Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China (Routledge Studies in China in Transition)

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ELITE DUALISM AND LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN CHINA

Who are the top political leaders in China? What are the major criteria in elite recruitment? How is job promotion in high politics determined? By studying over one and a half thousand top political Chinese leaders this book seeks to answer these questions and, as a result, defines how Chinese leadership is stratified. Unlike existing research on Chinese leaders, Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China draws on extensive statistical information and data analysis. It evidences how political development in the reform era has led to the division of labour between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government in governance, leading to two distinctive career paths in the two political systems respectively. Key issues examined include: • • • • •

the different selection criteria of the CCP and the government, the requirements for promotion, the effect of university education on the rate of mobility, the different career histories of the CCP cadres and government officials, the different roles of cooptation in the CCP and the government.

Many of the elite members discussed are still leading figures in China. This book draws on the most up-to-date and extensive biographical data set, which allows for a meaningful quantitative analysis of elite behaviour in China for the first time in Chinese Studies. This book will be useful to both students of Chinese studies and comparative politics and will also interest researchers, political commentators, statesmen and Chinawatchers. Xiaowei Zang is Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Social Studies, City University of Hong Kong.

ROUTLEDGECURZON STUDIES ON CHINA IN TRANSITION Series Editor: David S. G. Goodman

1 THE DEMOCRATISATION OF CHINA Baogang He 2 BEYOND BEIJING Dali Yang 3 CHINA’S ENTERPRISE REFORM Changing state/society relations after Mao You Ji 4 INDUSTRIAL CHANGE IN CHINA Economic restructuring and conflicting interests Kate Hannan 5 THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE IN CHINA Real estate and commerce departments in reform era Tianjin Jane Duckett 6 TOURISM AND MODERNITY IN CHINA Tim Oakes 7 CITIES IN POST MAO CHINA Recipes for economic development in the reform era Jae Ho Chung 8 CHINA’S SPATIAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Regional transformation in the Lower Yangzi Delta Andrew M. Marton 9 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA States, globalization and inequality Yehua Dennis Wei

10 GRASSROOTS CHARISMA Four local leaders in China Stephan Feuchtwang and Wang Mingming 11 THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM Globalization and local legal culture Pitman B. Potter 12 MARKETS AND CLIENTALISM The transformation of property rights in rural china Chi-Jou Jay Chen 13 NEGOTIATING ETHNICITY IN CHINA Citizenship as a response to the state Chih-yu Shih 14 MANAGER EMPOWERMENT IN CHINA Political implications of rural industrialisation in the reform era Ray Yep 15 CULTURAL NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA The search for national identity under reform Yingjie Guo 16 ELITE DUALISM AND LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN CHINA Xiaowei Zang 17 CHINESE INTELLECTUALS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE Edward Gu and Merle Goldman 18 CHINA, SEX AND PROSTITUTION Elaine Jeffreys

ELITE DUALISM AND LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN CHINA

Xiaowei Zang

First published 2004 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2004 Xiaowei Zang All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Elite dualism and leadership selection in China / Xiaowei Zang. p. cm. – (RoutledgeCurzon studies on China in transition) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Political leadership–China. 2. Communist leadership–China. 3. China–Politics and government–20th century. 4. Elite (Social sciences)–China. I. Zang, Xiaowei. II. Series. JQ1516.E45 2004 303.3'4'0951–dc21 2003008604 ISBN 0-203-30003-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-34029-9 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–32234–0 (Print Edition)

CONTENTS

List of illustrations Preface Acknowledgments Abbreviations

x xii xvii xix

1

Introduction Data 3 Variables and measurements 4 Summary 10

1

2

An institutional explanation of elite dualism in China Institutions, norms and rules 12 Hierarchy and functional differentiation 13 A governance dilemma in an one-party dictatorship 15 A two-front arrangement 17 The division of labor between the CCP and government 20 Institutional development in the reform era 22 New perspectives on the party-state relations 27 The distribution of capabilities and elite dualism 30 Summary 33

11

3

Dualism in historical perspective The Chinese Soviet Republic 35 The united front policy and the three third system 38 The political elite in the early years of the PRC 43 Summary 52

35

vii

CONTENTS

4

The Cultural Revolution and the leadership transition in the reform era China’s political elite during the Cultural Revolution 55 The cadre reform in the 1980s 59 Educational attainment and political credentials 65 Summary 66

55

5

Dualism and job assignment Human capital and labor market segmentation 70 Institutional differentiation and elite dualism 73 Descriptive statistics 78 Educational credentials and job assignment 80 Age, CCP seniority, and job assignment 82 Institutional effects on job assignment 83 Summary 85

70

6

Dualism and promotion Promotion and opportunity structures 88 Existing studies of elite mobility in China 90 Elite dualism and career advancement 93 Measuring promotion in the Chinese political hierarchy 95 Education, political credentials, and promotion 97 Institutional effects on promotion 101 Summary 105

87

7

Dualism and mobility rates Status attainment and promotion speed 108 Existing research on mobility rates in state socialism 110 Institutional distinction and mobility rates 114 Measuring promotion speed in the Chinese political hierarchy 117 Age, CCP seniority, and position attainment 119 Institutional effects on mobility rates 122 Summary 123

107

8

Dualism and career histories Career experience and status attainment 126 Career histories in state socialism 128 Internal labor markets and career experiences 133 Career backgrounds and recruitment patterns 140 Summary 143

126

viii

CONTENTS

9

Dualism and cooptation Cooptation, elite renewal, and regime survival 148 Existing studies of cooptation in China 151 Defining cooptation 152 Institutional distinction and cooptation 155 Institutional effects on cooptation 157 Summary 162

147

10 Dualism and the political elite in China Elite Dualism in Chinese socialism 165 The formation of political-technocracy in the PRC 168 Institutional development in China 170 Elite stability in China 171 Contributions to Chinese studies 172 Contributions to sociology 174

164

Appendix: methodology Defining the political elite in China 177 Status attainment models and elite studies 179 Data collection 180 Coding procedures 183

177

Notes Bibliography Index

184 219 239

ix

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 2.1

The two front arrangement, 1954–66

18

Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 6.1 6.2 6.3

Leadership positions in China, 1988 and 1994 Characteristics of selected elite groups in Britain Educational attainment of corporate managers in the US Statistics for assembly representatives in fourteen Xiang in Shangganning Border Region Class backgrounds of persons elected to leadership positions in Jin-Cha-Ji Border Regions, 1941 Leaders by types and task area, measured by index of fair representation Provincial interlocking directorates, 1949–78 Educational attainment of the PLA marshals and generals, 1950–66 Educational attainment, the 1988 and 1994 elites Date of joining the CCP, the 1988 and 1994 elites Descriptive statistics, the 1988 elite Descriptive statistics, the 1994 elite Educational credentials and job assignment, 1988 Educational credentials and job assignment, 1994 Mean age, mean CCP seniority, and job assignment, 1988 and 1994 Logistic regression coefficients for institutional effects on job assignment, 1988 and 1994 Descriptive statistics, the 1988 elite Descriptive statistics, the 1994 elite Logistic regression coefficients for institutional effect on elite stratification in 1988 x

4 7 8 41 42 47 57 59 65 67 79 79 81 81 82 85 98 100 102

ILLUSTRATIONS

6.4 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5

Logistic regression coefficients for institutional effect on elite stratification in 1994 Age limits for military, political, and logistics officers of combat units in the PLA Fast runners among China’s mayors Fast runners among provincial leaders Fast runners among state council officials Mean age and position attainment, 1988 and 1994 Mean CCP seniority and position attainment, 1988 and 1994 OLS regression coefficients for factors of mobility rates, 1988 and 1994 Institutional effects on mobility rates, 1988 and 1994 Main career patterns, the 1988 provincial elite Types of previous work experience, the 1988 provincial elite Main career patterns, the 1988 state council Main career patterns, the fouteenth and the fifteenth central committees Career backgrounds, 1988 Career backgrounds, 1994 Logistic regression coefficients for career backgrounds, 1988 Logistic regression coefficients for career backgrounds, 1994 Education attainment in the Soviet Union Characteristics of co-opted and non co-opted leaders Characteristics of co-opted leaders, the CCP and the government Cooptation and leadership position attainment Logistic regression coefficients for institutional effects on cooptation, 1988 and 1994

xi

104 109 111 112 113 121 121 123 124 130 131 132 132 141 141 144–5 144–5 150 157 159 161 162

PREFACE

In his 1993 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Douglass C. North pointed out that polities: significantly shape economic performance because they define and enforce the economic rules. Therefore an essential part of development policy is the creation of politics that will create and enforce efficient property rights. However, we know very little about how to create such polities because the new political economy (the new institutional economics applied to politics) has been largely focused on the United States and developed polities. A pressing research need is to model Third World and Eastern European polities.1 Responding to North’s call, I draw insights from the new institutionalism to study elite formation in the People’s Republic of China (the PRC). In this book I focus on the impact of institutional arrangements on leadership selection in the reform period. I have selected the new institutionalism as the theoretical framework for my work not because it is a fashionable paradigm in the social sciences but because it is effective in modeling patterns of leadership selection in China. It is also a versatile research program: many seemingly discrete issues in elite formation, such as cooptation, job assignment, promotion, and the rate of mobility, can be effectively placed and investigated within the framework of the new institutionalism. In hindsight, this is no surprise since institutions matter everywhere. I selected the political elite in China for an empirical study of the new institutionalism because of the following two considerations. First, the political elite is a central element of Chinese politics, and as such it provides necessary data for an institutional modeling of a key aspect of Chinese politics. It is argued that the student of state socialism is above all a student of the personnel who comprise the highest echelons of the political hierarchy.2 An institutional analysis of Chinese politics must include research on the political elite. xii

PREFACE

Second, I study leadership selection in this book because the political elite has played a key role in institutional development in China.3 State socialism creates a institutional basis for the rise of a communist power elite, who in turn exert a strong influence on institutional norms and arrangements in China. The political elite has a far greater impact on the trajectory of institutional evolution than any other group or strata in state socialism. Elite action accounts for a larger proportion of variance in institutional outcomes in the PRC than in the West.4 Of course, there are other good reasons to study China’s political elite. As noted above, Douglass North insists that modeling polities is an essential step toward an institutional explanation of development policy.5 The phenomenal track record in economic development since 1978 has transformed China from an economically backward country into an international export powerhouse. In the process it has accumulated huge trade surpluses with virtually every trading partner, including Japan, the toughest trader in the world.6 China’s Gross National Product is currently ranked sixth in the world and is optimistically predicted to surpass that of the United States in 2020, making China’s economy the largest in the world. Many scholarly works have already been written to analyze this economic miracle. I suggest that this literature must include books on China’s leaders since they have played a leading role in China’s success story. The institutional framework of the state’s policy and guidance has created an attractive environment for foreign investment, a favorable condition for the growth of private entrepreneurism, the rapid expansion of China’s domestic market that has supported its economic growth, and an incentive system that has stimulated exports to the world market. Shiping Zheng points out that much of the booming economy hinges upon the CCP’s grip on power in China.7 The institutional framework of reform, of which the political elite is a central component, underlies the major determinants of economic performance in the reform period. There is hence an urgent need to model elite behavior in China. However, the scholarly penetration of China’s far-flung bureaucratic leviathan has been highly uneven. Many scholars have studied political institutions and their impact on policy-making in China. Yet there have been few attempts to develop institutional explanations of leadership selection in the PRC, despite the fact that a political elite is ultimately the creation of political institutions.8 In this book, I seek to link political institutions with leadership selection in the reform era. Relying on standard statistical procedures and a data set on 1,588 top Chinese leaders, I investigate how institutional arrangements affect elite formation in China. I do not restate previous findings with numbers or statistical procedures but search for qualitatively different processes that have gone undetected in existing research. xiii

PREFACE

In the course of writing this book, I was enlightened by many works that highlight the distinctive features of the political elite and political hierarchy in the PRC. In particular I acknowledge the important contribution to Chinese studies by Shiping Zheng on the institutional distinction between the Chinese state and the CCP.9 I was also deeply impressed by Avery Goldstein’s structural approach toward Chinese politics.10 My other inspirations include works by David Bachman,11 Jing Huang,12 David Lampton,13 Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton,14 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg,15 Susan Shirk,16 Melanie Manion,17 and Jean Oi.18 Their works have provided the starting point for my institutional analysis of leadership selection in the reform era. When I started research on China’s political elite more than ten years ago, an institutional approach was hardly what I had in mind. I held some assumptions, however. The most important one was perhaps the distinction between political bureaucrats and party technocrats in the Chinese political hierarchy. I also questioned at that time whether elite recruitment could be based simply on technocratic criteria in the PRC. What was less certain to me back then was the structural sources of the distinction between these two groups of political leaders. Andrew Walder’s works on elite formation in China has stimulated my search for a theoretical framework from mainstream sociological theories, leading me to conclude that leadership selection is patterned by institutional arrangements in the Chinese political hierarchy. I have divided this book into ten chapters. Chapter 1 raises research questions, describes major findings of this book, and discusses data sources and methodological approaches. Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical context for my study of elite selection in the reform period. After specifying a clear definition of political structure, which includes both the distribution of capabilities across political actors in the political hierarchy and the extent of functional differentiation among them, I offer an initial identification of some basic features of the Chinese political system that shape the patterns of leadership selection in the PRC. I label this institutional analysis of leadership selection elite dualism. Since I posit that institutional arrangements rather than the attributes of participants determine the processes of elite formation, the analysis in the following chapters seeks to demonstrate institutional variation in patterns of elite recruitment and stratification in the post-Mao period. In Chapter 3 I trace some incidents of elite dualism in the history of the Chinese communist movement. I examine the Jiangxi Soviet government in 1934–5, the United Front in the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45, and elite recruitment in the early years of the PRC. These historical events show the traces of elite dualism and indicate that elite heterogeneity emerges whenever the CCP opts for efficiency and governance. In Chapter 4 I discuss the Cultural Revolution and the leadership transition in the 1980s, in which xiv

PREFACE

for the first time in the history of the CCP, technical education was used as one of the most important criteria in leadership selection. I report significant variations in CCP seniority and educational attainment among the Chinese political elite, which leads to several important research questions: why are the individuals with different amounts of political and educational credentials recruited into the post-Mao leadership? Are there institutional factors that compel the Chinese leadership to select people with different attributes? Do different political institutions value different combinations of personal attributes in elite recruitment? Equipped with elite dualism, I seek to understand how leadership selection is conducted in the reform era in the next five chapters. First, in Chapter 5 I analyze the effects of institutional distinction on job assignment in the reform era, examining different selection channels in the CCP hierarchy and the government system. My focus is on the differences in institutional missions and their impact on the distribution of human resources in the CCP hierarchy and the government system respectively. I then study in Chapter 6 the effect of elite dualism on promotion. I draw an insight from status attainment research that promotions in an organization are decided on efficiency criteria and awarded to employees who are judged most likely to contribute to the organization. Different institutional tasks lead to distinctive patterns of career advancement in the government system and the CCP hierarchy. In Chapter 7 I relate elite dualism to promotion speed, using a concept of “crowding” effects to explain different mobility rates between government officials and the CCP cadres. In Chapter 8 I examine the interrelationship among career histories, institutional arrangements, and elite recruitment. I use the concept of internal labor markets to explain the allocations of different career structures in the CCP hierarchy and the government system respectively. In Chapter 9, I adopt a concept of complimentarity to study cooptation of professionals and intellectuals into the Chinese leadership, further demonstrating the effectiveness of elite dualism in understanding patterns of elite recruitment in the PRC. In Chapter 10 I summarize the major findings of this study, discuss some observations about institutional arrangements and elite recruitment, and present a general outlook for leadership selection and political development in China in the years to come. I conclude with a short discussion of the modest contributions I make to Chinese studies and sociology respectively. For the sake of convenience, “elite,” “political leaders,” and “the political leadership” are used interchangeably in this study. So are elite formation, elite recruitment, and leadership selection. Elite stratification refers to promotion or career advancement in the Chinese political hierarchy. Finally, Erik Lane and Svante Ersson emphasize that the new xv

PREFACE

institutionalism can “only succeed if more specific models about the impact of institutions upon which clearly identified outcomes are developed.”19 In this book, I propose an elite dualism’s model of elite formation in post-Mao China by combining some key neo-institutional concepts with Chinese reality, thereby contributing to the development of the new institutionalism.

xvi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing an academic book is necessarily a lengthy and lonely enterprise that involves constant struggles with various theoretical and methodological issues. During the past few years I have worked on this book, I have felt both the frustrations and rewards of a book project. That the latter so far outweigh the former is largely the result of the generous assistance and encouragement I have received from many people, both in Hong Kong and abroad. In particular, I thank David Goldman for his unfailing support to this project. I would also like to mention that this book could have been written in an entirely different fashion had Elizabeth Perry and Andrew Walder not encouraged me to theorize elite recruitment in China five years ago. My other friends, colleagues and associates have also been very supportive during the course of writing this book. In particular, I would like to mention that Cheng Li, Professor of Government at Hamilton College, kindly drew my attention to the field of elite studies nearly a decade ago when both of us were graduate students at University of California at Berkeley. I also like to mention that frequent consultations with Jacky Cheung of City University of Hong Kong during the past few years over statistical analysis proved both educational and rewarding. Graeme Lang has been a vital source of encouragement and companionship for me since I joined City University of Hong Kong in 1997. Jacky Cheung, Kevin Hewison, Julian Lai, Linda Li, Yimin Lin, Colin Mackerras, and Xueguang Zhou read parts of the manuscript and saved me from many errors. In particular, Yimin Lin and Xueguang Zhou wrote lengthy comments and gave me many helpful suggestions, which have made this book a much better work. I have also benefited from comments and suggestions from David Goodman and two anonymous reviewers of Routledge. Stephanie Rogers and Zoe Botterill of Routledge handled my book proposal and manuscript with admirable professionalism. I also thank Matt Deacon and Gail Welsh of Wearset for their editorial assistance. Of course, I shall alone bear all the responsibility for any errors or shortcomings in the text. xvii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Finally, I am deeply indebted to my wife, Yuling, and my children, Lisa and Lucien, for their efforts to put up with the lengthy preparation and research for this book during the past few years. They willingly gave me most of the weekends and public holidays during the course of writing this book. I thank them for their patience, support, and understanding that I am a slow learner and needed more time than others to write a book. I love them. To them this book is dedicated. The author and publishers would like to thank the following for granting permission to reproduce material in this work: Figure 2.1 from Jing Hung, Factionalism in Chinese Politics (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 13. Table 4.1 from Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 147. Table 7.1 from Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 253. Table 3.1 from Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 148. Table 3.3 from Heath B. Chamberlain, “Transition and Consolidation in Urban China: A Study of Leaders and Organizations in Three Cities, 1949–53,” in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 286. Table 7.3 from Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 31/6 (1991), p. 520. Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder who is not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of this book.

xviii

ABBREVIATIONS

CCP CEC CPSU CR CYLC KMT NPC PLA PRC PSC

Chinese Communist Party Central Executive Council of the Chinese Soviet Republic Communist Party of the Soviet Union Cultural Revolution Communist Youth League of China Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) National People’s Congress People’s Liberation Army People’s Republic of China Provincial Standing Committee (of the CCP)

xix

1 INTRODUCTION

The political elite is a central element of Chinese politics because it monopolizes resources, information and power in the People’s Republic of China (the PRC). Much has been written about the Chinese political leadership, especially with regard to elite structure and politics.1 Yet little is known about the elite itself.2 Who are the men and women that make up the elite? What are their basic characteristics? Why are they chosen? What are major selection criteria? Who is likely to be promoted in the Chinese political hierarchy? Using an institutional approach, I study some key aspects of elite formation in the reform era in this book. More specifically, I ask the following questions: 1

2

3 4 5

6

how is job assignment in high politics determined? Do different political institutions recruit candidates with different combinations of human and political capital? how is the Chinese leadership stratified? What are the relative roles of institutional affiliation, political credentials, and human capital in promotion? what are the major determinants of mobility rates? Is the speed of promotion related to institutional distinction? are there distinctive career paths in different political institutions? How is the distribution of careers related to institutional affiliation? to what extent are intellectuals co-opted into the political elite in China? Do different political institutions exhibit different rates of cooptation? finally, is the political elite in China segmented? If it is what are the structural sources of elite segmentation?

The institutional approach with which I study these questions is elite dualism. By elite dualism I mean a segmented bureaucratic labor market in which two distinctive career paths are established to evaluate and screen candidates for top posts in the Chinese government system and the hierarchy of the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) respectively. These two 1

INTRODUCTION

paths diverge mainly in their different emphases on the role of political and human capital in career trajectory.3 The major arguments and findings from this book include: 1

2

3 4

5

political development in the reform era has enhanced the division of labor between the CCP and the government in governance, leading to two distinctive career paths in these two systems. Specifically, all candidates for elite positions are screened for human capital and political credentials. But those on paths to government positions are screened more vigorously for human capital whereas those on paths to the CCP hierarchy are evaluated more vigorously for political loyalty. CCP seniority plays a larger role in career advancement in the CCP hierarchy than in the government system. The requirement for human capital for promotion in the government system is higher than that in the CCP hierarchy. The presence of particularism in promotion processes is stronger in the CCP hierarchy than in the government system. university education increases mobility rates in general and those in the government system in particular. cadres with professional and administrative career backgrounds are likely to enter the government system whereas cadres with propaganda and party work experience tend to be affiliated with the CCP hierarchy. cooptation plays an important role in leadership selection in China. The government system is more likely to co-opt intellectuals and professionals than the CCP hierarchy.

These findings illustrate the distinctive career paths in the CCP hierarchy and the government system that weigh human and political capital differently in elite recruitment. The bureaucratic labor market is segmented, with institutional distinction becoming a key variable in leadership selection in China. This reflects the increasing institutionalization of Chinese politics. These findings motivate me to reinterpret the party-state relations, pointing out the division of labor in governance between the CCP and government. I also use these findings to model patterns of elite selection in post-Mao China, to show that the current Chinese leadership is a political technocracy rather than simply a technocracy, and to explain institutional development in post-Mao China. These endeavors contribute to Chinese studies in the following aspects: I challenge the conventional wisdom that the political elite in state socialism is monolithic; conduct an empirical study of the new institutionalism; argue for an increasing emphasis on formal politics in Chinese studies; and introduce the mainstream social science theories and methods into the study of elite behavior in China. 2

INTRODUCTION

Finally, how does elite dualism contribute to our understanding of Chinese politics? Elite dualism suggests: less informal politics and more formal politics in the reform era; an increasing link between policy making and institutional arrangements; efficient governance because of the division of labor among different political institutions; a reduced base for political dissent among intellectuals because of cooptation; and elite coherence and political stability in China.

Data This book is an empirical study of a data set that includes 1,588 top political leaders in China, who hold deputy provincial governorship or higher positions in the Chinese political hierarchy (Table 1.1). In other words, I focus on the apex or nucleus (leaders of the PRC central government and the CCP central organizations) and the immediately adjacent echelons (provincial leaders) of the Chinese political system. These leaders are appointed and managed centrally by the CCP.4 Of course, this is not to say that Chinese officials not included in this study, such as the head of the industrial bureau in a provincial government, are not part of the political elite in the PRC. Yet when compared to the sampled leaders, they belong to the “peripheral” sector of the political elite and command rather limited political influence. To date, 740 cases are identified for the 1988 elite and 848 cases for the 1994 elite. Many of the leaders included in the data set such as Mr. Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC, Mr. Wen Jiabao, member of the Standing Committee of the CCP’s Politburo and Premier of the State Council, Mr. Wu Bangguo, member of the Standing Committee of the CCP’s Politburo and Vice Premier of the State Council, and Ms. Wu Yi, member of the CCP’s Politburo and Vice Premier, are still leading figures in the PRC.5 Some powerful leaders who are no longer members of the CCP’s Politburo such as Jiang Zemin are also listed in the data set. Finally, the CCP’s Seventeenth Central Committee elected in November 2002 will govern China till 2007. The data set contains information on 84 percent of the Politburo of the Seventeenth Central Committee (21 of 25) and nearly 43 percent of the Seventeenth Central Committee (85 out of 198). Included in the biographies are names, dates of birth, gender, ethnicity, party membership, date of joining the CCP, university attended, academic discipline majored, and the like. To the best of my knowledge, this is the most extensive and up-to-date biographical data set of the political elite, which allows for the first time a meaningful quantitative analysis of leadership selection in China. The main data source for this study is Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders, compiled for 1989 and 1994 respectively.6 Such printed 3

INTRODUCTION

Table 1.1 Leadership positions in China, 1988 and 1994 Position

1988 (% in parentheses)

1994 (% in parentheses)

Councilor and above Minister Vice minister Central government bureau head Provincial secretary Provincial governor Provincial deputy secretary Provincial deputy governor Provincial discipline secretary CCP minister CCP vice-minister CCP bureau head

18 (1.8) 56 (7.6) 198 (26.8) 31 (4.2) 30 (4.1) 30 (4.1) 100 (13.5) 157 (21.2) 29 (3.9)* 31 (4.2) 42 (6.2) 14 (1.9)

18 (2.1) 57 (6.7) 213 (25.1) 48 (5.7) 30 (3.5) 30 (3.5) 97 (11.4) 189 (22.3) 30 (3.5) 56 (6.6) 68 (8.0) 12 (1.4)

Total

740 (100.0)

848 (100.0)

Note *Data on Yi Jun, discipline secretary of the CCP Yunnan provincial committee, are not available.

biographical sources have been frequently used to identify leading figures in both capitalist and socialist societies.7 Other data sources for this study include various issues of China: Facts & Figures and various issues of China Directory.8 To further establish my confidence in the reliability and accuracy of the data set, I used other data sources to cross-examine the information presented in Who’s Who.9 No significant discrepancies have been detected. Readers interested in the data set can refer to Appendix.

Variables and measurements The method with which I manipulate the data set is the conventional status attainment model widely used in social science research. Specifically, I treat the characteristics of individual leaders as the key attributes that define the elite. That is, I consider the elite from the perspective of how its members “score” on the variables of various personal attributes.10 The characteristics of the Chinese leaders are viewed as an aggregate profile and analyzed so as to unearth patterns and regularities that are theoretically significant. This methodological approach determines that the usual predictors of socioeconomic achievement such as education and age are the major variables in my analysis of elite recruitment and stratification in China. This is certainly not a novel scholarship. Attempts have been made to link such socioeconomic measures with elite formation in Japan, UK, and the US,11 4

INTRODUCTION

and the occupied West Bank.12 In fact, such an approach has also been exploited in the study of the Chinese elites.13 The variables I use in the following statistical analysis include age, ethnicity, gender, CCP seniority, and educational credentials. Both age and CCP seniority are interval variables. Ethnicity is a dummy variable with the Han Chinese coded as 1 and cadres of minority status as 0. Gender is also a dummy variable with male cadres coded as 1 and female cadres as 0. Finally, there are four dummy variables measuring educational credentials. Age, ethnicity, and gender are largely self-explanatory. CCP seniority and educational credentials, however, require some explanations. Political credentials In contrast to the existing practice, I use seniority in CCP membership to measure political credentials. Scholars have used party membership to measure political credentials.14 I propose that in elite studies, CCP seniority is a better measure than CCP membership since most leading cadres are CCP members. Seniority is the political life of a communist official, which starts when he or she joins the CCP. It refers to the total number of years of CCP membership a cadre has.15 CCP membership indicates merely whether a party member possesses a political credential, whereas CCP seniority measures the amount of political credentials he or she has accumulated over the years of party service. A high CCP seniority also embodies a high political loyalty, an asset for upward mobility.16 Further, A. Doak Barnettt argues that top party leaders in the Mao’s era equated seniority with political reliability and general organizational skills and used party seniority to gain access to top posts in China. Hong Yung Lee similarly points out that in the reform era, CCP seniority symbolizes both proven political loyalty and accumulated practical experience and is used in cadre selection.17 Hence, CCP seniority is more important than CCP membership to career advancement in the political hierarchy. Educational credentials Also in contrast to the existing practice, I use education credentials to study the bureaucratic labor market in the PRC. In most studies of elite recruitment and status attainment research, “education” is measured either by years of schooling or by completion of the next higher level of education, i.e., primary school, secondary school, university, and the like.18 Many scholars have followed this definition of education in their studies of the effect of college degrees on status attainment in China.19 However, these measures do not fully reflect the effect of educational achievement on labor market outcomes, especially with regard to elite recruitment and stratification. “University education” cannot catch the 5

INTRODUCTION

rich meanings of educational credentials. The payoff to education is allocated among different dimensions of educational achievement – credentials (earned degrees and academic majors), school quality (elite schools vs. non-elite schools), and the like.20 It is conceivable that two college graduates from two different academic disciplines receive different amounts of rewards in the labor market. The schools the graduates attended also matter in terms of earnings and promotion opportunities. Hence, I propose that it is educational credentials rather than “education” that matter in elite recruitment. Indeed, elite colleges, such as ENA in France, Eton, Oxford University and Cambridge University in Britain, and the Ivy League universities in the US, have provided a disproportionate share of their nations’ political and financial elites.21 Table 1.2 shows the percentages of the British elites with degrees from Oxford University and Cambridge University. Furthermore, “overeducation” has been a key feature of the workforce in the West.22 In particular, college education has approached universality among the business elites in the West.23 It has thus become a less useful variable in studying career advancement among elites. There emerges an urgent need to examine how stratification in educational attainment differentiates elites. Specifically, academic disciplines differ in social prestige and in the degree to which they facilitate admission to elites. Max Weber predicts that: the role played in former days by the proof of ancestry, as prerequisite for equality of birth, access to noble prebends and endowments and, wherever the nobility retained social power, for the qualification to state offices, is nowadays taken by the patent of education. The elaboration of the diplomas from universities, business and engineering colleges, and the universal clamor for the creation of further educational certificates in all fields serve the formation of a privileged stratum in bureaus and in offices. Such certificates support their holders’ claims for connubium with the notables . . . and, above all, claims to the monopolization of socially and economically advantageous positions.24 In a historical perspective, in the nineteenth century, a law degree was a recommended condition to enter the elites in the West. During the twentieth century other disciplines gained social prestige (notably technical studies, economics, and the social sciences).25 College training in technical fields such as law and management science has become the organizational “charters” serving as selection criteria for elite recruitment in the US (Table 1.3).26 Neil Fligstein points out the historical rise of CEOs with marketing and finance backgrounds in large American firms.27 Most 6

INTRODUCTION

Table 1.2 Characteristics of selected elite groups in Britain (%) 1880– 1899

1900– 1919

1920– 1939

1940– 1959

1960– 1970

Higher civil servants Graduates At Oxbridge At public schools

58 44 58

73 57 56

85 66 47

86 61 46

89 71 40

Bishops Graduates At Oxbridge At public schools

100 96 61.0

94 94 68

100 98 72

98 90 54

100 80 40

University vice-chancellors Graduates At Oxbridge At public schools Elite origins

100 81 73 17

98 83 71 8

98 70 55 0

100 80 44 3

91 62 47 0

Industrialists Graduates At Oxbridge At public schools

– – –

15 9 32

26 21 47

35 21 54

64 45 57

Source: adapted from R. D. Anderson, Universities and Elites in Britain since 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 47.

recruits of the Japanese government bureaucracy are graduates from the Law or Economics Faculty at Tokyo University, Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, or Waseda University.28 Educational credentials were also an important determinant of elite status in the Soviet Union and have remained so up to the present day in Russia. Institutional changes increased the value of technical training in elite recruitment, with a larger proportion of the Russian elite possessing technical degrees than was the case in the 1980s.29 However, during the Yeltsin years, education requirements for elite recruitment were shifted from technological education to training in law and economics.30 In China, the leadership transition in the reform era, to be discussed in some detail in Chapter 4, has improved the educational level of the political elite. It has been argued that most top Chinese leaders are college graduates.31 As such university education cannot effectively explain the variations in status attainment in the bureaucratic labor market. Hence, educational credentials should be a better variable than “education” for research on elite recruitment and stratification in China. How are educational credentials operationalized in the Chinese context? I combine academic majors and school quality to measure the values of different educational credentials. There are qualitative differences among Chinese universities in the admission and selection of students and 7

INTRODUCTION

Table 1.3 Educational attainment of corporate managers in the US Education

Chief executives (%)

Business association leaders (%)

Cases (%)

No university BA only, top college MBA, top program Law, top program

26.5 51.6 44.9 45.3

4.5 22.5 23.4 25.6

291 306 385 203

Source: adapted from Michael Useem and Jerome Karabel, “Pathways to Top Corporate Management,” American Sociological Review 51/2 (1986), p. 195.

academic staff. If the prestige differences were real and mirror an implicit or explicit quality order among Chinese universities, this would mean that there might be an analogous hierarchy among Chinese university graduates in their opportunities to enter elite positions. Specifically, like their counterparts in the West, the Chinese higher education system has contained a distinction between elite universities and ordinary universities. Elite universities, such as Qinghua University and Beijing University, are prestigious national centers of teaching and research, while ordinary universities such as Fujian Teachers College and Fuzhou University are minor teaching colleges. Elite universities receive a lot more funding from the government, command more talented faculty staff, and recruit better quality students than ordinary universities. Political discourse and academic debates that facilitate the formation of political interests, critical thinking, and analytic skills are daily events at the campus of elite universities but a rarity at those of ordinary universities. The prestige and training associated with elite universities should give their graduates a competitive edge in the bureaucratic labor market over their counterparts from ordinary universities. There are also differences among different academic disciplines in the quality of students. Like their counterparts in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, Chinese students rank a degree in the arts or social sciences low in the prestige hierarchy of the academic world. If the prestige differences were real and mirror an implicit quality order among students in different academic disciplines, this would mean that there might be an analogous hierarchy among university graduates of different academic majors in their quality – students in business science, medical science, computer science, and engineering may be smarter than those in the arts and social sciences. Hence, from the perspective of human capital theory, the quality of an engineering or management science degree from a key university should be higher than that of its counterpart from an ordinary university, which in turn should be higher than that of a BA degree from a key university, and at the bottom of the hierarchy is a BA degree from an ordinary university. Accordingly, I create four dummy variables for educational credentials: a 8

INTRODUCTION

BA degree from an ordinary university; a BA degree from a key university; a BA degree in engineering/management science from an ordinary university; and a BA degree in engineering/management science from a key university. I propose that the differences in educational credentials are related to the career trajectories of China’s political leaders. I show that this is indeed the case in the following chapters. The four educational credential variables are mutually exclusive. Management science majors include economic planning, finance, accountancy and the like. Engineering majors are broadly defined as applied sciences, which include textile engineering, civil engineering, mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, transportation and the like. BA degrees include those in education, history, Chinese, politics, mathematics, and the like. My categorization is mainly based on the fact that the CCP has stressed applied technical knowledge as an important criterion in leadership recruitment.32 I discuss dependent variables in detail in the relevant chapters. Virtually all dependent variables used in the following analyses, except those utilized in Chapter 7, are dichotomy in nature. Therefore, bivariate analysis and logistic regression analysis are used for assessing the impact of institutional arrangements, political capital, and educational credentials on elite formation and stratification. I use OLS regression analysis to estimate the institutional effects on mobility rates in Chapter 7. In the following chapters, I enquire the links between political institutions of various kinds and outcomes of leadership selection in the reform era, searching for institutional effects. I start by getting a glimpse of whether the formation of an institution is accompanied by specific tasks and outcomes. I then examine correlations between various independent variables and outcome variables, seeking to separate the impact of institutions in relation to the effect of other factors. Such probabilistic support in the form of correlations or regression analysis findings is clearly relevant when one examines the impact of institutions on outcomes. I endeavor to be as reader-friendly as possible in presenting my arguments. This is accomplished by the use of simple statistical methods such as percentages to explain findings wherever possible. A “simple is beautiful” approach dictates my presentation. Finally, our understanding of a single political system in one society is often limited. Only when we understand how one political system is different from, or similar to, others can we better appreciate why leadership behavior should be expected to be the way it is.33 Although a comprehensive cross-national comparison is highly desirable, it is beyond the capability of a lone researcher with limited resources. As an alternative to a full-scale comparative analysis, I propose to introduce a crude comparative backdrop from time to time. The backdrop is thus necessarily sketchy, eclectic, and unbalanced. 9

INTRODUCTION

Summary Members of a political elite represent a small proportion of the individuals exercising disproportionate authority in social control and allocation of resources in a society.34 Hence, political elites are a key research subject in both political science and sociology. In this chapter, I raise research questions and briefly report the basic arguments and findings from the subsequent chapters. I identify the study subject of this book, then briefly discuss my methodological approach, introduce the variables used in the subsequent analysis, and explain how these variables are operationalized in the Chinese context. In sum, this chapter makes necessary preparations for me to describe and analyze the mechanisms of elite formation in China and to speculate on the practical and theoretical implications of the Chinese experience in the following chapters. To accomplish this goal I draw insights from the new institutionalism to develop a theoretical framework, which is the central issue of Chapter 2.

10

2 AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF ELITE DUALISM IN CHINA

In this chapter I develop a theoretical framework to guide the empirical study of leadership selection in China in the following chapters. My approach rests mainly on the concept of constraints within institutions, which directs my attention to the fact that a political system includes, among others, hierarchy and functional differentiation. An institutional constraint can be observed in the dependence of a hierarchy on the fine division of labor among its constituent parts. I argue that a one-party dictatorship like the PRC relies more on functional differentiation than a Western democracy for governance and regime survival. Thus, in contrast to the prevailing image of an undifferentiated party-state in China, I focus on the division of labor between the CCP and the government, using a two-front arrangement in leadership structure in China to illustrate the relevance of functional differentiation for defining institutional arrangements. I then discuss how the leadership transition in the reform era has led to an emphasis on functional differentiation, with the government taking care of economic development and social order and the CCP providing policy, guidance, and supervision. The underlying forces for the division of labor between these two political systems are the CCP’s determination to uphold the Four Cardinal Principles and realize the Four Modernizations simultaneously.1 I discuss the mismatch between the CCP’s political ambition and its inability to fulfill it, which in turn has led to functional differentiation in the reform era. Functional differentiation requires the distribution of capabilities such as power, domains of governance, and personnel among different institutional actors. Drawing insights from Andrew Walder’s study of authority relations and elite recruitment in the Chinese workplace, I propose a linkage between leadership selection and the division of labor between the government and the CCP. I argue that functional differentiation has created a segmented bureaucratic labor market (i.e. elite dualism), in which the CCP and the government weigh human and political capital differently in recruitment. I then offer three propositions on elite dualism, 11

AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF ELITE DUALISM

from which I develop a series of hypotheses for an empirical examination of job assignment, promotion, mobility rates, patterns of career backgrounds, and cooptation in the Chinese political system in the subsequent chapters.

Institutions, norms and rules Combining the insights from the new institutionalism with an analysis of the structure of political power in the PRC, I propose an institutional explanation of elite dualism in this chapter. There are two obvious advantages in linking elite formation with political institutions. First, one will focus on the institutional context within which leadership selection occurs and can clearly identify the structural similarities across empirically distinct domains, national or sub-national, party or administrative, that account for broadly similar patterns of political outcomes. After all, political structure shapes behavior and outcomes in characteristic ways.2 Second, an institutional approach is superior to other explanations of elite formation since a political elite is ultimately the creation of a political structure. An institutional analysis requires insights from the new institutionalism. The new institutionalism, which is essentially a popular revolt against a long-standing practice that attempts to explain how institutions work by means of non-institutional factors, has become a dominant area of study in the social sciences since the 1980s.3 Yet there are many new institutionalisms – in economics, organization theory, political science and public choice, history, and sociology. Institutionalism has disparate meanings in different disciplines – united by little other than a common skepticism toward atomistic accounts of social processes and a common conviction that institutional arrangements and social processes matter.4 As a result, there are many definitions of institutions in the field of the new institutionalism. For example, some scholars define institutions as the webs of interrelated rules and norms that govern social relationships.5 Others define an institution as a system of behavior or an organization. When institutions stand for an organization, the meaning of the word may be wider than when they stand for a norm or rule. Furthermore, organizations act whereas rules are not actors and do not have preferences.6 Still, others conceptualize institutions as formal structures as well as established processes and procedures.7 Following Douglass C. North, I approach institutions as the webs of interrelated rules and norms, which govern social behavior and provide the framework within which formal structures emerge. This definition is particularly appropriate in the Chinese context where rules and norms give formal structures life, mandates, and power to accomplish their missions. 12

AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF ELITE DUALISM

The changing roles of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in China testify this point forcefully. The NPC has been defined constitutionally as the national legislature of the PRC since 1954. Yet it became a de facto rubber stamp during the Cultural Revolution since the governing ideology stressed the dictatorship of the CCP. The NPC has regained some dignity in the reform period due to the changes in political philosophy and principles in governance in the PRC.8 Furthermore, regardless of how an institution is conceptualized, a notion of choice within institutional constraints is always acknowledged. The major sources of the constraints are institutional norms and rules. More importantly, the new institutional analysis has gradually shifted its emphasis from the state, government, and bureaucracy9 to the structure of institutional arrangements, that is, formal rules, compliant procedures, and standard operating practices.10 I therefore focus on institutional rules and norms in the Chinese political system that govern elite formation in the PRC.

Hierarchy and functional differentiation There are many kinds of institutional constraints in the PRC. They all affect Chinese politics to various degrees. I recommend an emphasis on the interaction between the CCP hierarchy and the government system since they are the two most important institutional actors in China. And as such their interaction should be at the heart of an institutional analysis of Chinese politics. I accordingly consider the interrelationship between these two political actors as a main institutional constraint that influences governance in the PRC.11 This institutional constraint reflects itself mainly in the need for functional differentiation and the resulting distribution of capabilities between the CCP hierarchy and the government system. In other words, I suggest that these two political actors take on different domains of governance and adopt different lines of action, including those governing leadership selection, to fulfill their institutional missions. My suggestion rests on an observation that a political structure includes three key variables – hierarchy, functional differentiation, and the functions of formally differentiated units. As Kenneth N. Waltz points out: The three-part definition of structure includes only what is required to show how the units of the system are positioned or arranged. Concern for tradition or culture, analysis of the character and personality of political actors, consideration of the conflictive and accommodative process of politics, description of the making and execution of policy – all such matters are left aside. Their omission does not imply their unimportance. They are omitted because we want to figure out the expected effects of 13

AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF ELITE DUALISM

structure on process and of process on structure. That can be done only if structure and process are distinctly defined.12 Hence, I follow Avery Goldstein’s proposal that one examines the fungible political resources of actors not to arrive at a more complete description of their individual attributes but to discover the pattern of distribution across a system’s actors. The pattern indicates the extent to which each actor may be considered in realizing its political preferences. Similarly, with regard to functional differentiation, one wants to assess the extent of role specialization not to learn more about what each actor does but because the extent of role specialization indicates the degree of interdependence among the actors and, thus, the ways in which each may be constrained in pursuing political interests.13 This position is at odds with the dominant view of the political hierarchy in China, which emphasizes the total control of the state by the CCP and champions a party-state version of Chinese politics. The advocates of party-state politics either totally ignore or inadequately address functional differentiation among political actors. It is argued that the CCP has penetrated and dominated the state and that the effectiveness of party organization, the monopoly of resources, and the control of all the sources of information and agents of socialization, make it virtually impossible for any independent political organizations to crop up in China. The very conception of a “party-state” denotes a type of state in which the CCP exists as the core of the state and monopolizes state power over the direction and control of society. Some scholars even wonder whether it is meaningful to distinguish the CCP from the state in the PRC.14 I understand the party-state relations differently. I suggest that all regimes, capitalist or communist, are rational in the sense that they all seek survival and expansion. However, regime survival does not require overconcentration of political power. I argue that regime survival relies more on governance, which derives effectiveness from functional differentiation. In fact, the importance of functional differentiation for governance in a one-party dictatorship reaches a level that Western democracies cannot possibly match. The legal separation of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches, the political independence of the markets from polity, and a thriving civil society in the West allow the smooth and effective interaction of the institutional actors for better governance. The interaction is based on the principle of balance and check, so that the wrongs done by one institution can be sooner or later rectified by another, thereby ensuring regime survival. In a one-party dictatorship like the PRC, in sharp contrast, selfregulation is the key for regime survival. Functional differentiation is a crucial element of such process because it advantageously creates the division of labor among the constituents of the political hierarchy, which 14

AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF ELITE DUALISM

facilitates their cooperation for better governance. Hierarchy in a oneparty dictatorship in fact creates a structural need for the differentiation of functions among the constituent parts that make up a whole. There should be a direct relationship between functional differentiation and collective task performance as the division of labor permits more efficient expenditures of collective resources and more effective attainment of collective goals.15 The constituent parts of a hierarchy can develop separate functions for the successful resolution of problems.16 Functional differentiation is explained as a result of differences in the survival values of behavior and is expected when organizational tasks have differential importance for the survival of the hierarchy or when there are differences in the skills or training required to perform the tasks.17 Hence, a rational one-party dictatorship seeks regime survival and good governance by distributing power, resources, and the domains of government among different institutions. Functional differentiation, to a certain degree, substitutes for check and balance in governance and is politically acceptable to the ruling communist party – it is essentially a within-system innovation that does not require the development of independent institutions outside the political hierarchy. Clearly, each institution, especially the one in the strategically important position in the political hierarchy, may have an insatiable appetite for expansion at others’ expenses. But if the regime seeks functional efficiency and survival, such selfish and self-destructive demands for unlimited power and resources will have to be brought to a halt at a certain point. The regime will have to stop institutional decay itself since there are simply no external checks and balances in a one-party dictatorship. In this sense, institutional constraints in a state socialist society reflect themselves in that no one institutional order can conveniently annex another, that each institutional order has its own domain of governance, and that the interests of the political hierarchy can be best served through the division of power among and cooperation of institutional orders. These constraints are part of the norms and rules that govern political action such as recruitment and promotion.

A governance dilemma in an one-party dictatorship I use the PRC regime to further illustrate why hierarchy creates a structural need for functional differentiation in state socialism. From the perspective of economic and administrative efficiency, a revolutionary party cannot take charge of all functions by itself. It is true that at the very apex of the political hierarchy the chains of authority appear to converge upon a single command structure that comprises 25 to 35 top leaders in the PRC.18 Yet it is exactly this command structure that highlights the need to distinguish the roles or functions of the CCP from those of the government in governance below the very apex of the political hierarchy. 15

AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF ELITE DUALISM

First, there is a question about the capacity the 25–35 top leaders have in their strivings for total control over the state and society. Instead of enhancing good governance, a high degree of concentration of power in the hands of these top leaders would increasingly become a bottleneck in their effort to turn a communist regime away from mass mobilization and toward the task of administration and industrialization in the postrevolutionary era. A simple example can illustrate the difficulty associated with a dictatorial party’s attempt to manage the state and party: its top leaders can only consider a fraction of the stream of studies, reports, policy proposals, and draft laws that call for political decisions.19 For example: Mao had to keep all manner of control flowing directly to him in order to secure his command, it was too much of a task for him to follow every policy issue closely. As a result, those who had access to Mao could either try to manipulate the policy process, as Liu did in 1951–3, or use Mao’s name for their own gains, as Gao did in his lobbying activities in 1954.20 There are indeed decisional constraints on the top leaders due to the limited information available to them and the relentless time pressure they confront in comprehensively evaluating alternatives.21 As another example, between February 14 and April 23 in 1956, 34 central government ministerial leaders briefed Mao about industrial and financial situations in the PRC at the time. Afterwards, Mao complained bitterly that all he did during this period was to “[sleep] in bed and [listen to reports] on the ground.”22 The briefing session included only part of China’s economic matters and did not touch upon other governance issues such as ideology, military, party-building, education, culture, and sports. Nor did the briefing session give Mao any time to contemplate on the economic issues and come up with creditable decisions. The limited capacity of a person (or a few persons) to be informed about all the information, alternatives and consequences of action is conceptualized in the new institutionalism as “bounded rationality.”23 Susan Shirk thus argues that although the CCP has the ultimate authority in the communist polity in China, it cannot administer the country on its own. Like any principal in a large organization, it has limited information and has to delegate authority to agents, i.e. the state. Government bureaucrats have better information than the CCP leaders can possibly have. They “have specialized information, while the CCP leaders must know about everything; the bureaucrats are close to the problem, whereas the CCP leaders are remote.”24 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg similarly point out in their study of China’s energy sector that no matter how powerful the top 25 to 35 leaders in China appear, they lack the time, interest, and knowledge to 16

AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF ELITE DUALISM

manage and coordinate all the activities in the energy sector. Lieberthal and Oksenberg further argue that not even the handful of top energy specialists can manage the vast, sprawling petroleum, coal, and electric power industries. Much of the critical activity in the shaping and implementing of policy takes place within the government bureaucracies such as commissions and ministries without the top leaders’ active and sustained intervention. To understand the policy process in the energy sector, it is as necessary to appreciate the structure and process in the relevant portions of the government system as it is to appreciate the dynamics of the CCP leadership at the apex of the political hierarchy25 (the energy sector is just one example of the many economic arenas in the PRC that require attentions from these top leaders). Second, there is also a question whether or not top leaders have the talent and expertise to exercise state power in public administration in general and economic affairs in particular. Social and economic modernization in a developing country requires the services of officials schooled in fields ranging from medicine and economics to agronomy and metallurgy. It needs officials with the proper training and experience to manage the flow of reports and documents, to establish budgeting and auditing procedures, to develop systems of personnel recruitment and training, and to supervise and coordinate organizational activities.26 However, most communist leaders were revolutionary intellectuals when they came to power.27 This is particularly the case in China. Mao Zedong admitted unblushingly in 1959 that being basically unversed in economic construction and devoting his main energy to revolution, he knew nothing about industrial planning.28 Deng Xiaoping conceded candidly in 1980 that there was indeed a limit to a leader’s knowledge, experience and energy. If a leader held several posts (and attempted to handle many affairs) simultaneously, he would find it difficult to come to grips with the problems in his or her work.29 There thus emerges a governance dilemma between the political elite’s ambition and strive for total control (i.e. what the party leaders want to do) and its limited capacity and resources (i.e. what the party leaders can do).

A two-front arrangement Jing Huang points out that a strategic solution to this governance dilemma was invented and implemented in Mao’s China, namely, a two-front arrangement in which top leaders stayed in the second front to decide on the issues of principle, whereas leaders at the second echelon of the CCP hierarchy, most of whom were experienced bureaucrats and administrative experts, led various institutions with specific functions in policy making and implementation (Figure 2.1).30 For example, Mao Zedong was a second-front leader whereas people 17

AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF ELITE DUALISM

such as Li Xiannian, Li Fuchun, Bo Yibo, Chen Yun, and Tan Zhenlin were first-front leaders. Michel Oksenberg claims that the first front leaders “had special responsibilities in a particular field (agriculture, finance, public security, and so on). With a few exceptions, these men had occupied their specialized positions for a long period, and had probably developed considerably expertise.”31 Richard Diao also argues that the first-front leaders acted not only as political generalists coordinating a wide range of government activities, but also because of on-job training and experience as specialists in particular economic fields of leadership. Premier Zhou Enlai defended many of them during the Cultural Revolution because he presumably felt that, as experienced economic planners and administrators, these first-front leaders were essential to keep the economy and administration running.32 Few of the major economic planners had ever won Mao’s full trust. Yet they, except Bo Yibo, survived the first wave of purges in the Cultural Revolution. Mao needed them for housekeeping because of their expertise in economy and administration.33 The two-front arrangement highlights the need for the division of labor MAO ZEDONG (CCP and CMC Chairman) 2nd front (the party/administration)

(the military system)

Liu Shaoqi Politburo

PLA Marshals Central Military Commission

PLA Headquarters

Zhou Enlai State Council

Deng Xiaoping Secretariat 1st front subleaders CCP apparatus

provincial CCP committee

Commanders/Commissars Regional Military Commands

subleaders ministries

provincial government

provincial military command direct control

army corps

indirect control

Figure 2.1 The two front arrangement 1954–66. Source: Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 13.

18

AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF ELITE DUALISM

not only between the first and second front leaders but also between the CCP and government. Many CCP leaders recognized clearly that the revolutionary party organization was not the same thing as the state and that the CCP simply could not rule the country without the state institutions.34 Zhou Enlai confessed that due to the long-term war conditions in the past, “We have developed a habit of often issuing orders in the name of the Party. It was especially so in the army. Now that we have entered a peaceful period and established our national regime, we should change this habit.” He believed firmly that there “are connections, but also differences between the Party and the government. The principles and policies of the Party must be carried out through the government and the Party organization should guarantee the implementation.”35 Dong Biwu, a former vice premier of the PRC, similarly argued that the CCP: must exercise its leadership over the organs of the state power, but it does not mean that the Party should directly manage state affairs . . . the Party must achieve its leadership through the work of Party members in the organs of state power and by making the state organs accept the policies of the Party . . . under no circumstance, should the Party mix the functions of the Party organs with those of the state organs. The Party must not take over the work of the state organs simply because it exercises the leadership over them.36 Thus, in 1953, Mao Zedong officially recommended that the CCP’s central leadership be divided into the first and second lines: Mao would retreat from managing the day-to-day problems of running the country and devote his attention to major ideological concerns. Mao agreed that the CCP committee should make decisions and all other organizations (i.e. government departments) carry out the decisions. Mao also regarded the two-front arrangement as a method of smoothing the way for his inevitable political successor.37 Spurred by Mao’s recommendation, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed in 1956 that the CCP: is the highest form of class organization. It is particularly important to point this out today when our Party has assumed the leading role in the state affairs. Of course this does not mean the Party can exercise direct command over the work of the state organs or discuss questions of a purely administrative nature within the Party, overstepping the necessary line of demarcation between Party work and the work of state organs.38

19

AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF ELITE DUALISM

The division of labor between the CCP and government An effort to separate responsibility for the policy process was hence made in the early 1950s, with party leadership making general policy decisions, judicial and planning organs fleshing them out as laws and economic plans, and government bureaucracies implementing these laws and plans.39 The CCP organizations remained the center of policy-making throughout the Mao era. Yet they were passed by from time to time in favor of government bureaucracies when concrete social and economic issues required action. For example, the task of flood control was assigned to the Ministry of Water Resources40 instead of a CCP branch. As another example, power over economic planning was in the hands of the specialists in central government ministries rather than the generalists in the CCP provincial committees.41 Kenneth Lieberthal points out that Russian advisers brought blueprints for China’s new administrative apparatus and played a key role in the design of China’s new state structure. Whole organizational elements such as the State Planning Commission, ministries that oversaw industrial production, the network of science academies, and the Procuracy, were modeled in the early 1950s after their counterparts in the Soviet Union.42 Even Mao Zedong, “a life-long foe of officialdom, openly endorsed the formalization and centralization of China’s administrative structure and supported the development of greater technical skills within the bureaucracy.”43 As in the Soviet Union, “a core organizing principle of the Chinese system is the division of labor according to functional task. The Soviet experience strongly shaped the basic organizational principles of the Chinese Communist Party since the early 1920s and the organization of the Chinese government since 1949.”44 In fact, even during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76 when politics was in command and functional differentiation was politically disfavored, the division of labor between the CCP and government was still considered a necessary organizational arrangement. One of the most voiced criticisms at the time was that the CCP provincial committee had allocated to itself all the functions of party and state, instead of focusing on ideological and political leadership and allowing the provincial revolutionary committee to act as the administrative executive. On the other hand, the provincial revolutionary committee was criticized both for the way its work continued with little regard for the CCP committee and its search for a measure of independence.45 The CCP and the government not only took on different spheres of work but also exhibited distinctive patterns of the policy formulation process. Michel Oksenberg observes: Each organization had its own approach to policy making. The agendas, directives, and procedures of the State Council suggest a 20

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well-organized, pragmatic institution at work: sifting reports, searching for realistic options, calm and unhurrying, competently responding to problems by adjusting on-going policies at the margins. Reports from Party plenums and the informal Party meetings suggest another policy making style: tumultuous, hurried, concerned with relating means to ideological ends.46 Thus, before the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76, economic specialists in the Chinese bureaucracy were not active in the broader political discussions of state-society relations, whereas party generalists did not intervene in economic debates.47 In the reform era, economic debates such as those on the Three Gorge Dams or importation of foreign capital and technology into China, are conducted among economic planners, specialists, scientists, and bureaucrats. Policy advocacy is built into the state structure through assigning responsibilities and resources to various bureaucracies.48 Kenneth Lieberthal concludes that these fundamental structures of the Chinese bureaucratic system that were established in the 1950s have remained in place to the present and continued to “exert tremendous influence on policy process.”49 Shiping Zheng claims explicitly that the CCP and the state are two sets of political institutions with different organizational logic and tasks.50 Of course, in Mao’s China and to a much lesser extent in the reform era, the division of labor between the CCP and government has been confined largely to economic policy making and related arenas. The government’s participation in the key political areas such as propaganda, ideology, mass political campaigns, personnel arrangements, and the military commanding system may have been quite limited.51 Kenneth Lieberthal thus suggests that it is entirely possible that the extent of the CCP’s role varies considerably by sector – probably being more important in propaganda, organization, public security, and rural work, and less important in the urban economy.52 Precisely because power is distributed in such a fashion that the government system and the CCP hierarchy are given the mandates to deal with different domains of governance. For reasons alluded to above, there must be a functional need for the division of labor between the government and the CCP. Had reality not been more complicated than theory, I would begin to make propositions on the impact of functional differentiation on elite formation at this point. I cannot. Despite the pressure for functional differentiation for better governance, the division of labor between the CCP and government in Mao’s China was quite limited. The two-front arrangement was pursued in a lackadaisical way and totally suppressed during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76. As Michel Oksenberg points out, before the mid1950s: 21

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Mao placed a high value upon technology and believed that he could achieve his goals through rapid industrialization; hence, he paid special attention to issues dealing with industry, labor, and intellectuals. From the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, he placed a high value upon sheer manpower and the capabilities of proper organization, devoting more attention to the agricultural and organizational issues. Increasingly through the 1960s, Mao worried about the survival of the revolution, and pinned his hope upon securing attitudinal change. Moreover, he became concerned about his foreign and domestic enemies. His attention became riveted upon issues involving culture and education, youth, the military, and foreign affairs.53 Hence, the State Council was active when the governmental apparatus it headed played the dominant administrative role in the early 1950s. The peak of the CCP activity corresponded roughly with the height of its involvement in day-to-day administration in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The role of the PLA in Chinese politics became increasingly prominent in the late 1960s. The shift was from economic, to ideological, and finally to coercive organization.54 Shiping Zheng thus writes with some justifiable exaggeration: The extent to which the Chinese state institutions and functionaries are differentiated from, and autonomous of, the Party organization varies at different points in time. Thus we may pinpoint some best and worst moments in Chinese state-building since 1949. For instance, the Mao Zedong era was generally hostile, and the Deng Xiaoping era more favorable, to state building. Mao’s China was largely preoccupied with class struggle and political campaigns; Deng’s China was directly at reforms and economic development. One was when politics finally took command; the other was when economics ultimately prevailed.55 Reforms that started in the Deng Xiaoping era have built up the momentum for institutional development, leading to functional differentiation in the Chinese political system.

Institutional development in the reform era Much has been written about the changes in attitudes toward institutions, revolutionary campaigns, and the division of labor between the CCP and government in Mao’s era.56 Hence, I focus on the reform era, explaining major causes of functional differentiation and institutional building after 1976. I observe that at the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, 22

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repeated political campaigns and Mao’s “politics in command” approach brought the Chinese economy to the brink of collapse. Yet there was no guarantee that the economic crisis would compel the CCP to abandon the Maoist revolutionary line. Hua Guofeng, Mao’s handpicked successor, and his “Whatever Faction” made a wise choice to stay in the Maoist line since their ascendancy in Chinese politics rested almost exclusively on Mao’s political legacy.57 Hua and his retinue demanded that no policy motions should be proposed to challenge what Mao had said and done. Maoist practices such as the merging of the government and the CCP remained largely unchanged under the Hua regime. For example, Chairman Hua managed to amass more political titles, if not more power, (Chairman of the CCP, Chairman of the CCP Military Commission, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and Premier of the PRC) in two years (1976–1978) than Chairman Mao did (Chairman of the CCP and Chairman of the CCP Military Commission) in 27 years (1949–76). Hua’s insistence on the Maoist line formed a stumbling block to efforts by purged CCP leaders to reverse the verdict of the Cultural Revolution: they had been toppled by Mao because of their alleged violation of the Maoist line before 1966. Their political comeback must be based on the negation of the Maoist line and the removal of Hua from the power circle of the CCP, a job that was handled in a masterful way by Deng Xiaoping and his comrades. Deng’s decisive victory over Hua in December 1978 left him little room for a return to the Maoist line, however. In addition, Deng personally had every reason to nullify the Maoist line, which had victimized him during the Cultural Revolution twice and prevented him for regaining his office under the Hua’s regime.58 Furthermore, the political legitimacy of Deng’s regime came not from his mastery of Maoist thoughts. His cat theory, publicly denounced during the Cultural Revolution, rendered him an unsuitable candidate as an ambassador for Maoist orthodoxy. On the contrary, he was credited with the brief economic recovery in 1975, which gave people confidence in his leadership and hopes for future prosperity. The political upshot is that it was in Deng’s best interest to make a change. This was not just a matter of feasibility and convenience, it was also a matter of legitimacy. While a fundamental change away from Maoism was resolutely determined, the direction of the change could not be immediately identified. As a major architect of Maoist socialism between 1949 and 1966, Deng did not appear to have a version or master plan for reform in 1978 despite the huge amount of thinking about Chinese socialism he obviously did when he was toppled during the Cultural Revolution. Instead, Deng advocated a change in an ad hoc manner – he reiterated constantly that reformers must courageously seek truths from practices and “search for stepping-stones under the currents to cross the river.” 23

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Not surprisingly, there were heated policy debates among members of the political elite regarding reforms. Many scholars have highlighted ideological struggle during reforms over the interpretation of Marxism and definition of organizational mission and methods and have considered the struggle a key mechanism of institutional change within the Chinese political system.59 An important issue of contention among different voices about reforms was how much power the CCP should share with the central government, provinces, and state enterprises for better governance and economic performance. Deng and his associates might want to give more power away; whereas Chen Yun, the so-called leader of the “conservative” camp and a champion of a “bird cage” economy, might want to give less power away so as to maintain a socialist framework – the cage – with which the CCP could manipulate the economy – the bird.60 Indeed, reforms were hesitant and full of contradictory arguments in the 1980s.61 Nevertheless, all the development models proposed and tried out during this period of time aimed at rapid economic growth. Yet economic development relies on effective governance, which has ignited the interest among party leaders in functional differentiation and the resulting distribution of capabilities. The Cultural Revolution experience, still fresh in their memories, must have taught them a lesson that efforts to merge the government and the CCP undermined rather than strengthened the CCP’s leadership, at least in the light of despairing economic performance and its negative impact on the legitimacy of the PRC regime. The transaction costs for the over-concentration of power in the hands of the CCP was simply too high to bear indefinitely. Hence, in the early stage of reforms, Deng diagnosed the major causes of poor governance as, among others: the overconcentration of power; the arbitrary and patriarchal personal rule of Mao; the lack of distinction between Party leadership and government administration; and the lack of accountability according to rules and procedures.62 Deng argued explicitly in 1981 that it was absolutely necessary to distinguish between the responsibilities of the CCP and those of the government and stop substituting the former for the latter, which would help strengthen and improve the leadership of the CCP, facilitate the establishment of an effective work system at the various levels of government, and promote a better exercise of government functions and power.63 Hu Yaobang, then General Secretary of the CCP, similarly claimed that the CCP was not an administrative or production organization. It should exercise leadership over production, construction and work in all other fields. Its leadership should focus on matters of principle and policy and on the selection, allocation, assessment, and supervision of cadres, but not be equated with administrative work and the direction of production by government and enterprises.64 24

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With Deng in control of the political hierarchy, the CCP officially started a movement towards a greater separation of power between the government and itself in the CCP’s Twelfth National Congress in 1982. The logic was conceptually similar to the separation of power between executive and legislative branches in a parliamentary system: the CCP would be concerned with the formulation of policy and the government with the execution of the policies. Except in special circumstances, the CCP branch should play only a “guarantory and supervisory role” vis-àvis the government functional unit.65 This is not to say that Deng and his associates were inborn believers of an institutional approach toward governance. In fact, Deng admitted on many occasions that he had enthusiastically supported the Maoist line in the 1950s and 1960s. He agreed that he had shared Mao’s wishful thinking that mass mobilization and revolutionary campaigns would turn out an economic miracle. Deng and his associates contemplated different formulas during reforms: a Leninist bureaucratic model for maintaining order despite marketization, an East Asian development model combining both guided economic development and political authoritarianism, and the like. As successive policies were carefully tried out and critically evaluated, available options defining reform progressively narrowed and the credibility of the remaining alternatives precipitously declined.66 Hence, Deng Xiaoping promoted a certain degree of institutionalization in the reform era basically because he and the CCP had no choice but to pursue functional differentiation to bring China back from the brink of economic bankruptcy. A certain degree of the division of labor between the CCP hierarchy and the government system was deemed desirable, with an optimistic assumption that a greater extent of efficiency for economic management would come along with the change. In the area of institutional principles and norms, such concepts as “legislative supremacy, judicial independence, and separation of the Party and government, which had been condemned during the Mao era, could now be advocated. Some of them have been even officially endorsed.”67 For example, as mentioned above, the CCP has entrusted some power to the NPC in the reform era.68 The drive to a higher degree of the division of labor between the CCP hierarchy and the government system was given a timely boost by a 1980 directive issued by the CCP that first secretaries of provincial, municipal, or county CCP committees would no longer concurrently assume government posts as governor, mayor, or county magistrate. Directors of the CCP branches should not concurrently assume the leading posts of parallel government agencies. By the end of 1980, interlocking directorates at the provincial level were reduced from 21 to seven. In 1984, there was only one interlocking directorate at the provincial level.69 Dividing up the interlocking directorates implies an increasing 25

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distinction between the CCP and government institutions. Susan Shirk points out: No longer willing to pay the price of poor-quality decisions and inefficiency, the Party leaders moved to transform the relationship between Party and government in the 1980s. The Party delegated more responsibility to the government bureaucracy, especially in economic policy-making. The Standing Committee of the State Council, meeting twice a week, took charge of the economy . . . The Politburo, having earlier abolished its specialized economic units, limited itself to setting the overall political line of economic reform and ratifying important economic policies made by the government. At the provincial level, specialized Party departments overlapping their counterpart government departments were abolished . . . The Standing Committee of the State Council has become the main policy-making arena, while the Standing Committee of the Communist Party Politburo is much less active.70 Increasing functional differentiation between the CCP and the government is reflected to some extent in the personal relationship between CCP secretaries and government administrators. Shiping Zheng observes: For instance, personal relations were very tense between Rui Xingwen (Party secretary of Shanghai) and Jiang Zemin (mayor of Shanghai) in 1985–1987, and subsequently between Jiang Zemin (Party secretary of Shanghai) and Zhu Rongji (mayor of Shanghai) in 1987–1989. What has happened in Shanghai appears to be the rule rather than the exception, for Party secretaries and mayors/or governors in other cities and provinces have experienced the same problem . . . The causes of these tensions are more likely to be structural than personal. Economic reform, administrative and fiscal decentralization have given provincial and local government administrators a much larger role to play in managing the local economy. Government administrators have become increasingly confident and assertive in exercising their respective authorities.71 The momentum for the separation of the state from the CCP was brought to a halt after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, however. The student pro-democracy movement frightened the CCP leadership, leading them to apply brakes on decentralization tendencies and on the distinction between the government and the CCP. Clearly the CCP leadership is aware of developmental tendencies, and is capable of taking political action to staunch the trends that might threaten their personal interests. Nevertheless, the impetus for the division of labor between the CCP and the govern26

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ment has continued since it redistributes work but not political power between these two political hierarchies. Functional differentiation and economic development have characterized the reform era. These tendencies have been enormously enhanced after 1992 when Deng demanded a giant stride toward great openness and reform. This has provided a favorable environment under which the process of state building has unfolded. Deng’s reforms have thus allowed the division of labor between the CCP and the government to become more formal and advanced in the reform era.72 This is because the Chinese reforms have sought changes in important areas such as bureaucratic organization, the scope of responsibility, the definition of tasks of key bureaucracies, the distribution of bureaucratic resources, and the nature of the process through which decisions are made. In broad terms, the reform leadership of China has tried to make the government system less personalized, less ideological, less centralized, and more sensitive to greater efficiency and institutional dynamism.73 These moves are decidedly visionary, reflecting the political wisdom of the top leaders: the CCP must share power with various branches of the executive system to ensure their capacity to carry out their mandates and missions. Just as the CCP leadership exercises its power over the leaders of various agencies and branches, so these leaders must have power to exercise over their own subordinates and all those employees whose work they supervise. The real power of the CCP leadership, therefore, rests not on the amount of political power it has concentrated in its own hands but in the effectiveness with which it is able to distribute power among various political and administrative organs so as to expand, rather than reduce, its own capacity to rule. In other words, the CCP’s chief function is not to administer all political and administrative organizations directly but to see to it that its policies and objectives are implemented by relevant bureaucratic departments in all spheres of social life in China.

New perspectives on the party-state relations Post-Mao developments have given a new impetus to China scholars to assess the division of labor among institutions in the Chinese political hierarchy. A dominant model of post-Mao China is “fragmented authoritarianism” – a system in which coordination through coercion and ideology have declined while economic decentralization has been advocated enthusiastically and resorting to bargaining among bureaucratic agencies has been attempted repeatedly.74 Specifically, the fragmented authoritarianism model posits that authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed. The fragmentation is structurally based on, and has been enhanced by, reform policies regarding procedures. The fragmentation is not entirely a post-Mao phenomenon, yet post-Mao administrative and 27

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economic reforms have greatly increased its magnitude because of the dispersal of resources throughout the Chinese bureaucracy, the decline in the appeal of the Marxist revolutionary ideology, a higher degree of collective leadership, and complex economic and development issues.75 Some scholars thus argue that the Chinese state can no longer be viewed as the mighty leviathan of past years. Rather, it is deeply divided, fragmented, and complex. This makes the monitoring of activities difficult if not impossible, requiring elaborate formal and informal means of eliciting action. It also implies the need to pay off large numbers of people and institutions to allow projects and other activities to proceed.76 Other scholars argue that Chinese leaders “might propound views of the bureaucracy over which they preside, and that elite contention over policy and/or power might be a manifestation of bureaucratic conflict.” Such a conflict can become very complicated because of the segmented and stratified system of authority in China. Leadership relations reflect the leaders’ positions in the policy-making structure. Their institutional interests determine their policy choices.77 “What on paper appears to be a unified, hierarchical chain of command turns out in reality to be divided, segmented, and stratified.”78 Some scholars even envision a “segmented state” of China in which multiple centers of power emerge among the state legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions vis-à-vis the CCP organization, believing that: years of state-building under the Deng regime have given the state institutions more legitimacy and authority. Given the changed socio-economic environment, it is no longer possible to reverse the course of state-building as Mao did during the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution. Key political players in postDeng China are likely to hold on to their institutional power base in the legislature, the government administration, the military, and the provinces. Thus we can expect more debates and conflicts involving the power relationships among various political institutions.79 The Chinese military has offered the toughest resistance against institutionalization – the roots of the resistance have been the supreme leaders in the CCP such as Mao and Deng, who relied mainly on their personal networks to command the army and protect their power.80 Nevertheless, Jiang Zeming, current Chairman of the CCP Military Committee, has retained the authority over the military through the institutionalization of the CCP’s command of the gun. Institutionalization has brought the state into military operations that used to be an exclusive domain of Mao and Deng. The military’s subordination to the CCP is now secured not so much by the supreme leader’s personal networks as by institutional arrangements.81 28

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Clearly, the development since the 1980s and the growing complexity of governance have undermined the monolithic nature of political power the CCP established during the Cultural Revolution. Considerable administrative power has been shifted to government departments, although the CCP has undoubtedly had a steering function in defining policies and personnel matters. The division of labor is desirable and adopted because, as mentioned above, the CCP’s task is not to take upon itself the functions of governmental and social organizations or to turn them into mechanical implementers of its policies, but to elevate their roles and significance in all spheres of social life in Chinese society. Zhao Ziyang pointed out that “leaders must keep very cool; they must stand high and see far, consider things carefully, and avoid getting entangled in a pile of routine affairs. They cannot truly play a leading role if they are entangled in trivia all day long.”82 The higher degree of functional differentiation in the reform era also results from the nature of the current Chinese leadership. Many scholars have pointed out that there is a negative relationship between the amount of political capital such as network resources a CCP leader commands and the strength of political institutions.83 Mao Zedong constantly struggled to break through bureaucratic constraints and was able to take politics in command at the expense of functional differentiation. Deng Xiaoping, however, had to operate more or less within the framework of the political system after 1978.84 If informal politics prevailed between the late 1960s and the 1970s because Mao was a charismatic leader and commanded a strong network,85 formal institutions must be an increasingly important determinant of decision-making in the 1980s because Deng had significantly fewer political resources than Mao. Hence, the relative dominance of institutions over Chinese politics has become increasingly manifest in the reform period. David Bachman points out that the current Chinese leaders are significantly less autonomous than their predecessors. They will be much more limited than Deng.86 Their network resources are substantially lower than those of Mao or Deng. The degree of institutionalization in Chinese politics must be higher in the reform era than before. It is necessary to point out that although functional differentiation has developed in the reform period, the widening of government’s discretionary authority has not undermined the CCP’s leadership in the PRC.87 It is important to stress here that a colossal shift of power from the CCP to the state is not the intended argument of this chapter, nor is it essential to build up my arguments on leadership selection in the reform era. Central to my deliberation in this section is the increasing division of labor between the CCP and the government in the reform era. Such a division has long been detected and recorded, as shown in the above discussion. 29

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The distribution of capabilities and elite dualism Functional differentiation has many important consequences for the PRC regime, one of which is the distribution of capabilities between the CCP hierarchy and the government system, which leads to a structural foundation for elite dualism in the reform era. The division of labor dictates that the CCP and the government have different roles or functions, thereby influencing the distribution of capabilities such as human resources between these two political actors. Functional differentiation cannot become a political reality without the corresponding distribution of capabilities among political actors. To a large extent, functional differentiation in a political system resembles modernization in an organization – both mean that traditional work arrangements are reforged, resulting in new types of career ladders and pathways. These new career ladders and pathways occur as a by-product of strategic policies designed to solve a set of problems engendered by rapid social and economic restructuring.88 In a comparative perspective, in the Soviet Union, the party and state bureaucracies were different functional constituencies that developed their own identity, political position, and power of self recruitment and renewal.89 The staffing procedures accepted the specialization of labor as necessary, and subsequent initiatives by Stalin accentuated this development greatly.90 There were important divisions among the political, economic and cultural elites. Kenneth Farmer argues that the stereotyped Western concept of the one-dimensional apparatchik was the product of a time when less was known than now about Soviet political career patterns. There were distinctive subgroups of Soviet political cadres based on task specialization.91 Specifically, the diversity and differentiation of functions of the Soviet bureaucracy gave rise to elite segmentation rather than a unitary elite. For example state bureaucrats were largely specialists, whereas party cadres were predominantly political administrators. In contrast to the latter, the former preferred orderly procedures, routine and efficiency, relied on science and technology in problem solving, disregarded problems that were not pressing, and opposed intervention from outside.92 David Lane and Cameron Ross argue that the Soviet political elite was disaggregated into the three different constituencies (executives, law-makers, and party elite). Lane and Ross even consider elite segmentation as the key to understanding the dynamics of Soviet politics and the collapse of the Soviet Union.93 Elite segmentation has not been a favored topic in Chinese studies because of the above-mentioned undifferentiated party-state image. Nevertheless, some scholars notice that although most leading cadres in the government system are members of the CCP, CCP membership has less bearing than their assumed responsibilities and institutionally generated roles on their political preferences.94 Others observe that the most import30

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ant and fundamental occupational distinction among cadres is between political and professional cadres. There are also administrative and specialized cadres.95 Wenfang Tang and William Parish point out: Among elites on the bureaucratic pay scale, there is not only a two-way groups of government administrators and enterprise managers but also a third grouping of party and political operatives scattered throughout all types of organizations. For many people in China, the focus was not so much on reducing the power of ordinary administrators as it was on reducing the number and power of this third group of political operatives.96 Alan Liu similarly distinguishes political cadres who deal with ideological work from both professional cadres who are in charge of the special task of an organization and administrative cadres who are like administrators everywhere.97 Xueguang Zhou also writes that Chinese administrators resemble Weber’s notion of experts and specialists with the responsibility of managing administrative tasks. They include firm managers, bureau directors, university presidents, and so on. Politicrats are under the direct authority of the higher-level CCP organization rather than the administrative office. Their main function is to ensure the implementation of the CCP policy, especially the political adherence to the CCP line.98 If political cadres, government bureaucrats, and specialized administrators perform different functions in the Chinese political hierarchy, they may have come to fore through different mobility channels. Qualifications for party work and government administration may be different. Andrew Walder is perhaps the first to observe and explain the linkage between the division of labor and distinctive career paths in the PRC. He argues persuasively that in every workplace in China there is a hierarchy of the CCP offices and a hierarchy of management positions. Management deals with technical problems and production targets, the CCP hierarchy monitors workers’ political behavior and oversees management. Walder proposes that career advancement in the management hierarchy demands technical competency, whereas upward mobility within the CCP hierarchy relies on political loyalty and requires no formal training or education.99 Walder’s insightful observation can be usefully applied to high politics in the PRC. Reforms have led to an emphasis on the division of labor between the CCP and the government, aiming at upholding the CCP’s leadership and developing China’s economy (the Four Cardinal Principles and the Four Modernizations). There has been a strong tendency among all top leaders, including conservative generals in the PLA, to support economic reforms and maintain one-party dictatorship. Zhao Ziyang summed up this sentiment as the two principal points: one was to uphold the Four Cardinal Principles and the other was to adhere to the fundamental policy 31

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of reform and openness. Zhao stressed that these two points were interrelated with each other and neither could be dispensed with. Deng Xiaoping considered these two principal points as “grasping things with two hands,” with one hand grasping the reform, and the other political stability and unity. Deng hoped that this strategy would allow the reform to promote a rapid economic growth with little change in the political system.100 Peng Zhen, a so-called conservative leader in the CCP, also held this view.101 Clearly top Chinese leaders agreed that during reforms, the CCP should focus on political order and the government on economic and social issues. Such conceptions of what constitutes appropriate activity for these two political actors provide a basis for political action, including leadership selection. Once an actor’s tasks are strategically defined, a corresponding personnel policy can be adopted as an institutional guarantee for the fulfillment of the tasks. Functional differentiation may determine different rules, norms, and expectations in recruitment in the CCP and government respectively, resulting in two distinctive career paths in these two political institutions. Individuals with expertise and political loyalty must be recruited into the government system to deal with issues of governance and economic development. In comparison, individuals with political skills and loyalty must be favored candidates for leadership positions in the CCP. Scale and complexity entail organization, specialized knowledge, the division of authority, and the selection of personnel. Functional differentiation thus leads to the gradual erosion of a ubiquitous party-state and triggers the emergence of a segmented bureaucratic labor markets in which the roles of political and human capital are weighed differently in screening candidates for top posts in the government system and CCP hierarchy respectively. Hence: Proposition 2.1: Functional differentiation and the distribution of capabilities create the institutional condition for a segmented bureaucratic labor market to emerge in the reform period. More specifically, all candidates for elite positions are screened for human capital and political credentials. But those on paths to government positions are screened more vigorously for human capital whereas those on paths to the CCP hierarchy are evaluated more vigorously for political loyalty.102 Proposition 2.2: The more technical the tasks of an institution, the more likely it relies on technical expertise as the key criterion for recruitment and promotion. Conversely, the more political an institution is, the more likely it uses political loyalty and particularistic considerations in leadership selection. By a technical institution I mean an institution that focuses on economic development, public administration, and the provision of public goods and 32

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service. By a political institution I mean an institution that focuses on policy guidance, ideological indoctrination, and behavioral control. Finally, Proposition 2.2 can easily lead to Proposition 2.3: The returns to human and political capital should vary according to institutional context. Proposition 2.3 is indirectly supported by research on dual labor markets. Labor market segmentation theory envisions a segmented labor market comprising a “core” and a “peripheral” sector. In the core sector workers enjoy high wages, high fringe benefits, and high employment security. In the peripheral sector all is the contrary. Human capital variables tend to explain variations in earnings among jobs in the core sector but not those in the peripheral sector.103 These two sectors exhibit significant differences in both labor force composition and earnings levels.104 The sectoral differentials in earnings cannot be explained away by differences in labor force quality. Significant industry differences have remained after controlling for individual characteristics and working conditions. Surely, economic dualism (i.e. the “core” and “peripheral” sectors) differs qualitatively from the division of labor between the government and the CCP. Nevertheless, the findings that returns to the same individual attributes vary according to different economic sectors can certainly stimulate an intellectual imagination that the returns to political and human capital may be patterned by institutional arrangements. To test these propositions in the following chapters, I pay particular attention to functional differentiation and its impact on recruitment, promotion, career backgrounds, and cooptation between the government system and the CCP hierarchy. Such an approach is consistent with a new institutionalism’s assumption that institutionalization can occur at the sectoral level.105 Finally, the leadership transition in the reform era has emphasized educational qualification, competence, and political loyalty in recruitment and promotion (see Chapter 4), thus supplying cadres with both political and human capital to meet the demands for human resources from the segmented bureaucratic labor markets in the reform era.

Summary In this chapter I draw insights from the new institutionalism to develop an institutional explanation of elite dualism in the reform era, arguing that elite formation must be understood from an institutional perspective. After all, a political elite is the product of political institutions. My approach requires a discussion of the political structure in the PRC, which in turn demands a more detailed frame of reference than the prevailing concept of a single political hierarchy (namely, the party-state) in Chinese studies. Additionally, my institutional approach focuses on institutional constraints and the need for functional differentiation and the resulting 33

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distribution of capabilities for better governance. I argue that a one-party dictatorship like the PRC relies more on functional differentiation than a Western democracy for regime survival. By functional differentiation I mean the division of labor in governance between the Chinese government and the CCP. Specifically, the government focuses on economic development and social issues whereas the CCP provides leadership by taking on policy-making, matters of political principle, and personnel management. The division of labor in governance by no means suggests check and balance or the separation of the state from the ruling communist party. The party rules. Functional differentiation is adopted because it enhances rather than undermines the party’s dictatorship. The party ensures its grasp of power by penetrating and controlling various administrative organizations through policy guidance, direct supervision, personnel management, and other creative measures. I contest that functional differentiation reinforces rather than undermines party leadership, thus establishing better working relations between the CCP and the government in China. After all, political outcomes are shaped by political institutions, which are ex ante agreements about a structure of cooperation that “economize on transaction costs, reduce opportunism and other forms of agency ‘slippage,’ and thereby enhance the prospects of gains through cooperation.”106 I then examine institutional development in the reform era, putting forward three propositions on institutional arrangements on elite formation in the reform era. Institutional arrangements are adaptive solutions to problems of opportunism, imperfect or asymmetric information, and costly monitoring. They constrain individual and institutional behavior by rendering some choice unviable, precluding particular courses of action, and restraining certain patterns of resource allocation.107 In the Chinese context, they reflect themselves in the division of labor between the CCP and the government, which constrains their choices in leadership selection since appropriate personnel policy is key to accomplishing their institutional missions. Functional differentiation entails the distribution of capabilities among its major institutional players. Political behavior, including elite selection and stratification, is embedded in an institutional structure of rules, norms, expectations, and traditions.108 I develop hypotheses and test the three propositions in Chapters 5–9. But first I discuss elite dualism in historical perspective in Chapter 3, providing some background knowledge about elite recruitment in the PRC for the subsequent analysis of elite dualism. I use various instances such as the Chinese Soviet Republic of 1931–4 and the United Front policy of 1937–45 to show functional differentiation and the resulting distribution of capabilities between the CCP and the government it established.

34

3 DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Elite dualism, as defined in Chapter 1, is a full-fledged phenomenon of the reform era. Yet its spirits have always been part of the CCP’s organizational principles. Traces of elite dualism can be found in the history of the Chinese communist movement and have already been recorded in scholarly works. They have however been submerged in the mighty torrent of other major research programs, e.g. the functions of the united front pursued by the CCP during the Anti-Japanese War or the elite formation in the Jiangxi Soviet government of the 1931–4. In this chapter I select some of the major historical events to demonstrate that elite heterogeneity emerges whenever the CCP opts for efficiency and governance. Using research findings from existing studies, I show that the CCP consistently focused on military affairs, political agendas, and propaganda while the government took care of economic activity, implementation of the united front policy, and other social issues. The division of labor between the CCP and the government was earnestly observed and guided these two political actors to use different criteria in elite recruitment. Leadership positions were carefully created and never assigned randomly.

The Chinese Soviet Republic The CCP, formed by thirteen radical intellectuals and professionals in 1921 with a communist program to establish a classless society, had quickly gained popularity in a war-torn and poverty-stricken China in the early 1920s and was able to claim a membership of 30,000 by July 1926. However, the bloody coup-d’etat engineered by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927 delivered a lethal blow to the CCP, whose membership fell immediately to 10,000. In retaliation, the CCP courageously staged a number of armed uprisings in 1927, only to be ruthlessly suppressed by Chiang and his Kuomintang army. The depleted and deflated Red Army of the CCP had no place to run but to retreat to remote mountainous areas in Jiangxi province. The retreat turned out to be a historical turning point in the CCP’s 35

DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

struggle for power in China. The Red Army, under the adept leadership of Mao Zedong, was able to regroup its strength quickly and then strategically advanced to southern Jiangxi in 1929. By the end of 1930, the Red Army controlled much of southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, creating a geographic territory for a communist state. The Chinese Soviet Republic, the first state the CCP ever established, was formed in November 1931 and operated until the beginning of the Long March in October 1934. The supreme governmental organ of the Chinese Soviet Republic was the Central Executive Council (hereafter CEC), elected by the National Soviet Congress first in 1931 and again in 1934.1 Traces of elite dualism can be detected from the missions and organizational principle of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Although “at one time or another the CEC numbered among its membership virtually all the Chinese communist leaders of the time,”2 the CEC and the Central Committee of the CCP were assigned different organizational tasks. For example, the Chinese Soviet Republic declared war against Japan in April 1932 after the Mukden Incident in September 18, 1931, which was engineered by Japan to be a pretext to invade and occupy China’s northeast. In January 1933, the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Red Army proposed to enter into an alliance with all noncommunist military units in China to fight Japanese imperialism. An “Anti-Japanese and Anti-Chiang Preliminary Agreement” was subsequently signed on the basis of this proposal with the Fujian People’s Revolutionary Government in October 1933. Additionally, the famous August-First Declaration appealing for national unity with all anti-Japanese forces was issued in the name of the Chinese Soviet Republic in 1935, although by that time it was virtually non-existent due to its military defeats in 1934. The two surviving communist entities at the time were the CCP and its Red Army. This however did not prevent Mao from making a public statement on March 29, 1936 that the Chinese Soviet government decided to render all possible assistance to anti-Japanese student movements in China. Finally, it was the Chinese Soviet government that negotiated with the Kuomintang government during the Xian incident in 1936 that eventually led to the second united front between the CCP and the Kuomintang government during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45.3 The CCP was conscientiously absent from all these diplomatic activities. This is not to say that the CCP played no role in these historical events. On the contrary, the CCP decided the general policy and terms with which the delegates of the Chinese Soviet government negotiated with the Kuomintang government. The negotiators from the Chinese Soviet government such as Zhou Enlai were key CCP leaders. Yet the CCP opted to operate behind the scenes to enhance the likelihood of cooperation with the nonCCP forces. Its strong proletarian stance was a negative asset for attempts 36

DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

to form a united front. There was clearly a division of labor between the CCP and the Chinese Soviet since 1931: the CCP exercised leadership over the Chinese Soviet and focused on class struggle, party building, and administrative and military affairs of the Soviet areas, whereas the Chinese Soviet managed issues in diplomacy, government administration, women work, and untied fronts, etc. It is necessary to point out that the nominal leader of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Mao Zedong, lost his power in the CCP after 1932. Although Mao was reelected as chairman of the CEC of the Chinese Soviet Republic in February 1934, he was excluded from the CCP’s Politburo and was not even a member of the Secretariat of the CCP’s Sixth Central Committee. Furthermore, Mao was not informed of, let alone consulted about, the Long March until the very last minute. The then party leaders even planned to order Mao to wage guerrilla warfare against the mighty Kuomintang troops after the departure of the Red Army from Jiangxi, a move that might cost Mao’s life. The reins of the CCP and the Soviet Republic were, until the Zunyi Conference in 1935, in the hands of Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and the Comintern’s military adviser, Otto Braun; three leaders with no important posts in the Chinese Soviet Republic. The CCP also differed from the Chinese Soviet Republic in terms of personnel management. The Chinese Soviet Republic was designed to be a government of the whole China and did its best to include the CEC representatives from various geographic areas in the country. In particular, in the Second National Soviet Congress held in Ruijin, Jiangxi in 1934, great efforts were made to get delegates to come from soviet areas in other provinces, from the Kuomintang-controlled regions of China, and even from foreign countries such as Korea, Indonesia, and French Vietnam.4 No parallel efforts were ever made in forming the Central Committees of the CCP, although it too claimed to be the vanguard party of China. Also, when the CCP was established in 1921, not a single woman attended the opening ceremony. Later, some women, such as Deng Yingchao, joined the communist movement, but few became top CCP leaders. No woman was included in the first four Central Committees of the CCP. Two females were represented in the Fifth and the Sixth Central Committees of the CCP (1927–1945) but held no posts in the Red Army or the CCP organizations.5 Unlike the CCP, the CEC was not an overwhelmingly male group and contained more women than the Central Committees of the CCP. They included Zhang Qingqiu, Kang Keqing, Li Qingchen, Liu Chunxing, Deng Yingchao, and Cai Chang. It is necessary to stress that these names are derived from incomplete information on about 30 percent of the total CEC members (in contrast, information about women’s presence in the Central Committees of the CCP is based on complete data released by official sources in China).6 It is possible that the CEC had more than six women deputies. 37

DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Finally, there was no ethnic representation in the Central Committees of the CCP until 1945. However, the CEC included Guang Xiangying, a Manchu, and Wei Pocheng, a member of the Zhuang national minority. Again, it is necessary to stress that these names are derived from incomplete information on about 30 percent of the total CEC members (again, information about ethnic representation in the Central Committees of the CCP is based on complete data released by official sources in China).7 It is entirely possible that the CEC had more than two minority deputies. Clearly, the CEC was more inclusive than the Central Committees of the CCP in terms of geographic, gender, and ethnic representation. This was because the CCP declared itself to be, and was accordingly viewed as, a political party advocating class struggle to advance the class interests of the proletariat and poor peasants. The Chinese Soviet Republic was thus politically set up to appeal to a wider social spectrum. The division of labor between the CCP and the Chinese Soviet Republic mandated the latter a far greater degree of representation in various social strata than the former.

The united front policy and the three third system The unexpected military defeats of the Red Army in 1934 forced the CCP to begin the heroic Long March. It lasted until the famous Zunyi Conference in March 1935 an ad hoc, opportunistic, and desperate attempt by Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and Otto Braun to avert the complete destruction of the CCP and Red Army. The Red Army lost over 90 percent of its rankand-file when it reached northern Shananxi in October 1935. The Xian Incident in 1936 practically saved the CCP as it decisively led to the second united front between the Kuomintang government and the CCP to fight Japanese imperialism.8 The CCP moved its headquarter to Yenan in Shaanxi and began the famous Yenan period that led to its ultimate victory over the Kuomintang in 1949.9 The lesson from the Chiang Kai-shek’s coup in 1927 taught the CCP a valuable lesson that to defeat the Kuomintang government, it must have its own territorial base and army and must rely primarily on the support of the worker-peasant masses. The defeat in 1934 showed the CCP that it could not afford to alienate the intermediate elements in China. During the Yenan period, the rural guerrilla resistance movement and a broad antiJapanese united front were combined to secure as much the sympathy and support of the majority of the elites as possible.10 Mao Zedong wrote in 1939 that the united front, armed struggle, and party building were the three lethal weapons the CCP had to rely on in the Chinese revolution. He further pointed out: Chinese society is small at both ends and big in the middle, i.e., the proletariat at one end and the big landlords and big bour38

DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

geoisie at the other, each constituting only a small minority, while the great majority of the people consist of the intermediate classes. No political party that wants to run China’s affairs properly can do so unless its policy gives consideration to the interests of these classes . . . The three-third system and other policies put forward by the CCP seek to unite all the people who oppose Japan and take into consideration the interests of every class that does so, especially the intermediate classes.11 The united front was important because the CCP could use it to belie its sectarian image as a party only for the worker-peasant masses and transform it into a truly national party fighting for national defense and unity. Thus, it could allow the CCP to increase its popularity and political influence in China, undermine Kuomintang’s social basis, and maximize mass support for its revolutionary course. It could also help the CCP concentrate its energy on party building, armed struggle, and territorial expansion. Equally important, the united front could neutralize the potential opposition from landlord-bourgeois elites and prevent them from assisting either the Japanese or the Kuomintang government, thus greatly facilitating communist activities. It could solicit for the CCP the active service of a large number of moderate or progressive elites, who not only contributed material resources, administrative skills, and financial expertise to support the war, improve the administration and develop the rural economy, but also added legitimacy and stability to the communist base areas. A key element of the united front was a three-third system. Mao wrote in 1940 that in accordance with the united front principle concerning the organs of political power, the allocation of places should be one-third for communists, one-third for the non-CCP left progressive elements, and onethird for the intermediate sections who were neither left nor right. This would be no relinquishment of the CCP’s political leadership, but rather an attempt to make that leadership more acceptable to the general population. The non-CCP progressives must be allocated one-third of the places because they were linked with the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie. The aim in allocating one third of the places to the intermediate sections was to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. The CCP insisted that the united front policy would not be treated as a propaganda device, with non-communists permitted only token representation.12 In practice, the united front policy was not enforced with dogmatic exactness. Actual representation varied widely from one communist base area to another. It was reported that in the “old liberation areas” where land reform had been carried out thoroughly, the CCP and its followers made up more than a two-third majority in government councils. It was also reported that the communists withdrew from offices when less than 39

DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

one third of the official positions was won by non-communists in elections in the Shanganning Border Region.13 There were also areas where CCP’s control was partial and weak. As a result, in some places, coalitions of landlords, rich peasants, and KMT members were dominant, with the Kuomintang branches continuing to exist and elect many representatives to local assemblies. In one sub-region of Lungtang, for example, in the 1942 xiang (rural township) representative elections, there were 192 CCP members, 41 persons with KMT membership, and 732 independent candidates; in 1943, the figures were 180 CCP members, 101 persons with KMT membership, and 733 independent candidates. Overall, as one moved into higher-level assemblies, and later in time, the proportion of CCP members, progressives, and moderates became closer to the three-third guideline, at least in the Shanganning Border Region where Yenan was located.14 In comparison, in the communist base area in northwestern Shanxi, elections were held in all the villages between 1941 and 1942 and led to the convocation of a consultative assembly in October 1942, with only 47 of the 145 delegates being communists. Similar political developments took place in central Jiangsu province at the New Fourth Army base areas.15 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the class backgrounds of assembly representatives in fourteen xiang in the Shanganning Border Region and elected government officials in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Regions. The three-third principle was clearly pursued earnestly by the CCP as both the governments and assemblies contained a significant number of non-communists. The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Regions were a CCP stronghold throughout the Sino-Japanese War. Yet in 1941, less than 50 percent of leaders in the village, district, and county levels of government were workers and poor peasants (Table 3.2). In comparison, 40.2 percent of village government heads, 58.9 percent of district government officials, and 42.8 percent of county government leaders were middle peasants, whom had never won the CCP’s full trust. The large presence of rich peasants in county governments (42.8 percent) is also quite conspicuous, especially in comparison to 14.4 percent of poor peasants and 0 percent of workers. In the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi, in sharp contrast, rich peasants were a target of the CCP’s class struggle. Additionally, the opinions, ideas, and suggestions raised by noncommunist council members were taken seriously. For example, Mr. Li Dingming, a prominent local gentry figure, assumed the office of deputy chairman of the Shanganning Border Region government. He proposed to the CCP the policy of “Crack Troops and Simple Administration” (jingbing jianzheng) so as to reduce the amount of taxes collected from the masses. Li’s opinion was received by Mao with great enthusiasm. The CCP accordingly carried out a campaign during 1942–4, to promote 40

1,087

0,416 0, 69 1,402

1,887

Total

CCP KMT Independent

Total

Suide

2,636

0,400 0,161 2,075

2,446

0, 23 0,159 0,578 1,301 – 0, 22 0,236 0,127 –

–

–

Mici

225

83 2 140

225

8 3

8 12 33 154 7

Qingyang 969

196 41 732

971

12 89 325 460 – 36 22 27 –

Houshui 0,638

0,219 0, 58 0,361

1,636

0, 7 0,56 0,166 1,334 – 0, 4 0, 63 0, 6 –

Huangxian 757

229 12 516

731

8 32 137 501 – 9 38 6 –

Zhuchu 1,001

0,257 – 0,744

1,001

0, 47 0, 32 0,181 0,719 – 0, 22 – – –

494

107 – 387

314

124 2 188

386

20 185 165 13 2 – 1 –

494

–

Qinshui 3 65 405 5 14 – 2 –

Xingchen

–

584

10

640

1515 2 487

–

14 30 115 393 19 1 2

Qingpian 252

67 – 165

149

5 130 – 12 – – 2

– –

Qitan 825

386 – 439

815

2 45 101 541 – 89 14 3 20

57 5 64

73

1 2

1 14 55

Luxian 126

– –

–

–

73

89

162

–

167

3 5 30 111 – 7 9 2 –

Yenchang

10,926

2,801 0,352 7,773

10,765

0,134 0,686 2,437 6,549 0,44 0,312 0,394 0,177 0,32

Source: Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 148.

0, 10 0,202 0,502 0,280 – 0,93 – – –

Qingchen

Landlord Rich peasant Middle peasant Poor peasant Tenant Hired peasant Worker Merchant Gentry

Category

Xingning

Table 3.1 Statistics for assembly representatives in fourteen Xiang in Shanganning Border Region

Total

DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Table 3.2 Class backgrounds of persons elected to leadership positions in Jin-ChaJi Border Regions, 1941 (%) Class background

Village

District

County

Workers Poor peasants Middle peasants Rich peasants Landlords Merchants

7.6 40.1 40.2 6.7 0.1 5.3

3.2 35.3 58.9 1.94 0 0

0 14.4 42.8 42.8 0 0

Source: adapted from Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 31.

“simplification, unification, efficiency, economy, and opposition to bureaucracy” by reducing the size of administrative organs and transferring middle-level officials to leadership positions at the basic level.16 It is necessary to emphasize that the CCP consciously sought to use the three-third system in such a way that its leadership was strengthened rather than diluted. The system did not involve either the army or the CCP itself, and thus did not admit political outsiders to the inner circles of political power in the communist border regions. The government bodies and border region assemblies to which the three-thirds organizational principle applied were not policy-making agencies; rather, they were generally forums for discussing, transmitting, and implementing policy.17 Chen Yungfa’s detailed study of the united front and the CCP’s New Fourth Army in eastern and central China between 1937 and 1945 also shows that the communists maintained two separate fronts during this period: an external one posting a liberal-patriotic image and an internal one stressing class struggle and communist movements. The communists successfully manipulated the liberal-patriotic image in preventing the majority of elites from linking up with either the invading Japanese army or the Kuomintang government, in forestalling a rapprochement between the Kuomintang government and Japan, and in facilitating mass mobilization. Also, the liberal-patriotic image included a promise to respect the property and civil rights of the upper classes, which allowed the communists to recruit a small number of progressive elites into the CCP’s administration and military organizations for practical services such as fund-raising, tax collection, and clerical work. Chen maintains that the CCP’s management of class struggle and its concentration on developing power contributed greatly to its wartime success.18 The united front policy was of course one of the three weapons Mao mentioned in the Chinese revolution. The CCP also focused on armed struggle and party building. As part of the united front deal between the 42

DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

CCP and Kuomintang, the Red Army was renamed as the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. They grew quickly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. By 1945 the CCP commanded an army of over one million soldiers, most of whom were former poor and lower peasants. The CCP’s membership also increased from 40,000 in 1935 to 1.2 million in 1945. Class background was emphasized in recruiting CCP members and leaders. Party members with a middle-peasant background were reassigned from CCP leadership positions to other mass organizations, while poor-peasant members were promoted to branch leadership. Intellectuals from non-communist areas were subject to careful scrutiny by the CCP. Only those whose political loyalty was beyond any doubt were given important leadership positions.19 All levels of party leadership and the military forces were under the control of the people whom the CCP could trust. The CCP’s strive for political efficiency not only led to functional differentiation between the CCP and the border region governments but also required them to recruit individuals of different socioeconomic backgrounds to perform different tasks. Such personnel practices ceased to function during the Third Civil War of 1945–9 because of military action and the consequent political instability in China. The CCP focused all its efforts on armed struggle against the Kuomintang government. It was not until the CCP’s total victory in 1949 that elite dualism reemerged as a principle in leadership selection.

The political elite in the early years of the PRC The legacy of the pre-1949 intra-CCP struggle had a great impact on leadership selection in the Mao era. A series of ruthless political purges from the late-1920s to the mid-1940s had eliminated contenders for supremacy and established a legitimate center of power in the CCP before 1949. The rank and file of the CCP had already found their niches in the party hierarchy by 1945.20 Thus, there emerged a very high degree of continuity and stability among the top CCP elite between 1945 and 1966 (i.e. from the Seventh to the Eighth Central Committee).21 Apart from the very few who had died or been purged, members of the Seventh Central Committee (1945–56) constituted the core of the Eighth Central Committee (1956–69) elected in 1956.22 The Eighth Central Committee represented the top Chinese leadership as it contained the premier, all sixteen vice-premiers, the Chairman of the PRC, 10 out of the 14 vice-chairmen of the National Defence Council, 24 of the 28 first provincial secretaries, and all but one member of the general staff of the PLA.23 Franklin W. Houn points out that all of these communist leaders had long records of party activity; they suffered hardship and made sacrifices for the CCP cause. The CCP was under the control and 43

DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

guidance of dedicated and time-tested communists. After 1949, those who had had control over the armed forces and party organizations during the years of revolution enjoyed easier access to top positions in the CCP.24 The united front policy in the early 1950s Despite extraordinary elite stability among the top CCP leadership, a certain degree of elite dualism came into sight in the early years of the PRC, especially in leadership selection in the government system. On the eve of the communist takeover, the Chinese economy had been devastated by years of revolution, foreign invasion, and civil war. It was imperative that the CCP balance the national budget, reduce the level of inflation and unemployment, and stimulate the recovery of industry and agricultural production. Mao understood this point clearly, claiming in 1950 that only if China achieved a fundamental turn for the better in the financial and economic situation, could the CCP expect to maintain its popular support and lay the socialist foundation for planned economic development.25 Mao considered the national bourgeoisie a vital social force for a speedy recovery of economic life and the transition to socialism in China since it commanded administrative skills, technical expertise, and capital. He summarized his case with compelling candor: “We must learn to do economic work from all who know how, no matter who they are. We must esteem them as teachers, learning from them respectfully and conscientiously.”26 The CCP also needed the skills and expertise of politically neutral intellectuals, as knowledge was rather scarce in China at that time. It hoped that these intellectuals would participate with dedication and positive desire in bringing about national recovery and socialist transformation. Beyond this, the CCP wanted to trust the intellectuals both politically and professionally because such trust could inspire enthusiasm and commitment among the intellectuals. 27 The respect Mao and other CCP leaders paid willingly or unwillingly to intellectuals and professionals during the early 1950s can be easily detected in a political statement Mao made in 1958: “Professors? We have been afraid of them ever since we came into towns . . . When confronted by people with piles of learning, we felt we were good for nothing . . . I believe this attitude is another example of the slave mentality . . . We must not tolerate it any longer.”28 Finally, to effectively transform its power into authority and thereby consolidate the fruits of military victory, the CCP had to demonstrate its ability to govern urban areas. Smooth transition involved due attention to the aspect of continuity. To this end, the CCP leadership must make every effort to co-opt businessmen, prominent social figures, and leading intellectuals who commanded high status in the existing social structure. These people could lend their personal prestige to the CCP leadership and 44

DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

thereby ease the transfer of mass loyalties to, and enhance the political legitimacy of, the communist regime.29 It is no wonder that when Mao called for the entry of cadres to cities in 1949, he placed a great emphasis on forging a united front with all patriotic elements.30 Not surprisingly, the 1949 Chinese cabinet was meticulously composed to contain a high percentage of non-communists – presumably to demonstrate a united front posture and to draw on some highly qualified expert talents.31 Members of various minor political parties – representatives of the national bourgeoisie and intellectuals – were appointed to high posts in the government. Three of six vice-chairmen of the Chinese People’s Government were non-communists. Of the 56 councilors of the Chinese People’s Government, 26 were either independents or members of minor political parties. Two of the four vice premiers and nine out of the 15 state councilors of the State Administrative Council were non-CCP members. Non-communists were given the portfolios of the 14 out of 34 ministries, which included Textile Industry, Post and Telegraph, Communications, Education, Agriculture, Forestry and Land Reclamation, Water Conservation, Culture, and so on. In addition, 42 vice ministers were either independents or from minor political parties. Non-communists were also appointed to lower level positions in ministries, the Supreme Court, and the People’s Revolutionary Military Council. “Since the non-Communist parties altogether had fewer than 20,000 members compared to 4.8 million CCP members, these arrangements were very generous for the nonCommunists.”32 Such practices in leadership selection were also implemented in the subnational level with a certain degree of intensity. Complex administrative, economic and educational matters were under the direction of administrative cadres. The CCP adopted a pragmatic approach since it did not have enough cadres with expertise to administer government affairs. Except for party and military matters where political loyalty was important, noncommunists were assigned to jobs related to government and economic matters. In the early 1950s, first administrators and later scientists, technicians and other specialists diluted the revolutionary movement. Many of them were not members of the CCP or Communist Youth League of China (CYLC).33 Others were former Kuomintang government officials. Old intellectuals whose political loyalty was uncertain were assigned to specialist positions because of their expertise. Many young intellectuals were similarly allocated jobs in the functional fields of the state structure. It was estimated that over 70 percent of the government officials in Shanghai were non-CCP members even after the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns.34 The officials from the previous Kuomintang government accounted for fully half of the 180,000 cadres in the whole of the Southwest Region in mid-1950. Among the 1.75 million government officials in state institutions, only 600,000 were old cadres who joined the communist 45

DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

revolution before 1949. Approximately 400,000 were retained personnel from the old regime.35 In 1956, China’s Premier Zhou Enlai urged that at least one-quarter of government jobs be allocated to non-party members. In fact, about 40 percent of the government officials in 1957 were not party members.36 Much of administrative work during the early 1950s was not performed by CCP cadres.37 Of course, the positions in the government system that minor political parties occupied, such as education and water reservation, were mostly politically insensitive and unimportant. This pattern also reflected itself at the sub-national levels. Heath B. Chamberlain points out that the officials whom he identified as “Local Whites” in the governments in Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou were likely to operate in the area of mobilization – four out of five of them were engaged in such organs as “democratic parties,” “mass organizations,” “political consultative committees,” and the like. Another important area for the “Local Whites” to take was management at lower levels. In the years following the 1949 liberation, such non-CCP personnel as former KMT officials and local businessmen were to play a critical role in the process of administrative changeover. There were also some “Local Whites” in the area of “generalist” – a sphere of activity concerned with discussion and formulation of overall policy. However, the majority of positions in politically important areas such as control – an area that impinged on the linkages between policy and its implementation, between higher and lower leaders, and between leaders and the led – were firmly held by communists (Table 3.3). Regarding hierarchical placement, at the highest levels were mostly communists, and at the lowest, mostly “Local Whites.”38 Party cadres, regardless of their educational attainment, occupied politically powerful posts such as secretary of the CCP committee and other leading positions in the party-state organs.39 Victor C. Falkenheim similarly reports that 59.4 percent of the cadres in the Amoy (Xiamen) municipal bureaucracy were neither PLA cadres nor local communist officials. The handovers from the former Kuomintang government counted for over 63 percent of the Finance Bureau officials, 30.3 percent of the Health Bureau officials, 53.4 percent of the Public Security Bureau officers, and 57.1 percent of the People’s Court officials.40 Of course, it is necessary to note that the above-mentioned appointments at both the central and local government levels were by nature political manipulation of liberal intelligentsia. Nevertheless, it in fact created two different bureaucratic labor markets in China at the time – one was for the CCP and the other for the government. The two political hierarchies had different leadership selection criteria. The united front and the accompanying incorporation of non-CCP individuals into the government system were disfavored after the mid-1950s, a policy shift due to changes in domestic and international environments. 46

DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Table 3.3 Leaders by type and task area, measured by index of fair representation Task area

Outside Red

Local Red

Local White

Generalist Management High management Control Mobilization

1.3 0.7 1.5 3.7 0.7

1.1 0.6 1.1 1.0 1.2

0.9 1.2 0.8 0.1 1.1

Source: Heath B. Chamberlain, “Transition and Consolidation in Urban China: A Study of Leaders and Organizations in Three Cities, 1949–53,” in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 286.

Internationally, the growing rift between the Soviet Union and the PRC compelled the Chinese leadership to re-evaluate its approach toward socialist construction and rediscover the role of politics and mass campaigns in resource mobilization. Domestically, from 1949 to 1955, the rule of the communist party was legitimatized through its identification with the long-standing Chinese national revolution. From 1956 to 1962, especially after the nationalization of industry and commerce and the traumatic failure of the Hundred Flowers experiment in 1957, the CCP moved into open administration of the economy and society, and advocated its own ideology of socialist construction, which was built upon but went considerably beyond the ideology of the Chinese national revolution.41 The Hundred Flowers experiment and the following Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 created a political environment in which intellectuals were not trusted politically. Finally, power struggle within the CCP forced Mao to rely on some PLA leaders such as Marshal Lin Biao and to cultivate his cult in preparation for a final showdown with his competitors – Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. As administrative and economic life in China became increasingly politicized, expertise was downplayed in favor of “redness” (i.e. political loyalty). At the same time, the united front underwent a process of ideological escalation that rendered it increasingly irrelevant to political action. It was no longer a tactic or a strategy, but an element of thought and one of the prescriptive lenses through which Chinese society was viewed.42 Equally importantly, the CCP no longer depended on politically unreliable intellectuals since it had already trained its cadres and raised college graduates to manage the economy and government. Despite all these changes, the united front policy died hard because it modified the extreme Marxist nature of the CCP, which served the CCP’s efforts to bring about the possible unification of China with Taiwan, appeal to the political loyalty of overseas Chinese, and win sympathy and support from the international community in its open confrontation with the US and the Soviet Union. At the central government level, it was not 47

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until 1975 that all ministerial posts were held by CCP members.43 Before 1975, the impact of the Cultural Revolution purge on the non-CCP officials in the government system was nearly negligible. Only one out of the 11 non-CCP economic leaders, a deputy director of the Administrative Bureau of Commerce and Industry, was ousted. The other ten non-CCP leaders, including six non-CCP ministers such as Fu Zouyi and Li Wenhui, kept their jobs and continued to appear in public,44 a possible outcome of political considerations for the united front policy. The embryo of elite dualism While elite dualism on the basis of the united front policy withered away, a segmented bureaucratic labor market for communist cadres began to emerge, an outcome of the increasing division of labor between the CCP and the government. The establishment of the PRC as a socialist country in 1949 created a structural condition for functional differentiation. Lenin supported the idea that technicians and specialists, rather than politicians, should be in charge of the socialist regime. He described a very happy era as one in which politicians would grow ever fewer in number, people would speak of politics more rarely and at less length, and engineers and agronomists would do most of the talking.45 This is because a socialist country requires a large army of trained economic planners to plan economic development. Socialist economy also needs a huge number of engineers, agronomists, and the like since industrialization and the minute division of labor are at its heart. Alvin W. Gouldner thus argues that in collectivizing the means of production, the power of the moneyed old class is destroyed. In transferring the means of production to state control, thus swelling the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, socialism extends the domain within which the intelligentsia’s cultural capital holds sway. The control of the means of production by the state forms a mechanism to the advantage of the class interests of the intelligentsia.46 Indeed, in Eastern European socialist countries, technical experts were quickly co-opted into the ruling elite after the seizure of political power by communist revolutionaries. In the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin launched after 1937 a Great Purge to eliminate his political opponents, which swept up victims from every stratum of Soviet society.47 The Great Purge unintentionally opened up space for rapid elite turnover and mobility in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it coincided with the high tides of Stalinist industrialization that demanded economic planners, engineers, and managers. Thus, many party loyalists with good education were promoted rapidly. They were characterized as “red experts,” who were highly motivated, hard working and conscientious about education.48 The CCP adopted after 1949 the Stalinist model in designing the state 48

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structure and economic development.49 Soviet experts were invited to direct the formation of procedures and policy processes in China. The Five-Year Plans, modeled after their Soviet counterparts, were proclaimed once every five years to guide economic development. Soviet advisors and aides were instrumental in establishing industrial complexities in China. Technical experts, planners, and engineers were in urgent need to run the Soviet-style economy. However, most of the CCP cadres at the time were either ideologues or politicians without much technical expertise. Their method of governance was mass mobilization and political campaigns,50 which was inconsistent with the way the industrial economy was supposed to be managed. To overcome this problem, the CCP leadership recommended that some elderly and less competent officials be persuaded to retire or to return to their native villages to find work in farming.51 Others who had not learned Mandarin, the working language of the government, nor had the work habit necessary for office employment were considered unsuitable for administrative work and were weeded out of the formal government hierarchy.52 At the same time, the CCP transferred its cadres with technical expertise to leadership positions in the industrial and economic fields. When the PRC was founded, many communist cadres with technical backgrounds had been assigned to administrative positions in the CCP or the government or had been asked to work in an area other than that in which they had been trained. In the early 1950s, the personnel departments were ordered to identify their technical skills and made sure that they were reassigned to more appropriate positions. For example, technical personnel and college graduates were to be sent to factories.53 It is necessary to mention here that although the CCP had basically operated in rural areas before 1949, a small number of its cadres were former intellectuals and university students. In the late 1930s, the CCP was given a certain degree of freedom to operate in urban China because of the united front with the Kuomintang government. The CCP wasted no time in recruiting university students into its ranks and files.54 It is worth mentioning the “38-style cadres” – party members recruited in 1938 that included a contingency of intellectuals and students. Many of them joined the communist course after the Anti-Japanese December 9th student movement in 1936.55 As the best-educated people in the CCP, many of them moved up the CCP hierarchy rapidly and were placed at the middle and high levels of the post-1949 leadership in the government.56 John Israel and Donald Klein report that in the early 1950s the December 9th veterans were spread through the various ministries, commissions, administrations, and bureaus. In the Ministry of Fuel Industry, for example, Kuo Ta, a December 9th veteran, directed the Staff Office. Other important central government posts given to the December 9th veterans included leading posts in the Foreign Ministry, the chairmanship of the 49

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Yangtze River Water Conservancy Committee, and membership on a counterpart committee for harnessing the Huai River. Another December 9th veteran, Qin Yinlin, headed the Planning Bureau of the Ministry of Railways and later became a vice minister. The predominant fields of work among the December 9th veterans were: propaganda, education, and culture; finance, economics, and trade; industry and commerce. After the proclamation of the First Five-Year Plan, the national civil bureaucracy expanded rapidly – especially in the economic sphere. A large number of the December 9th veterans were then transferred to work in Beijing, presumably because of their expertise.57 It is important to point out that the appointments for the December 9th veterans and other former college students took place with regard to their academic backgrounds, seeking to match their expertise with posts. For example, former Yanjing University student Chen Hanbo was appointed deputy director of the Beijing Press School in 1949. For him this was a familiar territory since he had majored in journalism at Yanjing University. In fact, before this appointment Chen was head of a Press Training Class under the New China News Agency.58 As another example, Kang Shien, a former geology student at Qinghua University, joined the communist movement in the late 1930s and became head of the political department of the Ninth Division in the First Field Army. He was then appointed the chief military representative at the Yumen Oil Fields and the secretary of its CCP Committee. By 1952 Kang had been promoted to head the Petroleum Management Bureau of the entire Northwest. Next he moved to Beijing to head the General Bureau of the Beijing Municipal Petroleum Management and in 1953, at the age of 38, he was appointed director of the Petroleum Management Bureau in the Ministry of Fuel Industry. He became Assistant Minister when the Ministry of Petroleum was established as a separate entity in 1955 and vice minister in 1956. His background in geology at Qinghua University may have predetermined his career in the petroleum industry. Other examples include future State Planning Commission Chairman Song Ping and Foreign Minister Huang Hua.59 Of course, there were many cases in which cadres without technical expertise assumed leadership positions in the government system. This was mainly because the CCP could not find enough politically reliable intellectuals to staff the state structure in the early years of the PRC. This was a natural move given that the CCP even used the Kuomintang hangovers and politically unreliable intellectuals in administering the economy and government during this period of time. After the mid-1950s Mao and his associates had become increasingly radical and sought to reintroduce revolutionary campaign techniques into the planning and policy-implementation procedures of the increasingly rationalized bureaucracy. Harry Harding notices that: 50

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During the period of regularization [of the early 1950s], rules and regulations had been formalized; during the [Great] Leap [Forward in 1958], these same procedures were denounced as being outmoded relics that produced only waste and conservatism. During the period of regularization, cadres had been encouraged to develop administrative and technical skills and to become specialists; during the Leap, skills were still considered important, but specialists were seen as having tendencies toward conservatism, and cadres were urged to become jack-of-all-trades . . . By the early 1960s, the CCP had created a network of functional departments that paralleled the functional bureaus of the government and enabled the CCP to play an extensive role in policymaking at all levels of Chinese society. Under such circumstances it was inevitable that power would flow steadily from the government to the CCP.60 Nevertheless, it has been reported that prior to the Cultural Revolution, most bureaucratic expertise was still dispersed among functionally specialized agencies, especially among the ministries of the central government.61 Richard Diao divides the economic elite of pre-Cultural Revolution China into five groups. Group One was the economic high command, who were both coordinators of major government activities and specialists in economic fields. Group Two included many high-ranking communists, who occupied political supervisory positions and performed an important role in policy implementation in their respective agencies. Many members of the rest of the three groups held specialized jobs within their ministries or bureaus.62 However, no similar statements about the CCP organizations have ever been made. This is because the CCP central organ performed political tasks and the central government had a preponderant orientation toward economic issues. This was the case when the State Council was established in 1954, and it remained so until the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966.63 Not surprisingly, overall, the political qualifications required for posts in the State Council were lower than that for positions in the CCP central organ.64 Conversely, the technical requirements for positions in the government system were higher than those in the CCP system. Finally, it is necessary to stress here that bureaucratic regularization and the resulting elite dualism were quite limited throughout the Mao era because of leadership stability. Many China experts point out that revolutionary veterans monopolized the center of power at both the central and local levels until the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Political loyalty was the key factor of elite recruitment.65 As noted above, the CCP had some cadres who were both politically reliable and technically competent. But their number was small. A segmented bureaucratic labor market 51

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by nature requires candidates with different attributes. It could not possibly come into existence when the overwhelming majority of the cadres were political campaigners. It was not until the post-Mao cadre reform in the 1980s that adequate human resources became available for elite dualism to fully develop.

Summary This chapter reorganizes and reinterprets findings about the Chinese communist movement from existing studies. It shows that the spirit of elite dualism has always been an organizational principle that the CCP has used to achieve its political missions. The division of labor between the Central Committee of the CCP and the CEC of the Chinese Soviet Republic in the early 1930s was purposely created to enhance political efficiency. The different patterns of leadership selection between the two different political actors served different political purposes. The CCP continued its mission as a vanguard political party fighting for the fundamental interests of the working class and a communist China. Yet it established the Chinese Soviet Republic to appeal to a wider spectrum of Chinese society. The different political tasks dictated the two political systems to adopt different criteria in elite recruitment, especially in terms of ethnicity, gender, and geographic representation. Furthermore, reputed CCP leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhu De were made heads of state for diplomat purposes, while real power was held firmly in the hands of Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu. Similarly, functional differentiation between the CCP and the border region governments it controlled was effectively exploited to increase the odds that the CCP would survive and expand during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45. The communist leadership modified its orthodox stand and opted for expediency and efficiency, creating the division of labor between the CCP and the border region governments. Shum Kui-kwong points out that the CCP was able to develop creatively the structure of governance and personnel policy to serve its political ambition for the total control over Chinese society. Despite the fact that the CCP remained a proletarian party with a communist blueprint for China, the division of labor between itself and the border region governments and the patterns of elite recruitment for the border region governments greatly enhanced its status as the champion of national resistance. The CCP was therefore able to show its willingness to subordinate class warfare to the national interest, which allowed experimentation and adoption of conciliatory and mutually beneficial policies for both the elites and the masses. As a result, the communist base areas became the most democratic, popular and economically viable region in China. The united front narrowed the basis of the Kuomintang government’s social support to essentially a minority of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords. Thus, the legitimacy of the Kuom52

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intang government, in spite of its nominal leadership in the resistance war, was greatly undermined domestically and internationally.66 It is necessary to stress that before 1949 the division of labor between the CCP and the government it controlled was only in its embryonic stage. There were powerful constraints against functional differentiation in both the Jiangxi and the Yenan periods. First, before 1949, the various soviets in the Jiangxi era and border regions in the Yenan period sprang to life in different provinces, lasted for varying periods of time, and ranged in nature from a hideout for guerrilla warfare to viable political entities. Scholars point out that the CCP found it extremely hard to establish a regular tax base to support a meaningful civilian government as the population and geographic territory of a soviet or border region shrank or expanded unpredictably, depending on the outcomes of military operations. 67 Second, in Jiangxi, the shortage of skilled and literate officials made it difficult to build a formal framework of government bureaucracy. In Yenan, the CCP’s need to operate from widely dispersed border areas, its limited economic resources, and its involvement in a far-flung mobile guerrilla war made the “rural work style” more appropriate. Despite all these, the CCP did attempt to regularize its organizational structure whenever possible. Scholars report that in Yenan a degree of bureaucratization emerged, in part because of the availability of intellectuals from cities and in part because of the CCP’s desire to establish a more systematic administration. These earlier efforts such as the three-third principle and the resulting government bodies and assembles in border regions were but a prelude to a more extensive drive for a higher degree of the division of labor between the government and the CCP that was undertaken shortly after the CCP assumed nationwide power.68 After the CCP came to power in 1949, it understood that it was very important to incorporate intellectuals and professionals into the government system since they would give the communist regime a greater degree of political legitimacy as well as expertise necessary for the management of urban economy. A significant number of the non-CCP personalities were given leading positions in the Chinese government. The formation of the government elites provides a direct contrast to that of the CCP leadership. Political flexibility in elite recruitment in the government system and leadership stability in the CCP hierarchy represents emerging elite dualism. However, as the CCP consolidated its power in China and as mass mobilization and political campaigns gained increasing importance in economic activities, the united front policy gradually lost its appeal to the CCP leadership. Nevertheless, the CCP adopted the Stalinist model of industrial development in the early years of the PRC, creating the structural condition for the division of labor and the distribution of power between the CCP and 53

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the government. The CCP built the Chinese government after the Soviet model to handle complex economic and social matters. It also sent communist cadres with technical expertise to work in various government departments. Incompetent government officials were persuaded to retire, regardless of their long services to the CCP before 1949. Despite political rhetoric, different recruitment criteria for the government and the CCP continued to operate until the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Bureaucratic “regularization” continued although mass campaigns kept coming back as a main method of economic management since the late 1950s. Of course the process of bureaucratization and resulting elite dualism were rather limited because of leadership stability since 1949. Bureaucratic “regularization” and its emphasis on functional differentiation in the early 1960s reduced Mao’s political power substantially, which became a key factor that triggered the Cultural Revolution,69 an issue to be discussed in the next chapter. I also discuss in Chapter 4 the cadre reform in the 1980s that heralded the coming of a segmented bureaucratic labor market in the reform era.

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4 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION IN THE REFORM ERA

Chapter 3 shows that a certain degree of elite heterogeneity emerged when the CCP opted for efficiency and governance. However, the CCP had from time to time upheld revolutionary mobilization as its top priority. When it adopted a “politics in command” approach, elite homogeneity prevailed. The Cultural Revolution of 1966–76 provides such an example. In this chapter I examine how the politics of the Cultural Revolution undermined functional differentiation in the Chinese political system. I then outline the historical development of the political elite since the Cultural Revolution and the leadership transition in the 1980s, thereby supplementing a historical background for the subsequent discussion of institutional arrangements and leadership selection in the reform era.

China’s political elite during the Cultural Revolution Why did the Cultural Revolution take place? Some scholars argue that the division of labor between the first and second front leaders in the early 1960s led to a substantial redistribution of power among the CCP leaders, which triggered an ultimate showdown for supremacy between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao on one side and Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping on the other.1 Other scholars claim that Mao plotted the Cultural Revolution because his version of a socialist China was at odds with the increasing bureaucratization of the Chinese political system.2 Regardless, the Cultural Revolution turned Chinese politics into a series of treacheries, plots, and purges. As Jing Huang points out, the sense of comradeship among the CCP leaders was lost, their faith in ideology eroded, and the coherence of the CCP damaged.3 Shiping Zheng claims that except for Mao Zedong and a few of his followers, almost all the Chinese leaders were attacked. By 1968, 71 percent of the members and alternate members of the CCP Eighth Central Committee had been accused of being 55

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“traitors,” “enemy agents,” and “antiparty elements.” Among the high-ranking officials (above the rank of deputy minister or vice governor), 75 percent were placed under special investigation by rebel masses.4 Hong Yung Lee also reports that 70 percent of ministers and vice ministers in the State Council and leaders of the central CCP organs, together with 54 percent of provincial CCP secretaries, provincial deputy CCP secretaries, governors, and deputy governors, were victimized during the Cultural Revolution.5 CCP leaders with university education suffered greatly during the Cultural Revolution.6 The large-scale attack on the Chinese bureaucracy receded after Mao prevailed over Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in 1969. A small number of cadres were “liberated” and returned to work. Liberation by no means ensured permanent job security, however. Deng Xiaoping was liberated in 1974 but was brought down again in 1976. Other toppled cadres were in organizational limbo: some had been suspended from office and were performing menial clerical or service work until their cases were cleared, others were undergoing re-education at cadre reform schools, and still others remained at their posts but working under supervision.7 Functional differentiation was seriously undermined, diminishing the division of labor between the government and the CCP. After the initial chaotic period, the CCP took control over government functions. The CCP’s organizational principle was popularized as “Whether it is in the East, West, South, North or the middle, and among the Party, the government, the military, the civilian and schools, the Party should exercise its leadership over everything.”8 In the name of anti-bureaucratization, Mao “also eliminated the formal division of labor between the Party and government by merging the Party functionaries and state bureaucracies.” Mao believed that the merge would enhance revolutionary campaigns and mass mobilization.9 The pattern of the merges, with available data, can be best observed at the provincial level. Between the late 1960s and early 1970s, leadership passed decisively from revolutionary committees to party committees at the provincial level when the latter were re-established in the provinces. Among the 29 provincial governments (22 provinces, five autonomous regions, and three municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the central government): eleven had interlocking directorates for most of the time before the Cultural Revolution; seven had interlocking directorates before 1955, but not after; two had interlocking directorates after 1955; and nine never had interlocking directorates before the Cultural Revolution. Beginning in 1970–71, all the provincial 56

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governments set up interlocking directorates under which the first secretary of a provincial Party committee was concurrently the head of the provincial revolutionary committee.10 As a result, there were no substantial differences between the CCP and government administrative offices at provincial level since both shared the same functional departments, work, and personnel. These two organizations often formally met together.11 The reduction of functional differentiation trimmed down the structural need for different personnel policies in the government system and the CCP hierarchy and thus the need for expertise in elite recruitment in the administrative system. Since politics was in total command, political loyalty became the only selection criterion, resulting in a single bureaucratic labor market in the Chinese Table 4.1 Provincial interlocking directorates, 1949–78 Province

Pre-1955

Post-1955

Anhui Beijing Fujian Gansu Guangdong Guangxi Guizhou Hebei Heilongjiang Henan Hubei Hunan Inner Mongolia Jiangsu Jiangxi Jilin Liaoning Ningxia Qinghai Shaanxi Shandong Shanghai Shanxi Sichuan Tianjin Tibet Yunnan Xinjiang Zhejiang

1952–5 1951–4 1949–54

1955–66 1955–9

1949–53 1949–55 1952–4 1952–3

1955–7 1961–7 1955–64 1955–8 1956–8 1958–61

1949–54 1947–54

1955–66

1949–51 1952–4 1950–2 1949–50 1950–4 1949–52 1952–5 1949–52

1961–7 1961–3 1958–65 1955–8

1949–52

Cultural Revolution 1971–7 1972–8 1971–9 1971–7 1970–8 1967–77 1971–7 1971–9 1971–4 1968–78 1971–3, 1975–8 1970–7 1971–8 1970–7 1970–2, 1974–9 1971–7 1971–3, 1975–8 1971–7 1971–7 1971–8 1971–9 1971–6 1971–9 1971–9 1967–78 1971–9 1971–7 1971–8 1971–7

Source: Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 147.

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political system. Red Guard rebels and military officers, because of their unconditional obedience to Mao, were considered politically reliable and became the favored candidates for leadership positions in all levels of the political hierarchy. In Shanghai, for instance, Revolutionary Committees were established, with the considerable influx of military and mass representatives – previously political outsiders – into the field of municipal political power. Shanghai was not alone. David Goodman’s study of chairmen and vice chairpersons in China between 1967 and 1968 shows that 33.9 percent of them were “revolutionary cadres,” 42 percent were officers of the People’s Liberation Army (the PLA), and 25 percent were representatives of the mass organizations.12 The situation remained largely unchanged till 1973. In fact, the military influence in civilian politics increased significantly after 1969. Harry Harding points out that five of the eight ministerial positions filled between 1969 and September 1971 (the Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry, Foreign Trade, Communications, Sports, and the First Ministry of Machine Building) were given to military officers. Of the 170 members and 109 alternate members of the Central Committee elected at the Ninth CCP Congress in 1969, approximately 45 percent (74 full members and 55 alternate members) were PLA representatives. Military officers were assigned to 59 percent of the 158 secretaryships on the provincial CCP committees formed in late 1970 and 1971. Of the 29 provincial CCP first secretaries, 21 were either military commanders or PLA commissars. The Cultural Revolution raised military participation in the CCP and government to a level unknown since the early 1950s. Over 50 percent of the provincial CCP secretaryships and 32 percent of the Tenth Central Committee elected in 1973 were still from the PLA.13 The change of the rank-and-file in the Chinese bureaucracy during the Cultural Revolution reduced the overall educational level of the political elite in the PRC. The Cultural Revolution was initiated under the banner of anti-feudalism, anti-imperialism, anti-revisionism, and anti-bourgeois intellectualism. Cadres with college degrees were a chief target of the Red Guards since university education was viewed as the embodiment of bourgeois intellectualism. As a result, about 60 percent of provincial leaders before the Cultural Revolution had a college education. During the Cultural Revolution, the percentage dropped to around 32 to 43,14 and further dropped to about 20 percent in the early 1980s. This is because the replacement cadres, as mentioned above, were mostly military officers and representatives of rebels, who were much less educated than their predecessors.15 Table 4.2 shows that most of the PLA officers were illiterate or semiilliterate. Only 0.43 percent of them received university education, 4.52 percent military training, and 0.12 percent some sort of foreign education. 58

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Table 4.2 Educational attainment of the PLA marshals and generals, 1950–66 Education

Number

Percent

Foreign study University Military academy Vocational school Unknown

0,38 0,7 0,37 0,2 1,529

2.35 0.43 2.29 0.12 94.79

Total

1,613

100.00

Source: adapted from Xiaowei Zang, “Professionalism and the Leadership Transition in the Post-Mao Chinese Army,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 5/3 (1991), p. 51.

Yet it was from this group of poorly educated generals that replacement officers were chosen and dispatched to take over leadership positions in the civilian bureaucracy during the Cultural Revolution. Despite the extraordinary turnover in the political elite, some forms of the division of labor between different political systems re-emerged in the late stage of the Cultural Revolution. As Harry Harding sees it, the CCP developed three concentric circles of authority in schematic form. At each level the smallest and most powerful of these three circles was the CCP committee, which served as the locus of policymaking. The middle circle was the revolutionary committee, which discussed and ratified the policies determined by the CCP committee and began the task of formulating the specific measures for carrying them out. To ensure continuity between policymaking and policy implementation, virtually all members of the CCP standing committee were ex officio members of the revolutionary committee, and the first secretary of the CCP committee served, virtually without exception, as the revolutionary committee chairman. Finally, the outermost circle was the administrative staff of the revolutionary committee, organized into functional departments, which presented plans and data to the CCP committee and the revolutionary committee and worked out the detailed measures for the implementation of policy. This administrative staff was drawn primarily from the CCP and government departments that had existed before the Cultural Revolution.16

The cadre reform in the 1980s The Cultural Revolution ended in 1976. Deng Xiaoping regained his position in 1977 and wasted no time initiating a large-scale cadre reform in China to consolidate his power base and start economic reforms. Deng’s action was greatly facilitated by the popular demands for a rapid improvement of living standards, a task that could only be accomplished by new leaders with better skills. The Cultural Revolution caused 59

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substantial damage to the legitimacy of the CCP regime. The general apathy and cynicism toward political propaganda among the Chinese people fundamentally undermined the traditional mass campaign tactics the CCP had relied on since the Yenan era in the 1940s. The success stories of Japan and the Four Little Dragons in East Asia taught Chinese leaders a lesson that economic rationality and scientific management were a key to rapid industrialization in China. The situation exacerbated leadership inadequacies and thus pressed for organizational changes in elite recruitment.17 Between 1978 and 1982, Deng and his associates managed to rehabilitate many victims of the Cultural Revolution and those who had been purged between 1949 and 1965. The CCP believed that most veteran cadres were “good or relatively good” and assigned jobs to those still able to work.18 Despite stubborn resistance from those who had benefited from the Cultural Revolution, 2.9 million veteran cadres were rehabilitated. This massive return of purged cadres and the reversal of the past decisions and policies helped Deng Xiaoping strengthen his position in the ruling hierarchy and increase his popularity among the masses.19 Gradually, Deng and his associates took over key positions in the Chinese political hierarchy. The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee held in 1978 promoted four senior veteran cadres, including Hu Yaobang, to the CCP’s Politburo, the highest decision-making body in China. Soon, Zhao Ziyang became premier of the PRC and Hu Yaobang was elected Chairman of the CCP.20 It was against this background that the CCP held the Twelfth Congress in 1982. The 1982 Twelfth Congress marked the beginning of the leadership transition in the reform era.21 After returning to power, veteran cadres often found themselves ten years out of date regarding professional and technical aspects of their jobs. Moreover, many were cowed into indifference and indecision by the psychological trauma of their Cultural Revolution experiences. Consequently, many bureaucracies virtually grounded to a halt.22 Deng and his associates recognized that old CCP cadres were simply not well prepared in terms of mental state and administrative skills for the Four Modernization program (i.e. the modernizations of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense). Nor could they be retrained since most of them were aging (over 60) and had a very low educational achievement. Before 1981, for example, only 38 percent of the leading cadres in the State Council and 20 percent of provincial leaders were college graduates.23 Deng and his associates had no choice but to undertake a wholesale replacement of the veteran cadres with the individuals capable of accomplishing the Four Modernization program. Who should be the candidates for leadership posts? Deng Xiaoping explained: 60

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What do we mean when we talk about people around forty years old? They are the ones who entered college in the late 1950s. It has been thirty years since the founding of the nation. Those who graduated from college in the early 1960s are now forty to fortyfive years old. On another occasion, Deng advocated the idea of making the cadre corps “better educated, professionally more competent, and younger.”24 Hu Yaobang, then general secretary of the CCP and Deng’s chief protégé, jumped on the bandwagon, arguing that the success of the Four Modernization program largely depended on whether the cadre corps could achieve four transformations – to become politically loyal, young, better educated, and professionally competent.25 Song Renqiong, then head of the CCP’s Personnel Department, similarly pointed out that “the Four Modernizations demand a large number of knowledgeable leading cadres, cadres with specialized knowledge, abilities and energy. But the situation in our cadre corps is far from meeting these needs.”26 Mr Song also argued that the Four Modernizations: urgently require our cadres to be younger and more specialized. From now on, in recruiting full-time cadres, we shall stress seriously cultural qualification and specialized knowledge. In accordance with the requirement of the new era, cadres will be recruited from graduates of high schools, universities and specialized institutes.27 Hence, after the 1982 Twelfth Congress, the CCP launched a massive campaign to replace old revolutionary guards with younger and bettereducated communist cadres. During the first six years of the 1980s, almost 1.4 million senior cadres recruited before 1949 were persuaded or forced to retire from their posts. At the same time, more than 469,000 college-educated younger cadres came into leadership positions above the county level. Eighty percent of those promoted in 1984 had a college education. As a result, those with college-level educations grew from 43 percent to 60 percent of all leading cadres at the central and provincial levels.28 During the period of 1982–3, only 32 percent of the Politburo received university education, this figure increased to 67 percent after 1984. Similarly, 50 percent of ministers in the central government in 1982–3 had a college degree. After 1984, 73 percent of them received university education.29 The CCP was most interested in promoting politically loyal intellectuals and professionals. The best example is Mr. Jiang Zemin. Mr. Jiang joined the CCP in 1946 and graduated from Jiaotong University in 1947. He served as deputy director of Shanghai No. 1 Yimin Foodstuff Factory and Shanghai Soap Factory from 1949 to 1951, chief of the Electric Appliance 61

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Section of Shanghai No. 2 Designing Sub-bureau from 1953 to 1954, director of the Power Plant of No. 1 Motor Vehicle Plant from 1956 to 1962, and deputy director of Shanghai Electric Appliance Institute and director of Wuhan Thermo-engineering Machinery Institute from 1962 to 1967. Jiang’s career suffered a terrible setback during the Cultural Revolution when he was struggled against and then sent to engage in manual work between 1967 and 1971. Mr. Jiang was reinstated in 1972 to work as an expert in Romania. He came back to China in 1973 and became deputy director and then director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau under the First Ministry of Machine-Building from 1973 to 1979, vice-chairman and secretary general of the Office of the State Import and Export Administration Committee from 1980 to 1982; first vice-minister and then minister of the Ministry of Electronics Industry from 1982 to 1985, mayor of Shanghai in 1986, and secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee in 1987. In 1989 Mr. Jiang replaced Zhao Zhiyang as the general secretary of the CCP, a post he held until November 2002.30 Another example is Mr. Zhang Shukui, a native of Dingxing county in Hebei province. Mr. Zhang joined the CCP in 1959 and graduated from the Department of Radio Electronics at Qinghua University, one of the best universities in the PRC, in 1964. He worked as factory technician from 1964 to 1970 and was workshop director between 1970 and 1980. He became director of his factory in 1982 and was transferred to be deputy director of Guizhou Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Electronic Industry in 1984. He was appointed vice governor of Guizhou province in 1985 and stayed in that capacity for more than ten years.31 Similarly, Ms. Wang Rongzhen, who received her degree in biology in 1952 and joined the CCP in the same year, was only an engineer in 1978. She was appointed vice governor of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in 1983.32 Other examples include Zhang Shou, vice minister in charge of State Planning Commission between 1983 and 1989;33 Mr. Zhang Runshen, vice governor of Heibei province between 1985 and 1992;34 Mr. Wu Changli, who was only a senior engineer in 1979 and was appointed vice chairman of Tibet Autonomous Region in 1983;35 Mr. Chen Mingyi, who was only an associate professor and dean at Xiamen Aquatic Products Institute in 1983 and was appointed governor of Fujian in 1994.36 Although these leaders were professionals with high CCP seniority, they would never have the opportunity to become national leaders had the cadre reform not taken place in the 1980s. However, there was a short supply of intellectuals and professionals with party membership in the early 1980s because of the anti-intellectual Cultural Revolution. The Chinese leadership thus decided to recruit potential candidates into the CCP first and then promoted them into leadership positions. For example, Mr. Ma Lin, a native of Acheng County in Heilongjiang Province, received his degree in electric machinery from Tang62

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

shan Railway Institute in 1957. He then served successively as technician and engineer in China’s railway system. He was upgraded to be deputy chief engineer at the Baoji Sub-bureau of the Xian Railway Bureau in 1980 and became a CCP member in the same year. He then quickly became deputy director of the Xian Railway Bureau (a bureau (juji) level cadre) in 1983, director of the Chengdu Railway Bureau in 1984, and vice governor of Sichuan province in 1985.37 On average it takes 27.4 years for a person to receive such an appointment after his/her entry into the CCP (Table 5.5). Mr. Ma only took five years to complete the journey from an average CCP member to a provincial level cadre. Other examples include Mr. Zhu Jiazhen, who joined the CCP in 1979 and became vice governor of Liaoning in 1985;38 Mr. Zhang Fengyu, who joined the CCP in 1978 and became vice governor of Jiangxi province in 1988;39 Mr. Zhang Chunyuan, who joined the CCP in 1979 and became vice governor of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in 1985.40 An even more interesting case is Mr. Wu Chengzhi, who received his Bachelor of Sciences from the Department of Roads and Bridges at Tongji University in 1960. After completing a graduate program in Road Engineering at the same university, he worked in the Qinghai Provincial Department of Communications and was appointed as deputy director of Road Exploration and Designing Institute in that department in 1979. He was promoted as chief engineer and then became deputy director of the Qinghai Provincial Department of Communications in 1983. He joined the CCP in 1984 and assumed vice governorship of Qinghai in 1985.41 It appears that he entered the CCP after his promotion had been decided. Sometimes the CCP allows a candidate to become a high level official without CCP membership. For example, Ms. Xie Lijuan, who has never been a CCP member, received her degree from Shanghai No. 2 Medical College in 1961. She worked as a doctor in Shanghai Luwan District Central Hospital between 1961 and 1978 and was deputy director of that hospital from 1978 to 1984. She was then appointed deputy magistrate of Luwan District between 1984 and 1985 and then vice mayor of Shanghai from 1985 to 1996.42 As another example, Associate Professor Mr. Sun Daren of Shaanxi Teachers University was appointed vice governor of Shaanxi province in 1983.43 Similarly, Mr. Wang Wenyuan, who became dean and professor of the School of Business Administration at Liaoning University in 1988, was unexpectedly appointed vice governor of Liaoning province in the same year. He moved to Beijing in 1992 to be deputy procurator-general and was elected vice chairman of the Ninth CPPCC National Committee in 1998.44 Other examples include Mr. Yang Jike, appointed vice governor of Anhui province in 1980;45 Mr. Zhang Xuwu, appointed vice governor of Jiansu province in 1983;46 Ms. Wu Xijun, appointed vice governor of 63

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Jiangsu province in 1987;47 Mr. Feng Tiyun, appointed vice minister of Supervision in 1988;48 and Ms. He Luli, appointed vice mayor of Beijing in 1988.49 I label this group of cadres as co-opted officials because of their unique routes to political office and will discuss cooptation in detail in Chapter 9. Finally, the CCP also promotes individuals who were considered politically unreliable before. The best example is Mr. Zhu Rongji. Zhu joined the CCP in 1949 and graduated from Qinghua University in 1951. He was already deputy chief of the Production Planning Section of the Planning Office of the Industrial Department under the Northeast China People’s Government in 1951 and held other posts before 1957. However, Mr. Zhu’s successful career was abruptly aborted in 1957 when he was labeled a “rightist” for his participation in the Hundred Flower Campaign. He was stricken again during the Cultural Revolution and was sent to countryside for five years. Mr. Zhu recovered his political fortunes after the Cultural Revolution, becoming deputy party secretary of the State Economic Commission in 1979. He was transferred to Shanghai in 1987 to serve as deputy secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. Mr. Zhu became mayor of Shanghai in 1988 and vice-premier in 1991. In 1998, Mr. Zhu became China’s third prime minister, a post he held until 2003.50 In addition to co-opting professionals and intellectuals into the leadership hierarchy, the CCP has also encouraged poorly-educated cadres to receive formal education. For example, Mr. Quan Zhezhu, who joined the CCP in 1969, was deputy secretary and secretary of the Communist Youth League Prefectural Committee of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture between 1973 and 1982, and deputy secretary and secretary of the Communist Youth League Provincial Committee of Jilin province between 1982 and 1986. He was enrolled in a long-distance educational program and received his degree in politics in 1986. He then became deputy secretary of the CCP Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefectural Committee from 1986 to 1989 and head of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture from 1990 to 1993. Mr. Quan was appointed vice governor of Jilin province in 1993.51 As another example, Mr. Suo Changyou, who joined the CCP in 1956, was secretary of the CCP Daling People’s Commune Committee in Acheng County between 1865 and 1966, deputy secretary of the Songhuajiang Communist Youth League Prefectural Committee between 1966 and 1967, and deputy office director of the Songhuajiang Prefectural Revolutionary Committee between 1969 and 1973. Mr. Suo became deputy secretary of the CCP Hegang City Committee in 1981. He graduated from the Party and Government Cadres Section of the Party School of the CCP Heilongjiang Provincial Committee in 1985 and was appointed mayor of Qiqihar city in Heilongjiang Province in 1992.52 64

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Other examples include Mr. Xiao Jianzhang, who graduated from the Hebei Administrative Personnel Institute of Politics and Law in 1990 and was appointed vice minister of Justice in 1992;53 Mr. Wang Yang, who received his first degree from the Correspondence College of the CCP Central Committee’s Party School in 1992 and was appointed vice governor of Anhui in 1993;54 and Mr. Wang Shengtie, who received his first diploma from the training course for middle-aged and young cadres offered by the CCP Central Committee’s Party School in 1988 and was appointed vice governor of Hubei in 1993.55 All of them had been leading cadres at different levels of the CCP and the government system before receiving their formal education in the 1980s and 1990s.

Educational attainment and political credentials The discussion so far has indicated a general emphasis on educational attainment in elite recruitment in the reform period. As a matter of fact, some China scholars have constantly asserted the exclusive role of university education in general and technical degrees in particular in leadership selection in the reform period.56 Is university education a prerequisite for candidacy for a leadership position in the political hierarchy? Table 4.3 shows that over 38 percent of the 1988 elite were cadres without a college degree. In 1994 only 22.7 percent of the leaders did not have university education. The educational attainment of the 1994 elite was higher than that of the 1988 elite. These findings indicate that educational credentials have become an increasingly important selection criterion in the reform era. They also indicate that it is not the case that only college educated can become top leaders. In fact, the findings from Table 4.3 present a rather complicated picture of leadership selection in the reform period: there are great variations in educational attainment among the political elite. The complication was due to the fact that Deng and his associates advocated leadership selection Table 4.3 Educational attainment, the 1988 and 1994 elites Educational attainment

1988 N

%

■

1994 N

%

Graduate study University Some university Technical school No/unknown

40 358 59 26 257

5.4 48.4 8.0 3.5 34.7

64 546 46 38 154

7.5 64.4 5.4 4.5 18.2

Total

740

100.0

848

100.0

65

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on the basis of both political loyalty and technical expertise since 1982. One would not normally expect such variations in either 1988 or 1994 since many China scholars have insisted that the cadre reform was successfully concluded in 1987.57 Why were people with different amounts of educational credentials selected into elitehood? Did they just strike gold or were there institutional factors that compelled the CCP to recruit them? This complicated picture of leadership selection turns into a more intriguing puzzle when the political credentials of the political elite are included. As can be seen from Table 4.4, in 1988, 38.4 percent of the leaders joined the CCP before 1949 and approximately 80 percent of them become members of the CCP by 1960. In 1994, 19.5 percent of the leaders joined the CCP before 1949 and 55.3 percent of the elite became party members by 1960. Only eleven people among the 1988 elite joined the CCP after 1978. Approximately 3 percent of the 1988 elite and 3.4 percent of the 1994 elite were non-CCP members. Why does the political elite include people with different amounts of political credentials? How important are political credentials in elite recruitment? Are people with lower CCP seniority just lucky winners of a once-in-a-life time lottery for leadership selection, or are there structural factors that facilitate their inclusion into the political elite? If one combines findings from Tables 4.3 and 4.4, one cannot help but ask a fundamental question regarding elite recruitment in the reform period: how is leadership selection patterned given the vast variations in educational and political credentials among the political elite?

Summary In this chapter I show that during the Cultural Revolution, politics was in command and hierarchy prevailed over functional differentiation. The division of labor between the CCP and government was undermined as the latter was seriously paralyzed most of the time during the Cultural Revolution. Mao advocated the merge of the CCP hierarchy and government system for the sake of revolutionary campaigns and mass mobilization. Diminished functional differentiation reduced the structural need for expertise in the government system. Political loyalty became the only selection criteria. Poorly educated PLA officers such as Chen Xilian, Han Xianchu, and Wu Faxian and workers and peasants such as Wang Guixian and Chen Yonggui came to fore at the expense of veteran revolutionaries and government functionaries. As a result, there was only a single bureaucratic labor market during the Cultural Revolution. This situation was rectified by the Chinese cadre reform in the 1980s, which profoundly changed the composition of the political elite in China. David Lampton points out that there have been four fundamental dimensions of change in the reform era. Of most importance has been the 66

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Table 4.4 Date of joining the CCP, the 1988 and 1994 elites Year of joining the CCP

The 1988 elite N

■

%

The 1994 elite N

%

1924 1926 1927 1929 1930 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1968 1969 1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1988 No

2 3 1 2 3 3 1 3 8 6 14 8 10 5 3 4 11 26 18 34 56 63 35 6 49 34 43 20 61 4 9 23 25 15 12 2 8 32 11 1 0 1 3 0 4 2 2 0 22

0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 1.1 0.8 1.9 1.1 1.4 0.7 0.4 0.5 1.5 3.5 2.4 4.6 7.6 8.5 4.7 0.8 6.6 4.6 5.8 2.7 8.2 0.5 1.2 3.1 3.4 2.0 1.6 0.3 1.1 4.3 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.0 3.0

0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 3 1 3 16 15 20 32 33 19 1 30 33 26 22 68 5 23 27 50 25 18 1 22 72 47 2 7 10 10 12 4 7 4 1 29

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 1.9 1.8 2.4 3.8 3.9 2.2 0.1 3.5 3.9 3.1 2.6 8.0 0.6 2.7 3.2 5.9 2.9 2.1 0.1 2.6 8.5 5.5 0.2 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.1 3.4

Total

740

100.0

848

100.0

67

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evolution of the leadership structure from a personalistic regime with totalitarian pretensions into a “techno-authoritarian” state, which has produced changes in recruitment criteria.58 As noted above, the overall educational achievements of the Chinese political leaders at various levels of government increased significantly after 1984. Table 4.3 shows that over 61 percent of the 1988 elite and 77 percent of the 1994 elite received at least some university education. The percentage of the political elite with college degrees is quite high when compared with their counterparts at the lower level. In 1987, only 29 percent of the 21 million cadres had a college education, 26 percent a high school education, and 45 percent an educational level lower than junior high school.59 In 1994, only 10 percent of administrators and 9 percent of managers in China had college education.60 As another comparison, only four out of every 1,000 Chinese received a college education in 1987.61 High educational attainment is not the only characteristics shared by the members of the political elite. Table 4.4 shows that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese leadership are politically reliable officials since most of them are CCP members and have had a long history of organizational affiliation with the CCP. The leadership transition has prepared candidates with different attributes for leadership posts and has thus provided necessary human resources for the segmented bureaucratic labor markets. Elite dualism can be expected to be a reality in the reform era. Finally, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 provide readers with some basic information about educational attainment and political credentials of the political elite. However, they also generate interesting questions about leadership selection in China. Findings from these two tables indicate the vast variations in political and educational credentials among the political elite. Given such variations, how do we explain selection in the reform era? An apparent answer – a human capital explanation – is that people with higher political and educational credentials are more likely than people with lower political and educational credentials to occupy higher positions in the political hierarchy. Inherent in this explanation are the assumptions that human capital determines status attainment; that there is a unified bureaucratic labor market; that returns to political and educational credentials are the same for entry into all elite positions. This explanation, however, is inconsistent with reality, as shown in the following chapters. Another likely explanation – a dual elite hypothesis – is that the political elite includes a bureaucratic and red expert component because both are needed for governance. Red experts compensate their inadequate political credentials with high educational attainment and party bureaucrats compensate for their low educational credentials with high political capital.62 Similar to the human capital explanation, this hypothesis assumes a unified bureaucratic labor market, ignoring functional differentiation and its impact on leadership selection in the reform period. 68

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There is yet another possibility, inspired by the new institutionalism and Andrew Walder’s dual career model,63 that the division of labor between the CCP and the government has led to a segmented bureaucratic labor market in the reform era. This explanation agrees that the political elite includes both a bureaucratic and red expert components. Yet it relies on institutional order to explain the dual elite, i.e., returns to political and educational credentials are determined by institutional arrangements. There are separate paths into the political elite, one more political than the other. More specifically, the government takes care of economic issues, administrative affairs, and social order, whereas the CCP provides political leadership and guidance. Because of their different mandates and missions, the government may rely more on technical expertise as the key criterion for recruitment and promotion than the CCP does. In contrast, the CCP may be more likely to use political credentials in leadership selection. Hence, all candidates for elite positions in the political hierarchy are screened for technical credentials and political loyalty, but those on paths to government positions may be screened more vigorously for technical credentials while those on paths to the CCP hierarchy may be evaluated more vigorously for political loyalty. I test this possibility first by studying patterns of job assignments among the political elite in Chapter 5.

69

5 DUALISM AND JOB ASSIGNMENT

The first issue in my empirical examination of elite dualism in China is job assignment. As noted in Chapter 2, elite dualism is determined by the political structure within which the elite emerges. Hence, one of its best indicators is the allocation of jobs among the members of a political elite. The central question I ask in this chapter is whether the government system and the CCP hierarchy target individuals with different attributes in their recruitment exercises. Or in other words, who are likely to work in the government system rather than the CCP hierarchy? Do government officials and CCP cadres differ significantly in terms of personal attributes? Positive answers to these questions will constitute the first piece of evidence of elite dualism in the Chinese political hierarchy. Holding the division of labor between the CCP and the government constant, I deliberate on the complementarity of the functions of these two political systems and its impact on the job assignments of Chinese bureaucrats. I first briefly review human capital theory and labor market segmentation theory, the two major theoretical paradigms in the study of labor market outcomes. The insights from labor market segmentation theory encourage me to develop an elite dualism’s explanation of job assignment by identifying the different institutional conditions for leadership selection in the government and the CCP respectively. I offer two hypotheses regarding institutional differentiation and job allocation, focusing on the interrelationships among personal attributes, functional differentiation, and patterns of elite recruitment in the reform era.

Human capital and labor market segmentation Job assignment is a key area of status attainment. Aage B. Sorensen and Arne L. Kalleberg observe that labor markets are the arenas for the matching of persons of different characteristics to jobs of different types.1 Mark Granovetter argues persuasively that the matching process is a key link between individual characteristics and labor market outcomes such as income.2 The matching process, however, has not been adequately 70

DUALISM AND JOB ASSIGNMENT

addressed by either human capital theory or labor market segmentation theory. Human capital theory insists on a competitive and perfectly functioning labor market in which persons with different amounts of human capital such as education and experience are allocated to different jobs. Workers are seen as rational individuals who seek to maximize their labor market outcomes by investing time, money, and other resources in acquiring necessary skills or credentials. The amount of human capital is assumed to be more or less matched by the amount of reward in labor markets.3 In a similar fashion, a functional theory of stratification posits a competitive matching between the functional importance of occupational roles and the skills and training of job seekers. The differential placement in the socioeconomic order is accomplished in such a manner that job assignment is a reflection of a worker’s basic value to the social system in a society. Poor labor market outcomes are explained to be the result of resource and human capital insufficiency. Success or failure is tied directly to the characteristics brought into the marketplace by individual workers.4 Some scholars thus speculate that job rewards are exponentially distributed. Individuals enter the labor market with a given set of resources, which determine the best possible job that person can get. Estimation of individual-level models of job attainment yields estimates of the opportunity perimeters.5 It has also been argued that from an employer’s viewpoint, a candidate should be appointed to a post that supposedly best suits his or her potential. A recruiter usually pays a great deal of attention to the relationship between personal characteristics and productive capacity. It is a person’s potential performance that will be of concern. Previous work experience, education, seniority, and ascriptive characteristics such as ethnicity and gender are used as the indicators of potential performance. These indicators are chosen because they are visible and more importantly assumed to be able to show some relationship to future performance. Based on the information provided by these indicators, the recruiters will appoint the most promising candidate among those available for the job.6 The human capital explanation of job attainment and its assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market are severely criticized by labor market segmentation theory, which insists on a segmented labor market that comprises a “core” and “peripheral” sector. In the core sector workers enjoy high wages, high fringe benefits, and high employment security. In the peripheral sector all is the contrary. Members of the ethnic majority, men, and the college-educated are more likely than ethnic minority workers, women, and the poorly educated to find employment in the core sector.7 Nevertheless, labor market segmentation theory has paid little attention to the matching process.8 Human capital theory has thus remained the dominant paradigm in current labor economics9 and has guided much 71

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research on bureaucratic labor markets. For example, bureaucrats in different agencies are often viewed as sharing common characteristics in terms of education and career paths.10 In particular, the political elite in state socialism is often labeled as the “party-state elite” or simply “cadres.”11 As noted in Chapter 2, prevailing in Chinese studies is the view that it is of no analytic significance to distinguish the CCP from the state, because the CCP organization has deeply penetrated the state apparatus and the CCP leadership has tightly controlled the state bureaucracy.12 Political and educational credentials are considered as a pair of antithesis in leadership selection in China. It is asserted that political loyalty was the sole selection criterion in Mao’s China and that educational credentials have become the most important factor in elite recruitment in the reform period. Correspondingly, the elite in Mao’s China is labeled as “revolutionary mobilizers” and their counterparts in the reform period as “technocrats.”13 This human capital explanation of elite formation appears to explain to some extent career advancement in bureaucratic labor markets, that is, who becomes a member of the elite in the PRC. It however cannot explain how and why particular individuals get linked up with jobs of certain types – the central issue of this chapter. I propose to draw insights from labor market segmentation theory to study job assignment in the Chinese political hierarchy, namely, labor markets are segmented and individuals with different attributes are recruited into different labor markets. I extend these insights to research on political elites, proposing a segmented bureaucratic labor market in which candidates with different amounts of human and political capital are recruited into positions in the government system and the CCP hierarchy respectively. The elite dualism proposition is supported by the observation that political institutions differ in technical content and political implications and thus in the flow of personnel along different career paths.14 As Barbara Wake Carroll points out, the differences among a broad range of government departments are a source of variation in the characteristics of senior bureaucrats. This can be expected since there are different ideologies and ways of doing things in different bureaucratic department.15 Different institutions require different kinds of human resources to accomplish their respective missions. In other words, the institutional mission of a political organization is the independent variable and the personnel policy it adopts is the dependent variable. The CCP and the government are likely to adopt different recruitment criteria since they pursue different institutional tasks. Accordingly, I develop two hypotheses about the link between institutional missions and job assignment in the Chinese political hierarchy.

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Institutional differentiation and elite dualism I first identify two major determinants of elite recruitment and then deliberate on the relative roles they play in leadership selection in the CCP and government. As noted in previous chapters, the CCP relied basically on political loyalty in elite recruitment in Mao’s China. The importance of political credentials in leadership selection has continued into the reform era. The Eastern European experience, which shows the tenacious strength of the nomenklatura in the post-communism era, acts as a formidable deterrent against attempts to downplay the role of political capital in career advancement in China. The collapse of the communist regimes in 1989 undermined the organizational power of former communist elites, effectively creating a huge political vacuum in Eastern Europe. Freedom of press, assembly, and speech, together with independent political parties, has become a new political reality. Nevertheless, studies have shown that the members of the new power elites are still recruited predominantly from the reservoir of the eligibles intended for filling the positions in the former communist system. This is true in former East Germany,16 Romania, and many other emerging nation-states in Eastern Europe. In Russia, elite reproduction appears to be substantial as more than half of the 1993 elite were the members of the 1988 nomenklatura.17 Revolutionary changes in Eastern European countries have not substantially affected the social composition of their political elites. This can be explained or even expected: the communist elite has reproduced itself because its members are better educated than the rest of the population. The former communists also have better organizational skills and social networks, acquired before the collapse of state socialism, than anyone else.18 Elite transition in post-1989 Eastern Europe provides a solid reference point for an assessment of the effects of political credentials for leadership selection in the reform era. In contrast to the situation in Eastern Europe, there have been no colossal political changes in the PRC. The CCP has initiated and conditioned leadership transition and market reforms to rebuild its legitimacy and consolidate its dictatorship over society, which predetermines that the leadership transition in the reform era must be a process of gradual elite change. Since the institutional framework (i.e. the nomenklatura) for leadership selection has remained unchanged, the practice that stresses political loyalty in leadership selection has not been, and will not be, abandoned. Furthermore, the CCP leaders, who came to power with their communist ideology and worldviews, have insisted on the CCP’s dictatorship not only because power is the ultimate game of politics, but also because power gives them privileges, security, and frameworks with which they can create a China according to their blueprints. Before they pass on power to designated successors, they will make sure that the successors are of their 73

DUALISM AND JOB ASSIGNMENT

kind. Any deviant thoughts or behavior exhibited by a designated successor will bring about ultimate disaster on him or her, as exemplified by the fateful downfalls of Hu Yaobang in 1987 and Zhao Ziyang in 1989.19 It has never been the CCP’s intention to start the cadre reform in order to hand over its power to a group of technocrats whose political reliability is uncertain. The effect of political loyalty on leadership selection in China should never be questioned or underestimated. Having emphasized the importance of political loyalty in elite recruitment, one should also not underestimate the CCP’s determination to carry out the leadership transformation for better governance and economic management. In addition to upholding its leadership, a major point the CCP has been concerned about is governance efficiency, which can be achieved by assigning competent actors to particular posts. The general personnel policy in the cadre reform is to recruit candidates for top leadership positions who are both politically loyal and professionally competent.20 In other words, both political loyalty and expertise are important selection criteria. If this is indeed the case, are political loyalty and technical expertise equally important in leadership selection? Or do they play different roles in elite recruitment? If so, why? Many China scholars simply overlook these questions, taking political loyalty for granted and making no efforts to assess its impact on leadership selection. They focus on the impact of competence, defined either as educational attainment or professional experience or both, on elite recruitment in reform era.21 However, such an approach cannot yield accurate information on the effects of competence on leadership selection since it is not always defined in terms of educational credentials or professional careers. Rather, competence is measured by the ability to perform particular tasks. Institutional domains develop their own distinctive logics of operation that emphasize to some extent the predominance of different action-orientations and thus different bases of evaluation.22 A great athlete cannot be rated as a firstclass physicist just because he or she can run one hundred meters in nine seconds. Accordingly, the CCP and the government are likely to define competence and selection criteria differently since they pursue different institutional tasks. This likelihood is closely linked to the change in institutional goals: the more a certain institutional arena is transformed, the greater the change in recruitment criteria in that institution. As noted in Chapter 4, both the government and the CCP used political loyalty in leadership recruitment during the Cultural Revolution because there was little division of labor between these two political actors. Both took command in politics. However, the importance of the government system in economic management and administration has increased in the reform era. The CCP has handed in part of the administrative power it accumulated during the 74

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Cultural Revolution to the government for better governance and has increasingly focused on policy guidance, supervision, propaganda, and the like, thereby becoming progressively a pure political institution. Hence, although both political loyalty and educational credentials are important selection criteria, it can be expected that in the reform era, educational credentials are emphasized more in elite recruitment in the government system than in the CCP hierarchy, due to the fact that the change in institutional goals has been more pronounced in regard to the government domain than to the political arena. The center of government activity has shifted from revolutionary mobilization to economic development. Surely, the CCP gave up class struggle after 1978. Yet it has continued its major task of maintaining political orthodoxy and party dictatorship and hence has not been subject to the same pressure for change as the government system has been. Thus, institutional inertia in the CCP realm and institutional dynamism in the government realm should be translated into the relatively higher importance of educational credentials in selecting government officials and the relatively higher importance of political credentials in recruiting CCP cadres. It is thus likely that a segmented bureaucratic labor market emerges in which the CCP and the government are equipped with different selection criteria to search for candidates, weighing political and human capital differently so as to allow institutional and technical considerations to converge harmoniously in shaping institutional forms.23 Choices of strategies and the resulting political behavior, including leadership selection, are shaped, mediated, and channeled by institutional arrangements.24 Proposition 5.1: All candidates for elite positions in the political hierarchy are screened for educational credentials and political loyalty, but those on paths to government positions are screened more vigorously for educational credentials while those on paths to the CCP hierarchy are evaluated more vigorously for political loyalty. Proposition 5.1 is consistent with neo-institutional analysts’ view that the more technically developed an environment, the greater the role for discursive and analytic cognition,25 and vice versa. I derive two hypotheses from Proposition 5.1 regarding elite recruitment and institutional distinction: Hypothesis 5.1: The impact of educational credentials on elite recruitment is greater in the government system than in the CCP hierarchy, and the gap in educational attainment between them was greater in 1988 than in 1994. Hypothesis 5.1 does not suggest that cadres with educational credentials are not desirable candidates for leadership positions in the CCP. As 75

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mentioned above, what the cadre reform in the 1980s attempted to accomplish was to recruit individuals who were both politically reliable and professionally competent. However, the demand for such individuals could not be met in the 1980s. David Bachman observes that: Prior to the restoration of rigorous university admission standards in the late 1970s, there were only about two million total college graduates in the country, with only about half of those having specialties in what might be seen as technocratic fields, such as the natural sciences and engineering. From a historical perspective, the frequent political campaigns in the Mao’s period denigrated professional expertise. Given the absurdities and brutalities of intellectual policy under Mao, it is far from clear how many of those possible technocrats were able to serve as leaders in the post-Mao political system . . . The number of the post-Mao college educated is still quite small (on the order of four million) at the end of the 1980s.26 It is necessary to point out that the vast majority of these four million college graduates were not qualified politically for leadership positions at that time. Under Mao, China’s socialist regime stressed ideological rectitude and placed college-educated professionals under a degree of suspicion not seen in the Soviet Union since the early 1930s. Many of the college educated were not CCP members and were politically denigrated. At the same time, as Andrew Walder and his associates point out, the college educated may have learned to avoid the CCP and leadership positions that imposed political obligations and exposed them to political suspicion. This was particularly true when the demand for the college educated far exceeded the supply. Once they entered the professional elite, they might resist recruitment into the CCP or promotion into leadership positions.27 Thus, there must be an acute shortage of red experts – CCP members with a university education or professional expertise – that could be recruited into the political hierarchy when the cadre reform started in the early 1980s. Given this situation, two options were available for leadership selection. First, the allocation of available red experts must favor the government system at the expense of the CCP since it was the government that was entrusted with the task of running the economy and administration, a task that could not be accomplished without education and expertise. The need for red experts was greater in the government system than in the CCP hierarchy. The CCP could wait for a bit longer. The CCP could wait also because it weighs political loyalty more than expertise in defining competence. Second, the leadership could also recruit non-CCP professionals into the political hierarchy. As noted in Chapter 4, both options were tried in the 76

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leadership transformation in the reform era. But the second option could be used in the government system only since CCP membership is a prerequisite for leadership selection in the CCP hierarchy. Hence, it is likely that educational credentials should have a greater impact on elite recruitment in the government system than in the CCP hierarchy. This likelihood can be partially supported by the studies of the Chinese political elite that in the early 1980s cadres employed in the CCP organizations were less educated than officials working in state organizations. The educational level of the leading cadres of the CCP organizations was particularly low.28 The shortage of human resources in the 1980s must have motivated the CCP to enlarge the supply of red experts for subsequent elite selection exercises. After all, the cadre reform aimed at replacing revolutionary mobilizers with red experts. The CCP could adopt many remedial measures to achieve this goal. For example, it could increase the intake of intellectuals in CCP membership recruitment drives. The CCP might also lower the political requirements for leadership positions since reforms had gradually undermined political rigidity and orthodoxy formed under the Mao regime. Hence, it is likely that the pool of qualified candidates for leadership selection was larger in 1994 than in 1988, thereby allowing the CCP to recruit more red experts into its leadership structure. The differences in educational credentials between the CCP recruits and their counterparts in the government system should be reduced between 1988 and 1994. Hypothesis 5.2: Recruitment into the CCP system relies more on CCP seniority than into the government system, and the difference in CCP seniority between the two political actors was greater in 1994 than in 1988. The CCP, as mentioned above, has become an increasingly policymaking and supervisory statutory body in the reform era. CCP seniority remains an important asset for upward mobility in the CCP hierarchy since it is a political organization. The government, because of its preoccupation with governance and economic management, pays less attention to political loyalty in leadership selection than the CCP does. Technical expertise is the major component of competence in the government system. As already noted in Chapter 3, during the 1950s, both CCP cadres and non-CCP members held posts in the bureaucracies, from top to bottom.29 Many government positions require expertise. Thus, experts without a lot of political credentials may be recruited for these positions. The requirement for political capital is lower in the government system than in the CCP hierarchy also because candidates for CCP leadership positions compete with one another mainly on the basis of political capital, which will enhance the requirement for political capital for leadership positions in the CCP hierarchy – the price of a commodity goes down when supply exceeds demand. 77

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The difference in CCP seniority between the government system and the CCP hierarchy should be greater in 1994 than in 1988. As noted in Chapter 2, the cadre reform did not start until 1982. It encountered “left” resistance during the 1980s. After Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992, China has increasingly focused on economic development.30 Conceivably, the role of political loyalty in leadership selection in the government system was stressed less in 1994 than in 1988. There should be an overall decrease in political credentials among the 1994 government officials since the government did not need to pay as much attention to the political requirement in elite selection as it had done in the 1980s. In comparison, the shift from revolutionary campaigns to economic development should not affect the CCP as much as it does the government. There may not be a decline of political credentials among candidates for posts in the CCP hierarchy since its institutional mission – maintaining political orthodoxy and party dictatorship – has remained largely unchanged. In sum, if elite dualism exists and dictates leadership selection in China, there should be differences in political and educational credentials between government officials and CCP cadres. Using empirical data on top Chinese leaders in 1988 and 1994, I show this is indeed the case in the next three sections of this chapter.

Descriptive statistics To test the above-mentioned two hypotheses about the institutional effect on job assignment, I divide the political elite into two components. First, Government Officials includes all leading officials in the State Council and provincial governments. This group contained 500 individuals in 1988 and 588 in 1994. Second, Party Cadres includes all leading cadres in the CCP central organs and provincial CCP committees. There were 257 such cadres in 1988 and 318 in 1994. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 indicate that government officials and CCP cadres are very much alike demographically. For example, the difference in mean age between these two groups was 1.2 in 1988 and 2.1 in 1994. Over 94 percent of the 1988 government officials and 96 percent of the CCP cadres were men. The corresponding figures for 1994 were 93.9 and 94.5 respectively. Both tables show that there were no significant differences in terms of mean age, sex ratios, and ethnicity in both 1988 and 1994 between the government officials and CCP cadres. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 also show that, consistent with Proposition 5.1, both educational credentials and CCP seniority are important selection criteria in the CCP and government. The vast majority of the Chinese leaders are red experts. Equally importantly, these two tables show that government officials and CCP cadres differ with each other in terms of educational attainment and political credentials. 78

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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics, the 1988 elite Independent variable

The 1988 elite

Government officials

The CCP cadres

Age (mean year)

56.7

56.3

57.5

Gender (%) Men Women

94.7 5.3

94.1 5.9

96.0 4.0

Ethnicity (%) Han Chinese Non-Han Chinese

90.7 9.3

91.6 8.4

88.8 11.2

Educational credentials (%) Technical major, key university Technical major, ordinary university Arts major, key university Arts major, ordinary university CCP seniority (mean year)

9.9 17.6 13.5 20.8 34.1

10.8 22.0 12.7 21.6 32.6

7.6 8.8 15.2 19.2 37.0

No. of cases

740

490

250

Government officials

The CCP cadres

Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics, the 1994 elite Independent variable

The 1994 elite

Age (mean year)

57.3

56.6

58.7

Gender (%) Men Women

94.1 5.9

93.9 6.1

94.5 5.5

Ethnicity (%) Han Chinese Non-Han Chinese

92.1 7.9

92.1 7.9

92.1 7.9

Educational credentials (%) Technical major, key university Technical major, ordinary university Arts major, key university Arts major, ordinary university CCP seniority (mean year)

20.9 21.8 18.5 21.8 32.1

22.3 25.4 19.8 14.9 29.7

18.2 15.1 16.1 18.5 36.5

No. of cases

848

556

292

For example, in 1988, 32.8 percent of the government officials had college degrees in technical fields, as compared with 16.4 percent of the CCP cadres. The corresponding figures for 1994 were 47.7 percent and 33.3 percent. This finding tentatively supports Hypothesis 5.1 that the government system stresses educational credentials more than the CCP in 79

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leadership selection. It also confirms that the gap in educational attainment between government officials and CCP cadres was larger in 1988 than in 1994 (16.4 percent vs. 14.4 percent). Additionally, the mean CCP seniority of party cadres is higher than that of government officials in both 1988 (37.0 years vs. 32.6 years) and 1994 (36.5 years vs. 29.7 years). This finding tentatively confirms Hypothesis 5.2 that the CCP relies more on political credentials than the government in elite recruitment. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 also support my hypothesis that the difference in CCP seniority between government officials and CCP cadres was greater in 1994 than in 1988 (6.8 years vs. 4.4 years). As expected, the enlarged gap was due to the overall decline of CCP seniority among the government officials (from 32.6 years in 1988 to 29.7 years in 1994). There is basically no difference in CCP seniority between the 1988 party cadres and their 1994 counterparts (37.0 years vs. 36.5 years), indicating a high level of political orthodoxy and inflexibility in personnel management in the CCP hierarchy. This occurred despite the overall decline of CCP seniority among the Chinese leaders, from 34.1 years in 1988 to 32.1 years in 1994.

Educational credentials and job assignment In Tables 5.3 and 5.4 I present detailed information about leadership position attainment and the difference in educational credentials between the CCP cadres and government officials. These two tables show the overall improvement of educational credentials among the political elite, both in terms of the percentages of cadres with university education and those of cadres with technical trainings. They also show that the distribution of educational credentials among the Chinese elite is closely patterned by the institutional distinction between the CCP hierarchy and the government system. For example, provincial governors and provincial CCP secretaries are ranked similarly in the Chinese civil service scale. However, 53.3 percent of governors and 63.3 percent of provincial CCP secretaries in 1988 did not have a college degree, the corresponding figures for 1994 were 26.7 percent and 40 percent respectively. Further, in 1988, 33.3 percent of the governors had college degrees in engineering or management science, as compared with 16.7 percent of the CCP provincial secretaries. In 1994, 63.3 percent of the governors were trained in technical fields, as compared with 40 percent of the CCP provincial secretaries. These findings support Hypothesis 5.1. They also suggest that the more “political” a leadership position is, the less likely a well-educated cadre occupies it. For example, many vice ministers are very well educated because they are assigned to deal with specific issues in their ministries, which are often technical in nature. In contrast, many provincial CCP discipline secretaries are poorly educated, probably because they do not need university educa80

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Table 5.3 Educational credentials and job assignment, 1988 Position

University education Technical major N

Councilor 4 Minister 25 Vice minister 72 Bureau head 3 Provincial CCP secretary 5 Provincial governor 10 Provincial CCP deputy 27 secretary Provincial deputy governor 48 Provincial discipline secretary 0 CCP minister 4 CCP vice minister 5 CCP bureau head 0 Total 203

%

■

■

Others N

No university N

%

%

22.2 44.6 36.4 9.7 16.7 33.3 27.0

7 19 77 14 6 4 25

38.9 33.9 38.9 45.2 20.0 13.3 25.0

7 12 49 14 19 16 48

38.9 21.4 24.7 45.2 63.3 53.3 48.0

30.6 0.0 12.9 10.9 0.0 27.4

47 9 17 18 11 254

29.9 31.0 54.8 39.1 78.6 34.3

62 20 10 23 3 283

39.5 69.0 32.3 50.0 21.4 38.2

Table 5.4 Educational credentials and job assignment, 1994 Position

University education Technical major N

Councilor 11 Minister 27 Vice minister 107 Bureau head 15 Provincial CCP secretary 12 Provincial governor 19 Provincial CCP deputy 36 secretary Provincial deputy governor 86 Provincial discipline secretary 8 CCP minister 25 CCP vice minister 11 CCP bureau head 5 Total 362

%

■

■

Others N

No university N

%

%

61.1 47.4 50.2 31.3 40.0 63.3 37.1

4 16 79 19 6 8 27

22.2 28.1 37.1 39.6 20.0 10.0 27.8

3 14 27 14 12 8 34

16.7 24.6 12.7 29.2 40.0 26.7 35.1

45.7 26.7 43.9 16.2 41.7 42.7

73 7 20 35 5 294

38.8 23.3 35.1 51.5 41.7 34.7

29 15 12 22 2 192

15.4 50.0 21.1 32.4 16.7 22.6

tion to carry out their functions. Unlike government officials, CCP discipline secretaries do not need to worry about production planning and economic coordination. They merely enforce the CCP disciplines. Complicated cases that involve legal issues will be sent to the judiciary. 81

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Age, CCP seniority, and job assignment In this section, I investigate how political credentials are related to job assignment in the CCP and the government respectively. Table 5.5 shows age, CCP seniority and job assignment in 1988 and 1994, further demonstrating the distinctive recruitment practices between the CCP hierarchy and the government system. Most Chinese leaders are CCP members. In 1988, only 3 percent of the top leaders were without CCP membership. The corresponding figure for 1994 was 3.2 percent. However, the mean CCP seniority of party cadres is higher than that of government officials even if they hold similar ranks in the Chinese bureaucracy. For example, the CCP ministers and the State Council ministers are ranked more or less the same in the civil service scale. Yet in 1988, the party seniority of the former was 42.5 years and that of the latter was 40.8 years. The corresponding figures for 1994 were 43.4 years and 38.5 years respectively, supporting Hypothesis 5.2. As another example, in 1988, the mean party seniority of provincial CCP secretaries was 38.1 years and that of provincial governors was 35.5 years. The mean party seniority of the State Council vice ministers and deputy governors is much lower than that of the CCP vice ministers, provincial CCP deputy secretaries and provincial CCP discipline secretaries, although they hold similar ranks in the civil service in China.

Table 5.5 Mean age, mean CCP seniority, and job assignment, 1988 and 1994 Leadership position

The 1988 elite Age

CCP Age seniority seniority

Councilor Minister Vice minister Bureau head Provincial CCP secretary Provincial governor Provincial CCP deputy secretary Provincial deputy governor Provincial discipline secretary CCP minister CCP vice minister CCP bureau head

66.6 60.7 56.3 57.7 58.8 55.9 54.6

48.1 40.8 31.9 36.5 38.1 35.5 34.0

53.4

All elite members

■

The 1994 elite Age

CCP Age seniority seniority

18.5 19.9 24.4 21.2 20.7 20.4 20.6

66.3 60.7 56.9 59.0 60.4 57.6 55.3

44.3 38.5 30.0 33.3 40.9 32.0 31.4

22.0 22.2 26.9 26.3 19.5 25.6 23.9

27.4

26.0

53.4

24.1

29.3

56.4

35.7

20.7

58.0

36.7

21.3

62.9 59.4 60.1

42.5 38.9 40.2

20.4 20.5 19.9

63.4 59.0 60.0

43.3 35.6 37.4

20.1 23.4 22.6

56.7

34.1

22.6

57.3

32.0

25.3

82

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Further, Table 5.5 suggests that party cadres joined the CCP at a much younger age than their counterparts in the government system. For example, the 1988 government vice ministers joined the CCP when they were 24.4 years old whereas CCP vice ministers did so when they were only 20.5. Data on the 1994 leaders show that their mean age is older than that of their counterparts in 1988 and their CCP seniority is lower than that of the 1988 leaders. But the 1988 patterns of the distribution of age and CCP seniority between the CCP cadres and government officials repeated themselves in 1994. The findings from Tables 5.5 strongly support Hypothesis 5.2 that political credentials weigh more in leadership selection in the CCP hierarchy than in the government system. Finally, I suggest in Chapter 4 that human capital theorists may propose that people with higher political and educational credentials occupy higher positions in the political hierarchy. Findings from Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 show otherwise. For example, central government ministers, provincial governors, and CCP ministers are ranked the same in the civil service, but they differ greatly in both CCP seniority and educational attainment. Similar differences can also be found among vice ministers, deputy governors, CCP vice ministers, CCP provincial deputy secretaries and CCP provincial discipline secretaries. Hence, job assignment in the political hierarchy cannot be understood simply from the perspective of human capital theory. The variations in political and educational credentials among the Chinese political elite make sense only if they are investigated under the framework of elite dualism.

Institutional effects on job assignment In this section, I present the statistical results obtained to show the institutional effects on job assignment in 1988 and 1994 respectively. Findings on the Chinese political elite from the above five tables are informative. Yet they are obtained without much control. Will the difference between the government officials and CCP cadres remain with socioeconomic variables controlled? I conduct two logistic regression analyses to test this possibility. In the logistic regression analyses, I contrast the effects of the independent variables on the probability of attaining a government position versus that of reaching a CCP office (i.e. the contrast category) in the following analysis, treating Government officials as the destination. Independent variables include CCP seniority and four measures for educational credentials (a BA degree from an ordinary university; a BA degree from a key university; a BA degree in engineering/management science from an ordinary university; and a BA degree in engineering/management science from a key university). To examine the role of background factors, I include control variables, which include Age, Ethnicity, and Sex, in the 83

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following analyses. Controlled comparisons are necessary to rule out effects of these factors as partial explanations of differences among the Chinese leaders. Findings from the two logistic regression analyses confirm the two hypotheses put forward earlier in this chapter. Column 1 of Table 5.6 compares the probability of becoming a government official versus that of becoming a CCP cadre in 1988. Findings from Column 1 of Table 5.6 confirm Hypothesis 5.1. There is no difference in terms of college education in arts and social sciences between the CCP cadres and government officials. However, a university degree in a technical field facilitates a candidate to enter the government system significantly. Taking the exponents of the logistic regression coefficients for the two technical degrees, it can be seen that a technical major from a key university is 85 percent more likely than others to become a government official. The corresponding figure for a technical major from an ordinary university is 213 percent. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the quality of such a degree is higher than that of a degree in arts and social sciences. Hence, the educational requirement is higher for recruitment into the government system than that into the CCP hierarchy.31 Column 1 of Table 5.6 also confirms Hypothesis 5.2 that the party seniority of the government official is lower than that of the CCP cadres: CCP Seniority has a negative impact on recruitment into the government system, indicating a strong contrast effect regarding the value of party seniority in recruitment practices between the government system and the CCP hierarchy. In addition, Column 1 of Table 5.6 shows that Age has a positive impact on becoming a government official, suggesting that government officials are older than the CCP cadres. Thus, the CCP cadres are less educated than government officials not because they are illiterate or semiilliterate old revolutionary guards. Column 2 of Table 5.6 examines the relationship between educational credentials, CCP seniority, and elite recruitment in 1994. The results of the analysis do not differ significantly from those reported in Column 1 of Table 5.6. For example, the magnitudes of the logistic regression coefficients for CCP seniority and key technical degrees in 1988 and 1994 are similar. Although the size of the logistic regression coefficients for ordinary technical degrees for 1994 is smaller than that for 1988, it still indicates that a person with such a degree is 88 percent more likely than others to become a government official. Hence, the two hypotheses that are supported by the 1988 data are again confirmed by the empirical analysis of the 1994 data. Elite dualism as proposed in Chapter 2 indeed points out an established practice of elite recruitment in the reform era.

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Table 5.6 Logistic regression coefficients for institutional effects on job assignment, 1988 and 1994 Independent variable

1988

1994

Age Women Minority ethnicity CCP seniority Arts, key university Arts, ordinary university Technical major, key university Technical major, ordinary university

0.0493 (0.0212)* ⫺0.0166 (0.0194) ⫺0.2374 (0.3982) 0.0525 (0.3306) ⫺0.1893 (0.2729) ⫺0.1070 (0.2845) ⫺0.0526 (0.0144)* ⫺0.0549 (0.0114)* ⫺0.2099 (0.2661) 0.4029 (0.2407) 0.0932 (0.2327) 0.0486 (0.2409) 0.6197 (0.2836)* 0.6123 (0.2279)* 1.1410 (0.2542)* 0.6359 (0.2422)*

⫺2 Log likelihood Goodness of Fit Model Chi-Square

883.207 722.745 63.687*

No. of cases

740

1,011.989 834.383 80.018* 848

Notes * P ⬍ 0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Summary Job distribution influences the structure of an organization – both horizontally and vertically, and its overall orientation. A manager can change the organization’s design by reallocating jobs in a firm; the manager can also select new occupants who may change the character of the jobs as well as the performance level.32 Thus, in a classical study of political elites, Lester Seligman postulates a close relationship between the eligibility and selection phases of political recruitment, and the ultimate behaviors and role perceptions of persons who occupy elite positions. The assignment of individuals to specialized roles in decision-making institutions is the function of political opportunity, risk, and selection. The interplay of these factors influences the distribution of power, elite competence, policy outputs, and the collective norms of elites. Hence, job assignment is a key factor that determines the adequacy of decision-making and policy outputs.33 Proper job assignment provides adequate human resources for an organization to accomplish its institutional missions. Job assignment cannot be simply explained with reference to the uneven distribution of human capital among candidates. Mark Granovetter points out that in a system where rewards were determined entirely by personal characteristics, labor market outcomes could be understood by studying those characteristics alone. But as soon as the features of jobs start to exert an influence on rewards, so that the labor market outcomes are determined by some mixture of individual and job characteristics, a third factor 85

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becomes central: match – how do individuals with certain characteristics get matched up with jobs of certain types? To the extent that individual and job characteristics determine wages jointly, this matching question is theoretically urgent. Yet in both sociology and economics analyses of the matching between specific individuals and roles are rare.34 So is research on job assignment among political elites. In this chapter I develop two hypotheses about the matching process in the bureaucratic labor market, deliberating on the division of labor between the CCP and the government and its impact on job assignment among the Chinese political leaders. I argue in Chapter 2 that the chain of command between the CCP and the government bureaucracy has effectively carved up a territory in governance in which the CCP cadres play a leading role in policy-making and supervision of policy implementation, whereas government officials remain strong on issues of administration and economic management and enjoy wide discretion in using various measures to deal with social and economic issues in China. This division of labor leads to a relatively high level of innovation and flexibility in the government system and a relatively high level of orthodoxy and rigidity in the CCP hierarchy. Hence, although both political loyalty and educational credentials are important selection criteria in the reform era, the CCP and government weigh them differently in recruitment. In order to maintain orthodoxy, candidates for the positions in the CCP hierarchy must demonstrate a high degree of political reliability. In order to promote economic growth and better governance, candidates for posts in the government system must possess a high degree of technical competence. I then show that the current Chinese leadership commands both political loyalty and educational credentials. However, candidates with different combinations of educational and political credentials are recruited into the government system and the CCP hierarchy respectively. Government officials are better educated than CCP cadres. CCP cadres, however, hold higher political credentials than government officials. Returns to political and educational credentials are patterned by institutional arrangements. There is indeed a segmented bureaucratic labor market in reform era. This elite dualism’s account of job assignment also explains elite stratification (i.e. promotion), as discussed in the next chapter.

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6 DUALISM AND PROMOTION

Job assignment and promotion address two different aspects of leadership selection. The former yields information on what kind of individuals are likely to work for one political system rather than the other. The latter shows the kind of individuals who are likely to be promoted in the political hierarchy. However they are also intrinsically related to each other since they are two different dimensions of the same bureaucratic labor market process. Equally important, some assignments are by nature promotions. A promotion occurs when a vice minister is assigned to work as a minister. The analysis of job assignments in Chapter 5 has thus drawn my attention to the mobility effect of institutional arrangements in the reform period: if functional differentiation determines job assignment, would it also affect career advancement? If the division of labor between the CCP and the government is brought into the discourse on job assignment, should it also be considered an important independent variable in research on promotions in the Chinese political hierarchy? Hence, I do not seek in this chapter simply to understand who are likely to be promoted in the reform era. Rather, I direct my attention to different promotion patterns in the CCP hierarchy and the government system in the reform period. I explore the ways in which functional differentiation influences promotion outcomes in the CCP and the government respectively, seeking to understand whether returns to political and human capital for upward mobility are linear in different political institutions. What kind of individual is likely to be promoted in the government system? Who would be favored candidates for high posts in the CCP hierarchy? Positive answers to these questions can reinforce the empirical support given in Chapter 5 to my elite dualism approach toward leadership selection in the reform era. In the following, I first discuss human capital theory and labor market segmentation theory, highlighting the need to integrate personal characteristics and promotion structures to understand career advancement in China. Next, I define what I mean by career advancement and review the literature on promotion in China, thereby providing some background 87

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knowledge for the subsequent discussion of criteria for career advancement in the reform period. I then propose three hypotheses on the relationships between individual characteristics and promotion structures in the government system and the CCP hierarchy. I use the data set on the 1988 and 1994 Chinese political elite to examine the hypotheses and report findings of empirical analysis. My analysis indicates a strong institutional effect on career advancement in the Chinese political hierarchy. For convenience I use elite stratification, career advancement, and promotion interchangeably in this chapter.1

Promotion and opportunity structures Social mobility is a general concept in sociology and can entail two different kinds of comparisons: those between generations (i.e. intergenerational mobility) and those within a single generation (i.e. intragenerational or career mobility). Promotions represent a specific kind of career mobility, which is generally discussed in terms of climbing a ladder, being on a fast track, or winning the race. These metaphors are informative because they focus attention on an important aspect of career dynamics.2 Much of the research on career advancement in the general labor market draws insights from human capital theory. Assuming that labor markets are a perfectly competitive and functioning arena, many scholars have used individual attributes such as age, gender, ethnicity, education, length of service, or the differences in work experience to estimate how much influence each human capital factor has on promotion outcomes.3 Scholars notice that a person’s level of resources is changing over time due to on-the-job training, experience and the like. Such additions to a person’s resources lead to his or her next move to a better job. The higher the attainment level of a job, the higher the level of human capital required.4 Scholars of labor market segmentation theory take one step further, arguing that opportunity structures are an equal, if not far more important, independent variable than personal characteristics in research on career advancement. For example, using data from a large British Bank from 1890 to 1970; Katherine Stovel, Michael Savage, and Peter Bearm model the interplay between individual experience and organizational change in the evolution of career structures within a leading British bank. They show that promotion outcomes were related to career structures in the firm, which were in turn determined by the modernization process in the British banking industry.5 Labor market segmentation theory is important with respect to career advancement in bureaucratic labor markets. The models and methods that are derived from human capital theory, though well suited to analyzing inequality within the general labor market as a whole, may obscure key 88

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aspects of stratification within a bureaucracy because of its inadequate attention to the impact of labor market segmentation on mobility.6 Some scholars have thus advocated for more research into the institutional sources of career success.7 This approach is particularly relevant to research on elite mobility since, as noted before, a political elite is ultimately the product of a political structure. Opportunity structures are important for research on elite mobility because there can be several different ladders in an organization or system.8 What influences advancement in grade on one ladder may differ from what leads to a promotion on another. Differences among types of firms, industries, and occupations in their job rewards, career ladders, and employment relationships affect career advancement.9 Such effects are conceptualized as internal labor markets, a key concept of segmented labor market theory.10 Thus, labor market segmentation theory highlights the influence of structure on career advancement, pointing out a direction toward which research on career advancement should be headed. Nevertheless, insights from labor market segmentation theory cannot directly apply to research on promotion in bureaucratic labor markets without substantial elaborations. As Rachel A. Rosenfeld argues, what we need is not a proliferation of structural variables to include in models of career mobility: but a better understanding of the dimensions and mechanisms that define “opportunity structures”. Many of the approaches in sociological research see structure as interacting with resources, but here too there is a need for better specification of which types of resources are important for mobility in different settings and why.11 In other words, we need to explain whether there are different promotion structures in different political systems and in what ways they, in combination with personal characteristics, influence career advancement in the different political systems. For example, Barbara Wake Carroll uses the concept of functional determinism to study bureaucratic labor market outcomes. Functional determinism is the degree to which there is a specialized and organization specific knowledge or technological skill in use within a department. She observes that diplomats tend to believe that there are certain ways in which diplomats act. So do bureaucrats in the departments in charge of fiscal and monetary policy. Individuals in the same organizations tend to share common characteristics in terms of their education and career paths, and in particular to have spent long periods in “apprenticeship” to absorb the departmental culture. Thus, departments with a high degree of functional determinism appoint senior managers who are older, who have 89

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spent extensive time in that department, and who have an educational background that is specific to the function of the department.12 Carroll then analyzes the senior public servants in Mauritius and five Western countries and shows a close relationship between the type of education and the type of department. The dominant field of study is one which is considered for the department in question: science for agriculture; law and the social sciences for foreign affairs; economics for finance; science and engineering for the environment and defence.13 Carroll thus concludes that the senior officials in these countries are career civil servants, educated in the field of study for which they are responsible, and these characteristics have changed little over the past 20 years.14 Her study demonstrates that different bureaucratic systems develop different opportunity structures that evaluate and reward individuals who can contribute the most to their organizational tasks.

Existing studies of elite mobility in China So far, promotion structures in different political systems have not been included in research on career mobility in the PRC. Scholars have relied overwhelmingly on a human capital approach, focusing on personal characteristics in the study of career mobility.15 As noted in previous chapters, research on pre-reform elites has emphasized the role of political credentials in promotion in the Chinese political hierarchy. A. Doak Barnett reports that in Mao’s China, cadre ratings indicated very great differentials in power, prestige, salaries, and other prerogatives – and also involved great psychological distance between those at the top and those at the bottom. The difference and the gap between party and non-party cadres were very great indeed.16 Barnett also observes that there was an extremely important pattern of stratification based primarily on seniority or length of service for the Chinese communist revolution. Party cadres were differentiated into sub-groups, such as “Long March cadres,” “Yenan cadres,” “1938 cadres,” “Anti-Japanese War cadres,” and “Liberation War cadres,” depending on when they joined the Chinese communist revolution. High-seniority ratings opened the door to positions of power and authority in the bureaucracy, whether or not the cadres possessed special technical competence or experience qualifying them for such posts. Apparently, the CCP equated seniority with political reliability and perhaps also with general organizational skills. These were rated as being more important than special technical competence for many leadership posts in the bureaucracy.17 Other scholars similarly argue that: political advancement from 1949 to 1978 were usually based on (1) seniority in joining the party and the revolution, such as taking 90

DUALISM AND PROMOTION

part in the “Long March” and the “Anti-Japanese War”; (2) ideological sophistication in Marxism; (3) political loyalty and “activism in class struggle”; and (4) “class” background from a “proletarian family.” None of these policies changed significantly until the early 1980s, and the elite they generated can be seen in the pre-1987 central committees and the politburos.18 There have been so far no quantitative studies of the impact of political loyalty on leadership selection in Mao’s China, however. Studies of the Chinese leadership in the reform era have examined the effects of education and other individual attributes on career mobility. Li Cheng and David Bachman study mayors in China in the 1980s, arguing that seniority of both age and membership in the CCP bears a positive correlation to the highest rank in administrative levels of municipal government. High educational attainment also contributes to climbing high. Mayors whose main career is in the CCP and who have had experience in ideological and/or propaganda fields are less likely to attain the highest rank. By contrast, those who have worked as administrative directors at either the factory or the bureau level appear to have an advantage in promotion.19 In my study of the State Council in the 1980s I find strong and positive associations between age and highest rank and between seniority in the CCP membership and upward mobility. A career in the CCP or in the government system contributes significantly to climbing high. By contrast, those who have worked as professionals are less likely to attain the highest rank. Educational attainment is not positively associated with career advancement.20 I report similar findings in my study of China’s provincial elite in the 1980s.21 There are also studies of leadership selection at the lower echelons of the political hierarchy in the reform era, one of which is Andrew Walder’s attempt to model career success in urban China. Walder finds that prior CCP membership yields very strong returns in authority. There are significant but much smaller returns in authority in relation to education. Controlling for seniority and gender, the coefficients for CCP membership, college, and high school degrees are statistically significant, but the coefficient for CCP membership is more than ten times the size of those for either educational degrees.22 Another such study is Xueguang Zhou’ study of cadre recruitment and promotion in the reform era. Zhou reports that qualification and seniority are highly significant in bureaucratic promotion. Seniority, as measured in age, significantly increases the probability of being in the highest rank. One additional year of seniority increases the probability of being in the higher position by 0.01. Education is also highly significant: an additional year of education increases the probability by 0.5 of being in the higher rank. Seniority in the CCP membership contributes significantly to the 91

DUALISM AND PROMOTION

probability of promotion. However, only those recruited into the CCP in the reform era have a significantly higher probability of being in higher positions. There is no significant difference between those who joined the CCP in the Mao era and the non-CCP members. Cadres in governmental agencies and public organizations have a lower probability of being in the higher position than those working in industrial organizations. Politicrats have a significantly higher probability (0.58) of being in the higher rank than those in administrative jobs.23 Also, using a massive longitudinal data set, Xueguang Zhou reports that education played a consistent and positive role in entering the cadre profession over time, reflecting the institutional practice in the Chinese bureaucracy whereby most college graduates were routinely placed in cadre jobs. It also had a significant and positive effect on promotion throughout the period of 1949–94. Despite discriminatory policies against college graduates in their access to CCP membership, once they entered the bureaucracy, their educational credentials did contribute to a higher rate of promotion throughout the period of 1949–94. Zhou however did not study the effect of CCP membership or CCP seniority on promotion.24 Bobai Li and Andrew Walder analyze a mass survey data set and conclude that “other things being equal, those who join the party while young enjoy higher odds of subsequent promotion into an elite administrative position than those who join the party in midcareer.” Elite cadres, in their definition, are “the heads of work organizations, which include individuals with decision-making and managerial positions in public agencies and their first-level subunits.”25 Finally, using event history analysis, Yanjie Bian, Xiaoling Shu, and John Logan study how educational attainment and political credentials influence individual mobility into elite positions. They draw data from mass surveys conducted in Shanghai and Tianjin in 1993 and measure an elite position by defining a leading cadre in the CCP or state hierarchy as 1 and others as 0. Given the rate of 1 for non-members, the rate for CCP members is 17.63 for moving into a leading cadre position in party and state hierarchies. Given the rate of 1 for persons with less than a college education, the rate for persons with a college education is 2.72 for moving into a position of political authority. In moving into a leading cadre position in party and state hierarchies, the CCP members with a college education have a significant advantage over the CCP members with less education. The difference in the rates of movement into this position is very large indeed, 210 percent in favor of the college educated.26 The above studies shed much light on career advancement in the Chinese political hierarchy. However, the works by Walder, Zhou, and Bian et al. do not address elite stratification directly since their data are drawn from mass surveys in China. Many existing studies of elites cited above have relied on samples from government bureaucracies only. The 92

DUALISM AND PROMOTION

extent to which their findings can be legitimately generalized to the political hierarchy as a whole is uncertain. In addition, most existing studies have relied on human capital theory, focusing on the impact of individual attributes on upward mobility. The mobility models and hypotheses put forward in these studies are not developed to reflect specific processes or constraints that occur in the political hierarchy.

Elite dualism and career advancement I propose an institutional explanation of career advancement in the political hierarchy, using insights from labor market segmentation theory that opportunity structures are an important determinant of promotion. I observe that the promotion structure in the Chinese political hierarchy resembles in many respects the internal labor markets in large American and Japanese companies, which have the following characteristics: few ports of entry at the bottom of the hierarchy, hierarchical job ladders, well-defined career patterns, promotion from within, an emphasis on onthe-job training and skills thus acquired on career progression, low turnover, seniority-based rewards, and formal grievance procedures.27 I then speculate that the characteristics of the CCP and the government system must have a direct impact on their promotion decisions, just like what happens in internal labor markets. This speculation is based in large part on the findings from Chapter 5 that the government and the CCP rely on different political and educational criteria in their recruitment drives. It is likely that these two systems also use different combinations of political and educational credentials in determining promotion. Generally speaking, promotions in an organization are decided on efficiency criteria and awarded to employees who are judged most likely to contribute to the organization. The nature of the organization determines the definition of efficiency: profits are deemed to be a central component of efficiency in a market economy, whereas the fulfillment of production plans is the ultimate goal of a state socialist firm. The organization uses its definition of efficiency to identify a group of employees as potentially able to contribute much more than others. Many researchers have taken this efficiency model of career mobility in organization to be an approximation of reality.28 This makes good sense since particular jobs have their own imperatives and sub-environments, in addition to the general environment facing the organization. Whether based on technological requirements or the dictates of custom, establishments are likely to set up different promotion structures for particular types of jobs.29 Proposition 6.1: Functional differentiation leads the government and the CCP to establish different opportunity structures that reward individuals who are most likely to contribute to their respective missions. 93

DUALISM AND PROMOTION

On the basis of Proposition 6.1, I develop three hypotheses regarding the relationship among institutional arrangements, individual characteristics, and promotion. First, if the CCP and the government adopt different recruitment criteria, it is likely that they also use different promotion standards. As already argued in Chapter 5, political loyalty weighs more than expertise in the CCP hierarchy since it is a political organization and has to use political orthodoxy to define efficiency. Political credentials contribute to the CCP’s institutional mission. In contrast, expertise is regarded as a key to economic development and hence should be a major element of competence in the government system. It should be valued more than political credentials in the government system. The returns to political and educational credentials should vary according to institutional context. Hypothesis 6.1: The requirement for educational credentials for promotion in the government system should be higher than that in the CCP system. Hypothesis 6.2: The requirement for political credentials for promotion in the CCP system should be higher than in the government system. A footnote to Hypothesis 6.2: I liken the Chinese political hierarchy to internal labor markets in American and Japanese large firms.30 I hasten to add here that the CCP hierarchy resembles internal labor markets more than the government system. First, ports of entry into the CCP hierarchy are substantially fewer than those into the government system. Experts without CCP membership may be recruited into the government system for their expertise. This will not happen in the CCP hierarchy. Second, internal labor markets in general reward seniority highly. Seniority in the Chinese political hierarchy can mean two different measures: work seniority and CCP seniority. Many researches have demonstrated that work seniority is not as important as CCP seniority in terms of promotion in the CCP hierarchy since it is a political organization.31 Finally, promotion is never based completely on achievement. Particularistic attributes such as gender and ethnicity influence status attainment. Many studies have documented that, in general, promotion prospects for men and people of majority ethnicity are unjustifiably superior to those of women and people of minority status.32 However, it is conceivable that particularistic attributes are more likely to prevail in organizations where jobs can be handled with general human capital and skills do not atrophy with disuse. They are less likely to be a promotion criterion in organizations whose operation relies on specialized human capital. Thus, the more technical an organization’s tasks, the lower the returns on particularistic attributes. The government is more technical-task oriented than the CCP and should value universalism more than the CCP. The likelihood of 94

DUALISM AND PROMOTION

promotion for talented women and cadres of minority cadres should be higher in the government system than in the CCP hierarchy. Hypothesis 6.3: The presence of particularism in promotion processes may be stronger in the CCP hierarchy than in the government system.

Measuring promotion in the Chinese political hierarchy I create three dependent variables to test the above-mentioned three hypotheses. Most scholars conceptualize promotion in a bureaucracy on the basis of its ranking system.33 For example, James E. Rosenbaum develops in his study of career mobility three measures of promotion: a nonmanagement level, a foreman level, and a lower management level. A promotion is defined as a move from one of these three levels into one above.34 In a similar fashion, Thomas Diprete and Whitman Soule measure career advancement by grade promotions: 1 2 3

grade promotions in the lower grades (civil service GS1-GS4 of the federal government in the US); grade-promotions in the middle grades (GS5-GS10); grade promotions in the upper grades (GS11 and higher).35

Gary Powell and D. Anthony Butterfield divide their sample population in a cabinet-level federal department in the US into two sections: employees who were appointed to the Senior Executive Service (SES) and those who were lower functionaries in the department. Powell and Butterfield then classify the sample respondents according to the highest grade he or she has held (1 ⫽ grade 13 or less, 2 ⫽ grade 14, 3 ⫽ grade 15, 4 ⫽ SES).36 Students of state socialism have adopted the similar principle in measuring promotion. Philip Stewart et al. create a nine-point ordinal measure of promotion in the Soviet Union. They first arbitrarily assigned the midpoint (a code of 5) to oblast Party first secretary, then assign a lower number to those whose positions were believed to be lower in the Soviet hierarchy and a higher point to those attaining positions considered as promotions.37 William Reisinger and John Willerton similarly consider promotion in the Soviet Union as mobility up any of the hierarchy from one level to any other level above that first level, or movement from a state or other apparatus position to a party position at that level or a higher level, or movement from a given level to the same or higher level in a more important region.38 The same ranking principle has been adopted in Chinese studies. I first discuss the definitions of promotion in studies of career advancement using 95

DUALISM AND PROMOTION

mass survey data. Andrew Walder relies on a scaled measure of authority – number of subordinates – as the dependent variable in his study.39 Xueguang Zhou uses two Chinese bureaucratic ranks, the chu (department) and ke (section) levels, to create a categorical variable for a logistic regression analysis and estimate the effects of the coveriates on the probability of the respondent’s career mobility.40 In his most up-to-date study of career patterns in the Chinese bureaucracy, Zhou adopts two measures of promotion events. He uses information about changes in a respondent’s administrative rank to identify the timing and the event of being promoted. The administrative ranks include, in ascending order, the following categories: below ke (head of a section), ke, fu-chu (associate director of a department), chu (director of a department), and ju (bureau) and above. He also uses managerial positions within the Chinese workplace, asking a respondent to identify whether, and when, his or her position in the work organization was as an ordinary worker, lower-level manager, mid-level manager, or higher-level manager.41 Second, I discuss the definitions of promotion in the studies of career advancement among the political elite in China. Cheng Li and David Bachman rank the 247 majors in their sample by administrative level and population of each individual city. Mayors of cities that have over 3 million population or are provincial capitals are ranked the highest, mayors of cities with a population between 500,000 and 3 million are ranked in the middle, and majors of cities with a population below 500,000 are ranked the lowest. Li and Bachman then use the ranking as the dependent variable to study the effects of individual characteristics on position attainment.42 In my study of the State Council in the 1980s, I define leaders as having the highest rank if they are ministers or hold higher positions. Vice-ministers and their equivalents are ranked in the middle. All others such as heads of bureaus in the State Council are ranked the lowest. I combine these three measures to form a dependent variable to estimate the probability of promotion among the State Council elite.43 Clearly, in all these studies mentioned above, hierarchy is used as the baseline in measuring promotion. Following the established ranking principle, I devise three dependent variables in the following analysis: 1 2 3

Minister level cadre vs. vice minister level cadre, Minister/governor vs. vice minister/deputy governor, Secretary/CCP minister vs. vice CCP minister/deputy secretary.

Minister level cadre vs. vice minister level cadre: premier, vice-premiers, state councilors, ministers, the CCP Politburo members and ministers, secretaries of provincial CCP committees, and governors are all ranked as minister level cadres (or above) in the Chinese power structure. Others (i.e. 96

DUALISM AND PROMOTION

vice ministers, deputy governors, deputy secretaries of provincial CCP committees, secretaries for provincial CCP Discipline Committees, etc.) are ranked as vice minister level cadres. The former is coded as 1 and the latter as 0. There were 169 minister level cadres and 571 vice minister level cadres in 1988 and 193 minister level cadres and 655 vice minister level cadres in 1994. Minister/governor vs. vice minister/deputy governor: a dummy variable with premier, vice-premiers, state councilors, ministers, and governors coded as 1 and vice ministers, the State Council bureau heads, deputy governors, etc., as 0. The former is placed higher in the government system than the latter. There were 108 ministers/governors and 385 vice ministers and deputy governors in 1988 and 107 ministers/governors and 450 vice ministers and deputy governors in 1994. Secretary/CCP minister vs. vice CCP minister/deputy secretary: this is also a dummy variable with the CCP Politburo members, the CCP ministers, and provincial CCP secretaries coded as 1 and the CCP vice ministers and bureau heads, deputy provincial CCP secretaries, secretaries for provincial CCP Discipline Committees, etc., as 0. The former is placed higher in the CCP hierarchy than the latter. There were 63 CCP provincial secretaries and CCP ministers and 184 CCP deputy secretaries and CCP vice ministers in 1988 and 86 CCP provincial secretaries and CCP ministers and 205 CCP deputy secretaries and CCP vice ministers in 1994. The above three classifications are somewhat arbitrary. For example, although premier, vice-premiers, state councilors, ministers, the CCP Politburo members and ministers, secretaries of provincial CCP committees, and governors are all ranked as minister level cadres in this chapter, they do not hold the identical ranking in the civil service scale in China. In fact, premier, vice-premiers, state councilors are ranked higher than ministers. Nevertheless, the above classifications form three useful dichotomies for a logistic regression analysis of factors of elite stratification in China.

Education, political credentials, and promotion Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present basic information on the 1988 and the 1994 elite in terms of educational and political credentials. Table 6.1 shows that in 1988, the difference in CCP seniority between minister level cadres and vice minister level cadres was 8.2 years; between governors/ministers and deputy governors/vice ministers, 9.8 years; and between CCP provincial secretaries/CCP ministers and CCP provincial deputy secretaries/CCP vice ministers, 4.7 years. In 1994, the differences in CCP seniority between minister level cadres and vice minister level cadres increased to 10.3 years; between governors/ministers and deputy governors/vice ministers, widened to 10 years; and between CCP provincial secretaries/CCP ministers and CCP provincial 97

169

No. of cases

571

17.9 14.4 20.5

21.9 10.7 17.2

89.8 10.2 9.5

93.5 6.5

Ethnicity (%) Han Non-Han

93.7 6.3

10.7

98.2 1.8

Gender (%) Men Women

55.6 32.2

Educational credentials (%) Technical major, key university Technical major, ordinary university Arts major, key university Arts major, ordinary university

60.5 40.4

Minister level Vice minister cadre level cadre

The 1988 elite

Age (mean year) CCP seniority (mean year)

Independent variable

Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics, the 1988 elite

■

105

21.9 7.6 21.9

14.3

90.5 9.5

97.1 2.9

60.2 40.4

Governor/ minister

385

22.1 14.0 21.6

9.9

91.9 009.1

93.2 006.8

55.2 30.5

Deputy governor/vice minister

The government officials

■

64

9.4 15.6 21.9

4.7

98.4 001.6

100.0 000.0

61.0 40.5

CCP minister/ secretary

186

8.6 15.1 18.3

8.6

85.5 14.5

94.6 005.4

56.3 35.8

Deputy secretary/ CCP vice minister

The CCP cadres

DUALISM AND PROMOTION

deputy secretaries/CCP vice ministers, grew to 9 years (Table 6.2). Clearly, data from the 1988 and 1994 elites show that political credentials are consistently valued more in position attainment in the CCP hierarchy than in the government system, supporting Hypothesis 6.2. Table 6.1 shows that in 1988, 100 percent of the CCP ministers and CCP provincial secretaries were men, as compared to 97.1 percent of government ministers and governors. More than 98 percent of the CCP ministers and CCP provincial secretaries were Han Chinese, as compared to 90.5 percent of government ministers and governors. A similar pattern emerges when the 1994 data are examined. Hence, findings from Tables 6.1 and 6.2 support Hypothesis 6.3 as women and cadres of minority status are less likely to take top posts in the CCP hierarchy than in the government system. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 also show that the percentage of the officials with degrees in engineering and management science in the government system was higher in 1994 than in 1988 – 47.7 percent of the 1994 minister level cadres had technical degrees, as compared to 32.6 percent of the 1988 minister level cadres. The lower educational attainment of the 1988 elite is understandable. As already noted in Chapter 4, the leadership transition was initiated in the 1980s when the supply of red experts was limited – the anti-intellectual Cultural Revolution was not concluded until 1976, the orthodox Maoist leadership remained in power until 1978, and the emphasis on educational credentials in elite recruitment was not put forward officially until 1982. In 1994, in contrast, the shortage of supply of candidates who were both politically reliable and technically competent must be reduced greatly since the leadership transition had undergone for more than ten years. When the demand for candidates remains relatively fixed (since there are only so many leadership positions at the given time) and the supply of qualified candidates increases, the requirement for educational credentials therefore became higher in 1994. Finally, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show that in 1988 36.2 percent of the ministers and governors and 32 percent of the vice ministers and deputy governors commanded a technical degree, as compared to 14.1 percent of the CCP ministers and CCP provincial secretaries and 17.2 percent of the CCP vice ministers and CCP provincial deputy secretaries. More importantly, the percentage of the ministers and governors with a technical degree is higher than that of the CCP ministers and CCP provincial secretaries, a pattern that appeared again in 1994. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 6.1 that the educational requirement for promotion in the government system is higher than that in the CCP.

99

193

No. of cases

655

23.2 20.2 17.3

17.1 13.0 12.4

91.6 8.4 18.0

93.8 6.2

Ethnicity (%) Han Non-Han

93.1 6.9

30.6

97.4 2.6

Gender (%) Men Women

56.1 29.7

Educational credentials (%) Technical major, key university Technical major, ordinary university Arts major, key university Arts major, ordinary university

61.6 40.0

Minister level Vice minister cadre level cadre

The 1988 elite

Age (mean year) CCP seniority (mean year)

Independent variable

Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics, the 1994 elite

■

107

16.8 12.1 8.4

36.4

90.7 9.3

96.3 3.7

60.7 37.8

Governor/ minister

450

27.3 21.6 16.4

19.1

92.4 7.6

93.3 6.7

55.6 27.8

Deputy governor/vice minister

The government officials

■

86

17.4 14.0 17.4

23.3

97.7 2.3

98.8 1.2

62.7 42.9

CCP minister/ secretary

205

14.1 17.1 19.0

15.6

89.8 10.2

92.7 7.3

57.1 33.9

Deputy secretary/ CCP vice minister

The CCP cadres

DUALISM AND PROMOTION

Institutional effects on promotion In this section, I conduct two logistic regression analyses of elite stratification in China. I compare the odds of becoming a minister level cadre versus those of becoming a vice minister level cadre; those of becoming a governor/minister versus those of becoming a deputy governor/vice minister; and those of becoming a CCP provincial secretary/CCP minister versus those of becoming a CCP deputy provincial secretary/CCP vice minister. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show that in both 1988 and 1994, a cadre with a technical degree was more likely to become a minister level cadre than one without such a degree. These two tables also show that cadres with a technical degree from a key university are more likely to be promoted than those without such a degree. More importantly, Table 6.3 shows that a technical degree from either a key university or an ordinary university was essential for promotion in the government system in 1988. Taking the exponents of the logistic regression coefficients for the two technical degrees in Model 2 of Table 6.3, it can be seen that with other variables controlled, a key university graduate with an engineering/management science degree is 153 percent more likely than others to be promoted to be a minister or governor. The corresponding figure for an engineering/management science degree is 108 percent. In sharp contrast, there is no such an educational requirement for career advancement in the CCP hierarchy. There are changes in returns to technical education for the 1994 government leaders: one has to hold an engineering/management degree from a key university to serve in a minister level post in the government system. Holding other independent variables constant, a key university graduate with an engineering/management science degree is nearly 90 percent more likely than others to be promoted to be a minister or governor. An engineering/management science degree from an ordinary university does not have any effect on promotion in the government system, however. In comparison, in 1994, in the CCP hierarchy, an engineering/management degree led to upward mobility regardless whether it was from a key university or an ordinary university (Table 6.4). Taking the exponents of the logistic regression coefficients for these two degrees, it can be seen that everything being equal, a key university graduate with an engineering/management science degree is 208 percent more likely than others to be promoted to be a CCP minister or provincial secretary. The corresponding figure for an engineering/management science degree is 605 percent. Comparing Models 2 and 3 of Table 6.4, it can be argued that the requirement for educational credentials for promotion in the government system is higher than that for the CCP hierarchy, confirming Hypothesis 6.1. The returns to technical degrees are lower in the government system because 101

Notes * P ⬍ 0.1; **P ⬍ 0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

740

No. of cases

0.7304 (0.3320)**

490

425.000 561.857 84.188**

0.5272 (0.2701)** 694.856 766.501 100.362**

⫺2 Log likelihood Goodness of Fit Model Chi-Square

0.0682 (0.0339)** 0.5486 (0.6476) ⫺0.6489 (0.4346) 0.0818 (0.0220)** 0.0163 (0.4927) 0.4029 (0.3908) 0.9265 (0.3871)**

0.0617 (0.0250)** 0.9586 (0.6205) ⫺0.1636 (0.3665) 0.0612 (0.0171)** ⫺0.0422 (0.3398) 0.4235 (0.2808) 0.5548 (0.3170)*

Age Women Minority ethnicity CCP seniority Arts, key university Arts, ordinary university Technical major, key university Technical major, ordinary university

Model 2 (Minister and governor vs. vice minister and deputy governor)

Model 1 (Minister, governor, CCP secretary vs. others)

Independent variable

Table 6.3 Logistic regression coefficients for institutional effect on elite stratification in 1988

250

247.956 235.274 36.460**

0.1682 (0.5580)

0.1400 (0.0551)** 6.6545 (18.2347) ⫺2.3295 (1.0436)** ⫺0.0451 (0.0446) ⫺0.2563 (0.4938) 0.3963 (0.4264) ⫺0.3704 (0.6219)

Model 3 (CCP minister and secretary vs. CCP vice minister and deputy secretary)

DUALISM AND PROMOTION

many government officials are very well educated – the oversupply of a commodity reduces its price. Also, controlling for age, ethnicity, and gender, CCP seniority was associated with promotion in the government system but not in the CCP hierarchy in 1988. It appears that there were no substantial differences in CCP seniority among the party elite. By 1994, however, seniority became an important promotion criterion in both the government system and the CCP hierarchy. Table 6.3 also shows that ethnicity is negatively associated with climbing high in the CCP hierarchy. The logistic regression coefficient for ethnicity indicates that with other variables controlled, cadres of ethnic minority status are 90 percent less likely than the Han counterparts to be promoted as a CCP minister or CCP provincial secretary. In comparison, there was no such negative association in the government system. Additionally, Table 6.4 shows that cadres of ethnic minority status are advantaged career advancement in the government system: the exponent of the logistic regression coefficient for ethnicity indicates that everything being equal, they are 129 percent more likely than the Han counterparts to be promoted as ministers or governors. Yet cadres of ethnic minority status do not enjoy similar advantages over Han Chinese in the CCP hierarchy. Table 6.4 also shows that controlling other variables, women are 64 percent less likely than men to experience career mobility in the Chinese political structure (Model 1). The corresponding figure for the CCP hierarchy is 87 percent (Model 3). Gender discrimination however does not appear to affect promotion in the government system. The logistic regression coefficient for gender in Model 2 of Table 6.4 is not statistically important, which indicates that in the government system women have roughly equal chances for promotion as men do. These findings hence support Hypothesis 6.3 that the presence of particularism in the promotion process is stronger in the CCP hierarchy than in the government system. Finally, studies of the Soviet elites also show that there was a direct relation between age and political influence: the greater the age, the greater the authority.44 Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show that, except Model 3 of Table 6.4, age has a positive impact on promotion in the Chinese power hierarchy. There was not much difference in age between CCP ministers/provincial secretaries and their deputies in 1994. However, State Council ministers and provincial governors are older than their deputies. Yet, they are not necessarily old, illiterate or semi-illiterate revolutionaries. On the contrary, as the above analysis indicates, they are in charge because of their superior political credentials (high CCP seniority) and human capital (training in technical fields).

103

Notes * P ⬍ 0.1; **P ⬍ 0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

848

No. of cases

556

440.910 551.976 103.693**

732.445 843.893 177.210**

⫺2 Log likelihood Goodness of Fit Model Chi-Square

Model 2 (Minister and governor vs. vice minister and deputy governor) 0.1318 (0.0276)** ⫺0.7081 (0.6107) 0.8267 (0.4227)* 0.0441 (0.0130)** ⫺0.5644 (0.4151) ⫺0.5274 (0.4676) 0.6413 (0.3327)* ⫺0.0054 (0.3790)

Model 1 (Minister, governor, CCP secretary vs. others)

Age 0.1142 (0.0238)** Women ⫺1.0484 (0.5173)** Minority ethnicity 0.1230 (0.3601) CCP seniority 0.0596 (0.0130)** Arts, key university ⫺0.1560 (0.3122) Arts, ordinary university ⫺0.0327 (0.3185) Technical major, key university 0.8376 (0.2598)** Technical major, ordinary university 0.6400 (0.2927)**

Independent variable

Table 6.4 Logistic regression coefficients for institutional effect on elite stratification in 1994

292

266.346 286.767 87.646**

⫺0.0040 (0.0620) ⫺2.0547 (1.0879)* ⫺1.2758 (0.7873) 0.1626 (0.0473)** 0.5427 (0.4966) 0.4713 (0.4666) 1.1259 (0.4454)** 1.9529 (0.5138)**

Model 3 (CCP minister and secretary vs. CCP vice minister and deputy secretary)

DUALISM AND PROMOTION

Summary Promotions are a key issue in leadership selection. The structural imperative of a political system makes it inevitable that the number of people who can be promoted decreases steadily as they climb up the ladder. The number of potential candidates of the promotion process will vary inversely with the proximity of each echelon to the summit. The process by which a political hierarchy promotes its members to higher positions has tremendous practical implications. If we accept the notion that, in general, the higher one’s position in the hierarchy, the greater one’s impact on national policy-making and implementation, it becomes plain that the promotion process determines who shall exert power and influence in the political hierarchy. The character and caliber of the hierarchy’s outputs, be they goods, services, decisions, or policies, will hinge, to a significant extent, on who is promoted to the higher position and how. The promotion process influences elite behavior. Unless it is handled on the basis of generally understood and verifiable criteria, the promotion process has the potential of misleading bureaucrats in their execution of political policies.45 Furthermore, elite selection patterns determine avenues for political participation and status, affect the distribution of status and prestige, and influence the stability of the political and social systems.46 This is particularly true in state socialist societies where power, resources and prestige are concentrated in the hands of the ruling communist parties. Promotion in the political hierarchy embodies the most important career successes in these societies. In Mao’s China of 1949–1976, for example, a successful career in the political hierarchy represented almost the only form of career advancement. Market reforms have opened up alternative avenues of social mobility in China.47 However, structural inequalities in power and earnings are still associated to a large extent to the scope and complexity of bureaucratic systems.48 Social inequality in state socialism could not be adequately explained without confronting the issue of power and the whole mechanism of political stratification.49 An insight into the institutional effect of elite mobility can facilitate and is indeed an inseparable part of the overall understanding of social stratification and social mobility among the general population. Existing studies have generated mixed results regarding the major determinants of promotion in the Chinese political hierarchy. Many scholars claim that promotion is based on technical expertise in the reform period.50 However, others argue that recent studies of the current Chinese political leadership overestimate the role of educational backgrounds in the political mobility of Chinese political elites. A good education may be a ticket to officialdom but is not a credential for further political mobility.51 Still, others have insisted on the crucial role of political loyalty in 105

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career advancement.52 As a result, we can not be sure about the degree to which political credentials and educational attainment are related to promotion. There have been arguments about the effect of political and educational credentials on promotion because many scholars have assumed an undifferentiated bureaucratic labor market in their analyses. This inaccurate assumption has kept them from conceptualizing separate mobility channels within the political hierarchy as an important intervening variable. I show in this chapter that cadres with a technical degree are more likely to be promoted than those without such a degree. The value of a technical degree is higher than that of a non-technical degree. Cadres with a technical degree from a key university are more likely to be promoted than those without such a degree. CCP seniority is positively associated with elite stratification in China. More importantly, I show that the requirement for political credentials for promotion in the CCP system is higher than that in the government system. The requirement for educational credentials for promotion in the government system is higher than that in the CCP system. The presence of particularism in promotion processes is stronger in the CCP hierarchy than in the government system. The more technical an organization’s tasks, the lower the returns on particularistic attributes. The government is more technical-task oriented than the CCP and thus values universalism more than the CCP. These findings support the elite dualism’s central argument that the mobility effect of education and political capital depends on institutional context. Different political institutions develop distinct promotion criteria. The mobility effect of political and educational credentials does not remain fixed across structural settings, rather, it is defined by sectoral difference.

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The attainment of leadership positions is just one, though probably the most important, dimension of elite stratification. Another aspect of promotion that deserves careful attention is the rate of mobility, which can be defined as the speed with which individuals climb the political hierarchy, which to some degree is a measure of the skills and qualities most highly valued by the top party leadership.1 Promotions given too often or too quickly, or promotions involving a disproportionate increase in rewards, threaten the legitimacy of the entire system. Large organizations thus provide bureaucratic ladders with timed and serial promotions, each promotion involving only a modest increase in rewards relative to the last position held.2 Hence, scholars notice that meteoric ascent is not the norm in a stabilized political regime. In times of great social change or political transformation, however, new selection criteria can emerge and prevail. Mobility patterns may defy normative expectations. In the former Soviet Union, for example, after the conclusion of each purge or succession crisis, new men favored by the new leadership rose rapidly from obscurity. Examples include Andrei Kirilenko and Brezhnev under Khrushchev, Konstantin Chernenko, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, Vladimir Shcherbitsky, and Gorbachev under Brezhnev, and the so-called “Siberian coalition” under Gorbachev.3 China experts argue that the reform era is one of the most massive elite transitions in human history, even if compared with the Soviet experience. There have indeed been rapid turnovers among the members of the Chinese political elite.4 These developments lead to several questions about elite selection in China: do some officials climb the political ladder faster than others in the reform era? Why are they more likely than others to get a head start in the race to top posts in the Chinese political hierarchy? There can be other questions about mobility rates among the Chinese political elite. Furthermore, they can be analyzed from different theoretical perspectives. In this chapter I focus on the relationship between institutional affiliation and the rate of career advancement so as to be in tune 107

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with the major theme of this book. My question is, if institutional context affects promotion as shown in Chapter 6, will it also generate different mobility rates in the government system and the CCP hierarchy respectively? To address this question, I first discuss the relationship between promotion speed and status attainment. Next, I briefly review the literature on mobility rates in the reform era, pointing out areas in the existing studies that require improvement. I then define promotion speed and put forward two hypotheses regarding mobility rates and institutional arrangements in China. I then turn to the data set on the 1988 and 1994 elites to estimate individual-level regression models in which the effect of political and educational credentials on mobility rates is predicted on the basis of institutional distinction. The results indicate that promotion speed in China can be best understood from the perspective of elite dualism.

Status attainment and promotion speed As pointed out in Chapter 6, in status attainment research, career advancement is discussed in terms of both climbing a ladder and being on a fast track. The race metaphor suggests that it is important to model differences in the speed at which individuals are moving up the ladder or running the race. Demographic theories of promotion probabilities suggest that chronological age is one of the few universal human experiences and as a result provides a basic structural link between individuals and social systems. It is used to classify people into different categories and to match them with roles and statuses. Sometimes employers set age limits for promotions. There are real age norms in organizations: after a certain age, a person might be considered “too old” to be promoted. For example, the Chinese government has tried to institutionalize age norms to bring about desirable personnel changes in the PLA. The Regulations on PLA Officers on Active Service revised in May 1994 set new age limits for officers at or below military regional level (Table 7.1).5 Those who cannot reach a certain rank at the specific age will be demobilized from the military. Similar regulations have also been institutionalized in the civil service scale. For example, a vice minister or deputy governor is destined to retire if he or she fails to become a minister or governor by the age of 60. Hence, age norms regarding position attainment appear involved in a wide range of employment issues, including hiring decisions and promotion opportunities. Social pressures and political considerations frequently evolve around typical ages within careers that define success and identify failures.6 It has been reported in status attainment research that individuals must have moved through the foreman rank and be ready for middle management at least by the time they are around 35 years of age. Otherwise they tend to remain in lower-management positions.7 108

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Table 7.1 Age limits for military, political, and logistics officers of combat units in the PLA Level

Age limits

Major Military Region Principal leading officer Deputy officer Army Division Regiment Battalion Company Platoon

65 63 55 50 45 40 35 30

Source: Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 253.

Thomas DiPrete and Whitman Soule argue that a supervisor may interpret an employee’s slow progress in the past as an indication of limited future potential.8 Gary Powell and D. Anthony Butterfield similarly point out that applicants with many years of experience who have still not been promoted to a top rank may be viewed as being over the hill and undeserving of further advancement.9 Thus, long years of work experience and an older age may negatively influence review panels’ evaluations of applicants and referral decisions. Employees who get behind in age-based career patterns are less likely to receive future promotions.10 In contrast, review panels may be impressed by those who enter a system at a relatively young age or are promoted when young.11 If a manager is promoted when he or she is young in terms of the current age norms for a career level, for example, other managers in the same organization may see the promotion as a signal of the promoted individual’s ability. Once defined as a high-performance employee, the manager may have an increased probability of future promotions at an early age.12 In other words, applicants at the threshold of a top management position with less experience may be seen as “fast-trackers” with greater potential for rapid success precisely because they have reached that threshold sooner than the average applicant.13 The advantages that allowed employees to move speedily to his or her present position will generally continue to benefit him or her in the future.14 It is necessary to stress that promotion speeds cannot be estimated simply on the basis of human capital theory alone. This is because the difference in promotion speeds reflects both structural and individual characteristics. For example, some ladders have rungs that are further apart than others, making the climb more difficult.15 Personal attributes are certainly important, but they operate within the confines of the opportunity structure. Research in the West has shown that age judgments 109

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of career progress depend on organizational characteristics such as industry, size, age, and rate of growth.16 Mobility rates can vary across different organizations and are the outcome of the joint work of human capital and organizational characteristics.17 Hence, they must be modeled from the perspective of labor market segmentation theory.

Existing research on mobility rates in state socialism The rates of upward mobility have been a key topic in research on social stratification because they are one facet of career advancement and hence status attainment. They are part of the question “Who gets rewarded” that motivated status attainment research in the first place. And as such they are capable of demonstrating mechanisms of social inequality or opportunity structures in a society. For the same reasons, scholars have studied promotion speed among political elites. Many arguments that are derived from status attainment research among the general population can apply to political elites as well. For example, in Great Britain, those who first become the members of parliament when they are young, especially in their thirties, have greater rates of movement to higher positions.18 Yet there have not been many theoretical and methodological approaches toward research on mobility rates among the political elite in state socialism. The list of the literature on the subject is very short indeed. Kenneth Farmer is perhaps the first to conduct a sophisticated analysis of mobility rates in state socialism. He defines the speed of promotion as the length of the “wait” between an individual’s first acceptance of a party or government position and his or her first election to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.19 Farmer then studies the political careers of the post-Stalin Central Committees (n ⫽ 1,079) and observes that the mean wait for individuals with higher education (17.52 years, standard deviation 8.8) was almost 2.5 years shorter than the mean wait for those without higher education (19.83 years, standard deviation 9.6). Non-Slavic elite members had a mean wait (19.20 years, standard deviation 8.5) of almost two years longer than Slavic elites (17.40 years, standard deviation 8.5). Those with careers predominantly in the state apparatus achieved Central Committee status three years sooner than those with careers in the Party apparatus (15.35 years, standard deviation 9.5, as opposed to 18.56 years, standard deviation 8.5).20 Farmer also reports that the structural characteristics of elites that accounted for the greater variance in mobility were the number of years in the specialized occupation before joining the elite; sex; education; attendance at a party versus a non-party higher-educational institution; and type of career. Multiple regression analyses using the mean wait for the Central Committee status as the dependent variable yield the following equation with adjust R2 being 0.38: 110

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Y ⫽ 19.07 ⫹ 6.81 (SEX) ⫺ 1.12 (PARTY SCHOOL) ⫺ 0.91 (PARTY EDUCATION) ⫺ 0.59 (PARTY CAREER) ⫺ 0.67 (SPECIALIZED PARTY WORK)21 Farmer’s study has offered many insights into the mechanism of career mobility in state socialism. His methodological approach, especially the way he defines promotion speed, is a valuable contribution to elite studies. However, the regression results he provides are not very informative about the major determinants of promotion speed in the Soviet Union other than the negative impact of party affiliation on mobility rates. More importantly, his sample – the Central Committee members – prevents him from distinguishing different mechanisms of mobility in the Soviet political hierarchy. Of course this may not be his research interest at all. There are not many studies of promotion speed among the political elite in Mao’s China due to elite stability (Chapter 3) and data limitation. To my best knowledge, there have been altogether three inquiries into mobility rates in the reform era. But they seem to be less sophisticated than Farmer’s study of the Soviet elite, at least in terms of the statistical tools China scholars have used. First, in their study of China’s mayors in the 1980s, Li Cheng and David Bachman adopt from works by Ying-mao Kau and Peter Smith a dependent variable – “fastest runner” – to measure the speed of promotion. Specifically, Li and Bachman first rank the 247 majors they study by administrative level and population of each individual city. Based on each individual’s position on the highest rank list, Li and Bachman determine a mayor’s rank on the fastest runner list through his or her age (Table 7.2).22 Li and Bachman then use a number of measures such as age and seniority in the CCP membership to predict the speed of promotion and report that high educational attainment, especially training in engineering, is one of the most important determinants of mobility rates. Also, mayors whose main career has been in the CCP system are less likely to be the fastest runners. So are those who have had experience in ideological and/or

Table 7.2 Fast runners among China’s mayors Age

45 years old or below 46–50 years old 51 years old or above

Ranking by status and city population High

Middle

Low

Very fast Very fast Fast

Very fast Fast Slow

Fast Slow Slow

Source: adapted from Cheng Li and Bachman, “Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism,” World Politics 42/1 (1989), p. 80. Details of ranking can be found in the notes to their table.

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propaganda fields. By contrast, those who have worked as administrative directors at either the factory or the industrial bureau level appear to have an advantage in the speed of career advancement.23 In my study of China’s provincial elite in the 1980s, I define fastest runners as: 1

2

provincial leaders below the age of 49 who hold membership in the Central Committee or membership in provincial standing committees (the PSC) of the CCP, or; provincial leaders aged 50–59 who hold membership in the Central Committee.

Fast runners are defined as: 1 2 3

provincial leaders below the age of 49 who are not members of the Central Committee or PSC of the CCP; provincial leaders aged 50–59 who hold membership in PSC of the CCP, or; provincial leaders aged 60 and above who hold membership in the Central Committee.

Slow runners are defined as: 1 2

provincial leaders aged between 50–59 who are not in the Central Committee or PSC of the CCP, or; provincial leaders aged 60 and above who are not in the Central Committee of the CCP (Table 7.3).24

I then use career patterns and personal characteristics to estimate mobility rates for the provincial elite. I find that a career in an industry bureau or factory is helpful in climbing fast, so is a career in the CCP hierarchy or the government system. However, a career in an economic bureau or occupation as an engineer does not contribute to promotion speed.25 I use a similar research design to study mobility rates among the leading Table 7.3 Fast runners among provincial leaders Age

Very fast

Fast

Slow

Below 49 50–9 60 and above

CC or PSC member No – CC member CC or PSC member No – CC member PSC member or no

Source: adapted from data provided by Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 31/6 (1991a), pp. 513–14, 520–2.

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officials of the State Council in 1988. I first rank ministers and those who hold positions above minister the highest in the State Council. Vice ministers and their equivalents are ranked in the middle. All other officials holding positions below vice-minister are ranked the lowest in the central government bureaucracy. I then combine position attainment and age to measure promotion speed.26 Specifically, I define “fastest runners” as those below the age 55 in the highest and middle ranks and those of age 55–9 in the highest rank. “Fast runners” are defined as those below 55 in the lowest rank, those of age 55–9 in the middle rank, and those of age above 60 in the highest rank. “Slow runners” are defined as those of age 55–9 in the lowest rank and those of age above 60 in the middle and lowest ranks (Table 7.3). I report that educational attainment contributes to “climbing fast.” But those who have professional titles such as professor or senior engineer do not appear to have an advantage over others in the speed with which they get their current posts.27 The above three studies provide some basic information about mobility rates in the Chinese political hierarchy. However, the research designs and the analytic styles of these three studies yield limited findings about the key determinants of the rate of career progression in the reform period, especially with reference to those regarding the mobility rates among the CCP cadres. The sampled populations of the three studies are mostly government officials. Further, the existing studies, including the one by Farmer, assume explicitly that the rates of promotion are determined by individual attributes such as education and work experience and that there is only one mobility regime. Thus, these studies cannot model mobility rates accurately because of their exclusive reliance on human capital theory. As mentioned above, promotion speed results from the joint work of individual characteristics and the structure of opportunity. In fact, Kenneth Farmer reports that in the Soviet Union, individuals with a career predominantly in the state apparatus achieve Central Committee status three years sooner than those with a career in the party apparatus (15.35 years, standard deviation 9.5, as opposed to 18.56 years, standard deviation 8.5).28 Table 7.4 Fast runners among state council officials Age

Minister

Vice minister

Bureau head

Below 55 55–9 60 and above

Very fast Very fast Fast

Very fast Fast Slow

Fast Slow Slow

Source: adapted from data provided by Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in Post-Mao China,” Studies in Comparative Communism 24/1 (1991b), pp. 116, 120–1.

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Presumably, the difference in mobility rates among different political systems should also exist in China, a presumption that stimulates my intellectual curiosity about the effect of institutional distinction on mobility speeds among the Chinese political elite.

Institutional distinction and mobility rates The leadership transformation in the reform era has indeed led to rapid turnovers among the members of the Chinese political elite. Cadres have experienced different rates of mobility in the reform period. The CCP’s emphasis on youth and educational attainment in leadership selection has created an opportunity structure that has brought about variations in promotion speed in China. The variations are substantial and institutionally patterned. For example, Mr. Xiang Huaicheng, a native of Wujiang county, Jiangsu province, was born in 1939. He worked as researcher in the Institute of Computing Technology in the Chinese Academy of Sciences after graduating from the Department of Chinese at Shandong University in 1960. He served as deputy section chief of the Budgeting Department of the Ministry of Finance between 1979 and 1982, director of the Education Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture, director of the Education Bureau and then director of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries between 1982 and 1983. Mr. Xiang joined the CCP in 1983 and one year later became vice minister of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries.29 As another example, Mr. Liu Mingkung, born in 1946, received his MBA from the University of London in 1987. He came back to China and joined the CCP in 1988. He was appointed general manager of the Nanjing Branch of the Bank of China in 1987, vice president of the Fuzhou Branch of the Bank of China in 1988, and president of the Fuzhou Branch of the Bank of China in 1992. He became vice governor of Fujian province in 1993, six years after joining the CCP.30 However, there are also cadres who need to spend much more time, measured by either age, or CCP seniority, or both, than these novi homines on reaching the inner circle of power in the PRC. For example, Mr. Liu Mingjiu, born in 1919, joined the CCP in 1934. He was secretary of the CCP district committee in Fanxian county in Henan Province between 1936 and 1939, deputy chief of the Transport Division under the CCP Hebei-Shangdong-Henan District Committee between 1940 and 1948, deputy director of the Labor Bureau and deputy director of the Civil Affairs Bureau under Pingyuan Province Government between 1948 and 1952. Mr. Liu then served from 1952 to 1964 as CCP secretary and manager of Non-Ferrous Metals Industrial Machinery Installation Cooperation under the Ministry of Heavy Industry; manager of Machinery Instal114

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lation Cooperation under the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, CCP secretary and manager of Zhengzhou Aluminium Cooperation, CCP secretary of Building Research Institute under the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry. He was deputy director of the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping, chief of the First Office and member of the CCP Central Committee for Discipline between 1978 and 1987. Mr. Liu was appointed vice minister of Supervision in 1987, 43 years after he joined the CCP.31 As another example, Ms. Li Shuzheng, born in 1929, joined the CCP in 1945. She served as CCP secretary of the Shanghai Democratic Middle School for Women between 1947 and 1948, member of the District Committee of Middle Schools for Women of the CCP Shanghai Student Work Committee between 1948 and 1949, deputy secretary of the New Democratic Youth League Committee in Shanghai in 1950. She went to the Soviet Union to study at Youth League School of the USSR Communist Youth League Central Committee in 1951 and returned to China in 1952. She then worked as section chief of the International Department of the New Democratic Youth League Central Committee between 1952 and 1957, deputy head of the International Department of the Communist Youth League of China (CYLC) Central Committee, from 1961 to 1964, member of the Standing Committee, alternative member of the Secretariat and head of the Department of Children of the Nineteenth CYLC Central Committee from 1964 to 1966, deputy bureau director and bureau director of the International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee from 1973 to 1981, member of the Standing Committee and of the Secretariat of the Fourth Council of the All-China Women’s Federation from 1978 to 1981. She was then appointed as deputy head of the International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee. Ms. Li became head of the International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee in 1993.32 Clearly, there are variations in the speed with which cadres have climbed the political hierarchy in the reform period. There can be many reasons for the variations. What has attracted my attention here is the institutional sources of the variations. More specifically, do government officials and the CCP cadres differ in promotion speed? If yes, to what extent can the difference be attributed to the institutional distinction between the government system and the CCP hierarchy in China? In other words, how can the difference be modeled from an institutional perspective? I start with the findings reported in the previous two chapters that the CCP stresses political credentials in recruitment and promotion. It is a political organization and as such it does not emphasize specialized human capital as much as the government system. Since all candidates in the CCP are CCP members, they can be differentiated from one another mainly on the basis of political loyalty. Yet CCP seniority by nature is a general 115

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human capital – its acquisition does not require special training or skills. Hence, there are many people with high CCP seniority in China, which serves to crowd candidates with political capital in the list for promotion in the CCP. There should emerge a general devaluation of political capital due to an abundance of supply relative to demand. Crowding thus reduces opportunities for fast promotion over time in the CCP hierarchy. In comparison, candidates for promotions in the government system are different from their counterparts in the CCP because of their expertise or professional experience. For example, the minister of Coal is usually a person with a degree in mining and a professional title as senior engineer. Everything being equal, a cadre with a degree in textile or foreign trade must be less likely than a cadre with a degree in mining to head the Ministry of Coal. Many government posts require specialized human capital, which reduces the “crowding” effects and hence competition for promotion, leading to a relatively fast rate of career progression among government officials. Also, the government requires candidates with both political loyalty and technical competence. Such candidates by nature should experience faster promotion speeds than candidates for the CCP posts because the supply of the former is much more limited than that of the latter. The market value of the former should be higher than that of the latter. Additionally, candidates for government posts should have more human capital than those for the CCP posts because the former are not only politically reliable but also technically competent. Accordingly, it can be argued that the former should have a faster rate of mobility than the latter. Of course, it is not true that all candidates for the CCP posts are not college educated. Nevertheless, as Chapter 5 shows, education levels are higher among government officials than those among the CCP cadres, which should ensure the former command a higher promotion speed than the latter. This is because educational attainment is closely associated with promotion. Promotion in turn is intrinsically related to promotion speed – frequent promotion incidences increase the overall rate of mobility. In a comparative perspective, in the former Soviet Union, individuals with higher education (17.52 years, standard deviation 8.8 years) spent 2.5 years less than those without higher education (19.83 years, standard deviation 9.6 years) in becoming a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Co-opted elites or lateral entrants (i.e. individuals with working experience in a profession for at least seven years before entering the elite) reached the Central Committee in 13.35 years (standard deviation 7.5 years) on average, compared to 21.62 years (standard deviation 8.2 years) for recruited elites (i.e. individuals without such experience).33 Last but not least, as already noted in Chapter 5, the change in institutional goals has been more pronounced in regard to the government 116

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domain than in the political arena. The CCP organizations have not been subject to the same pressures for change as has the government system because of the insistence of the Four Cardinal Principles. Institutional inertia in the CCP hierarchy and institutional dynamism in the government system should create a dynamic labor market for candidates for government positions and a relatively stable one for candidates for CCP posts. The momentum for the government to undergo a thorough overhaul of the existing rank-and-file is stronger than that for the CCP. Hence the change in institutional goals should give the government great incentives to replace existing revolutionary mobilizers with younger and better-educated bureaucrats, which should create a rapid personnel turnover and thus faster promotion speed for candidates for government positions. In contrast, institutional inertia in the CCP hierarchy should translate itself into the relative stability of its recruitment practices. The CCP also likes to recruit candidates with both political loyalty and technical expertise. But it does not need a totally new personnel policy to accomplish its missions. The bureaucratic labor market in the government system is relatively “newer” and more dynamic than that in the CCP. Mobility rates are always slower in an established market than in a new dynamic one. Proposition 7.1: The variations in personnel requirements and institutional goals between the CCP hierarchy and the government system in China lead to two different promotion ladders, with the one in the former having wider rungs than that in the latter. I derive two hypotheses from Proposition 7.1 regarding mobility rates and institutional distinction: Hypothesis 7.1: University education increases the rate of mobility in general and in the government system in particular. Hypothesis 7.2: Government officials enjoy a higher speed of mobility than CCP cadres. Unlike the previous three chapters, I do not investigate the differential effect of the CCP seniority in the CCP hierarchy and the government system because of my definition of promotion speed which is discussed below.

Measuring promotion speed in the Chinese political hierarchy The dependent variable in the following analyses is the rate of mobility, which is defined as the speed with which individuals climb the political 117

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hierarchy. Yet there are a number of ways to measure promotion speed. For example, Gil Eyal and Eleanor Townsley propose that the year that a respondent was first advanced to a nomenklatura position can be operationalized as the year he or she first advanced to an authority position in the elite.34 Alternatively, Kenneth Farmer suggests that a useful indicator of the speed of mobility can be the length of the “wait” between the individual’s first acceptance of a party or government political post and the individual’s first election to the Central Committee.35 The merit of this approach is the coincidence of the baseline for calculating the speed of promotion (i.e. a race course) and that of a political hierarchy. However, the Chinese nomenklatura is more complicated than the prototype of the political bureaucracy in state socialism. In China, teachers and many others that are not considered as candidates for political positions are also included in the list of nomenklatura. A different approach is to use the beginning date of party membership as the baseline. Bohdan Harasymiw points out in his study of leadership selection in the Soviet Union that elite recruitment is a multi-staged process, the recruit at each of the stages is given a distinct designation suggestive of his or her differing degrees of involvement in politics. At the first stage, initial recruitment, a pool of eligibles is drawn from the adult population. Out of these eligibles, in turn, are drawn the activists, who have a part-time involvement in politics. Full-time politicians, members of the political elite, are selected from among activists. Initial recruitment into political elites can be taken to mean the induction of members of the labor force into the probationary state of a candidate member of a communist party.36 In China, entry into the CCP certainly represents the first concrete step toward political mobility, although party membership does not necessarily guarantee an earlier promotion or a better apartment. CCP membership is useful and often mandatory in a wide range of upper-level political careers. Party members who demonstrate effectiveness and loyalty in subordinate positions in the bureaucratic apparatus or as members of various committees may be identified by local leaders as desirable candidates for future appointment to high positions.37 Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to equate the date of party entry with the rate of mobility. Some of the political elite joined the CCP at a rather late stage in their lives because they are college-educated and as such were not favored politically in Mao’s China. Few would consider a vice minister with two years of CCP seniority a fast runner when he or she reached his or her office at the age of 60, just as few would consider an associate professor in a fast track who received a doctorate degree at the age of 59 and was awarded his or her title the year after. Biological age must be included in the definition of promotion speed. In fact, the three studies of the Chinese political elite mentioned above 118

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all use both biological age and position attainment in defining the speed of promotion. However, such an approach suffers a potentially fatal defect since it assumes erroneously that individuals begin race toward the summit of the political hierarchy since their births. One’s political career does not start when he or she is born. Political life and biological life are two different concepts in state socialism. A citizen becomes a “political man/woman” when he or she enters the CCP. I thus propose that both biological age and CCP seniority are included in the definition of promotion speed: 1 Formula 7.1: The Rate of Mobility ⫽ ᎏᎏᎏ Age ⫹ CCP Seniority This definition of promotion speed excludes age and CCP seniority from the list of the independent variables used in the following regression analyses. I thus focus on the impact of educational credentials on the rates of mobility in the government system and the CCP hierarchy respectively. To accomplish this task, I compare interaction terms using interactions between the independent variables and the four educational credential measures. This is necessary to attempts to test the two hypotheses put forward in this chapter. I thus develop four interaction variables: 1 2 3 4

government ⫻ a BA degree from an ordinary university; government ⫻ a BA degree from a key university; government ⫻ a BA degree in engineering/management science from an ordinary university; government ⫻ a BA degree in engineering/management science from a key university.

Additionally, I create a dummy variable with government officials coded as 1 and CCP cadres as 0. This variable, together with the above four interaction variables, are important for me to test the two hypotheses on the institutional effects on promotion speed in China.

Age, CCP seniority, and position attainment I first study age, CCP seniority, and position attainment in the government system and the CCP hierarchy respectively, an important step to understand the relationship between the rate of mobility and institutional distinction. If government officials command a higher rate of promotion than the CCP cadres as hypothesized above, there should be differences in age, or seniority, or both between these two groups of leaders. A null hypothesis derived from this hypothesis is that government officials and CCP 119

DUALISM AND MOBILITY RATES

cadres have a similar mean age. To test the null hypothesis, I choose T-value Test, a procedure that is both simple and appropriate. Table 7.5 shows that in 1988, the mean age difference is 1.2 between the government officials and CCP cadres. The T-value is –2.48, with a two-tailed probability of 0.013, so that there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the government officials and CCP cadres had a similar mean age in 1988. Similarly, on average, government officials become a vice minister or deputy governor at the age of 55.2, whereas party cadres reach a similar position in the CCP hierarchy at the age of 56.3. The T-value is ⫺2.28, with a two-tailed probability of 0.023, so that there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that these two groups of leaders had a similar mean age in 1988. However, the mean age of the government ministers and provincial governors in 1988 was 60.2, as compared with 61 of the CCP ministers and CCP provincial secretaries. The T-value is ⫺0.63, with a two-tailed probability of 0.529. There is no sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that these two groups of leaders had a similar mean age in 1988 Table 7.5 shows that the patterns of the distribution of age did not change significantly in 1994. The mean age difference is 1.1 between these two groups of cadres. The T-value is ⫺8.000, with a two-tailed probability of 0.015, so that there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the government officials and CCP cadres had a similar mean age in 1994. There is also ample evidence that the CCP vice ministers/deputy provincial secretaries are older than government vice ministers and provincial deputy governors. The age difference between the CCP ministers/provincial secretaries and government ministers/provincial governors becomes statistically significant in 1994, with a two-tailed probability of 0.030. There is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that these two groups of leaders had a similar mean age. Next, I propose a null hypothesis that government officials and CCP cadres have a similar mean CCP seniority. Rejection of the null hypothesis will allow me to proceed with my analysis of institutional effects on mobility rates. Table 7.6 shows that in 1988, on average, the CCP cadres have a higher CCP seniority than the government officials. The mean difference in CCP seniority between the government officials and CCP cadres is 4.4 years. The T-value however is ⫺5.08, with a two-tailed probability of 0.000. The CCP vice ministers/deputy provincial secretaries also command higher CCP seniority than government vice ministers and provincial deputy governors. With a T-value of ⫺5.5, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that these two groups of leaders had a similar mean CCP seniority. However, as can be seen from Table 7.6, there was barely any difference in the length of CCP seniority between the CCP ministers/ 120

56.3 (6.0) 60.2 (7.8) 55.2 (4.9)

Government

1988

57.5 (7.0) 61.0 (7.7) 56.3 (6.4)

CCP ⫺2.48* ⫺0.63 ⫺2.28*

T-value

32.6 (12.2) 40.4 (10.2) 30.5 (11.8)

Government

1988

Notes * P ⬍ 0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

All officials Minister level officials Vice minister level officials

Position

37.0 (8.8) 40.5 (9.1) 35.8 (8.3)

CCP

29.7 (12.4) 37.8 (11.2) 27.8 (11.9)

⫺5.08* ⫺0.11 ⫺5.5*

1994

56.6 (5.7) 60.7 (5.7) 55.6 (5.3)

Government

Government

■

■

1994

T-value

Table 7.6 Mean CCP seniority and position attainment, 1988 and 1994

Notes * P ⬍ 0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

All officials Minister level officials Vice minister level officials

Position

Table 7.5 Mean age and position attainment, 1988 and 1994

36.5 (9.8) 42.9 (8.6) 33.8 (9.0)

CCP

58.7 (6.3) 62.7 (6.4) 57.1 (5.5)

CCP

⫺8.13* ⫺3.48* ⫺6.50*

T-value

⫺4.90* ⫺2.18* ⫺3.20*

T-value

DUALISM AND MOBILITY RATES

provincial secretaries and government ministers/provincial governors in 1988. The T-value is only ⫺0.11, with a two-tailed probability of 0.910. Nevertheless, by 1994, there was significant difference in the length of CCP seniority between the CCP ministers/provincial secretaries and government ministers/provincial governors. The T-value is ⫺3.48, with a two-tailed probability of 0.001, so that there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that these two groups of leaders had a similar CCP seniority in 1994. The difference in CCP seniority between the CCP vice ministers/deputy provincial secretaries and government vice ministers/deputy provincial governors is also statistically significant, with a two-tailed probability of 0.000. Finally, the CCP cadres as a whole also have a higher CCP seniority than the government officials in 1994. Age and CCP seniority are the two important components in my definition of promotion speed. Since they are the two denominators in Formula 7.1, there is a negative relationship between them on the one hand and the rate of mobility on the other. That is, the higher the age or CCP seniority, the lower the promotion speed. Although the differences in age and CCP seniority between CCP ministers/provincial secretaries and government ministers/provincial governors in 1988 were not statistically significant, overall the findings reported in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 suggest that it takes a longer time both in terms of age and CCP seniority to reach a leadership position in the CCP hierarchy than a comparable one in the government system. In other words, it is highly likely that the government officials enjoy a faster rate of promotion than the CCP cadres, tentatively supporting Hypothesis 7.2.

Institutional effects on mobility rates In this section I conduct OLS regression analysis to further test the two hypotheses proposed above. Table 7.7 shows that a college degree, regardless whether it is in the arts, the social sciences, or technical fields, can significantly increase the rate of mobility, partially supporting Hypothesis 7.1. These findings make good sense since educational attainment has been a key criterion in leadership selection in the reform period. More importantly, Table 7.7 shows that government officials indeed enjoy a higher speed of mobility than CCP cadres. The standardized coefficients for Government officials are both substantial and statistically significant, confirming Hypothesis 7.2. The standardized coefficients of factors of promotion speeds in 1994 are not substantially different from those in 1988. This finding is significant indeed because the age and CCP seniority profiles of the two elites differ greatly (Tables 7.5 and 7.6). Moreover, as Chapter 5 shows, these two groups of leaders also differ in terms of educational attainment. It seems that there 122

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Table 7.7 OLS regression coefficients for factors of mobility rates 1988 and 1994 Variables

The 1988 elite

The 1994 elite

Women Minority ethnicity Arts, key university Arts, ordinary university Technical major, key university Technical major, ordinary university Government officials

⫺0.081 (⫺2.320)* ⫺0.156 (⫺4.443)** 0.149 (3.995)** 0.082 (2.173)*

⫺0.113 (⫺3.539)** ⫺0.102 (⫺3.173)** 0.249 (6.396)** 0.153 (4.062)**

0.181 (4.811)**

0.112 (2.796)*

0.295 (7.364)** 0.111 (3.114)**

0.323 (7.969)** 0.195 (6.034)**

R2 F-Statistics

0.13 15.178**

No. of cases

0.16 22.272**

740

848

Notes * P ⬍ 0.05; **P ⬍ 0.005. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.

is a pattern of institutional effects on mobility rates in the reform period. This pattern, in combination with those reported in Chapters 5 and 6, strongly suggests the relevance of institutional distinction for elite recruitment in China. I then use the four interaction variables to further examine the institutional effects on mobility rates. Table 7.8 shows that in 1988, government officials with college degrees in the arts or social sciences had a higher mobility rate than the CCP cadres with similar educational experience. The difference is statistically significant. However, a technical degree, regardless whether it was from a key or ordinary university, had no major impacts on the rate of promotion. In 1994, a college degree, regardless whether it was in the arts, the social sciences, or technical fields, could increase the rate of mobility better in the government system than in the CCP hierarchy. The variance explained for the 1994 elite is much greater than that for the 1988 elite (0.16 vs. 0.13), indicating the increasing importance of educational credentials in elite recruitment, a conclusion that is consistent with the findings reported in Chapters 5 and 6. The coefficients of the four interaction variables are both substantial and statistically significant. Of course, the impact of a technical degree from a key university is greater than other kinds of educational credentials. Government officials indeed enjoy a higher speed of mobility than CCP cadres. These findings support Hypotheses 7.1 and 7.2 strongly.38

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Table 7.8 Institutional effects on mobility rates, 1988 and 1994 Variables

The 1988 elite

The 1994 elite

Women ⫺0.077 (⫺2.213)** Minority ethnicity ⫺0.155 (⫺4.392)*** Arts, key university 0.043 (0.806) Arts, ordinary university 0.035 (0.623) Technical major, key university 0.168 (2.471)** Technical major, ordinary university 0.263 (3.294)** Government X Arts, key university 0.144 (2.772)*** Government X Arts, ordinary university 0.068 (1.274) Government X Technical major, key university 0.032 (0.486) Government X Technical major, ordinary university 0.066 (0.849)

⫺0.106 (⫺3.337)*** ⫺0.103 (⫺3.200)*** 0.092 (1.654)* 0.070 (1.434)

R2 F-Statistics

0.16 15.968***

No. of cases

0.13 10.649*** 740

0.052 (0.910) 0.219 (3.578)*** 0.237 (4.649)*** 0.133 (2.981)*** 0.107 (2.073)** 0.172 (3.064)***

848

Notes * P ⬍ 0.1; ** P ⬍ 0.05; ***P ⬍ 0.005. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.

Summary In this chapter I investigate the institutional effects on mobility rates among the Chinese political elite. I argue that the definition of mobility rates must include both age and CCP seniority. I then focus on institutionalized advantage the government officials enjoy over the CCP cadres in the mobility regime, which refers to the existence in a political system of formal arrangements that gives one group (or category) of individuals disproportional potential for achieving or maintaining a higher political position.39 I argue that the desire for rapid economic growth and better governance and the demand for upholding the CCP’s leadership have created a relatively dynamic labor market in the government system and a relatively lethargic one in the CCP hierarchy. These two labor markets require candidates with different characteristics and hence produce two different ladders. I then show that university education increases the rate of mobility in general and in the government system in particular. However, it is important to notice that both credentials in technical fields and degrees in the arts or social sciences increase the rate of mobility. This is because the coopta-

124

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tion process in the reform era has inducted some intellectuals, many of whom were educated in the humanities and social sciences, into the political elite. They command similar mobility rates as those with degrees in the technical fields. Cooptation does not discriminate against a history professor in favor of a computer science professor. I will discuss the cooptation process in detail in Chapter 9. Finally, I show that government officials enjoy a higher speed of mobility than CCP cadres. These findings are consistent with those reported in Chapters 5 and 6, clearly indicating a consistent pattern of institutional effects on leadership selection in the reform period.

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8 DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

In this chapter, I focus on the distribution of career backgrounds among the Chinese political elite in general and the different career structures between government officials and CCP cadres in particular. My focus is motivated by the findings from the previous chapters about the different educational attainments between these two groups of leaders. I reason that the differences in educational credentials may have led the two groups to concentrate on different occupations in their career histories. After all, occupational attainment and therefore careers are determined to a large extent by educational attainment.1 In the following, I first define what I mean by career and explain briefly how career experience influences labor market outcomes in general and those in bureaucratic labor markets in particular. I then review the existing studies of elite careers in state socialism, using the review as the baseline for a deliberation on the linkage between institutional arrangements and the careers of the Chinese leaders. I show that bureaucratic labor markets are internal labor markets in which candidates are likely to be recruited from within their systems. More specifically, the government and the CCP exhibit a salient tendency to recruit individuals with administrative or party work experience respectively. Like those reported in the previous three chapters, the findings from this chapter suggest the relevance of elite dualism for research on leadership selection in the reform era.

Career experience and status attainment A career is defined as a sequence of jobs in a person’s working life. Much of the research on social mobility has focused on intergenerational mobility, investigating the extent to which social inequality is reproduced across generations. While this line of research continues to be very important, scholars have shown increasing interest in intra-generational mobility and work history since the 1970s.2 This is because the use of the term “career” has overtones of some sort of progress or at least coherence to the jobs a person holds over his or her career. Scholars seeking to outline career 126

DUALISM AND MOBILITY RATES

structures usually look for distinctive patterns in career histories.3 In some instances, status attainment is largely considered as the result of a series of career moves.4 If this is the case, then it becomes necessary to gauge whether occupational demography that affects access to the avenues of attainment requires modeling career moves both within and between organizations.5 There is a need to trace the wage profiles of those with different patterns of career typicality and the impacts of career movements on labor market outcomes such as earnings.6 In a career with multiple assignments, new mixtures of skills and experience levels are likely to arise. Along the lines of such mixtures, hirings can be viewed in terms of a mixture of career streams or individuals located at various points in their career life cycles.7 Experience and seniority influence labor market outcomes. An employee’s particular route to his or her present position may also be related to further advancement. Past careers may also be negatively associated with future promotion. For example, managers sometimes view certain types of experience as disqualifying an employee for further advancement.8 Careers are not simply a subject of research on the general labor markets. In fact, they are also an important variable in elite studies. Their influence in leadership selection in state socialism is rather substantial. Some scholars maintain that in the Soviet Union, previous experience as an official in a state agency was a great advantage, and sometimes a prerequisite, for access to top jobs in the government.9 Others argue that in terms of recruitment to the nomenklatura, the Gorbachev leadership had to work within the boundaries of the qualifications, education, experience and institutional background of the recruits.10 Many China experts also call for special attention to careers in studying elite mobility. Franklin Houn studies the career backgrounds of the CCP’s Eighteen Central Committee and concludes that those who had control over the armed forces and party organizations had the easiest access to the CCP’s top leadership. This is because military rebellion and mass manipulation were the main forms of the struggle the CCP waged since the late 1920s, and specialists in these arts had advantageous positions. While specialists in persuasion and other activities were not excluded from elite recruitment, they were of secondary importance in the CCP leadership.11 A. Boak Barnett reports that ambitious party cadres tended to move into “party work” and other organizational activity. These fields seemed to offer the greatest opportunities for enhancing one’s power and authority in Mao’s China.12 As another example, in his study of factional politics in the CCP, Jing Huang singles out Liu Shaoqi and Gao Gang for detailed study because of their prominent civilian backgrounds and similar paths to power. Huang also points out that Deng Xiaoping’s comeback in 1974 was surprising but logical: he was the only one who had both Mao’s trust and, more 127

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

importantly, access to both the army and civilian systems due to his long military career and rich administrative experience.13 Carol Lee Hamrin similarly argues that in the reform era, politicking must be done without blatantly violating the rules of collective leadership and informal requirements that leaders should have some relevant functional experience and expertise.14 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg claim that data on individual careers can illuminate, among other things, whether the leaders at the top are a rather similar group in terms of their individual characteristics and personal attributes thus explaining the rise of officials to be among the top leaders.15 For example, a group of leaders rising from the oil industry formed a powerful “petroleum faction” in the CCP leadership in the 1970s and early 1980s, which clearly shows that similar career paths are a key criterion for factional alignments and the institutions are bases for factional activities.16 Career experiences are indeed an important dimension of political leadership and elite recruitment.

Career histories in state socialism Existing studies of state socialism indicate infrequent job mobility between bureaucracies. J. W. Cleary points out that in the Kazakhstan republic under the Soviet Union, exchange of personnel between the Communist Party apparatus and government ministries in charge of technical areas was rather uncommon. The typical minister, especially the one in industry, had worked his way up within one ministry. Such closed careers characterized the ministers in charge of highly technical areas: construction, non-ferrous metallurgy, and installation and special construction works. The ministers of finance, geology, and rural construction could also be included in the closed specialist professions.17 Kenneth C. Farmer also argues that party secretaries in agitation and propaganda worked in Ukraine under the Soviet Union tended to remain in that field throughout their careers.18 David Lane and Cameron Ross claim that their study of the Soviet leadership reveals the very different career paths of members of the party and state elites and important variations in the social composition of different sectors of the elites. The vast majority of Soviet officials had a lifetime of service in either the party or the state, and there was very little lateral transfer of personnel from one system to the other. The composition of government ministries shows that between 1984 and 1991, 56 percent (i.e. 119 out of 212 ministers) did not participate in the party executive committee, and a further 15 percent of the Soviet ministers had just a few years of service in the party apparatus. Lane and Rose thus generalize that the Soviet elite was of a polyarchic type: it was a segmented power elite with a closed form of recruitment.19 128

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

Paul Lewis similarly claims that in Poland, provincial party secretaries showed great specialization in terms of political work in the party apparatus and few had switched over to party work from an industrial or agricultural career. For example, in 1980, nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of the party secretaries received their first apparatus posting over 15 years earlier and each had spent, on average, 15 years working in the party apparatus. The number of those with significant production experience in industry or agriculture stood at exactly a quarter.20 Job immobility across bureaucratic systems appears to repeat itself in China as well. David Lampton maintains in his study of the Chinese bureaucracy that careers generally occur within single systems.21 It is reported that an officer or cadre in China is rarely transferred out of the army or system where he began his career.22 For example, in his study of the provincial leadership in Fujian between 1949 and 1966, Victor Falkenheim finds that 80 percent of the top leaders who remained in Fujian after 1954 were promoted within the system in which they had previously served. The number of intersystem transfers seems to be remarkably small.23 Restrictions on data have prevented scholars from investigating the career patterns of the political elite in Mao’s China. Greater data availability in the reform era has made it possible for scholars to examine the career histories of the Chinese political elite. Using biographical data on 247 mayors in 1986, Cheng Li and David Bachman present perhaps the first empirical study of career histories of cadres in the reform era. The mayors’ main career patterns are determined by the length and frequency of their work experience. Five major kinds of career patterns – administration, party, expert, office/personal secretary and youth league – emerge from their data. “Expert” refers to career patterns of those who worked more in a technical field than in administration. Li and Bachman point out that: 1 2

3 4

over 80 percent of the mayors had administrative experience; most mayors (over 80 percent) worked in industrial fields – 37 percent had been bureau directors; 46 percent, factory directors; and 47 percent, engineers; only a small number of the mayors had experience in party organizational and ideological work; few had military experience.24

David Bachman also puts forward a separate argument that current Chinese leaders are in some ways products of the bureaucratic system and not its creators or builders. They have limited horizontal contacts or breath of experience and have spent most of their careers in one bureaucracy and functional area. They have few contacts with the military, and those who do usually lack important connections with the CCP 129

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

organization, the state structure, or the economy. Arguably, their career experience is much more specialized (usually in only one important functional area) than that of their predecessors, and they are more experts than generalists. Almost all of them have backgrounds in economic affairs with limited skills or experience in other fields. All are fairly technocratic in orientation.25 Shi Chen shows that the municipal leaders in Shanghai serving the terms: that ran from January 1977 to April 1983 came from all major work areas in China. The relatively dominant units were the functional positions in party committees and government – approximately one-quarter of the leaders came from this area. Notably, there were still four leaders in this cohort that came from the military and party-mass organizations, the two areas that had predominated the provincial leadership during the Cultural Revolution. The composition of the 23 top municipal officials who served between March 1983 and April 1991 was different. More than half were from industry and communication units. Only two came from top positions in the party and government apparatus, and none from either the military and party-mass organizations or the political and legal system. Chen argues that the change in career backgrounds of municipal party and administrative leaders partly evidences the transfer of power from rehabilitated revolutionary veterans to a new elite, namely, party technocrats.26 Table 8.1 Main career patterns, the 1988 provincial elite Main career patterns Party work Government administration Industry Engineering Economic bureau Finance Culture/education Public health Mass organization Police Total

N

%

90 33 54 24 16 9 38 4 3 3

32.9 12.0 19.7 8.8 5.8 3.3 13.9 1.5 1.1 1.1

274

100.1

Source: adapted from Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 31/6 (1991), p. 520.

130

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

I study the careers of China’s provincial elite in 1988. Following Li and Bachman, I first use the length and frequency of work experience to determine the main career patterns of the political leaders. I show that former party workers and government administrators combined made up 44.9 percent of the 1988 provincial leadership; former engineers, industry bureau directors, and factory managers, 28.5 percent; and former culture workers (researchers, educators, newspaper editors, and the like), 13.9 percent. The fourth largest component of the 1988 provincial elite was former economic bureau directors and financial planners (Table 8.1). I also examine the “breadth” of career experiences among the 1988 provincial elite. Cadres identified in a single system have one unit credited to that system; if identified in two systems, one unit is credited to each system, and so on. I report that over 70 percent of the 1988 provincial leaders were engaged in party work before assuming their current posts; 50 percent had government administration experience; about 40 percent worked in an economic bureau or financial agency; and 31.8 percent had experience in industrial bureau or factories (Table 8.2).27 My study of the officials in the central government in the late 1980s (Table 8.3) shows that 5 percent of them came to the State Council through the CCP channel, more than 40 percent were promoted within the government system, 8 percent had engaged in economic work such as finance and industrial management, and less than 16 percent had experiences in engineering. Finally, a significant number of the State Council officials had experiences in either the education/research apparatus or culture field.28 I also study the main career patterns of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Central Committees of the CCP (Table 8.4). I show that 49.3 percent of the Fourteenth Central Committee and 48.7 percent of the Fifteenth Table 8.2 Types of previous work experience, the 1988 provincial elite Main career patterns

N

% of total (n ⫽ 274)

Party work Government administration Economic bureau/finance Industry bureau/factory Engineering Culture/education Mass organization Military/police Public health Agriculture

193 138 109 87 56 51 38 13 4 3

70.4 50.4 39.8 31.8 20.4 18.6 13.9 4.8 1.5 1.1

Source: Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 31/6 (1991), p. 520.

131

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

Central Committee had working experience in engineering, finance, and industry; 27 percent of the Fourteenth Central Committee and 20.8 percent of the Fifteenth Central Committee worked in the government and the party organization; and 23.3 percent of the Fourteenth Central Committee and 17.1 percent of the Fifteenth Central Committee were PLA generals.29 Table 8.3 Main career patterns, the 1988 state council Main career patterns

N

%

Party system Government system Office work Economic bureau Finance Industry bureau Military/police Education/research Public health/culture Engineering

15 123 4 14 8 2 26 30 31 46

5.0 40.7 1.3 4.6 2.7 0.7 8.6 9.9 11.3 15.2

Total

302

100.0

Source: adapted from Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in Post-Mao China,” Studies in Comparative Communism 24/1 (1991b), p. 121.

Table 8.4 Main career patterns, the fourteenth and the fifteenth central committees Main Career

The fourteenth central committee n

Engineering Finance Industrial bureau/firm Research/university Law/police Mass media/culture/sports Mass organs Government Party Party and government PLA Missing cases Total

%

■

The fifteenth central committee n

%

31 9 30 11 4 4 1 4 26 21 44 4

16.4 4.8 15.9 5.8 2.1 2.1 0.5 2.1 13.8 11.1 23.3 2.1

34 6 39 15 2 3 3 3 15 22 33 18

17.6 3.1 20.2 7.8 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 7.8 11.4 17.1 9.3

189

100.0

193

100.1

Source: adapted from Xiaowei Zang, “The Consolidation of Political Technocracy in China,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 15/3 (1999), p. 109.

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The above studies have provided a rich source of career patterns of the political elite in the PRC. Yet the sampled populations in these studies are different and thus cannot provide a common baseline for comparison. Most of the studies focus on career patterns of government officials only. My study of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Central Committees of the CCP does not reveal the orthodox careers of the cadres in the CCP hierarchy either. This is because each of the Central Committees included a substantial number of government officials, leading cadres in giant state enterprises, and representatives from the military.30 What do career backgrounds of the CCP cadres look like? Do they differ from those of government officials?

Internal labor markets and career experiences I return to elite dualism to answer these two questions. Existing studies have already shown that in some types of work, job ladder boundaries may represent substantial differences in skill requirement. These differences may be reinforced by educational or licensing requirements.31 Individuals’ job-relevant resources and constraints interact with structural characteristics to create careers.32 Proposition 8.1: The distinction between the CCP and the government should be an important variable in estimating the probabilities of the distribution of careers among the Chinese political elite. Proposition 8.1 is based on the suggestion put forward in Chapter 6 that the career structure in the Chinese political hierarchy resembles internal labor markets in American and Japanese large firms.33 An important feature of internal labor markets is their emphasis on firm-specific skills and on-the-job training, which discourages job-hopping, promotes employees’ loyalty towards the firm, and enhances skill accumulation and utilization. Also, a large corporation may have several internal labor markets because each of its constituents pursues a distinctive organizational mission. For example, there may be one internal labor market in its finance sector, one in its manufacturing sector, one in its R and D sector, etc. Each of the internal labor markets is mandated to develop its own criteria for recruitment and promotion, a tendency that is reinforced by the emphasis on firm-specific skills and on-the-job training. I liken the differences between the government and the CCP to those among departments of a firm. Government jobs handle specialized tasks. The technical nature of government jobs demands specialization. Government officials need to accumulate firm-specific skills and on-the-job training experience, which in turn may decrease the likelihood that they be transferred to different occupations since they are valued employees of the government system. Recruitment on the basis of rational considerations 133

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

would dictate the government system to recruit people with administrative experience. Similarly, the CCP is likely to select cadres with predominantly party work experience because of the consideration on firm-specific skills and on-the-job training experience in leadership recruitment. The probability for the CCP and the government to select individuals with different background experiences is further enhanced by the fact that the CCP cadres and government officials differ greatly in terms of CCP seniority and educational credentials (Chapter 5). This can be discussed from two aspects. First, educational credentials are usually related to career patterns. A university graduate is more likely than a person without university education to become a professional. An engineering graduate is more likely than a philosophy graduate to become an engineer. Government officials are better educated than CCP cadres. The percentage of government officials with degrees in technical fields is also higher than that of CCP cadres. Thus, it is likely that candidates for positions in the government system and those for the posts in the CCP hierarchy may have different career paths and work experiences. Second, the desire for social certainty usually leads decision makers to prefer working with individuals of similar socioeconomic characteristics. The “similar-to-me” effect may be based on perceived similarity, on actual similarity, or on both. The demographic composition of an organization in terms of age, gender or ethnicity influences many behavior-based events,34 including those of recruitment. CCP cadres may select people who are similar to them. So may government officials. Finally, Rosabeth M. Kanter argues that decision makers may see insiders as more similar to themselves than outsiders, and thus more preferable as candidates in recruitment.35 Gary Powell and D. Anthony Butterfield similarly claim that there may be legitimate reasons for choosing an applicant who has first-hand experience with an organization over applicants who are otherwise equally qualified. Familiarity with an organization may make the applicant better prepared to assume the responsibilities of the position.36 Hence, the CCP may want to recruit people with party work experience, whereas the government may want to select people with administrative work experience, resulting in the distribution of difference career backgrounds between government officials and CCP cadres. Hypothesis 8.1: The government system is more likely than the CCP hierarchy to recruit officials with administrative experience. Hypothesis 8.2: The CCP hierarchy is more likely than the government system to select cadres with party work experience. Of course, the government does not recruit all its leaders with administrative skills only. Nor does the CCP seek all candidates who have nothing 134

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

else other than party work experience. These two political systems also select individuals with working experience in areas other than administrative or party affairs. What kinds of candidates would they be interested in? It seems that likeness must be an important criterion guiding the selection of individuals with different careers in both the political systems. Likeness is measured by the extent to which one’s skills accumulated in one functional system can be transferred to another system. A sociologist specialising in social stratificaiton, for example, is less likely than an economist to be recruited by the World Bank as a consultant for a highway project in a developing country. The hiring decision is obviously based on the consideration of transferability of skills from one system to another. Transferability is determined by the nature of work. It can be argued that ideology work is more closely related to party work than to government work since propaganda is a main task of the CCP. In comparison, economic work or professional work is more closely associated with government work than with party work. Hypothesis 8.3: A candidate with ideology work experience is more likely to work in the CCP hierarchy than in the government system. Hypothesis 8.4: A candidate with economic work or professional work experience is more likely to work in the government system than in the CCP hierarchy. I develop several dependent variables to test these four hypotheses. As noted already, most China scholars focus on the main careers of the political elite, paying little attention to the rich variety of their career experiences. This is because they have recognized that the career patterns of Chinese political leaders are difficult to classify: cadres often shift from one position to another and sometimes hold several positions simultaneously. China experts have thus simply assumed that a cadre is mainly engaged in one type of work and define the career patterns of Chinese leaders according to the length and frequency of their worker experiences,37 an assumption that does not reflect reality accurately. This approach arbitrarily decides that each cadre can have only one main career for the sake of data analysis. I develop a coding procedure according to Rachel Rosenfeld’s approach that there are some ways of locating and describing employment structures within which careers take place: by tracing them inductively through observed job shifts, using observed shifts to estimate formal models of mobility and opportunity, or employing pre-existing typologies and gradings either directly or indirectly.38 This approach is consistent with my coding scheme for the 1988 provincial elite, in which cadres identified in a single system have one unit credited to that system; if identified in two 135

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systems, one unit is credited to each system, and so on. This approach captures the “broad” dimension of career backgrounds and can facilitate the empirical tests of my hypotheses put forward in this chapter better than other coding procedures. I provide two examples to illustrate my coding scheme. The first case is Mr. Wu Bangguo, currently vice premier of the PRC and a member of the CCP’s Politburo. Mr. Wu was born in 1941 and graduated from the Department of Radio and Electronics at Qinghua University in 1967. He served successively as engineer and director of Shanghai No. 3 Electronic Tube Factory from 1968 to 1980, deputy manager of Shanghai Electronic Industrial Company from 1980 to 1981, deputy manager of Shanghai Vacuum Apparatus Industrial Company from 1981 to 1982, deputy secretary of Shanghai Telecommunications Industrial Bureau Committee from 1982 to 1983, member of the Standing Committee of and secretary of Scientific and Technical Committee of the CCP Shanghai City Committee from 1983 to 1985. He was appointed deputy secretary of the CCP Shanghai City Committee in 1985.39 I code Mr. Wu as having three types of work experience: one for engineering, one for firm and finance, and one for party work. The second case is Ms. Wu Aiying. Ms. Wu was born in 1951 and graduated from the Department of Politics at Shandong University in 1973. She served as secretary of the CCP Committee of Gaoya and Chengguan People’s Communes in Changle County from 1974 to 1978; member of the Standing Committee, deputy secretary of the CCP Changle County Committee, and vice chairwoman of the Changle County Revolutionary Committee from 1975 to 1978; secretary of the CYLC Changwei Prefectral Committee between 1978 and 1982; deputy secretary of the CYLC Shandong Provincial Youth Federation between 1982 and 1989; vice chairwoman and chairwoman of the Shandong Provincial Women’s Federation between 1989 and 1993; president of the Shandong Branch, China College of Women Management Cadres between 1992 and 1993. Ms. Wu was appointed deputy governor of Shandong in 1993.40 I code her as having three kinds of work experiences, one for government work, one for party work, and one for mass organization work. I then develop a framework of the functional systems with which I record the career histories of the Chinese leaders. Such a framework is not a convenient methodological construct. Rather, it is an administrative reality in China. David Lampton points out that the broad contours (i.e. functional systems) have endured although details of the Chinese political structure have changed over time. Personal decisions, career paths and the like are all shaped by these functionally defined hierarchical systems.41 A. Doak Barnett is perhaps the first Western scholar to analyze functional systems in the Chinese political hierarchy. He identifies 11 functional systems: 136

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

organization and personnel; political and legal affairs; propaganda and education; united front work; agriculture and forestry; industry and communications; finance and trade; military affairs; foreign affairs; women’s work; youth work.42

Kenneth Lieberthal in contrast suggests six functionally defined clusters only, with each being assigned a distinctive set of tasks: 1 2 3 4 5 6

economic bureaucracies; propaganda and education bureaucracies; organization and personnel bureaucracies; civilian coercive bureaucracies; the military system; communist party territorial committees.

Lieberthal believes that the six clusters of bureaucracies identify the core organs that have nationwide hierarchies and that exercise strong executive power.43 Li Cheng and David Bachman seem to follow Barnett’s approach, devising 14 clusters: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

party; organization; propaganda; administration; economic planning; industry; bureau director; factory director; agriculture; cultural/education; office/personal secretary; military/police; youth league; engineer.44

I similarly adopt Barnett’s approach, creating the following ten categories to classify the work experiences of the 1988 provincial elite in China: 137

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

party work; government administration; economic bureau/finance; industry bureau/factory; engineering; cultural/education; mass organization; military/police; public health; agriculture.45

I use four major categories of careers in my study of the State Council officials in 1988: 1 2 3 4

party/administration work, which is subdivided into party system, government system, and office work; economic work, which is subdivided into economic bureau, finance, and industry bureau; military/police, which is subdivided into military and police; professional work, which is subdivided into education/research, public health, culture, and engineering.46

In other words, there are 12 categories altogether. My study of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Central Committees of the CCP adopts the following categories: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

engineering; finance; industrial bureau/firm; research for academic pursuit; research for party or government; law/police; mass media/culture/sports; mass organizations; government; the CCP; party and government; PLA (military); PLA (politics).47

Clearly, most of the existing studies have relied on a wide range approach, which include many functional systems in their coding procedures. This is probably because they have been mainly interested in the distribution of the main careers among the political elites in China. Such an 138

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approach allows a detailed description of career backgrounds. Yet, as mentioned above, it arbitrarily decides that each cadre has only one career, which does not reflect the reality accurately. Equally important, the very wide range it adopts compromises the feasibility of statistical analysis. Especially worrisome is the difficulty to map patterns from the wide range of classification. A narrow range of systems presents simplicity with which a researcher can manipulate data on careers statistically and report trends with relative ease. My research interest in this chapter requires a “narrow” classification scheme. Of course one cannot adopt a “narrow” classification scheme on the basis of opportunistic considerations for statistical manipulation. Fundamentally, one cannot force a wide range of occupational experiences into a few clusters. Yet the “narrow” classification scheme apparently matches the reality better than the “broad” classification scheme, thanks to the career histories of the current political elite. As David Bachman points out, current Chinese leaders have stayed in a department and had narrow career paths: new generation leaders have narrower career paths and fewer horizontal contacts, and have risen to the top of the Party-state system more slowly than the revolutionary generation. They will be significantly less autonomous political leaders than their predecessors, and the imprint of organizations, and in particular the organization in which each spent most of his or her career, will be much more deeply embedded than for older leaders . . . in their ability to accrue power in order to transcend the structure of interests in the bureaucratic system, they will be much more strictly limited than Deng, who in turn was much more strictly circumscribed in his choices than Mao.48 I develop seven functional clusters with which I classify the career histories of the Chinese leaders: 1 2 3

4 5

party work, with a cadre ever engaged in party work in his or her job history being coded as 1 and others as 0; government work, with a cadre ever engaged in government administration in his or her job history being coded as 1 and others as 0; industrial bureau/finance work, with a cadre ever engaged in industrial bureau/finance work in his or her job history being coded as 1 and others as 0; expert work, with a cadre ever engaged in professional experience in his or her job history being coded as 1 and others as 0; ideology work; with a cadre ever engaged in propaganda and ideological work in his or her job history being coded as 1 and others as 0; 139

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6 7

PLA/Police work, with a cadre ever engaged in PLA or police work in his or her job history being coded as 1 and others as 0; a catch-all category, which includes careers in the Communist Youth League, the Women’s Federation, Sports, Trade Unions, the mass media, etc, with a cadre ever engaged in one of these organizations in his or her job history being coded as 1 and others as 0.

The above seven job clusters are based on insights from existing studies of the Chinese political elite. For example, the “expert work” category is created by combining the “education/research” and “engineering” categories that have been used in the existing studies. Some of the categories used in the existing studies are dissected and then merged with other categories. For example, the “office work” category is merged into the “party work” or the “government work” categories, depending on whether an incidence of office work occurred in the CCP hierarchy or the government system. This approach is motivated by my interest in identifying the relationship between political institutions and the distribution of career experiences.

Career backgrounds and recruitment patterns Tables 8.5 and 8.6 report the distribution of career backgrounds among the Chinese political elite in 1988 and 1994. In 1988, more than 80 percent of the CCP cadres had party work experience, as compared with 36.5 percent of the government officials. In 1994, 80.1 percent of the CCP had party work experience, as compared with 47.1 percent of the government officials. Clearly, the CCP hierarchy is more likely than the government system to recruit individuals with party work experience, supporting Hypothesis 8.2. Tables 8.5 and 8.6 also show that the percentages of government officials with government work experience were higher than those of the CCP cadres in both 1988 (53.1 percent vs. 47.6 percent) and 1994 (57.7 percent vs. 47.9 percent), tentatively confirming Hypothesis 8.1. Furthermore, Tables 8.5 and 8.6 show that there were only 21.6 percent of the CCP cadres in 1988 with a working history as an expert, as compared with 45.7 percent of the government officials. The difference in the percentage of the cadres with expert work experiences in the CCP and the government remained unchanged in 1994 (31.5 percent vs. 51.1 percent). Also, nearly 62 percent of the 1988 government officials had worked in firm/finance/industrial bureau. Only 32.4 percent of the 1988 CCP cadres had a similar working experience. There were similar differences in 1994 (34.9 percent vs. 62.6 percent), supporting Hypothesis 8.3. 140

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Table 8.5 Career backgrounds, 1988 Career backgrounds Government work Party work Expert work Firm/finance/industrial bureau Ideology PLA/police/law Youth/women/sports/union No. of cases

The 1988 elite (%) 51.2 51.4 37.6 51.9 3.9 8.1 6.9 740

Government officials (%) 53.1 36.5 45.7 61.8 0.4 6.5 5.1 490

CCP cadres (%) 47.6 80.4 21.6 32.4 10.8 11.2 10.4 250

Finally, Tables 8.5 and 8.6 show that in 1988, 10.8 percent of the CCP cadres had working experience in the ideology front as compared with 0.4 percent of the government officials. Of the 1994 CCP cadres, 6.7 percent had been ideologues or propagandists once in their work histories. Only 0.7 percent of the 1994 government officials could make the similar claim. These findings confirm Hypothesis 8.4. Next, I use the seven clusters as the dependent variables to conduct several logistic regression analyses. Independent variables include age; sex; ethnicity; CCP seniority; the four educational variables; and government officials, which is a dummy variable with government officials coded as 1 and the CCP cadres as 0. Table 8.7 shows that ideology work is statistically related to an arts degree and the relationship is statistically significant at .05 level. This finding makes good sense since people trained in the arts and social sciences tend to engage in Marxist ideology or propaganda work. Taking the exponents of the logistic regression coefficients for arts degrees, it can be seen that holding other independent variables constant, a cadre with an arts degree from a key university is 16.5 times more likely than others to Table 8.6 Career backgrounds, 1994 Career backgrounds Government work Party work Expert work Firm/finance/industrial bureau Ideology PLA/police/law Youth/women/sports/union No. of cases

The 1994 elite (%) 54.4 58.5 44.3 53.1 2.8 7.2 6.4 848

Government officials (%) 57.7 47.1 51.1 62.6 0.7 6.5 5.0 556

141

CCP cadres (%) 47.9 80.1 31.5 34.9 6.8 8.6 8.9 292

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do ideology work. A cadre with an arts degree from an ordinary university is 7.8 times more likely than others to do ideology work. In comparison, ideology work is not statistically related to technical degrees. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that an engineer would be a good political mobilizer since propaganda is not part of his or her training. Table 8.7 also shows that firm/finance/industry bureau is associated with a technical degree but not with an arts degree. The association is statistically significant and is consistent with an everyday observation that graduates with a degree in the arts or social sciences usually do not take up jobs in technical areas. Taking the exponents of the logistic regression coefficients for the technical degrees, it can be seen that holding other independent variables constant, a cadre with a technical degree from a key university is 385 percent more likely than others to engage in firm/finance/industry bureau work. A cadre with a technical degree from an ordinary university is 217 percent more likely than others to engage in firm/finance/industry bureau work. However, both a degree in the arts or social sciences and a degree in the technical fields are statistically related to expert work at 0.01 level. Everything being equal, the probability for a cadre to have worked as a professional increases 690 percent with an arts degree from a key university, 560 percent with an arts degree from an ordinary university, 1,957 percent with a technical degree from a key university, and 2,013 percent with a technical degree from an ordinary university. These results can be expected since I coded experience as a university lectures/professor or engineer/senior engineer as “expert work.” A political science professor is as much an expert as a senior engineer. Furthermore, Table 8.7 shows that controlling for age, sex, ethnicity, CCP seniority, and the four educational variables, government officials are positively associated with government work experience and negatively associated with party work experience. The associations are statistically significant at .01 level. Taking the exponents for the logistic regression coefficients for government officials, it can be seen that a cadre with government work experience is 39 percent more likely than others to become a government official and a cadre with party work experience is 84 percent less likely than others to become a government official. These findings support Hypotheses 8.1 and 8.2. Also, the odds for becoming a government official increase 105 percent with expert work experience and 201 percent with firm/finance/industry bureau experience. However, a cadre with ideology work experience is 96 percent less likely than others to become a government official. These relationships are all statistically significant at 0.01 level, supporting Hypotheses 8.3 and 8.4. Career structures of the Chinese leaders are indeed patterned by institutional differences between the government system and the CCP hierarchy. Finally, Tables 8.7 and 8.8 show that the correlations between personal characteristics and past work experience for the 1994 elite is very similar 142

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

to those of the 1988 elite. For example, a degree in the arts or social sciences is closely related to ideology work while a technical degree is associated with finance/firm work. Government officials are more likely than the CCP cadres to have worked in the fields of government administration, expert work, or finance, industrial bureau, and factory. It is important to point out that the differences in educational credentials between the government officials and CCP cadres narrowed greatly between 1988 and 1994 (Chapters 4 and 5). Yet there are no corresponding changes in the difference in work experiences between the two groups of leaders. These findings clearly reflect a persistent pattern in leadership selection during the reform era. Tables 8.7 and 8.8 thus indicate the relevance of institutional arrangements for leadership selection in China.

Summary Career patterns are one important dimension along which questions about party-state relations or the nature of the political elite can be investigated.49 In this chapter I study institutional distinction between the government system and the CCP hierarchy and the distribution of the career experiences among the Chinese political elite. The gap in educational attainment between government officials and the CCP cadres reported in the previous chapters encourages me to hypothesize the difference in work experience between these two groups of leaders. As status attainment research has amply demonstrated, there is a close link between educational achievement and labor market outcomes.50 I propose a similar trend in the bureaucratic labor market in the PRC. I then show in this chapter that individuals trained in the arts and social sciences are more likely than others to engage in Marxist ideology or propaganda work. Firm/finance/industry bureau is associated with a technical degree but not with an arts degree. I also show that government officials are positively associated with government work experience and negatively associated with party work experience. Furthermore, job assignment to the government system is positively related to expert work experience and firm/finance/industry bureau experience and negatively related to ideology work experience. In comparison, party work experience and ideology work experience are positively associated with job assignment in the CCP hierarchy. These findings support my elite dualism’s explanation of the distribution of career experiences among the Chinese political elite. These findings are inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that the post-revolutionary elite has become a technocracy because of the importance of modernization in leadership selection and that problems of management and governance in industrializing, increasingly modern, and socially complex societies require a political elite with technical expertise, which leads to changes in the backgrounds and perspectives of those who govern.51 143

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Table 8.7 Logistic regression coefficients for career backgrounds, 1988 Independent variable

Government work

Party work

Expert work

Age Women Minority ethnicity CCP seniority Arts, key university Arts, ordinary university Technical majors, key university Technical majors, ordinary university Government officials

0.0247 (0.0170) 0.3077 (0.3459) 1.0058 (0.2891)** 0.0206 (0.0099)* ⫺0.87567 (0.2703)** ⫺0.8175 (0.2363)**

⫺0.0874 (0.0228)** ⫺0.2010 (0.3979) ⫺1.1406 (0.3432)** 0.0571 (0.0152)** ⫺0.9880 (0.2979)** ⫺1.0867 (0.2617)**

0.0289 (0.0200) 0.1897 (0.3966) 0.3027 (0.3745) ⫺0.0335 (0.0117)** 2.0661 (0.3312)** 1.8864 (0.3052)**

⫺0.2111 (0.2577)

⫺0.8678 (0.2847)**

3.0236 (0.3304)**

⫺0.0835 (0.2180) 0.3312 (0.1687)*

⫺1.4228 (0.2741)** ⫺1.8339 (0.1994)**

3.0508 (0.2954)** 0.7188 (0.2101)**

⫺2 Log likelihood Goodness of Fit Model Chi-Square

967.775 738.098 57.645**

792.177 729.738 233.140**

709.411 719.348 270.212**

Number of cases

740

740

740

Notes N ⫽ 740. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. * P ⬍ 0.05; ** P ⬍ 0.01.

Table 8.8 Logistic regression coefficients for career backgrounds, 1994 Independent variable

Government work

Age Women Minority ethnicity CCP seniority Arts, key university Arts, ordinary university Technical majors, key university Technical majors, ordinary university Government officials ⫺2 Log likelihood Goodness of Fit Model Chi-Square Number of cases

Party work

Expert work

⫺0.0281 (0.0152) 0.6294 (0.3021)** ⫺0.6265 (0.2827)** 0.0072 (0.0079) ⫺0.6715 (0.2332)** ⫺0.8985 (0.2421)***

⫺0.1705 (0.0212)*** ⫺0.0621 (0.3413) ⫺0.6138 (0.3266)* 0.0672 (0.0112)*** ⫺0.9382 (0.2629)*** ⫺0.5709 (0.2737)**

⫺0.4034 (0.2203)*

⫺0.4600 (0.2467)*

2.4112 (0.2645)***

⫺0.1525 (0.2307) 0.4185 (0.1552)**

⫺0.5389 (0.2573)** ⫺1.5353 (0.1878)***

1.7229 (0.2639)*** 0.5989 (0.1748)***

1,129.226 848.528 39.886*** 848

Notes N ⫽ 848. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. * P ⬍ 0.1; ** P ⬍ 0.05; *** P ⬍ 0.005.

144

0.1127 (0.0187)*** 0.2805 (0.3408) 0.3710 (0.3309) ⫺0.0427 (0.0098)*** 1.3634 (0.2676)*** 0.4786 (0.2941)*

950.512 839.775 200.494**

951.403 859.349 213.283**

848

848

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

Firm/finance ⫺0.0701 (0.0187)** 0.6274 (0.3785) 1.3472 (0.3292)** 0.0247 (0.0106)* ⫺0.1811 (0.2768) ⫺0.3723 (0.2489)

Ideology

PLA/police/law

Youth/women/sports

0.0248 (0.0519) 7.4520 (36.0936) ⫺0.3656 (0.7180) ⫺0.0048 (0.0407) 2.8608 (0.6355)** 2.1780 (0.6243)**

0.0379 (0.0395) ⫺0.2100 (0.7679) ⫺0.66575 (0.4389) 0.0796 (0.0317)* ⫺0.6027 (0.5272) ⫺0.2976 (0.3912)

⫺0.0708 (0.0350)* ⫺1.7146 (0.4537)** ⫺0.0241 (0.4634) ⫺0.0188 (0.0207) ⫺1.2422 (0.6463)* ⫺0.1256 (0.4059)

1.5788 (0.3112)**

1.1155 (0.9164)

⫺1.1085 (0.75820)

⫺0.8146 (0.5437)

1.1522 (0.2424)** 1.1004 (0.1820)**

⫺5.7044 (18.5089) ⫺3.3345 (0.7777)**

⫺0.6669 (0.5243) ⫺0.2643 (0.2944)

⫺1.4685 (0.5238)* ⫺0.7600 (0.3166)*

846.370 756.519 178.428**

155.937 300.723 88.794**

349.920 849.973 66.555**

329.256 727.098 41.977**

740

740

740

740

Firm/finance

Ideology

PLA/police/law

Youth/women/sports

⫺0.0014 (0.0162) 1.0688 (0.3399)*** 0.5800 (0.2977)* ⫺0.0052 (0.0086) ⫺0.4618 (0.2473)* ⫺0.4476 (0.2566)*

0.0458 (0.0511) 7.2049 (33.1192) 0.5471 (1.0684) 0.0162 (0.0339) 2.0415 (0.6950)*** 1.5408 (0.7156)**

0.0561 (0.0349) 1.0537 (1.0324) 0.3616 (0.6260) 0.0520 (0.0217)** 0.5763 (0.4185) 1.1472 (0.3913)***

⫺0.1749 (0.0414)*** ⫺1.4058 (0.4417)*** ⫺0.4351 (0.4433) 0.0445 (0.0267) ⫺0.3806 (0.4366) ⫺0.5241 (0.4379)

⫺0.0600 (0.4422)

⫺0.6560 (0.4425)

⫺5.9711 (17.9936) ⫺2.1652 (0.5808)***

⫺0.5347 (0.5990) 0.2485 (0.2992)

⫺2.6063 (0.7791)*** ⫺0.6174 (0.3058)**

967.147 850.868 205.240**

164.950 559.292 53.476***

377.643 942.690 60.965***

341.374 809.476 63.532***

848

848

848

848

1.3656 (0.2394)*** 1.5543 (0.2542)*** 1.0733 (0.1710)***

0.8249 (0.7894)

145

DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES

In contrast, I have shown in this book that institutional arrangements affect elite recruitment in the reform era. The bureaucratic labor market is segmented since the government and the CCP pursue different institutional missions, which in turn lead them to value different career experiences in leadership selection. The distribution of career structures among the Chinese leaders is clearly patterned by institutional differences between the government system and the CCP hierarchy.

146

9 DUALISM AND COOPTATION

In this chapter I examine the process of cooptation in the reform era. Elite renewal and regime survival require attention to cooptation. Gaetano Mosca believed that elites would go into decline if they lost their governing capabilities, their function, or their status and lost touch with the changes occurring below them. In order to avoid their own and their nation-state’s decay, they must transform themselves, or rather adapt themselves, by infusing elements from beneath them into their ranks.1 Vilfredo Pareto similarly claimed that as long as elites absorbed into their ranks the most talented people from the non-elite, talent and elite positions would largely coincide.2 Other scholars also argue that once elites open up their ranks, there will be a free circulation of elites (the talented enter the elites and the non-talented leave it), society will then be in a state of equilibrium, and it will change moderately and gradually. When the circulation of elites is impeded, social equilibrium may be upset, social order may decay, and society may become prone to upheavals and revolutions.3 Hence, cooptation is a key research topic in the social sciences. It has been considered a unique and important component of elite recruitment in the post-revolutionary era in state socialism, has been examined extensively, and has been analyzed from different theoretical perspectives. However, most studies of cooptation are based on Eastern European experience.4 A comprehensive study of the cooptation of the intelligentsia into the political elite in China is deemed to be necessary and desirable. Nevertheless, I decide to focus on the effect of institutional affiliation on cooptation in this chapter so as to be consistent with the major theme of this book. In the following, I first examine the literature on cooptation. Next, I discuss the definition and measurement of cooptation and the state of research on cooptation in China. I then rely on elite dualism to offer a proposition from which I derive two hypotheses regarding cooptation and leadership selection in China. More specifically, I propose that co-opted CCP cadres command higher political credentials than their counterparts in the government system and that cooptation is more likely to occur in 147

DUALISM AND COOPTATION

the government system than in the CCP hierarchy. I then return to the data set on the 1988 and 1994 elites to test these hypotheses. The findings from this chapter once again support my elite dualism’s explanation of elite recruitment in China.

Cooptation, elite renewal, and regime survival Cooptation takes place because of the increasing importance of expertise in complex, modernizing society. Frederic J. Fleron argues that the political elite in the monocratic system, which is frequently traditional and nonspecialized in its education and experience, is in a position of such marked dominance that any skills it believes it requires for the management of a society can be obtained from various specialized elites at no political cost. It is able to extract technical and managerial skills without offering in exchange any voice in the policy-making process.5 However, as societies become more complex and industrially developed, there is an increased need for these technical and managerial skills in government. Of course, the traditional elite may be prepared to use coercion and perhaps violence in order to continue to extract needed skills from the specialized elites. But there is no assurance that such techniques of coercion can be successful over long periods of time. They may even be self-defeating by preventing the system from adapting in a satisfactory way to the changing social and technical environment. Hence, the system for the sake of survival may transform itself from the monocratic type to an adaptive-monocratic one, paying increased attention to the functional importance of specialized elites. Under such a political environment, specialized elites might attempt to trade in skills for some degree of participation in the political decision-making process.6 Thus, cooptation becomes a regular practice in modern society, especially when an established elite finds itself increasingly incapable of dealing with new demands and challenges. Cooptation can become a matter of life or death for an elite. Depending on its political skills, resources, and flexibility, the political elite adopts different strategies to maintain its political dominance. It may modify its policies to meet new demands but retain its original composition. Or it may open its ranks to the new elements in society – particularly those from the lower social stratum. The political elite will then be renewed and invigorated by the ablest representatives of the new forces in society. At the same time it will make sure that the coopted talents become imbued with its values.7 Great Britain provides a nice example of such elite circulation and revival. Soon after the onset of the Industrial Revolution, the previously exclusive aristocratic schools opened their gates to the sons of the rising middle class and inculcated in them the political values and styles that had been characteristics of the traditional elite. The public schools perpetuated 148

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the political supremacy of the landed classes by “capturing” talent from the rising bourgeoisie and molding that talent into “synthetic” gentlemen.8 Similarly, the diversity of social origins among the American elite is considered by C. Wright Mills as evidence of a cooptation process that admits “new blood” in the long-term interests of elite revival in a capitalist democratic system.9 In the field of communist politics, scholars have long observed that one of the most consistent patterns found in state socialism is a reasonably cooperative, though frequently tense, relationship between the political authorities and the non-communist technical intelligentsia.10 Samuel Huntington argues that the communist party needs to coordinate and guide an increasingly complex society, which requires the acquisition of technical knowledge, for without it the party will suffer a reduction in its authority and capacity to make and implement policies.11 Hence, in the post-revolutionary era, the ruling bureaucracy incorporates into its ranks a small segment of the intelligentsia that commands relevant expertise and shows evidence of loyalty to the communist party and its leading role in society.12 Alvin W. Gouldner hence suggests that the political basis of détente in state socialism is the political alliance between the communist party on the one hand and the intelligentsia on the other.13 A shift from a state socialist regime emphasizing on political control to one on economic modernization requires the cooptation into the political elite of a relatively large number of technically trained experts.14 Take the Soviet Union as an example; the Communist Party came to power overnight in the October Revolution in Russia and had to solve the question of “who rules” in intra-party struggles after 1917. The Great Purge of the late 1930s swept up victims from every stratum of Soviet society.15 The incidence at senior levels of the bureaucracy was particularly high, which opened up spaces for rapid elite turnover and mobility. Many successors were party loyalists with good education. Some scholars have thus characterized the post-1939 Soviet leaders as “red experts,” who were highly motivated, hard working and serious in their attitude to education.16 It was in the levels of education and experience that the Central Committees of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) stood out most clearly from the Soviet population (Table 9.1).17 More importantly, industrial expansion in the Soviet Union since the late 1920s brought considerations of technical competence further and further to the fore. The need for technically trained personnel eventually forced the Soviet leadership to change the criteria for admission into the Communist Party. Similarly, the corpus of the bureaucracy in former Eastern European socialist societies was continuously replenished through the mechanisms of a selective co-optation.18 By the time of Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet regime had largely realized its aim of co-opting the technical intelligentsia, achieving this goal by means of inclusion in the CPSU, 149

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Table 9.1 Education attainment in the Soviet Union (% of college education) Year

Central committee

General population

1925 1939 1961 1976 1990

40.0 80.2 80.9 91.2 76.5

0.3 0.6 2.9 9.1 10.8

Source: adapted from Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 245, 248, 251, 254.

promotion into administrative positions, high salaries, and an assortment of other perquisites.19 Hence, Michael Gehlen argues that in the Soviet Union, during the period of 1952–66 “there has been a steady increase in the number and percentage of persons co-opted into the higher echelons of the apparat who have functional specializations in the economic sector of Soviet society.” Particularly, production oriented specialists in the industrial sector and to a lesser extent agricultural specialists: have risen in number. Between 5–10 percent of them spent their previous careers in the government bureaucracy or as pedagogspropagandists, whereas there is a sharp decrease of pure party functionaries. The number of years spent as specialists by apparatchiki increased sharply. In 1966, two thirds of them had more than six years’ experience as specialist; one fourth each spent 25–50 percent or 50–75 percent of their careers as specialist. Specialists begin their party work primarily in the district, city, or provincial organizations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union because those units are most immediately responsible for supervising the technical as well as the general aspects of industrial and agricultural productivity.20 It has also been reported that in the former Soviet Union the degree of cooptation at all levels of government, and at least as high as the level of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was substantial. “Well over half of the members of the Central Committee can be reasonably classified as coopted elites.”21 There were similar trends in post-Martial Law Poland as extraordinary attempts were made to co-opt the technical intelligentsia into the power elite in that country.22 The ripple of cooptation in former state socialist countries can be identified even in the post-communist era. Ivan Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi relate institutional building in post-1989 Eastern Europe to cooptation that has taken place in the pre-1989 period. They define elite reproduction 150

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as an occasion in which the communist elite has stayed in power in the post-1989 era and elite circulation an incidence in which the post-1989 elite has recruited most of its members from non-communists. They then suggest a high degree of elite reproduction in countries where the intelligentsia was already co-opted by the nomenklatura before 1989. By contrast, they expect a high degree of elite circulation in countries where the co-optation of the intelligentsia did not take place in the pre-1989 era. The degree of elite circulation or reproduction in turn is associated with important issues such as democratization, marketization, and social stratification in post-communist Eastern Europe.23

Existing studies of cooptation in China There have been few studies of cooptation in China. Some scholars believe mistakenly that Mao’s China defied the pattern of cooptation in leadership selection in state socialism.24 It has been claimed that “unlike the Eastern European socialist countries, where former revolutionaries started to coopt technical experts into the ruling elite immediately after seizure of political power, the elite transformation in China took place over a period of almost three decades after the foundation of the regime [in 1949].”25 In fact, as pointed out in Chapter 4, a certain degree of cooptation did take place in Mao’s China since some non-CCP professionals and intellectuals were appointed to important positions in the government system. The leadership transition in the reform era has stimulated scholarly interests in cooptation in China. Hong Yung Lee claims that in order to lead China to economic development, the CCP has found it necessary to raise the educational level of its members by co-opting intellectuals and professionals in the reform era. Using Frederic Fleron’s distinction between cooptation and recruitment, Lee maintains that bureaucratic technocrats, who make up the core of the Chinese leadership, are co-opted rather than recruited.26 Cheng Li and David Bachman indirectly provide some empirical support to Lee’s claim. They report that 19 (7.6 percent) of the 247 mayors in China in 1986 were experts before assuming their current leadership positions. Li and Bachman believe that cadres with such career backgrounds have an advantage in promotion and command a fast speed of career advancement.27 It is not clear whether Li and Bachman consider these mayors as incidences of cooptation, though. I also offer some indirect evidence of cooptation in my study of the political elite in the 1980s, reporting that 24 (8.76 percent) out of the 274 provincial elite in 1988 were former engineers.28 I also show that 16.4 percent of the Fourteenth Central Committee and 17.6 percent of the Fifteenth Central Committee had been engaged in engineering before becoming leading political figures in China.29 Finally, I show that officials who 151

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worked as professionals are less likely than those whose careers were with the CCP or the government to attain the highest rank in the State Council. Similarly, officials with professional titles did not appear to have an advantage over those without such a credential in either the levels they eventually reached or the speed with which they got their current positions.30 Overall, empirical findings about cooptation in China reported so far are scant, sketchy, and indirect. More often than not, they are part of the studies that explore different research interests. Unfortunately, cooptation is not one of the explorations. There are few attempts to search for theoretical frameworks that can explain patterns of cooptation in China satisfactorily. The developing state of research on cooptation in China is obviously inconsistent with its importance for elite renewal and regime survival. I place cooptation in the center stage in the following analysis.

Defining cooptation What do we mean exactly by “cooptation”? Philip Selznick defines it as the “process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence.”31 Under such an arrangement, a political elite acquires skills by co-opting into the power hierarchy the members of the professional elites, who are given direct access to the policy-making process. What distinguishes the cooptation process from normal recruitment procedures in a state socialist system is that co-opted specialists have already established professional careers in non-political sectors of society, and thus enter the political elite midway or late in their careers. These individuals may well have substantial bases of influence outside politics. The co-opted specialists have a greater degree of specialized training and experience, which may lead them to seek more complex and sophisticated solutions to economic and social problems.32 Many scholars have accordingly considered the political elite in state socialism as comprising two major constituents: recruited and co-opted elites. These two groups of leaders differ mainly in their different career paths to political power: the recruited cadres enter the political elite at very early stages in their careers, thus having little opportunity to form close ties with a professional-vocational group and the co-opted officials enter the political elite later in their careers, thereby having close professional-vocational ties outside the political elite.33 Cooptation can be further classified into two different types. The first type brings specialists into the framework of the power hierarchy. The second type grants the specialists the status of consultants.34 The second type is more likely to occur than the first type since it does not require significant redistribution of political power. As a matter of fact, the CCP has adopted the second type of cooptation since the later 1940s, in the 152

DUALISM AND COOPTATION

form of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the National People’s Congress (NPC).35 By using specialists as its consultants, the political elite receives a certain degree of political legitimacy and free expert advice.36 Specialists co-opted this way do not belong to the political elite. For example, Professor Fei Xiaotong, a renowned Chinese sociologist, was a vice Chairman of the NPC. He has never been and has never been considered by China experts as a member of the political elite. Such specialists will not be discussed below since my book is about the political elite in the reform period. I focus on cooptation of specialists into the power hierarchy in this chapter. On what basis do we define a politician a co-opted rather than recruited official? Frederic J. Fleron suggested that the variable – “years spent in professional occupation prior to entry into the political elite” – be dichotomized so that one can distinguish operationally between recruited and co-opted officials. There hence needs to be a cutting point along the continuum described by that variable. Fleron decides to use the “objective” standard of the mean number of years computed on the basis of all individuals in his study population, which was seven years.37 David Lane and Cameron Ross similarly distinguish between two important divisions in the career paths of the Soviet party elite: one group, beginning their party careers in their twenties, formed a nucleus of party career executives, whereas another group, defined as co-opted executives, entered party service later in life, being over 35 or even 50 years of age. Lane and Ross take the magical number of 35 as the dividing line since they believe that by that age in the life cycle, most people would have been into a chosen occupation.38 Clearly, scholars have directly or indirectly relied on professional service over a span of time to distinguish co-opted officials from recruited cadres. University education cannot distinguish a co-opted official from a recruited cadre since the latter can also be a college graduate. Another important point is that a co-opted official is not necessarily a technocrat. For example, a history professor is as much a co-opted official as a senior engineer if both are recruited into the political elite. Accordingly, I define an occasion of cooptation according to the following criteria: 1 2

the promoted official must have been an engineer or an equivalent professional; he or she did not hold an administrative post or was at most a section cadre (keji ganbu, the lowest rank officials in the Chinese civil service) by 1982, the year the post-Mao leadership transition started.

A college graduate becomes a section level cadre automatically after he or she is assigned a job in the state sector in China, regardless whether he 153

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or she is a teacher in a middle school, an assistant engineer in a factory, or a clerk in a government office. Hence, such an assignment is essentially an administrative move and cannot be considered as an indication for further advancement in the political hierarchy in China. My definition of cooptation makes sure that a co-opted official was in a profession before the 1982 cadre reform. Additionally, I code a person as a co-opted official even if he or she did not have a college degree. The key criterion is a professional career. In the coding process, over 95 percent of the co-opted officials are college educated, however. But how could someone become a professional without a university degree in China? This is because Chinese universities did not produce a large number of graduates before the Cultural Revolution took place in 1966. Many graduates of community colleges (dazuan in Chinese) and technical schools (zhongzuan in Chinese) became substitutes and took charge of technical issues in their workplaces. Some of them were subsequently promoted as engineers or equivalents in other professions. For example, Mr. An Zhendong graduated from an industrial school in 1951 and served as engineer in the Qiqihar Railway Administration from 1954 to 1958, engineer and deputy director of the Harbin Rectification Equipment Factory from 1967 to 1982, and chief engineer of the Harbin City No. 2 Light Industrial Bureau between 1982 and 1983. Mr. An became a vice governor of Heilongjiang Province in 198339 and is classified as a co-opted official in my data bank. Other examples of cooptation include Mr. Chen Mingyi, who was appointed deputy governor of Fujian in 1985 and governor of Fujian in 1994,40 Ms. Huang Maoheng, who was appointed vice governor of Jiangxi in 1993,41 Mr. Jiang Xinzhen, who was appointed vice governor of Shaanxi province in 1991,42 and the like. In contrast, I disqualify Mr. Wen Jiabao, currently premier and member of the Standing Committee of the CCP’s Politburo, from the list of cooption because he was already a deputy division chief (chuji ganbu) before 1982.43 Other examples include Mr. Zhang Haoruo,44 Mr. Qian Yunlu,45 and so on. They were division-level cadres before 1982. A division-level cadre is situated at the middle level of the Chinese bureaucracy and is much more closely related to political power than a section level cadre. Unlike a job assignment to a section level post, promotion into a division level position is much more a political appointment. Thus, these individuals were already chosen to be party leaders or government officials before the post-Mao cadre reform and were not part of the intelligentsia. Unlike co-opted intellectuals, their main careers are in the party or government system rather than the professions. Hence, their promotions in the post-1982 cadre reform cannot be coded as events of cooptation. It is debatable whether these cases should be coded as cooption events 154

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since these cadres have had some professional careers before becoming part of the political elite. In fact, results from my statistical analysis would be more consistent with my hypotheses about cooption and leadership selection if Mr. Wen and other similar cases were identified as co-opted officials. Yet I decide to choose methodological rigor and accuracy over flexibility and negotiability so that the cases of cooptation include individuals whom I or other China scholars will consider as engineers, doctors, or professors rather than government officials or party cadres.

Institutional distinction and cooptation Cooptation in a Leninist system occurs because it serves the interests of the communist elite. Cooption is a serious matter: to co-opt someone new into the political hierarchy may change the composition and balance of the top decision-making bodies in the PRC. As mentioned in previous chapters, the Chinese leadership has carried out the leadership transition in the reform era to enhance governance and the legitimacy of the CCP. Although the CCP emphasizes educational credentials in personnel management in the reform period, it would not compromise the political requirement for leadership selection. This is consistent with the existing studies that recruiters generally prefer to recruit people of their own kind.46 Co-opted officials must be politically reliable red experts. However, many red experts may suffer deficiency in political resources such as CCP membership or CCP seniority. Such political resources were allocated before the post-Mao cadre reform in the ways that overtly disfavored intellectuals and professionals, a result of anti-intellectual politics before 1976.47 It is likely that the co-opted officials joined the CCP rather late in their careers and consequently have lower CCP seniority than recruited cadres. Although their educational credentials are higher than the recruited cadres, their political credentials are lower than those of the recruited cadres. Nevertheless, both the co-opted officials and recruited cadres are selected into the Chinese leadership. That is, individuals with different combination of human and political capital reach the destination of a race at the same time. Obviously, the disadvantage in educational credentials is somehow offset by the sophisticated command of political capital, and vice versa. More specifically: Proposition 9.1: In the race toward top posts in the political hierarchy, coopted officials compensate lower political capital with higher educational credentials, whereas recruited cadres compensate lower educational credentials with higher political capital. I derive the following two hypotheses from Proposition 9.1: 155

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Hypothesis 9.1: The government system should be more likely to co-opt professionals than the CCP hierarchy. The compensation occurs because the CCP hierarchy and the government system weigh the role of political and educational credentials differently in leadership selection. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the leadership transition in the reform era was implemented with institutional inertia in the CCP dominion and institutional dynamism in the government realm. The pressure for increasing the levels of education by cooptation is lower on the CCP than on the government. The government, because of its preoccupation with governance and economic development, pays more attention to human capital in recruitment than the CCP. Intellectuals and professionals are valued more by the government system than the CCP hierarchy. The government can afford to lower the requirement for political credentials substantially in co-opting professionals and intellectuals. In fact, some co-opted government officials are not even CCP members. For example, Mr. Zhuang Gonghui graduated from the Department of Chemical Engineering at Tianjin University in 1957. Since then he served successively as teaching assistant, lecturer, and professor in that department. He then became deputy dean and dean of studies and was promoted as vice president of Tianjin University in 1992. He was appointed vice governor of Tianjin in 1993.48 In contrast, the CCP cannot deviate too much from political orthodoxy in recruitment because of its institutional mission – upholding its leadership in the PRC. Unlike the government, it cannot afford to compromise too much of political requirements in selecting its leaders. Consequently, the CCP is less likely than the government to rely on cooptation in its leadership selection since many red experts have relatively high educational attainment and relatively low political credentials. Furthermore, if the CCP is not willing to lower the political requirements in cooptation, then it is very likely that co-opted CCP cadres have more political capital than their counterparts in the government system. Hypothesis 9.2: The political qualification of co-opted cadres in the CCP hierarchy should be higher than that of their counterparts in the government system. Finally, I do not expect to detect a great variation in educational attainment between co-opted officials in the government system and their counterparts in the CCP hierarchy. This is because all co-opted leaders by definition have been professionals and as such are well educated – educational achievement is closely related to occupational attainment. 156

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Institutional effects on cooptation Table 9.2 compares the characteristics of co-opted officials with those of recruited cadres. My classification suggests that only 25 percent of the 1988 elite and 35.5 percent of the 1994 elite were co-opted cadres. This finding is inconsistent with the view that co-opted cadres have made up the core of the Chinese leadership.49 Table 9.2 also shows that the mean age of co-opted officials is only three years younger than that of recruited cadres in 1988. The age difference was further reduced by 1994. This is because by definition coopted officials, or lateral entrants, do not begin at the bottom of the hierarchy; when they join the political elite, they do so at a high rank and at a mature age. The lateral entrants have greater professional experience and age maturity when they join the political elite. In contrast, career politicians must gain this maturity and experience in low-level political posts.50 It is no wonder that the recruited cadres and co-opted officials do not differ greatly in terms of age. A second explanation of the small age difference between these two groups of cadres rests on the nomenklatura system in China. Non-political jobs such as teachers and technicians are also on the Chinese nomenklatura lists. A lateral entrant is almost certainly co-opted into the political elite at the same nomenklatura level he or she holds in the non-political Table 9.2 Characteristics of co-opted and non co-opted leaders Variables

1988 Co-opted

Others

■

1994 Co-opted

Others

Age (mean years) CCP seniority (mean years)

54.4 27.5

57.5 36.3

56.2 26.6

58.0 35.1

Gender (%) Male Female

91.4 8.6

95.9 4.1

92.8 8.0

95.2 4.8

Ethnicity (%) Han Non-Han CCP membership (%) College education (%)

95.7 4.3 92.4 96.2

89.0 11.0 98.6 50.3

94.4 5.6 93.4 96.0

90.9 9.1 98.4 67.1

Academic Majors (%) Ordinary art major Key art major Ordinary technical major Key technical major

21.6 13.0 41.1 20.5

20.5 13.7 9.7 6.1

10.3 17.3 33.9 34.6

19.4 19.2 15.2 13.3

Number of cases

185

555

157

301

547

DUALISM AND COOPTATION

sector. The higher that nomenklatura level is, the closer he or she is to political elite status. In other words, he or she differs from the lifelong politician only in that he or she has acquired his or her seniority outside the political elite. But he or she has been upwardly mobile all along in the profession he or she has worked.51 One such example is Professor Cao Zeyi. Professor Cao graduated from Sichuan Medical College in 1956 and joined the CCP in the same year. He taught and practiced medical profession in Western China Medical University. He was well known for his expertise in gynaecology and published a number of books on this subject. Over the years he was promoted to be lecturer and professor and finally President of his university. In 1988, at the age of 55, he was appointed vice minister of Public Health. Another example is Mr. Zhang Wule, who did not join the CCP until 1982. Mr. Zhang graduated from the Department of Machinery at Beijing Institute of Iron and Steel Engineering in 1959. He taught at his Alma Mater between 1959 and 1970 and was then transferred to Lanzhou Steelworks in 1971, where he worked as engineer, joined the CCP in 1982, and then became its director. In 1985 he became all of a sudden vice governor of Gansu and was at the age of 56 further promoted to governorship in 1993.52 Other examples include Professor Chen Minzhang, appointed Minister of Public of Health in 1987;53 Mr. Hong Fuzeng, appointed vice minister of Agriculture in 1989;54 and many others, who were co-opted into the political elite in their fifties. These examples and the findings from Table 9.2 about age and cooptation in China are consistent with those reported in the study of the Soviet Union. For example, it is reported that the mean age for achieving the Central Committee status in the Soviet Union remained constant at about age 50. Few leaders achieved that status before age 50, and few who had not made it by age 50 ever made it at all. The relationship is not just a statistical artifact, however. It means that a co-opted official, or lateral entrant, would get to the Central Committee at roughly the same age as the recruited official, no matter how late in his career he joined the political elite.55 Table 9.2 also reports the political qualifications of the 1988 and 1994 elites. Between 1983 and 1997, a number of individuals from minor political parties were given positions in the central and local governments, which included a vice-president of the PRC (Mr. Rong Yiren), a minister (Commission on Languages), twelve vice ministers, one bureau head, eleven bureau heads, and 54 deputy provincial governors.56 Nevertheless, Table 9.2 shows that most co-opted officials are red experts. The difference in party membership between co-opted and recruited cadres was not significant. Clearly, the Chinese leadership did not compromise political requirements in elite recruitment. Finally, Table 9.2 shows that recruited cadres enjoyed substantially 158

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higher CCP seniority than co-opted officials in both 1988 and 1994 (36.3 years vs. 27.5 years and 35.1 years vs. 26.6 years). Co-opted officials however are much better educated than recruited cadres: in 1988, for example, 96.2 percent of co-opted officials received university education whereas only 50.3 percent of recruited cadres had similar educational experience. The difference in educational attainment between these two groups remained largely unchanged in 1994. Table 9.3 compares characteristics of co-opted officials with those of recruited cadres in the government and the CCP hierarchy respectively. Apparently, there is difference in CCP seniority between co-opted officials in the government and the CCP (27.2 years vs. 28.8 years in 1988 and 25.1 years vs. 33.1 years in 1994), supporting Hypothesis 9.2 that the political qualification of co-opted cadres in the CCP hierarchy is higher than that of their counterparts in the government system. The difference in CCP seniority between co-opted government officials and their counterparts in the CCP hierarchy was much larger in 1994 than in 1988, suggesting that the government system paid much less attention to political credentials in the process of cooptation in 1994 than in 1988. This is understandable from a historical perspective. Political loyalty was almost the only criterion for leadership selection prior to the leadership transition in the reform era. It is entirely conceivable that the inertia (i.e. Table 9.3 Characteristics of co-opted leaders, the CCP and the government Variables

1988 Government CCP

Age (mean years) CCP seniority (mean years)

■

1994 Government CCP

54.8 (4.2)

52.2 (5.0)

56.1 (4.6)

56.6 (5.0)

27.2 (13.5)

28.8 (6.3)

25.1 (12.4)

31.9 (8.6)

Gender (%) Male Female

90.4 9.6

96.6 3.4

91.0 9.0

96.0 4.0

Ethnicity (%) Han Non-Han CCP membership (%) College education (%)

96.8 3.2 91.0 95.5

89.7 10.3 100.0 100.0

94.4 5.6 94.6 96.2

94.0 6.0 100.0 95.5

Academic Majors (%) Ordinary art major Key art major Ordinary technical major Key technical major

20.5 14.1 41.0 19.9

27.6 6.9 41.4 24.1

9.4 20.5 33.3 32.9

13.4 6.0 35.8 40.3

Number of cases

156

29

159

234

67

DUALISM AND COOPTATION

the emphasis on political credentials in elite selection) was stronger in the government in 1988 than 1994. What is interesting is the increase in party seniority among the co-opted CCP cadres from 1988 to 1994, especially with reference to the overall decline in party seniority among the co-opted government officials from 1988 to 1994. In other words, the government system has relied less on political credentials in leadership selection, whereas the CCP hierarchy has become more preoccupied with political qualifications in cadre recruitment. This contrast shows growing elite dualism in the reform era. Table 9.3 also shows that the co-opted CCP cadres are as well educated as the co-opted government officials. As mentioned above, all co-opted officials by definition are well educated. In 1988, for example, 60.9 percent of the co-opted government officials received degrees in technical fields, as compared with 65.5 percent of the co-opted CCP cadres. Furthermore, Table 9.3 shows that in 1994, 66.2 percent of the coopted government officials had a technical degree, as compared with 76.8 percent of the co-opted CCP cadres. Of course these figures only refer to the educational attainment of the co-opted leaders in the CCP hierarchy and the government system. They do not suggest that CCP cadres are better educated than government officials. There are fewer co-opted leaders in the CCP hierarchy than in the government system, which explains in part the higher educational achievement of government officials discussed in the previous chapters. Finally, Table 9.3 shows that 31.8 percent of the 1988 government leaders and 11.6 percent of the 1988 CCP cadres were co-opted officials. In 1994, 42.1 percent of the government leaders and 22.9 percent of the CCP cadres were co-opted into the political hierarchy. These findings are consistent with those reported in the previous chapters that the impact of educational credentials on leadership selection was greater in 1994 than in 1988. They also confirm Hypothesis 9.1 that the government is more likely to use cooptation to recruit leaders than the CCP, supporting the elite dualism’s explanation of leadership selection in the reform period. Table 9.4 reports cooptation and leadership attainment in both 1988 and 1994. It shows that in 1988, only 5.6 percent of councilors and 26.8 percent of government ministers were co-opted officials. By 1994 the corresponding percentages were 22.2 percent and 42.1 percent. Similarly, in 1988, only 10 percent of CCP provincial secretaries and 12.9 percent of the CCP ministers were co-opted cadres, whereas in 1994 the corresponding percentages were 34 percent and 33.3 percent. Table 9.4 shows the distribution of the co-opted officials in the various leadership positions. However, it is difficult to tell from the table whether the government is more likely than the CCP to rely on cooptation in leadership selection. I thus conduct a logistic regression analysis to estimate the institutional effect on cooptation in China. I create an independent 160

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Table 9.4 Cooptation and leadership position attainment Variables

1988 Co-opted (%)

Councilor Minister Vice minister Bureau head Provincial CCP secretary Provincial governor Provincial CCP deputy secretary Provincial deputy governor Provincial discipline secretary CCP minister CCP vice minister CCP bureau head Number of cases

Others (%)

■

1994 Co-opted (%)

Others (%)

1 (5.6) 15 (26.8) 63 (31.8) 6 (19.4) 3 (10.0) 7 (23.3) 19 (19.0)

17 (94.4) 41 (73.2) 135 (68.2) 25 (80.6) 27 (90.0) 23 (767.7) 81 (81.0)

4 (22.2) 24 (42.1) 99 (46.5) 9 (18.8) 33 (34.0) 0 (0.0) 9 (30.0)

14 (77.8) 33 (57.9) 114 (53.5) 39 (81.3) 64 (66.0) 30 (100.0) 21 (70.0)

64 (40.8) 1 (3.4)

93 (59.2) 28 (96.6)

15 (50.0) 83 (44.1)

15 (50.0) 105 (55.9)

4 (12.9) 2 (4.3) 0 (0.0)

27 (87.1) 44 (95.7) 14 (100.0)

19 (33.3) 6 (8.8) 0 (0.0)

185 (25.0)

555 (75.0)

301 (35.5)

38 (66.7) 62 (91.2) 12 (100.0) 547 (64.5)

variable – government officials, with government officials coded as 1 and CCP cadres as 0. I use cooptation as the dependent variable in my analysis. Table 9.5 shows that CCP seniority is negatively associated with cooptation in both Models 1 and 2, indicating that the political qualifications of the co-opted officials are lower than that of the recruited cadres. Also, there is a statistically significant relationship between cooptation and government officials, confirming Hypothesis 9.1. The relationship is important for both the 1988 and the 1994 data, suggesting an established pattern of cooptation in elite formation in the reform era. Taking the exponents of the logistic regression coefficients for government official, it can be seen from Model 1 of Table 9.5 that holding other independent variables constant, the government are 97 percent more likely than the CCP to co-opt the intelligentsia into its rank-and-file. The corresponding figure for Model 2 of Table 9.5 is 46 percent. Furthermore, Table 9.5 shows that educational credentials are positively related to cooptation, indicating a significant gap in human capital between the co-opted and recruited cadres. In both 1988 and 1994, the associations between technical majors and cooptation are much higher than those between arts degrees and cooptation. Taking the exponents of the logistic regression coefficients for the educational variables, it can be seen from Model 1 of Table 9.5 that holding other independent variables constant, the odds for cooptation increase 656 percent with an arts degree from a key university; 489 percent with an arts degree from an ordinary 161

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Table 9.5 Logistic regression coefficients for institutional effects on cooptation 1988 and 1994 Independent variable

Model 1 (The 1988 elite)

Model 2 (The 1994 elite)

Age ⫺0.0028 (0.0223) Women ⫺0.2945 (0.4294) Minority ethnicity ⫺0.2948 (0.4757) CCP seniority ⫺0.0464 (0.0116)** Arts, key university 2.0227 (0.4862)** Arts, ordinary university 1.5862 (0.4803)** Technical major, key 3.2834 (0.4476)** university Technical major, ordinary 3.5612 (0.4244)** university Government official 0.6801 (0.2592)** ⫺2 Log likelihood 561.118 Goodness of Fit 808.200 Model Chi-Square 271.138*

0.3814 (0.1902)** 847.617 818.256 255.561*

No. of cases

848

740

0.0359 (0.0184)* ⫺0.2753 (0.3521) ⫺0.0513 (0.3537) ⫺0.0640 (0.0098)** 1.3080 (0.3667)** 1.0440 (0.3851)** 2.8980 (0.3456)** 2.3261 (0.3486)**

Notes * P ⬍ 0.1 ** P ⬍ 0.05. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

university; 2,567 percent with a technical degree from a key university; 3,521 percent with a technical degree from an ordinary university. The corresponding figures for Model 2 of Table 9.5 are 270 percent, 184 percent, 1,814 percent, and 923 percent respectively. The findings from Table 9.5 are consistent with those reported in Chapter 5 that technical majors are more important than arts degrees in leadership selection in the reform era.

Summary I focus on the institutional effects on cooptation in this chapter. Elites do not invite non-elites to join their ranks randomly. Those in power do not voluntarily share political power to any greater extent than is required by the situational circumstances in which they operate. In a state socialist country, the circulation of elites takes place on an individual and selective basis. That is, the political elite seeks to revitalize itself through the selective recruitment of new members on an individual basis. Some persons from outside the social and occupational groups that usually do not supply the political elite may be brought into that august stratum of society, but only if their resocialization into the predominant values of the elite is beyond any doubt.57 Indeed, I show in this chapter that co-opted officials in China have higher educational attainment than recruited cadres. Yet 162

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both groups are politically reliable. For example, the mean age of the 1988 co-opted official is 54.4, whereas their average CCP seniority is 27.5, which means that on an average they joined the CCP when they were only 26.9 years old, two or three years after they started their professional careers. The difference in political credentials between the co-opted and recruited cadres was also small in 1994. Nevertheless, cooptation is fundamentally a process in which persons with high prestige in non-political areas are co-opted by a political organization to serve as its candidates or representatives, which means entry into politics midway or later in one’s career.58 Hence, co-opted officials’ sense of organizational identification is more likely than that of recruited cadres to be focused outside the major political organization, perhaps with their non-political professional-vocational group.59 There may be a decline in the prescriptive importance of ideology, the institutionalization of policy roles for academics, and the routinization of planning and decision procedures.60 For example, co-opted specialists may bring into the political process perspectives on the nature of political governance that may be identifiably different from those of the traditional political elite. For example, they may not be committed to political orthodoxy as much as recruited cadres. They may see political problems in substantially more pragmatic terms than recruited cadres. Furthermore, they may have a greater degree of specialized training and experience, which may lead them to seek more complex and sophisticated solutions to economic and social problems than recruited cadres. Cooptation may have significant implications for Chinese politics. Finally, I show in this chapter that the process of cooptation is clearly patterned by institutional arrangements in the reform period. Cooptation is more likely to occur in the government system than in the CCP hierarchy, a result that can be expected from the perspective of elite dualism – the government takes charge of economic development and governance and hence values experts more than the CCP, whereas the CCP focuses on policy-making and guidance and is not under the same pressure to co-opt professionals into its hierarchy as the government. There are also manifest differences in political qualifications between co-opted cadres in the CCP hierarchy and their counterparts in the government system. The process of cooptation provides one more piece of evidence that supports the neoinstitutional explanation of leadership selection in China. This chapter concludes my empirical study of elite dualism.

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10 DUALISM AND THE POLITICAL ELITE IN CHINA

Beginning with the writing of classical elite scholars such as Henri Comte de Saint-Simon, Gaetano Mosca, and Max Weber, political elites have been an important topic in political science and sociology. Leon Trotsky’s The Revolution Betrayed1 and Milovan Djilas’s The New Class2 have placed communist elites squarely on the center stage of research on state socialism. Barrington Moore’s works on Soviet elites3 have inspired a series of studies on elite formation and stratification in state socialist societies. The recent literature on political elites in former Eastern European socialist societies and the on-going debate on elite transition in the reform era have facilitated the integration of elite studies into the mainstream sociological studies of status attainment, elevating the discipline to a more prominent niche in the social sciences.4 Political elites are an important research subject in the social sciences because they are ultimately the product of the political institutions in which they have climbed and served. They are at the same time institutionbuilders and shape the institutions which they themselves design.5 Research on political leadership is thus an essential part of the study of political institutions in state socialism. This is particularly true in China where there are no embryos of alternative political forces that can challenge the communist rulers. Nothing like Poland’s semi-autonomous Catholic Church, which long served as a shelter for opponents of the Polish communist regime and enabled them to form a collective identity, exists in the PRC. An adequate understanding of political institutions in China must include research on its political elite. In this book, I focus on one aspect of elite politics, namely, leadership selection in the reform period. In the one-party political system like that in China, political recruitment refers to the process of selecting a few from several million socially favored and politically motivated individuals to hold positions of significant national influence. Existing studies of political elite recruitment have endeavored to reveal the life-chances of individuals and social aggregates in their getting to the top of the authority structure in a society. My research is motivated mainly by my attempt to model 164

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leadership selection in China from the perspective of the new institutionalism. The background of my research is the leadership transition in the reform era, which has given China a new political elite, manifesting both innovative change and historical continuity with the revolutionary and charismatic elite that has preceded it. Practices of leadership selection are re-forged, resulting in new types of career ladders and pathways. I focus on the new elite at the top leadership level and at the level of the few hundreds who are most significant politically both at the national stage and in the provinces of the PRC. I combine the demographic data from these leaders and the insights from the new institutionalism to study elite formation in the reform era. In the following I summarize the major findings reported in this book and then explain my modest contributions to Chinese studies.

Elite dualism in Chinese socialism I start this book by asking two important questions: is the political elite in China segmented? And if this is indeed the case, what are the structural sources of elite segmentation? I question the conventional wisdom that the political elite in state socialism is monolithic.6 The political elite in the Mao’s era has been viewed as revolutionary mobilizers with low educational attainment, whereas the political elite in the reform era has been hailed as a technocracy.7 This elite homogeneity approach has effectively framed our understanding of elites in state socialism in general and in the PRC in particular. The ruling class in state socialism has been most of the time conceptually considered as an ideological elite with strong unity and narrow differentiation due to a firm belief that the distinctive factor of the socialist system is the imposition of a single party over society and ideology8 and the concentration of political power in the hands of the ruling communist party.9 I understand the effect of a one-party dictatorship on elite structure differently, however. I argue that self-regulation is the key for regime survival in a state socialist country precisely because of power concentration. Unlike the situation in a Western democracy, there is no balance of power to stop or rectify the wrongs done by the political hierarchy in the PRC. The one-party dictatorship has to rely on itself for strategies and tactics for regime survival. Functional differentiation is a crucial element of such selfregulation because it creates the division of labor among the constituents of the political hierarchy, which in turn enhances their cooperation and hence better governance. Functional differentiation kills two birds with one stone not only because the division of labor to a certain degree substitutes for the balance of power in governance but also because it is a within-system innovation that does not require the development of independent institutions outside the ruling hierarchy. 165

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Such an understanding of the one-party dictatorship and functional differentiation encourages me to develop an elite dualism concept to study the leadership structure in China. Drawing insights from the new institutionalism, I observe that institutions comprise the constraints that construct the governance choices and behavior of institutional orders. Constraints arise from the fact that every regime seeks to survive and prosper. Each of the institutional orders in a political hierarchy is established with distinctive norms and rules that govern its activity. Each thus requires a distinctive domain of activity and power, which necessarily calls for the distribution of resources among institutional orders. Surely, each, especially the one in the strategically important position in the political hierarchy, may have an insatiable appetite for grandiose expansion at others’ expenses. For regime survival, such selfish expansions will have to be brought to a halt at a certain point, however. Institutional constraints reflect themselves in that no one institutional order can conveniently annex another and the interests of the political hierarchy can be best served through the division of power among and cooperation of institutional orders. My emphasis on the institutional constraints draws my attention to the essential features of the division of labor between the CCP and government in the reform period, which in turn allows me to account for some major patterns of leadership selection that have prevailed in the Chinese political hierarchy in which functional differentiation and the distribution of resources and capabilities have figured prominently. I examined their relevance for understanding of the dynamics of elite recruitment and stratification in the PRC. I show that new career ladders and pathways have occurred as a by-product of strategic policies designed to solve problems engendered by rapid social and economic restructuring in reforms, namely, upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and improving governance and economic performance. The CCP’s response to these intense pressures has resulted in the erosion of the traditional emphasis on political credentials in elite recruitment and triggered the emergence of a segmented bureaucratic labor market in the reform period. My understanding of institutional arrangements and elite dualism guides the empirical study of leadership selection in the reform period in this book, enabling me to show that political institutions regulate patterns of elite recruitment. How do I demonstrate the effect of institutions on leadership selection in the reform period? I first relate the institutional context to job assignment, proposing that members of the political elite are entrenched within a range of institutional clusters that make up the political hierarchy and are engaged with different institutional activities.10 I focus on the division of labor between the CCP and the government, showing that institutional arrangements are associated with the distribution of different human resources between the government and CCP. The 166

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two political hierarchies selectively recruit leaders with different combinations of career experience, educational attainment, and political credentials. Next, I examine the institutional effects on promotion. I show that there are separate mobility channels within the Chinese political hierarchy. The CCP hierarchy and the government system reward different mixtures of political and human capital in the race toward the top of the political hierarchy in the PRC. The institutional arrangements influence career advancement like what they do with job assignment in the CCP and the Chinese government. I then show the different mobility rates between government officials and CCP cadres and explain the differences in promotion speed from the perspective of functional differentiation. Next, I study the career backgrounds of the current Chinese leaders, showing and explaining the different distributions of career experiences between government officials and CCP cadres. I rely on the concept of internal labor markets to guide my empirical study. Finally, I investigate whether there are variations in co-opting intellectuals and professionals into the political elite between the CCP hierarchy and the government system. I show the manifest difference in political qualifications between co-opted cadres in the CCP hierarchy and their counterparts in the government system. I also show that the government system is more likely to rely on cooptation in recruitment than the CCP hierarchy. With all due caveats, I conclude that institutional distinction in the Chinese political hierarchy has a great impact on job assignment, promotion, the speed of promotion, the distribution of careers among the political elite, and cooptation in the reform era. The government is given the mandate to manage economy and enhance governance, whereas the CCP is mainly concerned with policy making, supervision, and guidance. The government and the CCP hence place different weight on human and political capital in recruitment and promotion. Human and political capital are important factors of elite formation, but their effects are clearly patterned by institutional arrangements. Specifically, all candidates for elite positions in the political hierarchy are screened for human capital and political loyalty, but those on paths to government positions are screened more vigorously for technical credentials and those on paths to the CCP hierarchy are evaluated more vigorously for political loyalty.11 The more technical the tasks of an organization, the more likely that it is led by a cadre with an educational credential. The Chinese bureaucratic labor market is as segmented as the government system and the CCP hierarchy operates according to different selection and promotion criteria, a necessary outcome of distinctive institutional missions pursued by these two political actors. The political leadership generated from the segmented bureaucratic labor market is segmented in terms of different ladders to power. Also, CCP cadres and government 167

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officials differ greatly in educational credentials, CCP seniority, and career experience. The gist of the new institutionalism’s relevance to elite formation is the idea that political institutions structure governance relationships, including those of elite recruitment. Political institutions do make a difference, and political outcomes are institutionally induced.12 My study of institutional distinction and career advancement in the Chinese political hierarchy suggests that elite dualism is a useful framework for elite studies. My study also raises an important question on comparative mobility research: is elite formation in other countries also patterned by institutional arrangements? The answer seems to be positive despite the fact that recruitment channels differ from country to country in institutional locus. Many students of the Soviet Union have treated the Soviet executives and leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union differently.13 Research in France, Japan, the US, and other Western countries has also considered the leadership in politics, economy, education, and other areas as distinctive constituent components of the elites.14 If, say, the financial and political elites in the West were conceptualized as the products of different institutions, recruitment and promotion criteria for these two groups must be different. Nevertheless, there are few comparative studies of leadership selection criteria for different elites. Nor are there many empirical analyses of institutional effects on elite formation. Replications of this study in a Western context will give us an opportunity to examine the extent to which elite formation can be explained by structural arrangements, thereby advancing research on the new institutionalism.

The formation of political-technocracy in the PRC My research on elite dualism in the reform period leads my attention to the class nature of the current political elite in China, a key issue in comparative mobility research and political sociology. Some scholars argue that current Chinese leaders are technocrats whose degrees are in engineering, applied sciences, or management science and whose professional careers are in technical fields such as engineering and economic planning.15 They believe that as communist regimes turn to the practical tasks of governing, political reliability can no longer be the prime criterion for elite recruitment. Some argue for the declining importance of political credentials in leadership selection. 16 Others claim that although: the official slogan for the recruitment and promotion of younger officials was to promote ‘more revolutionary, better educated, more professionally competent, and younger,’ in practice the term ‘more revolutionary’ was difficult to define and highly contentious. The result has been to rely on more objective criteria, 168

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particularly education and age, for selecting the Party elite and state cadres. Because the social sciences were highly suspect in the early part of the PRC, they even remain so today, there has been a very strong tendency to recruit those who have had technical training, particularly engineering, thus giving China’s political elite a very technocratic cast.17 My research on the political elite in China yields little support to these viewpoints, however. I show that elite recruitment is not based wholly on technical expertise. I show the crucial impact of party seniority on leadership selection, especially with regard to that into the CCP hierarchy. The economic and political imperatives of the reform era have accentuated the need for red experts with a deeper familiarity with both technology and political expertise. Candidates for leadership posts must be politically reliable, have the expertise and experience to function within the established hierarchy of the CCP and state institutions, and to cope with the economic complexities inherent in the modern industrial society. They do not need to have the same amount of political and human capital, however. I show in this book that government officials are indeed more likely than CCP cadres to have experience in industry and finance, whereas CCP cadres are more likely than government officials to work in the ideological and propaganda fields. In fact, there are bound to be differences in human and political capital between government officials and CCP cadres because the government and the CCP require different types of leaders to accomplish their distinctive missions. Government officials must command technical expertise to deal with economic and social issues whereas CCP cadres must possess the ability to make policy and provide political leadership. Troubleshooters move up through government bureaucracies, serving in diverse regional and organizational settings. Others make careers in the range of the CCP hierarchy, with more attention to policy concerns. Elite dualism suggests the emergence of a political-technocracy in the reform period. Similar to their counterparts in former Eastern European socialist countries,18 the current Chinese leadership includes both bureaucrats and red experts. The history of former East European socialist societies indicates that political-technocracy is a very stable polity with longevity. The two major components of the political-technocracy; bureaucrats and red experts, need each other very much to stay in power. Bureaucrats are essential for the management and stability of the political hierarchy. Yet they have to rely on technocrats for their advice and expertise and thus need to share power with them, especially with regard to economic spheres. The technocrats cooperate with the bureaucrats to climb up the political hierarchy controlled by the communist party. 169

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Political-technocracy is a very stable polity also because of its ability to co-opt intellectuals and professionals into the power circle. The CCP offers ambitious intellectuals opportunities to climb up the political hierarchy in China, thus leaving few in the state of discontent. The formation of the political-technocracy may reduce the base for dissent among Chinese intellectuals significantly, undermining societal demands for democracy. Like its counterparts in former East European socialist countries, China’s political technocracy may stay in power in the foreseeable future.

Institutional development in China The formation of the political technocracy indicates the progress of institutional development in the reform era. I show that the patterns in leadership selection in 1994 were similar to those in 1988 despite the bloody Tiananmen Incident in 1989. I also show that the patterns of elite recruitment are based on the institutional distinction between the government system and the CCP hierarchy. The division of labor in governance requires the CCP and the government to recruit leaders with different traits to perform different institutional functions. The political technocracy is the product of functional differentiation. These findings are important with regard to institutional development, which refers to the institutionalization of the political process in which political outcomes are determined by laws, rules, norms, and due procedures rather than political dynamics such as mass campaigns, purges, or other extra-legal means. The impact of functional differentiation on elite recruitment embodies the working of formal politics and institutions. Leadership selection is a key component of the political process in China. Hence, the patterns of leadership selection reported in previous chapters symbolize a growing emphasis on formal institutions and rules to govern and manage Chinese economy and society. Such an emphasis helps stabilize socioeconomic situations and ease political tensions with its emphasis on law and due procedures. Additionally, the room for manipulating personal ties in elite recruitment is severely curtailed if functional differentiation is in place. Leadership selection reflects the rationalization of the political process and hence institutional development in the PRC. This trend can be detected by the consistent effects of institutional distinction on recruitment in 1988 and 1994 and the stronger impact of elite dualism in leadership selection in 1994 than in 1988, especially with regard to promotion (Tables 6.3 and 6.4) and mobility rates (Table 7.7). My propositions and hypotheses about the segmented bureaucratic labor market in China receive more support from the 1994 data than the 1988 data, thereby suggesting the increasing institutionalization in the reform era. Needless to say, I am not the first to point out the increasing institutionalization of the political process in China. My contribution to this subject 170

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is empirical evidence of the effect of institutions on leadership selection. Several scholars have similarly pointed out that the leadership transition in the reform era has signaled a significant change in emphasizing bureaucratic efficiency and rationalization.19 This is because efforts to manage an increasingly complex social and economic system have led to a far more consultative policy-making process and the growing importance of political institutions in managing society. The Chinese political system has been in transition from a traditional hierarchical system toward a more modern and rational political system. In the former, activities are guided primarily by traditional relationships within the bureaucratic apparatus, and relations are shaped primarily by informal criteria such as personal connections. In the latter, a wider range of activities is shaped by rule-guided relationships, with a greater role for formal institutional boundaries, accepted rules, and laws.20

Elite stability in China My discussion of institutional development in the reform era encourages me to evaluate elite stability in the PRC. Many China watchers have argued that weak institutions led elite politics to become a game to win or lose all, resulting in the constant regime shifts and elite turnovers.21 For example, the mighty political dynamics unleashed by the Cultural Revolution replaced the planned economy regime established over a period of 17 years by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, paralyzing the entire CCP system and the state bureaucracy. The Cultural Revolution regime was replaced in a Babylonian style of coup d’etat by the Hua Guofeng group in 1976, which in turn was toppled by Deng Xiaoping and his political allies in 1978. Every regime shift brought down a substantial number of leaders at all levels of the political hierarchy.22 A direct political upshot of institutional development in the reform period is increasing elite stability since elite members are recruited to perform institutional functions rather than conduct political agendas advocated by specific leaders. Hence, a leader may disappear from the political stage, the elite as a whole stays. His or her downfall may not affect the political future of his entourages as long as they keep performing institutional functions. Elite stability is institutionally based. This may explain why the demotion of Hu Yaobang in 1987 and the dismissal of Zhao Ziyang in 1989 were essentially two mild hiccups in Chinese politics, in sharp contrast to the relentless purges after the arrest of the “Gang of Four” and the downfall of Hua Guofeng and his “Whatever Faction” in 1978.23 Hua’s followers enthusiastically championed a Maoist version of economic development and state building, forming stumbling blocks to Deng’s reform efforts. They had to leave to make room for reforms to proceed. Their promotions were political appoint171

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ments made by a patrimonial regime and they did not have human capital to be re-educated and reformed to serve Deng’s regime. In comparison, when Hu Yaobang was forced to resign from the CCP general secretaryship in 1987, the comrades he had placed in important central and provincial leadership positions remained basically intact. This is quite interesting because Hu Yaobang was tagged with engaging in “factionalism,” which was one of the charges that led to his downfall.24 Hu Jintao, one of Hu Yaobang’s chief trusted protégés, replaced Jiang Zemin as the General Secretary of the CCP in the Seventeenth Congress of the CCP in November 2002. Clearly, institutional considerations outweigh network connections in determining the political lives of Chinese leaders. Hu Yaobang’s protégés have survived and even been promoted simply because they have been part of the reform process. They were recruited by Hu in the first place to pursue institutional functions regardless whether Hu was in power. Similarly, the 1989 Tiananmen Incident did appear dreadful, but it was only a modest hitch in the reform process. Although Zhao Ziyang was victimized by Deng Xiaoping and other old revolutionary guards, the policy outcomes have remained relatively consistent, and leadership relations have been stable ever since.25 Most of all, elite turnover was kept at a minimum. Elite strife and conflict have indeed become less violent and more institutionalized in the reform era.26 Finally, it is necessary to point out that the characteristics of the elite as a whole rather than specific leaders should be the benchmark for us to determine the degree of elite stability. For example, two elite cohorts will testify elite continuity if they exhibit similar attributes. Whether or not they contain the same individuals is not important with regard to elite stability. And this is exactly what my findings illustrate: the similarity between the 1988 elite and the 1994 elite indicates institutional continuity in leadership selection in China. Elite stability can be best explained from the perspective of institutional development in the reform period.

Contributions to Chinese studies I make four modest contributions to Chinese studies in this book. First, I challenge the conventional view that the political elite in Chinese socialism is monolithic and explain the institutional source of elite dualism. Some scholars have argued for elite segmentation in former Eastern European socialist countries.27 In sharp contrast, elite homogeneity has remained the predominant thesis in Chinese studies. Certainly, some scholars have studied factionalism among the Chinese political elite. Yet they have focused on different policy orientations and political networks as the root of factionalism.28 Overall, the political elite in China has been conveniently 172

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viewed as having ideological unity, common career paths, and similar attributes. Few have ever contemplated elite division in terms of different careers and personal attributes. Even fewer have conceptualized elite segmentation from an institutional perspective.29 In this book, I analyze the political structure in state socialism, pointing out that the emergence of a segmented bureaucratic labor market in the reform era in which the CCP and the government recruit and promote candidates with different career paths and personal attributes respectively. Second, I develop an institutional explanation of elite formation in China. Most existing studies of the political elite in China have relied on a human capital approach, using political and educational credentials to explain leadership selection.30 In contrast, I conceptualize institutional distinction as the independent variable; human and political capital, the intervening variable; and the outcomes of leadership selection, the dependent variable. The findings reported in this book clearly reject the human capital approach. The human capital approach may be a good framework for the study of the CCP elite in Mao’s era since political loyalty was the only criterion in leadership selection in pre-1978 China. Political development in the reform era however requires an institutional approach because of functional differentiation and the resulting elite segmentation. A third and related contribution to Chinese studies is my endeavor to model and show the institutional effects on leadership selection in the reform period. Many scholars believe that China is governed by men, not institutions, and power is vested in individuals, not in established structures of authority.31 Others argue that the institutionalization of the political process has not been achieved in China. Some scholars dispute whether institutionalization is existent in China and insist on the concentration of political power in the hands of a few Chinese leaders.32 Using various statistical procedures, I show patterns of leadership selection in the reform era. The findings reported in this book challenge the conventional wisdoms, calling for attention to institutional development and the effect of institutions on elite politics in the PRC. Institutions matter in China as they do elsewhere. I also reflect on the implications of my findings for institutional development in the reform period. Finally, I endeavor in this book to incorporate the mainstream social science methods into the study of elite behavior in China. Many scholars have used standard statistical procedures to study social stratification in China.33 However, most existing studies of the political elite in China are based on qualitative methods such as case studies. I admire case studies experts deeply for their ability to provide either new evidence or novel interpretations of major political events that provoke controversies and debates, thereby stimulating reflections, imaginations, and contemplations on new theoretical frontiers.34 But case studies and qualitative research are 173

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not enough. A brilliant case study of China may appeal only to a small circle of area specialists. It may also be seriously plagued by incomplete, ambiguous, or conflicting evidence. The lack of extensive quantitative analyses can give a vague, and sometimes contradictory, picture of elite behavior. There destines to be anguishing uncertainties and regrets if nice ideas are not tested quantitatively. The validity and generalizibility of a theory derived from a qualitative study can never be firmly established without systematic verification on larger samples. There is also a potential risk that if qualitative studies become a prevailing fashion and then the dominant method in research on Chinese politics, they can effectively discourage the desirable union of elite studies and the mainstream social sciences from taking place. Against this background, I write this book with both descriptive and analytical goals. My primary descriptive aim is to document changes in the system of careers in the CCP hierarchy and the government system. My analyses are made possible by a carefully collected data set on the current Chinese leadership, from which I am able to reconstruct career histories for top Chinese leaders. I use these data to identify robust career structures in the CCP hierarchy and the government system. Various statistical procedures are used to model patterns of elite recruitment in the reform era. I also draw insights from status attainment research, using its key concepts such as segmentation to guide my empirical analysis. In designing statistical procedures, I benefit enormously from the insights from labor market segmentation theory that returns to human capital vary across different sectors. Some scholars believe firmly that politics among CCP elites remains so free-wheeling and explosive as to defy prediction.35 However, the patterns of elite recruitment reported in this book increase my confidence in our ability to explore explanations and predictions about certain if not all aspects of elite behavior in the PRC.

Contributions to sociology I make three modest contributions to sociology. First, I show that status attainment can be best understood by combining educational credentials and institutional distinction. In many studies of status attainment research, “education” is usually measured either by years of schooling or by completion of the next higher level of education, i.e. primary school, secondary school, university, and the like.36 Many elite studies have similarly relied on human capital measures of education instead of academic majors to understand elite mobility.37 However, as I argue in Chapter 1, these measures do not fully reflect the effect of educational achievement on labor market outcomes. I show in this book that the differences in leadership selection between the CCP hierarchy and the government system can be 174

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better detected by using academic majors than by using the human capital measure “university education.” For example, the differences in leadership selection between the government system and the CCP hierarchy reflect themselves the best in the differential mobility effect of educational credentials, especially those in the technical fields. It is necessary to stress that I am not the first one to argue for the importance of educational credentials in research on state attainment. Educational credentialism has long been a popular concept in the social sciences. However, scholars of educational credentialism assume either explicitly or implicitly that the returns to education are linear in different organizational contexts.38 My research shows that different political institutions develop distinct recruitment and promotion criteria. The mobility effect of educational credentials does not remain fixed across structural settings; rather, it is defined by institutional difference. For example, the returns to educational credentials in terms of promotion are higher in the CCP hierarchy than in the government system. Both institutional distinction and educational credentials are needed in modeling careers in the bureaucratic labor market in China. Second, there are many definitions of institutions in the field of the new institutionalism. Some scholars define institutions as the webs of interrelated rules and norms that govern social relationships.39 Others define an institution as a system of behavior or an organization. Still, others conceptualize institutions as formal structures as well as established processes and procedures.40 I approach institutions as the webs of interrelated rules and norms and show that they govern social behavior and provide the framework within which formal structures emerge. Rules and norms give formal structures life, mandates, and power to accomplish their missions. My approach is based entirely on works by Douglass C. North. My study however contributes to the new institutionalism by showing empirically the centrality of rules and norms in defining and developing institutions. Finally, neo-institutional scholars argue that institutions matter in politics. It is beyond the question that institutions also matter in state socialism. What is less clear is how institutions affect political outcomes in state socialism. Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson observe correctly that we: can hardly emphasize enough that neo-institutionalist theory needs empirical social science research in order to substantiate the claim about the existence of institutional effects. Much analysis in neo-institutionalism has been directed towards conceptual matters, distinguishing between various meanings of terms like ‘institution’ or ‘institutionalization’, or towards methodological questions such as the choice of an adequate approach in institutional analysis . . . It is now time to engage in empirical research, 175

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directed towards the main argument in neo-institutionalism . . . In empirical research, we are no longer talking about concepts or theoretical constructs, but real-life institutions and their impact upon politics and society.41 Empirical studies have become increasingly important in advancing our understanding of institutional effects on political processes. Scholars have presented some qualitative studies of institutions and political action in China.42 In this book, I present a quantitative study of the new institutionalism – I relate some of the key neo-institutional concepts to Chinese reality, put forward testable hypotheses, and demonstrate the effect of institutional constraints on elite formation, thus demonstrating the effects of institutions on political behavior. In conclusion, I seek in this book to identify some prominent features of the Chinese political structure that help explain distinctive patterns and recurrent outcomes of elite formation in differently structured areas, namely, the CCP hierarchy and the Chinese government system. Hopefully, the concepts and methods proposed in this book may be used as a reference point for institutional analysis of Chinese politics in the years to come as more sophisticated methods and better models become available.

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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

Elite studies command a rich intellectual tradition, contributing to the social sciences in a significant way. Yet quantitative research on political elites is a relatively recent endeavor, which often displays the limitations of a still-emerging specialism and a relative paucity of extensive empirical data and statistical models. In this section, I discuss three key issues in my empirical study of leadership selection in China: the definition of the political elite; status attainment models and elite studies; and data collection and coding procedures.

Defining the political elite in China Generally speaking, there are three methods – reputational analysis, decisional analysis, and a positional approach – in identifying political elites. The nature of state socialism dictates that I use the positional approach to define the political elite in the PRC. Why are the other two methods not chosen? First, reputational analysis relies mainly on informal reputations for power. Some researchers seek to identify power holders by querying informants who are presumed to have observed political machines from close up. The strength of this approach is its reliance on informed insiders with some insights into political processes. This approach has been used to study political elites in both capitalist and socialist countries.1 However, reputational analysis appears to be more appropriate for research on community leaders than on national elites because of the difficulty in gaining access to top leaders. Elites are by their very nature difficult to penetrate. They establish various barriers that set their members apart from the rest of society.2 Political leaders in state socialism are reputed for isolating themselves from ordinary citizens. Furthermore, many scholars point out that errors in choosing informants may irreparably bias the results. The respondents may not be as close to policymakers as they would like to think. It is also likely that their testimony is based on hearsay or rumors.3 An alternative approach is decisional analysis, which is based on the 177

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assumption that if political power is defined in terms of influence over government activities, a researcher can identify the members of a political elite by pinpointing those who successfully initiate or veto important proposals.4 However, patterns of power may vary systematically from issue to issue and bias in the selection of the decisions to be studied may produce misleading findings.5 Furthermore, it is fruitless to use this approach in state socialist society since political decisions are made behind the scene. Thus, many scholars adopt the positional approach that defines political elites as those who hold formal leadership positions in a political hierarchy. The formal institutions of government provide a good map of power relations. Incumbents of high positions in those institutions are likely to be politically powerful – people derive power from institutional roles.6 Thus, political elites in the West are often identified according to their institutional positions. This procedure is acceptable especially when political institutions are well established and relatively stable.7 For example, G. William Domhoff and others emphasize membership in the controlling institutions and key decision-making groups in defining the elites in the USA.8 Scholars similarly equate political elites in state socialism with the leadership in political institutions.9 There are good reasons for doing so. The dictatorship of state socialism decidedly effaces alternative elites or counter-elites, be it political, military, or cultural.10 Hence, career advancement in a communist political hierarchy represents the most important avenue of upward mobility in state socialist societies. Whether the hierarchy in question is that of a communist party apparatus, a government bureau, or whatever, such an office can be regarded as bestowing membership of the ruling political elite. It is access to political power as embodied in various levels of administrative offices in one of the command systems that forms the main basis of power and privilege.11 It is necessary to emphasize that such access is in essence conditioned by the nomenklatura system, or the cadre management system of the ruling communist party. The system is characterized by a pyramid, the base of which is the society at large, with the apex located in the Politburo of the ruling communist party. It is carefully guarded by rigid regulations about who is entitled to move upwards and how that move should be accomplished.12 Power and privileges are unequally distributed and closely related to the political hierarchy in state socialism.13 Many scholars thus assume with justifiable reasons that the role and structure of the partystate offer a ready-made solution to the identification problem. Hence, many scholars rely on the positional approach to study the political elite in China.14 In a comparative perspective, many students of Soviet politics also define political elitehood in terms of official position. Some view the Soviet elite as the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).15 Others regard the members of 178

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the Central Committee of the CPSU as the political elite since they were not only the chief party leaders at the center, but also leading figures in the various branches of government, regional first party secretaries, and leaders of government apparatus at the central and regional levels in the Soviet Union.16 Students of East European socialism, such as Ivan Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi, rely on the similar criteria to define the political elite in Hungary and Poland.17 I follow this practice in defining the political elite in the PRC. I observe that important organizations that elevate their leaders into national elite status in China include central bureaus and departments of the CCP, the State Council (i.e. the central government), and provincial governments. Many leaders from these bureaucratic agencies are or were members of the Central Committee of the CCP, the CCP’s statutory policy-making body. They make important decisions concerning military, administration, and local matters in China.18 Administrative organizations always provide a marvelously precise official definition of superordinate and subordinate job levels in the government system and the CCP hierarchy since the PRC regime is stratified mainly by official ranks. I thus consider the process of political recruitment centering on what is acknowledged as the principal political institutions in the PRC, namely, the CCP and the government system. My selection criterion excludes several categories of officials such as legislators, diplomats, military officers, and judges. It is certainly desirable to include them in my study. But data unavailability prevents such an inclusion. Fortunately, their exclusion does not undermine the importance of my study. First, unlike the sampled political leaders for this study, they are “provincial” in the sense that their political influence is mainly confined within their jurisdictions. Second, the military, the judiciary, as well as the national legislature are important political actors in China. However, the judiciary and the national legislature are subordinate to the CCP or government hierarchy. The military has been a key political player in China and certainly deserves careful study. Yet it has undertaken a process of professionalism since the late 1980s.19 Its impact on policy making and implementation is restricted when compared to the CCP and the government. In a sense, the leaderships in these excluded political constituents is to some extent already represented in the sample I use for this study.

Status attainment models and elite studies I rely on conventional status attainment models widely used in social science research to study the relationship between elite dualism and leadership selection in China. Robert D. Putnam observes that individuals toward the bottom of the political stratification system lack nearly all the prerequisites (such as education and wealth) for exercising political power, 179

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whereas those toward the top have these characteristics in abundance. For example, college graduates are statistically over-represented in political elites.20 Putnam concludes that: The disproportionate advantage of male, educated, high-status elite recruits increases as we move up the political stratification system. This ‘law of increasing disproportion’ seems to apply to nearly every political system, no matter how we measure political and social status, the higher the level of political authority, the greater the representation for high-status social groups.21 Other scholars similarly point out that: each country has its own pattern of political recruitment and pathways to political power. But everywhere the consequences of political recruitment are similar: the political elite is not like the rest of the population. In comparison with the general population, political leaders are always better educated, wealthier, more frequently male, and disproportionately drawn from the majority ethnic groups.22 There must be a positive correlation between an individual’s place in the political stratification system and his or her place in the social hierarchy. The powerful are the “healthy,” wealthy, prestigious, and presumably “wise.”23 If political systems are indeed stratified much as sociologists speak of social stratification, it makes good sense for students of political elites to follow conventional status attainment models. As a matter of fact, studies of leadership selection in the West indicate that the usual predictors of socio-economic achievement such as education and age explain elite recruitment effectively.24 Research on state socialism similarly shows that social-demographic factors are good predictors of elite formation and stratification.25 The personal attributes included in these studies are age/year of birth; ethnic background; character of place of birth and/or locale of early childhood (rural/urban dimension or in terms of economic or geographic characteristics); family social background and standing; amount of formal education; academic major; year of party entry, and the like.26 There demographic measures are exploited in my study of leadership selection in the reform era.

Data collection Students of political elites have been confronted by either political restriction on data collection or limited access to elites. As a result, many of them 180

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have resorted to exploratory studies using qualitative methods and data.27 Avery Goldstein suggests that ideally one would like to amass a very large data base of cases that fit the conditions set forth in a theory and subject it to statistical analysis. In the PRC, however, such statistical testing was not feasible. Unrestrictive “freedom to interview individuals and research party archives on sensitive political matters cannot be had.”28 Andrew Walder concludes that research on the “redistributive elite” has not brought empirical evidence to bear directly upon propositions about career advancement and elite status in state socialist societies because past political restrictions prevented the collection or examination of communist party membership data and the publication of analyses that included this variable.29 Fortunately, the research environment has changed substantially after the sudden and unexpected collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe in 1989. Surveys and interview techniques have been exploited to collect data on the political elites in that region. The most substantial interview-based studies in post-1989 Eastern Europe have focused upon a group of about 1,800 individuals who had occupied positions in the communist political hierarchy in 1988, and upon the same or different individuals who occupied elite positions in 1993, with each of whom the All-Russian Center for the Study of Political Opinion conducted a standardized interview. A number of journal articles and books have been written using the data set.30 Chinese reforms have also delivered a greater degree of data accessibility to China scholars.31 Surely, direct access to the Chinese leadership has remained restrictive or impossible. However, resort can be made to data collection from standard biographic directories. And many China scholars have done so.32 As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the main data source for this study is Who’s Who in China – Current Leaders, compiled for 1989 and 1994 respectively.33 Such printed biographical sources have been frequently used to identify leading figures in both capitalist and socialist societies.34 To a certain extent, gathering information from printed biographical sources is a proxy survey since both methods provide information on key variables such age, gender, ethnicity, educational credentials, institutional affiliation, party membership, and the like. It is also necessary to point out that printed biographical sources allow much larger data sets to be collected than interviews and are in principle less open to retrospective adjustment. What about the reliability and accuracy of the printed biographical data used in this study? Biographical data collection usually is based on selfreporting, and most people paint as positive a picture of themselves as they can when providing information for public consumption. This notwithstanding, demographic data on elites provided by communist official sources are usually reliable. Even during the Cold-War era when the Soviet 181

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Union carefully protected its “state secrets,” Western scholars discovered a very high degree of data reliability and accuracy reflected in demographic information and career entries of the Soviet leaders.35 Biographical data on the Chinese political elite from Who’s Who compilations are similarly quite reliable and accurate. To further establish my confidence in the reliability and accuracy of the data set, I used other data sources to crossexamine the information presented in Who’s Who.36 No significant discrepancies have been detected. What about data currency? The data set used for this book represents the most extensive and up-to-date information about the political elite in China.37 Yet it contains information on the Chinese leaders in 1988 and 1994. A more up-to-date data set is certainly desirable. However, it is not essential for this study. I am not a political commentator of current affairs. Rather, my goal is to report patterns of elite formation in the PRC and conduct an empirical study of the new institutionalism, using information on China’s leaders primarily to serve theoretical elaboration. Having said that, I argue that the trends I identify between 1988 and 1994 have continued. My argument is based on incomplete information on the Chinese leadership, however. The data set I use for this book is quite impressive. But it is rather unfortunate that data on the post-1994 Chinese leadership is scarce and incomplete. The best source of the post-1994 Chinese elite I can identify is Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders 1998 by the Data Center of the Xinhua News Agency, which includes 850 top government officials and CCP cadres.38 Most cases do not contain useful information. There are only 196 cases with solid data on both age and educational attainment. I find that 82.8 percent of the government officials have a university education, as compared with 73.8 percent of the CCP cadres. I also find that the mean age for the government officials is 59.4 years old and their mean party seniority is 33.6 years. The corresponding figures for the CCP cadres are 62.4 years old and 39.5 years respectively. The differences in the mean age and mean party seniority between the government officials and CCP cadres are statistically significant at 0.01 level as the F-statistics are 13.748 and 12.841. These findings are similar to those reported in Chapter 5 and are consistent with my argument that government officials are better educated than the CCP cadres yet have a lower party seniority than the CCP cadres. Although these findings are derived from a small and unrepresentative sample, they strengthen elite dualism and also give me confidence that the trends I demonstrate in this book are not simply historical precedents. Rather, they are part of the regular patterns of Chinese politics. As a matter of fact, I am not surprised by these findings. As I mention repeatedly in this book, the political elite is the product of political institutions. Elite dualism is generated by the CCP’s need to uphold its leadership and develop China’s economy simultaneously and by the fact that functional differentiation in gover182

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nance is the best option for the CCP to achieve its objectives. As long as these institutional mandates remain unchanged, they will build up institutional arrangements for elite dualism to exist. There will be continuity in elite recruitment and consequently elite composition.

Coding procedures The last issue I address in this appendix is coding procedures used for this book. How did I code cases and variables from the data set? As noted above, the Chinese political leadership is an institutionalized power elite – eliteness inheres in the office, not in the occupant.39 Thus, I treated each case as a person-position, so that, for example, a provincial governor who is also a deputy provincial party secretary would be represented by two separate observations for each post, namely, one for governorship and the other for deputy secretaryship. This coding procedure matches the methodological expectation of status attainment research – it is the personal attributes of a person, rather than the person himself/herself, that are of central importance in estimating factors of status attainment.40 Finally, most elite studies have so far relied on cross-sectional data. Such data facilitate particular research purposes in comparing inter-group differences, but they are inadequate for studying changes over time and pinpointing trends in leadership selection in China. In comparison, my research is based on two data sets over an extended period (from 1988 to 1994), which helps disclose patterns of elite recruitment that have occurred over time. Of course, leadership selection can be examined longitudinally by following a single cohort through their entire careers rather than cross-sectionally at two points in time. A cohort study has the advantage of following the same individuals and effectively controlling all personal attributes. However, given the difficulties of obtaining longitudinal data for an entire career, of controlling for cohort effects (some entering cohorts may be better qualified than others), and of controlling for period effects (some periods emphasize political loyalty more than others), longitudinal analysis was judged too unwieldy and also impossible for my study. Instead, crosssectional analyses of the institutional effect on leadership selection are performed for the two time periods (1988 and 1994). There are some difficulties in inferring patterns from cross-sectional analysis.41 Nevertheless, by replicating the analyses in the two different periods, I can discern whether institutional arrangements exhibit similar effects when different cohorts are in power.

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PREFACE 1 Douglass C. North, “Economic Performance Through Time,” pp. 247–57 in Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee (eds) The New Institutionalism in Sociology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998), p. 255. 2 Michael Urban, An Algebra of Soviet Power: Elite Circulation in the Belorussian Republic 1966–86 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 4; also see Rudole Tokes, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 211. 3 For similar arguments see A. Kaminski and J. Kurzewska, “Strategies of PostCommunist Transformations: Elites as Institution Builders,” pp. 131–52 in B. Grancelli (ed.) Social Change and Modernization: Lesson from Eastern Europe (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995). 4 Thmonthy Y. Colton, “Introduction,” pp. 1–4 in Thmonthy Y. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds) Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder: Westview, 1995), p. 2; also see Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Dualism, Educational Credentials, and Elite Stratification in China,” Sociological Perspectives 44/2 (2001b), pp. 189–205; Xueguang Zhou, “Partial Reform and the Chinese Bureaucracy in the Post-Mao Era,” Comparative Political Studies 28/3 (1995), pp. 440–68. 5 See North 1998 (footnote 1), p. 247. 6 The huge deficits the PRC has suffered from its trade relations with Taiwan have been basically the result of its political considerations for a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. 7 Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 3. 8 An exception is David M. Lampton’s book titled Paths to Power: Elite Mobility in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1986), in which he studies four leaders in the PRC. 9 Zheng 1997 (footnote 7). 10 Avery Goldstein, From Bandwagon to Balance-of-Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949–1978 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). 11 David Bachman, Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 12 Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 13 David M. Lampton (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

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14 Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 15 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 16 Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 17 Melanie Manion, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 18 Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 19 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, The New Institutional Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 20. 1 INTRODUCTION 1 Examples include Jing Hung, Factionalism in Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds) Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 2 Only two books on elites in post-Mao China have been published so far: Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) and Cheng Li, China’s Leaders (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). These two monographs contribute to our understanding of elite formation in China. Yet their research questions focus on the emergency of technocracy and thus are different from those of this book. 3 The concept of elite dualism is based on Andrew Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review 60/3 (1995), pp. 309–28. I discuss this point in detail in Chapter 2. 4 John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 18 (1987), p. 54; also see John P. Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990 Nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (June 1994), pp. 458–91. 5 For example, Cheng Li (2001, footnote 2) used part of the 1994 data to study the current Chinese leadership. 6 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China; Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989); The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China; Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994); The Data Center of the Xinhua News Agency, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: China Yearbook Publishing Limited, 1998). 7 For example, Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White use printed biographical sources in addition to interview materials in their research on the Soviet elite. See Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. xii-xvi. In fact, many scholars consider the entries in Who’s Who as elite members. See Mattei Dogan and John Higley, “Elites, Crisis, and Regimes in Comparative Analysis,” pp. 3–27 in Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds) Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield 1998), p. 14; Alan Knight, “Historical and Theoretical Considerations,” pp. 29–45 in Dogan and

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8 9

10 11

12 13

14

Higley 1998 (footnote 7), p. 40; Michael Useem and Jerome Karabel, “Pathways to Top Corporate Management”, American Sociological Review 51/2 (1986), pp. 184–200; Stephen White and Olga Kryshtanovskaya, “Russia: Elite Continuity and Change,” pp. 125–46 in Dogan and Higley 1998 (footnote 7), p. 133. James Mulvenon (ed.), China: Facts &Figures (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, various years); Radiopress, Inc. (ed.), China Directory (Radiopress, Inc., various years). The following sources were used to check the data presented in Who’s Who: Cai Kaisong and Yu Xinfeng et al., Ershi shiji zhongguo mingren cidian (A Dictionary of the 20th Century Chinese Celebrity Biographies) (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 1991); Li Fangshi, et al., Zhongguo renwu nianjian (Yearbook of Important Figures in China) (Beijing: Huayi Chubanshe, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1994); Liu Jintian, et al., Lijie zhonggong zhongyang weiyuan renming cidian, 1921–1987 (A Dictionary of Members of the Central Committees of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–1987) (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 1992); Wang Xiaopeng, et al., Zhongguo yidai zhengjie yaoren (Prominent Politicians in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 1994); Wei Pingyi, et al., Gongheguo yaoren lu (A Dictionary of Important Figures in the PRC) (Changchun: Jilin Renming Chubanshe, 1994); Yong Guiliang, Zhongguo dandai shehui huodongjia cidian (A Dictionary of Social Activists in Contemporary China) (Beijing Xuewan Chubanshe, 1990); Zhang Liqun et al., Zhongguo renwu nianjian (Yearbook of Important Figures in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe, 1996); Zhang Shengzuo et al., Dandai zhongguo shaoshuminzu mingren lu (A Dictionary of Important Minority Figures in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Huawen Chubanshe, 1992). See Michael Urban, An Algebra of Soviet Power: Elite Circulation in the Belorussian Republic 1966–86 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 6. For UK see George Borthwick, Daniel Ellingworth, Colin Bell, and Donald MacKenzie, “The Social Background of British MPs,” Sociology 25/4 (1991), pp. 713–17; Martin Holland, “The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates,” Parliamentary Affairs 34/2 (1987), pp. 28–46; Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, “Women Candidates for Parliament: Transforming the Agenda?”, British Journal of Political Science 19/1 (1989), pp. 106–15; Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); for the US and Japan see Burke D Grandjean, “History and Career in A Bureaucratic Labor Market,” American Journal of Sociology 86/6 (1981), pp. 1057–92; Hiroshi Ishida, Seymour Spilerman and Kuo-Hsien Su, “Educational Credentials and Promotion Chances in Japanese and American Organizations,” American Sociological Review 62/6 (1997), pp. 866–82; Useem and Karabel 1986 (footnote 7). Andre Elias Mazawi and Abraham Yogev, “Elite Formation under Occupation,” British Journal of Sociology 50/3 (1999), pp. 397–418. Examples include Li 2001 (footnote 2); Xiaowei Zang, “University Education, Party Seniority, and Elite Recruitment in China,” Social Science Research 30/1(2001a), pp. 62–75; Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Dualism, Educational Credentials, and Elite Stratification in China,” Sociological Perspectives 44/2 (2001b), pp. 189–205. Yanjie Bian, “Bringing Strong Ties Back In,” American Sociological Review 62 (1997), pp. 366–85; Yanjie Bian and John R. Logan, “Market Transition and

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15 16 17 18

19 20

21

the Persistence of Power,” American Sociological Review 61/5 (1996), pp. 739–58; Walder 1995 (footnote 3); Walder, Andrew, Bobai Li, and Donald J. Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in A State Socialist Regime,” American Sociological Review 65/2 (2000), pp. 191–209; Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Transformation and Recruitment in Post-Mao China,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 26/1 (1998a), pp. 39–57; Xueguang Zhou, “Partial Reform and the Chinese Bureaucracy in the Post-Mao Era,” Comparative Political Studies 28/3 (1995), pp. 440–68; Xueguang Zhou, Nancy Brandon Tuma, and Phyllis Moen, “Stratification Dynamics under State Socialism: The Case of Urban China,” Social Forces 74/3 (1996), pp. 759–96. Zang 2001a (footnote 13); also see Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg (eds), Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 146. A. Doak Barnettt, “Social Stratification and Aspects of Personnel Management in the Chinese Communist Bureaucracy,” The China Quarterly 28 (1966), p. 16. Lee 1991 (footnote 2), p. 47. Bian 1997 (footnote 14); Scott R. Eliason, “An Extension of the SorensenKalleberg Theory of the Labor Market Matching and Attainment Processes,” American Sociological Review 60/2 (1995), pp. 247–71; Arthur Sakamoto and Daniel A. Powers, “Education and the Dual Labor Market for Japanese Men,” American Sociological Review 60/2 (1995), pp. 222–46; Walder 1995 (footnote 14); John Robert Warren and Robert M. Hauser, “Social Stratification across Three Generations,” American Sociological Review 62/4 (1997), pp. 561–72; Zang 1998a (footnote 14); Xueguang Zhou, “Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China: Evidence from Panel Data,” American Journal of Sociology 105/4 (2000), pp. 1135–74; Xueguang Zhou, Nancy Brandon Tuma, and Phyllis Moen 1997 “Institutional Change and JobShift Patterns in Urban China, 1949 to 1994,” American Sociological Review 62/3 (1997), pp. 339–65. Bian 1997 (footnote 14); Bian and Logan 1996 (footnote 14); Walder 1995 (footnote 14); Zang 1998a (footnote 14); Zang 2001a (footnote 13); Zang 2001b (footnote 13); Zhou et al. 1997 (footnote 18). Duane F. Alwin, “College Effects on Educational and Occupational Attainments,” American Sociological Review 39/2 (1974), pp. 210–23; Ishida, Spilerman and Su 1997 (footnote 11); Margaret Mooney Marini and Pi-Ling Fan, “The Gender Gap in Earnings at Career Entry,” American Sociological Review 62/4 (1997), pp. 588–604; Seymour Spilerman and Tormod Lunde, “Features of Educational Attainment and Job Promotion Prospects,” American Journal of Sociology 97/3 (1992), pp. 689–720; Useem and Karabel 1986 (footnote 7). J-L Bodiguel, “Political and Administrative Traditions and the French Senior Civil Service,” International Journal of Public Administration 13/5 (1990), pp. 707–40; Randall Collins, The Credential Society (New York: Academic Press, 1979); Peter W. Cookson and Caroline Hodges Persell, Preparing for Power (New York: Basic Books, 1985); G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood: Prentice-Hall, 1969); G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles (New York: Random House, 1970); G. William Domhoff, The Power That Be (New York: Random House, 1979); Charles Kadushin, “Friendship among the French Financial Elite,” American Sociological Review 60/2 (1995), pp. 802–21; Jean Marceau, A Family Business? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Meyer, “The Charter,” pp. 564–78 in W. Richard Scott (ed.) Social Processes and Social Structure. (New York: Holt, Rinehart,

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22

23 24 25 26 27

28 29

30 31 32 33 34

1970); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Anthony Mughan and Samuel Charles Patterson (eds), Political Leadership in Democratic Societies (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1992); Caroline Hodges Persell and Peter W. Cookson, “Chartering and Bartering: Elite Education and Social Reproduction,” Social Problems 33/2 (1985), pp. 114–29; Ezra N. Suleiman, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Joh Urry Wakeford and John Wakeford (eds), Power in Britain (London: Heineman Educational Books, 1973). Richard B. Freeman, The Over-Educated American (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Russell W. Rumberger, Overeducation in the U.S Labor Market (New York: Praeger, 1981); James W. Shockey, “Overeducation and Earnings,” American Sociological Review 54/5 (1989), pp. 856–64. Ishida, Spilerman, and Su 1997 (footnote 11); Useem and Karabel 1986 (footnote 7). Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, III (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 1,000. Jaap Dronkers and Seraphine M.M. Hillege, “Board Membership of Traditional Male Fraternities and Access to Dutch Elites: A Disappearing Avenue to Elite Positions?” European Sociological Review 14/2 (1998), p. 194. Dronkers and Hillege 1998 (footnote 25); Ishida et al. 1997 (footnote 11); Spilerman and Lunde 1991 (footnote 20); Useem and Karabel 1986 (footnote 7). Neil Fligstein, “The Intraorganizational Power Struggle: The Rise of Finance Presidents in Large Firms, 1919–79,” American Sociological Review 52/1 (1987), pp. 44–58; Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number One (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1979), pp. 55–7. Kenneth C. Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 60–2; Eric Hanley, Natasha Yershova, and Richard Anderson, “Russia – Old Wine in A New Bottle? The Circulation and Reproduction of Russian Elites, 1983–1993,” Theory and Society 24/5 (1995), p. 665. White and Kryshtanovskaya 1998 (footnote 7), p. 138. Lee 1991 (footnote 2), pp. 387, 402. Lee 1991 (footnote 2). William A. Welsh, Leaders and Elites (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p. 23. See John A. Armstrong, The European Administrative Elite (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 14; also see Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), pp. 3–13. 2 AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF ELITE DUALISM IN CHINA

1 The Four Cardinal Principles are (1) upholding the CCP’s leadership in China, (2) upholding Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought, (3) upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship, and (4) upholding socialism. The Four Modernizations are the modernizations of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. 2 Avery Goldstein, From Bandwagon to Balance-of-Power Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 3. 3 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78/3

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4

5 6 7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20

(1984), pp. 734–49; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989); Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, The New Institutional Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 31; Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “Introduction,” pp. 1–38 in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1991). Lane and Ersson 2000 (footnote 3), pp. 1–2; DiMaggio and Powell 1991 (footnote 3), pp. 1–3; also see Ellen M. Immergut, “The Theoretic Core of the New Institutionalism,” Politics & Society 26/1 (1998), pp. 5–34; Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the New Institutionalism,” Political Studies 44/5 (1996), pp. 936–57. Douglass C. North, “Economic Performance Through Time,” pp. 247–57 in Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee (eds) The New Institutionalism in Sociology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998), p. 249. See Lane and Ersson 2000 (footnote 3), pp. 23–9. Nina P. Halpern, “Information Flows and Policy Coordination in the Chinese Bureaucracy,” pp. 125–48 in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 128. See Kevin J. O’Brien, Reform without Liberalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kevin J. O’Brien, “Agents and Remonstrators,” The China Quarterly 138 (1994), pp. 359–80; Murray Scot Tanner, “The Erosion of Communist Party Control over Lawmaking in China,” The China Quarterly 138 (1994), pp. 381–403; Murray Scot Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes, and Democratic Prospects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). Examples include Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bring the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 19. Shiping Zheng holds a similar view. See Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park, Cali.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 82. Goldstein 1991 (footnote 2), p. 29. See Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), pp. 9–12. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1964). Goldstein 1991 (footnote 2), p. 48. Amatai Etzioni, “Dual Leadership in Complex Organizations,” American Sociological Review 30/5 (1965), pp. 688–98; Henry A. Walker and Mary L. Fennell, “Gender Differences in Role Differentiation and Organizational Task Performance,” Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986), pp. 255–75. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel C. Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 40. See Michel C. Oksenberg, “Policy Making under Mao, 1949–68: An Overview,” pp. 79–115 in John M. Lindbeck (ed.), China: Management of A Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971). Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 11–12.

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21 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 (footnote 18), p. 13. 22 Huang 2000 (footnote 20), p. 215. 23 Lane and Ersson 2000 (footnote 3), pp. 50–1; also see Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Organization (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1986). 24 Susan L. Shirk, “The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform,” pp. 59–91 in Lieberthal and Lampton 1992 (footnote 7), p. 62; also see Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 25 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 (footnote 18), p. 63. 26 Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949–1976 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 4, 70. 27 Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: Seabury Press, 1979). 28 Oksenberg 1971 (footnote 19), p. 105. 29 Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984a), p. 303. 30 Lowell Dittmer, “Patterns of Elite Strife and Succession in Chinese Politics,” The China Quarterly 123 (1990), pp. 428–30; Huang 2000 (footnote 20), pp. 12–18, 211–59. 31 Oksenberg, 1971 (footnote 19), p. 93. 32 Richard Diao, “The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on China’s Economic Elite,” The China Quarterly 42 (1970), pp. 67, 69. 33 Huang 2000 (footnote 20), p. 292. 34 Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), p. 50. 35 Zhou Enlai, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981), pp. 174–5. 36 Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), pp. 82, 100. 37 Goldstein 1991 (footnote 2), p. 83; Huang 200 (footnote 20); Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), p. 100. 38 Quoted from Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), p. 90. 39 Carol Lee Hamrin, “The Party Leadership System,” pp. 95–124 in Lieberthal and Lampton 1992 (footnote 7), p. 98. 40 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 (footnote 18), pp. 398–99. 41 Harding 1981 (footnote 26), p. 105. 42 Kenneth Lieberthal, “Introduction,” pp. 1–30 in Lieberthal and Lampton 1992 (footnote 7), pp. 25–6; also see Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution (Washington D.C.: The Brook Institution, 1987). 43 Harding 1981 (footnote 26), pp. 66, 85. 44 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 (footnote 18), p. 404. 45 David S. G. Goodman, “The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People’s Republic of China, 1967–1979: An Obituary,” The China Quarterly 85 (1981), pp. 72–3. 46 Oksenberg 1971 (footnote 19), pp. 98, 100, 109–10. 47 David Bachman, Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 14, 237, 239. 48 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 (footnote 18). 49 Lieberthal 1992 (footnote 42), pp. 25–6; also see Harding 1987 (footnote 42). 50 Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), p. 16. 51 Bachman 1991 (footnote 47), pp. 32–6, 48; Huang 2000 (footnote 20), p. 69; Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), pp. 49–50. 52 Lieberthal 1992 (footnote 42), p. 28. 53 Oksenberg 1971 (footnote 19), p. 104.

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54 Oksenberg 1971 (footnote 19), p. 109; also see Lieberthal 1992 (footnote 42), p. 7; Hamrin 1992 (footnote 39), p. 98. 55 Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), p. 20. 56 See Harding 1981 (footnote 26); Huang 2000 (footnote 20); Zheng 1997 (footnote 11). 57 Huang 2000 (footnote 20), p. 351. 58 Deng was toppled from his CCP general secretaryship in 1966. He came back in 1974 as a vice chairman of the CCP and vice premier of the PRC, only to be deposed again in April 1976. For details see Huang 2000 (footnote 20); Zheng 1997 (footnote 11). 59 Murray Scot, “Ideological Struggle over Police Reform, 1988–1993,” pp. 111–28 in Edwin A. Winckler (ed.) Transition from Communism in China: Institutional and Comparative Analyses (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999a); Gordon White, “The Decline of Ideocracy,” pp. 21–33 in Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove (eds) China in the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1995); Yan Sun, The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism, 1976–1992 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ben Xu, Disenchanted Democracy: Chinese Cultural Criticism after 1989 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Wei-Wei Zhang, Ideology and Economic Reform under Deng Xiaoping, 1978–1993 (London: Kegan Paul International, 1996). 60 Reformers and conservatives also have had different opinions about the degree of market transition in China. See Harding 1987 (footnote 42). 61 Dittmer 1990 (footnote 30), p. 411; Winckler 1999a (footnote 59); also see Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). 62 Deng Xiaoping, “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” pp. 302–25 in Deng 1984a (footnote 29). 63 Deng 1984a (footnote 29), p. 178. 64 Lowell Dittmer, “The 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China,” The China Quarterly 93 (1983), pp. 111–12. 65 Zheng 1997 (footnote 11). 66 Zhang 1996 (footnote 59); Winckler 1999a (footnote 59). 67 Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), pp. 20, 161–90, 257. 68 Barrett L. McCormick, Political Reform in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); O’Brien 1990 (footnote 8); O’Brien 1994 (footnote 8); Tanner 1994 (footnote 8); Tanner 1998 (footnote 8). 69 Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), pp. 195–6. 70 Shirk 1992 (footnote 24), pp. 66, 68. 71 Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), pp. 196–7. 72 David Bachman, “The Limits on Leadership in China,” Asian Survey 32/11 (1992), p. 1,062. 73 Lieberthal 1992 (footnote 42), pp. 25–6; also see Harding 1987 (footnote 42); Zheng 1997 (footnote 11). 74 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 (footnote 18), p. 137; David Lampton, “A Plum for A Peach: Bargaining, Interest and Bureaucratic Politics in China,” pp. 33–58 in Lieberthal and Lampton 1992 (footnote 7). 75 Lieberthal 1992 (footnote 42), p. 8; Lampton 1992 (footnote 74), p. 35; Halpern 1992 (footnote 7), p. 125; Shirk 1992 (footnote 24), p. 69. 76 Bachman 1992 (footnote 72), pp. 1056–7. 77 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 (footnote 18), pp. 17, 137.

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78 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 (footnote 18), p. 137. 79 Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), p. 264; also see O’Brien 1990 (footnote 8). 80 See Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), pp. 106–31, 148–52, 225–54; also Huang 2000 (footnote 20), p. 136. 81 Huang 2000 (footnote 20), pp. 21, 24–5, 106. 82 Zhao Ziyang, “On the Separation of Party and Government,” Xinhua 26 November 1987, FBIS 27 November 1987, pp. 13–16. 83 Bachman 1991 (footnote 47), p. 230; Bachman 1992 (footnote 72); Huang 2000 (footnote 20). 84 Bachman 1991 (footnote 47), p. 230; Bachman 1992 (footnote 72); Huang 2000 (footnote 20), pp. 421–2. 85 Huang 2000 (footnote 20). 86 Bachman 1991 (footnote 47), p. 230. 87 Shirk 1992 (footnote 24), p. 66. 88 For the literature on modernization and new career ladders in organizations, see Katherine Stovel, Michael Savage, and Peter Bearman, “Ascription into Achievement,” American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996), pp. 358–99, especially pp. 360–1 89 Frederic J. Fleron, Communist Studies and the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971); Jerry F. Hough, “The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?” Problems of Communism, 21/2 (1972), pp. 25–45; David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), p. 54; David Lane and Cameron Ross, “Limitations of Party Control: The Government Bureaucracy in the USSR,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 27/1 (1994), pp. 19–38; David Lane and Cameron Ross, “The Social Background and Political Allegiance of the Political Elite of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,” Europe-Asia Studies 46/3 (1994), pp. 437–63; David Lane and Cameron Ross, “The CPSU Ruling Elite 1981–1991:Commonallities and Divisions,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 28/3 (1995), pp. 339–60; Susan Gross Solomon, Pluralism in the Soviet Union (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1971). 90 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 (footnote 18), p. 404. 91 Kenneth C. Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite (New York and Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992), p. 200. 92 Myron Rush, Political Succession in the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 89–96. 93 Lane and Ross 1999 (footnote 89), pp. 6–7, 11–3, 15, 57, 60, 25–9; 111, 185. 94 Zheng 1997 (footnote 11), pp. 18–19. 95 Alan P. Liu, How China Is Ruled (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1986), pp. 160–1. 96 Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 163. 97 Liu 1986 (footnote 95), p. 1161. 98 Xueguang Zhou, “Partial Reform and the Chinese Bureaucracy in the PostMao Era,” Comparative Political Studies 28/3 (1995), p. 443. 99 Andrew Walder, “Sociology of Work: The Case of China,” pp. 448–58 in Cohen Myron (ed.) Case Studies in the Social Sciences (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1992). 100 Huang 2000 (footnote 20), pp. 387–9, 401. 101 Huang 2000 (footnote 20), p. 399. 102 This proposition is based on Andrew Walder, “Career Mobility and the

192

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103

104 105 106 107 108

Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review 60/3 (1995), pp. 309–28. E. M. Beck, Patrick M. Horan, and Charles M. Tolbert, “Stratification in a Dual Economy,” American Sociological Review 43/5 (1978), pp. 704–20; Scott R. Eliason, “An Extension of the Sorensen-Kalleberg Theory of the Labor Market Matching and Attainment Processes,” American Sociological Review 60/2 (1995), pp. 247–71; David M. Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, Segmented Work, Divided Workers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Ted Magnac, “Segmented or Competitive Labor Markets?” Econometrica 59/1 (1991), pp. 165–87. Beck, Horan and Tolbert 1978 (footnote 103), p. 717. DiMaggio and Powell 1991 (footnote 3), p. 14. Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institution,” pp. 51–82 in Hilda Weisburg (ed.) Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon, 1986), p. 74. DiMaggio and Powell 1991 (footnote 3); pp. 7, 9–10. March and Olsen 1989 (footnote 3), p. 5.

3 DUALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1 See Trygve Lotveit, Chinese Communism 1931–1934 (Lund: Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series, No. 16, 1973); Tso-liang Hsiao, Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–1934 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961); Tso-liang Hsiao, The Land Revolution in China, 1930–1934 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969); Shanti Swarup, A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement, 1927–1934 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). 2 Derek J. Waller, “The Evolution of the Chinese Communist Political Elite, 1931–56,” pp. 41–66 in Robert Scalapino (ed.) Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 46. 3 Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 43–5, 69, 90. 4 Waller 1972 (footnote 2), pp. 46–7. 5 Liu Jingtian et al., Lijie Zhonggong Zhongyang weiyuan Reming Zidian, 1921–1987 (A Dictionary of CCP’s Central Committee Members, 1921–1987) (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 1992). 6 Waller 1972 (footnote 2), pp. 48–9. 7 Waller 1972 (footnote 2), p. 49. 8 See Shum Kui-kwong, The Chinese Communists’ Road to Power (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988). 9 Mark Seldon, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 10 Shum 1988 (footnote 8), p. 15. 11 Quoted from Shum 1988 (footnote 8), p. 197. 12 Van Slyke 1967 (footnote 3), pp. 143–5. 13 Shum 1988 (footnote 8), pp. 197, 203–4. 14 Van Slyke 1967 (footnote 3), pp. 147–51. 15 Shum 1988 (footnote 8), pp. 197, 203–4. 16 Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problems of Bureaucracy, 1949–1976 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), p. 91.

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17 Van Slyke 1967 (footnote 3), p. 151. 18 Yungfa Chen, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–45 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 19 Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 25–35; Selden 1971 (footnote 9). 20 See Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 21 In a comparative perspective, less than one-thousandth of the population received college education in China at that time. A graduate of higher education was more than two thousand times more likely than his less-educated compatriot to enter the national political elite. See Derek J. Waller, “The Chinese Communist Political Elite: Continuity and Innovation,” pp. 154–201 in Carl Beck et al. (eds), Comparative Communist Political Leadership (New York: David McKay, 1973), p. 174. 22 Waller 1972 (footnote 2). 23 John Wilson Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 122. 24 Franklin W. Houn, “The Eight Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” The American Political Science Review 51/2 (1957), pp. 392–404. 25 Harding 1981 (footnote 16), p. 32. 26 Donald Klein and John Israel, Rebels and Bureaucrats: China’s December 9ers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 217. 27 Van Slyke 1967 (footnote 3), p. 242. 28 Harding 1981 (footnote 16), p. 175. 29 Heath B. Chamberlain, “Transition and Consolidation in Urban China: A Study of Leaders and Organizations in Three Cities, 1949–53,” pp. 245–301 in Scalapino 1972 (footnote 2), p. 254. 30 Van Slyke 1967 (footnote 3), p. 242. 31 Donald W. Klein, “The State Council and the Cultural Revolution,” pp. in John Wilson Lewis (ed.) Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 362. 32 See Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 41–2; Wang Xian et al., Democratic Parties in Contemporary China (Dandai zhongguo de minzu dangpai) (Beijing: Dandaizhongguo chubanshe, 1999), pp. 54–59; also see Van Slyke 1967 (footnote 3), p. 210. 33 Ezra F. Vogel, “From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The ‘Regularisation’ of Cadres,” The China Quarterly 29 (1967), pp. 37–8, 40, 55. 34 Van Slyke 1967 (footnote 3), p. 222. 35 Harding 1981 (footnote 16), p. 37; Zheng 1997 (footnote 32), p. 80. 36 Lee 1991 (footnote 19), p. 59. 37 Vogel 1967 (footnote 33), pp. 37–8, 40, 55. 38 Chamberlain 1972 (footnote 29), pp. 279–81, 285, 294, 296, 39 Lee 1991 (footnote 19), pp. 49–51; also see Harding 1981 (footnote 16); Yingmao Kau, “The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan, 1949–65,” pp. 216–67 in A. Doak Barnett, Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969); Vogel 1965 (footnote 33), pp. 36–60. 40 Victor C. Falkenheim, “Provincial Leadership in Fukien: 1949–66,” pp. 199–244 in Scalapino 1972 (footnote 2), p. 231. 41 Chalmers Johnson, “The Changing Nature and Locus of Authority in Commu-

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42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

nist China,” pp. 34–76 in John M. H. Lindbeck (ed.) China: Management of A Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p. 35. Van Slyke 1967 (footnote 3), p. 5. Wang 1999 (footnote 32), p. 552. Richard Diao, “The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on China’s Economic Elite,” The China Quarterly 42 (1970), pp. 66–7. Quoted from Don K. Rowney, Transition to Technocracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. xi, 1. Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), p. 61. For the Great Purge see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics of Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); for the emergence of a new elite in the USSR after the Great Purge, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928–1939,” Slavic Review 38/3 (1979), pp. 377–402; Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Chapter 2. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 252. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel C. Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Lee 1991 (footnote 19); also see Klein and Israel 1976 (footnote 26); John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927–1937 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Publications, 1966). Harding 1981 (footnote 16), p. 77. Vogel 1965 (footnote 33). Harding 1981 (footnote 16), pp. 77, 94. Lee 1991 (footnote 19), p. 27; also see Israel 1962 (footnote 50); Israel and Klein 1976 (footnote 26). Israel and Klein 1976 (footnote 26). Lee 1991 (footnote 19), p. 27; also see Israel 1962 (footnote 50); Israel and Klein 1976 (footnote 26). Israel and Klein 1976 (footnote 26), pp. 225–35. Israel and Klein 1976 (footnote 26), p. 227. Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 (footnote 49), pp. 44–5; also see Klein and Israel 1976 (footnote 26); Israel 1962 (footnote 50). Harding 1981 (footnote 16), pp. 91, 188–9, 284. Nina P. Halpern, “Information Flows and Policy Coordination in the Chinese Bureaucracy,” pp. 125–48 in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 129. Diao 1970 (footnote 44), p. 67. Klein 1970 (footnote 31), p. 362. Klein 1970 (footnote 31), p. 362. Lee 1991 (footnote 19); Michel C. Oksenberg, “The Institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly 36 (1968), pp. 61–92 Shum 1988 (footnote 8), pp. 231–2; also Van Slyke 1967 (footnote 3), p. 151. Shum 1988 (footnote 8); Van Slyke 1967 (footnote 3). See Harding 1981 (footnote 16), pp. 29–30. Harding 1981 (footnote 16); Huang 2000 (footnote 20).

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4 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION IN THE REFORM ERA 1 Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 2 Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949–1976 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981); Roderick MacFarquhar, Origins of the Cultural Revolution vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). 3 Huang 2000 (footnote 1). 4 Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 137; also see Richard Diao, “The Impact of the Cultural revolution on China’s Economic Elite,” The China Quarterly 42 (1970), pp. 65–87. 5 Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 81–2. 6 Lee 1991 (footnote 5), p. 27. 7 Harding 1981 (footnote 2), p. 275. 8 Zheng 1997 (footnote 4), pp. 9, 146–8; David S. G. Goodman, “The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People’s Republic of China, 1967–1979: An Obituary,” The China Quarterly 85 (1981), p. 73; also see Harding 1981 (footnote 2); Avery Goldstein, From Bandwagon to Balance-of-Power Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 68. 9 Zheng 1997 (footnote 4), p. 148. 10 Zheng 1997 (footnote 4), p. 148. 11 Goodman 1981 (footnote 8), pp. 70, 72–3. 12 Goodman 1981 (footnote 8), p. 69. 13 Harding 1981 (footnote 2), pp. 301, 305; also see Xiaowei Zang “Professionalism and the Leadership Transition in the Post-Mao Chinese Army,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 13/3 (1991c), pp. 46–60. 14 Zhiyue Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, 1995), p. 71. 15 Diao 1970 (footnote 4), pp. 84–6; Frederick C. Teiwes, Provincial Leadership in China: The Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath (Cornell University, East Asia Papers, 4, 1974). 16 Harding 1981 (footnote 2), p. 285. 17 Lee 1991 (footnote 5); Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986). 18 Melanie Manion, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 45–6. 19 Lee 1991 (footnote 5), Chap. 8. 20 Lee 1991 (footnote 5), Chap. 8. 21 William deB Mills, “Generational Change in China,” Problems of Communism 32/6 (November-December 1983), p. 16. 22 Christopher M. Clarke, “Changing the Context for Policy Implementation: Organizational and Personnel Reform in Post-Mao China,” pp. 25–47 in David M. Lampton (ed.) Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987a), p. 31. 23 The CCP leadership was still a well-educated group as compared with the general population: only eight out of 1,000 employees in China had a college

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24 25 26 27 28 29

30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

education in 1982. In 1949, the total number of college graduates in the entire country was less than 210,000. Between 1949 and 1984, China produced 4.11 million college graduates and 41,800 postgraduate students. See Lee 1991 (footnote 5), pp. 221–2. Lee 1991 (footnote 5), p. 231. Lee 1991 (footnote 5), pp. 231–3. Song Renqiong, “Renzhen jiejue gongzuo mianlin de xin keti,” Hongqi 16 (1980), pp. 2–9; also see Manion 1993 (footnote 18), pp. 10–11. Quoted from Alan P. Liu, How China Is Ruled (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1986), p. 163. Lee 1991 (footnote 5), p. 265. Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers,” Asian Survey 28/4 (1988), pp. 371–99; Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin,” Asian Survey 38/3 (1998), pp. 231–64. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), p. 260–1. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), p. 947; The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), pp. 873–4. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), p. 699. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), p 947; The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 31), p. 873. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), p. 942; The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), p. 870. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), pp. 738–9. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), p. 53. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), pp. 479–80. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), pp. 1,018, The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), pp. 940–1. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), p. 920. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), p. 917; The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), p. 843. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), p. 739. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), p. 786; The Data Center of the Xinhua News Agency, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: China Yearbook Publishing Limited, 1998), p. 367. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), p. 618. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1998 (footnote 41), p. 111. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), p. 844. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), p. 960; The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 31), p. 885 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 31), p. 758; The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), p. 710. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), pp. 130–1. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), p. 196. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), p. 943 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), pp. 512–13. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), p. 578. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), p. 721.

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54 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), p. 668. 55 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), p. 653. 56 Li Cheng, China’s Leaders (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001); Li and White 1988 (footnote 29); Li and White 1998 (footnote 29); Lee 1991 (footnote 5). 57 See David M. Lampton, “The Implementation Problem in Post-Mao China,” pp. 3–24 in Lampton 1987a (footnote 22), p. 20; Lee 1991 (footnote 5); Li and White 1988 (footnote 54); Li Cheng and Lynn White, “Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 121 (1990), pp. 1–35. 58 David Lampton, “The Implementation Problem in Post-Mao China,” pp. 3–24 in Lampton 1987a (footnote 22). 59 See Lee 1991 (footnote 5), p. 221. 60 Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 174. 61 Lee 1991 (footnote 5), p. 270. 62 Hong Yung Lee, “China’s 12th Central Committee,” Asian Survey 23/6 (1983), pp 673–91; Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 31/6 (1991a), pp. 512–25; Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in Post-Mao China,” Studies in Comparative Communism 24/1 (1991b), pp. 114–23; Xiaowei Zang, “The Consolidation of Political Technocracy in China,” The Journal of Communist Studies and Transitional Politics 15/3 (1999), pp. 101–13. 63 Andrew Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review 60/3 (1995), pp. 309–28; Andrew Walder, Bobai Li, and Donald J. Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime,” American Sociological Review 65/2 (2000), pp. 191–209.

5 DUALISM AND JOB ASSIGNMENT 1 Aage B. Sorensen and Arne L. Kalleberg, “An Outline of a Theory of the Matching of Persons to Jobs,” pp. 49–74 in Ivar Berg, Sociological Perspectives on Labor market (New York: Academic Press, 1981), p. 52. 2 Mark Granovetter, “Toward a Sociological Theory of Income Differences,” pp. 11–47 in Berg 1981 (footnote 1). 3 For discussions of the literature on human capital theory and job attainment, see Aage B. Sorensen, “The Structure of Inequality and the Process of Attainment,” American Sociological Review 42/6 (1977), pp. 965–78; Sorensen and Kalleberg 1981 (footnote 1); Ross M. Stolzenberg, “Occupations, Labor Markets and the Process of Wage Attainment,” American Sociological Review 40/5 (1975), pp. 645–65. 4 Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, “Some Principles of Stratification,” American Sociological Review 10/2 (1945), pp. 242–9. 5 Sorensen 1977 (footnote 3); Aage B. Sorensen, “A Model and a Metric for the Analysis of the Intragenetational Status Attainment Process,” American Journal of Sociology 85/2 (1979), pp. 361–84. 6 Sorensen and Kalleberg 1981 (footnote 1). 7 For the literature on the labor market segmentation theory, see E. M. Beck, Patrick M. Horan, and Charles M. Tolbert, “Stratification in a Dual Economy,” American Sociological Review 43/5 (1978), pp. 704–20; Thomas A. DiPrete and Whitman T. Soule, “Gender and Promotion in Segmented Job

198

NOTES

8 9 10

11 12 13

14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22

Ladder Systems,” American Sociological Review 53/1 (1988), pp. 26–40; Scott R. Eliason, “An Extension of the Sorensen-Kalleberg Theory of the Labor Market Matching and Attainment Processes,” American Sociological Review 60/2 (1995), pp. 247–71; Ted Magnac, “Segmented or Competitive Labor Markets?” Econometrica 59/1 (1991), pp. 165–87. Granovetter 1981 (footnote 2), pp. 15, 20. Granovetter 1981 (footnote 2), p. 16. Barbara Wake Carroll, “Bureaucratic Elites: Some Patterns in Career Paths over Time,” International Review of Administrative Science 62/3 (1996), p. 384; also see Patrick Dunleavy, The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); George Hoberg, “Technology, Political Structure and Social Regulation: A Cross-National Analysis,” Comparative Politics 18/3 (1986), pp. 357–76. Barbara A. Misztal, “Understanding Political Change in Eastern Europe: A Sociological Perspective,” Sociology 27/3 (1993), pp. 451–70. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 4–6. Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Li Cheng, China’s Leaders (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001); Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers,” Asian Survey 28/4 (1988), pp. 371–99; Li Cheng and Lynn White, “Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 121 (1990), pp. 1–35; Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin,” Asian Survey 38/3 (1998), pp. 231–64. Merilee S. Grindle (ed.), Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). Carroll 1996 (footnote 10), p. 384. Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, “Elite Transformation and Democratic Consolidation in Germany after 1945 and 1989,” pp. 141–62, in John Higley, Jan Pakulski, and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (eds) Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 143; also see Eric Hanley, Natasha Yershova, and Richard Anderson, “Russian – Old Wine in A New Bottle? The Circulation and Reproduction of Russian Elites, 1983–1993,” Theory and Society 24/5 (1995), pp. 659–62. Ivan Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi, “Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe,” Theory and Society 24/5 (1995), pp. 615–38. Akos Rona-Tas, “The First Should Be Last: Entrepreneurship and Communist Cadres in the Transition from Socialism,” American Journal of Sociology 100/1 (1994), pp. 40–69. See Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Lee 1991 (footnote 13). Lee 1991 (footnote 13); Li 2001 (footnote 13); Li and White 1988 (footnote 13); Li and White 1990 (footnote 13); Li and White 1998 (footnote 13). Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, “Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions,” pp. 232–63 in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1991).

199

NOTES

23 For similar cases in other East Asian societies, see Marco Orru, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, and Gary G. Hamilton, “Organizational Isomorphism in East Asia,” pp. 361–89 in Powell and DiMaggio 1991 (footnote 22). 24 For theoretical deliberations on institutional arrangements and behavior, see Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “Introduction,” pp. 1–38 in DiMaggio and Powell 1991 (footnote 22), pp. 1–3. 25 See W. Richard Scott and John W. Meyer, “The Organization of Societal Sectors: Propositions and Early Evidence,” pp. 108–40 in Powell and DiMaggio 1991 (footnote 22). 26 David Bachman, “The Limits on Leadership in China,” Asian Survey 32/11 (1992), pp. 1050–1; Lee 1991 (footnote 13); Andrew Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review 60/3 (1995), pp. 309–28; Walder, Andrew, Bobai Li, and Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime,” American Sociological Review 65/2 (2000), pp. 191–209. 27 Walder, Li, and Treiman 2000 (footnote 26), p. 205. 28 Lee 1991 (footnote 13), pp. 222, 224. 29 A. Doak Barnett, “Social Stratification and Aspects of Personnel Management in the Chinese Communist Bureaucracy,” The China Quarterly 28 (1966), p. 11. 30 John Wong and Zheng Yongnian, The Nanxun Legacy and China’s Development in the Post-Deng Era (Singapore: Singapore University Press and World Scientific, 2001). 31 I ran a logistic regression analysis using “university education” instead of the four educational credentials and find that this is indeed the case. 32 Shelby Stewman and Suresh L. Konda, “Career and Organizational Markets,” American Journal of Sociology 88/4 (1983), pp. 637–85. 33 Lester G. Seligman, Recruiting Political Elites (New York: General Learning Press, 1971), p. 15. 34 Granovetter 1981 (footnote 2), p. 14.

6 DUALISM AND PROMOTION 1 I focus on major determinants of career advancement in this chapter. For information on promotion procedures in the political hierarchy in the PRC, see John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 18 (1987), pp. 47–83; John P. Burns, The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenkatura System (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1989); John P. Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990 Nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly 138 (1994): pp. 458–91; Melanie Manion, “The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders,” The China Quarterly 102 (1985), pp. 203–33. 2 William P. Barnett, James N. Baron, and Toby E. Stuart, “Avenues of Attainment: Occupational Demography and Organizational Careers in the California Civil Service,” American Journal of Sociology 106/1 (2000), pp. 90–1. 3 Katherine Naff, “Through the Glass Ceiling: Prospects for the Advancement of Women in the Federal Civil Services,” Public Administration Review 54/6 (1994), p. 508. 4 For discussions of the literature on human capital theory and job attainment, see Aage B. Sorensen, “The Structure of inequality and the Process of Attainment,” American Sociological Review 42/6 (1977), pp. 965–78; Aage. B.

200

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5

6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15

16

17 18

Sorensen and Arne L. Kalleberg, “An Outline of A Theory of the Matching of Persons to Jobs,” pp. 49–74 in Ivar Berg, Sociological Perspectives on Labor Market (New York: Academic Press, 1981); Ross M. Stolzenberg, “Occupations, Labor Markets and the Process of Wage Attainment,” American Sociological Review 40/5 (1975), pp. 645–65. Katherine Stovel, Michael Savage, and Peter Bearman, “Ascription into Achievement,” American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996), pp. 358–99; also Xiaowei Zang, “Labor Market Segmentation and Income Inequality in Urban China,” The Sociological Quarterly 43/1 (2002), pp. 27–44. Barnett, Baron, and Stuart 2000 (footnote 2), p. 89. William P. Barnett and Annes S. Miner, “Standing on the Shoulders of Others: Career Interdependence in Job Mobility,” Administrative Science Quarterly 37/2 (1992), pp. 262–81. Barnett and Miner 1992 (footnote 7), p. 262; Barnett, Baron, and Stuart 2000 (footnote 2); Dennis M. Daley, “Paths of Glory and the Glass Ceiling: Different Patterns of Career Advancement among Women and Minority Federal Employees,” Public Administration Quarterly 20/2 (1996), pp. 143–62; Thomas A. DiPrete and Whitman T. Soule, “Gender and Promotion in Segmented Job Ladder Systems,” American Sociological Review 53/1 (1988), pp. 26–40; Margaret Mooney Marini and Pi-Ling Fan, “The Gender Gap in Earnings at Career Entry,” American Sociological Review 62/4 (1997), pp. 588–604; Naff 1994 (footnote 3); Stovel, Savage, and Bearman 1996 (footnote 5). DiPrete and Soule 1988 (footnote 8); Rachel A Rosenfeld, “Job Mobility and Career Processes,” Annual Review of Sociology 18 (1992), pp. 39–61. Michael Wallace and Arne L. Kalleberg, “Economic Organization of Firms and Labor Market Consequences: Toward a Specification of Dual Economy Theory,” pp. 77–117 in Berg 1981 (footnote 4), p. 88. Rosenfeld 1992 (footnote 9), pp. 56–7. Barbara Wake Carroll, “Bureaucratic Elites: Some Patterns in Career Paths over Time,” International Review of Administrative Sciences 62/3 (1996), pp. 384–6, 392, 394–5. Carroll 1996 (footnote 12). Carroll 1996 (footnote 12). Examples include J. W. Cleary, “Elite Career Patterns in a Soviet Republic,” British Journal of Political Science 4/3 (1974), pp. 323–44; Bohdan Harasymiw Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 51; B. Michale Frolic, “Soviet Urban Political Leaders,” Comparative Political Studies 2/4 (1970), pp. 443–64; Philip D. Stewart, Robert L. Arnett, William T. Ebert, Raymong E. McPhail, Terrence L. Rich and Graig E. Schopmeyer, “Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: A Partial Test of Two Models,” American Political Science Review 66/4 (1972), pp. 1,269–94. A. Boak Barnett, “Social Stratification and Aspects of Personnel Management in the Chinese Communist Bureaucracy,” The China Quarterly 28 (OctoberDecember 1966), pp. 8, 14–16; 24; also see A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) Barnett 1966 (footnote 16), pp. 8, 14–16; 24; Barnett 1967 (footnote 16). Cheng Li and Lynn White, “The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers,” Asian Survey 28/4 (1988), pp. 373–4; also see Alan P. Liu, How China Is Ruled (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1986), pp. 162, 164.

201

NOTES

19 Cheng Li and David Bachman, “Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Changes in Post-Mao China,” World Politics 42/1 (1989), p. 81. 20 Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in PostMao China,” Studies in Comparative Communism 24/1 (1991b), pp. 116, 119–22. 21 Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 31/6 (1991a), pp. 520–22. 22 Andrew Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review 60/3 (1995a): pp. 319–20. 23 Xueguang Zhou, “Partial Reform and the Chinese Bureaucracy in the Post-Mao Era,” Comparative Political Studies 28/3 (1995), pp. 440–68, p. 459. 24 Xueguang Zhou, “Political Dynamics and Bureaucratic Career Patterns in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1994,” Comparative Political Studies 34/9 (2001), pp. 1,036–62. 25 Bobai Li and Andrew Walder, “Career Advancement as Party Patronage: Sponsored Mobility into the Chinese Administrative Elite, 1949–1996,” American Journal of Sociology 106/5 (2001), pp. 1380, 1394, 1403, 1405. 26 Bian, Yanjie, Xiaoling Shu, and John R. Logan, “Communist Party Membership and Regime Dynamics in China,” Social Forces 79/3 (2001), pp. 805–41. 27 James N. Baron, Alison Davis-Blake, and William T. Bielby, “The Structure of Opportunity: How Promotion Ladders Vary within and among Organizations,” Administrative Science Quarterly 31/2 (1986), pp. 248–73; Robert P. Althauser and Arne L. Kalleberg, “Firms, Occupations, and the Structure of Labor Markets: A Conceptual Analysis,” pp. 119–49 in Berg 1981 (footnote 4); Wallace and Kalleberg (footnote 10), p. 88. 28 James E. Rosenbaum, “Organizational Career Mobility: Promotion Chances in a Corporation during Periods of Growth and Contraction,” American Journal of Sociology 85/1 (1979), p. 27. 29 Baron, Davis-Blake, and Bielby 1986 (footnote 27), p. 252. 30 For the literature on internal labor markets and promotion, see Barnett and Miner 1992 (footnote 7); Paul Osterman (ed.), Internal Labor Markets (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984). 31 Barnett 1967 (footnote 16), Walder 1995a (footnote 22). 32 For the literature on particularism and promotions in China, see Xiaowei Zang, “Women and Elite Recruitment in China,” New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 2/2 (2000b), pp. 7–23; Xiaowei Zang, “Ethnic Representation in the Current Chinese Leadership,” The China Quarterly 153 (1998b), pp. 107–27; for the literature on particularism and promotions in the West, see Barnett, Baron, and Stuart 2000 (footnote 2); Daley 1996 (footnote 8); DiPrete and Soule 1988 (footnote 8); Marini and Fan 1997 (footnote 8), pp. 588–604; Naff 1994 (footnote 3). 33 DiPrete and Soule 1988 (footnote 8); Naff 1994 (footnote 3); Gary N. Powell and D. Anthony Butterfield, “Investigating the ‘Glass Ceiling’ Phenomenon,” Academy of Management Journal 37/1 (1994), pp. 68–86. 34 Rosenbaum 1979 (footnote 28), p. 30. 35 DiPrete and Soule 1988 (footnote 8), p. 29. 36 Powell and Butterfield 1994 (footnote 33), pp. 72, 74. 37 Stewart et al. 1972 (footnote 15), p. 1273. 38 William M. Reisinger and John P. Willerton, “Elite Mobility in the Locals:

202

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39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48

49 50

51 52

Towards a Modified Patronage Model,” pp. 99–126 in David Lane (ed.) Elites and Political Power in the USSR (Aldershot: Edward Elger Publishing Limited, 1988). Walder 1995a (footnote 22). Zhou 1995 (footnote 23). Zhou 2001 (footnote 24). Li and Bachman 1989 (footnote 18). Zang 1991b (footnote 20). Stephen White and Olga Kryshtanovskaya, “Russia: Elite Continuity and Change,” pp. 125–46 in Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds) Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 135. Walder 1995a (footnote 22). Lester Seligman, Leadership in a New Nation (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 7. Victor Nee, “A Theory of Market Transition,” American Sociological Review 54/5 (1989), pp. 663–81; also see Bian, Shu, and Logan 2001 (footnote 26); Zang 2002 (footnote 5). Yianjie Bian and John Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence of Power: The Changing Stratification System in Urban China,” American Sociological Review 61 (1996), pp. 739–58; Andrew Walder, “Property Rights and Stratification in Socialist Redistributive Economies,” American Sociological Review 57 (1992), pp. 524–39; Walder 1995a (footnote 22); Andrew Walder, “Local Governments as Industrial Firms,” American Journal of Sociology 101 (1995b); pp. 263–301; Andrew Walder, “Markets and Inequality in Transitional Economies,” American Journal of Sociology 101 (1996), pp. 1060–73. Murray Yanowitch, Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union (London: Martin Robertson, 1977), pp. 14, 20. Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press 1991); Cheng Li, China’s Leaders (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001); Li and White 1988 (footnote 18); Li Cheng and Lynn White, “Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 121 (1990), pp. 1–35; Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin,” Asian Survey 38/3 (1998), pp. 231–64. Zhiyue Bo, Chinese Provincial leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, 1995), pp. 182, 198–9. Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000). 7 DUALISM AND MOBILITY RATES

1 Kenneth C. Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite (New York and Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992), p. 211. 2 Glenn R. Carroll and Karl Ulrich Mayer, “Job-Shift Patterns in the Federal Republic of Germany,” American Sociological Review 51/3 (1986), p. 324; also see John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983). 3 Farmer 1992 (footnote 1), p. 211. For the Great Purge see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics of Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge:

203

NOTES

4

5 6

7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18

Harvard University Press, 1956); Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); for the emergence of a new elite in the USSR after the Great Purge, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928–1939,” Slavic Review 38/3 (1979), pp. 377–402; Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 2. Cheng Li and Lynn White, “The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers,” Asian Survey 28/4 (1988), p. 386; also see Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Transformation and Recruitment in Post-Mao China,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 26/1 (1998): pp. 39–57. Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 252. Barbara S. Lawrence, “New Wrinkles in the Theory of Age,” Academy of Management Journal 31/2 (1988), pp. 309, 311; also see Melanie Manion, “The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders,” The China Quarterly 102 (1985), pp. 203–33; Melanie Manion, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Katherine Naff, “Through the Glass Ceiling: Prospects for the Advancement of Women in the Federal Civil Services,” Public Administration Review 54/6 (1994), pp. 507–14. N. H. Martin and A. L. Strauss, “Patterns of Mobility within Industrial Organization,” pp. 85–101 in William Lloyd Warner and Norman H. Martin (eds) Industrial Man (New York: Harper, 1959). Thomas A. DiPrete and Whitman T. Soule, “Gender and Promotion in Segmented Job Ladder Systems,” American Sociological Review 53/1 (1988), p. 28. Gary N. Powell and D. Anthony Butterfield, “Investigating the ‘Glass Ceiling’ Phenomenon,” Academy of Management Journal 37/1 (1994), p. 83. James E. Rosenbaum, “Organizational Career Mobility: Promotion Chances in A Corporation during Periods of Growth and Contraction,” American Journal of Sociology 85/1 (1979), pp. 25–6; James E. Rosenbaum, Career Mobility in a Corporate Hierarchy (New York: Academic Press, 1984). 7 Rosenbaum 1979 (footnote 10), pp. 25–6; Rosenbaum 1984 (footnote 10). Lawrence 1988 (footnote 6), p. 331. Powell and Butterfield 1994 (footnote 9), p. 83. DiPrete and Soule 1988 (footnote 8), p. 28. William P. Barnett, James N. Baron, and Toby E. Stuart, “Avenues of Attainment: Occupational Demography and Organizational Careers in the California Civil Service,” American Journal of Sociology 106/1 (2000), p. 91; for the importance of promotion speed in status attainment research also see DiPrete and Soule 988 (footnote 8), p. 27; Rachel A. Rosenfeld, “Job Mobility and Career Processes,” Annual Review of Sociology 18 (1992), pp. 39–61; Shelby Stewman and Suresh L. Konda, “Careers and Organizational Labor Markets,” American Journal of Sociology 88/4 (1983), pp. 634–85; Harrison C. White, Chains of Opportunity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). Lawrence 1988 (footnote 6), p. 331. Katherine Stovel, Michael Savage, and Peter Bearman, “Ascription into Achievement,” American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996), pp. 358–99. S. E. Macdonald, Political Ambition and Attainment: A Dynamic Analysis of

204

NOTES

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39

Parliamentary Careers. Ph.D. Thesis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1987), cited from Rosenfeld 1992 (footnote 15), p. 53. Farmer 1992 (footnote 1), pp. 215–17. Farmer 1992 (footnote 1), pp. 215–17. Farmer 1992 (footnote 1), pp. 215–17. Cheng Li and David Bachman, “Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism,” World Politics 42/1 (1989), pp. 64–94. Li and Bachman, 1989 (footnote 22), pp. 80–1. Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 31/6 (1991a), pp. 513–14, 520–22. Zang1991a (footnote 24). Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in PostMao China,” Studies in Comparative Communism 24/1 (1991b), pp. 116, 120–1. Zang 1991b (footnote 26). Farmer 1992 (footnote 1), pp. 215–16. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), p. 772 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), p. 379. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 29), pp. 427–8. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 30), p. 318. Farmer 1992 (footnote 1), pp. 215–16. Gil Eyal and Eleanor Townsley, “The Social Composition of the Communist Nomenklatura: A Comparison of Russia, Poland, and Hungary,” Theory and Society 24/5 (1995), p. 733. Farmer 1992 (footnote 1), p. 214. Bohdan Harasymiw, “Mosca and Moscow: Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union,” pp. 265–92 in Moshe M. Czudnowski (ed.) Does Who Governs Matter? Elite Circulation in Contemporary Societies (Dekalb, IL.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982), pp. 268–9; also see Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1984). Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). Collinearity is not a serious problem in the above OLS Regression analyses as the collinearity statistics for tolerance, including those for interaction variables, are mostly above .20 level. Frederic J. Fleron, “System Attributes and Career Attributes: The Soviet Political Leadership System, 1952–1965,” pp. 43–85 in Carl Beck, Frederic J. Fleron, Milton Lodge, Derek J. Waller, William A. Welsh, and M. George Zaninovich (eds), Comparative Communist Political Leadership (New York: Mckey, 1973), p. 53.

8 DUALISM AND CAREER HISTORIES 1 Michael A. Faia, “Selection by Certification: A Neglected Variable in Stratification Research,” American Sociological Review 86/5 (1981), pp. 1093–111; Michael Hout, “Status, Autonomy, and Training in Occupational Mobility,” American Journal of Sociology 89/6 (1984), pp. 1379–409. 2 Rachel A. Rosenfeld, “Job Mobility and Career Processes,” Annual Review of Sociology 18 (1992), p. 39.

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3 Rosenfeld 1992 (footnote 2), p. 40; also see Seymour Spilerman, “Careers, Labor Market Structure, and Socioeconomic Achievement,” American Journal of Sociology 83/3 (1977), pp. 551–93. 4 Glenn R. Carroll and Karl Ulrich Mayer, “Job-Shift Patterns in the Federal Republic of Germany,” American Sociological Review 51/3 (1986), p. 327. 5 William P. Barnett, James N. Baron, and Toby E. Stuart, “Avenues of Attainment: Occupational Demography and Organizational Careers in the California Civil Service,” American Journal of Sociology 106/1 (2000), p. 95. 6 Rachel A. Rosenfeld, “Sex Segregation and Sectors: An Analysis of Gender Differences in Return from Employer Changes,” American Sociological Review 48/5 (1983), pp. 637–55. 7 Shelby Stewman and Suresh L. Konda, “Career and Organizational Markets,” American Journal of Sociology 88/4 (1983), pp. 637–85. 8 Thomas A. DiPrete and Whitman T. Soule, “Gender and Promotion in Segmented Job Ladder Systems,” American Sociological Review 53/1 (1988), p. 28. 9 Nicholas Lampert, The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State (London: Macmilliam, 1979), p. 72. 10 See Gil Eyal and Eleanor Townsley, “The Social Composition of the Communist Nomenklatura,” Theory and Society 24/5 (1995), pp. 723–50; Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, and Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe (London: Verso, 1998); Stephen White and Olga Kryshtanovskaya, “Russia: Elite Continuity and Change,” pp. 125–46 in Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds) Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998). 11 Franklin W. Houn, “The Eight Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” The American Political Science Review 51/2 (1957), p. 400; also see A. Boak Barnett, “Social Stratification and Aspects of Personnel Management in the Chinese Communist Bureaucracy,” The China Quarterly 28 (1966), pp. 8–39; A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). 12 Barnett 1966 (footnote 11), pp. 8, 14–16, 24; Barnett 1967 (footnote 11). 13 Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), pp. 77, 79. 14 Carol Lee Hamrin, “The Party Leadership System,” pp. 95–124 in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 112. 15 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel C. Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 43. 16 Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 (footnote 15), pp. 42–51, 60–62. 17 J. W. Cleary, “Elite Career patterns in A Soviet Republic,” British Journal of Political Science 4/3 (1974), pp. 338–9. 18 Kenneth C. Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 217. 19 David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 54, 62, 200. 20 Paul G. Lewis, Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland, 1975–1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 44. 21 David M. Lampton, “The Implementation Problem in Post-Mao China,”

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22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

pp. 3–24 in David M. Lampton (ed.) Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987a), p. 14. Huang, 2000 (footnote 13), p. 76; also see William Whitson, The Chinese High Command (New York: Praeger, 1978); Barnett 1967 (footnote 11). Victor C. Falkenheim, “Provincial Leadership in Fukien: 1949–66,” pp. 199–244 in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 238. Cheng Li and David Bachman, “Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Changes in Post-Mao China,” World Politics 52/1 (1989), pp. 64–94. David Bachman, “The Limits on Leadership in China,” Asian Survey 32/11 (1992), pp. 1050, 1054. Shi Chen, “Leadership Change in Shanghai,” Asian Survey 38/7 (1998), pp. 683–6. Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 31/6 (1991a), pp. 516–20. Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in PostMao China,” Studies in Comparative Communism 24/1 (1991b), p. 119. Xiaowei Zang, “The Consolidation of Political Technocracy in China,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 15/3 (1999), p. 109. Zang 1999 (footnote 29). DiPrete and Soule 1988 (footnote 8), p. 27. Rosenfeld 1992 (footnote 2). For internal labor markets in the West see James N. Baron, Alison Davis-Blake, and William T. Bielby, “The Structure of Opportunity: How Promotion ladders Vary within and among Organizations,” Administrative Science Quarterly 31/2 (1986), pp. 248–73. Gary N. Powell and D. Anthony Butterfield, “Investigating the ‘Glass Ceiling’ Phenomenon,” Academy of Management Journal 37/1 (1994), p. 71. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Cooperation (New York: Basic, 1977). Powell and Butterfield 1994 (footnote 34), p. 83. Zang 1999 (footnote 29), p. 797. Rosenfeld 1992 (footnote 2), p. 41. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), p. 738. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), p. 690. Lampton 1987a (footnote 21), p. 14. Barnett 1967 (footnote 11). Kenneth Lieberthal, “Introduction,” pp. 1–30 in Lieberthal and Lampton 1992 (footnote 14), pp. 2–3. David Bachman proposes similar clusters. See David Bachman, Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Li and Bachman 1989 (footnote 24), p. 78. Zang 1991a (footnote 27), p. 520. Zang 1991b (footnote 28), p. 121. Zang 1999 (footnote 29), p. 109. Bachman 1991 (footnote 43), p. 230. Cleary 1974 (footnote 17), p. 343. Faia 1981 (footnote 1); Hout 1984 (footnote 1). Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books,

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1973), pp. 358–64; Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 282; Jean Meynaud, Technocracy (trans.) Paul Barnes (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 72, 95; Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. xvii; Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers, Management in the Industrial World (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), p. 79; Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 219. Also see Kendall E. Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Thomas A. Baylis, The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Li Cheng and Lynn White, “Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 121 (1990), pp. 1–35; Peter C. Ludz, The Changing Political Elite in East Germany (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1972); Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1976). 9 DUALISM AND COOPTATION 1 Gaetano Mosco, The Ruling Class: Elementi di scienza politica, ed. Arthur Livingston and trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), pp. 65–6; 460–2. 2 Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935). 3 Eva Etzioni-Halevy, The Elite Connection (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1993), p. 20. 4 Kendall E. Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Thomas A. Baylis, The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Kenneth F. Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 207–10; Eric Hanley, Natasha Yershova, and Richard Anderson, “Russia – Old Wine in A New Bottle? The Circulation and Reproduction of Russian Elites, 1983–1993,” Theory and Society 24/5 (1995), pp. 639–68; David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism (London and Basingstock: Macmillan Press, 1999); Don K. Rowney, Transition to Technocracy: The Structural Origins of the Soviet Administrative State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Ivan Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi, “Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe,” Theory and Society 24/5 (1995), pp. 615–38. 5 Frederic J. Fleron, “System Attributes and Career Attributes: The Soviet Political Leadership System, 1952–1965,” pp. 43–85 in Carl Beck, Frederic J. Fleron, Milton Lodge, Derek J. Waller, William A. Welsh, and M. George Zaninovich (eds), Comparative Communist Political Leadership (New York: Mckey, 1973), pp. 44–5. 6 Fleron 1973 (footnote 5), pp. 44–5. 7 Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, and Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe (London: Verso, 1998); also see Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1995 (footnote 4), pp. 615–38. 8 Rupert Wilkinson, Gentlemanly Power: British Leadership and the Public School Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 4. 9 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

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10 Jerome Karabel, “Toward a Theory of Intellectuals and Politics,” Theory and Society 25/2 (1996), pp. 217–18; also see Carmen Claudin-Urondo, Lenin and the Cultural Revolution trans. Brian Pearce (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1977); Bailes 1978 (footnote 4); Nicholas Lampert, The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State: A Study of Soviet Managers and Technicians 1928–1935 (New York: Macmillian, 1979). 11 Samuel P. Huntington, “Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems,” pp. 3–47 in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established OneParty Systems (New York and London: Basic Books, 1970), p. 34. 12 Karabel 1996 (footnote 10), p. 222; also see Ivan Szelenyi, “The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Auto-Critical Reflection on The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power,” Politics and Society 15/2 (1986–1987), pp. 103–44; Janina Frentzel-Zagorska and Krzysztof Zagorska, “East European Intellectuals on the Road of Dissent: The Old Prophecy of A New Class Re-Examined,” Politics and Society 17/1 (1989), pp. 67–88. 13 Alvin W. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), p. 91. 14 Pater C. Ludz, The Changing Political Elite in East Germany (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1972), pp. 60–2. 15 For the Great Purge see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics of Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); for the emergence of a new elite in the USSR after the Great Purge, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928–1939,” Slavic Review 38/3 (1979), pp. 377–402; Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 2. 16 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 252. 17 Mawdsley and White 2000 (footnote 15), pp. 246–55. 18 Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller, and Gyorgy Markus, Dictatorship over Needs (New York: St. Martins, 1983), p. 45. 19 Bailes 1978 (footnote 4); Archie Brown (ed.), Political Leadership in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan, 1989); Seweryn Bialer, Stalin’s Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Farmer 1992 (footnote 4), pp. 207–10; Hanley, Yershova, and Anderson 1995 (footnote 4), p. 642; Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 253–72; David Lane, “Ruling Class and Political Elites,” pp. 3–18 in David Lane (ed.), Elites and Political Power in the USSR (London: Edward Elgar, 1988), pp. 14–16; Barrington Moore, Terror and Progress USSR: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 188–91; Rowney 1989 (footnote 4). 20 Michael Gehlen, “The Soviet Apparatchiki,” pp. 140–54 in Robert B. Farrell (ed.) Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970). 21 William A. Welsh, Leaders and Elites (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p. 127. 22 Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley 1998 (footnote 7), pp. 29–32. 23 Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1995 (footnote 4), pp. 619–21.

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24 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976). 25 Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 1. 26 Lee 1991 (footnote 25), pp. 288, 418. 27 Cheng Li and David Bachman, “Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism,” World Politics 52/1 (1989), pp. 79, 81–2. 28 Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 31/6 (1991a), p. 520. 29 Xiaowei Zang, “The Consolidation of Political Technocracy in China,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 15/3 (1999), p. 109 30 Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in PostMao China,” Studies in Comparative Communism 24/1 (1991b), p. 121. 31 Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (New York: Harper Touchbooks, 1966), p. 13. 32 Fleron 1973 (footnote 5). 33 Fleron 1973 (footnote 5), pp. 47–8. 34 Philip Selznick, “Cooperation: A Mechanism and Organizational Stability,” pp. 135–9 in Robert K. Merton (ed.) Reader in Bureaucracy (New York: Free Press, 1967). 35 See Kevin J. O’Brien, Reform without Liberalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kevin J. O’Brien, “Agents and Remonstrators,” The China Quarterly 138 (June 1994), pp. 359–80; Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967). 36 Shum Kui-kwong, The Chinese Communists’ Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935–45 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988); Mary G. Mazur, “The United Front Redefined for the Party-State: A Case Study of Transition and Ligitimation,” pp. 51–75 in Timothy Cheek and Tony Saich (eds) New Perspectives on State Socialism in China (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); O’Brien 1990 (footnote 35); Van Slyke 1967 (footnote 35); Frederick Teiwes, “Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1945–1957,” pp. 51–122 in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (eds) Cambridge History of China vol. 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 37 Fleron 1973 (footnote 5), pp. 47–49, 51, 53; also see Frederic J. Fleron, “Representation of Career Types in the Soviet Political Leadership,” pp. 123–38 in R. Barry Fareell (ed.) Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine, 1970). 38 Lane and Ross 1999 (footnote 4), p. 49. 39 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), pp. 6–7. 40 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 39), pp. 45, 49–50; The Data Center of the Xinhua News Agency, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: China Yearbook Publishing Limited, 1998), p. 156. 41 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), p. 232. 42 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 41), p. 258. 43 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1998 (footnote 40), pp. 114–15. 44 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 39), p. 927. 45 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 41), p. 500. 46 Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 33.

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47 Andrew Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review 60/3 (1995), pp. 309–28; Andrew Walder, Bobai Li, and Donald J. Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime,” American Sociological Review 65 (2000), pp. 191–209. 48 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 41), p. 951. 49 Lee 1991 (footnote 25). 50 Farmer 1992 (footnote 4). 51 Farmer 1992 (footnote 4), pp. 214–15. 52 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 39), p. 955; The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 41), pp. 881–2. 53 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1989 (footnote 39), p. 50. 54 The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China 1994 (footnote 41), p. 200. 55 Farmer 1992 (footnote 4), pp. 214–15. 56 Wang Xian, et al., Democratic Parties in Contemporary China (Dandai zhongguo de minzu dangpai) (Beijing: Dandaizhongguo chubanshe, 1999), pp. 552–5. 57 Etzioni-Halevy 1993 (footnote 3); William A. Welsh, Leaders and Elites (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979). 58 Fleron 1973 (footnote 5), pp. 47–9, 51, 53; also see Fleron 1970 (footnote 37). 59 Fleron 1973 (footnote 5), pp. 47–8; also see Cheng Li, China’s Leaders (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 60 Welsh 1979 (footnote 57), p. 36; also see Li 2001 (footnote 59). 10 DUALISM AND THE POLITICAL ELITE IN CHINA 1 Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972). 2 Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York: Praeger, 1961). 3 Barrington Moore, “The Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 1928–1944. A Study of Elite Formation and Function,” American Sociological Review 9/3 (1944), pp. 267–78; Barrington Moore, Soviet Politics – The Dilemmas of Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950); Barrington Moore, Terror and Progress – USSR: Some Sources of Stability and Changes in the Soviet Dictatorship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954). 4 A few examples of recent major publications on elite dualism include Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, and Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists (London and New York: Verso, 1998); Ivan Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi, “Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe,” Theory and Society 24/5 (1995), pp. 615–38; Szonja Szelenyi, Equality by Design (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Andrew Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review 60/3 (1995), pp. 309–28; Andrew Walder, Bobai Li, and Donald J. Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in A State Socialist Regime,” American Sociological Review 65/2 (2000), pp. 191–209; Xiaowei Zang, “University Education, Party Seniority, and Elite Recruitment in China,” Social Science Research 30/1 (2001), pp. 62–75; Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Dualism, Educational Credentials, and Elite Stratification in China,” Sociological Perspectives 44/2 (2001), pp. 189–205; for the debate on technocracy, see Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Transformation and Recruitment in Post-Mao China,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 26/1 (1998): pp. 39–57. 5 John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel, “Introduction: Elite Configurations after State Socialism,” pp. 1–21 in John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel (eds) Elites After State Socialism (Lanham and Boulder:Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,

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6

7

8 9 10

11 12 13

2000), p. 1; Antoniz Kaminski and Joanna Kurzewska, “Strategies of PostCommunist Transformations: Elites as Institution Builders,” pp. 131–52 in Bruno Grancelli (ed.) Social Change and Modernization: Lesson from Eastern Europe (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995); Herbert Kitschelt, “The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe,” Politics and Society 20 (1992), pp. 7–50; Pavel Machonin and Milan Tucek, “Czech Republic: New Elites and Social Change,” pp. 25–45 in John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel (eds) Elites After State Socialism (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 26. Thomas Henry Rigby, Political Elites in the USSR (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), esp. Chapter 1; Thomas Henry Rigby, The Changing Soviet System (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990); Gerd Meyer, “The Political Decision Makers,” pp. 195–221 in Lenard Cohen and Jame Shapiro (eds) Communist Systems in Comparative Perspective (New York: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 215; Andrew Walder, “The Decline of Communist Power: Elements of a Theory of Institutional Change,” Theory and Society 23 (1994), pp. 297–323. For a critique of the monolithic view on the socialist elite see Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 9–12. Joseph Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001); Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Cheng Li, China’s Leaders (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001); Cheng Li and Lynn White, “The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers,” Asian Survey 28/4 (1988), pp. 371–99; Cheng Li and Lynn White, “Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 121 (1990), pp. 1–35; Cheng Li and Lynn White, “The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin,” Asian Survey 38/3 (1998), pp. 231–64. David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism (London and Basingstock: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 25, 199. See Zheng 1997 (footnote 6), pp. 9–12. David Lane similarly points out the internal differentiation of the Russian political elite into different constituencies (e.g., the party vs. the government) and its link with differences in political values. See David Lane, “Transition under Eltsin: The Nomenklatura and Political Elite Circulation,” Political Studies 45/5 (1997), pp. 855–74. In a somewhat different fashion, Robert Dahl identifies different political blocks among the political elite in a polyarchy, arguing that polyarchy involves the articulation of interests through different political blocks and the unequal power of political elites. See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 8. As mentioned before, I owe Andrew Walder for his study on elite dualism (Walder 1995, footnote 4). Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 21. J. W. Cleary, “Elite Career Patterns in a Soviet Republic,” British Journal of Political Science 4/3 (1974), pp. 323–44; Kenneth C. Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite (New York and Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992), p. 61; David Lane and Cameron Ross, “The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites,” pp. 52–75 in David Lane (ed.) Russia in Transition (London: Longman, 1995).

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14 See J-L. Bodiguel, “Political and Administrative Traditions and the French Senior Civil Service,” International Journal of Public Administration 13/5 (1990), pp. 707–40; Barbara Wake Carroll, “Bureaucratic Elites: Some Patterns in Career Paths over Time,” International Review of Administrative Science 62/3 (1996), pp. 383–99; G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967); G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles (New York: Random House, 1970); G. William Domhoff, The Power That Be (New York: Random House, 1978). 15 Li 2001; Li and White 1988 (footnote 7); Lee 1991 (footnote 7). 16 Li 2001 (footnote 7). 17 Fewsmith 2001 (footnote 7), p. 67. 18 George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi first raise the concept of political technocracy in their seminal work entitled The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979); also see Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley 1998 (footnote 4); Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: Seabury Press, 1979); Lane and Ross 1999 (footnote 8). 19 Xueguang Zhou, “Partial Reform and the Chinese Bureaucracy in the PostMao Era,” Comparative Political Studies 28/3 (1995), p. 448; also see Fewsmith 2001 (footnote 7), pp. 55–6. 20 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, “Introduction: The ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ Model and Its Limitations,” pp. 1–30 in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 21–4. 21 Fewsmith 2001 (footnote 7), p. 111; also see Huang 2000 (footnote 12). 22 Huang 2000 (footnote 12); Lee 1991 (footnote 7); Zheng 1997 (footnote 6). 23 See Lee 1991 (footnote 7); Huang 2000 (footnote 12). 24 Fewsmith 2001 (footnote 7), p. 91. 25 Huang 2000 (footnote 12), p. 23. 26 Lowell Dittmer, “Patterns of Elite Strife and Succession in Chinese Politics,” The China Quarterly 123 (1990), p. 405; also see Huang 2000 (footnote 12). 27 See Lane and Ross 1999 (footnote 8). 28 Huang 2000 (footnote 12). 29 An exception is Zheng 1997 (footnote 6). 30 See Li 2001 (footnote 7), Li and White 1988 (footnote 7), Li and White 1998 (footnote 7); Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 31/6 (1991a), pp. 512–25; Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in Post-Mao China,” Studies in Comparative Communism 24/1 (1991b), pp. 114–23. 31 David Bachman, “The Limits on Leadership in China,” Asian Survey 32/11 (1992), p. 1046. 32 Huang 2000 (footnote 12), p. 7, 41, 67. 33 See Yanjie Bian, “Bringing Strong Ties Back In,” American Sociological Review 62 (1997), pp. 366–85; Yanjie Bian and John R. Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence of Power,” American Sociological Review 61 (1996): pp. 739–58; Walder 1995 (footnote 4); Walder, Li, and Treiman 2000 (footnote 4); Xueguang Zhou, Nancy Brandon Tuma, and Phyllis Moen, “Stratification Dynamics under State Socialism: The Case of Urban China,” Social Forces 74 (1996), pp. 759–96; Xueguang Zhou, Nancy Brandon Tuma, and Phyllis Moen, “Institutional Change and Job-Shift Patterns in Urban China, 1949 to 1994,” American Sociological Review 62/3 (1997), pp. 339–65. 34 Examples include Huang 2000 (footnote 12). My first book, Children of the

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35 36

37

38

39 40

41 42

Cultural Revolution (Boulder and London: Westview, 2000), is a case study of family life and political behavior in Mao’s China. Dittmer 1990 (footnote 26), p. 406; also see Fewsmith 2001 (footnote 7); Huang 2000 (footnote 12). Bian 1997 (footnote 34); Scott R. Eliason, “An Extension of the SorensenKalleberg Theory of the Labor Market Matching and Attainment Processes,” American Sociological Review 60/2 (1995), pp. 247–71; Arthur Sakamoto and Daniel A. Powers, “Education and the Dual Labor Market for Japanese Men,” American Sociological Review 60/2 (1995), pp. 222–46; John Robert Warren and Robert M. Hauser, “Social Stratification across Three Generations,” American Sociological Review 62/4 (1997), pp. 561–72. George Brothwisk, Daniel Ellingworth, Colin Bell, and Donald MacKenzie, “The Social Background of British MPs,” Sociology 25/4 (1991), pp. 713–17; Martin Holland, “The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates,” Parliamentary Affairs 34/2 (1987), pp. 28–46; Pippa Norris, and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 113–15. See Hiroshi Ishida, Seymour Spilerman and Kuo-Hsien Su, “Educational Credentials and Promotion Chances in Japanese and American Organizations,” American Sociological Review 62/6 (1997), pp. 866–82; Margaret Mooney Marini and Pi-Ling Fan, “The Gender Gap in Earnings at Career Entry,” American Sociological Review 62/4 (1997), pp. 588–604; Michael Useem and Jerome Karabel, “Pathways to Top Corporate Management,” American Sociological Review 51/2 (1986), pp. 184–200. Douglass C. North, “Economic Performance Through Time,” pp. 247–57 in Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee (eds) The New Institutionalism in Sociology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998), p 249. Nina P. Halpern, “Information Flows and Policy Coordination in the Chinese Bureaucracy,” pp. 125–48 in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 128. Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, The New Institutional Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 59. Examples are David Lampton (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987a); Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg. (eds), Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); David Bachman, Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Avery Goldstein, From Bandwagon to Balance-of-Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949–1978 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Lieberthal and Lampton 1992 (footnote 20); Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

1 Floyd Hunter, Top Leadership, U.S.A. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959); David Lane, “Gorbachev’s Political Elite in the Terminal Stage of the U.S.S.R.: A Reputational Analysis,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 10 (March 1994), pp. 104–16; David Lane, “Elite Cohesion and Division: Transition in Gorbachev’s Russia,” pp. 67–96 in John

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4 5 6 7

8 9

10

11 12

13

Higley, Jan Pakulski, and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (eds) Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 68. Rosanna Hertz and Jonathan B. Imber, “Introduction,” pp. vii–xi in Rosanna Hertz and Jonathan B. Imber (eds) Studying Elites Using Qualitative Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), p. viii. David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), p. 91; Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 16–7; also see Hertz and Imber 1995 (footnote 2). Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in An American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). Putnam 1976 (footnote 3), p. 17. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). Thomas A. Baylis, “Elites, Institutions, and Political Change in East Central Europe,” pp. 107–30 in Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski 1998 (footnote 1), p. 107; also see Mattei Dogan and John Higley, “Elites, Crisis, and Regimes in Comparative Analysis,” pp. 3–27 and Stephen White and Olga Kryshtanovskaya, “Russia: Elite Continuity and Change,” pp. 125–46, both in Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds) Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield 1998). G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: PrenticeHall, 1967), p. 142. Robert Scalopino, Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); Szonja Szelenyi, Equality by Design (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); also see Thomas Baylis “Elites, Institutions, and Political Change in East Central Europe,” pp. 107–30 in Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski 1998 (footnote 1); Dogan and Higley 1998 (footnote 7); Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, and Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe (London: Verso, 1998); White and Kryshtanovskaya 1998 (footnote 7). John P. Burns, The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenkatura System (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1989); Bohdan Harasymiw, “Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party’s Leadership Recruitment System,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 20/4 (1969), pp. 493–512; Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley 1998 (footnote 9); White and Kryshtanovskaya 1998 (footnote 7). Thomas Henry Rigby, Political Elites in the USSR (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990). John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 18 (1987), pp. 47–83; also see Susan L. Shirk, “The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform,” pp. 59–91; Carol Lee Hamrin, “The Party Leadership System,” pp. 95–124, both in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Melanie Manion, “The Cadre Management System, PostMao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders,” The China Quarterly 102 (1985), pp. 203–33. Lloyd Gordon Churchward, Soviet Socialism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987); Lane and Ross 1999 (footnote 3), p. 16; Ivan Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi, “Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe,” Theory and Society 24/5 (1995), p. 631; Gil Eyal and Eleanor Townsley, “The Social Composition of the Communist Nomenklatura,” Theory and Society 24/5 (1995), p. 730.

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14 Joseph Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001); Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 1–8; Scalapino 1972 (footnote 9); Xiaowei Zang, “Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,” Asian Survey 31/6 (1991a), pp. 512–25; Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in Post-Mao China,” Studies in Comparative Communism 24/1 (1991b), pp. 114–23; Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Transformation and Recruitment in Post-Mao China,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 26/1 (1998a), pp. 39–57. 15 Graeme Gill, “The Soviet Leader Cult,” British Journal of Political Science 10/2 (1980), pp. 167–86; Lane 1998 (footnote 1), p. 68. 16 Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. vi–viii; also see Frederick Fleron, “System Attributes and Career Attributes: The Soviet Political System, 1952–1965,” pp. 43–85 in Carl Beck, Frederic J. Fleron, Milton Lodge, Derek J. Waller, William A. Welsh, and M. George Zaninovich (eds), Comparative Communist Political Leadership (New York: David McKay, 1973); Liliya V. Babayeva, “Elite Conceptions of Russia’s Present and Future,” pp. 97–106 in Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski 1998 (footnote 1), p. 103. 17 Szelenyi and Szelenyi, 1995 (footnote 13); Eyal and Townsley 1995 (footnote 13); Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley 1998 (footnote 9); Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, “Elite Transformation and Democratic Consolidation in Germany after 1945 and 1989,” pp. 141–62 in Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski 1998 (footnote 1), p. 143; John Higley, Jan Pakulski, and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, “Introduction: Elite Change and Democratic Regimes in East Europe,” pp. 1–33 in Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski 1998 (footnote 1), p. 2; Also see David Lane and Cameron Ross, “The Social Background and Political Allegiance of the Political Elite of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: The Terminal Stage, 1984 to 1991,” Europe-Asia Studies 46/3 (1994), pp. 437–63. 18 Xiaowei Zang, “The Consolidation of Political Technocracy in China,” The Journal of Communist Studies and Transitional Politics 15/3 (1999): pp. 101–13; also see Alan P. Liu, How China Is Ruled (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1986), p. 160; also see Burns 1989 (footnote 10); John P. Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990 Nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (June 1994), pp. 458–91; Barnett A. Doak (ed.) Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969); David Lampton, Paths to Power: Elite Mobility in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1986); Lieberthal and Lampton 1992 (footnote 12); Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg. (eds), Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Scalapino 1972 (footnote 9). 19 Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); also see Xiaowei Zang, “Professionalism and the Leadership Transition in the Post-Mao Chinese Army,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 13/3 (1991c), pp. 46–60; Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 20 Putnam 1976 (footnote 3), pp. 26–7. 21 Putnam 1976 (footnote 3), pp. 9, 33; also see Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Elites in Modern Societies (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1988), pp. 54–5; Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 27.

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22 Rolf H. W. Theen and Frank K. L. Wilson, Comparative Politics (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996), p. 18. 23 Harold Lasswell, “Introduction,” pp. 3–28 in Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds) World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, MA.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 9. 24 George Borthwick, Daniel Ellingworth, Colin Bell, and Donald MacKenzie, “The Social Background of British MPs,” Sociology 25/4 (1991), pp. 713–17; Martin Holland, “The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates,” Parliamentary Affairs 34/2 (1987), pp. 28–46; Burke D Grandjean, “History and Career in A Bureaucratic Labor Market,” American Journal of Sociology 86/6 (1981), pp. 1057–92; Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, “Women Candidates for Parliament: Transforming the Agenda?” British Journal of Political Science 19/1 (1989), pp. 106–15; Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Hiroshi Ishida, Seymour Spilerman and Kuo-Hsien Su, “Educational Credentials and Promotion Chances in Japanese and American Organizations,” American Sociological Review 62/6 (1997), pp. 866–82; Michael Useem and Jerome Karabel, “Pathways to Top Corporate Management,” American Sociological Review 51/2 (1986), pp. 184–200. 25 Representative works include Robert E. Blackwell and William E. Hulbary “Political Mobility among Soviet Obkom Elites: The Effects of Regime, Social Background and Career Development,” American Journal of Political Science 17 (1973), pp. 721–43; Bobai Li and Andrew Walder, “Career Advancement as Party Patronage: Sponsored Mobility into the Chinese Administrative Elite, 1949–1996,” American Journal of Sociology 106/5 (2001), pp. 1371–408; J. W. Cleary, “Elite Career Patterns in a Soviet Republic,” British Journal of Political Science 4 (1974), pp. 323–44; Harasymiw 1984 (footnote 22), p. 51; Mawdsley and White 2000 (footnote 17); B. Michale Frolic, “Soviet Urban Political Leaders,” Comparative Political Studies 2 (1970), pp. 443–64; Philip D. Stewart, Robert L. Arnett, William T. Ebert, Raymond E. McPhail, Terrence L. Rich and Graig E. Schopmeyer, “Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: A Partial Test of Two Models,” American Political Science Review 66 (1972), pp. 1269–94; Xiaowei Zang, “University Education, Party Seniority, and Elite Recruitment in China,” Social Science Research 30/1(2001a), pp. 62–75; Xiaowei Zang, “Elite Dualism, Educational Credentials, and Elite Stratification in China,” Sociological Perspectives 44/2 (2001b), pp. 189–205. 26 See Beck et al. 1973 (footnote 16). 27 George Moyser and Margaret Wagstaffe (eds), Research Methods for Elite Studies (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987); Hertz and Imber 1995 (footnote 2). 28 Avery Goldstein, From Bandwagon to Balance-of-Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949–1978 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 13. 29 Andrew Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review 60/3 (1995), p. 310; Walder, Andrew, Bobai Li, and Donald J. Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime,” American Sociological Review 65/2 (2000), p. 193. 30 See White and Kryshtanovskaya 1998 (footnote 7), p. 131; also see Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley 1998 (footnote 9); Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1995 (footnote 13). 31 See Joshua A. Fogel, “Mendacity and Veracity in the Recent Chinese Communist Memoir,” pp. 354–58; Nancy Hearst and Tony Saich, “Newly Available Sources on CCP History from the People’s Republic of China,” pp. 323–38;

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32

33

34

35 36

37 38 39 40

41

Frederick C. Teiwes, “Interviews on Party History,” pp. 339–53; all three works are in Timothy Cheek and Tony Saich (eds) New Perspectives on State Socialism in China (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Kenneth G. Lieberthal, “Introduction: The ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ Model and Its Limitations,” pp. 1–30 in Lieberthal and Lampton 1992 (footnote 12), pp. 1–2. Cheng Li and David Bachman, “Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism,” World Politics 52/1 (1989), pp. 64–94; Li Cheng and Lynn White, “Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 121 (1990), pp. 1–35. The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989); The Editorial Board of Who’s Who in China, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994); The Data Center of the Xinhua News Agency, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: China Yearbook Publishing Limited, 1998). For example, Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White use printed biographical sources in addition to interview materials in their research on the Soviet elite. See Mawdsley and White 2000 (footnote 17), pp. xii–xvi. In fact, many scholars consider the entries in Who’s Who as elite members. See Dogan and Higley 1998 (footnote 7), p. 14; Alan Knight, “Historical and Theoretical Considerations,” pp. 29–45 in Dogan and Higley 1998 (footnote 7), p. 40; Useem and Karabel 1986 (footnote 24); White and Kryshtanovskaya 1998 (footnote 7), p. 133. Fleron 1973 (footnote 16), pp. 54–7. The following sources were used to check the data presented in Who’s Who: Cai Kaisong and Yu Xinfeng et al., Ershi shiji zhongguo mingren cidian (A Dictionary of the 20th Century Chinese Celebrity Biographies) (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 1991); Li Fangshi, et al., Zhongguo renwu nianjian (Yearbook of Important Figures in China) (Beijing: Huayi Chubanshe, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1994); Liu Jintian, et al., Lijie zhonggong zhongyang weiyuan renming cidian, 1921–1987 (A Dictionary of Members of the Central Committees of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–1987) (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 1992); Wang Xiaopeng, et al., Zhongguo yidai zhengjie yaoren (Prominent Politicians in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 1994); Wei Pingyi, et al., Gongheguo yaoren lu (A Dictionary of Important Figures in the PRC) (Changchun: Jilin Renming Chubanshe, 1994); Yong Guiliang, Zhongguo dandai shehui huodongjia cidian (A Dictionary of Social Activists in Contemporary China) (Beijing Xuewan Chubanshe, 1990); Zhang Liqun et al., Zhongguo renwu nianjian (Yearbook of Important Figures in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe, 1996); Zhang Shengzuo et al., Dandai zhongguo shaoshuminzu mingren lu (A Dictionary of Important Minority Figures in Contemporary China (Beijing: Huawen Chubanshe, 1992). Arguably, it is one of the most up-to-date data sources in the field of elite studies. The Data Center of the Xinhua News Agency, Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders (Beijing: China Yearbook Publishing Limited, 1998). See Kenneth Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite (New York: Praeger, 1992); Scalopino 1972 (footnote 9). Zhiyue Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, 1995); Zang 1998a (footnote 14); Zang 2001a (footnote 25); Zang 2001b (footnote 25). George Farakas, “Cohort, Age, and Period Effects upon the Employment of White Females,” Demography 14/1 (1977), pp. 33–42.

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administrative structure 20 age: career backgrounds 142, 144–5t; CCP cadres 79t, 82–3, 82t, 98t; and cooptation 157–8, 157t, 159t, 162t; government officials 79t, 82–3, 82t, 98t; job assignment 79t, 82–3, 82t; mobility rates 119–22, 121t; promotion 102t, 103, 104t, 108–10; retirement 108 An Zhendong 154 Anderson, R. D. 7t Anti-Rightist Campaign 47 Bachman, David 29, 76, 91, 96, 111, 111t, 129–30, 137, 139, 151 Barnett, A. Doak 5, 90, 127, 136–7 Bearman, Peter 88 Bian Yanjie 92 Bo Gu 37, 38 Bo Yibo 18 bounded rationality 16 Braun, Otto 37, 38 Brezhnev, Leonid 107 Britain 6, 7t, 88, 110, 148–9 Butterfield, D. Anthony 95, 109, 134 cadres 31, 72; see also CCP cadres Cai Chang 37 Cao Zeyi 158 career advancement see promotion career histories 31, 32, 173–4; age 142, 144–5t; CCP 131–2, 132t, 133, 138, 140–3, 141t, 144–5t; definition 126–7; ethnicity 142, 144–5t; functional clusters 139–40; functional systems 136–8; gender 142, 144–5t; government officials 31, 140–3, 141t, 144–5t; internal labor

markets and 133–40; literature review 128–33; provincial elite 130t, 131, 131t, 137–8; and recruitment patterns 140–3, 141t, 144–5t; Soviet Union 30, 127, 128; State Council 131, 132t, 138; and status attainment 126–8 Carroll, Barbara Wake 72, 89–90 CCP see Chinese Communist Party CCP cadres 72, 78–80, 79t; age 79t, 82–3, 82t, 98t; career backgrounds 131–2, 132t, 133, 138, 140–3, 141t, 144–5t; CCP seniority 77, 78, 82–3, 82t; educational credentials 75, 76, 77, 78–81, 79t, 81t, 92, 98t; ethnicity 38, 79t, 98t; gender 37, 79t, 98t; political loyalty 73–4; promotion 97–9, 98t, 100t, 115–16; reform era 59–65; seniority 5, 66, 67t, 77–80, 79t, 90–2; see also Chinese Soviet Republic; functional differentiation; leadership selection Central Executive Council (CEC) 36, 37–8 Chamberlain, Heath B. 46, 47t Chen Hanbo 50 Chen Mingyi 62, 154 Chen Minzhang 158 Chen Shi 130 Chen Xilian 66 Chen Yonggui 66 Chen Yun 18, 24 Chen Yungfa 42 Chernenko, Konstantin 107 Chiang Kai-shek 35 China: Facts & Figures 3 China Directory 3

239

INDEX

Chinese Communist Party (CCP): antiintellectualism 47, 76; Seventh Central Committee 43; Eighth Central Committee 43, 55–6; Tenth Central Committee 58; Eleventh Central Committee 60; Fourteenth Central Committee 131–2, 132t, 133, 138, 151; Fifteenth Central Committee 131–2, 132t, 133, 138, 151; Seventeenth Central Committee 3; Eighteenth Central Committee 127; and Chinese Soviet Republic 36–8; cooptation 152–3; and Cultural Revolution 55–60; formation 35, 37; governance efficiency 74; hierarchy 13, 14–15, 31; and Kuomintang 35, 36–7, 38; membership 66, 67t, 157t, 159–60, 159t; Politburo 26, 60, 61; promotion speed 115–16; Twelfth National Congress 25, 60; two-front arrangement 17–19, 18f; united front policy 38–43, 49; Yenan period 38–43; see also CCP cadres Chinese People’s Government 45 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 153 Chinese Soviet Republic 36–8 Chinese studies, contributions to 172–4 Cleary, J. W. 128 Communist Youth League of China (CYLC) 45 cooptation 162–3; and CCP 152–3; and CCP seniority 161, 162t; definitions 152–5; education 157t, 159, 159t, 160, 161–2, 162t; elite renewal and regime survival 148–51; individual characteristics 63–4, 157–9, 157t, 159t, 162t; institutional distinction and 155–6; institutional effects on 157–63; and leadership attainment 160–1, 161t; literature review 151–2; reasons for 147–8; Soviet Union 149–50; State Council 152; types 152–3 Cultural Revolution 18, 20, 21, 55–60 CYLC (Communist Youth League of China) 45 December 9th veterans 49–50 Deng Xiaoping: career 127–8; and CCP 19, 24; Cultural Revolution 55, 56;

and Hua Guofeng 23; as leader 17, 18f; and Mao 47; reforms 25–7, 27, 29, 32, 59–61; Southern Tour 78; and state building 22; and Zhao Ziyang 172 Deng Yingchao 37 development policy xii, xiii Diao, Richard 18, 51 DiPrete, Thomas A. 95, 109 distribution of capabilities 30–3 division of labor: CCP and government 20–2, 25–6, 29, 56, 59 Djilas, Milovan 164 Domhoff, G. William 178 Dong Biwu 19 Eastern Europe 73, 150–1, 169, 179, 181 economic elite 51 economy: crisis 23; development 25, 31, 48–9, 78; planning 20, 21, 26; socialist 48 education: academic prestige 6, 8; and cooptation 157t, 159, 159t, 160, 161–2, 162t; credentials 5–9, 7t, 65–6, 65t, 75–7, 78–81, 79t, 81t, 92, 98t, 194 n21; during Cultural Revolution 58–9, 60; “overeducation” 6; PLA officers 58–9, 59t; and promotion 91, 92, 97–9, 98t, 100t, 101–3, 102t, 105–6; reform era 61, 64–6, 65t, 76; social prestige 6; Soviet Union 149, 150t; technical degrees 101, 102t, 104t, 106, 142, 143, 144–5t, 157t, 159t, 160; universities 8, 76, 141–2, 143, 144–5t, 154 Eighth Route Army 43 elite see political elite elite dualism: in Chinese socialism 165–8, 172–3; concept 1–3, 166; institutional constraints 166; leadership selection 166–8 elite formation see leadership selection elite groups 6, 7, 7t, 8t, 110 elite mobility see promotion elite recruitment see leadership selection elite segmentation 30–1 elite stability 171–2 elite stratification see promotion energy sector 16–17 Ersson, Svante 175–6

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ethnicity: career backgrounds 142, 144–5t; CCP cadres 38, 79t, 98t; Central Executive Council 38; and cooptation 157t, 159t, 162t; government officials 79t, 98t; promotion 94, 102t, 103, 104t Eyal, Gil 118 Falkenheim, Victor C. 46, 129 Farmer, Kenneth 30, 110–11, 113, 118, 128 Fei Xiaotong 153 Feng Tiyun 64 Five-Year Plans 49, 50 Fleron, Frederic J. 148, 151, 153 Fligstein, Neil 6 Four Cardinal Principles 31, 188 n1 Four Modernizations 31, 60, 61, 188 n1 fragmented authoritarianism 27–8 Fu Zouyi 48 functional determinism 89–90 functional differentiation 11, 13–15, 165; Cultural Revolution 56–8, 59; distribution of capabilities 30–3; division of labor: CCP and government 20–2, 26, 29, 56, 59; governance dilemma 15–17; interlocking directorates 25–6, 56–7, 57t; personal relationships 26–7; promotion 93–4; reform era 24–7, 29, 32; two-front arrangement 17–19, 18f functional systems 136–8 Gao Gang 16, 127 Gehlen, Michael 150 gender: career backgrounds 142, 144–5t; CCP cadres 37, 79t, 98t; Central Executive Council 37; and cooptation 157t, 159t, 162t; government officials 79t, 98t; promotion 94, 102t, 103, 104t Goldstein, Avery 14, 181 Goodman, David S. G. 58 Gorbachev, Mikhail 107 Gouldner, Alvin W. 48, 149 governance dilemma 15–17 government: administrative power 74–5 government officials 78–80, 79t; age 79t, 82–3, 82t, 98t; career backgrounds 31, 140–3, 141t,

144–5t; CCP seniority 77, 78, 82–3, 82t, 92; educational credentials 75, 76–7, 78–81, 79t, 81t, 98t; ethnicity 79t, 98t; gender 79t, 98t; promotion speed 116; retirement 108; technical expertise 77 Granovetter, Mark 70, 85 Great Leap Forward 51 Gross National Product xiii Guang Xiangying 38 Guangzhou 46 Hamrin, Carol Lee 128 Han Xianchu 66 Harasymiw, Bohdan 118 Harding, Harry 50–1, 58, 59 He Luli 64 Hong Fuzeng 158 Houn, Franklin W. 43, 127 Hu Jintao 3, 172 Hu Yaobang 24, 60, 61, 74, 171, 172 Hua Guofeng 23, 171–2 Huang Hua 50 Huang Maoheng 154 human capital theory 71–2, 88, 109 Hundred Flowers experiment 47, 64 Huntington, Samuel P. 149 industrial organizations 91–2 industrialization 22 institutional development 170–1 institutionalism, new 2, 12–13, 29, 33, 175–6 institutions: definition 12–13, 175; goals 74; rules and norms 12–13, 32 intellectuals 44, 45, 46, 47, 49–50, 62–3, 76 interlocking directorates 25–6, 56–7, 57t Israel, John 49 Japan 7, 36 Jiang Xinzhen 154 Jiang Zemin 3, 26, 28, 61–2, 172 Jiangsu 40 Jiangxi 35–6, 40, 53 Jin-Cha-Ji Border Regions 40, 42t Jing Huang 17, 55, 127 job assignment 85–6, 87; age 79t, 82–3, 82t; CCP seniority 77, 78, 82–3, 82t; educational credentials and 80–1, 81t; human capital theory 71–2;

241

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job assignment continued institutional effects on 83–4, 85t; labor market segmentation theory 71, 72, 75; and status attainment 70; see also leadership selection June Fourth crisis (1989) 172 Kang Keqing 37 Kang Shien 50 Kanter, Rosabeth Moss 134 Karabel, Jerome 8t Kau Ying-mao 111 Khrushchev, Nikita 107 Kirilenko, Andrei 107 Klein, Donald 49 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed 107 Kuo Ta 49 Kuomintang (KMT) 35, 36–7, 38, 52–3 labor market segmentation theory 33, 46, 48, 51–2; internal labor markets 133–40; and job assignment 71, 72, 75; and promotion 88–9, 110 Lampton, David M. 66, 68, 129, 136 Lane, David 30, 128, 153 Lane, Jan-Erik 175–6 leadership positions 3, 4t leadership relations 26–7, 28 leadership selection xvi, 32, 166–8, 173; and career histories 140–3, 141t, 144–5t; early 1950s 45–8, 47t, 49–51; Eastern Europe 73; educational credentials 5–9, 7t, 65–6, 65t, 75, 194 n21; elite dualism 166–8; institutional goals 74; political credentials 66, 67t, 73, 90–1; reform era 61–6, 67t, 73–4; Russia 73; technical expertise 74, 77; see also job assignment; promotion; status attainment Lee Hong Yung 5, 42t, 56, 151 Lenin, Vladimir 48 Lewis, Paul G. 129 Li Bobai 92 Li Cheng 90–1 (n18), 91, 96, 111, 111t, 129, 137, 151 Li Dingming 40 Li Fuchun 18 Li Peng 3 Li Qingchen 37 Li Ruihuan 3 Li Shuzheng 115

Li Wenhui 48 Li Xiannian 18 Lieberthal, Kenneth G. 16–17, 20, 21, 128, 137 Lin Biao 47, 55 Liu, Alan P. 31 Liu Chunxing 37 Liu Mingjiu 114 Liu Mingkung 114 Liu Shaoqi 16, 18f, 47, 55, 56, 127 local government 25–7 Logan, John 92 Long March 37, 38 Ma Lin 62–3 Mao Zedong: Chinese Soviet Republic 37; cult 47; Cultural Revolution 55, 56; as leader 16, 17–18, 18f, 19, 20, 29; Long March 37; Red Army 36; and state building 22; united front 38–9, 44 Mawdsley, Evan 150t mayors 91, 96, 111–12, 111t, 129, 151 methodology: coding procedures 183; data 3–4, 4t, 180–3; educational credentials 5–9; political credentials 5; variables and measurements 4–5 military 28, 43, 58; see also New Fourth Army; People’s Liberation Army; Red Army Mills, C. Wright 149 mobility rates: age, CCP seniority and position attainment 119–22, 121t; age norms 108–10; definition 107, 117–19; institutional distinction and 114–17; institutional effects on 122–3, 123t, 124t; literature review 110–14; mayors 111–12, 111t; promotion speed and status attainment 108–10; provincial elite 112, 112t; reform era 107; Soviet Union 107, 110–11, 113, 116, 118; State Council 113, 113t Moore, Barrington 164 Mosca, Gaetano 147, 164 Mukden Incident 36 National People’s Congress (NPC) 12–13, 25, 153 New Fourth Army 42, 43 North, Douglass C. xii, 12, 175

242

INDEX

Oksenberg, Michel 16–17, 18, 20–1, 22, 128 opportunity structures 89, 93 Pareto, Vilfredo 147 Parish, William L. 31 party-state relations 14, 27–9 Peng Zhen 32 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 22, 58–9, 59t, 108, 109t personal relationships 26 Poland 128, 150, 164, 179 policy formation 20–1 Politburo 26, 60, 61 political cadres 31 political credentials 5 political elite xv, 164, 177–9 political structure 13–14 political-technocracy 168–70 Powell, Gary N. 95, 109, 134 pro-democracy movement 26–7 promotion 87; age 91, 102t, 103, 104t, 108–10; in CCP 97–9, 98t, 100t, 115–16; CCP seniority 91–2; definitions 96; educational credentials 91, 92, 97–9, 98t, 100t, 101–3, 102t, 105–6; efficiency model 93; ethnicity 94, 102t, 103, 104t; existing studies 90–3; functional determinism 89–90; functional differentiation 93–4; gender 94, 102t, 103, 104t; human capital theory 88, 109; institutional effects on 101–3, 102t, 104t, 105–6; labor market segmentation theory 88–9, 110; measuring 95–7; and opportunity structures 89, 93; political credentials 97–9, 98t, 100t, 105–6; State Council 91, 96; see also mobility rates provincial elite 112, 112t, 130t, 131, 131t, 137–8 provincial government 25–6, 56–7, 57t Putnam, Robert D. 179–80 Qian Yunlu 154 Qin Yinlin 50 Quan Zhezhu 64 Red Army 36, 37, 38, 43 Red Guard 58 reform era 22–7, 29, 32; cadre reform 59–65; education 61, 64–6, 65t, 76;

functional differentiation 24–7, 29, 32; leadership selection 61–6, 67t, 73–4; mobility rates 107 Reisinger, William M. 95 Rong Yiren 158 Rosenbaum, James E. 95 Rosenfeld, Rachel A. 89, 135 Ross, Cameron 30, 128, 153 Rui Xingwen 26 Russia 7, 73; see also Soviet Union Saint-Simon, Henri Comte de 164 Savage, Michael 88 Seligman, Lester G. 85 Selznick, Philip 152 Shanganning Border Region 40, 41t Shanghai 46, 58, 129 Shanxi 40 Shcherbitsky, Vladimir 107 Shirk, Susan L. 16, 25–6 Shu, Xiaoling 92 Shum Kui-kwong 52 Slyke, Lyman P. Van 41t Smith, Peter 111 socialist construction 47 sociology, contributions to 174–6 Song Ping 50 Song Renqiong 61 Sorensen, Aage B. 70 Soule, Whitman T. 95, 109 Soviet Union: administrative advice 20; bureaucracy 30; career histories 30, 127, 128; cooptation 149–50; data collection 181–2; education 149, 150t; Great Purge 48; mobility rates 107, 110–11, 113, 116, 118; political elite 178–9; see also Russia Stalin, Joseph 30, 48 State Council: career histories 131, 132t, 138; cooptation 152; during Cultural Revolution 56; establishment 51; mobility rates 113, 113t; policy making 20–1, 22, 26; promotion 91, 96 State Planning Commission 20 status attainment 70, 108–10, 126–8, 174–5, 179–80 Stewart, Philip D. et al. 95 Stovel, Katherine 88 Sun Daren 63 Suo Changyou 64 Szelenyi, Ivan 150–1, 179

243

INDEX

Wu Changli 62 Wu Chengzhi 63 Wu Faxian 66 Wu Xijun 63–4 Wu Yi 3

Szelenyi, Szonja 150–1, 179 Tan Zhenlin 18 Tang Wenfang 31 three-third system 38–43 Tiananmen crackdown 26–7 Tianjin 46 Townsley, Eleanor 118 Trotsky, Leon 164 two-front arrangement 17–19, 18f

Xian incident 36, 38 Xiang, Huaicheng 114 Xiao Jianzhang 65 Xie Lijuan 63 Yang Jike 63 Yenan 38–43, 53

united front policy: 1930s 49; early 1950s 44–8; and three-third system 38–43 United States of America 6, 8t, 149 universities see education: universities Useem, Michael 8t Walder, Andrew 11, 31, 69, 76, 91, 92, 96, 181 Waltz, Kenneth N. 13–14 Wang Guixian 66 Wang Rongzhen 62 Wang Shengtie 65 Wang Wenyuan 63 Wang Yang 65 Weber, Max 6, 31, 164 Wei Pocheng 38 Wen Jiabao 3, 154 White, Lynn 90–1 (n18) White, Stephen 150t Who’s Who in China, Current Leaders 3, 181, 182 Willerton, John 95 Wu Aiying 136 Wu Bangguo 3, 136

Zang Xiaowei 59t, 112t, 113t, 130t, 131t, 132t Zhang Chunyuan 63 Zhang Fengyu 63 Zhang Haoruo 154 Zhang Qingqiu 37 Zhang Runshen 62 Zhang Shou 62 Zhang Shukui 62 Zhang Wule 158 Zhang Xuwu 63 Zhao Ziyang 29, 31–2, 60, 62, 74, 171, 172 Zheng Shiping 21, 22, 26–7, 55–6, 57t Zhou Enlai 18, 18f, 19, 36, 37, 38, 46 Zhou Xueguang 31, 91, 92, 96 Zhu De 52 Zhu Jiazhen 63 Zhu Rongji 3, 26, 64 Zhuang Gonghui 156 Zunyi Conference 38

244