 October 1979, Carter Papers, Presidential Commission on Hunger, General Records – Subject File, Box 11, folder Cambodia [2]. 23 See Gareth Porter, “Vietnamese Policy and the Indochina Crisis,” in David P. Elliott, ed., The Third Indochina Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 69–137; Stephen P. Heder, “The Kampuchean–Vietnamese Conflict,” in ibid., 21–67; and Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 313–47.

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24 Chicago Tribune, 29 August 1995. 25 “Draft Talking Points for Vance–Chai meeting,” n.d., Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographical File, Box 10, folder Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 2/17/79–2/21/79. Bureau of Public Affairs, “Current Situation in Indochina,” June 1979, Current Policy No. 71. For negotiations regarding normalization of relations, see Chanda, Brother Enemy, 263–96 and, for a different interpretation, Steven Hurst, The Carter Administration and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1996). 26 Brzezinski to Carter, “Suggested Talking Points for Your Second Session,” n.d., Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographical File, Box 9, folder China – President’s Meeting with Deng Xiaoping. 27 Carter to Deng Xiaoping, 30 January 1979, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographical File, Box 9, folder China – President’s Meeting with Deng Xiaoping. (A note indicates that Carter read this letter to Deng and an interpreter transcribed it for him.) Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of a National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 409–10. 28 Michael Oksenberg and William Odom to Brzezinski, 19 February 1979, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographical File, Box 10, folder “Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 2/17/79–2/21/79.” B. Lynn Pascoe to Edward F. Snyder and Gretchen Eich, 5 April 1979, Carter Papers, WHCF: Subject File National Security and Defense, Box ND-48, folder General ND16/CO 172, 1/20/77–1/20/81. Because Deng had visited with Carter only two weeks before the Chinese attack took place, the Soviet Union and others accused the United States of sanctioning, if not actually helping to plan, the Chinese action. The administration’s public response was that Deng had not raised the issue of attacking Vietnam while in the United States – a patent falsehood. Minutes of the Special Coordination Committee Meeting, 17 February 1979, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographical File, Box 10, folder “Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 2/17/79–2/21/79.” 29 Qiang Zhai, communication to the author, 1 May 2001. I am grateful to Qiang Zhai for his assessment of Carter’s letter to Deng and American policy surrounding the Chinese invasion. 30 Carter to Deng Xiaoping, 30 January 1979, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographical File, Box 9, folder China – President’s Meeting with Deng Xiaoping. 31 Minutes of the Special Coordination Committee Meeting, 18 February 1979, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographical File, Box 10, folder Sino-Vietnamese Conflict 2/17/79–2/21/79. 32 Solarz et al. to Carter, 22 February 1979, Carter Papers, WHCF: Subject File: National Security and Defense, Box ND-47, folder Executive, ND 16/CO-172, 1/1/78–4/30/79. 33 Bennet to Solarz, n.d., Carter Papers, WHCF: Subject File: National Security–Defense, Box ND-47, folder Executive ND 16/CO-172 1/1/78–4/30/79. “Draft Talking Points for Vance–Chai Meeting,” Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographical File, Box 10, folder Sino-Vietnamese Conflict 2/17/79–2/21/79. 34 U.S. Congress, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1980–81 (Part 4), Hearings and Markup Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 96th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 69, 96–7. 35 See, for example, a speech by Vice President Walter F. Mondale to the UN Conference on Indochinese Refugees, 21 July 1971, Carter Papers, WHCF: Subject File: National Security and Defense, Box ND-38, folder Executive ND 16/CO 1 Indochina 8/1/79–11/30/79. 36 Sidney S. Rosdeitcher to Brzezinski, 14 June 1979, WHCF: Subject File: Countries, Box CO-66, folder Executive CO 172 4/1/79–1/20/81. Neuringer, Carter Administration, 60. J. Brian Attwood to Rudy Boschwitz, 8 August 1979, Carter Papers, WHCF – Subject File: National Security–Defense, Box ND-47, folder ND

204

37 38 39

40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

49 50

51 52

Notes 16/1081 1/20/77–1/20/81. The monetary figures are from Indochina Refugee Action Center, “Crying for Life,” 1 October 1979, 17, copy in Carter Papers, Presidential Commission on Hunger, General Records, Subject File, Box 11, folder Cambodia [2]. This report is an excellent summary of the early Cambodian relief effort. Kirk Alliman et al., “Report on Visit to Kampuchea by Church World Service Delegation, October 19–20, 1979,” Carter Papers, Presidential Commission on Hunger, General Records, Subject File, Box 11, folder Cambodia [2]. William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 80. Speech by Vice President Walter F. Mondale to the UN Conference on Indochinese Refugees, 21 July 1979, Carter Papers, WHCF – Subject File: National Security and Defense, Box ND-38, folder Executive ND 16/CO 1 Indochina 8/1/79–11/30/79. “Statement by Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State, Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law,” Carter Papers, WHCF, Subject File: Countries, Box CO-66, folder Executive CO 172 4/1/79–1/20/81. “Cambodia Still Starving,” New York Times, 27 September 1979. Shawcross, Quality of Mercy, 160–2. Henry Owen to Carter, 8 October 1979, Carter Papers, Staff Offices: Speechwriters, Chron File, Box 57, folder Kampuchean Statement. Press release, Federation of American Scientists, 17 October 1979, Carter Papers, Presidential Commission on Hunger, General Records, Subject File, Box 11, folder Cambodia [2]. Kennedy’s speech is quoted in Ray Jenkins to “Rick,” 1 November 1979, Carter Papers, Staff Office–Press–Jenkins, Box 2, folder Kampuchea (Cambodia) 1979. “Statement by the President,” enclosed in Henry Owen to Carter, 23 October 1979, Carter Papers, WHCF CO 81, Box CO-40. Press release, Overseas Development Council, 24 October 1979, Carter Papers, Presidential Commission on Hunger, General Records, Subject File, Box 11, folder Cambodia [2]. Monique Sihanouk to Carter, 26 October 1979, Carter Papers, WHCF, Foreign Affairs, Box FO-31, folder Executive FO3–2 (CO 81) 1/20/77–1/20/81. Former GKR Prime Minister In Tam sent a similar telegram of appreciation. Don Oberdorfer, “Cambodia: Salvation Coming, but Slowly,” Washington Post, 4 November 1979, A1. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Senators’ Report on Refugees, October 26, 1979,” Special Report No. 59. Bill Herod, “Statement to the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 10 October 1979,” Carter Papers, Presidential Commission on Hunger, General Records, Subject File, Box 11, folder Cambodia [1]. Jack Anderson, “State Dept. Obstructing Cambodia Aid,” Washington Post, 29 October 1979, C27. “Statement of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger on Kampuchea,” 5 November 1979, Carter Papers, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, General Records, Subject File, Box 11, folder Cambodia [1]. Dennis J. Doolin to Carter, 7 November 1979, Carter Papers, WHCF – Subject File, National Security–Defense, Box ND-47, folder General ND16/1081 1/20/77–1/20/81. Richard Moe to Hamilton Jordan, 12 November 1979, Carter Papers, Chief of Staff Jordan, Box 41, folder Cambodia. “Richard Holbrooke and the Problems of Southeast Asia,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 November 1979, 14. Brzezinski to Vance, 27 November 1979, Carter Papers, WHCF–Foreign Affairs, Box FO-31, folder Executive FO 3–2 (CO 81)1/20/77–1/20/81.

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53 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Cambodia/Kampuchea,” November 1979. 54 Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Announcement and Briefing on the Appointment of Victor Palmieri as Ambassador at Large for Refugee Affairs,” 30 November 1979, Carter Papers, Staff Counsel–Cutler, Box 54, folder Cambodia 11/79–1/80. 55 Brzezinski to Director of CIA, 3 December 1979 [misdated 1985], Carter Papers, Vertical File, Cambodia Directives. The White House, “Statement on Kampuchea,” 5 December 1979, WHCF–Foreign Affairs, Box FO-31, folder Executive FO 3–2 (CO 81) 1/20/77–1/20/81. Although the statement is dated 5 December, it was released on 6 December 1979. Joel Charny and John Spragens, Jr., Obstacles to Recovery in Vietnam and Kampuchea: U.S. Embargo of Humanitarian Aid (Boston: Oxfam America, 1984), 90. 56 Newspaper clipping, Mary McGrory, “Carter’s Geopolitics Helps Keep Cambodia …,” Washington Star, December [day uncertain], [1979], Carter Papers, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, General Records, Box 11, folder Cambodia [1]. 57 Henry Kamm, “Cambodian Food Aid Reported Snagged,” New York Times, 6 December 1979, 9. 58 McGrory, “Carter’s Geopolitics Helps Keep Cambodia …” 59 Author’s interview with Charles Twining, 27 December 1994, Phnom Penh. 60 Henry Kamm, “Cambodian Food Aid Reported Snagged,” New York Times, 7 December 1979, 9. Henry Kamm, “Red Cross Warns Cambodia on Blocking Aid Supplies,” ibid., 18 December 1979, A3. Lee Lescage, “Most of Cambodia’s Relief Supplies Still Undistributed,” Washington Post, 19 December 1979, A17. 61 Murray Hiebert and Linda Gibson Hiebert, “Famine in Kampuchea: Politics of a Tragedy,” Indochina Issues, 4 (December 1979), 3. Shawcross, Quality of Mercy, 340–3. Newspaper clipping, Richard M. Harley, “Are U.S. Asian Policies Slowing Cambodia Aid?” Christian Science Monitor, 4 December 1979, Carter Papers, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, General Records, Box 11, folder Cambodia [1]. 62 Brzezinski to Secretary of Defense, 26 November 1979, Carter Paper, Vertical File, folder Cambodia Directives. “Convoy to Aid Cambodia Planned,” Christian Science Monitor, 19 December 1979, 2. 63 Brzezinski to Vance, 20 December 1979, Carter Papers, Vertical File, folder Cambodia Directives. 64 McGrory, “Carter’s Geopolitics Helps Keep Cambodia …” 65 Lincoln Bloomfield, “Kampuchea: Demographic Catastrophe,” 12 February 1980, Carter Papers, WHCF, Country Files, CO 81, Box CO-40, folder 1/20/77–1/20/81. This document is Bloomfield’s summary of a classified CIA report. Kirk Alliman, letter to the editor, New York Times, 26 December 1979, A26. 66 Jack Anderson, “U.S. Officials Impede Cambodia Aid,” Washington Post, 12 January 1980, D31. 67 Lincoln P. Bloomfield to Jerry Schecter, 14 January 1980, Carter Papers, WHCF, Foreign Affairs, Box FO-31, folder Executive FO 3–2 (CO 81) 1/20/77–1/20/81. 68 Bloomfield to Schecter, 14 January 1980, Carter Papers, WHCF, Foreign Affairs, Box FO-31, folder Executive FO 3–2 (CO 81) 1/20/77–1/20/81. 69 Presidential Commission on World Hunger, “Recommendations for U.S. Actions to Help Alleviate Starvation and Malnutrition Among Victims of the Kampuchean Famine,” enclosed in Jean Mayer to Carter, 25 January 1980, Carter Papers, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, General Records, Subject File, Box 11, folder Cambodia [1]. In another implied criticism of the administration, the commission came close to recommending that normal diplomatic relations be established with Vietnam because this would facilitate the movement of relief supplies into Cambodia.

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70 Department of State, “Transcript of Special News Briefing, Wednesday, 24 January 1980, 11.30 a.m.,” Carter Papers, Staff Counsel–Cutler, Box 54, folder Cambodia 11/79–1/80. 71 Victor H. Palmieri to Carter, 28 January 1980, Carter Papers, National Security Adviser–Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 43, folder Kampuchea 1/80–1/81. 72 Kathryn E. Cade to Paul McCleary, 3 April 1980, Carter Papers, WHCFCorrespondence, Box 127, Tracking, Document 067284. 73 Quoted in remarks by Richard Holbrooke in Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “Kampuchea: The Never-Ending Tragedy in Indochina,” 2 April 1980, Current Policy No. 156. See also Linda Gibson Hiebert, “Kampuchea: Breaking the Cycle,” Indochina Issues, April 1980. 74 “Contingency Plans on Khmer Relief,” enclosed in Peter Tarnoff to Brzezinski, 29 January 1980, Carter Papers, National Security Adviser–Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 43, folder Kampuchea 1/80–1/81. 75 In a sheet attached to Palmieri’s report, there is a notation that on 14 February “ZB disapproved Recom.” It is probable that this meant that Brzezinski disapproved of Palmieri’s recommendations, although it is possible that his disapproval may have been directed at a recommendation from Henry Owen that Carter sign a thank-you note to Palmieri. 76 Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “Kampuchea: The Never-Ending Tragedy in Indochina.” 77 Ibid. The refugees on the Thai border hated the Vietnamese, Holbrooke stated, although he did acknowledge straightforwardly that they spoke of Pol Pot “with far greater emotion and bitterness.” Some refugees even recalled bitterly the bombing under Lon Nol. 78 Sihanouk told this to the Italian journalist Oriana Fallacci. William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (rev. ed.; New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 321. 79 Brzezinski to Vance, 4 January 1980, Carter Papers, Vertical File, folder Cambodia Directives. 80 Vance to Carter, 14 January 1980, Carter Papers, Vertical File, folder Cambodia Directives. 81 Vance to Carter, 14 January 1980, Carter Papers, Vertical File, folder Cambodia Directives. 82 Christine Dodson to Ben Evans, 21 March 1980, Carter Papers, Vertical File, folder Cambodia Directives. Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “Crisis in Indochina,” 24 March 1980, Current Policy No. 151. 83 Sihanouk’s letter is in Leonard Woodcock to SS, 7 April 1980, Tel. 3134, Carter Papers, WHCF–Country Files, CO 81, Box CO-40. 84 Brzezinski to Carter, 1 May 1980, Carter Papers, Brzezinski–Subject File, Box 23, folder Meetings: Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski 5/80–6/80. 85 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 126–7. Bloomfield to Brzezinski, 16 June 1980, Carter Papers, Brzezinski–Subject File, Box 23, folder Meetings: Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski 5/80–6/80. 86 Bloomfield to Brzezinski, 16 June 1980, Carter Papers, Brzezinski–Subject File, Box 23, folder Meetings: Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski 5/80–6/80. 87 Roger W. Sullivan to Brzezinski, 16 June 1980, Carter Papers, Brzezinski–Subject File, Box 23, folder Meetings: Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski 5/80–6/80. Sullivan to Brzezinski, 17 June 1980, Carter Papers, Brzezinski–Subject File, Box 23, folder Meetings: Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski 5/80–6/80. Brzezinski to David Aaron and Les Denend, 17 June 1980, Brzezinski Collection, Donated Historical Material: Subject File 01/1977–01/1981, Box 23, folder Meetings–Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski, 5/80–6/80.

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88 Edwin B. Forsythe to Carter, 17 September 1980, Carter Papers, WHCF–Correspondence Tracking, Box 260, Document 501961. 89 Sam Brown to Edmund Muskie, 8 October 1980, Carter Papers, WHCF: International Organizations, Box IT-8, folder IT86 1/1/80–1/20/81. 90 Shawcross, Quality of Mercy, 355. 91 Sullivan to Brzezinski, 16 June 1980, Carter Papers, Brzezinski–Subject File, Box 23, folder Meetings: Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski 5/80–6/80. Brzezinski to David Aaron and Les Denend, 17 June 1980, Brzezinski Collection, Donated Historical Material: Subject File 01/1977–01/1981, Box 23, folder Meetings–Muskie/ Brown/Brzezinski, 5/80–6/80. 92 John Pilger, “America’s Second War in Indochina: Only the Allies are New,” New Statesman, 1 August 1980, 10–15. Abramowitz tried to discredit Pilger’s piece with a lengthy response to the New Statesman. He pointed out a number of specific errors but did not refute the notion that the United States wanted the Khmer Rouge to survive so that it could challenge the Vietnamese. Abramowitz to U.S. Embassy London, 12 September 1980, Tel. 41685, Carter Papers, WHCF: National Security–Defense, Box ND-38, folder Executive ND 16/CO1 Indochina 2/1/80–1/20/81. 93 Leo Cherne to Members of the Citizens’ Committee, 8 October 1980, Carter Papers, WHCF: National Security–Defense, Box ND-38, folder Executive ND 16/CO1 Indochina 2/1/80–1/20/81. 94 According to Jonathan Winer, counsel to Senator John Kerry (D–MA), the United States actually provided the Khmer Rouge with $54.55 million in 1980. Winer to Larry Chartiennes, 22 October 1986, Indochina Project Library, Washington, D.C. Winer’s account has not been confirmed, however. Sorpong Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 143.

5 Toward a new beginning 1 “About This Issue,” Southeast Asia Chronicle, 79 (August 1981), 1. 2 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham: Duke University Press; 1996), 1–2. 3 Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Foreign Policy in Asia,” 24 April 1981, Current Policy, 274, 2–3. 4 Sihanouk’s armed forces are sometimes referred to as MOLINAKA, although MOLINAKA was a sometimes independent force that from time to time allied with Sihanouk. I am grateful to Craig Etcheson for this clarification. 5 See also John H. Holdridge’s testimony in “The Democratic Kampuchea Seat at the United Nations and American Interests,” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 15 September 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 17. 6 Scott, Deciding to Intervene, 87–9. 7 Nayan Chanda, “CIA No, US Aid Yes,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 August 1984, 16–18. 8 Paul Quinn-Judge, “Asia Allies Want Open US Aid for Kampuchean Guerrillas,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 October 1984, 13. 9 Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Cambodia After 5 Years of Vietnamese Occupation: Hearing and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 15 September, 6 and 18 October 1983, 70. 10 “Cease-Fire to End War in Lebanon Goes into Effect,” Washington Post, 26 September 1983.

208

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11 Muthiah Alagappa, “Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia: Towards Constructive Engagement,” Pacific Affairs, 63 (Autumn 1990), 325. “Aid the Three,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 June 1984, 13. “U.S. Would Raise Relief Aid to Cambodian Anticommunists,” Washington Post, 12 July 1984, A28. 12 “The Democratic Kampuchea Seat at the United Nations and American Interests,” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 15 September 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 28–32. Jack Colhoun, “Uncle Sam and Pol Pot: Not-so-strange Bedfellows,” The Guardian, 20 March 1985, 12. 13 Barbara Crossette, “U.S. Official Rules Out Arms for Cambodian Rebels,” New York Times, 19 January 1985, 4. 14 Craig Etcheson, “US–Cambodia Relations in the 1980s: A Puzzle for Historians,” Paper presented at the 20th Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Bentley College, Waltham, MA 23–26 June 1994. Eva Mysliwiec, Punishing the Poor: The International Isolation of Kampuchea (Oxford: Oxfam, 1988), 83, 146n27. Sorpong Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 143. 15 Etcheson, “US–Cambodia Relations in the 1980s.” Kenton Clymer, Interview with Phil Skellie, Director of the Christian and Missionary Alliance, 8 March 2000, Christian and Missionary Alliance headquarters, Colorado Springs, CO. 16 Etcheson, “US–Cambodia Relations in the 1980s.” 17 Congress, House, 99th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, 131 (9 July 1985), H5295. 18 Etcheson, “US–Cambodia Relations in the 1980s.” 19 Congress, House, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs: Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1986–87 (Part 5): 99th Cong., 1st sess., 152. 20 I am indebted to Craig Etcheson for these insights. 21 Scott, Deciding to Intervene, 83. “Cambodia Rebel to Visit U.S.,” New York Times, 31 March 1985, 12. “Cambodian Resistance Leaders Lobby in US,” Christian Science Monitor, 15 April 1985, 7. 22 “Cambodia Issue Again Flares in U.S.,” New York Times, 29 April 1985, A3. Robert W. Tiller et al. to “Dear Representative,” 9 May 1985, copy in Indochina Project Library. David J. Scheffer, “Arming Cambodian Rebels: The Washington Debate,” Indochina Issues, No. 58, June 1985, 6. See also Joel Charney to Marvin Ott, 26 April 1985, copy in Indochina Project Library, Washington, D.C. 23 Congress, Senate, 99th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, 131 (15 May 1985): S6212–6214. 24 Stephen J. Solarz, “It’s Time for Democrats to be Tough-Minded,” New York Times, 20 June 1985, A27. Helen R. Chauncey, “Give Military Aid to the Khmer Rouge,” New York Times, 30 June 1985, E23. The Record (Hackensack, NJ), 8 July 1985. 25 Quoted in “Kampuchean Contra Aid: ‘Here We Go Again’,” The Guardian, 5 June 1985. David Newsom, “Helping Insurgencies: The Real Questions,” Christian Science Monitor, 3 June 1985, 22. Robert H. Johnson, “Risks with Rebels,” Christian Science Monitor, 19 June 1985, 13. 26 The debate, and the quotations from that debate, are found in Congress, House, 99th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, 131 (9 July 1985), H5294–5308. 27 “Cambodian Refugees Seek Aid,” Washington Post, 10 July 1985, A12; “Shultz Opposes Military Aid for Guerrillas in Cambodia,” ibid., 11 July 1985, A23, A28. 28 Congress, House, 99th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, 131 (11 July 1985), H5615. 29 Scott, Deciding to Intervene, 98. Scott maintains the covert program “remained strictly nonlethal.”

Notes

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30 Quoted in Craig Etcheson, “US–Cambodia Relations in the 1980s: A Puzzle for Historians,” paper presented at the 20th Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Bentley College, Waltham, MA 23–26 June 1994. 31 For the background to how these talks were arranged, see MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers 1979–1998 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 35–9. 32 Ibid., 43. 33 Information and quotations from the hearings come from Congress, House, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hope for Cambodia: Preventing the Return of the Khmer Rouge and Aiding the Refugees: Hearing and Markup Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 30 June and 28 July 1988. 34 Congress, House, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Implications of Establishing Reciprocal Interest Sections with Vietnam: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 28 July 1988, 62. 35 John McAuliff and Mary Byrne McDonnell, “Ending the Cambodian Stalemate,” World Policy Review 7, 1 (1990), 94. See also Ben Kiernan, “Cambodia’s Missed Chance: Superpower Obstruction of a Viable Path to Peace,” Indochina Newsletter, issue 72 (November–December 1991), 7–8. 36 Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 53. McAuliff and McDonnell, “Ending the Cambodian Stalemate,” 79. 37 “The Sihanouk–Hun Sen Connection,” Washington Post, 8 May 1989, A14. “Cambodia Deserves Better than Guns,” New York Times, 7 May 1989, 4:26. See also “Blundering Ahead in Cambodia, New York Times, 3 June 1989, 26. 38 Quoted in Kenton J. Clymer, “American Assistance to the Cambodian Resistance Forces,” Indochina Issues, 90 (April 1990), 6. 39 “Congress Stymies Bush Plan to Arm Cambodian Rebels,” New York Times, 18 June 1989, 11, 17. Author’s interview with an important senatorial staffer, summer 1989. 40 New York Times, 23 June 1989, 5. 41 “Finally Fighting Murderers in Cambodia,” New York Times, 10 July 1989, A16. 42 Congress, Senate, 101st Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, 135 (20 July 1980), S8421. 43 Specifically the Senate voted to allow the administration to “make available to the non-Communist resistance forces and non-Communist civilians in Cambodia funds made available for foreign military financing and economic support assistance for fiscal year 1990 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.” 44 McAuliff and McDonnell, “Ending the Cambodian Stalemate,” 79. 45 Kiernan, “Cambodia’s Missed Chance,” 4. 46 “Bankrupt and Immoral on Cambodia,” New York Times, 27 September 1989, A28. Peter W. Rodman, More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994), 468. 47 Rodman, More Precious than Peace, 467–8. 48 Stan Sesser, “Report from Cambodia,” New Yorker, 18 May 1992, 63. McAuliff and McDonnell, “Ending the Cambodian Stalemate,” 79. “Washington,” McAuliff and McDonnell wrote wittily, “proved to be almost as mercurial as the prince.” “Bankrupt and Immoral on Cambodia.” 49 Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 59–63. 50 Charles Twining, interview with the author, 27 December 1994, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 51 Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 61. Typescript, “Statement of John R. Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Organization

210

52

53 54

55

56

57 58 59 60 61

62

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

Notes Affairs, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 28, 1990,” in author’s possession. Jeremy Stone, “Secret U.S. War in Cambodia,” New York Times, 16 November 1989, A31. Rodman, More Precious than Peace, 460–1. Typescript, “Testimony of Michael Horowitz before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, February 28, 1990,” in author’s possession. Stanley Cloud, “Still a Killing Field,” Time, 30 April 1990, 26–8. John McAuliff, interviewed by the author, 5 May 2000, New York City. Anthony Lewis, “The Killing Fields,” New York Times, 4 May 1990, A35. Christopher Brady, United States Foreign Policy Towards Cambodia, 1977–92: A Question of Realities (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 164–5. Charles Twining, interview with the author, 27 December 1994, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Rodman, More Precious than Peace, 460, 470. Richard H. Solomon, Exiting Indochina: U.S. Leadership of the Cambodian Settlement and Normalization with Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2000), 66–7. Craig Etcheson, “The U.S. Role in Negotiating Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: The Case of Cambodia.” Paper at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, 6 June 2003, Washington, D.C., 9. New York Times, 25 May 1990, A4. Congress, Senate, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record, 136, No. 73 (11 June 1990), S7675–81. Congress, House, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record, 136, No. 84 (27 June 1990), H4281–89. Rodman, More Precious than Peace, 470. William Shawcross, “Long Shadow of the Khmer Rouge,” Observer, 1 July 1990. “U.S. Begins to Rethink Policy on Cambodia,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 5 July 1990, 13A. Solomon, Exiting Indochina, 51–3. Associated Press Dispatch, “John Gunther Dean to Visit Cambodia,” 11 July 1990, in author’s possession. E-mail message, Quinn to the author, 30 December 2002. “U.S. Begins to Rethink Policy on Cambodia,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 5. July 1990, 13A. Clifford Krauss, “U.S. Policy on Cambodia Shifts a Bit,” New York Times, 14 July 1990, 3. Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Shifts Cambodia Policy,” New York Times, 19 July 1990, 1A, 6A. William Beecher, “In Changing its Policy on Cambodia, U.S. Picks Less Repugnant Alternative,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 19 July 1990, 14A. Steven Erlanger, “Allies on Southeast Asia Criticize Washington’s Shift on Cambodia,” New York Times, 24 July 1990, A2. Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 70. On this point see Solomon, Exiting Indochina, 44–5. Nate Thayer, “Cambodia Guerrilla Pressure on Cities Evidence of Gains,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 16 July 1990. William Beecher, “In Changing its Policy on Cambodia.” Rodman, More Precious than Peace, 461. Steven Erlanger, “Hanoi’s Partial Victory,” New York Times, 20 July 1990, A2. William Pfaff, “Cambodia: Belated Good News,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 19 July 1990, 20A. “Welcome US Shift on Cambodia,” Christian Science Monitor, 20 July 1990, 20. Uli Schmetzer, “China, U.S. Split over Cambodia,” Chicago Tribune, 20 July 1990, 14. Michael Vickery, “The Campaign Against Cambodia: 1990–1991,” Indochina Issues, No. 93, August 1991, 1. The text of the document is in The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991–1995 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995), 88–92. “Cautious Steps to Peace,” Jakarta Post, 3 September 1990.

Notes

211

72 The text of the Jakarta document is in The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991–1995, 93–4. Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 72–3. 73 United States General Accounting Office, International Security and Affairs Division, Cambodia: AID’s Management of Humanitarian Programs, GAO/NSIAD91–260, 28 August 1991. 74 “Phnom Penh Regrets Pressure on Dancers,” Jakarta Post, 16 October 1990. John McAuliff, “A Nation’s Problems, Right on the Dance Stage,” Boston Sunday Globe, 4 November 1990. Vickery, “The Campaign Against Cambodia,” 1. 75 See, for example, “Hanging On,” The Economist, 17 November 1990, 42–3, and James Fallows, “Vietnam: Shut Out,” Atlantic Monthly, March 1991, 42–8. 76 “Cambodian PM Boycotts Paris Meeting,” Jakarta Post, 30 November 1990. 77 “Khmer Leaders Meet in Beijing to Discuss Peace,” ibid., 13 March 1991. “Phnom Penh Interested in Japan Initiative on Cambodia,” ibid., 19 March 1991. “Japan Makes Cambodia Test-case of Diplomacy,” ibid., 20 March 1991. 78 “U.S. Allaying Concerns over Cambodia Plan,” ibid., 12 April 1991. E-mail message, Quinn to the author, 30 December 2002. “UN Plan Most Promising Way to Solve Cambodian Crisis: Solomon,” Jakarta Post, 24 April 1991. 79 “U.S. Believes Cambodia Pace Near,” Jakarta Post, 22 April 1991. 80 Anne E. Goldman, “The Dying Fields,” New York Times, 4 June 1991, A27. 81 Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 82–3. “Cambodia: Far from the Battleground,” The Economist, 20 July 1991, 36. Solomon, Exiting Indochina, 76–7. 82 Sheila Taft, “Pattaya,” Christian Science Monitor, 27 August 1991, 3. Sheila Taft, “Cambodia’s Prospect for Peace Agreement Moves a Bit Closer,” ibid., 28 August 1991, 3. Sheila Taft, “Cambodian Peace Plan Shifts Momentum to UN,” ibid., 4 September 1991, 6. 83 “Cambodia: U.N. is Given Chief Role in Making Sure Accord is Respected,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 24 October 1991, 17A. 84 Kenneth Quinn maintains that the United States “pushed very hard to include a reference to Genocide, but could never achieve a consensus that would have permitted it to be inserted.” E-mail message, Quinn to the author, 30 December 2002. 85 Sharon Waxman, “U.S. hopes Cambodian Treaty Signals New Era in Southeast Asia,” Chicago Tribune, 24 October 1991, 4. 86 “Hope for Cambodia, for Southeast Asia,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 25 October 1991. See also Elizabeth Becker’s comments in Stan Sesser, “Report from Cambodia,” 71. 87 Sesser, “Report from Cambodia,” 71. See also Ben Kiernan, “Inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian Peace Process: Causes and Consequences,” in Ben Kiernan, ed., Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 224–7. 88 Ibid., 64. Author’s interview with John McAuliff. Author’s interview with Craig Etcheson, 4 May 2000, New Haven. 89 Typescript, “Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Excerpts),” 31 March 1992, 25–7, in author’s possession. 90 E-mail message, Quinn to the author, 9 January 2003. 91 Philip Shenon, “U.S. Diplomat Warns of Return by Khmer Rouge,” New York Times, 14 November 1991, A3. 92 Barbara Crossette, “U.S. Welcomes Cambodian Chief, A Seasoned Communist Survivor,” New York Times, 25 March 1992, A1, A-4. For the luncheon with Solarz and Twining, see New York Times, 26 March 1992, A3. Solarz noted that Hun Sen’s legitimacy derived “from his opposition to Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, which is still a threat.”

212

Notes

93 See, for example, William E. Colby and Jeremy J. Stone, “Bypass the Khmer Rouge,” ibid., 9 July 1992, A21; “Pol Pot Against the U.N.,” ibid., 10 July 1992, A28. 94 See, for example, William J. Bonde, letter to the editor, ibid., 8 August 1992, 20, and Elizabeth Becker, “Cambodia Comes Back to Life,” ibid., 25 August 1992, A21. 95 See, for example, Mary Kay Magistad, “Jittery Phnom Penh Said to ‘Fight Dirty’,” International Herald Tribune, 28 November 1992; New York Times editorial, in ibid., 28 December 1992, 8; and William Shawcross, “The U.N.’s Biggest Gamble,” Time, 28 December 1992, 35. This is not to deny that some of the allegations against the CPP were valid. See, for example, Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 103–6, 146–7, and Judy Ledgerwood, “Patterns of CPP Violence during the UNTAC Period,” in Judy Ledgerwood and Steve Heder, eds., Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-keeping (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 114–33. 96 See, for example, William Shawcross, “The U.N.’s Biggest Gamble,” 35–7. 97 “Cambodian Guerrillas Denounce UN Effort,” International Herald Tribune, 17–18 April 1993. “Ethnic Cleansing,” Newsweek, 19 April 1993, 30–3. 98 “Giving Peace a Chance,” Newsweek, 7 June 1993, 22. “Fears of US Attacks Foil KR Bid to Stop Election,” The Nation [Bangkok], 7 June 1993. 99 The underlying causes of the secessionist movement were the subject of intense debate. See “Americans Debate Cambodian Secession,” The Nation [Bangkok], 26 June 1993. 100 “Official Says US Won’t Interfere in Cambodia,” ibid., 22 June 1993, A-1. Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 168–77. 101 “U.S. Pressure Forces Sihanouk to Shun KR,” The Nation [Bangkok], 21 July 1993. “U.S. Establishes Terms for Accepting KR Role,” ibid., 25 July 1993. Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 187. 102 For a devastating indictment of Thai cooperation with the Khmer Rouge, see Craig Etcheson, “Without Any Pretensions, Dump the KR,” The Nation [Bangkok], 28 September 1993. 103 Charles Twining, interview with the author, 27 December 1994, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 104 E-mail message, Quinn to the author, 30 December 2002. Ben Kiernan, letter to the editor, New York Times, 29 October 1993, A28. 105 “United States to Aid Khmer Rouge Defectors,” Cambodia Daily, 18 February 1994, 5. “U.S. May Supply Arms to Cambodian Army,” Chicago Tribune, 15 May 1994, 14. “US Considers Giving Arms to Khmer Soldiers,” Bangkok Post, 13 May 1994, 1. 106 “US Concerned over Thai–KR Contacts,” The Nation [Bangkok], 11 March 1994. Morton Abramowitz, “Pol Pot’s Best Pal: Thailand,” Washington Post, 29 May 1994, C7. 107 Charles Twining, interview with the author, 27 December 1994, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 108 Henry Kamm, “Cambodia Says It Foiled an Attempted Coup,” New York Times, 4 July 1994, 4. 109 Charles Twining, interview with the author, 27 December 1994, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 110 E-mail message, Quinn to the author, 30 December 2002; e-mail message, Quinn to the author, 9 January 2003. 111 “Cambodian Leaders’ Forces Clash,” Chicago Tribune, 18 June 1997 (1), 12. 112 William Branigan, “Cambodian Rivals Agree on Spurning of Albright,” Washington Post, 27 June 1997, A30. 113 E-mail message, Quinn to the author, 30 December 2002. “Law of the Gun,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 July 1997, 14–15. “Cambodian Legislators Approve New Co-premier,” Chicago Tribune, 7 August 1997 (1), 18.

Notes

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114 Craig S. Smith, “Hun Sen Begins to Unify Cambodia, Pledging Election, Winning Over King,” Wall Street Journal, 14 July 1997, A10. 115 E-mail message, Quinn to the author, 30 December 2002. 116 Jim Wolf, “Free and Fair Elections Possible in Cambodia – US Official,” Reuters dispatch, 10 June 1998 (in author’s possession). 117 Kassie Neou to “All Friends of Cambodia,” 8 June 1998 (in author’s possession). Wolf, “Free and Fair Elections Possible in Cambodia.” 118 “Cambodian Crisis Continues,” IRI Newsletter, Fall 1998.” See also “Hun Sen Threatens to Sideline Opponents,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 30 July 1998, A6. 119 “Seth Mydans, “Cambodian Power Struggle Heats Up Ominously,” New York Times, 3 September 1998, A3. 120 Terry McCarthy of Time, interview with Hun Sen, 22 March 1999, www.time.com/asia.

Conclusion 1 Craig Etcheson, “The Number” – Quantifying Crimes Against Humanity in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: Documental Center of Cambodia, 2000). 2 Press Release, Senator McConnell’s Statement to the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, 30 April 2003, http://www.dccam.org/ Documents%20and%20Microfilm/UN_draft_resolution_on_KR_trials.htm 3 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Release 13 May 2003, http://www.un.int/usa/03_069.htm. Etcheson, “U.S. Role in Negotiating,” 50–3.

Bibliography

Unpublished primary sources United States National Archives II RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric File, 1967–1973 Richard Nixon Presidential Materials

Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson

Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI Papers of Papers of Papers of Papers of

Gerald R. Ford Robert T. Hartmann Edward Hutchinson Ronald Nessen

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. Atlanta, GA Papers of Jimmy Carter Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection

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Brown, MacAlister and Joseph J. Zasloff. Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers 1979–1998. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. Chanda, Nayan. Brother Enemy: The War After the War. New York: Macmillan, 1986. Chandler, David P. The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991. ——, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992. ——, A History of Cambodia. 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000. Chandler, David P. and Ben Kiernan, eds. Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays. New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1983. Clymer, Kenton. “American Assistance to the Cambodian Resistance Forces,” Indochina Issues, 90 (April 1990): 1–7. ——, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia.” Diplomatic History, 27 (April 2003): 145–78. Corfield, Justin. Khmers Stand Up!: A History of the Cambodian Government 1970–1975. Melbourne: Monash University Asian Institute, 1994. Deac, Wilfred P. Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970–1975. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1997. Doyle, Michael W. UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993. Duiker, William J. U.S. Containment and the Conflict in Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. Elliott, David W. P., ed. The Third Indochina Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981. Etcheson, Craig. The Rise and Fall of Democratic Kampuchea. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984. ——, “The Reagan Doctrine in Cambodia Design for a Research Project.” Paper prepared for the Conference on the United States and Vietnam: From War to Peace, University of Notre Dame, 2–4 December 1993. ——, “US–Cambodia Relations in the 1980s: A Puzzle for Historians.” Paper at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Bentley College, Waltham, MA, 23–26 June 1994. ——, “The U.S. Role in Negotiating Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: The Case of Cambodia.” Paper at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, 6–8 June 2003, Washington, D.C. Guilmartin, John F., Jr. A Very Short War: The Mayaquez and the Battle of Koh Tang. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1995. Haas, Michael. Cambodia, Pol Pot, and the United States: The Faustian Pact. New York: Praeger, 1991. Heder, Steven and Judy Ledgerwood, eds. Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition Under United Nations Peace-Keeping. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996. Heininger, Janet. Peacekeeping in Transition: The United States in Cambodia. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1994. Hildebrand, George C. and Gareth Porter. Cambodia, Starvation and Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976. Hitchens, Christopher, “The Case Against Henry Kissinger: The Making of a War Criminal.” Harper’s, February 2001, 33–58. ——, “The Case Against Henry Kissinger: Crimes Against Humanity.” Harper’s, March 2001, 49–74. Hurst, Steven. The Carter Administration and Vietnam. New York: St. Martins Press, 1996. Isaacs, Arnold R. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

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Index

Abramowitz, Morton L. 92, 130–2; attempts to discredit Pilger 207n.92; on policy toward the Khmer Rouge 135 Abrams, Creighton 9–10, 28–9, 176n.28 Adams, Sam 46; on number of Khmer Rouge 187n.19 Addabbo amendment 75 Agnew, Spiro 32, 44; visit to Cambodia (1970) 39; visit to Cambodia (1973) 57–9 Akashi, Yasushi 165 Albert, Carl 103 Albright, Madeleine 167; protests possible Khmer Rouge participation in Cambodian government 164 Alliman, Kirk 126, 128–9 Alsop, Joseph 9 Amin, Idi 137 Anderson, Jack: criticizes Carter administration’s Cambodia policy 128–9; on anti-Vietnamese bias in U.S. government 124; on Khmer Rouge atrocities 106 Anderson, John B.: on U.S. invasion of Cambodia 31 Angkor 1, 33, 54, 167 ANS see Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste Arends, Leslie 176n.37 Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS) 139 Atkins, Chester G. 155; criticizes U.S. policy toward Khmer Rouge 147 B-52 bombing of Cambodia 6–7, 9–17, 176–7n.43, 192n.113 Baez, Joan 121 Baker, James A. 151, 154, 161; condemns Khmer Rouge151; withdraws U.S. recognition of CGDK 155–57 Barnes, Thomas J. 110

Barron, John 115; details Khmer Rouge atrocities 111 Becker, Elizabeth 153; opposes aid to the NCR 149 Beecher, William: reveals B-52 strikes 6–7 Bennet, Douglas J. 118 Bloomfield, Lincoln 120, 125–6, 129; on seating DK in the U.N. 134 boat people from Vietnam 121 Borman, Frank 30 Botum Bopha, Princess 67 Bowles, Chester 3, 12, 14 Bradsher, Henry 65 Brandt, Willie: on U.S. invasion of Cambodia 30 Branfman, Fred 118 Brinkley, Douglas: on Carter and human rights 113 Brown, George 177n.43 Brown, Harold 136 Brown, Edmund 30 Brown, Sam: on seating DK in the U.N. 135 Brzezinksi, Zbigniew 118, 120, 125–6, 128, 133–5, 136–7, 139, 143, 156, 206n.75; condemns DK 116; on normalization with Vietnam 119; resists efforts to pressure China over DK 117–18; response to China’s invasion of Vietnam (1979) 119–20; support for Khmer Rouge 114 Bu Chric: attack on 19 Bu Prang 19 Buchanan, Pat 44, 145 Bunker, Ellsworth 19 Burr, William 79 Bush, George H. W. 97, 100, 145, 147, 150, 153–4, 157, 171

Index 219 Bush, George W.: policy toward Hun Sen’s government 172–3 Buzhardt, J. Fred 74 Byrd, Robert 103, 152 Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) 163, 169, 172, 212n.95 Cambodian refugees see land people Cambodians: early American images of 2 Carter, Jimmy 113–37 passim, 139, 171, 210n.4, 206n.75; and assistance to Cambodian resistance forces 131–37; human rights policy of 113–14; response to China’s invasion of Vietnam (1979) 119, 203n; response to famine in Cambodia 121–31; response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia (1978) 119–20, 128; response to land people 121 Carter, Rosalyn 130 Case, Clifford 81 Casey, William140, 143; urges military support for the NCR 139 Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) 4, 10–11, 28, 33, 183n.150 CGDK see Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea Chams: persecuted by Khmer Rouge 106 Chanda, Nayan 145, 155; reports on U.S. covert assistance to Cambodian resistance forces 140, 147 Chandler, David P. 12, 115; on American role in coup against Sihanouk 22; on North Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia 191n.120; opposes lethal aid to the NCR 143–4 Charny, Joel 126 Chatichai Choonhavan 148, 159 Chau Doc: attack on 73 Chauncey, Helen R.: opposes lethal aid to NCR 144 Cheney, Dick 154–5 Cheng Heng 50, 71 Chenla II military campaign 48–49, 51, 54 Cherne, Leo 117, 134, 137 Chams: persecution of 106 Chou En-lai see Zhou Enlai Christian and Missionary Alliance 1–2, 48, 73, 88, 96 Christmas Bombings see LINEBACKER II Christopher, Warren: condemns DK 116 Church, Frank: on herbicide issue 18 Clark, Dick 124

Cleland, John 47 Cleveland, Harlan 32 Clifford, Clark 9 Cline, Ray 141 Clinton, Bill 169: protests Sihanouk’s plan to talk with Khmer Rouge 164 Cloud, Stanley 153 Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) 136, 140, 146, 149, 152–3, 161; U.S. withdraws recognition from 155–7 Colbert, Evelyn 180n.93; on American role in coup against Sihanouk 21–2 Colby, William 99–100; visits Cambodia (1970) 40 Columbia Eagle 24 Congressional Research Service 142 Corcoran, Thomas 179n.76 Corfield, Justin J. 12; on American role in coup against Sihanouk 22 COSVN see Central Office for South Vietnam Cranston, Alan 151; opposes aid to the NCR 149 Daddah, Ould 77 Dak Dam: attacks on 19–21 Danforth, John C. 124, 128 DANIEL BOONE, Operation 17–18 Deac, Wilfred 72, 92, 186n.5, 198n.43; on American role in coup against Sihanouk 22 Dean, John Gunther 87, 92–5, 98, 100, 165, 197n.32; proposes international conference 88–90 Democratic Party (Cambodia) 55 Democratic Kampuchea (DK) 109–10, 114–19, 132–3, 136, 164; debate about U.N. seat for 133–5; early U.S. contacts with 110; genocide issue and 116–17; U.S. humanitarian assistance to 110, 114; see also Khmer Rouge Deng Xiaoping 90, 120, 196n.20; on China’s invasion of Vietnam 203n.28; proposes attack on Vietnam 119 Denton, Jeremiah 144 Depuy, William 9 Derian, Patricia 113, 133 Deschamps, Noël St. Clair 3–6, 13, 16 Dicks, Norman 114 Dirksen, Everett 176n.37 Dith Pran: opposes lethal aid to NCR 144, 149

220

Index

Dodd, Christopher 120 Dole, Robert, 117, 144, 202n.11 Doolin, Dennis J. 74, 124–5 Dulles, John Foster 84 Eagle Pull, Operation 99–102 Eagleburger, Lawrence 80–1 Eaton, Cyrus 100 Eilberg, Joshua: on admitting refugees 112 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 84, 138 Enders, Thomas 54, 57, 85–6; attempted assassination of 56 Erickson, Eldon 175n.20 Etcheson, Craig: on possible U.S. assistance to the Khmer Rouge 141–2 Evans, Gareth: proposal of to end Cambodian conflict 152–3 Famine in Cambodia 121–31 Fernandez, Sosthene 57, 87, 95 Fonda, Jane 118 Ford, Gerald 12, 31, 74, 81, 86–7, 91–2, 96–100, 102–4, 107, 171, 176n.37, 196n.20 Forsythe, Edwin B.: on seating DK in the U.N. 135 Fraser, Donald M. 115 French colonialism: American views of 2 Friendship Highway 166 Fulbright, J. William 25; on U.S. invasion of Cambodia 31 FUNCINPEC see National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia Galbraith, Francis Joseph 27, 31, 35 Gang of Four 81 Geneva Conference (1954) 14, 49, 60 genocide issue 116–17, 120, 125, 134, 150, 153, 159–60, 172, 211n.84 Geyer, Georgie Anne 150 Gingrich, Newt 145 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry 92 Godley, G. McMurtrie 9–10, 68–9 Goldwater, Barry 30 Gorbachev, Mikhail 145–6 Gorton, John Grey 27 Goslier, B. P. 54 Graham, Billy 30 Graham, James: assesses Vietnamese communist infiltration through Cambodia 9–10 Graven, Merle 48

Green, Marshall 17, 19, 57 Gullion, Edmund 84 Habib, Philip 82, 96, 110, 196n.19 Haig, Alexander 44, 59; visit to Cambodia (1973) 70–1 Haldeman, H. R. 23, 28–9, 32 Hamill, Pete 32 Han Thun Hak 59–60, 64, 95; government of resigns 71 Han Xu 193n.139 Harben, William 55–7 Harper, Malcom 126 Harriman, Averell 76 Hatfield, Mark: opposes aid to the NCR 149 Hayden, Tom 118 Hebert, Edward 176n.37 Heng Samrin 118, 122, 125–8, 130–2 Herod, Bill 124 Herz, Martin: blames communists for herbicidal damage 18 Hesburgh, Theodore M. 123 Hickel, Walter: and U.S. invasion of Cambodia 33 Hildebrand, G. C. 108–9 Hitler, Adolph: Khmer Rouge compared to 134 Ho Chi Minh 2 Holbrooke, Richard 115, 120, 125, 131, 133, 144–5, 206n.77; condemns Vietnam’s policy toward food distribution in Cambodia 131; on Cambodian refugees in Vietnam 202n.16; on seating DK in the U.N. 134 Holdridge, John 100, 140–1 Hope, Bob 43 Horowitz, Michael 153 Hou Youn 63–5, 95 Hu Nim 63–4, 190n.81 Huang Zhen 78–80 Huang Hua 77 Hun Sen 138, 146, 148–9, 151–3, 155–7, 159–61, 163, 165–6,169, 170, 172–3; character of debated 149–50; coup of 167–8; Solarz on 211n.92; visits U.S. (1992) 162 Hurst, Sam 118 ICC see International Control Commission In Tam 55, 65, 70–1, 75–6, 85, 204n.46 Indonesia: assistance to Lon Nol

Index 221 government 27; military assistance to Cambodia 36–7; sponsors conference on Cambodia (1970) 25, 31, 35–6 International Control Commission (ICC) 20, 25, 35, 62, 148 Isaacs, Arnold R. 12 Jackson State University: students killed at 172 Jackson, Henry: on U.S. invasion of Cambodia 31 Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) 146, 153 Javits, Jacob 25 Jennings, Peter 153–54 Johnson, Lyndon B. 3, 9–10, 23, 107 Johnson, Robert H. 144 Jones, Sidney: criticizes CPP 168 Kahin, George McT. 108–9 Kalb, Marvin 48 Kamm, Henry 68, 125–7; details Khmer Rouge atrocities 111 Kang Keng 52 Karnow, Stanley 12–14, 63–4, 76 Kassenbaum, Nancy 144 Kassie Neou 168–9 Kasten, Robert 144 Kennan, George 138 Kennedy, Edward 73, 123 Kennedy, Richard T. 91 Kent State Univesity: students killed at 32, 172 Keo An 55, 191n.94; arrested 68 Ker Chhieng 188n.38 Kerrey, Bob 142, 154, 157, 162, 207n.94 Khieu Kanharith 161 Khieu Samphan 62–4, 87, 90, 92, 164, 169, 190n.81, 198n.56 Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) 139–41 Khmer Rouge 8, 11–12, 17, 21, 24, 28, 46, 50–1, 58, 60–1, 63–6, 71, 74–5, 78–80, 82–3, 85–7, 89, 91, 93–5, 97–103, 104–12 passim, 121, 127, 131–2, 133–4, 136–7, 139–40, 142–6, 149, 152, 154–5, 159, 161–2, 166, 168, 171–2, 207n.92, 211n.92; atrocities of 110–12, 115; doubts about atrocities of 107–9; end of 167, 169; international tribunal for 172; Kenneth Quinn’s analysis of 104–6; national anthem of 104; opt out of elections 163; persecution of Chams 106; possible

reasons for demise of 162, 165; possible U.S. assistance to 141–2, 207n.94; U.S. supports assistance to 135–6; see also Democratic Kampuchea Khmer Serei 23, 26, 38 Kiernan, Ben 151; on American role in coup against Sihanouk 22 The Killing Fields 144 Kimball, Jeffrey 12 Kimmitt, Robert M. 150, 155 Kissinger, Henry 4, 10–12, 14, 16, 24, 28, 37, 40–1, 44, 61–4, 72, 74, 77–8, 82–3, 85–9, 89–91, 93, 99–100, 102, 109–10, 156, 180n.85, 196n.19, 196n.20, 197n.32; and Paris Peace Accords 59; can find no place for Swank in state department 194n.156; on Mansfield 194n.159; on North Vietnamese dominance of the Khmer Rouge 58; visits Beijing (1973) 84 Klein, Herb 32 Koh Tang island: and Mayaguez affair 102–3 KPNLF see Khmer People’s National Liberation Front Krauthammar, Charles 138 Krisher, Bernard 195n.162 Kuon Wick 44 Labouisse, Harry 128 Ladd, Jonathan ‘Fred’ 40, 46–7 Lagnado, Lucette 129 Laird, Melvin 24–5, 40–1, 47; and invasion of Cambodia 28–29 land people (Cambodian refugees) 121; Carter administration’s response to 121 Le Duc Tho 74; and Paris Peace Accords 59 Leach, Jim: opposes lethal aid to the NCR 143–5 Lee Kuan Yew 43, 77, 81–3; on U.S. invasion of Cambodia 31 Lewis, Anthony 154; on Kissinger and Cambodia 109 LINEBACKER, Operation 59 LINEBACKER II, Operation 60 Linowitz, Sol M. 122–3 Lon Nol 8, 24–6, 28, 30, 34, 36–40, 43–4, 46, 48–9, 51–8, 60–2, 63–7, 70–2, 74–8, 81, 83, 85, 87–9, 90, 92–3, 98–9, 101, 107, 187n.29, 191n.105, 196n.20; and Paris Peace Accords 59; assumes

222

Index

dictatorial control 67–8; ousts Sihanouk 21–3; suffers stroke 44–5 Lon Non 58, 61, 65–7, 68–9, 71, 101; suspected of trying to assassinate Enders 56–7 Long Boret 95, 99, 101; executed by Khmer Rouge 107 Lord, Winston 80, 165 Lowenstein, James 26, 71 MacDonald, Malcolm 50 MACV see Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Magnuson, Warren 79 Malik, Adam 25, 27, 35; on U.S. invasion of Cambodia 31 Manac’h, Etienne 87, 92 Mansfield, Mike 6–7, 12, 16, 18, 25, 51, 61, 76, 84, 96–7, 100, 103–4; Kissinger’s comments on 194n.159; visit to Cambodia (1969) 8 Marcos, Ferdinand: on U.S. invasion of Cambodia 31 Marsh, John 44 Martin, Graham 86–8, 100 Mataxis, Theodore 45, 47 Mayaguez affair 102–4, 110 McCain, Admiral John 53–4 McCain, Senator John 166 McCleary, Paul 130 McClellan, John 103 McConnell, Mitch: criticizes CPP 172; sees no point in international tribunal for Khmer Rouge 172 McGovern, George 117 McGrory, Mary 153; criticizes Carter administration’s policy toward PRK 126 McHenry, Donald 133 McWhorter, Charles 32 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) 4, 6–10, 40 Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT) 40–1, 45–7 missionaries see Christian and Missionary Alliance Mitchell, George 154 Mitchell, John 32 Mok-Lean 64 MOLINAKA 207n.4 Mondale, Walter F. 125 Monique, Princess 124 Moorer, Thomas 12

Moose, Richard 26, 71 Muskie, Edmund 134–6, 153 Mylai Massacre 19 National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) 139, 163, 167–9 NCR see non-communist resistance Neal, John 102 Negroponte, John D. 59 Nessen, Ron 97 Newson, David 144s Nguyen Van Thieu 27, 90; and Paris Peace Accords (1973) 59–60 Nguyen Van Manh 26 Nhiek Tioulong 8, 98 Nimitz, Matt 125–6 Nixon, Richard M. 3–4, 7–9, 12, 16–17, 23–4, 27, 34, 39–41, 43, 47, 49–50, 54, 56, 59, 66, 70, 72, 76–7, 83, 87, 107, 171, 183n.143; and invasion of Cambodia 28–34; and normalization of relations 3–5; on Indonesia’s conference on Cambodia (1970) 35; refuses to see Sihanouk 188n.38; visit to Beijing (1972) 50–1 Nofziger, Lyn 32 non-communist resistance (NCR) 135, 156, 159; debate about lethal assistance to 139–55, 162; assistance to 209n.43 Norodom Chakrapong 163, 166 Norodom Chantarangsey 69 Norodom Ranariddh 148–9, 167–9 Norodom, Sihanouk 2–4, 8–9, 12, 20, 30, 33, 45, 49–50, 53, 56, 60, 62, 66, 68, 70, 73, 86, 105–6, 110, 132–3, 139, 141, 146, 148–9, 151–2, 154–5, 159–61, 165–6, 168, 171, 180n.93, 188n.38, 191n.93, 198n.46, 207n.4; and Khmer Rouge 109, 131; coup against 21–5; on hot pursuit 12–15, 177–8n.55; on U.S. war in Vietnam 3, 14, 16; on Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia (1978) 119; possible negotiations with 49–51, 61–4, 71–2, 76–85, 88–102 passim; question of his acquiescence in B-52 bombings 12–17; royal crusade for independence 2 Nuon Chea, 167, 169 Oakley, Robert 132

Index 223 Osborne, Milton: on American role in coup against Sihanouk 22 Ott, Marvin: supports lethal aid to the NCR 143 Owen, Henry 206n.75 Palmieri, Victor 125, 129–30, 206n.75 Paris Peace Accords (1973) 59, 62, 65–6, 74–5, 82 Paris Conference (1989) 148, 151–2 Paris Conference (1991) 160–1 Paul, Anthony: details Khmer Rouge atrocities 111 Peace Corps: members protest invasion of Cambodia 32 Pech Lim Kuou: bombs palace 85 Pedler, John: opposes aid to the NCR 149 Pell, Claiborne: opposes aid to the NCR 149 Penn Nouth 50, 62 People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 121–2, 126–9, 132–3, 118–37 passim, 146, 148, 150, 156; see also State of Cambodia Perez de Cueller, Javier 148, 160 Perot, Ross 30 Pfaff, William 156 Pfeiffer, E. W. 21 Pham Van Dong 23; on Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia 118 Phoumi Vongvichit 92 Phung, Mr. 100 Pilger, John: criticized by Abramowitz 207n.92; on U.S. support for the Khmer Rouge 136 Pol Pot 73, 115, 118, 120, 122, 125, 127, 129, 132, 134–6, 137, 140, 142, 144, 151, 190n.81, 205n.77, 211n.92; death of, 167; see also Democratic Kampuchea; Khmer Rouge Pompidou, Georges 83 Ponchoud, François: and Khmer Rouge atrocities 107, 111 Poole, Peter A. 115 Porter, Gareth 108, 115 Porter, John Edward: on seating DK in the U.N. 135 Porter, William J. 71 Powell, Colin 172 PRK see People’s Republic of Kampuchea Pueblo incident 102 Qiang Zhia 120

Quayle, Dan 149–50 Quinn, Kenneth 74–5, 110, 159, 168; analysis of Khmer Rouge rule 104–6; appointed ambassador 167; negotiates MIA agreement with SOC 155; on demise of Khmer Rouge 162, 165; on genocide issue 211n.84 Quinn-Judge, Paul 140 Ranariddh see Norodom Ranariddh RANCH HAND, Operation 18 Razak, Tun Abdul 61 Reagan Doctrine 138–9 Reagan, Ronald 30, 102, 138–9, 141, 144, 147, 153, 171 Republican Security Battalion 69; see also Lon Non Richardson, Elliott 176n.43 Rivers, Mendel 176n.37 Rives, Lloyd M. 25, 28, 42; on Dak Dam attacks 19–20; on herbicide issue 18; reopens U.S. embassy 8 Robb, Charles 151 Rockefeller, Nelson 107; on U.S. invasion of Cambodia 31 Rodman, Peter W. 80–1, 139, 151–2, 154, 156 Rogachev, Igor 159 Rogers, William 7, 4, 19, 32, 40, 47, 186n.5; and invasion of Cambodia 28–9; on meaning of the Paris Peace Accords (1973) 75 Roosevelt, Franklin: on French colonialism 2 Rostow, Walt 13 Roth, Stanley 169 Russell, Richard 176n.37 Sak Sutsakhan 48 SALEM HOUSE, OPERATION 17–18 Saloth Sar see Pol Pot Samlaut Rebellion 13 Santoli, Al: supports lethal aid to the NCR 143 Sarin Chhak 50, 110 Saukham Khoy 89, 101 Scaife-Mellon Foundation 44 Schevernadze, Eduard A. 156 Schlesinger, James R. 98, 103, 177n.43 Scott, James M. 138–39, 143; on nonlethal aid to NCR 208n Scowcroft, Brent 68, 70, 98, 102, 112, 154–5, 157, 193n.139, Severeid, Eric 48

224

Index

Shawcross, William 8, 58, 62 Sihanouk see Norodom, Sihanouk Sim Var 46 Sirik Matak 24, 28, 38, 46, 50, 52, 55–6, 64, 66–7, 69–71, 87, 101; and ouster of Sihanouk 21–3, 181n.106; placed under house arrest 68 Sitthi Savetsila 136 Smith, Terrence 44 Smyser, W. Richard 88, 90 So Photra 191n.93; bombs palace 67 So Satto 68 Sok An: negotiates MIA agreement with U.S. 155 Solarz, Stephen 115, 120, 117, 152, 154, 162; and lethal aid to NCR 140–9, 155; condemns DK 116; on Hun Sen 211n.92; Twining on 202n.10 Solomon, Richard 80–1, 100, 155, 159, 162 Son Ngoc Thanh: attempted assassination of 56 Son Sann 141, 143, 148, 149; heads KPNLF 139; possible negotiations with Sihanouk (1970) 50, 61, 76 Son Sen: murdered 167 Souvanna Phouma 70 Sparkman, John 81, 96 State of Cambodia (SOC) 148–50, 153, 155–6, 159, 161, 163, 165; see also People’s Republic of Kampuchea Stearman, William L. 93–4 Stennis, John 176n.37 Stewart, Michael 30 Stoessel, Walter J., Jr. 139 Strong, Robert A.: on Carter and human rights 113 Sudjatmoko 27 Suharto 21, 27; on U.S. invasion of Cambodia 31 Sullivan, William H. 71–2 Sullivan, Roger W. 134; urges support for the Khmer Rouge 135–6 Sumitro 37 Supreme National Council, 153, 155, 157, 159 Swank, Emory 40, 42–53, 55, 63–4, 66–71, 75–6, 96, 188n.47, 187n.23, 187n.29, 194n.156; recalled 83 Ta Mok 169 Tatu, Francis 47

Tep Kunnah: attempted assassination of 68 Thailand: military assistance to Cambodia 38–9 Thanom Kittikachorn 38 Thay Sok 7 Thayer, Nate: witnesses Pol Pot’s trial 167 Thompson, Robert 95 Timmons, William E. 75 Tito, Josip Broz: on U.S. invasion of Cambodia 30 Torricelli, Robert: co-sponsors Solarz bill to aid NCR 144 Touré, Sékou 76 Tran Chanh Thanh 15 Truong Nhu Tang 10–11 Turner, Stansfield 120 Twining, Charles 115–16, 127, 154, 162, 169; appointed ambassador to Cambodia 165; on Cambodia’s recovery 166–7; on Solarz’s influence 202n.10; opens liaison office in Phnom Penh 162 Ung Hout 168 Unger, Leonard 38 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 157, 160, 163; assessment of 165 UNTAC: see United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia Vance, Cyrus 113, 120, 122–5, 132–3, 136; defends vote to seat DK in the U.N. 134 Vickery, Michael 157 Vietnam: invades Cambodia (1978) 118; withdrawal from Cambodia 146, 148, 152 Vincent, Frank L., Jr. 1 Vivien, Alain 159 Vogt, John 4 Wallop, Malcolm 151 War Powers Act 102 Warnke, Paul 9 Watergate scandal 77, 80, 83, 87 Westing, Arthur 21 Westmoreland, William 40 Wheeler, Earle 10, 12 Wicker, Tom 32, 97 Wiedemann, Kent 169 Wilson, Harold 30

Index 225 Winder, Jonathan: on U.S. aid to Khmer Rouge 142, 207n.94 Wolfowitz, Paul D. 142–3; denies any U.S. assistance to Khmer Rouge 141 Woodcock, Leonard 120, 132 Wu, Eddie 64 yellow powder incidents 18

Yem Sarong 178n.63 Yost, Charles 19, 180n.85 Young Americans for Freedom 30 Young, Andrew 113 Zhou Enlai 78–81, 84–5; encourages negotiations 64