Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912-1949 : The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Soviet Republic 1931-1934

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Volume IV The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Soviet Repnhlle 1931-1934

MAO~S ROAD'IDPOWER

Revolutionary lVritings

1912·1_949

Stuart R. Schram, Editor ...._,.___

Nancy J, Hodes, Associate Editor

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Volume IV The Rise and Fall of the Chlneae Sorlet RepahHe 1931-1984

MAO~S ROADWPOWER Revoltdionartj ~lings

1912·1949

This volume was prepared under the auspices of the John King Fairbank Center for F.ast Asian Research, Harvard University

The project for the translation of Mao Zcdong 's pre- I949 writings has been supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency. A grant to aid in the completion ofthe project has also been received from The Henry Luce Foundalion, Inc.

The Cover The calligraphy on the cover is an inscription written on the occasion of the Second Soviet Congress in January 1934. The text reads as follows: ''The soviets are the organ by which the toiling masses of workers and peasants manage their own lives; they are the organizer and leader of the revolutionary war."

Volume IV The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Soviet Republic 1931-193(

MAO~S ROAD'IDPOWER

RevolutionaryWritings

J9I2·l_949 Stuart R. Schram, Editor Nancy J. Hodes

Stephen C. Averill

Associate Editor

Guest Associate Editor

An East Gate Book

c1'vf.E. Sharpe Annonk, New York London, England

Translations copyright 0 1997 John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research lntroductOJy materials copyright 0 1997 Stuatt R. Schram and Stephen C. A veri II Maps copyright C 1997 Stephen C. Averill

All rights reserved. No pan of this book may be reprodu_ced in uy form without written pcrmissiODITom tbe publisher, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 80 Business Park Drive., Armonk, New York 10504.

(Reviscdforvol.4) Mao, Tse-tung, 1893-1976. Mao'sroe.dtopower. "East gate book." Includes bibliogn~phical references and index. Cont.:nts: v. I. The pre-Manr.ist period, 1912-192Gv. 4. The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Soviet Republic, 1931-1934 I. Schram, Snaan R., II. Title. DS778.M3A25 1992 951.04 92-26783 ISBN 1-56324-049-1 (v. I :acid-free)> ISBN 1-56324-457-8 (pbk; acid-free) ISBNI-S6324-891-3(v.4:acid-free) CIP

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this publicatiOD meets the minimum requiremeniS of American NatiODal Standard for Information Sciencet-Pennanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSIZ39.48-!984.

Contents Acknowledgements•

General Introduction: Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, 1912-1949 Introduction: The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1931-1934 Note on Sources and Conventions About the Maps Map 1. South-central China Map 2. Southern Jiangxi Base Area

xxi xxvii xcv cii ciii

civ

1931 Order to Attac:k Tan Daoyuan (January I)

Order to Pwsuc and Attack 1ht Enemy Division ofTan Daoyuan (January 2)

Order to Cany Out Decentralized Fund-raising Activities After Smashing the First "Encirclement and Suppression" (January 16) The Tasks ofthe General Political Department, and the Relation Between Political Departments and Conunissars in the Red Anny (february 17)

12

Order No. V6 of the First Front Anny of the Red Anny to Continue to Move Eastward and Intensify Efforts at Fund-raising (February 21)

14

Letter from the Gencl1ll Political Department of the Central Revolutionary Military Conunission to the Soviet Government of Jiangxi Province (Fcbnwy27)

18

On Making the News Bulletin on Cu"ent AffQirs Widely Available

(Man:h 12-14)

22

The Military Prepuatory Work That Must Be Done to Achieve Victory in the Second Phase ofOperations (March 17)

28

The Significance of the Second Campaign, the Current Situation Between the Enemy and Ourselves, and Preparatory Work in Striving for a Second Victory (March 20)

34

Order to Move the Troops for Reorganization, Training, and Fund-raising (M.,.h23)

42

A Propaganda Outline for Seeking Victory in the Second Campaign

44

Eight Conditions for a Great Victory in the Second Campaign

45

Opposing the Fim Grcat"Enc:irclemcnt and Suppression" (Spring)

52

vi

CONTEI'n'S

Circular of the General Political Dcpartment on Investigating the Situation Regarding Land and Population (April 2)

54

Decision Regarding Acceptance ofthe Lener from the International and of the Resolution Adopted by the Founh Plenum (April)

56

Order for the Troops to Assemble Before the Banle (Aprill9)

67

Order to Mobilize the Troops to Help the Masses Plant and Plow the Fields (MayS)

69

Order to Wipe out the Enemy Troops That Are Anacking Donggu (May 13)

71

Orders to the First Front Army ofthe Red Amty to Anack Futian and to Eliminate the Two Divisions of Wang Jinyu and Gong Bingfan (May 14)

74

Order to Anack the Enemy at Zhongcun and Nantuan (May 21)

76

Order to Occupy Nanfeng Before the Enemy (May 24)

78

Minutes of the First Eight Meetings of the General Front Committee of the First Front Amty of the Red Army (May 2S-June 10)

81

General Order No. 14 of the Central Revolutiorwy Military Commission ofthe Chinese Soviets (June 20)

97

Minutes of the Third Day ofthe First Enlarged Meeting of the General Front Committee of the First Front Army ofthe Red Army (June 22)

98

Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the General Front Committee of the First Front Amty of the Red Army (June 22)

102

Proclamation ofthe Headquarters ofthe First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army: Execute Huang Meizhuang (June)

105

Letter to Zhou Yili, TanZhcnlin, and Others (June 28)

107

Letter to the Twelfth Army, the Thirty-fifth Army, and the Border Area Working Comminee (June 30)

110

Letter to Tan Zhenlin and the Twelfth Army (July I)

113

Opposing the Seeond Great"Encin:lement and Suppression" (Sununer)

114

The Question of the Soviet Area Central Bureau's Special Emergency Circular About"Mobilizing" and Preparing for the Third Campaign (July4)

liS

Letter of Instruction from Zhu De and Mao Zedong to Geng K.ai and Longjun (July 12)

118

Letter from Zhu De and Mao Zedong to Regimental Commander Zbu and PoliticaiCommissarLiu(July 12)

120

CONTENTS

vii

Order ofthe First Front Army ofthe Red Army to Prepare to Eliminate the Enemy Attacking from Laicun (July 24)

121

Regarding the Dispositions for Attacking Longgang (July 30)

123

Order to Take Futian and Xin'an (July 31)

124

Order to Oppose the Third "Encirclement and Suppression" (July)

126

Order to Wipe Out the Enemy Advancing from Chongxian to Gaoxingxu (August 3)

127

Order to Destroy the Enemy in Longgang (August 8)

129

Order from the Central Military Commission to the Red Anny and the Local Armed Forces in Xing(guo], Yu[du), Gan[xian], Wan[ an), and Tai[he](August12)

131

Order to Reduce Our Baggage and Number of Horses (August 17)

136

The Problem of Opposing Rich Peasants

138

General Order of the First Front Army of the Red Army to Cut Down on Expenditures (August 22)

142

Order to Shift Positions and Intercept the Enemy Forces (September II)

145

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Move to the East (September 12)

147

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Anny to Set Out for Longgangtou for Consolidation and Replacing Losses after Wiping Out Han Deqin's Troops (September 18)

149

Order to Proceed to Fujian to Work and Collect Revenue (September23)

151

A Letter to Our Brothcn the Soldiers of the White Army on the Forcible Occupation ofManchuria by Japanese Imperialism (September 25)

154

Eulogy for Comrade Huang Gonglue

157

Order to Gather Experience About Attacking Fonified Village Blockhouses (October 14)

158

The Economic Policy of the Chinese Soviet Republic (December I)

160

Order for the Anest ofGu Shunzhang. a Traitor to the Revolution (December 10)

163

Wii

CONT£NTS

Lener to the Popular Masses of the Whole Country Concerning the Betrayal of the Interests of the Chinese Nation by the Guomindang (December II)

167

Directive No.6 of the Central Executive Comminee of the Chinese Soviet Republic (December 13)

171

An Important Instruction regarding the Building of Soviets (December 15)

175

1932 Concerning Alteration and Increase of the Ratio of Soviet Deputies to Local Residents (January 28)

179

Resolution Concerning Verdicts ofthe Provisional Supreme Court in the Trial oflmportant Criminals Such as AB Corps Members, Reorganizationists, and War Criminals (February)

182

Lener from Mao Zedong to Yuan Guoping (March 6)

184

Lener to Western Fujian Concerning the Work in Shanghang and Wuping (March 9)

187

Directive ofthe Provisional Central Government to the First Congress ofWorkers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets ofFujian Province (March 17)

194

Only by Marching Directly on Zhangzhou and Quanzhou Can We Make the Enemy Move (March 30)

201

The Forces That Are Going Directly to Anack Zhangzhou and Quanzhou Should Act More Quickly and Be More Concentrated (April 2)

203

The Reasons Why the Banle at Longyan Was Victorious, and Future Work in [Long]yan and Yong[ding] (April II)

204

Manifesto of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic Declaring War on Japan (April I 5)

206

Directive of the Provisional Central Government on Mobilizing for the DeclamtionofWarAgainstJapan(April15)

209

Views Regarding the Central Task in the Future, and the Work in New Red Areas, as Well as in the White Areas (April22)

215

Views Regarding the Political Appraisal, Military Strategy, and the Tasks ofthe Eastern and Western Route Armies (May 3)

217

CONTENTS

i:r

An Open Telegram Opposing the Guomindang's Agreement to Sell Out

Shanghai (May 9)

219

Decision of the Central Executive Committee Approving the Various Resolutions Adopced at the First Soviet Congress of Jiangxi Province ~~

lli

The Central Government's Telegram to the Hunan-Jiangxi Provincial Congresses of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies

~"

m

On the Organization and Work of the Committee for Upholding Women's

Rights and Improving Women's Lives (June 20)

22S

On Mobilization for War and Work in the Rear (July 7)

230

The Question of the Direction of Attack at Present (July 2S)

242

Proposal to Appoint Mao Zedong as General Political Commissar (July25)

244

Resolution of the Central Executive Committee Approving the Decision of the Provisional Supreme Court in the Case ofthe CounterRevolutionary Crimes of Ji and Huang (August 10)

24S

Order to Wipe Out the Enemy in Le'an (August IS)

247

The Situation of the Enemy in Yihuang and Le'an and our Anny's Banle Dispositions(Augu.st IS)

248

Order to Attack the Forces of Chen Cheng (August29)

249

Order of the General Headquarters of the First Front Army of the Red Anny(August31)

2S3

Order That the Troops Must March with Light Packs (SeptemberS)

2S4

Opinion on Smashing the Enemy's Encirclement of and Attack on the Soviet Area in Western Hubei (September)

25S

Order No. 2S of the Council of People's Conunissars of the Provisional Central Government (September 17)

257

Proposal as to How the Fourth Front Army Can Smash the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" (September)

2S9

Opinion Regarding Strategic and Tactical Problems ofthe Red Army in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Area (September)

261

On the Problem of Continuing the Refonn of Local Soviet Governments (September 20)

263

:c CONTENTS Directive of the Central Executive Committee Concerning the Problem of Expanding the Red Army (September 20)

266

Rcpon on the Present Military Operations (September 23)

275

On Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Central Government (September 24)

278

We Propose a Plenum of the Central Bureau at the Front to Discuss Problems of Military Operations (September 25)

280

Opinions Regarding the Operation ofthe Front Army and the PIKe for Holding the Plenum of the Central Bureau (September 26)

282

Order for Our Troops to Work in the North for a Period of Time Before the Enemy's Big Offensive (September 26)

284

Opinon Regarding the Need to Select the Enemy's Weak Point in Hunan-Henan-Anhui, and to Destroy One of His Units (September 30)

290

Circular Telegram Opposing the Report of the International Investigation Team (October 6)

292

On Emergency War Mobilization (October 13)

295

Order No. 29 of the Central Council of People's Commissars (October 13)

301

Order No. 30 of the Central Council of People's Commissars (October 13)

302

Campaign Plans for the First Front Army of the Red Army (October 14)

303

Promoting the Sale of the Second Issue of Revolutionary War Bonds (OctobC

failings; beyon~ t~is, they ~uld only pass many of the criticisms on to Mao in Fujian and awaat has rerum. Deeply intertwined with these frictions over policy and personality we~e problems stemming from the ambiguous and uncertain political and military command structure then existing in the Central Soviet Area. Fonnal jurisdictional relationships and lines of authority among diverse organizations such as the Central Bureau, the Military Affairs Commission, the Soviet Government, and various Red Army headquarters and Pany organs were frequently overlapping and imprecise. Moreover, formal institutional position and actual power were not always congruent, as illustrated by the difficulty that young and relatively inexperienced Central Comminee representatives such as Xiang Ying and Ren Bishi had in restricting Mao's influence despite their nwnerical strength on the Central Bureau. In addition, the long-festering issue ofPany-anny relations, especially the question of the extent to which Party leaders should intervene in military decisiOn-making, had again become salient in an environment in which sttongly held differences of opinion over strategy tended to divide local basebuilden with military experience such as Mao and Zhu De from politicallyoriented outsiders such as Xiang Ying. This situation posed particular decision-making problems for the Central Bureau, which included both cadres whose primary responsibilities were for military operations and those whose main duties were political and administrative. In the first few months after its fonnation in January 1931, the Central Bureau had generally been located in the same place as the main Red Anny headquartcn. Gradually, however, some bureau members began to senle for a time in other spots to facilitate communications and the supervision of local Party branches and soviets. Following the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic, these cadres generally based themselves in Ruijin, the republic's formal political capital. Other bureau members, meanwhile, remained at the Red Anny's frontline headquarters, wherever that might be. As the size of both Base Area and anny grew, and as the division of the Central Bureau into what Party historians refer to as the "frontline" (qionfong) and "rear echelon" (houjong) segments became more clear-cut, it became incon-

-So.

NiDnpu, -ki. I, pp. 371-79, records Central Conuniuee criticisms of the Cennl Bureau's activities on April 14, April25 (in an article in Hongqi zhtmbtJu). May 20, and July 21. On May ll,lhe Central Bureau issued a self~rilieism in response to the Cenb'al Committee's complaints and repudiated Mao's oppositional views expressed in his May 3 telegram. On June 17, ahey issued a resolution accepting the Central Comminee 's May 20 crilicism. Warren Kuo plausibly argues that the June 17 resolution (the text of which is available in Crmrol Committee Documents (t932], pp. 24G-61) was one orsevcral items whoscconteniSlaidthcfounda!ionforlhclalerindictmcntofMaoattheNingduConfurenccin October 1932. See hisA.nalytictll History of Chinese CommiUlist Party (Taipei: lnstirute of lniCmational Relations. 1968), Vol. 2.p. 441 (hereafter Kuo,Analylictll History).

/vi

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

venicnt for the bureau to hold meetings with all members in attendance. Though increasing use of telegraphy helped close the communications gap to some extent, it was still not easy to have the thorough, face-to-face airings of views needed to reach consensus on controversial issues. During the spring and sununer of 1932, Mao had been able to take advantage of such ambiguities, inefficiencies, and divisions within the Central Soviet Area's leadership structure, as well as of his own experience, connections. and forceful personality, to minimize the impact of efforts to curtail his power. Following his return to southern Jiangxi after the raid on Zhangzhou, he continued to seek avenues--particularly military ones--through which to regain a prominent decision-making position. When the First Front Anny had reentered southern Jiangxi after the raid on Zhangzhou, Zhu De and Wang JiaxiaDg had rejoined the army as its commander and chief political commissar, respectively, though Mao remained very influential. Tlvoughout the Fujian campaign and the march back to the Base Area, Mao had had no fonnal position in the army or its Party organs. In order to give some retrospective instirutionallegitimacy to his actions, Chinese sources often justify his accompanying and directing the movements of the army during this period on the grounds that he was acting "in his capacity as chainnan of the Soviet Government," but Mao clearly exerted his influence primarily by force of personality and personal comections, rather than by virtue of any fonnal position. Zhou Enlai joined the First Front Army in southern Jiangxi in late July as the army was returning to the Central Soviet Area after the Battle of Shuikou. With Zhou thus joining the Central Bureau's ufrontline" leadership, Ren Bishi in the rear echelon became acting secretary of the Central Bweau in Zhou's place. A few days before Zhou's arrival, the Central Bureau had issued orders to various Red Army units for renewed assaults on central Jiangxi cities, such as Ji'an. The First Front Army had been ordered to attack Ganzhou to distract enemy forces, after which they were to march north along the Gan River to aid in the main assault. Mao, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang were able to convince Zhou that these orders were impracticable because of the great enemy strength in the area, and on July 25 Zhou joined the other three men in a joint telegram to that effect sent to the Central Bureau. s1 In another telegram of the same date, the four men also urged a significant realignment of the army's formal leadership. Because at that time the anny had no political commissar, the Central Bureau rear echelon leaders had recently suggested that Zhou occupy this post along with his other duties. Now Zhou, Mao, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang made the counterproposal that the position of Soviet Government chairman should be abolished and that Mao should instead become the general political commissar of the First Front Amty. They funher proposed that military operational matters should be the joint responsibility of 51. Sec below, ''Tbe Question of the Direc1ionof Attack a1 Presenl,'' July 25, 1932.

the army's commander-in- should aJ.o be- ...,..,..bilily, but 1he plaoes wberc worlt has oot boon- sbould belong to the Tbild Amy Group. In the future, in terms of the overall situation, Jianning should belong to the Third Anny Group. The General Front Committee Jianning. at I:00 P.M. on July 1

MaoZcdoog

Our source for this letter is Jiangxl dangshi zUitiO, Vol. 19, pp. 44-45. It can also be found in M110 ?Adongji. Bujuan, Vol. 3. pp. 197--98. 113

opposing the Second Great "Encirclement and Suppressirm" (To the Tune "Fisherman ~ Pride 'J (Summer 1931)' Atop White Cloud Mountain,2 clouds about to rise, Beneath White Cloud Mountain, the sound of frenzied shouts, Withered trees and roning trunksl join in the effort. A forest of rifles presses forward, The Flying General 4 sweeps down from the void. Driving forward seven hundred li in fifteen days,5 From the azure expanse of the Gan River to the jade-like mounlains ofFujian, We have swept away an army thousands strong like rolling up a mat. Someone weeps, Lamenting in vain his step-by-step strategy.6 Our soun:c for this poem is Shici duilian, pp. 41·-"13. I. This poem was written after the defeat of !be Guomindang's Second Encirclement and Suppression CampaignagaiiiSI the Red Anny, which look place in May 1931. It is tbe las! of the poems fuse published IOgdher in the May 1962 issue of People's Uterature. (for tbe author's note accompenying than, see the 1101e 10 Mao's Autumn 1929 poem. ''The Will Between Chiang Kaishek and the Guanpi Warlords." Volume Dl, p. 190.)

2. The Red Anny fon:cs (aboul 30..000 Slrong) were based on White Cloud Mounrain when this campaign was launched. The mountain is situated in southeastern li'an xian, Jiangxi Province, where the lhree :da11 of Ji'an, Taihe, and Xinuuo come toaether. The Guomindang troops mounled their anack from below. 3. This melaphor, which Mao had already used earlier (see Volume II, "Telegram 10 Mr. Xiao Hengshan," February 20, 1923), comes from the biopphy of Zou Yang in the RecrmlsoftheHistorirur. 1be meaning is that even the old and infirm among the population bave joined in the suuggle against the Wbitc forces. Some commentators take ''withered trees and rotting trunks" 10 refer to Chiang Kaishek's forces, but that is illogical, since the whole of this slalwl evokes the Red Army and iu supporters. 4. Li Guang, the famous Han dynuty general who fought against the Xiongnu, was dubbed by his adversaries "the Flying General of Han." Mao is undoubtedly referring here to the Red Army forces. S. Beginning with an allaek by the Red Anny on the Guomindang troopS II Futian along the Gan River on May 16, this sttugle lasted until May 30 when the fighting reached the border befween Jiangxi and Fujian provinces. 6. He Yingqin, the Guomindaag commander of the Second Encin:lcment Campaign, had based his stralegy on advancing step by step and consolidating his position.

The QJ.testion of the Soviet Area Central Bureau's special Emergency Circular About "Mobilizing" and Preparing for the Third Campaign' (July 4, 1931)

Ever since the big victory of the Red Army in the Second Campaign, the new development of the revolution is posing a greater threat to the ruling class, and the entire ruling class regards "suppressing the Reds" as its common central political slogan. The Nanjing government in particular has mobilized all its forces for a desperate attack against the revolution, with the aim of waging a

last-ditch sttuggle. Recently, it has sent reinforcements to strengthen its troops in Jiangx.i, made concessions to the northern warlords, and adopted a defensive posture toward Guangdong. Chiang Kaishek has even come to Nanchang himself. All of this is for no other purpose tban to launch another desperate attack on our Red Army. Now the enemy is moving toward us step by step! The Third Campaign will soon break out. In this campaign, the conditions for our victorygood masses, a good Red Army, and good terrain--are even more amply present than in the Second Campaign. The weaknesses of the enemy, on the other hand---the contradictions among the warlords, the contradictions between the soldiers and the officers, the opposition of the masses, the lack of familiarity with the temin, the difficulty in the tranportation of food, and so on--have substantially increased as compared to the Second Campaign. Consequently, so long as we apply the tactics correctly and work hard, we arc even more assured of securing victory in the Third Campaign. Now that the Red Anny is right in the midst of preparing to resist the attack, the Party branches at all levels should immediately mobilize, expand propaganda and agitation regarding the Third Campaign, arouse the broad masses, and intensify the work of preparation for the

Q;;;u~document isJitmgxl dangshi ziliao, Vol. 19, pp. 46-48. I. Accordin, to historical smm:cs ~ently published in China, Mao had been able in the late spring of 1931 10 appoint a sufficient number of his supporters 10 the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas to obtain a majority on that body. (He lost control of the bureau again in November.) Even though he is not credited with authorship of the Emergency Circular rererred to here, that document can therefore be assumed to haYe reflected his views, and the present commentary on it also appears relevant. ns

ll6

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Third Campaign: (I) Call a mass meeting at once, speed up the propaganda and agitation for victory in the Third Campaign, and also put up many posters and fliers (the Central Bureau has issued an outline for propaganda aimed at wiMing victory in the Third Campaign), as well as mobilizing the masses in a plaMed and concrete way to carry out practical work in preparation for the Third Campaign. (2) The local anned forces in every locality should rapidly be consolidated to the highest possible extent, in order to contribute to the immediate establishment of newly organized independent divisions, and to the reorganization of the guerrillas in each locality. We should strengthen their political and military training, eliminate the rich peasants and vagabonds from the local anned forces, and employ expeditious means to eliminate lhe AB Corps from our ranks. We should draw fully on our experience in the second campaign to make all kinds of preparations and take all kinds of precautions to meet and harass the enemy. (3) We should intensifY our fierce attacks on lhe AB Corps and use the correct line of the Party to carry out thoroughly the work of eliminating the counterrevolutionaries. We must make sure that the AB Corps and all counterrevolutionary elements are purged from every Party branch and administrative organ at all levels, as well as from all armed organizations and mass organizations. In this way we can strengthen the Red areas and shatter the plots of the reactionaries in the Red areas. (4) Immediately impose martial law (iieyan] in the Red areas. This should be done with particular strictness in the border regions, keeping close watch, checking passers-by, and checking passes. There must not be the sJightest carelessness; we must guard strictly against the penetration of enemy spies and the evasion of reactionary elements such as AB Corps members who may pass infonnation to the enemy. (5) Organizations such as the Red Guards, the communication teams, the espionage teams, and the transportation teams must be reorganized once again; their leadership and supctvision must be strengthened and constantly exercised; their command should be unified; and they should prepare to mobilize and go into action in the shonest possible time. (6) The work of strengthening the walls and clearing the fields2 should be carried out without delay, starting with all the districts in the border area. During the second campaign, some of the regions did this work very badly, and now we should make use of our past experiences to remedy our shortcomings and really do it. In the 2. "Slrengthcning the walls and clearing the fields" (jiDnbi qingye) was a traditional expression meaning to prepare for combat by strengthening TOWn walls., evacuating noncombatants, aDd hiding provisions and livestock. Imperial-era officials used the tenn to describe preparations to resist rural rebels (see Philip Kuhn, Rehellitm ond Its Enemies i11 Uue Imperio/ ChiiUl [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UnivetSity Press, 1980], pp. 41-47), but during this period Mao and some other Communist cadres in the Jiangxi base areas invened the meaning to refer to efforts to prepare the runal populace for the incursion of government armies. The use of the tenn was distinctive enough to catch the anention of the Central Committee, which later made pejorative reference to it in its criticisms of Mao-style"luringdecp"tactics.

JULY J93J

J17

past we neglected completely the preparation of secret work in the border region. Once the enemy came, all our work collapsed. During the war, we were wtable to can)' out secret work in order to lead the forces of the masses to cooperate with the Red Army in wiping out the enemy. This must be corrected. (7) In the Second Campaign, we did a very bad job in clearing the battlefield after the battles. It was so bad that many of the weapons were not collected quickly, and some were even lost or fell into the harxls of the reactionary elements. This time we should make use of our experiences and lessons in the Second Campaign. There must be good preparation and organization beforehand, so that when each battle is over, in the places where the Red Army is in charge of cleaning up, we should at once lead the masses to help the Red Army with it. If the Red Army has moved further to the front, the governments at various levels should at once lead the masses by district, by ridge, and by section to search the mountains in an organized way, to scoop up from the rivers, and to collect and pick up all the weapons such as cannons, mortars, machineguns, rifles, pistols, all bullets, shells, electrical wires, radios, as well as all the unidentified things (special care should be given to radios and the unidentified things). All these things should be sent to the government to be registered, and sent to the Central Revolutionary MilitaJy Conunission. Of the fruits of victory in this campaign, not a single bullet should be allowed to fall into the hands ofthe reactionuy elements. This is a VCJy imponant piece of work and we must prepare it very well beforehand. In this campaign we must mobilize the masses to comfort and take good care of the wounded and sick of the Red Anny. In addition, the govcnunent at each level should be responsible for sending stretchers as quickly as possible to take them to the hospitals of the Red Army. As regards the work toward the captives of the White army, we should mobilize the masses and encourage them to conduct propaganda and agitation toward the captives, and tell them to give the captives tea to drink and food to eat and not to harbor feelings of distaste toward them. As for the dead bodies on the battlefield, they must be buried very quickly. Comrades! The Third Campaign will soon start, and it will be an extremely cruel war, which will have an enonnous impact on the development of the Chinese revolution. We must summon up the Bolshevik spirit of hard struggle, usc the experience of the past few campaigns, and work tirelessly and ten times harder in order to achieve a great victory in the Third Campaign!

Letter ofInstruction from 7Au De and Mao Zedong to Geng Kai' and Longjrm2 Quly 12, 1931, 6:00A.M. at jianfeng)

To Comrade Geng K.ai and for transmission to Convade Longjun: I. The enemy forces from the direction of JiaMing arrived yesterday (the II th) at Paiqian (5 /i from Xicun) and are building fortifications there. The forces coming from Lichuan have arrived at Jiangjunmiao by way of Qiujiaai and may possibly launch an attack in the direction of Jianning today (the 12th). A letter from the Thirty-fifth Regiment explains that its forces have made clear the siruation of this particular enemy unit and are sabotaging iiS operations and then slowly retreating. 2. We have received both leners from Shuinan, and we quite agree with your dispositions. The enemy entered Qianshan and Shizui yesterday, and you should strengthen your preparations so as to delay the enemy's advance. 3. The enemy is advancing along the whole front, mainlaining the pattern of all moving forward simultaneously, so their actions will not be to advance rapidly and boldly,l 4. Comrade Longjun should be the one to investigate the grain supply in the three locations of Shicheng, Guangchang, and Ningdu, 10 see if there is enough food to supply the entire force"' for several weeks if gathered together. He should also be the one to set up communication stations quickly along the Shicheng and Gulonggang line. with the standard that a lertcr be able to reach its destination within twenty-four hours. We have translaled this letter fromJio.ngxi do.ngshi zillo.o, Vol. 19, pp. SG-51. I. Regardiag Geng Kai, sec the relevant note to "Minutes of the Ninth Meeting ofthe General From Comminee," June 22, 1931. 2. No person with this name (probably a given name, with the surname omincd) has been identified; the reference may be to a subordioate officer in the Twelfth Division. 3. As this passage indicates, Nationalist anny forces bad by this lime begun trying to cany out some elements of wbat would later take full fonn as the ''blockhouse strategy'' of slow, cuefuladvance against tbe base areas. 4. The Chinese tenn here is dadui, which nonnally corresponds, in military tenninoiOIY, to "battalion" or ''regiment." It was, however, conunonly used in 1929-1930 in the Red Anny insleld of lio.n to mean "company." In the J)JeleDI contcll.t it is not clear how many troops ue to be fed, so we have preferred the less specific lenn ''force." IlB

JULYJ93J

m

s. We will do our utmost to an:ive in Shicheng in time for rest, training. and consolidation. and will attack the enemy when the opportunity presents itself. Today we are still located here. Zhu De

Mao Zedong

Letterfrom 'l'hu De and Mao Zedong to Regi1111171fDl Commander 'l'hu' and Political Commissar Liu' (July 12,1931,6:00 A.M., atjianfeng)

Rcgimeneal Commander Zhu and Political Commissar Uu: I. Your letters of the 1Oth and II th and one squad of messengers have all arrived. 2. You should wait until the enemy has entered the city of Jianning and rmd out the strength of their forces and to which division they belong before slowly withdrawing in the direction of Tangfang. At all times seek out detailed infonnation about the enemy and report it to General Headquarters as well as Division Headquarters. The 104th Regiment in Anyuansi should also be notified so that

they know what is going on in Jiann.ing. 3. Today (the 12th), the Twelfth Division is engaged in guenilla fighting from the Shuinan-Changqiao-Guangchang line toWard Qianshan and Shizui. 4. Already yesterday (the lith), enemy forces arrived in Qianshan and Shizlli, and a small number of enemy troops arrived at Shuangjiangkou, IS li fromJing'an. 5. On the 12th and the 13th, letters can be transmitted by way of Jianfeng, and on the 14th and 16th by wayofBaishui. 6. The enemy is still advancing very slowly. You should sabotage the

enemy's movements, cover the concentration of the main fortes, and obtain more infonnation. Zhu De

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter isJiangrl dangshl ziiiDD, Vol 19, pp. 51-52. I. We have n01 detennined lhe identi!y of this individual. 2. The reference is 10 Liu Yalou (1911-1965). a native of Fujian wbo joiacd lhe Chiacse Comrmmisl Pany in 1929. He bad been political commiSSIII" of lhe Thirty-fifth Regimen! oflhe Founh Red Army since laiC 1930.

'"

Order of the First Front Army of the Red Army to Prepare to Eliminate the Enemy Attacking fromLaicun (Issued on july 24, 1931, at 11:00 P.M., from Headquarters at Niujiaotang.. Yinkeng, in Yudu) I. Up until today, the enemy's situation is as follows: A. Chen Mingshu's troops (Jiang, Cai, Han, Luo) are fighting against our Fifth Independent Division along the Futian, Shuinan, and Baisba line. 1 B. Sun Lianzhong's troops (Hao, Tang, Guo, Li) are fighting against our

Ninth Division along the Shaxi and Dajinzhu line.2 C. Zhu Shaoliang and Xu Kexiang are in Nanfeng, Zbou Hunyuan is in Ganzhu and Guangchang, Mao Bingwen is in Baishui and Xingpi, maintaining

communication lines between Chen, Luo, Zhao, and WeLl D. Zhao Guantao's division has entered Kanchaigang, Ningdu City, Tiantou, and so on; Wci Lihuang has entered Ruij in.4 E. The two divisions under Chen Cheng and Luo Zhuoying entered Ningdu on the 19th, and on the 22nd divided into two routes. 5 One route advanced to Qingtang and the other to Youshuping. On the 23rd, the enemy in Qingtang advanced to Gulonggang, and the enemy in Youshuping advanced to Laicun, each of these two routes consisting of one division. Tomorrow (the 25th) the enemy in Gulonggang will advance toward Qiaotou, and the enemy in Laicun will certainly advance toward Ping'anzhai. Our source for this order is Jlangxi dangshi zi/iao, Vol. 19, pp. 66--67. I. Chen Mingshu was the commander of the Right Wing Army Group of Nationalist army forces assembled for the Third Encirclement Campaign. The other officers named were commanders of first Army units subordinate to Chen. 2. Sun Lianzhong at this time commanded the Second Army under Chen Mingshu; some of the other officers mentioned were Sun's subordinates, and others subordinate to the Third Route Army ofShangguan Yunxiang(also pan of Chen Mingshu's forces). This orderseemstohaveconflatedthesevariousunits. 3. Zhu Shaoliang commanded the Third Army in the Nationalist army's Left Wing Army Group (under the general command of He Yingqin); the other officers mentioned werehissubordinatcdivisioncommanders. 4. Zhao Guantao commanded the Nationalist army's Sixth Division; Wei Lihuang commandedtheTenthDivision. 5. Chen Cheng commanded the Second Route Army (and concurrently that army's Fourteenth Division) under the Left Wing Anny Group; Luo Zhuoying commanded the Eleventh Division within Chen's army.

222

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

II. Given that the enemy is deeply mired in panic and fatigue, this front army has detennined first to wipe out the enemy attacking from l.aicun, and chen to tum in the direction ofQiaotou to eliminate the second section of the enemy's troops. Ill. Our anny'soffensive dispositions toward the enemy in La.icun arc a~ follows: A. Under the conunand of Peng Dehuai, the troops of our right wing (the Third Army Group and the Fourth Army) should set out tomorrow (the 25th), wait until the enemy in Laieun has moved to the vicinity of Gewa, and then use the Third Army Group to attack the enemy's rear from the Laowuchang line and the Fourth Anny to attack the enemy's left flank from the Lipowa and Datian line. To prevent enemy forces in Sanliao from coming to the aid ofGewa, a force of one regiment of the Third Army Group should guard Longshan so that enemy troops carmot pass, and a small unit must also be dispatched and located around Liuminba so as to make every effort to block any enemy attempts to cross the river. R The Central Army (the Twelfth Army) sets out on the 25th, and after establishing contact with lhe left wing of the Fourth Army, it will arrive at Gewa by way of Qiaobei to take up position and launch a frontal attack on the enemy forces. C. The left wing troops (the Seventh Army, the Thirty-fifth Army, and the Seventh and Eighth divisions of the Third Anny) are under the command of Li Mingrui. 6 With the Seventh Anny located at Meiwu, the Eighth Division should be stationed at Pibalong to pin down the enemy troops in the direction of Gulonggang so that they will be unable to provide reinforcements. The Thirty-fifth Army is to be located at Ping'anzhai to assist all units, and lhe Seventh Division is to be located around Zhongzhou to pin down the enemy in Guionggang. IV. General Headquarters is near Ping'anzhai and Qiaobei.1 !tis so ordered. Conunander-in-Chief Political Conunissar

Zhu De Mao Zedong

6. Li Mingrui (1894-1932), a native of Beiliu in Gllllllg:(i, was an officer in the National Revolutionary Anny who had joined the Communist Party in 1930 and became head of the Red Seventh Anny. This force relocated to the Hunan-Jiangx.i border area in late 1930, and fought in this region until being ordered east of the Gan River to JOin the First Front Anny in Julyl931. 7. These are locations in northern Yudu xian. It was in this area (probably in Ping'anzhai) at about this time (one source says on July 23) that the Twentieth Red Anny, which had been centrally involved in the Futian Incident, was disarmed, disbanded and itan poor and confiscale the houses and wealth of the landlords, despotic genby, warlords, bwaucmos, and politiciom. The houses should be banded- to the WOike!s, coolies, and appeotioes 10 live in. The wealth should be divided among the urban poor or approprialed by the Soviet for public .semoes. The city soviets should use every possible means to improve housing CODditions for the poor. MembeiS oftbc Slanding Committee of the Presidium of the Filst Natiooal. Congress of Chinese Soviels ofWorken, Peuonu, and Soldiers

Xiang Ying, Zbou Yili, Zeng Shan, Zhang Dmgcheng, Chen Zbengm>, Zb.u De, Deng Fa

Chainaan of the Central Executive Commit· tee of the Chinese Soviet Republic Mao Zcdong

v;ce-Chainncn

x;,.g Ymg Zbang Guotao

t. The Chinese is Rahu, literally "aboriginal," but here it probably means simply "local." 2. There appears 10 be 1 clwacter milsjag here before lhc conjunction pre.sumablythatfor"ruraa."

)'lo1

(and),

Order for the An-est of Gu Shunzhang,

a Traitor to the Revolution A General Order Issued by the Council ofPeoples Commissars of the Provisional Central Soviet Government (Unnumbered) (December 10, 1931)

To all soviet governments at the various levels of province, xian, district. and township, and to all Red Anny and Red Guard units. as well as to the broad masses of toiling workers and peasants in all soviet areas; To the workers, peasants, and all the exploited masses in areas under White rule: After he was arrested in Hankou on April 2S of this year by a search and arrest team of the counterrcvolutionuy GUOIIUndang, the traitor to the workers' and peasants' revolution Gu Shunzbang (also known as LiMing; original name Gu Fcngmin; alias The All-Transforming Magician; about twenty--seven or twenty-eight years of age; a native of Wusong, Shanghai; extremely sbon in stature, with bulging eyes and a prominent nose) inunediately capitulated to the reactionary rCgimc. He infonned the enemy regarding the Chinese Communist Party's liaison office in Wuhan, the Western Hubei joint xian soviet governments, and the Wuhan branch office of the Red Anny's Second Anny Group. As a result, all of them were discovered and arrested. In addition, more than ten revolutionary fighters were taken and subsequently aJI of them were slaughtered by the Wuhan reactioruuy government Wbal is more. there was a riverboat worker who was sympathetic to the revolution, and Gu Shunzhans was the only person who knew this secret. Gu save this man away too and landed bim in the prison of the cowuerrevolutionaries. Having; paid these dues and guarantees in blood. Gu Shunzhang: promptly sent several telegrams to NanjinJ requesting; a personal interview with Chiang K.aishek. After arriving in Nanjing, in addition to informing the Guomindang counterreVolutionaries about the organizations and This order was first published in Hongqf zhouiHJo, no. 27, December 17, 1931. We bavc translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 3, pp. 57-60, where it is reproduced ftom tbat

.......

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164

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

activities of the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet Government, the Red Army, and all the revolutionary groups of workers, peasants, and toiling masses, he identified Comrade Yun Daiying, 1 member of the Central Comminee of the Chinese Communist Party and nationwide leader of revolutionary youth, and others, who had already been sentenced to prison by the Nanjing govcmmcnt, and they were immediately shot by the counterrevolutionaries. At the same time he gave to the counterrevolutionaries the addresses he had learned when he was in Shanghai of five of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee mem· bers and responsible comrades, including Zhou Enlai, Qu Qiubai, and Li Weihan.l Telegraphic orders were promptly sent to the Shanghai Public Security Bureau to discover and arrest these people together with the imperialist police. Fortunately, these comrades had just left Shanghai at the time and so escaped the danger. Then Gu Shunzhang proceeded to have his family members work, on the basis of the clues he had, to track down the organs and responsible pcnonages of the Chinese Communist Party and other revolutioanry organizations and groups in Shanghai. Unfortunately, Comrade Xiang Zhongfa.l the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, was arrested and subsequently executed as a result of this scheme of his, thus becoming Gu Shunzhang's greatest contribution in betraying the revolution and surrendering to the counterrevolution. Since then, Gu Shunzhang has gone on to become an important member of the KK organiza· tion, an organization that carries out clandestine assassinations for Chiang I. Yun Daiying (189S...l931), a native ofWuchang in Hubei,joined the Party in 1921 and became one of its leading intellectuals and otp~izers dwing the 1920s. After falling out of favor with 1he Li Lisan leadership, he was working underground in Shanghai when arrested in April 1930. After his identity was bettaycd by Gu Sbunzhang, Yun was executedinAprili931. 2. Qu Qiubai (18~1935), a native of Changzhou in Jiangsu, joined tbe Communist Pany in 1922 while srudying in the Soviet Union. After reruming to China he rose to become Pany leader in August 1927, but was stripped of his position as secretary at 1he Sixth Congress in June 1928. He remained in the Soviet Union until 1930, when be returned to China and participated in the removal of Li Lisan ftom power at the Third Plenum. He then worked undcrgound in Shanghai. Li Wcihao (1896-1984), a native of Changsha in Hunan, joined the Party in 1922, rose 10 be a Politburo member by 1927, and became head of the Jiangsu provincial Party organization before leaving for 1he Soviet UnioninJulyl931. 3. Xiang lhongfa (1880-1931), a native ofHubci, was a factory worker, and then a sailor in his youth. He joined 1he Conununist Party in 1922, and thereafter engaged in labor organizing work. EJected to 1he Central Committee at the Fifth Congress in 1927, he also ancndcd the August 7 Emergency Conference. Atlhe end of 1927, Xiang went to the Soviet Union, where he became deeply involved in intra-Party factionalism, and was elected 10 the Executive Committee of the Comintem. At the Sixth Congress of the ChiDCSe CommuniSI Party, held in Moscow in 192g, he was appointed general secmary. Rerwning to China to work in Shanghai, he retained Ibis post both during the period of Li Lisan's dominance and subsequently as part of lhe Pavel Mif--dominated Returned Stu· dents group. He was., as indicated here, betrayed by Gu Shunzhang's family, arrested on Junc22, 193l,andcxcculcd on June 24.

DECEMBER l93J

165

Kaishek. Along with Chen Guofu. Chen Lifu,"' Xu Enceng,s and Yang Hu,6 he is one of Chiang Kaishek's murderous assistants. Recently, as a result of the victories that the Red Army has won in various soviet areas, the establishment of the Provisional Central Soviet Government, and the upsurge of the struggle by the workers. peasants, and other poor and toiling masses against the Guomindang and imperialism in areas under White rule, the Chinese Communist Party and the revolutionary mass organizations and groups, although faced with extreme difficulties under the White Terror, have, with the suppon of the broad masses of the people, become more consolidated and more tighdy organized in leading the workers, peasants, and other poor and toiling masses to rally for struggle under the banner of the soviets. Therefore, the traitor Gu Shunzhang will never have his way in his venomow scheme to destroy the revolutionary organizations and physically exterminate the revolutionary leaders. In consequence, he has changed his strategy and is slandering our responsible revolutiorwy comrades and the Central Comminee of the Chinese Communist Party as murderous criminals in a vain anempt to destroy the prestige of the Chinese Communist Party and its responsible personages in the eyes of the masses. Even more shamelessly, Gu Shunzhang himself wrote a letter published in a newspaper calling for the arrest of the responsible comrades Zhou Enlai and others and saying that since his defection he had never betrayed anyone in the Conununist Party, but had simply shut himself up behind closed doors to reacl. This shameless denial can never cover up the bloody damage that his ferocious and cruel schemes have wreaked upon the revolution. This is something that every member of the revolutionary masses can see. As for the public notice of a reward for capture, any revolutiorwy fighter and member of the masses of workers and peasants who joins the revolution automatically has his name entered on the countenevolutionaries' most wanted list, so who needs the traitor Gu Sbunzhang to publish such a call in the newspapers? Class hatred has reached the stage of life-and-death struggle. Those for whom the Guomindang wants to issue counterrevolutionary wanted circulars are pre-cisely the people the broad masses of workers, peasants, and other poor and toiling masses wish to suppon. Conversely, ferocious and cruel traitors such as Gu Shunzhang, protected by the Guomindang counterrevolutionaries, are precisely those the broad masses of workers, peasants, and other poor and toiling 4. Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, brolhers, wete well-known high-level Nationalist Pany politicians and advisors to Chiang Kaishek. Together they were leaders of the so-called ..CC Clique" wilhin tbc Guom.indang and the Nationalist government S. Xu Enceng (1898-1985) was a nalivc ofZhejiang. He had joined the CC Clique in 1927, and in 1931 was chicfoflhc investiptioa section in the Orpnization Department ofthe Guomindang. di ~-- Yang Hu (1889-?), a native of Anhui, participated in the Northern Expedition as a . VISion commander. In 1926., he was bead of the seem service of the National Rcvo.lu11on&ry Anny. He returned to Beijing in 1949, and died of illness shonly thereafter.

166

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

people wish to exterminate. Only people such as landlords. the bow'geoisie, Guomindang warlords, and bureaucrats can be relied upon by the counterrevolutionaries, but they are coming to the end of their road right now. Tbe participants in and supporters of the revolution are the extremely broad masses of the worken, peasants, Uiban poor, and the whole oflhe oppressed masses, and the triwnpbant Soviet Government and Chinese Conununist Party are now leading them in the sbuggle to seize nationwide victory for the revolution. The revolutionary tide is surging bigber and higher, and Chiang Kaishek's anny, two or three hundred thousand strong, has been once, twice, thrice defeated by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, as if crushing dry weeds and smashing rotten wood. How could a traitor such as Gu Shunzbang and Chiang Kaishek's murderous KK organization destroy the revolution? On the contrary, they will eventually be drowned in the great waves of the revolution. For this reason, the Provisional Central Soviet Government issues this general order to soviet governments at all levels, and to the Red Army and Red Guards in various areas, and also gives public notice to the workers, peasants, and other poor and toiling masses throughout the country to guard carefully against the countenevolutionary plots and devices of the Guomindang and to make a concerted effort to take the traitor Gu Sbunzhang. If this traitor is encountered in the soviet areas, he should be captured and sent to the revolutionary court for trial. If this traitor is encountered in areas under White rule, e:very revolutionary fighter, every worker, peasant, or poor person, is responsible for extenninating him. To caprure and extenninate lhe traitor Gu Sbunmang is the conscious and glorious duty of every revolutionary fighter and of the worker and peasant masses. The localities7 which the landlords, capitalists, and counterrevolutionary lackeys are trying to buy with their offers of reward cannot be employed to insult our exploited and oppressed masses. All workers, peasants, and other poor, toiling people! Let's consolidate our banle line and make a concerted effort to capture the traitor Gu Shunzhang! Develop the revolutionary struggle and thoroughly destroy Chiang Kaishek's murderous KK organization! Chairman ofdle Council of People's Commissars Vice-Chairmen

MaoZedong XiangYing ZhangGuotao

7. Difong.I1 is not clearwhetherlhisexpression here has irs llS1J81 senseof ..locality'' or "place," or whelher it means something vaguer, such as "those lhings."

utter to the Popular Masses of the Whole Country Concerning the Betrayal of the Interests of the Oti:nese Nation by the Guomindang (December 11, 1931) Dear workers, peasants, soldiers, and revolutionary studcms: The counterrevolutionary Ouomindang government is once again engaged in shameless new acts of betraying China and of selling out the interests of the nation and the popular masses. According to the newspapers, the Guomindang government has already recognized the establishment of a neutral zone in Jinzhou, proposed the organization of an international settlement in Tianjin, and recognized all the previous secret treaties selling out the country and forfeiting ow- sovereignty. 1 Brothers and sisters, do you all know what this means? It means banding over to the Japanese tens of thousands of[square] li of territory in Manchuria and tens of millions of people to be trampled Wlderfoot. It means handing over Tianjin and Jinzhou to intemationa1 imperialism to be ravaged; it means weighing down the four hundred million people of China with heavy iron chains, handcuffs. and shack1es, and subjecting generation after generation of our descendants to endless exploitation and oppression at the hands of Japan and the international imperialists, ruming them into slaves without a country. Brothers! Sisters! These are unprecedented and appalling acts of betrayal! Yet the reactionary ruling classes continue to boast unblushingly, utteriag empty shouts aboUI "revolutionary diplomacy," "fmal preparation," and ''marching north to recover This letter appeared in 1933 in the volume Suweiai Zhongguo, published in Moscow. We have translated it from Mao Zedongjl, Vol. 3, pp. 61-64, where it is reproduced from that source. I. The references here are to the aftennath of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, which began with the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. After the Japanese occupation began, a substantial force of Nationalist anny b'OOps remained in the city of Jinzhou in soulhem Liaoning Province throughout the fall of 1931. Meanwhile, two waves of Japanese-instigated "riots" broke out in Tianjin, as well as various Chinese studem protesls. The unrest provided a pretext for the Japanese 10 expand their movement south toward Tianjin, pressuring Nationalist forces to abandon Jinzhou and provide furtherconcessionstoJapaneseinterestsinTianjin.

"'

J68

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

lost territory." This is truly the most shameless and brazen business on earth. Brothers! SistcJS! Can we allow omselves to be slaughtered and carved up like sheep by the reactionary rulers in collaboration with imperialism at their discretion? Can we look on while our land is forcibly seized by Japanese imperialism? Are we to put up with the kind of cruel oppression, slaughler, and humiliation that slaves in the colonies endure? Can we remain silent when we see our own brothers whipped. cruelly massacred, and slaughtered by tbe imperialists? Can we remain unmoved as we watch our own sisten dallied with, humiliated, and raped? No, no, ten thousand times no! Well then, we must all rise in unison to resist, to resist the invasion of the Japanese imperialists and the other international imperialists, to resist the shameless capitulation of the Guomindang rulers to imperialism and their betrayal of China! Go on strike, workers, students, soldiers! 2 Seize the weapons of the reactionaries to ann ourselves, and let us all exert ourselves to drive the Japanese imperialists out of the country and overthrow the running dog ofimpcrialism--the Ouomindang! Brothers! Sisters! Can we still harbor any illusions or hopes at all with regard to Guomindang rule? The rule of the Guomindang bas created uninterrupted famine for years on end; it bas inDicted hunger, cold, and homelessness on countless members of the popular masses who are hovering between life and death; it has brought about unemployment for several million workers, who wander the streets without a means of subsistence; it bas resulted year after year in warfare among the warlords, leaving the bodies of tens of thousands of soldiers exposed in the wildcmess and their widows and orphans homeless and destitute; and it has resulted in countless secret treaties of national betrayal and humiliation, and in countless massacres, thereby placing China forever under tbe iron feet of imperialism, unable to free herself! Can we tolerate even for a minute longer reactionary rule such as this, of which the crimes mount to heaven? No, no, ten thousand times no! So what should we do? We must all rise up together and overthrow this reactionary Guomindang rule! Get organized, unite, muster our strength, ready our weapons, and cany out an anned uprising to overthrow Guomindang rule and set up the people's own government! Under the lcadeJSbip of our own government, cany out an anti-imperialist war of national liberation! Brothers! Sisters! Once we have overthrown the reactionary rule and organized our own government to wage revolutionary war, can we defeat Japan and international imperialism? Can we smash the well trained and amply provisioned imperialist troops? Yes, yes, ten thousand times yes! If the worker and peasant masses of Russia, exhausted from four yean of warfare, relying on their own 2. BtJgDng. btJire. btJcoo, literally "cease WOJk, cease attending classes, cease drill."

or

The first two these terms are the slalldanl Chinese expressions for strikes by workcn and students; tbc tbinf, which is ool so common, obviously refers to soldiers. Here we have supplied the subjects, implicit in the tenns; when the same phrase occurs again, in the fll'll o(the rallying cries at the end ofdlis texl, we have translated II10I'e literally.

DECEMBER t9JJ

Ui9

strength and on Bolshevik leadership, could defeat the Allied armies of fourteen

imperialist powers, why couldn't we? The unity of the masses, tens of millions strong, is mightier than all the planes and carmons of the imperialists, how much more so with the proletariat of the entire world, the oppressed slaves in the colonies, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, making up one sixth of the world, standing on our side. Arise, overthrow the reactionary rule of the Ouomindang, establish our own political power, and wage a bloody war to the dealh against imperialism! Brothers! Sisters! The Provisional Central Revolutionary Soviet Government hereby declares to you: the Soviet Govemment is the only revolutionacy government that opposes imperialism to the end; our aim is to achieve the complete independence and liberation of the Chinese nation; we oppose all unequal treaties, open or secret, between the reactionary government of China and imperialism; we oppose secret diplomacy; we advocate driving out ftom China all imperialist land, sea, and air forces; we advocate confiscation of all banks, mines, railways, and enterprises run by imperialism in China; we refuse to recognize all foreign debts; we consider the Guomindang government in Nanjing, like that in Guangdong, to be a traitorous govenunent of the landlord and capitalist classes that has no right whatsoever to represent the toiling masses of China. All negotiations and treaties between them and imperialism are considered by the Soviet Government to be null and void. As for the M&llChurian lncident,l we advocate inunediate and unconditional withdrawal of Japanese troops from China; abrogation of all fonner treaties between China and Japan; confiscation of all Japanese imperialist banks, mines, railways, and· enterprises in China; taking back all concessions; abolition of consular jurisdiction; and the signing of new, equal treaties on the basis of respect for the independence and freedom of Soviet China. OtheiWiSC. a detennined war of national liberation will be waged against Japanese imperialism. But in order 1o pursue the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation and to fight and win a war of national liberation, it is necessary first to overthrow the counterrevolutio1181y Guomindang government, which is selling out the interests of the Chinese nation, and to establish the rule of a democntic dictatorship of workers and peasants, in the form of a soviet, in the whole country. Brothers! Sisters! Imperialist aggression daily becomes fiercer, Ouomindang betrayal daily becomes more shameless, and the misery of the toiling and impoverished masses daily becomes more acute! Arise, loiling and impoverished masses of the whole country! Unite, organize, and ann yourselves to wage the final decisive battle against imperialism and the Ouomindang! Come and range yourselves under the banner of the soviets, destroy counterrevolutionary Guomindang rule with a soviet revolution of the workers and peasants, overthrow the semicolonial ruling system that imperialism has set up in China, and 3. I.e., the Japanese occupaticm of Manchuria.

170

MA.o·s

ROAD TO POWER

secure the ftecdom and liberation oflhe Chinese nation and of China's popular masses! Go on strike, boycott classes, and rejec:t military training in opposition to imperialism and to the suppression and massac:re of the anti-imperialist movement by the Guomindang! Let the popular masses arm themselves and drive out Japanese imperialism! Nullify all negotiations and secret treaties between the Ouomindang and imperialism! Overthrow the counterrevolutionary rule of the Guomindang! Down with imperialism! Support the Provisional Central Revolutionary Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic--die government of the Chinese people! Support the Red Army-the military f~ of the Chinese popular masses themselves and the only military force that opposes imperialism to the end! Long live the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation! Lorlg live Soviet China! Chainnan of the Provisional Central Revolutionary Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic

Vice-Chainnen

MaoZcdong Zhang Guotao Xiang Ying

Directive No. 6 of the Central Executive Cummiture of the Chinese Soviet Republic Provisional Procedure for Handling Counterrevolutionary Cases and Establishing Judicial Organs (Passed by an Extraordinary Session of the Central Executive Committee, December 13, 1931) Since the third victory of the revolutioniU)' war and the establishment of the Provisional Central Government, soviet political power has been further consolidated. At this time in the soviet areas there is a task that urgently must be done, which is to establish revolutionary order so as to safeguard the rights of the

masses. When countmevolutionazy organizations such as the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, the Reorganizationists, and all other counterrevolutionary factions were being exposed in the past, soviet governments at all levels everywhere resolutely carried out arrests and inteirogations and dealt with many counterreVolutionary elements, dealing death blows to these counterrevolutionaries and thereby consolidating soviet political power. The main direction of this type of work has been completely correct. Everyone must be aware, however, that past work in eliminating counterrevolutionaries has not been without mistakes. The Provisional Central Government seriously points out to soviet governments at all levels everywhere that in various respects the work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries was previOUsly done incorrectly in many localities. For example, people were arrested on the strength of confessions by a certain counterrevolution&JY element or by a few of them, without sufficient evidence or wtdcrtaking investigation work. During interrogation th~ was willful insistence on usiDg corporal punishment, SO that incidents of bearing a confession out of someone were a frequent occurrence. In punishing offenders there was failure to make distinctions in class status and between leaders and followen, so that those who should have beell. lighdy punished were instead punished severely. (For example, worker and peasant eleOur SOUrce for 1his texl is Z/rollfiYllng gMjudi Jhiliao Vol. 3, pp. 656-59. 171

Jn MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

ments who were followers were not released.) These mistakes were discovered on numerous occasions in many places in the soviet areas. A portion of these mistakes were made through the conspiratorial activities of counterrevolutionary elements hidden within the soviet governments. Ever since these mistakes were made, this has caused the worker and peasant masses in many places to develop suspicions toward the soviet governments' work of eliminating countem:volutionaries. The fact that the rights of the revolutionary masses cannot be completely ensured under the soviet govenunents. that it has not been possible to establish an excellent revolutionary order under the soviets, and that at the same time it has not been possible to eliminate thoroughly countem:volutionary organizations and activitie&--all this is extremely wrong. The Provisional Central Government hereby notifies soviet governments everywhere at all levels that they must resolutely and rapidly establish revolutionary order, so that the basic rights and all appropriate legal rights of the revolutionary masses arc absolutely ensured. At the same time, counterreVolutionary organizations and activities are to be thoroughly destroyed, and the following provisional procedures arc stipulated. I. Investigations, arrests, and preliminary interrogatioos in all countem:volutionary cases arc to be carried out by the State Political Security Bureau. After the preliminary interrogation is done, the State Political Security Bureau, acting as prosecutor, brings the case to a state judicial orpn (a court or a judicial department), and that organ interrogates and passes verdict. 2. The authority to carry out interrogations (except for preliminary interrogations handled by the State Political Security Bureau) and sentencing (from verdicts of not guilty to death sentences) in an counterrevolutionary cases rests with state judicial organs. Judicial organs 81 the xitJn level have no authority to pass the death sentence, but under unusual circumstances, those who obtain special permission from the provincial judicial organs may be excepted: after judicial organs of the Central Area and nearby provinces have meted out the death penalty, the defendant must appeal to the central judicial organs within fourteen days. 3. Where there is no organ of the State Political Security Bureau (that is, the State Political Security Bureau itself, a provincial branch offace. a xi11n brarx:b office, or a special agent of the Political Security Bureau), if the local soviet government discovers counterrevolutionary material it must report to the local organ of the State Political Security Bureau and may not on its own authority cany out arrests and interrogations. 4. At the xi11n and dislrict levels where only a committee on eliminating countc:m:volutionaries has been established and there is yet no brancb of the State Political Security Bureau or its special agents, and wbere the rCgime has at least a six month history, if counterrevolutionary materials are discovered in such a soviet government, consent must be obtained ftom a branch of the State Political Security Bureau (located where the provincial soviet is) before arrests

DECEMBER 1931

173

may be made. Only under extraordinary circumstances (such as cases in which counleJTevolutionaries have already begun to organize rebellion or where the area is cut off from the provincial soviet by a White area or on the bordeiS betWeen Red and White areas where it is easy to flee or there is urgent danger of enemy attack) in which there is no time to report or it is impossible to report to a provincial lnoch of the State Political Security Bureau and ample evidence of everything has been obtained is it permissible for the district or xian government and its committee on the elimination of counterrevolutionaries to authorize decisions to make anests. S. In newly developed an:as, which is to say in places where the revolutionary government has been in existence for less than six months, when the struggle between the local revolutionary masses and the despotic gentry, landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists is extremely intense, xian-level organs for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries and specially designated district-level organs for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries (special agents of State Political Security Bureau branches or committees for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries) have the authority to make decisions regarding the arrest and interrogation of counterrevolutionary elements, contingent upon the prior consent of the xian or district executive committee. After interrogation, [these elements) should be handed over to the judicial organs at the same level of government for final inteJrogation, and after inteJrogation is completed, a written verdict is drawn up and reported to the provincial judicial organ for the purpose of making a final judgment. In cases of despotic gentry, landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists, however, whose crimes are clear and evident and whose execution is demanded by the local masses of workers and peasants, the local government may rapidly carry out the execution without having to obtain permission from the provincial government. 6. When the movement is just beginning and organs of revolutionary political power have not yet been established, the local revolutionary masses have the authority to arrest and execute despotic gcntJy,landlords, and all counterrevolutionary elements on their own initiative. Once the revolutionary government is established, on the other band, matters are to be handled according to stipulation

no.s.

1. Whether in new or old areas, in dealing with members of counterrevolutionary organizations (such as the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, the Reorganizationist Faction, ... etc.), distinctions of class status and between leaders and followers must be made. That is to say, counteJTcvolutionary elements of despotic gentry, landlord, rich peasant, and capitalist origins and ringleaders, should be harshly punished (sentenced to death, and so on), whereas elements whose backgrounds are those of workers, peasants, poor people, and the laboring masses but who joined counteJTcVolutionary organizations, and those who are followers, should be punished leniently (released to make a fresh start, and so on).

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8. With regard to inten"ogation mctbods, in order 1o eliminate counterrevolu· tionary organizations thoroughly and pronounce judgment correctly in COW1ter· revolutionary cases. we must resolutely eliminate corporal punishment and instead adopt effective measures of various kinds, such as gathering and verify· ingevidcnce. 9. Before courts are established, local judicial organs are to set up tribunals in tbe governments at the three levels of province, xian, and district as provisional judicial organs to settle all criminal and civil cases. in addition to handling counterrevolutionary cases according to tbe above·listed principles. After receiving tbis order, soviet governments at all levels should strictly observe it and carry it out. Any violation of the principles stipulated in tbis order shall be severely punished. It is so ordered.

An lmpurtant lnstruclian Regarding the Building ofSoviets (December 15, 1931) In the past, the organization of soviets at all levels has been full of imperfections. First, the administrative areas have been too extensive, makillJ it inconvenient to carry out administrative functions. Second, there have been too many levels of government, causing a cumbersome chain of command and inefficient communications. Third, and of particular importance. election proccdurcs have been incomplete and imperfect. Governments at all lcvcls have been elected either through the usc of a simple mass rally or by holding meetings of deputies or a joint conference of chairmen, without regard to nonnal electoral procedures. This is particularly true of the basic-level soviet organizations-village and town soviets have not yet been truly established. Fourth, the division of labor and work methods within the governments at all levels have been mosdy inappropriate. All of these are things that do not accord wilh the Soviet Constitution and the various specific rules and regulations of the Central Government. The Provisional Central Government hereby declares: the government of every locality and every xian location must redivide its administrative areas and reorganize the governments at all levels in accordance with the provisions of the Constitueion and the temporary rules and regulations issued by the Centnll [Executive Committee]. 1 Of primuy importance is to delimit anew districts and townships, in accordance with the provisions of the temporary rules and regulations for the division of administnltive areas (the village and the small group should be abolished as administrative areas); then to elect township soviets and city soviets in accordance with the rules and regulations for elections (these arc the basic soviet organizations); and finally to reconstruct everything from the township soviet to the provincial soviet, in acconiance with the provisional rules

and regulations for the organization of local governments. This is an extremely important task, and local governments at all levels must approach it most resolutely, expend tremendous efforts, and proceed to carry it out painstakingly and This instruction was first published inHMgsezhonghua, no. 2, December 18, 1931. We

have trmslatcd it ftom MQQ Zedongji, Vol. 3, pp. 65-66, wbich reproduces the text ftom that source, with occasional reference to tbe reprint of HOJJgSf! zhonghua, where a few characters that could not be deciphered on the copy available to tbe Tokyo editon can be

""'· See below, Appendix, Soviet Governments" of November I.

in the

the ''Tempomy Organizational Regulations for Local 1931. 175

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judiciously, for only thus can we avoid having the newly delimited administrative areas develop defects like those of the old administrative areas and avoid having the newly reorganized governments at all levels more or less the same as the old governments. To eradicate such ills, the provincial government in every province mwt expend its utmost etTorts to direct this movement for building local soviets. In addition to issuing various detailed written documents and insbuctions. meetings should also be called at the provincial level as well as in existing localities of all the principal responsible people in each xian and district government. A suitable location should then be selected to gather those who bear the principal responsibilities in all township governments for a meeting, to which the provincial and xian governments should send people to offer guidance. At these meetings, the significance of the movement to build local soviets, and the concrete methods for carrying it out, will be clearly and thoroughly discussed. In addition, when administrative areas are actually being divided up and governments are being reelected, the leadeJship should send people to each xian to inspect, where they may sort out puzzling difficulties and correct mistakes at any time. Guidance by the .rUm to the district, and by the district to the township, should be handled in a similar manner to ensure that this campaign for building soviets achieves very good results. From December20, 1931, to March 31,1932, is the period designated for the two provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian, and Ruijin xian, directly subordinate [to the Central Government], to carry out the campaign for building soviets in accordance with the new laws. The soviets of these two provinces and of Ruijin xian must immediately produce a suitable work plan on the basis of this timetable, so that the delimitation of administrative areas and the election of soviets at all levels (most of the time and effort should be devoted to the delimitation and election at the township level) can be accomplished step by step and very well within a hundred days, and the facts regarding the process can be regularly reported to the Central Government, so as to facilitate timely guidance by the Central Government. All other provinces are to begin carrying out this instruction on the day it is received. It is so ordered. Chairman of the Central Executive Committee

Vice-Chairmen

Mao Zedong

Xiang Ying ZhangGuotao

--------'1932~----

Concerning Alteration and Increase of the Ratio of Soviet Deputies to Local Residents Directive No. 8 of the Central Executive Committee (january 28, 1932)

At present the Chinese revolution is still in the midst of a fierce struggle, and if the Soviet Government is to promulgate various types of regulations, it should first consider whether or not they are well suited to the conditions of the present struggle and base the promulgation of various types of regulations upon this principle. Therefore, the ratio of soviet deputies to local residents as set out in the election by-laws should also be based on this principle, and it will not do to set the ratio of deputies to residents too mechanically. In order to fit in with the environment of the present revolutionary struggle and to ensure the leading

position of the proletariat in soviet organs, the ratio of voting residents to depu-

ties in the current election must be slightly altered and amended in relation to the election by-laws promulgated in the past. Following arc the new standards and regulations with regard to the ratio of residents to deputies: I. Township soviets: one regular deputy to be elected from among every group of fifty poor peasants, middle peasants., and independent laborers; one regular deputy to be elected from among every group of thirteen workers, coolies, and farm laborers; in cases where the nwuber of people is fewer than stipulated, one regular deputy may still be elected. 2. Soviets in towns directly subordinate to the xian: one regular deputy to be elected from among every group of eighty poor city people as well as poor peasants., middle peasants, and independent laborers in the surrounding areas under its jurisdiction; one regular deputy to be elected from among every group of twenty workers, coolies, and fann laborers. In cases where the number of people is fewer than stipulated, one regular deputy may still be elected. 3. City soviets directly subordinate to the province: one regular deputy to be elected from among every group of four hundred urban poor people and poor and middle peasants fium the vicinity; one regular deputy to be elected :from among every group of one hundred workers, coolies, and fann laborers. In cases Our source for this ICXt is Mao Zedongji. &juan, Vol. 4, pp. 21-23.

JIKJ

MAO'S ROAD TO l'OW£R.

where the number of people is fewer than stipulaled, one regular deputy may still be elected. 4. The district soviet congress is made up of deputies fi"om the various township soviets and deputies from the local armed forces. Every group of two hundred residents may elect one regular deputy to the district congress. But as for the class status of the deputies, farm laborers, coolies, and workers should make up a total of20 percent of the congress. 5. The xian soviet congress is made up of deputies elected by the district congress and town soviets, as well as deputies from the local armed forces and the Red Anny. One regular deputy to the xian soviet congress is to be elected from among every group of 1,200 residents in each township. As for the class status of the deputies, workers, coolies, and fann laborers should make up a total of 25 percent, and soldiers, 30 percent. In each town, one regular deputy to the xian congress is to be elected from among every group of four hundred residents. As for class status, workers, fann laborers, and coolies should make up a total of 50 percent. 6. The provincial soviet congress is made up of deputies elected by xian soviet congresses and soviet congresses of cities directly subordinate to the province, as well as deputies from the Red Nrny and local armed forces. One regular deputy is to be elected from among every group of five thousand rura1 residents. As for class status, workers, coolies, and farm laborers should make up a total of 25 percent, and soldiers, 10 percent. One regular deputy is to be elected from among every group of two dtousand residents in each city. As for class status of the deputies, fann laborers, workers, and coolies should make up a total of 50 percent. At all levels of soviets, the ratio ofalternate deputies to regular deputies shall be one to five. That is, for every five regular deputies elected, one alternate deputy may be elected in addition. In cases where there arc fewer than five regular deputies, one alternate deputy may still be elected. When attending soviet conferences or congress meetings, alternate deputies have the right to speak but not to vote. When a regular deputy is absent, an alternate deputy is promoted to take his place. Supplementary Note 1. Where deputies to soviet congresses at the three levels of province, xian, and district arc concerned, the criteria for worker, coolie, fann laborer, and Red Anny deputies should be detennined before deputies arc elected. Rural and urban soviets as well as congresses at the two levels of district and xian must all pay attention to the components from the workers, coolies, farm laborers, and Red Anny. Supplemental)' Note 2. Election procedures for local armed forces and the Red Anny are stipulated separately under local armed forces and Red Nrny rules and regulations. The above regulations are to make up for the shoncomings in the election

JANUARY J!l32

J8l

bylaws. Aside from changes in the ratios of residents to deputies, all other procedures should follow the regulations in the election bylaws. Upon receipt of this directive, soviet governments at all levels are to hold the current round of elections according to the insbuctions in this directive. It is so ordered. Chainnan ofthe Central Execlllive Committee Vice-Chairmen

Mao Zedong Xiang Ying ZhangGuotao

Resolution Concerning Verdicts of the ProvisiOTUJl Supreme Court in the Trial oflmporkmt Crimiflllls Such as AB Carps Members,

Reorganiz.ationists, and War Crimiflllls (February 1932)

All three original court verdicts should be approved as a whole, but the following points should be revised. I. Cao Shuxiang was originally sentenced to two years' imprisorunent, but the Executive Committee regards this as too lenient. This is because she was the political commissar of the No. 4 branch of the Red Army Hospital, yet openly joined the AB Corps to undermine the soviet rCgime and the Red Anny, thus betraying the trust of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. Moreover, Cao Sbuxiang studied in the Soviet Union for three years, and during her stay there she sided politically with all sorts of bad elements. When she came back to work in the Soviet Area, she joined the AB Corps; clearly it was not a mere coincidence that she joined this counterrevolutionary organization. Therefore, her prison term should be increased by a year and three months, to make a total of three years and three months. With regard to the length of time for which she is denied the right to vote, the original verdict stands. 2. According to the verdict, Kong Fanshu was to be sentenced to three years in prison. Because he did a considerable amount of work in the revolutionary war, and he was wounded and consequently disabled, the court deducted a year and six months ftom his sentence. But he held the office of general commander in the AD Corps, and despite the fact that he did a considerable amowtt of revolutionary work his sentence is too light. His prison sentence should be increased by three months, to make a total of a year and nine months. With regard to the length of time for which he is denied the right to vote, the original verdict stands. 3. The original verdict for li Xincheng is two years in prison. Because he This resolution was first published in Hongse Zhonghua, no. 12, March 2, 1932, together wilh the texts oflhe three verdicts under discussion. Our source is Mao Zedongji, Vol. 3, pp. 93-94. which reproduces this version.

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183

fought bravely in evCJ}' battle and was wounded several times, his sentence should be reduced by six months, making it a year and six months. With regard to the length of time for which he is denied the right to vote, the original verdict

""""'· 4. The original verdict for Wei Baigang is five years in prison. This punishment is loo harsh for his crime, so his sentence should be reduced by six months, making it four years and six months. With regard to the length of time for which he is denied the right to vote, the original verdict stands. The above-mentioned counterrevolutionary criminals should be notified of the reduction or lengthening of their prison tenns as stated in this resolution. Chainnan of the Centra] Executive Conuninee Vice-Chairmen

Mao Zedong Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

Letterfrom Mao Zedong to Yuan Guoping (March 6, 1932)

Comrade Yuan Guoping:l I. Your fii'S1letter from Jiangkou has reached us. Since the masses in Sandu are as you described them in your letter, Gulonggang and other places must be even bcner than Sandu.l We should work even harder to win them over and must not, on the contrary, slacken our effons or relax our self-discipline because of the

consciousness of the masses. 2. This time in your work you must be ever-vigilant aboul all your strategies and work melhods and never allow them to stray from the general task of ''winning over the masses and creating soviet areas." It is not right to abandon our political slogans and yield to the ideology of the backward masses.

To be sure, there are times when, for the purpose of winulag over the masses,J our work may be divided into several steps, but we must in no wise stray from our basic task. On the contrary, we must carry out our general task of "wiMing over the masses and creating soviet areas" in a more realistic way. The insttuc1ions on strategy and working methods contained in issue no. 3 of Genert~l [Xf Co"espondence are on the whole correct, but you are expected to apply them in a flexible way, not to be rigidly tied to them exactly as they are wriuen. Our estimation of the masses in Sandu and Qibao was somewhat different from what you said in your letter, so the tactics and methods of our work should not be applied mechanically. For example, take the method-it is in no sense a tactic or a line--of attacking big landlords before anacking small landlords. When we take into consideration the conditions in Sandu, mechanical Our source for this lener is Mao Ud011gji, Vol. 3, pp. 95-97, where it is reproduced from a contemporary mimeographed version. I. for biographical infonnation aboUI Yuan Guoping, see the relevant noiC to the ..Minutes of the first Eight Meetings of the General front Committee of the First front Army ofthe Red Army," May 25-June 10, 1931. 2. Sandu, a settlement in Xingguo .xian, along with nearby Qibao and Gulonggang, comprised an area whose population had been vel)' resistant to the revolutionary movement. 3. Emphasizedinoriginalwithdolsnexttothecharactcrs. 4. The missing character here must be zheng(political)> the fblltitlc of the periodical mentioDCd could then be rendered as Con-esponlknce from (or Bulletin o!J the Geneldl

PolitU:ul[)epllrtment. 184

MARCH J932

185

application of the method would lead to opportunism. Furthermore, the process of going from peasant associations to soviets and poor peasant leagues should not be delayed too long. Great efforts should first be made to mobilize rapidly the masses of poor peasantS, fann laborers, and middle peasants for the sbUggle. During the struggle. develop the anack against big landlords rapidly to the phase of attac:king small landlords and rich peasants, that is, redisbibution of property and land and abolition of debts. As soon as a majority of the impoverished masses has risen up, all small landlords and rich peasants remaining in the peasant associations for the purpose of speculation should inunediately be expelled and the organ of political power of the muses--lhe soviets-and the class organization of the masse&--the poor peasant leagues-should immediately be established. In a word, strategies and work methods are fonnulated in the light of actual conditions. You should make a very realistic analysis of the local conditions and the sentiments and demands of the local masses in the course of their struggle, in order to decide on more realistic strategies and methods. Only thus can you anain greater practical results. When members of the Red masses first enter a White village, retaliation and adventurism are bound to occur. You must at the same time watch out for similar incidents in other areas as well. Army discipline must not be relaxed in the slightest. If the masses want to organize small guerrilla detachments to distribute the possessions of the despotic gently among the masses. then in order to organize small guerrilla detachments, they will establish preliminary mass bodies. such as peasant associations, and even set up provisional organs of political power-revolutionary comm.ince&--811 this with a view to organizing small guerrilla detachments to attack the fortified villages feared by the masses. Why do I say this? Because under circumstances such as those in Sandu and Qibao (to say nothing of situations worse than those in Sandu and Qibao, such as the town of Yongfeng where the Third Anny is now working, or the vicinity of Nanfeng where the Fifty-eigbth Army is now working, or Anyuansi 5 where the Fourth Army is now working, or the border areas between Shicheng and Ninghua where the Twelfth Army is now working), there is no security for the various organizations, such as mass bodies and organs of political power, nor for all the benefits derived from redistribution of land and the abolilion of debts. As soon as the Red Army withdraws, the armed forces of the landlords retwn, all organizations collapse, and all benefits are nullified. At such times, only small guerrilla detachments that have been organized and trained by us and have fought the local despots and divided up and distributed their belongings, and who have pitted themselves irreconcilably against the despotic gently and the landlords, are able to withdraw with the Red Army to the Red border areas and wait for a chance to lawu:h a second anack. Only this is something to S. The place ref'erml to here appears to be the toWn (and sunounding township) of Anyuan, in nonhwestem NinghuaxiaiJ in Fujian, bordering Shicheagxia/J in Jiangxi.

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rely on, a way to prevent the work this time from ending up in vain. Not to mention earlier events, but just looking at things after the battle of Changsha, does not all of the first-stage work in Ping[xiang], Li[ling], You[xian], and in the Yuanshui Valley, and in the Wujiang Valley, teach us the same lesson, that we failed to grasp the central task in our work----the organization of guenilla detachments who do not participate in production?6 Is it not as though all the work that our comrades have done, through iMumerable trials and tribulations, such as the redistribution of land, the abolition of debts, the establishment of soviets, and the organization of Red Guard units (which do participate in production), has been in vain? Because in all four of your letters you have not mentioned the organization of guerrilla detachments, it is discussed here in detail. But this is not to say that you should not make plans to establish and consolidate political power in Sandu and Qibao. The circumstances and conditions in Sandu and Qibao at the moment are very different fiom those in places like the town ofYongfeng, the town ofNanfcng, and Anyuans~ and there is no doubt whatsoever that you should make plans to establish and consolidate political power. You should plan to mobilize all of the masses thoroughly, annihilate the anned fon:es of the landlords completely, organize class organizations of the masses and organs of political power, and cany out redistribution of the land. You must, however, make plans for a situation In wllkb the eoemy advaaces npidly, the Red Army has to be CODteatrattd, aod the armed forces of the landlord class have not yet been ·ellmiaated; if you have planned for such a situation, you will know that the organization of small local guenilla detachments that do not participate in production .and that fight the local despots is truly the central task of all of your work. Not only will taking the organiation of guerriHa detachments as the central task not cause neglect of other tasks; quite the contrary, It will tlgbdy Unk aU other tasks IOgetber. In the past, the political departments of various armies and the great majority of the comrades who are engaged in political worlc did not wxlerstand the central task of organizing guenilla detachments under special circumstances, and most of the worlc they did was not in accord with the circumstances and conditions. so on the whole they wasted much effort and achieved few practical results. For this reason, what is said in this letter not only constitutes instructions for the work your army is doing in Sandu and Qibao, but is also something to which the whole fronl army as well as all independent divisions and all local guerrillas should pay equal attention, and which they should put into practice to the letter. Director of the Genml Political Department

MaoZedong March 6, al Huangpi

6. The rcfcrcnccs here appear to be to orpnizing activities in xian in northwcstem Jiugx.i and nonheas1em Hunan in the aftermath of the attacks on Changsha in the sum-

merof1930.

Letter to Western Fujian Concerning the Work in Shanghang and Wuping (March 9, 1932)

To the Executive Committee of the Western Fujian Soviet Govcmmen1 Dear Comrades: Over the course of a few days, Sbanghang and Wuping have been completely occupied by our Red Army's Twelfth Army in cooperation with the broad masses of workers and peasants, and Zhong Shaokui 's bandit regiment has been totally defeated and has fled to Guangdong. 1 This is a great victory, won at a time when the democratic revolutionary war has just begun to develop, which is of great significance both to the development and the triumph of the soviets throughout the country. The Red Army now has Ganzhou under siege,2 so the taking of the two xian, Shanghang and Wuping, is not only a threat 10 the Guangdong warlords, but especially ofgreal help to the capture ofGanzhou. The capture of the two xian, Shanghang and Wuping, has not only expanded and consolidated the soviet area in western Fujian, but also funned closer ties between Fujian and Jiangxi; this is especially true of the capture of the town of Shanghang, as it is the largest key city in western Fujian, giving it an important position politically, economically, and militarily. Thus the occupation of Shanghang and Wuping is not of a temporary nature, but, instead, they will be consolidated and turned into a solid Red area in western Fujian and the town of Shanghang made into a Red key city. This is a very weighty task for you, a task which you must make every effort to fulfill. The Council of People's Commissars hereby issues the following directives for the work in Shanghang and Wuping: I. Correctly cany out the Land Law,lhe Labor Law,the economic policies, and so on, adopted by the National Soviet Congress. This is the primary prerequisite and basis for the consolidation of the Red regimes in the two xian of This letter was first published inHongseZhotrghua, no. 13, March 9, 1932. Our source is Mao Zedtmgjl, Vol 3. pp. 99-105, which reproduces this version. I. Wuping was captured oo February 23, 1932, and Shanghang was capnucd on the 26th. 2. For infonnation on the scige ofGanzhou, sec the Introduction.

JBB

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Shanghang and Wuping. Under this condilion, arouse the vast numbers of workers and coolies in the towns, farm laborers, poor peasants, middle peasants in the countryside, and other toiling masses to participate actively in the struggle of the land revolution and in the Soviet Govcmmcnt. Only when they have attained concrete benefits can they be expected to give active support to soviet power, and the soviet regimes in the two xian can only be consolidalcd provided that there is a basis formed by the broad masses of workers, peasants, and other toilers. 2. In order to mobilize the masses of urban workers, the most basic provisions of the Labor Law, such as the eight-hour working day, wage raises, specification of a minimum wage, improved treatment, the practice of collective contracts and labor contracts, and so on, must be really put into effect. The government should serve as the defender of the interests of the workers and must secure the immediare realization of these minimum benefits. At the same time, it should provide material assistance to the workers and help with the procedure when they organize trade unions. There are, however, certain things which must be pointed out and prevented, corresponding to errors that often occurred in work in the past. (a) As regards puning the Labor Law into effect and protecting the interests of the workers, only a vague and general statement is issued, but the law is not enforced in practice and no concrete measures are adopted. Nor does the government examine or find out whether or not the workers have gained anything. It contents itself with an announcement or an order, thus adopting a negative attitude toward supporting the workers' interests. (b) As regards protecting the workers' interests, the government does not in most cases make a study of facts or of the circumstances of the actual struggle of the masses. It merely resorts to administrative orders to force the capitalists to comply with the law, it does not put its main effort into mobilizing the masses for the struggle. As a result, the masses cannot understand what is going on and remain temporarily passive in the struggle. (c) In the enforcement of the Labor Law, more often than not the local economic situation or the actual living conditions and needs of the workers are not investigated, so as to work out proper and practical measures. Instead, there is reliance on compulsion to go beyond the limits allowed by the actua1 local economic conditions. The result is that many capitalists are made unable to bear the burden and have to close down their businesses, thus undermining the present economic policy of the soviets and greatly affecting the economy in the soviet areas. Unemployment rises and, furthennore, a great many workers begin doubling and become dispirited in the struggle and even make secret compromises with and concessions to the capitalists, thereby dampening enthusiasm for the struggle and obscuring class consciousness on the part of the workers. This is e~ttremely hannful. At the same time, restraint on the workers' struggle or inactivity in the protection of the workers' interests on the pretex.t of maintaining the economy of the soviet areas and executing economic policy must be rejected still more resolutely. In short, the Labor Law is to be enforced

MAR.CH19J2

189

in keeping with the resolute protection of the workers' interests and economic policy, especially by evoking the workers' enthusiasm for class stnlggle and support for soviet political power. 3. To confiScate and redistribute the land in the cotmtryside, the Land Law must be enforced to the letter; the major issue is to follow clear-cut class lines and never let the fruits of the land revolution be usurped for a time by the rich peasants. Here an erroneous concept that existed in the past about the redistribution of land must be rectified, that is, the belief that it is inevitable at the outset of the land revolution that the rich peasants will usurp the benefits and there has to be a second or even a third distribution to solve the problem, so that disbibution of land is very careless at the beginning. This is very wrong. We can only say that, during the land revolution, the rich peasants will definitely try to usurp the benefits of the land revolution; jwt because of that, we have all the more reason to rouse the masses in a resolute way to frustrate the attempts of the rich peasants and prevent the benefits of the land revolution from being usl.llpCd by the rich peasants by following a clear-cut class line. This mistake was a common occurrence in the newly developed areas in Jiangxi, mostly because, in the land disbibution, the main effort was not to mobilize the masses and instead distribution was done simply through giving orders, thus affording an opportunity for usurpation by the rich peasants. It is true that the swift redistribution of land in the newly developed areas is for the purpose of rapidly mobilizing and winning over the basic masses and consolidating the area; if the rich peasants usurp the benefits of the land redisbibution, the new area cannot be consolidated effectively. Swift redistribution is only possible when the basic masses in the countryside are roused in the stJuggle for land redistribution, and only then can the anempts of the rich peasants be frustrated and the benefits of the land revolution not be usurped by the rich peasants. New areas can be powerfully consolidated only on the basis of the active struggle of the numerous farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants. Therefore, when distributing the land, a mass meeting should be called at which the Land Law of the Central Govcmmcnt is announced, for the purpose of mobilizing the masses. The land distribution committee should absorb into its membership many farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants. Members must be elected by the masses, and their backgrounds made publicly known at mass meetings and subject to examination. Every time a land distribution plan is made, a mass meeting should be called where the plan is made known to the people. The plan must be approved by the mass meeting before the land is actually redistributed. When proclaiming the Land Law and electing members of the land redisbibution committee, the most important thing is to announce that rich peasants may be given only poor land and that rich peasants are not entitled to membership on the land comminee, so as to attract the attention and participation of the masses in the struggle to defeat the attempts of the rich peasants, to repel the rich peasants., and to stop them ftom sneaking in and raking power in the redistribution ofland. During land distribu-

190

MAO'S R.OAD TO POWER.

tion in new areas in the past, the Red Anny took care of everything, and in most cases the soviet govenunents did not send personnel to assume leadenhip or even ignored the whole maner, leaving the entire responsibility to the Red Anny alone. On one hand, this hampered the Red Army in carrying out other tasks, and at the same time, because the Red Army had other tasks to cany out, it was unable to concentn.tc all its efforts on distribution under the circwnsWH:es, so naturally the land was distriburcd in a casual manner. Although the Red Army did have a serious problem with formalism in land redistribution in the past, responsibility for the mistakes lies mainly with the local governments, because they disregarded their responsibility and failed to asswne leadership. This time when land is confiSCIIed and redistribuled in Shanghang and Wuping, the government of western Fujian must exercise active leadership and carry it tluough correctly in accordance with the above instructions and in line with yotu many put experiences in land distribution. 4. You must pay serious attention to the problem of middle peuants. In the put, the middle peasants were rejected in many places or attacked under the camouflage of attacking the rich peasants. This was nothing less than undermining the alliance with the middle peasants and was extremely hannful to tbe consolidation of soviet political power and the future triumph of the revolution. Do not repeat the same mistake of the past this time in your worlc in Shanghang and Wuping. First, on the problem of land and with respect to equal distribution, you must strictly and conectly follow Article S of the Land Law, a principle concerning the middle peasants ( ... [equal distribution] is practiced only when the majority of the peasants are willing and directly supportive; if most of the middle peasants are rcluclant, they may choose not to participate). Second, the middle peasants should under no circumslances be encroached upon when funds arc collected. This is most likely to happen in fund collection in the newly developed areas. The funds we collect should nOI come out of the pockets of the middle peasants. Third, the more enthusiutic of the middle peasants should be absorbed in a positive way in the land distribution, and especially participation in the exercise of political power. Strict precautions must be taken against the exclusion of the middle peasants from election and government. In a word, consolidating the alliance with the middle peasants is one of the major bases for the victory of the land revolution and the soviet regime. Encroachment upon the middle peasants must be finnly opposed and considerable concessions should be made to them on a number of issues (such as the equal distribution of land). S. Apart from the problem of the workers and the implementation of the many principles and methods prescribed in the lener of the General Political Department with regard to the work in Oanzhou, the work in the towns or Shanghana: and Wuping should: First, follow the economic policy adopted by the National Soviet Congress. the tax laws promulgated by the Central Government, regulalions for investment, and regulations for loans; correclly cany them out using the experience of

MARCH J932

J9J

Tingzhou; and translate these documents into bulletins so as to make them publicly known. Second, try hard to maintain commerce and never undermine it on account of fund collection. Funds to be collected should be classified and small capital and part of middle capital should be cxempted.1 Shops run by reactionary leaders should be confiscated and their crimes and the reasons for the confiscation announced in detail to the public, the purpose being to foil reactionary attempts to spread rumors by making clear that it is the possessions of the reac:tionaries. not shops, that have been confiscated. Third, declare offacially that all houses belonging to the reactionary organs are confiscated by the Soviet Government and then realloned to various organs and mass organizations. Random occupation of houses at will by various organs and organizations is prohibited. Confiscation of houses and possessions should all be declared by the government. Some of the houses may be allotted to the workers as dormitmies and some rented out at low rates to ordinary poor people. Of the possessions confiscated, cash goes to the government, and apart from that, part should go as aid to the Red Army and the masses in disaster areas and the rest should be distributed as much as possible among the urban poor. Transponation of all confiscated items to the old soviet areas without distribution among the local people must be opposed The anarchistic phenomenon of free confiscation and free disposition by various organs and mass organizations must be redressed. Fourth, preserve unequivocally schools and objects of culrure, and even send personnel to superintend and protect them. No vandalism is permined. Fifth, on discovering any shops that issue their own paper bills. compel them to convert the bills into cash immediately and have the bills recalled for destruction. The government should send personnel for supervision when necessary and prohibit future issuance of such bills. Cash should be well guarded so that it will not be smuggled out of the area in large amounts by reactionaries and businessmen, and the economy of the Soviet Area will not be affected. 6. The collection of funds is to be concentrated in one unified organ, which is made up of personnel from the western Fujian government and the Political Department of the Twelfth Army. All [other) bodies and organs are strictly prohibited from anacking the local bullies, so that a basis for unified finances can be established. Most of the cash collected should be used to aid the Red Army in developing the revolutionary war. Any willful waste because economic resources are plentiful is strictly forbidden; cases of such waste are to be severely punished. 7. As regards the problem of eliminating counterrevolution, a Committee for Eliminating CountClTCVOiution should be organized in accordance with Directive 3. The evident meaning here is !hat small- and some medium-sized merchants should

be exempted.

J92

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER.

No.6 of the Central Government, and all principles in relation to the elimination of counterrevolution should be adhered to in order to carry on the work correctly. Preparations should also be made for setting up a tribunal and political security bureau to maintain revolutionary order, as well as to administer justice in economic matters. 8. It is very important to establish provisional political power. Once the revolutionary committee is set up, it must put into immediate effect all laws and decrees promulgated by the National Soviet Congress and the Central Government, in order to cany out the land revolution and the political program, suppress reactionary activities, mobilize the broad masses of the workers and peasants, and set up formal organs of political power. These are its major tasks. Revolutionary committees must be elected at mass meetings. The Government of Westem Fujian should spare no effort in leading and supervising the work of the revolutionary committees of various places. The Government of Western Fujian should establish Shanghang as a city soviet directly under its jurisdiction. When considerable progress has been made in the confiSCation and redistribution of land and in the elimination of the reactionaries, the establishment of the official government should be set in active motion. First urban and rural soviets must truly build up the system of representative conferences so as to lay a solid foundation for the organization of the xian soviets of Shanghang and Wuping. All formal organs of political power must be set up in accordance with the regulations and directives promulgated by the Central Government. Revolutionary committees must become organs that lead the masses in the struggle and strictly guard against the development offonnalism, as well as the infiltration of reactionaries and rich peasants. 9. Local armed forces must be organized in a plaMed way. You are expected to discuss the matter with the headquarters of the military district and work out practical plans for the organization of the local anned forces to defend the Shanghang and Wuping Soviet Area. 10. The Western Fujian [Government] has always been dependent in its work on the Red Army in the areas newly developed by the Red Army and does not exercise effective leadership or exert itself to carry on work and fortifY the area. Take Liancheng and Ninghua, for example. They were occupied by the Twelfth Army for a long time, but the Western Fujian Government did not make a point of assuming leadership and as a result the newly developed area could not be consolidated and was even lost when the Red Army left and the reactionaries occupied it. This was a grave mistake. This past mistake is not to be repeated in the work in Shanghang and Wuping. You should mobilize and immediately draft a large number of working personnel from the old soviet areas to work in these two xian. The responsible comrades of the Western Fujian Government should go to Shanghang in person to supervise a lithe work there. Now every effort must be made to consolidate Shanghang and Wuping, which is the most realistic and paramount task at present. No other work is more important than Ibis. For this

MARCH J9J2

J93

reason, we have decided to postpone the convening of the Congress of Fujian Peasants in order to fortify Shanghang and Wuping. It is hoped that you will issue a general order to notify the governments at all levels, and will moreover take this opportunity to step up the work of election and reorganization at the )ower levels. At present, to reinforce the work in Shanghang and Wuping, the working comrades whom western Fujian sent to the Central Government and who have received training can be sent back 10 you immediately, and then assigned to help with the work in Shanghang and Wuping. Comrades! Of all the tasks you have at present, consolidating Shanghang and Wuping is the most central. You must go all out to fulfill this task, turning the two .:cian of Shanghang and Wuping into the solidest of soviet territories and making the town of Sbanghang a Red key city. Finally, you are expected 10 reprint this lener and relay it to the Political Department of the Twelfth Army and the comrades working in Shanghang and Wuping. It is hoped that the recent situation in Shanghang and Wuping. as well as future work there, will be frequently reported to the Central Government in a timely fashion. Cbainnan ofthe Council of People's Commissars Vicc-Chainnen

MaoZedong XiangYing ZhangGuotao

Directive of the Provisil»>lll Central Government to the First Congress of Workers', Peasants', mul Soldiers' Soviets

ofFujian Province (March 17, 1932) To all comrades. delegates to the First Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiels' Soviets1 DearCoouades! The opening ceremony of your provincial Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets has taken place on the fli"St and most glorious day of the world proletarian revolutioll---the commemoration of the" Paris Commune.2 The congress is of great significance because it is being held at a time when the revolutionary situation in the world and in China has developed to a highly critical point, and especially when, in the cowsc of the current development of the rcvolutiooaJ)' war, the Twelfth Anny of the Red Amy has won repealed victories in Shangbang and Wuping. At the same time, this illusb'Btes the hisiOric importance of the great revolutionary mission assumed by your congress. In addition to having sent some represenlatives to participate in the congress and provide help and guidance in its work, the Central Executive Committee hereby issues the following wriaen instructions: I. At present, the Mvolutiomuy situations both in the world and in China This directive was lim published in HongsezhonghWG, no. IS, Man:h 23, 1932. We have transll1cd it from Moo Zetkmgji, Vol. 3, pp. 107-13, which ~uces this vcrsiOD. The date ofMarcb 17given here is taken from the index volume to lhc Mao Zedcngji. Blljllon. I. The e-90 Organic Law ofthe Central Soviet, 934, 935,942--47 Ouyang Jian, 98n I ; biography of, I 00n5 Oxen, 20, 458, SS9, 635, 692, 908, 924. See al:ro Livestock Pan Hannian,lxxxi; biography of, lxxxn,96 Paris Commune, 194 Peasants: class staNS of, 55, 506; and elections, 477, 532; food supply for,69;in.guerrillafon:es,69,235; and landlord anned forces, 18-19, 20; political power for, 57, 324, 529, 672, 685, 783, 822; recruits from, 232, 267-71; in Red Guards. 234; slaughter of, 154,293, 362; in Wbiteareas.685. SeealsoLand redistribution

990

INDEX

Peasants, middJe: CCP alliance wilh, 190, 396, 434-35, 510, 548, 686; andclassiDvestigation,436,438, 506,510-12, 524-25; descriplions of,55,247--48;falsereponson, 424-25; and government bonds, 497; and land distribution, 19, 55, 188, 190,317,411,414, 822-24; mobilization of, 185, 187; and poor peasant league, 453; in soviet structure, 458, 476; taxes on, 786, 879,8811; ttealmentof, 139, 190, 401,423, 424; well-to-do, 552-54 Peasants, poor, 138-41; CCP reliance on, 396, 434, 686; and class investigation, 506; defined, 55; as delegates, 400; descriptions of, 548; and land distribution, 414, 548, 822-24; and land issues, 188, 395, 411; mobilization of, xxiii, 185, 187,413, 416; in soviet Slructurc,476; taxes on, 786,815, 860,879, 8811,903. Seeal.ro Laborers, fann; Poor peasant league Peasants, rich·: CCP policy toward, lxv, 547; confiscation from, Ixii-lxiii, 396,413,422,425,438, 525, 556-57,565, 823, 824; and counterrevolution, 368,414-15, 556-58; deception by, 396,401, 414-15,421,435,456, 506; defection of, 109; described. 55, 138,434, 451-52, 525, 547; donations from, 360, 395, 417,495, 505, 558, 565, 909; economic disarmament of, 62-63, 70; and elections, 336, 472-73, 532, 789, 871; execution of, 173; families of, 557-58, 563, 901--02; as forced labor, 327, 559; identification of, 411,504--05,513-14, 547, 686-87; and instruments of production, 824; investigation of, 396, 436, 524-25; and Land Law, 188-89, 317, 823; and local armed forces, 50; market manipulation by, 364-65, 403, 441; and money market, 502, 503; opposition to, 13&-41, 224, 513; poor land for, 189,396,414,525,

Peasants, rich (continued) 558-59, 823; purges of, 65, 116, 185; reactionary, 556-57; Red Anny and, 70,360,562--63, 901; resistancefrom,425,SII;in revolutionary bodies, 60, 139, 141, 371,414, 425; sUJVCillance on, 299, 329, 369, 370,401, 907; taxes on, 236-37,318,786,815,816,860, 879, 903; undercover, 337; and war bonds, 310; weakening, 430,434, 558-59, 686; and weapons, 377; in Whiteareas,557,68S Peddlers, 633, 815,860 Peng Dehuai, xxix, xxxviiin22, xlviii, lxxxiii, lxxvi, lxxxiii, lxxxviii; and Executive Committee, 729, 820; and Front Commminee, 82, 98nl, 102; in Fujian, 468nl, 530; in Jiangxi, 122; on Japanese invasion, 154-56 Peoples' Revolutionary Government (Fujian),1xxxi, 581n4, 644--45, 649-50,665--66,715,723,732-35, 775-76 Ping'anzhai, Yudu.xiDn, troop movementsat,l21,122, 152, 153 Pinghe (Fujian), 47, 204-05, 215, 216 Pingjiang Uprising, 157 Pitou. Ji'an.xiDn, February Conference, 60 Poems, by Mao, 52, 114, 390, 779 Police: military, 292, 393,445, 753, 872; peoples', 851,855,856,930, 932, 933; provincial, 806; urban, 322, 856. See alro State Political Security Bureau Politburo (CCP), xxv,lxxxv, lxxxix, xci, xciii, 56-57 Political commissars, Red Anny, 704; appointment of, 272, 320, 342; and Front Conuninee, 58; and General Headquarters, 130; and Military Commission, 73; tasks of, 12-13 Political depanmems: expenses of, 142; fund collettion by, 191; and investigations, 55; propaganda section, 26-27; in Red Anny, 12-13,26, 142, 193; tasks of,

Political departments (continued) 38-40,44, S4-S5, 104, 146, 878. See also General Political Dopanmont Political Guards Regiment (CCP), 8, 876 Political power: and agrarian n:volution, 822; for peasants and workers. 57, 324, 529, 672, 685, 783, 822; and revolution, 528, 685; for soldiers., 783, 822; and soviets, 185,455, 529,844 Poor peasant league: in agrarian revolution, 453, 457, 824; and bond sales, 497,498, 500; confiscated houses for, 824; congress of, 398-40 I , 454, 512, 866; delegates for, 400; democnacy in, 457; and economic construction, 488; and elections, 474, 591; errors of, 45~54; expansion of, 515; and feudal forces, 453, 457; and investigations, 426-27, 436, 43 7, 439-40,506, 525; and judicial system, 851; and labor unions, 459; leadership of, 434; and meetings, 409,422,425, 426; membership in, 66, 512-13;andmidd1epeasants. 439,455--57, 510; organization of, 453-59,515--16,619-20,687, 749n4; propaganda for,455 Population: registration, 299, 322; statistics., 54--55, 400, 686, 908, 916, 931; in townships. 586-87, 623-24 Postal service: department for, 385, 855--56, 857, 926; to Ewope, 446; express, 118, 386-87; Japanese and, 759, 767, 773n2; and labor unions. 800, 895; for soldiers. 318, 784; standardization of, 321; and war mobilization, 213, 236 Preferential treatment: for gcwcmment workers, 318,371-72,:566,610, 879--80. 90()....901, 902; for labor unions. 800, 895; regulations for, 268, 372,458, 669-70, 183--85, 860; forteachers,S42,610 Preferential treatment, Red Army: committees for, 627, 906, 914;

Preferential treatment, Red Army: comminees for (continued) failurcin,226,267,319; implementation of, 223, 268, 273-74, 443--44, 458, 629, 704, 931; instructions for, 318-19, 844-48; and land distribution, 563; and mutual aid, 604-05; and postal SCJVice, 318, 784; price discounts. 633, 669, 784; tax exemptions, 318, 689, 81:5,879, 901--02; for women, 228

Price: market,lxxii, 20, 602--03, 636-37; of rice, 402,408.441,484, 486, 499; of salt, 602--03,637 Prisoners, enemy: captun: of, 291; care for, 6, 31, 40; count of, 374; disposition of, 31, 7:5; pay for, 49, 143; and propaganda, 39, 40, 49, 117; I'CCJ'Uitment of, 88; repatriation of,32,103 Production: development of, 414, :500; exemptions from, 186,235,610, 851; increase in, 223, 239, 318, 348-49,382,:526,690-91, 706; industrial, 160, 385,:576, 799; instruments of, 823, 824; labor power for, 224, 629-32, 670, 706; and labor unions, 799; market prices for, 602--03, 636-37; piecework, 796-97,884, 886; standards for, 886-87; and work inspection, 224, 322, 588--89, 621. See also Agriculture; Handicrafts Production cooperatives: development of, 458, :576, 693--94, 906; industrial, 240, 693, 706-07; labor, 504, 631; and labor laws. 882; and labor unions. 799; manufacturing, 140, 431; tax exemption for, 816, 861 Proletariat: and Communist Party, xxiii, 314; dictatorship of, xxi, xxv, 322, 668; and elections, 471, 871; international, 47, 208, 314, :519-21, :535; leadership of, 66, 139, 179, 217nl, 413,417,4:5:5,4:59,483, 672, 822; and revolution, 194

992

INDEX

Propaganda: anti-impcrialiSI, 66; for

bond sales, 31~11, 497, 499, 608, 638, 866; for coopen~tivcs, 442, 488; by defectors, 49; directives on, 29; for economic construction, 488--89; forelections,471,473, 531-32,591, 626, 911; for enemy troopS, 40-41, 49; for grain-lending, 358; and Japanese invasion, 212; for land investigation. 400-401, 424, 434-36,506-07,516--17, 524; making, 16,434-36, 620; for masses, 12, 16,44-50,268, 310, 358; methods for, 38, 95, 436; on mutual aid, 409; on national cum:ncy, 502; newspaJ)CIS as, 26; outlines for, 44-51, 95, 499; political, 29, 38; for poor peasant league, 455; recruitment, 233--34, 267--68, 629, 669; for soldiers, 40, 49, 95, 776; subversive, 958; for volunteer labor, 846; as war prepuation, 29, l8, 39,40, IIS...I6, 257,572, 724;inWbiteareas,216, 224 Provincial executive committees., 313, 806,807--08, 812f, 850,875,920 Provincial soviets: eultunl departments of, 22; judicial depar1menls of, 853, 93l; and land distribution, 19; in Laoyingpan, 145; and local soviets, 17S...76, 920; and mass mobilization, 258; oversight by, 258, 418; and revolutionary comminees, 709; and rich peasants, 224; and Security Bureau, 836; worlcstyleof,267,l12-ll, 708. &e also Congresses. provincial; Soviets

Provisions., Red Ann.y: drinking water, l2; food allowance, 16, ll, 5 I, 84, 95, 142, 402; from masses, 357; meetings for, lO, 32, ll; purchase of,68;shortageof,3~31;

stockpile of, 10,298, 317,462, 576,668,671,688, 724; system for, 58, 91, 306; transport of, 75, l26, 705

Public health: comminees for, 596,613, 909; department for, 806,855-56, 9ll ; and epidemics, 321 ; and hygiene, 458, 613; movement for, 613-14; as soviet work, 810 Qin Bangx.ian. See Bo Gu Qingtang, Ningdu xian, 127; conference in, x~~:xviii--xxxix,lxvin73, S6nl; troop movements, 4l, 121, 129 Qiu Shigui: biography of,410nl Qu Qiubai, 164,729-31,820 Qu Shounian, 14, 151,733

Radio: enemy, 6, 81, 86, 87, 110, 117, Ill; Red Anny, 88--89, 142,204 Railways, 9, 210, 260,446, 775; confiscation of, 169 Recruitment: ofactivists,417, 570, 917; of masses, 108-09,232, 267-71; meetings for, 268, 273; and mobilization, l95, 720; pace of, 291 ; and political education, 269, 297; of prisoners, 88; propaganda for, 233-14, 268, 629, 669; in provinces, 267--68,482,669, 670 Red areas. See Soviet areas Red Anny;668-72; and AB COTpS, 65; anaclcs by, xli--xlii, 5-6, 74, 76, 8l, 124,281, ll6, 36l; booty,liii, 31, 32, 87-88, 117; and Chiang Kaishek, l6, 46, 115, 72l; class mission of, 783; compulsory service in,271, 798, 888; defense of government, 844; deployment of, 91, 93, 102, 12l, 128, 129-30, 276-77, 286f; and elections, 180, 792,870-71,874, 875-76; errors of, 92, 13~19, 143-44, 494; e&tablishment of, 58, 155,443, 666-68, 885; GMD anaclcs on, xxix--ux, xciii, 69, 72,207, 210; itineraries of, 79-80, 149-50, 250, 305; and land revolution, 59, 189, 783, 844; and local armed forces, 29, 61, 63, 13l, 134-35,255, 901; mass work of, 12, 26, 58, 69-70, 92, 186; model divisions of, 505; morale in. 31, 37, 89, 276; political

INDEX

Red Anny (continued) depanmen1s in, 12-13, 39, 142, 193; polilical educ:alion for, 12, 462, 704; recruits for, 142,232, 233-34,267-71,273, 291, 395, 417; reinforcemen1s for, 231-32, 269-70,273, 297; and Sccurily Bureau, 836-37; and slogans, 39, 40--41,95, 184; s1rengthof, xxxv, lxxv,48, 65,267, 574, 670; subversives in, 47-48, 65; !asks of, 12,38-39, 87,91-92, 107, 109, 134, 783;1aXsupportfor,212; tnlining for, 32-33, 42--43, 92, 320, 462, 704--05; uniforms for, 204, 232-33, 377-79; women in, 228, 273; and Youlh League (CY), 61. See also Desertion; Rec:rui1men1; SoldiCJS Red Anny assis1anc:e., 49-50, 69, 81, 82, 117; c:omminees for, 267,270,906, 914; local armed forces and, 29, 49-50, 133, 134-35; masses and, 39,40,67, 100n7 Red Anny expansion, 266-74, 669-70; c:omminees for, 267, 594,906, 914; enors in, 320; and Military Commission, 233; officers for, 924-25; pac:e of, 270-71; and prefercnlialtreatment, 223, 629; and revolutioruuy enthusiasm, 435, 504, 638; in soviet areas, 92, 430-31, 469, 482, 577-78, 628-30, 783; victories and, 35, 296-97; and war mobilization, 458, 462, 569-71 Red Anny Military Academy, 85nl2, 232,302,320 Red Army Newspaper (Hongjun bao), 22, 27, 95, 112; conlent of, 24 Red China (Hrnrg:re Zhonghua), 410nl, 473, 499, 640, 696 Red Guards: in anny hospitals, 326; battle at Ji'an, 491-94; described, 233n I, 234, 340; establishment of, 186,320; expansion of, 273,458, 462, 526, 577, 671; in guerrilla wal'fare, 16, 235; near Hexi, 79; and inspections, 379,911, 917; and Japanese invasion, 212, 213;

99J

Red Guards (continued) judicial depanmenls and, 851; and landlord armed forces, 16; membershipin,271-72, 749; mobilization of, 296, 299-300, 933; model units of, 272,279,297, 341-43,570, 577; officers of, 924-25; organization of, 29, 87, 233-34, 320, 705; reinforcements from, 273,627, 705; res1ric:tions on, 103; security du1ies for, 237, 238, 299, 326, 907; in soulhem Jiangx.i, 94; training for, 269-70, 272,297,300,570,599, 749; as lnlnsport workers., 258, 299, 326, 327,571, 577-78; and weapons, 272,299,341-42, 377, 378; in White areas, 10; women in, 225, 341,597 Red May, 570, 629, 704, 755 Red Security Regiment, 43 Red Star (newspaper), 212, 696 Rehe Province: attacks on, 315, 361--62, 374, 443; and GMD armies, 775; Japanese occupation of, 461, 465, 481,519,575,659,712,767, 773; se1l-outof,388, 768 Religion, 562,617,661,789, 823,872, 888,958 Ren Bishi, xxxvii, xlvi-xlvii, lv-lvii, 6lnl4, 194n1, 730, 820; biography of, xxxviinl8 Rent: cancellation of, 824; collec:lion of, 298. 514, 926; land, 19, 66, 449-52, 514,546, 547, 685; systems.,495 Reorganjzationisls, 64, 89, 171, 173, 319,677,833-34 Returned Sludents. xxiv-xxv, xxxvi-xxxvii, lxiii,lxxin80, lxxv-lxxvii,lxxxii, lxxxiv, lxxxix Revolution: against GMD, 169, 196; anti-imperialist, 196; attacks on, 28, 34, 64, 67, 115, 317, 324; call to arms for, ISs-56, 219-20,294, 324-25, 407; development of, 64, 187,419,465,6S4-55, 700--713, 783; economic construction during. 483--85, 487; economic

994

INDEX

Revolution (conlinllfii) emancipation in, 787; enemies of, 324, 546; Executive Comminee on, 230-41,295--300,348-49, 357-l:iO, 754-SS, 821; of 1927, defeat of, 783; and politica1 power, 528, 685; sabotascof,I38,140,394,41S; socialist, 727; spontaneous, ISS; strategies for, xxiv, 35; support for, 47; suppression of, xxiii, 46, 206, 210,222,292-93, 315,658, 757; tasks of, 12, 46, 51, 667; threats against, 46; traitors to, 163-66, 336, 778, 958; and treasury bonds, 500; women in, 225, 264; world proletarian,lxxxvii,l94,657. See t~lso Agrarian revolution Revolutionary comminees: acts against, 957; on counterrevolution, 173, 191-92,380--81, 835,940, 954-SS; establishment of, 939-41; and guerrilla units, 185, 939-40; and provincial soviets, 709; wks of, 192,709,835,941 Revolutionary competition: and agriculture, 238,349, 621; and bond sales, 237,310,499, S4S; described, 621-22; and revenue collection, 237; in soviet work, 709, 749-SO, 809 Rice: confiscation of, 223; price of, 364, 402,408,441,484,486, 499; processing, 226; for Red Army, 68, 1S; shortage of, 224, 328; supply of, 16, 33,237, 364. Seet~lso Grain Right--deviationisrn, as main danger, 66 Ruijin (Jiangxi): and Border Committee, 104; Central Government in,lv, lxxv, 367n2, 464; confcrcm:e in, 479nl; counterrevolution in, 368; andGMO, 121, 367, 723; officers for, 301~; production in, 240; strategy for,IOO; troop movements at, ISI-S3;asworkarea,43,91, 109 Ruijin xit~n (Jiangxi): bandits in, 91 ; banle in, 390; bond sales in, 497, 544, 721; building soviets in, 176; c:lass struale in, 418; cooperatives

Ruijin ::rian (Jiangxi) (continued) in, 694; eiTOI'S in, 411, 448-52, 497, S 17; grain surplus in, 402, 403;judicial organs in, 849-S4; land investigation in, lv,lxxv, 394, 39S, 398-401, 448-S2, S04-II passim; poor peasant league in, 454, 512; Red Anny in, SOS, 720, 124; strategy for, 99; as work area, 107,111-13,323 Ruling class: bourgeoisie in, S29, 957; and Chiang Kaishelc, 46; contradictions in, 64; and counte!TeVolution, 28, 64, 115; deception by, 668; factionalism in, 35, 665; opposition to, 528; reactionary, 47, 167-68, 29S, SS~S1; and revolution, 46, 47, 64, 957; slogan of, liS; workers and peasants as, 466, 529,667-68 Russia, xxii, xxvi, 168-69,278,314, 820. See t~lso Soviet Union Sabotage: ofbond sales, 501; of currency, 368, S02-03, 959; execution for, 105-06, S03, 9S9; of governments, 64, 957; of harvest, 69, 238; ofinftastructurc, 959; of land investigation movement, 432; of production, 160, 237; of Red Army, 48, 64, lOS, 134, 268; of revolution, 138,369,394, 41S; of soviets, 64, 369,421 Salt: bidden, 50; price of, 602--{)3, 637; shortages of,lxxi, 24, 27,484, S78, 636; supply of, 16, 298, 36S, 600; llade in, 486, 487. 707 Sandu-Qibao, Xingguoxit~n, 29, 184; resis1ance in, 37, 184n2, 186 Schools: anny, 79; confiscated houses as, 824; and elections, 473; evening, 504, SOS, S11, 611-12, 639-40, 69S; factory, 798, 887; and labor unions, 89S; Lenin, S26, 61 0; missionary, 661; presCJYatiOD of, 191; prinwy, 321,431, S04, S11, 610-11,639,640, 69~; universities. S77, 697, 778; for women,228

INDEX

Second Campaign: conditions for, 45-50; cnors in, 116-17; GMD annies in, 90n27; poem about, 114; preparations for, 28-33, 38-43, 56nl, 65-66; and Soviet areas,34-35;strategics for, xxxiv-xxxvi, xxxix-xliii, 98-101; victories in, xl, 83, 84, 86,87,115 Second Red Army, victories of, 47 Second Route Army (CCP): banle at Dongshao, 7; Eleventh Division, 28,121n5, 132, 151,243,275; troop movements, 5 Second Route Army (GMD): Founeenth Division, 121, 132, 151, 242, 248-49, 275, 290, 353; oflicersof,243n3 Seventh Independent Division (CCP), 201--02 Seventh Red Army: near Chayuan, 124; in Chongyi, 36; in Fujian Province, 151, 153;nearGaoxing. 128; in Guangdong Province, 47; in Guangxi Province, 36, 37; and Han Deqin, 87; and Japanese, 769n1; in Jiangxi Province, 37, 68; near Longgangtou, 148; troop movements, 29, 47, 145, ISO Seventy-eighth Division, Nineteenth Route Army (GMD): in CentJal SovietArea,367;atJi'an, 132; officers of, 14n2, 132, 151,367 Shaanxi Province: GMD forces in, 46, 94; Red Army in, xxiv; land taxes in,689 Shandong Province: factionalism in, 45, 103; GMD forces in, 94 Shangguan Yunxiang, 121, 127,290 Shanghai: banles in, xlv, 195n3, 660, 776; CCP in, xlix, 164; and cease--fire,219-20,230; conferences in, 230, 522-23, 535; and First Campaign, 36; and GMD armies, 196, 775; invasionof,l95, 196,230, 292; mass slaughter at, 206--07, 362, 374; negotiations in, 209-10, 373--74; sell-out of, 195, 316, 362; strike in, 752-53

99S

Shanghang (Fujian): capture of, 187, 194, 204; GMD near, 432; occupation of, 316; and troop movements, 93 Sbanghangxian (Fujian): investigations in, 394, 623-40, 718; labor unions in, 684; Mao in, 202; Red Army in, 203, 215; as work area, 187-93, 197,721 Shanxi Province, Red Army in, 575 Shen Guangban: and Fujian Incident, 733;stn.tegiesagainst,131-32 Sheng (unit of measure), 361, 364-65, 619 Sheng1i :dan: labor unions in, 684; land investigation in, 398-401, 504, 508-09

Shicheng (Jiangxi): and Border Committee, 104; counterrevolution in, 368; GMD threat to, 723, 775; militaryactivityat,37, 118; strategy for, 304 Shicheng xian (Jiangxi): grain SUI))! us in, 402, 403; land investigation in,394,395, 398-401,504,508, 509; strategy for, 98, 99; as work area, 15-17,42,91, 107-11, 113, ISS Shock brigades, 238,273, 621,749-51, 810 Shuinan: battle at, 121; mass flight from, 67; Red army in, 92, 117, 120; strategy at, 75, 98; troop movemeniS, 8~5; as work area, 15,95 Sichuan Province: factionalism in, 36; GMD threat to, 775; land taxes in, 689; Red Anny in, 375, 538; Tibetan forces in, 520, 659 Sichuan Soviet Area: elections in, 530; growth of, 515; Red Army in, 480, 662-63 Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Area. 662--63nl0 Sixteenth Red Anny: activities of. 231, 282; betrayal by commander, 778; troop movements, 47 Sixth Campaign. See Fifth Campaign Sixth Red Army, troop movements, 47

996

INDEX

Sixlh Route Army (GMD): Eighlh Division, 5n4, 94, 132, 151, 249; Fifth Division, 14n3, 129-30, 132, 151,249, 275n4, 275; officers of, 7n3, 78n3, 100n6; retreats of, 9; troop movements, 67; Sixtieth Division, Nineteenth Route Anny(GMD):atLiangcun, 132; officers of, 9n2, 9, 124n2, 151; ncar Xingguo., 14,42,49;troop movements, 9, 37,67 Sixty-first Division, Ninelccnth Route Anny (GMD): a1 Gaoling, 132; a1 Lianc:heng, 367nl; oft'"ac:ers of, 9n2, 14n2, 14, 13Jn2, 151 Sixty-fourlh Division, Twelfth Red Army, 251; anac:k on Guanyingya, 74; work area for, IS, 43 Social DemoCnlic: Party: class status and, 415, 833-34; elimination of, 3 19; and GMD,Ixxix,lxxxii, 734; proseculionof,l71,173,557,677; insovictareas,64,105,368 Social Insurance Bureau, 922-23 Social security: depamnen1 for, 85s-56; developmenl of, 81 0; and disasler aid, 857; regulations for, 800, 889-90; soviet unils for, 930, 931; for women, 228 Socialism: and c:ooperalives, 140, 694; vs. capitalism, 195; and c:oopera1ivcs, 140,694; as goal, 727; and land distribution, 62; in Soviet Union, 195,278,657, 667n19, 728 Soldiers, GMD: agains1Japan, 196, 209, 213; c:ondilion of, 65; dc:f«:tion of, 47,49,211,234;illnessin, 132; Mao's leiters to, 154-56, 38&-89, 764--66, 772; morale of, 37, 49, 460, 664, 665; propaganda for, 40, 49, 95, 776; revolulionization of, 196,273. SeealsoDcf'eclions; Prisoners, enemy Soldiers, Red Anny: age of, 297, 570, 626; and agilalion, 31, 38; committees for, 58; delegales for, 180, 870; discharged. 783; divorce from, 715,785,901, 952; families

Soldiers, Red Anny (continued) of, 168,408,438,669-70, 783-85, 931; illness in, 143,251,262,276, 784, 901; land dislribution 10, 669, 783, 822; lighl packs for, 254; mee1ings for, 32, 38--39, 296; morale of, 31 ; newspapers for, 26-27; pay for, 43, 84, 95, 143; pensions for, 318,784, 931; political power for, 783, 822; propaganda for, 40, 49, 95, 776. See also Casuallies, war, Preferemialueaonent, Red Anny SongZiwen [T.V. Soong), 36n6, 461, 539n7,581n4 Soulhem Roule Army (CCP), disbanded, 43 Soulhweslem Jiangxi Special Commiuee, Second Plenum, 60-61 Soviet areas: AB Corps in, 105, 677; and air raids, 392, 49 I, 538; anac:ks on,46, 64, 67,259, 757; battle preparalions in, 29>-300; borders of,20, 116,117,199,238,298, 330,418, 571; and Comimem, 61; consolidalion of, xl, xlv,l-li, 35, 61, 71,215,313, 460; c:reation of, 184, 198; development of, 34-35, 91, 107, 317; enlarging, 90,223, 316,571, 658; GMD forces in, 50, 255, 290; in Jiangxi Province, 60, 65, 113; and Red Anny expansion, 92,430-31, 469, 482, 577-78, 628--30, 783; Red Anny in, 231-32, 255; size of, 63, 862--65; strength of, 116; zones in, lxviii, 413, 418. See also specifiC soviet amu

Soviel Union: as ally, 169,208,446, 618--19; and America, 657; communism in, 19; and imperialism, 66, 222, 230, 278, 292-93,314,443,464, 519, 756; revolution in, 19; Russia, 168-69, 278, 314, 820; socialism in, 195, 278,657, 667nl9, 728; threats 10, li,l95,659 SovieiS, 672-76; adminislnltive areas for, 17>-76, 862--65; benefils of,

1/IIDEX

Soviets (continued) 658; bw-eaucratism in, 224, 322, 332-33, 578, 584-85, 810; and Central Government, 707-08; class-alien elements in, 458, 471-72, 473, 504-05, 514-15, 525, 677; committees in, 139, 747-48, 875, 906-11,914-17,928,934-35, 937-38; competitions in, 621-22, 709, 749-50, 809; construction of, 51,175-76,322-23,413,420,577, 707-11, 803--13; delegates for, 180,624,870, 873--74; and democratic dictatorship, 169, 528, 871; depa11ments under, 921-38; errors of, 65, 171-72,224,263--64, 267-70, 702-03; establishment of, 23, 63, 91, 186, 199, 864-65; functions of, 528-29, 667; infiltrationof,l92,958; instructions for, 175-76, 803--13; and land investigation, 395, 421-29, 506; organizational law for, 175nl, 596, 904-41; political power in. 59, 185,455,464,466, 529,844, 871; powers of, 938; reform of local, 175-76, 263-65, 395, 396; tasks of, 528-29, 666-68, 671-72,690,708--09,716-17,744, 81 0; transfonnation of, 427-28. See also Elections; local

govemmoru• State Political Security Bureau: and confiSCation, 908; and counterrevolution, 299, 380-81, 429,677, 711,853--54, 866--67, 907, 955; detachments of, 933, 937; establishment of, 319, 821, 945; and firearms permits. 378; and land investigation, 395,411-12, 416, 510, 525; organization of, 835-38; prosecution by, 172-73; regulations for, 935-37, 955; and travel permits, 346 State-owned enterprises: and economic construction, 385; External Trade Bureau as, 486, 571, 868; Grain Bw-eauas. 365,486, 571, 868; income of, 830, 868; and labor

997

State-owned enterprises (continued) unions, 799, 895, 896; management of, 927-28; nationalized, 160, 169, 824, 925, 926, 927; and social security, 800, 889; stores as, 784; and taxes. 900--90 I Students, revolutionary, 167nl, 168, 373,393,406 Suichuan :dan (Jiangxi): GMD forces in, 242, 248; military activity at, 91;Redforcesin,47 Sun Lianzhong, 9, 14, IS, 42,45, 67, 78,90-91, 121, 129,132, 151, 247-49, 275, 280; biography of, 37nll Sun Yatsen, xxi, xxiii, 64n21, 461n3 Superstition, 424, 541,617, 865,872, 958 Supreme cou11: appeals to, 955; chief justice of, 73l;and counterrevolution, 319; decisions of, 182--83, 245-46; establishment of, 319, 838; and Executive Comminee, 836; and judicial departments, 850, 853, 932, 933; and military tribunals, 840-41 ; organization of, 946 Taibc: GMD forces in and near, 9, 42, 68, 242, 248, 275, 774; strategy for, 131; troop movements, 145n2, 14S-46;asworkarea,91,134,150 Taining (Fujian): occupation of, 324; strategy for, 306; as work area, 109 Tainingxian: fund-raising in, 85, 87; as Red area, 574; Red Anny in, 90-91,304 Tan Daoyuan: banle at Dongshao, 7; defeat of, 37nl2, 46, 48, 49; in Jiangxi,248; retreats of, 14; troop movements, S, 9 TanSitong,xxi--xxii TanZheng, biography of, llln2; 251 Tan Zbcnlin: and Executive Committee, 820; and Front Comminee, 84-86, 95, 98nl, 102; guerrilla warfare, 2(14...{)5; and Mao Zedong, 202; in Mao's letters, 107, 110, 113 Tang Youn:n, 774; biogn.phy of, 373

998

INDEX

Tang Yulin, biography of, 374n3 Tanggu Truce. See North China Truce Agreement Tax exemptions., 237,688-89, 784, 900-903; for coolies, 860, 879, 900-90 I, 902; for coopen11ives, 161,815,816,860,861, 901; and disasters, 161,815,861, 879, 902; forfann laborers, 318,689, 815, 860, 900-901; and Red Anny, 318, 689,815,879,901-02 Taxes: and class status, 688, 786; collection of,lxxiii, 162,224,298, 320, 810,830, 926; commercial, 688, 814, 859-60, 909; by GMD on grain,46S;Iawsregan:ling, 190, 318,688, 786; progressive, 213, 236, 318, 558, 688-89, 786, 859; for Red Army, 212; reform of, 495, 685; regulations for, 786, 814-17, 830,859-61,900-903, 957-58; state, 236; warlord, 154, 161, 318; in White areas, 685, 688, 689, 761. See also Agriculture, taxes on; Land taxes Teachers, 321, 542,563,610,612,639, 640 Teng Daiyuan, 468n I, 820 Tenth Division, Founh Red Anny, 84 Tenth Anny (CCP), 36, 47, 231 Third Army Group (CCP), 59-60, 494; attacks by, 74, 77, 83, 84, 85, 247; attempts on Nanfeng, 78-79, 90, 93-96;banlcsof, 7-8,10, 71, 72, 73, 129-30; at Chayuan and Shacun, 124; and discipline, 89-90; errors of, 59; First Division, 16; Front Committee of, 59, 89; and Fujian Province, lxxvi, lSI, 152, 153, 203; fundraising by, IS, 109; at Huzhuaping, 123; and Japanese invasion, 231; at Jiangle and Shunchang, 102; in Laicun area, 42,43; ncarGaoxing, 128; near Guangchang, 304; near Lichuan, 87,90-91;oflicerof,l22,156, 468nl; Sixth Division, 76, 87; troop movements, 5-6, I0, I5, 42, 68, 14s-46, ISO, 250, 30S; at

Third Army Group (continued) Wacun, 82; worlc areas for, 109, 113,288,306 Third Campaign, 28n2, 8Snl4, 98n2; baule at Fangshiling, 149; order to oppose, 126; predictions regarding, 98-100, 103; preparations for, 92, lls-16, 126; tactics for, 107-08nl, 131, 133-37; victories in, xlii, lOS, 149,151,171 Third Party,lxxix, lxxxii, 319 Third Army (CCP): attack at Qifang, 103; anack on Le'an, 16; attempts on Nanfeng, 78-79, 82-83, 86, 93; battles of, 7-8,129,491-94; defensive strategy, 98; division of force, 2SS; near Donggu, 72; Eighth Division, 10, 16, 147, 218; fortifications of, 6; and Front Committee, S8-S9; in Fujian Province, 152, IS3; fund-raising by, IS, 87; ncar Futian, 74; ncar Goaxing, 128; atlaoyingpan, 123, 124; in Longfeng, IRS; Ninth Division, 121, 14s-47; officer of, 82n4, I 56; in Shunchang and Shaxian, 110; in Tengtian area, 42; troop movements, 5-6, 42, 68, 79-80, ISO; work areas for, 10, 107, 109; at Xinyu, 127-28; near Yihuang, 90, 91, 2SI; near Zhongcun and Nantuan, 76 Third Route Army (CCP),troop movements, S-6 Thirty-fifth Division, West Route Anny (CCP}: near Donggu, 72; and guerrilla warfare, 133-34; mass assistancefor,67;1roop movements, 68, 87, 91, 147, ISO; nearXingguo, 10; work areas for, 108 Thirty-fifth Anny (CCP): attack on Fulian, 74; a1 Dongshao, 79; guerrilla warfare, 131; local anned forcesin,61;militaryac:tivitics, 134; at Ping'anzhai, 122; troop movements., 68, Ill, 14S, 147, ISO; work areas for,43, 107, 109, 112,113;atXingguo, 124

INDEX

Tianjin: and GMD armies, 775; GMD proposalfor,l67;Japanesein,388, 391,392,402,659, 773;Japanese near,461,465;riotsin,l67nl; sell-outof,362,759 Tibet: Britain in, 520n3, 528, 659, 757, 760; colonization of, 699; puppets in, 373; resistance to CCP, 520n3, 520;selloutof,405 Tingzhou (Fujian): counterrevolution in, 368;errorsin,717;GMDthreatto, 367, 775;RedArmyin,367. See also Changting Tingzhouxian (Fujian): meeting in, 57, 58; production in, 240; as work area,91,96, 102,151,191-92 Tongmenghui, 64n21 Toupi, Guangchang xian: GMD forces in, 67, 8!-82; Red Army near, 16, 42-43, 304; as work area, 15, 95 Township soviets, b.xiv, 737-51; construclion of, 175, 803--04, 862--63;cu1tura1departmentof,25; deputies for, 179,873-74;elections in, 473-74,531-32,789--91, 793; investigation of, 58~22, 623-40; and labor allocation,l!46; organization of, 913-18. See also Soviets Trade: and blockades, lxxi, 318, 462, 484, 500, 692, 707; bureau for, 486, 927, 928; export products, 441,442,486, 576, 636--37, 693, 706--07; external, 161, 385, 485-S?, 866; promotion of, 488--89, 526,691, 692-93; tariffs on,688; taxes on, 786. See also Commerce; Merchants Trade unions. See Labor unions Transportation: and baggage, 6, 8, 32, 79,1!3, 136,143, I 53; committees for, 907, 909, 916; defense of lines, 240; department for, 385, 855-56; infrastrueture,236,2SI,299,321, 327' 578, 588, S95, 8S6, 909, 931; and labor unions, 800, 895; management of, 204, 705, 927-28; organization of, 668; for provisions, 39, SO, 298; by railway,

999

Transportation (continued) 9, 230,260,446, 775; for soldiers, 784;stations,212;teamsfor, 116, 235,257,327,569,724, 916; workersfor,2S8,299,326,327, 571,577-78,598 Travel restrictions, 116,298-99, 346-47,571, S9&-99 Trotskyite-Chen Duxiu Liquidationists, 319,833-34 Twelfth Army (CCP): Army committee of,l07, 109, 113;toattackGMDat Gewa, 122; attacks by, 76--77,83, 84, 85; attempts on Nanfeng, 7~79; battles of, 7-8, 129, 491-94; and discipline, 89--90; fonification-building, 73; fund-raising by, 10, 1~16, 87; near Gaoxing, 128; gueni\la actionsby,2Sl;nearJainning,87, 90--91; in Jiangxi Province, 68; at Lixin and Anyuansi, 103; Mao's letter to, 113; medical department of,88;officerof,82n6;at Shanghang and Wuping, 187-93, 194; at Shicheng-Ninghua border, 185; Sixty-fifth Division, 251; Sixty-fourth Division, IS, 43, 74, 251; sttatcgy near Donggu, 72; nearTaishannao, 75; Thirty-founh Division, 15---17,85,91,107418, 111,113;Thirty--sixthDivision, 108,111,218,251;troop movements, 6, 7,68,80, 102; victories of, 187;workareasfor, 43, 107;atXiaoyaoling, 123,124 Twentieth Army (CCP), xxix, 29n7, 61, 494; disbanded, xliii, 122n7 Twenty-second Anny (CCP): troop movements, 304--QS; work areas for,288,306 Twenty-sixth Anny (GMD): Twenty-fifthDivision,42, 151, 275; Twenty-5eventh Division, 42,67, 76n3, \32, 151,247,262n7,

353 Twenty-sixth RoUie Anny (GMD): officers of, 14n1, 90n27; troop movements,67

JOOO

INDE.X

Uncmployment,l68,188,465,619, 656,907, 922-23; and social seeurily, 800--80 I , 890 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet. Union United Slates (U.S.). See America Usurers: class status of, 55, 452; prohibitions on, 161-72;replacement for, 707; voting by, 872 Vagabonds (/ir.~mang): defined, 55, 561--62; line of, 57, 58; in local soviels,371;purgeof,65,116 Vagrants (youmin), 109,685 Vandalism, prohibition of, 191 Voting, 591-92, 641,672-73,676, 698; exclusion from, 182--83, 336, 83~34, 871-72, 878; registration for, 531-32, 591--92, 789-90, 828, 872,91 I; regulations for, 336, 788--89,828,83~34

Wages: in agriculture, 605, 682t; deductions from, 798, 800; disputes over, 896; equalily in, 226, 228; in labor laws, 796--98, 884, 886-87, 892; forporters.l43,257; for workers., 188,619,680,6811, 682t, 710, 892,949 Wan'an.tian, 91, 132-34,242,248 Wang Jiaxiang, xlviii, !vi, lix, lx~~:, xciii, 242, 244, 248, 256, 260, 262, 275nl, 281,283, 291; biography of, xxxviinl8; and Central Bureau, xlvi,lix., lx~~:; and Central Military Commission, 711; and Council of Commissars., 730, 820; and Executive Committee, xxxvii, 729, 820; and Front Comminee, 98, I02 WangJingwei, xlii, 64n21, 537, 821; in Guangzhou, 93n32; and Japanese, 373nl, 375, 759; and Lusban meetings, 581n4, 759; and Reorganizalion Clique., 64n20 Wang Jinyu: banle 81 Donggu, 71-72; 81 Beiping meeting. 94; biography of, 37nl; on fiont line, 42; Red Army attacks on, 68, 74-75; 1r00p movements, 9-10,28,38,67

Wang Ming. See Chen Shaoyu Warlords: annies of, xli, 94,402, 765; anacks on Red Army, 61, 65; and Chiang Kaishek, 29, 35n4, 36, 45, 52n2, 64, 93n32, 406; class status of, 546; confiscalionofassets, 162, 822, 823--24; and counterrevolution, 166, 822; fonifications of, I 5~59; and GMD, 115, 168; and Japanese, 206, 209-10,315, 774;resolution asainst, 63--64; tactics of, 37, 45-46; taxation by, 154,465 Weapons: allocation of, 92, 925; confiscation of, 405, 941; found, 411; forGMD,520,521, 537-39, 581--82,664,757, 760, 762; gunpowder, 85; homemade, 297, 342; for local armed forces, 29, 48, 340--42, 597; poison gas, 462, 520, 521, 537, 599; privately owned, 371-79; for Red Guards., 272, 299, 341~2; regulations for, 37~79, 959; training with, 33, 232; warlord, 765; for Young Pioneers, 234,341~2

Weapons, captured, 48, 133,375, 663; disposition of, 88, 117, 570; firearms, 7, 36, 47, 86,291,316, 530 WeiLihuang.l21n4, 132,151 West Henan Soviet Area: attacks on, 303, 662; victories in, 316; war preparationsin,295 West Hunan-Hubei Soviet Are~: counterrevolution in, 677; development of, 574; elections in, 530; GMD foR:es in, 284; Red Army in, 232, 480; strategies for, 255-56, 276, 280; victories in, 231-295 West Route Anny (CCP), 43; attacks by, 47; and landlord anned forces, 16; Seventh Division, 72, 147; strategy for, 218; Thirty-fifth Diviaion, 10, 67, 72, 108, 133--34; troop movements. 68, 87, 91, 147, ISO; aearXiajiang, 87; troop movements,68

INDEX

WeSiem medicine, 17, 32, 86, 87-88, 92,102 Wbampoa Academy, 81n3, 82n4, 83n9, 84nl2 White areas: attacks on, 10; economy in, 515; efforts in, 223; fund--raising in, 224; guerrilla forces in, 216, 234, 238,273,297,481, 571, 705, 712, 776; Japanese in, 224; land rents in, 685; landlord armed forces in, 285; and mass organizations, 185,207,211;nearcities,276; mass work in, 298, 339; opposition to Japan in, 212, 576; propaganda for, 216,224; Red Guard in, 10; revolution in, 66, 270, 375, 480--81, 575-76,655,664,712, 732, 775-76; taxes in, 685; trade with, 20,385,485--87, 866; workers in, 461,679. See also Soldiers, GMD White Anny. See National Revolutionary Anny (GMD) White Cloud Mountain, 114 WhiteTerror,165,522,S81 Women, 615-17; in armed forces, 225, 228, 326; associations of, 409, 497; as cadres, 228; inCCP, 749n3; Comminees for, 225-29, 320, 474; conference for, 629, 696; congn:ss for, 227, 228, 617; as deputies, 499, 590--91, 617, 625-26, 629; education for, 228, 696; and elections, 225,471,474, 533, 673; and labor laws, 226, 228,796, 887; and land redistribution, 225-26, 228, 563, 616, 952; raising consciousness of, 228; rights of, 264, 319-20; as WOJkers,226, 472,606, 796, 797, 887, 894, 949 Worlter-peasam inspection departments., 916-17, 932; committees for, 911,934-35,945, 947; and regulations, 144,273, 847-48 Workef-Peasant Procuratolate, 395, 471,473, 51~15, 525; Commissariat for, 427-28, 820

J001

Workers:artisans,882;asset distribution to, 438, 549, 680; description of, 548--49, 563; and elections, 179-89,336,471,477, 532, 871; employment for, 7~5. 882-83; in guerrilla forces, 235; illness in, 800, 801, 885, 890, 949-50; intellectual, 797;job safety for, 798, 884, 889, 949; mental, 561, 884, 887; mobilization of, 187, 197; political power for, 51,324, 529,672, 783, 822; and poor peasant league, 455, 512; recruits from, 232, 267-71 ; in Red Guard, 234; slaughter of, 154, 293, 362, 752; and strikes, 168,293, 406,460,481,661,799, 895; taxes for, 815,879, 902; urban, 563; in White areas, 679; women as, 226, 472,606,796,797, 887, 894. See also Wages Workers, independent, 66; defined, 55; and labor laws, 794, 884; land rights of, 563-64, 822; and poor peasants' association, 66; poor people, 560, 902~3; with profession,55,393,560,S62 Workers' and Peasants' Red Anny. See Red Army

World war, 196,206--07,210,539,659 WuLiangping, 730 Wu Qiwci, 242n2, 248, 253, 276, 282 Wuping xian (Fujian), 204, 316, 394; captureof,l87,194;gucrrilla warfare in, 215; military activity in, 187--93,197,203 Xiajiang, 59, 87,248 Xian congresses, 532, 919; deputies to, 180,791,874-76 Xian executive committees: organization of, 812f, 875, 919-20; oversight by, 805, 845; regulations for,806-07, 808--09 Xi'an Incident, xxiv Xiang Ying, xxxiii-xxxix, xlvi-xlviii, lii,lv,lvii,lviii, lxx,lxxxiii, 61nl4, 62n 16, 283; biography of, xxxiin8; and Central Government, 220, 224, 294, 329, 356, 363, 376, 383, 393,

JD02

INDEX

Xiang Ying (continued) 401,404,407,444,447,459,467, 468,496,501,521, 523, 545,583, 763, 771, 817, 858; and Central Military Commission, 13, 97, 138-141, 373; and Council of Commissars, 187-193,225, 258, 301,302,326,327,328,339, 345, 346,364,377,384,386,394,408, 441,497,541,550,731, 857, 865; and election law, 878; election of, 729, 730, 820; and Executive Committee, 176, 181,183,200, 214,221,241,246,265, 311,313, 338,349,354,381,478, 540,726, 731,778,786,787,793,811,819, 821,826,829, 832, 834,838,839, 843, 848, 849, 854, 863, 870, 880, 896,897, 899,903,941,942,948, 951,954, 957; and Fifth Campaign, lxxvi-lxxviii, xciinl20, xciiin121; and First National Congress. xlviii, 162, 785,825;lettersfrom,367 Xiang Zbongfa, xxxviinl8, xlixn39, 164 Xiao Jingguang: biography of, lxxviiin89 Xiao Ke, 150, 729 Xiaobu. Ningdu.:cion, 7, 9, 10, 14, 61nl4, 83, 84,98 Xie Weijun,lxii, 95; biography of, lxiiin67 Xikang Province, 405, 520, 582, 757, 760 Xin'an, GMD fcm:es in, 64, 124, 127 Xinfeng:cion, 91, 101,201,394 Xin'gan.:cion,as Red area, 574 Xingguo (Jiangxi): and battle at Donggu, 71 ; elections in, 470, 534; GMD forces at, 9, 10, 85, 129, 145, 147;GMDrcueatftom, ISI;Red Army in, 124; in strategies, 90, 100 Xingguo:cion (JiBDgx.i): coopenatives in, 240, 694; and deserters, 570, 599; education in, 695--96; GMD threat to, 127, 723, 775; investigations in, xxivn6, 394, 584-622, 718; labor unions in, 683, 684; litenu;:y in, 431, 696; mass flight from, 67; middle peasants in, 512; Red Army

Xingguo :cion (Jiangxi) (continued) in, xli, xlii, 724; Red Guards of, 103; soviet work in, 721; strategies for, 98, 99, 102, 131-35; women workers in, 226, 472, 606 Xinjiang, British in, 373, 582 Xinyu.:cion, conference in, 59 Xu Kexiang: at Dongshao, 7; in Guangchang, I32; near Nancheng, 248, 249; nearNanfeng, 14,42, 78, 79, 8J.-.84, 86, 90, 121, 275; retreats of, 9, 81--82; troop movements, 5 Xunwu (Jiangxi). 91, 94n35, 205, 378, 432; labor wUons in, 684; land investigation in, xxivn6, lxUin67, 394 Van Xishan: and GMD, 64n21, 93n32, 103; and warlord factions, 35n4,

4>-46 Yang Lisan: biography of, 86nl8; and Front Comminee, 86, 93--96; and Management Office, 94-95 Yang Shizhu, 730; biography of, 410 Yangzj River area: Bureau for, 93n31; GMD forces in, 291; and imperialists, 196, 393, 405, 528, 659; Japanese in, 206, 760; and Red Anny, 108, 663-64nl0 Ye Jianying: biography of, lxxxn95; 302, 367, 729 Yihuang (Jiangxi): and GMD, 67, 78, 90, 280; land investigation in, 394; and Red Anny,lvii, 251,253, 316-17; strategies for, 87, 108, 249,250, 281; work area for, 95 Yihuang :cion (Jiangxi): fund-raising in, 15, 84; GMD forces in, 247, 248, 2S3, 363n3; land investigation in, 394; as Red area, 288n4, 574; strategyfor,285 Yongding.:cion (Fujian). 47,204-05, 215,721 Yongfeng: GMD forces in, 90, 248, 275, 276; GMD forces near, 9, 10, 42, 723; strategy for, 87, 100, 110, 186; IS work. area, 29, 37, 150, 185 Yongfeng.:cion (Jiangxi): GMD forces in, 5n5, 7n2; landlord armed forces

INDEX

Yongfeng xian (Jiangxi) (cofllinued) in, 16; Red Army in, 16nl0, 76n2, 374,418,574 Yongfeng-Beikeng Soviet Area, 569 Yoshizawa Kenkichi, 373-74 Young Pioneers: in army hospitals, 326; battle at Ji'an, 491-94; and committees, 929; establishment of, 320, 705;expansionof,458,462, 526, 577, 671; as guerrilla forces, 235,340;andinspections,379, 911, 917; and Japanese invasion, 213; and maniallaw, 299; membership in, 749; mobilization of, 296; model units of, 297,313, 341-43,570-71, 577; reinforcementsfrom,271,273, 570, 705;andreligion, 617; securiry dury by, 238, 907; and taxes,902;trainingfor, 570,599, 749; and weapons, 234, 341-42, 377,378;womenin,225,326 Yuan Guoping, xxxiin6, 83, 184--86, 729 Yuan (monetary unit), !On9, 553, 619, 637n6,831 Yuantou,5, 7, 76,77 Yuduxian: as battlefield, 98, 99, 100; bond sales in, 544--45; cooperatives in, 240; counterrevolution in, 378; GMD forces ncar, 127; headquaners in, 121, 122; labor unions in, 684; land investigation in, 394, 395, 398--401, 504, 508--{)9; local anned forces in, 133; Mao in, xc; military activiry in, 91, 122;instrategies, 100,102, 131; troop movements, 121, 122, 152, 153;asworkarea, 107,109,112 Yun Daiying, 164, 655 Yunmenling, 203, 240 Yunnan Province, 36, 528, 582, 659, 760 Zeng Shan, xxxiiinl1, xxxviiin22, 18-21, 162, 221nl; Council of Commissars, 731;andExecutive Commirtee, 729, 820; and First Nationa1Congress,825 Zhang Dingcheng, 162, 202, 730, 820, 825

1003

Zhang GuolaQ: biography of, xlviiin37; and Central Government, 170, 224, 294,329,356,363,383,393,401, 404,407,444,447,459, 467,468, 496,501,521,523,545,579,763, 817, 858;andCcntral Military Commission, 373; and Council of Commissars,l87,225,257,301, 302,326,327,328,339,344,346, 364, 377, 384,386, 394, 408,441, 497,541,857,865;andelection law,878;e1ectionof,xlviii, 729, 730, 820; and Executive Committee, 176, 183,200, 214, 221,241,246,265,311,313,338, 349,354,373,381,478,540,726, 731,778,786,787,793,811,819, 821,826,829,832,834,838,839, 843, 848, 849, 854, 863, 870, 880, 896,897,899,903,941,942,948, 951, 954, 957; and First National Congress, 162, 785,825; intelligence for, 290nl; in Sichuan Province, 530n4 Zhang Huizan: capture of, 46, 47, 50, 52; defeat of, 7,37n12,48,49; executionof,I05,492n6 Zhang (unit of measure), 532 Zhang Wentian (Luo Fu), xxxviin18, lxix, huuv--lx:uix, xcii, 730 Zhang Xueliang, 94n34, 94, 103, 775; and Chiang K.aishek, 29, 374; and Japanese invasion, 36ln2; as warlord, 764, 767; and warlord forces, 35n4, 35--36, 45-46 Zhang Zhen: defeated, 215, 316; in Longyan, 201; in Nanjing xian, 21!1;inNanyanandBaisha, 151 Zhangzhou (Fujian), liv, 96, 231; occupation of, 215, 216, 316; Red Anny attack on, lii-liii, lix, lxii, 201-{15 Zhao Bosheng, 353--54, 655; biography of,353nl Zhao Guantao, 121, 131; and battle at Longgang, 129; in nonheast Jiangx.i,248;retreatsof, 149,150, 151; near Xingguo and Gaoxing, 132; near Yudu, 127

J004

INDEX

Zhejiang Province, 775 Zhou Enlai, xxxiin8, xxxiii, xxxvinl5, xlixnn39-40, 1-iiii, lvi--l.x,lxx, lxxx, lxxxv, 6Jnl4, 164, 165; and Cenlnll Bureau, xxxiii, xlix, !iii, lvi--Jix, lxx, 242, 244, 248, 255, 259,261,275,280,282, 290; and Central Military Commission, 767; Circulars from, 292; election of, 729, 730, 820; and Fifth Campaign, lxxvi--Jxxviii, lxxxiii,lxxxviii, xci--xciii; Mao's Jencrs to, 201, 203,204,215, 367; as Political Commissar, 303; and Zhu De, 460nl Zbou Hunyuan: in Longgang, 132; retreats of, 149, ISO, ISI;troop movements, 249; in Yihuang. 27Sn4,276 Zhou Yili, xxxviiin22; biography of, 93n31; and Executive Committee, 820; and First National Congress. 162, 825; and Front Commincc, 93-96, 98nl, 102; and Fujian-Jiangxi border, 101--04, 110; in Mao's letters, 107, 109, 113 ZhouZhiqun, IS,42,86nl9,275 Zhu De. xxxiiin9, xxxix, xliii, xlvi, xlviii, li,lvii, lxxin80,1xxx, lxxxiin99,1xxKvii, and Central Bureau, xlvi, Iix,lxx, 6ln14, 242, 244,248,255,259,261,275,280,

Zhu De (conlinued) 282, 290; and Military Affairs Commission, xlviii, 12, 97, 138, 355, 373, 580, 767; and Central Soviet Government, 644, 649, 732; Cin:ularsfrom,292;as Commander-in-Chief, xxiv, xxix, xxxvi, lv,lvi, 247,249,252,253, 284, 303, 460nl; and Council of Commissars, 730, 820; election of, 129, 730, 820; and Executive Commince, 536, 729, 730; and Fifth Campaign, lxxvi--Jxxviii, lxxxiii--lxxxiv,lxxxviii; and First National Congress, 162, 825; and From Comminee, 81-96, 98nl, 102; on Japanese invasion, 154-56, 772; inJianfeng, 118, 120, 388; leltels of, 118, 120, 764; Mao's lenersto,J67;ordcrs,First Campaign, S, 7, 10, 28, 42; orders, Second Campaign, 67, 69, 71, 74, 76, 78; orders, Third Campaign, 121, 123, 124, 127, 129, 136, 142, 145,147, 149, 151,158 Zhu Shaoliang: near Guangchang. 67, 68, 78, 86, 121; as officer, 248; Red Army and. 7,91,100; retreat of,90 Zhu Yunqing, biogJaphy of, 85n 16 Zuo Quan, 85-90, 92; biography of, 8So2

About the Editor Stuart R. Schram was born in Excelsior, Minnesota, in 1924. After graduating from the University of MiMesota in physics, he took his Ph.D. in political science at Columbia University. From 1954 to 1967, he conducted research at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris, and from 1968 until 1989, he was Professor of Politics with reference to China at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Since 1989, he has worked at the Fairbank Center, Harvard University, on the edition of Mao Zedong's

prc-1949 writings of which this is the founh volume. His research has dealt with Leninist theories and their application in Asia, Chinese history and politics in the twentieth century, and the influence of the Chinese tradition on the theory and practice of the state in China. His works include Mao Tse-tung (1967), The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (1969), Marxism and Asia (in collaboration with Helene CWre d'Encausse) (1969). Ideology and Policy in ChiM since the Third Plenum, 1978-1984 (1984). and The Thought of Mao Tse-tung (1989). He has a1so edited a volume entitled Foundations

and Limits of State Power in China (1987). Mao Tse-tung and The Thought ofMao Tse-tung have been translated into Chinese and published in Beijing. Stuart Schram is a member of the Authors Guild.

About the Associate Editor Nancy J. Hodes was born in Philadelphia in 1946, and spent her formative years in Beijing, China, where her father taught physiology at the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. After graduating from Radcliffe College in Far Eastern Languages, she edited the Bulletin ofConcerned Asian Scholars, taught Chinese, and worked as a freelance translator. She returned to China in the 1970s to teach English and work on A Chinese-English Dictionary at the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute (Ill). l.ater she taught Chinese at Tufts University and Harvard Summer School, worked as a translator for M. E. Sharpe's translation journals and the Mao's Writings Project at Brown University, and served as Assistant Editor of the HartiQrd JourtuJI of Asiatic Studies. After receiving her Ph.D. in Chinese literature from Harvard University, she taught East Asian Civilizations and Chinese at Boston College, and has been working since 1991 with Stuart R. Schram on the present edition of Mao Zedong's pre-1949 writings. Until 1995, she served concUJTCntly as Associate Director of the Boston Research Center for the 21st Century, founded in 1993 by Soka Gakkai International President Daisaku Ikeda. She is now engaged in translating a novel by China's fonner Minister of Culture, Wang Meng.

About the Guest Associate Editor Stephen C. Averill was born in Savannah, Georgia in 1945. After graduating from Colgate Univenity in history, and serving for three years in the U.S. Army,

he obtained his Ph.D. in history from Cornell University. From 1980 to 1988 he taught East Asian history and Western civilization at Kenyon College, after which he moved to Michigan State University, where he now teaches modem Chinese history. Since 1991, he has also been editor of Republican China (now

Twentieth Cenlllry China). His research to date has focused primarily upon the social and political aspects of the early Communist-led revolutionary movement in China, with panicular reference to the development of rural revolution in Jiangxi Province. He has published a number of articles and review essays on this and other related subjects, and is nearing completion of a book on the histOJy of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area. In addition, he is currently engaged in research on the social and political impact of educational changes at the xian level and below in early twentieth-century China.