When Empire Meets Nationalism

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When Empire Meets Nationalism

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When Empire Meets Nationalism Power Politics in the US and Russia

Didier Chaudet Sciences Po, France Florent Parmentier Sciences Po, France benoÎt PÉlopidas Sciences Po, France, University of Geneva, Switzerland and Monterey Institute of International Studies, USA

© Didier Chaudet, Florent Parmentier and Benoît Pélopidas 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Didier Chaudet, Florent Parmentier and Benoît Pélopidas have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the authors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data When empire meets nationalism : power and politics in the US and Russia. 1. Balance of power--History. 2. Nationalism--United States. 3. Nationalism--Russia (Federation) 4. Imperialism. 5. Political culture--United States. 6. Political culture-Russia (Federation) 7. United States--Foreign relations. 8. Russia (Federation)--Foreign relations. I. Chaudet, Didier. II. Parmentier, Florent. III. Pélopidas, Benoît. 327.1'01'0947-dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Chaudet, Didier. When empire meets nationalism : power politics in the US and Russia / by Didier Chaudet, Florent Parmentier and Benoît Pélopidas. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-7546-7805-2 (hardback) -- ISBN 978-0-7546-9569-1 (ebook) 1. Nationalism--United States. 2. Conservatism--United States. 3. Nationalism--Russia (Federation) 4. Conservatism--Russia (Federation) 5. Imperialism. 6. United States--Politics and government. 7. Russia (Federation)--Politics and government. I. Parmentier, Florent. II. Pélopidas, Benoît. III. Title. JC311.C4563 2008 327.1--dc22  2009019237 ISBN 9780754678052 (hbk) ISBN 9780754695691 (ebk.V)

Contents List of Boxes Acknowledgements

vii ix

Introduction

1

Part I The Apostles of the Empire: Intellectual Genealogies 1 Neoconservatives, Old and New

11

2

39

From Eurasianism to Neo-Eurasianism:Nostalgia for the Empire

Part II  Imperial Calling and Nationalism 3 Anatomy of the Empire: Imperial Nationalism? 4

67

American History through the Neoconservative Looking Glass: Imperial Calling Derived from Nationalism 83

5 The Empire, Neo-eurasianists and Russian Nationalism

99

Part III  Geopolitics of Imperial Invocations: Between Cynicism, Ideology and Incoherence 6 Islam 7

Turkey and Central Asia

121 137

8 The Middle East

157

Conclusion The Impossible Empire of Ressentiment

179

Afterword Changing People, Continuing Patterns?

189

Select and Thematic Bibliography Index

197 207

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List of Boxes East Coast Jews? A Rapid Characterization of the Neoconservatives AIPAC and Neoconservatism Declinism Peter the Great, the Modernizing, Westernizing Tsar Russia and the Mongol Period Russian Emigration Scythianism The Post-Soviet Russian Political Scene The Founding of Dugin’s Eurasia Party Citizenship and Nationality The Rise of Anti-Americanism in Russia The “Platt Amendment” “Near abroad” Why this Eurasian Turnaround in the Russian Energy Sector? Accommodationism and Confrontationism: A Divergence among Orientalists Russian Muslims Turkish Eurasianism Neoconservative Fears and the Kyrgyzstan Tulip Revolution Kazakh Eurasianism The Soviet Afghan War (1979-1988) and Beyond

12 16 30 40 44 45 47 50 55 57 58 88 104 111 123 132 142 152 154 162

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Acknowledgements Our warmest thanks go to Richard Descoings, Alexis Keller, Zaki Laïdi, Ghassan Salamé and Sciences Po for their support. Philippe Forget must be thanked for his continued interest in our work and his numerous and useful comments. We also thank Natalja Mortensen for her kindness, her reactivity and constant dedication to the improvement of the manuscript. When Empire Meets Nationalism was translated from the French by Chris Flower with the help of the authors.

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Introduction The terror of the Roman arms added weight and dignity to the moderation of the emperors. They preserved peace by a constant preparation for war; and while justice regulated their conduct, they announced to the nations on their confines that they were as little disposed to endure as to offer an injury. Edward Gibbon, The History of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776). Vol. 1, Chapter 1: ’The extent and military force of the Roman Empire, in the age of the Antonines’. Edition provided by the online library of Liberty.

Even though it may not have been up to everyone’s expectations, Episode III of Star Wars, Revenge of the Sith, is in fact extremely revealing on a political level. Indeed, in the United States, while George Lucas was in Cannes in 2005, a controversy was seeing the light of day: the director declared he had developed his saga in reference to the Vietnam War and felt there was a disturbing parallel between this event and the invasion of Iraq. By comparing the “philosophy” behind his work to the current political situation, he was stating that “most bad people think they are good people, they are doing it for the right reasons” and, as if to underline the polemical aspect of his declaration, he added to the parallel between the American political context and the leitmotiv of his Episode III that “In terms of evil, one of the original concepts was how does a democracy turn itself into a dictatorship”, in other words, how a prosperous Republic, albeit in a crisis, becomes a moralistic and militarist dictatorship. A process which some, on the political left, would use to define George W. Bush’s policy-making. Such statements provoked anger among right-wing American groups. The position of the pro-republican group, the PABAAH (Patriotic Americans Boycotting Anti-American Hollywood), was to call for a boycott of Lucas’s latest film upon its release in the United States. However, over and above these reactions, one totally unexpected response was formulated by the intellectuals: the conservatives, and more particularly those categorized as the “neoconservatives” went along with Lucas, adding that the director was simply mistaken in his definition of Good and Evil: Anakin Skywalker, who becomes Darth Vader, chose, according to them, the good side, the Empire. The promotion of an imperial ideal had in fact already begun. As early as 2002, Jonathan V. Last, a journalist at the neoconservative Weekly Standard, had written   Chris Burns, “Lucas on Iraq War, Star Wars”, CNN.com, 16 May 2005.  The group proposes a petition for criminal charges against Michael Moore, for treason. They consider his documentary “Fahrenheit 9/11” (2004) as a support for the enemy in war time.



When Empire Meets Nationalism

a long article based on the universe of Star Wars to promote an imperial strategy. He put forward disturbing arguments for those who recognized in America the anti-imperialistic power par excellence. According to him, Empire represents order rather than slavery. Obviously the Emperor is a dictator, but a “kindly” dictator: to underline his point, the neoconservative journalist used the example of Pinochet, a reference that is in itself more edifying than any critical analysis of his vision of the “enlightened dictatorship”. He presents the Republic as a system in decline, following the example of the United Nations, and contemplates the justification of the use of force to subjugate populations and territories, in light of the current global situation. The analysis of a movie became in turn an unexpected political debate: American intellectuals and political analysts, sometimes in direct contact with those in power, turned out to be supporters of a so-called imperial strategy. Such thinking would appear to be at work in Russia, only a few years after the fall of the Empire, both externally (the popular democracies in 1989) and internally (dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991). The Gorbachev years, Yeltsin’s desire to move on from the USSR and post-1991 westernization would clearly suggest a backward surge in imperial thinking. However, a decline in Russian dominance certainly complicated the consolidation of a democracy and, even if the two notions are not a priori incompatible, a strengthening of the State and its power has entered the agenda rather than a continuation of the democratization process. Thus, the crisis of the 1990s led to nostalgia for a period during which the country was respected, and the Empire was considered as the fitting political form. This nostalgia was expressed just a short time before the sixtieth anniversary celebrations of 9 May 1945 in Moscow: during his speech to the Nation on 25 April 2005, Vladimir Putin presented the collapse of the Soviet Union as the “century’s worst geopolitical catastrophe”. Likewise, Boris Kagarlitsky, director of the Institute of Globalization and Social Movements (Moscow), considered the fall of the Eastern bloc as a personal catastrophe for many ex-Soviet citizens, with globally negative consequences, including those relating to personal freedom. This renewed interest in the USSR, and for the imperial idea in general, is illustrated by a kind of Russian counterpart to neoconservatism, neo-eurasianism, of which Alexander Dugin is the best known standard-bearer. The neo-eurasianists would appear to have evolved from political insignificance to a position of ideologists close to the former President, Vladimir Putin, who seems to be seeking a synthesis between Eurasian and Soviet values and the necessities of a globalized economy and the modernization of the country.   Jonathan V. Last, “The Case for Empire”, Weekly Standard, 16 May 2002.   Claire Bigg, “Was Soviet Collapse Last Century’s Worst Geopolitical Catastrophe?”, Radio Free Europe, 29 April 2005.  A biography of Alexander Dugin is available at the following address - Radio Free Europe: http://www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection/bio/dugin.asp.

Introduction



In both cases, a calling for what could be considered as an Empire lies at the heart of an intellectual and strategic edifice. It is precisely this convergence and renewed interest for a once old-fashioned notion that we have chosen to analyze. However, whereas the choice of the Americans speaks for itself, why Russia rather than the rising great powers of China or India? The similarities mentioned above are not enough to justify our choice. It should not be forgotten that, unlike the two Asian giants, Moscow has the experience of a world power, with an international influence and presence. We also take into consideration the pivotal role it has in the coming geopolitical order: the United States will continue to be the first world power for another twenty years at least, and the growth of Beijing and New Delhi in the mid-term is undeniable. But the return of bipolarity is in no way guaranteed. The future of Russia, the world’s leading exporter of natural gas and second world exporter of oil could play a decisive role in the reconfiguration of the international system to come, all the more so as China, India and the United States, in a desire to diversify their reserves, are eager to procure Russian hydrocarbons. Even if the heir to the Soviet Empire has only the world’s seventh largest oil reserves, approximately 5 percent of available resources, this is enough to satisfy demand until 2020. More importantly, it has the world’s largest gas reserves which will last for at least another 70 years according to the Minister for Natural Resources Yuri Trutnev. Consequently, Russia is in the paradoxical situation of a collapsed Empire whose role will be decisive in the future division of power. And President Putin knew this. In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in May 2006, he denounced the “American fortress”. “As the saying goes, comrade wolf knows whom to eat. It eats without listening and is clearly not going to listen to anyone” he declared with some irony before proposing the creation of a unified European strategy for energy resources. Beyond the stakes of nuclear proliferation, we felt the comparison between the United States and Russia would be both enlightening for tomorrow and intellectually stimulating. However, before beginning a true analytical comparison, let us first explain our theoretical and methodological choices. In this volume, we make the case for ‘analytical eclecticism’10 in International Relations (IR), combining material and ideational factors in the study of Empire. In doing so, we pretend to avoid the excesses of the two dominant paradigms in  Lucio Caracciolo, “The Importance of Being Russia”, available at the following address: http://www.eheartland.com/geopolitics_russian_empire_putin.html.  Information available at http://www.iags.org/futureofoil.html.  Information available at http://www.aneki.com/fr/gaz.html.   He announced this estimation in an interview given on Radio Maïak, 19 November 2005. 10  Peter J. Katzenstein, Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian – Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism”, International Security, Vol. 26 No. 3, Winter 2001/2002, pp. 153-85.



When Empire Meets Nationalism

contemporary IR theory: neorealism and social constructivism.11 Both originally admit the interplay between material and ideational factors in shaping the international scene but they only explain how one of the two aspects can lead to change.12 Broadly speaking, neorealism focuses on the relative distribution of capabilities among sovereign States, considering the international system as fundamentally anarchic; it deals with the art and practice of power politics. However, it underestimates the role of social forces in international relations, the diversity of socialization processes and provides a narrow view of competition between the different actors. On the other side, social constructivism underlines the role of the ideational factor, that is to say identity, ideas, norms and discursive practices, which provide broad orientation for behavior and policy. Yet, the heuristic potential of the interplay between material and ideational change is rarely fully explored. Thus, we argue that “the ideas and shared knowledge which are in focus in constructivist analysis never operate outside a specific material context.”13 That is why we will combine an in-depth study of the worldviews of neoconservative and neo-eurasianist intellectuals considered as political forces competing with others to shape the foreign policy agenda of their country14 and more material factors. We will do so at two levels. First, in our presentation of these movements, we take into account the material mediations, either institutions, media, or techniques, our two groups of intellectuals mobilize to broadcast their worldview both inside and outside the political sphere. Second, we include in our analysis the geopolitical constraints that weight on the way they formulate their worldview and try to impact foreign policy making. The intellectual movements we will analyze are commonly referred to as “neo-eurasianists” and “neoconservatives”. This first approach relates more to designation rather than definition and requires developing throughout our analysis. We have to keep in mind that these categories may result either from an auto – or a hetero-designation. The latter may come from two different sources: neutral observers and actors, whether political or intellectual, who qualify the opposition. “Neo-eurasianists” and “neoconservatives” retain, under their respective labels, all their intellectual and social complexity. The status of the subject in question, which calls upon the approaches of historical sociology, the history of ideas and

11  We completely recognize the fruitful efforts of the liberal tradition, the English school and Robert Cox’s neo-Gramscianism for providing balanced theories of material and ideational factors to explain change in IR. They nonetheless remain a minority. 12  Georg Sørensen, “The Case for Combining Material Forces and Ideas in the Study of IR”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 5, 2008. 13 Ibid., p. 21. 14  See the seminal work by Robert O. Keohane and Judith Goldstein (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993.

Introduction



political philosophy, confronts us with an “epistemological indetermination”.15 In the face of this complexity, we could call upon the concept of political culture which in the French case is defined as follows: [a coherent whole] that reflects a true vision of the world for those who adhere to [its] principals. [Its] strength lies […] in the interiorization of a whole series of parameters whose interweaving guarantees the solidity of the whole and makes any criticism difficult: philosophical bases or doctrinal vulgate, historical references, institutional conceptions, vision of economic relations and social organization, analysis of foreign relations, all expressed through symbols, rhetoric, rituals.16

We will not refrain from referring to one or other of the social dimensions included in this list but the extension of such a concept is problematic as this would revive an understanding of a whole as a whole via a process of assembling the infinite number of its elements. If we have decided to analyze globalizing conceptions, worldviews, it is through an extremely precise prism: that of the Empire. Our voluntary caution serves our initial ambition, which is to not know a whole in order to perform a localized examination to produce results of a scientific nature and likely to contribute to a better understanding of these intellectual groups. A detour via the concept of political culture warns us against the error of postulating an apparent coherence among the positions under analysis. We propose therefore the following hypothesis: Neoconservatives and neoeurasianists’ worldviews both evoke the rehabilitation of an imperial strategy. The concept of Empire is used here on both an historical and analytical level. However, the neoconservatives are more recalcitrant concerning the term imperial to describe their worldview than their Russian counterparts. This hypothesis, which we shall develop with a view to validating the comparison, will need to be confirmed later. Because we use the concept of Empire as an instrument for interpretation, it will need to be clearly defined to show whether it is more relevant than great power or hegemony to understand the phenomenon in question. Our analysis will contain three sections. The first will be to understand the historical construction of the rationalities and imaginations as developed by the actors under analysis. To do so, we shall develop an intellectual genealogy of the neo-eurasianists and neoconservatives, paying particular attention to the “neo” prefix that is common to both. Indeed the very definition of our object via this prefix requires a clear distinction from all that is “paleo”. We cannot begin to hope to understand the 15  Christian Delacroix analyzed this notion in Esquisses psychanalytiques, No. 18, Autumn 1992, pp. 211-15. 16  Serge Berstein, “Les cultures politiques à la fin du XXe siècle” in Serge Berstein (ed.), Les cultures politiques en France, Paris, Seuil, 1999, pp. 391-96, p. 391.



When Empire Meets Nationalism

historical players better than they understood themselves; rather, we shall aim at reconstructing how they understood their action, whether political or intellectual, in their time.17 We thus follow in the tradition of comprehensive sociology, from Dilthey to Raymond Aron, who applies it as follows to the international scene: The role of the empirical study of foreign affairs involves determining the historical perception which determines how the players act […]. Any concrete study of foreign affairs automatically becomes a sociological and historical study.18

The first stage is therefore a presentation of two parallel itineraries, based on the testimonies of the key players at the time of their commitments, without however developing a comparison, and without seeking to analyze any transfer of ideas or persons between the movements. It also aims to measure the contemporary influence of the movements in Washington and Moscow.19 Once this influence has been established, the neo-eurasianist and neoconservative positions will be confronted to the concept of Empire. This confrontation will allow us to elaborate more precise categories for analysis, which will be included in the third section. This will use geopolitics to investigate the position of the movements in relation to foreign policy. It will follow a similar pattern as the previous sections by analyzing the influence of the ideas proposed by the intellectuals and also their conformity with the concept of Empire, or any of its variants. This will also be an opportunity to outline an analysis of the status of such discourses, bearers of an ideology20 which leads its instigators to neglect the resistance which opposes the 17  For a greater development of what this implies concerning the unmasking of the authors intentions in the text, as opposed to what is behind the writing, cf. principally Quentin Skinner, “Motives, Intentions and Interpretation”, Visions of Politics 1, Regarding Method, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 90-102. For a wider panorama of the debates surrounding intellectual history and the various paradigms available, cf. part two of François Dosse, La marche des idées, histoire des intellectuels, histoire intellectuelle, Paris, La Découverte, 2003, pp. 139-320. 18  “Qu’est-ce qu’une théorie des relations internationales?”, Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 17, No. 5, 1967, in R. Aron, Etudes politiques, Paris, Gallimard, 1972, p. 367 and 371. Our translation. 19  We take the text as an act, a meaningful speech that has an effect. Thus, we have adopted the findings of the theory relating to speech act. Cf. the works of Lucien Jaume concerning what he refers to as “idéopraxies”, and his text “Philosophie en science politique”, Le débat No. 72, November-December 1992, pp. 134-45. 20  For the conceptions and justifications of empire in the American colonies of the 16th to 19th centuries, we shall refer to Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, 1500-1800, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. We mention this work since it refers to the imperial figure from a perspective of the comparative study of the history of ideas.

Introduction



real to those who intend to dismantle it, or legitimizing devices which do not stand up to classical Realpolitik.21 The lack of research devoted to the neo-eurasianists,22 and the almost total absence of related comparative political analyses involving the two sides of the Pacific pushed us to put pen to paper. Convinced of the fecundity of a consistent transdisciplinarity23 in social sciences, we hope to indicate a deficiency in the literature and create a passage way to future research.

21 The device in question is not indifferent. Its very existence denotes a relation with the holder and the world and a need for recognition. It distinguishes this practice from plain power, unless the device is so unrefined that it is simply another sign of the arrogance of the dominator. 22  With the exception of the works of Marlène Laruelle, which deal with the history of ideas, and some other articles devoted almost exclusively to Dugin, the man, there are some militant analyses by neo-eurasianist theoreticians, such as Jean Parvulesco. 23  We use this neologism in opposition to interdisciplinarity which often simply leads to the coexistence of autonomous approaches. We go beyond this coexistence to open a path for dialogue.

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Part I

The Apostles of the Empire: Intellectual Genealogies The re-election of George W. Bush in November 2004, which in no way could receive the same opprobrium as in 2000, revealed a much stranger America to the Europeans. This newly appeared strangeness of a world based on the cult of similarity could invalidate a certain number of existing forgone conclusions. However in no way did it reduce interest for the other side of the Atlantic. Eastern Europe on the other hand, in particular Russia, remains principally unknown territory for the general public and interests only a limited community of specialists. Based on this observation, the parallel genealogies in this first part correspond to markedly different objectives. The understanding of the historical emergence of two intellectual movements offers us two distinct possibilities in the presentation of our findings. In America, information is both readily available and overabundant. Consequently we have preferred to clarify the issues of the contemporary historiographical debates and to rectify certain genealogical errors that a certain “ease of expression” have made popular. Our analysis aims at showing that “the neo-conservative movement is […] not very “neo” and definitely not conservative.” In Russia, the objective is symmetrical, to familiarize the reader with a political era in which the political and intellectual life remains almost a mystery. The first point to add is that if the neo-eurasianism of the 1990s is presented as a relatively heteroclite intellectual constellation; many of the themes that marked its predecessor 70 years earlier are still present. This is why we have chosen to present the two movements separately, eurasianist in the 1920s and neo-eurasianist in the 1980s, to highlight the elements that are to be found in the two movements.

  Ghassan Salamé, Quand l’Amérique refait le monde, Paris, Fayard, 2005, pp. 137-38.

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Chapter 1

Neoconservatives, Old and New The history of the neoconservatives goes back more than half a century and has little to do with a simple post-9/11 phenomenon. Only by going back over the history of the movement one can begin to understand their situation and their vision of the world. Even if the neoconservatives of today differ from their intellectual forefathers, in many ways, a state of mind and a particular role among the American right travels down through the generations. Obviously the term neoconservative is an anachronism: the migration from the Democratic Party to the Republican camp which gave rise to the term no longer corresponds to the reality. Indeed the new generation has had a lasting relation with the latter and are frequently referred to as the best illustration of the conservative vision of the world. And yet the term continues to be used, and designates an ideological tradition, when not referring to a family tradition. From Anti-communism to Neoconservatism: The Itinerary of a Political Family The biggest possible mistake would be to compare this tradition to a form of Trotskyism at the service of the right. Clearly the parallel with historical Soviet communism is tempting: in both cases it concerns a small group who consider themselves avant-gardist, intellectuals who believe they hold the Truth of the historical destiny of their nation, even the whole world. We shall present the limits of this analogy which reveals the ideological nature of the neoconservatives: according to Irving Kristol, who designates himself as one of, if not the founding father of the movement, “what rules the world is ideas, because ideas define the way reality is perceived”. Finally, many intellectuals from among the first neo-conservatives were subjected to Trotskyite influences. In the 1930s many of them met, for their student debates, at the Alcove 1, a part of the New York City College cafeteria and meeting point for anticommunist socialists. Important names  See in particular the position of the neoconservative Max Boot in: Max Boot, “What the Heck is a Neocon?”, Wall Street Journal, 30 December 2002.  The Podhoretz, Kristol, and Pipes families are two-generation neoconservatives and true pillars of this movement over the decades.  Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, New York, Free Press, 1995, p. 233.

When Empire Meets Nationalism

12

of neoconservatism such as Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan or Daniel Bell quenched their thirst for debating and controversy there. At the time, it was not unusual, at least in student circles, to glorify Stalin. However, for these intellectuals, the most important was to stand for the left while rejecting the Soviet experience. And this anti-communist stance really took shape at the end of the Second World War, opposing them to the sometimes pro-USSR progressives. This avant garde stance, shared by the ideologists, is in no way specific to the far-left. The neoconservatives were referred to as the Vital Center, and represented the center-left of the Democratic Party. Among the representatives of this movement was the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, founder of the UDA (the Union for Democratic Action) in 1941 which was to become the ADA in 1947 (Americans for Democratic Action), an anti-totalitarian group which openly denounced the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and nationalist Japan. East Coast Jews? A Rapid Characterization of the Neoconservatives The importance of the role played by Niebuhr in the rise of neoconservatism is extremely interesting since it counters the rather hasty analysis according to which the neoconservatives were above all American Jews from the East coast. Of course, as Max Boot points out, some important names such as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz were Jews, but others such as James Woosley and William Bennett were not. While John Ehrman,a a specialist in the field, demonstrates that indeed American Jews, mainly from New York, whose parents had immigrated to the United States and been educated in the American way, were often behind the constitution of a neoconservative way of thinking, they are far from being the only ones.b   John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. b   See Max Boot, “What the Heck is a Neocon?”, “Think Again: Neocons”, Foreign Policy, January/February 2004, and “The Myth of a Neoconservative Cabal”, The Daily Star, 14 January 2004. a

Against American fellow travelers from Moscow representing a part of the left at the outset of the Cold War, Niebuhr refused to interpret the political situation   Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-conservatives and the Global Order, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 45.  Ibid.

Neoconservatives, Old and New

13

of the period as the simple outcome of an overly aggressive American attitude. The theologian defended American policy, respectful of individual freedom, as opposed to left-wing or right-wing totalitarianism. The roots of what was to become known as neoconservatism when dealing with foreign affairs can be found here. In 1949 the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr, a center-left activist, published one of his key works, The Vital Center, in which he criticizes both the partisans of an out-of-control capitalism and those who tend to be conciliatory towards totalitarian communism. He criticizes Niebuhr’s extremely pessimistic vision of human nature and calls for the protection of the democratic ideal, a founding American ideal, from an unstable world; he also recommends fighting against the communist threat; however the work is based around the “world destiny” of the United States, and its role as the world’s leading nation. If there has been one persistent neoconservative theme over the ages, it is this reflection referring to international relations, based on the assertion of an American exceptionalism and providentialism, both legacies of an age old tradition. It should be mentioned here that this belief in a “global destiny” for their nation, seen a priori as morally superior, pushed the neoconservatives at the time of the Cold War to misjudge the facts, or at least to produce a analysis of international issues that is condescending with regards the Third World and, unquestionably proIsraeli. Thus, in an article published in the March 1975 issue of the neoconservative Commentary titled “The United States in Opposition”, Moynihan maintains that the anti-Americanism in the Third World had spread due to the influence of British socialism and the very English “aristocratic contempt” for the United States. More generally, with neoconservatives, there is, whatever the generation, a certain amount of contempt for the Southern nations. In the article he wrote in reaction to the oil embargo, “Oil: The Issue of American Intervention” the neoconservative Tucker first condemned the egalitarianism advocated by the countries of the Third World which wanted to be treated like the Northern States. For Tucker the latter alone could be seen as able to create a real world order. Hence, to accept such a request would, in the eyes of the author, simply lead to international chaos. As partisans of a powerful America and an America that is free to act as it pleases, they can only reject the principal of equality with other nations.10

 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949.   John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism, op. cit., p. 15.  Ibid., p. 81.   Robert W. Tucker, “Oil: the Issue of American Intervention”, Commentary, Vol. 59, No. 1, January 1975. 10  For a more detailed analysis of inter-State equality, cf. G. Salamé, Quand l’Amérique refait le monde, Paris, Fayard, 2005, pp. 317-21.

14

When Empire Meets Nationalism

Logically, this led to a rejection of any discourse admitting the countries of the North were in any way responsible for the situation in the South, the neoconservatives considering that poverty in the Third World is historically due to their decision to give priority to equality rather than liberty. Consequently, any mention of financial compensation for colonization becomes inadmissible.11 This condescending approach is strengthened by the recurrent opposition of those countries to Israel, whose unconditional defense is another constant attribute of the neoconservative approach. As a vital strategic ally, close attention is paid to Israel.12 Moreover, the issue of anti-Semitism, associated with the traumatizing memories of the Second World War, plays an important role in their position concerning the Jewish State. This explains why the 10 November 1975 resolution 3379 of the UNO General Assembly likening Zionism to racism was a major intellectual battle for the neoconservatives of the time. It represents once and for all their rejection of multilateral institutions. They questioned the efficiency of such authorities as regards the promotion of democracy since they include non-democratic member States.13 The notion of democracy, which has been mentioned a number of times, should also be taken from a strategic point of view concerning American supremacy, which is their one lasting definition, over and above yesterday’s anticommunism and the anti-Islamism and democratic crusade of today. The striking article written by the neoconservative academic Jeane Kirkpatrick “Dictatorships and Double Standards”14 published in Commentary a few months after the Iranian Islamic revolution is proof enough of this. She openly criticizes Carter’s foreign policy who wanted to force allied authoritarian regimes to move too quickly towards democratization while at the same time keeping a friendly and diplomatic atmosphere when dealing with the totalitarian Soviet enemy and its satellite countries. According to her, such an attitude risked weakening the allied countries whose regimes could fall under the control of communist or more generally anti-American forces, as in Iran, which would counter any propagation of democracy. Washington should therefore have stopped criticizing its allies, however non-democratic they were, because whereas right-wing authoritarianism can, with time, evolve towards a democracy, such an evolution is impossible for a totalitarian regime. Some passages of the article are even opposed to the idea of a messianic diffusion of democracy in the rest of the world, suggesting the United States should adopt a position according to which, for Washington, all the countries of the world could become democracies one day or another.15 This analysis shows that the question of

11  John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism, op. cit., p. 83. 12 Ibid., p. 132. 13 Ibid., p. 7 and pp. 85-7. 14  Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards”, Commentary, Vol. 68 No. 5, November 1979 pp. 34-45. 15 See in particular the excellent analysis by James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, New York, Viking, 2004, p. 92.

Neoconservatives, Old and New

15

a democratic regime is only important for the neoconservatives when associated with a particular American strategic need.16 This neoconservative approach to international issues had its first moment of glory with the strategic decisions of the Truman government between April 1945 and January 1953. These decisions can be found in the NSC-68 document17 which has the definitively the rhetorical flavor of the Vital Center.18 Using the ideas of the historian William Appleman Williams, this point of view was countered by the left of the Democratic Party. In his work published in 195219 he presents national foreign policy as fundamentally dominated by the search for new markets. This work, which clearly denounces the United States as an expansionist nation was not an immediate success, but the shock of the Vietnam War shattered centerleft consensus concerning foreign policy. The 1968 presidential elections simply accentuated the fall of the neoconservatives who saw the Democrat Hubert Humphrey, the candidate who best represented their values, lose face to the republican Nixon. Even the neoconservative par excellence ADA group suffered from the crisis that ensued in the democratic camp. The ADA had no other choice than to strengthen its fiercely anti-communist stance, adopt a position even further from the left and had nothing else to define its ideology than a few Kantian principles of international law supposed to enable peace in the world, however contradictory this might be in relation to current neoconservative positions. More generally, alongside the multilateral approach which advocates cooperation and a less dominant role for Washington, as presented by the progressive moderates such as Stanley Hoffmann,20 the far-left critics gained more weight in the party. Not only was the Vital Center spirit threatened in foreign affairs, but it was also marked by a growing dread of the left and of the African American militancy. This latter militancy led to the birth of a Black nationalist movement which sympathized with the countries of the Third World and in particular with the Palestinian cause which could only displease the profoundly pro-Israeli neoconservatives. The New Left and afro-American militancy were seen as purveyors of a new anti-Semitism, notably with the war of 1967. Two months after the end of the war, the civil rights movement, the SNCC (Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee) presented Israel as a state without any real political legitimacy, and denounced the oppression the original inhabitants of Palestine were being subjected to. The left followed suit with renowned intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky. 16  For more information on the neoconservatives and the notion of democracy, see Didier Chaudet, Les néoconservateurs américains face à l’Islam, Paris, UniversCités, 2005, pp. 57-64. 17  NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”, 14 April 1950. Document available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm. 18  John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism, op. cit., pp. 16-17. 19  William Appleman Williams, American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947, New York, Rinehart, 1952. 20  John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism, op. cit., pp. 27-9.

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When Empire Meets Nationalism

AIPAC and Neoconservatism In their support for Israel, or more precisely for a pro-Likud policy in Israel, the neoconservatives have a powerful ally, the Washington based lobby group called the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC. For Paul Findley, former representative of Illinois (1961-1983) and member of the Committee for Foreign Affairs at the House of Representatives, this lobby managed to make a name for itself following the 1967 war. Today it is the second most influential lobby in the American federal capital after the American Association of Retired People. With 100,000 members throughout the country, well-known recognized for its organization and countless victories (for example its total opposition to those in favor of more support for Palestinian interests at election time, namely from Cynthia McKinney, or Adlai Stevenson), this group proudly proclaims on its website www.aipac.org that it succeeds in having more than 100 legislative initiatives in favor of Israel voted each year (see the section “Who We Are”). The best example of the importance of the AIPAC in American politics is without a doubt the debate surrounding the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia at the start of the 1980s. Ronald Reagan and his government had to use all their influence over the Senate to allow the sale of five aircrafts which the lobby and its supporters at the legislative level were doing their utmost to block. It is with this key period in the History of Capitol Hill that the debate over the importance of pro-Israelis in Washington began; this debate recently started up again following the publication of John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.a Support for AIPAC however is not unanimous in the American Jewish community. In November 1978, Nahum Goldmann, President of World Jewish Congress asked the President at the time, Jimmy Carter, to destroy the “Lobby” as the AIPACb pro-Israeli support group is known. Indeed, according to him, the lobby in question represented in reality an obstacle to Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Neoconservatives, Old and New

17

Moreover, the military-industrial and oil-based interests, or the all the more significant fundamentalist Protestant lobbying, have at least as much influence on current American foreign affairs relating to the Middle East. Thus, if they accept to work with the neoconservatives and if the neoconservatives are invited to the AIPAC annual convention (for example Richard N. Perle spoke out at the 2005 convention for military action against Iran), they become just one part, and not the engine, of a political group that unites pro-Israelis, neoconservatives, a hard right religious Protestant group, all of whom are keen supporters of the American policy led by the Bush administration in the Middle East. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, New York, Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2007. b Serge Halimi, “Le poids du lobby pro-israélien aux Etats-Unis”, Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1989, pp. 14-15. a

More generally, the neoconservatives were concerned that the social unrest, namely concerning the question of racism and the Vietnam War, could provoke a socio-political uprising on American soil. This explains why, in the 1970s, journalists such as Podhoretz denounced the American left much more than the right. For them, the latter was leading a campaign in favor of moral values and social order that was becoming essential in the completely disoriented America of the 1960/1970s. This position was picked up on by the right and after a period of hesitation and suspicion the traditionally conservative papers such as the National Review welcomed this ideological reconciliation. It was at this period that a number of neoconservatives swung over to the opposition. Part of the left then created and began to use the expression “neoconservative” in a derogative fashion to designate the former progressives who were sliding further and further to the right of the political scene. This slide was gradual and was not completely over in the 1970s, which explains why most neoconservatives rejected the term to begin with. In reality, in 1972, Irving Kristol was the only one that could be really called neoconservative. He was the first to cross the Rubicon and abandoned the Democrats for the Republican Party to support Nixon. The others, even though remaining faithful to their cause, became gradually more and more isolated. Following Humphrey’s defeat, the Democratic Party was in an extremely delicate situation. The organization had been undermined by Lyndon Johnson’s interventionism and internal splits, due to inflation, the war and the issue of civil rights, all of which combined to make any united stance impossible. In the face of such a state of advanced deliquescence, a vast program of reforms was launched, called the “McGovern reforms” or New Politics, which were not to the liking of the neoconservatives. Firstly, the announced objective of the reforms was favorable to the left wing of the party, promoting social issues which the “neocons”

18

When Empire Meets Nationalism

perceived increasingly from the security angle. Secondly, they remained critical of the introduction of a greater feeling of democracy within the party, considered to endanger the reputedly moderate former Democrat leaders, those in line with the Vital Center. The reforms were therefore behind the eviction of the candidate Henry “Scoop” Jackson, who was supported by the neoconservatives, during the primary elections leading up to the 1972 presidential elections. After McGovern’s electoral defeat, as the candidate from the left of the Democratic Party, the neoconservatives believed they could ideologically win back their political group. They founded the Coalition for a Democratic Majority which united former Humphrey’s and Jackson’s supporters and whose objective was a return to the political legacies of Truman and Kennedy. The venture, however, was a complete failure since the party adopted a document highlighting the spirit of the McGovern reforms during a Kansas City convention in December 1974. From the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s, it was among the conservatives that the neoconservatives best succeeded. A good example was the nomination of Moynihan as Secretary of State for urban affairs by the Nixon administration (from January 1969 to August 1974) and the Democratic reaction that ensued. During this period, the reputedly moderate Democrat was criticized more by his own party than by the Republicans. It clearly demonstrates the extent to which the neoconservatives had lost their place in their original political fold. The real divorce between the neoconservatives and the rest of the left took place during the Carter presidency (January 1977–January 1981). Over and above the historic slide to the right mentioned above, and Carter’s position towards America’s authoritarian allies, this government was considered much too weak in front of the communist threat, and especially not pro-Israeli enough. The President wanted to be seen as a firm supporter of peace in the Middle East, recognizing the Palestinian position and promoting the idea of land for peace, which the neocons had never accepted as adequate. For a while, Moynihan was the final link between them and the Democratic Party: they therefore believed he could transmit their ideas to both party leaders and government. However when this final hope announced his support in favor of Carter for a second term in office, despite what the neoconservatives judged as deplorable results for the first term, their disappointment was enormous. And during the summer of 1980 a massive swing occurred, from the Democratic to the Republican Party. However, this did not mean that there was general approval for the neoconservatives among the right, far from it. Their approach to international affairs went against that of the realists, another important element of the Republican Party and similar to the conservative moderates. The opposition is as intense as the battle between the neoconservatives and the left of the Democratic Party. At a time when the hard right, already represented at the time by Cheney and Rumsfeld, was strongly against the very idea of realism or moderation in international issues, the neoconservatives were leading a similar combat via the American intelligence

Neoconservatives, Old and New

19

agencies, denouncing Kissinger’s realism and the improved relations with the USSR.21 The neoconservative vision of the world gained the upper hand in the analysis of the famous “Team B”: in 1976, George H. Bush, then director of the CIA, gave in to the criticisms of the far right and the neoconservatives who maintained that the “National Intelligence Estimate”, produced by the intelligence agencies, was far too optimistic. The so-called “Team B”, made up of ten independent specialists, was therefore requested to analyze the document again to judge its seriousness. The neoconservative Richard Pipes, a Russian historian at Harvard, led the group which included Paul Wolfowitz. As expected, their findings took the form of an attack against Kissinger’s policies and forcibly denounced the soviet desire to dominate the world. This division is still present today among the Republicans, between the moderate and pragmatic conservatives who recognize the limits of American supremacy and who support policies based on a certain strategic balance among the important nations of the international scene, and the “hawks” who reject any mention of the limits of the “Force for Good”, in other words the United States. The neoconservatives serve as a kind of laboratory for ideas for those who promote an offensive policy in international affairs. The “Team B” is just one revealing example of the general atmosphere. It was Irving Kristol, accompanied by William Simon, director of the extremely conservative John N. Olin Foundation, and other influential right wingers, who led the intellectual counter-attack of the right-wing think tanks in the 1970s, at a time when left-wing thinking dominated Washington.22 For the right wing, the neoconservatives brought intellectual the backing that had until then been non-existent in the conservative diatribes. For three decades now they have been hard at work in the corridors of power, which has given them political insight. Although they are not numerous, this presence in the political arena can explain their power of influence among the American right, well before the arrival of George W. Bush and, without any doubt, for a long time to come. Between Strauss and Reagan: A Complex Legacy Having presented a general historical overview of the evolution of the neoconservatives, two questions remain before presenting the current situation of the movement: are they the disciples of Leo Strauss (1899-1973)? Are they the main inspiring factor behind the “Reagan attitude”? Far from being superfluous, these questions can help to better understand the neoconservative philosophy since Strauss is presented, somewhat ambiguously, as 21  James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, op. cit., pp. 75-77. 22  David M. Ricci, The Transformation of American Politics. The New Washington and the Rise of Think Tanks, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1993, p. 154.

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When Empire Meets Nationalism

a tutelary figure for the movement. Concerning the Reagan connexion, this was decisive in as much as the image of the President who brought down the USSR is forever present among the contemporary American right. In 2003, William Kristol, chief editor of the neoconservative Weekly Standard, co-signed an article “What was Leo Strauss up to?”23 published in The Public Interest. Having rejected Strauss’s hold over American foreign affairs, he adds: Strauss, chiefly by way of his students, is in large part responsible for making the thought and principles of America’s founders a source of political knowledge and appeal, and for making political excellence more broadly a subject of appreciation and study.

There then follows an announcement according to which President Bush is a supporter of Strauss, and his constant reference to regime change the “rather commendable consequence of Strauss’s restoration of the concept of regime”. Strauss specialists, however, agree that the reading proposed is an exaggeration. A precise interpretation of the master’s thoughts is enlightening. It raises points as to the choice of Strauss as tutelary figure, which reveals, via the borrowings and distortions, the true neoconservative strategy.24 For William Kristol, the first notion of legacy is the neoconservative nebulosity that is structured around a feeling of filiation; the cohesion of the group is above all built around a form of solidarity under the auspices of their spiritual leader. Some sixty disciples gather every year on July 4, the national holiday, for a picnic.25 Even if it is also important not to oversimplify and imagine there is a neoconservative behind every former student of Strauss, many, particularly in the generation that came after, can be labeled as neocons. Two of Leo Strauss’s key protégés at the University of Chicago were Allan Bloom and Albert Wohlstetter, who both went on to join the university staff; Wohlstetter himself had two prominent current neoconservatives as his disciples, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, who he helped make their first steps in politics in Washington.26 More generally, students of Strauss or his protégés became little by little rising political forces in various governmental structures from the seventies onwards. They held important positions in the Reagan and Bush senior administrations: for example the Straussian Carnes 23  William Kristol and Steven Lenzner, “What was Leo Strauss up to?”, The Public Interest, No. 153, Autumn 2003. 24  Ghassan Salamé states that “If Straussian thinking was more seriously studied in Europe, it is his status of mentor that dominates in America”, Quand l’Amérique refait le monde, op. cit., p. 152. We shall try to discover exactly why. 25  John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America, New York, The Penguin Press, 2004, p. 156. This figure only represents a minute part of Straussian adepts, whose importance in Washington under G.W. Bush is considerable, ibid., p. 22. 26  Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone, op. cit., p. 61.

Neoconservatives, Old and New

21

Lord was appointed to the National Security Council and Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court in 1991.27 This philosophical affiliation was strengthened by the creation of actual neoconservative dynasties, the Kagans, the Kristols and the Podhoretzs, all of whom were influenced to varying degrees by Straussian thinking or more generally by the teaching at Chicago University. Donald Kagan for instance, a neoconservative of the Cold War period and Straussian disciple at Yale University, is the father of one of the most influential figures of the movement today, Robert Kagan, a journalist at the Weekly Standard. In the same vein, William Kristol, the worthy heir to his Straussian father, follows the teachings of Allan Bloom.28 To conclude, Straussian influence is important to help understand the political role of the Podhoretz neoconservative clan, from the first generation with Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter, to their son, former journalist at the Weekly Standard and currently at the New York Post.29 This unusual dynastic cohesion allowed for a coherent interpretation of the world to take form and to be handed down from one generation to another. Strauss however died in 1973 before the neoconservative movement really took shape as such, and only a few contemporary figures followed the teachings of the master. It was rather among the second generation with Allan Bloom that the neoconservative intellectual group was formed. Furthermore, exegetes of the philosopher raise two key objections to the idea that neo-conservatism can be passed on from one generation to another. On the one hand, the legacy is based on written political commentary whereas Strauss rarely commented on current political issues. To attribute Strauss with a programmatic vision30 could be considered as an unfounded extrapolation. This in turn becomes usurpation if we consider the Straussian system is based on the primacy of philosophical life and a certain distance from the political scene. According to him, the greatest minds are destined to a life of contemplation and the best path is to live under a regime that allows for philosophical activities.31 On the other hand, philosophical thinking is

27 Ibid., p. 62. 28  See Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet, “Le Stratège et le Philosophe”, Le Monde, 15 April 2003. 29  Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone, op. cit., p. 67. 30  For an essay that follows this path, cf. Thomas G. West, “Que dirait Leo Strauss de la politique étrangère américaine?”, Commentaire, Vol. 27, No. 105, (2004), pp. 71-77. We shall not linger on this point since the analysis neglects a stage of the process by supposing the neoconservatives alone determine American foreign policy. The reader looking to better understand the political ideas of Strauss can consult: Shadia B. Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1988. 31  Daniel Tanguay, “néoconservatisme et religion démocratique. Léo Strauss et l’Amérique”, Commentaire, Vol. 29 No. 114, (2006), pp. 315-324, p. 316 and pp. 322324. Cf. also Carole Widmaier, “Leo Strauss est-il néoconservateur? L’épreuve des textes”, Esprit, November 2003, pp. 23-38.

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When Empire Meets Nationalism

so complex that it does not lend itself to ideological reduction and can not create consensus around the meaning of any eventual doctrine.32 His contribution has nonetheless been considerable if we are to believe William Kristol quoted earlier; thanks to him, “the thought and principals of America’s Founders [have become] a source of political knowledge and appeal.” Throughout the debates concerning the accuracy of the original text, let us now investigate the borrowings that have taken place. The theological-political issue is central to Strauss’s thinking, more than the art of writing or the question of natural rights. This is apparent in all his works, from the very beginning.33 And it is on the basis of this problematic that he recommends dialogue with the Ancients and concludes with the separation of classical and modern political philosophy, with Machiavelli. For the neoconservatives, the dilemma between Athens and Jerusalem, philosophy and religion, which he unceasingly investigated, gave rise to a political interpretation based on the life of the author himself. Even if Strauss himself was relatively unfamiliar with political commentary, the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the progress of nihilism became a subject of fundamental concern, following his emigration to the United States in 1937. The fight he led against the relativism of values became a favorite theme for the neoconservatives. Such relativism, associated with political liberalism as a solution to the theological-political issue, and which is extremely present in social sciences in favor of “axiological neutrality”, was, according to Strauss, responsible for failing to prevent the rise of Nazism in Germany. Rather, he calls for a return of the ancient tradition which supports, on the one hand, a demand of judgment, with universality borne by the Natural Right on the other hand. Here, the political struggles can be assimilated to those that punctuated life in the universities. The neoconservative movement was first strengthened by interest in American universities to “political theory” as opposed to political sciences.34 Then, with the various movements of cultural liberalization beginning with the 1960s, those who were to become neoconservatives rallied against the progressive historicism of the left, the specter of decadence and the relativism of values. This struggle was continued with determination by Allan Bloom in his most famous work The Closing of the American Mind35 which pleads in favor of a return to “general culture” and the studying of the classics rather than an ever-increasing dissolution of the concept of culture via its undifferentiated extension to all social behavior.

32  Daniel Tanguay, “néoconservatisme et religion démocratique”, op. cit., p. 316. 33 Maurice Kriegel, “Léo Strauss, la stratégie de la tension”, Critique, March 2004, pp. 163-80. 34  Dick Howard, “Le paradoxal succès politique d’un philosophe anti-politique”, translated from the American by Philippe Roger, Critique, March 2004, pp. 181-90. 35 Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1987.

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23

And so it is that the neoconservatives continue with the idea that orthodoxy of thinking is the best way to fight against decadence. Political liberalism is rejected as it prevents the constitution of a collective consciousness and allows for minority groups or “factions” to rule, which were feared by the Founding Fathers. This can explain why Irving Kristol, the Godfather of neoconservatism, supported a form of societal orthodoxy which was considerably influenced by the issue of women’s liberation and the sexual revolution. He proclaims himself to be the champion of the traditional vision of the couple, just like the philosopher, and presents any heresy as a purveyor of social chaos.36 Such a form of elitism can also be found in Strauss’ work, again for the good of social order. The Straussian distinction between exoteric and esoteric proclamation, and the legitimization of Plato’s “noble lie”, is politicized as follows: the philosopher controls a community in which a small, extremely brilliant group leads a mass that had been previously dazed by a bourgeois society without any grandeur. This is Kristol’s argument in his article “The Adversary Culture of Intellectuals”37 which presents the morally catastrophic situation of bourgeois thinking which only the return of philosophically or theologically inspired fundamental strictness can regenerate. In their combat, the neoconservatives believed they had found an authority in Leo Strauss who refused to deny the importance of religious referent for the political community. With Irving Kristol, the legacy is clear. All the political philosophers prior to the twentieth century, regardless of their personal piety or lack thereof, understood the importance of religion in the life of the political community. Neoconservatives, because of their interest and attachment to classical (as distinct from contemporary) political philosophy, share this understanding. […] Modern secularism has such affinities to moral nihilism that even those who wish simply to affirm or reaffirm moral values have little choice but to seek a grounding for such values in a religious tradition.38

For Strauss, as for Bloom, religious tradition is not a venerable wisdom built over the centuries, but rather the work of geniuses who, from Buddha to Mahomet, have conceived religious systems to shape Man to enable him to perform wonders. Irving Kristol deduces that far from being a threat, religious fundamentalists can be invaluable allies. Subsequently, the neoconservatives naturally came to consider the Christian Right in such a light. Finally, unceasing use of the concept of regime change among neoconservatives is also a legacy from Strauss. Clearly it is the case of the concept of regime itself, 36  “Without a Father”, in Irving Kristol, op. cit., 37  For more developments, cf. Shadia. B. Drury, Leo Strauss and the Political Right, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1997. 38 Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism, the Autobiography of an Idea, New York, Free Press, 1995, p. 381. Kristol’s debt towards Strauss becomes evident in the first few pages of the work (pp. 6, 7).

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When Empire Meets Nationalism

taken from the Ancients who propose typologies of possible regimes. It should however be mentioned that the preservation of a diversity of regimes was, for Strauss, necessary. We can try to understand this improper solicitation of a legacy via an analogy with what we have described concerning national policy. Indeed, for the neoconservatives, the battle against heterodoxy also, and most importantly, takes place in foreign policy. Strauss would have wanted a more hardline attitude in front of Nazism from the Weimar Republic. If, in his opinion, the European liberal democracies were unable to defeat Hitler, it was because in the fight for power and victory, only the most determined, he who imposes his positions with the greatest force by using all possible means to triumph, win. Such is the position adopted by Kristol and developed by the following generations in foreign policy. In his work Reflections of a Neoconservative,39 he rejects patriotism, a concept he sees as a love of the past motivated by nostalgia, to better embrace nationalism, which he considered as the aspiration of a state hoping to leave a lasting impression on the future. Over and above the fact that such political voluntarism is absent in Strauss’s thinking, as heir of Classic wisdom, it may suggest a shift in position that could explain the neoconservatives’ adoption of the philosopher. Indeed, Strauss’s gratitude to the United States for having accepted him does not make him an unconditional nationalist and harbinger of neoconservatism.40 And, paradoxically it is perhaps here that the politicization of Strauss, in their opinion, is the most interesting. The philosopher’s position at the outset was apolitical; he only speaks of politics to guarantee a place to philosophical thinking in the regime in question.41 In other words, according to Strauss, only the desire to preserve a place dedicated to an activity that is above politics can determine the political action of the greatest minds. Or as Dick Howard ironically puts it, the governing philosopher does not seek power nor influence for the good of a specific interest or project; if he dirties his hands in politics it is uniquely to protect the freedom required for a life devoted to philosophical contemplation.42

The neoconservatives, however, substituted an initial, extremely political conviction to this apolitical basis, that of fundamental nationalism, whilst preserving the disinterested philosopher’s dignity. This, we believe, is the price they paid to re-appropriate his legacy and the authority he embodies. Just as the philosopher wanted to preserve the conditions of possibility of the greatness of Man, the neoconservatives wanted to be, and this is clearly visible with Kristol, 39 Irving Kristol, Reflections of a Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, New York, Basic Books, 1983. 40  Daniel Tanguay, “néoconservatisme et religion démocratique”, op. cit., p. 318. 41 Maurice Kriegel, “Léo Strauss, la stratégie de la tension”, op. cit. 42  Dick Howard, “Le paradoxal succès politique…”, op. cit., p. 183-84. Our translation.

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25

both father and son, keepers of the spirit of the American Founding Fathers whose legacy would appear to be the victim of corruption. This being so, they parade their interpretation of the foundation stone as the only interpretation possible. Mark Blitz, assistant director of the USIA under Reagan, clearly demonstrates this desire to bring together the origins of American history and Straussian thinking when he identifies the vision of the American Founding Fathers with the eternal principals of Plato and Aristotle.43 Consequently, the neoconservatives, by politicizing the basis of his system, adopt from Strauss the strategy that had protected him from all possible criticism: By immediately separating kingdom of truth and freedom from an everyday reality of compromise and constraint, Strauss assumes an immense territory in which to deploy his criticism while protecting himself from all criticism. Nothing he criticizes can defend itself, being by definition on another level.44

He who defends the founding of the nation against his destroyers hopes to escape also from all criticism. The improper solicitation of the Straussian legacy by the neoconservatives does however clarify certain points. The excessive politicization of the neoconservatives and their total negligence towards the dilemma, which was impassable for Strauss, between Athens and Jerusalem,45 reveals their need to base their nationalism on a philosophical guarantee which also acts as a legitimating strategy. It would therefore appear that the “neocons” were influenced from their outset by Straussian thinking that was popularized and adapted to their nationalism. 43  Mark Blitz, “Leo Strauss, the Straussians and American Foreign Policy”, open Democracy, 14 November 2003, article available at: http ://www.opendemocracy.net/ democracy-americanpower/article_1577.jsp. 44  Dick Howard, “Le paradoxal succès politique…”, op. cit., p. 189. Our translation. 45 In her article “Leo Strauss et George Bush” (Le banquet No. 19, 1/2004), Corine Pelluchon proposes a refutation of the hypothetical Straussian support for the policies of the American president, based on the philosopher’s writings. She retains three axes: his connection with Carl Schmitt and criticism of liberalism and nihilism, his conceptualization of the perfect regime and his approach to religion as the cement of a society. Thus, the Straussian criticism of nihilism in no way led to the exaltation of a regime which supposedly represented the good, just as it does not result in Schmittian decisionism. If he sides with Schmitt, it is to denounce the use of humanitarian and moral rhetoric for economic or political ends, which leads to the rejection of the enemy from humanity and opens the path for total enmity. This siding with the German theorist distances him radically from the rhetoric of G.W. Bush, just as his notion of the perfect regime as a regulatory idea and certainly not an imposable political form. Finally, more than a cement for the population, religion for Strauss remains the fundamental problematic scene, that of the tensions between Athens and Jerusalem. The recuperation of this final aspect also appears strenuous since very early on the philosopher distanced himself from the unconditional Zionism that is present among a large number of neoconservatives.

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On the other hand, it is difficult to consider them as “Reaganites” if one takes a closer alook at the two terms in office of the 40th President. This is however a crucial point for current neoconservatives, who consider him as a key source for their legitimacy within the Republican Party. In one of the main neoconservative documents of the 1990s, Robert Kagan and William Kristol announce that their approach is truly representative of a Reaganite vision, and that it constitutes a strong and typically Republican alternative to Clinton’s multilateralism which they consider tepid.46 The assertion of this relation is maybe hasty because as one close advisor to Reagan observed, he was not the kind of person one could easily put a label to, in foreign affairs or otherwise.47 To the despair of the “New Right” and the neoconservatives, his closest advisors were always Republican moderates, notably Bush senior, who the neoconservatives strongly criticized as any direct criticism of the President himself was out of the question.48 During the first Reagan years, there was, to use the expression employed by Halper and Clarke, a real “honeymoon” between the Reaganites and the neoconservative movement. At the time, in the White House and among the Washington-based neoconservative think tanks, we adhere to the analysis according to which, due to previous Presidents, particularly Nixon and Carter, Moscow had dangerous military superiority over the land of freedom. Such a situation was potentially critical since the USSR was an intrinsically expansionist and violent State, a threat to world peace and freedom. Hence Reagan’s memorable “Evil Empire” speech relating to “a sad chapter, unseemly in the history of Mankind, whose end is nigh”.49 The declared intention to fight against a dangerous enemy became apparent with the administration’s decisions. First, the White House announced its decision to reduce the military gap with Moscow. A massive and unprecedented financial effort (for a time of peace) was made. Indeed, the defense budget doubled between 1981 and 1986. At the same time, the “Strategic Defense Initiative” or SDI, an anti-missile shield program to protect American soil from space, was launched in 1983. Finally, Reagan lent his support to anti-communist governments and right-wing guerrilla movements, in Latin America for example, by supplying weapons and funds. However, the so-called honeymoon was short-lived. Rapidly governmental practices distanced themselves from the original, pro-neoconservative, position, and Reagan turned out to be fairly moderate during his time in the Oval Office. The neoconservatives criticize just one example of this moderation during the imposition of martial law in Poland by the communists in 1981. The White House 46  William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 75, No. 4, July-August 1996, pp. 18-30, 22-3. 47  George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, New York, Scribner’s, 1993, p. 1135. 48  Joseph Scotchie, Revolt from the Heartland. The Struggle for an Authentic Conservatism, New Brunswick, Transactions Publishers, 2002, p. 43. 49  See Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone, op. cit., p. 162.

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could have imposed, in retaliation, an economic embargo on the Soviet and Polish dictatorships, particularly as part of the administration supported the ideas of the anti-communist hard-liners. But nothing happened and the sanctions were limited to the pipeline between Siberia and Western Europe, an action that was seen as too shy by the Straussians.50 What is more, far from being an interventionist and a supporter of armed resistance when necessary against the Soviets, Reagan limited the use of troops to that of an expanded Monroe doctrine:51 the United States refused to find themselves in a situation of direct confrontation in Latin America. The use of military aid had always been used with caution: thus to ward off the 600-strong Granada army, Reagan sent 7,000 soldiers. The neoconservative deception was also of importance concerning the China issue. After having been openly critical of the closer relations with the People’s Republic of China, Reagan pronounced himself in favor of improved relations with Beijing, just like Nixon before him. Rhetoric is sometimes harder than in the past, and the sale of weapons to Taiwan continued despite Chinese disapproval. But this did not prevent the signing of contracts linked to some sensitive technology, nor the confirmation of privileged relations. The distinction between Reaganites and neoconservatives is even more obvious concerning the Israeli issue. Certainly, for many people Reagan remains the most pro-Israeli of all the American Presidents. But his support for Israel, albeit very traditional from an American position, was far from being as hardcore as the Straussians would have wished for. The White House, under Reagan, never hesitated to criticize Israeli policies when it felt it was necessary. It constantly opposed any policy relating to the extension of its territories into the West Bank, and even the idea of the “annexation or permanent control by Israel of the West Bank and Gaza”.52 And when Tel Aviv refused to listen to its American ally, the Americans acted accordingly. When Israel decided to annex the Golan Heights, Washington followed the Security Council in denouncing the decision as illegal according to international law. Over and above this official stance, seen as exceptional given the support for the state of Hebrew from the various administrations, Reagan imposed specific American sanctions by suspending all strategic aid to Israel for a certain time, which inevitably aroused the anger of the neoconservatives. The neoconservatives are therefore a unique component of the American right: as the only group to have moved from the Democratic camp to the Republican camp during the second half of the twentieth century, they have managed to find a place in a new political family with a particular ideology that, even under Reagan, never really took off, despite what historical revisionism would like us to think.

50 See Norman Podhoretz, “The Neo-Conservative Anguish over Reagan’s Foreign Policy”, New York Times Magazine, 2 May 1982, p. 32, and Irving Kristol, “The Muddle in Foreign Policy”, Wall Street Journal, 29 April 1984. 51  See Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone, op. cit., p. 171. 52 Ibid., p. 167.

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But their approach to the world, linked to their position as “intellectual guides” of the governmental right, allowed the new, post Cold-War generation of neoconservatives to assert themselves following the collapse of the USSR. Even so, at the start of the 1990s, nothing suggested neoconservatism had a future. After all, it was simply a byproduct of the American political reaction to the Cold War: a center-left group had drifted to the right in the name of the fight against communism, but with the communist threat no longer around, the original raison d’être of the intellectuals had disappeared. Besides, what one can call “neoconservative realism” was born among the older and more pragmatic members of the movement. The title of an article published in the fall 1990 edition of the National Interest by Kirkpatrick sums up the group’s leading ideas: “A Normal Country in a Normal Time”. For the neoconservatives of the Cold War period, the fight was over; the United States can deal with their own interests, without seeking to spread democracy or Western values around the world. Moreover, for analysts of American politics in the 1990s, the very fact that people continued to talk of neoconservatives was nonsensical. As John Judis wrote at the end of one of his articles in 1995 for The New Republic, the neoconservative movement of the 1990s was nothing more than the right-wing equivalent of the situation of the New Left in the 1980s, in other words political nostalgia rather that a true program for the future.53 Following Bipolarity, The Revival and Rise in Power of Neoconservatism A new generation, however, refused to see the movement disappear, unlike some contented members of the old guard and the Washington intelligentsia, who were initially dubitative. Like their forefathers, they were determined to enhance the role of the United States throughout the world, despite the disappearance of the 50 year-old enemy. In other words, even after the fall of the Wall, a form of messianic spirit continued to live at the heart of their idea of what American foreign policy should be. Thus, according to Charles Krauthammer, one of the members behind the revival of the movement; “with the fall of communism, the promotion of democracy should become the touchstone of the new ideology behind American foreign affairs”.54 However, simply thinking in a traditional neoconservative way was not enough. They had to react to the new strategic issues that arose in a post Cold War environment. Thus, in 1991, the new generation of neoconservatives declared that “if the United States want stability, they must create it”. The choice of foreign policy becomes as simple as it is radical: intervention or chaos,55 action to disarm, before it is too late, the “rogue states” which are on the point of obtaining 53 Ibid., pp. 102-103. 54 Ibid., p. 78. 55  Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, Winter 1990/1991, pp. 23-33.

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weapons of mass destruction. The issue that led to the latest war in Iraq is therefore not new: it is simply the latest application of a logical post Cold War strategy proposed by the neoconservatives since the fall of the USSR. This rejection of the new American inaction following the victory over the “Evil Empire” expressed itself for the first time through the Yugoslavian issue at the beginning of the 1990s. It was this international problem, and more importantly Washington’s handling of the situation, that reunited the new Straussian generation. The first Bush administration wanted to show itself as pragmatic. The fall of the USSR should allow other international players, like the European Union or the UN, to become more involved in helping to maintain peace. For the 41st President, the Yugoslav problem was secondary. From Bush’s point of view, it was a situation that Brussels had to manage. At the time, the United States was much more concerned by the post-Soviet part of the world, where there was also the threat of an implosion. But, as early as June 1991, the EU clearly demonstrated that it lacked both the means and the common will to restore order. The only two nations that were really in a position to act decisively, France and the UK, developed a strategic approach of their own, putting Serbia against the other actors of the conflict.56 In the face of such a situation and the passivity of the Bush administration, the neoconservatives reacted indignantly, by emphasizing a moral position, to what American foreign policy should be. Their approach was also politically rational: to allow the Serbs to continue with their acts of violence was like informing all assailants and dictators who preferred to ignore Human Rights that the United States, like the rest of the world, would not react in the face of such atrocities.57 The handling of the Yugoslav problem only served to strengthen the opinion they already had of the United Nations, and also Europe. From here on, the neoconservative approach started gaining ground. We can see two main causes for the coming back to power of the neoconservatives through the first American administration of the 21st century. First, they continued to successfully perform the role of brain-trust in the Republican Party, a role that was enhanced by the increasing control by the right in general of the media. Secondly, they managed to get some important ideological allies on their side: not just the religious right, but also the “neo-liberals” or left-wing neoconservatives. The Neoconservative Strategy: A Network of Carefully Managed Think Tanks, Undisclosed Militancy and Media Support As mentioned previously, the ideological counter-attack by the right in the 1970s was partly led by Irving Kristol, Godfather of the neoconservative movement. Since this time, the neoconservatives have traditionally been seen as the intellectuals of conservatism, those who have given this ideology the backing it 56  See Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone, op. cit., p. 85. 57 Ibid., p. 82.

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Declinism The declinist approach was brought to the forefront in Paul Kennedy’s work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, published in 1988.a Based on an historical analysis, the author asserts that the American power, as Spain and France in the past, is condemned to decline. Just like other world powers in History, Washington has succumbed to imperial “over-expansion”, leading the country into military adventures that with time are negative for the economy. The book was an enormous success. It is true that the moment was favorable for the creation of a true declinist school. The United States had a number of economic problems at the time, which were particularly bad for public opinion. The declinist unease was all the more important as it was associated to the specific fear that Japanese competition was on the rise and could possibly dominate the United States in certain sectors.b By definition, the declinist approach goes against Reaganite and imperialistdemocratic conceptions. It lost importance at the beginning of the 1990s when it seemed the United States were, on the contrary, leading the world as the one and only superpower in all fields. Today, we can talk of a coming back of the “neo-declinist” concept. Indeed, after having been shouted down, the declinist vision appeared to be closer to the truth after September 11th. The rise of an anti-American feeling in the Muslim world and in some countries of the South (the demonstrations during the 4th Americas Summit are clear proof of that), the intellectual split between the United States and European populations during the War on Iraq, and the countless criticisms coming from the four corners of the world against the American Empire, makes us think that American leadership is no longer acceptable for a large part of the world’s population. Moreover, the disastrous consequences of Hurricane Katrina (August 2005) revealed to the world that a part of the American population is living in extremely precarious conditions, and that the State that is eager to do nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan (with mixed results so far), was incapable of effectively handling the crisis, leaving New Orleans in a catastrophic situation. Finally, as mentioned by Laura Secor of the New York Times in her article “That Sinking Feeling” (14 September 2003), neo-declinist thinking made a come-back partly via a number of works

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published between 2002 and 2003. In particular: The End of the American Era by Charles A. Kupchanc or Emmanuel Todd with Après L’Empire.d It would be wrong to say that theses writers present themselves as Declinists. But their vision does in some way reflect that of Kennedy a few years back.  Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, London, Unwin Hyman, 1988. b   Justin Vaïsse, ““Tout empire périra”: le débat sur le déclin des Etats-Unis”, Relations internationales, No. 94, Summer 1998. c   Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century, New York, A. Knopf, 2002, translated into French in 2004 under the title Comment l’Europe va sauver l’Amérique editions Saint Simon (Paris). d  Emmanuel Todd, After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order, New York, Columbia University Press, 2003. a

was so desperately lacking. It is thanks to this role that the new neoconservatism was able to politically survive and to reconquer D.C.. For Clarke and Harper, a real “shadow defense establishment” saw the light of day in the 1990s, by way of reaction by the new neoconservatives, then the right as a whole, to Clinton’s foreign policy. The new Straussian generation confirmed and amplified the importance of neoconservatism in right-wing thinking, and even beyond. Indeed, as early as the 1990s, the left-wing and center-left think tanks were totally surpassed. Today, neoconservative influence is concentrated around 1150 Seventeenth Street, a building in which the principal neoconservative think tanks are. Indeed, this place is the headquarters of the PNAC (Project for the New American Century), the main Straussian influenced right-wing think tank,58 the AEI (American Enterprise Institute) and the neoconservative “Pravda”, The Weekly Standard. They group together all the main neoconservative analysts who are also to be found in other key right-wing think tanks which promote a fairly similar approach to American foreign policy. On the right, no other sizeable ideological group can match them. The only remaining group that has managed to resist their influence is the Cato Institute, the libertarian think tank. Elsewhere, as in the Hudson Institute think tank, composed in the past of both liberal-libertarians and Straussians,got at least partly under the influence of the neoconservative movement. This influence has also been strengthened following the support of the “hawks” of the right-wing Republicans, or “assertive 58 At least concerning foreign policy, where he is completely dominated by the neoconservatives. Concerning economic aspects the situation is less apparent.

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nationalists”, for example Cheney or Rumsfeld. The latter belong to the post-Cold War right which has never ceased the fight to see the Vietnam trauma forgotten. This political vision calls for a unipolar world in which the United States has a vision equal to their power. They forcefully refused Paul Kennedy’s declinist viewpoint but have no real systematic approach to issues relating to foreign affairs. It is the neoconservatives themselves who explained in intellectual terms the Right’s state of mind in the 1990s, which was to draw the two movements together. This benefited them in as much as the hardline right-wingers found themselves in the Bush Administration in 2000. They subsequently teamed up with the neoconservative think tanks and transmitted their views over to the traditional conservative think tanks, which in turn led to what can be seen as a total Straussian domination of intellectual output as early as the 1990s. Today, in the office of the average Senator from the Democratic Party, one is just as likely to find a copy of the New York Review of Books, associated to the center-left, as The Weekly Standard. Besides, this is the very right-wing Heritage Foundation which most influences the important Democrats more than the think tanks which are seen as more neutral or more left-wing. This evolution remains not very intuitive: the think tanks, lobbies and also left-wing newspapers include in their ranks more intellectuals and have greater financial resources.59 But the left-wing intellectuals do not have the same concern for ideological efficacy as the right-wing foundations, which are managed like private firms whose profitability is calculated in terms of ideological spin-off. This only serves to strengthen a feeling of “revolution” among the American right in general, and more particularly in the neoconservative way of thinking that is absent in conservatism. Indeed, by definition, the latter works for the conservation of political and social order, whereas the American right, far from being opposed to progress, wants to change the world, for the good of the values associated to conservatism.60 Once again, the neoconservative thinkers are particularly virulent in this domain, which explains the tendency in Europe to see them as the spiritual sons of Marx and Trotsky. Like many right-wing journalists and intellectuals, they reject the idea of objectivity: claiming to be advocates without any complexes, which procures them a clear advantage in the ideological battle against the left and center-left.61 The desire of many journalists to remain neutral would tend to put the openly ideological vision of the neoconservatives and the presentation of an academic or foreign affairs specialist on an equal footing.62 This deceiving equivalence has allowed the American right and its neoconservative avant-garde to enter a true war of ideas in which he who does not consider “War on Terrorism” in the same way as the neoconservatives is 59  John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation, op. cit., p. 166. 60 Ibid., pp. 345-47. 61  David Brock, The Republican Noise Machine. Right Wing Media and How it Corrupts Democracy, New York, Crown Publishers, 2004, p. 10. 62 Ibid., pp. 52-3.

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automatically anti-American and a traitor, whilst retaining legitimacy in the eyes of the public. This situation also enabled for example the neoconservative paper, the Weekly Standard, to use invisible or truncated “evidence” to support the “connection” between Al Qaida and Saddam Hussein.63 It is therefore a question of style and of management that allows the right-wing think tanks and a fortiori the neo-conservatism that dominates them, to win the ideological battle of D.C. Over and above the think tanks, the fighting spirit and managerial expertise, neo-conservatism has benefited from the increasing control of the media by rightwing entrepreneurs. The support the neoconservatives received from Robert Murdoch, the press tycoon, supports this assertion and has allowed them to spread their message all over the country. Indeed, it is only thanks to Murdoch’s money that the Weekly Standard, in permanent deficit since its creation, has managed to survive. Its circulation has never gone beyond 60,000 copies, and it is sometimes offered for free, often to people of responsibility and leaders of industry. This is not simply an act of generosity, Murdoch is seeking to contribute to the ideological struggle of the American right which he is very close to, and to spread neoconservative thinking, whose pro-Israeli stance he supports.64 The existence of the paper allows the neoconservatives who write articles on recurrent themes to be invited as “specialists” onto political programs on news channels such as Fox News, which coincidently also belongs to Rupert Murdoch. This is a clear attempt to legitimize neoconservative ideology. Kristol himself pointed out that Fox News viewers were particularly close to the neoconservative position concerning the war in Iraq. He thanked them and also Rupert Murdoch.65 Two New Political Allies: The Christian Right and Left-wing Neoconservatives However, to be listened to by the Republicans, it is not enough to be the accepted brain behind the American right. Wide-spread local networks are also required, because it means a number of foot soldiers at your disposal to spread the word. Neoconservatism had none of this: as newcomers to the world of the American right, the ideologists, mainly East Coast bourgeois, had no links with the broad mass of American people. Therefore, not being able to arouse enthusiasm among Republican militants, they found important allies in the “hawks” of the Christian Right. The former, even if they represent a part of American history, have no 63 See in particular the articles by Stephen F. Hayes, author of The Connection: How al Qaida’s Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America, New York, HarperCollins, 2004. 64  Murdoch is principally known for having forced all the journalists who presented the Israeli-Palestine conflict as anything other than from a pro-Israeli position resign. See Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone, op. cit., p. 186. 65 Ibid., p. 188.

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clearly organized militant base. To find soldiers to support the neoconservative cause, they had to turn to the Christian Right. For Irving Kristol, religion is what binds a society together and an irreplaceable key to social order. This meant the Straussians, adopted positions that were very close to those of the hard-line Christians from the moment their movement became distinct from the governmental left. American Christianity, especially its evangelical branch, like the neoconservatives, was thus opposed to the cultural revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s. They also followed a similar path in their relations with the Democratic Party: having put all their hope and faith in a candidate who appeared attached to religion, Carter, they were soon disillusioned by a President who proved to be very open-minded and respectful of people’s different lifestyles. They were also fervent supporters of Reagan alongside the neoconservatives, whose disappointment they shared when the President took moderate stances concerning family and cultural issues. Following this period, the Christian Right entered into politics through their support for the most radical groups and were violently opposed to the Democrats, particularly during the Clinton years. Quite naturally therefore, ties were formed and strengthened during the 1990s between hard-line Christian groups and a neoconservative intelligentsia who were disillusioned by the Democratic President’s foreign policy which they considered extremely timid. It is interesting to note that during this period, Ralph Reed, at the head of the Christian Coalition from 1989 to 1997, was considered a “religious neoconservative”, a hyphen somewhere between a sometimes antiSemitic protestant fundamentalism and the pro-Israeli group par excellence in Washington.66 This coalition goes to show the popular success it enjoyed by playing a key role in the successful Congressional elections of the 1990s. The alliance with the Christian Right offered the neoconservatives the popularity they needed to become the leading voice in American politics. The PNAC sought to create links with key members of the Christian groups, for example Empower America, created in 1999 by William Bennett, a Christian who became a follower of neoconservatism. Equally, leading neoconservatives, such as Kristol or Eliott Abrams supported extreme Christian positions on abortion and Aids.67 This joining of forces was really boosted following September 11: from this day on, Christian Right think tanks and lobbies such as Empower America or the FDOD (Foundation for the Defense of Democracy), but also many affiliated preachers adopted the neoconservative vision of Islam, Islamic terrorism and the “War on Terrorism”.68 The influence of the Christians often helps sway Presidential decisions in favor of the neoconservatives: when the Bush Administration criticized the assassination attempt by Israel on Rantissi, the number two of Hamas, in June 66  Colin Shindler, “Likud and the Christian Dispensationalists: A Symbiotic Relationship”, Israel Studies, 2000, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 170. 67  See Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone, op. cit., pp. 196-99. 68 Ibid.

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2003, the neoconservatives protested, but it was the Christians who managed to overturn the situation. Following White House declarations, a huge number of emails were sent as a sign of protest, all with the same message: if Bush continues to oppose Israel, the Christians will block their support for him. The impact was real in light of the Presidential reactions to other targeted assassinations that were to follow: when Sheikh Yassin (March 2004), then Rantissi (April 2004) were eliminated by Jerusalem, Bush sided with Sharon.69 This “grassroots lobbying”, or pressure from the masses, was just what the neoconservatives were lacking in order to assert their influence over the intellectual world of Washington. Today, Christian fundamentalism offers them the strike force they need. The role of the left-wing neoconservatives in the movement’s ideological victory compared to the alliance with the Christian Right is more of a mystery and rarely talked about. Indeed, the average analysts outside the U.S., particularly in Europe, believe that as its name indicates, neoconservatism is a conservative phenomenon. In such a case, the Democratic Party, the American governmental left, would not be contaminated by Straussian philosophy. Combined with a lack of knowledge of American politics, it would explain why, for many somewhat Manichean Europeans, John Kerry represented a real alternative, an end to a bad dream in which the Kristols and Perles dominated Washington and criticized the European Union.70 In reality, the seduction of the neoconservatives has not spared the Democratic Party during the past twenty years. This was the work of philosophers and so-called “neo-liberal” politicians who, in many ways are left-wing neoconservatives.71 They formed a distinct group shortly after the neoconservatives swung from the left to the right. More precisely, their political birth can be seen as a reaction to Reagan’s total and humiliating victory in 1984 over Mondale, Democrat and former Vice-President. He came first in all the States except Minnesota. The neoconservatives had every conceivable opportunity to criticize their former party which had always listened to the left-wing and more radical groups whilst ignoring the center-left’s more reasonable approach which they had once embodied. This position was not entirely unfounded for some fringe groups of the defeated party who gathered together in 1985 to form the DLC (Democratic Leadership Council), created amongst others by Al From. The Council quickly disassociated itself from the African American left, the feminist groups and from all other specific interests and radical associations that, according 69  Stephen Zunes, “The Influence of the Christian Right on U.S. Middle East Policy”, Foreign Policy in Focus, 28 June 2004. 70  Some journalists however had the presence of mind, following the enthusiasm of the first months of the Democratic campaign, to show that a Kerry administration would not mean the end of an imperial outlook for America that was already underway with Bill Clinton. See in particular, Pierre Rousselin “Les faux amis”, Le Figaro, 2 November 2004. 71  See Daniel Vernet, “Les néolibéraux, George W. Bush et la guerre en Irak”, Le Monde, 9 March 2004.

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its members and the neoconservatives, were corrupting the political vision of the party. This intellectual movement could be socially identified to a well-defined fringe group of the Democratic camp: majority white, intellectual with free market convictions, all characteristics of neoconservatism when it split from the American left.72 The DLC openly proclaimed its hopes to attract the co-called “Reagan Democrats”. During this period, the term designated those Democrats who switched to the Republican side to operate under the Reagan Administration: in other words, the neoconservatives. The group immediately adopted fitting political ideas, rejecting all wideranging social policies and clearly asserting their militaristic and interventionist stance. For example, just like the neoconservatives and the members of the hardright, they applauded Reagan’s “Evil Empire” speech, rejecting the idea of any form of negotiation that might result in weapon control, and supporting major military projects such as the anti-missile shield defense system. To ensure their influence within the Democratic Party, they continued to get their inspiration from the right by creating their own think tank, the PPI (Progressive Policy Institute) which was similar to a right wing think tank in its organization and tone, the Heritage Foundation. Bill Clinton was greatly inspired by their ideas, which was of no surprise since his objective was to get the neoconservatives onto his side for his first presidential campaign.73 He gave the left-wing neoconservatives a lasting hold over the Democratic Party, and even today, the key names in the governmental left can be associated with the DLC: Joe Lieberman, Bob Graham, but also the 2004 Democrat “ticket”, John Kerry and John Edwards.74 A good example to take to clearly understand the right-wing Democratic neoconservative turnaround is the 2004 presidential campaign. Never before had the primary elections proved so clearly that right-wing interventionist philosophy was so present in the ranks of the governmental left. Even in the minds of those considered as representatives of the party’s left, for example Howard Dean. Dean was seen as anti-Bush par excellence during his short period of glory. However, he is far from being the popular representative of the left he was made out to be. He had a socio-economic background similar to that of the Bush family,75 is politically conservative and close to the new center-left of the Democratic Party. As governor of Vermont, one of the most left-wing of American States,76 he sought to ideologically defeat not the Right, but the democratic and popular Left. 72  John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation, op. cit., p. 103. 73  Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone, op. cit., p. 83. 74 See the Internet site New Democrats Online: New Dem Directory, at: www.ndol.org. 75  Dean was educated at Prescott Bush’s school, St George’s, before entering Yale University, like President Bush. Moreover, the two dynasties have been closely linked for longer than many imagine: G.W. Bush’s grandmother was bridesmaid at Dean’s grandmother’s wedding. 76  The only State to support a local curiosity like Bernie Sanders, the only openly socialist member of Congress.

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Concerning some issues, the death penalty for example, he held a position that was more radical than that of many Republicans. His position on foreign policy was truly neoconservative: he rejected the Kyoto agreements, was outwardly hostile towards Saudi Arabia, held a pure neoconservative denunciation of the “forces of evil”, particularly Iran, and gave unreserved support for Israel and for the war in Afghanistan just like for the first Gulf War. The one but extremely important difference (because it meant he was followed in 2004 by those he was politically opposed to) was his stance against the War in Iraq. Nonetheless, to label Dean an anti-neoconservative simply on this one element, or to hold this as proof of the existence of an alternative to the Democratic Party’s center-left neoconservative logic would mean not to examine his motivations in the rejection of the war. A fanatical interventionist, he supports all military action against any “Rogue States” in possession of, or on the point of obtaining, weapons of mass destruction. If he is opposed to Bush on the Iraqi issue, it is above all because he was sure Iraq had no such weapons and that consequently the military action was off-target.77 In Bush’s position, he would have launched a preventive strike on Iran78 which would have constituted a position almost more categorical than that of the Straussians in D.C. at the time. Kerry’s position was equally influenced by that of the left-wing neoconservatives. As written above, he was, with Edwards, his fellow candidate, linked to the neo-liberals via the DLC. For Kerry also, Iran was the enemy to eliminate, by force if necessary,79 just like Saudi Arabia: the two eternal enemies for the neoconservatives. Up against Dean who had support from the Left, he wanted to stand as an alternative in the Center, which took him closer to Bush’s political thinking, and certain neoconservative ideas: for example he approved part of the 43rd President’s economic policies, and was in favor of the second war in Iraq; he frequently stated he was not against the execution of terrorists, nor the continuation of a more aggressive policy towards certain countries of the Muslim world which, in his opinion, Bush was being too soft on.80 Of course, things could still change in the Democratic Party: President Barack Obama has taken up very clear positions on the war in Iraq which have allowed him to distance himself from a “left-wing neoconservative” movement that appears to be losing ground to other key players.81 But Hillary Clinton’s candidacy for the 2008 Presidential elections is a clear reminder that on the American political scene, the imperialist-democratic ideas have maintained all their might. Far from having had just a minimal impact during the Bush-Cheney Administration period, 77  John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation, op. cit., p. 359. 78 Ahmed Nassef, “Dean Not Progressive on Middle East”, AlterNet, 30 June 2003. 79  Stephen Zunes, “Democratic Platform Shows Shift to the Right on Foreign Policy”, FPIF Report, 5 August 2004. 80  John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation, op. cit., pp. 362-63. 81 See Didier Chaudet, “Le signe d’un tournant? Enseignements de l’échec de Joe Lieberman aux primaires démocrates du Connecticut”, www.euro-power.eu, August 2006.

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they will continue to weigh on the political debate in the United States until a strong intellectual alternative, based almost certainly on the neoconservative errors made in the war on Iraq, has been found. Thus, starting from a deep-rooted anti-communism, the neoconservatives have gradually developed their analyses which go far beyond the strict mould of their supporters to irrigate the whole political scene. During all their historical trajectory, there has always been a desire for American supremacy and a wariness of the rest of the world which can only lead them towards a re-legitimization of the Empire as a key to world order.

Chapter 2

From Eurasianism to Neo-Eurasianism: Nostalgia for the Empire In the beginning, there was the space: in everyday language, the term Eurasia refers to the name given to the whole of Europe and Asia. In the Russian world, a post-1917 intellectual movement associated Eurasia to an idea: that which says that Russia is a world apart, neither Europe nor Asia. This notion of space can be linked to a more ancient quest for identity which goes back at least as far as Peter the Great. Eurasianism – and later neo-eurasianism – hold out that Moscow incarnates a civilization in itself, one which must free the world from Romano-Germanic, then Atlanticist, influences by developing a form of imperial nationalism. The Intellectual Genesis of Eurasianism Eurasianism refers to a complex, sometimes contradictory philosophy which is closer to a form of spiritual sensitivity than a political program; on the one hand it is the result of numerous legacies of Russian thinking, and on the other hand the exile of many intellectuals following the October 1917 Revolution. Russian intellectuals sought their own identity in the image of the West (particularly Europe), principally from the beginning of the 19th century. Hence the existence of the Decembrists, a group of bright young army officers, strongly influenced by the ideals of the French Revolution, who tried to begin an uprising in December 1825 against the Tsar. The movement however was quickly suppressed due to a lack of public support. Their defeat marked the start of a new era of intelligentsia thinking, distancing it from political issues (for lack of hope to make any major changes) to redirect it towards more philosophical issues.   According to the historian Milyukov, intellectual leader of the cadet party, the comparison between the historical development of Russia and Central Europe reveals the “originality” and “extremely primitive character” of Russia. Russian exceptionalism can then been interpreted either as a model or to mean it is behind schedule on the path of westernization. Such are the two major tendencies for the historiography of the country. See Pavel N. Milioukov, Essais sur l’histoire de la civilisation russe, Paris, V. Giard & E. Brière, 1901, p. 292.  See Michel Heller, Histoire de la Russie et de son empire, Paris, Plon, 1997, pp. 686-95. Translated from Russian by Anne Coldefy-Faucard.   Andrzej Walicki, “Russian Social Thought: An Introduction to the Intellectual History of Nineteenth-Century Russia”, Russian Review, Vol. 36, No. 1, January 1977, p. 6.

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Peter the Great, the Modernizing, Westernizing Tsar Peter the Great (1672-1725) profoundly marked the Russian State, by defining two key orientations to which he dedicated his reign, the power of the empire and Europeanization. His trip to Western Europe, known as the “Grand Embassy” (1697-1698), convinced him of the need to modernize Russia. His project for internal transformation (both economic and social) was also intended to enable him to carry out his military ambitions: seizing the Baltic coast and the Black Sea. His legacy was far-ranging: the creation of a modern army, State services and national consolidation. However, the top-down modernization he launched cannot be judged so straightforwardly due to the ever-present violence (never-ending wars, famine, repression, exodus and hard labor). Also, even if the reforms benefited the elite, the population was often forgotten during the said reforms. He is often used as a reference for many contemporary political projects, whereas the conservative movements reject his work as they believe he sought to break away from traditional Russian values to import foreign ones. The Decembrists have mixed opinions concerning his reign. They support his objectives but not the means used to attain them. The Bolsheviks use his example to explain that violence is maybe necessary when used in the general interest. For the Eurasianists, he is generally considered as the person who, temporarily or not, broke the natural course of Eurasian history for the benefit of a European destiny. The key debate evolved around the position of Europe in Russia as much as that of Russia in Europe. Is Russia the representative of a specific culture, one that can not be applied to Europe and therefore should it continue to cultivate its differences or should it speed up the Europeanization process begun under Peter the Great? Our aim here is to present Eurasianism in the context of the interwar immigration, which means returning to the philosophical movements that compose the matrix, without forgetting the geopolitical conditions that led to its crystallization, for example the interest for the Far East at the start of the 20th century, the Bolshevik Revolution and the resulting exile of some intellectuals.

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Eurasianism helped Russia see its differences in relation to Europe, and also to Asia, in a new light. Strangely however, those who attempt to explain national specificity compared to the West are themselves highly westernized. For them, to define national identity means explaining its slow development compared to that of other European nations while affirming the messianic character of Moscow’s future role in the world. Two earlier movements offer an interesting vision of these issues: Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism. An analysis of these two movements, both from the 19th century, will allow us to understand the specificity of Eurasianism and its Eastern dimension. Slavophilism, influenced by the romantic movement of the period and quick to question the rationalist legacy of the Enlightenment, allowed for theorization about an organic link between nation, Christianity and the philosophy of history. It should be mentioned here that the Romantic Movement spread through Russia at the beginning of the 19th century, mainly thanks to German influence, thereby restoring the role of Christianity and its place in national history. As for the Slavophile movement, it was created by a group of educated land-owners who were critical of Westernization and who spoke in favor of a return to the Christian and Slav principles of the pre-Peter the Great period. The great conflict, as the Slavophiles see it, lies in the historical opposition of a religious East and a rationalist West: it is Russia’s role to reconcile the two aspects of this antagonism. Russia could represent a sort of “Third Way”, with its civilization, as opposed to Western individualism, favoring the values of solidarity, unanimity and community. Pan-Slavism, a movement of the second half of the 19th century had an even greater importance for the Eurasianists: its aim was the unity of all the Slavic peoples, despite their differences, whether religious, linguistic or geopolitical. The movement began during the reigns of Alexander II (1855-1881) and Alexander III (1881-1894), the years marked by the Crimean War (1856) and the RussoTurkish war of 1878. The defeat in Crimea highlighted the country’s fragility, and the army, supposedly the strongest in Europe, could not prevent the defeat of the stronghold Sebastopol, located in its own territory. The time had come to make sweeping national reforms, major political changes (abolition of serfdom in 1861) and the “Russianization” of the empire. PanSlavism gained importance and began to attract the attention of the intelligentsia, whilst economists and other experts were more in favor of developing links with the most advanced European powers. The main Pan-Slavist theoretician, Nikolaï

  Among the works devoted to Slavophilism, see: Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-century Russian Thought, Oxford, Clarendon, 1975. The movement is well represented by Ivan Kireevski (18061856), Alexeï Khomiakov (1804-1860) or Konstantin Aksakov (1817-1860). It goes against the Westernist movement of Vissarion Belinski (1811-1848), and, later, of Alexander Herzen (1812-1870).

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Danilevski (1822-1885), tried to establish Slav thinking on naturalist foundations rather than the mystical sentimentalism of the earlier Slavophiles. His theory is based on the cyclical character of the decline of civilizations, represented by principals that cannot be transmitted from one type to another; consequently the Europeanization of Russia is doomed to failure. Pan-Slavism therefore provided a multitude of concepts and guidelines for Eurasianism: the notion that world history is circular, civilizations are distinct, an opposition between Europe and Russia, a geographical notion engraved in a territory… . And the Eurasianists rapidly rejected any equivalence between Civilization and European civilization, dominated by “Romano-Germanic” culture. Nevertheless, whilst for the Pan-Slavists, Moscow continues to focus on its Slav identity, the Eurasianists include it in the Turk-Mongol world, giving it a much more Eastern connotation, and linking it directly to the steppe region. Over and above the Slavophile and Pan-Slavist movements which question the links with Europe, new interest in the Tsarist Empire emerged for the Asian world at the turn of the 20th century. The conquest of Siberia, like the American conquest of the West, is based on “open borders”, with no real barriers. However, unlike the American Far West, the Far East of Russia represents a cultural melting pot.10 The construction of the Trans-Siberian railway (1894-1903), linking Moscow to Vladivostok, and the emigration of some five million peasants between 1891 and 1914 highlighted and encouraged interest in the region. At the same time, other nations began to show an interest for the area: for example Japan which won the 1904-1905 battle against Nicholas II, even if the Japanese migrants were outnumbered by the Koreans and Chinese. Artists, state officials and geographers began exploring the Far East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and so began a period of new anthropological thinking around the theme of identity and difference. The notion of a “third continent” began to take shape. As a passageway between Europe and Asia, Russia had a unique geographical location for any European country.   Nikolaï Danilevski (1822-1885), key figure of pan-Slavism, naturalist and philosopher, presents his reflections on pan-Slavism and Russian identity in his work Russia and Europe.   For the transition from Slavophilism to pan-Slavism, see: “La décomposition du slavophilisme”, in Pavel N. Milioukov, Le Mouvement intellectuel russe, Paris, Editions Brossard, 1918, pp. 377-439.   On Danilevski, see Alexander Bourmeyster, L’Europe au regard des intellectuels russes, Toulouse, Privat, 2001, pp. 77-95.   Marlène Laruelle, L’idéologie eurasiste russe ou comment penser l’empire, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999, p. 39   Nikolai S. Trubetskoy, “Evropa i čelovečetvo” [L’Europe et l’humanité], 1920, available at the following address: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&fil e=article&sid=90. 10 Eva-Maria Stolberg, “The Siberian Frontier between “White Mission” and “Yellow Peril”, 1890s-1920s”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 165-81.

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These innovative representations of Asia were a boost for Eurasianist thinking, by offering on the one hand proof of its unity within a culturally specific area, and on the other hand, the mission it could claim to have in Asia. Thinking related to Asia was no longer limited to the myth of the “Yellow Peril” which was present in all Western countries at the time; it also illustrated an attraction for the East. Subsequently, its mission was to gather together around it, in an atmosphere of fraternity, all the peoples of the Eurasian region, which more or less coincided with the borders of the Empire in 1914.11 The Eurasianists developed thinking concerning the Central-Asian, Turanian legacy (the Turan being an equivalent to the Turkistan region in Central Asia). They also tried to revise the traditional Russian representation of the “Tatar yoke” by proposing a more positive interpretation of the steppe contribution to national identity: “the role of the Turanians in the national formation of ethno psychological characteristics of Russia […] is globally a positive role”.12 The term Pan-Turanism appeared in 1895 to denote the idea of the unification of Turanians from Finland to Manchuria. Unlike the majority of local historians who were behind Pushkin, who believed it was impossible to compare Mongol influence in Russia to that of the Arabs in the West since they brought neither Aristotle nor Algebra,13 the Eurasianists defended the following position: Mongol presence clearly isolated the Russian State, however at the same time this situation forced Russia to invent new structures and original, organizational, non-European systems, and the transformation of the country into a politically consolidated and centralized state-controlled society. In other words, this isolation greatly influenced the creation of the State it became in the 16th century, a reflection of its past, the experience of the Mongol State and the Byzantine model. The Intellectual Life of Eurasianism Strengthened by this legacy, the eurasianist movement is the outcome of the short but fruitful combination of thinking about identity over several decades and a situation of exile in the context of the interwar period. Most of the initial eurasianists, even if they came from varying scientific backgrounds, belonged to the 1880-1890 generation, and were educated in the liberal academic environment of SaintPetersburg and Moscow. For them, the 1910s were a period of major reflection on the Asian world which foreshadowed the birth of eurasianism in the following decade. 11  Charles J. Halperin, “George Vernadsky, Eurasianism, the Mongols, and Russia”, Slavic Review, Vol. 41, No. 3, Autumn 1982, p. 481 12  Nikolai S. Trubestskoy,“O turanskom èlemente v russkoj kul’ture” [relating to the Turanian element in Russian culture], Evrazijskij vremennik. Berlin, 1925, available at the following address: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=5 23. Our translation. 13  Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, La Russie inachevée, Paris, Fayard, 2000, p. 61.

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Russia and the Mongol Period In the 13th century, the Mongol cavalry invaded the great Eurasian plains wrecking havoc as they progressed. The occupation had important consequences on both mentalities and forms of government. Firstly, Russia ceased to exist as a political entity for two centuries which blocked all development of the country. The local Princes became go-betweens for the Mongols and the local populations, ruling the country under the authority of the Golden Horde.a This term designates the Mongol State founded by the grandson of Genghis Khan in the 13th century, which spread from Southern Siberia to the South of Russia to Crimea, until its fall in 1502. At the same time, the Mongols took advantage of the internal quarrels between the Russian Princes – which prevented the emergence of any notion of general interest – to rule. They overthrew towns such as Novgorod and Pskov where popular assemblies fixed the laws despite the presence of the Princes. In 1480, Ivan III (1440-1505) officially proclaimed the end of Mongol domination, procuring the Grand Duchy of Moscow real and increasingly greater international power. Jean-Paul Roux, Histoire de l’Empire mongol, Paris, Fayard, 1993, also B. Grekov, A. Iakoubovski, La Horde d’or. La domination tatare au XIIIe et au XIVe siècles de la mer Jaune à la mer Noire, Paris, Payot, 1939. a

The publication in 1921 in Sofia of the compendium Ishod k Vostoku (“Exodus to the East”) can be taken as the starting point of the movement. The compilation is the result of meetings between brilliant young emigrant intellectuals such as the linguist Roman Jakobson (1896-1982), the ethnologist Nikolaï Trubetskoy (1890-1938), the geographer Piotr Savitski (1895-1968) and the historian Georgi Vernadsky (18871973).14 The name eurasianist comes from the shared interest of these intellectuals for a specific geographical zone, even though there is not total agreement about this because of its ambiguity: in 1921, Trubetskoy wrote to Jakobson saying that the name was not very suitable as it could be used to create an atmosphere of political unrest.15 However, being exiles bound them together and enabled them to compare their thinking with the Western philosophical movements during the interwar

14  The key figures behind this movement are the philosopher Lev Karsavin (18821952), the musicologist Pierre Suvchinskii (1892-1985), the former Menchevik leader Nikolaï Tchkhéidzé (1864-1936), the literary critics Piotr Bitsilli (1879-1953), Dimitri Sviatopolsk-Mirski (1890-1939), and the theologian Georgi Florovski (1893-1979). 15  Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service (eds), Russian Nationalism Past and Present, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997, p. 160.

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Russian Emigration Massive emigrationa took place during and after the 1917 Russian Revolution. Between one and two million people were concerned and there was a somewhat elitist aspect to it. This is highlighted by Lenin’s 1922 expulsions of intellectuals who were prepared to remain in the new Russia, for example Berdiaev, Bulgakov and Karsavin. Apart from communists, almost all the political movements were represented among the emigrants, from the conservative “Whites”, who were in favor of restoration, to the anarchists and the Cadets (Constitutional Democratic Party), liberals and socialists. The emigrants gathered principally in Prague, Berlin and Paris, but also in the Balkans. The desire to return home as soon as possible to participate in the rebuilding process of the country was behind their refusal to integrate the West, preferring to live in isolation. During the 1930s, the emigrants were completely cut off by the Soviet authorities from their homeland and were witness to an autonomization of the Russian émigré community. See Nikita Struve, Soixante-dix ans d’émigration russe. 1919-1989, Paris, Fayard, 1996. a

period.16 Paradoxically, they developed an idea relating the “Eastern” dimension of Russian identity with Europe. Following the October Revolution and the end of the First World War, the émigré began wondering how their country had become what it was. The intelligentsia remembered the disappointments of the era, during which Moscow failed to catch up with the West. The exile revealed, much more than a loss of national territory, a twofold identity crisis, both vis-à-vis emigration and the emerging USSR. The experiences of the 1917 Revolutions, the Civil War and emigration were the cornerstones for the development of Eurasianism, the only plausible worldview for the emigrants. The notion was seen as a “Third Way”, neither Tsarist nor socialist nor capitalist but simply the best to redefine the frontiers of collective identity. After this long period of gestation, we can identify three key periods in the intellectual life of eurasianism.17 The golden founding period (1921-1925), mainly originating in Prague which pursued the intellectual development of the start of 16 They explore among other things, Western decadence, conservative revolutionary utopias, the critique of positivism and the return of metaphysics. See Marlène Laruelle, L’idéologie eurasiste russe…, op. cit. 17  For the following developments, see Marlène Laruelle, L’idéologie eurasiste russe…, op. cit., p. 63.

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the century and which involved approximately one hundred members. The second period (1926-1929) was an extremely productive period and saw the beginning of the politicization of the ideologies. Finally, the 1930s were marked by a decline in the movement which almost came to disappear. At the outset, the Eurasianists had little reason to believe in the positive repercussions of the emergence of the USSR. Indeed, their spiritualist and religious vision was a long way from historical materialism, the official ideology of the Soviet State which also promoted atheism. Moreover, for them, the Bolshevik Revolution was just one consequence of Russian Europeanization. And yet, it could also represent the time Russia broke away from its Western framework: to quote Trubetskoy: Russian interests are inextricably linked to the interests of Turkey, Afghanistan, India, perhaps China and other Asian countries. “Asianation” was the only alternative for true Russian nationalists.18

Subsequently, despite the opposition of certain members, eurasianism gradually moved towards Bolshevism, seen as a form of national communism. The Soviet regime was the basis for future development, if it incorporated a religious magisterium, put an end to the productivity excesses and abandoned its worship for the West. This explains why the eurasianists consider the Revolution as a redemptive cataclysm, as a ground swell, rather than a coup d’état organized by a small minority. They tried to give a philosophical and cultural meaning to the event and believed that Stalin was promoting a more anti-European nationalism than Lenin, therefore closer to their expectations. After the Second World War, a pro-Eastern feeling became apparent in USSR practices, notably in its support for the Third World and its criticism of imperialism. In other words, a former Tsarist empire turning in on itself represented a rejection of Europeanization and greater interest in the East and the continuation of the populist movement.19 The Revolution also strengthened the notion of greater solidarity between Russia and Asia (evoked during the Baku Congress in 1924) which sowed the seeds for “eurasianist” developments. On a cultural level, this attraction for Asian and Mongol themes became the prerogative of scythianism.20

18  Nikolai S. Trubetskoy, “Russkaâ problema” [The Russian problem], 1922, available at the following address: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&fil e=article&sid=146. Our translation. 19 Here we refer to a doctrine that was diffused by the revolutionaries between 1870 and 1880, whose objective was to avoid widespread proletarianism by moving towards socialism with the help of the rural community. 20  See Nicholas V. Rasianovsky, “Asia Through Russian Eyes”, in Wayne S. Vucinich (ed.), Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1972, pp. 19-39.

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Scythianism Scythianism represents a form of virulent nationalism that reduces European contribution to national history on behalf of Asian contribution. The famous symbolist poet, Alexander Blok (1880-1921), partisan of the October Revolution, illustrates this as follows. Below are the first two quatrains from his final and powerful poem, Scythians, written in January 1918: You are millions. We are hordes and hordes and hordes. Try and take us on! Yes, we are Scythians! Yes, we are Asians – With slanted and greedy eyes! For you, the ages, for us a single hour. We, like obedient slaves, Held up a shield between two enemy races – The Tatars and Europe!a a

Our translation.

The preservation of the Bolshevik regime led certain groups, including the proTsar, “Whites”, to favor reconciliation, in the name of patriotism. The divide between opponents and allies of the USSR corresponds to the two eurasianist movements, one turned towards religion and philosophy, the other more concerned by secular and contemporary issues. While the former was composed of moderates tempted by academic careers who considered eurasianism as a purely literary and philosophical movement, the latter, in favor of a more ideological setup, was composed of extremists who were more supportive of the USSR. The wavering between intellectual movement and political party conceal deep-rooted oppositions. Evrazija, for example, a review published in the Parisian suburb of Clamart, attempted to reconcile eurasianism with Marxism in a pro-Soviet perspective, stating that the universality of the 1917 Revolution was necessary for the recreation of a certain natural order. The review, which wanted to create a disciplined and well-organized political party, was ostracized by many “historical” and émigré eurasianists. However, over and above the possibility of a support group, the project behind a eurasian society, as mentioned above, was based on spiritual foundations, in this case the Orthodox religion which was perceived as a historical legacy that had lived through many a bitter battle. It had had tense relations with other Christian religions, particularly Catholicism, suspected of proselytism and the forceful conversion of Orthodox followers. A good example is Alexander Nevski (1220-1263) a national

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hero, who defeated the Swedes (1240)21 then the Teutonic Knights, the Livonian Brothers of the Sword (1242) and the Lithuanians (1245). He fought alongside the Mongols to save the Orthodox Church and Russian national conscience.22 It comes as no surprise therefore that the eurasianists wanted to see the advent of an Orthodox culture, tolerant towards the paganism of the non-Christian populations of Eurasia, just as the Mongols tolerated the Orthodox religion. By putting spirituality before materialism (duhovnost), community (sobornost) before the individual, the eurasianists have more in common with Buddhism and Islam than with the Western Christian Churches. The spiritualistic aspects of the movement aroused a number of sometimes contradictory questions among the émigré. Subsequently the democrats regret that the movement had a mystical, far-right tendency and that it did not seem to believe in democracy. They denounce the notion of raising spirituality to the rank of absolute principle which is clearly incompatible with modern-day politics. On the other hand, critics from other nationalist and conservative movements underline the too Eastern dimension of Russian identity, the link with religion and even the links between eurasianism and the USSR. In circles close to the Church, eurasianism is accused of not considering the Orthodox Church as a superior spiritual principle, and of treating it as an anthropological issue. Following this initial analysis, it is possible to say that the movement was not considered, at the time, as profoundly national, whereas it aimed at justifying, on these very grounds, the historical existence of the Empire and its role in the world. For this, the eurasianists proved to be highly innovative and underlined Moscow’s Eastern connection which comes, first by negation, from Europe which they do not assimilate to Russia, and secondly from the universality of Western values. This problem of theorizing the European rejection led to the suggestion for a positive definition of their country and of means to realize its identity to offer it the intellectual tools needed for its recovery. The movement declined intellectually during the thirties, and the sociability networks lost ground due to successive splits. The key representatives for the eurasianists were advocates of a “Third Way”, of the “Conservative Revolution”, wavering between either the pro-Soviet far left or far-right ideologies. The Second World War tolled the knell of eurasianism as a movement, its key members were no longer in contact with one another (some had gone to the United States to continue their academic careers, others had returned at their own risk to Soviet Union), while Trubetskoy and several other key figures died during the conflict.

21  Hence his nickname Nevski, the battle took place on the banks of the Neva. 22  Alexander Nevski is the hero of the film of the same name by Eisenstein of 1938, the period of the rise of the Nazis. The film was made to mobilize the Soviets and their patriotism.

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The Gestation of Neo-Eurasianism Just as in the period leading up to the constitution of eurasianism, the identity issue during the Brezhnev years was accompanied by a return of the Eastern theme. Via various publications, whether authorized or underground (samizdats – or selfpublished), the society rediscovered a number of writers who had raised questions concerning “Russian Idea”, the eurasianist texts however were not rediscovered. And yet, interest for the East was visible, for example in the works of the painter Nikolaï Roerich (1874-1947) who had moved to Bombay with his family. His paintings, inspired by Indian philosophy, were regularly exhibited in the USSR despite their lack of compatibility with official Soviet doctrine. However, the works of Lev Gumilev (1912-1992), the son of two prominent poets, Nikolaï Gumilev and Anna Akhmatova, fully correspond to the movement. He wrote a work on “ethnogenesis”, in which he develops a theory to explain how ethnic groups are born, mature and die. He combines cultural and biological factors to explain the changes through “biogeochemical” energy or passionarity (Passionarnost). His works concern the protohistory of Eastern nomadic empires (for example the Huns and the Mongols) and relations between the ancient Rus’ and the peoples of the steppe. These advances fit the continuation of Eurasianist historiography; he was deeply influenced by the Kalmuck23 eurasianist KharaVadan. Thanks to a former Gulag prison mate, where he had spent a number of years, Lev Gumilev encountered Piotr Savitski, the exiled geographer mentioned above, with whom he corresponded for many years. However, it was only during the Perestroika years that Gumilev publicly announced his belief in eurasianism.24 Towards the end of his life he was even heard to speak of himself as the last of the eurasianists. This revelation heralded a rise in a more wideranging interest for the movement. Neo-eurasianism takes its inspiration from a number of themes from nationalist tradition, while proposing a more inclusive thinking, advocating a new form of sovereignty, both for the ethnic groups and nationalities of the Federation and the peoples of the former Soviet Republics. In so doing, it avoids any risk of a dismantlement of Eurasia under the influence of Russian ethnocentrism.25 Having assimilated numerous classical themes of nationalism, neo-eurasianism could then develop in a USSR that was drawing to an end, in the second half of the 1980s. At the time, a less than convincing division was beginning to form: the 23  Kalmykia is a Russian-speaking federal district in South Russia whose main religion is Buddhism. 24  Lev Gumilev, “Menâ nazyvaût evracijem…” [They call me eurasianist …], Na£ sovremennik, No. 1, 1991, p. 132. 25  As suggested by Nikolaï Trubetskoy, quoted in Gosudarstvenno-patriotičeskoe ob’’edinenie “Duhovnoe nasledie”, Sovremennaâ Russkaâ Ideâ I Gosudarstvo [ a statecontrolled-patriotic association “spiritual legacy”], directed by G. Zûganov, Moscow, 1995.

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The Post-Soviet Russian Political Scene The Russian political scene has a number of particularities since it has its own references. For example to be “communist” does not necessarily mean to be on the far left. On the contrary, the KPRF (Communist Party) tends to favor conservation, or even paradoxically can appear “reactionary”,a in other words in favor of a return to a former system. Another specificity lies in the fact that both nationalists and communists support each other on a number of points. The far right can be classified as post-communist, representing a Soviet-inspired statocratism freed from Marxism and internationalism. It evokes its anti-Western position, its authoritarian and xenophobic stance and its belief in the specificity of Russian values. It believes that Russia can only be saved by a strong government, one that it able to restore law and order. Many nationalists are indeed former members of the Communist Party, Generals, members of the KGB and the Army. Their union is not only based on their opposition to the regime, but also corresponds to the fact that the KPRF’s program had undergone enormous changes since its recreation that had progressively taken it towards a national-patriotic stance. This concerns his political positioning and also the nationalism he develops. See in particular: James A. Gregor, “Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1998, pp. 1-15, and Jeremy Lester, “Overdosing on Nationalism: Gennadi Zyuganov and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation”, New Left Review, No. 221, January-February 1997, pp. 34-53. a

“forces for progress” the “reactionary forces”, the “reformists” and the “system conservatives”, also the “reform supporters” and the “reform enemies”. In such a situation, the term “reform” becomes synonymous with “liberal democracy”. The Soviet crisis granted legitimacy to those who believed in Western superiority and the need to copy the Western model at all costs. For the neo-eurasianists, the result of these “reforms” was the disintegration of the Soviet block and the beginning of the fall of Russia as heir to the USSR. A “national and patriotic” opposition party was formed in 1989-1990 bringing together part of the “Soviet conservatives” and groups of disappointed “reformists”. After a long period of gestation and despite the total absence of external strategic, intellectual and material aid, the conceptual model of post-Soviet patriotism began to see the light of day.

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Many classifications of these different re-compositions are possible. Certain pitfalls however should be avoided, for example by considering that the subject concerns clearly defined groups whose established members are in possession of clearly defined concepts. Often those who subscribe to such and such a doctrine defy all categorizations and tend to be eclectic. Alexeï Arbatov, the researcher, distinguished four groups at the start of the 1990s before the boundaries became even vaguer: pro-westerners, liberal moderates, centrist-moderate conservatives, and finally the neo-communists and nationalists.26 This initial description of the political scene needs however amending: the division between these different categories became out of date after the events of 1999-2000, and the spreading of eurasianist ideas. If Soviet, then Russian society has undergone major changes in the past twenty years, which have contributed to the development of eurasianism, it is important to analyze the various relays behind the movement. With the decline of state funding capacity and the reorganization of the intellectual community in 1991, the creation of think tanks was particularly favorable to eurasianist thinking. The post-Soviet Russian nationalist networks spread, recruiting former employees of the Science Academy and teachers of Marxism and Leninism whose principle sources of inspiration were to be found in the pre-revolutionary conservatives and the theories of nationality of the Soviet era.27 One of the first centers to attract Western attention was the “Center for Experimental Creation”, created in 1989 by the USSR Cabinet. Its mission was to develop geopolitical models and reform and anti-organized crime programs. Its reflection, based on an intellectual matrix combining nationalism and power, was a relay for eurasianist ideology. Then came Alexeï Podberiozkin’s RAUKorporatsiya foundation (Russian-American University Corporation); the International Geopolitical Institute, with S. Shatokhin and Y. Morozov; the Moscow History and Political Science Center, linked to the ultra-nationalist “Russian Multinational Union” party; or for example Oleg Bakhtiyanov’s “Centre of analytical and project forecasting”. Even if these groups are not as systematically hostile as the neo-eurasianists to collaboration with Washington, they have the same goal of placing Moscow at the heart of Eurasia, to the detriment of American power if necessary.

26  Alexeï Arbatov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives”, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, Autumn 1993, pp. 9-14. During the same period, others compare liberal westerners, hard-line nationalists and pragmatic nationalists. See Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 34. 27  Vera Tolz, “Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation-Building in PostCommunist Russia”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, p. 1012.

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Politicizing Eurasianism Alexander Prokhanov and Alexander Dugin are the standard bearers of a syncretic and politicized variant of eurasianism that arose during the 1990s and that they refer to as neo-eurasianism. Prokhanov was a war correspondent for the Pravda newspaper and the Liternaturnaya Gazeta for which he covered amongst others, the conflict between the USSR and Afghanistan. In 1990, to counteract the media support for Glasnost and Russian openness, the “nightingale of administrative staff” founded the weekly journal Den (“The Day”) which he presented as the “journal of spiritual opposition”. The journal was clearly for the “conservatives”, those against the changes underway in the USSR at the time, whether communists or ultra-nationalists. This member of the Writers Union is also a leading ideologist in favor of defending Soviet imperialism: he has actively participated in Russian nationalist publications, for example, Molodaya gvardia (“The Young Guards”) Nash sovremenik (“Our Contemporary”) or Literaturnaya Rossia (“The Literary Russia”) and the Sovietskaya literatura (“The Soviet Literature”). What was lacking however, over and above the left-right differences, was an element of synthesis to strengthen this reaction of rejection. Den (“The Day”) was a sort of laboratory used for the elaboration of a “Third Way” ideology; Prokhanov promoted eurasianism in the belief that it could unite a “spiritual opposition”. He evoked an alliance with the Arab-Muslim world against the West, with a messianic outlook. The paper was banned from publication following the constitutional crisis of 1993, but shortly after he became editor-in-chief of Zavtra (‘Tomorrow”), which actively participated in the communist movements of 1993, 1995 and 1996.28 Then, in August 2005, Prokhanov confirmed neo-eurasianist influence within the nationalpatriotic movement with an agreement with Rogozin’s Rodina (“Fatherland”, a Party incorporated since October 2006 in “Fair Russia”) party which he had gradually been siding with for the past year, leaving the KPRF (Communist Party) he was traditionally associated with.29 The other key figure behind neo-eurasianism, Dugin, is the best known ideologist outside Russia.30 He is also recognized as a major popularizer: he founded Arctogaia, a historico-religious association and also the Centre for Meta28  Wayne Allensworth, The Russian Question. Nationalism, Modernization, and Post-Communist Russia, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, pp. 247-48. 29  Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty, Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 148, Part I, 8 August 2005. 30  Dugin has written a number of articles and books, including Konservativnaâ revolûciâ [The Conservative Revolution], Moskva, Arktogeâ, 1994; Celi i zadači: našej revolûcii [The aims and objectives of our revolution], Moskva, Fravarti, 1995; Osnovy geopolitiki: geopolitičeskoe budušee [Foundations of Geopolitics. The Future of Russian Geopolitics], Moskva: Arktogeâ-centr, 1999 (3rd édition), or again “Proekt evraziâ” [Project Eurasia], available at www.evrazia.org.

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Strategic Studies.31 A polyglot, he has devoted his life to comparing eurasianism with other sources, such as geopolitics which he introduced into Russia, and to establishing contacts with Western groups whose ideologies he shared. At the end of the 1970s he joined an underground group of intellectuals who were interested in mysticism, paganism and fascism, which contributed to his intellectual thinking. In 1988 he met up with another neo-eurasianist, Geidar Dzhemal, former member of Pamiat (“Memory”), a nationalist and anti-Semitic organization. With the fall of the USSR, he promoted ideas that were close to fascism; he also gathered inspiration from reactionary and conservative ideologists (for example Julius Evola,32 the theorists behind the “Conservative Revolution” of Weimar Germany, the German jurist and philosopher Carl Schmitt), while collaborating with Prokhanov’s paper Den. These activities put him in contact with the European “New Right” movement represented in France by Alain de Benoist, and in 1991 he founded his own paper Elementy (The Elements), a title also used by the GRECE33 for its journal.

31 He is also the editor of the eurasianist website www.evrazia.org. 32  Giulio Evola (1898-1974) changed his name to Julius out of admiration for German culture. Mobilized in 1917, he returned to civilian life with notions of the futility and inconsistency of objectives that generally move individuals. Under the influence of Tristan Tzara, he created the Italian Dada movement and joined up with the founder of futurism, Filippo Marinetti. In 1923, he dropped these activities in favor of philosophy and the study of Western doctrines. Based on the concept of tradition, he developed a metaphysical theory of history as cyclical decline that is presented in Revolt Against the Modern World (1934). His studies systematically promote the heroic dimension of the warrior, a legacy from the Antiquity, and consider Christianity as opposed to the principal of life, in a style similar to Nietzsche. He concludes with a threefold racism “of the body, the soul and the mind”, developed in Synthesis of the Doctrine of Race (1941) since the golden era that is disappearing concerned a race. Thus, Evola felt attracted to the Nazi project and pleaded in favor of Italy joining forces with Germany, for the edification of a Germanic European Empire, neither capitalist nor socialist, that would stimulate a return of its antique pagan foundations. In 1968, the Italian new right party re-discovered the man and his works. For more information, cf. Christophe Boutin, Politique et tradition : Julius Evola dans le siècle, Paris, Kimé, 1992. 33 The Research and Study Group for European Civilization (GRECE: Groupe de Recherches et d’Etudes de la Civilisation Européenne) was founded in Nice in January 1968 by its intellectual guide: Alain de Benoist. The group, which disliked the term “New Right” used by the press, presented an original intellectual stance that was incomparable with the movements that had preceded it. Anti-democratic, and anti-egalitarian, elitist, and supportive of a form of conservative revolution, it did however distinguish itself from the Action Française movement thanks to its asserted pragmatism and germanophilia. Its will to go beyond the national limits to promote Europe as the cradle of culture and values completes its differences from the “integral nationalism” of Charles Maurras, the founder of Action Française. Among its members are former strong supporters of French Algeria who see Europe as a source of values, and others who are nostalgic for Vichy.

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There were however a number of points which divided Dugin and the European “New Right”, the former being religious, the latter pagans, the anti-Westernization of one against the desire of the other to create “European fascism”. Dugin also moved closer to Jean Thiriart, a Second World War fascist, who was theorizing about the idea of a non left-wing anti-imperialist battle, and who even went as far as advocating links with communist countries, promoted to the position of protectors of “Western civilization”. Dugin was behind the creation of an openly nationalist and fascistic party, Eduard Limonov’s National Bolshevik Party, whose symbol is a black hammer and sickle with a Nazi flag in the background. Limonov, a writer and dissident exiled first in the United States, then France, was opposed to Yeltsin and is today very critical of Vladimir Putin. Dugin distanced himself to move closer to those in power; in 1998 he officially supported Prime Minister Primakov, who can be classified as a democratic eurasianist, even if he does not officially claim to be so – see below. At the same time, Dugin was nominated advisor to Gennadi Seleznev,34 the communist president of the Duma, which procured him greater access to the media and conferences. He is largely pro-Putin, although not systematically (critical of Russian-American relations when they eased just after September 11th), and would be prepared to offer him “conceptual guidance”. Eurasianism had a twofold impact, it helped bring together some of those opposed to the reforms and at the same time it divided the specter of the nationalpatriots. Subsequently, some nationalists accused it of confusing Russian and Asian, of once again sacrificing the country in the battle against American Atlanticism. Such criticism came from the nationalists, religious fundamentalists, orthodox communists and liberals. As authors of the nationalist-patriot division, the neo-eurasianists can equally be divided into “democrats” and “slavophiles”. The former used the theme of Eurasia to make up for lost time in relation to the national issue; the adoption of neo-eurasianism became a strategy to win public support and gain power. The eurasianist position also allowed to underline the disappointment felt towards Western cautiousness relating to Moscow’s adhesion to its institutions and As a school of thought, the GRECE positioned itself on the right of the political chessboard, even though Alain de Benoist announced his intention to vote for the French Communist Party in the 1984 European elections, a vote against a civilization rules by money. Having been the target of a fierce controversy in the summer of 1979, the movement little by little lost its influence, except for a militant upsurge between 1985 and 1987. More recently, the slowly dying movement has lapsed into support for the Third World and differentialism. For further information, see Anne-Marie Duranton-Crabol, Visages de la nouvelle droite, le GRECE et son histoire, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1988 and Pierre-André Taguieff, Sur la nouvelle droite, jalons d’une analyse critique, Paris, Descartes, 1994. 34  Former member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), he was appointed president of the Duma in 1996. He was excluded from the KPRF in May 2002 for refusing to resign from his position for protesting against government policy. He took over the leadership of the National Renaissance Party (PVR) in September 2002.

From Eurasianism to Neo-Eurasianism

The Founding of Dugin’s Eurasia Party The “Eurasia” movement developed around Dugin in April 2001, with an openly multi-denominational setup, and includes of the Muslim, Orthodox, Christian, Buddhist and Jewish faiths in Russia. This point is worth mentioning since it reflects an issue concerning the lack of representation of the various confessions since the end of the USSR. The movement also claims to have gathered over fifty different regional organizations and almost 2000 activists for its first congress. It proudly announced the presence of Alexander Panarin, one of Moscow’s most celebrated political experts, which could help spread Eurasianist thinking even more in academic circles. During the Soviet period, Eurasianism was supported by both members of the Army and the KGB, particularly the special anti-terrorist group Alfa, which included many of the movement’s founders. Initially created in May 2002, it received the support of the presidential administration (and probably Gleb Pavlovsky, Putin’s leading “politechnologist”a), certainly to win a part of the Muslim electorate. Dugin’s outright anti-Americanism is less apparent, and his anti-Semitism apparently absent, which is quite rare for Russian nationalist movements. He hoped to play a key role in attempts to resolve the Chechen problem, under the authority of a former SVR colonel Petr Suslov. The terms “enemy” and “revolution” were not mentioned in the program which may prove his desire to widen the movement’s social basis, even if tensions existed between his traditionalism on the one hand and his concern for the technocrats, defenders of a strong State ( the “gosudarstvenniki”) and of power (the “derzhavniki”). The Executive Council of the international eurasianist movement includes many key political figures, for example the Minister of Culture Vladimir Sokolov, the presidential aide, Alsambek Aslakhanov, the chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs, Mikhaïl Margelov, and also members of other CIS countries. With Putin, the Kremlin calls upon extremely media-hyped “politechnologues” who have been greatly influenced by neo-eurasianism. Ivan Krastev even suggests they represent the specificity of the regime, more than the “silovikis” (members of the law and order institutions like the KGB) or the Putin oligarchs (Ivan Krastev, “Democracy’s Doubles”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 2, April 2006, pp. 5262). More than simple “public relations” specialists, these experts try and manipulate public opinion, notably with “kompromat”, the disclosure of compromising a

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information, whether true or invented. These westernized but anti-western intellectuals wish to restore Russian domination. To see the power of seduction of neo-eurasianism, it is worth remembering that some of them were liberals in the past, even former USSR dissidents. This is true for the “politechnologists” such as the gallery owner Marat Gelman or the academic Sergey Markov (who worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). The director of the “Foundation for Effective Politics” in Moscow, the former dissident Gleb Pavlovsky, is without a doubt today’s most famous “political technology” specialist. He belonged to the “democrats” at the start of the 1990s before joining the political administration.

the granting of massive financial aid. It permitted experts from some of the most prestigious institutes (The IMEMO – Institute of World Economics and International Affairs, the Russian Strategic Research Institute, etc), the “institutchiki”, to enter the political arena, to the detriment of some of the more experienced politicians. The slavophiles, on the contrary, were less interested in the national geopolitical situation than its profoundly unique, or somewhat imperial, character. They were against Western assistance and interference and refused to adhere to its economic, political or military institutions. Unlike the eurasianists, to defend the Russianspeaking minorities of other post-Soviet Republics, they were not against the use of force. Having painted the contemporary intellectual panorama of the neo-eurasianists, let us now distinguish the two economic conditions behind the Russian crisis that neo-eurasianism intends to rectify, notably on the international and demographic level. Firstly, the neo-eurasianists remark that Moscow is witness to a considerable and lasting weakening of the country: Russia is becoming dependent on the outside world, is losing many of its allies, national security is under scrutiny, it is territorially cut off and strategically unstable. In such a difficult context, neoeurasianism designates an opponent (American imperialism) and a means to fight against it (create a coalition with Arab and non-Western peoples). The general process originates from a form of nostalgia for the empire in the former Republics and from a set of Eurasianist alliances, mainly in the form of partnerships with Iran and the Moscow-Beijing-New Delhi triangle. Then, the ethnic Russians, representing 80 percent of the population, underwent a strong demographic crisis and had to redefine their role within the federation which in turn saw the beginnings of some regional nationalist actions. Alongside the administration of the minorities, the neo-eurasianists noted that some 25 million people from co-ethnic groups were spread among the fourteen other Republics. Sometimes used as instrumental in foreign policy, these coethnic groups were referred to in order to justify Russian presence in the former

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Citizenship and Nationality Citizenship means belonging to a State, having rights and duties. Nationality, however, refers to a group of individuals of similar origin, or who share a history and traditions. In France, citizenship and nationality are often mixed; in the Soviet case, a citizen’s nationality was indicated on his passport (Russian, Jewish, Tater, Ukrainian, Moldovan, etc.), this is no longer the case in post-Soviet Russia. empire. These “red feet” or colonists belong to the “Eurasian” zone, and Russia’s eurasianist dimension should allow for their incorporation. The spread of neo-eurasianism in the political spectrum happened to the detriment of the Westernization process. The decline of the latter is best illustrated by the attitude of the Foreign Affairs Minister at the beginning of the 1990s. While optimism was high concerning the evolution of Russia towards a democracy and free-trade economy, it was believed that Russia should also participate in the “new world order” that the United States were trying to put into place. In exchange for its participation, Russia could hope to preserve a position of superpower which would correspond to its calling. The then Foreign Minister, Andreï Kozyrev, was close to the business community and the intellectuals who were in favor of closer links with the West and who were the only ones in a position to help Russia end its dramatic economic crisis. This conciliatory position was badly interpreted by a large part of the public opinion who anxiously watched Moscow’s international credibility deteriorate. The infatuation for the West, so high at the start of the 1990s, began to fall in the face of the numerous empty promises concerning a wide-ranging transformation process. Criticism of the West, the quest for an identity, a geopolitical decline of the former superpower and the rise of nationalism that followed, together created fertile ground for an upsurge of neo-eurasianist influence. The deterioration of relations with the West was concomitant with a strengthening of eurasianist arguments on the national political scene. Thus, beginning in 1993, Kozyrev had no other choice but to become more radical and more demanding of the West: because the aid received for the reforms was below expectations, Russian attention was beginning to focus on more geopolitical issues, for example the expansion of the NATO or the increasing influence of China. Primakov’s nomination as Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 1996, then as Prime Minister (from September 1998 to May 1999) was symptomatic of a profound and lasting change in the political scene. Indeed, as an expert of the Arab world to which he had devoted part of his studies, Primakov had also been a Middle-Eastern correspondent for the Pravda newspaper. As an academic, he had directed the prestigious Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow. He was also appointed director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations

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The Rise of Anti-Americanism in Russia While the Eurasianism of the 1920s was a reaction to the European Romano Germanic civilization, this was no longer the principal target of the neoeurasianists since Russia no longer dominated the world as in the 19th and 20th centuries. On the contrary, they called upon Europe to balance the “imperial” dimension of the United States. In a way, the neo-eurasianists became allies of the American isolationist conservative movements. For decades, anti-Americanism had fed Soviet propaganda, essentially from the Cold War onwards. However, the period immediately after the Second World War was marked by anti-Nazi solidarity, and Stalin was initially in admiration of the United States (he sent groups to the United States to observe American industry during the interwar period), before becoming concerned by the increasing strength of the former ally. And, during the Soviet period, anti-Americanism was not necessarily deeply rooted among the population. With the decline of the USSR and the end of communist ideology, “encircled by capitalism” rhetoric no longer had its place. However, anti-Americanism developed in the transition period, in the period during which Russia was seeking to form a partnership with the United States. Three factors can explain this new feeling: the deep economic recession at the start of the 1990s, the search for a new national identity and the nationalist, isolationist and anti-Western demonstrations it provoked, and democratization, which allowed certain groups to make the United States the scapegoat for their difficulties.a September 11th prompted renewed sympathy for the United States from a part of the population. In fact, it can be said that the terrorist acts can be likened to the Nazi threat during the Second World War which helped cement relations between the two, albeit rival, nations. Nevertheless, popularity for the United States has fallen since the invasion of Iraq (80 percent of Russians are indignant about the American military campaignb), Putin himself was in favor of a “peaceful solution”, a clear statement against American hegemony. The confirmation of a new found power in face of the United States became even more apparent during the State of the Union address on May 10, 2006 during which Putin declared that Russia had to position itself as a military and economic power in the face of the American “fortress”. “Comrade

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wolf knows whom to eat, it eats without listening and it’s clearly not going to listen to anyone”: with this metaphor, Putin was clearly criticizing America’s constantly changing position on Human Rights, according to its own interests. To complete these aspects, see: Eric Siraev, Vladislav Martinovic Zubok, AntiAmericanism in Russia: from Stalin to Putin, New York, Palgrave, 2000. b According to a VCIOM (Russia Public Opinion Research Center) poll of April 2003 with a nation-wide sample of some 1592 people. VCIOM was founded in 1987 by Youri Levada, and is considered the most reliable in Russian public opinion polling: it performs numerous national polls with many regional relays. During the summer of 2003, its researchers founded the Levada Center to escape from the grips of the Russian State services. a

(IMEMO) and the Foreign Intelligence Service, or SVR. In 1991, he held talks with Saddam Hussein to try and avoid a Gulf War, without success. To that end he adopted a much firmer approach than his predecessor with regards the United States; he advocated a policy based on a position of multipolarity, rejecting Washington’s hegemony, and insisting on the role of international organizations in dealing with conflicts. Primakov refused to accept the idea of a Russia that had “lost the Cold War” and which, subsequently, should act as a defeated country of the Second World War. The Manichean division of the world into “civilized countries” and the rest, with its obvious consequences, falling into line behind American policy, was for him unacceptable, because dangerous.35 Today, virtually the whole political spectrum is irrigated by neo-eurasianist ideas, in a way or another. Eurasia can correspond to several expectations and respond to a wide variety of visions of the world.36 Eurasianist themes, developed by the national-patriots, have spread way beyond their initial boundaries. The leader of the Communist Party, Zyuganov, referred to neo-eurasianist geopolitics in his work The Geography of Victory.37 On several occasions he refers to the Eurasianists of the 1920s, notably for their national and antiWestern dimension, partly thanks to the influence of his former aide Podberiozkin, who runs the Dukhovnoe nasledie foundation (“Spiritual Heritage”).

35  Yevgeny Primakov, Au coeur du pouvoir, Paris, Editions des Syrtes, 2002, p. 163. French translation by Galia Ackerman and Jean-Christophe Thiabaud. 36  Graham Smith, “The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism”, Transaction, Institute of British Geographers, NS 24, 1999, pp. 481-500. 37  Gennadi Zyuganov, Geografiâ pobedy: osnovy Rossijskoj geopolitik [The geography of victory. The bases of Russian geopolitics], Moscow, 1997.

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Vladimir Zhirinovsky, one of the main figures of the “patriot” camp and several times candidate for the presidential elections, also refers to Eurasia in his speeches. He refers to the geopolitical desire to enlarge the empire all the way to the Indian Ocean,38 but his renowned Turkic phobia distances him from the first eurasianists.39 The Rodina Party (“Motherland”-National Patriotic Union), launched with the blessing of those in power by Dmitry Rogozin and Sergey Glazyev to weaken the KPRF’s score in the December 2003 elections, also defends a eurasianist alliance against the United States and a return of the 1991 borders (excluding the Baltic States).40 38 Even if there is a contradiction with the Eurasianist discourse, that supposes that Russia is a continental power (tellurocracy) that must oppose the powers of the seas (thalassocracy). It therefore goes further than Eurasian thinking stricto sensu, and a strong influence from other conservative movements can be detected here, like slavophilism or pan-Slavism. 39  Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service (eds), Russian Nationalism Past and Present…, op.cit., p. 184-85. 40 The creation of this party illustrates the concern for “the monopolization of the competition for power” which places Russia between liberal democracy and authoritarian State, an in-between that can be found in the concept of “sovereign democracy” proposed by Vladislav Surkov, One of Putin’s close advisors. (Vladislav Surkov, “Suverenitet eto politicheskii sinonim konkurentnosposobnosti” [Sovereignty is the political synonym of a capacity to stand up against the competition], Moskovskie Novosti, 10 March 2006, available at: http://www.mn.ru/issue.php?2006-8-1.) A “Sovereign democracy” is based on the action of a nationalist elite that seeks to monopolize power by creating new political parties, instruments of a supposed pluralism, and supported by the medias. This was the case for Rodina. This concept that structures the functioning of the Russian political system in the Putin years presents a number of affinities with neo-eurasianism. Both imply Russian economic independence and military power and a vision of its position in the world in opposition to the supposed universal Western values; they are based on anti-liberalism and the definition of democracy as presented by the German theoretician Carl Schmitt. In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy [1923], he presents this via the identity of the governing and the governed; it is thus incompatible with the liberal principal of political representation. From this point on, the neo-eurasianists, like the supporters of a sovereign democracy can draw a form of power that does not represent the people in their plurality, but incarnates them in a desire for unity. The authoritarian voluntarism that followed can be justified by Schmittian decisionism. If Surkov does not explicitly quote Schmitt, this is mainly because of the compromises he made with the Third Reich which makes him a persona non grata in a publication close to the Kremlin. For a more detailed analysis of this aspect, see Ivan Krastev, “Sovereign Democracy”, Russian Style”, 16 November 2006 (available at: http:// www. opendemocracy. net/globalization-institutions_government/sovereign_democracy_4104.jsp) The Schmittian conception of the division between friend and foe is a good representation of the neo-eurasianist vision of a radical enmity towards atlanticism/globalism. Moreover, supporters of a “sovereign democracy” and neo-eurasianists develop a conspirational vision of the “Colored Revolutions (Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 Kyrgyzstan in 2005), according to which the Ukrainian Orange Revolution was a CIA conspiracy, thus

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Alongside these supporters of hard-line contemporary eurasianism, the democratic neo-eurasianists try to develop a synthesis between Western liberalism and neo-nationalism, in the quest for an ideology that could consolidate the State. They recognize and accept the need to work with the West and the current Russian situation which does not allow it to obtain more than a sort of “Monroe Doctrine” limited to the “near abroad” zone. At the same time, the liberals, who were advocating Westernization and rapid privatizations, are today divided: Tchoubaïs’ SPS proposes to transform Russia into a “liberal empire”, while only the Iabloko Party remains on a truly Westernization line and untouched by the eurasianism. The various elections that have taken place under Putin have underlined their declining support among the population (no liberal party scored more than five percent at the December 2003 and 2007 elections). Following this chapter it becomes important to analyze the position of eurasianism in Putin’s Russia. If some of its aspects have been developed, to a point where Putin could be described as a “moderate eurasianist”,41 the ideas do not have an intellectual monopoly of the Russian political scene. Vladimir Putin was elected for his “return to order” campaign, which was based on a return of traditional values, stability, patriotism, a strong State and social solidarity. When the former Colonel of the KGB resigned in August 1991 to protest against the attempted coup d’état, it was more for a question of means (use of force) than an end (to save the USSR).42 The wish to establish and preserve a certain balance fits in difficultly with the policy declaring a fight against Atlanticism of the more orthodox of the neo-eurasianists. Likewise, during the presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004, he adopted a Pan-Slavist position rather than calling for the coming together of the Eurasian peoples. The problem of qualifying the Russian president as neo-eurasianist is understandable if one accepts that he sees Eurasia more as a zone than as an idea. Following the September 11th attacks, he chose to move closer to the United States and accepted the establishment of military bases in Central Asia, two decisions described by the neo-eurasianists, whose very aim is to fight against Atlanticism, as a “fatal error”. Such decisions reflect a more economic than spiritual vision of neoeurasianism.

interference in Moscow’s domestic affairs. (“Vladimir Surkov Secret Speech: How Russia Should Fight International Conspiracies”, 12 July 2005, available at: http://www.mosnews. com/interview/2005/07/12/ surkov.shtml/#go) Finally, “sovereign democracy” and neoeurasianism hope to give the country a role in its regional environment thanks to a new “soft power” that is distinct from that of the USSR (see Nicu Popescu,”Russia’s Soft Power Ambitions”, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 115, October 2006). 41  John O’Loughlin, “Geopolitical Fantasies, National Strategies and Ordinary Russians in the Post-Communist Era”, Geopolitics, Vol. 6, No. 3, Winter 2002, pp. 17-48. 42 Lily Marcou, Les héritiers, Paris, Pygmalion, 2004, pp. 301-303.

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A vision that is made up of three elements: an energy policy, including oil and gas exports to the Far East, a transport policy, development of North-South and East-West networks, and finally an economic policy of integration, based on the perspective of a huge market (Russia and candidate countries). So, when Putin declares before an APEC summit that “Russia has always considered itself to be an Eurasian country” he is thinking of the possibilities of economic cooperation.43 Moreover, the members of some circles, for example the “red barons” of the major Russian companies or military-industrial complexes, for whom the breaking up of the USSR led to major difficulties, were more than keen on better relations with the East. Nonetheless, the Russian president is all too well aware that his economy depends largely on the European markets, which pleads in favor of economic integration with the West rather than an autarkical eurasianist policy. Putin’s eurasianism represents an evolution in relation to the previous Yeltsin period; it has solid relays at its disposition but is not the only center of interest in the debates concerning foreign policy and the country’s identity since, like American neoconservatism, it must juggle with realism. Basically, it is just one of the elements of the “Third Way” with which Putin is trying to elaborate a synthesis between Western and eurasianist elements.44 The more economic than spiritual dimension of Putin’s vision of eurasianism does not however totally override this second aspect which is apparent through his public interventions and his close collaborators. He regularly praised the eurasianist ideologist Lev Gumilev during a visit to the Lev Gumilev University in Kazakhstan45 and during the anniversary celebrations of the city of Kazan. The key figures who support Putin share the same loathing for the liberalism experienced during the 1990s, which can explain their attachment to “traditional values”, and their support for this aspect of the neo-eurasianist program. These key figures are essentially composed of two categories.46 those from the salvaged national-patriotic, anti-Yeltsin opposition, for example Dugin, Rogozin and Natalia Narochnitskaya and who regularly communicate in the media thanks to a newfound respectability; the second group is made up of new “elites”, such as Boris Gryzlov, president of the Duma, Sergey Mironov, president of the Federation Council and Gleb Pavlovsky, all of whom were instrumental in Putin’s “grand strategy”. The first group clearly represents a hard-line neo-eurasianism,

43  From Putin’s speech at the APEC, from the Strana.ru press agency (http://www. strana.ru/), 13 November 2000. 44 Matthew Schmidt, “Is Putin Pursuing a Policy of Eurasianism?”, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 87-99. 45  “V Rossii s osoboj teplotoj čtut pamât’ L’va Nikolaeviča Gumileva” [Russia celebrates the memory of Lev Nikolaievitch Gumilev], 10 October 2000, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=105. 46  Galina Koževnikova, “Putinskij prizyv”: ideology ili mifotvorcy?” [Putin’s appeal: ideologists or mythical creatures?], 14 January 2005, available at: http://www.polit. ru/research/2005/01/14/kozhevnikova.html.

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while the convergence with the second reflects the spread of neo-eurasianist ideas in the highest realms of power, at the cost of certain compromises. The “liberal-conservatives” constitute an interesting case of how the neoeurasianist project has influenced political agendas, given the fact that they do not share the same intellectual traditions.47 Many former liberals (such as Andranik Migranian or Sergei Kurginian) have turned “Russian neo-conservative”,48 putting increasingly the emphasis on patriotism and statehood to the detriment of individual freedoms. They do not accept the Western idea that a “democratic Russia” would be “unequivocally a state with limited sovereignty, subscribing to Western standards of liberal democracy and market relations”.49 They differentiate themselves from classical conservatives because they accept a certain amount of liberalism, but they adhere to the idea that Russia has a specific mission to accomplish. At this point we can pinpoint two main characteristics that shall be developed later. First, neo-eurasianism combines hegemonic thinking and a national affirmation, nostalgic for the status of superpower, based on the idea of civilization to register national destiny in a zone that goes far beyond its frontiers. Secondly, we shall highlight its geopolitical rather than philosophical dimension, which suggests rather hostile relations with the West, particularly the United States, and the search for new alliances, mainly with the Muslim world and in Asia.

47  Marina Peunova, “‘Present Dangers’ through the looking glass: Russian neoconservatives’ designs for a (retro)empire in the ‘near abroad’”, CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2007, pp.108-132. 48  Arkadij Maler, “Prišestvie russkih neokonov” [The coming of Russian neocons], 18 April 2006, available at: http://www.pravaya.ru/look/7442. 49  Vladimir Frolov, Andrey Seregin, “The Multipolarity Trap: How Russia Should Make Friends... and With Whom?”, 2007, available at: http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2007/ item4/item1/.

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Part II

Imperial Calling and Nationalism

Chapter 3

Anatomy of the Empire: Imperial Nationalism? The neo-eurasianist and neoconservative worldviews now have to be confronted to the concept of Empire as an analytical tool to describe historical reality and not only a part of the discourses we are analyzing. Are these movements imperial, imperialist, calling for hegemony or merely nationalist? We answer this question in three steps. First, we consider the long history of the concept of empire to identify three analytical traps that usually prevent analysts to build an operational concept of empire. Second, we propose a multiscale definition, distinguishing empire from imperialism, hegemony or cosmopolis with which it tends to be confounded and illustrate it with the Roman case. Finally, given that our intellectuals do not reject the state as a political framework, we wonder how it can articulate with empire and elaborate more precise categories for analysis, pseudo-imperial nationalism and hegemonic nationalism, which will be used in the next chapters. Rumors of Empire: Three Analytical Traps The first problem consists in a specific and dominant posterity at least since the beginning of the twentieth century, namely the polemical reduction of empire to imperialism. Any analyst should be aware of this heavy burden behind this specific concept. Second, the historical depth of imperial phenomena could lead to the idea that empire as a reality is totally elusive: no definition can be provided. This leads to implicit definitions, most often considering as empire the historical forms that labeled themselves as such or were labeled as such by their enemies. Finally, those who try to build a definition often provide a one-scale description which misses the fact that empire is at the same time a political reality among others, an historical form of deployment and a narrative. We will briefly address these problems before proposing our own definition of empire. The story of the four monarchies or the four world empires which reads in the Book of Daniel in the Old Testament demonstrates the ambiguous legacy of

  James Muldoon, Empire and Order, the Concept of Empire (800-1800), New York, St Martin’s Press, 1999, Chapter 5, pp. 101-113 and in particular p. 103. In the 16th century, the Lutheran Johann Sleidan still used Daniel’s prophecy to advocate a crusade against the Ottomans in his Quattuor summiis imperiis (1556).

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the concept of empire: it led to sometimes providential, sometimes apocalyptic interpretations, at least until the beginning of the twentieth century. Beyond the historical identification of the four empires, suffice it to say that Daniel refers to the coming of a fifth monarchy, the kingdom of heaven, which will replace the four world kingdoms. However, Saint Augustine redefines the four monarchies and explains the cycle, which culminates with the Roman Empire, as moving towards the coming of the Antichrist. The heavens could then reign after his fall. Morally speaking, Dante’s vision, associating the Emperor with the sovereign who works for peace and the temporal fulfillment of humanity, is largely inversed with the civic humanism tradition which, during the Renaissance (14th and 15th centuries) perceived the empire as a sort of deteriorated political regime in relation to the previous Roman Republic. According to Hans Baron, from this point on, republics are generally associated with virtue, and empires with moral corruption. Quentin Skinner and John Pocock who continued and amended this idea, show how the civic humanists belonged to a majority movement in political thinking which rejected the empire associated with tyranny. Let us skip the great texts from the enlightenment period that are opposed to empires – Diderot, Montesquieu among others – and come to what we consider as the strong moment of moral disqualification of the empire. It starts at the   Virgil’s Aeneid (29-19BC) or Book II of Dante’s Monarchy (1310) would be examples of providential narratives of the Roman imperial vocation.   Cf. the classic work by Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.   This makes sense in the context of the conflict of the cities of Regnum Italicum against the Roman Germanic Saint Empire. Cf. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2 vols, 1978 and John G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975. These theses have today been qualified by Cary Nederman, who found traces of a number of Renaissance humanists attached to the figure of Empire, notably the future Pope Pius II, who was the private secretary to Frédéric III (1440-1493). One needs to add that this Italian turn in the meaning of empire was not shared everywhere. Indeed, since the 13th century, the Kings of France and Naples used the phrase “Rex in regno suo est imperator in regno suo” at the expense of the imperial authority. By the late 15th century, many of Europe’s monarchies had adopted the strategy of claiming for themselves an imperial crown. (John Robertson, “Empire and Union: Two Concepts of the Early Modern European Political Order” in John Robertson (ed.), A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 3-36.) See also Frances Yates, Astrae. The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985. And until the end of the 16th century and Tomaso Campanella’s Monarchy in Spain (1600), the dream of a universal empire of the Pope was alive even if this particular work did not find official favour and remained unpublished for twenty years.  In between, these arguments have not disappeared but empire has also had numerous advocates. For an overview of the debates surrounding the notion in France and Great Britain

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beginning of the twentieth century with the rise of Marxism-Leninism. The empire is generally considered as a particular form of domination over its subjects and a historical movement of greedy territorial expansion. This vision refers to a globally polemical posterity of the concept which is reflected in contemporary debates. He who designates the empire accuses the oppressor, remembering that, without going into the full details, imperium (the power over armed forces and power by force) is not potestas (power imposed by justice), to use the Roman terms. This posterity then confirms the concept of imperialism which supposedly reveals the truth behind the empire via a process of reduction. This concept first appeared in English at the end of the 19th century thanks to the American essayist Charles A. Conant, who referred to new outlets for capital and new opportunities for corporations. It was then popularized by John Hobson’s seminal work: Imperialism, a Study (1902), which in turn inspired Lenin (Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1916). Marxist-Leninist and anti-colonialist imprints10 on the concept have been so deeply ingrained that it cannot but have a in the 18th and 19th centuries, see Jennifer Pits, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Liberal Imperialism in Britain and France, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005. For the US Revolution, see Norbert Killian, “New Wine in Old Skins? American Definitions of Empire and the Emergence of a New Concept” in Erich Angermann et al. (eds), New Wine in Old Skins: A Comparative View of Socio-political Structures and Values Affecting the American Revolution, Stuttgart, Verlag, 1976, pp. 135-52, reprinted in David Armitage (ed.), op. cit.  Note that Karl Marx has not built any theory of empire or imperialism.  The Star Wars trilogy illustrates the pregnancy of the idea of the Empire being associated to tyranny and moral decline. A few words from Ben Kenobi in Episode IV, “A New Hope”, released in 1977, are extremely significant: “For over a thousand generations, the Jedi Knights were the guardians of peace and justice in the Old Republic; before the dark times, before the Empire.” The clear association of three pairs; virtue/vice, good/evil, light/dark is particularly eloquent. The same can be said for Ridley Scott’s Gladiator, released in 2000, in which the Roman general Maximus, having been reduced to slavery, returns to glory and promises to free the people of Rome by a return of the Republic, the Empire being associated to an oligarch of corrupt Senators.   “The Economic Basis of Imperialism”, North American Review, Vol. 167, No. 502, September 1898, pp. 326-40.   For a comparison of the two perspectives, see A.M. Eckstein, “Is There a ‘HobsonLenin Thesis’ on Late Nineteenth Century Colonial Expansion?”, The Economic History Review, Vol. 44, No. 2, 1991, pp. 297-318. 10 Building on the dialectic between center and periphery, the former dominating the latter, the Dependencia School mixed an overhall critique of capitalism with an anticolonialist agenda. The main figures of this school have been the young Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin. See for instance Samir Amin Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974 and the two volumes by Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System, New York, Academic Press, 1974 and 1980. After the decolonization, imperialism came to be fought on the cultural ground. Empires did not threaten foreign sovereignty any more but they still aimed at shaping hearts and minds. One of the main pieces of this

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polemical connotation, spreading to empire. Imperialism, in its narrow negative meaning, would then be the very essence of Empire. Thus, definitions of Empire are changed to fit political needs. On the one hand, those who want to praise an interventionist foreign policy build the most stringent definition of the concept of empire so that it cannot be applicable to this particular case. The next chapter will illustrate this aspect in the recent American debate. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine how anti-imperial activists could find one behind the slightest form of influence, which immediately reduces the consistency of the concept. If any influence is imperial, then the term loses all its meaning. Apart from the polemical reduction to imperialism, the history of the term “empire” which can be traced back to time immemorial leads to our second analytical trap: the idea of something that is totally elusive. This illusion of the impossible definition11 masks the epistemological choices the analysts refuse to make or cannot clarify. The Empire is the grandeur and excessiveness of the course of history, represented in a political form; remember Hegel upon seeing “the world-soul astride a horse” when Napoleon rode beneath his window on the aftermath of the battle of Jena in 1806. A bearer of age-old mystery, the imperial narrative reveals its mythological nature as a narrative of origins and destinies, in this case, the signs of the mystery surrounding origins. It truly is a question of mythology. Confronted by such a challenge, an empirical or historical approach is often used to identify existing Empires. However, such an approach is not tenable: how can an empire be recognized if it cannot be defined? Most often a method of “selfdesignation” is employed. In other words, the term “empire” is used to qualify any political form that describes itself or is referred to as such.12 From this point on, the different Empires have nothing more in common than a term which in each case has a different signification, or, once again, the common signification comes from the polemical posterity of imperialism.13 The typological approach, current was Edward W. Said’s Culture and Imperialism (New York, Knopf, 1993), a journey through modern Anglo-Saxon literature considered as a symptom of a persistent colonial mentality, which was a continuation of his seminal work on Orientalism (London, Vintage, 1978). Post-colonial studies follow on the same path and investigate linguistic forms of imperialism for example, the term being used as a quasi-synonymous with colonialism in this case. For a broader view of major texts in the history of “imperialism”, see P.J Cain. and M. Harrison (eds), Imperialism: Critical Concepts in Historical Studies, London, Routledge, 2001, 3 vols. 11  Some analysts argue that “such a definition would prove unusable”. Dominic Lieven, Empire, The Russian Empire and its Rivals, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 417. He agrees with Maurice Duverger, (ed.) Le concept d’empire, Paris, PUF, 1980, pp. 6-7. 12  Such a method leads to consider Bokassa’s polity as an empire while refusing this attribute to the Soviet Union. 13 Alexander J. Motyl warned analysts against this particular bias in his Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits, Theoretical Possibilities, New York, Columbia

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the most frequent, which distinguishes the different forms of imperium, also relies on self-designation or a minimalist definition of Empire as simply the exercising of power.14 Empire begins to be, not a political reality, but almost a metaphor. An alternative to self-designation does exist however, which consists in building a core of meanings for the concept of Empire, by collecting the distinctive criteria which allow the establishment of a scale of proximity to the historical political forms, whether referred to as Empires or not. This is the approach we have chosen after having identified a third trap, which is single scale analysis. The imperial form requires multiple levels of analysis which are often confused and undifferentiated. Consequently, a first empirical and static level gives the Empire a political form that can be distinguished by characteristics that are common to its different historical incarnations. A second level could represent a diachronic historical analysis which focuses on the political modalities behind the expansion of the Empire in both space and time. Such an analysis often results in the reduction of the Empire to its intrinsic finiteness. Ever since Montesquieu investigated the Roman situation, modern-day analysts have been looking at the reasons behind the grandeur and decadence of Empires.15 In so doing, the understanding of what distinguishes an empire is often overlooked since the finiteness appears to concern every historical form. Finally, a third level involves approaching the historical dynamic as a narrative considering that the empire bears history and carries it forth. Empire can only be truly understood by incorporating these three aspects. Indeed, the confusion between empire and great power may come from the exclusive consideration of the first of these three aspects.16 Similarly, its reduction to imperialism can be understood as an emphasis on the first two aspects, supremacy and imperial domination, considering the narrative as a mere mask for domination. Finally, neglecting the prophetic and revolutionary aspect of the imperial narrative may lead to it being confounded with a Hegemon. Thus, we shall now perform an anatomy of the Empire, with the conviction that what distinguishes it lies in the conjunction of these three aspects which must now be clarified: the lasting political characteristics, an evolution in time and space and also the original conviction shared by its subjects of an imperial calling.

University Press, 1999, pp. 116-17. 14  For example Justin Vaïsse, in his article on “les sens de l’empire”, introduces in these terms the typology he proposes: “as “empire” is synonymous with “power”, there is a sort of continuum, from the hardest form of exercise of power […] to the softest […]” in Michel Wieviorka (ed.), L’Empire américain?, Paris, Balland, 2004, pp. 201-12, p. 201. Our translation. 15  Cf. in particular Alexander J. Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse and Revival of Empires, New York, Columbia University Press, 2001. 16  See for example the definition of empire by Geir Lundestad: “empire simply means a hierarchical system of political relationships with one power being much stronger than any other.” in The American “Empire”, Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1990, p. 37.

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Anatomy of the Empire, Building a Multiscale Definition The empire first appears as a form of power, on the world scene – the world as it was known at the time – and in the eyes of its subjects. Let us analyze this notion in detail. 1(a)  The first criterion is imperial primacy. It can be considered through three angles. It presupposes a unipolar order of the known world, the empire represents the highest of all powers that exist17 and, in spatial terms, it is characterized by its quasi global dimension. This could be seen as an historical misinterpretation since the universal empire, or imperium mundi, has never come about and the historical empires have always had potential rivals. Anyway, this imperium mundi would have been a cosmopolis rather than an empire, given its finite aspect. The rivals are considered as groups of incomplete individuals. In the Roman case, that is the precise role of humanitas to distinguish between the two main kinds of human beings: those living in the wild state as Barbarians and those who have been improved by culture.18 For instance, Rome considered its Parthian neighbor as “an oriental despotism, a barbarian braggart and motley nation”.19 On that matter, the Roman Empire is paradoxical. Dominic Lieven sums up the case in those following terms: “In Roman eyes, the Roman Empire was a universal monarchy: it encompassed the whole globe, or at least all of it that was worth bothering about.”20 On the one hand, the Romans knew perfectly well that other educated peoples existed and that beyond the eastern border of the empire lay more than half of what they consider as appeared lands. Roman market venders even admired the soft customs of the Chinese and their Great Wall. On the other hand, they maintained that Rome reigned over the whole world and believed their conquest of the world was obviously legitimate, at least until Saint Augustine.21 Besides, size distinguishes Empires,22 both from cosmopolis and hegemon. They are always between the regional scale of hegemons and the global scale of cosmopolis. Polybius, in his examination of Roman history in the 2nd century 17 As Charles S. Maier rightly points out, “empire requires military supremacy” (Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2006, p. 70). 18 Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: les Romains et les autres” in Andrea Giardino (ed.), L’homme romain, Paris, Seuil, 1992, p. 422, p. 440. 19 Paul Veyne, “L’empire romain” in Maurice Duverger (ed.) Le concept d’empire, Paris, PUF, 1980, pp. 121-130, p. 123. Our translation. 20  Dominic Lieven, op. cit., p. 9. 21 Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: les Romains et les autres”, op. cit., p. 440-42. Strabo illustrates such a paradox, stating at the same time that all people outside the empire are Barbarians and that the Indians are civilized. See Claude Nicolet, L’inventaire du monde: géographie et politique aux origines de l’empire romain, Paris, Fayard, 1988, pp. 27-95. 22  “First the dimensions, the first condition for the use of the word. The territory designates the distinctive characteristic of Empire” as Jean Tulard writes in volume one of

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BC, already underlined the exception of having succeeded in dominating not just parts, but almost the entire world. In the first century AD, the two notions of orbis terrarium and imperium were regarded as identical.23 Dante upholds this global dimension in his conception of a universal empire. 1(b)  The conquered zones must be linked to the imperial center by the new occupying forces. An Empire is thus an administrated political form whereby the center exercises control over the peripheral areas. This is the first aspect of the concept of imperialism, most commonly associated with empires.24 To clarify, let us use the term imperial domination. It is often based on a center-peripheral relationship, the former dominating the latter. In the 1970s, Johan Galtung25 identified not just the nations of the center and those of the periphery but also a center and periphery within both types of nations. Galtung’s works allow the empire to be distinguished from a centralized multinational State: the peripheries have no political relationships between them – the relations can be economic or cultural – but only ever with the center and they constitute a relationship of subordination. Similarly, they have no direct relations with the world outside the imperialized zone. Sociologically, this implies the existence of distinct elites, one associated to the imperial center, the others to the various peripheries. 1(c) This domination presents a positive aspect: with the territorial extension of the empire, guaranteeing peace to the subjects becomes a strategic function.26 Once again, we can trace back to Dante the ambition of universal peace with the universal empire. He justifies the method of his treatise Monarchia in these terms, which can equally correspond to a definition of empire: universal peace is necessary “as an agreed point of reference to which anything which had to Histoire générale des systèmes politiques which he edits: Les Empires occidentaux de Rome à Berlin, Paris, PUF, 1997, p. 11. Our translation. 23 Robert Folz, The Concept of Empire in Western Europe from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Century, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1969, p. 4. 24  Cf. Michael Doyle’s definition: “Empire […] is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society.” in Empires, Ithaca, N-Y: Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 45. Even less formal definitions of Empire conserve this model: “Informal empires are structures of transnational political authority that combine an egalitarian principle of de jure sovereignty with a hierarchical principle of de facto control.”: Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim (“Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire in the Eastern German State”, International Organization Vol. 49, No. 4, Autumn 1995, p. 695.) 25  Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism” in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1971, pp. 81-117. 26 The Romans realize their obligation (paci imponere morem) when the conquered provinces decide to submit. Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: les Romains et les autres”, op. cit., p. 444.

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be proved might be referred back, as a self-evident truth”.27 This vocation of the empire is clearly tarnished by the effective absence of a universal empire. Then, if the imperial project succeeds, conflict areas move with the borders (or Roman limes) of the expanding empire, as we shall see below, and conflicts are temporarily resolved within the said borders. This dimension puts the final touches to the characterization of the empire as a political system within a world order, that exerts its authority on a specific territory and population for whom it guarantees peace in exchange for subjection. It is represented as a political entity which unifies several previously disconnected entities. Now, however, we need to analyze the historical fecundity of the imperial symbol that considerably redefines the above mentioned peace. With its territory ever growing, the no-war zone experiences the same dynamic. But for the empire also, the invaders are always at the gates. 2(a) Indeed, the spatial extension of the empire presupposes an historical dynamic of conquest: imperialism, in its second meaning. It is the other side of the coin. As Jean Baechler wrote, “the phase preceding the birth of the empire has every chance of corresponding to a military and warlike paroxysm.”28 This dimension appears in most works devoted to the empire as its proper pathology.29 Too hastily one was reduced to the other or one was defined by the other or the other by the first in a circular logic. Therefore the alliances an empire can enter into, however temporary, were forgotten. Moreover, Jean Baechler’s idea works for each conquered zone taken separately, but would appear difficult to apply to an empire in its entirety. It neglects the perpetual movement of the empire and performs a much too radical dichotomy between the before and after, between war and peace.30 We would rather contemplate this dimension following Charles S. Maier who writes that “The empire is large enough that zones of violence and zones of pacification can usually be kept apart.” We prefer to use the term expansionism, much less readily polemical, to qualify this dimension. Indeed, the warlike character of this conquest needs to be nuanced according to the type of domination it refers to. We do understand however that to guarantee peace does not necessarily mean maintaining established order. As we shall see, the empire is in no way a conservative symbol. This contributes to distinguishing it from hegemony, with a regional outlook, and which can act as a

27  Dante Alighieri, Monarchy (I, IV, 6), edited by Prue Shaw, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 13. 28  Jean Baechler, Esquisse d’une histoire universelle, op. cit., p. 109. Our translation. 29  Charles S. Maier echoes this pathology when he writes that “The lifeblood of empires is blood”. (Among Empires, op. cit., p. 20.) One should note that, paradoxically, when Rome became an Empire under Augustus in 27 BC, it had already conquered the majority of what would later become its territory at its largest. 30 Ibid., p. 23.

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power of status quo. As suggested below, it is also different from cosmopolis since it is deploying. 2(b)  Until now, the strategic dynamics of the empire only appeared to us in the imperative mode, in terms of pacification or expansionism. But if imperative there is, the empire only continues to exist because it is animated by a desire, by a determined and resolute political project.31 It must not be reduced by teleological theories to a mechanical and unavoidable movement which will necessarily drive it from the cradle to the grave. Only the two extremities of the trajectory are common to all imperial forms. Such a deterministic and fatalist move would be a symptom of a declining and agonizing empire. So what is the nature of this project? First, it embraces the historical movement of expansion and conquest. The emperor is not necessarily affected by the imperative of expansion detailed above, except during the decline period whereby it becomes a relentless and pointless pursuit in an attempt to protect the imperial center. As with Dante, the Emperor is the “cavalcatore de la umana voluntade” (“the one who rides in the saddle of the human will”).32 The empire now appears as a specific modality of power on the world scene, which spreads down through history. All that now remains is to give a meaning to this odyssey. 3  Finally, the empire involves the inscription of the abovementioned characteristics in a common narrative which illustrates the imperial vocation to transform the world. Thus, it cannot be reduced to pure violence. It designates

31  We are perfectly aware of the fact that Dante also considers that the Roman rule over the whole world came as a result of Divine Providence and was supposed to last forever. However, we have decided to live aside this dimension of his work and believe it should not hide another very fruitful contribution he made. Indeed, the civic and political dimension of empire as opposed to the religious and transcendent one has also been conceptualized by Dante in its Monarchy (1310), which takes the Roman Empire as an example. That is why our argument gives so much importance to this particular author. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect, see See Thierry Ménissier, “Monarchia de Dante. De l’idée médiévale d’empire à la citoyenneté universelle” in Thierry Ménissier (ed.), L’idée d’empire dans la pensée politique, historique, juridique et philosophique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2006, pp. 81-96, particularly p. 95. For a synthetic approach of Dante’s views on Empire, supposing a coherence between the Convivio, the Commedia and the Monarchia, and criticizing its exclusively apologetic vision of the Roman empire, see Charles Till Davis, “Dante and the Empire” in Rachel Jacoff (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Dante, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 67-79. 32  Dante Alighieri, Convivio, IV, IX, 10, translated by Richard Lansing (1998), available at the digital Dante library of Columbia University, http://dante.ilt.columbia.edu/ books/convivi/convivio4.html#09.

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a narrative of this violence and the creation of a political link around a common calling, a destiny. This federative desire33 can also distinguish it from hegemony. If we admit that this federative desire does not deny the existence of opponents,34 it is not a mere idealistic vision of empire. The Roman case illustrates this aspect very well. First, if one considers that empires correspond to a cultural area, Rome is a counter example that includes parts of Europe, Asia and the Sahara.35 Second, the Roman social structure allowed climbing the social ladder. Barbarians, slaves or prisoners of war could be integrated if they chose to swear allegiance to Rome, independently of their ethnic origins.36 This is also true at a collective level. A Barbarian village that decided to become Roman acquired the full status of a Roman city.37 This integrative dimension existed even before the Constitutio Antoniniana in 212 AD (edict of Caracalla) which gave the Roman citizenship to all free citizens in the Empire. Pierre Cordier thus writes about a “legal agglutinative community”.38 Constrained as it could be, integration entitled prisoners of war or even slaves to acquire full citizenship if the Roman master decides so. Hence, the Greeks recognized assimilation of the defeated as Roman specificity.39 Plutarch 33  That is why our argument lays so much emphasis on Dante’s work, which replaces mere subjection by political obligation in his conception of Empire. See Thierry Ménissier, “Monarchia de Dante”, op. cit., p. 87. 34  Charles S. Maier confirms this idea when he writes that “Empire begins where political resistance becomes possible, and resistance will become at least latent when empire begins.” Among Empires, op. cit., p. 59. 35  Jean Baechler, Esquisse d’une histoire universelle, op. cit., p. 117. 36 Ethnic differences or religious beliefs did not matter for the Romans, who found their generals among the Germans at the end of Antiquity. Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: les Romains et les autres”, op. cit., p. 448. 37 Ibid., p. 452. 38 Pierre Cordier, “L’empire romain : le pluriel et le singulier” in Thierry Ménissier (ed.), L’idée d’empire dans la pensée politique, historique, juridique et philosophique, op. cit., pp. 65-78. Our translation. Charles Maier confirms these elements when he writes that “The empire offers new possibilities of ascent. It insists on greater equality for those inside the frontiers: wider rights of citizenship and, at least initially, greater access to the higher ranks.” (Charles S. Maier, Among Empires, op. cit., p. 20). This description tends to exclude women from the federative imperial project, but this is not the case. “Empire offered women […] a gender-specific sense of fulfillment.” Ibid., p. 46. On this specific issue, see also Philippa Levine, Gender and Empire, New York, Oxford University Press, 2004. 39 The army was the most obvious illustration of this aspect. Its diversity in customs and languages was sometimes criticized, (See Tacitus, Histories, 2, 37) but the loyalty of these “incomplete Romans” proved fundamental during the long crisis of the 3rd century AD. (See Jean-Michel Carré, “Le soldat” in Andrea Giardina (ed.), L’homme romain, op. cit., pp. 127-72, p. 140-41.) However, one must not forget that assimilation was only one of the two Roman strategies towards the defeated, the other being destruction. Indeed, they were used to destroying a city that did not surrender before the first strike of the battering ram. Paul Veyne, “Humanitas:

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dates this type of extension of the citizenry back to Romulus. Roman citizenship requires local citizenship but did not substitute it, showing another aspect of the integrative dimension of the model.40 Third, the Roman identity was not closed and aggregated foreign elements. Its relationship to the Greek culture may be the case in point. It leads Paul Veyne to write about a “Greek-Roman Empire”, underlying that Greek and Latin languages were thought of as a couple (utraque lingua) in Rome.41 Indeed, since the times of Cicero (first century AD), the Greeks were a cultural model of refinement42 for the Romans whereas the latter laid emphasis on rusticity as a necessary tool for military survival.43 We use the term narrative because it refers to the foundation and vocation of the empire. This in itself is a distinctive element, as Philippe Forget writes, Not all the forms of collective self have historical reach; when their totalization is too complete, their hermeneutic economy too circular, they become deprived of an indetermination that is necessary for historical production.44

The understanding the empire has of its historical trajectory is quite specific. It wants to set an example in war. This effort shares with the Christian narrative of the four kingdoms mentioned above the notion of an immanent bearer of the universal, so much so that the universal meaning did not yet exist in the Romans’ eyes. It

les Romains et les autres”, op. cit., p. 435. As Plutarch notes in his Life of Marcellus (20, 11), “Foreign nations had held the Romans to be excellent soldiers and formidable in battle; but they had hitherto given no memorable example of gentleness, or humanity, or civil virtue”, translation by John Dryden. But the way the Romans fought goes well beyond they way of treating the defeated which is our matter of concern. 40 Pierre Cordier, “L’empire romain : le pluriel et le singulier”, op. cit., p. 72. 41 Paul Veyne. L’empire gréco-romain, Paris, Seuil, 2005, p. 11. 42 The Roman notion of humanitas comes from the Greek virtue called philanthropia which appeared in the 4th century BC. Even if Paul Veyne thinks it had no real impact on the Roman way of war, it deeply influenced the way the Romans portrayed their actions, particularly in the four centuries before the empire. Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: les Romains et les autres”, op. cit., p. 430sqq. 43  Latin remained the official military language even in the Greek-speaking East. See also the specific role of sweat (sudor) as a proof of the soldier’s commitment to the empire and its renouncement to civilian comfort, which was not at all positively considered by the civilians. Without losing their military specificity which was synonymous with a particular relation to the emperor, the soldiers have tended to reshape their image, in vain. In spite of their evolving posthumous representations depicting them as men of culture rather than violent fighters, the population did not change its view of the military and this rusticity remained. Jean-Michel Carré, “Le soldat”, op. cit., pp. 159-70. 44 Philippe Forget, “Herméneutique et grande politique” in L’art du comprendre, No. 10, June 2001, pp. 29-46, p. 29. Our translation.

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remained to be built through historical action.45 The life of the empire occurs with the constant dialectical actualization of the foundation and the vocation. The empire is not driven by a thirst for parousia nor by an eschatological faith, it is forged by the Olympian dream of all creators. More than the submission of the hypothetically interiority of men, the empire incorporates them through Dreams and Law. It calls upon no revelation of the being.46

The Roman auspices endorse Rome’s projects more than they command them: the capital of the Empire works for the advent of the great order of the ages (Magnus Ordo Saecularum) and the gods confirm its task,47 but it will never mean revealing a previous already determined order whose coming is expected. The empire vanishes whenever it forgets one of its two axes – foundation and vocation – and clutches upon the memory of its past or present grandeur. It cannot be static. Contrary to Hegemon, it bears the power to transform the world. And so we come to the following definition. The empire is the continuing actualization by a political community of the narrative of its historical calling; the above mentioned community embraces the difficulty of an indefinite expansion of its domination over an ever increasing territory likened to the whole world, upon which it imposes peace and offers to join its project of transforming the world. Echoes of Empire: Pseudo-Imperial and Hegemonic Nationalism With this definition of empire, we can now try to understand to what extent it applies to the neoconservative and neo-eurasianist worldviews. This requires to build more precise categories taking into account that the United States and Russia remain States, classically characterized by their existence within a delimited and fixed territory. They register in an alternative political system to 45  “The Empire, in fact, is not necessarily to be understood as an imperial regime that is organized around a universal and deified sovereign: first it must be considered as the ideal of a new age, the plural and universal unification of peoples under the same authority, just laws, in an order of peace, prosperity and bliss at a mytho-palingenesic level.” Ibid., p. 34. See also Id., “Théorie et puissance. Etude d’anthropologie stratégique” in Christian Harbulot and Didier Lucas (eds), Les chemins de la puissance, Paris, Tatamis, 2007, pp. 4189, mainly pp. 73-83. We do not have space enough to explore the radical change associated with the Christianization of the Roman Empire. 46 Philippe Forget, “L’expérience de la mantique, la voix des sibylles. Epreuve de l’événement et vocation impériale” in L’art du comprendre, No. 13, June 2004, pp. 113-36, p. 132. Our translation. 47  For more information on the meaning and forms of divination, and also the role of the prophet in relation to imperial dynamic, cf. ibid.

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the Empire, as borders differ from the imperial limes.48 Following a Weberian approach, we consider the State to be a political enterprise with an institutional character. Thus, any compatibility should be judged on a project level. This is all the more conceivable since the two states in question are founded on a federal basis which, even if it goes against the principal of imperial domination of a center over the peripheries, does seem compatible with the inclusive principle that is unique to imperial dynamic.49 The forces that a mobilization in favor of an imperial project could rely on remain to be determined. The aim of the project, as explained previously, is to transform the whole world, or more precisely virtually the whole world. Thus it could rely on an ethnocentric effect that is coherent with its understanding of what is non-imperial as imperfectly human.50 With the others being reduced to the status of threat, the protection and safeguard of the imperial borders become imperative. When taken in the framework of a contemporary State, this desire for cohesion doubled with an uppermost commitment to one’s own identity takes on the form of nationalism. Isaiah Berlin defines it as follows:

48 Even empires had some sort of closed limes but their specificity is the mere existence of this blurred and moving border. Cf. Michel Foucher, Fronts et frontières. Un tour du monde géopolitique, Paris, Fayard, 1991, pp. 63-65. 49 Anthony Pagden demonstrates how, in the 18th century, with the debates on doux commerce theory and at a time when the imperial projects of the Spanish, English and French monarchies were declining, intellectuals envisaged the transformation of the empire, seen as aggressive and militarist, into a federation (Turgot in France, Smith in Scotland, Count Aranda in Spain), and even a global confederation that could guarantee peace for all. A confederation as imagined by Kant in his Project for a Perpetual Peace (1795). Obviously this confederation, with no strong center, cannot be likened to an empire. It does however show the common concerns for extension through association and pacification. It is this transformation from a relation of political dependence to a cultural relation, a form of protection and free-trade that, for Pagden, characterizes the passage from empire to federation. The independence of the United States, albeit obtained by force, illustrates this evolution. Cf. Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500 - c. 1800, London, Yale University Press, 1995, Chapter VII, “From Empire to Federation”, pp. 178-200. For an analysis of the contemporary federalization of empires, cf. Anthony Pagden, “From Empire to Federation” in Balahandra Rajan and Elisabeth Sauer (eds), Imperialisms. Historical and Literary Investigations, 1500-1900, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 255-71. The metamorphosis of empire to federation is the reverse of what we are describing. 50  Jean Baechler, Esquisse d’une histoire universelle, op. cit., p. 113.

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When Empire Meets Nationalism The elevation of the interests of the unity and self-determination of the nation to the status of the supreme value before which all other considerations must, if need be, yield at all times.51

But it also presents an active, constructive and programmatic side which can be likened to the desire for world transformation which is inherent to the empire. Does this imply certain nationalists would like to see the coming of a new political form comparable to that of the empire? This is our understanding of pseudo-imperial nationalism. Indeed, the compatibility is only partial between the characteristics of the imperial symbol and a minimal definition of nationalism. Gil Delannoi defines four archetypal components of the latter: the fear of decline, which can be associated with causes – either internal or external to the nation – a desire to react against the present, which does not offer the nation the position it deserves – a desire which often gives rise to the rewriting of the past to justify the glorious future that needs defending – a form of organicism that says that the individual can be sacrificed for the good of the nation if required, and the use of propaganda to maintain and strengthen nationalist fervor.52 The prospect of decline refers to the permanent threat of the barbarians at the borders of the empire, as said above, but also of internal revolt and insurrections. It explains the infinite thirst for conquest and the myth that systematically associates imperial expansion to a beneficial situation.53 Clearly however, the first two aspects – the fear of decline and desire to react against the present – can be linked to any political system seeking to develop its influence, including the empire. The cohesion and concern for a shared destiny are good illustrations of imperial organicism.54 The empire becomes a single being heading towards its destiny. Finally, the dimension of propaganda can be linked with official narrative of the Empire. If there is only a partial compatibility, it is because the imperial project, tainted from the outset by the fear of decline, appears to lose some of its original federative vocation for a defensive rush forward which only serves to liken it to imperialism. This leads us to our final point, which is a distinction between pseudo-imperial nationalism and hegemonic nationalism. Both strive for an historical dynamic of 51 Isaiah Berlin, “Nationalism, past neglect and present power” in Against the Current, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 333-55, p. 338 (volume edited by Henry Hardy, originally published in 1979). 52  Gil Delannoi, Sociologie de la nation, fondements théoriques et expériences historiques, Paris, Armand Colin, 1999, p. 90. 53  This is the first of the myths identified by Jack Snyder in Myths of Empire, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991. 54  “The complete ascending dialectic of the imperial gnosis involves abandoning the impotence of the element for the organicity of the whole” Bruno Pinchard, “ Dante prophète du Saint Empire ”, op. cit., p. 44. Our translation.

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expansion. Whereas the former acts like a transformative power whose historical fecundity is as open as its horizon and puts no a priori limits on its expansion; the latter develops a policy of expansion limited to a predefined zone. Whereas the first stifles the imperial inspiration that animated it through the neglect of the other and a closing in on itself that removes all meaning from territorial expansion, the second never really makes it. Its process comes to an end at the very time it is born and the vocation of the power at work is to become a force of status quo once its ambitions fulfilled. The question remains to know on which pitfalls the neo-eurasianist and neoconservative hubris may stumble on.

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Chapter 4

American History through the Neoconservative Looking Glass: Imperial Calling Derived from Nationalism Criticism of an “imperial” or “imperialist” America was the prerogative of the counter-culture and far left from the 1960s to the 1980s. Besides, some care must be taken with the language used on this matter. If the term “imperial politics” is used quite loosely, the adjective “imperialist” has retained an accusatory meaning that limits its use to groups who criticize the power in place. Since the beginning of the twentieth century in particular, the foreign policies that characterize the empire, and by extension the very notion of empire, have been marked, in western democracies, by a lasting opprobrium. For a long time, the United States believed they were the anti-imperialist nation par excellence, as a former colony and whose exception came from their emancipation. John Pocock formulates this paradox in the following terms: The new republic, born of the revolt against empire, had a commitment to empire – and to empire of settlement – built into its structure in a way that the parent system never had.

The expansion of the United States in the 19th century , pushing the frontier further and further, was clearly an imperial conquest, whose aim was to create an “empire of liberty” to use Jefferson’s words. Today, Washington is often presented as a new Rome, whether to lament it, as does Chalmers Johnson in his book The Sorrows of Empire, or to praise it, as Max Boot is doing in his numerous articles. However, with the exception of just a few, neoconservative analysts try to find a term with a

 The 17th century Americans compared themselves to the Republican Romans battling against Julius Caesar whose empire had destroyed the republic. Cf. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 26.   J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 86.   Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, New York, Verso, 2004.

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less polemical connotation: Robert Kagan prefers hegemony, and Irving Kristol imperium that he judges “a more subtle term than empire.” And when the term is used, it is most often associated with a qualifier which aims at counterbalancing the polemical connotation. Hence the terms “Benevolent Empire” or liberal empire which is a term that was used explicitly as we shall see later in Russian Politics. Despite such semantic precautions, the Neoconservatives defend and embody an imperialist approach. And if the theme of empire does not belong exclusively to them, their considerable influence on the 43rd President gives the idea a hitherto unknown presence. Bush Sr., although initially irresolute, withdrew imperial ambition little by little from his discourse; Clinton, even if he continued to pursue it in certain fields, never openly assumed such a position. The current president has based a program around it, largely inspired by the neoconservative movement. Moreover, as Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay point out, the expression “neoconservative” is no longer really suitable. If we use this term for ease of use because it reminds us of the ideological origins of the movement, the expression that is closest to the current political reality is “democratic-imperialists” or imperialists of democracy. The notion of democracy, as seen above, and as confirmed by their approach to the Muslim world, should not be taken in its literal meaning, particularly when promoting democracy on Islamic soil. In such a situation it becomes purely instrumental. A more suitable term would be pseudo-imperial politics. As we suggested in the theoretical chapter devoted to Empire, it can only be based, in a nation-state such as the one we live in, on the exacerbation of a national sentiment. It has won renown through the redefinition of American historical tradition since the war of Independence with a view to reasserting and re-legitimizing what was originally an imperial calling. To do so, the neoconservatives want to demonstrate that far from representing a simple epiphenomenon as the Europeans like to believe, they are really in keeping with an age-old national tradition. We will now trace back the ancestors of the neoconservative views on foreign policy throughout the American history to show that they are right on this particular point. They continue a major tradition in American History, in spite of the Rooseveltian parenthesis. And this tradition corresponds to what we labeled pseudo-imperial nationalism.

  Cf. Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness”, Policy Review No. 113, June-July 2002, pp. 3-28.  Irving Kristol, “The Emerging American Imperium”, Wall Street Journal, 18 August 1997.   Ghassan Salamé, Quand l’Amérique refait le monde, Paris, Fayard, 2005, p. 88.  See Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, Washington D.C, Brookings Institute Press, 2003, p. 15.

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Unilateralism, Global Presence and Influence, Pre-emptive Action: John Q. Adam’s Legacy The neoconservatives believe the imperial calling has borne the History of the United States and has led to a specific form of intervention on the world scene that is axed around three principles: preventive/pre-emptive action, unilateralism, unmatched global presence and influence. These three points are indicative of the action of an empire, which bases itself on a model of superiority and calling, but which feels threatened and acts in self-defense. Peter Bender believes Rome and D.C. have this in common; they both expanded their territories to protect themselves from their respective enemies to a point whereby wars were started not for questions of political survival but more for the preservation of an undisputed power. This can explain the use of preventive action. This takes us back to one of the characteristics of Empire as presented by Charles Kupchan: the leaders perceive the political center as being extremely vulnerable. This in turn leads to an aggressive foreign policy in the name of the protection of the imperial center. It must not be forgotten however that the empire which thinks in this way is in fact ossified, because any expansion is no longer related to the primary dynamic of imperial association but rather to a logic of self-defense. Thus, the empire as perceived by the neoconservatives, and also as they want it to be perceived historically speaking, no longer corresponds to the associative project of an imperial calling in its conception. The extremely positive welcome the neoconservative movement reserved for John Lewis Gaddis’ book Surprise, Security, and the American Experience10 reveals their reading of the American history. The book describes the historical birth of the imperial America following a tragic event. On August 24, 1814, during the Anglo-American war, the British army attacked Washington D.C. and burnt the White House and the Capitol, two symbols of the independence of the young nation. But the disaster took place at the end of the war; it was appeased by the signing of the Ghent peace treaty, which consecrates no victor, then by the American success in New Orleans at the beginning of 1815.11 Basically it represents the paradoxical victory of the young Republic, highlighting its singularity. Europe that had become totally royalist is of no further interest for the republican regime which the British Empire considered a potentially dangerous rogue state that needed careful watching over.  Peter Bender, “The New Rome”, in Andrew Bacevich, (ed.), The Imperial Tense, Prospects and Problems of American Empire, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 2003, pp. 81-92.   Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1994. 10 Max Boot, “In Research of Monsters?”, Commentary, May 2004 (comparison of the work by Gaddis). 11 The victory effectively came after the signing of the peace treaty which did not put an end to all the battles.

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Consequently, Washington feared a new attack from the world’s greatest fleet. It would have been difficult to oppose a real resistance against one of the most important powers of the time during another war. In light of this, according to the Historian Gaddis, the preventive approach was developed by John Quincy Adams, one of the most influential Secretaries of State in American history (18171825) then president (March 1825 – March 1829). It resulted from the following diagnosis: Washington did not have the means available to protect all its territory. The only way to secure the nation was to anticipate the actions of its potential enemies, primarily those European nations with an imperialist vocation, but also the non-state elements that were as, if not more, dangerous for possessions and persons (Native Americans, pirates, etc), and to deal with them in one way or another. The buying of Louisiana distanced one direct state rival, and this became the direction to follow: Spanish Florida was the first victim of this tactic which today appears so new. In this example, the Americans acted no only against an imperial actor, Spain, but also against non-state elements, Indian tribes and fleeing slave groups who launched sporadic “raids” on American soil. The troops of the future president Andrew Jackson (in office from March 1829 – March 1837) conquered the territory in 1818. In 1819 an agreement was reached to compensate Spain for the loss of the territory. There then followed a battle against the Native tribes who refused to emigrate to the west (second war against the Seminoles in 1830). Florida could therefore be considered the first “failed State” the United States had to deal with. Texas, which was seen as a “collapsed State”12 was annexed following preventive action in 1845. It was this very logic of prevention inspired by Adams that was applied by Andrew Jackson against the Indians, with terrifying consequences,13 but which led to the conquest of the whole of the American territory as we know it today. The neoconservatives did not invent preventive or pre-emptive action as a system of action in foreign policy: they simply abided by a tradition that was behind the development of their country. Indeed, we can find evidence of Jack Snyder’s first myth at the heart of the imperial spirit: the neoconservatives are persuaded, like their ancestors, that conquest will bear its fruits sooner or later, whatever the price to pay, whereas the loss of a periphery is just the first sign of an inexorable decline.14 As for unilateralism and global influence, they can be traced back to American politics of the 19th and the start of the 20th centuries and are perfectly accepted by the neoconservatives who consider this period as the example to follow. Max

12  William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995. 13  Cf. Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States: 1492-present, New York, Harper Perennial, 2005 [first published 1980]. 14  Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991.

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Boot, with an element of admiration, talks of the “White Man’s Burden”.15 During this period, American diplomacy was closely influenced by George Washington’s Farewell Address, recommending the avoidance of any prolonged partnership with a European power during time of peace. Associated with the Monroe Doctrine16 (1823), which condemned all European interference in national affairs, this strategic choice allowed the government to carry out independent and unilateral policies to guarantee its supremacy over the whole American continent. The 1898 war which ended with the capture of Cuba that had become a quasi dominion, and the annexation of the Philippines are good examples. However the process of historical introspection led by Europe following the period of decolonization, which today offers the possibility of a more balanced analysis of colonization, was never truly carried out by an America which continues to consider itself as the Republic behind all decolonization. And yet European colonization was present in American action at a period of its history. Let us return to our two previous examples, the Hispano-American war (1898) then the Philippine-American war (1899-1913). For a long time the latter was referred to as an “insurrection” by the Americans until 1999 when it was finally given the status of war, according to the Congress Library. Both represent the ever increasing presence of the United States on the international scene. Without straying from the European prejudices of the time, the United States developed an openly racist vision of the Philippines, seen as the “little colored brothers” by President William McKinley (1897-1901); little brothers to educate, racially inferior and who need to be Christianized … even if they have been Catholics for centuries because of the Spanish presence. The Philippine nationalists, who initially supported the American soldiers in their struggle for emancipation from the Spanish, finally turned against their new occupying forces. D.C. then decided to initiate a policy of severe repression against the recalcitrant “natives”. Soldiers who had been trained to fight against the Indians were sent in: there were officially 200,000 deaths from among a population of 8 million.17 As for Cuba, even if it was not annexed, it is worth remembering that the strategic choice had nothing to do with a democratizing project. The United States could not afford to annex a country with a large African American population and a 400 million dollar debt which the United States would have had to settle. Rather than transforming it into an American territory, or colony, they made of it a dominion which they had complete power over: the 1901 “Platt Amendment” thus codified American rights and privileges to intervene in Cuban politics.

15 Max Boot, “Liberal Imperialism”, American Heritage, June/July 2002. The expression “White Man’s Burden” is from the English poet Rudyard Kipling. 16  James Monroe, Republican president from 1817-1825. 17 Andrew Carnegie, the famous industrialist offered to buy the Island from the American government for 20 million dollars at the time and to offer the people new-found sovereignty.

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The “Platt Amendment” The Platt Amendment was a rider to the 1901 Army Probations Act While the Teller Amendment publicly stated that the United States, contrary to the European continent, would not colonize Cuba, it gave scope for political colonization, thereby avoiding the problems mentioned above and also any action from a European country searching for new colonies. The White House was concerned in particular by German intervention. Far from being a simple parliamentary gadget, the amendment had been inspired by the Executive, principally by the Secretary of War Elihu Root. It forbids Cuba from signing any treaty for the transfer of sovereignty except those which may benefit the United States. Thus, the naval base of Guantanamo was handed over to the American army. The island was in reality under control, since Washington could intervene at any moment in Cuban affairs whenever it deemed necessary, mandated that Cuba would contract no foreign debt or sign any agreement with any country other than the United States. The height of humiliation for the Cubans, they were forced to integrate this amendment into their Constitution in 1901. Tomas Estrada Palma, a man of straw who would have preferred to see his island simply annexed, became the first president of the Cuban republic under American domination. When he attempted to remain in power after the end of his term by the use of procedures that were both non-democratic and contested by local public opinion, Liberal resistance was founded. In a situation that could be likened to the demands of the various Iraqi and now Iranian opposition factions to attack their own country, Estrada Palma turned to Washington. This “call to the empire” gave rise to vigorous reactions:a Theodore Roosevelt sent in troops to destroy the revolt and begin the island’s second period of occupation (1906-1909). Then, in 1934, the Platt Amendment was replaced by Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour Policy, promoting more respectful cooperation between the United States and the New World. To go further into this notion in the present day context, cf. Ghassan Salamé, Appels d’Empire, ingérences et résistances à l’âge de la mondialisation, Paris, Fayard, 1996. a

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Subsequently, the myth of imperial conquest as systematically beneficial for those undertaking it was still alive in the minds of the leaders of the time. Looking back, this right to intervene in Cuban affairs was used to its full: the Marines were sent to the island four times, in 1906, 1912, 1917 and 1920. Our position is not to morally judge American foreign policy but rather to see to which American History the neoconservatives refer to, in order to justify their current policies. In such circumstances, one can state that their historical approach presents them as the direct descendants of the 19th century imperialists. But, more than being simply the children of McKinley, they are the spiritual sons of Wilson.18 Pseudo-imperial Nationalism as a Wilsonian Legacy Rejection of Otherness and Desire to Change the World Like Wilson, to distance themselves from the classical imperialism that public opinion was so critical of, the neoconservatives understood that the use of moral values would allow them to justify any action outside American territory. Indeed, the twenty-eighth president had a strategic approach that was analogical to that of his predecessors, but he added an exaggerated feeling of American exceptionalism. This same inclination can be found among the neoconservatives today, who present American imperialist action as a “Force for Good.”19 With Wilson in command, as with the neoconservatives since September 11, D.C. decided to teach the whole world a lesson, and not just the Philippines. According to the poet Philip Freneau, the United States were a “new Jerusalem sent down from heaven.”20 The new Promised Land was the work of God, destined to free the world.21 As Martin Lipset wrote,22 American exceptionalism owes its existence to the fact that Americanism, more than an affection for a country, is a complete ideology in itself,23 a coherent system to explain the relations between oneself and 18  For a more detailed analysis, cf. Ghassan Salamé, Quand l’Amérique refait le monde, Paris, Fayard, 2005, pp. 55-67. 19 Max Boot, “U.S Imperialism: a Force for Good”, National Post, 13 May 2003. 20  From a poem On the Rising Glory of America, line 436. The poem is available at the following address: http://www.mith2.umd.edu:8080/eada/html/display.jsp?docs=freneau_ risingglory.xml&action=show 21 Andrew J. Bacevich, “New Rome, New Jerusalem” in Andrew J. Bacevich (ed.), The Imperial Tense…, op. cit., p. 95. 22 Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, New York, W.W. Norton, 1996. 23  Once again, American exceptionalism, like the 19th century colonial period, is still an issue today due to a lack of historical critique. Americanism comes from a feeling of exception resulting from the American Revolution against the English and that led to their independence. And yet, if we analyze the work of Hugh Bicheno, Rebels and Redcoats.The American Revolutionary War (London, HarperCollins Publishers, 2004), the key principles were only a screen for American opportunism and internal upheaval. Upheaval because

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the world, a truth that can not be criticized. The feeling of superiority in relation to other nations via its universal values, a perception that explains the notion of American exceptionalism”, has, according to the historian Michael Adas, led the United States to become prone to belittle non-western cultures and visions of the world.24 This may explain Wilson’s refusal to accept Japan’s request to recognize racial equality via an article in the Treaty of Versailles. More generally, if Wilson appeared as a generous ideologist through his discourse, like the Neoconservatives today, he was, in reality, much less liberal. If his logic of the Fourteen Points, creating the right for nations to get selfdetermination had indeed been applied to break up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the same right was not given to the Palestinians in his presidential speech in Chicago on March 2, 1919.25 Because the Zionist project at the time was supported by the American President, the principles, even though they were proclaimed out loud, could not be applied. No more so than the principle of self-determinationin the past, democracy today is not respected. An intellectual relation takes the “democratic crusaders” back to a political tradition that existed long before neoconservatism. President Bush has many things in common with his illustrious predecessor which we shall present throughout our analysis. “It would be ironical if my administration had to devote a lot of time to foreign policy” declared Wilson. For the meantime it is simply worth remembering that George W. Bush was elected president with an extremely minimal foreign policy program. In 2000, only three of his campaign speeches referred to the question. The link, or the analogies between the two men are not necessarily extremely important and many major differences could be highlighted (the former is the father of the League of Nations and an advocate of collective security, the latter sees himself as a fierce opponent of the UN). However they do bare light on neoconservative temperament and projects since they supported the man and follow the same line, even if amended for reasons of “hopeless naivety” according to Max Boot.26 This aspect introduces a specific connection between nationalism and internationalism, basing the latter on the former, which is particularly heuristic in the case of the neoconservatives. According to Robert Kagan, “the Americans have always been internationalists […] but their internationalism has always been a by-product of their nationalism.”27 at the end of the war, there were more Americans fighting under the English flag than for Washington, which presents the American Civil War as a logical follow up for a nation based on contradictions. 24 Michael Adas, “From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon: Integrating the Exceptionalist Narrative of the American Experience into World History”, The American Historical Review, Vol. 106, No. 5, December 2001, pp. 1692-1720. 25 Phyllis Bennis, Before and After. US Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis, New York, Olive Branch Press, 2003, p. 24. 26 Max Boot, “Neocons”, Foreign Policy, January/February 2004. 27 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the New World Order, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, p. 88.

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The neoconservatives are definitively nationalists. For example, in 2004, Gertrude Himmelfarb, wife of Irving Kristol and mother of William, the present editor of the Weekly Standard, published a criticism of modernity, accusing the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the source of a “liberal imagination that cannot support nationalism […] and represents finally one of the most obtuse visions of the world possible”.28 Such nationalism affects the imperial project in at least two ways, which represent the paradox of the Wilsonian affirmation taken up by Bush’s aides: it reflects both a refusal to recognize the other cultural zones, a result of ideological distortion, and a desire to change the world. The two aspects reveal in turn the ideological character of this nationalism. According to Hannah Arendt, ideology is nothing more than what it says it is: the logic of an idea;29 a system of senses that is closed in upon itself. The contrary of critical thinking in as much as it sees in itself a sixth sense, an omni-explanatory truth above all others. As the logic behind an idea, it pretends to be able to explain everything of the real by pure deduction. It is impossible to forge, incontestable. To apply such an intellectual process to imperial nationalism explains the rejection of otherness which in turn explains the lack of neoconservative attention paid to Arab-Muslim experts. The one and only truth surrounding the Muslim world is in the hands of Professor Bernard Lewis. For Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan Administration and member of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Commission from 1987 to 2004: “to talk to Bernard Lewis is like going to Delphi to hear the oracle”.30 The ideological dimension also takes into consideration the paradoxical relation the neoconservatives have with his ideas. Are they realists in the Kissinger tradition, in favor of a strict and sometimes aggressive defense in the interests of the nation as they understand it, or intellectuals who wish to see more ideas enter foreign policy decisions? To answer this question, let us refer to the words of Adam Garfinkle: “Neo-conservatives are realists for whom all utopian ideologies are anathema, except their own”31 Concerning these ideas, Irving Kristol acknowledges the monopolistic position of the neoconservatives to invalidate all objections from the intellectuals because 28  Gertrude Himmelfarb, Roads to Modernity: the British, French and American Enlightments, New York, Knopf, 2004. Quoted in Ghassan Salamé, Quand l’Amérique refait le monde, op. cit., p. 157. 29  For the notion of ideology, cf. Hannah Arendt, Les origines du totalitarisme, t.3: Le système totalitaire, translated by J-L. Bourget, R. Davreux and P. Lévy, Paris, Seuil, 1972. 30  Quoted in Ghassan Salamé, Quand l’Amérique refait le monde, op. cit, p. 442. For more on the influence of Bernard Lewis, see pp. 441-60. 31  Adam Garfinkle, “The Impossible Imperative?” in The National Interest, Fall 2002, pp. 156-167.

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“no modern nation has ever constructed a foreign policy that was acceptable to its intellectuals”.32 He who highlights the particularities of the societies targeted by the distant expeditions advocated by the neoconservatives or the limits of a purely military presence would be stigmatized as “culturalist”, or even “racist”. Their ideology challenges or denies the real. Hence it is a question of transforming it, which gives nationalism its imperial dimension. Irving Kristol explains: Patriotism has its origins in the love one has for a nation’s past: nationalism is born from the hope one has for the future, for the greatness that distinguishes it from others.

He is portraying a specific form of nationalism, different from patriotism that he judges backward-looking and conservative, because of its desire to transform the world. [The neoconservatives] believe that the goal of American foreign policy must go well beyond a narrow, too literal definition of “national security”. It is the national interest of a world power, as it is defined by a sense of national destiny, that American foreign policy is about, not a myopic national security.33

Now let us look at second aspect, the desire to transform the world of pure Wilsonian style. President Bush’ senior adviser sometimes could not be clearer: We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality ….we’ll act again, creating other new realities.34

Following his nomination, he chose to depose Saddam Hussein just as Wilson had chosen, for the first foreign military operation, to depose the Mexican president, Victoriano Huerta, in the name of democracy. He acted without justifying himself, for the good of the Mexicans, and for Mexicans only, since the other Latin American countries were just as despotic at the time. He was already an adept in the selective changing of regimes, according to the neoconservative Robert W. Tucker.35 It is also worth mentioning that this practice reveals in the two men a primate for national sovereignty whereas the others are subjected to a right to interfere. For Ghassan Salamé, there is a dialectic according to which American 32  Quoted in John Bolton, “The Prudent Irishman: Edmund Burke’s realism”, The National Interest, Winter 1997-1998. 33 Irving Kristol, Reflections of a Neo-conservative, New York, Basic Books, 1983, p. XIII. See also by the same author, Neo-Conservatism, Autobiography of an Idea, New York, Free Press, 1994. 34  Ron Suskind in the New York Times Magazine 17 October 2004. 35  Robert W. Tucker, “Woodrow Wilson’s “New Diplomacy””, World Policy Journal, Summer 2004.

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nationalism needs to be imperial just as the imperial policy at work needs the support of militant nationalism.36 Something we shall return to later, but clear proof of the American desire to transform, we can evoke the fundamental transformation of the military machine into a “power projection” machine.37 For Jack Snyder, such strategic choices can be related to the two other beliefs that are characteristic to empires. On the one hand, threat is considered a weapon that can bring the enemy to order via intimidation and even rally new allies. On the other hand, the axiom “attack is the best form of defense” best sums up the principle. The strategic visions proposed by the neoconservatives clearly correspond to the pseudo-imperial nationalism we have described. All said and done, let us now return to our analysis of American history as seen by a majority of neoconservatives. We shall see that Wilsonism also had its time in the wilderness. A Major Tradition in American History in Spite of the Rooseveltian Parenthesis The historical tradition, which could be taken back as far as the 1812 war and which is so close to the neoconservative vision, was pushed aside somewhat by the consequences of the Second World War. Franklin Roosevelt applied his more cooperative Pan-American vision of the “Good Neighbour Policy” to the world. However, the shock resulting from the Vietnam fiasco and the subsequent criticism from the left sparked off a reaction among the ranks of the American right and center. Consequently, the current neoconservatives, who at the time were on the center-left of the political scene, were party to the movement. Following the parenthesis opened by Roosevelt, there was a return to the original tradition. We could consider that two schools of thought concerning American foreign policy transcended the post-Vietnam right-left divide. On the one hand, those who felt the United States should accept total responsibility for the Vietnam fiasco and who believed the United States had not the means to protect the rest of the world, or even to be the “protector” of the world’s strategic zones. On the other hand, others refused to believe in the decline of American authority or the need for assistance from the rest of the world. This position grouped together a wide spectrum of opinions from across the political board: from centerleft interventionists to the neoconservatives, via the “assertive nationalists”. They were also supportive of American exceptionalism, strength and the capacity to project their country’s values and weapons throughout the world, to defend its vision and/or interests, both of which were thought to be compatible. Concerning the imperial issue, it is futile to try to distinguish the “assertive nationalists” and the democratic-imperialist as is traditionally the case. Both 36  Ghassan Salamé, Quand l’Amérique refait le monde, op. cit., p. 40. 37 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 127.

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schools of thought are thoroughly supportive of an imperial and conquering America. Of course, as stated by Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay,38 the former are in favor of the use of force to gain respect as a world leader, without necessarily seeking to obtain the democratization of the enemy State for the good of the population. However the differences end as soon as one considers the geopolitical perspectives, and the convergence of positions concerning the pseudo-imperial policies remains, as demonstrated by the reflections referring to the Gulf States by the neoconservative Tucker. The difference is in fact so hazy that it is not rare to hear Cheney or Rumsfeld referred to as neoconservatives, which they have never been. However, it is understandable since both men have been linked to neoconservative think tanks and because of their positions during the 1990s which were perfectly representative of the assertive nationalists. This imperialistic ideological “block” based its analysis on two major key subjects: the expression according to which “energy security is national security”39 and the idea, related to the first, that the United States have to see itself as a power above all others, ready to take responsibilities that are equal to their world ranking. Here, the image of the neoconservatives as democracy-loving idealists shadowed their interest for oil and other resources that are vital for the economy and American supremacy. Traces of this urgent interest can be found as far back as the 1970s: Tucker’s article “Oil, the Issue of American Intervention”40 is in many ways the text-manifesto of the imperialist American vision. The article clearly links imperial action on another territory and the defense of access to the Arabic oil fields whether the local population wants it or not. Another slightly masked but highly relevant example comes from the second half of the 1970s when Paul Wolfowitz, one of the neoconservatives the most involved in American foreign policy decisions, was requested by the chief of staff at the Pentagon, Harold Brown, to analyze the possibilities of destabilizing the Soviet Union from the South. Wolfowitz, under the influence of a young expert of the Middle East, Geoffrey Kemp,41 quickly began to understand the problems that could arise for the American Empire if, for some reason, the Gulf oil wells were targeted. He underlined their importance, not only in relation to the Soviet threat: and so began the Iraq issue which quickly became a personal obsession that proved contagious for the whole movement during the decades that followed. In his analysis, “The Limited Contingency Study”, Paul Wolfowitz points out that Iraq could represent a danger for the Arabic peninsula due to the ideological proximity of the Ba’th party with Pan-Arabism, too far from Washington, too close to Moscow (particularly concerning the sale of weapons), and too strong 38 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “Debating the Exit Strategy”, Center for American Progress, 12 November 2003, article available at: www.americanprogress.org. 39 Expression used by the Energy Secretary Abraham, in 2002. 40  Robert W. Tucker, “Oil, The Issue of American Intervention”, Commentary, Vol. 59, No. 1, January 1975, pp. 21-31. 41 At the time a member of the prestigious Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

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on a military level for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, two key oil producing States. At this time, Saddam Hussein was just a rising star who had little blood on his hands and the gassing of the Kurds was not an issue that could be raised.42 However, in the eyes of one key neoconservative and others around him, Baghdad was already considered a threat that needed taking care of. Obviously this was for reasons of energy and a strategy to guarantee access to the oil reserves. Even if today this argument is swept aside for reasons of supportive gain,43 clearly for the imperialist camp the factor was far from irrelevant. When confronted with this analysis, the pragmatics or moderates, like Kissinger or Nixon, could not reject the importance of the question of oil. However, they took into consideration the lessons learnt from the Vietnam War and believed that the roads to the oil fields could not be protected by the United States alone. So, they counted on the support of their main local ally, the Shah of Iran. The American-Persian security alliance was the symbol par excellence of American pragmatism, aimed at using local powers for each region to help guarantee the security of their respective zones. In total contradiction with them and with the military hierarchy at the time, the imperialists, with Wolfowitz at their head, promoted the need for a total reorganization of the American army to transform it into an efficient and unique police force for the Persian Gulf. History lent itself to prove them right with the 1979 Islamic Revolution which took the various American Ministries and services by surprise. The shock it produced on public opinion and the American elite prompted support for Wolfowitz’s approach. There then followed the creation of The Rapid Deployment Forces and Carter’s doctrine pronounced in the following terms: Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.44

This resulted in the creation of the CENTCOM, the United States Central Command which was responsible for the Persian Gulf.

42 This does not mean attributing all the responsibility to Saddam Hussein nor even to begin doing so, but rather to point out that this argument, however valid it may be, can still not be raised and used against him. 43 One of the great leitmotifs of the anti-war movement was the slogan “no blood for oil”. However, to reduce the last war in Iraq to a simple question of oil is too easy, and it is unthinkable that this one issue would have been enough to spark off military intervention. Nonetheless, the oil issue can not be totally discarded because it has been used excessively in a certain partisan rhetoric. 44  “State of the Union”, President Jimmy Carter, 21 January 1980.

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Following this victory over the pragmatics, the neoconservatives and other supporters of the American Empire declared themselves opposed to the “Declinists”, another branch of the American moderates. The latter cited Paul Kennedy’s work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987), which won over both the Democrats and the Republicans. Its message is the following: with the end of the Cold War, Washington has become something of a fading star. The foreign commitments of the past will be extremely negative for the American Budget. The imperial overstretch has already been the ruin of other empires in the past, for example Spain in the 16th century and Great Britain in the 19th century. It would be true to say that the events of the 1990s would tend to support Kennedy’s point of view. During the 1992 presidential campaign for example it was not rare to hear a candidate speak out against the huge cost of the Cold War with the now famous phrase: “The Cold War is over. Japan won”.45 The Yen was strong while the Dollar was falling.46 And yet the neoconservatives and all the key figures close to Bush today (Rice, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Armitage, etc.) positioned themselves against the theories presented in the book, then a best-seller. And once again, History took the path of the neoconservative movement: the United States proved to be stronger than some imagined and Japan went through a terrible economic crisis in the 1990s. Between this period and September 11, 2001, the “imperialist” theories progressively gained ground. This is why some writers speak of an imperial America immediately following the Cold War.47 The notion of policing the world was generally accepted during this period and the neoconservatives increasingly promoted an imperialistically inspired notion of foreign policy. For example the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) of February 1992, prepared by the neoconservative Wolfowitz for his hierarchical superior, the “assertive nationalist” Dick Cheney, was considered the basis of the new post-Cold War and post 9/11 American doctrine. It presents the preservation of Washington’s dominant position in the face of other nations of the world as one of the key objectives. The document explains the necessity to: Prevent any hostile power from dominating any zone whose resources could, once under control, be used to create a world super power.48

Once again, the capacity to impose its strength, notably by military force, anywhere in the world, and the defense of oil resources are one and the same thing for the neoconservatives and their allies. It is this desire for imperial power, associated 45 Robert D. Schulzinger, “The End of the Cold War, 1961-1991”, OAH Magazine of History, Winter 1994. 46  James Mann, op. cit., p. 160. 47 See in particular Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire, the Reality and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002. 48 Michael Klare, Blood and Oil, London, Penguin Books, 2004, p. 68.

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with a concern for the protection of the empire’s economic interests, outlined in these pages, which determine George W. Bush’s decisions: Wolfowitz’s influence became clear during the speech given at the “Citadelle”, the Charleston Military Academy on September 23, 1999. The future President confirmed his intention to give the army the means to police the world, notably by reorganizing military structures for greater projection towards strategic zones. The same position can be found in the Quadrennial Defense Review of September 2001. There are frequent references to the “revolution in military affairs”. At the same time the essential is often absent, the presentation of the capacity of American military projection as an absolute necessity. Moreover, the major oil producing regions are presented as “crucial points” that the American army could be called upon to invade. This direction coincides with the Cheney Energy Task Force of 2001 which, far from seeking to stop America’s increasing dependence on oil importations, confirms the need to accelerate foreign production. The main idea behind the Plan was to advise the government to always ensure the United States have the capacity to obtain the resources it needs from abroad, while at the same time justifying the use of force, if and when needed. More generally, when analyzing the evolution of America over the past fifteen years, it becomes clear that the pseudo-imperial approach as defined by the neoconservatives has become a reality. Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s analysis,49 presenting his country as an informal empire, remains valid, the world’s leading power having all the necessary instruments of imperial policies at its disposition, from equipment to local collaborators, ready to work with the proconsuls or representatives that Washington designates.50 Indeed, they have 725 military bases in 130 countries under their control, not including the secret ones,51 and their defense budget is greater than that of the fifteen leading industrial nations.52 The United States are not an empire that reigns over territories, but an “empire of bases”53 corresponding to the simplest definition of the imperial mission, in other words, to exercise control and assert the power of the homeland in those zones where the bases are to be found.54 This continuity in relation to the Cold War hides a new and clearly imperial conception of the bases. As instruments of contention for more than half a century, they become outposts within the framework of a policy of intervention and for the possible changing of regimes in the countries 49 Born in 1917, historian and advisor to President Kennedy. One of the fey figures behind anti-communist political liberalism, particularly via the ADA, Americans for Democratic Action. One of the pillars of the Vital Center, the political forerunner of neoconservatism. 50 See James Chase, “In Search of Absolute Security”, in The Imperial Tense…, op. cit., p. 120. 51  Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire ..., op. cit., p. 4. 52  James Chase, “In Search of Absolute Security”, op. cit. 53  Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire … op. cit., p. 159. 54 Ibid., p. 28.

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concerned. However, unlike Rome, the American military bases in Iraq operate in isolation, cut off from the outside world and do not seek to open up to the outside world to actualize this crucial divergence. The need for unparalleled military power, a commitment to perpetuate American supremacy for as long as possible and the implementation of this supremacy via a plan of global action are the three key elements which received the consensus of the American authorities following the Cold War.55 Clinton adopted them reluctantly. The neoconservatives asserted them vehemently. The new defense policy of the United States allies a wish for nationalist sanctity as illustrated by Bush’s revival of the National Missile Defense56 and increased interventionism, which go hand in hand. Indeed, the defense of the national territory reduces the capacity for projection, but this will be less the case once the shield has been completed. Finally, we should point out that this empire with its universal ambitions is expanding via a paradoxical movement which allows it to remain centered upon itself in a defensive movement, for example the Iraqi bases which remain hermetic to the outside, on the contrary to the previous Roman empire, and the wish to reduce the number of American troops employed abroad. It naturally opposes the emergence of rival powers. Clinton’s policies in relation to Russia were subjected to public obloquy by the neoconservatives; the magazine Commentary accused the democratic president of being overly tolerant in the face of the reaffirmation of a neo-imperial Russia,57 which shall be the subject of the following chapter.

55 Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire …, op. cit., p. 128. 56 The National Missile Defense Act was adopted by Congress in July 1999, in other words before the election of Bush to the presidency. However, the Republicans have had a majority in Congress since the 1994 legislative elections. More importantly, it was the Bush administration that supported the project the most. For an assessment of this initiative, cf. Nicolas de Boisgrollier, “La défense antimissile américaine: science ou fiction?”, Questions internationales No. 20, July/August 2006, pp. 97-103. 57  George Weigel, “Creeping Talbottism”, Commentary, Vol. 97, No. 3, March 1994.

Chapter 5

The Empire, Neo-eurasianists and Russian Nationalism From the small territory of the Principality of Moscow, Russia underwent a rapid and continual territorial expansion hitherto unknown in modern times: during the three centuries of the Romanov dynasty, it expanded with an average growth of 140 km² per day. The renowned Westernist historian and economist Vasili Klyuchevski (1841-1911) noted the extent to which the imperial process was at the heart of the state-controlled development of the country: “the history of Russia is the history of a nation that is colonizing itself. The space of colonization spread at the same time as the territory of the State”. The abolition of serfdom in 1861 strengthened this movement, freeing the peasants to allow the populations to migrate beyond the Volga and the Caspian Sea, particularly into Siberia. The Russian exception can be found in what Russia suffers from, again according to Klyuchevski; “an unlikely relation between State foreign policy and the domestic progresses of its people”. The will to stand out as a strong European nation, then to become a world superpower shaped, for many experts, Russian contemporary history. It is worth remembering this when considering the conditions in which the neo-eurasianists thought up their vision of Empire. Moreover, Moscow exerted centralized domination over its periphery and tried, with the help of authoritarian regimes, to maintain law and order throughout  Michel Heller, Histoire de la Russie et de son empire, Paris, Plon, 1997, p. 573.   Kliuchevski is notably the author of Kurs russkoi istorii [The course of Russian History], written at the start of the century and a reference for Russian economic history. However, he only slightly refers to the Asian and Mongol dimension of Russia, which eurasianists such as Vernadsky criticise him for. See Michael Karpovich, “Klyuchevski and Recent Trends in Russian Historiography”, Slavonic and East European Review. American Series, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1943, pp. 31-9.   Quoted in Jean-Louis Buer, La Russie, Paris, Le Cavalier Bleu, 2001, p. 29. Our Translation. It is unfortunate that, according to Michael Karpovich, he did not persevere with the thinking behind the quotation since he only uses it infrequently when dealing with the period around the birth of the empire. He does not deal with the development of border regions nor the problems of imperial administration of the period. Michael Karpovich, “Klyuchevski and Recent Trends in Russian Historiography”, op. cit., p. 38.   Quoted in Georges Sokoloff, Métamorphose de la Russie, 1984-2004, Paris, Fayard, 2003, p. 11. Our translation.   See for example Ûrij Baženov, “Priznak imperii” [Characteristics of Empire], Zavtra, No. 51 (631), 21 December 2005.

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the newly gained territories. The expansionism was truly the result of an assumed political will, and the account of this imperial adventure fits in with our definition of the last distinctive characteristic of empire. But neo-eurasianism does not correspond entirely to our definition of empire and comes closer to the status of regional hegemony. It claims to be a philosophy for multi-polar globalization and calls upon a massive movement for the construction of an original and authentic world, in which each element comes organically from historical traditions and local cultures. It is in no way similar to the hyperpowerrelated movement qualified as “atlanticist”. As neo-eurasianist, Russia represents the first historical power within a determined zone, and maintains the desire to lead a revolt against “Atlanticism” and“globalization”. From this point of view, while the “atlanticists” are supporters of “globalization”, the universalization of life-styles, the neo-eurasianists defend a system of provincialism referring to a given territory which, consequently, corresponds more to hegemony: its maximum sphere of extension being limited by the “Eurasian Steppe” area. Finally, the division of the world into ontologically incompatible civilizations is in total contradiction with the universal scope of the empire. The neo-eurasianist concept of empire presents a desire for the restoration of identity based on a form of nationalism that could be defined as hegemonic. The national political community could rediscover its lost glory via such a project, by reintroducing the notion of empire. Neo-eurasianist Attempts to Recreate a Hegemonic Calling The perception of empire, for the eurasianists at the start of the twentieth century, corresponded to original considerations of a cultural order. This singularity was not so much due to of the fact of considering itself as an empire; Russia had never existed in the form of a Western-style Nation-State, but rather to its very definition. From the very outset, we noticed the extent to which neo-eurasianism, like the original eurasianism, corresponded to a reasoning that refers to a specific region whose boundaries are close to those of the former Tsarist Empire of the Soviet Union. Trubetskoy also pointed out that Eurasia was separated from Europe and Asia by economic, ethnic and geographical specificities. To a certain extent, as he wrote: “the Russians inherited their empire from the Mongols”, since the

 See in particular Alexander Dugin in Osnovy geopolitiki, part 6, chapter 2, available at: http://www.geopolitika.ru/geop13.htm#2.   Nikolai S. Trubetskoy, “Pan-Eurasian Nationalism” in The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity, Ann Arbor, Michigan Slavic Publication, 1991, p. 220.   Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, La Russie inachevée, Paris, Fayard, 2000, p. 64. Our translation.

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expansion all the way to the Pacific followed the Eurasian plains: which was to have represented one enormous State. Indeed, from a eurasianist perspective, the physical layout of the territory conditioned the historical movements and the encounters between the different populations led to the creation of a large State. Trubetskoy saw the 1917 Revolution as the official end to the Russian Empire and the acceptance of a “Eurasian” identity, which encompassed it all. We could almost use the term transcended which shows all the ambiguity of Trubetskoy’s concept of “Pan-Eurasian Nationalism”. It strived towards the status of empire via a desire to regenerate identities and its associative objective which it took from the success of the imperial expansion: according to him, with the notable exception of Chechnya in the 19th century, it took place without practically any resistance. However, it remains within the category of geo-cultural nationalism which represents its fundamental limit. Consequently, the eurasianists moved away from the 19th century Russian historians who explained expansionism as the need to gather together all the lands that had been at one time or another included in the national territory, and also the Marxists who explained it as the need to conquer new zones to provide openings for the new activities resulting from industrial and commercial expansion. Trubetskoy presented the deep-rooted unity of the imperial Tsarist domain in a new light: Eurasia could represent the messianic version of a movement for world liberation that resists Romano Germanic Western domination. Thus, eurasianism believes in the idea that Moscow has a mission to fulfill in the world, but not so much in the form of a “Third Rome” but rather in the form of a new civilization that has the role of a liberator. Therefore the history of Russia is linked to the Eurasian continent, and its rare incursions outside its own territory were short lived: Alexander I refused to protect Hawaii in 1812 while Alexander II sold Alaska to the United States in 1867. The continental empire owes much to Peter the Great who boosted imperial changes while modernizing the State and the nation. Eurasianists and neo-eurasianists took up these various motives which they subsequently restructured: the restoration of an imperial movement, the modernization of the State and nation. The Tsar’s attempt to transform Russian political identity meant it was necessary to reconsider the nation’s geopolitics, which wanted to become both more European10 and to continue its eastward expansion into Asia. The eurasianists and their successors, as mentioned above, rejected all links with Europe that would compromise the Asian dimension of the continent.11 As explained by the celebrated   Nikolai S. Trubetskoy, “Pan-Eurasian Nationalism”, op. cit., pp. 233-67, here, pp. 233-34. 10 It was around this time that Peter the Great’s geographer, Vasily Tatishchev, separated European Russia and Asian Russia through the Urals, to secure Russia to the European continent 11  See Mark Bassin, “Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space”, Slavic Review, Vol. 50, No. 1, Spring 1991, pp. 1-17.

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Eurasian geographer and economist Savitski in a text published in 1921 (Povorot k Vostoku, [An Eastward turning point]), Russia is not only “West” but also “East”, not only “Europe” but also “Asia”, in fact not “Europe” at all but “Eurasia”.

The very same Savitski noted that there was no physical border between Europe and Asia: he suggested that Eurasia could represent a separate continent, based on the juxtaposition of certain ecological zones and a system of key waterways. By borrowing Montesquieu’s theory of climates, from The Spirit of Laws, the neoeurasianists proposed, and continue to do so even today, that to the homogeneity of the climate that prevails in Northern Eurasia, there should be a corresponding highly centralized regime.12 The imperial tradition the neo-eurasianists found their ideas on is therefore based also, or even more so, on an outwardly political dimension: not being able to come to a satisfactory definition of its identity, Russia, an eminently political nation, developed by regularly giving itself specific missions. The Tsars wanted to gather together the Russian lands, to protect the Orthodox religion and the Slavic peoples. Ivan III (1440-1505), shortly after his accession to the throne, married Sophia Paleologue, a descendant of the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine XI. Then, with the collapse of the Byzantine Empire (following the fall of Constantinople in 1453), Moscow became the “Third Rome”; it was at this time that the nation, and the Tsar, adopted all the finery of the sacred, to incarnate the “Saint Russia” so dear to the Slavophiles. Its new role as defender of the Orthodox Church became apparent in reference to the Sublime Porte, the Ottoman Empire, which included a number of “brothers” in need of liberating.13 The Tsars of the 19th century thus defined for their country an ethno-religious mission which was to defend the Slavs and the Orthodox, and another specifically ideological anti-revolutionary and anti-republican one, making them the policing force for Europe. This messianism became the fulcrum for any imperial inclinations and justified, when necessary, the use of force. Then came Bolshevism that represented universal messianism since the regime, according to Marxist-Leninist ideology, represented Reason for the good of the world. Fortified by this supreme mission, the USSR had to stand up to the world powers, and not just European, until its fall. In this light, eurasianism, and even more so neo-eurasianism, want to be recognized as an intellectual synthesis between “Saint Russia” and the former nationalist messianism, the Bolshevik experience and world power.14 In reality, 12  See G. Gačev, “Kosmos severa evrazii – i Rossiâ kak imperia” [The space of Northern Eurasia and Russia as Empire], Zavtra, No. 42 (517), 15 October 2003. 13  The invasion of Istanbul, “Tsarigrad” for the Russians, still figures among Nicolas II’s wartime objectives in 1914. 14 Boris Gubman, “The neo-Eurasian Temptation: Religion and Politics. Part 1: Eurasians and Neo-Eurasians; Religion, Culture and Politics”, Radio Free Europe/Radio

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neo-eurasianism has adopted many elements of traditional nationalism, whose complexity requires some clarification.15 They were supporters of imperialism rather than isolationism; in other words, for them, the empire represents an extension of the nation. They are nostalgic for the former USSR, not out of Marxist-Leninist atavism, but in the name of the power the Soviet Union had at its disposal. In the internal debate that has animated the pro-nationalist movements for centuries; they are more in favor of the East than the West. Finally, they give more importance to the State than to Russian culture as an ethnic group in itself: thus it is a form of centripetal rather than centrifugal nationalism. It represents the account of a geopolitical project that wants to be liberating and that supports the idea of a national power. It is this fundamental ambiguity of the synthesis or the incompatibility of the terms that need to be reconciled that explains our reluctance to use the concept of empire which would be better suited to a form of universal communism. The purely reactive and defensive character of expansionism leads us to finally adopt hegemony, in so much as an empire that believes it is under siege becomes anxious and protective and in so doing loses the historical calling it once had to become a power with conservative designs. Such hegemonic nationalism develops due to the fear of decline and foreign interference. The risk of a State breaking up is very present among the neo-eurasianists, as can be seen in the speech given by Yevgeny Primakov for his investiture as Prime Minister on September 14, 1998: “today there is a serious threat that our country falls apart” he announced. The role of neo-eurasianism therefore is to transform a State that has doubts as to its survival into a power that will go down in history: in a sense, the fact of assigning a supreme mission is like giving the State a certain impulsion to accomplish it. The ambiguity of the neo-eurasianists as regards the empire can be found here: they speak of an emancipating vocation, but such a project is based on an essentially defensive mobile: the traditional fear of decline which most often leads to remobilizing the figures of a past glory. This final aspect and the particularly composite character of neo-eurasianist discourse suggests that empire, other than the fact that it designates more a hegemony, constitutes an instrument at the service of a policy of power rather than a common and transmissible soul of a community seeking to expand. What is more, the historical movement the neo-eurasianists call for would appear incompatible with that of the empire. The perspective of a transformation of the world it announces falls more within the domain of a conservative revolution that is likely to restore a past power more than a collective accomplishment through palingenesia. The political strategy and the tension around a power that is losing

Liberty, East European Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 1, 7 January 2004. 15  Concerning the need for these distinctions, cf. Isabelle Grimberg, “La nationalisme russe, une catégorie en débat” in Gil Delannoi and Pierre-André Taguieff, (eds), Nationalismes en perspective, Paris, Berg International Editeurs, 2001, pp. 63-116, p. 76.

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“Near abroad” The term “near abroad” was first used at the end of 1993. It means that all the post-Soviet countries represent a “vital sphere of interest” whose links, human, historical and economic, justify a preponderant influence from Russia as heir of the USSR. In 1991, some 25 million Russians lived outside the national territory which continued to watch over its coethnic populations. In fact, Moscow even requested the status of “regional police” for peace keeping reasons. As a result, a series of bi- or multilateral agreements were signed with other CIS States allowing Russia to maintain a number of military bases outside its national territory. Whereas the political independence of the post-Soviet States is not questioned, the principal of a new integration, at least economic, or even strategic, needs considering. Once again this refers to Russia desire for association, and its imperial project – a near abroad is not and can not be indefinitely extendable. This attachment to a policy of “near abroad” demonstrates that the hegemonic ideology and nationalism have reappeared, as the results of the ultra-nationalist Party of Zhirinovsky at the 1993 legislative elections show: almost one quarter of the votes. The return of the importance of Russia has received almost unanimous support since the arrival of Putin who has battled to strengthen State efficiency to the detriment of democratization and civil liberties, and to win back a maximum of influence among the former Republics. In June 2004 at the Lev Gumilev University in Kazakstan, Putin did not hesitate to declare that Gumilev’s ideas were beginning to gain support. He thereby reaffirmed the role of Russia as the leader in the reintegration of the eurasianist zone and his desire to “restore what was lost” with the USSR.a The Russian military doctrine of October 2004 even includes the possibility of pre-emptive strikes in the post-soviet zone. See “Putin says CIS seeks to ‘restore what was lost’ with Soviet collapse…”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Vol. 8, No. 115, 18 June 2004. a

control take the wind out of the imperial vocation. Only empires in decline continue their expansion in a move to defend or preserve themselves. The fear of interference comes from the fact that the Kremlin was obsessed with distancing any risk of potential invasion as far away from its center as possible; the memory of past invasions forged an obsidianal complex, of confinement, the country having battled against the West, the Chinese and the Muslims on all sides. This under-siege mentality was strengthened by the attempted Germanic and Napoleonic invasions, the war against the creation of a Soviet power following World War I, and particularly the brutality of the attacks led by Hitler’s troops. The fear of decline and foreign interference in its former Soviet territory explains

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the difficulty for Moscow to conceive relations with what it refers to as its “near abroad”, even more so since the former metropolis continues to leave its mark on the eurasianist era.16 The neo-eurasianists affirm that Russia applies an imperial rather than imperialist policy, once again demonstrating the depreciative posterity of the concept of imperialism; they prefer to use the term to stigmatize the Atlanticist enemy.17 It can only successfully carry out its mission as an empire, after having revitalized national conscience and strengthened the State. To renounce the empire would be to renounce national identity: as Prokhanov says: “the Russian political idea is nothing without an imperial mission”.18 Imperial polity, as understood by the eurasianists and their successors, belongs to a tradition of tolerance towards the smaller nations which tends to justify union and reject the desire for independence and separatism. For the neo-eurasianists, Russia was not a “prison of the peoples” to employ a term used by Lenin: it was far from representing a dominant power within the empire; its citizens were even an exploited ethnic group.19 As the neo-eurasianist Mufti Tadzhuddin puts it: Even if it has been long said and suggested that Tsarist Russia was a prison for the peoples, in Tsarist Russia, during the autocracy, there were Muslim regiments, with Imams in the regiments, among the troops, and here, in the capital of our fatherland, during the war against Napoleon, the Muslim regiments resisted, where the Mosque today stands.20

This myth,21 which has its roots in the Tsarist past, bears the seeds of the notion of “friendship of the peoples” from Soviet propaganda. Strengthened by its victory over the Golden Horde, Russia became a pole of attraction for other populations such as the Tatars, the Votyaks and various other Uralian peoples, without however totally “Russianizing” them. Thus the empire combines a way of being 16 As mentioned by the geographer Jean Radvanyi, La Nouvelle Russie, Paris, Armand Colin, 2000, p. 21-5. 17 Alexander Dugin, “Imperializm ili “imperia”” [Imperialism or Empire], 31 August 2003, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=14 31 Our translation. 18  Alexander Prokhanov, “imâ imperii – Rossiâ” [The name of the Empire - Russia], Zavtra, No. 27 (554), 30 June 2004. Our translation. 19  Û. Osipov, “Russkaâ imperskost’” [The meaning of the Russian Empire], Zavtra, No. 42 (517), 15 October 2003. The author points out that the empire continues to exist as a decisive capacity to influence, veiled, immaterial, with no self proclaimed territory. The Empire is therefore not a phantom of the past, but a present reality. 20  Talgat Tadzhuddin, “Nas bsevyšnij svâzal celikom” [Our God has completely bound us], 21 April 2001, available at: http://evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file= article&sid=735. Our translation. 21  The myth has nothing of a mystification but is a major founding account of a common past.

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which includes the whole Eurasian Diaspora, without any territorial distinction; it aims at going beyond the stage of the Nation-States to develop a new form of associative sovereignty. From this angle, it resembles a foedus or alliance that could be conceived in an imperial system. As Dugin’s neo-eurasianist party doctrine states: in the place of Nation-States, new political forms must emerge, to combine the strategic unification of the large continental zones with the multi-dimensional complex system of national, cultural and economic autonomies. Some characteristics of such an organization of zones and peoples can be observed in former empires (for example of Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, etc.) and in the more recent political structures (European Union, CIS).22

All that remains now is the question of the basis and meta-political dimension behind this quest for identity. The spiritualist orientation that was at the origin of the initial eurasianist movement can be found to varying degrees, with their successors. Alexander Panarin, for example, a philosopher and member of the Academy of Sciences, sought to spiritually rehabilitate the notion of empire: unlike a chauvinistic imperialism, it is the only system that is able to meet the challenges of “post-modern” societies, and to claim historical legitimacy in Eurasia.23 In the face of the proclaimed “cosmopolitanism” of the West, Panarin put forward the concept of civilization as a means of access to the universal. In his opinion, Russian identity during the Tsarist period was based not on Ethnocentrism but rather on a confessional and civilizational tradition, which in turn was a legacy from Greek Orthodoxy.24 Thereby, the empire receives religious legitimacy which fostered reflection on Russia and its political “essence”.25 Again according to Panarin, Moscow should lean on religion, with humanity moving towards the rehabilitation of spiritual values in the face of a “materialistic” West.26 And so, logically, Eastern Christianity must form an alliance with the Muslim world, underlining the rejection of materialism that unites them.27 This new “spiritual” 22  “The eurasianist vision. Principles of the eurasianist doctrinal platform”, October 1, 2004, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid= 758. Our translation. 23  Marlène Laruelle, “Le néo-eurasisme russe. L’empire après l’empire?”, Cahiers du Monde russe, Vol. 42, No. 1, January-March 2001, pp. 71-94, see pp. 72 and 80-85. 24 Alexander Panarin, Pravoslavnaâ civilizaciâ v global’nom mire [Orthodox civilization in a globalized world], Moscow, Algoritm, 2002. 25 Ibid., p. 80. 26  See Marlène Laruelle, “The Two Faces of Contemporary Eurasianism: An Imperial Version of Russian Nationalism”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2004, p. 121. 27 Alexander Panarin, Revanš istorii : rossijskaâ strategičeskaâ iniciativa v 21 veke [History’s revenge: the strategic initiative of Russia in the 21st century], Moscow, Logos, 1998.

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path that Russia is following allows it to once again adopt a pioneering or messianic role,28 to reintegrate the course of history by shedding off the dominant materialism to prove that the West and its supporters are on the wrong path. However the civilizational referent, confined to a specific zone, constitutes the limit of the compatibility between Panarin’s thinking and the concept of empire we have presented. We should also add that he does not have the political backing other neo-euarasianists benefit from who, even if they propose an equally culturalist aspect, lean on more strategic and geopolitical considerations. Neo-eurasianism: A Narrow Geopolitical Vision of Empire Over and above its philosophical and cultural dimension, neo-eurasianism, particularly under the influence of Dugin, claims to have the backing of a scientific corpus, which explains its desire to include geopolitics in order to justify its hegemonic nationalism. This clearly differentiates the neo-eurasianists from their forefathers. Whereas eurasianist philosophy rejected the Romano-Germanic influence on the world, just as the neo-eurasianists call for a rejection of the influence of the “globalist” Anglo-Saxons, it did not resort to the geopolitical tool as such. An analysis of neo-eurasianist philosophy therefore requires a closer look at this discipline which represents a specific political instrument. Firstly, it presents the particularity of placing the Russian immensity at the heart of the global scene. And it fulfils its role so perfectly that its expansion serves as a “substitute civil religion”, replacing the official Marxist ideology of the Soviet era.29 Paradoxically, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor to Carter, who has always considered Moscow as an important strategic pole, has become a useful opponent for the neo-eurasianists. As a major ideologue of the doctrine of Russia rollback in the “near abroad”, he is in fact often quoted among nationalist circles to corroborate the existence of a global conspiracy, even though Brzezinski no longer has any real responsibilities in the American administration. Consequently, Dugin makes the eurasianist combat the main target of the Atlanticist strategists, with for example: Zbigniew Brzezinski, who, in his book The Grand Chessboard, describes the scenario for the future dissolution of CIS nations, and particularly Russia, as the ideal scenario (for the West, and notably, the United States). This combat is 28  Alexander Panarin, “O deržavnike-Otce I liberal’nyh nositelâh ‘èdipova kompleksa’” [On the almighty God and the liberal bearers of “Oedipus complex”], Zavtra, No. 17 (492), 23 April 2003. 29  Boris Kagarlitskii, “Geopolitika kak religiâ” [Geopolitics as religion], Svobodnaâ Mysl’ XXI, No. 6, 9 August 2005, available at: http://www.polit.ru/research/2005/08/09/ kagarlitsky.html.

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But on the geopolitical scene, popularized by Dugin and taken up by the neoeurasianists (gathering together the national-patriotic camp, from Zyuganov to Zhirinovsky and Rogozin), it is clear the latter present a composite corpus, centered on a few key ideas whose origins are easily identifiable. Russia, with its geography and messianic desires, had been the subject of many foreign studies which the neo-eurasianists got their hands on. They propose anti-Western ideas based on a Western matrix – and two geopolitical traditions. The first, from the Anglo-Saxon school, under the influence of Alfred Mahan, Harold Mackinder and their American disciple, Nicholas J. Spykman,31 tried to develop a theory based on the relations between continental and maritime powers. The second, linked to the German inter-war school, with among others Karl Haushofer, devoted a major part of their reflections to the theory of vital space, making an organic relation between territory and population.32 Dugin takes up the traditional geopolitical opposition (particularly from Mackinder) between maritime power (Carthage) and continental power (Rome),33 but offers it a spiritualist dimension by linking the geography of the State to its civilization, like the German geopolitician, Haushofer. He proclaims that “modern geopolitics is the product of the secularization and desacralization of a […] 30 Alexander Dugin, “L’Eurasie se fera”, 6 July 2002, available at: http://www. evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=761. 31  Alfred Mahan (1840-1914), Harold Mackinder (1861-1947) and Nicholas J. Spykman (1893-1943) may be considered the founders of the Anglo-Saxon school of geopolitics. The first was an American admiral who theorized on the importance of the control of the seas to become a world superpower. The two others worked on the definition of a strategic zone the maritime powers need to control, but their opinions differ over the geographical location: Mackinder considers Eurasia (Heartland) is the central zone, while Spykman goes for the intermediary zones (Rimland). The geopolitician Zbigniew Brzezinski is a disciple of the latter. 32  Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), a disciple of the German Friedrich Ratzel (18441904) and his geopolitical determinism, is a conservative monarchist, with liberal economic convictions. The major part of his geopolitical career took place between the years 1918 and 1945. Accused of having inspired German geopolitics of the Third Reich, he was in fact in complete disagreement with the regime, both for its desire to invade the USSR and for its racist and anti-Semitic stance, of which he was also a victim because of his marriage to a Jew. He was in fact imprisoned in Dachau for a time. See Aymeric Chauprade, Introduction à l’analyse géopolitique, Paris, Ellipses, 1999, pp. 21-6. 33  His position was promoted, via his book, in the military academies, the fourth edition of which, published in 2000 was sold out. Alexander Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki. Geopolitičeskoe buduščee Rossii [Geopolitical foundations. The Geopolitical future of Russia], Moscow, Arktogeja, 1997.

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traditional science – sacred geography”,34 but, he continues, it is modern science that has the greatest link with Tradition and traditional sciences. He believes there is a multiplicity of different forms of maritime and continental empires: among the maritime empires, there are the civilizations of the seas and oceans, while the continental empires include the civilizations of the Steppes and the Forests, the Mountains and the Plains, of the Desert and the Ice. There are also maritime elements in the continental zones and visa versa.35 To quote Dugin once again, “the empires of the Desert and the Steppes are logically the geopolitical bridgehead of tellurocracy”.36 This is the link between geopolitics and empire, the latter being based on the notion of a Steppe civilization. Modern geopolitics, concludes Dugin, (except for Russian eurasianists, the German disciples of Haushofer, and Islamic fundamentalists) appraises the world from a diametrically opposed perspective to that of traditional geography.37

This reflects the translation of a cultural reflection in geopolitical terms. According to the neo-eurasianists, the end of the bipolar world gives a particular relevance to geopolitical analysis. The opposition between tellurocracy (continental power) with the example of Rome, and thalassocracy (maritime power), with the example of Carthage, can be referred to as being behind the structuring of the international scene. For the neo-eurasianists, the two models oppose them, who present the world as being divided into different civilizations, to the “Atlanticists”, the supporters of unipolarity under American domination. At this point we could point out that the criticism of American domination, “Atlanticism”, includes criticism of the effects of a standardization of the world, represented by the term “globalization”. This “Atlanticist” category however does not really present any distinction between the Brzezinski realists and the neoconservatives: it groups together all American foreign policy interventionists in the “imperialist” category. Globalization appears as an opponent since the process for the construction of a “New World Order”, led by Western politico-financial groups, intends to “impose Western stereotypes” to the detriment of any diversity. The neo-eurasianists would

34 Alexander Dugin, “Géopolitique et la géographie sacrée”, available at: http://www. evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=238. Our translation. 35  For example, the “Bolivarism” in South America introduced a continental element into its maritime space. 36 Alexander Dugin, “Géopolitique et la géographie sacrée”, available at: http://www. evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=238. Our translation. 37  For more information concerning the East and the West in tradition or sacred geography, cf. ibid.

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prefer an isolationist America, promoted for example by the Republican Patrick Buchanan,38 a fervent critic of the neoconservatives and their foreign adventures. This designation of the foreign enemy is echoed by national political opposition parties: the “Western liberals” at the beginning of the 1990s were an obvious target. The maritime enemy has a “fifth column” at its disposition, the local “democrats” who are calling for the integration of Russia in the global organizations. The alliance between Russia and other continental powers to fight against globalization is seen as a need and is actively supported by the neo-eurasianists. Unlike other features that we have pinpointed, it would be wrong to declare this move towards an alliance as incompatible with the empire. Indeed, it appears to be the first step towards the realization of a common goal. The Likelihood of a Liberal Empire? Imperial Political Economy Concern for the imperial political economy is not absent from neo-eurasianist ideology which supports a “Third Way” and rejects unipolar globalization. Soviet economic potential was weakened for many years with the rapid liberal reforms at the start of the 1990s, or “shock therapy”. Liberalization, the key word for the economic reforms and the “Westernization” of the country did not produce the expected results: the industrial sector collapsed and the economic area broken up. Moscow could only count on its military-industrial complex, including its nuclear arsenal, to have any influence on international affairs. Then, beginning in 2000, the Russian elite began to understand the potentialities offered by an economic power, and more particularly energy. Gazprom became a pole around which Moscow intended to reform and control the energy sector to return to a position of superpower. In this case, the project associated increased State intervention, a suspicious attitude with regards its foreign partners and the administrative recentralization of power: the three elements being totally compatible with neoeurasianist ideology. This evolution would seem also to favor a “Eurasianist” perspective for the future of the country. Indeed, Moscow was turning more and more to the East, fully aware of the economic perspectives linked to the increasing energy consumption in Asia.39 In his state of the nation speech on May 10, 2006, Vladimir Putin put forward the idea that his country should trade its oil, gas and other commodities in Rubles to reduce the role of the Dollar in the world and strengthen Russia’s position.

38  “An American Populist. Interview with Patrick Buchanan”, 25 January 2005, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2183. 39  Sergueï Koltchine, “Davos: la Russie regarde vers l’Est”, 7 February 2006, available at: http://fr.rian.ru/analysis/20060207/43406440.html.

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Why this Eurasian Turnaround in the Russian Energy Sector? At least three reasons can be identified. Firstly, it would allow to solve the energy supply problem for the Far East, with the creation of new local gas distribution networks. Also, the main “new” oilfields were in eastern Siberia and the Far East, and Moscow was encouraging the neighboring countries to invest in their exploitation. Finally, Western Europe, a long-time consumer of energy exports was becoming concerned about its dependence on Russia and had recently begun seeking new sources of supply. Consequently the geo-economy was turning more to Asia than in the past. This represented a major change which favored the supporters of neoeurasianism. The notion of a “liberal empire” imported from the United States40 which thus began to develop brought some former liberals closer to neo-eurasianism. It should be remembered that in a context whereby a right-wing State is not in a position to apply the rules of the competitive game, the term “liberal” evoked the emergence, in the 1990s, of an economy of predation and the oligarchic excesses this involves. Anatoly Chubais41 is the perfect example of this and an analysis of his career gives great insight into the notion as it is understood in Russia today. As the instigator behind the 1992 privatization program, Chubais proposed two key objectives for the country during the 2003 legislative campaign: to convert to a system of “liberal capitalism” and the construction of a “liberal empire”, with a priority for the post-Soviet countries and, if possible, with the agreement of the international community. Previously criticized by the neo-eurasianists who considered him as a “fifth column” Atlanticist, he was now proposing a new mission for Russia: 40  Igor Torbakov, “Russian policymakers air notion of ‘liberal empire’ in Caucasus, Central Asia”, 27 October 2003, available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/ insight/articles/eav102703.shtml. 41  Anatoli Borisovitch Chubais, born 1955, was vice-prime minister under Gaïdar (1992), and behind a number of privatization programs, and he also held economic positions under Chernomyrdin (1992-1998). A partisan of “shock therapy”, acknowledged as a leading “young reformist”, he was behind a form of politics that was negative for the population, but which made some businessmen immensely rich, sometimes quasi-illegally, known as the oligarchs. As a company-owner, at the head of an electricity conglomerate (RAO EES), he profited from his position to support Russian interests in the former Soviet Republics, in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Gaïdar and Chubaïs assembled their political forces in 2001, but the SPS (Union of Right Forces), of which he is one of the key members alongside Boris Nemstov and Irina Khakamada, did not even get five percent of the votes in the legislative elections of December 2003. The SPS won less than one percent of vote in the 2007 elections.

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as the natural and incontestable leader of Eurasia, it now had to strengthen its position in the region.42 In the face of sweeping globalization, a “neo-eurasianist” and continental oligarchy could prove acceptable. This repositioning of one of the most public liberals of the Yeltsin years is a good example of the capacity for seduction of neo-eurasianist ideology way beyond its original framework. According to Dugin, the theme of liberal imperialism modernizes that of Eurasian integration by offering it a more pragmatic dimension.43 The specificity of this liberalism, a long way from the traditional category of political philosophy, makes it compatible with neo-eurasianist visions. Indeed, Dugin is as critical of neo-liberalism as presented by unipolar globalization as he is of Marxism represented by the Soviet system. He wants to be seen as a supporter of a “Third Way”. The neo-eurasianist economic model supposes that each historical community follows its own path for development, unlike the universalistic neo-liberal project. Market control of supply and demand is totally blind to cultural diversity and claims to be applicable anywhere, unlike the renewal of cultural particularities which is at the heart of the neo-eurasianist project. The creation of autonomous economic systems would allow Russia to continue its own development in Eurasia, in accordance with its strategy and geopolitical orientations. However, autonomy does not mean autarchy: the economic area is not totally closed, simply under the influence of a strategic eurasianist vision. Tempered Keynesian would best be suited to Eurasia, with a paternalistic dimension that is adapted to this vast zone which needs partially protecting from globalization. The “Third Way” therefore means that market elements coexist with strong State intervention in the most strategic sectors, like energy. Neo-Eurasianists share similar ideas to Friedrich List (1789-1846), the founder of the “protectionism educator” theory, which influenced thinking on economic development. In his book, National System of Political Economy [1841], he claimed that national companies needed to be provisionally protected so that free-trade could not spread via predatory-style practices. Thus, the idea of a “Eurasian economic block”, centered around the former Republics, combining both trade within the economic area and the selective opening up to the outside, becomes a combination of both liberal imperialism and the neo-eurasianist doctrine. And such a set up must take on the form of a “democratic empire” which aims at going beyond the logic of Nation-State to see the eurasianist project through to a successful conclusion.44 After all, the notion of a “liberal empire” 42  For the debates, see Laure Mandeville, “Russie: retour en force dans l’ex-empire”, Politique internationale, No. 103, Spring 2004, pp. 249-77. 43  Alexander Dugin, “Miroustrojstvo: aktual’nost’ imperii” [The construction of the World: update of the empire], 16 October 2003, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/ modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1491. 44  Alexander Dugin, “Rossiâ kak demokratičeskaâ imperia” [Russia as a democratic empire], 31 May 2003, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&fil

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has a regional basis which contributes to the “multipolar globalization” the neoeurasianists defend. For them, the only alternative to American hegemony for the CIS nations is to join Russia and the regional empire – which can only be qualified as hegemon. Eurasian, it would be based on a “new style of sovereignty”; it would gather together under the standard of “pan-Eurasian nationalism” that Nikolaï Trubetskoy was already referring to in 1920. As Dugin put it, quoting Aristotle, “the unity of plurality – this, today, is the revolutionary slogan of supporters of multi-polar peace”.45 Following this look at neo-eurasianist policy, what form of empire remains to be analyzed. Even the liberal empire of Chubaïs has been engulfed by the strictly geopolitical and economic discourse of the neo-eurasianists, who, haunted by the specter of decline, discard the construction of an associative project on any other basis than a common language and shared nostalgia, above all for the past glory of the empire. The only remaining associative project lies in an opposition to the American “thalassocracy”. The efforts for philosophical construction of the first eurasianists are far away, and little attention is paid to the echoes that are sometimes heard today (Alexander Panarin for example). The ensuing neo-eurasianist project betrays the symptoms of a classical policy for power, accompanied by cultural recognition to serve purely and simply an objective of restoration, as seen by the previously established geographical limits of the empire to be built. It should be remembered that if the historical project in question has traditionally presented an associative inclination with regards surrounding foreign countries, it has rarely ventured beyond the Eurasian continent. The only real exception is Bolshevism, which claims to be universalistic and whose objective is to gather together Russian territories, then to protect the Slavs and the Orthodox. Hegemonic nationalism is therefore behind the neo-eurasianist project but also responsible for its incapacity to attain an authentically imperial ambition. The political form presented by the neoconservatives appears closer to what we have defined as the ideal empire. The most striking element of this proximity lies in the clear desire to change the world. The preventive action, unilateralism and global presence and influence triptych connects them to an imperial ambition that would seem to originate from national foreign policy: for example the annexation of Florida, then Texas, American strategy at the end of the 19th century wars against Spain and the Philippines. The Wilsonism the neoconservatives call for reveals a selective interventionist dimension that corresponds closely to their stance and which they presented following the Vietnam fiasco. And yet the geographic illimitation of such a project is not e=article&sid=1259. Our translation. 45  Interview with Alexander Dugin, “Ul’tramodern, epoha imperij, zakat gosudarstv” [Ultra-modern, the time of empires, the twilight of States], 5 June 2003, available at: http:// www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1272. Our translation.

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enough to occult its fundamentally nationalistic and ideological dimension that ignores all reaction to such a discourse and believes it to be objectively attractive to all. Let us now examine the interpretation of both projects in foreign policy.

Part III

Geopolitics of Imperial Invocations: Between Cynicism, Ideology and Incoherence Our comparison of the neoconservative and neo-eurasianist imperial outlooks needs completing and illustrating by positioning them with regard to the foreign policies of the two powers. The conformity of the foreign policy practices of the two states with neoconservative and neo-eurasianist visions of Islam should again confirm the real influence of both groups. We shall therefore analyze any hiatus that may exist between the announced objectives and the current foreign policy. It cannot be reduced to the simple observation of a calculated cynicism that serves its own interests through the adoption of an a priori legitimate discourse without analyzing its implications. Such an explanation would suppose a perfect understanding of the ultimate convictions of the intellectuals in question, over and above their discourses, which is far beyond the limits of our analysis. Moreover, we do not neglect that their worldviews are not monopolist and sometimes influence but do not fully determine foreign policy. The hypothesis of a rational calculation is not without importance, but we feel it would be less instructive than an ideological approach. Indeed, the former seems almost to reify the very concept of interest, just as the realists do with national interest while the content of the notion does leave room for ideas and ideologies. The argument of cynicism progresses with a misleading obviousness, which neglects the construction of interests and can even go as far as a theory of conspiracy that represents for the targeted party the total premeditation of events and the required omnipotence so that nothing or no-one can intervene. Our sociological and historical analysis cannot a priori accept such conditions. Let us not linger on the spiral of conspiracy which makes it irrefutable: any argument likely to weaken the accusation is immediately reincorporated and subsumed by the complotting edifice. The failures are also the result of a super power that skillfully manipulates the image it offers of itself. Let us take the example of the neoconservatives to show just how an approach in ideological terms accounts for this reality more accurately than the idea of a cost/benefit calculation whose terms have not been defined.

  For an analysis of the diverse discourse relating to national interest, cf. Dario Battistella, “L’intérêt national. Une notion, trois discours” in Frédéric Charillon, (ed.), La politique étrangère, nouveaux regards, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2002, pp. 139-166.

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An accusation of cynicism could criticize the United States for pursuing a policy of domination that is reprehensible at least concerning its intentions, even if it not simple to perform. The cost/profit calculation could, in this instance, concern resources. Power seeking States are tempted to overvalue the resource or resources for which they believe they have by the highest comparative advantage. On this basis, we can explain the military activism of the United States and the development of a power projection as we have already mentioned. We can also justify certain strategic alliances whose objectives are to maintain this comparative advantage and to allow the United States to maintain their military presence. This hypothesis does not seem to be wrong, but it relies on two unassumed postulates: the hypocrisy of he who sets out the objectives and the need for a State to increase its power with reference to the rule of comparative advantage. If the search for power in undeniable, as we shall demonstrate in the pages that follow, the fact that it is at work for an imprisoning democratization process of the ideological yoke should not be excluded. Our aim is not to clear the name of such and such an intellectual but to examine the link between discourse and reality rather than to suppose there is none. This perspective recognizes the possibility of a hiatus but proposes elements to understand it, either cynicism or geopolitical constraints. Ideological discourse operates on the basis of a small number of postulates which form a whole that cannot be falsified when confronted by a reality. The rest of the world can be understood using these elementary truths via a relatively simple deductive process. There is no substitute for a sense of reality, declared Isaiah Berlin. […] Historians and men of action draw their information whence they can. Scientific, statistical methods, microscopic biographical details – none of these is irrelevant, all may increase the sense of what belongs where. […] Nevertheless, the sense of reality or of history which enables us to detect the relationships of actual things and persons is acquaintance with particulars, while all theory deals with attributes and idealised entities – with the general.

Ideology is the most perfect antithesis of all the elements it proposes. In the American case, there are at least two initial certitudes that undermine the democratic crusade, supposing such an operation can never be successfully carried out. The first concerns their vision of Islam. As we shall see, this prism means they select their allies whatever the level of democracy, if it is possible to use such terms, of the countries in question. The second concerns American messianism. The United States believe themselves to be the only player capable of fulfilling their democratization agenda. From here on, the conjunction of the two aspects could bring certain intellectuals to think that a strengthening of American power in the region is the necessary condition for democratization, which is currently  Isaiah Berlin, “The sense of reality” in The Sense of Reality, Studies in Ideas and their History, edited by Henry Hardy, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997, p. 35.

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way behind schedule. The debatable alliances appear as necessary evils. Such an ideological context makes it possible to implement policy that appears compatible with the proclaimed objective. This is how the judgment that isolates such a state of affairs, that are clearly compatible with policies of domination, at a simple cynical calculation, postulates the bad faith of he who sets out his objectives. This does not infer making the opposite mistake but rather underlying the deleterious effects of the ideological framework, in this case in its transformative version, whereby the primary danger is the denial of the real to make it true to the idea one has of it. Basically, without sounding out the ultimate convictions of the deciders, we should at least recognize that the policies we are analyzing could equally well come from ideological blinkering as from the calculation of interests. This nuance in no way reduces the sometimes blatant contradiction between the objectives announced and means employed to reach them. The final part of our work will be devoted to the qualification of this gap. An approach using ideological terms will also allow for a better understanding of neo-eurasianism than an exclusively rational and strategic approach. The place of conspiracy as an ideological form, meaning the denial of reality, is enough to understand this. Consequently, the history of Russian power is marked by assassinations, uprisings and conspiracies which are presented as the work of the opposition. On the basis of recognized events, from the first Tsars through to Rasputin, including the Decembrists, Russia has a long story of political murders and plots (though it is not exclusive). Little by little, the imaginary conspiracies abounded among the nationalist movements with whom the neo-eurasianists shared a common rhetoric. The most famous was the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” which outlined a project for world domination by the Jewish community including the destruction of Russia and the servility of its people. The hoax, which was requested by the Tsar, was disseminated for years to become the most famous conspiracy theory worldwide. It has since been brought up to date by General Filatov who denounced the secret alliance of the Rothschild dynasty, the speculative and philanthropic George Soros, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former director of the Russian petroleum company YUKOS and the American Congress. During the 1917 Revolution and also the Second World War, there were various attempted conspiracies aimed at determining the enemies’ secret activities. Depending on the camp you belong to, you can either refer to anti-Bolshevik conspiracies (international coalition with the White pro-tsarist movement during the Civil War) or pro-Bolshevik (Western countries such as Germany and the Jews). Internally, the Soviet notion of “enemy of the people” can be found. The link between these two forms of conspiracy, international and domestic, already illustrates the force of the “obsidional complex” of the country, which takes us back to the uncertain and problematic aspect of national identity.   Victor Sonkin, “Forget “The Da Vinci Code” – Russia’s own conspiracy theorists were doing the same thing long ago”, 22 April 2005, available at: http://context. themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/04/22/105.html.

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Conspiracy is not absent from neo-eurasianist thinking, since Dugin has developed theories relating to what he terms “conspiratology”. This pseudo-scientific term designates a theoretical construction based on an investigation that aims at unmasking the conspirators: in other words, another term for conspiracy. In 2002, Alexander Prokhanov created a sensation with the publication of his widely acclaimed book Mr Hexagon in which he explains in veiled terms that the arrival of Putin at the head of the State following the 1999 attacks which led to the second war in Chechnya was the result of an Atlanticist conspiracy linked to the Chechen. This fiction portrays the then President as a bumbling alcoholic which reminds the reader of a certain Boris Yeltsin. He is manipulated by his daughter and Jewish oligarchs, themselves controlled by former members of the KGB in league with the “new world order”. Prokhanov, who considers himself to be “the last soldier of the Empire”, wrote a work which like a nesting doll hides a conspiracy theory within a conspiracy theory. The character that disguisedly refers to Putin is, in himself, ambiguous: brought to power by an Atlanticist conspiracy, some passages do however allow to see in him the hope of a neo-eurasianist patriotism: in one particular scene, the “chosen one” resembles a dolphin and later turns into a ray of light which some interpret as a hint that he may ultimately belong to a patriotic new order. The novel cleverly expresses both the mistrust of some hard-line neo-eurasianists with regards Putin and their hatred for the Atlanticist forces, even if they are not systematically linked to the anti-Semitic attacks that are described in Mr. Hexagon. For the neo-eurasianists, the Atlanticist forces conspired at the end of the USSR, just as they are trying to dismember Russia today, under the influence of Brzezinski and other fellows. Here we can draw a parallel between the nationalpatriots who are nostalgic for the former USSR, whose decline they attribute to an act of treason from their leaders, and Germany of 1918, which experienced its defeat like a “stab in the back” from the political hierarchy. Part of the Atlanticist plan was to set the Muslim world, a privileged ally, up against Moscow, hence the mistrust of the Wahhabi who might well be involved in the conspiracy. Thus appeared the ideological nature of neo-eurasianism: its radical opposition to the Atlantic forces means any alliance with Washington against the Islamic   Vladimir Bondarenko, “Triumfator” [The Triumphant], Zavtra, 16 April 2002, No. 16 (439).   Alexander Prokhanov, Gospodin Geksogen, Moscow, Ad Marginem, 2002.   Sophia Kishkovsky, “Russian Novelist Scoffs at Post-Soviet Leaders”, New York Times, 24 August 2002.   For the question: “Is there a global conspiracy against Russia?” we get 31 percent probably yes, 14 percent yes, 30 percent probably not, and 9 percent of course not (no opinion: 16 percent). (According to, a national poll on the 24-27 September 2004 for a sample population of 1601 – Centre Levada). Also, Dugin mentions a VCIOM poll made between December 2 and 5, 2001, in which 73 percent of the Russians questioned considered themselves to belong to a “special” civilization, while 13 percent considered themselves Westerners.

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terrorists – an alliance that could dictate the most elementary cynical calculation of interests – is out of the question despite September 11th. This event cannot push aside the postulate of a manipulating America that is hostile to Russia and in collusion with the Wahhabi. The relationship of the two movements with the Muslim world is like an exercise ground which will represent the limit of our field of study. We shall look at the approach to Islam they have developed before confronting this to the two specific fields of application: Turkey and Central Asia on the one hand, the Arab-Persian world on the other. We shall breakdown the latter into four individual case studies: Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran.

  Consequently, the reader will not find any in-depth analysis of the Israeli and Lebanese cases in the pages that follow.

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Chapter 6

Islam While neoconservatism is developing a suspicious attitude towards Islam, the latter attracts the neo-eurasianists who consider Islam an ally in their project for liberation. These two aspects confirm the central role of ideology and the suspicious thinking of both movements. The Contradictions of the Neoconservative Position on Islam Since September 11th, and even since the beginning of the 1990s, the Muslim world has become a major strategic area for Washington. Indeed, with the decline of the USSR, it is the part of the world where opposition to the American model is at its greatest and where a politico-religious ideology can claim to be a viable and popular alternative. Among the major issues at stake, is the question of natural energy resources. The Neoconservatives, whose objective is to influence American foreign policy, are forced to pay careful attention to the Muslim world. In the pages that follow, we shall present their interpretation of the current situation, in relation to the “War on Terrorism”. When analyzing their work of the past years, the Muslim world is presented as a major subject, if not the main subject, along with China. Although Beijing remains a source of concern for the imperialist democrats, it is the “specialists” of the Muslim world who have the lion’s share of the reviews and daily papers.

  Cf. the figures of the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes Project available at: http://peoplepress.org/reports/pdf/165.pdf. See in particular pp. 63-81.  Of course it could be said that Chinese nationalism or some South American movements combine anti-Americanism and national support. However, the possible development of this alternative remains localized, unlike what can be seen in the Muslim world, where popular fervor goes beyond the borders.  See Christian Lowe, “Remember China?” The Weekly Standard, 17 January 2004. While all the world’s papers are focusing on this period of the Iraqi problem, the Iranian nuclear threat and the unsolved issue of North Korea, the author mentions China’s dream of becoming a world hyper-power which, thanks to the War on Terror, is progressing unnoticed. He adds that today, for Beijing, the American victories in the Middle East and Central Asia in the fight against terror are above all victories for the American superpower which will increase its hegemony on the world. This article represents a striking illustration of the fact that the fashion of many American analysts to consider world issues from the

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These specialists who contribute to such papers can be recognized neoconservatives, like Stephen Schwartz, or simply “followers” of imperialdemocratic ideology. Among the members of the second group are such prestigious names as Bernard Lewis, Professor emeritus at Princeton University, and whose position has become increasingly radical, to a point where it has become venerated by ideologists who at the same time reject academic expertise. The objective behind the democratization of the Muslim world as promoted by the neoconservatives would appear to give a positive vision of the region. They affirm the populations of Islamic lands have as much right to individual and political freedom as the rest of the world. For the most widely-read neoconservative on the “Eastern issue”, Daniel Pipes, the distinction between Islam and Islamism is of the utmost importance. The same idea can be found in all the works of neoconservative journalists, including the openly Islamophobic imperialist-democrats, such as Jonah Goldberg. Islam is a respectable, individual religion, chosen by individuals in a spiritual rather than political perspective, unlike Islamism which is an ideology which stems from its politicization. This simple distinction allows avoiding the accusation of civilizational error, which in turn would naturalize identified blocks into civilizations, often based on religious criteria, to then analyze their interactions. The Neoconservatives claim that Huntington, author of the successful Clash of Civilizations, had not understood the Islamic problem any more than the other specialists. He treats it as a fundamentally cultural problem whereas they believe the origin of all the ills linked to Islam is political. The fact that some neoconservatives or neoconservative followers are Muslims makes the neoconservatives seem even more opposed to the civilizational approach: Ahmed Chalabi is a friend of Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, and “superpower competition” angle is far from out-dated particularly since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  See the analysis of a former Bernard Lewis disciple, William O. Beeman, “From Respected Scholar to Neoconservative Ideologue”, Providence Journal, 11 May 2003, p. 9. Concerning the reverence the person inspires, we have already quoted Perle who confesses to consulting him as one consults the oracle.  All his articles are available on the website of the same name: www.danielpipes.org.   Jonah Goldberg belongs to the young neoconservatives: having worked at the very neoconservative American Enterprise Institute, he made a name for himself as a producer of documentaries and for the program Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg, a successful PBS political program. Today he writes mainly for hard right neoconservative papers, such as The Weekly Standard, New York Post, and National Review Online.  Samuel P. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996, The work is dated 1996 and follows an article, “The Clash of Civilizations?” published in Foreign Affairs in February 1993.   David Brooks, “Understanding Islam”, The Weekly Standard, 21 January 2002.   The latter introduced him to Albert Wholstetter in 1985, and worked for the Project for a New American Century.

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Stephen Schwartz converted to Islam under the name Suleyman Ahmad Stephen Schwartz.10 This conversion happened largely thanks to a group who were particularly appreciated by Pipes and neoconservative Orientalists, the American Naqshbandi Sufis, led by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani.11 Generally speaking, Sufism is promoted against a traditionalist Islam as it is considered in the Middle East. On this point already, we can see that the imperialistdemocrats have chosen an approach that is far from “accommodating”. Accommodationism and Confrontationism: A Divergence among Orientalists According to Fawaz Gerges,a there are two great tendencies with the Western Orientalists. The confrontationist tendency, which considers that the Islamist problem is in fact an Islamic problem, which is like saying the contemporary errors were already beginning to take root in the original Islam. For the accommodationists, this approach is too simplistic: instead it is necessary to make the distinction between Islam as experienced by the faithful, a political Islamism which accepts to play the democratic game when there is one or which moves for the creation of a free political sphere, and the Jihads, supporters of the terrorist struggle whatever the cost may be. This analysis has the advantage of not falling into the trap of essentialism. Thus, it allows making the distinction between the “Muslim-democrat” Prime Minister Erdogan and Mullah Omar in Afghanistan. Fawaz Gerges, America and Political Islam. Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999 a

This rather simplistic division between Sufism and the rest of Islam does not take the existence of an extremely conservative branch of Sufism into consideration, as can be found in Central Asia for example, the pillar of Sunnite Orthodoxy when its powerful neighbor, Iran, turned Shiite. Also, when observing the neoconservative supported Sufi group which Schwartz belonged to, it is clear that even if it 10  The neoconservative journalist evokes the reasons for his conversion in the following website http://www.naqshbandi.org/events/articles/conversion_schwartz.htm. 11 A succinct presentation of the person use the following article: Pat McDonnell Twair, “Dispute Between Kabbani Followers and Hosts Disrupts Forum at Islamic Center of Southern California”, July-August 1999, available at: http://www.washington-report. org/backissues/0799/9907021.html.

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represents a mystical and dynamic movement, its leader, Kabbani is also presented as a charismatic leader who believes himself to be, without any tangible proof, the one and only real representative of all Muslim Americans. Moreover, he is known for having stigmatized the 80 percent of American Muslims who do not belong to his movement, and who, according to him, have been influenced by extremist ideology. He even maintained that all the student associations that did not follow him were controlled by Islamists. In an interview for the neoconservative paper, the Middle East Quarterly,12 he added that to overthrow the dictator Saddam Hussein would be a good thing and that, despite what the Palestinians, the Arab community and many Muslims throughout the world say, Jerusalem was not an important sacred site for Muslims.13 This boils down to saying that imperialist-democrats support a man who refuses to give American Muslims the right to choose any other leader than him, and who moves in the direction of the imperial foreign policy they inspire, with little reference to Palestine. Remembering that the only other key American Muslim they support is Riad Nachef, who was condemned along with certain members of his religious group for having beaten, threatened and robbed two members of another Muslim group,14 raises the question whether the project for the instauration of democracy in the Middle East is not based on a contradiction between the objectives and the means used to reach them. In reality, the religious division as presented by the neoconservatives serves above all to denounce an “Arabic-Islam”. When reading Stephen Schwartz, probably the leading neoconservative author on the question, from his declaration on the naqshbandi site to his articles for various papers,15 one is tempted to oppose a non-Arabic Islam, essentially Turkish and European, frequentable, Sufi, mystical, to an Arabic world that is dominated by obscurantism and “Wahhabism”. This vision leads them to systemizing the notion of “Arabic imperialism”, whose roots go back to the birth of Islam. The origins of this “imperialism”, as seen by the neoconservatives, can be found in the Nobel Prize Winner 2001 Vidiadhar S. Naipaul’s now famous analysis.16 It presents the Muslim religion as a sort of supplementary, spiritual humiliation, which was imposed by the victorious Arabs on the defeated peoples. One example he uses in the Sindh, a kingdom composed of part of today’s Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Arabs savagely attacked the kingdom like predators, unnecessarily so because they were up against Buddhists 12 The Middle East Forum is a think tank led by Daniel Pipes. He is the editor of the Middle East Quarterly. 13 Interview from June 2000 for the Middle East Quarterly, Vol. VII, No. 2. 14 See Daniel Pipes, “Needed: Muslims against Terror”, Forward, 16 July 1999, and Richard Lorant, “Judge Sets $750 000 bail on Chelsea Home Invasion”, South Coast Today, 25 March 1997. 15  See for example Stephen Schwartz, “The Arab Betrayal of Balkan Islam”, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 43-52, Summer 2002. 16 This led to a presentation at the Manhattan Institute on October 30, 1990.

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who refused to fight and Hindus who were cut off from the world. The victors destroyed an age-old civilization which offered no armed resistance. This analysis however is historically inexact according to some specialists such as the French Indianist Louis Frédéric.17 Yes, the conquest took place for economic reasons, and the conquerors, much like any contemporary army, considered the region simply as a source of slaves and a territory to pillage. On the other hand, however, the opposition between the pillaging and violent Arabs on the one side, and the pacific Buddhists and peaceful Hindus on the other, is not realistic. Ibn Qâsim, the conqueror, mentioned by Naipaul, was joined by the Mazdeans, Buddhists and a number of outcast Hindus, all of whom had come to fight alongside the Muslims against the co-religionists who they considered above all as oppressors and that the foreigners would be a good substitute for. It is also wrong to say that traditional Indian culture in general was “destroyed” by the Arabs. The Muslim conquerors, Arabo-Syrian, Turks or Turk-Afghans, had complex relations with the culture, wavering between assimilation and rejection, from religious syncretism to inter-ethnic unions. In spite of varying degrees of tolerance, it is possible to say that a real Islamo-Hinduist symbiosis has existed since the 13th century. This approach, although historically unfounded, has the advantage for the neoconservatives of creating a parallel between Arabic “imperialism” since the death of Muhammad, and Western imperialism from the 19th century onwards, which was colonial in style and could be considered as racist for the period.18 It also enables the neoconservatives to present, albeit wrongly, the Crusades as a “defensive war”19 rather than clashes due to specific economic and political problems.20 Only by distorting the facts can the Arabian conquest be considered imperialist, and also totalitarian, representing a new super enemy comparable to the USSR.21 Thus, neoconservatism, whatever they say, has a civilizational vision, for reasons of efficacy if we analyze Daniel Pipes’ works.22 Pipes, like almost all the 17 See Louis Frédéric, L’Inde de l’Islam, Paris, Arthaud, 1989. 18 Hannah Arendt, L’impérialisme, Paris, Fayard, 1982, p. 72. 19 Thomas F. Madden, “Crusade Propaganda”, National Review Online, 2 November 2001. 20 See for example Franco Cardini, Europe et Islam, histoire d’un malentendu, Paris, Seuil, 2000, pp. 91-2. Urbain II’s appeal was behind the First Crusade primarily because the conflict between the Pope and the Germanic Emperor had caused major problems for a number of Barons who had chosen to side with the losing camp; this, plus the desire to obtain the riches of the East, presents a vision that has little to do with Huntingtonism of a conflict that used the cause of the persecuted Christians in the Holy Land a posteriori. 21  Charles Krauthammer, “The Real New World Order” The Weekly Standard, 12 November 2001. 22 There is a good example of this in two articles from Daniel Pipes published in the New York Post, “Evil Isn’t Islam” (30 July 2002) and “Islam’s Future” (13 August 2002). In the first, the author reacts to those who consider that all evil comes from the Koran itself. Despite a number of generalizations (concerning Muslims and slavery for example) he

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members of his movement, believe that Islamism originates in Islam itself, and that the apparent novelty does not arise from its “extreme” and “megalomaniac” character.23 Of the fourteen centuries of Islamic religion, he retains only two elements: first, Islam, more than any other religion in the world, has a political side to it, and secondly, he asserts that once Muslims obtain the power, they impose the sharia on the conquered nation. He also attributes justifications to Islam for conquest and intolerance.24 The carefully calculated original distinction between Islam and Islamism is therefore incompatible with the substance of Pipes’ thinking. From here on, all the economic, social and political arguments used to explain the kamikaze attacks, or the Bin Laden phenomenon, are rejected. Those academics who do not share this point of view are marginalized and accused of Marxist accommodationist excesses.25 For some neoconservatives in any case, the approach verges on Islamophobia through the incorporation of a relation of causality between Islam and Islamism.26 Subsequently, as we have just seen, Islam and Islamism are not considered as social objects that can be studied, but rather as a danger for the world. This sentiment of rejection of a religion and all those who believe in it, is even more flagrant when it concerns European Islam. Apparently, France has a “Muslim points out that there is a “clement” and acceptable Islam that goes back hundreds of years, and a more recent totalitarian-style Islam. In this article, the most important element is the “adaptation” of Islam to the modern world. Once again, there is an element of generalization (Islam is lived differently according to country and situation, to a point whereby it is difficult to imagine Islam becoming updated to suit a modern society), however it would seem the author refuses to combine Islam and Islamism. The tone changes in the second article, two weeks later. He evokes the violent criticisms of his readers who consider that Islamism is the true Islam and that this religion was and remains a dogma based above all on violence. In the face of these remarks, Pipes points out that his readers are widely read on the Muslim issue and agrees with this islamophobic interpretation. At the same time he seizes the opportunity to have a dig at what he refers to as the “apologists” of Islam. Often academics, they tend to promote the fact that Islam is not a war-prone religion. Moreover, his precisions demonstrate his pragmatism. For him, it is essential to support the position of the first article; to reject it would be to take all Muslims as enemies, which would make the task of seeking political solutions and Muslim allies in the war against terror even more complicated. Thus, for the neoconservative author, it is not a question of rejecting hasty amalgams or generalizations that correspond to historical errors or Islamophobia, but rather to advance in a tactical way. Concerning his real vision of Islam, it is in fact very close to that of his readers. 23  Daniel Pipes, “Fighting Islam, without Bias”, City Journal, November 2001. 24 Ibid. 25 A virulent criticism of the Muslim world academic specialists can be found in the work by Martin Kramer, Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America, Washington Institute on Near East Studies, October 2001. 26 See the analysis by Vincent Geisser, La nouvelle islamophobie, Paris, La Découverte, 2003, p. 28. This analysis, although much debated concerning other aspects, is extremely clear on this shift.

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problem”,27 more than any other western nation that accepts immigration from Dar el Islam.28 This is due to the large numbers of Muslims in France in relation to other European countries.29 Unlike a certain number of American personalities who criticized the law relating to the veil and the French notion of secularity,30 the imperialist-democrats refused, for once, to condemn Paris. Indeed, for the Weekly Standard journalists, the question of the veil goes beyond that of religious freedom, which would have positioned them against France’s stance. This goes to show that the concept of struggle between civilizations is mobilized by the neoconservatives to explain any problem linked to a Muslim population.31 The fear linked to demography is presented. Christopher Caldwell raises the question concerning America’s capacity to maintain its own identity if Washington accepted an equivalent percentage of French Muslims or Muslim immigrants, the equivalent of 30 million people. Of course, for the neoconservative movement, the riots of 2005 in France have been a divine surprise, giving them the opportunity to insist on this.32 They, of course, choose not to take into account the real story in order to make their narrative closer to their worldview.33

27 Today, France is the favorite target for the American conservative movement in general. The recent scathing attacks by right wing ideologists are proof of this. Take for example the satirical novel by Christopher Buckley, Florence of Arabia (published by Random House in September 2004. The author is the son of William F. Buckley, founder of the National Review, the most popular paper for the right wing conservatives of the Republican Party), The heroine encourages women to rebel against the male chauvinism of the Arab world and in Saudi Arabia in particular. France’s contribution is marked by duplicity and interference with a policy of liberty led by the heroine. Even more radical and without the cover of fiction is the work by John J. Miller and Mark Molesky, Our Oldest Enemy. A History of America’s Disastrous Relationship with France. (New York, Doubleday, 2004, translated into French in 2005 and published by Saint Simon) As the title suggests, it aims at presenting France as a historical enemy of the United States, more so than Germany or Russia. 28  Dar el Islam in medieval Muslim theology designates “the territory of Islam” as opposed to Dar El Harb, the territory of War, dominated by non-Muslims. 29  The neoconservatives talk of some 8 million Muslims whilst official records number only 4 or 5 million. Christopher Caldwell, “Allah Mode, France’s Islam Problem”, The Weekly Standard, 15 July 2002. 30  During the debate on the veil in France, John Hanford, Ambassador at Large of the Office of International Religious Freedom of the US State Department reprimanded France for violating “a fundamental principle of religious freedom”. 31  Christopher Caldwell, “Veiled Threat”, The Weekly Standard, 19 January 2004. 32  See Edward Morrissey, “Fallujah-sur-Seine?”, The Weekly Standard, 9 November 2005. 33  It does not mean that there is no information available on the subject. In French, there is the work of Laurent Mucchielli (book and articles). In English, the very wellwritten book by Trica Danielle Keaton, Muslim Girls and the Other France. Race, Identity, and Social Exclusion, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006.

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Moreover, even if the neoconservatives do not ignore the economic problems of an immigrant population, delinquency is almost automatically associated to them. Even personal success stories of people from the Maghreb are considered as a potential threat34 since such people would have a vision of themselves that would neither reject not occult their culture or religion, something their fathers tended to do. This feeling of belonging would be a factor for anti-Semitism, a refusal to integrate and of chauvinism, particularly since French Islam would become the hostage of religious organizations considered radical and Islamist. In such a situation, the neoconservatives use the same criticisms they apply to any MuslimAmerican association once they obtain a certain degree of influence outside the neoconservative sphere, and particularly in foreign affairs. In France, as in the United States, these associations, even if they are born out of the desire of local Muslim citizens, are considered non-representative since they take Muslims hostage and then radicalize them.35 The very idea that French Muslims could move away from their community, turn to other more ethnic than religious movements, to integration, is not even mentioned. The humanist tradition of Islam, like the Mu’tazili period (8th-13th century)36 which combines Islam with the logic and rationalism of Greek philosophy, is not seriously taken into consideration. The neoconservatives take it as a vision of the mind, unlike the more conservative, even Wahhabi French Islam. Once again, the French exception is neglected for the benefit of the neoconservative portrait concerning American Islam. Thus, Stephen Schwartz presents the largest Muslim organizations as the “Wahhabi lobby”, a center of an obscure power with a sad past.37 More generally, the Islamization of Europe is not a question of time: like the Muslims, the continent is envious of America’s power, and immigration and the adhesion of Turkey would be enough. This historical movement would make for a Muslim Europe, in its entirety, at the end of the century “at the latest” according to Bernard Lewis.38 Here, like in France, Muslims are taken as a whole rather than a group of individualities capable of breaking away from the religion of their forefathers or of living it differently. The neoconservative approach to the Al Qaeda phenomenon and September 11th is no less ideological than that of Islam. The terrorist network is presented as the work of the anti-American Arab secret services and the Saudi crown Prince 34  Thus, the expression “young” is synonymous with “Arab thugs”, Arab crooks, Islam acting as a negative factor. See the beginning of the article “Allah Mode”, op.cit. 35 The example the most often used for France is the French Muslim Party (PMF) of Mohammed Latrèche, which is a small party of little influence but which corresponds perfectly, via its media presentation, to the systematic accusations of Islamist radicalization and anti-Semitism from the imperialist democrats. 36 Abdelwahhab Meddeb, La Maladie de l’Islam, Paris, Seuil, 2002. 37  Stephen Schwartz, “Communists and Islamic Extremists – Then and Now”, FrontPageMagazine.com, 8 July 2002. 38  Christopher Caldwell, “Islamic Europe?”, The Weekly Standard, 4 October 2004.

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Abdullah,39 which simply ignores the independent identity origins of such a group. The “War on Terror” targets essentially the “rogue States” which use terror and religious extremism to oppose American foreign policy. A contrario, the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian “peace process” demonstrated, according to the neoconservatives, that any attempt at dialogue would be considered by the other camp as proof of weakness.40 From here on, even if the conquering of all enemy territories is not systematically the best method for the neoconservatives to defeat terrorism, it remains a radical and strategic vision that dominates their approach. The social and political questions associated to the populations are largely forgotten or simplified to the benefit of a fight for American supremacy in the Muslim world. The Role of Islam in Neo-eurasianism The importance of Islam for neo-eurasianism is twofold: firstly, the latter targets an internal affirmation of hegemonic nationalism that includes Muslims belonging to the Russian Federation, and secondly, it hopes to develop foreign policy cooperation with Muslim nations, to which Russia must show the way. Relations with the Muslims serve as a cleavage between a “classical” nationalism that is closer to Pan Slavism and Orthodoxy, and neo-eurasianism. Unlike the “classical” nationalists, the neo-eurasianists believe they share part of history and a common interest in tradition with the Muslim world, to a point whereby they become natural allies. To quote Mufti Talgat Taj al-Din, the Shaykh al-Islam of Russia,41 Russia is positioned between two continents – Asia and Europe - [and] unites more than 100 peoples, adepts of Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, peoples who share a life, faith, and as we know, faith comes from the All Mighty.42

He asserts loud and clear his attachment to “our sacred land – Saint Russia”43 and never misses out on an opportunity to say that “Eurasianism is the most sincere

39  David Wurmser, “The Saudi Connection”, The Weekly Standard, 29 October 2001. 40 Michael Rubin, “One of the Most Destructive Myths of American Foreign Policy”, New York Sun, 22 July 2002. 41  His real name is Talgat Tajuddinov. 42  Talgat Tadžuddin, “Verit’ ili byt’ bezbožnikom, èto pravo, dannoe Bogom” [To believe or be atheist, the right comes from God], 19 October 2001, available at: http:// evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=94. Our translation. 43  Talgat Tadžuddin, “Naša rodina – Svâtaâ Ruc’” [Our Fatherland – Saint Russia], 2000, available at: http://evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=95.

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and harmonious form of patriotism”.44 In fact, neo-eurasianism does not involve the forfeiting of Russia’s sacred role, with reference to its historical attachment to the defense of the Orthodox religion. This alliance therefore is not simply based on an objective interest to fight against American hegemony, but also, according to the neo-eurasianists, on a conception of a common society, closer to traditional values than those proposed by the Catholic Church or Protestant sects. Thus, Islam appears as both an essential element for Eurasian identity and also a reality Moscow has to cope with. Even if Russia continues to have a certain defiance towards Islam, principally concerning the Central Asian and Caucasian peoples, and also memories of the Afghanistan war, neo-eurasianism has brought both Russia and Muslims together by positioning the former at the geopolitical center of its preoccupations and by offering Islam an important role in national identity. Indeed, neo-eurasianism relies on a religious, civilizational culturalism, using the notion of ‘Sobornost’ which could be translated by “unity”, or “togetherness”, meaning a collective unity between God and the Russian people. To better appreciate the lasting relation between Russia and the Muslim world, it should be remembered there is no “civilizational border” stricto sensu to the South of the country: it incorporates a number of Muslims from the Caucasus, while the Armenians and the Georgians, both Christian peoples, are from the other side of the borders. Via the link it makes between Russian centrality and that of Islam in Asia, the attraction of the neo-eurasianist discourse has spread to the Muslims within the country. This can be seen in the interest their representatives have for it, even radicalizing it to gain greater public audience. For example, Geidar Djemal, the chairman of the Islamic Committee of Russia and a neo-eurasianist hard liner, affirms that the “only way for Russia to avoid geopolitical disappearance is to become a Muslim State”.45 He also advocates the abandoning of traditional weapons and their orthodox symbolism in favor of a multi-confessional content.46 Even if very few neo-eurasianists would ever go so far, they do stand apart from other movements through the importance they give to the alliance with the Muslim world:

44  Talgat Tadžuddin,,“Evrazijstvo est’ samyj garmoničnyj I iskrennij rossijskij patriotizm” [Eurasianism is the most harmonious and sincere of Russian patriotism], 30 May 2002, available at: http://evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=737. 45  Gejdar Djemal, Nezavissimaja gazeta, 31 January 1992. Quoted by Marlène Laruelle, “Jeux de miroir. L’idéologie eurasiste et les allogènes de l’empire russe “, Cahiers d’études sur la Méditeranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, No. 28, June-December 1999, pp. 207-29, p. 225. Our translation. 46  Gejdar Djemal, “Gejdar Džemal’ trebuet ubrat’ s gerba Rossii pravoslabnuû simboliku” [Gejdar Djemal ask to remove Orthodox symbols from Russia’s coat of arms], 6 December 2005, available at: http://www.polit.ru/news/2005/12/06/gaydar.popup.html.

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A union with around one billion people who represent today a stand against American hegemony [is necessary, and without which] Russia is simply not in a position to survive as a key figure of History.47

Consequently, some Muslim populations which were attracted by nationalism following the fall of the USSR have shown some interest in the neo-eurasianist model. This is the case for some 5.5 million Tatars who adopted Islam at the beginning of the 10th century. Tatarstan represents the most advanced laboratory for re-appropriation by the local elite of an eurasianism that for many was considered too Russian-based. This movement links a desire for local autonomy, as demonstrated during the discussions on the new constitution in 1993, and loyalty, since Tatarstan wants, in spite of everything else, to maintains relations with Russia.48 This reflects the idea that the empire, as defined by the neo-eurasianists, permits a different relation to sovereignty than that of modern Nation States, which think in terms of “separatism/regionalism” for the “smaller zones”.49 In their speeches of August 26, 2005, to celebrate the millennium of the foundation of the city of Kazan, both Vladimir Putin and Mintimer Shaimiev, the President of Tatarstan, acclaimed Lev Gumilev, the eurasianist theorist. Shaimiev declared on television: “we are only now beginning to realize the importance of this major philosopher”. The geopolitical situation of Tatarstan, close to Central Asia and Muscovite control, not far from the industrial regions of the Urals, combined with numerous and dynamic diasporas, makes it an important internal ally of neo-eurasianist thinking, just like the Yakutia-Sakha Republic.50 These regions use neo-eurasianist rhetoric which allows them to respond to the two fears of the Russian political leaders.51 Firstly, they exploit the precariousness of the status of world power, which is a major concern for the leaders. The fear of decline and the dissolution of the country in particular led to the election of Putin, whose slogan was “the restoration of the State”, during the 2000 presidential elections. Secondly, they exploit the fear of a massive migration out of Russia, whose population is in decline, in the face of the demographic movement of 47  Gejdar Djemal, “Vsemirnij tupik” [Global impasse], Zavtra, 12 March 2002, No. 11 (434). Our translation. 48 Their president was on the list of the “Fatherland” presidential party during the 1995 elections. 49 Remembering Dugin associated globalism to regionalism and separatism, while the empire is associated to traditionalism and ethnicism. See Osnovy geopolitiki [New Geopolitics], part 6 chapter 2, available at: http://www.geopolitika.ru/geop13.htm#2. 50  Yakutia or Sakha Republic is an immense region of North-East Siberia. It spreads over 3.1 million square kilometers (almost the equivalent of India). It was given the status of Autonomous Republic of the Soviet Union in 1922; it was renamed “Sakha” to designate the Yakuts in their own language. 51  Marlène Laruelle, “Jeux de miroir…”, op. cit., p. 220.

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Russian Muslims Just as the Mongols did not force the Russian populations to convert, the Eastern expansion of Muscovy has not led to forced conversions to the Orthodox religion. The expulsion of the Jews and Muslims from Spain during the 1492 Reconquista could be used as a comparison. Generally speaking, the neo-eurasianists like to think that the empire has developed almost naturally, hence the large numbers of Muslims living in Russia today (estimates vary between 15 and 23 million inhabitantsa). However, the census is imprecise since the criteria for identification is based on the ethnic belonging to peoples of Muslim tradition (of which there are around 40), which means systematically having to deduce the confession of the ethnic population. Among the main groups are the Tatars, Chuvash, Bashkirs, Volgaic peoples, Chechen, Kazakhs, Ingushes, etc. Also, conversions since 1990 to Islam must be included. Some regions are traditionally Muslim, for example the Volga or North Caucasus (Islam established itself here in the second half of the 7th century). Muslim presence is also growing in the major cities, first of all in Moscow, which has approximately 1 million followers, in Siberia, and in the Oblasts (administrative regions) of central Russia. During the 1980s there was a sort of return to religion partly thanks in part to Perestroika. Islam began to develop, as can be seen by the reopening of the Mosques and the madrasas (Koranic schools), the increasing numbers of pilgrims to the Mecca, and publications devoted to the Muslim religion. Its politicization is the result of influence on both domestic and foreign affairs. This was encouraged by foreign organizations such as the Islamic Development Bank or the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and many Muslim countries (mainly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran). This also favored the arrival of movements promoting the strict interpretation of Islam, such as Salafism and Wahhabism. At the same time, Russian Muslims were, because of the fall of the USSR, separated from their co-religionists of Central Asia and Transcaucasia (principally Azerbaijan) to become a less important minority compared to the “ethnic” Russians who represented almost four fifths of the federation. What is more, the Caucasian Muslims saw their social situation decline when, like the Chechens, they did not survive the ravages of a terrible conflict. a Aleksej Malašenko, one of the most well-known Russian experts on Islam estimates their number at around 20 million. See “Islam v Rossii” [Islam in Russia], Svobodnaâ mysl’, No. 10 (1488) 1999, p. 44.

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Muslim populations in the south. Consequently, only inclusive and non-hostile policies with regards Islam could benefit the country. Neo-eurasianism offers leaders a geo-strategic vision aimed at liberating non-Western civilizations from globalization, and tries to get closer to Muslim countries, by benefiting from the widening gap between the latter and the United States:52 with a priority for the Central Asian republics since they belong to the “Steppes region”, then the Gulf states of the “desert region”. In such a framework, a partnership with Iran can be considered as one of the trump cards for Russian diplomacy. As Zyuganov announced, even before the arrival of the Bush Administration, in the present conditions, at a time when the United states are clearly targeting global hegemony, Russia and the Islamic world have no other choice than to become strategic allies since both parties have a mutual interest in avoiding such an evolution of events”.53

This desire for dialogue with the Muslim world, borne by the neo-eurasianists, became apparent on an institutional level with the presence of Vladimir Putin at the August 2003 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting. Invited by the Organization to the 10th Islamic summit in Kuala Lumpur, the president reaffirmed the relations: “for many centuries, Russia, as a Eurasian nation, has had traditional, natural ties with the Islamic world”.54 So, Russia’s intention is clear, it wants regular contact, based on common foundations, with the Muslim world. Being allies of the Muslim world, has led the neo-eurasianists to attribute the responsibility of terrorism to an Atlanticist policy which has driven Muslims to violence despite themselves. What is more, the American financial backing behind this global enemy is brandished to better serve their plans for domination. For the neo-eurasianists, it represents more a conspiracy than simply foreign policy. However, the very existence of this terrorism means they have to make distinctions at the heart of Islam which cannot be considered a block. For a neo-eurasianist like Primakov, Islamic terrorism does not come from a form of aggressiveness that is co-substantial to Islam, but rather the social and geopolitical situation of the Arab 52 A Centre Levada poll of 1584 people made between January 9 and 13, 2004 revealed that for 43 percent of those interviewed, it was necessary to profit from the conflict between the west and the Muslim world, for 18 percent, Syria, Libya and Iraq were traditional Russian allies, while 30 percent expressed no opinion. It should not be forgotten however that the poll did not ask people to choose between the Muslim world and the West: subsequently it could simply reveal a pragmatic rather than ideological stance. 53  Guennadi Ziouganov, La Russie après l’an 2000. Vision géopolitique d’un nouvel Etat, Morsang-sur-Orge, Mithec, 1999. Translated from Russian by Michel Secinsky, p. 187. Our translation. 54 Speech available on the Kremlin website at: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/ speeches/2003/10/16/1452_54129.shtml. Our translation.

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world that is the result of the unfinished modernization process begun by Kemal in Turkey and Nasser in Egypt, but also the continuing Israeli-Palestine conflict. The mass terrorism of today has its roots in the Cold War, even if its dimensions make it a new phenomenon. According to the former Prime Minister, the “War on Terror” led by the Americans following September 2001 targets a real problem but offers bad solutions, marked by a unilateralism that tends to nourish the problem it aims at ending. Moreover, for Primakov, the techno-military operations that were decided unilaterally, without consideration for the possible political solutions, risk undermining the solidity of the international coalition. Vladimir Putin had a lot of trouble to have his support for the United States accepted at a time that the United States were questioning the 1972 ABM treaty, the basis for nuclear disarmament.55 The most virulent neo-conservatives criticized the choice of the Kremlin concerning the positioning of American troops in Central Asia. The Russian-American alliance, led by Putin following September 11th in the name of the fight against “Islamic terrorism” has since been referred to as a “fatal mistake”. Indeed, the neo-eurasianists are opposed to a tainted vision of neoconservatism that makes “Islamic-Fascism”56 a totalitarian enemy: for Dugin, the equation “Islamism = fascism” represents a conceptual invention of the globalists who need an enemy to continue unipolarity under the American aegis. The neo-eurasianists globally denounce the “Christian solidarity” proposed by the West as opposed to the “Islamic threat”. Thus, in November 2001, a short time after the attacks on New York, Dugin proposed the following:57 either Bin Laden is operating alone, which should benefit the neo-eurasianists since an atlanticist renegade58 becomes an objective ally; or he is not and the Kremlin has committed a fatal mistake, a position he personally supports. If there is no Bin Laden, then we have been deceived and have been pushed into counting a chimera (Islamic radicalism) as a reality, and a reality (eurasianism) as a chimera.

55  For Grigori Iavlinski, the meeting, organized shortly after the September 11 attacks, between Presidents of parliamentary groups, plus a few governors, produced the following results: two people called for solidarity with the United States, one for Al Qaeda, and eighteen recommended neutrality. Quoted by Daniel Vernet, La Russie de Vladimir Poutine: l’héritier du despotisme oriental se tourne vers l’Occident, Paris, IFRI, 2002, p. 12. 56  Alexander Dugin, “Malyj šaytan islamo-fašisma”, [Little knight of Islamofascism] 18 November 2002, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file= article&sid=830. 57  Alexander Dugin, “Bin Laden – to Be or not to Be”, 14 November 2001, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=411. 58 Bin Laden fought against the USSR in Afghanistan with the complicity of the United States.

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This has led to the creation of “geopolitical terror”.59 September 11th blurred somewhat the “atlanticism = Wahhabism” equation. Later, in an interview in August 2004, Dugin did not refute the reality of international terrorism but underlined its instrumentalization by the United States: Of course, there is terrorism and terrorists; however, this is not the kind of global enemy that America claims, in its bid to consolidate its global domination.60

According to the same Dugin, September 11th, also meant making the distinction between “atlanticism” and globalism or globalization. The first operates on the dual mode of thalassocracy and refers to a geopolitical rivalry: its borders are protected while the majority of the conflicts occur in foreign lands. Globalism on the other hand, represents a homogenization of the space and territory: the borders between the elements (Sea-Land) are progressively weakened, with, as a consequence, an extension of the field of domination and a reduction of security in the center.61 More moderately, Primakov also spoke out against the current American administration, whose understanding of the Arab world appears less acute than their interests in the oil industry. In his opinion, understanding the Muslims and their interaction with the rest of the world requires distinguishing the “fundamentalists” from the “extremists”62. If the former underline their concern for a life stamped with religion, the latter incarnate a puritan and anachronistic vision of history. This distinction finds all its worth in the relations with Iran, which belongs to the “fundamentalist” camp rather than the “extremist” one. Even if they accept the traditional values of a certain Islam, the neo-eurasianists are systematically critical of Wahhabism, which they consider as a sectarian branch of Islam, in a way similar to Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. Wahhabism had specific relations with the British Empire, then the United States, and the link between the puritan and reformed culture of this form of Islam and the Anglo-Saxon culture is clear to them. Subsequently, whether it was to destroy the Ottoman Empire or to keep the USSR out of Afghanistan, this conservative movement has received massive support from the maritime Empires, the “thalassocracies” to use the neo-conservative term. The fundamental duality between thalassocracy and tellurocracy refers to two forms of Islam, of which only one is acceptable for eurasianist minds. 59  Alexander Dugin, “Geopolitika terrora” [Geopolitical terror], 2001, available at: http://evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=604. 60  “Eurasia and Europe should cooperate against America” interview with Alexander Dugin, 19 August 2004, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&f ile=article&sid=1911. 61 Ibid. 62  Yevgeny Primakov, A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Washington D.C., The Nixon Center: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, pp. 27-30.

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The neo-eurasianist Orientalist Khydar Imamovic remarks that in Europe, the major religions are often divided in two:63 Judaism has the Ashkenazi and Sephardic branches, Christianity the Catholics and Orthodox Churches. He also adds that the penetration of Islam into Europe followed two different paths, opposing the land and the sea: from the West, with the Saracens and the Moros, with North Africa and Spain, and from the East, the Tatars, in Anatolia, the Balkans and from Central Asia. More globally, the “Tatars” include the Kurds, the Persians and other IndoEuropean and Turkic peoples converted to Islam: similarities exist in as much as they have all integrated certain pre-Islamic elements into their faiths. On the contrary, again according to Imamovic, the “New Saracens” from the Anglo-Saxon countries have chosen to give a “modern dimension” to Islam which distances them from the “Islamic traditionalists” or fundamentalists. The latter are seen as a possible solution to the rise of “extremist” Wahhabic movements and are the main allies of the neo-eurasianists, particularly in Central Asia and Iran. There is no real general agreement concerning this interpretation of Islam, particularly among the moderate neo-eurasianists since it combines elements that are difficult to associate: a fundamental determinism (the land-sea opposition) with a strong presupposition (Wahhabism as an atlanticist invention). The study of the neo-eurasianist vision of religion must be differentiated: in the post-Soviet space, the approach the neo-eurasianists defend can be defined as hegemonic. Obviously this does not mean the rebuilding of the USSR (none of the independent States, with the exception perhaps of Byelorussia, want to give up their sovereignty), but rather the renewal of the traditional sources of influence and to make Russia the regional hegemon. Putin and supporters of the revival of the State and its international status are aware of its current limits: thus the neo-eurasianist doctrine encompasses the real possibilities of the Kremlin via a regional approach. In July 2004, the president reminded his ambassadors during a congress that Russia needed to exploit its central position in Eurasia to weigh upon the international scene.64 Following this global presentation of the neoconservative and neo-eurasianist approaches to the Muslim world, we shall now assess them in more detail by analyzing two geopolitical sub-groups: Central Asia with Turkey and the Middle East.

63  Khaydar Imamovic, “Beyond Wahhabism. Islam in Eurasia in the Next Future: Tatars and the “New” Saracens”, 2001, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php? name=News&file=print&sid=451. 64 See Cyrille Gloaguen,”Les tropismes centre-asiatiques de la Russie”, Défense nationale, No. 11, November 2004, pp. 89-95, p. 94.

Chapter 7

Turkey and Central Asia According to Richard Holbrooke, who shares many common ideas with the neoconservatives, Turkey is a “pivot State” located between Europe and an Arab and Persian Middle East that is quite hostile towards American foreign policy. The neo-eurasianist position, which in the past was extremely cautious with regards the Turkish Atlanticist power, now sees the situation in a new light. Following the decline of the Soviet rival, Washington invited the Central Asian countries, the majority of which are Turkic, with the exception of Tajikistan, to follow the Turkish, Kemalist example, rather than the Iranian Islamist alternative. This is precisely the neoconservative position, explained in the works of Bernard Lewis who describes the conflict at the heart of Islam as “a war between Kemalism and Khomeynism”. In fact, the nodal character of Turkey in the Central Asian zone was not unfamiliar to the United States. It has extremely strong strategic ties with Azerbaijan and economic links with all the Central Asian Republics. As the first Muslim country to officially recognize the Jewish State in 1949, Turkey is well-disposed towards it, unlike the rest of the Muslim world. The concomitant alliance for the recognition of Israel was extended by a military agreement in February 1996 which illustrates the American involvement in relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Indeed, Washington removed all geopolitical barriers for the completion of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline linking the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. On the other hand, when Kyrgyzstan recognized Jerusalem, the third holy city of Islam, as the capital of the Jewish State, demonstrations broke out in many Muslim countries. The neoconservative approach therefore opposes a Turkic area that is considered an “ally” in the “war against terrorism” against a hostile Arab-Persian world. Turkey is not distinguished from its strategic environment, but is under close observation. As for the neo-eurasianists, they clearly distinguish Turkey from their former Central Asian Empire. Indeed, since the Russian-Ottoman conflicts of the 18th century, Ankara has continued to represent the enemy of the past. Moreover, Turkey was a key member of the atlanticist movement during the Cold War, before adopting a new position in more recent years. Central Asia, however, represents a   Fawaz Gerges, America and Political Islam. Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 195.  Bernard Lewis, The Future of the Middle East, London, Phoenix House, 1997, p. 13.  Bülent Aras, The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey’s Position, Portland, Franck Cass Publishers, 2002, pp. 56-7 and 60-63.

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key strategic position for a return to regional hegemony; with it, Moscow can not legitimately hope to have a leading position on the world stage. In the pages that follow, we shall analyze the Turkic area as a region with imperial or hegemonic potential, depending on the perspective: neoconservative or neo-eurasianist. We shall distinguish the situations of Turkey and of Central Asia to identify the rivalries and differences in perspective of both sides. For the neo-eurasianists, the distinction is explicit, as we have seen, but it is not absent from the neoconservative vision, which has always granted a particular status to Turkey, at the center of a Turkic geocultural region that has long been seen as a whole. Turkey: Former Neoconservative Ally, Future Eurasianist Pillar? As we have already mentioned, Turkey is a special State in the eyes of the imperialist-democrats, since it represents an alternative to Iran with a modern approach to the civil war between Islamists and non-Islamists that is happening in the Muslim world. This approach only goes to strengthen the idea that, for the neoconservatives, it is all a question of “rogue states” and allied states, with little consideration for public opinion in the Muslim world. However, the affinity for Ankara is not unconditional. The AEI and the PNAC are supporting a Turkey that is firmly set in Kemalism, is controlled by the army and in the sphere of influence of Washington. They believe Turkish secularism allows the country to threaten the Islamists, whereas deeper analysis would show that the relatively advanced democratization of the nation within the Muslim world allowed it to avoid similar tensions to those in Egypt and Algeria. This democracy has nonetheless allowed a moderate Islamist, or “Muslimdemocrat” party to accede to power, much to the neoconservatives’ displeasure. For them, the government has a “secret Islamist agenda” which would explain Turkey’s refusal to allow American troops to cross its territory during the 2003 war on Iraq. Just as the representativeness and the legitimacy of the ruling party, its desire to join the European Union, is not really taken seriously: contrary to what people believe, the neoconservatives are not necessarily in favor of its adhesion. They think the Copenhagen criteria and EU membership will push Turkey towards a democratization that will lead to an Islamization that has until now been prevented by the army. Let us not return once again to the short term prophecies of an Islamization of Europe as set out by their intellectual leader Bernard Lewis, which   Daniel Pipes, “Islam’s Intramural Struggle”, National Interest, Summer 1994.   Daniel Pipes, “Turkey’s Radical Turn”, New York Post, 5 August 2003.   Cf. the article by Daniel Pipes, “Is Turkey Going Islamist?”, New York Sun, 7 June 2005, available at: http://www.danielpipes.org/article/2670.   Christopher Caldwell, “The Turkey Paradox”, The Weekly Standard, 26 July 2004.

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become applicable to Turkey if it accepts the European framework. Likewise, they fear that, by following public opinion, the government will distance itself from the policy of an alliance with Israel that is considered vital. A policy to distance itself from America, its main local ally, and to move closer to Europe and also the Muslim world is portrayed as a global “neo-ottoman” vision that is dangerous for American interests. The neoconservatives want Turkey to reaffirm its intention to be their ally and not to join “Old Europe”.10 To boost the Ankara-Washington alliance, the imperialist-democrats are prepared to recognize that both sides have committed wrongs and that the White House should support Turkey in their fight against the Kurdish PKK independence movement. Moscow, on the other hand, played an active part in the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire and was for a long time closely involved in the “Eastern issue”. The genealogical similarities of the two States, their geographical situation between Europe and Asia, their imperial past,11 their revolutions following the First World War did nothing to remove a form of mutual suspicion. This long-standing rival (seven armed conflicts12) which stood for an uncompromising Atlanticism during the Cold War is still the cause of suspicion for the neo-eurasianists, particularly since pan-Turkism (the union of Turkic peoples) represents a real alternative to their political project. And this does not include the former bones of contention that were rekindled in the 1990s, for example the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh between the Armenians (supported by Russia) and the Azeris (supported by Turkey). The disintegration of Yugoslavia revived an old conflict concerning the Balkans, with the same traditional allies, the Serbs for Moscow, the Bosnians and Albanese for Ankara.   The joint reference of relations between the neoconservatives and Turkey and Israel reveals a paradox in their approach that is significant of the selective process they apply. Whereas the holocaust is reason enough for lasting relations with Israel, the Armenian genocide is never mentioned. This denial of recognition led to Bernard Lewis, a key neoconservative intellectual, being condemned by the French courts on 21 June 1995. And if this approach favors a strategic Turko-Israeli alliance, it is in total contradiction with the official position of the International Association of Genocide Scholars which addressed a letter to the Turkish president reminding him that hundreds of historians throughout the world approved of the qualification of genocide.  Michael Rubin, “Shifting Sides?”, National Review Online, 10 August 2004. 10  Ugur Ziyal, “Perspectives in Turkish Foreign Policy”, speech made at the AEI, 17 June 2003. 11 Alexander Dugin, Evrazijskij zavet I geopolitika Turcii [Eurasianist and geopolitical testament of Turkey], 28 January 2004, available at:http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?n ame=News&file=article&sid=1660. 12  For the following developments, see: Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Oles M. Smolansky, Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran, NewYork, Sharpe, 1995, p. 3 and after.

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Pan-Turkism did not last long due to political and economic differences, and new Russian-Turkish relations became possible; after analysis, some similarities do become evident, on a political and ideological level, concerning common problems such as separatist, Kurd or Chechen terrorism. The decline of the USSR therefore created new possibilities for cooperation between the two countries, including on a strategico-military level,13 in relation to Iraq in 1991 and 2003, or to the development of relations with Iran. For Dugin, the time has come for Turkey to understand that a certain number of Europeans still consider Turkey as “the Other” and to opt for a “Eurasian” orientation.14 For him, there are many explanations for this: geographical and historical, Turkish oriental origins, the economy (to shed off the yoke of globalized economic structures) and the will to develop a new world in which Turkey would be a central figure. The creation of a Moscow-Ankara axis is very much sought after since their alliance would be a major geopolitical change in the region, giving new strategic importance to the two partners15 to the detriment of the United States. Many highranking members of the Turkish army, including generals and commanders, and members of the National Security Council, are aware of the potentialities of an alliance with Moscow.16 The neo-eurasianists hope to pressure Ankara into consolidating their influence in Central Asia, which explains the drawing together of the two parties, notably with Putin’s visit to Ankara in December 2004. As for Turkey, it would probably be in favor of a new eurasianism17 following the war in Iraq. The incredible success (hundreds of thousands of copies sold) of a book by Orkun Ukar and Burak Turna, Metal Fιrtιna (Metal Storm) indicates just this: in the story, Turkey 13  The first sale of weapons from Russia to a NATO country took place in 1993 between Russia and Turkey. See Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 2002, pp. 294-95. 14  “Obraŝenie partii “Evraziâ” k evrazijcam Turcii” [Appeal from the “Eurasia” party to Turkish eurasianists], 6 September 2002, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules. php?name=News&file=article&sid=500. See also Alexander Dugin, “Tureckij gambit” [The Turkish gambit], 12 January 2005, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php? name=News&file=article&sid=2157. 15  Valentin Prussakov, “Dolgij put’ v Evropu (Turciâ)” [The long road to Europe (Turkey)], Zavtra, No. 52 (527), 23 December 2003. See also, in two parts: Alexander Dugin, “Os’ Moskva-Ankara” [Axe Moscou-Ankara], 6 December 2004, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2093 and http://www. evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2094. 16  Al’bert Černyšëv, “Evrazijskaâ Rossiâ – Evraziskaâ Turciâ” [Eurasianist Russia– Eurasianist Turkey], 15 March 2003. Available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?na me=News&file=article&sid=1068. 17  Alexander Dugin, “Turciâ na Evrazijskom viraže” [Turkey on an eurasianist turning point], 18 March 2003, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name= News&file=article&sid=1074.

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is at war with Washington, and ends up creating an alliance with Moscow, sealing the “reconciliation of the Orthodox world with Istanbul”18 against the American neoconservatives who are seeking to impose world domination. Turna even suggests an alliance with Russia, India and China, the “Primakov Triangle”. He writes that Turkey’s future does not lie in its relations with the United States and the European Union but in an “Eastern alliance”. Subsequently, eurasianist ideology is beginning to interest political leaders more and more,19 both the non-religious left and the nationalists, like the Workers’ Party20 or the Muslim-democrats of Erdogan21 or Süleyman Demirel, the former President (1993-2000).22 Obviously, these different groups turn to eurasianism for different, even incompatible reasons, which just illustrates its syncretic vocation. The first discover an ambitious nationalism, the second the rehabilitation of a spiritual principle in a secularized republic, and the last who is concerned about the geopolitical interests of the country. Central Asia: The “Great Game” and the Rise of China The notion of Central Asia as a distinct region of the world was first introduced by the German geographer Alexander von Humboldt in the 19th century. It has some similarities, concerning the nomadic populations and the Silk Route, which makes it difficult to unanimously fix any real boundaries: in the USSR, Kazakhstan was not included in Central Asia, but the UNESCO definition takes the region as far as Mongolia, Afghanistan, to the north of India and Pakistan, and also Eastern China. Our definition is limited by the post-Soviet States: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Our analysis first shows that this area, which is central to the definition of the neo-eurasianists hegemonic policy, also plays an important part in the objectives of the neoconservatives. This takes us to look at the “Great Game” the two intellectual movements are playing and whose objectives give increasing importance to China. To speak 18  Dan Bilefsky, “Turks embrace novelist war on EU”, International Herald Tribune, 13 October 2005. 19  “Turciâ: bum Evrazijskoj Idei” [Turkey: the boom of eurasianist thinking], 16 December 2003. Available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=art icle&sid=1607. 20  “Vstreča predstavitelâ Evrazijskogo dviženiâ s rukovodstvom Rabočej partii Turcii” [Meeting between representatives of the eurasianist movement and leaders of the Workers Party], 22 October 2003, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name =News&file=article&sid=1496. 21  Evgenij Baxrevskij (SPB), “Rezul’taty vyborov v Turcii: na ûge Evrazii peremeny?” [Results of the elections in Turkey: changes in southern Eurasia?], 30 November 2002, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=847. 22  “Evrazijskoe turne A.G. Dugina po Turcii” [Dugin’s eurasianist tour of Turkey], 13 December 2004, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file= article&sid=2116.

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Turkish Eurasianisma The development of Turkish eurasianism constitutes an original phenomenon since it imagines a common future between Russia and Turkey, countries that were so often opposed in the past. It also represents an example of “post-imperial traumatism”, similar to that of post-Soviet Russia: both states had to find their own way, without being “re-educated” like Germany and Japan after the Second World War. Turkish eurasianism is thus based on a reinterpretation of history, the Russians and Turks not being eternal enemies but naïve states manipulated by Westerners, notably the French and the English. The principal theorist, Attila Ilhan (1925-2005), one of the greatest Turkish poets of the 20th century, already defended this anticonformist position during the Cold War years, even if they were stained by Russophobia. The post 1989 years, with the development of RussoTurkish relations helped strengthen this movement. To a pan-Turkism on the decline, pan-Islamism and westernism, eurasianism represented a “fourth pole” to the Turkish ideological and strategic scene. Post-Ottoman, it distinguishes itself from pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism since it does not make Turkey the leader of a block, just the most influential partner, second to Russia. Thus, it is perfectly compatible with Russian neo-eurasianism. Both have antagonistic relations with westernism. The EU’s agreement in December 2004 for the opening of negotiations for Turkey’s membership does not put an end to Turkish eurasianism, since the “privileged partnership” is not excluded if negotiations fail by some European politicians. See Sener Akturk, “Counter-Hegemonic Visions and Reconciliation through the Past: The Case of Turkish Eurasianism”, Ab imperio, 2004/4, pp. 207-238.

a

of the “Great Game” to designate a struggle for power (with reference to the Anglo-Russian “Great Game” of the 19th century), is not an anachronism given the underlying tensions in Russia and China in relation to the American intruder following the creation of American military bases in the region.23 This imperial policy will be dealt with later based on the study of each of the States in the region.

23  For more information, see Didier Chaudet and Sabrina Vidalenc, “Les Empires sur la Route de la Soie: Etats-Unis, Russie, Chine dans un nouveau Grand Jeu en Asie Centrale”, Eurorient, No. 20, Winter 2005, pp. 133-83.

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Central Asia is today a strategic area, both for the neo-eurasianists and the neoconservatives, even if the interest of the latter is more recent. Before, the neoconservatives were essentially preoccupied by Turkey and the Arab world. Recent papers produced by their journals and think tanks suggest however increasing interest for the region. For them, Central Asia is important, first for its natural resources which could be imagined as an alternative to the Oil States of the Arab peninsula, and also as a battlefield between what they refer to as “Western democracy” and “Islamo-fascism”.24 For this, it becomes a zone for democratization, in other words, imperialization, for an Empire whose project can be construed as such. As for the neo-eurasianists, the region is of key importance and they consider it as an integral part of Moscow’s sphere of influence. Indeed, Central Asia, for them, evokes “Turkestan”, a strategic region for centuries at the heart of Eurasia, at the crossroads of civilizations and trade (for example the mythical “Silk Route”).25 Once again, Atlanticism is the designated enemy to explain the break up of the Central Asian zone that has occurred to the detriment of eurasianist presence: in the first years of “sovereignty”, [following the dissolution of the USSR], the ideological and political expansion […] of globalization was guaranteed […] [ thanks to] ethnic and religious ties via Turkish and Saudi Arabian channels, and economically, with the help of the “Boukhara mafia”.26

Here, the Turks and Saudi Arabians are quite simply associated to Atlanticist nations that are marked with a similar civilization. The Eurasian hegemonic project must win them back or admit defeat. This is hegemonic nationalism with its horizon of regional conquest. The neoconservatives go further by including Iran and Afghanistan. The latter would benefit from a sufficiently safe environment to consolidate the peace that should result from the present campaign. Their perception of Central Asia has been built around these objectives. It involves avoiding that these States become the prey of extremist Islamic movements or fall into a state of decay, to become shelters for transnational terrorist movements such as Al Qaeda. In the face of what is perceived as homogenous Islamic fundamentalism, the instigator of September 11th and the face of the enemy in the “War on Terrorism”, it is normal for the neoconservatives that the American army is present there and that they are there for an unlimited period.27 This creates a paradoxical situation is as much the primary 24  Ami Horowitz, “Kazakhstan’s Run”, The Weekly Standard, 11 August 2003. 25  Alexander Borodaj, Vladimir Andreev, Alexander Rudakov, “Srednââ Aziâ v tiskah Peremen” [Central Asia stuck in change], Zavtra, No. 23 (340), 6 June 2000. 26  Nikolaj Kon’kov, “Strategiâ razrušeniâ” [Strategy of destruction], Zavtra, 12 March 2002. Our translation. 27  Elie Krakowsky, “How to Win the Peace in Afghanistan”, The Weekly Standard, 1 July 2002.

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mission of the American Empire is to ensure peace through a military presence by winning the “War on Terrorism”. But we come up against the nationalist basis we detected at the origin of such a policy. Over and above any preferences in favor of one or the other of these States – Stephen Schwartz for example developed a proUzbek approach – the most widely upheld opinion is that the United States must first operate for themselves, without necessarily taking the geo-strategic intrigues of the States involved into consideration. Washington has to give itself the means required to impose its projects, or at least to play the role of arbitrator in conflicts between the various regional powers. In this new “Great Game”, the neoconservatives distinguish three opponents to Western influence as represented by the United States: Russia, China and Iran. First, the former hegemon is considered in different ways, and often with great mistrust. Some plead in favor of selective collaboration, to the detriment of the alliance with Uzbekistan which is thought of as dangerous:28 the Russians would conserve their regional political supremacy while harmonizing their interests with those of America.29 But Moscow, like Beijing and Tehran, is seen above all as an opponent to the ideals promoted by the United States.30 Moreover, the neoconservatives are not convinced by the position of the Kremlin with regards its Muslim populations.31 Thus, whereas Moscow has never really considered the late Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov as a legitimate representative, the majority of Washington-based political analysts, including some imperial-democrats, do not liken him to the “Wahhabi”, who have consistently been subjected to public obloquy. If radical Islamism really is a common enemy for Moscow and Washington, for the neoconservatives, the Russians are clearly responsible in part for the persistent hostilities among the Chechen fighters, which distances Putin even further from the democratic crusade they have set out to lead. The idea of a future partnership subsequently becomes much less attractive.32 When all is said and done, this imperialist-democratic vision is not very far from an underlying movement that has existed in the United States since the start of the 1990s: to consider Russia

28  Uzbekistan has difficult relations with Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, two countries which are clearly located within the Russian orbit. Growing tensions, particularly between Tashkent and Dushanbe, could have sparked off a crisis in Russian-American relations if the Americano-Uzbek strategic alliance had gone ahead. 29  Frederick Kagan, “Afghanistan – and Beyond. A Long-term U.S. Strategy for Central Asia”, The Weekly Standard, 22 November 2001. See also Charles Krauthammer, “The Real New World Order”, The Weekly Standard, 12 December 2001. 30  Ami Horowitz, “Kazakhstan’s Run”, The Weekly Standard, 11 August 2003. 31 See in particular Stephen Schwartz, “Trust, But Verify”, The Weekly Standard, 26 November 2001. 32  Victorino Matus, “Terror in the Aisles”, The Weekly Standard, 23 October 2003.

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a fundamentally imperialistic country from the moment it strays from American interest.33 China is associated to the coalition the neoconservatives hope to set up to help in the rebuilding process of Afghanistan. This in itself is proof that collaboration is possible, even if a feeling of mistrust continues to dominate the situation.34 China represents the perfect new enemy following the decline of the USSR. For many years it represented the ideal target for the American Right as the future rival, but also for a part of the Left. During the Clinton administration, all sinologists were gradually replaced by general analysts with little or no precise knowledge of the region, but who were extremely skilled in highlighting any potential threat that China represent for the United States. From this time on, the image of China that was presented to the world was more ideological than academic. In 1999, the Fox Commission, under the influence of the Republicans, went as far as to suggest that every Chinese person entering the United States as a tourist or otherwise should be considered a spy.35 Only September 11th and the idea that it would be too difficult to resist a Russian-Chinese association managed to lead to an easing in relations, however slight that may be. Despite all of this, for the neoconservatives, the Russians, like the Chinese, can help in the war against terrorism whilst any form of collaboration with Iran is simply out of the question. The international coalition for the rebuilding of Afghanistan and the stabilization of Central Asia excludes outright any Iranian participation, a fortiori, since the arrival of the ultra-conservative President, Ahmadinejad. Tehran is exclusively perceived as a disruptive factor for peace hopes in the region, despite its past opposition to the Taliban and the part it played in the return of peace in Tajikistan. Alongside this outright opposition, the neoconservatives do not hesitate to promote a whole series of untruths, for example Iran’s supposed support for the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan. By simply remembering that the same movement received support from the Taliban (the enemy of the Iranian Shiite revolution) and that it was against an end to the civil war in Tajikistan, helps to understand the absurdity of the situation.36 Such reasoning with regards the Central Asian situation only goes to prove the deep-rooted opposition of the neoconservatives for the Khomeini regime. This obsessive fear takes us back to the ideological dimension we analyzed at the root of pseudo-imperial nationalism. Its geopolitical expression is, as expected, opposed to Realpolitik thinking. 33  Leon Aron, “The (Russian) Empire Strikes Again”, The Weekly Standard, 10 November 2003. 34  Victorino Matus, “Terror in the Aisles”, op. cit. 35 Anatol Lieven, Le nouveau nationalisme américain, Paris, J.C. Lattès, 2005, pp. 351-53. 36 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad, the Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 145.

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The neo-eurasianist regional vision is that of a former Empire: it hopes to retain a maximum of influence over its former territories and as far as possible to counter any involvement of the United States which would prevent the setting up of a multipolar order in which Russia would have a positive and leading role. This position is also closely linked to the issue of regional security and stability. Indeed, the neoeurasianists fear a “balkanization of Eurasia” following September 11th, resulting from increased American presence in the region. Such a conflicting process is greatly encouraged by the Atlanticist forces. To back up this theory they refer to Brzezinski who has been noted as saying that Central Asia should become a zone of permanent conflict, a terrain of “small and medium intensity”37 wars to prevent the emergence of an anti-American block in Eurasia. The American intervention in Afghanistan therefore aimed at compromising cooperation in matters of defense and the Iranian-Russian partnership. The neo-eurasianists base their interventionism in Central Asia on a concern for peace in the peripheral regions. The fundamental geopolitical opposition between an Empire that is trying to transform the world and a hegemon that is striving to preserve a balance becomes visible. However, historically speaking, Russian regional strategy remains marked by a certain voluntarism whenever danger threatens its borders. This real concern already existed at the time of Prince Gorchakov, Foreign Affairs Minister, who, in 1864, signed a memorandum justifying expansion into Asia and the Caucasus. The situation of Russia in Central Asia is similar to that of any civilized state that enters into contact with savage nomadic tribes that lack any form of social organization … Consequently, the State must decide: to put an end to its efforts and leave its borders under constant threat, which means prosperity, security and cultural progress all become impossible; or to push further into the wild territories, whereby the increasing distances increase the difficulties and trials …38

This dilemma is characteristic of an imperial movement, borne by a vocation, but resulting from a conferred political arbitration, whose intention is to revive those in favor of an imperial cause. However, it is no longer at work in neoeurasianist geo-policy other than at a state of echoes of a glorious past. Today, any voluntarism is displayed in the game of alliances and a concern to preserve a sphere of influence. The project for the restoration of Moscow inside the zone, both on a military level and among the international organizations, seems to divide

37  The term “Eurasian Balkans” is used in particular by Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Great Chessboard – American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York, HarperCollins Publishers, 1997. Alexander Dugin, “Will There Be a War in Central Asia?”, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=434. 38  Quoted by Marie-Pierre Rey, De la Russie à l’Union Soviétique, la construction d’un Empire, 1462-1953, Paris, Hachette, 1994, pp. 150-51. Our translation.

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the Muscovite intelligentsia.39 The new concept of foreign policy, presented in June 2000, underlines the “geopolitical position of Russia, one of the greatest Eurasian powers”, which would imply a responsibility to “guarantee security in the world, both internationally and regionally”.40 This is precisely the ambiguity of a hegemon which does not go beyond its regional boundaries but which believes it is the leader of a movement that could go beyond the boundaries and whose intention is to reaffirm its own identity as opposed to a globalized uniformity. The Kremlin continues to maintain a strong influence throughout parts of Central Asia, which obviously differs according to the countries, thanks to its troops, its minorities, the media and can also give a different sense to the American notion of “War on Terror” which is often perceived in the region as a “war against Islam”. Thus, Russia participates in the war against Islamist terrorists but tries to maintain good relations with the Muslim world. The war in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the impression of outright arrogance of the American administration, which has relied on authoritarian regimes in Central Asia since September 11th, and the dramatic socio-economic crisis the country is going through all create a form of pro-Soviet nostalgia, that is most apparent among the oldest inhabitants. Primakov had already redirected Russian policy towards Central Asian countries,41 hoping to put an end to the civil war that had ravaged Tajikistan from the fall of the Soviet Union to the peace agreement in 1997. His conception created some extremely interesting developments for the neo-eurasianists. He centered his foreign policy on two key directions, which were to be continued by his successors, principally by Putin. The first was for a strengthening of relations with those countries which had been marginalized by the West with its policy of isolating the “rogue states”, in particular Iran, but also Iraq and Syria, which at the same time developing relations and alliances with other non-Western countries. The second direction to be inaugurated by Primakov aimed at introducing an element of flexibility into the CIS structure to allow for more advanced relations with certain former Soviet Republics. After Primakov, Putin pushed hard for improved relations with Central Asia, just as the neo-eurasianists had requested. His first two state visits abroad as President took him, in May 2000, to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; both of which were desperately seeking emancipation. He used the Chechen issue to demonstrate that only he had the capacity to fight against the threats that international terrorism and radical Islamism represent. The President 39 The Russian military operations during Mobilnost’ 2004 [Mobility 2004], which took place between June 9 and 30, 2004, reflect Russian will to appear credible in terms of reaction to threat, and to justify its position in the region. See Cyrille Gloaguen, “Les tropismes centre-asiatiques de la Russie”, Défense nationale, No. 11, November 2004, pp. 89-95. 40  For the complete concept of foreign policy, see: http://www.mid.ru/mid/eng/ econcept.htm. 41 Roland Dannreuther, “Can Russia Sustain Its Dominance in Central Asia?”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 32, No. 2, June 2001, pp. 245-58, p. 249.

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believes, following the example of the neo-eurasianists, that if Russia wants to be seen once again as a super power, it must prove itself in Central Asia. The absence of any other serious candidate for regional hegemony, at least as long as China continues to not show any vague desires in the region, would seem to support this vision. However, the neo-eurasianists do not reduce relations between Moscow and its former Republics to a tête-à-tête, but rather they include Beijing, a fervent supporter of a multi-polar world. If relations with India are already old, the bilateral partnership with China was sought after throughout the 1990s, not only on a strategic level but also from an economic and political point of view. Indeed, over and above a tame CIS, which all said and done had led to the signing of the Collective Security Treaty, or “Tashkent Treaty” in 1992, Russia pushed for the creation of other organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 following the founding of the Shanghai Five in 1996. This organization, which at the outset was designed to coordinate the policies of Moscow and Beijing with relation to Central Asia has today developed enormously to become a reference for all players in the region. Both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan contacted it for information concerning the dismantling of American bases. Some analysts already refer to it as the “NATO of the East”42 following the first SinoRussian military operations involving several thousand troops which took place on August 18 2005 in Vladivostok, in the Far East. The neo-eurasianists have spread far and wide the multi-polar theme, which would appear to be gaining popularity among their strategic partners, particularly the long-standing ally that is India.43 The improved Sino-Indian relations that were hinted at by the visit of the Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao to New Delhi in April 2005 could even be considered as the birth of the Primakov’s famous “strategic triangle”. Let us assess the importance of these evolutions: China, India and Russia represent some 2.5 billion inhabitants and three nuclear arsenals, and also a serious threat to American supremacy in Eurasia. This was the Russian reaction to American comments concerning the meeting: 42 An example, the Christian Science Monitor of 26 October 2005, in an article “Russia, China looking to form ‘NATO of the East’?”. The Russian analysts quoted (Feodor Lukyanov, Sergei Karaganov, Alexander Dubnov and Alexander Dugin) explain their motivations to shed off American influence, particularly by using the SCO. 43  According to Sergueï Lounev, the Indian and Russian situations have a lot in common. “The political processes in Southern Asia are similar to the post-Soviet realities. This is due to a) the existence of a State that dominates all others economically, politically, intellectually and military-strategically, b) the community history of the countries of the region, c) the similarity between the cultures and civilizations, d) the ambition of the smaller countries to strengthen their geopolitical positions at the expense of the super power nations outside the region, e) the breaking off of economic relations within an economic complex that was once united”. Sergueï Lounev, “Le partenariat stratégique se cultive comme un jardin”, 5 January 2007, available at: http://fr.rian.ru/analysis/20070105/58045325.html

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one can imagine, behind the words of Henry Kissinger [“China : Containment Won’t Work”, Washington Post, 13 June 2005] a question of major concern, but unclear for all: is the Vladivostok meeting of representatives of the “troika” eurasianists in a position to bear not symbolic but material fruit? In the innermost reaches of his mind, the architect of the “détente” of the 1970s is certainly aware that it is the answer to this question (rather than relations between China and the United States as he writes) that will determine whether or not our children will witness a “new world order”, that is compatible with the common hopes for peace and progress.44

This Russian initiative could subsequently lead to a Eurasian pole of power that could nourish the project for a multi-polar world that corresponds to the wishes of the neo-eurasianists. If the analysis on the regional level confirms the opposition of the neoeurasianists to American imperialism, through the concern we have raised for establishing multi-polar globalization as opposed to a uniformization the Americans would create via a policy of alliances to develop the atlanticist-globalist camp, one should not believe the neoconservatives consider Moscow as anything more than a rival. Clearly Moscow is not the only opponent. It contributes to the War on Terrorism, but is clearly a rival whose political positions concerning Chechnya and in relation to Islam, an element that is so crucial to neoconservative thinking, oppose them. Once this rivalry has been brought to light with Turkey’s increasing interest in eurasianism to the detriment of the Americans, and the creation of a pole of eurasianist power around the SCO, we must now concentrate on the geopolitical effects. This will become clearer with an analysis of each country concerned. Central Asia: Between Ideology and Hegemonic Motivations Whereas the neoconservatives discover numerous influential networks by presenting themselves as partisans of the frenzied democratization of the Arabian Middle East, the “regime change”, they seemed, until recently, to ignore the political situation of the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia. For example, when Stephen Schwartz talks of Uzbekistan,45 he openly supports the regime of Islom Karimov. Without being totally blind to the problem of nepotism and torture in Central Asia, he considers that before the creation of a real Western democracy, first, you must defeat the “enemies of freedom”, meaning the Islamic opposition. This goes to show the limits of the neo-conservative approach of a “democratic crusade”: rather than 44  Vladimir Maksimenko, researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, “L’après-euroatlantisme”, Ria-Novosti, 5 July 2005. 45  Stephen Schwartz, “Our Uzbek Friends”, The Weekly Standard, 22 October 2001, and “How Shall Freedom Be Defended?”, The Weekly Standard, 17 July 2003.

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choosing to help countries that respect pluralism, in accordance with the ideas they claim to represent, they defend regimes that are far from exemplary. Subsequently an analysis of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan reveals the hegemonic motivations of the neoconservatives rather than a desire to democratize the region. Subsequently, the “Wahhabi” issue becomes the major preoccupation for the neoconservatives, while the objections from Human Rights Watch groups are vigorously rejected as if there were a link between Human Rights and the terrorists. And yet, as demonstrated by Ahmed Rachid, the authoritarianism of the Central Asian regimes has played a significant role in the rise in power of radical Islamic organizations. He goes on to add that Uzbekistan is under the control of a quasi anti-religious law that restricts all forms of freedom: the “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” of May 1998.46 This law means all religious organizations must be registered, proselytism is forbidden and any Muslim openly displaying their faith, the wearing of a beard or Islamic veil for example, is automatically under suspicion. The extremely tense political situation at the beginning of the 1990s, which saw the ruling party threatened by extremist Islamic organizations, can help explain why the government reacted in such a way. A good example would be the actions taken by the Adolat Islamic group, which did not hesitate to defy the authorities in the clear aim of taking over, with force if necessary. The attack and subsequent control of the Uzbek Communist Party HQ in Namangan in December 1991 was a clear reply to the City Mayor who refused the construction of a Mosque. Islom Karimov, who came to calm the situation down following the events, was requested to develop a radical Islamization of the state which was clearly impossible for someone from the Soviet school. Such tensions, which had already existed before the official independence, help understand just how Islamic action and State position have become increasingly radical. Thus, far from appeasing the population, the neoconservative vision could only support those in power and their management of the Islamic situation, and also prevent any evolution towards greater political liberalism. The neoconservatives found themselves up against their own contradictions: the defense of pluralism was sacrificed on behalf of strategic interests. With the events of May 2005 in Andijan, during which 2000 people protested in the name of Islamic organizations and which led to a violent reaction from the authorities and several hundred deaths, the neoconservatives began to distance themselves from the Uzbek authorities. For Stephen Schwartz and William Kristol the Uzbek regime had become part of the problem47 rather than part of the solution, even if this did not lead to any form of mea culpa. Even their position with regards Andijan is ambiguous. For Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation, Andijan was clearly an Islamic rebellion, and with the call for the removal of American military bases from Uzbekistan from 46 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad…, op. cit., pp. 125-27. 47  See Stephen Schwartz, William Kristol, “Our Uzbek Problem”, The Weekly Standard, 30 May 2005.

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the authorities, America had to establish new contacts to renew its strategic alliance with the country, while seeking other allies in Central Asia at the same time. The removal of the American military bases from Uzbek territory was more relevant than democratization and Human Rights, even if the neoconservatives have to compromise with international attention. Once again the imperialist-democrats give an illustration of White House contradictions, torn between the promotion of Human Rights and geopolitical interests in the “War onTerror”. The neoconservatives could have been inspired by the Tajik experience to promote democratization in this area but they did not for strategic reasons. This would have cast doubt over the perception of Islamism of the key neoconservative figures. Indeed, Tajikistan, where a dictatorship was up against an opposition composed principally of Islamists, but also democrats48 (hence the expression “Islamic-democrats”, used to define the fringe group of the population who were against the Dushanbe authorities), had managed to put an end to the civil war and is today the most pluralist political system of Central Asia. The government finally accepted an agreement with those the neoconservatives consider indistinctly as Islamists, in other words those opposed to freedom. By way of comparison, Uzbek Islamism became more radical in reaction to governmental action, and more international: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (the IMU) fought alongside the Taliban, and the Hizb-Ut Tahrir (HT) has become increasingly popular.49 It is interesting to note that the first movement was led, up until the end of 2001,50 by Namangani, a man who was considered, even by his followers, to be honest but not very knowledgeable in Islam. His motivation was more an outright opposition to the Uzbek government, than a world-wide Jihad.51 This greatly differs from the general imperialist-democratic position of the militant Islamism. As for the HT, much of its success comes from a cause that was rejected by neoconservative Orientalists, local poverty. The former President, Askar Akayev, had himself admitted the situation was catastrophic.52 Between neglecting political problems and refusing to take into consideration the economic situation, the imperialistdemocrats would appear to have an extremely limited understanding of the current situation in Central Asia.

48  The notion of Islamist, just like that of democrat or neo-communist has no real meaning in the context. The grouping together was on a clan and sub-national rather than ideological level. 49  For more in Hizb-Ut Tahrir in Central Asia, see Didier Chaudet, “Hizb-Ut-Tahrir, An Islamist Threat to Central Asia?”, Journal of Muslim Minorities Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1, April 2006, pp. 113-25. 50  He died during the Afghanistan conflict. 51 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad…, op. cit., p. 143. 52  The economic situation of the country is such that the trafficking of human beings has become more profitable than tourism. However the main Kyrgyz industry remains drug trafficking. See ibid., p. 129.

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Neoconservative Fears and the Kyrgyzstan Tulip Revolution The Kyrgyzstan revolution allowed to see whether the Islamists in the region, principally the Hizb-Ut-Tahrir, would be able to influence a country on the Silk Road during a change of regime. Neoconservative fears of seeing Central Asia fall into the hands of the Islamic enemy plus the terrorist threat makes one think that such a scenario is not so unfamiliar to them when they linger over Central Asia. And yet, even the most alarming previsions did not take shape. The revolutionary movement gleaned power from the inter-clan unrest and the transfer of Kyrgyzstan territories to the mighty Chinese neighbor. The Islamic movement was not able to pose as spokesman for the discontent. Due to its ideological strictness, the Hizb-Ut-Tahrir did not understand that a boycott of the February 2005 presidential elections would be counterproductive. At a time when the Kyrgyz finally had the impression that their votes could be useful, and that other religious actors were entering the political arena to openly support certain candidates, a position based solely on a rejection of democracy as a western value, in other words, non-Islamic, could not gather massive support from the population. Once the revolution was almost over without their participation, the Hizb supporters proclaimed their opposition to the new regime. Clearly the post-Akaev government has still to prove its worth, but the Kyrgyz have a much more optimistic vision of the situation. There is still the fear that the capital, Bichkek, which was shaken by recent events, will not manage to save the country from the socioeconomic unrest. The instability of government, combined with a catastrophic situation could be a means for recognized terrorist groups, like the IMU, to find refuge in the country, particularly in the South, for terrorist actions elsewhere, notably in Uzbekistan. For fear of chaos as a purveyor of radical Islamism means the neoconservative, and more generally American, approach could be applied in such a case. However Kirgizia is no weaker that it was before. The country has been weakened, past and present, not because of the Tulip Revolution but rather by its economic problems, which require greater international aide. Today, as in the past, South Kyrgyzstan, where the Uzbek ethnic groups are most numerous, acts as a base for the Islom Karimov opponents, particularly the Islamists, even if this does not represent a real threat.

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The real danger is to be found more in the neoconservative misinterpretation which has spread and in the logic of the “War on Terror” and which views the situation in terms of “Islamist-enemies against allies in the region” than an Islamism that is likely to benefit from the situation. In terms of destabilization, the Silk Road has more to fear from inter-clan tensions that have been poorly handled and wrongly interpreted by the West and economic problems than the distribution of tracts by the Hizb-Ut-Tahrir.

One of the key allies of the neo-eurasianists is Kazakhstan which has developed its own conception of eurasianism; Moscow also has a lot of influence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while Uzbekistan hopes to become a regional power and Turkmenistan remains hostile to any international commitment at least until the death of Saparmurat Niyazov. Kazakhstan was the last State to proclaim independence on 16 December 1991, after Moscow itself. This is explained by the large minority of Russian speaking inhabitants in the North of the country (around six million). This also explains the neo-eurasianists interest in the country.53 This probably constituted one of the country’s major strategic problems, probably more than radical Islamism: the Kazakhs were the last to convert, and their conversion to Islam remains slightly superficial.54 While Russia is developing a policy of partnership on the basis of a protection of its co-ethnic groups that has been inspired by a form of widespread nationalism, Kazakhstan prefers to keep good relations with Russia; on the one hand it seeks to preserve its political autonomy and, on the other hand, to channel Russian unilateralism with the creation of a multilateral framework. Astana wants to be a bridge between the East and the West and to be the spearhead for the promotion of Eurasian integration. Consequently, the neo-eurasianist movement supports the Kazakh president even if he does not claim to represent the same form of eurasianism. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, is more concerned by the impacts of Islamist extremism than the influence of Moscow, which led it to cooperate as much as it could. So as not to arouse the suspicion of the Russian and Uzbek minorities, the government sought to build a civic rather than ethnic identity and to develop a positive understanding of its relations with Russia.55 The “color revolutions” or 53  Ûrij Solozobov, “Kazahstan I Rossiâ” [Kazakhstan and Russia], Zavtra, No. 29 (609), 20 July 2005. 54  Yann Breault, Pierre Jolicoeur, Jacques Lévesque, La Russie et son ex-empire. Reconfiguration géopolitique de l’ancien espace soviétique, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2003, p. 225. 55  Yann Breault, Pierre Jolicoeur, Jacques Lévesque, La Russie et son ex-empire…, op.cit., pp. 304-305. See also Emil’ Džumabaev, “Revolûciâ maka” [The poppy revolution], Zavtra, No. 13 (593), 30 March 2005.

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Kazakh Eurasianism Kazakh eurasianism illustrates the re-appropriation of the Russian discourse by the post-Soviet Turkic elite, who distance themselves from the Russian vision by seeking “indigenous” origins (with the exception of Lev Gumilev).a The presidential discourse, which is generally thought of as true State ideology, is supplied by the Lev Gumilev Eurasian University in Astana, and responds, without a certain ambiguity, to a twofold expectation, internally (national assertion) and externally (regional policy) On the one hand, Kazakh eurasianism reflects a desire for national assertion and to distance itself from Russia, particularly during the second half of the 1990s. Indeed, the president refuses to give the opposition the privilege of the ethnic discourse; he underlines the difference in relation to the numerically important Russian minority. On the other hand this ideology allows him to propose regional economic relations, for example the Eurasian Economic community, which correspond to Kazakhstan’s desires: to become a “bridge” between three great regions, Russia, China and the Muslim world, positioning it even better than the former metropolis for the creation of Eurasian union. For the following developments see: Marlène Laruelle, “Les ambiguïtés de l’idéologie eurasiste kazakhe. Ouverture sur le monde russe ou fermeture nationaliste?”, Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turcoiranien, No. 34, July-December 2002, pp. 119-34. a

“permanent revolutions” to use the terms employed by the neo-eurasianist experts, have a bad press: they are considered the result of an Atlanticist plot to destabilize Eurasia using the domino effect. Thus, the Kyrgyz “Tulip Revolution”, based on models from Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), is perceived as the illegitimate “dismantling of Eurasia”.56 For the neo-eurasianists, this intrusion can be seen as a serious test for the influence of the Kremlin in the region and represents, much to their regret, the proof that a unipolar world is on the horizon if nothing is done to prevent it. They confirm their fear that after the revolutions in the post-Soviet republics, the “Atlanticist forces” will attempt to dismember Russia itself, beginning with the North Caucasus and Chechnya. Similarly to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the most Southern nation of the CIS, bordered by Afghanistan and China, represents a major strategic element for the 56  Alexander Dugin “Kyrgyzstan : demontaž Evrazii” [Kyrgyzstan: dismantling Eurasia], 31 March 2005, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News &file=article&sid=2339.

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neo-eurasianists. They include this Persian-speaking country in their Slavo-Turkish union: “Russia needs to be careful with the (eurasianist) ideas of (a uniquely) Slavo-Turkish unification”, and include other Persian-speaking countries such as Tajikistan.57 Consequently, the Russia troops in position must control order in the Republic and train the Tajik to control their Tajiko-Russian border where drug trafficking is commonplace. The country’s involvement in international cooperation was greatly hampered by the civil war which broke out one year after its independence, opposing a post-communist elite and Islamists. Moscow had to react, not because of the Russian minority or for economic considerations, but in order to guarantee its security. The end of the Tajik conflict brought Moscow and Tehran strategically closer. Again, pacification goes hand in hand with a set of antagonistic alliances in relation to that of the United States whose hostility with regards Tehran is clear. Unlike the previous examples, Islom Karimov’s Uzbekistan clearly sought a position of regional power in itself, thus defending the vision of a “Greater Turkestan”. Traditionally it is among the most rebellious States as regards Russian hegemony. But, despite its wishes for independence from Moscow, the neoeurasianists have clearly positioned themselves behind Karimov in relation to the May 2005 Andijan massacre.58 The resulting renewed Russia-Uzbek relations are all the more surprising considering their apparent impossibility a short while earlier.59 The country has moved closer to the Sino-Russian block represented by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), principally for military issues which in itself is a remarkable success for active Eurasian thinking. To conclude, this Turkish-speaking zone reveals two fundamental contradictions to the movements in question. On the one hand the neoconservatives pretend to brandish the United States as the standard bearer of democracy, while their analyses only highlight a few cases in point. The neo-eurasianists on the other hand mean to assert a specifically imperial dimension, which supposes a common mission; and yet they put forward ideas that take less after the empire than a hegemonic desire to defend their own backyard. We now need to analyze the possibilities of Empire in the Middle East, where the search for “geopolitical pluralism” is underway in an extremely contradictory manner. Indeed, the American movement hopes to maintain its regional supremacy, while the Russian movement intends to lead a policy of alliances to change the status quo that today is favorable to the Atlanticists. 57  Iskandar Asadullaev, “V zaŝitu Evrazijstva” [Protecting Eurasia], Zavtra, No. 35 (562), 25 August 2004. Our translation. 58  Muzaffar Zahidov, “Taškent: bez kolebanij” [Tachkent: without hesitation], Zavtra, No. 35 (615), 31 August 2005. 59  Ivan Alexandrov, “Uzekistan v sisteme central’noaziatskoj regional’noj geopolitki” [Uzbekistan in the regional system of Central Asian geopolitics], 29 January 2003, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=955.

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Chapter 8

The Middle East The Middle East is a good illustration of just how different the visions of our two movements are on a geo-strategic level. By analyzing both Russian and American foreign policy with regards to four States of the region, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran, we can once again measure the influence of neoconservative and neo-eurasianist thinking and test the ideological and destabilizing character of their understanding of this region. It confirms the definitions of pseudo-imperial nationalism and hegemonic nationalism that we have already proposed. Now, it becomes necessary to see how both visions manipulate the notion of Empire: for the neoconservatives, it represents order, under the American aegis, but can only function if the periphery grants it a form of legitimacy; the neo-eurasianists want to prove themselves as the leaders of anti-imperial policies, as against globalization. Their “hegemonic” ambitions are thus limited to Central Asia where they are seeking allies in accordance with their vision of “multipolar globalization”. We have begun by putting aside those States involved in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. This major international situation is of little importance in the framework of our current analysis: the extremely pro-Israeli position of the neoconservatives simply reflects the position of the vast majority of the American population. And the other nations of the region (Syria, Libya, etc.) are rarely the object of any neoconservative studies. On the contrary, we have selected four countries: Iran, which has had conflicting relations with the United States since 1979, Saudi Arabia, the largest producer of oil in the world, and Iraq and Afghanistan both of which have been witness to two American military interventions. Without going back over what they represent for certain imperialist-democrats and Paul Wolfowitz’s interest in Iraq since the 1970s, it is easy to understand how revealing a study of these cases is concerning American foreign policy in the “War on Terror”. The Arab-Persian world also plays a central role in the vision of the neoeurasianists since our four countries occupy the Southern flank of Eurasia. They are vital partners for the neo-eurasianists in their desire to free themselves from Atlanticist influence. The neo-eurasianists have managed to imprint this idea into Russian foreign policy. This interest is well illustrated by Mikhail Margelov, President of the Russian Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee, for whom, “a new Middle East policy represents an important part of Russia’s mission in Eurasia”. Over and above our cases for study, it is the policies relating to this part   John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America. New York, Penguin, 2004, p. 296.   Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 79, Part I, 27 April 2005.

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of the world that are under analysis. The central zone of the Middle East including Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian sector, represents a strategically important region whose evolution has direct repercussions on the Eurasian core. Moscow’s force projection has been weakened, at a time when the country’s security depends on developments in the Middle East. Thus, the neo-eurasianists hope to develop Moscow’s influence in the traditionally friendly secular States of the Middle East: Syria, Libya and formerly Iraq. The renewal of relations with Bachar Al-Assad’s Syria in January 2005 after a decade of silence illustrates the desire, over rand above the fight against terrorism and the buying of military equipment, to benefit from the legacy of Soviet foreign policy in the region. If they pay particular attention to Islam, the neo-eurasianist position has evolved in a slightly less anti-Israeli direction, since the country where almost one fifth of the population are Russian speakers, represents a quasi “sixteenth postSoviet State”. This can explain the changing opinion of some neo-eurasianists with regards the Jews. Also, the movement includes adepts from Israel itself, Israeli citizens of Russian origin like Avigdor Eskin, or Avrom Shmulevitch, the Hassidic Rabbi (the extremely orthodox Judaic equivalent of the suffists). Today, the neo-eurasianists aim at distinguishing the “traditionalist” Jews from the “modernists”. Thus they are breaking away from the traditional anti-Semitism of a large majority of the nationalists to rediscover the original eurasianists, to include the Bukharan Jews who were part of the Eurasian peoples since they shared the same civilizational area. Afghanistan: The New Great Game? Afghanistan evokes the geopolitical “Great Game” of the 19th century between Great Britain and Russia, and also that of the 20th century between the Americans and the Soviets. The Afghan kingdoms represented the Northern limit of the Indian Empire and the confluence of two imperial areas; in the following century they   Vladimir Putin’s visit to Israel in April 2005, the first from a Russian President, allowed to underline their converging points of view concerning the important part played by the Red Army during the Second World War, but also on terrorism and the solving of conflicts.   Avigdor Eskin is an Cabbalist Israeli theologist, who joined forces with Dugin through traditionalism and a rejection of the Wahhabi movement, and for whom the eurasianist model presents “an realistic alternative to liberalism”. See his interview with Aleksey Belov on 11 September 2003, available at: http://www.avigdor-eskin.com/page. php3?page=7&lang=0&item=169.  In fact, anti-Americanism plays an important role here since they are rather bellicose in their approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and they feel resentment towards the United States which no longer supports them as unconditionally as in the past. Their neoeurasianism is therefore the result of their commitment elsewhere.

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were the stage for a conflict between the USSR and the United States; and at the beginning of the 21st century they have once again staged a conflict between the Jihads and international forces. Let us now continue with a study of the geopolitical dimension as seen by the two movements. Afghanistan was the first real “test” for the neoconservatives following September 11th, since the first troops were sent in (operation Enduring Freedom) immediately after the attacks. The Taliban regime personified the very face of terrorism, even going so far as to accept Osama bin Laden on their territory, and so it was not difficult to gather a large coalition force to overthrow them. For the neoconservatives, whose principal targets are the so-called “rogue States”, to simply “chase after (Islamic) terrorists”, was not enough. However, as an objective, this would certainly have been politically more efficient, allowing for greater targeting concerning those presumably responsible for the September 11th events. As advocates of radical reprisals immediately following the attacks, they did not hesitate to present themselves as the leaders for the cause, provided it brought about less terrorist violence. Within this framework, the Taliban became the enemy to destroy, even if it was not the number one strategic priority for the neoconservatives. To kill Osama bin Laden was an almost secondary objectives compared to overthrowing a radical Sunni regime, which given time could become a disruptive element in the region. We have here a good example of the contradictions the ideological prism prevents from understanding and which is not broached with a cynical explanation. The upholders of the American Empire are prepared to change the world, to destroy its order to recreate it and, they hope, establish a new equilibrium. Moreover, this desire for upheaval is born from the fear of an upheaval that they are not responsible for. How can this contradiction be explained? As soon as mention is made of the two premises of neoconservative ideology, it disappears: a conception of Islam as a new enemy, whose movements need to be anticipated, and exceptionalism, the vocation of the nation to organize the transformation of the world, the very core of pseudo-imperial nationalism. From this point on, the upheaval sparked off by the enemy requires American intervention, the disruptive effects of which no longer require justifying. This is the conception of the ‘Benevolent Empire’. Once again, an explanation using cynicism would be limited. Only ideology can perhaps justify operations which removes all limits from the expression imperial hybris. Because of the instability of South East Asia, and more precisely Pakistan, which, with India, represents a nuclear threat, some care must be taken when defining what can be considered as American interests. What is more, Afghanistan is bordered by Iran and Central Asia, both unstable areas. However, once the war in Afghanistan underway, the neoconservatives focused on the criticism of a realistic or pragmatic approach according to which   Jeffrey Gedmin, “The Value of Pre-Emptive Force”, Financial Times, 13 September 2001 (article reproduced by the AEI).

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military intervention would not offer security unless it was understood and accepted by local public opinion. Instead of this vision of the situation, supported by the State Secretary Colin Powell, they preferred an all out offensive including the bombing of towns in which the enemy troops could be hiding among the civilian population, even at the risk of provoking “collateral damage”. The systematic bombing by the B-52s in the fight against the Afghan Taliban was finally adopted. This afghan campaign represents a victory for neoconservative ideology over realism: the hard right and the imperialist-democrats carried it off against Colin Powell and the CIA. Long before the neoconservatives, the neo-eurasianists severely criticized the Taliban regime as being the result of American support for an extremist group during the war in Afghanistan. The regime that is dominated by the Wahhabi also threatened Russian positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The neo-eurasianist movement prefers to underline the paradox according to which, by attacking Afghanistan, the United States were simply attacking their former Wahhabi allies in the anti-Soviet combat. It believes the Taliban are a product of Wahhabism and that Putin’s decision to support the intervention was largely influenced by “pervading Americanism”. Nevertheless, they also mention that the equivalence between Afghanistan and Chechnya should be recognized, since the Wahhabi are also present there.10 So the neo-eurasianists hope for an Atlanticist defeat in Afghanistan as much as the eradication of the Taliban, provided Russia can benefit from the situation. First they welcome the increasing cooperation with the Northern Alliance which Moscow had supported for several years and whose representatives have key positions in the new Afghan administration. As proof of this, during the June 2004 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Afghan president Hamid Karzaï spoke in favor of greater economic relations with the member States of the SCO, while Putin proposed the creation of an economic development fund for Afghanistan.11 Secondly, by coordinating the fight against the Afghan terrorists, the neoeurasianists want to do away with all threats to the stability of Central Asia: they call for an end to foreign aide for the supposed Wahhabi forces in Chechnya with the blessing of the West. For them, the “War on Terror” led by the United States in Afghanistan was nothing more than an eyewash victory since the Taliban and   Charles Krauthammer, “Not Enough Might”, Washington Post, 30 October 2001, p. A21.   William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “A Winning Strategy”, The Weekly Standard, 26 November 2001.   Alexander Prokhanov, “Amerikanskij specnaz sdaetsâ talibam”, [The Americans back down to the Taliban], Zavtra, No. 40 (409), 2 October 2001. 10  Alexander Prokhanov, “Ne obagrim russkoj krov’û mečeti Kabula”, [Don’t cause bloodshed in the Kabul mosques], Zavtra, No. 39 (408), 25 September 2001. 11 See Cyrille Gloaguen, “Les tropismes centre-asiatiques de la Russie”, Défense nationale, No. 11, November 2004, pp. 89-95, p. 91.

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Al Qaeda have been able to regain influence in the country, which undermines the perspectives for a return to law and order in the near future.12 And yet it appears obvious that a Taliban victory would at least have had a doubly negative impact for the Russian command: on the one hand, by provoking a massive and destabilizing exodus towards Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and by presenting the enormous risks of exporting terrorism into Central Asia, a region that is already scared by “failed States”. Iraq: Imperialist War, Hegemonic Peace? For us, the case of Iraq is more an illustration of neoconservative inspired American foreign policy of the 1990s, which led to a war in 2003, than a result of its geopolitical position as such. Our analysis will focus on the value of this conflict, particularly concerning the idea of an “imperialist war” led by the United States and the reaction of the neo-eurasianists as seen through the looking-glass. If Afghanistan does not represent a real threat for the neoconservatives, or an imminent danger, the same cannot be said for Iraq. We have already seen that their desire to attack Baghdad goes back a long time. More so, following September 11th, Paul Wolfowitz considered that the supposed weapons of mass destruction represented more of a threat than Kabul. According to him, there was between a 10 and 50 percent chance that the late Saddam Hussein was linked to the September 11th attacks.13 Although low, this percentage is an illustration of imperialistdemocrat obsession for Iraq which was omnipresent in the official American approach before, during and after the war. Such recurrence takes the form of the following syllogism: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is in contact with Al Qaeda. And this terrorist group is, in their own words, responsible for the September 11th attacks. So, Iraq can not deny any responsibility for the attacks. The first element of this reasoning, albeit invalidated, has always been recognized, which was enough for the neoconservatives.14 There is no need to underline the ideological character of such reasoning: an indisputable premise even if it does not stand up to the litmus test and the systematic deduction that follows. In fact it reflects an under estimation of the ideological, political and organizational power of groups like Al Qaeda that are under no state control, and the over assessment of the power of the Middle Eastern States. Their perception of 12  Valentin Prussakov, “Afganistan: taliby ne ušli” [Afghanistan: The Taliban have not gone], Zavtra, No. 41 (516), 8 October 2003. 13 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 104. 14 See Laurie Mylroie, “The Iraqi Connection”, The Wall Street Journal (reproduced by the AEI), 13 September 2001. Stephen F. Hayes has written a number of articles in the Weekly Standard to defend this position.

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The Soviet Afghan War (1979-1988) and Beyond Afghanistan has a belligerent geopolitical situation, combined with much domestic instability.a The policy for modernization led by King Zaher Shah in the 1960s never really took off and was accepted by only a limited urban population. The rest of the country remains very much linked to its traditions. In the 1970s, the country became increasingly unstable; a number of incidents disrupted the political life, while two major phenomena marked the period. On a parallel with an increasing Soviet presence and the coming to power of the Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) there was a strengthening of the Islamic opposition which became increasingly apparent with a number of major uprisings. As an unstable pro-Moscow regime, the new government requested greater Soviet support in 1979, which led to the Soviet intervention in December. 50,000 troops arrived within just a few days and took control of certain strategic points. Different explanations have been given to this deployment so we do not need to adopt a stance here: it can be understood as a defensive act, aimed at helping out a socialist regime to fight against Muslim fundamentalism in order to avoid the spread of its ideology into Central Asia; some geopolitical analysts however explain the campaign as an illustration of the historical Russian quest for the “warm seas”, to strengthen their positions in the Arab-Muslim world; finally, we can imagine that the Soviets seized an opportunity to strengthen their influence without there being any premeditation. The Red Army, considered as the best in the world, was in an extremely difficult situation due to Afghan resistance and despite the many internal splits (its cohesion lies in its rejection of Soviet occupation and militant Islam), and a number of strategic errors committed by the Soviets. Added to the military problems was the diplomatic breakdown, including international criticism and condemnation and a hardening of the American position. Finally, the conflict cost the lives of almost one million people, several hundred thousand people were wounded and amputated, and five million people became refugees (Pakistan, Iran). For the Soviets, it resulted in 13,000 deaths, but the losses provoked an enormous reaction in the Soviet Union. Some observers even go so far as to say that Afghanistan was behind the fall of the USSR. However, according to others, the decision to invade the country delayed its fall by 10 or 12 years by allowing it to find an external enemy which served to strengthen internal cohesion against American actions along its Southern flank.b

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For details of the conflict, see: Jean-Marc Balencie and Arnaud de la Grange, Mondes rebelles.Guérillas, milices, terroristes, Paris, Michalon, 2001, pp. 370-373. Among the numerous works on the subject: Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics, New York, HarperCollins, 2002; Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999. b This is the opinion of, for example Yuri Drozdov, when head of a section of the KGB. “L’introduction des troupes soviétiques en Afghanistan en 1979 a reporté la disintegration de l’URSS de 10 à 12 ans”, 22 December 2004, Ria Novosti, available at: http://fr.rian.ru/rian/index.cfm?prd_id=427&msg_id=5240934&startr ow=21&date=2004-12-22&do_alert=0 a

the strategic interests of the United States was greater than an understanding of the situation of the Muslim peoples in general, and in the Middle East in particular.15 This can explain why it is impossible for them to imagine any form of national resistance from Iraq: as we shall see, this armed resistance against the American troops is just one expression of the “Wahhabi” evil that has been exported by the Saudi Arabians. On the other hand, the neo-eurasianists had a good understanding of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and had the intention of siding with him on the international scene. Iraq was among the pro-Soviet States during the Cold War (the Iraqi Communist Party was one of the most effective and socially influential Marxist organizations in the region), even if it received the support of the two superpowers in its conflict against Iran (1980-1988). In return, the Soviet Union provided large scale economic and military aide following the military take-over in 1958, and support for Arab nationalism. The post Cold War period, marked by the isolation of Baghdad after the first Gulf war in 1991, convinced the neo-eurasianists to keep contacts with the country alive. Thus, on 9 November 1992, a delegation of parliamentarians from the Supreme Soviet, led by Sergey Baburin, an eminent member of the red-brown movement, visited Baghdad and condemned the consequences of the blockade.16 The neoeurasianist opposition was largely supportive of the Iraqi regime, and stated that the sanctions were simply the result of an “unfair imperialist ploy” that had been thought up by the Americans. In January 1996, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the ultra-nationalist, even went so far as to say Iraq was right to resist the operation 15  Thirty-three international relations experts who define themselves as realists or neo-realists, one of the most prominent being Kenneth N. Waltz, the founder of the second school, published a tribune in the New York Times on 26 September 2002 in which they present their arguments against the strategy of George W. Bush and the neoconservatives. 16 Talal Nizameddin, Russia and the Middle East. Toward a New Foreign Policy, London, Hurst & Company, 1999, pp. 202-203.

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“desert storm” that he qualified as “Western aggression”.17 In November 1997, the Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov visited Iraq to support the Baghdad authorities and to renew condemnation of the embargo; it should be noted that the opinions of the communist-nationalist camp became a quasi object for consensus in political spheres. Primakov’s foreign policies, first as foreign minister (19961998) then as prime minister (1998-1999) consisted in improving relations with Iraq while simultaneously explaining to the United States and Saudi Arabia that his policies were not directed specifically against them.18 Such relations with a “rogue State” could not continue after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Consequently, in 2003, Putin opted for peace in Iraq, and Russian public opinion became openly hostile to the conflict.19 The war in Iraq was seen not as a war for freedom but as an imperial war. All the neo-eurasianists opposed it. Some, for example Talgat Tadjuddin, called for a “Jihad against America”, much to Putin’s regret who found the phrase somewhat excessive. Such an aggressive reaction is taken as additional proof of an Atlanticist imperial project to nurture unipolar globalization.20 Indeed, for the geopolitical approach of the neo-eurasianists, the Americans basically wanted to control Eurasia; the oil being simply a means to an end. Thus they decry a war that corresponds to five essential American strategic interests:21 the control of gas and oil in Central Asia, the introduction of military bases in Asia, between China and Russia, the continuation of American supremacy over Saudi Arabia, the militarization of the American economy and finally the end of resistance to the globalization process. This is an avowed conspiratorial perception that presents the same unilateral dimension as the ideological discourse. If we take the objectives the neoeurasianists accuse the Americans of having one by one, we immediately notice they target all the motives behind eurasianist pride: as a tellurocratic power, Eurasia must take advantage of the control of its natural resources, it must once again become the key partner with the peripheral States and find dignity in its resistance to unipolarity. These objectives therefore create extreme incompatibility between the two geopolitical and hermeneutic worlds presented by an American Empire and neo-eurasianist hegemony. Eurasianist identity is reduced to its polemical dimension; it can only exist through a denial of the other. Also, the conspiratorial 17 Ibid., pp. 208-209. 18 Ibid.., p. 215. 19  80 percent of those interviewed expressed their indignation in relation to the American campaign in Iraq, and only 3 percent expressed their support. National VCIOM poll of 1592 people, 24-28 April 2003. The same poll revealed that for 45 percent of Russians, the Putin Administration had made the right decisions, while 38 percent felt he should have vigorously opposed the intervention. 20  Valentin Prussakov refers to the work of Ivo Daalder. See Valentin Prussakov, “Posle šoka” [After the shock], Zavtra, No. 22 (497), 27 May 2003. 21  From an article by Michel Collon published in the weekly Zavtra. Michel Collon, “Mirovaâ vojna za neft” [The world war for oil], Zavtra, No. 37 (460), 10 September 2002.

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logic it develops strengthens its argument since it procures the enemy an infallible instrumental rationality. It allows neo-eurasianism to assert itself as the standard bearer of a spiritualistic civilization as opposed to the all-conquering march of Atlanticist materialism. Saudi Arabia: Between Oil and Wahhabism There are at least two reasons why Saudi Arabia can not be ignored as a State in the region. Firstly, it is a key player on the oil market and the principal supplier for the United States. Secondly, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Wahhabism, a conservative reform movement of Islam that has become almost synonymous with “international terrorism” for our two movements. Saudi Arabia retains a unique position in the minds of the imperialistdemocrats. Logically, this state attracted their attention because of, as mentioned above, the strategic importance of oil reserves in their imperial vision. This would appear slightly out of line with the American tradition of friendship with the Saudi Kingdom that some authors attribute to deep-rooted reasons of a shared identity between the two peoples: a form of Puritanism and a winning spirit.22 This privileged relationship developed particularly during the Cold War years on the alter of anti-communism. Indeed, King Faisal driven by anti-Semitism of Western origin, rejected communism that he imagined to be an occult political branch of Judaism.23 In such a situation, American foreign policy is up against a major dilemma, between its affirmed support for Israel and a guaranteed supply of oil. Even so, the neoconservative denunciation of an obscurantist kingdom and an overly complaisant American administration24 does not correspond to the reality. However, the Muslim “specialists” of the PNAC or the Weekly Standard have received some echoes, not because of the originality of their position, but because it is totally in keeping with recent American diplomacy. Since the Bush Senior years, way before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Saudi-American relations have progressively deteriorated, primarily because of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Every day the Saudi could follow the suffering of the Palestinians on television and they were particularly shocked. The feeling of 22 See Georges Corm, Le Proche-Orient éclaté, 1956-2000, Paris, Gallimard, 1999, pp. 319-20. For Georges Corm, Saudi-American relations are not just based on oil: he talks of “active and reciprocal sympathy” linked to a common puritanical and religious spirit that pushes them to intervene in world affairs, and a past of conquests that does not take into consideration past cultural traditions other than religion. 23 Ibid., pp. 320-21. 24 Thus, one of the favorite themes of the neoconservatives concerning the internal situation in Saudi Arabia is to denounce the lack of religious freedom in the kingdom, which Washington preferred to occult for many years. See Terry Eastland, “Speaking the Truth about Saudi Arabia”, The Weekly Standard, 8 October 2004.

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identification with the victims was felt throughout the population: rumor has it that the crown Prince Abdallah, spent hours in front of the screen, deeply moved and scandalized by the situation in the occupied territories. Following the incursion of the Tsahal into Hebron on August 23, 2001, the Prince threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Tel-Aviv, and it took a quasi act of contrition by the Bush administration to avoid it.25 With September 11th, the White House reaffirmed its position concerning Riyadh, and relations between the two countries plummeted: when Abdallah proposed a peace plan between Israel and the Palestinians, involving the historical recognition of the Jewish State by the whole of the Arab world, George W. Bush did not take him seriously.26 And the accusation by the neoconservatives of Saudi Arabia as a Terror Master was not a new idea among the Washington-based politico-intellectual circles. They simply reiterated an idea that was gaining ground. Clearly, September 11th meant that when the imperialist-democrats denounced the Saudi regime they had a large audience. A Gallup poll in 2002 showed that 63 percent of Americans interviewed felt that the Saudi no longer belonged to a friendly power and 75 percent felt it was no longer possible to trust Riyadh.27 The neoconservatives only had to evoke the Saudi origins of the hijackers like Bin Laden28 to win public support. However they went further than general American opinion by presenting Saudi Arabia as the source of all evils. Indeed, thanks to this country, they had found a common denominator for all their enemies in the Muslim world: they were all “Wahhabi”.29 Once again, we come upon the basis of their ideology, in other words the logic behind an idea, to use Hannah Arendt’s expression. Yes, the Islamic radicalism advocated by the supporters of terrorist action is in part influenced by the religious body behind this movement, which is a minority Islamic movement. But the neoconservatives use this evidence to produce a number of shortcuts and simplified analyses of the current situation. For example, Saudi Arabia is a sort of new Soviet Union. Far from being the consequence of political, economic, social and historic evolutions of the Muslim world, Islamism is simply an expression of Wahhabism, which in turn owes its existence to the

25 Eric Laurent, La guerre des Bush, Paris, Plon, 2003, pp. 91-100. 26 Ibid., p. 105. 27 Laurent Murawiec, La Guerre d’après, Paris, Albin Michel, 2003, p. 18. Our research took us to the following figures: a Gallop poll between the 9-12 February showed that 28 percent of Americans had a positive opinion of Saudi Arabia, and 66 percent a negative opinion. 28 See for example Stephen Schwartz, “The Dysfunctional House of Saud”, The Weekly Standard, 18 August 2003. 29 It is interesting to note that Moscow also frequently presents the Islamist opposition to the occupation of Chechnya as being globally “Wahhabi”, thereby subsuming the political problem under a question of religious fanaticism.

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harmful action of the “New Evil Empire” – Saudi Arabia,30 which operates on a global scale through the intervention of a Machiavellian “Islamintern”, comparable to the Comintern of the past.31 This denunciation helps clarify the Iraqi situation: opposing the liberators are Saudi Arabians who have come to Iraq to fight against the Americans, rather than native Iraqis. Here we can see how neoconservative ideology leads to a theory of conspiracy which henceforth justifies any defensive action from an America that is persecuted for what it is and not only for what it does. The logic becomes even clearer since the excessiveness that follows reassures supporters of the antiAmerican conspiracy theory. Thus, there is often a misunderstanding among opinion makers between “Wahhabi”, which is increasingly used to designate a certain type of Iraqi resistant who belongs to the Islamist movements, and the Saudi Arabians who have joined the resistance, to a point where the two have become one and the same.32 For example, the Ansar el-Islam group is presented as “Wahhabi” religious extremism, even if it is above all a branch of Kurdish Islamism whose national dimension is too often ignored. Clearly Saudi Wahhabism has influenced it but there is no clear proof of any links with Al Qaeda.33 Indeed, not only are Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism comparable, but Al Qaeda is considered a Saudi Arabian production, or organization that makes common cause with Saudi Arabia, which is similar to a straightforward accusation of complicity.34 From here on, all extra-territorial activism on behalf of the Saudi Arabians is seen as religious fanaticism; at a time when an analysis of the political preferences of the young Saudi population reveals concern for the conflicts that are occurring in the Muslim world, over and above a simple Israeli-Arab controversy. These are the key motives for activism and protestation, including towards the Saudi government itself.35 The neoconservative analysis cannot accept that the kingdom is evolving or that the pro-Americans are not necessarily the exalters of democratic reform. They see Saudi Arabia as a country that has been completely dominated by Wahhabism since its creation which infers a persistently violent hostility towards the non30 Stephen Schwartz, “The New Evil Empire?”, The Weekly Standard, 13 December 2004. 31 Laurent Murawiec, La Guerre d’après …, op. cit., p. 89. 32  Stephen Schwartz, “Saudi Mischief in Fallujah”, The Weekly Standard, 23 June 2003. 33 See Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Mouse that Roared?, International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing, 7 February 2003. 34  David Wurmser, “The Saudi Connection”, The Weekly Standard, 20 October 2001, and Max Boot, “With friends like these …”, The Weekly Standard, 1 January 2004. 35 Pascal Ménoret, L’énigme saoudienne. Les Saoudiens et le monde, 1744-2003, Paris, La Découverte, 2003, p. 220.

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Wahhabi minority Muslims, particularly the Shiites.36 And yet the situation of the latter has vastly improved over the years: like the Sufis, they are now unofficially accepted. The Shiite demonstrations against their inferior status that started on 27 November 1979, forced the government to accept the presence of such groups, particularly with the Khomeini revolution. Despite the repression of this movement, the government was forced into making concessions to this minority group and the subsequent talks led to a real improvement in inter-communitarian relations in 1993. this does not mean the Shiites are not hated by some Wahhabis but the hostility of the 1930s has become much rarer.37 As proof of this improvement of the Shiite situation and that of other minorities in general, on 21 June 2003, religious diversity was recognized by the Wahhabi Ulema,38 under the decisive direction of the crown Prince Abdallah, which was unthinkable in the Saudi Kingdom as imagined by the neoconservatives. The Prince however is not really appreciated by the imperialist-democrats who see in him a heir whose main concern is to safeguard both throne and power:39 they also believe he represents a fanatical anti-American stance that is linkable to terrorism, therefore dangerous.40 The image of the crown prince is, however, inversely all the more reassuring for supporters of a deep reform of the Arab world. He is a liberal; as de facto ruler of the country since 1998, he is seen above all as a reformer, launching a fight against the rife corruption among other princes is positions of power and seeking to attract foreign investments.41 He is behind fundamental political reforms that have led to an unprecedented degree of freedom of speech in the kingdom and social reforms to fight against poverty.42 The reduction performed by the two opposing theories of conspiracy concludes with an over-simplification of the world, reducing it to a confrontation between two persons: the American and the Wahhabi from the American position, and the neo-eurasianist and the globalist from the other camp. However the real problem with Abdallah, according to the neoconservatives, lies in his Arabic nationalism and his openly critical position towards American foreign policy. As presented by Stephen Zunes, Washington’s problem with the crown Prince is his opposition to the last two Gulf Wars and his decision to support

36 Stephen Schwartz, “A Saudi Protest March”, The Weekly Standard, 15 November 2004 37  The State of Saudi officially became a Kingdom in 1932. 38 Pascal Ménoret, L’énigme saoudienne..., op. cit., p. 50. 39 Terry Eastland, “The Saudi Gambit”, Dallas Morning News, 29 April 2002 (reproduced by the Weekly Standard on the 30 April 2002). 40  David Wurmser, “The Saudi Connection”, op. cit. 41 Robert Baer, Or Noir et Maison Blanche. Comment l’Amérique a vendu son âme pour le pétrole saoudien, Paris, J.C. Lattès, 2003, pp. 270-1. 42 Pascal Ménoret, L’énigme saoudienne..., op. cit., pp. 235-36.

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Israeli-Palestinian peace in a logic of “fair peace” or “territory for peace”, which is increasingly rejected by the neoconservatives.43 If Saudi Arabia has become an enemy in their minds, it is more for reasons of American foreign policy than for differing opinions with regards the fight against Bin Laden. The most frequently cited solution is the “de-Saudi-ization” of the kingdom, or the breaking up of Saudi Arabia with the separation of the oilproducing zone from the rest of the kingdom.44 Only the 2003 war on Iraq and the deterioration of relations with the United States has allowed for much improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Russia. During the Cold War, relations were more or less nonexistent.45 The USSR wanted above all to reduce Saudi Arabian dependence on the United States by underlining the Soviet pro-Arab position in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. However their divergences were much greater: the invasion of Afghanistan, support for Marxist regimes in South Yemen and Ethiopia, and the issue of the religious freedom of Soviet Muslims. The decline of the USSR helped establish new contacts between the two countries: the heir of the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan and Central Asia, stopped its adventures in Africa and Persia. As soon as the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is repositioned as a vital ally of the United States, it becomes clear why Moscow paid no further attention to it during the Cold War. The neo-eurasianists also criticized the puritanical conception of Islam in the country, or Wahhabism, and its position as privileged ally of the “Atlanticists”. As for the Kremlin, it regretted the low level of Saudi investment in the country and more importantly, accused Saudi Arabia of participating, one way or another, in the perpetuation of the Chechen war,46 the rise of Islamism in Central Asia and for Taliban activities in Afghanistan. By far, they prefer Iranian fundamentalism to Saudi Wahhabism whom they accuse of stirring up international conspiracies with the help of the United States. This is another element of the conspiracy theories or Manichaean suspicion: neutrality is but a mirage. Since identities are implacably polemical, there can be neither allies nor enemies; those who pretend to be neutral, necessarily collaborate with one or other of the camps and must therefore be looked upon with mistrust. 43  Stephen Zunes, Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism, Monroe, Common Courage Press, 2003, p. 196. 44 Laurent Murawiec, La Guerre d’après …, op. cit., pp. 273-74. 45  For more on Russian-Saudi relations, see: Mark N. Katz, “Saudi-Russian Relations in the Putin Era”, Middle-East Journal, Vol. 55, No. 4, Autumn 2001, pp. 603-22, also Gawdat Bahgat, “The New Geopolitics of Oil: The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia”, Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol. 47, No. 3, Summer 2003, pp. 447-61. 46 An estimated 100 million dollars was given by Saudi foundations and a few individuals to the Chechen separatists between 1997 and 1998. Ariel Cohen, “SaudiRussian Rapprochement: U.S. Should Beware”, Heritage Foundation, 12 September 2003, available at: http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia /wm336.cfm.

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Relations could be established with Riyadh if Washington puts it on its enemy list. Following the September 11th attacks and the cooling off of Saudi-American relations, the two countries did move closer as demonstrated by Prince Abdallah’s visit to Moscow in Fall 2003, the first of any importance since 1932.47 For the neo-eurasianists, this represented an opening not to be ignored: If there are political forces in Russia that are interested in closer cultural, economic and political relations with the Islamic world than those that exist today, the Prince’s visit is clearly the best possible occasion.48

The neo-eurasianist press also underlines the idea that the development of petroleum resources has not just been profitable for a few, but rather for the population as a whole.49 The kingdom is gradually becoming a nation to have links with: Primakov stated that Prince Abdallah’s ascending to the throne was a good thing for Russia since the heir to King Fahd is concerned by the question of religious extremism.50 The paradox according to which Saudi Arabia suffers from evils it is accused of spreading even allows to counter certain Islamophopic accusations.51 For example the central role played by Saudi Arabia in the Muslim world is recognized. A Saudi Arabian book by the doctor Madjed At-Turki on Russian-Saudi relations published in 2003 even states that the Islamic world needs a strong, democratic and peaceful Russia […], and […] Russia needs the Islamic world to together establish lasting economic and cultural relations.52

For the neo-eurasianists, Saudi Arabia has been cleansed of all suspicion that it was traditionally associated with. Whatever the sincerity behind the closer relations, the 47  Alexander Shumilin, “Prince’s Visit Shows Importance of Russia-Saudi Links”, The St-Petersbourg Times, 16 September 2003, available at: http://www.sptimes.ru/archive/ times/902/opinion/o_10304.htm. Alexander Shumilin is the director of the website http:// www.mideast.ru/new/index.php. For a history of Russian-Saudi relations, see “RussieArabie saoudite: une coopération qui gagne en qualité”, 9 February 2007, available at: http://fr.rian.ru/analysis/20070209/60443987.html. 48  Valentin Prussakov, “Rossia – Saudovskaâ Arabia: vremâ družit’” [Russia – Saudi Arabia: the time to become friends], Zavtra, No. 36 (511), 3 September 2003. Our translation. 49  “Na rodine proroka” [In the land of the prophet], Zavtra, No. 5 (270), 2 February 1999. 50  Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty, Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 144, Part I, 2 August 2005. 51  Valentin Prussakov, “Islamskaâ mozaika” [The Islamic mosaic], Zavtra, No. 48 (575), 24 November 2004. 52  Valentin Prussakov, “Islamskaâ mozaika” [The Islamic mosaic], Zavtra, No. 15 (542), 6 April 2004. Our translation.

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outstanding anti-American character of the eurasianist conspiracy theory suggests that the improved relations could not have received eurasianist support without a reversal of alliances with relation to the United States. Let us not forget that any conspiracy theory53 is based on the idea of the “diabolical causality”,54 to employ a term used by Léon Poliakov. At the origins of the conspiracy is Evil with whom any political compromise is impossible. Consequently, whenever a theory of conspiracy is employed as a political instrument, even for legitimate purposes, it creates constraints for the speaker. We leave the political world for an ethical and ontological confrontation. The dignity of any pursued objective is calculated, in relation to its capacity to harm, to its antagonistic and malicious principal. The world is reduced to a binary confrontation which goes to show how the logic of conspiracy calls upon over-generalization. The various non-reducible elements are integrated to form a unified enemy. For Dugin, Atlanticism is an objective ally of globalism, and the two accomplices form a whole. Inasmuch as the power it represents is, temporarily at least, superior, the room for action is limited by reaction in the true sense of the term. Iran: A Center of Revolutionary Activity? Our analysis of the region would not be complete without a study of Iran: indeed, the former Persia was the location for the first Islamic revolution which led to fears for the stability of the Muslim world. It is through this country that the neoconservatives began to take an interest in political Islam. If Saudi Arabia is seen as the Islamist USSR of the start of the 21st century, Iran played a similar role for the neoconservatives during the 1990s. All was linked to an “international khomeinism” whose specter was felt everywhere: from the Iranian peripheries, including Sudan, to Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Tajikistan, through Iraq, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Bosnia.55 Everything is linked and nothing occurs by chance. Here we have two of the three postulates of any conspiracy rhetoric.56 And Iran is a good example to take. Moreover, the contagious metaphor is another feature of this sort of equation. Evil seduces and spreads since all is linked. Similarly, the moral condemnation by he who denounces the conspiracy supposes this is perfectly intentional: nothing happens by chance. And yet, even if there has been some Islamist unrest in Egypt and 53  For further developments on the conspiracy theory, cf. Véronique Campion-Vincent, La société parano, théories du complot, menaces et incertitudes, Paris, Payot, 2005, PierreAndré Taguieff, L’imaginaire du complot mondial: aspects d’un mythe moderne, Paris, Mille et une nuits, 2006 and Benoît Pélopidas, “Face aux théories du complot. Esquisse d’un dialogue”, February 2006, available at: http://www.euro-power.eu. 54  Léon Poliakov, La causalité diabolique, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1980. 55  Daniel Pipes, “Islam Intramural Struggle”, National Interest, Summer 1994. 56  Véronique Campion-Vincent, La société parano…, op. cit., p. 12.

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Algeria, (sometimes extremely violent), they were Sunnite protests and were linked to domestic political situations. In Tajikistan, Iran pushed the Islamist opposition in the direction of peace rather than towards conflict. Even in Bosnia, where Iranian interference was criticized, in particular by experts close to the American Congress like Yossef Bodansky for example, it is difficult to imagine a revolutionary conspiracy aimed at destabilizing Europe. The multiplicity of political ideas proposed by the representatives of the Islamic Republic in Bosnia helps understand the ideological divisions that existed in Tehran at the time. The one thing we can be sure of by analyzing the various players is that none of them aimed at exporting the revolution.57 To stop at this point would be like putting aside what links the conspiracy theories of any ideological edifice: things are not always what they appear to be. This is the missing third postulate behind the conspirational character of the reasoning. The lessons of common sense and immediate perception are swept aside. And this virulent approach remains the dogma in use among the neoconservatives and the right wing of the Republican Party. Far from being satisfied that a reformist such as Khatami is placed at the head of the Iranian State, they hope for a radical change. From this point of view, they were more in favor of a revolution than a smooth reform, despite the foreseeable consequences for regional stability. The arrival of the conservative Ahmadinedjad in June 2005 only strengthens their convictions that a revolution would be better than smooth evolution. Indeed, for the neoconservatives, there is no alternative since the Iranians can integrate the global economy without softening an alleged religious and revolutionary purity.58 With a transformation of the regime being impossible, the only option is its overthrow. But an overthrow does not necessarily mean the presence of American GI’s on Iranian soil. The war in Iraq has allowed the presence of American troops at the gates of Tehran, which could strengthen the position of the supporters of democracy, and provoke a revolution within the country.59 Clearly Ahmadinejad’s landslide victory invalidates this scenario, since the war in Iraq seems to have encouraged his election to the detriment of the more moderate candidate Rafsandjani. However this approach does explain why the imperialist-democrats announced the idea that, the Iraqi Sunnite uprising being in fact of Saudi origin, Muqtada al Sadr’s rebellion60 could only have been fomented by Tehran. And yet the tradition of Arab nationalism adopted by Muqtada’s 57  Xavier Bouganel and Nathalie Clayer (eds), Le Nouvel Islam Balkanique, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001, pp. 423-25. 58  Reuel Marc Gerecht, “On to Iran!”, The Weekly Standard, 18 February 2002. 59 Reuel Marc Gerecht, “Regime Change in Iran 2”, The Weekly Standard, 5 August 2002. 60 Muqtada el Sadr (born 1974) is the son of the Iraqi Shiite ayatollah Mohammed el Sadr, who comes from a famous Shiite family, many members of which were assassinated by Saddam Hussein’s regime. He led the al-Mahdi army that controlled part of Najaf in 2004 and regularly opposed the Americans in violent armed clashes. He stopped the fighting after the intervention of the influential ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

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movement, the Mahdi Army, raises problems for an religious Iranian establishment which claims to have spiritual authority over all the Shiites of the world.61 The neoconservative vision was even rejected by members of the CIA62 who saw in it a political attempt by collaborators to the Pentagon, with support from the far right, to link the Hezbollah and Tehran to anti-American terrorism, despite the absence of any real proof of such conniving. This desire to associate the struggle against the Khomeini regime and the “War on Terror” quite naturally led the Weekly Standard to announce the link between Tehran and Al Qaeda.63 One point illustrates this American “double standard” policy with regard terrorism, that is incompatible with the ideological prism, and that clearly refers to cynical manipulation: the support of the “Mujahideen of the People” terrorist group is common knowledge,64 even if the movement is considered by the State Department itself as a terrorist movement.65 In a word, the American attitude in general and neoconservative in particular, is above all to treat Iran as an outright enemy that can not be negotiated with. However, it is no more Iran’s revolutionary or Islamist character that the neoconservatives consider dangerous. If today the country receives such close attention it is because of its nuclear projects. Far from being an idea of the Iranian mullahs, Tehran’s nuclear plans go back many years.66 At the start of the 1960s, the Shah launched a nuclear program with the creation of around twenty nuclear power stations, with the blessing and help of a number of different countries (United States, France, USSR and Germany amongst others). Today, Washington D.C., like the neoconservatives, fear a military use of the nuclear energy, mainly, if not exclusively, against Israel, the main regional ally.67 To back this up, the Iranian president’s declaration of October 25, 2005, announcing the desire to “eliminate Israel from the map” and the December 2006 conference on the Holocaust in Tehran, went a long way to strengthen these fears. They note with a certain lucidity that, given the current situation, the security of the Islamic Republic and whatever form of pressure on the pro-American regimes in the neighboring Arab world, requires obtaining the bomb.68 The Iranian issue therefore will probably remain a priority in the coming future even if it not necessarily linked to the fight against Al Qaeda. 61  Jim Lobe, “Neoconservative Try to Suggest that Sadr Uprising Is ‘Made in Teheran’”, Foreign Policy in Focus, 9 April 2004, available at: http://www.fpif.org/ commentary/2004/0404neoconsadr_body.html. 62  According to the journalist of the Times, James Risen. See Jim Lobe, ibid. 63  Jeffrey Bell, “Al Qaida New Base”, The Weekly Standard, 3 November 2003. 64  “Self-fulfilling Prophecy. US Threats Make Matters Worse in Iran”, The Guardian, 20 May 2003. 65 See A. William Samii, “Iran Hates Iraq”, The Weekly Standard, 29 April 2002. 66  Cf. Nader Barzin, L’Iran nucléaire, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2005. 67 Richard Perle and David Frum, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror, New York, Random House, 2003, p. 106. 68  Christian Lowe, “A Nuclear Iran”, The Weekly Standard, 29 November 2004.

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For the neo-eurasianists, Iran represents a “privileged partner”, due to the geopolitical complementarities of the two countries. They are extremely favorable for a strengthening of relations with Tehran, particularly since its openly hostile position with regards the United States and Iran are beneficial to Moscow and fit in with their anti-Atlanticist worldview.69 Relations between an atheist USSR and a religious Iran were clearly not easy. But, from a relationship of suspicion, based on American action, Russian strategic reasoning has evolved little by little. There was a first improvement at the end of the 1980s, following the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini and Gorbachev’s decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. Once the wave of Westernism of the 1990s had passed, the Iranian leaders began taking greater interest in Eurasia. If, during the Cold War, Tehran had some 2000 km of borders in common with the USSR, today Moscow has no direct physical links with the former Persia, a long time rival. This distancing has gradually given Iran more confidence and has led to a renewal of relations. For the Russians, the attenuation of Iranian revolutionary proselytism has meant new relations are possible. The 1979 Revolution was a key moment for Muslims, similar, according to the neo-eurasianist Gejdar Dzhemal, to the reconquest of Jerusalem or the capture of Constantinople by the Osmanlis. According to Dzhemal, its evolution was similar to that of the USSR: its destiny was modified by bureaucracies each with differing objectives70 and all against those common to the Revolution. In this case, Khatami’s Iran is as distant from Khomeini as the Soviet Union from Lenin in its final days:71 the question around its position in the construction of a new Eurasia can be raised once again. Today, Iran represents a key ally for the neo-eurasianist movement, and this reality conforms to their vision of regional geopolitics: Tehran represents Shiite Islamic fundamentalism which, unlike Islamist extremism, refers to a cultural and traditional ideology. This is the other face of the idea that transforms Saudi Sunnite Wahhabism into the enemy. As expressed by the General Secretary of the Russian Communist Party Zyuganov, “Fundamentalism”, meaning a return to an age-old national spiritual tradition will no doubt bear its fruit72

Moreover, Primakov, the former Prime Minister progressively introduced the idea that Iran could become a “strategic partner”. The geopolitical complementarities 69  Adam Tarock, “Iran and Russia in ‘Strategic Alliance’”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1997, p. 209. 70  Gejdar Djemal, “Iran idët gibel’nym putem sssr” [Iran is fatally going down the path of the USSR], Zavtra, 6 August 2002, No. 32 (455). 71  Valentin Prussakov, “”Aâtolla Gorbačev” i konec islamskoj revolûcii” [“Ayatollah Gorbatchev” and the end of revolutionary Islam], Zavtra, No. 36 (459), 3 September 2002. 72  Gennadi Zŭganov, La Russie après l’an 2000. Vision géopolitique d’un nouvel Etat, Morsang-sur-Orge, Mithec, 1999, translated from Russian by Michel Secinsky, p. 186.

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are numerous. The project to find solutions to end the Central Asian conflicts, particularly the civil war in Tajikistan is just one example. Both countries also worked together to fight against the Afghan Taliban. The partnership, cemented by a shared condemnation of Sunnite Islamism, gives the two countries a certain strategic scope in Central Asia and in the Caucasus. For Primakov, such a partnership should also recreate a role for Russia in solving the Israeli-Arab conflict. The nuclear issue, which is officially for civil purposes only, also offers a good reason for cooperation, much to the distaste of the United States. While Iran certainly hopes to have the nuclear bomb one day, the Kremlin, despite officially rejecting the possibility, intends to cooperate to ensure the survival of some 11 cities and the million jobs related to the project.73 In the light of this concern we can interpret Putin’s offer of November 11, 2005 to enrich the uranium on Russian soil.74 The war in Iraq has also accentuated the mutual attraction of the two partners and the neo-eurasianists fear an increased American influence in Iran, particularly because of the reformist “fifth column” which has adopted the themes of “liberty”, “democracy” and “universal values”, all concepts belonging to the arsenal of the “Atlanticist civilizations”.75 They hope for a strong Iran, one that is “capable of reacting to all aggressions”, including nuclear.76 Its request for weapons and its geopolitical position, between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, make it a worthy partner. The close relations, particularly on an economic level, are well received by Moscow, even more so since Iran has a relatively compliant position concerning the situation in Chechnya. At this point, neo-eurasianist policies need to bear in mind a number of difficulties: to project its power into neighboring states, to exclude a heavy American presence and to impose its priorities in terms of security. What is more, Iran remains interested in limiting the regional influence of Azerbaijan, since Tehran has a large minority of Azeris in the North of the country. Thus it becomes a key element for Russian diplomacy in the Middle East, both for the sale of weapons or geopolitical advantages (proximity of the warm seas) and economically.77 Alexander Dugin recommends the creation, concomitantly with the rebuilding of the Soviet zone, 73 Hannah Carter and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, The Middle East’s Relations with Asia and Russia, New York, Routledge Curzon, 2004, p. 24 and Thérèse Delpech, L’Iran, la bombe et la demission des nations, Paris, Autrement, 2006. 74  Following a period of doubt, Iran seemed to accept the proposal in May 2006. Cf. the opinion of the general secretary of the Supreme Council for national security, Ali Larijani, available at: http://fr.rian.ru/russia/20060509/47892748.html. 75  Valentin Prussakov, “Moment istiny dlâ irana I rossii” [Moment of truth for Iran and Russia], Zavtra, 1st July 2003, No. 27 (502). Our translation. 76  Vladimir Petrov, “Bušer protiv buša” [Buhsher contre Bush], Zavtra, No. 39 (619), 28 September 2005. Our translation. 77 The Russian-Iranian partnership does not receive unanimous support: Alexei Arbatov, member of the Iabloko party (democratic), then director of the defense committee of the Duma feared for the loss of Russia’s long-term interests due to the agreement (entering the international system).

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of a Moscow-Tehran line to counter the United States,78 which could be extended to India and China. The second election of George W. Bush, in 2004, the longterm impact on his views on diplomacy between the two countries, and the role of the neoconservatives in the American administration makes the disengagement of the two countries seem unlikely, even more with the radical Ahmadinejad and is own kind of harsh conservative friends leading the country.79 Indeed, during his election campaign, Ahmadinejad did not hesitate to propose “an end to decadent tendencies of the past years”, non-Iranian ideas and to “recreate the founding spirit of the Great Islamic Revolution”, and to cease being “humiliated” by the United States and the West.80 Therefore, for the neo-eurasianists, it represents an opportunity not to be missed to strengthen relations. Particularly since many Iranian hard-liners were trained in the USSR, for example the Ayatollah Ali Khameneï.81 At the end of our strategic analysis, the pseudo-imperial projects of the two movements would seem to lead to a joint impasse for the two former super powers of the Cold War. Certainly they impact both the domestic and foreign policies of Washington D.C. and Moscow, particularly within the Muslim world. The intervention in Iraq demonstrated America’s capacity to set up a military presence at the very heart of the Middle East, in accordance with the neoconservative project. The neo-eurasianists want Moscow to play a key role. Putin’s diplomatic offensives, concerning energy, the Iranian nuclear issue or following the invitation of the newly-elected Palestinian leader of the Hamas in 2006, strengthen the idea that Moscow is back and that Russia can play the part of referee in international affairs. The impasse is not so much due to the geopolitical project as the impossibility of setting it up and giving it a meaning for those it is designed for. Thus, as we have demonstrated case by case, if cynicism is not totally absent from the approaches of our two movements, only ideology can explain some of their arbitrage. For example the neoconservative project encourages the propagation of democracy, at least on principal, but its definition, which they present as the cornerstone of their reflection, remains more than ambiguous. Are they simply interested in the running of elections, in which case democracy is just a simple technique that can be transposed, or do they want to set off a process of democratic acculturation that took two hundred years in France or the United States? Whatever the case, this would mean accepting the election results, even when they go against the interests of the United States, which is in total 78  Alexander Dugin, “Os’Moskva-Tegeran vpolne vozmožna” [The Moscow-Tehran axis is possible], 2 April 2003, available at: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=N ews&file=article&sid=1118. Our translation. 79  Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjood Jweiri, Iran and Its Neoconservatives : The Politics of Teheran’s Silent Revolution, London : I.B. Tauris, 2007. 80  Valentin Prussakov, “Iranskij urok” [The Iranian lesson], Zavtra, 26 June 2005, No. 26 (606). Our translation. 81 He was educated at Lumumba University in Moscow.

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contradiction with neoconservative thinking. This contradiction reveals an even greater strategic error, which explains all the ambiguity of the democratic project: the neoconservatives have shrugged off the work relating to the reception of their message which is extremely damning when one remembers that a democracy is based on a population, for the benefit of a simple undifferentiated propagation. Democracy becomes simply a strategic tool for the easy resolution of certain enmities towards the United States that are based on a past of conflict, and more generally major international problems in which a democratic process , if sincerely accepted, is welcomed but never enough. As for the neo-eurasianist project, it invests itself with a return of mysticism. Its rejection of unipolar globalization could earn it a huge popularity throughout the world, both in China, India and the Muslim world, and even beyond. It reflects the plurality of the world, unlike the more unilateral American project. However it is Moscow’s capacity to act as the model which makes the project inoperable. Even at the heart of the post-Soviet space, the attempts to create a new USSR have failed. The desire to fight against unipolar globalization has gained support from the Muslim world, but the repeated Soviet then Russian military operations against the Islamists since 1979, in Afghanistan, in Chechnya, in Dagestan and Tajikistan have put a new light on the seductive project. In such conditions, to rebuild a “Turanian synthesis” around Slav-orthodox and Muslim elements appears risky particularly since Putin’s Russia is not the USSR of the past. Thus it is clearly their conception of Empire that poses a problem for the two movements. Let us return once again to this point to better understand what it is that is hampering their historical fecundity.

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Conclusion The Impossible Empire of Ressentiment “Ressentiment inextricably reunites those who mutually excommunicate.”

The empire is the continuing actualization by a political community of the narrative of its historical calling; the above mentioned community embraces the difficulty of an indefinite expansion of its domination over an ever increasing territory likened to the whole world, upon which it imposes peace and offers to join its project of transforming the world. Given our previously established definition, the imperial figure cannot be the instrument of nationalism that we have qualified as pseudo-imperial for the neoconservatives and hegemonic for the neo-eurasianists. The way the neo-eurasianists desire to restore Moscow’s influence in its former near abroad diverts them from a genuine imperial project. It is stifled by a cultural boundary the neo-eurasianists do not want to cross. They want to be the leaders of a return of spirituality over the uniformizing and materialist Americans; on this basis, they can build alliances beyond the Eurasian zone. But this means an opportunist strategic coalition which does not establish the common vision of a history they would create together. This is limited to a perspective of resistance. Being nostalgic for the Soviet Federal Republic, this vision leads to the creation of different autonomous cultural universes whose association would not have much meaning once the hyperpower has been defeated. How then can we speak of anything else than a strategy for hegemony based on a negative founding principal? This is reflected in Dugin’s works which develop a syncretic ideology, not always coherent, that fluctuates according to the coalitions he hopes to create nationally and the geopolitical alliances he hopes to develop internationally. And it truly is a case for revenge: first and foremost, the empire, for the neoeurasianists, represents a metaphorical topos which refers back to memories of former glory more than a symbol for the future. Putin’s Russia thus appears lastingly turned to the restoration of order rather than to new revolutionary adventures. As for the neoconservatives, whose ideas have little by little seduced a large part of the American political elites, they do want to transform and recreate a large part of the world, but are not concerned by how their message is received. They do not have either a real project of association that would be the elementary basis of an acceptable meaning of a common future. This would seem obvious when we observe the countries in which they have chosen to deploy their military panoply:   Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Avions-nous oublié le mal? Penser le politique après le 11 septembre, Paris, Bayard, 2002, p. 47. Our translation.

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those where they were a priori the least popular. Many of their erring ways come from an ideological understanding of the world, indifferent to certain aspects of reality such as the existence of public opinion in the Muslim world, to a point where it takes the shape of a paranoid style that requires nipping enemies in the bud. As stated above, this is an empire on the defensive, one that immediately loses the historical fecundity the term normally offers. The myth according to which attack is the best form of defense well sums up the current American position. It reveals a relentless pursuit, arrogant and fearful at the same time, as the very opposite of an authentic imperial movement. Besides, Jack Snyder, who unearthed this myth, recognizes the futility of American foreign policy and assimilates it more to a strategy of hegemony. We agree with him on the lack of importance given to association in the pseudo-imperial project. However, let us not forget what distinguishes the neoconservatives from the neo-eurasianists: the democratic guarantee proposes a teleological objective that is a priori universalizable, whereas the neo-eurasianist project is limited to the affirmation of distinct and autonomous cultural identities. With “pan-eurasian nationalism”, the eurasianists did introduce a perspective of association, but were already reifying the enclosure of a zone. This represents the limit to their imperial pretensions. When they finance NGO networks in the near abroad, it is to better counter the attraction for the EU and to bring these countries back under Moscow’s wing, with constant reference to the Russian language and a shared nostalgia for the imperial era. By contrast, the democratization campaign undertaken by the United States is a priori territoriallyspeaking undefined, although strategically selective. This takes American strategy close to the imperial model whereas the neo-eurasianist project never even approaches it. From this angle, the September 11th attacks represent a threshold which ends rather than inaugurates American imperial ambition. Indeed, even if one does not entirely trust the political rhetoric, there is a striking discrepancy between the occasional references to foreign policy by the candidate Bush during the 2000 presidential campaign, confirming a preference for moderation and multilateralism, and the interventionist and military practices of his administration. If the reorientation is less perceptible among the neo-eurasianists, the events, and American reaction that followed, strengthened the bases of a founding   Cf. the statistics of the Pew Global Attitudes Project of 2002, available at: http:// people-press.org/reports/pdf/165.pdf. See in particular pages 63 to 81 of the document.   We refer to the category elaborated by Richard Hofstadter in his article “The Paranoid Style in American Politics” in “the clinical paranoid sees the hostile and conspiratorial world in which he feels himself to be living as directed specifically against him; whereas the spokesman of the paranoid style finds it directed against a nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not only himself but millions of others.” in Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays, New York, Knopf, 1965, p. 4.   Jack Snyder, “Mythes d’empire et stratégies d’hégémonie”, Critique internationale, No. 26, January 2005, pp. 59-78.

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ressentiment. Following September 11th, it became clear the neoconservatives believed themselves to be a citadel under attack from a world they thought they were protecting and that suddenly turned hostile towards them. It is easy to understand how the status of victim has become the source of an attitude of identity retraction. Over and above the problematic character of the movement of retraction in itself, it is paradoxical. The power that adopts a warlike rhetoric demands nothing from its population that is equivalent to the means deployed: yes it increases the controls on its territory but does not restore national service, it maintains the ideal of “zero casualties” and continues its policy of reducing taxes for the wealthier. Thus, it does not really assume the imperial dimension of its action which should be borne by the people as much as by the Constitution. The quest for invulnerability and the illusion of the fungibility of the political resources led to a deployment of force motivated by technical and economic laws that do not suffice to make it meaningful. This damning incoherency can be found in the relation to the other. The return of this nationalism has chosen an expansionist policy with defensive designs. And the expansion is presented as vital since American mistrust spares no one, even if the authors of the attacks have been identified. Charles Krauthammer’s reaction to Europe’s attitude during the first semester 2002 is indicative of this shift. The resurgence of anti-Americanism and an opposition to Israeli policies in the Middle East were enough to flush out a European feeling of anti-Semitism that in his view had been hidden for half a century. After what was taken as a betrayal, trust and loyalty lose all meaning: the mission creates the coalition and not the opposite according to Donald Rumsfeld, the then Defense Secretary, who stated that the post-September 11th world was characterized by an unprecedented level of danger. What sort of empire is possible when it is no longer a question of associating with the other but of protecting from him? The fundamentally pessimistic anthropology that underlies the policies defended by the neoconservatives forbids the fulfillment of an imperial project, whose vocation is precisely to offer the possibility of self-fulfillment. In our opinion, other than its selectivity, the ambiguity behind the American “dream” for the democratization of the world lies in the tension between two aspects: a democratic messianism that would re-establish American exceptionalism co-exists with the total ignorance of the other, that the attacks transpose into suspicion. This in turn prevents the associative movement of the empire from developing. President Bush’s lapidary offer must be interpreted through this prism: the choice to be with the United States for a specific mission rather than with the terrorists does not automatically   Ghassan Salamé, Quand l’Amérique refait le monde, Paris, Fayard, 2005, p. 542 and more generally Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire, New York, Verso, 2003.  This corresponds to the theory of Walter Mead according to which this policy is a Monroe doctrine for the whole world, remembering that the Monroe doctrine guaranteed the non-interference of foreign powers in the affairs of the American continent.   Quoted in Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Avions-nous oublié le mal? op. cit., pp. 55-6.

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remove all suspicion. And the memories of September 11th serve to maintain this mistrust. The concept of ressentiment is extremely useful to understand the incapacity of the two projects, both of which claim to be imperial, to have a meaning and thus to read over again the picture we have just painted. It reflects a neurotic repetition that is orchestrated by a few individuals, and that is built around a traumatic event and repressed rancour rather than a positive project. This analysis requires to consider the impact of the September 11th attacks and, for the Russians, the Orange revolution, as the most significant of all the “Colored Revolutions”. The application of this concept of individual psychology to a group is possible because the two nebulas in question have a common affective relation with two traumatic founding events upon which they hope to base a new worldview and political practices. Thus, the ressentiment becomes politicized as a legitimizing principle. One objection could be to say that the ressentiment in question supposes a period of neurotic repetition before the riposte occurs, if ever it does, overriding the feeling of helplessness that is at the basis of such a state. But the American reaction to the attacks in New York was immediate and its dimension incites one to turn away from this appreciation. And yet the effects of the attacks on the perception of the nation the neoconservatives are developing are similar to those of ressentiment: they produce an inversion of the values that involves positioning oneself as the unfair victim; therefore legitimately prey to a desire for revenge. Moreover, more than seven years after the destruction of the twin towers, the neoconservatives continue to present the event as the founding traumatism of the War on Terror. Consequently, repetition co-exists with action. If we can state that neoconservative policies have been developed within the relation of a national tradition, the status of victim conferred by the event can be added to the self-legitimation of the objective of democratization. This is the phenomenon, as described by Pierre Hassner, of the “barbarization of the bourgeois” when he is seized by ressentiment.10 It creates greater tolerance with regards reprehensible acts committed by ones own troops. The reappearance of the reference to Theodore Roosevelt who affirmed that “unless we keep the barbarian virtues, gaining the civilized ones will be of little

  Thus, the project of a new Russian military doctrine reflects the traumatism caused by the Orange Revolution and the political lessons learnt. Similarly the September 2002 and March 2006 National Security Strategies bear traces of September 11. “General Gareev: “Russia will be the geopolitical referee of future conflicts”. The new Russian military doctrine” 26 January 2007, available at: http://www.mondialisation.ca/index.php?context =viewArticle&code=LIT20070126&articleId=4603.  Max Scheler, L’homme du ressentiment, Paris, Gallimard, 1958 [1919], pp. 14-16. 10 Pierre Hassner, “La revanche des passions”, Commentaire, No. 110, Summer 2005, pp. 299-312, p. 305

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avail”11 reflects warlike extolling, following the prejudice caused, which is a case for hubris.12 It reflects a will to sublimate the ressentiment, to transform it into a revolutionary power to act, with which the United States aim to transform world order. At first glance, this puts them in line with an imperial project. If the memory of humiliation permits a less restrained expression of hostility and revolt,13 it prevents the surpassing and sublimation of total accomplishment: alongside this imperative for action and all conquering image, the neoconservatives retain the feeling of vulnerability and a denial of recognition. Therefore the extreme susceptibility that arises is a product of the ressentiment; it leads to imagining political disagreement as an attack on the very identity of the United States.14 Therefore the rivalry that sets in, in a way aims at establishing the status of victim that has been subjected to the greater prejudice. Already in 1991, the fall of the USSR imposed the redefining of an identity that led to ressentiment. The fifteen years that followed were a time of neurotic repetition which has no equivalent on the neoconservative side. It is precisely this ressentiment that distinguishes neo-eurasianism from its historical ancestor, which was also the result of a catastrophe: the end of Russia as a spiritual power with the Bolshevik Revolution and the ensuing loss of territory. Seven decades later, the neo-eurasianists instrumentalize the spiritual quest for geopolitical ends; ressentiment reduces the project to a simple reaction and transforms antagonism into hostility. The new enemy is now Atlanticism. Structured around a power that is protected by the oceans, it exports conflicts. To this grievance can be added a major geopolitical rivalry between this thalassocracy and the tellurocracy par excellence that is Eurasia. 11  Quoted by W.A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, Boston, Houghton, 1997, p. 105. 12  Cf. R.D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, New York, Random House, 2002 or Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, New York, Basic Books, 2002. 13  We can liken this observation to Michèle Ansart-Dourlen’s analyses of the excess of ressentiment in revolutionary practices. Michèle Ansart-Dourlen, “Le ressentiment: les modalités de son dépassement dans les pratiques révolutionnaires. Réflexions sur l’usage de la violence” in Pierre Ansart (ed.), Le ressentiment, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2002, pp. 22340, p. 239. 14  Let us recall the words of Deleuze: “The man of ressentiment does not know how to and does not want to love, but he wants to be loved.” He therefore demonstrates “great susceptibility”. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, Paris, PUF, 1973 [1962], p. 135. (Our translation) Nietzsche spoke in these terms: “one does not know how to get free of anything, one does not know how to have done with anything, one does not know how to thrust back – everything hurts. Men and things come importunately close, events strike too deep, the memory is a festering wound.”, Ecce Homo, I, 6, translation by R.J. Hollingdale, New York, Penguin, 1992, p. 15. This dimension constitutes the weakness of the American neoconservatives’ posture. Thus, they are prone to ressentiment which is characteristic of the weak (Max Scheler, L’homme du ressentiment, op. cit., p. 15).

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At this point, if ressentiment indeed there is, in other words the powerless repetition of the tragic memory of the end of the empire,15 it allows transposing the responsibility of the fall onto an illegitimate dominant. For the ideologue who is speaking, just as those to whom he directs his message, to be innocent, involves creating an iniquitous international system, up against which both of them in a powerless position.16 On the basis of this ressentiment, an attempted politicization will occur, whose aim is to overcome it but which once again never quite makes it since it remains founded on the negative principle of revenge. It is not surprising that one of Panarin’s major works is called The Revenge of History. Neo-eurasianism is almost synonymous with the restoration of the imperial power. This nostalgia and ressentiment are also developed by Prokhanov who, in his novels, analyzes the smoking ruins of the empire of which he claims to be the last soldier. This trend developed out of the deception of Westernism of the early 1990s, which was experienced as a period of rapid decline by the country. The Yugoslavian crises, the growth of NATO, the criticism of the Chechen war and American unilateralism led the Russian elite to turn away from the euro-atlantic structures. From this point on, the Kremlin shifted strategically to the East, and particularly China, then moved closer to India, to form Primakov’s “triangle”.17 It is therefore not surprising that Putin has made broad rhetorical concessions to the neo-eurasianists, even if his definition neglects the philosophical aspects in favor of a more geopolitical and economic vision. As Alexander Pumpyansky, a critic of the neo-eurasianists, notes with some regret,

15 This leaves the choice between two ideal-types: a military Russia, which the national patriots want, and a democratic Russia that wants to further integrate the West. Neo-eurasianism therefore represents a largely backward-looking form of nationalism for its democratic opponents. See for example Aleksej Arbatov, “Rossiâ: osobyj imperskijput’?” [Russia: a special imperial path?], Rossiâ v global’noj politike, No. 6, November-December 2005. 16  For Nietzsche, it is the pathology that is characteristic of the man of resentment to need to conceive another on which to project negativity before even being able to deduce his own moral quality. This is the characteristic of the “moral of the slave” which only exists through the supposed evil of the master. On the contrary, the latter needs no other to be himself. For the slave, the negative becomes “the original idea, the beginning, the act par excellence”. (Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, I, 11, quoted in Deleuze, op. cit., p.113). Negation creates new values when he who said he is good turns out to be bad. In this precise case, we can go to the very extreme of Nietzsche’s logic since he who appears bad in the eyes of the weak is precisely he who does not withhold his might. The United States perfectly play this part in neo-eurasianist discourse. We have borrowed this reading of Nietzsche from Gilles Deleuze (Nietzsche et la philosophie, op. cit., pp. 105 sqq.). 17  Alexander Dugin, “Putin prorubaet okno v Aziû” [Putin opens a window on Asia], Izviestia, No. 228 (27029), 14 December 2005.

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we are still hostages to the past, victims of our own anti-Western propaganda and shameless, mendacious arguments which had to confirm our Utopian claims to the role of the only true and worthy world leader.18

Then came September 11th and the Orange Revolution which introduced a dialectic of the ressentiment which strengthened the hostility. In the face of the catastrophe, the superpower revealed to the neo-eurasianists the whole scope of its domination, but also its vulnerability. As Walter Laqueur observed, “[the revanchist nationalists] recalled that America had dismembered the Soviet Union (and was now doing the same with China), that it had bombed Belgrade, that it tried to intervene in Chechnya”19 Laqueur pursues: there was, in brief, a great deal of hostility and resentment mainly among the Russian right, but there were doubts even among former liberals about whether the country should join the war on terrorism. Konstantin Zatulin, a leader of the Otechestvo party, argued that while he was not in principle anti-American, the attack of 2001 had been a blow to America and therefore in the Russian interest because it would weaken America’s position as the only remaining super-power. For the same reason it would be against Russian interest if America would win the war against terrorism. Mikhaïl Delyagin head of the Institute on the Problems of Globalism, went further: America was a terrorist state just as NATO was a terrorist organization, and Russia cooperation in the war against terrorism was therefore ruled out.20

With the attacks on New York, a new vision of the United States was presented to the neo-eurasianists. The shift is palpable with Dugin, who redefines the enemy. No longer was it only a case of fighting against Atlanticism, but globalism also, a theme that has become more profitable in the country. And the new target is particularly significant. The new opponent represents the desire to dominate but also to distort the world via the confusion of land and sea. This means threatening the fundamental principle of the collective neo-eurasian identity. The reaction would then build on some kind of survival instinct. For the Russians, the Orange Revolution was even more of a threshold than September 11th. With this political upheaval in Ukraine, it was the attraction for their great neighbor that was at stake; the Ukrainians became more Atlanticist to the detriment of Moscow. As regards its neighbourhood policy toward Eastern Europe, the European Union thus 18  Alexander Pumpyansky, “We and the world. Do Russians want to join Europe?”, New Times, 9 September 2003, available at: http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_ id=873. 19  Walter Laqueur, No End to War, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, New York, Continuum, 2003, p.154. 20 Idem.

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appeared as a rival under the control of Warsaw and Washington. It is easy to understand therefore how the two antagonistic visions of the world, that of the neoconservatives and that of the neo-eurasianists, gradually retreat into forms of logic that are shut off one from the other. We believe this is the result of September 11th and the American reaction that followed in two of its dimensions. First, the rapidly announced American adventurism and militarism are taken up by those who denounce American domination to support their theses. But, more importantly, the process of competition over victimhood or victimization produces a sudden increase in hostility and not only a passive denigration of the other as we observed in the previous period. Ressentiment becomes a principle of reaction: the political injunction to fight against the enemy becomes a vital necessity. This rising dialectic of enmity would appear to represent the new element of post-September 11th. From a feeling of denial of recognition, the residual ressentiment that one hopes to sublimate through political action is now based on the idea according to which the real identity of the two movements is at stake.21 This only aggravates their blindness. The overstating of persecution would suggest that any action on behalf of the other is aimed at who we are and not what we do. Precisely, the reactions of our two intellectual groups, that both experience a deliberate assault,22 correspond to this type of attitude. This takes us back to the paranoid style that is characteristic of the conspiracy theories, whether explicit or otherwise, that negatively unite the different ideas of both camps. This is simply the conclusion of Manichean reasoning. President Bush’s moral rhetoric opposing Good and Evil would seem to support this idea. Thus, the neoconservatives are all the more cautious as the opposition is growing in the Muslim world. The neo-eurasianists and Russia are probably not their main target but, as key allies of Iran and other “rogue” states, they are in a position to be considered as enemies. Indeed, Manichean reasoning can lead to a construction of the world based on conspiracy. He who elaborates such a conception positions himself as the solitary and abandoned victim which potentially opposes him to the rest of the world; he can rank his assailants, but they all become the accomplices of the cruelest of all. Amalgamation is widespread practice for such mental constructions whose main cognitive attraction is their faculty of explanation by simplification. Since what you do implacably refers to what you are, the criticism 21  “Ressentiment falls within a logic of domination. It supposes the dispossession of oneself, the confiscation of properties: it can mean the stripping of cultural references, the pushing aside, even the suppression, of political values, both individual and collective” writes Pierre Ansart, “Présentation” in Le ressentiment, op.cit., pp. 1-8, p. 7. Our translation. 22  Pierre Hassner thus remarks that the end of the Cold War led to replacing the notion of threat, identified, by that of “risk”, much more blurred. Following September 11th, a new notion of threat appears. It reintroduced a hostile intention, but retains the indeterminacy and the extension of the notion of risk. Pierre Hassner, “La signification du 11 septembre: divagations politico-philosophiques sur l’événement” in La terreur et l’Empire, Paris, Seuil, 2003, pp. 383-402, pp. 390-91.

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that targets the neoconservatives is presented as hostility towards the United States of America. As with the reaction we have just presented, the neoconservative mistrust and the force projection that accompanies it are seen by the neoeurasianists as hostility and the work of hubris. Moreover, the hyperrationalism of the conspiracy theory attributes the accused with a perfect understanding of the world and a faultless historical capacity to act, to a point whereby chance never interferes with his Machiavellian visions. This finalizes the positioning of the United States as a technical and material power, against the spiritual ideal the neo-eurasianists hope to attain. Such conspirational construction represents the beginning of the action since, by revealing the hidden motivations behind the enemy’s action, it is a first step towards a better defense.23 It removes any specific attention relating to the complexity of the world and grants moral sanctification upon he who identifies the devil. It therefore creates a “negative re-enchantment of the world”,24 but it does seem radically and definitively incapable of founding an imperial project. Without mentioning association, the very perspective of reconciliation seems to be fading little by little. The conspiracy theory shapes the forms of possible action whereby a pragmatic and sincere partnership with the presumed plotter, likely to reduce hostility, becomes impossible. Only the incoherency of our two movements and the selective reassertion of traditional power policies can save them from rising to extremes. Nonetheless, they cannot reach access to an authentic imperial project. Thus the competition over victimization phenomena mutually sustain one another until any form of reconciliation with the persecutor considered as lucid and sadistic becomes impossible. Once the United States have gotten over September 11th, it is highly unlikely they will be again motivated by authentic imperial perspectives. The problems of 2008 and the increasing enmity their actions are provoking augur ill for any future association to an American Empire. No more so can we base any hope on the broadening of Russia’s hegemonic calling, for the simple reason of capacity.25

23  The analyses of Mark Fenster in Conspiracy Theories. Secrecy and Power in American Culture, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999, seem to confirm this relation between the sublimation of ressentiment and the paradoxical capacity to act produced by the discovery of a conspiracy. “This is conspiracy as (…) a positively enervating experience, approaching the maniacally depressive pessimism of conspiracy theory with an ironic, cynical detachment from its dystopian implications.”, p. 216. 24 Pierre-André Taguieff, Prêcheurs de haine, traversée de la judéophobie planétaire, Paris, Mille et une nuits, 2004, pp. 802-804. See more generally pp. 797-811 on the “functions of the conspiracy myth”. 25  Dimitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia, Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002.

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Throughout these instrumental and often incoherent invocations, the imaginary fecundity of the imperial figure once again triumphs over its historical incarnations.

Afterword Changing People, Continuing Patterns? 2008 was a presidential electoral year in Russia and the United States. Does this mean that the trends we identified vanished and should be considered as a historical moment? This afterword aims at showing if there is a change, it will probably not be so clear cut. First of all, there was no need for a new episode of the Star Wars saga to ensure the continuity of the polemical reduction of empire. This means that our conceptual clarification and effort to combine intellectual history and foreign policy analysis remains relevant. The most recent literature treats empire as “pathology”. The debate on colonial legacy in the Western world leads columnists to write antiimperial books or to overuse the term Empire, in order to disqualify any kind of power because it is both fashionable and very emotional. The recent trend that gives voice to pro-imperial writers faces an equally symmetrical pitfall, just as politically sensitive as the previous one. The debate is often blurred by unclear definitions, despite some very valuable contributions in this direction. For all these reasons, our clarification of the notion to give a precise definition based on conceptual distinctiveness and historical validity seems most useful. Second, the interest of our comparison rises with time. The two great powers at the heart of our analysis seem to have a relative favorable future in front of them. Such a situation will continue to nourish the debate around the notion of Empire in the years to come, in Moscow and in Washington D.C.

 The title of the second chapter of Chalmers Johnson’s Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic (New York, Metropolitan Books, 2007, reprinted in 2008 by Holt Rinehart and Winston), makes it explicit: “Comparative imperial pathologies: Rome, Britain and America”.   For an interesting overview, see Joseph W. Esherick “The Return of Empire?” in Joseph W. Esherick, Hasan Kayali and Eric Van Young, (eds), From Empire to Nation. Historical Perspective on the Making of the Modern World, New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.   See for instance the works of Hardt and Negri on the critical side, that of Niall Ferguson on the pro-imperial side and their review by Alexander J. Motyl, “Is Everything Empire? Is Empire Everything?”, Comparative Politics, January 2006, pp. 229-49. We insist on these works which first came out in 2003 and 2004 because they are all reprinted by Penguin Press between 2006 and 2008.   For example, Amy Chua, Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall, New York, Doubleday Books, 2007.

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Even if more and more people speak of the end of the “American era” or the “unipolar moment”, the US remains the first global power and will be so for many years. China and India are increasingly seen as potential challengers and key players in international relations. However, due to various internal problems, including economic ones that will be strengthened by the current financial crisis, they have merely the potential to be so in the decades to come. For example, the Chinese leadership will have to cope with the worrying gap between the rich and the poor, social unrest (e.g. Xinjian) and its obligation to attain at least 7 percent annual growth in order to meet the employment demands of newcomers in the labor market. As for India, economic, social and religious tensions are extremely worrying for the future, despite the rosy picture one usually gets when trying to learn more about the South Asian nation. The recent terrorist attack in Mumbai is an illustration of a nation that is too divided to become a global power anytime soon. Specifically, as long as the rivalry with Pakistan persists, it will be difficult for India to be more than a regional power: peace with Islamabad over Kashmir is a necessity to deal with some important security and economic issues. Even if those problems were solved, the competition between the most important powers in Asia will make things difficult for a would-be global power to emerge in the area.10 The European Union could be a more believable challenger.11 Unfortunately, the unwillingness of some European nations to participate more decisively in the fight in Afghanistan12 seems proof that Europeans are not as yet ready to be much more than an economic power. This leaves the United States with an absence of global rivals in the years to come. Of course, the extent to which the US will be hurt by Iraq is anybody’s guess. But for now there is no indication whatsoever that the formidable American power, built during the last century, could be destroyed only by a war, even if this war definitively eroded its image and impact all over the  See for example Rollie Lal, Understanding China and India. Security Implications for the United States and the World, London, Praeger Security International, 2006.   Didier Chaudet, “La chine face a la menace Islamiste”, Le Figaro, 5 August 2008.   This problem, and others facing China, are perfectly explained by Susan L. Shirk, China, Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.  To read a radical approach of those problems, see Vandana Shiva, India Divided: Diversity and Democracy under Attack, New York, Seven Stories Press, 2005.   One can think of energy for example. The pipelines that should come from Iran and Turkmenistan will all cross Pakistan before going to an energy-starving India. 10  For more on this question, see Bill Emmot, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade, New York, Harcourt, 2008. 11 See Stephen Haseler, Super-State: The New Europe and Its Challenge to America, London, I.B. Tauris, 2004; Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century, London, Fourth Estate, 2005. 12  An important fight for Europe, at least in order to deal in the short term with the Jihadist problem, and in the long term with the drug issue. The vast majority of heroin consumed in Europe is coming from Afghanistan.

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world. On the other hand, the rise of China and India, Russia’s reemergence, and the violent reactions from the South against what will be seen as injustice, will certainly breed pseudo-imperial thoughts in the decades to come. On the other side, Russia is increasingly assertive. It clearly appears as a central player in the current international order. It has kept traditional assets – a permanent seat at the UN Security Council – and still ranks second in terms of nuclear warheads. The second oil exporter in the world benefited from the rise of the raw material prices over the last five years (oil and gas comprise more than 60 percent of the country’s export). If Russia relied on Western loans in the early 1990s, it now hopes that the other countries will depend on it, particularly in the energy field. China desperately needs the energetic Eurasian resources and one can easily forecast that with the rise of India and South East Asia, these new powers will increasingly turn toward the post-Soviet space in terms of energetic trade and investments.13 One of the most serious problems for Russia, namely the overall population decline, may be altered if the significant increase of its birth rate, observed in 2007, at its highest level over the last 25 years, is confirmed and associated with a decrease in death rate.14 Russia’s loss of population (5.8 million people from 1993 to 2007) is probably among the greatest in history for reasons other than war, famine and disease. The decline negatively impacts the country in economic, social and security terms, with great regional disparities. Looking confidently at the 2014 Olympic games of Sochi, Speaker of the Duma Boris Gryzlov considered in April 2008 that his country needed no less that 200 million people in the report he released at the 9th Party congress “United Russia”.15 Beyond the change in population dynamics, the migration issue constitutes a complex equation for Russia, but it could also help to circumvent the demographic issue; Moscow could at the same time resort to foreign immigration – from the exSoviet territories in particular – and rely on its diaspora abroad in order to retain influence.16 Last but not least, if the current financial crisis is effectively weakening the Russian economy,17 it would be a mistake to think that one factor could change overnight the political will dominant in the Kremlin. After all, Russian economy was hit even harder with the collapse of the Soviet structure of production in 1991, and with the default of 1998. The analysis betting on a change of attitude of 13  See Nikolaï Zlobine, “Relations internationales: une époque de rude concurrence se profile”, 15 November 2007 14 Anna Arutunyan, “From Crisis to Baby Boom”, Moscow News No. 5, 8 February, 2008. 15 On 1 January 2008, 142 million people are supposed to live in the country. “Démographie: la population russe doit augmenter”, Ria Novosti, 15 April 2008. http:// fr.rian.ru/russia/20080415/105109808.html. 16 See Anne de Tinguy, La grande migration. La Russie et les Russes depuis l’ouverture du rideau de fer, Paris, Plon, 2004. 17 Sergei Blagov, “Caspian Sea: Russia faces a collapse of its economic and political clout”, Eurasianet, 30 December 2008.

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Russia towards the West seems more like wishful thinking than anything else. So, the new assertiveness suggests that the dreams of imperial restoration we called “hegemonic nationalism”, built on solid and evolving material factors, are not likely to be reversed in the years to come. Third, the two ideologies remain influential for the time to come. If some leaders change, neoconservatism and neo-eurasianism have nonetheless left their imprint in the US and Russian political lives. In other words, strong parts of their worldview have spread beyond their original supporters. On the US side, neoconservatism managed to establish an important influence on the conservative movement, through media now dominated by the Fox News way of thinking, through some of the most important think tanks in D.C., and even through a part of the Democrats. There is no doubt that it will remain after the Bush administration. One important indication of the neoconservative imprint is the behaviour of the would-be candidates for the presidential election of 2008. With the Iraqi fiasco18 mainly shaped by neoconservatives, one would have thought that they would have been silenced during the campaign. This is not what happened. Rudy Giuliani, who was expected to be the Republican candidate for 2008 until December 2007, was in fact the neoconservative candidate. Major figures of the movement were among his closest advisers: Norman Podhoretz from Commentary and the famous Daniel Pipes to quote the two most obvious examples. Besides, what Giuliani thinks about the War on Terror reveals deep neoconservative influence.19 He analyzes Islamist groups as a whole and does not consider terrorism as a strategy, which means that groups using it can be led to change. He is very much in line with the neoconservative pro-Likud orientation and traces the fight against Al Qaeda back to a struggle that began with the proPalestinian terrorist actions in the 1970s rather than with anti-American attacks of 1998 or 2001. One might then object that he was not chosen and that it is a sign of change. As for John McCain, his image as a “maverick” in the Republican Party neglects his evolution from pragmatism in the 1980s and early 1990s to a more hawkish approach. He strongly supported the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the war in Iraq in 2003. He has been a standard-bearer of unilateralism if necessary, that is to say of coalitions of the willing, did not hide his desire to bomb Iran and approved George Bush’s notion of the “axis of evil”. Besides, the neoconservatives massively joined him after Giuliani’s retreat from the race. As one of the main thinkers of the campaign for McCain, Max Boot came out with the idea that the US had to support a “League of democracies” rather than using the multilateral system. The Republican candidate endorsed this view, which is completely in line with the neoconservative rejection of the UN as a Third-World, anti-Israelian and anti-American organisation. Ivo Daalder, from the Brookings 18  Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, New York, Penguin, 2006. 19 Michael C. Desch, “Declaring Forever War”, The American Conservative, 14 January 2008.

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Institution, went so far as to consider that he would make a President even closer to the neoconservative views than George W. Bush: “He is a true neocon”, he said.20 Within the Democratic Party, a neoconservative legacy may also be forecast. It is true that they consider Bill Clinton’s foreign policy as an example of a wrong path. However, Hillary supported the war in Iraq; she is not very attached to the UN and her foreign policy campaign team shared many views with a liberal interventionist approach.21 On the contrary, Obama’s advisers are not neoconservative. He even chose Zbignew Brzezinski, one of the main figures of contemporary realism in American politics, as an inspirer. Moreover, he opposed the Iraq War from the start. However, the well-known neoconservative Robert Kagan declared his satisfaction with Obama’s vision on foreign policy,22 as the candidate showed his choice of an interventionist approach. Besides, realists like Brzezinski have never been the major force in the inner circle of the now President-elect. The choice of Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, and the fact that Robert Gates will continue to lead the Pentagon, shows that structurally speaking, continuity will be the reality of American foreign affairs. Therefore, it would be a mistake to dismiss the neoconservative movement as something of the past after the last presidential elections. The movement has already shown its ability to reinvent itself. For example, currently, it is changing its focus and coming back to an old Cold War scheme: the tension between the US in one hand, Russia and China in the other.23 As for Russia, it is true that Putin the “moderate neo-eurasianist” is not the Russian President anymore, but he became Prime Minister after the elections of March 2008. Continuity is not hard to show in Russia since President Medvedev played a central role in implementing Putin’s policies, as his former chief of staff and chairman of the board of Gazprom. The State system is not likely to change soon substantially, as Medvedev was elected as Putin’s heir, even if he is part of the moderate “liberal wing”. The chief ideologist of the ruling party United Russia, named in February 2008, the 44-year old Ivan Demidov, is famous for his sympathy for neo-eurasianism.24 More fundamentally, with Putin shaping Russian

20 Robert Dreyfuss, “Hothead McCain”, The Nation, 24 March 2008. 21  Stephen Zunes, “Hillary Clinton on international law”, Foreign Policy in Focus, 11 December 2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4803 and Id., “Behind Obama and Clinton”, Foreign Policy in Focus, 4 February 2008. http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4940. 22 Robert Kagan, “Obama the Interventionist”, The Washington Post, 29 April 2007, page B07. 23 See Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2008. 24 Andreas Umland, “Moscow New Chief Ideologist: Ivan Demidov”, Global Politician, 25 March 2008, http://www.globalpolitician.com/24333-russia.

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memory from 2000 onwards, empire now equates with stability and order,25 which are important values in Russian society, traumatised by the chaos of the 1990s. Fourth, the persisting role of neoconservative and neo-eurasianist ideologies implies a foreign policy continuity, which confirms the ideological prisms we analysed. On one hand, even realpolitik can lead to different choices26 and it is a specific set of preferences in realpolitik that determines the final decision. This set of preferences can only be understood by deciphering the worldview of the leader and his team. On the other hand, as we insisted much in this book, ideology means pursuing the logic of an idea at the expense of some parts of reality, which are purely denied. Even those who try to make the finest distinctions between coalitions of people end up with the conclusion that “US foreign policy after President George W. Bush is likely to remain imperial in approach.”27 As seen during this presidential campaign, only some second tier candidates, like Ron Paul, asked for a major rejection of interventionism. Besides, the actions of a stronger Jihadist movement because of the Iraq War, and the desire of other Great Powers to maintain or expand their areas, will make it difficult for the US to do otherwise. On the Russian side, there may be a problem of capacity to build an empire along the neo-eurasianist lines. Russia seems to be progressively losing its former monopoly in the post-Soviet space, facing the European attraction, the American offensive and the Chinese influence, although it remains the core power. However, Sergei Kovalev confirms that the conspirationist turn of neo-eurasianist worldview is echoed by Putin’s foreign policy as well as their nostalgia for the Soviet era after the economic chaos of the 1990s. “In foreign policy he has revived the pernicious Soviet concepts of being “surrounded by enemies” and a “world plot against Russia.”28 In this scheme, media and human rights NGOs play the role of a “fifth column.”29 What does this say for the future of Russia? It may be much clearer if we add that “Many people are happy he’s done so.”30 In late 2007, Foreign Minister Lavrov mentioned “a situation that can hardly be perceived as 25 Sergei Kovalev, “Why Putin Wins”, New York Review of Books, Vol. 54 No. 18, November, 22, 2007. 26  Classical realism, which is the academic translation of realpolitik, frequently suffers from this critique of “equifinality”. In other words, the concept of vital interests is blurred enough to be reconciled a posteriori with many and sometimes antagonistic options. 27  Inderjeet Parmar, “Not Neoconservatism: Conservative Nationalism and Liberal Interventionism: The New Alliance Dominating the US Policy Establishment”, paper presented for the International Studies Association’s 49th meeting in San Francisco, March 2008, p. 47. 28  Sergei Kovalev, “Why Putin Wins”, op. cit. Mike Haynes agrees when he considers that there is “a degree of paranoia” in Russian’s behaviour. “The Uncertain Return of Russian Power”, International Socialism, 28 September 2007. 29 Sergei Kovalev, “Why Putin Wins”, op. cit. 30 Ibid.

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other than re-establishment of a sanitary cordon west of the Russian borders… Various attempts are being made to contain Russia”, while General Patrushev of the FSB claimed that “politicians thinking in the categories of the Cold War… in a number of Western nations” were “hatching plans aimed at dismembering Russia”.31 Disappointment and mutual lack of understanding have led to “the clash of illusory hopes against reality”, to use the terms of Solzhenitsyn.32 This mental gap has been even wider during the Georgian Crisis, which was the first time that Russia has waged war outside its borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The ‘8/8’, the day the Georgian forces began their operation against South Ossetia, is considered by the Russian leadership as a ‘Russian 9/11’. Whereas many Russian strategists feared that Georgian NATO membership could spark a domino effect across the Caucasus, many observed with satisfaction that Moscow has re-established its strength in the international realm, filling a geopolitical vacuum in the post-Soviet space. As a commentator underlined, “President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent foreign-policy manifesto, outlining Russia’s claim to its own sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union, might have been penned by Dugin”.33 These two foreign policies would entail a lasting antagonism between the US and Russia, perhaps not at a global, but at least at a regional level as the case of Georgia shows.34 The time of strategic partnership now looks like a relic of the past, even if the beginning of each presidency is likely to be softer.35 The zone we focused on remains the theatre of this rivalry,36 considering the resources of Eurasian countries but also the fact that the US policy on “Greater Central Asia” is ultimately against Russia.37 Indeed, its selective policy of democracy promotion (through “coloured revolutions”) focuses on post-Soviet States, encouraging a non-Russian alternative, but never on Pakistan, Egypt or Saudi Arabia. On one hand, the US difficulties are now officially seen as opportunities for the return of Russia among the highest world powers: a document from the Russian government put it bluntly in April 2007: “The myth about the unipolar world fell apart once 31 Sir Roderic Lyne, “Russia and the West: Is Confrontation Inevitable?”, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 1, January – March 2008, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/22/1177. html 32  Quoted in Sir Roderic Lyne, Ibid. 33  Fred Weir, “Moscow’s moves in Georgia track a script by right-wing prophet. Is Alexander Dugin really the new sage of the Kremlin?”, The Christian Science Monitor, 19 September 2008. 34  See Il’â Dmitriev, “Eto slakoe slovo ‘revanš’” [This sweet word “revenge”], 25 August 2008, http://www.evrazia.org/article/609. 35 See Michael L. Levin, The Next Great Clash: Russia and China against the United States, New York, Praeger Security International, 2007. 36  See Nikolaï Zlobine, 15 November 2007, “Relations internationales: une époque de rude concurrence se profile (II)” http://fr.rian.ru/analysis/20071115/88181426.html. 37  See Nikolaï Zlobine, 22 November 2007, “Relations internationales: une époque de rude concurrence se profile (III)”. http://fr.rian.ru/analysis/20071122/89072499.html.

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and for all in Iraq… A strong, more self-confident Russia has become an integral part of positive changes in the world”.38 On the other hand, Washington would disapprove of the creation of an energy club in Eurasia headed by Moscow within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) irrespective of whether Iran is formally included or not.39 Fifth and lastly, the continuing existence of a conspirationist mindset will undermine the imperial ambitions – if ever truly imperial – of each country. Its consequence, i.e. the victimization competition and hubris as a result of Manichean thinking can still be heard from some prominent members of the American elite. For example, in Rudy Giuliani’s views, one can find the consideration that the Jihadists hate the US because of who they are instead of what they do. The actions of the US in the Muslim World, and in the Middle East in particular, are just forgotten, so much so that the Bush administration used this rhetoric precisely after 9/11. Empire based on resentment will never be possible and growing rejection of US foreign policy functions as an every day proof of our conclusive thesis. Throughout these instrumental and often incoherent invocations, once again it is the imaginary fecundity of the imperial figure that triumphs over its historical incarnations.  Didier Chaudet, Florent Parmentier, Benoît Pélopidas Paris and Geneva, January 2009.

38  Quoted in The Guardian, April, 11, 2007. 39  M.K. Bhadrakumar “The new ‘NATO of the East’ takes shape”, Asia Times, 25 August 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/IH25Ag02.html.

Select and Thematic Bibliography The United States and the Neoconservatives Primary Sources www.weeklystandard.com www.commentarymagazine.com www.nationalinterest.org www.ndol.org www.danielpipes.org Himmelfarb, Gertrude, Roads to Modernity: the British, French and American Enlightenments, New York, Vintage, 2005. Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the New World Order, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. Kristol, Irving, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, New York, Free Press, 1995. Kristol, Irving, Reflections of a Neoconservative, New York, Basic Books, 1983. Lewis, Bernard, The Future of the Middle East, London, Phoenix House, 1997. Bolton, John, “The Prudent Irishman”, The National Interest, Winter 1997-1998. Garfinkle, Adam, “The Impossible Imperative?”, The National Interest, Autumn 2002. Kagan, Robert, “Power and Weakness”, Policy Review, June 2002. Kirkpatrick, Jeane, “Dictatorships and Double Standards”, Commentary, vol. 68 No. 5, November 1979. Kirkpatrick, Jeane, “A Normal Country in a Normal Time”, The National Interest, Autumn 1990. Krauthammer, Charles, “The Unipolar Moment”, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990-91. Kristol, William and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, July-August 1996. Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, “The United States in Opposition”, Commentary, Vol. 59, No. 3, March 1975. Tucker, Robert W., “Oil, the Issue of American Intervention”, Commentary, Vol. 59, No. 1, January 1975. Weigel, George, “Creeping Talbottism”, Commentary, Vol. 97 No. 3, March 1994.

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Secondary Sources Bacevich, Andrew J., American Empire, the Reality and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002. Bacevich, Andrew J., (ed.), The Imperial Tense, Prospects and Problems of American Empire, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 2003. Bacevich, Andrew J., The New American Militarism, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005. Badie, Bertrand, L’impuissance de la puissance, essai sur les incertitudes et les espoirs des nouvelles relations internationales, Paris, Fayard, 2004. Baer, Robert, Or Noir et Maison Blanche. Comment l’Amérique a vendu son âme pour le pétrole saoudien, J.C. Lattès, Paris, 2003. Brock, David, The Republican Noise Machine. Right Wing Media and How it Corrupts Democracy, Crown Publishers, New York, 2004. Chaudet, Didier, Les néoconservateurs américains face à l’Islam, Paris, UniversCités, 2005. Corm, Georges, Le Proche-Orient éclaté, 1956-2000, Paris, Gallimard, 1999. Daalder, Ivo H. and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, Brookings Institute Press, Washington D.C, 2003. Drury, Shadia. B., Leo Strauss and the Political Right, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1997. Ehrman, John, The Rise of Neoconservatism. Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. Frachon, Alain and Daniel Vernet, L’Amérique messianique: les guerres des néoconservateurs, Paris, Seuil, 2004. Frédéric, Louis, L’Inde de l’Islam, Paris, Arthaud, 1989. Gerges, Fawaz, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Halper, Stefan and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-conservatives and the Global Order, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004. Hoffmann, Stanley, L’Amérique vraiment impériale. Entretiens sur le vif avec Frédéric Bozo, Paris, Louis Audibert, 2003. Johnson, Chalmers, The Sorrows of Empire. Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, New York, Verso, 2004. Klare, Michael, Blood and Oil, London, Penguin Books, 2004. Kramer, Martin, Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America, Washington Institute on Near East Studies, Washington, October 2001. Lipset, Seymour Martin, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, New York, W.W. Norton, 1996. Mann, James, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, New York, Viking, 2004. Meddeb, Abdelwahhab, La Maladie de l’Islam, Paris, Seuil, 2002.

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Ménoret, Pascal, L’énigme saoudienne. Les Saoudiens et le monde, 1744-2003, Paris, La Découverte, 2003. Micklethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America, New York, The Penguin Press, 2004. Ricci, David M., The Transformation of American Politics: The New Washington and the Rise of Think Tanks, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993. Salamé, Ghassan, Quand l’Amérique refait le monde, Paris, Fayard, 2005. Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949. Scotchie, Joseph, Revolt from the Heartland: The Struggle for an Authentic Conservatism, New Brunswick, Transactions Publishers, 2002. Daalder, Ivo H. and James M. Lindsay, “Debating the Exit Strategy”, Center for American Progress, 12 November 2003, www.americanprogress.org. Shindler, Colin, “Likud and the Christian Dispensationalists: A Symbiotic Relationship”, Israel Studies, 2000, Vol. 5, No. 1. General History of the United States Bennis, Phyllis, Before and After: US Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis, New York, Olive Branch Press, 2003. Bicheno, Hugh, Rebels and Redcoats: The American Revolutionary War, London, HarperCollins, 2004. Marienstras, Élise, Nous, le peuple: les origines du nationalisme américain, Paris, Gallimard, 1988. Zinn, Howard, A People’s History of the United States: 1492-present, Harper Perennial, 2005, [1st edn. 1980]. Adas, Michael, “From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon: Integrating the Exceptionalist Narrative of the American Experience into World History”, The American Historical Review, Vol. 106, No. 5, December 2001, pp. 16921720. Schulzinger, Robert D., “The End of the Cold War, 1961-1991”, The OAH Magazine of History, Winter 1994. Russia, the Eurasianists and the Neoeurasianists Primary Sources www.evrazia.org www.zavtra.ru www.politcom.ru www.polit.ru www.prognosis.ru www.regnum.ru

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www.kreml.org www.patriotica.ru. Dugin, Alexander, Le prophète de l’eurasisme, Avatar, 2006. Dugin, Alexander, Osnovy Geopolitiki. Geopolitičeskoe buduščee Rossii [Basics of geopolitics. The Geopolitical Future of Russia], Moscow, Arktogeja, 1997. Panarin, Alexander, Pravoslavnaâ civilizaciâ v global’nom mire [The Orthodox Civilization in a Globalized World], Moscow, Algoritm, 2002. Panarin, Alexander, Revanš istorii: rossijskaâ strategičeskaâ iniciativa v 21 veke [Revenge of History: The Strategic Initiative of Russia in the XXIe Century], Moscow, Logos, 1998. Primakov, Yevgeny, Au cœur du pouvoir, Paris, Editions des Syrtes, 2002. French translation by Galia Ackerman and Jean-Christophe Thiabaud. Primakov, Yevgeny, A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Washington D.C., The Nixon Center: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. Ziuganov, Guennadi, Geografiâ pobedy: osnovy Rossijskoj geopolitik [The Geography of Victory. Basics of Geopolitics in Russia], Moscow, 1997. Ziouganov, Guennadi, La Russie après l’an 2000. Vision géopolitique d’un nouvel Etat, Morsang-sur-Orge, Mithec, 1999. Translated from Russian by Michel Secinsky. Gumilev, Lev, “Menâ nazyvaût evracijem…” [They call me eurasianist…], Naš sovremennik, No. 1, 1991. Rasianovsky, Nicholas, “Asia through Russian Eyes”, in Wayne S. Vucinich (ed.), Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972. Rasianovsky, Nicholas, “‘Oriental Despotism’ and Russia”, Slavic Review, Vol. 22, No. 4, December 1963. Trubetskoy, Nicolaï, “Pan-Eurasian Nationalism,” in The Legacy of Ghengis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity, Ann Arbor, Michigan Slavic Publication, 1991. Secondary Sources Bourmeyster, Alexander, L’Europe au regard des intellectuels russes, Toulouse, Privat, 2001. Laruelle, Marlène, L’idéologie eurasiste russe ou comment penser l’empire, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999. de Tinguy, Anne, Contribution à l’étude de la puissance dans le monde de l’aprèsguerre froide. Le cas de la Russie, Paris, Institut d’études politiques, 2003. Rubinstein, Alvin Z., Oles M. Smolansky, Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia. Russia, Turkey and Iran, New York, Sharpe, 1995. Basin, Mark, “Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space”, Slavic Review, Vol. 50, No. 1, Spring 1991.

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Halperin, Charles J., “George Vernadsky, Eurasianism, the Mongols, and Russia”, Slavic Review, Vol. 41, No. 3, Autumn 1982. Ingram, Alan, “Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia”, Political Geography, Vol. 20 No. 8, 2001. Karaganov, Serguey, “New Contours of World Order”, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4, October-December 2005. Laruelle, Marlène, “Jeux de miroir. L’idéologie eurasiste et les allogènes de l’empire russe”, Cahiers d’études sur la Méditeranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, No. 28, June-December 1999. Laruelle, Marlène, “Le néo-eurasisme russe. L’empire après l’empire?”, Cahiers du Monde Russe, Vol. 42, No. 1, January-March 2001. Laruelle, Marlène, “The Two Faces of Contemporary Eurasianism: An Imperial Version of Russian Nationalism”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2004. Lester, Jeremy, “Overdosing on Nationalism: Gennadi Zyuganov and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation”, New Left Review, 221, JanuaryFebruary 1997. O’Loughlin, John, “Geopolitical Fantasies, National Strategies and Ordinary Russians in the Post-Communist Era”, Geopolitics, Vol. 6, No. 3, Winter 2002. Schmidt, Matthew, “Is Putin Pursuing a Policy of Eurasianism?”, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 2005. Smith, Graham, “The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism”, Transaction, Institute of British Geographers, NS 24, 1999. Stolberg, Eva-Maria, “The Siberian Frontier between “White Mission” and “Yellow Peril”, 1890s-1920s”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2004. Tishkov, Valery, “Russia as a European Nation and Its Eurasian Mission”, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4, October-December 2005. Vernet, Daniel, La Russie de Vladimir Poutine: l’héritier du despotisme oriental se tourne vers l’Occident, Paris, IFRI, 2002. General History of Russia Allensworth, Wayne, The Russian Question: Nationalism, Modernization, and Post-Communist Russia, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998. Buer, Jean-Louis, La Russie, Paris, Le Cavalier Bleu, 2001. Carrère d’Encausse, Hélène, La Russie inachevée, Paris, Fayard, 2000. Carrère d’Encausse, Hélène, L’Empire d’Eurasie: une histoire de l’empire russe de 1552 à nos jours, Paris, Fayard, 2005. Donaldson, Robert and Joseph Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 2002. Grekov, Boris and Alexander Iakoubovski, La Horde d’or. La domination tatare au XIIIe et au XIVe siècles de la mer Jaune à la mer Noire, Paris, Payot, 1939.

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Heller, Michel, Histoire de la Russie et de son empire, Paris, Plon, 1997, translated from Russian by Anne Coldefy-Faucard. Hosking, Geoffrey and Robert Service (eds), Russian Nationalism Past and Present, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997. Malcolm, Neil, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996. Marcou, Lily, Les héritiers, Paris, Pygmalion, 2004. Milioukov, Pavel, Essais sur l’histoire de la civilisation russe, Paris, V. Giard & E. Brière, 1901. Milioukov, Pavel, Le Mouvement intellectuel russe, Paris, Editions Brossard, 1918. Rasianovsky, Nicholas, Histoire de la Russie. Des origines à 1984, Paris, Robert Lafont, 1987. Translated from American by André Berelowitch. Roux, Jean-Paul, Histoire de l’Empire mongol, Paris, Fayard, 1993. Siraev, Eric and Vladislav Martinovic Zubok, Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Stalin to Putin, New York, Palgrave, 2000. Sokoloff, Georges, La puissance pauvre. Une histoire de la Russie de 1815 à nos jours, Paris, Fayard, 1993. Sokoloff, Georges, Métamorphose de la Russie, 1984-2004, Paris, Fayard, 2003. Struve, Nikita, Soixante-dix ans d’émigration russe. 1919-1989, Paris, Fayard, 1996. Walicki, Andrzej, The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought, Oxford, Clarendon, 1975. Arbatov, Alexeï, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives”, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, Autumn 1993. Gloaguen, Cyrille, “Les tropismes centre-asiatiques de la Russie”, Défense nationale, No. 11, November 2004. Gregor, James A., “Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1998. Grimberg, Isabelle, “La nationalisme russe, une catégorie en débat” in Gil Delannoi and Pierre-André Taguieff, (eds), Nationalismes en perspective, Paris, Berg International Editeurs, 2001. Karpovich, Michael, “Klyuchevski and Recent Trends in Russian Historiography”, Slavonic and East European Review. American Series, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1943. Mandeville, Laure, “Russie: retour en force dans l’ex-empire”, Politique internationale, No. 103, Spring 2004. Tolz, Vera, “Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation-Building in PostCommunist Russia”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998. Walicki, Andrzej, “Russian Social Thought: An Introduction to the Intellectual History of Nineteenth-Century Russia”, Russian Review, Vol. 36, No.1, January 1977. Wieczynski, Joseph, “The Frontier in Early Russian History”, Russian Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, April 1972.

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The Concept of Empire Armitage, David, Theories of Empire, 1400-1800, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998. Baechler, Jean, Esquisse d’une histoire universelle, Paris, Fayard, 2002. Doyle, Michael, Empires, New-York, Cornell University Press, 1986. Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, Tout empire périra, Paris, Armand Colin, 1992. Duverger, Maurice (ed.), Le concept d’empire, Paris, PUF, 1980. Kupchan, Charles, The Vulnerability of Empire, New York, Cornell University Press, 1994. Lieven, Dominic, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000. Maier, Charles S., Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2006. Ménissier, Thierry (ed.), L’idée d’empire dans la pensée politique, historique, juridique et philosophique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2006. Motyl, Alexander, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse and Revival of Empires, New York, Columbia University Press, 2001. Motyl, Alexander, Nations, Revolutions, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. Muldoon, James, Empire and Order, the Concept of Empire (800-1800), New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999. Münkler, Herfried, Empires, The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007. Salamé, Ghassan, Appels d’Empire, ingérences et résistances à l’âge de la mondialisation, Paris, Fayard, 1996. Snyder, Jack, Myths of Empire, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991. Tulard, Jean (ed.), Histoire générale des systèmes politiques, volume 1: Les Empires occidentaux de Rome à Berlin, Paris, PUF, 1997. Forget, Philippe, “Herméneutique et grande politique”, L’art du comprendre, No. 10, June 2001. Forget, Philippe, “L’expérience de la mantique, la voix des sibylles. Epreuve de l’événement et vocation impériale”, L’art du comprendre, No. 13, June 2004. Galtung, Johan, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1971. Nederman, Cary, “Humanism and Empire: Aenea Silvius Piccolomini, Cicero and the Imperial Ideal”, The Historical Journal, No. 36, 1993. Pinchard, Bruno, “Dante prophète du Saint Empire”, L’art du comprendre No. 13, June 2004. Vaïsse, Justin, “Les sens de l’empire” in Michel Viewiorka (ed.), L’Empire américain? Paris, Balland, 2004. Wendt, Alexander and Daniel Friedheim, “Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire in the Eastern German State”, International Organization, No. 49, Autumn 1995.

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International Politics Appleman Williams, William, American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947, New York, Rinehart, 1952. Aras, Bülent, The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey’s Position, Portland, Franck Cass Publishers, 2002. Bouganel, Xavier and Nathalie Clayer (eds), Le Nouvel Islam Balkanique, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001. Bradsher, Henry, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999. Carter, Hannah and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds), The Middle East’s Relations with Asia and Russia, New York, Routledge Curzon, 2004. Ewans, Martin, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics, New York, HarperCollins, 2002. Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1997. Laqueur, Walter, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, New York, Continuum, 2003. Lo, Bobo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003. Miller, John J. and Mark Molesky, Our Oldest Enemy. A History of America’s Disastrous Relationship with France, New York, Doubleday, 2004. Pursiainen, Christer, Russian Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000. Sakwa, Richard, Putin. Russia’s Choice, London, Routledge, 2004. Akturk, Sener, “Counter-Hegemonic Visions and Reconciliation through the Past: The Case of Turkish Eurasianism”, Ab imperio, No. 4, 2004. Chaudet, Didier and Sabrina Vidalenc, “Les Empires sur la Route de la Soie: EtatsUnis, Russie, Chine dans un nouveau Grand Jeu en Asie Centrale”, Eurorient No. 20, Winter 2005. Dannreuther, Roland, “Can Russia Sustain Its Dominance in Central Asia?”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 32, No. 2, June 2001. General References Campion-Vincent, Véronique, La société parano, théories du complot, menaces et incertitudes, Paris, Payot, 2005. Delannoi, Gil, Sociologie de la nation, fondements théoriques et expériences historiques, Paris, Armand Colin, 1999. Fenster, Mark, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Poliakov, Léon, La causalité diabolique, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1980.

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205

Aron, Raymond, “Qu’est-ce qu’une théorie des relations internationales?”, Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol.17, No. 5, 1967, republished in R. Aron, Études politiques, Paris, Gallimard, 1972. Berlin, Isaiah, “The Bent Twig: A Note on Nationalism”, Foreign Affairs 51 (1972), 11-30; reprinted in Hoge, James F. Jr, and Fareed Zakaria (eds), The American Encounter: The United States and the Making of the Modern World, Essays from 75 Years of ‘Foreign Affairs’ (New York, 1997: Basic Books) The following websites have also been largely consulted: Eurasia daily monitor, published by the Jamestown Foundation: www.jamestown. org/edm/ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: www.rferl.org Ria Novosti: http://fr.rian.ru/

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Index Abdallah, Prince (Saudi Arabia) 166, 1689, 170 accommodationism, vs confrontationism 123 ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) 15 see also UDA Adams, John Quincy 86 Adas, Michael 90 AEI (American Enterprise Institute) 31 Afghanistan and the “Great Game” 158-61 and neo-eurasianism 160 Soviet war (1979-88) 162 war, post-September 11 events 147, 159 “War on Terror” in 160-1 Ahmadinedjad, Mahmoud 172, 176 AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) 16-17 Akayev, Askar 151 Akhmatova, Anna 49 Al-Qaeda 33, 128, 143, 192 and Saddam Hussein 161 Saudi Arabian connections 167 Al-Rantissi, Abdel Aziz, assassination attempt 34-5 Al-Sadr, Muqtada 172 Alexander I, Tsar 101 Alexander II, Tsar 41, 101 Alexander III, Tsar 41 America counter-culture 83 Cuba, intervention 87-9 exceptionalism 89-90, 93, 159, 181 Florida, annexation 86 as global power 190-1 Granada, intervention 27 imperial beginnings 85-6 imperial strategy 2, 93-4, 96-7 National Missile Defense 98

Roman Empire, comparison 85 Saudi Arabia, relations 165-6 Texas, annexation 86 unilateralism, origins 86 world destiny concept 13 Americanism, ideology 89-90 analytical eclecticism 3 Anglo-American War (1812-15) 85 Ansar el-Islam group 167 anti-Semitism 14, 15 Arab-Israeli conflict see Israeli-Palestinian conflict Arbatov, Alexei 51 Arendt, Hannah 91, 166 Aron, Raymond 6 Aslakhanov, Alsambek 55 Atlanticism 54, 61, 100, 109, 139, 143, 183 globalization, distinction 135 and Iraq 164 and terrorism 133, 135 Azerbaijan 137 Iran, relations 175 Baburin, Sergey 163 Baechler, Jean 74 Bakhtiyanov, Oleg 51 Baku Congress (1924) 46 Baku-Ceyhan pipeline 137 Baron, Hans 68 Bell, Daniel 12 Bender, Peter 85 Bennett, William 12, 34 Berlin, Isaiah 79-80 bin Laden, Osama 126, 134, 159, 166, 169 Blitz, Mark 25 Blok, Alexander 47 Bloom, Allan 20, 21 The Closing of the American Mind 22 Bodansky, Yossef 172 Bolsheviks 40

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Bolshevism 102, 113 and eurasianism 46 Boot, Max 12, 83, 86, 90, 192 Brown, Harold 94 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 107-8, 118, 146, 193 Buchanan, Patrick 110 Bush, George H. 19, 84 Bush, George W. 1, 9, 19, 90, 97, 176, 194 Caldwell, Christopher 127 Carter, Jimmy 16, 18, 34 defense doctrine 95 Cato Institute 31 CENTCOM (US Central Command) 95 Center for Experimental Creation, Soviet Union 51 Central Asia neo-eurasianism 141-55 regimes, authoritarianism 150 Russian expansionism 146 scope 141 strategic importance 143 Centre of Analytical and Project Forecasting 51 Centre for Meta-Strategic Studies, Russia 52-3 Chalabi, Ahmed 122 Chechnya 101, 118 Wahabism 160 Cheney, Dick 18, 32, 94, 96 Cheney Energy Task Force (2001) 97 China and neo-conservatives 145 problems 190 Reagan’s policy towards 27 Russia, relations 148 and “War on Terror” 121n2 Chomsky, Noam 15 Christian Right, and neo-conservatives 23, 33-8 Chubais, Anatoly 111-12 citizenship, nationality, distinction 57 Clarke, Jonathan 31 Clinton, Bill 34, 36, 84, 98, 193 Clinton, Hillary 37, 193 Coalition for a Democratic Majority 18 Cohen, Ariel 150

Cold War 13, 28, 32, 58, 96, 97, 134, 137, 142, 163, 169, 193 Commentary 98 “communist”, meaning 50 Conant, Charles A. 69 confrontationism, vs accommodationism 123 conspiracy thinking neo-eurasianism 118 Russia 117 conspiratology 118 Constantine XI, Byzantine Emperor 102 Constantinople, fall (1453) 102 Crimean War (1856) 41 Cuba American interventions 87-9 Guantanamo naval base 88 Daalder, Ivo 84, 94, 192-3 Danilevski, Nikolai 42 Dante, on empire 73-4, 75 de Benoist, Alain 53 Dean, Howard, neo-conservative influences 36-7 Decembrists 39, 40 declinism Kennedy on 30 neo-declinism 30-1 Declinists 96 Decter, Midge 21 Delannoi, Gil 80 Demidov, Ivan 193 Demirel, Süleyman 141 Democratic Party, impact of neoconservatism 193 Den journal 52, 53 Djemal, Geidar 130, 174 DLC (Democratic Leadership Council) 35-6 Dugin, Alexander 2, 52-3, 54, 62, 106, 107, 108, 113, 134, 175, 185 founder, Eurasia Party 55 Dzhemal, Geidar 53 Edwards, John 36 Ehram, John 12 Elementy paper 53 empire/s

Index analysis 71 anatomy of 72-8 characteristics of 85 concept 67-8 Dante on 73-4, 75 definitions 68-71, 78 four, in Book of Daniel 67, 68, 77 narrative basis 77-8 nostalgia for, and neo-eurasianism 56, 63, 179, 184 as pathology 189 peace, guarantee 73-4 as pejorative term 83 recognition of 70 size 72-3 see also hegemony; imperialism; Roman Empire Empower America 34 Estrada Palma, Tomas 88 EU (European Union), neo-conservative criticism of 35 Eurasia 100 as idea 39 Moscow as center of 51 Eurasia Party doctrine 106 Executive Party 55 foundation 55 supporters 55 eurasianism and Bolshevism 46 and collective identity 45 decline 48 dual strands 47 “Exodus to the East” 44 influence 54 intellectual life of 43-8 intellectual origins 39-43 Marxism, reconciliation 47 and Orthodox religion 47-8 Putin’s 62 Turkish 142 see also neo-eurasianism; Pan-Slavism Europe Islamic invasions 136 New Right 53, 54 “Evil Empire” speech, Reagan 26, 29, 36 Evola, Julius 53

209

Evrazija 47 exceptionalism, American 89-90, 93, 159, 181 Fair Russia party 52 FDOD (Foundation for the Defense of Democracy) 34 Findley, Paul 16 Florida, American annexation 86 Forget, Philippe 77 Fox News 33 France, Islam in 126-7, 128 Frédéric, Louis 125 Freneau, Philip 89 From, Al 35 Gaddis, John Lewis 86 Surprise, Security, and the American Experience 85 Galtung, Johan 73 Garfinkle, Adam 91 Gates, Robert 193 Gazprom company 110, 193 Gerges, Fawaz 123 Ghent, Treaty (1814) 85 Giuliani, Rudy 196 on “War on Terror” 192 Glasnost 52 Glazyev, Sergey 60 globalization, Atlanticism, distinction 135 Goldberg, Jonah 122 Golden Horde 44, 105 Goldmann, Nahum 16 “Good Neighbor Policy”, Roosevelt 93 Graham, Bob 36 Granada, American intervention 27 “Great Game” 141-2 Afghanistan 158-61 and neo-conservatives 144 GRECE (Research/Study Group for European Civilization) 53 Gryzlov, Boris 62 Guantanamo naval base, Cuba 88 Gulf War (1991) 163-4 Gumilev, Lev 49, 62, 104, 131 Gumilev, Nikolai 49 Harper, Stefan 31

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Hassner, Pierre 182 Haushofer, Karl 108 hegemony 74, 84 Heritage Foundation 32, 36, 150 Himmelfarb, Gertrude 91 Hispano-American War (1898) 87 Hizb Ut-Tahrir movement 151, 152, 153 Hobson, John, Imperialism, a Study 69 Hoffmann, Stanley 15 Holbrooke, Richard 137 Howard, Dick 24 Hudson Institute 31 Huerta, Victoriano 92 Humboldt, Alexander von 141 Humphrey, Hubert 15, 17 Huntington, Samuel P., Clash of Civilizations 122 Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans 30 ideology 91, 116, 194 Americanism 89-90 Ilhan, Attila 142 Imamovic, Khydar 136 imperialism concept 69 as essence of empire 70 see also empire/s imperium 84 IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) 151 India, problems 190 Institute of Globalization and Social Movements (Moscow) 2 International Geopolitical Institute 51 IR (International Relations) theory 3-4 Iran Azerbaijan, relations 175 conspiracy rhetoric 171-2 Islamic revolution (1979) 95, 168, 171, 174 and neo-conservatives 145, 172-3, 176-7 and neo-eurasianism 174, 176, 177 nuclear ambitions 173, 175 Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) 163 Iraq and Atlanticism 164 and neo-conservatives 161

and neo-eurasianism 163 Russia, relations 164 Soviet Union, relations 163 war (2003) 1, 161 Islam as Arab imperialism 124-5 and Eurasian identity 130 European invasions 136 in France 126-7, 128 humanist tradition 128 Islamism, distinction 122, 126 and neo-conservatives 121-9 and neo-eurasianism 129-36 see also Muslim World Islamic revolution, Iran (1979) 95, 168, 171, 174 Islamism Islam, distinction 122, 126 Uzbekistan 151 Wahabism as 166-7 Islamophobia 126 Israel neo-conservative support for 14, 1617, 33, 157 Reagan’s policy towards 27 Israeli-Palestinian conflict 16, 129, 134, 157, 165-6, 169 Ivan III, Tsar 44, 102 Jackson, Andrew 86 Jackson, Henry “Scoop” 18 Jakobson, Roman 44 Jefferson, Thomas 83 John N. Olin Foundation 19 Johnson, Chalmers, The Sorrows of Empire 83 Johnson, Lyndon 17 Judis, John 28 Kabbani, Sheikh Hisham 123, 124 Kagan, Donald 21 Kagan, Robert 21, 26, 84, 90, 193 Kagarlitsky, Boris 2 Kapuchan, Charles 85 The End of the American Era 31 Karimov, Islom 149, 150, 155 Karzai, Hamid 160 Kazakhstan, neo-eurasianism 153, 154

Index Kemp, Geoffrey 94 Kennedy, Paul 32 on declinism 30 The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers 30, 96 Kerry, John 35, 36 neo-conservative influences 37 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali 176 Khatami, Mohammad 172 Khodorkovsky, Mikhail 117 Khomeini, Ayatollah 174 Kirkpatrick, Jeane 14, 28 Kissinger, Henry 19, 149 Klyuchevski, Vasili 99 Kovalev, Sergei 194 Kozyrev, Andrei 57 KPRF (Communist Party), Russia 50, 52 Krauthammer, Charles 28, 181 Kristol, Irving 11, 12, 17, 19, 23, 29, 84, 91-2 Reflections of a Neoconservative 24 on religion 34 Kristol, William 20, 21, 22, 26, 91, 150 Kupchan, Charles 85 Kurginian, Sergei 63 Kyrgyzstan 137, 148 Tulip Revolution 152, 154 Laqueur, Walter 185 Last, Jonathan V. 1-2 Lenin, V.I., Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism 69 Lev Gumilev University 104 Lewis, Bernard 91, 122, 137 Lieberman, Joe 36 Limonov, Eduard 54 Lindsay, James 84, 94 Lipset, Martin 89 List, Friedrich, National System of Political Economy 112 Lord, Carnes 20 Louisiana, American purchase 86 Lucas, George 1 McCain, John 192 McGovern, George 18 Mackinder, Harold 108 McKinley, William 87, 89

211

McKinney, Cynthia 16 Mahan, Alfred 108 Mahdi Army 173 Maier, Charles S. 74 Margelov, Mikhail 55, 157 Marxism, eurasianism, reconciliation 47 Marxism-Leninism 69 Maskhadov, Aslan 144 Mearsheimer, John J. & Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy 16 Medvedev, Dmitry 193, 195 Middle East Quarterly 124 Migranian, Andranik 63 Mironov, Sergey 62 Mondale, Walter 35 Mongols, and Russia 44 Monroe Doctrine (1823) 87 Montesquieu, Baron de, The Spirit of Laws 102 Morozov, Y. 51 Moscow, as center of Eurasia 51 Moscow History and Political Science Center 51 Moscow, Principality of, expansionism 99-100 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick 12, 13, 18 Murdoch, Rupert, ideology 33 Muslim World, democratization 122 Muslims, Russian 132 Nachef, Riad 124 Naipaul, V.S. 124 Naqshbandi Sufis, American 123 Narochnitskaya, Natalia 62 National Bolshevik Party 54 National Interest 28 National Missile Defense, America 98 National Review 17 nationalism components 80 definition 80 hegemonic 81, 103 neo-conservatives 91-3 and neo-eurasianism 103 patriotism, distinction 92 pseudo-imperial 80, 81 nationality, citizenship, distinction 57

212

When Empire Meets Nationalism

neo-conservatism American politics, impact on 192-3 Democratic Party, impact on 193 neo-eurasianism, distinction 180 origins 11-19 post-Cold War 28 revival 28-9 think-tanks 31 neo-conservatives 1, 2, 4, 32 and China 145 and the Christian Right 23, 33-8 dynasties 21 EU, criticism of 35 in government 20-1 and “Great Game” 144 and Iran 145, 172-3, 176-7 and Iraq 161 and Islam 121-9 nationalism 91-3 pro-Israel policy 14, 16-17, 33, 157 Reagan, criticism of 26-7 and Reaganism 26 and regime change 20, 23-4, 149 and Russia 144-5 and Saudi Arabia 166, 167 and September 11 events 180-1 Strauss’s influence on 20-2, 25-6 and Turkey 138-9 as Vital Center 12, 15 and Yugoslav problem 29 neo-eurasianism 2, 4, 9 and Afghanistan 160 and Central Asia 141-55 conspiracy thinking 118 economic policies 62, 110, 111, 112 gestation of 49-51 ideology 118-19 imperial nostalgia 56, 63, 179, 184 institutions 51 and Iran 174, 176, 177 and Iraq 163 and Islam 129-36 Kazakhstan 153, 154 and nationalism 103 neo-conservatism, distinction 180 philosophy 107-13 politicizing 52-63 as regional hegemony 100

role 103 Russian politics, impact on 193-4 and Saudi Arabia 170-1 Tatars 131 as “Third Way” ideology 52, 62, 110, 112 neo-realism 4 Nevski, Alexander 47-8 New Left 15 New Orleans Battle (1815) 85 Hurricane Katrina 30 New Republic, The 28 New Right, Europe 53, 54 New York Post 21 New York Review of Books 32 Nicholas II, Tsar 42 Niebuhr, Reinhold 12-13 Nixon, Richard M. 15, 17 nuclear ambitions, Iran 173 Obama, Barack 37, 193 OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) 133 Orange Revolution, Ukraine 182, 185 Orthodox religion, and Eurasianism 47-8 Pamiat organization, Russia 53 Pan-Slavism 41-2 see also eurasianism Pan-Turanism 43 Panarin, Alexander 55, 106 The Revenge of History 184 patriotism, nationalism, distinction 92 Paul, Ron 194 Pavlovsky, Gleb 55, 62 Perestroika 132 Perle, Richard 12, 17, 20, 91 Persian Gulf, as American interest 95 Peter the Great, modernization 40, 101 Philippine-American War (1899-1913) 87 Pipes, Daniel 122, 125-6, 192 Pipes, Richard 19 Platt Amendment (1901) 87-8 Plutarch 76-7 PNAC (Project for the New American Century) 31, 34, 165 Pocock, John 68, 83

Index Podberiozkin, Alexei 51 Podhoretz, Norman 17, 21, 192 Poland, martial law 26-7 Poliakov, Léon 171 political culture, definition 5 Powell, Colin 160 PPI (Progressive Policy Institute) 36 Primakov, Yevgeny 54, 103, 133, 134, 135, 147, 164, 174 career 57, 59 Prokhanov, Alexander 52, 105, 184 Mr Hexagon 118 Protocols of the Elders of Zion 17 Pumpyansky, Alexander 184-5 Putin, Vladimir 2, 3, 58-9, 61, 110, 118 eurasianism 62 Rachid, Ahmed 150 Rafsandjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi 172 Rapid Deployment Forces 95 RAU-Korporatsiya foundation (RussianAmerican University Corporation) 51 “Reagan Democrats” 36 Reagan, Ronald 16, 34 China policy 27 “Evil Empire” speech 26, 29, 36 Israel policy 27 neo-conservatist criticism of 26-7 Reaganism, and neo-conservatives 26 Reed, Ralph 34 regime change concept, Strauss 23-4 and neo-conservatives 20, 23-4, 149 religion, Irving Kristol on 34 ressentiment concept 182-6 Rodina party, Russia 52, 60 Roerich, Nikolai 49 Rogozin, Dmitry 60, 62 Roman Empire 72 America, comparison 85 citizenship 76-7 social mobility in 76 Romano-Germanic culture 39, 42, 107 Romantic Movement, Russia 41 Roosevelt, Franklin D., “Good Neighbor Policy” 93 Roosevelt, Theodore 88, 182-3

213

Rumsfeld, Donald 18, 32, 94, 181 Russia anti-Americanism 58-9 Central Asia, expansionism 146 Centre for Meta-Strategic Studies 52-3 China, relations 148 conspiracy thinking 117 economy 191 Fair Russia party 52 gas reserves 3 Georgian Crisis 195 as global power 191 imperial strategy 2 Iraq, relations 164 KPRF (Communist Party) 50, 52 liberal parties, decline 61 messianism 102 as Mongol successor empire 100-1 and the Mongols 44 Muslim peoples 132 and “near abroad” policy 104-5, 179 and neo-conservatives 144-5 Pamiat organization 53 political groupings 51 population decline 191 post-1917 emigration 45 Rodina party 52, 60 Romantic Movement 41 Turkey, relations 139-41 voluntarism 146 Westernization, decline 57 Russian Multinational Union party 51 Russian Revolution (1917) 39, 101 Russian-American alliance, and September 11 events 134 Russo-Turkish War (1878) 41 Saddam Hussein 33, 59, 92, 95 and Al-Qaeda 161 and September 11 events 161 Salafism 132 Salemé, Ghassan 92-3 Saudi Arabia Al-Qaeda connections 167 America, relations 165-6 and neo-conservatives 166, 167 and neo-eurasianism 170-1 religious diversity 168

214

When Empire Meets Nationalism

and Shiite minority 167-8 Wahabism in 165, 169 Savitski, Piotr 44, 102 Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. 97 The Vital Center 13 Schmitt, Carl 53 Schwartz, Stephen 122, 123, 124, 128, 144, 149, 150 Scythianism 47 SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) 26 Secor, Laura 30 secularism, Turkey 138 Seleznev, Gennadi 54 September 11 events 30, 34, 58, 61, 89 and Afghanistan war 147, 159 and neo-conservatives 180-1 and Russian-American alliance 134 and Saddam Hussein 161 Shaimiev, Mintimer 131 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001) 148, 155, 160, 196 Shatokhin, S. 51 Shiites, Saudi Arabia 167-8 Simon, William 19 Sindh, Arab conquest of 124-5 Skinner, Quentin 68 Slavophilism 41, 56 SNCC (Student non-Violent Coordinating Committee) 15 Snyder, Jack 86, 93, 180 social constructivism 4 Sokolov, Vladimir 55 Soros, George 117 Soviet Union Afghanistan, war (1979-88) 162 Center for Experimental Creation 51 dissolution 2 Iraq, relations 163 nostalgia for 2 see also Russia Spykman, Nicholas J. 108 Star Wars, Revenge of the Sith 1 Steppe civilization concept 109 Stevenson, Adlai 16 Strauss, Leo 19-20 influence on neo-conservatives 20-2, 25-6 regime change concept 23-4

Tadzhuddin, Mufti Talgat 105, 129-30, 164 Tajikistan 154-5 civil war 147, 150, 151 Taliban 145, 159, 160, 161, 175 Tashkent Treaty (1992) 148 Tatars, neo-eurasianism 131 Tatarstan 131 “Team B” report 19 terrorism, and Atlanticism 133, 135 see also “War on Terror” Texas, American annexation 86 think-tanks, neo-conservatism 31 Thiriart, Jean 54 Thomas, Clarence 21 Todd, Emmanuel, Aprè L’Empire 31 Trans-Siberian railway 42 transdisciplinarity 7 Trotskyism 11 Trubetskoy, Nikolai 44, 46, 48, 100, 101, 113 Truman, Harry S. 15 Tucker, Robert W. 13, 92, 94 Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan 152, 154 Turkey eurasianism 142 and neo-conservatives 138-9 pivotal position 137 Russia, relations 139-41 secularism 138 Turkmenistan 147 UDA (Union for Democratic Action)m foundation 12 see also ADA Ukraine 61 Orange Revolution 182, 185 Uzbekistan 147, 148, 149 American bases 148, 151 authoritarianism 150 IMU 151 Islamism 151 unrest 150-1 Vernadsky, Georgi 44 Veyne, Paul 77 Vietnam War 1, 15, 93, 95 voluntarism, Russia 146

Index Wahabism 132, 135 Chechnya 160 as Islamism 166-7 Saudi Arabia 165, 169 Walt, Stephen see Mearsheimer, John J. “War on Terror” 32, 34, 121, 129, 134, 143-4, 149, 151 in Afghanistan 160-1 and American foreign policy 157 and China 121n2 Giuliani on 192 Russian view 147 Washington, George, Farewell Address 87 Weekly Standard, The 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 91, 165, 173 Weimar Republic 22, 24, 53 Williams, William Appleman 15 Wilson, Woodrow 89 Fourteen Points 90

215

Wohlstetter, Albert 20 Wolfowitz, Paul 12, 19, 20, 94, 95, 161 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 96 Woosley, James 12 World Jewish Congress 16 Yakutia-Sakha Republic 131 Yassin, Sheikh 35 “Yellow Peril” myth 43 Yeltsin, Boris 118 Yugoslav problem, neo-conservative approach 29 Zavtra 52 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 60, 163-4 Zunes, Stephen 168 Zyuganov, Gennady 164, 174 The Geography of Victory 59