Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

There are many people who have made the completion of this book possible. Adrian, Madeleine and Phoebe Taber: my wonderful (sustainable) family. This book is for you. Associate Professor Samina Yasmeen, supervisor, mentor, teacher, friend. It is an honour and pleasure working with you. From one of your many ‘children,’ thank you. My parents, Patricia and Stephen Riddell. My sister Aimee, brother-in-law David and nephew, Emlyn. Thank you for all for your love and support. Dr Safieh Shariari and Ms Zara Azizzi (Iran), and Mr Malik and the late begum Safraz Iqbal (Pakistan), thank you for making me your family when I was so far from home. There were so many people who helped in ways both large and small, in Perth, Tehran and Islamabad. I can’t thank you all individually. Please know that I am extremely grateful to you for your time and assistance. To everyone, this book is as much your work as it is mine.

Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies Muslim States and Sustainability

Katrina Riddell Centre for Muslim States and Societies, University of Western Australia, Australia

© Katrina Riddell 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Katrina Riddell has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Riddell, Katrina. Islam and the securitisation of population policies : Muslim states and sustainability. 1. Population policy. 2. Population policy--History. 3. Population policy--Religious aspects--Islam. 4. Pakistan--Population policy. 5. Iran--Population policy. I. Title 363.9'091767-dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Riddell, Katrina. Islam and the securitisation of population policies : Muslim states and sustainability / by Katrina Riddell. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7571-6 (hardback) -- ISBN 978-0-7546-9688-9 (ebook) 1. Islamic countries--Population policy. 2. Islamic countries--Population. 3. Population policy--Religious aspects--Islam. I. Title. HB3660.5.A3R53 2009 363.90917'67--dc22 ISBN 978 0 7546 7571 6 (hbk) ISBN 978 0 7546 9688 9 (ebk.V)



2009011777

Contents List of Figures and Tables Preface and Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations

vii ix xi

Introduction

1

1

Population: From Low to High Politics in the Twentieth Century

9

2

Population and Family Planning in Islamic Jurisprudence

55

3

Islam and Fertility: Twentieth Century Myths and Realities

75

4

Islam, Politics and Population: The Iranian Debate from 1953–1989

97

5

Islam, Population, Sustainability and Security: The Iranian Debate from 1989–2006

119

6

Islam, Politics and Population: Debate in Pakistan 1947–1988

153

7

Islam, Population, Sustainability and Security: The Pakistan Debate 1988–2006

177

Conclusion

213

Bibliography Index

217 249

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List of Figures and Tables Figures 4.1 Basic organogram of the Islamic Republic of Iran government 6.4 Pakistan population, total, rural, urban (in millions) Tables 1.1 Major international population conferences 5.1 Percentage increase in family planning spending per year 5.2 Percentage of government budget allocation, by spending type, according to year, Iran  5.3 Population growth rate and total fertility rate for Iran by year 5.4 Unemployment rate of 15–24 year olds (%) 5.5 Unemployment rate as percentage of productive population 5.6 Predicted and actual PGR and TFR for Iran by year 6.1 Total population, PGR, and TFR Pakistan 1950–2006 6.2 Contraceptive prevalence rate, current and ever use, % 15–49 years women, for Pakistan, by year 6.3 Unemployment figures: total, rural, urban in millions 7.1 PGR and TFR regional and most populous countries 7.2 Unmet need for family planning Pakistan 1990–1991, % age group 7.3 National spending on population welfare, by FYPD, million rupees 

108 175

10 125 125 131 136 144 148 158 168 174 178 182 182

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Preface and Acknowledgements Iran and Pakistan are places many Westerners think they know, but in reality they do not. What we know comes via the media and is coloured by the political agendas and relations of our respective governments. Too often we make the mistake of equating people with politics. For the most part, Iran and Pakistan are shrouded in myth: hostile, repressive, backward. My experience is that this is not the case. Rather, the people, the societies, are warm, hospitable, intelligent, and sophisticated. I have never been made to feel so welcome and wanted. So many people went to great lengths to assist me in my research and make my stay in Iran and Pakistan comfortable and enjoyable: From cups of tea in libraries and newspaper offices, to fully catered, personally accompanied field visits to villages and facilities away from Islamabad and Tehran. Most of all, it was the extension of friendship and the welcoming into lives and homes that will stay with me for life. Inshallah, I will have the chance to return to both places one day. The global imagination has been captured by the possibility of an impending civilisational conflict between the Western and Muslim worlds. Post 9/11, political, public, and even academic, discourses on both sides have become dominated by apocalyptic imaginings of the other. My hope is that this book will go some way toward deconstructing this myth by highlighting an area of global politics where there is a great deal of co-operation between the Western and Islamic worlds, where conflict is expressed discursively rather than militarily: global sustainability. Rather than looking at the relationship between Islam and the West through the dichotomising ‘with us or against us’ prism, this book demonstrates aspects of the relationship where we stand together. What I have found, and what I will demonstrate, is that Muslim states and societies can and do internalise contemporary population-sustainability-security norms, and in doing so stand as effective partners in global sustainability efforts. There are many people who have made the writing of the book possible. I would like to thank the Centre for Muslim States and Societies, School of Social and Cultural Studies, at the University of Western Australia, for providing me with a home and the facilities to finish my manuscript. The Iranian and Pakistani experts and individuals quoted in this book, and listed throughout, for granting me interviews and taking the time to share your knowledge. To staff at the Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Ministry of Population Welfare, Pakistan, for arranging access to people and facilities necessary to my research. The people I met in Iran and Pakistan who made my stays memorable.  Katrina Riddell

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List of Abbreviations AIWC All India Women’s Conference BPO Budget and Planning Office, Government Islamic Republic of Iran CFP Council of Family Planning CII Council of Islamic Ideology, Pakistan DPA Draft Plan of Action ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East ECOSOC Economic and Social Commission, UN FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation FP Family Planning FPAIRI Family Planning Association, Islamic Republic of Iran FPAP Family Planning Association of Pakistan FYPD Five Year Plan of Development ICPD International Conference on Population and Development ILO International Labour Organisation IPPF International Planned Parenthood Federation IRC Islamic Research Council, Pakistan IRIB Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting IUSSP International Union for the Scientific Study in Population IWO Iranian Women’s Organisation JeI Jamaat-e-Islami MDGs Millennium Development Goals MoH Ministry of Health, Iran MoHME Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Islamic Republic of Iran MPO Management and Planning Office, Islamic Republic of Iran MPB Ministry for Planning and Budget, Islamic Republic of Iran NBFP National Board of Family Planning, Pakistan NIPS National Institute of Population Studies NGO Non-Government Organisation NPB National Planning Board PRB Population Reference Bureau PGR Population Growth Rate TFR Total Fertility Rate UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNEP United Nations Environment Program UNESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

xii

Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

UNESCO United Nations Economic and Social Commission UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activity USAID United States Agency for International Development WAT Women’s Aid Trust WCED World Commission on Environment and Development WHO World Health Organisation WPA World Plan of Action WPPA World Population Plan of Action

Introduction Over the course of the twentieth century population growth became an international political and then security concern. Prior to this, concern about population growth of an anti-natalist kind were largely absent from politics. Rather, most governments, if at all concerned about population issues, focused their attentions on the geostrategic advantages of a large population which would afford it an endless supply of manpower (read ‘cannon fodder’). Perhaps the only, and certainly most famous, anti-natalist dissenter was the nineteenth century essayist Thomas Malthus who, in On Population (1803), warned against unchecked population growth. NeoMalthusianism emerged in the early twentieth century, revived by a number of non-governmental agents, primarily demographers and the birth control leagues. It was through this and concurrent, sometimes overlapping, conceptual shifts in the field and practice of security, and through the discursive interactions of a milieu of interested actors and change agents that population growth has been elevated to a national and international security issues and produced a securitised global population discourse. In the twentieth century, the study and practice of security was largely dominated by the realist/neo-realist and idealist/neo-liberalist paradigms. These traditional paradigms approached security in a state-centric manner, focused on reconciling the security aims of states, primarily deterrence of or defence against external attack, with the concerns of the international community as a whole (Ayoob 1986: 261–62). A number of paradigmatic shifts in the late twentieth century – the Oil Shocks of the 1970s and the end of the Cold War – prompted a process of revisionism with regards to the study and practice of security, particularly of the utility and validity of state-centrism. The resultant re-conceptualisation of security from its traditional forms gave rise to broader understandings of threat – both source and object – and of what it means to be secure. Areas once considered the realm of low politics, were elevated to the high political status of security. This includes issues such as the environment, disease, economics and population. Security is understood more fundamentally: it is about survival. At the international level, population growth has been securitised. To securitise an issue is to present and elevate it, initially discursively, to security status; to place it above the simply political. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) in Security: A New Framework for Analysis, argued that “In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicised … through politicised … to securitised.” During this final stage political actors attempt to convince other change agents that population threatens the existence of a given object, and should therefore be securitised. This notion of and approach to security emerged



Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

out of debates within the field of security studies that critiqued the limitations of realism and widened the concept of security to include non-military and internal sources of threat, based on an understanding of security as being fundamentally about survival. This approach rests on a particular type of discursive interaction between actors (individuals with immense social capital), agents (experts who do not necessarily possess social capital), and audience (the public). Through this, a sense of threat is inter-subjectively constructed, meaning that enough of agents and audience members agree with the subjective threat assessment made by the actor to arrive at a consensus concerning the security situation. In looking at international and national discourses in this way, we can begin to understand how and why population has emerged as an international and national security concern. Out of those critical debates on the nature, study and practice of security, population growth emerged with other non-military issues, as a potential threat to security at all analytical levels. This threat is exacerbated by a number of factors, including age and gender composition, poor national socio-economic indicators, and environmental degradation. Regions, states and societies where these factors prevail are considered more vulnerable to population based threats than those where these factors are absent. These areas are predominantly in the developing world and include South Asia and the Middle East. In these areas high rates of population growth past and present, coupled with other exacerbating factors, could cause political and state instability, violence, and fundamentalism (Steinbruner 1997: 18, Hughes 1998, pp. 2–4; Demko 1994: 183; Sarkesian 1989: 558). Over time a milieu of interested change agents have engaged to produce a generally accepted set of population norms, concepts and conclusions that connect it to national and global sustainability, stability and security. The United Nations (UN), particularly the United Nations Fund for Population Activity (UNFPA), have provided the main global forum for this debate process. Global sustainability norms were first codified in the document Our Common Future, also known as the Brundtland Report, produced by the UN Commission on Environment and Development, in 1987. It decided sustainable development to be “development meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987). The report extended development beyond meeting basic-socioeconomic needs, and established a universal working paradigm that became foundational to all UN conferences, commissions and conventions pertaining to development and associated areas. Emerging from the UN’s last World Population Conference (WPC), the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) at Cairo in 1994 was a population-sustainability paradigm infused with norms, concepts and conclusions pertaining to global peace and security, reproductive rights, female empowerment and sustainable economic development, and a realisation that “... if we do not deal with rapid population growth, we will not reduce poverty – and development will not be sustainable” (Preston 1994). The global population-sustainability-securitydevelopment is this: “... we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development ...” (Annan 2005). The global population

Introduction



currently stands in excess of six billion people: its growth shows no sign of slowing or stabilising in the near future. Without population control, a sustainable global future cannot be secured. A number of temporal factors shape and shift opinion and thus debate on population: these include ideology, socio-economic status, gender, ethnicity, culture and religion. Religious agents and opinions have long influenced localised and domestic responses to population questions, often encouraging high fertility. Reverence of children as deified gifts and the encouragement of fertility as a matrimonial duty are common to many religions: Catholicism, Judaism, Hinduism and Islam. Religious influence has only recently manifested at the international level, largely in opposition to global population stabilisation objectives. Indeed, one commentator has asked whether religions, the traditional “nurturers of group life ... in praying for health and fecundity ... are now abetting rather than preventing ‘the population bomb’ or ‘population explosion’” (Trompff 1998: 206). At Cairo Muslim states and Islamic opinion emerged front and centre, having been absent or peripheral until this point, despite the resurgence of Islam in national and global politics some twenty years before. Muslim contributions demonstrated the diversity of Islamic population opinions ranging from the ultra-conservative and seemingly obstructionist, to moderate interpretations which accommodated yet critiqued Western liberal viewpoints. The moderate viewpoint preserved moral and religious sanctity in the pursuit of global objectives. The milieu of Islamic opinion demonstrates that religious agents can either enable or hinder national and global objectives. Partly because of this, the influence of Islam over national and international population debates has attracted academic and political attention. Patterns of fertility and population growth in many Muslim states, coupled with vocal objections to national and global agendas from within the Islamic world, have fostered myths equating Islam with population growth. Iran and Pakistan were chosen as case studies to assess the validity of the myths surrounding Islam and population, and to develop a nuanced understanding of Muslim states’ interaction with global debates and emergent norms. Iran and Pakistan are neighbouring Muslim states with Muslim majority societies. Islam is central to the identity and polity of each. Pakistan was created in the name of Islam. Iran’s revolution shifted it from monarchy to Islamic theocracy. Both have experienced high fertility and population growth rates. How did the governments of these states conceptualise high growth and control: problematic or beneficial? Did they engage with global population discourses and norms? Did they accept the securitised global population logic and, if yes, how? Did they engage the society in this process and what was the reaction? Has Islam played a role in this process? About this Book In writing this book, I consulted a wide body of primary and secondary sources of data and discourse: discourse is understood here as any written or verbal data



Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

comprising “speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas” (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000: 4). The body of academic literature analysed, by Muslim and non-Muslim authors, was multi-disciplinary, coming from the disciplines of international relations, security studies, strategic studies, political science including environmental and feminist politics, environmentalism, religion and theology, socio-economic development, economics, history, demography, reproductive health and linguistics. Primary sources included official demographic and fertility reports, and policy documents and papers pertaining to population, foreign affairs, economics, development and security, from national governments, global organisations and regimes, and non-governmental agencies and think tanks. This included for example the Ministries of Health and Population in Pakistan and Iran, the UN and UNFPA, Population Reference Bureau (PRB), the National Institute of Population Studies in Pakistan, and the Family Planning Association of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Additional, and issue specific primary sources included fatwas on population and family planning issued by Islamic clergy, media statements from Pakistani and Iranian officials concerning population growth, policy and family planning, and news articles – the public discourse – on population growth and control, family planning, international norms and objectives, and on interrelated factors such as the environment, youth, women, unemployment, urbanisation and security. The internet proved an invaluable source providing access to contemporary and historical documents, reports, statements, and academic and news articles relating to population, Islam and security. In addition, I visited Iran and Pakistan from June to August 2002, where I personally conducted interviews with a number of actors and change agents, individually identified at the end of the book, including government officials and ministers in the fields of health, population and family planning, academics in the disciplines of demography, political science, health, sociology and development economics, local ulema and Ayatollahs, and staff and clients at family planning and health clinics, non-government organisations and civil society groups, in Pakistan and Iran. In addition, I personally attended the World Population Day Conference in Tehran, 11 July 2002, jointly convened by the UNFPA Iran and the Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME), and the launch of the National Population Policy of Pakistan, 2002, in Islamabad, organised by the Ministry of Population Welfare and attendee by government ministers, bureaucrats, academics and experts and the media, people who are securitising actors, such as government officials and office holders, and Islamic groups, and secular and liberal Islamic NGOs and special interest groups. This book comprises seven chapters. Chapter 1 examines the emergence of an international population-sustainability-security discourse, demonstrating how population has been conceptualised and re-conceptualised, by whom and with what result. It shows the emergence of a neo-Malthusian international population discourse perpetuated by European, North American and South Asian birth control leagues: persistent campaigning, even agitation, by these groups forced the transition of population from a non-political to political issue. By the late

Introduction



1940s, population had been inducted into the UN’s agenda, thus making it an international issue. It will demonstrate that the population-sustainability-security nexus has evolved over the course of the twentieth century through a number of global forums and the input of a milieu of change agents: the link between population and development, sustainable development and security is identified and explained. The League of Nations and UN are chosen as the focus of analysis because the population and associated debates that have taken place within them have served as microcosms of global political, academic, technical and religious developments. Through these forums the perspectives of agents representing different interest groups – state, sub-state and non-state – merged. Subsequent debate and negotiation produced global consensus on population and interrelated issues, evident in final conference documents. These documents embodied globally defined norms, objectives, concepts and conclusions. In this chapter, alternative academic and political perspectives to dominant global norms are acknowledged and discussed. With reference to the ICPD, it demonstrates the emergence of Islamic agents and perspectives as important to global debate. Chapters 2 and 3 examine Islamic discourses on population and related issues, looking at how Muslim states, societies and agents perceive issues of population growth and control. In doing so, these chapters demonstrate that Islam is not inherently hostile toward family planning and population control. Rather, that a variety of nuanced interpretations, ranging from orthodox to modernist, have manifested nationally and internationally with varied effect. Chapter 2 focuses primarily on the Islamic teachings and jurisprudence pertaining to population and family planning, recognising that these are foundational to Muslim responses to national concerns and international objectives. What arises is a mixed picture that is contrary to persistent political and academic assumptions of Islam as conservative and monolithic: Islam, it is shown, is diverse. Because of this, there is no singular Islamic opinion on, or experience regarding, population. This is a product of a milieu of factors of Islamic and non-Islamic origin, and is demonstrated with reference to historical debates within Islam, jurisprudential positioning, and the contemporary application of these arguments by Muslim states and societies, nationally and globally. Chapter 4 focuses on Iranian discourse from 1953–1988, looking at governmental responses to national population and development issues. The primary objective of the discussion is to demonstrate consistencies and inconsistencies between global and national population concepts, conclusions, norms and objectives, and to highlight the responses of change agents, particularly Islamic ones, and the public to government discourses. It finds that although Islam did not inform government responses prior to the Islamic revolution, it was a factor in agent and public responses. Moreover, Chapter 4 demonstrates, rather surprisingly, that although threats and security did not factor into the concerns of the monarchical regime, they came to feature prominently in the thinking of the Revolutionary government by the late 1980s: by this time the Iranian government spoke of population growth as a threat through a discourse wholly consistent with the emerging international



Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

securitised one. It examines the religio-political context in which population growth was debated in Iran, demonstrating that a century of political upheaval, caused by coups and revolution, fomented shifts in societal-religio-political relations that significantly shaped national conceptions of population. It will further demonstrate that population first emerged in the 1950s through a geostrategic pro-natalist discourse, which in the 1960s shifted to anti-natalist under the rubric of socio-economic development and the influence of external actors. International norms were inducted and internalised. Following a period of initial confusion immediately after the revolution, geo-strategic pro-natalism was revived in the context of war and international isolationism, joined with the discourse of Islamic identity and nationalism. International norms were ignored. 1986 stands as a critical juncture because the census of the year demonstrated that the growth of the population was such that the newly developed Five Year Plan of Development (FYPD) would not succeed. Bureaucrats engaged first the elite, then the public and ulema, in a debate as to the socio-economic merits of population control. Family planning was revived, pro-natalist and international norms were adopted, and a nascent population-security discourse emerged. Chapter 5 focuses on Iranian population discourse from 1989 until the present. In this period, post-Khomeini, the supreme leadership was resolved in favour of religious pragmatists who advanced political and economic reconstruction, international re-engagement and a more liberalised societal sphere. This produced an Iranian discourse wholly consistent with the global population-sustainable development-security paradigm. By this time, Iranian government had become fully cognisant of the threat population growth posed to nation, society and Islam, and that this threat would manifest through social unrest. What emerged in Iran was a high level of elite-public engagement through the communication channels of the media, experts, education facilities and the clergy that, after some initial hesitation, resulted in a national consensus on population, development and security. Moreover, Iranian discourse engaged Islam – its teachings, symbols and the identification of it as a security referent – to produce a discourse with wide reaching social appeal. In Iran Islam enabled the development of a discourse on population-sustainability-security that was, and remains, consistent with global norms and objectives. Chapter 6 examines governmental responses to population in Pakistan from 1947–1948, illustrating periods of consistency and inconsistency between global and national population concepts, conclusions, norms and objectives. It finds a mixed picture response from change agents, including Islamic ones, and the public to government discourses. From the 1970s, Islamic ideas become highly informative to government, agent and public responses to population, often resulting in overtures to conservatism which disguised actual commitment to population control. The religio-political environment in which Pakistan’s population debate has occurred was marred by pre-partition politics which left a legacy of confusion in which the rightful political place of Islam was debated and remained unresolved. Political division and upheaval led to pseudo and then actual

Introduction



Islamisation in Pakistan. Population control and family planning emerged in nongovernment circles at a time of political moderacy and international engagement. It was politically adopted under the rubric of economic development, consistent with international discourse. Initially Pakistan was actively engaged with and involved in international debate. Pakistan’s religio-political orthodoxy was particularly opposed to family planning and population control thus, as the power of this group grew the political profile of population declined. Pakistan eventually turned its back, if only rhetorically, on domestic and international population objectives. Chapter 7 examines Pakistani discourse from 1988 to the present, finding elite understandings to be consistent with the global population-sustainable development-security paradigm. Moreover, Pakistani governments came to conceptualise population growth as a threat to security, and this was particularly the case under President Musharraf. Although Pakistani elites attempted to engage the public on population, their strategy was lacklustre and excluded a number of influential agents and groups, in particular the clergy. The public were largely unresponsive to macro scale messages on population at odds with their reality, and some agents were resentful of being alienated. In addition to this, there are a number of experts in Pakistan who, whilst cognisant of international population-development-security discourses, reject them in favour of alternative socio-economic development perspectives. Only recently has Islam been joined to Pakistani discourse, with President Musharraf inviting scholars and ulema to participate as stakeholders in national debates and programs. Until this point, Islamic agents and symbolism were major obstacles to reconciling Pakistani discourses to international ones, but it must also be understood that these were not the only ones. From the late 1980s Pakistani governments have attempted to redress religio-political orthodoxy through moderate Islamic discourses and modernisation policies. Cognisant of the influence of Islamic opinions and agents, governments have countered orthodox objectionism with Islamic language and symbols. Population, revived as a national socio-economic concern in the late 1980s, has been prioritised and discursively elevated to security status since 2000. The government implemented a social mobilisation strategy aimed at elevating the societal profile of its securitised population conception, paying particular attention to Islamic opinion and agents, and engaging them in debate through a number of enabling initiatives. Twentieth century international population discourse – the product of debate and engagement between political, academic, technical, non-governmental and religious actors – demonstrates that population transitioned to political and security status. Through their involvement in this, Pakistani and Iranian actors have been exposed to global concepts, norms and conclusions on population, including those linking population to sustainability and security.

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Chapter 1

Population: From Low to High Politics in the Twentieth Century Precursors to Contemporary Debate In the twentieth century, population issues, particularly those pertaining to the growth of the global human population, were internationalised, politicised and securitised. It is from this that we have arrived at the twenty-first century understanding of population growth as being inextricably linked with global sustainability and security. The milieu of factors contributing to these shifts and the alternative concepts they have given rise to is the subject of this chapter. Over the course of the twentieth century population evolved from its long standing demographic conception, to a broader, holistic one that encompasses, amongst other things, development, environmental, human rights and security concerns. This is not to say that ‘population’ is an entirely modern concern: Contemporary population-security discourse originates from the discourses of ancient civilisations. Ancient Chinese, Middle Eastern and Greek discourses on optimal population size – such as Plato’s theory on overpopulation and war – are foundational to contemporary population conceptions (Mann 1993: 25; Wolfe 1929). The numbers and thinking may have changed, but the central themes endure: the question of numbers; the costs or benefits of large or small populations; the link to security; and the establishment of pro and anti-natalism as the overarching demographic paradigms. European scholars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries revisited ancient arguments in response to national population concerns; the most famous was Thomas Malthus. Malthus revived and popularised anti-natalist thought with his pessimistic tract On Population. In it, Malthus argued that population growth would cause food and agricultural shortages that the modes of production at the time could not meet. Fertility and therefore population control was, he argued, the only solutions. This is the essence of Malthusianism. An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) was his response to the utopian population tracts of his predecessors William Godwin and the Marquis de Condorcet in 1793 (Boserup 1978, pp. 133–34; Himmelfarb 1960; Mann, 1993). Godwin and Condorcet, influenced by French egalitarianism, argued that proper education and guidance would enable men to make sensible fertility choices. Godwin stated that “Every man will see, with ineffable ardour, the good of all,   Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, 1793.   Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, 1793.

Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

10

Table 1.1 Year 1928

1954

1965 1974

1984 1994

1999 2004

Major international population conferences

Conference World Population Conference Geneva

Themes/Agenda Population Control, Birth Control, Economics, Maternal Health

Attendees Birth Control Advocates, Health Experts, Demographers, Some League of Nations Officials First United Nations Demographic Data and UN Officials, World Population Indicators, Economic Demographers, Conference (UNWPC), Development Economists, Health Rome Experts 2nd UNWPC, Belgrade Demographics, Health, UN Officials, Economics, Family Demographers, Health Planning Experts, Economists 3rd UNWPC, Bucharest Demography, Health, State and UN Officials, Experts, Socio-economic Development, Human Non-Government Rights, Women’s Rights, Organisations, Academics Child and Maternal Health, Peace, World Population Plan Of Action (WPPA) Reaffirmed Bucharest, State and UN Officials, 4th UNWPC, Mexico City joined Environment, Technicians, NGOs, Female Empowerment Academics As Above 5th UNWPC, Reaffirmed Mexico International Conference City, joined Sustainable on Population and Development, Development, Cairo Reproductive Health and Rights, Female Empowerment, HIV/ AIDS, Religion As Above ICPD +5 Reaffirmed Cairo, joined Global Peace and Security ICPD at 10 Reaffirmed Cairo and As Above ICPD +5, Set 2015 Benchmark

free of the political, social and natural restraints upon him” (Malthus 1960: xv). Likewise, Condorcet argued that the “…duty of all men [is] to promote the general welfare of the human race or of the society in which they live or of the family to which they belong rather than foolishly encumber the world with useless and wretched beings” (cited in Himmelfarb 1960: xvi). Moreover, each was convinced that science and technology would enable man to master nature to his advantage, particularly in the agricultural sector; Condorcet speculated that with “new instruments, machines … a very small amount of land will be able to produce a

Population: From Low to High Politics in the Twentieth Century

11

great quantity of supplies” (cited in Mann 1993: 26, see also Boserup 1978: 134). Population and fertility control were, therefore, unnecessary. Malthus’ rejected the notion that man was capable of controlling nature, because “the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for men” (Himmelfarb 1960, p. 9): this is his enduring legacy. Man is incapable of manipulating the earth to sustain geometric population growth thus population growth must be controlled to match arithmetic rates of food production (Malthus 1960, pp. 8–9). Furthermore, his moral conception of population control, in which he considered it “difficult to conceive any check to population which does not come under the description of some species of virtue or vice” (Malthus 1960: xxii), also endured. Malthus referred to natural constraints on population growth, such as disease, misery and immoral practices, which included the use of contraception, as vice. The second edition of On Population (1803) approved chastity as a control, serving as a “… restraint on a strong natural inclination, it must be allowed to produce a certain degree of unhappiness; but evidently slight, compared with the evils which result from any of the other checks to population” (Malthus 1960: xxix). Malthusianism, then, informed the dominant contemporary socio-economic paradigm, which posits population growth as an impediment to development, and demonstrates the historical foundations of moral objections to contraception and population control in twentieth century debate. Despite its initial popularity, Malthusianism declined as European conflict and instability gave rise to resurgent geo-strategic pro-natalism, advanced by military and strategic theorists who advocated policies enabling and encouraging population growth. Clausewitz, for example, argued “… superior numbers are becoming more decisive with every passing day. The principle of bringing the maximum possible strength to the decisive engagement must therefore rank higher than it did in the past” (Clausewitz 1968). Instability in Europe made this paradigm politically attractive. France, Belgium and Germany, reacting to declining national birth rates, institutionalised it through strategic pro-natalist policies with the explicit aim of growing their national populations to increase military and political power and security vis their adversaries (Johnson 1987: 3, Symonds and Carder 1973, pp. 3–4). Moreover, the simultaneous population and economic growth in Europe and North America strengthened academic and political beliefs that the former was casual to the latter, giving further impetus to pro-natalism, and the saliency of the strategic paradigm (Ehrlich 1991, pp. 158–59). The spectre of depopulation and its negative strategic implications, coupled with religious and moral sensibilities enabled the strategic paradigm to persist into the twentieth century in a majority of European states. France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Sweden pursued pronatalism through economic incentives to encourage high fertility. Britain was the exception, where static birth rates gave no cause for depopulation concerns, allowing Malthusianism to re-emerge in national, and then international, debate.   For more on the specific policies of these countries see Symonds and Carder, 1973, pp. 3–7.

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An international discourse emerged in 1900, but at the non-state/nongovernment level, with no evidence of a concurrent intergovernmental discourse until 1910. Between 1900 and 1914, 304 neo-Malthusian and birth control leagues were established globally, which lobbied for service provision and ran clinics to service an unmet contraceptive need. In 1900, the first of several international neoMalthusian conferences was held by the Federation Universelle de la Regeneration Humaine in Paris. Here experts discussed the health and welfare benefits of birth control and the causal link between overpopulation and war. Essentially, these groups advanced the neo-Malthusian economic paradigm and established the nascent security and reproductive health paradigms that endure to this day. Whilst their ultimate aim, population control, remained a non-political issue, the importance of their work of, in the context of contemporary debate, lies in their internationalisation of debate and in establishing the now universally accepted socio-economic and reproductive health paradigms. The first intergovernmental discourse emerged as a product of the growth and influence of the birth control movements, and through national policies to restrict the propagation of information by subjecting the movement to restrictive obscenity laws. In 1910, governments convened to establish an international convention to suppress the trafficking of obscene material and publications, including contraceptive information in its remit. The omission of population discussion reflected the conceptual distinction between it and birth control that persisted at the state level (Symonds and Carder 1973, pp. 3–25; Johnson 1987). Population Debate Inter-War Through the League of Nations (hereafter League), established in 1919, the population debate was internationalised and institutionalised. The League enabled debate and interaction between states, and between state and non-state actors that developed into an international population discourse. Moreover, the absence of a dedicated population commission meant that debate was undertaken by various League organs, resulting in the merging of population concerns with other agendas. In short, these activities established enduring patterns of interaction, concepts and conclusions in international population discourse. Population matters, particularly sensitive ones concerning control and limitation, remained the preserve of the nongovernmental sector: the League’s hesitant direct involvement was a result of the unwillingness of many European governments to countenance sensitive population discussions (Johnson 1987, pp. 6–7). This was clearly demonstrated in 1922 when states convened at the League to reconfirm the 1910 International Obscene Material Convention. Through its delegate Mr Hannequin, France, where Catholic and Right Wing groups had successfully secured similar prohibitive legislation, argued, “Contraceptive propaganda is undoubtedly made the cloak of obscenity …” However, the British reaction demonstrated that the global anti-birth control consensus was decaying. In Britain, the activities of the birth control movement, sanctioned by

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the medical profession and Church of England, had metamorphosed into family planning or Planned Parenthood, which was understood to have socio-economic benefits and thus had attained a degree of moral respectability. Britain’s decision to distance itself from the stated conference aims reflected this perceptual shift. It stated that eventually “… circumstances would permit the consideration of an international agreement for the defence of all states against this social menace” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 23, see also pp. 22–4, Wolfe 1929, pp. 93–4). State reluctance meant that the nascent population control agenda was largely driven by non-governmental actors, whose international influence was growing as a result of domestic support and the growing rift in the League’s anti-birth control consensus. Whilst the British Malthusian League was unsuccessful in its attempts to force population onto the League’s agenda, Margaret Sanger founder of the American Birth Control League, was instrumental in establishing the first World Population Conference held by the League at Geneva in 1927. However, the reluctance of some states to submit completely to this agenda resulted in diluted League participation, as demonstrated by the distance between Sanger’s vision and the conference proper. Sanger envisioned a conference attended by economic, sociological, demographic and biological experts, and League delegates, to identify and solve pressing population problems. However many high profile League, state and non-state delegates refused to attend a conference with a pro-birth control, neo-Malthusian agenda. Then League Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, declined League representation fearing the conference would discuss issues “… which arouse the strongest national feelings and which were of a delicate character …” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 13). Dissention within the League demonstrated the growing cognisance of the importance of birth and population control amongst high profile officials. Then Director of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Albert Thomas expressed to the organisers his hope that the conference would “be the beginning of an international movement which will contribute much to the solution of world problems which are largely the result of the bad distribution of the population of the globe” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 14). Whilst the conference did not fulfil Sanger’s vision, it did institutionalise population as an international concern, albeit a technical one. Post-conference, two distinct agendas emerged: one upholding moral objections to, and the defining the conceptual distinction between, birth control and population matters, the other approaching population and its implications  This group unsuccessfully lobbied to restrict League membership to pro-birth control states, in 1919 and 1925.   I would like to acknowledge that Sanger has been largely criticised because of her overtly eugenicist agenda. However, in the context of this book, her work is important because, whatever her intentions, she played a crucial role in getting population and birth control issues onto governmental and international agendas.  For more on the League’s debates see, Johnson, 1987.

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from a pragmatic perspective. European states such as Italy were concerned over increasing domestic population pressures caused by restrictive post-war migration policies. At the 1927 International Economic Conference in Geneva, Italy’s delegate, Mr Belloni argued that this would have “serious repercussions on world peace,” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 16), thus demanding demographic assistance from the League. However, this did not shift the distinction between population and birth control, which was reinforced at the League’s 13th session in 1932 where birth control was labelled “a practice abhorrent to a large section of religious beliefs and contrary to the national laws of certain countries” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 1). In 1937, the Second Committee of the 18th Session of the Assembly agreed to request that the League Council: take the necessary steps to draw up a scheme of work for the study of demographic problems” and adopted a resolution requesting the Council establish “a special committee of experts to study demographic problems and especially their connection with the economic, financial and social situation and to submit a report on the subject which may be of value to governments in the determination of policy (cited in Symonds and Carder, 1973, pp. 18–19).

In 1939, the League established a Committee dedicated to the study of governmental problems relating to rapid population growth, diminishing population growth, and small populations relative to productive capacity, but its activity was disrupted by the outbreak of World War Two. However, the Committee was significant because it demonstrated the growing international cognisance of population factors and associated problems. The shifts in developing world debate, occurring concurrently with but external to those in the League would alter the course of the post-war international population debate. In India, for example, the world’s first government sponsored birth control clinic was established in Mysore: the first example of population politicisation. Moreover, in 1935 the Indian National Congress – which governed India post1947 – incorporated family planning and population policy into its post partition plan. It found “in the interests of social economy, family happiness and national planning, family planning and the limitation of children are essential, and the state should adopt a policy to encourage these” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 8). In addition, India was highly involved during the 1930s in international birth control activities, with Indian experts and non-government groups, including the All India Women’s Conference, attending international birth control conferences, and by encouraging international advocates and experts such as Sanger to assist in national activities. The global significance of these developments became apparent in post-war United Nations debate and activities.

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The United Nations and the International Population Debate: 1945–2006 Post War to Rome, 1954 The shift from technical to political involvement was relatively slow, reflecting tensions and obscurantist tactics from within and outside the UN. Because of this population management was disorganised and mandates fragmented; the UN, its agencies, and member states could not agree on the complexity of the issue (Johnson 1987: 9) resulting in the establishment of multiple UN population agencies outside of the Economic and Social Commission (ECOSOC) and the Population Commission, such as the Population Division within the Department of Social Affairs. Whilst the developing world was demanding immediate action and involvement, the developed world, pre-occupied with the Cold War, was less concerned with involving itself and the UN in population activities and debates and, indeed, co-opted the latter as part of the East West ideological struggle, played out through GA meetings and the first World Population Conference in 1954. Despite these difficulties, UN debates enabled the expansion of pre-existing discourses and agendas and the establishment of nascent discourses and agendas alongside enduring patterns and themes of protest. Further, the increasing membership of developing states, the growth of academic population research and debate, and the influence of high profile appointees within the UN consolidated the merging of population and other agendas. The establishment of the Population Commission in 1946 demonstrated a shift toward a neo-Malthusian socio-economic paradigm that would later dominate international discourse. Whilst pro-natalism persisted in some developed states, such as France, the attentions of the United Kingdom and United States, developing states such as Transjordania and Ceylon, and non-governmental experts such as demographer Frank Notestein turned to the detrimental economic and environmental effects of rapid population growth in the developing world, caused by improved health, declining mortality and persistent high fertility. A joint Anglo-American proposal to the ECOSOC for the establishment of a Demographic Committee evolved into the Population Commission (un.org/popin/icpd/ conference/bkg/unpop.html; Sadik 1990: 193), under ECOSOC auspices, for the purpose of gathering and disseminating technical expertise. That the commission was mandated to only undertake demographic research and offer demographic advice reflected the reluctance of some members to politicise population. Further, in debating the Commissions’ function, some states demonstrated their suspicions of these socio-economic arguments, advocating a cautious UN approach that conflicted with the urgency amongst program and policy advocates. For example, Commission chairman Arca Parro’s 1947 report to ECOSOC reflected the cautious approach, stating that population was “too delicate to discuss in the abstract … the Commission realised that its real work was to formulate population policies; for the moment, however, the emphasis should be placed on laying the necessary factual foundations” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 53). This contrasted with

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the urgency in United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Director General Julian Huxley’s 1948 annual report which stated that “somehow or other population must be balanced against resources of civilisation will perish. War is a less inevitable threat to civilisation than is population increase” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973, pp. 53–4). These overlapping tensions played out within and between UN agencies, such as UNESCO, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). The resultant fence sitting was to the initial detriment of the population agenda and activities. For example, the 1946 International Health Conference demonstrated the ongoing struggle within the WHO to reconcile itself to population activities. The Polish and Transjordanian delegates urged immediate UN action; Poland proposed that the WHO’s agenda include “the important subject of population problems and vital statistics,” and Dr Tutunji of Transjordan, argued the need for “worldwide birth control as a prophylaxis against overpopulation and war” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 59). The United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) governments refused to extend the agenda until the WHO was more established. Likewise UNESCO, under Huxley, found itself in competition with the FAO, under the directorship of Norris Dodd, over the relationship between population growth and food production. Huxley’s proposed Food and Population conference produced research papers such as Aldous Huxley’s ‘The Double Crisis’ which suggested the agricultural and environmental impact of population growth was potentially more devastating than an atomic bomb, and advanced the need for population control. Dodd responded to this debate by rejecting the “propaganda that the world’s present resources are not sufficient to feed the present population, let alone any increased population. If this is true the FAO might as well fold up” suggesting institutional inertia and protectiveness of the agenda were strong motivators within UN debates. Furthermore, at the Asian Regional Conference of 1950, ILO Director General David Morse argued that there was a “…need for a positive population policy … only if population growth can be checked will workers in Asian countries be able to obtain substantial and lasting gains from programs of economic and social development” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 57). In response, French delegate, Mr Tessier argued, “our social duty is to have confidence in life, not to place artificial barriers in its way” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 58). Furthermore, the Cold War ideological rift entered the international population debate at the Commissions fifth session in 1950, establishing enduring, competitive socio-economic paradigms. The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends, the product of an ongoing Population Division study stated:

  He was ineligible to make proposals due to his country’s observer status.

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where it is thought to be difficult to or impossible to achieve economic development on a large scale … governments may consider it advantageous to adopt policies to curb population growth … and early curtailment of population growth … would in many cases be advantageous … (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 71).

Yugoslav delegate Mr Vogelnick rejected the implicit neo-Malthusian premise that overpopulation caused poverty and prevented socio-economic development, and advanced instead a Marxist paradigm that held imperialism and exploitation as the cause of overpopulation. Outside of the UN, the population-security paradigm, introduced into organisational debate under aforementioned circumstances, was subject to increasing academic and non-governmental attention. In some instances, this was a direct response to UN work. The Division’s above mentioned report is cited as foundational to papers presented at the University of Nebraska’s 1953 seminar, The Crisis in World Population, where it was concluded, among other things, that “overpopulation or population pressure within nations … and marked socioeconomic differentials between nations suggest the relationship between these and such international disturbances as migration and war” (Hertzler 1953: 106). Moreover, American philanthropist Hugh Moore coined the term “population bomb” in a 1954 pamphlet. The pamphlet, a product of Moore’s personal interest in and concern for world peace and population, were rejected by the Population Council on the grounds it might cause public panic (infoshare1.princeton.edu/ libraries). The First United Nations World Population Conference, Rome 1954 Within this context, amongst these developments, the first World Population Conference was proposed and determined: all but the population-security paradigm featured heavily on the conference agenda. Huxley initially, but unsuccessfully, proposed a conference in 1950 to enable unrestricted professional and public dialogue on population. He however failed to draw governmental and agency support for a conference with a morally sensitive agenda (Chamie 2002). The Population Commission couched its objections in scientific terms arguing that it would prefer to wait for the results of the 1950 national censuses before making any decisions on conferences (Johnson 1987: 11). At its sixth session in 1951, the Commission proposed an international conference to be held in 1953 or 1954; permission to proceed would be based on the proposals scientific merits. At its 14th Session in 1952, ECOSOC passed Resolution 435, which decided the conference would be held in Rome in 1954, and stipulated, “… the sole purpose of the session was to provide an opportunity for the exchange of information and experience by experts” (Notestein, 1954: 242). This ruled out resolutions or recommendations for policy or action (Chamie 2002, Johnson 1987: 11, Symonds and Carder 1973,

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pp. 82–3, un.org/popin/icpd/conference) which assuaged members’ fears of sensitive discussion topics and maintained the population debate as scientific and non-political. To further this, ECOSOC, in collaboration with the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), decided on a scientific, technical, and demographic agenda (Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 55). Moreover, attendance was restricted to population specialists and technical experts, and those who did not represent bodies ‘concerned with the promotion of any particular theory or policy or a special social or religious interest’ (Symonds and Carder 1973: 83). Furthermore, they attended as private individuals and not as government representatives, contrary to requests by the USSR to include government delegates (Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 55). Despite these deliberate limitations, Rome produced several unintended, but significant and enduring, outcomes. Firstly, discussions on the merits and successes of birth control by Egyptian, Indian, Indonesian, and Japanese delegates, (Johnson 1987: 12; Notestein 1954: 247) and American delegate Dr Abraham Stone’s paper advocating birth control (Symonds and Carder 1973: 83) introduced population control as a potentially useful solution to demographic problems. Secondly, Communist countries such as the USSR and Poland, continued to protest against a perceived bias in favour of the Western economic paradigm; a theme that endured until the post- Cold War era. Communists advanced their Marxist economic paradigm as superior to the capitalist model and one under which overpopulation could not exist; under such economic models birth control programs would be unnecessary, and population growth welcomed (Notestein 1954: 247; Symonds and Carder 1973: 83). Thirdly, the Catholic Church, which had established its influence via Catholic states’ delegates, was permitted attendance because of its observer status within the UN, and established itself as an independent and permanent actor in the global population debate. It supported, in theory, the Communist economic alternative, holding “… the optimistic views of the possibility of solving population growth through economic development” (Notestein 1954: 247). Furthermore, it directly voiced its moral and religious objections to birth control – and continues to do so to this day – which it had previously done through the representative of Catholic states such as France, stating that it opposed “the reduction of birth rates by methods which [it] held to be morally objectionable” (Notestein 1954: 247). Inter Conference Debates and Developments: Rome to Belgrade International population discourse between Rome and the second WPC at Belgrade in 1965 continued to be shaped by the ideological and moral considerations of UN member states, resulting in the further advancement of competing socioeconomic paradigms, the reluctance of the UN and member states to politicise the issue, and the competing interests of the developed and developing states. What becomes evident during this period is a puzzling, almost schizophrenic approach

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to population in which the issue becomes political but is not politicised. The ideological games of the superpowers hijacked population as a political tool, yet the majority of developed states, and thus effectively the UN, refused to make population a matter of government and policy. Administrative reorganisation within the UN affirmed this by increasing non-governmental influence over international population debate, effectively stymieing politicisation. Under instruction from the new UN Director General, Dag Hammarskjöld, the Population Division was downgraded as part of an administrative rationalisation program and its research outsourced to universities and other national institutions. On ideology, at the Commissions Eighth Session in 1955, the Soviet delegate Mr Ryabushkin, reaffirmed the Communist bloc view that Rome had demonstrated the presence of “two diametrically opposed trends …” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 87): at the ninth session, this shifted to accusations of a neoMalthusian bias at the expense of the Marxist view. The Cold War ideological rift may also explain the reluctance of some members to politicise population. For example, the 1959 US Presidential Committee on American Foreign Aid Programs recommended that the US should “assist … countries … on request in the formulation of … plans designed to deal with the problem of rapid population growth” (cited in Johnson 1987: 15). President Eisenhower disputed this, stating he could not “imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or government activity or function or responsibility” (cited in Johnson 1973: xxiv), arguably because Cold War politics dominated the national agenda to the exclusion of other issues. For its part, the Commission reaffirmed its and the UN’s role as purely scientific, stating in its 1959 report that “It is not the task of the Population Commission to suggest policies that the Government of any Member state should pursue” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 67). Moreover, the Cold War rift hampered efforts to consolidate population in the UN agenda. In 1962, Communist countries threatened to veto or abstain from the SwedenNorway proposal to include population on the GA agenda unless references to population control assistance were removed from the text as they claimed these were incompatible to Marxist ideology (Johnson 1987: 20). This is not to say that the global population debate stalled during this period, for many significant and enduring changes took place. The population-development paradigm was affirmed with the designation of the 1960s as the United Nations Development Decade, under GA Resolution 1710 (XVI) in December 1961 which determined to “mobilise and to sustain support for measures … to accelerate progress towards self-sustaining growth of the economy of the individual nations and their social advancement,” established a framework which legitimated and actualised developing states’ demands for population activity. Japan, India and Iran proposed a draft resolution demanding that the GA and Population Commission review developing states responses to ECOSOC’s 1964 report and “make   Politicised is understood here in the context of the securitisation spectrum outlined in the introductory chapter.

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recommendations with a view to intensifying the work of the UN in assisting … governments … to deal with the population problems confronting them,” which was later adopted by ECOSOC (cited in Johnson 1987, pp. 22–3). Also, outside of the UN, academics and politicians through publications, addresses and conferences, continued to develop and advance the populationsecurity paradigm. At an address to the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), at New York in 1963, US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, applied nuclear discourse to the unmet expectations theory. He argued that the invention of nuclear weaponry had served to undermine traditional notions of strategy and security precisely at the time when they most needed because “…scientific discoveries have so extended the average span of life that population growth threatens to frustrate all our costly efforts to achieve significant improvements in living standards …” Furthermore, he linked this situation to national and international stability claiming, “ours is a world of multiple revolutions, of vast ferment, or pervasive change, or political turmoil” (Stevenson 1964, pp xiii-xiv). These papers appeared in The Population Crisis and the Use of World Resources complied by the World Academy of Art and Science. This publication demonstrated the nascent merging of the socio-economic and security paradigms and the growing global cognisance of the potentially destabilising effects of population growth on national and international security. Belgrade 1965 The UN intended the Belgrade conference to be non-political (Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 55; Symonds and Carder 1973: 145). Its mandate, agenda and attendance requirements demonstrated the desire of the UN and some member states to maintain a strictly technical focus to the exclusion of policy discussions. The deciding conference resolution, ECOSOC 820C, 1961, which designated the World Population Conference at Belgrade in 1965, “specified that it would be a meeting of experts in demography and related disciplines and not a meeting of representatives of government. Therefore, it was not intended that the conference should pass resolutions or make recommendations” (Adams 1965: 436). Furthermore, in 1962, the General Assembly decided that although “the health and welfare of the family require special attention in areas with relatively high rates of population growth … it is the responsibility of each government to decide on its own policies and devise its own programs” (un.org/popin/icpd/conference), thus distancing itself from any political involvement in population. However, Belgrade, and preceding prep-coms and debates, became political and ideological battlegrounds over population. On the one hand were nonstate actor, UN delegates and developing state representatives pushing for organisational population assistance beyond technical activity. On the other were UN officials conscious of the need to maintain the organisation’s neutrality in the context of global ideological conflict, and ideological demagogues who would not

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compromise on their ideological perspectives for the sake of unified decisions, thus injecting a political flavour to the debate. For example, at Belgrade the neoMalthusian population-development paradigm was first introduced into the UN debate amid: mounting concern among Governments of developing countries of their rapid population growth rates. Goals of the United Nations Development Decade were not being met, and there was a conviction in many quarters that rapid population growth was a major impediment to the achievement of satisfactory progress (Adams, 1965: 443, see also Sadik, 1990: 194).

However, their desire to pursue population control via family planning with UN assistance met with rejection from the organisation, which perceived an internal lack of “consensus as to the desirability of Government sponsored family planning programs aimed at moderating population growth rates” (Adams 1965: 443). The Secretary General insisted that the UN maintain a “neutral attitude on questions of family limitation, [but that] it was ready to respond to requests for assistance from Governments which had adopted, or were contemplating the adoption of, family planning programs” (Adams 1965: 443). Soviet delegates rejected the population control to development argument. They advocated a development to population control argument, which incidentally established the nascent female empowerment paradigm arguing, “attempts to introduce birth control would fail unless a sufficiently high level of education, employment, urbanisation and the status of women was first achieved” (Adams 1965: 442). Moreover, delegates at Belgrade expressed a desire to shift the debate to the political by extending discussion beyond demography. This had been the case at the 1963 Asian Population Conference where resolutions and recommendations on regional population problems had been adopted (Symonds and Carder 1973, p. 136). Opening the session on fertility, Julian Henderson, director of the Bureau of Social Affairs, expressed his hope that the Conference would “shed light on the paths of policy and action” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 145). Moreover, the inclusion of family planning on the Belgrade agenda – following its omission at Rome – established its legitimacy in international population discourse (Adams 1965; Notestein 1954). Although delegates could not agree on the efficacy of family planning as a development tool, it was agreed that governments, but not the UN, should enable couples to fulfil their right to control their own fertility (Sadik 1990: 194), establishing it as a potential solution to population problems. Belgrade was significant for many reasons including the impetus to shift the agenda to the political and consolidating key concepts and conclusions, particularly the development paradigm and the right to fertility control.

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Belgrade to Bucharest: The Critical Decade International political developments between Belgrade and the fourth WPC, at Bucharest in 1974, shifted the internal workings of the UN and thus the population debate. For example, throughout this decade developing states membership increased; many were experiencing the detrimental effects of growth on development. They had integrated population programs into national development plans and were demanding greater UN assistance in population policy, planning, and programs. This was clearly demonstrated in Paragraph 4 of GA resolution 2211 (xxi) 1966, proposed by India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Sweden which: … called upon the Economic and Social Commission, the Population Commission, the Regional Economic Commissions, the United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut and the specialised agencies concerned to assist, when requested, in further developing and strengthening national services in the field of population bearing in mind the different character of population problems in each country and region and the needs arising there from (daccessods.un.org).

The developing states’ demand for assistance shifted the international population debate to the political. This led to UN internal restructuring which institutionalised the neo-Malthusian population-development paradigm, and because this was adopted as the UN’s operational paradigm, it came to dominate international population discourse at the expense of the Marxist alternative. The Population Trust Fund was proposed by UN Secretary U Thant, at ECOSOC’s 43rd Session in 1967, for “Governments and institutions [to] pledge voluntary contributions” (cited in Johnson 1987: xxvi) for Commission, Division and other agencies population activities. It was renamed the United Nations Fund for Population Activity (UNFPA) in 1969, and operated under the auspices of the UN Development Program (UNDP), reflecting the development- centred operational rationale. The fund’s purpose was to ensure that other development programs were not adversely financially affected by increasing state attentions to and reliance on, population control activities in national development plans (Johnson 1987, pp xxvi–xxviii, pp. 27–8). Moreover, the UNFPA mandate which authorised its involvement in population planning and programming activities reflected how the merging of population and other discourses shapes and shifts prior established concepts and conclusions. For example, the Tehran Conference on Human Rights, and its subsequent Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), codified the right of couples to plan, space and choose the number of their children. The UDHR designated family planning as a fundamental human right within the context of socio-economic development, particularly the individuals’ “struggle against hunger and poverty … and thus the full realisation of human rights …” (Tehran Declaration 1968). Population and human rights discourses merged under the UNFPA’s mandate which authorised the Fund to promote the

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implication of population growth on human rights alongside other issues such as social and economic development, and the environment. Furthermore, the UNFPA was mandated to provide assistance at the request of states in population and family planning activities and to promote and co-ordinate these activities within the UN. Through the UNFPA, the UN became more involved in and responsive to member demands for population assistance. By placing population under UNDP control, the UN institutionalised the population-development paradigm which, along with its conclusions, remains central to contemporary international discourse. The membership of developing states was further significant because they introduced alternative and enduring concepts and conclusions to international population debate, many of which were realised at Bucharest. For example, the establishment of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in 1947, the Asian Population Conference at New Delhi in 1963, and subsequent conference follow-up at ECAFE’s Twentieth Session in Tehran, 1964 (Chandrasekharan 1968: 651) enabled developing states to discuss and establish practical solutions to their population problems. ECAFE agreed to assist in program development, and in doing so, developing states reconceptualised population as a political issue, introducing this to international debate through forums such as the WPCs. Further, the confidence and international status of developing states was strengthened by changing dynamics in international politics, particularly the formation of the G77, which was able to demonstrate its collective international strength vis-a-vis the developed world through events such as the 1970s, Oil Shocks, proving they had the capacity to force developed states to listen to their concerns. This was evident at the UN’s Sixth Special Session, held prior to the WPC, which hinted at the North/South divide that would shift the Bucharest debate. A more vocal, confident developing states bloc used the forum to express collective concerns on a number of issues; they demanded reformation of the international system to further the development process through the removal of artificial barriers resulting from global political and economic inequality. Furthermore, it argued that the WPC should include discussion on other aspects of development, not just population. These demands were carried to the Bucharest conference, thus shifting the context of the population debate (Finkle and Crane 1975, pp. 91–2), and introducing enduring concepts and conclusions to the international discourse. Moreover, the stated aims of the UN and its main agencies demonstrated increasing organisational cognisance of the seriousness of the global population problem at a time when many member states were still reluctant or refused to connect themselves to population control for moral or ideological reasons. U Thant’s 1969 statement is telling of his personal belief in the correctness of the dominant neo-Malthusian development paradigm and of his willingness to commit the UN to population activities – which were perhaps a result of the experiences  The G77 included oil-producing states. The oil crisis of the early 1970s, which had demonstrated the vulnerability and reliance of the developed world on the co-operation of the G77 states, bolstered their confidence.

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of his home country Burma. It also reflects his frustrations with the developed states, particularly the Superpowers, and their pursuit of ideological struggles at the expense of global population and development. He stated: I do not wish to seem over dramatic, but I can only conclude from the information that is available to me as Secretary-General that the Members of the United Nations have perhaps 10 years left in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion and to supply the required momentum to development efforts. If such a global partnership is not forged within the next decade, then I very much fear that the problems I have mentioned will have reached such staggering proportions that they will be beyond our capacity to control (1969 statement by U Thant, then Secretary-General UN cited in Johnson 1987: xxi).

Likewise, the World Bank committed itself to the development paradigm, adopting it as the rationale for its own population activities, which included funding and support: to let the developing nations know the extent to which rapid population growth slows down their potential development … to seek opportunities to finance facilities required by our member countries to carry out family planning programs … to join others in programs of research to determine the most effective methods of family planning and of national administration of population control programs (cited in Johnson 1987: 41).

Within and without the UN, security references were increasingly embedded into academic and political population discourse. President Lyndon Johnson, in his 1965 State of the Union Address expressed his commitment to “…seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources” (janda.org/state/politxts/State). In 1968, World Bank President Robert McNamara, in his Board of Governors Address, repeated Johnson’s sentiment, arguing that the Development Decades goals had been hampered by “the mushrooming cloud of the population explosion” (cited in Johnson 1987: 41) thus likening population to nuclear weapons. Demographer Paul Ehrlich’s seminal, though controversial, 1968 publication The Population Bomb, advanced this image and the security paradigm. This work identified many of the casual relationships and factors that would feature in later populationsecurity discourse: food crisis, environmental degradation, youth cohort, and human security issues. President Richard Nixon politically institutionalised the security paradigm. Firstly, he stated in his 1969 Special Address that “[o]ne of the most serious challenges to human destiny in the last third of this (20th) century will be the growth of the population” (cited in Mumford 1995: 36). Then, through National Security Study Memorandum 2000, 1974, “Implications of Worldwide

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Population Growth for US Security and Overseas Interests”, he expressed his concern with the potential for population growth to drive “disruptive foreign policies and international instability,” primarily via the spread of communism, in the under- and undeveloped world, specifying that the: study should focus on the international political and economic implications of population growth rather than its ecological, sociological or other aspects … population factors are indeed critical in, and often determinants of, violent conflict in developing areas. Segmental (religious, social, racial) differences, migration, rapid population growth, differential levels of knowledge and skills, rural/urban differences, population pressure and the spatial location of population in relation to resources – in this rough order of importance – all appear to be important contributions to conflict and violence … (cited in Mumford 1995: 42).

Through such statements, population was reconceptualised as a national and international security concern. Bucharest, 1974: Confirming Population as Political The Bucharest conference consolidated the developments outlined above and affirmed population as an international political issue. This was due partly to the politically charged nature of the debate and also through the designation of the resultant World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) (1974) as “a policy instrument within the broader context of the internationally adopted strategies for national and international progress” (UNFPA 1975: 163). This enabled further, and also recent, changes to the conceptualisation of population that were reflective of the wider global political agenda. A key international political concern at the time was the growing North/South divide which was partly informed by the overarching East/West ideological rift. The population agenda became fused with the wider economic and political conflicts inherent in these divides. Bucharest’s unintended significance was “…to be found in a new politicisation of population [in] the contemporary context of the struggle over the distribution of resources and power between the industrial nations and the developing world” (Finkle and Crane 1975: 89). Unintended because ECOSOC resolution 1484 (1970), in deciding on a third WPC, declared “…the conference be devoted to consideration of basic demographic problems, their relationship with economic and social development, and population policies and action programs needed to promote human welfare and development” (cited in Finkle and Crane 1975: 110): it was not intended as an international political or ideological battleground. The five regional pre-conference forums and four population symposia, where the Bucharest Draft Plan of Action (DPA) was debated, gave little indication of the imminent shift in the agenda and politicisation of the debate. The conferences and DPA Preparations centred largely on regional conferences and four population

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symposia. The symposia, in 1973 and 1974, discussed population issues in relation to development, the family, resources and the environment, and human rights: in doing so, seemingly disparate agendas were merged and many key concerns of contemporary debate were established (UNFPA 1975, pp. 163–64). Furthermore, prep-com attendees appeared in a private and professional capacity, not as government representatives, presenting their own, supposedly private and unofficial, opinions. This is important given that those in attendance at Bucharest were government officials, presenting governmental opinion (See Johnson 1987, pp 86–7). In this respect, these conferences were not representative of Bucharest proper, and could not provide a sufficient estimate of the outcome. However, because the DPA was approved at these conferences, the UN was under the impression that consensus, affirmation and the non-economic agenda would carry to the conference proper. This impression was reflected in the opening address of the Secretary General of the Conference, Antonio Carillo-Flores who stated explicitly “this is a World Population Conference and not a world economic conference” (cited in Finkle and Macintosh 1975: 97). What these prep-cons also enabled was the establishment of regional voting blocs that paralleled the global developed/developing division, and also the development of regional (read alternative) concepts and conclusions on questions of population and development. At Bucharest, the debate was divided along these geographical, developmental and conceptual lines. What emerged were competing and enduring conceptions of development and its relationship with population, demonstrating competing notions of causality. The aforementioned, prior-established neo-Malthusian socio-economic paradigm largely informed the developed states position. Development was primarily an economic function; structural readjustment would improve productivity and therefore national income, which would trickle down to the populace through improved individual income and services. The majority, primarily developed states, believed that population growth was causal to underdevelopment. The demands of large and growing populations outpaced supply producing unmet social expectation and basic needs. Population control and reduction, via family planning, ‘contraception-for-development,’ were posited as the means to development. Developed states insisted that developing states, with UN and external assistance, should adopt or increase national family planning programs, and that development projects and assistance should be contingent on commitments to population control. However, the Scandinavian countries, whilst committed to family planning, are said to have expressed their receptiveness to the developing states’ arguments, against the agenda of their American and Western European counterparts (Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 58; Finkle and Crane 1975: 102–104). The developing states, particularly the G77 nations, in alliance with the Soviet bloc, revisited the prior-established Marxist alternative paradigm, merging it with a unique perspective on the causal relationship between development and population. This paradigm contrasted directly with that of the developed states, positing underdevelopment as causal to population growth. The catchcry of the

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G77 was ‘development is the best contraceptive’: global population problems, they argued, would be solved if the developing world committed to reordering the international system and creating a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that would establish an equitable political and economic environment that would enable development in the above context, through which the population growth problem would solve itself (Grimes 1998: 385). The socialist bloc aligned itself with this view, which mirrored its own, but couched its objections to the ‘contraception-for-development’ model in ideological rather than developmental, terms. Communist states argued that as capitalism and colonialism caused underdevelopment, and therefore rapid population growth, any global population initiative would require the developed states of the West to rectify the ills of capitalism and post-colonialism (see Finkle and Crane 1975, pp. 91, 104–106). The wider significance of these developments is the enduring impact on the international population debate. In propelling the NIEO onto the agenda and WPPA, which contained a stated recognition of the historical origins of the “situation of the developing states … in the unequal processes of socioeconomic development” (UNFPA 1975: 164), the South effectively shifted the focus of the conference from population and development, to development and the structure of the international system (UNFPA 1975, pp. 165–68). It was here that the nascent counter-development debate, which critiques global population and development agendas from localised and ‘South’ perspectives, was melded to the international population debate. The final 1974 WPPA reflected consensus through compromise: due to three hundred amendments to the DPA, it and the WPPA were two were very different documents (Finkle and Crane 1975: 88). The WPPA reflected growing international cognisance of the indivisibility of population and socio-economic development, declaring that “population and development are interrelated: population variables influence development variables, and are also influenced by them” (UNFPA 1975: 167, see also Sadik 1990: 198; Finkle and Crane 1975: 88). The concepts and conclusions remain central to current debates, policies and programs. Although the demanded NIEO did not emerge, a middle way fusing population policy and family planning with programs aimed at economic and social development did (Johnson, 1987: 106). Furthermore, the WPPA recognised that growth and consumption were equally to blame for a growing number of economic and environmental problems, declaring, “the demand for vital resources increases not only with growing population but also with growing per capita consumption” (UNFPA 1975: 167). Bucharest was instrumental in consolidating population and development, whatever the relationship, as indivisible.10 Although the WPPA reflected a fundamental shift in perception at the global level, the persistent pursuit of population control for development at the national level, in countries such as India, and as the underlying philosophy of donor programs, such as USAIDS’s, meant that the Western paradigm, slightly altered, 10 For example, food and agriculture, education and health, see Johnson 1987: 235.

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continued to dominate for some time. The final WPPA, in recognition of the stated desire and urgency to address global population problems, urged states to overcome their ideological and other differences in the belief that “international co-operation, based on the peaceful coexistence of States having different social systems, should play a supportive role in achieving the goals of the Plan of action” (UNFPA 1975: 180). Bucharest to Mexico: 1975–1984 In the decade between these conferences, population discourse merged with other agendas with enduring effect. Within the boundaries of the populationdevelopment paradigm, population was problematised and merged with multiple discourses. This reflected international cognisance of the indivisibility of population issues from women’s rights, the environment, and urbanisation, as developed through a number of UN sponsored conferences, including: the Independent Commission on International Development, 1977; The International Conference of Parliamentarians, Colombo 1979; International Conference on Population and the Urban Future, Rome 1980; Second World Conference on Women, Copenhagen 1980. The Colombo Declaration on Population and Development, essentially a +5 review of Bucharest, reaffirmed population goals and policies as critical to “... the principle aim[s] of social, economic and cultural development...” (Colombo Declaration 1979: 731). Further, the declaration identified the difference between declared and actual state commitment as detrimental to global population efforts, stating “today most countries have recognised that population and development are inextricably bound together … However, as far as the first UN review made since Bucharest makes clear, not enough progress in this direction has been achieved …” (Colombo Declaration 1979: 731). This sentiment was reiterated in North-South: A Program for Survival, also known as the 1980 Brandt Report, which emerged from the 1977 Independent Commission and stated that “international support for population policies is flagging at precisely the time when the commitment to, and political acceptance of, family planning policies is spreading in the Third World” (Brandt and MacNamara 1980: 337). Colombo also recognised the importance of non-state actors as participants in population activity and galvanisers of societal opinion and support. It called on religious leaders and non-governmental organisations to assist national and international population efforts. The Rome Declaration on population advanced an holistic concept of population policies, which continues to evolve to this day, recognising that it “will need to be fully integrated into the process of development, planning, with particular emphasis being given to health, education, housing, nutrition, employment and environmental conditions” (Rome Declaration 1980: 681). The Brandt Report injected a sense of urgency into population discourse and shifted conclusions from population balance to stabilisation by the year 2000. It warned

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that although fertility and growth rates in many developing countries had slowed since Bucharest, any future decline in fertility in the 1980s and 1990s is not likely to make a great difference to total numbers in the year 2000” adding that “whether the nightmarish vision of a hopelessly overcrowded planet in the next century can be averted depends gravely on what is done now to hasten the stabilisation of population (Brandt 1980: 337). During this period, academic and political enquiry and UN debates became increasingly concerned with links between population and security. This field of enquiry considered population a threat to national and international stability and a challenge to world peace: this was foundational to international securitising debates. This discourse was enabled by academic developments, particularly within the US, which resulted in expanded conceptions and definitions of security: redefined, for example, to include “… resource, environmental and demographic issues” (Tuchman Matthews 1989: 274). National security policies also consolidated the population-security interrelationship. For example, the Ford Administration upheld NSSM 200 because it considered “… United States leadership [was] essential to combat population growth, to implement the World Population Plan of Action and to advance United States security and overseas interests” (cited in Mumford 1995: 40), repeating, in implicit terms, Nixon’s intent to curb Communist takeovers in the developing world, using population control to mitigate socio-political destabilisation. Furthermore, the Declarations of several conferences advanced a globally endorsed understanding of the interrelationship between population and peace, identifying many of the factors and variables present in political and academic discourse. Colombo linked population and peace through development, citing social unrest as an intervening variable, stating, “[p]eace itself, which is the precondition of development, will be put in jeopardy. For one of the principal threats to peace is the social unrest caused by the accumulation of human fear and hopelessness” (Colombo 1979: 731). The Rome Declaration added socioeconomic variables to this, stating “unplanned urbanisation may generate tension between groups and classes within the city itself; it may also generate tension between urban and rural areas within national boundaries. Peace … may be put in jeopardy” (Rome Declaration 1980; 681). In 1983, Nazli Choucri, a pioneer of academic research on new security issues, published Population and Conflict: New Dimensions of Population Dynamics, a report sponsored by the UNFPA, which was essentially a critique of the detrimental lack of political attention to the population-security relationship. He stated, “[a]t a time when military expenditures are escalating and insecurities abound, the challenges mount in an already burdened international environment. It would be the height of myopia to continue to disregard the increasing evidence concerning the relationship of population variables to conflict dynamics” (Choucri 1983 [online]). The report’s introduction, written by UNFPA Director Rafael Salas, suggested increasing organisational cognisance of a broader conceptualisation of population. Salas stated:

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies [w]hile the absence of population related pressures does not guarantee peace; these pressures could increase the probability of conflict. This [was] particularly true when such additional aggravating factors as widening economic disparities, worsening environmental conditions and dwindling natural resources [were] also present in countries (cited in Choucri 1983 [online]).

Choucri criticised the narrow understanding of population, which focused primarily on “…the consequences of high fertility in many parts of the world …” and the lack of interest in the effects of population beyond socio-economic ones. He stated: … evidence suggests that population problems include not only births and deaths, but also demographic change as it affects national and international politics. Conflict is a central feature of all political behaviour, at all levels of human interaction. Thus, the prominence of population variables in shaping political behaviour places population and conflict in close proximity (Choucri 1983 [online]).

Moreover, Choucri’s report highlighted what have come to be accepted variables in the population-security equation: age, composition, size, growth, ethnicity, migration, density, crowding, scarcity and pressure. Furthermore, he prescribed social institutions and population regulating policies as the best methods for inhibiting and controlling the destabilising potential of population factors. Mexico 1984: A Shift in Focus Developing states feared high political issues such as the arms race and the global energy crisis would obscure population on the international agenda; distracting the attentions of the developed world to the detriment of their national population concerns and efforts. However, the staging of the fourth WPC indicated the global importance of population issues. ECOSOC Resolution 1981/87 decided the Mexico WPC as “… devoted to the discussion of selected issues of the highest priority, giving full recognition to the relationship between population and social and economic development, with the aim of contributing to the process of review and appraisal of the [WPPA] and to its further implementation” (cited in Sadik 1990: 201). Mexico City reaffirmed the “full validity of the principles and objectives of the World Population Plan of Action” (UNFPA 1984: 755). This was reviewed and revised to ‘reflect the major demographic, social, economic and political changes’ (Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 60) which had arisen since Bucharest through the aforementioned conferences and preparatory committees on fertility and the family; population distribution, migration and development; population, resources, environment and development; and mortality and health policy (See Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 60; Sadik 1990: 202).

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Rafael Salas reconfirmed the UN’s commitment to population and development, and the urgency and goals of the Brandt report, stating “our goal is the stabilisation of global population within the shortest period possible before the end of next century” (cited in Johnson 1987: 250). This remains central to international and national policies, programs and debates. His statement, which recalled the findings of the various population declarations of the 1970s, implied that continued levels of high population growth, coupled with slow income growth and technological acquisition hampered the improvement of living standards in developing nations and exacerbated the North/South divide. He argued that stabilising population growth was crucial to rectifying this situation and that family planning was the key. Controlling growth was considered not only vital to national interests, but to those of the global community (Johnson 1987: 250), thus cementing the place of population in the international political agenda. Furthermore, Salas reaffirmed the problematic conception of growth, and control as the main solution. As with Bucharest, conference attendance influenced and shifted the debate. In addition to the one hundred and forty seven nations attending were a greater number of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), particularly women’s groups. NGOs were permitted to address the conference, in recognition of their “continuing important role in the implementation of the World Population Plan of Action” (UNFPA 1984: 758); this decision further shifted the context of the debate with lasting effect (Johnson 1987: 250). As a result, emphasis in the debate shifted from specific population concerns to those that affected and were affected by population. Some of these issues, such as human and women’s right, were recognised in the Bucharest WPPA. Others, such as the environment, had gained recognition through the interim conferences. All were the concern of special interest groups such as NGOs. These ideas endure and are relevant to current population-development and population-security debates. Bucharest had confirmed family planning as a human right and as central to population policy, but interim studies demonstrated the failure to transpire into political action and the distance between stated and actual commitment. Mexico City identified “... unmet needs for family planning in many countries” (UNFPA 1984: 761) and impressed on governments the urgency of service provision, recommending they “make universally available information, education, and the means to assist …” couples to fulfil their reproductive rights (UNFPA 1985: 769, Johnson 1987, pp. 277–78).11 Bucharest had also identified the importance of female empowerment to population outcomes, which was codified in the Copenhagen Declaration which recommended that states ensure a woman’s “right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children …” (Copenhagen 1980, Article 16). Advancing on this, the Mexico City WPA stressed that a woman’s right to control her own fertility was not only important in curbing 11  Note: it must be clarified that reproductive rights has been applied retrospectively in this instance. This particular terminology is generally accepted as arising from the Cairo ICPD in 1994, and is not generally used with reference to earlier WPCs.

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growth, but formed “the basis for the enjoyment of other rights …” (UNFPA 1984: 764), and encouraged governments to implement programs of socio-economic integration conducive to this end (UNFPA 1984, pp. 764–65; Johnson 1987: 278). Likewise, the environment, which was legitimated as an international population concern by the Commission and the Urban Futures Conference, was consolidated on the global population agenda at Mexico City. The Plan of Action recognised that rapid population growth aggravated “environmental and natural resources problems [such] as soil erosion, desertification and deforestation, which affect food and agricultural production” (UNFPA 1984: 759). It recommended that where problems and imbalances existed, governments should “in the context of overall development policies, to adopt and implement specific policies that will contribute to redressing such imbalances …” (UNFPA 1984: 764, see also Cliquet and Thienpont 1996: 61). The inclusion of these issues on the conference agenda, as introduced by a variety of actors, illustrated the expanding conceptualisation of population as an issue, and realisation of its indivisibility from other concerns. These population norms have endured and are continually strengthened through international regimes and discourse. Mexico City was also significant because it codified the relationship between population and security, thus consolidating its place in population discourse. Furthermore, Islam emerged as influential over national perceptions, and moral obscurantism re-emerged. Mexico allowed state representatives and UN delegates to express their concerns regarding the population-security relationship. UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar stated to the conference that “… these activities are directly related to the first objective of the United Nations, the preservation of peace, since future political stability, like economic development, will depend heavily on the way in which population policies are handled” (cited in Johnson 1987: 254). In addition, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal stated, “[p]opulation issues cannot be confined within national boundaries. They are closely related to the attainment of our ideals of peace, security and stability in the world” (cited in Johnson 1987: 244). Furthermore, the Plan of Action was the first to acknowledge the population-security interrelationship: Section Two, Peace, Security and Population, recognised “peace, security, disarmament, and cooperation [as] indispensable for the achievement of humane population policies …” (UNFPA 1984: 762). The Turkish delegation, through the statement of Health Minister Mehmet Aydın, injected modernist Islamic discourse into the conference. Aydın drew attention to the religious permissibility of family planning stating, “the Holy Koran in its Sura12 Enfal set out the family edict 14 centuries ago … [which] imposes on the parents the responsibility of proper upbringing of their children … parents should have no more children than they can appropriately care for” (cited in Johnson 1987: 270). 12 Literal translation: chapter.

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The shift in US position, from outright support at Bucharest, to obscurantism in Mexico, established a destabilising precedent in national opinion and policy that would re-emerge post 2000. Under the influence of the economic rationalism of Reaganomics and the moral objections of the religious right, the US delegation announced a new direction on population issues under the Mexico City Policy, also known as the Global Gag Rule. This policy, which remained in place until its rescinding by the Clinton Administration in 1993, dismissed the consensus of the 1960s and 1970s as the product of ‘demographic overreaction.’ Instead, the US advocated economic rationalism over population control, stating “population growth is, of itself, neither good nor bad. Its becomes an asset or a problem in conjunction with other factors, such as economic policy … people, after all, are producers as well as consumers” (cited in Johnson 1987: 255). Furthermore, under the Mexico City Policy, the US refused to “contribute to separate nongovernmental organisations which perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other nations” (US Government 1984). A number of international family planning associations, including the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), refused to bend to this ruling, and lost vital USAID funding as a result. Even the UNFPA was held accountable to this policy: the US had been the largest donor to the UNFPA, but it stipulated future funding would be “... conditional on ‘concrete assurances’ that no part of the US monies will be used to for abortion and that the Fund does not support abortion or coercive family planning programs” (US Government 1984). The Mexico City Policy was strongly criticised by international groups such as the European Parliamentary Forum on Population and Development, which claimed the US policy “undermine[d] internationally agreed consensus and goals” (www.iepfd.org). Mexico to Cairo The Cairo WPPA credits a number of interim conferences and occasions as foundational to its platform: The World Summit for Children, New York, 1990; UN Conference on Environment and Development and Agenda 21, Rio, 1992; World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 1993; International Year of the World’s Indigenous People, 1993; and the International Year of the Family, 1994. That each was the subject of a chapter in the WPPA indicated international cognisance of their interrelationship with the key themes of population and development. However, rather than focusing solely on these, the influence of which was duly noted by the UNFPA, this discussion turns to two other events highly influential developments, both of which significantly shifted and shaped the Cairo agenda and thus the course of international population discourse: the World Commission on the Environment and Development, 1987, and its subsequent report Our Common Future, and the UN Round Table on HIV/AIDS and Population, 1993.

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Our Common Future, known also as the Brundtland Report, established the concept of sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland 1987). It was subsequently adopted as the universal working paradigm by international conferences, commissions and conventions, including Cairo. The Report extended development beyond meeting basic socio-economic needs, establishing human equity and dignity as desired outcomes of and as essential to development, stating: the satisfaction of human needs and aspirations in the major objective of development. The essential needs of vast numbers of people in developing countries … are not being met, and beyond their basic needs these people have legitimate aspirations for an improved quality of life. A world in which poverty and inequity are endemic will always be prone to ecological and other crises. Sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life (WCED 1987).

Moreover, the report consolidated the interrelationship between population and development established through aforementioned conferences and declarations. It stated: an expansion in numbers can increase the pressure on resources and slow the rise in living standards in areas where deprivation is widespread … sustainable development can only be pursued if demographic developments are in harmony with the changing productive potential of the ecosystem (WCED 1987).

Furthermore, the report reaffirmed patterns of resource exploitation and consumption as equally deleterious, stating: the sustainability of development is intimately linked to the dynamics of population growth. The issue, however, is not simply one of global population size. A child born in a country where levels of material and energy use are high places a greater burden on the Earth’s resources than a child born in a poorer country (Brundtland 1987).

Finally, it repeated and reaffirmed established policy prescriptions, stating “[p]opulation policies should be integrated with other economic and social development programmes female education, health care, and the expansion of the livelihood base of the poor” (Brundtland 1987). HIV/AIDS added a new element to the population debate: it was partly in response to this that reproductive health discourse emerged at Cairo. Until the late 1980s, HIV/AIDS was largely conceptualised as a health issue and remained the preserve of national health sectors and non-governmental activist groups. The first concerted UN response came in 1987, through the WHO Global Program on AIDS

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and its Global AIDS Strategy, approved by the World Health Assembly in May that year. The Strategy established a blueprint for local, national and international action to prevent and control HIV/AIDS, which included the need for every country to have a “supportive and non-discriminatory social environment” (www. avert.org). By 1993, the conceptualisation of HIV/AIDS had expanded to include its interrelationship with, among other things, population and development. The 1993 UN Round Table on HIV/AIDS and Population appraised “the demographic impact of acquired immune deficiency syndrome, its impact on social and health development, and its implications.” At the time, it concluded “that AIDS will not have a significant impact on population growth, at global, regional or national levels”, a position which has subsequently been revised in light of the decimating effects of the virus in Africa. On development, the consensus was that HIV/AIDS had a detrimental impact because it: caused … growing rates of premature death among the most productive segments of the population – young and middle-aged adults” With regard to family planning participants decided that “programmes [had] a major role to play in HIV/AIDS prevention, particularly in helping women and young people to better protect themselves from infection. Substantial additional resources are needed for both family planning and AIDS prevention (ICPD Newsletter 1993).

Population and Security, the Academic Debate: 1984–1994 Academic interest in population as a security issue flourished between Mexico and Cairo, building on developments in the field during the 1970s, and as part of the general security and strategic revisionism in the final stages of, and then post-, Cold War. Furthermore, it built upon the increasingly pessimistic outlook on a range of issues, such as the environment and urbanisation, established under the conventions and declarations of the 1980s. Resultant academic research advanced the understanding of the population-security relationship through theoretical and empirical research, establishing a number of conclusions, concepts and methodologies. Scholars in the field acknowledged that the field of enquiry had its limitations, namely its speculative rather than predictive nature. They acknowledged the methodological difficulties in establishing definitive linkages and providing empirical verification (Leroy, 1986: 160; Wiarda, 1986: 159). Patricia Mische cited the work of the Ethiopian Relief Commission in 1975 as an example of the rare projects identifying population growth as causal to conflict (Mische 1994: 276). Scholars acknowledged the indirect causal linkage between population and insecurity, and the influence of exacerbating variables and factors. Moreover, they conceded that research was susceptible to contradiction and criticism under a burden of proof.

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However, this is not to say that population cannot or should not be analysed as a security issue; there are established methodological solutions to these problems. For example, Wiarda argued that “not all propositions need to be scientifically proven or provable for them to be valid. Common sense may be as valid a guide in this instance as the admittedly inadequate scientific evidence available” (Wiarda 1986: 159). Credible analysis has been enabled by the academic establishment of an accepted set of exacerbating factors and/or variables. It is because of this that analysis tends to focus on assessing threat potential or the retrospective location of demographic causes in conflicts. The methodological outcome was the establishment of causal analytical chains that enable the identification of exacerbating conditions and variables, and a clear assessment of threat/conflict potential. Marcel Leroy13 (1986) and Shaukat Hassan14 (1991), for example, demonstrated how growth can produce disruptive or violent behaviour that may undermine socio-political stability. Both are careful to demonstrate that these threats/causes are possible rather than probable, stressing that human agency and social effect ultimately determine outcomes. Analysts can assess the possibility of a population based threats or conflicts arising, but not predict the occurrence of either. Leroy established a direct link between population and insecurity (Leroy 1986: 159). Leroy, devoid of predictive pretence, concedes to methodological problems and the burden of proof (Leroy 1986: 160). He offered a plausible causal chain which posited social effect as a crucial variable. Population growth caused instability by exacerbating existing tensions and variables: in this case internal and external competition for resources, which could potentially catalyse events disruptive to the international status-quo. Leroy cautioned that this is not a given because temporal factors, such as population growth, decline or a changed resource base, could alter the outcome. Likewise, he was careful to demonstrate the potentially mitigating effect of socio-political management and policies, adding cultural perspective as a variable determinant of management strategies and outcome through influences over domestic decision making. Leaders must examine how demographic and cultural factors temper popular acceptance of larger goals, particularly economic and military responses. These considerations in turn influence how the domestic system relates its internal situation externally (Leroy 1986: 166–68). How states address the population-resource tension could cause domestic crises and instability at the international level. Leroy’s model is comprehensive in that it considers the positive and negative influence of intervening variables in security equations. 13  In 1986, when his referred to research was published, Michael Leroy was a Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the University College of Cape Breton. He is cited as an ‘authority on international relations and demography’ (Westing 1986). The research referred to in this paper was an historical, qualitative analysis of the political and strategic implications of population growth and environmental degradation. 14  Dr Shaukat Hassan holds a PhD in International Relations. In 1991, at the time he published his above referred to research, he was a fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

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Hassan’s model was embedded in the environment-security paradigm that dominated alternative security discourse in the 1980s, which incorporated population as a variable in the environment-security chain. His work was premised on environmental degradation as causal to economic, social and political instability, and offered a number of possible outcomes, covering all levels of analysis. For example, environmental degradation could cause inter-state conflict by reducing economic opportunities, which forces demographic displacement internally and/ or trans-nationally. Displacement may also increase social pressure on a particular sub-national group, in turn shifting political allegiances and ultimately causing civil strife or even insurgency. Mitigating internal and external threats may induce policy choices which heighten existing tensions. Where the cause of degradation is trans-boundary, bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations may be undermined (Hassan 1991: 5). In identifying demographic factors as exacerbating variables, Hassan posited population as indirectly causal to insecurity (Hassan 1991: 5–7). Again, there was no pretence to predictiveness, rather the establishment of plausible outcomes and variables which enabled the identification of vulnerable groups and situations. These models illustrated tensions in the field concerning the degree of causality that can be assigned to population growth. Few posit population growth as an independent variable. Paul Ehrlich (1991) and Howard Wiarda (1986) posited population growth as the primary cause of instability and insecurity. Although they acknowledged the influence of other variables, such as resource scarcity and environmental degradation, they argued that these were caused, not exacerbated, by high population growth rates (Ehrlich 1991: 171; Wiarda 1986: 154). Population growth, then, caused insecurity because it created the factors contributing to instability. However, most observers believed “[t]here [was] no evidence to suggest that population growth alone as an independent variable can explain instability, violence, aggressive behaviour, and the rise of radical movements of the left and right” (Myron Weiner cited in Foster 1989: 23). The cautionary approach, positing these conditions as pre-existing, suggested population growth exacerbated, rather than caused, instability and insecurity. Furthermore, it recognised the variance between developed and developing societies, between countries with low population density and high density, and between different levels of economic growth and technological development; these were factors that temper the impact of population growth (Foster 1989: 19; Myron Weiner cited in Foster 1989: 23; Mische 1994: 276): Population growth then, is a factor rather than the factor that causes insecurity; other variables serve to heighten the threat posed. Wiarda offered a succinct commentary on this relationship and suggested: in focusing on population and internal unrest … we shall be treating the following topics: the relation between size, crowding and internal tension; the changing age profile … and whether younger means more radical; the pressures on the land and agriculture brought on by increased population growth; the effects of urbanisation and immigration and of cities that have grown beyond the size of liveability or governability; the prospects for increased emigration and

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies spiralling refugee problems, the prospects for economic growth or, alternatively, contraction and negative growth; rising social tensions, riots, and revolutionary activities; the unravelling of political systems’ and finally, war, both civil and international” (Wiarda 1986: 158–59).

Population and Security: Exacerbating Factors, Intervening Variables Economic Variables The understanding that rapid population growth coupled with low socio-economic development could directly threaten state stability and therefore security embedded the population-development nexus in security discourse. The population-economicsecurity dynamic is complex. Economic factors enable states to safeguard against domestic unrest and instability through service provision, and are attributes to national power. By extending this logic in a simplified realist/neo-realist vein, more power equals more security, less power equals less security. A state’s position in the international system rests partly in its economic capabilities. Economic stability is therefore important to a state’s domestic stability and/or national security (Wiarda 1986: 171). Analysts consider weak economies as most vulnerable to this type of threat and the theoretical examples presented in the literature demonstrate how this relationship is understood. The complex technological foundations of modern economies require highly skilled workforces which can only be developed through sufficient investment in education and vocational training. However, states beset by population – resource imbalances have little to invest in social capital once basic needs are fiscally catered for (Tuchman Matthews 1989: 164, Wiarda 1986: 167). Because of this, governments face tough spending decisions, which could adversely affect state stability; they either invest in economic growth at the immediate expense of the people, or invest in the people immediately at the expense of long-term economic growth. The social and political outcomes of these tradeoffs are potentially detrimental. For example, reduced social infrastructure expenditure could exacerbate socioeconomic divisions with potentially violent and destabilising outcomes due to the “breakdown of governmental authority” leading to “increasingly repressive means that lead, in turn, to the decline in the perceived legitimacy of the regime in power” (Ullman 1995: 27–8). The trade-off shifts to security: whose security – the government or the peoples’? In the interest of state and administrative survival governments may turn on the people. Their security is then compromised by its usual provider: the state. Furthermore, an economic downturn may make radical solutions politically or socially attractive. For example, analysts speculate that unemployment and the accompanying depreciation in quality of life could compromise security where the disaffected unemployed are drawn to radical groups offering immediate solutions to their problems, thus increasing the presence and influence of groups seeking to challenge both national and international security:

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Communist and Islamist groups feature heavily in national assessments in this vein. States may also seek radical solutions in the form of increased militarisation to address rising unemployment. This may promote competitive militarisation with potentially destabilising effects at the regional and international levels (Foster 1989: 6; Saunders 1991). At the heart of these situations is the pressure brought to bear on vulnerable economies by rapid or high rates of population growth. Environmental Challenges Academics posit human population growth15 as one of three increasingly serious environmental challenges, and the degradation it causes as potentially destabilising at the national, regional and international levels. Environmental security literature is rich in hypothetical and empirical case studies of scarcity-based conflicts fomented by political decisions taken to sustain growing populations. For example, Fairclough, Homer-Dixon and Tuchman-Matthews demonstrated that intra-state conflicts could arise through expansionist policies designed to address domestic population-resource imbalances. Tuchman Matthews argued: Environmental decline occasionally leads to conflict … Generally, however, its impact on nations’ security is felt in the downward pull on economic performance and, therefore, on political stability. The underlying cause of turmoil is often ignored; instead governments address the poverty and instability that are its results (Tuchman Matthews 1989: 166. See also Fairclough 1991: 83; Homer Dixon 1994: 17).

Mische demonstrated this empirically and retrospectively using African and South American case studies. Firstly, the findings of the Ethiopian Relief Commission found human and animal population pressure caused environmental degradation and the subsequent 1975 famine resulted in social upheaval (Mische 1994: 276). Secondly, the forced migration from El Salvador to Honduras, due to environmental degradation, resulted in a Honduran political response which contributed to subsequent interstate conflict, and resultant Salvadoran anger which then morphed into civil insurgency. Both cases demonstrated population pressure as causal to intra and interstate instability and insecurity (Mische 1994, pp. 276–77). Other academics have hypothesised that urban environmental problems will result in dire security outcomes. For example the global trend of rapid growth and urbanisation has resulted in an increased demand for a range of social services and infrastructure: the incapacity of vulnerable and overburdened systems to meet societal needs could cause frustration, violence and disobedience, resulting in political instability and violence nationally and internationally (Demko 1994: 183; 15 Distinct from animal population growth, referred to by Mische 1994: 276.

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Foster 1989: 7; Sarkesian 1989: 558). Population growth is considered central to these scenarios.16 Migration Developed states have advanced an understanding of migration as a threat, amid growing fears of an influx of third world refugees fleeing conflicts and economic downturn, caused by a number of factors including population growth.17 For example North American concerns were that “the geo-political security and potency of America and its Western allies are likely to be threatened by a variety of population trends around the world” (Ben Wattenberg cited in Foster 1989: 24). This has prompted political demands for a pivotal states strategy on the understanding that “demographic forces will play a major role in the political and security prospects of developing countries” (Eberstadt 1998: 34), in the vein of NSSM 200. Whilst this conceptualisation posits migration – and therefore migrants and refugees – as causal to instability and conflict, it is also seen as a consequence of conflict and insecurity (Lynn Jones and Miller 1995: 8). Migration, including forced migration, is motivated by a number of manmade and natural factors, but primarily by the survival instinct (Hassan 1991: 24; Weinbaum 1992/93: 91).18 The UN’s former High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, legitimised this controversial assessment. She stated: “migration must be treated not only as a matter for humanitarian agencies of the UN, but also as a political problem which must be placed in the mainstream of the international agenda as a potential threat to international peace and security” (cited in Demko, 1994: 184). Moreover, academics have speculated that states may be internally 16  This logic has been applied to more recent conflicts. In 2007, the UNEP reported that the Darfur conflict in Sudan had been driven by climate change and environmental factors (www.unep.org press release 22 June 2007). This event is footnoted to recognise the continuing significance of such research, and to ensure chronological ordering of the chapter is not disrupted. 17 A similar logic was implied by the discourse of the Australian Government under John Howard (1996–2007), where the motivations of refugees was de-legitimised by the label ‘queue jumper’ and high ranking government officials speculated that Islamic terrorists would exploit the refugee process to infiltrate Australia (see for example, www. abc.net.au/am/am_archive_2001.htm). 18  Conflict is the primary man-made factor. For example, increased secessionist and irredentist activity post-Cold War has increased the flow of migrants and refugees on a global scale (Weinbaum 1992/3: 92). People are forced to move in search of security, political stability and to escape persecution (Ghosh 1997). Environmental degradation and economic hardship are also cause migration (Weinbaum 1992/3: 92; Ghosh 1997). For example, environmental degradation creates land scarcity thus undermining agricultural production. In turn, food shortages occur, forcing people from country to city in search of food, in order to survive (Wiarda 1986, pp. 160–64).

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destabilised by migration where it causes significant political demographic disequilibrium between religious, cultural, political and/or ethnic groups, which exacerbate existing tensions to give rise to new ones with destabilising effect, forcing harsh policy responses that ignite religious, ethnic and international conflict (Baral 1984: 103; Wood 1994: 12). Host and home states are considered equally vulnerable. The political stability of host states may be existentially threatened by political and societal challenges, or where home states use migrants for cross border covert operations. Home states are vulnerable to punitive actions taken by host states in reaction to adverse migrant behaviour (Ghosh 1997: 14, Weinbaum 1992/3: 103). Furthermore, the adverse pressure on social infrastructure and services caused by migration could cause socially disruptive and potentially destabilising behaviours. Developing, not developed, states bear the disproportionate responsibility for and burden of global refugee movements, and whilst some endeavour to accommodate new arrivals, mass influxes may strain already overburdened economic resources and physical infrastructure. Unmet needs of migrants and citizens could potentially lead to civil disobedience, protests and riots (Baral 1984: 104; Demko 1994: 183; Ghosh 1997: 12; Weinbaum 1992/93: 93; Wiarda 1986: 167; Wood 1994: 192). International political discourse and domestic policies reinforce and reflect academic enquiry into population and security. The Clinton Administration’s 1994, and subsequent, National Security Strategies of Engagement and Enlargement (www.fas.org) acknowledged the altered international security environment of the post Cold War where: the United States and its allies faced a radically transformed security environment. The primary security imperative of the past half-century – containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war – was gone. Instead, we confronted a complex array of new and old security challenges America had to meet as we approached the 21st century … [where] trans-national problems which once seemed quite distant, like environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, rapid population growth and refugee flows, now pose threats to our prosperity and have security implications for both present and long-term American policy (cited at www.fas.org).

The National Security strategy not only identified population growth as a national security concern, but included population and development spending in its security and strategic policy prescriptions, earmarking international population assistance and global leadership at the ICPD. President Clinton expressed this concern internationally, addressing and Earth Day Convention in April 1994, just prior to the ICPD, stating that our fourth principle is that we have to understand the urgency and magnitude of this environmental issue as a global crisis. We have to work to stop famine and stabilize population growth and prevent further environmental degradation.

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies If we fail, these problems will cause terrorism, tension and war (cited at www. fas.org).

The 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development: Racing Toward 2000 The WPC at Cairo in 1994 was renamed the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) reflecting the global consensus on the indivisibility of population and development. Delegates anticipated that the ICPD would be devoid of the aforementioned ideological and moral hurdles of the Cold War Conferences (McIntosh and Finkle 230–31), hoping for a co-operative and consensual environment. In his opening address, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated “the importance of this Conference lies in the fact that it is held in a new world climate, in which humanity has great hopes of a possibly different world order, in which peace, justice and cooperation will prevail” (ICPD 2 1994: 10). However, whilst ideological rifts had dissipated, the newly emerging secular rift in international politics would influence the debate at Cairo in response to perceived Western liberal attacks on socio-cultural mores and the familial institution. Cairo built upon the outcomes of Bucharest and Mexico City, merging them with interim conference findings and arrived at a more nuanced understanding of population that has directed subsequent discourse and agendas. At the same time, it was plagued by the sense of urgency these conferences established when designating global population stabilisation by the year 2000 as the desired outcome of the international population-development agenda. The PA preamble stated that “ during the remaining six years of this critical decade, the world’s nations by their actions or inactions will choose from among a range of alternative demographic futures” (ICPD 1 1994: 4).19 The Cairo agenda was both a response to and reflection of the aforementioned international conferences, debates and conventions. For example the: conference was explicitly given a broader mandate on developmental issues than previous population conferences, reflecting the growing awareness that population, poverty, patterns of production and consumption and the environment are so closely linked that none of them can be considered in isolation (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]).

This reflected not only the global consensus regarding the indivisibility of these issues, but also to the sustainable development paradigm established by the Brundtland Report. Moreover attendee diversity was greater at Cairo than previous conferences, and this was critical in shaping and widening the debate. Furthermore, it reflected 19  See also Chapter 1, paragraph 1.21.

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prior acknowledgement of the crucial role played by non-government actors in population and sustainable activity programs and their participation in a number of preparatory conferences and committees. Chapter 15 of the WPPA, Partnership with the Non-Governmental Sector, committed states to greater participation with the NGO sector and recognised the unique role such organisations play as “important voices of the people, and … an effective and efficient means of better focusing local and national initiatives …” (UNFPA 1994 [online]). NGOs were instrumental in transforming the conference and its subsequent international agenda. Demographic concerns, once the rationale for WPCs, gave way to the “broad issues of interrelationships between population, sustained economic growth and sustainable development, and advances in the education, economic status and empowerment of women” and injected into the debate “the environment and consumption patterns; the family; internal and international migration; prevention and control of [HIV] and [AIDS]20; technology, research and development; and partnership with the non-governmental sector” (Sadik 1995, pp. 1, 6). These issues were considered inextricably linked to population. The interrelatedness of these issues to population had been established at a number of prior inter-governmental and non-governmental conferences, and their manifestation in the WPPA reflected the consultative process between these two groups. The ICPD agenda reflected a conceptualisation of population greatly removed from its demographic origins. For example, the introduction of reproductive health and rights discourses built on and advanced the Mexico City conceptualisation, where population had been interwoven with human rights, environmental, female empowerment, and development discourses. Reproductive health discourse affected a reformulated concept of family planning and caused divisions between nonsecular and secular delegates that almost derailed the conference. This discourse came courtesy of women’s groups, the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, and the 1993 Roundtable on HIV/AIDS and Population. Reproductive health was defined as: a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes. Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so (ICPD 1 1994: 30).

20 HIV/AIDS fostered reproductive health discourse, resulting in a re-examination of taboo subjects through the reproductive health lens. At Cairo, abortion was included in the final document for the first time, and with the approval of religious leaders. Changing the context from a method of lowering fertility/family planning to one of public/reproductive health and a means to lowering maternal deaths, abortion became morally acceptable to its previous opponents (McIntosh and Finkle 1995, pp. 245–49).

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In the context of this discourse, particularly the safe sex provision, HIV/AIDS shifted the concept of family planning from fertility control to a human right. Moreover, having been designated as detrimental to development, health, human rights, and quality of life, specialists and policy makers at the Roundtable had to rethink accordingly their conceptions of contraception and therefore fertility control. Family planning shifted from a population control measure, to a population and development safeguard.21 WPPA chapter seven urged governments to: provide accessible, complete and accurate information about various family planning methods, including their health risks and benefits, possible side effects and their effectiveness in the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases (UNFPA 1 1994: 35).

Until Cairo, ideological considerations had overshadowed international population debates and conferences, marginalising religious and cultural concerns. The absence of an overarching international ideological battle by the time of Cairo enabled cultural and religious perspectives to shift from the periphery to the centre of debate (Bowen 1997: 162; Davis 1995: 189; 195, Mertens 1995). The resultant Secular/Non-Secular divide brought tension, dissension and alternative concepts and conclusions to the debate, threatening the much anticipated global consensus. Conference organisers anticipated but did not intend for this to happen. This was evident in the opening addresses by a number of high profile delegates, such as UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who pleaded for tolerance “for we cannot allow a given philosophical, moral or spiritual belief to be imposed upon the entire international community or to block the progress of humanity” (UNFPA 2 1994: 7). However an uneasy, but nonetheless disruptive secular bloc emerged preconference in August 1994 between the Vatican, Muslims, and Baptists, the Ad Hoc Coalition for Cairo (Obaid 1 2002, www.skepticfiles.org) – united in their opposition to Western liberal perspectives on abortion, family formation, sexual relations, and sexuality. Some members of the religious alliance interpreted this as condoning abortion as a substitute for family planning – as well as homosexuality, pre- and extra marital sex – counter to Islamic, Catholic and Christian family and sexual norms. The Baptists, from the United Sates, attended the Cairo conference as an NGO; their position did not reflect that of the then Clinton Administration, which by 1994 had rescinded the Mexico City policy of the Regan/Bush administrations. Although the official US position was one of open and unequivocal support for the ICPD, the presence of Baptists dissenters demonstrated that religious objections were firmly entrenched amongst some Americans. A number of Catholic Latin

21 There is little discussion of the impact of HIV/AIDS in the literature reviewed, however for further discussion of the indirect impact of the virus on issues related to population see Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 64.

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American countries expressed similar concerns. Honduras, for example, reservedly supported the majority of reproductive health provisions, stating: one accepts the concepts of ‘family planning’, ‘sexual health’, ‘reproductive health’, ‘maternity without risk’, ‘regulation of fertility’, ‘reproductive rights’ and ‘sexual rights’ so long as these terms do not include ‘abortion’ or ‘termination of pregnancy’, because Honduras does not accept these as arbitrary actions; nor do we accept them as a way of controlling fertility or regulating the population (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]).

However, the willingness of Muslim delegates to reformulate draft abortion references enabled universal, though reserved, endorsement of the final document (Bowen 1997: 177). In the draft document, abortion references were made primarily in Chapter 7, Reproductive Rights and Family Planning, reaffirming the “consensus of the 1984 International Conference on Population that governments should “take appropriate steps to help women avoid abortion, which in no case should be promoted as a method of family planning …” (UNFPA 1 1994: 36). Whilst this paragraph was included in the final document, the primary difference between it and the draft was that the majority of abortion references were shifted to Chapter 8 Health, Morbidity and Mortality, more specifically in section three Women’s Health and Safe Motherhood, where it was stated in paragraph 8.25 that In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning. All Governments and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are urged to strengthen their commitment to women’s health, to deal with the health impact of unsafe abortion as a major public health concern and to reduce the recourse to abortion through expanded and improved familyplanning services. Prevention of unwanted pregnancies must always be given the highest priority and every attempt should be made to eliminate the need for abortion. Women who have unwanted pregnancies should have ready access to reliable information and compassionate counselling. Any measures or changes related to abortion within the health system can only be determined at the national or local level according to the national legislative process. In circumstances where abortion is not against the law, such abortion should be safe. In all cases, women should have access to quality services for the management of complications arising from abortion. Post-abortion counselling, education and family-planning services should be offered promptly, which will also help to avoid repeat abortions (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]).

This shifted abortion from the context of reproductive rights. Religious delegates accepted the specification of abortion use only to safeguard maternal health or as a last resort. The Vatican reservedly joined the consensus, endorsing those chapters of the document it could reconcile with its own convictions, whilst reserving the right to formally dissent on a number of topics, particularly abortion. It chose to:

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies associate itself with this consensus in a partial manner … without hindering the consensus among other nations, but also without prejudicing its own position with regard to some sections. Nothing that the Holy See has done in this consensus process should be understood or interpreted as an endorsement of concepts it cannot support for moral reasons … or has in any way changed its moral position concerning abortion or on contraceptives or sterilization or on the use of condoms in HIV/AIDS prevention programmes (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]).

Post Cairo: 1994–2015 2015 is allocated as the end point for this chapter because it is the year by which the UN expects the ICPD and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be fully implemented. Furthermore, it is the year when the current population-sustainable development paradigm will once more be subject to international review. Since Cairo, the international community has reaffirmed its commitment to the ICPD agenda and consolidated the ongoing process of agenda merging through a number of conferences and declarations, such as the Beijing Fourth World Conference of Women, 1995, the ICPD +5, 1999, the Millennium Summit and Millennium Development Goals, 2000, and the ICPD +10 follow up meetings. Building on the global momentum and consensus established at Cairo, these conferences reaffirmed population, reproductive health, women’s rights and empowerment, and poverty eradication as interrelated and indivisible aspects of sustainable development. However review documents and declarations reveal a substantial gap between stated commitment to international population and sustainable development goals and actual implementation. Furthermore, these conferences demonstrated the endurance of religious and cultural influence since Cairo, through UN dedication to tailoring plans, programs and activities to localised religio-cultural norms, and the detrimental shift in the US position under the Bush administration to accommodate domestic religious conservatism. The ICPD +5 and +10 conferences reinforced the ICPD agenda and reaffirmed global commitment to the full realisation of its outcomes, yet also demonstrated the distance between stated and actual commitment to the implementation of the ICPD agenda and the centrality of religious perspectives as had emerged at Cairo. The unanimous adoption of the +5 document, Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the ICPD, by UNGA reconfirmed global commitment to the ICPD agenda. This review, however, revealed the process of implementation since Cairo to be bittersweet. The +5 acknowledged that “the five year progress of review shows that implementation of the recommendations of the Plan of Action has shown positive results” but conceded that “in some countries and regions, progress has been limited and, in some cases, setbacks have occurred” particularly with regard to female empowerment and the containment of HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the adoption of the document demonstrated that religious opposition had shifted

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from obstruction to reserved conciliation since Cairo. The US strengthened its resumed leadership role in global debate – which had been rescinded under Regan and Bush – sending First Lady Hilary Clinton as the honorary head of its official delegation (http: //www.commondreams.org/pressreleases/feb99/020599a.htm). Muslim countries, such as Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, the UAE, Jordan and Iran, continued to play an important leadership and brokering role. Whilst expressing reservations on certain provisions they endorsed the document and desired to join the global consensus. The Holy See too expressed its reserved desire to join the +5 consensus, repeating its Cairo qualifier that nothing the Holy See has done in this process should be understood as an endorsement of concepts it cannot accept for moral reasons … the intention therefore of the Holy See is to welcome the consensus decision of the Assembly … by welcoming the adoption of the final document wishes to express its understanding of the document just adopted (UNFPA 1999 [online]).

Interim events were as influential over international population discourse as the conferences themselves. Between the +5 and +10, the implementation of the MDGs and the election of the George W. Bush administration in the US were significant in shaping international population discourse. Moreover, the UN consolidated its position on religion and culture established at the ICPD, reconfirmed at +5, further legitimising the place of religio-cultural norms, considerations and actors in international population discourse. The ICPD and +5 were foundational to, and reinforced by the MDGs, through their overlapping goals regarding, poverty, education, gender, mortality, health, HIV/AIDS, the environment, and global development partnerships, and through the human-centred approach to sustainable development they endorsed. With regard to population and family planning, all recognised and reaffirmed the interrelatedness between these and sustainable development. Moreover, UNGA Resolution 55/2, 2000, The Millennium Declaration, merged a number of UN agendas, most notably sustainable development and global security. It established the concepts and conclusions of each as interrelated and indivisible. The Millennium Declaration determined to: establish a just and lasting peace all over the world … respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the equal rights of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion and international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character (UNGA 2000 [online]).

The centrality of population and family planning to this end was confirmed in a 2004 ECOSOC report which stated “evidence from the Asian and Pacific region shows that the implementation of the ICPD and ICPD+5 continues to be important as they are essential to the achievement of the MDGs” (ECOSOC 2004: 1).

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Furthermore, the report cited a 2004 UNFPA finding that “the MDGs, particularly the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, can no be achieved if questions of population and reproductive health are not squarely addressed” (ECOSOC 2004: 2). Within the context of the ICPD and MDGs, the UN has also recognised religious actors and cultural norms as essential to the full implementation of sustainable development goals. For example, in an April 2002 address at Georgetown University, UNFPA President Thoraya Obaid acknowledged the importance and influence of religious partnerships and opinion, in and over UN activities and debates. She stated: religion counts because the dialogue within the United Nations between North and South, and East and West has been about culture and religion, as well as about the politics of power. Thus, the tension ends up being a political confrontation over religious beliefs and cultural values; conflict between the belief and value systems of the various societies (Obaid 2002 [online]).

However, with the exception of the +5 Conference, some states have coopted religion to obstruct debate and the institution of constantly evolving population norms and initiatives. This has particularly been the tactic of the US since the election of George Bush in 2000 and his administration’s revisiting of Reagan’s Mexico City Policy, dubbed the Global Gag Rule. This is a concession to domestic conservative religious opinion which restricts global family planning funding where it could be used for abortion provision, promotion, counselling and lobbying (www.pai.org). This has contributed to the US decision to de-fund the UNFPA due to its support for coercive family planning and abortion practices in China. Furthermore, the Global Gag Rule has also resulted in obstructionist tactics by US delegates at global population forums. For example at the 2004 Parliamentarians Meeting on the ICPD +10, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kelly Ryan stated: The United States is unable, however, to endorse the world leaders’ statement on supporting the ICPD. The statement includes the concept of sexual ‘rights,’ a term that has no agreed definition in the international community, goes beyond what was agreed to at Cairo and is not a component of the ICPD (Obesity, Fitness and Wellness Week, 6 November 2004).

Despite this, the 2005 +10 Conference, The World Reaffirms Cairo, demonstrated the agenda’s universal endorsement. Yet, once again, the UN was forced to concede the gap between stated and actual commitment. The UN’s confident proclamation that “countries throughout the world continue to use the ICPD Programme in forging the strategies and policies with which they hope to address population issues and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. And they are making substantial progress, building on the achievements of earlier decades” contrasted

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with its concession that “any satisfaction we may feel at the expansion of rights and freedoms involving population issues must be tempered by an acute awareness of the unfinished agenda, the fact that parts of the world are not sharing in this progress, and the daunting challenges that have emerged in the meantime (UNFPA 2005 [online]). Since, and perhaps because of, Cairo, the population-security agenda has advanced and expanded, through the convergence of academic and political discourses. Through theoretical and empirical research, scholars and practitioners have expanded the 1980s discourse and have merged the population-securitysustainable development discourses through attention to and the prescription of concepts and conclusions embedded in the ICPD and MDGs. Scholars such as Mumford (1995), Ullman (1995), Ehrlich (1996), Eberstadt (1998) and Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion (2003) emphasised that under the right conditions and with the adequate resources, states could mitigate potential population based threats. Their prescriptions were embedded in sustainable development discourse. For example, in The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War (2003), Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion empirically and retrospectively located a number of demographic factors – mortality, fertility, age, distribution and disease – as contributing to conflict and insecurity. Amongst the policy prescriptions they made is the need for “greater recognition of the demographic transition as a security-relevant process [which] could … encourage policy makers to become familiar with foreign policies and international programs that have influenced the speed of demographic transition” (Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion, 2003: 23). Likewise, in Breeding Insecurity: Global Security Implications of Rapid Population Growth (2005) Katherine Weiland added to existing populationsecurity knowledge by arguing: Rapid population growth in developing countries creates national security problems, including civil unrest and terrorism. In particular, population growth leads to large youth bulges, rapid urbanization, and resource scarcity, all of which can lead to insecurity and instability (Weiland 2005: 3).

Moreover, through this and the prescription that “comprehensive family planning programs, as part of an integrated development strategy, will reduce the security risks associated with rapid population growth” (Weiland 2005: 1), Weiland demonstrated the interconnectedness of population, security and sustainable development. This interconnectedness was also expressed in international political discourse. In his 2005 report In Larger Freedom, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan argued “[n]ot only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other … we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights” (Annan 2005 [online]). In reaffirming the aforementioned Millennium Declaration, UNGA resolution 60/1, adopting the 2005 World Summit

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Outcome, decided “many threats are interlinked, that development, peace, security and human rights are mutually reinforcing” (UNGA 2005 [online]). Population-Development-Security: The Counter Debates This chapter has acknowledged throughout the dissenting voices, most notably ideological and religious, and their alternative population paradigms. Through debate, the international community has arrived at a hard fought and much negotiated consensus understanding of a workable population paradigm. Even this is not without its critics. Post Cairo, a number of academic challenges have been mounted against this paradigm and its underlying assumptions. Critiques range from accusations of racism, paternalism gender bias, and neo-colonialism, through to the lack of academic rigour and empiricism, and the validity of interconnecting population, sustainable development and security. For example, a common criticism of the population-development paradigm is that it marginalises, homogenises and demonises the global South. Postmodernists and feminists argue that the starting point should be the broadening of the development agenda beyond its neo-classical framework which conceptualises development as a globally homogeneous process controlled by states through their economic institutions. It assumes uniformity of perceptions and experiences within and between states. Whilst their focuses may be on different problems of the neo-classical approach, what unites post-modernist and feminist critiques is their emphasis on the micro aspects of development, particularly the need to consider the myriad and disparate voices of the poor, as well as ethnic, religious, gender perspectives (Thomas-Slayter 2003). Urban (2001) and Grimes (1998) argue that the global debate has constructed blame for overpopulation and ills to be the fault of the Third World, leading to the imposition of insensitive homogeneous population policies and the marginalisation of localised concerns and perceptions in the pursuit of a global, read Western, good. Urban highlights the dichotomy between the conception of population and proposed solutions, arguing that whilst the global debate talks of “our shared problem” and “our overcrowded planet” resultant research and policies, by focusing their attentions on conditions in the developing world, serve to blame and subsequently, demonise the South as the cause if global disasters. Population control in the developing world is thus constructed as the only solution to global problems. Grimes critique extends this argument, suggesting, amongst other things, that the construction of blame hides a more insidious agenda embedded in Western foreign and security policy fears, generating a desire to control Third World growth and expansion. This resulted in what he termed “paternalistic humanitarianism” the imposition of insensitive population control policies, from contraceptive use to the small family norm, for the supposed benefit of the developing world, in order to safeguard the developed. Hartmann (1998, 2001), Krebs and Levy (2000) and Gilbert (2000) question the validity and necessity of constructing population as a security issue, criticising

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the lack of intellectual rigour and empiricism in a number of foundational research projects. Hartmann is particularly critical of Homer-Dixon’s ongoing research into environmental causes of conflict, which include references to population. She questions whether security is the right framework for discussing these issues because their solutions lie in international co-operation which she says is traditionally antithetical to security. Like Urban and Grimes, she highlights the blame game being played out through the environment/population-security agenda, the focus of which is predominantly Third World Scarcity conflicts. She argues that this distracts attention from other causes, such as the effects of poverty caused by global inequity, and shifts blame away from the developed world and state governments, onto the people, mainly the global poor. Moreover, she criticises the intellectual rigour of Homer-Dixon’s work, labelling it assumptive and reduction for failing to consider the paradox in his proposals; for example, conflict can be as much a cause of environmental degradation as degradation is a cause of conflict. As to the saliency of the population-security agenda, Hartmann stated “[i]t is important to remember that national security agencies need an enemy, and who is the enemy when violence and instability are blamed on population pressures and resource scarcities? Implicitly, if not explicitly, the enemy becomes the poor people” (Hartmann 1998: 127). Gilbert, like Hartmann, was critical of the reductive and assumptive nature of empirical studies. His empirical research on urbanisation and security led to the conclusion that there is no “consistent or meaningful relationship” between the two, and the dispelling of a number of pessimistic myths. He found the assumptions that social anomie, radicalism, revolution, rioting and the magnification of tension are the outcomes of rapid urbanisation to be false and that, in a number of cases, the opposite was generally true, urbanisation was generally of societal and political benefit. Conclusion Contemporary population-security discourse originates from the discourses of ancient civilisations. Consistent historical debate produced two overarching paradigms: pro- and anti-natalism. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Thomas Malthus revived and popularised anti-natalist thought with his pessimistic population tract On Population. In it, Malthus argued that population growth would cause food and agricultural shortages that the modes of production at the time could not meet. Fertility and therefore population control was, he argued, the only solutions. This is the essence of Malthusianism. Despite its initial popularity, Malthusianism declined as European conflict and instability gave rise to resurgent geo-strategic pro-natalism in the form of policies enabling and encouraging population growth. In the twentieth century, population was internationalised and securitised. Initially it was a non-political issue, and was largely the preserve of non-governmental neoMalthusianism birth control leagues. These groups convened several international

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conferences, the first in 1901, and lobbied national governments for birth control facilities. The basis of their arguments were economic and health concerns. In this, they served as the foundations for later socio-economic and health paradigms. Most states were reluctant to involve themselves with birth control advocacy or activities for moral reasons. Many attempted to silence neo-Malthusian groups through legislation against, and prosecution for, perceived obscenities in birth control literature. This common interest led to the first international, inter-state conference on population in 1910. The League of Nations and then the United Nations involvement transformed the international agenda. Initially reluctant to engage in anything other than technical activities, demonstrated at the 1927 and 1954 conferences as well as debates with these organisations. However, through the forum of general and specialised agencies debate, states, experts, and non-government agencies engaged and debated the national and international aspects of the growing global population. Competitive demands and agendas were negotiated and then merged, giving rise to a politicised global population agenda. This debate, which emerged out of the Belgrade World Population Conference of 1965, established the economic-development paradigm as globally dominant. The UN involved itself in national policy and program assistance, primarily to the developing world, assisting developing states in population control in the pursuit of economic development objectives. Alongside this discourse, the nascent securitised and alternative critiques were established in political, academic and non-government circles, within and external to the UN. From Belgrade in 1965 to the present, numerous change agents have shifted and shaped global population discourse by melding and merging a number of issues and agendas to it. This has included human rights, health, female empowerment, the environment, sustainable development and reproductive health. Also during this time, population – particularly growth – was securitised at the international level. National securitising discourses emerged in the late 1960s, which posited population growth as a threat to national and international peace and security. In the 1970s concurrent with, and because of, re conceptualisation in the field of security studies, the securitised notion of population emerged in academic discourse. It also found its way into global population and development agendas through global UN conferences and declarations. In the 1980s, an academically, politically and internationally recognised population-security paradigm emerged. This paradigm understood population growth as a potential threat to national and international security, because of its causal relationship with a number of other destabilising factors such as environmental degradation, economic stagnation and unemployment. Where states were unable to mitigate these conditions through political and economic means, the paradigm prescribed population control as the best solution. However, at the 1994 Cairo Conference a previously peripheral and potentially obstructive factor emerged in the debate: religion. Incensed by a perceived agenda to impose Western sexual mores as the global norm, Catholic and Muslim states – conservative and moderate – sought to inject their own understandings of

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population as linked to sustainable development, into conference discussions. Whilst conservative agents, such as the Holy See and Al-Azhar, gained press and prominence for their obscurantist tactics, moderate state and non-state delegates engaged with their secular liberal counterparts to produce what now stands as the blueprint of the global population-sustainable development agenda: the 1994 ICPD World Population Plan of Action. With regard to Islam, Cairo, and subsequent follow-up and interrelated conferences, has shown that on population the Muslim world was divided. There is no singular Islamic position on population growth and control, rather there are multiple and nuanced positions that are informed by a milieu of factors including religion.

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Chapter 2

Population and Family Planning in Islamic Jurisprudence Contraception, birth and population control are long standing Islamic and Muslim concerns. The Hadith and Sunna contain references to the practice of al-azl, withdrawal, by the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) which, joined with Quranic interpretations, are foundational to past and current debates on religious permissibility. There are two essential Islamic positions, pro- and anti-natalist and family planning, with overarching varying degrees of permissibility, limitation, and applicability. This diversity is a product of historical debates on interpretative practices, the validity of sources, and the fallibility of the Prophet, joined with localised non-Islamic practices and norms, and a milieu of other temporal factors, such as political and economic circumstance. What is evident is that there is no singular Islamic opinion or experience with regards to family planning and population, and this diversity serves to dispel persistent assumptions of Islam as monolithic and conservative. Interpretation, experiences, and the influence of Islam vary between states, and within. Contemporary international debates have been partly informed by religious concerns, primarily Catholic ones, however despite this, long standing Muslim tradition, and the adoption of global norms by a number of Muslim states and societies, Islam remained at the periphery of international debate until the Cairo ICPD: This absence and then shift warrants is investigation in this chapter. Here, the literature on Islam and family planning is examined, in order to understand the religious position on population growth, family planning and contraception, to gauge how this might manifest in national level debates, and whether this necessarily means that debates in the Muslim world will be different from international ones. This chapter begins by exploring the historical and theological origins of jurisprudential arguments, which are many and often conflicting. Although all are based on the same central sources and

 Sayings of the Prophet.  Examples set by the Prophet.  Literal translation: withdrawal method.  Due to word limit restrictions, further references to the Prophet will not be followed with this blessing. This initial inclusion applies to all following references to the Prophet, out of respect for the reverence Muslims afford him.

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interpretive practices – Quran, Hadith, Sunna, Qiyas, and Ijma, permanent and temporal influences – the lack of religious hierarchy, a tradition of interpretation, and the existence of divergent schools of thought, have shaped interpretations and created diverse opinion. The chapter concludes by examining the domestic and international manifestations of Islamic population discourse. Although Islam is important to population debates it is not the only determinant of fertility in the Muslim world. Religion is one of many factors acknowledged as influential by fertility studies; these same studies further indicate that local level religious leaders have their own interpretations on fertility, family planning and population issues which they promulgate throughout their communities. Moreover, a variety of data confirm that some ulema are vocal in population debates, supporting or opposing local, national and/or international programs and policies. Although we cannot conclusively prove the degree of influence they have over fertility patterns, the fact that they are vocal on these issues means that they have an important role play in the debate. This book is more concerned with the role of the ulema within the debate, rather than determining the exact level of influence they have over fertility decision making. This requires an understanding of Islamic opinion – from jurisprudential to political – concerning subjects such as population growth, family planning and contraception; namely the concepts and conclusions central to international population debate. International opinion holds that population growth is problematic, thus it is important to establish an Islamic jurisprudential position on the question of population growth and optimum size. Where population growth is considered problematic, finding solutions draws us into the morally sensitive areas of family planning and contraception; if these are not acceptable, how should the problem then be approached? It may be that population growth is not considered problematic from a jurisprudential perspective, therefore population control is unnecessary and the utility of family planning shifts to the personal level. Why Religion? Why Islam? Religion can, and does, influence population opinion and subsequent debate. This is clearly manifest at the domestic level where religious opinion has influenced political and personal decision making. Religious influence only recently manifested in international population debate, but the expression of religious concerns at Cairo prompted the belief that religion could work against global population goals: , whether religions, the traditional “nurturers of group life … in praying for health and fecundity … are now abetting rather than preventing ‘the population bomb’ or  Analogical reasoning.   Consensus of learned scholars (traditional/orthodox) or the Muslim community (liberal/modernist).   Cultural, political, economic, and societal influences.

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‘population explosion” (Trompf 1998: 206). This oppositional trend, long observed in domestic debate, suggests that where religious groups and figures are socially influential and are important to political legitimacy, states cannot ignore religious opinion in debate, policy and planning. It follows that where religious opposition to family planning and population control are strong, policy and programs are either abandoned or made covert. Reverence of children as deified gifts, and the encouragement of fertility are not unique to Islam; they are also part of Catholic, Judaic, and Hindu traditions (Hassan 1996: 64; Maguire 2001; Trompf 1998, pp. 220–23). Moreover, most religions and traditions were founded at a time when overpopulation was not even a local, let alone global, concern, and many have been ‘caught off guard’ by the relatively quick advance of global concerns and pressures for control (Trompf 1998: 207). However, whilst global population control efforts have focused on the developing world in a broad sense, Muslim fertility and pro-natalism in particular garnered considerable academic, and more recently political, attention, possibly in a response to the rise of radical Islam: fears of revolutionary exportation coupled with increasing numbers have pervaded Western political thinking (Teitelbaum and Winter 1998: 221). Early Islamic Opinion and its Origins: 1st (AH)/7th (AD) Century – 12th (AH)/18th (AD) Century Text and Interpretation: The Debates Although all Islamic interpretations on contraception, family planning and population derive from the same sources – Quran, Hadith and Sunna, Qiyas, and Ijma – there is no uniformity of interpretation. This is as much to do with historical processes as it is to do with the nature of the texts. Scholars of the various schools generally agreed on broad, descriptive definitions of these sources, the importance of, adherence to, and privileging of some sources over others reflected the outcomes of post-Prophetic debates within Islam. This produced orthodoxy, created the Sunni-Shia divide, led to the establishment of jurisprudential schools, and later caused an orthodox-modernist schism. The Quran is the word and book of God as transmitted to the Prophet. It is the code for the Muslim way of life, as well as the intellectual and moral foundation of Islamic law, the Shariah. Its text is implicit rather than explicit, and codifies social and societal ethics; as Piscatori explains, “… the Quran invites questioning, and therefore interpretation, when it admits – with remarkable candour – that certain verses are ‘obscure’ or ‘ambiguous’, and that only God knows what they really mean (3: 7)” (Piscatori 1991: 3, see also A. Rahman 1992: 5; Nasr 2 1994: 41–3; F. Rahman 1979: 30). Sunna is a pre-Islamic  Establishment of authoritative theological doctrine. See below for further explanation of this process in Islam.  Literal translation: the straight path. This is the collective term for Islamic law.

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tradition of non-verbal authoritative example set by revered groups or individuals. Under Islam, this practice came to be associated with the Prophet, his Companions and the Caliphs as the authoritative figures in Islam. The validity and authority of certain Sunna came into question during the 3rd (AH)/9th (AD) century (Brown 1996, pp 6, 8; F. Rahman 1979: 54–6). Hadith is the verbal traditions of the Prophet, his answers to and directives on certain situations as they arose, as interpreted from the Quranic teachings. Hadith was transmitted by the Companions and Caliphs who served as authoritative witnesses to Hadith. In the 1st (AH)/7th (AD) century, the process of isnad,10 supportive authority or referencing to a legitimate and reliable transmitter, was introduced to substantiate and validate the proliferating Hadith. The authority and validity of Hadith were also later brought into question (A. Rahman 1992: 6; F. Rahman 1979: 54). Ijma is an interpretive practice, offering authoritative interpretations of the Quran, Hadith and Sunna through the unanimous consent of learned scholars, embedded in the Prophetic directive my community shall never agree in error (Nasr 1994: 100). It includes the practice of ijtihad, independent reasoning on the part of learned scholars with full knowledge of the sources and in consultation with other scholars. Ijma should be a gradual rather than an immediate process, and should only operate where the Quran and Hadith offer no substantial clarification or guidance on a particular matter (A. Rahman 1992: 7; Nasr 1994: 100). Qiyas, or analogical reasoning, are the application of principles to contemporary problems. It is the preserve of the ulama who, with full knowledge of the sources, can find comparatives in these to answer questions not previously encountered (A. Rahman 1992: 8; Nasr 1994: 100). Over time the authority, validity and primacy of the religious texts changed as a result of developments within the community, and subsequent shifts in the use and authority of the sources, falling under four periods: early Islamic from the time of the Prophet until the establishment of orthodoxy around 3rd (AH) /9th (AD) century; Islamic orthodoxy from 3rd (AH) /9th (AD) century until around 12th (AH)/18th (AD) century; Orthodox-Modernist schism in the 12th (AH)/18th (AD) Century; Islamic revivalism beginning in the 13th (AH)/19th (AD) century. During each of these periods, the sources were shaped and used to suit the religiopolitical needs and agendas of authoritative figures in the Islamic world. The need for codification in order to establish religious authority and preserve religious cohesiveness and distinction did not arise until after the death of the Prophet. During the early Islamic period, the Quran, Hadith, and Prophetic and companion Sunna11 were used conterminously based on acceptance of their divine origins and thus equity, and for personal moral, rather than political, reasons (Brown 1996: 6–8, 10–13; F. Rahman 1979: 54–6). Living tradition during the time of the Prophetic exemplar produced a fluid notion of uncontested Prophetic and religious 10 Chain of transmitters 11 According to Brown, Sunna predates Islam, referring to the word of revered groups or individuals (Brown 1996: 8).

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authority which negated the need for codification, and “an unsystematic approach prevailed until the completion of Quranic compilation in the early post-Prophetic era” (Lapidus 1991: 21). The lack of recorded material meant no sources could be confidently proclaimed the Prophetic word. In an “increasingly complex religious and political environment” (Brown, 1996: 13) besieged by external and internal conflicts, in a vacuum of religious authority, coupled with an environment of uncertainty, scholarly interpretation was being made expediently to establish personal legitimacy and discredit opponents: the need for codification arose (Brown 1996: 13). The question of rightful succession, on the basis of direct lineage or religious piety, produced the Shia-Sunni schism. Furthermore, the growth and migration of the Umma away from Mecca and Medina, particularly during the Umayyad years, brought Muslims and Islam into contact with other customs and traditions. The conversion of people to Islam, coupled with flexible interpretive practices, and the development of regional schools under the guidance of various Companions and Caliphs, enabled these customs and traditions to be embedded into Islamic practice and thought. Jurisprudential codification began under the Abbasids to avert religious dilution (Nasr 1994: 100–103) which led to the establishment of the first two Sunni schools of law – the Maliki in Medina and Hanafi in Kufa (Nasr 1994: 103). The move toward orthodoxy reflected debates over source and transmitter fallibility and the need for textual authoritativeness. Around the 3rd (AH)/9th (AD) centuries, suspected transmitter fallibility brought Sunna authority into question. Three disciplines emerged: living tradition scholars who favoured the existing early period practices; Speculative theologians who accepted only the Quran; AlShafii’s perspective, which prevailed, rejected non-Prophetic Sunna and Hadith, and distinguished Quran and Hadith as the primary, and Ijma and Qiyas as the secondary sources of Islamic thought, and formed the third school of Sunni law. Shafii formalised textual hierarchy and co-extensiveness, based on Prophetic infallibility and divine connection. The Quran was the superior devotional and spiritual source and the Sunna its jurisprudential equal. Distinction was in form only; the Quran as recited revelation, the Sunna as unrecited. Prophetic Hadith and Sunna were used to ‘amplify’ the Quran, and to ground its implicit directives in human experience (Nasr 1994: 99; Brown 1996: 10–16; F. Rahman 1979: 59–64). Moreover in the 2nd (AH)/8th (AD) century, following the appearance of “… a large body of Hadith, claiming to emanate from the Prophet …” (F. Rahman 1979: 76), Hadith became the accepted representation of the Sunna, thereby generally replacing Ijma, and by extension Qiyas and Ijtihad, as the methodology for Quranic interpretation. Orthodoxy produced an authoritative textual base, rendering further interpretation unnecessary. This served as the basis of the Hanbalite School, the fourth in Sunnism, founded by Al Shafii’s student Ahmad bin Hanbal. The Sunni finalisation of Ijma in the 4th (AH)/10th (AD) century marginalised and almost extinguished ijtihad, confining scholarly and juristic interpretation and reinterpretation to within one’s own school, rather than across schools, described

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by Rahman as ‘relative ijtihad’ as opposed to ‘absolute ijtihad’ (F. Rahman 1979: 79, see also pp. 74–6; Nasr 1994: 103–104; Piscatori 1991: 4–9). Ijtihad was kept alive by the Jafari Twelver Shiite, whose mujtahids served as living interpreters of the law in the absence of the unrevealed Imam. The Schools of Thought and a ‘Spectrum of Permissibility’ In the early Islamic period, the majority of schools permitted family planning; differentiations on the question of consent produced a spectrum of interpretation and conditional permissibility. This section draws heavily on Omran’s Family Planning in the Legacy of Islam (1992), which is the most comprehensive English language study12 on interpretation from the major schools13 of Islamic thought, and is a primary source for Muslim and non-Muslim scholars and practitioners of Islamic fertility.14 Omran found that the early findings of the major schools conform to the above described pattern in that there is a relative consensus as to the centrality of the Quran and Sunna, but differentiated interpretations (Omran 1992: 146). Natural methods of contraception, such as rhythm and withdrawal, were generally permitted because they were analogised and akin to al-azl, practiced by the Prophet’s companions with his consent and thus having a degree of religious legitimacy. There is a multitude of substantiated traditions in numerous Hadith compilations that refer to this practice, which Omran classified into nine major categories: experience of the companions; tacit Prophetic approval with the predestination caveat; verbal Prophetic sanction; women as tilth; permitted with wife’s consent; equivocal language; pregnancy whilst nursing; hidden infanticide; denial of infanticide (Omran 1992: 115). For example, Hadith 1.1 from Jabir claimed that “on the authority of Jabir Ibn Abdullah he said ‘we [Companions] used to practice al-azl during the time of the Prophet while the Quran was being revealed” (cited in Omran 1992: 115). The spectrum of permissibility arose out of minor interpretive variations on the question of consent. On family planning, Omran observed only minor differences between the schools, noting more agreements than disagreement regarding permissibility. Contemporary interpretations as to the permissibility of population control and family planning are partially derived from 12 Although there is a large body of literature on Islam and family planning, it focuses on Islamic influence over family planning policies and programs, rather than Islamic jurisprudence on the subject. 13 Omran stresses that the theistic divisions within Islam are schools of thought rather than sects because, unlike Christian denominations whose religious beliefs and practices differ, Islam’s schools share the same fundamental principles; their differences are generally variations in custom. They are unified in their belief in the centrality of the Quran and Sunna, but differentiated by their interpretations of these sources (Omran 1992: 146). 14 See for example, al-Hibri 1993; Bowen 1997; Demriel 1996; Obermeyer 1994; Roudi-Fahimi 2004.

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the findings of these early scholars. Fundamentally, the majority of Sunni and Shia scholars permitted couples to practice al-azl, and, by extension, other natural methods of contraception, only if both partners consented15 (Bowen 1997: 165; Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 21; Omran 1992, pp. 152–53). The question of consent produced a multiplicity of enduring interpretations. Sunni Schools The Hanafi School permitted the use of al-azl and natural contraceptive methods but cited consent as conditional. For some Hanafi scholars, such as Al-Kasani (AH6th/AD12th), husbands had to seek their wife’s consent to al-azl, as its use contravened her childbearing right. Others, such as Ibn al-Humam (AH9th/ AD15th) and Ibn Nujaimi (AH10th/AD16th), argued that in times of ‘religious decline’ al-azl could be used non-consensually for prudential reasons, based on the Prophetic Hadith such as that regarding a child’s right to future security that “to leave your heirs rich is better than leaving them dependent upon people’s charity” and on parental obligation for religious training and good upbringing by “establish[ing] regular prayer, enjoin[ing] what is just and forbid[ding] what is wrong, and bear[ing] with patient consistency whatever betide you, Lo! That is the steadfast heart of things” (31: 17) (Omran 1992, pp, 35–6, 154, 183). The position of the Maliki School, more nuanced than the Hanafi, included natural and barrier methods of contraception, and drew conclusions based on reproductive mechanics and spousal rights and consent. Maliki scholars permitted al-azl with the wife’s consent, a position formalised by Imam Malik who stated “No man shall practice al-azl without the (free)16 wife’s consent” (cited in Omran 1992: 155). Maliki School interpretations included barrier contraceptive methods: Ointments and suppositories were used in early Muslim societies to prevent conception by barring or expelling semen from the uterus. Al-Qurturbi (AH 654/ AD 1272) clarified the Maliki school’s position, stating that “[T]he drop of seed is not a thing in actual fact, and therefore no wrong [was] done by the woman if she expel[ed] it, unless it [had] already lodged in the woman’s uterus. It [was] for all purposes as though it [was] still in the man’s loins” (cited in Omran 1992: 156), which derived from the Hadith “On the authority of Abu Sa’id: The Prophet was queried about al-azl and he said ‘Not out of all the semen [was] a child formed, 15 A wife must consent to al-azl because, as a contraceptive method, it may contravene her right to childbearing. 16 Note the reference to ‘free wife’. Men could have sexual relations with their slaves, who, being their property and not party to a marriage contract, did not have the same rights to childbearing as a free wife. Non-consensual al-azl did not contravene any personal rights in such cases. Men were permitted to have sexual relations with slaves, being their property and given that Islam does not condone abstinence, and in this relationship coitus interruptus could be used without the woman’s consent as there was a danger that the man could lose the use of his property should she become pregnant (Bowen 1997: 165).

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and if Allah willed to create something nothing would stop him from doing it” (cited in Omran 1992: 120). The distinction was made between preventing conception and termination. The sperm in itself was nothing and can be expelled and destroyed to prevent conception. Once conception has taken place then it becomes a ‘life’, and interpretations shift into the realm of abortion and elimination of life. Prior to conception, the sperm was of no purpose and could be dealt with as the couple saw fit, and this included the use of contraception. Maliki School interpretations embodied the holistic approach that most Islamic schools took toward family planning: it is not simply about preventing births and family limitation. The essence of the Islamic concept17 of family planning is that it is about planning all aspects of family life, not just the number and spacing of children. Hanbali School interpretations, like those of those the Hanafi and Maliki schools, ruled consent to be conditional. Hanbali scholars permitted the use of al-azl in marriage with the wife’s consent, but identified situations where it was prudent to bypass consent, for example al-azl was mandatory when men engage in intercourse with women in enemy territory because if a child was conceived and born it would then become a slave or captive to its father’s tribe (Omran 1992: 162). Ibn Qudama (AD 5th/AH 11th) stated that “if, however, there is a justification, such as being in enemy territory and there is a need to have relations, the he can practice coitus interruptus …” (cited in Omran 1992: 162). This would have negated the child’s aforementioned right to future security, and also its rights to legitimacy and good name from the Prophetic Hadith “the child belongs to the marital bed and the right of a child on his parent is to be given good breeding and good name” (cited in Omran 1992: 34). The position was similar to the Hanafi school obligation to use al-azl in times of religious decline, and the Maliki school one differentiating between free wives and slaves and the need for consent – whereby the man was left to contextually and prudentially decide on al-azl. The Shafii School permitted the use of al-azl without the wife’s consent, taking a different view of her reproductive rights (Omran 1992: 159). Interpretations were informed by the traditions of its founder, Imam Shafii who permitted the use of al-azl due to its practice by the Companions, and later by Al-Ghazali (d AH 493/AD 1111). On consent, both likened al-azl to a legal contract, which was validated by an offer and its acceptance: when an offer was made but withdrawn prior to acceptance, no breach of contract had occurred. Intercourse was reasoned to be similar. It offers semen and the chance for conception, but if the offer is withdrawn before ejaculation into the uterus, no breach of contract took place; a wife’s right to conception was not broken. This contrasted with other schools that believed wives’ to hold an inalienable right to conception and must consent to its abrogation through al-azl. Al-Ghazali also made the distinction between contraception and termination to justify al-azl; arguing that no living thing comes 17 And here it is acceptable to generalise an Islamic position, because at the heart of all interpretations is an holistic approach to family planning.

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to any harm through al-azl: life was not destroyed, simply prevented (Omran 1992: 159–60). The similarity between the Shafii School and other schools lay in permitting al-azl because of its preventative qualities, but differed in interpreting reproductive rights as alienable and consent as unnecessary. Shia Schools Zaydi scholars, such as Ibn al-Murtada (AH 9th/AD 15th) permitted al-azl with a wife’s consent because “the Prophet prohibited it except with her permission” (cited in Omran, 1992: 165). Ismaili scholars also permitted al-azl with consent. Al-Nu’man (AH4th/AD10th) cited Imam Ali as practicing al-azl. The Ismailis also established that spousal permission should be included in marriage contracts, citing Abu Ja‘far Ibn Mohammad Ali18 who reported that “I dislike it in the case of a free wife unless this has already been agreed upon at the time of marriage contract” (cited in Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 22; Omran 1992: 167). Furthermore, Ismaili scholars advised on al-azl with nursing mothers, citing Ibn Mohammad Ali’s report of the Prophetic Hadith “it is also advisable to practice al-azl with a nursing woman, lest she get pregnant and the child may be harmed. Such was reported from the Prophet” (Mohaghegs-Damad 1992: 22). To do so is to uphold the Prophetically ordained right to breastfeeding from the Hadith “and mothers should suckle their children two full years, for those who wish to complete breastfeeding” (cited in Omran, 1992: 35). Ibaddi19 scholars (Kharjirite) also permitted al-azl conditional on a wife’s consent (Omran 1992, pp. 163–65). The Imami of the Twelver School permitted al-azl with consent, and recommended that this be codified in the marriage contract as a legally binding condition of the relationship. Further, some scholars ruled that wives were entitled to monetary ‘compensation for the sperm’ if the husband violated the contract. Al-A‘amili (AH10th/AD16th), for example, ruled that “al-azl [was] not permitted with a free wife without agreement during the marriage contract” (cited in MohaghegsDamad 1996: 22), and bound both spouses to consent, arguing that a wife could not practice al-azl, by pessaries or other methods, without her husband’s consent. The Zahiri School, described by Omran as short-lived,20 was the only one reported to have prohibited the use of al-azl, based on the Hadith of Judama who reported that the Prophet described it as akin to hidden wa’d (infanticide) (Omran, 1992, pp, 86–7, 165–67). Furthermore, the Zahiri scholar, Ibn Hazm (d. AH 445/AD 1063), prohibited any further interpretation on al-azl, believing that once something was committed to text as a sin, all other verses concerning it were nullified. 18  Neither Omran (1992) or Mohaghegs Damad (1996) offer an explanation of who Ibn Mohammad was or of his time of death. It is possible that they are referring to Ja‘far Ibn Mohammad, the Sixth Imam if Shiism, and the father of Ismail, the spiritual leader of the Ismaili School, and hence Ibn Mohammad’s centrality to Ismaili opinion. 19 Spelling from Omran 1992: 147. 20  Founded by Ibn Hazm (d. 1063) in Spain.

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Twentieth Century Interpretations and their Origins Text and Interpretation: The Debates Contemporary Muslim interpretations merge early rulings with the interpretative practices and arguments from the periods of Islamic revivalism. The first period, the ‘reformation’ (Brown, 1996), was rooted in the orthodox-modernist split that emerged out of the late eighteenth century Prophetic infallibility debates. The question of Prophetic fallibility/infallibility brought the validity and authority of the primary sources into question, leading modernist interpreters to reformulate textual applicability. This process began in 18th century post-Moghul India where, under conditions of social and political turmoil, and missionary and Orientalist intrusion, Indian Muslims sought a pragmatic, restorative model of reformation and counter-colonialism from within Islam. Resultant debates on the utility of Islam in a contemporary context produced Modernist counter-interpretations regarding the infallibility of the Prophet and textual authority. Modernists reformulated the Prophet as a social and political reformer, leader and authority, removing him from his Divine orthodox construct and thus producing an exemplar for reformist leadership. Moreover, the fallibility of the Prophet removed barriers to interpretation enabling Modernists to lay claim to interpretive authority. The Ahl-i-Quran movement, for example, distinguished the texts on the basis of eternality and temporality, arguing that the Quran, as eternal, was unchangeable and binding, and the Sunna, as temporal, was non-binding. The Quran embodied unchanging legal principles, analogous to a constitution, and the Sunna as the practical and changeable application of the law, analogous to a set of by-laws. The Hadith ceased to be binding as its association with the Prophet made it fallible. Moreover, because the Hadith of the Companions had contested and sometimes prevailed over Prophetic ones, there was no guarantee of their Prophetic legitimacy. Convinced of Prophetic infallibility, the Orthodox upheld the validity and authority of the Hadith and Sunna through the logic that to doubt the sources is to doubt the Prophet and to doubt his mission is to doubt the Quran; in this way they defended the universality of the Sunna. A middle ground emerged espoused by Jafar Shah Phulwarawi, which upheld the modernist human/divine textual distinctions but accepted all as products of the Divine Revelation. Sunna and Hadith were further distinguished into binding and non-binding depending on whether their origin was in the revelation and Prophetic mission, or as the product of ijtihad by the Human prophet, or a reflection of his personal habits and preferences. This classification operated in concert with the historical distinction between obligatory, recommended, forbidden, reprehensible, and optional acts (Brown 1996, pp. 18– 75; Piscatori 1991, pp. 7–10).

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Twentieth century revivalism was intensified, sharpened and made dynamic by globalisation, modernity,21 conflict, and the imposition of foreign norms and ideologies on the Muslim world. Revivalist movements are unique and situated on a spectrum ranging from reactionary/anachronistic to particularist. The upshot is interpretive and conceptual multiplicity. This process, labelled Muslim politics, denotes the competition and contestation for control over the interpretation of religious symbols and the institutions that produce and sustain them; in some cases this has pitted religious and political figures against one another in the pursuit of power in a process of “public negotiation over the rules and discourse that morally bind the community” (Eickleman and Piscatori 1996). This process was and is used to demarcate and dichotomise socio-political boundaries, distinguishing good and bad, Muslim and non-Muslim. Women, the family, sexual norms and family planning became potent symbols in the politics of distinction played out in the Muslim world (Ehteshami 1996; Eickleman and Piscatori 1996; Esposito 1983; Esposito and Voll 1996; Lehmann 1998, pp. 607–15; Piscatori 1991). On Family Planning: For and Against in the Islamic Texts Sheikh Jad-al-Haq, a Grand Mufti of Egypt, argued that “nothing in the Holy Quran or in the reported utterances of the Prophet prohibits the planning or limitation of childbirth” (cited in Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 1). Quranic silence on issues such as population and family planning is not an omission of opinion rather the answers to these questions exist in hidden form for contemporary scholars to uncover. Both supporters and opponents of birth control and family planning seize this lack of direct prohibition or sanction in the Islamic texts as evidence and justification of their positions (al-Hibri 1993: 2; Obermeyer 1994: 42; Omran 1992, pp. 85–6). For example, Sheikh al-Sharabassi of Al-Azhar stated that “there is little doubt that the size of progeny, large or small, is not a fixed, rigid or uniform position, similarly, birth planning swings from one extreme to the other, taking various positions along the arc of the pendulum …” (cited in Omran 1992: 83). This is an important point to any discussion on family planning and population arguments in Islam. Modernist interpreters allow flexible Quranic interpretation. Through qiyas and ijtihad, Quranic principles are applied to demonstrate the religious compatibility of family planning. Orthodox scholars, the primary opponents of family planning, reject anything but literal interpretations of the texts, and privilege the Quran over other sources where possible. For example, orthodox Scholars recall Suras and aya22 such as “Kill not your children, on a plea of want” (Sura 6: 151, cited in 21 Distinct from modernisation. Modernity implies the desire for, and thus imposition of, uniform values, norms, and modes of socio-political organisation, whereas modernisation is the process of blending modern technological and scientific developments with different political and social models, which many Islamist groups have reconciled with their own political agendas. 22 Literal translation: verse.

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Omran 1992: 86) and others outlawing pre-Islamic infanticide to demonstrate the prohibition of family planning and limitation by comparing them to murderous practices. Islamic scholars derive permission and prohibition for family planning from the same texts and principles. The Islamic principles most often referred to in the family planning debate are: Islam is a religion for all times; Islam is a religion of ease, not hardship; Islam is a religion of moderation; Islam is a religion for organisation; Islam strives from the greater good or lesser evil; and, finally, Islam is about the primacy of God and a belief in his omnipotence (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996, Omran 1992). However, it is evident that for every interpretation of Islamic principles sanctioning family planning, counter interpretations are found in the same or other principles. Orthodox misuse of jurisprudential practice, particularly the interpretation of textual silence as a prohibition of family planning, has been criticised by authors such as Omran, who argue that Orthodox scholars hold an unreasonable expectation of textual inclusion of contemporary concepts unknown to early recorders of Islamic tradition. Omran’s counter to the Orthodox position is that Islamic tradition revealed both knowledge and acceptance of methods for preventing pregnancy, primarily through the tradition of al-azl: modern jurists could thus sanction the use of modern contraceptives, based on these traditions. Further, Muslim scholars have a responsibility to consider all texts in context, rather than relying solely on textual omission as the basis of opinions (Omran 1980, pp. 32–3). Hadith and Sunna complimentary to personal opinions and agendas may be used at the expense of contradictory ones, thus giving religious legitimacy to an individual’s argument. The ijtihadi tradition, practised mainly under Shiism and by modernists, through its three core principles; laws change with time and place, choosing the lesser of two evils, and preserving the common good (alHibri 1993, pp. 1–2; Omran 1992: 60), enables interpretive flexibility, adding to the multiplicity of opinion. Ijtihad is an important tool in contemporary times, enabling the historical and implicit edicts of the primary texts to be reinterpreted in light of current concerns. When this process fails, Muslims should seek the instruction of a trusted scholar (Sheikh Jad-al-Haq ‘Ali Jad-al Haq, Grand Mufti of Egypt in, Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 20), thus adding to the diversification process by allowing individual scholars to interpret religious sources and offer their own opinions. Orthodox scholars reject this process as an attempt to “conform the law to man arguing that these modern movements which seek to reform the Divine Law rather than human society are, from the Islamic point of view, in every way an anomaly” (Nasr 1994: 98). For the orthodox, the door to ijtihad is not necessarily shut, rather it should operate in the reverse to modernist practice, not “to change the law to suit the convenience of men but to face and solve every new situation in conformity with the teachings of the Shariah” that is, in accordance with the recorded tradition (Nasr 1994: 105).

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Family Planning in Islam: For and Against Islam as a Religion for All Time Islam was designated a religion for all times, in recognition of its position as the last of the revealed monotheistic traditions, implying that: … Islam is meant for all mankind and not restricted to a special population in specific area or to a circumscribed period in history … this religion should cater for … the requirements of future generations and different population groups until the end of time (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 21; Omran 1992, pp. 65–9).

For modernists, this is accepted as a directive to flexible and responsive reinterpretations of the texts under changed circumstances. Scholars such as Omran and Mohaghegs-Damad have argued that the Quran, Hadith and Sunna are not static proscriptions, rather the interpretive flexibility, inherent in traditions such as qiyas and ijtihad, permits continual textual reinterpretation to cater for the needs of successive Muslim generations. This suggests that if, when and where population control becomes necessary, scriptural interpretation could accommodate this need by permitting Muslims to use family planning with religious sanction. Furthermore, Omran has argued that modern demographic changes require scholars to rethink their position on family planning and population control. He noted that Islamic scholars had generally adopted a pro-natalist stance, derived from historical precedents that encouraged high fertility. However, contemporary demographic trends in the Muslim world are very different. The high mortality rates and siege mentality that prompted pro-natalist thinking are no longer relevant, therefore scholars needed to return to the texts and principles and adapt their thinking in line with current circumstances (Omran 1992, pp. 65–6). This practice was sanctioned by Sheikh Hasan Ma’mounm’s, former Grand Imam of Al-Azhar University, fatwa which stated: But now we find that conditions have changed. We find that the density of population in the world threatens a serious reduction of the living standards of mankind to the extent that many men of thought have been prompted to seek family planning. … I see no objection from the Sharia point of view to the consideration of family planning as a measure, if there is a need for it (cited in Omran 1992: 68–9).

This demonstrates the modernist textual approach which reconciles changed circumstances with Islam, in this case permitting the use of family planning and population limitation where required. Furthermore, arguments in favour of family planning based on this principle are substantiated by Sunna referring to al-azl (Dardir and Ahmed 1981; Obermeyer 1994; Omran 1992; Rafiabadi 2003). Contraceptive methods, particularly al-azl,

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are established Islamic practices, recorded in the Hadith and Sunna as practiced by the Prophet’s companions with his blessing. Muslim doctors are credited with the development of contraceptive methods and with transferring their knowledge and technology23 to Europeans (Maguire 2001) and there is reportedly textual evidence suggesting the use of barrier methods such as sponges and douches by early Muslims. Modernist scholars, using qiyas and ijtihad, have re-examined these historic examples and joined them with the requirements of ‘religion for all times’ to sanction all non-terminal modern contraceptive methods, to fulfil the growing need and demand for family planning in the Muslim world (Obermeyer 1994: 62). For example, Sheikh Jad-al-Haq, a former Grand Mufti of Egypt, issued the following fatwa on family planning: Question: Many Muslims … are unclear about the permissibility of birth planning in Islamic law and tradition. Can you give your authoritative opinion? Answer: No Quranic text forbids prevention of conception. The principle of preventing conception was accepted in those sayings of the Prophet which allowed some of his followers to practice ‘withdrawal’ … Most scholars of the Prophet’s traditions (‘hadith’) agree that this permission was granted (cited in Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 2, italics added).

Yet this principle is also used by orthodox scholars to legitimate a literal interpretation of the Quran in opposition to family planning. Maududi argued against family planning on the basis of the immutability of the Divine path. He cited the aya: Our Lord is He Who gave everything its peculiar form and nature, the guided it aright (i.e. showed it the way following which it can fulfil the purpose for which its creation was due) (20: 50) and effecting change in the scheme of God (khalqAllah) is a fiendish act (4: 119) (Maududi 1967: 82),

as proof of the Quran’s literal universality: everything has a divinely proscribed place that should not be altered. For Maududi, interpretation was dangerous because “deviation from the right course may on the face of it seem quite attractive and fascinating and advantageous. But the fact is that straying away from the path laid down by the Creator and violating the limits set by Him is bound to be harmful to man” (Maududi 1967: 75). The Quran, he argued, proscribed regulations on sexual activity and the procreative objective of marriage which are transcendent, and therefore demonstrated the prohibition of family planning and fertility control under Islam.

23 They developed barrier contraceptive methods, such as condoms fashioned from animal intestines and sponges which could be inserted into the vagina.

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Ease not Hardship v. Fear of Want/God’s Providence “Allah desires for you ease; He desires no hardship for you” (Sura 2: 185, cited in Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 20; Roudi-Fahimi 2004: 3). Islam, a religion of ease rather than hardship, offers guidance to make life as easy and burden free as possible. Family planning proponents, such as Ayatollah Mohaghegs-Damad, have cited this to justify their position, arguing that this principle suggests “Islam would be sympathetic to family planning if spacing pregnancies and adjusting their number would make the mother more physically fit and the father more financially at ease …” (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 20). Omran, Sachedina and Tantawi have made similar arguments regarding the permissibility of family planning to ease physical and economic burdens (Omran 1980: 34, 1992: 59–60, Sachedina 1990, Tantawi 1996: 5). Omran has further demonstrated the compatibility of family planning with this principle, and therefore Islam, citing the 1971 declaration of Sheikh al-Sharabussy, of al-Azhar University – which derives from al-Ghazali24 and the Shafii School (Omran 1992, pp. 6–9) – in which Sharabussy identified circumstances under which it would be acceptable to use family planning to bring ease. These included: • • • •

where either parent caries a contagious, transmittable disease which would unduly burden both child and parents; where a woman may but cannot physically sustain further or multiple pregnancies family planning would ease the burden on her health, physical wellbeing, and overall quality of life; when a husband/father is unable to make adequate basic provisions;25 and to protect a wife’s beauty so that she may continue to be a pleasure to her husband (cited in Omran, 1980: 33), but does not state who bears the burden in this instance.

Al-Sharabussy’s opinion was a continuation of pro-family planning interpretations emerging from Al-Azhar University. For example, in 1953 the Al-Azhar fatwa committee issued the following statement in support of family planning: The use of drugs to prevent pregnancy temporarily is not forbidden (the principle of all times), according to the Shafi’is, and the committee endorses the views, seeing that it helps ease matters for people and relieves them from hardships, particularly if concern is felt for the woman’s life or health as a result of too frequent pregnancies, without long enough intervening space between one pregnancy and another (cited in Omran, 1980: 34).

24 A 6th/9th century scholar. 25  Basic provisions such as: food, clothing, shelter, health care and education.

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This particular ruling is important for two reasons. First, it further illustrates the permissibility of family planning under the ‘ease not hardship’ principle, explicitly permitting its use where a mother’s health and/or life will suffer as a result of pregnancy. Furthermore, it demonstrates that through qiyas and ijtihad modern contraceptive methods can be sanctioned by drawing on historic examples, in this case, the use of the contraceptive pill today is in keeping with Shafii rulings. Opponents of this justification take issue with the motives rather than methods, evident in rulings in favour of family planning for health, but not for other, reasons (Sachedina 1990: 108). Opponents have countered economic permissibility by invoking the Suras and ayas regarding ‘fear of want’ and on the basis of God’s providence. Maududi argued that “Islam’s economic system has struck at the very roots of capitalism … takes these and many other effective measures to remedy the ills that have been responsible for economic dislocation and disparity in the Western society” (Maududi 1967: 78). An Islamic economic system would render population control for economic reasons unnecessary. A 1987 ruling by the Council of Islamic Fiqh in Mecca also prohibited the use of family planning for economic reasons, finding: contraception is prohibited if it is because of the fear of want because Allah provides sustenance or on account of other factors prohibited by Islamic law. But if contraception is due to any risk or danger to a mother such as she cannot deliver her child in an ordinary manner and is subjected to operation; in such cases there is no harm in contraception (cited in Omran 1992: 216).

The Council permitted the use of family planning only where the hardship was a physical or medical one. Orthodox interpreters have rejected financial hardship as a valid justification for family planning, because it runs counter to the providential ideal of God: He will provide for those who are in need. This is derived from Sura such as “there is not a creature on earth, but its sustenance depends on Allah. He knows its habitation and its depository” (11: 6 cited in Omran 1992: 90). For example, this was the 1962 finding of Sheikh Abu Zahra of Cairo University who, citing the aforementioned Suras and ayas on infanticide, argued that this “indirectly applied to birth control because it implie[d] denying Allah’s ability to provide (rizq). If Muslims really believe in Allah they should leave their progeny and what support they expect for them to Allah” (Omran 1992: 204). To justify or use family planning for fear of economic hardship demonstrates mistrust in God’s providence, therefore it is forbidden. However, Abu Zahra conceded to fertility control to preserve maternal health and prevent the transmission of hereditary disease. On ‘ease not hardship’ and ‘fear of want’ it was generally agreed that where the hardship was medical or physical, the use of family planning was permitted. Economic circumstances however, were contentious. Some argued that where a family’s basic needs could not be financially met, family planning should be used to ease hardship. Likewise, where communal hardship was likely, family planning should be used to limit population growth. Others argued that there was

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no economic justification for the use of family planning: want is a moot point because God is providential. To think otherwise is to question God. Moderation/Quality v Quantity Proponents of family planning, who accept economic reasons as legitimate, recall the verses which designate Islam as a religion of moderation. For example, Mohaghegs-Damad has cited Sura 2: 286, “Allah takes not a soul beyond its capacity (or limits) (2: 286) and let not your hand [in giving] be chained to your neck, nor you open it to extreme lest you end up in rebuke, in beggary” (17: 29) (Mohaghegs-Damad, 1996: 20) as evidence that family planning is permissible for economic reasons where “pushing Muslims to continue their unregulated fertility in the face of hardships is rather harsh, for Islam sponsors moderation and discourages extremism …” (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 20). Implicit in this argument is the permissibility of state sanctioned population control, to limit growth to a level commensurate with a state’s capacity for socio-economic provision. Furthermore, moderation is joined with the pursuit of quality over quantity. Mohaghegs-Damad has argued that although Islam, like other faiths, had encouraged the growth of its community, this was done so under the “provision that their quality should not be compromised. If it is in either quantity or quality … Islam would certainly go for quality.” He substantiated this interpretation with the Sura: ‘the evil and the good should not be valued equal, even though the abundance of evil may dazzle you” (5: 100) and “How oft, by Allah’s will, has a small host vanquished a numerous host” (2: 249) (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 21). Omran joined moderation and quality to counter ‘quantity’ arguments based on historic circumstances very different from contemporary ones. He urged against indiscriminate procreation where ‘quality’ of life cannot be guaranteed, justifying family planning because it safeguarded the ‘quality’ of individual, familial, and community life. Moreover, he argued that pro-natalist directives, which coerced couples into high fertility, could increase personal and familial burden, thus contravening the ‘ease not hardship’ principle (Omran 1992, pp. 61–2). Likewise, Obermeyer identified justifications joining ease, moderation, and quality, arguing that small families are more economically viable, thus enabling the provision of a better quality of life, and that couples should aim for ‘better’ children, happier, healthier, well educated and loved, rather than many (Obermeyer 1994: 61). These interpretations are substantiated by the Al-Azhar Fatwa Committee’s finding that “in countries with lower resources than others, family planning is recommended together with other means that lead to its progress” (Al-Mashad 1988, pp. 15–16), which invoke both the ease not hardship and quality over quantity principles. Opponents of birth control have countered quality with quantity, by arguing that the Prophet exhorted Muslims to multiply, and that procreation is a marital obligation (al-Hibri 1993: 3, Omran 1992: 97, 203). This argument is rooted in historic circumstances under which early Muslim communities, such as the Zahiri in Spain, found themselves outnumbered and under siege from non-Muslims

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(Omran 1980: 33). Under such circumstances, the strategic applicability of a large population made sense. These arguments were revived in the twentieth century by fundamentalist and revivalist scholars who viewed contemporary circumstances as detrimental to the Umma and Islam. They took the seemingly pro-natalist injunctions of the texts as justification for population growth, and prohibition for family planning. For example, Maududi was convinced of the matrimonial procreative objective, citing ayas such as “your wives are a tilth for you, so go into your tilth as you like and do good before hand for yourselves” (2: 223) (Maududi 1967: 83) as evidence of Islamic pro-natalism. Omran highlighted some Quranic Sura utilised by pro-natalists as a justification for high fertility such as “O mankind! Be careful of your duty to your Allah who created you from a single soul, and from it created its mate, and from them twain, has spread a multitude of men and women” (4: 1) (Omran 1992: 99). Abu Zahra confirmed this in 1962, finding that multitude is required of Muslims and that procreation is a marital duty (Omran 1992: 205). In 1964, the Academy (High Council) of Islamic Research at Al-Azhar ruled that “Islam regards it as desirable to increase the number of offspring and multiply on the consideration that multitude is calculated to give strength to the Islamic nation, ‘socially, economically and militarily enhance its prestige and render it stoutly invulnerable” (cited in Omran 1992: 215). Organisation v God’s Will Mohaghegs-Damad has argued that Islam is a religion of planning which “aims to organise the life of its people and that Muslims are repeatedly urged to reflect on the divine plan in the pursuit of an orderly universe.” He cited ayas such as “it is not for the sun to overtake the moon, nor does the night outstrip the day. They all float along, each in its own orbit” (36: 40) (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 21). This aya offers implicit justification for population control where an imbalance between population and resources could have wider, detrimental effects. Scholars such as Mohaghegs-Damad and Omran join this with the principle of ease as further theistic justification for family planning. Omran’s interpretation of ‘organisation’ argued that Islam provides an organisational framework for its followers, which encourages planning in, and for, life. Moreover, he argued that the Quran legally binds Muslims into organising their lives to avoid individual, familial and/or community hardship, and then extends this reasoning to family formation and the use of family planning for these ends. Family planning, in this sense, is not simply the use of contraception to prevent or delay pregnancy, rather it starts with choosing a partner, deciding upon the desired and sustainable number of children, birth spacing, and whether their needs could be met financially (Omran 1992: 63– 5). Religious sanction could be extended to family planning where it was part of an overall life planning process that served the greater good of easing individual, familial and community hardship, in keeping with Islamic principles. Opponents counter by arguing that acts preventing the fruition of God’s Divine plan refute His omnipotence (see al-Hibri 1993: 3, Obermeyer 1994: 62, Omran

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1992, 204, Sachedina 1990: 109). They cite aya such as that relating to reports in which the devil said “and surely I will command them and they will change Allah’s creation” (4: 119, cited in Omran 1992: 207), as proof that family planning is a direct challenge to predestination: God wills the creation of a life and trying to prevent it demonstrates mistrust in His decision. However Sura such as “but you shall not will except as Allah wills, Master of the Universe” (81: 29) (cited in Omran 1992: 89) are used by both opponents and proponents as justification for their position. Opponents point to the futility of family planning because God can ultimately override the will of man. Proponents argue that if family planning can not negate predestination it is not a genuine refutation of God’s will, therefore there is no harm in practising it. Family planning proponents, such as Dardir and Ahmed, further refute the predestination argument claiming that man is incapable of overriding the will of God; we simply lack the power. Moreover, they have argued that God has gifted humans the ability to reason: utilising this is not a sign of disobedience but rather it indicates use of His gift (Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 4–5), citing the fatwa of Sheikh Jad-al-Haq, contraception through withdrawal or any newer method, does not mean mistrust in Allah’s generosity and mercy … Omar bin Khatab, the second Caliph of Islam, explained … the man who trusts Allah is one who believes that Allah will make the seed grow but he does not neglect to sow his crop (Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 4).

Al-Hibri also highlighted the futility predestination based objections, citing the Sunna which claims that humans are incapable of changing what God has willed: what God wills will be done26 (al-Hibri 1993: 3). Extending this to family planning, Al-Hibri argued that if God has planned a life, contraception will not prevent it. He rejected arguments to the contrary as flawed because human action is powerless against God’s will, concluding that objections to family planning based on this are, therefore, theistically invalid. Modernists add to their justifications for family planning, arguing that Islam obliges Muslims to use their deified gifts of reason and rationality in pursuit of the greater good or lesser evil, the lesser harm principle of jurisprudence (Omran 1992: 75), to improve the lives of themselves, their families, and the community. On the greater good, Al-Hibri argued that “If the existence or well-being of the community is being threatened for some reason, then the scholar and each member of the community must consider that fact which is subsumed under [the greater good], in reaching their own final conclusion” (al-Hibri 1993: 2) In this instance, Al-Hibri’s argument suggests there are two choices a community faces with regards 26  Representatives of the MMA presented this argument when interviewed in Pakistan, although they were arguing that it is futile to use family planning because of God wills a pregnancy, it will happen.

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to family planning and population: Is the greater good to be found in protecting the community against the hardships of population growth, or in rejecting family planning because it is considered by some to be un-Islamic? Likewise, Maguire has demonstrated that ‘lesser evil’ grants permissibility to permanent contraceptive methods. Sterilisation is sometimes forbidden in Islam because it means making an unalterable change to the human body, thus contravening God’s design. However, in situations where sterilisation is the lesser evil, for example, where parents carry an inheritable disease, sterilisation is considered preferable to a child being born burdened by disease27 (Maguire 2001). The same reasoning applies to the matter of population growth, where it threatens the existence of the entire state or society. The use of contraception and family planning is less harmful than uncontrolled growth, which could unduly burden a community.

27 This is the case in Iran where couples undergo pre-marital testing for such diseases, and are permitted to be sterilised if they are carriers.

Chapter 3

Islam and Fertility: Twentieth Century Myths and Realities Islamic jurisprudential findings are foundational to the discourses of Muslim states and scholars participating in national and international family planning and population debates, resulting in a multiplicity of opinions. Yet, a false essentialist perspective on Islamic and Muslim thought and behaviour persists amongst Western observers: Despite evident jurisprudential diversity and permissibility there has been, and remains, a tendency to essentialise Islam as pro-natalist, conservative, and monolithic. Furthermore, Islam is often posited as the critical explanatory factor for Muslim fertility patterns, which are attributed to the religions’ assumed conservatism and monolithic status. All of this has served to engender contestable assumptions about Islam and Muslim fertility. In Factors Affecting Moslem Natality Kirk argued that “factors contributing to high birth rates generally in these nations are linked in several ways with Moslem influences [which] … is strongly conservative … fatalistic … pro-natalist” (Kirk 1977, pp. 146–47). On the role of religion in population debates, Johnson has argued that “on the whole, the religious leaders of the world … have failed to grasp the meaning of demographic realities or … have resolutely ignored them … the prospect of major breakthroughs in attitude, at least as far as Islam and Catholicism are concerned, seems dim” (Johnson 1987: 324). Karim has identified demographers Caldwell and Caldwell (1987) as exponents of such essentialist assumptions, stating that they explained resistance to the two child small family norm in Sub-Saharan Africa as having “much to do with a religious belief system, that operates directly to sustain high fertility” (Karim 1997: 1). Seitz has argued that “religion is a powerful force in rural societies and some religions advocate large families. The influence of Islamic fundamentalism is strong in some Islamic states and it is a major force discouraging the use of contraceptives” (Seitz 1995: 35). These essentialised assumptions were, and remain, the product of several factors of Muslim and non-Muslim origin. First, fertility rates throughout the Islamic world were, and are, generally and comparatively high by global standards. Kirk asserted the “relative uniformity and high level of Muslim natality contrasts with that of all other major religious groups” (Kirk 1977: 146), and indeed, fertility in the vast majority of Catholic countries stands at replacement level despite pro-natalist directives from the Vatican (www. unfpa.org). Second, highly publicised Islamic clerical and political opposition,  The level of fertility at which a couple has only enough children to replace themselves (about two children per couple) Haupt and Kane 1998: 62.

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as at Cairo, toward family planning and fertility control uphold perceptions of Islam as a pro-natalist religion. Third, local and external demographic studies tend to emphasise and isolate Islam as the major factor influencing fertility decision making, artificially substantiating this overarching assumption. However, this is changing as researchers shift their attention to factors other than, but not excluding, religion. They are also asserting the need to avoid the essentialist trap by accepting and understanding the Muslim world as diverse, and this includes accepting determinants of fertility and Islamic interpretation as diverse. Islamic fertility and its determinants are not homogeneous and cannot be essentialised. Carla Obermeyer has demonstrated that high Muslim fertility, particularly in the Middle East, was, and remains, a product of several interrelated factors: low female education, low contraceptive use, belief in male dominance, cultural preference for sons, and the high social status favoured upon mothers of many children (Obermeyer 1994: 63). Karim, Omran and Sheykhi have also warned against privileging Islam as the explanatory factor for Muslim fertility, arguing that temporal, regional, cultural and political factors can be as important determinants of fertility as religion: Knowledge and attitude studies from within Muslim countries substantiate such arguments. Karim and Omran have both demonstrated that economic status, for example, is more likely to influence fertility than religion. Moreover, Karim critiqued persistent academic emphasis on religious determinants of fertility citing a lack of empirical evidence. Furthermore, in comparing fertility patterns between geographically proximate Muslim and non-Muslim populations, Karim found differences that could only be explained by socio-economic and demographic determinants, not religious ones (Karim 1997: 1). Likewise, and in addition, Omran has suggested that the socioeconomic status of Muslim countries, rather than of individuals, best explains high fertility in the Islamic world. Muslim countries are predominantly developing, or between developed and developing, ones. Because of this, they, like non-Muslim developing countries, have experienced late onset fertility transition (Omran 1992: 67). Both Karim and Omran found that in countries where governments perceived rapid population growth to be a socio-economic challenge, family planning policies and programs were implemented (Karim 1997: 2; Omran 1992: 67): This further suggests that socio-economic rather than religious considerations inform Muslim opinions on fertility and population. Further still, in some Muslim countries, where national and individual socio-economic status improved fertility   For example, Dr Abdul Hakim and his colleagues at the National Institute for Population Studies (NIPS) in Pakistan.  Refer to Chapter 1 for more on the relationship between fertility and socio-economic development.  Demographic transition: Shift from patterns of high birth and death rates, to high birth and lower death rates, to declining birth and low death rates, to low birth and death rates. Late onset transition occurs when death rates decline, but birth rates take a considerable amount of time to fall (Haupt and Kane 1998, pp. 46–7).

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began to decline: Karim observed shifts from Total Fertility Rates (TFR) of 6 or more in the 1960s, to moderate TFRs of 4 or below (Karim 1997: 2). This demonstrates that there is no Muslim fertility trend, nor are there trends that can be attributed exclusively to religious influence. Because of textual ambiguity and interpretive flexibility there is no singular Islamic position on fertility. Varied interpretations of Islam inform fertility patterns, knowledge, and debate within countries as much as between them. The result, as argued by Bowen, is that this multiplicity and ambiguity enabled ulema to selfregulate local understandings of fertility issues, because: Unlike most Roman Catholics … Muslims are not well acquainted with Islam’s positions on these issues. This can be attributed partly to the gap in communication between the educated religious leaders (ulama) and the local or village religious leaders. Material mastered and taught by the ulama is often simplified and reduced by local religious leaders into lowest common denominators. Thus, family planning is forbidden, and abortion is forbidden. They are not aware of the minority opinions, the methods of juridical reasoning, or exceptions (Bowen 1997: 176).

Whilst multiple opinions must be considered healthy in a debate, when both the opinion and its recipients are ill informed, and the latter lacks the skills or resources to access alternatives, it can become problematic. Omran has argued that this results in a population debate that is not, in essence, purely Islamic, but one that has the pretence of being Islamic (Omran 1992: 202–203), and that this circumstance has contributed to the aforementioned problem of the essentialism. Moreover, local leaders may co-opt religion to substantiate an ill formed opinion, for the purpose of furthering a personal agenda, at the expense of programs that could be beneficial at the personal, local, national and global levels. The assumption that Islam causes and/or can explain high fertility is clearly false. Historical and contemporary literature suggests that there is great diversity in Muslim fertility patterns and perceptions. Most Muslim states and societies have experienced the late onset of fertility transition, shifting from high to moderate or low fertility levels. Socio-economic and political factors appear just as influential as Islam in influencing fertility trends. Likewise, the interplay between these factors was, and remains, important. Empirical research, such as that undertaken by Karim et al. in Pakistan, has found that Islam is an important factor influencing individual fertility decision making, therefore, whilst Islam may not be the defining factor it is certainly an important influence on fertility in Islamic countries. Regarding family planning and population, these factors can have positive and/or negative influences. Bowen considered textual ambiguity, which enables family planning debates between Islamic scholars, and within the Muslim world,  The average number of children that would be born to a woman during her lifetime (Haupt and Kane 1998: 63).

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as having a negative effect on population and fertility outcomes. She has suggested that whilst debate and diversity is generally considered healthy, it is not necessarily so with regard to these issues because, in the absence of a definitive opinion on population and family planning, the debate is ultimately shaped by the power relationship between political and religious interests. In general terms, where this relationship is relatively stable, as was the case in Indonesia in the 1960s, diversity of opinions is tolerated by both sides, permitting multiple interpretations of fertility causes and consequences, which then widen the courses of action available. However, Bowen has further observed that when this relationship is unstable, and the political side feels threatened by the religious, the need for accord rather than diversity often enables conservative, religious opinion to dominate (Bowen 1997: 166). This was the case in the Sudan, Nigeria and Tunisia, where, following periods of political instability caused by religio-political imbalance, conservative religious opinion came to dictate population/family-planning debates and policies (Mazrui 1994; Obermeyer 1994). With regards to the Sudan, Faour observed that “in addition to its poor socio-economic conditions, [it] suffer[ed] from political instability and internal strife. All of these factors discourage[d] the government from intervening to lower fertility” (Faour 1989: 261). It follows that if a definitive religious opinion did exist, Muslim governments would have the guidelines necessary to implement population and family planning policies and programs that would be compatible with Islam and thus acceptable to national clerics. Some religions, such as Catholicism, have top down structures through which an absolute religious opinion, from a recognised central authority, is delivered: Islam does not. Because of this, some commentators have argued that conflict arising from textual ambiguity will never be resolved. Diversity in opinion exists not only across schools and between societies, but within them as well: Localised interpretations of Islam are produced in the absence of a central source for interpretation and/or verification (Sachedina 1990: 107; Maguire 2001). Iran stands as an anomaly. More a product of politics than religion, Iran’s Vali-e-Faqih, or Supreme Leader, can establish a religious precedent on an issue, as was the case with family planning and population control, by issuing a fatwa. Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamanei both issued fatwas in favour of family planning for example, in response to a question by a thirty-nine-year-old woman with four children and in poor health seeking guidance as to the religious permissibility of tubaligation, Khomeini stated that “In The Name of GOD if sterilisation causes infertility, it is not allowed, however for a woman with your condition it is allowed” (Ministry of Health and Medical Education). This served as a directive on interpretation that was largely followed and accepted by Iran’s religio-political leadership and leading Shia ulema, and created accord in the nation’s population debate. However, in the majority of Muslim countries, and in the absence of a centralised interpretive authority, multiple localised interpretations remain the norm. These interpretations often reflect the influence of situational, rather than juristic, factors such as pre-Islamic practices, European legal traditions, and local

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cultural norms (Obermeyer 1994: 42; Omran 1992: 201; Yusuf 2005). Yusuf has demonstrated the influence and pervasiveness of pre-Islamic cultural practices in northern Nigeria. Here he observed that in the twelve states under Sharia rule, the practices of the predominant Hausa-Fulani culture are observed alongside Islam, fostering the presumption that all practices are “Islamic” and “creating a confusion among the less discerning about when sharia is being implemented and when it is laced with cultural practices” (Yusuf 2005). The evolution of such religio-cultural melds throughout the Muslim world works against the establishment of a definitive Islamic opinion on many matters, including family planning and population, between or within Muslim states. This only serves to further demonstrate that the Islamic world is diverse rather than cohesive. The persistence of monolithic and conservative assumptions amongst Western observers continues to engender equally false opinions of singular and enduring Muslim experiences. Yet the Muslim world is as open to temporal and other influences as the non-Muslim world, and because of this Islamic experiences with, and opinions on, population are neither singular nor static. Geographical, political, cultural, socio-economic and historical variances exist across the Muslim world. These inform Islamic practice and religious opinions at the national and local level and also inform the specific issues that Islamic scholars must respond to, which includes contraception, population and family planning. Obermeyer, Omran and others have cited the importance of historical and cultural factors, demonstrating the influence of pre-Islamic cultural influences on localised interpretations of Islam, which when fused with the Islam, have created distinct theological positions (Obermeyer 1994, pp. 59–60). This is evident in the persistence of son preference, which is also a pre-Islamic and non-Islamic preference, as attested to by the experiences of China and India, within some Muslim societies despite Islam’s positioning of women as equal to men. Faour and Omran have highlighted the political and socio-economic influences on Muslim interpretations on population control, observing “… less positive views coming from some rich countries with those from overpopulated countries, which are, in the main positive” (Omran 1992: 201). Faour has likewise, found that: No national programs exist in regions of high socio-economic status … Since none of these states wish to retain massive imported labor, they promote and reinforce pro-natalist norms and values and [took] all necessary measures to maintain the high fertility rates of the indigenous populations (Faour 1989: 261).

  It is important to distinguish Omran’s observation of religious interpretation from demographic theory: he did not suggest that fertility would necessarily be higher in wealthy countries – wealth is an accepted determinant of lower fertility – only that he had observed clerical and political opposition to family planning and population control in wealthier Muslim countries.

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Saudi Arabia exemplifies this: It offers socio-economic incentives and rewards for high fertility such as government subsidised housing initiatives. Furthermore, in 2000 the Saudi government indicated to the UNFPA its satisfaction with the national TFR, stating that although it would implement UN reproductive and adolescent health goals, it would not actively promote family planning and has indeed restricted access to contraceptives. The underlying rationale for Saudi pronatalism is to grow the indigenous Saudi population to reduce national reliance on foreign labor forces (Faour 1989, pp. 255, 258; Roudi 2004: 7; Winckler 1998, UNFPA 2000). Moreover, Islam has been used to justify this position: In 1975 the Saudi government banned the import of contraceptives on the grounds that they were contrary to religious teachings. In contrast, poorer and growing states, such as Yemen and Djibouti, are concerned by high fertility and offer direct support for contraceptive use (Roudi 2004: 7). These examples illustrate Muslim perspectives as diverse, and influenced as much by (differing) experience as religion. Another persistent, yet false, assumption is that Islam is conservative, and by extension, Muslim opinions on contraception, family planning and population must also be conservative. Kirk, for example, has asserted that: in many ways all religions are conservative, but it is often noted that this is especially true of Islam, in which religion and way of life are so intertwined as to be inseparable … the contribution of this general conservatism to the maintenance of pre-modern natality is diffuse, difficult to measure, but probably very important (Kirk 1977: 147).

This is not the case. Islam is diverse and, therefore so is theological interpretation and opinion on a number of issues, including population and family planning. Islamic opinions and interpretations range from liberal to conservative; this was clearly demonstrated at the 1994 ICPD in Cairo and through the success of family planning programs in a number of Muslim countries, expressed in low fertility rates, and through conflicting jurisprudential opinion on contraceptive use. The Cairo consensus made evident the diversity of Muslim opinion concerning family planning and population. For example, in approving the Plan of Action many Muslim states, along with the Vatican and a number of Catholic Latin American states, expressed their reservations over the language, principles and norms it codified. The diversity of Islamic opinion was evident in the varying degrees of reservation expressed; for example, the Yemeni delegation was uncompromising on the question of language, stating that: Actually, we want to delete the words ‘sexual activity’. And, if we cannot delete them, then we wish to express our reservations. In paragraph 8.25, concerning ‘unsafe abortion’, we find that the definition is unclear and is not in accordance with our religious beliefs. In Islamic Sharia there are certain clear-cut provisions on abortion and when it should be undertaken. We object to the expression

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‘unsafe abortion’. We wish to express our reservations on paragraph 8.35, relating to ‘responsible sexual behaviour (UNFPA 2 1994).

By contrast, Syria conceded that although some aspects were not consistent with its religious and social principles, the spirit of the document should be upheld for the greater good, stating: the Syrian Arab Republic [would] deal with and address the concepts contained in the Program of Action in accordance with chapter II and in full accordance with the ethical, cultural and religious concepts and convictions of our society in order to serve the unit of the family, which is the nucleus of society, and in order to enhance prosperity in our societies (UNFPA 2 1994).

The Population Reference Bureau’s (PRB) 2004 policy brief Islam and Family Planning, has demonstrated the diversity of fertility rates, government views on fertility, and government-assisted access to contraception in countries with Muslim populations of fifty per cent or more: 44 countries in total. Drawing on PRB, UNFPA, and UNICEF statistics, the report found amongst Muslim countries that: • • • •

32 per cent had low TFRs (