Debate and Dialogue (Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies)

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DEBATE AND DIALOGUE This book explores the construction of Christian identity in fourth and fifth centuries through inventing, fabricating and sharpening binary oppositions. Such oppositions, for example Christians – pagans; truth – falsehood; the one true god – the multitude of demons; the right religion – superstition, served to create and reinforce the Christian self-identity. The author examines how the Christian argumentation against pagans was intertwined with self-perception and self-affirmation. Discussing the relations and interaction between pagan and Christian cultures, this book aims at widening historical understanding of the cultural conflicts and the otherness in world history, thus contributing to the ongoing discussion about the historical and conceptual basis of cultural tolerance and intolerance. This book offers a valuable contribution to contemporary scholarly debate about Late Antique religious history and the relationship between Christianity and other religions.

ASHGATE NEW CRITICAL THINKING IN RELIGION, THEOLOGY AND BIBLICAL STUDIES The Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies series brings high quality research monograph publishing back into focus for authors, international libraries, and student, academic and research readers. Headed by an international editorial advisory board of acclaimed scholars spanning the breadth of religious studies, theology and biblical studies, this open-ended monograph series presents cutting-edge research from both established and new authors in the field. With specialist focus yet clear contextual presentation of contemporary research, books in the series take research into important new directions and open the field to new critical debate within the discipline, in areas of related study, and in key areas for contemporary society. Series Editorial Board: Jeff Astley, North of England Institute for Christian Education, Durham, UK David Jasper, University of Glasgow, UK James Beckford, University of Warwick, UK Raymond Williams, Wabash College, Crawfordsville, USA Geoffrey Samuel, University of Newcastle, Australia Richard Hutch, University of Queensland, Australia Paul Fiddes, Regent’s Park College, University of Oxford, UK Anthony Thiselton, University of Nottingham, UK Tim Gorringe, University of Exeter, UK Adrian Thatcher, College of St Mark and St John, UK Alan Torrance, University of St Andrews, UK Judith Lieu, Kings College London, UK Terrance Tilley, University of Dayton, USA Miroslav Volf, Yale Divinity School, USA Stanley Grenz, Baylor University and Truett Seminary, USA Vincent Brummer, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands Gerhard Sauter, University of Bonn, Germany Other Titles in the Series: Narrative Theology and Moral Theology The Infinite Horizon Alexander Lucie-Smith The Trinity and Ecumenical Church Thought The Church-Event William C. Ingle-Gillis Biblical Scholarship and the Church A Sixteenth-Century Crisis of Authority Allan K. Jenkins and Patrick Preston

Debate and Dialogue Christian and Pagan Cultures c. 360–430

MAIJASTINA KAHLOS University of Helsinki, Finland

© Maijastina Kahlos 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Maijastina Kahlos has asserted her moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Kahlos, Maijastina Debate and dialogue: Christian and pagan cultures c.360–430. – (Ashgate new critical thinking in religion, theology and biblical studies) 1. Church history – Primitive and early church, ca. 30–600 2. Christianity and other religions I. Title 270.2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kahlos, Maijastina. Debate and dialogue: Christian and pagan cultures c.360–430 / Maijastina Kahlos. p. cm. – (Ashgate new critical thinking in religion, theology, and biblical studies) Includes index. 1. Apologetics–History–Early church, ca.30–600. 2. Christianity and other religions – Roman. 3. Rome–Religion. I. Title. BT1160.K34 2007 261.2’209015–dc22 2006021158 ISBN 978-0-7546-5713-2

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall.

Contents

Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations 1

2

3

4

vii ix

Introduction

1

Demarcation of Boundaries and the Problem of Incerti Polemic and Polarization

2 3

Constructing and Deconstructing Dichotomies

11

Between the Darkness and the Light Naming the Otherness The Birth of Paganism Dichotomous Presuppositions and Grey Areas Subversions Incerti on the move Divided Loyalties or the Necessity of Choice? Leading a Double Life Opportunists and Turncoats – Attitudes towards Incerti Feigned Conversions and ‘Cryptopagans’ The Two Cities Interwovenness and Separation

13 15 18 26 29 30 35 38 42 46 48 51

Debate, Polemic and Dialogue

55

Identity and Otherness The Rhetoric of Boundaries Debate, Polemic and Otherness Dialogue and Otherness Dialogue and Mission Conversion Between the Old and the New Wretched Christians and Good Pagans Big Fish

55 57 62 75 78 83 86 89 91

Religio and Superstitio

93

The Boundaries of Religio Relocating the Boundaries

93 96

Debate and Dialogue

vi

5

6

Paganism becomes Superstitio Continuity and Change Paganism, superstitio and Magic

99 103 110

Ceremonies of Light and Dark

113

Corrupt and Shameful Rituals Unclean Purificatory Rites Public versus Private Acts of Sacrifice Blood versus Spirit Pompa diaboli – Condemning Spectacles The Grey Area of Urban Festivals Redefining Content and Boundaries

113 115 116 119 123 126 129 132

Gods and Demons

137

I One and Many Ignobilis turba deorum – the Multitude of Gods Between Monotheism and Polytheism Shared Premises and Monotheistic Tendencies The Paradox of Monotheism

137 141 145 150

II Gods The Gods of the Civic Religion Deceased Humans Anthropomorphic Gods and Suffering Saviours The Depraved Gods Inadequate Gods and Empty Idols Signa and the Threat of Idols

153 154 158 161 166 169

III Demons From Gods to Demons There are only Evil Demons Divine Miracles and Demonic Magic Associates – Angels and Demons The Creator and the Creation One God, one Emperor, one Empire

172 174 177 179 181 183

Bibliography Index

185 205

Acknowledgements The research for this book was generously supported by the Academy of Finland, hereby gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also due to the Department of Classics at the University of Helsinki, which provided me with first-rate working facilities and let me enjoy its tranquil professional atmosphere. In addition to the libraries of the University of Helsinki, I have had opportunities to use the libraries of the Freie Universität and Humboldt-Universität in Berlin as well as the Bibliothèque nationale de France and the library of L’Institut d’Études Augustiniennes in Paris. I also wish to thank the research group ‘Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity – Critique and Apologetics’ at the University of Aarhus for its cooperation within the field of Christian apologetics. Thanks are due to Mag. Phil. Outi Kaltio, who systematized the notes with the abbreviations of classical authors and the bibliography, Mag. Phil. Laura Patrikainen, who made the indexes, and Robert Whiting for painstakingly revising my English. Any possible remaining mistakes are due to later additions. I dedicate this book to my husband Jarkko and my daughter Aino, the brightest stars in my sky.

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List of Abbreviations The ancient authors and their works are mostly abbreviated according to the conventions of Thesaurus Linguae Latinae. Index librorum scriptorum inscriptionum ex quibus exempla afferuntur, ed. altera (Leipzig: Teubner, 1990), H.G. Liddell – R. Scott, Greek – English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) and G.W.H. Lampe, Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). Some of the abbreviations are slightly modified for the sake of clarity. Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this book are my own. Greek words have been transliterated according to the conventions of Penn State University Libraries. AG AJPh ANRW AugSt CAH CCSL CIL CIust CP CSCO CSEL CTh FIRA HThR JECS JEH JHS JJS JRS JThS NHC PG PLRE RA RAC RAL RE REA REAug

Anthologia Graeca American Journal of Philology Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt Augustinian Studies The Cambridge Ancient History Corpus Christianorum Series Latina Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum Codex Iustinianus Classical Philology Corpus scriptorum Christianorum orientalium Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum Codex Theodosianus Fontes Iuris Romani Anteiustiniani Harvard Theological Review Journal of Early Christian Studies Journal of Ecclesiastical History Journal of Hellenic Studies Journal of Jewish Studies Journal of Roman Studies Journal of Theological Studies Nag Hammadi codices Patrologia Graeca Prosopography of Later Roman Empire Recherches Augustiniennes Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum Rendiconti della classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche dell’Accademia dei Lincei Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft Revue des études anciennes Revue des études Augustiniennes

x

RHR SC ThZ VC ZKG ZPE

Debate and Dialogue

Revue de l’histoire des religions Sources chrétiennes Theologische Zeitung Vigiliae Christianae Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

Chapter 1

Introduction This is a story of Babylon and Jerusalem – binary oppositions in Christian polemics against ‘paganism’ in 360–430. In Christian texts, Jerusalem cannot exist without Babylon and vice versa. In order to exist, Christians need their counterpart, ‘pagans’. The theme of this book is the construction of Christian identity through inventing, fabricating and sharpening binary oppositions. Binary oppositions, such as Christians – pagans, religio – superstitio, truth – falsehood, the one true God – the multitude of demons, served to create and reinforce the Christian self-identity. I will examine how the Christian argumentation against pagans was intertwined with self-perception and self-affirmation. The hypothesis to be tested is that literary evidence tells us more about Christian authors, their audiences and communities rather than about any polytheists or polytheistic religions themselves. Thus, in my research on the presentation of otherness, I will observe Christian authors themselves as the creators of the images of pagans rather than pagans as such. One of the basic assumptions is that the image of the ‘other’ reveals more of the creators of the image than of the object portrayed. In the search for Christian identity the pagans were a good enemy – particularly in the altered religious circumstances after the ‘Constantinian revolution’. Furthermore, the construction of Christian identity, or rather, identities, was (and is) an ongoing process. In the course of the fourth and fifth centuries and later on, Christian identity was continuously re-constructed by polarization and building up discursive dichotomies between Christians and others. Thus, I propose that the Christian polemical writings functioned as a tool for establishing and defining boundaries between Christianity and other religions. The aim of this book is to unfold the structures of the polemics of the Latin fathers: rhetorical strategies, argumentation, the means of debate and moments of dialogue. I am working, not on the level of the historical facts, but on the level of ideas. Therefore, I am not interested in trying to judge whether the version argued in the polemic is truthful or not, but rather in observing the strategies that the authors make use of in creating their concepts of reality. I will not attempt to reconstruct the historical conditions of polytheistic religions on the basis of Christian information. Consequently, I will not discuss, for example, how and to what extent polytheistic cults were practiced at the turn of the fifth century but rather what kind of ideas Christian writers constructed of polytheistic cults and practices and how they used these ideas in their argumentation.

2

Debate and Dialogue

Demarcation of Boundaries and the Problem of Incerti One of the frontiers demarcated and constantly rectified in the Christian polemical and apologetic literature was the one between Christians and pagans. Christian opinion leaders implanted and then polarized the Christian–pagan dichotomy in order to strengthen the Christian Selbstverständnis. They bundled up a large variety of diverse religions, cults and practices into the overall term paganism.1 This simpleminded division of the world into two opposing segments turns out to be problematic because there were individuals (as well as places, practices and festivals) that did not fit into this simplified categorisation. I have developed a concept of incerti to describe these individuals in between – in the grey area between the Christians and pagans (see Chapter 2). The simplified distinction introduced by late antique Christians has lived on in the Western culture dominated by Christianity and consequently also in modern research. The nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars tended to interpret historical events and cultural phenomena of the Late Roman Empire in terms of this sharp dichotomy. From the 1970s onwards, however, the dichotomous structures have been questioned and sometimes even successfully deconstructed in late antique studies2 and alternative ways of perceiving late antique society have been elaborated in recent scholarship.3 What the Christian polemical texts are anxious about are the grey areas and forbidden frontier crossings and trespassings. It seems that the authors often write to affirm themselves in their own confusion with the pagan past, either with the high literary tradition and history or the festivals and practices of urban and rural communities. The cultural heritage of the past had become problematic to Christian opinion leaders and they had to define their relationship with polytheistic religions as well as with the old cultural structures in which they had grown up. They had to define what was to be regarded as Christian and what as non-Christian and what was suitable for a Christian and what was not. Could Christians take part in the traditional festivals and ceremonies of the local communities without endangering their souls? Furthermore, I discuss the aspiration of Christian authors to emphasize the unique character and exceptionality of Christianity when compared with other ancient religions and traditions. This is due to the polemical and apologetic ends of the writers – their desire to distinguish their own religion from others. It is understandable that, in constructing and reinforcing one’s identity, one’s own religion and tradition is seen as unique, distinct and different from others and even as superior and as the acme of world history. Needless to say, this apologetic emphasis influences us even today: Christianity is perceived – in research often implicitly – as unique when 1 Christian polemicists of the mainstream church wanted to present Christians as one uniform group and their opponents as one monolithic group of pagans. In reality, both groups were far from homogenous but consisted of a colourful diversity of numerous different sects. 2 E.g., J.J. O’DONNELL, ‘The Demise of Paganism’, Traditio 35 (1979a), 45–88. 3 E.g., M. FORLIN PATRUCCO, ‘Pagani e cristiani’, Storia di Roma, 3,2, Torino 1993, 753– 80: 762 perceives the rivalries in the eastern Roman Empire in the fourth century as a contrast in ideological and cultural order within Hellenism rather than as a religious polemic.

Introduction

3

compared with other religions.4 I wish, however, to bring forward the historical roots of this thinking, not to take a stand on whether Christianity was remarkably different from other ancient religions or not. I rather discuss in what kind of light Christian writers wanted to represent their religion.5 This book records and explores moments of debate and dialogue in Christian texts. The writings of Christian authors were not always merely polemics against polytheistic religions and debate with polytheists but they were also a dialogue with the pagan past. Augustine’s City of God, for example, is this kind of debate and dialogue, on one hand an attack against old Gods, on the other hand a dialogue with Greco-Roman cultural tradition. The Christian polemics in 360–430 continued the long tradition of debate and dialogue between pagans and Christians. The Christian writers in Late Antiquity exploited classical literature and Greek philosophy. Therefore, discursive dichotomies are also set in the context of Greek and Roman literature as well as of the Christian apologetic tradition. In Chapter 4, for example, the phases of the binary opposition of religio and superstitio are followed and the subversion made in Christian apologetics is recorded. In these turnovers, however, the Greek and Roman concepts are utilized and the debate is conducted with the techniques and arguments that were already familiar and conventional in the GrecoRoman tradition but that were utilized for the Christian writers’ own purposes. Polemic and Polarization C. Guignebert stated that the polemical and apologetic writings of the church fathers give us the impression that there prevailed an irreconcilable conflict between Christianity and paganism. “Or, ce n’est certainement pas la vérité”, he asserted.6 One could add that at least it was not the whole truth but only a polemicist’s truth. Before the 380s Roman society enjoyed a phase of relative tranquillity. The period of about thirty years from Constantius II to Valentinian I has even been called a ‘peaceful coexistence’ for pagan and Christian cults.7 In the 360s and 370s, particularly in the city of Rome, there prevailed an atmosphere of ‘tolerance’ and 4 The tendency to treat Christianity as separate from other ancient religions has prevailed in modern research for decades. Nevertheless, there are some outstanding exceptions, for example, in the recent Religions of Rome by M. BEARD – J. NORTH – S. PRICE, Cambridge 1998, Christianity is discussed as one religion among others. 5 Or conversely, pagan writers attempted to accentuate or downplay the similarities with Christian thought. As M. VINZENT, ‘Das “heidnische” Ägypten im 5. Jahrhundert’, Heiden und Christen im 5. Jahrhundert, Leuven 1998, 32–65: 65 has pointed out, the efforts of fourth- and fifth-century pagans to minimize the differences between their paganism and Christianity must be read as critically as the corresponding attempts of Christian apologists to create unbridgeable gulf between the two. 6 C. GUIGNEBERT, ‘Les demi-chrétiens et leur place dans l’Eglise antique’, RHR 88 (1923), 65–102: 65. 7 L. CRACCO RUGGINI, ‘Simboli di battaglia ideologica nel tardo ellenismo’, Studi storici in onore di Ottorino Bertolini 1, Pisa 1972, 177–300: 192: “la convivenza pacifica”. E.R. DODDS, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety, Cambridge 1965, 107 introduced the term “peaceful coexistence”.

4

Debate and Dialogue

compromise on the level of everyday life.8 R. A. Markus has proposed that it was both the last repressive of years of Constantius II’s reign and Julian’s attack on Christianity in the name of Hellenism in the 360s that brought on the polarization of the Christian and pagan attitudes in the last decades of the fourth century (c. 380– 400). He speaks of increasingly embattled positions from about 380 onwards and of a wave towards a more resilient attitude to pagan, that is, classical, culture – but not towards polytheists and polytheistic cults – about 400.9 Markus’ notion of wave-like movement in the assimilation and attitudes towards the pagan is worth taking account. However, it is also important to emphasize the varying historical circumstances of each writing and writer. For instance, anonymous polemical pamphlets (such as Carmen contra paganos and Carmen ad senatorem) and Augustine’s De doctrina christiana represent two different modes of argumentation. Furthermore, Markus’ zigzag theory can be surveyed in the light of the proposed notion of the construction of Christian identity through creating and sharpening binary oppositions. I am inclined to argue that both Constantius II and Julian are symptoms or catalysts of the beginning polarization rather than causes. In the eyes of Christian opinion leaders, Christians had assimilated themselves too much in the late antique – pagan – universal culture in the preceding decades. Christian leaders, the loud-voiced writers, considered Christian identity threatened and attempted to crystallize the differences. Julian’s attack against Christians, particularly his argumentation against Christian use of classical learning, seems to have given form to Christians’ own phobias and thus functioned as a catalyst. There had been comparable situations with similar fears of weakening Christian identity from time to time in preceding centuries. Tertullian’s admonitions to luke-warm Christians in De spectaculis is an example of the concerns of Christian opinion leaders. It is the Christian polemicists’ interpretation of history that still influences our modern views of the triumph of Christianity and the defeat of paganism in the Late Antiquity as well as our conceptions of polytheistic religions of the Roman world.10 It is worth noting that much of what we believe to know, for example, about polytheistic religions in the fourth and fifth centuries has been conveyed by Christian authors in their polemical texts.11 Christian apologetic and polemic gives us a remarkably biased and unidimensional picture of polytheistic cults and practices. The idea of polytheist religious views as morally, spiritually and intellectually bankrupt asserted 8 S. MAZZARINO, ‘La propaganda senatoriale nel tardo impero’, Doxa 4 (1951), 121–48: 142: “ambiente di compromesso”; M.R. SALZMAN, On Roman Time: The Codex Calendar of 354 and the Rhythms of Urban life in Late Antiquity, Berkeley 1990, 195: “ambience of compromise”. 9 R.A. MARKUS, ‘Paganism, Christianity and the Latin Classics in the Fourth Century’, Latin Literature of the Fourth Century, London 1974, 1–21: 5, 7, 12–13; cf. R.A. MARKUS, The End of Ancient Christianity, Cambridge 1990a, 30. 10 A classic example of the Wirkungsgeschichte of the binary oppositions elaborated by Christian apologists is A.D. NOCK’s (Conversion, Oxford 1933 (repr. 1961), 2–5) sharp distinction between primitive or traditional religion (paganism) and the religion of prophetic movements (Christianity). 11 Fortunately, our knowledge is not entirely dependent on Christian sources; there is also (increasing) epigraphical and archaeological evidence extant.

Introduction

5

by Christian authors, for example, by Augustine of Hippo, was taken at face value and largely continued until very recent religious studies.12 Constructing the other to suit their purposes, Christian writers operated by moulding the alleged views of the opposition into forms that the writers could then use to their own advantage – not only simplifying but also distorting polytheists’ views on idols, blood sacrifices, demonology and so on.13 Opponents’ religions were represented as ridiculous, childish, superficial and detached and then contrasted with the more developed, adultlike, profound and salutary Christianity. In order to illustrate the history of the effect of Christian apologetic and polemical literature, I take the interpretations of the taurobolium rite as an example. Much of the evidence of the taurobolium belonging to the cult of Magna Mater comes from Prudentius’ description in the Peristephanon. Prudentius’ detailed portrayal of the rite has generally been accepted as a valuable source for the rite in classical and in religious studies. However, ultimate vigilance is needed in interpreting this narrative. N.B. McLynn has appositely questioned the reliability of Prudentius’ description. He states, “the shower of blood [of the taurobolium] belongs to the world of fantasy”. Prudentius probably could not have had first-hand information on the rite itself.14 Moreover, we must remember that the purpose of the poet is to defame pagan practices. Could the narrative of a denigrator be taken at face value? Would scholars write the history of early Christianity employing the statements of Pliny the Younger, Tacitus, Fronto or Celsus as they stand? The purpose of this work, however, is not to correct the reconstructions of the historical circumstances of polytheistic religions or to provide some sort of rehabilitation of these religions but rather to discuss the argumentation, structures and rhetorical tools of the Christian polemics from which our Vorverständnisse about the inferior, immoral and decadent pagan cults derive. Understanding the historicity of our interpretations, we will hopefully attain a deeper wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein, a historical-effective consciousness of Christianity. I focus on the text world created by the Christian polemicists although other worlds, the world of historical reality and other text worlds, are glimpsed from time to time. The Christian preunderstanding influences our ideas of ancient religions. Modern scholars have often been stuck in a Christianly-defined concept of religion and value Greco-Roman religions anachronistically – more or less subconsciously – in

12 N. SHUMATE, Crisis and Conversion in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, Ann Arbor 1996, 24–30 criticizes the modern research of Greco-Roman religions for still valuing paganism as psychologically and emotionally sterile (whether implicitly or explicitly). She criticizes both Nock and R. MACMULLEN, Paganism in the Roman Empire, New Haven 1981, 95–6 for underestimating the dynamics of non-Christian personal religious experiences and psychological capacities of polytheism. 13 For the rhetorical techniques used in distortion of the opponents’ views, see the discussion in Chapter 3. Correspondingly, pagan polemicists applied the same techniques against Christianity. 14 PRVD. perist. 10.1006–1050. N.B. MCLYNN, ‘The Fourth-century Taurobolium’, Phoenix 50 (1996), 312–30: 319. See also Chapter 5.

6

Debate and Dialogue

relation to Christianity.15 M. Sachot criticizes researchers of ancient religions for having searched for features that could fit into the analysis modelled according to Christianity.16 Some scholars would not even call pagan cults and practices religions at all; for example, John North in his otherwise outstanding article in 1992, makes an overall generalization of pagans, stating: “the pagans, before their competition with Christianity, had no religion at all in the sense in which the word is normally used today”. North’s concept of religion seems extremely narrow – one could say, Christianly defined – for he lists characteristics of a religion that pagans lacked: a tradition of discourse about ritual or religious matters, an organized system of beliefs and authority-structure.17 This is remarkably strange since in religious studies the concept of religion has generally expanded after a long series of debates on the essence of religion. Another distortion achieved by Christian polemics is the representation of receding paganism. I am inclined to think that extreme caution is needed when Christian apologists are used as sources for polytheistic cults and their vitality. In their narrative of the triumph of Christianity, Christian writers, understandably enough, wished to present a picture of receding paganism. This was part of their persuasive rhetoric. Thus, modern research has fallen into the rhetorical trap of Christian polemicists. Scholars have adopted the ideas of the dying pagan tradition, particularly the completely lifeless Roman religion.18 The late paganism of the late fourth century was usually described as a form without content and without genuine religious emotions.19 Nevertheless, vigorous attempts to re-evaluate the vitality of 15 A. HAMMAN, ’Chrétiens et christianisme vus et jugés par Suetone, Tacite et Pline le Jeune’, Forma Futuri. Studi in onore del cardinale Michele Pellegrino, Torino 1975, 91–109 may serve as an example of the Christianly-determined attitude of a modern scholar. While he reproaches Roman authors for not having bothered to acquaint themselves with Christianity, he has not bothered to familiarize himself with the Roman religion on its own terms (p. 109): “Leur [Suetone, Tacite, Pline] faiblesse à tous est de n’avoir pas étudié le christianisme du dedans et sur dossier, de n’avoir pas cherché à comprendre la nouveauté et l’esprit de la religion nouvelle et reconnu la sclérose de la religion romaine, incapable de répondre aux véritables interrogations.” 16 M. SACHOT, ‘Religio – superstitio’, RHR 208 (1991), 355–94: 358–60. 17 J. NORTH, ‘The development of religious pluralism’, The Jews Among Pagans and Christians in the Roman Empire, London 1992, 174–93: 187–8. 18 E.g., G. BONNER, ’The Extinction of Paganism and the Church Historian’, JEH 35 (1984), 339–57: 340: “these last defenders of a dying cause”; 356: “the decline of paganism had set in even before the conversion of Constantine, and the virtual absence of any pagan martyrs confirms the impression that paganism was already dying even before”. M. TESTARD, Chrétiens latins des prémiers siècles, Paris 1981, 116–17: “En réalité, le paganisme ne représente plus une pensée qui puisse exercer un attrait sur les esprits, mais seulement un ensemble complexe de mentalités et de comportements ataviques qui persistent dans divers milieux.” 19 E.g., L. VIDMAN, Isis und Sarapis bei den Griechen und Römern, Berlin 1969, 157–8, 164–5, claimed that the many initiations and priesthoods of the Roman senators served only as symbolic scenery. For a discussion about Roman cults and counter-arguments, see M. KAHLOS, Vettius Agorius Praetextatus, Roma 2002, 87–8, e.g., that the ‘forms and contents’ of Greco-Roman religions ought not to be hastily assessed according to the modern, Christianlycoloured concept of religion.

Introduction

7

late antique paganism have been done recently, e.g., by G.W. Bowersock, Garth Fowden and F.R. Trombley.20 It has been observed that the Christian polemic against pagans and polytheistic cults at the turn of the fifth century was mainly conducted with traditional arguments and clichés. R.A. Markus has even called this polemic ‘shadow-boxing’.21 M.R. Salzman, R. Lizzi and L. Cracco Ruggini have recently argued that the significance and vitality of the polytheistic cults during this period have been underestimated.22 Christian opinion leaders might have regarded the Roman religion as well as the socalled Oriental cults as a threat to Christianity because polytheistic cults and urban feasts were still popular.23 According to these scholars, many cults seem to have persisted longer and more extensively than had earlier been thought. As Salzman has shown, the major pagan cults that were closely connected to the imperial cult ensured their survival in the fourth century: because of the imperial cult even Christian emperors were sustaining pagan ceremonies.24

20 G.W. BOWERSOCK, Hellenism in Late Antiquity, Ann Arbor 1990; F.R. TROMBLEY, Hellenic Religion and Christianization c. 370–529 I–II, Leiden 1993–94; G. FOWDEN, The Egyptian Hermes, Cambridge 1986, e.g., 173: “... paganism is widely perceived as not just a lost cause, but a deservedly lost cause. That is changing; but late paganism is still in urgent need of students, just to bring our understanding of its literary remains to the level already enjoyed by the patristic tradition.” MCLYNN 1996, 326 sees the development of the taurobolium as evidence that paganism may have retained something of its flexibility and vitality; see also P. BARCELÒ, ‘Zur Begegnung, Konfrontation und Symbiose von religio Romana und Christentum’, Christen und Heiden in Staat und Gesellschaft des zweiten bis vierten Jahrhunderts, München 1992, 155–6 and A. WARDMAN, Religion and Statecraft among the Romans, London 1982, 135. 21 MARKUS 1974, 7–8: “To read the various formal set pieces, the contra paganos type of literature from the pens of Christian apologists, is to enter a world of almost total unreality. We are the spectators of shadowboxing. The real issues scarcely ever appear, except between the lines”. Recently R.A. MARKUS, in response to G. O’Daly, ‘Augustine’s Critique of Varro on Roman Religion’, Religion and Superstition in Latin Literature, Bari 1994, 78–9 has pointed out that “there certainly were genuine and living issues of moment at stake” but the polemic is strikingly antiquarian and highly artificial. Also BONNER 1984, 342: “the apparent irrelevance of so much Christian polemic to the actual conditions of paganism”. 22 R. LIZZI – F.E. CONSOLINO, ‘Le religioni nell’Impero tardo-antico: persistenze e mutamenti’, Storia di Roma, Torino 1993, 895–974; R. LIZZI, ‘Ambrose’s Contemporaries and the Christianization of Northern Italy’, JRS 80 (1990), 156–73: 156; L. CRACCO RUGGINI, ‘Un cinquantennio di polemica antipagana a Roma’, Paradoxos politeia, Milano 1979a, 119–44. 23 J. MATTHEWS, The Roman Empire of Ammianus Marcellinus, London 1989, 425 assumes that Christians regarded the Gods of the Oriental mystery cult, rather than the old Gods, as the main challenge to their Christian religion. However, the Christian polemicists’ main attack was centered upon the traditional civic religion, not the mystery cults, e.g., in Augustine’s City of God. People continued to dedicate inscriptions to the Gods of the Roman civic religion: G. ALFÖLDY, ‘Die Krise des Imperium Romanum und die Religion Roms’, Religion und Gesellschaft in der römischen Kaiserzeit, Köln 1989, 53–102: 55–7. 24 SALZMAN 1990, 141–6; J. CURRAN, [Review of Salzman, On Roman Time, 1990], JRS 82 (1992), 305–8: 306.

8

Debate and Dialogue

Thus, we see the antiquarian polemic against paganism on one side and the vitality of polytheistic practices in everyday life on the other side. As was stated above, this inquiry is not concerned with whether Christian polemic was targeted against real pagan adversaries and whether the anti-pagan literature reflected the real religious circumstances of the turn of the century. I see the issue of the Christian polemic in 360–430 as even deeper and more complicated than a mere juxtaposition of literary topoi and ‘real’ religious circumstances. I am shifting the emphasis from the objects of the polemic onto the writers of the polemic. Thus, the ‘shadow-boxing’ and the antiquarian character of the fourth- and fifth-century polemic are unpacked by discussing the techniques, topoi and motives in Christian writing. It is worth asking why Christian writers attack to such a great extent as, for example, Augustine does in his City of God – in twenty-two books.25 Why this remarkable fervour and these energetic assaults? Why are the Christian writers utilizing old arguments in their invectives? Both Christian and pagan assaults are highly literary in character. As Markus has aptly written, the archaism of the Christian – pagan debate is more than a literary device. In the fourth century the identities and relations between polytheists and Christians were far from clear and in these perplexing circumstances the traditional arguments elaborated in the debate of preceding centuries became so important that, in Markus’ words, they were “a way of coming to grips with something which neither side has been able to get into focus”. In order to clarify their self-identity Christians knew whom to rebut but they did not know exactly what to refute. One might add that in the religious circumstances of the fourth century Christians did not always recognise even whom to refute. In the Christian (and Jewish) apologetic tradition as well as in the philosophical and antiquarian tradition they found suitable tools for their construction of identity through attacks. This is why the figure of Porphyry becomes so significant in the fourth- and fifth-century debate. He was an easily identifiable target for Christian polemicists. Through the old arguments and clichés, things that were far from clear could be squeezed into clear discursive categories. The Christian polemicists of the fourth century were shaping their world through the old arguments of the earlier apologetic tradition and philosophical and antiquarian discussion of classical authors utilized by apologists.26 The main target of Augustine’s City of God is the late Republican Roman civic religion described by Varro.27 It was more convenient to mould a straw man from the traditional civic religion as “empty, contradictory, proliferating endless gods and 25 A. MANDOUZE, ‘Saint Augustin et la religion romaine’, RA 1 (1958), 187–223: 200 stressed the topicality of Augustine’s attacks: the church father “n’a jamais eu de goût pour combattre les fantômes”. Similarly C. LEPELLEY, ‘L’aristocratie lettrée païenne: une menace aux yeux d’Augustin’, Augustin le prédicateur, Paris 1998, 327–42: 335; G. O’DALY, ‘Augustine’s Critique of Varro on Roman Religion’, Religion and Superstition in Latin Literature, Bari 1994, 65–75: 67 and E.G. WELTIN, Athens and Jerusalem, Atlanta 1987, 75, 99. 26 MARKUS 1974, 8: “a means which enabled the Christians to get an indeterminate and polymorphic reality into sharp focus”. MARKUS 1994, 79 even speaks of the “fiction of a conflict between pagans and Christians” imposed on us by the Christians of the fifth century. 27 AVG. civ., particularly books 2–6. Augustine pays little attention to the Gods of the socalled Oriental mystery cults such as Isis and Mithras. Nevertheless, other Christian writers

Introduction

9

endless rituals without meaning, almost totally isolated from its social context and then to destroy it”.28 It is also worth remembering that Varro appears as a religious authority to educated pagans of the fourth and fifth centuries.29 Augustine remains silent on the still living cults and the religious tensions in North Africa. One wonders if he backs off from the contemporary paganism deliberately because he is afraid of making a frontal assault on the contemporary polytheism.30 Most of the arguments of the fourth and fifth century Christian polemic come from classical literature and earlier apologetic.31 Thus, Christian polemicists turned to the old clichés of Greco-Roman Gods handed over by Varro, Cicero and Seneca, as well as Greek philosophical critiques of religion. These classical topoi were a tried and proved arsenal of arguments in Christian apologetics.32 Even earlier apologists such as Lactantius and Arnobius had turned their attack, not against the altars next-door, but against myths.33 Thus, references to contemporary everyday religious life did not belong to the Christian polemical strategies. The debate was conducted in literary terms. The polemic focuses on tradition. It seems that the polemicists avoid the real issues of the present. There are, for instance, no references to contemporary events, literature or persons in Augustine’s City of God, except the discussions in the first book on the Sack of Rome and at the end of the fifth book on the battle of Frigidus. This is why many scholars have sensed an atmosphere of unreality in City of God. Nevertheless, tradition and history were a means of dealing with the present, questions of immediate interest. Tradition had always been a way of discussing highly topical issues in Greco-Roman literature and I am inclined to see Christian polemic following this convention of a learned discussion. Christian writers are showing themselves as capable of intellectual debates. The events and exempla of the past were used in handling contemporary problems.34 Thus, the issues of the present were projected into the past and the contemporary controversies were paralleled with the dichotomies of the history. also attack the Gods of mystery cults, e.g., in the anonymous poems Carmen contra paganos and Carmen ad senatorem. 28 NORTH 1992, 187. Lactantius and Arnobius as well as Augustine made use of the Republican writers, particularly Varro. For the rhetorical strategy of straw men and stereotypes, see Chapter 3. 29 AVG. civ. 7.22. O’DALY 1994, 69. 30 Suggested by H. CHADWICK, ‘Augustine on Pagans and Christians: Reflections on Religious and Social Change’, History, Society and the Churches, Cambridge 1985, 9–27: 22. 31 AVG. civ. 4.1 mentions as his sources personal experience, ipse vidimus, and pagan literature, ex litteris eorum. 32 The arguments against pagan Gods are discussed in Chapter 6. 33 M. EDWARDS, ‘The Flowering of Latin Apologetic: Lactantius and Arnobius’, Apologetics in the Roman Empire, Oxford 1999, 197–221: 219 points out that Arnobius and Lactantius addressed ‘the commonwealth of learning’. 34 Similarly Arnobius in his Adversus nationes utilizes the history of Republican Rome in his argumentation. As O. NICHOLSON, ‘Civitas Quae Adhuc Sustentat Omnia: The Limits of Ancient Christianity, Ann Arbor 1999, 7–25: 15 states, “This is not antiquarianism; it is effective strategy.”

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Debate and Dialogue

This is why the tradition became such an important issue: the antiquarian character of the pagan–Christian debate was no longer antiquarian but rather of current interest. This is why the Republican and early imperial authors Varro and Vergil were so important. The Augustinian dialogue with Vergil was by no means antiquarian. On the contrary, because everyone – Christian and pagan – knew Vergil, his description of the destruction of Troy was an apposite way of discussing contemporary issues such as the Sack of Rome in 410.35

35 For the use of Vergil in all kinds of issues of human interest, see S. MACCORMACK, Shadows of Poetry, Berkeley 1998, 160.

Chapter 2

Constructing and Deconstructing Dichotomies Good is set against evil, and life against death: so also is the sinner against a just man. And so look upon all the works of the most High. Two and two, and one against another. SIRACH 33:15

There was a strong tendency in late antique Christian writings to analyze, arrange and verbalize the surrounding world in terms of polar opposites. In fact, Christian polemical texts were based on dichotomies. Binary oppositions are more than a rhetorical tool; they are a way of conceiving of the world. Even as a mere rhetorical effect they reveal the basic antithetic structure of thinking. Augustine parallels the beauty of binary oppositions in the world and in rhetoric: “... God would put such creatures to good use, and thus enrich the course of world history by the kind of antithesis that gives beauty to a poem. ‘Antithesis’ (antitheta) provides the most attractive figures in literary composition: the Latin equivalent is ‘opposition’ (opposita), or more accurately, ‘contra-position’ (contraposita) ... The opposition of such contraries gives an added beauty to speech; and in the same way there is beauty in the composition of the world’s history (saeculum) arising from the antithesis of contraries – a kind of eloquence in events, instead of in words.”1 The dichotomies Christians – pagans, certainty – uncertainty, the certain – the uncertain, light – darkness, civitas caelestis – civitas terrena, civitas dei – civitas diaboli, the eternal city – the temporal city, the immortal city – the mortal city, the city of believers – the city of the wicked, Jerusalem – Babylon, Jerusalem – Rome are discussed in this chapter. The contrapositions between order and chaos, unity and diversity, simplicity and complexity, clarity and confusion as well as unity (concordia) and discord (discordia) and the contrast between ‘now’ (after the conversion) and ‘earlier’ (before the conversion) are treated in Chapter 3. The binary 1 AVG. civ. 11.18. Augustine offers 2 Cor 6:7 as an example of a rhetorical antithesis and Sirach 33:15 as an example of the antitheses of the world. Augustine’s praise of the beauty and utility of binary oppositions has often been regarded as influenced by Stoic views according to which disasters and even evil things could finally contribute to the goodness of the whole and by Neoplatonic views according to which good and evil balance each other as light and dark colours complement each other in a painting; see J.M. RIST, Augustine. Ancient Thought Baptized, Cambridge 1996, 261–2 and J. VAN OORT, Jerusalem and Babylon, Leiden 1991, 240. Cf. AVG. civ. 11.23.

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opposition religio vs. superstitio and its variations vera religio vs. falsa religio, the worship of the true God vs. worship of idols, new religio vs. old superstitio is discussed in Chapter 4. The next bundle of dichotomies surveyed in Chapter 6 is connected with the relationship with the divine sphere: one true God vs. many false Gods (or demons or idols) and good angels vs. wicked angels (or demons). Monotheism is sharply contraposed with polytheism. The binary opposition of public and secretive as well as that of sober and excessive are discussed in Chapter 5. Binary oppositions are by no means a Christian innovation. There have always existed patterns of thought that are based on antitheses between the good and the evil, light and darkness, good and bad people, us and them, us and the others, us and our opponents. Many religious, doctrinal and mythological manifestations of thought around the world are called dualistic.2 Ugo Bianchi has defined dualism as a doctrine of the principles. All “those religions, systems, conceptions of life which admit the dichotomy of the principles which, coeternal or not, cause the existence of that which does or seems to exist in the world” are dualistic. According to A.H. Armstrong cosmic dualism “sees the whole nature of things as constituted by the meeting and interaction of two opposite principles”.3 Dualistic tendencies are well attested in ancient thought, in Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Gnostic thought, ancient religious thought (e.g., Hermetism) and even in Stoicism. It has been remarked that, despite some dualistic features, there was no radical dualism in Greek philosophical systems. Moreover, it seems that there were no strong dualistic elements in Homeric, classical and Hellenistic Greek religious thinking, with the exception of Orphism. However, the world was often arranged in dichotomous terms, for example, in the Stoic division of mankind into two classes of men, the morally good and the morally bad. It is generally recognized that the Platonic doctrine of ideas has influenced the western way of structuring reality through hierarchical binary oppositions. In Plotinus’ thought the evil in the world was a necessary prerequisite of the goodness of the whole: since the good is to avoid the evil, the good could not be active in the material world without the evil.4 In Jewish tradition there are strands of thought that could be characterized as

2 U. BIANCHI, ‘The Category of Dualism in the Historical Phenomenology of Religion’, Temenos 16 (1980), 10–25: 13 calls them a “common concern for an Evil which ... contrasts God or the divine, but also ... finalizes creation and earthly life”. W. GEERLINGS, ‘Zur Frage des Nachwirkens des Manichäismus in der Theologie Augustins’, Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 93 (1971), 45–60: 60 speaks of “diese Strukturverwandtschaft im Lebensgefühl”. 3 BIANCHI 1980, 15; A.H. ARMSTRONG, ‘Dualism: Platonic, Gnostic, and Christian’, Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, New York 1992, 33–54: 33. Dualisms can be classified into, e.g., radical and softened dualisms, dialectical and eschatological ones and pro-cosmic and anti-cosmic ones. For religious dualism, see also U. BIANCHI, Il dualismo religioso, Roma 1983; U. BIANCHI, ‘Il dualismo come categorica storico-religiosa’, Selected Essays on Gnosticism, Dualism and Mysteriosophy, Leiden 1978, 49–62 and U. BIANCHI, ‘Le dualisme en histoire des religions’, Selected Essays on Gnosticism, Dualism and Mysteriosophy, Leiden 1978, 3–48. 4 H. DÖRRIE, ‘Dualismus’, RAC IV, Stuttgart 1959, 334–50: 336, 341; BIANCHI 1980, 12.

Constructing and Deconstructing Dichotomies

13

dualistic. For instance, some texts from Qumran speak of two opposing spiritual powers (angels) and two antithetical societies of good and evil people.5 Early Christian writings, such as the Shepherd of Hermas, the Acts of Peter and the Pseudo-Clementines, introduce a metaphor of the two antithetical cities or roads. The difference between the antithetical parts is stressed as in Didache, “There are two ways, one of life and one of death, but a great difference between the two ways”, and in the Epistle of Barnabas, “There are two ways of doctrine and authority, the one of light, and the other of darkness. But there is a great difference between these two ways. For over one are stationed the light-bringing angels of God, but over the other the angels of Satan.”6 Christian writers such as Cyprian, Tertullian and Lactantius presented Christians and their pagan opponents as contraposed entities.7 Tertullian, for example, quotes Mt 6:24, Nemo enim potest duobus dominis servire, and 2 Cor 6:14, Quid luci cum tenebris? Quid vitae et morti? to strengthen his firmness about the distinction between us and others. The distinction of the two alternatives serves as an instrument of group identity.8 Between the Darkness and the Light One of the most frequent binary oppositions is the metaphor of light and darkness in which light represents the truth of Christian doctrine and darkness the falsehood of other beliefs. This light of truth is dimmed by the pagan falsehoods. Paulinus of Nola, for example, asks his correspondent Iovius why he wants to keep the perspicuous truth in darkness instead of directing his mind towards the supreme wisdom, that is, Christ.9 The metaphor of light and darkness had been frequent in Jewish and early Christian as well as Gnostic and Manichaean tradition. Lactantius had stated that demons drew on darkness and overspread the truth with obscurity so that men could not know the true God. Tertullian had called the Christian community castra lucis while the

5 E.g., Manual of Discipline (3.13–4.26) speaks of the spirit of truth and the spirit of perversity in a human as well as the prince of Light and the angel of Darkness; VAN OORT 1991, 318, 323–4; J. VAN OORT, ‘Civitas dei – terrena civitas: The Concept of the Two Antithetical Cities and Its Sources (Books XI–XIV), Augustinus De civitate dei, Berlin 1997, 157–70: 167; J. MAIER, ‘Geister (Dämonen): B.III.b. Frühes und hellenistisches Judentum’, RAC IX, Stuttgart 1976, 626–40: 627–32. 6 The two cities: HERM. sim. 1.1–9 (50.1–9) and the Pseudo-Clementines (Hom. Clem. 15.7; 20.2); VAN OORT 1991, 301-12, 327–34; M. HENGEL, ‘Die “auserwählte Herrin”, die “Braut”, die “Mutter” und die “Gottestadt”’, La Cité de Dieu. Die Stadt Gottes, Tübingen 2000, 245–85: 275. The two roads: Did. 1.1; BARN. 5.4; 18.1 (quoted). 7 E.g., LACT. inst. 2.9.2 and 2.9.5: opposition between heaven as the realm of God and light and the earth as the place of devil and darkness; CYPR. ep. 58.8.2; 60.2.2; 74.8.3 distinguished between the castra dei and castra diaboli. For Cyprian’s, Tertullian’s and Lactantius’ dichotomies, see VAN OORT 1991, 284–301. 8 TERT. spect. 26.4; cf. 28.1–2; idol. 19.2. Segregation is discussed in Chapter 3. 9 PAVL. NOL. ep. 16.6.

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Debate and Dialogue

opposing camp was castra tenebrarum.10 Gnostic and Manichaean writings also introduce the separation of the realms of light and darkness. Manichaean texts often refer to a heavenly kingdom or city, whose antithesis is the kingdom of darkness. In the Manichaean worldview, the history of cosmos is one continuous war that began with the primordial clash of light and darkness. The Manichaean drama focuses on the redemption of the elements of Light that have been swallowed by the archons of Darkness. The elements of light and darkness make up a human being, too.11 Light had been used as a metaphor for truth in philosophical disputes. In the rhetoric of philosophers, the opponent’s views had been refuted as the doctrine of darkness. In conversion narratives, either describing conversion to a philosophical sect or a religion, the apprehension of truth was depicted as progress from darkness to light, or blindness to sight, or sleep to awakening.12 In his praise of Emperor Julian, the Antiochian rhetor Libanius uses the same metaphor of light and darkness – in this case the light of truth is Hellenism and the darkness of error is Christianity: “Then you quickly threw away your error and like a lion you shook your chains, released yourself from darkness, grasped truth instead of ignorance, the true instead of the false, our old Gods instead of this recent intruder and his defective rites.”13 When discussing the celebration of the Kalendae Ianuariae, Maximus of Turin contrasts the errors of dark pagan superstitions with the splendour of the true Christian light. Furthermore, the darkness of error or ignorance was a frequent way of referring to unaccepted religious groups and practices in legislation, in laws against Christians as well as later in edicts against pagans.14 The contraposition of light and darkness is cosmic. In City of God Augustine structures the world as divided into two powers of light and darkness. In the eleventh book, in the commentary on Genesis, he describes how God distinguished light from darkness and takes this to mean the good and wicked angels. The difference between these powers was the contrast between humility and pride and love of God and love of self. Augustine makes this lucid with repeating distinctive pronouns una – altera, illa – ista. One of these angelic companies enjoys God whereas the other swells with pride. Augustine stresses that the two societies of angels are contrasted and opposed to each other (has duas societates angelicas inter se dispares atque contrarias).15 10 E.g., I Thess 5:5. LACT. inst. 2.16.10; TERT. coron. 11.4: castra lucis and castra tenebrarum; 15.3: castra lucis and castra tenebrarum; idol. 19.2. I. OPELT, Die Polemik in der christlichen lateinischen Literatur von Tertullian bis Augustin, Heidelberg 1980, 14. 11 C.R. ALLBERRY, A Manichaean Psalm-Book II, Stuttgart 1938, 9, 99; R. HAARDT, Die Gnosis, Salzburg 1967, 224–7; VAN OORT 1997, 165; S.N.C. LIEU, Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China, Tübingen 1992, 17, 24; H.J.W. DRIJVERS, ‘Conflict and alliance in Manichaeism’, Struggles of Gods, Berlin 1984, 99–124: 101–2. 12 SHUMATE 1996, 33; see also Chapter 3. 13 LIBAN. or. 13.12. Cf. IAMBL. myst. 3.31.179 of Christians staying in the darkness. 14 MAX. TAVR. 98.1: inter ipsas tenebrosas superstitiones errorum veri luminis splendor effulgeret; cf. PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 111. In legislation: e.g., the edict of Maximinus Daia against Christians, apud EUS. eccl. 9.7.3; 9.7.9; Constantine apud EUS. v. Const. 2.60 calls paganism the power of darkness. 15 AVG. civ. 11.33. ARMSTRONG 1992, 49–50 points out that in patristic thought the fall of angels plays an important part in the explanations of cosmic or physical evil. Combined with

Constructing and Deconstructing Dichotomies

15

Naming the Otherness The pagans did not know they were pagans until the Christians told them they were. H. CHADWICK, ‘Augustine on Pagans and Christians: Reflections on Religious and Social Change’, History, Society and the Churches, Cambridge 1985, 9–27: 9

Christian polemicists created and polarized a clear demarcation line between Christians and pagans and this dichotomy is still influencing the modern pattern of thought. The clear demarcation line between pagans and Christians sharpened by Christian polemicists has had a considerable impact on modern scholars who have needed to make distinctions between pagans and Christians, for example, in defining whether an Ausonius or a Claudian was a Christian or a pagan. Classical and patristic scholars cannot help interpreting ancient ‘paganism’ and ancient Christianity in terms of this binary opposition – as my own use of the discursive distinction between ‘paganism’ and Christianity indeed indicates.16 Christian writers made a simplification of their rivals but at the same time they simplified Christians themselves. Making distinctions and polarizing them was part of the great project of clarifying Christian self-identity and reinforcing Christian self-consciousness in the altered fourth century circumstances. Forcing ‘them’ into collective conceptions, Christian opinion leaders aimed at defining who ‘we’ were. The dichotomy pagans – Christians has come down as the legacy of Christian writers who for their polemical ends created and sharpened the division, diminishing the vast variety of adherents of polytheistic religions as pagans. There was never a homogeneous religion called paganism but rather a wide range of various cults and beliefs, practices and attitudes but it was opportune and practical for Christian polemicists to group religious rivals together under a single blanket-term. The cults, beliefs and practices of the Greco-Roman world varied so much in time and area that any attempt to telescope them into a single ‘pagan’ pattern necessarily distorts them.17 In the religious market place of the Roman world, an individual was inclined to adapt religious affiliations according to social status, age, sex, ancestry, ethnic and geographical background as well as cultural orientation. Within this vast variety of different systems of belief and practice, for adherents of a cult, for example, the fall of humankind, the fall of angels provides elements that may make Christian thought as murky as a Manichaean world-view or even more aggressive than a Mazdaean conflictdualism. 16 Dichotomous presuppositions are discussed in M. KAHLOS, ’Incerti in Between – Moments of Transition and Dialogue in Christian Apologetics’, Parola del Passato 59 (2004), 5–24. 17 The wide variety of Greek and Roman and other cults has been emphasized by, e.g., G. FOWDEN, Empire to Commonwealth, Princeton 1993, 38: the plethora of polytheisms; R. TURCAN, ‘Les dieux et le divin dans les mystères de Mithra’, Knowledge of God in the GraecoRoman world, Leiden 1988, 243–61: 245: pas un polythéisme, mais des polythéismes; W.E. KAEGI, ‘The Fifth Century Twilight of Byzantine Paganism’, Classica et Mediaevalia 27 (1966), 243–75: 270: an amorphous group of customs and beliefs and attitudes; MARKUS 1994, 80; K. HOPKINS, A World full of Gods. Pagans, Jews and Christians in the Roman Empire, London 1999, 30; O’DONNELL 1979a, 48.

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Debate and Dialogue

devotees of Isis or participants in a Roman civic religion, it was difficult or even impossible to define themselves as ‘pagans’. The situation actually changed in the course of the fourth century and particularly in Julian’s programme of developing a pagan Hellenism as a response to the Christian construction of the ‘pagan’. It is noteworthy that non-Christian individuals perceived their religion by listing ritual acts they attended or initiations or cultic posts they held rather than defining themselves as ‘pagans’. Even those learned individuals who could be regarded as relatively conscious in their religious activities as a certain kind of – although not necessarily hostile – reaction to Christianity, for example, Vettius Agorius Praetextatus and his wife Fabia Aconia Paulina, indicated their religious affiliation by listing rituals and cultic posts.18 The imperial authorities in the fourthcentury legislation were not able to forbid paganism as a whole but legislators had to attack rituals and practices one by one. For instance, in an edict of 392, each ritual is specified and prohibited one at a time: “No person at all ... shall sacrifice an innocent victim to senseless images in any place at all or in any city. He shall not, by more secret wickedness, venerate his lar with fire, his genius with wine, his penates with fragrant odours; he shall not burn lights to them, place incense before them, or suspend wreaths for them.” There were no established and permanent terms for pagans or paganism before the later legislation under Theodosius I.19 When emphasizing the plethora of ancient religions, we must also stress the plurality of Christianities. It would be a grave simplification to speak of a single Christianity since Christianities in context are found to be diverse. Thus, it is important to keep the same variety of religious affiliations in mind when discussing beliefs and practices that we tend to group – for reasons of convenience – in one ‘Christian’ category: Eastern, Western, Roman, Syrian, Egyptian, Nicaean, Arian, Pelagian, Donatist, Nestorian, Manichaean and other branches of Christianity. The boundaries of being Christian were in constant flux from place to place and year to year.20 In the self-definition of the mainstream Christianity – Nicaean Christians who called themselves Catholic – other Christian sects labelled as heretic were often branded as non-Christians: in CTh 16.5.5 (in 379) it was stated that heretics, who even used Catholic terms for their prelates, “nonetheless should not be regarded as Christians”. The mainstream church gradually gained a position powerful enough to be able set the boundaries for Christianity. Lumping all non-Christians together under one term was a convenient and practical way of clarifying the complex reality. However, this lumping together was also an efficient rhetorical strategy since it was far easier to attack one target at a stroke than try to hit opponents one by one. Not only were the diverse Greco-Roman cults bundled together but also all religious dissidents (from the viewpoint of the mainstream church) were regarded as a single common denominator of demonicallyinspired error. Athanasius of Alexandria mocked the Arians as Hellenes in the sense of 18 CIL VI 1779. For the religious activities of Praetextatus and Paulina, see KAHLOS 2002, 62–84. 19 CTh 16.10.12. K.L. NOETHLICHS, ‘Kaisertum und Heidentum im 5. Jahrhundert’, Heiden und Christen im 5. Jahrhundert, Leuven 1998, 1–31: 11. 20 MARKUS 1990a, 34.

Constructing and Deconstructing Dichotomies

17

pagans: they, for example, the Arian Emperor Constantius, had returned to paganism. Chromatius of Aquileia bundled together Jews, pagans and heretics, stating that the Hebrews looked for the truth from their Law, pagan philosophers searched for it from their vain erudition and the heretics changed it for false revelations. All three searched in vain since they did not follow the path of the truth. In the imperial legislation, Roman society was divided into four categories: the Catholic church, “all heresies, perfidies and schisms”, “the madness of the Jewish impiety” and “the error and insanity of stupid paganism”.21 Furthermore, in the polemic of orthodox Christians, heretics were depicted as plagiarists of pagans, particularly of pagan philosophy, or as pagans. The church historian Socrates remarked that Manichaeans were Christians (christianizousin) in their voice but in their doctrines they were really pagans (hellenizousin).22 For the most part we are still dependent on the terminology invented by late antique Christians.23 In using the term ‘pagan’ we are at risk of bringing with the term the negative ways of Christian representation of the otherness.24 Nevertheless, despite these problems, I have decided to use the term ‘pagans’ in this study, varying it with more neutral words such as polytheists, adherents of traditional cults and worshippers of old Gods. First, there appears to be no satisfactory alternatives without further problems. The term ‘polytheist’ seems to be useful but it causes other problems because, in using word ‘polytheist’, we simplify the complex religious world of Late Antiquity into the binary opposition of monotheism and polytheism. Several philosophically orientated pagans could with good reason be called monotheistic and their relationship with the divine was probably far more monotheistic than of many Christians.25 ‘Worshippers of old Gods’ and ‘adherents of traditional cults’ tend to exclude late antique cults and religions more recent than Christianity since not all non-Christian religions were primeval. ‘Adherents of Greco-Roman cults and religions’ leaves out non-Greco21 ATH. or. c. Ar. 3.16; 4.10 bundled his rivals, Arians, into the group of ethnikoi and Hellenes; CHROMAT. serm. 28.2; CTh 15.5.5 and 16.5.63. This strategy is discussed in Chapter 3. 22 SOCR. eccl. 1.22. R. KLEIN, ‘Hellenen (Teil A.II–IV.B)’, RAC XIV, Stuttgart 1988, 375–445: 436–7. 23 C. ANDO, ’Pagan Apologetics and Christian Intolerance in the Ages of Themistius and Augustine’, JECS 4 (1996), 171–207: 175 does not see the term ‘pagan’ as a problem and ironizes the fashionable trend of lamenting the use of the terms ‘pagan’ and ‘paganism’. I join the fashionable group of the lamenters. 24 ‘Pagans’ and ‘paganism’ are not neutral concepts but always connected with derogatory connotations. E.g., A.D. LEE, Pagans and Christians in Late Antiquity, London 2000, 10 points out that ‘pagan’ is an ’oppositional label’ and using it “risks colluding with the way in which one side chose to represent the other”. VINZENT 1998, 34 remarks that unlike another ancient concept ‘barbarian’, which is both negative and positive, ‘pagan’ is essentially negative. 25 For further discussion, see Chapter 6. ANDO 175, n. 14 criticizes the term ‘polytheist’ maintaining that such erudite persons as Themistius or Symmachus or Longinianus would have found the term insulting. However, I find Ando’s claim only reflecting modern prejudices against polytheism. Why would polytheism have been offensive to these individuals if it was not insulting to more philosophical orientated persons such as Porphyry or Praetextatus?

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Roman cults. ‘Religions of Greco-Roman antiquity’ or ‘religions of the Roman Empire’ also include Christianity and Judaism. Second, we could also speak of religions and cults that belong to neither Christianity nor Judaism – perceiving those religions in terms of Judeo-Christian culture. Thus, even if we replaced ‘pagans’ with a more appropriate word, we would be stuck in modern Christianly coloured thinking nonetheless. The dichotomy Christian – non-Christian is still there. Third, the term ‘pagans’ abounding in literary sources illustrates the binary oppositions in the Christian polemic. These people indeed exist as the category of ‘pagans’ in Christian discourse (if not necessarily elsewhere). The Birth of Paganism Paganism was never a religion and there were no pagans before Christianity. Christians invented paganism, not only as a term, but also as a system.26 The emergence and phases of the concept pagan illustrates the evolving Christian self-consciousness, Christian eagerness to become separate and different from other, non-Christian, people. Pagans are a relational concept, that is, there were no pagans as such but only in relation to and in most cases in contrast with Christians.27 Using the concept pagans, Christians identified others as non-Christians in a way in which these people would not have identified or recognized themselves. These people would not originally have identified themselves as a single entity, paganism. How did these people understand themselves and call themselves and their religious commitments? It has been stressed that the religious traditions of the Greco-Roman world – paganism – is manifest especially in its lack of a distinctive name for itself. The cult activities and the emotional ties could be called threskeia, eusebeia, nomos, religio or pietas.28 Emperor Julian called these people adherents of ‘the laws inherited from the fathers’.29 However, at this time, ‘pagans’ had become more conscious of themselves in relation to Christians. In the course of the fourth century, there was an essential change in the selfconsciousness of these people whom we call pagans. In competition and interaction with Christians, the worshippers of the old Gods were compelled to reflect on their 26 BEARD – NORTH – PRICE 1998, 312, n. 202; G. FOWDEN, ‘Between Pagans and Christians’, JRS 78 (1988), 173–82: 176: “Roman paganism is especially difficult to deal with because anyway it did not exist.” 27 J.-C. FREDOUILLE, ‘Heiden’, RAC XIII, Stuttgart 1986, 1113–49: 1115; U. HECKEL, ‘Das Bild der Heiden und die Identität der Christen bei Paulus’, Die Heiden. Juden, Christen und das Problem des Fremden, Tübingen 1994, 269–96: 270 discusses the concept in relation to the Jews. 28 G. FOWDEN, ‘Varieties of Religious Community’, Interpreting Late Antiquity, Cambridge Mass. 2001, 82–106: 83 emphasizes the “unselfconsciousness of traditional religion in the Roman empire”. This is apparent, for example, in the rareness of conversion in ‘paganism’; the idea of abandoning the religious community of one’s birth for another is almost impossible. 29 IUL. ep. 89a Bidez – Cumont (= 20 Wright).

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own beliefs and practices more consciously and explicitly.30 The Neoplatonist Iamblichus’ writings were a fourth-century attempt to present Greco-Roman polytheism as a coherent system. G. Fowden introduces modern parallels to ancient polytheists’ reactions: anthropologists have surveyed, for example, how monotheistic and scriptural religions have exuded a new reactive identity to the adherents of the old religions in Indonesia.31 Emperor Julian’s vision of pagan Hellenism in the 360s was also such a reaction to Christianity.32 The reactions of the adherents of the old Gods naturally varied. Other pagans attempted to minimize differences between their old ways and Christianity, partly because they did not necessarily see such distinctions and antagonism in everyday life. Minimizing differences could also be interpreted as a defence against the growing aggressions from the Christian side.33 Ethne, ethnikoi, gentes and nationes In the course of the centuries, Christian writers developed a diverse terminology to mark these others. There was, however, no clear single term for pagan in Hebrew, Greek or Latin until the mid-fourth century. The Christian concept of pagan was influenced by Jewish tradition that distinguished between Jews and non-Jews. Israel needed ‘nations’ for the construction of its own self-identity. The Greek words ethne and ethnikoi referring to nonChristians and non-Jews are loan translations from the Hebrew gôyîm that refers to other, foreign, nations and tribes contrasted with Israel, God’s chosen people. This term was used as a neutral concept of foreign peoples but particularly after the Exile period it was used as a religious concept with negative connotations of nations that did not worship Yahweh, lived without the Torah and led an immoral and intemperate life.34 In the Septuagint it was translated ethne in contrast to God’s people, laos.35 30 According to LEE 2000, 10, the change in the self-identity had occurred by the fourth century whereas MARKUS 1994, 79 states that, excluding Julian’s programme of Hellenism, it was Augustine’s generation of Christians that created paganism. NORTH 1992, 188–9 dates the invention of paganism as a religion to as early as the second to third centuries. North, however, distinguishes between pagan self-awareness of themselves as a religious group among others (second and third centuries) and a self-conscious effort to defend the pagan tradition as a whole (Julian in the fourth century). 31 IAMBL. myst. 3.31.179–180; 10.2. In a disguised reference to the propaganda of the atheistic Christians, he stressed the need for an account of polytheism. FOWDEN 2001, 86–7. 32 Nevertheless, I am inclined to argue that no other person but Julian could have visioned such a militant pagan Hellenism in response to Christianity because Julian was raised as a Christian before his conversion to ‘paganism’. 33 VINZENT 1998, 65. 34 M. HENGEL, ‘Einleitung’, Die Heiden. Juden, Christen und das Problem des Fremden, Tübingen 1994, ix–xviii: xii, xv; FREDOUILLE 1986, 1116–18; E. DEMOUGEOT, ‘Remarques sur l’emploi de paganus’, Studi in onore di Aristide Calderini e Roberto Paribeni I, Milano 1956, 337–50: 338; P. ATHANASSIADI – M. FREDE, ‘Introduction’, Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity, Oxford 1999, 1–20: 5; N. UMEMOTO, ‘Juden, “Heiden” und das Menschengeschlecht in der Sicht Philons von Alexandria’, Die Heiden. Juden, Christen und das Problem des Fremden, Tübingen 1994, 22–51: 22. 35 1. Macc. 1.11–14.

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In the New Testament the word ethne refers to pagans as contraposed to God’s people and Christians converted from pagans. The Latin words gentiles, gentes and nationes are translations from the Greek ethne and sometimes ethnici appears in Latin, particularly in Tertullian’s writings. All these terms have the connotation of being foreign, strange and barbarian. They also stress the local or tribal nature of non-Christian religions in contrast to the universality of Christianity.36 Before and during the fourth century, the Greek ethne and ethnikoi as well as the Latin gentes, gentiles and nationes are the most frequent words for non-Christians. When the laws before 415 refer to polytheists, the word gentiles is utilized although the most recurrent way to allude to them is to refer to people by describing various practices, particularly sacrifices, or applying the word superstitio.37 As mentioned above, the religious legislation could not prohibit paganism as a whole because there was no such religion. Side by side with the Christian use, gentilis appears in the sense of barbarian or native.38 The word is also used in a deliberately ambiguous manner, linking the non-Christian aspect with the barbarian nature. Hellenes Another term, the Greek Hellenes, became commonly used as the synonym for nonChristians. Christian apologists applied the term in the sense of pagan; some authors, for instance, Tatian in his Pros Hellenas, with strong negative nuances, while other writers such as Justin the Martyr and Clement of Alexandria saw Hellenism, the Greek culture, in a more favourable light. In Greek Hellenes became the standard overall term for pagans – it replaced the word ethne by the beginning of the fourth century – and was in use throughout the Late Antique and Byzantine period.39 Hellenes were those who belonged to the Greek culture but were neither Christians nor Jews. It is hard to say when exactly the linguistic, ethnic and cultural emphasis was replaced by the negative contraposition in relation to Christians.40 I am inclined to stress the dual sense of the term: Hellenes probably carried both aspects at the same time throughout a long period. The term could be used in a deliberately vague way, and it probably meant different things to different persons, particularly in

36 E.g., TERT. spect. 1.2; 3.1; 3.5; 5.1; 19.5; 21.1; 24.3; 27.1. FREDOUILLE 1986, 1117–20; HECKEL 1994, 270; BOWERSOCK 1990, 10–11. 37 FREDOUILLE 1986, 1119–20; DEMOUGEOT 1956, 342–3. 38 E.g., AMM. 14.7.9; 15.5.6. MATTHEWS 1989, 426. 39 KLEIN 1988, 434–8; FREDOUILLE 1986, 1118–20. The expressions Hellenismos, hellenizein and Hellenikos were also used. The title of Theodoret’s work, Hellenikon therapeutike mathematon, is illustrative (THEOD. affect. prooem. 1.19; 2.95; 9.28; 11.16). 40 According to KLEIN 1988, 434, Hellenes are to be understood as an ethnic entity treated from a religious point of view but not as pagans in the early apologetics (e.g., Tatian, Justin, Clement of Alexandria). KLEIN 1988, 434 and VINZENT 1998, 36 believe that the word Hellenes carries the contraposition of pagans and Christians for the first time in Origen’s use whereas BOWERSOCK 1990, 9–10 states that the term was used in the sense of pagan in the Constantinian period (e.g., by Eusebius of Caesarea).

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the fourth century.41 For example, for Emperor Julian, Hellenism meant pagan cults whereas for Synesius of Cyrene it was above all culture.42 Whichever the emphases were, Greek culture (myths, literature, art, lifestyle) and paganism (the traditional religious life) were closely connected in the term Hellenismos. Libanius uses an expression ‘to be a Hellene’43 but it was also understood to emphasize the traditional Greek way of life, including traditional religious customs of the fathers. Eusebius of Caesarea usually applies Hellenes in the ethnic and cultural sense but in some passages Hellenes are clearly pagans and hellenizein is used to mean ‘to practice pagan rites’. The ambivalence of the term is apparent in the words of Ephraem of Edessa for whom Hellenism was above all the Greek culture that was to be rejected. He proclaimed that “blessed is the one who has never tasted the poison of the wisdom of the Greeks”. As G. Bowersock rightly points out, Ephraem hardly distinguished the Hellenes as cultural carriers and the Greeks as religious actors.44 The two aspects went hand in hand. It is noteworthy that, in the construction of their self-identity as a reaction to the growth of Christian influence, the adherents of old cults revalued the term Hellenes. Emperor Julian confined the meaning of Hellenes to emphasize the religious aspect over the cultural and ethnic aspects. This polarization, however, was by no means Julian’s own innovation but rather he followed the existing trend that was already discernible in Eusebius’ definitions. Nevertheless, Julian cunningly exploited the possibilities of this use against educated Christians.45 Julian’s edict that prohibited Christians from teaching Greek classics implied the identification of adherence of the old religions with the devotion to Greek culture and insisted on the distinction of everything Christian and Greek. If Christians refuted Hellenism in the sense of the old cults, they should also give up the Greek culture, including literature. Gregory of Nazianzus complains that Julian wickedly changed the meaning of Hellenes to 41 KLEIN 1988, 434 excludes the ambiguity of the term in the Porphyrian critique of Origen (apud EUS. eccl. 6.19.7) where Porphyry reprimands Origen, grown up a Hellene among the Hellenes, of having been lost into barbarian insanity. I would argue, however, that Porphyry could have used the term in a deliberately vague sense. The religious, cultural and ethnic aspects probably were not as easily discernible as modern scholars tend to surmise. 42 VINZENT 1998, 37–8; BOWERSOCK 1990, 9–10; H.-I. MARROU, ‘Synesius of Cyrene and Alexandrian Neoplatonism’, The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, Oxford 1963, 126–50: 144; G. FOWDEN, ‘Polytheist Religion and Philosophy’, CAH XIII, Cambridge 1998, 538–60: 555. 43 LIB. ep. 285.2; other examples in A.J. FESTUGIÈRE, Antioche païenne et chrétienne, Paris 1959, 220–22. BOWERSOCK 1990, 9–10 stresses the “nexus between paganism and Greek culture”, suggesting that the pagans themselves advocated the use of the words in their religious sense: it seems that this was a part of the later pagan self-affirmation. 44 EUS. eccl. 4.16.7 speaks of Tatian’s conversion from the doctrines of the Hellenes, Hellenon mathemata, EUS. eccl. 4.8.5 of Justin’s conversion of the Hellenike philosophia; EUS. v. Const. 2.44. EPHRAEM, De fide quoted by BOWERSOCK 1990, 34. 45 Julian emphasized the contrapository, pagan aspect of Hellenism probably because he had been raised as a Christian. BOWERSOCK 1990, 11 remarks aptly that Julian’s “attempt to stop the Christians from teaching the pagan Greek classics was a decision of diabolical cunning, the kind of decision that only a former Christian could have made”; cf. J. VANDERSPOEL, Themistius and the Imperial Court, Ann Arbor 1995, 126.

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represent a religion but not a language. Julian had lumped together, Gregory writes in his assault on the emperor, the nuances of the verb hellenizein; on one hand the cult and on the other the nation and those who had found the power of the Greek language.46 Despite the fact that this was exactly what many Christian writers had been doing in their use of the term Hellenes, Gregory of Nazianzus lays the blame only on Julian. Pagani The cultural aspect implied in the term Hellenes did not make its breakthrough into Latin. It was applied occasionally in the sense of pagans only by very few writers.47 The term standardized for non-Christians in the Latin west was pagani that emerges as the opposite of Christians in the course of the fourth century and replaces other terms such as gentes and gentiles in Latin from the fifth century onwards. The history of the term pagani has been a much-debated issue in modern scholarship.48 Before the Christian use, the Latin word paganus, meaning literally a villager, referred to a country-dweller, peasant, or rustic and included somewhat negative connotations of an unlearned, uncivilized person or hick as opposed to sophisticated city dwellers. The most recurrent modern interpretation stresses this aspect of rusticity and provinciality of the Christian use of paganus: the application of the word was explained with the supposition that within the spread of Christianity throughout the Roman Empire, pagan cults and practices survived most tenaciously in the remotest country districts whereas Christianity dominated in the cities and central areas of the Empire. Paganism was the relic in the periphery.49 Thus, according to this view, the meaning of the word rose from the dichotomy of centre and periphery. This interpretation actually follows the fifth-century contraposition connected to the term: Orosius points out that non-Christians are called pagani because they live in pagi of rural places. They are aliens to God’s commonwealth; thus, the writer labels them as strangers to the Christian society, that is, the Roman civilization.50 Another interpretation introduced the contraposition between civilian and military. According to this view, in the early Christian use, the term paganus was used of a person who was not a miles Christi.51 The most common example for the 46 GREG. NAZ. or. 4.5.79–81; 4.103. 47 AVG. quaest. euang. 1.14: propter Graecos, id est gentes; op. monach. 13.14: Graecos, quos etiam paganos dicimus. 48 The scholarly discussion is surveyed by J.J. O’DONNELL, ‘“Paganus”: Evolution and Use’, Classical Folia 31 (1977), 163–9: 163–4. 49 E.g., J. ZEILLER, Paganus. Étude de terminologie historique, Fribourg 1917, 59–70. MATTHEWS 1989, 544, n. 3 remarks that by the later fourth century, paganus has come to mean country-folk. 50 OROS. hist. 1 prol. 9: praeceperas mihi uti adversus vaniloquiam pravitatem eorum qui alieni a civitate Dei ex locorum agrestium compitis et pagis pagani vocantur sive gentiles, quia terrena sapiunt. 51 B. ALTANER, ‘Paganus. Eine bedeutungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung’, ZKG 58 (1939), 130–41 (= B. ALTANER, Kleine Patristische Schriften, Berlin 1967, 582–96). This aspect is supported by R. LANE FOX, Pagans and Christians, London 1986, 30–31. E. DEMOUGEOT,

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use of paganus is a passage in Tertullian’s De corona militis that has often been interpreted as setting paganus opposed to miles Christi. However, this is not the case, as has been shown by H. Grégoire and P. Orgels. In this passage Tertullian discusses how a soldier is able to avoid taking part in non-Christian rites and proposes that a soldier is able to suffer for the sake of God, a cause that the civilian faith – the faith of a believer who is not in military service – could also support (perpetiendum pro Deo quod aeque fides pagana condixit). Then he continues: apud hunc tam miles est paganus fidelis quam paganus est miles fidelis, that is, in front of God, a civilian believer becomes a soldier and a soldier believer becomes a civilian. Thus, Tertullian’s aim is to stress that the circumstances of a profession should not effect belief (non admittit status fidei necessitates), not to contrast the pagan faith with militia Christi.52 A third interpretation offered by C. Mohrmann mediated between the two preceding views. The word pagani was used to refer to the outsiders of the Christian community and in this way became the standard word for non-Christians. The meaning of non-Christian does not appear until the fourth century.53 P. Chuvin also combines the aspects of country people and civilians. Pagani are people who are rooted in the places where they live, unlike soldiers who have come from elsewhere. Chuvin interprets them as ‘people of the place’, whether country or town, who have preserved their local customs. In this contrast Christians are alieni, ‘people from elsewhere’.54 J.J. O’Donnell has criticized these interpretations as one-sided because they have concentrated only on the etymology of paganus: the derivation of a word does not always govern its meaning at a particular time.55 I am inclined to agree with O’Donnell since in the case of paganus hunting for original exclusive etymologies leaves out interesting aspects. The strength of the term was its ambiguity. It included – whatever the original etymology was – several connotations such as rustic, uncivilized, ignorant, profane (that is, uninitiated) and civil as opposed to the aspects of urban, civilized, learned, initiated and military.56

‘Paganus, Mithra et Tertullien’, Studia Patristica 3 (1961), 354–65: 364 stated that the miles Christi used by Tertullian refers to the language used in mysteries of Mithras (cf. miles Mithrae) rather than military language. 52 TERT. coron. 11. H. GRÉGOIRE – P. ORGELS, ‘Paganus, Étude de sémantique et d’histoire’, Mélanges Georges Smets, Bruxelles 1952, 363–400: 387–9; J. FONTAINE, Tertullien, De corona (Sur la couronne), Paris 1966, 141 also remarks correctly that paganus is still used completely in the Roman sense of civilian. Nor is paganos in militaribus in TERT. pall. 4 to be understood in the sense of non-Christian. ATHANASSIADI – FREDE 1999, 4 quote TERT. coron. 11 incorrectly: deorum falsorum multorumque cultores paganos vocamus. 53 C. MOHRMANN, ‘Encore un fois: paganus’, VC 6 (1952), 109–21. 54 P. CHUVIN, A Chronicle of the Last Pagans, Cambridge Mass. 1990, 6–9. According to P. CHUVIN, ‘Sur les origines de l’équation paganus = païen’, Impies et païens entre Antiquité et Moyen Age, Paris 2002, 7–15, the term paganus (the member of a pagus) was originally used without pejorative connotations. 55 O’DONNELL 1977, 164. 56 GRÉGOIRE – ORGELS 1952, 366.

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In the sense of non-Christian, the word paganus does not become frequent until the mid-fourth century57 and even in the late fourth century it appears sporadically in legislation and Christian literature.58 The words gentiles and nationes are still more common and pagani appear occasionally in the texts of Ambrosiaster, Prudentius and Augustine.59 The earliest writer is probably Marius Victorinus who applies the word a couple of times explaining the word Graeci used in the sense of nonChristians. Paganus becomes more frequent in the beginning of the fifth century (around 415–20). Orosius applies the term recurrently. In Salvian’s De gubernatione Dei (around 440) paganus appears fairly rarely whereas writers such as Pacianus of Barcelona, Optatus of Milevis and Philastrius of Brescia use the word recurrently.60 In legislation the term pagani was applied to non-Christians for the first time in 370.61 Thereafter paganus is used in legal language connected with words such as superstitio, error, crimen and insania.62 Paganus in the sense of non-Christian was a word of the popular language and was probably in common use before it appeared in literary texts and legislation. Pagani became prevalent at the cost of the previously frequent words gentes and gentiles that were disturbingly ambiguous, referring to both non-Christians and nonRomans.63 Because of this double meaning, church fathers and legislative texts often clarified the use of gentiles with explanatory remarks of pagani. There is a gradual 57 There are two unclear cases usually dated to the beginning of the fourth century. These are two funerary inscriptions erected by parents to their daughters: CIL X 7112 presents the deceased daughter as fidelis facta and pagana nata and CIL VI 30463 states that the departed girl inter fedeles fidelis fuit, inter [al]ienos pagana fuit. In both cases GRÉGOIRE – ORGELS 1952, 383 interpret the word pagana as referring to a non-Christian with a non-pejorative nuance because parents would not have written of their children in an offensive tone. Therefore, they believe that the term paganus was used without pejorative nuances during this period. However, the interpretation of both inscriptions is far from clear and the term paganus does not necessarily refer in these cases to non-Christians. 58 E.g., in CTh 7.21.2 (in 353) paganus is still applied in the sense of country-dweller. 59 E.g., in Augustine’s City of God the word appears only six times (twice in 8.26; 9.9; 21.6; 22.3; 5.23; P.C. BURNS, ‘Augustine’s use of Varro’s Antiquitates rerum divinarum in his De Civitate Dei’, AugSt 32 (2001), 37–64: 44). Augustine also uses the nouns paganitas and paganismus. Gens pagana appears few times in PRVD. c. Symm. 1 praef. 6 but nowhere else in PRVD. c. Symm; 1.449 paganus is used in the sense of rustic. Ambrose and Jerome do not use the term. DEMOUGEOT 1956, 337–40, 344–5; O’DONNELL 1977, 165. 60 MAR. VICTORIN. in Gal. 2.3: qui [sc. Titus] utique, inquit, Graecus erat, id est paganus; 4.3: … apud Graecos, id est apud paganos. Marius Victorinus even uses the word paganismus (in Gal. 2.9). OROS. hist. 1 prol. 9. GRÉGOIRE – ORGELS 1952, 379; CHUVIN 2002, 8. 61 CTh 16.2.18 (in 370): cum paganorum animi contra sanctissimam legem quibusdam sunt excitationibus excitati. DEMOUGEOT 1956, 341. However, according to M.F. MARTROYE, ‘La répression de la magie et le culte des gentils au IVe siècle’, Revue historique de droit francais et étranger 9 (1930), 669–701: 683, n. 1, CTh 16.2.18 pagani refers to Donatists – not non-Christians – as country-dwellers, inhabitants of pagi. 62 CTh 16.10.2–3; 16.10.13; 16.10.16; 16.10.20–21; 16.10.25. 63 CTh 16.5.46 (in 409) explains pagani as a word used by the commons: gentiles quos vulgo paganos appellant. AVG. ep. 184a.5 stresses the popular character of the word: istorum sane infidelium, quos vel gentiles vel iam vulgo usitato vocabulo paganos appellare

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shift in the meanings of the words paganus and gentilis and this change is connected with political and social alterations and the prominence of the Germans in the west. Gentilis became too imprecise a term in the sense of non-Christian because nonRoman Germans could also be Christians. Thus, the gentiles Germans in the sense of non-Romans could not be called gentiles in the sense of non-Christians.64 The previously vulgar word pagani was applied in order to clarify the vagueness. This transformation also labelled the non-Christian pagani as non-Romans. Thus, nonChristians were not regarded as proper Romans – they were branded as barbarians outside the Roman civilization. This is a coup d’état in the hierarchy of the previous centuries in which Christians had been marked as disloyal Romans and outsiders of the Roman Empire. Moreover, as O’Donnell has shown, late fourth-century church fathers advocated the use of pagani in order to tie together peasants and senators who both still preferred to remain non-Christians. The self-important senators certainly did not feel comfortable with the association with country people – in their eyes, hicks.65 It is probably in an ironic tone when a non-Christian intellectual, Longinianus, applies the term in this sense of a hick to himself: id est, a pagano homine.66 The terminology became remarkably divergent in the Greek east and the Latin west. In the western part of the Empire, pagans were labelled as a group on the periphery or even outside Roman Christian society, with a nuance of barbarism, whereas in the eastern part of the Empire they were defined as Hellenes without any insinuation of provinciality. As has been remarked, the difference in the terms may reflect the fact that in the east non-Christian cults were not restricted to the remotest areas of the Empire but remained active in the great urban centers such as Heliopolis, Antioch and Edessa.67 However, observing to these differing terms, Chuvin points out that the cities in the west hardly became Christianized more rapidly than in the east.68 consuevimus; retract. 2.43.1: deorum falsorum multorumque cultores, quos usitato nomine paganos vocamus. GRÉGOIRE – ORGELS 1952, 390; FREDOUILLE 1986, 1121–2; CHUVIN 2002, 8. 64 The terms could be explained the other way round as in CTh 16.10.21 (in 416): qui profano pagani ritus errore seu crimine polluuntur, hoc est gentiles. The terms are used together for the sake of clarity in AVG. serm. 47.28: Gentiles pagani qui remanserunt. GRÉGOIRE – ORGELS 1952, 392–4; DEMOUGEOT 1956, 345, 349 connects the change in the terms with the military and political crisis of 408–410. Thereafter gentiles refer exclusively to non-Romans, Germans or barbarians, and particular élite military groups in the Roman army. 65 It is noteworthy that, when church fathers attempted to persuade non-Christians, e.g., prominent senators, to embrace Christianity, the term pagani was not used. When non-Christians were mocked within the Christian inner circles, they were called pagani. As O’DONNELL 1977, 166-8 puts it, non-Christians “were called ‘hicks’ behind their backs”. Both Augustine and Prudentius apparently avoid using the term pagani in De civitate Dei and Contra Symmachum, which are addressed at least formally to non-Christians. However, paganus in the sense of nonChristian appears in the preface later annexed to Prudentius’ poem. 66 LONGIN. Aug. ep. 234.1. 67 L. CRACCO RUGGINI, ‘Pubblicistica e storiografia bizantine di fronte alla crisi dell’impero romano’, Athenaeum 51 (1973), 146–83: 161, n. 72. The Greek word paganos, borrowed from Latin, never had the sense of non-Christian but retained the sense of rustic and civilian. GRÉGOIRE – ORGELS 1952, 366–73, 391. 68 CHUVIN 1990, 6–7.

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I would argue that the term pagani tells us more about the manner that Christian polemicists regarded as efficient in labelling their religious rivals even though it may reveal historical circumstances as well – the swiftness of the Christianization of western cities and the lingering of pagan remnants in the countryside. In the east, the contrast was constructed between the Hellenic and Christian cultures. This contraposition between the Hellenic and Christian paideia had been emphasized in the earlier Greek Christian apologetic. In the west the dichotomy fell between the centre and periphery, sophistication and crudeness, and even the Roman and the barbarian. Dichotomous Presuppositions and Grey Areas Scholars before the 1970s for the most part took the division between pagans and Christians for granted and regarded them as mutually exclusive categories and even as opposed and hostile to each other. Several modern scholars nonetheless have recently questioned the clear borderlines and investigated the late antique persons who do not fit into the category of the rigid Christian–pagan dichotomy. A wide area of ambiguity between straightforward Christians and plain pagans has been opened in the world of Late Antiquity. Furthermore, instead of perceiving only differences, scholars have observed the habits, beliefs and values that pagans and Christians shared.69 In the previous scholarship, for want of an existing term, individuals standing between hard-line polytheism and hard-line Christianity – in-between people – have been most frequently called half-Christians or semi-Christians. Moreover, there have been cryptopagans, Christianized pagans or Christianizing pagans, paganizing Christians or paganized Christians, nominal Christians, seeming Christians and pagans with Christian masking. The phenomenon has been characterized as Christianity of a transitional stage, implying teleologically that the movement was targeted to its final end, a complete Christianity. Sometimes there appears a more neutral term Philhellenes. Persons leading a double life have been termed as turncoats, trimmers, fair-weather patriots, lukewarm Christians, conformists, apostates and opportunists. They have been characterized as waverers, the faint69 O’DONNELL 1979a, 52 asserts that “the line between pagans and Christians was considerably more blurred than it has been the custom to assume”; BOWERSOCK 1990, 5–6 maintains that paganism itself has not been observed on its own terms, not so much as a rival of Christianity, but rather as a contemporary alternative expression of piety; NOCK 1933 [1961], 259 and MARKUS 1990a, 33 speak of ‘a wide no-man’s land’ and ample room for uncertainty between explicit pagans and uncompromising Christians; P. ATHANASSIADI, Julian and Hellenism, Oxford 1981, 28–9 of an extensive no-man’s-land; FOWDEN 1998, 556 of the area between hard-line polytheism and hard-line Christianity and VINZENT 1998, 64 of “ein Bereich der Mitte, in welchem nicht immer klar war und nicht immer klar zu sein brauchte, ob jemand der einen oder der anderen Seite angehörte oder beiden zugleich zuneigte”. See also BARCELÒ 1992, 151–89; SALZMAN 1990, 193–231; P. BROWN, ‘Christianization and religious conflict’, CAH XIII, Cambridge 1998, 632–64. The same applies to the boundaries between Christians and Jews, cf. ATHANASSIADI – FREDE 1999, 17 and S. MITCHELL, ‘The Cult of Theos Hypsistos between Pagans, Jews, and Christians’, Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity, Oxford 1999, 81–148 on the Hypsistarians.

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hearted and the half-committed.70 These characterizations of religiously ambiguous figures in Christian terms have often arisen from the complaints of church fathers as the example of the term Christians in name only indicates. Ambrose mentioned these people as aliqui nomine Christiani.71 Almost all these terms and characterizations are derogatory. The first attempt to break away from the fixed pagan–Christian dichotomy was Charles Guignebert’s article on semi-Christians in 1923. Guignebert brought up semi-Christians as a phenomenon of Late Antiquity. He regarded these semiChristians as an extreme case of Christianizing syncretism in the way that they did not attempt to harmonize their incompatible beliefs but simply juxtaposed them.72 In church fathers’ complaints, the inadequately Christianized and educated, simple folk were susceptible to the influences of pagan environment and remained uncertain and indecisive between Christianity and paganism.73 Guignebert speaks of the hypnosis of the past among the uncertain people (des gens incertains). He stresses that the pagan and the Christian aspects are simultaneous: these people did not cease believing in Christ but they returned to the temples because they also believed in the Gods. This is obvious in his splendid characterization of Ausonius: “Ausone est tantôt chrétien, tantôt païen, qu’il est les deux et, sans doute, plus le second que le premier, mais qu’au total c’est un demi-chrétien.”74 The ideas developed by Guignebert reappear in Gerald Bonner’s scheme in 1984. Bonner divides late antique people into four groups: pagans, semi-Christians, paganized Christians and Christians. In this model, semi-Christians were those who had not accepted baptism and the restraints and burdens of the church but who at the same time sympathized and adhered, to some degree, to the church. Paganized Christians were sincere converts who had accepted baptism and were ready to commit 70 Demi-chrétiens: GUIGNEBERT 1923, passim, and S. LANCEL, Saint Augustin, Paris 1999, 229; semi-Christians: BONNER 1984, passim, R. MACMULLEN, Christianising the Roman Empire (AD 100–400), New Haven 1984, 144, n.26; ‘half’-Christians: W. KINZIG, ‘“Trample upon me …”. The Sophists Asterius and Hecebolius: Turncoats in the Fourth Century A.D.’, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Leiden 1993, 92–111: 95; Halbchristentum and Übergangschristentum: previous views surveyd by VINZENT 1998, 41; “latent ... paganism of many Romans”: O’DALY 1994, 67; paganised Christians: BONNER 1984, 348–9; Namenschristen: H. CANCIK, ‘Nutzen, Schmuck und Aberglaube. Ende und Wandlungen der römischen Religion im 4. und 5. Jahrhundert’, Der Untergang von Religionen, Berlin 1986, 65–90: 75; Scheinchristen: NOETHLICHS 1998, 9; Christliche Tarnung: CANCIK 1986, 75; lukewarm Christians: ALAN CAMERON, ‘The Date and Identity of Macrobius’, JRS 56 (1966), 25–38: 36 and B. CROKE – J. HARRIES, Religious Conflict in Fourth–Century Rome. A Documentary Study, Sydney 1982, 79; fair-weather patriots, waverers and the half-committed: BONNER 1984, 352–3; plain turncoats or trimmers: MACMULLEN 1984, 56. 71 AMBR. ep. 17.8 (= ep. 72, CSEL 82.3). 72 GUIGNEBERT 1923, 69: “ils les juxtaposent tout simplement”. 73 GUIGNEBERT 1923, 69–70; 71: “ou demeurassent incertains et indécis entre les deux, dans un position plus ou moins consolidée par le syncrétisme” [the italics are mine]. GUIGNEBERT 1923, 66, n. 1 distinguished between semi-Christians and those who had “returned to their vomit” and could not be regarded even as semi-Christians. He was following the condemnations of Tertullian (apol. 44.3; 46.17) and Minucius Felix (35.6). 74 GUIGNEBERT 1923, 74; 99 of Ausonius.

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themselves to the church but still carried on retaining some of their old practices and beliefs. Bonner insists on the clear distinction between the paganized Christians and semi-Christians. Despite their weaknesses, paganized Christians were within the circle of the church while semi-Christians remained on the fringe.75 In Bonner’s scheme, the crucial difference between paganized Christians and semi-Christians seems to be not only the acceptance of baptism, but also their differing motives. What makes paganized Christians Christian is their sincerity. One is, however, willing to ask if semi-Christians are then deceitful and dishonest. Not necessarily – at least in their own eyes. Bonner has captured some features of the vagueness of the betwixt-and-between individuals with his term “paganized Christians”. Nevertheless, the weakness of this term is that the Christian element is supposed to be the dominant part. The term semi-Christians also has its serious flaws. The Christian perspective governs the term. Moreover, the ‘semi’-terminology bisects and underrates these unclassifiable individuals. Being Christians did not prevent these people from being pagans; thus, in these cases a pagan did not cease to be a Christian. There need not be anything halfdone, half-finished or incomplete in these in-between figures.76 If we take a closer look at Bonner’s scheme that at first glance seems a four-part classification, we find either a three-part scheme with pagans, semi-Christians and Christians including paganized Christians or virtually a binary model modified with subdivisions: pagans including semi-Christians versus Christians including paganized Christians. The pagan – Christian dichotomy is still there. J.J. O’Donnell’s approach in 1979 was even more innovative. He rejected the traditional division of pagans and Christians and offered an alternative division between tolerant and intolerant attitudes toward religious issues. According to his model ‘paganism’ should not be defined as a religion but as an attitude toward religion and as tolerance of religious plurality. Thus, the dividing line was drawn between those who accepted a plurality of types of cult and those who insisted on the validity of a single form of religion to the exclusion of all others. O’Donnell classified, for example, Emperor Julian as ‘unpagan’ in his religious fanaticism while many Christian intellectuals such as Marius Victorinus and Synesius of Cyrene were ‘pagan’ in their tolerant attitude toward religion. O’Donnell’s inventive model can be perceived as a quadripartite table in which people are divided into the tolerant (‘pagan’) and the intolerant: tolerant pagans, tolerant Christians, intolerant pagans and intolerant Christians. O’Donnell has successfully broken away from the traditional binary opposition between Christians and pagans and introduced other criteria for describing individuals.77 These criteria are probably more appropriate for interpreting the historical circumstances in Late Antiquity. It seems, however, that he has replaced one dichotomy with another: the tolerant (tolerant pagans, tolerant Christians) versus the intolerant (intolerant pagans, intolerant Christians). 75 BONNER 1984, 348–50. 76 GUIGNEBERT 1923, 99 acknowledges that his concept demi-chrétiens is too vague and too rigid and, p. 65, also admits that demi-chrétiens is perhaps not an apposite term for these people because they believed themselves to be integral Christians. 77 O’DONNELL 1979a, 51–7.

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Subversions For he is our peace, he who made both one and broke down the dividing wall of enmity … Ephesians 2:14

In the passage from Ephesians quoted above, the Apostle Paul proclaims that Christ had broken down the dividing wall between the Jews and the Greeks. Thus, the emergence of Christianity was meant to be the Aufhebung of the earlier dichotomous structure. Christ had created the unity of Jews and Hellenes and all the ethnic and cultural differences were wiped out. The Christians were a new entity, tertium genus, outside the division between the Jews and the Greeks.78 However, in fact, the earlier dichotomy was replaced by a new one: the new border was set between Christians and non-Christians. Either one belonged to Christ’s body or was outside. It seems that new dichotomies merely replace older ones. One begins to wonder if we are ever able to escape from thinking in terms of dichotomies, if ‘we’ will be capable of defining our selves without ‘them’, the otherness. Are binary oppositions necessarily negative, hierarchical and oppressive? In the Christian–pagan dichotomy, one of the two terms clearly governs the other, ‘has the upper hand’. The otherness, paganism, was characterized with derogatory terms such as eidololatreia, idolatria, superstitio, iniquitas, insania, error and ignorantia. The pagans were denounced as apistoi, apistountes, asebeis, dyssebeis, atheoi, infideles, impii, increduli, perfidi and iniqui, nescii, caeci, miseri, stulti and infantes. A mere replacement of one dichotomy with another is not enough. Nor is subversion of the hierarchy of a binary opposition sufficient. Inverting the hierarchy, one would only set the oppositional parts in other places and would leave the hierarchical basic structure unchanged. The subversion only reinforces the positions of the oppositional parts. For example, it was a mere subversion that Emperor Julian accomplished in his religious policy in the 360s. Julian aimed at inverting the dichotomous hierarchy Christians–pagans in order to prevent Christians from having the upper hand. In his subversion he only changed the positions of the hierarchy. Therefore, he was not capable of going beyond the horizon of the hierarchical binary opposition. Instead, he only succeeded in catalysing the already existing polarization of the positions of pagans and Christian even further. He introduced into paganism a religious fanaticism untypical for polytheists. Furthermore, one might claim that he brought the pagan–Christian dichotomy into the Greco-Roman religious world. It has been stated that only a former Christian could have conceived of paganism as opposite to Christianity. It is probable that Julian would not have become a polytheist with such a religious zeal if he had not been raised as a Christian.79 After his conversion he turned against Christianity with 78 HECKEL 1994, 280–1; KLEIN 1988, 421–2. Cf. Rom. 10.12. 79 BOWERSOCK 1990, 6, 11. FOWDEN 1998, 547 emphasizes Julian’s zealously ideological approach to his faith that was perhaps part of his Christian heritage. Cf. O’DONNELL 1979a, 52–3 and A.H. ARMSTRONG, ‘The Way and the Ways: Religious Tolerance and Intolerance in the Fourth Century A.D.’, VC 38 (1984), 1–17: 7.

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the fervour of a recent convert, thus being an illustrative example of the play of differences in Late Antiquity. Even as a pagan he was more Christian than Christians themselves. In his religious zeal he bears a resemblance to Christian apologists rather than to his contemporary pagans while Christian intellectuals such as Synesius of Cyrene and Gregory of Nazianzus are reminiscent of pagan philosophers. Incerti on the move In the attempt to go beyond the horizon of dichotomous structures it is essential to become conscious of the interdependence of the parts of a binary opposition. The one side needs and includes its opposite side because the self cannot be conceptually defined without the other.80 The concepts of Christian and pagan are similarly interdependent. In fact, they are one. Christian includes non-Christian (pagan) and therefore, Christians cannot be defined without a conceptual opposite, that is, nonChristians (pagans).81 As we have discussed above, there was no such concept as ‘pagan’ or ‘paganism’ before Christianity. As Christians construed themselves as Christians, they also invented pagans. Christian apologetic and polemical texts show how the knowledge of the other is necessary for understanding oneself and vice versa. The other provides a medium through which the self can see and test its limits. In a binary opposition neither part has its own independent identity without the other one: thus, there could not have been Christians without pagans. The one part of a binary opposition fundamentally contaminates the other; therefore, the Christian is necessarily infected by the pagan and vice versa. In Emperor Julian, for example, the pagan and the Christian were entangled in each other: the paganism advocated by Julian had been touched by contemporary Christianity. Thus, we see the pagan and the Christian intimately intertwined with each other. Christian iconography had influenced the fourth-century pagan art even as Christian iconography had been influenced by the pagan.82 We observe that the fixed antithesis of pagan and Christian begins to fracture within the texts and images themselves. This applies to other dichotomies elaborated in Christian polemics such as light vs. darkness, the city of God vs. the terrestrial city, truth vs. falsehood and superstition vs. true religion. These parts of hierarchical oppositional pairs cannot be understood without each other; the city of God and the terrestrial city cannot exist independently without each other. They are in need of each other. In this kind of deconstructive reading of texts, the supposed differences begin to flow and become obscured. A new concept emerges and cancels the earlier conceptual hierarchy of a binary opposition. The differences between the other and 80 Cf., e.g., J. DERRIDA, L’écriture et la différance, Paris 1967, 431: “L’autre est dans le même”. 81 In the pagan–Christian dichotomy, the conventional contrariété (e.g., black vs. white) has replaced the logical contradiction (e.g., black vs. non-black). Cf. A.J. GREIMAS, ‘Pour une théorie des modalites’, Langages 43 (1976), 90–107. 82 BOWERSOCK 1990, 26, 33 gives an example of the mosaic of Apamea that could be interpreted either as a non-Christian depiction of Socrates and the seven sages or as a Christian portrayal of Jesus with his disciples.

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the same are never resolved by an ultimate synthesis. Instead, a new concept keeps a certain indeterminacy, a double and contradictory value, in a play of differences, or dialectics without synthesis. Thus, the Christian and the pagan are inseparable in individuals and even the most convinced Christian hardliners are forced to bear both parts interwoven in themselves during their lifetime. Consequently, in order to demonstrate the impossibility of strict dichotomies I have conceived a new concept, incerti.83 As a double entendre incerti refers to those unclassifiable and indefinable individuals who appear in the grey area between hard-line polytheism and hard-line Christianity in Late Antiquity and who elude the rigid pagan–Christian dichotomy. First, the term describes the state of uncertainty – incertitudo – on the mental level of individuals. Second, it draws into consideration the inflexibility of classifications and the conceptual violence done to individuals by hierarchies. Incerti is a concept reminiscent of the term hybrid. Hybrids do not fit in the symmetrical model of the world where the self and the other are defined dualistically in terms of either – or. Instead, hybrids are understood in terms of both – and, confusing the order of the world based on symbolic borders and questioning clearly defined demarcation lines.84 We could describe incerti as being conceptually indeterminant and undecidable. They are both-this-and-that and neither-this-nor-that at the same time. An incerta or incertus person does not cease being a pagan but she or he does not cease to a Christian either. Becoming a Christian did not stop an incerta/incertus from continuing to be a pagan and vice versa. Thus, there is no clear-cut choice between the two. Furthermore, incerti is not plainly a tertium quid that mediates the other and the same. Therefore, it would be fallacious to outline a tripartite model where incerti would be set between Christian and pagan. Instead, the concept functions as an undecidable between. Neither should we interpret incerti as a sort of synthesis, that is, something new that is born from two opposing elements. Instead, incerti could be characterized as a constant movement between the opposites. Zeno of Verona describes appositely this paradox of incerti in his complaint of vague and deceitful Christians (ambiguos utique Christianos … ac lubricos). Among the pious and impious they are in the middle and take neither part completely because they do not cease to take both parts. They are not believers since they have brought something of their infidelity with them. However, they are not non-believers either because they have a vision of the Christian faith. They want to know the law of Christ but they do not want to obey its rules. They worship the salutary sign of Christ and, still, they have not given up the mysteries of demons, that is, the pagan Gods.85 83 The concept incerti is also discussed in KAHLOS 2004, 5–24. 84 Cf. hybrids in modern research on identities, e.g., S. HALL, ‘The Spectacle of the ‘other’’, Representation. Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, London 1997, 223–79: 236 who writes of hybrids, such as mulattoes who are neither ‘white’ nor ‘black’ but float ambiguously in some unstable, dangerous, hybrid zone of indeterminacy in between. 85 ZENO 1.35.2 Löfstedt: Ambiguos utique Christianos designavit ac lubricos, qui inter pios impiosque sint medii nullam partem tenentes ad plenum, cum utramque tenere non desinunt. Fideles non sunt, quia habent aliquid infidelitatis insertum; infideles non sunt, quia habent imaginem fidei, professione deo, factis saeculo servientes. Volunt nosse legem, nolunt eius praecepta servare. Signum salutare venerantur et tamen a mysteriis daemonum

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Historical research is usually based on the presupposition that historical subjects fit into a model of anachronistic and limited rationality.86 Historical subjects are usually presupposed to act and behave with clear insight, motives and aims. Even in the well-documented case of Augustine of Hippo, wanderings, doubts and Angst are supposed to belong to the life before fundamental and final conversion and the church father after his conversion is assumed to have become a completed personality with a determined Christian conviction and with thought evolving into a plausible system of ideas. It is Augustine himself who advocates the idea of a fundamental and final conversion in his Confessiones. This harmonizing view is criticized by, for example, O’Donnell, who questions the supposedly single fixed unity of a historical subject and instead proposes the multiplicity of historical, prismatically separable, Augustines.87 Thus, the recent scholarship has paid more attention to these complexities and uncertainties of the individuals of Late Antiquity and aimed at understanding them, not only as figures in constant change, but also as individuals observed in various lights – ambiguous, inconsistent personalities that do not fit into clear categories created for reasons of convenience.88 To take another example, the interpretations of wall paintings in the hypogeum in Via Latina illustrate the categories into which the modern research has attempted to squeeze late antique individuals. Scholars have often explained the mixture of Christian and pagan iconography as combined burials of both actual Christians and actual pagans in the same hypogeum.89 This view is based on the assumption that the non recedunt. The word lubricus has connotations of slippery, slimy, uncertain, hazardous and elusive. 86 G. LEVI, ‘Les usages de la biographie’, Annales 44 (1989), 1325–36: 1326 introduced this term, questioning the possibility of classifying historical subjects into clear categories and the tendency to construct narratives with stable and coherent personalities. 87 For the complexities of Augustine’ conversion narrative, see P. FREDRIKSEN, ‘Paul and Augustine: Conversion Narratives, Orthodox Traditions and the Retrospective Self’, JThS 37 (1986), 3–34. Augustine’s ambiguities are stressed by C. HARRISON, Augustine. Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity, Oxford 2000 and O’DONNELL 1979a, 63–4 who points out that Augustine was more a typical late antique pagan – although not in the traditional sense of the word – than scholars have admitted him to be and calls him a spiritual drifter. Cf. J.J. O’DONNELL, ‘Next Life of Augustine’, The Limits of Ancient Christianity, Ann Arbor 1999, 215–31: 229. 88 GUIGNEBERT 1923, 98 already realized that Ausonius’ discrepancies need not be harmonized: “C’était un païen et même un bon païen; un indifférent; un chrétien tiède et même un mauvais chrétien; un bon chrétien”. 89 E.g., A. FERRUA, Le pitture della nuova catacomba di Via Latina, Città del Vaticano 1960, 94 insisted upon individuals “senza alcuna mescolanza” but H.-I. Marrou, ‘Une catacombe pagano-chrétienne découverte à Rome’, Bulletin de la Société nationale Antiquaires de France 1956, 77–81: 81 speaks at least of the catacomb with “caractère mixte, chrétien et païen à la fois”. J. ELSNER, ‘Art and architecture’, CAH XIII, Cambridge 1998, 736–61: 750–51 criticizes the “rigid insistence on a simple correspondence of iconography and doctrine” and calls in question the assumption that a pagan image necessarily refers to a pagan belief and a Christian image to a ‘real’ Christian. Cf. L. KÖTZSCHE–BREITENBRUCH, Die neue Katakombe an der Via Latina in Rom, Münster 1976, 12 who leaves the issue of the religious adherence unanswered.

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individuals buried in the hypogeum are straightforward and coherent unitary wholes in their religious beliefs. According to this simplification, a Christian wanted to be buried in a room filled with decoration exclusively of Christian iconography and averted pagan themes. This view fails to take into account the fact that various persons had different standards: people of the same era and the same community and even the same single person could have had varying standards and different ways of outlining reality. In their writings the Christian opinion leaders formulate a much more severe standard for Christian life than the majority of Christians probably professed. Transitional periods in history nourish ambiguous situations. In the lives of incerti, ambiguity often ceases to be a mere transition and becomes a set way of life, a permanent state of affairs.90 There prevailed an area of ambiguity in Alexandria and its surroundings at the turn of the fifth century and there were individuals who did not care to draw sharp borderlines in religious issues. Cyril of Alexandria refers to these people in his tractate Against Julian. In fact, Cyril’s refutation of Julian’s Against Galileans is due to the threat that he and other Christian hard-liners recognized in these compromising people. The attack of Christian monks against the philosopher Hypatia in 415 probably was a part of the reactions of the extremists against not only paganism as such, but also the ambiguous situation and the incerti people.91 In the fourth-century literature we find areas of vagueness where categorizing between pagan and Christian is inadequate. A part of this ambiguity is unconscious, but a part of it is studied and deliberate. An intentional ambiguity appears in Themistius’ speeches where he referred to the supreme deity in such general terms that listeners might interpret the referred divinity according to their own religious ideas.92 There are several references to moments of transition, uncertainty and hesitation in church fathers’ writings, for example, in Augustine’s correspondence with Marcellinus and Volusianus.93 In a letter to Augustine, Volusianus refers to the 90 In anthropology this phenomenon has been interpreted with the term liminality and the people on the threshold with the term liminaries: V. TURNER, ‘Variations on a theme of liminality’, Secular ritual, Assen 1977, 36–52: 37 describes liminality as “the state and process of mid-transition” and characterizes liminaries, who evade ordinary cognitive classification, as paradoxically being neither-this-nor-that as well as both-this-and-that. Liminaries are also regarded as ‘polluting’ by the community because they transgress boundaries. 91 CYR. c. Iul. praef. 4.20. FOWDEN 1998, 556; G. HUBER-REBENICH – M. CHRONZ, ‘Cyrill von Alexandrien. Ein Forschungsvorhaben’, Heiden und Christen im 5. Jahrhundert, Leuven 1998, 66–87: 69–72. 92 The same applies to the fourth-century Latin panegyrists (e.g., PANEG. 9(12).26.1; 9(12).2.4–5). W. LIEBESCHUETZ, Continuity and Change in Roman Religion, Oxford 1979, 286. AVERIL CAMERON, ‘Constantinus Christianus’, JRS 73 (1983), 184–90: 189 points out that, in addition to this studied ambiguity, there remained much genuine ambiguity. 93 Rufius Antonius Agrypnius Volusianus (382–437) was a praefectus urbi 417–418 and praefectus praetorio Italiae et Africae in 428–429 (Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire II, Rome 2000, ‘Volusianus 1’, 2340–41; PLRE II, ‘Volusianus 6’, 1184–5). A. CHASTAGNOL, ‘Le sénateur Volusien et la conversion d’une famille romaine au Bas-Empire’, REA 58 (1956), 251–62: 252 and A. FRASCHETTI, ‘Trent’anni dopo “Il conflitto fra paganesimo e cristianesimo nel secolo IV”’, Pagani e cristiani da Giuliano l’Apostata al sacco di Roma, Messina 1995, 5–14: 6 identify Volusianus with Antonius, the target of the Pseudo-Paulinian Poema ultimum. Flavius Marcellinus was a tribunus and notarius, younger brother of Apringius, proconsul of

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doubts of a participant in a discussion within his circle as “the doubts in which I am entangled” (ambigua, in quibus haereo). Who could give firmness to the hesitating faculties (dubiosque adsensus meos) of the interlocutor? In a letter to Augustine, Marcellinus refers to Volusianus’ doubts and asks Augustine to clarify all doubtful matters that Volusianus had in mind (omne … quod habere potest, insinuasset ambiguum). Marcellinus describes Volusianus as a person with somewhat wavering footsteps (hominis gressus aliquanto titubantes) that Augustine had intervened to sustain and strengthen.94 The expressions of hesitation and uncertainty are frequent in Christian literature. It is often the pagan practices or pagan arguments against Christianity that cause uncertainty. Ambrose impresses on Emperor Valentinian II’s mind that he must not be ambiguous but rather certain in his faith: Itaque non fidei tuae ambiguus, sed providus cautionis, et pii certus examinis. Augustine stresses that a strong brother (firmus) should support his weak brother (infirmus) who is easily seduced by pagan sacrificial meals.95 Christian writers often refer to these moments of uncertainty and vagueness as perilous. An individual on the edge is in a transitional stage in which she or he does not seem to belong anywhere. From the viewpoint of the Christian opinion leader, a person in a transitional stage is in constant danger of falling back to paganism. Nevertheless, it is also from this moment of uncertainty that the conversion to Christianity may occur and certainty and clarity arise thereafter. The word incertus actually appears in a polemical poem Carmen ad Antonium by Pseudo-Paulinus, where the anonymous writer describes the feeling of uncertainty or indecisiveness and contraposes it with the state of lucidity and clarity after the conversion. He tells us that he had been uncertain for a long time and had been tossed by many a storm but then he had seen the clear light and had been saved in the harbour of the holy church.96

Africa. Marcellinus and his brother were charged and put to death during a revolt of Heraclian in 413. Augustine dedicated to him the two first books of De civitate Dei as well as other writings. PLRE II, ‘Fl. Marcellinus’ 10, 711–12; J. MATTHEWS, Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court AD 364–425, Oxford 1975, 353; W. ENSSLIN, ‘Marcellinus 23’, RE XIV, Stuttgart 1930, 1445–6; P. BROWN, Augustine of Hippo, London 1967, 337. 94 VOLVS. Aug. ep. 135.2. Volusianus may refer indirectly to his own doubts concerning Christianity – possibly in an ironical manner. MARCELL. Aug. ep. 136.1. See the discussion in Chapter 3. 95 AMBR. ep. 18.2 (= ep. 73, CSEL 82.3); AVG. serm. 62.4.7; 62.6.9–10. 96 PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 152–4: Haec ego cuncta prius, clarum quam lumen adeptus, / meque diu incertum et tot tempestatibus actum / sancta salutari suscepit eclesia portu ... Pseudo-Paulinus’ words are a clear reminiscence of Cyprian’s description (ad Donat. 3) of the spiritual state before the conversion. Darkness and obscurity (in tenebris atque in nocte caeca) are stressed as are the wavering, hesitation, ignorance and alienation from the truth and the light (nutabundus ac dubius … nescius, veritatis ac lucis alienus).

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Divided Loyalties or the Necessity of Choice? Said Myrtias (a Syrian student in Alexandria during the reign of Emperor Constans and Emperor Constantius in part a pagan, in part a Christianizer) … C.P. CAVAFY, ‘Dangerous Thoughts’ v. 1–3 (Collected Poems, ed. G. Savidis, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

Christian opinion leaders insisted on making a choice between Christianity and paganism. Nevertheless, the reactions to the demands of the church fathers varied. Some persons distressed themselves when, for example, participating in the festivals of the community condemned by church fathers whereas others could not or did not want to make an absolute choice between the pagan and the Christian.97 The reactions of the same individuals even fluctuated according to the circumstances. The writings of the fourth- and fifth-century bishops are filled with the complaints of the divided loyalties of their parishioners. There were individuals, incerti, who did not regard pagan and Christian as mutually exclusive options or did not want to see pagans and Christians as opponents in a bipolarized conflict as church fathers attempted to teach them. For every individual brought up in the world of Greco-Roman polytheistic religions it was not possible to comprehend such fundamental and exclusive religious commitments as Christianity required.98 We could state that the old and the new persisted “side-by-side, logically incompatible, but contemporaneously accepted by different individuals or even by the same individual”, and that it was “perfectly possible for a man to live in both worlds at once without discomfort”.99 Incerti people do not usually emerge from the sources with their own voices. Instead, they appear in the complaints of ecclesiastical writers, bishops and other opinion leaders. The same authors, who sharpened or even constructed the dichotomy between Christians and pagans and insisted upon a decision between these two options, also disapproved of those who did not fit into their categories and did not make this choice. Thus, incerti led a double life because, in the eyes of the church leaders, there were no alternative routes available. For example, Petrus Chrysologus demanded that his parishioners had to break with pagan feasts and spectacles. Either a Christian joined the pagans or followed Christ. “He who has been willing 97 The issue of choice is discussed by BEARD – NORTH – PRICE 1998, 377–8; FOWDEN 1998, 542; K. SHELTON, The Esquiline Treasure, London 1981, 65 and ATHANASSIADI 1981, 28–29. VINZENT 1998, 51, reporting on fifth-century Christians who wrote hymns to Nile as a divinity, remarks: ”Es gab eben eine nicht geringe Zahl von denjenigen, die … an die christliche Wahrheit glaubten, ohne dass sie aufhörten, ‘auch an die Wahrheit des Heidentums zu glauben’”. 98 For the Greco-Roman religious world, see NORTH 1992, 178 who emphasizes the lack of exclusive choices of religion. For an individual brought up as a Christian (as Emperor Julian) the choice was understandable. 99 The words are of E.R. DODDS, The Greeks and the irrational, Berkeley 1951, 179 and ALAN CAMERON, ‘The empress and the poet: paganism and politics at the court of Theodosius II’, Later Greek Literature, Cambridge 1982, 217–89: 246.

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to joke with the devil will not be able to rejoice with Christ”, Petrus Chrysologus asserts. “No one plays with a serpent without danger, and no one jokes with the devil unpunished with the devil.” Salvian similarly insists upon the choice, complaining of Christians who continued to visit pagan shrines, and quotes the Apostle Paul: Non potestis calicem domini bibere et calicem daemoniorum.100 Ambrose’s complaint of Roman senators reveals a group of incerti that he despises as Christians in name only, aliqui nomine Christiani. The aspect of incerti sets the well-known dispute on whether Christians or pagans formed the majority in the Roman senate during the dispute on the altar of Victory in 384 in a new light.101 Posing the problem in a Christian–pagan axis perspective might be misleading because there were individuals who could be classified into both camps or into neither camp. One could even claim that it was incerti who were unquestionably the majority in the senate in 384! Augustine mourns over double-hearted (duplici corde) Christians. They fall back daily on seeking pagan remedies when they or their relatives get sick. The bishop stresses that a Christian who resorts to pagan practices has received the sign of the devil and lost the sign of Christ even though he defends himself, claiming that he has not lost the sign of Christ. Augustine insists upon the choice between the signs, accentuating that a Christian cannot have both signs at the same time. “Christ does not desire community of ownership”, the bishop asserts, “but he desires to possess alone what he has purchased” (non vult Christus communionem, sed solus vult

100 PETR. CHRYS. serm. 155.5. SALV. gub. 8.13–14 (quoting 1 Cor 10:20). Correspondingly, TERT. spect. 20.2 insisted upon the decision, condemning Christians who continued to participate in Roman spectacles as suaviludii. TERT. scorp. 1 also called them ‘Christians in the air’ (plerosque in ventum et si placuerit christianos). The grey area of urban celebration is discussed in Chapter 5. 101 AMBR. ep. 17.8 (= ep. 72, CSEL 82.3). The religious adherence of the Roman senate has been a much-disputed issue in the studies of Late Antiquity. MATTHEWS 1975, 206; CRACCO RUGGINI 1979a, 141 and G. CLEMENTE, ‘Cristianesimo e classi dirigenti prima e dopo Costantino’, Mondo classico e cristianesimo, Roma 1982, 51–64: 63 assert that Christians were in the majority in 384 while S. MAZZARINO, Antico, tardoantico ed èra costantiana I, Bari 1974, 391–3, R. KLEIN, Das frühe Christentum in römischen Staat, Darmstadt 1971, 124 and A. DEMANDT, Die Spätantike, München 1989, 287 believe that pagans had the majority as late as 394–95. AVG. conf. 8.2.3 wrote of the pagan majority in the 350s: sacrilegiorumque particeps, quibus tunc tota fere Romana nobilitas inflata spirabat. AMBR. ep. 17.9–10; 18.8 (= ep. 72–3, CSEL 82.3) maintained that pagans were not a majority in 384 but admits that pagan senators exerted a remarkable influence on many of their Christian fellow senators. A.H.M. JONES, ‘The Social Background of the Struggle between Paganism and Christianity’, The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, Oxford 1963, 17– 37: 31–2 has pointed out that the rival propaganda of the pagan and Christian sides hides the actual circumstances. It is obvious that the information we get is biased. In support of Ambrose’s claim, P. HEATHER, ‘Senators and senates’, CAH XIII, Cambridge 1998, 184–210: 199 points out that Symmachus nowhere claimed the opposite. I do not find this argument ex silentio particularly convincing. Ambrose’s letters are an answer to Symmachus but we do not have knowledge of Symmachus’ possible replies to Ambrose. If Symmachus continued this dispute, no sources are extant.

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possidere quod emit). The wretched double-hearted in their hearts gave part to God and part to the devil.102 The gap between pronouncement and practice seemed wide because the views of ecclesiastical leaders about what belonged and did not belong to Christian life differed to a great extent. Maximus, the bishop of Turin, speaks of many Christians who after having accepted the Christian faith were still involved in their previous vanities (prioribus vanitatibus involvuntur), taking part in the celebration of Christmas but also in the pagan New Year festivities. Thus, they received the blessing of the Christian God with us but at the same time they observed superstitious omens with them.103 The both-this-and-that and neither-this-nor-that character of incerti is also revealed in Gelasius’ dispute with Roman senators in fifth century Rome. In a letter to a Roman aristocrat, the bishop of Rome makes it clear that Christians cannot participate in the celebration of the Lupercalia. Christian aristocrats had wished to continue the ageold celebration but Gelasius stresses no baptized person, no Christian, is to celebrate the feast because it belongs only to pagans. Again, a choice between the two must be made. Quoting the Apostle Paul, Gelasius maintains that a Christian cannot partake of both the Lord’s table and of the table of demons, that one cannot drink the Lord’s cup and the cup of demons. For what partnership do righteousness and lawlessness have or what fellowship does light have with darkness? Christian aristocrats should decide who they really are. Gelasius impresses on their minds that they fix their steps firmly (figite gradum). They should either celebrate the pagan rites entirely as pagans or give them up. Gelasius calls the aristocrats who backed the Lupercalia as non-Christians and non-pagans (nec Christiani nec pagani).104 After a conversion or shift towards Christianity, pagan and Christian continued side by side in the life of an individual. Christian hardliners complained of people who became Christian and still remained pagans. The ecclesiastical historian Philostorgius reports on pagans who came into the church in Berytus, professing Christianity and imitating Christians. They resembled Christians but lived like pagans.105 It depended on the observer into which category these people were forced. 102 AVG. in ep. Ioh. 7.7. Augustine’s double-hearted resemble the people who – according to the writer of the Shepherd of Hermas (vis. 3.7) have abandoned the true path because of their double-mindedness (apo tes dipsychias). 103 MAX. TAVR. 61c.4. 104 GELAS. ep. 100.30 (CSEL 35, p. 463): Postremo, quod ad me pertinet, nullus baptizatus, nullus Christianus hoc celebret et soli hoc pagani, quorum ritus est, exsequantur; 100.9; 100.19: Dicite nobis, nec Christiani nec pagani, ubique perfidi nusquam fideles, ubique corrupti nusquam integri. The writer is usually identified with Gelasius, sometimes with bishop Felix III. Gelasius’ letter is analyzed by G. POMARÈS, Gélase Ier, Lettre contre les Lupercales, Paris 1965, 20–51. Gelasius’ incerti are also discussed in KAHLOS 2005, 481–3. 105 PHILOST. eccl. 23. These people bore a resemblance to Christians as much as the Samaritans resembled the Jews. Another, though highly unreliable, account of the mixture of religions, appears in Historia Augusta (v. FIRMI – SATURNINI – PROCULI – BONOSI 8 of the circumstances in third-century Alexandria): Illic qui Serapem colunt christiani sunt, et devoti sunt Serapi qui se Christi episcopos dicunt. … Ipse ille patriarcha cum Aegyptum venerit, ab aliis Serapidem adorare, ab aliis cogitur Christum. Even if the account is imaginary, it would reveal what the late fourth or early fifth century writer wishes to bring forth.

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From a pagan viewpoint, for example, in the rhetor Libanius’ opinion, they were pagans who, despite their changeover to Christianity, deep in their hearts remained pagans. Church fathers speak of weak brothers who fall back into pagan practices.106 Church councils report that even after baptism people continued to frequent pagan temples and take part in pagan ceremonies. Bishop of Rome Leo, when criticizing Christians for worshipping Sol, explains that people persisted with the practice, partly because of ignorance and partly because of the spirit of paganism (partim ignorantiae vitio, partim paganitatis spiritu). Thus, Leo sees the perseverance as both unconscious and conscious activity. Augustine speaks of Christians who returned in usus privatos, that is, to private religious use, cult objects that had been robbed from demolished shrines. He also makes a mention of Christians who joined pagans in destroying churches.107 Leading a Double Life Incerti people were accused of leading double life. Several church councils discussed the issue of baptized Christians who functioned as pagan priests such as flamines and therefore took part in pagan practices, making sacrifices and organizing spectacles, either gladiatorial games or theatrical performances. In the early fourth century the council of Elvira forbade Christians to make sacrifices and decreed punishments for those who still continued pagan practices.108 This forced Christians who had pressures to function as priests of local communities into an uncomfortable position.109 106 LIBAN. or. 30.28. AVG. serm. 24 and 62 make a distinction between strong and weak brothers. 107 E.g., Concilium Valentinum (in 374), can. 3 (CCSL 148, p. 39); LEO M. serm. 27.3–4; AVG. ep. 47.3; 101. 108 Concilium Eliberitanum (c. 305), can. 2–4; cf. Concilium Ancyranum (in 314), can. 24. MARKSCHIES, Zwischen den Welten wandern, Frankfurt 1997, 67. 109 Christians of distinguished social status are known to have functioned as priests such as flamen perpetuus and sacerdotalis provinciae throughout the fourth to sixth centuries; e.g., Astius Vindicianus (CIL VIII 450; PLRE I, ‘Vindicianus 3’, 968; A. CHASTAGNOL – N. DUVAL, ‘Les survivances du culte impérial dans l’Afrique du Nord à l’époque vandale’, Mélanges d’histoire ancienne offerts à William Seston, Paris 1974, 87–118: 95–7, n. 2; late fourth or early fifth century) and Astius Mustelus (CIL VIII 10516 and 11528; CHASTAGNOL – DUVAL 1974, 97–100, n. 3; in 525–26) were flamines perpetui of the Roman civic religion. Other examples are listed in CHASTAGNOL – DUVAL 1974, 100–105. The fourth century imperial legislation did not forbid Christians to hold priesthoods of the Roman civic religion; on the contrary, it was in the emperors’ interest to keep local priesthoods functioning since the flamines continued to organize games in honour of emperors. Cf. CTh 12.1.112 in 386 on Christians holding Roman civic priesthoods. It has been remarked (CHASTAGNOL – DUVAL 1974, 110; C. LEPELLEY, ‘Le lieu des valeurs communes. La cité terrain neutre entre païens et chrétiens dans l’Afrique romaine tardive’, Idéologies et valeurs civiques dans le Monde Romain, Paris 2002a, 271–85: 276–7) that the flamen title was secularized and had lost its religious significance, being now purely a political institution. However, it is impossible to distinguish between political and religious aspects in Roman civic religion and particularly in the imperial cult. Furthermore, CHASTAGNOL – DUVAL 1974, 110 admit that there is a pagan atmosphere in the above-referenced

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In Augustine’s correspondence, there are several individuals who can be described as incerti. One of them is Firmus, a catechumen, who postponed his baptism because he did not feel ready to embrace Christianity entirely. Augustine persuades him to stop hesitating to take the final step and urges him to accept baptism.110 Firmus was not the only one to postpone his baptism because of personal uncertainty. In the fourth century the catechumenate often extended to a relatively long period, sometimes until the moment of death.111 Volusianus is another incertus notable whom Augustine sets out to persuade to embrace Christianity. He was raised as a pagan in the aristocratic family of the Caeionii that consisted of both pagans and Christians.112 He showed some interest in Christianity and corresponded with Augustine who tried to convince him by explaining problems of the Christian doctrine. Despite the united attempts of his Christian mother, his friend Marcellinus and Augustine, Volusianus did not embrace Christianity and take baptism until his deathbed in 437, persuaded by his niece Melania the Younger. Augustine’s Christian friend Marcellinus is connected with Augustine’s correspondence with Volusianus. It is Marcellinus that begs the church father to clarify the doctrinal problems, not only to Volusianus, but also to Marcellinus who thus emerges as an incertus as well.113 Another intellectual incertus is Iovius, a correspondent of Paulinus of Nola and an addressee of carmen 22.114 Paulinus’ letter and poem reveal that he was an aristocrat who took an interest in philosophy and literature and wrote poetry. Paulinus states that he had been told that Iovius was eager to be called a Christian. Scholars have been puzzled by Iovius’ religious allegiance, that is, whether he should be classified as a baptized Christian,

North African inscriptions and that the above-mentioned Astius Mustelus wanted to stress being a flamen perpetuus Christianus. Thus, he needed to emphasize his Christian background because the priesthood implied another kind of religious adherence. 110 AVG. ep. Divjak 1A and 2 (= 212A and 272). The Firmus in these letters has been mistakenly identified with a presbyter Firmus, Augustine’s literary agent in Carthage. Correct identification in VAN OORT 1991, 172–3; BROWN 1998, 658 and S. MRATSCHEK, Der Briefwechsel des Paulinus von Nola, Göttingen 2002, 473. See also Chapter 3. 111 BONNER 1984, 350–51 connects the tendency to lengthen the duration of the catechumenate to the increasing number of semi-Christians (as he calls them). Postponing the baptism: e.g., AVG. conf. 1.11; 8.2. 112 AVG. ep. 135–8. Volusianus’ mother, sister Albina and niece Melania the Younger were Christians whereas Volusianus’ father Rufius Albinus and grandfather C. Caeionius Rufius Volusianus were pagans. CHASTAGNOL 1956; MATTHEWS 1975, 353; O’DONNELL 1979a, 62; P. BROWN, ‘Aspects of the Christianization of the Roman Aristocracy’, JRS 51 (1961), 1–11: 7. 113 Vita Melaniae Iunioris 55; AVG. ep. 137–8. 114 PAVL. NOL. ep. 16 and carm. 22 (dated around 400). Iovius is probably not known from elsewhere (although may be identified with a Iovius, a legate of usurpator Constantine III in 409: MRATSCHEK 2002, 628). W. ERDT, Christentum und heidnisch-antike Bildung bei Paulin von Nola, Mannheim 1976, 267–72 is inclined to think that the letter and poem were written and sent to Iovius at the same time because the carmen is a supplement to the letter. F.G. SIRNA, ‘Sul cosidetto ”poema ultimum” Ps.-Paoliniano’, Aevum 35 (1961), 87–106 regarded Iovius as the writer of the Pseudo-Paulinian Poema ultimum. The case of Iovius is discussed further in Chapter 3.

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a catechumen, a reluctant Christian, a paganizing Christian, or a pagan interested in Christianity.115 For intellectuals it was often particularly hard to recognize clear differences between pagans and Christians (and Jews for that matter). There prevailed “a vigorous public culture that polytheists, Jews and Christians alike could share” within the intellectual élite of the Empire.116 Despite many differences, they shared a common vision of the cosmic order governed by divine forces and this worldview was articulated primarily in Platonic terms. I have already mentioned Emperor Julian as an example of the play of differences in which no one really is what she or he appears. The same applies to such Christian thinkers as Synesius of Cyrene and Marius Victorinus. As an ambivalent person, Synesius has challenged modern scholars to deliberate on his religious adherence. He regarded himself as a representative of Hellenism in the sense of Greek culture and as a disciple of Hypatia of Alexandria he embraced Platonic philosophy. Synesius became the bishop of Ptolemais but before accepting the consecration he attached as a condition to his acceptance of the bishopric the right to take three Neoplatonic principles with him into his Christian faith. Moreover, unlike many contemporary Christian leaders, he showed a considerable lack of concern for details of Christian doctrine.117 Was Synesius Christian before he became bishop of Ptolemais and did he remain a Hellene after his conversion? A. Garzya has grasped something of the undecidable situation and incertitudo of Synesius since, when discussing the question whether Hellenism was primary and Christianity only secondary for the bishop, he remarks that the arguments concerning Synesius’s spiritual adherence are either reversible or annulled and speaks of his ambivalence. Despite their differences the two worlds were equally legitimate for Synesius; he did not draw a borderline between the old and the new

115 PAVL. NOL. ep. 16.1: cum certe studiosus Christiani nominis … docearis. MRATSCHEK 2002, 171, 294 and P.G. WALSH, Letters of Paulinus of Nola I, Westminster 1967, 8 label Iovius as a pagan while R.P.H. GREEN, ‘Paulinus of Nola and the Diction of Christian Latin Poetry’, Latomus 32 (1973), 79–85: 84 regard him as a Christian, “albeit one with intellectual difficulties”. ERDT 1976, 10–11 perceives Iovius in dichotomous terms, “… er einerseits noch ziemlich stark heidnischem Denken verhaftet ist, andererseits aber für das Christentum ein besonderes Interesse hegt …”, but admits that the case cannot be solved. According to M. SKEB, Einleitung, Paulinus von Nola, Epistulae – Briefe I, Freiburg 1998, 9–113: 80, Iovius sympathized with Paulinus’ ascetic way of life but his interest in Christianity was intellectual at most. 116 The words of BROWN 1998, 652. See also BARCELÒ 1992, 177–9, 184, 189; CLEMENTE 1982, 63; MARKUS 1990a, 12, 22. 117 E.g., C. LACOMBRADE, Synésios de Cyrène, Hellène et chrétien, Paris 1951 analyzed Synesius’ life as a development from paganism to Christianity; J. COMAN, ‘Synésius de Cyrène fut-il un converti véritable?’, Augustinianum 27 (1987), 237–45: 245 interprets him as a sincere convert. MARROU 1963, 141–2 calls him a half-hearted Christian and stresses the importance of breaking away from the antithesis Hellenism vs. Christianity; ATHANASSIADI 1981, 28–9 mentions Synesius as an example of complex figures who stood mid-way between Hellenism and Christianity; O’DONNELL 1979a, 60 pays attention to the extent and depth of his ambivalences. MACMULLEN 1984, 53 states that Synesius was not really a Christian.

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in his conversion. In Garzya’s words, there was “la consapevolezza d’una sintesi irrisolta o dell’impossibilità d’una scelta”.118 Pagan philosophy and Christian theology are mixed in Synesius in such a way that it would be useless to try to clarify this concoction. Therefore, it is irrelevant to ask whether Synesius was a Christian or whether he remained a Hellene because there probably was no such distinction for Synesius himself. Platonic and Christian elements were intertwined in him. Garzya’s description of Synesius as speaking as a Christian whose texts are woven with Neoplatonic reminiscences could be cast the other way round; thus, Synesius could be seen as a Hellene whose texts are woven with Christian reminiscences.119 The Roman rhetor and philosopher Marius Victorinus is another illustrative example of an incertus who did not see an explicit choice as necessary. Augustine’s Confessions describes Marius Victorinus’ famous conversion and public confession of Christian faith after a long hesitation. On one hand, according to Augustine, Marius Victorinus tried to avoid a public confession of faith because he did not want to offend his pagan friends. On the other hand, he regarded himself already a Christian, with the words noveris me iam esse christianum, and replied to his Christian friend Simplicianus, who insisted upon a more apparent choice and a more visible commitment to the Christian church, by asking him whether it was the walls that made people Christians.120 Late antique poets such as Ausonius, Claudian and Nonnus of Panopolis have puzzled modern scholars with their ambiguity. Pagan and Christian elements have been observed as being entangled with each other in the writings of these authors and scholars have tried to label these poets either Christian or pagan, with the presupposition that an author’s Christian conviction should be manifest in his writings or that pagan motifs should be absent from a Christian writer’s works. Claudian, for example, obviously wanted to be regarded as a Christian even though 118 A. GARZYA, ‘Una testimonianza fra due mondi: Sinesio di Cirene’, Pagani e cristiani da Giuliano l’Apostata al sacco di Roma, Messina 1995, 141–8: 141, 146–7. E.g., SYNES. ep. 66(67) declares that he felt he was a sinful learned outside the church and that he had been formed spiritually in a diverse manner. SYNES. ep. 105 is illustrative of Synesius’ awareness of his unresolved synthesis. 119 GARZYA 1995, 143–6. Similarly, BOWERSOCK 1990, 67 describes a sixth-century writer, Dioscorus of Aphrodito, as blending and weaving pagan and Christian elements into a fabric that was intricate but whole. Nevertheless, despite realizing Synesius’ unresolved synthesis, Garzya seems to treat Platonic and Christian elements in the bishop as if these elements were distinguishable. Cf. F. TINNEFELD, ‘Synesios von Kyrene: Philosophie der Freude und Leidensbewältigung, Studien zur Literatur der Spätantike, Bonn 1975, 139–79: 141, who claims that Synesius’ meditation of the divine is characterized by, not Christian, but Neoplatonic thinking. 120 AVG. conf. 8.2. BONNER 1984, 350 regards him as the archetype of the semi-Christian “torn between two irreconcilable factions” and O’DONNELL 1979a, 51–7 notes to his ‘unChristian’, i.e., tolerant, attitude towards religious issues. Cf. P. HADOT, Marius Victorinus, Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres, Paris 1971, esp. 248–50. MARKUS 1990a, 28–9 points out that Augustine in the 390s interprets Marius Victorinus’ conversion in the 350s in terms of his own age and does not understand the smoothness of Marius Victorinus’ passage from Neoplatonism to Christianity but rather sees his paganism anachronistically in militantly antiChristian terms.

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the Christian polemicists Augustine and Orosius branded him as a pagan.121 The ambivalent and unclassifiable character of Claudian as well as of Ausonius and Nonnus is now widely recognized.122 Opportunists and Turncoats – Attitudes towards Incerti Christian opinion leaders took a negative stand to incerti and labelled them as opportunists who had chosen Christian creed for reasons of social convenience or for winning promotion in their careers. In the late fourth century, the pagan senator Symmachus states bitterly that Romans advanced in their careers by being away from the altars of the Gods.123 Now, is every person condemned as an opportunist an incertus/incerta? Certainly not, since there undoubtedly were hard-boiled opportunists who were converted to Christianity only in order to attain economic benefits and social prestige and carried on their previous pagan practices. What I wish to stress is that many of those individuals whom church leaders denounced as opportunists were attached to both Christian and pagan ways of life because for them Christian and pagan were not necessarily exclusive opposites. Maximus, bishop of Turin, refers in several sermons to people who confessed Christ only with their lips and who came to the church, not because they were Christians, but simply because they wished to be considered Christians. In De catechizandis rudibus Augustine discusses how ecclesiastical leaders should treat those who pretended to be Christians when applying to become catechumens. In City of God Augustine speaks of false Christians within the church (de falsis intra ecclesiam Christianis). Although they are united with the church in participation in the sacraments, Augustine states, they will not join with her in the eternal destiny of saints. Some of these were hidden; some were well known, for they did not hesitate to murmur against God, whose baptism they had, even in the company of

121 AVG. civ. 5.26 and OROS. hist. 7.35.21. 122 Claudian’s ambivalence: ALAN CAMERON, Claudian, Poetry and Propaganda at the court of Honorius, Oxford 1970, 155; O’DONNELL 1979a, 60; BONNER 1984, 350–51; NOETHLICHS 1998, 8, n. 19. Ausonius’ ambiguity: GUIGNEBERT 1923, 99, O’DONNELL 1979a, 62 (“he was probably a bit of both”), BOWERSOCK 1990, 43–4, BONNER 1984, 350–51 and MARKUS 1990a, 34. Nonnus of Panopolis: BOWERSOCK 1990, 43 and O’DONNELL 1979a, 84–5. The same applies to other complex figures such as the fifth century poet Cyrus of Panopolis who is known to have been a Hellene but after having fallen into disgrace had been forced to become a bishop of Cotyaeum (IOH. MALAL. chron. 14.361–2; O’DONNELL 1979a, 60, 84– 5), the Roman philosopher Macrobius (KAHLOS 2002, 180–85) or the sixth century rhetor Choricius whom some scholars (e.g., W. SCHMID, ‘Chorikios’, RE 3, Stuttgart 1899, 2424–31: 2426–7) have regarded as Christian while T.D. BARNES, ‘Christians and the Theater’, Roman Theater and Society, Ann Arbor 1996, 161–80: 180 interprets as pagan. 123 SYMM. ep. 1.51: nunc aris deesse Romanos genus est ambiendi. EUS. v. Const. 4.54 had already complained of people who let themselves to be baptized only because they wanted to advance their careers.

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his acknowledged enemies.124 Augustine clearly refers to those Christian incerti who lead a double life. The charge of opportunism, feigned conversion, cryptopaganism or heresy was a frequently used tool against personal ecclesiastical or political rivals. Some church fathers probably refer to incerti as they complain of opportunists. Severus of Antioch was accused of having still cherishing all pagan things while studying in Berytus and having become a Christian only for show.125 Similarly, Stilicho, for a time the most powerful man in the Western Empire, was accused of paganism after his fall. Orosius tells us of accusations according to which Stilicho did everything he could to get his son Eucherius on the throne: this Eucherius had planned persecution of Christians since his childhood.126 Several individuals, particularly those keen on advancing in their careers, were indeed prone to adjust their religious adherence to that of the reigning emperor. The Constantinopolitan rhetor Themistius refers to this tendency in his speech to Jovian on religious forbearance. He asserts that if the choice of religion was compelled, people tended to become opportunists. He alludes to the religious policies of the emperors Julian and Constantius II who both advocated their religion actively – the former his version of Hellenism and the latter his version of Christianity. These policies had caused several individuals to switch their religion, to ‘turn their coats’. Themistius complains that people had altered their religious rituals more easily than the river Euripus changed its course. Long ago there was one Theramenes but nowadays all men were kothornoi. The same people now paid homage at shrines and altars of the Gods and now at altars of the Christian God. The term used by Themistius, kothornoi, is illustrative: it refers to boots that were suited to either foot.127 There are a few well-known religious changeovers, particularly under Julian. Domitius Modestus, a comes Orientis, is known to have changed sides at least twice: originally a Christian, he became pagan under Julian and returned to

124 MAX. TAVR. 41.4; 79; 71.2: qui ideo aliquando ad ecclesiam veniunt, non quia christiani sunt, sed ne christiani ab hominibus non putentur; AVG. catech. rud. 5.9; civ. 1.35. 125 Zacharias Scholasticus states that he has written Severus’ biography in order to refute these accusations (ZACH. SCHOL. v. Severi (éd. & tr. M.A. Kugener, in Patrologia Orientalis II.1, Paris 1907, 8–9); VINZENT 1998, 52. 126 OROS. hist. 7.38.1; 7.38.6; HIER. ep. 123. Pagans accused Stilicho of Christian intolerance and some Christian writers stress his measures against paganism (RVT. NAM. 41; ZOS. 5.38; AVG. ep. 97). 127 THEM. or. 5.67–8a. Other metaphors used by Themistius also refer to changeover: the Euripus, the channel between Euboea and Boeotia, changed its direction of current seven times a day and it was used as a proverbial term for those of inconstant opinion (PLAT. Phaid. 90c). Theramenes was an Athenian politician infamous for changing sides (XEN. AG. hell. 2.2.31) and his nickname was Kothornos. R. MAISANO, Temistio, Discorsi, Torino 1995, 278, n. 46; P. HEATHER – D. MONCUR, Politics, Philosophy, and Empire in the Fourth Century. Select Orations of Themistius, Liverpool 2001, 156–7; L. CRACCO RUGGINI, ‘Intolerance: equal and less equal in the Roman World’, CP 82 (1987), 187–205: 203; G. DAGRON, ‘L’empire romaine d’Orient au IVème siècle et les traditions politiques de l’hellénisme: le témoignage de Thémistios’, Travaux et Mémoires 3 (1968), 1–242: 169.

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Christianity under Jovian or Valens.128 The most infamous incident concerns the Constantinopolitan Hecebolius and is meticulously analyzed by W. Kinzig. The church historian Socrates complains that many people apostatized during Julian’s reign and mentions Hecebolius among these people. Hecebolius had been a fervent Christian under Constantius II, turned eagerly to paganism under Julian and finally became a Christian again after Julian’s death.129 Thus, Socrates represents Hecebolius as one of the turncoats who changed their religion according to the tides, just as Themistius describes in his speech. Under each emperor, he clearly fluctuated with prevailing currents. It is easy to draw the conclusion that his acts and beliefs were completely disingenuous: This is based on the presupposition that a person indulging in so many conversions cannot be regarded as sincere.130 However, since we cannot know his true inner religious beliefs, the only statements we can make are about the reactions he aroused among his contemporaries. Socrates is not the only writer who complains of religious renegades. During previous centuries, ecclesiastical leaders and church councils had discussed the problem of lapsi who returned to the church.131 There were several conversions from Christianity to paganism under Julian.132 However, the apostasies133 did not end with Julian’s death since a substantial number are attested after his reign. At the end of the fourth century, church leaders and emperors seem to have been particularly worried 128 Flavius Domitius Modestus, a friend of Libanius, prefect of Constantinople: PLRE I, ‘Modestus 2’, 605–8; MAISANO 1995, 278, n. 45; KINZIG 1993, 102; DAGRON 1968, 169. 129 SOCR. eccl. 3.13. According to KINZIG 1993, 95–8, it is possible that Hecebolius had originally been a pagan and this is implied by Socrates’ words “he pretended to be an ardent Christian” and by a pagan name, Hecebolius. However, the pagan name does not necessarily reveal pagan origin. PLRE I, ‘Hecebolius 1’, 409. 130 GUIGNEBERT 1923, 73 asks whether Hecebolius as ‘un simple flagorneur du prince’ changed his conviction according to the winds but leaves the question open; BONNER 1984, 353 admits that even if Hecebolius seems an unprincipled adventurer, it is just possible that he was carried away by the pagan renaissance under Julian; ATHANASSIADI 1981, 28–9 writes of Hecebolius’ chameleon-like attitude to moral and religious matters and KINZIG 1993, 93 calls Hecebolius a ‘modern’ phenomenon of the fourth century and presumes him to be a person apparently without inner scruples. 131 Apostasies and practices of penance are surveyed by KINZIG 1993, 105–8 and BROWN 1998, 659. The fifth-century bishop Asterius of Amasea, hom. 3.10.3 (Datema p. 34) tells us of apostates who were pointed out in the street, “as if they were horses with bells on their bridles”. The apostasy is often termed a return to one’s vomit (Prov 26:11), e.g., in 2 Pet 2:22. 132 E.g., Emperor Julian’s uncle Julian, comes Orientis in 362–363 (PLRE I, ‘Iulianus 12’, 470–471); Felix, comes sacrarum largitionum in 362 (PLRE I, ‘Felix 3’, 332), Helpidius, comes rei privatae in 362–363 (PLRE I, ‘Helpidius 6’, 415). O’DONNELL 1979a, 61; KINZIG 1993, 102. 133 According to N. GAUTHIER, ‘La notion d’apostat dans l’occident latin du IVe siècle’, Les chrétiens face à leurs adversaires dans l’occident latin au IVe siècle, Rouen 2001, 129–42: 140, the Latin word apostata was used to refer to all forms of impietas, particularly rebelling against God and separating from Christ or the church. Thus, all pagans were apostatae: e.g., AVG. in psalm. 50.18: Illa proprie impietas dicitur apostatare a deo, unum deum non colere, aut numquam coluisse, aut quem colebat dimisisse. I use the word here in the modern sense, that is, conversion away from Christianity.

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about conversions from Christianity to paganism even under Christian emperors, and this concern seems to have been well founded. The writer of Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti, the so-called Ambrosiaster, complained that the Roman pagan aristocracy found imitators too easily. Bishop Ambrose writes of some Christians who turned to paganism because of the privileges that pagan priests enjoyed. Furthermore, the anonymous polemical poem Carmen contra paganos attacks an unnamed senator who is blamed for beguiling many Christians to paganism and thus taking these miserable people with himself to Tartarus. The poem even names two apostates that the senator has influenced: Leucadius and Marcianus. Another anonymous pamphlet poem, Carmen ad quendam senatorem, was targeted against another senator who lapsed from Christianity to paganism.134 It has been noted that laws against apostasies became more frequent and severe at the end of the fourth century. There are seven laws against Christian converts to paganism in the Codex Theodosianus dating back to 381–426; five of these laws are dated to 383–91.135 Theodosius I was forced to issue laws against renegades from Christianity and, as late as in 426, Emperor Valentinian III (424–455) had to renew previous legislation against apostasy. Valentinian’s law speaks also of those who, dressed in Christian name (nomen christianitatis induti), make or have made pagan sacrifices.136 Moreover, Christian writers report on sympathies that paganism aroused in different people at the turn of the fifth century. Augustine states that, because of the clash between Donatism and mainstream Christianity in Northern Africa, some peasants had rejected the Christian creed and returned to old pagan practices.137

134 PS. AVG. quaest. test. 114.13: facile enim imitatores invenit dehonestata nobilitas; AMBR. ep. 17.4 (= ep. 72, CSEL 82.3); CARM. c. pag. 78–86. Both Marcianus and Leucadius were high-ranking magistrates who may be identified with a Marcianus, vicarius Italiae in 384 (PLRE I, ‘Marcianus 14’, 555–6), and a Leucadius, praeses (PLRE I, ‘Leucadius 1–2’, 504–5). PS. CYPR. CARM. ad senat., esp. 49–50. KAHLOS 2002, 166; K. ROSEN, ‘Ein Wanderer zwischen zwei Welten – Carmen ad quendam senatorem ex Christiana religione ad idolorum servitutem conversum’, Klassisches Altertum, Spätantike und frühes Christentum, Würzburg 1993, 393–408: 407–8. 135 M.R. SALZMAN, ‘The evidence for the conversion of the Roman empire to Christianity in book 16 of the Theodosian Code’, Historia 42 (1993), 362–78: 373, 376; K.L. NOETHLICHS, Die gesetzgeberischen Massnahmen der christlichen Kaiser des vierten Jahrhunderts gegen Häretiker, Heiden und Juden, Köln 1971, 166–7. L. CRACCO RUGGINI, ‘Il paganesimo romano tra religione e politica (384–394): per una reinterpretazione del Carmen contra paganos’, RAL ser.8, 23 (1979b), 3–141: 124–30 dates the anonymous Carmen contra paganos, Poema ultimum, Carmen ad quendam senatorem and Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti (Ambrosiaster) between 380 and 385 and proposes that this period of Christian polemic and apostasies coincides with the epoch of action and influence of the prominent Roman pagan senator Vettius Agorius Praetextatus. For Praetextatus’ person and activities, see KAHLOS 2002. 136 CTh 16.7.1 (in 381); 16.7.2–3 (in 383); 16.7.4–5 (in 391); 16.7.6 (in 396); CTh 16.7.7 (in 426). CTh 16.7.5 (in 391) may reflect the relative frequency of apostasies among highranking magistrates and aristocrats. 137 PAVL. MED. v. Ambr. 31; AVG. civ. 4.1: deos falsos, quos vel palam colebant vel occulte adhuc colunt; OROS. hist. 7.35.5.

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Feigned Conversions and ‘Cryptopagans’ The question of the sincerity of converts is connected with the incerti. Church fathers bemoaned feigned conversions to Christianity and these laments became recurrent during Constantine’s reign: Eusebius, for example, complains that many people pretend to have become Christians only to win imperial favour.138 The complaints of insincere conversions became even more frequent at the turn of the fifth century when pagans and heretics were increasingly forced to conform to mainstream Christianity. For instance, Shenoute of Atripe (c.335–451) grumbles that now these people stand in churches crying out Christian prayers and raising their hands in Christian gestures. They care for Christian teaching less than peacocks flapping their wings.139 The same ecclesiastical leaders who advocated religious coercion lamented feigned conversions. Augustine was aware of the fact that many polytheists consented to become Christians so that their Gods and shrines would be left in peace. Church fathers refer to people who became Christians to secure their position in the community or to acquire a post in the imperial administration or just to keep their jobs. Augustine speaks of the conveniences of this present life that induced people to embrace Christianity or, in the case of clients of an influential pagan landlord, to retain pagan practices.140 Ambrose, complaining of the opportunism of Christian converts, reveals that Christians did not want to betroth a daughter to a non-Christian or let one into local office, and would try to do him harm, or at least withhold help of any sort. Consequently, non-Christians accommodated themselves to the Christian rules through the force of circumstances. Thus, a young man who wanted to get married to a Christian girl pretended to be a Christian.141 Thus, non-Christians, instead of a complete ‘exit’, seem to have attempted at a ‘passing’ in which the most essential thing was to get the dominant group of the society – Christians – to believe that they had assimilated into Christianity. Fourth-, fifth- and sixth-century writers report on this assimilation – sometimes exerted just for show. At the end of the fourth century, when the imperial government strengthened its measures against non-Christian religions, Libanius states that it was out of fear of intimidation that peasants crowded to church, pretending that they had become Christians, but kept on invoking their own Gods there. In the sixth century Procopius writes that, when pagans were

138 EUS. v. Const. 4.54.2. Cf. SOZ. eccl. 2.5 who states that some people accommodated themselves to the emperor’s religion because they wanted to gain the same honour that Christians had in the emperor’s eyes. 139 SINUTH. ATRIP. ep. 18 (CSCO 96, tr. H. Wiesmann, Louvain 1953, 22). 140 AVG. serm. Dolbeau 24.8 (= 360A). F. DOLBEAU, ‘Nouveaux sermons de S. Augustin pour la conversion des païens et des donatistes’, REA 37 (1991), 37–77: 41 (= F. DOLBEAU, Saint Augustin. Vingt-six Sermons au Peuple de l’Afrique, Paris 1996, 231); Conveniences: AVG. catech. rud. 16.24: vitae praesentis aliquod commodum; 17.26; AVG. serm. 47.18: temporalis commoditas; people made their religious choices either to avoid pressura huius saeculi or to remain in favour of a patron; AVG. serm. 279: some tried to get administrative posts. 141 AMBR. expos. in psalm. 118 serm. 20.48–9.

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harassed, they pretended to be Christians but later their deceit was often uncovered as they were making libations.142 Sometimes these people are called cryptopagans. One of them is Pegasius, Bishop of Ilion, who in the eyes of Emperor Julian showed up as a sympathizer of local polytheistic cults. All we know of him comes from a letter of Julian who met him when travelling in the surroundings of Ilion in 354. Julian wished to see the sights of the town – for him this was the excuse for visiting the pagan shrines. Pegasius guided Julian around all the places and when they visited Hector’s and Achilleus’ shrines, the bishop showed great reverence and enthusiasm, saying to Julian: “Is it not natural that they should worship a brave man (that is, Hector) who was their own citizen, just as we worship the martyrs?” Julian states that Pegasius’ point of view and intentions were those of “a man of culture, if you consider the times in which we then lived” – thus, declaring that the bishop was to be regarded a Hellene even at that time. Unfortunately, we rely on Julian’s interpretation only; nevertheless, the defensive tone of his letter implies that there were pagans who objected to Pegasius’ appointment to Julian’s pagan hierarchy.143 It seems that people on both sides took a suspicious attitude towards this in-between person. Augustine had to deal with an attempt at deception with the inhabitants of Madauros. The Madaurians had tried to conceal that they were continuing with pagan practices. Augustine writes to the Madaurians that despite their attempt to hide their paganism, for instance, in their Christian-sounding salutation to the bishop, he is well aware of their superstitious devotion to idols. The bearer of the letter had revealed that the Madaurians had in no way been changed (nequaquam vos esse mutatos). Augustine was grieved because, although the Madaurians had seen that the whole world was subjected to Christianity, they continued not only to reject it, but also to ridicule it in their attempt to deceive. On one hand Augustine declares the triumph of the Christian church, but, in the same letter, he turns out to be sceptical about this process: he writes that it was easier to close the temples than the hearts against idols.144 142 The terms ‘exit’ and ‘passing’ are used in studies of the relations of majorities and minorities in modern societies. LIBAN. or. 30.26–9; nevertheless, we must remember that Libanius’ description is a part of his argumentation for pagan practices in a speech addressed to Theodosius I. PROCOP. hist. arc. 11.31–2. 143 IUL. ep. 79 Bidez-Cumont (= ep. 78 Hertlein). W. ENSSLIN, ‘Pegasius’, RE XIX, Stuttgart 1937, 56. Julian points out that Pegasius did not hiss and make a sign of the cross on his forehead as if against demons when entering pagan shrines as Christians usually did. Pegasius is the only known bishop who was converted from Christianity to paganism. FOWDEN 1998, 542 calls Pegasius a crypto-polytheist; ATHANASSIADI 1981, 28–9 describes him as a person who “managed to convince both parties of the genuineness of his beliefs”; BONNER 1984, 352 assumes that he had probably always been a Philhellene; HEATHER – MONCUR 56, n. 33 regard him as “a convinced inhabitant of the middle ground which existed between Christianity and paganism” and ARMSTRONG 1984, 14 interprets him as “a sincere Christian, though perhaps not one of very deep and passionate faith”. 144 AVG. ep. 232.1–2: … contra quae idola facilius templa vestra quam corda clauduntur, vel potius quae idola non magis in templis quam in vestris cordibus includuntur, … The letter has been dated between 400–407. It may be connected with the closure of temples and

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Church fathers acknowledged the costs of the religious coercion and the rapid growth of the church. Augustine did not always consider the rapid growth of the church as a completely positive phenomenon but also complained that the huge draught brought up a mixture of good and bad fish and a rupture in the fishnet of the church. People who were hastily compelled to enter the church neither had absorbed the Christian doctrine properly nor were able to give up their former way of life and pagan practices.145 However, despite the problems caused by intimidation, Augustine regarded forced conversions in the long run as beneficial to the church. It was not for humans but to God to judge which converts were sincere and which false. God would solve this concoction of sincere and false converts in the final separation at the end of time. The Two Cities Augustine admits that the present church consists of a mixture of true and false Christians. He also emphasizes the inseparability and interwovenness of good and bad people in this life. However, God will make an end to the confusion and mixedness at the end of this world. Despite the outward mixture of good and bad in this life, the world is fundamentally divided into two distinct entities that Augustine names the city of God (civitas Dei) and the terrestrial city (terrena civitas). The whole human race is divided into these two civitates but the partition is even cosmic because other powers, the angels, are divided into the just and the wicked.146 The line is drawn according to the differing ethical and religious orientations of the cities. Augustine speaks of two standards of life or two kinds of love. The terrestrial city consists of those who live ‘according to man’ (secundum hominem) and the city of God of those who live ‘according to God’ (secundum Deum). Correspondingly, the earthly city is directed by self-love and contempt of God while the heavenly one is guided by love of God and contempt of self.147 The humans as well as the angels divided into these two societies are predestined, the just to reign with God for all eternity, the wicked to suffer eternal punishment with the devil. Although human beings belong either to the city of God or the earthly city, they are mixed during the course of time in this world. The people of the devastation of idols decreed in CTh 16.10.15 (in 399) and 16.10.17 (in 399) or Constitutiones Sirmondianae 12 (in 407). P. MASTANDREA, Massimo di Madauros. Agostino, Epistulae 16 e 17, Padova 1985, 80–81. 145 AVG. serm. 248–52; in psalm. 39.10: multiplicati sunt super numerum; ep. 29.8–9. 146 E.g., AVG. civ. 11.33: nos ergo has duas societates angelicas inter se dispares atque contrarias, unam et natura bonam et voluntate rectam, aliam vero natura bonam, sed voluntate perversam, ... existimavimus. I prefer to translate the word civitas as ‘city’ or ‘community’ rather than as ‘kingdom’ or ‘state’. The word civitas as well as the Greek polis is to be understood mainly as a community of citizens, a city or a group of people, not simply as a state or an empire. For the concept civitas in Augustine, see VAN OORT 1991, 102–8; VAN OORT 1997, 158, 160–61, 168. 147 Two standards: AVG. civ. 15.1; two loves: 14.28; gen. ad litt. 11.15.20 (between 401– 15); the right order of love is disturbed, caritatis ... ordine perturbato: civ. 15.22.

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heavenly city must live in pilgrimage, intermingled (permixtae) with the people of the terrestrial city. Thus, the cities are intermingled with respect to bodies (permixtae corporibus) but separated with respect to wills (voluntatibus separatae). However, the at present mixed communities are destined to be separated also with respect to bodily presence (etiam in corpore separandae) at the Last Judgment, at the end of the world.148 The doctrine of two civitates is most manifest in Augustine’s City of God, but the bishop presented his ideas of two antithetical communities in previous treatises, too; for instance, in On Teaching of the Uninstructed in which the two communities are said to be carried down from the beginning of humankind until the end of the world and in his commentary to Genesis where the final separation and eternal life vs. eternal fire are emphasized.149 As regards the doctrine of the two civitates, previous scholarship has stressed the classical-philosophical, particularly Platonic, influence on Augustine.150 Furthermore, some scholars have paid particular attention to the possible Manichaean impact on Augustine who, as a former member of the sect, must have been informed on the Manichaean distinction of the heavenly realm and the realm of darkness.151 Then, in his Jerusalem and Babylon J. van Oort states that the essential elements of Augustine’s doctrine on civitates were present in both the earlier Christian and the Jewish traditions.152 Finally, a fourth century North African writer Tyconius, a Donatist dissident, has been proposed as a possible prime source

148 AVG. civ. 11.33; 12.1; 12.9; 12.10; 12.28; 14.4; 14.26; 14.28; 15.1; 15.8; 15.21; 15.22 etc.; catech. rud. 19.31; 21.37; gen. ad litt. 11.15.20; serm. Dolbeau 26.2 (= 198augm) speaks of commixtio corporalis and separatio mentis. 149 AVG. catech. rud. 19.31; gen. ad litt. 11.15.20; lib. arb. 1.15.31; vera relig. 27.50. 150 H.-I. MARROU, ‘Civitas Dei, civitas terrena: num tertium quid?’, Studia patristica 2, Berlin 1957, 342–50: 343 believed that Augustine wrote “dans une atmosphère platonicienne”; C. PARMA, ‘Plotinische Motive in Augustins Begriff der Civitas Dei’, VC 22 (1968), 45–8 interpreted Augustine’s civitates in Neoplatonic terms. Civitas Dei has been seen as a Christian counterpart of the Platonic ideal polis as well as resembling the community of God opposed to this world in Stoic and Platonic tradition. VAN OORT 1997, 167, 241–52, 351 recognizes resemblances between Augustine’ civitates and the Platonic and Stoic ideas but stresses that these similarities are only superficial. The Platonic distinction is radically different from the Augustinian antithetical concept: e.g., the earthly city is not an adumbration of the heavenly city, as in Plato. Similarly, J. DOUGHERTY, ‘The Sacred City and The City of God’, AugSt 10 (1979), 81–90: 86 points out that civitas terrena is not simply an imperfect earthly version of a heavenly model, as in Plato and Seneca. 151 A. ADAM, ‘Der manichäische Ursprung der Lehre von den zwei Reichen bei Augustin’, Sprache und Dogma, Güterloh 1969a, 133–40, partic. 139–40 states that Augustine spiritualized the Manichaean Vorstellungswelt but never gave up the fundamental dualism; cf. VAN OORT 1991, 229–34, 351; VAN OORT 1997, 164–6 and GEERLINGS 1971, 47 who stress the influence of the common early Christian tradition on both Augustine and the Manichaeans. 152 VAN OORT 1991, 301–59, VAN OORT 1997, 161, 167–8 and GEERLINGS 1971, 47 stress the influence of the Jewish and early Christian apocalyptic and catechetic tradition, such writings as the Shepherd of Hermas, Acts of Peter, Didache, Epistle of Barnabas as well as later texts, e.g., Didascalia, Apostolic constitutions and the Pseudo-Clementines.

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for the civitates.153 Whatever sources we emphasize more than others it is clear that the division of the world into two entities, cities or communities, was in the air in Augustine’s time. One of the most frequent metaphors for the dichotomy of our community and the community of others is the contraposition between Jerusalem and Babylon. Jerusalem is called the city of God in the Psalms and it was applied as the metaphor for the kingdom of heaven in early Christian tradition. Babylon became the antithesis of Jerusalem and was identified with Rome. Tertullian, for example, had attacked Rome, calling it Babylon, the great arrogant enemy of the saints of God.154 Ambrose sees the world as divided into two antithetical communities that he calls the terrena civitas and the civitas Hierusalem. The earthly civitas was of this world and was to be rejected for Jerusalem, the heavenly city. Augustine applies the metaphorical binary opposition Jerusalem and Babylon several times in City of God as well as in enarrationes to psalms. Jerusalem is the vision of peace (visio pacis) whereas Babylon is called chaos or confusion (confusio).155 The contrast of the communities marks the fundamental division of humans into the good and the wicked. Ambrose, for instance, distinguishes the wicked and the saints, the former constituting the body of the snake and the latter belonging to the body of Christ. Augustine divides the whole human race into two genera, those of the multitude of the wicked and those devoted to the one God.156 The metaphor often applied to describe the wicked and the just is that of Cain and Abel. Ambrose states that Cain and Abel represent the two sectae of humans that are contraries to each other and in conflict with each other. Augustine discusses the dichotomy of Cain and Abel 153 Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire I, Paris 1982, ‘Tyconius’, 1122–7. Tyconius wrote a commentary on the Apocalypse of John that only survives in fragments and a Liber regularum. Augustine uses his Liber regularum (AVG. doctr. christ. 3.30.42–3.37.56) and it is possible that Augustine also knew the commentary. T. HAHN, Tyconius-Studien, Dorpat 1902, 115–16 brought up Tyconius as the possible source for Augustine but was cautious to take no stand on the issue. M. DULAEY, ‘L’Apocalypse. Augustin et Tyconius’, Bible de tous les temps III: Augustin et la Bible, Paris 1986, 369–86: 385 considers Tyconius’ influence clear in the last books of City of God: “l’empreinte du traité sur l’Apocalypse est évidente”. 154 Apocalypse of John (14:8; 16:19–21; 17; 18; 21:2 depicts Babylon as the wicked city of this world against Jerusalem, the city of God; TERT. adv. Marc. 3.13.10. 155 AMBR. ep. 63.104 (CSEL 82.2); Ambrose also understood Jerusalem and Babylon as a spiritual antithesis within the human soul: e.g., ep. 70.13 (CSEL 82.2); Isaac 6.54. AVG. civ. passim; in psalm. 61; 86; 145.20; 148.4; 136.1: unam cui finis est pax aeterna, et vocatur Ierusalem; alteram cui gaudium est pax temporalis, et vocatur Babylonia. … Ierusalem interpretari Visionem pacis, Babyloniam Confusionem. A sixth century commentator of the Apocalypse of John, Primasius of Hadrumentum (in apoc. 14.8) interprets Babylon as chaos or confusion. Rome is identified with Babylon: AVG. civ. 16.17; 18.2; 18.22; 18.27. VAN OORT 1991, 118–23, 278–80. 156 AMBR. explan. ps. 37.9: Sicut enim sancti corpus et membra sunt Christi, ita peccatores (...) corpus draconis et membra. AVG. vera relig. 27.(50); cf. lib. arb. 1.15–16. Caesarius of Arles (serm. 151.2) also divided the world into two communities: Duae sunt civitates, …: una est civitas mundi, alia est civitas paradisi; and serm. 233.3: Duo enim aedificia et duae civitates a mundi initio construuntur: unam aedificat Christus, alteram diabolus; unam aedificat humilis, alteram superbus.

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at length in City of God and sees their opposition as representing the two civitates that devote themselves to things of this world and to trust in God, respectively.157 Interwovenness and Separation Pick them up like sheep for the slaughter, set them apart for the day of carnage. JEREMIAH 12:3

Christian writers stress the radical opposition and the clear distinction of the two entities, cities, communities or groups of people. Augustine introduces a series of binary oppositions when declaring that the two civitates differ from each other as widely the sky from the earth, eternal life from temporal joy, solid glory from empty praises, the society of angels from the society of mortals, the light of the creator of the sun and moon from the light of the sun and moon. The difference is due to their different origins in the world of angels. The community of the wicked originated from the fall of the angels and their rebellion against God before the creation of man and the division came to this world in the fall of man.158 The line between the good and the wicked is clear and sharp but confusion prevails in this lifetime. Augustine stresses the inseparability and interwovenness of the antitheses in this world. It is impossible to make confident distinction between the good and the wicked in this life. The church father reminds his readers that even among the most open adversaries of the Christian community there are hidden some predestined citizens of the city of God (in ipsis inimicis latere cives futuros) even though these people did not yet know it themselves (si apud apertissimos adversios praedestinati amici latitant, adhuc ignoti etiam sibi). Correspondingly, there were false Christians within the Church who were united with her in participating in the sacraments but who would not join with her in the eternal destiny of saints. Some of these people were concealed, some were well known, for they did not hesitate to murmur against God, whose sacramental sign they bore, even in the company of his recognized adversaries. Augustine emphasizes the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ when stating that these people took part in the spectacles in the theatre ‘with them’ (that is, with pagans) as well as in Christian rituals in the church ‘with us’ (that is, with Christians), modo cum illis theatra, modo ecclesias nobiscum replentes. In truth, Augustine remarks, the two civitates were interwoven (perplexae) and intermixed (invicemque permixtae) in this time until they were to be separated at the Last Judgment.159

157 AMBR. Cain et Ab. 1.1.4; AVG. civ. 15.21. 158 AVG. civ. 5.17: illa civitas ... tantum ab hac distet, quantum distat caelum a terra, a temporali laetitia vita aeterna, ab inanibus laudibus solida gloria, a societate mortalium societas angelorum, a lumine solis et lunae lumen eius qui solem fecit et lunam. 159 AVG. civ. 1.35. In the same way, AVG. in psalm. 147.7 points out that there were future Christians, even bishops, among those who went to see the spectacles and that he had himself attended those spectacles.

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Augustine constantly emphasizes the interwovenness of the two cities at present, playing with the words discretio, discrimination, and concretio, combination, in the relations of the two cities.160 He calls it a kind of amalgam of the two cities, quaedam utriusque confusio civitatis, stressing that the citizens of the two cities share the same society, the same occupations, the same laws and sometimes even the same family and the same church.161 Augustine discusses the intermingling, using metaphors of the draught of fish as well as of the wheat and tares. The nets of the church filled with fish are a recurrent theme in his sermons. Explaining the great catch of fish (Lk 5:1–7 and Jn 21:1–14), Augustine remarks that the church is this huge draught mixed of the good and bad. God lets both the good and bad live intermingled until the end of the world. They are collected in the net of the gospel and they continue to swim without separation, enclosed in the net of this world until they will be brought ashore. Thus, the church contains citizens of both the civitas Dei and the terrena civitas. Correspondingly, the metaphor of the wheat and tares (Mt 13:24–43) illustrates the present mixture and the final separation of humankind. Augustine describes the church as a mixed body (corpus permixtum) containing both wheat and tares.162 It is possible that Augustine stresses the intermingling of the two cities in order to clarify his difference from the antitheses elaborated by the Donatists. Mainstream church leaders regarded the Donatists’ partition of the human race as too strict and too external a distinction. In the council of Carthage in 411, the Donatists are reported to have opposed the view that the good and the wicked were mixed within the same church and maintained that the church was faultless and stainless. Thus, it is for antiheretical purposes that Augustine ends up by laying a strong emphasis on the intermingling of the oppositional parts.163 Similarly, Augustine wished to emphasize the difference from Manichaean ideas, for example, when he was accused of being a cryptomanichaean and sticking to Manichaean views.164 As is widely accepted, the Augustinian dualism is ontological. However, a number of scholars acknowledge that the influence of Manichaean dualism on Augustine – whether at a conscious or

160 E.g., AVG. civ. 11.1; 15.8; 15.22; 18.49; 18.54; 19.26; catech. rud. 19.31; gen. ad litt. 11.15.20. As long as the two cities are intermingled, the citizens of the city of God make use of the peace of Babylon: AVG. civ. 19.26: quamdiu permixtae sunt ambae civitates, utimur et nos pace Babylonis. 161 AVG. civ. 15.22. This commixtio or permixtio appears also in AVG. in psalm. 61.8; 64.2; 136.1. 162 AVG. serm. 248–52; also civ. 18.49; in psalm. 61.6. 163 Gesta Conlationis Carthaginiensis 3.258 (CCSL 149A, p. 244). O’DONNELL 1979b, 75–9 has suggested that the Donatist antitheses influenced Augustine in a negative manner. HARRISON 2000, 201–202 interprets Augustine’s dichotomy of two opposed communities as a “less dualistic, less realized and more eschatological conception of two antithetical groups” than the “Donatists’ rigorous perfectionism, separatism and exclusivism”. However, it is worth keeping in mind that the Donatists’ views are mainly conveyed by their opponents. 164 E.g., Julian of Eclanum interpreted Augustine’s theology as filled with Manichaean remnants, in AVG. c. Iulian. op. imperf. 5.25; 1.59; 6.28; 2.31–3; 4.42. VAN OORT 1991, 200; A. ADAM, ‘Das Fortwirken des Manichäismus bei Augustin’, Sprache und Dogma, Güterloh 1969b, 141–66: 164–6; GEERLINGS 1971, 45.

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subconscious level – cannot be ignored.165 It looks as if the more eagerly Augustine wanted to break away from Manichaean patterns of thought, the stronger he had to fight against them and the deeper he was in fact involved with them and continued play the game on the terms of the Manichaeans. There are remarkable differences between the Augustinian and Manichaean views but there are significant similitudes, too.166 Augustine was by no means the only one to underline the intermingling since Manichaean texts also introduce an idea of the outward dissolution of Light and Darkness in this world. Thus, in Manichaean texts the spheres of Light and Darkness are interwoven with each other and will be finally separated at the end of this world. Thus, the Manichaean dualism hardly was as simplified as Augustine wishes to make it appear.167 The concoction of the two opposing elements appears as well in the Gnostic Gospel of Philip in which Light and Darkness, life and death, right and left are brothers for each other and cannot be separated from each other. Similarly, the Gnostic Apocryphon of John declares that, when the light had mixed with the darkness, it caused the darkness to shine and, when the darkness had mixed with the light, it darkened the light, becoming neither light nor dark but dim.168 H.-I. Marrou took note of the area between the civitates of the Augustinian dichotomy and suggested that there might be room for a third entity. According to Marrou, the temporally inseparable mixture of the two could constitute this tertium quid. He ended up recognizing this third entity as saeculum, the world or the historical circumstances, ‘le donné empirique de l’histoire’, in which the members of both civitates lived inextricably interwoven.169 R.A. Markus examined the issue of the saeculum even further. He described the Augustinian concept saeculum as the

165 E.g., HARRISON 2000, 200; O’DONNELL 1979b, 75. ADAM 1969b, 166, emphasizes the subconscious impact of the Manichaean patterns of thought on Augustine; J. O’MEARA, The Young Augustine, London 1954, 79 writes, “In a sense, it might seem that to become a Manichee was to depart little, if at all, from being a Christian”; LIEU 1992, 187–90 speaks of the dualistic appeal of Manichaeism; VAN OORT 1991, 352 admits that Manichaeism continued to influence Augustine’s theology remarkably and this is obvious in regard to the extent the church father stressed a subordinated dualism; and GEERLINGS 1971, 58–60 speaks of ‘diese Strukturverwandtschaft im Lebensgefühl’ between Augustine and Manichaeans. 166 Similarities are surveyed by VAN OORT 1991, 204, 210–27 and ADAM 1969b, 159. 167 E.g., Kephalaia 17.55.16–24 (The Kephalaia of the Teacher, Leiden 1995, 59–60); Bêmapsalm 223.11; 223.15–16 (Die Bema-Psalmen, Liber Psalmorum II.I, Corpus Fontium Manichaeorum, Turnhout 1996, 36–41). The archons of Darkness had swallowed the elements of Light and thus the Light elements had become tainted and mingled with the Darkness; this necessitated the creation of this world. For the Manichaean dualism and the conflict between Light and Darkness, see, e.g., LIEU 1992, 11–21, 187–90 and DRIJVERS 1984, 102 who emphasizes that in Manichaean theology Darkness and Light are not equivalent entities and that the evil power of Darkness is strictly limited. 168 Gospel of Philip 10 (53.15), NHC; Apocryphon of John 12, NHC. The Darkness and Light are mentioned as undistinguishable brothers in Mandaic texts as well: Die Gnosis. Koptische und mandäische Quellen, Düsseldorf 1997, 96, 230–31. 169 MARROU 1957, 346–8; A.-M. LA BONNARDIÈRE, ‘La “Cité terrestre” d’après H.-I. Marrou’, Bible de tous les temps 3, Paris, 1986, 387–98. The saeculum is discussed in AVG. civ. 15.1 and gen. ad litt. 11.15(20).

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temporal secular context of the two civitates, not as an area between the two cities. The Roman Empire was this saeculum, a theologically neutral entity.170 Although Augustine stressed the division of humankind, he carefully rejected the dualism inside an individual. Instead, he brought forth the idea of the undivided self. It is, again, the opposition to the Manichaean ideas of the duality of two natures (and his own fears?) that led him to emphasize the unity of the self. The human self was one whole and it was to be healed as a whole.171 Nevertheless, the complete healing of the self divided by internal tensions was not entirely possible in this world. A human being would become whole only in the transcendence. Augustine was capable of deconstructing the dualism based on the two natures in conflict within the human self. One would expect that the same could apply to his dualism at the macrocosmic level. He rejects the existence of evil as nature; therefore, his dualism is not ontological but ‘intellectual’, but this does not make his dualism more easy-going. The antitheses are necessary for Augustine. In City of God he explains that contradistinction is required in order to make the civitas Dei shine out in contrast with its opposite.172 Thus, we see the parts of the binary opposition, civitates, in interdependence with each other. Neither part can exist independently without its counterpart: there is no civitas Dei without terrena civitas. As with the dichotomy of pagans and Christians, the antithesis of civitates begins to break down. Augustine himself admits the indeterminacy of the two antithetical parts when he states that there are some of the predestined citizens hidden among the most open adversaries of the city of God. Correspondingly, there were false Christians within the church. No human can make out who really is a member of civitas Dei and who is not.173 The Augustinian antithesis is irresolute and inseparable in this era and this play of differences will continue until the final clearing at the Last Judgment. It is only then that the intermingled opposites will be separated and the outward coexistence of good and evil will cease. What is undetermined now will be determined in its clarity in the transcendence.

170 R.A. MARKUS, Saeculum, Cambridge 1970, 54–5, 71. The Empire or the state is not to be identified as terrena civitas; neither is the church to be recognized with the city of God. 171 AVG. serm. 30.3.4. According to R.A. MARKUS, ‘Augustine’s Confessions and the Controversy with Julian of Eclanum: Manicheism Revisited’, Collectanea Augustiniana, Leuven 1990b, 913–35: 915, 918–20, 924, Augustine internalized the conflicts that were previously projected outside the self. The Manichaeans assumed that evil was to be separated from good and to be removed somewhere outside whereas Augustine wanted to separate evil from good only intellectually because evil was not substantia. Therefore, evil was to be removed from the self, not as if it could be outside the self, but rather healing it within the self. AVG. c. Iulian. op. imperf. 3.37; 6.8. 172 AVG. civ. 15.8: civitas Dei etiam suae adversariae conparatione clarescat. 173 AVG. civ. 1.35. The earthly church with its nets filled with false Christians is only an allegorical shadow that prefigures the eschatological reality. K. FLASCH, Augustin, Stuttgart 1994, 397–8; DOUGHERTY 1979, 88.

Chapter 3

Debate, Polemic and Dialogue

Identity and Otherness As was stated in Chapter 1, Christian argumentation against pagans and pagan practices is likely to tell us more about Christians themselves than polytheists or polytheistic practices as such. The otherness does not exist without the inventors of the image. In fact, the image of the otherness is always in relation to us. Correspondingly, the other is necessary in producing the identity of the self. The concepts of self and other are interdependent and complementary in such a way that the knowledge of oneself is necessary for understanding the other and vice versa.1 There is an eternal interplay between the self and the other. In other words, there is a stranger living in me: there is no I without the stranger and no stranger without me. The otherness provides a medium or background field through which a group can define its boundaries and test its limits. There is no identity that could exist by itself, completely without its opposite or negative. Christians understood themselves in terms of the other, for instance, pagans, Jews and other Christian sects defined as heretical, by contrasting themselves with the other and defining what ‘we’ were not. Anthropologists and social psychologists speak of processes in which identity boundaries are fixed and maintained. Identities could be described as maps or models according to which an individual guides her/his acts and behaviour and makes reality meaningful.2 A person’s identity consists of many levels; for example, Christians would attach themselves both to mainstream Christians in general and to a group of ascetics in particular and, moreover, to non-religious groups according to their social status and local and ethnic origin. Furthermore, self-definition and self-perception of an individual and a group is in continuous fluctuation. Thus, the boundaries of a group are by no means fixed but they can be perceived evolving constantly. During the fourth and fifth centuries Christians faced new challenges in their self-definition. The Roman emperors were now Christians, the church strengthened its position in late antique society, and at the end of the fourth century Christianity became the established state religion. Christian writers responded 1 R. SHUSTERMAN, ‘Understanding the self’s others’, Cultural Otherness and Beyond, Leiden 1998, 107–14: 107–12. 2 For identities in classical and especially in Late Antique studies, see R. MILES, ‘Introduction. Constructing identities in late antiquity’, Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity, London 1999, 1–15: 5–6 and T. RAJAK, ‘Talking at Trypho: Christian Apologetic as Anti-Judaism in Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho the Jew’, Apologetics in the Roman Empire, Oxford 1999, 59–80: 61.

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to these changes in diverse ways: typical reactions were resentment, approval and indifference. Some writers regarded the rapid assimilation of Christians into Roman society as a threat to Christian identity. We find Christian intellectuals and church leaders pondering what it meant to be a Christian, what made people Christians and whether the Empire was already Christianized, the very same issues that are continuously discussed in the modern research. The identity boundaries are by no means determined and objective. Not all the members of a community outline the boundaries precisely in the same way but they rather are interpreted individually. Consequently, the criteria of what constituted Christianization naturally varied. Christian writers might have shown agreement with respect to outsiders but within the Christian community there seldom was internal agreement about Christian identity.3 One example of the evolving Christian identities is the comparison of the worlds of Augustine and Gregory of Rome. In Augustine’s time Christians were puzzled by questions of what it meant be a Christian and what was the difference when a Christian was compared to non-Christians. In Gregory’s time, in R. A. Markus’ words, “Christianity could now be taken for granted”, and the church leaders regarded the Christian identity as secured. It is worth remembering that it is a question of perception here rather than of a fixed reality. Gregory has to admit that there still may be some people who do not carry the Christian name but he considers these people – if there are such people, he asserts – to be marginal.4 One of the reactions to the changed circumstances was the change of the earlier apologetic writing into a more offensive polemic. Apologia was transformed into categoria and defenders of Christianity became prosecutors of paganism.5 Apologetic and polemical writings should be seen as maintaining discipline and reinforcing group identity among Christians themselves, insiders, rather than as communication with pagans, outsiders. This is apparent in the apologetic tradition of the previous centuries: Cyprian’s writings, for example, are illustrative of keeping a curb on parishioners in the period of great anxiety. This applies as well to fourth-

3 Criteria used in modern research on the Christianization of the Roman Empire are, among others, the evidence of ecclesiastical organization, church buildings, the spread of Christian nomenclature, adoption of Christian religious terms, Christian ordering of time and appearance of Christian symbols. MILES 1999, 10–11. Christianization and the boundaries of sacred and secular are discussed by MARKUS 1990a, 1–17. The standards of the late fourthcentury ascetic circles were far stricter than those of incerti – BROWN 1998, 651, 655 speaks of the ’hyper-Christianization’ of the ascetics and priests. 4 GREG. M. moral. 18.6.12. R.A. MARKUS, Signs and Meanings, Liverpool 1996, 46–7 speaks of the different worlds of Augustine and Gregory of Rome. 5 J.-C. FREDOUILLE, ‘Tertullien dans l’histoire de l’apologetique’, Les Apologistes chrétiens et la culture grecque, Paris 1998, 271–81: 279 speaks of the two eras of Christian apologetic, defence and attack, and a shift from the writings pro Christianis to those contra gentes. This is of course a generalization, though a useful one. The earlier Christian apologetic of the second and third centuries already contained aggressive elements. For the aggressive basis of Christian apologetic, see AVERIL CAMERON, ‘Apologetics in the Roman Empire – A genre of Intolerance?’, “Humana sapit”, Turnhout 2002, 219–27.

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and fifth-century church leaders who had to fix and check the boundaries of proper Christianity.6 Pagans were needed in the construction of Christian identity. In the period before the ‘Constantinian revolution’ as well as in the years after it, Christian identity was constantly built up and probed in relation to the otherness, non-Christians. One may even state that Christian theology was worked out – at least in part – in relation to polytheistic religions as well as to Jewish traditions. Building dichotomies was a form of self-expression. Similarly, Roman authors had also drawn boundary marks in contrasting their own beliefs to those of the others.7 Pagans were not the only background against which late antique mainstream Christians tested the limits of their identity and doctrine, but Christian identity was also constructed in relation to Jewish tradition and increasingly to other Christian sects labelled as heretical. Gregory of Nazianzus defines Christian orthodox theology in relation to Jewish and Hellenic thought. On one hand he warns of those who accorded with Jews (ioudaizontes) insisting upon one God and on the other of those who, believing in the separate persons of the divinity, fell into a Hellenic error (hellenizontes).8 The construction of Christian identity through creating and sharpening binary oppositions had been apparent already in the Apostle Paul’s letters. Paul had made divisions such as believers – non-believers, the righteous – the non-righteous and those inside – those outside. His polemic against pagans had a parenetic function since he applies the polemic, not against pagans outside, but believers inside his community.9 Thus, the image of the otherness in Christian texts is more likely to reflect the internal circumstances of the community than to reveal something of the object portrayed.

6 The boundaries drawn between Christianity and paganism have sometimes been interpreted as depicting reality, that is, the prevailing circumstances. This view is true to a degree but it seems to imply that apologists described their ideological positions as if these had been taken as a completed set of ideas. Instead, it should rather be emphasized that Christian writers shaped reality in their writings, elaborating and polarizing their discursive dichotomies between Christians and others. 7 E.g., Tacitus (hist. 5.4) stressed that Jewish rites were different from those of other mortals and that among Jews everything the Romans held sacred was profane whereas what among the Romans was forbidden was permitted among them. 8 GREG. NAZ. or. 45.4. Cf. MAR. VICTORIN. homous. 1: as Christians argued against the pagans, they spoke of one God, and when they debated with the Jews, they had to argue for the Father and the Son. KLEIN 1988, 433; M. FREDE, ‘Monotheism and Pagan Philosophy in Later Antiquity’, Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity, Oxford 1999, 41–67: 41. 9 E.g., 1 Cor 5:12; 12:2; 1 Thess 1:9; 4:12. HECKEL 1994, 275–9, 282–4 emphasizes that the target of Paul’s polemic is not pagans as such but rather those inside the Christian community.

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The Rhetoric of Boundaries For what partnership do righteousness and lawlessness have? Or what fellowship does light have with darkness? What accord has Christ with Beliar? Or what has a believer in common with an unbeliever? What agreement has the temple of God with idols? 2 Corinthians 6:14–16

During the fourth and fifth centuries Christian ecclesiastical leaders in their antipagan writings and imperial government in legislation attempted to establish rhetorical boundaries between Christianity and paganism. They redefined what was Christian and what was not. Christian boundary marks were drawn in relation to, not only polytheistic ideas and practices, but also urban festivals, classical literature, Roman history and Greek philosophy. Christian writers’ argumentation aimed at accentuating the differences between the two and, at the same time, minimizing the similarities.10 Scholars have stressed the strong Christian awareness of being different. This is certainly true to an extent, but taking Christian self-assurance at face value may be misleading. This does not mean to deny the existing differences between the Christian thinking and other strands of thought in Greco-Roman antiquity, but I am inclined to argue that we should also observe this awareness from the viewpoint of the rhetoric of difference. I would rather speak of Christian opinion leaders creating and reinforcing this awareness in their writings. The language of separation stands out at its clearest in Ambrose’s reaction to Symmachus’ famous plea of toleration. The bishop asserts, “your ways, therefore, do not agree with ours” (non congruunt igitur vestra nobiscum) and “we cannot stand any community with the alien error” (alieni erroris societatem suscipere non possumus). Similarly, Augustine stresses the ultimate separation from pagan society. A Christian cannot belong to both Christ and the devil: “Christ does not desire community of ownership, but he desires to possess alone what he has purchased. He has bought at so great a price that he may possess alone.” In the Christian catechesis, the teaching of the two ways stressed the difference of the two alternatives and rejection all that was understood as pagan.11 Jerome is an illustrative example of the rhetoric of segregation: his renowned question makes a difference between pagan, that is, Greek philosophy and Christianity, inquiring what Aristotle and Paul, what Plato and Peter had to do with each other: Quid Aristoteli et Paulo? Quid Platoni et Petro?12 10 J.W. HARGIS, Against the Christians: The Rise of Early Anti-Christian Polemic, New York 1999, 2–3 analyzes the same strategy in the pagan polemicists Celsus, Porphyry and Julian, calling it the rhetoric of difference. 11 AMBR. ep. 18.8 and 17.14 (= ep. 72–3, CSEL 82.3); AVG. in euang. Ioh. 7.7. For the catechetical tradition, see VAN OORT 1991, 326–51. 12 HIER. adv. Pelag. 1.15. Jerome imitates Tertullian (praescr. 7.9): Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid academiae et ecclesiae? Quid haereticis et christianis? Cf. TERT. apol. 46.18. Tertullian (spect. 28.1) demands that a Christian should abstain from the feasts,

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Legislative texts and polemical writings built a wall of hostility against nonChristians. Boundaries around legitimate religion were drawn in these texts and the condemned groups, pagans among others, were excluded from the rest of society. This language of segregation was applied in the imperial legislation against heretics as well. Manichaeans, for example, were said to have nothing in common with the rest of humankind.13 We observe different groups competing for the honour of having made the clearest separation from pagans. In a dispute with Faustus of Milevis, a Manichaean bishop, Augustine defends mainstream Christianity against the Manichee’s derision. Faustus ridicules mainstream Christians as being pagans and only a schism, not even a sect, of pagans whereas the Manichaeans have nothing to do with pagans.14 Faustus asserts that his views and cult are absolutely different from those of pagans. According to Faustus, Augustine’s Christians differ from pagans only in the fact that they have their own convent. In other issues Christians have not broken away from pagans since they had just transformed pagan sacrifices into love feasts and their idols into martyrs. Faustus maintains that there are only two religions (sectae), that of the pagans and that of the Manichaeans (gentium et nostra) that are as opposed to each other as were truth and falsehood, day and night, poverty and wealth, health and sickness.15 Augustine replies to Faustus by arguing that, although mainstream Christians do not call the Manichaeans pagans or a schism of pagans, the Manichees have some kind of resemblance to them. Augustine’s reproach is no milder than that of Faustus for he continues by stating that the Manichaeans are even worse than pagans.16 We see the rhetoric of boundaries developing and changing in the course of the fourth- and fifth- centuries. According to R.A. Markus there was a zigzag movement in the Christian attitudes to pagan, that is, classical culture: from about 380 until

spectacles and games defined as pagan and that a Christian could not have anything in common with pagans: “We cannot recline with them at the same table, as they cannot with us.” His admonitions are reinforced with quotations from the Scriptures (spect. 26.4): Nemo enim potest duobus dominis servire [Mt 6.24] and Quid luci cum tenebris? Quid vitae et morti? [2 Cor 6:14]. For the ancient tradition of these rhetorical questions, see G.R. STANTON, ‘Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid mihi tecum est and Ti emoi kai soi;’, Rheinisches Museum 116 (1973), 84–90. 13 Against heretics in CTh 16.5; against Manicheans in particular: 16.5.18 (in 389): nihil ad summum his sit commune cum mundo; 16.5.3; 16.5.40: nihil ex moribus, nihil ex legibus sit commune cum ceteris. D. HUNT, ‘Christianising the Roman Empire: the evidence of the Code’, The Theodosian Code, London 1993, 143–58: 156. 14 Faustus apud AVG. c. Faust. 20.1. MARKUS 1974, 8 states that, to an outsider such as Faustus, paganism and Christianity looked only too alike. Or, to be more accurate, Faustus was able to sneer at the similarities in Christian and pagan ideas and practices. See the discussion in Chapter 5. 15 Faustus apud AVG. c. Faust. 20.3; 20.4. … qui eis longe sentimus, ita quidem obpositi invicem nobis, ut est veritas et mendacium, ut dies et nox, ut egestas et copia, ut morbus et sanitas. Faustus crowns his insult by labelling mainstream Christians as not even a sect either of truth or error or a schism of truth, but just a schism from error. 16 AVG. c. Faust. 20.5.

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about 400, a hardening of earlier more resilient attitudes is apparent and from about 400 onwards the attitudes begin to soften again.17 In the light of the interplay of similarities and differences in Christian polemics, the wavelike movement in the Christian attitudes observed by Markus seems to reflect the fears of Christian opinion leaders. These leaders regarded Christians as having assimilated themselves too closely with their pagan neighbours and saw Christian identity as endangered. Consequently, they reacted with the abrupt rhetoric that drew clear distinctions between pagan and Christian. Moments of assimilation and isolation can be discerned in Christian fourth- and fifth-century literature. The wavelike change in attitudes, however, is blurred by the great variety of positions of different writers. We cannot speak of a clear Christian position towards pagans and the pagan culture. The purpose of writing influenced the viewpoint, style and atmosphere. Augustine’s attitudes, for example, evolved in the course of his life and his approaches varied according to the genre of his writings: De doctrina christiana takes a more resilient tone than De civitate Dei. The question is who made these distinctions and who had the authority to draw the lines. Not all the members of Christian communities and not all the Christian writers were as absolute in their insistence on segregation as the severest guardians of Christian demarcation lines, Jerome for instance, were. The harsh language of separation could be interpreted as revealing the fears of the writers. The more painfully these writers felt their Christian identity to be threatened, the more absolute frontier lines they attempted to draw. It has been noted that Augustine felt himself more selfassured with classical culture than the anguished Jerome and this is discernible in Augustine’s treatment of classical tradition in De doctrina christiana. Christian argumentation in the apologetics of the previous centuries as well as in the fourth and fifth century literature is not merely accentuating differences and marking boundaries. There is a continuous dialectic between the similarity (societas) and difference (diversitas) in Christian apologetic and polemical literature. Because Christian authors were not only making debate but also aiming for a dialogue, mainly for missionary reasons, they needed to indicate similarities, too, in order to find a common starting point.18 Second- and third-century apologists had taken pains to minimize the differences and to stress the resemblances of the Christian and pagan spheres.19 The most prominent representative of this tendency is Justin who 17 MARKUS 1974, 5–7, 12–13; MARKUS 1990a, 30. 18 For the concepts of societas and diversitas, see C. GNILKA, Der Begriff des ‘rechten Gebrauchs’, Basel 1984, 94. As has been shown, e.g., by GNILKA 1984, in their attempts at missionary dialogue, Christian writers aimed to articulate Christian ideas in such a manner that could appeal to pagans. This tendency was not only due to conscious missionary purposes but also to the fact that Christians themselves outlined their cosmos in a very much similar manner as the rest of the Greco-Roman world. It is impossible to separate form and content here as if the content were ready-made and as if Christians lay mystically outside the GrecoRoman civilization. When Christians were articulating their ideas, they were constructing their worldview at the same time. 19 HARGIS 1999, 3. Tatian and Tertullian are exceptions to this rhetoric of similarity but even the absolute segregationist Tertullian (apol. 42) stresses the common life Christians share with pagans in their everyday life.

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had gone as far as to stress the common origin of Platonic and Christian doctrines – of course with the qualification that Plato and his followers had not grasped it all correctly. Thus Justin was inclined to see some pagan achievements as positive, the seeds of truth that were scattered around the world even before the advent of Christ. Christians taught the same things as the poets and philosophers whom pagans honoured but the Christian teaching was more precise and more divine.20 Christian writers were inclined both to reveal and conceal similarities. When similarities in Christian and pagan cult practices, cosmology, concepts of deity and morality were felt uncomfortable, they were either ignored or denied. Augustine, for example, forbids his pagan opponents as well as his readers to make comparison between the homage paid to Christian martyrs and the veneration of the pagan Gods. In his argumentation Augustine draws a sharp distinction between the Christian feasting in martyrs’ graves and sacrifices made to the pagan Gods. It is the malevolent pagans who want to see these completely distinct things as parallel.21 Similarities were explained as imitation, too. In order to deceive human beings and prevent them from embracing Christianity, demons and the devil in particular copied the original true Christian doctrine and cult and created the variety of pagan practices. Augustine tells us that demons knew of the coming of Christ beforehand and set out to imitate Christ’s example in creating a counterfeit of Christ. Thus, demons try to deceive those who follow Christ. Jerome also contrasts the true Christian religion with the counterfeit of the others as he replies to Jovinian who condemns the Christian practice of fast because pagans also fast, particularly in the cults of Isis and Cybele. He argues that there are absolute differences in these practices: Christian fasting is true and the pagan one only a forgery in the same way as Moses’ signs were true and imitated by the Egyptian magi. Their signs were in reality no signs at all and therefore Moses’ [sic] rod swallowed their rods [Exod 7:12]. Similarly, the Christian true virginity is by no means cancelled by the devil’s virgins – probably an allusion to the Vestals. The devil tries to rival God (aemulatio Dei), Jerome concludes, but this does not prove the true Christian practices as superstitious. This argument of imitation was also utilized by polytheists. Ambrosiaster reports that some pagans regard the Christian Good Friday as a plagiarism (quasi per aemulationem superstitione quadam inventam) from the expiation spring ceremony of Cybele and Attis. He argues that, because fallacy arrived before the truth, it made the truth look like fallacy. 22 20 IUST. 1. apol. 18–20 stressed resemblances between the Christian teaching and the ideas of philosophers, poets and prophets; 1. apol. 44: the imitation by pagans and the seeds of truth; 2. apol. 13.3: spermatikos logos. Cf. Theophilus of Antioch (Autol. 2.8) who admitted that, although pagan poets wrote with an erring imagination and without the pure spirit, they sometimes uttered in the name of the true living God. Similarly, Clement of Alexandria, Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea cherished the idea of the praeparatio evangelica of pagan thinkers and aimed to demonstrate that there was an essential agreement between Christianity and all that was best in Greco-Roman culture. 21 AVG. civ. 8.27. 22 AVG. in euang. Ioh. 7.6. HIER. adv. Iovin. 2.17. PS. AVG. quaest. test. 84.3: ut, quia praevenit veritatem fallacia, veritas fallacia videretur, quasi antiquitate praeiudicans veritati.

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Religious rivals accused each other of imitating and forging beliefs and practices. In order to show the cult practices of the other as merely a counterfeit of one’s own practices, it was essential to prove that one’s religion was more ancient than those of the others and thus the original religion. Earlier apologists as well had explained the similarities in cult and belief by using the argument of imitation. Justin had referred frequently to the imitation by demons that had heard from the prophets of the advent of Christ and wanted to lead humans astray from the true knowledge. Therefore, they had invented all the myths of Zeus’ sons and their miracles so similar to Christ and his true accomplishments. Demons succeeded in deceiving people because they mixed falsehoods with true things. Tertullian had stated that the devil combined something resembling the divine in his idolatrous ceremonies, in baptism in particular.23 Debate, Polemic and Otherness I use the terms debate, dispute and polemic when describing the Christian rhetorical strategies against pagans. Debate refers to a discussion about a subject on which interlocutors have different views that they defend. Debate and dispute are used here roughly as synonyms although dispute refers to a stronger disagreement between two or more persons. I regard debate as attempting to persuade other debaters through argumentation and I stress an aim of change of opinions, attitudes or beliefs. Thus, my understanding of debate differs, for example, from that of D. Rokeah who interprets debate as not aiming at any change.24 Polemic is understood here as a strong attack – either written or spoken – on a particular group of people, doctrine or belief. Polemic also includes a defence of one’s opinions and beliefs. Contrary to Rokeah’s definition of polemic that stresses the attempt to change an opponent’s views or ideology,25 in my interpretation polemic does not necessarily aim to change an opponent’s views (though this is possible). The purpose of polemic is to reinforce one’s own stand and weaken the other’s position. 23 IUST. 1. apol. 21–3; 25; 54; 62: baptism; 66: Eucharist. Cf. THEOPH. Autol. 2.37 who explained similarities as plagiarisms of pagan authors; TERT. praescr. 50.2; coron. 15; bapt. 5.1; ieiun. 16.7; cf. NOVATIAN. spect. 3.3, who remarked that, through the devil’s artifice, things that were holy were changed into illicit things; LACT. inst. 6.7; 2.16.5; FIRM. err. 22.1. 24 Cf. D. ROKEAH, Jews, Pagans and Christians in Conflict, Jerusalem 1982, 9, who regards debate and dispute as synonymous, defining both of them as “an interchange of words aiming at the clarification of various matters”. According to Rokeah, “the disputants participate while fully aware that the outcome will not entail any crucial change in their future attitudes, behaviour or fate”. According to C. PERELMAN – L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, London 1969, 38, in a debate, “each interlocutor advances only arguments favourable to his own thesis, and his sole concern with arguments unfavourable to him is for the purpose of refuting them or limiting their impact”. 25 ROKEAH 1982, 9 defines polemic as a campaign or conflict that aims to change an opponent’s view or his religion. “A religious polemic”, he adds, “can be conducted independently or in conjunction with other coercive means, police or political. … a polemic is at the same time also apologetics, that is, a justifying of oneself in the face of an opponent’s attack”. ROKEAH 1982, 10 classifies the antagonism between pagans and Christians as polemic while the Jewish – Christian confrontation and the Jewish – pagan one were merely disputes.

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Polemic can be seen as a form of aggression as well as a mere attack. In some texts it is impossible to draw a distinction between debate and polemic. In fourth-century debate and polemic, it was often a question as much of the reinforcement of identity and restoration of discipline inside the Christian community as of refuting and annihilation of opponents. Many of these writings were addressed both to outsiders and insiders. A good example is Augustine’s City of God, which addresses both those inside and those outside the community.26 An apologetic and polemic work aimed to fortify the position of one’s own religion and this was achieved by strengthening the faith of those inside the community against the criticism, scepticism and hostility – real or imagined – from outside. Christian writers also attempted to persuade outsiders, either pagans or Jews, of the superiority of their own religion, both in showing opponents’ errors and introducing the Christian truth. Augustine’s City of God illustrates these manifold aims in the early fifth century. The first part of the work (books 1–10) is a learned refutatio of the false opiniones of pagans while the second part (books 11–22) is a demonstratio of the true Christian doctrine.27 Augustine frequently declares that the work is targeted at unbelievers who do not believe in Christ, but he states that baptised Christians will get consolation and answers from it as well.28 The church father aims not only to prove false the views of the pagans, but also to satisfy the doubts of hesitating individuals. Furthermore, Augustine regards his pagan audience as divided into two categories, the incurable and the curable. First, there are those who, being so foolish and stubborn, remain immune to argumentation. Second, there were those who 26 In the apologetic tradition of previous centuries, some writings were clearly exoteric, addressed to outsiders, e.g., Tertullian’s Ad Scapulam and Minucius Felix’s Octavius, and the argumentation implies criticism from outside. Some writings have been classified as esoteric since they are clearly addressed to insiders: among these there are treatises such as Tertullian’s De spectaculis and De idololatria, Cyprian’s Ad Donatum and Novatian’s De spectaculis. Whoever was addressed in these writings, it is obvious that they all aimed at self-affirmation and self-justification among Christians themselves. F. YOUNG, ‘Greek Apologists of the Second Century’, Apologetics in the Roman Empire, Oxford 1999, 81–104: 90–92. Christian apologetic hardly was much read outside the Christian community – this applies to the second and third centuries but also to the fourth century. There were only a few non-Christian writers, Celsus, Porphyry, Hierocles and Julian, who are known to have debated with Christians in the course of these centuries. M. EDWARDS – M. GOODMAN – S. PRICE – C. ROWLAND, ‘Introduction: Apologetics in the Roman World’, Apologetics in the Roman Empire, Oxford 1999, 1–13: 9; E. HECK, Me Theomakhein oder: die Bestrafung des Götterverächters, Frankfurt am Main 1987, 89–90. 27 Cf. TERT. nat. 1.20.14: erroris inspectio et veritatis cognitio. The purposes of apologetic: M. FIEDROWICZ, Apologie im frühen Christentum, Paderborn 2000, 16–17. For the twofold function of City of God, see VAN OORT 1991, 164–70, who stresses that the work is to be regarded, not only as an apologetic work, but also as a thetic exposition; J.-C. GUY, Unité et structure logique de la “Cité de Dieu” de saint Augustin, Paris 1961. 28 AVG. civ. 1.16: Nec tantum hic curamus alienis responsionem reddere, quantum ipsis nostris consolationem; 1.28.2; 1.29.1; cf. 4.2.45; ep. 184A; cf. LACT. inst. 5.1.9: nostros ... confirmabimus. For the audience of the work, see T.D. BARNES, ‘Aspects of the background of City of God’, Revue de l’Université d’Ottawa 52 (1982), 64–80: 73.

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could reflect upon the church father’s arguments and weigh them without any, or too obstinate, devotion to their old errors. He also distinguishes between those with ingenia celeriora atque meliora who were convinced by his argumentation in the six preceding books and those who needed even more instruction and persuasion.29 Augustine addresses his pagan adversaries, who at the same time are those to be persuaded and converted, vaguely and with circumlocution: they are illi, isti or ii, qui. They are never named and hardly ever called pagans.30 Despite this anonymity, his opponents have been identified on the basis of the insinuations that Augustine has scattered throughout his work: these people are worshippers of false Gods and have arrived at Carthage as refugees from Rome. They are of noble birth, “the offspring of men like Regulus and Scaevola, Scipio and Fabricius”. These people question Christian doctrine and blame the sack of Rome and other disasters on the Christian religion. By their accusations they try to stir simple folk up against Christians. Thus, they are destroying themselves when they insult God but they are also deceiving the ignorant.31 Augustine’s twofold work was targeted at cultivated incerti who were prone to reflect on his argumentation and put away their old errors when they were sufficiently convinced. Many of his intended readers, for instance, the senator Volusianus, came from noble families that had been partly Christianized and were thus already connected with Christianity. Neil McLynn demonstrates how hard Augustine actually had to labour in order to make an impression on these cultivated aristocrats and get into their circles.32 In order to convince and impress his potential learned audience, Augustine had to argue with pagans in their terms on their cultural and intellectual ground, using common terminology, methods and argumentation and operating with Roman history, Stoic and Platonic philosophy and references to literature. City of God was necessary for those baptized Christians and catechumens who needed fortification in their own uncertainties and support in debates with pagans. Thus, it was a manual that offered ready-made arguments as weapons against pagan 29 AVG. civ. 6. praef; 7. praef. 30 AVG. civ. passim, e.g., 1. praef.: eos qui conditori eius deos suos praeferunt. Cf. Arnobius, who introduces his opponents either by inquit or inquiunt or indirectly. A. REHN, ‘Vomunt ut edant, edunt ut vomant. Beobachtungen zur Epikurpolemik in der römischen Literatur’, Die Heiden. Juden, Christen und das Problem des Fremden, Tübingen 1994, 381– 99: 383: isti is used pejoratively of rivals in the polemic between philosophical schools. 31 AVG. civ. 1. praef.; 2.3; 2.29; 3.17; 4.18; 5.22: nec insanis adversus deum linguis se interimant et decipiant imperitos; 1.1; 3.31 claims that many of them had saved themselves by seeking shelter in Christian churches. Both BARNES 1982, 73 and O’DALY 1994, 68–9 believe that Augustine identified his opponents accurately and that potential readers can be precisely specified. 32 N.B. MCLYNN, ‘Augustine’s Roman Empire’, History, Apocalypse, and the Secular Imagination. AugSt 30.2 (1999), 29–44: 34–5 remarks that these cultivated aristocrats probably regarded Augustine as a mere provincial bishop and did not readily accept him as a worthy antagonist. McLynn even casts doubts on whether Augustine ever actually met Volusianus whereas M. MOREAU, Le dossier Marcellinus dans la Correspondance de saint Augustin, Paris 1973, 53 believes that Augustine and Volusianus were well acquainted. For Volusianus and his Christianized family, see Chapter 2.

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views. This becomes clear in Augustine’s correspondence with Marcellinus, who refers to uncomfortable situations that Christians, faced in disputes with pagans and requests the bishop to provide texts that could be useful in these debates.33 In the latter part of City of God Augustine deals with various problems that had probably arisen in these and other discussions, such as tricky passages in the Scripture, chronological problems and problems concerning carnal resurrection. Augustine provides his fellow Christians with consultation in another work, De divinatione daemonum. The dispute was related to the destruction of the Serapeion in 391 as rumours were spread that the priests of Serapis predicted the devastation of the temple in advance. Christians were confused on what to reply to arrogant pagans and searched for suitable answers to pagan arguments in a debate on divination.34 Similarly, Augustine offers advice to Deogratias, a priest who had to answer arguments against the Christian doctrine raised by a pagan intellectual. The bishop gives explanations to the questions raised and asks Deogratias to share these answers with others whom the priest knows to be interested.35 Ecclesiastical leaders stressed the importance of proper catechesis since they felt that feebly instructed Christians were vulnerable to the influence of the nonChristian environment and heretical impact. Augustine remarked that the ignorance of some Christians disposed them to be prey for the Manichaeans. Earlier apologetic works had had a didactic function: it had been important to make use of readyformulated arguments that could be applied in debates with outsiders. They had served both as self-affirmation and as missionary tools.36 The reinforcement of the hesitant is the motive of Cyril of Alexandria in writing the Contra Iulianum between 434–441. Cyril declares in his dedication to Emperor Theodosius II that Julian’s polemic against Christians in Contra Galilaeos had caused a lot of damage by making many Christians uncertain.37 The tricky questions raised by pagans, Jews 33 MARCELL. Aug. ep. 138. The didactic character of City of God is stressed in AVG. ep. Divjak 1A and 2 (= 212A and 272) in which Augustine persuades Firmus to embrace Christianity finally and hopes that, reading the books of De civitate Dei, Firmus would be encouraged to enter the city of God. Moreover, he asks Firmus to distribute the books of his work to his friends, both to those who wished to be instructed in Christian doctrine and to those who still clung to superstition. See Chapter 2. 34 AVG. div. daem. 1.1. Augustine’s discussion resembles his argumentation in books 8–9 in City of God. De divinatione daemonum, written between 406 and 411, is a dialogue that is set between a group of lay brothers and Augustine; for the work, see K. KÜHN, ‘Augustins Schrift De divinatione daemonum’, Augustiniana 47 (1997), 291–337. 35 AVG. ep. 102.1 ad Deogratias (c. 409). This pagan, known both to Augustine and Deogratias, had become a difficult case for Augustine since he had not answered the bishop’s letters. The issues disputed were the resurrection, the reason why Christianity appeared so late to the world, the similarity of pagan sacrifices and the sacrifices in the Old Testament, the eternal punishment, the existence of the Son of God and the story of Jonah. 36 AVG. c. Faust. 14.8: Talis imperitia nonnullorum catholicorum, venatio Manichaeorum. 37 CYR. c. Iul. praef. 4.20. HUBER-REBENICH – CHRONZ 1998, 71–2. Similarly, ORIG. Cels. 1. praef. 4 complained about the injury and insecurity that Celsus’ arguments had caused to Christians. In fact, Origen composed his work in order to confirm these Christians shaken in their faith.

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or heretics were one of the reasons why the question-and-answer format became so popular in Christian literature.38 Argumentation In argumentation one attempts to persuade one’s audience to believe one’s account of reality instead of the rival’s version. Thus, one tries to modify a pre-existing state of affairs, arguing one’s version of reality to be factual and making one’s positions, opinions and contentions to appear an undisputed fact.39 In argumentation, protreptic (exhortative) and apologetic (defensive) tones are closely intertwined in Christian debate and polemic: defensive rhetoric, which attempts to fortify one’s own arguments, and aggressive rhetoric, which aims to damage the arguments of an opponent, are essentially connected to each other. Christian apologetic and polemic was a daughter of ancient Greco-Roman rhetoric in its adaptation of argumentative devices and rhetorical figures. It drew from Jewish apologetic tradition as well.40 We observe rhetorical devices of the ancient tradition utilized, for example, in the use of analogies and metaphors, the dialectical use of question and answer, rhetorical questions, reiterations, anticipation of possible counter arguments and introduction of classifications. Writers often proceeded in answering an opponent’s arguments item by item. Cyril of Alexandria, for instance, advanced by answering Julian’s objections point by point and41 Augustine engaged his opponents, answering their arguments item by item. Writers concentrated in pointing out the inconsistencies on the rival ideology and ignoring the weaknesses of their own. In City of God, for example, Augustine searched for internal inconsistencies and discrepancies of pagan authors such as Cicero, Apuleius and Porphyry and then offered Christian doctrine as a resolution.42 It is noteworthy that rhetoric, persuasion and convincing are not needed when there prevails a perfect identification and concord between the interlocutors. Neither 38 For the question-and-answer literature, see Erotapokriseis. Early Christian Questionand-Answer Literature in Context, Leuven 2004. The Apocriticus written by Macarius of Magnesia probably around 400 was one these erotapokriseis writings; R. WAELKENS, L’économie, thème apologétique et principe herméneutique dans l’Apocriticos de Macarios Magnès, Louvain 1974, 296. 39 PERELMAN – OLBRECHTS-TYTECA 1969, 54. 40 M. RIZZI, Ideologia e retorica negli exordia apologetici. Il problema dell’altro (II–III secolo), Milano 1993. 17. For the influence of Jewish apologetic, see M. GOODMAN 1999, ‘Josephus’ Treatise Against Apion’, Apologetics in the Roman Empire, Oxford 1999, 45–58: 51. 41 Cf. Origen, who had presented Celsus’ arguments and then refuted them item by item. K. PICHLER, Streit um das Christentum. Der Angriff des Kelsos und die Antwort des Origenes, Bern 1980, 220, 228. In Praeparatio evangelica, Eusebius had stated his truth first and then attacked Porphyry’s arguments. Lactantius (inst. 2.6) was convinced that he would refute the arguments of his pagan opponents, not only by the Christian truth but even by their own words. 42 AVG. civ. passim. AVG. ep. 118.12 stresses that in order to refute pagan errors one must know them well enough. Cf. EUS. praep. 1.6.8–9, who quoted an ample variety of authors in order to show the contradictions of pagan philosophy, particularly Porphyry’s arguments against Christians.

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is there use for rhetoric if the parties are completely apart from each other, that is, if there is no kind of contact of minds. Rhetorical strategies are used in debates between Christians and non-Christians in which both identification and distinction are possible between the competing groups. Therefore, in argumentation it is essential to start with such premises as are commonly shared and accepted. Building communicative bridges is a way of captatio benevolentiae. Christian apologists and polemicists had to find threads of mutual understanding and agreement.43 One example of searching for a point of contact is the letter of Paulinus of Nola addressed to an incertus, Iovius. Paulinus maintains that it is a universally accepted fact that all comes from God – only profane people can doubt that. Thus, Paulinus leans on an alleged consensus about the concept of deity. Later he tries to build a bridge between Christian and Stoically coloured philosophical thinking by appealing to virtue.44 In his discussion with Platonists in City of God, Augustine finds points of mutual agreement, premises that are shared by both Christians and Platonists, for instance, in issues of the immortality of the soul, the afterlife beatitudo and their concentration on contemplating the deity as well as God’s creation of the universe and his providence.45 After having built a communicative bridge between him and his Platonizing opponents, Augustine turns to refute those views that differ from Christian dogma. One method of denigrating the other side is to construct a straw man, a caricatured or extreme version of the antagonist’s arguments, simplifying and twisting the opposing views into a feeble construction that is easy to contest and ridicule. Those details that do not serve the refutation are left out and those issues that do serve one’s own purposes are emphasized. Many of Porphyry’s arguments were probably cut into suitably distorted torsos in Christian argumentation, for instance, in Augustine’s debate against his views. Thus, the complete original argumentation was not presented in its complexity. Furthermore, in his discussion on the afterlife beatitudo in City of God, Augustine keeps silent on pagan mystery cults. He wants to show that pagan religions have nothing to offer for a human in quest of eternal happiness and it is only Christianity that can provide this bliss; therefore, it is not favourable to mention mystery religions that promised alternatives to the Christian afterlife.

43 Arguments that created a sympathetic atmosphere between the writer and the intended audience were particularly important in the exordia of the works, whether they were protreptic or more disputative. The purpose of the exordium is to make the listeners benevolent to the speaker and to secure their attention and interest: ARISTOT. rhet. 3.14.1414b–1416a; CIC. inv. 1.20; orat. 8.28; QVINT. inst. 4.1; PERELMAN – OLBRECHTS-TYTECA 1969, 495–6. RIZZI 1993, 8, 14 on the significance of the exordium in Christian apologetic writings. 44 PAVL. NOL. ep. 16.3; 16.6. For Iovius as an incertus, see Chapter 2. 45 Particularly AVG. civ. 8.1–11. In civ. 1.36 Augustine lists shared positions and states that Platonists are above all other opponents because they are in agreement with Christians on many points; cf. civ. 8.11. Despite Platonists’ polytheistic views, their concept of God as immaterial and unchangeable was true. AVG. civ. 8.4; 2.29 even admits that Platonists might have known the trinitarian divinity.

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Similarly, the writer of Consultationes Zacchei et Apollonii represents the views of the pagan interlocutor, Apollonius, as a set of arguments that is easy to refute.46 Unity and Diversity As was seen in Chapter 2, Christian polemicists lumped their polytheistic opponents together into one manageable group. This method extended the simplification and complemented the construction of a ‘straw man’ and it proved to be efficient because it was easier to shoot at one target than to go through all the rival groups one at a time.47 Consequently, the miscellaneous arguments and beliefs of Greek philosophers, polytheistic oracles and priest, classical poets and historians were lumped together in the Christian argumentation. Not only were the adherents of diverse local cults bundled together, but mainstream Christian leaders sometimes regarded all their religious rivals as united into a conspiracy against orthodox Christianity. Augustine remarked that pagans murmured in accordance with the Jews and heretics. He believed that the Jews, pagans and heretics had formed a unity against the unity of Catholic Christians, thus contrasting their unity, the unity of paganism, Judaism and heresy, against our unity.48 Similarly, Primasius of Hadrumentum lumped together pagans, false Christians, heretics and schismatics, belonging to the devil’s part of the world, while proper mainstream Christians constituted God’s side of the world.49 Mainstream Christians saw pagans, heretics and schismatics as one front united against Catholic Christianity.50 Although the religious and ideological rivals were bundled together and seen as a unity, their chaotic diversity and discord were emphasized against the unity and concord of Christians. Our group was uniform and solid whereas their group was 46 For the argumentation, see J.L. FEIERTAG, ‘Introduction’, Questions d’un païen à un chrétien I, Paris 1994, 7–73: 16. 47 As FOWDEN 1988, 176 puts it, pagans were “given a name by the lazy cunning of Christian apologists, who could then use their most salacious material to discredit all their opponents at one go”; cf. FOWDEN 1993, 38. 48 AVG. serm. 62.18: Sciatis autem, charissimi, murmura illorum [scil. paganorum] coniungere se cum haereticis, cum Iudaeis. Haeretici, Iudaei et pagani unitatem fecerunt contra unitatem [scil. nostram]. 49 PRIMAS. in apoc. 837: Duae partes sunt in mundo, una Dei et altera diaboli. Sed diaboli in tres subdividitur partes, intus ac foris, id est gentilitas, falsi fratres, et aperto errore vel schismati separati; cf. GAVDENT. serm. 7.21. 50 E.g., IOH. CHRYS. adv. Iud. 1.6. Basil of Caesarea (hom. c. Sabell. 24.1) remarks that pagans and Jews had fought against each other but they had also fought against Christianity. In Christian apologetics the Jews and the Hellenes had often been bunched together: the Jews were seen as making the same errors as the pagans, for instance, clinging to ritualistic cult tradition and denying the divinity of Christ; WAELKENS 1974, 21. It is difficult to say whether pagans and heretic Christians really allied against Catholic Christianity in particular cases. It is more appropriate to state that mainstream Christians, lumping their rivals together, were inclined to interpret the situation in terms of conspiracy. For the cooperation between pagans, Jews and heretics, see L. CRACCO RUGGINI, ‘Gli antichi e il diverso’, L’intolleranza: uguali e diversi nella storia, Bologna 1986, 13–49: 39–40.

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dispersed and disunified. Christians were in harmonius concord while pagans were scattered in their discord. Greek philosophical schools were bunched together but, consequently, pagan philosophers were never unanimous about anything. Augustine, for instance, stresses the diversity of opinions of Greek philosophers: multiplying Varro’s speculation on the four ends to human endeavour, he elaborates 288 possible opinions that the Greek schools of thought held about the summum bonum. This ridiculous assortment of opinions is contraposed with the unity of the Christian truth of Christ. Orosius contrasts the confusion and discord of pagan views with the one Christian opinion.51 The lack of unity among Greek philosophers and pagan writers in general had been a frequent issue in earlier Christian apologetic and polemic. In Irrisio gentilium philosophorum Hermias had ridiculed how Greek philosophers contradicted and refuted each other, for example, in their opinions of the human soul. Eusebius of Caesarea had laid emphasis on the diaphonia of pagan writers. The dissension of pagan authors was contrasted with the alleged homonoia of the Christians. The truth was one and, therefore, the concord of the Christians was an essential value because it proved that they alone had acquired the truth.52 Tatian had connected diversity and plurality with immorality and insanity. Where there was multiplicity, there was error and this was caused by demons.53 Correspondingly, pagan writers were prone to point to Christian discord. Augustine reports to us that pagans mock at Christian splitting up into competing sects.54 He complains that the internal clash and violence among rivalling Christians encouraged the pagans, Jews and heretics to stick together. He even has to admit that polytheists practice their numerous cults in harmony while Christians, filled with bitterness and mutual hatred, clashed against each other.55 Thus, Augustine himself

51 The discussion on summum bonum in AVG. civ. 19.1–3. OROS. hist. 6.1.4: multas ... suspiciones confusa dissensio – una opinio. 52 HERMIAS irris. 2–3; EUS. praep. 1.7.16; 1.8.14–16; 1.9.28; for other examples, see G. DORIVAL, ‘L’apologétique chrétienne et la culture grecque’, Les Apologistes chrétiens et la culture grecque, Paris 1998, 423–65: 449–50. 53 TAT. or. 8; 32: Greek culture was dispersed into many contradicting dogmas whereas Christians completely lacked this diversity and their philosophy suited for all. TAT. or. 29.2–3; 30.11–14 regarded monarchic constitution of the universe as the best option that liberated humans from numerous lords and myriad tyrants. E. NORELLI, ‘La critique du pluralisme grec dans le Discours aux Grecs de Tatien’, Les Apologistes chrétiens et la culture grecque, Paris 1998, 81–120: 81, 92–4, 98. K. OEHLER, ’Der Consensus Omnium als Kriterium der Wahrheit in der antike Philosophie und der Patristik: Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Begriffs der allgemeinen Meinung’, Antike und Abendland 10 (1961), 103–30: 117–23; R. LIM, ‘Christian Triumph and Controversy’, Interpreting Late Antiquity, Cambridge Mass. 2001, 196–218: 196–9. 54 AVG. serm. 47.28: gentiles pagani qui manserunt, non habentes quid dicant contra nomen Christi, dissensiones Christianorum Christianis obiiciunt. Celsus (apud ORIG. Cels. 3.10–12) had already used this argument against Christians and showed how they were dispersed into a multitude of sects. Ammianus (22.5.3) tells us that Julian advised Christians to lay aside their divergences and each to observe one’s own beliefs. 55 AVG. ep. 20.18; 20.20; 20.26; util. ieiun. 8–9.

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connects polytheism with social coherence, contraposing it with the monotheism of quarrelsome Christians. Apart from this concession, polytheism was mainly associated with chaos and confusion. The multiplicity of pagan cults and the multitude of pagan Gods are opposed with the one Christian faith and the one Christian God, for instance, in the first seven books of Augustine’s City of God. For Augustine, pagan diversity constitutes the earthly city that is contraposed with the Christian unity of the city of God. This harmony is divine whereas the confusion is demonic. He interprets the metaphor of the terrena civitas, Babylon, to mean ‘the city of confusion’. In books 18 and 19 he lays emphasis on the multiplicity and discrepancy in the history of the earthly city represented by the secular empires.56 Eusebius of Caesarea had already presented polytheism as connected with ethnic dissent within the Empire and as a cause or catalyst of conflict and chaos.57 The letter of a polytheist grammarian, Maximus of Madauros, to Augustine shows how a pagan perceived the diversity of polytheism that was so vigorously condemned by church fathers. Maximus argues that the diversity of religions is indispensable for creating social cohesion and introduces an oxymoron concors discordia, harmonious discord, in which all humans – this implies both pagans and Christians – pay homage to their common Father in a thousand ways.58 In the same way, a Constantinopolitan polytheist rhetorician, Themistius, describes the diversity as a positive issue. He maintains that the supreme deity did not want unity of worship and points out that the supreme deity had even separated the Syrians themselves, that is, Christians, into various sects.59 Polarity and Authority Each writer elaborates pairs in which the second term is the opposite of the first one and hierarchically subordinate. These pairs are introduced as facts that structure the discourse in a way that makes it appear objective and uncontested. Christian 56 AVG. civ. 20.11. DOUGHERTY 1979, 85–8. For the multitude of Gods and the one God, see Chapter 6. 57 EUS. or. 9.2; 13.9; 16.2–3; 17.13–14. All error and immorality – war, rape and adultery – comes from polytheistic diversity and truth and morality from Christian unity. Unified worship of one true God and universal moral law will end idolatry and immorality. An enemy is usually described as working against law and order and causing chaos in society. DAGRON 1968, 170; H. CHADWICK, ‘Christian and Roman Universalism in the Fourth Century’, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Leiden 1993, 26–42: 37–8; see Chapter 6. 58 MAX. MADAVR. Aug. ep. 16.4: Dii te servent, per quos et eorum atque cunctorum mortalium communem patrem universi mortales, quos terra sustinet, mille modis concordi discordia veneramur et colimus. Maximus of Madauros is only known from Augustine’s correspondance (AVG. ep. 16–17). MASTANDREA 1985, 30–31 finds hidden criticism of Christian dissension in Maximus’ mockery of Namphamo, probably a Donatist martyr. This possible criticism is interesting particularly because Maximus praises the discordia concors later in his letter. 59 THEM. or. 5.70a.

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apologists and polemicists resorted to binary oppositions as well. They created their own dichotomies but they also worked with polarities of the Greco-Roman tradition by inverting them. The hierarchy of an oppositional pair is turned upside down: for instance, in the case of the binary opposition of religio and superstitio, the traditional hierarchy of the Roman religion as a religio and Christianity as a superstitio was reversed and, instead of the earlier hierarchy, another hierarchical pattern was introduced. In this inversion it was possible to make use of the old arguments of the traditional discourse but to convert them to Christian use. Previous Roman charges against the Christians who were accused of angering the Gods were reversed to Christian charges against pagans who angered the Christian God with their idolatrous cults. Similarly, accusations of Christian immorality were transformed into blame for the immorality of polytheistic cults. This method of counterattack, retorsio, was one of the most characteristic features of Christian apologetic.60 In attacking pagan authoritative texts, Christian writers seem to have challenged an argument from authority, but, in fact, they appealed to the very same pagan texts as important evidence when these suited the argumentation. Were pagan authors used to build a communicative bridge in a dialogue with non-Christians? Searching for a starting point in a persuasive dialogue was only one aspect in the deployment of pagan authors, such as Euhemerus, Porphyry, Varro, Cicero, Seneca and even oracles. These writers were used as evidence for documenting the veracity of the Christian doctrine against the falsehoods of pagan religions and philosophies. Thus, the authorative texts of opponents were turned against pagan themselves. In their argumentation against pagan Gods, Christian polemicists made use of the philosophical critique of Greek and Roman writers who had questioned the religious practices of their own communities, the nature of Gods and their myths. Augustine, for example, turns Varro’s, Cicero’s and Seneca’s critiques of the Roman religion against the Roman Gods.61 This method of attacking paganism from within was reflected by John Chrysostom and Jerome who described how the Apostle Paul had stricken Hellenes with their own weapons. In John Chrysostom’s words, Paul tore down the altar in the Areopagus at Athens with the help of the inscription of the very same altar. Jerome states that Paul turned the inscription into an argument for the Christian faith and he was like David who defeated Goliath – polytheism – with the enemy’s own sword.62 Earlier Christian apologists had quoted a wide range of pagan writers to refute the falsity of polytheism and to indicate the Christian truth.63 Although Tertullian was pessimistic about the use of the polytheists’ own weapons, he nevertheless regarded 60 PERELMAN – OLBRECHTS-TYTECA 1969, 422, 441. For religio and superstitio, see Chapter 4. For retorsio, see FIEDROWICZ 2000, 162–3, M.B. SIMMONS, Arnobius of Sicca, Oxford 1995, 243–63, DORIVAL 1998, 456–7 and G. O’DALY, Augustine’s City of God, Oxford 1999, 8. 61 AVG. civ. 4 and 5 passim; e.g., 4.9; 4.31. For further discussion, see Chapter 6. 62 IOH. CHRYS. hom. 1 in actorum princip. 3; hom. 3 in Tit. 1; HIER. ep. 70.2. M. FIEDROWICZ, ‘Die Rezeption und Interpretation der paulinischen Areopag-Rede in der patristischne Theologie’, Trierer Theologische Zeitschrift 111 (2002), 85–105: 95. 63 E.g., IUST. 1. apol. 18 referred to oracles of Amphilochus, Dodone and Pytho, to the teachings of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato as well as to Homer in his argumentation of immortality and resurrection.

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curiosity and memory as of great importance when one wished to gather evidence of the Christian truth from the texts of pagan philosophers, poets and other teachers of wisdom. Lactantius, Arnobius and later Augustine found this method of arguing within the framework of the pagan value system most feasible.64 Ridicule and Denigration In the Christian argumentation against pagans we can distinguish between the erudite weapons and the less intellectual ones. Irony and ridicule were powerful armaments in Christian polemic. The rival views and their consequences were represented as ridiculous and thus as perverted views that cannot be taken seriously. Augustine mocks the multitude of Roman Gods and marches in the most absurd and preposterous divine figures of the Roman pantheon – among others Sterculus, Cloacina, Venus Calva, Timor, Pallor and Febris that belonged to a conventional list of ludicrous Gods used in Christian apologetics. After this disqualification no Roman God could be considered seriously as an alternative for the Christian God. In a letter to Maximus of Madauros, Augustine stresses that he needs to do nothing to deride the polytheistic Gods since pagan superstition itself offers so ample material for ridicule (quanta in vestra superstitione ridenda sint). Why should he mock their Gods when Maximus himself lays them open to ridicule (quos abs te subtiliter derideri).65 The beliefs of others were debarred as foolishness, naivity, illusion or myth. Rivals were mocked and called with names – pushed into categories with deprecatory connotations. The rhetoric of harsh defamation had not been unusual in the disputes between ancient philosophical schools: the Stoics and Academics, for example, had polished their own image by disparaging their rivals, the Epicureans. Polytheists had denigrated Christians and Christians had defamed rival Christian sects. Christians had been rumoured to have orgies; practice magic, incest and promiscuity; commit ritual murders and eat human flesh.66 64 TERT. test. anim. 1.1–3. E.g., LACT. inst. 5.4.6 states that pagans should be convinced with human testimonies so that their views would be refuted by their own authorities. ARNOB. nat. 4.25 appeals to pagan authors. Moreover, Lactantius and Arnobius turned the arguments that pagan writers had applied against Christians against polytheists themselves. M. EDWARDS 1999, 197 even speaks of robbing the pagans of their arsenal. 65 AVG. civ. 4.8 et passim; ep. 17.2; 17.5. The catalogue of preposterous Gods: MIN. FEL. 25.8. Ridicule in argumentation: PERELMAN – OLBRECHTS-TYTECA 1969, 206–207. 66 The denigration of the Epicureans: REHN 1994, 381–99. The denigration of Christians: MIN. FEL. 8–9; 12.7; 16.5; IUST. dial. 10; 1. apol. 29; TERT. apol. 2.4: homicidae, sacrilegi, incesti and publici hostes; 2.16; 7.1; 8.2; nat. 1.2.8; 1.9.2: cladis publicae vel iniuriae causas; 4.2: The denigration of Christian sects: CLEM. str. 3.2.10; EUS. eccl. 4.7.10; IUST. 1. apol. 26; IREN. haer. 1.6.3–4; 1.13.3. FREDOUILLE 1986, 1134; OPELT 1980, 68–72. S. BENKO, ‘Pagan Criticism of Christianity During the First Two Centuries A.D.’, ANRW II.23.2 (1980), 1055–118: 1089 shows surprising credulance of the defaming rhetoric when he takes the polemic of mainstream Christian writers against the Gnostics at face value and claims that “the pagan criticism of the Christian Eucharist is not mere religious polemic but was based on the practices of extremist fringe groups”.

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For their part, Christian polemicists called polytheists with derogatory names, such as impii, infideles, inimici, irreligiosi, sacrilegi, profani, iniusti, perfidi and iniqui.67 Pagan cult practices were labelled as dissolute and corrupt. Augustine’s critique of the cult of Magna Mater and Prudentius’ lists of profligate deities and depraved practices are illustrative examples of this technique. Fourth-century polemicists never failed to make mention of the perverted galli priests of the cult of Magna Mater.68 Furthermore, polytheists were called ignorant, foolish, stupid and infantile – with a nuance of compassionate pity – they were miserable beings. Augustine, for example, states that his pagan intellectual opponents stulti desipiendo iactitant as well as refers to the stupidity (stultitia) of pagan philosophy. Pagan writers for their part poured insults on Christians who were called stupid, insane, ignorant and perverted; Ambrosiaster reports that Christians were characterized as stulti in the late fourth century.69 Augustine compares polytheists to children who are playing in the mud, that is, paganism. These children are not capable of taking care of themselves and, therefore, imperial government must guide them as if they were minors under guardianship.70 Christian writers also defamed beliefs and opinions of their pagan rivals as old wives’ tales. Paulinus of Nola calls the Platonic views as comic prattling of old wives. Here Christian writers were closely connected with the Roman tradition that debased unaccepted religious beliefs and practices as old-womanish superstitions, superstitiones aniles.71 Furthermore, paganism was associated with madness and blindness. Augustine refers to the mira dementia and tam inmanis sacrilegaque dementia of his opponents. Pagans were mad in their furious impiety and ridiculous 67 AVG. civ. 16.21; 20.17: impii; 15.16: impii deorum multorum falsorumque cultores; civ. 9.19: isti … daemonicolae; AMBR. fid. 2.15.131: infideles; 1. prol. 5: perfidis. Tertullian had introduced an ample range of offensive appellations for polytheists: apol. 13.1; uxor. 2.6.1: iniqui; 2.5.1: iniusti; nat. 1.20.1: iniquissimae nationes; 1.7.29: miserae atque miserandae nations; idol. 2.1: importuni rebus humanis; apol. 39.8: they were less human, vos parum homines, quia mali fratres. Cf. LACT. inst. 5.10.11: impii. The invectives in Christian polemic have been collected by OPELT 1980. 68 Fourth- and fifth-century polemicists deride and reprimand pagan practices with all the usual traits already familiar to the second and third century apologists. For further discussion, see Chapter 5. 69 E.g., AVG. cons. euang. 1.26.40; 1.21.29: miseri; serm. 141.3; civ 4.2: stulti. Apologists had called pagans nescii, miseri and stulti: e.g., TERT. nat. 1.9.10: stultissimus; ARNOB. nat. 1.53: nescii, mentes incredulae; 2.5: nescii, etiam fletu et miseratione dignissimi; LACT. inst. 1.20.42: pagans who worshipped idols were in their stupidity like stones and stocks lapides et stipites; cf. epit. 52.10: stulti homunculi; inst. 2.6.11: stulti; 1.21.4: dementissimi homines; 2.17.8: homines inanissimi. Christians as stulti: PS. AVG. quaest. test. 114; AVG. ep. 102.30– 31; in psalm. 34.2.8; HIER. ep. 77.9; cf. ARNOB. nat. 2.31; 5.32; LACT. epit. 52.9. OPELT 1980, 74, 243–4 remarks that Christian writers employed insults similar to those used in Roman comedies. 70 AVG. serm. 62.18. Cf. TAT. or. 30, who writes that he wants to reject his previous pagan errors like the stupidities of his childhood. Pagans had been compared with children by EUS. praep. 1.6.1–3 and with abdicated boys and run-away slaves by LACT. inst. 4. 71 PAVL. NOL. ep. 16.4 : ridiculam anilis fabulae cantilenam; cf. ep. 1.9: aniles quaestiones. Aniles superstitiones are discussed in Chapter 4.

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in their blindness. Carmen contra paganos mocks an unnamed pagan senator as filled with rabies animi and insania mentis.72 The term deliramentum is frequently used in referring to the views and beliefs of pagan opponents. Insanity was associated with the label of superstitio as well. Another technique of denigration of the ‘other’ is dehumanization by comparison with animals. Polytheists were considered dogs, asses, snakes and scorpions. This was by no means a Christian innovation but rather Christian authors continued a long tradition of defaming rivals. Maximus of Turin states that polytheists were like the ass that with eyes closed goes in the circle of its own error round the millstone of ignorance. Pagans were referred to as dogs but this was not always understood as derogatory since pagans were the dogs destined to be converted into Christianity, for example in Augustine’s exegesis on the story of the Canaanite woman (Mt 15:21– 8).73 A less sympathetic association was the one that Augustine introduces when discussing a pagan patron who exerted pressure on his tenants in religious affairs. He could not be regarded as a bandit since a bandit was a human, too; he was rather a fever, scorpion or noxious mushroom. Carmen contra paganos calls the attacked senator a luridus anguis. This reminds us of the polemic against Christian heretics in which heretics are often depicted as snakes.74 In associating others with beasts, polemicists insinuated that their opponents were somewhere outside humanity. Correspondingly, Christians had been situated outside the Greco-Roman civilization and even humankind. Similarly, mainstream Christians banished the rivalling sects outside human society. The most extreme and most used technique in Christian polemic was to demonize pagans and paganism on the axis of good and evil. Pagans were labelled as worshippers of demons; their Gods were branded as the fallen angels or demons under the direction the devil.75 Furthermore, polemicists denigrated an opponent as resembling a third group condemned by both sides. In the dispute referred to below, both Faustus the 72 AVG. cons. euang. 1.32.50; 1.9.14: isti desipiunt; civ. 6.6: tam inmanem sacrilegamque dementiam; ad tantum praecipitium furiosissimae impietatis insanit; CARM. c. pag. 30; 78. Blindness: AVG. cons. euang. 1.10.15; PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 94; PRVD. perist. 10.731; Consult. Zacch. 1. praef. 5. In earlier apologetics: according to LACT. inst. 2.5, pagan philosophers are not only unlearned and impious, but also blind, foolish and senseless beings, who have surpassed in shallowness the ignorance of the uneducated; cf. TERT. paenit. 1.1: caeci sine domini lumine; LACT. inst. 5.13.21: surdi aut excordes; 1.8.3: caeci, incogitabiles, excordes. Other examples: Opelt 1980, 111, 119, 177–9. EUS. v. Const. 2.45 refers to the madness of polytheism; for other examples of insanity and superstition, see Chapter 4. 73 Asses: MAX. TAVR. 48.4: qui clausis oculis circa ignorantiae molam erroris sui gyro pertrahitur. For the ass as a symbol of pagans in patristic literature, see I. OPELT, ‘Esel’, RAC VI, Stuttgart 1966, 564–95: 577–8. Dogs: AVG. serm. 77; GAVDENT. serm. 9.16–17; G. BÜHRER-THIERRY, ‘De païens comme chiens dans la monde germanique et slave du hait moyen âge’, Impies et païens entre Antiquité et Moyen Age, Paris 2002, 175–87: 177–9. Cf. LACT. inst. 1.8.3: non multum a mutis animalibus differentes; epit. 52.9: pecudibus aequales. 74 AVG. serm. 62.(10).15; CARM. c. pag. 53. Epiphanius of Salamis in his Panarion lists eighty species of snakes, that is, eighty heresies. Snakes in polemic: OPELT 1980, 214; R.M. GRANT, Gods and the One God, Philadelphia 1986, 172. 75 The demonization of the Gods of others is discussed in Chapter 6.

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Manichaean and Augustine tried to label each other as pagan. But in an excessive attack, a rival could be defamed as being even worse than pagans as Augustine does in his answer to Faustus.76 The examples introduced above show that pagans and Christians were involved in a discourse of mutual insults and invective. Arnobius had described the situation aptly: “You do not believe our writings, and we do not believe yours. We are accused of falsehoods of Christ and you equally are accused telling people of false and inane things of your Gods.” In the fourth and fifth centuries, by the force of circumstances the pagan critique of Christianity became to a certain degree more reserved and hidden but it did not come to an end. Libanius, for instance, is by no means gratifying in his evaluation of Christian life and culture and Augustine’s writings reveal to us the criticizing voices of pagans, particularly contempt for Christian literary culture.77 Dialogue and Otherness Einer, das höret man wohl, spricht, nach dem andern, doch keiner mit dem andern; wer nennt zwei Monologen Gespräch? J.W. GOETHE and F. SCHILLER, Xenien 66.

The preceding subchapter ended with a scene of deadlock. Was a dialogue between religions not possible in the Roman world? Because mission was an essential part of ancient Christianity, Christians had to aim at a dialogue with non-Christians. A mere debate was not enough. C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca define dialogue as “a discussion in which the interlocutors search honestly and without bias for the best solution to a controversial problem”. The interlocutors are “concerned only with putting forward and testing all the arguments, for and against, bearing on the various matters in question”. The prerequisite of a dialogue is “freedom to express our belief and to try and convert others to it, with the obligation to let others do the same with us, and to listen to them with the same willingness to understand their truths and make them ours that we demand of them for our own”. This could be expressed in hermeneutical terms: when two or more horizons come together in a situation of endeavoured understanding of the other, the successful result – the fusion of horizons as a result of a dialogue – does not necessitate disappearance of the horizons but a new situation where all the parties have changed but still remain distinct.78

76 AVG. c. Faust. 20.5; 20.9: vos paganis dicimus deteriores; 20.10: longius a vobis quam a paganis forte distamus. AVG. serm. Dolbeau 24.4 (= 360A) states that the Donatists are much worse than pagans. 77 ARNOB. nat. 1.57; Libanius, e.g., in or. 13.12; Augustine, e.g., in serm. 197. 78 PERELMAN – OLBRECHTS-TYTECA 1969, 37, 56. Cf. J. MOLTMANN, ‘Is “Pluralistic Theology” Useful for the Dialogue of World Religions’, Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered, Maryknoll 1998, 149–56: 153 asserts that “in an interreligious dialogue one must take one’s partners’ strong points seriously and refrain from litanies of criticism” and “one does not lose identity in dialogue but does attain a deeper understanding of that identity”. For dialectical

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According to the most pessimistic views, a genuine, humble dialogue, which respects the convictions of the other, is impossibility. Primordial violence is included in language itself and is obvious in debates and conflicts. The violence of language and the failure of dialogue can be discerned in the fourth- and fifth-century discussions. What is crucial in these discussions is who is the leading party in a dialogue and who defines the conditions in which a dialogue is conducted. Is a dialogue conducted on the terms of the stronger interlocutor? It was the Christians who held the upper hand in discussions with polytheists. In their answers to pagan writers, Christian leaders mainly aimed at conversion of pagans. Otherwise dialogue with pagans ceased, as the discussion between Augustine and Maximus of Madauros shows. Christian leaders insisted upon conducting dialogue on their terms: Augustine refuses to continue the discussion with Maximus unless it is done seriously (graviter), that is, under the bishop’s conditions. Maximus’ way of treating the subject is not serious enough for the church father. Augustine’s attitude in De consensu evangelistarum does not promote a dialogic atmosphere as he exclaims that pagans may argue and interpret whatever they wish since God will turn down their arguments anyway.79 At the end of the fifth book of City of God, Augustine refers to some unnamed persons who, he has heard, have prepared a reply to the first three books but have not yet published it. These people are waiting for a suitable occasion to make their views public without danger to themselves. Now, Augustine summons his opponents to a dialogue. He asks them to consider all his arguments scrupulously and to weigh things with an unprejudiced mind (sine studio partium). Then they will see that there are some arguments that can be attacked but not rebutted by arrogant garrulity and theatrical frivolity. If they realized this, they would give up their nonsense and let the wise (that is, Christian teachers) correct their views. Augustine invites his adversaries to a friendly dispute and asks them to give up their empty boasting. Then, they could inquire about any point they wish and listen honestly, seriously and politely (amica disputatione honeste graviter libere). Then they will get all the answers Augustine is able to give them.80 It is clear from Augustine’s patronizing tone that this friendly discussion is to be conducted on the conditions set by the church father himself. hermeneutics without synthesis, see J. TONTTI, Right and Prejudice, Aldershot 2004, 3; cf. P. RICOEUR, Liebe und Gerechtigkeit. Amour et Justice, Tübingen 1990, 6–7. 79 AVG. ep. 17.5; cons. euang. 1.25.38: dicant quod placet. Interpretentur quod sapiunt, dum tamen eorum argumenta perturbet Deus Israel; later (1.30.46) Augustine ridicules his opponents as fragiles contradictiuncules garrientes … sicut stipula in cinerem. 80 AVG. civ. 5.26. Augustine warns these people not to wish for something that is not for their own good. It is not clear in what sense he patronizes his opponents: whether he is concerned for the damage done to their immortal souls or more concrete terrestrial punishments. It is possible that his opponents were waiting for more tolerant times in imperial politics. Augustine states that people will be far happier if they are silenced by the law. BARNES 1982, 65 refers to a pagan who was provoked to write a reply but who was too timid to publish it. Some scholars have proposed that Rutilius Namatianus’ De reditu suo from 417 is a response to Augustine: for the bibliography, see P. BRUGGISSER, ‘City of the Outcast and City of the Elect: The Romulean Asylum in Augustine’s City of God and Servius’ Commentaries on Virgil’, History, Apocalypse, and the Secular Imagination. AugSt 30.2 (1999), 75–104: 99–100, n. 81.

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The more optimistic position is to see the difference of interlocutors as an opportunity. In a dialogue interlocutors must begin from the idea that they do not comprehend each other. The starting point is that one cannot understand the other person. In a genuine dialogue the interlocutors agree on, first, that they discuss, and second, that they are attempting to create a world where they can understand each other. The prerequisite of a dialogue is goodwill to understand the interlocutor and it requires that one render oneself constantly receptive to the other’s attempts.81 Interlocutors cannot ignore the other’s attempts because, if one speaks of one’s own world only, the whole shared world vanishes.82 The famous discussion between bishop Ambrose and Symmachus could be interpreted in either optimistic or pessimistic terms. This exchange of opinions has been called a ‘dialogue between the deaf’ and it appears that the interlocutors are only talking past one another. I. Gualandri questions the ‘dialogue between the deaf’ and reads messages between the lines. Ambrose replies to Symmachus’ Vergilian citations and reminiscences with his own quotations from the poet. Gualandri reevaluates these counter-quotations as a game in which one interlocutor makes a quote and the other must respond, making another citation. Thus, Ambrose has to show that he is acting on an equal cultural level with Symmachus, sharing the language, models and symbols of the mutual aristocratic Roman tradition.83 Thus, Ambrose’s letter 18 is filled with messages of common cultural ground.84 Whereas Gualandri sees Ambrose as implying possibilities of encountering interlocutors with common themes and aspects on a mutual cultural level, I am inclined to regard Ambrose’s messages as captatio benevolentiae searching for a point of contact that ultimately aims at mission. Despite these shadows of dialogue, Ambrose makes no ideological concessions to polytheism and his final goal is mission. 81 J. VARTO, ‘Ideologia ihmisen tutkimiseksi?’, Lihan viisaus, Tampere 1996, 29–31: dialogos could be determined as implying that there is something that comes from two or more participants and is situated between these. H.-G. GADAMER, ‘Text und Interpretation’, Text und Interpretation, München 1984, 24–56 = Gesammelte Werke 2, Tübingen 1993, 330–60: 343: “Beide haben den guten Willen, einander zu verstehen, so liegt überall, Verständigung gesucht wird, guter Wille vor”. According to Gadamer, a dialogue finally ends with an understanding of the other; for what sense would language else have? 82 M. BUBER, Ich und Du, Wiesbaden 1966 (e.g., 10, 37) speaks of a dialogical I – you world that cannot be cut into pieces since all meanings are constructed only in a dialogue, I and you as presented. 83 ‘Un dialogo fra sordi’: D. VERA, Commento storico alle Relationes di Quinto Aurelio Simmaco, Pisa 1981, 15. I. GUALANDRI, ‘La risposta di Ambrogio a Simmaco: destinatari pagani e destinatari cristiani’, Pagani e cristiani da Giuliano l’Apostata al sacco di Roma, Messina 1995, 241–56: 242–9 analyzes Vergilian quotations and reminiscences in Symmachus’ relatio 3 and in Ambrose’s answers (esp. AMBR. ep. 18.17–23 = ep. 73, CSEL 82.3). Ambrose’s counterquotations were usually regarded either as irony (J.-R. PALANQUE, Saint Ambroise et l’Empire romain, Paris 1933, 135) or as an appeal to Vergil’s authority. According to GUALANDRI 1995, 252, another point of contact that Ambrose creates is the description of creation; the bishop expresses it in a way that could be identified both by Christians and pagans. 84 GUALANDRI 1995, 255–6 regards AMBR. ep. 18 (= ep. 72, CSEL 82.3) above all as a message to pagans while AMBR. ep. 17 (= ep. 73, CSEL 82.3) was addressed to Valentinian I as harsh restoration of discipline.

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However, Ambrose’s and Symmachus’ discussion shows that H.-G. Gadamer is right in stressing that one who opens one’s mouth wants to be understood. Otherwise one would not speak or write.85 Ambrose had to make his message understandable and therefore he spoke in the symbolic language of Roman aristocratic culture. Dialogue and Mission Every truth expressed by any man belongs to us Christians because, after God, we worship and love the Word … JUSTIN, Second Apology 13

The attitudes of late antique thinkers can be distinguished as exclusivistic (or particularistic), inclusivistic and pluralistic (or relativistic).86 In the texts of late antique church fathers, there is an obvious tension between exclusivism and inclusivism. Even Augustine was ready to acknowledge that in paganism, despite all idolatry, there was internal motion towards the true religion.87 Nevertheless, exclusivism became the dominant strand of thought already in Late Antiquity as Augustine’s discussion on Christianity as the via universalis shows. Church fathers represented the inclusivist and exclusivist models but a pluralistic attitude seems to have been missing in their texts. Traces of pluralism, however, can be found in some writings of polytheists, for example, Themistius and Maximus of Madauros. The missionary goal is present in the discussions of fourth- and fifth-century church fathers. To what extent could the pagan quest for the divine be regarded as praeparatio evangelica for the Christian truth? The Apostle Paul’s speech on the Areopagus (Acts 17:22–31) was a model of Christian missionary dialogue and, commenting on it, Christian opinion leaders discussed the contemporary mission of pagans and relationship to classical heritage. John Chrysostom stresses that Paul based his argumentation on Aratus and not on Jewish prophets because pagans would not have believed in prophets. Ambrose states that, if Paul had started his speech reproaching idolatry, pagans would have turned their ears away: it was far 85 H.-G. GADAMER, ‘Und dennoch: Macht des guten Willens’, Text und Interpretation, München 1984, 59–61. 86 According to exclusivistic models, only those who embrace Christianity can be saved. Inclusivistic models regard Christ as God’s normative revelation but salvation is also possible outside Christianity. Pluralististic interpretations consider all religions equally salutary and expressing the same divine reality. According to relativistic models all religions are equally true or they contain some truth in different measures but none of them have attained the whole truth. 87 AVG. c. Cresc. 1.34. Augustine admits that the Athenians had worshipped the same God as Christians but unintentionally and uselessly (ignoranter et inutiliter) outside the church. The Apostle Paul (Acts 17:22–31) wanted to convert them to worship God knowingly and finding salvation (sapienter et salubriter) within the church. Inclusivistic features are found in some church fathers such as Clement of Alexandria who admitted that the Hellenes had recognized the creator God although only superficially and Justin who cherished the idea of the seeds of Logos in pre-Christian Greek thinking. FIEDROWICZ 2002, 88, 97–8; GNILKA 1984, 13.

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better to make monotheism understandable first.88 Church fathers understood that in a missionary situation a superior attitude: “you are wrong, we have the truth” would not be as successful as an attitude of amelioration: “our views are basically the same, but they are better and deeper than yours”.89 Thus, Christian attempts at a dialogue with pagans were closely connected with mission.90 Christian writers consciously sought a mutual language that would make it possible for non-Christians to comprehend the Christian position within their non-Christian horizon of understanding. This dialogue with pagans did not mean a mutual search for a truth that might exist somewhere for both to find but rather it implied that Christians had already grasped the truth and had to deliver it to nonbelievers.91 For that reason, mission was not dialogue – at least in the sense I have discussed above. In Christian mission, dialogue was only an instrument.92 Therefore, is it possible to speak of authentic dialogue in the case of church fathers? Or, are the criteria of genuine dialogue set here too demanding? John Chrysostom characterizes the missionary dialogue with a concept synkatabasis derived from ancient pedagogic. It describes how a teacher, for didactic reasons, descends and adjusts himself to the level of a disciple. Lactantius had illustrated this condescending attitude in his deliberation of what good apologetic was like. He set out to show to his supposedly pagan readers the beginnings of light by degrees because those who were ignorant of the truth ought not be dazzled. 88 IOH. CHRYS. hom. 3 in Tit. 1; AMBR. in Luc. 6.105. AVG. c. Petil. 2.30.69, arguing against Donatists, states that Paul had found evidence of truth among the sacrilegious. For Paul’s speech on the Areopagus as a model of missionary dialogue, see FIEDROWICZ 2002, 96–7, 100–103 and GNILKA 1984, 13, 127–9 with bibliography. 89 H. RINGGREN, ‘The Problems of Syncretism’, Syncretism, Uppsala 1969, 7–14: 11. 90 Similarly, apologetics and missionary propaganda were intertwined with each other. For attempts at a dialogue in Christian apologetic writing, see RIZZI 1993, 3–11 and FIEDROWICZ 2002, 104. HECK 1987, 89–90 defines good apologetic as starting from an opponent’s positions, citing pagan authors and avoiding Christian terminology. Cf. LACT. inst. 5.1–4. Several apologetic works had been set in dialogue form, following the GrecoRoman tradition of Platonic dialogues, e.g., Minucius Felix’s Octavius. A similar situation is set in the fictive discussion between a pagan philosopher and a Christian in the Apocriticus of Macarius of Magnesia. In fact, both interlocutors conduct monologues, ignoring each other’s views. WAELKENS 1974, 14, 17 remarks that this kind of writing hardly convinced any pagan reader and calls Macarius’ Apocriticus a juxtaposition of two monologues. In my opinion, this characterization applies to Octavius as well. There is no real interaction between the interlocutors. 91 FIEDROWICZ 2000, 16 describes how Christian authors utilized the standard literary means of their time in introducing Christian Selbstdarstellung in categories of pagan thought. Fiedrowicz nevertheless seems to imply an authentic Christian content behind these forms. However, can form and content be distinguished here? 92 A fruitful interreligious dialogue requires, according to C. SCHWÖBEL, ‘Particularity, Universality, and the Religions. Toward a Christian Theology of Religions’, Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered, Maryknoll 1998, 30–46: 43, both the independence and the interdependence of the partners in dialogue; independence requires the acknowledgement of the genuine and distinctive particularity and individuality of the respective positions while interdependence implies mutual understanding of the universality of God.

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He compared an ignorant pagan to an infant, who because of the tenderness of its stomach, was not capable of receiving solid and strong food but must be nourished with liquid and soft milk. Correspondingly, pagans were not able to receive the divine truth: instead, they had to be habituated to it by obtaining human testimonies.93 One way of descending was to admit that there were seeds of truth in pagan philosophical doctrines, poetry and even religion. All suitable fruits of ancient thought were teleologically interpreted as educative preparation – praeparatio evangelica – for the Christian truth. The same strand of thought is obvious in fourthand fifth-century writings. Augustine admits that the Platonists have recognized many important truths although incompletely. Correspondingly, he values some ideas of Cicero and Varro. He feels pity for Varro who had approached so near to the truth. If only had he had the strength to resist the power of the long-established error of paganism, Augustine exclaims.94 The same rhetorical devices and the same passages of pagan authors could be utilized both in polemics against non-Christians and in their persuasion. Pagan poets and philosophers could be referred to for building bridges to the cultured pagans – not just for playing these writers against pagans themselves and refuting their views. Christian apologists sought common features and mutual understanding on particular themes – premises of dialogue – but they did this only to be able to point out in the other’s mental world those issues that reinforced one’s own conviction. In books 8–10 of City of God Augustine discourses with contemporary Platonizing polytheists and incerti on the concept of God, the immortality of the human soul, demons, incarnation, Christ as the mediator as well as Christianity as the via universalis. The discussion is conducted through the figure Porphyry who was an important authority for fourth- and fifth-century intellectuals. It is through Porphyry that he addresses his contemporary opponents: he takes pity on the philosopher, declaiming, “if only you had recognized God’s grace through Jesus Christ our Lord! If only you had been able to see his incarnation, …! But what can I do?” Then he states that it is to no use to speak to a dead man. But then he turns to his contemporaries: “But there are people who hold you in high regard, who are attached to you … and they are the audience to whom I address when blaming you (quos potius in tua compellatione alloquor) and maybe not in vain.” Augustine emphasizes the compatibility of Platonism and Christianity in order to build bridges to his opponents but ends up pointing out the essential (at least for him) differences. He asserts that they have realized the right goal whereas he condemns the path in which they try to reach this goal.95 In fact, Augustine uses his moving dialogue and address to Porphyry as a rhetorical weapon against his arrogant opponents. In several instances in City of God Augustine invites these opponents of his to discussion, mainly to a debate; could his invitation be sometimes taken as one to 93 E.g., IOH. CHRYS. hom. 3 in Tit. 2; LACT. inst. 5.4.5–6. For synkatabasis, see FIEDROWICZ 2002, 102; for Lactantius’ method of leading a reader gradually to the Christian truth, see FIEDROWICZ 2000, 85–7. 94 Platonists: e.g., AVG. vera relig. 7; ep. 118; civ. 4.31; 6.6; 7.5. 95 AVG. civ. 10.29; T. FUHRER, ‘Die Platoniker und die civitas dei (Buch VIII–X)’, Augustinus De civitate dei, Berlin 1997, 87–108: 106–108.

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a dialogue? In many cases his words are ironical: for instance, he writes: “‘Here’, they say, ‘is our explanation’. Very good. Let us give it an attentive hearing.”96 Nonetheless, Augustine was not always merely sarcastic but could also compose skilful and persuasive appeals to his audience such as the above-mentioned eloquent plea to Platonizing intellectuals through Porphyry’s figure. The most renowned of Augustine’s exhortations is the one addressed to the Roman aristocrats, the descendants of Regulus, Scaevola, the Scipios and Fabricius, as he calls them. There he invites the aristocratic incerti to add themselves to the number of citizens of the heavenly city and to abandon false and deceitful Gods. Then they will rise up to genuine liberty. Quoting Vergil (Aen. 1.278–279), he encourages them to take possession of the heavenly country where there will be no Vestal hearth, no Capitoline stone but the one true God who “fixes no bounds for you of space or time / but will bestow an empire without end” (nec metas rerum nec tempora ponit, / imperium sine fine dabit).97 Furthermore, Augustine stresses to his opponents that he wants to them to contemplate prudently what he says instead of engaging in obstinate dispute. At the beginning of the sixth book, he states that he has done his very best to refute the pagan errors. He wishes that “those who understand what they have read” would “reflect upon it and weigh the arguments without any stubborn devotion to their old errors or at least without excessive and exaggerated attachment to them”. Similarly, Augustine challenges his opponents to read his discussion on divination and demons in De divinatione daemonum, promising to answer all their counterarguments. He is convinced that his argumentation should convince easily even a mediocre reader who considers these things, if one just regards them without stubbornness and without the vain arrogance of controversy.98 The correspondence between Augustine and a polytheist, Longinianus, might be regarded as an interreligious dialogue. The church father takes the initiative and invites Longinianus with a genial tone to discuss one single deity and Christ.99 Longinianus replies as politely but declares his preference for the path of sacred and ancient rites that have been tested in the course of time. However, he comes to meet Augustine halfway, recognizing the one single deity whose virtutes the Gods are and recognizing these Gods as Christian angels. Thus, Longinianus is building a bridge of mutual understanding between him and Augustine. Furthermore, he acknowledges that his correspondent is secure in his path towards the supreme true Father of all. (His words ire securus es could, however, be interpreted as referring either to Augustine’s certainty, the sheltered position of Christians, or the confidence of attaining the supreme deity). Regarding Christ, Longinianus is too cautious to take a stand, expressing his attachment to Augustine and showing hesitation and interest in Augustine’s writings in such a manner that the church father begins to cherish

96 AVG. civ. 8.13. 97 AVG. civ. 2.29. 98 AVG. civ. 5.23; 6. praef.; other appeals: AVG. civ. 8.27; 7.35; div. daem. 10.14; 4.8. 99 AVG. ep. 233. Longinianus was a Roman philosopher not known elsewhere. He was about to become a pagan priest (AVG. ep. 234.2).

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hopes of converting the polytheist.100 In his reply, Augustine is eager to interpret Longinianus’ description of the supreme deity as cast in Christian terms. He is pleased to hear that Longinianus wishes to learn from Augustine’s writings. Moreover, he is delighted to see that his pagan correspondent is uncertain in a suitable way: he has neither refused nor affirmed. Longinianus must be unsatisfied with his pagan path. Thus, Augustine rejoices seeing that the sowing of their mutual discussion on this great issue has sprouted. This is what he had wished for and God has helped him. But he wants more than a good discussion; he wishes that it would end in a conversion leading to salvation.101 Therefore, Augustine’s motive to go on with the dialogue with Longinianus is to convert him, that is, to change him. His own religious views are to remain unchanged. Thus, is it possible to call this correspondence an authentic dialogue? We return once more to Augustine’s correspondence with Volusianus and Marcellinus. Again, Augustine has taken the initiative and written to Volusianus, encouraging him to ask about all the problems concerning the Christian doctrine that ever occurred to him.102 Volusianus answers that he would voluntarily let Augustine teach him. Although his tone is respectful, his words could be interpreted as hidden irony by which he provokes the bishop to a learned debate. He refers to an anonymous interlocutor in a real or fictive conversation that makes it possible for him to pose embarrassing questions to Augustine.103 Furthermore, Marcellinus takes part in the discussion, asking Augustine for further elucidation in problematic issues such as miracles, sacrifices, the relationship of the Christian doctrine and Roman morality. Augustine takes considerable pains to explain the doctrinal problems in two letters to Volusianus and Marcellinus. Nevertheless, he admits to Marcellinus that his teaching might suffice neither for souls with a slower intelligence nor for those souls who cling to long-standing errors.104 In their missionary dialogue church fathers were prone to regard some achievements of pagan philosophy and poetry as praeparatio evangelica. However, as Jerome stressed, although a Christian could agree with pagans on details, it did not mean that the whole of paganism was accepted.105 Boundaries for understanding and acknowledging pagan phenomena were usually drawn to the rival Gods. Augustine, for example, condemns any syncretistic attempts of polytheists to identify their Gods with the Christian God or Christ. That kind of syncretism was the work of demons 100 LONGIN. Aug. ep. 234.2–3. 101 AVG. ep. 235.1–2. Compared with Augustine’s sarcastic answers to other polytheists such as Maximus of Madauros and Nectarius his tone here is particularly gentle. 102 The first initiative was taken by Volusianus’ Christian mother who wished her son to become a Christian and asked Augustine to write to him: AVG. ep. 132. 103 VOLVS. Aug. ep. 135.1–2. G.A. MÜLLER, Formen und Funktionen der Vergilzitate und –anspielungen bei Augustin von Hippo, Paderborn 2003, 349 regards the conversation referred by Volusianus as fictive and MOREAU 1973, 56, 126 assumes that the counterarguments in fact are those of Volusianus himself who provokes Augustine to an intellectual debate. 104 MARCELL. Aug. ep. 136; AVG. ep. 137–138. The letters 135 and 136 are closely connected with each other as are Augustine’s replies ep. 137 and 138 as MOREAU 1973, 49–77 has shown. The order of the letters set by MOREAU 1973, 50–51 is followed here. 105 HIER. in Tit. 1.12 on the Apostle Paul quoting Menander. GNILKA 1984, 124.

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who tried to deceive poor people by counterfeiting certain shadows of divine honour to themselves. Thus, Augustine rebuffs the pagan priest who claimed that the deity called ‘capped one’ (Pilleatus, presumably Attis) was himself a Christian too. However, not every Christian sect had as limited a scope as mainstream Christianity had. A Christian movement of Ophites was known for having adapted a liturgy from the cult of Mithras into their own religious use.106 It is noteworthy that dialogue is conducted between persons, not religions and ideologies. In the fourth century, in many places in the late Roman Empire, pagans, Christians and Jews were able to live in peaceful coexistence and go on with dialogue. Some scholars even speak of the symbiosis between pagans and Christians on the level of daily reality. In their everyday life, particularly in family life, people had to make and were ready to make compromises, as the church fathers’ many complaints show.107 Even though church fathers in principle accepted mixed marriages between Christians and pagans, they were concerned about Christians who could be seduced to polytheism by their pagan spouses.108 Conversion Conversion may be delineated as a process of transition from one religious or nonreligious allegiance to another.109 Some scholars have emphasized conversion as a moral transformation, as a conversion from one moral path to another. Others stress a conversion operating within a cognitive framework. N. Shumate even speaks of conversion as a variety of paradigm shift.110 Conversion is depicted either as gradual 106 AVG. in euang. Ioh. 7.6. It is unclear what the pagan priest implied when claiming that his God was Christian. CHADWICK 1993, 29, n. 14 does not believe that he meant that a temple of Cybele had lately been transformed into a church although sometimes pagan deities were said to be made Christian, e.g., HIER. ep. 107.2: Iam et Aegyptius Serapis factus est Christianus referring to the destruction of Serapeum in 391. The Ophites: CHADWICK 1993, 33. 107 BROWN 1998, 652. G.W. BOWERSOCK, ‘I percorsi della politica’, Storia di Roma 3, Torino 1993, 527–49: 546 speaks of symbiosis, rather than competition. For the coexistence of pagans and Christians in families, see CHASTAGNOL 1956 and O’DONNELL 1979a, 62–3. 108 E.g., ZENO 2.7.8–9 Löfstedt; AVG. fid. et op. 19.35; 21.37. Ambrose and Augustine regarded paganism as a justified excuse for divorce. AMBR. in Luc. 8.2–3 claimed that a union between a Christian and a pagan was not a marriage sanctioned by God. E.A. CLARK, ‘Constraining the Body, Expanding the Text: The Exegesis of Divorce in the Later Latin Fathers’, The Limits of Ancient Christianity, Ann Arbor 1999, 153–71: 162–4; LIZZI 1990, 161. 109 J.W. FOWLER, Stages of Faith, San Francisco 1981, 281–2. NOCK 1933 [1961], 7 delineates conversion as “the reorientation of the soul of an individual ... a turning which implies a consciousness that a great change is involved, that the old was wrong and the new is right”. The Latin and Greek terms for conversion (conversio, epistrophe, metabole, metanoia) describe this transformation. 110 The Hellenistic type of conversion to philosophy also involved the turning away from luxury and self-indulgence: NOCK 1933 [1961], 179. Cognitive change: SHUMATE 1996, 166 depicts conversion as “a process of cognitive breakdown and restructuring”. Kuhnian paradigm shifts have been referred to in modern discussions on conversion stories. The modern research on conversion has stressed the active participation of the convert instead of seeing

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personal growth or radical personal change. In any case, it entails changes in structures and contents of beliefs. It is this shift from ‘the old’ into ‘the new’ that ancient writers – Christians and pagans alike – describe in conversion stories. The conversion and the crisis preceding it are understood as achieving a rupture with the old habituated belief structures. The collapse of the old is depicted as a preconversion crisis in which one’s familiar structures of meaning seem to fail and distintegrate. In the conversion to a religious system one restores structures of meaning, reconstructing a new world along the lines of this received system. The process of unification or the reception of the new faith can be outlined either as a gradual transformation or a sudden revelation of the ‘truth’.111 All conversion accounts are retrospective by nature since one examines one’s life and tries to explain one’s present in light of one’s past. In many cases, as in Augustine’s case, the gap between conversion experience and narrative was remarkable. P. Fredriksen has appositely described Augustine’s famous narrative in the Confessions as a “theological reinterpretation of a past event” and an “attempt to render his past coherent to his present self”. This applies to all converts who come to their past only through their present and attempt to construct a coherent, continuous and comprehensible account of their life. In fact, we could call the conversion story a description of the convert’s present.112 A complete change of life is required in a Christian conversion. The old had to be rejected. As R.A. Markus puts it, “the central problem for fourth-century Christians was their own past”, and this implies Christians both as individuals and as a group. They had to reconstruct their identity in relation to their past. The contraposition of the old and the new serves to reinforce the Christian self-understanding of the writers: what I was before I am no more. The old is depicted as wrong and regrettable and the new as right and worth pursuing.113 In this evaluation, Christian writers follow the tradition of philosophical conversion accounts where the old conventional values are scorned as false as contrasted to the new true ones.114 the convert as passive. Emphases vary, depending on whether the perspective is sociological, anthropological, psychological, theological or historical. E.g., Freud regarded conversion as a regressive, disintegrative pathological phenomenon whereas theological viewpoints stress it as a progressive and integrative process. For the trends of scholarship, see L.R. RAMBO, ‘Current research on religious conversion’, Religious Studies Review 8 (1982), 146–59. 111 SHUMATE 1996, 139 calls the preconvert’s crisis an “unsettling sojourn in paradigm limbo”. W. JAMES, The Varieties of Religious Experience, London 1902 (repr. New York 1999) already distinguished three phases of conversion: “the sick soul”, “the divided self” and “the process of its unification”. 112 According to FREDRIKSEN 1986, 21–4, 33, conversion stories are anachronistic and apologetic – anachronistic because the writer shapes the narrative according to the concerns of the present and apologetic because one must justify one’s conversion to oneself and the audience. The retrospective character is stressed by NOCK 1933 [1961], 255 and N. GAUTHIER, ‘L’expérience religieuse de Julien dit “Apostat”’, Augustinianum 27 (1987), 227–35: 233. 113 MARKUS 1990a, 85; SHUMATE 1996, 33. 114 The possibility of conversion was not limited to Christianity. Greek and Roman authors described conversions to a mystery cult or to philosophical life and many of the topoi

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Conversion is described as a transformation from blindness to sight or from slumber to wakening. It is also a movement from darkness to light. Augustine describes his preconversion life as confusion with yearning and longing, false routes and drifting. In his conversion he left the darkness of hesitation and entered the light of certainty. The anonymous writer of Poema ultimum confesses that he had searched for the truth in all religious sects but found there nothing that could be better than faith in Christ. Conversion is also a progress from slavery to freedom or from drunkenness to sobriety. A metaphor of safety in the harbour after a storm is utilized, too. In Poema ultimum the convert describes his conversion as a salvation to the haven of the church.115 Augustine insists that Christian converts had to learn to hate those things they loved before and to learn to love the things they had not loved before. They had to empty themselves of their earlier life in order to be filled with the new one. Ambrosiaster tells us of many aristocrats who after their conversion to Christianity began to love Christ whom they had hated before. Earlier apologists had also contraposed the pagan past and the Christian present. Justin had drawn a distinction between the earlier immoral pagan life and the present decent Christian life with several binary oppositions of formerly and now: “… we who formerly delighted in fornication, now embrace chastity alone; we who formerly used magical arts, dedicate ourselves to the good and unbegotten God; we who loved above all things and patterns familiar in pagan conversion narratives reappear in Christian conversion stories, e.g., in Justin’s (IUST. dial. 1–8; 2. apol. 8.3; 10.1–3; 13.3) and Augustine’s accounts, and the Christian conversion was articulated in terms reminiscent of philosophical conversion. Apuleius’ fictional description of Lucius’ conversion in the Metamorphoses is the only first-person narrative of religious conversion in Greco-Roman polytheism. Conversions to philosophy are known, e.g., from Dio Chrysostom’s Thirteenth discourse, Aelius Aristides’ Sacred words and some philosophical biographies by Diogenes Laertius. FOWDEN 2001, 83–5; SHUMATE 1996, 23–7, 31–3; NOCK 1933 [1961], 173–83; M. FIEDROWICZ, ‘Die apologetischen Schriften als Apologia pro vita sua: Zur autobiographischen Komponente einer literarischen Gattung’, Studia patristica 34 (2001), 65–71: 68–9. NOCK 1933 [1961], 5–7, 14 limits the true conversion to Judaism and Christianity; this simplistic trend continues even in recent scholarly discussion on conversion, e.g., D. DEVOTI, ‘Sogno e conversione nei Padri: Considerazioni preliminari’, Augustinianum 27 (1987), 101–36: 105–106, n. 14–15 writes of the conversions of Lucius and Aelius Aristides in quotation marks. I would not follow this drastic contradistinction between a paganism without religious frontiers to cross and no choices to make and a Christianity with a fundamental decision to make. Even though pagan conversion did not necessarily imply the rejection of all earlier beliefs and practices, a polytheist was converted to one particular cult or philosophy and a choice was involved. Cf. R.W. HEFNER, ‘Introduction: World Building and the Rationality of Conversion’, Conversion to Christianity, Berkeley 1993. 3–44: 4, who, reviewing the variety of forms of conversion, reveals that conversion (even to Christianity) is “not always an exclusivistic change of religious affiliation requiring the repudiation of previously held beliefs”. 115 AVG. conf. 8.12; 8.5; PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 1–2; 152–4. Cf. haven of safety in APVL. met. 11.15. Cf. CYPR. ad Donat. 3–4 in which the convert lies amongst the shades and gloomy night, tossed on the seas of this proud age, driven about in uncertainty and with wandering steps, ignorant of his own life, a stranger to truth and illumination. In conversion he is washed of the filthiness of the past and thus becomes purified.

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the acquisition of wealth and possessions, now bring what we possess into common use of all in need; we who hated and killed each other … and did not live with alien people, now … live familiarly with them and pray for our enemies …”116 Christian converts were supposed to manifest their change and rejection of the old. Writers had to justify their situation in front of themselves, their new Christian fellows and their old pagan fellows. Arnobius and Firmicus Maternus had been such convert-narrators who had testified that their former lives had been driven by false and deceptive values but that now they had discovered true and solid ones. Arnobius, for example, had declared that he, who had a little time ago (nuper) worshipped idols, now (nunc) walked along the ways of the truth. Firmicus Maternus had retracted his earlier devotion to Sol Invictus.117 The manifestation of the rejection of the former errors was required – in Arnobius’ and Firmicus Maternus’ case in particular because they had been renowned as opponents of Christianity. Therefore, the Sitz im Leben of these works was to confirm the separation of the pagan past in twofold manner – both justifying the new faith and attacking the old one. Between the Old and the New Christian convert-narrators wished to stress the definitiveness of their conversion.118 However, we must distinguish between the self-assertive narrative of a complete conversion and the challenges that individuals had to face even after their conversion. Therefore, I am inclined to emphasize the incertitudo of many Christian converts. They often found themselves hovering between the old and the new. It is impossible for converts to change their former thought patterns as well as their way of expressing religious emotions and ideas radically and immediately. New faith is structured by the patterns of thought of the old religion in an unconscious mixture of ideas and customs. Thus, converts carry with them the old life and the old world. This applies particularly to Greco-Roman culture in which polytheistic cults, 116 AVG. in psalm. 30.2.3.11: Disce non diligere, ut discas diligere; avertere, ut convertaris; funde, ut implearis. PS. AVG. quaest. test. 114.31: Quanti retro oderunt Christum, qui nunc amant quique dolent odisse se, quod nescierant. IUST. 1. apol. 14; cf. 1. apol. 25; TERT. apol. 1.6. 117 ARNOB. nat. 1.39.1–2. Arnobius wrote his Adversus nationes between 302–305 at the request of the bishop of Sicca: he had to denounce his earlier errors and opinions as the adversary of Christians and thus to verify his conversion to the Christian community. In FIRM. err. 8.1–3, Sol condemns his own cult. I. OPELT, ‘Firmico Materno. Convertito convertitore’, Augustinianum 27 (1987), 71–8: 75; W. KINZIG, ‘Überlegungen zum Sitz im Leben der Gattung Pros Hellenas/Ad nationes’, Rom und das himmlische Jerusalem, Darmstadt 2000, 152–83 with further examples. Firmicus Maternus’ militant fanaticism, however, has not convinced all his modern interpreters: R. TURCAN, Firmicus Maternus. L’erreur des religions païennes, Paris 1982, 23–4 speaks ironically of fear and opportunism as motivators of conversions and of ‘le virage à 180°’ and FOWDEN 1998, 555 calls him ‘a lukewarm polytheist and a Christian of convenience’. 118 The idea of a fundamental, complete conversion has been questioned, e.g. by FREDRIKSEN 1986, O’DONNELL 1999, 220 and E. BAMMEL, ‘Rückkehr zum Judentum’, Augustinianum 27 (1987), 317–29: 317.

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practices and Gods were twined around everything else: literature, art and community life. Thus, paganism and pagan culture were the ‘Inherited Conglomerate’, a generally accepted set of beliefs, conventions and religious assumptions, that had to be taken in toto, not in parts.119 To reject such an all-inclusive tradition was a task that was never completed. A Christian had to ponder how much renunciation of the past a conversion required. Each convert and each writer had a solution of their own. Christian opinion leaders took their stand in defining borderlines between the old and the new. One of the solutions that church fathers offered was the ‘right use’ (usus iustus, chresis orthe, chresis dikaia).120 In the right use, what was crucial was not which texts were read, cited or emulated but rather how literature was read or, in the case of the visual arts, how things were seen. Augustine, for example, wrote in De doctrina christiana that it was completely appropriate to take into Christian use what was true and in accordance with Christian doctrine. When philosophers had said something that was true, Christians should not be afraid of it but rather they had to reclaim it from its false owners for their own use (tamquam iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda). Augustine employs the verb vindicare, which alludes to regaining, rescuing and taking back what was ‘ours’ from those who kept it in their unjustified possession. In arguing that it was virtually a Christian duty to take from pagan tradition whatever might nourish the growth of the Christian culture, Augustine compares Christians with the Hebrews whom God had ordered to take the spolia Aegyptiorum, the gold, silver and garments of the Egyptians with them in their Exodus (Ex 3:22; 11:2; 12:35).121 Paulinus of Nola employs the same image of the spolia seized from the enemy in his letter to his incertus friend Iovius whom he attempts to convince to go through a transformation from a profane poet into a Christian writer. Paulinus tries to show Iovius the emptiness of his earlier pursuits with pagan, that is, classical literature and requests him to put his literary talents to the right use – for the benefit of Christianity. Iovius should seize the eloquent language and polished expression from pagan poetry, rhetoric and philosophy like making booty out of enemy weapons (quasi quaedam de hostilibus armis spolia).122 Paulinus prepares the ground for this appeal, introducing the contrast between vain human knowledge and the wisdom of God. 119 RINGGREN 1969, 11–12. ‘Inherited Conglomerate’: a term used by BONNER 1984, 342. 120 The concept of the right use was contemplated, e.g., by Clement of Alexandria (str. 1.37.1–4), Basil of Caesarea (leg. lib. gent. 2.39; 4.40), Gregory of Nazianzus (ep. 235) and Theodoret of Cyrrhus (affect. 1.124–7) as well as Augustine (doctr. christ. 2.40.60–61) who connects the right use of the pagan tradition with the verbs uti and frui: their difference defines the manner in which Christians should adjust themselves to this world. Because Christians are only on a peregrinatio in the world, they should only use the offerings of this world and never stop to enjoy them. AVG. civ. 19.17; also doctr. christ. 1.3.3. The concept of right use is analyzed meticulously by GNILKA 1984. 121 AVG. doctr. christ. 2.40.60–61; cf. conf. 7.9.15. The metaphor of booty appears from Origen onwards: ORIG. ep. 2; cf. GREG. NYSS. v. Mos. 67.9–69.3. C. GNILKA, ‘Interpretation frühchristlicher Literatur. Dargestellt am Beispiel des Prudentius’, Impulse für die lateinische Lektüre, Frankfurt am Main 1979, 138–80 = Prudentiana II, Leipzig 2001, 32–90: 41, n. 72. 122 PAVL. NOL. ep. 16.11.

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He praises Iovius’ literary achievements and talents but at the same time he attempts to make Iovius feel guilty. Iovius has not used his talents for the Christian cause; he has put forward the excuse of not being good enough for God. Paulinus blames him for being busy with worldly matters and anxieties. Paulinus rejects Iovius’ excuses, accusing him of having enough time and ability for sacred Scriptures since Iovius has had enough leisure for profane literature as his eloquence and knowledge prove. Here Paulinus links his praise and blame together. It is the will to read the Scriptures that is lacking here.123 Paulinus employs all his skills in persuading his addressee. He requests Iovius to transform (verte) his sententia and change his style of eloquence (facundia). Iovius need not give up his philosophy of the mind, Paulinus attempts to assure him, and the only thing he has to do is to flavour it with faith. Paulinus wants to make Iovius a Christian poet, and the transition is possible but Paulinus admits that the skills of a secular poet and scholar are needed in this transition. In his exhortation, the transition appears quite an unproblematic and painless process: all Iovius has to do is to dedicate his intellectual and literary talents as a sacrifice to the service of the Christian God. Iovius must let his mind, which has been kindled by heavenly seed and is a shining divine glow, be guided by Christian faith.124 Furthermore, Paulinus composed carmen 22 in order to appeal to Iovius. The beginning (v. 1–34) and the end of the poem (v. 148–67) are a strong request to write on Christian themes. With different expressions, Paulinus demands that Iovius take superior themes for his poems – he must devote his heart to divine topics, he has to raise his thoughts from the earth and direct them up to God. He must wield his lyre and stir his fertile heart to great themes for a greater order of things has been reserved for him. Iovius has received praise for composing poems on false and empty subjects but he will, Paulinus promises, achieve even greater glory with Christian poetry. Similarly, in his letter, in order to persuade Iovius of the advantages of the Christian option, Paulinus asserts that Iovius has an even better opportunity to attain the eloquence of the philosophers in Christian scholarship.125 Paulinus offers Iovius the right use (usus iustus) as a solution to his dealings with profane literature. In his carmen, he writes of the vain use (vanos … in usus) of Iovius’ talents: “Let the trumpet of your voice that has so far sounded in frivolous uses now resound divine things in a more sublime tune.” Then Paulinus could cherish him as a Christian poet.126 Wretched Christians and Good Pagans There would be no pagan if we were such Christians as we ought to be. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, Homily 10 on 1 Timothy 3.

123 PAVL. NOL. ep. 16.2; 16.6. 124 PAVL. NOL. ep. 16.6; 16.9; 16.11. Paulinus emphatically assures Iovius that he and his family need not abandon their properties. 125 PAVL. NOL. carm. 22.1–5; 22.9–11; 22.20–25; ep. 16.11. Paulinus contrasts the emptiness of Iovius’ previous themes with the superiority of Christian topics (carm. 22.26–32). 126 PAVL. NOL. carm. 22.33–4; 22.157–61; cf. ep. 16.6: sis … dei vates.

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Christian leaders were aware of obstacles both before and after conversion. Augustine recurrently warns his audience not to fall into pagan practices (adtente, ne cadas), for example, when discussing participation in pagan urban festivals. He also tells his parishioners not to cause the lapse of their weaker brothers. One should not become a stumbling block to one’s brother.127 Augustine realized that in the struggle against idols, it was easier to close the temples of idols than to expel them from the hearts of worshippers (contra idola facilius templa quam corda clauduntur). He knew that some Christians, in times of crisis such as famine, forgot Christ and turned back to Mercurius, Jupiter, Caelestis or other pagan deities.128 Augustine frequently refers to wretched Christians as an obstacle to the conversion of pagans. It was important to set a good example for the remaining pagans. Those Christians who took part in pagan practices prevented pagans from entering the church because pagans, seeing Christians frequenting pagan ceremonies, could say: “Why should we reject our Gods whom Christians worship along with us”. Those pagans who could have come and joined the Christian church would feel insulted and return to their paganism. Augustine wants to bring in the remaining pagans and calls out to his Christian audience: “You are the stones in their way”.129 Furthermore, he urges his parishioners to treat their pagan neighbours decently in order to convince them to convert to Christianity: “Love unbelievers in such a manner that they wish to become brothers in your faith.” A Christian should not insult pagans but rather pray for them. Augustine did not want to hear pagans complaining that Christian merchants cheated them. It seems that there was considerable need for his admonitions since relations between pagans and Christians in North Africa had become tense.130 Christian writers were occasionally ready to acknowledge pagan virtues or the existence of morally good pagans. Augustine stresses that many pagans led far more respectable, sober and chaste lives than those Christians who occupied themselves with amusements, banquets, inebriety and debauchery. Christian dissoluteness and extravagance both insulted these good pagans and gave occasion for mockery. He claims that some pagans did not want to be converted because Christians did not improve their own way of life and, therefore, pagans were impeded from salvation. Thus, a pagan, whom Augustine prefers to call morally good rather than a depraved Christian, stayed in the darkness with eyes wide open while a Christian, leading a corrupt life, stayed in the light of the Lord, eyes shut.131 This juxtaposition of 127 AVG. in psalm. 50.3. Augustine refers to the Apostle Paul (1 Cor 8:7) who warns his readers not to cause their brothers with weak conscience to relapse into pagan practices. See also Chapter 5. 128 AVG. ep. 232; serm. 62.11.17. 129 AVG. serm. 62.6.9: Paganos reliquos colligi volumus, lapides estis in via; venire volentes offendunt, et redeunt. Dicunt enim in cordibus suis: Quare nos relinquamus deos, quos Christiani ipsi nobiscum colunt? cf. catech. rud. 7.11 of tentationes et scandala within the church and without. For further examples, see P. COURCELLE, ‘Propos antichrétiens rapportés par S. Augustin’, Rercherches Augustiniennes 1 (1958), 149–86: 172–3. 130 AVG. in ep. Ioh. 10.7; serm. 90.10; Christian merchants swindling pagans: in euang. Ioh. 70.18. CHADWICK 1985, 17. 131 AVG. in psalm. 25.2.14. Similarly AVG. in psalm. 100.8 remarks that he rather eats with pagans than Christians who live indecently. For further examples, see COURCELLE 1958,

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pagans and Christians and the inversion of moral hierarchy must have offended his audience. Praising pagans for being morally good was a rhetorical technique for reproaching fellow Christians. Pagan virtues were recognized but they were used for arguing a minori ad maius that Christians should do even better.132 The technique of flexible prejudices may explain some of the praising acknowledgments of good pagans. The exceptions of good pagans may reinforce the general rule of corrupt and miserable pagans, explaining away inconveniences that do not fit the stereotype. Flexible prejudices that did not label all pagans as depraved made it possible for pagans or incerti to draw themselves closer to Christianity. Nevertheless, some passages may reflect sincere sympathy for admired pagan thinkers. In a letter to Euodius, Augustine deliberates which pagan poets and philosophers might be saved from hell but is not able to give a definite answer. He writes that it would be a great joy to know that those pagan poets whose eloquence and literary talent were esteemed and who had understood the futility of false Gods and even occasionally acknowledged the one true God would be found among the saved. Moreover, among those saved there could be philosophers who had uttered similar things. Augustine adds virtuous pagans to his hypothetical list even though these praiseworthy pagans had erred to worship the vanities. These models of virtues please Augustine to such an extent that he would like to have them freed from the pains of hell.133 Furthermore, Augustine admits that there are pagans who live morally good lives but they do not walk in the right path (bene currunt, sed in via non currunt). Nevertheless, a decent life was not enough if pagans kept on worshipping false Gods. Christian writers also recognized pagans’ sincere quest for the truth in a range of teachings and philosophies. Jerome declares that Christians must strengthen their fellows – whether heretics, Jews or pagans – who themselves want to be liberated from the doctrina gentilium with the help of Christians.134 There are mentions of pagans and sometimes of pagan intellectuals who come to listen to Ambrose’s and Augustine’s sermons. Both bishops were famous for their preaching and attracted listeners outside the Christian community. Pagans came to hear Ambrose’s interpretations of the Christian Scriptures. In some of his sermons Augustine refers to pagans who were present, presumably as an invited audience, in

171–2. 132 J.C. SALZMANN, ‘Vorbildliche Heiden. Überlegungen zum 1. Clemensbrief 55,1’, Die Heiden. Juden, Christen und das Problem des Fremden, Tübingen 1994, 317–24: 321. The Apostle Paul (Rom. 2:14–15; cf. 2:26–7) had admitted that there were gentiles who by nature observed the law even though they did not know God’s law. Cf. AVG. serm. Dolbeau 26.10 (= 198 augm) in which pagans stated that there were both good and bad pagans as there were both good and bad Christians. 133 AVG. ep. 164.2.4; cf. 177.12; civ. 18.23; 18.47. 134 AVG. serm. 141.4; un. bapt. 8; cf. serm. Dolbeau 26.38 (= 198 augm); 25.19 (= 360B). HIER. in Is. 12.41.17: search for the truth; 7.21.14: ipsi cupiunt vestro auxilio liberari. A. SOLIGNAC, ‘Le salut des païens d’après la prédication d’Augustin’, Augustin le prédicateur (395–411), Paris 1998, 419–28.

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the congregation.135 In one sermon, he tells Christians to pray for non-believers so that they can see Christians in prayer for them. In another sermon Augustine states that the remaining pagans have a providential role as the reprobatores of Christian faith set by God.136 Big Fish Pagan senators and landowners were an important prey to pursue because influential aristocrats – whether male or female – who were converted to Christianity drew a great number of dependents with them to the church. People in the region of Hippo used to say that if one particular aristocrat became a Christian, none would remain pagan.137 Christian landowners were expected not only to build churches, but also to tear down pagan shrines and convert peasants on their estates. Augustine stressed that a master of a household should encourage his slaves either to become or remain Christians. Maximus of Turin addresses the divites and potentes in his sermons and demands that they clean up their estates from pagan rites and cult places.138 He complains that some Christian landowners tried to shirk their responsibities and regarded the religion of their peasants as none of their business.139 In the imperial legislation, African landowners were ordered to pay fines if they declined to draw their slaves and tenants from that depraved religion.140 The importance of landowners is illustrated in Augustine’s sermon to fervent Christians who wanted to smash idols on the estates owned by pagans. The bishop calms down these rioters, stating that they are not allowed to do this now and that 135 AMBR. explan. in psalm. 36.61. E.g., AVG. serm. Dolbeau 25.1 (= 360B). F. DOLBEAU, Augustin d’Hippone. Vingt-six Sermons au Peuple de l’Afrique, Paris 1996, 244; O’DALY 1999, 7–8; O’DONNELL 1979a, 63. 136 AVG. serm. Dolbeau 25.16 (= 360B); 24.4 (= 360A). 137 AVG. in psalm. 54.13: ille nobilis, si Christianus esset, nemo remaneret paganus. For the influence of aristocratic landowners: LIZZI 1990, 156–73, esp. 164–8; A. MERKT, Maximus I. von Turin, Leiden 1997, 83, 114–17; CHADWICK 1985, 18–19; ALAN CAMERON, ‘The last pagans of Rome’, The Transformations of Urbs Roma in Late Antiquity, Portsmouth 1999, 109–21: 109; P. BROWN, ‘Religious Coercion in the Late Roman Empire: The Case of North Africa’, History 46 (1963), 283–305 = P. Brown, Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine, London 1972, 301–31: 329. 138 Building churches: IOH. CHRYS. hom. 18 in act. apost. 4; the duty to Christianize the estates: AVG. civ. 19.16. E.g. MAX. TAVR. 42.1; 106.2; 107.1; 108. 139 MAX. TAVR. 106.2 refers to the answers of indifferent landowners: Nescio, non iussi; causa mea non est, non me tangit. Maximus’ sermon is related to the clash between pagans and Christians in Val di Non in 397 in which three fervent Christians protested against a pagan procession of the local people and were killed by peasants. Cf. ZENO 1.25.6 Löfstedt. 140 CTh 16.5.52.1. According to ANDO 1996, 203, Augustine was perhaps thinking only about the propagandistic value of aristocratic conversions but the imperial government was more realistic and counted on such men to convert their peasants. I am inclined to think that Augustine was too realistic not to realize the aristocratic power and conversion of dependants by landlords. Furthermore, these two aspects, power and propaganda, cannot be distinguished from each other.

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they must wait for the right time: “… we do not break them down because God has not given them into our power. When does God give them into our power? When the masters of these things shall become Christians.” Then he mentions a landowner who could recently have let the idols on his estates be devastated. However, this man, Augustine regrets, had not done this. But Christians were not allowed to harm idols until they were on Christian property and had the permission of the owner: “I do not touch them when I have not the power; I do not touch them when the lord of the property complains of it; but when he wishes it to be done and gives thanks for it, I should incur guilt if I did it not.”141 Correspondingly, pagan aristocrats also exercised remarkable influence on their Christian dependents, as church fathers complained.142 Bishops exulted when a pagan aristocrat was converted to Christianity. The influence of a master of a household was related to the old Roman patria potestas that, in addition to women and children, covered slaves and dependants. The authority of pater familias included religious practices as well as other areas of activity; thus, a pater familias was responsible for the maintaining of the sacred rites.143 Therefore, although modern scholars have often stressed the importance of individual conversion in Late Antiquity, the patria potestas and the patronage system contributed to the Christianization of rural areas. Thus, the application of coercive religious legislation in the countryside depended on landowners. In these circumstances it is understandable that bishops did their best to press aristocrats to move against their pagan, heretical or schismatic tenants.144 The propagandistic value of the conversion of a prominent man was probably as significant as the power of a wealthy patronus. Both aspects are united in the case of the learned aristocrat Volusianus. Augustine wishes, he writes to Volusianus, that the senator would soon become a Christian. Then, he could, due to his excellent intelligence and eloquence, illuminate his fellows. It was a matter, not only of this life, but also of the salvation of Volusianus’ soul and those of other people, too. Augustine clearly wanted to catch a big fish here because he knew that the conversion of such an illustrious intellectual aristocrat would be a great triumph that might attract other pagan aristocrats to join the church. Similarly, the conversion and public confession of Christianity of Marius Victorinus had been such a symbolically remarkable triumph for the Roman church.145

141 AVG. serm. 62.18.2. 142 AVG. conf. 8.4.9; serm. 62.5.8; 81.7. 143 AMBR. ep. 27.3 (CSEL 82). HIER. ep. 107.2 tells us of the conversion of Furius Maecius Gracchus who destroyed a Mithraeum in 377, before harsh anti-pagan legislation; cf. PRVD. c. Symm. 1.561–563. MATTHEWS 1975, 23 believes that the Mithraeum was situated on private, probably Gracchus’ own, property. For the patria potestas in cultic issues, see NORTH 1992, 185. 144 Augustine exerted pressure on landowners on the application of the coercive laws: AVG. ep. 89.8; 139.2. BROWN 1963 [1972], 329. 145 AVG. ep. 137.1. Marius Victorinus: AVG. conf. 8.2.3; HADOT 1971, 248–50. Lactantius (inst. 5.4.6) had understood the force of example of learned and eloquent men who decided to apply their talents and power of speaking for the benefit of the Christian truth.

Chapter 4

Religio and Superstitio

… lest either an oldwomanish superstition be introduced or all religion be overthrown. Caecilius in MINUCIUS FELIX, Octavius 13.5 Let superstition be restrained, let impiety be expiated, let true religion be preserved. Octavius in MINUCIUS FELIX, Octavius 38.7

The Boundaries of Religio One of the fundamental dichotomies in Christian debate against pagans was the binary opposition of religio and superstitio. The parts of this binary opposition are mirrored in each other. Religio, a true and proper religion, is delineated through its counterpart superstitio, a false and deformed religion, in the same way as superstitio is defined through religio: thus, what is not religio must be superstitio and vice versa.1 Until recent religious studies, scholars had attempted to maintain a clear division between proper religion and superstition or magic. Some have emphasized the difference in terms of the nature of the relationship to the supernatural forces that a human believes to influence the world. According to this distinctive interpretation, in religion one submits oneself to the supernatural forces while in superstition or magic one tries to control and manipulate these forces, seeing them merely as instrumental. In religion one attempts to persuade and plead with supernatural forces through prayers and sacrifices; this is regarded as entirely different from the magical manoeuvres.2 However, this distinction drawn between religion and superstition 1 Religio and superstitio are also discussed in M. KAHLOS, ‘Religio and superstitio – Retortions and phases of a Binary Opposition in Late Antiquity’ (forthcoming in Athenaeum, in 2007). 2 E.g., J. Frazer saw religion as having a complex cognitive significance while magic was labelled as purely instrumental; see also A.A. BARB, ‘The Survival of Magic Arts’, The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, Oxford 1963, 100–125: 100–101 and also D. KURTH, ‘Suum cuique. Zum Verhältnis von Dämonen und Göttern im alten Ägypten’, Die Dämonen, Tübingen 2003, 45–60: 45. J. BREMMER, ‘The Birth of the Term ‘Magic’, ZPE 126 (1999), 1–12: 9–12, P. BROWN, ‘Sorcery, Demons and the Rise of Christianity: From Late Antiquity in the Middle Ages’, Witchcraft, Confessions and Accusations, London

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or magic is artificial and untenable and has been rejected as unfounded in current religious studies.3 Nevertheless, one can still run into some traditional statements in classical and patristic studies, in which, for example, superstition is claimed to have increased in Late Antiquity.4 I am inclined to think that such concepts as religio and superstitio should be understood as socially accepted and unaccepted forms of religious behaviour and beliefs. The valuations of the great majority or the leading elite tend to mark the boundaries between the correct and the incorrect.5 Neither should religio and superstitio be comprehended as objective categories reflecting objective reality as some scholars do.6 Instead, religio and superstitio are to be interpreted as discursive categories that were used as an argumentative apparatus when marking the approved and the disapproved. These terms were loaded with ambiguous connotations and, therefore, they could be applied as helpful devices in power struggles and political intrigues – in the use of classical authors as well as Christian writers.7 The demarcation of borders for religio and superstitio is connected with authority and power as well as with the relationship of centre and periphery. Consequently, the Romans regarded their own religious tradition as religio while the traditions of others were often denounced as superstitiones. The political and social male elite dictated what was appropriate, effective and coherent religious behaviour.8 Thus, in the Roman religious system, religio and superstitio were used to delineate the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable rituals and beliefs. In order to set the argumentation of the Christian writers into its context, I survey the phases of the terms religio and superstitio in the Roman world briefly.9 The meanings and connotations of these concepts were in constant change in the Roman 1970, 17–45 = P. BROWN, Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine, London 1972, 119–46: 121 and BEARD – NORTH – PRICE 1998, 219 survey these views. 3 E.g., BEARD – NORTH – PRICE 1998, 219 and A. SEGAL, ‘Hellenistic magic: Some questions of definition’, Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions, Leiden 1981, 349–75: 349–51, 373 criticize the division as artificial and F. BOLGIANI, ’Religione Popolare’, Augustinianum 21 (1981), 7–75: 46 casts doubts on whether the distinction is possible. 4 E.g., MACMULLEN 1981, 70: “… superstition within this meaning certainly increased. The fact is best sensed … in the greater prominence of magic”; F. RUGGIERO, La follia dei cristiani, Milano 1992, 166. 5 MARKUS 1996, 126; BEARD – NORTH – PRICE 1998, 215–16. 6 E.g., L.F. JANSSEN, ‘“Superstitio” and the persecution of the Christians’, VC 33 (1979), 131–59. 7 QUINT. inst. 4.4.5 mentions superstitio as one of the propositions of accusing rhetoric. Cicero made ample use of the religious prejudices of his contemporaries, accusing his enemies of irreligion: e.g., dom. 104–109; Vatin. 14; Phil. 2.78–84; surveyed by J. NORTH, ‘Religious toleration in Republican Rome’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 25 (1979), 85–103: 85. 8 For the relationship between center and periphery, see R. GORDON, ‘Religion in the Roman Empire: The civic compromise and its limits’, Pagan Priests, London 1990, 233–55: 237. 9 There were two rivalling etymologies of the word religio already in antiquity: according CIC. nat. deor. 2.28.71, the word originated from the verb relegere, ‘to reread, to go through (again)’ while LACT. inst. 4.28 connected it with religare, ‘to bind’. The etymology of superstitio is discussed by W.F. OTTO, ‘Religio – superstitio’, Archiv für Religionswissenschaft

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religious world. In general, the Romans regarded their own civic religion as religio. However, religious practices of other nations and communities could be considered religiones too. Thus, religio was not necessarily only the Roman civic religion but it could refer to other religions and devotions as well. However, even if the Romans might be equal or even inferior to other nations in all other respects, in their religio they were superior to other peoples.10 Cicero defined religio as cultus deorum, worship and service to the Gods.11 In religio it was crucial, not which deities a person worshipped, but how one built the relationship with them. Here we come to the borderlines drawn up between religio and superstitio during the late Republic and early Empire. Superstitio was an empty fear of the Gods (timor inanis deorum) while religio was respectful worship of the Gods with a pious cult (cultu pio). According to Cicero, this cultus was chaste and holy, filled with pietas and it was carried out with candid and unpolluted mind and speech.12 The difference between religio and superstitio was seen in the extent of emotion and behaviour. According to Cicero, the term religiosus referred to the commendable side of the phenomenon while superstitiosus described the blameworthy area. Religio was a virtue, superstitio its opposite, a vice. In fact, religio was fear of the Gods, too, but in a commendable and appropriate measure. In relation to its decent counterpart, superstitio was excessiveness both in behaviour and emotion: exaggeration in performance of rituals and in awe of the Gods. Consequently, superstitio was a vice that constituted a hyperbole or perverted appendix inside the same religious tradition, thus, to be accurate, not an antithesis of religion. Each nation, including the Romans, had its own religio and superstitio. Thus, superstitio was not applied only to religions of other nations but it rather referred to the distorted practices and devotions of the whole of humankind.13 Varro distinguished a religiosus person from a superstitiosus one on the grounds of their different fear: whereas a superstitiosus individual dreaded (timeri) the Gods as if they were enemies, a religiosus one revered (vereri) them as if they were parents. Seneca made a distinction between superstitio and religio, labelling the former as a distortion and deviation of religion. As in Cicero’s delineation, Seneca regarded superstitio as a perversion or fag end of religio, but still working inside the same religious tradition.14 As a disproportionate 12 (1909), 533–54, E. LINKOMIES, ‘Superstitio’, Arctos 2 (1930–31), 73–88, S. CALDERONE, ‘Superstitio’, ANRW I.1 (1972), 377–96 and SACHOT 1991, 376–8. 10 CIC. Flacc. 28.69; nat. deor. 2.3.8; har. resp. 19. Cf. LIV. 4.30.9; 25.1.6–12; 39.16.6, who refers to alien cults with the term religio although he disdains them; cf. APVL. met. 11.14 on the cult of Isis. D. GRODZYNSKI, ‘Superstitio’, REA 76 (1974), 36–60: 45. 11 CIC. nat. deor. 2.3.8: religione, id est, cultu deorum. According CIC. nat. deor. 2.28.72, religio was the scrupulous performance of the ritual. SACHOT 1991, 368 describes religio as an approach, attitude or prism through which ritual performances were assessed. Ritual performances had their own terms such as caerimonia, cultus, ritus and sacra. Sometimes, however, the plural religiones could refer to rites. 12 CIC. nat. deor. 2.28.71–2; 1.42.117. 13 CIC. nat. deor. 2.28.71–2; inv. 2.165. Cicero (leg. 1.11.32) describes weaknesses and vices characteristic of all nations. 14 Varro apud AVG. civ. 6.9; SEN. clem. 2.5.1; ep. 123.16. Some legal texts refer to disproportionate awe of the divine: DIG. 48.19.30; 28.7.8.

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and distorted fear the Latin superstitio resembles the associations often attached to the Greek deisidaimonia.15 For Romans, religio was above all connected with the state and displayed in public, describing communal acts and relationship towards the Gods of the state. Whereas religio referred to the public cults of the community, the word superstitio only alluded to private devotions and gradually became derogatory.16 The Roman elite regarded the public religio as being performed for the benefit of the state, and the growth and grandeur of the Roman Empire was linked to religio, to the scrupulous maintenance of good relations with the Gods.17 Relocating the Boundaries It is obvious that the concepts religio and superstitio were vague and applied in an ambiguous way. There were no universal confines or measures of disproportionate fear and extreme forms of behaviour. The word superstitio was linked to all irrational, improper and perverted credulity as well as unauthorized divination, magic and astrology, and the elite scorned the beliefs and practices of popular religion as superstitio.18 It is well known that the Romans allowed some foreign Gods with their cults to enter the Roman pantheon. The Roman civic religion and those cults and practices that were gradually adopted into the Roman religious system were regarded as religio while those cults and practices that were not thought to suit this tradition were considered superstitiones. Although Roman writers could sometimes acknowledge 15 Theophrastus (char. 16) had defined deisidaimonia as the dread felt towards the divine but he did not present the concepts deisidaimonia and eusebeia as antithetical. The concepts deisidaimonia and eusebeia were contraposed for the first time in CORNVT. nat. 35. PLUT. sup. 1.164E; 5.167A–B; 6.167D–E; 10.169E–170A; 14.171E connected atheism and deisidaimonia; it was ignorance of the Gods that led to these two condemnable vices. Atheism was apatheia towards the divine and ignorance of the good but deisidaimonia was polypatheia that distorted the good into the depraved. The true piety, eusebeia, stood in the middle between the two extremes. For the fluctuations in the meaning of deisidaimonia, see D.B. MARTIN, ‘Hellenistic Superstition: The Problems of Defining a Vice’, Conventional Values of the Hellenistic Greeks, Aarhus 1997, 110–27 and D.B. MARTIN, Inventing Superstition: from Hippocratics to the Christians, Cambridge Mass. 2004, 21–124. 16 SACHOT 1991, 372; cf. J. SCHEID, ‘Religion et superstition à l’époque de Tacite: Quelques reflexions’, Religion, supersticion y magia en el mundo romano, Cadiz 1985, 19–34: 26–7, who states that religio and superstitio were two complementary levels of cultic behaviour, public and private. CALDERONE 1972, 384 dates the gradual shift to the first century B.C.E. and GRODZYNSKI 1974, 44–8 to the second century C.E. The term superstitio is still used from time to time as a neutral terminus technicus in legal texts during the Empire; in these cases superstitio was used of personal religious devotions without negative connotations, e.g., in DIG. 12.2.5.1 it is decreed that one should take an oath according to one’s personal superstitio. 17 E.g., CIC. nat. deor. 2.3.7–8; 3.40.94; div. 2.70–76; har. resp. 19. Cf. the argumentation of the pagan Caecilius in MIN. FEL. 6.2–3. 18 CIC. nat. deor. 3.39.92; div. 2.129; COLVM. 1.8.6; PLIN. nat. 30.2.7; TAC. hist. 3.78.2. On the scorn of the elite: TAC. ann. 1.28; APVL. Socr. 3.122.

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religions of other nations as religiones, during the early Empire the term superstitio was applied, with more or less negative associations, to alien religions and practices.19 Although scholars have sometimes characterized the religious attitudes of the Roman leaders as broadminded and tolerant, the Roman permissiveness was essentially limited. Those cults and practices that were left outside the Roman ‘civilization’ and were branded as superstitiones were often considered a threat to Roman society and imperial order. Among these superstitiones were, for example, Judaism and early Christianity.20 Superstitiones could either be tolerated or held as dangerous and forbidden by the governing elite. Roman writers despised, ridiculed and complained about cults and practices that they labelled as superstitiones, but the Roman administration forbore these cults as long as they were considered harmless to the Roman order. Superstitio as such was not a crime to be punished in the Roman law. Nevertheless, those cults and practices that were believed to threaten the imperial rule were prohibited.21 As the Greco-Roman religious system was based on sacrifice, two kinds of people that were labelled as atheists and magicians were denounced as enemies of humanity. They were regarded either as denying or perverting the sacrificial system. Persons called atheists did not believe in the Gods and refused to perform sacrifices whereas those who practiced magic distorted sacrifices for their own wicked selfinterested purposes. The difference between the two concepts was usually vague. In this grouping, Christians often fell into the class of atheists because they, by refusing to sacrifice to the Gods, did not take part in the Greco-Roman sacrificial system. Despite this label of atheism, Roman writers branded Christianities as distorted versions of religion too. Christian writers transformed the relationship between religio and superstitio, condemning their previous polytheistic affiliation as a superstition and defended their new Christian devotion as a true religion. Whereas superstitio had previously often been understood as a distorted appendix or fag end of the proper religio, Christian writers represented the concepts as an oppositional pair. Roman writers had certainly contraposed the concepts religio and superstitio, but in the Christian apologetic and polemical use, the opposition became even more polarized. In the Christian subversion of the traditional hierarchy of the dichotomy, Christianity became religio, the only true religio, whereas all other cults and beliefs were lumped together as superstitio or falsa religio. In their defence of Christianity, Christian apologists of the second and third centuries aimed to refute the charges of atheism and impiety and, in this defence, 19 The pejorative connotations increased, according to M.R. SALZMAN, ‘Superstitio in the Codex Theodosianus and the Persecution of Pagans’, VC 41 (1987), 172–88: 174, in the beginning in the first century B.C.E.; according to GORDON 1990, 253, during the first and second centuries C.E.; according to GRODZYNSKI 1974, 47–8, in the early second century C.E. 20 Foreign superstitiones: PLIN. paneg. 49.8; TAC. ann. 2.85.5; hist. 4.81.2; Jewish superstitio: SVET. Tib. 36.1; TAC. hist. 2.4; Christian superstitio: PLIN. ep. 10.96.8–9; SVET. Nero 16.2; TAC. ann. 15.44.5. 21 From the late Republic on, throughout the imperial period, private rituals such as private soothsaying, secret meetings, nocturnal sacrifices and astrology were banned because they were considered a danger to the security of the state. KAHLOS 2002, 51–2.

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attack turned out to be the best method. They subverted these accusations, maintaining that it was polytheists that really were atheists because they did not recognize the true God, that is, the God of Christians. Athenagoras declared that Christians, in the manner of certain poets and philosophers, were not atheists in their views of deity but professed the supreme God. They rather venerated the deity that philosophers regarded as the first and supreme principle.22 It was Tertullian who introduced an innovation in his reinterpretation of religio. M. Sachot has shown that Tertullian invested the term religio with an entirely new content, transferring the substance and connotations usually associated with a philosophical school to religio. Thus, he represented Christianity as a philosophy.23 Furthermore, he subverted the charges of atheism, impiety and criminal practices by making a counter-offensive on pagans. Christians venerated the only true God and this fact should suffice to discharge them from all the accusations of offence against the Roman religio. Tertullian maintained that, because there were no other Gods but the one true God, there was no Roman religio to be offended. The indictment should rather be applied to polytheists themselves since, in worshipping the falsehood, they neglected and even assaulted the true religio of the true God (veram religionem veri dei). That is why they were guilty of the real irreligiosity (crimen verae irreligiositatis).24 Minucius Felix’s Octavius is an illustrative example of the Christian subversion. Caecilius the polytheist accuses Christians of anilis superstitio that threatened religio. In his reply Octavius the Christian applies the same terms but turns the dichotomy over. Now superstitio and impietas refer to Roman and other polytheistic practices and vera religio to Christianity.25 Lactantius delienated superstitio as the cult of what was false whereas religio was the cult of what was true. Here Lactantius’ Christian definition, declaring other Gods false, diverged from the Roman tradition that had never actually deemed the Gods of others false. Instead, what had been essential in the Roman dichotomy of religio and superstitio was how the Gods were worshipped and how cult was performed, not which deity was venerated. Lactantius describes the distinction: 22 ATHENAG. leg. 4; 5.1; 6.2. Other charges of atheism and defences: ARNOB. nat. 1.29; 5.30; TAT. or. 27; ATHENAG. leg. 3.1; CLEM. str. 7.1.1; 7.54.3; TERT. apol. 13.1; TERT. nat. 1.10.20; ORIG. Cels. 7.62–3; MIN. FEL. 8.1; EUS. praep. 1.2.2. For the charges, see LIEBESCHUETZ 1979, 77–8; FIEDROWICZ 2000, 197. IUST. 1. apol. 6; 13 condemned atheism when it was understood as a refusal of the existence of deity but admitted that in the sense of a denial of the pagan Gods, Christians were atheists. Apologists applied earlier philosophical discussion of the supreme deity, e.g., negative theology; see D.W. PALMER, ‘Atheism, apologetic and negative theology in the Greek Apologists of the second century’, VC 37 (1983), 234–59. 23 TERT. apol. 1.1. SACHOT 1991, 379, 384–8. Representing Christianity as a philosophy was by no means a novelty since Justin and Aristides of Athens had also introduced Christianity as a philosophy. 24 TERT. apol. 24.1–2; cf. apol. 13.1; nat. 1.10.20; CLEM. prot. 2.23–4. TERT. apol. 24.6 urged Romans that they should not give further grounds for the charge of irreligiosity (ad irreligiositatis elogium) by eliminating religious liberty and forbidding free choice of deity. 25 MIN. FEL. 13.5; 38.7; 1.5: Caecilius is said to have changed his superstitiosae vanitates to the vera religio; 24.10: the Roman religion as Romana superstitio.

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“And it makes the entire difference what you worship, not how you worship or which prayer you offer.”26 The worshippers of the Gods regarded themselves as religiosi even though they were superstitiosi. Lactantius introduces the etymology of superstitiosus, explaining superstitious people either as venerating the surviving memory of their deceased (superstitem memoriam defunctorum) or as surviving their parents (parentibus suis superstites) and worshipping them as household Gods in private. Romans considered the public cult of Gods religio. Lactantius deconstructs this distinction by arguing that all worship of Gods was superstitio because, in fact, Gods were deceased humans consecrated after their death. Therefore, those who worshipped many and false Gods were superstitious whereas Christians who made their supplications to the one true God were religious.27 Paganism becomes Superstitio Thus, Christian writers built a new hierarchy in which Christianity is presented as vera religio and all other cults, including the Roman civic cults, were falsa religio or superstitio. Superstitio alluded to the doctrines and cult practices not only of pagans, but of heretics as well. In the course of the fourth century, the traditional Roman hierarchy of religio and superstitio was gradually reversed in imperial policy and legislation. Christianity, the former superstitio, replaced the civic Roman cults as religio. Although the shift was not a straightforward one, as we will see below, towards the end of the century the Roman civic religion and other traditional cults were recurrently labelled as superstitiones in official legal documents. Fourth-century Christian writers regularly use the term superstitio as a synonym for polytheistic cults and practices.28 Similarly to Lactantius who had primarily paid attention to the false object of the pagan worship, Augustine asserts it is not the sacrifices as such that are condemned. When they were offered to demons, they were noxia superstitio but, when they were presented to God, they were vera religio. In City of God he nonetheless accuses pagans of committing a double error (bis peccat) in their idolatry, in regard both to the false object of the cult and to the manner of their cult.29 In De vera religione Augustine defines the true religion of Christians with repeated negations non sit nobis religio. He outlines pagan beliefs and cults, that is, cults of animals, deceased people, demons, elements and celestial bodies, marking an absolute border to these things. Finally, he asserts that Christian souls

26 LACT. inst 4.28.11: Et omnino quid colas interest, non quemadmodum colas aut quid precere. The expression religio veri cultus est, superstitio falsi is to be understood either as referring to verus deus or the truth. Cf. TERT. apol. 24.2: veram religionem veri dei and AVG. vera relig. 2.2: verus cultus veri dei. 27 LACT. inst. 4.28.1–2; 4.28.11–12; 4.28.16. 28 E.g., AVG. civ. passim; 2.13: the Roman religion as superstitio; ep. 232.1: superstitiosus cultus idolorum; OROS. hist. passim; AMBR. ep. 17.16; 18.17 (= ep. 72–3, CSEL 82.3); PRVD. c. Symm. 2.511: victa superstitio, et passim; GAVDENT. serm. 6.14; GELAS. ep. 100.3; 100.28 (CSEL 35). 29 AVG. ep. 102.12; civ. 7.27.

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are bound (religantes) to the only God alone, from which fact the term religio is believed to come, and avoid superstitio.30 In City of God Augustine discourses on superstitio with Cicero, with substantial quotations from De natura deorum. One of Cicero’s interlocutors, Balbus the Stoic, despises the erection of images of Gods and the invention of their myths as aniles paene superstitiones. Despite this confession of the scorn felt, these same persons defend the Gods of pagans. Balbus tries to distinguish between those things that belong to superstitio and those things that constitute religio. Augustine asserts that Balbus attempts to praise the religio of Roman ancestors and to disentangle it from superstitio because he fears the established customs of his community. However, his attempt is incompatible since he has only a moment ago denounced erection of cult images as superstition and, therefore, those ancestors are implicated as the founders and worshippers of cult images. Even the speaker himself is mixed up with superstition because, despite his criticism, he regarded these institutions as venerable. Thus, for Augustine, all the beliefs and practices are altogether all the same superstition. There is no need to make distinctions. Augustine ends the chapter by proclaiming that the God of Christians has overthrown these superstitiones, not only in the religious hearts (in cordibus religiosis), but also in the superstitious temples (in aedibus superstitiosis).31 Furthermore, Augustine debates superstitio with Seneca who had criticized some traditional Roman customs as well as images and conceptions of some deities in his De superstitione. The church father is quick to make use of Seneca’s criticism as a weapon against the Roman cults. According to Augustine, Seneca had disparaged cult images of the Gods, bisexual Gods, deities introduced by Titus Tatius and Romulus and rituals performed on the Capitol such as the washing and anointing of Jupiter. Despite his hard criticism of Roman civic religion, Seneca, in the manner of Balbus and Cicero, insisted that the traditional rites ought to be performed. Seneca had been emancipated with the help of philosophers but as a senator he was stuck with the Roman religion, worshipping what he criticized, performing acts that he reprimanded and venerating what he condemned. This Augustine finds most blameworthy: this man, even though he had unmasked the deception and knew that he should be not be superstitiosus in mundo, reconciled himself to it because of laws and customs.32 We see the relationship between periphery and centre in changes in fourthcentury legislation. By the end of the fourth century, the mainstream version of Christianity was identified as religio and other beliefs and practices as superstitio. For example, in an edict in 392, it was declared that if anyone dared to worship

30 AVG. vera relig. 55.111. 31 AVG. civ. 4.30. Cf. LACT. inst. 1.17 discussion with Cicero. 32 AVG. civ. 6.10. Seneca’s work has been preserved only in fragments, largely in Augustine’s City of God. It was written in dialogue form and it is hard to reconstruct which arguments belong to each interlocutor and what Seneca’s own position was. BEARD – NORTH – PRICE 1998, 218 believe that Seneca disparaged even the most traditional Roman practices while LIEBESCHUETZ 1979, 117 states that he mainly attacked some practices of private worship rather than the civic religion.

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man-made images, by burning incense before these images, offering gifts or in any other way, this person, serving a gentilicia superstitio, would be found guilty of the violation of religion (violatae religionis reus).33 This turnover was not completed immediately. In the course of the fourth century, the term superstitio remained ambiguous in legislative texts and, thus, could be interpreted in two different ways: First, the word could be understood as meaning illegal divination and magical practices. This reading followed the Roman nonChristian tradition going back to the Twelve Tables. Roman authorities had from time to time forbidden unauthorized divination and harmful magic as dangerous superstitio, and this tradition went on till the late Empire. Thus, the legislation of Christian emperors against superstitio could be seen as part of an age-old tradition. Second, in Christian interpretation, superstitio could be taken to refer to pagan cults and above all sacrifices to Gods. These rivalling definitions of superstitio coexisted in the fourth century and the word was often probably used in an intentionally vague manner in legislation. The interpretation of the term and enforcement of laws depended to a great extent on the administrators of each region.34 Thus, it was up to those in power how this ambiguous term was interpreted. Some of them applied the term in traditional Roman context while others utilized it in a Christian setting. Moreover, many people could even understand superstitio in both ways. Political and ecclesiastical factions could play upon the vagueness of the term, using it as a weapon against rivals. The ambiguity of the word superstitio is apparent in Emperor Constantine’s announcement addressed to the people of Hispellum in 337. The temple consecrated in honour of the imperial family should not be polluted with fraud of any superstitio, which could be understood either according to Roman tradition as prohibiting sacrifices connected to unauthorized divination or in Christian context as forbidding any pagan sacrifice.35 In an edict in 341, Constantius II declared, “superstitio shall cease, the insanity of sacrifices shall be abolished”. His words could be taken either as prohibiting performance of magic, if the administrator was a polytheist or sympathized with polytheists, or forbidding pagan practices, if the governor wanted to suppress polytheistic cults.36 The competing interpretations of superstitio appear in Firmicus Maternus’ writings. In his astrological work Mathesis, before his conversion to Christianity, he refers to superstitio as disproportionate fear that some rites provoke in human beings. After his conversion he denounces pagan cults in his

33 CTh 16.10.12.1–2. 34 SALZMAN 1987, 176–80; LIEBESCHUETZ 1979, 137–8; NOETHLICHS 1971, 66. 35 CIL XI 5265. Sometimes, as in CTh 16.2.5 (in 323), religio and superstitio were used to refer to religious practices of others as if they were synomyms. First, Constantine has found out that the Christian clergy had been constrained by people of various religiones to perform sacrifices. Then, he orders that Christian priests should not be forced to take part in rituals of an alien superstitio. It is the sacrifice that is crucial for Constantine in making a distinction on non-Christian practices. For the discussion on sacrifice, see Chapter 5. 36 CTh 16.10.2. SALZMAN 1987, 172–88; NOETHLICHS 1971, 65–8; Cf. MARTROYE 1930, 672–3, who regarded superstitio as referring, not to idolatry in general, but some particular illicit practice.

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De errore profanarum religionum: at this point, superstitio has become a synonym for paganism.37 It is possible that concessions made from time to time to the versions of divination and magic that were held as harmless, that is, ‘white magic’, blurred the borderline between the licit and the illicit and could have been applied for the benefit of certain polytheistic practices. The attitudes of emperors toward this sort of superstitio varied as they had done in the early Empire. Constantine permitted the practice of superstitio in this form in public. One of his laws made a distinction between accepted magic performed for health and harvests, and unaccepted magic causing someone’s death or seduction. In 319 Constantine allowed the practice of haruspices in public, calling the practice superstitio.38 In 371 Valentinian I permitted the performance of benevolent haruspicina, even calling it religio according to the Roman tradition. Only maleficious performance of haruspicina was forbidden. Thus, for Christian emperors the boundaries were not necessarily drawn along plain religious lines but were complicated by the age-old Roman tradition of legislation.39 Nevertheless, in the course of the fourth century the Christian interpretation little by little replaced the Roman definition. From the reign of Theodosius I onwards and later in the fifth century, the imperial legislation applied superstitio to refer to ‘alien’ devotions, that is, those of pagans, Jews and heretics. These were branded as perfidiae, superstitiones and errores.40 Sacrifices that previously had functioned as the criterion of loyalty to the Roman state, that is, the civilized society, were designated as superstitio, for example, in CTh 16.10.12 in which the switch of the roles of religio and superstitio is particularly apparent. The only religio, the normative religious system, was now defined as Nicaean Christianity. The Roman civic religion had been legitimized by tradition. In a similar manner, it was tradition, the apostolic tradition, that justified the status of Nicaean Christianity as the only religio.41 It was the emperor who set the boundaries of correct worship (rectus cultus) in his laws for the whole empire.42 Those who confessed and practiced other devotions were regarded as falling outside the civilized – Christian and Roman – society. Whereas Christians had sometimes been held as hostes publici during the preceding centuries, non-Christians and non-Catholic Christians were now represented as enemies of the Roman rule. Christianity had become religio Romana.

37 Before conversion: FIRM. math. 6.25.2: superstitiosa trepidatione sollicitos; after conversion: FIRM. err. 2.1; 6.1; 12.1; 12.7; 13.3; 17.4; 18.1; 20.1. 38 CTh 9.16.3; 9.16.1 (in 319). Roman lawyers had distinguished between good and bad magic: GAIVS dig. 50.16.236. 39 CTh 9.16.9. For the imperial legislation, see HUNT 1993, 145–6. 40 E.g., CTh 16.5.63 (in 425): Omnes haereses omnesque perfidias, omnia schismata superstitionesque gentilium, omnes catholicae legi inimicos insectamur errores. 41 E.g., CTh 16.1.2 (in 380); 16.5.41 (in 407); 16.5.6 (in 381) proclaims that the Nicaean Christianity is religio. It is worth remembering that the manifestation of an entirely Christianized state under Theodosius’ successors is also reflected in the compilation of laws in the Theodosian Code. 42 CTh 16.5.41 (in 407). For the role of the emperor, see HUNT 1993, 148.

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Continuity and Change Christian subversion supplied the term religio with a new content, particularly in Tertullian’s reinterpretation, as M. Sachot points out.43 However, in spite of this innovation, Christian writers stuck with the Roman conventions in their characterization of the pagan superstitio and echoed the traditional Roman loath and disdain. Connotations and formulas familiar from Roman discussion shifted to Christian discourse. Error and Perversity Everything polytheistic was typified as an error. Prudentius bundled together all pagan practices, stating that it is all the same superstition, even if the error wears a different hue. Polytheistic cults and practices were recurrently branded as error in fifth-century legislation. The label of error had also appeared in earlier Roman legislation: in his edict in 312, Maximinus Daia had described Christianity as a dark mist of error, as a destructive error and as a blind error and delusion.44 The word error had frequently been utilized by Christian apologists to refer to polytheistic cults and, vice versa, by pagan writers to refer to Christianity, for example, by Porphyry. It is possible that Maximus of Madauros alludes to this previous reciprocal use of error in his letter to Augustine as Maximus states that he cannot hide his impatience with such a great error (tanti erroris) – that of Christians.45 Christian polemicists depicted polytheistic cults, the pagan superstitio, as a distortion of the true religio. In this portrayal, they followed essentially the Roman tradition that characterized superstitio as the perversion, forgery or caricature of religio. They tried to explain the parallels in pagan and Christian rituals as a counterfeit achieved by demons. Tertullian had acknowledged that there were similarities between pagan and Christian rituals but stated that it was out of truth that falsehood was constructed and out of religio that superstitio was compacted. Lactantius had rejected the possibility that cults with images of the Gods could be regarded as religiones since there could be no religio wherever there was a cult image. Religio consisted of divine things and there was nothing divine except in heavenly things. Thus, Lactantius asserted, cult images were without religio because there could be nothing heavenly in images made from earth. Pagan cults with images were a mere mimicry of religio.46

43 SACHOT 1991, 390–91 stresses that for the Romans religio was an attitude and a system of rituals and cults while for Christians it was above all a system of ideas and doctrine. 44 PRVD. c. Symm. 2.872: Una superstitio est, quamvis non concolor error. The Greek translation of Maximinus’ edict, apud EUS. eccl. 9.7.3; 9.7.9; 9.7.11; the fragmentary Latin text in S. MITCHELL, ‘Maximinus and the Christians in A.D. 312: a New Latin Inscription’, JRS 78 (1988), 105–24: 108. 45 Christian apologists: OPELT 1980, 77; Porphyry apud AVG. civ. 19.23: Christianos vero pollutos et contaminatos et errore implicatos esse. MAX. MADAVR. Aug. ep. 16.2. 46 TERT. ieiun. 16.7; LACT. inst. 2.18. For imitation, see Chapter 3.

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The Roman authors had often portrayed superstitio and false religion with the adjective pravus.47 The label of superstitio and perversion occurred in Diocletian’s and Maximian’s law against Manichaeans in which it was stated that disproportionate leisure sometimes tempted people to join together to transgress the boundaries of human nature and made them introduce certain foolish and shameful types of superstitious doctrine. That is why the emperors decided to punish the obstinate and corrupt minds of the most depraved people. Manichaeism was even called a strange and unexpected monstrosity.48 Pravus and pravitas appear in Christian writings and in the legislation in the early fifth century. An imperial edict in 407 contrasted the distorted decisions and opinions of people (pravae hominum voluntates, prava opinio) with the noble simplicity of the true faith and religio (simplex religio, simplicis fides religionis): in this law, it is the heretical Christian groups that are contraposed with mainstream Christianity. Bishop Gelasius denounced the Lupercalia festival in Rome as an instrument of perversions (instrumenta pravitatum).49 Futility and Insanity The Roman elite had connected superstitio with futility or emptiness. In Cicero’s and Varro’s delineations, superstitio was a vain fear of Gods whereas religio was the proper respect paid to them. The word superstitio had been applied in legal texts to the disproportionate fear or terror of the divine and Pliny the Younger had despised Christianity as an excessive superstition (superstitio prava immodica). Correspondingly, Ammianus Marcellinus called Emperor Julian superstitiosus, thus criticizing him for excessive performance of sacrifices, for being magis quam sacrorum legitimus observator.50 The vain fear of the Gods appears in an edict in 392 forbidding sacrifices, incense in front of man-made cult images of the Gods and other practices. The text of the law does not hide the legislator’s disdain towards gentilicia superstitio: it ridicules a pagan for suddenly beginning to fear the cult image that he himself has created.51 The Roman elite had characterized superstitio as vanitas: Tacitus, for example, had labelled rituals of an alien cult as superstitio vana. The edict of Maximinus Daia, decreed against Christianity, refers to the empty pride and vain foolishness of 47 Referring to the Bacchanalia scandal in 186 B.C.E, Livy (39.8–18) called the cult of Bacchus a prava et externa religio, implying that depraved religio drove people to crime and lust and threatened the Roman order. PLIN. ep. 10.96.8 characterized Christianity as a superstitio prava immodica. Tacitus (hist. 5.5) characterized the Jewish rites as perverse and disgusting and having endured only because of their depravity: cetera instituta, sinistra foeda, pravitate valuere. Cf. LACT. inst. 2.1.1: in susceptis pravissime religionibus; 2.1.2: a pravis itineribus; 2.1.4: depositate pravitate; 5.10.14: homines prave religiosi; 6.4.2: pravis religionibus. 48 Compar. Mos. et Rom. leg. 15.3, FIRA II, 580–81. 49 CTh 16.5.41. Heresies are also called a perversa superstitio (CTh 26.5.5) and portentuosa superstitio (CTh 16.5.66pr.). GELAS. ep. 100.17 (CSEL 35). 50 CIC. nat. deor. 1.42.117; div. 1.117; Varro apud AVG. civ. 6.9; DIG. 48.19.30; 28.7.8; PLIN. ep. 10.96.8; AMM. 25.4.17. 51 CTh 16.10.12.2 (in 392).

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Christians.52 This terminology is echoed in the wordings in Christian literature as well as in the late fourth-century and early fifth-century legislation where pagan superstitio is regularly phrased as vana, vanissima, inanis or inanissima superstitio.53 The vana superstitio of pagans was repeated in Prudentius’ poems.54 Moreover, it was characterized as blind, for example, in Augustine’s remark of the blind and vain convention and superstition of the Greeks. Ambrose connected the vana superstitio of the Chaldaean astrologers and the impious errors of paganism.55 Delusions were associated with the inanissima or vana superstitio; for instance, Gelasius mocked the ancestral Roman practices as bizarre superstitions and vain figments that had been blown empty a long time ago.56 Roman writers had described superstitio as insanity; Seneca, for example, called it error insanus. Pliny the Younger labelled Christianity as amentia, stressing the stubbornness and inflexibility of Christians and in the legislation against Christians, Maximinus Daia had denigrated Christianity as a damned madness and vain foolishness.57 The corresponding phraseology occurs in Christian literature and legislation in which the label of insanity or stupidity becomes one of the most frequent ways to describe the pagan superstitio. In 341 an edict of Constantius II connects superstitio with the madness of sacrifices.58 The Greco-Roman dichotomy of insanity and rationality was reversed in an edict in 448 that ordered all the works written by Porphyry or any other author surmounted by madness (mania) to be burned. It was Porphyry who had contrasted the rationality of the Greco-Roman tradition and the ludicrousness of the Christian faith and judged Christianity as irrational and Christians as beasts who with eyes shut believed whatever was told them. Moreover, the philosopher referred to by Macarius of Magnesia and often identified as Porphyry had stated that Christianity was not only bestial and absurd but

52 TAC. hist. 4.54.4. Maximinus’ edict apud EUS. eccl. 9.7.6; 9.7.9. 53 E.g., CTh 16.10.18: vanae superstitionis. TERT. pall. 4.10; apol. 24.7; MIN. FEL. 1.5; LACT. inst. 2.1.2; 2.17.6; 5.13.21; ARNOB. nat. 1.42. 54 E.g., PRVD. c. Symm. 1.198: gentilia, vana superstitio; apoth. 510: vana superstitio lex et carnaliter acta; Consult. Zacch. 1.27.1: vana religio. Cf. MACR. Sat. 1.17.2: quod omnes paene deos, dumtaxat qui sub caelo sunt, ad solem [poetae] referunt, non vana superstitio sed ratio divina commendat. Is Macrobius alluding to the Christian use of the term vana superstitio? 55 AVG. civ. 18.8: caeca et vana consuetudine ac superstitione Graecarum; 18.24 of the Roman religion: vanae atque impiae superstitionis. AMBR. explan. in psalm. 1.22.3: Chaldaei sunt, qui siderum cursus vanae studio superstitionis explorant et impiae serunt gentilitatis errores. 56 GELAS. ep. 100.3 (CSEL 35): ad prodigiosas superstitiones et vana figmenta seducitur; 100.29: pagan practice was superstitiosum and vanum; 100.28: paganitatis superstitio ventilata est. The practices performed on the Capitol were profana vanitas. Cf. ARNOB. nat. 4.7.2: inanissimae superstitionis figmenta. Cf. SVLP. SEV. dial. 2.15.4: per inanes superstitiones et fantasmata visionum ridicula. 57 SEN. ep. 21.123.16; cf. CIC. div. 1.132; cf. LIV. 39.16.5, who stated that superstitio made a human insanus and insaniens; PLIN. ep. 10.96.4; Maximinus’ edict apud EUS. eccl. 9.7.6; 9.7.9. 58 CTh 16.10.2. Cf. CTh 15.5.5 (in 425).

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also more absurd than all absurdity and more bestial than all bestiality.59 This kind of dehumanization was also characteristic of Christian vilification of paganism.60 People clung obstinately to their insane superstitio and the legal texts describe this state of affairs. Correspondingly, the Roman elite had despisedly characterized the adherents of alien superstitiones as stubborn and persistent in their error, for example, Tacitus in his description of Jews and Diocletian and Maximian in their decree against Manichaeans.61 Profanity and Filthiness The Roman elite had tended to despise the customs and beliefs of popular religion as superstitio. The same attitude reappears in the texts of the new Christian elite in the fourth and fifth centuries. Superstitio is applied to refer to popular practices of the Christian folk that bishops disapproved and labelled as pagan remnants mixed with the Christian faith. Rufinus simply declared that vulgus was superstitiosum.62 Roman authors had labelled superstitio as an old-womanish behaviour or belief, thus associating the excessive commitment to the Gods with women and implying that women were likely to lose their self-control in religious issues. Christianity had been branded as anilis superstitio.63 For his part, Firmicus Maternus turns the insult on the cults of pagan Gods, calling them born of superstitionibus anilibus.64 In the Roman tradition, the term profanus had been sharply contrasted with the religio of the state. Profanus was outside the official sphere of the sacred, and the private religious life outside the religio was also characterized as profanus. Again, Christian writers inverted the hierarchy of the oppositional pair. Polytheistic religions, including the Roman civic religion, became profane, as the title of Firmicus Maternus’ work De errore profanarum religionum shows, and Christian beliefs and practices were portrayed as sancti, pii and religiosi. From Cyprian onwards, profani was used of non-Christians, that is, those outside the sacred sphere of the Christian community. In Carmen contra paganos, the anonymous writer attacks the pagan senator who seduces poor people to apostatize from Christianity and makes them profane. For Paulinus of Nola, profani are those people who dare to cast doubt on 59 CIust 1.1.3. Porphyry apud EUS. praep. 1.3.1 (= fragm. 73 Harnack) and apud EUS. dem. ev. 1.1.12 (= fragm. 73 Harnack); MAC. MAGN. apocr. 3.15 (= fragm. 69 Harnack). Cf. Iul. ep. 114 Bidez-Cumont (= 41 Wright) of the raving madness and folly of the Christians. 60 OPELT 1980, 76, 245; BÜHRER-THIERRY 2002, 175–87. 61 CTh 16.10.20.2: ad superstitionem pertinens. TAC. hist. 2.4; PLIN. ep. 10.96.4 of stubborn Christians; Diocletian and Maximian against Manichaeans: Compar. Mos. et Rom. leg. 15.3, FIRA II, 580–581. 62 TAC. ann. 1.28; APVL. Socr. 3.122. RVFIN. hist. 6.41.1. For the attitudes towards popular religion, see BOLGIANI 1981, 52. 63 CIC. nat. deor. 2.28.70: superstitiones paene aniles; cf. 2.20; 3.92; dom. 105; div. 1.7; 2.19; 2.125; 2.60; cf. IVV. 6.511 of superstitions of women. According to AMM. 21.16.18, Emperor Constantius II had confused the plain and simple Christian religio with anilis superstitio by encouraging theological disputes. Christians: e.g., apud LACT. inst. 5.2: cohibita impia et anili superstitione; 1.17 quoting Cicero. 64 FIRM. err. 17.4 referring to Cicero.

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God. A council of 374 complains of Christians who after baptism pollute themselves with profane rites of demons or filthy pagan washing ceremonies.65 Superstitiosus and profanus were also connected with filthiness and pollution in contrast to the purity of the adherents of the correct religio. In the Roman discourse, Christians had been regarded as as the blemish (miasma or macula) of impiety. Porphyry had labelled Christians as polluted, contaminated and entangled in error.66 In the Christian subversion, polytheistic cults, in their turn, became polluted and stained. Prudentius bundles pagan religions into one filthy superstitio. J. Dougherty points out that Augustine overturns the traditional Roman order in which the profane was situated beyond the city walls and the puriefid was within the sacred space of the city. The church father brands the Roman cults that are practiced within the city walls as shameful and the objects of that worship as unclean.67 Disease and Destruction The oppositional pair filthiness and purity is connected with the metaphors of pollution, contagion and disease. In the Roman tradition, superstitio was regarded as a menace threatening the Roman Empire and even all humankind; thus, it was associated with infection and disease.68 Pliny the Younger, reporting to Emperor Trajan on the Christians’ spread in the towns and the countryside of Bithynia, had applied the metaphor of infection, superstitionis istius contagio. In his Christian reversal, Firmicus Maternus seems to echo Pliny’s words when complaining about the dreadful pollution of pagan superstition, superstitionis istius metuenda contagio. Furthermore, the anonymous polytheist interlocutor in the Apocriticus of Macarius of Magnesia employs a parallel phrasing in his assault on the malady of Christianity that has spread, not only to the countryside, but also to the towns.69 Maximinus Daia had called Christianity a severe disease and a sudden storm from which people had been saved.70 A similar moralizing tone prevails in the legislation of Christian emperors: Constantine ruled that the temple in Hispellum dedicated to his family should not be polluted with the frauds of any infectious

65 E.g., LACT. inst. 7.26.5: profani. OPELT 1980, 89; ERDT 1976, 88. CARM. c. pag. 82–3; PAVL. NOL. ep. 16.3; Concilium Valentinum, can. 3 (CCSL 148, p. 39). 66 Maximinus’ edict apud EUS. eccl. 9.7.11; the fragmentary Latin text in MITCHELL 1988, 108. Porphyry apud AVG. civ. 19.23. 67 PRVD. apoth. 194–6: Quae gens tam stolida est animis, tam barbara linguis, / quaeve superstitio tam sordida … AVG. civ. 7.27. DOUGHERTY 1979, 84. 68 PLIN. nat. 30.2.7–8 on magic; SEN. ep. 123.16; TAC. ann. 15.44.5; 2.85.5. GRODZYNSKI 1974, 47–48. 69 PLIN. ep. 10.96.9. FIRM. err. 12.1; cf. 17.4: quasi ex longa aegritudine. MAC. MAGN. apocr. 3.15 (= fragm. 69 Harnack). Similarly, Emperor Julian (IUL. ep. 89a Bidez-Cumont = 20 Wright) attacked the Galilean impiety, that is, Christianity, labelling it as a malady that pollutes life; cf. Iul. ep. 114.438c Bidez-Cumont (= 41 Wright) and ep. 61c Bidez-Cumont (= 36 Wright). 70 Maximinus’ edict apud EUS. eccl. 9.7.11; the fragmentary Latin text in MITCHELL 1988, 108.

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superstition (cuiusquam contagiose superstitionis fraudibus polluatur).71 Moreover, the mainstream Christians used to denounce their Christian rivals as illness or infection (pestis or contagio).72 The pollution by pagan cults was used as a metaphor but was also feared as a ‘real’ contaminating influence on Christians. According to Maximus of Turin idolatry defiles the whole community. If a tenant makes sacrifices, a landowner is polluted as well. Maximus contrasts the religio veritatis with the diabolical impiety that is purified by the splendour of baptism.73 Roman writers had regarded superstitio as a morbus mentis.74 Correspondingly, Christian authors considered paganism a sickness of the soul. The metaphor of the disease of paganism and the cure of Christianity is particularly present in the Healing of Hellenic Diseases by Theodoret of Cyrrhus. Augustine refers to pagan cults as morbid and pernicious attachments that are cured by divine Scriptures. In City of God Augustine states that he has done his very best to rebut the pagan errors but it is not the fault of the physician if the disease turns out to be incurable, despite all efforts to treat it. Later he writes that proud Neoplatonists who refused to receive the Christian faith were miserable as they not only were sick, but were arrogant in their sickness and were ashamed to take the medicine that could cure them. Moreover, they did not do this in order to rise up but to fall and suffer more severely.75 Augustine described his own conversion as the cure of his languishing soul.76 He applies the metaphor of falling ill and healing in several instances, not only in converting pagans, but also in exhorting baptized Christians to live a better life. In reproaching his double-hearted parishioners who have taken part in pagan festivities, Augustine asserts that a Christian should not seek anything else but the help of the Christian God. When God wants to cure a soul from its sickness, he cuts away the infected parts like the physician uses his knife on the putrid parts of a body. Is God cruel in persecuting the wound or is he rather merciful in curing the sick person? Thus, the healing God pressured not only individuals, but also whole groups of 71 CIL XI 5265. Cf. PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 89 that calls galli priests contagia. 72 AVG. c. Faust. 20.5 of the erroneous views of Manichaeism; Consult. Zacch. 2.11.3: tantae haereticorum ac tam innumerae pestes sunt. In legislation: CTh 16.5.56: haeresi superstitionis … contagione; 16.5.44: Quae pestis cave contagione; 16.5.62; 16.5.54; 16.5.58.3: pestiferi dogmatis. 73 MAX. TAVR. 105.2; 106.1–2; 107.2: Grande igitur est idolatria: polluit exercentes polluit habitantes polluit intuentes; penetrat ad ministros penetrat ad conscios penetrat ad tacentes; 22a.2: posteaquam enim ecclesia baptismi nidore purgata est, diabolicae inpietatis non meminit religione veritatis exultati; cf. GAVDENT. serm. 9.2: idolatriae contagio. For the pollution, see Merkt 1997, 111, 139, 198 and C. LEPELLEY, ‘La diabolisation du paganisme et ses conséquences psychologiques: les angoisses de Publicola, correspondant de saint Augustin’, Impies et païens entre Antiquité et Moyen Age, Paris 2002b, 81–96: 88–9. 74 E.g., HOR. sat. 2.3.79–80. 75 Partic. THEOD. affect. 1.1–8; 1.127–8; also PRVD. c. Symm. 1.2: antiqui morbi. AVG. ep. 102.19; civ. 6. praef; 10.29; serm. Dolbeau 26.28 (= 198augm). 76 AVG. conf. 6.4 on the illness of his soul before conversion; 8.7.17. For the metaphor of sickness in the Hellenistic conversion narratives of Lucian of Samosata and Dio of Prusa, see SHUMATE 1996, 33.

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people to the treatment of the Christian faith. Imperial legislation was only a tool of God in this medicinalis molestia, treatment by disruption.77 Roman authors had connected superstitio with damage and destruction, using metaphors, not only of infection and disease, but also of tempests and bonfires. Tacitus and Sueton had described Christian superstitio with adjectives exitiabilis and malefica, thus stressing the criminal and pernicious character of the movement. Maximinus Daia had raged at the injurious darkness and the damaging error of Christians. Christianity was also compared with a fire that had been incautiously tended and that would cause great disaster.78 Mainstream Christians associated the metaphors of noxiousness with pagans and heretics. Augustine speaks of the genus perniciosae superstitionis into which he includes polytheistic cults as well as astrology and magical practices. Dealings with demons are idle and noxious superstitio and their harmful character is stressed with expressions of pestifera societas and dolosa amicitia.79 Old superstitio and new religio New alien cults had fallen under the suspicion of the Roman leading elite. Suetonius had branded Christianity as a superstitio nova ac malefica and Celsus had detested it as a recently established cult. Again, the Manichaeans were bundled into this group of loathsome new religions. A new religion should not oppose the primeval religio that had been fixed and defined by the forefathers.80 It was the contraposition of novelty and antiquity where Christian writers truly departed from the Roman tradition. Christian authors wanted to represent the novelty of Christianity as a positive feature and the antiquity of pagan religions as a negative one whereas the general opinion had judged the antiquity of cults and rituals as a proof of their authority and validity.81 Christian writers regarded the antiquity of pagan superstitions only as deplorable since the age-old errors had become rooted too deep in human souls that were too stubbornly stuck on the ancient tradition. Augustine, for example, complained 77 AVG. in euang. Ioh. 7.12; ep. 185.7.26: medicinalis molestia. 78 TAC. ann. 15.44.5; SVET. Nero 16.2. Maximinus’ edict EUS. eccl. 9.7.3; 9.7.9; 9.7.11; the fragmentary Latin text in MITCHELL 1988, 108: in exsecranda superstitione. Bonfire: Maximinus’ edict apud EUS. eccl. 9.7.6. 79 AVG. doctr. christ. 2.21.32; 2.23.36: vel nugatoriae vel noxiae superstitionis; ep. 102.18 connects impia superbia and noxia superstitio. CTh 16.5.48 (in 410) labels heresies as a nefaria superstitio. EUS. eccl. 7.31 had compared Manichaeans with a lethal poison that was brought from Persia to injure the Roman Empire. 80 SVET. Nero 16.2: superstitionis novae; Celsus apud ORIG. Cels. 1.29; 1.38; 1.46. An exception to the general Roman trend is Tac. ann. 3.60.5, who speaks of old superstitiones. Diocletian and Maximian against Manichaeans: Compar. Mos. et Rom. leg. 15.3, FIRA II, 580–81. The Manichaeans were condemned as one of those peoples who founded new and unheard-of sects opposing more ancient religions. 81 Old cults are treated negatively in AMBR. ep. 18.7 (= ep. 73, CSEL 82.3); AVG. civ. 8.22: inveterata superstitione; cf. LACT. inst. 2.1.1: persuasione inveterate; ARNOB. nat. 1.2; EUS. v. Const. 3.54.

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that people drank in this superstitio with their mother’s milk. He turned Seneca’s criticism of Roman religion and other polytheistic cults against the old Gods, quoting his De superstitione: “All this disgraceful multitude of Gods, which the long-lasting superstition has gathered, we should … worship in such a manner that we would remember all the time that its worship belongs rather to convention than to reality.” Despite this position, and echoing the earlier Roman argumentation, in 410 legislators nevertheless emphasized the antiquity of mainstream Christianity and denounced the new superstition of heresies.82 Paganism, Superstitio and Magic Where the sign of the Cross appears, magic is weak and witchcraft has no strength. ATHANASIUS, Vita Antonii 78

The next subversion introduced by Christian writers was the association built between paganism and magic. However, this renversement de sens did not make its breakthrough easily; polytheistic cults and magical practices were not automatically coupled with each other. Polytheistic practices and celebrations were so closely connected with the life of urban as well as rural communities that Christian emperors were forced to make concessions to old customs. As we have discussed above, in the course of the fourth century, there prevailed two competing readings of the term superstitio in the legislation. Towards the end of the century, superstitio was increasingly interpreted as referring to polytheistic cults and practices. At the same time, superstitio was associated with magic too. In their argumentation against the old Gods, Christian leaders did all they could to reinforce this interpretation. Augustine is an illustrative example of this linking up. In De doctrina christiana he assembles together pagan cults, magical practices, divination and astrology into a group of superstitiones.83 Augustine defined superstitio as including “anything established by humans that refers to the making and worshipping of idols, or the worshipping of creation or any part of creation as God, or to consultations and certain agreed codes of communication, settled in collusion with demons”. Therefore, Augustine’s definition consisted of, first, the worship of idols as Gods, that is, polytheistic cults; second, the worship of creation or any part of creation as God, that is, all philosophical allegorical interpretations of the world or its elements as divinities (such as Neptune worshipped and interpreted as the sea); and third, magical practices, astrology and divination – including haruspicina and augury that had earlier been allowed as official and public practices – that in Augustine’s description were based on contracts with demons.84 82 AVG. civ. 22.6; 6.10. CTh. 16.11.3: novella superstitione. 83 AVG. doctr. christ. 2.20.30–2.24.37. MATTHEWS 1989, 426 describes the fourth-century situation appropriately: “fear of magic, though connected with it, is not the same as hostility to paganism”. 84 AVG. doctr. christ. 2.20.30; 2.23.36.

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There is an essential change in Augustine’s definition. Augustine, like other contemporary Christian writers, bundles the Roman religion as well as magic into the term superstitio. In earlier Roman thought the Roman civic religion had been delineated as religio and magic as superstitio. At the same time, in this Christian reinterpretation, the Gods of polytheistic cults were denounced as false Gods and identified as demons. All the practices dealing with pagan Gods – now demons – were branded as magic and, thus, polytheistic religions could be conveniently cast into the sphere of magic. In Augustine’s demarcation between religio and superstitio, it is the intentions and aims that make the crucial difference. Religio is practiced in public for unselfish purposes and for the common good, for the sake of the neighbour and for the love of God whereas personal interests and private reasons characterize superstitio.85 In his work On different questions, the church father explains the difference between the miracles performed by Pharaoh’s magicians and those by Moses and Aaron. He contraposes public and private goals as well as emphasizes the divergent authority (diverso fine et diverso iure). Magicians performed miracles for their own good – seeking their own glory – as private agreement with demons (quasi si privata commercia vel beneficia) while Christian saints acted for the benefit of their community as public service (publica administratione) and seeking God’s glory. Thus, it was one thing when magicians performed miracles and another thing when good Christians performed them, Augustine declares.86 In my opinion, this Christian interpretation with the emphasis of the public and the private continues to a degree the Roman tradition of distinguishing religio and superstitio. In Roman thought, religio represented the official religious life of the state, superstitio the unofficial, private and popular side of religious behaviour. This is particularly apparent in Roman legislation in which private religious practices were regarded with great suspicion while public ones were accepted. The Roman leading elite had despised Christians who had performed their cult in private and kept out of the Greco-Roman sacrificial system. Moreover, Christian leaders had been reproached for performing magic.87 Thus, the binary opposition of religio – superstitio was also turned around in regard to the public and the private and the parts switched their position: Christianity moved from the periphery of the private superstitio to the centre of the public religio. In City of God Augustine constantly bonds polytheistic religions and magical practices. In his discussion about Numa Pompilius, he represents this primordial king as practicing magic and dealing with demons, that is, the Roman Gods. This is again a coup d’état since he delineates Numa, whom the Romans esteemed as the founder of their religio, as a mere magician. Finally, he contraposes the pernicious 85 AVG. doctr. christ. 2.23.36. For Augustine’s discussion on superstitio, see MARKUS 1996, 131–9, 146. AVG. doctr. christ. 2.20.30; 2.29.45 admits that certain objects or acts (e.g, taking certain drinks and foods) could be understood either as superstition or medication but the interpretation depeded on the intention of the person involved. 86 AVG. divers. quaest. 73.79.1–4. 87 E.g., apud ARNOB. nat. 1.42–4; LACT. inst. 5.3; EUS. dem. ev. 3.2; 3.5. Echoes of the charges of magic are found still in AVG. cons. euang. 1.9.14 and 1.11.17.

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superstitio that worships demons and the vera religio that unmasks and overcomes them. Later in City of God the simple faith and pious confidence (simplici fide atque fiducia pietatis) that achieved the miracles depicted in the Old Testament are contrasted with the spells and charms that were composed in the art of nefarious curiosity (incantationibus et carminibus nefariae curiositatis arte compositis). Again, he builds a connection to the cult of polytheistic Gods – who are demons.88 Superstitio was transferred outside the boundaries of the vera religio Christiana. However, it slipped back inside Christianity and church leaders had to mark borderlines between religio and superstitio again. In regard to Christian sacraments, Augustine’s emphasis on motives was valid in making distinctions. The Christian sacraments of the vera religio could also be used for superstitious goals, that is, for selfish and perverted ends.89 Here, again, we find the idea of the distortion or fag end of the proper religio. Modern scholars have often discussed the ‘magicization’ of Christian sacraments and symbols in the course of Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages. I would rather speak of practices and beliefs that we often call magical and that Christian opinion leaders labelled as magical.90 Church fathers raised baptism as an example of the use of Christian sacraments for magical purposes. Baptism was often connected with, not only spiritual salvation, but also material success and bodily health. Likewise, ecclesiastical writers report to us that physical objects such as the codices of the Scriptures and the cross were utilized as magical tools for healing. Furthermore, the name of Christ was used in spells.91 The use of magic for private ends was widely denounced but the attitudes of church leaders towards Christian magic varied according to the circumstances. Nevertheless, Jerome does not condemn Hilarion who agreed to pray for the victory of a team of horses at the circus. Hilarion even blessed water that was sprinkled over the stable, horses, charioteers and carriages. The team won the race and even pagans had to acknowledge the victory although they accused the holy man of practicing magic.92

88 AVG. civ. 7.35; 10.9; cf. serm. Dolbeau 26.28 (= 198augm). 89 MARKUS 1996, 142–3. BOLGIANI 1981, 46 calls the continuous demarcation of boundaries “processo di decantazione e di distinzione dell’una dall’altra”. 90 WELTIN 1987, 6 writes that “humble converts to Christianity naturally carried over pagan elements into their new faith” and tried “to transfer the potency of old idols to new Christian sacramentals like the sign of cross, shrines, icons, and relics”. However, MARKUS 1996, 142–3 speaks of magicization in quotation marks and criticizes the trend. 91 AVG. in euang. Ioh. 7.12 forbids his listeners to visit pagan sorcerers for seeking healing in illness. He states that it is better to place the gospel at one’s head instead of having recourse to a pagan amulet, “not because it is done for this purpose, but because the gospel is preferred to amulets”; cf. ep. 245.2: superstitio ligaturarum; IOH. CHRYS. hom. 72 in Matt. 2; HESYCH. HIEROS. fragm. ps. 109.2 (PG 93). Spells: IOH. CHRYS. hom. 8 in Col. 5; BAS. hom. in ps. 45.1. 92 HIER. Hilar. 20.

Chapter 5

Ceremonies of Light and Dark Corrupt and Shameful Rituals If these monstrous rites find favour, no holy things are chaste. Carmen contra paganos v. 13 The dignity of the Christian religio is implied or directly contrasted with the profligacy of pagan rituals. Augustine, for example, compares the obscenities of pagan Gods presented in theatres with what is read, said and heard in Christian churches. Furthermore, he contrasts the night of pernicious impiety with the light of Christian salubrious piety.1 The words turpitudines, turpia and turpiter were used frequently to refer to the pagan shamefulness.2 Augustine introduces a pun on the Fugalia, writing that the feast is in fact the flight of all decency and honesty (fugalia pudoris et honestatis).3 In City of God Augustine’s polemic concentrates on rituals that he can easily label as obscene and distorted, in the cult of Magna Mater and the cult of Bacchus as well as in primeval Roman wedding ceremonies.4 He even employs Seneca to criticize the perverted elements of his own religious tradition, such as castration of priests, and lets him remark that Gods do not deserve any kind of worship if this is the worship they desired. Particularly noteworthy is Augustine’s attack on theatrical performances. He connects the obscenity of propitiatory spectacles with the general decline of morality described rigorously by the Republican historian Sallust. It is appalling that Romans prefer to appease their angered Gods with debauchery rather than decency. Augustine refers to the theatrical shows celebrated in honour of the Goddess Flora as an example of the disgusting enormities performed in honour of 1 AVG. civ. 19.23; 2.28. The shamefulness of pagan cults had been a recurrent theme in Christian apologetics. E.g., CLEM. prot. 2 condemns the mysteries connected with Aphrodite as disgraceful and preposterous; TERT. idol. 15.11; apol. 35.2: the door of a temple was a facies novi lupanaris; ARNOB. nat. 6 was intended to label pagan temple cult as ludicrous. 2 E.g., PRVD. c. Symm. 1.115: turpiter of Priapus; PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 88: mysteria turpia; PS. CYPR. CARM. ad senat. 8; 29; AVG. civ. 2.27: turpiter and turpius of theatrical performances; 6.6: turpitudo publica and turpitudo theatrica; 6.7: turpitudines, turpia of galli priests; 7.21: ad quantam turpitudinem, tanta licentia turpitudinis and 7.24: turpitudine crudelissima vel crudelitate turpissima of the cult of Liber; cons. euang. 1.33.51: turpitudo of Flora. Augustine also employs other words here: indigna, detestabilia and obscenitas. 3 AVG. civ. 2.6. 4 E.g., AVG. civ. 6.8; 7.25–6: Magna Mater; 7.21: Liber; 6.9: nuptials. For Augustine’s tendentious polemic, see also O’DALY 1994, 73.

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pagan deities.5 Flora was a favourite object of Christian slanders: performances connected with her cult were an apposite target for rebuke and ridicule. For instance, Carmen contra paganos attacks the unnamed senator under whose consulship Flora meretrix rejoices. In their polemic against polytheistic cults, Christian writers focused on those Gods and rituals that in their sexual carnevalism were an easy target for defamation and probably quite an uncomfortable issue for many pagans themselves. Priapus and his phallus cult as well as the Bacchic rites were among these embarrassing cults.6 Similarly, the cult of Magna Mater and Attis with castrated galli priests was a recurrent theme in Christian assaults. The sacrilegious shows and entertainments (spectacula ludibriaque sacrilegiorum) of the cult of Magna Mater hardly were suitable for decent mothers’ ears, Augustine writes. He reports to us of the galli whose existence insults all decency in men and women and appeared in the city life of fifth-century Carthage. Similarly, Poema ultimum attacks galli, and Prudentius condemns the castration made as an offering to the Goddess.7 In his tractate against circumcision, Zeno of Verona parallels the shamefulness of the galli with the Jewish circumcision. If a Jew regarded circumcision as an honour, thus the castration of a priest of the disgraceful Goddess Magna Mater would be even greater, he exclaims mockingly.8 In City of God Augustine probably aims to embarrass contemporary pagan intellectuals as he implies that Varro or any other pagan writer, who otherwise gave naturalistic and allegorical explanations for obscene myths, Gods and rites, never mentioned galli because they were too shamed to offer interpretations of these castrates. Thus, Magna Mater surpassed all pagan Gods in perversity, not in the greatness of divinity (non numinis magnitudo, sed criminis), Augustine states eloquently.9 Augustine brings his presentation of the disgrace of pagan cults to a climax by making an extensive list of the scandals and crimes in pagan rituals, from 5 AVG. civ. 6.10; 2.27; cf. cons. euang. 1.33.51. Augustine makes ample use of Sallust’s pessimistic moralization of Roman history, particularly in book 2. For Augustine’s use of Sallust, see O’DALY 1999, 240–46. 6 CARM. c. pag. 112: Sola tamen gaudet meretrix te consule Flora. In earlier apologetics: TERT. spect. 17.3; ARNOB. nat. 3.23; 7.33; LACT. inst. 1.20.10. Priapus and phallus cult: PRVD. c. Symm. 1.102–115; AVG. civ. 7.24; Liber and phallus cult: AVG. civ. 7.24. 7 AVG. civ. 2.4; 7.26; 6.8; PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 88: Nunc quoque semiviri mysteria turpia plangent; PRVD. perist. 10.1068; cf. PS. CYPR. CARM. ad senat. 22–3; PS. AVG. quaest. test. 115.18; 114.7; 114.11; CARM. c. pag. 77. Cf. ARNOB. nat. 5.17; LACT. inst. 6.23; for other mentions, see G.M. SANDERS, ‘Gallos’, RAC VIII, Stuttgart 1972, 984–1034: 1028–31. 8 ZENO 1.3.1 Löfstedt. 9 AVG. civ. 7.26; also 6.7; 7.24; 2.2–4; 2.7; other attacks against the cult of Magna Mater: PRVD. perist. 10.151–60, 10.196–200, 10.1006–85; c. Symm. 1.187; PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 81–93. Augustine derides Varro, e.g., in civ. 7.33, for attempting to explain scandalous pagan ceremonies as allegories. It seems that the cult of Magna Mater and Attis was one of the few pagan cults that the church father himself had witnessed in city life. Festivals in honour of Magna Mater appear in the calendar of 354 (SALZMAN 1990, 164–9) and Gregory of Tours (glor. conf. 76) reports of celebration in honour Magna Mater during the grape harvest.

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monstrous idols to human sacrifices, from mutilation of genitals to prostitution and from obscene spectacles to effeminate priests.10 Unclean Purificatory Rites Pagan filthiness is contrasted with Christian purity.11 In Carmen contra paganos the pagan senator under attack is called pollutus sanguine tauri, sordidus and infectus after having taken part in a taurobolium. Pagans could not be purified in their purificatory rites. On the contrary, the humans consecrated to pagan Gods fell as victims of polluted superstitions under the sway of filthy demons, as Augustine concludes after having attacked the cult of Magna Mater and Attis. He makes a pun with the words mundus (world) and inmundus (unclean): a pagan intellectual explains the obscene pagan rituals as referring to the world as God. They rather refer to pollution, the church father responds. A Christian becomes purified from the worldly blemish (mundanis sordibus expiatus) and as pure (mundus) reaches God who has created the world (condidit mundum).12 The discussion on the pure and impure appears in Augustine’s correspondence with the pagan intellectual Longinianus, who claims that it is possible for a good man to reach the supreme Creator God with pious, pure, chaste and true words and deeds and under the protection of Gods. He prefers to walk along the way of those who were purified by pious precepts and most pure expiatory rites of the ancient cults (purgati antiquorum sacrorum piis praeceptis expiationibusque purissimis), that is, pagan cults.13 Thus, Longinianus insists that pagans are able to attain the supreme God in their way. In his response, Augustine questions Longinianus’ conviction, turning his words to look as if he has claimed that the expiatory rites of the ancient cults are indispensable – which the pagan intellectual actually has not stated. According to Augustine, Longinianus has maintained that a good man with pious, pure, chaste and true words and deeds is accepted by the Gods and under their protection reaches the supreme God but that this is not enough: a human should be purified by pious precepts and expiatory rites. Now the church father begins to deconstruct Longinianus’ alleged claim, asking what must be purified in a man, who 10 AVG. civ. 7.27. The aim is to show that no one could claim to worship the one true God with this sort of cult. Pagans committed a double offense against the one true God, erring in the object and in the manner of cult: both in their worship of creature and in their degraded rituals. In contrast to the abundance of attacks against Magna Mater, the cult of Vesta is usually passed over with few remarks or in silence: AVG. civ. 4.10 only contrasts Vestal virgins and Christ who was born of a virgin and in his argumentation proceeds to pagan identifications of Vesta with Venus whose depravity is easier to reprove. PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 143–5 depicts Vestals as worshipping the devil. The privileged status of Vestals was a much-debated issue as the controversy over the statue of Victory between Ambrose (ep. 17–18) and Symmachus (rel. 3) in 384 shows. In the 380s Emperor Gratian had cancelled the payments of the government to the Roman priestly colleges, Vestals among them. 11 The filthiness of pagan rites and priests had been stressed by, e.g., TERT. apol. 23.14 and spect. 10.2. 12 CARM. c. pag. 60–62; AVG. civ. 7.26. 13 LONGIN. Aug. ep. 234.2.

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has lived a pious, just, pure and true life. If he must be purified by rites, he is not pure (mundus) and, if he is not pure, he has not lived a pious, just, pure and chaste life. Since, if he lives such a life, he is already pure. Augustine’s purpose is show that, for a human living a pure life, purificatory rites are useless.14 Similarly, pagan writers had attacked the Christian baptism. Emperor Julian had classified it as a purificatory rite but regarded it as futile. He had argued that the Apostle Paul, who taught that baptism would wash away sins, was wrong since water could not purify the transgressions of a soul.15 A number of writers on both sides tried to label the rituals of the other as extravagant and decandent. One’s own rituals had to be verified as sober and chaste. The pagan rhetor Libanius represents Christian church services as revelry and turmoil, referring to cheerful banqueting, much drinking, fights and turmoil. Gregory of Nazianzus aims to show the Christian ceremonies as pure and contrasts them with senseless pagan sacrifices.16 In a speech in honour of the feast of Christ’s nativity, he asserts to his listeners that Christians shall celebrate Christ’s theophania, not in the manner of profane, that is, pagan festivals, but after a divine fashion. For Gregory the segregation from pagan feasting meant abstinence from banquets and drinking as well as decoration, festive dress, perfumes and food. Instead, Christians should leave all these things and pomp to Hellenes who regarded as Gods beings that rejoiced in the sacrificial smoke of fat and who adored the divinity with their belly.17 Public versus Private Christian polemicists reproach pagan rituals for being private and secretive. Poema ultimum attacks the mysteria turpia of Magna Mater that celebrate some allegedly great secret behind closed doors (intus). Augustine complains that the obscenities that were represented in public in theatres were performed hidden in temples. He asks how anything good could be thought of rites that were shrouded in darkness. Pagans could conceal their clandestine rites but they could not hide the galli priests. Augustine states that, even if Christians did not know what happened within the walls of temples, they knew what kind of priests performed these rites (nescimus quid agant, sed scimus per quales agant).18 Augustine’s words imply that fifth-century Christians were not particularly well acquainted with pagan rituals. In fact, fourth- and fifth-century Christian polemicists were considerably ignorant of the details of pagan rituals. The most illustrative 14 AVG. ep. 235.2; AVG. civ. 10.22–4; serm. Dolbeau 26.36 (= 198augm). 15 IUL. Galil. 245C–D Neumann. Cf. the philosopher in MAC. MAGN. apocr. 4.19 (= fragm. 88 Harnack) and Celsus apud Orig. Cels. 3.59. 16 LIBAN. or. 2.59. GREG. NAZ. or. 4.3 speaks of a laudatory speech to God that is more sacred and pure than all senseless sacrifices, pases alogou thysias. 17 GREG. NAZ. or. 38.4–6. U. CRISCUOLO, ‘Aspetti della resistenza ellenica dell’ultimo Libanio’, Pagani e cristiani da Giuliano l’Apostata al sacco di Roma, Messina 1995, 85–103: 96–8 suggests that Libanius’ above-mentioned rebuke (or. 2.59) on the Christian cult might be a reaction to Gregory’s attack. 18 PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 90; AVG. civ. 6.7. Cf. PS. AVG. quaest. test. 114.6.

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example is Prudentius’ famous description of a taurobolium19 in Peristephanon upon the trustworthiness of which N. McLynn has with good reason cast doubts.20 Prudentius’ narrative is the only full literary account on the taurobolium but modern scholars have usually taken it at face value.21 However, as McLynn has shown, it seems that Prudentius’ account more likely mirrors Christian prejudices against pagan rites and is at best based on second-hand information.22 Because Christians were excluded from the mysteries proper, what they usually saw of pagan rituals was the public part as Augustine states in the case of the procession of the galli. In the case of the taurobolium Christians perceived only the ‘results’ and it seems that sprinkling of blood made Christian outsiders disgusted and imaginative about what might be going on behind closed doors. McLynn points out that the wild stories about the taurobolium correspond to the denigration of the Christian cult in preceding centuries: some pagans interpreted the Christian celebrations of the Eucharist as a slaughter of infants, cannibalistic banquets and promiscuous orgies. Christians aroused suspicion because, in the eyes of the Romans, they seemed to constitute a clandestine society.23 Thus, both Christian and pagan writers reflect the traditional Roman mistrust of rites performed in private. Private devotion was connected with conspiracies and other clandestine purposes. The proper religio was always practiced in public.24 19 Inscriptions (CIL VI 497–504) found in a phrygianum on the Vatican Hill show that taurobolia were still performed in Rome in 350–390. We do not know much of the ritual but it seems that in the fourth century a bull’s blood was believed to strengthen a participant’s vital force and the ritual was repeated after 20 years, as is mentioned in CIL VI 512: viginti annis expletis and in Carm. c. pag. 62: vivere cum speras viginti mundus in annos. Nevertheless, in CIL VI 510 a person is mentioned be in aeternum renatus. M. GUARDUCCI, ‘L’interruzione dei culti nel Phrygianum durante il IV secolo d.Cr.’, La soteriologia dei culti orientali nell’Impero romano, Leiden 1982, 109–22: 115–18; M.J. VERMASEREN, Cybele and Attis, London 1977, 45–7, 103, 106; R. DUTHOY, Taurobolium, Leiden 1969, 112–26; KAHLOS 2002, 75–7. 20 PRVD. perist. 10.1006–50. MCLYNN 1996, 312–30. 21 E.g., DUTHOY 1969, 104 and VERMASEREN 1977, 102. For the influence of Christian polemic, see Chapter 1. Other Christian mentions of taurobolium: ARNOB. nat. 5.5–7; 5.42; FIRM. err. 3. 22 MCLYNN 1996, 314–18. Prudentius’ ignorance is apparent, e.g., in the fact that he depicts the officiant leading the ritual as belonging to the Roman civic religion. MCLYNN 1996, 317–18 also points out that the poet makes mistakes elsewhere, e.g., in apoth. 439–40 he makes a quindecimvir a wheezing fanaticus. This may, however, be a purposeful slander against Roman civic religion since many Christian polemicists had a deliberate tendency to bundle all pagan cults and religions together under the rubric of paganism. 23 MCLYNN 1996, 318–19. Celsus apud ORIG. Cels. 1.1; 8.17: Christians were a surreptitious society, holding their meetings in secret; MIN. FEL. 8: latebrosa et lucifugax natio; cf. RVT. NAM. 1.440 who depicts Christian monks as lucifugi viri in the fifth century. 24 See Chapter 4. Pythagoreans had been castigated for being secretive: SEN. nat. 7.32.2 calls them invidiosa turbae schola. Dionysiac initiates had been recognized by their secret signs (PLAVT. Mil. 1016). In the fourth and fifth centuries, Manichaeans were blamed for secrecy, e.g, AVG. conf. 5.11 complains that Manichaeans do not operate in public but keep to themselves, secretius. They were thought to commit unspeakable crimes behind closed doors. LIM 2001, 209.

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Augustine’s pagan correspondent, Maximus of Madauros, subverts the binary opposition of the candid publicness of Christianity and the conspirational secrecy of pagan mysteries. He represents Christians as a surreptitious sect that worships a God in locis abditis and contrasts them with pagans who revere their Gods in public before the eyes and ears of every mortal; everyone could observe and evaluate pagan practices.25 Augustine answers Maximus, inverting the binary opposition: Maximus claims that pagan worship Gods in public (publice) and Christians meet in secret convents, but, the church father points out, Maximus fails to mention the secret worship of Bacchus that only a few initiates were allowed to see. Then Augustine goes on sneering at the public side of the Bacchic cult: he mocks decuriones and other leaders of the town who participate bacchantes et furentes in a Bacchic procession. He also ridicules the paradox of pagan mysteries performed in public. Whether public or secret, they were slanderous.26 The binary opposition of publicness and privacy is subverted in Augustine’s attack against pagan rituals in general. He complains that pagan Gods give moral instruction to a select few of their adherents in secret chambers (in adytis suis secretisque penetralibus) whereas their iniquity was taught openly and in public (palam aperteque). Indecent piety echoes in the ears of the people while pretended chastity resonates inside to the few. Decency was veiled from sight and indecency was exposed to view: decus latet et dedecus patet. The writer of Poema ultimum also plays with the opposition of the open and the clandestine. The mysteries of Mithras worshipped the light in secret whereas the mysteries of Isis did not conceal anything, celebrating every ritual in public places. While one hid the sun, the other set forth in public (palam) its monstrosities.27 The binary opposition of private secrecy and public openness was applied in polemic against heretics and schismatics as well. Augustine contrasts the private rage of circumcellions and the ecclesia catholica that worked with the public support of emperors.28 In the course of the fifth and sixth centuries, depending on the local circumstances, pagan practices were made illegal and thus pushed aside to the margins of society. Augustine refers to pagans convening in secrecy to practice their cults.29 While Christian writers attempted to label pagan cults as clandestine and secretative, pagan enthusiasts stressed the public character of the cults of the traditional Roman civic religion. The Roman religion and many local cults were based on public performances and on the participation of the whole populace: consequently, they were essentially the cults of communities. By the end of the fourth century the Roman civic religion had lost the support of the state and this made some pagans at the turn of the century

25 MAX. MADAVR. Aug. ep. 16.3. 26 AVG. ep. 17.4. 27 AVG. civ. 2.26; also 7.21 on the obscenities of Liber performed in public, not in secrecy. PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 114–16; 118; 121–2. The obscurity and secrecy of the cult of Mithras had been pointed out by Firmicus Maternus (err. 5.2). 28 AVG. c. Cresc. 3.47.51. 29 AVG. cons. euang. 1.27.42.

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ask for the performance of pagan rituals in public and at public expense. Otherwise rituals would have no effect on the divine powers that protected the Empire.30 Acts of Sacrifice What is more holy than an altar that drinks blood drawn by ritual weapons? PRVDENTIUS, Contra orationem Symmachi 1.398–9.

Pagan rituals are regularly characterized above all as gory sacrifices and pagan Gods as bloodthirsty demons. Prudentius paints a caricature of the ceremony of a hecatomb, depicting it as an overflow of blood.31 For Christian opinion leaders, the most essential demarcation line between Christianity and paganism lay in the attitude towards sacrifices: it was made clear that Christians made no sacrifices while pagans did – in excess. However, blood and sacrifice come up as an essential part of Christian argumentation when Christian doctrine is clarified both to Christian insiders and pagan outsiders. Sacrifices had been the core of the Greco-Roman public religious life. In their regulations the emperors Decius and Valerian had aimed at religious unity and control of their subjects and, consequently, the whole population of the Roman Empire was ordered to perform Roman rites as a mark of their loyalty to the Empire and the emperor. The crucial test was the performance of sacrifice, participating in the sacrificial system of communities. As M. Beard, J. North and S. Price express it, “sacrifice delimited and paraded the true subjects of Rome”.32 Sacrifice became the distinguishing boundary in the Christian self-understanding. It was important for Christian writers to demonstrate that Christians never made and had never made sacrifices: thus, as Orosius depicts Philippus Arabs as the first Christian emperor, he has to project his ideal of ceremonies without sacrifices to the Roman past: he reports on the magnificent games that Philippus Arabs celebrated and makes a deduction ex silentio, claiming that the emperor never ascended to the

30 SYMM. rel. 3; ZOS. 5.40–41; cf. SOZ. eccl. 9.6.3–6. FOWDEN 2001, 82. Emperor Gratian – presumably under the influence of the pressure group of Christian leaders, such as the bishop of Milan Ambrose – removed the public subsidies of the costs of the Roman civic cults as well as annulled the economic privileges of the priests of Roman civic cults and confiscated the revenues of pagan temples. Furthermore, he was the first emperor to abandon the traditional title of pontifex maximus, the head of the Roman civic religion. Gratian’s action indicated the separation of the Roman state and the Roman civic religion. 31 PRVD. perist. 10.1051–5. Cf. the sixth-century writer Corippus (Ioh. v. 86–7) who depicts gory slaughtering in honour of Saturn in Africa: funditur horrendis sanguis maestissimus aris, / omnigenumque pecus mactat vittata sacerdos. In earlier apologetics: e.g., ARNOB. nat. 7.24 had introduced an extensive list of different types of strange-sounding sacrifices and sacrificial meals. 32 BEARD – NORTH – PRICE 1998, 239; also 240–41, 361, 374–5.

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Capitol – that is, he made no sacrifice to Jupiter there – because no Roman author mentions any procession to the Capitol.33 Pagans had to continuously make countless sacrifices while Christians had one once-for-all sacrifice – Christ’s sacrifice. Augustine, for instance, speaks of the unique sacrifice of the holy blood (singulare sacrificium tam sancti sanguinis fusi). He stresses that Christ was both the sacrifice and the priest for Christians. Even if many sacrifices of saints symbolized this supreme sacrifice, Christ’s sacrifice was the true one.34 Pagans performed animal sacrifices but, Christian writers reminded their readers, pagans had also killed humans as a sacrifice to their Gods. Christian polemicists were keen to offer examples of human sacrifices from the Greco-Roman past, which would make the pagan sacrificial system even more detestable.35 Poema ultimum reminds us of human victims that were offered to appease the empty name of Jupiter. Augustine mentions the crudelissima vanitas of human victims offered to Saturn in Carthage. Reference to pagan human sacrifices became a recurrent topos in polemic: even Martin of Braga makes a mention of them.36 Orosius lists several human sacrifices from the mythical past of humankind as well as from Roman history. Romans were also responsible for having killed humans in sacrilegious sacrifices (sacrilegis sacrificiis) in 228 B.C.E. Orosius states that finally Romans had to pay for these human victims with their own blood, thus implying that the Christian God as well demanded human blood as compensation.37 Accusations of human sacrifices and ritual murders had been a frequently used tool against political and religious adversaries during the Empire; murdering infants for divination had been a conventional charge. Christians, for example, had been accused of sacrificing infants in their orgies. Porphyry had stated that the Apostle Peter had sacrificed a one-year-old infant in order to make a prediction of the 365 years of Christianity. Correspondingly, Christian writers stated that, under Emperor Julian’s regime, pagan sorcerers killed infants in order to inspect their entrails for divination.38 33 OROS. hist. 7.20.3. 34 AVG. civ. 4.31; also 10.3; 10.6: universale sacrificium; 10.20; 20.24–5: Jewish sacrificial traditions were replaced by the new covenant; c. adv. leg. 1.18.37; serm. Dolbeau 26.53 (= 198augm). 35 E.g., PRVD. c. Symm. 1.395–6 refers to human sacrifices made in honour of Diana, Jupiter Latiaris and Pluto; 2.296–7 on children sacrificed to Saturn; 1.380–85 on gladiators as human sacrifices. Cf. TERT. apol. 9.6 on human victims in honour of Jupiter in Latium; ARNOB. nat. 2.68. LACT. inst. 1.21 reports on human sacrifices performed in honour of Zeus in Cyprus, of Diana in Tauris, of Hesus and Teutates in Gaul and of Saturn in Latium and adds that human blood was shed even now in honour of Jupiter Latiaris. 36 PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 110. AVG. civ. 7.19; 7.26; MART. BRAC. corr. 8. Cf. AVG. civ. 16.24; 16.32, who gives an allegorical explanation for the sacrifice demanded of Abraham. 37 OROS. hist. 1.11.2 on the victims of Busiris; 4.6.3–4 on human sacrifices in Carthage; 4.13.3 on Roman expiation rites in which two Gauls and a Greek were buried alive. 38 Christians’ ritual murders: MIN. FEL. 9.5; Porphyry apud AVG. civ. 18.53. Pagan sorcerers: SOCR. eccl. 3.13.11–12; cf. IOH. CHRYS. hom. 28 in Matt. 3. H. CHADWICK, ‘Oracles

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In place of human and animal victims, it was stressed, Christians had their martyrs. For Augustine the members of civitas Dei were God’s best and most glorious sacrifice. The sacrifice of martyrs was regarded as a spectacle to the eyes, not only of God, but also of angels and humans.39 Blood is present as an essential element in Christian writings; one is inclined to claim that on the level of metaphors the idea of blood is as important for Christians as it had been for pagans. Christian authors dwell in the imagery of blood, whether the blood is of Christ or of martyrs. Augustine contrasts the blood shed by the Lamb with the blood shed in front of idols in a festival that he calls the festivitas sanguinis, nescio cuius mulieris. He states that pagan rituals imitated the shedding of the precious blood of Christ in order to lead humans astray.40 Christian writers do not conceal their loathing for pagan sacrifices that they characterize primarily as blood, flesh and smoke, as Prudentius does when describing the togas of senators as coloured with smoke and blood. Ambrose depicts how pagan ceremonies penetrated to the senses of Christians even against their will – smoke in their eyes, music in their ears, ashes in their throats, incense in their nostrils and dust stirred up from hearths in their faces. Furthermore, the writer of Poema ultimum asks how a pagan dared to seek forgiveness through bloodshed.41 The Christian revulsion of blood sacrifices is reflected in the language of the fourthand fifth-century legislation of Christian emperors. As S. Bradbury points out, the laws against sacrifice were released as moralizing declarations in which emperors announced their resentment at animal sacrifices.42 Emperor Constantine, for example, made it clear that he detested blood sacrifices, condemning them in his speeches and

of the End in the Conflict of Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century’, Mémorial A.J. Festugière: antiquité païenne et chrétienne, Genève 1984, 125–9: 125–6; J. RIVES, J., ‘Human Sacrifice among Pagans and Christians’, JRS 85 (1995), 65–85. 39 AVG. civ. 19.23; cf. PAVL. NOL. carm. 19.145. Spectaculum: e.g., CYPR. ep. 10.2; 60.2: sub oculis dei spectaculum gloriosum, quale in conspectu Christi eius ecclesiae suae gaudium ...; LACT. mort. pers. 16.6. 40 AVG. in euang. Ioh. 7.6. Augustine refers to the festivities of Magna Mater and the words nescio cuius mulieris possibly implies a gallus. For a discussion of this passage, see J. PÉPIN, ‘Réactions du christianisme latin à la sotériologie métroaque. Firmicus Maternus, Ambrosiaster, Saint Augustin’, La soteriologia dei culti orientali nell’Impero Romano, Leiden 1982, 256–72: 263–7. For imitation, see Chapter 3. 41 PRVD. c. Symm. 1.8: togas procerum fumoque et sanguine tingui; AMBR. ep. 18.31 (= ep. 73, CSEL 82.3); PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 27: Quid petit ignosci veniam qui sanguine poscit? For the Christian revulsion of blood sacrifices in particular, see S. BRADBURY, ‘Constantine and the Problem of Anti-Pagan Legislation in the Fourth Century’, CP 89 (1994), 120–39: 129. 42 E.g., CTh 16.10.13 in 393: abominanda sacrificia. BRADBURY 1994, 134, 139. There is no evidence of practical measures against pagans for making conventional sacrifices. Emperors and administrators mainly worried about private divination. Legislation against magical practices was gradually extended to cover pagan sacrifices from CTh 16.10.10 (in 391) onwards, and the total abolition of pagan sacrifices was completed in the legislation of Arcadius and Honorius.

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correspondence.43 He rebuked pagans for their sacrifices that in fact were revelry and debauchery under the guise of religion.44 In their disgust for pagan sacrifices, some Christians refused to eat sacrificial meat. Maximus of Turin asserts that, when a peasant made a sacrifice, the landowner of the estate was contaminated as well. Since the Apostle Paul Christians had discussed whether a believer could eat meat that been offered to idols. The council of Elvira, for instance, had taken a severe position against sacrificial meat, decreeing that Christian landowners could not accept payments in products that had been dedicated to idols.45 The Apostle Paul’s attitude (1 Cor 8) had been pragmatic; he had emphasized the unity of the community and, therefore, did not want make sacrificial meat too great an issue. The attitude towards sacrificial meat divided the Corinthian parish: for some Corinthian Christians eating meat dedicated to idols caused no problems since, having attained the gnosis, they knew that idols were no Gods. However, Paul reminds his readers that not everyone had attained the gnosis and eating sacrificial meat stained their uncertain conscience. Eating it as such did not contaminate Christians. Those stronger Christians who ate sacrificial meat in temples could cause their weaker brothers to fall back into idolatry. Augustine takes a similar stand towards sacrificial meat when discussing Christian participation in pagan urban festivals, and rests his argumentation on Paul’s appeal to stronger Christians. When the weaker brothers see the stronger ones taking part in banquets, they may start eating the food offered in sacrifice to pagan deities and even make sacrifices themselves. Stronger Christians who did not interpret urban feasts as religious acts could thus tempt their infirm brothers to fall into idolatry.46 43 E.g., apud EUS. v. Const. 4.10. Constantine’s personal hostility towards blood sacrifices is apparent. Another matter is whether he was able and willing to give effect to his personal attitudes in Realpolitik. The claim of Eusebius (v. Const. 2.45.1) that Constantine banned all sacrifices has raised a wide discussion among modern scholars: T.D. BARNES, Constantine and Eusebius, Cambridge, Mass. 1981, 210, 269, 377 n. 11 accepts Eusebius’ report as accurate whereas BRADBURY 1994, 120–39, H.A. DRAKE [Review of T.D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 1981], AJPh 103 (1982), 462–6: 463–5, J. CURRAN, ‘Constantine and the ancient cults of Rome: the legal evidence’, Greece & Rome 43 (1996), 68–80: 72, 76– 7 and AVERIL CAMERON 1983, 189 have called into question whether the account can be taken at face value. It is worth noting that modern historians have often observed Constantine’s ban from the viewpoint of which pagan practices were forbidden, not which practices were still allowed to continue. However, HEATHER – MONCUR 2001, 49–54 have viewed the law from the latter perspective; as it prohibited blood sacrifice, it implied that many other traditional practices such as the lighting of lamps and candles, the singing of hymns and the burning of incense were permitted to continue. It is also important to note the distinction between private and public sacrifices and other rituals: Constantine and his successors turned against private sacrifices and divination but allowed the performance public sacrifices and haruspicina. 44 E.g., CONST. or. sanct. 11. 45 MAX. TAVR. 107.2; Concilium Eliberitanum (c. 305), can. 40. Cf. IREN. haer. 1.6.3, who had blamed Gnostic Christians for frequenting spectacles and eating sacrificial meat. In Greco-Roman antiquity eating meat and blood sacrifice were closely interrelated since most of the meat consumed was eaten in feasts in connection with sacrifices. 46 AVG. serm. 62.4.7 warns the firm Christians, who could defend themselves, saying, “My God knows my heart”, that their frailer brothers did not know their brothers’ hearts. If

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On another occasion, Augustine takes a somewhat divergent stand as he replies to the inquiries of a neurotic Christian, Publicola, who desperately tries to find out if he can eat meat, wheat or beans that have been offered to pagan Gods, if he can drink water from a fountain into which something has been cast from a pagan sacrifice or if he can use baths in places in which sacrifices have been offered to idols. Augustine attempts to calm down Publicolas’s anxieties by a reduction to the absurd, explaining that one cannot avoid everything as one cannot avoid breathing the air into which the sacrificial smoke and incense ascend from pagan altars or being in the light of the sun that sacrilegious people worship with sacrifices. Nonetheless, despite his rationalizing argumentation, Augustine concludes that, in some cases, if it is certain that the meat placed in a pagan temple has been offered to an idol, it is better to reject it with Christian rectitude.47 Another realist is Paulinus of Nola who ended up with a compromise that permitted animal sacrifices in a Christian setting, at the tomb of the Christian saint Felix.48 Blood versus Spirit The blood and flesh of pagan rituals corresponded to the blood and flesh of the Christian Eucharist, except that pagan sacrifices were false and the Christian one true. Moreover, pagan sacrifices were carnal, it was emphasized, whereas the Christian one was spiritual. Augustine makes sacrifice, incense and other offerings and dedications into metaphors for the spiritual commitment. In the Christian sacrifice one offered oneself to God and one’s heart was the altar of God. It was the sacrifice of humility and praise. Sacrifice was also the offering of the whole community since the Christian congregation and the fellowship of the saints was offered as a universal sacrifice to God. Whereas pagans made visibilia sacrificia to their Gods, Christians’ invisibilia sacrificia to God were offerings of a pure soul and good will (purae mentis et bonae voluntatis officia). Correspondingly, Zeno of Verona contrasts the Christian sacrificium laudis with the detestable sacrifice of pagans. Prudentius states that nothing is a pleasing gift to God but an offering of peace.49 one was infirm, one should beware of becoming more ill; if one was firm, one should take care of the brother’s illness. The weaker brother would perish through the firmer one’s knowledge. The sermon was delivered in Carthage in 399 to calm down the unease of austere Christians who felt indignant as some more moderate Christians had taken part in a local feast in honour of the genius of Carthage. 47 Publicola apud AVG. ep. 46.6–18; AVG. ep. 47.3–4. LEPELLEY 2002, 89 represents Publicola’s fear of becoming polluted by demonic sacrifices as characteristically Roman, i.e., as pagan. 48 PAVL. NOL. carm. 27.434–5 stresses that animals voluntarily offered themselves for this ritual slaughter. D. TROUT, ‘Christianizing the Nolan Countryside: Animal Sacrifice at the Tomb of St. Felix’, JECS 3 (1995), 281–98. 49 AVG. civ. 10.3; 10.6; 10.19: hostia humilitatis et laudis. O’DALY 1999, 123; B. STUDER, ’Das Opfer Christi nach Augustins ’De Civitate Dei’ X, 5–6’, Lex orandi, lex credendi, Roma 1980, 93–107: 100–105. According to STUDER 1990, 939, Augustine’s discussion in civ. 10.6 refers to Porphyry. ZENO 1.25.2 Löfstedt. PRVD. psych. 784–787: quisque litare deo mactatis vult holocaustis / offerat in primis pacem: nulla hostia Christo / dulcior, hoc solo sancta

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In their accentuation of the monopoly of Christian spiritual sacrifice, Christian polemicists usually attempt to downplay any possible similarities in the pagan discussion on spiritual sacrifice.50 However, Christians were by no means the only group in Greco-Roman antiquity to show their contempt for blood sacrifices and stress the spiritual sacrifice. A number of Greek and Roman intellectuals had emphasized an individual’s spiritual devotion and spoken for the worship of Gods with a pure heart.51 Animal sacrifices seem not to have been the dominating ritual during the Empire. It seems that, in the religious atmosphere of the late Roman Empire, bloodless rituals such as pouring libations, burning incense and lighting of lamps had become even more prominent than previously.52 Porphyry had been an intense critic of traditional blood sacrifices of the civic cults. He had condemned animal sacrifice in his Letter to Anebo and On Abstinence from Animal Food. He introduced a hierarchy of sacrifices according to which different offerings were meant to different levels of divinity: the supreme deity was honoured only with spiritual sacrifices, that is, pure thoughts, whereas the intelligible Gods were best worshipped with prayers and hymns. Inanimate objects such as honey, fruit and flowers were offered to the visible Gods. Finally, on the lowest level, blood sacrifices were offered to demons.53 Porphyry had also implied a hierarchy of worshippers; traditional animal sacrifices were meant for ignorant masses while the most elevated philosophers were to approach the divine purely intellectually.54 ad donaria vultum / munere convertens puro oblectatur odore. M. LÜHKEN, Christianorum Maro et Flaccus, Göttingen 2002, 125–6 analyzes how Prudentius applies Vergil’s verses to describe the spiritualized concept of sacrifice. 50 However, in order to reinforce their own argumentation in appealing to pagan antecedents, Christian writers admit that the religion of philosophers did not include animal sacrifices. Varro apud ARNOB. nat. 7.1. 51 E.g., CIC. nat. deor. 2.71 stresses the purity of heart; SEN. benef. 1.6.3; 4.25.1; ep. 95.47; 115.5 regards sacrifice irrelevant compared with the goodness of a worshipper; PHILOSTR. v. Apoll. 1.10–11 accentuates the purity of spirit; Apollonius of Tyana is known to have refused to participate in blood sacrifices and criticized them (PHILOSTR. v. Apoll. 1.31–2). For the late antique champions of bloodless sacrifice such as Porphyry, Pythagoras appeared as their forerunner (PORPH. v. Pyth. 36). For the discussion on spiritual sacrifice in Late Antiquity, see TROUT 1995, 282, S. BRADBURY, ‘Julian’s Pagan Revival and the Decline of Blood Sacrifice’, Phoenix 49 (1995), 331–56: 332–41, E. FERGUSON, ‘Spiritual Sacrifice in Early Christianity and its Environment’, ANRW II.23.2, Stuttgart 1980, 1151–89: 1155–6 and G. CLARK, ‘Translate into Greek. Porphyry on the new barbarians’, Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity, London 1999, 112–32: 128. 52 M.P. NILSSON, ‘Pagan Divine Service in Late Antiquity’, HThR 38 (1945), 63–9: 65 and BRADBURY 1995, 335–7 with examples. 53 PORPH. abst. 2.34; 2.61; apud EUS. praep. 4.8 and apud AVG. civ. 19.23. Animal sacrifices were a distortion of the original offerings of plants and herbs to Gods: PORPH. abst. 2.5–9. The second book of De abstinentia, in particular, attacks sacrifice; most of the material comes from Theophrastus’ lost treatise Peri eusebeias. J. BOUFFARTIQUE – M. PATILLON, Porphyre, De l’abstinence 2, Paris 1979, 4; BRADBURY 1995, 333–4. 54 PORPH. abst. 2.38–43. As U. BIANCHI, ’Religiosità popolare cristiana e pagana, Augustinianum 21 (1981), 77–90: 89 points out, Porphyry felt obliged to save something of the ancient sacrificial rites by applying hierarchies.

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Christian writers had a tendency to portray pagan beliefs as a unified tradition. However, even Neoplatonist philosophers were far from unanimous on the issue of blood sacrifice. Porphyry’s views were not shared by all Platonists. Iamblichus, for example, insisted on the performance of traditional blood sacrifices.55 Thus, we see that, in regards to sacrifices, the demarcation line runs, not between Christians and pagans, but between those who opposed animal sacrifices, Christians and pagans alike, and those who defended them. Porphyry had insisted on avoiding blood sacrifice because it engaged the worshipper with evil demons. He had also stated that demons had deceived humans to propitiate them instead of the real Gods. Porphyry, however, had had to admit that propitiation of demons with blood sacrifices might be requisite for communities.56 Christians believed that demons – pagan Gods – longed for blood sacrifices because they fed on the gore and vapour of slaughtered animals. Demons needed and lusted for the blood and smoke of sacrifices whereas the true God did not need material offerings.57 Correspondingly, Porphyry and some other pagan writers had stressed that the supreme God neither needed nor wanted sacrifices. The writer of the Neoplatonic treatise Peri theon kai kosmou stated that humans sacrificed for their own benefit, not of the divine, since the divine had no needs.58 In his discussion on sacrifices in City of God Augustine states that God has no need of anything and requires no sacrifices. He stresses that God should be given a spiritual sacrifice, quoting Psalm 51:18: “The sacrifice offered to God is a broken spirit.” However, God does not even need the righteousness of a human. It is a human, not God, who benefits from all rightful worship of God, Augustine argues in a manner parallel with Porphyry and other pagan writers: the cult was for humans, not for God.59

55 E.g., IAMBL. myst. 5.7–25 on sacrifices; Iamblichus (myst. 5.10), however, rejected the idea that demons were nourished by blood sacrifices. Nevertheless, even those Neoplatonists who defended blood sacrifices, acknowledged the contemplation and dedication of one’s soul as the worthiest offering to Gods: IUL. or. 9.199b. For Iamblichus, see E.S. CLARKE, Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis, Aldershot 2001, 50 and BRADBURY 1995, 338–40. 56 PORPH. abst. 2.40: deception; 2.43: propitiation. Christian writers were ready to attack this inconsistency: EUS. praep. 4.8–15; AVG. civ. 10.10. 57 Nourishment of demons: in earlier apologetics, e.g., ATHENAG. leg. 26; ORIG. Cels. 7.35; 8.60; TERT. apol. 22.6; EUS. praep. 5.2; ARNOB. nat. 7.23; LACT. inst. 2.16–17; FIRM. err. 13.4. Earlier Christian apologists had responded to the numerous charges of atheism, maintaining that the true God needed no material offerings; e.g., ATHENAG. leg. 13 wrote that God does not need blood or the odour of burnt offerings or the fragrance of flowers and incense. Christians offered a bloodless sacrifice and ‘the service of the reason’. ARNOB. nat. 7.3–15 refuted sacrifices as inconsistent and unnecessary. 58 E.g., PORPH. Marc. 18–19 had stated that ancestral traditions were followed, not because the divine was in need of them, but because humans were called to revere the divine by its very majesty; Porphyry apud AVG. civ. 19.23; also apud LACT. ira 2: God did not need anything and should be honoured by means of justice, chastity and other virtues. SALUST. mund. 15. 59 AVG. civ. 10.4–6; 10.17; 10.19. Augustine discusses here with Porphyry and other Platonists. Cf. AVG. ep. 138.6: God orders nothing for his own advantage but for the benefit of a human on whom the decree rests.

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Augustine’s writings reveal that some pagans questioned the Christian denunciation of blood sacrifices, inquiring on the sacrifices mentioned in the Old Testament. Why God, who is pronounced the God of the Old Testament and had accepted the sacrifices of the Hebrews, now spurns the ancient sacrifices and delights in new ones? Augustine replies that the sacrifice that God had required from the Hebrews in the old times had at that time been fitting (aptum) but now it is not so. God prescribes another sacrifice that is fitting for this age.60 Augustine explains the animal sacrifices of the past times as symbols (signa) of what God requires, a sacrifice of the heart bruised and humbled in penitence. The sacrifices in the past foreshadowed the one true sacrifice to come – Christ’s sacrifice. Christian sacraments are also sacred visible signs of the true invisible sacrifice.61 Pompa diaboli – Condemning Spectacles Ecclesiastical leaders and councils forbade Christians to participate in traditional spectacles and festivals under penalty of excommunication.62 Fourth- and fifthcentury bishops persistently urged their audience to keep away from shows whether these were gladiatorial games at the amphitheatre, races at the circus or theatrical performances. Quodvultdeus, for example, orders his listeners to flee from spectacles and the devil’s shameful caveae of amphitheatres.63 Despite this starting point, Christians frequented theatre, amphitheatre and circus as the numerous complaints of church fathers indicate.64 Ambrose exclaims that hopefully his explanations will call away those who hurried their way into spectacles. According to Augustine, Christians preferred the vanitates et insaniae mendaces to the church rituals and went to see circus games. He stresses that he is not speaking of either pagans or Jews, but of Christians, and furthermore, not of mere catechumens but of already baptized Christians.65 Similarly, Salvian grumbles about the countless number of Christians 60 Questions: apud AVG. ep. 102.16 and MARCELL. Aug. ep. 136.2. Answers: AVG. ep. 102.21; 138.5; civ. 10.17. 61 AVG. civ. 10.5; 10.17; 10.19; ep. 102.17; 138.6–7; c. adv. leg. 1.16.30; 1.18.37. Augustine’s theory of signs: MARKUS 1996; O’DALY 1999, 123–4, 128–9; R.J. TESKE, ‘Sacrifice in Augustine’s Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum’, Studia patristica 33 (1997), 255–9. Similarly, Eus. praep. 14.3.1; dem. ev. 1.2.1, 1.9.1 had explained that Christians did not make animal sacrifices as the Hebrews had done because the primordial sacrifices prefigured the sacrifice of Christ. 62 For the prohibitions, see M. HARL, ‘La dénonciation des festivités profanes dans le discours épiscopal et monastique en Orient chrétien à la fin du IVe siècle’, La Fête, pratique et discours, Paris 1981, 123–47, partic. 132. It is noteworthy that the secular legislation did not forbid the performance of spectacles and games, except on Sundays and some important ecclesiastical festivals (CTh 2.8.20 in 392 and CTh 2.8.23 in 399). 63 QVODV. symb. 1.2.1: Fugite, dilectissimi, spectacula, fugite caveas turpissimas diaboli, ne vos vincula teneant maligni; cf. 1.2.10. 64 Earlier complaints: TERT. spect. 26.1; NOVATIAN. spect. 3. It is noteworthy that, when defending Christians in apologetic, TERT. apol. 42.7 denies that Christians visited the theatre; cf. MIN. FEL. 12.5; 37.11. 65 AMBR. expos. in psalm. 118 serm. 5.28; AVG. in psalm. 50.1.

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who hang around in the spectacles every day. If Christian festivities, he deplores, coincided with ludi publici, the majority preferred to go to the latter. Moreover, those who went to church were not ashamed to visit shows, too. Even some priests frequented these performances.66 Christians who frequented shows and games defended themselves against the charges of church leaders. Salvian refers to the apologies of these people who thought it better that they did not always go to see spectacles. The bishop compares them to murderers and thieves who defended themselves and who said that they did not always kill and steal. Those who watched shows could not remain untainted by the crimes of spectacles during the time that they did not watch them. Salvian also warns that those Christians who visited spectacles could not trust in God’s protection. When shameful things were shown in circus or theatre, God turned his eyes away from those things and at the same time away from those people there. Earlier Christian writers had referred to similar problems and parallel defences. Tertullian names Christians who went to shows and games suaviludii whereas Novatian calls them ‘ingratiating champions and indulgent advocates of vice’ (vitiorum assertores blandi et indulgentes patroni) who were not ashamed to pose as believers and Christians. They defended themselves explaining that the Scriptures did not unambiguously forbid participation in shows.67 Church fathers denounced spectacles as idolatry and therefore perilous to Christian souls. All performances in amphitheatre, circus and theatre were seen as connected with the cult of false Gods: consequently, they were pompa diaboli, the devil’s procession. Demons were present everywhere in these spectacles, Christian writers maintained, reminding their readers of the cultic origins of many shows.68 Salvian aims to show that spectacles are idolatry, stating that, for example, Venus is 66 SALV. gub. 6.4.20; 6.7.38; 6.7.37 contrasts the festivitas ecclesiastica with ludi publici, asking rhetorically which place attracted Christian masses, church or theatre. Other complaints: AVG. in psalm. 80.2: quam multi enim baptizati hodie circum implere, quam istam basilicam maluerunt; 61.10; 30.2.2; 84.15; serm. 51.1; 250.3; 252.4; 88.17; catech. rud. 25.48: Christians filled churches on ecclesiastical feast days and theatres on pagan ones; LEO M. serm. 84.1; Concilium Carthaginense can. 61 (in 401) (CCSL 149, p. 197); Severus of Antioch (cath. hom. 26) laments on Christians who attended the circus games organized during the festival of Fortuna in Antioch. HIER. ep. 69.9 of priests frequenting spectacles; cf. AVG. in psalm. 147.8; 30.2.2; 90.1.4. 67 SALV. gub. 6.2.11; 6.4.20. Earlier defences: TERT. spect. 20.1–2; coron. 6.3; NOVATIAN. spect. 1.3–2.4. TERT. spect. 20.1–5: some even found justification in biblical passages with metaphors of stadium, David as a dancer and Elijah as a charioteer. Moreover, spectacles could not harm anyone because the Sun or God witnessed without becoming stained. 68 In earlier polemic: TERT. spect. passim, e.g., 4.1: diabolus et pompae et angeli eius; 4.3–4 and 5.1–8 on the origins of spectacles; 6.1–4; 7.2–3; 9.1; 10.10–13; 12.6; 25.5 on theatres as ecclesia diaboli; NOVATIAN. spect. 4.1: Idololatria ... ludorum omnium mater est; 4.3: inventa daemoniorum; 4.4; MIN. FEL. 37.11; ARNOB. nat. 7.33; LACT. inst. 6.20.34; epit. 58.1. For the Christian argumentation concerning the cultic origin of theatre, see H. JÜRGENS, Pompa diaboli, Stuttgart 1972, 147–8, 155. Gods were visible in Roman games and performances in many ways even though a Roman commoner hardly recognized spectacles as a cultic act. Games were usually started with a procession of Gods and humans through a city and Gods were offered sacrifices before the shows.

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worshipped in theatres, Neptune in circuses and Mars in amphitheatres.69 Augustine writes that demons are pleased with vain songs, worthless shows and the diverse filth of theatres, with the frenzy of circus games, the cruelty of amphitheatre, the violent contests of those who undertake strife and controversy provocative even of hostility in their support of noxious characters such as mime actors, actors, performers of pantomime, charioteers or hunters. In this way people, as it were, offered incense to demons in their hearts.70 Jacob of Seroûg exclaims that Satan had set up paganism by means of the theatre. An edict of Constantius II and Constans also stresses the connection between games and the worship of Gods.71 Therefore, in church fathers’ eyes, shows and Christian life were incompatible. They remind their readers that in baptism they have promised to reject the devil and his pomp and spectacles.72 Salvian regarded participation in shows as apostatatio quaedam fidei and a symboli ipsius et caelestibus sacramentis letalis praevaricatio. It was an offence and sacrilege against God. In an attack against the Kalendae Ianuariae Maximus of Turin stresses that those who linked themselves with the vanities of pagans could not have a connection with the truth of saints.73 The renunciation of shows as idolatry was the most emphatic argument, but Christian writers also censured them as immoral, disgraceful, useless, irrational and illusory. Quodvultdeus, for example, stresses the insanity and shamefulness of spectacles.74 Christian writers contrast Roman shows with the Christian ones, asserting that the Christian repertoire was far better and more truthful. Augustine declares that God had not dismissed Christians without spectacles. “Behold the spectacles of Christians”, he writes and contraposes pagans who with the eyes of the flesh see 69 SALV. gub. 6.11.60; cf. 6.11.61; 6.6.31: opus diaboli; 6.3.14. 70 AVG. serm. 198.3; also civ. 1.32; 2.11; 2.13; 2.25; 8.5; 8.13; 19.9; ep. 138.4; serm. 198.3; 311.6. Theatre was brought to Rome to propitiate Gods: AVG. civ. 3.17; 1.32; 2.8; OROS. hist. 3.4.5. 71 JACOB. SARUG. hom. de spect. 3, referred by BOWERSOCK 1990, 37. CTh 16.10.3. 72 QVODV. symb. 1.1.11: renuntiemus diabolo, pompis et angelis eius; SALV. gub. 6.6.31: renuntiare se diabolo ac pompis eius et spectaculis atque operibus; CAES. AREL. serm. 12.3: Interrogamur enim in baptismo, utrum abrenuntiemus diabolo, pompis et operibus eius; 12.4; Cyril of Jerusalem (catech. 19.1.5) stresses that a catechumen had to reject Satan, all his works and his pomp. Cf. TERT. spect. 4.1: renuntiasse nos diabolo et pompae eius et angelis eius; spect. 24.3: repudium spectaculorum is the distinctive mark of a true Christian; NOVATIAN. spect. 2.2 maintained that a person who visited games worshipped pagan Gods and thus abandoned the true God; 4.2; LACT. inst. 6.20.36. 73 SALV. gub. 6.6.31; 6.4.23; 6.11.58–61. MAX. TAVR. 98.1. 74 QVODV. symb. 1.1.19: insaniam studiorum ac turpium voluptatum. SALV. gub. 6.3.14 speaks of cotidianae obscenitates and inlecebrarum insidiae; 6.2.10; 6.3.17: illas rerum turpium imitationes, illas vocum ac verborum obscenitates; 6.4.20; 6.4.22; 6.5.26; 6.8.43; 6.9.49; 6.11.60; HIL. in psalm. 118.5.14: spectacula obscena; AVG. civ. 2.13; 4.26; 6.6–7; 8.5; 19.23. Attacks on the shamefulness of theatre are abundant in Christian literature, surveyed by W. WEISMANN, Kirche und Schauspiele, Würzburg 1972, 72–6, 103–104, 141. This disparagement was closely anchored to the Greco-Roman traditional criticism of spectacles; e.g., Tertullian in De spectaculis had in part followed contemporary Stoic views: see M. WISTRAND, ‘Change and Continuity: Some Observations on Tertullian’s De spectaculis and Pagan Views on Entertainment’, Tongues and Texts Unlimited, Stockholm 2000, 289–307.

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vanity and Christians who with the eyes of the heart see truth. In the church Christians are allowed the great spectacle of Christ’s sacrifice in which the lion is vanquished by the blood of the Lamb.75 What is the insanity of the circus compared with the great spectacle of Christians?76 Quodvultdeus contrasts the Christian struggle and endeavour with the fights shown in amphitheatres and theatres. Christians need not give up the delight of watching (voluptas spectandi) but to change it. The church is full of venerable and salubrious spectacles and can offer better alternatives for every entertainment: circus goers can marvel at Elijah the charioteer; instead of Jupiter and Juno in pantomime one can watch Christ in his purity and the Virgin Mary; in place of acrobats a Christian can admire Jacob and Esau in the womb; and Daniel is superior to the venationes of the amphitheatre.77 Thus, Christian authors made ample use of the imagery of Roman spectacles in describing Christ’s sacrifice, Christian martyrdom and the internal struggles of a Christian soul as well as God’s creation or his providence in the course of history.78 Pagans do not have the only performances, Augustine claims, since Christians’ true spectacle is Jerusalem, ‘the vision of peace’, and Sion, ‘contemplation’. Furthermore, the spread of Christianity throughout the Roman Empire and the conversion of pagans were seen as a great spectaculum. In Psychomachia Prudentius presented the battle between Christian virtues and pagan vices in a human soul as a public display, exploiting the imagery of the Roman arena.79 The Grey Area of Urban Festivals In the Greco-Roman world, urban festivals were closely woven into the fabric of the daily life of local communities. Christians continued to take part in public festivals and various rites during the fourth and fifth centuries and this celebration of local 75 AVG. in euang. Ioh. 7.6; see also Chapter 3. The lion may either refer to the lion of Cybele or memorize martyrs thrown to lions. PÉPIN 1982, 266. 76 AVG. in psalm. 80.1. Cf. TERT. spect. 29.3–30.7 who had contrasted Roman shows with the spectacle of the Last Judgment in which rulers, philosophers, poets, actors, charioteers and athletes will be cast into fire. Thus, Christianity offered better performances than a praetor or any other Roman could supply. This entertainment was sacred, eternal and free of charge. Similarly, NOVATIAN. spect. 10.3 had exulted the triumph of Christ over his enemy as the gracious spectacle. 77 QVODV. symb. 1.2.5; 1.2.27. Similarly, CASSIOD. in psalm. 39.6 offers the saving psalms of the church as an alternative for theatrical performances. 78 Martyrdom as a spectacle: e.g., PRVD. perist. 10.463; 10.701; AVG. serm. 49.11; in euang. Ioh. 7.6; in psalm. 39.9; serm. 313A; in earlier apologetics: CYPR. ep. 60.2; ep. 10.2; LACT. mort. pers. 16.6. God’s creation: e.g., NOVATIAN. spect. 9 and AMBR. expos. in psalm. 118 serm. 5.28–9; cf. CIC. nat. deor. 2.104; 2.155. For the metaphorical use of spectacles in Christian literature, see WEISMANN 1972, 111–21, 173–5 and D.S. POTTER, ‘Martyrdom as Spectacle’, Theater and Society in the Classical World, Ann Arbor 1993, 53–88. 79 AVG. in psalm. 98.5; 147.8; discussed by MARKUS 1990a, 117–18. For Prudentius’ ideological reconstruction of the amphitheatre, see P. JAMES, ‘Prudentius’ Psychomachia. The Christian arena and the politics of display’, Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity, London 1999, 70–94.

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communities turned out to be a problematic and vague borderland for Christians. Therefore, Christian opinion leaders, bishops and church councils, had to define what was allowed as a neutral, that is, harmless celebration of community and what was banned as idolatry incompatible with Christian belief. They tried to draw a clear distinction between religious ceremonies and secular festivals. If celebrations were regarded as religious, they inevitably were condemned as demonic and diabolic. If they were interpreted merely as secular and even considered useful or necessary for creating coherence in human communities, Christians were permitted to participate in them.80 I do not take any stand here on the religious or non-religious content of urban festivals: the issue is beyond my discussion. What is discussed here is the content, connotations and significations with which Christian writers provided these celebrations. Those Christians who preferred to participate in local festivals are known to have provided them with significations deviating from those of Christian leaders. Petrus Chrysologus tells us of Christians who took part in the festivities of the New Year (Kalendae Ianuariae) and understood these as harmless celebrations without religious content: “This is not practice of sacrilegious rites but only a desire of entertainment. This is the enjoyment of the new, not the error of the old. This is the beginning of the year, not a pagan transgression.” Nonetheless, Petrus responds that these people were mistaken since these celebrations were not a mere enjoyment but a crime, labelling these celebrations as impietas, sacrilegium and piaculum. Thus, in Petrus’ interpretation the Kalendae Ianuariae fell outside the category of the secular; instead, he insisted upon a choice between joking with the devil and rejoicing with Christ.81 The reactions of incerti Christians to the reproofs varied. Some of them were troubled whereas others saw no contradiction between urban entertainment and the Christian faith. Some of them defended themselves, arguing that they were good Christians; moreover, the sign of cross that they received on their foreheads as catechumens protected them from the pollution of idolatry.82 Augustine complains of Christians who thought that they could visit idols and consult magi and soothsayers 80 MARKUS 1990a, 6, 9 poses an apt question of where religion ends and where ‘secular’ customs begin and remarks that boundaries were different and tended to change in the course of time. 81 PETR. CHRYS. serm. 155.5. The celebration of the Kalendae Ianuriae remained popular throughout centuries as numerous complaints of church fathers imply (e.g., AST. AM. hom. 4; IOH. CHRYS. hom. in Kal. 1–3; MAX. TAVR. 98; 63; AVG. serm. Dolbeau 26 (= 198augm); CAES. AREL. serm. 192–3; MART. BRAC. corr. 11; 16 and even as late as in the eighth century Bonifatius ep. 314.6 ad Zachariam and in the ninth century Atto of Vercelli cap. 79). In their legislation emperors permitted it to continue (CTh 16.10.17 in 399) but church leaders opposed it, paying attention to public and private sacrifices and auspices as well as nocturnal dances and drunkenness. M. MESLIN, La fête des kalendes de janvier dans l’empire romain, Bruxelles 1970, esp. 95–118. 82 AVG. serm. 301A.8. For the reactions, see KAHLOS 2005, 470–2; FOWDEN 1998, 538– 60: 542; BROWN 1998, 658. MARKUS 1990a, 4 points out that Christian leaders were generally more worried about non-Christian cult, that is, about what pagans were doing, rather than about what they believed.

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and who at the same time regarded themselves as good Christians, claiming: “I have not abandoned the church for I am catholicus.” Similarly, Jacob of Seroûg reports of Christians who considered spectacles and local feasts as secular entertainment without religious content and defended themselves, saying: “It is an amusement, not paganism”, “I confess God but I enjoy the play, too” and, “I do not go there to that I may believe but that I might laugh”.83 Similar debate on the idolatric content and the harmlessness of entertainment had been conducted in the third century. Christian opinion leaders, such as Cyprian, Tertullian and Novatian, had attempted to dissociate Christian from urban spectacles and feasts and refute the answers of those who did not interprete their own participation in local celebrations as idolatry.84 The defences of incerti Christian echoed in church fathers’ writings stressed the social aspect of traditional celebrations. They had always belonged to the rhythm of public civic life and served to reinforce the coherence of local communities.85 R.A. Markus is inclined to see this social aspect as present in Augustine’s famous classification of human institutions into three categories: first, there are the superstitious (superstitiosae) institutions, which are connected with demons; second, the useful and indispensable institutions (commodae et necessariae) and third, the useless and luxurious ones (superfluae et luxuriosae). In his classification, theatre, for example, belonged to the category of the useless and extravagant institutions, not to the superstitious ones. This is notable divergence from earlier Christian tradition that had regarded shows as idolatry.86 Augustine declares that a Christian should not avoid all that part of human institutions that contributes to the necessary ordering of life. A Christian should rather learn and make use of useful human institutions but on the condition that they do not involve a Christian in superstition, that is, in the worship of demons, and, in addition, are not luxurious or superfluous.87 83 AVG. in psalm. 88.2.14. Jacob of Seroûg asked who could wallow in mud without becoming filthy. JACOB. SARUG. hom. de spect. 5, quoted by MARKUS 1990a, 104 and BOWERSOCK 1990, 38. For a thorough discussion on spectacles, see MARKUS 1990a, 101–107. 84 CYPR. ad Donat. 7–8. This is why Tertullian (spect. 5.1–8) paid particular attention to the cultic origins of shows and needed to make the connection between spectacles and cult conspicuous enough for his Christian readers. He (spect. 4.4) aimed to point out what was idolatry and what was not. 85 During the preceding centuries, pagans had charged Christians of not visiting performances and thus isolating themselves from communal life, e.g., apud TAT. or. 22 and apud MIN. FEL. 12.5. 86 AVG. doctr. christ. 2.25.38–39. Augustine stresses that theatrical performances as a luxurious institution must be avoided anyway. MARKUS 1990a, 111–12 regards Augustine’s attitude towards theatre ‘notably mild’; according to V. BURRUS, ‘In the Theater of This Life: The Performance of Orthodoxy in Late Antiquity’, The Limits of Ancient Christianity, Ann Arbor 1999, 80–96: 80, Augustine classed theatre, “not with demonically inspired superstitions, but in the ambiguous category of merely human institutions, and thus linked with the realm of the ‘secular’”. Later Augustine nevertheless demonizes theatre (AVG. catech. rud. 25.48; civ. 1.31–32; 2.8; 4.26). 87 AVG. doctr. christ. 2.40.25–6. This makes MARKUS 1990a, 118–21 believe that Augustine shows understanding for the social functions of urban shows: these could be useful for communities in creating cohesion and need not to be interpreted as idolatry. As I have argued in KAHLOS 2005, 472–3, it seems that Markus has read more understanding for urban

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In De doctrina christiana Augustine outlines a relatively rigid cultural scheme for Christians but in everyday praxis he seems to have assumed a more conciliatory attitude towards urban amusements. He acknowledges the difficulties that Christians embrace in their relationship with local festivities: he advises his parishioners to refrain from hollow entertainment – as far as they are capable of resisting them.88 In the complexities of everyday life, Augustine’s threefold classification of institutions turned out to be inadequate. Augustine recognizes that feasts and shows could be given diverse significations according to the strength of one’s faith. Augustine and firm Christians can admit that urban celebrations are not idolatry but for weaker brothers they could cause injury. Weaker Christians could invest celebrations with cultic contents. Even if Christians firmer in their faith would not link any religious intentions with their participation in local feasting, they should abstain from these celebrations in the sake of their frailer brothers. Therefore, it is the interpretation and intention that makes the difference, not the participation as such. Even if the firm brothers knew that the deities of the feasts are not real Gods, the weaker ones might err in thinking that the firm fellows are showing respect to idols in the middle of celebration.89 Redefining Content and Boundaries As the complaints of church fathers show, many Christians and even some of their clergy did not judge it necessary to make an either–or choice between the church and urban celebrations. Neither saw they any difficulty in taking part in local feasts and spectacles. This made Christians a suitable target of their opponents, as the example of Faustus the Manichaean indicates. Faustus derides Christians who participate in pagan celebrations such as the Kalendae Ianuariae and the solstices and merely modify pagan rituals for Christian use, for example, transforming pagan sacrifices into love feasts (agape) and idols into martyrs. They are a mere schism from paganism, not a real religion of its own; the only distinction is their segregation from pagans.90 Such label of pagan was by no means flattering for Christian leaders and certainly aroused, not only literary replies such as Augustine’s Contra Faustum, but also more intensive preaching. Christians had to clarify their identity by separating themselves from pagans and their amusements. Christians were constantly urged to choose between two alternatives, involvement in idolatry within traditional celebrations or Christian life without them. Augustine’s attitudes towards urban celebrations fluctuated between more conciliatory and more severe tones according to the circumstances and audience. performances than can safely be attributed to the church father. Augustine hardly regards urban spectacles as valuable for communities. 88 AVG. serm. 9.17: ... abstinete vos a detestabilibus corruptelis, a detestabilibus inquisitionibus, a mathematicis, ab haruspicibus, a sortilogis, ab auguribus, a sacris sacrilegis; abstinete vos, quantum potestis, a nugatoriis spectaculis. 89 AVG. serm. 62.4.7. See also Chapter 3. 90 Apud AVG. c. Faust. 20.4.1. According to Faustus, both Jews and Christians were schismata of paganism.

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R.A. Markus nevertheless traces a substantial change in the church father’s positions in 399–401. Thereafter his attitudes towards urban festivities as well as towards religious deviation in general hardened to considerable extent. The hardened attitudes of Augustine and other Christian leaders reflect the tense religious atmosphere of the period and coincide with the severed imperial legislation against polytheistic practices.91 The notion of separation is demonstrated in Augustine’s use of pairs of words congregari – segregari, misceri – separari, commixtio – separatio. In a sermon on the Kalendae Ianuariae, the church father admonishes Christians to distinguish themselves from pagans in their beliefs and habits: they must be congregated (congregaris) and segregated (segregaris) from pagans. They will be congregated (congregabimini) from among the nations and be thus saved. However, those who are intermingled (miscentur) with the pagans will not be saved. There is no need to feel troubled because of physical concoction (commixtio corporalis) with pagans since the separation of minds (separatio mentis) is far more important.92 The separation is shown in dichotomies: while pagans give gifts (according to the habit of the Kalendae Ianuariae), Christians give alms; pagans are fascinated by luxurious songs, Christians by the sermons of the Scripture; pagans run to the theatre, Christians to the church; pagans become inebriated, Christians fast.93 When speaking of abstaining from theatrical performances, Augustine also brings forth the violent metaphors of gladius ad separationem and of ignis ad ustionem. The former will separate Christians from their evil customs and even their earlier life and ancestry and the latter will burn their enemies who have rejected God and embraced idolatry. The church father stresses that every Christian has somehow been connected with the pagan past and traditions but they are to be taken apart from what they have been before.94 The hardened positions meant reclarifying Christian conduct and identity as well as redefining the content of urban festivities. The public celebrations of local communities that previously had served to articulate a civic consensus and legitimated a religiously mixed community’s value-system – as Markus depicts their integrative role in late antique communities – under new tensioned circumstances turned out to cause disagreement and hostility within communities.95 I am inclined to see Augustine both as polarizing the positions and as soothing agitated feelings 91 MARKUS 1990a, 123. E.g., AVG. civ. 1.31–2; 4.26; serm. 301A; CAES. AREL. serm. 2.4; QVODV. symb. 1.2.1; 1.1.11; SALV. gub. 6.6.31–4. 92 AVG. serm. 198.1–2. For Augustine’s emphasis on the bodily intermingledness and separation of wills, see Chapter 2. 93 AVG. serm. 198.2: Dant illi strenas, date vos eleemosynas. Avocantur illi cantionibus luxuriarum, avocate vos sermonibus Scripturarum: currunt illi ad theatrum, vos ad ecclesiam: inebriantur illi, vos ieiunate. Augustine (serm. 198.3) adds that real Christians must live in the diverse manner and with the detaching faith: aliter vivite, et distantem fidem, spem, et charitatem vestram distantibus moribus approbate. 94 AVG. in psalm. 96.7; in 96.10 the church father encourages his listeners to fetch their fellow Christians from spectacles. This enarratio was spoken in 399 a few days after the sermon 62 and reflects the tensioned religious circumstances in North Africa. 95 MARKUS 1990a, 118–19.

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of Christian crowds.96 He tries to restrain aggressions of Christian extremists against incerti Christians and smoothe down tensions within Christian community. However, at the same time he contributes to the growth of tension, in defining urban festivities as cultic and in insisting upon the either–or choice.97 The imperial government interpreted traditional civic celebrations in a manner divergent from the delineations of church leaders. The administrators wished to retain the traditional festivities that were so imperative to the populace. An edict in 392, for example, speaks of the sorrow that would be produced if theatrical performances were forbidden.98 Christian leaders insisted upon harsher procedures against pagan feasting. In 401 the council of Carthage, for instance, demanded emperors to forbid banquets (convivia), stating that pagans induced Christians to take part in them and through them were drawn into pagan error. In other writings, Christian writers tend to depict Christians as unvoluntary, more or less passive victims of the coercion of pagan crowds: they grumble about infirm Christians who are abducted by their pagan friends to shows and banquets.99 As a compromise with ecclesiastical authorities the legislators tried to clean up civic celebrations of their cultic features, that is, ‘secularize’ them. An edict of 399 declares that amusements shall be performed to the people as before but without sacrifices and superstition.100 We see boundaries fluctuating constantly in a time-to-time repeated redemarcation of frontiers. Some civic celebrations and spectacles were erased of conspicuous pagan features and were thus gradually ‘securalized’. In the eyes of Christian emperors they were again functional to the social needs of local communities. Some festivities remained dubious in the eyes of ecclesiastical leaders because either they still included superstitious and sacrilegious elements or new pagan contents were ‘detected’ in them during identity crises.101

96 E.g., in serm. 62 Augustine attempts to calm down the heated feelings of Christian hardliners against incerti Christians who had taken part in a pagan feast. The purpose of the sermon is twofold; it both pacifies too aggressive extremists and assures them that idolatry will be wiped out in the near future. 97 E.g., AVG. in psalm. 61.10, contrasting the festivals of Jerusalem and the festivities of Babylon and serm. 301A.7, insisting on abstaining the civic munera and turning to spiritual enjoyment. 98 CTh 15.6.1. 99 Concilium Carthaginense can. 60–61 (in 401) (CCSL 149, p. 196–7); AVG. in psalm. 80.11; 85.15; 90.10; conf. 6.8.23–4. 100 CTh 16.10.17. R. LIM, ‘People as power: games, munificence, and contested topography’, Transformations of Urbs Roma in Late Antiquity, Portsmouth Rhode Island 1999, 265–281: 268–269 calls this ‘desacralisation of spectacles’. 101 MARKUS 1990a, 134 speaks of the replacement of a trichotomy of Christian (sacred), secular (neutral, civic) and pagan (profane) by a dichotomy of sacred (Christian) and profane (pagan). One example set by MARKUS 1990a, 131–133 is the Lupercalia that had long been regarded as a harmless and neutral festival even by clergy and was condemned as idolatry by Bishop Gelasius. GELAS. ep. 100.16–17; 100.28–31 (CSEL 35) redefined the Lupercalia as pagan superstition and perilous for Christians, refuting arguments of the positive influence of the festival for the local community. For Gelasius on the choice between the Christian and the pagan, see Chapter 2.

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The civic celebrations, however neutral and harmless or demonic and injurious they were considered, coincided with several ecclesiastical feast days.102 Bishop Leo feels ashamed that Christians spend more resources on demons than on the apostles and go more frequently to foolish shows than to the martyria.103 Imperial government was persuaded to forbid the performance of games and theatrical performances on Sundays and on the most important Christian feast days.104 Christian leaders attempted to channel their fellow Christians away from pagan festivities. The competing cycle of time was gradually conquered: pagan celebrations were either neutralized and tolerated or demonized and wiped out and a Christian cycle of sacred time was inserted. Some pagan ceremonies were incorporated into a Christian framework.105 Funerary cult as well as martyr cult was a problematic issue for church leaders who complain of banqueting, abundant eating and heavy drinking at Christian tombs and martyria. Augustine, for example, reproaches his fellow Christians whose celebrations in the memory of martyrs turned out to be as licentious and intemperate as the festivals in honour of pagan Gods. Paulinus of Nola complains that people feasting in honour of S. Felix think that saints are pleased to see their tombs flooding with wine.106 Christian leaders interpreted too luxurious feasting as continuity of pagan festivals such as Parentalia or Feralia. Bishop Ambrose prohibits them quasi parentalia superstitioni gentilium ... simillima. In his epigrams Gregory of Nazianzus attacks those Christians who celebrated too opulently at martyria and at tombs and connects the feasting with demons, implying that recent converts persist in their pagan customs.107 Those funerary customs or rituals belonging to martyr cult that influential Christian bishops disapproved were redefined as pagan contamination, superstitious and demonic. Augustine represents certain ritual behaviours as pagan customs that a recent crowd of converts has brought into the church after the conversion of Emperor Constantine. These recent converts have not given up the

102 Reported by, e.g., SALV. gub. 6.7.37; AMBR. expos. in psalm. 118 serm. 16.45; AVG. conf. 10.23; in psalm. 80.23; 96.7.10; serm. 301A.7; CAES. AREL. serm. 89.5. A. FRASCHETTI, La conversione: da Roma pagana a Roma cristiana, Roma 1999, 307–309 and JÜRGENS 1972, 182 with several examples. 103 LEO M. serm. 84.1. Nevertheless, Leo exults elsewhere at the decline of pagan festivities: LEO M. serm. 8.1. 104 E.g., CTh 2.8.23; also 2.8.20; 2.8.24–5; 15.5.2; 15.5.5; CIust 3.12.6 (7).3; 3.12.9 (11). 105 Modern scholars describe this phenomenon as the conquest of time or the Christianization of time: M.R. SALZMAN, ‘The Christianization of sacred time and sacred space’, The Transformations of Urbs Roma in Late Antiquity, Portsmouth 1999, 123–34; MARKUS 1990a, 125, 130. 106 AVG. in ep. Ioh. 4.4; PAVL. NOL. carm. 27.555–7; cf. ZENO 1.25.6 Löfstedt; AMBR. Hel. 17.62; AVG. civ. 8.17: the epulae at the tombs of martyrs were not appropriate to better Christians; ep. 22.3–6; serm. 311.5; SIDON. ep. 5.17. Cf. Faustus the Manichee’s derision of the feasts at martyrs’ tombs (apud AVG. c. Faust. 20.4). For the complaints and control of church leaders, see P.–A. FÉVRIER, ‘Approches de fêtes chrétiennes (fin du IVe s. et Ve s.)’, La fête, pratique et discours, Paris 1981, 149–64. 107 AVG. conf. 6.2 of Monnica who gave up North African traditional martyr cult because Bishop Ambrose prohibited them. GREG. NAZ. carm. epigr. (AG 8.166–9; 8.175).

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revelling and drunkenness that is characterictic of pagan feasting. Thus, Augustine redefines what is appropriate for Christians and represents an ideal of a pure and true Christianity as a historical fact having existed before Constantine.108

108 AVG. ep. 29.9. In serm. 311 Augustine also interprets banquets in honour of martyrs as the continuation of pagan funerary banquets; cf. ZENO 1.25.6 Löfstedt. According to BROWN 1998, 662–3, this is an issue of authority since ecclesiastical leaders had the power to define even what polytheism had been and how much of it survived within the church: “Any custom that did not win the approval ... might be deemed a ‘habit of the heathen’.” The church fathers’ claims of the paganization of the pure and true Christianity has often been taken at face value in scholarship, e.g., LANCEL 1999, 228–9, BARB 1963, 105–108 and C. ANDRESEN, ‘Altchristliche Kritik am Tanz – ein Ausschnitt aus dem Kampf der Alten Kirche gegen heidnische Sitte’, Kirchengeschichte als Missionsgeschichte I, München 1974, 344–76: esp. 363.

Chapter 6

Gods and Demons

I One and Many Ignobilis turba deorum – the Multitude of Gods The multitude of Gods was a recurrent theme in Christian polemic against pagans. The plurality of the pagan Gods was stressed while the singleness of the one Christian God was brought forth. In this polarization the Christian God was emphatically unus verus deus and other deities were false Gods or even demons. Thus, a striking difference between monotheistic Christianity and polytheistic paganism was constructed and accentuated in Christian rhetoric. In City of God Augustine derides the multitude and diversity of Gods, referring to it with the Ciceronian expressions multitudo deorum and magna turba deorum. He also stresses the danger raised by this mob, calling it falsorum deorum multitudo noxia.1 Anonymous pamphlets sneer at their huge number: Carmen contra paganos, for example, lists numerous deities that the unnamed senator worships and labels them as monstrosities.2 Augustine describes how Romans brought numerous Gods to Rome in order to protect the state from disasters. Then, Romans believed that they remained “under the protection of all these Gods – who could list them – indigenous and foreign Gods, celestial and terrestrial Gods, Gods of the underworld and of the sea, Gods of the springs and of the rivers, and as Varro tells us, certain and uncertain Gods, and in all classes, like animals, male and female Gods”. In collecting far too many Gods, the Romans only insulted the true supreme God with the immense amount of smoke of the sacrifices performed to these innumerable Gods. Rome would have been much happier with a smaller number of Gods. Augustine ridicules

1 AVG. civ. passim; e.g., 7.24: deorum multitudo; also 3.17: turba tot numinum; tantae numinum turbae; 4.8: tanta deorum turba; 4.21: tantam deorum turbam; 4.23: turba indignissima tanta; aliorum deorum superflua multitudine; 4.34: tantae falsorum deorum turbae; 4.23: falsorum deorum multitudo noxia; 7.3: turba vilis. These expressions appeared already in, e.g., CIC. nat. deor. 1.15.39: magna turba ... deorum; 2.63: multitudo deorum. Furthermore, Seneca (apud AVG. civ. 6.10) had written of omnis ista ignobilis deorum turba, not concealing his scorn for the large number of divinities in Roman religion. 2 CARM. c. pag. 115: omnia quae in templis positus tot monstra colebas. The PseudoPaulinian Poema ultimum also stresses the large number of deities that the attacked person worships. Cf. PAVL. NOL. carm. 19.98–100; 159.

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the idea according to which a greater state needed more deities like a larger ship needed a larger crew.3 The lesser divinities recur several times in Augustine’s derision of the multitude of the Gods. In the middle of the discussion on naturalistic interpretations of the Gods, he sneers at the functions of individual Gods. Each divinity is said to have a task of her/his own portioned out in minute penny packets (ipsa numinum officia tam viliter minutatimque concisa), as the church father sarcastically calls these assignments. Then he lists divinities taking care of childbirth, Intercidona, Pilumnus, Deverra, deities connected with marriage and sexual intercourse, Jugatinus, Domiducus, Domitius, Manturna, Virgin(i)ensis, Subigus, Prema mater, Pertunda, Venus and Priapus. Are these the salubrious deities of cities, he exclaims, that are more laughable than the comic stories in theatres?4 Again, Augustine introduces ancient obscure deities hardly remembered in Late Antiquity in order to make the Roman religion look even more bizarre. He mocks Romans who have assigned single deities to care for particular things and for almost every single movement (deos singulos singulis rebus et paene singulis motibus) and goes on naming Agenoria, Stimula, Murcia, Strenia and Quies as deities of warfare and peace.5 Augustine even compares the multi ac minuti dii to flies when they were driven away from their altars.6 Furthermore, he singles out the most ridiculous and absurd deities, such as Cloacina, Volupia, Lubentina, Vaticanus, Cunina, Rusina, Jugatinus, Collatina, Vallonia, Segetia, Seia, Tutilina, Proserpina, Nodutus, Volutina, Patelana, Hostilina, Flora, Lacturnus, Matuta and Runcina, and adds ironically that he cannot list all the minute Gods and Goddesses needed when even Romans had difficulties in getting them catalogued in their vast volumes – probably an allusion to Varro’s Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum that Augustine utilizes to a great extent.7 These many divinities of the Roman past picked from Varro’s antiquarian writings were hardly known by the average fifth century Roman (and by a late Republican Roman for that matter) but they served as an apposite rhetorical tool in subjecting Roman polytheistic religion to ridicule. Furthermore, Augustine mocks the hierarchy created by Romans among their Gods, calling the Gods assigned with minor duties the plebeian multitude of

3 AVG. civ. 3.12. Cf. the classifications of Gods in works of Greek and Roman authors, e.g., ARTEMID. 2.34 who divided the Gods into Olympian or ethereal, heavenly, earthly, subterranean, sea and river Gods and those outside these categories. AVG. civ. 7.21 emphasizes the continuous multiplication of Gods, i.e., demons, in Greco-Roman religion; 7.22: people sought excuses for adding even more deities; dii plures, plura daemonia; 7.24: Verum sicut volunt, dividant, conflent, multiplicent, replicent, inclipent. Cf. PRVD. c. Symm. 2.347–59. 4 AVG. civ. 6.9. 5 AVG. civ. 4.16; cf. 4.15; cons. euang. 1.18.26. 6 AVG. civ 2.22: tam multos ac minutes deos tamquam muscas; scorn for minute Gods also in civ. 4.8–21 passim; 7.11: inter illos minuscularios. 7 AVG. civ 4.8. Augustine says that he is not going to list them all because he feels it shameful. Finally he adds that Romans even needed three Gods to guard the doors, Forculus, Cardea and Limentinus, when mortals needed only one doorkeeper; other attacks against the multitude of Gods in civ. 4.11; 4.21; 4.23.

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divinities.8 Even if Romans tried to assign in minute detail their Gods as specialists to deal with all benefits of human life, they could not succeed in this attempt. Why did they need their dii minuti et singuli? Why did they invent all this mob of Gods when they could have assigned all human blessings, for instance, to the Goddess Felicitas, the church father asks.9 Augustine contraposes the one true God of the Jews with the innumerable false Gods of the Romans. The Jews founded their faith in the one God only who freed them from Egypt. The Jews had needed neither Lucina nor Rumina, Cunina, Educa, Potina, Priapus, Neptune, Mannia, Nymphs, Lymphs, Mars, Bellona, Segetia, Bubona, Mellona nor Pomona but they received from the one true God everything for which Romans thought it necessary to pray to so many false Gods.10 In fact, Augustine asserts on several occasions that the multitude of Gods is the mob of demons. The cult of many false Gods was the cult of as many demons. Furthermore, Augustine associates the noxious mob of false Gods and the multitude of stupid people who worship them and exhorts his readers to reject the cult of the false Gods. Finally, he asserts that there is only one God to be worshipped and urges the Romans to put away the hullabaloo of innumerable demons.11 Augustine attempts to embarrass his pagan correspondent Maximus of Madauros by picking out the most preposterous deities of the Roman religion, stating, “if you wish to laugh, you have among yourselves ample material for derision”, and continuing with a list of Stercutius, Cloacina, Venus Calva, Timor, Pallor and Febris. In City of God Augustine refers several times to Cloacina, the Goddess of drains.12 Such catalogues of numerous bizarre and absurd sounding deities were not Augustine’s innovation but had been used by earlier Christian apologists. Lactantius had called polytheistic rites a derision of religions and listed ridiculous deities, such as Fornax, Muta, Lara (or Larunda), Caca, Cunina, Stercutus and Tutinus, asking who could refrain from laughter on hearing of these kinds of Gods. Moreover, Romans had “a thousand other fictions so that they who regarded these as objects of worship

8 AVG. civ. 7.2: plebeiam numinum multitudinem minutis opusculis deputatam; cf. 7.3: in his minutis operibus, quae minutatim diis pluribus distributa sunt; 7.15; 4.11; 4.8.–21: di minuti; 7.11: di minuscularii. AVG. civ. 7.2–3 criticizes Varro’s conception of dii selecti, the principal deities, inquiring why Vitumnus and Sentinus are not included among them although these two obscure and unknown Gods should be more important than the rest because they give the life and sense to the foetus. 9 AVG. civ. 4.21. 10 AVG. civ. 4.34. In a similar manner, AVG. civ. 5.21 compares the Romans with the Persians who worshipped only two Gods, the good one and the evil one. They venerated neither Segetia nor other numerous Gods that the Romans had assigned to particular duties and even several Gods to one task. 11 AVG. civ. 4.16: illam turbam colere perseveraret non plane deorum, sed daemoniorum; 4.8: daemoniorum turbae; 4.23: cultus falsorum tot deorum, quot daemoniorum; 4.25: strepitus innumerabilium daemoniorum. 12 AVG. ep. 17.2; a similar list in MIN. FEL. 25.8. Cloacina: AVG. civ. 4.8; 4.23; cf. LACT. inst. 1.20; MIN. FEL. 25.8. Stercutius: AVG. ep. 17.2; TERT. apol. 25.10; nat. 2.9.17; LACT. inst. 1.20; PRVD. perist. 2.449.

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may be said to be more stupid than the Egyptians who worship certain monstrous and preposterous idols”.13 In Christian polemic, the multitude of the pagan Gods and cults is represented as a chaos that is contraposed with a vision of the one Christian God and one Christian cult. Paulinus of Nola, for example, contrasts the deus unus and the nomina mille deorum. This opposition runs through Augustine’s De civitate Dei but appears in writings of earlier apologists as well. Tatian, in his oration to Hellenes, had stressed the dichotomy between one God and many Gods, that is, between the one truth and the error of plurality. Hellenes had preferred the rule of many (polykoiranie) to the rule of one (monarchia) and followed the demons.14 Christian polemicists created rhetorical boundaries, emphasizing differences and downplaying similarities in their debate against non-Christian religions and philosophies. Pagans were defined solely as worshippers of false and many Gods, deorum falsorum multorumque cultores, as, for example, Augustine does in his Retractationes.15 This polarization was a rhetorical device and a reaction to the pagan, particularly philosophical, criticism against the divinity of Christ. The Christian responses that stressed the monotheistic nature of their own doctrine and the polytheistic character of their opponents served mostly as strengthening the faith and as clarifying the doctrine within the Christian communities. Orosius in his Historia contra paganos is aware of the monotheistic views of contemporary pagan intellectuals who acknowledged one God as the creator of all and claimed that they did not worship many Gods but rather venerated the many servants under the one supreme God. Nevertheless, Orosius condemns the monotheistic trend of his rivals and accuses them of refusing to receive the already declared truth. Augustine refers to the monotheistic and pantheistic views of pagan philosophers but he rejects their interpretation of the multitude of Gods as the members or powers of Jupiter.16 It is noteworthy that Augustine’s emphasis in his attack is on the innumerable Roman Gods. He stresses that, in spite of the monotheistic doctrines of intellectuals, pagan religions remain polytheistic and Platonic philosophers, such as Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyry, Apuleius and even Plato himself, thought that the numerous Gods should be venerated with sacrifices.17 13 LACT. inst. 1.20. TERT. nat. 2.9 had mocked Varro’s hierarchy of Gods and dii selecti, stating that if Gods were selected like onions, then the rest were rejected as worthless; cf. AVG. civ. 7.1. 14 PAVL. NOL. carm. 19.133; 159; cf. PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 165–6; 205. TAT. or. 14.1; 15.7–10. NORELLI 1998, 81, 92–4; see also Chapter 3. The chaotic appearance of polytheism is fortified by the multiplicity of the same deity. AVG. civ. 7.11–13 and 4.10 refers to manifold Jupiters and Venuses. Similar attacks against the multiple divinities: THEOPH. Autol. 1.10; CLEM. prot. 28.1–3 refers to three Zeuses, five Athenas and six Apollos. 15 AVG. retract. 2.69. 16 OROS. hist. 6.1.2–3. AVG. civ. 4.11: the aspects of Jupiter; 4.12: God as the mundi animus. 17 AVG. civ. 8.12. Similarly, earlier Christian apologists had represented pagans as the worshippers of many Gods or idols or impure spirits: e.g., TERT. idol. 1.5; LACT. inst. 2.9.11– 13. THEOPH. Autol. 2.38 contrasted polytheism with monotheism. Cf. the Letter of Aristeas 135 that contrasted the Jewish monotheism with the polytheism of others, claiming that “all

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Between Monotheism and Polytheism Religions have traditionally been defined either as monotheistic or polytheistic. Polytheism is usually defined as “belief that the divine realm is populated by a plurality of gods of broadly comparable status, not fully subordinated to or comprehended within a single god of higher status”. Correspondingly, monotheism is “belief in one unique god to the exclusion of all others”.18 At first sight polytheism may appear an exact opposite to monotheism but religious phenomena turn out to be too intricate to be stowed into only two restricted categories. In order to specify phenomena that do not fit in these categories, modern scholars have introduced a third term, henotheism. Henotheism is defined as affirmative belief in one supreme God but not in one God only; thus, other Gods are not excluded.19 However, even the term henotheism has not sufficed to explain the complex religious phenomena of Greco-Roman Antiquity. Therefore, some developments and trends in ancient religious life and thought have often been depicted as monotheistic tendencies within Greco-Roman polytheism.20 As the dichotomy between Christian monotheism and pagan polytheism has not been adequate in explaining philosophical monotheism, new contrapositions have been introduced, for example, between syncretistic monotheism and pure monotheism.21 The modern division between monotheism and polytheism is a heritage of the Christian polemic. The simplification according to which pagans are polytheists and Christians are monotheists is due to the Christian writing that incessantly represented pagans as worshippers of many Gods even though being a pagan in Late Antiquity did not necessarily mean that one could not be a monotheist.22 In the following, we will see how the issue of one God and many Gods is utilized as a polemical tool in the debate between Christians and non-Christians as well as a means of selfaffirmation both among Christians and non-Christians. At the same time, we will see how the boundaries between one God and many Gods become confused. What causes confusion for a modern scholar in the late antique debate on one God and many Gods is a concept of God that diverges in a remarkable way from the modern notions of God. In the Greco-Roman use, the words theos and deus did not, mankind except ourselves believe in the existence of many Gods, though they themselves are much more powerful than the beings whom they worship in vain”. 18 FOWDEN 1993, 5. 19 Henotheism: H.S. VERSNEL, Ter unus. Isis, Dionysos, Hermes, Leiden 1990, 1; FOWDEN 1993, 5; M.L. WEST, ‘Towards Monotheism’, Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity, Oxford 1999, 21–40: 24. MACMULLEN 1981, 89 calls megalodemonia a tendency in which the Great Spirit was portrayed in friendly relations with minor ones. P. HAYMAN, ‘Monotheism – a misused word in Jewish studies?’, JJS 42 (1991), 1–15: 2, 11 states that it is hardly ever appropriate to use the term monotheism to depict the Jewish idea of God. 20 E.g., KAHLOS 2002, 100–104. Cf. VERSNEL 1990, 23 who speaks of “implicit polytheistic trends in a doctrinal monotheism”. 21 RUGGIERO 1992, 165 states that in Late Antiquity the contraposition has to be drawn not between pagan polytheism and Christian monotheism but rather between syncretistic monotheism represented by Porphyry and the pure monotheism of Christianity, thus implying that Christianity is pure monotheism. 22 This is also stressed by ATHANASSIADI – FREDE 1999, 1–2, 20.

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as E.R. Dodds puts it, “carry the overwhelming overtones of awe and remoteness” that the modern word ‘God’ does. Thus, it is more suitable to make a distinction between ‘a God’ and ‘the God’. For the Greeks and Romans a God was immortal and had supernatural powers; otherwise there was not much difference between a human and a God. A human could be held as a God by mistake if she/he used superhuman powers and, for instance, performed miracles.23 To make the situation even more perplexing, the Greeks and Romans believed in the divine element in a human and in the world in general. In addition to these divine beings, pagans acknowledged the God that I call the supreme God in order to clarify the distinction between the two concepts. Most late antique pagan thinkers believed in one supreme God but they recognized the existence of other divine beings as well. For example, according to the Platonists, there was one God, the first principle, but there were also other divine beings. They could be characterized divine because they were immortal and blessed by divine grace even though they were created beings. The existence of other divine beings was by no means incompatible with the belief in one supreme God. The same applies to Christians who acknowledged that in the universe there were beings that could be called Gods, for example, the un-fallen, good angels and redeemed humans.24 In his discussion with Platonists in City of God, Augustine admits that good angels could be called Gods as Platonists call them. Plato (Timaios 40) has stated that they were created by the supreme God. If the Platonists mean that these being are immortal but made by the supreme God and blessed but through adhering to the supreme God, then Augustine is willing to concede that they are speaking of the same beings as the Christians, whatever name they give for these beings. He is not interested in engaging in a dispute about words. There was hardly any disagreement between Christians and Platonists about the appellation ‘Gods’ given to immortal and blessed beings, he adds, because even the Scriptures use the word in that manner, making mentions of ‘the God of Gods’ and ‘the Lord of Gods’ (Psalms 50:1 and 136:2). Therefore, it is justified for Augustine to speak of angels as Gods. We see Augustine seeking a point of contact with Platonists and creating threads of understanding with them.25 Thus, there are Gods in Augustine’s universe. The existence of other Gods is not denied. In a way it is not monotheism and polytheism that are at issue here. Rather what is debated is whether these beings, Gods or angels, are to be worshipped or not. Augustine asserts that whatever name these immortal and blessed beings deserve they should not be venerated. Created angels do not wish to be venerated since worship belongs only to the one God, that is, the supreme God, the Creator. Augustine is ready to acknowledge that the God whom Platonists believe in is the one true God. Their 23 DODDS 1965, 74–5. The Lystrans mistook the Apostle Paul and Barnabas (Acts 14:8– 13) for Gods in the likeness of humans and Apollonius of Tyana (PHILOSTR. v. Apoll. 4.31; 5.24) was regarded as a deity. 24 WEST 1999, 38; FREDE 1999, 43–4, 54–5, 58–9. 25 AVG. civ. 9.23. In ep. 102.20, in which Augustine is not seeking for a point of contact, he argues against pagan intellectuals who imagine that the only difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is in names – Gods and angels.

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problem – in the eyes of the church father – is that they worship the lower deities, too. Secondary Gods or good demons or angels should not be venerated. Augustine seems to respond to pagan criticism reminiscent of the polemic of the anonymous pagan philosopher in Macarius’ Apocriticus. This philosopher asserts that it is only terminology that is debated here: one could call these beings Gods or angels.26 In his argumentation the philosopher wants to minimize the differences, accentuating the similarities between Christian and pagan conceptions. It is noteworthy that Augustine agrees with Platonists but goes on drawing another demarcation line, the one between Christians who allow the worship only of one supreme God and pagans who see no obstacles to paying homage to secondary Gods. Augustine and Macarius of Magnesia continued an earlier discussion on one God and many Gods. Christian writers had responded to philosophers who charged Christians with compromising their alleged monotheism. Celsus had disparaged Christians for blasphemy because they placed another God, Christ, on the same level as the supreme God. Moreover, Origen had reported on some Christians who felt uncomfortable with the idea of the divinity of Christ and feared that this second God would be inconsistent with the belief in one God. Origen’s solution had been to keep the conceptions of the God and a God separate. For him it was possible to accept a God or even many Gods in participation in the supreme God.27 For Celsus the worship of secondary Gods was not compromising the belief in one supreme God. On the contrary, it was rational to venerate several Gods that derived from the supreme God. Consequently, instead of paying appropriate homage to the Gods, Christians rejected them and thus blasphemed against the supreme God that they claimed to worship.28 It was against this kind of criticism that Christian writers polarized the differences between pagans and Christians. Arnobius had set out to answer pagans who asked why Christians did not serve the other Gods with them. It sufficed to Christians to worship the supreme deity, the Creator and Lord of the universe. In a similar manner to Augustine, Arnobius had recognized the divine powers of the world but asserted that it was an idle task to approach these powers individually. Humans could neither know who they were nor recognize their real names nor establish their number.29 One technique was to efface the similarities. For polemical reasons Minucius Felix had picked out as the representative of pagans a person, Caecilius, who stood for plain polytheism and scepticism and differed clearly enough from Christian monotheistic 26 AVG. civ. 9.23; cf. 10.1. MAC. MAGN. apocr. 4.21 (= fragm. 76 Harnack). FREDE 1999, 58–9. 27 ORIG. Cels. 8.12–14; 5.4–5; 8.3–4. Similarly to Augustine, Origen had interpreted the Scriptural mentions of Gods as referring to angels. However, there were Gods and so-called Gods. The former were angels and the latter were the pagan Gods that in fact were mere demons. For the discussion, see FREDE 1999, 57–61. 28 Celsus apud ORIG. Cels. 8.2; 8.9; 8.11; 8.66. It was appropriate for each human who worshipped the supreme God also to honour divine beings who were charged with tasks of governance over each sphere. According to DODDS 1965, 116–117, Celsus appears to be a stricter monotheist than Origen. This is precisely what Celsus’ argumentation aims to prove. 29 ARNOB. nat. 3.2. Justin’s argumentation shows that second century philosophers discussed the divine monarchy and presupposed the one God, e.g., IUST. dial. 1.3.

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positions. It is obvious that he avoided deliberately introducing a Platonist or a Stoic whose monotheistic beliefs would not have differed much from those of the Christian Octavius. Christian writers built a model of the progress of humankind from primitive polytheism towards the more refined monotheism. Orosius, for instance, after having stated that aspiration towards the divine is universal in all humans, declares that humankind advances from polytheism to monotheism. A human could not remain completely ignorant of God. But humans had erred to invent many Gods out of their confused fear, as they believed in God in many aspects, Orosius explains the emergence of polytheism. But people had already progressed from that position because of the influence of the Christian truth but also because these things could be reckoned by reason as even the ideas of pagan philosophers showed.30 The notion of the progress of humankind towards the one God had appeared in earlier Christian apologetics. According this scheme, there had been an original scientia dei innate in all humans. Some writers speak of pure monotheism as the original form of worship that polytheism later corrupted. Nevertheless, humankind advanced irrevocably towards the truth of monotheism.31 Needless to say, this model of progress has lived on in modern conceptions of history of religions as well as in the valuation of polytheistic and monotheistic religions.32 Scholars have often perceived monotheism as an exclusive patrimony of the Judeo-Christian tradition and represented Christianity as having replaced the static polytheistic religious systems with a monotheistic creed instead of recognizing Christianity as a part of the broader monotheistic trend of the period and understanding its success as resulting from this common ground. Some scholars even believe that pagan monotheism in Late Antiquity sprang up as a reaction to Christianity, thus ignoring that monotheistic tendencies existed in pagan philosophy and religious thought before the emergence of Christianity.33 As P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede aptly put it, “Christianity did not convince because it was monotheistic; … in order to convince, it had to be monotheistic”.34 Christians did not have a monopoly of monotheism in Late Antiquity even though Christian apologists wished to give the impression that they had.

30 OROS. hist. 6.1.2–3. 31 E.g., EUS. praep. 1.9. For Lactantius (inst. 5.6.13) the golden age that Vergil sang about was the age of the original monotheistic religion of humankind. 32 Just to take one example of modern valuation: FOWLER 1981, 19–23 speaks of many minor centers of value and power that an individual has in a ‘polytheistic’ pattern of identity and faith (which is not limited specifically to religious instances). According to Fowler, none of these centers of value is strong enough to harmonize an individual and to give order to her/his life. The ‘henotheistic’ pattern is somehow defective too. Instead, in the ‘monotheistic’ pattern an individual invests the utmost confidence in one transcendent center of value. 33 These views are questioned, e.g., by ATHANASSIADI – FREDE 1999, 1–7. Cf. the writers of One God or Many? Concepts of Divinity in the Ancient World, Chebeague 2000, who survey Semitic monotheism in the Near East more than a thousand years before the rise of Christianity and Islam. 34 ATHANASSIADI – FREDE 1999, 20.

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Shared Premises and Monotheistic Tendencies Augustine’s debate with Platonists shows that Christians and pagans had more in common than Christian polemicists wanted to acknowledge. They had to share mutual points of contact in order to be involved in a debate. One of the shared premises was a belief in one supreme deity: there were no significant divergences between pagans and Christians concerning the transcendent, incorporeal, passionless, unchanging and ineffable nature of this supreme God. This applies to not only pagan philosophers, but also a remarkable number of other pagans who were knowingly monotheistic. Thus, monotheism was pervasive in the educated circles in Late Antiquity, particularly in the Greek east.35 With this general agreement on the nature of the supreme deity, Christian writers used pagan authors in their persuasive argumentation.36 Among the late antique intellectuals, there prevailed a consensus on the existence of the supreme God that both Christian and polytheist writers exploited in establishing universal agreement for the starting point of a dialogue. Paulinus of Nola, for example, pleads consensus on the supreme God, stating that, naturali sensu, even pagans acknowledged one supreme power. Augustine writes that even if Varro was not able to liberate himself from contemporary prejudices, at least he confessed one supreme God and advised people to worship him. Correspondingly, Maximus of Madauros stresses as a self-evident truth that only an insane person denied the existence of the supreme God.37 The concept of the supreme God had become a commonplace among the educated. All divinities were interpreted as aspects, particles or epithets of one supreme God.38 35 PLAT. rep. 380d, 382e; MAX. TYR. or. 2.10a; 39.5b–e; DION CHRYS. or. 31.11; 12.27; PS. ARIST. mund. 397b; 400b; 401a; APVL. Plat. 1.5; PLOT. Enn. 5.3[49].13–14. Christians: ARIST. apol. 1; IUST. 1. apol. 13.4; 20.3–4; ATHENAG. leg. 6.2; 8.1; TAT. or. 4.1–3; 15.1; 25.2; THEOPH. Autol. 1.3–5; PS. IUST. coh. Gr. 21; ARNOB. nat. 1.62. DODDS 1965, 118; ATHANASSIADI – FREDE 1999, 1–20. 36 In order to reinforce their own arguments, earlier Christian apologists had made ample use of quotations of pagan philosophers and poets who had spoken of the one supreme God. E.g., Athenagoras (leg. 5.2) quoted Sophocles who had written: “There is one God, in truth, there is but one, / who made the heavens, and the broad earth beneath”. Theophilus (Autol. 2.36) used Sibylline oracles forged by Jews in which the one God blames humankind for rejecting his cult and worshipping idols. LACT. inst. 2.9 proclaimed that Hermes Trismegistus, the Sibyls, the Pythagoreans, the Stoics and the Peripatetics, Socrates and Plato all testified that the world was made by divine providence. Christian apologists utilized quotations and arguments collected and elaborated by Jewish apologists. M. ALEXANDRE, ‘Apologétique judéo-hellénistique et premières apologies chrétiennes’, Les Apologistes chrétiens et la culture grecque, Paris 1998, 1–40: 5–6, 38–40. 37 PAVL. NOL. ep. 24.18; AVG. civ. 4.31; MAX. MADAVR. Aug. ep. 16.1. In a similar manner, in arguing against Christian exclusivism, Emperor Julian (Galil. 52b) argued that knowledge of God was not attainable in doctrine but rather it was a natural tendency of humans to long for the divine. 38 Maximus of Tyre (or. 11.5a–b) had stated that there was only one God, the King and Father of all, and diverse Gods who were his sons and governed with him and (or. 39.5) that God had one nature but many names; PS. ARIST. mund. 401a had called God polyonymos; Aelius Aristides (or. 43.15) had interpreted Gods as the emanations of the power of Zeus,

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Monotheistic tendencies were not restricted to the speculation of philosophical and literary circles but can be observed as well in the religious life of the Late Roman Empire. Inscriptions and papyri reveal a growing inclination to interpret single deities as synonyms or epithets of one supreme God. A Roman senator, Vettius Agorius Praetextatus, for example, is accounted in his epitaph to have worshipped the numen multiplex.39 The phenomenon has been described either as composite monotheism, a kind of non-exclusive monotheism, syncretism, monotheistic tendencies, universalism or universalistic tendencies.40 Christian writers acknowledged that pagans, in spite of their idolatry, also honoured the supreme God.41 Both pagans and Christians articulated their ideas of the divine in a similar monotheistic religious language, the theological koine or idiom of the Late Antiquity. We see church fathers clarifying, formulating and defending their theology following the conventions of their time. Moreover, we see fourth and fifth century pagan writers articulating their ideas of deity in monotheistic terms and accentuating similarities with Christian views. In their argumentation, both Christian and pagan apologists utilized concepts and vocabulary that were current in middle Platonic and Neoplatonic theological speculation; one could speak of recirculation of arguments. C. Ando suggests that polytheist intellectuals adopted, imitated and transformed the rhetorical strategies that previous Christian apologists such as Tertullian and Lactantius had applied in their apologetics.42 It is, however, possible that pagan intellectuals may have quite easily obtained the concepts and argumentation from the current Platonically coloured ambience, not necessarily from particularly Christian apologetic writing. Furthermore, it is not probable that polytheist writers were well acquainted with Christian apologetic works. Instead, the ideas of internal unity of religions, negative theology, the many names and manifestations of the Father of all. The supreme deity is presupposed, e.g., in CIC. nat. deor. 2.24–8; Varro apud TERT. nat. 2.2.14–20; Varro apud AVG. civ. 7.5–6. For monotheistic tendencies in GrecoRoman antiquity, see G. REALE – A.P. BOS, Il trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro attributo ad Aristotele, Milano 1995, 343–4, WEST 1999, 27–39, FREDE 1999, 41–57 and KAHLOS 2002, 100–104. Illustrative examples of monotheistic features with a strong Platonic influence in the Late Roman Empire are Tiberianus, a pagan poet, who composed a hymn to the Creator in the late third century or in the early fourth century (S. MATTIACCI, I carmi e i frammenti di Tiberiano, Firenze 1990, 11–13), Firmicus Maternus, who wrote an astrological work Mathesis before his conversion to Christianity (FIRM. math. 1.4; 1.5; 1.8; 1.10; 2.30), and Rufius Festus Avienus, who translated Aratus’ Phaenomena into Latin (AVIEN. Arat. 7–26). 39 The oracle of Apollo at Claros announced that the supreme deity was superior to Apollo and remained ineffable and unknown even to him. The oracle conceded that the traditional Gods, the angels, were but a particle of God. Theosophia Tubingensis 13 Erbse; the inscription of Oenoanda apud LACT. inst. 1.7. Lane Fox 1986, 169–71, 186–8 and ATHANASSIADI – FREDE 1999, 16–18 with other examples. Praetextatus: CIL VI 1779 and KAHLOS 2002 with bibliography. 40 WELTIN 1987, 7: composite monotheism; R. BROWNING, The Emperor Julian, London 1975, 167: a kind of non-exclusive monotheism; FOWDEN 1993, 37: universalistic tendencies. 41 OROS. hist. 6.1.2–3. 42 ANDO 1996, 173–4, 182. In the same way, the second century Christian writers, such as Justin and Athenagoras, had employed middle Platonic concepts of the supreme deity in their argumentation.

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supreme deity, and guardian Gods were fluctuating both in Christian and polytheist discussions and debates. Pagan writers such as Themistius and Maximus of Madauros, who defended their religious tradition against the monopolistic claims of the most rigoristic Christians, seized upon these areas of mutual agreement. Themistius referred to God, using epithets and metaphors common to both pagans and Christians, and his listeners interpreted the terms according to their beliefs. In a letter to Augustine, Maximus of Madauros attempted to convince the church father that God was a common name for all religions. These appeals postulated the concept of a universal supreme deity whose manifestations or emanations the Gods of all religions were.43 In the fourth century philosophical discussion, this supreme deity was often identified with the world intellect (nous, mens). The idea of the forces (dynameis, virtutes) of the supreme God scattered around the world that Maximus of Madauros introduces in his letter to Augustine is typical of the Platonically coloured discussion. These forces were called with many names (multis vocabulis) because nobody knew the right appellation of the supreme deity (nomen ignoramus). Therefore, in worshipping his components, people in fact venerated him as a whole. At the end of his letter Maximus repeats the idea that all humans worship the common Father of Gods and men (eorum atque cunctorum mortalium communem patrem) through the Gods.44 Another correspondent of Augustine, Longinianus, also refers to the forces (impletis virtutibus) of the incomprehensible, ineffable and indefatigable Creator God and adds that these forces were called angels by Christians.45 The paradox of polynymia and anonymia introduced by Maximus also appears in Hermetic discussion of the divine: the Supreme Being “has all names, because all things issue from this one father; and ... no name, for He is the father of all”.46 The many names of one supreme deity were already discussed in Greek Stoicism and developed further in Roman Stoic tradition and Neoplatonism. For example, Varro in his Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum had stated that all deities could be reduced to one substance only and that it made no difference by which name he was invoked. The anonymia served as the justification for pagan polynymia as Maximus of Tyre explains it: because God was anonymous, ineffable and invisible and humans had no means of ascertaining his nature, they used words, names and products of wood and ivory and silver and plants and rivers.47 Polynymia was a frequently diffused idea 43 THEM. or. 5–6; MAX. MADAVR. Aug. ep. 16. 44 MAX. MADAVR. Aug. ep. 16.1; 16.4. The forces of the supreme deity are called potestates in APVL. mund. 27. The common Father of Gods and men appears as the epithet of the supreme God in Homer and Hesiod onwards both in Greek and Latin literature. MASTANDREA 1985, 50. 45 LONGIN. Aug. ep. 234.2. 46 Corpus Hermeticum 5.10. FOWDEN 1986, 148; MASTANDREA 1985, 51. Cf. AVG. civ. 8.23, who admits that Hermes Trismegistus had uttered much about the one true God that corresponded to the truth. 47 Varro apud AVG. cons. euang. 1.22.30; MAX. TYR. or. 2. Celsus (apud ORIG. Cels. 5.41; 5.45) claimed that it did not matter by which name the Supreme Being was called, whether he was named as Jupiter, Zen, Adonai, Sabaoth, Ammon or Pappaeus. M. SIMON, ‘Anonymat et polyonymie dans l’antiquité tardive’, Perennitas, Roma 1980, 503–20; GRANT 1986, 114–15.

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in the fourth century as the panegyric addressed to Emperor Constantine shows: the emperor’s deity is called the creator of things who has as many names as peoples have languages. In the fifth century Macrobius represented all Gods as the manifestations of One Supreme Being: they were named according to the aspects of this supreme deity.48 The hierarchy of the supreme deity and minor Gods served as an argument for religious forbearance. The aspects of the supreme God were seen as manifested as minor divinities of all religions. These lesser Gods were protectors of humankind and the Empire and they, as Libanius explains it, took care of various subjects, some Gods were responsible for the greatness of the Roman Empire, others cared for their particular cities and others for the countryside. Symmachus calls them varii custodes, guardians who had been granted to peoples and cities by mens divina.49 Pagan polemicists had employed the idea of lesser Gods as guardians and protectors of the communities in their attacks against Christianity. In his tractate against Christians, Emperor Julian had described the many deities as ethnarch Gods and protectors of cities (ton ethnon ethnarchais kai poliouchois theois) whose own functions had been assigned by the Creator God, the common Father and King of all things.50 The anonymous Hellenic philosopher in Macarius’ Apocriticus maintained that the Christian monarchical idea of God was erroneous because monarchy did not mean being alone but governing alone. God was to be compared with the emperor who governed alone but whom numerous people served in administration.51 This pagan philosopher did not reproach Christians for worshipping one God but for worshipping him in an incorrect way. Maximus of Madauros, when arguing for the maintenance of the polytheistic civic cults, refers to the salutary protector-Gods of his community (salutarium numinum frequentia). Answering Augustine’s counterarguments, he states that, even if the Olympian Gods were an uncertain issue, the beneficence of the Gods on the forum of Madauros were clearly seen and verified. Augustine replies ironically, applying a frequently used topos that the guardians (Gods) in fact were looked after by the Similarly, in Islamic tradition Allah has appropriated the attributes of other deities as his beautiful names: J. WAARDENBURG, ‘Changes of Belief in Spiritual Beings, Prophethood, and the Rise of Islam’, Struggles of Gods, Berlin 1984, 259–90: 275. 48 PANEG. 9.26; MACR. Sat. 1.18.7; 1.18.15; 1.17.2–4: virtutes and effectus. 49 LIBAN. or. 30.34; SYMM. rel. 3.8. For parallels between the divine hierarchy and human administration in earlier Greco-Roman tradition, see AEL. ARIST. or. 43.18 and ALBIN. epit. 15–16. 50 IUL. Galil. 115D Neumann; also 143A–B. Cf. IAMBL. myst. 5.25. Celsus (apud ORIG. Cels. 8.35–6; 5.25–6) had compared the Gods under the supreme deity to satraps, prefects, generals or governors under the Persian or Roman monarch. These lesser figures took care of the administration of the world after the manner of administrators of the Empire. The various quarters of the earth were allotted to various superintending spirits. Themistius used the metaphor of the emperor’s different servants, referring to the diversity of worshippers of the supreme deity (not to minor deities under the supreme God). A similar idea of division of labour between Yahweh and his angels/other Gods appears in Jewish tradition, e.g., in the Book of Jubilees: HAYMAN 1991, 6–7 and J.C. VANDERKAM, ‘The Demons in the Book of Jubilees’, Die Dämonen, Tübingen 2003, 339–64: 352. 51 MAC. MAGN. apocr. 4.20–21 (fragm. 75–6 Harnack).

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protected (humans). Orosius refers to the views of his contemporary pagans who believed simultaneously in one God and in many Gods and justified their belief stating that they worshipped the numerous servants under the great God.52 We see this kind of hierarchy between the supreme God and divine beings influencing the minds of Christians too. The universe is divided into compartments of invisible powers. Augustine reports that there were Christians who acknowledged the supreme God and his greatness, superiority, eternity and inviolability. They confessed that he was the giver of eternal life and incorruption after the resurrection. However, they regarded the things of this physical present world as belonging to the responsibilities of demons and invisible powers, as Augustine calls them, and resorted to sacrifices, leaving God aside.53 For many individuals, the supreme God was too transcendent and thus beyond reach. Augustine’s argumentation in City of God against divine hierarchies and naturalistic and syncretistic interpretations of Gods can be seen as setting and clarification of boundaries for confused Christians. The church father debates with contemporary learned pagans, criticizing the interpretation of other deities as the aspects or forces of Jupiter (omnia ista partes eius sive virtutes eius), similar to the views introduced by Maximus of Madauros, and aiming to show the absurdity of these interpretations. Augustine asks ironically what pagan intellectuals would lose by a more prudent economy in worshipping one God instead of these intricate interpretations. Would the aspects of Jupiter be insulted if they were not honoured individually and separately? Augustine goes on with his sarcastic argumentation, asking whether all the stars were aspects of Jupiter. Pagans did not know how many of these stars they failed to worship and honour with temples and statues.54 Augustine turns against the hierarchy of Gods defended by pagan intellectuals. In City of God he derides the polytheistic view of divine division of labour, declaring that there was no ostensible or rational system in the hierarchy of Roman Gods. He refers to the view according to which the Creator God had entrusted to minor deities as to household servants (quasi famulis) the supervision of earthly things. Augustine aims to demonstrate the flaws of the divine division of labour. In the seventh book of City of God, the detailed criticism of Varro’s dii selecti functions as part of his argumentation when he analyzes the duties of several deities, mocking the uneven division of labour between the dii selecti and minor deities. There was no need for minor Gods, he concludes, since the Supreme Being, the Creator God, should be responsible for everything.55 52 MAX. MADAVR. Aug. ep. 16.1; AVG. ep. 17.1. OROS. hist. 6.1.2–3: non se plures deos sequi sed sub uno deo magno plures ministros venerari fatentur. Cf. ARIST. apol. 13 (the Syriac version) who remarked that, even though pagan philosophers had declared the nature of all their Gods as one, they had not apprehended the Christian God who, while he was one, was in all. 53 AVG. in psalm. 34.1.7. Origen (Cels. 8.36) and Arnobius (nat. 3.3) also implied that some Christians paid honour to these minor spirits but only in connection with the worship of the supreme God. BROWN 1998, 636–8 calls this view a compartmentalized model of the universe. 54 AVG. civ. 4.11. 55 AVG. civ. 7.3; 7.29 and passim.

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The Paradox of Monotheism While Christians represented pagans as polytheists, pagan polemicists tried to question the monotheism of Christians. Pagan writers targeted such complexes of problems as the conceptions of Father and Son, the doctrine of the Trinity, the martyr cult and the angelology. Whether Father and Son were inconsistent with Christian monotheism was an issue debated between pagans and Christians in the fourth and fifth centuries as well as in earlier debates. The Hellenic philosopher in Macarius’ Apocriticus argues that the alleged monarchy of Christianity is only hidden polytheism. Furthermore, Augustine refers to pagan criticism that attacks the worship of Christ as a God.56 Earlier pagan polemicists had also stated that this veneration of a man was incompatible with Christians’ assumed monotheism: Celsus, for instance, had blamed Christians who refused to worship other Gods and yet adored a man. In his defence of Christianity, Athenagoras, after having argued for the existence of the one God and having attacked pagan polytheism, had stated that Christians acknowledge a Son of God. The Christian mode of thinking was not the same as theirs, concerning either God the Father or the Son, he had asserted, stressing the oneness of the Father and the Son who was the Logos of the Father, in idea and in operation. Tertullian had tried to explain monotheism with the two Gods with the comparison to the Roman double principate in which monarchy was governed by two united persons, the emperor and his son. Thus, the relationship between God and Christ was similar to the relationship between emperor and his son and co-ruler.57 Another challenge was the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in relation the alleged monotheism. Augustine refers to infideles who insist that the Trinity is in fact three deities and then asserts to his listeners that the Trinity is one God. Similarly, Gregory of Nyssa wishes to refute the charges of tritheism.58 Christianity was also criticized as compromising with its alleged monotheism in the cult of martyrs and other saints. Faustus the Manichaean, for instance, ridiculed Christians for venerating martyrs as their idols. Furthermore, Emperor Julian attacked the Christian martyr cult that compromised with monotheism. Christians had not remained true to the Mosaic command to worship one God only. He stated that, if Christians had paid heed to the Hebrew teachings, they would be worshipping one God instead of many and not a man, or rather many wretched men, that is, martyrs.59 56 MAC. MAGN. apocr. 4.20 (= fragm. 75 Harnack). AVG. civ. 19.23. 57 Celsus apud ORIG. Cels. 8.12; ATHENAG. leg. 5–10. TERT. adv. Prax. 3.2; 4.3, referring to the contemporary double principate. Cf. ATHENAG. leg. 18.13–18 who compares the relationship between God and Logos with the emperor and his son. M. GIUNCHI, ‘Dunamis et taxis dans la conception trinitaire d’Athénagore’, Les Apologistes chrétiens et la culture grecque, Paris 1998, 121–34: 131. 58 AVG. in euang. Ioh. 39.3; GREG. NYSS. or. cat. 3. AVG. civ. 10.29; 10.23–4 also reckons that the Platonists had intuitively spoken of the Trinity. Cf. IUST. 1. apol. 60; ORIG. Cels. 6.18. 59 AVG. c. Faust. 20.21. IUL. Galil. 201E Neumann. R. SMITH, Julian’s gods, London 1995, 202.

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In the eighth book of City of God Augustine responds to these allegations and accentuates the difference between Christian martyr cults and pagan cults of demons, that is, Gods. Christians certainly honour the memory of their martyrs, he admits but asserts that Christians do not assign to their martyrs temples, priests, ceremonies or sacrifices as pagan do to their Gods. Martyrs are not Gods for Christians, he declares. No Christian has made sacrifices to martyrs; instead, sacrifices are given to God at martyrs’ sanctuaries. Augustine continues to emphasize the absolute difference between the two cults. Christian martyr cults are not ceremonies or sacrifices offered to the dead as to Gods. Neither do Christians deify their martyrs. Augustine warns his pagan opponents not to dare to compare Gods with holy martyrs.60 II Gods In the Christian polemic, the arguments used in the Greco-Roman philosophical critique of religion were mobilized against the pagan Gods. Augustine, for instance, based his argumentation partly on the Roman writers such as Varro, Cicero and Seneca who themselves were critical of their own religious tradition. The exploitation of Greco-Roman discussion on their own Gods had been a recurrent feature in the apologetics of the second and third centuries.61 Greco-Roman criticism of religion offered a ready arsenal of arguments against the pagan Gods. Thus, the Christian polemic against the pagan Gods as late as the fourth and fifth centuries followed the conventions of Christian apologetic tradition as well as of the tradition of Greco-Roman criticism – ‘in terms of well-worn clichés’, as R.A. Markus has depicted the atmosphere of the Christian polemic.62 The polemic appears anachronistic and antiquarian and it seems that the debate is conducted with the first century authors Cicero and Varro rather than pagans of the fourth and fifth centuries. As I have already argued in Chapter 1, the traditional arguments remained important in the fourth- and fifth-century debate because they served to clarify Christian self-identity in the confusing religious circumstances of the period. The antiquarian polemic served as a tool in accentuating and creating differences with the monotheistic paganism of the fourth and fifth centuries. Diverting the attention from what was common, the monotheistic heritage, to the old Roman religion described and preserved by Varro in Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum, Christian polemicists were able to draw clearer distinctions between Christianity and paganism.63 The Varronian

60 AVG. civ. 8.27: Nec tamen nos eisdem martyris templa, sacerdotia, sacra et sacrificia constituimus, quoniam non ipsi, sed Deus eorum nobis est Deus; cf. serm. 313A.5 in which Augustine assures his listeners that the altar at Cyprian’s shrine is not dedicated to the saint as if he were a deity but that Christians see in the saint himself an alternative to God. Other defences of martyr cult: HIER. ep. 109; AMBR. ep. 77 (CSEL 82.3); THEOD. affect. 8.34. 61 E.g, LACT. inst. 1.11–14; ARNOB. nat. 4.24–9. 62 MARKUS 1994, 78–9. 63 Antiquarian material on Roman religion that would otherwise have disappeared was preserved in Christian polemic, e.g., Verrius Flaccus in ARNOB. nat. and Varro in AVG.

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antiquarian polytheism was a better target for ridicule than Platonic paganism that had too much in common with Christianity. Christian writers conduct the debate and dialogue with their contemporary pagans through the antiquarian Varro and the philosopher Porphyry. It is the contemporary pagan intellectuals that Augustine speaks to as he addresses Varro in the sixth and seventh books of City of God. He writes that he appeals “to you, Varro and to you readers of those great scholars who preen yourselves on receiving such valuable instruction [on the Gods]”.64 Varro is the most important source of the Roman religious tradition for Augustine. Similarly, Augustine employs Cicero’s criticism against pagan Gods. In De divinatione Cicero himself derided auguries, the church father writes, and in De natura deorum Balbus criticized fictitious and invented Gods. Augustine states that those who defended the Gods of pagans admitted that their religion was superstitious.65 Seneca’s De superstitione is likewise turned against idols and Roman rituals. Augustine portrays him as refuting the obscenities of pagan cults and as despising idols, bisexual deities and incestuous marriages of the Gods. Seneca, who praised natural theology, refused to believe in single deities, condemned the castration of the galli of Magna Mater and reproved even civic rituals.66 In City of God Augustine applies Varro’s theologia tripertita, the classification of religion and Gods into three classes: theologia civilis, mythica and naturalis, and plays it off against the Roman religious institutions and Roman Gods.67 By means of the tripartite model it is easier for him to proceed in stages in his refutation of the rival religious tradition. Thus, the threefold classification guides his polemic against pagan Gods and practices in books 1–10. He sets out to refute theologia mythica and theologia civilis in books 1–5 whereas theologia naturalis is contested in books 6–10. Nonetheless, the use of the theologia tripertita was in no way Augustine’s own innovation but rather a locus communis that belonged to the discussion of religious issues in general.68 The theologia tripertita had been adopted by Christian apologists into their argumentation against pagan deities. Eusebius of Caesarea, for example, civ. However, it is obvious that both Arnobius and Augustine bring inequitably forth those elements that were felt as absurd, alien, ridiculous or out of date in the Roman religious life. 64 AVG. civ. 7.22; cf. civ. 4.1: vir doctissimus apud eos Varro et gravissimae auctoritatis. Varro had also been used by Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Arnobius and Lactantius. Augustine, however, uses Varro more thoroughly and systematically than these earlier apologists. O’DALY 1994, 70; BARNES 1982, 75–6. 65 AVG. civ. 4.30, referring to CIC. div. 2.24 and quoting CIC. nat. deor. 2.28.70. 66 AVG. civ. 6.10. 67 AVG. civ. 6.12 also calls them civilis, fabulosa and naturalis. The origin of the theologia tripertita is a disputed issue but it seems that it originates either from Posidonius, Panaetius of Rhodes or Antiochus of Ascalon and was developed further either by Mucius Scaevola (tria genera tradita deorum, AVG. civ. 4.27) or Varro (tria genera theologiae, AVG. civ. 6.5). Greek writers referred to tripartite theology as mythike, physike and politike. For the origin and use of the theologia tripertita, see J. PÉPIN, ‘La “théologie tripartite” de Varron’, REAug 2 (1956), 265–94, who considers the tripartition of theology Stoic. 68 For the use of theologia tripertita in De civitate dei, see B. CARDAUNS, ‘Di gentium’, Augustinus-Lexikon 2, 3–4, Basel 1999, 368–81: 373–8; B. CARDAUNS, ‘Varro und die römische Religion, zur Theologie, Wirkungsgeschichte und Leistung der ‘Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum’’,

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had called the three classes of theology mythikon (or historikon), physikon and theoretikon and Tertullian had referred to these three genera as physicum, mythicum and gentile.69 The Gods of the Civic Religion But who that was weak and unlearned could escape the deceits of both the statesmen and the demons? AUGUSTINE, De civitate Dei 4.32.

According to Augustine, Varro aimed to preserve and restore the Roman civic religion by listing the divinities that the Romans ought to worship and establishing the particular activity that each deity was responsible for. Thus, Romans would know which specialist to turn to in every possible situation. Varro insisted that there was no doubt of the benefit of being familiar with the Gods if a human knew the power, ability and competence of each deity in the particular sphere. Augustine ridicules this benefit, exclaiming ironically, “a great advantage indeed” and adding that Varro should have shown Romans the truth and taught them to worship the one true God from whom all good things come.70 In his attack against Roman religion, Augustine takes Scaevola’s threefold classification of Gods as his weapon. Scaevola had stated that, while the mythical theology of poets was nonsense (genus nugatorium), the natural theology of philosophers did not go well with communities because it offered irrelevant things (supervacua) and things that were harmful for the peoples to know (aliqua etiam quae obsit populis nosse). Instead, Scaevola thought it more useful for communities to be deceived in religious issues.71 The same deception applies to Varro who exhorts people to worship Gods even though he acknowledges that he is not following his own judgment. He would rather have Gods consecrated and named according to the principles of nature, rather than as they are now in Rome. Thus, Augustine reads Varro’s ideas as an annihilation of the theologia civilis and theologia mythica and as a preference for theologia naturalis.72 For Varro, the ideal civic religion should be in accordance with the theologia naturalis of philosophers. Thus, Varro, similarly to Stoic philosophers, attempted ANRW II.16.1 (1978), 80–103: 93–4 and B. STUDER, ’Zum Aufbau von Augustins De civitate Dei’, Collectanea Augustiniana, Mélanges T.J. van Bavel, Leuven 1990, 937–51: 940–2. 69 EUS. praep. 3.17.1–2; 4.1.2–4; TERT. nat. 2.1–8. PÉPIN 1956, 267. 70 AVG. civ. 4.22. 71 AVG. civ. 4.27. Augustine remarks that Varro agreed with Scaevola in this matter. Cf. Aristotle (metaph. Lambda 1074b) who had stated that the traditional myths about Gods served a significant social function since they made folk comply with the laws of the community. 72 AVG. civ. 4.31; 6.4. PÉPIN 1956, 269 points out that Augustine (as well as Tertullian) has obscured Varro’s ideas in his polemic; therefore, it is not easy to discern Varro’s own critique of Roman religion; BURNS 2001, 38, 55 stresses that Augustine had his own agenda which influenced his selection of material and that he did not necessarily provide exact quotations; O’DALY 1994, 71 sees Augustine as misusing Varro’s method.

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to harmonize civic religion with the cosmic explanations of natural philosophy and to place each divinity into the structure of the universe. This leads him, Augustine states, to incongruities in his theological system; he wanted to take civic religion as it was and still explain deities with natural phenomena.73 But for Varro, Roman religion was essentially a civic creation functioning for the good of the Roman state. According to Augustine, instead of exposing the truth (to which Varro was so close), Varro maintains the traditional narrative of the Gods in order to encourage people to venerate the Gods, not to despise them. Thus, Varro shows the fact that he does not reveal everything. Varro admitted elsewhere that there were many truths concerning religious issues that were not expedient for the people to know and that there were falsehoods that it was useful for the people to regard as true.74 Augustine attacks the fabrication of civic religion, discussing why leaders of nations wished to mislead their subjects in religious issues (in religionibus fallere) and explains that in imitation of demons rulers wanted to deceive people in the name of religion (religionis nomine) in order to bind them tighter to the community and to keep them under control. “Which weak and ignorant individual”, he exclaims, “could escape from the rulers and the demons at the same time?”75 Thus, this delusion by rulers and wise men was meant for governing communities and nations. Augustine states that malicious demons rejoiced in this fraud because they thus controlled both the deceivers and the deceived at the same time. With this deceit of pagan civic religion Augustine contrasts the deliverance of Christianity. Only Christianity freed humans from the power of the demons.76 Deceased Humans Augustine states that the leaders and savants of the Romans had deceived people in concealing the fact that pagan Gods merely were deified humans. Scaevola knew that Hercules, Aesculapius, Castor and Pollux were not Gods but mortal men but he wanted to conceal the truth from the Roman people. He did not want the Romans be aware of the truth that the true God has neither sex nor age nor bodily form. He also explains that the Greeks and the Romans as well as other nations gave divine honours to those individuals whose public services they valued highly and that they 73 AVG. civ. 7.23; 7.28. According to AVG. civ. 6.6, Varro wished to honour natural Gods but he was compelled to worship the civic ones: naturales deos colere cupis, civiles cogeris. 74 AVG. civ. 4.31; for the utility of the state, see also civ. 4.9; 4.27. AVG. civ. 6.5 states that Varro excludes the speculation of philosophers a foro, id est a populis rather than the myths. 75 AVG. civ. 4.32. The theme of keeping people under control was familiar in ancient historiography: e.g., Polybius (hist. 6.56) saw the Roman religion as a means to bridle the people. A. DEMANDT, Der Idealstaat. Die politischen Theorien der Antike, Köln 2000, 217. 76 AVG. civ. 4.31. At the end of the chapter Augustine declares repeatedly that Christianity emancipates from the power of demons. AVG. civ. 6.10 attacks Seneca in the same way, accusing him of concealing the truth. As a philosopher Seneca was aware of the fraud of civic religion but, nevertheless, he recommended that the traditional rites should be maintained and the Gods worshipped.

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regarded these individuals as having been made immortal and received among the Gods.77 In his argumentation Augustine follows the Euhemeristic theory of the origin of the Gods recurrent in antiquity, thus using again the arsenal of Greco-Roman tradition in order to refute the Gods of the very same tradition.78 Christian apologists had made ample use of this popular theory; Eusebius of Caesarea, for example, had dedicated the last part of the first book of his Praeparatio evangelica to reinforcing Euhemeristic arguments and to showing that pagan Gods were mortals. Tertullian and Lactantius had also used these arguments to refute Roman Gods.79 Augustine is aware of the Euhemeristic theory and even mentions Euhemerus by name.80 He refers to pagan Gods as deceased humans in his sermons and letters as well. In a sermon he declares that pagans honour deceased humans. Most of them had been kings in human communities. Jupiter, Hercules, Neptune, Pluto, Mercurius and Liber Pater had been only humans and this was demonstrated, not only in the tales of poets, but also in the history of nations. In a psalm explanation, he again states that pagan Gods had been humans who, after they had been deified, gave their names to stars. These had been individuals who had made beneficia to their communities and had therefore become beloved by the people. In order to pay reverence to their heroes, people claimed them to be stars.81 In Contra Symmachum Prudentius explains the origin of pagan Gods in verse form, following the Euhemeristic theory. He describes how Jupiter, an earthly ruler, with his mischievous metamorphoses made the foolish, rude and uncivilized folk believe in his divinity and how Mercurius who succeeded Jupiter as ruler and taught people the skill of thieving is now regarded as a God. It was the simplex vetustas that made people honour him as more than human. Similarly, Bacchus became a

77 AVG. civ. 4.27; 2.5. The Gods are deceased humans also in civ. 6.8; 7.18; 7.27; 18.5– 6; 18.8. 78 The Euhemeristic theory is named after the novelist Euhemerus of Sicily who in his Hiera anagraphe about 300 B.C.E. claimed that Gods were deified humans. Euhemerus stated that there was on an island in the Indian Ocean a column that recorded the achievements of Uranos, Cronos and Zeus, human rulers deified by grateful people. Euhemerus’ tractate was well known in Rome since it was either translated or paraphrased into Latin by Ennius. The main sources for the fragments of Euhemerus are Diodorus Siculus and Lactantius. GRANT 1986, 61; J.M. VERMANDER, ‘La polémique des apologistes latins contre les dieux du paganisme’, RA 17, 1982, 3–128: 21–30. 79 LACT. inst. 1.6; 1.11–15; 1.18; TERT. apol. 10.3; nat. 2.12; idol. 9.3. Other writers: IUST. 1. apol. 21; ATHENAG. leg. 28–30; ARNOB. nat. 4.25; 4.28–9; MIN. FEL. 21. Euhemeristic interpretation had been unfamiliar to the first Christian generations but became recurrent in the late second century and thereafter. As M. SIMON, ‘Les Dieux antiques dans la pensée chrétienne’ in M. SIMON, Le christianisme antique et son contexte religieux, Tübingen 1981, 187–204: 193 points out, the use of Euhemeristic arguments indicates adaptation of GrecoRoman tradition. 80 E.g., AVG. civ. 6.7; 7.27; cons. euang. 1.23.32. 81 AVG. serm. 273.3; in psalm. 93.3; cf. ZENO 1.13.2 Löfstedt; PS. AVG. quaest. test. 114.3. Even MART. BRAC. corr. 8 states that Mercurius, Jupiter, Venus and Saturn, after which people still used to name weekdays, had been impious Greeks and none of them had created a single day.

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God because of his earthly achievements.82 Thus, in the days of old, ignorant people believed that their rulers could ascend in all their filthiness to heaven. The deified rulers were given divine honours with incense and shrines. Prudentius explains the phenomenon as due to either fear or love or hope; furthermore it became a tradition (mos patrius) and a false semblance of piety (falsae pietatis imago).83 Pagan temples were in fact tombs of deceased heroes: there were as many temples of Gods at Rome as there were tombs of heroes in the world. The tradition of tombs of certain Gods was interpreted as evidence of their humanness.84 For the Greeks and Romans, temples had been the dwelling places of Gods and the spaces of divine presence. In their assaults, following the Euhemeristic line of argumentation, Christian polemicists stated that pagan temples had originally been the burial places of deceased humans: that is why Prudentius identifies the Roman temples as sepulcra heroum.85 The identification of pagan temples as tombs was connected with the dispute on the Christian cult at the martyrs’ memorials. Pagan polemicists reproved Christians who flocked to the tombs of their martyrs.86 Church fathers tried to demonstrate that the case was the other way round: it was pagan temples that were the real tombs. Echoes of this debate can be discerned in the discussion between Maximus of Madauros and Augustine in which Maximus states that fools frequent the tombs of local African saints and thus abandon the temples and neglect the worship of their manes. For his part he wants to show that Christians performed rituals at the real tombs.87 In his reply to Maximus of Madauros, Augustine appeals to the testimony of Vergil who demonstrates that the Gods of pagans had been humans. In addition to Augustine, several other Christian writers refer to Vergil who tells us that Saturn escaped his son Jupiter, arrived as a refugee to Italy and reigned in Latium during the golden era.88 Prudentius repeats this story to argue for the human origin of Saturn, 82 Jupiter: PRVD. c. Symm. 1.79–80; Mercurius: 1.84–8; 99–100; Bacchus: 1.122. Similarly, Prudentius (c. Symm. 1.166–79) interprets Venus and Mars as mere humans who had lived promiscuous life. 83 PRVD. c. Symm. 1.145–8; 151–4. Cf. similar arguments in LACT. inst. 1.15. 84 PRVD. c. Symm. 1.190–91: et tot templa deum Romae quot in orbe sepulcra /heroum numerare licet; cf. 1.54; ZENO 1.1.3 Löfstedt. Cf. LACT. inst 1.11 who regarded Jupiter’s tomb in Crete as a proof of his human nature and mortality; cf. TAT. or. 27.1; THEOPH. Autol. 1.10; 2.3; TERT. nat. 2.17; apol. 25.7; ATHENAG. leg. 30.3; CLEM. prot. 2.37.4; ARNOB. nat. 4.25. For the tradition of Jupiter’s tomb, see CIC. nat. deor. 3.21.53; F. MORA, Arnobio e i culti di mistero, Roma 1994, 54. 85 Cf. the pagan Caecilius, who in MIN. FEL. 8.4 complained that Christians despised temples as tombs; TERT. spect. 13.4: Nec minus templa quam monumenta despuimus; FIRM. err. 16.3: busta sunt haec appellanda, non templa. 86 E.g., IUL. Galil. 335C; 339E Neumann; LIBAN. or. 62.10. 87 MAX. MADAVR. Aug. ep. 16.2: Horum busta, si memoratu dignum est, relictis templis, neglectis maiorum suorum manibus stulti frequentant. For the commentary on the letter, see MASTANDREA 1985, 54–5. The conversion of temples into tombs, i.e., into martyria: PS. APVL. Ascl. 24; AVG. civ. 8.26 and EUN. v. soph. 6.11.8. 88 AVG. ep. 17.3, referring to VERG. Aen. 8.319–20. This passage is used in AVG. cons. euang. 1.23.34 and civ. 7.27. Cf. TERT. apol. 10.6–11; nat. 1.12.6; MIN. FEL. 23.9–12; ARNOB. nat. 4.24–6; LACT. inst. 1.11; 1.13; 5.5. North African Christian writers seem to have been

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even referring to the pun with the words Latium and latere (PRVD. c. Symm. 1.48 – VERG. Aen. 8.322–3).89 The writer of Carmen contra paganos wonders if any suppliant would venerate a God that was overthrown and put to flight by his son.90 The temporality and historicity of pagan Gods is stressed and contraposed with the eternity of the Christian God. Pagan Gods are born in this time and they have their origin in this world while the Christian God is beyond time and place. This is why the Euhemeristic arguments including genealogies of pagan Gods were so prominent in the Christian polemic.91 M. Simon distinguishes two phases in the use of Euhemeristic theory: in the first stage, deification was not denied but rather it was stressed that the immoral pagan Gods did not deserve to be deified; the apotheosis had to be justified; in the second stage, the deification as such was contested as contrary to Christian monotheism.92 We see these two features appearing in the fourth and fifth century polemic as well. Augustine, for example, combined both features in his argumentation against heroes, demi-Gods and deification of humans. In his organization of the pagan Gods into Gods, demi-Gods and heroes, Cornelius Labeo had classified Plato among demiGods such as Hercules and Romulus. The deification of Plato certainly was far more justified than any of the immoral pagan Gods or heroes or other demi-Gods such as Hercules, Romulus, Priapus, Cynocephalus (that is, Anubis) or Febris. Moreover, Augustine declares that in this hierarchy Plato should be placed above these corrupt Gods. However, he continues, for Christians Plato was neither a God nor a demi-God. Augustine states that Plato could not be even compared with holy angels, prophets, apostles, martyrs or any Christian, thus in a way paralleling Christian angels and holy men with pagan demi-Gods and heroes.93 particularly interested in Saturn who was the most prominent deity in Roman Africa and rivalled the Christian God as late as the fourth and fifth centuries. LIEBESCHUETZ 1979, 233, n. 1; C.O. TOMMASI MORESCHINI, ‘Un testimonium sul Saturno africano nella Iohannis di Corippo?’, Studi classici e orientali 47 (2000), 329–49. Therefore, EDWARDS 1999, 216 is somewhat inaccurate when claiming that for Lactantius and Arnobius Saturn was a purely Roman figure. M.B. SIMMONS, Arnobius of Sicca, Oxford 1995, 16 assumes that Saturnian theology may have influenced Arnobius’ concept of the Christian God, e.g., ARNOB. nat. 1.29–30. 89 PRVD. c. Symm. 1.42–58. Similarly, PRVD. perist. 10.207 and PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 105. Cf. VERG. Aen. 8.314–58. For the Vergilian reminiscences in Prudentius, see LÜHKEN 2002, 105–108. 90 CARM. c. pag. 14–16. 91 E.g., LACT. inst. 1.11 stressed that Jupiter was a son of Saturn, thus, he was born and therefore could not be regarded as the supreme God; inst. 2.5 contraposed Jupiter, who was born seventeen hundred years ago, with the Christian God whose beginning cannot be comprehended. Genealogies in ARNOB. nat. 4.13–17. ARNOB. nat. 1.34–8 contrasted born and anthropomorphic pagan Gods with the unborn and eternal Christian God. 92 M. SIMON 1981, 193–4. 93 AVG. civ. 2.14. Cornelius Labeo placed demi-Gods above heroes but he ranked them both among deities. Attacks against Romulus and Hercules belong to this criticism of deification. According to AVG. civ. 2.15, the veneration of Romulus was a mere exercise of flattery. He certainly did not deserve to become a God; cf. civ. 3.6. PRVD. c. Symm. 1.116–21 attacks Hercules’ sexual immorality and homosexuality. Hercules was still prominent at the turn of the fifth century, and some pagans, e.g., Emperor Julian, seem to have interpreted

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Anthropomorphic Gods and Suffering Saviours As Sibyl of Erythrea says: ‘It is impossible for a God to be fashioned from the loins of a male and the womb of a female.’ LACTANTIUS, Institutiones divinae 1.8 Perhaps you were offended by the unparalleled birth from a virgin? AUGUSTINE, De civitate Dei 10.29

Christian writers aimed to draw a clear distinction between Christ and pagan saviour figures. In the famous passage in City of God, Augustine tells us of the oracle of Apollo according to which Christians venerated in Jesus a deceased God (mortuus deus). Porphyry had recognized Jesus as a divinely inspired holy man or heros but refused to identify him as a God. Jesus’ disciples were mistaken to proclaim him as God.94 This assault on the human nature of Christ continued the earlier pagan criticism. Christians worshipped Christ as a God even though, in pagan eyes, he had been a mortal man. The pagan philosopher Hierocles had complained that Christians proclaimed Jesus a God because of some tricks. For pagans, he had stated, a human who performed miracles was not a God but a human favoured by the Gods. Julian had contrasted the ever-living Gods with the dead man Jesus.95 Modern scholarship has seen an influence of Greek culture in the figure of Christ, an immanent God who appears in the guise of a human on earth and performs miracles. Christian apologists recognized this connection as well but wanted to repel the analogy between Christ and pagan saviours, either explaining the resemblance as a fraud of demons or reminding their readers that pagan heroes were not worthy of becoming deified.96 For pagan intellectuals who recognized the supreme deity, the idea of the incarnation and passibility was unthinkable for such a deity. Augustine’s debate with

Hercules as a counterpart to Christ. KAHLOS 2002, 69–71; M. SIMON, Hercule et christianisme, Strasbourg 1955, 150–55. 94 AVG. civ. 19.23; cf. cons. euang. 1.7.11; sermo 126.4; 129.3; 240.3; in psalm. 40.4; 52.4; 93.15. Cf. PRVD. perist. 5.35 who calls pagan Gods dei mortui. For further examples, see COURCELLE 1958, 155–6. 95 Hierocles apud EUS. c. Hier. 2; IUL. c. Galil. 197C Neumann. ARNOB. nat. 1.36–47 recorded that pagans accused Christians of worshipping a born human (natum hominem colimus) instead of a real God. LACT. inst. 4.22 reported pagan arguments against the humanness of Christ; it was unworthy of God to be willing to become a human, to burden himself with the infirmity of flesh and to subject himself to passions, pain and death. 96 E.g., ARNOB. nat. 1.37 responded, comparing Christ with other sons of Gods in order to justify the Christian cult of a mortal man. He wanted to show that Christ was the only human who deserved to be venerated. He (nat. 1.41) compares Christ with other suffering Gods, Dionysus, Aesculapius, Hercules, Attis and Romulus-Quirinus. TAT. or. 21 remarked that God was born in the form of a human and invites his pagan opponents to compare their own myths with Christian views, stressing that pagan Gods, such as Athene, Phoibos and Zeus, took the form of a human in Greek myths and Asclepios, Heracles and Prometheus suffered like humans.

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his contemporary Neoplatonists – through the authority of Porphyry – indicates the contempt of pagan intellectuals for Christ’s humanity and corporeality. The notion of the God born from a woman insulted them. Augustine sets a myth against a myth: all the insanity of pagan fables deserved to be swept away by Christ who was born of a virgin.97 Both pagans and Christians stressed the eternity, immutability and immateriality of the supreme God or the Christian God. Again, we see a point of contact in the paganChristian debate even though the interlocutors sometimes seem to speak of the concept of God on different levels (a God – the God). Both of them speak continuously about anthropomorphic and anthropopathic deities and deified humans, charging each other with blasphemy. For pagans Christ was merely a human whereas for Christians, pagan Gods had human features.98 Pagan intellectuals reproached Christians for representing a blasphemously anthropomorphic image of God. Augustine refers to his contemporary pagans – through the dispute with Porphyry – who despised the humility of Christ in becoming a human. The church father reprimands their arrogance and remarks that it is no easy task to win over the proud necks of pagan intellectuals to accept Christ’s incarnation. Similarly, Gregory of Nyssa writes of people who regarded the incarnation as incompatible with the dignity of a God.99 Within this context it is understandable why Christian polemicists stress the human features of pagan Gods to such an extent.100 With the technique of retorsio, they turn pagan critique of Christ’s human nature against pagan opponents themselves. It is your Gods that really are the anthropomorphic and anthropopathic, is the message of the retortion. Augustine, for example, stresses the sorrow of Diana and the tears of Hercules in Aeneid. He quotes Cicero who stated that Homer had transferred human features to the Gods and who would rather have had divine features transferred to humans.101 97 AVG. civ. 10.2; 4.10. Consult. Zacch. 1.1; 1.9–12 discusses the issue of Christ’s humanity and corporeality. 98 Celsus (apud ORIG. Cels. 4.14; 4.18; 5.2; 6.61; 6.63) had declared that God did not have human characteristics; he could not be incarnated in a human since he was unchangeable. God or a child of God did not descend to earth: only daimons descended to earth. For Celsus a suffering God was unsustainable. Correspondingly, ARNOB. nat. 4.24–5 criticized pagan Gods for their human features that did not belong to the concept of God. LACT. inst. 1.17 rebuked pagans who represented their Gods with age, clothing, ornaments, sex and race and quoted (inst. 1.8) the oracle of Apollo to declare that it was impossible for a God to be fashioned from the loins of a man and the womb of a woman. What was so far removed from the nature of God as breeding and corporeality? For a discussion on the passibility of Gods, see VERMANDER 1982, 18–21. 99 AVG. civ. 10.28–9. GREG. NYSS. or. cat. 9. The incarnation as an insult: COURCELLE 1958, 160–61. 100 E.g., ARNOB. nat., in books 3–4, particularly in 3.11, 3.29–32 and 4.28, had caricatured the human features of pagan Gods. The anthropomorphic depictions of Gods had been criticized within the Greco-Roman tradition itself: Xenophanes (Diels – Kranz 21 B 14–16) had derided people who believed the Gods to undergo generation and who equipped them with human voice, form and clothes. 101 AVG. civ. 3.11, referring to VERG. Aen. 11.836 and 10.464; civ. 4.26 quoting CIC. Tusc. 1.26.65. Augustine goes on speaking about Homer’s fiction of the Gods’ crimes, which Cicero

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In their polemic against the human characteristics of pagan Gods, Christian writers deride the pagan belief in male and female divinities. In articulating the distinction of the Christian God with pagan divinities, Christian authors imply that the Christian God has no sex because gender does not belong to the features of the supreme God.102 In this notion of God without gender, Christian writers followed the speculations of Greco-Roman philosophy. Another way of outlining deity was to understand deity as representing both sexes. Some writers, pagans and Christians alike, stated that the supreme God was both male and female, both Father and Mother. Some Christian thinkers stressed that the supreme God was both the conceiver and the conceived (Father and Son). Thus, on one hand, the coincidentia oppositorum of the supreme God indicated the total perfection of the deity. On the other hand, Christian polemicists attack pagan androgynous Gods.103 The negative theological thinking was shared by pagan, Jewish and Christian thinkers alike. All of them agreed that, since the supreme deity was incomprehensible, undefinable and ineffable, every attempt to characterize the supreme God would be fruitless and futile.104 Thus, in his letter to Augustine, the pagan philosopher Maximus of Madauros is capable of pleading to mutual understanding when speaking of the supreme God who is one and without beginning (sine initio) and adding that only a person completely deprived of sense would deny this. Similarly,

also despised; cf. AVG. conf. 1.16.25. 102 E.g., AVG. civ. 3.12. God’s gender had been discussed in earlier apologetic: Arnobius (nat. 3.6) had ridiculed pagan Gods divided into sexes and (nat. 3.8–10) mocked pagan Gods who had children; LACT. inst. 1.8 had stressed that God needed neither difference of sex nor succession. 103 Rufius Festus Avienus (Arat. 7–26) describes the supreme God Jupiter as sexu immixtus utroque and Firmicus Maternus (math. 5. praef. 5) depicts the divinitas principalis as omnium pariter ac mater, pater ac filius. For the discussion about the gender of deities and androgynous divinities, see C.O. TOMMASI MORESCHINI, ‘L’androginia di Cristo-Logos: Mario Vittorino tra platonismo e gnosi’, Cassiodorus 4 (1998), 11–46 and C.O. TOMMASI MORESCHINI, ‘L’androginia divina e i suoi presupposti filosofici: il mediatore celeste’, Studi classici e orientali 46.2 (1998), 973–98. 104 E.g., PLUT. de E 393b; ALBIN. epit. 8; APVL. Plat. 1.5. Plotinus depicted the One in terms of positive and negative theological thinking but even went beyond distinguishing and not distinguishing the One from all beings; for Plotinus’ mystic dialectic, see J. BUSSANICH, ‘Plotinus’ metaphysics of the One’, The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, Cambridge 1996, 38–65: 63. MAX. TYR. or. 2 depicted God the Father and Demiurge as superior to time and age and every transient nature, anonymous, ineffable and invisible. Philo (opif. 8.30) declared that the perfectly pure and unblemished Intellect of the universe transcended virtue, knowledge, the good itself and the beautiful itself; D.T. RUNIA, ‘Naming and Knowing: Themes in Philonic Theology with special Reference to the De mutatione nominum’, Knowledge of God in the Graeco-Roman world, Leiden 1988, 69–91. The Gnostic Apocryphon of John (NHC II.1) proclaimed that God is completely perfect, illimitable, unsearchable, immeasurable, invisible, eternal, ineffable, unnameable and has no definable attributes. ATHENAG. leg. 5–6; 10.1 delineated God as uncreated, eternal, invisible, impassible, incomprehensible and infinite. The theme runs through the history of not only Christian, but also Islamic and Hindu thought; J. HICK, An Interpretation of Religion, London 1989, 238–9.

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another pagan correspondent of Augustine, Longinianus, depicts the supreme God as incomprehensible and ineffable.105 Christian apologists and polemicists employed the language of negative theology developed by Stoics and Middle Platonists in order to construct and accentuate the opposition between the definable pagan Gods and the undefinable Christian God. Whereas pagan Gods had visible forms, utterable names and epithets, genealogy, gender and history, the supreme God – for Christians their God – was indefinable, ineffable, invisible, nameless, uncreated, sexless, eternal and imperishable.106 Therefore, giving names to deities was pointless. Christian polemicists stress that only the false Gods of pagans needed names.107 Furthermore, negative theology and arguments of the undefinable nature of the supreme God were utilized for championing religious forbearance either for Christians or polytheists. If the supreme deity was undefinable and ineffable, then one attempt to define the divine was as adequate or inadequate as any other. The Depraved Gods The theologica mythica and theologica civilis are interconnected in the polemic against pagan Gods, for example, in Augustine’s argumentation. The myths of Gods and ceremonies of the civic religion interact closely with each other. Thus, according to Augustine, myth and ritus concord and function together, feeding on each other.108 Augustine ends up by criticizing Varro’s theologia tripertita and states that, instead of the division of the Gods into three classes, the Gods should be distinguished into two groups: natural Gods and Gods set by humans. Augustine depicts poets and priests as allied in a fellowship of falsehood (consortio falsitatis). The lies of both of them are equally pleasing for demons. Using a metaphor of sowing and harvesting and repeating a pair ille–haec, Augustine represents theologia mythica and theologia civilis cooperating in conspiracy: “The one sows a crop of shame by inventing foul stories about the Gods; the other by supporting them, reaps the harvest. The one 105 MAX. MADAVR. Aug. ep. 16. Maximus also defines God as without offspring (sine prole) and this seems to be directed against the Christian dogma of incarnation. MASTANDREA 1985, 49 and W. LIEBESCHUETZ, ‘The Significance of the Speech of Praetextatus’, Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity, Oxford 1999, 185–205: 185. LONGIN. Aug. ep. 234.2: et incomprehensibilis, et ineffabilis, infatigabilisque Creatoris. 106 PALMER 1983, 238–50. E.g., the anonymous writer of Ad Diognetum 2.4 employed inverted negative theology when asking whether pagan Gods are not dumb, blind, lifeless, without perception and without movement, and implying their opposite, the Christian God. IUST. 1. apol. 9.1; 10.1 contrasted the pagan Gods who are corruptible and in need of care and the Christian God who does not need any material offering and has no set name. Cf. THEOPH. Autol. 2.35–6; ARNOB. nat. 1.31. 107 E.g., LACT. inst. 2.16 argues that God did not need a name because he was the only God; cf. IUST. 2. apol. 6 stresses that the unborn God had no name of his own: there were mere appellations given by humans such as Father, God, Creator and Lord. 108 AVG. civ. 4.26; 6.5–7. See also AVG. cons. euang. 1.8.13. For Augustine’s argumentation, see O’DALY 1994, 73.

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scatters lies; the other collects them. The one slanders divine matters with false reports; the other includes among divine matters the shows in which the slanders are presented. The one chants in verse the unspeakable fictions of human imagination about the Gods; the other consecrates those fictions in the festivals of the Gods. The one signs the crimes and shames of the deities; the other views them with complacence. The one reveals or invents them; the other either attests them as true or enjoys them as false.” The connection between mythology and civic religion is demonstrated by the similarity of the theatricae turpitudines with those obscenities that were performed in temples.109 Augustine lists cults in which a myth is involved, the cults of Juno, Ceres, Venus, Magna Mater and Attis. The spectacles of theatre are disgraceful but these rites are even more shameful than theatre.110 The myth and the rite are intertwined in the mourning for Osiris in the Egyptian mysteries. Augustine stresses the fictitious nature of the mysteries: the loss and discovery of Osiris are invented (fingatur) but the grief and the joy of people who really have neither lost nor found anything are genuine (veraciter exprimatur). Thus the church father contrasts the fiction of the myth behind the rite and the authenticity of the emotions of people. Carmen contra paganos ridicules the mourning for Osiris, mocking the iteration of the ritual: Osiris is lost and found again and again. Similarly, Poema ultimum mocks pagans who search for something and rejoice when they have found it; but they lose it again in order to search for it again.111 Christian polemicists continuously emphasize the fictitious nature of pagan myths, for instance, making ample use of Plato’s denunciation of myths.112 Discussing myths in Soliloquia, Augustine claims that pagans taught that people should believe in the content of myths, for instance, in the myth of Daedalus who flew towards the sun. With this alleged gullibility of pagans, he contrasts Christians who recognized the falseness of a myth’s content. Paulinus of Nola portrays pagan literature and its myths (such as Paris or the gigantomachia) as childish fiction suitable only for children and youths whereas Christian themes are depicted as more advanced and suitable for adults. In City of God Augustine calls the stories of the Gods figments of poets and great folly (figmenta poetarum, talia deliramenta).113 Nonetheless, he points out that pagans themselves knew that their myths were either poetic fancies or allegories of nature and life. He even reports on philosophizing interpretations of ancient myths that were read to people gathered in the temples “yesterday and the 109 AVG. civ. 6.6. 110 AVG. civ. 6.7. Augustine aims to demonstrate the connection between the two theologiae in arguing that both of them depict the Gods, e.g., Jupiter, Mercurius, Priapus, Saturn, Apollo, Forculus, Limentinus, Cardea, Diana, in the same way. 111 AVG. civ. 6.10; Augustine is referring to Seneca’s critique of religion. CARM. c. pag. 100–101: cumque Osirim miserum lugens †latrator Anubis†? / quaereret, inventum rursum quem perdere posset, / post lacrimas ramum fractum portares olivae? The latrator Anubis, which must have shifted erroneously from the preceding lines of the poem, should probably be corrected as Isis. PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 119–20; cf. PAVL. NOL. carm. 19.114–16. 112 E.g., AVG. civ. 2.14; 8.13; 9.7. In earlier apologetics, e.g., the fifth book of Arnobius’ Adversus nationes is dedicated to the falsehood of myths; CLEM. prot. 1 derided the credulity of pagans who believed in the most preposterous myths. 113 AVG. soliloq. 2.11.20; PAVL. NOL. carm. 22.14–19; AVG. civ. 4.17.

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day before yesterday”.114 He understood that allegorical interpretations made myths more tolerable and justifiable for pagan intellectuals.115 In discussing the theologia mythica or fabulosa in City of God, Augustine sums up the immorality of myths. He writes that the poets depicted Gods in such a distorted manner that such Gods could not be compared with good humans. One is portrayed as thieving, another as adultering, and so on, every deity as doing and saying something disgraceful and absurd. Prudentius set the same in verse form, complaining of the dishonouring of young women, forbidden love for young men, adulterers caught polluting the marriage-bed.116 The attacks against immoral Gods had become fixed in the polemic of second and third century apologists. They employed the myth critique of Greek and Roman philosophers, for example, that of Xenophanes who had ridiculed Homer and Hesiod for their disgraceful accounts of Gods with human vices and passions, Gods who stole, committed adulteries and deceived one another.117 In Minucius Felix’ and Tertullian’s writings, the critique of pagan Gods had focused on a couple of ancient myths, for example, those of Venus’ and Mars’ adultery and Jupiter’s scandalous sex affairs.118 Thus, the sexual promiscuity of pagan Gods is the most prominent theme. Most assaults are aimed at Jupiter, culpable of adultery, incest and pedophilia. Prudentius calls him primus moechus and reports meticulously on his activities with Europa, Leda, Danaë and Ganymede as well as mentioning his incestuous marriage with his sister Juno. Similarly, Carmen contra paganos lists his love affairs.119 Augustine condemns Jupiter’s licentious conduct in several passages in City of God.120 The descriptions of Jupiter’s corruption serve to question the basis of the worship of pagan Gods. This kind of behaviour should be unthinkable for the Gods in general, 114 AVG. c. Faust. 20.9; ep. 91.5. FOWDEN 1998, 547 connects these readings to Emperor Julian’s attempts to establish a polytheist church. 115 AVG. civ. 7 passim. According to Aristotle, the truth was expressed in the form of myths in order to make it more approachable to ordinary people. Stoic philosophers construed myths about the Gods as veiled versions of the truth. FREDE 1999, 51–3. 116 AVG. civ. 4.27. PRVD. c. Symm. 1.159–163. Prudentius explains the depravity of Gods as originating from the immorality of human rulers. 117 XENOPHAN. fr. 11 (Diels – Kranz 21 B 11). Xenophanes was highly regarded by Christian writers who quoted his statements, e.g., by Clement of Alexandria who is the principal source of Xenophanes’ fragments (str. 5.109.1; 7.22.1) and Theodoret of Cyrrhus (affect. 3.72). WEST 1999, 32; GRANT 1986, 76–7. 118 According to TERT. nat. 2.7, the immorality of the Gods was the very foundation of pagan literature and higher education. ARNOB. nat. 3.25; 4.26–9; 6.22. Cf. ARIST. apol. 8–11 who wrote that the Gods of the Greeks were governed by human passions and vices and they were criminals, adulterers, murderers and thieves; ATHENAG. leg. 21; TAT. or. 8; THEOPH. Autol. 1.9; 2.5; 2.7. 119 PRVD. c. Symm. 1.58–83; cf. perist. 10.221–7; 2.465; 2.12; ENNOD. carm. 2.102. CARM. c. pag. 4, 9–12; cf. PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 54–63. 120 E.g., AVG. civ. 2.7; 2.8; 2.12; 3.17; 4.25: adulter uxorum; pueri pulchri amator et raptor; 4.26: corruptorem pudicitiae Iovem; 7.26; cf. ep. 91.4; 138.4.18; cons. euang. 1.22.30– 1.23.32. BAS. leg. lib. gent. 4. Earlier apologists against Zeus-Jupiter, e.g., ATHENAG. leg. 22.7; ARNOB. nat. 4.22; 4.24; 5.21–3; TERT. apol. 14.3; 21.8; LACT. inst. 1.10.14.

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to say nothing of the Father of the Gods. Augustine argues that it was impossible to look for happiness or success from this God, who was clearly inferior to any Roman who detested such acts.121 The depravity of other Gods is not forgotten either. Prudentius describes the decadence of Bacchus, despising his sexual indulgence, love affairs with men and drinking, and shuddering at the ecstatic behaviour and orgies of his followers.122 Prudentius introduces Mercurius as the pioneer of thieves.123 He also describes the love affairs of Venus and Mars with mortals. Venus had been a woman of noble blood who lusted after a man of lower birth. Carmen contra paganos mentions Venus’ affair with Adonis who is mourned in temples.124 Augustine discusses three Venuses and connects one of them with the prostitution that Phoenician girls practiced before their marriages. One Venus was the Goddess of married women, Augustine states, and adds ironically that he hopes they will not imitate what Venus did with Mars.125 In addition to Venus, other Goddesses and mythical figures are referred as prostitutes. Carmen contra paganos calls Flora a meretrix and a disgraceful creator of spectacles. Augustine also refers to the obscene shows in honour of Flora.126 As the use of Flora and her spectacles shows, Christian polemicists implied a close connection between the myths and the theatrical shows. In City of God Augustine devotes considerable attention to the representation of myths in ludi scaenici because their shamefulness provides a powerful weapon against pagans. Augustine stresses that Roman writers themselves, among them Cicero, felt embarrassed about the fabricated crimes of Gods and adds that they should feel indignant at the divine crimes represented in speech, in song and on the stage in honour of those Gods.127 It is most perverted that in the Roman theatre Gods are propitiated, not offended, 121 AVG. civ. 4.26. 122 PRVD. c. Symm. 1.122–44; cf. LACT. inst. 1.10.9: cum semiviro comitatu. PAVL. NOL. carm. 19.169: dementia Bacchi. The cult of Dionysos-Bacchus was practised in Greece, Syria and North Africa as late as the fourth and fifth centuries: BOWERSOCK 1990, 4–5, 48–52. 123 PRVD. c. Symm. 1.86–8; cf. LACT. inst. 1.10.7; ARNOB. nat. 4.24 of Mercurius as a thief. PRVD. c. Symm. 1.89–94 (cf. VERG. Aen. 4.238–258) depicts Mercurius as the psychopompos and connects this role with stealing: he knew how to rob the (eternal) life from humans (vita itidem spoliare alios ars noxia novit). LÜHKEN 2002, 110 remarks that Christian writers usually fail to mention this aspect. 124 PRVD. c. Symm. 1.164–79. Prudentius explains the story of Venus and Anchises as well as Mars and Rhea Silvia as originating from the love affairs of nobles with persons of lower status. CARM. c. pag. 19–20. 125 AVG. civ. 4.10. Cf. ARNOB. nat. 4.25 claimed that Venus was a famous courtesan in whose honour Cinyras established a cult in Cyprus; cf. LACT. inst. 1.17.10; FIRM. err. 10.1; CLEM. prot. 2.13.4. For Euhemeristic material on Aphrodite-Venus, see MORA 1994, 45. 126 CARM. c. pag. 112–113: meretrix ... Flora; ludorum turpis genetrix Venerisque magistra; AVG. civ 2.27. Flora was frequently denigrated in Christian apologetics: e.g., LACT. inst. 1.20; Flora and Acca Larentia are referred as harlots in MIN. FEL. 25.8 and CYPR. idol. 4. The Floralia festival was disparaged for its licentiousness: CARM. c. pag. 112; AVG. ep. 91.5; cons. euang. 1.33.51; civ. 2.27; in earlier apologetics: TERT. spect. 17.3; ARNOB. nat. 3.23; 7.33; LACT. inst. 1.20.10. 127 AVG. civ. 4.26 (referring to CIC. Tusc. 1.26.65). Similarly, BAS. leg. lib. gent. 4 reproaches theatre for showing the adulteries, loves and public copulations of the Gods.

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by representing their depravities. Pagan Gods should have been angered with these shows but they rather took delight in these scandals. The service paid to Jupiter in the form of theatrical shows was in fact the service of the devil (diabolo serviretur).128 Augustine points out that in theatres pagans laughed at what they worshipped in temples. If Gods deserved to be worshipped, why were they ridiculed in theatre, he asks in De consensu evangelistarum. If they were preposterous, it was even more ludicrous to venerate them in temples.129 In a letter to a pagan Nectarius, he turns the attack against the divine crimes into a general cultural critique: In so many places, Jupiter, in the act of committing such adulteries, is painted, cast, beaten, carved, written, read, acted, sung, danced; what good would it do for anyone to read of him as forbidding such things, least of all in his own temple on the Capitol? If these misdeeds, full of impurity and impiety, are approved among the people with no one to prohibit, are adored in the temples and laughed at in the theatres, while the sheepfold of the poor is squandered to supply victims for the worship of such Gods, and the inherited wealth of the rich is lavished on singers and dancers representing their immorality, is this to be called a state in bloom?130

Petrus Chrysologus complains that the tragedies of pagans depicted the shameful acts of Gods and Prudentius exclaims that, as Jupiter’s evil acts are performed on the stage, the good name of deity is polluted. Quodvultdeus was convinced that spectators watching Jupiter’s adulteries and incests performed in mimes stained their own chastity.131 The connection between the reprehensible myths and the disgraceful theatrical performances had been stressed in earlier apologetics, for example, by Arnobius and Tertullian.132 Augustine offers a psychological explanation for the depravities of the pagan Gods depicted in myths and performed in theatre. They served to justify human vices and desires, he claims. He mentions Terence’s play in which a young man looks at a wall painting representing the love affair between Jupiter and Danaë. Jupiter’s promiscuity served as an authoritative precedent for the youths’s own reprehensible demeanour. Augustine states that the immorality of pagan myths kindled the most depraved desires in human hearts by giving them a kind of divine authority.133

128 AVG. civ. 2.8; 2.12–13; 4.26; 7.26. Augustine stresses that ludi scaenici were first instituted at Rome by authority of the pontifices at the time of a plague. For Augustine’s argumentation against theatrical shows, see O’DALY 1994, 74. 129 AVG. c. Faust. 20.9; cons. euang. 1.8. 130 AVG. ep. 91.5; cf. ep. 138. 131 PETR. CHRYS. serm. 155. PRVD. perist. 10.221–5; cf. 10.228–30 of Venus played and defiled on the stage. QVODV. symb. 1.4. 132 ARNOB. nat. 7.33; TERT. nat. 1.10.44; apol. 15.2. This was by no means an innovation of Christian apologists. Plato (rep. 376e–394e) had argued that theatrical performances insulted Gods. TERT. nat. 2.7.11–13 is aware of Plato’s attitude; cf. IUST. 2. apol. 10.6; MIN. FEL. 23.2. For other mentions of the depravity of Gods in theatrical performances, see JÜRGENS 1972, 234–7 and WEISMANN 1972, 103–104. 133 AVG. civ. 2.7 (referring to TER. Eun. 584–5 and 590–3); 2.14. Again, this explanation appears already in classical authors, cf. PLAT. rep. 291e.

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Implying that religion should include a moral code, Christian writers complain that pagan Gods did not offer moral teaching for their worshippers. Augustine writes that pagan Gods never sanctioned a doctrine of right living for humans. Instead, pagan rites were full of obscenities, for instance, in the cult of Magna Mater. Because Gods did not instruct the people to a decent life, the Romans were forced to borrow the laws of Solon from the Athenians.134 Pagan Gods were not in the least interested in protecting Romans from wicked life and corruption of morality. If pagan Gods were guardians of communities, they should have prevented Roman society from becoming corrupt and perishing by advising humans in the ways of right living.135 For Augustine, a clear indication of the indifference or even malevolence of Gods was the fact that they did not punish evildoers. Paris’ adultery did not really insult Gods since they were adulterous themselves. The fratricide committed by Romulus was left unavenged.136 Augustine, however, asserts that pagan Gods, who in fact were demons, offered moral instruction for the few elected in secret whereas the iniquity of their sacrifices and the obscenity of their ceremonies were public. The clamour of impure impiety rings in the ears of the public outdoors while the voice of pretended chastity is meant only for the chosen few indoors. Decency is concealed from sight and indecency is exposed to view (decus latet et dedecus patet).137 Inadequate Gods and Empty Idols In all the argumentation against pagan Gods, Christian polemicists rarely contest their existence.138 Pagan deities are false and vain Gods, demons and impure spirits and their stories are figments of poets but they do exist in the universe of Christians. In De consensu evangelistarum Augustine asserts that the pagan Gods really exist but they are wicked.139 Augustine declares that pagan Gods such as the abstraction Felicitas are only God’s gifts that stupid humans mistakenly regard as a deity. It is the contributor of the gift that is God. Augustine contrasts the real bread (the Christian God) and a 134 AVG. civ. 2.4; 2.6; in 2.16 Augustine concedes that Numa Pompilius instituted some sacred laws but these were inadequate. Roman authors themselves did not present their Gods as givers of any moral code: e.g., CIC. nat. deor. 3.36.87 stated that Jupiter was called Optimus Maximus, not because he made humans just, sober or wise, but because he made them healthy, rich and prosperous. LIEBESCHUETZ 1979, 39–40. 135 AVG. civ. 2.16; 2.22. 136 AVG. civ. 3.3; 3.5–6. 137 AVG. civ. 2.26. Christian polemicists usually claimed the contrary: pagan mysteries were secretive and veiled their disgraceful performances; see Chapter 5. 138 An exception might be PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 112: Quod colitur nihil est that is reminiscent of 1 Cor 8:4 in which the Apostle Paul asserts that idols are nothing but adds that there are so-called Gods in heaven and on earth. AVG. civ. 4.17 claims that Victoria is no substantia but by no means denies the existence of pagan Gods in general. Christian apologists refer to pagan opponents who contested the existence of the God of Christians because he could not be shown and seen, e.g., MIN. FEL. 10.5. 139 AVG. cons. euang. 1.25.38.

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painted image of bread (a pagan deity). Anyone who just licked the picture of bread could not be nurtured.140 The Christian assaults concentrate on showing that the cult of pagan Gods is useless and futile because Gods are not able to either help their worshippers in this earthly life or save their souls for the next life. A classic example of the inefficiency and ineptitude of pagan Gods with regard to this life is Augustine’s argumentation in the books 1–4 of City of God. Pagan Gods could not protect the Romans or any other nation from earthly disasters and sufferings. The church father asks sarcastically whether Jupiter was on vacation or up to something else when the Romans needed his aid.141 These Gods had not helped the Romans in their adversities; Augustine argues and lists their misfortunes in Roman history – reinforcing his issue with repeated ubi erant questions.142 Augustine derides the lack of foreknowledge in pagan Gods; consequently, the omnipotent foreknowledge of the Christian God is implied. The church father mocks Apollo and Neptune who could not foresee Laomedon’s deceitfulness when building the walls of Troy. Pagans should be ashamed to worship such Gods if they believed in such tales.143 Thus, pagan Gods were inadequate as divinities but Christian writers admitted that they had special capacities because they were demons. As demons they were able to help their servants. Augustine concedes that they protected their favourite Sulla but they did this for their own purposes: they wanted to deceive humans to regard and worship them as Gods. Even though demons had some power, their power was limited because they were able to act only under permission of the omnipotent Christian God.144 This demon argument turned out to be functional in providing explanations for pagan miracles and prophecies that Christians did not want to or could not deny: when pagan Gods were observed to help humans, they were interpreted without difficulty as demons; when they could not help their worshippers, they were easily demonstrated to be inefficient. In either case they were not true Gods. The inefficiency of idols recurs ad nauseam in the Christian polemic against pagan Gods.145 Instead of protecting their worshippers, idols themselves had to be protected. Augustine points out that Vergil himself had revealed that household Gods 140 AVG. civ. 4.23. 141 E.g., AVG. civ. 1.3: the penates failed to protect Troy from its disaster; 1.4: Juno’s sanctuary in Troy did not save the Trojans from the cruelty of the Greeks. This is contrasted with the churches of Rome that gave protection from the barbarians; 2.23: discussion about Marius; 3.2: the fall of Troy; civ. 4.14: Iove vacante vel aliud agente; 4.15: feriato Iove. 142 AVG. civ. 3.17. The source of the events of Roman history is Livy. H. HAGENDAHL, Augustine and Latin Classics II, Göteborg 1967, 650–53. 143 AVG. civ. 3.2. Cf. LACT. inst. 1.13, who sneers at the lack of foresight in Saturn who could not see Jupiter’s hiding place on earth. 144 AVG. civ. 2.23–24. 145 In earlier apologetic, e.g., Justin (1. apol. 9) proclaimed that humans were guardians of Gods; Gods were not guardians of humans; ARNOB. nat. 6.26 wrote that Gods could not protect themselves and therefore needed the protection of laws; ARIST. apol. 3. The incompetence of pagan Gods appears already in the Old Testament (e.g., Jer 10:14–15; 16:19–20) and Jewish apologetic.

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(penates) had been entrusted to Aeneas, rather than the other way round. Palladion did not preserve humans; rather, it was humans who safeguarded the image.146 In their blindness, pagans believed that perishable objects could prevent temporal things from perishing. In his answer to Maximus of Madauros, Augustine even turns the pagan idea of Gods as guardians upside down: Gods do not protect cities but rather communities should be protected from them, daemones infestissimi.147 Augustine stressed in his sermons and enarrationes to psalms that gold and silver cannot give life and intellect to idols worked by humans. They are made of matter that lacks sense perception. They have eyes but they cannot see. Even animals such as rats and snakes recognize idols as false and make their nests in them, escaping only when a human drives them away. A human moves a seeing animal away from a blind deity, a hearing from a deaf, shouting from a mute, a walking from an immovable, a sentient from an insensate, a living from a dead that is even worse than a dead one. A living animal is better than this kind of deity that a pagan worships as if it were potens.148 Poets stress that pagan Gods are only matter, calling them lapides and ligna.149 The moralizing tone of church fathers recurs in the language of imperial legislation, for instance, in an edict that despises a pagan who suddenly begins to fear the cult image that he himself has fashioned.150 Furthermore, Christian polemicists draw a contrast between the factual presence of idols as objects and the pervasive presence of the Christian God. Idols are visible but dead while God is invisible but living. The idols of pagans are only matter but Christ is life.151 146 AVG. civ. 1.3 (referring to VERG. Aen. 2.203). Romans were foolish in confiding their wellbeing to the penates who could not protect Troy. Palladion: civ. 1.2; cf. 3.18. Even the geese were better guardians than the sleeping Gods: civ. 2.22. 147 AVG. civ. 3.18; ep. 17.1. 148 AVG. serm. 141.3: idols are made by manufacturers; in psalm. 85.12; 94.6; 96.11: sculptilia enim sunt manu facta idola; 134.23; 135.3; 113.2.1: idols are made of vile matter; 113.2.2. Cf. CLEM. prot. 4, who stated that idols, being made of inanimate matter, were inferior to lower animals like caterpillars and worms since they lacked senses that even these animals had. 149 Lapides: PRVD. perist. 3.82; PAVL. NOL. carm. 5.44; ligna: SEDVL. carm. pasch. 1.268. Earlier apologists had mocked pagan Gods that could not protect themselves because they were mere vile matter, gold, silver, bronze, stone or wood worked by craftsmen. Already Acts 17.29 referred to gold, silver or stone fashioned according to human imagination; THEOPH. Autol. 1.1; 2.2; IUST. 1. apol. 5; ARIST. apol. 13; ARNOB. nat. 6.14; 6.16; 6.19; 6.21; TERT. apol. 13.4 pointed out that pagans sometimes recirculated the material used for idols, thus making a cooking-pot of a Saturn, a firepan of a Minerva. Christian reproof of material Gods was partly based on Greek religious satire and philosophical critique as well as the Jewish tradition. Chrysippus had regarded the sculpture of anthropomorphic Gods as childish and Lucian had ridiculed Gods who were incapable of defending themselves from robbers and animals. For other examples, see R. GRIGG, ‘Constantine the Great and the cult without images’, Viator 8 (1977), 1–32: 25–6. 150 CTh 16.10.12.2 (in 392); cf. LACT. inst. 2.2.1. Eusebius (laud. Const. 9; v. Const. 2.16) had contrasted lifeless pagan statues with the saving and lifegiving sign that Emperor Constantine adopted for his use; see GRIGG 1977, 1–32: 15–16. 151 GAVDENT. serm. 9.28–30. AVG. civ. 10.15 asserts that the invisible God was visible in his creation; cf. Rom 1:20. LACT. inst. 2.2.8–10 had argued that God whose spirit and influence were diffused everywhere and who was never absent did not need an image. Pagans,

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Christian writers often state that the original Roman religion had been imageless. Augustine refers to Varro who thought that primordial Romans had worshipped their Gods without images for 170 years and compares them to the Jews. According to Augustine, Varro wrote that images of Gods caused the abolition of reverent fear and the increase of error. The church father points out that Varro says errorem addiderunt, not tradiderunt, thus implying that there already was an error – the cult of false Gods – but that the idols amplified it.152 The notion of imageless Roman religion is connected with the notion of Greek and Roman authors who speculated upon an original cult of elements without images, temples and sacrifices.153 Signa and the Threat of Idols The attacks against the cult of images are a constant theme in Christian literature. Even if the existence of pagan Gods was not contested, idols were regarded as mere objects and therefore lacking sense perception and being inanimate and empty. They were simply images of the deceased. In fact, idols as such were nothing and imposed no danger but it was demons that dwelled in the images of the deceased and made them perilous for human souls.154 In this way, two strands of thought, Euhemeristic interpretations and demonology, were connected in the Christian polemic. Demons gave the illusion that idols were deities, working miracles, and deceived humans to venerate them. Pagan cult rituals kept them active and alive. Thus, the reality of supernatural forces behind cult images was not questioned: Augustine even equates idols and demons, for instance, when discussing the verbal divergences between the Hebrew text of Psalm 96:5 and its Septuagint translation: according to Augustine, the Hebrew version speaking of pagan Gods as simulacra and the Septuagint version speaking of them as daemonia were to be understood as the same thing: idols were demons since demons were in idols.155 He stresses that demons, dwelling in simulacra and deceiving humans, seduced them to pay homage to demons themselves.156 Correspondingly, many pagans regarded cult images as Lactantius wrote, insisted that they should see as present what they worshipped and therefore set up idols. 152 AVG. civ. 4.31; 6.10; cf. 4.9. PRVD. c. Symm. 2.345–56 stressed that the primordial Roman religion had only few Gods and altars; cf. AVG. civ. 18.24. 153 Some Christian writers follow this line of thought, e.g., EUS. praep. 1.9.13; LACT. inst. 2.14 on imageless religion of the heaven, the sun, the earth and the sea before the corruption of religion with simulacra, temples, victims and odours. Christian writers explained the imageless Roman religion as an influence of Moses through the Pythagoreans. The mythical founder of Roman religion Numa Pompilius was thought to have been a Pythagorean and discarded the cult of idols (e.g., CLEM. str. 1.15). 154 E.g., AVG. in psalm. 113.2.3 and 135.3, referring to the Apostle Paul in 1 Cor 8:4–6 and 10:19–20: idols have no real existence and as such are nothing. Cf. TERT. spect. 13.2; 12.5; LACT. inst. 1.11. 155 AVG. in psalm. 135.3 (referring here to Psalm 96:5); cf. c. Faust. 21.9; cons. euang. 1.23; c. adv. leg. 2.29; in psalm. 47.15; 49.2.6; 76.15; 85.12; 94.6; 95.6; civ. 1.29; 8.24; 9.23; 19.23; ep. 102.19. 156 AVG. in psalm. 113.2.3; civ. 8.24.

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animated by a positive divine presence. After the devastation of pagan cult images, pagan opinion leaders were at pains to explain that pagan deities had not ceased to exist after the demolition of cult images but had gone to heaven and that pagans should not abandon the religion of their forefathers.157 Idols as such were only ridiculous images. Likewise, temples were not regarded as dangerous as such but rather the acts that were performed in them were held as harmful. Pagan cult places as such did not contaminate Christians but the things that happened there did if Christians took part in them. The extensive measures against pagan temples and cult statues – destruction and mutilation – reveal a vigorous belief in the might of pagan Gods, even though in the form of demons. M. R. Salzman notes the fact that Christian bishops and emperors long avoided taking over pagan religious space whereas they did not shun seizing pagan religious time in the form of festivals and feasts.158 The de-demonization of pagan cult places – the destruction or conversion of temples – was a centuries-long process. The Christian views seem to follow the Greco-Roman discussion on the relationship between cult images and the Gods. Greek writers had debated whether images were or were not to be regarded as Gods themselves. Some of them had even ridiculed the cult of images.159 Others had defended the cult of idols, arguing that they did not worship mere objects themselves but that they honoured the deities that these images stood for. In the late first century Maximus of Tyre had explained that it was precisely because of the ineffability and anonymity of the supreme deity that humans used words, names and images for depicting the divine. Celsus had reprimanded Christians who did not believe in images, arguing that everyone knew that they were not Gods but only images representing Gods. In his defense of the statues of Gods, Porphyry had stated that the images were visible symbols of the invisible. Thus, he argued for a naturalistic allegorical interpretation of cult images that were symbolical writing: chrystal, marble, ivory, gold and black stone of statues symbolized diverse aspects and hence guided believers towards God’s lightness.160

157 For the destruction of statues, see BOWERSOCK 1990, 69. According to a pagan, Olympius, statues were perishable material and were mere pictures but the divine powers that had resided in them had ascended to heaven (SOZ. eccl. 7.15). 158 E.g., TERT. spect. 8.8–9; 15.1. SALZMAN 1999, 129–31. For the destruction or partial dismantling of sacred buildings and their modification into churches, see TROMBLEY 1993, 98–108. 159 For the pagan critique on cult of images, see M. EDWARDS 1999, 215; GRANT 1986, 46, 82. 160 MAX. TYR. or. 2. Celsus apud ORIG. Cels. 7.62; Porphyry apud EUS. praep. 3.7.1–3. The Hellenic philosopher in MAC. MAGN. apocr. 4.21 (= fragm. 76 Harnack) argued that, as in the case of the image of a friend, no one really believed that the deity is in the wood or stone or bronze of a statue and that the Gods dwelled within the statues. Cf. LACT. inst. 2.2 who refers to pagans who claimed that they did not fear the images themselves but rather those beings after whose likeness they had been formed. Cf. a fifth-century Alexandrian pagan, Heraiscus (referred to by BOWERSOCK 1990, 58), who maintained that he was able to distinguish between the statues inhabited by deities and those that were mere representations of deities and not inhabited.

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Augustine continues this tradition when discussing images, signs and symbols. In De doctrina christiana he writes that humans need to use signs (signa) but he warns against confusing these signs with the things signified. The visible things created by God are good and may help humans to show respect to God but humans should not err to venerate things instead of the true God as pagans have erred to do. In worshipping Neptune, pagans show respect to the sea, thus adoring the creation instead of the Creator. God wanted to be glorified in his creation, not his creation to be glorified instead of him. Augustine stresses that creation was always inferior to its Creator and it was a sacrilegium to show created things the respect that belonged only to the Creator.161 Thus, Augustine is drawing a borderline between the right attitude and the distorted one in regard to God’s creation. Previously, in Confessions, he had himself conceded that it was justified and important to try to grasp the invisible and divine through the visible creation. Later in City of God he criticizes Varro who had argued in a similar manner that humans of ancient times invented simulacra deorum et insignia ornatusque so that, as initiated into mysteries, people could fix their eyes on them and then could see with their intellect the Intellect of the universe and its parts, that is, the true Gods (animam mundi ac partes eius, id est deos veros, animo videre). Thus, for Varro the divine mysteries were made accessible for humans by visible means.162 Augustine’s discussion with his contemporaries through Varro implies that the demarcation line of the proper and improper approach towards the divine was far from clear to some individuals. Pagans gathered the order of the heaven, earth, sea and all elements into Gods and, thus, in making idols, lost what they had found in God’s creation.163 In his argumentation against cult images, Augustine contrasts the creation of idols by craftsmen with God’s creation: mundus opus est dei, idolum opus est fabri. As the manufacturer of a human was God, the creator of an idol was the craftsman. If the manufacturer of an idol gave a heart to his work as he gave it a form, it would adore its maker. Similarly, Poema ultimum contrasts God who formed the human with a human who dared to form an idol.164 In another binary opposition, Augustine speaks of pagans who were infuriated for the sake of idols that they themselves had fashioned; and pagans were raging at the One who had created them. An idol is compared to a slave who was better than an idol: a slave was created by God whereas an idol was fashioned by a craftsman. Moreover, idols that are not able to see are contraposed with God who has created humans with seeing eyes.165 Artists and craftsmen are able to fashion matter into a piece of art that resembles a living being but this image remains inferior to life itself. A simulacrum of a deity 161 AVG. doctr. christ. 2.1–2; 3.7.11; serm. 197.1; in psalm. 62.1; 149.13; vera relig. 55.108. 162 AVG. conf. 7.17.23; 7.20.26 (quoting Rom. 1:20); civ. 7.5. According to AVG. civ. 4.9; 4.31, Varro had defended the cult of images but admitted that the simulacra of Gods had abolished reverence and increased error. O’DALY 1994, 74. 163 AVG. serm. 141.3. 164 AVG. serm. 141.3. PS. PAVL. NOL. Poema ultimum 29–30: cum deus omnipotens hominem formaverit olim, / audet homo formare deum. 165 AVG. in psalm. 98.2 and 94.6.

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was only a piece of work by a manufacturer: making images themselves was not dangerous but rather the purpose of their making, the cult. Augustine exhorts his listeners to understand that pagans pay homage to a simulacrum, that is, a created thing (creatura). In worshipping an image, they distort the truth of God into a lie. Pagans should not say (as they said) that they do not worship an image but what images signify. Augustine refers to pagan views similar to those of Porphyry and Julian who had claimed that idols were fabricated to be signs. According to the church father, people believed, as they saw no sign of life, that there was a hidden divinity. For Augustine, this was even more perilous than a mere cult of a simulacrum because, in creating a cult for bad demons, people invited them to empty idols and fortified the power of demons. Pagans who thought to represent a more purified version of religion claimed that they worshipped neither an idol nor a demon but rather physical images of things they signified, Tellus for the earth, Neptune for the sea, and so on.166 III Demons

From Gods to Demons We have discussed above how Christian writers described the transformation from demons to Gods. Now we observe the same issue the other way round: how Gods of others became demons. In Christian polemic a contrast was drawn between the true God and his imitations, demons that passed for Gods by animating idols. The continuously repeated idea of dii falsi who are vera daemonia rises from this very contraposition. An idol received life from a demon that inhabited it and a demon got a body from an idol. Thus, pagan Gods existed as the combination of fiction and reality. A. Mandouze explains Augustine’s twofold argumentation – this applies to many other Christian writers as well – with two requirements: first, there was a rhetorical prerequisite to represent pagan Gods as vain and, second, as a bishop, he had to explain demons and warn of them on the spiritual level.167 Pagan Gods are referred as daemonia, daemones, impure spirits (spiritus immundi) and wicked angels (angeli maligni). Christian writers remind their readers ad nauseam that pagan deities are not Gods but demons. They were, not a crowd of Gods, but a multitude of demons, unclean spirits who deceived humans under the 166 AVG. serm. 197.1 (referring to Rom. 1:18–25) and in psalm. 113.2.3–4. According to AVG. serm. Dolbeau 26.16–17 (= 198augm), contemporary pagan intellectuals claimed that uncultivated pagans adored idols as mere idols in the same way as some Christians worshipped columns. AVG. in psalm. 113.2.5 argues that, in their superstition, people nevertheless adore the statue instead of the element, Neptune’s statue instead of the sea and the statue of the Sun God instead of the sun. Augustine implies that it is narcissism that leads humans to idolatry because the idol’s form resembles a living human. MANDOUZE 1958, 208–10. 167 AVG. civ. passim; cons. euang. 1.20.28: in suis diis falsis, quae sunt vera daemonia; c. Faust. 20.5 (quoting 1 Cor 10:20) stresses the real existence of demons: idols are demons. MANDOUZE 1958, 211.

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title of Gods.168 Leo, Bishop of Rome, stated that pagans worshipped the devil under the guise of idols. Various pagan deities were labelled as mere demons; Sulpicius Severus, for example, depicts demons as appearing as Jupiter and Mercurius, and Martin of Braga identified them as Neptune in the sea, the Lamiae in rivers, the Nymphs in fountains and the Dianae (sic).169 The demonization of rival beliefs and cults has been the prevailing model in the polemic between adherents of divergent religions. A.H. Armstrong and W. Liebeschuetz have drawn attention to the extent to which the early Christian belief in demons and the identification of the Gods of others with demons darkened the later antique world-view. This metamorphosis of the pagan Gods into demons had a substantial psychological consequence. Even though there had been a propensity to believe in supernatural evil forces in later Greek and Roman paganism, too, it was Christianity that filled the late antique world with wicked impure spirits. To put it ironically, Augustine and his colleagues, who proclaimed that they liberated humans from the power of evil spirits, actually imprinted these powers on the minds of late antique Christians to a greater extent than ever before.170 Christian authors employed a term daimon/daemon that had already been in GrecoRoman use but they furnished it with a divergent meaning.171 Daimons appeared as supernatural intermediary beings between Gods and humans in the writings, for instance, of Plato, Plutarch, Iamblichus and Porphyry. In Plutarch’s doctrine on daimons, these beings were lesser deities between Gods and humans. According to Plutarch, Cornelius Labeo and Porphyry, daimons were usually benevolent and beneficent but there were also malevolent and harmful daimons.172 Some Greek and Roman authors believed 168 AVG. civ. passim; e.g., 4.29: non deorum, sed daemoniorum; 4.1: deos falsos, …, eos esse inmundissimos spiritus et malignissimos ac fallacissimos daemones; 4.16: illam turbam … non plane deorum, sed daemoniorum; 2.2: servire daemonibus ... falsos et fallaces deos eorum; 2.4: inmundi spiritus deorum nomine decipientes; 2.10: maligni spiritus, quos isti deos putant; 1.31; 2.5; 2.25; 2.29; 3.10; 4.25; 4.27; div. daem. 2.6: vel daemonum vel quilibet illi sint, quos deos pagani vocant; serm. Dolbeau 26.3 (= 198augm). Other writers: THEOD. eccl. 5.22.3–6; GAVDENT. serm. 6.5–6; 12.8. 169 LEO M. serm. 8; SVLP. SEV. Mart. 22; dial. 2.13.6; 3.6.4; MART. BRAC. corr. 8–9. 170 ARMSTRONG 1992, 50; LIEBESCHUETZ 1979, 269: “life became a battle in which men must fight for God against ‘the enemy’”. WAARDENBURG 1984, 259, 279 analyzes similar changes in the relationships between Allah and the diverse deities and other spiritual beings of the ancient Arabian religions before the rise of Islam. In the conflict between the other deities and Allah, the other deities were degraded to jinn and shayatin. 171 In order to avoid confusion, I use the word ‘daimon’ for Greco-Roman use and ‘demon’ for Christian use. 172 E.g., PLAT. symp. 202e–203a; rep. 392a; 427b; 469a; 617d; leg. 4.713d; PLUT. Isid. 26.361b; def. or. 10.415a; de E 13.390c; APVL. Socr. 12; MAX. TYR. or. 8.8; 9.4; Cornelius Labeo (apud AVG. civ. 2.11); IAMBL. v. Pyth. 37, 55, 146, 219; PORPH. abst. 2.38; IUL. or. 4.145C. The word daimon had been used from Homer onwards to refer to both good and evil supernatural powers. Some writers such as Plotinus, Salustius and Proclus stressed that there could not be evil daimons but in Late Antiquity the division of daimons into good and wicked ones was the most current view. Philo of Alexandria (e.g., gig. 16) combined Jewish angelology with Hellenistic daimonology and cosmology. The word daimon appears only once in the New Testament (Mt 8:31) whereas the diminutive daimonion is used regularly.

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that from time to time daimons inhabited bodies in the world beneath the moon. There was also a current belief that exceptional humans could become daimons after their deaths. Even if there was considerable disagreement about the nature of daimons and some confusion about the difference between Gods and daimons, Platonists, as M. Frede points out, did not regard wicked daimons as Gods.173 It was the evil daimons/demons that Christian writers had in mind as they identified pagan Gods with demons. Christian writers regarded demons as constantly hostile and treacherous beings, and in Christian perspective, all pagan worship could be interpreted as commerce with evil spirits and identified with magic.174 Justin had interpreted demons as the fallen angels or as the descendant of the fallen angels who had led humans astray with trickery to pay homage to them as Gods. Tatian had labelled the pagan Gods as demons and Zeus as their leader, the devil.175 Christian authors had seen the surrounding pagan society as filled with demons – Satan and his angels, as Tertullian had put it. The pagan cults were diaboli ecclesia and daemoniorum conventus that were contrasted with the ecclesia dei. Lactantius had regarded Roman religion as a machinery of demons and divided demons in two classes: demons of heaven who were the fallen angels and demons of the earth who were the descendant of the fallen angels, being a kind of mixture of angels and humans. The latter were the wicked spirits whom pagans regarded as Gods and worshipped in temples.176 There are only Evil Demons In order to condemn the cult of pagan Gods as a whole, Christian polemicists accentuated that all demons are evil. To present this in a drastic way, one could maintain that Christian views differed from pagan ideas only in their claim that pagan deities were not beneficent but evil. The supernatural nature and powers of

For the development of the concept of daimon, see A. KLOSTERGAARD PETERSEN, ‘The Notion of Demon. Open Questions to a Diffuse Concept’, Die Dämonen, Tübingen 2003, 23–41: partic. 24–6, L. ALBINUS, ‘The Greek daimon between Mythos and Logos’, Die Dämonen, Tübingen 2003, 425–46, J. TER VRUGT-LENTZ, ‘Geister (Dämonen): B.II. Vorhellenistisches Griechenland’, RAC IX, Stuttgart 1976, 599–615 and C. ZINTZEN, ‘Geister (Dämonen): B.III. c. Hellenistische und kaiserzeitliche Philosophie’, RAC IX, Stuttgart 1976, 640–68. 173 FREDE 1999, 62. 174 MARKUS 1996, 130. The religions of others were traditionally labelled as magical practices and condemned as commerce with evil demons; e.g., Celsus (apud. ORIG. Cels. 1.6) believed that Christians received their powers from demons. 175 IUST. 2. apol. 5; 1. apol. 5; 10; 14; 25; 54. Demons and stars had the same names and, therefore, demons identified themselves with stars: consequently, idolatry was veneration of elements, i.e., the creation; cf. ATHENAG. leg. 26–7 with similar arguments. TAT. or. 7.4–5; 7.24–8.3; 16–17; 19.5–9; 21.14–22.2. 176 E.g., TERT. spect. 8.7; 8.9; 10.6; 10.10; apol. 29.1; for Tertullian’s attacks, see OPELT 1980, 15, 20. LACT. inst. 2.14–16. These are the demons that the magicians invoke to deceive humans. Cf. Porphyry who distinguished between daimons in the air and those in the ether (apud AVG. civ. 10.9; 10.26).

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these beings were acknowledged.177 Augustine constantly stresses the wicked nature of demons; malevolence is their factual nature.178 They were not Gods but rather malevolent spirits: Non sunt di, maligni sunt spiritus. Augustine states bluntly that pagans should refer all their superstition to deceased humans and wicked demons and there would be no questions left to be discussed.179 In the eighth book of City of God Augustine debates with several authors – Plato, Apuleius, Plutarch, Cornelius Labeo and Porphyry – on the nature of demons.180 According to Augustine’s definition, in reality demons are spirits “whose only desire is to do harm, who are completely alien from any kind of justice, swollen with arrogance, purple with envy and full of crafty deception”. They dwell in the air because they have been cast down from the upper heights of heaven as a punishment for their irretrievable transgression and condemned to inhabit there as in a prison suitable to their nature.181 Augustine attacks Cornelius Labeo’s distinction between the good and bad deities, emphasizing that all those impure spirits are evil.182 There exist no good demons, Augustine asserts, even if pagan writers regard some of them as good and pay them homage. When discussing pagan cults that are either instituted by humans or by demons, Augustine stresses that these demons are not to be called good demons, as pagans do.183 In one of his sermons, addressing pagans who insist on worshipping deities, the church father asks which deities they adore: do they venerate good spirits such as angels? There are two kinds of spirits: holy angels and evil spirits. Pagans worship evil spirits that are easily recognized since in their malice and arrogance they want to be worshipped and offered sacrifices. Consequently, the demonic nature of pagan Gods is revealed by the fact that they wish to be worshipped as Gods. Thus, they must be wicked spirits, fallen angels. God’s holy angels do not want to be venerated with cults and sacrifices because such adoration belongs only to the true God. The blood sacrifices that pagan Gods/demons demanded from their worshippers were a particular indication of their iniquity.184 177 J. PÉPIN, “Ex Platonicorum persona”. Études sur les lectures philosophiques de saint Augustin, Amsterdam 1977, 29–37 stresses that numerous features in Augustine’s theology on angels and demons come from Greco-Roman philosophy; and MARKUS 1996, 130–31 emphasizes the very close affinities between the spiritual world of Augustine and that of Porphyry: both believed in good and wicked angels with a monotheistic universe. 178 AVG. in psalm. 26.2.19: hoc enim malevolentiae illorum proprium est; cf. civ. 2.11; div. daem. 4.8. 179 AVG. civ. 2.29; 7.28. 180 AVG. civ. books 8 and 9; div. daem. passim. 181 AVG. civ. 8.22; according to AVG. in psalm. 94.6, demons cannot inhabit heaven because they have been dispelled from there; cf. MART. BRAC. corr. 8 who states that many demons that have been driven out of heaven now reign over the sea, rivers, fountains and forests. 182 AVG. civ. 2.11. Cornelius Labeo had divided deities into the good and evil according to the cult that they received. AVG. civ. 3.25 ridicules Cornelius Labeo’s classification. 183 AVG. civ. 6.4; also 9.2. AVG. civ. 9.19 draws a sharp distinction between Christian and pagan views on demons, insisting that for Christians there are no good demons; cf. TERT. apol. 22.1. 184 AVG. in psalm. 96.12; cf. ep. 102.18–20; TERT. apol. 23.14. Porphyry (abst. 2.40) had argued that demons had misled humans to accept them as Gods in place of the real deities and

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How did demons succeed in becoming the Gods of pagans? Christian writers tell their readers that some of these demons were successful in deceiving ignorant humans with false miracles and signs to regard them as deities. Augustine explains the beginning of the cult of demons, stating that people had first started to venerate deceased persons as immortal Gods but that demons then substituted themselves as the objects of worship.185 Demons aimed at becoming Gods because they wanted to alienate humans from the true God and mislead them to destruction, inciting people to crimes and wickedness by their own example. For this purpose they could help and protect their worshippers in earthly life; Augustine gives L. Cornelius Sulla, who was said to have been a particular favourite of the pagan Gods, as an example of demons’ assistance.186 The malevolence of demons and their great deception is contraposed with the salvation offered by the Christian God and the Christian revelation of the demonic fraud. Only Christianity, vera religio, had divulged the imposture of malicious spirits (fallacia spirituum malignorum), Augustine proclaims.187 Christian writers concede that demons are capable of doing things that are beyond human capacities, for instance, foreknowledge of the future. This, however, does not make them worthy of worship. These abilities of demons caused embarrassment among Christians. Therefore, Augustine answers the questions of hesitant Christians in his De divinatione daemonum, explaining, for example, why demons were able to know of the destruction of the Serapeum beforehand. The bishop writes that demons’ abilities are due to their aerial bodies: because of their intensity of perception and speed of movement they can foretell and declare many things that they have recognized far in advance. Furthermore, their nature enables them to work many miraculous things and these capabilities astonish humans who as earthly beings are slower. Besides, demons very often foretell acts that they themselves intend to perform. Thus, Augustine aims to show that as a matter of fact what demons do is nothing particular. Animals have special abilities and so do different craftsmen, tumblers and tricksters, and yet, they are not worshipped as deities.188 Illustrative of the attitude that demons longed for blood sacrifices. For the discussion about sacrifices, see Chapter 5. 185 E.g., AVG. civ. 8.22; 6.7; 7.35. The deception of demons: AVG. cons. euang. 1.12.18; ep. 102.20; ZENO 1.1.3 Löfstedt; MART. BRAC. corr. 6–7; GREG. NAZ. carm. 1.1.7.74–9; GREG. NYSS. or. cat. 6. 186 The malicious motives of demons: e.g., AVG. civ. 2.10; 2.25; 8.22; IOH. CHRYS. hom. 28 in Matt. 2. Sulla: AVG. civ 2.24. Earlier apologists as well had stressed the fraud of pagan Gods/demons and their malicious motives: e.g., IUST. 2. apol. 5; 1. apol. 14: demons had misled humans to worship them with sacrifices and libations and enslaved humans; ATHENAG. leg. 26–7; TAT. or. 8; 14; 16–18; TERT. apol. 22.4; LACT. inst. 2.15–16. 187 AVG. civ. 7.33–4; 9.15. In discussing Numa Pompilius, AVG. civ. 7.34–5 emphasizes the connection of the demonic deceit and magic, attaching a label of illegal activity to Roman civic religion. Cf. Gal 4:3–9 on the enslavement to the elemental powers of the world from which Christianity liberates humans. Macarius of Magnesia (apocr. 2.21; WAELKENS 1974, 194) asserts that as such demons have no power on humans or the world; they work only through illusions and deception. 188 AVG. div. daem. 1; 3.7; 4.7–8; cf. retract. 2.56; civ. 8.15; 9.22; 18.15; 21.6 and passim; cf. LACT. inst. 2.15. AVG. div. daem. 5.9: demons cause illnesses; cf. TAT. or. 18: demons enter

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of Christian polemicists is the fact that they never question the existence, abilities or power of demons.189 The demonic forces are only contrasted with God’s supreme power. The demons do their evil work under God’s providence.190 Divine Miracles and Demonic Magic Miracles seem to have had a central role in situations of religious competition in which people had to be persuaded of the superiority of the advocated religion. Even though the importance of miracles in conversions should not be overestimated, it is worth recognizing the emphasis Christian writers themselves put on miracles in their accounts. Jerome, for instance, contrasts the Christian miracle performed by Hilarion with pagan magic of demonic incantations and stresses that Hilarion’s miracle, which made the team of the Christian Italicus win in the circus, caused many people to turn to the Christian faith.191 Thus, Christian writers contraposed Christian miracles with wonders of others, calling them magic. Both pagans and Christians recognized the possibility of miracles performed by supernatural forces but what aroused divergence was how to value these miracles, for instance, whether the miracles of the rival were genuine or not; whose miracles were stronger and more effective; whether miracles were performed for right reasons or not; and whether miracles originated from the true God or wicked demons. The authenticity of pagan miracles could be contested as well. Augustine, for example, derides pagan miracles as illusions. It was not difficult for demons to achieve illusions and make people to believe in them, he asserts and labels miracles connected with the cult of Fortuna Muliebris as a piece of female gossip. Similarly, he refuses to regard the ever-burning lamp of Venus as a miracle, explaining the phenomenon as a natural one by the use of asbestos stone. Moreover, pagans, by the use of human arts, were able to effect things that ignorant people considered marvels.192 Scepticism about miracles is reported from the other side as well: Augustine writes of pagans who refused to regard Christian miracles such as the resurrection of Christ and Lazarus and the salvation of Jonah as genuine.193 Augustine proclaims that miracles should not be understood as events contrary to nature but the bodies and produce diseases; TERT. apol. 22.5; MIN. FEL. 27.2; LACT. inst. 2.15–16. AVG. div. daem. 5.9: demons were able to enter human bodies and confuse the thoughts of human per quaedam imaginaria visa. 189 E.g., AVG. civ. 2.24 and div. daem. 2.6, admitting that the works of demons are so great that it seems that these works can only be attributed to God’s power. 190 AVG. civ. 7.35; 18.18; in psalm. 26.2.19; div. daem. 2.6; cf. IUST. 2. apol. 5; LACT. inst. 2.15. CAES. AREL. serm. 12.5 states that demons even believed in God’s existence and omnipotence but they rebelled against him. 191 HIER. Hilar. 20; see also Chapter 4. Cf. MACMULLEN 1981, 95–6 and NOCK 1933 [1961], 254 who regard miracles as the main factor in producing converts; for counterarguments, see SHUMATE 1996, 27. 192 AVG. civ. 4.19: Fortuna Muliebris; 21.6: the lamp of Venus and mechanemata achieved by human arts. 193 AVG. ep. 102.30–32. Augustine remarks that pagans believed in miracles as well but that their miracles were unsupported by reliable testimony. Christian miracle stories aroused

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rather contrary to what is known of nature. Portents and miracles are not contrary to nature since everything happens by the will of God that is the nature of every created thing. They merely are beyond human knowledge. However, miracles in the human sense have occurred and continue to occur, Augustine asserts.194 Christian and pagan miracles rivalled in might and strength. In Christian literature the power of Christ and Christian holy men was represented as greater than the powers of demons. Christian holy men were contrasted with the holy men of pagans or the Jews, and the biblical story of Moses and the Egyptian magi served as a paradigmatic narrative of the superiority of God’s men compared to the capabilities of pagan holy men.195 The miracles performed by Jesus and firstcentury holy man Apollonius of Tyana had been contraposed in the early fourthcentury controversy, for example, in the debate between Hierocles and Eusebius of Caesarea. Hierocles had mocked credulous Christians who fussed about Jesus’ miracles even though Apollonius of Tyana had performed far greater miracles than Jesus. Eusebius had replied in his tractate against Hierocles, arguing that stories about Apollonius’ miracles were unreliable and his works were based on demonic magic.196 Augustine reports on similar comparison of Jesus with Apollonius in his own time but waves it aside as an absurdity. It is meaningless to compare Christ and his prophets with Apollonius or Apuleius of Madauros who based their magic on Gods, that is, demons.197 Augustine concedes that portents and miracles happen but explains them as demonic and thus morally inferior to Christian ones. They are distorted because of their demonic origin.198

controversies in the second and third centuries as well: cf. IUST. 1. apol. 22; TERT. apol. 21.17; ORIG. Cels. 2.48. 194 AVG. civ. 21.8; 22.8. 195 Moses and Egyptian magi, e.g., in AVG. divers. quaest. 73.79; serm. 90.5; trin. 3.7.12; HIER. tract. in psalm. 81. Cf. TERT. apol. 23.15–16 on the power of the name of Christ and the power of touch and breath; MIN. FEL. 27.5 on the power of Christians’ words and prayers over demons; ARNOB. nat. 1.46 on Jesus’ superior power; LACT. inst. 4.26–7 on the power of the cross; EUS. eccl. 7.10.4 on the persons whose presence, glance, mere breath and voice expelled evil spirits. ORIG. Cels. 1.6, in his reply to Celsus’ charges of magical incantations, asserted that Christians did not use incantations; instead, they prevailed over demons in the name of Christ. 196 Hierocles apud EUS. c. Hier. 1–2. Hierocles’ arguments were probably based on Porphyry. BARNES 1981, 177. LACT. inst. 5.3. Philostratus’ biography of Apollonius in the early third century has sometimes been interpreted as an anti-Christian work. This view, however, has been contested, e.g., by S. SWAIN, ‘Defending Hellenism: Philostratus, In Honour of Apollonius’, Apologetics in the Roman Empire, Oxford 1999, 157–96; the Vita Apollonii was written as a defence of Hellenism against orientalizing tendencies in general during the reign of the Severi and Apollonius was raised as a counterpart to Jesus as late as at the turn of the fourth century. 197 AVG. ep. 138.4.20. F. MUNDT, ‘Die Maske des Christen – Spuren christlicher Literatur in der Historia Augusta’, Es hat sich viel ereignet, Gutes wie Böses, München 2001, 37–56: 49 is somewhat inaccurate in claiming that the comparison of Apollonius with Jesus had no more polemical force around 400. 198 AVG. civ. 10.16; cf. 4.19; 4.26.

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It was the origin of miracles that mattered: if miracles were from pagan deities, they were demonic magic. Thus, pagans and Christians contended for legitimate supernatural power. In this rivalry those who were seen to lack the proper divine justification were labelled as mere sorcerers whereas the holders of legitimate power were holy men, saints.199 On both sides, the other’s miracles were branded as magic: Christians as well had been accused of practicing magic and revering demons. As late as at the turn of the fifth century, Jerome and Augustine reply to such charges that label Jesus and his disciples as sorcerers.200 Likewise, the writer of Consultationes Zacchei et Apollonii brands pagan miracles as the achievements of demons, not real miracles, and Augustine condemns pagan practices and Neoplatonic theurgy as demonic sorcery. The miracles of Christian holy men are performed under God’s authority for the public good whereas the pagan wonders are demonic influence for private goals. Pagan magicians work wonders seeking their own glory while Christian saints seek God’s glory. Pagans act through private contracts with evil powers but Christians work though public righteousness.201 Associates – Angels and Demons Pagans and Christians shared a world-view according to which good and evil spirits filled the invisible world between the divine and the human. These spirits could be called minor Gods, angels and daimons/demons. This is why Christian writers attempted to make a clarification between the terms. Augustine admits that, when Platonists prefer to call good angels Gods, there is no need for Christians to engage in a tedious debate about words. However, a line should be drawn between good angels and demons when Platonists insist upon good demons that they do not regard as Gods. Augustine stresses that for Christians the name ‘demon’ is so detestable that it could not be applied to the holy angels. In Christian interpretation, pagan Gods, now demons, were identified with the fallen angels of Jewish cosmology and later Christian mythology. They were praevaricatores angeli.202 Another essential distinction to be drawn was the position towards the cult of good angels or Gods as Platonists chose to call them. These immortal and blessed beings, whatever name they are called, Augustine points out, are created beings. The cult belonged only to the supreme God, the Creator, not to the creation. Good angels 199 In pagan and Christian circles alike the divine powers of holy men were recognized. P. BROWN, The Making of Late Antiquity, Cambridge, Mass. 1978, 58–60. 200 E.g., Celsus apud ORIG. Cels. 1.38 and Porphyry apud EUS. dem. ev. 3.2 and apud AVG. civ. 19.23; other charges apud. TERT. apol. 21; LACT. inst. 4.15. HIER. tract. in psalm. 81 and AVG. cons. euang. 1.10.15; civ. 18.53. 201 Consult. Zacch. 1.13.2–4; AVG. civ. 10.9; divers. quaest. 73.79.1–4; see also the discussion in Chapter 4. 202 AVG. civ. 9.23; ORIG. Cels. 5.4–5: Christians do not call angels demons. Praevaricatores angeli: AVG. civ. 8.22; ep. 102.18. For the identification of fallen angels with demons, see A. KALLIS, ‘Geister (Dämonen): C.II. Griechische Väter’, RAC IX, Stuttgart 1976, 700–715: 701 and P.G. VAN DER NAT, ‘Geister (Dämonen): C.III. Apologeten’, RAC IX, Stuttgart 1976, 715–61: 718.

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did not wish to be worshipped as deities because such homage should be paid to the one God only. The difference between good and wicked angels was the fact that the wicked ones in their pride longed for adoration as deities. Thus, the pagan Gods who wanted to be regarded and adored as divinities were mere demons.203 Augustine’s sermons and letters reveal confusion between good angels and the celestial Gods of pagans at the turn of fifth century. Some pagans and probably some Christians validated the cult of pagan Gods as the worship of good angels. Augustine’s pagan correspondent Longinianus identified the angels of Jewish and Christian tradition with the pagan deities created by the incomprehensible and ineffable supreme God.204 Augustine condemns the cult of angels in its totality. Good angels had always acknowledged the monopoly of God and prohibited humans from paying homage to them.205 Pagans probably used the recurrent identification of good angels and Gods as an opportune justification for their religion. Augustine tells us of some pagans who maintained that they offered sacrifices to celestial powers that were not demons. They explained that the only difference between pagans and Christians was in terminology because pagans named those powers Gods and Christians called them angels. The church father’s response is stern: despite their elegant interpretations, these pagans worshipped only demons that betrayed humans with manifold deceptions.206 It is noteworthy that Augustine appears more openhanded in regards to ‘names’ when conducting a dialogue with Platonists than when maintaining discipline in his bishopric. In the Christian spiritual universe clarified by church fathers, God acted as the only true God and Creator. Angels were admitted to this universe as God’s servants and messengers.207 A number of Greek philosophers had regarded daimons as mediators between the human world and the divine sphere. Christians offered Christ as the mediator in place of daimons. In the Christian inversion or usurpation, church fathers lay claim to a monopoly of the mediator: as the Christian God is the only true God, Christ is the only true mediator. All other sources of spiritual power are excluded: as there are numerous false Gods, there are many false mediators. In City of God Augustine argues that humans do not need any other mediators but Christ.208 203 AVG. civ. 9.23; 10.4; 19.23; also in psalm. 135.3; serm. Dolbeau 26.32 (= 198augm). 204 LONGIN. Aug. ep. 234. Similarly the anonymous pagan philosopher in MAC. MAGN. apocr. 4.20–21 (= fragm. 75–76 Harnack) maintains that Gods such as Athene were identical with the angels of Christians; cf. IAMBL. myst. 5.25. 205 AVG. in psalm. 85.12; also in psalm. 96.12; ep. 102.20. Similarly LACT. inst. 2.17 insisted that angels did not wish themselves to be called Gods but submitted to the will of God. 206 AVG. ep. 102.20. 207 AVG. civ. 7.30: Hac autem facit atque agit unus verus deus … Agit autem multa etiam per angelos ...; 7.32. J. BOTTÉRO, ‘L’homme et l’autre dans la pensée babylonienne et la pensée israélite’, Hommes et bêtes: entretien sur le racisme, Paris 1975, 103–13: 109 points out that the Old Testamental monotheism lays an unbridgeable ontological distance between the Creator and the creation and eliminates all intermediary grades between the divine and the human. 208 AVG. civ. 9.15: The Mediator must be Christ, both divine and human; neither good nor wicked angels can mediate because the former are both blessed and immortal and the latter are immortal and wretched; also 10.24, 10.29 against Porphyry; serm. Dolbeau 26.25–32 (= 198augm). For the ‘usurpation’, see KLOSTERGAARD PETERSEN 2003, 27. For the dispute on

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In City of God and his sermons Augustine aims to refute the view according to which demons were mediators between Gods and humans. Demons only pretended to be both Gods and mediators. Augustine sneers at the Platonic belief that Gods would have no contact with humans but would have dealings with wicked demons; he clarifies his argument with an ironical series of rhetorical opposites, contrasting a suppliant human and an arrogant demon, a penitent human and a deceitful demon, a human who flees towards a divinity and a demon who pretends to be a divinity, a human who begs for mercy and a demon who seduces to iniquity and so on: eight opposites altogether are introduced.209 The Creator and the Creation The claim for cultic monopoly for the Christian God recurs in the argumentation of fourth and fifth century church fathers. In an enarratio Augustine stresses that God did not want to share worship with other beings even though he would be more adored than those others.210 This exclusivism seems to have been the major demarcation line drawn between Christianity and pagan tradition. Many pagans believed that each deity could and should be paid due reverence and this homage was by no means diminishing the glory of the supreme God – on the contrary, it was seen as increasing it.211 Christian leaders elucidated borderlines between the Christian and pagan interpretations of monotheism in stressing the distinction between the Creator God false and true mediators, see J. PÉPIN, ‘Falsi mediatores duo. Aspects de la médiation dans le sermon d’Augustin Contra paganos (S. Dolbeau 26)’, Augustin prédicateur (395–411), Paris 1998, 395–417. 209 AVG. civ. 8.20–22, partic. 8.20; cf. 9.16. Augustine attacks the doctrine of Apuleius of Madauros. 210 AVG. in psalm. 26.2.19: Non vult autem deus coli cum illis, nec si ipse colatur multo amplius, et illi multo minus; also civ. 10.1; 10.4; 10.10 and passim. Jewish and Christian writers had regularly condemned the worship of angels or other divine powers in general. ORIG. mart. 46 attacked syncretistic views on divinity and maintained that God could not be worshipped under the names of Zeus, Apollon or Sun; the only acceptable names for God came from the biblical tradition. LACT. inst. 1.19 argued against those who claimed that the Supreme Being and Creator could be adored with various cults and asserted that the worshippers of other deities could not be worshippers of God. If the honour paid to God was shared by other deities, God altogether ceased to be worshipped. A.H. ARMSTRONG, ‘Man in the Cosmos. A study of some differences between pagan Neoplatonism and Christianity’, Romanitas et Christianitas, Amsterdam 1973, 5–14: 6 calls this “the monotheism of the ‘jealous god’, separated by an unbridgeable gulf from his creation”. 211 In Celsus’ polytheistic monotheism (apud ORIG. Cels. 8.2; 8.9; 8.11; 8.66), one who honoured what belonged to God the Creator did not offend him since everything belonged to him. The worship of the supreme God was only magnified in the cult of the Gods. Pagans seem to have even joked about Christian monopolistic claims, as Augustine (civ. 19.23) tells us of the misinterpretation of Exod 22:20: sacrificans diis eradicabitur nisi deo soli. According to GUIGNEBERT 1923, 90, pagans believed that Christians worshipped the Sun God. However, the pun is probably meant as sarcasm.

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and the created universe. Church fathers referred to the Apostle Paul (Rom 1:25) who had condemned the confusion of the Creator with the creation, accusing pagans of exchanging the truth of God for a lie and worshipping the creature rather than the Creator.212 This error of worshipping the creation instead of its Creator included pagan cults of animals and plants, rivers and mountains, celestial bodies such as the sun, the moon and the stars, elements such as the sea and the earth but also the naturalistic interpretations of traditional Gods as cosmic phenomena as well as the identification of the created universe as the supreme God. The notion of the confusion of the Creator with the creation dominated the debate on the naturalistic interpretation of pagan Gods. The allegorical explanations of Gods as elements and natural phenomena in natural theology was mostly ridiculed and condemned. Sometimes, however, an appeal to natural theology could function as a starting point for a dialogue, as the famous example of the Apostle Paul in the Areopagus shows.213 Fourth- and fifth-century polemicists followed the disapproving trend of earlier apologetic writers. Augustine condemns the confusion in his attack against the theologia naturalis in City of God.214 He argues against Varro who makes God the universe or the soul of the universe (anima mundi), attempts to maintain some multiplicity in the divine and thus fails to distinguish the transcendence of the divine from the universe.215 Augustine mocks philosophers who in their naturalistic explanations of Greco-Roman religions regard the world and its elements and phenomena as divinities, maintaining that pagan intellectuals only try to colour their miserable error with the depth of doctrine and to make their myths look more respectable. He asserts continually that Christians are to adore the Creator, not the universe or its parts. Therefore, the cult of God should be clearly distinguished from opera Dei.216

212 In earlier apologetic: e.g., CLEM. prot. 5; IUST. 1. apol. 48; LACT. inst. 1.18; 2.5; 27. ARIST. apol. 14.4 claimed that even the Jews venerated angels rather than God even though they thought that they worshipped God; the only difference between the Jews and pagans was the fact that pagan idolatry was intentional whereas the Jews were unaware of their idolatry, worshipping the creation instead of the Creator. The confusion was pointed out already in Jewish tradition, e.g., by Philo (opif. 14.45). On the other hand, Christian writers emphasized the notion that God was best seen in his works – his creation: THEOPH. Autol. 1.5. 213 In earlier apologetics, e.g., ATHENAG. leg. 22; TERT. nat. 2.2–6; LACT. inst. 1.12; 2.6, stresses that neither the parts of the universe or the universe altogether is not God. Areopagus: Acts 17:22–23. 214 AVG. civ. books 6–7, esp. 7.5–6; 7.9 against Varro’s theologia naturalis. For the attacks, see CARDAUNS 1978, 85–6. The naturalistic explanations of Gods and myths under attack resemble the interpretations introduced in the speech of Praetextatus in MACR. Sat. 1.17. For Praetextatus’ speech, see LIEBESCHUETZ 1999, 185–205 and KAHLOS 2002, 192–200. 215 Anima mundi: AVG. civ. 4.9 (quoting VERG. ecl. 3.60: Iovis omnia plena; mundi animus); 4.11–12; 4.31; 7.6–7; 7.9–16. 216 AVG. civ. 7.5; 7.18–19; 7.27–32; also sermo Dolbeau 26.2; 26.17; 26.25; 26.31; 26.35 (= 198 augm); ep. 102.20; vera relig. 55.108–22; cf. PS. AVG. quaest. test. 114.2; 114.10. For the issue of the Creator and the creation, see R.J. O’Connell, St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391, Cambridge Mass. 1968, 96.

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In his argumentation Augustine arrives at preferring the Platonic monotheistic ideas of the transcendent God to the polytheistic pantheism of Stoicizing intellectuals. He declares that the naturalistic interpretations (physiologiae) of pagan intellectuals revered the material, even if invisible, and changeable nature: this was by no means the true God. It is blasphemy, he exclaims, to pay homage to anything, whether material or spiritual, in place of the true God.217 He turns against the worship of elements in De consensu evangeliorum, asking why pagans did not prefer to worship God, the Lord of the cosmic elements, instead of Neptune who was only the Lord of the sea, or Silvanus who was only the Lord of meadows and forests, or Sol who was only the Lord of the day, or Luna who reigned only over the night … or Iuno who had supremacy only over the air.218 The confusion of the Creator with the creation is frequent in fourth and fifth century Christian literature. Paulinus of Nola, for example, advises his friend Sulpicius Severus to stay aloof from the ideas of those who confuse the distinction between the Creator and the creation. Similarly, in a letter to Iovius, he refers to those miserable people, who worshipping demons, creatures or elements in God’s name, transgress against his majesty since they pay reverence only to servants. Furthermore, Martin of Braga connects the origin of idolatry with this confusion and states that, as humans forgot their Creator, they began to worship created things – the sun, the moon, stars, deep sea and fountains – and demons appeared and attracted people to venerate them as Gods.219 One God, one Emperor, one Empire Christian leaders stressed the oneness of God against pagan, as well as Gnostic, speculations of the diverse forces of the supreme divinity and the elements of the universe interpreted as God. However, the Christian emphasis on the oneness of the Creator God was by no means an unheard of innovation.220 As we have seen, many pagans acknowledged this unity of the supreme deity but did not regard it as inconsistent with the plurality of minor divinities. In the Christian rectification of frontiers, Christian leaders asserted that there was no place for division of the 217 AVG. civ. 7.27. Augustine stresses that it is blasphemy to worship a created thing or spirit, whether good or evil, since that worship belonged only to the true God; also AVG. in psalm. 34.13; 94.6; ep. 102. 20. For Augustine’s criticism, see O’DALY 1994, 72–3. For Stoic interpretations, see LIEBESCHUETZ 1979, 36–7; CIC. nat. deor. 2.24.65–6. 218 AVG. cons. euang. 1.29.45. 219 PAVL. NOL. ep. 1.9; 16.9; MART. BRAC. corr. 6–7. Consult. Zacch. 1.28.5–9 stresses that worship was due to God only, not to angels, elements or powers; however, the reverence paid to the image of the emperor was not the worship of a deity and had nothing to do with the pagan errors. For the discussion, see M.A. CLAUSSEN, ‘Pagan Rebellion and Christian Apologetics in Fourth-Century Rome: The Consultationes Zacchaei et Apollonii’, JEH 46 (1995), 589–614: 609. 220 XENOPHAN. fr. 24 (Diels – Kranz 21B 24) had affirmed that God “sees as a whole, understands as a whole and hears as a whole”; Plutarch (de E 391F, 393C, 394A) referred to views that explained the name Apollon as meaning ‘not many’ and denying the multiplicity. For these tendencies, see GRANT 1986, 89, 115.

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functions or powers of the Creator God.221 The Christian God in Prudentius’ Contra Symmachum declares that he needs neither servants nor associates (ministeriis ... non egeo, nec participes sociosve requiro).222 God was substantia simplex and could not be divided into parts. The thousand deities that pagans claimed to be virtutes of the supreme God would only diminish him into pieces. Thus, Prudentius’ God concludes with a claim for absolute monotheism.223 Christian polemicists aimed to demonstrate the superiority of the oneness of God and the unity of religion as contrasted with the plurality of Gods and the chaotic diversity of pagan beliefs and practices. In City of God Augustine introduces his civitas Dei as the realm of unity. It is characterized by the one God as well as one uniform doctrine and Scripture. Its opposite is the opposing civitas that is not actually a unity but rather a concoction of many diverse cities and communities. What unites them is only their misdirected love, the love of the self instead of love of God. This other civitas is characterized by its plurality and diffusion of beliefs, interpretations and writings.224 The argument frequently employed was the analogy between monotheism and monarchy. Prudentius represents the establishment of monarchy and the triumph of Christian monotheism going hand in hand with each other. He states that, as Rome has at last adopted the right form of government, the imperial monarchy, it is ready to receive the true religion and no longer hesitates.225 Several fourth and fifth century Christian writers also associated the oneness and undividedness of God with the unity of the Roman rule. Ambrose connects the authority of the one empire and the one God, writing that all the people have learned to confess the rule of the one almighty God living under the reign of the single earthly imperium.226 221 E.g., AVG. cons. euang. 1.17.25; 1.18.26; 1.19.27 condemns such pretensions. PS. CYPR. CARM. ad senat. 46 argues that a person who worships everything virtually worships nothing: nilque colis, dum cuncta colis. 222 PRVD. c. Symm. 2.231. Two verses below (2.233) Prudentius refers to angelicas legiones as God’s associates. 223 PRVD. c. Symm. 2.236–40; 2.244–5. 224 M. VESSEY – K. POLLMANN – A.D. FITZGERALD, ‘Introduction’, History, Apocalypse, and the Secular Imagination. AugSt 30.2 (1999), 1–26: 8. Cf. AVG. ep. 102.10 who asserts that different nations are bound together by one and the same religion. Cf. EUS. laud. Const. 9; 13; 16, who had stated that the diversity of polytheism caused discord and conflict. EUS. or. 17.13–14 implied that the united cult of the one true God ended immorality. See Chapter 3. 225 PRVD. c. Symm. 2.441–2; 2.430–31; 1.287–90. Cf. LACT. inst. 1.3.19, who argued that as the empire needed the single leader, humans were in need of the one God. Philo of Alexandria (spec. leg. 1.13–65) explained Jewish monotheism, using the term monarchy, and Christian apologists (IUST. dial. 1.3, TAT. or. 14.1, THEOPH. Autol. 2.4, 8, 35, 38) referred to Iliad 2.204 in order to justify divine monarchy. ALEXANDRE 1998, 9; CHADWICK 1993, 37–41. 226 AMBR. explan. ps. 45.21. FOWDEN 1993, 5 regards the Christianization of the Roman Empire as “a part of a wider and longer process by which the idea of empire, and in particular monarchy, was conjoined with the belief in the One God – monotheism”. According to EUS. laud. Const. 9; 16, the Roman Empire that had united most of the diverse nations and was destined to control those not yet united announced the kingdom of God. For the idea of one religion reinforcing the unity of the Empire, see V. BUCHHEIT, ‘Einheit durch Religion in Antike und Christentum’, Chartulae, Münster 1998, 36–43: 36.

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Index

Ancient Persons and Authors Ambrose 7 n. 22, 24 n. 59, 27, 34, 36 and n. 101, 45-6, 50 and n. 155, 58, 77-78, 83 n. 108, 90-1, 105, 115 n. 10, 119 n. 30, 121, 126, 135 and n. 107, 184 ‘Ambrosiaster’ (the writer of Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti) 24, 45 and n. 135, 61, 73, 85, 121 n. 40 Ammianus Marcellinus 7 n. 23, 69 n. 54, 104 Antiochus of Ascalon 152 n. 67 Apollonius of Tyana 68, 124 n. 51, 142 n. 23, 178 and n. 196-7 Apringius 33-4 n. 93 Apuleius 66, 85 n. 114, 140, 175, 178, 181 n. 209 Aratus 78, 146 n. 38 Arcadius 121 n. 42 Aristides: Aelius Aristides 85 n. 114, 145 n. 38 Aristides of Athens 98 n. 23 Aristotle 58, 153 n. 71, 163 n. 115 Arnobius 9 and n. 28 and n. 33-4, 64 n.30, 72 and n. 64, 75, 86 and n.117, 143, 149 n. 53, 152 n. 63-4, 157 n. 88, 160 n. 102, 162 n. 112, 165 Asterius of Amasea 44 n. 131 Athanasius of Alexandria 16 Athenagoras 98, 145 n. 36, 146 n. 42, 150 Atto of Vercelli 130 n. 81 Augustine of Hippo passim Ausonius 15, 27 and n. 74, 32 n. 88, 41-2 and n. 122 Avienus: Rufius Festus Avienus 146 n. 38, 160 n. 103 Barnabas 13, 49 n. 152, 142 n. 23 Basil of Caesarea 68 n. 50, 87 n. 120 Bonifatius 130 n. 81

the Caeionii 39 Caesarius of Arles 50 n. 156 Celsus 5, 58 n. 10, 63 n. 26, 65 n. 37, 66 n. 41, 69 n. 54, 109, 143 n. 28, 147 n. 47, 148 n. 50, 150, 159 n. 98, 170, 174 n. 174, 178 n. 195, 181 n. 211 Choricius 42 n. 122 Chromatius of Aquileia 17 Chrysippus 168 n. 149 Cicero 9, 66, 71, 80, 94 n. 7, 95 and n. 13, 100, 104, 106 n. 63-4, 137, 151-2, 159 and n. 101, 164 Claudian 15, 41-2 and n. 122. Clement of Alexandria 20 and n. 40, 61 n. 20, 78 n. 87, 87 n. 120, 163 n. 117 Constans 128 Constantine 6 n. 18, 14 n. 14, 46, 101 and n. 35, 102, 107, 121, 122 n. 43, 135-6, 148, 168 n. 150 Constantius II 3-4, 43-4, 101, 105-6 n. 63, 128 Cyprian 13 and n. 7, 34 n. 96, 56, 63 n. 26, 106, 131, 151 n. 60 Cyril of Alexandria 33, 65-6 Cyril of Jerusalem 128 n. 72 Cyrus of Panopolis 42 n. 122 Decius 119 Deogratias 65 and n. 35 Dio Chrysostom (Dio of Prusa) 85 n. 114, 108 n. 76 Diocletian 104, 106 and n. 61, 109 n. 80 Diodorus Siculus 155 n. 78 Diogenes Laertius 85 n. 114 Empedocles 71 n. 63 Ephraem of Edessa 21 Epiphanius of Salamis 74 n. 74 Eucherius 43 Euhemeristic 71, 155 and n. 78-9, 156-7, 164 n. 125, 169 Euodius 90

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Eusebius of Caesarea 20 n. 40, 21, 46, 61 n. 20, 66 n. 41, 69-70, 122 n. 43, 152,155, 168 n. 150, 178 Faustus of Milevis (Faustus the Manichaean) 59, 132, 150 Felix, comes sacrarum largitionum 44 n. 132 Felix III, the bishop of Rome 37 n. 104 Firmicus Maternus 86 and n. 117, 101, 1067, 118 n. 27, 121 n. 40, 146 n. 38, 160 n. 103 Firmus 39 and n. 110, 65 n. 33 Flaccus: Verrius Flaccus 151 n. 63 Fronto 5 Gelasius 37 and n. 104, 104-5, 134 n. 101 Gracchus: Furius Maecius Gracchus 92 n. 143 Gratian 115 n. 10, 119 n. 30 Gregory of Nazianzus 21-2, 30, 57, 87 n. 120, 116 and n. 17, 135 Gregory of Nyssa 150, 159 Gregory of Rome 56 and n. 4 Gregory of Tours 114 n. 9 Hecebolius 27 n. 70, 44 and n. 129-30 Helpidius 44 n. 132 Heraiscus 170 n. 160 Hermias 69 Hierocles 63 n. 26, 158 and n. 95, 178 and n. 196 Hilarion 112, 177 Honorius 42 n. 122, 121 n. 42 Hypatia 33, 40 Iamblichus 19, 125 and n. 55, 140, 173 Iovius 13, 39-40 n. 115, 67 and n. 44, 87-8, 183 Jacob of Seroûg 128, 131 and n. 83 Jerome 24 n. 59, 58 and n. 12, 60-1, 71, 82, 90, 112, 177, 179 John Chrysostom 71, 78-9 Jovian 43-4 Jovinian 61

Julian, the emperor 4, 14, 16, 18-9, 21-2, 26 n. 69, 28-30, 33, 35 n. 98, 40, 43-4, 47 and n. 143, 58 n. 10, 63 n. 26, 656, 69 n. 54, 104, 107 n. 69, 116, 120, 145 n. 37, 148, 150, 157 n. 93, 158, 163 n. 114, 172 Against Galileans 33, 65 Julian, comes Orientis 44 n. 132 Julian of Eclanum 52 n. 164, 54 n. 171 Justin 20 and n. 40, 21 n. 44, 60-2, 78 n. 87, 85 and n. 114, 98 n. 23, 143 n. 29, 146 n. 42, 167 n. 145, 174 Labeo: Cornelius Labeo 157 and n. 93, 173 and n. 172, 175 and n. 182 Lactantius 9 and n. 28 and 33, 13 and n. 7, 66 n. 41, 72 and n. 64, 79-80 n. 93, 92 n. 145, 98-9, 103, 139, 144 n. 31, 146, 152 n. 64, 155 and n. 78, 157 n. 88, 169 n. 151, 174 Leo of Rome 38, 135 and n. 103, 173 Leucadius 45 and n. 134 Libanius 14, 21, 38, 44 n. 128, 46-7 n. 142, 75, 116 and n. 17, 148 Livy 104 n. 47, 167 n. 142 Longinianus 17 n. 25, 25, 81-2, 115, 147, 161, 180 Lucian of Samosata 108 n. 76, 168 n. 149 Macarius of Magnesia 66 n. 38, 79 n. 90, 105, 107, 143, 176 n. 187 Macrobius 27 n. 70, 42 n. 122, 105 n. 54, 148 Marcellinus: Flavius Marcellinus 33-4, 39, 64 n. 32, 65, 82, 104 Marcianus 45 and n. 134 Martin of Braga 120, 173, 183 Maximian 104, 106 and n. 61, 109 n. 80 Maximinus Daia 14 n. 14, 103-5, 107, 109 Maximus of Madauros 70 and n. 58, 72, 76, 78, 82 n. 101, 103, 118, 139, 145, 147-9, 156, 160, 168 Maximus of Turin 14, 74, 91, 108, 122, 128 Maximus of Tyre 145 n. 38, 147, 170 Melania the Younger 39 and n. 112 Menander 82 n. 105 Minucius Felix 27 n. 73, 63 n. 26, 79 n. 90, 98, 143, 152 n. 64, 163

Index Modestus: Flavius Domitius Modestus 43-4 n. 128 Monnica 135 n. 107 Namatianus: Rutilius Namatianus 76 n. 80 Nectarius 82 n. 101, 165 Nonnus of Panopolis 41-2 n. 122 Novatian 62 n. 23, 63 n. 26, 127-9, 131 Olympius 170 n. 157 Optatus of Milevis 24 Origen 20 n. 40, 21 n. 41, 61 n. 20, 65 n. 37, 66 n. 41, 87 n. 121, 143 and n. 27-8, 149 n. 53 Orosius 22, 24, 42-3, 69, 119-20, 140, 144, 149 Pacianus of Barcelona 24 Panaetius of Rhodes 152 n. 67 Paul, the Apostle 29, 36-7, 57-8, 71, 78-9 n. 88, 89 n. 127, 90 n. 132, 116, 122, 166 n. 138, 169 n. 154, 182 Paulina: Fabia Aconia Paulina 16 and n. 18 Paulinus of Nola 13, 39-40 n. 115, 67, 73, 87-8, 106, 123, 135, 140, 142 n. 23, 145, 162, 183 Pegasius 47 and n. 143 Peter, the Apostle 13, 49 n. 152, 58, 120 Petrus Chrysologus 35-6, 130, 165 Philastrius of Brescia 24 Philippus Arabs 119 Philo of Alexandria 173 n. 172, 189 n. 225 Philostorgius 37 Philostratus 178 n. 196 Plato 49 n. 150, 58, 61, 71 n. 63, 140, 142, 145 n. 36, 157, 162, 165 n. 132, 173, 175 Pliny the Younger 5, 104-5, 107 Plotinus 12, 140, 160 n. 104, 173 n. 172 Plutarch 173, 175, 183 n. 220 Polybius 154 n. 75 Porphyry 8, 17 n. 25, 21 n. 41, 58 n. 10, 63 n. 26, 66-7, 71, 80-1, 103, 105, 107, 120, 123-5, 140, 141 n. 21, 152, 158-9, 170, 172-5, 178 n. 196, 180 n. 208 Posidonius 152 n. 67

207

Praetextatus: Vettius Agorius Praetextatus 16-7 n. 25, 45 n. 135, 146 and n. 39, 182 n. 214 Primasius of Hadrumentum 50 n. 155, 68 Proclus 173 n. 172 Procopius 46 Prudentius 5, 24-5 n. 65, 73, 87 n. 121, 103, 105, 107, 114, 117 and n. 22, 119, 121, 123-4 n. 49, 129 and n. 79, 155-6 and n. 82, 157 n. 89, 163-5, 184 and n. 222 Pseudo-Paulinus see Carmen ad Antonium (Poema ultimum) 33 n. 93, 34 and n. 96, 39 n. 114, 137 n. 2 Publicola 123 and n. 47, Pythagoras 71 n. 63, 124 n. 51 Quodvultdeus 126, 128-9, 165 Rufinus 106 Sallust 113-4 n. 5 Salustius (Salutius) 173 n. 172 Salvian 24, 36, 126-8 Scaevola: Mucius Scaevola 64, 81, 152-4 Seneca 9, 49 n. 150, 71, 95, 100 and n. 32, 105, 110, 113, 137 n. 1, 151-2, 154 n. 76, 162 n. 111 Severus of Antioch 43 and n. 124, 127 n. 66 Shenoute of Atripe 46 Simplicianus 41 Socrates, the church historian 17, 44 and n. 129 Socrates, the philosopher 30 n. 82, 71 n. 63, 145 n. 36 Sophocles 145 n. 36 Stilicho 43 and n. 126 Sueton 109 Sulla 167, 176 and n. 186 Symmachus 17 n. 25, 36 n. 101, 42, 58, 778, 115 n. 10, 148 Synesius of Cyrene 21, 28, 30, 40-1 Tacitus 5, 57 n. 7, 104 and n. 47, 106, 109 Tatian 20-1 n. 44, 60 n. 19, 69, 140, 174 Terence 165

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Tertullian 4, 13 and n. 7, 20, 23 and n. 51, 27 n. 73, 50, 58 n. 12, 60 n. 19, 62, 63 n. 26, 71, 73 n. 67, 98, 103, 127-8, 131 and n. 84, 146, 150, 152 n. 64, 153 and n. 72, 155, 163, 165, 174 and n. 176 Themistius 17 n. 23 and n. 25, 33, 43-4, 70, 78, 147-8 n. 50 Theodoret of Cyrrhus 20 n. 39, 87 n. 120, 108, 163 n. 117 Theodosius I 16, 45, 47 n. 142, 102 Theodosius II 65 Theophilus of Antioch 61 n. 20, 145 n. 36 Theophrastus 96 n. 15, 124 n. 53 Theramenes 43 and n. 127 Tiberianus 146 n. 38 Trajan 107 Tyconius 49-50 Valens 44 Valentinian I 3, 77 n. 84, 102 Valentinian II 34 Valentinian III 45 Valerian 119 Varro 7-10, 69, 71, 80, 95, 104, 114 and n. 9, 124 n. 50, 137-40, 145, 147, 149, 151-4, 161, 169, 171 and n. 162, 182 and n. 214 Vergil 10 and n. 35, 77 and n. 83, 81, 124 n. 49, 144 n. 31, 156-7 n. 89, 167 Victorinus: Marius Victorinus 24 and n. 60, 28, 40-1, 92 and n. 145 Volusianus: Rufius Antonius Agrypnius Volusianus 33-4, 39 and n. 112, 64 and n. 32, 82 and n. 102-3, 92 Xenophanes 159 n. 100, 163 and n. 117 Zacharias Scholasticus 43 n. 125 Zeno of Verona 31, 114, 123 General Index Aaron 111 Abel 50 Abraham 120 n. 36 Acca Larentia 164 n. 126

adultery 70 n. 57, 163-6 Aeneas 168 Aesculapius 154, 158 n. 96 agape 132 Allah 148 n. 47, 173 n. 170 ambiguity 26-7, 31-4, 41-2 n. 122, 94, 96, 101, 131 n. 86 amphitheatre 126-9 amulet 112 n. 91 androgynous Gods 160 angels 12-4 and n. 15, 48, 51, 74, 81, 121, 142-3, 146 n. 39, 147-8 n. 50, 157, 172, 174-5 and n. 177, 179-83 anonymia 147 Anubis 157, 162 n. 111 Apollo 140 n. 14, 146 n. 39, 158-9 n. 98, 162 n. 110, 167, 181 n. 210, 183 n. 220 apostasy 44-5 apostate 26, 44-5 Areopagus 71, 78-9 n. 88, 182 and n. 213 asses (pagans as asses) 74 ‘atheists’, ‘atheism’ 19 n. 31, 96-8, 125 n. 57 Athene 140 n. 14, 158 n. 96, 180 n. 204 Attis 61, 83, 114-5, 158 n. 96, 162 Aufhebung 29 augurs, augury 110, 152 Babylon 1, 11, 50 and n. 154-5, 52 n. 160, 70, 134 n. 97 Bacchanalia 104 n. 47 Bacchus 104 n. 47, 113, 118, 155-6 n. 82, 164 and n. 122 banquets 89, 116-7, 122, 134-6 n. 108 baptism 27-8, 38-9 and n. 111, 42, 62, 1078, 112, 116, 128 beasts (pagans as beasts) 74, 105 bisexual deities 100, 152 Bithynia 107 blindness 14, 73-4, 85, 168 booty (as a metaphor) see spolia 87 n. 121, 88 Busiris 120 n. 37 Caelestis 89 Cain 50 Capitol 81, 100, 105 n. 56, 120, 165

Index Carmen contra paganos 4, 9 n. 27, 45 and n. 135, 74, 106, 114-5, 137, 157, 162-4 Carmen ad Antonium (Poema ultimum) 34, 14 n. 14, 33 n. 93, 39 n. 114, 45 n. 135, 85 and n. 115, 96, 114-6, 118, 120-1, 137 n. 2, 162, 171 Carmen ad (quendam) senatorem 4, 9 n. 27 Carthage 52, 64, 114, 120, 134 the genius of Carthage 123 n. 46 Castor 154 catechumen 39 and n. 111, 40, 42, 64, 126, 128 n. 72, 130 Ceres 162 circumcision 114 circus 112, 126-9, 177 the city of God 30, 48-54, 65 n. 33, 70 civitas 11, 48-54, 70, 121, 184 civitas caelestis 11, 48-54, 121, 184 civitas terrena 11, 48-54, 70 Cloacina 72, 138-9 complexity 11, 67 concordia 11 confusion 2, 11, 48, 50-1, 69-70, 85, 141, 174, 180, 182-3 Consultationes Zacchei et Apollonii 68, 179 conversion 6 n. 18, 11, 14, 18 n. 28, 19 n. 32, 21 n. 44, 29, 32-4, 37, 40-8, 76, 82-7, 89, 91 n. 140, 92 and n. 143, 101-2 n. 37, 108 and n. 76, 129, 135, 146 n. 38, 177 conversion of temples 156 n. 87, 170 cryptopagans 26, 43, 46-7 and n. 143 Cybele, see also Magna Mater 61, 83 n. 106, 129 n. 75 Daedalus 162 daemon, daimon ch. 6.III Daniel 129 darkness (as a metaphor) 11-4, 30, 34 n. 96, 37, 49, 53 and n. 167-8, 58, 85, 90, 109 David 71, 127 n. 67 deisidaimonia 96 and n. 15 demonization 74 and n. 75, 131 n. 86, 135, 173 demons ch. 6.III demonstratio 63 denigration 5, 67, 72-5, 105, 117, 164 n. 126

209

Diana 120 n. 35, 159, 162 n. 110, 173 dii selecti 139 n. 8, 140 n. 13, 149 Dionysus, see Bacchus 158 n. 96 discord 11, 68-70, 184 n. 224 disease 107-9, 177 n. 188 diversity 2 n. 1, 11, 68-70, 137, 148 n. 50, 184 and n. 224 divination 65, 81, 96, 101-2, 110, 120-2 dogs (pagans as dogs) 74 Donatism 16, 24 n. 61, 45-6 n. 140, 49, 52 and n. 163, 70 n. 58, 75 n. 76, 79 n. 88 the draught of fish 52 elements 99, 110, 169, 171, 174 n. 175, 182-3 Elijah 127 n. 67, 129 Elvira, the council of Elvira 38, 122 Esau 129 ethnarch Gods 148 ethne 19-20 ethnikoi 17 n. 21, 19-20 ethnici 20 eusebeia 18, 96 n. 15 exempla 9 Eucharist 62 n. 23, 72 n. 66, 117, 123 Euhemerism 155 and n. 78-9, 156-7, 164 n. 125, 169 exclusivism 52 n. 163, 78 and n. 86, 85 n. 114, 145 n. 37, 181 exordium 67 n. 43 Felicitas 139, 166 Felix (the patron saint of Nola) 123 and n. 48, 135 Feralia 135 filthiness 85 n. 115, 106-7, 115 and n. 11, 131 n. 83, 156 flamen 38 and n. 109 flexible prejudices 90 Flora 113-4, 138, 164 and n. 126 Floralia 164 n. 126 Fortuna 127 n. 66, 177 Frigidus 9 Fugalia 113 galli priests 73, 108 n. 71, 113 n. 2, 114, 116-7, 121 n. 40, 152

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gentes 19-20, 22, 24, 56 n. 5 gentiles 20, 22, 24-5 and n. 64, 90 n. 132 gigantomachia 162 gladiatorial games 38, 120 n. 35, 126 Gnosticism 12-4, 53, 72, 122 n. 45, 160 n. 104, 183 half-Christians, see semi-Christians 26 haruspices, haruspicina 102, 110, 122 n. 43 hecatomb 119 Hellenes 16-7 n. 21, 20-2, 25, 29, 68 n. 50, 71, 78 n. 87, 116, 140 Hellenism 2 n. 3, 4, 14, 16, 19-21, 40 and n. 117, 43, 178 n. 196 Hellenismos 20 n. 39, 21 henotheism 141 Hercules 154-5, 157-9 heros 155-8 Hermes Trismegistus 145 n. 36, 147 n. 46 Hesus 120 n. 35 Hispellum 101, 107 Historia Augusta 37 n. 105, 178 n. 197 Homer 12, 71 n. 63, 147 n. 44, 159 and n. 101, 163, 173 n. 172 homosexuality 157 n. 93 hybrid 31 and n. 84 hypogeum 32-3 hypogeum in Via Latina 32 identity 1-2, 4, 8, 13, 15, 19 and n. 30, 21, 30, 55-7, 60, 63, 75 n. 78, 84, 132-4, 144 n. 32, 151 self-perception, self-affirmation 1, 21 n. 43, 55, 63 n. 26, 65 idolatria, idolatry, idols 5, 12, 29, 47-8, 59, 62, 70-1, 73 n. 69, 78, 86, 89, 92, 99, 101 n. 36, 108, 110, 112, 115, 121-3, 127-8, 130-4, 140, 145-6, 150, 152, 166-174 n. 175, 182-3 imperial cult 7, 38 n. 109 impietas, impiety 17, 44 n. 133, 73, 97-8, 107-8, 113, 130, 165-6 impii 29, 73 and n. 67 incest 72, 152, 163, 165 incerti 2, 30-43, 46, 56 n. 3, 64, 67 and n. 44, 80-1, 86-7, 90, 130-1, 134 and n. 96 inclusivism 78 and n. 86-7 Isis 8 n. 27, 16, 61, 95 n. 10, 118, 162 n. 111

Jacob 129 Jerusalem 1, 11, 50 and n. 154-5, 129, 134 n. 97 Jesus Christ 13, 17, 29-31, 35-6, 42, 44 n. 133, 50, 58, 61-3, 68 n. 50, 69, 75, 78 n. 86, 80-2, 85, 89, 112, 115 n. 10, 120-1, 126 n. 61, 129-30, 140, 143, 150, 158-9, 168, 177-80 Jonah 65 n. 35, 177 Juno 129, 162-3, 167 n. 141 Jupiter, see also Zeus 89, 100, 120 and n. 35, 129, 140 and n. 14 and 16, 147 n. 47, 149, 155-7, 160 n. 103, 162 n. 110, 163, 165-7, 173 Kalendae Ianuariae (the New Year) 14, 128, 130, 132-3 kothornoi 43 lapsi 44-5, 89 and n. 89 the Last Judgment 49, 51, 54, 129 n. 76 Lazarus 177 libation 47, 124, 176 n. 186 Liber, see also Bacchus 113 n. 2 and 4, 114 n. 6, 118 n. 27, 155 light (as a metaphor) 11-4, 30, 34 and n. 96, 37, 51, 53 and n. 167-8, 79, 85, 90, 113 170 Logos 61 n. 20, 78 n. 87, 150 and n. 57 ludi 127 and n. 66, 164-5 n. 128 Luna 182-3 Lupercalia 37, 104, 134 n. 101 Madauros 47, 148 magi 61, 130, 178 and n. 195 magic 72, 86, 93-4, 96-7, 101-2, 107 n. 68, 109-112, 121 n. 42, 174 and n. 174, 176 n. 187, 177-9 magicians 97, 111, 174 n. 176, 179 Magna Mater, see also Cybele 5, 73, 113-6, 121 n. 40, 152, 162, 166 Manichaeans, Manichaeism 13-4, 16-7, 49 and n. 151, 52-4, 59, 65, 75, 104, 106, 108 n. 72, 109 and n. 79-80, 117 n. 24, 132, 150 Mars 128, 139, 156 n. 82, 163-4

Index martyrs 6 n. 18, 47, 59, 61, 70 n. 58, 121, 129 and n. 75, 132, 135, 150-1, 156-7 martyr cult 47, 61, 135-6 n. 108, 150-1, 156 Mary: Virgin Mary 129 mediators 31, 80, 180-1 mens divina 147-8 Mercurius 89, 155-6 n. 82,162 n. 110, 164 and n. 123, 173 miles Christi 22-3 and n. 51 miracles 62, 82, 111-2, 142, 158, 167, 169, 176-9 Mithraeum 92 n. 143 mixed marriages 83 Moses 61, 111, 169 n. 153, 178 and n. 195 mysteries 23 n. 51, 31, 113, 116-8, 162, 166 n. 137, 171 myth critique 9, 62, 71-2, 100, 114, 152-3, 159, 161-5, 169 n. 153, 182 and n. 214 nationes 19-20, 24 negative theology 98 n. 22, 146, 160-1 Neptune 110, 128, 139, 155, 167, 171-3, 183 nous see mens Numa Pompilius 111, 166 n. 134, 169 n. 153, 176 n. 187 obscenity 113, 116, 118 n. 27, 152, 162, 166 Oenoanda 146 n. 39 opportunists 26, 42-3 oracles 68, 71 and n. 63, 145 n. 36, 146 n. 39, 158-9 n. 98 Osiris 162 paganus, pagani 22-6 paideia 26 paradigm shifts 84 n. 110 Parentalia 135 Paris 162, 166 pater familias 92 patria potestas 92 and n. 143 patrons 46 n. 140, 74, 92 penates 16, 167 n. 141, 168 and n. 146 phrygianum 117 n. 19 Pluto 120 n. 35, 155

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pollution 30, 33 n. 90, 101, 107-8, 115, 1223 n. 47, 130, 135, 163, 165, 170 Pollux 154 polynymia 147 pompa diaboli 126-7 pontifex maximus 119 n. 30 praeparatio evangelica 61 n. 20, 78, 80, 82 Priapus 113 n. 2, 114, 138-9, 157, 162 n. 110 profani 73, 106-7 prophecies 167 purification 115-6 Qumran 13 refutatio 33, 63, 67, 152 religio 1, 3, 12, 71, ch. 4, 113, 117, 176 retorsio 71, 159 ridicule 47, 59, 67, 69, 72 and n. 65, 76 n. 79, 97, 104, 114, 118, 137-8, 150, 152-3, 160 n. 102, 162-3, 165, 168 n. 149, 170, 175 n. 182, 182 the right use, see usus iustus Rome (as a metaphor) 11, 50, 137 Romulus 100, 157-8 n. 96, 166 sacrifice 5, 16, 20, 38, 45, 59, 61, 65 n. 35, 82, 88, 93, 97 and n. 21, 99, 101-2, 104-5, 108, ch. 5, 140, 149, 151, 166, 169, 175-6, 180 human sacrifice 115, 120 and n. 35 spiritual sacrifice 124-5 sacrilegium 130, 171 saeculum 11, 53-4 Saturn 119 n. 31, 120, 155 n. 81, 156-7 n. 88 and 91, 162 n. 110, 167 n. 143, 168 n. 149 saviour 158 secrecy 117 n. 24, 118 and n. 27 self-consciousness 15, 18 semi-Christians, see half-Christians 26-8, 39 n. 111 senate, the Roman senate 36 the majority of the Roman senate 36 and n. 101 separation 14, 48-9, 51-2, 58-60, 86, 119 n. 30, 133 and n. 92 Septuagint 19, 169

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Serapeion 65, 83 n. 106, 176 Serapis 65 sexual affairs 72, 163, 165 ‘shadow-boxing’ 7-8 the Sibyls 145 n. 36 signa 126, 169, 171 Silvanus 183 simplicity 11, 104 simulacra 169 and n. 153, 171-2 snakes (heretics as snakes) 74 and n. 74 Sol 38, 183, 127 n. 67, 172 n. 166, 181 n. 210-1 Sol Invictus 86 and n. 117 spolia (as a metaphor), see booty 87-8 Sterculus (Stercutius, Stercutus) 72, 139 straw man 8, 67-8 suaviludii 36 n. 100, 127 superstitio 1, 3, 12, 20, 24, 29-30, 37, 47, 61, 65 n. 33, 71-4, ch. 4, 115, 131, 134-5, 152, 172 n. 166, 175 synkatabasis 79-80 n. 93

the altar of Victory 36 the wheat and tares 52 Yahweh 19, 148 n. 50 Zeus, see also Jupiter 62, 120 n. 35, 140 n. 14, 145 n. 38, 153 n. 120, 155 n. 78, 158 n. 96, 174, 181 n. 210 Modern Writers Ando, C. 146 Armstrong, A.H.12, 173 Athanassiadi, P. 144 Beard, M. 119 Bianchi, U. 12 Bonner, G. 27-8 Bowersock, G.W. 7, 21 Bradbury, S. 121

taurobolium 5, 7 n. 20, 115, 117 and n. 19 and 21 tertium genus 29 Teutates 120 n. 35 theatre 38, 51, 76, 113, 116, 126-9, 131 and n. 86, 133-5, 138, 162, 164-5 theologia civilis 152-3, 161 theologia mythica 152-3, 161, 163 theologia naturalis 152-3, 182 and n. 214 theologia tripertita 152 and n. 67-8, 161 Titus Tatius 100 Trinity 150 and n. 58 turncoats 26-7 n. 70, 42-45 turpitudo 113 and n. 2, 162

Chuvin, P. 23, 25 Cracco Ruggini, L. 7

unity 11, 29, 32, 54, 68-70, 119, 122, 146, 183-4 and n. 226 usus iustus 87-88

Kinzig, W. 44

Val di Non 91 n. 139 Venus 72, 115 n. 10, 127, 138-40, 155 n. 81, 156 n. 82, 162-5, 177 and n. 192 Vesta 81, 115 n. 10 Vestals 61, 115 n. 10 via universalis 78, 80 Victoria 36, 115 n. 10, 166

Dougherty, J. 107 Gadamer, H.-G. 78 Garzya, A. 40-1 Grégoire, H. 23 Gualandri, I. 77 Guignebert, C. 3, 27 Fowden, G. 7, 19 Frazer, J. 93 n. 2 Frede, M. 144, 174 Fredriksen, P. 84

Liebeschuetz, W. 173 Lizzi, R. 7 McLynn, N.B. 5, 64, 117 Mandouze, A. 172 Markus, R.A. 4, 7-8, 53, 56, 59-60, 84, 131, 133, 151 Marrou, H.-I. 53 Mohrmann, C. 23

Index North, J. 6, 119

Rokeah, D. 62

O’Donnell, J.J. 23, 25, 28, 32 Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. 75 van Oort, J. 49 Orgels, P. 23

Sachot, M. 6, 98, 103 Salzman, M.R. 7, 170 Shumate, N. 83 Simon, M. 157

Perelman, C. 75 Price, S. 119

Trombley, F.R. 7

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