Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes (Directions in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis)

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Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes

Directions in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis Series Editors: Stephen Hester, University of Wales, UK David Francis, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis are cognate approaches to the study of social action that together comprise a major perspective within the contemporary human sciences. This perspective focuses upon naturally occurring talk and interaction and analyses the methods by which social activities are ordered and accomplished. From its origins within sociology, EM/CA has ramified across a wide range of human science disciplines, including anthropology, social psychology, linguistics, communication studies and social studies of technology. Its influence is international, with large and active research communities in many countries, including Japan, Australia, Canada, France, The Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden as well as the UK and USA. The International Institute of Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis is the major association of EM/CA researchers worldwide. It was set up in 1978 by Prof. George Psathas to provide a forum for international collaboration between scholars working in the field of studies of social action and to support their work through conferences and publications. It published several books in EM/CA in association with University Press of America. Now reconstituted under the direction of Francis and Hester, supported by an international steering committee, the IIEMCA holds regular conferences and symposia in various countries. This major new book series will present current work in EM/CA, including research monographs, edited collections and theoretical studies. It will be essential reading for specialists in the field as well as those who wish to know more about this major approach to human action. Other titles in this series Talk and Social Interaction in the Playground Carly W. Butler ISBN 978-0-7546-7416-0 Ethnographies of Reason Eric Livingston ISBN 978-0-7546-7106-0

Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes How Young Children Resolve Conflict

Amelia Church University of Melbourne, Australia

© Amelia Church 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Amelia Church has asserted her moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Church, Amelia Preference organisation and peer disputes : how young children resolve conflict. - (Directions in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis) 1. Interpersonal conflict in children 2. Social skills in children 3. Conversation analysis I. Title 302.3'4'083 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Church, Amelia, 1974Preference organisation and peer disputes : how young children resolve conflict / by Amelia Church. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7441-2 -- ISBN 978-0-7546-9146-4 (ebook) 1. Conflict management. 2. Interpersonal conflict in children. 3. Interpersonal relations in children. 4. Problem solving in children. 5. Social skills in children. I. Title. HM1126.C49 2008 303.6'90833--dc22 09ANSHT 2008043655 ISBN 978-0-7546-7441-2 e-ISBN 978-0-7546-9146-4

Contents

List of Figures and Tables Acknowledgements  

vii ix

1 Introduction  

1

2

7

Defining Child Conflict  

3 Conversation Analysis  

31

4

53

Peer Disputes  

5 Dispute Outcomes  

111

6

Preference and Dispute Outcomes  

151

7

How to Resolve Disputes  

187

Appendix A   Observation 1 transcripts   Observation 2 transcripts   Observation 1 summary   Observation 2 summary   References   Index

197 198 233 253 254 255 273

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List of Figures and Tables

Figure 2.1 Sequences in contradicting routines, Boggs (1978) Figure 6.1 Continuum of account objectivity

23 176

Table 2.1 Categories of opposition Table A.1 Transcription conventions

17 197

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Acknowledgements

This study was supported by a Monash Graduate Scholarship and the singular supervision of Professor Keith Allan – I continue to be grateful for his guidance and support. Publication of this work was assisted by a publication grant from the University of Melbourne. Since completing this study I have had the good fortune to participate in conversation analysis forums with established scholars. In particular, thanks to Professor Susan Danby, Dr Mike Forrester, Professor Bill Wells, Dr Johanna Rendle-Short and Dr Anna Filippi for their interest in this work. I would also like to acknowledge the encouragement given by Professor Li Wei, Professor Trisha Maynard, Professor Bridie Raban, Professor Collette Tayler and Professor Field Rickards. Thanks are most obviously extended to the children and staff of the two childcare centres in Melbourne who participated in the project; without their interest in the research and willingness to participate, this contribution to our understanding of children’s interactions would not exist. The study presented in this monograph was undertaken as doctoral research in the then Linguistics Department at Monash University. Parts or versions of the research presented in this monograph have appeared in earlier publications: Rask: International Journal of Language and Linguistics; Journal of Australian Research in Early Childhood Education; and a chapter in Thomas, N. (ed.) (2009), Children, Politics and Communication: Participation at the Margins. Bristol: Policy Press.

For my parents, for making everything possible.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Conflict between children Lauren and Fran (aged three) are sitting in the back garden having a tea party. As Lauren pours ‘tea’ into chipped cups, she accidentally spills some on Fran’s leg. In response to Fran’s challenge “You poured juice on me”, Lauren replies quickly: “I didn’t”. Fran’s insistence (“You did”), and Lauren’s counter-denial (“I didn’t”) is repeated over a number of turns, until Lauren issues the indirect threat “I’m not your friend anymore”. Fran accompanies a later counter-threat (“Well I’m gonna tell on you”) by poking Lauren in the ear. The subsequent claim (“I was only tickling”) is obviously rejected by Lauren as she kicks Fran, who responds by pulling Lauren’s dress. The physical struggle escalates until Lauren bursts into tears and runs towards the back door of the house in search of her mother.

In this episode, the young girls are engrossed in their pretend play and the subsequent collapse of co-operative interaction. As adults, our involvement is usually restricted to the collapse of children’s arguments, where conflict has escalated beyond the point of children’s own sociolinguistic resources. Disputes between children, for the most part, are reconstructed from retrospective reports rather than first hand evidence. In the absence of adult supervision or intervention, then, how do young children manage disputes? What resources do young children employ to persuade, assuage or confront their peers in conflict situations? What do they say? How do they respond? What is the most effective way of pursuing one’s own goals in the preschool playroom? Fundamentally, how do children go about resolving disputes? Addressing these questions is the overriding aim of this book. The purpose of this chapter is to locate the work in the broader fields of conflict and children’s language development, and introduce the research project which informs the work as a whole.

 This footage appears in the documentary Woodbine Place (McEvoy, 1989), which explores children’s friendships and play activities in a neighbourhood of urban Northumberland, UK.



Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes

What constitutes conflict? Intuitively we recognise the episode between the two girls described above as a form of conflict. Given the range of interaction encompassed by this term, however, the type of conflict studied in this book needs to be identified. The generic phrase ‘adversative discourse’ is used to identify stretches of talk (and accompanying nonverbal behaviour) in which children oppose the prior utterance(s) or action(s) of another child or group of children. Opposition is fundamental to this type of discourse. Whilst definitions of verbal conflict are discussed in the next chapter, the terms adversative discourse, conflict, dispute and argument are used throughout to denote mutually articulated disagreement. For the most part, disagreement refers to real (rather than pretend) and serious (rather than joking) opposition which occurs spontaneously in the children’s interaction. The emphasis in this research rests on verbal disputes as illustrative of young children’s developing communicative competence (see below), rather than on argument per se. This work is not concerned with exploration of reasoning, argumentation theory or studies of negotiation processes in the adult world (e.g. Pruitt, 1981; Diez, 1986; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Blair and Willard, 1991; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993; Ehlich and Wagner, 1995; van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Henkemans, 2002) nor with related concepts such as game theory (e.g. Schelling, 1960; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). Here, the term ‘argument’ refers to opposing interaction between parties; in other words we are concerned with ‘arguing about’ rather than ‘arguing that’ (O’Keefe, 1977). Negotiation theory falls beyond the scope of this book primarily because it concerns adult interaction. Whilst the overlap between adult and child conversation is acknowledged, I do not support the idea of child language as an imperfect version of adult language. A tradition of identifying children as incomplete, or by their inabilities rather than abilities precludes a comprehensive understanding of children’s social and linguistic competence (Waksler, 1991; Danby, 2002). The social world of young children can be considered an experience distinct from adult perspective (e.g. Corsaro, 2004). Indeed, childhood is attributed with specific social status, a status which exits through contrast with the adult world (Baker and Campbell, 2000). Not only are arguments between adults outside the immediate area of inquiry, adult-child disputes (e.g. Vuchinich, 1984, 1999; Grootevant and Cooper, 1985; Hess and McDevitt, 1984) are also, for the most part, excluded. Our concern here is the talk-in-interaction, specifically adversative discourse, between children. Examining peer conflict affords an opportunity to see how children of similar ages manage to persuade or attempt to manipulate others of essentially equal status and same stage of language development. To this end, the skill and complexity of young children’s talk is uncovered, moving away from the idea of preschool as pre-competent.

Introduction



Adversative discourse as productive interaction Competency is subsumed by the notion of disputing as a complex, rule-governed, constructive, shared activity (Laursen, Hartup and Koplas, 1996: 77; Lein and Brenneis, 1978: 308; Brenneis, 1998). Moving away from viewing children as egocentric, Piaget would propose that ‘argument leads to intellectual co-operation and the increased understanding of self and others’ (Eisenberg, 1987: 114). In accommodating (or rejecting) the intentions of another speaker, children negotiate locally determined roles and rules, co-constructing the outcomes of disputes. Although disagreements require some sort of resolution for the prior content of conversation to resume (Stalpers, 1995: 288), adversative discourse should not be seen as an aberration or sort of non-conversation. Indeed, the data in this book shows children’s disputes to be the site of co-operative and productive talk-ininteraction. Furthermore, the ability to manage conflict ‘is related to other indexes of competence, including sociometric status, aggression, emotional control, and social adjustment’ (Chen and French, 2008: 604). Oppositional talk provides an opportunity for children to construct and negotiate their own social world, simultaneously reflecting and constructing their particular cultural experiences. Indeed, ‘conflict among children latently functions to develop their sense of social structure and helps reproduce authority, friendship, and other interactional patterns that transcend single episodes of dispute’ (Maynard, 1985b: 220). Conflict fosters the acquisition and refinement of social skills (Hay and Ross, 1982: 112), and is related to social acceptance (Putallaz and Sheppard, 1995: 346). Far from causing permanent rifts or discord, arguments between children tend to be quickly forgotten: “That stupid Mr. Dan gonna come up there and say (0.4) ‘Y’all better (0.2) come on and shake hands’. Don’t mean nothin cuz we be playing together next day anyway” (Goodwin, 1982: 87). Opposition arising in isolated disputes does not permanently disrupt peer interaction, and, moreover, the co-operative benefits of negotiating social relationships are enduring. As Corsaro and Rizzo (1990: 65) summarise, it is clear that ‘disputes and argumentation serve positive functions in terms of children’s development of communicative competence and social knowledge’. So whilst language remains the focus of this book, analysis of conflict discourse is also demonstrative of children as competent social agents, actively constructing peer culture. Communicative competence Children’s acquisition of language and developing abilities in social interaction have been studied in a myriad of ways – beyond traditional cognitive (Piaget, 1959) and socio-cultural (Vygotsky, 1986) theories – from behavioural approaches (Skinner, 1957), structural emphasis on syntax (e.g. Chomsky, 1957, 1965; Brown, 1973), rule-based systems (Bloom, 1970; MacWhinney, 1982), and systemic



Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes

linguistics (Halliday 1975, 1978; Fine and Freedle, 1983), to an increasing emphasis on social context (e.g. Ochs and Schieffelin, 1979, 1983; Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986; Romaine, 1984). This study of children’s disputes belongs to the domain of developing communicative competence (Hymes, 1972, 1974; cf. Gumperz, 1986) where ability or performance is recognised not only as linguistic but encompassing broader, culturally-situated aspects of language in use. Although it is not designed to address the concept of communicative competence directly, the research contributes to a greater understanding of children’s developing abilities in language in interaction. As children acquire language for multiple purposes, they are learning to argue (Eisenberg, 1987; Maynard, 1986b). Far from being a disordered activity, in adversative discourse children are ‘playing with structures of embedding and ellipsis in return actions, providing disclaimers disarming the illocutionary force (Austin, 1962) of a prior speaker’s talk, and formulating logical proofs – all without creating rifts in relationships’ (Goodwin, 1982: 91). Verbal disputes, then, provide children with an opportunity not only to manipulate or persuade their play partners but use increasingly complex language to do so. Viewing verbal conflict as an activity best avoided, one to be ended as quickly as possible (cf. Sackin and Thelen, 1984), fails to acknowledge the opportunity afforded by adversative discourse for children to pay close attention to language. Indeed, dispute contexts provide children with far greater motivation to quickly produce creative structures than could be constructed by the teacher for pedagogic purposes (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1987). The ubiquitous teacher instruction for children to “use your words” during conflict with peers, prompts consideration of the range of strategies employed by young children. Children are encouraged to pursue verbal rather than physical resolution of conflict, yet there is little specification in the preschool classroom as to what words the children should actually use. We need to consider not only what words children use, but what words they use in response to opposition. Moreover, the words produced by children in serial oppositional utterances will be considered in terms of dispute outcomes. What words do children use to resolve disputes? Outline of monograph Existing research in children’s arguments has predominantly focused on types of verbal strategies produced within dispute episodes. As shown throughout  For exemplary work in the area of children’s developing communicative competence see Susan Ervin-Tripp (e.g. 1977, 1978, 1982).   Preschool-aged children’s ability to manage conversations with peers is well documented (e.g. Dore, 1979, 1985; Corsaro, 1979; Garvey and Berninger, 1981; Garvey, 1974, 1984; Ochs, 1983; McTear, 1985; Wood, 1989; Foster, 1990; Ninio and Snow, 1996; Thompson, 1997).

Introduction



Chapter 2, earlier studies in peer conflict have identified speech acts in disputes and, in some cases, attempted to establish patterns of subsequent utterances. Whilst illustrative of types, frequency and social context of disputes, these prior studies do not effectively account for the sequential, turn-by-turn structure of adversative discourse. The primary aim of this research is to understand what leads to conflict resolution, or alternatively, to a breakdown of collaborative play, by investigating children’s responses to opposition and the relationship between oppositional turns. The limitations of speech act theory in the study of adversative discourse are addressed more directly in Chapter 3, through juxtaposition with the methodological advantages of a conversation analytic approach. Conversation analysis (CA) is particularly well suited to investigation of children’s peer language given the insistence on recording real interaction, analysis driven by the data in favour of a priori hypotheses, and consequent attention to features of the talk-in-interaction which are salient to the participants themselves. The real interaction in this study was recorded (audio and video) in two child care centres in Melbourne, involving children enrolled in the four-year-old preschool program (attending on average 3 days per week), which generated a dataset of the 60 disputes transcribed for analysis (see Appendix A). Preference organisation, (an ordering principle defined by the asymmetry of second pair parts – described in Chapter 3) was found to be prominent in the preliminary analysis. That is, turns in the children’s disputes were typically produced in one of two ways: (1) as short direct opposition (preferred turn shape) or (2) as delayed (by markers or pauses) and justified opposition (dispreferred turn shape). Chapter 4 presents an analysis of preference features occurring throughout the disputes. In order to determine if preference organisation is an organising principle in adversative discourse, a description of the outcome of disputes is required; so Chapter 5 is devoted to exemplifying three types of dispute endings identified in the data: resolution, abandonment and teacher intervention. The function of threats as ‘atypical’ dispreferred turn shapes is also considered in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 establishes the relationship between turn shape and outcome. The analysis shows preferred turn shapes to be sustaining – more likely to promote conflict – and dispreferred turn shapes as non-sustaining – resolution is only secured through final utterances where the opposition is justified. The quality of accounts (i.e. the reason given for the speaker’s objection) also proves to be influential in the development of disputes; the more objective the content of the account, the more persuasive the utterance. The micro-analysis afforded by conversation analysis, with particular focus on features of preference organisation, proves effective in uncovering how children go about resolving disputes. Intervention strategies for children to manage relationships with their peers tend to be adult-centric. Children, however, do not necessarily negotiate social relationships as adults would. Empirical evidence, such as provided in the research reported here, is essential to improve understanding of the highly ordered activity of young children’s social interaction. The findings contribute to a greater



Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes

understanding of how children function in their own social worlds. Importantly, these social worlds are constructed and maintained by increasingly complex language use, that is, by developing communicative competence.

Chapter 2

Defining Child Conflict Introduction To position the research reported in this monograph, it is important to identify its departure from prior studies. Throughout this book, the method of conversation analysis (CA) is framed as a novel perspective on this type of children’s discourse – although there is increasing interest in CA in children’s interactions more broadly (see Chapter 3). The analytic account presented in this book responds immediately to the unexplored ground in existing research in children’s conflict. As such the existing ground requires some account. Chapter 1 was concerned with identifying our interest in peer disputes and articulating why children’s adversative discourse should be studied. This chapter presents a summary of what has already been studied in child conflict. Each of the sections in the chapter represents a theme identified in studies in child conflict. First, definitions of conflict are discussed, followed by the interdependent classification of types and frequencies of conflict, and interpretation of how disputes begin. Identifying verbal strategies produced during arguments is a prominent concern in existing research, and some attempts have been made to investigate sequences of these strategies (where disputes may escalate or, conversely, be resolved). Few of these attempts have satisfactorily captured the properties of dispute closings. Lastly, the wide interest in gender differences in children’s arguments is discussed. This review is deliberately restricted to studies of conflict between children of the same age. Discussion of arguments between children and their parents (e.g. Maccoby, 1996; Crockenberg and Lourie, 1996), siblings (e.g. Ross, 1995), or children of significantly different ages are, for the most part (with the exception of e.g. Vuchinich, 1990) beyond the scope of immediate relevance. Similarly, research in conflict resolution strategies in atypical populations – for example children with specific language impairment (e.g. Horowitz, Jansson, Ljungberg and Hedenbro, 2005) do not feature here. Furthermore, whilst work in developmental psychology extends to examining why children argue and determining the influence of such interaction on developing social cognition, this research is concerned with features of the language used by children to manage conflict with peers. Before the existing work on children’s language in disputes is reported, however, what actually constitutes adversative discourse needs to be established.



Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes

Definitions of conflict Argument can be considered a ‘fuzzy’ concept (O’Keefe and Benoit, 1982: 157). As disputes arise in ongoing interaction, identifying adversative sequences is not a straightforward task (Corsaro and Rizzo, 1990: 26). Yet despite the breadth of discourse denoted by the nominal ‘argument’ and debate about confining episode boundaries, core features of conflict can be identified. Essential properties of disputes are: the central notion of opposition, boundaries of episodes, and mutuality. These properties carry across registers of disputes. The adversative episode is defined as the interaction which grows out of an opposition to a request for action, an assertion, or an action. It is a social task whose objective is the resolution of that conflict or contradiction. The negating responses include refusals, disagreements, denials and objections. Thus, an adversative episode is a sequence which begins with an opposition and ends with a resolution or dissipation of conflict. Its apparent goal is to work out the initial opposing positions of the participants (Eisenberg and Garvey, 1981: 150).

‘Oppositional talk’ (Corsaro and Maynard, 1996) and its various guises (conflict, argument, dispute, adversative discourse, etc.) is fundamentally identified through opposition to some prior objectionable utterance or event. Elsewhere, opposition is described as ‘overt disagreement’ (Miller Danaher and Forbes, 1986: 544), expressing an ‘adversary position’ (Coulter, 1990: 185) or ‘counter-assertion’ that rejects, denies or contradicts the prior assertion (Phinney, 1986: 48). ‘Protest, resistance, or retaliation’ (Hay and Ross, 1982: 107) are also used to describe the onset and progress of opposition. Conflict, then, denotes an articulated form of disagreement where ‘one party impedes the satisfaction of the wants of the other’ (O’Keefe and Benoit, 1982: 163). We note that disagreement is not necessarily overt; persuasion (Miller, Danaher and Forbes, 1986: 544) is also proposed as a defining characteristic of conflict. That is, conflict can be identified where ‘Child A attempts to influence Child B, Child B resists, and Child A persists’ (Shantz and Shantz, 1985: 4). Importantly, conflict is viewed as a type of exchange which disrupts the ongoing interaction. In this light, disputes function as a sort of side-sequence in ongoing talk, one which must be resolved if non-adversative talk is to resume. Misunderstanding and dissent are two manifestations of divergence in common ground.[] … When disagreement occurs, common ground must be established before the discourse can proceed. (Establishing common ground does not necessarily lead to a common opinion.) Most often disagreements call for additional interactional work, e.g. repair and insertion sequences, before the

  For discussion of common ground, see Clark (1997).

Defining Child Conflict



conversation can proceed (that is, before the expansion of common ground can continue) (Stalpers, 1995: 275).

Consequently, the beginnings and endings of disputes are inseparable from the definition of conflict itself. ‘The boundaries of a conflict episode, thus, are identified by the onset and termination of oppositional exchanges’ (Garvey and Shantz, 1995: 96). As conflict is seen as a ‘halt’ to non-argumentative conversation, the departure is marked by the onset and cessation of overt objection (O’Keefe and Benoit, 1982: 163) to a prior utterance/speaker. Inherent in this idea of resuming co-operative, non-adversative discourse, is the co-operative nature of conflict itself. Identifying conflict as a type of discourse with distinctive boundaries does not signify that disputes are something other than conversation. Conflict, as with all forms of talk-in-interaction, is mutually created. Indeed, opposition must be mutual for argument to continue. A core, defining feature of conflict is the performance of adversary positions (Coulter, 1990: 185) maintained by at least two people (Garvey and Shantz, 1995: 94; Hay, 1984: 2). Mutuality is not limited to opposition (both parties must produce some form of objection), given that mere participation requires more than one party. Consequently, disputes are defined as spontaneously co-constructed by the children themselves (Eisenberg and Garvey, 1981: 150). Definitions also extend to the range of disputes which appear in children’s peer play. It should be noted that while aggression is typically expressed in the context of conflict, it does not follow that all conflict is aggressive (Shantz, 1987: 285). Sprott (1986: 427) points out that contemporary definitions of conflict include exchanges which have ‘a joking or teasing quality or a cooperative, playful quality, in addition to the serious or angry dispute’. Manifestation of cultural variation is also apparent in more ritualised forms of conflict such as ‘playing the dozens’ (Labov, 1972b; Mitchell-Kernan, 1972), the stylised ‘brogez’ of Israeli children (Katriel, 1985) or other varieties of verbal dueling (e.g. Dundes, Leach and Ozkok, 1972; Corsaro and Maynard, 1996). To this end, Garvey and Shantz (1995) propose four dimensions of conflict talk: orientation (serious/joking); format (ritual/nonritual); frame (pretend/real) and mode (mitigated/ aggravated). Whilst the range of conflict types is considered, for the purposes of the current research, conflict is taken to mean episodes of real or serious opposition. Although other domains of disputes are not discounted (and a degree of shifting between modes is recognised), the primary interest in this study is to understand dispute resolution where non-pretend, non-ritual, non-joking argument serves as the default, unmarked norm of child conflict – a norm, at least, for middleclass, English-speaking Australian children attending urban daycare centres. It is proposed that variation in disputing styles according to shifting key or register can then be explored from this platform of ‘standard’ adversative discourse.

10

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Conflict openings From the definitions above, we surmise that conflict ‘begins with overt opposition between individuals and continues until opposition ceases. Moves within conflict either continue the opposition or address it with attempts at conciliation or resolution’ (Ross and Conant 1995: 154). Before moving on to consider the content and outcome of disputes, we should note that the identification of opening moves in verbal conflict is inherently tied to the definition of conflict. A description of adversative discourse needs clear identification of how children begin arguments. Whilst the definitional relationship between conflict and conflict openings can be viewed as bi-directional, in the following discussion, emphasis rests on distinguishing the beginnings of conflict. To nominate the beginning of an argument, establishing what actually constitutes the first move of the sequence is fundamental, because assigning a particular move as the opening of the dispute has implications for the subsequent analysis of the unfolding argument. A prominent disparity in studies of young children’s conflict lies in identifying either (a) the first act of overt (verbal) opposition as the beginning of the dispute, or (b) the action or utterance which provokes the initial opposition. The following summary outlines the differing justifications offered in labelling specific turns as the beginning of arguments. The first turn of adversative discourse can be marked as the initial statement of opposition to an antecedent event. Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) propose that the central definition of argument is the action of opposition, so it follows that they propose argument begins with this action. Phinney (1986: 50) also claims that an argument does not begin until a statement or action is challenged by another speaker; consequently, the first move of the quarrel is identified as the first counterassertion made by another child. Corsaro and Rizzo (1990: 26) ‘do not view the antecedent event as part of the dispute per se but rather as its source’. Similar to Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) then, the authors view initial opposition moves to be the defining characteristic of conflict openings. In contrast, Brenneis and Lein (1977) propose that the beginning of an argument is marked by the statement or action which is refuted by a next speaker, thus instigating conflict. The debate, therefore, is not limited to determining which move constitutes the beginning of the dispute, but involves classification of which acts or moves are considered as part of the conflict at all. Within these discrepancies of identification lies the problem of denoting verbal turns as exclusively intrinsic to the opening of disputes. That is, ignoring properties of non-verbal turns. Maynard (1985a) criticises Eisenberg and Garvey’s (1981) concept of ‘antecedent event’ for being primarily linguistic. By focusing on the ‘semantic continuity’ of disputes (Brenneis and Lein, 1977), challengeable nonverbal actions are overlooked in instigating the argument. That is, the presupposition that antecedent events are verbal often fails to account for what may actually constitute the initial opposition. Maynard argues that recognising actions as well

Defining Child Conflict

11

as utterances as antecedent events (or ‘arguables’ as he prefers to label them) has significant implications for the interpretation of the structure of disputes. The following episode appeared in Eisenberg and Garvey’s (1981) data and is reproduced here as the example used by Maynard to demonstrate the repercussions of ignoring nonverbal actions as possible opening moves. ((B has been screaming)) A: Don’t be so loud B:  ((shouts)) YES! A: Don’t be so loud B:  Why? A:  Because it hurts my ears, yes, it does ((B is quieter))

Maynard (1985a) argues that the screaming serves as the antecedent or ‘arguable’ event and that A’s opposition (‘Don’t be so loud’) should be numbered as the first opposition in the adversative episode. It appears not only reasonable, but essential to recognise the role of nonverbal actions in disputes if the structure of the discourse is to be understood. Attributing opening status to a particular action or utterance has an additional analytical influence on the allocation of speaker roles. That is, opening moves not only instigate argument, but also function to nominate specific roles for the participants in the dispute. Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) propose that the beginning of conflict establishes the role of each participant, roles which are held throughout the episode. The Opposer makes the initial statement of opposition, while the interlocutor is the Opposee by default. The authors claim that these roles are significant in the choice of strategies used by each child in that ‘the Opposee is trying to influence his partner while the Opposer is resisting influence’ (1981: 152). As these roles are determined by attribution of the initial move of the conflict, the analytical significance of assigning the first point of opposition is twofold (assigning both the opening move and speaker roles). Most closely related to earlier definitions of conflict, is the response to the first opposition move, that is, the next utterance in the exchange. The definition of conflict obviously influences which episodes constitute the data for a particular study. For example Laursen and Hartup (1989) follow Shantz (1987), and include interactions consisting of only two turns: a statement or action and opposition to this prior move. However, as most data in research on children’s conflict comprises episodes of three or more turns (e.g. Dunn and Munn, 1987), it can be argued that

12

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a sequence of two turns is not indicative of disputing but is rather an example of repair (i.e. a correction of sorts). Consequently the original speaker has the option of treating the initial opposition as a prompt for self repair and to diffuse the possibility of conflict by ‘letting the opposition pass’ (Maynard, 1985a: 7). The situation escalates, however, when the opposition is treated by the original speaker as a challenge of some sort and the argument unfolds (Maynard, 1986a). It follows then, that conflict takes hold in the third turn, where the original action (the antecedent event or arguable) is defended by the first speaker. If the first speaker accepts the challenge or correction made by the second speaker, argument dissipates and the episode is one of repair. Although the earlier two turns become established as the beginning of the conflict retrospectively, they do not constitute a dispute in isolation. Maynard (1985a: 8) states this position as follows: … initial opposition does not constitute an argument. An utterance may oppose a prior action, but its status as part of an argument is dependent on whether it is treated as a legitimate repair initiation or whether it is let to pass or whether it is itself counteracted. Thus, in addition to the notion of the ‘antecedent event’, as an arguable utterance or action that can potentially be opposed, we also need a concept of an ‘argumentative’ which would capture how an initial statement of opposition is only contingently turned into an element of an argument or dispute episode.

It has also been found that particular pairs of utterances are more likely to function as the beginning of an argument. O’Keefe and Benoit (1982: 172) found that amongst 2-5 year-olds, the majority of disputes began with request-refusal, orderrefusal, need statement-refusal and assertion-denials. Furthermore, the manner in which the dispute is begun (e.g. aggravated or mitigated objection) not only influences the development of the dispute, but determines how the hearer responds to the initial opposition (e.g. probable threat to face as mentioned by Benoit and Benoit, 1990: 171-172). In this research, the beginning of the dispute is taken to mean the first point of overt opposition (be it verbal or non-verbal), as conflict does not exist until this occurs. In the transcripts (Appendix A), however, this opposition is not necessarily marked numerically, i.e. identified as line 1 in the episode. In some cases, prior utterances (antecedent events) are recorded to provide contextual cues to the reader. Indeed, for the most part, the antecedent event that directly precedes the primary opposition appears as the first line of the transcript. Only episodes which consist of three or more turns are included as data for the present analysis. Problems associated with defining the openings of disputes are not the preoccupation of this study, as it attempts to detail the closings of conflict episodes. Before reviewing existing research on dispute endings, however, we need to consider what constitutes the substance of disputes, what happens between the beginning and the end. Our discussion moves, therefore, from the initiation of conflict to consider the frequency and types of conflict in young children’s peer interaction.

Defining Child Conflict

13

Frequency and types of conflict Given the range of studies in children’s peer disputes, we presume that arguments are a regular feature of children’s interaction. Intuitively, we perceive disputes between children to be common events. In moving from general perception to quantification, however, problems are encountered. It becomes clear that frequency of conflict evades objective calculation: the manner in which conflict is defined determines the number of instances or episodes recorded in a specified period of time. Consequently, the incidence of disputing in the preschool environment is inherently dependent on the theoretical approach of the researcher. Also, practical concerns of available resources, number of children, dimensions of play space and so on influence the prevalence of arguments. Given that the working definition of conflict determines the values of frequency, and that this definition shifts from one study to another, it is unreasonable to contrast the various findings. Likewise, variation in methodology (e.g. naturalistic observation vs. contrived episodes recorded in laboratory settings) precludes viable comparison. This summary, therefore does not attempt to collate the frequencies reported in each study, but rather identifies the occurrence of conflict within other domains. That is, a more meaningful overview of the prevalence of children’s conflicts exists in the relationship between frequency of conflict and (1) age of participants, (2) friendship relations and (3) activity type. Frequency of conflict and gender of participants also receives attention in extant research, as described later in this section. Frequency of conflict is associated with the age of the disputants. Although longitudinal studies are not common in research on preschool children’s interactions, uncontroversial findings point to fewer disputes among older children. In one of the earliest studies in this area, Dawe (1934) recognised a tendency for fewer quarrels amongst the older children in her observation sessions, suggesting a decrease with age. Chen et al. (2001) similarly report that insistence in disputes declines with age and that instances of resolution increase as children get older. O’Keefe and Benoit (1982) comment that if a relationship exists between age and frequency of conflict exists, it is a negative one. ‘That is, rather than learning to disagree, children ultimately learn not to disagree so often’ (p.170). A distinction is also evident in relation to friendship categories. Given the interest in interpersonal relationships in developmental psychology, considerable attention in conflict research has been paid to the frequency of arguments between friends and between to non-friends. A correlation was described in the early work of Green (1933) who claimed that there are more quarrels between mutual friends, suggesting that ‘quarrelling is a part of friendly social intercourse’ (p.251). Indeed, amongst some groups of children, initiating conflict can be equated with fostering friendship (Corsaro and Rizzo, 1990). The greater number of disputes between children who nominate each other as friends can also be explained by increased contact between friends, and underscores the idea that disagreement is not problematic in the maintenance of peer relationships (Ross and Conant,

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1995). The form or structure of arguments between friends may differ in structure, however, as there is increased motivation to sustain or resume shared play, to sustain the relationship. Frequency of conflict is also related to the specifications of the play environment and the type of activity in which play partners are engaged. The number of disputes is higher when children are indoors, in contrast to play outside (Dawe, 1934), a proportion which can be attributed to a restriction of play space. The greater frequency of disputes indoors (a discrepancy not often recorded because the large majority of studies are conducted inside preschools or laboratories) can also be ascribed to the necessity of sharing resources. Particular activities are also more or less likely to serve as environments in which disputes unfold. Where children are engaged in parallel play (activities such as drawing, painting, cutting and pasting), where resources are not restricted, conflict is less frequent. The influence of play activity is not limited to the frequency of disputes. The type of dispute is in some ways constrained by the play environment and play materials. Object conflicts, for example, are obviously more frequent in activities which demand the sharing of resources, such as playing with building blocks. This brings us to the content of children’s disputes and attempts to categorise the cause of conflict. Parallel with the variation in reporting the frequency of conflict, the identification of dispute types is dependent on the focus of the research, where classification is generated by the researchers themselves. Again, the focus of the research dictates the working definitions employed, in this case, the categories of conflict observed. Dawe (1934) proposed four categories of quarrels amongst preschool children: possessions, physical violence, interference with activity and social adjustment. Genishi and Di Paolo (1982) proposed the following as major themes of argument: possession, number, conduct, truth, role, opposition to request, and exclusion. Phinney’s (1986) study of 5-year-olds arguing with siblings and peers categorised six types of disputes (frequency given in brackets) as follows: procedure (44 per cent), fact (28 per cent), possession (11 per cent), intention (11 per cent), attribution (5 per cent) and opinion (2 per cent). In their study of an integrated early childhood classroom, of typically developing children and children with disabilities, Malloy and McMurray (1996: 191-192) ‘identified seven social goals associated with conflict that have been identified by previous researchers. These were object acquisition, annoyance, group entry, change in the course of play, invasion of space, defying school rules, and stopping others’ actions’ (Krasnor and Rubin, 1983; Shantz, 1987; Wilson, 1988). The most prevalent type or category of recorded child peer conflict involves object disputes of some kind. Indeed, these types of arguments typically make up the greatest percentage of preschool conflict (Shantz, 1987). Disputes involving objects are not solely driven by desire for the article in demand, as the object may assume a social significance, depending on who maintains possession. That is, a toy may appeal to a child as a valuable commodity if it has been seen to be enjoyed or owned by another child (Hay and Ross, 1982). Additionally, as Bakeman and

Defining Child Conflict

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Brownlee (1982) found in their work with children aged 12-48 months, possession of an object is not simply determined by the power status of the children involved in the study. That is, conflict is not only influenced by individual dominance, but by possession rights established prior to the dispute. If one child had the object in his or her possession at some earlier time, his or her claim to it is reinforced. Although object disputes predominate most studies involving young children, this prevalence is not claimed universally. Corsaro and Rizzo (1990) found an inverse proportion of ‘nature of play’ disputes to object disputes as reported by Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) and Genishi and Di Paolo (1982). However, this difference may be explained by varying definitions (Corsaro and Rizzo included all opposition to the action of others in ‘nature of play’ disputes). The disparity may also be accounted for by methodological differences (specifically resulting in an absence of disputes over access to play in Eisenberg and Garvey’s (1981) and Genishi and Di Paolo’s (1982) research). The greater frequency of claim disputes amongst Italian children could also be attributed to the children’s apparent enjoyment of the ‘discussione’ as a verbal routine (Corsaro and Rizzo, 1990; see also Eisenberg, 1990). That is, the children enjoy the (culturally specific) format of the argument, similar to participation in other ritualised games (e.g. ‘sounding’ or ‘playing the dozens’; Labov, 1972b; Kochman, 1983). Indeed, cultural imperatives influence the purpose, content, and management of conflict (e.g. Medina, Lonzano and Goudena, 2001; French, Pidada, and Victor, 2005). Furthermore, in the earliest studies by Green (1933) and Dawe (1934), a positive correlation was suggested between gender and frequency of quarrelling: boys were involved in more disputes with their peers than girls. Contemporary research, however, does not point to discrepancies in frequency, but rather a different focus or purpose in girls’ compared with boys’ disputes. Goodwin and Goodwin (1987: 227) note that ‘although they had much in common, when the boys and girls on Maple Street interacted in same-sex groups they displayed different interests, engaged in different activities, and constructed different types of social organization. This had consequences for the types of disputes that occurred within each group’. Differences in the underlying social structure of the groups, then, influence the types of disputes in same-sex interaction. ‘The analyses of both object and person control conflicts indicate that one’s gender predisposes one toward becoming involved in conflicts over particular issues (often objects for boys, and others’ behavior for girls) in ways that are not accounted for by differences in social-cognitive functioning’ (Shantz and Shantz, 1985: 12). This does not suggest that children engage exclusively in these types of conflict according to gender, but rather that disputes function differently depending on the goals or underlying motivations of the group. ‘Boys appear to be more concerned with power and status during their interactions with other children, girls with relationships and sustaining harmonious interaction’ (Putallaz and Sheppard, 1995: 344). Differences can be viewed through the contrasting social organisation of each group. That is, ‘the comparisons made by girls characteristically deal with ties they

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Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes

have to others or their appearance, whereas the boys employ a variety of criteria to explicitly rank themselves against each other’ (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1987: 229). Consequently, the boys’ disputes are frequently centred around ‘issues of relative power’ while the format of the girls’ challenges ‘reflects their concerns with what others say about them’ (p.230). This latter format of reporting and challenging accusations is discussed in detail by Goodwin and Goodwin (1987), emphasising the highly structured pattern of he-said-she-said disputes. Given the embedded sequences in these arguments, they constitute a ‘much greater complexity than exists when only two positions to an argument are debated, the general situation in most boys’ and cross-sex disputes’ (p.238). The indirect style of disputing attributed to girls can be seen as multi-layered, enhancing the speaker’s position while maintaining solidarity within the group. Sheldon (1992, 1996) identifies the concept of ‘double-voice discourse’ where the speaker promotes her own agenda whilst sustaining social harmony. Sheldon (1992) also notes that the framework of pretend play allows girls an indirect form of opposition which in turn allows a greater number of alternatives for solving an incompatibility of intentions. The difference in girls’ and boys’ production of double-voice discourse should not be attributed to ability (boys are as capable of recognising the perspective of other) but rather ‘it is more likely that that the difference in usage is due to discourse norms in solidarity-based groups’ (Sheldon, 1992: 113). Sheldon concludes by returning to the acceptability of direct confrontation in boys’ conflict in contrast (but not in opposition) to the expectation of girls to attend to the needs of the social group. In an earlier paper, Sheldon (1990) comments that dispute episodes involving girls were typically constructed of strategies that asked for or provided clarification of the speaker’s intentions. Sheldon relates this finding to Maltz and Borker’s (1982) claim that girls maintain relationships based on ‘closeness and equality’, and to the concept of care orientation put forward by Gilligan (1988). Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) challenge such an orientation by stating that ‘in contrast to the prevalent stereotype that female interaction is organized with reference to politeness and a dispreference for dispute (Gilligan 1982: 9-10; Lever 1976: 482; Piaget, 1965: 77), we find that girls are not only just as skilled in argumentation as boys but have types of arguments that are both more extended and more complex in their participation structure than those among boys’ (p.201).

Verbal strategies It becomes apparent that subjectivity is not restricted to defining openings, frequency, and types of conflict. Categorising verbal strategies produced in children’s adversative discourse is also dependent upon the researcher’s bias – strategies are imposed by the researcher rather than necessarily identified as such by the children themselves. Although there is considerable overlap in the classification of argumentative moves put forward in various studies, there is a

Defining Child Conflict

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lack of uniformity which precludes any direct correlation of findings. Furthermore, quantification of types of verbal strategies used in conflict episodes (e.g. Haslett, 1983) does not tell us how children are producing these strategies. However, some description of the repertoire of verbal strategies identified across young children’s peer disputes is called for. Predominantly, verbal strategies produced throughout episodes are grouped according to illocutionary intent. Occasionally, opening moves are distinguished from later oppositional turns. Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) identified five types of initial opposition: simple negative; reason or justification; countering move; postpone (temporise); and evade. Of these the most common was supplying a reason (101/208), followed by a simple ‘no’ (73/208). Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) then classified nine types of objection which are performed after these opening moves. As these categories of reaction to opposition are replicated elsewhere (e.g. Genishi and Di Paolo, 1982), Table 2.1 (below) serves as a summary. Table 2.1  Categories of opposition Insistence

Repetition or reinforcement of previous utterance (adding no new information).

Mitigation/Aggravation

Paraphrases of original requests by either increasing indirectness or increasing directness.

Reasons

Statements providing explanation or justification for refusal to comply, or to influence other speaker.

Counter

Speaker offers an alternative proposal.

Conditional directive

Composed of two linked, complex propositions: (1) a promise and (2) a directive.

Compromise

Proposal for some form of sharing.

Requests for explanation

Used to elicit a reason or justification when partner has failed to provide either.

Physical Force

Includes grabbing, taking object that partner has not released, hitting, struggling, and pushing.

Ignores

No response is made within 1.0 second.

Source: Eisenberg and Garvey, 1981.

Elsewhere, in their study of role-play-elicited conflict involving early primary school children, Brenneis and Lein (1977) used the following categories to identify moves in the disputes: threats, bribes, insults, praise, command, moral persuasion, negating or contradictory assertion, simple assertion, denial, affirmative, supportive assertion, demand for evidence and non-word vocal signals. In his

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study of disputing amongst part-Hawaiian children Boggs (1978) identified ten distinct verbal strategies: assertion, claim allegation, contradiction, challenge, insult, supporting argument/allegation, appeal to authority, and counter insult/ threat/trial. Genishi and Di Paolo (1982) borrowed these categories to distinguish verbal strategies employed by children. The categories were designed to be mutually exclusive, and were grouped according to Eisenberg and Garvey’s (1981) definitions of (1) antecedent events, (2) initial oppositions and (3) resolutions. The categories are listed as (1) action, assertion, claim, request, (2) challenge, contradiction, denial, insult, refusal, threat and (3) acceptance, appeal to authority, compromise, supporting argument. A prominent strategy in children’s adversative discourse is stating references to social rules. These rules are not necessarily invoked for their own sake, i.e. by a law-abiding speaker, but constitute a means-end approach. Maynard (1985a: 19) observes that ‘in disagreement episodes, while rules may be related to extraneous cultural values, they are not necessarily invoked because of a basic concern to support these values, even though that may be the unintended consequence. Primarily, rules are used to manage local social concerns which are indigenous to the children’s own social group’. Also, in each collection of data, threats emerge as a distinct category of opposition. An inherent aspect of conditionality distinguishes threats as type of argumentative move, as they ‘express the intention to hurt or punish the hearer with the purpose of altering the hearer’s behavior’ (Benoit, 1983: 315). Essentially, then, threats invoke undesirable outcomes. Benoit points to the importance of considering the hearer’s role (see Grimshaw, 1980) in response to a threat. The hearer is obliged to ‘produce an appropriate response to the threat to complete the unit’ (1983: 306). She further emphasises the collaborative nature of threats, rather than identifying threats as isolated utterances, because ‘threats as structural units … contribute to the sequential organization and collaborative development of discourse’ (Benoit, 1983: 307). Haslett (1983) found that threats were used more frequently by four and five year-olds than two and three-year-olds; not surprisingly, given the prerequisite level of linguistic complexity. Threats are most powerful when the speaker controls the projected outcome (e.g. harm-threats, withholding action/outcome), whereas threatening unspecified consequences or teacher retribution is less forceful. The response to a threat is typically rejection by the hearer: ‘the nature of the conversational unit does not promote open discussion between the interactants’ (Benoit, 1983: 327). Consequently, cycles of threats and counter-threats are implicated in escalating disputes (O’Keefe and Benoit, 1982; Haslett, 1983; Benoit, 1992). It is not only the content and function of verbal strategies which have been reviewed in existing research; suprasegmental features in the discourse have also prompted investigation. Brenneis and Lein (1977), for example, observed a number of stylistic tactics which accompanied the verbal strategies used by the children, namely volume (most frequent amongst the younger children), speed,

Defining Child Conflict

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stress and intonation. The distribution of these paralinguistic features was parallel to that noted by Boggs (1978): a pattern of escalation was characteristic in each. Visual cues (Camras, 1980), pitch leaps, vowel lengthening and dramatic contours have all been shown to be meaningful in challenges made in the course of play (Goodwin, Goodwin and Yaeger-Dror, 2002). Recycling the content of a prior turn constitutes a particular type of opposition strategy in children’s adversative discourse. As discussed in the previous section, Maynard (1985a) distinguished between mutual opposition as conflict, and twoturn sequences identified as occasions of repair. Once the argument has begun, however, what may constitute repair in adult speech can function as a conflict strategy among children. That is, partial repetition is a type of oppositional move used by children (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1987), a form of overt opposition which is distinguishable from the notion of correction used within the broader framework of (adult) repair. Partial repetition as an opposition move is distinct from other-initiated repair by difference in performance: no hesitation and no rising intonation. This type of opposition not only creates a challenge to the content of the preceding utterance, but also challenges the authority of the previous speaker. ‘Opposition can thus call into question not only what has been said, but also the general competence of someone who would produce such talk’ (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1987: 210). Similarly, in her work with African-American children living in inner cities, Goodwin (1983) identified types of aggravation and mitigation strategies produced in argumentative sequences. The first of these are identified as aggravated partialrepeat correction formats: ‘In contrast to repair operations performed in adult conversation in a mitigated way, among children, pointing to the trouble source and supplying the correction may be collapsed into a single turn’ (p.659). Goodwin moves on to consider aggravated contradiction and replacement correction formats: ‘Both of these formats can be considered more aggravated than the partial repeat formats discussed above in that they provide unquestionable opposition to a prior turn’ (1983: 662). Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) refer to the function of aggravation and mitigation in adversative episodes, in that they raise or lower the status of the speaker, and consequently manipulate the participatory role (see Labov and Fanshel, 1977). The term mitigation denotes the speaker’s attempt to soften the unwelcome effect of the utterance (Fraser, 1980). Aggravated disagreements, on the other hand, are bald-on-record (Brown and Levinson, 1987) and are particularly salient in the peer culture of Italian preschool children (Corsaro and Rizzo, 1990). This strategy, one of augmenting the previous action, was most common in claim disputes and ritualised dispute routines.

 Fraser makes the point that mitigation is distinct from politeness: ‘Mitigation entails politeness, while the converse is not true’ (1980: 344).

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Strategies and friendships The relationship between strategy choice and social relationships has also generated considerable interest (e.g. Hartup, Laursen, Stewart and Eastenson, 1988; Hartup, 1995; Fabes and Eisenberg, 1996). The type of strategies chosen by children during disputes is influenced by the relationship existing between the participants. The relationship is not only defined by the relative power status but also by the degree to which each child nominates the other as a friend. ‘The point is not that close peers always avoid disruptive behavior; coercion prevails in voluntary and involuntary close relationships alike. Instead, we suggest that close peers avail themselves of mitigation often enough during critical instances to preserve future rewarding exchanges’ (Laursen, Hartup and Koplas, 1996: 87). Laursen, Hartup and Koplas (1996) do not claim that friends engage in fewer conflicts than non-friends, but rather that children are aware that aggravated strategies are not conducive to maintaining close ties over a period of time. Children are motivated to negotiate their position during disputes with friends, because they have a vested interest in an outcome which is satisfactory to both partners. Consequently friends are more likely to use ‘softer conflict management strategies’ than non-friends. It is interesting that a preference for negotiation rather than coercion exists between friends but not between family members (Laursen, Hartup and Koplas, 1996). It could be argued that the relationship with siblings and parents is sustained regardless of the child’s behaviour, but the relationship between peers will not withstand disregard for the other child’s wishes. ‘In sum, studies are compatible with the conclusion that close peers try not to allow conflict to interfere with previously established patterns of rewarding exchange. According to Rizzo (1992), the absence of observed negative conflict outcomes suggests that scholars overestimate the actual threat of conflict to friendships’ (Laursen Hartup and Koplas, 1996: 90). An additional aspect of children’s arguments is that help is seldom sought from the teacher, or at least rarely, by children who are more competent: Elementary-aged children who experience interpersonal conflict with their peers typically are reluctant to go to an adult authority for assistance. Help seeking is perceived as a way of avoiding rather than resolving conflict. Children who are socially well accepted, in particular, prefer to use prosocial, constructive strategies (e.g. discussing the situation) without relying on adults (Newman, Murray and Lussier, 2001: 398).

While acknowledging that this observation is applicable to relatively mild conflicts, the same authors underscore children’s preference for independence in resolving more serious disputes with peers. The most common reason given for not seeking help was that children want to resolve arguments on their own terms. The children involved in the study appeared to seek teacher intervention as a last resort, when

Defining Child Conflict

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their own repertoire had been exhausted and proven ineffective (Newman, Murray and Lussier, 2001: 406). Whilst studies of conflict typically report boys using more aggressive or hostile strategies when compared to the more passive or mitigated disputing practices of girls (e.g. Chung and Asher, 1996: 138), we should be wary of over-extending these findings to claims of female passivity. ‘Female children are not devoid of aggressive actions; they simply have other strategies of control as well’ (Benoit, 1983). Additionally, cultural differences should be recognised in disputing practices; Chinese girls, for example have been shown to use as many direct strategies in managing conflict as American boys (Kyratzis and Guo, 2001). In her study of Chinese preschool children in Taiwan, Farris (2000: 545) found that ‘the masculine-associated, direct ‘aggravated’ style is used interactively by both girls and boys as the unmarked, or normal mode for engaging in conflict in both all male and cross-sex groups’. Fundamentally, both boys and girls demonstrate ability to use the same range of strategies. As mentioned above, dispute strategies, are influenced by differences in play activities and social organisation of groups. Most importantly, however, the similarities between boys’ and girls’ dispute structures and strategies are greater than the differences (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1987). This overlap in boys’ and girls’ observed patterns of behaviour during conflict situations suggests that gender differences of this type may involve differences in emphasis rather than a quantitative discontinuity. Rather than conceiving of sex differences in social development as reflecting two distinct paths, which is what Gilligan (1982) proposes – one concerned with ‘justice’ and the other concerned with ‘relationships’ – the results of this study suggest that there may be a continuum of responses to conflict. This continuum ranges from avoidance of conflict to aggressive or heavy-handed responses. Males and females are represented by overlapping distributions on this continuum that are centred more towards direct persuasion and negotiation for males, and more towards maintaining interpersonal harmony for females. Although males do engage in conflict mitigation, their predominant mode of dealing with conflict is initially more direct. Similarly, females do engage in heavy-handed persuasion, but their predominant mode of dealing with conflict is more indirect. In addition, there is no indication that boys and girls are not equally manipulative, they merely use different means to attain their respective ends (Miller, Danaher and Forbes, 1986: 547). The variety of verbal strategies summarised above suggests that young children’s ability to use different approaches in promoting their own position is considerable. A better indication of developing communicative competence, however, lies in establishing just how children employ these strategies during arguments. That is, how do children attempt to manipulate the outcome of disputes by serially constructing verbal strategies in adversative discourse? The most fundamental organisation of children’s conflict, in terms of the structure of discourse, is found in the sequences of these strategies.

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Sequences of strategies The verbal strategies identified above have been considered in terms of patterns of argument, establishing which actions are likely to precede or promote subsequent strategies. Brenneis and Lein (1977) suggest that dispute sequences follow one of three patterned structures: repetition, escalation or inversion. They also point to the interrelatedness of the turns at talk, as ‘one remark indicates what the next remark will probably be, because the arguments are constrained by structural rules’ (p.60). Furthermore, the participants must adhere to the subject or theme put forward by the previous speaker if the sequence is to be sustained, as Brenneis and Lein (1977: 61) claim that ‘semantic continuity is the organizing rule for argumentative sequences’. Building on this research, Lein and Brenneis (1978) looked for patterns of children’s argument in three different speech communities. They found a tendency for African-American and Fijian Indian children to respond to insults with a pattern of escalation (i.e. each insult is exaggerated by the following speaker). The white American children participating in the study, however, tended to negate the previous speaker’s insult (a pattern of inversion). Differences in manner of escalation were also found: both American groups escalated sentences semantically (by augmenting the expression of the previous statement). The Fijian Indian children would use either substitution of equivalent terms or syntactic escalation (increasing the number of morphemes). As in their previous research, Lein and Brenneis (1978) found increasing volume in subsequent turns to be a common occurrence in all three speech communities. Boggs (1978) identified a pattern of argument amongst part-Hawaiian children, aged between one and eight, which he labelled ‘contradicting routines’. The organisation of these routines suggests a predictable sequence of events, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Boggs notes that ‘there is a tendency for disputes to escalate from contradiction to challenge, insult, counter insult, threat or trial’ (1978: 332). Each type of strategy may be repeated, but children do not revert to strategies used earlier in the interaction; the pattern of the contradicting routine is therefore one of progression. This pattern of escalation was also observed in paralinguistic features of the routines as there was a complementary pattern of increasing volume, stress and pitch, and a shortening of gaps between turns.

Defining Child Conflict

assertion

claim

allegation

contradiction

23

supporting

challenge

argument/allegation

insult

appeal to authority

counter insult/threat/trial

Figure 2.1  Sequences in contradicting routines, Boggs (1978)

As suggested earlier, the sequence of argument is to some extent predictable from the form of initial opposition. For example, Phinney (1986) found that the development of an argument was highly influenced by the type of opening counterassertion. Indeed each turn was seen to be affected by the form of the previous utterance, as simple strategies (basic rejection, denial or contradiction) were more likely to elicit a simple response, whereas elaborated forms (reasons, explanations, justifications or query of preceding statement) usually prompted elaborate replies. Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) point out that the content-based escalation observed in children’s arguments is mirrored in the structural form of the argument itself. ‘Indeed, there is a nice fit between the social activity of escalating a sequence and challenging a prior move and the syntactic structure of these utterances, in which the prior move becomes an embedded subcomponent of the sentence used to answer it’ (p.219). Responding moves in argumentative sequences not only attend to the semantic and syntactic content of previous turns but also to the force of the utterance, or type of strategy. Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) emphasise the dynamic nature of strategy choice, in that each speaker attends to the form of the previous action: The two participants in the adversative episodes did not use strategies randomly, but were responding to the strategies of their opponent. The process of conflict resolution was a highly interactive one. If the partner used a strategy which provided no new material for him to work on or with, the child was less creative in his own choice of alternatives (p.166-7, emphasis in original).

The serial dependency of turns has also been acknowledged in analysis of threats in conflict episodes:

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Analyses of threats as structural units suggest emergent patterns. Harm-threats are preceded by threats and insults and followed by threats … the interactants both refuse to give ground. … Withhold-action/object threats are preceded by assertions, [objectionable] behaviour, and refusals and followed by rejection or acceptance … Tell-authority threats are preceded by [objectionable] behaviour and followed by topic shift and explanation. … Unspecified-consequence threats are preceded by refusal and followed by acceptance or explanation (Benoit, 1983: 327).

In acknowledging the relationship between turns, it could be suggested that focusing on singular strategies within disputes obscures a central organising principle of interdependence (cf. Halliday and Hasan, 1976). It is proposed in this research, however, that a more illuminative approach to adversative discourse lies in understanding how each successive turn builds on prior moves, rather than isolating and categorising the moves themselves. Similarly, Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) do not view episodes of opposition moves as one distinct action followed in turn, but rather as a development of interrelated utterances. They also highlight the importance of analysing opposition moves beyond the level of speech acts, as children manipulate syntactic structures of prior moves. The sequential nature of children’s arguments is emphasised through consideration of format tying as a resource in adversative episodes. ‘According to Goodwin, format tying generally involves participants’ strategic use of phonological, syntactic, and semantic surface structure features of prior turns at talk (Goodwin, 1990: 177; see also Goodwin and Goodwin, 1987)’ (Corsaro and Maynard, 1996: 158). Format tying is not only achieved by rephrasing prior phonological, syntactic and semantic content, but is also accomplished by reusing the structure of previous utterances. In other words, the child uses the surface structure of the prior turn and manipulates this structure to promote his or her own position. Essentially, format tying may be used as a powerful counter, because the prior speaker’s words can be turned and used against her/him. ‘Format tying and substitution thus work hand in hand, the similarity of the structure between two utterances provided by format tying making the relevant difference in the second utterance, the substituted term, stand out with particular salience’ (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1987: 220). Multi-party disputes Many of the studies reported above are based on data collected from contrived play situations in laboratory settings, and the majority of findings are specific to interactions between two children. Although two-party disputes are common in naturalistic settings, restricting observation to dyads does not allow analysis of all manifestations of adversative discourse. Children frequently participate in group disputes; so the full repertoire of argumentative styles and structures cannot be generalised from observing dyadic conflict.

Defining Child Conflict

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Before reviewing the structure of conflict involving more than two participants, however, a metalinguistic problem should be acknowledged. Goodwin and Goodwin (1990) criticise the use of the term ‘multi-party’ to describe the interaction of more than two speakers. Given that multi-party is used elsewhere to denote a speaker and hearer, Goodwin (1981) argues that the term appears insufficient in distinguishing between two party discourse and discourse involving three or more participants. However, as the term is used elsewhere (Maynard, 1986a), the Goodwins employ the term despite reservations about its appropriateness. Goodwin and Goodwin (1990) present a stronger argument against the use of the term ‘dyadic’, in that it suggests the interaction between two parties is somehow unique, operating under specific principles which are not necessarily related to patterns of discourse involving three or more participants. They would argue that the norm is constituted by multi-party configuration and that the dyad operates within this same structure. The jargon also appears redundant when the more neutral ‘two-party’ functions effectively as a label to identify the number of participants. The necessity of distinguishing between disputes involving two participants and those involving more than two participants is justified by features which may only appear in arguments involving multiple participants. Opportunity for collusion is the most distinctive feature of multi-party arguments. As an argument begins with an opposition to a prior utterance or action, two distinct positions are attributed to two participants. A third speaker may then align him or herself with one of these positions, or raise an alternative objection. Maynard (1986a) notes that this alignment may or may not be accepted by the original opposer and consequently should be seen as an offer of collaboration. Acceptance of an offer of this kind is not marked, but typically is displayed by the fact that the offer is not rejected. Offers may be rejected if they are not content-tied to the original opposition. ‘Thus, not only can an apparent collaboration offer be treated in various ways by its recipient so that it is more or less successful, but the offerer herself can follow with various strategies that retrospectively construct how an alignment display should be constructed’ (Maynard, 1986a: 274). Furthermore, One important consequence of the parasitic organization of these utterances, and in particular of the way in which they second the action of prior speaker, is that the subsequent speaker affiliates himself to the position being taken by the party whose talk is being followed. … Principal parties within the dispute can reject as well as accept such offers of collaboration (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1990: 102).

Collaboration is therefore not achieved simply through the support of a third party, nor solely by the acceptance of this participation as compatible with the position of the original opposer or opposee. As noted by Goodwin and Goodwin (1990) this ‘piggybacking’, as they call it – distinct from insertion sequences – is a collaborative achievement ‘accomplished as much through the actions of

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the subordinate party (who actively demonstrates his willingness to change his behavior at the suggestion of the other) as through those of the dominant party’ (p.113). Danby and Baker (1998) note that multi-party disputes typically begin as twoparty confrontation, with other speakers rapidly aligning themselves with one position or the other. Yet Maynard (1986a) underscores the idea that the dispute does not simply consist of two sides (although it is initiated by only two parties). ‘Rather, given one party’s displayed position, stance or claim, another party can produce opposition by simply aligning against that position or by aligning with a counter-position. This means that parties can dispute a particular position for different reasons and by different means’ (p.281). Consequently, multiparty disputes are generally not described as two-party disputes with additional speakers, because additional participants may attempt to align themselves with a particular speaker but not necessarily with the position of that speaker. In this light, collaboration may provide a platform for introducing a new objection or agenda. Conflict outcomes As discussed above, most research on child conflict illustrates the type of verbal strategies produced, with provisional attempts made to describe sequences of these strategies. Consideration of the outcomes of children’s disputes is generally made only in passing. Although most studies specify the boundaries of conflict episodes – disputes ‘end with either clear settlements, physical movement of dispute participants from the interactive scene, or a shift away from the disputed event to a new topic or activity’ (Corsaro and Rizzo, 1990: 26) – attention to the form of closing sequences is limited. Samuel Vuchinich (1990) is one of the few who has attempted to identify the characteristics of utterances which bring about the end of disputes. He proposes five categories of conflict termination: submission, dominant third-party intervention, compromise, stand-off, and withdrawal. By far the most frequent of these (from recordings of families during dinner time) was the stand-off (66 per cent), which is defined as neither party submitting to the position of the other. In the same paper Vuchinich (1990) suggests that the closing of argumentative sequences is characterised by a two-slot structure. This structure displays either a ‘dominant/ submissive relationship between the participants’ or a ‘consensus on compromise’ (p.121). The notion of a two-slot structure (recognisable in other terminal exchanges – see Schegloff and Sacks, 1973) in the ending of disputes, appears in Genishi and Di Paolo’s (1982) work. However, Genishi and Di Paolo’s claim that arguments are brought to a close by unsuccessful attempts to participate (i.e. by not tying to previous content) appears circuitously flawed. In this case, the definition of closing is generated retrospectively and attempts are qualified as unsuccessful solely

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because the dispute is abandoned. On other occasions, where the same type of utterance is understood as relevant to the dispute and taken up by another speaker, the move is no longer considered ‘unsuccessful’ because the dispute proceeds. It could be argued that prediction of outcome, while facilitated by the knowledge of the dispute ending, should instead be based on a pattern of discourse recognised by the participants and demonstrated as universal by the researcher. Identification of patterns of discourse and utterance types which are instrumental in the closing of arguments is in many ways problematic. Ditchburn (1988) proposes a number of categories of de-escalation strategies used by the children (aged 4.5-6 years) she observed in three preschools. The first of these is negotiated compliance, which, from the example provided appears to overlap the category of compromise used elsewhere (Eisenberg and Garvey, 1981). A second de-escalation strategy is labelled as a topic change, where one speaker shifts from the dispute and introduces a new topic. (This topic change is a collaborative action, in that the other participants accept the shift and simultaneous abandonment of the dispute.) Tracking, a third category proposed by Ditchburn, appears to be a shift from the pretend to real frame, rather than a de-escalation strategy. That is, the dispute constitutes a negotiation of the play script; when one child’s suggestion regarding the state of play is acceptable to the other child, the pretend play may continue. Another de-escalation strategy put forward by Ditchburn (1988) is labelled trial and error, where the dispute may unravel at various points through unrelated discourse. Ditchburn also presents third-party tracking as a de-escalation strategy, but the example used to illustrate this strategy fails to qualify as adversative discourse, because the child’s question does not constitute a challenge to the previous speaker but rather a request for information. Negating the grounds for dispute identifies a justification which is not challenged by the play partner. Similarly, the category of role-related grounds appears designed to qualify a particular dispute ending rather than a form of de-escalation produced as effective on multiple occasions. Ditchburn’s (1988) categories are reported here to highlight the difficulties associated with identifying properties of conflict closings. An undisputed feature of conflict endings is that the conclusion is brought about by the collaborative effort of the parties involved. The successful resolution, dissipation or abandonment of conflict depends on the acquiescence of both or all parties. Vuchinich (1990) states that the end of a conflict episode is dependent upon the mutual participation of all participants. This is reached in one of two ways: either one child achieves a dominant position (which necessitates the resignation of the argumentative partner), or both parties negotiate an acceptable end to the disputing. As Eisenberg and Garvey (1981: 168) point out, the ‘successful resolution of an adversative episode is a mutual endeavor: a child is more likely to win if he considers his opponent’s intentions and more likely to concede if his own desires are taken into account’. As the primary aim of Eisenberg and Garvey’s (1981) study was to determine which verbal strategies were most likely to lead to conflict resolution, some emphasis

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was placed on defining clear-cut outcomes. However, the number of resolved disputes presented in their study must be interpreted in light of the method used to elicit arguments. For example, the small sample of children observed by Genishi and Di Paolo (1982) did not arrive at as many mutually acceptable conclusions to disputes as put forward in other research. The authors ascribe the absence of definite resolution in many cases to the spontaneous nature of the data (cf. Brenneis and Lein, 1977). Other differences in data collection procedure may also explain this discrepancy. For example, as Eisenberg and Garvey’s (1981) episodes were generated in pair-play situations in restricted space, a higher frequency of resolution should be anticipated. That is, in the laboratory setting the children had no other play partners to appeal to and nowhere else to go; resolution in this instance becomes necessary if any type of cooperative play is to be sustained. Attempting to isolate successful examples of conflict resolution is further complicated by the fact that in many children’s disputes a clear outcome does not exist: The majority of disputes, however, are terminated without any sharp indication that either position has ‘won’ or ‘lost’. In general, the end of an argument occurs when one of the two disputing parties does not tie his talk to the topic of the prior dispute, but instead produces an action that breaks the argument frame … and his adversary accepts this shift. Although compromise is seldom reached, nor sought as a goal of the interaction, by shifting to noncompetitive talk (between former disputants), parties cooperate in bringing about the closure of the dispute. Despite the absence of a clear outcome, disputing allows participants the opportunity to construct and display character, a process important in their social organization (Goodwin, 1982: 87-88).

The negotiation of social roles is an important feature of conflict, and not always dependant on outcome. Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) claim that the objective of the participants is to resolve the conflict, yet do not allow for the situation where the speaker’s aim may be to extend the conflict. That is, the type of conflict, or the child’s motivation for participating in the argument, will have bearing on the urgency of resolution. While the participant’s goal may be to resolve a dispute involving property rights, where attempting to assert status is a primary ambition, a cooperative conclusion may not be a satisfactory outcome. Patterns of closing sequences are also influenced by cultural communicative styles (e.g. Adger, 1986). Overall, ‘the reason for the empirical lack of resolution in children’s disputes is that a basic function of conflict is to achieve a concrete, particular social organization through the display of opposition and the construction of accountable alignment structures. Such organisation is accomplished without resolution of a dispute episode’ (Maynard, 1985b: 212). Given the contention that resolution is not readily achieved in children’s disputing, further investigation of conflict outcomes is warranted. If children are not always ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ arguments, how is it that arguments are brought

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to a close? And where disputes are resolved, how is this achieved? Other than the termination sequences identified above, what features of turn sequences are implicated in outcomes?

Limitations of existing research The body of existing research in children’s conflict presents a thorough account of what children argue about and the types of strategies children use during disputes. Essentially, what children do in disputes is well established. But questions remain as to how children co-construct conflict. The data in this book do not contradict the findings of earlier research, but rather extend beyond the preoccupation with types of ‘moves’ produced by children, to investigation of how these moves may be related to one another. With the exception of the ethnomethodological studies of Majorie Harness Goodwin, Charles Goodwin and William Corsaro, existing child conflict research has essentially been limited to an analytic emphasis on single utterances or a discourse analytic approach, largely overlooking the inherent properties of connectedness in adversative discourse. Discourse analysis, although moving beyond isolated speech acts, cannot adequately cope with the mechanics of how one turn relates to the next (cf. Jackson and Jacobs, 1980; see also Wooffitt, 2005). Analysis of sequences of strategies has been restricted by pre-emptive nominations of strategies. In attempting to classify the structure of the discourse in terms of sequences of single actions, ordering principles may be overlooked. That is, the serial production of turns might not be organised according to the externally allocated force of the utterance but through other properties of the discourse. The purpose of this research is to approach the data from another perspective, with the intention of uncovering universal properties of adversative discourse, specifically closing sequences, which are not limited by categories of actions imposed by the analyst.

 This denotes discourse analysis as conceived in linguistics, rather than the broader conceptualisation employed in social psychology (see Forrester, 1996).

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Chapter 3

Conversation Analysis

Introduction In the previous chapter, contemporary research in child conflict was discussed in terms of categories of analytic emphasis, underscoring the lack of attention given to the sequences of turns in children’s arguments. Emphasis has rested on the force of single utterances and the significance of these moves in a broader social context, yet the interrelatedness of the turns themselves has been largely overlooked. The premise here is that the method of conversation analysis is particularly suited to an investigation of the sequences and, subsequently, the outcomes of disputes. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to identify the relevant attributes of a conversation analytic approach and demonstrate their applicability to the study of child conflict. Essentially this chapter sets out to (1) locate the current study in the expanding field of research in conversation analysis; (2) summarily identify key concepts in conversation analysis for readers who may be unfamiliar with this methodology; (3) present an argument for the efficacy of conversation analysis as a tool for investigating young children’s peer interaction; and (4) discuss properties preference organisation as a principle of sequential talk that is relevant to adversative discourse. In the late 1960s, Harvey Sacks’ deliberative approach to the order of social interaction distinguished itself from the contemporary work of Harold Garfinkel (1967, 1972) and Erving Goffman (1961, 1963, 1971). With his prolific collaborators Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson, Sacks developed a rigorous model for the study of spoken interaction, establishing conversation analysis (CA) as a distinct field in sociological research. Whilst the theory of CA did not emerge entirely independently of Garfinkel’s pioneering work (departing from Parsonian theory) in ethnomethodology (Heritage, 1984; Taylor and Cameron, 1987), Sacks’ early work represented a critical shift in treating the inherent order of spoken language – uncovered through microanalysis – as a vehicle of social organisation and behaviour. Nor did conversation analysis rest on the platform of Goffman’s ideas; rather Goffman’s work opened the path that Sacks and Schegloff, in particular, would follow (Schegloff, 1988b). A discussion of the organic history of conversation analysis within contemporary sociological inquiry will not appear here. Not only does a thorough retrospective introduction fall outside the boundary of immediate relevance, the ontology of CA is comprehensively provided for elsewhere (e.g. Heritage, 1984; Schegloff, 1995; Psathas, 1995; ten Have, 2007; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2008). Similarly, the present chapter does not pretend to serve as a review of collections of conversation

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analytic research (e.g. Sudnow, 1970; Schenkein, 1978; Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Button and Lee, 1987; Psathas, 1979, 1990; Boden and Zimmerman, 1991; Drew and Heritage, 1992; Watson and Seiler, 1992; Firth, 1995; ten Have and Psathas, 1995; Ford, Fox and Thompson, 2002, Richards and Seedhouse, 2005; McHoul 2008). The discussion here is not concerned with exploring the breadth of studies in this field, but rather in highlighting the fundamental concepts in CA that serve as a basis for the investigation of disputes among preschool children. Attempts are continually made to classify the varying approaches to analysing spoken language (Coulthard, 1985; Schiffrin, 1994; Wooffitt, 2005), however, the borrowing and modification of methods suggests that the categorisation and interpretation of existing discourse theory is often blurred (Pomerantz and Fehr, 1997). Other models of discourse analysis are not discounted, but the present discussion is concerned with describing the particular advantages of a conversation analytic approach. Some commentary should be made, however, on the limitations of speech act theory, as this type of analysis essentially dominates earlier research in children’s adversative discourse. Even where not theoretically framed as such, labelling strategies as particular types of actions – as illustrated in the previous chapter – presents a classification of speech acts. Searle (1969, 1975a and b) developed this notion of speech act from Austin’s (1962) initial work on performatives in language, identifying the locution, illocution and perlocution of utterances. Whilst general accounts of speech act theory are provided for elsewhere (e.g. Allan, 1994; Mey, 2001; Levinson, 1983) it is pertinent to briefly identify weaknesses of speech act theory in its application to spoken (connected) discourse. An obvious difficulty of identifying acts within utterances is due to the fact that a single utterance may represent more than one speech act at any given time. ‘One serious weakness with speech act theory has been to pretend that each U [utterance] has only one illocutionary point’ (Allan, 1994: 4132; see also Labov and Fanshel, 1977). The notion of one-to-one mapping of a single act to each turn does not allow for the common performance of more than one speech act within an utterance (Levinson, 1981). Not only does this model fail to adequately account for multiple actions achieved in single utterances, not all moves can be affiliated with the catalogue of speech acts. Speech act theory does not account for all possible interpretations of utterances, be they direct or indirect, as demonstrated by the misinterpretation or confusion of questions and pre-sequences (Schegloff, 1988a). Another weakness in speech act theory concerns the opacity of speaker intention (Allan, 1994: 4132), as the illocutionary force is not always clearly displayed. The hearer’s response may not be consistent with the speaker’s original meaning. In other words, the type of action an utterance realises can be considered dependent upon the manner in which it is understood by the hearer. An utterance cannot, therefore, be understood to represent a particular speech act in the absence of the conversational context in which it occurs. Speech acts as hypothetical constructs (Emihovich, 1986: 496) present conceptual problems, as the acts themselves are only realised through actual conversation. Consequently, a limitation of speech

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act theory lies in the secondary importance of the immediate context in which conversation develops. Acknowledgment of context is essentially restricted to broader semantic fields. Recent research has also begun to reveal that participants pay very close attention to their local environment, for example the exact words spoken in the immediately prior talk, and use that knowledge to build appropriate subsequent talk. Such phenomena become inaccessible to study when analysis takes as its point of departure a gloss of a turn’s talk as an instance of a particular type of speech act (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1990: 85). Conversely, ‘the CA perspective embodies a dynamic approach in which “context” is treated as both the project and the product of the participants’ own actions and therefore as inherently locally produced and transformable at any moment’ (Drew and Heritage, 1992: 19). Conversation analysis is not only better equipped to deal with the influence of prior turns (local context), but to consider multiple meanings inherent in any single utterance. The merits of speech act theory are certainly not dismissed; nor is conversation analysis upheld as an infallible or exhaustive tool for the study of connected discourse. However, the focus on the sequence of turns in talk-in-interaction promotes CA as an apposite tool for the analysis of young children’s adversative discourse. Methodological advantages of conversation analysis The following summary illustrates procedural aspects of conversation analytic methodology which are particularly suited to the study of children’s conversations. Although multiple features may be shown to be ‘pertinent to a process-focused analysis of conflict talk’ (Garvey and Shantz, 1995: 95), three significant components will be discussed here. The first of these is the insistence on naturally occurring data which constitutes the empiricism of CA. Secondly, data-driven analysis is found to be more fruitful than a pre-theorised approach to children’s verbal interaction. Thirdly, CA is derived from the very rules of interaction that the speakers themselves orient to and is therefore particularly relevant to a study in which the researcher does not have member access to the group involved. A fundamental interest in the sequential organisation of conversation is also recognised as a dominant strength in CA and will be discussed further in this chapter. The recording of real interaction In order to analyse the rules of conversation that speakers themselves orient to, the issue becomes how these rules may be discovered; that is, what should constitute the data. In this regard, the development of CA was aligned with existing sociological practices rather than the contemporary methods in linguistics (namely

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the Chomskyan approach of constructing ideal phrases) given that emphasis is placed on recording naturally occurring data. [A] base for using close looking at the world for theorizing about it is that from close looking at the world we can find things that we could not, by imagination, assert were there (Sacks, 1984a: 25).

This method in conversation analysis is seen as preferable to other sources of data: those being generated by interview; observations recorded through fieldnotes or preconceived categories; native intuitions (or inventions); and contrived situations (Heritage, 1984). An additional advantage of reproducing naturally occurring conversation for analysis is that the analysis itself is open to review and the findings may be called into question. Results cannot remain an idiosyncratic set of observations ‘because others could look at what I studied and make what they could, if, for example, they wanted to be able to disagree with me’ (Sacks, 1984a: 26). Authentic conversation is seen as preferable to an imagined series of turns for a number of reasons. One of these is that a single phrase may be reasonably designed by intuition, but the development of a sequence of turns cannot be accurately predicted, and only unfolds authentically in talk-in-interaction. Indeed the complexity of turn-taking itself with speaker shift, pause and overlap (see discussion below) is a barrier to a fabricated account. Additionally, discourse does not unfold in a contextual void, and it is the speakers themselves (through their shared knowledge) who construct the framework of interaction. Specifically related to research in early childhood is the fact that the researcher is not a member of the subject group, and is therefore unqualified to assume what may or may not be feasible in a conversation produced by four-year-olds; William Corsaro (1997) makes a similar argument. Most obviously, only naturally occurring interaction can illustrate the richness of authentic conversation. In order to study conversation, therefore, the analyst should turn to naturally occurring data. The use of interviews would also be inappropriate given the age of the participants in the current study. It is arguable that preschool children’s stage of development limits the metalinguistic ability necessary in deconstructing verbal moves (cf. Becker, 1988). Yet regardless of the age of conversational partners, understanding of processes in conflict is best examined through actual events rather than through secondary reporting. Experimental procedures are similarly viewed to be insufficient in CA tradition, as they may be considered unrepresentative of natural behaviour. Although it could be argued that conversations recorded in laboratory settings follow the same rules of discourse as those in spontaneous exchange, the motivation of the speakers involved is inevitably altered. Obviously inseparable from the recording of naturally recorded data is the manner in which the interaction is transcribed. Transcription theory in CA allows for analysis not only of talk but of paralinguistic features of interaction which may be significant or meaningful to the participants. Consequently, transcripts used by

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conversation analysts mark every single utterance by each of conversationalists, turn-taking and overlap, pauses, hesitations, stutters, inhalations and exhalations, laughter, stress, intonation contour, pitch rate of speech, changes in volume and nonverbal actions such as gestures, gaze, body posture etc. (a discussion of transcription theory and procedure appears at the beginning of Chapter 4). Importantly, the task of transcribing the recorded interaction is assumed by the researcher her or himself, because repetitive review of the recorded data serves as a preliminary form of analysis. Additionally, the recorded interaction constitutes the data rather than the resulting transcript. The transcript serves as a representation of the conversation rather than a flawless mirror of the conversation itself, given the incompatibility of the written word and the many nuances of the spoken word (Moerman, 1988). Data-driven analysis Another advantage of employing conversation analysis in the study of young children’s arguments is the emphasis on data-driven analysis in favour of a precategorised approach. This is particularly relevant given the purpose of this study, namely to determine what it is that children are actually doing in constructing adversative discourse. The concept of unmotivated looking used in CA provides a theoretical route to discovering features of conversation, as opposed to features the researcher has established prior to analysis. Although certain categories of action may be generated as a result of the analysis, these are derived directly from the unfolding talk. An unwillingness to dismiss features of conversation as unrelated to the focus of investigation constitutes a particular strength of conversation analytic research. By allowing analysis to be directed by the data, CA distinguishes itself from other methods of discourse analysis. Rather than starting with a set of theoretical specifications of ‘structure’ or ‘action’ (cf. Parsons 1937) or with an a priori theoretical specification of particular actions (for example, Searle’s [1969] speech act specifications) or with a theory of the motivation of action such as the theory of ‘face’ (Goffman 1955, 1959, 1971; Brown and Levinson 1987), CA has avoided premature and idealized theory construction in favor of the empirical identification of diverse structures of practices (Heritage, 1995: 397).

This emphasis on empirical identification ensures that any feature of the interaction may be considered as possibly significant in the development of conversation. Although it can be argued that the researcher does not arrive at the data uninfluenced by a particular theoretical orientation, at best the analysis is not constrained by rigid boundaries of observation criteria. In other words, ‘the order found in conversational materials is not imposed by the analysts’ use of a priori conceptual schemes or coding categories, but discovered’ (Zimmerman, 1988: 418). The

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data-driven nature of CA methodology not only enables a broader approach to conversation (broad in the sense that any feature of conversation may be viewed as significant) but ensures that the conversation is not removed from the very source of its design. Rather than observing the aspects of conversation predetermined by a hypothesis, the researcher is able to attend to the actual production of conversation; that is, features of talk which are salient to the speakers themselves. The emic perspective of CA A fundamental issue in conversation analytic research, is a requisite preoccupation with the features of conversation which are significant or meaningful to the participants. This is related to the point made above that the analysis is datadriven: the researcher’s observations must be drawn from the turns constructed and organised by those involved in the interaction. This allows for findings which are based exclusively on the evidence which is open to, or indeed constituted by, the participants. The fact that the participant’s understanding of the development of the topic at hand is demonstrated on a turn-by-turn basis, means that this understanding is also on display for the analyst (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984). In other words: while understandings of other turns’ talk are displayed to co-participants, they are available as well to professional analysts, who are thereby afforded a proof criterion (and a search procedure) for the analysis of what a turn’s talk is occupied with. Since it is the parties’ understandings of prior turns’ talk that is relevant to their construction of next turns, it is their understandings that are wanted for analysis (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974: 729, emphasis in original).

This focus on the participants’ own orientation to the development of conversation is of particular value to the study of children’s verbal interaction. CA provides an approach to the discourse which is not removed from the children’s own understanding of the relatedness of each utterance. Consequently, by attending to the data in this manner, we are perhaps better able to identify those aspects of argument which are salient to the children involved. As discussed in the first chapter, an aim of this research is to determine how children manage conflict, as opposed to how adults interpret this management. Importantly, if the children ‘themselves do not display an obvious orientation to the ideas and concepts that the analyst thinks might be important, then it is hardly a tenable position to insist that such constructs are critical or even important’ (Forrester, 1996: 95). As ‘CA insists that the categories used to describe participants, action and context must be derived from orientations exhibited by the participants themselves’ (Goodwin and Heritage, 1990: 295), this approach to spoken language is particularly suited to discover the properties of verbal disputes which the children themselves respond to as significant. It is therefore necessary in the analysis of the conflict episodes (or,

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from a CA perspective, any conversation) to restrict observation to those functions which are apparent to participants and investigator alike. Sequential organisation of conversation Having established the importance of attending to features of conversation which participants themselves recognise as significant, it is necessary to clarify how these features may be identified. How can the analyst be confident that she is attending to features recognised by the participants? The answer lies in the sequential organisation of turn-taking systems in conversation. The pioneering work by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) established this fundamental notion in CA, outlining the rules by which the turn-taking system operates. The order of turns in conversation is such that each follows the last, where each new speaker attends to the previous turn in a way that is deemed relevant by all members. Conversation analytic research focuses on sequences of actions rather than single utterances removed from conversation (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984). Attention is given to the relationship between turns, rather than focusing solely on the function of each turn (cf. earlier discussion of speech act theory). By restricting analysis to single utterances, the interpretation of that utterance displayed by the next speaker in their turn at talk is neglected. The following discussion of turn-taking, repair and adjacency pairs outlines basic concepts established in conversation analysis which serve to illustrate participant orientation to talk-in-interaction. Turn-taking and repair A fundamental concept used in conversation analysis, underlying the ordered nature of social interaction, is the organisation of turn-taking. Although the features or conditions of turn-taking in conversation were developed throughout Harvey Sack’s lectures in the 1960s and early 1970s, they are presented most succinctly in the seminal publication ‘A simplest systematics for the organization of turntaking in conversation’ (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974). In this paper, the organisation of conversation is identified as both context-free in that the rules of turn-taking apply across any variety of social contexts, and context-sensitive in that any situational restraints may be incorporated in the interaction. By way of introducing their model for the organisation of conversation, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974: 700-701) make the following observations: (1)  Speaker change recurs, or at least occurs (2)  Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time (3)  Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are common, but brief (4)  Transitions (from one turn to a next) with no gap and no overlap are common. Together with transitions characterized by slight gap or slight overlap, they make up the vast majority of transitions

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Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes (5)  Turn order is not fixed, but varies (6)  Turn size is not fixed, but varies (7)  Length of conversation is not specified in advance (8)  What parties say is not specified in advance (9)  Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance (10)  Number of parties can vary (11)  Talk can be continuous or discontinuous (12)  Turn-allocation techniques are obviously used. A current speaker may select a next speaker (as when he addresses a question to another party); or parties may self-select in starting to talk (13)  Various ‘turn-constructional units’ are employed; e.g. turns can be projectedly ‘one word long’, or they can be sentential in length (14)  Repair mechanisms exist for dealing with turn-taking errors and violations; e.g. if two parties find themselves talking at the same time, one of them will stop prematurely, thus repairing the trouble.

Following these observations, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974: 704) propose that the turn-taking system for conversation can be exemplified by a turnconstructional component, a turn-allocation component, in the following set of rules: (1)  For any turn, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial turnconstructional unit: (a)  If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to involve the use of a ‘current speaker selects next’ technique, then the party so selected has the right and is obliged to take next turn to speak; no others have such rights or obligations, and transfer occurs at that place. (b)  If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a ‘current speaker selects next’ technique, then self-selection for next speakership may, but need not, be instituted; first starter acquires rights to a turn, and transfer occurs at that place. (c)  If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to not involve the use of a ‘current speaker selects next’ technique, then the current speaker may, but need not continue, unless another self-selects. (2)  If, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial turn-constructional unit, neither 1a nor 1b has operated, and, following the provision of 1c, current speaker has continued, then the rule-set a-c re-applies at the next transitionrelevance place, and recursively at each next transition-relevance place, until transfer is effected.

An important feature of the turn-taking system is that turns do not simply occur one after the other, serially, but that each new turn refers to or builds upon the preceding turn(s) sequentially (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2008: 38). This sequential organisation, most importantly for the analyst, allows for a demonstration of the

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hearer’s explication of the previous turn at talk. In other words it is ‘a systematic consequence of the turn-taking organization of conversation that it obliges its participants to display to each other, in a turn’s talk, their understanding of other turns’ talk’ (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974: 728). As the participants demonstrate their understanding of the previous utterance in their own turn at talk, this understanding or synthesis is also on display for the analyst. Given that an appraisal of an utterance (or an interpretation of the illocutionary force) is produced by the hearer in their turn at talk, the speaker of the first turn is able to correct any misunderstanding of their own contribution made in the previous turn. It is important to note that this continual opportunity to check and maintain mutual comprehensibility exists precisely through the placement of turns, the ‘next positioned linkage’ (Heritage, 1984: 256), that each utterance is relevant (unless overtly stated) to the immediately preceding turn. Indeed, where misunderstanding occurs, the opportunity for clarification or correction is located in the contiguous turn. The term ‘repair’ is used in conversation analysis to denote discourse revisions, and this label is not restricted to notable errors or replacement (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977; see also Sidnell, 2005). It is the turn-taking system that allows for repair initiations to be made throughout a conversation, where the inherent rule of relevancy ensures the trouble source can be recognised as occurring in the previous turn. The compatibility of the model of turn-taking with the facts of repair is thus of a dual character: the turn-taking system lends itself to, and incorporates devices for, repair of its troubles; and the turn-taking system is a basic organisational device for the repair of any other troubles in conversation. The turn-taking system and the organisation of repair are thus ‘made for each other’ in a double sense (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974: 724). It should be noted that a preference for self-repair exists in conversation (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977). That is, repair structure lends itself to the speaker correcting his or her own speech, primarily self-initiated or failing this where the repair is initiated by a co-conversationalist. Previous trouble sources, then, are only likely to be actively identified and replaced by another speaker when the original speaker forgoes the opportunity provided to correct his or her own error. This preference for self-repair may be deliberately revoked in verbal disputes, however, as other-initiated repair could be produced as a form of direct opposition. Indeed, other-initiated repair (suggesting an error has been made) may itself be treated as an antagonistic move. While it remains to be seen if overt repair made by another speaker represents a form of opposition in children’s arguments (cf. Maynard, 1986a), the organisation of turn-taking and repair indicates that the place to look for repair performed as a challenge lies in each subsequent utterance.  That speakers attend to the sequential nature of conversation is also evident where the expectation to make following turns is not met, with prefaces such as ‘by the way’ acknowledging an accountable departure from the preceding talk (Schegloff, 1984: 37).

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Adjacency pairs The concept of the adjacency pair is a particularly robust example of sequentially ordered turns, in that it consists of two turns where the first sets up an expectation of a specific second turn. Examples of these ‘basic sequential units’ (Schegloff, 1979: 210) include, greeting/greeting, question/answer, and invitation/acceptance. Built into the structure of adjacency pairs is the notion of conditional relevance (Schegloff, 1972) in that the first pair part places certain constraints on the type of utterance that is acceptable as a second pair part. A basic rule of adjacency pair operation is: given the recognizable production of a first pair part, on its first possible completion its speaker should stop and a next speaker should start and produce a second pair part from the pair type of which the first is recognizably a member. … A given sequence will thus be composed of an utterance that is a first pair part produced by one speaker directly followed by the production by a different speaker of an utterance which is (a) a second pair part, and (b) is from the same pair type as the first utterance in the sequence is a member of. Adjacency pair sequences, then, exhibit the further features (4) relative ordering of parts (i.e., first pair parts precede second pair parts) and (5) discriminative relations (i.e., the pair type of which a first pair part is a member is relevant to the selection among second pair parts) (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 296).

The adjacency pair serves as a powerful demonstration of the hearer’s interpretation of the previous turn. The position of the second pair part, namely occurring directly after a first pair part (with the exception of insertion sequences, discussed below), directly addresses the previous turn. What two utterances produced by different speakers can do that one utterance cannot do is: by an adjacently positioned second, a speaker can show that he understood what a prior aimed at, and that he is willing to go along with that. Also, by virtue of the occurrence of an adjacently produced second, the doer of a first can see that what he intended was indeed understood, and that it was or was not accepted (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 298).

  Whilst most units consist of pairs, adjacency triples are found in conversation and institutional talk, e.g. in the classroom question-answer-evaluation sequences are common.  Schegloff acknowledges the compatibility of the notion of conditional relevance (recognised in the constraints of summons-answer sequences (1968)), with the category of utterance pairs (later adjacency pairs) put forward by Sacks, and ‘use[s] these terms interchangeably’ (1972: 77).

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Failure to acknowledge a first pair part may be manifest by ignoring the other speaker. That is, supplying a relevant second is not the only type of hearer response; failing to respond is also heard as an accountable action. As the adjacency organisation creates an expectation of second pair part, when this second turn is not forthcoming it is heard as ‘noticeably absent’ (Schegloff, 1968). A common example of this can be found in the repetition of a greeting when the initial greeting receives no response. If the hearer’s failure to respond to the greeting cannot be attributed to inaudibility, the absence of a response is noticeable and may be interpreted as evidence of rudeness. For any second pair part, ‘its nonoccurrence is an event, upon which inferences can legitimately be based (by coconversationalists)’ (Schegloff, 1972: 77). An alternative explanation for the absence of a second pair part arises when a response is produced as another first pair part. This exception, however, does not indicate inattention to the adjacency pair structure, as the subsequent first pair part may simply be a manner of clarifying the original utterance in order to supply a second pair part. Two related utterances introduced between an adjacency pair are recognised as an insertion sequence: Speaker A (Q1):  Are you going to go see Jack? Speaker B (Q2):  What time are visiting hours? Speaker A (A2):  From three thirty till eight. Speaker B (A1):  Yeah, I’ll go this afternoon.

Indeed, the inclusion of an insertion sequence does not represent a departure from the inherent obligation of adjacency pairs but rather operates within these boundaries. Given that a response to a first pair part is constrained by an expectation of relevance, another first pair part is heard as addressing the initial utterance in some way. In other words, ‘since the insertion sequence is specifically done and heard as prefatory to the activity made conditionally relevant by the question, attention to that activity and to the question is thereby exhibited’ (Schegloff, 1972: 114). Consequently, adjacency pairs account for a highly structured organisation of turn-taking, occurring throughout conversation. ‘The rule that seems to obtain is extremely neat: An adjacency pair first part can go anywhere in conversation, except directly after a first pair part, unless the second first pair part is the first pair part for an insertion sequence’ (Sacks, 1995b: 534). As Sacks (1995b: 536537) goes on to demonstrate, the observation that first pair parts can occur at any point has considerable implications for the hearer(s) as they may be called on as the next speaker at any time and consequently must listen throughout the conversation. This obligation to listen is placed on the speaker also, as he/she must be accountable for his/her own prior contribution.

  Related to the notion of scorekeeping put forward by Lewis (1979).

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The observation that speakers must attend to the previous utterance highlights the fundamental importance of sequencing in conversation. As Schegloff and Sacks (1973) demonstrate, the accomplishment of any utterance (its locally determined meaning) must be looked for in the placement of the utterance in the organisation of conversation. Consequently, the basic unit of analysis (Heritage, 1984: 245) and the primary focus of conversation analysis is the sequence of turns. As the escalation or resolution (or indeed existence) of argument is dependent upon the orientation of subsequent turns to the development of the dispute, focusing on the sequential organisation of the discourse is pointedly appropriate. As noted by Jacobs and Jackson (1982: 228) ‘the characterization of argument in terms of sequential expansion is theoretically important because it emphasizes the collaborative work that goes into having and making arguments’; collaborative work which is on display for the analyst through the organisation of turn-taking. Built into the notion of sequential turn-taking, particularly in adjacency pair structure, is the concept of preference organisation, which we shall see features significantly in young children’s arguments.

Preference organisation The concept of preference employed in conversation analysis is one which accounts for the fact that not all second pair parts are heard as having equal status. A ranking of alternatives operates in conversation, and the ranking is determined by the local context. As discussed in the previous chapter, the composition of adjacency pairs is such that a first pair part sets up an expectation of a relevant second pair part. This relevance, however, extends beyond the type of action (e.g. answer) to the selection within an action category (e.g. acceptance). In other words, ‘the first part of an adjacency pair not only makes one of a set of type-fitted second parts relevant in next turn, but typically displays a preference for one of them’ (Schegloff, 1979: 36; emphasis added). Essentially preference organisation exists in the taxonomy of possible actions and operates at varying levels in conversation, from referential identification options for recipient design (Sacks, 1979) through to topic organisation. At all levels, inferences may be drawn when a first preference is not selected. To illustrate this point, Sacks (1995b: 368) uses the example of an invitation to dinner; serving food is only a part of the evening’s activities but preferred in the invitation itself, given that “Would you like to come over for a drink?” suggests that dinner will not be provided (as it should be mentioned in preference to other partial features of the evening). The idea of scaling alternative components operates not only   Inferences are also drawn where preferred (immediate) responses are produced, but derive directly from the response itself rather than its absence.  From this example it becomes apparent that the concept of preference is related to Grice’s maxims of conversation (1975, 1978), in this case the maxim of quantity (provide

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within utterances (regulating content) but governs the sequential organisation of conversation. This organisation, the manifestation of preference in turn-by-turn interaction, is explored throughout the first part of this chapter. Linguistic markedness Typically, preferred responses are produced without delay or hesitation and the action is stated directly or ‘properly done’, (Levinson, 1983: 333). Dispreferred seconds are recognisable from the following features: (1) they are delayed by pauses, and/or (2) they are introduced with prefaces (markers such as ‘well’, ‘uh’, partial agreement/appreciations/apologies, or qualifications); (3) they include accounts (explanations for not providing preferred response) and (4) a declination component which addresses the first pair part. Thus ‘the two essential features of dispreferred actions are thus (a) they tend to occur in marked format, and (b) they tend to be avoided’ (Levinson, 1983: 333). Consequently, markedness, or the absence of these markers, is indicative of the preference status of the turn. Although these features are not universally accepted as defining criteria of preference (as discussed below) they are overwhelmingly recognised as characteristic of preference in CA literature (e.g. Heritage, 1984; Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Goodwin and Heritage, 1990; Hutchby and Wooffit, 2008). An ubiquitous example of preference organisation is found in the following pairs of invitation and acceptance/rejection sequences published in Atkinson and Drew (1979: 58), where extract (i) provides a preferred second pair part and (ii) a dispreferred response: (i) B:   Why don’t you come up and see me some[times A: [I would like to (ii) B:         A: B: A: B:

Uh if you’d care to come over and visit a little while this morning I’ll give you a cup of coffee. hehh Well that’s awfully sweet of you, I don’t think I can make it this morning .hh uhm I’m running an ad in the paper and – and uh I have to stay near the phone. Well all right [And- uh [Well sometime when you are free to give me a call because I’m not always home.

As illustrated in the examples above, the preferred response is produced immediately and clearly, whereas in the dispreferred response the refusal is deferred until later in adequate information to be understood). The common ground of preference, Gricean cooperative principle, face-work (Goffman, 1967) and politeness theory (Brown and Levinson, 1987) will be discussed briefly in the final chapter.

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the turn and accompanied by an account (reason) for the rejection. The difference in position or ordering of items in preferred and dispreferred turns was originally noted by Sacks (1984b: 59): insofar as disagreements are pushed into the back, then there is a variety of things that go in front of them, that then can get treated as ‘going in front of disagreements’, and that may have an import in signalling the future forthcomingness of a disagreement. Components like ‘well’ and/or ‘I don’t know’, for instance, as the beginning of an answer turn, characteristically precede something less than agreement.

That is, a pause or hesitation frequently precedes the production of a dispreferred second action, and in itself may be interpretable as indicative of a forthcoming dispreferred response by the next speaker. Delays not only allow the prior speaker to pre-empt a dispreferred response, but also provide an opportunity to ‘modify or revise the first utterance to a more ‘attractive’ or ‘acceptable’ form, rather than simply using it to formulate an anticipation of rejection’ (Heritage, 1984: 274). The delay or pause may even be heard as the beginning of a failure to provide a second pair part, a zero response, which is also heard as dispreferred, given that silence is accountable. Similarly, such is the sensitivity of the immediacy of a preferred response that ‘when an acceptance is not done at this point, that is, immediately after a possible sentence completion point and in overlap with any components occurring after this point, that an inviter or offerer may take this absence of acceptance at this point as being possibly rejection-implicative’ (Davidson, 1984: 116). The final components of a first pair part, then, may be designed to preview the preferred or dispreferred nature of the response. As with delays or hesitations, preface markers (e.g. ‘well’, ‘but’) are also heard consistently as indicative of dispreference in conversation. In her study of speaker interruptions, Ahrens (1997: 83) found that most interruptions occurred after turn prefaces such as ‘well’, ‘well then’, ‘okay but’, ‘yes but’, ‘but’, ‘yeah no’ and so forth, and labelled these as ‘interruption[s] of a potential rejection’. Given that markers serve as an indication of preference status, the hearer may begin a subsequent version as soon as these items are performed. Consequently, interlocutors orient the subsequent turn to the dispreferred shape of the previous utterance (as demonstrated elsewhere, e.g. Davidson, 1984; Pomerantz 1975). Fundamentally, pauses, hesitations, and preface markers serve to hold the illocution of the turn until the end of the utterance. Contiguity, therefore, is incorporated into the identity of preferred turns. For example, ‘there is an apparent interaction between the preference for contiguity and the preference for agreement, such that, if an agreeing answer occurs, it pretty damn well occurs contiguously, whereas if

  Belonging to the category of discourse markers detailed by Schiffrin (1987). See also Sprott (1992).

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a disagreeing answer occurs, it may well be pushed rather deep in to the turn that it occupies’ (Sacks, 1987: 58). Another feature of dispreferred turns is that accounts or justifications are usually provided. Although accounts are identified as characteristic of dispreferred turns, description and discussion of this feature is scarce in comparison to analysis of prefatory markers. Accounts have been seen as evidence for the dispreferred status of certain second pair parts, such as rejections to invitations (Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 139). Elsewhere (Toolan, 1989: 262), parallels have been drawn between accountability as a defining feature of preference organisation and Grice’s (1975, 1978) maxims of conversation – quality, quantity, relevance and manner – which are discussed below. In sum, the dispreferred status of turns at talk are reflected in the arrangement of each turn. Levinson (1983: 333) notes that whilst preferred turns have little in common other than their relative brevity, dispreferred turns share many characteristics, although designed to respond to a wide range of first pair parts. Pomerantz (1984: 64) states that the preference status of actions can be located in the turn shape: preferred actions are typified by turns which are produced with minimum gap and overtly stated function; dispreferred actions, on the other hand, are produced in turns characterised by delay and ‘nonexplicitly stated action components’. Structural rather than psychological concept It is the form of the utterance, not the wishes of the interactants that typically defines the linguistic (abstract) concept of preference. That is, ‘the term “preference” refers to the structural disposition, to the fact that conversational organization conspires to make it easier to use the preferred type of turn, not to the participants’ wishes’ (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 38). Of course, the fact that speakers may attend to the preferred character of some actions over others in the design of turns containing those actions should not be taken as exhibiting, or as proof of, participants’ ‘actual feelings’ or intentions at the time. … Thus the term ‘preference’ in this context does not refer to a speaker’s psychological predisposition: instead it describes the systematic features of the design of turns in which certain alternative but non-equivalent actions are taken, as well as sequential organisation of such actions (Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 59).

  Atkinson and Drew (1979) use the term ‘defence’ to identify reasons which are given in response to allegations, distinct from ‘accounts’ in other contexts, as each form of accounting serves different purposes (the former to avoid blame, the latter to reduce the offence to the other speaker).

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This interpretation of the term ‘preference’ distinguishes it from the normal lay interpretation. The concept was originally used by Sacks to identify an abstract principle operating in conversation: If there is what we are talking about, namely, an abstract or formal preference for agreement, then we have to see that the questioner is designing the question not just to get a personal preference, but is designing the question with an orientation to getting agreement. … So the linkage of contiguity and agreement is oriented to by both questioners and answerers, can operate to avoid a disagreement, and is an aspect of a formal and anonymous apparatus for agreement/disagreement, rather that being a matter of individual preferences (Sacks, 1987: 63, 65).

‘Preferred’ actions are ones which are sought out; dispreferred actions are not. Sacks (1987: 64) notes ‘that there is one sort of way that a questioner can be seen to be orienting to getting agreement, i.e. they try to end up with a form that can be agreed with’. This orientation to elicit preferred responses is not only found within adjacency pairs, but is also manifested in surrounding talk. Pre-sequences, for example, ‘constitute a further procedure through which speakers can collaborate in forwarding preferred sequences or actions and avoiding (or aborting) dispreferred ones’ (Heritage, 1984: 278). It has been shown that pre-sequences, particularly to requests and invitations (Atkinson and Drew, 1979), are intended to avert the possible production of a dispreferred response. Conversational devices for avoiding dispreferred responses are not limited to pre-sequences. As Drew (1984: 146) demonstrates in his study of speaker reportings in invitation sequences, ‘through just reporting, recipients not only manage to avoid outrightly or directly doing a rejection; particularly, they also have speakers (co-participants) collaborate in seeing that, objectively or reasonably, an acceptance is not possible’. It is the organisation of the turn itself, therefore, that creates the expectation of a particular second action. While a general tenet of ‘preference’ is identifiable, as presented above, this does not equate to a uniform understanding of the theory, and as a result there is a muddiness in inference and application. Given that the concept of preference originates from Harvey Sacks’ lectures, and, due to his untimely death, the concept was not expanded or developed as originally conceived, it has ‘been construed in a variety of mutually incompatible, and sometimes methodologically questionable, ways’ (Bilmes, 1988: 161). The confusion in interpretation represents a fundamental problem in applying preference theory, a problem we move on to consider.

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Problems with preference Problems in applying preference theory arise from the disparity of interpretation, specifically in relation to the blurred distinction between linguistic and psychological paradigms. The fact that the linguistic form and the wishes of the participants overlap more often than not, causes considerable problems in sustaining a homogenous definition of preference that refutes psychological inferences. The following discussion not only identifies the debate concerning the abstract identity of preference, but also orients the interpretation of preference organisation as a framework for the current study of children’s arguments. Furthermore, the essential problem of categorising actions as either preferred or dispreferred will be exemplified in the conversational domain of arguments. Disparity of interpretation The features of preference described above have been challenged, specifically by Bilmes (1988) and Boyle (2000), for overextending the criteria of preference and for overlooking the inherent property of accountability (see Boyle, 2000). This constitutes a significant oversight given that the notion of accountability is a principal concept underlying conversation analysis theory (Heritage, 1984: 291). Specifically, the speaker is accountable for failing to provide a preferred response (accountability being tied to dispreferred responses, or silence). In Bilmes’ review (1988: 176), Levinson’s model is criticised for confusing reluctance with dispreference and for classifying actions based on the proportion in which they occur. Commentary on frequency of occurrence as a property of preferred turns (Levinson, 1983; Heritage and Watson, 1979; Atkinson and Drew, 1979; Sacks and Schegloff, 1979; Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977) can be challenged, as quantity does not serve as a criterion of preference. Whilst preferred turns may be performed more often than dispreferred turns, the frequency itself does not constitute preference status. Quantification, when broadly applied, as in this instance, ignores the fundamental importance of local context. Although supporting Levinson on certain points, Bilmes (1988) advocates returning to the original concept of preference proposed by Harvey Sacks and subsequently focuses on two aspects: the principle of ordering and that of relevant absence (i.e. where a preferred action is not performed). Bilmes (1988) reiterates that the concept of preference must be isolated from the motivation or expectations of the speakers to avoid the assumption of psychological conditions. Although Boyle (2000: 586) acknowledges that Levinson’s account of preference is well regarded, he also claims that Levinson’s ‘description of preference is not fully coherent’. Boyle recognises that ‘markedness and frequency of occurrence  Different scholars using the term to describe different phenomena is the essential problem. The fact that turns at talk are performed in distinctive ways is not in dispute (Pomerantz, 2003).

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are aspects of preference organisation’, but he argues that ‘the concept can only be adequately understood in terms of normative accountability and its role in achieving intersubjective understanding’ (Boyle, 2000: 601). In response to the confusion of defining preference, rather than castigating varying interpretations of preference as ‘misconstruals’ (see Bilmes, 1988), Boyle describes them as ‘aspects’ of Sacks’ original concept of preference. However, even where the concept is most closely related to Sacks’ original idea – expectation indicated by interpretation of an absent response – the interpretation of preference is blurred. Pomerantz (1984: 81) for example, does not use the term with any reference to social psychology, yet still opens the door to possible misinterpretation by identifying certain preferred actions as ‘natural, right and/or desirable’. Although the turn is not identified as preferred because of these qualities, using descriptions that invoke the speaker’s subjectivity obscures the line between psychological preference and the more abstract, sequential (linguistic) organisation operating in conversation. The supposed misapplication of the term ‘preference’ begs the question whether this line needs to be constantly redrawn. Confusion and debate is prompted by inferring a lay definition of the technical label. As Mey (2001: 152) comments, ‘markedness’ would serve as a more suitable term. I would add that continual effort to drag the concept of preference into the domain of abstractness is misdirected. Certainly, preferred (or dispreferred) turns do not always mirror the personal preferences of either the speaker or the hearer, but it does not follow that conversational preference is therefore entirely extraneous to psychological preference. Perhaps too much effort has been made to disassociate the concept of linguistic preference from psychological inferences. Undoubtedly preference organisation is identified by specific linguistic structures and does not necessarily reflect the motivations of the speaker. For example, a speaker may realise their personal preference in a dispreferred turn shape, such as declining an invitation. Yet, whilst linguistic preference may be identified as distinct from psychological preference it does not necessarily follow that the concept must wholly reject any organic relationship between linguistic markedness and broader social expectations of preferred actions. Why is it that preferred actions are, in fact, preferred? Evidently this preference is set up by the prior turn, but why is it that this prior turn orients to a particular type of response? Most CA researchers are at pains to adhere to a definition of preference that does not encompass the speaker’s wishes, yet it would appear overly ideological to insist that preference exists entirely independently from the participants’ expectations. While preference is recognisable as an abstract concept operating in conversation, that is, each turn can be shown to orient to the form of the preceding turn, the idea that this concept is built upon underlying conventions of social expectations (Lewis, 1969) should not be dismissed. In sum, while the properties of preference (specific turn shapes) can be identified and distinguished as functions of discourse organisation, it does not automatically follow that these functions have no relationship with broader social expectations.

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Extending the observation that personal preference and linguistic preference frequently overlap but are nevertheless distinguishable, Heritage (1984) suggests that preference is closely related to the maintenance of face (Goffman, 1955; Brown and Levinson, 1987) where ‘the term “face” may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact’ (Goffman, 1967: 5). Furthermore, if we acknowledge that the concept of preference need not necessarily be stringently disassociated from psychological preference, the relevance of facework and politeness theory (Brown and Levinson, 1987) becomes apparent. The question posed above, as to why certain actions take on preferred status, could be answered in terms of concessions to face needs and, subsequently, forms of politeness. That is, if an action is perceived as face threatening it is likely to be performed in a mitigated, less direct, dispreferred format. Conversely, as preferred actions are likely to be preferred because they do not threaten face, these actions can be performed directly. It follows, then, that preference norms may be flouted in performing intentionally face-threatening acts. Indeed, in a defence of their politeness model, Brown and Levinson (1987: 38) argue that face considerations are implicated in the preference status of actions; that is, dispreferred actions are typically face threatening acts. Elsewhere it has been less cautiously claimed (e.g. Holtgraves, 2000: 97) that dispreferred turns operate as face-threatening actions. This suggests that markedness not only signifies the expectation of a dispreferred response but that this response should be interpreted as managing a probable face threatening move. This point, however, should be challenged on the same platform as proclaiming particular categories of action as preferred or dispreferred; whilst certain face-threatening turns may be marked as dispreferred, dispreferred turns are not always face threatening, as illustrated in adversative discourse. Essential problem of categorising actions Having considered the blurred interpretation of conversational preference, the discussion now moves to the secondary problem of assigning fixed preference status to classes of actions. As is apparent from the examples used to illustrate features of preference above, preference organisation is often studied in specific sequential contexts, in invitation sequences, for example, or commenting on prior assessments. As such there is a tendency to attribute preferred status to a particular class of action, such as a preference for agreement (Sacks, 1987). However, ‘preference organization is not synonymous with the organization of agreement/ disagreement’ (Lerner, 1996: 305). Sweeping generalisations about classes of action present a flawed characterisation of preference organisation. Categorising types of action as preferred or dispreferred overlooks the fact that the ranking of alternatives is determined locally, by the preceding turn, and that preference organisation is not a hierarchical set that exists detached from interaction. Atkinson and Drew (1979), for example, identify certain actions

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(denials, justifications/excuses, counter-accusations) as preferred, rather than acknowledging that it is the local context which assigns preference status. Again, the overwhelming thrust of preference organisation is not that categories of actions be heard as preferred or dispreferred, but that each action may be interpreted as such given the expectations arising from the immediately prior turn.10 Perhaps the majority of denials following accusations can be shown to be preferred, but this frequency does not characterise the action as invariably preferred. Identifying turns as dispreferred or preferred without taking into account the immediate, sequential context in which they are produced (e.g. Kakavá, 2003) overlooks the very context that determines preference status. The misrepresentation of preference organisation is therefore found where types of turns are identified categorically as preferred or dispreferred. Attributing preferred or dispreferred status to a particular class of action (cf. Pomerantz, 1978, 1984; Ahrens, 1997) disregards the context-sensitivity of preference organisation. Essentially it is the manner in which an action is performed as expected or otherwise which is indicative of preference rather than the type of action performed in the turn. If emphasis remains on the turn shape (i.e. absence or presence of markedness, such as delay and accounts) rather than turn action, all-encompassing (and subsequently false) categorisation of preference may be avoided. For example, agreement is not universally preferred, but rather, more often than not, agreement is performed in an utterance which has a preferred turn shape (i.e. immediate and overt). To list categories of actions as preferred or dispreferred: glosses over the fact that all language is indexical (Garfinkel, 1967: 4-7) and that preference can only be determined in the circumstances in which action is constituted. Thus, as Coulter (1983: 362-363) points out, there might be a generalised preference in society for agreement, but there are clearly situations where disagreement is preferred, as for example, in responses to self-deprecations (Pomerantz, 1984: 83-95) or in argument sequences (Kotthoff, 1993) (Boyle, 2000: 587).

Indeed, argument sequences serve as the most striking example of types of actions being performed as preferred or dispreferred depending upon the local context (Bilmes, 1991: 464). Kotthoff’s (1993) study of preference organisation in adult disputes demonstrated that there is not a ubiquitous preference for agreement in conversation. Kotthoff noted that in her examples of university students arguing with professors, the pattern of preference changes throughout the interaction, stating that ‘a dispute is performed by a change in preference structure’ (1993: 196). This change, however, is not due to a change in markedness per se, but simply underscores the fact that the assumption of agreement as preferred second pair part 10  Clayman and Heritage (2002: 307) give the example of political news interviews where a question may invite disagreement.

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does not operate in this conversational domain. In other words, while disagreement may occur in dispreferred turn format at the beginning of the conversation, each subsequent objection becomes less marked until overt action of disagreement appears in preferred turn format. Once the argument is collaboratively recognised as such, ‘it is no longer preferred to agree. On the contrary, it seems to be very important to contradict quickly and in a coherent manner’ (Kotthoff, 1993: 203). This idea of inference drawn from failure to immediately oppose the prior speaker is taken up by Bilmes (1991: 466): ‘Once in a state of argument, disagreement is preferred in that if one does not explicitly disagree, it may be presumed that one has not found grounds to disagree and that (however reluctantly) one agrees’. The performance of disagreement as preferred appears to occur at the onset of children’s arguments, rather than gradually over a series of turns. It has been noted that children’s arguments are typified by opposition occurring in a preferred turn shape: rather than being preceded by delays, turns containing opposition are produced immediately. Moreover, such turns frequently contain a preface that announces right at the beginning of the turn, characteristically in the first word said, that opposition is being done (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1987: 207).

It follows that one cannot claim that agreement is a preferred action and disagreement a dispreferred action, as the local context determines the expectation set up by the prior turn. If preference cannot be assigned to categories of actions, we need clarify how the preference status of a second pair part is assigned. As demonstrated in this chapter, preference status refers to an organising principle operating in the local context of contiguous turns at talk – regardless of the degree to which underlying social expectations are recognised or dismissed. Essentially, the preferred or dispreferred nature of any action is performed by the speaker and consequently recognisable to the hearer (who performed the first pair part). Preference organisation is not, therefore, something to be guessed at, but rather is conspicuous to all participants. The place to look for preference status, then, is in the organisation of turns, in the construction or shape of each utterance. The turn shape remains a constant indicator of preference, with direct responses produced without delay indicative of a preferred response, while turns prefaced with delay and/or hesitation (reluctance) markers are characterised as dispreferred. Although Bilmes (1988) and Boyle (2000) argue that pauses, hesitation markers and accounts are not criteria of preference, they do not adequately discount these markers as indicators of preference. Turns are not preferred or dispreferred because of the absence or presence of these markers; rather these markers serve as an index of the preference status of the turn in which they appear.

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Applicability of conversation analysis Preliminary review of the data suggests that oppositional second pair parts are usually performed in one of two turn shapes, which points to the relevancy of preference organisation. As discussed above, the concept of preference organisation has become blurred due to variations in interpretation and accompanying application of the theory. It has been argued here that attention should be refocused on linguistic markedness as evidence or manifestation of preference. Essentially, the confusion outlined above could be addressed by using a more neutral term than ‘preference’ to describe the phenomena of unequal second pair parts. It remains to be seen, however, what label may serve as a suitable replacement. Presumably preference organisation operates in children’s adversative discourse by regulating the responses to possible forms opposition. Indeed, in the analysis of children’s arguments presented throughout the remaining chapters, turn shapes will be identified as sustaining or non-sustaining in terms of conflict outcome. It is premature, however, to propose a substitute term for ‘preference’ at this stage, prior to uncovering the role of preference organisation in the sequential organisation of children’s arguments. For this reason, turn shapes are referred to as ‘preferred’ or ‘dispreferred’ throughout the next chapters, specifically to denote opposition which is immediate and direct (preferred turn shape) and opposition which is delayed, either by pauses or makers, and incorporates accounts (dispreferred turn shape). The constancy of these features elucidates preference organisation in young children’s adversative discourse.

Chapter 4

Peer Disputes

An introduction to the data The previous chapter outlined fundamental principles of conversation analysis and presented this approach as ideally suited to the study of young children’s talk-ininteraction. Preference organisation in particular was considered as an organising principle of talk, as the prevalence of preference features in the children’s disputes will become evident in this and the subsequent two chapters. This chapter is concerned with providing the reader with a background to the data in this research, before systematically analysing the turn shapes of utterances in the children’s disputes. Children attending two long daycare centres in inner Melbourne participated in the main study. Children, parents, teachers and each centre director consented to be involved in the research, which effectively allowed observations (video and audio recorded) of the children’s spontaneous peer interactions each morning for a period of two months. All children participating in this study were aged between 3;11 and 5;3 at the time of recording, and all but one of these children (the youngest) would be entering formal schooling in the following year. Some children attended the centre five days a week, but all children were enrolled at least three days per week. A total of 36 children participated in the study; 15 girls and 21 boys. As identified by socioeconomic rating of residential suburb, children were from middle class families and English was the dominant language; the few children whose first language was not English had developed near-native proficiency. A pilot study (undertaken with the four-year-old group in a long daycare centre near a university campus which is frequently involved in research projects) resolved issues of age of participants (three-year-olds resorted to physical conflict in many cases, so the four-year-old group was selected to allow focus on verbal processes); viability of naturalistic observation of conflict (spontaneous disputes were observable, recordable, without compromising ethical responsibility); and activity type as observation context (recording to be undertaken indoors for audibility; and video camera to remain stationary as moving equipment proved distracting to the children). Observations were recorded over a period of six weeks in each centre (two weeks were spent in the centre prior to recording observations, to allow children the opportunity of familiarity with the researchers and video and audio equipment). Recording usually took place in the mornings as this time of day proved optimal for peer interactions in free play situations. Acknowledging the observer’s paradox (Labov, 1972a) and particular limitations of recording in preschool environments

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(e.g. Graue and Walsh, 1998; Fine and Sandstrom, 1988), the data was collected with seemingly minimal disruption to the children’s environment (see also Corsaro, 1985). The transcripts The data are not only influenced by collection procedure, but also by the manner in which the verbal dialogue is represented for analysis, deserving some further discussion here. A primary concern is the extent to which the final transcript is representative of the recorded interaction. Transcription is universally recognised to be constrained by the perspective of the researcher and the purpose of the research. Consequently, the shift of recorded data from oral to written form is inherently theory bound. As noted by Ochs (1979: 43, emphasis in original text), ‘the problems of selective observation are not eliminated with the use of recording equipment. They are simply delayed until the moment at which the researcher sits down to transcribe the material from the audio- or videotape’. Central to the concern of valid interpretation of data, then, is the manner in which it is transcribed. Features of transcription which provoke theoretical discussion include spatial representation of text (Ochs, 1979; Edwards, 1993), segmentation of text (Gumperz and Berenz, 1983; Lampert and Ervin-Tripp, 1993; Bloom, 1993; Johansson, 1995) and appropriacy of transcription conventions (Du Bois, 1991; Edwards, 1993; Du Bois, Schuetze-Coburn, Cumming and Paolino, 1993). Given that ‘no transcript is completely theory-neutral or without bias’ (Edwards, 1993: 3), considerable effort should be made to validate the written organisation of verbal data. The transcript should also be recognised not only as theory bound, but also as theory shaping, because inclusion or exclusion of particular features promote specific recognition (Du Bois, 1991). A particular concern in generating a written record of talk-in-interaction is the representation of turns at talk. Obviously, a new speaker signifies a new turn, but subsequent utterances produced by the same speaker are not so clearly distinguishable. Establishing what constitutes a new utterance proves difficult to tie down, given that transcribers frequently work from an intuitive basis and attempt to construct a retrospective justification or definition of the turn as a unit. Essentially new turns by the same speaker are distinguished by a combination of intonational contour and pause length (Edwards, 1993: 20). In other words, the turn can be defined as ‘a rhythmically bounded, prosodically defined chunk, a   Ochs (1979) argues that the researcher must consider the ‘conceptual underpinnings’ (p.51) of a transcript and evaluate the bias associated with spatial alignment and organisation of speakers. Although she advocates participant columns and justification of speaker assignment, it should be noted that this recommendation is particularly relevant to adult/child discourse, and not compatible with many software programs designed for transcription of speech.

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lexical string that falls under a single intonational contour’ (Gumperz and Berenz, 1993: 95). This working definition is employed in the current study, to distinguish between intra- and inter- turn pauses. As research presented in this monograph adopts a conversation analytic (CA) framework for the study of children’s arguments (see Chapter 3), the method of transcription adheres to the model generated by Gail Jefferson (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974: 731-734; see Appendix A). In conversation analytic research the transcripts serve as an account of the features of the discourse identifiable as pertinent for analysis (Psathas and Anderson, 1990). While a list of transcription conventions is given at the beginning of Appendix A, a brief account of the most frequent features in the transcripts follows. Given the interest in turn-taking in CA, attention is given to transition relevance places: terminal contours are marked (e.g. rising or half-rising) and overlap or pauses between turns are recorded. Emphasis within utterances is recorded in a number of ways. Emphatic stress is recorded by underlining letters or syllables and lengthening of syllables is demonstrated by the use of a colon. Changes in pitch are marked within the transcript with arrows, changes in volume are noted with capital letters (louder) or degree signs (softer). A convention not employed universally in CA (although certainly recognised), but used in this study, is the dollar symbol ($) to indicate ‘smile talk’ (where the child is on the verge of laughing). Elsewhere, overlapping speech is marked on the page at the point of overlap (i.e. indented in the text so the phrase occurs directly below the point at which it overlaps the prior utterance). Throughout the text and in Appendix A, however, overlaps in the data are simply marked with square brackets [overlapping utterance] and are kept flush left on the page to avoid formatting problems. For clarity, double square brackets are used [[overlapping utterance]] in instances of multiple overlap. Where single utterances are provided as examples in the discussion (particularly in Chapter 4), brackets are retained despite the non-inclusion or reproduction of overlapping talk. The brackets could be omitted where the turn is discussed in isolation, but it is important to remember that these examples are taken from extended sequences of talk where overlap does occur. Due to background noise in all of the recordings, inbreaths (.hhh) and outbreaths (hhh) were marked only where audible. Likewise only exaggerated emphasis is underlined in the transcripts. Where speech is unintelligible the letter ‘x’ represents a syllable. Features of significance noted in the analysis/discussion are marked in bold. Information provided in the headers for each episode was abbreviated for inclusion in Appendix A. In the transcripts presented in later chapters, there is little deviation from standard orthography, and the exceptions represent an atypical production made by the speaker. Although a CA approach advocates conveying the closest approximate description of the word production, readability of the transcripts (particularly in  Although Gail Jefferson continued to expand the range of suprasegmental features recorded in CA transcription (see Gardner, 2001 for a succinct discussion of shifts in pitch), only exaggerated shifts were marked in the present study.

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the case of child speech) is a competing issue. Although the manner in which the spoken word is reproduced (other than standard spelling) can be shown to be analytically significant (Jefferson, 1996), in the current study conventional orthography is for the most part appropriate (as idiosyncratic pronunciation did not prove to be particularly significant in dispute outcomes). The most common exception to this is abbreviations used by the children (e.g. the appearance of ‘coz’ as a shortening of ‘because’). Most importantly, conversation analytic tradition underscores the necessity of referring to the original audio or video recording as the ‘data’ and fundamental substance for analysis. The analysis is concerned with what occurs in the conversation rather than what appears in the reporting of the conversation. The transcripts should be seen as providing those not present with an opportunity to review the interaction in a secondary form. It is important to recall, therefore, that throughout the following chapters, although the transcripts are used to illustrate specific features of the adversative discourse, the analysis itself is based on continual review of the audio and video recordings. Additionally, the transcripts serve a more significant function than simply providing the outsider with an image of the discourse under observation. As the CA tradition calls for the researcher to transcribe his or her own data, the transcription itself serves as a form of analysis. The process of transcribing one’s own material allows the researcher to become aware of salient features of the interaction. Through constant repetition and review of the audio recordings, notable phenomena begin to appear. A total of 60 verbal disputes were recorded in two preschool centres and transcribed (35 arguments recorded in Observation 1 and 25 arguments in Observation 2; full transcripts are provided for all episodes in Appendix A). The discrepancy in the number of arguments between the two groups is not necessarily representative of a higher incidence of conflict in the first observation environment for a number of reasons. The most conspicuous of these is a difference in audibility; the second observation playroom was noisier, making children’s voices indistinguishable at times. Any discussion of the differences in the arguments recorded in the two preschools must therefore be made cautiously. The intention to record in similar play contexts, for example, was not always realised, as inaudibility in the second observation environment precluded the inclusion of a number of episodes, and the movement of children to outside play or to other activities meant fixed recording in the block corner was not always feasible. Neither does the number of arguments recorded definitively reflect the proportion of arguing in the children’s play, as the observer was located in a fixed position in the playroom and witnessed only those disputes occurring between children within the proximity of recording equipment.  For the purpose of establishing the reliability and accuracy in transcribing the children’s arguments, the transcripts were submitted to a panel review of researchers experienced in CA methodology.

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Although not all recorded disputes occurred in block corner, the inclusion of dramatic play and other activities (e.g. fishing with magnets) did not secure an equal distribution of girls’ and boys disputes as hoped for. Indeed, half of the 60 disputes included in the data were between boys. Whilst this study does not set out to compare frequency of disputes or differences which are specifically attributed to gender, the disproportion of the data set is acknowledged. However, given that a almost a third of the disputes involved only girls, and the remaining episodes were generated by both girls and boys, some degree of representativeness has been maintained. Comparison of frequencies or distribution of disputes in the two child care centres should also be made warily due to age differences between the two groups. Given the difference in time of observation, the children in the second observation environment were (on average) five months older than those in Observation 1. A discrepancy in ability to manage conflict may be looked for here. Differences in pedagogic style (see discussion below) can also be acknowledged as a probable influence on conflict in the playroom – the teacher in the second observation environment was not heard to intervene in the disputes recorded. Furthermore, differences may also be attributed to the higher proportion of children in Observation 1. Conditions which can, however, be more definitively tied to frequency of adversative episodes in this study are discussed in the next section. This preliminary discussion of the data evidently does not account for all social features which influence the manifestation of peer conflict, but rather introduces the data by way of features identified in existing research in child conflict (see Chapter 2). Frequency and types of conflict A measurable condition influencing the frequency of conflict can be attributed to the physical play area and available resources. This type of constraint can be defined as both micro-local (related to the particular play scenario) and macro-local (the physical space of the playroom). An example of the first condition is found where access to play equipment is restricted. For example, numerous arguments in the first observation environment developed during the magnet fishing game, because there were only two fishing rods available for the children to play with (Episodes Ob1.6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11; transcripts provided in Appendix A). The second condition (physical play space) also appears to influence the frequency of conflict, specifically according to the number of children in a certain area. In the first child care centre, there were fewer arguments directly after naptime, for example, because the resumption of play was staggered, with children

 Although more children were enrolled in Ob2, the proportion of space and number of children playing inside was relatively stable across the two observation environments.

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waking and returning to the playroom at different times. In the second preschool, where children were free to move from inside to outside play areas, the greatest number of disputes (Ob2.8, 9, 10, 11, 12) were recorded on a very wet morning when all children were forced to play inside. Consequently, a greater demand on resources (micro- and macro-local constraints) suggests a higher incidence of disputes. In order to discuss the frequency of particular types of disputes a temporary classification needs to be made. The following classes of types of disputes refer back to the categories discussed at the beginning of chapter two. Although it could justifiably be argued that rigorous definition of these categories should be provided (as the proportion of occurrence is wholly influenced by the categorisation itself) the following labels are not intended to quantify types of argument precisely, but simply to facilitate a general description of – and introduction to – the types of arguments recorded. In other words, these categories do not directly inform the current analysis, but rather serve as a preliminary review of the data in line with findings from existing studies. To this end, four major classes of disputes were identified in the audio/ video recordings: object/ownership (cf. Phinney, 1986); play script (elsewhere categorised as ‘nature of play’ – see Corsaro and Rizzo, 1990); local rules (cf. Malloy and McMurray, 1996); and truth (cf. Genishi and Di Paolo, 1982). It should be noted that categories overlap due to shifts of focus within disputes. For example, a dispute may initially be recognised as an object dispute (rights to a cardboard box) but could also be labelled as a negotiation of the play script (the application or use of the cardboard box) – e.g. Ob1.24. For the purpose of this discussion, episodes were categorised according to the nature of the opening of the dispute. Object/ownership disputes were common in both groups, arising in situations where children would argue over rights to an object, or claim prior ownership (e.g. Ob2.2). Occasionally the access rights under dispute pertain to non-concrete entities (e.g. a song in Ob1.4). Arguments about the organisation of play (play script) were dominant in Observation 1 (13 of 35) but were least frequent in Observation 2 (2 of 25). Typically this type of dispute focused on negotiating the function or role of objects in the play context (e.g. Ob1.31). Local rule disputes arise from challenges to behaviour deemed acceptable within the playroom (again, more frequent in Observation 1). This encompasses both broader social expectations (e.g. Ob1.23) and rules proscribed by the teacher (e.g. Ob2.21). The final category (truth) refers to challenges of knowledge or factual accuracy (e.g. Ob2.3), the majority occurring in the second observation environment. A notable difference between the two groups lies in the proportion of the varying types of disputes. While ownership disputes are relatively common in   On two occasions, observation sessions were held in the afternoon in Ob1 due to morning activities scheduled for the four-year-old group.  A summary of dispute types is given in Appendix A.

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both preschools (28.6 per cent in Observation 1 and 56 per cent in Observation 2), the remaining three categories show an inverse proportion: play script (Ob1 – 37.1 per cent, Ob2 – 8 per cent), local rules (Ob1 – 25.7 per cent, Ob2 – 8 per cent), and truth (Ob1 – 8.6 per cent, Ob2 – 28 per cent). However, if ownership/ object disputes and arguments over the play script are recognised as intrinsic to the development of play, and local rules and truth disputes are grouped as not organically derived (i.e. monitoring behaviour rather than imbedded in the play scenario), the proportion of disputes in both preschools is strikingly similar (65.7 per cent: 34.3 per cent in Ob1 and 64 per cent: 36 per cent in Ob2). However, any discussion of the ratio of disputes must be made cautiously. Not only is the categorisation of children’s disputes inherently subjective (despite best efforts to define objectively), the number of participants and length of observation in the current study prevents grand, sweeping commentary on definitive classification of preschool disputes (not to mention criticisms of quantitative analysis with a limited sample). Furthermore, given that existing studies use idiosyncratic categorisation of types of disputes, it is difficult to compare findings. The prevalence of object disputes, however, is reported universally (Shantz, 1987; Hay and Ross, 1982; Eisenberg and Garvey, 1981; Genishi and Di Paolo, 1982) and the frequency of play script disputes was also reported to be high in nonlaboratory settings (Corsaro and Rizzo, 1990). Additionally, no firm conclusions can be drawn from the correlation existing between gender and frequency of disputing. Although a greater number of arguments recorded in the transcripts involve boys, this may indicate manner rather than prevalence of conflict. That is, boys’ arguments are typically more overt and subsequently more likely to attract the observer’s attention due to a greater incidence of raised voices and overtly physical play. Activity type has also been acknowledged as influencing the proportion of disputes according to gender, even though both boys and girls played in block corner, and nearby activities are included in the data. Omitting analysis of gender and frequency of disputes does not suggest that no correlation exists, but rather that the procedure of the data collection in this study precludes sustainable conclusions. Whilst conflict patterns can be considered as gendered (Aronsson and Thorell, 1999), the purpose of this research is to identify patterns which are intrinsic to adversative discourse, to identify turn shapes which are produced by both girls and boys. That is, this research seeks to identify common disputing practices as a prelim to looking for variation within these practices. What is proposed here is further exploration of generic linguistic practices in children’s disputes with the intent of uncovering patterns of discourse which are related to outcome; patterns attributable to both girls and boys. From this platform, differences in children’s gender, age and friendship groups may be looked for. The primary consideration remains to better understand governing principles of how children go about resolving disputes.

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Teacher attitudes to conflict intervention As discussed in earlier chapters, external (non-linguistic) influences on children’s arguments, although not focused upon in this monograph, should be acknowledged. While the relative social status (power relationships) among children has been recognised elsewhere (see Chapter 1), as has the link between friendship and the frequency of arguments (see Chapter 2), the role of the teacher in establishing and monitoring group dynamics may also be influential in the prevalence of conflict in the preschool playroom. Although this feature is not directly incorporated in the analysis presented here, it is prudent to note that the expectation of appropriate behaviour of preschool children is influenced by the teacher. To ascertain staff attitudes to assisting children to manage peer conflict, informal interviews were held with teachers at the completion of each observation round. While both teachers reported similar theoretical approaches, their practical intervention strategies were performed in markedly different ways, a difference which may have been informed by pedagogic experience; the teacher in Observation 1 was younger and comparatively new to the profession. The teacher in the first observation centre stated that she was inclined to let the children negotiate their own disputes and would intervene only when the children were crying (see Danby and Baker, 1998), shouting or otherwise visibly upset or angry, or if the conflict escalated to physical exchanges such as hitting. She reported that once involved she would ask each child to tell their own version of events, thereby creating an opportunity for each child to listen to the other, as well as establishing for herself the nature of the problem. If the children were not able to propose a viable solution she would impose one. The children’s individual abilities to manage conflict were noted by the teacher, with reference to children’s varying needs of staff support to negotiate with peers. In response to questions about the instructional phrase ‘use your words’ the teacher indicated that children were coached to express how the other’s behaviour made them feel, encouraging children to recognise the emotions of others. In relation to the frequency of disputes in the playroom, the teacher in Ob1 commented that there was a greater proportion of adversative discourse at the beginning of the year and that as time progressed the children were arguing less. She attributed this to familiarisation with the new playroom, teacher and increased challenges, and children recognising certain limitations, specifically sharing toys. The teacher also noted that the children were more likely to ‘work out’ a dispute if they were friends (as discussed in Chapter 2). She added that the motivation to argue was not always driven by the play context, but sometimes by the mood of the children, who were more likely to argue ‘for the sake of it’ or be easily annoyed when they were tired. The teacher in the second observation environment saw her role as clarifying the perspective or intention of each child for his or her playmate(s). She believed in talking through the problem because one (or both) participant(s) may not have the resources to explain their internal state. She noted that it was important to

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clarify each child’s motivation before moving on to consider what action could be taken to resolve the problem. The teacher spoke of the importance of not assigning blame in these situations, as most offences are not made intentionally. The teacher insisted that the self-esteem of the children involved in a dispute remain a priority, perceiving her responsibility being to assess which child’s needs appeared greater, recognising that it is not always the child who has been wronged who is in greater need of support. As far as suggesting strategies for children to manage conflict, the teacher in Ob2 noted that the advice would vary for each individual child, given their specific needs. It was her intention to provide the children with strategies for them to cope independently rather than focus on solving the immediate problem. As a general strategy, the teacher referred to the common theme of identifying internal states, in other words ‘tell the other child how you feel’. In relation to the instruction ‘use your words’ the teacher emphasised the importance of following this through by monitoring the response. She expanded this point by underscoring the fact that most children of this four-year-old age group are able to express their dissatisfaction (“I don’t like it when you do that”), therefore attention should be given to the other child’s ability or willingness to listen. The teacher also acknowledged a relationship between language skills and ability to manage conflict situations; that children with less fluency were unable to articulate their position and consequently were more likely to become more frustrated and resort to physical confrontation. She emphasised the fundamental importance of communication skills for a successful future. Types and sequences of strategies Whilst acknowledging the influence teachers may have on children’s peer interaction, the purpose of this study is to determine how children manage disputes without the direct support of an adult. In earlier research (see discussion in Chapter 2) attention was given to the types of strategies young children used in arguments (Eisenberg and Garvey, 1981; Genishi and Di Paolo, 1982; Brenneis and Lein, 1977; Boggs, 1978). Whilst previously established categories of strategies (e.g. insistence, modification, reasons, counter assertions, conditional directives, compromise, denial, requesting evidence, and insults) were evident in my data, quantitative evidence is not reported here as it does not contradict earlier findings and is not the primary focus of the analysis. Relevant to this research however, are existing claims relating to possible or probable sequences of these verbal strategies. Elsewhere it has been noted that one utterance prompts a particular type of response, and that semantic continuity is a distinguishing feature of adversative discourse (Brenneis and Lein, 1977). This continuity, however, has been looked for within categories of strategic actions mentioned above. Whilst sequences of strategies may follow particular patterns (Boggs, 1978), given that the strategies are an imposed categorisation, the sequence is also externally imposed. These

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sequences may indeed operate probabilistically, yet the task at hand is to establish if an organising principle is evident to the participants themselves. As hearers, the children involved in disputes may not recognise prior utterances as a particular type of strategy, but may attend to other features of the discourse. Of particular interest is the absence or presence of pauses, hesitation or direct opposition markers and the plausibility of accounts. Consequently (as with outcomes of disputes) a thorough discussion of sequences of disputes appears in the following chapters. We now turn our attention to the organisation within the disputes that become apparent when viewed from a different perspective – an alternate methodology. As detailed in Chapter 3, conversation analysis is proposed as eminently useful in uncovering significant features of children’s arguments. Existing research and preliminary review of the data suggests that preference organisation is pertinent to the sequences of turns in these disputes. So this Chapter progresses to consider features of turn shapes in the children’s adversative discourse. During the process of transcribing the 60 disputes recorded with both groups of four-year-old children, preference features emerged as overwhelmingly present. That is, utterances in these naturally-occurring arguments appeared to be consistently performed in either preferred or dispreferred turn shape. Although the data presented here may appear to apply preference organisation as an analytic framework, it is important to emphasise that these patterns emerged from the data. Unmotivated looking while repeatedly transcribing the children’s disputes uncovered particular and regular types of turn in the dispute. The reader is reminded that analysis presented here is reported after the fact: the data, and particular features of the data, came first. Preference features in the children’s utterances If a principle for agreement operates in conversation (Sacks, 1987), then it stands that this principle is revoked in conflict situations. That is, if speakers do not disagree with one another, adversative discourse is not sustainable. A purpose of the analysis, therefore, is to determine if the performance of preference organisation in disputes (i.e. linguistic markedness) mirrors this reversal of conversational preference. The purpose of this and subsequent chapters is to illustrate typical features of preference, and to demonstrate how these features are significant in children’s disputes by influencing the outcome of disputes. If we continue on the assumption (see discussion in Chapter 3) that disagreement is preferred in order for adversative discourse to be sustained, it remains to be seen if the turn shape (preferred or dispreferred) of the opposition influences the subsequent turn(s). Before establishing a possible interdependence between preference and the progression and conclusion of disputes, however, features of the turn shapes in the children’s arguments need to be examined. This chapter exemplifies the prevalence of the following turn components: immediate responses, short turn

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length, direct action (preferred turn shape), pauses, delay markers, and deferred statement of intent (dispreferred turn shape). Preferred turn shape As discussed in Chapter 3, preferred turns are typically produced without delay, the turn length is usually short and the action (locution) is overt and direct. These elements (immediate response, turn length and directness) were identified throughout the arguments recorded in both observation environments. The data recorded are presented below by identifying each characteristic of preferred turn shape in turn: immediacy; brevity of utterance and explicitness of action being done. Immediate responses Turns are identified as occurring immediately or contiguously where less than 0.2 seconds elapsed, marked as a zero time lapse (appearing in the transcripts abutting the prior turn). Where the inter-turn pause is timed under 0.2 seconds, the gap is not noticeably hearable as a significant pause. Pauses of less than 0.2 seconds made by the speaker within an utterance were heard as noticeable, and are subsequently recorded as (.) in the transcripts. This type of preferred format (produced without delay) is seen throughout dispute episodes, in initial opposition moves, in utterances during the argument and in later turns once the argument is well established. The notable finding here, then, is that immediate responses are not limited to the opening of adversative discourse. Ob2.4 1 JAK: 2 LOU:

oh (then the two of us can) do it today? no i can do it¿

Immediate responses are not limited to simple contradiction of the prior utterance (although frequently used in this type of inversion) because counter-challenges are also made without delay, as are criticisms of the prior speaker. Ob2.22 7 PAU: 8 NIG:

i wrecked my thi↑ng (0.2) and it wasn’t yours¿ yeah and i put those things up there¿

Ob1.7 12 13 14

not till you (0.2) say sorry Sam. (0.4) ((silly voice)) sorry Sam dee↑dee:huh. ↑no: (.) properly.

JON: TES: SAM:

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Responses are also considered to be produced without substantial delay where there is less than a 0.3 second delay between turns. Whilst a 0.2 second pause between utterances is marked in the transcripts, the gap (as with delays of less than 0.2 seconds) is not heard as significant. The brevity of this time lapse is not noticeably hearable as a pause, whereas a 0.3 second or greater silence or absence of nonverbal behaviour is distinguishable as a gap or delay between turns. Consequently, when turns are produced with less than (0.3) seconds delay, this is considered to be an almost immediate response. Contiguous responses, then, are identified where there is no delay (latched utterances) or following a pause of less than 0.3 seconds. Ob2.1 8 MIR: gimme one of them. (0.2) 9 CAZ: i am not going to. Ob2.7 2 ELI: that’s not a girl that’s a bo::y. (0.2) 3 CAZ: girls wear pants.

Immediate utterances constitute varying types of responses. Usually, preferred turn shapes are tied in semantic content and syntactic structure to the previous turn, often with minimal addition of novel information – an example of format-tying (Goodwin, 1990; see Chapter 2).When turns are repeated or partially repeated (adding to prior content) the previous turn, in most cases there is no significant delay. Ob2.4 2 LOU: no i can do it¿ (0.2) 3 JAK: NO: I WANNA Do it.

Often this type of repeat is used to contradict the prior speaker, with the repeat produced as an inversion of the previous utterance. These simple inversions are labelled elsewhere as ‘contrastively-matched counters’ (Coulter 1990: 196). Ob2.19 6 SIM: my party’s befo:re you:rs¿ 7 GAR: no MY party’s before yours.=

Peer Disputes Ob1.4 3 4 ... 12 13

HIL: TES:

65

it’s my so:ng¿ it’s my song too: and it’s not your song.

HIL: it is my song too:. TES: it’s not your song too::¿

There is also evidence of no significant delay when the speaker’s objection is a repeat of his/her own earlier opposition: Ob1.28 14 15 16 17 18

JON: FEL: JON: FEL: JON:

no don’t break it! (0.2) i will [break it]? [otherwise] i’ll tell the teacher. (0.5) i will break it John. DON’T BREAK it OTHERWISE I WILL TELL [THE TEACHERS on you].

Although Felicity’s turn in line 17 in Ob1.28 is also a repeat of her earlier utterance, this turn does not serve as a direct opposition to the prior turn (line 16), but rather a re-initiation and repeat of an earlier threat intended to provoke John. This interpretation is significant given that Felicity’s turn is preceded by a short pause. It should also be noted that whilst the content of John’s utterance was repeated, the turn is aggravated through increased volume (see Brenneis and Lein, 1977 and Boggs, 1978 for discussion of paralinguistic features as demonstrative of escalation in disputing). From the examples presented here, it becomes apparent that turns made without delay usually present little new information. In some cases, each speaker continues to repeat the form of earlier utterances, providing no novel content to promote their position. Ob1.25 3 4 5 6 7 8

KOY: i was us[ing it-], SAM: [BUT I] thought you weren’t using i:t,= KOY: =I’m using it (0.3) i wanna- (.) tha[t’s (mine)]. SAM: [i thought you] weren’t using i::t.= KOY: =i wanna (.) but (.) i was- that was mi:ne. SAM: but ↑i thought you weren’t using i:t.

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Throughout the episodes we also see examples where opposition pre-empts the close of the previous utterance (the transition-relevant place), where the beginning of the challenge overlaps the prior turn. Ob1.1 3 NOR: ºlet’s [go to the jettyº]. 4 MIN: [no (.) no (0.3)] no no (0.4) no (we) don’t want those (0.4) big anim[als x-],

and later in the same episode: 14 15

CHE: we’re [going through it]. LIA: [uh uh].((expresses objection))

Turns are also produced with zero delay, where no discernible lapse between one utterance and the next is heard. The following examples identify turns which are latched to the prior utterance. Ob2.4 5 LOU: no:w (.) i know which day (0.2) and i can do it¿= 6 JAK: =i can do it too. Ob2.19 7 8 9

GAR: no MY party’s before yours.= SIM: =not bef[ore mine]. GAR: [but mine is] (0.3) yours- (0.6) my: mum said yours is in February.

Ob1.22 5 KOY: ↑no (.) you’re not packing¿= 6 ADM: =YES I AM.

Turns are also considered to be produced immediately (without delay) if the utterance overlaps or occurs contiguously to a nonverbal action by another party. Ob2.1 6 MIR: (if you don’t) then i’ll just take it then. %act: reaches to grab plastic lid. 7 CAZ: STO::P!

Peer Disputes Ob1.10 2 3

TES: JON:

67

0 ((%act: attempts to take JONS’s fishing rod which he has put on the ground to pick up a fish)) ((rising pitch throughout)) no no no no no.

Ob1.13 1 ADM: 0 ((%act: drives duplo car towards garage)) 2 KOY: no big ↑cars! Ob1.16 6 7

ADM: %act: SAM:

that (.) that can be (0.5) umm, (2.5) pulls down a block that SAM has placed upright ↑no: (0.4) that is UP.

Ob2.16 PAU: 0 ((%act: 1 headset)) 2 FRE: he[::y].

turns

volume

control

to

another

Ob1.22 1 KOY: 0 ((%act: knocks block off shelf)) 2 ADM: ((whines)) NO:: (.) YOU’RE BREAKING IT. Ob2.22 PAU: 0 ((%act: knocks over tower of blocks)) 1 2 NIG: you WRECKER. Ob2.25 JIM: 0 ((%act: pushes the ramps together)) 6 7 PAU: ↑hey you’re making it differe::nt.

Turns can similarly be made contiguously to the prior utterance and its accompanying nonverbal action. Ob1.13 13 14

ADM: %act: KOY:

[i have to stay out] of the gargage (0.2) (get ou:t),= puts his car next to the blocks =STO::P!

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Turn length Not only are preferred turn shapes characterised as produced contiguously to the prior utterance, the length of the turn is also indicative of preference status: preferred turns are typically short. Whilst the content of preferred turns may demonstrate little homogeneity (Levinson, 1983), the brevity of utterances is a uniform feature. As seen in the following examples, immediate opposition is often made in short utterances, the shortest being one-word objections. Ob1.1 31 NOR: up ↑he↓re [i’m] up here. 32 LIA: [no]. Ob2.17 5 6 7 8

SIM: GAR: SIM: GAR:

Ga↑ry: (1.0) can i have a little play of yours? (0.2) no. (1.3) can i? no.

Ob1.35 ADM: now (0.2) (i’m gonna put that there). 1 2 PET: HE::Y. Ob1.18 TES: NO I DIDN’T DO IT did i ↑Nancy (0.5) Koyo did 34 it¿= 35 KOY: =no.

These shortest preferred turn shapes (one-word objections) follow nonverbal actions as well as verbal turns. Ob2.2 %act: girls attempt to enter the spaceship 1 JAK: no! Ob2.25 PAU: 0 ((%act: pulls blocks apart)) (2.3) 9 10 JIM: o::y:. Ob1.32 KOY: 0 ((%act:tries to shut flaps)) 8 9 SAM: no:.

Peer Disputes 10 11

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KOY: the show (.) is (.) fin↑ished (.) [(now)]. SAM: [no]:. ((whines))

Brief utterances (preferred turn shapes) need not necessarily denote one-word objections: the turn may also be considered short where it contains more than one item. A short turn, then, typically consists of a single clause. Ob2.20 3 GAR: it’s just a little one¿ (0.2) 4 ROB: hey don’t! Ob1.20 5 LUK: 0 ((%act: pushes PET’s hand away)) 6 PET: ((whines)) don’t draw mi::ne. Ob2.23 LUK: look Sam (0.3) ow ow.= 1 2 SAM: =don’t do that (.) that’s-, Ob1.7 1 TES: %act: 2 JON: 3 SAM:

((silly voice)) these are mine (.) that’s mine (.) that’s mine (.) tha- my yeeiyeei [yeiyei], grabbing boxes [hey (.) hey,]= = ↑hey sto:p (0.5) TE::S[S]::!

Ob1.22 1 KOY: 0 ((%act: knocks block off shelf)) 2 ADM: ((whines)) NO:: (.) YOU’RE BREAKING IT. Ob2.1 MIR: gimme one of them. 8 (0.2) 9 CAZ: i am not going to.

Preferred turn shapes are also evident in sequences where short turns are made in succession, often in overlap. Ob2.8 2 3 4 5

PAU: WIN: PAU: WIN:

give it to me! i [found it]. [no i-](.) no i had i:t. i found it¿

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The repetition of short turns was evident elsewhere in the data: Ob1.11 14 15 16 17 18 19

FEL: NAN: FEL: NAN: FEL: NAN:

mmm. don’t say mmm. (1.1) mmm. don’t (0.3) don’t say THAT! (0.2) mmm. (0.4) DON’T SAY THAT!

Ob1.26 16 17 18 19 20 21

ADM: CHE: CHE: ADM: TES: CHE:

you [have to say] “doggie doggie who’s got the bone”. [go away]. GO away from us! don’t you know “doggie [doggie who’s got]-, [we don’t] ca:re don’t we?= =go away from us!

Ob1.31 5 ... 7 8 ... 10 11

ADM: no we don’t need to put corks in.= SAM: [no] they’re food (0.7) they[‘re] carro[ts.] ADM: [no], ADM: no they’re not. (0.2) SAM: they’re carrots!

A common type of short preferred turn shape in argumentative discourse occurs when an utterance is a simple contradiction of the prior term (often inversion of previous turn). Ob2.8 8 PAU: i had it a while ago.= 9 WIN: =no you did[n’t]. Ob2.14 7 DON: [one] o’clo:ck (0.4) yea::h (.) it’s one o’clock. (0.2) 8 TOM: no it’s not.

Peer Disputes Ob1.17 1 2 3 4

ADM: PET: ADM: PET:

71

i’m gonna build xxxx. (0.2) oh no you’re not. (0.2) yes i am. (0.2) no.

Ob1.23 7 SAM: don’t you like your mummy. 8 LUK: ºyes i doº. Ob1.28 26 27

JON: well don’t break my house (0.8) coz (0.2) it’s (0.3) very special [what i made]. CHE: [is not]?

Ob1.34 3 PET: no ↑I’m not¿ (0.2) 4 ADM: yes you are¿ Ob2.24 3 BRI: yours is yuck (.) Gary¿ 4 GAR: no it isn’t¿

Criticism of the previous speaker was also made in one-word utterances with little or no pause. Ob1.14 4 5 6 7

SAM: =i was trying to bal[ance it]. LUK: [tst oh] oh [oh oh no: ]. ((whining)) SAM: [i was trying to balance] i:t= LUK: =NAUGHTY!

Opposition stated directly As demonstrated in the examples above, preferred turn shape can be identified by both brevity of response and absence of delay. A third feature of preferred status is found in the directness of the utterance, as the turn’s purpose is stated overtly (essentially achieved through contiguity and brevity). In argumentative sequences, then, clarity of intention can be identified where the opposition is not only stated

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clearly, but specifically at the beginning of the turn (given that the illocutionary intent in dispreferred turns is typically delayed). The most striking examples of direct and overt opposition being performed at the beginning of the turn are found when the adversative response is a single-word utterance. Ob1.6 2 TES: [no: i need r]e:d (0.3) coz i like that colour as well. 3 JON: NO:¿ 4 SAM: no:. Ob2.18 3 SIM: plea:se can i have it. (0.2) 4 GAR: n:o:. Ob2.9 5 PAU: 0 ((%act: continues to touch blocks)) 6 LOU: do:n’t! Ob2.12 LOU: 0 ((%act: knocks another set of blocks)) 3 4 WIN: DO:N’T! Ob2.15 1 2

MIR: %act: PAU:

i can’t hea:r it. fiddles with buttons (0.2) ↑hey.

Ob2.21 4 NIG: you’re not allowed to go outside, 5 SIM: yea:h¿

These single word items used to challenge the prior turn serve as opposition markers, because they function as immediate and overt indicators of challenge to the prior speaker. Not only are these opposition markers heard as demonstrably argumentative, their placement must also be considered. In relation to the directness of opposition, the significance of the initial position in the utterance should be emphasised. Evidently, if the first word of a turn is an opposition marker (such as ‘no’) the turn is immediately recognisable as one of dissension.

Peer Disputes Ob1.9 2 3 4 5

73

TES: take everything (out),= JON: =not the-, TES: 0 ((%act: continues packing up the boats)) SAM: NO (0.5) leave it he↑re!

Ob1.18 9 KOY: [see (.) $yo:u] did it$. (0.2) 10 TES: NO:: I DIDN’:T. Ob1.21 1 PET: 0 ((%act: picks up a few blocks which are on the ground near CHE)) 2 CHE: don’t break ours Peter? Ob2.24 3 BRI: yours is yuck (.) Gary¿ 4 GAR: no it isn’t¿ Ob1.30 15 LUK: John did it. 16 JO2: no the [table done it].

The attention-getting device ‘hey’ (McTear, 1979) also functions as an opposition marker: Ob2.25 6 JIM: 7 PAU:

0 ((%act: pushes the ramps together)) ↑hey you’re making it differe::nt.

On one occasion in the data, however, the item ‘hey’ served as an indicator or marker of compromise (the distinction made by different intonation). When Paul proposed an alternative solution to circumvent opposition from another speaker, it was prefaced with ‘hey’. Ob2.25 13 PAU: hey that can be both of ou:rs. (0.3) 14 JIM: yeah.

Elsewhere, although an opposition marker does not appear in utterance-initial position, the opposition is clearly exhibited. In the next-turn positioning, the speaker explicitly rejects the prior turn.

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Ob2.3 11 TOM: you’re (.) you’re (0.3) you’re tricking me:. (0.2) 12 GAR: i am not! Ob1.12 18 ADM: [yes they do:]. (0.2) 19 LUK: ((sing song voice)) the:y do: no:t. Ob1.18 1 2 3 ... 40 41

%act: SAM: KOY: TES:

blocks knocked (acidentally) off shelf by KOY o:hh[h huh huh huh] [[huh huh,]] [hah hah hah,] [[THAT’S]] (.) VERY NAUGHty.

ADM: you Miss Mu:shroom? TES: I’M NOT A MISS [MUSHROOM] I’M [TE::SS].

Ob1.27 6 CHE: no i didn’t. 7 FEL: yes i did i hear you.

In each of the examples above, features of preferred utterances have been identified in the children’s arguments, specifically brief and direct turns being produced without delay, that is, contiguously to the prior action or utterance. These turns shaped were heard persistently and consistently throughout the disputes. Each of these features is typified in the following sequence of preferred turn shapes: Ob1.30 8 9 10 11 12 13

JON: JO2: FEL: JO2: LUK: JO2:

it ↑wasn’t (0.2) it was that John. i wa- i didn’t do that. yes you did. no [i didn’t]. [you did] so:! did no:t.

Preferred turn shapes, then, are omnipresent in adversative discourse in preschool peer interaction. Having identified the prevalence of preferred features, it needs to be established if these features are performed consistently throughout the data.

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‘Atypical’ preferred turn shapes? As discussed and exemplified throughout this chapter so far, preferred turn-shape is reflected in the immediacy (no inter-turn delay), brevity and directness of the utterance. Although these features are recognised as a taxonomy of preference, they are not always produced cohesively or uniformly in the children’s argumentative episodes. Or rather, preference organisation in these disputes does not entirely emulate preference features in adult speech. The audio recordings reveal otherwise preferred turn shapes (brief, direct opposition) occurring after pauses. Similarly, turns may be made without delay, but demonstrate otherwise dispreferred features (as discussed below). Pauses appear between some adjacency pairs, in similar contexts to sequences of preferred turns (i.e. those produced without significant delay) noted in the examples above. One of these contexts is delay which prefaces repeats or partial repeats of the prior speaker’s turn. Ob2.7 11 CAZ: no that’s mine (i got mi:ne) mine! (0.4) 12 ELI: it’s mine. Ob2.9 8 LOU: 9 PAU:

((to WIN)) Paul’s spoiling- (0.3) ((to PAU)) we were here fi:rst. (0.5) we were here first.

Ob2.20 9 GAR: then (you can’t) come to my party. (2.7) 10 ROB: i >don’t wanna come to your< party.

Pauses were also found to occasionally preface repeats of the speaker’s own earlier utterance. Ob1.17 1 2 3

ADM: PET: ADM:

i’m gonna build xxxx. (0.2) oh no you’re not. (0.2) yes i am. (0.2)

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76 4 5

PET: no. (0.8) ADM: ºi amº.

Ob1.4 4 5 6

TES: HIL: TES:

Ob2.24 4 5 6

GAR: no it isn’t¿ (0.4) BRI: yes it is. (1.0) GAR: NO IT ISN’T.

it’s my song too: and it’s not your song. (0.2) it is my song. (0.5) NOT YOUR: SONG.

Of primary interest here is the considerable shift in volume after the delay. It could be suggested that a marked change in prosody signifies novel content, perhaps accounting for the slight delay, yet no pause occurs prior to the shouted turn in line 18 in Ob1.28 (presented earlier in this chapter). The data also revealed examples of delay occurring before otherwise preferred format turns which overtly contradicted the prior speaker, providing no new content to support the contradiction. Ob2.3 6 GAR: i’m going befo:re lunch. (1.0) 7 TOM: no you are::n’t. Ob1.4 13 14 15

TES: HIL: TES:

it’s not you:r song too::¿ (0.2) it is. (0.4) no:.

Ob2.5 2 LOU: you did it. (0.4) 3 ELI: no i didn’t?=

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Ob2.10 23 PAU: i didn’t i didn’t even make a building. (0.5) 24 JIM: yes you di:d¿ Ob1.12 6 7 8 9

ADM: LUK: ADM: LUK:

you HAFta SHARE. (0.6) NO:? (0.6) yeah but the teacher says (0.4) “share”. (0.5) NO:?

Ob1.17 13 14 15 16

ADM: PET: ADM: KOY:

yeah BUT YOU HAVE TO. (0.8) no. (0.3) .hh NO BUT YOU HAVE TO SHARE. (1.1) NO.

Ob1.18 22 TES: [i i] i didn’t do it did i Nancy? (1.1) 23 KOY: yeah you did it i did[n’t]. Ob2.19 7 8 9 10

GAR: SIM: GAR: SIM:

Ob1.22 2 3 4

ADM: KOY: ADM:

no MY party’s before yours.= =not bef[ore mine]. [but mine is] (0.3) yours- (0.6) my: mum said yours is in February. (1.3) no it isn’t. ((whines)) NO:: (.) YOU’RE BREAKING IT. (0.2) BECAUSE YOU’RE NOT PACKING UP. (0.6) yes i am.

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The relative frequency of ‘atypical’ turn shapes, however, is of less interest to us here, as although these turns are prefaced by a pause, the turns are explicitly oppositional because the objection of the speaker is clearly on display. Of most relevance to establishing the role of preference organisation in children’s verbal disputes is the relationship between conflict outcomes and the sequential organisation of the talk-in-interaction. The turns above are perhaps ‘atypical’ only in comparison with preference features noted in adult speech. Indeed, it may turn out that prefatory delays are not influential in the preference organisation of children’s disputes. The sequential positioning of these turn shapes will be considered further in Chapter 6. Multi-party disputes Before moving on to illustrating dispreferred turn shapes heard in the children’s disputes, some comment needs to be made regarding the number of speakers involved in the examples provided thus far. Not all disputes are restricted to two parties, and the influence of more than two participants on the structure of conflict episodes is acknowledged. It has been argued (Maynard, 1986a) that multi-party disputes should not be represented as two-party disputes with additional speakers, as new speakers may align themselves with an original speaker by introducing a novel contention. Whilst it is recognised that a third speaker may attempt to add his/her own agenda, in the present data the addition is usually aligned with one existing position or another. So while more than two speakers may present more than two points of contention, these points are typically directed to one of the two opposing positions. In the sequential organisation of multi-party disputes then, there are essentially two sides. Whilst the individual form of opposition may vary (multiple speakers on the same side) it is nevertheless unilateral opposition to the other (antipathetic) position. Furthermore, there is little room for peer mediators in disputes between four-year-olds. Typically, external participants either align themselves with either opposing party or remain neutral and therefore outside the dispute. In Ob1.17 below, for example, Peter solicits support from Sam and Koyo (who are also playing with the blocks, and are overhearers up until this point). Koyo’s response (line 10) is not only collaborative, it is content-tied to Peter’s earlier taunt. Koyo’s subsequent turn (line 12) is a faithful repeat of Peter’s prior opposition (line 11). Ob1.17 6 PET: i’m gonna get all of these (0.4) little blocks,= %act: PET starts removing blocks from shelf.

  There are exceptions in specific cultural settings, e.g. the ritualised role of a third party in resolving standoffs (brogez) between Israeli children (Katriel, 1985).

Peer Disputes 7 8 9 10 11 12

ADM: PET: %com: ADM: KOY: PET: KOY:

79

=yeah but YOU HAVE TO SHARE. (1.5) but we’re not gonna share with our toys [are we]¿ PET is addressing SAM and KOY. [yeah but] you [HAVE to]. [>we don’t want to share] with [youGary do you wanna come< to my party? (0.8) GAR: if you- (0.3) if you don’t give those (0.4) those things to me (.) you won’t come to my par:ty.

Ob2.20 2 ROB: hey that’s mine Gary:. (1.2) 3 GAR: it’s just a little one¿

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Ob2.22 4 PAU: that was my one i made. (0.6) 5 NIG: well (0.2) do you know what you did to it? Ob1.11 4 NAN: [i wan] i wanna tu:rn (0.7) i wanna turn of that. (0.4) 5 FEL: well ↑we (0.3) got here fi:rst? Ob1.12 7 LUK: NO:? (0.6) 8 ADM: yeah but the teacher says (0.4) “share”. Ob1.13 2 KOY: no big ↑cars! (2.4) 3 ADM: yeah but Luke said i can ºcome inº. Ob1.16 4 SAM: no. (1.3) 5 ADM: yeah but we have to. Ob1.18 10 TES: NO:: I DIDN’:T. (0.9) 11 SAM: Te:ss (.) too: lou:d. Ob1.21 2 3 4 5

CHE: PET: CHE: PET:

don’t break ours Peter? (1.2) but we need lots of (these). (1.6) but but don’t take o:urs. (0.5) no we won’t.

Ob1.23 3 SAM: don’t do that Luke¿. 4 LUK: i want to crack it. (2.2)

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84 5

SAM:

if you crack heads you’ll ↓die: (0.3) do you want to ↑die:: (0.3) and then your mummy will cry:?

In each of the examples above, the turn shape following (incorporating) the pause is performed as dispreferred. Inter-turn pauses, however, are not universally indicative of preference status. There are pauses heard in the children’s arguments which are not necessarily attributed to dispreferred turn shape. In some instances, for example, the speaker is not responding to the immediately prior turn, but rather reinitiates a contention, challenge or provocation. Ob1.1 9 10 11 12 13 14

LIA: MIN: CHE: CHE: %com: FEL: CHE:

Ob1.29 3 4 5 6 7

JON: JON: CHE: JON: JON:

Ob1.34 2 3 4 5

ADM: PET: ADM: FEL:

((to the girls, teasing voice)) you can’t go on (0.4) we: ma:de i:t. (1.1) but ‘cept but ‘cept [they ↑can go] on (.) they ca:n. [but we’re new]. (1.4) going. produced as statement of intent (1.7) me as well. (1.5) we’re [going through it].

yes (.) she (.) did. (1.2) Felicity did. (1.4) Felicity didn’t. (0.4) Felicity’s (0.2) shoe did it. (2.6) i know that (1.6) really.

you’re having a long turn. (0.3) no ↑i’m not¿ (0.2) yes you are¿ (1.4) Peter’s having a long turn.

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In other words, some pauses heard in the disputes are of such length as to suggest that the prefaced utterance is not a response to the prior turn but instead a reinitiation of the topic/conflict. Ob2.7 11 CAZ: 12 ELI: 13 CAZ: 14 ELI: ... 18 ELI: 19 ELI: Ob1.27 8 9 10 11

CHE: FEL: LUK: LUK:

no that’s mine (i got mi:ne) mine! (0.4) it’s mine. (1.1) then i’ll have these. (3.3) i wanna have (.) a gir:l (0.4) i wanna have a one ↑girl. but i don’t like that girl. (6.8) you can’t have two girls. ((petulant tone)) no: i didn’t say your name. i know: [because you- (.) i heared]. [you’re going to beat Che]rie aren’t you. (2.2) ((to CHE)) last is you.

Delay: Markers Another delaying feature of dispreferred turns (which may or may not also be prefaced by a pause) is markers that defer the opposition in the utterance. The marker ‘well’ appears in the data as a typical preface to – or turn-initial item in – dispreferred turn shapes. Whilst in children’s arguments the marker appears in similar position to dispreferred turn shapes recorded elsewhere (e.g. Pomerantz, 1984) and serves to render the opposition less direct, the marker does not necessarily serve to mitigate the disagreement. In adult disagreement the marker ‘well’ can genuinely be identified as a delay or hesitation, but this dispreference marker is not necessarily used hesitantly in the children’s disputes. Although there are differences noted in the use of markers in children’s adversative discourse, they nevertheless signify dispreferred turn shape. Each turn prefaced with a marker such as ‘well’ (and indeed ‘but’ as evidenced below) also demonstrates accountability and is frequently delayed by a pause. Importantly, turn-initial markers, do not appear in the data in short, overtly oppositional, immediately produced and unaccounted for utterances (preferred turn shapes).

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Ob1.4 1 TES: everybody can sing it (0.5) not just you. (4.6) 2 HIL: well i sing my song if i want. Ob1.11 NAN: [i wan] i wanna tu:rn (0.7) i wanna turn of that. 4 (0.4) 5 FEL: well ↑we (0.3) got here fi:rst? Ob1.27 1 2 Ob2.7 2 3 4

LUK: look (0.7) look (0.5) ((singsong voice)) i: beat you (.) didn’t I:. (0.4) CHE: well i’m still doing mine so (you can’t xxxx). ELI: CAZ: ELI:

that’s not a girl that’s a bo::y. (0.2) girls wear pants. (0.9) well (0.5) that’s- i know that’s a boy.

In the following examples, each marked utterance began as a seemingly dispreferred turn shape (given the utterance-initial marker) but was abandoned. Ob1.34 8 9 10 11

ADM: PET: FEL: PET:

=i wanna have a turn. but i:’m not fin(.)ished ye::t.= =yeah: (0.6) well .hh,

Ob2.18 6 7 8

GAR: SIM: SIM:

no (0.2) you will be- (0.3) you will (0.4) be (.) be here (0.2) but i won’t. well-, (4.7) what time are you going ho:me?

In other utterances, the use of ‘well’ serves as an introduction to a statement of intention or statement of fact, the declaration of which serves as inherent account for opposition.

Peer Disputes O1.28 22 23 24 25 26

JON: CHE: LUK: GGG: JON:

87

don’t break my house (.) like that! (1.1) [i (break) my things]. [how about making] (0.2) tram [tracks xxxx], [this can be Winne] the Pooh’s house. (0.7) well don’t break my house (0.8) coz (0.2) it’s (0.3) very special [what i made].

Ob2.8 9 WIN: =no you did[n’t]. 10 PAU: [well] i’m telling on you. Ob2.12 1 WIN: do:n’t you’re wrecking everything. 2 LOU: well i’m trying to go round. Ob2.16 5 PAU: i can’t hear anything. (1.1) 6 FRE: well i can hear it. Ob2.22 8 NIG: yeah and i put those things up there¿ 9 PAU: well it doesn’t need them.

Although the item ‘well’ would not be labelled a hesitation marker in the examples above (the children are not hesitant in challenging the prior speaker), it consistently prefaces turns which demonstrate other dispreferred features, specifically justification of the speaker’s position (see discussion below). This suggests that ‘well’ and other markers do not always denote hesitation, but rather that they preface qualified opposition. Whilst dispreference markers may be produced as a form of delay, they most significantly function as an indicator that the utterance will contain some form of support for the speaker’s opposition. In other discourse contexts the turn-initiator ‘well’ may give little indication of what is to follow (Schiffrin, 1985), but in children’s argumentative utterances ‘well’ performs invariably as a preface to justified objection. The item ‘well’ also appears in children’s disputes as a preface to questions which are not strictly argumentative, i.e. requests for clarification or permission. In the first instance, when requesting further information, the marker ‘well’ is typically produced with a degree of indignation (Ob1.30, Ob2.10, Ob2.22).

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88 Ob1.30 9 10 11 12 13 14

JO2: FEL: JO2: LUK: JO2: JON:

i wa- i didn’t do that. yes you did. no [i didn’t]. [you did] so:! did no:t. (0.7) well who did that.

Ob2.10 3 JIM: yes he i:s. (0.2) PAU: well then (1.2) then how come you’re not using it¿ 4 Ob2.22 4 PAU: that was my one i made. (0.6) 5 NIG: well (0.2) do you know what you did to it?

Otherwise, ‘well’ serves to mark the speaker’s disregard for the content of the prior turn (e.g. Ob2.17 – heard as ‘well, you may think no, but can I break it anyway?’). Ob2.17 1 2 3

SIM: GAR: SIM:

can i break this? (0.5) n:o. well >can i have a-< can i (break this) .hhh¿=

In similar contexts to the item ‘well’, the marker ‘but’ was also used by the children, typically to introduce support for their opposition. The function of ‘but’ has been noted elsewhere as a boundary marker in verbal challenges. “But is operating on the action level because it marks an adversative relation between speech acts rather than a contrast in propositions” (Kyratzis and Ervin-Tripp, 1999). Similar observations are made of the marker ‘well’. Ob1.1 9 LIA: ((to the girls, teasing voice)) you can’t go on (0.4) we: ma:de i:t. (1.1) 10 MIN: but ‘cept but ‘cept [they ↑can go] on (.) they ca:n. 11 CHE: [but we’re new].

Peer Disputes Ob1.2 3 ADM: 4 JON: 5 JON:

89

[no no no] (.) no [no] this one hasn’t got any le:gs. [but-], (0.9) but (0.3) but (0.3) but (0.2) but this one (0.3) it’s not rea- the space- (.) this (0.2) we’re just not ready yet. (3.6)

Ob1.7 5 SAM: ↑Tess (0.4) don’t SNA:tch! 6 TES: but (0.3) i am doing fishing. Ob1.8 3 JON: no (0.3) no you got my ↑blue one. (0.4) 4 TES: but we (0.3) but (0.5) but we are just sharing. Ob1.9 5 6 7

SAM: NO (0.5) leave it he↑re! (1.0) TES: b[ut we (.) we-,] SAM: [leave (.) all] of them here.

Ob1.20 3 LUK: no: you’re drawing on the moo::n.= 4 PET: =but this is where the sun is. Ob1.21 2 3 4 5

CHE: PET: CHE: PET:

Ob1.25 2 3 4

KOY: it’s mi::ne. (0.9) KOY: i was us[ing it-], SAM: [BUT i] thought you weren’t using i:t,=

don’t break ours Peter? (1.2) but we need lots of (these). (1.6) but but don’t take o:urs. (0.5) no we won’t.

90 Ob1.35 2 3 4

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PET: HE::Y. ADM: >yeah but< you left it here? (1.3) PET: but i:- (0.6) leave it there where i put it.

Ob2.2 5 CAZ: no: we still haven’t finished. 6 JAK: well [we have-], 7 MIR: [but that] was our fairy [spaceship]. Ob2.15 4 PAU: he:y don’t you’ll break it like tha:t. (1.2) 5 MIR: but i can’t hea:r.

Similar to earlier examples of the item ‘well’, the marker ‘but’ occasionally prefaces requests which are not necessarily challenges to the prior speaker. In the example below, the marker ‘but’ performs slightly differently to the illocution carried by ‘well’. A repeated request prefaced with ‘well’ suggests a discounting or disregard of the prior speaker’s objection (e.g. Ob2.17 above). The prefatory ‘but’, on the other hand, suggests acknowledgement of the prior speaker’s opposition in the repeated request. Ob1.15 4 ADM: [i got] another one of the special car? (0.3) 5 PET: but [but can i have] this one?

The data were further analysed to determine the distribution of ‘well’ and ‘but’ in the disputes, to see if children would repeat the marker used previously in the episode by another speaker, or indeed produce the same marker themselves. Ob1.6 6 SAM: drop (0.2) (John’s got those) (0.7) you got those ones John’s got these ones. (0.9) 7 TES: but (0.3) i got three coz i need (1.3) that many. (1.6) 8 SAM: but then (0.4) John will have three (0.3) and you don’t like pink do you John.

Whilst it was most common for the same marker to reoccur in a dispute episode, there were examples of different turn-initial items performed later in an argument.

Peer Disputes Ob1.20 3 4 ... 10 11 12 13

91

LUK: PET:

no: you’re drawing on the moo::n.= =but this is where the sun is. (1.9)

ADM: PET: LUK: PET:

i wanna have (.) i wanna have (the) petrol truck. yes. ((to PET)) ↑wha- (.) well not if you do not (.) not if you’re gonna go on (.) on mine. ((ie. draw on LUK’s part of the paper)) (0.3) i wo:n’t.

Ob2.7 18 ELI: but i don’t like that girl. ... 20 ELI: well that’s the boy and i hate boys.

A final, striking use of the marker ‘but’ was frequently produced by one of the boys in the first observation environment. Adam usually produced the marker ‘but’ prefaced with ‘yeah’, with ‘no’ produced on one occasion. In the recorded interaction, this particular turn opening was produced idiosyncratically by this child (with the exception of Peter in Ob1.15, line 12 who is responding to Adam). Although essentially limited to Adam in the present study, this “yes, but” preface has been recorded in preschool dispute data elsewhere (e.g. Sheldon, 1996: 65). Ob1.12 8 ADM:

yeah but the teacher says (0.4) “share”.

Ob1.13 3 ADM: yeah but Luke said i can ºcome inº. Ob1.15 10 ... 12 13

ADM: [yeah but] but ah (0.2) coz i don’t have a- but i don’t have a trai:ler. PET: [no but i:] but i: want (.) one of those. (1.2) ADM: yeah but i (.) but i don’t have any more.

Ob1.16 3 ADM: yeah but (0.6) we need those (.) .hhh coz (0.2) .hh this is- (0.2) how bout we make creche Sam¿ ...

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92 5 ... 12

ADM:

ADM: =yeah but (0.2) but that’s the river you remember that (.) .hhh that’s the river.

Ob1.17 13 14 15

ADM: PET: ADM:

Ob1.26 10 ADM:

yeah but we have to.

yeah BUT YOU HAVE TO. (0.8) no. (0.3) .hh NO BUT YOU HAVE TO SHARE. [yeah but i] but i just have to show you because-,

Ob1.35 3 ADM: >yeah but< you left it here?

The context and content of each of the turns above indicate that ‘yeah but’ essentially has the same function as the marker ‘well’ in each dispute. That is, the turn-initial phrase indicates that the content of the prior content was heard but is about to be contradicted (cf. the acknowledgement implied by the marker ‘but’ on its own). Opposition delayed and justified In summary, delays (pauses and/or markers) at the beginning of responses serve to push oppositional content further into the turn. Earlier in this chapter, it was demonstrated that in preferred turn shapes, the opposition is usually made overtly at the beginning of the turn. In contrast, dispreferred turn shapes illustrate the deferral of opposition in the utterance through the inclusion of prefatory delays. Ob1.2 (0.9) 5 JON: but (0.3) but (0.3) but (0.2) but this one (0.3) it’s not rea- the space- (.) this (0.2) we’re just not ready yet. Ob1.20 (1.3) 8 LUK: then i’m - (0.5) well then (.) i won’t let you have a turn on (0.2) the petrol truck.

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Ob1.35 (1.3) 4 PET: but i:- (0.6) leave it there where i put it. Ob2.17 (0.8) 13 GAR: if you- (0.3) if you don’t give those (0.4) those things to me (.) you won’t come to my par:ty.

‘Atypical’ dispreferred turn shapes? It has been established that in the children’s disputes, dispreferred turn shapes are characterised by delay (pauses and markers) and action pushed to latter part of turn. The data were analysed further to determine if these turn shapes were produced consistently (i.e. uniformly displaying these features). This process demonstrated that accounts (discussed in detail below) are occasionally produced immediately as a form of opposition. Ob1.19 3 4

LUK: SAM: %com:

i saw you: put one away¿= =that doesn’t matter cause it wasn’t a block it was a cylinder. LUK makes no further comment.

Ob1.34 14 ADM: [tha]t’s a long tu:rn. (0.2) 15 PET: i’ve got four more minutes (left). Ob2.1 3 CAZ: no: (0.3) (I’ve got these). 4 MIR: then give one to me Caroline because you’ve got lots there. Ob2.3 12 GAR: i am not! 13 TOM: you you you are so you’ve got a smile on your face.

In contrast to preferred turn shapes, dispreferred turn shapes are more constant in the adversative discourse. Whilst in some cases the opposition may not be pushed deeper into the turn (may even begin with an opposition marker such as ‘no’), the turn shape, with hesitation, restarts, and, most significantly, accounts provided, is identifiable as dispreferred rather than preferred (exemplified in episodes Ob1.15,

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2.18, 1.33, Ob2.5, and Ob2.7 below). That is, dispreferred utterances seek to resolve rather than continue the dispute. Ob1.15 5 6 7

PET: but [but can i have] this one? ADM: [that that-], (0.2) ADM: no coz that one’s little tiny and (.) it’s got .hhh little pieces (0.3) .hhh and you might choke on them (0.4) .hhh [and] it’s (0.2) and there’s a sharp thing up the back.

Ob2.18 5 SIM: =and then this afternoon you can make it agai:n. 6 GAR: no (0.2) you will be- (0.3) you will (0.4) be (.) be here (0.2) but i won’t. Ob1.33 3 PET: ye:s it’s [xx], 4 CHE: [no] (0.2) coz (0.2) first we need to do it again (0.3) at the start. Ob2.5 3 ELI: no i didn’t?= LOU: =coz you were- (0.4) you were putting (0.3) your (.) h:ands on it. Ob2.7 4 5

ELI: CAZ: %act:

well (0.5) that’s- i know that’s a boy. (0.2) coz she’s wearing ↑pants (0.3) she’s a girl? pointing to the observer

Threats in children’s arguments are also performed in ‘atypical’ dispreferred turn shape, distinguishable primarily by absence of turn-initial pauses or delay markers. This type of utterance has a unique function in the discourse as each threat imposes conditionality on hearer’s reaction. Importantly, threats share no characteristics of preferred turn shapes discussed earlier in this chapter; they are neither brief nor produced contiguously to the prior turn. Although not performed in standard dispreferred turn shape, the promise of unwanted outcomes in threats could be considered in the position of accounts.

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Accounts in dispreferred turn shapes The examples above illustrate that pauses and markers are not only precursors to delayed opposition, they may be readily and noticeably heard as dispreferred features. Perhaps the most striking feature of dispreferred turn shapes, however, is the accompanying account for opposition. A universal feature of utterances beginning with a delaying marker, is the justification which is provided in the turn. Typically, accounts serve to support the position, authority or rights of the speaker; they provide reasons for the opposition. In adult discourse, particularly in non-conflict situations, accounts serve to explain the absence of a preferred response. In the children’s arguments, however, the dispreferred turn shape constitutes a mitigating move in the conflict episode. Essentially, accounts are recognisable as mitigation given that ‘each represents an attempt by the speaker to make the request to the hearer [or, in this case, opposition] more palatable’ (Fraser, 1980: 346). The inclusion of an account or justification proves of particular significance in the children’s disputes. Before considering their influence, however, the types of accounts must be identified. The purpose of this section, then, is to describe the variety of accounts produced as justifications for opposition. Not surprisingly, the categories of accounts generated in the analysis share features with the taxonomy of types of arguments discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Parallels can be seen with possession (objects) as a dispute topic and ownership rights as a form of justification. Accounts which invoke expectations of appropriate behaviour mirror argument topics provoked by supposed infractions of local rules. Similarly, the theme of disputes regarding truth values is replicated in the category of accounts where justifications are based on factual information. Elsewhere, accounts are produced as epistemological or factual claims, or based on the personal wishes of the speaker. It should be noted that the categories proposed below are designed to facilitate description of accounts heard in the data rather than provide rigid classification boundaries. Volition, necessity and personal preference This category incorporates accounts which overtly state the personal wants and needs of the speaker. The justification for opposition may be realised through stating volition (“I want”), necessity (“I need”) or personal likes and dislikes. Each of these types of accounts may represent the position of the individual (“I”), or the speaker may claim to speak for the desires or wishes of his or her playmates (“we”). These types of accounts are inherently subjective, as the speaker’s own wishes serve as the basis for opposition. Accounts which are based on personal volition promote the wants of the speaker as a justification for opposition.

96 Ob1.10 8 SAM:

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[well i:] want to have a turn?

Ob2.4 3 JAK: NO: I WANNA Do it. Ob1.15 12 PET: [no but i:] but i: want (.) one of those. Ob1.23 4 LUK: i want to crack it.

This type of account may also be expressed as a negative by identifying the prior actions of the hearer as antipathetic to the wishes of the speaker. Ob2.17 10 GAR:

[i don’t want] those jets (going) off.

The speaker may claim to represent the wishes of those children aligned with her/ his position in the dispute. In the following examples the intent is realised through verb negation, as in the utterance above, and employing a plural subject pronoun. Ob1.17 10 KOY:

[>we don’t want to share] with [youyeah but< you left it here?

Properties of objects, play space and play script Opposition is made by children in both observation environments by producing accounts which refer to properties of objects, space and the state of play. Each of these sub-categories will be defined in turn through examples heard in the data. The first type of property account or justification is one based on identifying features of the object, which challenges the authority of the other speaker, or at least the validity of their perception of the object under dispute. Ob1.2 3 ADM:

[no no no] (.) no [no] this one hasn’t got any le:gs.

Ob1.3 6 ADM: no that’s a- that’s got ehhm no only jets and rockets. Ob2.7 5 CAZ: coz she’s wearing ↑pants (0.3) she’s a girl?

In the following example, Adam provides an elaborate account for his refusal of Peter’s request. The refusal is based on the unsuitability of the car for Peter’s use (as he may choke on the little pieces). Ob1.15 7

ADM:

no coz that one’s little tiny and (.) it’s got .hhh little pieces (0.3) .hhh and you might choke on them (0.4) .hhh [and] it’s (0.2) and there’s a sharp thing up the back.

Clarifying or re-defining the properties of the object also serves as an account for opposition. Ob1.19 4 SAM:

=that doesn’t matter cause it wasn’t a block it was a cylinder.

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Properties may also be incorporated into accounts where they refer to the play space or the play script. In other words, children may justify their opposition by stating criteria or constraints imposed by the local play context. The content and force of these types of accounts is varied. In the following two examples, properties of the play space (restricted play space in Ob1.3 and identity of play space in Ob1.28) are used as reasons for exclusion. Ob1.3 8 ADM:

no: cause (0.3) rockets are not allowed to come in (.) only (0.4) a rocket and a jet (0.4) cause there’s no space in there.

Ob1.28 12 JON:

no it doesn’t (.) it’s a different sort of house.

The following utterance depicts a property of the play script itself which serves as an account for the speaker’s challenge. Ob1.33 2 CHE: [↑no] (0.3) there’s no baby in this one.

The third type of property account groups together utterances which incorporate justifications based on the state of play. These include accounts which state the time constraints of the play. Ob1.34 15 PET:

i’ve got four more minutes (left).

Ob1.2 5 JON: but (0.3) but (0.3) but (0.2) but this one (0.3) it’s not rea- the space- (.) this (0.2) we’re just not ready yet.

In John’s account (Ob1.2, line 5), he hesitates to organise his own supporting evidence, and eventually settles with ‘we’re just not ready yet’. The point to be emphasised here is that John makes a revision of the spaceship not being ready, and attributes that unreadiness to both himself and Adam. In the following accounts which refer to the state of play (emphasis on temporal limitations), the speaker alludes to a reasonable point of conclusion of play (reasonable according to the promotion of his or her own interests!). This type of account recurs in the data.

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Ob1.32 4 KOY: the show is finished (0.4) Sam the (.) .hhh show is finished ↑Sam you can’t - (0.2) [now you], Ob1.34 9 PET: but i:’m not fin(.)ished ye::t.= Ob2.2 5 CAZ: no: we still haven’t finished.

The play state is also monitored by identifying roles and actions assumed by participants in the course of play as accounts for behaviour. Most of these accounts serve as a justification (clarification) of the activity itself. Ob1.6 6 TES:

but (0.3) i am doing fishing.

Ob1.26 2 CHE: no we are not singing that song,= Ob2.5 5 ELI: no .hh coz i was helping with Hilary. Ob2.12 2 LOU: well i’m trying to go round. ... 5 LOU: well i’m trying to get through and you put so many things here.

In the next example, Sam accounts for his objection by clarifying the mode of the play situation (‘we’re just pretending’). Ob1.9 9 SAM: leave- (1.5) i know ↑that (0.4) but we’re just pretending (.) and leave (0.3) the boats (0.4) out (0.4) you can put the fishes in (0.2) but (0.3) uh (0.4) not the boats.

Behavioural obligations The accounts identified in this category contain references to behavioural constraints or obligations to support opposition. Each challenge is essentially based on criticising the appropriateness of the other’s actions. These accounts may be seen as underscoring a breaking of rules, rules which relate to expectation of behaviour.

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Ob2.20 7 ROB: [[you can’t take it FROM SOMEONE ELSE]]! Ob2.15 4 PAU: he:y don’t you’ll break it like tha:t. Ob2.5 4 LOU: =coz you were- (0.4) you were putting (0.3) your (.) h:ands on it. Ob1.7 9 SAM:

but (0.5) she did it fi:rst.

The previous example (Ob1.7) refers to an infringement made by the other speaker. That is, if Sam’s behaviour is deemed unacceptable, so too must the actions (taking boxes) of Tess. Other types of accounts which appear in this category denote broader social expectations or behavioural constraints. In Ob1.5 a challenge is made to Tess’ maturity, as her behaviour is criticised as ill-mannered (“rude”) and inappropriate for her age. In Ob1.23 the opposition is accounted for by identifying the consequences of Luke’s actions (hitting his own head with a block). Ob1.5 4 SAM: ((serious tone)) Tess: (0.3) [it’s rude]. ... 7 SAM: babies say that sort of thing? Ob1.23 5 SAM: if you crack heads you’ll ↓die: (0.3) do you want to ↑die:: (0.3) and then your mummy will cry:?

Children may also employ local rules to support their position or challenge to the prior speaker. In the following example, Koyo accounts for his objection by referring to rules established by the teacher (i.e. pack-up time). Ob1.22 3 KOY:

BECAUSE YOU’RE NOT PACKING UP.

Similarly, the rules imposed by the teacher which comprise the routine of the preschool environment feature in the following example.

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106 Ob2.21 2 3 4

NIG: no you’re not allowed to¿ (1.0) SIM: wha:t? (0.3) NIG: you’re not allowed to go outside,

Ob1.19 2 SAM: leave them there (0.3) ↑Adam’s (.) Adam’s in charge of putting them away (0.3) Luke?

The most common type of account which challenges forms of acceptable behaviour, invokes the rule of sharing. Common expectation both within and outside the preschool dictates that children are obliged to share resources, typically toys, with other children. This type of account was prevalent in dispreferred turn shapes produced by children in the first observation environment. Ob1.17 7 ADM:

=yeah but YOU HAVE TO SHARE.

Ob1.8 2 TES: ↑no: we are sharing John? ... 4 TES: but we (0.3) but (0.5) but we are just sharing.

Note the use of the mitigating ‘just’ in Tess’ second (successful) attempt. This item is used in Ob1.2 with similar effect. In the example below (Ob1.11), in response to the previous turn which claimed prior ownership, Nancy negates the claim by invoking the common rule of sharing Ob1.11 5 FEL: well ↑we (0.3) got here fi:rst? (0.3) 6 NAN: we have to share (0.6) have to [share].

As found with justifications based on ownership, occasionally an account constitutes the entire turn. Ob1.12 6 ADM:

you HAFta SHARE.

The sharing rule is upgraded – discussed further in Chapter 6 – where the obligation is underscored by reference to teacher instructions.

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107

yeah but the teacher says (0.4) “share”.

A sharing rule may even be invoked where the rule is not overtly stated but implied by drawing attention to another child’s excessive property. Ob2.1 4 MIR: then give one to me Caroline because you’ve got lots there. Ob2.7 19 ELI: you can’t have two girls. ((petulant tone))

Epistemological accounts This description of accounts produced by children in the disputes may appear to serve as an ‘other’ category, an amalgamation of justifications which do not share features of the accounts identified in the previous four categories. Closer attention, however, delineates each of the utterances below as referring to claims to understanding, or facts or truths which may be verified. Challenges to the previous speaker, then, may be accounted for by supplying factual information. Ob2.14 10 TOM: it’s not that’s ten o’clock. Ob1.20 4 PET: =but this is where the sun is.

While the previous two examples refer to stable facts to justify their opposition, the following utterances report others’ behaviour as factual evidence. Ob2.23 9 NIG: yeah i ↑did (0.2) >you didn’t< see us¿ Ob2.3 13

TOM: you you you are so you’ve got a smile on your face.

The speaker’s own knowledge of events is also invoked as an account for opposition. Ob2.18 5 SIM: =and then this afternoon you can make it agai:n. 6 GAR: no (0.2) you will be- (0.3) you will (0.4) be (.) be here(0.2) but i won’t.

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Occasionally, accounts refer to external authority for the opposition, challenging the claim of the prior speaker. Ob1.4 16 HIL:

i heard it on the radio.

The authority need not be an extraneous (non-present) third party as in the previous utterance, but can be localised to the preschool where the agent is another child or the teacher. Ob1.13 3 ADM:

yeah but Luke said i can ºcome inº.

Ob2.4 4 JAK: the the teacher said ↑i will do it.

In the following turns, the speaker invokes knowledge as a form of justification for their opposition. These types of epistemological expressions (“I know but”) have been reported elsewhere as mitigating devices in conflict situations (Walton, 2000). Ob2.4 5 LOU: no:w (.) i know which day (0.2) and i can do it¿= Ob2.7 4 ELI: well (0.5) that’s- i know that’s a boy.

A variety of accounts with disparate referents, then, have been identified in the data. A constant feature of dispreferred turn shapes, accounts have been grouped here as stating personal wishes, claiming ownership rights, referring to object properties, invoking behavioural obligations or making epistemological or factual claims. Whilst dispreferred turns are not always prefaced with delay markers or pauses, a justification is always provided and distinguishes a dispreferred from a preferred turn shape. As accounts are the most salient (and probably most persuasive) feature of dispreferred turns, they will be considered further, in the extended sequential context of the disputes, throughout Chapter 6. Prevalence of preference features The summary of analysis in this chapter has demonstrated the prominence of preference features in the children’s disputes. Preference features described in existing conversation analytic research (e.g. Pomerantz, 1984) have been identified throughout the data confirming the validity of investigating preference

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organisation in verbal conflict. Typically, opposition is made in the children’s disputes in one of two ways: (1) overtly in short turns or (2) in longer turns which are often delayed and always accompanied by a reason for opposition. It remains to be seen how these features are treated by the hearer. If there is an overriding discourse preference for conflict to continue, turn shapes must be considered in light of dispute outcomes (as defined in Chapter 5). A particular finding reported in this chapter is the inconsistency of pauses as dispreference markers. Turns which demonstrate preferred features are occasionally prefaced by this form of delay (not only in multi-party disputes), and, in some instances, dispreferred turns are produced contiguously to the prior utterance. The disparity of inter-turn pauses in otherwise preferred and dispreferred turn shapes suggests that this feature is not necessarily indicative of preference organisation in young children’s disputes. Whilst the significance of pauses has been demonstrated in adult speech, the present analysis indicates that this type of delay is not consistently indicative of a specific turn shape in children’s adversative discourse. If inter-turn pauses, then, are not necessarily attributed to preference organisation in children’s arguments, the significant features, those that influence the sequential or serial development of disputes, need to be identified. The primary analysis presented in this chapter suggests that it is accounts or justifications accompanying opposition which will prove to be of fundamental import.

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Chapter 5

Dispute Outcomes

Introduction The previous chapter identified features of preference repeatedly produced throughout the children’s disputes. In particular, the provision of accounts in particular types of opposition turns was noted. We shall come to see (Chapter 6) that these accounts are implicated in the resolution of disputes, but before considering the persuasiveness of accounts in dispreferred turn shapes produced by the children, properties of what constitutes a ‘win’ in child peer conflict needs to be established. Persuasiveness is inextricably tied to the outcome of the dispute, the manner in which the argument is brought to a close. If a child is successful in resolving a dispute, more often than not they have been successful in persuading (or defeating) the opposing party. But it remains to be seen how this ‘success’ realised in the data, and how resolution may be co-constructed. It stands to reason that once an argument has begun there are only two possible outcomes: continuation or dissipation. Once children have engaged in verbal conflict the only alternatives are to sustain the dispute or to arrive at some sort of ending. It is the closing of disputes, then, that is of particular interest because the continuation of conflict is defined purely by the absence of a conclusion. Throughout this chapter the analysis of the closings of the disputes is documented, namely by distinguishing three possible closings: resolution; abandonment; and teacher intervention. Threats as a particular type of dispute closing are discussed in the final section of this chapter. In Chapter 2, it was noted that Vuchinich (1990) identified conflict closings as being achieved through mutual orientation, where both participants essentially agree to move to a new topic. This agreement may be one of mutual satisfaction or be prompted by the subordination of one party’s wishes. This idea of mutual acceptance of conflict endings (distinct from mutual satisfaction) is worthy of further consideration, particularly to distinguish types of dispute closings. Mutual acceptance implies that some sort of resolution has been achieved, that the conflict is recognised by the involved parties as concluded (even where one party may be dissatisfied with the outcome). However, disputes may also come to an end without overt acknowledgement by either party – a cessation of disputing despite any clear conclusion. I describe acceptance of the outcome as ‘resolved’, and unacknowledged dissipation as ‘abandoned’. The differentiation between these two outcomes will become apparent in the following discussion of dispute endings. The fundamental distinction between resolution and abandonment of disputes lies in the maintenance of established play partnerships. That is, children continue

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to play together once a dispute is resolved but do not when a dispute is abandoned. Alternatively, where the children are unable to orchestrate some sort of conclusion themselves, one may be imposed through teacher intervention. One purpose of this chapter is to define each of these three dispute outcomes. The other purpose is to identify turn shapes at the closing of disputes. When defining the outcome of disputes (as resolved, abandoned or intervened), the turn shapes of the final utterances will be considered.

Resolution Close attention to the endings of disputes reveals a set of outcomes which can be described as resolved. In resolved episodes, a clear conclusion of the argument is arrived at, one which is mutually acceptable to all participants. As almost half of the disputes recorded in both observation environments were heard as resolved, outright resolution appears more common than has been suggested by existing research (e.g. Goodwin, 1982). Difference in age of participants and categorisation of outcomes, however, may influence the proportion of recognisably resolved disputes in other studies. Essentially, three types of resolution have been identified in the children’s arguments. The first is characterised by the overt success of one party, imposed upon the other party (compatible with Vuchinich’s (1990) category of submission). The second type of resolution is brought about where an alternative proposal is accepted or a conditional agreement is made (identified by Vuchinich (1990) as compromise). The third type of resolution is marked by an absence of response, realised through silence, and making no further opposition but continuing with co-operative play. The only resolved outcome in the data which does not belong to one of these three types was heard where a technical solution to the problem existed – see Ob2.15 below. Ob2.15 5 6 7

MIR: but i can’t hea:r. PAU: 0 ((%act: turns the control button for MIR’s headset)) (1.6) PAU: now you can hear¿

Win/loss outcome A form of resolution identified as a distinct win/loss outcome arises when one child is successful in imposing his or her wishes on another party.

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Ob1.7 11 12 13 14 15 16

JON: JON: TES: SAM: TES: JON: %com:

it’s not nasty to hit (1.4) ↓Tess now you (0.2) can’t (0.4) come (0.2) to ↑any (0.4) birthdays. (1.1) not till you (0.2) say sorry Sam. (0.4) ((silly voice)) sorry Sam dee↑dee:huh. ↑no: (.) properly. (0.3) s[orry] Sam. [prop-], play resumes

Ob1.20 12 13 14

LUK: PET: LUK:

((to PET)) ↑wha- (.) well not if you do not (.) not if you’re gonna go on (.) on mine. ((ie. draw on LUK’s part of the paper)) (0.3) i wo:n’t. (1.1) there you can go there. ((on the paper))

Ob2.17 15

GAR: %act:

you can- (0.4) leave it for me (0.3) leave it you can’t come to my par:ty. SIM places object on ground and returns to basket to look for other plastic connector pieces.

Ob1.23 9 SAM: then don’t (0.3) then don’t die yourself. %act: LUK stops hitting his head with the block.

Where the outcome of a dispute renders one party victorious, their success is arrived at through imposing their wishes on the other, understood either in the nonverbal acquiescence of the other party, or through vocal acceptance. Peculiar to these episodes is the content of the utterances that precede the submission of the opposing party. All four episodes above which close with this type of resolution (Ob1.7, Ob1.20, Ob1.17, Ob2.23), incorporate a conditional, implied or overt threat. In Ob1.7 John denies Tess access to any birthday parties until she apologises, “properly”, for hitting Sam. She complies. In Ob1.20 Luke refuses Peter access to his petrol truck (a toy he has brought from home) unless he desists drawing on Luke’s side of the paper. Peter complies. The third example of a threat used to resolve a dispute (Ob2.17) is less conditional, and on this occasion is only successful as a repeat.

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GAR: SIM: GAR: %act:

if you- (0.3) if you don’t give those (0.4) those things to me (.) you won’t come to my par:ty. (0.2) (now) do you wanna come to my party? (0.3) you can- (0.4) leave it for me (0.3) leave it you can’t come to my par:ty. SIM places object on ground and returns to basket to look for pieces.

In the fourth dispute resolved by implied threat (Ob1.23), Luke stops hitting himself on the head once Sam states that his mother will cry if he hurts himself. Although the implied threat would be accomplished indirectly (consequence of Luke’s actions to affect a third, non-present, party) it fits the criteria of undesirable consequence. In this and the previous example (Ob2.17), the boys comply with the other party’s wishes by acquiescing nonverbally (halting the behaviour which was objected to by the opposer). Resolution is also achieved in a more face-saving manner when a child agrees with the proposal made by the prior speaker. This agreement promotes the speaker to the role of collaborator, although it should be noted that it is the preceding turn which creates the opportunity for collaboration. Typically, this type of acknowledgment of the opposing position is performed with an agreement token (e.g. ‘yeah’). Ob1.8 3 4 5 6

JON: TES: TES: JON:

no (0.3) no you got my ↑blue one. (0.4) but we (0.3) but (0.5) but we are just sharing. (0.8) that one goes in there [John]. [ººyeah] oh yeah cozºº-,

Although an overt acceptance of Tess’ position is made by John in line 6, preliminary acquiescence is made to Tess’ claim in line 4, through an absence of further opposition. Given that Tess goes on to make a directive in line 5, however, the dispute is effectively resolved through John’s acceptance (line 6) of Tess’ prior utterances and his decision not to restate opposition to the immediately prior turn. In the closing utterance of Ob1.21 the agreement token is performed as ‘no’ given the prohibition in the prior turn.

Dispute Outcomes Ob1.21 2 3 4 5

CHE: PET: CHE: PET:

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don’t break ours Peter? (1.2) but we need lots of (these). (1.6) but but don’t take o:urs. (0.5) no we won’t.

In the two episodes above, each dispute is clearly resolved through the verbal acceptance made by the opposing party. In both episodes the objection which is subsequently accepted is prefaced with the dispreference marker ‘but’. These prefaced objections are based on an account of the equal or prior claim of the speaker (see discussion of accounts relating to ownership rights, and expectation of behaviour, in Chapter 4). Notably, the acceptance which brings about resolution in the previous two examples is preceded by a turn that demonstrates dispreferred features. Modified acceptance/compromise The second type of resolved dispute closing incorporates a modified acceptance of the opposing position or introduces an alternative proposal. The first of these (modified acceptance) is similar to the outcome of the previous two examples, in that one party’s position supersedes another. In this instance, however, the acquiescing party incorporates some condition of their own. That is, disputes are resolved where the acceptance of the other’s position is implied rather than overtly stated. In these cases the child is essentially accepting the position of the other party but imposing some of her/his own conditions. The distinction here is pertinent to considerations of face in argumentative interaction; one child essentially submits to another’s wishes but maintains status through her or his own contribution to the outcome of the dispute. An example of this modified acceptance leading to resolution is found in Ob2.1, where Caroline accepts Miranda’s prior proposal to cooperate. Ob2.1 11 12

MIR: CAZ: %com:

let’s just be nice and understand okay? (1.9) but we have to just type into the computer. MIR takes up this suggestion and both girls return to playing with the keyboards in the spaceship.

The dispute is essentially resolved by Miranda’s non-verbal acceptance of Caroline’s modified acquiescence (line 12); that is, Miranda’s assent is carried

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by typing on the computer keyboard. Characteristic of the utterances preceding acquiescence in this type of resolved dispute (see also Ob1.16 and Ob1.34, see below) is a dispreferred turn shape. Ob1.16 11 12 13 14

SAM: ADM: SAM: ADM: %com:

and these (0.3) ºthese go over likeº that= =yeah but (0.2) but that’s the river you remember that (.) .hhh that’s the river. (0.3) that’s the river going (0.9) going u:nder it. (0.4) yes. (2.7) cooperative play continues.

Ob1.34 15 PET: i’ve got four more minutes (left). (0.4) ADM: ((to FEL)) no i think he’s got four more minutes¿ 16

A dispute may also be resolved by the acceptance of a compromise. Earlier studies have pointed to the effectiveness of compromise as a verbal strategy in disputes (e.g. Eisenberg and Garvey, 1981), a finding replicated in the present data. In each instance where a compromise or alternative solution was produced, this type of digression from conflict is accepted by the other party. Ob1.24 1 2 3 4 5

LUK: RON: RON: LUK: RON:

we ca-(.) they have to join (under [there]). [no tha-] (0.3) we need tha:t¿ (0.6) we need that. (0.4) how about we can put it in the ↑mi:ddle↓:= =yeah:.

Ob2.25 9 10 11 12

PAU: JIM: PAU: PAU:

0 ((%act: pulls blocks apart)) (2.3) o::y:. (0.2) look see:? (0.4) no you’re ↑a chea:ter:. (0.3)

Dispute Outcomes 13 14

117

PAU: hey that can be both of ou:rs. (0.3) JIM: yeah.

Compromise is a successful strategy (i.e. leads to resolution) in disputes because it is not strictly a form of opposition. By providing an alternative solution, the speaker drops his original opposing position. Furthermore, as compromises do not directly challenge the opposing party, an acceptance of a compromise can be made with minimal affront to face. A shift is made from maintaining disagreement, to proposing a novel position which may prove acceptable to all parties. In the following two episodes (Ob1.30 and Ob2.6) the dispute is resolved through an alternative proposal performed by a third party to the dispute. Importantly the suggestion made by the third party is designed to address the dispute topic directly (i.e. not a topic shift). In Ob1.30, the suggestion made by Bill in line 30, which functions as a compromise by shifting blame from one of the participants to an imaginative other, prompts a series of suggestions, one of which (line 33) is acceptable to all the participants. Ob1.30 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

JO2: FEL: JO2: LUK: JO2: LUK: LUK: LUK: FEL: JON: JO2: BIL: LUK: FEL: BIL: JON:

the table (0.6) the table done it. (0.7) did not? (0.5) [did too:]. [did not i] s-, the table [done it and then] it stepped on itself,= [i sa:w it.] =i saw what happened. (1.1) um how did- who did it? (0.7) um [Bill who did it]. [i don’t know] who did it. (0.5) we [don’t know]. [ma:ybe:] (0.5) maybe somebody did it ºxxxx[x.]º [it might] have been a (boy that had [xx).] [i know] who did it lion did. (1.2) may:be a bear came. (1.0) yeah (0.3) well done.

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In Ob2.6, Elinor provides an alternative suggestion which removes blame from Hilary, thereby side-stepping personal culpability for placing blocks on the floor. Ob2.6 6 7 8 9 10

LOU: HIL: ELI: LOU: ELI:

$why did you do that$. (2.2) ºi’m not telling you whyº. (0.9) maybe coz she was (0.6) (making a floor). (1.5) oh >shall we make a< floor? (0.3) yes (0.2) >of course we< can.

The suggestion made by a third party in Ob1.28 below, however, does not secure resolution of the dispute (although the episode is brought to a close), as the alternate proposal is not designed as a compromise, but rather functions as a topic shift. That is, Luke’s suggestion (line 29) does not propose a solution to the prior dispute; it provides a novel position which is subsequently picked up by John (abandoning the dispute by not responding to Cherie’s continued opposition in line 30). Ob1.28 26 27 28 29 30 31

JON: CHE: JON: LUK: CHE: JON: %act:

well don’t break my house (0.8) coz (0.2) it’s (0.3) very special [what i made]. [is not]? (0.5) it is so¿= =how bou[t i can] join my tram (0.2) rail round to your house. [it is not]. yes (0.5) eh (0.4) (yes good) idea. JON now becomes involved in the building with LUK.

Unlike topic shifts, compromises are tied to the prior content of the dispute and are actively designed to bring the dispute to a close by introducing a novel but topictied proposition which satisfies both parties. Whilst each of these compromises which prompted dissolution of the argument was prefaced by a pause and incorporated an explanation of sorts, they do not represent typical dispreferred turn shapes because the novel content does not function as an account. However, as preference in this context relates to organisation of opposition, compromises could be considered as operating beyond oppositional constraints within adversative discourse: these utterances do not function as opposition moves because they do not challenge the prior turns, nor the prior speaker, in the dispute.

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Notably, these utterances serve to redirect the focus of the dispute (not a topic shift as a compromise is topic-tied), by proposing a position which addresses the wishes of both parties. The acceptability of this new position within the dispute brings about its conclusion. Failure to respond The third type of resolution is distinguished by an absence of response, achieved through silence and resumption of collaborative interaction with no further opposition. In other words, disputes may be seen to be resolved where no further challenge is made to the prior speaker. The absence of a vocal opposition implies silent acquiescence to whoever produces the final turn. A defining feature of resolution in these episodes is that the children continue to play together after the zero response. Ob1.2 5 JON:

but (0.3) but (0.3) but (0.2) but this one (0.3) it’s not rea- the space- (.) this (0.2) we’re just not ready yet. (3.6)

Ob1.6 8 9

SAM: JON: %act:

but then you don’t (0.9) hmm (0.3) (4.4) TES makes

Ob1.19 3 4

LUK: SAM: %com:

i saw you: put one away¿= =that doesn’t matter cause it wasn’t a block it was a cylinder. LUK makes no further comment.

(0.4) John will have three (0.3) and like pink do you John. no. no further attempt at topic.

Ob1.27 15 FEL: i didn’t mean you i meant Luke:. %com: three children continue to play together with no further reference to this exchange.

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Ob2.4 9 LOU: i know but i’m very gentle. %act: puts arrow on Friday %act: both children return to collaborative play with connector pieces. Ob2.5 5 ELI: no .hh coz i was helping with Hilary. %act: LOU and ELI start rebuilding. Ob2.12 5 LOU: well i’m trying to get through and you put so many things here. %com: WIN makes no further comment. Ob2.13 5 WIN: that car that you’ve got already¿ %com: Lou makes no response Ob2.14 10 TOM: it’s not that’s ten o’clock. %act: ALI then draws DON’s attention spaceship play.

back

to

the

Ob1.33 7 PET: no:: we’ve already been (near) the start. %com: Cherie makes no response. Parallel play continues. Ob2.23 7 8 9

NIG: we already had morning tea:? (0.6) ROB: did not Nigel. NIG: yeah i ↑did (0.2) >you didn’t< see us¿ %act: ROB walks off to have morning tea.

As leaving the play area denotes abandonment (exemplified in the next section of this chapter), the local context of Ob2.23 (which determines the dispute as resolved) should be clarified. In this episode, Rob is trying to persuade Nigel to have morning tea with him; as he leaves unaccompanied by Nigel, it is assumed that Rob was unsuccessful in his attempts to secure a partner for morning tea. Importantly, he was not playing with Nigel and Simon prior to the episode, so resuming cooperative play does not in fact involve Rob. The argument was effectively ‘won’ by Simon, rather than characterised by the dissipation of abandoned disputes. Consequently, the dispute was heard as resolved.

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The most significant observation to be made regarding the sequential organisation of this type of resolved dispute ending concerns the turn shape of the utterance which precedes the zero response. In each of the 11 episodes identified with this type of ending, the final utterance is performed in a dispreferred turn shape. Importantly, this consistent production of dispreferred turn shape in final utterances of resolved disputes occurs in both preschools. Although some of these turns are prefaced by a pause (Ob1.2, Ob1.6, Ob2.13, Ob1.33), and some with the marker ‘well’ or ‘but’ (Ob1.2, Ob1.6, Ob2.12), every final utterance incorporates some type of account. As discussed in Chapter 4, it is the presence of an account or justification for opposition which consistently performs as a feature of dispreferred turn shape in children’s arguments. Dispreferred turn shapes may be prefaced by delay, but are always accompanied by accounts. Given that the accounts provided in the final turns of the episodes listed above are met with silence (zero response) it can be inferred that either this justification is accepted by the opposing party or they are unable to better the prior account. Ob1.19 3 4

LUK: SAM: %com:

i saw you: put one away¿= =that doesn’t matter cause it wasn’t a block it was a cylinder. LUK makes no further comment.

Prior to this excerpt from Ob1.19, Sam has admonished Luke for putting blocks back on the shelf (a responsibility delegated to Adam on this occasion). Luke counters (line 3) with an accusation that Sam himself has committed the same offence. Sam’s response accounts for his own actions as entirely defensible, given that he was not interfering with the re-shelving of blocks (he returned a cylinder to the shelf). As Luke makes no further challenge, his zero response is heard as acceptance of Sam’s entitlement to replace cylindrical objects on the shelf. Similarly, in Ob2.5 below, Elinor is successful in defending herself from Louise’s censure by providing an account for her actions at the time of the event for which she is being blamed (blocks falling down). As Louise makes no further objection, this account is presumably heard as satisfactory. Ob2.5 1 2 3 4

%act: ELI: LOU: ELI: LOU:

a stack of blocks fall down of their own accord. Loui:se, (0.7) you did it. (0.4) no i didn’t?= =coz you were- (0.4) you were putting (0.3) your (.) h:ands on it. (0.3)

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122 5

ELI: no .hh coz i was helping with Hilary. %act: LOU and ELI start rebuilding.

Resolution may also be achieved indirectly, effectively accommodating the claims of the other party in the next turn without overtly acknowledging them. A child may ignore the prior speaker’s contribution, yet if he/she does not actively reject the content of this contribution, the dispute is resolved. A common feature of these varieties of closings is that one party decides not to continue the dispute. Ob1.3 7 8 9 10

KOY: ADM: KOY: ADM: %act:

i’m a rocket too. (0.5) no: cause (0.3) rockets are not allowed to come in (.) only (0.4) a rocket and a jet (0.4) cause there’s no space in there. (0.2) i’m a jet. (0.8) now this is gonna have a big-, KOY joins ADM and JON at the table.

Ob1.13 14 15 16 17 18

KOY: ADM: ADM: ADM: LUK: %com:

=STO::P! NO i have to stay out of the garage (0.3) (o)kay↑ (0.3) coz it’s fat. (0.9) see? it’s got this- (0.2) it’s got (0.3) hard job to do. (2.6) ((to ADM)) i’m making one for you. Play continues and ADM is now part of the group.

In both episodes (Ob1.3, Ob1.13), each child is trying to enter an established activity, and provides an account which qualifies him as suitable to join the play. In Ob1.13, for example, Koyo makes no further objection to Adam parking his car next to the garage, and appears to be reassured that Adam is not actually intending to drive his car inside the garage. Consequently, Adam is tacitly accepted (no continued rejections) as a member of the garage-making group. In all three types of resolved dispute endings, the single most important defining feature is the resumption of collaborative (or at least parallel) play. In each of the episodes identified as resolved, the children were able to continue playing together once the dispute had closed. Whilst the outcome might not have been gratifying to all involved, it was acceptable to each party, evident in resumed shared activity. This outcome is therefore distinct from abandoned disputes where

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one of the participants typically left the play area or at least refrained from any further interaction with the opposing party. Abandonment As discussed earlier, disputes must be resolved if conversation or interaction is to continue. Without active resolution of a dispute, collaborative play cannot be resumed. An outcome described here as abandonment denotes the interruption of cooperative interaction. When an argument is not resolved by the children themselves, or through the teacher as an arbitrator (as discussed below), the abandonment of the argument results in the breakdown of shared activity. Essentially, regardless of mutual satisfaction, disputes were seen to be resolved where the outcome is mutually acceptable, that is, when the children involved in the conflict continue to play together. Where disputes were abandoned, however, collaborative or parallel play is not resumed. Failure to respond Previously, failure to respond was seen as a final move in resolved disputes, where a zero response (i.e. no further challenge) functioned as tacit acceptance of the other party’s position. Yet, in abandoned disputes, zero responses also mark the end of the episode. Unlike resolved episodes, however, an absence of further opposition in abandoned disputes precedes a breakdown in collaborative play. Where zero responses were implicated in resolution, the participants continued to play together. In abandoned disputes, on the other hand, one party made no further challenge and no further attempt to engage the other party in any activity (cf. Vuchinich’s (1990) withdrawal format). Ob1.10 9 10 11 12

JON: TES: JON: JON: %com:

well (0.9) WELL (0.7) NObody can have (.) my fishing rod. (2.0) ((to MIL)) Mil- (.) i’m gonna share my: fishing rod. (0.8) well (0.4) i’m going to share mine with Sam. (1.6) ((to girls)) not you. (3.1) Neither TES nor JON actually pass on the rods to MIL or SAM. Eventually the teacher steps in to allot turns to SAM and MIL who have not yet played.

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124 Ob2.22 8 9 10

NIG: PAU: %act: PAU: %com:

yeah and i put those things up there¿ well it doesn’t need them. rebuilding (3.0) don’t need >all of emotherwise you can’t come to my partyGary do you wanna come< to my party? (0.8) GAR: if you- (0.3) if you don’t give those (0.4) those things to me (.) you won’t come to my par:ty.

This sequence is repeated in subsequent episodes by the same children. Ob2.19 3 SIM: i’ll let you come to my par:ty:? (0.4)

Dispute Outcomes 4

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GAR: and if (.) you (.) don’t give me (0.5) one of those (1.0) one of those big thi:ngs (0.6) you [can’t come to my par:ty].

Ob2.20 9 GAR: then (you can’t) come to my party.

Two of these episodes were abandoned (Ob2.19, Ob2.20) but the other three were resolved. In Ob1.7 and Ob2.17 the hearer conformed to the directive made in the prior threat, and Ob1.27 was resolved by clearing up a misunderstanding (as to who uttered the offending statement). On one of only two occasions where producing a threat did not result in the end of the dispute, threatening the withdrawal of an invitation to a birthday party was met with a counter challenge (not threat), and subsequent mid-episode topic shift to arguing about the birthday calendar. Ob2.19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

SIM: Gary: (0.5) this afterno:on i saw you put the (x x). (0.7) GAR: n:o:. SIM: i’ll let you come to my par:ty:? (0.4) GAR: and if (.) you (.) don’t give me (0.5) one of those (1.0) one of those big thi:ngs (0.6) you [can’t come to my par:ty]. SIM: [hey Ga::ry]? (0.7) SIM: my party’s befo:re you:rs¿ GAR: no MY party’s before yours.= SIM: =not bef[ore mine]. GAR: [but mine is] (0.3) yours- (0.6) my: mum said yours is in February. (1.3) SIM: no it isn’t. (0.4) GAR: when i:s it. (1.4) SIM: Ga:ry if you- (0.7) if you let me have that one xx. (0.3) GAR: what birthday is in your- (0.4) - (0.3) is yours? SIM: my brother’s in Febru[ary]. GAR: [my] brother is si:x¿ %com: continuing conversation focuses on ages of siblings.

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A point of interest in this dispute is Simon’s challenge (line 6) to the validity or power of Gary’s threat (line 4). As Simon contests that his party will be held first, it follows that he has the first right of (un)invitation. However, threatening to uninvite a prospective party guest is seldom related to the date of the actual event and at this age, children typically invite most, if not all, of their preschool group to their birthday party. The party need not be imminent for the threat to be persuasive; the birthday may have recently been celebrated or the child might not have a temporal understanding of when their birthday party will be held. As with the more abstract concept of removing friendship, these threats are not actually played out: children play together the next day and attend birthday parties, regardless of the response to these types of threats. The other threat that did not bring about the closing of the dispute (either through resolution, abandonment or teacher intervention) was heard in Ob1.28 (see below). John’s ineffectual threat (lines 16 and 18) promises that he will ‘dob’ (tell the teacher) if his house gets broken. Benoit’s (1983) finding that unspecified or tell-authority threats are least powerful plays out in this instance. Ob1.28 6 FEL: 7 CHE: 8 FEL: 9 LUK: 10 FEL: 11 CHE: 12 JON: 13 CHE: 14 JON: 15 FEL: 16 JON: 17 FEL: 18 JON: LUK: 19 20 CHE: 21 FEL: 22 JON:

[that] doesn’t look like a house. it doesn’t look like one? no:?= =it looks like a tram track doesn’t it. [yes]. [yes]. (0.2) no it doesn’t (.) it’s a different sort of house. (0.4) i’ll break it? (0.4) no don’t break it! (0.2) i will [break it]? [otherwise] i’ll tell the teacher. (0.5) i will break it John. DON’T BREAK it OTHERWISE I WILL TELL [THE TEACHERS on you]. [John (0.3) Jo:hn] i won’t break your [house]. [i] can’t break my: things. (0.3) i don’t break my: things. (0.7) don’t break my house (.) like that! (1.1)

Dispute Outcomes 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

CHE: LUK: GGG: JON: CHE: JON: LUK: CHE: JON: %act:

141

[i (break) my things]. [how about making] (0.2) tram [tracks xxxx], [this can be Winne] the Pooh’s house. (0.7) well don’t break my house (0.8) coz (0.2) it’s (0.3) very special [what i made]. [is not]? (0.5) it is so¿= =how bou[t i can] join my tram (0.2) rail round to your house. [it is not]. yes (0.5) eh (0.4) (yes good) idea. JON now becomes involved in the building with LUK.

Based on the data collected, there is a temptation to claim that only withholding an invitation to a birthday party functions as a successful (i.e. precursor to resolution) threat, but there are too few examples in the data to make such a claim (although earlier research suggests that withholding actions/object threats are powerful). Additionally, we should be wary of over-attributing the content of the threat, as other factors (children involved in the dispute, type of dispute, and sequential context – previous and subsequent turns) are related to outcome. It could be claimed, however, that concrete threats where the speaker controls the punishment are most likely to close an argument. Threats operate differently in the disputes when compared with the earlier categories of justified objections (dispreferred turn shapes); they leave little if no room for further negotiations. Only two options are available to the hearer: comply or suffer the penalty stated in the threat. The status of threats as an endpoint is further implied in the immovability of the speaker’s position. Once the speaker has issued an ultimatum, failure to impose the stated consequences of the threat relinquishes any position of power or authority. Consequently there is little opportunity for either the speaker or hearer to negotiate once a threat has been issued. The implications of this finding relates specifically to the position of threats in the sequential organisation of arguments. Threats do not appear in the early stages of disputes, and result in the submission of one party (an outright ‘win/ loss’ resolution) or a breakdown collaborative play (abandonment). Consequently, threats function as a last resort strategy. Threats in sequences Overwhelmingly, then, threats appear in the closings of the dispute. Regardless of the outcome (resolved or abandoned), other conflict strategies are seldom produced once a threat or counter exchange of threats has been uttered. Subsequently, our

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attention shifts to the preceding context of threats, that is, the sequences of turns which lead to these last resort strategies. In Ob1.7, the threat (party invitation) follows failed attempts to gain the teacher’s attention to intervene. Ob1.7 7 8 9 10 11 12

SAM: TES: %com: SAM: %com: JON: JON: JON:

0 ((%act: SAM succeeds in reclaiming the boxes (0.6))) ((whines)) .hhhh ↑Sam took the boxes ↓from me. directed towards teacher who does not hear (0.4) but (0.5) she did it fi:rst. also directed to teacher with no response (1.6) she hit (0.4) Sam. (1.7) it’s not nasty to hit (1.4) ↓Tess now you (0.2) can’t (0.4) come (0.2) to ↑any (0.4) birthdays. (1.1) not till you (0.2) say sorry Sam.

The threat is not made contiguously to Tess’ objection. Furthermore, the conditional component of the threat (line 12) follows the consequence stated in line 11, after a considerable pause (1.1). Tess complies with this condition and apologises to Sam (she has to repeat the apology to satisfy Sam’s expectation of sincerity). The threat is built upon a reprimand of Tess’ behaviour, as John claim’s she hit Sam. Tess’ compliance with the threat is tied to acceptance of her wrongdoing. This compliance is made without any significant delay. In Ob1.27, Felicity makes a conditional threat (line 13) in response to Luke’s earlier teasing (he claims that he is doing the puzzle faster then Felicity). Cherie misinterprets the threat as directed towards her, presumably because she is the immediately prior speaker to Felicity’s threat. Ob1.27 11 12 13 14

LUK: CHE: FEL: CHE:

((to CHE)) last is you. (1.0) i got (part of xxxx). (0.7) don’t SAY those sort of things >otherwise you can’t come to my partyGary do you wanna come< to my party? (0.8) if you- (0.3) if you don’t give those (0.4) those things to me (.) you won’t come to my par:ty. (0.2) (now) do you wanna come to my party? (0.3) you can- (0.4) leave it for me (0.3) leave it you can’t come to my par:ty. SIM places object on ground and returns to basket to look for other plastic connector pieces.

Simon’s indirect threat in line 12 is met with a reciprocal, recycled threat from Gary (slightly delayed). Gary’s repeat is subsequently upgraded from the conditional ‘won’t’ to the definite ‘can’t’ (line 15). This modal upgrade is effective, as Simon relinquishes the object under dispute. The restarts or hesitations (lines 13 and 15) are compatible with dispreferred turn shape. Indeed in each of the threats used in the closings of these resolved disputes, the turn shape could be characterised as dispreferred: delayed, opposition deferred, and containing further evidence (if not account) of the speaker’s position. Gary and Simon produce more ‘birthday party’ threats in Ob2.19, although in this instance, Simon’s prior turn consists of a conditional promise rather than an implied threat (line 3). Ob2.19 2 GAR: n:o:. 3 SIM: i’ll let you come to my par:ty:? (0.4)

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144 4 5 6 7

GAR: SIM: SIM: GAR:

and if (.) you (.) don’t give me (0.5) one of those (1.0) one of those big thi:ngs (0.6) you [can’t come to my par:ty]. [hey Ga::ry]? (0.7) my party’s befo:re you:rs¿ no MY party’s before yours.=

In line 6, Simon challenges the validity of the threat made by Gary, and the dispute moves to an exchange of preferred turn shapes (e.g. line 7). Subsequent questions produced by Gary (asking when Simon’s birthday is) diffuse the primary conflict and the dispute is abandoned (no further opposition from Gary or Simon). In this instance, although the dispute is dropped, Simon does not concede to Gary’s threat, as there is a topic shift (to a disagreement about birth dates). Another abandoned ‘party’ episode (Ob2.20), features Gary making a threat during an object dispute with Rob, the consequences of which Rob rejects. Ob2.20 8 9 10 11 12

ROB: this is mine¿ (0.7) GAR: then (you can’t) come to my party. (2.7) ROB: i >don’t wanna come to your< party. (2.4) ROB: i don’t want to come to your party anyway. SIM: i don’t wanna come to your party anyway either. %com: no further response.

Rob repeats his rejection of Gary’s threat (again after a lengthy pause) and Simon jumps on the bandwagon by repeating the rejection (although he is not directly involved in the dispute). Gary’s threat is rendered powerless: if the withheld event is discounted by the hearer, the consequence is no longer a persuasive entity. The dispute is abandoned as the boys have reached a stalemate. A stalemate is also reached in the following object dispute between Elinor and Caroline (Ob2.7) about who gets to play with the ‘girl’ doll. Ob2.7 16 17 18

ELI: CAZ: ELI:

(you’ve got) both the girls. (0.3) no: there’s another girl¿ (0.2) but i don’t like that girl. (6.8)

Dispute Outcomes 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

145

ELI: you can’t have two girls. ((petulant tone)) (0.7) ELI: well that’s the boy and i hate boys. (1.1) ELI: i’m not gonna to be your friend if you don’t ever give me that. (1.0) CAZ: i’m not gonna ever give that to you. ELI: okay (.) i’m getting out of here. CAZ: alright? (1.1) CAZ: there you are? %act: throws the boy/disliked girl doll out to ELI %com: ELI moves away from play area.

The most striking feature of this episode is the number of attempts Elinor makes to gain possession of the ‘girl’ prior to issuing the conditional threat in line 21. Each of these turns is performed in dispreferred shape (lines 18-20), which suggests further attention should be paid to quality of the account (i.e. efficacy or persuasiveness of the referent) in the dispute. The following dispute is abandoned (Ob1.15), because Adam ignores Peter’s continuing attempts to use one of Adam’s cars. Ob1.15 14 PET: 15 ADM: 16 PET: 17 SAM: 18 PET: 19 PET: 20 SAM:

but which one can i have then. (1.0) (i have) nothing for you. (0.4) why:. (2.3) ((to PET)) make with me! (0.2) ↑oka:y i will make with (0.2) Sam then ((to ADM)) i won’t be your friend anymore¿ (0.4) ((to SAM)) now can i have that one? (0.9) here you go. ((gives car to PET))

In the sequence above, Adam ignores not only Peter’s threat (Peter has already shifted his allegiance to Sam at this point), but also his prior request for explanation (line 16). The length of pause (2.3 seconds) and redirection by a third party (Sam in line 17) suggest that the dispute was in fact abandoned by Adam after his turn

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in line 15. At the very least the threat in this episode is not made as a contiguous, next-turn opposition. In Ob1.26, threatening to withdraw friendship resulted in teacher intervention, because Adam was shouting at Cherie, and both children had begun to push one another. Ob1.26 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

CHE: ADM: CHE: ADM: CHE: %act: ADM: CHE: ADM: %act: YYY: %yyy:

[plea:se] can you go away from us? coz (0.3) [coz (0.5) coz]-, [we’re playing a game]. coz coz coz coz [(you got)-,] [GO AWAY] FROM US! pushes ADM (0.3) DON”T PUSH ME! ((to TES)) go on get him. (0.4) I WON”T BE YOUR FRIEND¿ CHE is still pushing ADM so he pushes back. um excu:se me Adam. Teacher engages ADM in another activity

Cherie ignores Adam’s threat (line 30) and continues to push Adam away from where she is playing with Tess. In this instance, the dispute has escalated before the threat is produced: Cherie has already pushed Adam and he has begun shouting in response, prior to issuing the threat. This suggests that there is a point in the discourse where resolution is unlikely (following physical rebukes and escalating volume), regardless of the form of subsequent utterances. As noted in the previous section, a threat of harm/physical punishment was heard only once in the observation sessions. Ob2.10 16 17 18 19

%act: PAU is pulling some of the pieces off the ladder. (3.6) FRE: DON’T (.) WRECK i:t! (0.2) PAU: i wanna make something (.) and you weren’t even using it. (1.0) FRE: but i (.) i will use it ↑later. (1.2) PAU: no you were:n’t no you weren’t even using it no:w¿ (0.7)

Dispute Outcomes 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

FRE: PAU: FRE: PAU: JIM: PAU: JIM: PAU: %com:

147

yeah now- (0.5) then- (0.3) you’re (wrecking it) i’ll kill your whole building down? (0.3) huh? (0.3) kill your whole building down if you don’t-, (0.3) i didn’t i didn’t even make a building. (0.5) yes you di:d¿ what. (0.7) your um (0.6) bits:. (0.4) ↑yeah (0.3) and i’ll break your ↑head off. JIM and FRE ignore PAU and continue imaginative play in the spaceship.

A point of interest in Ob2.10 is the turn shapes which precede the first threat in line 20. The dispreferred turn shapes produced by both parties (lines 18 and 19) fail to influence the other speaker, emphasising the ‘last resort strategy’ nature of threats. Fred has moved from a direct order (line 16) to justifying his objection (line 18) with no effect, finally issuing a threat after false starts/hesitation (line 20). Similar to the earlier example in Ob2.19, Paul challenges the validity of the threat (he didn’t even make a building). Dropping this side sequence (whether or not Paul has a building which may be killed) Paul produces a counter harm-threat (line 27) which is ignored by Fred and his offsider Jim. As noted in Chapter 2, one way in which disputes escalate is through cycles of threats and counter-threats (O’Keefe and Benoit, 1982; Haslett, 1983). A withhold-object threat which was successful in resolving the dispute (Ob1.20 below) involves access to a petrol truck that Luke has brought from home (these novel toys are always highly sought-after objects at preschool). Ob1.20 1 2 3 4 5 6

PET: LUK: LUK: PET: LUK: PET:

0 ((%act: draws on LUK’s side of the paper)) ((to PET)) no this is the moo:n. (0.8) no: you’re drawing on the moo::n.= =but this is where the sun is. (1.9) 0 ((%act: pushes PET’s hand away)) ((whines)) don’t draw mi::ne. (0.2)

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148 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

LUK: LUK: %com: PET: ADM: PET: LUK: PET: LUK:

no you (.) you draw on you:r part. (1.3) then i’m - (0.5) well then (.) i won’t let you have a turn on (0.2) the petrol truck. this is a toy LUK has brought from home. (0.5) ºyesº. i wanna have (.) i wanna have (the) petrol truck. yes. ((to PET)) ↑wha- (.) well not if you do not (.) not if you’re gonna go on (.) on mine. ((ie. draw on LUK’s part of the paper)) (0.3) i wo:n’t. (1.1) there you can go there. ((on the paper))

In his previous attempts (lines, 2, 3, 5 and 7), Luke has not been able to stop Peter drawing on his side of the collective paper (Peter claims rights to this part of the paper as he believes this is where the sun should be in the picture – line 4). Luke resorts to issuing the powerful conditional promise of permission to play with his petrol truck. In this instance the threat is successful and Peter complies. The finality of the threat is recognisable in contrast to the possible alternative outcome: if Peter had not complied, the threat would have been rendered powerless, leading to a break in interaction. Ob1.23 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

SAM: LUK: SAM: LUK: SAM: LUK: SAM: %act:

don’t do that Luke¿. i want to crack it. (2.2) if you crack heads you’ll ↓die: (0.3) do you want to ↑die:: (0.3) and then your mummy will cry:? (1.3) ºyesº. (1.5) don’t you like your mummy. ºyes i doº. (0.3) then don’t (0.3) then don’t die yourself. LUK stops hitting his head with the block

In Ob1.23 Sam is successful in instructing Luke not to hit himself in the head, by equating the action with disrespect for his mother. In line 5 Sam claims

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that continuing this action will cause distress to Sam (defined as threat due to undesirable consequences). Luke is obliged to stop hitting himself in the head or otherwise risk contradicting his own professed affection for his mother. The analysis has demonstrated that threats operate, if not outside the boundaries of preference, in a slightly different manner to other opposing turns (e.g. do not share typical dispreference markers). However, it has also been established that threats function as a dispreferred response to opposition, as they are not designed to sustain the dispute, but to end the argument through submission of the other party. A distinctive feature of threats in sequences of discourse is the expectation of response. A preferred second pair part (to a first part threat) is acquiescence through no further challenge, and conformability to the direction inherent in the threat (i.e. cease the objectionable/offensive action). Evidently, a zero response or submission to the speaker’s wishes does not perform elsewhere in disputes as a preferred second, given that overt disagreement serves to sustain this type of discourse. It remains to be seen why certain threats lead to resolution while others prompt a breakdown in shared activity, a consideration for the next chapter. Dispute closings In the 60 recorded disputes, three distinct types of dispute closings were identified: resolution, abandonment and teacher intervention. Each of these possible outcomes was arrived at through a variety utterances, seemingly unrelated if considered from a speech act perspective. The most significant finding presented in this chapter, however, points to the constancy of turn shape implicated in outcomes. That is, disputes were always resolved through final utterances performed in dispreferred turn shapes or threats. Conversely, preferred turn shapes were prevalent in concluding sequences of abandoned or intervened conflict. Through classification and analysis of the dispute closings, preference organisation (as identified throughout Chapter 4 by the presence or absence of markedness) emerges as an influential principle in the development and outcome of disputes: dispreferred turn shapes lead to resolution; preferred turn shapes are not heard in the final utterances of resolved disputes. As only the final turns of each episode were considered in this chapter, we cannot infer that all dispreferred turn shapes resolve disputes. Sequences of discourse need to be examined to consider where dispreferred turns shapes are successful in securing mutual acceptance of the dispute closing. Therefore, the discussion now moves to address the specific features of dispreferred turn shapes which are implicated in resolution.

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Chapter 6

Preference and Dispute Outcomes

Introduction In the previous chapter, it was established that the final utterances of resolved disputes are overwhelmingly performed in a dispreferred turn shape. It does not follow, however, that dispreferred turns always secure resolution. It remains to be seen, then, if some finer distinction exists; if there are particular sequential characteristics of these utterances that are implicated in resolution. The analysis of dispreferred turn shapes in Chapter 4 pointed to accounts as the most prominent component of these turn shapes in the children’s disputes, so the focus now shifts to an analysis of justifications. As seen in the earlier analysis, a variety of accounts are used throughout dispute episodes. Are certain accounts apprehended as more persuasive than others? Are persuasive accounts attributed to content? Can examples of successful accounts (appearing dispute-final position) be found in early stages of other arguments? What types of accounts are implicated in a restart of preferred turn exchanges? Responding to these questions and subsequently uncovering sequential patterns in the children’s arguments forms the substance of this chapter. Accounts in final utterances of resolved disputes Accounts are the universal feature of dispreferred turn shapes in the data: while most dispreferred turns are prefaced with delay (pause or marker), all incorporate some kind of account. In Chapter 4, various types of accounts were identified in the disputes, namely: (1) references to personal desire (want, need, (dis)likes); (2) claiming ownership of objects or play area; (3) stating properties of objects, play space or play script; (4) invoking behavioural obligations (e.g. rules of sharing); and (5) epistemological claims. Whilst these categories are not proposed as finite, a grouping of accounts based on content allows for exploration of possible distribution according to referents. Fundamentally, does the referent of the account (what the justification is based upon) influence the persuasiveness of the turn and subsequently the outcome of the conflict? This question will be answered first by considering the types of accounts appearing in the closings of resolved disputes. A review of the final sequences of turns in resolved disputes shows a predominance of accounts which refer to properties of entities under dispute. More accounts are based on these concrete qualities than all other four types of

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accounts combined. Illustration of the sequential context of these accounts in each resolved dispute follows. Ob1.3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

KOY: JON: KOY: KOY: ADM: KOY: ADM: KOY: ADM: %act:

where i can go Adam? (1.1) nowhe[re]. [i] got a rocket? (1.3) i got a rocket (and a jet). (1.3) no that’s a- that’s got ehhm no only jets and rockets. (1.4) i’m a rocket too. (0.5) no: cause (0.3) rockets are not allowed to come in (.) only (0.4) a rocket and a jet (0.4) cause there’s no space in there. (0.2) i’m a jet. (0.8) now this is gonna have a bigKOY joins ADM and JON at the table.

In Ob1.3, Adam supports his refusal to allow entry of Koyo’s rocket (line 8) by stating that only objects which are a combination of rocket and jet have access to the landing strip (table), suggesting he did not hear the barely audible second part of Koyo’s utterance in line 5 (“and a jet”). As Koyo conforms to the criteria set by Adam (“only a rocket and a jet”) by changing his description of his rocket to ‘jet’, Adam makes no further objection and the dispute is resolved (boys continue in collaborative play). Ob1.2 1 ADM: ((to JON)) move out the way! 2 JON: no no (0.3) no ↑this [spacesh-] 3 ADM: [no no no] (.) no [no] ↑this one hasn’t got any le:gs. 4 JON: [but-] (0.9) 5 JON: but (0.3) but (0.3) but (0.2) but this one (0.3) it’s not rea- the space- (.) this (0.2) we’re just not ready yet. (3.6)

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John’s successful utterance in line 5 (no further challenge made by Adam) was preceded by Adam’s justified objection “this one hasn’t got any legs”. John’s dispreferred turn shape features a number of restarts, noticeably changing the account from a property of the object (the spaceship’s not ready) to an inclusive depiction of the participants (“we’re just not ready yet”). Significant in this account is the plural pronoun ‘we’ (vs. the less persuasive “I’m not ready”), and the mitigating ‘just’. This appeal enlists Adam and secures resolution of the episode. Ob1.13 14 15 16 17 18

%act: KOY: ADM: ADM: ADM: LUK: %com:

ADM puts his car next to the blocks =STO::P! NO i have to stay out of the garage (0.3) ↑(o)kay (0.3) coz it’s fat. (0.9) see? it’s got this- (0.2) it’s got (0.3) hard job to do. (2.6) ((to ADM)) i’m making one for you. Play continues and ADM is now part of the group.

Prior to this segment of the dispute (Ob1.13), Koyo has refused Adam’s entry into the garage because his car is too ‘big’. Adam placates Koyo by incorporating this objection into his own account for placing his car next to the garage (line 13). This account (conforming to the size requirements established by Koyo) is successful as no further objection is made, and Adam is accepted as legitimate member of the garage-making, car-driving play group. Ob1.16 7 8 9 10 11 12

%act: SAM: ADM: SAM: %com: SAM: SAM: ADM:

ADM pulls down a block that SAM has placed upright ↑no: (0.4) that is UP. (0.7) no but i wanna make CRECHE. (0.3) but it’s my bui:ldi:ng (.) i: did this bridge. (3.2) ADM is watching SAM move the blocks. and its-, (1.6) and these (0.3) ºthese go over likeº that.= =yeah but (0.2) but that’s the river you remember that (.) .hhh that’s the river. (0.3)

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154 13 14

SAM: ADM: %com:

that’s the river going (0.9) going u:nder it. (0.4) yes. (2.7) cooperative play continues.

Adam’s account for his objection in line 8 fails to persuade Sam, who responds with his own dispreferred turn. Both boys base their early opposition on reflexive motivations: “I want”, “I built”. Sam’s account in line 9 is not challenged by Adam, suggesting rights to the play script are strengthened by prior claim (the fact that Sam originally built the bridge holds more sway than Adam’s plans to turn the building into ‘creche’). Adam accepts Sam’s authority, but saves face by making his own addition to the play script (line 12) which is taken up by Sam. It is consensus to the properties of the bridge ((i) that it is a bridge and (ii) that there is a river going under it) that secure the mutually contrived closing. Ob1.19 1 2 3 4

LUK: SAM: LUK: SAM: %com:

(%act) puts a block on the shelf. leave them there (0.3) ↑Adam’s (.) Adam’s in charge of putting them away (0.3) Luke? (5.7) i saw you: put one away¿= =that doesn’t matter cause it wasn’t a block it was a cylinder. LUK makes no further comment.

In Ob1.19, line 2, Sam explains his objection to Luke putting blocks back on the shelf by stating that this responsibility has been assigned to Adam. Luke challenges the quality of this opposition (why should he not be allowed to put blocks away when he saw Sam do the same thing). Sam immediately counters this objection by qualifying his own actions, clarifying the distinct features of the object he returned to the shelf: “it wasn’t a block it was a cylinder”. This specificity is met with no further opposition from Luke and the dispute is quickly resolved. Ob1.33 1 2 3 4 5 6

PET: CHE: PET: CHE: PET: CHE:

↑now: (0.6) you have to have a baby: now [you]-, [↑no] (0.3) there’s no baby in this one. ye:s it’s [xx], [no] (0.2) coz (0.2) first we need to do it again (0.3) at the start. (1.9) no::. (goes there). (0.9)

Preference and Dispute Outcomes 7

155

PET: no:: we’ve already been (near) the start. %com: Cherie makes no response. Parallel play continues

Cherie’s dispreferred turn shape in line 4 is based on necessity “first we need to do it again”. Peter objects in a preferred turn shape (line 5) then accounts for his opposition by challenging the content of Cherie’s prior account (line 7). In this utterance, Peter corrects Cherie’s version of the play script. Cherie’s zero response and the continuing play indicates resolution. Ob1.34 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

ADM: PET: FEL: PET: ADM: FEL: ADM: PET: ADM:

=i wanna have a turn. but i:’m not fin(.)ished ye::t.= =yeah:. (0.6) well .hh, (1.9) no:,= =no[:]. [tha]t’s a long tu:rn. (0.2) i’ve got four more minutes (left). (0.4) ((to FEL)) no i think he’s got four more minutes¿

Peter’s early attempt to justify his refusal to let Adam use a toy car “I’m not finished yet” and his subsequent abandoned dispreferred turn (line 11) fails to satisfy Adam and Felicity. The account in Peter’s next turn addresses Adam’s objection (“that’s a long turn”) by specifying a restricted period of time after which he will relinquish the car, and presumably allow Adam to play with it (“I’ve got four minutes left”). This justification is validated by Adam: “he’s got four more minutes”. Ob2.5 2 3 4 5

LOU: you did it. (0.4) ELI: no i didn’t?= LOU: =coz you were- (0.4) you were putting (0.3) your (.) h:ands on it. (0.3) ELI: no .hh coz i was helping with Hilary. %act: LOU and ELI start rebuilding.

In Ob2.5, the adjacency pair of preferred turns (lines 2 and 3) is followed by a dispreferred turn shape produced by Louise (line 4). Elinor subsequently rejects the prior account and provides an alibi – she could not be held responsible for the

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blocks falling down because she “was helping with Hilary”. This justification, describing concrete actions, is accepted by Louise (no further challenge) and the dispute is resolved. Ob2.12 1 2 3 4 5

WIN: do:n’t you’re wrecking everything. LOU: well i’m trying to go round. LOU: 0 ((%act: knocks another set of blocks)) WIN: DO:N’T! LOU: well i’m trying to get through and you put so many things here. %com: WIN makes no further comment.

In Ob2.12, Louise defends her first infringement (knocking over the block bridge) as unintentional “well I’m trying to go round”. In response to the next attack (line 4) Louise points to Winnie’s role in the accident “you put so many things there” which successfully resolves the dispute. The examples above illustrate that most accounts in final turns of resolved disputes are based on concrete entities of the play objects, play space, play script or play actions. The common feature of these properties is the transparency of the justification. That is, in each of the successful dispreferred turns above, the content of the account is visible or verifiable to the opposing party. These accounts are based on tangible properties, present in the interaction. More abstract accounts were also implicated in resolution, although less frequently. Epistemological claims, for example were used by children in Ob2 to secure resolution. In Ob2.14 below, Tom’s (actual) knowledge of how to read the time is tacitly accepted by Don. In line 8, Tom challenges Don’s statement “it’s one o’clock” in a preferred turn format. His correction is only successful, however, when he provides a further account of the actual time (“ten o’clock”) in line 10. Ob2.14 7 8 9 10

DON: TOM: DON: TOM: %act:

[one] o’clo:ck (0.4) yea::h (.) it’s one o’clock. (0.2) no it’s not. (2.3) (on (.) on the) time it says-, it’s not that’s ten o’clock. ALI then draws DON’s attention back to the spaceship play.

Similarly, in that the justification is based on the speaker’s knowledge, a ‘truth’ account appears in Ob2.23.

Preference and Dispute Outcomes Ob2.23 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

ROB: NIG: SIM: NIG: NIG: ROB: NIG:

157

you’ve gotta have a muffin with [me]. [i] already had-, (0.4) i’ve already had mi:ne? (0.4) i’ve >already had morning tea< too¿ (1.3) we already had morning tea:? (0.6) did not Nigel. yeah i ↑did (0.2) >you didn’t< see us¿

Rob challenges Nigel and Simon’s claims that they have already had morning tea (line 8). Nigel claims that Rob is not in a position to disbelieve them as he did not witness the event (an event that Simon and Nigel maintain has occurred). Importantly, Robert only accepts their claims once this account (“you didn’t see us”) has been made. Invoking behavioural norms or expectations of appropriate behaviour has been identified in the data as a justification used by children. This type of account was heard, although not frequently, in the closings of resolved disputes. In the two episodes below, references to expectations of appropriate behaviour secured acquiescence. Ob1.8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

JON: TES: JON: TES: TES: JON: JON:

oh you got my one (.) x ing it. ↑no: we are sharing John? no (0.3) no you got my ↑blue one. (0.4) but we (0.3) but (0.5) but we are just sharing. (0.8) that one goes in there [John]. [ººyeah] oh yeah cozºº-, (1.0) oh yeah coz.

The persuasiveness of mitigating dispreferred turn shapes is exemplified in Ob1.8. Tess invokes the sharing rule in her first opposition (line 2), but is only successful when she repeats this account in a marked turn shape (repetition of ‘but’ at the beginning of the utterance) and includes the modifier ‘just’. Notably, the plural pronoun ‘we’ (as in Ob1.2 above) is implicated in resolution of this episode. Also, the rule of sharing is produced as a description by Tess rather than as a more direct (confronting) instruction (e.g. “you have to share”).

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158 Ob2.4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

JAK: oh (then the two of us can) do it today? LOU: no i can do it¿ (0.2) JAK: NO: I WANNA Do it. (0.5) JAK: the the teacher said ↑i will do it. (0.3) LOU: no:w (.) i know which day (0.2) and i can do it¿= JAK: =i can do it too. (0.6) LOU: no (.) i i can do it [I-], %act: pulling arrow from JAK JAK: [it’s] gonna break >it’s gonna breakalready had morning tea< too¿ (1.3) NIG: we already had morning tea:? (0.6) ROB: did not Nigel. NIG: yeah i ↑did (0.2) >you didn’t< see us¿ %act: ROB walks off to have morning tea.

Accounts based on appeals to acceptable/permissible behaviour were also responded to with overt (preferred) opposition in the data. In Ob1.11 Nancy’s turn invoking an obligation to share is met with a preferred (although delayed) response from Cherie, prompting a cycle of preferred turns throughout the remaining dispute.  Delay may be accounted for in this instance by prior opposition made by Felicity, i.e. next-speaker selection is not automatic or straightforward in multiparty disputes.

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Ob1.11 11 NAN: you have to sha:re (.) don’t get away. (1.2) 12 CHE: we (.) ↑a:re↓.

In Ob1.12, Adam’s protest in line 6 is based on the rule of sharing. This turn, and his following upgrade in line 8 (stating the rule is imposed by the teacher), is met with overt (shouted) opposition by Luke (lines 7 and 9). The episode then breaks down to a series of repeated short utterances, until Adam abandons his attempts to join the group. Ob1.12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

LUK: ADM: LUK: LUK: SAM: ADM: LUK: ADM: LUK: ADM: LUK: KOY: ADM:

against the wall? (0.7) no you need to make a ↑hu:ge house. (0.3) we’re no:t. (0.9) none for A- (.) none for Adams. (0.2) no. you HAFta SHARE. (0.6) NO:? (0.6) yeah but the teacher says (0.4) “share”. (0.5) NO:? (0.2) . (0.6) [no:]? [i’m mak]ing a garage. (0.6) Y[ES:].

In Ob2.21, Nigel’s opposition is based on the centre’s rule that outside play cannot begin until a teacher has moved outside (which has already occurred in this instance, witnessed by Simon but not by Nigel). Following a request for clarification (presumably Simon did not hear Nigel’s utterance in line 2), Simon opposes Nigel’s admonition outright.

Preference and Dispute Outcomes Ob2.21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

SIM: NIG: SIM: NIG: SIM: NIG: SIM: %act:

167

i’m going outsi:de. (0.3) no you’re not allowed to¿ (1.0) wha:t? (0.3) you’re not allowed to go outside, yea:h¿ (0.3) no you’re not, i a::m? SIM opens door and goes outside.

In Ob2.20 Rob’s utterance in line 7 is also unsuccessful, although it is not met with immediate opposition, because the behaviour rule is ignored by Gary. Ob2.20 6 ROB: [no:: (give it) back]! %act: takes piece from GAR’s construction 7 ROB: [[you can’t take it FROM SOMEONE ELSE]]!

In Ob1.17, Adam objects to Peter taking all the blocks by invoking the rule of sharing (line 7), which is explicitly rejected by Peter in the next turn. Adam repeats this account throughout the dispute and Peter invariably responds with the most direct form of opposition, using the single word ‘no’. Adam’s final shouted objection (prior to bursting into tears) claims that the blocks do not belong to Peter. Ob1.17 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

PET: %act: ADM: PET: ADM: KOY: PET: KOY:

i’m gonna get all of these (0.4) little blocks,= PET starts removing blocks from shelf. =yeah but YOU HAVE TO SHARE. (1.5) but we’re not gonna share with our toys [are we¿]((this directed to SAM and KOY)) [yeah but] you [HAVE to]. [>we don’t want to share] with [youput](them) init’s gonna break


Slower than surrounding talk

.hhh

Audible inhalation

$ ( ) (( )) x

Laughing while talking (smile talk) Uncertain words (best guess) Comments e.g. quality of speech or intended hearer Unintelligible speech

%act

Identifies (accompanying) nonverbal action

%com

Observer comment

text

Feature of interest

Source: See Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974.

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Observation 1 transcripts @Begin @Participants: @File name: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

NOR: NOR: NOR: MIN: LIA: LIA: CHE: NOR: LIA: MIN: CHE: CHE: %com: FEL: CHE:

NOR Norm CHE Cherie MIN Minnie LIA Liam FEL Felicity Ob1.1.ca Disc 2(1) (Begin) 9:50 1 MIN and LIA have spent considerable time constructing a jetty together for their lions. NOR, CHE and FEL approach and try to push their ‘boats’ (blocks, each with a different animal as a passenger) under the bridge.

((to Ch and F)) let’s go to the li:on jetty:! (0.7) let’s go to the jetty:. (1.5) ºlet’s [go to the jettyº]. [no (.) no (0.3)] no no (0.4) no (we) don’t want those (0.4) big anim[als x-], [no]. (0.3) no: animals allowed under the bridge (0.9) or on top of the bridge. (0.5) y[es]! [(well)] that lion’s on top of the bridge? (0.2) ((to the girls, teasing voice)) you can’t go on (0.4) we: ma:de i:t. (1.1) but ‘cept but ‘cept [they ↑can go] on (.) they ca:n. [but we’re new]. (1.4) going. produced as statement of intent (1.7) me as well. (1.5) we’re [going through it].

Appendix A 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 @End

LIA: LIA: MIN: FEL: %com: LIA: NOR: CHE: NOR: MIN: LIA: MIN: CHE: NOR: FEL: MIN: NOR: NOR: LIA: CHE: %com: %yyy:

199

[uh uh]. ((negating prior utterance)) (1.3) uh uh= =uh uh (0.2) uh u[h]. [m]mmmm. sound of frustration as she tries to push her boat through but LIA stops her (0.3) no no [NAH] NO:: (0.2) No::: do:n’t. i’m [up here]. ((places his animal on the jetty)) (0.6) ºxxxxxxº (3.4) i’m up here (0.2) i’m up here (0.3) up (0.3) x ºthat one’s upº.= =you s[ee lo]ok- (0.5) you see look what happened (0.8) your dog broke the jetty. [nah], ((whines)) (0.8) or maybe [he might broke] the jetty when he walks along. [(i’m breaking it)]. (0.5) no he can just stand there when he doesn’t break it? (3.1) he can just stand there.= =break it Felicity. (0.5) get that up here. (1.3) up ↑he↓re [I’m] up here. [no]. i’ll go and tell the teacher. i.e. to report she is not being allowed to push her boat through Teacher suggests to LIA that he should let the girls play and that they will help fix the jetty if they cause a piece to fall.

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200 @Begin @Participants: @File name: @Tape: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 @End

ADM: JON: ADM: JON: JON:

((to JON)) move out the way! no no (0.3) no ↑this [spacesh-], [no no no] (.) no [no] ↑this one hasn’t got any le:gs. [but-], (0.9) but (0.3) but (0.3) but (0.2) but this one (0.3) it’s not rea- the space- (.) this (0.2) we’re just not ready yet. (3.6)

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

KOY: KOY: JON: KOY: KOY: ADM: KOY:

ADM Adam JON John Ob1.2.ca Disc 3(1): (Begin) 0:48 2 ADM and JON are using Lego to make Astro spaceships.

ADM Adam KOY Koyo JON John Ob1.3 Disc 3(1): (Begin) 11:34 3 JON, ADM and KOY are landing their Lego rockets/jets on the table.

Adam (0.6) where i can go. (0.7) where i can go Adam? (1.1) nowhe[re]. [i] got a rocket? (1.3) i got a rocket (and a jet). (1.3) no that’s a- that’s got ehhm no only jets and rockets. (1.4) i’m a rocket too. (0.5)

Appendix A 8 9 10 @End

ADM: KOY: ADM: %act:

no: coz (0.3) rockets are not allowed to come in (.) only (0.4) a rocket and a jet (0.4) coz there’s no space in there. (0.2) i’m a jet. (0.8) now this is gonna have a big-, KOY joins ADM and JON at the table.

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

TES: HIL: HIL: TES: HIL: TES: TES: YYY:

201

HIL Hilary TES Tess YYY Teacher Ob1.4.ca Disc 4(1): (Begin) 11:19 4 HIL and TES are sitting at a table, each placing coloured pieces into mesh frames. HIL has quietly been singing a popular tune about ‘Barbie’. Before the dialogue is picked up by the audio tape (prior interaction is obscured by the conversation of other children closer to the microphone) TES has started to sing the same song. HIL has told TES that she’s not allowed to sing this particular song.

everybody can sing it (0.5) not just you:? (4.6) well i sing my song if i want. (1.7) it’s my: so:ng¿ it’s my song too: and it’s not your song. (0.2) it is my song. (0.5) NOT YOUR: SONG. (0.6) EENGHH ((screeches in frustration)) .hhh (.) IT’S NOT YOUR SONG Hilary. (1.5) Tess are you okay? (1.3)

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202 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 @End

TES: HIL: YYY: HIL: TES: HIL: TES: HIL: YYY: %yyy:

Hilary just said the song is hers and it’s not it’s mi:ne. (0.9) well it is mine too:. (3.8) ↑girls (0.4) what’s the problem. (1.5) it is my song too:. it’s not you:r song too::¿ (0.2) it is. (0.4) no:. (2.5) i heard it on the radio. (0.4) okay what’s the matter over here. teacher goes on to explain that songs belong to everybody

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

TES: ADM: TES: SAM: ADM: SAM: SAM: TES: HIL:

TES Tess, ADM Adam, SAM, Sam, HIL Hilary Ob1.5.ca Disc 4(1) (Begin) 21:06 5 Children are playing near blocks. TES is some distance from boys, yet they overhear.

bum bum heh heheheh heh huh.((laughing)) (1.2) who said bum bum? (0.2) eh heh heh $me:$ he he. (0.8) ((serious tone)) Tess: (0.3) [it’s rude]. [cept] you’re not allowed to say bum [bum]. [rude] rude rude. (2.0) babies say that sort of thing? huh huh [huh]. [yes] they do:: (.) don’t they? (1.2)

Appendix A 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 @End

ADM: SAM: ADM: TES: SAM: ADM: TES: SAM: HIL: TES: %com: HIL: TES: ADM: TES: %yyy:

203

yes they-, (1.6) >they [do]we don’t want to share] with [youyeah but< you: you don’t have to say you don’t care .hh coz .hh coz [coz coz]-, [plea:se] can you go away from us? coz (0.3) [coz (0.5) coz]-, [we’re playing a game]. coz coz coz coz [(you got)]-, [GO AWAY] FROM US! pushes ADM (0.3) DON”T PUSH ME! ((to TES)) go on get him. (0.4) I WON”T BE YOUR FRIEND¿ CHE is still pushing ADM so he pushes back. um excu:se me Adam. Teacher engages ADM in another activity.

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224 @Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 @End

CHE Cherie, FEL Felicity, LUK Luke Ob1.27.ca Disc 14(1): (Begin) 21:03 27 CHE, FEL and LUK are sitting at a table doing jigsaw puzzles. LUK is rushing to finish his first.

LUK: look (0.7) look (0.5) ((singsong voice)) i: beat you (.) didn’t i:. (0.4) CHE: well i’m still doing mine so (you can’t xxxx). (0.8) FEL: don’t SAY don’t beat me (0.2) [otherwise], CHE: [no i’m] not speaking to you (.) i’m (0.2) i’m saying it to Luke. FEL: you (0.3) you said my name? (0.5) CHE: no i didn’t. FEL: yes i did i hear you. (0.3) CHE: no: i didn’t say your name. FEL: i know: [because you- (.) i heared]. LUK: [you’re going to beat Che]rie aren’t you. (2.2) LUK: ((to CHE)) last is you. (1.0) CHE: i got (part of xxxx). (0.7) FEL: don’t SAY those sort of things >otherwise you can’t come to my partyput](them) inyeah but< you left it here? (1.3) PET: but i:- (0.6) leave it there where i put it. ADM: yeah now i: got it. PET: nnghehhngh: ((grabbing object)). %act: both boys struggle, holding onto Lego. YYY: Adam and Peter. %yyy: teacher intervenes and explains to ADM that PET was still using the Lego and that he must put it back on the table.

Appendix A

233

Observation 2 transcripts @Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 @End

MIR: MIR: CAZ: MIR: CAZ: MIR: %act: CAZ: MIR: CAZ: %com: MIR: CAZ: %com:

MIR Miranda, CAZ Caroline Ob2.1.ca Disc 2: (Begin) 6:06 1 MIR and CAZ are playing in the spaceship. MIR is holding two plastic lids.

we ↑both have two. (1.2) see? (0.8) no: (0.3) (i’ve got these). then give one to me Caroline because you’ve got lots there. (1.0) i’m not giving any of these to you¿ (1.8) (if you don’t) then i’ll just take it then. reaches to grab plastic lid STO::P! (0.3) gimme one of them. (0.2) i am not going to. .... (5.6) utterances inaudible let’s just be nice and understand okay? (1.9) but we have to just type into the computer. MIR takes up this suggestion and both girls return to playing with the keyboards in the spaceship

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234 @Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 @End

CAZ Caroline, MIR Miranda, JAK Jack, TOM Tom Ob2.2.ca Disc 2: (Begin) 22:45 2 CAZ and MIR were playing in the spaceship prior to dressing up for a wedding. JAK and TOM have come in from outside, and JAK has entered the spaceship.

%act: girls attempt to enter the spaceship JAK: no! (0.2) MIR: Jack ]. ((whines)) CAZ: [(hey] we’re playing with) that. (0.3) JAK: no: (.) you were over there. CAZ: no: we still haven’t finished. JAK: well [we have-], MIR: [but that] was our fairy [spaceship]. JAK: [no::]! %act: pushes CAZ as she tries to enter TOM: it’s a rocket ship (.) you guys. (1.1) CAZ: we’re playing we were playing in there fi:rst¿ CAZ: and then we’re just next to there (0.3) and we got some fir:st [and we] just went to get married. JAK: [POW]! (2.3) JAK: ((to TOM)) come on! %act: CAZ starts moving towards teacher. CAZ: ((to Teacher)) excu:se [me:]. JAK: [HEY WAIT]! %act: JAK follows CAZ to teacher to argue his case.

Appendix A @Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 @End

SIM: SIM: TOM: SIM: TOM: GAR: TOM: GAR: TOM: GAR: TOM: GAR: TOM: GAR: %act:

235

SIM Simon, GAR Gary, TOM Tom Ob2.3.ca Disc 5: (Begin) 12:46 3 SIM, GAR and TOM are playing in the block corner.

((to TOM)) what time do you leave creche today? (1.4) are you going home before lunch or after lunch. (0.3) a:fter (0.3) i :’m going after lunch are you? (0.2) i’m going (0.5) a:fter lunch. (0.2) me too. (0.9) i’m going befo:re lunch. (1.0) no you are::n’t. (2.2) i’m not staying for lunch. (0.2) pardon? (0.3) i’m not staying for lunch. (1.2) you’re (.) you’re (0.3) you’re tricking me:. (0.2) i am not! you you you are so you’ve got a smile on your face. (0.9) go and look in the book (0.4) go and have a look! TOM goes to ask teacher if GAR is staying for lunch.

Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes

236 @Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 it¿= 6 7 8 9 @End

JAK: LOU: JAK: JAK: LOU:

oh (then the two of us can) do it today? no i can do it¿ (0.2) NO: I WANNA Do it. (0.5) the the teacher said ↑i will do it. (0.3) no:w (.) i know which day (0.2) and i can do

JAK: =i can do it too. (0.6) LOU: no (.) i i can do it [i-], %act: pulling arrow from JAK JAK: [it’s] gonna break >it’s gonna breakwhy did you do< that. (0.4) i ↑didn’t. (1.2) who: did the:se. (0.7) ((to HIL)) did you? 0 ((%act: nods)) (0.8) $why did you do that$. (2.2) ºi’m not telling you whyº. (0.9) maybe coz she was (0.6) (making a floor). (1.5) oh >shall we make a< floor? (0.3) yes (0.2) >of course we< can.

Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes

238 @Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

CAZ: ELI: CAZ: ELI: CAZ: %act: ELI: CAZ: %act: ELI: %com: CAZ: ELI: CAZ: ELI: CAZ: ELI: ELI:

ELI Elinor, CAZ, Caroline Ob2.7.ca Disc 8: (Begin) 10:22 7 ELI and CAZ have been playing in the spaceship. CAZ is holding a doll that she has collected from the nearby dollshouse.

here’s another big girl¿ (0.4) that’s not a girl that’s a bo::y. (0.2) girls wear pants. (0.9) well (0.5) that’s- i know that’s a boy. (0.2) coz she’s wearing ↑pants (0.3) she’s a girl? pointing to the observer (1.8) who’s wearing pants. (0.3) she is. points to observer (1.9) i know she is (.) but that’s a boy (.) i know that. referring to doll (1.2) girls can have short hair. ºx x x x xº. (2.5) no that’s mine (i got mi:ne) mine! (0.4) it’s mine. (1.1) then i’ll have these. (3.3) i wanna have (.) a gir:l (0.4) i wanna have a one ↑girl. (0.7) you’ve got two: gi:rls. (0.4)

Appendix A 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 @End

ELI: (you’ve got) both the girls. (0.3) CAZ: no: there’s another girl¿ (0.2) ELI: but i don’t like that girl. (6.8) ELI: you can’t have two girls. ((petulant tone)) (0.7) ELI: well that’s the boy and i hate boys. (1.1) ELI: i’m not gonna to be your friend if you don’t ever give me that. (1.0) CAZ: i’m not gonna ever give that to you. ELI: okay (.) i’m getting out of here. CAZ: alright? (1.1) CAZ: there you are? %act: throws the boy/disliked girl doll out to ELI %com: ELI moves away from play area

@Begin @Participants: @Note: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

239

WIN Winnie, PAU Paul raining this morning, therefore more children inside than usual. Ob2.8.ca Disc 9(1): (Begin) 24:08 8 WIN and LOU are building garages with the wooden blocks. PAU has joined them. WIN picks up a plastic ladder made from connector pieces.

WIN: i’ve got a great idea what we can do with this¿ (2.5) PAU: give it to me! WIN: i [found it]. PAU: [no i -](.) no i had i:t. WIN: i found it¿ PAU: no i had it a while ag[o]? WIN: [no]. (0.5) PAU: i had it a while ago.=

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240 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 @End

WIN: =no you did[n’t]. PAU: [well] i’m telling on you. (0.7) WIN: excuse me [Y]YY. PAU: [no], PAU: um Caroline gave it to me. %com: Caroline is not present in the play (0.5) WIN: excuse me [YYY]. PAU: [Caroline] gave it to me. %yyy: teacher intervenes but response is inaudible.

@Begin @Participants: @Note: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

LOU Louise, PAU Paul raining this morning (more children inside than usual) Ob2.9.ca Disc 9(1): (Begin) 27:40 9 LOU and WIN have been building garages with wooden blocks. PAU approaches and touches one of the blocks with a plastic ladder.

PAU: 0 ((%act: touches block with plastic ladder)) LOU: what are you do:ing. (1.5) PAU: 0 ((%act: continues to nudge the blocks)) LOU: what are you doing you’re breaking everything. (2.2) PAU: 0 ((%act: continues to touch blocks)) LOU: do:n’t! (1.1) PAU: you can still (.) fix it¿ (1.1) LOU: ((to WIN)) Paul’s spoiling- (0.3) ((to PAU)) we were here fi:rst. (0.5) PAU: we were here first. (0.4) PAU: xx [xxx] LOU: [we (need)] the-,

Appendix A 12 13 @End

LOU: we were- off you go because we were here first! (3.4) LOU: you’re wrecking everything. %act: PAU moves away from block area.

@Begin @Participants: @Note: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

241

FRE Fred, JIM Jim, PAU Paul raining this morning (more children inside than usual) Ob2.10.ca Disc 9(1): (Begin) 31:26 10 FRE and JIM are playing in the spaceship. PAU approaches them holding a plastic ladder made from connector pieces that he found in the block corner.

PAU: Fred are you still using this? (0.5) FRE: ME. (1.4) JIM: yes he i:s. (0.2) PAU: well then (1.2) then how come you’re not using it¿ (0.5) JIM: C[O::Z]. FRE: [put it] over the::re! JIM: YEAH::! FRE: don’t x (0.2) look after it xxxxx. (0.2) FRE: Paul DON’T BREAK it! PAU: i won’t. (0.2) JIM: (co:z). (0.3) PAU: I WON’T. (0.4) FRE: alright. (0.2) JIM: you better watch it. (4.4)

242 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 @End

Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes FRE: ((to JIM)) you can kill the trolls alright (.) ((to PAU)) you’re wrecking it. %act: PAU is pulling some of the pieces off the ladder. (3.6) FRE: DON’T (.) WRECK i:t! (0.2) PAU: i wanna make something (.) and you weren’t even using it. (1.0) FRE: but i (.) i will use it ↑later. (1.2) PAU: no you were:n’t no you weren’t even using it no:w¿ (0.7) FRE: yeah now- (0.5) then- (0.3) you’re (wrecking it) i’ll kill your whole building down? (0.3) PAU: huh? (0.3) FRE: kill your whole building down if you don’t-, (0.3) PAU: i didn’t i didn’t even make a building. (0.5) JIM: yes you di:d¿ PAU: what. (0.7) JIM: your um (0.6) bits:. (0.4) PAU: ↑yeah (0.3) and i’ll break your ↑head off. %com: JIM and FRE ignore PAU and continue imaginative play in the spaceship.

Appendix A @Begin @Participants: @Note: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 @End

FRE Fred, JIM Jim, PAU Paul raining this morning (more children inside than usual) Ob2.11.ca Disc 9(1): (Begin) 34:33 11 FRE and JIM are still playing in the spaceship. PAU approaches them for a second time.

FRE: 0 ((%act: throws a party hat out of the spaceship)) PAU: don’t (.) you can’t wreck those (0.2) he:lmets. (0.4) FRE: i hate this helmet.= PAU: =you can’t even throw em out. (1.4) FRE: we don’t need them ºdo weº? (0.2) PAU: then why don’t you ↑need them. %com: FRE does not respond, PAU moves away.

@Begin @Participants: @Note: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 @End

243

LOU Louise, WIN Winnie raining this morning (more children inside than usual) Ob2.12.ca Disc 9(2): (Begin) 3:59 12 LOU and WIN have been building bridges etc in the block corner for some time. As LOU drives her car around she is knocking over blocks.

WIN: do:n’t you’re wrecking everything. LOU: well i’m trying to go round. LOU: 0 ((%act: knocks another set of blocks)) WIN: DO:N’T! LOU: well i’m trying to get through and you put so many things here. %com: WIN makes no further comment.

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244 @Begin @Participants: @Note: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 @End

WIN: 0 ((%act: drives a car onto the blocks)) LOU: i want to u:se (.) i was using that car. (0.4) WIN: no you were using that car. (0.6) LOU: what? (0.8) WIN: that car that you’ve got already¿ %com: Lou makes no response

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

LOU Louise, WIN Winnie raining this morning (more children inside than usual) Ob2.13.ca Disc 9(2): (Begin) 7:08 13 WIN and LOU are playing in the block corner.

DON Don, ALI Alistair, TOM Tom Ob2.14.ca Disc 11(1): (Begin) 10:24 14 9:48 am. DON and ALI are playing in the spaceship. TOM approaches DON, who is wearing a watch.

TOM: what’s the time Don. DON: 0 ((%act: shows watch to TOM)) ALI: can i see what the time is? (0.4) DON: one o’clock. (0.8) ALI: that’s the time? TOM: (yeah) th[at]-, DON: [one] o’clo:ck (0.4) yea::h o’clock. (0.2) TOM: no it’s not. (2.3) DON: (on (.) on the) time it says-,

(.)

it’s

one

Appendix A 10 @End

TOM: it’s not that’s ten o’clock. %act: ALI then draws DON’s attention spaceship play.

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 @End

MIR: %act: PAU: MIR: PAU: MIR: PAU: PAU:

back

to

the

MIR Miranda, Pau Paul Ob2.15.ca Disc 12: (Begin) 5:37 15 PAU, FRE and MIR are listening to a story tape on headsets with another child. The children are having problems controlling the volume (there is a main control board with a volume switch for each headset plugged in).

i can’t hea:r it. fiddles with buttons (0.2) ↑hey. i can’t hear it. (0.9) he:y don’t you’ll break it like tha:t. (1.2) but i can’t hea:r. 0 ((%act: turns the control button for MIR’s headset)) (1.6) now you can hear¿

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2

245

MIR Miranda, Pau Paul, FRE Fred Ob2.16.ca Disc 12: (Begin) 5:52 16 PAU, FRE and MIR are still having difficulties with the volume control on the headsets.

PAU: 0 ((%act: turns volume control to another headset)) FRE: he[::y]. %act: pushing PAU’s hand away

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246 3 4 5 6 @End

PAU: FRE: PAU: FRE: %act:

[hey]. (0.7) i’ve got this o:ne. (1.4) i can’t hear anything. (1.1) well i can hear it. PAU then turns to teacher for help.

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

GAR Gary, SIM Simon Ob2.17.ca Disc 14(1): (Begin) 5:03 17 GAR and SIM are playing in the block corner with the plastic connector pieces. SIM is looking for a piece and finds it in one of GAR’s constructions.

SIM: can i break this? (0.5) GAR: n:o. SIM: well >can i have a-< can i (break this) .hhh¿= GAR: =NO NO: (0.3) (no i built it) don’t! (1.0) SIM: Ga↑ry: (1.0) can i have a little play of yours? (0.2) GAR: no. (1.3) SIM: can i? GAR: no. SIM: i won’t [break it]. GAR: [i don’t want] those jets (going) off. (0.2) SIM: i won’t break it. (1.8) SIM: >Gary do you wanna come< to my party? (0.8) GAR: if you- (0.3) if you don’t give those (0.4) those things to me (.) you won’t come to my par:ty. (0.2)

Appendix A 14 15 @End

SIM: (now) do you wanna come to my party? (0.3) GAR: you can- (0.4) leave it for me (0.3) leave it you can’t come to my par:ty. %act: SIM places object on ground and returns to basket to look for other plastic connector pieces.

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 @End

SIM: GAR: SIM: GAR: SIM: GAR: SIM: SIM: %com:

SIM:

GAR Gary, SIM Simon Ob2.18.ca Disc 14(1): (Begin) 6:12 18 follows episode 17 by 40 seconds (same context).

Gary can ↑i break this. (0.8) no:. (2.0) plea:se can i have it. (0.2) n:o:.= =and then this afternoon you can make it agai:n. no (0.2) you will be- (0.3) you will (0.4) be (.) be here (0.2) but i won’t. well-, (4.7) what time are you going ho:me? dialogue between the two boys shifts to conversation about when lunchtime falls relative to GAR’s departure.

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1

247

GAR Gary, SIM Simon Ob2.19.ca Disc 14(1): (Begin) 9:36 19 follows episode 24 by 3 minutes (same context).

Gary: (0.5) this afterno:on i saw you put the (x x). (0.7)

Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes

248 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 @End

GAR: n:o:. SIM: i’ll let you come to my par:ty:? (0.4) GAR: and if (.) you (.) don’t give me (0.5) one of those (1.0) one of those big thi:ngs (0.6) you [can’t come to my par:ty]. SIM: [hey Ga::ry]? (0.7) SIM: my party’s befo:re you:rs¿ GAR: no MY party’s before yours.= SIM: =not bef[ore mine]. GAR: [but mine is] (0.3) yours- (0.6) my: mum said yours is in February. (1.3) SIM: no it isn’t. (0.4) GAR: when i:s it. (1.4) SIM: Ga:ry if you- (0.7) if you let me have that one xx. (0.3) GAR: what birthday is in your- (0.4) - (0.3) is yours? SIM: my brother’s in Febru[ary]. GAR: [my] brother is si:x¿ %com: continuing conversation focuses on ages of siblings.

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4

GAR Gary, SIM Simon, ROB Robbie Ob2.20.ca Disc 14(2): (Begin) 6:07 20 ROB, GAR and SIM are playing in the block corner with connector pieces.

GAR: 0 ((%act:takes piece near ROB)) ROB: hey that’s mine Gary:. (1.2) GAR: it’s just a little one¿ (0.2) ROB: hey don’t! (1.5)

Appendix A 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 @End

GAR: you didn’t see it (.) that [xx if you can] the (fishy) one this (.)((singsong voice)) eeny meeny miney moo (0.2) catch a tiger by the toe (.) if you holler [[let him go eeny meeny miney]] moo, ROB: [no:: (give it) back]! %act: takes piece from GAR’s construction ROB: [[you can’t take it FROM SOMEONE ELSE]]! (0.9) ROB: this is mine¿ (0.7) GAR: then (you can’t) come to my party. (2.7) ROB: i >don’t wanna come to your< party. (2.4) ROB: i don’t want to come to your party anyway. SIM: i don’t wanna come to your party anyway either. %com: no further response.

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6

249

NIG Nigel, SIM Simon, Ob2.21.ca Disc 14(2): (Begin) 13:16 21 It has been raining and all children have been inside. Three minutes prior to this episode the assistant teacher has gone outside which means the children may now go outside and play under the veranda. NIG did not see the teacher move outside.

SIM: i’m going outsi:de. (0.3) NIG: no you’re not allowed to¿ (1.0) SIM: wha:t? (0.3) NIG: you’re not allowed to go outside, SIM: yea:h¿ (0.3) NIG: no you’re not,

Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes

250 7 @End

SIM: i a::m? %act: SIM opens door and goes outside.

@Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 @End

PAU: 0 ((%act: knocks over tower of blocks)) NIG: you WRECKER. (0.7) SIM: we don’t need it Nigel? (0.3) PAU: that was my one i made. (0.6) NIG: well (0.2) do you know what you did to it? (0.7) PAU: yes¿ (0.9) PAU: i wrecked my thi↑ng (0.2) and it wasn’t yours¿ NIG: yeah and i put those things up there¿ PAU: well it doesn’t need them. %act: rebuilding (3.0) PAU: don’t need >all of emalready had morning tea< too¿ (1.3) NIG: we already had morning tea:? (0.6) ROB: did not Nigel. NIG: yeah i ↑did (0.2) >you didn’t< see us¿ %act: ROB walks off to have morning tea.

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251

SIM Simon, BRI Brian, GAR Gary Ob2.24.ca Disc 17(1): (Begin) 2:14 24 BRI and GAR are in the block corner making spaceships with connector pieces.

%act: SIM looks at GAR’s contruction. SIM: ((laughing)) he he look at Ga::ry’s heh heh, (0.3) BRI: $oh yu:ck$. (0.8) BRI: yours is yuck (.) Gary¿ GAR: no it isn’t¿ (0.4) BRI: yes it is. (1.0) GAR: NO IT ISN’T. (0.5) SIM: don’t worry about it Brian. %act: BRI returns to making his own construction.

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252 @Begin @Participants: @Filename: @Audio: @Episode: @Situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 @End

PAU Paul, JIM Jim Ob2.25.ca Disc 20 (1): (Begin) 1:45 25 PAU and JIM have made two ramps leading to a swimming pool in the block corner. The ramps are for the zoo animals they are playing with.

PAU: here’s my ↑house (0.3) here’s your house. (0.5) PAU: that’s my si- (0.2) this is all our fun zoo. (0.2) PAU: that’s your ↑side (0.3) this is my side (0.2) we stay on our [own]-, JIM: [we c]an (.) we can wa:lk on each others? (0.2) PAU: yes except (0.2) we ca::n’t¿ (0.5) JIM: 0 ((%act: pushes the ramps together)) PAU: ↑hey you’re making it differe::nt. (0.3) PAU: you’re ch↑eati:ng i need o:ne. ((whining)) PAU: 0 ((%act: pulls blocks apart)) (2.3) JIM: o::y:. (0.2) PAU: look see:? (0.4) PAU: no you’re ↑a chea:ter:. (0.3) PAU: hey that can be both of ou:rs. (0.3) JIM: yeah. (0.3) PAU: see? %act: pushes blocks together (0.9) PAU: both of ours now.

Appendix A

253

Observation 1 summary Type Ob1.1 Ob1.2 Ob1.3 Ob1.4 Ob1.5 Ob1.6 Ob1.7 Ob1.8 Ob1.9 Ob1.10 Ob1.11 Ob1.12 Ob1.13 Ob1.14 Ob1.15 Ob1.16 Ob1.17 Ob1.18 Ob1.19 Ob1.20 Ob1.21 Ob1.22 Ob1.23 Ob1.24 Ob1.25 Ob1.26 Ob1.27 Ob1.28 Ob1.29 Ob1.30 Ob1.31 Ob1.32 Ob1.33 Ob1.34 Ob1.35

Play script Play script Play script Possession Local rules Play script Local rules Object/possession Play script Object Object Play script Local rules Local rules Object/possession Play script Object Local rules Local rules Play script Object Local rules Local rules Object Object Play script Truth Play script Truth Truth Play script Play script Play script Local rules Object

Outcome I Intervention (C) R Resolved R Resolved I Intervention (T) V * (Interrupted) (T) R Resolved R Resolved R Resolved A Abandoned A Abandoned A Abandoned A Abandoned R Resolved I Intervention (T) A Abandoned R Resolved I Intervention (T) I Intervention (T) R Resolved R Resolved R Resolved A Abandoned R Resolved R Resolved I Intervention (T) I Intervention (T) R Resolved A Abandoned A Abandoned R Resolved I Intervention (C) (T) I Intervention (C) R Resolved R Resolved I Intervention (T)

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Observation 2 summary Type Ob2.1 Ob2.2 Ob2.3 Ob2.4 Ob2.5 Ob2.6 Ob2.7 Ob2.8 Ob2.9 Ob2.10 Ob2.11 Ob2.12 Ob2.13 Ob2.14 Ob2.15 Ob2.16 Ob2.17 Ob2.18 Ob2.19 Ob2.20 Ob2.21 Ob2.22 Ob2.23 Ob2.24 Ob2.25

Object Object Truth Object Truth Truth Object Object Object Object Local rules Play script Object Truth Object Object Object Object Truth Object Local rules Object Truth Truth Play script

Outcome R Resolved I Intervention (C) I Intervention (C) R Resolved R Resolved R Resolved A Abandoned I Intervention (C) A Abandoned A Abandoned A Abandoned R Resolved R Resolved R Resolved R Resolved I Intervention (C) R Resolved A Abandoned A Abandoned A Abandoned A Abandoned A Abandoned R Resolved A Abandoned R Resolved

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Index abandoned disputes 120, 122–3, 125, 127, 136, 164 abandonment 5, 27, 111, 120, 123–30, 140–1 failure to respond 123–7 increasing volume 130 topic shifts 127–9 acceptance 18, 24–5, 42, 44, 46, 115–17, 142–3 accountability 45, 47, 85 accounts behavioural obligations 104–7 continuum of objectivity 175–9 in dispreferred turn shapes 95–108 downgrading 179–80, 183–5 epistemological 107–8 in final utterances of resolved disputes 151–60 hierarchy of 175–6, 179–80 ownership rights 99–102 preceding preferred turn shapes 160–75 properties of objects, play spaces and play scripts 102–4 saliency in dispute resolution 187–9 upgrading 179–83 volition, necessity and personal preference 95–9 acknowledgement 90, 92 actions categories of 29, 47, 49–51 dispreferred 43, 45–6, 49, 51 objectionable 98, 149, 164 preferred 45, 47–9, 51, 189 active resolution 123, 129 adjacency pairs 40–2, 46, 75, 155, 179 adult speech 2, 19, 75, 78, 109 adults 1–2, 5, 20, 36, 193 adversative discourse 2–5, 7–8, 10, 18–19, 24, 59–63, 193–5 as productive interaction 3 adversative episodes 8, 11, 19, 23–4, 27, 57

age 2, 7, 13, 34, 53, 59, 139–40 aggravation 17, 19 agreement 44, 46, 49–51, 62, 111, 114, 189–90 analysts 29, 34–9, 42, 177, 184 analytic research 32, 35–7, 55, 108 antecedent events 10–12, 18 argumentation 3, 16 theory 2 argumentative sequences 19, 22–3, 26, 71, 125 Asher, R. 21 assertions 8, 17–18, 23–4, 99, 133 Atkinson, J. M. 32, 36–7, 43, 45–7, 49, 189 atypical dispreferred turn shapes 93–4 atypical preferred turn shapes 75–8 atypicality 5, 75–9, 93–4, 193 authority 3, 18–19, 23, 95, 102, 108, 130 teacher’s 182 Baker, C. D. 2, 26, 60 behavioural obligations 104–7 Benoit, P. 8–9, 12–13, 18, 21, 24, 136, 140 Berenz, N. 54–5 Bilmes, J. 46–8, 50–1 birthdays/birthday parties 113, 129, 137–40, 142–3, 179 Bloom, L. 3, 54 Boggs, S. T. 18–19, 22–3, 61, 65 boundaries 8–9, 26, 31, 35, 41 of preference 136, 149 Boyle, R. 47–8, 50–1 boys 15–16, 21, 57, 59, 91, 183–4, 195 breakdowns in shared play/collaborative activity 5, 123, 137, 141, 149, 180 Brenneis, D. 3, 10, 17–18, 22, 28, 61, 65 brevity 63–4, 68, 71, 75, 130 CA, see conversation analysis calendar 158, 182

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challenges 16, 19, 58, 90, 101–2, 107, 188–9 child-initiated intervention 133 Chomsky, N. 3 claims 20–3, 95–6, 98–9, 106–8, 141–2, 157–9, 176–7 epistemological 151, 156, 163, 176 factual 95, 108, 175–6 ownership 169–70, 174 prior 99–101, 115, 154, 163, 165 closings 12, 26–7, 111–12, 115, 129–30, 133, 140–1, 149, see also outcomes; resolutions of resolved disputes 151, 157–8, 160, 169 communicative competence 3–4 developing 2, 4, 6, 21, 193, 195 communities, speech 22 compliance 136, 142 compromise 17–18, 26–8, 61, 73, 112, 115–19, 179 conditional directives 17 conditional threats 138, 142, 145 conflict between children 1 closings, see closings continuation 111, 176 definition 2, 7–8, 13 episodes 9, 12, 17, 23, 26–7, 36, 78 frequency 13–16, 57–9 openings 10–12 outcomes 20, 26–9, 52, 78 resolution, see resolutions situations 1, 21, 61–2, 108, 195 strategies, see strategies types 13–16, 57–9 verbal 2, 4, 10, 80, 109, 111 connected discourse 33, 193 connector pieces 120, 158, 182 constraints 40, 57, 103 behavioural 104–5 context 9, 36, 45, 75, 189–90, 194 local 33, 42, 47, 50–1, 120 sequential 49–50, 136, 141, 152 social 4–5, 31, 37, 193 contiguity 44, 46, 71 continuation of conflict 111, 133, 176, 189–90 continuum of objectivity 175–9, 195

contours, terminal 55, 197 contradicting routines 22–3 contradiction 8, 18, 22–3, 63, 70, 76, 126 contrived episodes/situations 13, 34 conversation development of 35–6 features of 35–7 maxims of 42, 45 sequential organisation, see sequential organisation conversation analysis 5, 7, 30–52, 55 applicability 52 emic perspective 36–7 methodological advantages 33–7 theory 47 conversational preference 48–9, 62, see also preference correction 12, 19, 39, 156 Corsaro, W. A. 2–4, 8–10, 13, 15, 19, 24, 58–9 Coulter, J. 8–9, 50, 64 counter insults 18, 22–3 counter threats 1, 18, 147 counters 17 cycles of threats 18, 147 Danby, S. 2, 26, 60, 138 data-driven analysis 35–6 data, introduction to 53–4 Davidson, J. 44 Dawe, H. C. 13–15 delay 43–5, 50–1, 63–6, 74–6, 80–92 markers 63, 80, 85–92, 94, 108 pauses 80–5 prefatory 78, 92 denials 8, 17–18, 23, 50, 61 development of conversation 35–6 development of disputes 5, 175, 193 developmental psychology 7, 13 Di Paolo, M. 14–15, 17–18, 26, 28, 58–9, 61 direct opposition 39, 65, 75, 173, 190–1 markers 62 short 5, 190 direct threats 138 directness 63, 71–2, 75, 130 discourse analysis 29, 32, 35, see also conversation analysis discourse markers 44

Index discrepancies 10, 14–15, 28, 56–7 dislike 95, 98, 159, 173, 177 dispreference 16, 44, 47 markers 85, 87, 109, 115, 149 dispreferred actions 43, 45–6, 49, 51 dispreferred responses 43–4, 46–7, 49, 149 dispreferred status 45, 50, 136 dispreferred turn shapes 5, 80–93, 121, 149, 189–90, 192–3 accounts in 95–108 atypical 93–4 disputes abandoned 120, 122–3, 125, 127, 136, 164 closing of, see dispute closings closings, see closings frequency 14, 57, 59–60, 193 multi-party 24–6, 78–9, 109, 165 object 14–15, 58–9, 144 outcomes, see outcomes peer, see peer disputes resolution, see resolutions Ditchburn, S. 27 double-voice discourse 16 downgrading 178–80, 183–5 Du Bois, J. W. 54 Dunn, J. 11 dyads 24–5 Edwards, J. A. 54 effectiveness 99, 116, 160, 176, 178–9 Eisenberg, A. R. 3–4, 8–11, 15, 17–20, 23, 27–8, 59 emic perspective, conversation analysis 36–7 endings, see closings; outcomes; resolutions environments, observation 56–8, 60, 63, 91, 102, 106, 112 episodes adversative 8, 11, 19, 23–4, 27, 57 resolved 112, 123, 168 epistemological accounts 107–8, 164–5 epistemological claims 151, 156, 163, 176 Ervin-Tripp, S. 54, 88 escalation 18, 42, 65, 134 pattern of 19, 22 ethnomethodology 31

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events, antecedent 10–12, 18 exchanged threats 162, 164 existing research 4, 7, 12, 18, 57, 62 limitations 29 expectations 16, 39–42, 46–50, 60, 95, 149, 157 social 48, 51, 58, 105 explanation requests 17 extended sequences 55, 178–9, 191 external intervention 130–2 facework 49, 195 factual claims 95, 108, 175–6 failures to respond 41, 44, 51, 119–25 final sequences 151, 160 final utterances 5, 112, 124, 126–7, 136 resolved disputes 121, 149, 151–60, 193 first pair parts 40–1, 43–5, 51, 162 food 42, 70, 131, 172 format 9, 15–16, 19, 51, 156 tying 24 Fraser, B. 19, 95 frequency, conflict 13–16, 57–60, 193 friendship 3, 20, 60, 137, 146 relations 13 threats 179 gaps 22, 37, 63–4, 80 Garvey, C. 4, 8–11, 15, 17–19, 23, 27–8, 33 gender 13, 15, 57, 59, 195 Genishi, C. 14–15, 17–18, 26, 28, 58–9, 61 Gilligan, C. 16, 21 girls 15–16, 21, 57, 84–6, 144–5, 173–5, 183–4 Goffman, E. 31, 35, 43, 49 Goodwin, C. 4, 15–16, 19, 21, 23–5, 33, 51 Goodwin, M. H. 3–4, 15–16, 19, 21, 23–5, 28, 33 Gumperz, J. 4, 54–5 Halliday, M. A. K. 4, 24 harm-threats 18, 24, 136 Hartup, W. W. 3, 11, 20 Haslett, B. 17–18, 136, 147 Hay, D. F. 3, 8–9, 14, 59 hesitations 19, 35, 43–4, 51, 62, 80, 85

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hierarchy of accounts 175–6, 179–80 ignoring 17 immediate responses 63–7 increasing volume 130 indirect threats 1, 138, 143 initial opposition 10–12, 17–18, 23, 63 insertion sequences 8, 25, 40–1 insistence 17 insults 17–18, 22–4, 61 counter 18, 22–3 intentions 3, 14, 16, 18, 29, 45, 60–1 inter-turn pauses 63, 79–80, 84, 109 interrogatives 126, 128–9 interruptions 44, 123 intervention 1, 130–3 child-initiated 133 external 130–2 strategies 5, 60, 195 teacher 5, 20, 111–12, 130, 132–8, 140, 193–4 teacher attitudes 60–1 teacher-initiated 130, 133–4 intonation 19, 73, 197 inversion 22, 63–4, 70, 136, 190 invitations 42–3, 45–6, 48–9, 137–42, 179 Israeli children 9, 78 Italian children 15, 19 Jackson, S. 29, 42, 189 Jacobs, S. 29, 42, 189 Jefferson, G. 31, 36–9, 47, 55–6, 197 justifications 17, 95, 102–4, 106–9, 155–8, 160–3, 173–80 objective 193 quantifiable 160 retrospective 54 subjective 178–9, 188 justified objections 87, 141, 153 justified opposition 5, 162, 192 knowledge 27, 33, 58, 107–8, 156 Koplas, A. L. 3, 20 Kotthoff, H. 50–1, 190 Labov, W. 9, 15, 19, 32, 53 Lampert, M. D. 54 language 3–4, 7, 32, 50, 53

acquisition 3 latched utterances 64 Laursen, B. 3, 11, 20 Lein, L. 3, 10, 17–18, 22, 28, 61, 65 length, turn 63, 68–74 Levinson, S. C. 19, 32, 35, 43, 45, 47, 49 Lewis, M. 41, 48 liking 99, 173, 181 linguistic markedness, see markedness linguistic preference, see preference local context 33, 42, 47, 50–1, 120 local rules 58–9, 95, 105 Lussier, C. 20–1, 130 markedness 43–5, 47–50, 149, 187, 192–3 markers 5, 43–4, 51, 73, 85, 87–8, 90–3 delay 63, 80, 94–5, 108 dispreference 85, 87, 109, 115, 149 maxims of conversation 42, 45 Maynard, D. W. 3–4, 8–12, 18–19, 24–6, 28, 39, 78 McTear, M. 4, 73 methodology 13, 31, 33–7, 56, 62 mitigation 17, 19–20, 95, 135 modified acceptance 115–19 motivation 15, 28, 34–5, 47–8, 60–1, 177, 184 multi-party disputes 24–6, 78–9, 109, 165 Murray, B. 20–1, 130 mutuality 8–9 necessity 95–5, 99, 155, 172 negotiation 20–1, 27–8, 58, 135, 141, 190, 194 Newman, R. S. 20–1, 130 next-turn opposition 146 non-opposition 136, 179 nonverbal actions 10–11, 35, 66–8, 197 novel content 65, 76, 118, 124, 132, 190–2 novel positions 117–18 object disputes 14–15, 58–9, 99–102, 143–4, 151–4, 161–3, 176–80 objectionable actions 98, 149, 164 objections 8–9, 25–6, 99–100, 104–5, 121–2, 126–7, 152–5 justified 87, 141, 153 repeated 132

Index objectivity 175–80, 184 continuum of 175–9, 195 relative 176–7, 179 in threats 178–9 objects, see object disputes; properties of objects observation environments 56–8, 60, 63, 91, 102, 106, 112 observers 56, 94, 133, 168, 183, 197 Ochs, E. 4, 54 O’Keefe, B. J. 2, 8–9, 12–13, 18, 147 one-word objections/utterances 68–9, 71 openings, conflict 10–12 opposition 2–5, 8–12, 14–19, 95–6, 98–103, 107–9, 189–93 categories of 17 delayed and justified 92–3 direct forms of 190–1 initial 10, 12, 17–18, 23, 63 initial statement of 10–12 justified 5, 162, 192 markers 62, 72–3, 93, 126 next-position 189 next-turn 146 organisation of 118, 134 overt 10, 12, 19, 136, 175–6, 189–90, 193 unjustified 131 organisation of opposition 118, 134 sequential, see sequential organisation social 15, 28 organising principles 5, 24, 51, 53, 62, 160, 176 orientation 9, 16, 35–7, 42, 46 other-initiated repair 19, 39, 189 outcomes 56, 109, 111–49 abandonment 123–30 compromise 115–19 dispute closings 149 failure to respond 119–27 increasing volume 130 intervention 130–6 modified acceptance 115–19 and preference 151–85 resolutions 112–23 threats 136–49 topic shifts 127–9

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win/loss 112–15 overt opposition 10, 12, 19, 136, 175–6, 189–90, 193 ownership 59, 99–100, 106, 134, 169, 177–8, 180 claims 169–70, 174, 182 rights 95, 99–102, 115, 158–9, 176–7 pair parts 43, 50, 52, 149, 189, 192 first 40–1, 43–5, 51, 162 second 5, 40–5, 50–2, 136, 149, 162, 189–90 pairs, adjacency 40–2, 46, 75, 155, 179 parents 7, 20, 53 part-Hawaiian children 18, 22 partial repetition 19 participant orientation, see orientation party invitations, see invitations patterns of discourse 25, 27, 59 patterns of escalation 19, 22 pauses 43–4, 62–4, 75–6, 80–5, 108–9, 142–5 inter-turn 63, 79–80, 84, 109 peer disputes 53–109 personal preferences, see preference, personal personal volition, see volition persuasiveness 111, 145, 151, 157, 175–7, 179, 187 physical force 17 Piaget, J. 3, 16 pitch 22, 55, 67 play scripts 27, 58–9, 102–4, 154–6, 162–3, 171, 175–7 play space 13–14, 57, 99–104, 125–6, 132, 169, 175–6 politeness 16, 19, 49, 195 Pomerantz, A. 32, 44–5, 47–8, 50, 85, 108, 189 possession 14–15, 95–6, 98–9, 134, 145, 158, 170 power 15, 140–1 preference 20, 39, 42–52, 62, 75, 98, 189 boundaries 136, 149 categorisation of actions 49–51 and dispute resolution 189–91 features 5, 47, 49, 62–3, 108–9, 187, 192–3

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function of 189–90 interpretation differences 47–9 linguistic 48–9, 194 organisation 5, 42–53, 62, 78, 109, 191–5 and outcomes 151–85 personal 46, 48–9, 95–9 problems with concept 47–51 psychological 48–9 and psychology 45–6 status 43–5, 47, 49–51, 68, 84 structural nature of concept 45–6 preferred actions 45, 47–9, 51, 189 preferred responses 43–4, 46–7, 51, 80, 95, 136, 163 preferred status 49, 71, see also preference, status preferred turn shapes 63–74, 134–6 accounts preceding 160–75 atypical 75–8 multi-party disputes 78–80 prior claims 99–101, 115, 154, 163, 165 prior rights 99, 132, 169 prior utterances 2, 12, 25, 55, 62–3, 66–8, 189–90 productive interaction, adversative discourse as 3 properties of objects 102–4, 108, 160, 175–6 Psathas, G. 31–2, 55 psychological inferences 47–8 psychological preference 48–9 real interaction, recording 33–5 reasons 17 recording of real interaction 33–5 referents 145, 151, 176–7, 179–80, 184 refusals 8, 17–18, 24, 43, 102, 152, 155 rejections 18, 24, 44–6, 122, 144, 162 relative objectivity 176–7, 179 repair 8, 12, 37–9 other-initiated 19, 39, 189 repeated objections 132 repetition 22, 41, 70, 132, 135, 157, 190 partial 19 research analytic 32, 35–7, 55, 108 existing, see existing research

researchers 13, 16, 27, 33–6, 54, 56 resolutions 8–10, 27–8, 149, 175–9, 193–5 active 123, 129 compromise 115–19 failure to respond 119–23 how to resolve disputes 187–95 modified acceptance 115–19 saliency of accounts 187–9 sequence of turn shapes 191–3 why preference? 189–91 win/loss outcomes 112–15 resolved disputes 28, 112, 115–16, 123, 151–2, 159–61, 190 closings 151, 157–8, 160, 169 final utterances 121, 149, 151, 160 resources 1, 14, 57–8 responses dispreferred 43–4, 46–7, 49, 149 immediate 63–7 preferred 43–4, 46–7, 51, 80, 95, 136, 163 restarts 93, 100, 143, 151, 153, 160, 182 rights ownership, see ownership rights prior 99, 132, 169 Rizzo, T. A. 3, 8, 10, 13, 15, 19–20, 58–9 Ross, H. S. 3, 7–8, 10, 13–14, 59 rudeness 41, 105 rules 3, 33–4, 37–9, 104–7, 166–8, 176–7 local 58–9, 95, 105 social 18 Sacks, H. 26, 31, 34, 36–42, 44–9, 55, 62 Schegloff, E. 26, 31–2, 36–42, 47, 55, 197 Schieffelin, B. 4 Schiffrin, D. 32, 44, 87 scripts, play 27, 58–9, 102–3, 154–6, 162–3, 171, 175–7 Searle, J. R. 32, 35 second pair parts 5, 40–5, 50–2, 136, 149, 162, 189–90 self-repair 39 sequence of turn shapes and dispute resolution 191–3 sequences argumentative 19, 22–3, 26, 71, 125 extended 55, 178–9, 191 insertion 8, 25, 40–1 invitation 46, 49

Index side 8, 147, 162 of strategies 22–6 threats in 141–9 sequential context 49–50, 136, 141, 152 sequential organisation 33, 37–42, 45, 52, 78, 121 Shantz, C. U. 8–9, 11, 14–15, 33, 59 sharing 14, 17, 80, 89, 166–8 rule 106–7, 157 Sheldon, A. 16, 91 shifts 26–8, 31, 54–5, 58, 76, 117, 128 short utterances 68, 99, 191 repeated 166 shouting 60, 130, 134, 146, 194 side sequences 8, 147, 162 silence 44, 47, 64, 112, 119, 121 single utterances 29, 31–3, 35, 37, 55, 172, 193 social context 4–5, 31, 37, 193 social expectations 48, 51, 58, 105 social organisation 15, 28 social rules 18 social status 2, 194 social structure 3, 15 social worlds 2–3, 6, 195 space, play, see play space speech acts 5, 24, 32–3, 88 adult 2, 19, 75, 78, 109 communities 22 staff intervention 131–2 stalemate 132, 144, 162 status dispreferred 45, 50, 136 preference 43–5, 47, 49–51, 68, 84 preferred 49, 71 social 2, 194 strategies 4, 7, 25–7, 116–17, 141–3 sequences of 22–6, 61–2 types of 61–2 verbal 16–21 stress 19, 22, 35, 55, 197 structures social 3, 15 syntactic 23–4, 64 subjective justifications 178–9, 188 subjectivity 16, 48, 177

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submission 26, 112–13, 136, 141, 149, 177–8 syntactic structures 23–4, 64 talk-in-interaction 2–3, 5, 9, 33–4, 37, 53–4, 78 teacher-initiated intervention 130, 133–4 teachers 60–1, 107–8, 130–5, 140, 166, 171–2, 182 conflict intervention attitudes 60–1 instructions 4, 106, 135 intervention 5, 20, 111–12, 130, 132–8, 140, 193–4 tell-authority threats 24, 137, 140, 170 Thompson, S. A. 4, 32 threats 17–18, 22–4, 94, 125, 136–49, 178–9 birthday party 143, 179 conditional 138, 142, 145 counter 1, 18, 147 direct 138 exchanged 162, 164 function 5, 125, 141, 149 harm 18, 24, 136 implied 114, 143 indirect 1, 138, 143 objectivity in 178–9 in sequences 141–9 tell-authority 24, 137, 140, 170 types 136–41 unspecified outcome 18, 24, 136 withholding actions/object 24, 136–7, 141, 147 topic shifts 24, 117–19, 127–9, 144 mid-episode 139 topics, dispute 95, 117, 184, 195 toys 14, 79, 106, 113, 155, 164, 167 transcription 54–6 conventions 54–5, 197 transcripts 12, 34–5, 54–64 truth 14, 58–9, 107 turn length 63, 68–74 turn shapes dispreferred, see dispreferred turn shapes preferred, see preferred turn shapes sequence and dispute resolution 191–3 turn-taking 37–9

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unspecified outcome threats 18, 24, 136 upgrading 159, 178–9, 187 utterances short 68, 99, 191 single 29, 31–3, 35, 37, 55, 172, 193 verbal strategies 16–21 video recordings 5, 53, 56, 58, 80

volition 95–5, 99–100, 159–60, 162, 175–6 volume, increasing 22, 130, 170 Vuchinich, S. 2, 7, 27, 111–12, 123, 127 win/loss outcomes 112–15 withholding actions/object threats 24, 136–7, 141, 147