Psychological Criminology: An Integrative Approach (Crime Science Series)

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Psychological Criminology

Psychological criminology addresses the question: what is it about individuals and their experiences that causes them to commit crime and/or to become criminal? This book provides a comprehensive coverage of psychological theories of crime and criminality, exploring theories focusing on factors present at birth (human nature, heredity); theories that focus on factors that influence the offender over the lifespan (learning, development); and theories focusing on factors present at the crime scene. It emphasises the connections among the different approaches, and demonstrates how, taken together rather than as rival explanations, they provide a more complete picture of crime and criminality than each provides individually. Theories are arranged throughout the book in a temporal sequence, from distal to proximal causes of crime. The analysis spans 100,000 years, from the evolutionary roots of criminal behaviour in the ancestral environments of early humans on the African savanna, to the decision to engage in a specific criminal act. Key features of the book include: • • •

a focus on theory – ‘explaining’ crime and criminality; an integrative approach; accessibility to readers who do not have a background in psychology.

Psychological Criminology highlights the contributions that psychological theory can make to the broader field of criminology; it will be of interest to students, academics, researchers and practitioners in both criminology and forensic psychology. Richard Wortley began his career as a prison psychologist and has subsequently taught in criminology schools for many years. He is currently a Professor at University College London, where he is Director of the Jill Dando Institute for Security and Crime Science.

Crime Science Series Edited by Richard Wortley, UCL

Crime science is a new way of thinking about and responding to the problem of crime in society. The distinctive nature of crime science is captured in the name. First, crime science is about crime. Instead of the usual focus in criminology on the characteristics of the criminal offender, crime science is concerned with the characteristics of the criminal event. The analysis shifts from the distant causes of criminality – biological makeup, upbringing, social disadvantage and the like – to the near causes of crime. Crime scientists are interested in why, where, when and how particular crimes occur. They examine trends and patterns in crime in order to devise immediate and practical strategies to disrupt these patterns. Second, crime science is about science. Many traditional responses to crime control are unsystematic, reactive and populist, too often based on untested assumptions about what works. In contrast crime science advocates an evidencebased, problem-solving approach to crime control. Adopting the scientific method, crime scientists collect data on crime, generate hypotheses about observed crime trends, devise interventions to respond to crime problems, and test the adequacy of those interventions. Crime science is utilitarian in its orientation and multidisciplinary in its foundations. Crime scientists actively engage with front-line criminal justice practitioners to reduce crime by making it more difficult for individuals to offend, and making it more likely that they will be detected if they do offend. To achieve these objectives, crime science draws on disciplines from both the social and physical sciences, including criminology, sociology, psychology, geography, economics, architecture, industrial design, epidemiology, computer science, mathematics, engineering and biology. 1. Superhighway Robbery Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke 2. Crime Reduction and Problem-oriented Policing Edited by Karen Bullock and Nick Tilley 3. Crime Science New approaches to preventing and detecting crime Edited by Melissa J. Smith and Nick Tilley

4. Problem-oriented Policing and Partnerships Implementing an evidence-based approach to crime reduction Karen Bullock, Rosie Erol and Nick Tilley 5. Preventing Child Sexual Abuse Stephen Smallbone, William L. Marshall and Richard Wortley 6. Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis Edited by Richard Wortley and Lorraine Mazerolle 7. Raising the Bar Preventing aggression in and around bars, pubs and clubs Kathryn Graham and Ross Homel 8. Situational Prevention of Organised Crimes Edited by Karen Bullock, Ronald V. Clarke and Nick Tilley 9. Psychological Criminology An integrative approach Richard Wortley

Psychological Criminology An integrative approach

Richard Wortley

First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2011. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2011 Richard Wortley The right of Richard Wortley to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Wortley, Richard (Richard K.) Psychological criminology : an integrative approach / Richard Wortley. p. cm. 1. Criminal psychology. I. Title. HV6080.W67 2011 364.3—dc22 2010041203 ISBN 0-203-80609-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN: 978–1–84392–806–5 (hbk) ISBN: 978–1–84392–805–8 (pbk) ISBN: 978–0–203–80609–8 (ebk)

Contents

List of illustrations Acknowledgements 1 Introduction

x xii 1

What is psychological criminology? 1 Defining crime and criminals 3 Debates about the nature of crime and criminality 7 Psychological theories of crime and criminality: an integrated model 15 2 Human nature

20

The principles of evolution 20 Evolution and behaviour 24 Crime-focused evolutionary approaches 30 Offender-focused evolutionary approaches 35 Conclusion and evaluation 40 3 Heredity

42

A primer in behavioural genetics 42 Heritability of criminality 49 Variations in the heritability of criminality 57 Beyond behavioural genetics: molecular genetics 61 Conclusion and evaluation 62 4 The brain Basic brain structures and functions 65 Psychophysiology and crime 73 Biochemistry and crime 74

65

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Contents Neuroanatomy and crime 77 Neuro-environmental factors and crime 81 Putting it together: neuropsychological theories of crime 85 Conclusion and evaluation 88

5 Personality

90

Trait approaches to personality 90 The single-trait approach and crime 96 The super-trait approach: Eysenck’s three-factor theory of crime 100 Antisocial personality disorder (APD) 106 Conclusion and evaluation 113 6 Development

115

The biological and environmental foundations of human development 115 Developmental risk and protective factors for crime 121 Psychosocial development and crime 126 Criminal careers 132 Conclusion and evaluation 137 7 Learning

139

The science of behaviour 139 Classical conditioning 145 Operant conditioning 151 Social learning 155 Conclusion and evaluation 160 8 Cognition

162

The cognitive revolution 162 Social cognitive theory 166 Offender decision-making 174 Schemas and scripts 180 Conclusion and evaluation 184 9 Situations What is a situation? 186 Social psychology 191 Environmental psychology 195

185

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Opportunity theories 199 The person–situation interaction (again) 205 Conclusion and evaluation 206 10 Conclusion

208

The argument in a nutshell 208 The strengths and limits of integration 210 Implications for practice 212 Bibliography Index

216 261

Illustrations

Figures 1.1 The age–crime curve for a hypothetical data-set 1.2 An integrative model of criminal behaviour 3.1 A section of the DNA molecule showing the double helix structure 3.2 Ratios for the transmission of dominant purple (P) and recessive white (w) genes for different combinations of parental genotypes 4.1 A neuron 4.2 Flow diagram of the nervous system 4.3 Cross-section of the brain showing hindbrain, midbrain and forebrain 4.4 Side view of the lobes of the cerebral cortex 5.1 The hierarchical structure of Eysenck’s three super-traits 5.2 The relationship between neuroticism and extraversion 6.1 Age distribution for criminal offenders for a hypothetical data-set separating life-course persistent and adolescent-limited offenders 7.1 Bandura’s principle of reciprocal determinism 7.2 Classical conditioning of the salivation response to the sound of a bell 7.3 Classical conditioning of the fear response to sight of a white rat 7.4 Operant conditioning of (a) the pecking response in pigeons and (b) the avoidance response in rats 8.1 Protoscript for burglary 9.1 The relationship between precipitators and facilitators of crime 9.2 The hypothetical interaction between offenders and situations

7 16 44 45 66 67 70 71 101 103 133 142 146 147 152 183 190 205

Tables 3.1 Key terms in genetics 3.2 Twin studies showing concordance rates (%) for MZ and DZ twins based on criminal conviction data 3.3 Percentage of adoptees with criminal convictions as a function of congenital and post-natal predispositions to criminality

43 51 55

List of illustrations xi 4.1 5.1 5.2

Neurotransmitters and their associated effects The Big Five personality factors Comparisons of DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for APD, and Cleckley (1941) and Hare (1991) criteria for psychopathy 5.3 Expert ratings of APD and psychopathy in terms of the five-factor model 6.1 Major periods of life 6.2 Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning 8.1 Comparison of Sykes and Matza (1957) and Bandura (1976, 1977)

69 95 107 112 120 128 173

Acknowledgements

Most of the research and writing for this book was done while I was on sabbatical from the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Griffith University, Australia. Without this opportunity to have a consolidated period of time to devote to the project, the book would not have been written. I am grateful to Peter Cassematis who helped with the literature searches and to Sandra Hart to helped with the mindnumbing task of organising the references. Anna Stewart, John Rynne and Aiden Sidebottom provided helpful feedback on one or more chapters. The excellent drawings of the DNA molecule (Figure 3.1), the neuron (Figure 4.1), and the brain (Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4) were done by Alisa Wortley. Finally, as ever, I am indebted to my wife Chris, and my two children Tom and Sally, for putting up with me as this book increasingly became something of an obsession.

1

Introduction

What is psychological criminology? Psychology is the scientific study of behaviour and mental processes; criminology is the scientific study of crime and criminals. Thus, psychological criminology may be succinctly defined as the scientific study of the behaviour and mental processes that contribute to an understanding of crime and criminals. Beyond this bald definition, the fact that this book is about psychological criminology requires elaboration. It is often said that criminology is not so much a discipline as it is a collection of disciplines, each of which brings a different set of assumptions and explanations to a common concern with crime and criminals. Overwhelmingly, however, sociology has traditionally been the dominant discipline in criminology and most criminological theories are sociological in nature. In the absence of further qualification, criminology is generally interpreted to mean sociological criminology. Sociological criminology examines the question: what is it about society that influences the incidence of crime and the distribution of criminality? Sociological theories are largely concerned with groups or classes of people in society. Sociologists might be interested in how fundamental structures in society contribute to crime, or why it is that society chooses to label certain behaviours as criminal (and not label others). For example, the relationship between social class and crime is largely a sociological issue. So too is the question of why cigarette smoking is legal while marijuana smoking is not. In contrast, psychological criminology addresses the question: what is it about individuals and their experiences that causes them to commit crime and/or to become criminal? Psychologists are concerned with how an individual’s biological make-up, personality, upbringing, thought processes, current circumstances, and so on produce criminal behaviour. Some psychological analyses examine the relationship between crime and normative factors that are common to everyone’s experience. For example, everybody from time to time conforms to peer pressure, and this can sometimes lead an individual to commit crime. Other psychological analyses focus on ways that criminals differ from non-criminals. For example, research might examine whether criminals have distinctive personality profiles that contribute to their criminal behaviours.

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Introduction

To illustrate the difference between society-level and individual-level explanations, consider the case of rape. A sociological analysis of rape is likely to focus on factors such as cultural norms with respect to male–female relationships, the power differential between men and women in society, and so on. Further, it might be discovered that rape is particularly prevalent among certain social groups – for example, in a particular delinquent sub-culture. On the other hand, a psychological analysis would typically examine the special characteristics or circumstances of individuals who commit rape. Do rape offenders possess hostile attitudes towards women? Have they experienced childhood traumas? Is there evidence of psychological disorder or sexual dysfunction? Were there factors at the time of the rape (e.g., alcohol consumption) that contributed to their behaviour? This does not mean that psychological criminology ignores the social contexts of crime or, for that matter, that sociological criminology ignores the personal characteristics of offenders. Just because psychological criminology focuses on the individual does not mean that it is assumed all of the causes of crime originate from within the individual. Using the rape example above, psychologists might well be interested in how an offender’s attitudes towards women are shaped by his social interactions and sub-cultural experiences. Likewise, sociologists might be concerned with how the organisation of society reinforces male attitudes towards women that support rape. There are overlaps, then, between psychological and sociological perspectives, especially regarding the role of social influences on attitudes and behaviour. Nevertheless, even here, sociological analyses will usually remain at the collective level (e.g., the attitudes of a group), while psychological analyses will usually return to the individual (e.g., the attitudes of individuals within a group). Traditionally, sociologists have been very critical of psychological approaches to explaining crime and criminality. In particular, they argue that in focusing on individuals, psychologists ignore factors such as social disadvantage and economic inequality that are the ‘root causes’ of crime, and instead further stigmatise the vulnerable and powerless in the community. For their part, psychologists often believe that sociological theories ignore important individual variations in criminal conduct and are unduly influenced by an ideological agenda rather than scientific evidence. It is not the purpose here to debate the relative merits of sociological and psychological criminology. Rather than seeing sociological and psychological theories as competing explanations of crime, it is more productive to see them as complementary approaches. The analogy can be drawn with a microscope. A microscope has a control that allows the viewer to alter the magnification with which a specimen might be examined. Sometimes it is useful to take a close-up or micro view to examine in detail particular parts of the specimen; other times it is useful to take a broad or macro view to get an overall picture of how the various parts of the specimen interconnect. So too, psychological and sociological theories are explanations of crime and criminals that are set at different levels of resolution. Because of their different foci, sociological and psychological criminology serve different purposes. The goal of sociological criminology is generally ‘big-picture’

Introduction

3

structural reform of the social systems that are seen ultimately to be responsible for producing crime and criminals. The goal of psychological criminology, on the other hand, is to intervene directly with offenders and potential offenders. Psychological interventions have two main goals. First, psychological criminology may be used to predict criminal behaviour. For example, a prison psychologist might be required to make an assessment of the likelihood that a given prisoner will represent a danger when returned to the community. Second, psychological criminology informs efforts to prevent criminal behaviour. This might involve attempting to stop criminal behaviour before it occurs – for example, reducing the childhood risk factors that are related to the development of criminal dispositions, or making changes to particular locations that seem to encourage the performance of criminal behaviour – or treating known offenders in order to stop them from reoffending. This book examines the theories of crime and criminality that comprise psychological criminology and that inform the tasks of prediction and prevention of criminal behaviour. The order of the words in the title – Psychological Criminology and not Criminological Psychology – was a considered choice. While the difference may be subtle, the selected title reflects a mission to highlight the contribution that psychology can make to the multidisciplinary enterprise that is criminology. The sub-title of the book is An Integrative Approach. The integration is not between psychological and sociological theories (although there is no intention to diminish the contribution of sociological approaches) but among psychological theories. Rather than present the various psychological perspectives as a series of discrete and rival explanations, the aim of the book is to emphasise the connections among approaches, and to show how, taken together, they provide a more complete picture of crime and criminality than each can provide individually. This introductory chapter sets out the rationale for this approach. First, the problem of defining crime and criminals is addressed. Next some of the major debates about the nature of crime and criminality are examined. There follows an overview of the psychological approaches covered in this book, and a presentation of a framework for understanding the relationship among approaches and the contributions each makes to the overall task of explaining crime and criminality. A central argument to be developed in this chapter is that crime and criminality are diverse and complex phenomena, and that the causes of offending may vary for different types of offenders. An integrative approach to psychological theory better accounts for this variability among offenders.

Defining crime and criminals In order to examine explanations of crime and criminality, it is first necessary to define these terms and to specify what will be included in and excluded from the analyses. The task is surprisingly difficult. It is easy to slip into the habit of talking about crime as a static and unitary phenomenon, and about criminals as if they are a separate sub-species of human being bound by a common set of deviant characteristics. In fact, crime is a slippery concept encompassing diverse behaviours, and criminals do not form a clearly distinguished or homogeneous subgroup.

4

Introduction

The shifting definitions of crime The first thing to note is the obvious but crucial point that crime is legally defined. A behaviour only becomes a crime when a particular law proscribing it is enacted. There are numerous examples of definitions of crime varying over time and from society to society. For example, in Britain today, any man having sexual relations with a girl under the age of 16 years is guilty of sexual assault; however, in Victorian times, it was legal to have sex with a girl as young as 10 years of age. Worldwide, the age of consent for girls currently varies from 12 to 21, and there are even variations within multi-jurisdictional countries such as Australia and the USA. Thus, whether someone commits rape can depend upon where and when that person lives. One implication of this is that any crime could immediately be eliminated by the simple expedient of decriminalising it. We have seen this happen in a number of areas. Abortion, homosexual acts and prostitution are examples of behaviours that have been partially or fully decriminalised in many places in recent years. On the other hand, we can also see the process working in the other direction. Sexual abuse of children is an example (as noted above), as is the increasing criminalisation of drug use over the twentieth century. One perspective in sociological criminology – conflict theory – is particularly concerned with how society makes decisions about which behaviours to declare criminal, arguing that crime is invariably defined in a way that serves the interests of the powerful. The shifting definitions of crime pose difficulties for those psychological theories that focus on differences between criminals and non-criminals. Psychological profiles of criminals cannot be tied to an arbitrary legal construct. If someone can be a criminal today but not tomorrow for the same behaviour, then how can anything meaningful be said about their criminal nature? Recognising this problem, some researchers have pointed out that there are limits to which definitions of crime vary among cultures and over time. For example, Ellis and Walsh (2000) argue that, despite some variability at the edges, there is a ‘stable core of universally condemned offences’ (p. 7). These are behaviours that involve purposeful victimisation of other community members, and include acts such as murder, theft, rape, vandalism, and so on. Every society has individuals who engage in these sorts of behaviours and who are liable to community sanctions. By focusing on these core offences and the concept of purposeful victimisation, it is argued that ‘crime’ and ‘criminal’ become stable and meaningful entities for psychological analysis. Some researchers have gone further and dispensed with legal definitions altogether. Instead of crime, they focus on the concept of antisocial behaviour. Antisocial behaviour is a clinical construct, and refers to acts that violate societal norms or infringe on the rights of others. Individuals who persistently behave antisocially may be assessed as having an antisocial personality disorder (APD). According to the current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), specific symptoms of APD include deceitfulness, impulsivity, irresponsibility, lack of remorse, reckless disregard for the welfare of others, and repeated failure

Introduction

5

to conform to social norms that may include violating the law. Note that some antisocial individuals may also be referred to by the older term of psychopath, although APD and psychopathy are not fully equivalent and there is much debate about the relationship between the two (Hare, 1993). Nevertheless, because antisocial behaviour, APD and psychopathy are psychologically defined, they are readily analysed using psychological theory. However, while antisocial behaviour and crime overlap, they are not necessarily the same. Not everyone who has committed crime has performed antisocial behaviour or has APD. A person arrested for an act of political dissent, for example, might even argue that they were behaving prosocially. Likewise, not all antisocial behaviour is illegal and not all individuals with APD are criminals. Some people go through their life callously using and abusing other people in ways that do not actually break the law. Criminality as a continuum Even if we agree on a set of behaviours that qualify as crimes, the dividing line between criminals and non-criminals is not clear-cut. Like many personal attributes – intelligence, anxiety, self-confidence, and so on – criminality is best conceptualised as a continuum. Also, like other attributes, criminality is normally distributed. That is, most people tend to cluster around the middle of the continuum, while relatively few are at either extreme (very law-abiding or very criminal). Thus, almost everybody at some time or other breaks the law (or commits antisocial acts). They might cheat on their tax, inflate their travel expenses, take stationery home from work, knowingly accept too much change from a shopkeeper, keep found goods, run red lights, and so on. Obviously, many of these offences are trivial and may be performed by an individual only occasionally. Under these circumstances we would not regard the individual as being a ‘real’ criminal. As the offences committed by an individual become more serious and more frequent, then their level of criminality is presumed to increase. However, there is no clear point at which the individual qualifies as a criminal, and inevitably researchers and clinicians need to make pragmatic decisions on where to draw the line. Types of criminals Finally, in the event that we are able to agree on who the ‘real’ criminals are, we might still question the assumption that they form a single homogeneous group. The label criminal can be applied to a wide diversity of individuals and this has prompted some researcher to develop typologies that group different kinds of criminals into various categories. Most obviously, criminals commit different sorts of crimes. A person who has committed murder and a person who has committed tax evasion may be both defined as criminal but otherwise they may have little in common. It is sometimes useful, therefore, to examine criminals separately in terms of the specific crimes they have committed, or at least in terms of broader crime categories (e.g., violent

6

Introduction

offenders versus property offenders). However, this approach often breaks down. The evidence increasingly shows that many criminals do not specialise in one type of offence, but rather are criminally versatile. For example, Smallbone and Wortley (2004a) found that among a sample of 362 prisoners convicted of child sexual abuse – a group for which a high level of offence specialisation might be assumed – offenders were four times more likely to have previous convictions for non-sex offences than for sex offences. All 16 of the Australian Bureau of Statistics offences categories were represented in the criminal histories, including theft (30 per cent), traffic offences (24 per cent), personal injury offences (19 per cent), burglary (14 per cent) and drug offences (13 per cent). Sex offences (22 per cent) were not even the most common prior offence. Clearly categorising versatile offenders in terms of their crimes is problematic. Apart from offence type, criminals also vary markedly in the frequency and persistence of their criminality. It has been recognised for some time that a small group of chronic offenders is responsible for a disproportionately large amount of crime (e.g., Wolfgang et al., 1972). Criminologists sometimes talk about this as the 80/20 rule – 80 per cent of crimes are committed by 20 per cent of offenders. (These percentages are not necessarily precise; it is the general concept, that also applies to other phenomena such as victimisation rates, which is important.) This observation has led to an important distinction by some criminologists between life-course persistent (LCP) and adolescent-limited (AL) offenders (Moffitt, 1993). Life-course persistent offenders commit frequent offences over an extended period. Signs of antisocial behaviour in these offenders are evident in early childhood, and many may be clinically assessed as having psychological disorders, especially antisocial personality disorder. In contrast, for adolescent-limited offenders, involvement in crime may be a transitory phenomenon, often linked to specific stages of development or particular life events. In particular, it has been noted that the aggregate offending rate peaks around 17 years of age, after which it rapidly declines, a phenomenon referred to as the age–crime curve (see Figure 1.1). The age–crime curve is one of the most robust and important findings in criminology. It suggests that a great deal of crime is associated with developmental changes and social experiences specific to adolescence. In fact, some studies have shown that the majority of young males have some formal contact with the law, and that not engaging in some form of delinquency is the exception (e.g., Farrington et al., 1986). The overwhelming majority of these individuals, however, do not have a fixed propensity to commit crime, and they desist from offending as they mature and/or their life circumstances change. An individual’s offending pattern over time is referred to as his/her criminal career. The idea that criminals have careers that parallel conventional careers has provided a useful analogy for criminologists. Careers have a beginning and an end, and individuals can move in and out of particular occupations as circumstances change. Accordingly, criminal-career researchers are interested in when and how criminals are initiated into crime, the type of crime they commit and their shifts from one crime-type to another, the frequency of their offending, and their desistance from criminal activity. The two-path career model described above (i.e., life-course

Introduction

7

Figure 1.1 The age–crime curve for a hypothetical data-set.

persistent versus adolescent-limited) is just one of a number of proposed offender typologies based on offending pathways. Other researchers have suggested that there are three or more distinct offender pathways (DiLalla and Gottesman, 1989; D’Unger et al., 1998; Nagin and Land, 1993; Tracy et al., 1990). Whatever the number, for our purposes, looking at criminals from a careers perspective provides a more nuanced picture than the crude dichotomy of criminal/non-criminal. It serves to remind us that criminals are a heterogeneous group and that criminality is a dynamic attribute that may change significantly over an individual’s life-time. When thinking about the causes of crime and criminality, this variability needs to be accounted for, and different explanations may be required for different types of offenders.

Debates about the nature of crime and criminality There are many psychological theories relevant to crime and criminality and these theories vary on the fundamental assumptions made about how human beings operate. Before we consider how various psychological theories might be combined into an integrated model, we need first to understand – and seek to accommodate – the ways in which they differ. Five underlying debates about the nature of crime and criminality are examined here. These are: (1) do offenders freely choose to commit crime, or are their actions determined by factors outside of their control?; (2) Do the causes of crime reside in the biological make-up of individuals, or in the way that

8

Introduction

individuals are raised?; (3) Are offenders normal or do they display pathologies that distinguish them from other people?; (4) Do offenders need to acquire the criminal motivations that drive them to commit crimes, or do they fail to control the criminal impulses that are naturally present in all of us? And (5) is crime determined by the characteristics of offenders, or does crime occur because of opportunities and pressures in the immediate environment? Free will versus determinism Most people intuitively adhere to a philosophy of free will, believing that they are able to make unconstrained choices about their behaviour and to guide their own destiny. Explanations of crime, too, have traditionally portrayed criminals as freely choosing their deviant ways. Originally free will was viewed within a religious framework, with crime equated with sin and moral failing. Later, the early criminologists of the late eighteenth century – members of the so-called classical school such as Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham – presented free will as a process by which individuals weigh up the perceived costs and benefits of behaviour, and choose the path that they judge to be most advantageous. Most modern psychological theories, however, are based on the assumption of determinism. These theories assume that all behaviour is ultimately caused by factors outside the individual’s personal control. Theorists who adhere to determinism try to apply the same scientific principles and laws used in the ‘hard’ sciences to the issue of human behaviour. A seismologist would never say that an avalanche occurred because a rock chose to fall down a hill: likewise a psychologist ought not to say that behaviour occurred simply because the person chose to perform it. According to the deterministic logic, every action a person performs can be traced to some prior biological or environmental factor. Thus, when a person ‘chooses’ to perform an act, we need to ask why they chose to do it (and what caused that to occur, and so on). Free will is thought to be just an illusion. While we have the subjective experience of making choices, it is argued that our conscious thoughts are just after-the-fact commentaries to ourselves on what we have already subconsciously decided. As some have put it, how can we know what we have thought until we have thought it? The usual reaction of people when presented with the concept of determinism is to reject the prospect out of hand. To be the subject of deterministic forces outside of our control is an unappealing and rather unsettling thought, and moreover, it does not seem to accord with our subjective experience of making choices. And the fact is, we can happily get by in life continuing to believe that we possess free will, whether or not it is true. However, at a theoretical level, it is the adherence to determinism that drives researchers to uncover the causes of crime and to build theories. After all, if offenders simply committed crime as a random expression of free will, then there would be nothing left to explain. This does not mean, however, that psychologists ignore the thought processes and decision-making strategies of offenders. Many deterministic psychologists believe that cognition plays an important mediating role in the causes of behaviour. Some cognitive

Introduction

9

psychologists have gone further and have proposed the concept of ‘soft determinism’. Soft determinists argue that because human beings are capable of conceptual thought, they therefore have some limited capacity to make choices and to exercise some control over their own behaviour. In fact, despite the profound philosophical gap between free will and determinism, often both positions will lead to similar conclusions. Most adherents to free will would accept that people will invariably ‘choose’ the behaviour which seems to offer them the most benefits, an interpretation which is not very far from saying that a person’s behaviour is ‘determined’ by the perceived outcomes of that behaviour. Moreover, in practice, when dealing with real-life problems, psychologists often operate ‘as if’ there is free will. For example, telling clients that they have no control over their life events is not seen as a particularly useful therapeutic strategy! Likewise, our laws and courts remain rooted in classical school notions of free will and individual culpability. It is sometimes suggested that if behaviour is determined by factors outside of the control of offenders, then punishing them for their crimes cannot be morally justified. However, identifying reasons for criminal behaviour is not the same as excusing it. All behaviour has consequences and it is wholly consistent with our everyday experience that criminal behaviour should attract legal sanctions. Indeed, it would be unnatural if this were not the case. Determinism is also sometimes confused with the idea that behaviour is predestined and fixed in a fatalistic fashion. In fact, determinism suggests that behaviour is dynamic and ever-sensitive to changes in causative influences. Determinism is not just about an individual’s biological make-up; environmental factors can be equally deterministic in their effects on behaviour. Thus, one desired outcome of punishing offenders is to cause them to change their criminal behaviour. Nature versus nurture To the extent that behaviour is determined, the nature/nurture debate refers to whether the determinants of behaviour are biological (nature) or environmental (nurture). Biological explanations explore the role in criminal behaviour of genetics, psychophysiology, biochemical processes, neurological factors and physical traumas. Environmental explanations look to the formative role in behaviour of child-rearing practices, family dynamics, school experiences, peer group influences, and so forth. Historically, nature and nurture explanations of behaviour have gone in and out of fashion over the years. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, biological factors, albeit often crudely conceptualised, were a major component of theories of behaviour. Indeed, criminology as a scientific discipline began with Cesare Lombroso’s pseudo-Darwinian theories of the ‘born criminal’. In their own ways, the development of Freudian psychodynamic theory and Pavlovian conditioning theory in the first half of the twentieth century provided the theoretical bases for a shift towards environmental explanations. Psychodynamic theory emphasised the role of childhood experiences and trauma in psychological disorder, while conditioning theorists argued that all learning was the result of an individual’s

10

Introduction

environmental experience. The Second World War helped cement the dominance of the environmental perspective, as people reacted against Nazi doctrines of racial superiority that underpinned practices of genocide and forced sterilisation. It became politically incorrect to even contemplate the biological bases of crime. Towards the end of the twentieth century, however, biological explanations started to make a come-back, spurred particularly by advances in gene technology. Nevertheless, biological explanations of crime remain unpopular in the wider discipline of criminology. For example, Ellis and Hoffman (1990) reported that only 20 per cent of criminologists agreed that genes may play a significant role in criminal behaviour. However, most contemporary psychological theories accept that behaviour is a combination of both biological and environmental factors. This is referred to as the biosocial perspective. These days, no reputable scientists would argue that there are ‘born criminals’. Rather, they talk about biological factors as predispositions that, given the right environmental influences, increase the chances of criminal behaviours occurring but do not guarantee that they will occur. Thus, for most psychologists the nature/nurture debate is no longer about whether the causes of crime are biological or environmental, but about the nature of the interplay between these two factors. One issue is how the respective roles played by biological and environmental factors might vary from offender to offender. For example, it is argued that life-course persistent offenders are more likely than adolescent-limited offenders to display antisocial traits from an early age that can be linked to biological processes. Adolescent-limited offenders, on the other hand, are more likely to be influenced by environmental factors such as peer pressure. Another issue concerns the way that biological and environmental factors might interact with one another. A nature/nurture interaction occurs when different individuals react to the same environment in different ways. This raises the prospect, for example, that some individuals may be biologically more vulnerable to criminogenic environmental influences than are others. Note that from a biosocial perspective, a common way that the nature/nurture debate has been framed – which factor is more important in explaining an individual’s criminal behaviour? – makes no sense since no behaviour can exist without both conditions. This approach to the debate has been likened to asking whether length or breadth is more important in determining the area of a rectangle (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997). Normal versus pathological A related (though distinct) debate is whether criminals are normal or pathological. This is often referred to as the mad/bad debate. There are a number of theoretical explanations of crime that assume that criminals are revealing some form of biological, psychological and/or behavioural dysfunction that separates them from non-criminals. This approach is known as the medical model: criminal behaviour is seen to result from a ‘sickness’ that must be ‘cured’ in order to restore good health. On the other hand, other psychological approaches take the view that crime and criminals are normal. This is not to say that that these theorists hold that

Introduction

11

most people rape and rob banks, or that raping and robbing banks are acceptable or harmless behaviours in our society. Rather, they mean that we do not need special psychological explanations for these behaviours. Criminal behaviour is seen to be learned in the same way, and motivated by the same basic needs, as any other behaviour. For example, a thief has learned to steal to get money just as other people have learned to work to get money. Further, the thief’s desire for money is perfectly rational and depends upon no hidden or perverse motives. The thief’s behaviour is a normal response to his/her particular life experiences. It may be bad but it is not mad. The mad/bad debate overlaps the nature/nurture debate inasmuch that biological differences between criminals and non-criminals can be used as one argument that criminals are pathological. However, it should be noted that not all biological theories of crime assume pathology. For example, some biological theorists propose that the genes that predispose individuals to commit crime have evolved as normal – indeed, adaptive – human characteristics. On the other hand, some models of pathology do not rely on biological explanations. The psychodynamic theories of Sigmund Freud and his followers are probably the best-known examples of this. According to these theorists, crime arises from unconscious psychological conflicts deep within the individual, and offenders are rarely aware of the true reasons for their offending. Criminals are seen as psychologically rather than biologically sick. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that pathological means more than simply unusual, socially unacceptable, or even maladaptive. Criminality may be each of these things, but no one condition is sufficient to justify the label of pathology. People with red hair, or with high IQs, are statistically infrequent but they are not pathological. Likewise, burping at the table may violate social norms but is not a sign of pathology, while homosexuality was once considered both socially deviant and pathological and is now no longer considered so. And people who smoke potentially cause physical damage to themselves and others, while shyness can be a debilitating condition that most people experience at some time or other; yet neither qualifies as pathology. In DSM-IV-TR, the American Psychiatric Association (2000) attempts to overcome the deficiencies of single definitions of pathology by stipulating a combination of conditions that must be satisfied in order for an individual to attract a diagnosis of mental disorder. It defines mental disorder as: [A] clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom. In addition this syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned response to a particular event, for example, the death of a loved one. Whatever its original cause, it must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioural, psychological or biological dysfunction in the individual. Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual and

12

Introduction society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the individual, as described above. (ibid., p. xxxi)

According to the DSM definition, performance of criminal behaviour is not of itself sufficient evidence of pathology. However, the definition allows that some portion of offenders may commit crime as a result of a pathological condition. For many researchers, then, the normal/pathological debate involves determining which particular offenders are pathological and which specific mental disorders they possess. Based on our discussion so far, those offenders diagnosed with antisocial personality disorders and/or as being life-course persistent offenders are the most likely candidates to qualify as pathological. Nevertheless, pathology is an elusive construct and debate remains about the validity and usefulness of the label (Maddux et al., 2005). At what precise point, for example, does normal behaviour become pathological? The view of offenders as pathological is a powerful image that can shape the way that clinicians, criminal justice practitioners, policy-makers, and the public react to the problem of crime. At the same time, there is a sense in which the normal/pathological debate is more about terminology than substance. The nature/nurture debate describes real differences of opinion about the causes of behaviour. In contrast, it is possible for two researchers to agree on the causes of crime, say, a particular set of developmental experiences, or even the presence of some distinctive biological feature, but to disagree on whether those causes have produced a condition that ought to be labelled pathological. Arguably, the decision about whether an offender is normal or pathological is as much a value judgement as it is a scientific judgement, and either way the decision need not interfere with the search for the causes of crime and criminality. Driving forces versus restraining forces Most psychological theories of crime seek to answer the question: how does an individual become criminal? These theories begin with the assumption that human beings are born criminally neutral and must therefore acquire the motivations and behaviours that drive them to commit crime. However, some theorists have turned the question around and asked: what stops an individual from becoming criminal? These theorists examine the personal, social and physical constraints that control criminal impulses (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi, 1969; Matza, 1964). The so-called control perspective assumes that the acquisition of criminal motivations does not need to be explained. Human beings naturally act on the basis of self-interest and the desire to maximise their pleasure. Criminal behaviour, in turn, is intrinsically rewarding and requires little in the way of specialised skill. It is therefore taken for granted that people will commit crime if there are no constraints on them to do so. Control theorists ask you to imagine the extreme case of a child who has grown up without any restrictions being placed on his/her behaviour. The outcome in such a scenario would be a selfish, impulsive individual who satisfies

Introduction

13

his/her urges indiscriminately. According to the control perspective, criminals do not learn to commit crimes, but rather, they fail to learn not to commit them. This distinction might at first sound like mere semantics, but in fact the implications are quite profound. According to the control perspective, the potential to commit crime is universal. For example, everybody has at some time had sexual fantasies about people they have met or observed. Most people, however, realise that these fantasies cannot be instantly acted upon. Their sexual impulses are kept in check by their moral standards, their fear of legal and social consequences, and the logistic difficulty of carrying out the behaviour. The difference between someone who commits rape and someone who doesn’t lies not so much in the nature of their sexual motivations, but in the level of control that exists over their sexual motivations. Criminals are defined as individuals who routinely exercise poor self-control over their criminal impulses. Sometimes, too, the usual controls over behaviour can break down, and normally law-abiding individuals can commit crimes they would otherwise not commit. Thus, rape often occurs in the turmoil and anonymity of a war zone, committed by soldiers who in other circumstances would never carry out such behaviour. Generally speaking, theories that emphasise the acquisition of criminal behaviours suggest that offenders will at least to some extent specialise in their offending, since the motivations and skills needed for each type of crime must be acquired independently. On the other hand, control perspectives on crime suggest that many offenders will be generalists; i.e., that the same lack of control that causes them to steal will also cause them to break traffic rules, take drugs, commit rape, and so on, as the opportunities arise. An implication of offending versatility is that fewer separate theories are required to explain different types of crime. Person versus situation As the above example of rape in war illustrates, whether or not an individual commits a crime can depend upon the particular circumstances at the time. The immediate environment can be one source of control over behaviour. This leads to our final debate, which concerns the extent to which the causes of criminal behaviour reside within the individual, or in the situations in which the behaviour occurs. This is also referred to as the cross-situational consistency debate. A great deal of psychological theory and research is devoted to the study of internal constructs: personality, attitudes, beliefs. Once acquired, a person’s psychological attributes are viewed as being more or less fixed. Everybody can be described in terms of their characteristic personality profile and on this basis their behaviour in new situations can be reliably predicted. It is the person’s psychological make-up that determines how they behave. However, this view has not gone unchallenged. Mischel (1968) argued against stable trait models of behaviour that portrayed personality as a consistent predisposition. Instead, he argued that behaviour is highly situationally-specific, and that an individual’s behaviour may vary considerably from one situation to the next. We may identify variability across situations in our own behaviour. For example, we might consider ourselves as generally confident but also recognise that there are times when

14

Introduction

we are not confident. Similarly, we can sometimes be surprised to see changes in the behaviour of others when we encounter them in new environments (for example, when visiting the home of a friend or work colleague for the first time). Note that the person/situation debate is conceptually distinct from the nature/ nurture debate. While both debates are about the role of environments, the nature/ nurture debate focuses on distal causes (i.e., long-term factors that helped shape the person’s personality or behavioural repertoire) whereas in the person/situation debate, the focus is on proximal causes (i.e., factors occurring at the time the behaviour is performed). Following the person-centred bias of psychology more generally, most psychological theories of crime seek to explain criminal behaviour largely in terms of the characteristics of offenders and pay little attention to the circumstances in which the crime occurs. However, according to the situational perspective, the crime scene is more than a passive backdrop against which criminal action is played out. Instead it plays a fundamental role in initiating and shaping that action. A great deal of crime is impulsive, opportunistic or a reaction to situational stresses. Individuals may become violent in the heat of the moment, succumb to temptations to steal, commit crimes under the effects of alcohol, or feel pressured to go along with delinquent friends. Moreover, even the most prolific, predatory criminals do not offend randomly. On the contrary, their offending is relatively infrequent and is responsive to the nature of the immediate environment. For example, professional burglars do not burgle every house that they see, but rather, they carefully select targets that will maximise their gains and minimise their risks. Knowledge of the precise circumstances in which crime occurs is crucial for a complete understanding of criminal behaviour, and traditional theories that are devoted to explaining the development of criminality only as a fixed attribute are missing a key ingredient. Summary: some guiding principles The aim of this book is to develop an integrated model that draws together a range of psychological theories of crime. The more the contributing theories differ in terms of their fundamental premises, the more difficult this task becomes. However, while the five debates discussed in this section have been proposed in terms of polar opposites, there is common ground between the poles and it is not necessary or even sensible to adhere to extreme positions. It is not so much a case of deciding which side is correct as it is deciding how much emphasis should be placed on one side or the other. Below are propositions with respect to the five debates that will guide the selection of theories for this book and development of an integrated model that links these theories together. 1

It is most productive to think about criminal behaviour as being the product of causes, rather than as the expression of evil or of capricious whims. At the same time, this does not preclude the examination of the thought patterns and decision-making processes of offenders, nor does it suggest that offenders ought not to be held accountable for their actions.

Introduction 2

3

4

5

15

Crime, like all behaviour, is the product of a biosocial process, that is, a combination of biological predispositions and environmental experiences. However, the relative roles of specific biology and environment factors, and the nature of their interplay, vary among offenders. Some – but by no means all – offenders have distinct biological, psychological and/or behavioural features, and satisfy diagnostic criteria for mental disorders such as antisocial personality disorder. However, whether or not such offenders are labelled pathological involves a qualitative judgement that does not materially affect the scientific search for the causes of their behaviour. Criminal behaviour is the result of acquired deviant motivations and behaviours, and a failure to inhibit natural criminal impulses. The inherent tendency for human beings to act out of self-interest helps account for the latent propensity for criminal conduct in the general population, and the criminal versatility of many offenders. All criminal behaviour results from the combination of dispositional and situational factors. The probability of crime therefore varies according to both the criminal characteristics of the individual and the criminogenic nature of the immediate crime setting.

Psychological theories of crime and criminality: an integrated model We now turn to consider the psychological theories that will go into the integrative model. In sociological criminology, theories are typically developed specifically for the purpose of explaining crime and criminality. In contrast, there are very few distinctly criminological theories in psychology. Instead, criminal behaviour is treated as just another human response that obeys more general psychological rules, and that can therefore be explained by mainstream psychological theory. Individual psychological theories, in turn, often have a narrow focus, emphasising the role of some particular psychological factor or process. Eight areas of theory are covered in this book, each of which is the subject of a chapter. These eight areas can be arranged in a temporal sequence, from a focus on distal to proximal causal factors, suggested by the nature/nurture and the person/situation debates. Some theories focus on factors that are present at birth; other theories focus on factors that influence the offender over the lifespan; and other theories focus on factors that are present at the crime scene. The analysis spans 100,000 years, from the ancestral environments of early humans to the decision to engage in a specific criminal act. The relationship among the eight theoretical areas is shown in Figure 1.2 and each area is briefly described below. Human nature Human nature refers to a set of psychological features and behavioural tendencies assumed to be characteristic of the human species. Human nature is explained by evolutionary theory, which in recent years has been invigorated by advances in the field of genetics and the development of the sub-discipline of evolutionary

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Introduction

Figure 1.2 An integrative model of criminal behaviour.

psychology. The premise of evolutionary psychology is that, just as humans have evolved adaptive physical characteristics – carried by genes – in response to natural selection, so too they have evolved adaptive behavioural patterns – also carried by genes – that have likewise maximised reproductive success. However, some evolved behavioural tendencies can in certain circumstances increase the likelihood of criminal behaviour. For example, the evolutionary pressure to pass on genes underpins sexual attraction and courtship behaviours, but also supplies the basic motivation for rape. Evolutionary psychology sets out the broad parameters of human behaviour and the origins of the biosocial foundations for criminal impulses. Heredity Whereas evolutionary theory examines the distribution of genes throughout the human population, heredity is concerned more specifically with the transmission of genes from one generation to the next. It has been an age-old observation that crime often runs in families. However, on this observation alone it is not possible to disentangle the contributions of genes and environmental influences within the family. The results of research on twins and adoptees, however, strongly point to a genetic basis to intergenerational criminality. Note that while both human nature and heredity are shown in Figure 1.2 as present at birth, it is not suggested that genes predetermine behaviour. Genes are responsible for behavioural potentials but do not programme precise behavioural repertoires. Whether an individual becomes criminal will depend upon lifespan and situational factors.

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The brain Genes create behavioural predispositions by directing the construction of neuronal networks in the brain. It might at first be thought odd that in Figure 1.2 the brain is not depicted in the first category of factors that are present at birth. In fact, the crucial point about the brain is its essential plasticity. Onto the hard-wired structures constructed by genes, new neuronal networks are laid down as the individual interacts with his/her environment. The very physical structure of the brain is a product of biosocial forces. Neurological processes include autonomic functions to do with arousal (e.g., heart rate), biochemical processes (e.g., the secretion of hormones), and neurological functioning (e.g., brain wave patterns). Research is increasingly showing links between brain structures and functions and attributes associated with criminal behaviour. Personality Brain structures and functions provide the foundations for the development of personality, and these predispositions are shaped by an individual’s unique developmental experiences. Personality is the relatively stable set of psychological characteristics that define an individual. It comprises ways of thinking, patterns of behaviour and emotional responses that are assumed to be consistent over time and from one situation to the next. Personality is typically summarised as a collection of traits – aggression, shyness, confidence, and so forth – that can be used to profile an individual and to distinguish one person from another. In criminology, researchers are interested in individual differences between offenders and non-offenders in order to identify personality traits that are predictive of criminal conduct. Development Psychologists who study social development are interested in the way that human beings’ social behaviour matures and changes over time. They study the importance of the bonds between children and their parents or primary caregivers, how children learn the rules and expectations of society, and how they learn to behave as autonomous individuals. The depiction in Figure 1.2 of social development occurring as a lifespan process is not meant to imply that genes do not play an important role in social development, or that social development is not closely linked to critical, biologically-determined periods of life. However, the focus here is on the effect of developmental experiences – including parenting and disciplinary strategies, childhood neglect and abuse, family dynamics, peer relations and educational experiences – on social development. In terms of crime and criminality, social development research informs in particular the criminal careers perspective, which examines changes in criminal involvement over time.

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Introduction

Learning The learning perspective is concerned with enduring changes in behaviour that result from environmental experiences. There are three principal models of learning: classical conditioning, operant conditioning and social learning. The first two models (classical and operant conditioning) exclude from their analysis unseen internal psychological processes (thoughts, attitudes, personality, etc.) and focus only on the observable relationships between behaviour and tangible reinforcement (rewards and punishments). The third model (social learning) presents a less extreme view. According to social learning theory, a great deal of human behaviour is learned through social interactions (e.g., observation and imitation) and does not require tangible rewards or punishments. In the application of learning approaches to criminology, most attention has been given to the way patterns of criminal behaviour are acquired over time, through childhood experiences and the like. However, learning theory also holds that for learned behaviour to be produced on any given occasion, it needs to be evoked by an appropriate environmental stimulus. Thus, as shown in Figure 1.2, learning approaches explicitly incorporate a role for situational factors. Cognition Cognition refers to the thought processes involved in covert functions such as perception, information-processing, memory, reasoning, problem-solving and decision-making. In traditional behaviourism, cognition is treated as an unnecessary and unverifiable construct. However, social learning theory introduced the role of mental processes into the learning perspective and was subsequently renamed social cognitive theory. Social cognitive theory is based on the premise that the external environment does not act on us in an objective way, but is mediated – perceived and interpreted – by our cognitive processes. Through cognition – our ‘self-talk’ and imagination – we can generate an internal representation of the world that has the power to reinforce, punish and stimulate us in ways similar to actual experience. However, this does not imply a return to unfettered free will. The analogy is sometimes drawn between cognition and computers. Computers are efficient information-processors but they still require external inputs. With respect to criminal behaviour, the cognitive perspective focuses on the way that offenders perceive criminal opportunities and make decisions about whether or not to become involved in criminal conduct. Situations Learning and cognitive approaches each take into account how the offender deals with environmental information at the time of the crime. To these approaches can be added a range of other situational approaches that examine in detail what it is about the crime scene that encourages crime. There are two broad approaches to this task. Some theorists view situations in terms of criminal opportunities that

Introduction

19

offenders exploit. According to this view, offenders enter the crime scene motivated to offend and proceed with the crime if it is easy to carry out, the promised rewards are high, and the chances of detection are low. Other theorists emphasise the role of immediate environments in generating the motivation to commit crime. According to this approach, some situational factors – peer pressure, authority figures, environmental stress, provocation, and so forth – can actively induce individuals to commit crime that they might not have otherwise contemplated at that time. Of course, situational theorists do not propose that all offenders are hapless victims of circumstance. It is understood that crime occurs as a person– situation interaction, and that some people are more susceptible to situational temptations and pressures than are others. Summary Whether an individual commits a crime and the form that criminal behaviour takes are complex products of biological, developmental and situational forces. It is unrealistic to expect any one theory to adequately cover the scope of factors that may contribute to the diverse phenomena of crime and criminality. The model outlined in this section and elaborated upon in the chapters that follow is designed to provide a general and flexible framework for understanding the relationship among theories, and for accounting for variations in crime and criminals.

2

Human nature

Human nature is a term that is widely used and understood in everyday conversation. Most people have a common-sense belief that there are some universal characteristics and predictable ways of behaving that make humans human. However, throughout much of the twentieth century, the idea of human nature was strongly resisted in psychology and the social sciences more generally. Other animals might have instincts that cause dogs to act like dogs and cats to act like cats, but humans were assumed to be above such base influences. Instead, we were seen to acquire all of our psychological characteristics during our individual lifetimes via social, cultural and other environmental factors. In the past few decades, however, some psychologists have begun exploring the behavioural implications of evolutionary theory to create the sub-discipline of evolutionary psychology, and to provide a scientific foundation to the concept of human nature. In this chapter, those universal human characteristics that provide the foundation for criminal behaviour are examined. According to evolutionary psychologists, humans have evolved not only physical characteristics that have been adaptive for survival, but also adaptive behavioural patterns. Modern-day criminal behaviours are the echoes of strategies employed by our distant ancestors to solve the everyday problems they faced as nomadic hunter–gatherers. We now live in a very different world, but these ancient behavioural responses remain hard-wired in our psychological make-up. The behaviour of humans today cannot be fully appreciated unless these evolutionary origins are understood. However, before examining evolutionary psychology’s explanations of criminal behaviour in detail, the basic principles of evolutionary theory are outlined, and the theoretical assumptions of evolutionary psychology, and its theoretical predecessor sociobiology, are discussed.

The principles of evolution It is difficult to overstate the profound effect that Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution had on the way that human beings view themselves. Prior to the publication of his On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection in 1859, scientific thinking about life on Earth was dominated by creationism – the belief that God had created different species as they appear today and that each species was immutable and unconnected to other species. Human beings were viewed as the

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peak of creation, fundamentally different in kind from ‘brute’ animals. Darwin’s evolutionary theory, in contrast, outlined a process of gradual change over time by which species arise and become extinct. All life falls on a continuum from simple to complex, and the development of each species can be traced back through earlier forms. Human beings are just another animal, different from other species only by degrees, and connected to every other living thing through common ancestry. Natural selection Driving evolution is natural selection. Darwin argued that within any species, individuals differ in attributes – adaptations – that contribute to their ability to survive and reproduce in the face of environmental pressures. Some features of the environment, perhaps the arrival of a new predator or a change in climate, pose challenges for a species. Variants, such as longer beaks or thicker fur, permit some members of the population to better exploit the new environmental conditions. Individuals who possess these favourable attributes will produce more offspring than other members of the species, and, to the extent that these variations are inheritable, their offspring will also carry this competitive advantage. Through this process of natural selection, and over many generations, these adaptations will spread throughout the population and eventually the species itself will undergo change. Put another way, any characteristic exhibited by a species is likely to have come about because it has conferred some reproductive advantage on the ancestors of the species. It is important to realise that natural selection is neither random, on the one hand, nor purposeful, on the other. In the first case, it is often mistakenly asserted that evolution occurs by chance. Critics of evolution have seized on this misconception in an attempt to support the concept of intelligent design. For example, they have likened the evolution of complex life to the improbability of a jetliner being assembled by a cyclone blowing through a junkyard, or the works of Shakespeare being produced by monkeys tapping on a typewriter (see Dawkins, 2006a). But evolution is far from a random process. As the term natural ‘selection’ clearly indicates, the characteristics of a species are actively shaped in precise ways by the environments to which that species has been exposed. It is no happy coincidence that polar bears appear to have white fur that provides an effective camouflage against the snow; polar bears appear to have white fur because it is an effective camouflage. Equally erroneous is the view of evolution as a progressive process that pushes species inexorably towards ever-increasing levels of complexity and refinement. We are particularly prone to this error when we think about the evolution of our own species, which we are inclined to regard as the pinnacle of evolution. As we look back on our evolutionary journey, through the various ‘primitive’ forms of hominid and on to modern humans, it seems as if we are the culmination of a predetermined developmental trajectory. But this view is what Dawkins (2004, p. 1) calls the ‘conceit of hindsight’. Evolution follows no master design, and at no point in our evolution were we destined to take the form that we currently have.

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Nor are we ‘more-evolved’ than are other species. Like all species, humans have been designed by natural selection to meet the environmental challenges and exploit the environmental niches that happen to have come their way. Darwin made a few speculative comments about evolution and crime. In his Descent of Man (1871, p. 173), he suggested that some of man’s ‘worst dispositions’ were reversions to earlier primitive states ‘from which we are not removed by many generations’. However, it was left to Cesare Lombroso five years later to publish the first concerted attempt to explain crime in terms of evolution (Lombroso, 1876). Homo delinquens: an evolutionary dead end Lombroso took the idea of crime as regressive – or atavistic – behaviour and proposed that criminals were evolutionary throwbacks, a brutish subspecies of humans whom he labelled homo delinquens. In effect, criminals were conceived of as living ‘cavemen’ who had failed to fully develop the civilised and gracile characteristics of homo sapiens. In addition to their primitive behaviour they could be identified by their primitive physical features: large noses and ears, prominent jaw and cheekbones, asymmetrical facial features, protruding lips and so on. Lombroso wrapped these ideas in a crude interpretation of Darwinism. For example, he endorsed the view of evolution as a progression, with European adult males the highest form of evolved life. Other races were assumed to have evolved before Europeans and so were lower on the evolutionary scale, while women, because they resembled beardless youths, were thought to be stuck in a childlike stage of development. Just like species, theories also evolve, and new branches that prove themselves ill-equipped to adapt to changing conditions become extinct. So it is with Lombroso’s concept of homo delinquens. To his credit, Lombroso actually set about empirically testing his theory by taking skull measurements of prisoners and comparing them with measurements taken from non-criminal soldiers. While Lombroso claimed to have found more physical abnormalities among the prisoners, a later, more rigorous study by Charles Goring (1913) failed to replicate this finding and his theory quickly fell into disrepute. For our purposes here, Lombroso’s theory is a mere historical oddity, and it is disappointing to see so many criminology texts still present it as if it represents current thinking on evolution and crime. Evolutionary theories of crime have come a long way since Lombroso, and crucial to that development has been the discovery of genes. Gene-based evolutionary theory When he formulated his evolutionary theory, Darwin knew nothing of genetics. While the basic principles by which traits were inherited were demonstrated by his contemporary, Gregor Mendel, in 1865, the significance of Mendel’s discoveries was not appreciated until the early twentieth century. It is a testament to Darwin’s genius that subsequent genetic research has broadly affirmed his original insights while at the same time refining and enriching evolutionary theory.

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What are genes? Genes are basic units of heredity that contain information relating to some aspect of an organism’s construction, and are responsible for the transmission of characteristics from one generation to the next. People have known since antiquity that offspring inherit characteristics from their parents, but the process by which this occurred was not established until Mendel’s famous research on peas in the midnineteenth century (Mendel, 1865). Mendel discovered that each inherited characteristic involves a pair of hereditary units – what are now called genes – with one unit taken randomly from each parent. Most importantly, Mendel showed that heredity was not a blending process as was commonly thought, but that genes made replicas of themselves in their offspring. In this way, genes are shuffled and passed down intact through the generations, potentially indefinitely. Species, then, carry their evolutionary histories in their genetic make-up. Genetics can be used to examine the relationship among species in order to help untangle their shared evolutionary ancestries. For example, humans have around 98 per cent of their genes in common with chimpanzees, confirming them as our closest living relatives. Genetics is examined in more detail in Chapter 3. Genetic mutations Only characteristics that have a genetic basis can evolve. However, if genes continued to make perfect replicas of themselves each time an organism had offspring, there would be severe limits on the degree to which a species could change. At most, certain existing traits might spread or shrink in subpopulations in response to local conditions (e.g., the variation in skin colour among racial groups of humans). Evolution depends upon the introduction of new genes into the gene pool, and these are created through genetic mutation. From time to time there is a random error in the replication process during reproduction and a gene makes a flawed copy of itself in an offspring. Most of the time, these genetic mutations will be inconsequential or even harmful to the receiving organism and will die out. However, a few mutations will produce beneficial adaptations. Following Darwin’s principle of natural selection, if organisms that possess beneficial mutant genes are even fractionally more successful in reproducing than are organisms without the mutant gene, then over time more and more members of the species will possess that gene. Note that while mutations are random, whether the mutation survives and spreads is not. Selfish genes All genes have one thing in common and that is the ruthless imperative to replicate. Dawkins (2006b) coined the term ‘selfish gene’ to convey the idea that evolution must be understood from the perspective of what is ‘good’ for genes. For Dawkins, organisms exist to aid the replication of genes (rather than the reverse), and organisms have therefore evolved to act selfishly in the interests of

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Human nature

their genes. The bodies of organisms are merely disposable ‘survival machines’ for genes. The individuals who host genes will inevitably die, but their genes, if they are successful in their quest to replicate, live on, passed from generation to generation. Of course, Dawkins was not suggesting that genes possess conscious intentions or strategies to maximise their chances of replication, but genes that are good at replicating will be favoured by natural selection precisely because they are good at replicating. This view of evolution, known as gene selection, overturns the traditional theory of group selection. Group selection is the idea that it is the survival of the species that drives evolution, and that individual organisms will therefore act for the good of the species even when it threatens their own well-being. As Dawkins points out, group selection contains a fundamental contradiction. The tendency to act for the good of the species would need to be genetically encoded in order to be inherited. Further, the more strongly an organism possesses this trait, the more likely that organism is to sacrifice its own life so that other members of the species will live. Because of their reckless indifference to their own welfare, they will therefore be less likely themselves to reproduce. Any genes for group selection, therefore, should eventually become extinct through natural selection. The fossil and genetic evidence for the physical evolution of species through natural selection is overwhelming and few reputable scientists dispute the essential mechanics of the process. However, as Darwin recognised, and the concept of the selfish gene reinforces, organisms evolve not only adaptive physical characteristics, but also to behave in ways that maximise the intergenerational transmission of genes. This proposition – that behaviour also has an evolutionary and therefore a genetic basis – has proven more contentious, especially when it is applied to humans.

Evolution and behaviour Systematic efforts to apply evolutionary principles to understanding human behaviour began in earnest in the 1960s with an interdisciplinary group of scientists known as sociobiologists, comprising psychologists, sociologists, biologists, anthropologists and zoologists. More recently, an explicitly psychological explanation of human nature – evolutionary psychology – has emerged as an alternative approach to understanding the behavioural implications of evolution. Sociobiology According to sociobiologists, the causes of all social behaviour can be ultimately traced back to an organism’s struggle for ‘fitness’ (Alexander, 1979; Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971, 1972; Wilson, 1975). Derived from the evolutionary concept of ‘survival of the fittest’, fitness is the capacity of an organism to maximise its share of genes in the gene pool of the next generation. The fittest organisms are by definition those that are the most successful in passing on their genes. Sociobiologists see basic consistencies between the social behaviours of humans and other species.

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Human social networks, power hierarchies, family bonds, courting rituals, mating patterns and sexual taboos all have parallels in the animal kingdom and all serve the same purpose for us – increasing fitness – as they do for other animals. Two adaptive, cross-species patterns of behaviour that are especially important for understanding criminal behaviour are altruism and parental investment. Altruism On the face of it, the concept of the selfish gene paints a bleak picture of human nature. It seems to portray a dog-eat-dog world where people look out only for themselves. Yet clearly this image conflicts with many of our everyday experiences. Humans are social animals and have built cohesive societies where people work cooperatively together for the common good. When disasters and tragedies occur, we see people responding with selfless acts of heroism and generosity towards complete strangers in need. On a smaller scale, we are all providers and recipients of acts of kindness, friendship and cooperation routinely in our daily lives. If evolutionary theory does indeed shape human behaviour, then it must be able to explain self-sacrificing behaviour, that is, altruism, of this sort. In the past, altruism was taken as evidence of group selection, where individual organisms were designed to put the interests of the species ahead of their own. As outlined earlier, this argument is genetically unsustainable. However, paradoxically, altruism can be accounted for by the concept of selfish genes. Two selfish-gene explanations have been proposed, kin selection and reciprocal altruism, covering two different conditions under which altruism occurs. Kin selection is the tendency for an organism to act altruistically in the interests of genetic relatives (Hamilton, 1964). Kin selection is most obviously observed in the self-sacrificing behaviour that parents perform for their offspring, but it may extend to other relatives as well. We experience the effects of kin selection in the close family ties that we feel. Sociobiologists view kin selection in terms of ‘inclusive fitness’. In other words, when ‘considering’ the prospects of passing on its genes, an organism will take into account (include) the genes that it shares with relatives. In some cases it makes strategic sense from a gene’s-eye view of the world for an organism to assist the reproductive chances of a relative even if this jeopardises its own reproductive success. Generally speaking, the closer the genetic relationship, the greater the level of altruism an organism is prepared to show. Of course, organisms do not really ‘consider’ kin selection. Kin selection exists because organisms that practised it were as a result more successful in passing on their genes, including their genes for kin selection, than organisms that did not. Organisms can also act altruistically towards other organisms to which they are not genetically related, and sometimes even towards organisms from a different species. From the perspective of the selfish gene, such a strategy will pay off if it is likely that the assistance will be reciprocated in the future, a case of ‘you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours’ (Trivers, 1971). How genes for reciprocal altruism may have evolved over time based on self-interest has been demonstrated using

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game theory (Axelrod, 1984; Dawkins, 2006a, 2006b). Game theory involves examining the strategic choices made by people when presented with certain scenarios. One game is the prisoners’ dilemma, in which two players take the roles of suspects arrested by police. Police separate the suspects and secretly propose to each the following deal: if one suspect testifies against the other, and the other suspect remains silent, the one testifying will go free and the other will be sentenced to ten years; if they both remain silent they both receive six months; and if they both testify they both receive five years. If the game is played once, then the best self-serving strategy for each player is to testify – they will receive a reduced sentence no matter what their opponent does. However, if each player could be sure that their opponent would cooperate, then both benefit most by remaining silent. If the game is played on successive occasions using the same players (the iterated version), then each player has the opportunity to examine the strategy of their opponent. In computer simulations of tournaments involving the iterated game, the most effective playing strategy was ‘tit-for-tat’: remaining silent on the first iteration and thereafter copying the behaviour of the opponent. Thus, if the opponent reciprocated the initial play of silence, then both players became locked into a pattern of cooperation; if the opponent did not reciprocate, the first player punished him/her in the next round by testifying. In the long run, tit-for-tat players won out over uncooperative players and eliminated them from the tournament. Players who always cooperated irrespective of what the opponent did were also eliminated because they left themselves open to exploitation by uncooperative players. In the same way, genes for a tit-for-tat behavioural strategy – reciprocal altruism – can come to dominate a gene pool. It is altruism that makes human society possible. We have evolved to ‘understand’ that if everyone did as they pleased whenever they wanted, then in the long run we would be personally worse off. However, as will be discussed in more detail later, people do not always act altruistically. The existence of criminal behaviour is clear evidence of this. Parental investment In order to pass on genes, an organism must reproduce, so effective reproductive strategies are a central concern for all organisms. The approach to reproduction adopted by organisms has been conceived to fall along a continuum (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967). At one end of the continuum are organisms that reproduce prolifically and provide little or no care to their offspring. Many of these offspring may die, but through weight of numbers enough survive to perpetuate the species. Organisms that reproduce rapidly in this way are referred to as r-strategists (or quantitative reproducers). At the other end of the continuum are organisms that have few offspring and devote considerable effort to raising them (an example of kin selection). Though there are fewer offspring, parental care increases the chances of each individual surviving. These organisms are referred to K-strategists (or qualitative reproducers). Humans, of course, are extreme K-strategists.

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To the extent that an organism invests in its offspring, typically that investment will not be shared equally by both parents. In most species the female is required to make the greatest sacrifice, even if this just involves gestating the unborn offspring. According to Trivers’ (1972) parental investment and sexual selection theory, the parent who invests more in the offspring will be more choosy in the selection of a mate, while the parent who invests less in the offspring will be more competitive with rivals for sexual access to mates. In humans, for example, females have a biologically-limited number of offspring that they can produce in their lifetimes, and not only do they have to carry each child for nine months, they then must devote many years to raising the child to independence. Females will therefore look for a partner who can provide her with necessary resources and who can be relied upon to make a long-term commitment to assisting with child-rearing. Males, on the other hand, can produce many children and at a minimum need only contribute one copulative act to the enterprise. Males are more indiscriminate in their sexual selections than are females, and are more likely to seek multiple partners. However, because females are choosy, males must compete with other males to demonstrate their claim to be selected for mating rights. As will become more apparent later in this chapter, this division in parental responsibilities in humans is viewed as the root cause of the basic psychological differences between men and women, including differences in their respective propensities to commit crime. Evolutionary psychology Sociobiology has generated heated debate in the social sciences. Critics have objected to the portrayal of human behaviour as a direct consequence of the pressure on individuals to spread their genes, and the associated assumption that there are direct parallels between human and animal social behaviours. Partly in response to the criticisms of sociobiology, evolutionary psychology developed as an alternative way of conceptualising the implications of evolutionary theory for human behaviour. Evolutionary psychology shares many theoretical concepts with sociobiology, but also departs from it in a number of ways. The most important difference between sociobiology and evolutionary psychology is the role attributed to fitness. Evolutionary psychologists reject the sociobiological view of human beings as mindlessly driven by the need to maximise the representation of their genes in the gene pool. As Buss (1995, p. 10) noted, ‘If men had as a goal the maximization of fitness, then why aren’t they all lined up to give donations to sperm banks?’ Sociobiologists go from genes straight to social behaviour. Evolutionary psychologists argue that this overlooks a crucial middle link in the chain, and that is the psychological dimension of behaviour. Genes do not generate behaviour, but they are responsible for the construction of the brain that does. It is the way that evolution has determined the wiring and functioning of the human brain that is the focus of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists are concerned with evolved psychological mechanisms that are particular to humans and that help shape behavioural responses in given contexts (Buss, 1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1997; Nicholson, 1997; Tooby

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and Cosmides, 2005). Psychological mechanisms are specific cognitive programs that have their origins in the more general patterns of adaptive behaviour. The broad behavioural strategies identified by sociobiologists are starting points (not ends in themselves) for evolutionary psychologists. For example, Trivers’ (1972) theory of parental investment and sexual selection can be extended to explain a range of associated behaviours, such as why humans consistently judge certain physical characteristics to be sexually desirable. By way of illustration, males in all cultures prefer female hips to be wider than the waist, with an average preferred hip-to-waist ratio of .7 (Singh, 1993). Evolutionary psychologists argue that this preference originated because wide hips in women correlated with good health and fertility. Men who preferred wide-hipped women therefore tended to produce more children than did other men and so genes for this preference came to dominate the gene pool. Through selection, the wide-hipped preference has become hard-wired and still affects present-day judgements by males of female attractiveness. There are many similar evolved psychological mechanisms that underpin universal human attributes, such as human preferences for certain foods, common fears of particular situations or objects, curiosity and attraction to novelty, the tendency to become aggressive in predictable situations, proneness to sexual jealousy, and so on (Buss, 1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1997). Collectively, these psychological mechanisms comprise human nature. The existence of such psychological mechanisms implies a brain architecture that is domain-specific. In other words, evolutionary psychologists argue that the brain is not a general-purpose, problem-solving machine. Rather, it comprises a collection of specialised neuronal circuits – modules – to deal with specialised adaptive problems. For example, the problem of deciding what food to eat from the limitless options available – grass, dung, stones, animal flesh – cannot be solved by any general reasoning process. Instead evolved mechanisms guide us to prefer high-calorie, nonpoisonous food that can be processed in our stomachs. In this view, the brain is likened to a Swiss army knife. Like the famous knife, the brain contains a set of specialised tools, each with a specific function, waiting to be deployed when required. There are several important points to clarify about evolutionary psychology. First, the original adaptive purpose of evolved psychological mechanisms need not still be valid. Central to evolutionary psychology is the proposition that the behaviours of humans today have their origins in ancestral environments. Modern humans are thought to have evolved by 100,000 years ago and physiologically to have changed little since that time. Humans were designed for life as hunter–gatherers on the African savanna, or, as Cosmides and Tooby put it, ‘our modern skulls house a stone age mind’ (1997, p. 11). For most of our existence as a species, humans have lived in small, nomadic groups and the skills that were needed centred on finding food, negotiating immediate social relationships within the group, and defending the group from attack and other dangers. It is remarkable just how successfully our original construction has equipped us to deal with modern-day problems that would have been unimaginable to our ancient forebears. At the same time, there are behavioural patterns, including many behaviours we now label as criminal, that once were functional but are no longer so. All psychological mechanisms developed because

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they were at some point adaptive for survival, but they may not now confer any reproductive advantage and may even be detrimental in the modern world. Our liking for fatty food, for example, once ensured that humans took full advantage of scarce high-calorie food sources when they were available, but now it is responsible for widespread obesity and heart disease. In the case of hip-to-waist ratio, it doesn’t matter whether or not it is still a good predictor of fertility, it continues to shape judgements of attractiveness nevertheless. Second, evolved psychological mechanisms do not operate at a conscious level (ibid.). The brain is an information-processing machine like a computer, and all human behaviour – every thought and every blink of the eye – can be traced to chemical reactions within it. As with a computer, the complex computations that are performed by the brain occur deep in the circuitry, and what human beings experience as awareness is a tiny fraction of the neuronal activity that has occurred. Our consciousness has tricked us into believing that behaviour is simple and that we have a great deal of rational control over our actions. However, even ‘simple’ tasks, such as catching a ball, require complicated analyses and calculations that occur automatically below our level of awareness. It follows that we are never truly aware of the reasons for much of our behaviour. Human beings do not go about their daily business calculating the most effective ways to pass on their genes, even if they may often behave in ways that are consistent with this general objective. It is not suggested, for example, that men prefer women with wide hips because they knowingly judge them to be healthy and fertile; they just prefer wide hips. Third, evolved psychological mechanisms do not furnish humans with a repertoire of behavioural responses that are fixed at birth and that set individuals along a predestined pathway. Rather, psychological mechanisms are flexible cognitive programs that are responsive to individual circumstances and environmental inputs. The types of adaptive problems faced by people may differ depending upon whether the person in question is male or female, young or old, or rich or poor. Consequently, adaptive solutions also vary among people. Moreover, evolutionary psychology is a biosocial model of behaviour that depends fundamentally upon the role of developmental experiences, social contexts and situational contingencies. Psychological mechanisms define the broad outlines of human nature, but it is recognised that there will still be wide variations in our expressed behaviour. Returning to the hip-to-waist ratio, there are individual differences in the precise preferred coefficient, as well as variations across cultures and changing fashions over time within cultures. While some evolutionary psychologists have explicitly distanced themselves from sociobiologists (e.g, Buss, 1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1997), there are clear overlaps between sociobiology and evolutionary psychology and in practice it is often difficult to neatly distinguish between the two approaches. The remainder of this chapter draws on both perspectives to examine criminal behaviour, but for convenience the newer term of evolutionary psychology will be used as a collective label. Evolutionary psychologists have come at the task of explaining criminal behaviour from two different directions. One approach is to explain why certain

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crimes occur; the other approach is to explain why certain people are more likely to commit crime.

Crime-focused evolutionary approaches The essential argument of evolutionary psychologists is that criminal behaviours are responses that were adaptive at some point in our evolutionary history by conferring reproductive advantage on those who performed them. Even though these responses are now illegal and are considered maladaptive in modern society, the evolutionary origins remain encoded in the human psychological make-up. To examine this argument, the specific cases of violent offending, property crime and sexual offending will be examined. Violent offending To emphasise the need to think objectively about human nature, Wilson suggested that the task be approached as if by ‘zoologists from another planet completing a catalogue of social species on earth’ (1975, p. 547). Surely if such a catalogue was actually compiled, one of the first things that the alien zoologists would record about humans is their extraordinary capacity to inflict death and injury upon fellow members of their species. While within-species violence and even killing is far from unique to humans, we are very good at it. There is fossil evidence that our ancestors attacked and killed one another. Even a cursory examination of recorded human history reveals a dismal inventory of wars between communities and homicides and assaults within communities. Cross-cultural studies further reveal that violence is common in all contemporary societies, and that rates in traditional tribal groups are sometimes higher than those for industrialised countries. As Buss and Shackelford (1997) point out, the ubiquity of human violence across time and across societies cannot be explained solely by the usual criminological explanations that invoke the influence of modern-day factors such as the strains of urbanisation, depictions of violence in the mass media and the decline in Western values. There can be little doubt that the potential for violence is part of human nature. That human beings have a natural propensity for violence is not of itself evidence for the role of evolution. Evolutionary psychology does not propose human violence as a generalised aggressive impulse that is expressed indiscriminately; the issue is whether the circumstances in which human violence occurs today indicate that the violence had its roots as an adaptive strategy that increased reproductive success. To answer this question evolutionary psychologists have examined human violence from a number of perspectives. Power and status The evolutionary bases of violence lie in the sexual-selection strategies of humans, which promote female choosiness and cast males as sexual rivals. Most assaults

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and homicides involve both male perpetrators and victims. It does not take much imagination to see how in ancestral populations of small, hierarchical social groups, violence and intimidation might have originated by giving the perpetrator a competitive advantage over other males. Aggressive individuals could take from weaker ones important resources such as food and territory; they could more successfully defend themselves from attack; and through their increased power and status they could attract and keep more sexual partners (Buss and Shackelford, 1997). Male violence today is often associated with asserting status and demonstrating toughness within the peer group, or with restoring honour and reputation following some perceived insult or challenge (Buss and Shackelford, 1997; Daly and Wilson, 1997). From seemingly trivial incidents, male posturing of this sort can lead to serious injury and death. Campbell (2009) has pointed out that females, too, can commit status-related violence. She argues that in monogamous societies, competition for mates is a two-way street. If males are to commit to one partner, then they will also be selective. Usually competition between females is conducted in non-violent ways, for example, through the use of cosmetics and other beauty aids to increase sexual attractiveness. However, competition among females for mates may be particularly fierce in economically deprived communities where there is a shortage of males (for example, through high death and imprisonment rates), or where economic resources are concentrated in the hand of a few powerful males. Under these circumstances, competitive behaviour may begin with attacks on a rival’s appearance or reputation, and escalate to physical violence (Burbank, 1987; Mullens et al., 2004). Sexual proprietariness Where males already have a sexual partner, a major cause of violence involves efforts to keep her and to ensure that she does not mate with anyone else. According to evolutionary psychology, males have evolved to be proprietorial when it comes to their mates. Unlike females, males cannot be certain that they have parented the offspring that are attributed to them and thus they have the most to lose genetically from infidelity. Males risk becoming victims of cuckoldry, that is, unwittingly raising the offspring of another male, an exercise which in evolutionary terms is wasted effort. Males, therefore, are the main perpetrators of jealous violence, a pattern that has been observed cross-culturally and in other species (Wilson and Daly, 1993). Consistent with the predictions of evolutionary psychology, the most common causes of wife-killing (uxoricide) and spousal assault are suspicion by the husband that the victim has been unfaithful or that she has decided to leave the marriage (ibid.). The most common reason that wives kill husbands, on the other hand, is in retaliation against male violence (Campbell, 2009; Daly and Wilson, 1988). Thus, male jealousy is a key factor in both male and female spousal violence. Further, male violence towards spouses is negatively correlated with the age of the victim – that is, it is most likely to occur when the woman is young and fertile – reinforcing

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the view that proprietariness is linked to attempts to control reproduction (Daly and Wilson, 1988; Wilson et al., 1993). For spousal assault to have evolved as an adaptive strategy, at some point it must have been effective in increasing the reproductive success of perpetrators. Some researchers have suggested that traumatic bonding – the tendency for many battered wives to remain with their abusive husbands – is evidence of the payoff to perpetrators of spousal assault (Dutton, 1995; Ellis and Walsh, 1997). It has also been hypothesised, based on animal studies, that women who are victims of domestic violence may, as a result of the harassment, suffer reduced fertility and higher rates of miscarriage. If this pattern holds for humans, it suggests that spousal assault may in part have evolved as a strategy to counteract possible cuckoldry (Ellis and Walsh, 1997). Genetic relatedness One of the predictions of evolutionary psychology is that individuals will act in ways that increase the replication of the genes of kin. It would be counterproductive, then, for people to kill or seriously injure close genetic relatives. Daly and Wilson (1997) have pointed out that many criminological studies emphasise the relatedness of victims and perpetrators of violence. However, because most researchers are not coming from an evolutionary perspective in which genetic relatedness is of crucial significance, studies examining victim–offender relationships generally do not differentiate between genetic relatives and non-genetic relatives (e.g., spouses, stepchildren, in-laws). Examining the available data more closely, Daly and Wilson found that intrafamilial homicide was eleven-times more likely to involve non-genetic relatives than genetic relatives. The most common form of family violence is between spouses, and as discussed in the previous section, much of this violence can be explained by male proprietariness. Examination of child abuse and infanticide data reveals a similar picture. Research has consistently shown that adopted children and stepchildren are more frequently victims of child abuse and neglect than are children raised by their biological parents (Daly and Wilson, 1985; 1988, 1997; Lightcap et al., 1982). For example, Daly and Wilson (1985) found that preschool children living with families in which one of the parents was a step-parent were 40 times more like to suffer child abuse than children living with two biological parents. From an evolutionary perspective, there is nothing to gain by raising offspring with whom there is no genetic relationship and so there is an evolutionary pressure for less parental investment. Related behaviour occurs in other species. For example, it is not uncommon among mammals for a new male taking over a group of breeding females to kill any existing offspring that he has not sired (Ebensperger, 1998). At the same time, maltreatment of non-genetically-related offspring is not inevitable. Psychological mechanisms may generalise in scope beyond their narrow evolutionary origins. In some animal species females will adopt orphans in a ‘misfiring’ of the kin selection rule (Dawkins, 2006b, p. 101). Likewise, in humans, adults often have parental feelings towards unrelated children, while

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rates of maltreatment of stepchildren may be significantly affected by cultural factors (Temrin et al., 2000). Property crime The evolutionary explanation for male property crime is an extension of the proposed role of power and status in violent offending. Stealing is viewed as a strategy designed to enable the perpetrator to accumulate resources in order to be more competitive with other males for selection as a sexual partner. A key factor in female choosiness is her estimation that the prospective mate can provide materially for her and her offspring. Shackelford et al. (2005) examined preferences in mate attributes from nearly 10,000 participants across 37 cultures. In assessing a prospective mate, women around the world valued status and resources more highly, and valued good looks and health less highly, than did males. Similarly, other studies have found that wealthier males have more sexual partners than do poorer males (Kanazawa, 2003). Of course, females also steal, but they take smaller amounts, less frequently, and for different reasons than do males. According to Kanazawa (2009, p. 96) ‘Women steal what they need, men steal partly to show off.’ Nevertheless, there has been a steady increase in the number of women arrested for property crimes over recent years. While this increase is often attributed to women’s increased criminal opportunities due to greater participation in the workforce (the by-product of liberation), in fact the majority of these crimes are committed by unemployed women and involve welfare fraud, credit card fraud, shoplifting, and the like (Campbell, 1999, 2009). A more likely explanation is that the increase in female property crime is the rise in the proportion of female-headed households due to higher divorce rates and more unmarried mothers. Campbell argued that female theft is usually motivated by economic hardship and is often related to the parental investment obligation of providing for a family. Sexual offending At the heart of evolutionary psychology is the assumption that behaviours that once increased reproductive success will be favoured by natural selection. The behaviour that is most directly related to reproduction, of course, is sexual behaviour. Unsurprisingly then, present-day human sexual behaviour, including sexual offending, is argued to be heavily influenced by evolved psychological mechanisms. This proposition is examined for rape, child sexual abuse and incest. Rape Rape is a behaviour that is almost exclusively carried out by males and occurs in many animal species in addition to humans (McKibben et al., 2008; Thornhill and Thornhill, 1992). Evolutionary psychology suggests that sexual aggression is a male reproductive strategy that was successfully employed by our ancestors and

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continues to exert an influence on human sexual behaviour to the present day. According to Trivers’ (1972) parental investment theory, sexual aggression is most advantageous for the sex that makes less parental investment in offspring. Because males do not gestate offspring, they are free to have multiple sexual partners and it is in their genetic interests that they impregnate as many females as possible. On the other hand, because females make a heavy investment in offspring, they will strongly resist any attempts to become impregnated by someone not of their choosing. Males who were able to overcome female resistance, including through the use of aggression, had more offspring than did other males, and their ‘pushy’ genes spread in the gene pool. If increased procreation was the original basis for rape, it would be expected that selection would favour sexual aggression towards victims of reproductive age. Statistics consistently show this to be the case in all societies (Thornhill and Thornhill, 1987). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that psychological mechanisms are not conscious strategies and nor do they necessarily fulfil their original purpose of maximising fitness. As with the case of parental care, behavioural patterns may become more generalised. It is for this reason, for example, that couples continue to have consensual sex beyond the age that they are capable of producing children. The evolved psychological mechanism is a desire for sex, not a calculating need to pass on genes. Child sexual abuse It follows from the foregoing discussion that females are most likely to be at risk of sexual victimisation from the time they reach puberty. Because legal definitions of child are based on prescribed age, in most jurisdictions there is period during which females are defined as children but are biologically capable of reproduction. Evolutionary theory predicts that most child sexual abuse should occur during this window. In fact, Simon and Zgoba (2006) found that the 12–17-year-old age bracket accounted for the greatest proportion of all (child and adult) female sexcrime victims, with 43 per cent of the total compared to the 31 per cent of victims who were over 17 years of age. This still leaves around a quarter of female sex-crime victims who were under the age of 12 years and presumably pre-pubescent. Again, it is important to remember that psychological mechanisms need not be perfectly selective in their targeting. Mechanisms predisposing males to a preference for youthful sexual partners may combine with other factors to push the age of the victim below puberty. One argument recently advanced is that child sexual abuse may be a by-product of human nurturing (caregiving) and attachment (care-seeking) behaviours (Smallbone et al., 2008). Nurturing and attachment are evolved psychological mechanisms crucial for establishing the parent–child bond (Bowlby, 1969). However, both mechanisms are also important in adult sexual behaviour, with which they share common biochemistry and neuronal structures. Romantic sexual attraction in adults is bound up with feelings of taking care of, and being taken care of by, a sexual partner. Smallbone and Wortley (2000) found that many child sexual abuse incidents occurred in the

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context of routine care-giving, such as giving the child a bath or tucking them into bed. It is suggested that when adults carry out care-giving activities with children they may on occasion experience involuntary sexual arousal. Incest Evolutionary psychology seeks to explain not only who is sexually victimised but also who is not. One of the enduring human sexual taboos is incest (Lieberman et al., 2003). Breeding between close kin can produce offspring with higher rates of genetic abnormalities and health problems. In the late nineteenth century, Westermarck (1889) proposed that in order to prevent this occurrence, humans have an evolved mechanism to discourage incest. The so-called Westermarck effect proposes that early and persistent close physical and emotional contact with children during their early development inhibits subsequent sexual attraction to those children. There is evidence for the Westermarck effect from a variety of sources. Incest has been found to be lower between siblings who were emotionally close in their early years than in those who were emotionally distant or physically separated (Bevc and Silverman, 2000). Other studies have reported that couples who were reared together as children (for example, children living communally on a kibbutz) experience higher levels of sexual dysfunction than do other couples (McCabe, 1983; Wolf, 1995). Finally, the incidence of father–daughter incest is higher in cases where the father is separated from the child at an early age (Parker and Parker, 1986; Williams and Finkelhor, 1995). Note that the Westermarck effect depends upon an interactive view of evolved psychological mechanisms, in that the incest taboo must be ‘switched on’ by certain environmental experiences.

Offender-focused evolutionary approaches Evolutionary psychology is principally concerned with attributes that are shared by us all. However, clearly criminality is not uniformly distributed throughout the population; some people commit more crime than others. Evolutionary theory has two ways of explaining individual differences in offending. The first is to relate variations in offending to demographic and environmental factors. In this analysis, the underlying psychological mechanisms are assumed to be the same for offenders and non-offenders, but some mechanisms operate in ways that put certain sections of the population at an increased risk of criminality. The second approach is to treat criminal behaviour as an alternative strategy. Alternative strategies are variations in the response to an adaptive problem that have been selected by evolution and that therefore have genetic bases (Rowe et al., 1997). In this analysis, there are seen to be genetic variations between criminals and non-criminals. Demographic variations in offending Three of the most stable findings in criminology are that males commit vastly more crime than do females; that crime rates peak when offenders are in their late

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teens and early twenties; and that convicted offenders come predominantly from the poorer sections of the community. Traditionally in criminology, all three of these crime–demographic relationships have been explained largely in terms of social, cultural and environmental factors. Evolutionary psychology, on the other hand, explains these variations in terms of the natural operation of evolved psychological mechanisms. People face different adaptive problems depending upon their role and position in society, and so psychological mechanisms have equipped them with behavioural responses suited to their circumstances. Sex Across the world, males typically account for 80 per cent or more of all crimes committed (Ayres and Murray, 2005; Heidensohn, 2002; Steffensmeier and Allan, 1996). Despite years of determined effort by social scientists to explain these gender differences entirely in terms of the differential socialisation of males and females, it is no longer plausible to ignore the role of biological factors. As will already be evident from the earlier discussion of specific offences, the assumption that males and females differ in biologically-based behavioural patterns is the starting point for most evolutionary explanations of crime. When evolutionary psychologists talk about the universality of human nature, in many cases this means consistencies within the sexes. Many features of human nature are sex-specific and are the direct consequence of the differences between males and females in their respective parenting roles and sexual selection strategies. The task of reproduction presents males and females with different adaptive problems and they have accordingly evolved different adaptive solutions. Males are in competition for selection as mates while females bear the brunt of child-rearing. Males have therefore evolved to be more reckless, aggressive and sexually assertive to better meet the challenges of securing mating rights. These are attributes which also correlate with criminality. Females, on the other hand, are more cautious, restrained and fearful. These are crucial attributes for the role of protecting offspring from danger, and also make it less likely that females will engage in crime (Campbell, 2009; Campbell et al., 2001). Where women do commit crime, evolved sex differences also show up in the different types of crimes males and females commit. Women are particularly underrepresented in confrontational crimes such as robbery (Campbell, 2009). Robbery, Campbell argues, is a crime about the thrill of dominating a victim. To some extent the relatively low numbers of women committing robbery might be explained by their less powerful physique, but as Campbell points out, robbery frequently involves multiple assailants and the use of weapons, and is committed against vulnerable victims (women, children and the elderly). The sex differences are less (though still substantial) for non-confrontational crimes of dishonesty such as forgery, fraud, embezzlement, larceny and fraud. As discussed earlier, these offences are typically committed by poor women needing to feed their families. Summarising the different offending patterns of males and females, Campbell draws parallels with the gender roles in ancestral hunter–gatherer societies – male crime involves hunting and female crime involves gathering.

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Age Almost as striking as gender differences in crime rates is the male age–crime curve (Daly and Wilson, 1997; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983; Kanazawa and Still, 2000). Offending generally begins after puberty, with rates rising sharply to peak in the late teens, before going into a steady decline (see Figure 1.1). By their thirties, the majority of offenders have aged-out of crime. Again, there have been attempts to explain the age–crime curve purely in sociological terms without recourse to biological factors. For example, adolescence is seen as the most unstructured period of a person’s life, sitting between the breaking free of direct parental supervision and the taking on of adult responsibilities such as marriage and mortgages. Crime is most likely to occur during this window of relative freedom from environmental control (Hirschi, 1969). On the other hand, evolutionary theory provides a biosocial explanation for the age–crime curve. Daly and Wilson (1997) argued that young men have evolved to become more present-focused and risk-accepting at the developmental stage that coincides with the age that they must begin to compete for a mate. It is at this critical time, therefore, that they are more likely to fight and kill rivals, steal to accumulate resources, and if these strategies fail, commit rape. This delayed activation of psychological mechanisms is analogous to certain physical characteristics that develop later in life, such as the appearance of teeth in early childhood or the secondary sexual characteristics that develop at puberty. However, since males are capable of reproducing most of their lives, the fall in crime with age must be explained by another process. The argument here is that as males age, the relative costs of competition increase (ibid.; Kanazawa, 2009). Once they begin to sire children, males have more to lose by becoming seriously injured or losing their life, and their energies are more productively diverted into making sure that their children will reach adulthood and in turn breed. Thus, risktaking tendencies have been designed to abate with age. Further, Daly and Wilson reasoned that in addition to a general decline in risk-taking with age, risk-taking propensity should also be responsive to social cues. For example, marriage or the birth of a child should accelerate the decline in criminality. A number of studies have found that marriage does have an effect on dampening crime rates independently of age (Daly and Wilson, 1990; Kanazawa, 2003). Complementing such finding are biochemical studies which report falls in men’s testosterone following their marriage (Mazur and Michalek, 1998). Socio-economic status While some criminologists argue that the over-representation of poor people in the criminal justice system is the result of systematic bias, there seems little doubt based both on official statistics and self-report studies that poor people commit more crimes than do people from other socio-economic strata of the community (Braithwaite, 1979; Carmichael and Ward, 2000; Shover, 1991; Weatherburn and Lind, 2001). That crime is more prevalent among the poor is a finding wholly

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consistent with evolutionary psychology for reasons that will now be familiar to the reader – low status individuals commit crime as a part of an unconscious strategy to increase their attractiveness to potential mates. Crucially, the psychological mechanism that underpins this behaviour is universal in males; variations in offending depend upon environmental factors. Both rich and poor males crave status, but poor males have fewer options for how to achieve this goal and so they are more likely to resort to crime. However, the role of environmental factors is more complicated than this. Low socio-economic class is associated with a range of developmental experiences that further increase the risk of criminality. Children from low socio-economic circumstances are more likely to come from large families, to be raised by only one parent, to receive harsh and inconsistent punishment, and to be victims of physical and emotional neglect (Barber, 2000, 2002, 2008). These experiences in turn are more likely to produce children who are aggressive, emotionally hardened and self-concerned, and who as a consequence also commit crime. Barber (2008) has argued that what seem like harsh and insensitive parenting strategies in some low socio-economic families in fact have been selected by evolution to prepare children for survival within the challenging social environment in which they are to live. To succeed in the lower strata of society, tough-mindedness and an egocentric concern for one’s self are valuable assets. Notwithstanding the fact that these attributes may also increase criminality, they are adaptive given the environmental circumstances in which they are designed to operate. Crime as an alternative strategy So far in this chapter, explanations of criminal behaviour have emphasised the underlying similarities between offenders and non-offenders. Criminal behaviour has been explained as the product of psychological mechanisms that we all share, at least within our own sex. Where individual differences in offending occur, the flexibility of psychological mechanisms to take account of individual circumstances and environmental conditions has been stressed. However, some evolutionary theorists (especially those with sociobiological leanings) have proposed that individual differences in offending can also be explained by genetic variations within the population. Sometimes in evolution two or more successful solutions evolve to solve the same adaptive problem. Specifically, it has been proposed that criminal behaviour has evolved as a genetically-based alternative strategy to altruism. Altruism works in the common interest as long as everyone plays fairly and reciprocates. But what if some individuals try to cheat the system by accepting resources from others without returning the favour? Recall that in the computer simulations of the iterated prisoners’ dilemma game, tit-for-tat players won out over uncooperative players. In these simulations, tit-for-tat – or reciprocal altruism – was an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), that is, one which drives all competing strategies to extinction and becomes a universal strategy within a population. On this basis it would seem that not reciprocating – cheating – is not a viable strategy.

Human nature

39

But simulations do not capture all aspects of reality, and in the real world reciprocal altruism is not an ESS (Raine, 1993). The punishing consequences of titfor-tat can be avoided under certain circumstances, allowing cheats to carve out a niche for themselves within the population. In the simulation, players always played the same player and thus the unreliability of the cheat quickly became apparent. In real life, however, cheats can go from one victim to another each time their unreliability is exposed. In this way, cheats can survive as long as they keep on the move. Cheating strategies, therefore, are particularly suited to individuals living in large populations where there is a high degree of anonymity; the strategies would be less successful for individuals living in small, closely-knit communities. Also, within any population, cheats should be in the minority. Cheats cannot prosper from other cheats; they need a pool of altruistic people who will give them the benefit of the doubt, even if it is just once. The above theorising serves to demonstrate how genes predisposing individuals to cheating (criminal behaviour) can survive in a population dominated by genes predisposing people to cooperative (law-abiding) behaviour. Of course, the division between cheats and altruists is not as black and white as portrayed above. In reality, cheating and altruism are on a continuum and individuals perform varying mixes of both behaviours. Most people cheat sometimes; some people cheat most of the time. At the extreme end of the cheating polarity are individuals who may be described as having antisocial personality disorders and/or who display life-course persistent offending habits. Note that from an evolutionary perspective, while they may have genetic differences, antisocial individuals are not pathological. Rather, the behaviours that they adopt have evolved to solve the same adaptive problems faced by everyone. The propensity to cheat exists because cheating has been an evolutionarily successful strategy. Blatant cheating is easy to recognise and to guard against. To improve their chances of going undetected, cheats need to evolve more subtle strategies. One such strategy is to mimic the behaviours of non-cheats. Thus, one of the diagnostic criteria for psychopathy is a superficial charm that enables psychopaths to create a favourable first impression, a feature Cleckley (1941) referred to as a ‘mask of sanity’. A specific example of mimicry occurs in the area of parental investment and is described by the theory of cads and dads (Ellis and Walsh, 1997). Unfortunately for females, in many K-strategist species males do not always live up to their obligations to contribute to child rearing. According the theory of cads and dads, because females have been naturally selected to choose mates who will make a high parental investment, two types of males have evolved. Dads are the genuine article who fulfil females’ expectations and make a high investment in their offspring. Cads, on the other hand, go through the motions of offering high investment but do not deliver on their promise. They have developed the ability to imitate the behaviour of dads in order to trick females into mating with them. In effect, they are r-strategists who seek to impregnate as many different women as possible while avoiding all parental responsibilities. Evolutionary theorists have drawn a parallel between this form of deception and criminal behaviour (ibid.; Raine, 1993). It is argued that the tendency to adopt cad strategies is part of a broader

40

Human nature

antisocial syndrome. In addition to deceiving females, cads are deceptive more generally in other areas of their life and therefore are more likely than dads to commit criminal behaviour. In the evolutionary equivalent of an arms race, humans have evolved cheaterdetection mechanisms that provide some capacity to read the intentions of others – for example, via their facial expressions, body language, voice tone – in order to enable deployment of counter-strategies against cheats (Trivers, 1985; Walsh, 2000). Most human moral precepts are based on obeying the rules of reciprocal altruism (as in the biblical command to ‘do unto others as you would have others do unto you’), and we have likewise evolved to feel anger towards those who try to get a free ride by breaking the rules. Evolutionary theorists argue that the development of laws to define criminal behaviours, and the construction of criminal justice systems to catch and punish offenders, are institutional extensions of cheater-detection mechanisms and the human impulse to enforce reciprocal altruism (Duntley and Shackelford, 2008; Walsh, 2000). It is the evolutionary basis of law that helps explain why there is a basic consistency across cultures in the kinds of behaviours that are defined as crime.

Conclusion and evaluation Criminology is said to have begun in the late nineteenth century with Lombroso’s evolutionary theory of crime, and now evolutionary psychology is among the newest perspectives in criminology. The contemporary evolutionary approach to explaining crime, however, differs radically from that of Lombroso. Where Lombroso conceived of offenders as pathological, evolutionary throwbacks, contemporary evolutionary theory treats criminal behaviour – even that performed by determinedly antisocial individuals – as a normal outcome of human nature. The behaviours that we now call criminal did not start out as crimes. They were adaptive behaviours that, in the environment in which they first evolved, gave those who performed them a competitive edge in the struggle to reproduce. Criminal behaviours are responses designed to solve problems from another time. It may even be that in some circumstances criminal behaviour is still adaptive. Certainly crime is costly to society and the consequences for the individuals who commit crime – if they are caught – are unpleasant. However, the modern urban landscape may suit predatory offenders well, providing plenty of opportunities for them to locate victims and a degree of anonymity for them to reduce their chances of detection. The evolutionary perspective nevertheless remains deeply unfashionable in sociological criminology, and only marginally less so in psychological criminology. In part, this rejection may be a legacy of the crudeness of Lombroso’s original efforts to bring evolutionary principles into criminology. More generally, Cosmides and Tooby (1997) have argued that the idea of human nature is unappealing to social scientists because it challenges the notion that human behaviour is governed by rationality. Evolutionary psychology advances the disconcerting proposition that human beings do many things for reasons which are hidden from

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41

them and over which they have no conscious control. However, the contrary proposition that humans – alone among earth’s animal species – could be born without any inherent, universal behavioural propensities that define their nature seems increasingly absurd. The unique contribution of evolutionary psychology to psychological criminology is to explain the origins and functions of motivations that are usually taken for granted. As Buss (1995) argues, without reference to human nature, most psychological theories are little more than descriptions of the phenomena they seek to explain. For example, control theories of crime propose that humans are naturally selfish, but provide no reasons for why this should be so. Similarly, theories of aggression may identify salient situational triggers, such as being subject to a perceived insult, but do not explain the function of aggression in such circumstances. To say that aggression is designed to restore the pride of the aggressor, for example, only begs the question of why it is important in humans for pride to be restored. The starting point for all psychological theories must be some basic understanding of what Cosmides and Tooby refer to as ‘our universal psychological human architecture’ (1997, p. 3). Thus, Buss asserts that evolutionary psychology has ‘profound and revolutionary implications . . . for the conceptual foundations of the core of each branch of psychology’ (1995, p. 16). Likewise, according to Cosmides and Tooby, evolutionary psychology ‘is not an area of study (but) it is a way of thinking about psychology that can be applied to any topic within it’ (1997, p. 1, emphasis in the original). A corollary of this view, of course, is that evolutionary psychology cannot on its own provide a complete explanation of crime, and nor do proponents pretend that it can. While evolutionary psychology provides the foundation for other theories, it in turn needs these theories in order to help explain variations in the way that human nature is expressed. The role of other theories in elaborating on the causes of crime and criminality is the focus of the chapters that follow. In the first instance, Chapter 3 takes up the idea raised by some evolutionary theorists that variations in criminality are related to variations in genetic make-up.

3

Heredity

The previous chapter on human nature introduced the role played by genes in criminal behaviour and this chapter on heredity continues that examination. However, where human nature is the product of the intergenerational transmission of genes over the course of evolutionary history, this chapter is more narrowly concerned with the transmission of genes within the family over just one or two generations. Moreover, the study of human nature is largely concerned with the similarities in genetic make-up across the human species, while the focus here is on genetic variability and individual differences within a given population. Nevertheless, the two approaches are quite consistent with one another. The proposal that humans have a universal, genetically-based, psychological structure does not preclude variations in the strength with which certain characteristics are possessed by individuals, and indeed, evolution depends upon a degree of genetic variability within a species. The aim of this chapter is to examine the extent to which criminality can be attributed to genetic predispositions that are passed down in the family. The field of study that examines the relationship between genetic inheritance and the psychological expression of those genes, in the form of emotions, actions, mood and personality, is called behavioural genetics. The chapter begins with a brief overview of behavioural genetics before going on to examine the evidence for the heritability of criminality.

A primer in behavioural genetics Behavioural genetics is a specialised and complex field bridging biology and psychology, and it is not possible to cover it in detail here. However, it is important that some of the fundamental principles of heredity be understood in order to assess its role in criminality. A description of key genetic terminology is provided in Table 3.1, and a diagram of the DNA from which genes are made is shown in Figure 3.1. Laws of heredity As noted in Chapter 1, the laws of heredity were first demonstrated by Gregor Mendel in 1865. Mendel showed that each inherited aspect of an organism involves two genes with one gene taken randomly from each parent. The alternative forms of each

Heredity

43

Table 3.1 Key terms in genetics Term

Definition and function

DNA

Short for deoxyribonucleic acid, DNA is the material from which genes are made. The structure of the DNA molecule, famously described as a double helix, was discovered by Watson and Crick in 1953. It consists of two tightly twisted strands, known as polynucleotides, and between each polynucleotide are ‘rungs’, known as base pairs. If unravelled, the DNA in a single cell would resemble a rope ladder nearly 2 metres in length (see Figure 3.1). The bases come in four chemical varieties – adenine, thymine, guanine and cytosine – which are usually shortened to A, T, G and C. A bases on one polynucleotide always link with T bases on the other, while G bases always link with C bases. For example, a hypothetical base sequence of ATTGGGACC on one polynucleotide would bond with the base sequence TAACCCTGG on the other. It is the sequencing of the base pairs that codes genetic information. One complete set of human DNA comprises over 3 billion base pairs, although the exact purpose of up to 98 per cent of DNA is unknown.

Gene

Genes are specific sections of the DNA molecule. A gene is a combination of sequential base pairs – anywhere from a few dozen to a few thousand in length – that work together to perform a task. Functionally, genes are basic units of heredity that contain information relating to some aspect of an organism’s construction, and are responsible for the transmission of characteristics from one generation to the next. While genes have specific functions, they also typically work in concert with other genes in complex combinations. For most human characteristics, many genes are involved. Human have two sets of between 20,000 and 25,000 genes, with one set inherited from each parent. With the exception of identical twins, the exact mix of genes for each person is unique. However, about 99.9 per cent of genes code for basic structure and are responsible for the similarities among humans; individual variance is accounted for by the remaining .1 per cent of genes (about 3 million base pairs).

Chromosome Genes come packaged in chromosomes. Chromosomes are rod-shaped structures comprising tightly packed coils of DNA; a gene for a particular function occupies a specific location on a specific chromosome, and that location is identical for all members of the species. Humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes (thus 46 in total), one set inherited intact from each parent. Twenty-two of the pairs do not vary by the sex of the individual (and are referred to as autosomes); the 23rd pair is made up of two sex chromosomes comprising an X and Y chromosome in males and two X chromosomes in females. The 23 chromosomes contributed by the father are formed in the testes in the production of sperm. The father’s 46 chromosomes divide in a process called meiosis, in which sections from one chromosome of a pair detach and combine with complementary sections from the other chromosome of the same pair. In that way, the 23 new chromosomes are built containing a mix of genes that have come originally from each of the father’s parents. Fathers can produce either X or Y sex chromosomes. A similar process occurs in the mother’s ovaries during the formation of an ovum, except that mothers can only produce X sex chromosomes. Each parent’s 23 contributing chromosomes provide an alternative set of genetic instructions (e.g., brown eyes versus blue eyes) which are then selected or combined in some fashion to construct the offspring. (Continued overleaf )

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Heredity

Table 3.1 Continued Term

Definition and function

Genome

The genome is the full set of chromosomes, and thus it is the complete set of genetic instructions necessary for making an organism. A copy of the genome is found in the nucleus of every cell in an organism (except red blood cells), and in the case of humans, cells number in the trillions. The Human Genome Project began in 1990 with the task of sequencing the entire human DNA (i.e., mapping the order of the base-pairs and their location on a particular chromosome), a task which was largely completed in 2003. In fact, there is no one human genome – to the extent that people have different genetic make-ups they necessarily have different genomes. Differences in base sequences (polymorphisms) between individuals at particular locations of the DNA molecule are the basis of a person’s so-called DNA fingerprint.

Figure 3.1 A section of the DNA molecule showing the double helix structure.

Heredity

45

gene are called alleles and are rivals for expression in the offspring. Mendel made this discovery by experimenting with pea plants, examining what happened when plants displaying alternative versions of a particular aspect were crossed. For example, some pea plants have purple flowers and some have white flowers. The key to Mendel’s experimental method was the fact that for some aspects of the pea plant, one alternative is dominant and the other is recessive, and in the case of flower colour, purple is dominant over white. Dominant characteristics are displayed when both genes are dominant, as well as in hybrids where there is one dominant and one recessive gene; recessive characteristics are displayed only when both genes are recessive. The pattern of genes that underlies an observable characteristic of an organism is referred to as the genotype, and the observable characteristic itself is called the phenotype. For pea-flower colour, there are three possible genotypes and two phenotypes: some purple-flowered plants have two purple-flower genes (a purple homozygotic genotype); some purple-flowered plants have one purple-flower gene and one white-flower gene (a heterozygotic genotype); and all white-flowered plants will have two white-flower genes (a white homozygotic genotype). Figure 3.2 shows what happens when plants with these three genotypes are crossed in all six possible ways. For example, if two purple heterozygotic plants are crossed (Figure 3.2, iv), in terms of the phenotype 75 per cent of the offspring will be purple and 25 per cent will be white. However, in terms of the genotype, 25 per cent will have two purple-flower genes, 50 per cent will have one purple-flower and one

Figure 3.2 Ratios for the transmission of dominant purple (P) and recessive white (w) genes for different combinations of parental genotypes.

46

Heredity

white-flower gene, and 25 per cent will have two white-flower genes. Thus, half of the flowers, while displaying the dominant purple trait, carry forward the recessive white-flower gene which may reappear in subsequent generations. Note, that because genes are taken from parents randomly, the ratios shown in Figure 3.2 are averages. For example, it would be theoretically possible (though statistically improbable) for a particular pair of heterozygotic pea plants to produce all homozygotic whiteflowered offspring. The principal significance of Mendel’s research was to establish the pattern by which genes are passed from one generation to the next. The dominant and recessive nature of some genes is largely a secondary issue. Dominance was important in Mendel’s experiments because it allowed him to accurately track the genotype of the offspring. In fact, relatively few traits come in dominant and recessive versions. In most cases where there is a heterozygotic genotype, the phenotype is a compromise involving an intermediate design. This outward appearance of blending, however, does not involve the genes themselves blending – they remain discrete ‘packages’ to be passed unaltered (unless there is a mutation) down through the generations. Further, Mendel was aided by the fact that pea-flower colour is a monogenetic trait, that is, it is controlled by just one gene. In humans, most traits (e.g., height, skin colour, intelligence) are polygenetic, involving complex combinations of many genes. Genetic relatedness The knowledge that exactly half of an offspring’s genes comes from each parent allows degrees of genetic relatedness (proportion of shared genes) for different relatives to be calculated. Relatedness is found by the formula r = .5n, where n is the number of generational links. Thus, parent/child relatedness is .5. Relatedness diminishes rapidly (halves) for each succeeding generation – it is .25 for grandparents/grandchildren, .125 for great-grandparent/great-grandchildren, and only .0625 for great-great-grandparents/great-great-grandchildren. Relatedness can also be calculated for indirect or collateral relationships. Relatedness among full siblings is .5, .25 for half siblings and for aunts–uncles/nieces–nephews, and .125 for cousins. Note that identical twins are a special case. Identical (or monozygotic) twins are formed when a single ovum splits into two after it has been fertilised by a sperm. Thus identical twins share 100 per cent of their genes – relatedness is 1. Non-identical fraternal (or dizygotic) twins are formed when two ova are fertilised around the same time by two different sperm, and thus relatedness is the same as for normal siblings (.5). As we will see, the different degree of relatedness for identical and fraternal twins has important implications for genetic research. The rapid decay in relatedness as the number of generational links increases imposes limits on the reach of heredity. To illustrate the point, many Australians are now interested in their convict heritage, and to be able to claim a forebear on the First Fleet is for many a matter of pride. However, if we assume nine generations have passed since Australia’s colonial founding in 1788, direct descendants today would share less than one-thousandth of their genes with their convict

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47

forebear. (Descendants may find this disappointing or comforting depending on their point of view.) Looking at the issue another way, genes are rapidly dispersed throughout the population with each succeeding generation. For example, it has been estimated that (theoretically at least) it would necessary to go back just 23 generations (around 550 years) for every Briton living today to find a common ancestor with every other living Briton (Dawkins, 2004). Again, apart from parent–child and identical twins relationships, relatedness coefficients are averages. In the random selection of genes from a parent, it would be possible for a person to inherit a disproportionate number of genes that came originally from either their grandmother or grandfather. Likewise, siblings may be more or less similar depending upon the exact parcels of genes that they have inherited from their parents. The various claims made about the percentage of shared genes can be the source of some confusion. For example, how can humans have 98 per cent of their genes in common with chimpanzees, but share just 50 per cent with each parent? The answer lies in the distinction between fixed and segregating genes. Around 99.9 per cent of genes are fixed (i.e., the genes come in only one form so there is no variation in the population) and code for universal physical structures of a species (Plomin et al., 2002). All humans have these genes, and many are also shared with other species. The remaining .1 per cent of genes are segregating genes and are responsible for individual differences. While people do inherit 50 per cent of all their genes from each parent, the vast majority of these are fixed; it is the 50 per cent of the .1 per cent segregating genes which are crucial for relatedness. Genes and behaviour That people inherit physical characteristics from their parents is entirely uncontroversial; that they might also inherit temperament, personality characteristics and behavioural patterns is one of the mostly hotly contested issues in criminology. And yet people have for many years utilised the inheritance of behavioural traits in selective breeding programs with animals. It is accepted, for example, that different dog breeds have different temperaments and sometimes even characteristic behaviours (such as the freezing response of pointers). It seems reasonable to assume as a starting point that the same principle may apply to humans. The rationale for the effect of genes on behaviour is an extension of the process by which genes affect physical traits. The role of genes is to control the manufacture of proteins, and proteins are the bases of the body’s physical structure. Variations in genes create variations in proteins which in turn cause variations in individual physical attributes. The brain is a physical entity comprising billions of proteins and it has been estimated that up to 60 per cent of genes are involved in its construction (Shore, 1997). Like evolutionary psychologists, behavioural geneticists assume that all behaviour has a biochemical correlate in the brain. Genes for specific behavioural predispositions direct the manufacture of relevant proteins that are used to construct particular sections of the brain responsible for that behaviour (Raine, 2008).

48

Heredity

Recall that traits can be either monogenetic or polygenetic. This distinction has important implications for the gene–behaviour relationship (Bazzett, 2008; Plomin et al., 2002; Steen, 1996). Traits which are monogenetic are qualitative in nature. Because they involve just one gene, qualitative traits are either present or not present, as prescribed by Mendelian laws of inheritance. (Where the alleles are not dominant and recessive, there will also be a third intermediate version.) Thus people fall into distinct categories with respect to the trait, just as Mendel’s peas were either purple or white and not various shades of pale purple. In the case of behaviour, qualitative traits may occasionally be associated with specific genetic disorders, such as Huntington’s disease, a condition which causes jerky body movements. Most behavioural traits are polygenetic. Polygenetic traits are quantitative in nature since the strength with which an individual possesses the trait varies depending upon the exact mix of genes that they receive. It is the fact that many genes are involved, present and absent in different combinations from one individual to the next, that permits the variability to occur. Thus, quantitative attributes are usually normally distributed along a continuum. Most research on quantitative behavioural traits relies on observational, inferential methods that involve comparing the behaviours of people according to their degrees of genetic similarity and the similarity of the environments to which they are exposed. Known as behavioural genetics, this line of research will be our primary focus in this chapter. The most powerful methods for identifying genetic influences involve the study of twins and adoptees. Precisely how twin and adoption studies are designed is outlined a little later in this chapter. Because criminality falls along a continuum, then any inheritable component is almost certainly polygenetic. Further, as we will discuss in more depth in Chapter 5 (Personality), ‘criminality’ itself is not a unidimensional construct. Rather, there are numerous quantitative attributes – for example, risk-taking, impulsiveness, aggression, callousness – that each may contribute to an increased probability of criminality. The upshot of this is that the search for a ‘crime gene’ that neatly distinguishes criminals from non-criminals is futile. Instead, to the extent that attributes related to criminal predispositions are inheritable, it would be expected that many genes will be involved and that individuals will vary in these attributes by degrees. Heritability The complexity of the gene–behaviour relationship is further increased by the fact that the expression of genetic traits is significantly affected by the environment, and particularly so in the case of polygenic traits. This point can be clearly illustrated by considering the case of height. A seed planted in fertile ground will grow more vigorously than a genetically-identical seed planted in barren ground. Likewise for humans, a person may inherit genes for tallness from both parents, but how tall the person actually grows will depend heavily on environmental factors such as nutrition, exercise, pollution, climate and standard of living. It is because of such environmental factors that people today are much taller generally than

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49

they were in medieval times, and taller even than they were one or two generations ago. The extent to which variations in a given trait are inherited is referred to as its heritability. Heritability is expressed as a coefficient that reflects the sources of variance in a population. For example, the heritability for human height in a particular sample has been estimated at .8 (Visscher et al., 2006). This means that when accounting for the height differences among individuals, 80 per cent can be attributed to genes, with the remaining 20 per cent to environmental factors. In humans, heritability is usually estimated using twin and adoption studies designed to tease out the relative contributions of genetic and environmental factors. However, the exact methods used to calculate heritability coefficients can involve complex multivariate statistical models, the precise details of which need not concern us here. (Those readers wishing to follow up on the underlying statistics of the heritability coefficient can be ‘walked through’ the basic computations by Walsh, 2009, p. 34.) Heritability is a term that is frequently misinterpreted so it is important to clarify a number of issues. First, heritability is not a measure of the extent to which genes contribute to an attribute; it is a measure of the contribution of genes to variations in that attribute. For example, genes are completely responsible for autonomic functions such as heartbeat, but since everybody has a heartbeat (i.e., there is no variability), the heritability coefficient is zero. Thus, it is not meaningful to say that 80 per cent of human height is caused by genes, or even that genes are more important in determining height than is the environment. For any biosocial trait, genes and the environment are by definition both indispensable, irrespective of the heritability coefficient. Second, heritability is not fixed, but may vary from group to group. With respect to height, a country that has a uniformly high standard of nutrition is likely also to have greater heritability for height than a country in which levels of nutritional are distributed unevenly (e.g., half the population is well fed and half malnourished). This is because any variations in height in the first country will be largely due to genetic differences (since everyone’s nutritional level is similar), while in the second country variations in height are relatively more likely to be caused by variations in diet. Third, heritability measures apply only to groups and not to individuals. Heritability estimates are averages. The circumstances for every person are unique and so the relative effects of heredity and environment in individual cases cannot be determined. We turn now to examine in detail the research on the heritability of crime. The analysis is presented in two sections. First, the overall relationship between heritability and criminality is examined. This is followed by a more fine-grained analysis of variations in the heritability–crime relationship.

Heritability of criminality Family studies of criminality and antisocial behaviour have consistently revealed that crime often runs in families (Farrington et al., 2001, 2009; Rowe and

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Heredity

Farrington, 1997), a fact that any police officer will readily confirm. However, little can be concluded about the genetic bases of criminality from such family data alone. Parents not only contribute their genes to their children, they also potentially have a major influence on their children’s social development. Family studies cannot disentangle the genetic and environmental influences acting on children. Twin and adoption studies attempt to overcome this problem by holding one factor constant while measuring the effect of the other. Importantly, by teasing out the contributions of heredity and upbringing to criminality, these studies can tell us just as much about the role of environmental factors as they can about the role of genetics.1 MZ versus DZ twins The most common heritability research method is to compare the respective similarities for a given trait in monozygotic (MZ) twins and dizygotic (DZ) twins. The rationale for this design lies in the fact that MZ and DZ twins vary in their relatedness, with MZ twins sharing 100 per cent of their genes and DZ twins sharing just 50 per cent of their genes (or more accurately, of their segregating genes). The design is assumed to control for environmental effects since each twin in a pair should experience much the same upbringing as the other twin. If genes play a role in behaviour, it would be expected that there would be greater similarity in trait expression between MZ twins than between DZ twins, reflecting their respective differences in relatedness. Based on the difference between MZ and DZ twins in their degree of similarity a heritability coefficient can be calculated. There have been dozens of published MZ/DZ twin studies examining various aspects of criminality and related concepts. Many studies utilise one of the large established twin databases, such as the Danish twin registry, the Swedish Adoption/ Twin Study for Aging and the Minnesota twin registry. Typically, individual published studies are part of larger, ongoing research program, and criminality is just one of the heritability issues examined. Twin zygosity is usually determined by a questionnaire (more than 95 per cent accuracy), blood test (99 per cent accuracy) (Rhee and Waldman, 2002), and more recently, DNA testing (e.g., Baker et al., 2007). The review below is organised in terms of the dependent measure of criminality that has been employed, whether that is official criminal convictions or reported antisocial behaviour. Criminal convictions The first twin studies on criminality were conducted in the 1930s and examined official conviction records (Table 3.2). When the dependent variable is dichotomous in this way (criminal record versus no criminal record), the degree of similarity between twins is usually given as a concordance rate. If one twin of a pair displays a given trait, concordance is the number of cases, expressed as a percentage, in which the other twin also displays the same trait. Every study in Table 3.2 shows

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Table 3.2 Twin studies showing concordance rates (%) for MZ and DZ twins based on criminal conviction data MZ

DZ

Author

Location

Sex

N

Lange (1930)

Germany

M

13

77

17

12

Legras (1932)

Holland

M

4

100

5

0

Rosanoff et al. (1934)

U.S.

M

33

67

23

13

F

4

75

5

40

Stumpfl (1936)

Germany

M

18

65

19

37

F

3

67

2

0

Kranz (1936)

Germany

M

32

66

43

54

Slater (1953)

UK

M

2

50

10

30

Borgstrøm (1939)

Finland

M

4

75

5

40

Yoshimasu (1961)

Japan

M

28

61

18

11

Dalgard and Kringlen (1976)

Norway

M

31

26

54

15

M

73

34

146

18

F

15

20

28

7

Cloninger and Gottesman Denmark (1987)

Concordance N

Concordance

Source: Adapted from Raine (1993).

higher concordance rates – on average more than twice as high – for MZ twins than for DZ twins, suggesting a significant role for genes in criminality. The studies shown in Table 3.2 vary in their methodological rigour and this had led many criminologists to question the findings (see Dalgard and Kringlen, 1976). Several of the early studies had small sample sizes and the determination of zygosity was based on subjective judgements of the degree of resemblance between the twins. The validity of two of the German studies (Kranz, 1936; Stumpfl, 1936) has been further questioned because they were conducted during the Nazi era, raising suspicions that they may be ideologically tainted. However, later studies are more rigorous and the differences between MZ and DZ concordance, though rather more muted, are still substantial. For example, the most recent study by Cloninger and Gottesman (1987) is the culmination of a research project that extended over almost twenty years, during which time a series of progress reports was published (Christiansen, 1970, 1977a, 1977b; Cloninger et al., 1978; Gottesman et al., 1983). The final data set comprised 4,175 twin pairs from the Danish twin registry with zygosity determined using a questionnaire. Concordance rates were almost twice for MZ male twins than for DZ male twins, and nearly three times for female MZ twins than for DZ female twins. Converting concordance rates to a heritability coefficient produced an estimate of .54, which is to say that 54 per cent of the variation in criminality in the sample can be attributed to genetic factors.

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Reported antisocial behaviour An obvious problem with conviction data is that people may commit offences without getting caught. An alternative research strategy is to ask respondents or other informants to provide reports of illegal and antisocial behaviours. Typically these studies employ standardised behavioural checklists or personality scales which produce continuous measures (i.e., they vary by degrees) rather than categorical ones as was the case for conviction data. The respective similarities within MZ and DZ twin pairs are expressed as correlations rather than concordance rates, before being converted to a heritability coefficient. There is considerable variation among studies in the ages of the twins in the sample (children, juveniles and adults), the sources from which information is obtained (self-report, parent reports, teacher reports), the methods used to collect data (face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews, mail-out surveys), the nature of the dependent variable (actual behaviours, personality traits, clinical diagnoses), and the psychological domain examined (antisocial personality, delinquency, aggression, impulsivity, conduct disorder, etc.). Despite these variations, studies consistently yield heritability coefficients in the .3–.5 range (Baker et al., 2007; Blonigen et al., 2003; Coccaro et al., 1993, 1997; Edelbrock et al., 1995; Hicks et al., 2004; Jacobson et al., 2000, 2002; Rowe, 1985, 1986; Silberg et al., 1996; Slutske et al., 1997; Taylor et al., 2003). A brief description of a recent study will give a flavour of this line of research. Blonigen et al. (2003) studied 89 MZ and 47 DZ pairs of adult male twins (born between 1961 and 1964) from the Minnesota twin registry. Zygosity was determined using blood tests. Participants completed the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI) sent to them in the mail and returned the same way. The PPI comprises 163 self-report items reducing to eight subscales: Machiavellian Egocentricity (narcissism and self-centredness), Social Potency (charisma and the ability to manipulate others), Fearlessness (risk-taking), Coldheartedness (callousness and emotional detachment), Impulsive Non-conformity (recklessness and rebelliousness), Blame Externalisation (rationalisation and guilt-avoidance), Carefree Nonplanfulness (impulsivity), and Stress Immunity (lack of anxiety). For MZ twins, correlations for all subscales were significant, ranging from a low of .28 for Machiavellian Egocentricity to a high of .57 for Blame Externalisation, with a total scale correlation of .46: for DZ twins, none of the correlations were significant. (Remember, correlations are not the same as heritability coefficients.) In other words, while MZ twins tended to be similar to each other on each of the dimensions measured, there was no such trend for DZ twins. Heritability coefficients for the subscales ranged from .24 for Machiavellian Egocentricity to .56 for Blame Externalisation, with a total scale heritability of .4. Despite consistent findings of greater similarity between MZ twins than between DZ twins, MZ/DZ studies continue to attract criticisms on methodological grounds. In particular, critics challenge the assumption that the MZ/DZ design effectively controls for environmental influences. It is argued that, because they are physically more similar, MZ twins are also treated more similarly than are DZ twins. There is perhaps some validity to this criticism. For example, Carey (1992)

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found that MZ twins imitate each other more so than do DZ twins; that is, to some extent the similarity between MZ derives from environmental factors. On the other hand, others have argued that the opposite process can also occur, that MZ twins may make conscious efforts to distinguish themselves from each other (Schachter and Stone, 1985). One way to help resolve this issue is to examine the behaviours of MZ twins reared apart. MZ twins reared apart The MZ/DZ design attempts to hold environmental effects constant while examining variations in the genetic make-up of participants. Studies examining MZ twins reared apart (MZA) do the opposite – they hold the genetic make-up of participants constant and examine the effects of different environments. In this way, they attempt to counter criticisms that MZ twins share a more common environment than do DZ twins. Unfortunately, there are relatively few participants who qualify for inclusion in such research, so studies of MZA are relatively rare and have small samples. Because there are so few studies, it is possible to describe the main ones briefly. Only one MZA study has employed criminal convictions as the dependent variable. Christiansen (1977b) examined eight cases of MZA adult twin pairs, in which at least one twin had a criminal record, accessed from the Danish twin registry. Of these cases, there were four pairs for which both twins were criminal. In addition to the small sample size, a methodological weakness of this study is that there is no comparison group of DZ twins reared apart (DZA). Nevertheless, the concordance rate (50 per cent) is higher than that found in most studies for DZ twins reared together (DZT) and similar to that found for MZ twins reared together (MZT), so it can be assumed that it would also be higher than that for DZA. The remaining studies have employed various self-report measures. Tellegen et al. (1988) examined 44 MZA, 27 DZA, 217 MZT and 114 DZT adult twin pairs from the Minnesota twin registry. Twins were administered the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ) comprising 11 subscales: Well-being, Social Potency, Achievement, Social Closeness, Stress Reaction, Alienation, Aggression, Control, Harm Avoidance, Traditionalism and Absorption. There were an additional three higher-order factors: Positive Emotionality, Negative Emotionality and Constraint. While many of these scales do not directly examine antisocial behaviour, they do measure conceptually related concepts and are similar to scales on the Psychopathic Personality Inventory described earlier. Correlations among MZA ranged from .29 (Social Closeness) to .61 (for both Stress Reaction and Absorption) with a median correlation of .49. The correlations were much stronger than for DZA (median correlation .18) and DZT (median correlation .23), but similar to MZT (median correlation .52). Heritability coefficients ranged from .39 (Achievement) to .58 (Constraint), with a median value of .45. Also drawing participants from the Minnesota twin registry, Grove et al. (1990) assessed 32 sets of MZA adult twin pairs using the Diagnostic Interview Schedule, which examines the presence of psychiatric disorder and antisocial personality. Few participants were found to meet the criteria for a clinical diagnosis, but each

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was awarded scores on four dimensions: alcohol-related problems, drug-related problems, childhood antisocial behaviour and adult antisocial behaviour. Only alcohol-related problems showed no evidence of heritability. The other heritability estimates were .45 for drug-related problems, .41 for childhood antisocial behaviour, and .28 for adult antisocial behaviour. Finally, Coccaro et al. (1993) examined 74 MZA, 152 DZA, 117 MZT and 157 DZT adult twin pairs from the Swedish Adoption/Twin Study of Aging. Participants completed a 223-item inventory, with items drawn from nine existing scales, designed to measure two factors: assertiveness/aggression and irritability/impulsiveness. The respective within-pair correlations for MZA, MZT, DZA and DZT were .21, .26, .08 and .16 for factor one, and .41, .42, .10 and .18 for factor 2. In keeping with previously discussed trends, MZA are more similar to MZT than they are to either DZA or DZT. Heritability was estimated at .17 for factor one and .41 for factor two. Adoption studies Adoption studies offer an alternative method of overcoming the limitations of the MZ/DZ twin design. In the full model, adoption studies systematically vary both genetic and environmental factors in a 2×2 design. This is done by examining cases where cross-fostering of adopted children has occurred. Biological and adoptive parents can either be criminal or non-criminal. This means that adopted children can grow up under one of four possible conditions – they can have criminal biological parents and criminal adoptive parents, criminal biological parents and non-criminal adoptive parents, non-criminal biological parents and criminal adoptive parents, and non-criminal biological parents and non-criminal adoptive parents. By comparing the criminality of adoptees under these conditions, inferences can be drawn about the source of the criminogenic influences. As with twin studies, because of the logistical difficulty involved in setting up adoption research, most studies rely on accessing participants through one of the major established databases, such as the Danish, Swedish and Iowa adoption registries. Criminal convictions The most widely cited adoption study of criminality was conducted by Mednick et al. (1984) and involved the full 2×2 cross-fostering design described above. Mednick et al. examined the court records of 14,427 Danish adoptees, along with the records of their biological and adoptive parents. The greatest rate of criminal conviction among adoptees (24.5 per cent) occurred when both a biological and an adoptive parent also had a criminal conviction. The next most risky condition was when a biological parent had a criminal conviction and the adoptive parents did not (20 per cent). When the biological parents did not have criminal convictions, the convictions rate for adoptees was 14.7 per cent when the adoptive parent had a conviction and 13.3 per cent when they did not. Statistically, only the status of the biological parents was found to increase the likelihood of an adoptee becoming criminal. It was also found that the number of criminal convictions of the biological

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parent was significantly related to the number of convictions of the adoptee, but that this applied only to property crime and not to violent crime. Later analysis of the Danish sample, in which adoptees transferred to their adoptive home later than one year after birth were excluded, found that both genetic and environmental factors significantly contributed to property criminality (Baker, 1986; Baker et al., 1989). Another important series of studies examining conviction data has utilised the Swedish adoption registry. The first of these studies (Bohman, 1978) found no evidence for an increased conviction rate among adoptees who had a biological parent with a criminal record. Later analyses of 862 adoptees, however, found a biological effect for petty crimes (Bohman et al., 1982; Cloninger et al., 1982; Sigvardsson et al., 1982), a finding consistent with the Danish studies. Further, Cloninger et al. (1982) found an interaction effect between genetic and environmental factors. Like Mednick et al. (1984), this study employed a 2×2 design. However, instead of classifying the biological and adoptive parents solely on the basis of the presence or absence of a criminal conviction, composite measures of ‘predispositions to petty criminality’ were calculated using data about criminal convictions, alcohol abuse, occupation, social status and medical history. In particular, this design provided a more comprehensive measure of the quality of the family environment in which the adoptee was raised. Both congenital (the influence of the biological parents) and postnatal (the influence of the adoptive parents) backgrounds were classified as low and high risk. The rate of criminality among adoptees when both congenital and post-natal predisposing conditions were high (40 per cent) was more than twice the rate obtained when the separate effects of high congenital and high post-natal predisposing factors are combined (18.8 per cent) (see Table 3.3). In other words, the findings suggest that the effects of genes and environment are not simply additive – when predisposing genetic and environmental factors occur together they interact to intensify the impact of one another. The interplay between genes and environment in this way emphasises the complexity of the biosocial perspective. Reported antisocial behaviour A series of studies by Cadoret and colleagues, using the Iowa adoption registry, has examined the heritability of antisocial personality/behaviour among Table 3.3 Percentage of adoptees with criminal convictions as a function of congenital and post-natal predispositions to criminality Congenital predisposition to petty criminality (%)

Post-natal predisposition to petty criminality Source: Adapted from Cloninger et al. (1982).

High Low

High

Low

40.0 12.1

6.7 2.9

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cross-fostered adoptees (Cadoret, 1978; Cadoret and Cain, 1980; Cadoret et al., 1983, 1985, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1995). For example, Cadoret et al. (1995) compared adoptees (95 males and 102 females) who had at least one biological parent diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder and/or a history of alcohol abuse, with a matched control group of adoptees for whom neither biological parent had a psychiatric diagnosis. Information about biological parents was gathered from institutional records, while all adoptees and their adoptive parents were interviewed in person using a standardised diagnostic schedule. Four adoptee outcome variables were obtained: childhood aggression, adolescent aggression, conduct disorder and adult antisocial behaviour. The quality of the adoptees’ upbringing was assessed by gathering evidence about marital, legal, substance abuse and mental health problems among adoptive parents. It was found that antisocial backgrounds of biological parents predicted increased adolescent aggression, conduct disorder and adult antisocial behaviour in adoptees. In addition, adverse home environments in which adoptees were raised independently predicted adult antisocial behaviour. Further, there were interaction effects for adolescent aggression and conduct disorder. That is, the effect of a biological predisposition was accentuated by the addition of adverse environmental conditions, but adverse environmental conditions alone had no significant effect on these outcomes. Meta-analyses A meta-analysis is a way of synthesising the results from multiple comparable studies. Only studies that meet specified selection criteria for methodological rigour are included in the analysis. Using various statistical methods, findings are pooled and the overall statistical significance is calculated for the various effects. By combining studies in this way, statistical power is maximised and some general conclusions can be drawn about the dominant trends identified in a research field. There have been three major meta-analyses examining the genetic bases of criminal behaviour and related constructs. Walters (1992) analysed 38 family, twin and adoption studies. Criminality was defined to include either criminal conviction or diagnosis of antisocial personality. Heritability estimates were .41–.43 for family studies, .33–.47 for twin studies and .11–.17 for adoption studies. Miles and Carey (1997) focused on personality measures of aggression and antisocial behaviour, examining 24 twin and adoption studies. Depending upon the statistical model used, heritability was estimated to be up to .5. Finally, Rhee and Waldman (2002) analysed 51 twin and adoption studies in which the dependent measure was criminal conviction, clinical diagnosis, reported aggression or reported antisocial personality. Heritability was .41. The meta-analyses confirm what the literature reviewed in this chapter has suggested, that the weight of research evidence supports a role for genes in criminal behaviour. Estimates of the extent of that role vary, but on balance it seems that genetic factors account for something less than half of the variance in criminality, with the remaining variance due to environmental factors.

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Variations in the heritability of criminality The usual question in criminology is simply to ask if genes play a role in criminality. However, once that question has been answered, then a more fine-grained analysis needs to occur in order to examine whether heritability varies for different classes of offenders. This section examines whether genetic factors have differential influence according to offenders’ sex, crime, age and persistence. Male versus female crime It was established in the previous chapter that males commit vastly more crimes than do females. However, whether male or female offenders have stronger inherited criminal dispositions is a different question. In fact, it has been suggested that precisely because female crime is relatively infrequent, then it is likely to be the result of stronger heritability than is the case for males (Widom and Ames, 1988). The logic for this argument is as follows. Females face much stronger social pressures and expectations to behave in pro-social ways than do males. These social pressures have the effect of suppressing criminality in many females who might otherwise have committed crime. Thus there is a higher criminality threshold for females to cross. Those relatively few females who overcome these social forces and go on to commit crimes must therefore have especially strong genetic predispositions to do so. There is some evidence to support stronger heritability for female crime, although the findings are often conditional and dependent upon the type of crime and the age of the offender. In their study of Swedish adoptees, Sigvardsson et al. (1982) reported that adopted females who committed petty crimes were more than twice as likely to have at least one biological parent with a criminal record than was the case for adopted males who had committed petty crime (50 per cent versus 21 per cent). Further, the biological parents of the female offenders had on average nearly three times the number of convictions than the biological parents of the male offenders (3.6 versus 1.4). Baker et al. (1989), in their study of Danish adoptees, reported similar findings for property crime. Eley et al. (1999), comparing MZ and DZ child and adolescent twins, found greater heritability for female nonaggressive antisocial behaviour when compared with that of males, but they found no sex differences for aggressive antisocial behaviour. In Jacobson et al.’s (2002) twin study, greater heritability was found for female than male antisocial behaviour in childhood, but these differences disappeared in adolescence and adulthood. However, a number of studies have failed to find sex differences in heritability (Cadoret and Cain, 1980; Hicks et al., 2004; Jacobson et al., 2002), and some have found greater heritability for male crime (Cadoret et al., 1985). So where does this leave the issue? Two meta-analyses have examined male and female heritability. Examining psychometric measures of aggression and antisocial behaviour, Miles and Carey (1997) found that, contrary to the conclusions drawn from studies examining conviction data, heritability was slightly stronger in males than in females, though substantial for both. Rhee and Waldman (2002), looking at broader measures of antisocial behaviour, found stronger heritability for female

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crime when all studies in the meta-analysis were included. However, the authors believed that the inclusion of studies in which only male offenders were examined may have skewed the findings, since these studies often used less stringent criteria for criminality that reduced levels of heritability. When a more rigorous selection rule was adopted, and only those studies that included both males and females were examined, no significant difference for heritability was found. The most parsimonious conclusion would seem to be that greater heritability for female crime remains to be proven. Violent versus property crime Where the issue has been examined, most studies have either found heritability for property and ‘petty’ crime but no heritability for violent crime (Baker, 1986; Bohman et al., 1982; Cloninger et al., 1982; Mednick et al., 1984; Sigvardsson et al., 1982), or stronger heritability for property crime than for violent crime (Cloninger and Gottesman, 1987). This finding has puzzled researchers. Intuitively, it might be expected that the reverse would be the case. Violent crime would seem more likely to be a result of psychological deficits while property crime more likely to be an outcome of social learning and peers influence. Thus, violent crime would seem the stronger candidate for heritability. One theoretical explanation for the unexpected findings in adults may be provided by the distinction between prudent and imprudent offending (Thornton, 1987). Prudent offending refers to crimes in which offenders calculate the advantages to themselves from offending, and proceed with the offence in full knowledge of the likely harm and distress that will be caused to victims. Thus, theft and other acquisitive offences are typically prudent in nature. Imprudent offending, on the other hand, occurs more or less spontaneously with little planning or wellformulated intentions. Arguably, many assaults and even murders fall into this category. Thornton and Reid (1982) found that prudent offenders exhibited greater levels of egocentric, instrumental moral reasoning than did imprudent offenders. It is significant that definitions of antisocial personality disorder emphasise the callous disregard for the plight of others. It will also be recalled from the previous chapter that ‘cheating’ was advanced as a genetically-based alternative to altruistic, law-abiding behaviour. When looked at in this way, the finding of stronger heritability for property crime than violent crime is perhaps not so surprising. However, some researchers have pointed to methodological limitations of the research to account for the low heritability found for violent offending. Violent crime is less frequent than property crime and it is argued that when conviction is used as the dependent measure, the low base rates may reduce the statistical power needed to detect heritability effects (Raine, 1993). When self-report or informantreport measures of aggression and violent antisocial behaviour are used, the evidence for heritability of aggression is generally stronger (Burt, 2009; Coccaro et al., 1997; Eley et al., 1999; Tellegen et al., 1988). These measures can pick up violent incidents that otherwise would go undetected so arguably are more sensitive than convictions. Moreover, self-report and psychological measures may

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better identify individuals who consistently and instrumentally behave in violent antisocial ways, as opposed to those who may be convicted for isolated acts of imprudent violence. As we shall see in Chapter 4, support for the argument that the failure to detect heritability for violent crime is a methodological artefact is provided by evidence linking specific genes to violence. Juvenile versus adult crime Research has generally found much stronger heritability for adult crime than for juvenile crime. Reviewing seven twin studies on juvenile delinquency, Raine (1993) calculated overall concordance rates of 84 per cent for MZ twins and 69 per cent for DZ twins. While this indicates greater similarity between MZ twins than between DZ twins and thus the influence of genetic factors, the difference is relatively small when compared to that typically found for adults (see Table 3.2). Likewise, adoption studies generally find relatively weak evidence of heritability for juvenile crime (Bohman, 1972; Cadoret, 1978; Cadoret et al., 1983). As with the findings for violent offending, heritability for delinquency is often stronger when self-report and informant-report measures are used rather than conviction data (Baker et al., 2007; Edelbrock et al., 1995; Grove et al., 1990; Jacobson et al., 2000; Silberg et al., 1996; Slutske et al., 1997). There are three main explanations for the weaker heritability found for juvenile crime. The first is that the genetic factors underlying crime do not ‘switch on’ until late adolescence (Raine, 1993). According to this argument, the full effect of genetic predispositions depends upon mature brain structures being in place, and for some crucial sections of the brain, such as prefrontal areas, this does not occur until early adulthood (see Chapter 4). The second explanation is that social factors play a greater role in offending for young people than is the case for adults. Juvenile delinquency typically occurs in groups, and young people are particularly susceptible to the influence of peers. The power of social pressures to offend overrides genetic influences in young offenders. The third argument is that low average heritability coefficients mask important variations in heritability in subgroups of delinquents. That is, while some juvenile offenders have strong heritability for crime, most do not, and unless these two groups are considered separately, the overall finding will be of weak heritability. This argument is considered more fully below. Adolescent-limited versus life-course persistent crime As outlined in previous chapters, criminal-careers researchers have often distinguished between two classes of offenders. Adolescent-limited (AL) offenders begin offending in adolescence and desist from offending as they mature in early adulthood; life-course persistent (LCP) offenders show early signs of conduct disorders in childhood and continue to offend throughout their adult years. It is suggested that there are different aetiologies for these two classes of offender. AL offending is associated with normal developmental changes and social factors

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specific to adolescence; LCP offending, on the other hand, is a consequence of antisocial predispositions that are evident at an early age and are stable over time. Greater heritability would therefore be predicted for LCP offending than for AL offending (Eley et al., 1999; Miles and Carey, 1997; Rhee and Waldman, 2002). There is good evidence for the heritability of LCP offending. Childhood conduct disorders have been shown to have strong heritability (Baker et al., 2007; Edelbrock et al., 1995; Grove et al., 1990). It has also been shown that behavioural and emotional problems in childhood are good predictors of adolescent and adult criminality (Caspi et al., 1995; Grove et al., 1990; Langbehn et al., 1998). However, to date there is little research that directly tests the assumed differences in heritability between LCP and AL offending. To do so it would be necessary to conduct a longitudinal study following cohorts of twins and/or adoptees from childhood through to adulthood, and comparing subgroups of LCP and AL offenders. One study has partially fulfilled this requirement. Taylor et al. (2000) examined heritability for antisocial behaviour as a function of age of onset, with early onset assumed to be predictive of LCP offending. The researchers studied three groups of boys: 36 early-starter delinquents (LCP), 86 late-starter delinquents (AL), and 25 non-delinquents. Each participant was one of a twin. Participants were first tested at age 11 and followed for six years, being retested at the ages of 14 years and 17 years. Early starters were defined as boys who already showed signs of antisocial behaviour on intake at age 11. Late starters were boys who showed no signs of antisocial behaviour at age 11, but did show signs when retested at age 14 years or 17 years. Non-delinquents showed no signs of antisocial behaviour at any of the three testing periods. Taylor et al. found that, when compared with late starters and non-delinquents, early starters exhibited higher rates of psychopathology (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant disorder) and personality measures indicating deficits in control (impulsivity, negative emotionality and lack of constraint). While early starters also reported more antisocial peers than do the other two groups, late starters reported an increase in antisocial peers just prior to the onset of their antisocial behaviour, a pattern consistent with an AL offending. In terms of twin analysis, for early starters, concordance rates were 55 per cent for MZ twins and 29 per cent for DZ twins, with the difference between the two rates indicating high heritability. For late starters, concordance rates were 43 per cent for MZ twins and 39 per cent for DZ twins, a relatively small difference that indicates low heritability. These results suggest that early starters had stronger predispositions to antisocial behaviour, and that these predispositions were more likely to have a genetic base, than was the case for late starters. A limitation of Taylor et al.’s study, however, is that participants were not followed past adolescence. Thus, while the study was able to examine patterns of onset, it did not examine patterns of desistance. Nevertheless, on the available evidence it seems likely that there is stronger heritability for LCP offending than for AL offending, and this finding reinforces an important theme of this book. Offenders are a heterogenous population. When heritability estimates for crime are cited, it is important to keep in mind that these are

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averages, and that individual offenders will vary considerably in the extent to which they possess criminal predispositions. Despite the overall evidence for the heritability of crime, for many convicted offenders there may be no significant elevation of inherited criminal dispositions when compared with the general population.

Beyond behavioural genetics: molecular genetics This chapter has reviewed research that has examined the relationship between genes and behaviour indirectly through the techniques of behavioural genetics. The link between behaviour and genes has been inferred – the genes themselves were not examined. In recent years, however, the Human Genome Project has stimulated enormous advances in the gene technology. The mapping of the human genome involved sequencing the 3 billion base pairs that comprise the complete set of human DNA. Each gene occupies a specific location on a specific chromosome, and the task of the Human Genome Project was to identify the location of each gene. Identifying genes, however, is not the same as determining what those genes do. Researchers are now busily matching specific genes to specific functions. The direct examination of the causal relationship between the structure of DNA and genetic expression in this way is referred to as molecular genetics. (At this point the reader should be familiar with the contents of Table 3.1.) As noted earlier, most genes are fixed; that is, they come in only one variety and so they do not differ from one person to the next. No matter who your parents are, you will inherit the same copy of the gene from each of them. Where there are at least two alternative versions of a gene – alleles – within the gene pool, then variation can occur among humans according to Mendelian laws of inheritance. A gene that comes in more than one version is called a genetic polymorphism. For example, genetic polymorphisms are responsible for some people having blue eyes and some people having brown eyes. There are three types of polymorphism (Beaver, 2009). The most common variation (accounting for around 90 per cent of all polymorphisms) is called a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP). In an SNP, one allele is distinguished from another allele by variation in just one of the base pairs that define that gene. For example, instead of the base sequence ATTGGGACC found in one allele, another allele might have the sequence ATTAGGACC. The second type of polymorphism is called a microsatellite, also known as a short tandem repeat. In this variation, alleles differ in length; that is, one has more base pairs than the other. This occurs when small sections of the gene – usually up to four sequential base pairs – are repeated a number of times. For example, one allele may include the sequence ATTGGAGGACC (two repeats of GGA) while another has the sequence ATTGGAGGAGGAGGACC (four repeats of GGA). The third type of polymorphism is called a minisatellite, also know as variable number tandem repeats (VNTP). Minisatellites are similar to microsatellites, except there are many more sequential base pairs are repeated (more than 20) and they may be repeated many times. By comparing sequences of DNA from a particular chromosomal location taken from different people, molecular geneticists seek to link genetic polymorphisms with

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phenotypic variations. In other words, they examine whether different versions of a particular gene produce different observable outcomes. There is accumulating evidence linking specific genes to behaviour, personality traits and psychological disorders. In many cases a single gene has pleiotropic effects; that is, it is responsible for a number phenotypic outcomes, suggesting that different behavioural problems may have a common genetic basis (Beaver, 2009). Most behaviour-related research has been conducted on genes that are responsible for the regulation of biochemicals in the brain that in turn help to regulate behaviour (to be discussed in more detail in the following chapter). Polymorphisms of these genes have been identified as playing a role in an increased probability of impulsive, violent, addictive and antisocial behaviours (Beaver, 2009; Cardon, 2002; Caspi et al., 2002; Plomin et al., 2002). One gene that has attracted a good deal of research is called D4DR, located on chromosome 11 (Beaver, 2009). The job of D4DR is to help regulate the functioning of dopamine, a chemical in the brain associated with feelings of pleasure and euphoria. D4DR is polymorphic and comes in numerous varieties. The polymorphisms are minisatellites that involve a 48 base pair sequence that is repeated between two and 11 times depending upon the allele. The allele that has the sevenrepeat sequence causes a reduced availability of dopamine. Because dopamine is associated with feelings of pleasure, reduced access to dopamine can increase an individual’s tendency to engage in pleasure-seeking behaviours in an effort to compensate for the reduction. Low levels of dopamine have been linked to the personality trait of novelty-seeking and have been associated with increased risk of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), conduct disorder and pathological gambling (Noble et al., 1998; Rowe et al., 2001). It should be noted that D4DR is estimated to account for just 4 per cent of the variance for novelty-seeking (Benjamin et al., 1996). This finding reinforces the polygenetic nature of quantitative traits – D4DR is likely to be just one of many genes that contribute to sensation seeking. In an exciting development, interactions between genes and the environment (GxE) have also been observed at the molecular level. Caspi et al. (2002) examined the relationship between childhood maltreatment and the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene, located on the X chromosome. MAOA is an enzyme that helps break down other biochemicals (including dopamine). Researchers have found a relationship between conduct disorders and a minisatellite polymorphism of the MAOA gene that causes low availability of the enzyme (Brunner et al., 1993; Manuck et al., 2000). However, Caspi et al. (2002) subsequently found that the increased antisocial behaviour in individuals who had the low-activity version of the gene only occurred if they had also been maltreated as children. The allele on its own had no direct criminogenic effect. Researchers are increasingly interested in the implications of the complex interplay between genes and environment (Delisi et al., 2008; Moffitt, 2005), and we will revisit this issue in later chapters.

Conclusion and evaluation There is now an extensive body of research that has examined heritability for crime. Studies have employed different research strategies (MZ versus DZ twins,

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MZ twins raised apart and cross-fostered adoptees), have been conducted on large samples from different countries (notably Denmark, Sweden and the USA), and have operationalised criminality in different ways (convictions, reported behaviour, and psychological and clinical assessment). The overwhelming weight of the research findings is that there is a significant inherited component of criminality, probably accounting for between .3 and .5 of the variance. This conclusion is not widely accepted in criminology. Critics have countered claims that there is heritability for crime with methodological criticism of genetic research. To be sure, there are methodological limitations to be considered. Zygosity, especially in early studies, was not always reliably assessed. But if anything, misattributed zygosity is most likely to have reduced rather than increased observed differences between MZ and DZ twins. It may also be true that MZ twins are exposed to more similar environments than are DZ twins, leading to overestimates of genetic effects. However, studies examining MZ twins reared apart and cross-fostered adoptees overcome this problem and have reported similar findings to those of traditional twin studies. Undoubtedly too, individual studies may be examined to find particular weaknesses in design and execution. However, it seems implausible that methodological biases could fully account for all of the positive findings for heritability from over a hundred different studies. It is hard to escape the conclusion that many criminologists simply do not want to believe that genes play a role in crime. To date, most research examining the genetic bases of crime has been in the field of behavioural genetics and this has been our focus in this chapter. Studies infer genetic effects based on the similarities in behaviour between individuals as a function of their genetic relatedness. The genes themselves are not actually studied. However, there have been enormous advances in gene technology in the past decade or so and increasingly the field of molecular genetics is being applied to understanding behaviour. Already a number of specific genes have been implicated in violent and antisocial behaviour. This does not mean that we are closer to finding the crime gene – because there is no such gene – but it suggests that genetic research is here to stay in criminology and destined to become even more important. Nevertheless, it is important to keep the findings in context. Criminologists should not be frightened by genetic research, because what the research shows us most clearly is just how dependent gene expression is on environmental influences. Across the board, environmental factors were found to be at least as strong, and probably stronger, than genetic factors, in explaining variations in criminality, accounting for between .5 and .7 of the variance. The genetic research cannot be interpreted as supporting the idea of the ‘born criminal’. Heritability coefficients also disguise important variations within offender populations. While heritability will be strong for some offenders, many offenders are likely to have no particular genetic predisposition for crime. One possibility explored in this chapter was that there was stronger heritability for LCP offending than for AL offending. But beyond broad classifications such as this, it must be remembered that heritability coefficients tell us nothing about individual offenders.

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The circumstances for each offender are complex and unique, and there is no way to apportion genetic and environmental influences in individual cases. One particularly important finding was evidence for a GxE interaction. The addition of adverse post-adoption conditions had a relatively greater impact on adoptees with a genetic predisposition to antisocial behaviour than it did on adoptees without a genetic predisposition to antisocial behaviour (Cadoret et al., 1985; Cloninger et al., 1982). Evidence of a GxE interaction was also found at a molecular-genetic level (Caspi et al., 2002). The finding of GxE interactions takes the biosocial perspective beyond the conclusion that both genes and environment are separately important in crime; a gene–environment interaction means that the effect of the same environment varies from individual to individual depending upon the individual’s genetic makeup. Thus, environmental risk-factors are not experienced equally; some individuals are genetically more susceptible to criminogenic environments and some are more resilient. Put another way, genes responsible for criminal dispositions may remain dormant unless they are activated by specific environmental conditions. The current chapter was limited to establishing whether there was heritability for crime. There was little discussion of how genes affect behaviour. The biological pathway from genes to crime, via the brain, is the focus of Chapter 4.

Note 1 Most modern heritability studies further divide environmental influences into two components: shared and non-shared. Shared environments refer to experiences an individual has in common with other members of the family and non-shared environments refer to the unique experiences of an individual. We will leave discussion of this issue until Chapter 6.

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Genes may be responsible for certain behavioural predispositions, but they do not themselves produce behaviour. The behavioural expression of genes occurs indirectly. Genes guide the construction of the brain and it is the brain that is responsible for the initiation, performance and maintenance of behaviour and other psychological processes. The brain takes over where genes leave off. At the same time, the brain is not a wholly genetically-engineered organ. Genes determine the basic architecture of the brain and are responsible for a certain amount of hardwiring. But it would be impossible for the brain to come pre-programmed to deal with all of the contingencies and challenges that will arise in an individual’s lifetime. The brain is adaptive and every experience causes a biological change within it. Consequently, the brain that you possess now is physically very different from the one you had when you were born. It is the essential plasticity of the brain that is the basis for the biosocial nature of behaviour. Examined in this chapter is the pivotal role in criminal behaviour played by the brain as it mediates between internal biological inputs and external environmental inputs. The area of psychology concerned with brain structure and function is neuropsychology. Neuropsychologists examine the biological events in the brain that underlie human action, emotion and thought, including those associated with criminal behaviour. They are concerned with both normal brain structures and functions, and with the behavioural implications of brain impairments. We begin with an overview of the general field of neuropsychology, before moving to a more specific discussion of neuropsychological correlates and explanations of criminal behaviour.

Basic brain structures and functions Neuropsychology, like behavioural genetics, is a specialist field and it is beyond the scope of this book to cover it in detail here. What follows, then, is a simplified description of basic brain structures and functions that are especially relevant to neuropsychological explanations of crime. The nervous system The brain is part of the body’s nervous system, a network of nerve cells – or neurons – that is responsible for all psychological, behavioural and physiological

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activity. The basic job of a neuron is to relay information. Neurons come in a variety of shapes and have different specialised functions, but most comprise four main structures. The body of the neuron is called the soma and houses the basic machinery of the cell. Extending from the soma are tree-like fibres – hundreds or even thousands in number – called dendrites, which have receptors responsible for receiving messages from other neurons. Also extending from the soma is a slender tube called an axon, which is responsible for sending messages. The axon divides and branches, and at the ends of the branches are terminal buttons from which the messages are sent. A simplified diagram of a neuron is shown in Figure 4.1. The nervous system is divided into two parts: the central nervous system (CNS) and the peripheral nervous system (PNS) (see Figure 4.2). The CNS comprises the brain and the spinal cord and is the body’s ‘command centre’. The brain receives and processes stimuli from inside and outside of the body, it interprets and stores information, and it dispatches messages to initiate responses. The spinal cord is connected to the base of the brain and primarily acts as a conduit between the brain and the rest of the body below the neck. The PNS, as the name suggests, comprises the network of neurons outside the CNS and extending to the extremities of the body. The function of the PNS is to carry messages to and from the CNS. Sensory neurons provide information to the CNS about the body and the outside world gathered from internal and external sensory organs; motor neurons deliver commands from the CNS to muscles, glands and organs to control movement and the performance of bodily functions.

Figure 4.1 A neuron.

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Figure 4.2 Flow diagram of the nervous system.

The PNS is further divided into two parts: the somatic and the autonomic nervous systems. The somatic nervous system is connected to the skeletal muscles and governs voluntary actions. The behaviours involved in reading this book – sitting comfortably, focusing on the words, turning the pages – are products of your somatic nervous system. The autonomic nervous system (ANS) controls the body’s involuntary functions such as heart rate, respiration, digestion, pupil dilation, perspiration, and so forth. These processes occur automatically and are largely (though not entirely) outside of personal control. Finally, the ANS comprises two parts: the sympathetic and the parasympathetic nervous systems. These two systems work together but in opposing directions. The sympathetic nervous system generally acts to increase autonomic functioning and is responsible for the so-called flight-or-fight response. When faced with a stressor, the body automatically prepares itself to respond with maximum

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efficiency by increasing heart rate, increasing respiration, diverting blood to the muscles and so on. The parasympathetic nervous system, on the other hand, acts to slow autonomic functioning and restore equilibrium, allowing the body to ‘rest and digest’. As we shall see, some offenders have been found to differ markedly from non-offenders in the functioning of their ANS. Biochemical messengers Ultimately all behaviour can be traced back to the actions of chemicals that transmit messages within the brain and around the body. There are two main categories of such biochemicals: neurotransmitters and hormones. Neurotransmitters are responsible for fast-acting communication among neurons; hormones are slower-acting and are transmitted via the bloodstream. Neurotransmitters Neurons are not physically connected to one another, and because of this any one neuron can connect with perhaps thousands of other neurons. Communication between two neurons across the miniscule gap between them – called the synaptic cleft – involves a combination of electrical and biochemical activity. When a neuron is stimulated, it generates minute amounts of electrical voltage. This causes a tiny glob of neurotransmitter to be released from the neuron’s terminal buttons and to travel across the synaptic cleft to the dendrite of another neuron, where it alters the electrical charge of the receiving neuron. The connection made between two neurons is called a synapse. Once a synapse between two neurons has occurred, those neurons become more receptive to future intercommunication in a process called long-term potentiation. It is through this strengthening of the connections between neurons with repeated activity that neuronal circuits are laid down and learning takes place. There are at least 75 types of neurotransmitters and each one binds only with certain receptor sites, ensuring that messages go to the right neurons. Different neurons in turn may be associated with particular psychological functions, and excessive or deficient levels of the relevant neurotransmitter can produce harmful effects. Neurotransmitter levels can be affected by a combination of genetic and environmental factors. A number of specific genetic polymorphisms have been implicated in variations in neurotransmitter production, while levels also fluctuate in response to emotional stressors and other life events (Beaver, 2009; Caspi et al., 2002). Scientists have used knowledge about the role of neurotransmitters to develop drugs to treat some disorders. For example, low levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin are implicated in severe depression, and so some medications for depression (such as Prozac) are designed to stimulate serotonin activity. Note that the effects of a neurotransmitter depend more on the type of receptors to which it binds than on its chemical composition per se, and so the same neurotransmitter can be associated with multiple effects depending upon where it goes. Some of the main neurotransmitters associated with psychological functioning are shown in Table 4.1.

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Table 4.1 Neurotransmitters and their associated effects Neurotransmitter

Associated with neurons involved with . . .

Dopamine Serotonin

Emotional arousal, pleasure, voluntary movement Sleep, appetite, impulse control, aggression, anxiety, depression Norepinephrine Emotional arousal, anxiety, fear Acetlycholine Learning, cognition, memory Gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) Sexual functions, growth, motor functions

Hormones Hormones are produced by the endocrine system, a collection of glands that are located throughout the body. Endocrine glands include the adrenal glands, the thyroid gland, the pituitary gland, and the sex glands or gonads (ovaries and testicles). Chemically, hormones are similar, and in some cases identical, to neurotransmitters. For example, the hormone noradrenaline (produced by the adrenal glands) is the same as the neurotransmitter norepinephrine, and both have similar effects (triggering physiological arousal). However, hormones are secreted into the bloodstream and delivered directly to organs, muscles and other glands around the body. In comparison to neurotransmitters, hormones are relatively slow-acting. Like neurotransmitters, different hormones are associated with different functions. Of particular interest to criminologists are the hormones secreted by the sex glands. The major sex hormones are estrogens and androgens. Both classes of hormones are present in males and females alike, but in vastly different amounts. Most men produce 6–8 mg of testosterone (an androgen) per day, compared to most women who produce 0.5 mg daily. Estrogens are also present in both sexes, but in larger amounts for women. Sex hormones have both organisational and activating effects. Organisational effects refer to the permanent physical changes that occur during an individual’s formative years, such as the development of secondary sex characteristics during puberty (e.g., breasts in females, beards in males). Activating effects refer to temporary changes in the body and psychological functioning and include the production of sperm, ovulation and sexual arousal. Anatomy of the brain In the late eighteenth century, Franz Gall developed the theory of phrenology, which proposed that personality could be assessed by reading the bumps on an individual’s head that were assumed to correspond to overdeveloped sections of the brain below. While Gall’s principles of phrenology were fanciful and quickly dismissed by the scientific community, the basic idea that different parts of the brain are responsible for different functions is the basis of modern neuropsychology.

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For classification purposes, the brain is usually divided into the hindbrain, the midbrain and the forebrain, each of which contains several sub-divisions. The hindbrain sits at the top of the spinal chord and is evolutionarily the oldest part of the brain, sharing similarities with brain structures of other animals. Together the subsections of the hindbrain regulate vital functions such as breathing and blood circulation, and coordinate motor activity, equilibrium and sleep patterns. The midbrain sits above the hindbrain and forms part of the brain stem that connects the forebrain to the spinal cord. It is the smallest part of the brain – around 2 centimetres in length – and is primarily concerned with relaying auditory and visual information. The forebrain is the uppermost part of the brain and is the largest and most recently evolved structure. It deals with complex sensory, emotional, cognitive and behavioural functions. A map of the brain is shown in Figure 4.3. The largest and most complex of the forebrain substructures is the cerebral cortex, accounting for 80 per cent of total brain mass. It is the cortex which is largely responsible for the superior intelligence of humans. It comprises a layer of cells that covers the entire forebrain and is often referred to as grey matter. The cortex is physically divided into two hemispheres – the right and left – connected by a collection of nerve fibres called the corpus callosum. There is some division – or lateralisation – in the function of each hemisphere although

Figure 4.3 Cross-section of the brain showing hindbrain, midbrain and forebrain.

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there is also considerable overlap between hemispheres. The right hemisphere tends to be associated with creativity and spatial manipulation, while the left hemisphere tends to be associated with language and reasoning. For some functions, such as perception and motor behaviour, each hemisphere manages the activities of the opposite side of the body. Each hemisphere can be further divided into four lobes – parietal, occipital, temporal and frontal. Thus there are two versions of each lobe – a left and right version. In reality, the lobes are not defined by clear physical boundaries and functions tend to merge into one another (see Figure 4.4). The parietal lobes are at the top of the head and are involved with movement, orientation, perception and recognition of stimuli, and sensory experiences. The occipital lobes are at the back of the head and are involved with processing visual information. The temporal lobes are located at the side of the head around the temples, and are involved with hearing and speech. Finally, the frontal lobes are located at the front of the head behind the forehead and are involved with motor behaviour, abstract thinking, reasoning, planning, impulse control, problem solving, emotions and social skills. Collectively, the complex cognitive processes of the frontal lobe are known as executive function, and are particularly associated with the anterior (forward) region known as the prefrontal cortex. It is obvious from the brief description above that the frontal lobes, in particular, are associated with attributes and behaviours related to the ability to sustain socially-appropriate behaviours.

Figure 4.4 Side view of the lobes of the cerebral cortex.

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Brain development and the environment The human brain weighs about 350 grams at birth and will grow to around 1,400 grams by adulthood. While people are born with all the neurons that they will ever have – in fact, neurons begin to die off from birth – most of the connections among neurons are yet to develop. The growth of the brain is a product of the relentless proliferation of synapses and neuronal circuits. Axons and dendrites grow in length and complexity as they reach out to make connections with other neurons. The trillions of neuronal connections that ultimately become established develop in response to each individual’s unique interaction with his/her environment. These neuronal connections in turn govern how the individual responds to new environments. The most rapid growth in the brain occurs in the first few years of life, and by the age of 3 the main brain structures are in place to provide the foundation for future cognitive and behavioural development. The localisation of function in the brain begins at birth but in these first few years, in particular, there is a high degree of brain plasticity. At this point, many areas of the cortex are not committed to specific functions and the young brain has the capacity to reorganise its structure and utilise alternative locations if the original sites are damaged. The number of neuronal circuits continues to increase during childhood, but after the age of 10, weak or underused connections begin to be pruned to make room for more important and enduring ones. The result is that by early adulthood the brain is less adaptable but more efficient and powerful than it was during childhood. Brain maturation continues into the twenties with the final development of the frontal lobe (Anderson, 2002; Steinberg, 2005). Because brain structures develop over time, there are biologically-determined limits on cognitive functioning at given stages of life. Children and adolescents simply do not have the cognitive machinery to make some of the complex moral decisions that can be made by adults. Researchers have distinguished between two ways in which environmental experiences become incorporated into the structure of the brain: experienceexpectant and experience-dependent brain development (Black and Greenough, 1997). Experience-expectant mechanisms involve environmental inputs that guide the development of species-typical functions. The associated brain structures are genetically hard-wired and have evolved to prepare members of the species to deal with the environments they can be expected to encounter. However, these structures depend upon the individual receiving particular environmental stimuli to activate normal brain development. For example, in order to properly develop, the section of the cortex dealing with vision requires that the host individual be exposed to light. Experience-dependent mechanisms, on the other hand, involve environmental inputs that create new neuronal connections in response to individual differences in genetic make-up and each individual’s idiosyncratic experiences. Experience-dependent synapses are made throughout the lifespan and allow individuals to learn new skills and to adapt to the changing demands of everyday life. For example, learning to play the piano is an experience-dependent process. The brain of a person who has learned to play the piano is physically

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different from the brain of someone who hasn’t. Together, experience-expectant and experience-dependent mechanisms provide the neurological basis for the biosocial approach advanced in the preceding chapters. Brain development involves a combination of species-typical and individually-inherited structures, both of which are shaped and built upon by specific environmental experiences. Deficits in appropriate stimulation at crucial developmental stages can have irreparable effects on cognitive abilities and social behaviour. In a classic series of studies with rhesus monkeys, Harlow and Harlow (1962) found that monkeys who were deprived of maternal contact as babies developed severe and permanent behavioural pathologies, and especially an inability to form emotional attachments with other monkeys. Later research exploring the neurological bases of these behavioural effects found (among other things) that stimulus-deprived monkeys had less complex synaptic connections in their cortex (Kraemer, 1992). It is of course not possible to conduct similar experiments on children but sometimes circumstances provide the opportunity to conduct natural experiments to examine the detrimental effects of stimulus deprivation on brain development. For example, Rutter et al. (2004) studied children discovered in Romanian orphanages after the fall of that country’s communist regime. While in the orphanages, children were left alone in their cribs for extended periods without adult interaction. Many of these children were subsequently adopted by families in Great Britain. Those children adopted before the age of six months showed considerable cognitive and social improvements in their new environments. However, those adopted after this age had severe and persistent cognitive and social deficits, accompanied by below-average head size. In the following sections, research evidence linking neuropsychological processes with criminal, violent and antisocial conduct is reviewed. The reviews examine psychophysiological, biochemical, neuroanatomical and neuroenvironmental correlates of crime.

Psychophysiology and crime Psychophysiology is broadly concerned with the relationship between psychological processes and the nervous system. Of particular interest to psychologists and criminologists is the functioning of the ANS. Recall that the ANS governs involuntary physiological processes such as respiration, heart rate and perspiration. These processes in turn are related to emotional arousal and regulation. The experience of psychological stress increases autonomic functioning via the sympathetic nervous system. These physiological reactions can be easily observed through non-invasive techniques; for example, by measuring heart rate or electrodermal activity. The literature typically reports arousal under three different experimental conditions: (1) resting (in the absence of obvious stressors); (2) task (in anticipation or the presence of experimental stressors, for example, an aversive noise); and (3) reactivity (the change from resting to task). It has been found that many offenders have slower ANS responses than do non-offenders and are therefore less responsive to aversive environmental stimuli.

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Heart rate The most common method of assessing autonomic functioning is heart rate, usually measured for experimental purposes using an electrocardiograph (ECG), although sometimes simply by manually taking a pulse. Conveniently, there have been a number of meta-analyses examining the relationship between heart rate and crime. Ortiz and Raine (2004) examined 40 studies that examined the heart rates of delinquent and antisocial children and adolescents. The studies involved 45 separate analyses. Of these analyses, 29 supported the prediction that delinquency was related to low resting heart rate while a further 13 were nonsignificant but in the predicted direction. Nine studies also examined heart rates in the presence of a stressor. All but one of these found a significant relationship between delinquency and low heart rate. Lorber (2004) examined 95 studies involving juveniles or adults displaying aggression, psychopathy or conduct problems. Results for resting, task and reactivity heart rates were examined. The significant effects were mixed and depended upon the condition under which heart rate was measured, the age of the sample, and the nature of the problem behaviour. For both juveniles and adults, low resting heart rates were associated with increased aggression and conduct problems. There were no significant effects for the task condition, while for the reactivity condition, low heart rates were associated with increased conduct problems in adults. Lorber concluded that there is sufficient evidence to link low heart rates with characteristics associated with antisocial behaviour but that there are aspects of the complexity of the relationship that need to be explored in greater depth. Electrodermal activity Fluctuations in ANS functioning cause variations in perspiration, and because sweat contains salt, there are accompanying variations in the extent to which skin conducts electricity. By attaching electrodes to the skin (usually the fingertips) these minute variations in electrodermal activity can be measured by a galvanic skin response (GSR) meter. Increases in stress produce increases in conductivity. Lorber (2004) included GSR studies in the meta-analysis described above. Low resting GSR was significantly associated with psychopathy; low task GSR was significantly associated with psychopathy and conduct problems; and low reactivity GSR was associated with aggression in adults only, and psychopathy. Thus, in comparison to heart rate, the association between GSR and aggression and conduct problems was weaker, but the relationship with psychopathy was more robust.

Biochemistry and crime Because biochemical messengers are often implicated in alterations of mood and arousal they potentially play an important role in criminal behaviour, especially impulsive and violent crime. Of particular interest from a criminal careers

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perspective, research indicates that changes in biochemical activity in individuals as they age can help explain corresponding changes in their levels of criminal activity. This section reviews the research on three important biochemicals: the neurotransmitters dopamine and serotonin, and the sex hormone testosterone. Dopamine and serotonin While numerous neurotransmitters have been linked to criminal and antisocial activity, dopamine and serotonin are perhaps the two most widely researched. As noted in the previous chapter, in recent years research has moved beyond simply establishing the empirical link between particular neurotransmitters and behaviour; with advances in molecular genetics, research has increasingly focused on tracking down the specific genes associated with different neurotransmitters. The release of dopamine is associated with the feelings of pleasure that accompany activities such as eating and sexual intercourse. Dopamine, therefore, has a rewarding effect that encourages repetition of behaviour. Both excessive and deficient levels of dopamine are problematic. Higher-than-normal levels of dopamine have been linked to increased aggression and violence (Niehoff, 1999), while low levels may promote compensatory, self-rewarding behaviours such as novelty-seeking, gambling and substance abuse (Beaver, 2009). Serotonin is associated with impulse control. The release of serotonin decreases neuronal activity and with this it also decreases the tendency for aggression and other impulsive behaviour. Low levels of serotonin are hypothesised to increase antisocial involvement by dulling sensitivity to punishment cues. In a meta-analysis, Moore et al. (2002) reviewed 16 studies, involving 20 separate analyses, examining the relationship between serotonin and various measures of delinquency and antisocial behaviour. They found a moderate-sized effect (−.45) for reduced serotonin on antisocial behaviour. A number of genes have been identified as playing a role in regulating neurotransmitters. Some genes – known as receptor genes – code for proteins that facilitate the binding of neurotransmitters to neuronal receptors. Other genes – known as transporter genes – code for proteins involved in the reuptake (i.e., absorption) of neurotransmitters after a neuronal synapse (Beaver, 2009). In the case of dopamine, polymorphisms of the receptor genes DRD2 and DRD4, and the transporter gene DAT1, have been linked to violent, addictive and antisocial behaviours (ibid.; Guo et al., 2007; Lu et al., 2001). The polymorphisms of DRD4 and DAT1 are minisatellites (variable number tandem repeats) while DRD2 is a single nucleotide polymorphism (see Chapter 3). Likewise, a minisatellite polymorphism of the serotonin transporter gene 5-HTTLPR has been found to be related to increases in antisocial behaviour (Beitchman et al., 2006; Haberstick, et al., 2006). Of course, these genes are just some of the many that combine in complex permutations to influence the quantitative traits associated with criminal dispositions. In the cases of both dopamine and serotonin (and other neurotransmitters as well) production levels fluctuate over the life-course. Changes in the levels of

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certain neurotransmitters may help explain the age–crime curve. As outlined in earlier chapters, across all societies there is a surge in offending rates around the age of 17, followed by a gradual decline after the age of 24 or so. It has been found that serotonin levels increase with age, while dopamine peaks in adolescence before dopamine receptors begin to decay (for reviews of the research, see Collins, 2004, and Spear, 2003). These changes over time in neurotransmitter levels correspond to the increase and abatement of aggressive and sensation-seeking behaviour, and fit with the predictions of evolutionary theory discussed in Chapter 2. When humans lived in hunter–gatherer societies, it was adaptive for males to engage in risky behaviour during adolescence because this maximised their preparedness to compete for a mate. Testosterone The fact that males in humans and many other species are typically more aggressive than females has led to obvious speculation about the role that the male sex hormone testosterone may play in aggression. However, while there is good evidence from animal studies linking variations in testosterone to variations in aggressive behaviour, the evidence for humans is more mixed (Archer, 1991). Research has examined violence in terms of both the organisational and activating effects of testosterone. Research on organisational effects has examined whether abnormal exposure to androgens such as testosterone at critical developmental periods has resulted in permanent increases in the propensity for violence. Most of the limited research has examined the long-term effects on girls of prenatal exposure to androgens. It has been found that while such girls may develop more ‘tomboy’ characteristics, there is little consistent evidence of an increased risk of aggression (Berenbaum et al., 2000; Ehrhardt and Meyer-Bahlburg, 1981). Research on activating effects has examined whether levels of testosterone are related to concurrent levels of violence. In a meta-analysis, Book et al. (2001) reviewed 45 studies involving 54 independent analyses. Some 83 per cent (45) of the analyses produced significant positive correlations between testosterone and aggression, producing a weighted mean correlation of .14. Thus, while there is evidence implicating testosterone in aggression, the overall strength of the effect was modest. Examining the research more closely, Book et al. identified two moderator variables that affected the strength of the relationship between testosterone and aggression. The first was age. Testosterone levels in males surge in adolescence and, not surprisingly, the effect of testosterone on aggression was greatest for males between the ages of 13 and 20 years, declining with age thereafter. This finding mirrors that for neurotransmitters and is similarly consistent with an evolutionary explanation of the age–crime curve. The second moderator was the time of day that testing for testosterone was conducted. Book et al. make the point that testosterone is released into the bloodstream in spurts and that levels fluctuate considerably during the day. Most researchers take just one measure of testosterone, and that is usually done in the morning when levels are most unstable.

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The unreliability of testosterone measures may be one reason for the somewhat patchy findings for the effects of testosterone on human aggression. Interestingly, sex did not emerge as a moderator. While females have less testosterone than males, and overall are less aggressive, the relationship between aggression and testosterone was the same for males and females. That is, like males, aggressive females had higher levels of testosterone than did non-aggressive females. There are two ways to conceptualise the relationship between testosterone and aggression, described by the basal and reciprocal models (Mazur and Booth, 1998). The basal model proposes a direct, one-way relationship in which increases in testosterone produce increases in aggression. Most researchers, however, endorse the reciprocal model in which testosterone and aggression are seen to be interdependent. That is, testosterone not only facilitates aggression but aggression (or the anticipation of aggression) increases testosterone. In this analysis, the production of testosterone is an evolutionary adaptive response designed to help an individual confront an environmental threat. For example, Mazur and Booth reported that male testosterone rises prior to competition with other males. Mazur and Booth argued that testosterone may be related to dominance rather than aggression per se, with aggressive behaviour a by-product of attempts to assert ascendency over others.

Neuroanatomy and crime A fundamental challenge for neuropsychologists is to map brain structure and function against outward behaviour without causing damage to the individual being studied. To assist in this task, a number of techniques have been developed. These include electroencephalography, brain imaging, and neuropsychological assessment. Electroencephalography Electroencephalographs (EEGs) measure electrical impulses that are produced by the firing of neurons in the brain and are relayed by electrodes attached to the scalp. There are four main brainwave patterns that vary in frequency and that are associated with different brain functions (Martin, 2006). Delta waves are the slowest (frequency up to 4 Hz) and are found in babies, and in adults in deep sleep; theta waves (4–7 Hz) are found in young children and in drowsy adults; alpha waves (8–12 Hz) are associated with relaxed states in adults; and beta waves (12–30 Hz) are associated with active concentration. There has been extensive research over more than 50 years on the relationship between brainwaves and constructs related to antisocial behaviour. There is a substantial body of research that shows significant brainwave abnormalities in criminal and antisocial populations. The most consistent finding is that under conditions of rest, many antisocial individuals have high levels of slow-wave activity. Slowing has been found to manifest as a shift to lower frequencies within the alpha wave band (Finn et al., 2000; Linberg et al., 2005; Mednick et al.,

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1981), and a relative abundance of low-frequency theta and delta waves (Pillmann et al., 1999). Further, these abnormalities have been found to occur particularly in the frontal-lobe regions of the brain (Finn et al., 2000), and in the left hemisphere (Deckel et al., 1996; Pillmann et al., 1999). Recall that the frontal lobe is associated with higher-order executive function, while the left hemisphere is associated with verbal and linguistic reasoning. Two main hypotheses have been offered to explain the slow brain activity of offenders. The first is that, since slow brainwaves are characteristic of children, slow wave activity in adults may reflect delayed neurological development. However, longitudinal studies do not support this interpretation (Mednick et al., 1981). The second and more widely accepted hypothesis is that slow brainwaves are part of the same syndrome that produces the slow ANS responses reported earlier. That is, slow brainwaves contribute to an interpretation of some offenders as under-aroused (Raine, 2002a). Another line of EEG research has examined brainwave patterns known as event-related potentials (ERP) that occur in response to an internal or external stimulus. Most research has examined an ERP called P300 (denoting that it is a positive peak 300 milliseconds after the presentation of the stimulus), elicited experimentally by presenting a subject with a novel stimulus that demands their attention (e.g., discriminating between two auditory tones). The typical finding is for antisocial and substance-dependent individuals to produce lower amplitude ERP waves and longer response delays (latencies) when compared to non-clinical samples (see Gao and Raine, 2009, for a meta-analytic review). P300 amplitude is thought to be a measure of mental processing capacity, while latency is a measure of processing speed (Polich, 2007). Low amplitudes and long latencies, therefore, are thought to reflect deficits in attention, memory and cognitive processing. Polich locates these processes in frontal, temporal and parietal brain structures. While EEG research can go some way towards localising the dysfunction detected by abnormal brainwave patterns, EEG is not ideally suited to the task of mapping brain structures and functions. A single EEG electrode picks up signals from millions of neurons, many of which may be some distance from the electrode. In recent years brain imaging techniques have taken over as the preferred methods of investigating brain structure and function, allowing researchers to view directly areas of brain abnormality. Brain imaging There are several different brain imaging methods (Martin, 2006). Some techniques provide static, three-dimensional structural images of the brain. Computerised tomography (CT) does this by analysing X-rays passed through the brain on a 180 degrees rotation; magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) detects changes in atomic particles as a magnetic field is passed through the brain. Other techniques provide images of ongoing brain activity. Positron emission tomography (PET) displays neuronal activity based on measurements of glucose metabolism and oxygen consumption in the brain; single photon emission computerised tomography

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(SPECT) tracks the flow of radioactive chemicals that are injected into the bloodstream; and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measures the effect of oxygen concentrations on the magnetic properties of the blood’s haemoglobin. In terms of brain structure, research indicates a number of differentiating neurological characteristics for antisocial and violent individuals. Using CT, more right temporal abnormalities (Hucker et al., 1988) and smaller left temporal and frontal brain area (Wright et al., 1990) have been found in violent sex offenders than in non-violent controls, although other studies have failed to replicate these findings (Langevin et al., 1989). The findings for MRI have generally been more consistent. Dolan et al. (2002) compared 18 personality-disordered prisoners with 21 controls. They found that temporal lobe volumes were 20 per cent smaller in the personality-disordered sample. Similarly, Huebner et al. (2008) found a 6 per cent reduction in average volume of grey matter in boys with conduct disorder, with particular deficits in the left frontal lobe and both temporal lobes. Studies of brain activity reinforce and extend the findings of structural abnormalities in antisocial individuals. Using PET, Volkow and Tancredi (1987) found decreased glucose metabolism at rest in the frontal and left-temporal regions of violent offenders. Similarly, PET studies examining metabolic activity during a performance task report abnormalities of the prefrontal and temporal regions of antisocial individuals (Goyer et al., 1994; Raine et al., 1997). Studies using SPECT report reduced blood flow in the prefrontal cortex, temporal cortex, and a sub-cortical (i.e., beneath the cortex) forebrain structure associated with memory called the hippocampus (Sondrestrom et al., 2000; Wong et al., 1997). Finally, studies using fMRI report decreased neural activity – principally in the frontal lobe, temporal lobe, and limbic system (a collection of sub-cortical forebrain structures, including the hippocampus and amygdala, associated with learning, memory and emotions) – during various cognitive and emotional tasks (Birbaumer et al., 2005; Kiehl et al., 2004; Müller et al., 2003; Vollm et al., 2004). Birbaumer et al. (2005), for example, subjected a sample of ten psychopaths and a comparison group of ten non-psychopaths to a learning condition in which pictures of faces were paired with painful pressure. The procedure was designed to examine the acquisition and maintenance of conditioned fear. Birbaumer et al. found that non-psychopaths showed significant activation in limbic-prefrontal circuit – areas involved in emotional learning – while the psychopaths did not. They concluded that the psychopaths had neurological deficits in processing emotions and anticipating painful events. In summary, brain imaging studies have found a range of structural and functional neurological deficits in antisocial and violent offenders. While there are some inconsistencies in the findings, in general, structural imaging has identified abnormalities in the temporal region, and functional imaging has identified abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex. For more detailed reviews of brain imaging studies on antisocial behaviour see Bassarath (2001), Buffkin and Luttrell (2005) and Yang et al. (2008).

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Neuropsychological instruments While brain imaging techniques provide accurate information on the location of brain functions, everyday psychological assessments of brain functioning are usually carried out using a range of cognitive tests. By presenting subjects with different cognitive tasks, conclusions can be drawn about the functioning of those areas of the brain assumed to be involved in the performance of those tasks. The most common instruments assessing cognitive functioning are measures of general intelligence (IQ). That offenders have on average IQ scores 8–10 points below normal (100) is one of the most robust findings in criminology, with research dating back almost a century (Doll, 1920; Hirschi and Hindelang, 1977; Moffitt et al., 1981; West and Farrington, 1977). The effect of IQ on crime holds when other possible confounding factors – such as parental criminality, socio-economic status, and whether or not the offender was caught – are controlled for. Low IQ in pre-school children predicts later delinquency (Lipsitt et al., 1990) and low IQ in released prisoners is an independent predictor of recidivism (Gendreau et al., 1996). As would be predicted, life-course persistent offenders have lower IQ scores than do adolescent-limited offenders (Donnellan et al., 2000; Moffitt, 1993). Measures of global intelligence, however, provide little information about how different parts of the brain are functioning. Some tests break IQ down into different abilities. For example, the most recent version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (the WAIS-III) comprises 14 sub-scales, with a broad division made between verbal tasks (e.g., defining the meaning of words) and performance tasks (e.g., assembling blocks). The characteristic pattern for offenders is to score particularly poorly on verbal tasks, with deficits in serious, persistent offenders of up to 12 points (Andrew, 1977; Binder, 1988; Cornell and Wilson, 1992; Hirschi and Hindelang, 1977; Moffitt, 1993). Verbal tasks are assumed to provide a measure of abstract reasoning and social judgement, and low scores are usually interpreted as indicating left hemisphere dysfunction. There are many other individual tests that are designed to measure specific cognitive abilities. Particular attention has been given to measures of executive function. As noted earlier in this chapter, executive function refers to the cognitive processes involved in the planning and execution of goal-oriented behaviours. These processes include reasoning, problem-solving and cognitive flexibility, and are located in the frontal lobes, and more specifically, the prefrontal cortex (Morgan and Lilienfeld, 2000; Royall et al., 2002). Common tests of executive function include the Porteus Mazes Test (PMT), in which individuals are required to trace the pathway through various mazes, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), in which individuals are required to sort cards containing different numbers, colours and shapes according to specified rules. Typically, tests are administered as part of a battery in order to capture the complex nature of executive function. In a meta-analysis, Morgan and Lilienfeld (2000) reviewed 39 studies involving at least one of six validated tests of executive function. They found significant deficits in executive function for antisocial individuals, with effect sizes described as medium to large depending on the test in question. In

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another meta-analysis, Ogilvie, Stewart, Chan and Shum (under review) reviewed 42 studies that were published after Morgan and Lilienfeld’s review, and which involved at least one of 15 validated tests. They similarly found executive function impairments in antisocial individuals, with an average effect size described as medium. There remains debate about whether the effect of cognitive deficits on crime is direct or indirect (McGloin et al., 2004; Ward and Tittle, 1994). The direct argument holds that less cognitively-able individuals are more prone to crime because they possess impaired decision-making abilities, social judgement and impulse control. The indirect argument holds that, because of these cognitive deficits, such individuals do poorly at school and in other areas of life that are important for social development, and it is this that increases their risk of criminality. In all likelihood, the effect of cognitive deficits on crime involves a combination of both direct biological influences and indirect environmental influences (Quay, 1987). A further aspect of a biosocial approach, addressed below, is the extent to which environmental factors also contribute to the cognitive deficits themselves.

Neuro-environmental factors and crime It has been emphasised in this chapter that every environmental experience has implications for brain structure as part of normal brain development. However, this section is concerned more narrowly with the impact on neurological functioning, and the subsequent role in crime, that might be played by adverse environmental events such as perinatal trauma, child abuse and neglect, poor diet, exposure to toxins and substance abuse. Perinatal factors Perinatal factors refer to events around the time of birth, covering conception, gestation, delivery and the first weeks of life. Adverse events for the baby include the mother smoking during pregnancy, her consumption of drugs and alcohol, and birth complications such as oxygen deprivation, forceps delivery and low birth weight. There is now convincing evidence that if the mother smokes during pregnancy there is an increased risk of childhood and adult behavioural problems in the offspring (Brennan et al., 1999; Huijbregts et al., 2007; Linnet et al., 2003; Maughan et al., 2004; Nigg and Breslau, 2007). Two components of cigarette smoke, nicotine and carbon monoxide, are thought to be the main culprits through their deleterious effect on the development of neurotransmitter systems (Olds, 1997). In one study, Brennan et al. (1999) found twice the rate of adult violent offending in the offspring of mothers who smoked 20 cigarettes per day when compared to the offspring of non-smokers. The levels of violent offending increased with the levels of smoking. Further, there was an interaction effect when foetal exposure to smoking was paired with birth complications; the concurrence of these two conditions produced a five-fold increase in adult offending. Finally,

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the effects of smoking applied only to life-course persistent offenders, and not to adolescent-limited offenders. Alcohol consumption by the mother during pregnancy has also been found to have a range of negative outcomes for the child. In extreme cases, the child may develop foetal alcohol syndrome, which results in significant growth retardation, physical abnormalities and neurological dysfunction (O’Leary, 2004). Linnet et al. (2003) reviewed nine studies examining maternal drinking and behavioural outcomes for the child. They found correlations between alcohol consumption and increased rates of ADHD and similar behavioural symptoms such as inattention, impulsivity and externalising behaviour. The findings for the long-term effects of birth complications are more mixed and generally involve interactions with other variables. For example, Raine et al. (1997), following a sample of 4,269 males, found that birth complications when paired with maternal rejection predicted adult violent offending but not property offending, and applied only to early onset offending. Similarly, Piquero and Tibbetts (1999), in a prospective longitudinal study of 867 males, found that birth complications interacted with disadvantaged family environments to increase the risk of adult violence. Child neglect and abuse As the earlier discussion of Romanian orphans indicates, adverse childhood experiences have potentially significant implications for brain development. There has, however, been little research examining the relationship between childhood abuse and neglect, brain function and antisocial conduct. In one exception, Raine et al. (2001) used fMRI to examine brain function in four groups: (1) individuals who had experienced severe child abuse but had no history of violence; (2) those who had experienced severe child abuse and did have a history of violence; (3) those who had no experience of child abuse but had a history of violence; and (4) a control group with no experience of child abuse or a history of violence. Abused participants (irrespective of their violence status) showed reduced cortical activity, especially in the left hemisphere, when compared with non-abused participants. However, in comparison to non-violent individuals who had experienced abuse, violent offenders who experienced abuse showed reduced right-hemispheric functioning. Overall, results suggest that abuse in childhood causes changes in brain structure that build upon existing right-hemispheric dysfunction to increase the risk of violence. However, an earlier study by Raine et al. (1998) did not detect increased brain dysfunction associated with abuse. Raine et al. examined the prefrontal functioning of convicted murderers. The sample was divided into two groups, those who had a deprived background and those who came from relatively good homes. The researchers found greater levels of impairment in the murderers who came from a good home. Interpreting the findings, the authors argued that offenders from deprived backgrounds became involved in crime largely through environmental factors. The offenders from good homes, however, committed crime in

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spite of their relative environmental advantages. It is likely then, that they were born with biological deficits. In reconciling this study with the previously described one, it may be that neglect and abuse need to be severe before it produces brain dysfunction that is observable using current brain imaging techniques. Diet Research on the link between diet and antisocial behaviour has examined the effects of deficiencies in certain vitamins and minerals; deficiencies in polyunsaturated fatty acids; intolerance to particular foods or food additives; and consumption of sugar and other refined foods. A recent series of meta-analyses by Benton (2007) examined the separate effects of each of these dietary conditions on violence and antisocial behaviour. Micro-nutrient deficiencies potentially affect behaviour by interfering with the production of neurochemicals such as serotonin. Benton reviewed three studies that examined the effects on misconduct of vitamin supplements. In one study the participants were incarcerated juveniles, in another they were incarcerated adults, and in the other they were school children with records of disciplinary infractions. The three studies found significant reductions in rule violation of between 28 and 47 per cent after participants were administered the supplements. The brain is a fatty organ and in particular contains high levels of essential polyunsaturated fatty acids which must be obtained via diet (i.e., they are not manufactured by the body). Benton examined the effects of polyunsaturated fatty acid supplements on attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children and aggression in adults. He found no reliable evidence that the supplements led to improvements in ADHD. However, in the case of adults, a meta-analysis involving eight studies showed significant reductions in violence following the supplements. Intolerance to certain foods can lead to malabsorption or other adverse reactions, although the mechanisms by which this then affects behaviour is unclear. Most studies have examined the effects of food intolerance on ADHD in children. Benton reviewed five studies that examined the efficacy of systematically eliminating problem foods from the diet. All five studies reported post-intervention improvements in behaviour. Benton concluded that there is evidence that some foods – especially wheat, dairy products and chocolate – can exacerbate ADHD. However, the effects of the foods and the treatments vary among individuals. Finally, consumption of sugar can affect blood glucose levels which in turn can affect brain function. Too much sugar is thought to stimulate the production of insulin which causes reduced sugar levels in the blood two to four hours after ingestion, a condition which in extreme cases is known as hypoglycaemia. Sugar intake is popularly thought to increase aggression. Benton found the evidence for a link between sugar intake and violence to be weak. In normal adults, a drop in blood glucose to the point of hypoglycaemia is rare. However, some individuals are susceptible to low glucose levels and they may become more violent and irritable as a result.

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Toxins Heavy metals, such as lead and manganese, are highly toxic, and if they enter the bloodstream they can seriously affect brain structure and function. Lead, for example, affects the functioning of neurotransmitters such as dopamine, while manganese affects levels of serotonin (Masters, 1998). Exposure to toxins can occur as the result of environmental pollution, and some heavy metals may find their way into the food chain. One line of research involves large-scale epidemiological studies. Masters (1998) examined the effects of exposure to lead and manganese on crime rates. He compared data on lead and manganese pollution with crime rates for 1,165 USA counties, covering a population of over 130 million. Controlling for a wide range of socio-demographic factors, he found highly significant effects on crime rates for both metals. More recently, Nevin (2007), using a longitudinal design, examined the relationship over several decades between blood lead levels in preschool children and subsequent national adult crime rates in nine countries (the USA, Britain, Canada, France, Australia, Finland, Italy, West Germany and New Zealand). Lead levels predicted rates of juvenile offending, property crime, violent crime and repeat offending. Other studies have examined smaller, targeted samples. Needleman et al. (1996) examined lead levels in the bones of 301 schoolboys. Lead levels correlated with teacher and parent ratings of aggressive and delinquent behaviour. Similarly, Gottschalk et al. (1991) found higher levels of manganese in the hair of violent criminals when compared to levels in controls. In a prospective longitudinal study involving 250 children, Wright et al. (2008) took prenatal measures of maternal blood lead concentrations, followed by regular measures from the children for the next 6.5 years. Both the mothers’ and the children’s blood lead levels predicted higher rates of arrest in adulthood. Substance abuse Most research on the relationship between substance abuse and crime has focused on violence. Research has shown consistently that substance abuse is involved in a high proportion of violent crimes. For example, statistics from Australia (Dearden and Payne, 2009), England and Wales (Kershaw et al., 2008), and the USA (US Department of Justice, 2009) indicate that in around half of all violent crimes the perpetrator was using alcohol at the time of the offence, while in onefifth to one-third of cases the perpetrator was using some other type of drug. For our purposes, violence that occurs as a direct result of pharmacological effects of substance abuse must be distinguished from violence associated with disputes in the illegal drug trade or with the activities of users to obtain money to buy drugs. The pharmacological effects of substance abuse may be the result of short-term alterations to psychological functioning, or long-term impairment to brain structure. The neurological mechanisms by which substance abuse affects behaviour varies from substance to substance, but in general is thought to involve alterations

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in the levels of various neurotransmitters, including dopamine and serotonin, and impairment to prefrontal functioning (Boles and Miotto, 2003; Fishbein, 2000; Giancola and Tarter, 1999). Substance abuse is embedded in cultural, social and situational contexts, and isolating the pharmacological effects from other factors has proved a challenge for researchers. In a review of the literature, Boles and Miotto (2003) concluded that the evidence of a direct link between substance abuse and violence was strongest for alcohol. However, the effect of alcohol on aggression is most pronounced in individuals with pre-existing dispositions for violence. In addition, there is a debate about the extent to which alcohol-induced disinhibition is a neurologically-based phenomenon, or a psychologically-based phenomenon that has more to do with the expected effects of alcohol consumption. Some violent offenders may use alcohol as a justification for their actions. Of other types of drugs, Boles and Miotto found some evidence to link violence with the pharmacological effects of benzodiazepines, amphetamines, cocaine and phencyclidine (PCP). They found no evidence of a link with violence for marijuana, opiates and hallucinogens, although hallucinogens may trigger violent outbursts in individuals with pre-existing psychopathology.

Putting it together: neuropsychological theories of crime The focus in the previous sections was on reporting research findings on the crime–brain relationship; organising these findings into coherent explanatory models of crime is the task of this section. The findings reviewed in this chapter present a complex and at times a seemingly contradictory picture of the role of neurological factors in crime. Four explanations are described – sub-optimal arousal, reward dominance, prefrontal dysfunction and hemispheric functioning – each of which addresses different aspects of the data. These explanations are not mutually exclusive and each may describe a particular set of crime patterns or offender types. Sub-optimal arousal One of the most consistent neurological correlates of antisocial behaviour is low arousal. Experimentally, low arousal has been exhibited in ANS functioning as measured by ECG and GSR, and in cortical brain wave activity as measured by EEG. Antisocial individuals have been shown to have lower resting arousal levels, and to show less arousal in response to aversive stimuli. The neurological processes responsible for low arousal are thought to involve the reticular formation (Eysenck, 1967; Lykken, 1957). The reticular formation is a hindbrain structure with neural pathways into the limbic system and frontal cortex. Low arousal is viewed as the failure of the reticular formation to activate cortical functioning effectively. Low arousal in antisocial individuals is thought to increase the predisposition to crime in two ways. First, it is argued that individuals with low internal levels of

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cortical arousal will seek to compensate with increased levels of external arousal (Ellis and Walsh, 2000; Eysenck, 1997; Raine, 2002b, 2002c; Walsh, 2009). According to this line of reasoning, humans have an optimal level of arousal that they find comfortable. Low levels of internal arousal are experienced by the individual as boredom. Individuals with low arousal are hence prone to seek stimulation in order to increase arousal to optimal levels and relieve boredom. It is because sensation-seeking individuals are under-aroused that Ritalin, which is a stimulant designed to increase dopamine levels, is used as a treatment for ADHD. One consequence of sensation-seeking, however, is an increased likelihood of engaging in exciting and risky activities that may include illegal behaviours. In addition to tangible rewards, an attraction for offenders of many crimes, such as stealing cars and breaking into houses, may be the thrill involved. Second, low ANS arousal is associated with a relative insensitivity to aversive stimuli (Ellis and Walsh, 2000; Raine, 2002b, 2002c). If pain is experienced less intensely, it is argued that an individual will be less inhibited and more fearless, and is consequently more likely to engage in impulsive and reckless behaviour. It takes a degree of toughness and a disregard for the prospect of injury to get into a fight. Moreover, insensitivity to pain makes an individual less responsive to corrective environmental feedback. Individuals with low arousal are more difficult to discipline and less likely to learn from experience because harmful consequences have less impact on them. It should be pointed out that the attributes associated with low arousal are not necessarily bad. It is sensation-seeking that drives individuals to climb Mt Everest and to sail solo around the world. And it is fearlessness that enables a war hero to put his/her life at risk to save his/her platoon. Proponents of sub-optimal arousal recognise the crucial role that social development and other environmental experiences play in shaping the way that sensation-seeking and risk-taking behaviour is manifested. Reward dominance A number of researchers (Fowles, 1988; Gray, 1982) have proposed the existence of two opposing but independent regulating systems in the brain for governing the performance of voluntary behaviour. The behavioural activation system (BAS) encourages behaviour by processing reward cues; the behavioural inhibition system (BIS) discourages behaviour by processing punishment cues. In most people, these two systems are roughly equivalent in strength. However, individuals who have a dominant BAS have an increased potential for impulsivity; those with a dominant BIS have an increased susceptibility to anxiety. It is argued that in offenders the BAS is dominant over the BIS. Offenders, therefore, are more sensitive to the prospect of rewards than to the threat of punishment and they behave in impulsive and self-defeating ways accordingly. Structurally, neuronal connections linking the limbic system and the left frontal lobes have been identified as the location for BIS/BAS functioning (Gray, 1982). Among the functions of the limbic system is the regulation of fear, which plays an

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important role in the ability to learn associations between certain behaviours and their unpleasant consequences. The presumed role of the frontal lobes and the limbic system is consistent with findings of decreased neural activity in these regions in psychopaths during conditioned fear trials (Birbaumer et al., 2005). Behavioural studies investigating the role of BIS/BAS regulation involve examining the perseverance in a task in the face of negative feedback. One common research design compares the strategies of antisocial and conduct disordered individuals with those of controls when playing computerised games (Matthys et al., 1998; O’Brien and Frick, 1996). The games are programmed to deliver some initial easy wins, and then to progressively increase the proportion of losses. Under these conditions, antisocial and conduct disordered participants are more likely than controls to persist in playing in spite of the mounting losses. It is claimed that this focus on short-term rewards and the corresponding inattention to punishment are not only responsible for criminal conduct, but also explain the high incidence of gambling addiction and substance abuse among offender samples (Ellis and Walsh, 2000). Prefrontal dysfunction While many structures of the brain have at some point been implicated in antisocial behaviour, the most consistent findings have been of frontal lobe dysfunction, particularly in the prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for executive function. Findings of prefrontal abnormalities in antisocial and violent individuals have come from research using EEG, brain imaging and neuropsychological instruments. In comparison to controls, offender samples display less neural activity in the prefrontal cortex, and are less able to perform cognitive tasks associated with prefrontal structures. The conceptual relationship between executive function and crime is readily apparent. Executive function is involved in such tasks as planning, emotional control, empathy and moral reasoning (Raine et al., 2000; Raine and Yang, 2006). It is the complexity of the prefrontal cortex that most distinguishes the human brain from that of other primates. From an evolutionary perspective, the skills associated with the prefrontal cortex are essential for the ability to live cooperatively in social groups. Injury to the prefrontal cortex has been associated with the development of impulsiveness, impaired decision-making, callousness and lack of empathy (Bechara, et al., 1997; Damasio et al., 1994). Executive function is among the last of the cognitive processes to develop, with final maturation not occurring until the early twenties (Steinberg, 2005). The normative development of executive function helps explain adolescent-limited offending and the age–crime curve. In the case of pathological development, impairment of executive function is likely to be a joint result of inherited deficits in brain structures and adverse developmental experiences. Hemispheric functioning Lateralisation of brain abnormalities in offender samples has also been found, with left-hemispheric dysfunction the most frequently reported. The left hemisphere

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plays a particular role in analytic, serial functions such as language and reasoning. The right hemisphere specialises in synthesising information, and so has greater involvement in tasks requiring holistic analyses such as spatial perception. Slow brainwave activity and reduced structural volume are more common in the left hemisphere than the right hemisphere of antisocial individuals when compared to controls. In addition, neuropsychological tests consistently show that offenders perform poorly on verbal in comparison to performance tasks, a disparity that is thought to reflect inferior left-hemispheric functioning. It is argued that left-hemispheric dysfunction results in deficits in languagebased reasoning, making it more difficult for individuals to understand and follow social rules (Ellis and Walsh, 2000; Flor-Henry, 1989). In addition to deficits in the left hemisphere, researchers have argued that the relative strength of the right hemisphere is also problematic. Right hemispheric dominance has been associated with increased negative emotions and impulsivity (Ellis and Walsh, 2000). It should be noted that not all researchers favour the left-hemispheric dysfunction explanation. Raine and colleagues (Raine, 2002a, 2002c; Raine et al., 2001) have argued that some offenders, particularly those charged with crimes of violence, are characterised by abnormalities of the right hemisphere. Raine et al. (2001) suggested that just as the right hemisphere is associated with the expression of negative emotions, it is similarly involved in the recognition of those emotions in others. Dysfunction of the right hemisphere may mean that an individual responds inappropriately to emotional cues and this contributes to the escalation of disputes.

Conclusion and evaluation The brain occupies a central position in the chain of events that ultimately results in crime. Its role is to receive and process biological and environmental data, and to initiate and regulate responses that may include criminal behaviour. To the extent that criminal behaviour has a genetic basis, the effect of genes is realised via the construction and functioning of the brain. To the extent that criminal behaviour is caused by the environment, the learning that occurs as a result of environmental experiences must be encoded in neuronal circuits in the brain. In terms of the nature/nurture debate, all behaviour, and hence all crime, are inescapably biosocial. The very physical structure of the brain is determined jointly by biological and environmental factors. An important distinction can be made between the roles played in crime by normative and pathological brain development. Normative brain development refers to the maturation processes that are common to us all. The normal patterns by which brain structures and functions develop over time help explain changes in general criminality risk at different ages. Levels of impulsivity, risk-taking and sensation-seeking, and the capacity for moral reasoning, change over the life-course. Males in particular experience surges in testosterone and changes in neurotransmitter activity in early adolescence, an age at which widespread involvement in delinquency also begins to occur. The final maturation of the

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frontal lobes and executive function does not occur until the early twenties when most offenders begin to age out of crime. Pathological brain development refers to the differences between offenders and non-offenders in brain structures and functions. There is strong and consistent evidence that many offenders have neurological deficits that underlie their criminal activities. These deficits include slow autonomic functioning, disrupted biochemical activity, brain structure abnormalities and impaired brain function. The effect of these deficits is to predispose the individual to greater-than-normal levels of impulsive, risky, callous, and at times violent behaviour. The results of the research reviewed in this chapter can be best understood within the multiple pathways model of a criminal careers framework. It needs to be emphasised that in most of the studies reviewed in this chapter the experimental samples comprised persistent antisocial, psychopathic and violent individuals; that is, offenders who were at the high-end of the offending-seriousness scale. In the studies in which there were direct comparisons between life-course persistent and adolescent-limited offenders, evidence of dysfunction was found only in the life-course persistent sample (Brennan et al., 1999; Donnellan et al., 2000; Moffitt, 1993; Moffitt and Caspi, 2001; Raine et al., 1997). For adolescentlimited offenders, the effects of normative brain development are of most relevance. While the brain plays an indispensable role in all crime, not all offenders have neurological impairments. This chapter has focused on the neurological bases of various attributes – sensation-seeking, risk-taking, fearlessness, impulsiveness – that may predispose individuals to criminality. How these attributes might be organised into a coherent model of personality is the subject of Chapter 5.

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In previous chapters we have examined some of the biosocial bases of criminality. In the course of this examination it has been emphasised that criminality is not a unitary construct. There is no one gene or neurological feature that distinguishes offenders from non-offenders, and nor can criminality be defined in terms of a single offender attribute. Rather, a predisposition to commit crime may involve a variety of different personal characteristics. There has been some discussion already about what these attributes include. For example, in the previous chapter sensation-seeking, risk-taking and impulsivity were each identified as potential contributors to criminal conduct. In this chapter we unpack in a more systematic way the personal attributes that may increase an individual’s likelihood to engage in crime. The study of human attributes is the province of personality psychology. Personality may be broadly defined as the consistent and enduring ways of thinking, patterns of behaviour and emotional responses that characterise an individual. The focus on personality in this chapter marks a shift for us to a more overtly psychological view of criminality. Genes and neurons are physical entities whereas personality is an abstract concept involving thoughts, feelings and behaviour. While our analysis of personality remains firmly within the biosocial perspective, our starting point is the psychological expression of biological processes rather than the biological processes themselves. The chapter begins with an examination of the concept of personality traits, moving then to review the relationship between crime and various dimensions of personality, before concluding with an examination of antisocial personality disorder and the contribution this construct makes to understanding criminal behaviour.

Trait approaches to personality There are many different ways to conceptualise and explain personality. Indeed, most psychological theories are at some level personality theories. However, in this chapter we focus particularly on those theories that understand personality as an organised assemblage of subunits known as traits.

Personality 91 What are personality traits? Thinking in terms of personality traits comes naturally to humans. Every day we use trait descriptors as shorthand ways of summarising the personal attributes of ourselves and others. Based on our observations of someone’s behaviour we may describe him/her as confident, lazy, generous, happy-go-lucky, disorganised, and so on. We might refine our descriptions by qualifying the extent to which the person possesses these attributes; for example, he/she may be very confident but only moderately lazy. In any case, we assume that these labels say something fundamental about the individual and have some predictive value – that the person will tend to be very confident and moderately lazy across a variety of different situations both now and in the future. Invoking personality traits is an efficient way for us to process information and make sense of our social world. Likewise, psychologists interested in personality traits seek to reduce the complexities of human behaviour into manageable units of analysis in order to build explanatory and predictive models. Trait theorists attempt to define and quantify the components of personality in ways that permit personality to be empirically studied. Despite arguments about the precise definition of trait, most theorists agree that a trait is a generalised tendency to behave in a certain way, and that a given trait will be possessed by different individuals in varying strengths. A person who consistently acts aggressively is assumed to have a stronger aggressive trait than a person who does not consistently act aggressively. The goal of trait research is to identify and measure ways in which individuals differ from one another. Perhaps the most significant disagreement among trait theorists concerns the issue of causality. For some theorists, traits are merely descriptive summaries of behaviour. A person is described as aggressive only if he/she is observed to act aggressively sufficiently frequently to suggest that there is a trend in his/her behaviour. These theorists are interested only in the way that personality is structured – no assumptions about causation are made. Other theorists, however, argue that traits are internal predispositions – experienced as drives and desires – that help to cause behaviour. Thus a person performs aggressive acts in part because he/she has an aggressive trait. At the same time, for these theorists, the expression of outward behaviour is not necessary for the trait to exist. An individual may refrain from assaulting someone – perhaps they count to ten – but still have the latent capacity for aggression. For our analysis, the clear conclusion from the foregoing chapters is that many traits have their foundations in biosocial structures and processes. As such, these traits can be considered to be more than descriptive labels and to play at least some causal role in behaviour. The stability debate A necessary characteristic of a trait is that it describes a consistent pattern of behaviour. A major point of contention surrounding trait theory concerns the extent to which behavioural patterns meet the criterion of consistency. Consistency can take two forms: stability over time and stability across situations.

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Stability over time The stability over time debate refers to the extent to which behavioural patterns are fixed or changing throughout an individual’s life-span. Trait theorists would expect that someone who was aggressive now was aggressive as they were growing up and will be aggressive in the future. The alternative argument is that traits fluctuate over time in response to an individual’s physical, social and intellectual maturity, and to his/her changing circumstances, social roles and accumulated life experiences. An aggressive youth may mellow with age and come to look back on his previous aggressive behaviour as if it was carried out by someone else. In general, longitudinal research supports the idea of enduring traits, although with a number of qualifications. First, consistency increases with age (Caspi et al., 2005; McCrae, 2002; Roberts and Del Vecchio, 2000). Children and adolescents are in the process of establishing aspects of their individual identities and demonstrate more variability in their behaviour than do adults. By the age of 30, however, most broad patterns of behaviour have become firmly established. Second, traits thought to have a biological basis – such as sensation-seeking and impulsivity discussed in the previous chapter – show greater consistency than do attributes assumed to be more sensitive to social and environmental influences – such as attitudes, opinions and beliefs (Conley, 1984). Third, underlying traits may be consistent but their manifestation may change over the years. The temper tantrums of childhood may become irascibility in adulthood but both are products of the same personality trait of disagreeableness (Caspi et al., 1987). Finally, the strength with which an individual possesses a trait may remain stable relative to other people, but the absolute strength may change (Costa and McCrae, 1994). For example, as we have discussed in previous chapters, risk-taking behaviour generally declines with maturity. However, those who were most risky for their age during adolescence are likely also to be the most risky for their age in later life. Stability of traits over time has important implications for criminal careers’ research. For example, it was noted in Chapter 3 that childhood conduct disorders are good predictors of adolescent and adult criminality, especially in the case of life-course persistent offenders (Caspi et al., 1995; Grove et al., 1990; Langbehn et al., 1998). We examine the developmental aspects of criminality in more detail in the following chapter. Stability across situations The stability across situations debate refers to the extent to which individuals behave in similar or dissimilar ways under different circumstances. We encountered this debate in the introductory chapter as one of the key questions in psychology. Trait theorists argue that because traits reflect generalised behavioural tendencies, then manifestations of any given trait will show up in many different areas of a person’s life. This does not mean that the trait will always appear or that its expression will always be the same. An aggressive person is unlikely to be aggressive at a funeral (certainly not their own), and the form his/

Personality 93 her aggression takes is likely to be different at work, say, than when playing sport. Nevertheless, it is argued that when behaviour is aggregated across a range of situations, a consistent aggressive trend will be found. On the other side of the debate, situationalists argue that behaviour is highly variable and is a specific response to different demands and expectations. A person can be aggressive in one circumstance and not in others depending upon the situational context. This variability makes the very notion of a trait unsustainable. It is the situation that causes the behaviour not the person. The correlation between measures of personality traits and their related behaviours is typically found to be in the order of .4 (Nisbett, 1980), a strength of association that can be described as medium.1 Both sides of the debate have claimed this figure as support for their respective positions. Trait theorists argue that the significant correlation demonstrates that behavioural patterns develop around a stable core; situationalists point to the high level of unexplained variance as evidence for the role of situations. The resolution of the person/situation debate parallels that of the nature/nurture debate. Just as the acquisition of behavioural traits is best understood as involving both biological and environmental factors, so too is the performance of behaviour best understood as involving both dispositional and situational factors. Furthermore, we can similarly expect dispositional and situational factors to interact – different people will respond to the same situation in different ways. Consider the case of two friends, one with a high level of dispositional aggression and the other with a low level. They are chatting peaceably at a bar when they are accosted by a drunken patron. All other things being equal, the probability of an overtly aggressive response to this provocation will be higher for the aggressive friend than for the non-aggressive friend. The non-aggressive friend can probably also be induced to retaliate at some point, but it will take much stronger situational pressure for this to occur. At the same time, prior to the provocation, there was little outward difference in the behaviour of the two friends. The interactionist interpretation of the way traits operate is now widely accepted by theorists and has resulted in the specificity model of personality. According to the specificity model, while people do possess traits, trait differences between people only become meaningful in certain circumstances. Moreover, in some cases those circumstances can be very specific and encountered only occasionally. In the example above, it may be that the aggressive friend is particularly sensitive to being insulted in public but is relatively tolerant of other forms of provocation. As will become more apparent in later chapters, the specificity model has crucial implications for why people commit crime, as distinct from why people become criminal. It can help explain why individuals with criminal dispositions do not offend all of the time – and why they do offend when they do – as well as why normally lawabiding people can sometimes commit crimes that are apparently out of character. Identifying key traits Two central questions for trait theorists are: what are the most important traits? and what relationship do they have with one another? There are many ways to

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describe someone’s personality, with often subtle distinctions among terms. Indeed, in a seminal study, Allport and Odbert (1936) pored over dictionaries and identified some 4,500 stable trait descriptors. The task for researchers since has been reducing the many available, overlapping traits to a manageable number of meaningful and independent concepts. Two main trait-reduction methods have been used. The first is the lexical approach, by which trait descriptors are grouped together into conceptually-similar clusters. For example, one cluster may include hostile, hot-headed, aggressive and quick-tempered. The number of synonyms comprising a given cluster is taken to be a measure of that concept’s cultural importance. Where there is agreement on the importance of the concept across cultures, it is assumed that it represents a universally-relevant human trait. The rationale for this approach is that human beings will invent lots of different ways to describe things that really matter to them (as in the much-repeated, though apparently exaggerated story that Eskimos have over a hundred words for snow). Using the lexical method, Cattell (1943) reduced Allport and Odbert’s list of descriptors to 35 clusters. The second reduction method is to use statistical techniques such as factor analysis to obtain clusters. Large samples of people rate themselves on a range of personality dimensions. Factor analysing the responses reveals which descriptors tend to go together (covary) and which ones are unrelated (orthogonal). For example, people who identify as hostile are also likely to identify as quicktempered, but they may be just as likely as not to rate themselves as shy. Thus hostility and quick-temperedness will go into one factor and attributes to do with shyness go into another. Note that in factor analysis the covariation can be positive or negative. For example, ‘outgoing’ negatively covaries with ‘shy’ and so both would go into the same factor (‘degree of outgoingness’) but at opposite poles. When Cattell (1946) reanalysed Allport and Odbert’s items using factor analysis, he further reduced the clusters to 16 personality factors. As the above discussion indicates, traits exist at varying levels of generality. Trait researchers seek to find the smallest number of traits that adequately explains the breadth of human personality. But in achieving this, they are also conscious that important nuances of personality may be lost as traits become more inclusive. This problem is dealt with by organising traits into hierarchies. Further factor analysis of Cattell’s 16 personality factors resulted in the isolation of five ‘higherorder’ factors (Cattell, 1957). These new super-traits comprised several primary traits that often seemed to appear together in individuals. For example, people who were impulsive were often also found to be sociable, so both of these traits (along with some others) contributed to a super-trait of extraversion. The supertraits did not replace the original 16 factors, however, but sat at a level above them. Thus the 16 personality factors are at one level independent traits in their own right and at another level they combine to produce more global measures that subsume the subordinate attributes. The most recent and widely-researched hierarchical trait-theory of personality is the five-factor – or Big Five – model. The Big Five are not identical to Cattell’s original five higher-order factors but they are a product of the same line of lexical

Personality 95 and factor-analytic research. The five factors in a form similar to their current incarnation were first identified by Tupes and Christal (1961), and the basic five-factor structure has been subsequently replicated by other researchers over the years (e.g., Costa and McCrae, 1992a, 1992b; Norman, 1963). Supporters of the model claim that the five factors are the basic building blocks of personality, at the same time parsimonious and all-inclusive (Goldberg, 1993; McCrae and John, 1992). The Big Five factors are openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism, giving the acronym OCEAN. Descriptions of these five factors and their contributing primary traits (facets) are provided in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 The Big Five personality factors Factor

Facets

Low score

High score

Openness: Appreciation of new experiences and toleration of the unfamiliar

Fantasy Aesthetics Feelings Ideas Actions Values

Conventional, down-to-earth, narrow interests, unartistic, non-analytic

Curious, broad interests, creative, original, imaginative, untraditional

Conscientiousness: Degree of persistence and motivation in goal-directed behaviour

Self-discipline Dutifulness Competence Order Deliberation Achievementstriving

Aimless, unreliable, lazy, careless, lax, negligent, weakwilled, hedonistic

Organised, reliable, hard-working, punctual, scrupulous, neat, ambitious, persevering

Extraversion: Activity level, need for stimulation and capacity for enjoyment

Gregariousness Activity level Assertiveness Excitement-seeking Positive emotions Warmth

Reserved, sober, not exuberant, aloof, task-oriented, retiring, quiet

Sociable, active, talkative, person-oriented, optimistic, fun-loving, affectionate

Agreeableness: Degree of compassion versus antagonism in one’s interpersonal orientation

Straightforwardness Trust Altruism Modesty Tendermindedness Compliance

Cynical, rude, suspicious, uncooperative, vengeful, ruthless, irritable, manipulative

Soft-hearted, good-natured, trusting, helpful, forgiving, gullible, straightforward

Neuroticism: Level of adjustment and degree of emotional stability

Anxiety Self-consciousness Depression Vulnerability Impulsiveness Angry hostility

Calm, relaxed, Worrying, nervous, unemotional, hardy, emotional, secure, self-satisfied insecure, inadequate, hypochondriacal

Source: Adapted from Costa and McCrae (1992c).

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Measuring traits The most common way to measure personality traits is with pencil-and-paper tests. There are a number of different formats but the most common is to present statements – for example, ‘I am always courteous to my elders’ – to which respondents indicate their agreement or disagreement. Sometimes the choice is dichotomous (i.e., either ‘yes’ or ‘no’) but more frequently respondents check a position on a multi-point Likert scale that represents the strength with which they agree (e.g., ‘strongly agree’ through to ‘strongly disagree’). The measurement of any given trait involves numerous statements that examine different aspects of trait expression. Trying to measure personality with just a few items is akin to assessing student performance in a semester-long course with a two-item multiple-choice exam. Because of situational specificity, it is important that a comprehensive range of items is included in order take in the full picture and to iron out variability across situations. As long as the statements are all measures of the same trait (i.e., they have been found to covary), then the items can be summed to produce an aggregate measure of trait strength for an individual. The measurement of traits is never perfect. Error can come from a number of sources. A test may have insufficient items to capture the trait, or the items may not all go together. The psychological state and motivation of respondents can also introduce error. Their responses may vary according to their mood, or they may deliberately try to fake the test, a particular problem with offenders who may have good reason to try to create a good impression. The accuracy of a test is referred to as its reliability, and is given by a reliability coefficient that varies between 0 (totally unreliable) to 1 (perfectly reliable). Most published tests have reliability coefficients between .7 and .9. Some test instruments are designed to measure a single trait, while others measure many traits organised in terms of super-traits. Whether a researcher uses a singletrait or super-trait instrument depends upon what question he/she is trying to answer. In the single-trait approach, the researcher is interested in the sorts of behaviours related to a particular trait. In the super-trait approach, the researcher is interested in which traits are the most important in accounting for a particular behaviour (Funder, 2007). Both of these approaches have been used to study criminality.

The single-trait approach and crime Single-trait studies begin with a specific trait of interest and examine the role that it might play in offending. The selection of the trait is based on prior theorising about the underlying nature of criminal behaviour. Looking back on the previous chapters, a number of key personality dimensions have been identified as theoretically important in criminality. These include altruism, empathy, sensation-seeking and impulsivity. Altruism According to evolutionary psychologists, many crimes can be defined as failures of altruism. Altruism, you will recall, is the tendency to perform self-sacrificing

Personality 97 behaviour in the aid of others. It is altruism that allows humans to function as social beings. One hypothesis of evolutionary psychologists is that genes for altruism and genes for cheating struggle for dominance in the gene pool. While altruism is the dominant human condition, there will always be a proportion of the population who are cheaters and seek to take advantage of altruists. Cheaters are predicted to be more likely than altruists to commit criminal acts. Surprisingly little research has been done on altruism as a personality construct. The main instrument is the Self-Report Altruism (SRA) scale (Rushton et al., 1981). The SRA scale comprises 20 items that measure altruistic behaviours such as generosity, help-giving and volunteerism (e.g., ‘I have given money to a stranger who needed it’). The few studies examining altruism and antisocial behaviour have produced mixed findings. Rushton et al. (1986) administered the SRA scale and a measure of aggression to a community sample of twins. As predicted, they found a negative correlation (−.23) between the scales. Further, the heritability for altruism was .56, indicating a strong genetic basis. However, Krueger et al. (2001), also using a community sample of twins, found no correlation between altruism and self-reported levels of antisocial behaviour. They also found little evidence of heritability for altruism, with most of the variance accounted for by environmental factors. In explaining their negative findings, Kruger et al. questioned whether the conceptualisation of altruism in the SRA scale is broad enough to capture the full nature of the trait. In another negative study, Book and Quinsey (2004) found no significant difference in altruism among incarcerated psychopathic offenders, incarcerated non-psychopathic offenders and non-offenders. They suggest that altruism may be difficult to measure on selfreport scales when used with antisocial individuals, since part of the cheater syndrome is to hide one’s true intentions. There has been more consistent success with other scales conceptually aligned to the altruism-cheater dimension. For example, the Machiavellianism (Mach) inventory (Christie and Geis, 1968) is a 20-item scale that focuses on the extent to which respondents have a cunning, manipulative and unscrupulous approach to dealing with others (e.g., ‘The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear’). As expected, Rushton et al. (1981) found an inverse correlation between the SRA scale and the Mach inventory. Correlations for the Mach inventory have been found with self-reported psychopathy in community samples (McHoskey et al., 1998; McHoskey, 2001; Paulhus and Williams, 2002; Williams and Paulhus, 2003), and with clinical and psychometric measures of psychopathy in prison inmates (Widiger et al., 1996). Empathy Another trait that falls into the broad domain of interpersonal transactions is empathy. Empathy is the capacity to understand and share another’s emotional state. This definition identifies two components of empathy: the cognitive ability to ‘understand’ another’s emotional state, and the affective ability to ‘share’ another’s emotional state. Neuropsychological research locates the structures and

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functions associated with empathy in the prefrontal cortex. The capacity for empathy is thought to be the product of a skill cluster known as executive function. Lack of empathy is predicted to result in callous and uncaring behaviour towards others and because of this an increased risk of criminality. There are numerous measures of empathy, the most prominent being the Hogan Empathy Scale (HES) (Hogan, 1969), the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (QMEE) (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972), and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1980). A sample question from the IRI is: ‘I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me’. Jolliffe and Farrington (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of studies that used any of these three scales (or their derivatives) to investigate empathy and criminal behaviour. Only studies that examined reported or official criminal offences were included in the analysis. The final sample involved 35 studies, 21 that studied cognitive empathy (involving the HES and a subscale of the IRI) and 14 that studied affective empathy (involving the QMEE and a different subscale of the IRI). The weighted mean effect size for all studies was −.28, indicating a medium negative relationship between empathy and offending (i.e., low empathy was related to high offending). For cognitive empathy, 10 studies reported that offenders had lower empathy than did non-offenders, while 11 studies found no differences between the two groups, yielding a weighted mean effect size of −.48 (medium). For the affective studies, four studies found lower empathy among offenders, nine found no differences, and one found that offenders had higher levels of empathy than did non-offenders, yielding a weighted mean effect size of −.11 (small). Analysing the studies further, Jolliffe and Farrington found a number of factors influencing effect size. The relationship between a lack of empathy and offending was stronger for violent offenders than for sex offenders and for young offenders than for older offenders. They also found that empathy correlated with intelligence and socio-economic status (SES), and concluded that effect sizes were inflated by the failure to control for these covariates. In other words, to some extent the differences between offenders and non-offender are explained by differences in intelligence and SES rather than empathy. The interrelatedness among these variables is open to a number of interpretations. For example, in the case of intelligence, low intelligence may independently cause both offending and low empathy; low intelligence may cause low empathy which causes offending; or low empathy, low intelligence and offending may be collateral products of deficits in executive function. In conclusion, while low empathy and offending are related, the nature of that relationship is complex and may be indirect. Sensation-seeking Sensation-seeking has been defined as ‘the seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and experiences, and the willingness to take physical, social, legal and financial risks for the sake of such experience’ (Zuckerman, 1994, p. 7). While sensation-seeking and risk-taking are related, risk-taking is a possible outcome of sensation-seeking but is not a necessary condition. Alternative explanations for

Personality 99 sensation-seeking have been provided by arousal theory and reward dominance theory. According to arousal theory, individuals who have low levels of internal stimulation compensate by seeking out external stimulation and as a consequence they may engage in risky behaviour that may include crime. According to reward dominance theory, individuals are prone to sensation-seeking when the behavioural activation system (BAS) is stronger than the behavioural inhibition system (BIS). There are two main scales dedicated to sensation-seeking, the 40-item Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS-V) (Zuckerman, 1994) and the 20-item Arnett Inventory of Sensation Seeking (AISS) (Arnett, 1994). A typical item from the AISS is: ‘I can see how it must be exciting to be in a battle during a war’. Males and younger respondents consistently score higher on sensation-seeking than do females and older respondents (Zuckerman, 1994). Positive correlations have been reported between sensation-seeking and a range of problematic behaviours including selfreported delinquency (Gatzke-Kopp et al., 2002; Hansen and Breivik, 2001; Modecki, 2009; Newcomb and McGee, 1991; Simó and Pérez, 1991; White et al., 1987), drug use (Martin et al., 2002; Stephenson et al., 2002), alcohol use (Andrew and Cronin, 1996; Read et al., 2003), risky driving (Iversen and Rundmo, 2002) and gambling (Breslin et al., 1999). At the same time, studies also find correlations between sensation-seeking and many positive risk-taking behaviours such as participating in sports (Malkin and Rabinowitz, 1998), pursuing stimulating vocations (Biersner and LaRocco, 1983), and undertaking outdoor adventure activities (Hansen and Breivik, 2001). The point has been made before but is worth repeating: personality traits may provide predispositions for behaviour but the environment plays a crucial role in shaping the way that traits are expressed. Impulsivity Impulsivity refers to the performance of behaviour in anticipation of short-term as opposed to long-term consequences. Impulsivity is theoretically and biologically related to sensation-seeking (Hur and Bouchard, 1997) but focuses more particularly on the ability of an individual to inhibit or delay self-gratifying urges. The two most common measures of impulsivity are the 30-item Barrett Impulsiveness Scale (BIS – not to be confused with the behavioural inhibition system) (Barratt, 1985) and the 54-item Eysenck Impulsivity Scale (EIS) (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975). An example item from the EIS is: ‘Do you generally do and say things without stopping to think?’ Of the single trait measures, impulsivity has attracted the most research and has also produced the most consistent positive findings, suggesting that it is a particularly important trait in criminality. Convicted offenders have been found to be more impulsive than non-offenders in both male (Barratt et al., 1997; Carroll et al., 2006) and female (Komarovskaya et al., 2007) samples; high-aggression inmates are more impulsive than low-aggression inmates (Edwards et al., 2003; Komarovskaya et al., 2007); early onset offenders are more impulsive than are late onset offenders (Carroll et al., 2006); and in non-institutionalised samples, impulsivity is positively correlated with self-reported measures of criminal behaviour and delinquency (Luengo et al., 1994; White et al., 1994),

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substance abuse (Petry, 2001) and problem gambling (Blaszczynski et al., 1997; Petry, 2001). Evidence has also been found for situational specificity for impulsivity. Lynam et al. (2000) found that the relationship between impulsivity and delinquency was stronger in poor neighbourhoods than in better-off neighbourhoods, but that there was little difference in delinquency between non-impulsive adolescents in the poor and better-off neighbourhoods. Thus there is an interaction between impulsivity and adverse situational factors, and delinquency is especially likely when both are present. Evaluation of the single-trait approach Overall, the evidence from single-trait approaches is that many offenders possess distinctive personality traits, although the strength of association is sometimes weak and the trends are not always consistent. The advantage of the single trait approach is that it can examine very specific, theory-driven questions about the relationship between certain traits and crime. The disadvantage is that this specificity can also produce a fragmented picture of the personality of offenders. Often different traits – such as sensation-seeking and impulsivity – may be measuring different aspects of the same construct. What is lacking in the single-trait approach is an overall model of personality that makes sense of the relationship among traits. This is where the super-trait approach comes in.

The super-trait approach: Eysenck’s three-factor theory of crime Research using super-trait instruments begins with a comprehensive model of personality, with the aim of determining how well the model as a whole explains criminality. By examining numerous traits simultaneously, the relationships among traits can be examined. Thus a personality profile can be produced based on the strength with which offenders possess different traits. In addition, examining variations among offenders in the pattern of traits permits the development of typologies that discriminate among different categories of offenders. In this section we will focus exclusively on the three-factor theory of Hans Eysenck. Eysenck is a major figure in the history of trait psychology and there are a number of reasons for choosing to examine his approach in preference to other available models such as the Big Five. First, Eysenck’s theory comes with a detailed account of the presumed causes of traits, explanations that are based on a combination of genetic, neurological, psychophysiological and environmental factors. Most other trait theorists, including those responsible for the Big Five, make no assumptions about where traits come from – their aim is simply to describe the structural framework of personality. Second, there is a long tradition in criminology of using Eysenck’s theory, and Eysenck himself was very interested in the problem of crime and antisocial behaviour. While criminology researchers have also used other models, there is in comparison far more Eysenck-related research to draw upon for our review. Finally, as we shall see, there is in any case

Personality 101 considerable overlap between Eysenck’s three factors and super-traits identified by other theorists. There is, then, little to lose and much to gain by focusing on Eysenck’s three factors. The three factors Eysenck’s model of personality comprises three orthogonal dimensions: psychoticism (P), extraversion (E) and neuroticism (N), remembered by the acronym PEN. Each dimension is a super-trait, and beneath each sits a number of more specific, primary traits. The hierarchical nature of the three super-traits is shown in Figure 5.1. Looking at Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1, overlaps between the Big Five and Eysenck’s three factors are immediately evident. Eysenck’s E and N scales parallel almost exactly the same-named scales in the five-factor model, while P is a combination of low agreeableness and low conscientiousness (Clark and Watson, 1999; Costa and McCrae, 1995). The remaining scale from the fivefactor model – openness – has no obvious match in Eysenck’s model. However, openness has the weakest conceptual relationship to crime. It is also the most contentious of the five factors, with some debate about how well it translates across cultures (De Raad et al., 1998). Extraversion and neuroticism were the first two super-traits identified by Eysenck (1956, 1970). Eysenck’s definition of extraversion extends the common understanding of the word. In addition to the usual characteristics of being sociable and outgoing, in more extreme cases Eysenck’s extraverts are reckless, unreliable, quick-tempered and prone to aggression. At the other end of the dimension, introverts are timid, reserved and cautious. Eysneck’s explanation for extraversionintroversion involves the concept of cortical arousal that we encountered in the previous chapter. Extraverts are cortically under-aroused and seek positive environmental stimulation (excitement) to alleviate boredom. The cluster of extraverted-related traits identified by Eysenck through his factor-analytic

Figure 5.1 The hierarchical structure of Eysenck’s three super-traits. Source: Adapted from Eysenck et al. (1992).

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studies – dominance, sociability, assertiveness and so on – all have this common neurological root and derive from the same basic need for external stimulation. The need for stimulation is predicted to increase the risk of criminal behaviour through a combination of increased risk-taking and a reduced capacity to learn from experience. Neuroticism refers to negative emotionality. Neurotics are moody, anxious and tense, and are prone to depression, phobias and psychosomatic illnesses such as headaches and digestive problems. Emotionally-stable individuals, on the other hand, are calm and even-tempered. According to Eysenck, the biological basis for neuroticism is arousal of the autonomic nervous system (ANS). Recall from the previous chapter that the sympathetic nervous system increases physiological functioning – the ‘fight or flight’ response – while the parasympathetic nervous system restores physiological equilibrium. Individuals with high neuroticism are hypothesised to have relatively quick-acting sympathetic nervous systems and slow-acting parasympathetic nervous systems. Neurotics, therefore, have more easily provoked, stronger and longer-lasting adverse reactions to negative environmental stimulation (stress). According to Eysenck, crime is associated with high neuroticism. He viewed neuroticism as a driver of behaviour. Under stress, individuals are less likely to consider the consequences of their actions and are more likely to resort to habitual patterns of responding. Thus, emotional instability will accentuate any pre-existing antisocial tendencies an individual may have. The biological mechanisms underlying extraversion and neuroticism are presumed to be independent of one another. While both are concerned with arousal and environmental stimulation, extraverts experience cortical arousal as pleasant while neurotics experience ANS arousal as unpleasant. Eysenck conceived of extraversion and neuroticism (E-N) as intersecting dimensions, producing four personality types: stable extraverts, unstable extraverts, stable introverts and unstable introverts (see Figure 5.2). The four types parallel the four temperaments described by Hippocrates in ancient Greece nearly two and a half thousand years ago: sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic and melancholic. In its role as a behavioural driver, emotional instability brings out the worst aspects of the extraversionintroversion dimension. Thus, stable extraverts (sanguines) have many desirable qualities such as sociability, outgoingness and easygoingness, whereas unstable extraverts (cholerics) have the less desirable qualities of excitability, restlessness and aggressiveness. Likewise, stable introverts (phlegmatics) are calm, eventempered and thoughtful, while unstable introverts (melancholics) are moody, pessimistic and unsociable. As will be evident from these descriptions, the combination of high extraversion and high neuroticism is seen to produce a particularly high risk of criminal behaviour. Eysenck’s third dimension, psychoticism, was a later addition designed to plug perceived gaps in the E-N model (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1976). Psychoticism does not refer to the psychotic behaviours – delusions, hallucination, and the like – exhibited by the mentally ill. Rather, it describes behaviours that are closer to those characteristic of antisocial individuals. Individuals high on psychoticism

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Figure 5.2 The relationship between neuroticism and extraversion.

are cold, aloof, cruel, impulsive and insensitive; those low on psychoticism are warm and tender-hearted. Crime, obviously enough, is thought to be related to high psychoticism. Eysenck thought that psychoticism was related to high levels of testosterone, and low levels of serotonin and monoamine oxidase (MOA) (Eysenck, 1992, 1996). He also argued that, like extraversion, it also may be related to cortical under-arousal (Eysenck and Gudjonsson, 1989). Visually representing three dimensions on a flat piece of paper is difficult but the reader should imagine a third line passing perpendicularly through the point of intersection of the E and N axes in Figure 5.2. The addition of the third axis doubles to eight the number of possible personality types, although the characteristics of each of these have not been spelled out. Nevertheless, the combination of high psychoticism, high extraversion and high neuroticism is viewed as the most problematic constellation of traits when it comes to criminality. PEN and crime Eysenck constructed a psychometric instrument, the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ), in order to test his predictions about PEN. The most recent version of the instrument (the EPQ-R; Eysenck et al., 1985) comprises 100 yes/no questions: 32 for P (e.g., ‘Do you stop to think things over before doing anything?’), 23 for E (e.g., ‘Are you a talkative person?’), 24 for N (e.g., ‘Does your mood often go up and down?’), and a further 21 included as a ‘lie scale’ (e.g., ‘Are all your habits good and desirable ones?’) to try to identify respondents who are unduly concerned with creating a good impression.

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Empirically, support for Eysenck’s model has been mixed. Cale (2006) conducted the most recent meta-analysis of studies which have examined delinquent, criminal and antisocial samples with measures of PEN. Most of the included studies used the EPQ, but Cale also included some studies that had employed comparable measures. Based on earlier statistical analyses (Sher and Trull, 1994), E included measures of sociability, N included measures of negative emotionality, and P included measures of impulsivity. Antisocial samples were identified either by self-report or as members of known antisocial groups (e.g., prison inmates). However, the analysis only examined studies that employed measures of general antisocial behaviour – those examining specific offender types and individuals diagnosed with antisocial personality disorders were excluded. Fifty-two studies, involving 97 independent samples, were ultimately examined. Cale’s findings were consistent with those of previous reviews (Feldman, 1993; Furnham and Thompson, 1991; Miller and Lynam, 2001). She found that P/ impulsivity had the strongest association with antisocial behaviour, with 98 per cent of the samples producing a positive effect and with a weighted effect size of .39 (moderate). N/negative emotionality had the next strongest association with 84 per cent of samples producing a positive effect and with a weighted effect size of .19 (small). E/sociability had the weakest association with 73 per cent of samples producing a positive effect and with a weighted effect size of .09 (weak). Offender typologies While Eysenck proposed that his three factors provided a general theory of crime, he also recognised that not all offenders would score highly on all scales. He suggested that the heterogeneity of the offender population might help account for some of the weak empirical findings reported for the EPQ (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1970; Eysenck and Gudjonsson, 1989; Eysenck et al., 1977). Eysenck theorised that there are two broad offender types: (1) high P, high E and high N; and (2) high P, low E and high N. The first profile has the classic peaks on all three scales and was that of the active offender type; the second profile was characterised by low E and describes the inadequate offender type. Active types were predicted to be ‘typical’ offenders – young, boisterous, below-average intelligence, heavy drinkers, prone to violence and likely to offend in company with peers. Inadequate types were older, neurotic, introverted, likely to have psychiatric problems, to have poor social and interpersonal relations, and typically to offend on the spur of the moment. Research has supported Eysenck’s notion of typologies, but more PEN permutations have been reported than he predicted and not all are interpretable within his theory (McEwan, 1983; McGurk and McDougall, 1981; van Dam et al., 2007). Most recently, van Dam et al. (2007) identified three clusters among a sample of incarcerated delinquents: (1) low P, high E and low N (63 per cent); (2) high P, low E and high N (29 per cent); and (3) high P, high E and high N (8 per cent). Van Dam et al. found Eysenck’s active and inadequate types, but together they only accounted for around a third of the sample. The typical delinquent, these researchers concluded, was a stable extravert with low levels of psychoticism.

Personality 105 While this finding clearly contradicts Eysenck’s theory, it is consistent with what would be predicted by the life-course persistent/adolescent-limited distinction. The high P found in two subgroups (groups 2 and 3) may be identifying lifecourse persistent offenders with established criminal dispositions. Low P scores accompanied by high E and low N (group 1) may be identifying adolescentlimited offenders – essentially normal, if extraverted, young people with no particularly strong criminal dispositions. Evaluation of Eysenck’s theory In the face of mixed research findings, there has been an ongoing debate about the adequacy of Eysenck’s super-traits as explanations for crime, and of their presumed biological bases. Of the three factors, the latest addition to the model, P, has the strongest association with crime. This is not surprising given that this scale was purposely constructed to tap behavioural problems, and it incorporates attributes – aggressive, cold, antisocial, impulsive – that at face value are most obviously linked to criminality. Most criticisms, therefore, have been reserved for the original E and N scales. There is general agreement among researchers that E is not a reliable predictor of antisocial behaviour, and Eysenck’s proposal that offenders could be either high or low on E seems to concede this point. This conclusion, however, poses a dilemma. The mechanism presumed to be responsible for E is cortical underarousal and the weakness of E would appear to call this presumption into question. At the same time, we saw in the previous chapter that there was good evidence that many antisocial individuals are indeed cortically under-aroused just as Eysenck predicted. A critical issue would seem to be the location of impulsivity within the super-trait structure. In the single-trait studies cited earlier, impulsivity was found to be the trait that had the most consistent association with antisocial behaviour. Originally, Eysenck located impulsivity in E as a companion to sensation-seeking but later he decided that impulsivity belonged in P (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1978). Without impulsivity, E includes many items concerned with sociability (e.g., ‘Do you have many friends?’) and it is perhaps not surprising that many antisocial individuals do not score highly on measures of positive social relations. It may be that it is impulsivity which is the key correlate of cortical under-arousal for offenders. If this is so, and given the location of impulsivity in the EPQ, then cortical arousal theory may be a better explanation of P than it is of E (Cale, 2006). There is better evidence that N is associated with offending, but the role of ANS arousal is a matter of debate. Eysenck proposed that high ANS arousal increased the potential for crime by energising antisocial tendencies. However, it will be noted that Eysenck’s theory runs counter to the conclusions drawn in the previous chapter, where a slow-acting ANS was found to be related to antisocial behaviour. In Chapter 4, it was argued that resistance to stress – not sensitivity to it – increased the likelihood of crime by making individuals more fearless. Where Eysenck treated cortical arousal and ANS arousal as independent of one another, other

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researchers are inclined to regard them as indices of the same arousal phenomenon (Ellis and Walsh, 2000; Raine, 2002b, 2002c). Scarpa and Raine (1997) have suggested that the role of ANS arousal varies depending upon offender-type. Heightened ANS reactions to stress (and thus high neuroticism) may be related to ‘emotional’ crimes, while emotionally detached offenders (such as psychopaths) are more likely to have a slow-acting ANS (low neuroticism). In conclusion, Eysenck’s theory presents a comprehensive trait approach to understanding criminal and antisocial behaviour. Eysenck not only proposed what the key traits are, he also proposed explanations for the sources of those traits. However, his model of personality and its relationship to crime has been challenged on empirical and theoretical grounds. Undoubtedly, not all of Eysenck’s predictions can be supported by the evidence. Nevertheless, his work was pioneering and his model still attracts active research interest more than 50 years after the first version appeared.

Antisocial personality disorder (APD) As noted in Chapter 1, many researchers employ the concept of antisocial behaviour, rather than crime, as the object of their research. The definition of antisocial behaviour is independent of any particular legal system and so is not affected by variations in law over time and across jurisdictions. Consequently, many of the studies cited in this and previous chapters have utilised samples of individuals categorised on the basis of the performance of antisocial behaviour. We have also at various times referred to individuals who are persistently antisocial as having an antisocial personality disorder (APD) and sometimes as being psychopathic. In this section we examine in more detail APD and related concepts. We trace the changing conceptualisation of APD and the terminology that has been used to describe it; we look at the relationship between APD and crime, and we outline the key personality traits that contribute to the syndrome. Defining APD and related terms Over the years, a confusing array of labels – including psychopathy, sociopathy, dyssocial personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder – has been used to describe the cluster of behaviours and traits that are seen to relate to antisocial behaviour. Our first task is to sort out the distinctions among these terms by tracing the history of academic and clinical interest in antisocial individuals. While the existence of a class of particularly unscrupulous individuals has been recognised throughout history, Philippe Pinel in the early nineteenth century is credited with identifying extreme antisocial behaviour as a form of ‘insanity’ (Herpertz and Sass, 2000; Hervé, 2007; Millon et al., 1998). At that time, all disorders were considered to arise from an impairment of reasoning. Pinel pointed out that some individuals acted in erratic and self-defeating ways in spite of the fact that they knew in an intellectual sense the consequences of their behaviour. He coined the term manie sans délire – insanity without delirium – to indicate that

Personality 107 disorders could involve faculties other than the ‘mind’. The term moral insanity became the Anglicised version of Pinel’s concept, emphasising more explicitly that the syndrome involved deficits in character. By the late nineteenth century the term psychopathic inferiority had emerged in reaction to the value-laden implications of moral insanity, and eventually the term psychopathic personality was widely adopted. Cleckley (1941), in his famous book The Mask of Sanity, was influential in setting out the classic features of psychopathy as we know them today. Cleckley was a practising psychiatrist and his book includes over twenty case studies of psychopaths with whom he had dealt. Cleckley’s psychopaths were far from common criminals. While many inevitably came into conflict with the law, others did not and some were even successes in their chosen careers. The typical psychopath was not the bloodthirsty serial killer popularised in film (although such an individual may be an extreme example of a psychopath), but more often a hustler, conman, bigamist, and imposter. What intrigued Cleckley – reflected in the title of his book – was the disconnect between the air of competence and sociability exuded by psychopaths and the hollowness within. Psychopaths were outwardly charming, relaxed, seemingly intelligent and generally gave a favourable first impression (see Table 5.2). Quickly, however, the mask fell away and their fundamental unreliability, insincerity, selfishness and callousness became apparent. Psychopaths not only caused grief to others but were also often their own worst enemy, unable to sustain long-term commitment to any course of action and frequently snatching defeat from the jaws of victory through their reckless and impulsive behaviour. Table 5.2 Comparisons of DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for APD, and Cleckley (1941) and Hare (1991) criteria for psychopathy DSM-IV-TR

Cleckley

Hare PCL-R

Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviours as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest

Juvenile delinquency Early behaviour problems Revocation of conditional release Criminal versatility

Deceitfulness, as indicated Untruthfulness and insincerity by lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure

Pathological lying Cunning/manipulative Parasitic life-style

Impulsivity or failure to plan ahead

Need for stimulation, boredom proneness Lack of realistic long-term goals Poor behavioural control Impulsivity (Continued overleaf)

Inadequately motivated antisocial behaviour Failure to follow any life plan Poor judgement and failure to learn by experience

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Table 5.2 Continued DSM-IV-TR

Cleckley

Hare PCL-R

Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behaviour or honour financial obligations

Unreliability

Irresponsibility

Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalising having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another

Lack of remorse or shame

Lack of remorse or guilt Failure to accept responsibility for own actions Callous/lack of empathy

Superficial charm and ‘good’ intelligence

Glibness/superficial charm

Pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love

Grandiose sense of self-worth

General poverty in major affective reactions

Shallow affect

Sex life impersonal, trivial and poorly integrated

Promiscuous sexual behaviour

Unresponsiveness to general interpersonal relations

Many short-term marital relationships

Irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults Reckless disregard for safety of self or others

Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking Absence of nervousness or other psychoneurotic manifestations Specific loss of insight Fantastic and uninviting behaviours with drink and sometimes without Suicide rarely carried out

Personality 109 Meanwhile, from the 1930s, the term sociopath began to be used alongside psychopath. From the start, psychopathy was conceptualised as a constitutional defect. The term sociopathy, on the other hand, emphasised the social causes of antisocial behaviour. Lykken (1957, 1998) proposed that psychopathy and sociopathy were distinct syndromes. Sociopaths shared many of the character flaws of psychopaths – impulsiveness, callousness, deceitfulness – but lacked the plausibility and superficial charm. They were essentially unsocialised individuals, the product of poverty, neglect, and harsh and inconsistent discipline. Numerically, sociopaths were seen to be far more common than psychopaths. In practice, however, the term psychopath was applied in an increasingly loose manner as a catch-all diagnosis for almost anyone who had committed a crime. In order to bring some definitional clarity a number of psychopathic subtypes were proposed (Hare, 1970; Hervé, 2007; Millon and Davis, 1998; Poythress et al., 2006). The most common distinction is between primary, secondary and dissocial psychopaths (Hare, 1970). Primary – or true – psychopathy refers narrowly to the classic, constitutional version of the syndrome defined by criteria similar to those outlined by Cleckley. Secondary psychopaths are characterised by severe neurotic symptoms. Their crimes were expressions of acting-out resulting from inner emotional disturbances. Dissocial psychopaths are similar to sociopaths, and are the product of a dysfunctional upbringing. To diagnose primary psychopathy, Hare refined Cleckley’s criteria to develop the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; Hare, 1980) and a later revised edition (PCL-R; Hare, 1991) (see Table 5.2). The PCL-R involves a structured rating process in which points are allocated for each criterion and a total psychopathy score is produced. Factor analysis of the PCL-R suggests it comprises three core factors: (1) interpersonal deficits (manipulativeness, glibness, deceitfulness, etc.); (2) emotional deficits (lack of remorse, absence of anxiety, fearlessness, callousness, etc.); and (3) behavioural deficits (impulsivity, need for stimulation, lack of planning, irresponsibility, etc.) (Cooke and Michie, 2001). In an alternative attempt to end confusion about definitions and the abuse of the term, the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980) dispensed with the label ‘psychopathy’ entirely and replaced it with APD. Similarly, the other major classification system, the International Classification of Disease (ICD-10) (World Health Organization, 1992) adopted the term ‘dyssocial personality disorder’. Not only did DSM-III and ICD-10 change the name of the disorder, they also made significant changes to the diagnostic criteria. In particular, these classification systems shifted the emphasis away from assumed dispositional factors and onto objective, behavioural criteria on which diagnoses were to be made. In the most recent version of DSM (DSM-IV-TR) APD is defined as ‘a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 701). To receive a diagnosis of APD, an individual must be over 18 years of age, have a childhood history of conduct disorder, and satisfy at least three of the seven criteria outlined in Table 5.2.

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The changes made by DSM have not settled the matter, however. Some researchers have argued that modern definitions of APD are too behaviourally oriented and do not encapsulate the core characterological deficits described in early definitions of psychopathy. Most notably, Hare has criticised the DSM criteria for over-diagnosing APD and as describing little more than habitual criminality (Hare, 1996; Hart and Hare, 1989). While the labels APD and psychopathy are often used interchangeably, Hare maintains that true psychopaths are a subset of those diagnosed with APD: all psychopaths have APD but not all individuals diagnosed with APD are psychopaths. In this book, APD is used as a general term that includes psychopathy, while psychopathy is used to specifically refer to those antisocial individuals who also satisfy the more restrictive Cleckley/ Hare criteria. APD and crime The proportion of offenders estimated to have APD depends upon how the syndrome is defined. Generally speaking, the proportion is greater when DSM criteria for APD are employed than when criteria for psychopathy are employed. Fazel and Danesh (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of 28 studies from 12 countries examining APD among prison inmates. Overall, 47 per cent of male prisoners and 21 per cent of female prisoners were diagnosed with APD. On the other hand, Hare (1996) estimated that the proportion of prison inmates who qualify as psychopaths is between 15 and 25 per cent, while Simourd and Hoge (2000) put the figure even lower at 11 per cent. Individuals with APD do not necessarily commit crimes, but those who do may exhibit distinctive patterns of offending. Antisocial individuals are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime (Farrington et al., 1986), and Moffitt (1993) equates APD and life-course persistent offending. In the case of psychopaths, when they commit serious crimes these crimes are often particularly savage. The lack of empathy possessed by psychopaths means that their behaviour is not attenuated by the victims’ suffering. Homicides committed by psychopaths are more likely than is the case for non-psychopaths to be instrumental (calculating) rather than reactive (emotional), and to involve gratuitous and excessive violence (Porter and Porter, 2007; Woodworth and Porter, 2002). Finally, offenders with APD are noted for their high rates of criminal recidivism. Hiscoke et al. (2003) found that prisoners diagnosed as antisocial/dyssocial according to either DSM or ICD-10 criteria were 4.8 times more likely to reoffend for any offence, and 3.7 times more likely to reoffend for a violent offence, than were other prisoners. High recidivism rates also have been reported when samples have been categorised in terms of psychopathy (Hemphill and Hare, 2004; Quinsey et al., 1995; Serin and Amos, 1995). In a direct comparison of violent recidivism rates for APD and psychopathy, Harris et al. (1991) found a correlation of .26 when the diagnosis was based on DSM criteria and .56 when diagnosis was based on the PCL-R.

Personality 111 APD and trait theory APD is a multi-faceted syndrome comprising a diverse collection of maladaptive personality traits. However, the conceptualisation of APD departs from trait theory in two significant ways. First, APD is operationalised as a categorical construct (Trull and Durrett, 2005; Widiger et al., 2009). An individual either has or does not have APD, and those with APD are seen to be qualitatively different from those without. Trait theory, on the other hand, is based on the premise that personality traits are quantitative variables. People differ from one another by degrees and there is no clear threshold at which a trait turns from normal to disordered. Second, APD is a heterogeneous construct (Widiger, 2005; Widiger et al., 2009). In trait theory, personality constructs are formed from traits that are linked to one another in a hierarchical structure. In contrast, the traits that make up APD derive from clinical observation and are not necessarily connected in any conceptual way. Further, there is no requirement that an individual must meet all criteria in order to receive a diagnosis, and thus two people may each be diagnosed with APD but share no traits. This means that even if APD was conceptualised as a dimensional rather than a categorical construct, there is no single continuum of ‘antisocialness’ along which individuals could be arranged. In recent years a number of researchers have sought to understand APD in terms of traditional trait theory such as the five-factor model (Lynam et al., 2005; Lynam and Derefinko, 2006a, 2006b; Lynam and Widiger, 2001, 2007; Miller et al., 2001; Trull and Durrett, 2005; Widiger, 2005; Widiger and Lynam, 1998a). One research method for converting APD diagnoses to the language of the fivefactor model has drawn on expert ratings. Lynam and Widiger (2001) presented a panel of experts in DSM classification of APD with a prototype description of an APD case. The experts were asked to rate the case along the six facets for each factor in the Big Five model (see Table 5.1). Miller et al. (2001) adopted a similar research method, but on this occasion the ratings were performed by experts in psychopathy. The findings are shown in Table 5.3. Only those facets on which the case was rated to be particularly high or low are shown. It can be seen that there is in fact little difference in the descriptions for APD and psychopathy, suggesting that in the minds of experts at least, the distinction between the two is blurred. The most significant factor was seen to be agreeableness, with all six facets rated as low by both panels. The importance of neuroticism was also rated highly, with an interesting mix of high and low ratings for the contributing facets. Extraversion and conscientiousness were seen as moderately important, with openness seen as marginally relevant. An alternative approach to find the relationship between the five factors and APD is to examine the personality profiles of diagnosed APD individuals. The most common instrument for measuring the Big Five is NEO-Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI-R). Lynam and Derefinko (2006b) conducted a metaanalysis involving 11 studies that examined psychopaths on measures of the Big Five. The weighted effect sizes were −.52 for agreeableness, −38 for conscientiousness, .16 for neuroticism, −.10 for openness, and −.03 for extraversion. Unfortunately

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Table 5.3 Expert ratings of APD and psychopathy in terms of the five-factor model Five factors

APD

Psychopathy

Openness Feelings Actions

high

low high

Conscientiousness Self-discipline Dutifulness Competence Deliberation Extraversion Activity level Assertiveness Excitement-seeking Warmth Agreeableness Straightforwardness Trust Altruism Modesty Tendermindedness Compliance Neuroticism Anxiety Self-consciousness Depression Vulnerability Impulsiveness Angry hostility

low low low high high high

low low high low

high high low

low low low low low low

low low low low low low

low low

low low low low high

high high

Source: Adapted from Lynam and Widiger (2001) and Miller et al. (2001).

the analysis was not able to examine the specific facets of each factor. However, at the factor level, these findings closely match the predictions of the experts described above. Low agreeableness and low conscientiousness are the key discriminating factors. Contradicting Cleckley, psychopaths are moderately neurotic. However, taking into consideration the ratings by the experts, it is likely that psychopaths have high scores on some neuroticism facets and low scores on others. Openness and extraversion were not strong predictors of psychopathy, although again the experts suggest these factors may include a mix of low and high scores at the facet level. In summary, research supports a view of APD as a collection of extreme personality traits, quantitatively rather than qualitatively different from the traits that describe sub-clinical levels of antisocial behaviour. Converting APD and psychopathy diagnostic criteria to continuous trait measures promises to bring

Personality 113 greater clarity and precision to a field of research and clinical practice that has been notoriously plagued by confusion around definitions and terminology.

Conclusion and evaluation There has been an enormous amount of research examining the personality traits of offenders. It is fair to say that many criminologists – and not just sociologists but psychologists as well – have been underwhelmed by the accumulated research findings. Those hoping that the research would reveal a set of personality traits that invariably predicted offending behaviour have certainly been disappointed. As this chapter has revealed, the research is characterised by modest effect sizes and sometimes frustratingly inconsistent findings. However, the failure to identify strong relationships between personality traits and criminal behaviour should not surprise and nor does it suggest that research on personality and crime ought to be abandoned. The strength of the trait–crime relationship reported in this chapter is comparable to strength of trait–behaviour relationships reported for other behavioural domains. Personality theorists have long given up the notion that traits are independent and direct predictors of behaviour. Rather, traits operate on the specificity principle. They describe generalised tendencies to behave in certain ways, but behaviour on any given occasion is the product of an interaction between traits and situations. The possession of criminogenic traits puts an individual at an increased risk of committing crime, but that risk may not be realised until that individual encounters conducive situational conditions. Equally, when criminogenic traits and criminogenic situations do coincide, the risk of crime is multiplied. The picture is also complicated by the fact that the strength with which traits were possessed varied among offenders. Measures of a self-centred, cynical and aggressive interpersonal style – high Machiavellianism, high P and low agreeableness – emerged as the strongest predictor of criminal and antisocial behaviour. However, van Dam et al.’s (2007) cluster analysis of the EPQ indicates that many juvenile offenders do not score highly on these qualities. Similarly, the inability of offenders to inhibit urges – measured most directly by univariate impulsivity scales, but also as part of Eysenck’s P scale and the conscientiousness and neuroticism scales from the NEO-PI-R – increased with the seriousness and persistence of their offending. Finally, measures of negative emotionality – principally the N scales on the EPQ and NEO-PI-R – were moderately correlated with crime and antisocial behaviour, but some psychopathic offenders are noted for their lack of anxiety and their fearlessness. In sum, these findings reinforce the general approach adopted in this book that offenders are a heterogeneous population and cannot be described by a single personality profile. All of these findings are broadly interpretable within the life-course persistent and adolescent-limited taxonomy. The acquisition of traits has been presented in this chapter as the product of a biosocial process. However, while the importance of environmental factors has been stressed, the focus of the analysis to date has been on the role of genetic and

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neuropsychological processes in creating predispositions for crime. It is time to turn our attention to examining in detail the role the environment plays in shaping those predispositions into criminal behaviour. We begin in the following chapter by looking at the role of developmental experiences.

Note 1 This coefficient should not be confused with the heritability coefficient reported in Chapter 3. The environment influences personality in two stages. First, genes and the developmental environment combine to create personality traits, and then those traits combine with the immediate environment to produce behaviour.

6

Development

While the biosocial bases of crime have been emphasised throughout this book, to date, there has been little attention given to the precise environmental events that contribute to crime. In this chapter and the ones that follow, we shift to a more explicit and detailed examination of the nurture side of the nature–nurture interplay. We begin in this chapter by taking a developmental perspective, examining the significant life events that contribute to crime and criminality. Examining crime in terms of developmental experiences can help increase our understanding of when and why individuals begin offending, when and why they desist, and why there are individual differences in these patterns. This chapter is informed by theories and research in developmental psychology. Developmental psychology is the study of the ways that humans both change and remain constant over time. Developmental psychologists study orderly changes and continuities in three interrelated domains: physical development, cognitive development and psychosocial development. A common misconception about developmental psychology is that it is child psychology. While a great deal of attention in developmental psychology is indeed given to the critical early years of childhood, development continues across the lifespan: from ‘womb to tomb’. Many theorists argue that an individual’s future is not set in concrete by their childhood experiences. Instead, throughout each period of life there are critical transition points that may lead an individual down one pathway or another. The chapter begins by setting out the biological and environmental foundations of development. There follows a review of the critical developmental factors that increase or reduce the risk that an individual will engage in crime. Development in three specific psychological domains particularly relevant to criminology – attachment, moral reasoning and self-control – is then discussed. Finally, the criminal careers perspective is presented, with an examination of variations in offending patterns across the lifespan.

The biological and environmental foundations of human development The focus of this section is on how genes and the environment combine to shape the process of development. The key point to be made is that biosocial processes

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produce a wide array of developmental possibilities that help account for individual differences in offending patterns. The first task in this analysis is to identify the sources of influence on development. Heritability revisited: shared and non-shared environments As discussed in Chapter 3, heritability studies estimate the portion of the variance in a trait that is attributable to genetic factors on the one hand, and environmental factors on the other. These studies have revealed that in general .3–.5 of trait variance is attributable to genetic factors, leaving .5–.7 due to environmental factors. However, in most modern heritability studies, environmental factors are further broken down into shared (or common) environments and non-shared (unique) environments (Plomin et al., 2001; Plomin and Daniels, 1987). The shared environment refers to environmental factors that are experienced by all children within the same family and are therefore assumed to make the children alike. Shared environmental influences include factors such as parenting style, family size, socio-economic status, and the religious, social and moral values of parents. The non-shared environment refers to environmental factors to which children within the same family are differentially exposed and which are therefore assumed to make the children unalike. Many non-shared experiences occur outside the family. For example, children within the same family will have different teachers, mix with different peers, and may grow up in different cultural eras. However, siblings may also have non-shared experiences within the family. For example, being the eldest child involves different developmental experiences to being the youngest or middle child. Parents may also treat individual children differently; for example, by showing favouritism to one child over another. When considering the role of environmental factors in development, social scientists have traditionally focused on shared familial experiences. It has been generally assumed that, to the extent that the environment is important in development, children raised in the same family will tend to acquire similar behavioural traits. However, the significance of non-shared environments is readily apparent from examining the results of twin and adoption studies. Consider the case of MZ twins raised together. Because they are genetically identical, if their environmental experiences were also identical, then we would expect 100 per cent concordance in their traits. But MZ twins never have identical personalities. Thus some of their environmental experiences must be working to make them different from one another. These experiences comprise their non-shared environment. There are a number of different ways of estimating shared and non-shared environmental effects, most involving sophisticated multivariate statistical models. For our purposes, it is sufficient to know that these techniques apportion the variance attributable to environmental factors into shared and non-shared components. To the surprise of many social scientists, the consistent finding from twin and adoption studies is that non-shared environments account for more trait variance than do shared environments. In studies of personality, it has been found that on average around 40 per cent of trait variance is due to genetic factors, 35 per cent

Development 117 to non-shared environments, 5 per cent to shared environments, and the remaining 20 per cent to measurement error (Dunn and Plomin, 1990). There are relatively few studies that have examined shared and non-shared environments and crime, but the findings from those studies report a similar trend. For example, the meta-analysis by Rhee and Waldman (2002) reported that environmental factors accounted for 59 per cent of the variance for antisocial behaviour, a total that comprised 16 per cent for the shared environment and 43 per cent for the non-shared environment. In sum, to the extent that people within the same family are alike, it is largely because of their genetic similarity; the environment is important but its main effect is to make people different rather than to make them alike. Note that shared and non-shared environments have been sometimes interpreted as meaning inside and outside the family, and the conclusion has been drawn by some that families do not matter. This is a serious over-simplification. As described above, non-shared environments can include many within-family experiences. The significance of the research on shared and non-shared environments is to address the important but neglected question of why children from the same family have different developmental outcomes. Gene–environment interplay Identifying the sources of influence on development goes only part of the way to explaining the acquisition of skills, traits and behaviours. Genes and environment do not operate separately but rather they work in concert with one another in what is referred to as the gene–environment (GxE) interplay. There are two broad types of GxE interplay: interactions and correlations. We have encountered GxE interactions in earlier chapters. A GxE interaction occurs when the same environment affects genetically different individuals in different ways. For example, a child high on sensation-seeking may be less responsive to parental discipline than a child low on sensation-seeking, meaning that the same parenting strategies will be more effective for some children than for others. Similarly, a child predisposed to neuroticism may experience the divorce of his/her parents more traumatically – be less resilient – than will a sibling low on neuroticism. Thus while siblings may have the same shared environment, the effect of their shared experiences can vary between them, depending upon their individual genetic make-up. A GxE correlation occurs when genetically different individuals are differentially exposed to different environments. Correlations come in three forms: passive, reactive and active (Plomin, 1990; Plomin et al., 1977). A passive correlation occurs when a child is simultaneously provided with compatible genes and environment. For example, a child may inherit genes for high sensation-seeking from his/her parents. Because the parents are also high on sensation-seeking, the home environment is likely to be one in which the child is given many opportunities to engage in exciting activities. Similarly, a child who inherits genes for high intelligence is also likely to have a home environment that reinforces academic

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pursuits. The correlation in these examples is passive because both the genes and the environment are provided to the child without him/her needing to do anything. A reactive correlation occurs when genetically different individuals evoke different environmental reactions. Because a child high on sensation-seeking is likely to be more boisterous and demanding than a child low on sensation-seeking, he/she may elicit more negative parental responses such as harsher discipline and less intimate physical contact. It is by the same principle that attractive individuals tend to be treated more favourably in the wider world than are unattractive individuals. The nature of the environment experienced by an individual in part depends upon the reactions he/she provokes from others. An active correlation occurs when genetically different individuals select or create particular environments. The child high on sensation-seeking is likely to pursue more exciting and risky experiences than will the child low on sensationseeking; the child low on sensation-seeking, on the other hand, may be less likely to skip school and be more likely to complete homework assignments. Active correlations are also called niche-picking (Scarr and McCartney, 1983). Individuals are not necessarily passive recipients of environmental factors but can actively control some aspects of their environment to suit their needs. Epigenetics A further layer of complexity to the relationship between genes and the environment is provided by epigenetics. Whereas the GxE interplay is concerned with the role of genes in the way that environments impact upon individuals, epigenetics is concerned with the role of environments in the way that genes are expressed. The term epigenetics has been around since the 1940s (Waddington, 1942) but its meaning has changed over the years (Haig, 2004; van Speybroeck, 2002). Literally, epigenetic means ‘on the outside of ’ or ‘beside’ genes and was originally used to describe all of the non-genetic mechanisms that affect gene expression in the course of development. The term was coined to emphasise the bi-directional nature of the gene-environment relationship. For example, the onset of puberty is governed by epigenetic processes. The genes responsible for puberty are present at birth but exactly when these genes switch on partly depends upon environmental factors such as nutrition and stress (Ellis, 2004). Since the 1990s and the era of molecular genetics, epigenetics has become more narrowly defined to mean ‘the study of heritable changes in gene expression that occur without a change in DNA sequence’ (Wolffe and Matzke, 1999, p. 481). The focus has shifted to explaining at a molecular level the process by which genes are switched on and off in response to environmental signals (Champagne and Mashoodh, 2009; Harper, 2005; Masterpasqua, 2009; Suffrein-Roberts et al., 2008; Walsh, 2009). Two major epigenetic mechanisms have been identified: DNA methylation and histone modification. Briefly, DNA methylation involves molecules that attach to guanine-cytosine (C-G) base pairs (see Table 3.1) and silence them. Histone modification affects the way the DNA molecule comes wrapped (around proteins called histones) within each cell; the less tightly wrapped

Development 119 a sequence of DNA, the greater the likelihood of genetic expression. These epigenetic processes involve reversible changes to DNA that can be passed from one generation to the next but that do not involve any alteration to the sequence of DNA base pairs. The changes to DNA suggest that the genome has a certain degree of plasticity analogous (but less pronounced) to the plasticity of the brain. Relevant environmental factors affecting epigenetic mechanisms can include diet, the quality of parental care, hormonal activity and exposure to drugs and toxins (Masterpasqua, 2009; Suffrein-Roberts et al., 2008). To date, most research investigating epigenetic mechanisms has involved animal studies since these permit tight control of relevant variables. For example, Weaver et al. (2004) investigated the effects of maternal care on epigenetic regulation in rodents. They found that rodent pups who received high levels of maternal care were more resistant to stress than were pups who received low levels of maternal care. Examining the genes responsible for suppressing excessive stress reactions, the researchers found that the low maternal-care group had higher levels of DNA methylation than did the high maternal-care group. That is, the genes that might have helped the low maternal-care pups deal with stress had been switched off. These changes persisted into adulthood, but were reversed if pups were cross-fostered with a high-care mother. Fraga et al. (2005) showed that epigenetic changes to the genome also occur in humans. They examined a sample of MZ twins aged from 3 to 74. The researchers found that for 50-year-old twins there were significant differences between twin pairs in the distribution of DNA methylation and histone modification, while there were no differences between twin pairs at age 3. In other words, epigenetic changes to the genome accumulated over the lifespan. The presence of these changes in the genome may help explain why a pair of MZ twins can develop distinctive genotypes – including differential susceptibility to genetically-based disorders such as schizophrenia – despite sharing 100 per cent of their genes. Development across the lifespan Developmental psychologists typically divide the lifespan into periods (see Table 6.1). These divisions are based on chronological age and associated physical, cognitive and psychosocial developments, but they are also recognised as social constructions. There are significant differences in the way development is conceptualised in different eras and among different cultures. For example, what we today call adolescence in the West is largely an invention of the twentieth century (Keller, 1999). Similarly, in contrast to the divisions described in Table 6.1, in some East African tribes males are categorised as youths, junior warriors, senior warriors, junior elders, senior elders and retired elders (Keith, 1985). Developmental theories vary in the way that they portray the progress of an individual through the developmental periods. Two broad theoretical positions may be characterised. Theories that emphasise the primacy of biological processes generally present development as the fulfilment of a pre-programmed genetic blueprint. Every individual is seen to follow the same developmental path,

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Table 6.1 Major periods of life Periods of life

Approximate age

Typical characteristics

Prenatal

conception to birth

Period of most rapid physical development. Vulnerability to environmental influences.

Infancy

first 2 years

Dramatic neurological development and emergence of motor, perceptual and cognitive abilities. Attachments to parents form.

Early childhood

2–6 years

Refinement of motor skills and expansion of cognitive and language skills through play. Ties with peers begin to be established.

Middle childhood

6–12 years

Advances in academic and social skills associated with the school years. Peer group becomes important. Concept of self develops.

Adolescence

12–20 years

Onset of puberty leads to major physical changes and sexual maturity. Search for identity and establishing autonomy from family. Peer group exerts increasing influence.

Early adulthood

20–40 years

Physical conditions peaks. Concerns centre on leaving home, entering the workforce and forming intimate relationships. May establish a family and take on responsibility for others. Personality characteristics become more stable.

Middle adulthood

40–65 years

Slow deterioration of sensory and physical abilities but mental abilities peak. Height of career. May need to help own children become independent.

Late adulthood

65+ years

Health and physical abilities decline. Adjustment to retirement. Reflecting on the meaning of their lives.

moving lock-step with everyone else from one developmental stage to the next. These stages comprise discrete developmental milestones that involve abrupt shifts in development as genes switch on and off, producing a developmental trajectory that resembles a staircase. On the other hand, theories that emphasise the primacy of the environment generally present development as a dynamic process that unfolds in response to each new experience. Developmental pathways are infinitely varied depending upon the unique environments and life experiences of each individual. There are no discrete stages; rather, development is a continuous process involving the steady and incremental acquisition of new skills and behaviours over time.

Development 121 The complex relationship between genes and the environment suggests a compromise position somewhere between the two scenarios outlined above. One way of integrating these two views is provided by a family of developmental perspectives known collectively as lifespan psychology (Baltes, 1987; Baltes et al., 1999; Smith and Baltes, 1999; Staudinger and Lindenberger, 2003). Lifespan psychology is a meta-theoretical approach that stresses development as a life-long process that is subject to multiple causal influences. Development is seen to occur both as a series of qualitatively different stages, during which new skills and abilities appear; and as periods of continuous, quantitative development, during which skills and abilities are consolidated and honed. While stages are biologically co-ordinated, the emergence of each new stage is mediated by environmental factors. Development is characterised by life-long plasticity and may take many different courses according to each individual’s unique biological make-up and ongoing environmental experiences.

Developmental risk and protective factors for crime In researching risk and protective factors for crime, psychologists have traditionally focused on the role of early experiences as predictors of later criminality. However, as suggested by the lifespan perspective, there are limitations to such an approach. Risk factors early in life do not necessarily condemn an individual to a life of crime, and nor do early protective factors provide a guaranteed inoculation against criminality. Risk and protective factors can be both distal (occurring during early formative years) and proximal (occurring near the time of offending). The factors examined in the section are family structure, child maltreatment, parental disciplinary styles, schooling, peers and marriage. Family structure In general, research shows that being raised in an intact family comprising both biological parents is related to lower levels of delinquency than being raised in alternative family structures (Apel and Kaukinen, 2008; Blazei et al., 2008; Demuth and Brown, 2004; Harper and McLanahan, 2004; Heck and Walsh, 2000). For example, Kierkus and Hewitt (2009) examined the relationship between four types of delinquency – general delinquency, violent crime, property crime and substance abuse – and four family structures – two biological parents (‘traditional’), single parent, single parent plus step-parent, and single parent plus other relative. Children from the three alternative family structures had higher levels of all types of delinquency than did those from traditional families. These findings were independent of gender, race and socio-economic status. Delving more deeply into the role of family structure, researchers have uncovered a number of moderating effects. Generally, the absence of mothers has a more deleterious effect than does the absence of fathers (Demuth and Brown, 2004; Haas et al., 2004), although the absence of fathers has a greater impact on boys than on girls (Ram and Hou, 2005; Schwartz, 2008). However, Demuth and

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Brown (2004) found that initial differences between single-father and singlemother families disappeared when the level of parental involvement and supervision was controlled for. In a similar vein, the negative effects of living in a single-mother family can be mitigated if there is a loving and warm relationship between the mother and child (Haas et al., 2004; Mack et al., 2007). In the case of fathers, the positive effect of their presence in the family home is conditional on their level of antisociality (Blazei et al., 2008; Jaffee et al., 2003). For fathers with low levels of antisocial behaviour, the more time that they lived away from their children, the greater the children’s risk of conduct problems: for fathers with high levels of antisocial behaviours, the more time that they lived with their children, the greater the children’s risk of conduct problems. What actually happens within families may be more important than family structure per se. Child maltreatment Maltreatment of children may involve physical abuse, neglect, sexual abuse and psychological abuse (Kinard, 1994). Kinard notes that overlaps in the definitions of different types of maltreatment, and the fact that children may experience multiple forms of maltreatment, make it difficult to disentangle separate maltreatment effects. For this reason, most studies employ composite measures of two or more types of maltreatment. There is an extensive body of research that shows children who experience various combinations of maltreatment have a significantly increased risk of engaging in delinquency and adult crime, after controlling for other risk factors such as socio-economic status (Heck and Walsh, 2000; McCord, 1983; Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Mersky and Topitzes, 2009; Smith and Thornberry, 1995; Ryan and Testa, 2005; Stewart et al., 2008; Teague et al., 2008; Weatherburn and Lind, 1997; Widom,1989; 2003; Widom and Maxfield, 2001; Zingraff et al., 1993). The effects of maltreatment may be moderated by a number of factors. Kruttschnitt et al. (1987) found that abused males who had good social support systems – close ties with siblings, involvement in sporting teams, and so on – had lower subsequent rates of violent offending than did other abused males. Zingraff et al. (1993) found that good performance at school – good grades, low absenteeism, good behavioural record – also reduced the risk of later criminality in abused and neglected children. Alternatively, the level of delinquency has been found to be stronger if the maltreated child is moved into foster care rather than remaining at home (Ryan and Testa, 2005). Finally, Stewart et al. (2008) found that maltreatment that extended into adolescence – that is, closer to the typical age of offending onset – was related to higher rates of delinquency than was maltreatment that ceased prior to adolescence. Parental disciplinary styles Baumrind (1991) identified three types of parental disciplinary styles: authoritarian, permissive and authoritative. In the authoritarian style, parents set the

Development 123 behavioural standards to be achieved by their children in the form of a predetermined, inflexible set of rules. The rules need to be obeyed for their own sake – little emphasis is given to negotiating with children or to explaining the rationale upon which the rules are based. Rule infringements are punished with sanctions that may include physical punishments. In the permissive style, parents do not play an active role in the socialisation of their children. They provide little in the way of firm behavioural guidelines to children and have a tolerant approach towards their children’s behaviour, including acting out behaviour. Children have a great deal of freedom in deciding when to go to bed, how much television they watch, and when and with whom they socialise. The authoritative style is characterised by a firm but fair approach to discipline. Emphasis is given to providing direction to children based around open communication and rational discussion. Standards of behaviour are set against age-appropriate expectations. While independence and individuality are valued, family rules are enforced by the consistent and balanced application of social controls. Both authoritarian (Farrington et al., 2009; Grogan-Kaylor, 2005; Verona et al., 2005; Verona and Sachs-Ericsson, 2005) and permissive (Beck and Shaw, 2005; Frick, 2006; Schaffer et al., 2009; Warr, 2005) parenting styles have been found to correlate with juvenile and adult offending. It is argued that the authoritarian style generates hostility and distrust in children and fails to facilitate the learning of the principle that underpins the rule. The permissive style is distinguished from neglect (Maccoby and Martin, 1983), but both may have much the same outcome. Both permissiveness and neglect can contribute to antisocial behaviour in the short term because children’s activities are not adequately monitored or supervised, and in the long term because children do not learn appropriate behavioural boundaries and self-control. One particular line of research has focused on the effects of corporal punishment – most likely a component of an authoritarian parenting style – on subsequent antisocial behaviour. Corporal punishment is distinguished from physical abuse, and is defined as ‘the use of physical force with the intention of causing the child to experience pain but not injury for the purposes of correction or control of the child’s behavior’ (Straus, 1994, p. 4). Gershoff (2002) conducted a metaanalysis involving 88 studies. The only desirable outcome for corporal punishment was an increase in immediate compliance, with a large effect size of 1.13. Undesirable outcomes included increased child aggression (effect size .36), increased child delinquency and antisocial behaviour (effect size .42), increased adult aggression (effect size of .57), increased adult delinquency and antisocial behaviour (effect size of .42), decreased quality of parent–child relationship (effect size of −.58) and decreased moral internalisation (effect size −.33). Schooling Poor academic performance has consistently been found to be related to the development of antisocial behaviour (Dodge and Pettit, 2003; Harlow, 2003; Henry et al., 1999; Loeber et al., 1998; Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Meltzer et al., 1984).

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Children as young as 8 years of age who fail at school have been found to have almost double the risk of later delinquency (Loeber et al., 1998). At every age bracket, non-delinquent children outperform delinquent children in all academic areas (Meltzer et al., 1984). Delinquency is negatively related to the length of time spent at school (Harlow, 2003; Henry et al., 1999; Lochner and Moretti, 2004). There are several possible reasons for the effect of school failure on delinquency. First, a poor education decreases employability and potential earnings, making criminal behaviour a relatively more attractive option (Petras et al., 2004). Second, repeated school failure may result in a damaged self-image that creates an expectation of failure in other areas of life (Zamora, 2005). Third, negative experiences at school inhibit the development of social bonds and attachments to wider social institutions that serve to bind the individual to a prosocial life-style (Henry et al., 1990; Sprott, 2004). Peers Having delinquent friends has been found to be a powerful predictor of delinquency and is perhaps the most significant proximal cause of offending onset. Research has found that delinquency increases with the number of delinquent friends (Akers et al., 1979; Matsueda, 1982; Mears et al., 1998), the proportion of friends who are delinquent (Haynie, 2002), the intensity of the relationship with delinquent friends (Alarid et al., 2000; Payne and Cornwell, 2007), the duration of association with delinquent friends (Akers et al., 1979), and the frequency of association with delinquent friends (Akers et al., 1979; Akers and Lee, 1996; Haynie and Osgood, 2005). Traditionally two alternative explanations have been proposed for the association between delinquent friendships and delinquency. The first is that delinquent peers exert an undesirable influence that encourages individuals to engage in crimes they might otherwise not have considered committing. The second explanation is that delinquent-prone individuals seek out like-minded friends in an example of niche-picking, and thus the association between delinquency and delinquent friends is merely correlational and not causational. More recent longitudinal research suggests a third explanation that involves a reciprocal relationship between delinquent peers and delinquency (Aseltine, 1995; Matsueda and Anderson, 1998). Matsueda and Anderson (1998) examined self-report delinquency data from 1,725 youths collected in three waves over four years. They found that delinquents tended to gravitate towards other delinquents. At the same time, associating with other delinquents exacerbated existing delinquent tendencies. Delinquency both affects and is affected by the choice of friends an individual makes. Marriage The variables examined so far have been concerned with the onset of offending. Of equal interest are factors that increase desistance from crime. The most widely researched of these factors is marriage (Beaver et al., 2008; Bersani et al., 2009;

Development 125 Farrington and West, 1995; King et al., 2007; Maume et al., 2005; Sampson et al., 2006; Savolainen, 2009; Warr, 1998). In one of the most influential studies, Sampson et al. (2006) reanalysed longitudinal data collected by Glueck and Glueck (1950, 1968). The data included criminal records, personal interviews and individual and family background measures for a sample of 500 high risk boys from adolescence to the age of 32 years. Sampson et al. (2006) then traced a stratified sample of 52 participants who at the time of the reanalysis (1994) were aged up to 70 years. They found that marriage was associated with a 35 per cent reduction in offending. Reductions in offending were also found for stable cohabitation. There are a number of qualifications concerning the protective effects of marriage. First, marriage as individuals move out of adolescence is distinguished from romantic relationships during adolescence. For adolescents, romantic involvements typically increase existing delinquency propensities, especially for girls (Capaldi et al., 2008; Cauffman et al., 2008; Eklund et al., 2009). Second, the quality of the relationship is important. For marriage to have protective effects, it must be characterised by stability and genuine attachment (Sampson et al., 2006). Relatedly, marriage may be a risk factor for crime if the partner is also engaged in antisocial behaviour (Capaldi et al., 2008; Sampson et al., 2006). Third, the beneficial effects of marriage tend to be greater for men than for women (King et al., 2007; Leverentz, 2006). While males typically marry partners with less deviant histories than themselves, the reverse is typically true for women. As Laub and Sampson (2003) put it, men tend to marry up while women tend to marry down. Social explanations for desistance propose either indirect or direct effects for marriage on crime. The indirect argument is that marriage alters the pattern of interaction with delinquent friends and the relative opportunities for crime (Giordano et al., 2003; Maume et al., 2005; Warr, 1998). Offending is no longer part of the individual’s daily routine. Those arguing for direct effects propose that marriage fundamentally changes people through strengthening their social bonds and their commitment to more conventional social values (Laub and Sampson 2001; Maume et al., 2005). Marriage becomes a turning point in the offender’s life that provides the chance of a fresh start. Few researchers had considered the biosocial bases for desistance. However, recently Beaver et al. (2008) identified a number of genetic polymorphisms – specifically, DRD2, DRD4, DAT1 and MAOA – that were directly related to desistance. It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that these polymorphisms are involved in the availability of dopamine, a neurotransmitter implicated in emotional arousal, and that levels of dopamine normally drop sharply after adolescence. More importantly, Beaver et al. found that for males there was a GxE interaction for three polymorphisms (DRD2, DRD4 and MAOA). The effect of marriage on desistance depended upon which versions of these three genes an individual possessed. While the exact reason for the interaction effect is at this stage not clear, Beaver et al.’s findings highlight at a molecular level why marriage may lead to desistance for one person but not for another.

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Psychosocial development and crime The previous section identified the key environmental factors associated with the development of criminal behaviour. This section considers some of the mediating psychological mechanisms through which these environmental factors operate. Three areas of psychosocial development of particular relevance to antisocial behaviour are attachment, moral reasoning and self-control. Attachment Attachment refers to the strong and enduring bonds between people. Attachment patterns are established in infancy between a child and his/her primary caregivers, and these patterns may affect the nature of an individual’s interpersonal relationships later in life. The inability to form close bonds with others has potentially important consequences for the later development of antisocial behaviour. Bowlby’s attachment theory The need for attachment is thought to be innate, the product of evolution and designed to ensure that offspring are cared for. In Harlow’s (Harlow and Zimmermann, 1959) famous experiment, baby monkeys who were deprived of contact with their mother clung for comfort to a soft cloth doll that did not provide food, in preference to a wire doll that did provide food. Based on a combination of ethological and psychoanalytic ideas, Bowlby (1969) proposed a theory of attachment to account for the development of human parent–child bonds. Bowlby argued that while infants come hard-wired for attachment, bonds develop as a result of the interaction between the child and the caregiver over the first few years of life. In normative development, childhood attachment occurs in four stages. In the pre-attachment stage (0–2 months) infants do not discriminate among adults and show no particular preference for any individual. In the ‘attachment-in-the-making’ stage (2–6 months) the infant shows a clear preference for his/her primary caregivers but does not protest when separated from them. In the ‘clear-cut’ attachment stage (6 months–2 years) the infant displays separation anxiety when taken from his/her primary caregivers. Finally, after 2 years of age, the child begins to form reciprocal relationships with the primary caregivers as he/ she comes to understand and predict their comings and goings. Not all children follow the normative developmental pathway. Ainsworth (1973) identified four attachment styles based on how children during the attachment phase responded to the departure and return of their mother. In the secure attachment style, the child may cry when the mother leaves but welcomes her when she returns. The caregiver is an anchor-point for security. In the avoidant attachment style, the child does not cry when the mother leaves and avoids her when she returns. In the ambivalent (or anxious) attachment style, the child becomes very upset when the mother leaves but resists contact with her when she returns. Finally, in the disorganised attachment style, the child behaves in

Development 127 contradictory, ineffectual and unpredictable ways, perhaps resorting to rocking behaviour or approaching the mother without looking at her. Attachment style is affected by a number of factors, including the quantity of caregiving opportunities, the quality of caregiving, characteristics of the child and characteristics of the family environment. As described in previous chapters, when children are deprived of close human contact early in life – as occurred with the Romanian orphans (Rutter et al., 2004) – they have ongoing difficulty in forming emotional bonds with others. In terms of the quality of caregiving, secure attachment is related to loving, accepting, attentive, sympathetic and understanding caregiver behaviour, while insecure attachment styles can result from inconsistent, unresponsive, rejecting and abusive caregiver behaviour (van IJzendoorn et al., 1999; van IJzendoorn et al., 2004). The quality of caregiver behaviour may in turn be affected by the behaviour of the child; children who are emotionally unresponsive or who are difficult to manage may elicit negative responses from caregivers in an example of reactive correlation (van IJzendoorn et al., 2004). Finally, caregiver behaviour can be affected by family stresses such as financial difficulty and marital discord (Thompson and Raikes, 2003). According to attachment theory, childhood attachment has long-term effects on interpersonal behaviour and the ability to form close relations with others (Bowlby, 1980; Hazan and Shaver, 1987; Nelis and Rae, 2009). Attachment experiences with the primary caregivers create expectations in the individual about the reliability of others and evaluations of one’s own self-worth. Secure attachments help shape an interpersonal style that is characterised by confidence, cooperation and empathy while an insecure attachment styles will lead to deficits in these area of interpersonal behaviour (Thompson et al., 2003). Attachment and criminal behaviour Bowlby’s original theorising about attachment was based on his clinical analysis of the backgrounds of 44 juvenile thieves (Bowlby, 1944). He concluded that 14 of the sample displayed a marked lack of affection and warmth for other human beings, a condition he traced back to the inadequacy of their early home environment and weak parent–child bonds. Research has subsequently confirmed higher levels of insecure childhood attachment among offenders than among non-offenders (Anderson et al., 1999; Leiber et al., 2009; Mack et al., 2007; Rankin and Kern, 1994; Smallbone and Dadds, 2000). Rankin and Kern (1994) reported that children who are securely attached to both parents have lower self-reported delinquency than do children who are securely attached to just one. Smallbone and Dadds (2000) found that self-reported antisocial behaviour was related most strongly to avoidant paternal attachment, suggesting that the relationship with the father plays a particularly important role in determining whether or not an individual offends. Mack et al. (2007) found that the level of maternal attachment was a stronger predictor of delinquency than whether the child came from a two-parent or single-mother family. There has been particular interest in the relationship between attachment style and sex offending. It is reasoned that the social-skills deficits that characterise

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insecure attachments impair the ability of individuals to gain intimacy with adults in a socially appropriate manner and so the offender seeks compensatory intimacy with children (Marshall, 1989). Sex offenders have been found to have less secure attachments than non-sex offenders (Lyn and Burton, 2004; Smallbone and Dadds, 1998) and non-offenders (Smallbone and Dadds, 1998; 2000; 2001), but attachment style does not reliably discriminate among different types of sex offenders (Lyn and Burton, 2004). Moral development Moral development is concerned with the way that individuals make judgements about ethical issues and social rules. The application of moral development theory to criminology is premised on the assumption that deficits in moral reasoning affect an individual’s ability to tell right from wrong and to fully appreciate the rights and feelings of others. Moral development is most closely associated with the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1958, 1969). Kohlberg’s moral development theory Kohlberg’s formulation of the acquisition of increasingly sophisticated levels of moral reasoning is an example of a developmental stage theory, but one that recognises the role of environmental factors in helping to move individuals between stages. Based on the pioneering work of Piaget (1932) on the stages of cognitive development in children, Kohlberg proposed that moral development involved a set of six sequential, qualitatively-different stages, separated into three levels: pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning Stage

Offending is justified if . . .

Level 1: Pre-conventional reasoning 1. Punishment and obedience 2. Instrumental hedonism

. . . punishment can be avoided . . . rewards outweigh risks

Level 2: Conventional reasoning 3. Good boy/girl 4. Authority and social order

. . . it maintains relationships . . . it is in the interests of society or social institutions

Level 3: Post-conventional reasoning 5. Social contract 6. Universal ethical principles

. . . it maintains human rights or furthers social justice

Development 129 At the pre-conventional reasoning level the bases for moral decisions are seen to be external to the individual. In stage one (when the child is approximately 4–8 years old), moral decisions are based on obeying powerful others and avoiding externally imposed sanctions. Certain behaviours are wrong because they result in punishment. In stage two, the rationale for obeying rules shifts to the relative balance of rewards and punishments. The individual has an egocentric view of the world and pursues behaviours that further his/her self-interest. Misbehaviour can be justified if the rewards outweigh the costs. However, the motives of others are also taken into account leading to decisions that may be reciprocally beneficial. In the conventional reasoning level, the individual has internalised the rules and expectations of society. At stage three, the individual sees him/herself in relation to others and as embedded in a social network comprising family and friends. Other people’s needs are taken into account and moral decisions are based on maintaining important relationships. At stage four, the importance of maintaining social institutions is recognised. These social institutions are seen to form the basis for the fair and consistent functioning of society, and behaviour can be justified if it furthers these objectives. Finally, in the post-conventional reasoning level, the individual adopts ethical positions that are based on personal values selected from a set of universal moral principles. At stage five, the individual understands that morality involves the accommodation of competing interests and values. Moral decisions are not based on a set of rigid rules but may involve compromise in order to deliver ‘the greatest good for the greatest number of people’. At stage six, the individual operates on the basis of abstract reasoning and internalised ethical principles, and has a duty to disobey unjust laws. Kohlberg recognised that few people actually operate consistently at stage six, and many researchers have omitted it from the hierarchy. However, Kohlberg favoured its retention as a logical, if theoretical, end-point of the hierarchy. Moral development is linked to more general age-based stages of cognitive development that impose strict limitations on the level of moral sophistication that could be achieved. It is not neurologically possible, for example, for young children to reason at the same level as an adult. The stages are hierarchical in the sense that an individual must move through the stages in strict succession – there is no skipping or backtracking permitted – although at any one time an individual may utilise reasoning strategies from adjacent stages. However, an individual need not progress to all stages, and indeed, the relevance to criminology is that offenders are generally assumed to become stuck at relatively low levels on the hierarchy. According to Kohlberg, individuals have a natural tendency to prefer operating at higher rather than lower stages of reasoning. However, their passage from one stage to the next is facilitated or constrained by their personal developmental experiences. In particular, progress may be advanced by exposing individuals to stages of reasoning that are higher than the one in which they are currently operating. This is thought to create ‘cognitive disequilibrium’. In an effort to resolve this state of internal conflict, the individual is required to assimilate and accommodate moral arguments that challenge existing ways of thinking (Rest, 1973; Walker, 1983). Positive social interaction is the key to creating disequilibrium and stimulating moral development. The

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adoption by parents of inductive disciplinary strategies that involve explaining the rationale for rules – an example of an authoritative disciplinary style – leads to higher levels of moral reasoning in children (Boyes and Allen, 1993; Janssens and Deković, 1997). Similarly, a supportive and democratic family atmosphere that encourages open discussion of moral issues also correlates with higher levels of moral reasoning (Palmer and Hollin, 1996, 1997; Powers, 1988; Speicher-Dubin, 1982; Walker and Taylor, 1991). The other side of the coin, of course, is that moral development may be retarded when opportunities for disequilibrium are absent. Moral development and criminal behaviour Theoretically, as Table 6.2 shows, criminal behaviour can be justified at any moral stage – it is the rationale for a moral judgement, not the judgement itself, that determines the level of reasoning. In practice, however, most crime is not committed to fulfil abstract ethical principles but generally involves self-interest. It is predicted by moral development theory, therefore, that most offenders operate at pre-conventional levels of reasoning. For empirical purposes, moral development is typically measured by eliciting responses to scenarios describing various moral dilemmas (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987; Gibbs et al., 1984). There have been several reviews and meta-analyses over the years examining the relationship between offending and responses on these measures (Blasi, 1980; Nelson et al., 1990; Palmer, 2003; Smetana, 1990; Stams et al., 2006). In the most recent meta-analysis, Stams et al. (2006) examined 50 studies on moral reasoning and delinquency that included most studies examined in earlier reviews. The overall effect size was .76 (large), indicating that delinquents were rated to be significantly lower on Kohlberg’s hierarchy than were non-delinquents. A number of significant moderator variables were identified; that is, factors that affected the strength of the relationship between low levels of moral reasoning and delinquency. Effect sizes were greater for male delinquents than for female delinquents; for delinquents in late adolescence than for delinquents in early adolescence; for psychopathic delinquents than for non-psychopathic delinquents; for delinquents with low intelligence than for delinquents with average intelligence; for incarcerated delinquents than for non-incarcerated delinquents; and for delinquents incarcerated for 18 months or more than for delinquents incarcerated for 6 months or less. The relationship between moral reasoning and delinquency was not moderated by socio-economic status (lower class or lower-middle class), type of delinquency (petty crime; violent/serious delinquency, or combined) or cultural background (Caucasian white or other). Overall results suggest a robust relationship between delinquency and low levels of moral reasoning that remains significant after controlling for social class, cultural background, gender, age and intelligence. Self-control Self-control refers to the capacity of individuals to resist temptation and delay gratification. Conversely, the absence of self-control is conceptually related to the

Development 131 trait of impulsivity. While self-control is a psychological construct, the most comprehensive theorising about the relationship between self-control and crime is presented by criminologists Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) in their general theory of crime. Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory of crime The general theory of crime is an example of the control perspective in criminology. It will be remembered from Chapter 1 that control theories shift the focus from explaining how criminal dispositions are acquired to explaining why lawabiding dispositions are not acquired. It is assumed that individuals are born with the natural motivation to commit crime, and the main role of the environment as far as crime is concerned is to suppress or not suppress these motivations. We have encountered elements of the control perspective already in this book. Evolutionary psychology stresses that the potential to behave in criminal ways is a universal aspect of human nature, while behavioural-genetic, neuropsychological and many trait perspectives propose that certain people are born with relatively strong predispositions to criminality. In each case, whether or not an individual commits a crime depends upon how successful the environment is in controlling the expression of the pre-existing criminal potential. According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), the cause of all criminal behaviour can be reduced to an individual’s inability to exercise self-control. While they did not speculate on the precise nature of its origins, Gottfredson and Hirschi viewed poor self-control as a biologically-based phenomenon. People do not learn to be ‘impulsive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-taking, short-sighted, and non-verbal’ (ibid., p. 90); they are born with these traits. However, unlike Eysenck and other trait theorists, Gottfredson and Hirschi were stridently opposed to including any role for inborn, individual differences in self-control. Everyone is seen to be endowed with the same initial susceptibility to criminality. A corollary of the control perspective is criminal versatility. Low self-control may manifest in many different ways, including in non-criminal behaviours such as excessive drinking and gambling. All crime is motivated by the same basic desire – to satisfy one’s immediate desires and urges – and is caused by the same inability to deny or delay self-gratification. The causes for rape are essentially the same as the causes for theft. Accordingly, offenders tend to commit a wide range of offences rather than specialising in any particular type. There is therefore no need to build different theories to explain different sorts of crimes – all can be explained by the one general theory. As for the capacity to exercise control over criminal impulses, this Gottfredson and Hirschi posited was a purely learned skill acquired during the first few years of socialisation (by the age of around 8 years). Self-control is instilled by effective child-rearing practices that are built on strong attachments between children and caregivers, effective parental supervision, measured and consistent punishment of deviant acts, and the modelling by parents of prosocial behaviour. Specifically, children need to internalise the lesson that criminal acts carry painful and negative

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consequences, and alternatively that the achievement of worthwhile long-term goals requires the delay of immediate rewards. Differences in self-control depend upon how well these lessons are learned within the family. According to Gottfredson and Hirschi, once established, self-control remains stable across the life-course, although it may be expressed in different ways. In comparison to the crucial and enduring role of the family, other social institutions such as schools have a limited capacity to affect criminality or the commission of crime. Accordingly, an individual’s offending trajectory can be reliably predicted in childhood. Self-control and criminal behaviour Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory of crime is one of the most influential and widely cited theories in criminology. The proposals that offenders have low self-control and are therefore criminally versatile have considerable empirical support. Grasmick et al. (1993) constructed a 24-item self-control scale based on Gottfredson and Hirschi’s theory. In a meta-analysis of studies employing this scale, Pratt and Cullen (2000, p. 952) report an effect size of .26, which they claim ‘rank[s] self-control as one of the strongest known correlates of crime’. Further, there was no significant variation in effects size for different kinds of crime, suggesting that low self-control is a general cause of crime. Undoubtedly the construct of self-control is a major contribution to the explanation of criminal behaviour. However, aspects of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s theoretical portrayal of selfcontrol are controversial and have generated heated debate (Farrington, 2003; Geis, 2000; Hay and Forrest, 2008; Paternoster et al., 1997). Their denial of biologically-based individual differences in self-control is at odds with the biosocial approach adopted in this book. In addition, their insistence that an individual’s offending trajectory is set in childhood is contentious and clearly contradicts the position taken in lifespan psychology that change is possible at any stage across the life-course. An approach to explaining the development of criminality that is more compatible with these alternative positions is provided by the criminal careers perspective.

Criminal careers The criminal careers perspective has a criminological rather than psychological heritage and has evolved in directions that are separate from (and sometimes in opposition to) developmental psychology. There are nevertheless many overlaps between lifespan psychology and the criminal careers perspective. The central concern for criminal careers researchers is to understand patterns of offending across the life-course. Their starting point is the familiar age–crime curve (see Figure 1.1). The criminal careers perspective is founded on the possibility of multiple age–crime trajectories to account for different developmental experiences and/or different types of offenders. Offending patterns can vary among offenders in a number of ways. Offenders may differ on the age that they first offend, the

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Figure 6.1 Age distribution for criminal offenders for a hypothetical data-set separating life-course persistent and adolescent-limited offenders.

frequency of their offending, the seriousness of their offending, the duration of their offending, and the age that they stop offending. Traditionally the drop in aggregate crime rates after adolescence was explained as a result in a change in offending frequency across all offenders; there were the same number of offenders but they all offended less frequently (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). The criminal careers perspective offered the alternative explanation that the aggregate crime rate masks different patterns of criminal participation (onset, duration and desistance) over time. The aggregate crime rate falls because some offenders stop offending. Perhaps the most common distinction between criminal career patterns, and one that has been used already throughout this book, is that of adolescent-limited (AL) offenders and life-course persistent (LCP) offenders (Moffitt, 1993). AL offenders have brief criminal careers involving relatively late onset and early desistence, while LCP offenders continue to offend at much the same high rate over their lifetime. The respective age–crime curves for AL and LCP offenders are shown in Figure 6.1. Life-course persistent offenders The genesis of the criminal careers perspective was the observation that crime rates across offenders are highly skewed. A small number of offenders account for a large amount of crime. For example, Farrington et al. (1986) found that 5 per cent of offenders commit 50 per cent of all crime. Criminologists and policy-makers were interested in this finding because it suggested that large reductions in the crime rate could be achieved by the selective incapacitation of these ‘career criminals’ (Blumstein et al., 1986). It is this group of offenders that Moffitt (1993) labelled LCP.

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LCP offenders are characterised by the longitudinal consistency in their criminality. While the nature of their antisocial acts may change with age, underlying their behaviour is a persistent antisocial disposition across time. Troublesome behaviour may begin in early childhood with conduct disorder, shift to delinquent acts in adolescence, and culminate in serious criminality in adulthood. Thus, their potential criminality may be predicted from an early age. Their antisocial nature is likewise consistent across situations. They commit a wide diversity of crimes and display antisocial characteristics in all areas of their life. In addition to their formal criminal records they are likely to have poor work habits, substance addictions and a history of poor relationships. The characteristics of LCP offenders and the origins of their behaviour have been discussed in previous chapters. LCP offenders are the offenders most likely to possess inherited criminogenic dispositions; to display neuropsychological deficits; and to attract a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. Moffitt, however, was explicit in ruling out a purely biological explanation for LCP offending. She saw LCP offending in terms of various forms of GxE interplay. One important form of interplay is reactive correlation. LCP offenders typically evoke negative responses from others and this serves to exacerbate and perpetuate their antisocial tendencies. They are difficult babies, challenging for even resourceful and loving parents let alone parents prone to inconsistent and harsh discipline. Once LCP individuals have started off on the wrong foot, each subsequent negative experience has cumulative consequences, with failure piling upon failure. When they move to school, they continue to elicit damaging responses from teachers and peers. LCP offenders are also likely to engage in niche-picking, gravitating towards other antisocial individuals with whom they engage in mutual reinforcement of each other’s deviancy. The offending persistence of LCP offenders is caused by a combination of their ongoing exposure to negative experiences via GxE correlations, deficits in social skills that have resulted from their impoverished social development, and the presence of the underlying criminogenic traits that were there from the beginning. Adolescent-limited offenders AL offending is the modal age–crime pattern. Not only are the vast majority of offenders adolescent-limited but the majority of all youths – up to 80 per cent – have some formal contact with the police during adolescence (Farrington et al., 1986). Delinquency during adolescence is normal. According to Moffitt (1993), AL offending is marked by its discontinuity. The delinquent behaviour of the AL offender is neither stable across time nor across situations. Future engagement in delinquency cannot be reliably predicted in childhood by any particular biological factors or developmental experiences. There is no prior history of behavioural problems. Offending may begin abruptly, continue for a brief period, then end just as abruptly. The offending itself may be patchy, occurring in some circumstances and not in others, as dictated by the situation and in response to a rational consideration of available rewards.

Development 135 Moffitt argued that adolescents in modern Western cultures are caught in a ‘maturity gap’. With modernisation, biological maturity has fallen out of synchronisation with social maturity. Improved nutrition has meant that adolescents are physically maturing earlier than ever before in history. At the same time, their entry into the adult social world is increasingly being delayed. Instead of starting work and getting married soon after puberty, they are staying on at school or university, living at home under parental care, and delaying marriage and parenthood. In many areas of life, adolescents are legally prohibited from undertaking adult behaviours and responsibilities. There are legally prescribed ages at which they can get a job, drive a car, have sex, get married, vote, drink alcohol, and so forth. AL crimes occur during this window of ‘role vacuum’ as adolescents seek to resolve the frustration they experience at being denied the spoils of adulthood. Crime is instigated and maintained by adolescent social networks. In particular, AL offenders mimic the behaviours of LCP offenders, who assume the status of role models. Impressed by the relative wealth, sexual experience and freedom of LCP offenders, AL offenders see delinquency as a way to gain access to valued possessions, to increase their social status among peers, and to assert their independence from family control. With respect to this latter point, the fact that delinquent acts are regarded as deviant by parents and other authority figures is part of their attraction. Engaging in risky delinquent behaviour is a surrogate for the rites of passage common in pre-industrialised societies. The crimes committed by AL offenders reflect these motivations and comprise mainly thefts – to secure resources – and vandalism, drug use and public order offences – to provoke acknowledgement. In contrast to the crimes of LCP offenders, AL crimes typically involve co-offending and are sustained by peer support. Desistance from crime occurs as adolescents move out of the maturity gap. As AL offenders gain legitimate access to adult privileges, previously rewarding delinquent behaviours lose their salience. Simultaneously, the perceived costs of offending also increase. An arrest record, for example, is now seen to have serious consequences for employment. Moffitt implies that the decline in criminal activity for AL offenders is not invariant but is dependent upon how soon the adolescent assumes adult responsibilities. Marriage, employment and other transition events in the life-course provide the ‘opportunities for desistence’. Evaluation of the criminal careers perspective The investigation of the criminal careers model requires prospective longitudinal research that tracks offenders over time. Moffitt’s original observations were based on what is known as the Dunedin study, which followed a cohort of 1037 New Zealanders born in 1972–73 (Silva, 1990). Moffitt identified a small group of boys who were rated as exhibiting antisocial characteristics at each of the two-year data-collection points. Subsequent analysis of the Dunedin cohort has continued to support the central prediction that early onset of offending is associated with a range of adverse psychological, social and criminal outcomes (Moffitt and Caspi, 2000; Moffitt et al., 1996; Moffitt et al., 2002). Similar findings have

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been reported from other longitudinal studies (Farrington, 1995; Farrington et al., 1998; Huesmann et al., 2009). It should be emphasised, however, that AL and LCP offenders do not represent a tidy, rigidly defined dichotomy. They are broad prototypes and within each category variation in offender characteristics and offending patterns may exist. Moreover, the typological career model continues to evolve. Moffitt et al. (2002) found that many AL offenders continued to offend into their twenties, and exhibited more problematic characteristics (impulsivity, mental health problems, substance dependence, etc.) than did a comparison group of non-offenders (though still less than the rates for LCP offenders). Moffitt et al. argued that this prolonged adolescent pattern might be explained by an increasing maturity gap during which individuals experience continuing difficulty in assuming adult roles. Moffitt et al. also found evidence for a third category represented by offenders who exhibited behavioural problems in childhood, but subsequently exhibited low-level, chronic offending at rates that did not warrant classification as LCP. Other researchers have independently proposed four (Côté et al., 2001; Nagin and Land, 1993; White et al., 2001) and even five (Chung et al., 2002; Loeber and StouthamerLoeber, 1998) offending trajectories. Theoretical criticism of the criminal careers approach has come from two opposing directions. On the one hand, researchers with a more traditional criminological view have objected that the approach is too heavily influenced by biological and psychological concepts. Prominent among these critics are Laub and Sampson (Laub and Sampson, 2001, 2003; Sampson and Laub, 2003, 2005) who found no evidence for distinct offender groups. They argued that there were no significant biological or psychological differences among offenders and that the strongest influences on engaging in crime were family, peers and school. Further, all offenders – irrespective of how criminally active they are – eventually succumb to the age–crime curve and reduce their offending frequency. However, Sampson and Laub (2003) argued that there were individual differences in offending trajectories that could not be predicted by childhood factors. While a poor upbringing is a disadvantage, an individual is not forever bound by it. Rather, desistance from crime for all offenders is largely governed by contemporaneous changes in lifestyle – such as getting married and getting a job – that provided increased structure and social control (Sampson and Laub, 2005). The age of desistance varies as exposure to these moderating social conditions varies. On the other hand, Blonigen (2010) has recently commented on the failure of criminal careers researchers to incorporate within their models important findings from developmental psychology. In particular, he pointed to the lack of attention given to normative biological and psychological changes over the life-course. A number of these factors have been raised in previous chapters. Evolutionary psychologists argue that males in particular are designed to be at their most competitive, impulsive, risk-taking and aggressive during adolescence in order to maximise their chances of securing a mate. Neuropsychologists point out that adolescence is characterised by a surge in the production of sex hormones and fluctuations of certain neurotransmitters implicated in behavioural regulation,

Development 137 while important brain structures governing executive function do not mature until the early twenties. Personality theorists have found that the greatest change in personality traits occurs with the transition to adulthood and that traits do not become relatively fixed until around the age of 30. The converging picture from these different fields of psychology is that adolescence is marked by psychological change and instability that have the potential to increase criminal propensity. Largely ignoring these internal developmental factors, criminal careers researchers assume that criminal propensity remains constant across the life-course, and thus they are forced to explain criminal onset and desistance by relying solely on changes in social circumstance (e.g., delinquent peers in the case of onset and marriage in the case of desistance). Blonigen argues that environmental factors must be understood in terms of their interplay with normal maturation processes. Offending increases during adolescence because individuals are psychologically more vulnerable to the effects of criminogenic influences during this phase of development. Likewise, offending declines after adolescence at least in part because individuals become psychologically more mature, a process that may be accelerated by stabilising life-events such as marriage.

Conclusion and evaluation This chapter has considered the development of criminality over the life-course. Risk and protective factors for criminality were identified and theoretical explanations were proposed to account for the role played by those factors. In the course of this examination, two key debates emerged. The first debate concerns the relative importance of early and concurrent developmental experiences. Is criminality determined in the first few years of life (e.g., Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990), or do childhood risk factors play a minor role in later criminality when compared to more immediate life events (e.g., Sampson and Laub, 2003)? Lifespan psychology attempts to resolve this debate. According to the lifespan perspective, the journey through life involves both change and continuity. Behaviour cannot be predicted solely on the basis of an individual’s early life experiences, but neither are these early experiences irrelevant to the performance of later behaviour. Each period of life presents an individual with new challenges and experiences that are transition points for change. At the same time, there is also a degree of longitudinal predictability in people’s lives. The experiences absorbed at each period of life do not disappear each time an individual moves into a new phase. Rather, individuals carry their developmental histories with them. Experiences accumulate as biologically encoded memories and traits that can continue to exert an influence on future behaviour. Negative experiences in early phases of life can set the groundwork for subsequent failure in later phases. The second debate concerns the role of biological factors in psychosocial development. This is the familiar nature/nurture debate. The biosocial perspective has been advocated throughout in this book and this is also the position taken in lifespan psychology. However, several of the theorists discussed in this chapter

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argued determinedly against according a role in the development of criminality to biological factors. Their opposition was at two levels. First, they opposed the idea that there were inherited individual differences between offenders and non-offenders or among different types of offenders. Second, they rejected the proposition that normative biological development played a role in shaping patterns of offending onset and desistance over the life-course. This debate about the role of biological factors to some extent reflects a clash of disciplinary paradigms. Brought together in this chapter were developmental perspectives from psychology and criminology. There is within developmental criminology – as distinct from developmental psychology – a traditional aversion by many theorists to overtly biological and psychological explanations for behaviour. It is the nature of sociological criminology that primacy is given to the role of social and environmental forces. It should not be concluded, however, that all psychologists endorse the biosocial perspective on crime. In Chapter 7, we examine the radical environmental position advanced by learning theorists.

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In the previous chapter we began the examination of environmental contributions to crime. There we focused particularly on those aspects of the environment that increased or protected against the development of criminality over an individual’s lifespan. In this chapter we continue the examination of environmental factors. Our particular focus here is on the psychological processes by which environmental experiences translate into criminal behaviour. For example, we know from Chapter 6 that child maltreatment significantly increases the risk of later criminality. But just why is this so? By what mechanisms are criminal patterns of behaviour acquired, triggered and maintained? In short, how do offenders learn to offend? The field of psychology concerned with the mechanics of behaviour is learning theory, more commonly referred to as behaviourism. While there are different models of behaviourism, all share the assumption that behaviour is shaped by stimuli available in the environment. Learning is an adaptive response by an organism to the environmental events it encounters that results in relatively permanent changes in behaviour. The aim of behaviourists is to uncover through scientific methods the laws which govern learning. Many of these laws apply to all complex organisms and so the experimentation that forms the basis of the scientific method employed by behaviourists may involve studies on rats, pigeons and even worms. For behaviourists there is nothing special about offenders or their behaviour. Crime is just another kind of behaviour that must be learned in the same way as all other behaviours. We begin this chapter with an examination of the philosophies and principles underpinning behaviourism that set the approach apart from most other fields of psychology. We then examine three models of learning – classical conditioning, operant conditioning and social learning – and the ways that each accounts for criminal behaviour.

The science of behaviour All fields of science – physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy and psychology – have their roots in philosophy. The ancient Greeks, for example, were very interested in chemistry but their method of enquiry involved little more than thinking about the composition of matter rather than undertaking careful and systematic

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observations of chemical phenomena. From around the sixteenth century or so, one by one the scientific disciplines broke free from philosophy and began to build testable laws based on observation and planned experimentation. This transition for psychology did not begin until the late nineteenth century and from the beginning of the twentieth century the behaviourists became the leading advocates for bringing the same level of scientific rigour to psychology as existed in the other sciences. The key concepts of behaviourism are examined in this section through the contributions of the three leading behavioural theorists of the twentieth century: John Watson, B.F. Skinner, and Albert Bandura. A focus on observable events The term behaviourism was coined by Watson in 1913 with the publication of his article ‘Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It’. At that time, psychology was primarily concerned with the mind or psyche. The way to study the mind was through introspection – looking inside one’s head in an attempt to examine conscious thoughts, emotions and other inner experiences. Watson pointed out that introspection was subjective and unreliable, and that there was no way to check the validity of a researcher’s findings. He argued that in order to be the subject of scientific enquiry, variables had to be observable. As far as psychology is concerned, there are only two observable variables: behaviour and the environment in which it occurs. What goes on in the mind is ultimately unknowable but also irrelevant. Watson regarded internal events such as thoughts and feelings as epiphenomena, the mere side-effects of behaviour. Speculation about internal events is unnecessary. All behaviour can be adequately explained by careful analysis of the environmental events that cause it. Behaviourism is not a unitary theory and over the years different behavioural models have developed from Watson’s original formulation. While subsequent models also stress the crucial role of the environment and behaviour, they differ from Watson in their treatment of internal events. Like Watson, Skinner (1953) believed that internal events were an ‘explanatory fiction’ that played no causative role in behaviour. But unlike Watson, he did not dismiss them as epiphenomena. Rather he regarded thoughts and feelings as another kind of behaviour. They are internal, covert responses to the environment just as our overt actions are external responses to the environment. Feelings and thoughts occur at the same time as their associated observable behaviour. Consider the scenario of a person suddenly encountering a dangerous animal while walking through a forest. Conventionally we would say that the person saw the animal, then became afraid, and then ran away. According to Skinner, the sequence of events is instead: the person saw the animal, then both became afraid and ran away. There is no need to refer to fear to explain the running; both the covert fear and overt running are explained by the presence of the dangerous animal. Nevertheless, fear and other internal responses are real phenomena. The position taken by Skinner with respect to internal events is referred to as radical behaviourism because of the uncompromising insistence on the

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examination only of observable events. It is also called black-box psychology because what happens inside the person is regarded as being inaccessible for scientific study. However, some behavioural approaches do examine internal phenomena. In mediational models of behaviourism, internal events are treated as intervening variables that sit between the environmental inputs and behavioural outputs in a causal chain. Bandura (1977) proposed that environmental events do not act upon the individual in an objective way but rather must be perceived and interpreted in a process of cognitive mediation. People respond to their perceptions of environmental stimuli rather than to the stimuli per se. Coming full circle, cognitive processes were now considered by many behaviourists to be a legitimate focus for scientific psychological research. Environmental determinism Determinism is sometimes erroneously thought to apply only to biological explanations of behaviour. Biological determinism is the idea that a person’s destiny is fixed at birth by their genes. In fact, as we have discovered in previous chapters, few biologists today would advance this proposition. Instead initial biological states interact with the environment, and their effects are subject to considerable plasticity over an individual’s lifetime. However, this does not mean that the philosophy of determinism has been abandoned. Determinism can apply equally to environmental causes of behaviour. According to determinism, all events are subject to the law of cause and effect. Behaviourists assert that it is illogical to think that an organism can self-generate behaviour. All action must have a prior cause, and that cause resides outside of the person and in the environment. Unlike biological determinism, environmental determinism is an ongoing, dynamic process. Behaviour is not fixed at any point in time, but rather people change as their environment changes. Thus, behavioural offender-rehabilitation programmes are based on the assumption of environmental determinism. The goal of these programmes is to identify the environmental inputs causing criminal behaviour and replace them with environmental inputs that will promote law-abiding behaviour. For most people, environmental determinism is as unappealing as is biological determinism. Watson in particular seemed to portray human beings as passive automatons, moulded by their upbringing and emitting behaviours only in response to their chance encounters with environmental stimuli. Skinner (1971), a committed environmental determinist, tried to counter this negative perception of environmental determinism in his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Skinner argued that is was the belief in free will, not in determinism, that limited human potential for happiness and fulfilment. The belief in free will results in the blaming of individuals for their misfortunes and encourages people to resort to punitive methods of controlling behaviour. Skinner pointed out that while the environment shapes behaviour, human beings were capable of shaping their environment. If humans adopt ‘a more effective technology of behavior’, then they can learn to engineer environments and social systems that will improve the collective human condition without the need to resort to coercion, threats and punishment.

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Figure 7.1 Bandura’s principle of reciprocal determinism.

Bandura (1977, 1978) has taken the idea that individuals can change their environments a step further and proposed the concept of reciprocal determinism. He argued that the causal relationship between the environment and behaviour was not one-way. Instead he proposed that behaviour, the environment and personal factors (internal events) influence one another in a triadic interaction (Figure 7.1). For example, imagine two strangers drinking in a bar. Let us focus on the behaviour of person A and treat person B as part of person A’s environment. Person A hears person B laugh and turns to see the reason (the environment has affected behaviour). Person A has a negative self-image and interprets the laughter as being directed at him (personal factors have affected perception of the environment). He walks towards person B in a threatening manner (personal factors have affected behaviour). Person B responds by getting to his feet and confronting person A (behaviour has affected the environment). Person A feels intimidated (environment has affected personal factors) and backs down, but as a result now feels even worse about himself (behaviour has affected personal factors). By introducing a role for internal cognitive events, reciprocal determinism is a version of soft determinism – in contrast to the hard determinism favoured by Watson and Skinner – since it allows some limited degree of personal agency. Evolution, biology and behaviourism The behaviourists’ view on the role of biological factors is frequently misunderstood. The stereotype of the behaviourists’ position is that biology does not matter – that each child is born as a tabula rasa (blank sheet), infinitely malleable depending upon its life experiences. Indeed, early in the history of behaviourism Watson (1930) made some provocative and now infamous claims about the primacy of environmental factors: Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one of them at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select – doctor, lawyer,

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artist, merchant-chief, and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors. (ibid., p. 104) Watson was overstating the case and he knew it. In the very next sentence (which is typically omitted from the quotation) he continued: ‘I am going beyond my facts, but so have the advocates of the contrary and they have been doing it for many thousands of years’ (ibid., p. 104). While few behaviourists would endorse the extreme environmentalism described by Watson, the image has stuck. Skinner (1953, 1974) recognised that behaviour occurred within a biological context. He viewed behaviourism as a logical extension of evolutionary theory. The very ability to learn is an adaptive skill that is biologically encoded and has been passed down through natural selection. Organisms that were good at devising flexible responses to environmental problems outperformed those which were not. Moreover, the things in the environment that members of a species find to be rewarding and punishing have acquired these characteristics because they are evolutionarily important. For example, humans have evolved to prefer certain foods that are essential to our survival and that therefore serve to motivate behaviour. The foods that are rewarding to humans are very different from the ones that are rewarding to a panda. At a conceptual level, too, there are parallels between the process of natural selection and the process of learning. Through natural selection, characteristics that are adaptive increase in frequency within a species. Likewise through learning, behaviours that are adaptive increase in frequency within an individual. Thus the acquisition of behaviours over an individual’s lifetime may be likened to a mini-evolutionary process – behaviours that do not confer any advantage are discarded and those that produce favourable outcomes are retained. However, Skinner argued that biological factors provided only the capacity for learning. They were necessary but not sufficient conditions. How an organism actually behaves depends upon their environmental experiences. For example, humans are born with the capacity for aggression, but for an individual to become aggressive requires the learning of aggressive behaviours. Skinner also recognised that there were individual biological differences among people. His objection to including a role for genetics in the science of behaviour was based largely on pragmatic grounds. Since nothing could be done to change an individual’s genes, it was much more productive to focus on the modification of behaviour through environmental means. He wrote: Even when it can be shown that some aspect of behavior is due to season of birth, gross body type, or genetic constitution, the fact is of limited use. It may help us in predicting behavior, but it is of little value in an experimental analysis or in practical control because such a condition cannot be manipulated after the individual has been conceived. The most that can be said is that the knowledge of the genetic factor may enable us to make better use of other causes. If we know that an individual has certain inherent limitations, we may

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Personality, psychological disorder and behaviourism Earlier we discussed the behaviourists’ view on transitory internal events such as thoughts and feelings. Much the same arguments were raised by behaviourists against including within their analyses stable internal factors such as personality traits and psychological disorders. For behaviourists, traits and disorders are merely descriptive labels for observed patterns of behaviour but they do not cause the behaviours they describe. They are hypothetical – and unnecessary – constructs. They are hypothetical because we cannot see them, only their presumed effects. Thus, the constructs are also unnecessary because they tell us nothing new. Their presumed existence depends upon circular logic. We know someone has an aggressive trait because we observe him/her acting aggressively. And why is he/she acting aggressively? Because he/she has an aggressive trait. And so on. Behaviourists point out that we can dispense with the whole notion of the hypothetical construct and be no worse off. Simply identifying the behavioural pattern and the environments in which it occurs is all that is necessary. Behaviourists also make no distinction between normal and so-called pathological behaviour. Problem behaviours are caused by the same learning processes as are any other behaviour. They differ from non-problematic behaviours quantitatively not qualitatively. Whether behaviour is labelled pathological, abnormal, disordered, deviant or dysfunctional is a value judgement, not a scientific one. The denial of personality traits and psychopathology as causes of behaviour does not mean that behaviourists regard everyone as being the same. They recognise that people have predictable behavioural patterns that vary from one person to another. Everyone’s learning history is different so individuals have different potentials to act in certain ways. For example, some people because of their particular upbringing behave aggressively in a wider range of circumstances than do others. Such a person may be described by others as being aggressive but this does not mean that they have an aggressive trait that explains their aggression. The behaviourists’ position is the specificity model outlined in Chapter 5. For behaviourists, what is commonly referred to as an individual’s personality is in reality a collection of acquired habits that are expressed under particular situational conditions. What elicits aggression in one person may have no effect on another while even a person who has a reputation for aggression is not uniformly aggressive in all circumstances. The key to behavioural analysis is identifying the conditions that elicit a given behaviour for a particular person. Thus, as shown in Figure 1.2, the behaviourists explicitly acknowledge the importance of both historical and immediate environments in the commission of crime.

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A behaviour-specific focus Many of the theoretical positions we have covered so far in this book may be broadly classified as control theories. Control theories start from the premise that individuals are born with an inherent tendency to behave in antisocial ways and that it is the job of the environment to temper these natural inclinations. The antisocial acts themselves are thought to require little skill to perform. Because the fundamental causes of all crime are general factors such as selfishness and impulsivity, offenders are likely to be versatile in their offending. Rapists and burglars are subject to the same basic deficiencies in control. There is therefore no need to develop different explanations for different types of crime. The behaviourists put forward a very different argument. They view individuals at birth to be criminally neutral. All criminal behaviour must be acquired during a person’s lifetime through learning. Neither is learning criminal behaviours a trivial matter. Referring explicitly to aggressive acts, but making an argument that applies to all crime, Bandura wrote: People are not born with preformed repertoires of aggressive behavior. They must learn them one way or another. Some of the elementary forms of aggression can be perfected with minimal guidance, but most aggressive activities – whether they be duelling with switchblade knives, sparring with opponents, military combat, or vengeful ridicule – entail intricate skills that require extensive learning. (1976, pp. 204–5) Moreover, learning is very specific. The set of environmental experiences that teach a person to rape will be different from those required to teach a person to burgle or to steal a car. It is expected, therefore that there will be a degree of specialisation in the crimes of offenders. Once an offender has perfected a modus operandi, they are likely to repeat it. There can be no general theory of crime. Explaining crime requires analysis of the particular environmental conditions that led to the acquisition of a particular criminal behaviour. There are three principal models of learning: classical conditioning, operant conditioning and social learning. These models are associated respectively with Watson, Skinner and Bandura. In the following sections each of these models is described and their contribution to explaining criminal behaviour is examined.

Classical conditioning The first formal model of behaviourism – the one that informed Watson’s perspective on behaviourism – was classical conditioning. The principles of classical conditioning, however, were first demonstrated not by Watson but by Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov at the turn of the twentieth century. Classical conditioning is sometimes called respondent conditioning because it focuses on the reaction of an organism to the environment. Respondent behaviours are

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involuntary reflexes such as salivating, perspiring, blinking, crying, yawning, becoming sexually aroused, feeling nauseous, and so forth. It will be remembered from Chapter 4 that involuntary behaviours are products of the autonomic nervous system. These behaviours occur naturally in response to appropriate environmental stimuli. For example, a puff of air in the eye causes an involuntary blink. This process is referred to as the Stimulus-Response (S-R) model. The revolutionary finding by Pavlov was that the respondent behaviours could also be learned. Principles of classical conditioning Pavlov’s research involved conditioning the salivation response in dogs. Pavlov first showed that the dogs salivated when presented with food. The food is an unconditioned stimulus (UCS) and the salivation is an unconditioned response (UCR). Both the food and the salivation are unconditioned because no conditioning had taken place for the association to occur. Pavlov then presented a neutral stimulus – in this case, a bell – that did not elicit the salivation response. Next Pavlov presented the bell and the food simultaneously and again the dogs salivated. Finally, after numerous trials presenting the bell and the food together, Pavlov presented the bell on its own. Now the dogs salivated at the sound of the bell. Through repeated association, the bell had assumed the eliciting properties of the food. The bell had become a conditioned stimulus (CS) and the salivation had become a conditioned response (CR). Pavlov’s experiment is represented diagrammatically in Figure 7.2. Watson later demonstrated that in addition to conditioning a neutral stimulus to take on positive associations with an UCS, conditioning could also be used to create aversive associations or mini-phobias. In a famous study (Watson and Rayner, 1920), a baby boy – Little Albert – was conditioned to fear a white

Figure 7.2 Classical conditioning of the salivation response to the sound of a bell.

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rat. First Little Albert was shown the rat (the neutral stimulus) to which he showed no signs of fear. The UCS was the loud sound of a hammer hitting an iron rail positioned behind Little Albert’s head. The UCR to this noise was a range of fear responses – crying, jumping and falling over. After six trials in which the white rat and loud noise were paired, Little Albert showed fear responses to the white rat alone. The white rat was now a CS (see Figure 7.3). Three important principles associated with classical conditioning are generalisation, discrimination and extinction. In generalisation, another neutral stimulus that is similar to the CS also becomes a CS. For example, after Little Albert was conditioned to fear the white rat, he also showed fear responses towards a white rabbit and a fur coat. On the other hand, discrimination refers to the specificity of the CS. For example, Pavlov’s dogs only salivated to the sound of a bell and not to other noises. That is, they were able to discriminate between the CS and related stimuli. Finally, extinction refers to the weakening of the power of the CS over time when it is presented in the absence of the UCS. For example, Pavlov’s dogs would eventually stop salivating to the sound of the bell unless there was occasional ‘topping-up’ of the association with food. There are many examples of classical conditioning in everyday life. Your cat magically arrives to be fed when it hears you take the can-opener out of the drawer. The smell of lavender makes you think of your grandmother who always used lavender talc. The sight of a hypodermic needle makes you break out in a cold sweat. You once got food poisoning eating fish and now the smell of fish makes you feel nauseous. You are trying to give up smoking but each time you see someone with a cigarette you crave to light up. Remember, classical conditioning does not rely on any mediational cognitive processes. In other words, you do not need consciously to know why a CS elicits certain responses in you. You may feel

Figure 7.3 Classical conditioning of the fear response to sight of a white rat.

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sad every time you hear a certain piece of music and have no idea why (perhaps you were depressed the first time that you heard it but have since forgotten). Watson joked that later in life Little Albert, with no memory of his participation in the conditioning experiments, might seek psychotherapy for his strange aversion to white rats and rabbits. Watson pictured Sigmund Freud confidently proclaiming that Little Albert had an unresolved Oedipal complex. Note that classical conditioning – like all behavioural approaches – is a model of both the acquisition and the performance of behaviour. Pavlov and Watson showed that behavioural responses could be conditioned but also that the CR was situationally dependent. Once learned, a response (R) must be elicited by a relevant stimulus (S) in the environment; otherwise it remains dormant. Thus Pavlov’s dogs only salivated when they heard a bell and Little Albert only cried when he saw a white rabbit. This suggests two ways to deliberately alter behaviour. The first is through un-conditioning in order to reverse the faulty learning. Pavlov might have stopped the dogs salivating at the sound of the bell by then pairing the bell with a noxious stimulus; while Watson might have restored Little Albert’s affections for white furry animals by pairing them with pleasant stimuli. (In fact, Jones, 1924, demonstrated the efficacy of this technique in a case similar to that of Little Albert.) Clinically these techniques are used to treat certain problem behaviours. In aversion therapy, the therapist creates a mini-phobia in order to eliminate habitual behaviours. For example, a person with a drinking problem might be given a drug that makes them feel nauseous each time they taste alcohol. On the other hand, systematic desensitisation is used to eliminate phobias. For example, a person with a fear of snakes might be progressively exposed to snakes while simultaneously being put in a relaxed state by the therapist. The second way to alter respondent behaviour is through stimulus control. Stimulus control involves eliminating from the immediate environment stimuli that elicit the problem behaviour (i.e., the UCS or the CS). For example, a person trying to keep to a diet might be instructed to ensure that all food is put away in cupboards and not left out in view where it is likely to elicit feelings of hunger. Using stimulus control, the problem behaviour is not eliminated from the person’s repertoire but its expression is suppressed, which is an outcome that may be sufficient. Classical conditioning and crime Watson claimed that all behaviour could be explained by S-R theory. However, the sorts of behaviours described in the previous section are low-level reflexes and physiological responses. How then do we get from these micro-behaviours to complex behavioural patterns such as crime? Watson proposed that all behaviour comprised long chains of simple S-R relationships that moved an organism along in step-by-step fashion. This level of explanation is referred to as a molecular approach (not to be confused with molecular genetics). In a molecular analysis, behaviour is broken down moment-by-moment in order to identify the behaviour– environment relationship governing each particular stage of the sequence. In practice, reconstructing such sequences of S-R is problematic and, as we shall see

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later, theorists such as Skinner and Bandura abandoned the molecular approach. Nevertheless, when examining crime there are some relatively simple examples of classical conditioning in action. In particular, classical conditioning is useful for explaining crimes that involve autonomic physiological responses to environmental stimuli. Two examples are examined here: sex offences and violent crime. Sex offences Sexual arousal is respondent behaviour that can be elicited by a variety of sexual stimuli. An eliciting stimulus may be a naturally occurring UCS, (e.g., the sight of a naked body) or a CS that has become associated with sexual stimulation. The process by which a CS for sexual arousal might be created was demonstrated in an experiment by Rachman (1966). Rachman showed male subjects a series of pictures of naked women interspersed with pictures of black boots. He found that after a number of trials the subjects became sexually aroused just by the pictures of boots. This study has been replicated using diverse neutral stimuli including fur-lined boots (Rachman and Hodgson, 1968), geometric figures (McConaghy, 1967) and a penny jar (Plaud and Martini, 1999). It is through their natural association with sexual arousal that individuals find certain parts of the body (e.g., hair) or particular items of clothing (e.g., underwear) to be arousing. In extreme cases, a person might develop a fetish whereby the CS becomes the primary source of sexual stimulation. Fetishes are not illegal although they may in some cases lead to illegal behaviour. For example, an offender may steal underwear from clothes lines or commit rape in order to satisfy a particular fetish. In a more direct link to crime, classical conditioning has been used to explain the development of sexual behaviours such as voyeurism (Jackson, 1969), exhibitionism (Evans, 1968; Maletsky, 1980) and paedophilia (Bancroft and Marks, 1968; Kelly, 1982). The general framework within which deviant sexual interests are thought to develop is set out in McGuire et al.’s (1965) sexual preference hypothesis. McGuire et al. argued that the early chance pairing of a particular behaviour with sexual arousal provides an individual with material for sexual fantasies and masturbation imagery, which serve to entrench the behaviour as a sexual preference. For example, it is hypothesised that paedophiles are likely to have had one or more stimulating sexual experiences with other children when they were also children, and that images of these experiences continue to dominate their sexual fantasies as they grow older. However, as Marshall et al. (1999) point out, while intuitively appealing, there is in fact little hard evidence to support the sexual preference hypothesis. Though less popular now, aversion therapy based on classical conditioning has been used extensively to treat sex offenders. The procedure typically involves pairing an aversive stimulus with images or fantasies of the target sexual object or behaviour. Aversive stimuli have included nausea-inducing drugs (Glynn and Harper, 1961), electric shocks (Abel et al., 1970; Marshall, 1973; Quinsey et al., 1980), foul odours (Laws et al., 1978) and noxious covert images (Callahan and Leitenberg, 1973). In their review of behavioural treatment of sex offending,

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Laws and Marshall (2003; Marshall and Laws, 2003) conclude that attempts to suppress deviant sexual preferences via aversive techniques have shown some empirical success. However, they argue that in modern treatment programmes changing sexual preferences is only part of a comprehensive approach to rehabilitation that includes building the capacity for alternative, healthy sexual relationships. S-R theory suggests that sex crimes are triggered by the sight of stimuli that elicit deviant sexual responses. For example, Smallbone et al. (2008) argued that some child sex offenders do not have formulated plans to abuse children but become aroused in the course of carrying out routine caregiving tasks such as bathing the child or tucking him/her into bed. In relapse prevention therapy, offenders are taught to recognise and avoid situations that might trigger offending behaviour (Pithers et al., 1983). Violent crime Aggression is typically categorised as either instrumental or expressive. In instrumental aggression the individual engages in violence in a calculated attempt to derive some gain. In expressive aggression, violence is an impulsive and involuntary response to some environmental cue. Berkowitz (1971, 1974; Berkowitz and LePage, 1967) argued that expressive aggression may be cued by stimuli that have been classically conditioned to be associated with violent behaviour. To demonstrate this principle, Berkowitz and LePage (1967) conducted an experiment with 100 male university students. The participants were first subjected to electric shocks, with half receiving one shock (low arousal condition) and the other half receiving seven shocks (high arousal condition). The participants were then given the opportunity to deliver shocks to the person responsible for shocking them. In some cases when the pay-back shocks were delivered, a gun was visible near the shock apparatus, while in other cases there was no gun. The longest and most severe pay-back shocks were delivered by the aroused participants who were exposed to the gun. Berkowitz and LePage hypothesised that through their frequent associations with violence, weapons assume the status of CS. Just the sight of a weapon is capable of eliciting aggressive responses. This phenomenon is known as the weapons effect. The weapons effect has been replicated many times but variability for the effect has also been found among subjects (see Turner et al., 1977, for a review). It has been argued that the strength of the effect depends upon the extent to which each individual associates weapons with violence, which is in turn a function of an individual’s learning history (Berkowitz, 1990). Bartholow et al. (2005) compared the priming effects of weapons for hunters and non-hunters. They found that pictures of hunting guns were more likely to prime aggressive thoughts and behaviour in non-hunters than in hunters, while pictures of assault guns were more likely to prime aggressive thoughts and behaviour in hunters than non-hunters. Explaining these findings, the researchers argued that for hunters hunting guns were associated with positive experiences (e.g., camaraderie), not with interpersonal violence.

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However, because hunters were more knowledgeable about guns than were nonhunters, they also better appreciated the connection between assault guns and the killing of humans. While most empirical research has focused on the aggression-eliciting effect of guns, it should be obvious that the weapons effect has wider implications. Guns are just one of many possible situational cues for aggression. Carlson et al. (1990) conducted a meta-analysis on 23 studies that examined the effects of aggression cues that included guns, knives, the names of people who had been previously paired with violent images, Ku Klux Klan clothing, aggressive verbalisations, vengeance-themed bumper-stickers, aggressive films and boxing films. The mean effect size for the association between aggression cues and the expression of aggressive attitudes or behaviour was .38 (medium). The effects were stronger when the target of the aggressive response was of low status or an outgroup member.

Operant conditioning Operant conditioning is most closely associated with the work of B.F. Skinner. Operant conditioning is also called instrumental conditioning because it applies to behaviour that is performed in order to achieve some goal. According to the operant conditioning model, behaviour is shaped by the consequences it produces. The consequences of behaviour can be rewarding (i.e., reinforcing) or unpleasant (i.e., punishing). Behaviour that is rewarded will be repeated while behaviour that is punished will be avoided. Skinner did not reject classical conditioning but he regarded it as playing a relatively restricted role in learning. While classical conditioning explains behaviour as a reaction to the environment, operant conditioning explains behaviour as an action – or operation – upon the environment. While classical conditioning is concerned with what comes before behaviour, operant conditioning is largely concerned with what comes after behaviour. While classical conditioning is concerned with involuntary reflexes and physiological responses, operant conditioning is concerned with volitional behaviours. And while classical conditioning portrays organisms as passive receivers of learning, operant conditioning views organisms as active participants in learning. Principles of operant conditioning Skinner demonstrated the principles of operant conditioning in a series of experiments involving pigeons and rats. The general procedure for investigating the reinforcement of behaviour is as follows. A pigeon is placed in a box – sometimes referred to as Skinner box – which contains a disk that, when pecked, delivers food from a chute below. Left to its own devices and through accidentally pecking the disc from time to time, the pigeon eventually learns that each time the disc is pecked it will be rewarded with food. The behavioural response (R) produces a rewarding stimulus (SR). Next a red/green light is introduced into the Skinner box. Now the food is delivered only when the disc is pressed and the light is red. The red light signals the availability of the reward. Eventually the pigeon learns that

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pecking the disc when the light is green is futile, and it restricts its response to when the light is red. The red light is an example of a discriminative stimulus (SD), so-called because it allows an organism to discriminate between occasions when a particular behaviour is appropriate and when it is not. The operant model for the reinforcement of behaviour is shown in Figure 7.4(a). A variation to the experimental design is used to demonstrate the effects of punishment on behaviour. This time half of the floor of the Skinner box is electrified. A rat placed in the Skinner box quickly learns to escape being shocked by moving to the non-electrified section when the electrified section is activated. The next step is to teach the rat to avoid the shock before it occurs. Prior to electrifying the floor a light is switched on in the box. The light is the SD that signals the imminent delivery of the punishing stimulus (SP) and the rat learns to move to the other side of the cage to avoid being shocked. The operant model for punishment is shown in Figure 7.4(b). As Figure 7.4 shows, stimuli in operant conditioning may be antecedent (SD), coming before the response, or contingent (SR or SP), coming after the response. Thus instead of the classical conditioning S-R model, operant conditioning is described by the S-R-S model. However, an antecedent stimulus in operant conditioning does not trigger a reflex response, but rather signals the nature of the contingent stimulus. It is the contingent stimulus, by reinforcing or punishing a response, that is responsible for the acquisition of behaviour; the antecedent stimulus determines when the behaviour will be performed. Both reinforcement and punishment come in two forms: positive and negative. Positive reinforcement involves the application of a rewarding consequence while negative reinforcement involves the removal of a punishing consequence. The food delivered to the pigeon in the Skinner box is an example of positive reinforcement; going to the dentist to stop a toothache is an example of negative reinforcement. Note that reinforcement always encourages behaviour – negative reinforcement is not punishment. Similarly, positive punishment is the application of an aversive stimulus while negative punishment is the removal of a rewarding stimulus. The electric floor in the Skinner box is an example of positive punishment; punishing a child by taking away privileges is an example of negative punishment. As with classical conditioning, if after some time rewards and punishments cease to occur when the behaviour is performed, eventually the learned behaviour will extinguish.

Figure 7.4 Operant conditioning of (a) the pecking response in pigeons and (b) the avoidance response in rats.

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Positive reinforcements may be delivered according to different schedules. On a continuous reinforcement (CRF) schedule, behaviour is reinforced each time it is performed. Giving a dog a treat each time it performs a trick is an example of a CRF schedule. Behaviour may also be reinforced intermittently. There are four types of intermittent reinforcement. On a fixed ratio (FR) schedule, reinforcement is contingent upon a set number of responses. For example, a fruit-picker might be paid a set amount for every basket of fruit picked. On a variable ratio (VR) schedule, the reinforcement varies in an unpredictable way. Payouts from a slot machine are on a VR schedule. On a fixed interval (FT) schedule, reinforcements are delivered according to predictable time periods. A weekly pay cheque is a FT reinforcer. Finally, on a variable interval (VI) schedule, reinforcements are delivered according to unpredictable periods of time. For example, a lion hunting prey will encounter a likely meal at random time intervals. In general, response-based schedules (FR and VR) produce higher response rates than do interval-based schedules (FT and RT) because there is a closer relationship between the behaviour and the consequence. VR schedules produce particularly effective learning that is relatively resistant to extinction. This is because it is difficult for an organism to distinguish between the withdrawal of reinforcement and a particularly long gap between reinforcers. VR schedules are therefore associated with persistent problematic behaviours such as gambling. VR schedules can also help explain why people may stay in abusive relationships, sustained by the occasional gestures of contrition and positive treatment from the abusive partner. Skinner (1953, 1974) believed that reinforcement was generally preferable to punishment as a means of changing behaviour. Punishment is most effective when it is consistent and immediate. Unfortunately in the real world these conditions are frequently not met. An individual may be punished for only a fraction of his/her misbehaviours and punishment may be administered long after the misbehaviour has been performed. Where punishment is used to change behaviour, it is important that it be combined with the reinforcement of alternative appropriate behaviours. Operant conditioning and crime Where classical conditioning adopts a molecular approach to behavioural analyses, operant conditioning adopts a molar approach. In a molar analysis, behaviours and their causes are treated in an aggregate fashion. An extended behavioural pattern – such as committing a crime – might be examined as a single activity and explained by an accumulation of factors, rather than as a series of discrete microbehaviours each with their own cause (Baum, 2002). Adopting a molar approach, it is easy to see how criminal behaviours fit within an operant conditioning model. Most crimes are goal-directed behaviours that involve rewards in some way and are therefore intrinsically reinforcing – stealing is positively reinforced by the goods acquired, rape is positively reinforced by the sexual gratification obtained, and murder is negatively reinforced by the elimination of someone unpleasant (as far as the offender is concerned at any rate). On the other hand, most of us refrain from committing crime because of the punishments – fines, imprisonment,

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condemnation by family and friends, and so forth – that we associate with getting caught. There is, however, little empirical research that directly examines the operant conditioning of criminal behaviour. While Skinner and other radical behaviourists are considered to be arch empiricists, there are obvious difficulties in carrying out on humans operant conditioning experiments that involve the creation of problematic habits. In fact, Skinner did not think such experiments were necessary. He believed that the principles of learning were universal and so the application to humans could be extrapolated from the experiments with animals. Most behavioural analysis of crime involves reinterpreting known causes of crime within an operant conditioning framework. Like classical conditioning, operant conditioning is concerned with both the acquisition of behaviour and the circumstances which cause that behaviour to be performed. Offenders are assumed to have had learning histories that have established in them criminal habits as part of their behavioural repertoires. While the principles of learning are universal, each habit is learned separately. Thus a car thief must learn to steal cars, a burglar must learn to burgle houses, an assaulter must learn to assault people, and so on. Let us take burglary as an example. We can speculate that many burglars began stealing as children, perhaps sneaking into their parents’ room and taking loose change or other items. The behaviour is naturally rewarded by the things taken, and with each success the habit would be strengthened. Perhaps they stole many times without getting caught, or if they were caught, they received ineffective and inconsistent punishments from their parents. What Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) called poor self-control (see Chapter 6), radical behaviourists explain as a failure to learn the contingent relationship between self-gratifying behaviour and punishing consequences. Rather than being a generalised personality trait, ‘self-control’ may be exercised in some areas of life and not in others, depending upon the varying reinforcement histories in those areas. It is likely that stealing from parents generalised. Offenders probably moved to other targets, perhaps breaking into neighbours’ houses and later moving further afield to burgle the houses of strangers. Along the way, they would need to hone their technical skills. They would learn which were the best points of entry into a house, how to jimmy a window, how to disable an alarm or to pacify a guard dog if necessary, how to locate valuable goods within the house quickly and efficiently, how to make an escape without being seen, and how to dispose of the goods that they stole. These skills would be learned through trial and error in a process of successive approximations known as shaping. Their initial efforts would be clumsy but with each successful attempt they would come closer to the optimal response. As they became more practised in their crimes, they would also start to recognise discriminative stimuli that would guide them to maximise the reinforcements and to minimise potential punishments. For example, they would come to know that newspapers accumulating on the front lawn meant that the owner was likely to be away and that the house was unguarded, while lights on inside the house suggested that someone was home and the house should be avoided. In

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many houses they may find little of value but occasionally they would be rewarded on a variable reinforcement schedule with a particularly lucrative haul that would encourage their persistence. They are likely to perform many undetected and therefore unpunished burglaries. And if they are caught for their crimes from time to time, the delay between committing their crime and receiving a formal criminal justice system sanction may be months and even years, effectively severing the learning connection with their criminal acts. Similar scenarios can be devised for all criminal behaviours. However, from a practical point of view, behaviourists are less interested in the historical origins of behaviour than they are in the here-and-now task of applying behavioural technologies to change problem behaviour. They argue against the popular idea, exemplified in the psychoanalytic tradition of Sigmund Freud, that you must know the causes of a problem in order to fix it. It does matter how someone came to be criminal; the same behavioural modification techniques can be applied irrespective of the aetiology. What is important to know from a behavioural analysis are the current reward and punishment structures determining the performance of the target behaviour, because these are the contingency arrangements that need to be altered in order to change that behaviour. If there is little direct research on the acquisition and performance of criminal behaviour, the same cannot be said for research on the modification of criminal behaviour. Behaviourists have developed an extensive array of therapeutic techniques based on operant conditioning. We do not have the space to review these in detail here (see Braukmann and Fixsen, 1975; Davidson and Seidman, 1974; Pearson et al., 2002) but as a general principle these techniques aim to create prosocial habits and eliminate antisocial habits. This is achieved by strengthening the connection between prosocial behaviours and rewarding outcomes, and between antisocial behaviours and punishing outcomes. One technique is contingency contracting in which the punishments for misbehaviour and the rewards for sticking to agreed-upon behavioural goals are set out in concrete terms, literally as a written contract. For example, Stuart (1971) describes a contingency contract developed between a 16-year-old delinquent girl and her parents in which privileges (e.g., going out one evening a week) were contingent upon the fulfilment of specific responsibilities (e.g., maintaining a B average across all grades). A similar principle has been applied at an institutional level in the form of token economies. In token economies residents are rewarded for specified prosocial behaviours (e.g., keeping their room clean) with points which they can accumulate and exchange for privileges or treats (Phillips et al., 1971).

Social learning Social learning – also called observational learning – presents a kinder, less extreme side of behaviourism. The person most closely associated with social learning theory is Albert Bandura. Bandura (1977) argued that a great deal of human behaviour is learned not through direct experience, as the classical and operant conditioning theorists suggest, but vicariously through the process of

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modelling. That is, he argued that we can learn through observing others and imitating or avoiding their behaviours. We do not need to be personally run over on a busy highway to know not to leap out in front of the traffic. If human beings learn through modelling, then they must possess the ability to anticipate the consequences of behaviour that they have not yet performed. This ability to look into the future suggests a role in behaviour for cognitive processes, that is, thoughts, beliefs and perceptions. In recognition of the mediating role of internal events, social learning theory is described by the Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) model. Social learning is not an alternative to classical and operant conditioning but an extension of the behavioural tradition. Note, however, that in more recent theorising, Bandura (1986, 2001) has given increasing emphasis to cognitive processes, and has relabelled his approach as social cognitive theory. We will deal largely with the observational learning aspects of the theory in this chapter, and with the more explicit cognitive aspects in the following chapter. Principles of social learning According to Bandura (1977), most behaviour is learned in the process of social interaction and, in particular, by observing the actions of others. Models provide people with information that guides their own performance. There are four components to the modelling process. First, people must attend to the model. Models that are closely attended to – for example, because they are observed frequently, they are interesting, or they have high status – will be subject to greater imitation than models that do not capture the observer’s attention. Second, people must retain the modelled information in memory. This requires the individual to convert the observed events into symbolic cognitive representations in the form of internal dialogue (self-talk) or pictorial images. Third, the cognitively encoded information must be converted into action. Observed behaviours, especially complex ones, are rarely reproduced correctly the first time but must be practised and perfected. Finally, the performance of modelled behaviour is subject to motivational factors. People acquire countless behaviours observationally, but their performance of these behaviours is highly selective, depending upon the perceived appropriateness and effectiveness of the behaviour in a given context. People perform modelled behaviour in the anticipation of reinforcement rather than as a consequence of reinforcement. Bandura divided social learning into three stages: acquisition, instigation and maintenance. Bandura (1965; Bandura et al., 1961, 1963a, 1963b) demonstrated the acquisition of behaviour via modelling in a series of classic studies involving a large inflatable Bobo doll. In the prototype study (Bandura et al., 1961), children observed an adult model interacting with the doll. In one condition, the adult behaved non-aggressively towards the doll; in the other condition the model verbally and physically attacked the doll. In a variation of the study (Bandura et al., 1963a) children observed a film of the encounters. In both studies children imitated the behaviour of the model – those children who observed the aggressive model behaved twice as aggressively towards the Bobo doll than did children who

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observed the non-aggressive model or no model. The children had learned the aggressive responses without receiving any direct reinforcement. Models are involved not only in the acquisition of behaviour but also in providing guidance about where and when behaviour should be performed. Thus models can also instigate more-or-less immediate imitation. However, social cueing is not an automatic, ‘mindless’ process as it is presented in operant conditioning. Modelling cues must be interpreted and an individual makes a judgement about the likely benefits of imitating the model. The power of a model to prompt behaviour depends upon the regard that the observer has for the model as a reliable source of information. For example, Lefkowitz et al. (1955) found that people were more likely to follow someone crossing the street against a red light if the model was dressed in high-status clothes (a business suit) than if the model was poorly dressed. In operant conditioning, behaviour is maintained by the consequences it produces. Whether or not a person retains a learned behaviour in their repertoire depends upon if it is reinforced or punished. Bandura agreed that behaviour is subject to direct reinforcement and punishment. However, he also argued that the same operant process could occur vicariously in observational learning; that is, that reinforcement rules could be drawn from noting the experiences of models. This principle was demonstrated in a further extension of the Bobo doll experiment (Bandura, 1965; Bandura et al., 1963b). In these experiments, the model behaved aggressively towards the doll and subsequently either received rewards (candy, drink and verbal praise), punishment (spanking and verbal condemnation), or no consequences. The children then interacted with the doll. Those who observed the punishment condition were significantly less aggressive towards the doll than were the children in the other two conditions. In Bandura (1965) all children were then offered treats to demonstrate the aggressive behaviour of the model. There was no significant difference in the children’s performance of aggressive behaviour. That is, the children in all three conditions had learned the aggressive behaviour; what distinguished the children in the model-punished condition was that they also learned the punishing consequences associated with performing the aggressive behaviour. Bandura referred to the learning of contingency arrangements through observation as vicarious conditioning. In addition to vicarious conditioning, Bandura (1977) extended operant principles of behaviour maintenance in two further ways. First, he argued that some of the most powerful consequences of behaviour were not the tangible rewards and punishments emphasised in operant conditioning, but social and status rewards and punishments in the form of approval or disapproval from significant others. For example, children will seek to win the approval of parents without the promise of tangible rewards. Likewise, being admonished by a valued figure can be more distressing than tangible punishment. At a societal level, honorific titles, awards, medals and other status-enhancing forms of public recognition are highly valued. Second, Bandura argued that behaviour could be self-rewarded and selfpunished. Human beings engage in an ongoing assessment of their own performance, making judgements of self-adequacy – in the form of self-statements (talking

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to one’s self) – against personal standards of behaviour. Depending on the outcome of this assessment, individuals will cognitively congratulate or censure themselves for their actions. We explore the cognitive aspects of reinforcement in more detail in Chapter 8. Social learning and crime Social learning theory is arguably the most widely cited psychological theory of crime. Versions of social learning theory are also found in sociological criminology – for example, Sutherland’s (1947) differential association theory – although sociological versions lack the detailed behavioural framework and experimental underpinnings of psychological approaches. Akers (1977; Burgess and Akers, 1968) has attempted to combine the sociological and psychological traditions of social learning in his differential association-reinforcement theory. Bandura (1977) suggested that there were three main sources of models for observational learning: the family, the peer group and the mass media. Familial models As reported in Chapter 6, children who grow up in abusive households are at a higher risk of criminality than are those raised in non-abusive families. From a social learning perspective, it would be expected that the sorts of crimes committed by individuals would reflect the specific sorts of experiences to which they were exposed as children. There is empirical evidence for the intergenerational transmission hypothesis. Felson and Lane (2009) analysed interviews with nearly 14,000 prisoners, focusing on their childhood experiences and their current offending patterns. They found that offenders who experienced physical abuse were most likely to commit violent offences and offenders who experienced sexual abuse were most likely to commit sexual offences. Likewise, Teague et al. (2008) found that the severity of physical abuse predicted self-reported violent offending, but was only weakly associated with property offending and did not predict sexual offending. The link between being a victim and a later perpetrator of child sexual abuse has been reported in a number of studies (Connolly and Woollons, 2008; Glasser et al., 2001; Paolucci et al., 2001). Stith et al. (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of 39 studies examining the childhood familial experiences and subsequent spousal abuse. They found a weak to moderate relationship between growing up in a family characterised by domestic abuse and becoming a perpetrator (.18) and victim (.17) of domestic abuse. Subcultural models The correlation between having delinquent friends and engaging in criminal activity was also reported in Chapter 6. Social learning theory has been widely used to interpret the association between delinquency and delinquent associates (Akers and Jensen, 2006). A novice offender has the opportunity to observe the

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delinquent acts of more experienced friends from whom he/she learns both normalising beliefs about crime (committing crime is OK) and the technical skills required to commit crime. He/she may also receive social approval by peers for having engaged in crimes and this may be more important in terms of reinforcement than tangible rewards delivered by their criminal acts. There has been particular interest by social learning theorists in criminal behaviour within delinquent gangs. Battin-Pearson et al. (1998) found that gang members had double the offending rates of juveniles who just had delinquent friends. The tight social structure of gangs increases the social learning opportunities. Winfree et al. (1994) examined data from 97 incarcerated male and female juvenile offenders on self-reported delinquency, gang membership, the number of friends who were gang members, the level of approval from friends of their gang membership, and their acceptance of gang values. They found that gang members were more likely to have friends who were also gang members, to have approval from friends for their gang membership and activities, and to be more accepting of gang values. Symbolic models Models for imitation do not have to appear in person but can be represented symbolically in words and pictures via the mass media (Bandura, 2001). Most research in this area has examined the effects of media violence, including sexual violence. There are numerous examples in the literature that indicate a copy-cat phenomenon accompanying publicised crimes. Felson (1996) recounts a case in which a girl was abducted and forced to douse herself in petrol before being set alight two days after the screening of a television programme with a similar plot. Suicide has been found to increase immediately following the portrayal of suicide in popular television programmes (Gould and Shäffer, 1989; Phillips, 1989; Phillips and Carstensen, 1990; Schmidtke and Häfner, 1989). Phillips (1983) found that delinquent homicides increased in the days following the televising of major boxing matches. Supporting the role of imitation, the increase only applied to cases where the losing fighter and the homicide victim were of the same race. There have been numerous systematic reviews and meta-analyses on the outcomes of media violence more generally (Anderson et al., 2003; Anderson and Bushman, 2001; Bushman and Huesmann, 2006; Felson, 1996; Wood et al., 1991). In the most recent study, Bushman and Huesmann (2006) conducted a meta-analysis on 431 studies, examining the effects of media violence on adults and children. The researchers distinguished between short-term effects involving immediate but transient changes in behaviour (instigation), and long-term effects producing stable and prolonged changes in behaviour (acquisition). The media examined included television, video games, movies and comic books and the outcome variables included aggressive behaviour, aggressive thoughts and physiological arousal. Bushman and Huesmann found average effect sizes ranging from .19 for violent behaviour to .26 for physiological arousal. The short-term effects were greater for adults while the long-term effects were greater for children. The authors interpreted this finding as

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indicating that different psychological mechanisms were in play for children and adults. For children, symbolic models were involved in the construction of violent responses as predicted by social learning theory. Children had fewer existing learned violence responses that might interfere with the absorption of new messages modelled in the media. However, for adults, violent media had a priming effect, eliciting already encoded violent responses rather than creating new ones, by a process best described by S-R theory. The relationship between pornography use and sexual offending is particularly controversial (see reviews by Bauserman, 1996; Seto et al., 2001). While some studies have reported high levels of pornography use by sex offenders (Bourke and Hernandez, 2009; Kingston et al., 2008; Marshall, 1988), others have not (Becker and Stein, 1991; Smallbone and Wortley, 2000). Moreover, because such studies are correlational, it is unclear whether any reported association is because pornography causes sex offending or sex offenders are attracted to pornography. To overcome this limitation, the short-term psychological and behavioural effects of pornography have been examined experimentally. Allen et al. (1995) conducted a meta-analysis of 30 laboratory studies examining the link between exposure to pornography and increased aggression (for example, the willingness to deliver electric shocks to other participants). They found that increased aggression depended upon the type of pornography and the pre-exiting emotional state of the observer. Pornography that simply involved nudity actually decreased aggression; pornography involving non-violent sex and violent sex both increased aggression, although the increase was greater for violent sex. Subjects who were made to feel angry prior to viewing non-violent and violent pornography became more aggressive after the viewing, while subjects who were not made angry did not; again there was a decrease in both groups after viewing nudity. The findings were similar for both men and women. There were also no gender effects for the target of the post-viewing aggression. That is, post-viewing aggression was displayed towards both male and female victims, even though the targets of aggression in the pornography were overwhelmingly female. These findings suggest that for sexual aggression, arousal is more important than the actual content of the pornography. Viewers did not seem to be modelling specific elements they observed in the pornographic images; rather their response depended upon their emotional reaction to the pornography. This finding mirrors that of Bushman and Huesmann (2006) for the short-term effects of violent media generally. In summary, it seems that exposure to violent and pornographic media can have deleterious psychological and behavioural effects on some viewers. However, effect sizes are typically modest and there are inconsistencies and contradictions among the findings. Moreover, the role of imitation is most apparent in the acquisition phase, while the short-term instigating effects are more likely to be related to arousal-priming.

Conclusion and evaluation Behavioural theories present a very different approach to understanding crime from that offered by other psychological theories. In the behavioural approach,

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the focus is switched from a biosocial perspective to one which places the environment at the centre of the analysis. The role of the environment is to create criminal behaviours from a criminality-neutral starting position, not to control inherent, generalised criminal impulses. Behaviours are not organised around biologically-based traits, but remain as discrete habits that are evoked on a situationally-specific basis. Given these points of departure, behavioural theories would appear to present some conceptual challenges to the integrative mission of this book. However, some of the ‘radical’ aspects of behaviourism have been overstated and perceptions of the approach are often based on ideas presented nearly a hundred years ago. Skinner, for example, did not dismiss the role of biological factors in behaviour but he did question the utility of incorporating them into explanations of behaviour. This is a practical objection to the biosocial perspective more so than a theoretical objection. More recent versions of behaviourism – social learning theory and social cognitive theory – have gone further and explicitly included personal variables in their explanations of behaviour. Moreover, behavioural approaches add significantly to our understanding of crime, addressing issues ignored in other theories. The contribution of behavioural approaches is to set out the precise mechanisms by which behaviour is learned and the conditions under which it is performed. Behaviourists of all persuasions have a shared commitment to rigorous and systematic empirical research. Through application of the scientific method they have uncovered causal relationships that have permitted the development of powerful laws of behaviour. From these laws, behaviourists have developed a wide range of interventions for modifying and preventing crime. The distinction made between learning and performance of behaviour is crucial. Behaviourists are the first situationalists. Understanding why individuals develop criminal habits is one thing; of equal or greater importance is understanding why they commit crime. With the behavioural approach, we begin our examination of the third stage of the integrative model, factors operating at the crime scene (see Figure 1.2). Behaviourism began as a reaction against the mentalism of the nineteenth century. Ironically, the behavioural approach has been reinvigorated in recent years by the incorporation of cognitive processes into the behavioural framework via social learning theory, which has evolved into social cognitive theory. It is to the role of cognition in crime that we now turn.

8

Cognition

As outlined in Chapter 7, psychology began in the late nineteenth century as the study of mental processes, but the dominance of the behavioural perspective in the first half of the twentieth century saw the virtual abandonment of cognition as a topic of psychological investigation. By the end of the 1950s, however, many researchers were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with what they saw as the limitations of radical behaviourism. The behavioural paradigm, it was argued, failed to account for the complexity and creativity of human behaviour. More particularly, it did not capture the very quality that makes us human, namely our capacity to think. Cognition is studied in a number of different fields of psychology. The primary field of study, naturally enough, is cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychology is the study of how humans perceive, interpret, encode, store and recall information. Cognitive psychologists study mental activities such as attention, memory, language, problem-solving, reasoning and decision-making. Aside from the core field of cognitive psychology, cognitive processes have also been incorporated into other areas of psychology. We saw in the previous chapter that many psychologists did not abandon behaviourism but introduced cognition into learning theory to produce social learning theory, which later became social cognitive theory. Social cognitive theorists are specifically interested in the mediational role that thoughts and perceptions play in the learning process. Cognition has also found a home in social psychology (of which we will hear more in Chapter 9) as social cognition. Though similar in name to social cognitive theory, social cognition is more specifically concerned with the social perception of groups and events that underpins the development of attitudes, values, stereotypes and schemas. The chapter begins by outlining the key features and assumptions of cognitive approaches. Three ways of understanding offender cognition are then examined – as a mediating process in social cognitive learning, as a rational decision-making process, and as an automatic, schema-driven process.

The cognitive revolution The renaissance of cognitive psychology is commonly fixed at 1956 when two influential conferences on cognition were held, one at Massachusetts Institute of

Cognition 163 Technology (MIT) and the other at Dartmouth College (Gardner, 1985; Neisser, 1988). The MIT conference brought together researchers from various academic fields interested in perception, memory and the development of language; the Dartmouth conference was attended by researchers in the nascent field of computer science and focused on the implications of new technologies for understanding human intelligence. Though perhaps not apparent at the time, the conferences are credited with heralding what has been referred to as the cognitive revolution and with setting the theoretical direction that cognitive psychology was to take in the coming years. The need for cognition Radical behaviourists like Skinner argued that all behaviour could be explained without recourse to internal events such as cognition. A serious challenge to this claim came in the wake of the publication by Skinner (1957) of a book on the acquisition of language. According to Skinner, language is acquired incrementally via reinforcement in the same way as is any other behaviour. As a child verbalises his/ her first words – for example, correctly identifying an object – parents reinforce the response with praise and encouragement. The child then learns to associate words with the objects in question and in this way builds a vocabulary and a catalogue of sentences. However, many researchers felt that Skinner had pushed behaviourism beyond its explanatory bounds. Most notably, linguist Noam Chomsky (1959) (who had attended the MIT symposium) responded with a devastating critique in which he argued that the infinite array of novel sentences that an individual is capable of producing simply cannot be learned in a mechanistic way. Even when children are first learning to talk they will utter sentences – often containing errors (e.g., ‘Me not like doggie’) – that they have never heard before. The creative potential of language, Chomsky argued, must have a cognitive basis. He proposed that the human brain comes equipped with a hard-wired language acquisition devise (LAD) that allows individuals to manipulate words that they hear according to a limited set of innate grammatical rules in order to create new sentences. Many regard Chomsky’s critique as a turning point in the decline in the pre-eminence of radical behaviourism and the increasing influence of cognitive psychology (Lachman et al., 1979). The computer analogy Around the time that psychologists were rediscovering cognition there were rapid advances in the development of the computer. As computers became more sophisticated, researchers became interested in the parallels between the informationprocessing capabilities of computers and human thought. The term artificial intelligence (AI) was coined at the Dartmouth conference to describe the attempt by programmers to simulate on computers the analytic skills of humans. The computer chess game, capable of beating most human players, is an example of AI. Working in the other direction, computers provided cognitive researchers with a model for what goes on inside the ‘black box’.

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With the computer as metaphor, the information-processing model became the dominant perspective in cognitive psychology (Lachman et al., 1979). According to this model, humans process information through a sequence of stages. Like a computer, the brain receives inputs which it encodes in symbolic form, it stores this information, it retrieves this information, and it operates on and transforms this information. The data used in mental activity involve an internal representation of environmental information, and human beings are active manipulators of these data. The information processing model distinguishes between the physical structure of the brain and mental processes, a distinction that is broadly (though not perfectly) analogous to that between a computer’s hardware and its software. Different software programs represent different types of mental activity. Though useful as a descriptive device, the computer analogy should not be pushed too far. There are significant differences between the brain and the computer. Most importantly, the computer has a central processing unit that rapidly performs tasks one at a time in a serial fashion. In contrast, the brain can perform different tasks simultaneously, but less rapidly, utilising neuronal networks throughout the brain. This model of cognition is referred to as parallel distributed processing. The brain and computers also have different strengths and weaknesses. Computers outperform the brain in some areas of functioning. For example, by definition, computers are not prone to human error. On the other hand, and despite advances in AI, the brain is still superior to computers in performing conceptual tasks such as sorting objects into categories on the basis of some underlying quality. Consciousness Consciousness is an elusive concept to define but is generally taken to have something to do with our subjective experience and awareness (Block, 1995; Kriegel, 2007). While we like to believe that our behaviour is under the control of our conscious thoughts, in fact most cognition takes place below the level of phenomenal consciousness. Consider an experience common to most drivers. You are driving home along a familiar route when suddenly a car pulls out in front of you. You slam on the brakes and narrowly avoid an accident. Only then do you realise that you have no recollection of your journey home up to that point when you are jolted back to a state of conscious awareness. Your driving behaviour seems to have been performed on ‘auto-pilot’. This scenario illustrates the distinction between automatic processes and nonautomatic (or controlled) processes (Moors and De Houwer, 2006). An automatic process is one that is activated without intention, occurs rapidly, and operates in the absence of conscious attention. In contrast, a non-automatic process is one that is intentionally initiated, is relatively slow-acting, and requires conscious attention. Automatic processes generally develop as a function of practice. Many tasks that start off requiring non-automatic processing can eventually be performed using automatic processing. In the scenario above, when you first start to learn to drive, you are conscious of every element of the task that you need to perform – scanning

Cognition 165 the road, turning the steering wheel, applying the brake, and so on. Only after extensive experience are you able to switch to auto-pilot. Reading is another example. When children learn to read, they laboriously sound out each word. Eventually they read fluently without consciously attending to every word. Similarly, when people are learning a new sport, they concentrate on each component of their technique until their play becomes automatic. This analysis suggests there is a close link between consciousness and attention. There is a limited number of things an individual can attend to at any given time, and so there is also a limited number of non-automatic processes that can be undertaken simultaneously. Since automatic processes occur with minimal attention, they are seen as a way for humans to maximise informationprocessing resources. However, as the following section explores, the exact nature of conscious thought and the purpose that it serves remain controversial. The mind–body problem As suggested in the preceding sections, cognitive psychology is the study of mental processes rather than the study of the brain. While this distinction might seem obvious enough, it involves a centuries-old philosophical conundrum known as the mind–body problem. The problem concerns the nature of the mind. The mental activities that comprise the mind – thoughts, ideas, imagination – are intangible phenomena. We cannot see or touch them and they are not composed of atoms or even energy. However, if the mind is a non-physical entity, then how can it be contained within a designated physical space (i.e., the skull)? Moreover, how can the non-physical mind exert a causal influence on the physical body without violating the fundamental laws of physics? There are two main philosophical approaches to the mind–body problem: dualism and materialism (Fodor, 1981). Dualism was proposed by the French philosopher René Descartes in the seventeenth century. Descartes maintained that the mind and body are separate entities but that they causally interact with one another. However, the ongoing weakness of dualism has been the inability for any proponents to satisfactorily account for how this mind–body interaction actually occurs. Nevertheless, historically dualism has had a powerful influence in the development of cognitive psychology and is the way that most people intuitively understand thinking. Materialism holds that all mental activity has a physical correlate in the brain, and therefore there is no separate mind. The mind–body problem disappears because the mind and body are one. Radical behaviourists like Watson and Skinner were materialists, but so too are many cognitive psychologists. They argue that it is theoretically possible (even if it is highly unlikely ever to happen) for all cognition ultimately to be described in terms of underlying neurological processes. However, materialism has been criticised on grounds that have been canvassed already; that is, that it seems increasingly apparent to many that human behaviour cannot be explained without invoking a separate role for mental activity. Parallels may be observed between the mind–body problem and the free will/ determinism debate. Dualism implies that humans possess some level of free will.

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It portrays the existence of a separate mind that sits outside the physical brain and operates as a moderating agent, overseeing and guiding our actions. Critics of dualism sometimes compare this with the absurd image of having a little person (a homunculus) inside the head telling us what to do. Materialism, on the other hand, is consistent with determinism. Mental processes are firmly attached to the brain and as such are subject to the same biological and environmental causal processes that shaped the physical characteristics of the brain. Debate about the mind–body relationship continues with no obvious resolution in sight. Indeed, some researchers have concluded that the problem is essentially insoluble (McGinn, 1989). Despite the profundity of the philosophical issues involved, in practice most cognitive psychologists are not constrained by the controversy. They are content to focus on the function that cognition plays in human behaviour and to leave the mind–body problem (and the free will/determinism debate for that matter) to the side.

Social cognitive theory As has been discussed, social cognitive theory developed from social learning theory. Social cognitive theory is consistent with the basic operant conditioning mode, but posits a range of cognitive processes that sit between environmental inputs (the stimulus S) and behavioural outputs (the response R). Behaviour occurs as a response to a cognitive representation of the environment (the StimulusOrganism-Response or S-O-R model), rather than to the environment per se. Cognitive processes are in turn subject to bias, error and distortion. Thus, the cognitive representation of the environment may involve dysfunctional perceptions and interpretations of events that result in dysfunctional behaviour. The internal world that is created inside the head can even be entirely self-generated and need not relate to any particular event occurring at the time. Sexual fantasies, for example, can produce emotional and physiological responses similar to those produced by actual sexual experience. Note that the conceptually similar cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) developed alongside social cognitive theory, though with a slightly different heritage. CBT has its roots in the therapeutic applications of behavioural and cognitive techniques and is associated with clinical researchers such as Albert Ellis, Aaron Beck and Arnold Lazarus. Where traditional behaviour therapies attempt to change behaviour by changing some aspect of the environment, CBT aims to change behaviour by changing an individual’s internal representation of the environment, a technique known as cognitive restructuring. In this section a number of cognitive-mediational processes are described. These are: expectancies, causal attributions, locus of control, frustration-aggression, perceived self-efficacy, self-reinforcement and moral disengagement. Expectancies According to operant conditioning, people are likely to perform behaviour for which they have been previously rewarded. According to social cognitive theory,

Cognition 167 for this to occur, an individual must hold an expectation of being rewarded for that behaviour, and this implies that they possess the cognitive capacity to imagine a future event. Expectancies are memory constructs that inform individuals about the likely outcome of goal-driven behaviour. Based on their expectancies, offenders will commit crimes that promise to deliver them rewards. For example, O’Donohue et al. (1996) examined expectancies for rape among a sample of undergraduate college students. Possible outcomes of rape that were presented to participants included enjoying the sex, feeling ashamed, getting a bad reputation, being convicted and contracting an STD. Positive (or less negative) perceptions of rape outcomes were associated with both higher self-reported past involvement and predicted future involvement in coercive sex. The significance of the cognitive basis of expectancies is most clearly demonstrated in research on the effects of alcohol on behaviour. The association between alcohol consumption and aggression is well established (see Chapter 3). However, what is not immediately clear from this association is the extent to which aggression is the result of the pharmacological effects of alcohol or alcohol expectancies. According to the expectancy argument, people may become aggressive after drinking alcohol because this is what they expect the effects of alcohol to be. To test this hypothesis, Lang et al. (1975) devised an innovative experiment designed to control for the pharmacological effects of alcohol. Subjects were led to believe that they were participating in a study to test the effects of alcohol on motor coordination. Half the subjects were given tonic water containing vodka, and the other half were given straight tonic water. Pretesting on a different group of subjects indicated that the tonic water effectively masked the taste of the vodka. In addition, two different expectancies were created. For both conditions, half the subjects were led to believe that their beverage contained alcohol while the other half were led to believe they were drinking straight tonic water. After subjects drank their assigned beverage, they were then required to deliver shocks to another subject (actually a confederate of the experimenter) in what was portrayed as a learning phase of the experiment. (In fact the shocks were simulated.) Those subjects who thought that they had imbibed alcohol – irrespective of whether or not they had done so – delivered longer and more severe shocks to the confederate than subjects who believed that they had not imbibed alcohol. The actual consumption of alcohol had no effect on aggression and there were no interaction effects. The belief by subjects that they had consumed alcohol became a cognitive reality that was independent of the objective reality. Assuming that they had imbibed alcohol, subjects acted out their alcohol expectancies as if they had imbibed alcohol. Alcohol expectancies have subsequently become an important part of the explanation for the effects of alcohol on violent and other criminal behaviour. Quigley and Leonard (2006) conducted a systematic review of the alcohol expectancy literature in which they concluded that alcohol expectancies for aggression contributed to the performance of aggressive behaviour, although the pharmacological effects of alcohol also played a role along with situational cues for aggression. The broader point, however, is that expectancies of all sorts are subjective

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cognitive creations that need not necessarily mirror the objective consequences of behaviour. Causal attributions Causal attributions refer to the inferences individuals make about why an event has occurred, or about the motives and dispositions of others (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1972). Human beings are driven by the need to understand and predict the world and to exercise control over events. Attribution theorists take the view of human beings as ‘naive scientists’ who continuously analyse and interpret environmental information to arrive at logically derived (though not always accurate) conclusions. According to Weiner (1986), causal attributions are made along three dimensions – is an event caused by factors in the environment (external) or factors in the person (internal)?; is the cause long-term (stable) or temporary (unstable)?; and is the cause intentional (controllable) or accidental (uncontrollable)? The causes which a person ascribes to an event may profoundly affect their reaction to that event and their subsequent behaviour. For example, harmful behaviour which is judged to be deliberate will elicit quite different responses from an observer (or victim) than the same behaviour judged to be inadvertent. Thus, in line with the principles of social cognitive learning, it is not the environmental event that causes behaviour but the interpretation placed on the event. Human beings, however, are far from being good, deductive scientists, and attributional analyses are subject to a number of common errors and biases. For example, fundamental attributional error refers to the tendency of individuals to over-attribute the causes of another person’s behaviour to dispositional factors, and correspondingly to underestimate the role played by environmental factors (Jones, 1979; Ross, 1977). In particular, we like to blame others for negative outcomes even when objectively they are not at fault. However, we do not apply the same rules to ourselves. We are prepared to attribute a greater role for environmental factors when explaining our own behaviour (especially in the case of negative behaviour). This discrepancy is called actor-observer bias (Jones and Nisbett, 1971). Misattributions of cause are frequently implicated in violent behaviour. Hostile attribution bias refers to the tendency to misinterpret social cues and to infer aggressive motives to others when their intentions are in fact benign (Berkowitz, 1990). Having interpreted the intentions of the other person as hostile, an individual may respond in a way that leads to an escalation of violence. Many a barroom fight has begun because someone looked at someone else the ‘wrong way’. Studies consistently show that aggressive individuals are more likely than nonaggressive individuals to misattribute hostile intent in hypothetical situations. For example, Bailey and Ostrov (2008) found that levels of self-reported aggression correlated with the tendency to interpreted ambiguous provocations (e.g., someone spilling drink over you) as a hostile act. James and Seager (2006) likewise found that criminal convictions for violence correlated with the tendency to make hostile attributions.

Cognition 169 Locus of control Locus of control refers to the extent to which individuals believe they have control over their life events (Rotter, 1954, 1975). Individuals who have an internal locus of control believe that the things that happen to them are a result of their own actions and endeavours; individuals who have an external locus of control believe that things happen to them because of fate, luck or the actions of powerful others. Beliefs about control are a kind of causal attribution, but unlike attribution theory, which is mainly concerned with normative perceptions, locus of control is concerned with individual differences in perception. In social cognitive theory, locus of control is important because of the moderating effect it has on expectancies. That is, locus of control affects the way an individual perceives the reinforcements of behaviour. For example, students who attribute their performance on an exam to internal factors (e.g., the amount of study they do) will be encouraged to work hard; students who attribute their performance to external factors (e.g., the fairness of the exam) will not. In most circumstances, an internal locus of control is considered to be desirable and to provide the basis for healthy psychological adjustment. On this basis it would be predicted that offending would be associated with an external locus of control. It is suggested that by attributing the cause of their criminality to external factors, offenders are able to avoid the self-blame that might discourage them from offending. Locus of control is usually measured on one of several psychometric scales (Gudjonsson and Singh, 1989; Nowicki and Strickland, 1973; Rotter, 1966). Despite the theoretical relevance of locus of control to offending, direct empirical research with offenders is not extensive. Research that has been conducted has tended to focus on violent offenders (Deming and Lochman, 2008; Halloran et al., 1999; Hollin and Wheeler, 1982; Marsa et al., 2004; Österman et al., 1999) and child sex offenders (Elliott et al., 2009; Katz, 1990), and generally supports the prediction that offenders have an external locus of control. In the case of violent offending, gender differences have been reported in some studies, with the association between external locus on control and violence stronger for males than for females (Halloran et al., 1999; Österman et al., 1999). Frustration-aggression Frustration is the emotional state produced when an individual is thwarted in their pursuit of a goal. According to the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al., 1939), when an animal is prevented from performing a desired behaviour, the animal automatically experiences an increased level of physiological arousal, which it seeks to dissipate through some form of aggressive response (snarling, scratching, biting, etc.). When applied to humans, there have been a number of challenges and refinements to Dollard et al.’s original theory. In particular, the idea that there is an invariable relationship between frustration and aggression has been largely dismissed. Frustration does not always produce aggression. Some people respond to frustration by productively striving to

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overcome the frustrating situation, while others simply become resigned to defeat. In a reformulation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis to bring it into line with social cognitive principles, Berkowitz (1989) argued that the presence of frustrating stimuli in the environment increases the probability that an individual will become angry and act aggressively but does not necessarily guarantee aggression. Berkowitz emphasised that it was not sufficient for an event to be perceived as frustrating but that it must also be interpreted as aversive. People can tolerate frustration if they believe that there was no deliberate attempt to harm them or if they agree that the blocking of their goal was fair and legitimate. The precise form the response to frustration takes depends upon an individual’s learning history, cognitive interpretation of the event and available behavioural repertoire. Studies have highlighted the relationship between frustration and antisocial behaviour in a diversity of situations. Harding et al. (1998) found that incidents of road rage correlated with high traffic volume and were initiated by factors such as encounters with slow drivers, other drivers cutting in, and competition for parking spaces. Frustration at work has also been found to be related to increased workplace vandalism and sabotage (Chen and Spector, 1992; Spector, 1997; Storms and Spector, 1987). Homel and Clark (1994) found nightclub violence was related to levels of patron boredom, lack of seating, unavailability of food and provocative behaviour of security staff. Perceived self-efficacy Perceived self-efficacy occupies a central place in social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997). It refers to an individual’s estimation of his/her capabilities to perform a designated type of task. Tasks for which a person has high selfefficacy are the things that he/she thinks that he/she is good at and is likely to succeed in if he/she tries. A person’s perceived self-efficacy will strongly influence the goals that he/she sets, and the effort and commitment he/she will devote to achieving those goals. For example, a student with high self-efficacy in mathematics is likely to aim for a high grade on the mathematics exam and to work hard in order to attain that grade. On the other hand, a student with low self-efficacy in mathematics may decide that study is pointless because he/ she is destined to receive a poor grade in any case. Moreover, perceived selfefficacy can causally affect the quality of performance. Collins (1982) showed that when children of equal mathematical ability were given difficult mathematical problems to solve, those with higher perceived self-efficacy became less rattled, were more persistent, and solved more problems than children with low perceived self-efficacy. Self-efficacy may sound similar to self-esteem but the concepts can be distinguished in two ways. First, where self-esteem is a global measure, perceived selfefficacy is task-specific. It is meaningless to say someone has high perceived self-efficacy without specifying in what areas the perceived self-efficacy applies. Second, where self-esteem is an abstract concept relating to beliefs about self-worth,

Cognition 171 perceived self-efficacy is anchored in behaviour and a person’s beliefs about what they can do. In the context of crime, research usually focuses on the protective effects of perceived self-efficacy in prosocial behaviour. Individuals who perceive that they are likely to achieve prosocial goals are more likely to attempt and succeed in the behaviours necessary to achieve those goals. It is argued that offenders perceive that they lack the skills that help them avoid crime and that this is reflected in the choices they make and the quality of their performance. For example, a number of studies have examined perceived self-efficacy to resist peer pressure to engage in risky activities, seeking responses to items such as ‘How well can you resist peer pressure to use drugs?’ (Bandura et al., 2003; Caprara et al., 1998, 2002; Jagers et al., 2007). High perceived self-efficacy is associated with lower rates of self-reported violent and delinquent behaviour. High perceived self-efficacy in controlling emotions (Bandura et al., 2003) and in academic performance (ibid.; Chung and Elias, 1996) have also been shown to protect against delinquency. Self-reinforcement According to social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1977), in addition to tangible and social rewards and punishments, human beings have the capacity to self-reinforce and self-punish their behaviour. Our behaviour is powerfully influenced by our own judgements of its adequacy. We have personal standards of performance against which we assess our actions. Depending upon our self-assessments, we can self-reinforce behaviour through congratulatory self-statements – ‘I did well’ – or self-punish behaviour through condemnatory self-statements – ‘I did poorly’. In this way we encourage ourselves to repeat the behaviour, to improve on our performance, or to drop the behaviour from our repertoire. It perhaps sounds odd to talk about positive self-assessments of criminal behaviour but criminal performance can be for some a source of pride that is self-reinforced. Sigmourd and van de Ven (1999) administered the Pride in Delinquency (PID) scale to a sample of 141 incarcerated male offenders. They found that PID scores positively correlated with number of convictions, number of different offences, number of incarcerations, number of recorded institutional misconducts, rearrest and reincarceration. Correlations were generally higher for non-violent offenders than for violent offenders. Pride may be felt particularly for crimes which involve some degree of skill or prowess. A number of studies have identified the pride that car thieves feel about their ability to break into and hot-wire cars (Copes, 2003; Light et al., 1993; O’Connor and Kelly, 2006). Computer-hacking is another crime that requires technical skill and can engender a sense of self-satisfaction (Barber, 2001; Thomas, 2005; Wible, 2003). Likewise graffitists may regard their tags as artistic creations of which they can be justly proud (Docuyanan, 2000; Halsey and Young, 2006; Lachmann, 1988). Finally, an enhanced sense of masculinity is drawn by some from their ability to overcome and humiliate an opponent in a physical encounter (Baumeister et al., 1996; McMurran et al., 2010).

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Moral disengagement While some offenders may be proud of their criminal exploits and congratulate themselves for their cleverness and daring, the evidence suggests that most offenders do not positively value criminal behaviour. Most people, even offenders, absorb the broad values of the society in which they live and know that criminal behaviour is morally wrong. We should expect, then, many offenders to engage in self-condemnation of their criminal behaviours. Criminologists Sykes and Matza (1957) recognised the paradox that this posed. If offenders do not value their crimes, then why do they continue to commit them? To address this question, Sykes and Matza proposed neutralisation theory. According to neutralisation theory, many offenders do not hold positively antisocial values, but ‘drift’ in and out of crime by periodically redefining their behaviour as non-criminal. In this way they are able to continue to offend without feeling bad about themselves. Bandura (1976, 1977) took the same basic idea and proposed the concept of moral disengagement within a social cognitive framework. In social cognitive terms, when an individual makes a negative self-assessment of their behaviour, they may avoid self-punishment by cognitively redefining the event in such a way as to minimise their personal culpability. In plain language, neutralisations and moral disengagements are excuses offenders make to convince themselves that they are not to blame for their crimes. Sykes and Matza suggested five specific techniques of neutralisation and Bandura (1976, 1977) provided ten techniques of moral disengagement. Bandura further suggested that these techniques can be grouped into four broad categories: (1) those aimed at minimising the moral illegitimacy of the behaviour; (2) those aimed at minimising the degree of personal responsibility for the behaviour; (3) those aimed at minimising the negative consequences of the behaviour; and (4) those aimed at minimising the worth or blamelessness of the victim. Both sets of techniques are shown in Table 8.1 along with examples of accompanying cognitive distortions. There has been extensive empirical research on excuse-making (both neutralisations and moral disengagements) by offenders. Research has been both quantitatively based, involving questionnaires in which offenders endorse various excuses for particular crimes, and qualitatively based, in which offenders give an account of their crimes and the extent to which they seek to absolve themselves of blame is assessed. Both quantitative (Agnew, 1994; Ball, 1966; Bandura et al., 1996; Landsheer et al., 1994; Minor, 1981; Wortley, 1986) and qualitative research (Dabney and Vaughn, 2000; Durkin and Bryant, 1999; Forsyth and Evans, 1998; Shover et al., 2003) provide considerable empirical evidence that offenders utilise neutralisations and moral disengagements. It is important to note that excuses are offence-specific; that is, that offenders excuse their crimes, not crime generally. For example, Wortley (1986) examined excuse-making by offenders convicted either of murder, rape or theft. Offenders were more likely to endorse excuses for the offence that they committed than they were for the other two offences.

Cognition 173 Table 8.1 Comparison of Sykes and Matza (1957) and Bandura (1976, 1977) Purpose

Sykes and Matza

Minimising moral Appeal to higher illegitimacy loyalties

Bandura

Examples

Justification in terms of higher principles

‘I had to steal to help a friend’

Condemning the condemners

‘The police are the real crooks’ Palliative comparison ‘At least I’m not a child-molester’ Euphemistic labelling ‘It’s just tax minimisation’

Minimising personal responsibility

Denial of responsibility

Minimising Denial of injury negative outcomes

Minimising the victim

Denial of the victim

‘I was drunk and couldn’t help myself’ Displacement of responsibility

‘I was only doing what I was told’

Diffusion of responsibility

‘I was just one cog in the machine’

Ignoring the consequences

‘The shop was insured’

Minimising the consequences

‘I just gave her a few slaps’

Misconstruing the consequences

‘She really enjoyed it’

Dehumanising the victim

‘She was just a whore’

Blaming the victim

‘He started it’

Despite the conceptual similarity between neutralisations and moral disengagements, the two concepts have different theoretical bases. Bandura portrayed moral disengagement as a dynamic process by which an individual’s moral standards are gradually eroded. Neutralisations, on the other hand, are presented as temporary releases from an individual’s moral status quo. However, the concept of a temporary release raises the question of whether neutralisations occur before or after offending – do they permit the offender to engage in crime by freeing his/her conscience in advance, or are they merely a means to make the offender feel better after he/she has committed a crime? If they occur beforehand, how does the offender know he/she will feel guilty for something they have not done? If they occur afterwards, then how can neutralisations be said to help the cause of the crime? Neutralisation theory does not have satisfactory answers to these questions. Social cognitive theory suggests that disengagement occurs both before and after offending in a process of graduated desensitisation (Bandura, 1976). Initially, moral disengagement may occur as a reaction to having performed

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self-disapproved-of behaviour. To the extent that disengagement is successful in reducing self-punishment on this occasion, then in a future circumstance the expectancy of self-condemnation will be reduced, thus increasing the probability that the behaviour will be repeated. With each successive performance of the behaviour, expected self-condemnation progressively reduces. With time, acts that were once regarded by an individual as morally reprehensible can be performed with an easy conscience.

Offender decision-making A decision is a choice that is made among possible alternatives. We make choices continually throughout the day, every day. Some decisions are trivial and the outcome is of little consequence – ‘which socks should I buy?’ – and some decisions are serious and the outcome is life-changing – ‘which career should I choose?’ Some decisions are simple and the outcome is obvious – ‘should I get out of the way of this oncoming car?’ – and other decisions are hard and the outcome is uncertain – ‘which shares should I buy to give the greatest return?’ In this section we treat offenders as active decision-makers and examine the way that they make choices in the process of committing their crimes. The expected utility model The classic description in cognitive psychology of the decision-making process is the expected utility model. The expected utility model assumes that people seek to maximise their pleasures and minimise their pains, and accordingly that they make rational decisions based on an evaluation of the available alternatives in order to achieve these ends. Decisions are made along the two dimensions hinted at above: the value of the outcome and the probability that the outcome will occur. Applied objectively, the model works as a straight mathematical formula; expected utility equals probability times pay-off. For example, consider being faced with a choice between a .5 probability of winning $100 and a .75 probability of winning $80. The expected utility of each bet is $50 (.5 × $100) and $60 (.75 × $80) respectively, and so rationally you should choose the second option. However, human beings do not make decisions like mathematicians. Even when presented with choices for which there is an objectively best option, we will often veer from the expected utility formula. The expected utility model provides a normative benchmark – the optimum strategy – against which the rationality of decisions can be assessed. Of course, the decisions we routinely make in our daily lives do not involve objective values and probabilities but subjective ones. In real-world decisionmaking we need to make a personal judgement about what an outcome is worth to us and how likely it is we think that we can achieve that outcome. This does not mean that we actually assign numbers to subjective probabilities and pay-offs in order to arrive at a decision. Our decision-making is much more informal than that. Simon (1957) suggested that human beings are neither perfectly rational and

Cognition 175 nor are they irrational in their decision-making. Rather, humans display bounded rationality. The concept of bounded rationality recognises that there are limits on our capacity to make rational decisions. These limits include our cognitive abilities, the amount of relevant information at our disposal, and the amount of time we have to make the decision. Simon described the decision-making strategy humans employ as satisficing. The expected utility model suggests that we examine all possible alternatives and then we select the one that has the highest (subjective) expected utility. In satisficing decision-making, alternatives are examined one by one until we find one that meets our minimum standards. In most cases, examining all options is simply unrealistic. No one buying a house has the time to look at every house on the market. Rather, house-buyers keep looking until they find a house that is satisfactory. Decisions based on a satisficing strategy are by nature often sub-optimal but they are good enough. The rational choice perspective The best-known decision-making model in criminology is Cornish and Clarke’s (1986, 2008) rational choice perspective. Rational choice perspective is an adaptation of the expected utility model, but has also been influenced by control theory, Skinner’s model of operant conditioning, and Simon’s satisficing decision-making model. The rational choice perspective views offenders as utility-maximisers who weigh up the subjective costs and benefits of criminal behaviour when reaching the decision of whether or not to commit a crime. Crime occurs when the perceived benefits of a criminal act outweigh the perceived costs. Rational choice perspective bears similarities to the deterrence model proposed by classical criminologists such as Beccaria and Bentham in the eighteenth century. However, where deterrence theory focuses on the administration of punishment by the criminal justice system, Cornish and Clarke emphasised that much of the information that an offender uses to make a cost–benefit analysis is located in the immediate environment of the potential crime scene. The benefits of crime include the tangible rewards on offer (money, drugs, goods, etc.), the approval of friends, excitement, and so forth; costs include the effort involved in committing the crime (e.g., the presence of locks, bars and other security devices) and the risk of getting caught (e.g., the presence of burglar alarms and surveillance equipment). Cornish and Clarke (2008) identified six core concepts underpinning the rational choice approach. The first is that criminal behaviour is purposive. Offenders commit crime deliberately and with the intention of achieving some outcome. Rational choice perspective rejects the view of crime as the product of irresistible urges, a loss of control, or hidden psychological forces. The instrumental nature of crime is obvious enough for property crimes. However, even crimes that are often portrayed in the media, and by many psychologists and criminologists, as senseless, pathological, or impulsive – vandalism, hooliganism, assault, rape – involve choices and pay-offs for the perpetrator in the form of excitement, revenge, control and sexual gratification.

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Second, criminal behaviour is rational. Not only does the offender commit crime in order to derive a benefit, the decision to commit the crime to achieve that benefit represents the best available option from the perspective of the offender. The behaviour of offenders is comprehensible when viewed in the context of their motives and goals. This does not mean that offenders display perfect rationality. Rather, their rationality is bounded, limited by their background, skills and the turmoil and pressures that characterise many crime scenes. Their decisions may well be poor ones when judged by others, but they are satisficing for the offender given the conditions under which they are made. Third, criminal decision-making is crime-specific. Every crime involves different motives and pay-offs. The choices and decisions involved in committing rape are different from the ones involved in stealing a car or passing a bad cheque. There are even differences within crime categories. The motivations, decisionmaking processes and criminal strategies of professional car thieves are different from those of joy-riders. Understanding crime from a rational choice perspective requires a detailed analysis of what the offender is hoping to achieve. Fourth, the distinction can be made between event decisions and involvement decisions. Event decisions are made about the commission of specific crimes – selecting a target, selecting the location, deciding on the modus operandi, and so on. Involvement decisions are over a longer time-frame and are about the offender’s criminal career with respect to a particular kind of crime – the decision to begin committing that type of crime, to continue committing that crime, and to stop committing that crime. Fifth, there are different stages of involvement. As suggested above, involvement may be divided into three main stages: initiation, habituation and desistance. Each of these stages involves different sorts of motives and decisions. Consider the career of a drug user. The reasons that a person begins to take drugs (curiosity, peer pressure, image, boredom) are different from the reasons that he/she continues to use (habit, enjoyment, lifestyle), and different again from the reasons that finally prompt him/her to give up (arrest, concerns about health, cost, damage to relationships). Sixth, there are different stages of the crime event. Crime is often treated in criminological research as a single data point. A moments thought will reveal that crimes may extend over prolonged periods of time, and involve detailed planning and complex modus operandi. The crime event has a beginning, middle and end, and unfolds in a dynamic fashion. Committing a crime does not involve one decision but there are many decision points throughout the crime-commission process as the offender deals with each new contingency. We examine the stages of an offence in more detail in the final section of this chapter. The rational choice perspective presents a stripped-down psychological model of the offender. The approach focuses solely on the offender as a decision-maker in the here-and-now. No consideration is given to the offender’s background or unique psychological characteristics. The offender is assumed to enter the crime scene already motivated to offend and without any moral scruples or emotional defects that might get in the way of making a rational choice. Of course, Cornish

Cognition 177 and Clarke do not believe that this simplistic portrayal is an accurate psychological profile of offenders. Their aim was to present the most parsimonious (uncluttered) model of offender decision-making. They describe this as ‘good-enough theorising’. In fact, Cornish and Clarke did not regard the rational choice perspective as a theory at all (and hence they are careful not refer to it as rational choice theory). Rather it is a ‘heuristic device or conceptual tool’ (Cornish and Clarke, 2008, p. 24). Their goal was to present a model of offending that is above all useful and accessible to police and other criminal justice practitioners who actually deal with offenders. The rational choice perspective has been extremely influential in the development of situational strategies to prevent crime. If offenders commit crime because the benefits are perceived to outweigh the costs, then redesigning environments in ways that increase the relative costs of crime – by making crime more risky, less rewarding, and more difficult to carry out – has the potential to reduce offending (Clarke, 2008). This strategy is often referred to as opportunity reduction and we will return to this topic in Chapter 9. Research on offender decision-making Information on offender decision-making has been obtained largely through interviews in which offenders are quizzed on the reasoning behind their modus operandi, or through simulations in which offenders respond to scenarios or photographs of potential crime opportunities. Empirical research has been conducted on the decision-making by burglars (Bennett and Wright, 1984; Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Cromwell et al., 1991; Garcia-Retamero and Dhami, 2009; Hochstetler, 2001; Hough, 1987; Nee and Meenaghan, 2006; Walsh, 1986; Wright et al., 1995), robbers (Feeney, 1986; Hochstetler, 2001; Indermaur, 1996; Luckenbill, 1982; Walsh, 1986), shoplifters (Carroll and Weaver, 1986), assaulters (Bennett and Brookman, 2009; Tedeschi and Felson, 1994), child sex offenders (Conte et al., 1989; Elliott et al., 1995; Smallbone and Wortley, 2000), rapists (Bachman et al., 1992; Beauregard and Leclerc, 2007) and drug users (Bennett, 1986). For illustrative purposes, offender decisionmaking will be examined for an example of a property crime (burglary), a violent crime (robbery) and a sexual crime (child sex offending). Burglary The case for rational choice is rather easy to make for property crime because the potential benefits to offenders are self-evident. The most detailed empirical analysis of property crime from the rational choice perspective has been conducted on burglary. Research has focused particularly on burglars’ search strategies and target selection; that is, why they choose some houses for burglary and not others. In a pioneering study, Bennett and Wright (1984) interviewed 316 persistent burglars and showed them videos and photographs of prospective targets. Burglars were categorised into three types:(1) opportunists (7 per cent), unskilled burglars

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who committed burglaries more-or-less on the spur of the moment; (2) planners (10 per cent), highly skilled burglars who informed themselves in advance about the properties that they wanted to burgle; and (3) searchers (76 per cent), burglars with mid-range skills who scanned houses sequentially until they encountered a likely target. All groups, but searchers in particular, looked for visual cues when selecting a target that indicated whether the house was likely to contain valuable goods, whether the house was occupied, whether they could burgle the house without being observed, whether there was easy accessibility, and whether there were security measures in place. The burglars were making rational decisions, albeit bounded ones, choosing houses that promised the greatest rewards but entailed the fewest risks. Subsequent research has confirmed and elaborated upon Bennett and Wright’s findings. Much of this research has attempted to identify just what cues burglars utilise to make their decisions. While there is strong evidence to support the rational choice perspective, findings suggest some variability among burglars (especially when experienced burglars are compared with inexperienced ones) with no one cue consistently indentified as either an invariable deterrent or attractor (Bennett and Wright, 1984, Garcia-Retamero and Dhami, 2009; Hough, 1987; Nee and Meenaghan, 2006; Nee and Taylor, 1988). Level of perceived affluence is generally found to be an important attractor, and is judged by the décor and general upkeep of the house, any visible expensive items, and the type of car that residents own. Signs of occupancy are generally regarded to be a deterrent and are judged by the presence of a car in the drive or whether lights are on. However, some offenders prefer the residents to be home, as long as they are asleep, because it increases the chance that wallets and other personal items will be in the house, and it means that the owners will not return to disturb them. Also generally considered to be important is the layout out the house and the nature of the surroundings. Offenders prefer targets that offer some cover from prying eyes (shrubs and fences), and offer good escape routes (are on an intersection or have a back lane). Perhaps surprisingly, most studies find that locks, dogs, alarms and other security devices have a minimal deterrent effect. Most offenders seem to regard these as occupational hazards that they can overcome. Robbery Robbery is the taking of goods from a victim against his/her will through the use of intimidation or force. Actual or threatened violence used during a robbery may be viewed as instrumental aggression designed to coerce the victim to comply with the robber’s demands. Treating robbery as a series of rational choices, researchers have examined why robbers decide to commit robbery, how they choose a victim, and how they use force to gain compliance. Feeney (1986) interviewed 113 convicted robbers. Over half said that their offence was carried out without any planning and only 5 per cent made detailed plans. Sixty per cent said that prior to the offence they did not consider the possibility of being caught. Fifty-seven per cent were motivated by money or goods,

Cognition 179 24 per cent by other factors such as excitement or to impress friends, and 19 per cent became involved ‘accidentally’ (e.g., they were interrupted during a burglary). Robbery was selected by offenders over alternative crimes such as burglary because it was quicker and yielded a higher return. Particular individuals or establishments were chosen as victims because they were convenient, they looked as if they had money, or they looked to involve little risk. In line with the general lack of planning, few offenders travelled outside of their local neighbourhood or town to commit their crime. Some 80 per cent of robbers used a weapon for intimidation, but about a third of these involved an unloaded or toy gun. Those using a simulated weapon did so in order to avoid accidental injury to the victim during the robbery, or because they believed that they would receive a reduced sentence in the event that they were caught. Where injury to the victim did occur, it was usually associated with victim resistance. While many of the robbery offences examined by Feeney exhibited little detailed planning, the decisions that the offenders made before and during the offence nevertheless demonstrate purposive and rational decision-making. Indermaur (1996) elaborated on the use of force by robbers, and particularly on how violence developed as a function of victim–perpetrator interactions. In interviews with 88 convicted robbers, Indermaur found that the way that the robbery progressed depended upon the reactions of the victim. Robbers talked about the need to establish quickly an air of intimidation and so many offenders used violence strategically before demanding money. Violence escalated if victims resisted. Not only did offenders need to reassert their authority in order to complete the robbery, but defiance by the victim was considered to be an affront and offenders reacted with ‘righteous indignation’. Child sex offending Sex offenders, and particularly those who offend against children, are widely assumed to possess motivations that are pathological and long-standing. Their offending is largely portrayed as internally driven, the result of irresistible sexual urges. However, in recent years a number of studies have challenged the stereotypic assumptions about the ‘irrationality’ of child sex offenders. It is now clear that many offenders do not begin sexually offending until a relatively late age. Smallbone and Wortley (2004b) reported a mean onset age of 32 years, around the age when men typically have greater access to children through child care duties and as volunteers in youth organisations. Additionally, child sexual offending has a relatively low recidivism rate – around 13 per cent after five years according to Hanson and Bussiere’s (1998) meta-analysis – much lower than would be expected from individuals irresistibly driven to offend. It seems that detection and its consequences are sufficient to deter the overwhelming majority of offenders. As distasteful as we may find the behaviour of child sex offenders, it is nevertheless interpretable within a rational choice framework. Child sex offending is purposive, and within the terms of reference of offenders, rational. Conte et al., (1989) interviewed 20 adult males who had sexually offended against children. Participants were in treatment and most (17) were serial offenders

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with up to 40 victims. Offenders expressed clear preferences for the types of victims that they targeted. While some of their preferred characteristics were to do with things that they found to be physically attractive – for example, that the child was pretty, or was wearing certain types of clothes – the overriding consideration was to find a compliant child who was unlikely to tell others about the offence. They particularly looked for children who were trusting, vulnerable, quiet, withdrawn and lacking in confidence. Children who came from unhappy homes or those who had few friends were seen as likely targets. Often young children were chosen, not so much because they were considered to be more attractive, but because they were seen as easier to manipulate and less likely to talk. Experienced child sex offenders do not offend randomly. On the contrary, they carefully select vulnerable children who offer least resistance and pose fewest risks. The strategies used by offenders to gain victim compliance – often referred to as grooming – similarly display rational decision-making and sometimes patient planning. Smallbone and Wortley (2000) interviewed 182 convicted child sex offenders, asking detailed questions about their modus operandi. The use of overt coercions or violence by offenders to gain compliance was very rare. Offenders typically built non-sexual, emotional bonds with victims prior to engaging in sexual contact. Most perpetrators invested a lot of time with the child, touching him/her non-sexually (67 per cent), giving him/her a lot of attention (65 per cent), and playing with him/her (57 per cent). In most cases, sexual contact was introduced gradually. The perpetrator said nice things about the child (51 per cent), touched him/her sexually more and more (49 per cent), and talked lovingly to him/ her (45 per cent). Similarly, offenders relied on the emotional bonds established with the child to prevent disclosure of the abuse. The most commonly used methods of keeping a child from disclosing was saying he (the offender) would go to jail or get into trouble if the child told anyone (61 per cent), and relying on the child not wanting to lose the offender because of the affection he provided (36 per cent).

Schemas and scripts Utility-based decision models, even those recognising the bounded nature of rationality like rational choice perspective, portray decisions as a deliberative process involving the conscious weighing-up of various alternatives. Engaging in such conscious deliberations for every decision we have to make in our lives, however, would be laborious, inefficient and time-consuming. Earlier in the chapter the distinction was made between automatic and non-automatic cognitive processes. Deliberative decision-making is a non-automatic process that is most likely to occur when making new decisions involving unfamiliar data. When making routine judgements and decisions that we have made many times before, we are likely to use an automatic process involving cognitive constructs called schemas and scripts (see Augoustinos et al., 2006; Fiske and Taylor, 1991).

Cognition 181 What are schemas? Schemas are content-based cognitive structures that contain learned information about a specific domain. Schemas comprise our assumptions and expectations about a social category. They provide us with a store of general knowledge we have acquired about a person, group or event that helps us deal efficiently with new situations involving that person, group or event. Drawing on existing schema, we can rapidly interpret familiar social stimuli, fill in any gaps, and make predictions and judgements without needing to resort to deliberative decision-making. Unless we encounter something unexpected that disconfirms our prior assumptions, the schema becomes our default position on which we base our subsequent behaviour. There are different types of schemas. Person schemas refer to our psychological understanding of particular individuals. Our preconceived ideas about people we know (either personally or through the media) help us make inferences about the motives for their behaviour and to form expectation of how they will behave in new situations. Self-schemas contain the assumptions we make about ourselves. They provide us with our self-concept and sense of identity. Role schemas contain the expectations that we have about people according to their social position or category. Some roles are achieved by people. We expect doctors, soldiers and teachers each to have certain characteristics and to behave in certain ways. Other roles are ascribed to people. We have role schema for all sorts of social categories such as those based on gender (men/women), race (black/white) and age (old/ young). The dark side of role schemas is stereotyping and prejudice. All the accumulated assumptions that people have about themselves and the world are collected and organised into schemas. Where these schemas involve distorted assumptions they may contribute to criminal behaviour. For example, a self-schema that includes beliefs such as ‘I can’t control my sexual urges’, and a gender schema that includes beliefs such as ‘women really enjoy having forced sex’, may facilitate the behaviour of a rapist. Further, the concept of schemas suggests that many of the decisions of experienced offenders are made ‘off the top of the head’ rather than as a conscious rational choice. For example, research shows that experienced burglars – in comparison to novice burglars, police, homeowners and students – make very rapid, efficient and consistent judgements about which houses are suitable for burglary (Garcia-Retamero and Dhami, 2009; Logie et al., 1992; Nee and Meenaghan, 2006; Nee and Taylor, 2000; Taylor and Nee, 1988; Wright et al., 1995). Through practice, burglars develop a ‘suitable house to burgle’ schema that guides their decisions about target selection. Likewise, experienced rapists will have a ‘suitable rape victim’ schema, robbers will have a ‘suitable robbery victim’ schema, and so on. Crime scripts A script is a particular type of schema called an event schema. An event schema contains the appropriate behavioural sequence required for everyday activities.

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The most commonly cited example of an event schema is the restaurant script (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Without having to consciously deliberate, we know that eating at a restaurant requires us to enter the restaurant, wait to be seated, order from the menu, wait for the food, eat the food, pay the bill and leave. Cornish (1994) has taken the concept of an event schema and has used it to describe the different stages of the crime event. As described by Cornish and Clarke: [Crime scripts] are step-by-step accounts of the procedures used by offenders to commit particular crime. Crime scripts are designed to help identify every stage of the crime-commission process, the decisions and actions that must be taken at each stage, and the resources – such as criminal cast, props and suitable locations – required for effective action at each step. By providing a template that outlines the necessary steps involved in any kind of successful offending, crime scripts can reveal the rationality in even ostensibly ‘senseless’ crimes, and the complexities of even simple ones. (2008, pp. 31–2) Scripts come at different levels of abstraction. From the most general to the most specific, these levels are metascript, protoscript, script and script track (Abelson, 1981; Cornish, 1994; Gioia and Poole, 1984). For example, a general crime category, such as property crime, has a metascript that contains few specific details. Moving to the next level of specificity, a particular category of property crime, say, auto-theft, has a protoscript that outlines a general template for that category of crime. A specific type of auto-theft, for example, taking a car for temporary use (as opposed to selling it for parts), has a script that sets out in detail the precise steps an offender needs to take. Finally, the particular form that the temporary use of a car takes, for example, using it to get home from the city late at night (as opposed to joyriding), is a script track that involves distinct motives and methods. With each step down the hierarchy, the scripts become richer in content. Like Russian dolls, each level in the hierarchy subsumes the next level down. Crime scripts are a relatively new concept in criminology but protoscripts have been developed for numerous types of crime, including joy-riding (Cornish, 1994), burglary (Cornish and Clarke, 2008), child sex offending (Leclerc et al., in press), terrorism (Clarke and Newman, 2006), organised crime (Hancock and Laycock, 2010), professional car theft (Morselli and Roy, 2008; Tremblay et al., 2001), sexual assault of a stranger (Beauregard et al., 2007), vandalism (Cornish, 1994) and fraud (Lacoste and Tremblay, 2003). By way of illustration, the protoscript developed by Cornish and Clarke (2008) for burglary is shown in Figure 8.1. Of course, the precise script adopted by a particular offender will be more detailed than the protoscript and scripts are likely to vary from one offender to another. Crimes that go according to script can be performed as ‘mindless’, routinised behaviour. The more practised the offender is in a particular crime, the less conscious decision-making he/she needs to do at the various stages. For example, Nee and Meenaghan (2006) reported that three-quarters of their sample

Cognition 183

Figure 8.1 Protoscript for burglary. Source: Adapted from Cornish and Clarke (2008).

of experienced burglars actually used terms like ‘automatic’, ‘routine’, ‘second nature’, and ‘instinctive’ when describing their burglary strategies. Similarly, the robbers in Indermaur’s (1996) study talked about not thinking during their robbery and acting on instinct. For cognitive psychologists, it is the automatic nature of scripts that is of theoretical interest. For criminologists, crime scripts are tools that can assist them devise ways to disturb the routine nature of offending. By setting out all the steps in the crime-commission process, crime scripts give

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crime-prevention practitioners multiple points of intervention. Disrupting any point in the script changes the routine behavioural sequence, and in the best-case scenario, the crime may be prevented.

Conclusion and evaluation Psychology was defined in Chapter 1 as the scientific study of behaviour and mental processes. For over fifty years from the beginning of the twentieth century scant attention was paid to the ‘mental processes’ part of this definition. There is little doubt that the resurgent interest in cognition has invigorated psychology and enriched our understanding of how human beings operate. Humans, including those who commit crimes, think. Part of our understanding of offenders must include an examination of the way that they think and the role that their thinking plays in their crimes. This is not to say that the thorny theoretical and philosophical issues which are raised by cognition, and which were responsible for early behaviourists discarding the concept in the first place, have been fully resolved. Whether mental processes exist as separate phenomena from electrical activity and neurotransmitter secretions in the brain is a matter of ongoing debate. Relatedly, the extent to which conscious mental activity plays a causal role in behaviour also remains contentious. But leaving these issues aside, having cognition as part of a descriptive model of behaviour has proven to be enormously useful. Cognitive processes are proximal elements in behaviour that provide access to the current psychological functioning of an individual. It is only via an individual’s cognitions that we can learn about the way that he/she perceives and interprets the world. In a therapeutic context, cognition gives clinicians access to immediate factors in the stimulus-behavioural chain. People may develop faulty patterns of behaviour for all sorts of historical reasons. However, changing the way an individual currently thinks about events can change those behavioural patterns. Based on this principle, cognitive behavioural therapy has become the dominant model in clinical psychology and the therapy of choice with offenders. In the crime prevention context, the way that offenders make decisions about committing crime has provided the basis for situational interventions designed to influence the choices that they make. By systematically examining the reasons individuals decide to commit crime, why they select certain targets for crime and not others, and their adoption of particular modus operandi, potential crime scenes can be redesigned in ways that make crime more difficult and/or risky to carry out. Our investigation of offender cognition has taken us into the crime scene. The focus on the role in crime of environmental factors at the crime scene is continued in Chapter 9.

9

Situations

Criminology has been defined as the scientific study of crime and criminals. However, most traditional criminological theories involve the study of criminals. They seek to explain how biological factors, developmental experiences and/or social forces create criminality. The occurrence of crime is understood largely as an expression of the offender’s deviance, which may be a function of distant events that occurred many years beforehand. Once criminality has been explained, many theorists take the view that the theoretical task has been accomplished. Criminals will inevitably commit crime; we just need to wait for them to do so. In contrast, it has been emphasised in this book that criminal behaviour must be understood in terms of the person–situation interaction. Crime may be committed by individuals who do not have entrenched criminal dispositions. And even where offenders might be regarded as ‘real’ criminals, they do not offend randomly; they commit particular crimes in particular contexts. We require not just theories of criminality but also theories that explain why offenders commit crimes when and where they do. This requires a shift from an examination of the distal causes of criminality to an examination of the proximal causes of crime. The examination of situational influences on criminal behaviour was begun in the previous two chapters. In those chapters, situations were viewed largely through the eyes of the offender, that is, we examined the way that individuals interpret and react to their personal environment. The situational factors contributing to crime tended to be specific to the individual, based on his/her particular learning history and/or cognitive style. In this chapter we work in the other direction, beginning with situational factors and examining their impact on individuals. Theories that examine situations in this way tend to be concerned with the way that immediate environments affect people generally rather than with individual differences in situational effects. Two psychological perspectives – social psychology and environmental psychology – are dedicated to the examination of the effects on behaviour of the immediate environment. Social psychology focuses on the social environment, examining the psychological effects on individuals of the presence of others. Environmental psychology focuses on the physical environment, examining the psychological effects on individuals of factors associated with built and natural environment. A third perspective, this time from criminology, is also relevant to the analysis of situations, and that is the focus on

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opportunity. Opportunity theories – which may examine both social and physical environmental factors – simply assert that crime occurs where it can occur, a principle summed up in the well-known saying ‘opportunity makes the thief ’. Before examining these three perspectives, we will have a closer look at just what a ‘situation’ is.

What is a situation? A situation is the setting in which behaviour occurs. Situations have both spatial and temporal dimensions: they are specific locations at particular points in time. Situational factors include tangible elements such as the physical aspects of the immediate environment and the behaviour of the people who are present. Somewhat less tangibly, situations can also refer to a state of affairs or set of circumstances at a given moment. A funeral and a wedding, for example, both may involve friends and relatives packed into a church, but the behaviour of the respective congregations will be shaped by the circumstances of the occasion. A clearer idea of what a situation is can be gained by examining the ways in which the term has been operationalised in psychological and criminological research. Levels of situational analysis One issue confronting researchers is to define where a situation starts and finishes, that is, how big is it? Addressing this problem, Brantingham and Brantingham (1991) developed a typology of immediate environments comprising three levels of analysis: macro, meso and micro. Macro-level analyses refer to highly aggregated entities such as whole cities or even counties, states and countries. Some of the earliest research in criminology examined the effect of macro-level environments on crime. In the late 1820s, Andre-Michel Guerry and Adolphe Quetelet independently conducted detailed analyses of French crime statistics (see Beirne, 1993). They produced the first recognisable examples of crime maps, depicting crime rates for the provinces of France. Guerry and Quetelet found that crime was not evenly distributed across the country, and that the distribution varied according to the crime in question. Violent crime was highest in poorer rural areas while property crime was highest in wealthy, industrialised areas. From these finding they reasoned that property crime was not caused by poverty, but rather that wealthy provinces had more property crime because there was more to steal. That is, variation in crime rates could be explained by environmental features of different districts. Whether someone lived in the city or country was a macro-situational influence on his/her potential to commit crime. Meso-level environments refer to subareas of a city, ranging from suburbs down to individual streets and addresses. Crime is never evenly distributed throughout a given city but clusters in ‘hotspots’ around certain suburbs, streets and premises. The concentration of crime is an example of the 80/20 rule – a few pubs, for example, account for most pub violence (Block and Block, 1995; Homel

Situations 187 and Clark, 1994). Crime rates also vary over the course of the day, by days of the week, and throughout the year. In the case of pub violence, peaks occur on Friday and Saturday nights (Finney, 2004). Crime patterns will vary for different sorts of crime; hotspots for pub violence will be different from hotspots for burglary. Meso-level analyses are concerned with identifying the geographic and sociodemographic characteristics of the locations in which hotspots occur that account for their disproportionate share of particular crimes. Crime hotspots are the logical places to direct policing and crime prevention resources. Micro environments refer to features of the site in which behaviour is performed. At this level of analysis, the focus is on the relationship between specific elements of the immediate environment and specific decisions and behaviours of individuals. Psychologists are particularly interested in the role of micro environments in behaviour. Many psychologists take an approach to behavioural analyses referred to as reductionism. Reductionism involves the analysis of complex systems by breaking them down into their smaller constituent parts. From this perspective, the more specific and concrete the identified situational influence is the better. The bell that caused Pavlov’s dog to salivate is an example of a micro-environmental element. In terms of crime, micro-environmental elements include ‘building type and its placement, landscaping and lighting, interior form, and security hardware’ (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991, pp. 21–2). C. Ray Jeffery (1971), in his seminal book, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, is credited with being the first theorist to articulate in a comprehensive way the implications for crime of micro environments. Jeffery argued that the key to crime control was through the redesign of crime-prone environments that systematically eliminated their criminogenic features. Ways of conceptualising situational effects There is no one theory to describe the effect that situations have on behaviour. Many psychological perspectives include an explicit or implicit role for situational factors, and different theoretical perspectives conceptualise the role of situations in different ways. This section summarises the various ways that the situation–behaviour relationship has been explained. Situations as a source of social influence Human beings are social animals and were designed by evolution to live in small, cohesive social groups. In ancestral communities, acceptance by other members of the group was essential for survival. Evolution has equipped humans with altruistic predispositions that encourage cooperative relationships with in-group members. We are profoundly influenced by the expectations and demands that are placed upon us in the course of our interactions and affiliations with other members of our species. The opinions and reactions of others are important to us. We may perform behaviours (including crime) through a sense of obligation and loyalty; to fit in and win approval; and to maintain harmony and avoid giving offence.

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Equally, human social groups are also competitive and hierarchical. Members struggle for power and status within the group. Insults and other threats to status, particularly for males, call for behavioural responses – that may involve violence – that will restore the individual’s standing in the group. Situations as a source of moral guidance The human conscience is highly malleable and sensitive to the physical and social context in which behaviour is performed. Given the right circumstances, ordinary individuals are often capable of great brutality. While we might like to think that we are guided by a fixed moral compass, in fact we often we rely on the feedback from the environment for guidelines for correct behaviour. Situational factors can facilitate moral disengagement by obscuring the link between an individual’s behaviour and its negative outcomes. The situational context can help shield individuals from the full consequences of their actions. The more remote an action is from its consequence, the easier it is for the consequences to be ignored or minimised. For example, it is psychologically easier to imagine dropping a bomb on a village from an aircraft than it is to imagine personally slaughtering each villager. In addition, situations can help individuals minimise their responsibility for the consequences of their behaviour. Individuals may blame alcohol, circumstances, or social systems for their actions. One of the defences offered by Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann at his trial was that although he organised the transport that took the Jews to the concentration camps he did not personally kill anyone. He was just a cog in a machine. Situations as a source of behavioural priming Priming refers to the unconscious activation by an environmental stimulus of emotions, thoughts or behaviours. Priming effects are described in classical conditioning as well as cognitive psychology. According to classical conditioning principles, environmental cues – conditioned or unconditioned stimuli – elicit involuntary, reflex reactions. For example, viewing sexually explicit images increases sexual arousal and this primes the individual for sexual behaviour (and sometimes sexual offending). Cognitive models explain priming in terms of the automatic activation of cognitive structures such as schemas (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). For example, the weapons effect (Chapter 7) has been explained as both a product of classical conditioning (Berkowitz and LePage, 1967) and as a cognitive process (Anderson et al., 1998). According to the cognitive approach, exposure to weapons and other symbols of violence increases access to aggression-related thoughts that are stored in longterm memory and that prime the individual for violence. Situations as a source of aversive physiological arousal Situations can be sources of frustration, provocation and stress that threaten an individual’s well-being and increase his/her physiological arousal. Aversive

Situations 189 arousal-inducing experiences include being thwarted, constrained, insulted, threatened, annoyed, overwhelmed and discomforted. Physiological arousal prepares the individual for a flight or fight response as a means of managing or adapting to noxious conditions and events. Aversive physiological arousal may be accompanied by emotional responses such as irritability, anxiety and depression, and behavioural responses such as aggression, withdrawal and suicide. The extent to which aversive situational experiences affect an individual is moderated by the individual’s appraisal of that situation. Events that are regarded as stressful by one person may be regarded as non-stressful to another. Similarly, even when an event is judged to be stressful, some people have more effective coping skills to manage the resultant stress than do others. Situations as a source of anticipated consequences Situations provide individuals with information about the likely outcomes of their behaviours. It is this view that underpins operant conditioning, social cognitive theory and the rational choice perspective. While these approaches differ in fundamental ways, they all share the assumption that behaviour is goal-directed. People perform behaviour in order to obtain rewards, and refrain from performing behaviour in order to avoid punishments. The immediate environment contains the data required by an individual to select between behaviours that will deliver rewarding or punishing outcomes. Whether these data are interpreted as discriminative stimuli, expectancy cues, or in terms of expected utility, behaviour is seen to be governed by its anticipated consequences. Precipitating and facilitating situations Examining the various ways outlined above in which situations can affect behaviour, two broad types of situational forces can be identified (Wortley, 2001, 2008). Some situations affect behaviour by precipitating action. Situational precipitators actively induce individuals to perform behaviour that they may not have otherwise contemplated. Other situations affect behaviour by facilitating action. Facilitating environments encourage or permit individuals to proceed with behaviour that they are predisposed to perform. Consider the case of a young man – let us call him Jim – who arranges to meet his friends at a local nightclub for an evening out. He arrives at the club in good spirits anticipating an enjoyable night. However, when he arrives at the front door, the doorman is surly and belligerent towards him before eventually allowing him to go inside. When he enters the nightclub, he discovers it is packed to capacity. After fighting his way through the crowd, he finally locates his friends. There are no tables or chairs left and they are forced stand in the corner with people jostling around them. The music is at full volume and continues without a break, making it impossible to carry on a conversation. The air conditioning cannot cope with the crowd and the room is hot, dark and oppressive. Jim and his friends drink steadily. However, getting to the bar is an ordeal and it can take half an hour to get served.

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As Jim struggles back from the bar with the latest round of drinks, another patron bumps him and knocks the drinks all over him. Jim’s friends urge him to retaliate and hit the man. That Jim is at the point of contemplating assault is the result of an accumulation of precipitating events. Since he arrived at the nightclub, he has experienced a series of stresses and frustrations that have primed him for aggression. This has been compounded by his alcohol intake, which has lowered his inhibitions, and by the social pressure not to back down in front of his friends. The spilled drinks were the final straw. Had these events not occurred, then the confrontation with the other patron would not have arisen. However, whether Jim now carries through with the assault is subject to a different set of situational considerations. Perhaps Jim sees a security guard out of the corner of his eye and decides it is too risky to fight. Or perhaps the other man is much bigger than Jim, or is surrounded by his friends, and Jim judges that he will come off worse in a physical encounter. Whether or not Jim ultimately commits assault depends upon whether he judges that he is safely able to do so. Precipitating and facilitating factors differ in two main ways. First, precipitating events occur prior to the contemplated behaviour; the facilitating characteristics of the situation concern the events that are likely to follow the contemplated behaviour (see Figure 9.1). The stresses and pressures Jim experienced are antecedents of action; consideration of whether the security staff will swoop if he throws a punch is to do with the consequences of that action. Second, precipitating events supply or intensify the motivation for behaviour; facilitating considerations

Figure 9.1 The relationship between precipitators and facilitators of crime.

Situations 191 are relevant after the person is already motivated to act. Jim became aggressive as a direct consequence of his experiences in the nightclub; the assessment of whether or not to proceed with the assault is only activated once the motivation to commit assault was present. We turn now to examine three perspectives that are concerned primarily with the role of situational factors in behaviour: social psychology, environmental psychology and opportunity theories. Social psychology and environmental psychology focus largely on the role of precipitating events; opportunity theories focus on the role of facilitating environments.

Social psychology Social psychology is the study of the way people influence one another. A great deal of our behaviour is governed by immediate social settings. We behave differently in the company of others than we do when we are alone. The social psychology of crime has focused particularly on social influences that interfere with moral judgements and allow good people to do evil things. This phenomenon has been called the Lucifer Effect (Zimbardo, 2007), a reference to the supposed transformation of God’s favourite angel, Lucifer, into the devil. In this section we examine the tendency for individuals to conform to group norms, to obey the instructions of authority figures, to comply with or defy requests and persuasive arguments, and to submerge their identity within the group. Conformity Conformity is the tendency for individuals in groups to adopt group norms and standards of behaviour, even when these contradict personally held beliefs and values. Asch (1955) provided the classic laboratory demonstration of social conformity. He devised an experiment that involved embedding a naïve subject in a group of seven to nine confederate subjects. The group was shown two cards, one on which was drawn three lines of different lengths, and the other on which was drawn a single line equal in length to one of the three lines. Subjects were required to identify the matching line on the first card and announce their judgements publicly to the group. Pretesting with other subjects showed that the correct answer was obvious. However, in the experimental condition, all of the confederate subjects went first and publicly gave the wrong answer. Asch found that over three-quarters of naïve subjects conformed to the group and nominated the obviously incorrect response. In a variation of the experiment, in which the naïve subject was permitted to write down his/her response after hearing the confederates’ wrong answer, conformity fell to just 12.5 per cent. Asch concluded that there were two factors inducing conformity. The first was informational social influence. Some subjects actually believed that the group answer was correct and that their perception must be wrong. The second and more powerful factor was normative social influence. Most subjects who gave the wrong answer did so for fear of censure or ridicule by

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the group. Note, by the way, that conformity is different from modelling. In modelling, the individual willingly emulates the behaviour of others, while in conformity the individual feels pressured to follow the example of others. The conformity effect suggests that offenders may commit crimes in order to avoid social disapproval and to gain group acceptance. In particular, most delinquent behaviour is performed in groups, and peer pressure to conform to subcultural norms is commonly agreed to be an important factor (Harkins and Dixon, 2010; McGloin and Piquero, 2009; Warr, 2002; Warr and Stafford, 1991). Conformity is particularly strong within gangs and may be strengthened by the use of gang insignia (Quinn and Forsyth, 2009) as well as explicit intimidation and violence (Decker, 1996; Padilla, 1995). Conformity can also induce illegal behaviour in otherwise law-abiding adults. For example, a new employee entering an organisation in which corrupt practices are common faces social pressures from co-workers to also engage in those practices and may come to accept those practices as normal (Altheide et al., 1978; Clark and Hollinger, 1983; Horning, 1970; Jaspan, 1974). Obedience Obedience is the following of a direct command issued by someone perceived to possess legitimate authority. In a classic series of studies, Milgram (1974) explored the willingness of individuals to comply with commands to inflict harm on others. In the prototype study, a subject was strapped into an electrified chair, while in an adjoining room another subject was placed before a shock generator. This second subject was told that the purpose of the experiment was to examine the effects of punishment on learning, and was instructed to deliver electric shocks as punishment whenever the first subject got an answer wrong. In reality, the first subject was a confederate who deliberately gave wrong answers, and the shock generator was phoney. Even when the confederate subject screamed and begged in apparent agony, almost two-thirds of the naïve subjects continued with the experiment and administered the maximum ‘shock’ levels. Milgram conducted a number of variations on the original study. He found that obedience could be manipulated by varying the situational conditions. Levels of obedience varied with the psychological closeness between the subject and the victim. For example, if the subject moved next to the victim, obedience decreased. If the victim remained silent and did not scream, obedience increased. Obedience also varied according to the level of authority conveyed by the experimenter. When the experimenter stood next to the subject, he exerted a stronger influence and was more likely to be obeyed. Obedience to authority has been widely used to explain atrocities perpetrated by military regimes, such as the extermination of Jews by the Nazis (Milgram, 1974) and the My Lai massacre by US soldiers during the Vietnam War (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989). However, inappropriate obedience can also play a role in crimes in civilian contexts. Corruption within bureaucracies often involves subordinates who act illegally on the orders of superiors, motivated by a misguided

Situations 193 loyalty to the organisation. According to Beau and Buckley (2004), leaders may encourage obedience by presenting illegal conduct to subordinates as morally justified action, thus assisting subordinates to utilise moral disengagements. Examples of crimes of authority include cases of governmental abuses of power (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989) corporate crime (ibid.), police corruption (Fitzgerald, 1989) and prison officer brutality (Nagle, 1978). Compliance and defiance Compliance refers to the acquiescence to the direct request of others. Compliance is similar to conformity and obedience in that the compliant individual is induced to perform behaviour that he/she would rather not perform. However, compliance is usually concerned with the role of persuasive communication in inducing behaviourchange rather than direct pressure. A number of techniques have been found to increase compliance. Compliance with rules increases when people feel that they have contributed to the formulation of those rules. For example, Snyder et al. (1991) found that company theft was reduced when employees are consulted about what constitutes legitimate and illegitimate use of company goods. Similarly, compliance increases when people have actively endorsed a given rule. Iso-Ahola and Niblock (in Roggenbuck, 1992) found that when campers were asked to sign an anti-littering petition, levels of littering decreased. Generally, too, requests made in person are more effective than impersonal requests (Oliver et al., 1985). Encouraging compliance is an important factor in face-to-face interactions between potential offenders and official guardians such as police, security guards, nightclub crowd controllers and correctional officers. In many cases these personnel cannot rely solely on their delegated authority to secure compliance, but rather must utilise their personal legitimacy and interpersonal skills. Requests and commands are more likely to be followed if they are perceived as fair, consistent and legitimate (Bottoms et al., 1995; Lombardo, 1989; Sparks et al., 1996). The flip side of compliance is defiance. According to Brehm’s (1966) theory of reactance, when people feel that they are being manipulated or forced to comply with a request, they may respond by behaving in the opposite direction. Reactance is the psychological state experienced by people when they believe that their freedom of choice is being restricted. The expression of defiance restores their sense of personal freedom. Thus, when attempts to control behaviour are seen as heavy-handed, illegitimate, or manipulative, they may well be counterproductive and lead to outcomes opposite to those intended, including the performance of antisocial and delinquent behaviour (Bushman and Stack, 1996; Goodstein et al., 1984; Martin and Osgood, 1987; Sherman, 1993). The vandalising of public signs prohibiting certain behaviours is a classic example of defiance. Deindividuation Being a member of a group or crowd can create a sense of reduced self-awareness and induce a state of psychological disinhibition known as deindividuation

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(Diener, 1980; Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1982; Prentice-Dunn and Spivey, 1986; Zimbardo, 1970). Deindividuation interferes with two levels of selfawareness – public self-awareness and private self-awareness (Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1982). Public self-awareness refers to the recognition of oneself as a social object. As a member of a crowd, an individual is afforded a degree of anonymity and becomes less concerned with the opinions and possible censure of others. At this level of deindividuation, people may be aware of what they are doing but have a reduced expectation of suffering any negative consequences. Demonstrating this effect, Zimbardo (1970) abandoned a car in New York and another in Palo Alto (population about 55,000). The car in New York was quickly stripped by looters of all valuable parts while the car in Palo Alto was left untouched. Zimbardo argued that the behaviour of New Yorkers could be explained by the anonymity they felt in living in a large city and the relative freedom from social and legal repercussions such anonymity provided. More recently, Silke (2003) analysed the dynamics of interpersonal assaults in Northern Ireland. He found that when perpetrators wore masks that hid their identities, the levels of violence used in the attacks escalated. Private self-awareness refers to the ability to focus on one’s own thoughts, feelings and values. As individuals become immersed in a group, they submerge their identities and experience a decreased ability to self-monitor their behaviour. In this state, their capacity for self-regulation is fundamentally impaired. Individuals are particularly sensitive to situational pressures and may permit themselves to engage in collective behaviour that they would never contemplate performing on their own. This level of deindividuation is most likely to occur in groups that are characterised by high cohesiveness and high arousal, as exemplified by the herd mentality and frenzied behaviour displayed by members of a ‘lynch-mob’ (Colman, 1991; Leader et al., 2007; Prentice-Dunn and Spivey, 1986). Perhaps the best-known empirical demonstration of deindividuation is the Stanford prison study (Haney et al., 1973; Haney and Zimbardo, 1998; Zimbardo, 2004). This research involved the creation of a simulated prison in the basement of Stanford University. Male college student volunteers were recruited to play the parts of prisoners and guards. Participants were screened to ensure that they had no pre-existing psychological problems, and their allocation to prisoner or guard roles was randomly determined. Zimbardo and his colleagues found that shortly into the experiment both groups began displaying pathological behaviours. The guards harassed the inmates, deprived them of sleep, hosed them with fireextinguishers, forced them to do push-ups (while sometimes standing on the prisoners’ backs), and locked dissenters in solitary confinement. The prisoners became servile and showed signs of psychological distress. The study, which was planned to go for two weeks, was abandoned after six days because of concerns for the psychological welfare of participants, and after the prisoners began to plan a mass escape. The guards’ uniforms, which included reflecting sunglasses, provided a disguise for their wearers that helped submerge their individuality and promote a sense of group cohesion and collective identity. The inmates’ uniform, in contrast, was humiliating and dehumanising; the use of numbers rather than names stripped

Situations 195 away personal identity; the dependency of inmates on guards for daily needs was emasculating and promoted helplessness. The results of the Stanford prison experiment have been used to explain the abuses of power that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2003 (Lankford, 2009; Zimbardo, 2007). In that case, US soldiers guarding the prison punched, sexually abused, urinated on, threatened and tortured detainees, and forced them to perform degrading acts such as wearing women’s underwear on their heads, engaging in simulated sex acts with one another, and acting like dogs. Zimbardo (2007) argued that the behaviour of the soldiers could not be understood in terms of individual pathology, but as a consequence of the physical and social dynamics of the prison that promoted deindividuation. The atrocities of Abu Ghraib were not the result of a few rotten apples; rather, it was the barrel that was rotten.

Environmental psychology Environmental psychology is ‘the study of the interrelationship between behaviour and experience and the built and natural environment’ (Bell et al., 1990, p. 7). Environmental psychologists are concerned with the psychological effects of geographic and climatic variables such as temperature, sunshine, wind and humidity; and of the unintended consequences of urbanisation, including the effects of high-density living, workplace noise, artificial lighting and interior design. Many of the harmful effects of the environment that might lead to crime are interpreted within the environmental stress model (Baum et al., 1981). Taken individually, environmental stressors may be little more than background irritation; however, collectively and cumulatively, ambient noxious stimulation can seriously affect psychological functioning and, in particular, lead to violent responses. Three elements of environmental psychology are covered here: atmospheric conditions, crowding and territoriality. Atmospheric conditions The relationship between behaviour and atmospheric conditions has been a major interest of environmental psychologists. At a macro-level of analysis, there has been a long tradition in explaining the development of civilisations in terms of the benefits of conducive climates (Huntington, 1915), or in using climate to explain variations in culture and national character (Mills, 1934). At a more immediate level of analysis, daily weather conditions and the changing seasons have been used to help explain variations in behaviour within a given population. The effects of temperature on behaviour have been of particular interest. Laboratory studies suggest that as the temperature moves outside an individual’s comfort zone, there is some deterioration on a number of performance variables (vigilance, memory, cognitive tasks, etc.) (Fine and Kobrick, 1987; Riley and Cochran, 1984). With respect to social behaviour, curvilinear relationships have been found between temperature and aggression (Baron and Bell, 1975; Bell, 2005; Cohn and Rotton, 1997, 2005; Hipp et al., 2004). It seems that moderately

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warm and moderately cool temperatures increase aggression but extremely hot and extremely cold temperatures reduce them. Aggression, then, is facilitated within critical temperature bands. One explanation for this finding is that while people become more irritable when the temperature is uncomfortable, at some point heat has a debilitating effect while cold reduces arousal. These laboratory findings have been supported by studies on the relationship between temperature and crime rates. A number of studies have reported a correlation between outside temperature and violent crime (Anderson, 1987; Anderson et al., 1997; Cotton, 1986; Harries and Stadler, 1988). Goranson and King (1970) showed that riots were more likely to occur during heat waves. Atlas (1984) reported that assault rates in prisons are lower for air-conditioned areas and areas with easy access to showers than for areas where no relief from high temperatures is provided. In addition to temperature, other atmospheric conditions have also been examined. LeBeau (1994) reported a relationship between domestic disputes and the temperature-humidity index. Banzinger and Owens (1978) found a correlation between wind speed and delinquency. Rotton and Frey (1985) reported an association between air pollution levels and violent crime. In a field-observation study, Homel and Clark (1994) found that nightclub violence correlated with a range of aggravating environmental features such as the amount of cigarette smoke, lack of ventilation and poor lighting. Much of the early research on the effects of atmospheric conditions was based on the assumption of a direct effect of climatic variables on psychological functioning, as per the environmental stress model. More recent research has explored indirect effects. According to this line of research, changes in weather and the seasons cause changes in social activity and it is this which accounts for increases in antisocial behaviour. For example, a number of researchers have found that burglary was most likely to occur in pleasant weather (Cohn and Rotton, 2000; Hipp et al., 2004). It is argued that when the weather is fine, people are more likely to go on excursions away from home, and this leaves domestic dwellings unguarded and vulnerable to burglary. Similarly, McLean (2007) found that the incidence of sexual assault increased with the maximum daily temperature and hours of sunshine. According to McLean, the most likely explanation for these findings was that long, sunny days increased levels of socialisation and therefore also increased opportunities for sexual assault. Crowding Crowding research is concerned with the psychological consequences of high density conditions. Foundational evidence for the harmful effects of crowding has come from animal research. In both natural and laboratory environments, many animal species have been found to have a critical upper threshold for population concentration. In a classic study, Calhoun (1962) examined the behaviour of rats who were confined to a fixed-sized environment but who were otherwise provided with unlimited resources (food, water and nesting material). As the rat population

Situations 197 increased, the social order disintegrated and a multitude of physiological and behavioural pathologies developed (abortions, infant mortality, desertion of young, aggression, cannibalism, tumours). In considering the effects of population density on human conduct, a number of important distinctions need to be made. First, outside density can be distinguished from inside density. Outside density refers to broad population trends (e.g., people per acre) while inside density typically relates to primary living areas (e.g., people per dwelling). Research on outside density has produced somewhat inconsistent findings but, in general, high-density urban environments have been found to be associated with increased crime rates (Booth et al., 1976; Galle et al., 1972; Gove et al., 1977; Regoeczi, 2002, 2003; Roncek, 1981; Shichor et al., 1979). Research on inside density has examined the physical, psychological and behavioural problems associated with specific crowded settings such as domestic residences (Regoeczi, 2003; Roncek, 1981), college dormitories (Baum and Valins, 1977), night-clubs (Graham et al., 2006; Macintyre and Homel, 1997), naval ships (Dean et al., 1978) and prisons (Cox et al., 1984; Lahm, 2008; Paulus, 1988; Steiner and Wooldredge, 2009). As a general rule, inside density effects are more pronounced than are outside density effects. Second, a distinction can be made between spatial density (i.e. the amount of space per person) and social density, (i.e. the number of people in a given space). Reducing population density can involve either increasing the amount of space available for a given number of people – reducing spatial density – or decreasing the number of people in a given space – reducing social density. When nightclubs and similar establishments restrict the number of patrons that may enter, they are manipulating social density; when prison administrators build more prisons to alleviate overcrowding, they are manipulating spatial density. Social density may be varied without altering spatial density. For example, a 500 sq metre room with 100 people in it has the same spatial density as, but greater social density than, a 50 sq metre room with 10 people in it. Generally, high social density is more stressful than high spatial density (Baum and Valins, 1977; Cox et al., 1984). Finally, crowding can be distinguished from density. Density is an objective measure of spatial limitation (people in a given area); crowding is the subjective experience of that spatial limitation. Perceptions of spaciousness can be changed architecturally through the effective use of colour, lighting, windows, partitions, interior design and so forth, without altering density (Macintyre and Homel, 1997; Marrero, 1977; Nacci et al., 1977; Paulus and Nagar, 1989). For example, Macintyre and Homel (1997) showed that nightclub violence was related to inefficient floor plans that created jostling among patrons as the paths of those going to the bar intersected with the paths of those going to the toilets. Territoriality Territoriality refers to the behaviours and psychological states associated with the perceived ownership of a physical space. Territorial behaviour includes the tendency to defend claimed areas against intruders. There is an extensive body of

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animal research demonstrating territorial behaviour in many species, including birds, mammals, reptiles and even insects (Edney, 1974; Hediger, 1950). Human territoriality subsequently became a popular topic in environmental psychology from the 1970s (Altman, 1975; Edney, 1974). Just as animals may mark their territory, so humans may erect or display territorial markers – fences, gates, signs, personal possessions – to signal ownership and to deter outsiders. Territoriality has implications for the behaviour of both territorial possessors and potential territorial intruders. In the case of territorial possessors, a direct relationship is proposed between territoriality and antisocial behaviour. A sense of ownership is associated with psychological states that may produce two opposing outcomes. On the one hand, possessing territory can inhibit aggression and promote pro-social behaviours. ‘Home turf’ is a place where people can relax and feel in control over their lives. Altman’s (1975) privacy regulation model suggests that people require sanctuaries in which to retreat in order to reduce the stress and overstimulation associated with excessive interpersonal contact. O’Neill and Paluck (1973) reported a drop in the level of aggression among institutionalised intellectually-disabled boys when they were given identifiable territories to call their own. People also feel greater responsibility towards property over which they have a sense of ownership. Greater care is taken of estates when tenants are given greater involvement in their management (Foster and Hope, 1993; Power, 1994). Likewise, vandalism in institutions can be reduced by promoting in residents a sense of possession over their living areas by allowing freedom in personalising environments with pictures, personal possessions, or individual furniture arrangement (Wener and Olsen, 1980; Zupan, 1991). On the other hand, precisely because ownership is highly valued, invasion of territory can incite an aggressive response in territorial possessors. At a macro level, gang warfare is often caused by aggressive reactions to territorial invasion (Ley and Cybriwsky, 1974). Similarly, a high proportion of assaults against prisoner officers occur in the prisoners’ living areas (Atlas, 1983; Light, 1991; Sylvester et al., 1977), suggesting that prisoners become particularly hostile when they feel that their private domain has been invaded. In the case of territorial intruders, signs of territorial possession can have a deterrent effect on criminal behaviour. This argument was introduced into criminology primarily through the work of architect Oscar Newman (1972) in his seminal book, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design. Newman used territoriality as the basis for his concept of defensible space, which he defined as ‘a surrogate term for the range of mechanisms – real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance – that combine to bring an environment under the control of its residents’ (ibid., p. 3). According to Newman, potential offenders are sensitive to environmental cues that indicate an area is uncontrolled and open to criminal opportunities. Residents are encouraged to assume a greater sense of ownership over private and semi-public areas within their domain and to become more vigilant in recognising and deterring outsiders. According to Newman’s approach, territoriality affects the behaviour of offenders indirectly. Environmental design aims to change the behaviour of residents, who then, through their increased vigilance, deter potential offenders.

Situations 199 Newman’s (1972) original insights on the effectiveness of defensible space in reducing crime were based on field observations. However, the research he cited often amounted to little more than illustrative case studies. For example, he noted instances of high-rise residential blocks that had real and symbolic barriers differentiating the building from the street, and he pointed out that they were less vandalised than similar buildings that had no such barriers. Later research has been more systematic (Brown and Altman, 1983; Brown and Bentley, 1993; Brown et al., 2004; Foster et al., in press; Ham-Rowbottom et al., 1999; McDonald and Gifford, 1989; Perkins et al., 1992; Perkins et al., 1993; Wortley and McFarlane, 2009). For example, Brown and Altman (1983) used structured rating schedules to compare the characteristics of 306 burglarised and non-burglarised houses. They found that non-burglarised houses were more likely to have a range of territorial features, including symbolic indicators of ownership such as signs with the owner’s name; actual barriers such as fences and locked gates; and signs of current occupation such as toys strewn on the front lawn. In a field experiment, Wortley and McFarlane (2009) examined the theft of photocopy cards left on library desks. The study employed a 2×2 design – cards were either signed or unsigned, and left next to library books or on their own. Over a 500-minute observation period in each condition, 18 cards were taken by library patrons in the unsigned/no-books condition, while only two were taken in the signed/with-books condition.

Opportunity theories Social psychology and environmental psychology are concerned, for the most part, with the direct influence of immediate environments on psychological functioning, and of particular interest to us, on the motivation to perform violent or antisocial behaviour. However, we saw in the previous section that there were exceptions to this rule. Weather conditions may affect patterns of social activity that in turn make it easier or more difficult for offenders to carry out crime. Likewise, territorial behaviours by residents may deter potential intruders by providing increased surveillance. These are examples of the role that opportunity plays in crime. The starting point for opportunity theories is the assumption that the offender is already motivated to commit crime. Opportunity theories examine the situational factors – both social and physical – that facilitate the motivated offender in committing their contemplated crimes. We examine two new theories – routine activities approach and crime pattern theory – and further examine the situational implications of rational choice perspective, which was introduced in the previous chapter. These three approaches respectively provide macro-, meso- and micro-analyses of the role of situational factors in crime. Routine activities approach The routine activities approach provides a macro-level analysis of the effects of broad social trends on the distribution of crime. Cohen and Felson (1979) formulated the routine activities approach to provide the most parsimonious account of

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crime possible. According to Cohen and Felson, the explanation for crime can be reduced to the coincidence in time and space of three minimal elements: ‘(1) motivated offenders, (2) suitable targets and (3) the absence of capable guardians against a violation’ (ibid., p. 589). For example, burglary occurs when a motivated burglar encounters unguarded premises that contain desirable products. If the burglar does not pass by the house, the property is guarded, or it contains little of value, then burglary is unlikely to occur. The approach makes no attempt to explain why offenders might be motivated to commit a crime. The routine activities approach is a deceptively simple idea but it has great explanatory power. Central to the routine activities approach is the proposal that the concurrence of the three elements for crime is dictated by the natural rhythms of everyday life, producing predictable crime patterns. Cohen and Felson originally set out to explain the apparent paradox that crime rates after World War II rose substantially at the same time that economic conditions improved. According to traditional criminological theories that associate crime with poverty, crime rates might have been expected to fall during this period. Cohen and Felson argued that higher crime rates could be explained by the changes in the routine activities that accompanied economic prosperity. Improved economic conditions had the incidental effect of bringing the three elements for crime into alignment. For example, with the increased participation of women in the workforce, there was an accompanying increase in the number of houses left unattended during the day. At the same time, growing affluence and technological advances meant that there were more small, valuable personal possessions available to steal. These factors helped explain why rates of daytime residential burglaries doubled between 1960 and 1975. We have encountered examples of the routine activities approach previously in this chapter. The proposals that burglary is more likely to occur in pleasant weather because homeowners are away from home (Cohn and Rotton, 2000; Hipp et al., 2004), and that rates of sexual assault rape increase with hours of sunshine because people socialise more in warm weather (McLean, 2007), are routineactivities explanations. There are many other cases where crime patterns are influenced by the respective lifestyles of victims and offenders. Young males experience the highest rates of physical victimisation because they have risky lifestyles that involve visiting bars in dangerous districts, staying out late at night, and mixing with other alcohol-affected youths (Jensen and Brownfield, 1986); juvenile violence peaks in the hour or so around the close of school in the afternoon when large numbers of young people – potential offenders and victims – spill into the streets (Snyder et al., 1996); and burglary rates are highest for houses with multiple streets leading to them that increase the amount of passing traffic (Beavon, 1985, cited in Felson, 1987). One of the appealing features of the routine activities approach is that it can explain apparently counterintuitive crime patterns. For example, Felson (2002) notes research showing that young people who have part-time jobs commit more crime than those who do not have jobs. As Felson explains, a job allows a young person to fund a relatively risky lifestyle (in terms of crime opportunities) that might include taking illegal drugs, drinking alcohol, visiting shopping malls and driving his/her own car.

Situations 201 Crime pattern theory Building on the routine activities approach, Brantingham and Brantingham (1984, 1991, 2008) developed crime pattern theory as a meso-level account of the movement of offenders in time and space. Whereas the routine activities approach is principally concerned with the effect on crime of social trends and lifestyle patterns, crime pattern theory focuses on the relationship between crime and the urban landscape. According to Brantingham and Brantingham, crime is associated with the distribution of key activities in a community and an offender’s familiarity with the environment. Brantingham and Brantingham identified two key environmental elements – nodes and paths – that structure an individual’s daily movement patterns. Nodes are locations that an individual regularly visits in the course of his/her routine activities. They include where a person lives, where he/she works or goes to school, the places he/she shops, and the entertainment venues and recreation facilities he/she frequents. Paths are the routes the person takes to move from one node to the other. Together nodes and paths determine an individual’s awareness space. This is the part of the urban environment that the individual knows well and in which he/she feels comfortable. Most people, for example, have a set way that they travel to work or school, and they become very familiar with the environment along that path. They may, however, know little about the environment just one or two streets outside of their usual route, and feel disoriented if they stray too far from their awareness space. A great deal of crime occurs in predictable locations defined by the intersection of crime opportunities and an offender’s awareness space. In particular, crime opportunities cluster around certain nodes referred to as crime generators and crime attractors. Crime generators are locations, such as sports stadiums and transport hubs, to which large people are attracted for legitimate, non-criminal activities. The presence of so many people provides many criminal opportunities that may tempt potential offenders who may happen to be mixed in with the general crowd of patrons. Crime attractors are particular districts or premises that attract potential offenders for the specific purpose of committing crime. They include certain bars, red light districts, drug markets and non-secured parking lots. Crime attractors are particularly likely to be located near freeway exits and public transport hubs, which provide convenient access and escape. Crime generators and attractors are likely hotspots for crime. One prediction of crime pattern theory is that offenders generally will not travel far from their key personal nodes – their home, work or school – in order to commit crime. This prediction may seem counterintuitive – we might imagine that offenders would travel away from their usual haunts in order to cover their tracks and to search out the most desirable targets – but it is consistent with the routine activities approach. Crime is most likely to occur in locations that are encountered in the course of one’s daily routine. So-called ‘journey to crime’ research has verified the prediction that offending frequency decays as a function of the distance the offender is from home. For example, Snook (2004) examined data from 41

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serial burglars. He found that the median distance travelled to commit a burglary was 1.7 kilometres, and that 85 per cent of burglaries were committed within 5 kilometres of the burglar’s home. The rate of decay was rapid; 33 per cent of burglary sites were within 1 kilometre of home, 25 per cent between one and two kilometres, and 15 per cent between 2 and 3 kilometres. Further, Rengert and Wasilchick (1985) examined the spatial orientation of burglary sites in relation to the burglar’s home. They found that over 75 per cent of burglary sites were within a 45 degree arc around the path between the burglar’s home and place of work, while 57 per cent were in a 45 degree arc around the path between the burglar’s home and place of recreation. Rational choice perspective – implications for situations It will be recalled from the previous chapter that, according to the rational choice perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986, 2008), crime occurs when the perceived benefits of offending outweigh the perceived costs. Clarke (1992) has used the rational choice perspective as the basis for analysing the micro-environmental factors that facilitate crime. Conducive environments for crime are ones in which there are many perceived opportunities for the offender to benefit himself/herself. Clarke outlined three dimensions along which opportunity judgements are made: perceived effort, perceived risks and perceived rewards. These dimensions are the basis for opportunity-reduction strategies in his model of situational crime prevention (increasing effort, increasing risk and reducing rewards).1 Effort The amount of effort required to perform behaviour is a cost to the individual. Offenders will generally commit crimes that entail the least effort, and they may impulsively commit crimes just because they are easy to carry out. If effort seems at first glance to be a trivial deterrent for crime, consider the following study. Clarke and Mayhew (1988) examined suicide patterns in the UK. They noted that, historically, gassing oneself (for example, by putting one’s head in the oven and turning on the gas) was the most common method of suicide, accounting for up to 40 per cent of all cases. The traditional source of domestic gas is coal, and coal gas is toxic. However, from the late 1950s, the UK gradually switched from coal gas to natural gas, which is non-toxic. From 1958 to 1977, as the changeover occurred, suicide rates fell from 5,298 to 3,944. This drop was almost entirely accounted for by the drop in suicide by gassing, which fell from 2,637 to 2. Gassing is a relatively convenient and easy method of suicide. Most UK homes have ready access to gas, and the act of gassing requires little skill or planning. It seems that when the gassing option was denied, a large proportion of potential suicide victims abandoned their suicide attempt rather than seek out other, less convenient methods. Even for desperate and deeply motivated behaviour such as suicide, opportunity plays a significant role. Increasing effort is the rationale for crime prevention strategies that make it more difficult for offenders to commit crime. The best-known strategy is

Situations 203 target-hardening, in which potential crime targets are protected by barriers, locks, or toughened materials. For example, Webb (1997) found that the introduction of steering locks for cars in Germany, Britain and the USA resulted in immediate and long-term reductions car theft. Similarly, pop-up anti-bandit screens in banks and post offices have been found to reduce over-the-counter robberies by up to 40 per cent (Clarke et al., 1991; Ekblom, 1988). Making it more difficult for potential offenders to gain access to tools and weapons used in crime is another example of increasing the effort. For example, restricting access to firearms can reduce firearm-related crime (Baker and McPhedran, 2007; Cook and Ludwig, 2004; Gius, 2009; Ludwig, 2005). Risk Situations can provide important cues to offenders on the likelihood of getting away with criminal acts. Crime rates can escalate dramatically when the chances of detection and punishment are reduced. This fact can be demonstrated through the natural experiments that occur when law and order breaks down during police strikes (Nagin, 1978), riots (Rosenfeld, 1997), blackouts (Muhlin et al., 1981) and natural disasters (LeBeau, 2002; Teh, 2008). For example, LeBeau (2002) reported that burglary rates spiked the day that Hurricane Hugo hit Charlotte, North Carolina, and remained high for the next three days as police resources remained stretched. Common sense tells us that potential crime sites that are guarded or under surveillance are less likely to be subject to crime than are sites that are not. Research confirms this assumption. The installation of CCTV cameras has been found to reduce crime in a variety of settings, including car parks (Poyner, 1992), town centres (Brown, 1996) and buses (Poyner, 1988). Improved street lighting has been found to reduce theft, vandalism and vehicle crime by up to 45 per cent (Painter and Farrington, 1999). The use of radar to detect speeding drivers has resulted in crash reductions of up to 30 per cent (Cameron and Delaney, 2008; Mountain et al., 2005; Novoa et al., 2010), while a meta-analysis on the preventive effects of random breath testing showed reductions in crashes of at least 17 per cent (Erke et al., 2009). Rewards People can be tempted to offend when rewards are on ready offer. Demetriou and Silke (2003) provided neat empirical evidence for the seductive lure of illicit temptations. They established a website that offered free legal shareware downloads. People were directed to the website if they searched for ‘shareware’, ‘freeware’, ‘free’, ‘free games’ and ‘free software’. However, once visitors arrived at the site they were offered links to a range of software options – legal shareware, hacked commercial games, hacked commercial software, softcore pornography, hardcore pornography and stolen passwords. (The links to illegal sites were dummies.) Demetriou and Silke found that the hardcore pornography link was the

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most popular site (clicked by 483 of the 803 visitors), followed by the softcore pornography link (358 clicks), the illegal software link (338 clicks), the illegal games link (302 clicks), the illegal passwords link (297 clicks) and the legal shareware link (268 clicks). A check of the search words that visitors used to reach the website confirmed that most (745 visitors) were actively searching for legal shareware. However, once visitors arrived at the website, the legal shareware was the least popular link. Presented with an unexpected chance to gain free illicit software, apparently normally law-abiding individuals seized the opportunity presented to them. Crime may be prevented by reducing temptation. One way to do this is to conceal or remove potential crime targets. For example, leaving expensive items in open view in parked cars invites theft. For this reason, many car CD players come with a removable face, and as portable car satellite navigation devices are switched off they typically remind drivers to take the device with them. Likewise, many self-service department stores place especially valuable, concealable items in cabinets or behind the service counter. Crime targets can also be rendered worthless if they are stolen. Electronic goods, car components and livestock that are clearly marked are difficult to sell if they are stolen. Using an alternative strategy, some clothing stores use ink tags that destroy the clothes if the tag is removed incorrectly. Do opportunities cause crime? While opportunities determine where and when crime occurs, it is important to appreciate that they do not just redistribute an existing amount of criminal activity; they stimulate a net growth in criminal activity. The more opportunities there are for crime, the more crime there is committed. In short, opportunity is a cause of crime. This can be made clear by the following ‘thought experiment’ proposed by Tilley and Laycock (2002, p. 31). Imagine that suddenly people stopped locking their houses when they went out; that drivers left their parked cars unlocked and with the keys in the ignition; and that customers took what they needed from unattended shops and left the money on the counter. Would crime increase? Of course it would. The logical obverse of the above scenario is that reducing opportunities will reduce crime. The more risky, less rewarding and more effortful it is to commit crime, the less crime there is committed. This is the rationale that underpins situational crime prevention. Nevertheless, one of the perennial criticisms levelled against situational prevention is that it does not prevent crime but it merely displaces it. That is, it is often argued that if opportunities are reduced in one location, an offender will simply move to another, more conducive location to commit his/her crimes. While at first glance this criticism may seem intuitively plausible, it underestimates the role that opportunities have in causing behaviour, and is an example of the fundamental attributional error. The conclusion that reducing opportunities reduces crime is supported not just by theory but also by empirical research. Guerette and Bowers (2009) reviewed

Situations 205 102 studies that examined the displacement of crime following situational interventions. Crime displacement was observed in only 26 per cent of interventions. Further, where displacement did occur, the amount of crime displaced was typically less than the amount prevented. That is, reducing opportunities resulted in a net reduction in crime.

The person–situation interaction (again) It should not be concluded from the foregoing discussion that situational approaches assume that all offenders are hapless victims of circumstance and that dispositions do not matter. As has been stressed throughout this volume, crime occurs as an interaction between person and situation. Different individuals react differently to the same situation, with some individuals dispositionally more susceptible to criminogenic environments than are others. The stronger the individual’s antisocial commitment, the weaker the situational pressures required for criminal behaviour to occur, and vice versa. Crime is especially likely when highcriminality individuals enter high-criminogenic situations. This interaction is shown in Figure 9.2. To clarify the relationship between offender dispositions and situations, Cornish and Clarke (2003) proposed an offender typology based on the strength of the offender’s criminal commitment and the nature of the immediate environment. Three offender types were suggested: antisocial predators, mundane offenders and provoked offenders. Antisocial predators are the stereotypical, calculating criminal. They possess ingrained criminal dispositions, and their offences involve premeditation and at least some rudimentary planning. They are active manipulators of situations, and obstacles to offending are challenges to be overcome. They enter the crime scene with pre-exiting motivation to commit the crime, and their crimes are carried out intentionally and with a purpose. Their motivations for offending derive from the

Figure 9.2 The hypothetical interaction between offenders and situations.

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intrinsically rewarding nature of the crimes they commit. Predators may specialise in a particular type of crime or may be criminally versatile, but in any event all will have developed ‘knowledge, skills and experience enough to minimize risk and effort, and maximize payoffs’ (ibid., p. 57). Mundane offenders are flexible in their criminal commitment and opportunistic in their offending. They engage in occasional, low-level criminality and may possess generalised impulse-control problems, committing crime with minimal forethought. Like predatory offenders, they seek to derive benefits from their crimes, but they have a greater stake in conformity and are therefore subject to stronger personal and social constraints on their behaviour. These constraints, however, weaken from time to time, and mundane offenders are susceptible to precipitating events that engage their criminal motivations. In particular, to facilitate their performance of morally proscribed behaviour, they may invoke neutralisations for their crimes, especially where situational factors serve to obscure personal responsibility. Provoked offenders are reacting to a particular set of environmental circumstances – situational frustrations, irritations, social pressures and the like – that induce them to commit crimes they would not have otherwise committed. Their crimes include ‘crimes of violence that erupt in the heat of the moment; or impulsive ones committed by offenders overcome by temptation, or a temporary failure of self control’ (ibid., p. 70). Provoked offenders may have conventional value systems and lead otherwise law-abiding lives. Their involvement in crime may represent an aberration that would not have occurred if it were not for the precipitating events. Be clear that Cornish and Clarke are not saying that situations become less important as an individual’s criminality increases, but rather that the role that situations play in crime changes. For antisocial predators, situations provide the data required to make calculated decisions about offending. They are opportunity-seekers and, if necessary, opportunity-makers. Their rate of offending may be reduced significantly by making it more difficult for them to commit crimes. For mundane offenders, situations offer temptations to be seized. They are opportunity-takers. Because of the moral ambivalence of the mundane offender, in the absence of easy opportunity they may not be sufficiently motivated to seek out crime targets. For the provoked offender, situations provide the impetus to offend. They are reactors to the immediate environment. Their engagement in crime requires a kick-start, and relieving the precipitating conditions may be sufficient to prevent offending. Note that all things being equal, antisocial predators are the most prolific offenders across all situations. They do not just commit predatory crimes. Following the principles of the person–situation interaction, it is likely that antisocial predators (as high-criminality offenders) will be even more likely to seize easy temptations and to react to situational precipitators (both high-criminality situations) than will mundane or provoked offenders.

Conclusion and evaluation Situations are a neglected element in many explanations of criminal behaviour, too often treated as merely the incidental locations in which offenders act out their

Situations 207 criminality. Worse, an emphasis on situational factors is often argued by critics to be misguided and to divert attention away from the ‘root causes’ of crime. But as demonstrated in this chapter, the importance of situational factors in crime is supported by a solid base of psychological and criminological theory and research. Like all species, human beings are best understood from an ecological perspective, as being in an intimate and dynamic relationship with their immediate environment. The performance of criminal behaviour is inextricably dependent upon the situational context. Situational factors determine why offenders commit their crimes when and where they do. They play a role in every crime. Some situations can turn law-abiding citizens into offenders. But situations are no less important in the offending by career criminals. The frequency with which they commit crime, and the precise targets that they select, are both dependent upon situational conditions. Situational approaches do not ignore the root causes of crime; situations are a root cause of crime. The examination undertaken in this chapter has revealed a wide range of situational variables that influence behaviour, and a variety of ways in which situations and their effects may be understood. Situations can vary in size; some approaches conceptualise situational factors in global terms (e.g., urban crowding) while other approaches seek to break situations down into their precise elements (e.g., specific territorial markers). Situations can involve both physical and social variables; situational forces can refer to the influences of observable, concrete stimuli (e.g., architectural features) and to influences that take place in the course of interpersonal interaction (e.g., conformity). Finally, situations can have precipitating and facilitating effects on behaviour; some situations engender criminal motivations while others make it easy for motivated offenders to carry through with their criminal intentions. Situational approaches do not deny the importance of criminal dispositions. Individuals do not enter criminogenic situations as equals. They bring with them different biological make-ups and developmental histories. Situational influences on criminal behaviour are the final element outlined in the integrative model described in Chapter 1 and summarised in Figure 1.2. In the next and final chapter of the book, we review how biological, developmental and situational influences fit together to produce criminal behaviour.

Note 1 In later publications (Clarke 2008; Cornish and Clarke, 2003), Clarke has added two more dimensions to his situational crime prevention model – removing excuses and reducing provocations. Excuses and provocations are not discussed here because they are not strictly opportunity dimensions and, moreover, they have been covered in previous chapters (excuse making) and earlier in this chapter (provocations).

10 Conclusion

The argument in a nutshell People who commit crime are a diverse population. Almost everybody commits trivial offences from time to time in their lives. Occasionally, a normally lawabiding person will commit a serious, isolated offence such as murder, fraud, or sexual assault. Some people engage in bouts of criminal activity for a relatively brief period of their lives – typically during adolescence – then desist. On the other hand, other people begin getting into trouble with authority from an early age and commit frequent and serious crimes throughout their lives. Offenders may specialise in one type of crime, or they may be versatile in the crimes that they commit. They may offend alone or in the company of others. Some offenders carefully plan their offences and others act impulsively. The pathways that lead individuals to crime are similarly diverse. Criminal behaviour may have many causes, the precise mix of which varies from offender to offender. Some causes involve psychological processes that are common to us all, and that account for the latent potential for crime in all human beings. Other causes involve biological factors and environmental experiences that account for why some people become offenders and others do not. These causes may be arranged temporally, from distal to proximal, according to three stages. The first stage involves factors that are present at birth. Every individual is born with genetically-encoded predispositions that increase or decrease their risk of committing crime. These predispositions are of two sorts: universal characteristics that are part of being human and that are dispersed throughout the species, and individual characteristics that vary among people and that are passed down within the family. The tendency to respond aggressively to insults and humiliating treatment, for example, is part of human nature. Aggression under these circumstances was at some point in human evolution an adaptive behaviour that helped an individual maintain status within the group; now responding with physical violence to perceived insults is a criminal offence. However, humans also differ in the degree to which they are predisposed to aggression. Polymorphisms of the genes that control for the availability of dopamine, for instance, have been linked to differences in levels of aggressive behaviour.

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The second stage involves factors that occur over the course of an individual’s lifetime. People change across their lifespan. Some of these changes are normative – they occur for everyone as part of normal development. For example, puberty is universally a period of rapid physical, psychological and social change. Males, in particular, are much more likely to commit crimes in the year or so that follows the onset of puberty than they are at any other period in their lives. Other developmental changes are experience-dependent. People’s differing developmental experiences create different potentials to commit crime. Developmental risk factors for crime include growing up in a broken home, experiencing child maltreatment, being subjected to harsh parental discipline, failing at school, having delinquent peers and failing to form a stable relationship with a partner. Environmental experiences are reflected in the physical growth and structure of the brain, they help form personality traits, they can influence the passage of an individual through developmental stages, they determine the behaviours that a person learns, and they shape the way he/she thinks about the world. As a result of adverse developmental experiences, an individual may acquire criminal tendencies and/or fail to acquire the capacity to control inherent tendencies in all of us to behave in self-serving ways. The final stage involves factors present in the immediate environment at the time of the crime. All behaviour is shaped by the context in which it occurs. Situations can exert social influence, obscure moral insight, trigger behavioural responses, provoke physiological arousal and signal the likely outcome of behaviour. Situations determine when and where crime is committed and even if it is carried out at all. Criminogenic situations can induce normally law-abiding individuals to commit crime they would not have otherwise committed, and allow seasoned offenders to commit more crime than they would otherwise have committed. Some situations precipitate crime by stimulating the motivation to offend, and other situations facilitate crime by enabling or encouraging offenders to act on criminal motivations. Causal factors are not only linked in a temporal sequence that allows multiple pathways to crime, but there are interactions among causes as individuals move from one stage to the next, providing additional layers of complexity. Moving from stage one to stage two may involve gene–environment interactions that affect the development of stable dispositions and habits. Depending on their genetic make-up, different individuals may respond differently to the same developmental experiences. Some individuals are resilient in the face of adverse treatment while others are deeply and negatively affected. An individual may have a genetic risk of developing certain criminality-related traits, but those traits may only develop in the presence of the ‘right’ environment. Moving from stage two to stage three may involve person–situation interactions that affect the behavioural expression of stable dispositions and habits. Depending upon their personal characteristics, different individuals may act differently in the same situation. Some individuals will seize criminal opportunities or succumb to criminogenic pressures, while others will resist such influences. The risk of criminal behaviour is especially great when individuals with

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entrenched criminal dispositions enter high-criminogenic situations. Equally, most of the time even predatory offenders are not committing crimes. There is no one psychological theory of crime that covers the breadth of causal factors described above. This is by no means surprising. It is common in psychology for theorists to focus on a fairly narrow psychological domain. This specialisation, however, can result in a fragmented picture overall. The temporal arrangement of causal factors presented in this book is designed to provide an integrative model to understand the relationship among theories in order to better account for the variations in criminal behaviour that we observe. These theories together provide a more complete picture of crime and criminality than each theory provides individually.

The strengths and limits of integration In broad terms, the proposition that criminal behaviour is caused by a combination of biological, developmental, and situational factors would seem largely uncontroversial. However, things get trickier when it comes to combining individual theories within this broad framework. In undertaking this task, the term integrative model rather than integrative theory has been used advisedly. What has been presented in this book is by no means a seamless knitting together of theories into a unified whole. It is well to remember that the theorists responsible for the various theories often disagreed fiercely with one another. Learning theory, for example, was developed as an explicit reaction against the study of the mind. It is not possible to be simultaneously a radical behaviourist and a cognitive psychologist. The term model has been used to imply no more than a general and flexible framework for conceptualising connections and commonalities among theories. Despite tensions among theories, there are nevertheless many points of agreement and complementarity. There are at least three kinds of relationships among theories that permit some level of linkage. First, some theories are natural bedfellows. They are based on similar philosophical and theoretical assumptions, although they may examine different psychological domains. The relationship between evolutionary theory and learning theory is an example of this. Both approaches are concerned with the way that organisms adapt to their environment, albeit over vastly different timescales. Characteristics or behaviours that prove useful will be retained; those that confer no advantage will not. In their respective explanations of adaptation, evolutionary theory and learning theory hold to the same basic view of humanity, that is, of human beings as complex animals shaped by environmental forces outside of individual control. Second, some theories balance other theories. While they may be based on different philosophical and theoretical assumptions they do not directly contradict one another. They provide answers to different questions, and there may be an implicit or explicit recognition that multiple theories are needed to complete the bigger picture. The relationship between genetically-focused approaches and environmentally-focused approaches illustrates this relationship. No geneticist would deny the vital importance of life experiences in the development of

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behaviour, just as few environmentally-focused psychologists would deny a genetic basis to behaviour. It is quite possible, for example, to accept the principles of operant conditioning while also accepting that there are geneticallybased individual differences. Even Skinner, the arch environmental determinist, acknowledged that biological factors play a role in behaviour, although on pragmatic grounds he believed that it was more productive to concentrate his efforts on the role of environmental factors. Third, some theories may fill perceived gaps in other theories. They are based on different philosophical and theoretical assumptions and offer different interpretations of the same problem. However, individually each theory may be considered to be incomplete or deficient in some respect. A combination of theories is thought to offer an improved explanation, but this is likely to require modification of the original theories. At this level, true theoretical integration is required. The development of social cognitive theory demonstrates this principle. Operant conditioning denies a causative role for cognitive processes; cognitive theory lacks an overarching framework that sets out the principles of learning. Social cognitive theory incorporates a role for cognition within a learning framework. From this blending a new theory has emerged that differs in significant ways from each contributing theory. It is worth noting, of course, that this does not mean that those associated with the parent theories necessarily welcome the arrival of the new offspring. However, adopting an integrative approach entails risks and must be done with prudence. There are two potential dangers to guard against. The first is that integration may violate Occam’s razor. Dating from the fourteenth century, Occam’s razor is a principle of logic that is widely applied to science. According to Occam’s razor, in a choice between two equally valid theories, the one that makes the fewest assumptions – is the most parsimonious – is preferred. Further, where one theory is adequate to explain a phenomenon, other theories should not be added unnecessarily. Thus, while an attraction of integration is an increase in complexity, in science it is simplicity not complexity that is the mark of a good explanation. However, Einstein, in a restatement of Occam’s razor introduced a subtle change. The so-called Einstein’s razor asserts: ‘Things should be as simple as possible, but not simpler.’ In other words, simplicity is not of itself a virtue; the level of complexity should be determined by what is required to do the job. Integration can be justified if the combination of theories used adds to the explanatory power of the individual contributing theories. The second potential problem with integration is atheoreticism. The integrative approach is also sometimes referred to as eclecticism. Eclecticism is defined as ‘the selection and orderly combination of compatible features from diverse sources, sometimes from incompatible theories and systems . . . into a harmonious whole’ (English and English, 1958; emphasis added). Integration, then, is not an excuse for the haphazard or unsystematic application of theory, or for the artificial gluing together of incompatible positions. There remain among the theories that have been presented a number of issues for which there are fundamentally contradictory and irreconcilable positions. The rationality of offenders is one such issue. Are the

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motives for offending buried deep in the circuitry of the brain away from conscious control as the evolutionary psychologists assert? Or are the decisions to commit crime based on rationality (albeit bounded rationality) as some cognitive psychologists would have it? In the end, readers must make a choice about which set of explanations makes most sense to them. When making this choice, they must retain a coherent, overarching theoretical orientation to guide the integrative process.

Implications for practice The purpose of theory is ultimately to inform practice. Theories are ways of accounting for observed phenomena, providing principles and rules that can be generalised to other settings. In psychology, theory serves two main practical purposes. First, theories are applied to the problem of predicting how individuals will behave in given environments. Second, theories provide guidelines for what might be done to prevent a certain behaviour from becoming established or from recurring once it has become established. Not much has been said in this book about the application of theory – that was not its purpose. However, taking a view of criminality that encompasses biological, developmental and situation causes has important implications for the twin endeavours of prediction and prevention. Detailing the complexity of crime causation highlights the enormity of the challenge facing practitioners who intervene directly with offenders. Take the problem of predicting which individuals among a sample of convicted offenders are likely to reoffend. This is a task routinely performed by mental health professionals testifying in court, or writing reports to parole boards and similar bodies. Traditionally, predictions about reoffending have involved clinical judgements. Clinical predictions are based on personality assessments and clinical diagnoses carried out on the offender by a psychologist or psychiatrist, informed by the professional’s particular psychological approach. More recently, actuarial instruments have been constructed in an attempt to provide a more objective, scientifically-based method of prediction. Actuarial prediction involves using known relationships between offending and demographic characteristics to place individuals in risk categories. For example, if it is shown that, overall, single offenders are statistically more likely to reoffend than married offenders, then being single is assumed to be a risk factor in the individual case. In actuarial prediction, there is no need even to interview the offender as long as all the relevant demographic risk factors are known. Actuarial prediction routinely outperforms clinical prediction (Bonta et al., 1998; Grove et al., 2000; Hanson and Morton-Bourgon, 2007). But the accuracy rates for both clinical and actuarial prediction is worryingly low, given the weight attached to prediction in the criminal justice system and the consequences of getting it wrong. Lidz et al. (1993), for example, found that clinical prediction is not much better than tossing a coin. In the case of actuarial prediction, claims of predictive utility seem promising but look less impressive when examined more closely. For example, Hanson and Thornton (2000) examined the performance of three actuarial instruments designed to assess recidivism among sexual offenders.

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The best performer was a scale called the Static-99. The scale was successful in significantly discriminating between low- and high-risk recidivists. Offenders who scored six or more on the Static-99 (the top 12 per cent of the sample) were four times more likely to be rearrested for new sex offences after 15 years᾿ release than offenders who scored zero (the bottom 10 per cent). However, within the high-scoring group, just 52 per cent reoffended (compared with 13 per cent in the low-scoring group). In other words, offenders rated as the highest risk were just as likely to reoffend as not. Overall the correlation between Static-99 scores and recidivism was .3, moderately strong but accounting for just 9 per cent of the variance. Why should this be so? It is certainly not through any lack of effort – risk prediction is an active area of research producing hundreds of scholarly articles and books. One likely reason is that risk prediction relies on an assessment of an offender’s criminality, whether clinically assessed or inferred from demographic variables. The task is limited to predicting risky individuals. However, we know that there are limits to the cross-situational consistency of behaviour. According to the specificity model, differences in dispositions only become meaningful in particular situations. Assessing disposition, therefore, provides only half the information needed to make a prediction; we also need to know what risky situations a risky individual is likely to encounter. Some actuarial instruments have endeavoured to include more dynamic, ecological measures. Silver et al. (1999), for example, found that the accuracy of risk prediction could be improved by including characteristics of the neighbourhood (specifically, the concentration of poverty) into which an individual was released. However, such ecological factors are blunt situational measures. There are limits to the extent to which micro-situational factors can be captured on a prediction instrument. How can we predict in any fine-grained way the criminogenic opportunities and situational pressures that an individual is likely to encounter at some point in the future? Situational theories suggest that irrespective of the research effort devoted to risk prediction, accuracy rates will inevitably hit a ceiling. More optimistically, a causative model that spans biological, developmental and situational factors expands the options available to prevent criminal behaviour. Borrowing from the public health model, prevention programmes may be classified as one of three types. Primary prevention involves interventions that are directed at a community-wide level to prevent problems before they emerge. Mass inoculation for polio, and advertising campaigns to encourage people to exercise more and eat healthier diets, are examples of primary prevention initiatives in public health. Secondary prevention involves interventions to prevent the emergence of problems in specific at-risk groups. AIDS-HIV programs directed at intravenous drug-users and the gay community, and health messages targeted specifically at smokers or the overweight, are secondary prevention strategies. Tertiary prevention involves interventions directed at problems once they have appeared. Medical treatment for cancer patients or those suffering heart disease are health examples. Like the medical profession, psychologists have traditionally conceived of prevention in tertiary terms. The task of preventing criminal behaviour has

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focused on providing rehabilitation designed to prevent known offenders from reoffending. A great deal of energy has gone into devising programs to treat sex offending, violence, substance abuse and other antisocial behaviours. The most common approach adopted is cognitive behavioural therapy in which offenders are taught to modify the dysfunctional thoughts that support their problem behaviours. Rehabilitation efforts have yielded modest though worthwhile returns. Meta-analyses of the efficacy of rehabilitation programs have reported reductions in recidivism rates of 12 per cent (Redondo et al., 1999), 14 per cent (Tong and Farrington, 2006), and up to 25 per cent (Landenberger and Lipsey, 2005). Irrespective of the success rates, a fundamental problem with rehabilitation as a prevention strategy is that it comes into play only once an offender has committed a crime and the damage has been done. In addition, rehabilitation is only available to those few who are caught and convicted for their crimes. Even then, a small minority of convicted offenders actually undergo treatment. In comparison to the efforts directed at rehabilitation, primary and secondary prevention of criminal behaviour have suffered relative neglect. A broader view of crime causation opens up the potential for preventing crime before it occurs. Two alternative prevention methods are developmental prevention and situational prevention. These approaches may involve either primary or secondary prevention depending upon whether the interventions are broadly applied across the community or targeted at specific risky groups or locations. Developmental prevention is based on understanding and manipulating the factors associated with the formation of delinquent and criminal dispositions. Prevention involves strengthening protective factors and reducing the risk factors for crime along the individual’s developmental pathway. In addition to poor parenting practices and negative socialisation experiences outlined earlier in this chapter, risk factors include environmental events that have a detrimental effect on neurological development. These include birth complications, substance abuse during pregnancy, poor diet and exposure to toxins. While developmental prevention is ideally delivered as early as possible, intervention may occur at any point in a person’s life. Successful developmental crime prevention programmes include home visits and social support to young single mothers (Olds, 2002), enriched pre-school education (Homel et al., 2006; Schweinhart, 2004), and effective parenting programmes (Hawkins et al., 1999; Tremblay et al., 1995). Farrington and Welsh (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of 40 family-based crime prevention programs, reporting a 16 per cent reduction in offending in target groups. Situational crime prevention differs from other psychological interventions in that it does not directly target or seek to alter the offender’s criminal disposition. Rather, it works on the offender’s immediate motivation or ability to commit crime by altering the situational dynamics around the potential crime scene. The aim is pragmatic and modest – simply to stop crime occurring in a specified context. No claim is made that the potential offender is changed in any permanent way. Cornish and Clarke (2003) identified five broad situational strategies: reducing the perceived rewards for crime, increasing the perceived effort of committing crime, increasing

Conclusion

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the perceived risks associated with committing crime, reducing the provocations for crime, and removing excuses for committing crime. There are now hundreds of studies demonstrating the efficacy of situational crime prevention (see Clarke, 1997, for a collection of case studies; and Welsh and Farrington, 2000, for a systematic review). To date, interventions have focused on the role of environmental factors in the effort to prevent crime. The implications that genes might play in prevention are yet to be explored. The very thought of this is likely to evoke horror in many readers, conjuring images of Nazi-like eugenics. It is not being suggested here that programmes of selective breeding ought to be considered. However, the findings of gene–environment interactions – that individuals respond more favourably to some environments than to others – raise interesting possibilities of matching individuals to the most appropriate intervention based on their genetic profile. In this post-genomic age, incorporating genetic information into interventions with offenders and potential offenders may be the next step in the quest to prevent crime.

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Index

Note: Page numbers in italics are for tables, those in bold are for figures. acetylcholine 69 actor-observer bias 168 adaptive behaviours 21, 28, 29, 30, 36, 40, 143 ADHD see attention deficit hyperactivity disorder adolescence 6, 37, 92, 119, 120, 136, 137; testoterone levels 76, 88, see also adolescent-limited (AL) offenders; juvenile crime adolescent-limited (AL) offenders 6, 10, 59–61, 63, 89, 105, 133, 134–5, 136 adoption studies 16, 48, 54–6, 63, 116; child abuse and neglect 32; criminal convictions 54–5; juvenile crime 59; male versus female crime 57; reported antisocial behaviour 55–6 affective empathy 98 age 37, 59–61; and testosterone levels 76 age–crime curve 6, 37, 76, 132–3, 136 aggression: alcohol consumption and 84, 85, 167–8; causal attributions 168; classical conditioning and 150–1; dopamine and 75, 208; frustration and 169–70; galvanic skin response and 74; instrumental and expressive 150; pornography and 160; temperature and 195–6; testosterone and 76–7 agreeableness 95, 111, 112, 113 Ainsworth, M.D.S. 126 Akers, R.L. 158 alcohol consumption: and aggression 84, 85, 167–8; maternal, during pregnancy 82 alleles 45, 61 Allen, M. 160 Allport, G.W. 94

alternative strategies 35, 38–40 Altman, I. 198, 199 altruism 25–6, 39, 96–7; reciprocal 25–6, 38–9, 40 amygdala 79 Anderson, K. 124 androgens 69, 76 anticipated consequences 189 antisocial behaviour 4, 5, 97, 104, 106; arousal levels and 85–6; brain activity and 77–8, 79; corporal punishment and 123; diet and 83; environmental factors and 117; frustration and 170; heart rate and 74; heritability of 52–3, 55–6, 57–8, 60, 64; neurotransmitter levels and 75; territoriality and 198 antisocial personality disorder (APD) 4–5, 6, 12, 39, 53–4, 55–6, 58, 106–13, 134 antisocial predators 205–6 approval/disapproval 157 Arnett Inventory of Sensation Seeking (AISS) 99 arousal 99, 188–9; ANS (autonomic nervous system) 85–6, 105–6; cortical 101, 105–6; sub-optimal 85–6 artificial intelligence (AI) 163 Asch, S.E. 191 Atlas, R. 196 atmospheric conditions 195–6 attachment 34, 126–8 attention, consciousness and 165 attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 60, 62, 82, 83, 86 authority, obedience to 192–3 autonomic nervous system (ANS) 67–8, 73, 74, 85, 86, 102, 105–6 aversion therapy 148, 149–50

262

Index

aversive physiological arousal 188–9 axons 66, 72 Bailey, C.A. 168 Baker, L.A. 57 Bandura, A. 141, 142, 145, 155–6, 157–8, 170, 172, 173 Banzinger, G. 196 Barber, R. 38 Barrett Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) 99 Bartholow, B.D. 150 Battin-Pearson, S.R. 159 Baumrind, D. 122 Beau, D.S. 193 Beaver, K.M. 125 Beccaria, C. 8, 175 behavioural activation/inhibition systems 86–7, 99 behavioural genetics 42–61, 63 behavioural modification/therapies 155; see also aversion therapy; cognitive behavioural therapy; rehabilitation programs behaviourism 18, 160–1, 162, 163; formal models of see classical conditioning; operant conditioning; social learning; molecular analysis 148–9; philosophies and principles 139–45; (behaviourspecific focus 145; denial of personality and psychopathology 144; environmental determinism 141–3; and evolution and biology 143–4; focus on observable events 140–1) Bennett, T. 177–8 Bentham, J. 8, 175 Benton, D. 83 Berkowitz, L. 150, 170 Big Five personality factors 94–5, 101, 111–12 biochemical activity 68–9, 74–7, 89; see also neurotransmitters; testosterone biological determinism 141 biological explanations 9, 10, 11, 15, 36, 37, 115–21, 137–8, 142–4, 208; see also biochemical activity; gene-environment (GxE) interaction; genes; genetics; psychophysiology biosocial perspective 10, 15, 37, 73, 137, 161 Birbaumer, N. 79 birth complications 81, 82, 214 black-box psychology 141 Blonigen, D.M. 52, 136, 137

Bobo doll experiment 156–7 Boles, S.M. 85 Book, A.S. 76, 97 Booth, A. 77 Borgstrøm, C. 51 bounded rationality 175, 212 Bowers, K.J. 204–5 Bowlby, J. 126, 127 brain imaging 78–9 brain structures and functions 17, 27, 28, 47, 65–89; abnormalities/impairments 77–81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87–8, 89; anatomy 69–71, 77–81; behavioural activation/inhibition systems 86–7, 99; computer analogy 29, 163–4; environmental factors and 72–3, 81–5, 88; executive function 71, 78, 80–1, 87, 89, 98, 137; frontal lobe dysfunction 87; hemispheric dysfunction 87–8; investigative techniques 77–81; nervous system and 65–8 brainwave patterns 77–8, 85; event-related potentials (ERP) 78 Brantingham, P.J. and Brantingham, P.L. 186, 201 Brehm, J.W. 193 Brennan, P. 81 Brown, B.B. 199 Brown, S.L. 122 Buckley, M.R. 193 burglary 177–8, 183, 196, 200 Bushman, B.J. 159–60 Buss, D.M. 27, 30, 41 Bussiere, M.T. 179 Cadoret, R.J. 56 cads and dads theory 39–40 Cale, E.M. 104 Calhoun, J.B. 196 Campbell, A. 31, 33, 36 Carey, G. 52–3, 56 Carlson, M. 151 Caspi, A. 62 Cattell, R.B. 94 causal attributions 168 central nervous system (CNS) 66 cerebral cortex 70, 71 cheating 38, 39, 58, 97 childhood experiences 38, 73, 116, 137; family structure 121–2; neglect 32, 38, 73, 82–3, 122; parenting styles 122–3; physical abuse 158; schooling 123–4; sexual abuse 4, 6, 34–5, 122, 149, 150, 158, 177, 179–80

Index children: and media violence 159–60; step- 32, 33 choleric temperament 102 Christal, R.E. 95 Christiansen, K.O. 53 Christie, R. 97 chromosomes 43 Clark, J. 196 Clarke, R.V. 175, 177, 182, 202, 205–6, 214 classical conditioning 18, 145–51, 188; and crime 148–51; molecular approach 148–9; principles of 146–8 classical school 8 Cleckley, H. 39, 107–8, 109 climate 195–6, 199, 200 Cloninger, C.R. 51, 55 Coccaro, E.F. 54 cognition 8–9, 18, 184, 211; and behavioural priming 188; and computers analogy 18, 163–4; and consciousness 164–5; and mind–body problem 165–6; need for 163; schemas and scripts 180–4; see also decision-making; social cognitive theory cognitive behavioural therapy 166, 184, 214 cognitive empathy 98 cognitive functioning 80–1 cognitive restructuring 166 cognitive revolution 162–6 Cohen, L.E. 199–200 Collins, J.L. 170 competitive behaviour 31 compliance 193 computerised tomography (CT) 78, 79 computers, and cognition analogy 18, 163–4 conditioned response (CS) 146, 147 conditioned stimulus (CR) 146, 147–8, 149 conditioning 9–10; vicarious 157; see also classical conditioning; operant conditioning conduct disorders 59, 60, 62, 74, 92 conflict theory 4 conformity 191–2, 193 conscientiousness 95, 111, 112, 113 consciousness 164–5 constraint, lack of 60 Conte, J, R. 179–80 contingency contracting 155 continuous reinforcement (CRF) schedule 153 control theories 12–13, 41, 131–2, 145, 175

263

conviction records 50–1, 54–5 Cornish, D.B. 175, 176–7, 182, 205–6, 214 corporal punishment 123 corruption 192–3 cortical arousal 101, 105–6 Cosmides, L. 28, 40, 41 creationism 20–1 crime event stages 176, 182 crime generators and attractors 201 crime pattern theory 201–2 crime prevention see prevention strategies crime scripts 181–4 criminal careers perspective 6–7, 17, 74–5, 132–7 criminal convictions 50–1, 54–5 criminalisation 4 criminality as a continuum 5 cross-situational consistency debate 13 crowding 196–7 CT (computerised tomography) 78, 79 cuckoldry 31, 32 Cullen, F.T. 132 D4DR 62 Dadds, M.R. 127 Daly, M. 32, 37 Danesh, J. 110 Danish twin registry 51, 53 Darwin, C. 20, 21, 22, 23 DAT1 75, 125 Davis, M.H. 98 Dawkins, R. 21, 23–4 decision-making 174–80; expected utility model 174–5; rational choice perspective 175–7; research on (burglary 177–8; child sex offending 177, 179–80; robbery 177, 178–9); satisficing 175 defensible space 198–9 defiance 193 definitions of crime 4–5 deindividuation 193–5 Demetriou, C. 203–4 demographic variations 35–8 Demuth, S. 121–2 dendrites 66, 72 Derefinko, K.J. 111 Descartes, R. 165 determinism 8–9, 165, 166; biological 141; environmental 141–3; hard 142; reciprocal 142; soft 9, 142 deterrence theory 175 development 17, 115–38, 209; across the lifespan 119–21; biological and

264

Index

environmental foundations of 115–21; moral 128–30; psychosocial 126–32, 137; risk and protective factors for crime 121–5, 137 (child maltreatment 122; family structure 121–2; marriage 124–5; parental disciplinary styles 122–3; peer goups 124; schooling 123–4) developmental crime prevention 214 developmental psychology 115 Diagnostic Interview Schedule 53 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) 109 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 4, 11–12, 107–8, 109, 110 diet 83, 214 differential association-reinforcement theory 158 differential association theory 158 discipline, parental 122–3 discriminative stimulus (SD) 152 dizygotic (DZ) twins 46, 50, 51, 52–3, 59, 60, 62, 63 DNA 43, 44, 61 DNA methylation 118, 119 Dolan, M.C. 79 Dollard, J. 169 dopamine 62, 69, 75, 84, 85, 86, 125, 208 DRD2 75, 125 DRD4 75, 125 drug use 4, 84, 85 DSM see Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders dualism, mind-body 165–6 Dunedin study 135 dyssocial personality disorder 106, 109 eclecticism 211 effort 202–3, 214 Eichmann, A. 188 80/20 rule 6, 186 Einstein, A. 211 electrodermal activity 74 electroencephalography (EEG) 77–8, 85 Eley, T.C. 57 Ellis, L. 4, 10, 39 emotionality, negative 60, 88, 102, 104, 113 empathy 97–8 endocrine system 69 environmental determinism 141–3 environmental factors 9, 10, 15, 38, 48–9, 53, 54, 56, 140, 161, 209, 210–11; brain

development and 72–3, 81–5, 88; gene expression and 63; shared and non-shared environments 64 n., 116–17; see also classical conditioning; environmental psychology; geneenvironment (GxE) interaction; operant conditioning; opportunity theories; social learning; social psychology environmental psychology 185, 195–9 environmental stress model 195 epigenetics 118–19 Epstein, N. 98 estrogens 69 event decisions 176 event-related potentials (RP) 78 event schemas 181–4 evolutionary psychology 16–17, 24, 27–41, 96–7 evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) 38 evolutionary theory 15–16, 20–4, 143, 210 evolved psychological mechanisms 27–9, 33, 34, 35, 36 excuse-making 172 executive function 71, 78, 80–1, 87, 89, 98, 137 expectancies 166–8 expected utility model 174–5 experience-dependent brain development 72–3 experience-expectant brain development 72, 73 extraversion (E) 95, 101, 102, 104, 105, 111, 112 Eysenck, H.J., three-factor theory 100–6 Eysenck Impulsivity Scale (EIS) 99 Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) 103–4, 113 factor analysis 94 familial experiences 116, 158; see also childhood experiences family structure 121–2 family studies 49–50, 56; see also adoption studies; twin studies Farrington, D. 98, 133, 214 fathers, absence/presence 121, 122 Fazel, S. 110 Feeney, F. 178–9 Felson, M. 199–200 Felson, R.B. 158, 159 fetishes 149 fitness 24–5, 27 5-HTTLPR 75

Index five-factor personality model 94–5, 101, 111–12 flight-or-fight response 67–8, 102, 189 fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) 79, 82 foetal alcohol syndrome 82 food intolerance 83 forebrain 79 Fraga, M.F. 119 fraud 33, 36 free will 8–9, 141, 165 frequency of criminality 6 Freud, S. 9, 11 Frey, J. 196 frontal lobe 71, 72, 78, 79, 80, 86, 87, 89 frustration-aggression 169–70 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 79, 82 Gall, F. 69 galvanic skin response (GSR) studies 74, 85 game theory 26, 38 gamma-aminobutyric acid (GAA) 69 gang membership 159, 192 Geis, F.L. 97 gender differences see sex differences gene–environment (GxE) interaction 55, 62, 64, 115, 116, 117–19, 121, 125, 209, 215; active correlation 118; life-course persistent (LCP) offenders 134; passive correlation 117–18; reactive correlation 118 gene selection 24 gene technology 10, 61, 63 general theory of crime (Gottfredson and Hirschi) 131–2 genes 23, 42, 43, 65, 88, 116–17, 208; and behaviour relationship 47–8, 143; dominant 45, 46; fixed 47; receptor 75; recessive 45, 46; segregating 47; selfish 23–4, 25; transporter 75 genetic mutations 23 genetic polymorphisms 61–2, 68, 75, 125, 208 genetic relatedness 32–3, 46–7 genetics 16, 17, 22–4, 38, 210–11; behavioural 42–61, 63; molecular 61–2, 63, 64 genome 44 genotype 45, 46 Gershoff, E.T. 123 Glueck, S. and Glueck, E. 125

265

Goranson, R.E. 196 Goring, C. 22 Gottesman, I.I. 51 Gottfredson, M.R. 131–2, 154 Gottschalk, L.A. 84 Grasmick, H.G. 132 group selection 24, 25 Grove, W.M. 53–4 Guerette, R.T. 204–5 Guerry, A.-M. 186 Haney, C. 194–5 Hanson, R.K. 179, 212–13 Harding, R.W. 170 Hare, R.D. 107–8, 109, 110 Harlow, H. 73, 126 Harlow, M. 73, 126 Harris, G.T. 110 heart rate 73, 74 heredity 16, 23, 42–64; genetic relatedness 46–7; laws of 42, 45–6 heritability 48–9 heritability of criminality 49–57, 62–4, 116–17; adoption studies 54–6, 57, 59 (criminal convictions 54–5; reported antisocial behaviour 55–6); metaanalyses 56, 57–8; twin studies 50–4, 56, 57, 59 (concordance rates 50–1; criminal convictions 50–1, 53; monozygotic twins reared apart (MZA) 53–4; reported antisocial behaviour 52–3); variations in 57–61 (adolescentlimited versus life-course persistent crime 59–61, 63; juvenile versus adult crime 59; sex differences 57–8; violent versus property crime 58–9) heterozygotic genotype 45, 46 Hewitt, J.D. 121 hindbrain 70, 85 hippocampus 79 Hippocrates 102 Hirschi, T. 131–2, 154 Hiscoke, U.L. 110 histone modification 118–19 Hoffman, H. 10 Hogan Empathy Scale (HES) 98 Hoge, R.D. 110 Homel, R. 196, 197 homicides 31, 32, 110, 159 homo delinquens 22 homozygotic genotype 45, 46 hormones 68, 69; see also testosterone hostile attribution bias 168

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Huebner, T. 79 Huesman, L.R. 159–60 Human Genome Project 61 human nature 15–16, 20–41, 42 ICD-10 (International Classification of Disease) 109, 110 impulsivity 60, 74, 86, 88, 92, 99–100, 104, 105, 131 incest 35 Indermaur, D. 179, 183 infanticide 32 informant-report measures 58 information-processing model 163–4 instrumental conditioning see operant conditioning intelligence 80, 98; artificial 163 intelligent design 21 intergenerational transmission hypothesis 158 International Classification of Disease (ICD-10) 109, 110 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 98 introversion 101, 102 involvement decisions 176 Iowa adoption registry 55 Jacobson, K.C. 57 James, M. 168 jealous violence 31 Jeffrey, C.R. 187 Jolliffe, D. 98 Jones, M.C. 148 ‘journey to crime’ research 201–2 juvenile crime 6, 59, 74, 88, 127, 158–9, 200; see also adolescent-limited (AL) offenders K-strategists 26, 39 Kanazawa, S. 33 Kern, R. 127 Kierkus, C.A. 121 kin selection 25, 26, 32 Kinard, E.M. 122 King, D. 196 Kohlberg, L. 128 Kranz, N. 51 Krueger, R.F. 97 Kruttschmitt, C. 122 Lane, K.J. 158 Lang, A.R. 167 Lange, J. 51 language acquisition 163

Laub, J.H. 136 Laws, D.R. 150 Laycock, G. 204 learning 18, 139; models of see classical conditioning; operant conditioning; social learning learning theory see behaviourism LeBeau, J.L. 196, 203 Lefkowitz, M. 157 left hemisphere 71, 78, 80, 82, 88 Legras, A.M. 51 Leonard, K.E. 167 LePage, A. 150 Lidz, C.W. 212 life-course persistent (LCP) offenders 6–7, 10, 59–61, 92; antisocial personality disorder (APD) and 110, 134; brain dysfunction 89; criminal careers perspective 133–4, 135, 136; heritability and 60, 63; as pathological 12; personality traits 105 lifespan psychology 121, 132, 137 Lilienfeld, S. 80 limbic system 79, 85, 86–7 Linnet, K.M. 82 Little Albert 146–7, 148 locus of control 169 Lombroso, C. 9, 22, 40 Lorber, M.F. 74 Lucifer Effect 191 Lykken, D.T. 109 Lynam, D.R. 100, 111 Machiavellianism (Mach) 97, 113 Macintyre, S. 197 Mack, K.Y. 127 macro-level environments 186, 199–200 mad/bad debate 10, 11 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 78, 79 manie sans délire 106–7 marriage 37, 124–5 Marshall, W.L. 149, 150 Masters, R.D. 84 materialism 165, 166 Matsueda, R.L. 124 maturity gap 135, 136 Matza, D. 172, 173 Mayhew, P. 202 Mazur, A. 77 McFarlane, M. 199 McGuire, R.J. 149 McLean, I. 196 media violence 159–60 medical model 10

Index Mednick, S.A. 54 Meenaghan, A. 182–3 Mehrabian, A. 98 melancholic temperament 102 men: heritability of crime 57–8; locus of control 169; sexual proprietariness 31–2; testosterone levels 37, 69, 76–7; see also fathers Mendel, G. 22, 23, 42, 45, 46 meso-level environments 186–7, 201 meta-analyses, heritability of criminality 56, 57–8 micro environments 187 microsatellite polymorphism 61 midbrain 70 Miles, D.R. 56 Milgram, S. 192 military regimes 192 Miller, J.D. 111 mind-body problem 165–6 minisatellite polymorphism 61, 75 Minnesota twin registry 52, 53 Miotto, K. 85 Mischel, W. 13 modelled behaviour 156–7, 158–60 Moffitt, T.E. 110, 133, 134, 135, 136 molar analysis of behaviour 153 molecular analysis of behaviour 148–9 molecular genetics 61–2, 63, 64 monoamine oxidase (MAO) 103 monoamine oxidase A (MA0A) gene 62, 125 monogenetic traits 46, 48 monozygotic (MZ) twins 46, 50, 51, 52–3, 53–4, 59, 60, 62, 63, 116 Moore, T.M. 75 moral development 128–30 moral disengagement 172–4, 188 moral guidance, situations as source of 188 moral insanity 107 Morgan, A. 80 mothers: absence of 121; single 122; smoking/alcohol consumption during pregnancy 81–2 motor neurons 66 MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) 78, 79 Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ) 53 mundane offenders 206 natural selection 21–2, 23, 24, 33, 143 nature/nurture debate 9–10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 88 Nazi doctrines 10

267

Nee, C. 182–3 Needleman, H. 84 negative emotionality 60, 88, 102, 104, 113 NEO-Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI-R) 111, 113 nervous system 65–8, 73 neurons 65, 66, 68 neuropsychology 65–73 neuroticism (N) 95, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 111, 112, 113 neurotransmitters 68, 69, 75–6, 84, 85, 88, 125, 136; see also dopamine; serotonin neutralisation theory 172, 173 Nevin, R. 84 Newman, O. 198–9 niche-picking 118, 124, 134 noradrenaline 69 norepinephrine 69 normal/pathological debate 10–12 novelty-seeking 62, 75 nurturing 34; see also nature/nurture debate obedience 192–3 observational learning see social learning Occam’s razor 211 occipital lobe 71 Odbert, H.S. 94 O’Donohue, W. 167 Ogilvie, J.M. 81 O’Neill, S.M. 198 openness 95, 101, 111, 112 operant conditioning 18, 151–5, 157, 166, 175, 189, 211; and crime 153–5; molar analysis 153; principles of 151–3 opportunity reduction 177 opportunity theories 186, 199–205 oppositional defiant disorder 60 Ortiz, J. 74 Ostrov, J.M. 168 Owens, K. 196 paedophilia 149 Paluck, B.J. 198 parallel distributed processing 164 parasympathetic nervous system 67, 68, 102 parental disciplinary styles 122–3 parental investment 26–7, 28, 32, 34, 39 parietal lobe 71 pathology 10–12 Pavlov, I. 9, 145–6, 148 peer groups 124, 158–9, 192

268

Index

perceived self-efficacy 170–1 perinatal factors 81–2 peripheral nervous system (PNS) 66, 67 persistence of criminality 6; see also adolescent-limited (AL) offenders; life-course persistent (LCP) offenders person schemas 181 person/situation interaction 13–14, 15, 92–3, 205–6, 209–10 personality 17, 116–17; see also trait theory of personality perspiration 73, 74 PET (positron emission tomography) 78, 79 petty crime 57, 58 phenotypes 45, 46, 62 Phillips, D.P. 159 phlegmatic temperament 102 phrenology 69 Piaget, J. 128 Pinel, P. 106–7 Piquero, A. 82 polygenetic traits 46, 48, 62 population density 196–7 pornography 160 Porteus Mazes Test (PMT) 80 positron emission tomography (PET) 78, 79 power 30–1, 33 Pratt, T.C. 132 prediction of criminal behaviour 3; actuarial prediction 212–13; clinical prediction 212 prefrontal cortex 71, 79, 80, 87, 98 prevention strategies 3, 213–15; developmental crime prevention 214; primary 213, 214; rehabilitation programs 214; secondary 213, 214; situational crime prevention 202–3, 204–5, 214–15; tertiary 213–14 Pride in Delinquency (PID) scale 171 priming 188 prison studies 194–5 prisoners’ dilemma 26, 38 property crime 33, 55, 58–9, 177–8, 182, 186; see also burglary; robbery prostitution 4 protoscripts 182, 183 provoked offenders 206 prudent/imprudent offending 58 psychodynamic theory 9, 11 Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI) 52, 53 psychopathology 144

psychopathy 5, 39, 79, 106; galvanic skin response (GSR) and 74; personality traits 107–8, 109–10, 111, 112–13; primary, secondary and dissocial 109 Psychopathy Checklist (PCL/PCL-R) 107–8, 109, 110 psychophysiology 73–4 psychosocial development 126–32 psychoticism (P) 101, 102–3, 113 punishment 152, 153, 155, 157; self- 157–8, 171, 174 purposeful victimisation 4 Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (QMEE) 98 Quetelet, A. 186 Quigley, B.M. 167 Quinsey, V.L. 97 r-strategists 26, 39 Rachman, S. 149 radical behaviourism 140–1, 162, 163 Raine, A. 59, 74, 82, 88, 106 Rankin, J. 127 rape 2, 33–4, 167 rational choice perspective 175–7, 189, 202–5 rationality 211–12; bounded 175, 212 Rayner, R. 146 reactance 193 recidivism 110, 212–13, 214 reductionism 187 rehabilitation programs 214 Reid, R.L. 58 reinforcement 156, 157; continuous 153; fixed interval (FT) schedule 153; fixed ratio (FR) schedule 153; intermittent 153; positive and negative 152, 153; self- 171; variable interval (VI) schedule 153 Rengert, G. 202 reproductive strategies 26, 36 respondent conditioning see classical conditioning reward 153, 154, 155, 157, 203–4; reduction 214; self- 157–8 reward dominance 86–7, 99 Rhee, S.H. 56, 57–8, 117 right hemisphere 71, 88 risk-taking 37, 86, 88, 92, 98, 99, 102, 203, 215 robbery 36, 177, 178–9 role schemas 181 Rosanoff, A.J. 51 Rotton, J. 196

Index routine activities approach 199–200, 201 Rushton, J.P. 97 Rutter, M. 73 Sampson, R.J. 125, 136 sanguine temperament 102 satisficing decision-making 175 Scarpa, A. 106 schemas and scripts 180, 181–4, 188 schooling 123–4 Seager, J.A. 168 self-awareness 194 self-control 12–13, 130–2, 154 self-efficacy 170–1 self-esteem 170 self-interest 15, 25–6 self-punishment 157–8, 171, 174 self-reinforcement 171 Self-Report Altruism (SRA) scale 97 self-report measures 58–9 selfish genes 23–4, 25 sensation-seeking 86, 88, 92, 98–9 Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS-V) 99 sensory neurons 66 serotonin 68, 69, 75, 76, 84, 85, 103 sex differences 36; in heritability 57–8; locus of control 169 sex hormones 69, 76–7, 136; see also testosterone sexual offending 33–5; and attachment style 127–8; aversion therapy 149–50; child sexual abuse 4, 6, 34–5, 122, 149, 150, 158, 177, 179–80; classical conditioning and 149–50; familial models 158; incest 35; pornography and 160; rape 2, 33–4, 167; recidivism 212–13; weather conditions and 196, 200 sexual preference hypothesis 149 sexual proprietariness 31–2 sexual selection 28, 30–1, 33, 39 Shackelford, T.K. 30, 33 short tandem repeat 61 Sigmourd, D.J. 171 Sigvardsson, S. 57 Silke, A. 194, 203–4 Silver, E. 213 Simon, L.M.J. 34 Simon, H.A. 174–5 Simourd, D.J. 110 single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) 61, 75 single photon emission computerised tomography (SPECT) 78–9

269

situational crime prevention 202–3, 204–5, 214–15 situations 13–14, 15, 18–19, 92–3, 100, 185–207, 209–10; environmental psychology perspectives 185, 195–9; levels of analysis 186–7; opportunity theories perspective 186, 199–205; precipitating and facilitating 189–91; rational choice implications for 202–4; social psychology perspectives 185, 191–5; as source of anticipated consequences 189; as source of aversive physiological arousal 188–9; as source of behavioural priming 188; as source of moral guidance 188; as source of social influence 187–8 Skinner, B.F. 140, 141, 143–4, 151–2, 153, 154, 161, 163, 175, 211 Slater, E. 51 Smallbone, S.W. 6, 34–5, 127, 150, 179, 180 Smith, T. 179–80 smoking, maternal, during pregnancy 81–2 Snook, B. 201–2 Snyder, H.N. 193 sociability 102, 104, 105 social cognition 162 social cognitive theory 18, 156, 161, 162, 166–74, 189, 211; causal attributions 168; expectancies 166–8; locus of control 169; moral disengagement 172–4; perceived self-efficacy 170–1; self-reinforcement 171 social learning 18, 155–60, 161, 162; and crime 158–60 (familial models 158; subcultural models 158–9; symbolic models 159–60); principles of 156–8 social psychology 185, 191–5 socio-economic status (SES) 37–8, 98 sociobiology 24–7, 29 sociological criminology 1, 2–3, 4, 15, 40, 138, 158 sociopathy 106, 109 soft determinism 9 soma 66 somatic nervous system 67 specificity model 93, 144, 213 SPECT (single photon emission computerised tomography) 78–9 Stams, G.J. 130 Stanford prison study 194–5 status 30–1, 33, 38 stepchildren 32, 33

270

Index

Stewart, A. 122 stimulation, need for 101, 102 stimulus control 148 stimulus deprivation 73 Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) model 156, 166 Stimulus-Response (S-R) model 146–8, 150 Stimulus-Response-Stimulus (S-R-S) model 152 Stith, S.M. 158 Stuart, R.B. 155 Stumpfl, F. 51 sub-optimal arousal 85–6 subcultural models 158–9 substance abuse 75, 84–5, 214; see also alcohol consumption sugar intake 83 suicide 202 Sutherland, E.H. 158 Swedish adoption registry 55 Swedish Adoption/Twin Study of Aging 54 Sykes, G.M. 172, 173 symbolic models 159–60 sympathetic nervous system 67–8, 73, 102 Tancredi, L.R. 79 target-hardening 203 Taylor, J. 60 Teague, R. 158 Tellegen, A. 53 temperature 195–6 temporal lobe 71, 79 terminal buttons 66, 68 territoriality 197–9 testosterone 37, 69, 76–7, 88, 103 Thornton, D. 58, 212–13 three-factor theory 100–6 Tilley, N. 204 token economies 155 Tooby, J. 28, 40, 41 toxins, exposure to 84, 214 trait theory of personality 90–106, 113, 137; antisocial personality disorder (APD) and 111–13; behaviourism and 144; causality issue 91; five-factor (Big Five) model 94–5, 101, 111–12; identification of key traits 93–5; measuring traits 96; single-trait approaches 96–100, 105; specificity model 93, 144, 213; stability debate 91–3; super-trait approach: Eysenck’s

three-factor theory of crime 100–6; trait-reduction methods 94 traumatic bonding 32 Trivers, R. 27, 28, 34 Tupes, E.C. 95 twin studies 16, 48, 50–4, 56, 63–4; adolescent-limited versus life-course persistent crime 60; altruism 97; concordance rates 50–1, 53; criminal convictions 50–1, 53; epigenetic changes 119; juvenile delinquency 59; male versus female crime 57; monozygotic twins, reared apart (MZA) 53–4, 63; reported antisocial behaviour 52–3, 97; shared and non-shared environments 116–17 twins: dizygotic (DZ) 46, 50, 51, 52–3, 59, 60, 62, 63; monozygotic (MZ) 46, 50, 51, 52–3, 53–4, 59, 60, 62, 63, 116 two-path career model 6–7 types of criminals 5–7 unconditioned response (UCR) 146, 147 unconditioned stimulus (UCS) 146, 147, 148, 149 uxoricide 31 van Dam, C. 104, 113 van de Ven, J. 171 variable number tandem repeats (VNTP) 61, 75 vicarious conditioning 157 victimisation, purposeful 4 violence, media 159–60 violent offending 30–3, 74, 186; classical conditioning and 150–1; familial experiences and 158; heritability for 58–9; locus of control and 169; see also homicide; robbery Volkow, N.D. 79 voyeurism 149 Waldman, I.D. 56, 57–8, 117 Walsh, A. 4, 39 Walters, G.D. 56 Wasilchick, J. 202 Watson, J. 140, 141, 142–3, 146–7, 148 weapons effect 150–1, 188 weather conditions 195–6, 199, 200 Weaver, I.C. 119 Webb, B. 203 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III) 80 Weiner, B. 168

Index Welsh, B. 214 Westermarck effect 35 Widiger, T.A. 111 wife-killing 31 Wilson, E.O. 30 Wilson, M. 32, 37 Winfree, L.T. Jr. 159 Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 80 Wolf, S. 179–80 women 36; competition for mates 31; heritability of criminality 57–8; property

271

crime 33, 36; sexual selection 30, 33, 39; testosterone levels 77; see also mothers Wortley, R.K. 6, 34–5, 172, 179, 180, 199 Wright, R. 177–8 Yoshimasu, S. 51 Zgoba, K. 34 Zimbardo, P.G. 194–5 Zingraf, M. 122 Zuckerman, M. 98, 99