Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States (A Westview special study)

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Terror and Communist Politics

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About the Book and Editor Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States edited by Jonathan R. Adelman From the Great Purges in the Soviet Union in the late 1930s to the bloody elite purges in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s to the mass terrorism in Cambodia in the middle 1970s, the role of terror and the secret police in Communist politics has been powerful and highly visible. This book reviews the surprisingly sparse literature on the subject and presents new studies of secret-police forces and the political use of terror in the USSR, China, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Cambodia. The focus of each country study is the nature and extent of internal terror and repression, the range of external intelligence functions, and the effect of secret-police interference in internal policymaking processes. The book ably fills a void in the literature by providing needed case studies as well as a theoretical framework for understanding secret-police activity. Jonathan R. Adelman, assistant professor in the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, has recently published two volumes. The Revolutionary Armies (1980) and Communist Armies in Polities, Westview Press (1982).

Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States edited by Jonathan R. Adelman

Westview Press / Boulder and London

A Weetview Special Study

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Copyright

©

1984 by Westview Press, Inc.

Published in 1984 in the United States of America by Westview Press, Inc., 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301; Frederick A. Praeger, President and Publisher

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: ISBN: 0-86531-293-1

84-50189

Composition for this book was provided by the editor Printed and bound in the United States of America 5

4

3

2

1

For Nancy

Contents Acknowledgments

xi

1.

Introduction, Jonathan R, Adelman

1

2.

Terror in Communist Regimes, Alexander Dallin

11

3.

Polish Secret Police, Michael Checinski

17

4.

Soviet Secret Police, Jonathan R. Adelman

79

5.

Romanian Secret Police, Walter Bacon

135

6.

Czechoslovakian Secret Police, Condoleezza Rice

155

7.

Hungarian Secret Police:

The Early Years,

Ferenc Vali

175

8.

Cambodian Secret Police, Kenneth Quinn

195

9.

Toward Creation of a Just Social Order: Politics of Education in the Chinese People's Republic, Marshal Y. Shen

233

10.

Conclusions, Jonathan R. Adelman

About the Contributors Index

267

281 283

ix

Acknowledgments The completion of this book has given me a deeper understanding of the classical tale of Sisyphus. It is a pleasurable task to thank those who made this book possible. My intellectual debts are primarily to Alexander Dallin and Seweryn Bialer. All of the authors of this book were most positive in the endeavor, with a special debt to Michael Checinski and Wally Bacon in this regard. The editors at Westview Press, and especially Miriam Gilbert and Byron Schneider, were most encouraging and helpful throughout the process. My wife, Nancy, my parents, Benjamin and Kitty Adelman, and my in-laws, Larry and Florence Sloane, helped provide a warm, supportive environment throughout the incubation period of this book. And, last, but not least, I thank Liz Isaacson for her careful proofreading and supervision of the typing process, and her typists, Margie Salg, Nancy Delveaux, and Arline Fink.

Jonathan R. Adelman

1 Introduction Jonathan

R.

Adelman

In the almost four decades of the postwar era, a veritable flood of memoirs, novels, plays and even movies have dealt with the topics of Communist (preeminently Soviet) espionage, secret police forces and terror. Western novelists from Ian Fleming to John LeCarre and Len Deighton have painted indelible pictures of "Moscow Center" and Soviet espionage in the West. Soviet memoirists from Eugenia Ginzburg to Alexander Solzhenitsyn have graphically depicted life in the Soviet Gulag. And Western movies, from "The Confession" to "The Spy Who Came In From the Cold" to "The Osterman Weekend" have vividly portrayed Soviet and Eastern European espionage and terror. There seems no end, especially in the current era of revived Soviet-American confrontation, of interest in these subjects for the American populace. And yet, enduring public fascination with these topics has not been matched by academic interest and attention. Indeed, it is amazing precisely how minimal an interest has been displayed in this area. In the first postwar decade the totalitarian theorists, led by Hannah Arendt, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, brought initial intellectual attention to the secret police and terror as integral aspects of Communist regimes.(1) But in terms of theory it was almost two decades until 1971 when the next significant contribution appeared — Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer's Political Terror in Communist Systems, with its structuralfunctional and personality orientation.(2) And in the more than a decade since that work was published, no further works of general interest on terror and the secret police have been produced. What Dallin and Breslauer found in 1971 is still valid in 1984, We soon discovered, to our surprise, that the theoretical literature on political terror was not nearly so well developed as we had expected and that, in particular, there are almost no

2 systematic efforts in this field to compare and to explain differences among various Communist (and non-Communist) systems. (3) Equally apparent has been the notable absence of case studies on individual Communist states. Only the Soviet Union has been studied in any depth, from works in the early postwar years by Barrington Moore, David Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky to more recent works in the 1970s by authors such as Boris Levytsky and Joel Carmichael.(4) On other countries the gap is startling. On countries as critical as China, Poland and Vietnam no books have appeared and for most Communist countries it is hard to turn up even scattered scholarly articles in the area. What makes this lacunae significant is the general academic concensus that terror, espionage and secret police forces are important subjects to a wellintegrated analysis of Communist politics. Indeed, many of the most vital and dramatic events in the history of Communist politics have involved terror, espionage, and the secret police. How can one even conceptualize Soviet politics without reference to the Great Purges, Gulag, Doctors' Plot, and Khrushchev's "secret speech"? How can one speak of Pol Pot's Cambodia without reference to his plan to systematically exterminate a significant proportion of the population? And how can the secret police be ignored in Eastern Europe, where the secret police forces have been omnipresent in supporting largely inauthentic regimes? Furthermore, unlike military leaders who usually (with the notable exception of General Jaruzelski) were disqualified from competing for the top leadership position in Communist countries, secret police chiefs have frequently (and even successfully) bid for supreme power. In Russia Lavrentia Beria enjoyed several months of power as a member of the ruling triumvirate in 1953 before he was arrested and shot. Yuri Andropov's fifteen years as head of the KGB did not stand in his way of achieving the post of Party General Secretary after Brezhnev's death in 1982. In China Hua Guofeng's stint as Minister of Public Security was a way station to his temporary assumption of power after Mao's death. In Eastern Europe both Erich Honecker in East Germany and Stanislaw Kania in Poland directed security affairs for the Party before assuming the top Party leadership position. And in Yugoslavia Aleksandr Rankovic, as secret police chief and Tito's heir apparent, had to be purged in 1966 after he had abused his position and bugged Tito's apartment. Overall, then, secret police chiefs have played a key and visible role in Communist politics, with even the highest positions available to them.

3 Indeed, too, secret police have prominent force in has best expounded

there was the striking fact that the often been a highly visible and Communist states. Seweryn Bialer on this phenomenon,

Far from acting as an anonymous, discreet and secret force, the 'secret' police was an open and recognized political force, glorified and praised in the media, highly visible at all official ceremonies and political assemblies, and extolled by Soviet propaganda as a prime example for emulation. Its high officials were 'elected' to the Soviet parliament and constituted, in fact, from 1936 until Stalin's death, the second largest homogeneous group of deputies. (5) Clearly then there has been a notable gap between the importance of the subject and the academic attention paid to it. As Alexander Dallin points out in the next chapter, many scholars have perceived the subject to be unsavory and lacking in verifiable material. Inevitably official documents are virtually non-existent and secrecy is omnipresent. Yet, a certain amount of material has surfaced and the importance of the subject demands examination. Over time at least five viable approaches to the subject matter have appeared—totalitarianism, structural-functionalism, traditional political culture, personality and barbarism. Historically, totalitarianism was the first and most influential theory of terror and secret police. In the early years of the Cold War it built on an analogy between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski in Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, published in 1956, provided the classic definition of a totalitarian system as including the following six elements: 1. official ideology with chiliastic claims, based on rejection of existing society and conquest of the world for a new society. 2. single mass party led by single dictator and consisting of elite and dedicated membership. 3. system of terroristic police control aimed at "enemies" of the regime and selected classes of the population. 4. technologically perfected near monopoly of control of mass communications. 5. technologically perfected near monopoly of control of armed forces. 6. central control and direction of the entire economy. Special emphasis was placed on the role of terror which

4

increases as the system becomes more stable. Eventually an elaborate terror machinery is created and, as a result, It is at this latter stage that totalitarian terror comes into its own. It aims to fill everyone with fear and vents in full its passion for unanimity. Terror embraces the entire society, searching everywhere for actual or potential deviants from the totalitarian unity. Indeed to many it seems as if they are hunted, even though the secret police may not touch them for years, if at all. Total fear reigns. (6) Of much more recent vintage is the application of structural-functional theory to terror and the secret police. Its classic exposition, in an era in which totalitarianism seemed to be a simplistic and outmoded notion, came in Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer's Political Terror in Communist Systems, published in 1971. Dallin and Breslauer perceived terror as an instrument of political power whose manipulation "can be a rational process, with changes in instrumentalities and processes following changes in goals, available assets and perceived priorities." They emphasized three principal stages of development: 1. takeover stage - "A revolutionary regime tends to rely heavily on coercion to consolidate its power by effectively eliminating actual and potential enemies within the territory under its control and by deterring hostile acts." 2. transformation stage - To accomplish major societal transformation, "Organized teror now serves to ensure compliant behavior during such a period." 3. post-mobilization stage - "Less reliance is placed on coercive power; terror, in particular, tends to be increasingly perceived by the elite as dysfunctional." (7) Another enduring theory has been one seeing in Communist political culture a recrudescence of traditional political culture in new garb. These theorists feel comfortable with the famed French saying, "Plus ca change, plus ca reste la meme." They have especially chosen to concentrate on the Russian case and drawn numerous parallels between Tsarist Russia and Soviet Russia. The most classic example is that of George Kennan who found in Marquis de Custine's famous account of his visit to Tsar Nicholas I's Russia, La Russie en 1839. "an excellent book, probably in fact the best of books, about the Russia of Joseph Stalin, and not a bad book about the Russia of Brezhnev

5 and Kosygin." similarities,

For as Kennan has analyzed the

Here, as though the book had been written yesterday — appear all the familiar features of Stalinism: the absolute power of a single man, his power over thoughts as well as actions; the impermanence and unsubstantiality of all subordinate distinctions of rank and d i g n i t y — the instantaneous transition from lofty station to disgrace and oblivion; the indecent association of sycophancy upwards with brutality downwards, the utter disenfranchisement and helplessness of the popular masses; the nervous punishment of innocent people for the offenses they might be considered capable of committing rather than ones they had committed; the neurotic relationship to the West; the frantic fear of foreign observation; the obsession with espionage; the secrecy; the systematic mystification; the general silence of intimidation. . . (8) Similarly Richard Pipes has argued for the resurgence of traditional culture for the October Revolution cut Russia off from Western culture and eliminated Russia's Westernized elite. For as he declared, The elite which has controlled Russia for the past fifty years may well be irreligious and even militantly atheist: but having come to power on what is in effect an anti-Western program, it has no culture to fall back on except that of Muscovy. These people instinctively think of themselves as a nation sui generis, unique and unrelated to any other, part of no state system or international community, the only guardians of true Orthodoxy, once Christian, now Communist. (9) And finally, even that leading proponent of totalitarianism, Zbigniew Brzezinski, citing numerous similarities between pre- and post-revolutionary Russia, has more recently argued, The Bolshevik revolution not only was not a break from the predominant political tradition, but was, in historical perspective, an act of revitalized Restoration. . . The overthrow of that (Romanov) ruling elite brought to power a new group, much more vital, much more assertive, and imbued with a new sense of historical mission. The political result of the Bolshevik revolution was thus revitalized restoration of long dominant patterns. (10)

6

Another theory of increasing popularity has focused on the personality of the leader. Inspired by psychology, psycho-historians such as Robert Tucker and Richard Solomon have written biographies of Stalin and Mao. As Robert Tucker has written about Stalin in 1929, Here, then, was an historic instance—neither the first nor the l a s t — i n which a leader's personality acquired critical importance. A basic element of the ominous situation taking shape in the Soviet Communist party at the end of 1929 was the discrepancy between Stalin's way of perceiving himself and the way a great many in the party perceived him. He was under stringent inner pressure to keep the idealized Stalin-figure steadily and clearly in focus and to shut out everything of his past that moved it. . . In the terror of the thirties, untold thousands of loyal party members and other Soviet citizens would have to be condemned as covert enemies of the people so that Djugashvili could prove to himself and Russia that he was really Stalin. (11) Similarly, Soviet dissident authors on both the left and right, from Roy Medvedev to Anton AntonovOvseeyenko, in the last several years have emphasized the role of personality, especially Stalin's, in Soviet politics. While Anton Antonov-Ovseyeenko has aptly entitled his book, The Time. of Stalin — & Portrait of. Tyranny. Roy Medvedev, in On Stalin and Stalinism has proclaimed, I continue to believe that the terror was basically prompted by Stalin's inordinate vanity and lust for power: he was determined to be in a position of absolute control, ruling as an autocrat, with no restraints of any kind. He promoted the 'cult of personality' in order to claim credit for non-existent services to the Party and to the young Soviet state at the time of its foundation. And when it seemed that the basic cadres of the Party and state were obstacles in the way of achieving these goals, Stalin did not hesitate to destroy them all, just as he had not hesitated when it was a question of well-to-do peasants or 'bourgeois speculators.' (12) The prominent role of key Communist leaders such as Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot in fostering the Great Purges, Cultural Revolution and "purification" of Cambodia has enhanced interest in personality theory. A final theory is the "barbaric" one, which sees Communism as inherently inhumane and barbarous, as

7 requiring repression and coercion on a large scale. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has become in recent years the major exponent of this theory. Most notably in his massive work, The Gulag Archipelago. Solzhenitsyn has documented the existence of terror, camps and coercion in Russia from shortly after the October Revolution. He has argued that "the (Gulag) Archipelago was born with the shots of the cruiser Aurora." Seeing Communism as inherently contradictory to the basic interests of the people, Solzhenitsyn has stressed the innate barbarism of the system, In various parts of our country we find a certain piece of sculpture: a plaster guard with a police dog which is straining forward in order to sink its teeth into someone. In Tashkent there is one right in front of the NKVD school, and in Ryazan it is like a symbol of the city, the one and only monument if you approach from the direction of Mikhailov. And we do not even shudder in revulsion. We have become accustomed to these figures setting dogs onto people as if they were the most natural things in the world. Setting the dogs onto us. (13) These, then, are at least five theories in search of the reality of terror, repression and secret police power in Communist countries. They focus on different levels of the system and with different impacts. While the totalitarian, barbaric and traditional political culture theories project a relatively static and changeless Communist reality, structural-functional and personality theories project evolution and change over time in Communist states. While totalitarianism and barbarism posit high and ever higher levels of political repression and secret police power, structural-functionalism posits a wavelike progress from lower to higher and then back to lower levels of coercion. Drawing from many diverse sources—sociology (structural-functionalism), psychology (personality theory), history (traditional political culture theory) and political science (totalitarianism) — these theories offer a wide variety of possible interpretations. Nor do these five theories cover the entire field of possible explanations for Communist secret police behavior and repression. One key question is the extent to which secret police forces are internationalized. For example, how strong a role has the Soviet secret police played in Eastern Europe or, more recently, the Vietnamese security forces in Laos and Cambodia? A second significant possible explanation is that of revolutionary political culture, as opposed to traditional political culture. To what

8 extent, as I have suggested elsewhere, have key differences in Communist political culture, arising from different paths of pre-state revolutionary developments, impacted on the role of secret police and terror in countries such as Russia and China? (14) And, equally importantly, what differences exist between states with strong revolutionary traditions (as Russia, China, Vietnam and Yugoslavia) and those lacking such traditions (primarily Eastern Europe), where power was given to the Communists (except in Czechoslovakia) by external intervention? A third possible factor is the international political environment. If, as Harold Lasswell has suggested, a threatening international political environment promotes a "national security syndrome" and enhanced role for the military, does it also promote a heightened role for repression and the secret police domestically? (15) Was it merely coincidental that the Russian Great Purges, Chinese Cultural Revolution and Cambodian reign of terror all occurred at times of heightened international tension? Finally, there are considerations of the overall level of economic and political development. Does the creation of a legitimate and effective military and other capable bureaucratic rivals limit the role of the secret police? What is the overall role of political legitimacy in determining the role of the secret police? These questions too need to be answered. In this collection of essays, the authors address the general problems of secret police, terror and coercion from a variety of viewpoints. Four Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Czechoslovakia), the Soviet Union and Cambodia are treated in this book. A further chapter on China challenges most of the traditional modes of analysis of the topic. Inevitably, a number of interesting countries—most notably, Cuba, Vietnam and Y u g o s l a v i a — are not discussed. But at least enough case studies are provided so that some generalizations will be possible in the concluding chapter. NOTES 1. See Carl Friedrich and zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger, 1961) and Hannah Arendt, Ine. Origins fif Totalitarianism (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958). 2. Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 7 1 ) . 3. Ibid., p. vii. 4. For the early postwar years, see Barrington Moore, Terror and Progress—USSR (New York: Harper and

9 Row, 1 9 5 4 ) , David Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955) and David Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky, Forced Labor in Soviet Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947). For works of the 1970s see Boris Levytsky, The. Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Service 1917-1970. translated by H.A. Piehler (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1971) and Joel Carmichael, Stalin's Masterpiece (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1 9 7 6 ) . 5. Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) , p. 14. 6. Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp. 9-10, 137. 7. Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems, pp. 5-9. 8. George Kennan, The Marquis de Custine and His Russia in 1839 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 124-125. 9. Richard Pipes, U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era Of Detente (Boulder: Westview Press, 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 5. 1 0 . Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past?," in Paul Cocks, Robert Daniels, Nancy Heer, editors, The Dynamics of Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) , p. 340. 11. Robert Tucker, Stalin As Revolutionary (New York: W.W. Norton, 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 493. 1 2 . See Roy Medvedev, On Stalin and Stalinism, translated by Ellen de Kadt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 9 7 9 ) , p. III and Anton Antonov-Ovseeyenko, The Time Of Stalin-A Portrait of Tyranny, translated by George Saunder (New York: Harper and Row, 1 9 8 0 ) . 13. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago Two, translated by Thomas Whitney (New York: Harper and Row, 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 9, 655. 14. See Jonathan R. Adelman, "The Impact of Civil Wars on Communist Political Culture: The Chinese and Russian Cases," Studies in Comparative Communism, v. XVI, nos. 1 and 2 (Spring/Summer 1 9 8 3 ) , pp. 25-48. 1 5 . See Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today," in Samuel Huntington, editor, Changing Patterns of Military Politics. (New York: Free Press, 1 9 6 2 ) , pp. 51-69.

2 Terror in Communist Regimes Alexander

Dallin

Political terror has often been viewed as a distinguishing hallmark of Communist regimes—neither unique to them nor ubiquitous but so characteristic as to evoke stereotypes of purges, Gulag, and brainwashing. Yet the subjects of Communist "justice," political mass terror, the secret police, and the labor camps were neglected in scholarly literature for a surprisingly long time. At times deemed suspect as significant elements of life under Communism, they w e r e — i t may be surmised—slighted as topics of research (at least until the 1950s) for several reasons. For one thing, some of the eye-witness accounts by survivors and escapees—initially, from the Soviet U n i o n — w e r e so appalling as to raise doubts about their veracity. For another, there were of course no official Soviet sources and virtually no independent accounts by Western observers to corroborate the stories. Beyond that, academic analysts used to consider topics such as terror and propaganda somehow cheap and unworthy of treatment, and many among them feared being used for political ends and succumbing to exaggerations regarding Communist practices and institutions. Most important perhaps, much of what happened in the secret police empire in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe remained simply unknown to the outside world. Since then, things have changed some because, piece by piece, sources and studies have at least partially helped fill the gaps in our knowledge and understanding. Memoirs by former officials and inmates, compilations by conscience-stricken activists in the Communist world, some retrospective official publications of documents, recollections contributed by foreigners who had "done time" in Communist prisons and camps, and academic case studies have been among these materials. It was above all the theory of totalitarianism that probably helped legitimize in Western academic

12 circles the study of terror and the secret police, since it identified terror and the institutions that practice it as one of the defining characteristics of totalitarian systems. (1) The adequacy or otherwise of the totalitarian model for the analysis of Communist regimes is a different matter; at least insofar as the role of terror is concerned, that question is addressed elsewhere in this book. But, while there has been increased interest in the topics here discussed, there have also been continuing problems both with the evidence of Communist practice and with the theorizing concerning it. No doubt personal, journalistic and academic accounts have at times needlessly overstated—innocently or o t h e r w i s e — a painful and shameful reality. No doubt, in other instances we have been inclined to question what was too far from the parameters of our own experience. No less important, we have heretofore all too often failed to consider the scattered data in a broader, comparative framework to assess the record of the various Communist regimes. Finally, our quest needs to be pressed further for answers to the question, "Why?" In recent years public attention to the use of terror in Communist systems has been eclipsed by dramatic instances of anti-regime terrorism by a variety of groups and gangs, from the Red Brigades in Italy to urban guerrillas in Latin America, from Islamic fundamentalists to the Baader-Meinhof gang in West Germany. And yet the past decade has also seen a number of fascinating developments regarding the role and saliency of the secret police in Communist polities, such as the wholesale retreat from the extremes of the Cultural Revolution in China, revelations concerning the mass exterminations in Pol Pot's Kampuchea, the creeping, routinized but carefully contained reassertion of the KGB in the Soviet Union, and the virtual absence of political mass terror in a few "socialist" societies such as Hungary. These developments provide interesting data for the study of terror in a comparative framework. Some confusion may be avoided if a clear distinction is maintained between political terror as a means of government policy (as the present volume deals with i t ) , and terrorism as anti-regime action, usually by extremist individuals or groups (which is outside the scope of this group of papers). Along with the effort to document the activity of the secret police and to understand both the purposes and the ups and downs in resort to political terror, interest has also centered, quite properly, on the search for the mainsprings of terror policies in Communist regimes. As the editor makes clear more systematically, explanatory hypotheses have ranged far

13 and wide. They have included attempts to apply contemporary social-science thinking to the topic, as well as efforts to explain terror and the secret police in historical and cultural terms; they have led to the application of structural-functional patterns and personality theories as well as to arguments attributing them to specifically or even uniquely Russian (or other ethnic and racial) traits. Some of these have regrettably been rather simplistic. The search for single masterkeys to the functioning of societies, polities, or economies tells us more about ourselves than about the objects we seek to fathom. Monistic explanations of history fall as short of the mark as do simplistic macro-theories of economics; and single-variable accounts of human motivation do no better. To point this out is not to argue that the pursuit of etiology is a futile chase, nor to imply that the number of variables is infinite or that they are inherently unmeasureable. It should not be a surprise then if the application to the study of terror of the method of "focused comparisons" through a series of case studies yields both transnationally and longitudinally significant similarities as well as important differences and variations. In most concise form, it might be argued that in our search for an explanatory scheme a functional model of successive stages of development, coupled with the notion of a mobilization system, serves more satisfactorily than the conceptual alternatives to be found in the professional literature. But such a model needs to be modified considerably to explain what has actually taken p l a c e — f o r instance, in pre-1953 Czechoslovakia, in Pol Pot's Kampuchea, in Stalin's Russia, or in Cuba under Fidel. And the three major correctives to the developmental hypothesis (or structural-functionalist perspective, as some prefer to label it) turn out to be rather common-sensical variables: — t h e political culture of a given society; — t h e personality of the leader (or of the top elite); and — e x o g e n o u s factors, such as the Soviet role which made East European conditions which impose special needs and constraints on a given system. We can assume that these intervening variables may but need not be overriding; they can be temporary in their impact (as shown, for instance, in the changes that obtained after Stalin and M a o ) ; at times they may be all but invisible. But as a working hypothesis their inclusion seems deserved. In simplest (perhaps excessively simple) terms,

14 what we find, then, is the applicability of an analogy to humans—individuals, families, and tribes. At some level, all humans share certain physiological and behavioral attributes and characteristics: so do all political systems, Communist and non-Communist alike. At another level, all members of the same clan or tribe share some physical or behavioral traits which tend to distinguish them from o t h e r s — a n d so all Communist systems have (with regard to the use of terror, for instance) certain inclinations and practices which, while not unique, tend to set them apart from many other contemporary polities. But, just as individuals vary one from another, even within the same family, and just as the same individual may over time "outgrow" certain proclivities, change values and priorities, and vary styles of behavior, so Communist systems in different nations show important variations, and prove to undergo significant changes over the course of time—changes associated precisely with the varying "weight" of the three modifying variables suggested above. None of this is surprising. It is reassuring to find one's earlier assertions and findings validated by others, at a later date, against a broader canvas of evidence. Not that my earlier analysis was beyond reproach (I am speaking only of my own contribution to a book which was the product of dual authorship) (2): as is often the case with historical evidence, events do not readily conform to the artificial neatness and simplicity which social-science designs and models project onto, and require of, them. The task then is to explain what intervened to modify or complicate the outcomes, or to allow and account for further variation. Several general points emerge from this volume which deserve to be underlined. It is natural and refreshing that all the contributors to this volume do not agree on everything (even if for purposes of rigorous comparison one would have wished for more symmetrical treatments of different countries). In contrast to the arguments of the proponents of the "totalitarian" school, the evidence in this volume argues against a "rational actor model" and supports the case for the importance of elite politics in Communist systems. As for the view that Soviet terror was largely the product of historical Russian brutality and secretiveness, the evidence argues that this is at best a highly inadequate view. If that were the principal ingredient, one would be led to expect t h a t — i f not in Eastern Europe, where the Communist secret police systems were introduced with the active aid and under the control of the Soviet Union, then s u r e l y — i n authentic Communist regimes elsewhere, be it China,

15 Kampuchea, or Cuba—political mass terror would not be found on such a scale. In that case, one would also not expect and could not readily explain the significant diminution of mass terror since Stalin. As for the question whether all Communist systems "need" terror, the answer may not yet be in. It is certainly the case that the use of terror, as a mass phenomenon and as an instrument purposively and centrally applied, has varied greatly, with the paroxysms of the Stalin purges, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the Karapuchean exterminations at one extreme, and certain periods in Khrushchev's USSR, recent Poland, and contemporary Hungary as instances at the other pole. It is also interesting how in virtually every instance of a popular upheaval in a Communist society—say, Prague 1968 or Gdansk 1 9 8 0 — t h e substantial diminution of police powers and an end to terror figure prominently among the political priorities of the day. Yet in such instances the return to a more extensive application of terror — whether more overt or more subtle — always remains a possibility; the institutional framework perdures on a stand-by basis even if the policy-makers appear to have learned that—because terror is dysfunctional or because terror is immoral—it is smarter to substitute other forms of social and political control if indeed one may assume that fundamentally the existing order is perceived as legitimate. But of course the widespread knowledge that political terror might return, should those in power deem it necessary, is in some respects the equivalent of and serves the same deterrent purpose as resort to demonstration terror. The cases in this volume illustrate a number of interesting propositions, only a few of which can be singled out here. The experience of Czechoslovakia is remarkable in showing that the "vulgar" model of terror as something associated with the traditional absence of pluralism and high levels of socio-economic development reflects far too primitive an approach (as indeed the case of Nazi Germany had shown earlier as w e l l ) . The role of the Soviet Union and Stalinism is an essential element in the explanation of the Czechoslovak experience. But it is also important to recognize variations among the "derivative" East European Communist polities. If, unlike its neighbors, Poland was able to resist Soviet pressure for bloody purges in the Stalin days, this must be ascribed to a combination of situational factors (such as the role of the Church) , the earlier experience of the Polish Communist elite with Moscow (such as the Soviet "liquidation" of the Polish Party in 1 9 3 8 ) , and the role of individuals in the Polish leadership willing to take a chance in holding their ground. The authors would no doubt agree that there are

16 many questions yet to be investigated and cleared up. Thus the role of the secret police in Communist elite politics remains to be studied more systematically; the tension between the terror machine as a servant of the Party leadership and its tendency to make itself into "an empire within an empire" (or even to place itself above the other principal institutions) needs resolution; the effects of the termination of mass terror on popular compliance, perceived legitimacy, and expression of dissidence deserve further attention. Questions of fact such as the number of Soviet labor camp inmates have been the object of earnest if bitter disagreements. (3) The psychiatric confinement of Soviet dissidents has provoked controversy which deserves further exploration. The whole phenomenon of "routinized terror" needs rethinking. Perhaps the informative chapters that make up this book and the stimulating insights scattered throughout its pages will encourage further work on these and other questions. NOTES 1. See Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and. Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 5 6 ) ; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 5 6 ) . 2. The reference is to Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 7 0 ) . 3. See, e.g., S.G. Wheatcroft, "Towards a Thorough Analysis of Soviet Forced Labor Statistics," Soviet Studies. April 1983, pp. 223-37, and sources cited therein.

Polish Secret Police Michael

Checinski

The Background of the Power of the Police State The postwar history of Poland, particularly recent political developments, make the analysis of Communist terror exciting and difficult. Poland is the only Communist state to have experienced political shake-ups nine times in the thirty-eight years of its postwar history. Between 1945-1947, a civil war cost 30,000 lives. In June 1956, mass workers' strikes in Poznan led to a bloody battle with the police and military in which more than 100 people were killed. In October 1956, a mass national shake-up brought serious personnel changes in the ruling Party and administration. In March-April 1968, Poland throbbed with mass student demonstrations and strikes. By December 1970, bloody battles with workers on the Baltic coast brought a change to the ruling Politburo. Many people were killed and hundreds were wounded. By 1976, a new wave of strikes and police brutality produced unprecendented resistance from dissident organizations which subsequently created the mood for a desperate strike in August 1980 in the shipyards of Gdansk and Szczecin. For the first time in Communist history, this strike led to the creation of a mass

Parts of this study are based on previous works published by the author: (1) The. Postwar Development of the Polish Armed Forces, (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corportion, 1 9 7 9 ) , a part of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier, US Air Forces project, and (2) Poland; Communism, Nationalism. AntiSemitism. (New York: Karz Publishers, 1 9 8 2 ) . I wish to express my gratitude to Rand and Karz Publishers for permission to use these materials. I am also thankful to Professor David E. Powell, Harvard University, for his useful comments and to Professor Jonathan R. Adelman, University of Denver, for his contribution in editing this work.

18 independent trade union organization, "Solidarity." After 17 months of unprecedented labor and political freedom, Poland was again pushed back by the martial law imposed on December 13, 1981 into the darkness of a terrorized country, with the use of mass militarized police and security units. Despite the terror, there were many clashes between workers and the police forces during 1982 and 1983 in factories and mines all over the country. The victims at once became new symbols of the brutality of the ruling stratum and its estrangement from the people. As almost every state has its secret service and intelligence service, the problem is to indicate those activities that are specific for Communist political terror. Our aim is to describe the specifically Polish aspects of Communist political terror, its functional structure and activities. As a totalitarian state, Poland inevitably shares many of the well-known characteristics of the Soviet system, but the regime has also devised its own particular "solutions" in the successive stages of its post-war history. The Communist terror apparatus, contrary to popular opinion, has never been an independent social power which tends to destroy its own Party, military elite, or other mainstays of the political system. It was also never proved that "irregularities" of the Soviet, Polish, or other Communist terror apparatuses were the result of a Party "overruled" and betrayed by the secret service. The terror apparatus, primarily an instrument of the Soviet rulers, operated in the whole postwar history under the full and permanent control of the Party leader and his subordinates. This dual role has generated factional conflicts which came to the surface at critical moments and which are felt all the way from the top Party elite through the different groups in the political constellation and the various sections of the secret services. Though divided in this way and manipulated both by domestic and foreign rulers, the security system has operated as an integral part of the political system. Carrying out a variety of functions, it has by and large strengthened the Party bureaucracy. The Communist secret police in Poland remained an integrated part of the whole political system. They act, not only to terrorize the political opposition, but also to "unify" Party cliques, to collect correct information about the political views and moods of the population, both inside the country or of emigres around the world, and to influence the political development and activities of various social groups and political movements at home and outside the country. The "pure" political function of the Communist secret police is no less important than its terrorist role. First, the political function of the Communist secret

19 police is its most distinctive feature compared to nonCommunist terror organizations of dictatorial and authoritarian states. The second specific feature of the Communist secret police is that they have permanently violated the laws created by their own legislature. This is important because the system must operate within a political program which it is unable and unwilling to fulfill, yet is sole justification for the power of the new elite. The necessity of permanently admiring the prerevolution Communist ideology and political program creates some difficulties for the Party rulers and the secret police, but this admiration also supplies some important advantages. Gulags, thousands of "guilty" and innocent victims, and the violation of law and order are more easily motivated by the mirage of the "more important" and unspecified "further" socialist goals and values. These "values" help to entice young and inexperienced followers into the Socialist/Communist secret police and are extremely useful for the cynical and pragmatic elite of the terror apparatus in its relationships with world Marxist movements. Another specific feature of the Communist political police is that it operates not only in the framework of a totalitarian system, but in a state where the whole economy is under the complete control of the government. This gives the secret police a tremendous range of additional instruments for pressure, blackmail, and corruption. The centralized economy is also the source of secret, uncontrolled financial outlays to expand the size and power of secret activity. Neither the Party nor the secret police has the physical power to rule over and terrorize the entire population. The real power is centered in the hands of the army and the principal police units. A precondition for the Party's rule is therefore Party control of and supervision over these two foci of power in the country. If the police and its secret arm, counter-intelligence, is manipulated together with the army by a foreign state (in this context the USSR, of course) and there is no legal or political way of preventing or stopping this, then clearly the real power of the Polish Party elite is restricted. There is, however, another side to this: the fact that this interference from the outside is accepted, or at least tolerated internationally as in some sense legitimate, permits the use of harsher physical terror in crises when the domestic police and army are shaken by unexpected developments affecting national interests and sentiments. This configuration of power foci, partly domestic and partly foreign, means that an analysis of the role

20 of terror must cover both Polish and Soviet political, military and economic aims. THE ORIGIN AND TASKS OF THE REPRESSION APPARATUS We begin with a look at the main goals of the USSR in Poland and the methods used by the GPU, NKVD, and KGB in the non-Russian Soviet republics, transferred in great part after 1945 into Eastern Europe. After the Yalta conference early in 1945, Moscow strove to do everything to insure the presence of the Soviet army and KGB in Poland and to subordinate it militarily, politically and economically. Stalin and his successors were convinced that the working class of Poland would not be willing and able to build a stable and credible consensus for Soviet domination. Stalin wonderfully understood the depth of Polish anti-Russian sentiment, fed by Tsarist occupation of Poland and reinforced by Soviet annexation of the eastern third of the country. He know, too, the power of the Catholic Church in a country now 95% Roman Catholic. The Polish Communist Party in 193 8 had been dissolved, the only one in Europe to suffer this fate and most of the Party leaders were liquidated in Russia. Between 1940-1945 Poland had a well-organized patriotic military underground (Armia Krakow) and a popular legal government in exile in London. It was, therefore, impossible to subordinate Poland to Moscow only by using mass terror. Both Stalin and his Polish Communist subordinates combined political terror (as in Russia after the revolution) with a broad range of social and nationally important changes. The mass terror could not be effective without such steps as incorporating the former Eastern German territory and a number of important social changes: a progressive system of education, health services, housing, land reform, and other popular social reforms. Declarations that the rulers were not Communists and only wanted to build a new and just social system within the framework of an absolutely independent Poland and the social policy introduced in these years help explain why resistance to the proSoviet government was quickly destroyed and why the Communists succeeded step by step in cooling off antiSoviet movements. After the political situation was stabilized, and Poland had started to build up its economic and social life, the secret police grew dramatically more powerful. It became not only an assistant to the Party and military, but a substitute for them. The growing power of the secret police and the whole system of repressions (prosecutors, censorship, political falsification and indoctrination) were in the first postwar years manipulated by Moscow in full with little

21 support from Polish decision makers. Using the Polish Party, Soviet advisors and Soviet agents inside the Polish ruling elite, the USSR developed a very efficient system of manipulating and controlling all Polish political, economic and especially military activities. Poland is probably the only partner in the Warsaw Treaty Organization which maintained three and even four separate secret police and intelligence service organizations. The first and most powerful was the military counterintelligence called Informacja. Created before Poland became a puppet government in 1944, Informacja played a crucial role not only in penetrating and controlling the Polish army, but in almost all political terror activities between 1944-1956. After changing its organizational structure and name from Informacja to Wojskowa Sluzba Wewnetrzna (WSW) (Military Internal Service) in 1957, it still continued the repressive traditions of Informacja into the eighties. A second organization was the civilian security service, called Ministerstwo Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego (Ministry of Internal Security), which from the end of the fifties acted as an integral but dominating part of the Ministry for Internal Affairs (Ministertwo Spraw Wewnetrznyeh - M S W ) . Presently, the internal civilian security service still includes the civilian intelligence service. The third separate repressive organization was the Tenth Department of the Ministry of Internal Security. The Tenth Department operated between 1949 and 1955 as an independent and most menacing security organization in the post-war history of Poland. The fourth organization was and remains the Second Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. Subordinate to the Chief of Staff as a military intelligence service, it cooperates closely with the civilian intelligence service, and the KGB, and is sometimes exploited by the military counterintelligence also for different internal political goals and provocations. The existence of various and formally separate security organizations would play a significant role in a number of crucial political events. The divided security organizations competed with one another in serving Soviet supervisors. This competition dimmed the principal goal of all four stages of Communist terror, the seizing of power by the new elite and the new bureaucracy. In addition, they had to fight not only for their own victory but for the most alienated and difficult goal of the Polish take-over period: to force the nation to accept the dominant position of Russia — a traditionally deeply hated dictatorial superpower in Poland.

22 But even after 1956 when the internal repression system was carried out only by Poles (there were only after that time single Soviet advisors), the Polish nation treated it as instrumental primarily for Moscow and only in a small degree for its own Party bureaucracy. This feeling probably played a role in other Warsaw Pact countries, but in no other was its emotional power so deep and so politically sensitive. This attitude was, however, gradually modified at various stages after 1956, when there were signs of at least partial autonomy in the conduct of domestic affairs. The armed forces, now totally Polish, seemed to be showing a better understanding of Polish traditions and hopes. As we shall show, these bonds between the nation and an army backed by the terror apparatuses broke down on the hard realities of the communist system, which proved impotent to act in the national interest or even on behalf of its own ruling elite. POLISH REPRESSION APPARATUS IN THE TAKEOVER AND MOBILIZATION STAGES: 1945-1947, 1948-1960 Polish Military Counterintelligence

(Informacja)

After the evacuation of Anders Army from the USSR to Iran, Stalin recruited in Russia his own Polish army (The First Kosciuszko Division). Simultaneously, the most important task of SMERSH was to create a Polish military counterintelligence counterpart called Informacja. Informacja imitated the structure and modus operandi of its parent organization, including its political and police functions, going far beyond the usual scope of a counterintelligence outfit. Almost all of its leading personnel were Russians, enabling it to become later the first, most important, and most powerful instrument of Soviet domination in Poland. As the Soviet army crossed the prewar Polish frontiers in 1944, SMERSH developed its offensive activities and was entrusted with more and more purely political functions. The anti-German focus of Informacja was gradually replaced by reconnaissance and combatting of any actual or potential resistance to Soviet domination in Poland. Until November 1944, the military counterintelligence of the Polish army was formally an integrated part of SMERSH. On November 1, 1944 this key military organization took the name Informacja and was subordinated formally to the Polish Ministry of Defense. By this time its organizational structure was finally established and adapted to its future police and political functions. However, these functions were put into the framework of the Polish military and

23 national traditions, waiting until the time when the pro-Soviet repression apparatus was deeply settled within the Polish army. The importance of exploiting Polish national traditions was obvious to the Soviet organizers and to the Polish Communists. Every effort was made to conceal the "socialist" character of the army and of the future political system. By stressing the national nature of the struggle, the need to rebuild the ravaged country and important social and economic reforms, the Soviets and their Polish sympathizers succeeded in obscuring the true objectives of the Soviet policy in Poland. In the first postwar years, these tactics helped recruit many cadres of the pre-war Polish army. By 1947, nearly one-half of the commmanding and staff officers had served in the pre-war Polish army, while one-third were Soviet officers in Polish uniform.(1) Most of the old Polish officers were subsequently ousted from the political scene in Poland and cashiered from the military; many were arrested and condemned to long prison terms or even sentenced to death. But their use enhanced the prestige of the Communists with the Polish population and helped military counterintelligence, which badly needed political collaborators to cool off the very active political and even armored resistance. These collaborators helped to mask the pro-Soviet and pro-Communist character of the army, which was then in its formative stages. Repressions against non-Communist groups were kept minimal. Political indoctrination was conducted not by army Party cells but by units ostensibly engaged in socalled "Social Work Circles." Officers of Jewish origin were pressured to adopt Polish-sounding names and surnames, and command of the Polish language was required of all Soviet officers holding representative posts. The tactics employed against the anti-Communist opposition movement were, therefore, not based only on brutal repressions. A tremendous effort was being aimed at gaining public sympathy for the new, unpopular authorities. The Soviet SMERSH was for that reason interested in pushing Poland into a bloody civil war. The leadership of the armed anti-Communist resistance failed to grasp the fact that by killing their fellow countrymen they were playing into Moscow's hands. This helped the repression apparatus to stress that its only desire was to restore law and order to a country "thrown" into chaos by the occupants and by "criminal elements alike." The Soviet tactic disoriented not only their enemies, but also some leading Polish Communists. When in November 1944, Informacja was subordinated to Marian Spychalski, Polish First Deputy Minister of Defense, he stressed the process of its "polonization." This in no

24

way limited the key role of Soviet advisors and officers. As the police and political role of the military counterintelligence grew, the power of SMERSH also increased. Spychalski contributed to the growing role of the Soviet security service by initiating the political espionage function of the military counter intelligence. The conflict with Yugoslavia and the events of 1948-1949 led to the replacement of the Polish Marshal Michal Zymierski by the Russian Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky as Minister of Defense, and the Polish Colonel Stefan Kuhl, head of Informacja. by his deputy, Soviet Colonel Dmitri Voznesensky, in November 1949. Informacja's supervision over the military, and involvement in Polish politics became ever more pervasive. This started with the well prepared arrest of the generals in the Tatar-Utnik-Kirchmayer group, leading to the arrest of Spychalski himself and other high ranking officers from the military intelligence service. These arrests prepared the ground for arresting Wladyslaw Gomulka by the Tenth Department of the civilian security service, which acted in full coordination with the Soviet heads of Informacja — Dmitri Voznesensky and Anatoly Skulbashevsky. Fearing that the Soviet officers in the Polish army might fall under disruptive Polish liberal or national influence, SMERSH kept them under the close surveillance of a special Informacja department (headed by a Soviet Colonel Shalygin). Polish Chief-of-Staff, General Wladyslav Korczyc, was returned to the USSR in 1954, for being too "polonized." Polish Minister of Defense Rokossovsky feared Voznesensky and with good reason: his functions included that of spying on his superior commander and keeping Moscow informed about his every step. Formally Voznesensky, as Polish Informacja chief, was subordinated to Rokossovsky and responsible to the Polish Party Politburo (personally to Boleslaw Bierut, Jakub Berman and Franciszek Mazur). In practice he reported directly to Moscow, to Abakumov or to Beria. Reports submitted to the Polish Party Politburo were either incomplete or full of misinformation. From the very beginning of People's Poland this method of deliberate misinformation had been introduced on Moscow's orders into the Polish civilian as well as the military security services. When in 1945 a representative of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), Henryk Wachowicz, was appointed Deputy Minister of Public Security, he was systematically supplied with emasculated "top secret" reports. Copies were simultaneously sent to Berman, Bierut and Gomulka, who knew they were fakes, while Wachowicz had not the slightest idea.(2) As powerful as Voznesensky was, even he was not

25 supreme. Semyon Davidov was the KGB's real viceroy of Poland. He was head of all the Soviet officers and advisors, both military and civilian, and one of the chief architects of Polish security and intelligence services. Officially Davidov held the relatively modest post of head of Soviet advisors in Poland; but without his agreement no serious operational decisions on any questions pertaining to political and police terror or provocation were ever taken, although in official Polish publications his name has been mentioned only once.(3) Davidov had at his disposal a network of his own, with headquarters in a suburb of Warsaw. His was a dual role. He supervised the activities of the Soviet advisors in all the mainstays of real power in Poland (the armed forces, the security service, the Party apparatus, the state administration, industry, e t c . ) . In addition, Davidov was responsible for the setting up, operational control and decisionmaking of the entire Polish apparatus of terror, including the security officials. All his interventions, therefore, both in operational and personnel questions were regarded by Informacja. the Ministry of Security Service, and also by the Politburo of the Polish party, as "his Master's Voice." All Soviet advisors and Soviet officers in Polish uniforms retained a dual Party membership: they belonged simultaneously to the Polish Party (PPR, later PZPR) and to the CPSO. In the Polish army headquarters they had a so-called "part-org" of their own, which acted under the directives of Moscow. At the same time they belonged to Polish Party cells or committees in the Polish army and could influence all current decisions. Between 1944-1954, in all Polish army units, a candidate for secretary of a Party cell, even before his "election," had to obtain prior approval from an appropriate officer of the Informacja and this in fact from KGB. The first Polish members of Informacja came mainly from the Armia Ludowa units, from the Dabrowski Brigade from the Spanish Civil War, and from the pre-war Polish and French Communist Parties. Few came from the Polish army organized in 1943 in the USSR. The few Polish pre-war Communists were gradually removed from service in Informacja. The bulk of the younger cadres directed to the service through the Informacja school were young Poles (20-25 years old) with a relatively modest education and totally lacking in political experience. Informacja was dominated by Russians. In 19491954, during the most intensive terror, there were at most 15-20 Poles including 5-7 of Jewish extraction, out of the 100-120 staff officers in the central and district headquarters. The absolute ruler of the sanguinary Investigation Department was Colonel Anatoly Skulbashevsky who, together with Colonel Voznesensky,

26

played the most prominent role in the reign of terror in Poland; both were Soviet officers. The Investigation Department of Informacja dominated the military judicature. In 1944-1955 most political trials in Poland were prepared by the Tnformacja — that is by SMERSH (later K G B ) . All military judges, prosecutors, and other officials were selected, appointed and confirmed by the Informacja. In the years of Stalinist terror, a military judge or prosecutor who dared to refuse any demand made by the Tnformacja could easily find himself in the dock or even — in extreme cases — in a death cell. Supreme Court judges supplied Informacja officers with blank detention orders or orders for the prolongation of preventative arrest, without even bothering to check the dossier or to question the grounds for detention.(4) This kind of legal subordination of the military judicature to the orders of the secret police changed after October 1956, but only for a short time. In the early sixties the old system of psychological and moral pressure employed by the military secret police over the legislature was renewed and remained in operation even during the months of the activity of legal "Solidarity."(5) Even such wide powers to appoint prosecutors and judges to deal with the cases prepared by the Informacja investigation officers were, in the first postwar decade, deemed unsatisfactory by the Soviet authorities. After 1949, Soviet officers were appointed as advisors of the most important military judicature offices both to the Supreme Military Court, to the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office and to the Military Justice Department (later renamed the Military Judicature Directorate). All cases investigated by the Fourth (Investigation) Department in the Main Informacja Directorate were "supervised" on behalf of the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office by another Soviet officer in Polish uniform; it was he who held the prosecutor's brief in the famous case of the 19 senior army and navy commanders, sentenced to death and executed in the 1950s. Except for one member who was a Jew, no other name was ever mentioned during the "settling of scores" in October 1956 — nor in March 1968 — and of course never by the quasi-nationalistic "Grunwald" in 1981. By the second half of 1947, the armed struggle against the political underground was virtually over, and the legal opposition was defeated. The Communist regime was definitely in command. Thanks to a rapid reconstruction of the war-ravaged national economy during the Three Year Plan (1946-1948), a considerable part of the population, hitherto hostile to Communist rule, seemed ready to accept the inevitable. However, one year later, the great witch-hunt began in all the

27 satellite countries, directed against the Communists' former allies and "unreliable" local Communists. In Poland, this was the era of denunciation of Gomulka's "right-wing nationalist deviation." The Informacja was among the very first to receive Moscow's new guidelines to purge the Polish armed forces of all the "alien and hostile elements." Many pre-war regular officers were the first victims of the new wave of mass repressions. The Informacja. under Bierut's supervision, prepared the trial of the "Tatar and Utnik group" which opened amid voluble publicity on June 3, 1950. No death sentences were pronounced and three defendants — Stanislaw Tatar, Franiszek Herman, and Jerzy Kirchmayer — were sentenced to life imprisonment. The mere fact that a handful of "reactionary" generals of the pre-war Polish army had allegedly plotted against "People's Poland" or spied for its enemies would not in itself have merited such elaborate publicity. These preposterous charges were deemed necessary in order to compromise the "right-wing nationalist" Gomulkaite faction and the former Deputy Minister of National Defense, General Marian Spychalski. This led to the in camera trial of many high ranking pre-war officers, 19 of whom were executed.(6) The secrecy of these trials left undisturbed the picture of internal stability in Poland, while the trials terrorized and blackmailed prewar army officers, political activists and officials of high rank before the war. Learning of the trials, they lived in permanent fear. Each defendant "produced" new suspected persons and new victims. Forty-eight trials with 37 military pre-war officers sentenced to death, and dozens of others with long-term prison sentences resulted from the investigation activity conducted by the Informacja between 19501955.(7) These trials were personally supervised by the Soviet officers and heads of Informacja. Only in October, 1956, was the truth about Informacja told. As Berman, former member of the Politburo responsible for the activity of the security service, stated: As concerns cases prepared by the military Informacja. which at this time belonged to a fully independent entity, I had no influence whatsoever; the same is true in the case of Tatar which afterwards became a starting point for a number of provocations...The case was taken over by the military Informacja which, using the most perfidious and brutal methods, mounted an accusation of conspiracy. On the basis of such faked evidence and insinuations Comrade Spychalski was arrested in May 1950, while in 1951, riding the tide of evidence given during the investigation already under way, the same fate was meted out to Comrade Gomulka...(8)

28 The Informacja invented the trumped-up "Tatar Affair" to provide the justification for the arrest and subsequent show-trial (fortunately never held) of Spychalski and Gomulka. The leaders of Informacja were never named or brought to trial in order to maintain "friendly relations" with Moscow. While Jewish Communists played a prominent role in the civilian branch of the security service, the Soviet advisors dominated Informacja. After October 1956, hopes of a more extensive national autonomy in the Polish army, including the army counterintelligence, increased. Anti-Russian sentiments, entertained in wide army circles, became intensified. The publicly repudiated crimes of the regime accelerated the political and psychological decay of the terror machinery in Poland. The entire spy network disintegrated, since the agents refused to continue with their duties, for fear of exposure. Officers of the security services became totally confused by the political and moral condemnation of their activités by the mass communications media. The process began in 1954, when the newly created Security Committee was assigned the task of introducing changes and reforms in the nature of the activities of Polish security organs. In 1955, Colonel Voznesensky, the Russian head of the Informacja. was replaced by a Pole, Colonel Karol Bakowski. Most Soviet advisors and heads of Informacja left Poland. Military counterintelligence was placed under the control of the Chairman of Security Committee, even though the Defense Minister, Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky, remained in charge. Rokossovsky's intervention in the Informacja remained insignificant. During 1955 and 1956, radical changes were attempted in the methods of the military repression apparatus. Colonel Bakowski s bid to rehabilitate a number of victims of the security service met with Bierut's determined resistance. His opposition coincided with a marked relaxation of the pressure exerted by the Soviets on Polish terror organizations and Informacja. which managed to rid itself of its Soviet advisors. Moscow's control over the Polish terror machinery, which was particularly valuable to its control of the army and party, was not relinquished. Its nature had become more sophisticated and less obvious to the outsiders, and remains so until today. The KGB, through the Soviet advisors inside the military and civilian counterintelligence, prepared a special network of Polish informers, from the highest to the lowest levels of decision making. A special network of trusted Moscow Party leaders act in the Polish Party Politburo and inside the party Central Committee Apparatus. This network is used primarily as 1

29

a secret and trustworthy information channel. Part of it is used for political instigation, for influencing personal politics, and for playing off different groups inside the Polish Party leadership against one another. The system consists of a surface level which is publicly declared and exists for world opinion and for the bulk of Polish citizens, and more important, a substratum whose links with Moscow are secret and unofficial. This layer is the basis of all Soviet influence in the Polish Army and all over Poland. The mainstays of this multifaceted system are: 1. The "Independent Polish Government" and the Polish Military Command which exist for legal and official agreements or for other official contacts with the USSR. 2. The Main Political Administration of the Polish Army (GZP in Polish) and the Central Committee apparatus which are politically and ideologically dependent on Moscow and "Marxism;" as the primary political ruler of the state and the military and as defender of the "international interests of the socialist movement" i.e., of Moscow. 3. The secret organized Soviet network of Polish officers and civilians connected with the KGB, or with various departments of the Soviet Party's Central Committee. This network ordinarily acts merely as an information service. However, in crucial historical moments, and for more sophisticated political or police operations, its role suddenly becomes extremely instrumental for Moscow. Some members of this network are members of the Polish Party Politburo, heads of Party Central Committee departments or government ministers, vice-ministers of Defense, or commanders of various military branches. Others act in the civilian and military security services. They are also located in the lower level of industry, and in other important places. Some of them are specially educated KGB agents. While before 1956 they were old trained Communists, after 1956 they were recruited on the basis of ambition or personnel conflicts. Blackmail and material inducements were important on the lower levels. The role of the Soviet secret network increased after 1956, when the bulk of Soviet "advisors" were removed from Poland. In 1957 an agreement between the Polish and Soviet military and civilian security services created "liaison officers." However, the Polish "liaison officers" are subordinated to the Soviets, while the latter are sponsors, initiators, and instructors. The Polish liaison officers were engaged

30 in counterintelligence activity, connected with Polish military or civilian personnel abroad. The Soviet liaison officer controlled personnel policies in the highest army positions and in the security service of Poland. After 1956, the system of Soviet control over the Polish army was rebuilt in a more sophisticated manner and with a more demonstrative display of Polish "independence." The quasi-independent activity of the Polish military counterintelligence lasted about 3-4 years after October, 1956. Despite the purges of some extreme nationalistic or liberal commanders, Moscow was impatient. It felt unsure that it had full control over the security service. By the end of the fifties or the early sixties Moscow started a principal shifting of its military strategy and the preparing of all the WTO armies for an atomic war. An important role in the Northern Tier of the WTO was planned for the Polish army. Polish military leaders still hoped that the margin of independence for Polish strategic and operational planning and performing would remain, and that the Polish voice would be listened to in the WTO headquarters. These hopes were specifically credited to General Zygmunt Duszynski, Main Inspector of the Polish army and Deputy Minister of Defense. The KGB worked out a very sophisticated police provocation which led to the ouster of General Duszynski and his most important followers. Subsequently the former chief of the military counterintelligence was replaced by General Teodor Kufel, a devoted pro-Soviet Pole, who purged the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces of all nationalist-minded officers in the cause of the 1960s. The. Bezpieka - the. civilian security Service The first contacts between Soviet and Polish officials concerning the formation of a civilian security service had started in 1944, even before the Polish Committee of National Liberation was proclaimed in Lublin on July 22nd, 1944. On the governmental level they were held between future Soviet Marshal N.S. Bulganin, and the future Polish Minister of Public Security Stanislaw Radkiewicz. On the so-called "operational level" there was Soviet General Ivan A. Serov, and Roman Romkowski and Mieczyslaw Mietkowski, who were designated as Radkiewicz's Deputy Ministers. The first training course for future officers of the Polish security services was set up in 1944 after the Serov-Romkowski talks. In Kuybyshev, NKVD experts began to train a carefully selected group of future investigation and operation officers - many of whom can still be found today at top levels in the Ministry of

31 Internal Affairs in Warsaw. The main outlines of the organizational scheme and the modus operandi of the Polish security services were patterned after the NKVD. In every major administrative, economic, cultural and scientific institution at least one full-time functionary of the Bezpieka was to be installed, to work through a network of "informers" and "resident agents." From 1944 until 1947, Poland verged on civil war. The new regime ruled only due to the presence of countless Soviet Army divisions and NKVD "special troops" and the ruthless physical terror employed by a hastily improvised network of voivodship/province. district and city Security Offices. In the "takeover stage" terror assured the survival of and strengthened the new, pro-Soviet administration. It extended its control by the elimination of those suspected of active or potential hostility; the use of intimidation to deter hostile action by political opponents, the destruction and discrediting of organized alternatives and the transformation of the country's socio-economic structure. In Poland, the "takeover stage" lasted for some three or four years. In those early years the terror apparatus had to confront real, strong, armed and often ruthless opposition. The political balance of power was obviously stacked against the new Communist rulers: in mid-1944 the Home Army (AK), which owed allegiance to the London Government-in-Exile, had some 250,000-300,000 soldiers; the Peasant Battalions (which usually joined forces with the AK) had 158,000 men; while the Communist-led People's Army (AL) claimed with exaggeration 40,000 men, i.e. 5 per cent of all the resistance forces.(9) The presence of the Soviet army tipped the scale but could not avoid prolonged, bloody armed struggle. The civilian security service prepared a card-file for the entire adult population classified according to political views, past activities and leanings. At the end of 1947 the card-file, while incomplete, was fully operational and contained detailed data about virtually all those active in the political underground in all the political parties, civil service, armed forces, major industrial enterprises and economic management. As the Party had only limited political influence, the new regime could maintain itself only thanks to the Soviet military presence and by massive terror directed against selected social and political groups which were considered especially dangerous. The security service, faithfully imitating Soviet practices, became a quasiindependent political force. The Soviet personnel and advisors were unfamiliar with the complicated political configurations in Poland. Unline their comrades in the Polish armed forces, the could not rely on their own expertise.

32 They were obliged to a much greater degree to rely on politically experienced and dependable local Communists, often Jewish, who did not enjoy the full confidence of the NKVD. Soviet officers, with little knowledge of Polish, were attached to all the major operational outfits; Russians were found in various capacities in district Security Offices, and even in auxiliary departments (finance, administration, maintenance, e t c . ) . They not only advised, but often commanded. After 1947, when the most active opposition was eliminated, the underground laid down its arms and Communist rule was consolidated. Yet, the role played by the security service did not diminish; spending for security services grew together with the power of all security organizations. At the end of 1949 the security service apparatus, excluding special units and police (M.O.), may be estimated at around 50,000 men, backed by a network of 150,000 informers spread throughout a population of 25 million people.(10) The quickly extended repression apparatus adopted new tasks: a wide-scale censoring of correspondence and mass media, and strict control over the personnel policy which made any career dependent on the security service. The security service started to contribute its own initiatives to such political events as agricultural collectivization, lowering salaries and increasing discipline in the factories, and in suppressing religious and intellectual activities. Without sowing in all social strata a feeling of fear, the Party apparatus would have been impotent. As a result the entire Party apparatus supported the priorities given to the security services. But even if there were "irregularities," they were decided by the Party rulers, not by the security service. Under Moscow's direction, Poland was later than the USSR in the rehabilitation of innocent victims. It was not possible to limit the activities of the repression apparatus with the approval of the legislature and in accordance with the law. This "illegal" power of the security service enabled the Polish Communists to rule in a half-occupied country, not only before but also after 1948 and even after 1956.(11) Although there are not data on victims in the 1945-1955 period, 4823 people were rehabilitated up to January 1957.(12) But even if the number of the victims were twice or more larger, this would not explain the tremendous power of the security apparatus. People were not only arrested, but molested morally, economically and psychologically in all social strata, in the offices and factories, in the villages and towns. Fear was a tremendous political instrument in paralyzing any will to resistance. The security service officers were specially trained in how to

33 generate fear among the people. Special methods were used to disseminate a feeling that the security service knew everything about everyone. This key task succeeded so well that between 1949 and 1955 there were only individual cases of organized anti-government activities. Routing the armed underground and the political opposition soon ceased to be the most important aim. Security officials now systematically started to infiltrate each factory and each village, ostensibly to catch "saboteurs" and wreckers; whenever a fire broke out, or another accident happened, security officials were out in strength, and mass arrests inevitably followed. Such mass repressions had a double aim: to perpetuate terror among the population, and to transform the lower level security officials into ruthless executors of directives "from above." This shifted the blame for anything that went wrong onto the "enemy," both within the country and abroad, thus creating a "beleaguered fortress" atmosphere. The political functions of the security service should not be overlooked, especially given the institutional weakness of the ruling Party and its limited political influence. There was also the task of collection of information concerning "what the people really thought." Party leaders preferred using the secret service for more widely accepted means of propaganda. Instead of mobilizing or sounding out public opinion through the Party cells or the press or radio, they did it with the help of their agents. The security service was ordered to find out what Party members felt and thought. In all the satellite countries the pattern was the same: whenever the "takeover stage" was completed and the regime had been consolidated the "mobilization stage" terror began. A sequence of victimization beginning with active enemies and moving to erstwhile partners of the ruling Party, then to quasi-legal opponents from the "bourgeois" and "petit-bourgeois" camp, and finally to members of the Communist Party, the state, military and police hierarchies. Members of the Polish Communist elite ignored the lessons of the Soviet experience in the 193 0s and 1940s. When this enormously expensive and overmanned apparatus of state security turned to its next task, it concerned itself with the ruling Party elite, including members of the government and Politburo. It kept watch over Soviet orthodoxy and uncovered and destroyed even the slightest suspicion of heresy or independent thinking. And if no heresy was discovered, its task was to invent it. Not even the highest officials would be free of constant police surveillance. A special outfit was established for this purpose: The Tenth Department in the Ministry of Public Security.

34

The Tenth Department As early as 1947, a Special Bureau was created in the Fifth Department of the Ministry of Public Security. In 1948 a new wave of terror and purges began in the Soviet Union, connected with the "Leningrad Case." The split between Moscow and Belgrade brought about a series of purges in the satellite countries. With the beginning of the Cold War, Stalin was determined to stamp out the Titoist heresy throughout East Europe. Ruling Communist elites were forced to give up any independent thinking and action. Indiscriminate mass terror directed against the bulk of the population was gradually supplemented by selective terror directed against allegedly unreliable elements inside the Communist Establishment. This is why "Tenth Departments" were created in each satellite country. A Czechoslovak victim of this department noted: The Soviet advisors started to arrive in 1949. They rapidly constructed an all-powerful apparatus responsible to its chief, Beria, alone. It included Likhachev and Makarov who had already proved themselves in preparing the Rajk trial. They immediately proceeded to set up a special organization within State Security with the purpose of discovering the enemy within the Party...(13) Department No. 10 of the Polish Ministry of Public Security was created in 1948 primarily to investigate whether top Party and government leaders had been informers for the pre-war police in Poland or collaborated with it and whether they had worked for the Gestapo during the war. It soon emerged, however, that their main task would be to check the political loyalty of the ruling elite to the USSR. The creation of this watchdog body became urgent when Gomulka began to be seen as the most unreliable leader in the "People's Democracies.' The Tenth Department began its work by a close scrutiny of the personnel files and dossiers of all prominent members of the Communist establishment in Poland. They recruited a network of agents and informers among leading Party militants, installed wire-tapping devices in their homes and offices, scrutinized their correspondence, ordered round-theclock surveillance of their movements and checked on their family members, friends and acquaintances. Detailed reports on the most intimate conversations, Views and doubts of all members of the Party Politburo and ministers—even Bierut, Berman, Cyrankiewicz and

35 others—were regularly dispatched to Moscow. Their activity was duplicated in the voivodship security offices. Top officials in the Ministry of Public Security, even veteran Communists, were not supposed to know anything about the Tenth Department and its well concealed activities. As a starting point, the Tenth Department, in close co-operation with the Informacja. took over the cases of Wlodzimierz Lechowicz and Stanislaw Jaroszewicz. Both had been double agents, working simultaneously for the pre-war Polish secret police (Defa) and for Soviet military intelligence, and continued in this capacity for the first years of the German occupation of Poland. The arrest of high ranking pre-war officials gave an ideal opportunity for actions against their war-time superiors: General Marian Spychalski and pre-war General Michal RolaZymierski, both Ministers of Defense after 1944, and pre-war Soviet spies. Spychalski was a close friend and underground follower of Gomulka.(14) Thus among the first victims of Department No. 10 were double agents, who were unable to defend themselves by disclosing that they had acted on behalf of the Soviets and had continued to do so up to the time of their arrest. No one was trusted in the Soviet s y s t e m — n o one was safe from victimization. Marshal Zymierski and General Spychalski had also been double agents, in fact, and they too were perfect victims for Department No. 10. The Tenth Department's task consisted of supplying by any means evidence of guilt of the "right-wing nationalist deviationists" who had turned traitors to Communism and to Poland, and had become spies, agents and subversive elements in the party of Tito and of Anglo-American imperialism. Only Gomulka's confession was lacking for this show trial. The Politburo decided to try to convince Gomulka "to play ball." None of the Party leaders were ready to go and plead with their former comrade whom they knew to be not only stubborn but innocent to boot.(15) Gomulka continued to refuse to cave in and thereby avoided the fate of Rajk, Rostov and Slansky. His resistance probably saved other comrades too. Poland remained the only East European country where no major Communist leader was put on public trial and executed. Why was he spared? There can be no clear-cut answer to this question. Although directives of the Tenth Department came from Moscow, it was directly responsible to the Polish Party leadership and, without its agreement, could not arrest any prominent "suspect." Three top leaders decided all security and espionage cases: Boleslaw Bierut, Jakub Berman, and Franciszek Mazur. Bierut was responsible for making and clearing final decisions with Stalin and Beria,

36 Berman was in charge of security matters for the Polish Politburo and Mazur played a similar role for the CPSU and KGB. The Minister of Public Security, Radkiewicz, was ostensibly responsible for the Ministry's contacts with the Politburo, while the heads of the Tenth Department reported to Berman and to Bierut separately. The top men in the Polish Party leadership, therefore, bore direct responsibility for the provocation mounted by the Tenth Department against Gomulka and his followers, even if they acted under strong pressure from Moscow. Some, as Berman in 1956, claim they resisted pressure for a trial. Others stress Gomulka's toughness. A third version, propounded by Swiatlo, is that Gomulka had been saved by his "stubborn refusal to reveal the dirty work of his wartime predecessors."(16) The possibility that he might reveal some compromising facts connected with Nowotko's and Finder's deaths, or directly involving Soviet agents' collusion with the Gestapo, might well have weighted heavily with his Polish and Soviet persecutors. Stalin probably planned, after the antiJewish trial in Poland, to rehabilitate Gomulka and represent his arrest in 1949 as the work of the Jews in the Politburo. Only with this one victim of wrongful arrest from all satellite countries did Khrushchev try to exculpate even the Beriovschina for Gomulka's arrest. Gomulka was the only one of all the victimized Communists in the satellite countries to be treated with such gingerly respect. In Poland there was a widespread conviction that the Party leadership, and Bierut in particular, procrastinated in the hope that something might happen to allow them to save Gomulka and his followers, as in fact Stalin's death did. Bierut and his deputies worried that once Gomulka and his followers were executed as traitors, their turn might come. This consideration must have weighed particularly with Berman and other leading Jewish officials of the Party and the security apparatus. The Jewish Communists in Poland could shrug off the first signals coming from Russia since 1948, as they never had had anything to do with Zionism; on the contrary, all their lives they had fought against it on the "Jewish street." They could ignore Rajk's trial in October 1949 because there were only three Jews among the defendants and the charges of "Zionist conspiracy" seemed almost incidental and irrelevant. But Slansky's demotion and trial in 1951/52 left no room for doubt they were in for it. Of the fourteen prominent Communists who went on trial in Prague there were eleven Jews, and the anti-Semitic character of the indictment was openly and cynically underlined. The linchpin on which the entire case rested was the so-called "Field affair," referred to during Rajk's

37 trial, but later blown up to unprecedented dimensions in order to demonstrate the ties between Titoism and the American wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS). During the war, the American Noel Field had served as Director-General of the Unitarian Service Committee in Switzerland, which helped refugees from various countries in Nazi-occupied Europe. Among them were many Communists and fellow-travellers, veterans of the International Brigades in Spain and Jews. During Rajk's trial in September 1949, it was alleged that Noel Field was in fact an American spy who used to work for the OSS under Allan Dulles and recruited the agents who had infiltrated most of the European Communist Parties. Although Field was already in a Hungarian secret police prison, he was not summoned to give evidence against Rajk. Field, a dedicated Communist, was in fact a duped agent of the Soviet secret service and, as such, expendable. As the FBI already knew of or suspected his espionage activities, he could be used by the KGB only as a scapegoat in a big international provocation against Communist "dissidents" in Eastern Europe. He therefore "disappeared" in Prague together with his wife and was handed over to the Hungarian secret police. His brother and his step-daughter similarly disappeared. After an uproar in 1954 in the wake of revelations by the defector to the West, Jozef Swiatlo, the whole family was released.(17) As Tito himself had organized recruitment in Paris for the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, and Field had helped the survivors in Switzerland, an alleged treacherous connection could be concocted. Another category of unreliable elements were Communists who had spent long periods of time in the West or had previously belonged to Communist Parties which had not been completely dominated and screened by the NKVD. The Tenth Department, like its counterparts in other satellite countries, paid special attention to such cases, considering every "Westerner" or "Spaniard" (as they were colloquially called) not only a potential spy or agent-provocateur. but another link between Western intelligence services and the "Gomulkaites." While there were numerous Jews with Comintern background and experience among the "Westerners" and "Spaniards," the "Gomulkaites" belonged to the "domestic" species of Communism and could well be accused of latent anti-Semitism. The Informacja and the Tenth Department, emulating Czechoslovakia and other brother countries, tried to find proof of collusion between Polish "right-wing nationalist deviationists" and "Zionists." Once the indictment against Slansky and his codefendants had accused Noel Field of instructing his agents among the Czechoslovak Communist leaders to use

38

their key positions to serve the Jewish bourgeoisie and Zionists and to foment nationalist conflicts, the quick-witted officers of the Informacja and of the Tenth Department fully changed the direction of their hunt and concentrated all their efforts on the current enemy no. 1 — t h e Jews. Twelve persons, all of them Jewish Communists were arrested by the Tenth Department in connection with the Field affair. They were supposed to serve as witnesses for the prosecution during the trial of Spychalski, Kliszko, Gomulka, and other "right-wing nationalist deviationists" and, possibly, during a subsequent trial of Jakub Berman and other prominent Jewish Party leaders. After having played their role, they were to be executed. A similar fate was prepared for the sixteen Jewish army officers arrested and investigated simultaneously by the military Informacja. The mass arrests connected with the Field affair began in July-September 1949, while Gomulka was detained in July 1951; nonetheless, up until Stalin's death in March, 1953, the united efforts of the military Informacja and of the Tenth Department had not succeeded in welding a coherent case and in bringing the "deviationists," "spies," and "saboteurs" to trial. There is no doubt that a huge anti-Semitic trial was prepared in Poland and only the death of Stalin prevented it from being carried out. Had it been staged, the number of Jewish victims, including members of the Politburo and the Tenth Department, would have been even greater than in other satellite countries. Gomulka and Berman thus barely escaped Slansky's fate.(18) The briefly described role of the Tenth Department requires further description of some characteristics, in addition to those outlined by Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer in their discussion of the role of terror against authority figures in the "mobilization stage." These additional characteristics were caused specifically by Polish and East European political circumstances, apart from those which existed in the USSR before and after World War II. First, as in other satellite countries, after the seizure of power in Poland by the Communists, a number of quasi-independent political parties and associations existed. Not one leader of these puppet parties was arrested, with the exception of Lechowicz and WidyWirski who acted as Communist "moles" in the Democratic Party. The former members of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) who in 1948 joined the PZPR have kept their high positions in the Politburo and in the government until today (e.g., Henryk Jablonski, President of the State from the early seventies). Second, the process of organizing trials against the Communist elite was really "more compressed in time

39

and occurred sooner after the takeover than in the Soviet Union,"(19) but the reason for that was more complex than suggested by Dallin and Breslauer. Stalin did not wish to leave too many old Communists in the top echelon of the ruling elite in Eastern Europe. Some of them were even anxious to fit their political decisions into the framework of Marxist theory and ideology. Stalin was not willing to allow such polemics because that could give the "old comrades" some feeling that they were equal with him.(20) Such a dangerous intention did not surface among the younger admirers of Soviet domination, or the non-Communist puppet party leaders, who were consequently favored by Stalin. But even after Stalin's death only those from the "old cadres" who had learned their "lesson" in prison (e.g., Kadar, Gomulka, Husak) were acceptable. Third, during the Korean War, Moscow forced Poland to militarize its industry. Between 1950-53 about 30% of all industrial investment was devoted to expanding the military production.(21) This destroyed the previously conceived economic plan, and led to the cancellation of most of the social promises. As a result, in the early 1950s, the population became more and more embittered, both with the continuing Soviet domination and with the lower standard of living. It was necessary for some rulers to take responsibility for these failures. From 1951 in almost all political trials, accusations of economic sabotage and of deliberate malpractice were included. This phenomemon shortened the takeover time in the East European countries. Furthermore, the strong anti-Semitic undertones of the Slansky trials and those prepared in Poland were not only a result of the anti-Israeli policy of the USSR. The permanent intention of the KGB to use antiSemitic slogans in political trials and propaganda is due to the fact that only a few Jews remained in Poland after the Holocaust, and in the other European countries. The strong Jewish community, which was the social basis for an anti-racial political movement, was no longer alive. The single great Jewish community in the USSR is a silent minority. This also explained in great part why, beginning in 1956, the KGB together with the Polish security service was so likely to use the anti-Semitic tool in all political crises. Even after 1968, when Poland was Judenrein. anti-Semitic political manipulation remained in the arsenals of the Polish secret police, and the extreme pro-Soviet party faction. Finally, the dominant accusation against the Communist leaders arrested in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria was that they were much too nationalistic and not sufficiently pro-Soviet. The same "crimes"

40

were also formulated against Gomulka, and his followers. But in relatively homogeneous Poland, it was not possible to use ethnic conflicts as in Czechoslovakia, to play the anti-nationalist card. The investigators needed much more "work," imagination, and time than in Czechoslovakia or in Hungary to find a "crime" for Gomulka. The activity of the Tenth Department stopped in 1955, but its functions were interrupted only for a short time. To replace it, the KGB elaborated sophisticated and effective new methods of infiltration and "cooperation." BETWEEN 1960-1970: FACTION

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE POLICE

In the Soviet view the Polish military and civilian security services were not up to their task in the critical months of 1956. Part of the security apparatus supported the patriotic aspirations of the Polish people, as did the majority of the Polish Armed Forces (LWP).(22) As most of the Soviet officers and advisors had been withdrawn to the USSR, it was now urgent to subordinate the Polish security services to Moscow's control. Following the agreement between the Kremlin and Gomulka, the KGB set to work establishing a new system of surveillance over the LWP. This one had to be less conspicuous but more efficient than that in the Stalin-Beria period. Great emphasis was placed on maintaining the appearance of national independence and non-interference. Poland's new ruling elite sought partial independence from the Soviets. The Politburo, with a strong liberal wing and a program of democratization, was difficult for Moscow to accept. But, the possibility that Poland would obtain limited political independence was openly voiced by Moscow. The Polish leaders were not entirely deceived, to be sure. The leaders tried to organize a new security service which would protect Poland not only from espionage and political penetration by the West but also from KGB infiltration. Information required by Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence had to be passed from above, exclusively by bodies designated for this purpose by the Minister and the Politburo. This meant curtailing the role of the KGB agents in the military and other central bodies in Poland. After October, 1956, Marian Spychalski, rehabilitated and elevated as the new Defense Minister, reorganized the army. He carried on in his double role as "one of Gomulka's people" and "a KGB man," reorganizing the army elite and military counterintelligence. He placed officers whom he could trust in the most important command positions. Most were

41 veterans of the People's Guard or People's Army (AL, Armia Ludowa) and some were commanders persucuted during the Stalinist period. Moscow could not easily tolerate the new order. After 1956, the purge of the Polish military command became one of the KGB's main objectives in Poland. The first to be removed were those who had distinguished themselves by their open anti-Soviet stand. This intimidated the others, reducing them to impotence and convincing them of the merits of a farreaching conformism. Any danger that the Polish army would support anti-Soviet developments in the country was over. The fear pumped step by step into the Polish ruling elite was only one means of control. The KGB, in cooperation with the Polish security services, used a wide network of agents planted at the most important levels of personnel and political administration. They organized intrigues, exploited human weaknesses and ambitions, practiced blackmail and bribery on a large scale (using promotions, trips abroad, educational appointments to military academies, etc. as b a i t ) , setting in motion a process of gradual demoralization. This process was aided by the Kremlin's ability, only a few months after October, to force concessions from Gomulka leading to the isolation and ultimately the smashing of the liberal wing of the party. To earn Khrushchev's confidence Gomulka removed all so-called "revisionists" from the Politburo and from the Party apparatus. He started a very sophisticated operation to strengthen the political power of the security service, which had been much weakened by the events of October 1956. Gomulka, himself a victim of the secret police, never underrated the importance of this instrument of power for the consolidation of Communist rule; indeed he had used it ruthlessly in 1944-48 to suppress any form of opposition, and was ready to use it again after 1956. In spite of his personal experience, he declared in 1959, The public security employees have proved that, together with the whole Party and all the progressive forces in our country, they unflinchingly stand guard over the interests of the nation, they wholeheartedly support the changes in our lives, and are ready to prevent any attempts to undermine the political ine mapped out by the leadership.(23) Reorganizing and consolidating the security apparatus, Gomulka was interested not in restricting its power but only in subordinating it to his own control. He did not manage to achieve this goal in

42

full. Moscow still considered the secret police too precious an instrument to relinquish direct influence over its activities as a check on Gomulka and a means for influencing the balance of power inside the Polish Party. Renewed Soviet infiltration of the Polish security apparatus was facilitated by Gomulka's plans. The Committee for Public Security, set up in 1954 after the dissolution of the discredited Ministry of Public Security, was abolished in 1956. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was rebuilt. Until the end of 1959, the employees of the security services, both civilian and military, were divided into a number of political camps, exactly reflecting the divisions in the whole country and in the party. The two main factions were the Natolin (or extremely pro-Soviet) group, and the Pulawska faction, a centrist goup which tended to close ranks with the liberals in the party. According to a reliable and well-informed source, In the leading circles of the Bezpieka. two camps have crystallized: one headed by Moczar as the rising star, and another under the patronage of Deputy Minister Alster, who was known to be destined for elimination... Alster (a Jew 'of course') was entrusted (by Gomulka) with supervising the most active members of the Natolin group. Senior Natolin members were kept under surveillance, their contacts with the Soviet Embassy were watched, and on this occasion their ties with Moczar's men were discovered, even inside the Bezpieka. Mieczyslaw Moczar in turn, also acting on Gomulka's instructions, ordered a thorough study of the Pulawska group. Security men and Party leaders in the know used to say that Alster watched over the conservatives while Moczar watched over the revisionists...Alster tried to keep tabs on his colleague, Deputy Minister Moczar, but his power was too limited and his influence diminished even more because he had lost the support of his powerful protector, the Soviet security service, while Gomulka's support, given for only a short time, proved insufficient. Deputy Minister Moczar did the same, but much more efficiently, with respect to his colleague...(24) Moczar was connected with the Natolin faction not for political reasons, but as a Soviet agent, who worked directly for the KGB throughout Polish postwar history. It was therefore astonishing to many Poles that the Western experts and the mass media represented Moczar as a "nationalist" who was even more

43

nationalistic than Gomulka.(25) This myth even survived clear evidence that Moczar acted as "Moscow's man" all through the Polish crisis of 1980-1982. In a study published recently, a distinguished historian made the following surprising statements: The 'Partisans' led by veteran Communists. . ., and far more nationalistic and conservative, criticized the Gomulka regime. . . The 'Partisans' launched a major campaign against him in the guise of an offensive against 'Zionist' elements in the Party. . . which rapidly deteriorated into an anti-Jewish, antirevisionist and anti-liberal witch-hunt. . . The liberal and revisionist elements within the PZPR were virtually eliminated from significant positions. . .(26) Like many other writers on the subject, the author of this statement is apparently unaware of any need to explain the contradiction between being antiMuscovite" and at the same time "virtually eliminating liberal elements. . ." The situation only becomes intelligible when Moczar's real role and the KGB tactics are understood. In the early sixties Moczar was elevated to Minister of Internal Affairs; the military counterintelligence was headed by another KGB agent, General Teodor Kufel. Through them, Moscow successfully manipulated the political developments in Poland, neglecting the "leading role" of the Polish Politburo. From this time the security services were resubordinated to the KGB, although in a more subtle manner than in the era of the Beriovschina. First Secretary Gomulka and Minister of Defense Spychalski were no longer in control of the military and bureaucratic apparatus. The anti-Semitic slogans of Moczar and his followers blurred their role as sophisticated Soviet agents in purging Poland of those dreaming of Polish autonomy. The Soviets never had faith in Gomulka and Spychalski. They feared that Poland could become another Rumania or even Yugoslavia. Exploiting his loss of popularity, the Soviets decided to overthrow Gomulka, under the banner of nationalistic and anti-Semitic slogans, using Moczar and Kufel as the heads of this operation. The task of Moczar was to destroy the Politburo; Kufel was to destroy all nationalistic groups in the military. This war to the death against nationalists in Poland was disguised as a struggle against the Jews. Gomulka understood the Soviets' game in Poland. He especially disliked Jewish intellectuals, but he was not a primitive anti-Semite. He felt many Jewish specialists were needed in the economy. To remove this

44

instrument from the hand of the KGB, Gomulka chose the lesser of two evils: he decided to purge Poland of all Jews. The Six Day War in June 1967 provided an excellent opportunity for Gomulka to wrestle the weapon of anti-Semitism away from Moczar and the KGB by using anti-Semitic propaganda (most blatantly in his speech to the Trade Union Congress in June 1 9 6 7 ) . The fact that the Jewish question played such an important role in the sixties, and even in the seventies, indicates that the security apparatus was no longer able to dominate Poland after October 1956 merely through physical and moral means of terror. The decline in Gomulka's popularity, the growing unrest among intellectuals and students, and the political apathy of the Party were the factors enabling Moczar to put the security service forth as the most credible organization to defend Poland's interests. In the short run this enhanced the power of the secret police, but — in the long run — this undermined the respect of the population toward the government. This contradiction brought Moczar, the ambitious Minister of Internal Affairs, on a collision course with Moscow. Moczar tried to combine the use of terror and sophisticated political manipulation with the silent approval of Moscow. The main task of this operation in the early sixties was to purge the military command, but secondarily to break the intellectuals. The "Moczarites" were not a political faction but a police faction, even though they penetrated such a mass organization as the Union of Fighters of Freedom and Democracy (ZBoWiD in Polish), the veterans' organization in Poland. The security service organized, manipulated and led its own political movement, while acting simultaneously as the policeman of the Party's monopolistic position in the political life of the country. Fighting against intellectuals and "Jews," the police faction created a competitive center of power to the Party. This undermined the absolute authority of the Politburo, which was accused of being under Jewish influence. The police faction, being publicly anti-Semitic, opened the Pandora's box of Polish nationalism which was primarily anti-Russian. Neither writers nor scholars — nor Jews for that matter — could have constituted in the sixties a serious menace to Communist rule in Poland. Nonetheless, in the mid-sixties the whole might of the security organs and the party apparatus was directed against them. By leading a quasi-dissident, antiintellectual and anti-Jewish movement, both the Soviet and the Polish secret police were bent on stamping out any potentially independent political force which, for all its weaknesses, could in a moment of crisis present an alternative solution to that offered by the Party. But such an approach contradicted Polish tradition;

45 every dissident movement in that Communist state, even if organized by the pro-Soviet secret police, eventually assumes an anti-Soviet character. Moczar succeeded in convincing the Soviet leadership that Gomulka was no longer capable of safeguarding their interests in Poland. He had to prove that he was able to rally under his banner the genuine nationalist elements in the Polish population and to disarm them by temporarily diverting their attention from Soviet supremacy and funneling their pent-up hatred against "the Jews" instead. The unity of the Communist empire would then be safeguarded, especially since anti-Zionist propaganda abroad and Jew-baiting at home became the twin props of official Soviet policy. In Poland itself, anti-Semitism, coupled with police provocation, could thus be counted upon to provide — when the time was ripe — the sort of internal crisis necessary for maintaining the dominant Soviet position in the Soviet bloc. The "revisionists," with their high proportion of intellectuals and Jews, fitted the exaggerated claims of the imminent dangers threatening the nation on all sides, both internally and externally. Throughout the sixties, a relentless fight against the "revisionists" was being carried on simultaneously by Gomulka and the Party leadership on the one hand, and by Moczar and the secret police on the other. Moczar, the more dynamic and purposeful, was able to score a double victory. Moczar continually drove Gomulka into policies calculated to outbid his own chauvinistic and racist demagogy, and liable to incur the dissatisfaction, passive resistance or even outright opposition of Gomulka's supporters. He persuaded Gomulka to dismiss and alienate people opposed to the ascendancy of the police faction and to replace them with younger cadres who were more receptive to police control.(27) Moczar started to strengthen the self-confidence of the secret police with the infamous provocation against Henryk Holland, a journalist and writer respected in Poland and around the world. At the end of 1961 Holland was thrown from the window of a fifth floor apartment. After the government closed in 1957 the popular student weekly newspaper "Po Prostu," there followed a series of brutal suppressions the stopping of the discussion clubs (Klub Krzywego Kola.) , the attacks against the liberal writers, the expulsion and arrest of two young followers of reform socialism, Karol Modzelewski and Jacek Kuron, the organized attack against Professors Kolakowski, Schaff, Zolkiewski, and Brus, and finally the infamous provocation of March 8, 1968. This led to prolonged mass demonstrations in all universities around Poland, and an unprecendented (in the postwar years) expulsion from the universities of

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hundreds of students and dozens of the most skillful and popular professors. The brutality of the police, the cynicism of the arranged trials, the unparalleled campaign of lies in the press, the blackmailing and censorship, covered the country with a blanket of fear, not felt since the years of the Beriovshchina.(28) Moczar succeeded in winning support for his brutal actions not only within the Party and security apparatuses, but among broad social circles, fascinated by his anti-Semitic and even slightly anti-Soviet demagogy. Never before and never after the sixties did such brutal police action attain the support of part of the population, including workers. The security service stressed that the anti-Jewish purge would make tens of thousands of managerial posts free for Poles; this helped to direct both anti-Soviet and antigovernment feelings among the educated younger generation.(29) Moczar also claimed that only people who had fought during World War II for liberation inside the country were entitled to rule Poland. This argument was applauded by the large circle of former Polish nationalist underground fighters. Moczar went one step too far; degrading the former soldiers of the Soviet-sponsored Polish army, he gave every Pole to understand that this was a voice against the USSR. Moczar lost Moscow's support in his attempt to topple Gomulka in 1968. He and his followers apparently underestimated the Soviet dislike of having a popular nationalist and a master of political intrigue at the head of the Polish leadership. Gomulka's successor, Edward Gierek, also realized that his supporter in overthrowing the former Party ruler was too dangerous to keep as a member of the Politburo. When in May 1971 Gierek was tipped off that Moczar was preparing a conspiracy, he removed him from the Politburo (but not entirely from the ruling elite). Moczar's closest followers were also quietly purged from the security apparatus, although they kept their positions in the military, in the administration, and in the Party apparatus. Gierek understood that without the security service, the police faction would be crippled and would lose its momentum. Some personnel changes at the top of the Ministry of Internal Affairs brought this trend to completion. The developments within the military and the military counterintelligence took another direction. In the early sixties, after cracking down on the more nationalistic group led by General Duszynski, General Kufel, the Soviet man, prepared the ground for expelling from the military his own superior — the Minister of Defense, Marshal Spychalski. While acting on behalf of the RGB, Kufel was backed by a growing number of generals who disliked Spychalski for his weakness vis-a-vis Kufel; in the military, a weak

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commander had no chance for respect. The power of Kufel symbolized the fact that the military security service was again set above the Politburo, of which Spychalski was a member. At a Party meeting of the OPK (Anti-Aircraft Defense) Command in the summer of 1967, the military counterintelligence (WSW), using formulas supplied by the "Soviet comrades," reproached the OPK Command that an unidentified plane was allegedly circling over Poland "when the fate of Poland was being decided!" At that time General Czeslaw Mankiewicz, a close friend of Spychalski, was commander of the OPK units. He and his deputies were expelled from their positions on the demand of their subordinates, an action unprecedented in the history of the Polish army. In a letter to the Politburo, the OPK Command officers expressed their distrust of Spychalski, their highest military commander. This was definitely the end of the Marshal's military and political career, though he continued to be a member of the Politburo. Spychalski was well aware that behind this plot stood his "subordinate," General Kufel, and that behind Kufel stood the mighty KGB. The Marshal yielded, accepting the will of the plotters. After the Mankiewicz affair Spychalski was but a puppet in the hands of the military counterintelligence. It is not surprising that during the critical days of March 1968, the military officers acted under pressure of the military counterintelligence, the staunchest supporter of the KGB in Poland. This was not the first time that army officers were put in as a quasi-civilian police force. In mid-1966, when Marshal Spychalski was still Defence Minister and General Wojciech Jaruzelski was Chief of General Staff, highranking military men were called in to control the Catholic mass rallies throughout the country organized by the Church to celebrate the thousandth anniversary of Polish Christianity. Such a step had never been taken before the war or after it till then, and this instance created a precedent. The officer corps had been terrorized and made subordinate to the secret police, used as a police force against their own countrymen, even women and children. Military men were driven into an acute conflict, moral and political, with their consciences and their opinions. They would not forgive their commanders for making them carry out duties like these. Nevertheless, the "taboo" had been broken and so it was possible two years after this to call out these officers against demonstrating students (and thirteen years later to use a large number of army officers as part of the police power that suppressed "Solidarity.") I was horrified in 1968 to see my former comrades from the military being brought in civilian clothing as ORMO (Reserve Workers' Police

48 Units) men in trucks to the gates of Warsaw University or to the Polytechnic, armed with clubs and armbands from this "honorable service."(30) Many of them envied me and I pitied them. Those few who had the courage to refuse to participate in this shameful action were immediately dismissed for not executing orders and were threatened with further consequences. Mention should be made of the righteous stand of Professor Edward Perkowicz of the General Staff Academy, an army officer since before 1939 who declared that he would never go disguised in civilian clothes against students. Spychalski at once signed his release, after which he was dismissed from the military. By the time the whole country was convinced of the significance of the huge and popular demonstrations, the army had already been terrorized, subjugated to the political military police, and therefore under Moscow's full control. A month after the first mass demonstration by students at Warsaw University, Spychalski was easily removed from his post as Minister of National Defense and "kicked upstairs" to the impotent role of President of the state. Spychalski stayed on until December 1970 and then, together with Gomulka, disappeared from the political scene forever. In April 1968 General Wojciech Jaruzelski took Spychalski's place as Minister of National Defense. As in Stalin's years, the military counterintelligence continued to be the dominant authority in the military's personnel policy. It remained an arm of the KGB in political matters. Jaruzelski and the top commanders were always aware of the situation. Jaruzelski succeeded in removing General Kufel only by the end of 1979, when the position of the Minister of Defense in the army and in the Party was strong enough to control the military counterintelligence. The changes in the civilian and in military security services in the seventies were to a decisive degree influenced by the bloody events of December, 1970. 1970-1981: THE DECADE OF CONFLICTS OF A MODERNIZED POLICE STATE; THE BIRTH AND FALL OF "SOLIDARITY" In December 1970 a bloody upheaval of Polish shipyard workers toppled a part of the Politburo, including its First Secretary — Wladyslaw Gomulka. The workers demanded a stop to the price increases, greater democracy within the Party and the abolition of privileges and discrimination. The new Party ruler, Edward Gierek, together with the elite of the party and security service, learned the limited utility of Moscow's support. He built his own powerful repressive apparatus and strong Party bureaucracy against the power of the workers. To buttress his own position, Gierek set about

49 creating a special elite of his own, stable and highly remunerated, unlike anything in the past. This closely-welded group of people was protected by an unprecedented special decree from financial loss on retirement or even in the event of losing their posts for inefficiency. Similar groups of functionaries, each of which included people in the security service, were set up at lower administrative levels. To win support among the population, Gierek poured large-scale Western credits into ambitious projects for modernizing industry and improving the standard of living. In the long run, however, this aim was not achieved and nothing was solved, since as a whole the controlled economic system remained inefficient. The promised economic, social and political reforms could not be implemented because of undiminished administrative and political corruption. In the mid-1970s it became evident that the situation was not improving but was in fact getting worse, which naturally affected the attitudes of different sectors in society. Different conclusions were reached by the betrayed workers and many intellectuals, whose response at the time of the 1970 strike was silence. A part of the Polish intelligentsia, particularly the younger generation, was honestly Marxist, and until the 1968 events believed in a "socialism with a human face." The Party bureaucracy and the police totally demolished any hope of change in the Communist Party. Even though the activity of the police faction was halted by Gierek, while leaving all the rapacious Moczarites inside the lower level of the security service, the 1968 events strengthened the brutal methods of the Party and police apparatus. Furthermore, this paralyzed any political activity on the part of the population for a long time. The reemergence of part of the intellectuals as a major factor in political life started only in the midseventies, initially as a democratic opposition with the goal of forcing the Party to fulfill the program of reforms promised in 1970. There were no illusions that the Party rulers would accept proposals on the basis of logical, patriotic, or ideological argumentation. Not only was the elite of the Party demoralized, but also the composition of its rank and file had changed dramatically the Polish United Workers Party. In 1948 workers constituted 60.5% and peasants 16.9% of the Party membership. In 1960, 1970, and 1979, workers composed only 40.3%-41.0%, and peasants fell from 11.8% in 1960 to 9.4% in 1979. Too, most of the recorded workers and peasants were masters and managers of factory divisions and of state owned farms.(31) The police and the security apparatus became more professional, sophisticated, cynical, and elitist. The Party and security apparatus became corrupt from top to

50 bottom. By April 1981, 282 leading members of the Party elite were expelled for corruption.(32) General Kufel, the former head of military counterintelligence, was replaced for large-scale financial malfeasance. This social picture will help explain why the conflict between the government and the governed started to increase again despite 4-5 years of relatively stable political conditions and some improvement in the material well-being of the population. In the mid-seventies the continuing shortage of food supplies started to worsen dramatically, the state debt grew rapidly, the system of planning disorganized the national economy more and more. The growing disappointments led gradually to the creation of dissident groups outside the party. Poland's ratification of the Helsinki "Final Act" helped the weak opposition groups. Their real power grew only after June 1976 when the workers' upheaval in Radom and Ursus (near Warsaw) resulted in a new wave of brutal repressions. Dozens of workers were maltreated, beaten, dismissed from their jobs, arrested and sentenced to long prison terms. All promises given the workers on December 1970 were cynically and brutally betrayed. This spurred the creation of the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) by intellectuals and dissidents.(33) Two kinds of activities were most troublesome for the secret police: 1. the demand of KOR and other organized groups that the government would respect its own law and order; 2. the systematic informing of the Polish and international public about all kind of police repressions which were in conflict with the above mentioned law and order. It was because, Public life in Poland has witnessed the growth of a whole area of extralegal activity by the power apparatus that is subject to no regulation... The police apparatus is de. facto, subordinated at all levels to the parallel Party cell... It has...given rise to manipulation of the law enforcement apparatus to meet the needs of the moment...as a result, the size of the police apparatus has been increased to proportions more in keeping with a police state ... Thanks to the lack of control over the police apparatus there has been a growth of criminality within that apparatus itself, ranging from the material advantages from the exercise of power...to the ever more frequent

51 cases of robbery and beatings committed by members of the police...(34) Aware of the competitive political function of Moczar's people inside the repression apparatus, Gierek strengthened the control of the Party bureaucrats over the security service. This, however, did not influence the illegal methods of the police. On the contrary, between 1976 and 1980 police repressions grew in their brutality; a number of dissidents were secretly killed. The Human Rights Movement (ROPCiO) collected and published a large number of testimonies, documents and other information, which lay a great charge of criminal acts on the security service and the police. In 1980 and 1981, when "Solidarity" started to act as a legal trade-union organization, a list of 26 people secretly killed or heavily beaten and injured by the police was published. It was discovered that Poland has the highest rate of arrested and sentenced people in Europe, excluding the USSR, and that concentration camps exist, similar to the Soviet "Gulags" in southern Poland. The popular detestation of the police (MO) and the security service (SB - Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa) is so deep, that even when they act against criminals the mob is hostile to the police. There have been cases of policemen killed or beaten by people who took revenge for the brutality which they experienced.(35) Hence, it is understandable that the government for more than a decade tried to support the image of the high morality and and patriotism of the army, which in Poland was indeed loved and respected. The army had successfuly regained much of its traditional prestige since 1956. During the unrest in Poland in 1976, rumors were widespread that the Minister of Defense, General Jaruzelski, would be unwilling to use the military against the workers. Jaruzelski probably advised Edward Gierek that using the military against the workers would involve risks. Jaruzelski, a professional soldier with a deep feeling for the mood of the army, had good reason to doubt in 1976, or in 1980-1981, that the soldiers would fight against the workers. For that reason not military, but security service, units were used to suppress the resistance of the Polish workers after martial law was introduced; the regular army can't be trusted for that task. After the bloodshed and turbulent upheavals which occurred in 1970, the Polish army was morally and politically weakened. They needed years to recover sufficiently to become involved in any battle with striking workers. After August 1980, when the desperate workers forced the Polish government, for the third time in the recent decade, to rescind the decision of increasing the food prices, and also to recognize "Solidarity" as a legal trade-union; a new era started not only in

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Poland but in all countries ruled by the Communists. The creation of "Solidarity" was such an unconventional phenomenon that the Polish party elite and its apparatus was shocked, dis-oriented, and paralyzed for a long time. The functional and organizational structure of the Polish secret service and the police was prepared to discover and to suppress small dissident groups, or local unrests. But a mass, independent movement, which arose in a few weeks and embraced 10 million workers or almost 50% of the adult population of Poland, a union which comprised about 2/3 of city residents, could not be suppressed by using old methods of terror. Either democratic forms of dealing with that union had to be used or else a large security or military force, which would act without mercy, using unlimited violence, even if hundreds of its countrymen would be killed and the whole economy of the country would be paralyzed. During 1980 and 1981 there was much doubt in Warsaw and in Moscow if the Polish army was prepared for such a confrontation. This is why the Party elite in Poland, including the extreme hardliners, accepted in the summer of 1980 the tactics of finding some temporary compromise with "Solidarity." There were a few real liberals in the Politburo, but many more realists, who saved Poland from a total catastrophe. It was not by chance that in August 1980 Stanislaw Kania succeeded Edward Gierek as Party leader. Kania was the single Party bureaucrat who received full secret information about what was going on in Poland. In 1971 Kania was elevated to the Head of the Administration Department of the Central Committee which is responsible for security affairs. In the mid1970's he was appointed as Party Secretary in charge of all security affairs, therefore also as supervisor of the same Administration Department. He bridged all important channels of Polish secret activity with the Party First Secretary and with the secret activity of the Soviet Union in Poland. Kania, using his knowledge collected from secret reports, understood that it could be counterproductive and ruinous to use force against the striking workers. This tactical approach was probably not accepted in Moscow, and under its pressure to keep control over the Politburo, two other instrumental men, Mieczyslaw Moczar and Stefan Olszowski, were incorporated into that highest Party body. Moczar was badly needed to strengthen the security services and to resurrect the mass political provocation, which had proved so successful in the 1968 events. The KGB was still convinced that it was possible to resolve the Polish crisis by resuscitating a mass wave of anti-Semitism. This is why after returning to the political scene in 1980 Moczar immediately started to play the old quasi-

53 nationalist card. For example, in a speech given at the Seventh Party Plenum in December 1980, Moczar stated, Men of reason in the trade unions are to be valued highly. Unfortunately, however, hiding behind these men are those who seek revenge for their own past failures. They have infiltrated Solidarity and now try to stir up unrest, encouraging hostility toward socialism itself. I do not want to give their names at this time, but I believe such an accounting of names will be unavoidable in the future. It is a shame that these instigators have forgotten from where they have come. Their political past originated in the 1950s. We remember that this was a time when so many people (Communists) for no apparent reason were sent to prison for many years.(36) Everyone in Poland understood what Moczar intended by this statement: Jewish Communists were responsible for Stalinist terror in Poland, and the Jews were responsible for the present unrest in Poland. The fact that there are virtually no Jews left in Poland had of course not prevented the secret police and the newly created extreme pro-Soviet association "Grunwald" from playing upon anti-Jewish sentiment within the Party apparatus, and even within "Solidarity." It was not by chance that in March 1981, on the anniversary of the 1968 student unrest, a new wave of organized antiSemitic spectacles took place in Poland. The. New York Times correspondent in Warsaw described the new antiSemitic wave in Poland as "the gutter of Polish politics."(37) But many symptoms suggest that this was rather a synthesis of the Polish and Soviet gutters of politics. Some events which seemed coordinated and managed by the Polish security organs, together with the KGB, included the facts that: 1. The speeches of Moczar with anti-Semitic undertones about KOR and "Solidarity," and the simultaneous springing up of an extreme quasinationalistic and publicly anti-Semitic association "Grunwald" also strongly supported by Stanislaw Olszowski. On April 2 8 , 1981 "Grunwald" was legalized with almost 100 thousand members (officially announced) throughout the country, and started to publish its own weekly Rzeczywistosc. very often quoted by the Soviet mass media. In September of the same year a National Youth Committee of "Grunwald" was created. It was also "Grunwald" which started to denounce liberal Politburo members (H. Kubiak) as CIA agents, and whose leaflets suggested that KOR (in summer 1981

54 self-dissolved) and "Solidarity" are a Jewish and Zionist plot. This accusation found its full support in Literaturnaya fiazeta. (38) 2. The arranging of a mysterious police provocaton against "Solidarity" in Bydgoszcz in the days when the military manoeuvers of the WTO armies were at the apex, and Soviet troops were concentrated on the border with Poland. Even after a general strike of the Polish workers, the Polish government was unable and unwilling to. unmask who b_eat the "Solidarity" leaders in Bydgoszcz, although it was officially recognized that the beaters were security service men. It is even possible that the directing idea behind the attack was to provoke a general strike and justify Soviet intervention, but, if so, it misfired. All these activities were a copy of the famous police provocation of March 1968, but this time with little success. The majority of Poles understood that the anti-Jewish card is also an anti-Polish one. Furthermore, though "Solidarity" had no access to the government-controlled mass media, it was successful in unmasking official propaganda lies through its own publications and radio. Faced with enormous economic problems, a totally disorganized food market, the pressure of strikes, and the Soviet threat of military intervention, the ruling elite of the Polish Party decided to concentrate power in the hands of the Minister of Defense and Prime Minister, Wojciech Jaruzelski; since the October Party plenum in 1981 he has been simultaneously Party First Secretary. We should also not overlook another phenomenon in the history of the Polish security service. For the first time in Polish postwar history, all security organizations are under the control of one man. These changes mean the KGB will have difficulties in playing the old game of supporting the competition of the divided security organizations. A country under martial law is not necessarily run by army commanders nor does martial law necessarily mean the concentration of the most important executive posts and powers in the hands of one man. Long before the imposition of martial law on December 13 1981, a select group of high-ranking army commanders had in fact concentrated all the real power in its hands and taken over the conduct of political affairs. In July 1981 there had been a batch of appointments of high-ranking army men to key control posts: General Czeslaw Priotrowski, head of Army Engineers and of Armaments Research and Development, had been made Minister of Mines and

55 Energy Industries. At the same time General Tadeusz Hupalowski, First Deputy Chief of General Staff, was given control of all local affairs as Minister for Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection. General Czeslaw Kiszczak, Deputy Chief of General Staff and Head of Military Counterintelligence, became Minister of internal Affairs in charge of all security affairs, and was made a member of the Politburo. In October 1981 General Florian Siwicki, Chief of General staff of the Armed Forces, was elected candidate member of the Politburo. The process extended through the whole of the government and Party apparatuses. An especially important nomination was that of General Tadeusz Dziekan, former Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration in the Army, to be head of the Personnel Department of the Party Committee. This department ratifies the nomenklatura (listing) of all the Party apparatchiki at the center and in the districts, as well as the directors of the 207 most important factories in the country. General Dziekan was therefore able to effect thorough-going changes of personnel in the top and middle level of the Party and government bureaucracy. From February 1981 on, personnel changes included replacing 440 persons who held positions as deputy premiers, ministers, district governors, newspaper directors, etc., 200 chairmen and heads of local administrations, 650 directors of the largest factories. Moreover, 250 memoers of the Party Central Committee were changed and another 5,800 political functionaries throughout the country, part of them because of their support for "Solidarity." (39) Only 750 of all these changes were effected after martial law was imposed. The military elite had tightened their grasp in this manner in the course of the continuing political crisis in order to crush "Solidarity," which was turning into the focus of real power in the country. This state of affairs would hardly have been acceptable even to a more democratic government than that of Poland. It was deemed unthinkable in a Communist regime. On October 2 3 , 1981, special "operational Groups" of army officers were sent out to a number of points around the country. This was the opening move in the introduction or martial law. To camouflage the aim of this operation, it was announced that these special groups were being sent to check the efficiency of the local bureaucracy. This was in effect their real task, but what they also had to do "on the spot" was to assess the extent to which the local administration would be likely to knuckle under to martial law and continue to function. This secret, sophisticated maneuvering in the Communist

56 terror system should be a warning signal to anyone who might be tempted to underestimate the ability of the Warsaw Pact countries to prepare secretly for war. On November 20, the "operational groups" were withdrawn from the small towns and villages, so as to lull any suspicions "Solidarity" might have. On November 26th these same groups were sent to the big towns where the main clash with "Solidarity" was expected. Public opinion was no longer informed on these proceedings, and the "Solidarity" leaders, increasingly divided among themselves, were not even aware of the preparations in progress for the entire terror infrastructure—detention camps, places cleared in the hospitals, the C3 system (Command, Control, Communications) being made operative, and other steps as well. This is sufficient proof, if any were needed, that a mass following such as "Solidarity" enjoyed is not the equivalent of real power when it comes to challenging a resourceful, well-organized and ruthless power focus like the ruling Communist elite. The determination of the army heads to eliminate "Solidarity" had been stiffened by the growing realization that the Party apparatchiki. corrupted politically by cynicism and careerism, had totally lost control of the country. These people feared for their future and their very lives and were prepared to act on Moscow's orders at this precise moment when there was a real threat of Soviet military intervention. In these circumstances, the weakness of the Party bureaucracy gave the army the possiblity of manipulating the situation, so as to open the way for political aims which might conceivably be realized in the specific conditions of Poland. These specific conditions were the sum total of Poland's entire history since the war. The nation and the ruling elite had been faced with two main problems: how to reform the very conservative and inefficient economic, social and political system, and how to limit Soviet interference in Poland's domestic affairs. The experience of other Communist countries—Yugoslavia, Albania and in part Rumania and China—showed that these two problems are connected with each other but are not identical. It is a mistaken belief that members of a ruling Communist elite would not prefer to see their country more efficient economically and more independent of Soviet semi-colonialist control. The main social group in favor of reform is the large stratum of technocrats, and the last to see the light are the Party apparatichiki. The same holds good where Soviet interference is concerned. On the day to day level, Soviet interference is most burdensome for the

57 economic sector, but it should not be overlooked that it is also obnoxious to most Polish army commanders. They have to suppress their views and shelve their personal ambitions in accordance with the Warsaw Pact (that is, Soviet) orders. Their military pride is constantly wounded by a foreign superpower. Their theoretical responsibility for the defence of the national interest is increasingly mocked by reality. It is oversimplifying matters to calculate how many and what percentage of Polish army commanders have studied in Soviet military academies and to ignore the deeper motives at work. Even the fact that most Polish army commanders are Party members does not define their posture as a group in society. A closer scrutiny would certainly reveal their potential ability and their will to carry out a more independent policy as regards both the larger aspects of defence and the details of military organization: planning and performance, armament policy, training, etc. The single factor that has countered this potential of the commanders and paralyzed their will has been the extensive infiltration of Soviet agents at all levels of the military machine, as has already been described in these pages. In this sphere too the socio-political group most subservient to Moscow if not totally so is that of the Party apparatchiks. who often show themselves to be dangerous adversaries of the military elite. At several critical moments in the history of "People's Poland," particularly after October 1956, it looked as if hopes of economic and social reform might be realized. The central issue again presented itself with "Solidarity," could a democratic mass movement really help achieve these apparently impossible "Polish dreams" or would it not in fact be an obstacle instead? No ready answer can be given without an attempt to assess the capability of the ruling Polish elite and the real intentions and possibilities of the Soviet Union. If Polish goals are at all feasible, they can only be reached by the exercise of political sophistication equal to that of the Soviets, and in this equation mass support must have its weight. Such support can only be publicly demonstrated, however, in conditions of relative political freedom, and political freedom also offers a field for Soviet manipulation and intrigue. This was manifested in the emergence of such groups and "mass organizations" as "Forum" and "Grunwald" with their well-financed pulications, the semi-fascist weekly, Rzeczywistosc. already referred to, booklets, books, pamphlets and so on. The question arises whether it is not more important in a given situation to rein in rather than encourage the enthusiasm of emotional and ill-organized masses and abandon

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wholesale freedom for everyone, so as to be able to channel and control the pressure of the wellorganized Party cliques and agents backed by Moscow. To give a clear-cut answer to this question requres a more detailed review than has been given so far of the specific conditions to which it refers. The dangerous activity by Soviet-backed Party apparatchiki and Moscow's Polish agents was stepped up over the months in 1980 and '81. The process was complicated after August 1980 by thorough-going changes in the rank and file of the Communist Party (£Z£E), which was going badly to pieces, especially in the biggest and most important industrial enterprises. On June 3 0 , 1980 just before the waves of strikes and "Solidarity" action began, the Communist Party numbered 3,150,000 members. By midDecember 1981 when martial law was imposed, the membership had fallen to 2,693,000—some 457,000 l e s s — a n d by the end of the next year another 353,000 had dropped out of the ranks. Thus betwen July 1980 and the end of 1982 the Party had lost altogether more than a quarter of its members. The percentage of the workers who gave up membership in the same period was however much higher—over a third, 36%, and their total percentage in the Party membership as compared with the period before August 1981 had fallen from 46 to 40 percent. The workers' role in the Party cells in the main industrial plants was much reduced. These changes can be exemplified by the figures from the highly industrialized district of Baluty in the very "proletarian" city of Lodz. Of the 16,495 Party members registered there in mid-1982, only 6,303 (38.2%) were "workers" - most of them managers of factory departments; 3,161 (19.2%) were pensioners. There were four peasants and four students.(40) The process of losing Party members has gone on since then at approximately the same rate of 6,000 a month. The weakened links of "the ruling Party" with "the workers and peasants" had to be replaced by a stronger terror appratus: martial law continued after 1982, and the main factories and institutions were kept militarized. During the 17 months of "Solidarity's" activity, when the power of the ruling bureaucracy was ebbing away day after day, opinions were divided on how to solve the political crisis. The line of division did not necessarily run between the different groups - the Party as a political organization, the army, the security services - but rather inside each of the focuses of power in the system. The Party apparatchiki were the major trend running counter to the national aspirations for freedom and in favour of repression even by Soviet military intervention. This was the end result of the apparatchiki's social

59 function in a "socialist" society: the Party apparatus in Poland can only survive and hold on to power with Moscow's support and blessing, and is not even ashamed to use the threat of Soviet armed intervention as blackmail, in order to maintain its right to rule. Armed forces and police exist in every political system; the essential question is whether it is they who are in control or whether they are controlled, and if the latter, by whom. In the critical situation in Poland, the problem was whether the army would act at the bidding of the corrupt Party apparatus or else as an independent Polish focus of power. A paradoxical situation resulted: a man in uniform was raised to the leadership of the country but was unable to act in the national interest. With the consent of a corrupt parliament (the S e j m ) , martial law destroyed the organizational structure of "Solidarity" and made it illegal. This kaleidoscopic shake-up of the institutions of the regime and the new legal and political configuration that thereby came into being changed all the relationships between the Party apparatus, the Party leaders and the army as an institution in farreaching and unpredictable ways. The fact itself that "Solidarity" had existed legally became a permanent factor not only in the Polish domestic situation but in all the Communist countries and particularly those under Soviet domination. AFTER DECEMBER 1 3 , 1981:

THE TIME OF MARTIAL LAW

The suppression of Solidarity and the turning point which martial law represented should not blur many important political, legal, organizational, and military aspects of this event. For the first time in the history of any Communist state, the military played a dominant political role, eclipsing the party bureaucracy and the party as a whole. To correctly estimate this unique role of the Polish military commanders, we must start with a brief description of the decree which is binding on Poland in time of martial law. On November 21, 1967, after operating secretly for about 17 years, the Committee for the Defense of the Country (Komitet Obrony Kraju) was officially created as a body of the Council of Ministers.(41) Based on this decree, a network of military and civilian cells was organized which embraced the whole administration of the country from top to bottom. The network of KOK is built in such a way that the life of the country could be switched on short notice form peace to emergency activity without special organizational changes. Members of the KOK are (1) the Party First Secretary (Schirman); (2) the Prime

60 Minister; (3) the Minister of Defense; and other high officials (such as Chief of Staff of the Polish army, head of the Planning Commission, ministers), if necessary. On the day when martial law was imposed in Poland General Wojciech Jaruzelski was the one person who legally represented the entire body of the KOK. There are clear indications in Polish sources that after martial law was imposed in December 1981, the local Military Staffs, acting as the executive arm of the Military Council for National Salvation, started to replace or supervise the local Party functionaries and local administrative governors. This whole operation to channel or divert power from the civilian decision-makers to the military (or militarized) ones was based on the legislation passed long before, which had set up the infrastructure described above as part of Poland's preparations for atomic war. What was new was the 1981 creation of a special military system to control the civilian administration and the Party bureaucracy from top to bottom, directing the functionaries of the Party, town and district apparatuses and the whole of the economic administration, both in the government and in the factories. Very summarily stated, the system worked as follows: On the factory level were Military Commissars (Komisarze Wojskowi) and on the local administration level Military Operation Groups (Wojskowe Grupy Operacyjne); parallel to this was a high level military control (Inspekcja Sil Zbrojnych) investigating the political effectiveness and professional efficiency of local Party and government functionaries. To make the operations of the last-named body more "legal" politically, it usually worked together with representatives of the Party's Central Audit Commission.(42) Martial law as imposed in Poland was not, therefore, a military coup d'état but a legal act by a totalitarian system incapable of solving a political crisis by democratic means. In this sytem, General Jaruzelski is the legal ruler, elected according to the book, first as Defence Minister, then Prime Minister and Party First Secretary. As legal head of KOK, Jaruzelski set up the Military Council for National Salvation, mainly in order to militarize economic life (factories, transportation, services) and to paralyze "Solidarity." This new supreme executive body made him in effect independent of the Party Politburo and consequently of the Party Central Committee, although as Party First Secretary he has to act in accordance with Central Committee decisions. Under the newly created political conditions, however, the Party bureaucrats, weakened and disorganized, depend entirely on the military rulers for effective action. This

61 subordination of t h e i r s — o r rather their being practically r e p l a c e d — was only acquiesced in by the Party and the economic managerial elite as a lesser evil than "Solidarity." The power exercised by the members of the Military Council for National Salvation under martial law to control and reorganize the local bureaucracy showed up the "ruling elite" as corrupt, inefficient and politically powerless. This must inevitably have farreaching consequences both on the domestic scene and in other countries in the Communist world, particularly those under Soviet domination.(43) Viewed from the capitals of these countries, the Warsaw events had embarrassing implications: at a time of growing economic difficulties, it is not easy for the leaders to come to terms with the disclosure of the corruption and inefficiency of the Communist bureaucracy, which had to be replaced by the military elite to save its fictive political power from complete collapse. This was hardly a welcome spectacle not only for the neighboring Warsaw Pact states but even for "dissident" Rumania or independent Yugoslavia. The power now in military hands was of special importance in the past internal rivalries between bureaucratic groups. Contrary to accepted notions, a ruling Communist elite's capacity to direct events or at least influence them is not necessarily based on a small set of people at the top but much more on the large "middle stratum" of managers and administrators, and in Poland these may number as many as some half a million, according to a Polish expert.(44) It was primarily this sector, many of them not even Party members, which was interested in suppressing "Solidarity," but it also wanted more freedom for itself inside the cumbersome, over-centralized economic and administrative decision-making system. The economic reforms implemented under martial law were meant for it in the first place, and its role in the new political configuration should not be underestimated. Alongside many army commanders who will probably remain part of the non-military bureaucracy, this middle-level sector will substitute for the paralyzed Communist Party and will be the most effective component of the terror regime in operation. In the long run these people could help rebuild the Party as an efficient organization but not necessarily a politically respectable and influential one, which it never was in the past. At all events, in the language of Marxist demagogy they would be restoring to the Party its legal rights and historical mission. By helping the Party to become effective again, they would also be helping the army to go back to its main task of defending the country against "external enemies." The military elite is still strong and influential, but

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isolated in society. If it was used under martial law in its internal function to fight "enemies of socialism at home," this too, it was officially stressed, strengthened the country's defence capability.(45) Jaruzelski will certainly never act against the main Soviet interests in Poland, but martial law gave him unique leverage as a negotiating partner on many Polish issues with the USSR. In a worsening economic situation, without Western economic support, Poland is increasingly dependent on the COMECON countries, particularly the USSR. On the other hand, Poland's economic difficulties must affect Polish-Soviet trade relations in the sense that Moscow has been forced to realize that its exploitation of the Polish economy reached the stage of being politically counterproductive and would have to be cut back. (46) Thus even Poland's economic distress could strengthen Jaruzelski's hand vis-a-vis the USSR and stabilize his position inside the domestic power structure as well. Profiting from past experience, Jaruzelski has been building up a bigger, better-organized security force with a part of the array commanders from the top and middle levels. When martial law was introduced, security forces in Poland were able to mobilize about 250,000 men. The Motorized Police Units (ZOMO), the most feared of all, organized in brigades, battalions and companies, armed with everything needed for crushing organized resistance in the civilian population, probably number about twenty to twenty-two thousand. They are part of the regular police (MO) numbering altogether about 150,000. The next militarized security force is the Internal Military Service (Wojskowa Služba Wewnetrzna - W S W ) , a combination military police and security service. They are part of the regular army but are separate organizationally and come under the Chief of Military Counter-intelligence. Besides the vertically organized counter-intelligence branch covering the entire armed forces, WSW also includes a large, well-organized second major branch: law and order enforcement. This last branch initially fulfilled three types of functions: 1. "Investigation officers" of the WSW attached to every military unit dealt with economic corruption and other non-political crimes such as breaches of discipline, offences against morals and so on. 2. WSW sections attached to divisions and special military units included gendarmerie platoons, organized in patrols, with duties regarding army discipline in barracks and on the move (on the roads, in cities, e t c . ) . 3. The third function of the "law and order"

63 branch is to go into action against any military units affected by mutiny and against rioting organized by civilian groups. This function is entrusted to a specially-trained wsw unit, initially the size of a battalion and enlarged in the early 1960's to the size of a regiment. In the '70s additional special attack units were organized by each garrison, varying in size from a company to a regiment, in line with the size and importance of the garrison. All the wsw units, including "law and order" and guard units, amount together to about 22 to 25 thousand men, but in time of political crisis an additional 25 thousand reservists can easily be mobilized, most of them consceipts. In addition, there are 60 thousand Internal Military (Wojski Wewnetrze - WW) and 18 to 20 thousand border units (Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza - WOP), together about 80 thousand men under the command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and this number too can be doubled if necessary. This WW is trained to fight against internal armed resistance: it has light armored vehicles, tanks, artillery, helicopters and other heavy weapons. We see, therefore, that the military regime in Poland can easily mobilize hundreds of thousands of security forces to fight against the workers, and it has done so. There is no evidence, however, that the regular army was used to suppress "Solidarity." The most powerful and best equipped regular army units are the Operational Units under the Chief Inspector of the Polish army, and these form part of the united Warsaw Pact Northern Tier. We can assume that these units are kept in barracks, isolated from events in the country, and even guarded by WSW units, but even this cannot shut them off from political events or prevent the undermining of their morale, and their future stand remains very much open to question.(46) The military elite is certainly not a uniform body politically. High-ranking commanders differ from each other in their political views: some have connections with the KGB or with Warsaw Pact generals, while others may support one faction or another in the Polish Party. If they are not homogeneous, they are however a highly disciplined group operating under specific military orders. A different set of rule dictates the actions of the Party civilian apparatchiki: they are subject to Party directives and Party discipline, in line with socalled Party "centralism," but unlike the military apparatchiki they do not have to bow to the extra military discipline that dominates Party life under martial law more than previously. The principle of edinonachalie ("one sole commander")—where the commander is responsible both militarilty and

64 politically—relegates different political views to the background. In times of emergency, the generals have very little leeway for intrigue, even if they are connected with some Party or outside pressure-group which could theoretically challenge Jaruzelski's leadership. Moreover Moscow is obliged in view of the continued instability in the country to be very careful in tampering with the existing political set-up or supporting any quick changes. Then too the composition of the Military Council for National Salvation shows that not all the top echelon army commanders have been given an equal say on the new decision-making bodies. Most of them are charged with the regular training of battle units and with keeping them in their quarters, isolated from "the outside world." Yet all these measures, even combined with more intense surveillance by military counter-intelligence, cannot suffice to prevent the martial law situation from affecting the morale of the most powerful part of the army, with farreaching political consequences. The regular army is based on conscription, and the young recruits are an integral part of the nation, sharing its moods, its hopes and its disappointments. They will not forgive or forget the suppression of "Solidarity." The morale and political state of mind of the regular army units will also be badly affected by the realization that the suppression of "Solidarity" by the armed forces meant the end of the myth that they were there to defend the country against its enemies, West Germany and America. The younger generation no longer believes all this propaganda. The masses of conscripts, and the younger officers along with them, have learnt that the real enemy of Poland inside its borders is the Communist Party, and outside the country—the other members of the Warsaw Pact. This is why in the long run the suppression of "Solidarity" will have done irremediable damage both to the Polish Party bureaucracy and to their Soviet accomplices. Martial law taught the Polish people the hard lesson that the Communist system is impervious to reform by peaceful means alone. This long-term development is one that no realistic politician can be expected to observe with satisfaction. The Polish rulers understand perfectly well that after those seventeen months of freedom, when millions of their countrymen learned the truth about the history of their generation and the events of the present, the nation's will to be free can never again be broken by terror or deflected by shameless lies. General Jaruzelski's quandary has been made still sharper by the growing role of the Church with the two visits of Pope John Paul. Overwhelming economic problems now encompass all the East European countries including the USSR. After

65 the suppression of the brief "Prague Spring," Husak was able to give the people bread instead of freedom. This alternative is not available to Jaruzelski, now or in the foreseeable future. AFTER "SOLIDARITY"—THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE The struggle between the ruling elite and "Solidarity" went on under martial law without respite and with little success on either side. A close scrutiny will confirm the view that while "Solidarity" did not survive as a legal trade union or mass movement, the military rulers did not succeed either in stopping its impressive illegal demonstrations and other even more openly antiGovernment actions. "Solidarity" underground has had to change its organizational structure and its tactics but it is bound to have a continuing influence on public morale and on political and economic life in Poland for long years to come. Precisely because it is underground, the Polish rulers will have more difficulty fighting an invisible dissident power in the shadows that comprise the majority of workers and intellectuals or is indirectly supported by them.(47) The political role of the terror apparatus will expand again, as will the associated physical and psychological means of pressure placed at its disposal. Terror will be combined with systematic political corruption based on bribery, bought loyalty and official pressures, but it will nevertheless do little to help solve the chilling economic and social problems of the day. The government and at least part of the Party bureaucracy nevertheless learned some lessons from the past. After a major upheaval, in December 1970 as in October 1956, the police terror altered its methods of oppression as well as its approach to social conflicts and management of the economy. Changes in economic policy were to be expected after the events of December 1970 in an attempt to lessen the extent of the rulers' isolation from their people. Any effort to change things, to act otherwise than in the past, was however bound to produce conflict within the ruling elite and within the more complex political and economic configuration in Eastern Europe, a situation in which the Soviet Union could not confine itself to the role of an indifferent observer.(48) The first sign of roundabout interference could be discerned in the recent publication by the main Soviet theoretical Party organ, Kommunist of a summary of an article that appeared in the journal, Nowe Drogi written by Jerzy Kraszewski, Deputy Chief Editor of the Polish Party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu. Kraszewski is known to be a

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Soviet "mole" and the fact that his article was given publicity in Kommunist is of clear political significance. The conclusion emphasized by the Soviet translator was that the two main dangers present in Poland's political life today are the "counter-revolution" outside the Party and the "right-wing" policy inside the ruling elite, both of which cloud over the real goals of socialism for tactical and political short-term purposes. Observers accustomed to reading between the lines could have little doubt that the criticism was directed at the ruling military elite. Martial law did not affect any fundamental change in a fundamentally lawless system. Under the cover of martial law, it was easier to break the power of "Solidarity." The very same legislation that lifted martial law and dispensed with the Committee of National Salvation gave a specious legitimacy to fresh emergency powers. Plus ca change, plus, c'est la, meme chose! (49) Now that martial law has been rescinded (July 1 9 8 3 ) , the immediate political outcome will be influenced by international actors as well as domestic ones: Various groups within the army and Party elites will clash with each other as they seek to establish some new modus vivendi between their own formal and informal guiding cadres, and between themselves and some parts of their own p e o p l e — a n d the USSR as well. There is no problem about getting the various army commanders back into barracks; except for a few ambitious personalities, these commanders almost certainly do not have and never had political aspirations. The difficulty will be how to create a new situation in which these army men will not be called on in the near future to take part in solving essentially civilian domestic crises of political and economic origin. "Solidarity" underground will have the support of a large group of experienced Polish political emigres of a different caliber from the backers of the old anti-Communist parties after the war, more deeply involved and better able to evaluate the issues. This will help make it into a centre of influence constantly affecting the conduct of the whole nation, interacting with the Church to produce an endemically unstable political balance. The possibility cannot be ruled out that in a crisis these different groups could find themselves involved in a dramatic new conflict even against their will by the acts of the external actor, the USSR.(50) Never again or at any rate not for many years to

67 come will the greater part of the nation trust government promises and ostensible concessions. The people will become more anti-Communist and antiSoviet, more accessible to dissident movements which could even penetrate the ranks of the army itself. And as ever there will be the group of the cynics and the corrupt, loyal to the system on which their personal careers depend. The two sides will co-exist but not cooperate. The consequences for the national economy can only be still lower efficiency in the factories and still greater difficulties all along the line. The Soviets, even under a former KGB chief, will have to seek to strengthen the Polish Party bureaucracy as their best basis for control of the country. They will be bound to step up the harshness of the security services and increase their own influence on these services' operations. There is no certainty that the centralized Polish political apparatus and its terror arm are today acting in obedience to specific KGB demands or commands. Clearly, however, Moscow will never flinch in its silent struggle behind the scenes to restore the power and influence of the most extreme pro-Soviet faction in the Polish Party. If the Soviets succeed, social demagogy combined with anti-Semitism will be backed by still more terror. Jaruzelski should not be viewed as anti-Soviet, but Moscow is not usually keen to rely on a ruler strong in his own right and in full control of the Party and state bureaucracy. It is to be expected that Moscow will foment internal intrigues in order to get a new configuration of the top decision-making bodies which would be easier to manipulate.(51) What is the main aim of the ruling elite in Poland today and what developments seem likely? Lifting of martial law is not likely to go very far to meet the people's demands for bread and freedom (not that the regime in the USSR or any other Communist country has ever had much in common with meeting such demands). The suppression of "Solidarity" is no substitute for a radical program or even a minimal one to create conditions for real economic and social development. The postWorld War II continuing political and economic crisis in Poland is due to two constant factors: Soviet domination and the operation of a corrupt and inefficient system, and nothing any Polish leaders can do can outweigh them. Nevertheless, it is oversimplifying things to see the Polish leaders of the Stalin era or Gomulka or Gierek and his successors as nothing but Soviet puppets. Even a politically corrupt and puppet government acts within a framework of existing realities, in order to get

68 more support from the population it rules. Terror was never an aim in itself nor just an instrument in the service or corruption—it was needed to support a given economic, political and military program. This program might be and usually was anti-national or pseudo-national, but the rulers had to formulate aims that would win support from some social groups, and terror could only be "justified" or "excused" in the context of such a program. In the present situation, the program must seek to offer a solution to urgent social and economic problems but it must also represent a continuation of traditional Polish political thinking and behavior. The most constant factor in Polish political thinking and sentiments has always been the country-s geopolitical situation between two hostile neighbours stronger than itself—Russia and Germany.(52) This external factor has had a strong impact on most of the domestic difficulties and the social and political conflicts in the country before the war and since. Once the Western powers had acquiesced in Poland's remaining in the zone of Russian domination after the war, the nation and its rulers could no longer come to any decision on domestic political issues without taking this external factor into account. Most of the pragmatic politicians in Poland, however anti-Soviet they may be, do not trust the West because of its impotence when Stalin violated the Yalta accord and again at the time of the armed interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Even the most militant "Solidarity" leaders understood and accepted the government's policy of loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. The problem was not that the Polish dissidents were not sincere in this respect but that Moscow has no faith in loyalty based on promises by Poland's leaders. Nothing will suffice but a situation in which the leaders are totally dependent on Moscow. There can be no question of the USSR's allowing any noteworthy degree of freedom to the most important country in the Warsaw Pact, and one bordering on the completely totalitarian systems of the USSR itself, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The dilemma that faced the Polish Government in having to decide whether to suppress "Solidarity" was thus not only one of internal policy but an external one as well. The question was not whether the system could in tact be reformed by peaceful means but whether the existing international Communist configuration could allow this to happen, whether the USSR would acquiesce in such reforms. If not, if they were prepared to stop any such attempt at reform by military intervention if necessary, none understood better than the Polish army commanders what this would

69 mean for their country. All the same, never since the war had Poland seemingly had a better opportunity for a new modus vivendi between rulers and ruled and also between Poland and the USSR to the advantage of both States. Jaruzelski and his people may be blamed for not choosing the support of 'Solidarity' for this hopeful way. They would have, however, needed a very large dose of steely courage in order to ignore the instructive events unfolding before the eyes of the world in Afghanistan, where three successive governments were overthrown, the last two of them Communist-led. The second Communist group of leaders was simply murdered by the KGB in order to install yet another, rhe third and last (to d a t e ) , and there was no one to help them. Even if freedom for 'Solidarity" might conceivably have created a new type of relationship with the USSR, it would also have meant giving free rein to all Moscow's agents inside the Party, the government and the army. The continued existence of this group of people "sold" to the Soviets must also be taken into account in an analysis of the events of the years 1981 to 1983 and of the unusual role played by the army at that time. Many former "Solidarity" leaders for their part would prefer to work for domestic social reforms even if they had to accept Soviet political and military domination in order to do so. There is still another alternative, however, to make this domination so expensive and counter-productive for the USSR itself that the pressure will have to be reduced and the door will be opened tor step-by-step economic and social reforms in Poland. At all events, the country will never be ruled successfully for any length of time (if at all) by plain terror, and the time must come when this will finally De realized not only in Warsaw but in Moscow too. The possibility should not be excluded that continuing economic difficulties and another Polish political crisis could induce or force the Soviet leaders to think again and find a way acceptable to the majority of tne people of Poland, the largest nation in the Warsaw Pact. Notes 1. Kazimierz Frontczak, Sily zbrojne polski ludowej (The Armed Forces of the Polish People's Republic), (Warsaw 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 335-336, 366. 2. Where is good reason to presume that Communist allies in the governments of Nicaragua, Southern Yemen and Angola are manipulated in the same way.

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3. In the official gazette Monitor Polski. no. 44/1946, Lt. Col. Serayon Davidov was mentioned as one who "...rendered service in the reconstruction of the security services..." for which he was honored with the highest Polish order, Polonia Restituta. 4. Recently published documents, both in the West and in Poland, support in full this description about the relationships between the judges, prosecutors, Informacja and the Party Politburo. Cf. Mieczyslaw Szere, Komisja do Badania Odpowiedzialnosci za Lamanie Praworzadnosci w Sadownictwie Wojskowym (The Commission to Investigate the Responsibility for Violating Law and Order in the Military Courts. An Official Report), Zeszty Historyczne (Kultur), Paris, 1979, no. 49, pp. 7 1 160, Marian Tybicki, "Bolesna i trudna rewizja wielu dognatow" (A Painful and Difficult Revision of Many Dogmas) Kultura. Warsaw, no. 43, October 25, 1981, p. 7. This is the speech of Rybicki given at the VII Plenum, July 1956. The material of this plenum was never published see "Na razie tyle" (This For the First T i m e ) , an interview with Edward Ochab, the former Politburo member, Party First Secretary and President of Poland, Polityka. no. 4 4 , October 3 1 , 1981, p. 14. 5. This issue is discussed later. 6. See the above documents, also Michael Checinski, Poland Communism. Nationalism. AntiSemitism. (New York: Karz Publishers, 1 9 8 1 ) , chapter 5. 7. Mieczyslaw Szere's above report, pp. 156-159. 8. Nowe Drogi. Warsaw, no. 1 0 , 1956, p. 88. In the interview quoted above Ochab stated that in 1953 he was nominated by the Politburo to lead a commission which checked the investigative methods of Informacja. When in his final conclusions he demanded to remove Voznesensky and Skulbashevsky this led "to a heavy scandal..." without achieving any result. Ochab also strongly opposed the accusation of "Grunwald" that the oppressors in Informacja were Jews and the victims were Poles. For the first time in Poland he made clear that the victims were mostly Jewish officers chosen for some "specific goal" (read, to prepare an anti-Jewish trial) by the Soviet officers of Informacja. See Edward Ochab interview, Polityka, no. 4 4 , October 31, 1981, pp. 14-15. It is worth noting that in a report recently published by the extreme pro-Soviet weekly Rzeczywistosc about these trials the name of Informacja is totally omitted. See Stefan Wysokinski, "Praktyka szpiegomanii", Rzeczywistosc. no. 23, Oct. 1981. 9. Susanne S. Lotarski, "The Communist Takeover in Poland" in Thomas T. Hammond, editor, The. Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, (New Haven: Yale

71

University Press, 1 9 7 5 ) , p. 358. 1 0 . The number of members of the security service apparatus is based on my own estimate. The population in 1949 was roughly 24.6 million, while the number of employees in the state-run economy was 3.97 million. See Rocznik Statystyczny 19JL1 (Statistical Yearbook), (Warsaw: 1 9 6 1 ) , pp. 13, 42. 11. See George Leggett, "The Cheka and a Crisis of Communist Conscience," Survey, vol. 25, no. 3 (Summer, 1 9 8 0 ) , pp. 122-137. Ota Sik, the former Deputy Prime Minister under Dubcek in 1968 stated in his recently published book, "Although Stalin's repressive methods were criticized by Khrushchev...and although efforts are still being made today to pretend that these methods have been eliminated at the same time as the Stalin cult, administrative repression continues to exist under the cover of legality..." see Ota Sik, The Communist Power System. (New York: Praeger, 1981) , p. 101. A respected Polish expert argues: "Using the to some extent schematic but at times useful distinction between the content and the form of social phenomena, we could say that in the post-Stalin period changes ensued in the forms of exercise of power which were important for the daily lives of many millions of people, without changes of principle in the content of the political system, which consists in monopolization f power in the hands of the narrow directing group in the Communist Party." See Wlodzimierz Brus, Socialist Ownership and Political Systems, (London and Boston: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1975) , pp. 140-141. These quotations contradict in some respects the more optimistic statements of Dallin and Breslauer about the function of terror in the post-mobilization stage, that: "...the Communist experience suffices to confirm the strength of the secular trend away from political terror — above all, because of the growing pluralism and the awareness of the costs of terror." See Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1 9 7 0 ) , p. 102. The recent events in Yugoslavia prove that even in that country it is very difficult to adopt a more pluralistic model of rule. Also Poland, with its very strong "Solidarity" trade union, was in the meantime not prepared to adopt a more pluralistic system without a permanent state of conflict with the Party and the security service. 1 2 . The number of persons released from prisons on the basis of the Act of Oblivion announced by the Sejm (Polish Parliament) was at the end of April 1956 about 40,000, but only 5,847 were sentenced or arrested for political activity, and 1,063 for collaboration with the German occupiers and for "fascisation of the country" in pre-war Poland, therefore also for political reasons. Only 4,823

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from these altogether 6,910 political prisoners were rehabilitated before January 1957. If, however, we compare the number of political victims in Poland with those in Czechoslovakia or in Hungary, Poland looks like an Eden. In Hungary, where the population was only 9.5 million or 40% of that in Poland, 516,708 people were interned, or sentenced, and the majority of the ruling elite were killed. In Czechoslovakia the number of victims was lower than in Hungary, but much higher than in Poland. See: Jan Skorzynski, Piotr Brozyna, "Rok 1956," Tygodnik Solidarnosc. no. 3 0 , October 2 8 , 1981, p. 6, Jerzy Robert Nowak, "Wegry doby Rakosiego" (Hungary in the Time of Rakosi), Kultura (Warsaw), no. 4 4 , 1 November 1981, p. 1 0 , Trybuna Ludu, 16 January 1957, p. 6. 13. Artur London, On Trial, (London: MacDonald, 1970) , pp. 370-371. 14. For more details see: Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism. Nationalism. Anti-Semitism, chapter 7. See also the recently published testimony of the victims of the Tenth Department and of Lechowicz, in which he confirms that he sent to Bierut, the Party ruler at this time, two memoranda. What Lechowicz does not reveal in his testimony, is that he wrote to Bierut as to a man who knew that Lechowicz was a pre-war Soviet spy. See Wlodzimierz Lechowica, "Bylem wiezniem rakowieckiej" a letter to the editor of Polityka. no. 4 2 , October 1 7 , 1981, p. 1 5 , Feliks Widy-Wirski, "Bylem wiezniem na Rakowieckiej" (I was a Prisoner of the Rakowiecka Prison), Polityka. no. 3 8 , September 21, 1981, p. 15. 15. Jozef Swiatlo, Za kulisami bezpieki i partii (Behind the Facade of the Bezpieka and the P a r t y ) , (New York: 1 9 5 5 ) , p. 16. See also note 1 4 . 16. Flora Lewis, The Polish Volcano: A Case History of. Hope. (London, 1 9 7 1 ) , p. 46. 17. For more details see, Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, chapters 6, 7, and 8, Flora Lewis, Red. Pawn: The. Story oj; Noel Field, (Garden City, New York: 1965) , Erica Wallach, Light at Midnight. (Garden City, New York: 1967) . 18. Jakub Berman's brother, Adolf, was until 1947 chairman of the Jewish Committee in Poland. He left Poland for Israel in 1948 as a leader of the Poaley-Zion Left and joined the Israeli Communist Party. The Tenth Department collected testimony from high officials who had been arrested for possible use against Gomulka, Ochab, Berman and even against the party leader — Boleslaw Bierut. See Feliks WidyWirski, "Bylem wiezniem na Rakowieckiej" Politiyka, no. 3 8 , September 21, 1981, p. 1 5 , Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, chapter 8. 19. Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer,

73 Political Terror in. Communist Systems, pp. 29-30. 20. The former secretary of Stalin (in 19231926) noted that in the early twenties "...The freedom to argue without, mind you, taking the argument outside the Party, was respected, but as Stalin's gift in matters of theory and principle were extremely modest, he sought and found security in silence..." See George R. Urban, "A Conversation with Boris Bazhanov. Stalin Closely Observed," Survey. Summer 1980, vol. 2 5 , no. 3, p. 88. After the Great Purges Stalin found the same security by silencing his adversaries. 21. Author's own and fully tested information. About the destructive role of the militarization of the economy mentioned also Ochab, the former Polish party leader. See Edward Ochal interview, Polityka. no. 4 4 , October 3 1 , 1981, p. 141. 22. Michal Checinski, "Ludowe Wojsko Polskie przed i po marcu 1968" (The Polish Army Before and After March 1 9 6 8 ) , Zeszyty Historyczne.(Paris: Kultura) no. 1978/44, pp. 14-30. 23. Quoted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 341. About the real intentions o Gomulka's question of liberalization see also Michael Checinski, "An Intended Polish Explanation: December 1956", Soviet Jewish Affairs. 1972, no. 3, pp. 82-93 and a recently published discussion about the "Polish October" with Eligiusz Lasota, the former chief editor of Po Prostu. the famous dissident weekly of the Polish young intelligentsia, suppressed by Gomulka in 1957. See "Narodziny i zgon polskiego pazdziernika" (The Birth and the Agony of the Polish October), Polityka, No. 43, 24 October 1981, pp. 1 4 15. 2 4 . Romuald Barwicz, "UBE a sowiecka sluzba bezpieczenstwa" (The Bezpieka and the Soviet Security Service), Kultura. Paris, June 1970, no. 6/173, p. 90. 25. "...A fierce nationalist...Moczar's return to power did not cause rejoicing in the Kremlin. The Soviets fear that his fierce nationalism and widespread popularity might transform him into a Tito-style strongman independent of Moscow..." noted Newsweek on Dec. 1 2 , 1980. In fact the exact opposite was true. Pravda published a number of articles supporting Moczar and trying to revive the ZBoWiD (The Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy) which had cooled-off by the end of the seventies, keeping in mind the "excellent job" which was done in 1967-1969. See: "Priziv Veteranov," Pravda. January 1 8 , 1981, and "K polozhenii v Polshe," Pravda. March 27, 1980. Of course, after the KGB discovered that ZBoWiD was a dead body, a new

74 organization, "Grunwald," was created. 26. Jack Bielasiak, "The Party: Permanent Crisis," in Abraham Brumberg, editor, Poland: Genesis of a Revolution. (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), p. 15. 27. As Hannah Arendt wrote, in a totalitarian system "Not only do almost all higher officials owe their positions to purges that removed their predecessors, but promotions in all walks of life are accelerated in this way. . . The government has itself established those conditions for advancement which the police agent formerly had to create." See Hannah Arendt, The. Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 431. This typical phenomenon of all totalitarian systems appeared again with Gierek, who replaced Gomulka, and with Jaruzelski after he imposed martial law. 28. Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism. Nationalism. Anti-Semitism, chapters 15-19. 29. In 1960 the universities had 20,535 graduate students, in 1970 the number was 47,117, in 1975, 63,236 and in 977, 081, 393. See Rocznik Statystyczny 1978 (Statistical Yearbook 1978) , pp. 47 and 373. The number of employees with higher education in 1977 was 805,400. 30. In 1966, on the anniversary of 1000 years of Christianity in Poland, military officers also helped the police disperse and beat smaller groups of demonstrating religious people, after the sermon of Cardinal Wyszynski in Warsaw. See Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism. Nationalism. AntiSemitism, chapter 16, Antoni Sambrowski, "Przeoczona rocznica" (An Overlooked Anniversary), Tygodnik Solidarnosc, no. 3 1 , October 3 0 , 1981, p. 13. 31. Jan Bluszkowski, "Masowa i awangaradowa" (A Mass and Vanguard), Zycie Partii. no. 6/1981, p. 11. 3 2 . Jan Czula, "Oczyszczanie partii trwa" (The Purge in the Party Is Going O n ) , Zycie Partii. no. 6 1981, pp. 17-18, Henryk Jruata, "Rozliczenia-akcja czy proces" (The Clear- and Action or a Process), Rzeczywistosc. no. 20, October 4, 1981, p. 5. It is interesting to note that Rzeczywistosc. being a mouthpiece of the former "police faction" and still very close to the secret police, was very willing to publish any "unmaking" information about the Gierek clique, using this as a poor substitute for a real and effective program of reform. 33. See Dissent In Poland: Reports and Documents iin Translation?, Dec. 1975-July 1977. (London, 1 9 7 7 ) , Adam Bromke, "The Opposition in Poland," Problems of Communism, no. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1978, pp. 37-51, Karl Hartmann, "Streiks in Polen", Osteuropa, no. 1 2 , 1980, pp. 1269-1270.

75 34. Poland Today, The. State of the Republic. Compiled by the "Experience and the Future" Discussion Group. (New York, 1981) , p. 39. 3 5 . Anatol Marek Lipiec, "Praworzadnosc i bezprawie" (The Law and Order and the Lawlessness), Kultura. Paris, no. 7-8, 1981, pp. 96-107. See also the permanent notes in Tygodnik Solidarnosc. under the column "Praworzadnosc." The system of "secret terror" is not only a feature of the Soviet style satellites, but is an unavoidable kind of activity of all the Communist countries. Let us note the recent case of Milovan Djilas who had been receiving letters and phone-calls threatening him with death unless he supported anti-Communist emigre groups. Djilas suspects that the whole operation was organized by the Yugoslav police. See: New York Sunday, No. 1, 1981, p. 20. 36. Trybuna Ludu, 4 December 1980, p. 5. 3 7 . The New York Times, March 15, 1981. 3 8 . Literaturnaya Gazeta, April 21, 1981. 39. General Tadeusz Dziekan, "Polityka kadrowa partii" (The Personnel Policy of the Party), Zycie partii. no. 21, 8.XII.1982, pp. 3-5. 40. Interview with Politburo member Kazimierz Barcikowski in Zycie Partii. no. 1 4 , 1.IX.1982, pp. 1-3, and Zycie Partii, no. 1 9 , 10.XI.1982, pp. 8-10. See too statement by Andrzej Czyz, deputy head of the Ideological Department of the Party Central Committee, quoted in Politikya. no. 1 7 , 1982, p. 2. 41. Dziennik Ustaw PRL (Government Gazette) , no. 4 4 , November 29, 1967. 42. Lech Winisraki, "Rezygnacje przjeto" (Resignation Accepted), and General Wladyslaw Honkisz (Deputy Chief of the Polish Army Main Political Administration), "Wierni tradycjom" (Loyal to the Traditions), in Zycie Partii. No. 1 7 , 13.X.1982, pp. 3-4; and Polityka. no. 20. May 1 4 , 1983, p. 6. 43. Fred Oldenburg, "Die DDR und die polnische krise," in Osteuropa, 1982 no. 2, pp. 1004-1011, and current reports from Warsaw in the Soviet press. A special symposium was held in the Polish MilitaryPolitical Academy to discuss how to fit the unusual role of the army into the Communist system. See Zolnietz Wolnosci (Soldier of Freedom) no. 57, 1983, Polityka. no. 1 2 , March 19, 1983, p. 2. 44. Stefan Bratkowski, "Polska: Zycie na zakneblowanym wulkanie" (Poland: Life on a Gagged Volcano), in Kultura. Paris, no. 1/424-2/425, 1983, p. 111. 45. Wladyslaw Honkisz, "Wierni tradycjom," Zycie Par±ii, no. 1 7 , 13.X, 1982, pp. 3-4. 46. For the first time in Polish-Soviet trade relations, there are published indications that the USSR is paying back Poland part of the hard currency

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that the Polish shipbuilding and electronics industries had to spend in the West to buy the necessary components for the finished goods exported to the USSR for unconvertible rubles. In 1982 the USSR transferred 1.2 million convertible rubles to the Polish telephone industry and 13.5 million convertible rubles to the shipbuilding industry to buy the necessary components in the West for the ships and telephones produced for the Soviet Union. In addition, and for the same reason, the shipbuilding industry will receive 44 million dollars from the USSR in 1983. From these figures we can estimate that in recent years the shipbuilding industry alone has been paid about 500 million dollars for supplying Polish ships to the USSR. See Boguslaw Lesiewicz, "Przyjaciol poznaje sie w potrzebie" (The Test of Friends Is In Time Of N e e d ) , in Zycie Partii. no. 21, 8.XII.1982, p. 16. 47. Drew Middleton, "Polish Security Forces Listed," New York Times, January 5, 1981, Michael Checinski, "At the Polish Regime's Disposal," New York Times, January 6, 1981. Contrary to accepted opinion, the available information confirms that during the most critical months of martial law, soldiers of the regular battle units were isolated in their barracks and most of them were not allowed even a day's leave except for the most urgent family reasons. 48. This is confirmed by current information in the Polish press. About 260 illegal newspapers and bulletins and 37 illegal books and brochures were published in Poland during the first eight months of martial law alone (mid-December 1981 to mid-August 1 9 8 2 ) . See Kultura, Paris, no. 1 2 , 1983, pp. 95-104. For the continued resistance of the population after martial law was imposed see two documents, one on the situation among intellectuals and one on the role of the Polish law courts. See Kultura. Paris, No. 11/422, 1982, pp. 163-174. Kultura continues to give fresh lists of illegal publications in every issue. 49. See "Statia v zhurnale Nowe Drogi," Kommunist no. 7, 1983, pp. 85-87. 50. See the statement by the editors of Kultura. the main Polish emigre journal, in its issue no. 1/242-2/245, 1983, pp. 3-5. 51. The Moscow-manipulated extreme anti-liberal weekly Rzeczywistosc. with its nationwide Associations of Socio-Political Knowledge (Stowarzyszenie Wiedzy spoleczno-Politycznej Rzeczywistosc) has recently been charged with attacking the Party leadership, the army and even the police. The charge has been directed mainly against Tadeusz Grabski, the former Prime Minister who was removed for his extreme anti-liberal views and who

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wrote a letter to his Party cell criticizing the current policy of Jaruzelski. This letter was distributed with all speed throughout the country and published in a special bulletin. No explanation is forthcoming of where the money for this association came from and why this anti-government activity could not be stopped at a time of martial law. An indication of the inter-factional fighting against this group of "dogmatists" can also be discerned in Jaruzelski's speech at the XII Plenary Session of the Party Central Committee on June 2, 1983. See Henryk Slonimski, "Ideowosc partyjna - to nie alternatywa" (Party Idealism is Not an Alternative), in Zolnierz Wolnosci (Soldier of Freedom), February 7, 1983, p. 4; and Trybuna Ludu. June 3, 1983, p. 3. 5 2 . For a historical analysis of this question see Adam Bromke, Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 6 7 ) , and for the attitude of "Solidarity" leaders see Wojciech Gruszecki, "Czy porozumienie jest mozliwe" (Is an Understanding Possible), Kultura. No. 10/421, 1982, pp. 85-89. Gurszecki, today a "Solidarity" representative in the West, suggests that the only partner of "Solidarity" for talks is Moscow, while the Polish government is a mere puppet and tool. This is not necessarily an objective picture of the situation in Poland.

4 Soviet Secret Police Jonathan

R. Adelman

Although the Soviet secret police has easily been the most studied police force in Communist countries, there still remains a dearth of works which try to analyze the secret police in the broader framework of Soviet politics. Here we will analyze the functions performed by the secret police in each major period of Soviet history and its role in Soviet politics. We will assess the validity of major theories of secret police behavior and influence for each of the periods. As the history of the Soviet secret police at times merges with the history of the Soviet state, the resultant essay is inescapably long but hopefully worthwhile. CIVIL WAR A significant problem in the creation of the Cheka was the lack of continuity with its corresponding pre-revolutionary ancestor, the Okhrana. In this attribute the Cheka was alone among major Communist institutions. The Party could draw on two decades of revolutionary experience. The Red Army, while lacking experienced Communist officers, could at least use 48,000 former Tsarist officers in its ranks. The government bureaucracy could use tens of thousands of Tsarist chinovniki and bourgeois specialists. But, given the harsh repression and infiltration of the Bolsheviks by the Okhrana, it was inadmissible to use more than a handful of men from the Okhrana in the secret police—and in no ways could it be used as a model. Indeed, under Kerensky the old secret police apparatus had been dismantled and many Okhrana agents had been arrested and sent to jail or the army. Under these conditions the methods and personnel of the revolutionary parties, not the hated Okhrana, would form the basis of Cheka work. While years of underground experience would provide some help in working in the secret police, it would

80 hardly substitute for real experience. Yet, despite these problems the Cheka rose to become a powerful, multifaceted organization during the civil war. This reflected the serious organizational weaknesses of the Bolsheviks, who lacked either any government or military experience prior to the civil war or a broad popular base in the countryside. Given the weaknesses in the army and government, the Party repeatedly had to turn to the secret police to fulfill military and government tasks. By the end of the civil war the Cheka had become a pervasive force in Soviet life. The Cheka also faced formidable enemies in establishing its domestic control. The Whites, who controlled substantial terrorities during the war, could rely on many former Okhrana agents, numerous monarchist former army officers in Bolshevik controlled areas and extensive Allied material and human help. Too, the Allies, especially the English, maintained and intensified their secret work inside Russia in an effort to overthrow the Bolsheviks who had taken Russia out of the war. For much of its early existence the Cheka had to battle a strong British secret service effort, exemplified by the work of Bruce Lockhart, Paul Dukes and Sydney Reilly. Army weakness prompted the formation of 34 border Chekas in 1918. Repeated voenspet (former Tsarist officer) treason and mass peasant desertion led to the creation of special sections (00 units) to fight espionage and counterrevolutionary activity in the army in January, 1919. Red Army ineffectiveness prompted the creation in May, 1919 of VOKhR (Armies for Internal Defense of Republic) units numbering 120,000 men, which protected cities, factories, railroads, road and water transport and warehouses in rear and near front areas. Cheka army units, ultimately numbering several hundred thousand men, in 1918 and 1919 suppressed 390 revolts and liquidated 447 counter-revolutionary groups. (1) Similarly, the secret police intruded in governmental functions, especially at the end of the civil war. The secret police monitored and attacked criminal and counterrevolutionary activities by government employees. In December, 1919 the Cheka took the task of combatting epidemics, notable typhoid. In January, 1920 the Cheka directed the clearing of snow from the railroads. Taking on the fuel crisis in 1921, Dzerzhinsky became chairman of the Ukrainian Fuel Board and Avanesov chairman of the Soviet of Work and Defense Commission for Struggle with the Fuel Crisis. The Cheka struggled with the problems of nearly four million orphan children. Cheka

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responsibility for transportation was highlighted by the appointment of Dzerzhinsky as People's Commissar of Transportation in April, 1921. (2) Finally, the secret police had extensive repressive functions. The suppression of rampant criminal banditism occupied 47% of the cases of the Moscow Cheka by December, 1918. (3) Liquidating numerous plots and foiling many sabotage attempts, the secret police, in Levytsky's words, made "a contribution towards the victory of Bolshevism in Russia of no less importance than the fighting of the Red Army on the war fronts." (4) It carried out arrests and searches and killed 50,000 - 100,000 "enemies of the people." The Cheka conducted intelligence, counter-intelligence, investigation, trials and punishment of enemies of the regime. It took hostages, confiscated property, and established concentration camps. Latsis, a leading Chekist, proclaimed, Cheka - this is not an investigatory commission nor a court nor a tribunal. It is a fighting organ, active on the internal front of the civil war, utilizing in the struggle itself the means of investigatory commissions, courts, tribunals, and military force. It does not judge the enemy but strikes it; it does not spare the enemy but burns to ashes anyone, who with a weapon in his hands, is on the other side of the barricade and who cannot be useful for us. Cheka only establishes harmfulness or lack of harmfulness of a given person and the extent of harmfulness for Soviet power. He conforms to this or is annihilated or isolated from society, neutralizing him by this and preventing possible repetition of active actions against Soviet power. (5) The secret police earned its powerful political role from its effective actions and legitimate leadership. Despite undeniable excesses, the Cheka effectively performed its multitudinous tasks. Its leaders, unlike those in the army, were Communists and trusted Old Bolsheviks. The chairman of the Cheka was Feliks Dzerzhinsky, a "crystal pure Bolshevik," "the best model of a deeply idealistic fighter for Communism." Unlike the Red Army officer corps, the All-Russian Cheka collegium during the civil war consisted entirely of hardened Old Bolsheviks as Ivan Ksefuntov (1903 Bolshevik), Martin Latsis (1905 Bolshevik), Yakov Peters (1904 Social Democrat), Vasilii Fomin (1912 Bolshevik), Mikhail Kedrov (1901 Bolshevik), and Yosef Unshlikht (1900 Social Democrat). (6) Over 70% (24/33) of the

82 leaders of the Moscow Cheka in the civil war had joined the party before the October Revolution. (7) Yakov Peters in October, 1918 boasted that the "best Party forces" were found in the Cheka. While only 4% - 6% of all Red Army soldiers and 5%-6% of all government employees were Communists, 65% of all Chekists in 1918 and 50% in 1920 were Communists and sympathizers. As Dzerzhinsky could declaim in February, 1920, "Nowhere, not in any institution, is there such a percentage of worker-Communists as in ours." (8) This expanded secret police role was a functional response to objective conditions, not an inherent condition of Communist revolutions. In China the Communists came to power in a protracted (1927-1949) agrarian insurrection. Aided by a lengthy gestation period and popular peasant support (via nationalist and agrarian reform appeals) the Party created an effective army dominated by a Communist officer corps and a large Party stratum in the ranks (20% - 2 6 % ) . The Party gained valuable governmental experience and trained many government cadres in the expanded rural base areas (which ruled 100 milion people in 1 9 4 5 ) . The government was notably more effective and legitimate than in Russia. Under these conditions the army subordinated the secret police troops under its command and the role of the secret police was sharply less than in Russia. The early beginnings of the Cheka in December, 1917 were inauspicious. The humane strains of the revolution were then dominant. The Moscow Junkers and General Krasnov, who had tried to crush the revolution, were simply released. The revolutionary opposition to death sentences predominated. The Cheka had only three departments and one armed detachment of thirty army men and a group of soldiers. Key posts were given to Left Socialist Revolutionaries (Aleksandrovich was Deputy Chairman) while four other organs performed similar functions. (9) The development of the Cheka proceeded slowly in 1918. Local Soviets, often ignoring central orders and creating their own departments, committees, and commissions, "significantly complicated the activities of the All Russian Cheka." (10) By March, 1918, after the capital was moved to Moscow, the All Russian Cheka called for the creation of guberniya and uezd Chekas. In March, Perm, Nizhnii Novgorod and Petrograd formed guberniya Chekas while the central apparat was reorganized. The Moscow Cheka, formed in February, was merged with the All Russian Cheka, only to reappear in the fall. In April, Krasnoyarsk and

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Ryazan, in May, Saratov, and in June, Orenburg, created guberniya Chekas. By the end of June, 1918 forty guberniya and 365 uezd Chekas had been created. That month the All Russian Cheka Conference was held. By the summer of 1918 the main system of Cheka organization was solidly in place. (11) But it was the civil war, which began in May, and White terror in the summer of 1918, which sharply altered the attitude towards terror and the role of the secret police, In January, 1918 when Cadet Ministers Shingarev and Kokoshkin were murdered in their hospital beds by sailors, Izvestiya denounced the crime as "terror" and "a blot on the honor of the revolution." (12) Conducting searches for political prisoners and food speculators, the Cheka shot exactly twenty-two people in its first six months. Even in May, 1918 the Cheka, with a staff of only 150 persons, treated plotters mildly. Confiscation of property and deprivation of ration cards were the main weapons, as "in the first period of its work the Cheka excessively leniently and magnanimously treated the enemies." (13) In July, 1918 the Left Socialist Revolutionary revolt in Moscow and Yaroslavl highlighted the weakness of the Cheka. The revolt was led by Popov's secret police detachment of 2,000 men and Left SR Aleksandrovich, deputy chairman of the Cheka. Further embarrassment was the seizure of Cheka leaders Dzherzhinsky and Latsis and the occupation of the Cheka headquarters in Moscow. Coupled with the White revolt of the Upper Volga, murder of Count Mirbach, treason of Muraviev, large scale peasant revolts, and foreign invasion, these actions led to a strengthening of the Cheka. All Left SR's were expelled from the Cheka. In August the Cheka was given power to shoot those guilty of counterrevolutionary agitation, inciting Red Army soldiers to disobedience, aiding the Whites, engaging in espionage or sabotage, committing thefts, banditry or corruption or plotting pogroms. While only fifty-six were shot in June, 937 were shot in July and August. (14) But it was the spreading White terror in the summer of 1918 which unleashed Red terror. The assassinations of Volodarsky, a popular Petrograd tribune, and Uritsky, head of the Petrograd Cheka, and the serious wounding of Lenin at the end of August compelled the Party to counter with Red terror. In September, 2,600 were shot, in October 641, by official statistics. In September the Petrograd Cheka shot 512 in one day, the Kronstadt Cheka claimed 500. On September 2, 1918, the VTsIK

84 declared Russia a military camp and proclaimed that "To the White terror of enemies of worker-peasant power, the workers and peasants respond with massive Red terror against the bourgeoisie and its agents." The Cheka was allowed to isolate class enemies in concentration camps and decide immediately the punishment of counterrevolutionary offenders without handing them over to courts and tribunals. (15) A new Cheka soon emerged. At the end of August Latsis, a leading Chekist, declared, "In the civil war there is no place for judicial procedure. The struggle is one of life and death. If you do not kill, you will be killed...kill that you may not be killed." (16) In October the Cheka proclaimed that "in its own activities" it was "completely independent." (17) By October it had branches in every significant city in the country. In December Latsis summarized the spirit of new Chekist procedures, Do not ask for incriminating evidence to prove that the prisoner opposed the Soviets either by arms or by words. Your first duty is to ask him to what class he belongs, what were his origins, education, and occupation. These questions should decide the fate of the prisoner. This is the meaning and essence of Red Terror... (18) In the provinces the stratum of Old Bolsheviks was thin and the temptation to abuse vast Cheka powers strong. The relationship of the center and the localities was new and weak. No firm guidelines existed on the work of the local Cheka. Even more than Party membership, a Cheka card was likely to be sought by some very dubious elements. Its intelligence and surveillance work would take months, if not years, to firmly establish. Rapid enlargement of their functions and powers increased abuse by guberniya and uezd Chekas. In August, 1918 Izvestiya deplored their "fullest separatism" and "peculiar local methods of struggle and means of punishment." In July the center created an external control department while in September, Dzerzhinsky called on all guberniya Chekas to form four departments (counterrevolution, speculation, official crimes, external). (19) While in October Peters attacked the "undesirable forms that the system of terror is assuming in the provinces," in November Pravda declared that, In a number of provincial cities the Cheka by itself determined the jurisdiction of cases for the tribunals, also took from the tribunals for

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itself consideration of the cases, already being processed, reconsidered already reached verdicts, in an illegal manner liquidated cases in which yet there was no legal inquest or legal work. Instead the Cheka uncontrollably took charge in the localities of imprisonment. (20) By December complaints multiplied about the work of local Chekas. Investigating the fall of Perm, Stalin and Dzerzhinsky found that the Vyatka and Perm Chekas "fell into an extraordinarily isolated position harmful to the prestige of Soviet power." (21) Sverdlov reported "much dishonor" in the Astrakhan Cheka. (22) Peters and Fomin, calling on the local Chekas to "not terrorize the peaceful Philistine stratum," concluded that, In a whole number of guberniya and uezd cities...Chekas do not at all correctly master and understand the political line of Soviet power, very often local Chekas adopt such methods and ways of struggle which go contrary to all policies which Soviet power and our policy have selected for the nearest future. (23) The Party took strong measures to reform the local Chekas. A special government investigatory commission recommended increased Party control over the Cheka, improved personnel selection and closer observance of revolutionary legality. All Cheka heads had to be Old Bolsheviks. Government commissariats gained the right to participate in investigations and to take a suspect on bail with the signatures of two members of the collegium. There was stricter prosecution and punishment by execution for false denunciations. In January, 1919 the central government ordered the liquidation of uezd Chekas with transfer of cases, money, archives, and members to the guberniya Chekas. However, sixty uezd Chekas continued to function. In February the right to carry out punishment in all cases was transferred to the revolutionary tribunals. (24) But the position of the Cheka remained strong. In January concentration camps were created under guberniya Chekas. In February, the same VTsIK decree taking power away from the Cheka reserved for it the right to administer immediate punishment in case of armed uprising and areas on military footing. A Central Committee circular lauded the Cheka for successful work in destroying counterrevolutionary activity. (25) As the civil war heated up again in the spring of 1919, the role of-

86 the secret police expanded accordingly. In April the Cheka gained the responsibility of protecting railroads, bridges, and other structures. In May, after an initial Yudenich thrust on Petrograd, a Soviet of Defense decree called for heightened vigilance and proclaimed "Death to spies." A June VTsIk decree gave the Cheka, in areas declared to be on a military footing, the right of immediate punishment for a wide range of offenses, including treason, espionage, arson, robbery, and illegal trade in cocaine. In October a Soviet of Workers and Peasants Defense decree granted all Chekists the same privileged food ration as soldiers. In November, 1919 a Special Revolutionary Tribunal was created under the All Russian Cheka to struggle with speculation. In December a Central Committee decree called on Party committees to send the "greatest number of the most steady, capable of being fully responsible comrades" to the Cheka to replace mobilized Communists. (26) Serious problems remained among some provincial Chekas in 1919. In January Peters, Yanel, and Dhimkis spoke of frequent abuses by employees and mistakes "especially in smaller provincial cities." In February a Central Committee circular to Chekists noted that Party members "often arrive at a completely obscene tone" in discussing the Cheka. At the Eighth Party Congress Sapronov attacked the isolation of the Cheka from the Party; Zinoviev lamented the many incorrect executions carried out by the Cheka. In June the Kazan gubkom complained to the Central Committee about the abnormal working of the Cheka. (27) Conditions were especially trying in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian Cheka wielded enormous authority on a virtually autonomous basis. In April, 1919 Latsis, chairman of the Ukrainian Cheka, deplored numerous cases of Cheka actions discrediting its authority. In July, 1919 a substantial purge was carried out among Ukrainian Chekists. As Lenin wrote to Latsis at this time, The plenipotentiary of the Soviet of Defense says — and declares that some prominent Chekists confirmed — that in the Ukraine the Cheka has brought lots of evil having been created excessively early and admitting to itself a mass of those attracted to power. (28) A pattern similar to 1919 recurred in 1920. The lull in fighting led to the abolition of the death penalty in January. By March the Cheka had gained the right to send potential offenders to forced labor camps for five years by administrative

87 decree. After the Polish attack in May, Dzerzhinsky became commander of the Rear South-West Front and the Cheka assumed the right of military revolutionary tribunals. By September all Chekists gained rights equal to those of army employees. Party membership rose from 50% of all Chekists in January to 70% - 80% in December. All leading workers were Communists. (29) The Cheka played a key role in suppressing revolts at the end of the civil war. By the end of 1920 Cheka armies had 68,300 men. In January, 1921 the Central Intradepartmental Commission for Struggle with Banditism was formed under the leadership of Dzerzhinsky. Indeed "The fundamental work for ensuring social order in the country, liquidation of banditism and other appearances of enemies of Soviet power was entrusted to Cheka and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs." Cheka units helped liquidate revolts in Voronezh, Tambov and Saratov guberniyas. the Ukraine, Siberia, and Central Asia. In 1922 they helped crush revolts in Vitebsk and Gomel guberniyas.(30) At the end of the civil war the power of the 31,000 member secret police was reduced somewhat, but remained significant. In February, 1922, the All Russian Cheka was eliminated and replaced by the GPU (State Political Administration). This new agency retained armed detachments and was given many responsibilities. It would suppress revolts, struggle with espionage, protect rail and water transport, defend borders, struggle with contraband, fulfill special government instructions, and maintain revolutionary order. (31) The Cheka, initially a weak institution, emerged from the civil war as a legitimate and effective actor in Soviet politics. In December, 1921, Lenin declared that "Without such an institution the power of the toilers could not exist." (32) Sofinov could conclude that the Cheka, as a "symbol of deep devotion to the cause of Communism" had become "a powerful, well organized and accurately operating state apparat." (33) And Dzerzhinsky, as head of the Cheka, was an influential member of the Central Committee. Interestingly, despite the accrual of many functions by the secret police during the civil war, one vital function was only minimally performed at this time—foreign work. Indeed, the Foreign Department was created in the Cheka only in 1921 under Meyer Trilisser. During the civil war the young Soviet republic faced such overwhelming domestic problems that little time was left for foreign work. Few human or material resources could be spared for such work which often promised little

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immediate return. Too, the Bolsheviks, saw little need tor classic secret police work abroad when they expected an imminent proletarian socialist revolution. Furthermore, the Western blockade and encirclement of the Soviet Union made foreign work difficult, coupled as it was with the dismantling of the Okhrana. The creation of the Comintern in 1919 gave tne Bolsheviks a significant foreign base in revolutionary movements, as opposed to classic secret police work which requires years to put trained agents in place. The role of terror in the Russian civil war provides an interesting test for various theories about Soviet politics. The totalitarian, Russian political culture and "innately barbarous" (Solzhenitsyn) theories would lead us to expect a very high level of repression and coercion, far out of proportion to any threat posed to the system. The totalitarian and "innately barbarous" theories would stress the dynamics of communism while the Russian political culturists would emphasize a more moderate level of coercion, proportional to the external threat. The personality theorists would point to the unegotistical, pragmatic and cultivated nature of Lenin while structural-functionalists would focus on the broad diversity and seriousness of threats to the system. The evidence tends to support the structuralfunctional and personality theories. While perhaps 100,000 victims of Chekist terror are scarcely an insignificant figure, it still represented less than .1% of a Russian population of 170 million people. Too, the level of repression in wartime Russia was significantly less than during the Great Purges in peacetime Russia. Red terror was roughly on the same level of intensity as White terror. Deaths from Cheka repression represented roughly only 1% of the 8-13 million deaths during the civil war. Far more people died from hunger, disease, pogroms and battles than at the hands of the secret police. Too, unlike in the late 1930s, the terror and coercion was directed against real and substantial enemies during wartime. White and Allied intelligence agencies spawned numerous plots against the nascent Red republic. Periods of White and Allied military advances especially activated strong anti-Bolshevik secret activity. The emigration of perhaps two million Russians, numerous rural revolts and strong urban strike movement by the end of the civil war testified to the thinness of the Bolshevik class base. Too, Red terror beginning in September 1918 had been a response to a wave of White terror in the summer of 1918 which had Killed Volodarsky

89 and Uritsky and wounded Lenin. The terror was thereby a product of years of war and violence, disintegration of society and administration and desperate acts of rulers fighting for control and survival. Thus, secret police coercion helped eliminate and neutralize strong counterrevolutionary elements. At the same time, a serious problem remained that would escalate under Stalin in the 1930's. This was the fact that while dedicated old revolutionaries were in charge of the Cheka, many very dubious elements with no real revolutionary interest had joined it. They had been attracted by its power, autonomy and possibilities for material advancement and criminal activities. As Jerry Hough has written, The Cheka was a law unto itself. While it served the purposes of the party leadership by striking terror into the hearts of the class enemy, it also became the refuge of all sorts of adventurers and scoundrels who used their untrammeled power to commit acts of pilfering and pillage for their own personal adventage. (34) 1920s During the 1920s the role of the secret police underwent significant changes. The end of the civil war inevitable meant a sharp transformation in the role and status of the secret police. The advent of NEP and civil peace led to a drastic decline in the need for shooting and repressing active enemies of the regime. The massive demobilization of the Red Army from 5 1/2 million men in 1921 to 562,000 men in 1924 diminished the Cheka's military role. And, with NEP, the governmental functions decreased in scope, lessening the need for secret police controls. Yet there were strong counterbalancing tendencies. During the 1920's the Party, faced with continuing difficulties in the functioning of the army and government, found in the secret police an effective and legitimate institution. Given the internal Party struggle over the Leninist succession in this period, there was a strong tendency to embroil the secret police in the fight. Too, despite the civil war victory, significant domestic and foreign forces continued to work for the active overthrow of the Soviet regime. The possibilities for a strong economic role remained quite real. Finally, these tendencies were reinforced by the natural bureaucratic tendency of the secret police

90 organization to resist assaults on its power and privileges after the end of the civil war. These tendencies were accentuated by a natural alliance and affinity between many Chekists and Stalinists. During the 1920s the Cheka underwent significant organizational changes. Despite the end of the civil war the secret police did not wither away and die. Rather it underwent superficial changes. In 1922 the Cheka was replaced by the GPU (State Political Administration) which remained under Dzerzhinsky in the Lubyanka. The functions of the new GPU included suppression of counterrevolutionary acts, protection of railroads and waterways, guarding the state frontier and protecting revolutionary order. The GPU was allowed to conduct searches and make arrests but had to free suspects after two months or seek governmental permission for continued detention. In 1923 the GPU became the OGPU, which was removed from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. The OGPU, now supervised by the USSR Prosecutor, was seen as a permanent body answerable to the Party's Central Committee and Politburo. In 1926 Menzhinsky succeeded Dzerzhinsky but Genrikh Yagoda, as Menzhinsky's deputy, was to emerge as a real political power in his own right.(35) The secret police played a major, but hardly decisive, role in the Leninist succession struggle. During the civil war Dzerzhinsky had worked closely with Stalin on secret police matters and (in 1920) on leading the South Western front. In the 1923^ 1927 period the secret police leaders, especially Dzerzhinsky and Yagoda, generally were allied with Stalin against Trotsky and the Left Opposition. There was a natural affinity between Stalinists and the secret police in terms of their strong appreciation of civil war culture and methods to be used against political enemies. In 1923 the GPU intercepted a letter which Stalin used to obtain the arrest of Sultan Galiev by the secret police, the first time a political leader had been so arrested. In 1923 Dzerzhinsky collaborated with Stalin in his Great Russian assault on Georgia and in January, 1924 spoke for Stalin at the 13th Party Conference. In 1924 GPU agents rounded up all copies of Lenin's Testament, which had been critical of Stalin. In the following three years the GPU continually monitored and harrassed the Left Opposition, leading up to its dispersal of an opposition demonstration in 1927. Indeed Dzherzhinsky's final speech before he died in 1926 was an attack on Kamenev and Pyatakov. In the process the secret police became increasingly independent, operating outside of the control of the Party as a whole. In 1928 and 1929

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the secret police, despite certain affinities with the Right Opposition, did nothing to oppose Stalin's purge of Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov. However, there was no complete identity of interests between the secret police and Stalin. Dzerzhinsky, as a strong political figure in his own right and avid Leninist, was opposed to sharp changes in Party procedures and supported collective leadership. As to Yagoda, he had noted rightist proclivities which he had shown in unkept promises to support Bukharin and Rykov against Stalin in the late 1920's. Probably better informed than anyone else of the potential popular discontent with the Bolsheviks, he was leery of any radical moves which might lead to civil war, especially in the countryside. At the end of the 1920's a GPU delegation of Menzhinsky, Yagoda and Trilisser warned Stalin that the secret police could not guarantee rural peace in the case of a major collectivization campaign. Yet, once Stalin moved ahead the secret police, albeit a little tardily, did carry out Stalin's plans. (36) The GPU had a modest, but real role in the economy in the 1920s. From 1924 until his death in 1926 Dzerzhinsky served as chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy. His deputy, Lobov, and a number of assistants hailed as well from the GPU. Yet in a period of mixed economy the secret police role was necessarily modest, limited largely to checking omnipresent corruption. Unlike in the 193 0s the camp system was very small and played no significant political role. Perhaps there is no better symbol of the 1920s than the very limited size and extent of the camps. With 65,000 prisoners in 1923, 104,000 in 1926 and less than 200,000 in 1929 (including actual criminals), the labor camp system held less than . 2 % of the adult Soviet population in this period. In the 1920s the camps were for actual criminals, cultural and political dissidents, and open counterrevolutionaries. Political prisoners had their own organizations, kitchens and special privileges. The camps were seen as primarily punitive, not economic. Conditions were often quite appalling and executions were not uncommon. As David Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky wrote, "Overcrowding, disgusting sanitary conditions, lack of opportunity for washing and lack of soap played havoc with the prisoner's health. The unsuitable buildings offered little protection against the cold." (37) But two functions of the GPU came into their own in the 1920s. One, as amply revealed in the Smolensk archives, was the active and passive

92 surveillance of the population, especially potentially hostile groups and people. Now in peacetime the secret police could systematically penetrate every corner of Soviet society. In so doing the GPU not only could block any active subversive attempts but also could garner a wealth of information of great value to the top political leadership. (38) Too, the end of the civil war allowed time for the proper establishment of espionage work, especially abroad. Given the Soviet perception of being trapped within hostile capitalist encirclement, this work was seen to be of especially high importance. In 1921 a Foreign Department was created under Trilisser. Initially, everything had to be started anew, relying heavily on enthusiastic amateurs and Communists rather than trained professionals. An index of dossiers and networks of agents had to be constructed from scratch. Too, the Comintern and army ran their own foreign networks as well. Further, foreign targets involved not only foreign governments but numerous, well financed White exile groups. Yet despite poor human and material resources and continued Western intelligence efforts to overthrow the Soviet Union, the GPU and its intelligence allies scored notable successes against the West. In a brilliant intelligence operation from 1922 until 1927, the Soviet Union managed to thoroughly penetrate hostile emigre groups abroad, deceive Western intelligence agencies and destroy counterrevolutionary forces. The focal point was the Monarchist Organization of Central Russia (MOCR) which, with 400 members mainly in Moscow, was preparing an uprising with the help of Western intelligence agencies. The first step was to create a new front organization for MOCR known as the Moscow Municipal Credit Association ("The T r u s t " ) , and to arrest and turn a MOCR leader, Alexander Yakushev, a patriotic monarchist, into a double agent. Then a leading monarchist general was pressured into advancing Yakushev, who became a top "Trust" leader. Meanwhile credibility was established by allowing White agents to cross the frontier safely. With the trap securely set the famous spy, Boris Savinkov, who had organized the Union for Defense of the Fatherland and Freedom in 1918 and Ukrainian resistance in 1920, was lured back to Russia and arrested in 1924. The next year Sydney Reilly, the famed British agent, was similarly lured back and arrested. Only in 1927 was "The Trust" blown with the defection of two key GPU agents to the West. But, in the process the plots of White emigres and foreign intelligence

93 organizations had been smashed, Soviet security had been enhanced, Savinkov and Reilly had been liquidated and a pall cast on the credibility of all future anti-Soviet operations. Not everything went so well in the 1920s. Indeed amateurism, inexperience and crude methods plagued Soviet foreign espionage attempts repeatedly. In 1927 the French network under Communist leader Jean Cremet was betrayed and smashed. Soviet consulates and trade delegations were raided in London, Peking and Istanbul. Arrests of operatives came in Switzerland, Poland and Austria that year. Everywhere reorganization, smaller organization and increased professionalism became the password. But these failures were to lay the groundwork for future successes. (39) In this respect, too, the trials of the 1920s were harbingers of the future. The 1922 trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries, which resulted in a number of suspended death sentences, foreshadowed political trials of the 1930s. The 1928 Shakhty Trials of industrial specialists foreshadowed future charges of industrial wrecking. In the 1920s, though, these trials were seen as isolated events. If we turn to the theories of secret police behavior, the totalitarian, traditional political culture and barbaric theories all would predict moderate to high levels of repression. The totalitarian and barbaric theories would see this as innate to the system while the traditional culture theory would argue for a recrudescence of "normal" activity. By contrast structuralfunctionalists would anticipate a low level of repression, citing the internal weaknesses caused by the succession struggle and the relative quiescence of NEP, a period of revolutionary retreat. Personality theorists would argue similarly but for different reasons. They would stress the passivity of the dying Lenin and restraining influence of the cosmopolitan and civil minded Bukharin on Stalin until 1928. As with the civil war era, the evidence again points more favorably towards the personality and structural-functional theorists. For the level of repression during the 1920s was quite low and the number of shootings minimal. During the "civil peace" of the 1920s the secret police played a significant, but hardly powerful role. After Dzerzhinsky's death in 1926, his place on the Politburo was not taken by either Menzhinsky or Yagoda. Thus the 1920s remain a perplexing period for those who wish to see a single-minded Soviet rush towards totalitarianism.

94 1930 - AUGUST, 1936 During the early and middle 1930s Stalin launched a massive third revolution from above. Through rapid and large-scale programs of industrialization, collectivization and modernization, he sought to push backward, largely rural Russia into the modern era in ten years. Such a rapid, unprecedented, huge social transformation entailed enormous changes and engendered a vast increase in societal tensions. Under these conditions, a swift expansion in the role and influence of the secret police, which were closely allied with Stalin, became well nigh inevitable. Barrington Moore perhaps best defined the linkage between change and coercion almost three decades ago, In this connection it must be emphasized that the choice was not between using terror and permitting the disintegration of Russian society. Rather it was between using terror as a major instrument to create and then consolidate a new social system, or else letting power go by default. By the late twenties the forces of recovery and reintegration were growing stronger in Russian society. Since these forces were growing from the ground up in a way that threatened Bolshevik power, terror had to be used to destroy them and impose a new order, a process most clearly seen in the collectivization of agriculture. (40) During the 1930-1936 period the level of repression, as we shall see, rose markedly. However, key constraints remained in place, reflecting the fact that a powerful faction of moderate Stalinists (such as Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Kalinin and Kuibyshev) opposed indiscriminate terror. In 1932 the bulk of the Party resolutely opposed Stalin's proposal to shoot Ryutin for his anti-Stalinist program. At the "Congress of Victors" in 193 4 the mood was one of intraParty conciliation. There was no random, mass urban terror and rural terror, however indiscriminate, was still targetted against the kulaks. The Party, although subjected to massive purges, remained immune to coercion directed against it. The secret police, under Yagoda's effective control in this period, was also not subjected to major purges. And physical torture against prisoners was expressly forbidden before 1937.

95 Politically the highlight of the 1930-1936 period was the alliance between Genrikh Yagoda, who as Menzhinsky's deputy was already running the secret police before Menzhinsky's death in 1934, and Stalin. At this time Stalin, although powerful, faced important obstacles in his drive to consolidate his absolute power. The bloody war in the countryside to impose collectivization (which Stalin later told Churchill exceeded World War II in its ferocity) and enormous strains from the industrialization effort sapped popular and Party support for his leadership. As seen at the 17th Party Congress in 193 4 and Central Committee Plenum in 1936, a clear Central Committee and Politburo majority were supportive on many Stalinist policies (in moderation) but were opposed to his personal power drive and vindictiveness towards his opponents. In this context Stalin found it important to cultivate the secret police. The alliance of Stalin and Yagoda was cemented by a number of factors. Stalin was the only major contender in the Leninist succession struggle to speak strongly in favor of the secret police. Both leaders were strongly influenced by their civil war experiences. Their heroic Lenin was the Lenin of the civil war era, a strident state-oriented, centralist radical who resolutely used force to smash all enemies. In spirit and manner Stalin was an honorary Chekist. As a secret police official told a prisoner during the Great Purges, Comrade Stalin would have made an excellent Chekist. He is one of us body and soul. We understand each other without words. We have a common language, a common method. Do you know what I mean? In the most difficult periods, Stalin has come to the Chekists for help, and each time the Chekists have helped him. Many of his friends and comrades-in-arms have helped him. Many of his friends and comrades-in-arms have betrayed Stalin but never has he been betrayed by a Chekist! And Stalin appreciates this. (41) Stalin catered to Yagoda's eccentricities, which had been heightened by the universal hatred he inspired. Yagoda's vanity was stroked by his apartment in the Kremlin, daily conversations with Stalin, promises of promotion to the Politburo, title of General Commissar of State Security (in 1936) and specially designed marshal's uniform. Joel Carmichael has captured this side of Yagoda, who in many ways was the diametrical opposite of the modest Lenin and Dzerzhinsky,

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Yagoda's inflated arrogance was accompanied by an endless vanity. This expressed itself in an obsession with trivialities—decorations, medals, insignias, uniforms, etiquette. He personally created designs for full-dress uniforms, laboured over restoring the pomp of the changing of the guard, tightened up to the point of preposterousness the regulations of behavior between officers, the hierarchy of the government and the Political Police. (42) Stalin was equally solicitous in expanding the rights and privileges of the secret police, which by 1936 had become a caste of highly qualified professionals. In 1934 at the 17th Party Congress a number of secret police officials (Yezhov, Mekhlis, Balitsky and Evdokimov) were elected candidate members of the Central Committee while Yagoda was made a full member. That same year there were created Special Boards of the newly named NKVD, empowered in secret proceedings without hearings to exile, banish or sent to the camps for up to five years any "socially dangerous" individual. In 1935 the death penalty was extended to children as young as 12 years old. Parallel to the institution of ranks in the armed forces, ranks were introduced in the secret police as well. By 1936 the secret police had become a privileged caste. As Robert Conquest has summarized the situation, New and more ostentatious uniforms came in. At the same time NKVD officers were expected to learn the social graces. Many of them married smart and good-looking wives from the old educated classes, the type who gravitate to power and money in whatever form, and who, moreover, gained immunity from the otherwise unfortunate results of their social origins. NKVD children attended special schools. Junior posts often went to the sons of high officials. Many family connections of the usual caste type sprang up. (43) However, Stalin, while assiduously cultivating Yagoda and the secret police leadership, also carefully prepared his own parallel secret police network which he could use if necessary. As early as 1931 Stalin introduced his own man, Akulov, as Menzhinsky's deputy, withdrawing him only after a good relationship had been established with Yagoda. In 1933 the office of Chief Prosecutor was established under Andrei Vyshinsky, a Stalinist protege. That year too Stalin, bypassing the Party

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and secret police, created his own Special Branch of the Central Committee under Aleksandr Poskrebyshev, head of Stalin's personal secretariat. This department maintained clandestine surveillance of the secret police by placing its own men in the various sections of the NKVD. This department would later become the backbone of the post-Yagoda era. Too, Stalin promoted men such as Nikolai Yezhov as an alternative leadership. In 193 4 Yezhov was named to the Central Committee, in 193 5 to the Party Secretariat. Simultaneously, Agranov, a dedicated Stalinist, became Yagoda's deputy. Thus by 193 6 Stalin had his own alternative secret police network in place. (44) Finally, Stalin further protected himself by organizing his own large bodyguard organization. While Lenin had two bodyguards before the assassination attempt by Fanny Kaplan in August, 1918 and four afterwards, Karl Pauker commanded several thousand bodyguards on behalf of Stalin. His department, (the Special Operations Department), became the first department in the reorganized NKVD in 1934. The road to Stalin's villa (35 kilometers) was guarded by three shifts of NKVD agents, each one with 1200 men. Furthermore, the NKVD evicted the inhabitants of many of the houses on the route to Stalin's estate or occupied the houses themselves. Stalin's personal armored train was equipped to withstand a siege for two weeks. Security was very tight at the Kremlin as well, with all officials cleared out of the way before Stalin left his apartment. Thus, Stalin commanded his own very large bodyguard contingent through Karl Pauker, his personal confidant until 1937. (45) Unlike Lenin's personal chief bodyguard (Abram Belensky) who kept his distance from the leadership, Stalin's chief bodyguard used his position to further his boss. Pauker played a key role as a Politburo insider. A former Hungarian barber at the opera house, Pauker was a sociable and effusive man ever willing to supply favors or information. Alexander Orlov has well captured the tenor of this man who spent 15 years as Stalin's chief bodyguard until 1937, He concentrated in his hands the business of supplying them (the Politburo) with foodstuffs, clothing, automobiles, country estates, et cetera. He not only satisfied their demands but he knew how to stimulate their appetites and amaze them with the newest products from abroad. For the members of the Politbureau he imported the latest models of autos, pedigreed dogs, wines and radio sets; for their wives he

98 purchased in Paris dresses, silks, perfumes, and a lot of other things which appeal to a woman's heart; for their children he bought expensive toys. Pauker became a Santa Claus who worked indefatigably all year around, from Christmas to Christmas. (46) The 193 0-193 6 period saw an enormous expansion of roles and authority for the secret police. The great increase in societal tensions and Stalin's drive for personal power virtually asured the secret police of a key role. The first key role was a major increase in surveillance and information gathering of the entire upper echelon of Soviet society. Through bodyguards and thousands of secret informers, Yagoda watched over and gained secret and compromising information of the pasts, sexual habits and friends of these leaders. When necessary, Stalin had Yagoda's men appointed as deputies to watch ever more closely on the activities of key leaders. Thus Trilliser helped run the Comintern, Hessing and Loganovsky the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, and Kishkin and Blagonravov the People's Commissariat of Railroads. Furthermore the NKVD had Special Departments within the Red Army as well as its own Transport Departments and Economic Departments. (47) Given the major expansion of the armed forces in this period and persistent Stalinist concern about Bonapartism, the secret police role vis-a-vis the army became especially important. Secret police officers functioned within military units down to battalion level while a number of informers existed at all ranks. An army career could be harmed by negative remarks by the appropriate secret police officer. The NKVD secret network within the army and the existence of large independent secret police units equipped with artillery, tanks and even planes, acted as a significant counterweight to any possible independent army action. Secondly, the secret police greatly stepped up its surveillance and detention of all potentially disaffected segments of the population. By contrast the 1920's were soon to seem like "golden years" of a laisser-faire attitude of the police to the population. The secret police had networks within plants, universities and key institutions. The possibilities of being sent to labor camps for even chance anti-Stalinist remarks increased greatly. The NKVD network thereby acted as a major prophylactic device during a period when greatly heightened social tensions could have produced significant protests against regime policy. The enormous increase in the size and

99 activities of the secret police was reflected in the creation of GULAG under Yagoda in 193 0, necessitated by a large increase in the number of prisoners. Two major causes—collectivization and increased societal tensions—provided the major recruits for the camps. This was especially true given the prominent role of the secret police in promoting collectivization. Collectivization was an extremely tense struggle in which secret police forces killed many resisting peasants, sent over one million peasants into exile and perhaps as many as 800,000 peasants to the new massive camp system. Parallel to this campaign was a major anti-religious campaign which closed the majority of all churches by 1930 and deported many priests as kulaks. As Joel Carmichael has written, in response to mass peasant resistance to collectivization in the form of violent acts and the huge slaughter of livestock, The Political Police had to be called in: they slaughtered hundreds of thousands of women and children as well as men. when the government seized its quotas, the peasants were simply starved to death. Thanks in large measure to the work of the secret police, collective agriculture was eventually firmly established in the countryside.(48) The new GULAG empire, so extensively described by Solzhenitsyn, represented both a major new economic function and more extensive repressive function. During the 1930s the economic function became extremely important for the secret police. As Swianiewicz observed in his excellent work, Forced Labor and Economic Development. The camps acquired great importance in the carrying out of investments plans, particularly in the field of construction, and in the exploitation of natural resources in remote regions of that enormous country. During the 1930s the NKVD became not only a security police with its own army (including artillery and air force units) but also a huge industrial and construction concern which organized production under its own administration. Moreover the NKVD was a big contractor supplying labor force to enterprises in the administration of other commissariats. (49) The number of prisoners in labor camps escalated from .6 million in 1930 to 2 million in 1931 to 5 million in 1934 to 6 million in 1936. Fully 60%-70% of all forced laborers were peasants. During this

100 period estimates by Robert Conquest give over 2 million deaths in the camps. Prisoners worked 12 hours a day under poor working conditions for token remuneration and semi-starvation food rations. Forced labor helped liquidate the rural labor surplus, ease the bottleneck of food supply and lessen the demand for scarce consumer goods. It provided labor for the industrial development of remote areas, and overall cheap labor. Clearly these labor projects were labor intensive, requiring little capital, as well as few clothes and consumer goods and minimal food. (50) The economic value of these camps, Swianiewicz notwithstanding, was minimal. Several hundred thousand healthy secret police troops were needed for the economically useless function of guarding the prisoners. A significant and expensive infrastructure was needed to support the system. Starving and dying prisoners, demoralized by their plight and surrounded by a hostile and primitive environment, were unlikely to produce output even half that of a free man. Too, there was no serious attempt to match skills with jobs or to train the prisoners for their jobs. Overall, then, while the camps did produce a significantly valuable economic output, it came at a very high price. The clear value of the camps was political in removing potentially hostile elements from society and serving as a strong disincentive for those in society to act against Stalin. The scale of the secret police work projects was enormous, paralleling the amount of human suffering. Hundreds of thousands of prisoners toiled on the White Sea Canal and the Moscow-Volga Canal. The gold mines of Kolyma in the Far East were developed under the most horrible conditions of intense cold and blizzards, weeks of polar nights, hard work and meager food. Clearly by the 193 0s the camps had changed from punitive institutions to economic establishments. (51) A fourth major function of the secret police was to strike at "enemies of the people" either through open trials or through covert intimidation and assassination. While from 1922-1927 there had been no major political trials, the 1930-1936 period was replete with major trials masterminded by the secret police. Throughout the period large groups of bacteriologists, historians, plant directors and agricultural officials went on trial to absorb the blame for the inevitable shortcomings of the Soviet leap forward. In 1930 Professor Ramzin's Industrial Party based in Gosplan was in the dock. In 1931 it was the turn of ex-Menshevik specialists. In 1933 the famous Metro-Vickers trial saw a failed attempt

101 to charge British engineers with economic sabotage. Over time the secret police was refining the techniques which would become so pervasive in the Great Purges. The secret police also played a role in the elimination of Stalin's enemies, although by definition this remains a very shadowy and largely circumstantial area. Suffice it to say that it was extremely odd that Sergei Kirov, Stalin's chief rival in 1934, could be shot by a man (Leonid Nikolayev) in his heavily guarded Leningrad Party headquarters at a time when no bodyguards, not even Kirov's personal one, were on the scene. And even odder was the fact that Nikolayev, a deranged student, had been arrested twice before for possession of a revolver and released. Too, the leaders of the Leningrad NKVD were only quickly tried and given light sentences (2-3 years) for such negligence. In all likelihood a key role was played by Yagoda and his followers. (52) A further role for the secret police was the accretion of numerous military and even Party roles not normally performed by such an institution. The secret police played an increasing role within the Party, especially during the mass purges of 1933 and 1934. In 1933 Yezhov sat on the Central Purge Commission and in 193 5 served as chairman of the Party Control Commission. Militarily it had its own army and air force, replete with specially picked and trained recruits. It also gained responsibility by 1934 for running the local militias. Its troops were responsible for protecting the long Soviet border and suppressing internal revolts. Labor camps and prisons came under its purview. So too did a number of government tasks which came to be viewed as sensitive. The tasks of geographical surveys and maps, forest protection and fire brigades came under its domain. So too did the administration of main roads, motor transportation, protection of property and the determination of weights and measures. Even the registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces became a secret police function. In many ways this assumption of numerous governmental functions recalled the civil war era.(53) A final increasingly important role was the function of foreign espionage. During the 1930s the Soviet Union found itself increasingly menaced by the rise of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, each with designs on Soviet territory. Too, there remained the traditional capitalist enemies in the West as well as White emigre groups. During this period the NKVD gained increasing control over the parallel but separate networks of the Comintern and

102 GRU (Military Intelligence) in directing this increasingly important work abroad. At this time Abram Slutsky and Mikhail Shpiegelglass were in charge of the Foreign Department. Much of the important work at this time was preparatory for the coming war. At Cambridge University in England Soviet talent spotters were highly successful in recruiting in the early 1930s such talented men as Kim Philby/ Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt and Donald Maclean. These upper middle class intellectual products of public schools were deeply disillusioned by the depression, decline of England, World War I and the failings of the British Labor Party. These men provided a solid base for future Soviet work in England, especially given the strength of the old boy network. (54) Similarly the basis for future espionage coups was being laid in Japan and directed against both Germany and Japan. The mercurial Richard Sorge, a brilliant German political scientist who had been a Communist since 1920 and left the Comintern for the GRU in 1929, managed to join the German Nazi Party in 1933. Arriving in Tokyo in 1933 as a senior correspondent for a German newspaper, Sorge proceeded to befriend Colonel Eugene Ott who later became German Ambassador to Japan. By 1936 his ring was firmly established, with the recruitment of Ozaki Hotsumi, a wealthy and well connected senior Japanese journalist, his greatest success. (55) Not everywhere were matters going so well. In France a huge Soviet military espionage ring with 250 agents under Lydia Stahl, Octave Dumoulin and Pauline Jacobsen-Levine, was smashed by French authorities. The rise of Hitler to power in Germany, which had been the center for workshops making false passports for European agents, had destroyed a large part of Soviet espionage efforts. And America had been largely ignored by Soviet agents in the 1930-1936 period, a mistake that later had to be rectified. (56) Overall, though, Slutsky and Shpiegelglass had good reason to be pleased by 1936. Major espionage plans directed against Japan, Germany and England were already in place. The threat from White emigre forces abroad had been controlled and tamed. As seen by the 1930 kidnapping of Kutyepov, commander of Russian emigre military forces, the movement was under strong Soviet surveillance. And the rise of fascism and a world wide capitalist depression in the 1930s ensured many willing recruits for the Soviet cause in the West. The major theories discussed earlier all point in the same general direction of increased repression and a greater role for secret police.

103 The totalitarian theorists see the 1930's as the height of Soviet totalitarianism as do the proponents of Soviet barbarism. The advocates of continuity with Soviet traditional political culture would stress the resurgence of traditionalism in the 1930s. This was seen in the emphasis on conservative educational and social norms, the revival of Russian patriotism and glorification of the Czars, the rise of Stalin's personality cult and the introduction of ranks in the army. Similarly the structural-functionalists, underlining the heightened domestic and international tensions and increasing gap between societal goals and performance, would see (as Barrington Moore did) the inevitable result of a heightened role for the secret police and coercion. Too, the personality theorists, stressing (as Robert Tucker did) the overweaning drive of Stalin to be the Lenin of his generation and absolute ruler, would argue for a sharply increased role of the secret police in Stalin's drive for power. Overall, then, none of the major theories really miss the broader aspects of this period. However, the totalitarian, traditional political culture and barbarous theories miss the genuinely revolutionary character of the period and the mass support, especially among the youth, women and Communists, for the radical socialist transformation of society. They also miss the clear limitations on terror in this period and the moderate interlude from 1934 to 1936. The personality theorists, by focusing on one man, ignore the mass base for Stalinism within the Party as well as enthusiasm among strata in the population. Finally the structural-functionalists tend to be overly deterministic. Had the moderate Stalinists only triumphed, the level of coercion and role of the secret police would have been significantly lower than under Stalin. Overall, then, there are results compatible, to differing degrees, with the various theories. GREAT PURGES The Great Purges, or Yezhovshchina. which lasted basically from 1936 to 1939, represented the apogee of secret police influence and power in Soviet politics. Just as Mao Zedong turned to the People's Liberation Army to crush opposition during the Cultural Revolution, so did Stalin during this era make the NKVD the fundamental instrument of his policies. As the Party, military, and government bureaucracies crumbled under the secret police assault, the power of the NKVD rose comcomitantly at

104 this time. The power of the NKVD chiefs came to exceed that of even the Party secretaries. Many were the signs of this new found power and status of the secret police. In December, 1937 Stalin held a grand ceremonial meeting for NKVD leaders in the Bolshoi Theater to toast their accomplishments. No longer largely an anonymous force, it was praised in the media, held up for emulation and highly visible at public ceremonies. From the republic level downward the secret police chiefs played significant roles in the Party organization and government bureaucracy. In the center Lavrentiya Beria became an alternate member of the Politburo in 1939 and one of the five members of the State Defense Committee in World War II. In 193 9 the secret police was well represented on the Party Central Committee with three full members (Beria, Bagirov and Merkulov) and seven alternate members. During the Great Purges NKVD chiefs even served briefly as People's Commissar of the Navy (Frinovsky) and Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs (Dekanozov). As a recognized and powerful political actor, the NKVD accrued major influence through the performance of many roles within Soviet society. With terror changing in form from a mechanism for social engineering to a medium for administration and subjugation of the party, (as Seweryn Bialer has stressed), the role of the secret police expanded accordingly. (57) However, at no time in this era did the secret police ever become a truly autonomous force independent of Stalin. Rather Stalin maintained firm control of this potentially dangerous institution and made it an extension of his personal rule. He maintained a private secretariat under Poskrebyshev to check on the NKVD. The Central Committee Sepcial Department under Stalin's control directly supervised the secret police. He encouraged competition between the rival security services, the NKVD and GRU. Stalin masterfully played off competing factions within the secret police to check each other and retain appointment power in his own hands. Perhaps his greatest power was his capacity to use this competition to repeatedly purge the secret police and firmly maintain his control over them. This worked so well that Robert Conquest has aptly observed, "But for the moment the police themselves purged and purged again were the direct agents of the center and executors of its main missions." (58) The purging process was a powerful tool in the hands of Stalin. Paradoxically, despite the vast power they accumulated, both Yagoda and Yezhov would prove relatively easy to eliminate due to the enormous number of people who hated them. When Yezhov replaced Yagoda as head of the secret police

105 in August, 1936, he brought with him up to 300 of his own men, largely from the Central Committee apparat. In 1937 Yezhov carried out a sweeping purge which eliminated upward of 3,000 NKVD officers, including Yagoda, Agranov, Slutsky, all Moscow NKVD department heads and nearly all of Yagoda's men. The great majority of foreign operatives that were recalled were shot as well. The GRU chief, Ian Berzin, his deputy Alexander Korin, and scores of key operatives were also eliminated. When Lavrentiya Beria was brought in to replace Yezhov and end the Great Purges at the end of 1938, he carried out his own sweeping purge. Ordering the execution of perhaps as many as 500 NKVD operatives, Beria eliminated the few Yagoda era survivors, Frinovsky and Zakovsky, Yezhov himself, and such key Yezhov aides as Uspensky, Redens and Kedrov. The bulk of the Yezhovites were shot or ousted. In their place came Georgians in Beria's image in Moscow (Kobulov and Merkulov), Leningrad (Goglidze), Belorussia (Tsanava), as well as the Transcaucasus. Too, Stalin's own agents, as Mekhlis, Vyshinsky, Malenkov and Khrushchev, prospered. Overall, though, the carnage within the NKVD was so vast that by 1939 lowly sergeants, rather that majors, were conducting investigations. The Lefortovo staff of prison guards, investigators and intelligence personnel was massively "renewed" no less than four times during the Great Purges. As Joel Carmichael has contemplated the overall impact of the purges, This rapid turnover meant that inexperienced, youthful men of provincial origins would be put in charge of cases whose backgrounds they could not know, not even how the confessions had originally been obtained, and were ignorant to a large extent of the unusual circumstances prevailing before their arrival. Thus the bulk of the youthful, ignorant, and provincial examining magistrates were convinced of the guilt of the 'enemies of the people,' i.e., of the authenticity of their confessions. (59) During the Great Purges the role of the secret police expanded geometrically to become well nigh overpowering within Soviet politics. The secret police decimated the Party, government and army elites. At the elite level no less than 9 Politburo members (including Kirov, Kuibyshev, Ordzhonikidze and Rudzutak) and 10 ex-Politburo members (including Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky and Bukharin) died in the 1934-1940 period, mainly at the hands of the secret police. On top of this devastation fully 98 of the

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139 members of the Central Committee in 1934 were shot by 1939. Less than 2% of the delegates to the 18th Party Congress in 1939 had been delegates to the 17th Party Congress in 1934. Furthermore the secret police directly tortured even such Politburo members as Kossior and Chubar. The carnage was even worse in some of the provinces. In the Ukraine only 3 of 102 members of the Central Committee survived the purges while four consecutive chairmen of the Russian Republic's Council of People's Commissars were ousted. The great mass of Old Bolsheviks as well as a large number of rank and file Communists were gone by 1939. The army and government suffered to an equal degree. No less than 3 of 5 Marshals, all 11 Vice Commissars of Defense, 60 of 67 corps commanders, 136 of 199 brigade commanders and upwards of 10,000 officers were liquidated. Even many of those commanders who survived the purges, as Konstantin Rokossovsky, had been beaten unconscious during secret police interrogations. A similar devastation struck the government bureaucracy. Fully 80% of the members of the Council of People's Commissars were purged. By the end of 1937 most people's commissars were gone, except for Voroshilov and Kaganovich. Overall a large percentage of the leading workers in the civilian and military apparatus were charged with terrorism, wrecking, diversion, espionage and defeatism. This mass elite decapitation was accompanied by the three major show trials of this era. In 1936 Stalin had instructed the NKVD Secret Police Department to find the threads of a vast conspiracy against him. The resulting three mammoth show trials were meant to totally discredit all possible opposition to Stalin, especially from Lenin's trusted Old Bolshevik colleagues. The trials were highly artificial with extravagant charges of treason and subversion, a mass of details, numerous false confessions, no defense by the defendants and an alleged willingness of all to die for T r o t s k y — while now acknowledging Stalin's geniusl They were accompanied by mass public demonstrations demanding the elimination of these "traitors" to the Soviet homeland. At the first trial in 1936 Zinoviev and Kamenev confessed to being terrorists operating on Trotsky's instructions. In 1937 Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov and 16 colleagues took the blame for the massive inadequacies of waste and errors in the industrial leap forward. They also confessed to seeking to overthrow the government with German and Japanese aid, to restore capitalism and to conduct wrecking, espionage and terrorist activities at Trotsky's behest. In 193 8 the Rightists, embodied by Bukharin,

107 Rykov, Krestinsky and Yagoda, were tortured to confess of crimes against the Soviet state. They confessed to plots to dismember the Soviet Union with German and Japanese aid and to assassinate Stalin and members of the Politburo. The great majority of the prominent defendants were executed by the NKVD after they had served their purpose by confessing their alleged deeds at the trials. (60) The Great Purges went far beyond the elite to touch every corner of society. Perhaps Joel Carmichael has best captured this aspect of a frenzied era, For months the Political Police seemed to be working twenty-four hours a day; carting ordinary citizens off in paddy-wagons in cities and countryside alike, snatching people out of houses, workshops, laboratories, factories, universities, army barracks and government bureaus. Peasants, workers, functionaries, intellectuals, artists, officers all wound up in the same cells...Counterrevolution was nowhere, counterrevolutionary plots were everywhere. The tiniest village had several groups of terrorists plotting day and night to kill Stalin; every factory was stiff with saboteurs—all on the verge of some atrocity. (61) The process of arrest, isolation, interrogation and confession to usually false charges went on relentlessly, touching hundreds of thousands of people, overwhelming men. However, the exact scope of the slaughter remains sharply contested. At one extreme Anton Antonov-Ovseenko has estimated 19 million deaths, from 1935 to 1941. Boris Nicolaevsky has given a figure of 10.5 million deaths and Robert Conquest 3 million deaths. On the other extreme Jerry Hough has argued for a figure of several hundred thousand of fatalities and George Kennan tens of thousands of fatalities. (62) With Soviet archives closed, all interpolations of Great Purge deaths are marred by an inability to separate them from the massive casualties caused by resistance to collectivization, the Ukrainian famine and World War II. Thus, all estimates are highly problematic and subject to gross errors. However the estimates of many millions of deaths from the Great Purges seem unrealistic. Since the Soviet camps even at their worst were labor camps (and not death camps) and the mortality rate probable never exceeded 20% a year, the higher figures would imply a minimum of 6-10 million arrests in two years. The withdrawal of

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such a massive number of largely urban workers from the economy and resultant terrorizing impact on those not arrested would have paralyzed the still fragile Soviet industrial surge and sent it into a nosedive. The fact that economic growth slowed but continued in this period implies a marked lower arrest and death rate than suggested by Conquest or Nicolaevsky, one closer to but perhaps somewhat higher than that suggested by Hough. A third major role of the secret police was its largely military functions. It fielded hundreds of thousands of men, replete with planes, artillery and army, in internal security units and border troops. The NKVD, having decimated the GRU apparatus, gained direct control of military intelligence during the Great Purges. And it maintained exclusive control of Red Army counterintelligence with detachments down to the battalion level and plenipotentiaries down to the company level. Secret police representatives even served as People's Commissar of the Navy (Frinovsky) and chief of the Red Army Political Administration (Mekhlis). Thus the military functions of the secret police increased sharply as it ravaged the military elite during the Great Purges. Another major secret police role expansion came in the area of governmental responsibilities. It had a major judiciary role directly through its special boards of three officers who performed speedy secret trials and indirectly through its control of the courts and procuracy. The secret police had its own official representatives in the machine-tractor stations, agricultural bureaucracy and large industries. It controlled the Ministry of Communication and all elite communication for the Party, government and military. It ran key ministries, as heavy construction, lumber and nonferrous metals. The secret police ran science research prison institutes and secret projects (later atomic research). Overall, the secret police, as Seweryn Bialer has shown, became a major governmental force. (63) The economic and administrative tasks involved in running the labor camps with millions of prisoners were of critical importance to the secret police. Swianiewicz has stressed that the Great Purges helped provide urban labor, with the end of the village labor reserve, for industrial development in remote areas. By 1941 forced labor covered 5% of total state investment. While the economic conditions of labor surplus that produced a rationale for labor camps had vanished by 1940, the institutions created by these earlier conditions had a momentum of their own. The major GULAG

109 economic activities were concentrated in construction, mining (mainly of gold and non-ferrous metals), and lumbering and forestry. (64) The period of the Great Purges brought both great benefits and high costs to the personnel of the secret police. The caste-like character of the secret police was greatly reinforced at this time. Anton Antonov-Ovseeyenko has only slightly overstated the status of the NKVD after the purges when he declared, They scrounged everything from the "enemies of the people'—personal possessions, wives, apartments. By 1939 all of the best buildings in Moscow, Leningrad and other cities were occupied by NKVD employees or their relatives and friends. They even took over the names of towns...Stalin provided them with all of life's blessings: special stores closed to the public, limitless funds, box seats at the theater, trips abroad, luxurious apartments and villas by the sea. (65) However, all this was purchased at a high cost. The heavy workload, recurrent purges of secret police personnel and high pressure took their toll. This was particularly true since examiners often worked long hours trying to extract false confessions using torture, the conveyer system and lengthy confessions. The inevitable results were nervous breakdowns, drug and alcohol addiction and withdrawal from the system. The arrival of Beria to replace Yezhov at the end of 1938 meant the windup of the Great Purges. After liquidating Yezhov and his followers and replacing them with his own men from the Caucasus, Beria proceeded to reorganize the NKVD. He tightened central control, improved the educational level of students, created hundreds of new agents and emphasized the apolitical professional agent (rather than amateur enthusiast) as a model. Stressing expertise over raw terror, Beria created a network of training schools to replace the untrained Yezhovites. Beria himself created a system that lasted until Stalin's death in 1953. (66) Finally, foreign espionage efforts were seriously affected by the Great Purges. The heads of both the NKVD Foreign Department (Slutsky) and Red Army GRO (Berzin) were shot and both networks were damaged, with the GRU nearly destroyed. As David Dallin observed, Hundreds of official and secret agents were called home 'to report': many were dismissed,

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deported, purged or executed; military attaches and their assistants and agents never returned to their posts; some members of the Soviet secret services abroad, in fear for their lives, joined the ranks of the "nonreturnees' and either 'submerged' in a foreign country and disappeared or tried to save themselves by appealing to the public opinion of the West. (67) At the very moment that the menace of fascism was reaching its peak in Europe, the Soviet intelligence network was dissolving with no reserves to take its place. In 1938 the critical German network disappeared. Even by 1939-1940 there were fewer than 40 professional agents in Germany, 10 in Holland and under 50 in neutral Switzerland. (68) Too, the main efforts of the rapidly shrinking foreign effort were no longer focused on the enemies of the Soviet Union but on Stalin's personal vendettas. In December 1936 Yezhov organized an NKVD Administration of Special Tasks with mobile groups to carry out foreign assassinations. In Spain the POUM was suppressed during the civil war with Andres Nin and many POUM followers shot. Those agents who did not voluntarily return, as Ignace Reiss (the Swiss NKVD Resident A g e n t ) , were killed abroad. Most important of all an enormous effort was made to kill Leon Trotsky, the arch villain of the trials. After several unsuccessful attempts, the NKVD succeeded in infiltrating Ramon Mercader into the Trotsky entourage in Mexico City. In 1940 with the swing of an ice-ax, Mercader killed Trotsky. The NKVD was also busily occupied in eliminating the foreign Communists residing on Russian soil. The Polish Communist Party was so ravaged that it was dissolved in 1938. Major purges swept the German, Hungarian, Korean and Yugoslav Communist Parties. The Comintern was ravaged, except for a few leaders like Kuusinen, Dmitrov, Togliatti and Tito. Most foreign Communists parties were in disaray by 1939. Yet despite all the losses and the recall of most of its best agents, remarkable progress was soon made in restoring foreign networks. Hundreds of new agents, recruited from the ranks of army officers and young Communists, were rapidly trained and sent abroad. Actions against Nazi Germany were developed from Switzerland and Belgium to Holland and Denmark, starting in 1939. By 1939 the German embassies in both Warsaw and Tokyo had been penetrated at a high level. In Warsaw Soviet agents were receiving information from the German Embassy

Ill counselor, Rudolf Von Scheliha, in return for money for his expensive life style of gambling and women. In Tokyo, Richard Sorge by 1939 had become German Embassy Press Attache and met every morning with his friend, Eugene Ott, new German Ambassador to Japan. He also was friendly with the German Military, Air and Naval Attaches. Furthermore, his conspirator Ozaki had become an unofficial advisor to the Japanese cabinet in 1938 and to the Tokyo office of the Southern Manchurian Railroad in 1939. Thus Sorge had also penetrated the Japanese government and later the military as well. In 1937 Sorge had reported that Japanese failures in China would lead to a long war there and in the spring of 1939 he reported that the Japanese had rejected a German offer of a military alliance against Russia. In the summer of 1939 Sorge helped the Red Army defeat the Japanese army at Khalkin-gol by learning which units were being sent to the battlefield and that Japan intended not to escalate the conflict. Finally, other critical networks were taking shape. Leopold Trepper with his deputy Victor Sukolov had arrived in Brussels early in 1939 to lay the foundation for the brilliant French and Belgian networks that would become known as the "Red Orchestra." Overall, then, foreign work was being prepared with remarkable speed. Too, the abduction of White General Evgeny Miller in Paris in 1937 had removed any serious menace from White emigre groups. (69) The Yezhovshchina provides an excellent laboratory for the testing of various theories of Soviet reality. The totalitarian and barbaric theories have always seen this period as the ultimate proof of the validity of their theories. So too do the personality theorists who see the Great Purges as rooted in Stalin's character. Roy Medvedev has best stated this case, I continue to believe that the terror was basically prompted by Stalin's inordinate vanity and lust for power: he was determined to be in a position of absolute control, ruling as an autocrat, with no restraints of any kind. He promoted the 'cult of personality' in order to claim credit for non-existent services to the Party and to the young Soviet state at the time of its foundation. And when it seemed that the basic cadres of Party and State were obstacles in the way of achieving these goals, Stalin did not hesitate to destroy them all, just as he had not hesitated when it was a question of well-to-do peasants of 'bourgeois speculators.'(70)

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Finally, those emphasizing historical roots, could turn to orgies of bloodshed in Czarist Russia as antecedents. But the theory of structural-functionalism breaks down in trying to explain this period. For by 1937 the need for violence had sharply subsided as the breakthroughs in industrialization and collectivization had basically been achieved and consolidated. The growing foreign threat demanded internal peace and the strengthening of the instruments of coercion for wartime, not civil strife, the massive decimation of the army officer corps and government bureaucracy, liquidation of foreign espionage networks and creation of large labor camps. Too, the bulk of the Party leadership was opposed to any such purge and voted against Stalin at a Central Committee plenum in 1936. Thus the highly dysfunctional purges reflected the interests of only Stalin and a small coterie of followers. WORLD WAR II During World War II the vast secret police apparat played a significant role and emerged as a strong political force under Stalin. In 1941 Beria served as Stalin's security aide, deputy premier and one of five members of the State Defense Committee. By 1945 he was a marshal and eventually one of the contenders for the Stalinist succession. Too, powerful rivals to Beria emerged within the secret police, notably Kruglov and Abakumov who ran SMERSH, created in 1943. The secret police were sufficiently important as to merit frequent reorganizations. In February, 1941 the NKVD was divided into the NKVD and NKGB, only to be reintegrated in June 1941 with the start of the war. In April 1943, with a change in Russia's fortunes, the NKVD was again divided into the NKVD and NKGB headed by Beria and his ally Merkulov again.. During the war the secret police naturally amassed further military functions, especially in the early stages when the Red Army suffered major reverses. The NKVD troops were better clothed, housed, fed and equipped than army troops. During 1941 nine NKVD divisions fought courageously and well in the front lines against the Germans. In the battle for Moscow in the fall of 1941 two of the six armies were commanded by secret police generals. Furthermore, internal security troops had to be brought in to quell unrest in Moscow when major government departments were being evacuated. In 1942 two secret police divisions crushed a revolt in Turkestan. In 1943 secret police General

113 Maslennikov's NKVD Army of Special Purpose smashed the German Blue Defense Line in the Kuban. (71) Throughout the war the secret police performed a large number of quasi-military tasks. Secret police troops ran blocking battalions to prevent unauthorized army retreats, stop fleeing soldiers and turn them over to military tribunals. They organized and controlled Red partisans behind German lines. They ran penal battalions, guarded prisoners and patrolled labor camps. Secret police troops protected Stalin and top leaders, convoyed military supplies and manned secret weapons. The secret police under Beria were in direct charge of important arms industries which turned out vast quantities of weapons during the war. And SMERSH strived to prevent treason among the Red Army officers and desertion and disaffection among the largely raw peasant recruits. While mass terror ended with the demise of the Great Purges, it did continue in attenuated form. Following Trotsky's assassination in Mexico City in 1940, Walter Krivitsky, a Soviet resident agent who defected rather than return during the purges, was killed in Washington in 1941. The rapid German advance in June, 1941 led to large-scale NKVD shooting of political prisoners in the threatened areas of the Ukraine and Belorussia. In August Chubar and Antipov were shot and in October top military commanders Shtern, Alksnis and Smushkevich were liquidated. In December the secret police killed Viktor Alter and Heinryk Erlich, Polish Bundist leaders. During the entire 1939-1945 period mass deportations were the order of the day for nonRussian nationalities. The Soviet advance in the wake of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact led to deportation of over one million Poles and several hundred thousand Baits to the Soviet Union. Too, there was the shooting of perhaps 4,000 Polish officers in the Katyn forest. During the war roughly 1 1/2 million people from eight minority nationalities were deported and resettled within the Soviet Union. In August 1941 400,000 Volga Germans were dispatched to the east in cattle trucks on charges of suspected treason. In December 1943 100,000 Kalmyks and Karachai were deported, in March and April 1944 500,000 Chechens and Ingush suffered a similar fate. In April 1944 with much brutality 200,000 Crimean Tatars were forcibly deported. In the course of these deportations roughly one-third died, particularly children and the elderly. In each of these cases the secret police made detailed plans and familiarized themselves with the region. When the action started each village was surrounded by armed troops and a number of soldiers were detached to join police officers in rounding up

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families in a given group of houses. Then they were sent into exile in cattle trucks. (72) Other police duties were also important as well. Many secret police agents were left behind in German occupied areas to watch the behavior of the local population. When the Red Army reoccupied areas during the war, tens of thousands were executed and hundreds of thousands were sent to the camps for collaborating with the Germans. Similarly, extensive preparations were made to train Chekists to work in areas which the Red Army might occupy by the end of the war. Too, the NKVD had to combat the repeated attempts of the Germans to infiltrate thousands of agents into Soviet territory, especially in 1941. All German attempts to foment anti-Soviet sentiment among dissident segments of the population had to be rigorously combatted. At the same time the NKVD had to greatly increase its efforts to gain local and important military information on the Germans. The NKVD continued to be intimately occupied in major governmental activities. NKVD signal troops were in charge of maintaining vital communication links among Party, government and military leaders. In the fall of 1941 the NKVD was in charge of the vital evacuation of over one thousand plants eastward out of the way of the advancing Germans. Transportation too came under its purview. In 1942 the NKVD took control of the railroads, which were vital to the war effort. A NKVD permit was necessary for travel, as well as a certificate of delousing. And perhaps most important no key governmental or Party appointments could be made without an investigation by the secret police and its stamp of approval. Despite the war, the NKVD continued to perform major administrative and economic functions in running GULAG. Although mass terror had ended, a stream of prisoners continued to arrive in the camps. All prisoners in camp on June, 1941 had their terms extended for the duration of the war. The millions of laborers made the NKVD the single largest economic enterprise in Russia. In the 1941 Soviet capital budget 18% of all investment went to the NKVD, 40% of which was for the camps. During the war major attention was given to war and warrelated production as building airfields and war plants. Construction projects involved half of all labor. (73) But economic output was hampered by a high mortality and sickness rate among prisoners. Dmitri Panin in his memoirs about his camp experiences during the war has chronicled the devastating impact that a starvation diet, lack of camp clothinq, unrealistic production quotas, heavy

115 work, lack of rest, cold and a dreadful Arctic winter (where -35 C was a high temperature) took on weakened prisoners. (74) Indeed Eugenia Ginzburg recalled that at Kolyma work stopped only when the temperature reached -50 C (75) Perhaps the utter futility of working on labor camps under horrendous conditions in the far north took the greatest toll. For as Joseph Scholmer has recalled his war years spent in a labor camp in Vorkuta, Each camp is surrounded by a twelve-foot high barbed wire fence. Round the inside of this fence is a prohibited zone, about six yards wide, the zapretnaya zona, within which the guards in the tower will shoot at sight. Spring guns are placed in the wire. The guard towers are linked to each other by telephone, and to headquarters by an electric alarm system. There are powerful arc lamps every ten to fifteen yards along the wire, and during hours of darkness the zapretnaya zona, is lit up as bright as day. Outside the camp there is a wire running parallel to the fence to guide the police dogs. If the alarm is given...the whole camp is surrounded in a few minutes by a special squad, which is kept permanently at readiness. (76) It was in the foreign sphere that the secret police played their most vital role, greatly contributing to Russia's ultimate victory in World War II. In Tokyo at the Germany Embassy Richard Sorge by May 1941 was able to warn Moscow of an impending German attack with 170-190 divisions late in June. His subsequent information was put to better use. At the end of August he reported that the German Embassy had lost hope that Japan would enter the war against the Soviet Union in 1941. In his most fateful report in October 1941 he told Moscow that Japan had decided to move south, removing any danger of the Kwangtung Army attacking across the Siberian frontier. This allowed Stalin to transfer 100,000 tough troops from the east to aid in the defense of Moscow. Soon therafter the network was smashed by the Japanese and Sorge and Ozaki were ultimately executed. (77) In Europe the "Red Orchestra" and the "Lucy" networks provided the Soviet Union with invaluable information on German military moves. The "Red Orchestra" was led by the Polish Jewish Communist agent Leopold Trepper, who commanded seven networks in France and Belgium from 1940 until his arrest in December, 1942 (later he escaped to Moscow). The "Red Orchestra" provided critical information to

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Moscow during its functioning. Especially important was the "Lucy Network" run by Alexander Rado. Rudolf Roessler ("Lucy"), cooperating with Rado with the consent of Swiss and English intelligence, from 1941 to 1944 ran a Swiss based network of 50 agents that was the most effective intelligence operation of the war. The plans and orders of the German High Command down to the brigade level were sent daily to Moscow beginning after the German invasion in June, 1941. Over 5,500 messages were sent in the course of three years. Among his sources evidently were Major General Hans Oster of the Abwehr, who was on intimate terms with many generals, and probably Colonel Boetzel, head of the ciphers department of the German General Staff. When the network was finally destroyed over 100 people were executed by the Nazis. But in the meanwhile it had provided extraordinary information worth many divisions to Moscow. (78) As Alexander Foote, who had been Rado's deputy, has written with only slight exaggeration, In fact in the end Moscow largely fought the war on Lucy's m e s s a g e s — a s indeed any high command would who had access to genuine information emanating in a steady flow from the high command of their enemies...In effect, as far as the Kremlin was concerned, the possession of Lucy as a source meant that they had the equivalent of well placed agents in the three service intelligence staffs plus the Imperial General Staff plus the War Cabinet Offices. Lucy provided Moscow with an up-to-date and day-to-day order of battle of the German forces in the East. This information could come only from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht itself. In no other offices in the whole of Germany was there available the information that Lucy provided daily. Not only did he provide information on the troop dispositions, information which could have come from the O.K.W. (Supreme Command of the German Army) in the Bendlerstrasse but he also produced equally good information emanating from the headquarters of the Luftwaffe and Marine Administration, the German Admiralty. (79) And all this mass of information reached Moscow within 24 hours after the decisions had been taken in Berlin! Russian penetration of its temporary Western

117 allies, notably England, the United States and Canada, continued apace during the war. In 1944 Kim Philby had achieved the ultimate position—head of the Soviet section of England's secret service. By 1945 Philby was still running the Soviet section of SIS, Maclean was in Washington at the center of the Anglo-American atomic energy program and Burgess was dining with Cabinet ministers and backbenchers. Too, by the end of the war the atomic program had become a priority target. Alan Nunn May, a leftist British experimental physicist doing atomic research in Canada during the war, was able to furnish the Soviet Union with atomic information and laboratory samples of U-235 by 1945. Klaus Fuchs, a German emigre physicist who worked at Columbia University and Los Alamos during the war, provided the Soviet Union with critical information, including the outline of the American gaseous diffusion project. Bruno Pontecervo, the brilliant physicist who fled to the Soviet Union in 1950, worked in Canada and the United States during the war. Overall, a 1949 report of the American Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy estimated that Soviet intelligence operations had saved the Soviet Union 18 months in its development of atomic weapons. (80) Finally, the Soviets targeted the United States by the end of the war. Lend Lease brought hundreds of Soviet officials to the United States where they accumulated hordes of industrial plant designs, technical blueprints and even American maps. During the war a limited OSS-NKVD relationship evolved. And regular political espionage succeeded at this time in penetrating key American government agencies. Overall, an impressive start had been made. (81) The various theories have some difficulty in coping with the complex Soviet reality of World War II. The totalitarian and barbaric theories have trouble in explaining the genuine mass support for the regime displayed during the war and the decline in terror. The structural-functionalists can't explain the irrationality of maintaining a large labor camp system during a war when the services of thousands of skilled prisoners (especially officers and engineers) were badly needed at the front. The personality theorists need to explain the oscillations in Stalin's personality while the traditional culturists need to explain why Russia performed so much better in World War II than World War I. As Roy Medvedev cogently put the matter, During the war years the camps of "Gulag Archipelago' were overflowing with prisoners, many of whom were desperate to get to the

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front. Here were thousands of former commanders and commissars, so badly needed by a battered army, and they were being kept under surveillance by thousands and thousands of strong and healthy guards and troops of the NKVD, who also could have been rather useful at the front. (82) THE LAST YEARS OF STALIN, 1946-1953 The secret police remained a powerful institution in Soviet politics in the postwar era. By the end of the period Beria was able to make a credible, though ultimately unsuccessful, bid for power. A major aspect was the struggle between secret police factions supporting and opposing Beria. In 1946 Beria was removed from direct control of the secret police as the NKVD was divided into two new agencies, the MVD headed by Sergei Kruglov and MGB headed by Abakumov. Neither men were allies of Beria, who now headed the atomic project. By 1949 Beria s star rose as he joined with Malenkov to purge the followers of Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin's heir apparent who had died in 1948, mainly in Leningrad. In the "Leningrad Affair" Nikolai Voznesensky, a full member of the Politburo, and Aleksei Kuznetsov, a Party Central Committee Secretary, were purged and eventually shot. Several thousand Leningrad Communists were arrested in connection with the case. In 1951 Semen Ignatiev and his deputy Mikhail Ryumin replaced Abakumov. The last year of Stalin's life saw a frenzy of secret police action which seemed to many to foreshadow a new bloody mass purge. Many of the actions seemed directed at Beria, who no longer had direct control of the secret police. In 1952 the "Mingrelian Affair" saw a mass purge of the Georgian Communist Party, a key base for Beria. Stalin let it be known that he was unhappy with the pace of atomic weapons work, Beria's domain. The virulent antiSemitism of the period clearly, too, was not Beria's work. In 1952 in the "Crimean Affair" 30 Jewish poets were shot and constant trials of Jewish "black marketeers" in the Ukraine were held. At the end of 1952 in the "Doctor's Plot" many Kremlin doctors, primarily Jews, were charged with trying to poison Zhdanov and Shcherbakov and damage Stalin's health. Organized by Ignatiev and Ryumin, the case called the doctors "human monsters" and blamed the MGB for lack of vigilance. Rumors swept Moscow that plans were underway to deport all Jews to Northern Kazakhstan "for their own protection." Too, it seemed likely that Stalin had decided to eliminate 1

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many top Politburo leaders, including Beria, Molotov and Voroshilov, shrinking thereby the enlarged Presidium back to its usual size. But in March, 1953 Stalin had a heart attack and died, with unsubstantiated rumors of secret police complicity in not summoning help. During the latter years of "mature" Stalinism, the secret police continued to play an important role in Soviet politics and society. With the advance of the Red Army into Eastern Europe at the end of the war came new functions for the secret police. Partisans had to be suppressed in the German-occupied Ukraine and Belorussia and control re-established. Billions of dollars worth of reparations, principally from Germany, had to be removed to the Soviet Union. The army had to be purged and restored to its lesser place in Soviet society. Control had to be established over Eastern Europe. The new borders had to be safeguarded through physical barriers, a dense network of informants and a forward reconnaissance area beyond the frontier. Too, internal controls within Soviet society had to be reestablished with the reimposition of the norms of orthodox Stalinism. This was not easy in a society where tens of millions of people had lived beyond Soviet control during the war in Germany in prisoner of war camps and factories or in German-occupied areas. Millions of returnees had to be screened for re-entry into Soviet society. Finally, atomic work took on ever greater importance in the post-war era. (83) The camps of the postwar era filled up with large convoys of new prisoners, far removed from the Russian peasants of the early 1930's. Now the haul reflected the war years. German SS soldiers and officers, regular German and Japanese army officers and soldiers, anti-Soviet partisans and Vlasovites (Russians in German uniforms) filled the camps. So too did displaced Soviet civilian laborers from Germany, Red Army POWs and Russian collaborators with the Germans in occupied areas. Those expressing anti-Stalin sentiments (as Solzhenitsyn) soon found themselves on the road going north and east. Given the priorities of reconstruction and massive economic devastation, life was harsh in the camps. In the north Dmitrii Panin has recalled "logging camps, deep mine shafts, the construction of useless roads, building sites buried in Arctic ice and snow, brooding Northern lights, unbearable cold." (84) With the advent of the Cold War, foreign work became extremely important. There was a major reorganization of key departments. The Operations Department changed from economic and technical work to running all internal security work. The

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Espionage/Anti-Espionage Department took over from SMERSH the running of military and political antiespionage work. Eastern Europe became a major area for the secret police to aid in establishment of Communist control. Within the Foreign Department there were individual branches for each state. The secret police played a major role in setting up and penetrating the security establishments in each country. It set up files and training programs, established targets and ran agents directly. It played a hand in the bloody purges in Eastern Europe in the early 1950s. Only in Yugoslavia was the secret police bested when it failed to oust Tito after 1948. The Soviet Union continued to score impressive intelligence coups at this time. Its recruitment of Cambridge University leftists in the 1930s now paid off handsomely. A Communist intellectual similar to Sorge and Trepper, Kim Philby ran the counter-Soviet intelligence effort for the British secret service from 1945 to 1947. From this coup the Soviet Union learned the identity and personality of British intelligence officers, gained a closeup view of its filing system and office procedures and could counter all British operations. In 1947 he became the British liaison officer with the CIA and in 1949 Philby went to Washington in this capacity. He was often briefed by the CIA on its Soviet operations and was cleared to speak with its director, General Smith. The Soviet Union thereby gained access to CIA methods and personalities. During this period British and American activities in Eastern Europe, most notably in Albania, were totally ineffective. Similarly in 1947 and 1948 Donald Maclean sent atomic information to the Soviet Union as he was head of the American Department of the British Foreign Office. Guy Burgess was assistant to Hector McNeil who acted as Foreign Secretary when Bevin was sick or abroad. This idyllic state of affairs ended when British intelligence closed in on Burgess and Maclean who, on Philby's advice, fled to the Soviet Union in 1951. And, Kim Philby, under suspicion, lost his chance to head the British secret service and had to resign his post. (85) Penetration of the American, British and Canadian atomic effort proceeded apace. Philby and his friends had valuable information on the program. A Canadian spy ring, with help from Canadian Communists, a major in the Defense Ministry, a clerk in the Department of External Affairs, a source in the British High Commission and a number of government employees, furnished a large number of

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classified documents to Moscow. Klaus Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo worked in key positions at Harwell, the British atomic research plant. Fuchs regularly attended meetings in London at which secret American information was discussed. Fuchs was arrested in 1950, the same year Pontecorvo fled to Russia. In addition, the American spy ring was able to produce much useful information. Finally, Western Europe became a major target. The Russians were able to recruit widely among the hundreds of thousand of refugees moving westward, as well as from those people under their control in the German and Austrian zones of occupation. Monetary rewards tended to replace ideological inducements. Germany was a particularly key target with nearly 2,000 convictions for espionage in West Germany in the 1950-1953 period.(86) The structural-functionalists have difficulty in explaining the final years of Stalinism. The mounting terror and anti-Semitism were scarcely functional to the severely ravaged Soviet economy and society. The totalitarian, traditional cultural and barbaric theories find this period especially congenial. The personality theory, focusing on the increased paranoia of the aging Stalin, seems promising. KHRUSHCHEV ERA The death of Stalin and ascension of Khrushchev to power portended large-scale changes for the secret police. It had been an integral and powerful element in Stalin's Russia, a major factor in suppressing the political ambitions, of other key actors in the system. With Stalin's death, the political fortunes of Key institutions, as the Party, government and armed forces, would improve markedly while those of the secret police would decline sharply. Stripped of many of its powers, strongly purged of its key personnel and assailed for the crimes of the Stalin era, the secret police would find itself on the defensive and restored to Party control during the Khrushchev years. Yet, reduced in stature, it continued to be a significant, if diminished, political actor in this period. The death of Stalin led to a short but spirited bid by Beria to become his successor. The very existence of such a bid and its initial successes before its final failure testify to the enormous powers accumulated by the secret police under Stalin. Within the first tew weeks after Stalin's death in March, 1953, Beria had become head of the NKVD and fused the MGB with it. Ignatyev, Ryumin

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and Poskrebyshev had been purged, the doctors exonerated of charges in the "Doctors' Plot," and the "Mingrelian Affair" had been exposed as a falsehoodBeria's followers were gaining the ascendancy in Georgia, the Baltics and the Ukraine and Beria actively sought the support of nationality minorities. Alarmed by Beria's successes, Beria's civilian opponents (led by Khrushchev and Malenkov) garnered support from Red Army generals (led by Zhukov and Konev) and secret police figures opposed to Beria (as Kruglov and Serov). Seizing on the discontent caused by the East German riots and using army troops to neutralize Beria's secret police troops, they managed to arrest Beria and expel him from the Presidium. By December 1953 Kruglov had become head of the MVD and a massive purge of over 100 senior secret police officers was conducted. That month Beria and his leading followers, including Merkulov (former Minister of M G B ) , Kobulov (Deputy Minister of N K V D ) , Dekanazov (Georgian Minister of N K V D ) , and Goglidze (former Ukrainian Minister of N K V D ) , were all shot. These executions set the stage for the execution of Abakumov, former USSR Minister of M G B ) , in 1954 and Ryumin, who had been preparing to liquidate the Stalinist "old guard," in 1955. By 1956 most major leaders of the secret police in 1952 had been liquidated and a new structure had emerged. In 1954 the KBG under Ivan Serov, a veteran secret police official, had been created, and the MVD sharply reduced in size. In 1956 Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalinist crimes and the rehabilitation of his victims further blackened the secret police image. In 1957-1958 a new penal code eliminated strictly political crimes. In 1958 Alexander Shelepin, former head of the Komsomol with no secret police background, replaced Serov as KGB head, speeding the complete subordination of the KGB to the Party. And in 1961 Shelepin was replaced by another Party functionary with a Komsomol background and no secret police experience, Vladimir Semichastny. Thus, to a significant degree, the secret police had been tamed. The secret police underwent significant role depletion as its role in society was fundamentally altered during the Khrushchev era. The proclamation of the need for socialist legacy, the stress on Party control of the secret police and Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program all took their toll. Terrorism was no longer an acceptable tool of Soviet politics. In September, 1953 the feared Special Boards of the NKVD were abolished and in April 1954 the terror decrees of December 1954 were annulled. The frontier guards were now placed under the Red

123 Army. By April 1956 a special department of the Public Prosecutor's office had been established to supervise the secret police. Equally significantly, the vast GULAG labor camp empire underwent a sharp contraction. By 1956 a series of special commissions, with representatives from the Procuracy, Party Central Committee and Party, (significantly there were no secret police representatives), rehabilitated and decided to set free all former POWs, those who had served their terms and those whom they deemed innocent. The great majority of "political prisoners" were sent home and, in all, over one million prisoners were probably liberated. In the wake of a series of camp uprisings in the 1953-1955 period and release of so many prisoners in 1956, many camps were closed and others sharply reduced in size. Conditions improved in the camps and few "politicals" remained in the system. (87) However, the secret police retained considerable powers in this period. With hundreds of thousands of troops armed with artillery, armor and airplanes, the secret police remained a potent force and counter to any independent action. With its network of agents within the army, government and economic bureaucracy, it possessed that most important power—information. It maintained a massive presence among the Soviet population to prevent and deter actions hostile to the regime. The secret police still ran a reduced labor empire of some importance. And, as would be seen in 1964', no coup against the leader could succeed without at least secret police acquiescence. Finally, with the ongoing Cold War, the foreign operations of the secret police would be of significant value to the Party leadership. Too, with the notable exception of Oleg Penkovsky, the Soviet Union was reasonably successful in thwarting Western efforts to penetrate its borders. The shooting of Beria and his associates had a certain cost as a number of Soviet agents, such as Peter Deriabin (KGB section head in V i e n n a ) , chose to flee to the West rather than return abroad. Overall, though, notable progress was made in this period. Soviet security services could count some important successes. In Germany Heinz Felfe, head of the Soviet counter-intelligence branch for the West German secret service, spent 10 years working for the Soviet Union until caught in 1963. He photographed index cards of all agents abroad and their profiles, reports on Eastern agents under investigation and minutes of committee meetings. No less than 15,000 photographs and tapes went eastward before he was caught in 1963 (and exchanged in

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1969). Given the East German base, the KGB literally poured hundreds if not thousands of agents into West Germany, which became a high priority target. (88) England became another high priority area. Cleared by Harold Macmillan in 1955, Kim Philby went to Beirut from which he ultimately fled to Moscow in 1962. George Blake, an English naval officer in the war and key British secret service agent in Korea, became a Soviet sympathizer while being held in a North Korean prison in 1950. Returning as a hero to England in 1953, he served as a double agent until his arrest in 1961 (and escape from jail to Moscow in 1966) . During these years he revealed British and American secret activities, turned over names of British agents in Germany and Russia and gave Russia secret British plans. Too, there was Gordon Lonsdale (originally Konon Molody), who had spent part of his childhood in California and in 1955 returned to England as Resident Director in the guise of a free wheeling financial wizard and womanizer. Before his arrest in 1961 (and exchange in 1 9 6 4 ) , he had successfully penetrated various government agencies. (89) Also, significant attention was paid to the United States. Rudolf Abel, an NKVD colonel, spent seven years as a resident agent in North America before being caught in 1957 (and later exchanged). In 1960 National Security Agency employees William Martin and Bernard Mitchell fled to the Soviet Union. American efforts stressed numbers and volumes of information. Overall, the secret police adjusted to its new diminished role in the change from the massive police state of the Stalin era to the traditional authoritarian polity of the Khrushchev era. By the end of the Khaushchev period the secret police had begun to establish a new position for itself within the system. A new professionalism and a new pride in its work, especially abroad, began to exert itself. The totalitarian and barbaric theories cannot explain the radical changes of the Khrushchev era and demise of terror. Khrushchevism is not easily interpreted as a revival of traditional political culture. The personality theory has problems with the mass support of Khrushchev and Khrushchev's past history as an ardent Stalinist. Structuralfunctionalism offers the best explanation, with stress on the dysfunctionality of mature Stalinism and needs of a modern industrial society and major bureaucracies.

125 BREZHNEV ERA Under Brezhnev Soviet politics took on a far more stable, routinized and bureaucratized form than under the "harebrained" schemer, Nikita Khrushchev. Each of the major central bureaucratic institutions had regular input into the policymaking process and, after 1973, direct representation on the Politburo as well as the Central Committee. Everyone of these institutions was granted real appropriations increases yearly and areas of professional autonomy. As a result, the secret police gained significantly from the Brezhnev era. Having suffered at the hands of Khrushchev, the secret police, led by Shelepin and Semichastny. aided in his overthrow. As a reward Shelepin was elevated to the Politburo and Semichastny to the Central Committee. The limits of secret police influence were seen in 1967 when Shelepin lost out in a power struggle and was ousted as head of the KGB. In his place came Yuri Andropov, who had no secret police experience, and three deputies, two of whom (Gregory Isinev and Semen Tsvigun) were Brezhnev^s allies. By 1973 Andropov had been elevated to the Politboro and secret police influence was on the rise. Gone were the vilifications of the Khrushchev era, replaced by repeated praise and ecomiums for the secret police. Having become a legitimate and powerful political actor, the secret police had achieved a secure niche in Soviet politics. Too, the increasing professionalism of the KGB kept it apace with the advances in Soviet government and society. By 1982 Yuri Andropov had become a credible and major contender to succeed Brezhnev, capable of pushing aside Brezhnev's heir apparent, Konstantin Chernenko. Secret police influence derives heavily from its control over vital sources of information. The KGB and GRU are important providers of critical information and intelligence assessments. As Jiri Valenta has observed, "The KBG can influence Soviet decision-making by screening and interpreting intelligence information and delivering to the Politburo only reports that its top officials believe are important." (90) The domestic control function of the secret police became especially important during the Brezhnev era with the demise of mass terror and political activism from the center. Nationality, religious and political dissidence became a significant force which the regime felt obliged to suppress, but within the newfound parameters of "socialist legality". The secret police under Andropov met this new and more difficult challenge

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with a sophisticated and subtle brand of coercion. Gone were the heavy handed days of brute terror, mass repression and liberal doses of physical abuse. Now dosage became the name of the day. In the 1970s 250,000 Jews and perhaps 100,000 Germans were allowed to emigrate as a safety valve measure. They were joined abroad by numerous dissidents, such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Valery Chalidze and Petr Yakir, who were deported. Too, the signing of the Helsinki accords, disarmament campaigns and support of Third World revolutionary movements gave a decidedly liberal air to the regime. At the same time selective and seemingly random intimidation prevented emulation of these "antiSoviet" elements. Nearly every year a major political figure was put on trial and sent to p r i s o n — f r o m Yulii Daniel, Andrei Sinyavsky, Aleksandr Ginzburg and Petr Grigorenko in the 1960s to Andrei Amalrik and Anatoly Shcharansky. Those in the dissident movement were systematically isolated and then progressively eliminated over time. Many of the leaders in the emigration movement were repeatedly denied emigration visas. Overall, the KGB effectively performed its assigned task of suppressing domestic dissent. Its foreign tasks continued to be performed with an increased efficiency and professionalism, especially under Andropov. Penetration of NATO, especially via West Germany, was notably effective. The arrest of one of Willy Brandt's top aides, Gunter Guilliaume, as a Soviet agent, symbolized the vulnerability of West Germany and the vast resources at the disposal of the Soviet Union in East Germany. A massive and sophisticated Soviet campaign achieved notable successes in obtaining information about American high technology developments, as in Silicon Valley. And the vulnerability of England, ever a favorite Soviet target, was dramatically revealed in the arrest of a translator at the British installation engaged in sophisticated code cracking. Overall, the multitude of functions for the secret police have ensured them a major role in Soviet politics. The continuing absence of terror or significant coercion calls into question the totalitarianism, 'barbaric' and traditional cultrual explanations. The collectivist bureaucratic pluralism of the era vitiates the value of personality theories while the "normalization" of the secret police role suggests a structuralfunctional adaptation to the emergence of advanced industrial society.

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ANDROPOV ERA In the intense political infighting that surrounded Brezhnev's death, Yuri Andropov, KGB chief for 15 years before moving to the Central Committee Secretariat in 1982, emerged initially victorious. His victory said a great deal about the changes that had occurred in Soviet politics since the Khrushchev era when the secret police had been repeatedly purged and borne the brunt of attacks on Stalin's crimes. Under Brezhnev the secret police had become a powerful, respected and legitimate organization. Too, Andropov's first moves involved promotion of his former secret police colleagues— Geydar Aliyev to full membership in the Politburo, Vitaly Fedorchuk to USSR Minister of Internal Affairs and Viktor Chebrikov to KGB chief. But, it is important to stress that in no way did Andropov's ascension represent a move towards dominance by the KGB. Indeed to gain his ascendancy Andropov had to leave the KGB and move to the central Party organ. Too, as a man without prior secret police experience he retained his "civilian" status while running the KGB. Overall, then, Andropov's rise signifies the extent to which the secret police has become a powerful, effective and legitimate actor within the policy-making establishment.

We have seen the changing and evolving role of the secret police throughout Soviet history. Its power and influence have been strongly correlated with the gap between the capabilities of the regime and the goals which it has tried to achieved. For most periods the structural-functionalist interpretation of Dallin and Breslauer has provided the most cogent explanation. During the 1937-1953 period of mature Stalinism, though, serious account needs to be taken of the nature of the ruler's personality, as both Dallin and Tucker have suggested. Overall, the role of the secret police in Soviet politics is largely comprehensible without resort to "exceptionalist" theories (such as totalitarianism) which tend to see the Soviet Union as a deviant aberration in modern politics.

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NOTES 1. Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii. 1211 - 1221 gg: sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1 9 5 8 ) , p. viii, Perepiska sekretariata Tsk RKP(b) s. mestnymi partiinymi organizatsiyami (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974) , v. 8, p. 670, E. I Belov, "Vnutrennie voiska v pervye gody sovetskoi vlasti," in Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny interventsii (1917 1922); sbornik statei (Moscow: Nauka, 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 229 - 231. 2. Istoriya sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava(Moscow: Nauka, 1 9 6 8 ) , v. 1, p. 437, P. G. sofinov, Ocherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvchainoi komissii (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1 9 6 0 ) , pp. 191 - 192, 214 - 216, A.L. Kublanov, Sovet rabOChii i krest'yanstva oborony (noyabr' 1313. - maxi 1920? (Leningrad: Leningrad University Press, 1975) , p. 179, Iz. istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii. 1212 - 1221 gg: sbornik dokumentov, pp. 426 - 427. 3. MChK: iz istorii Moskovskoi chrezvychainoi komissii 1218. - 1221 (Moscow: Moskovskoi Rabochii, 1 9 7 8 ) , p. 8. 4. Boris Levytsky, The. Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Police 1212 - 1970 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 33 - 34. 5. A. Essen, Euti stroitel' stva SSSR. (Moscow and Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1 9 2 9 ) , p. 71. 6. P.G. sofinov, Qcherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvchainoi komissii. pp. 18 - 19. 7. MChK, pp. 304 - 308. 8. Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii. 1212 - 1221 gg; sbornik dokumentov, pp. xii, 361. 9. P.G. Sofinov, Ocherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii, p. 20. 10. ibid-, p. 21 and iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvchainoi komissii. p. 471. 11. P.G. Sofinov, Ocherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii. pp. 3 9 , 131. Ocherki istorii Permskoi oblastnoi partiinoi organizatsii (Perm: Permskoe Knizhdat, 1971) , p. 140, Ocherki istorii Gor'kovskoi organizatsii KPSS (Gor'kii: Gor'kovskoe Knizhdat, 1 9 6 6 ) , v. 2, p. 1 8 , Ocherki istorii Krasnoyarskoi partiinoi organizatsii (Krasnoyarsk: Krasnoyarskoe Knizhdat, 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 304, Ocherki istorii SaratPVSkoi organizatsii KPSS (Saratov: Privolzhskoe Knizhdat, 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 5 5 , Ocherki istorii Orenburgskoi organizatsii KPSS (Chelyabinsk: Yuzhno-Ural'skoe Knizhdat, 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 145 and Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii 1212 - 1221 gg: sbornik dokumentov, p- 120.

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12. James Bunyan and H.H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917 - 1918: Documents and Materials (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), p. 386. 13. Victor Serge, Year One of the Russian Revolution (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1 9 7 2 ) , translation, p. 231, Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissji, 1917 - 1221 gg: sbornik dokumentov. p. ix. 14. Pravda. July 7, 1918, P.G. Sofinov, Ocherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii. pp. 69 - 7 3 , 95, A.M. Spirin, Klassy i partii y grazhdanskoi voine v. Rossii (1917 - 1920) (Moscow: Mysl', 1 9 6 8 ) , p. 186, Victor Serge, Year One of the Russian Revolution, p. 284, G.A. Trukan, Rabochii klass v bor' be za pobedy i uprochenie sovetskoi vlasti (Moscow: Nauka, 1 9 7 5 ) , p. 275. 15. G.A. Trukan, Rabochii klass v bor 'be za pobedy i uprochenie sovetskoi vlasti, p. 275, Victor Serge.Year One of the Russian Revolution, p. 289. Stanovlenie sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava (1917 1920) (Moscow: Nauka, 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 438 - 439, and E.G. Gimpel'son, Sovety v gody inostrannoi interventsii i grazhdanskoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1 9 6 8 ) , p. 319. 16. Izvestiya August 23, 1918 17. Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii, 1917 - 1222 ggx sbornik dokumentov. p. 200. 18. Pravda. December 25, 1918. 19. Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii, 1212 - 1221 ggj_ sbornik dokumentov. pp. 174, 192. 20. Victor Serge, Year One of the Russian Revolution, p. 306, Pravda. November 21, 1918. 21. P.G. Sofinov, Ocherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii. p. 135. 22. Ya. M. Sverdlov, Izbrannye proizvedeniya. v. 3, p. 206. 23. Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii, 1917 - 1221 gg; sbornik dokumentov. pp. 236 - 237. 24. P. G. Sofinov, Ocherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii. p. 133, Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti (Moscow: Politizdat, 1 9 6 8 ) , v. 4, p. 570, E. G. Gimpel'son, Sovety v. gody inostrannoi interventsii i grazhdanskoi voiny , p. 318, Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti, v. 4, p. 302, and Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii, 1212 = 1221 gg; sbornik dokumentov. p. 258. 25. p. G. Sofinov, Ocherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii p. 142, stanovlenie sovetskogo gosudarstva 1 prava (1917 1 9 2 0 ) . p. 441, Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii, 1212 - 1221 gg: sbornik

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dokumentov. p. 249. 26. Stanevlenle sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava (1917 - 1920) . p. 442, Dekrety sovetskoi ylasti. v. 5, p. 253, v. 6, 448, Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii. 1917 - 1121 SSJ. Sbornik dokumentov. pp. 299 - 300, 319, P. G. Sofinov, Ocherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii pp. 190, 193. 27. Perepiska sekretariata TsK RKP. (b) 2 mestnymi partiinymi organizatsiyami (Moscow: Politizdat, 1 9 7 4 ) , v. 8, p. 300. 28. Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii. 1917 - 1921 gg: sbornik dokumentov, pp. 278, 294, Arthur Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign. 1218. - 1212 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963) pp. 330 - 331. 29. P. G. Sofinov, Ocherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii, pp. 202 209, 243, and Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii. 1212 - 1221 SSj. sbornik dokumentov. p. 356. 30. I. Ya. Trifonov, Klassy i klassovaya bor'ba y SSSR y nachale NEPa (Leningrad: Leningrad University Press, 1 9 6 4 ) , pp. 210, 237, 238, 239, 261. 31. Iz istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii 1212 - 1221 gg: sbornik dokumentov, pp. 422, 437. 3 2 . V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, v. 4 4 , pp. 327 - 328. 33. P. G. Sofinov, Ocherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii. p. 246. 34. Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 7 9 ) , p. 88. 35. The ethnic component is of particular interest here. While many prominent Chekists were Russians, the first two leaders were Poles. 36. For some interesting thoughts on the political role of the secret police, see Simon Wolin and Robert Slusser, editors, The Soviet Secret Police (New York: Praeger, 1 9 5 7 ) , pp. 67 - 93 and Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, The Time of Stalin-Portrait Of a. Tyranny, translated by George Saunder (New York: Harper and Row, 1 9 8 0 ) , pp. 19-22, 45-49, 106109. 37. David Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky, Forced Labor in Soviet Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947) , p. 183. 38. See Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 5 8 ) . 39. The best account of "The Trust" is found in Paul Blackstock, The Secret Road to World Wax. Two (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1 9 6 9 ) , pp. 21 - 128.

131 40. Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress—USSR (New York: Harper and Row, 1 9 5 4 ) , p. 11. 41. Quoted in Robert Conquest, The. Great Terror (New York: Macmillan, 1968) p. 546. 42. Joel Carmichael, Stalin's Masterpiece (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 119. 43. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror. p. 547. 44. See Boris Levytsky, The Uses of Terror: Ihe Soviet Secret Service 1917-1970, translated by A. Piehler (London: Sidwick and Jackson, 1 9 7 1 ) , p. 77. 45. See Peter Deriabin, Watchdogs of. Terror (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 282-292. 46. Alexander Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes (New York: Random House, 1 9 5 3 ) , p. 342. 47. Ibid, pp. 252-257. 48. Joel Carmichael, Stalin's Masterpiece, p. 19. 49. S. Swianiewicz, Forced Labor and Economic Development (London: Oxford University Press, 1 9 6 5 ) , pp. 14-15. 50. For a particularly good account, see the classic work by David Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky, Forced Labor in Soviet Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 4 7 ) , p. 53. 51. Ibid, pp. 108-168. 52. For a good reveiw of the Kirov murder, see Robert Conquest, The Great Terror , pp. 45-60. 53. See Boris Levytsky, The Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Service 1917-1970. p. 76. 54. See Andrew Boyle, The Fourth Man(New York: Dial Press, 1979) 55. See Chalmers Johnson, An Instance of Treason-Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge spy Ring (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 6 4 ) , pp. 66105 56. David Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 5 5 ) , pp. 60-67, 389. 57. For an excellent study of mature Stalinism, see Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 8 0 ) , pp. 12-40. 58. Robert Conquest,The. Great Terror. p. 251. 60. For a discussion of this period see also Alexander Orlov, The. Secret History of Stalin's Crimes. pp. 214-253, Robert Conquest, The Great Terror. pp. 155-189, 451-521 and Richard Deacon, A History of the Russian Secret service (London: Fredrick Muller, 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 303-324. 61. Joel Carmichael, Stalin's Masterpiece, pp. 135,160.

132 62. See Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, The Time Of Stalin-Portrait of a Tyranny, p. 213 and Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union Is Governed(Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard university Press, 1 9 7 9 ) , p. 176. 63. See Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors, pp. 12-14. 64. S. Swianiewicz, Forced Labor and Economic Development, pp. 134-290. 65. Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, The. Time, of Stalin-portrait of a Tyranny, p. 153. 66. See Richard Deacon, A History of the Russian Secret Service, pp. 317-318. 67. David Dallin, Soviet Espionage, p. 137. 68. Richard Deacon, A History of the Russian Secret Service, pp. 319-321. 69. David Dallin, Soviet Espionage, pp. 1 2 4 , 139-148, Charles Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy-The Sorge Spy Ring (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1 9 5 2 ) , pp. 57,101-104. 70. Roy Medvedev, On Stalin and Stalinism, translated by Ellen de Kadt (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1 9 7 9 ) , p. 111. 71. For a good account of military roles, see James Reitz, "The Soviet Security T r o o p s — t h e Kremlin's Other Armies," in David Jones, editor, Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual #6 (1982) (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1 9 8 2 ) , pp. 279-316. 72. The best discussion of these events is Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers—The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (New York: Macmillan, 1960) 73. Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress—USSR.. p. 28 and S. Swianiewicz, Forced Labor and Economic Development, p. 290. 74. Dmitri Panin, The Notebooks of Sologdin. translated by John Moore (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 66. 75. Eugenia Ginzburg, Within the Whirlwind (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1 9 7 9 ) , p. 28. 76. Joseph Scholmer, Vorkuta (New York: Henry Holt, 1 9 5 4 ) , p. 65 77. The best works on Sorge include Charles Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy—The Sorge Spy Ring and Chalmers Johnson, An Instance of Treason—Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring. 78. See David Dallin, Soviet Espionage. pp. 165-195 and The Rote Kappella—The CIA's History of Soviet Intelligence and Espionage Networks in Western Europe. 1936-1945 (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1979) 79. Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies, pp.

133 92-95. 80 . See H. Montgomery Hyde, The. Atom Bomb Spies (New York: Atheneum, 1980) and Bruce Page, David Leitch and Philip Knightley, The. Philby Conspiracy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1968) 81. See H. Montgomery Hyde, The. Atom Bomb Spies and David Dallin, Soviet Espionage, pp. 429461. 82. Roy Medvedev, On Stalin and Stalinism, p. 132. 83. For good studies of the period, see especially Simon Wolin and Robert Slusser, editors, The Soviet Secret Police and Boris Levytsky, The Uses of Terror: The. Soviet Secret Service. 84. Dmitri Panin, The Notebooks of Sologdin, p. 245. 85. See H. Montgomery Hyde, The Atom Bomb Spies and Bruce Page, David Leitch and Philip Knightley, The Philby Conspiracy. 86. Harry Rositzke, The KBG-The Eyes of Russia (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1 9 8 0 ) , pp. 138-140. 87. For a good account of this period, see Boris Levytsky, The Uses of Terror. pp. 213-270 88. See Harry Rositzke, The KGB- The Eyes of Russia. pp. 151-155. 89. See Richard Deacon, A History of the Russian Secret Service, pp. 439-458. 90. Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czeckoslevakia 1968 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 9 7 9 ) , p. 104.

5 Romanian Secret Police Walter

Bacon

To the casual observer and the seasoned specialist alike the Socialist Republic of Romania seems a country in which the presence of uniformed representatives of the state's coercive power is all but inescapable. When the Western visitor relates his unease to a Romanian, the latter is likely to be perversely amused, explaining that one should beware the undetected agents of the state security apparatus more than their uniformed colleagues. Few Romanians are willing to discuss the matter beyond such oblique references, at least in part because of the widely held belief that the obvious presence of so many representatives of the state's coercive power is but the tip of an iceberg of a truly omnipresent network of agents and informers. Ten percent of the population (i.e., approximately 2,000,000 people) is a frequently heard speculation about the network's strength, but such a figure must surely include a vast majority of part-time informers - full-time busybodies which all totalitarian political systems seem to produce in parasitic abundance.(1) Functionally, it makes little difference whether such estimations are accurate or grossly, and perhaps deliberately, exaggerated. The regime's objective of political control is achieved either way. The long-suffering Romanian citizen, whose involuntary material and spiritual sacrifices have borne the burden of the regime's uncompromisingly Stalinist quest for rapid industrialization, remains as passive, uncontesting and nonparticipatory as his forefathers. Such an assessment should not be interpreted to suggest that all compliance with the regime's directives is the product of coercion or conditioned fear. The rule of Romanian Communist Party (RCP) General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu has elicited sporadic infusions of genuine popular support based primarily on its advocacy of national autonomy and, to a lesser extent, on the marginally accessible material

136 returns of modernization. Intensive and often ludicrously grandiose compaigns of political socialization aimed at instilling normative commitment to Marxist-Leninist values have had little success.(2) The Romanian "socialist man" has not yet been conceived, much less born. Thus, given the minimal material incentives available for distribution in the RCP's investment-oriented economic policy and the unattractive economic and political risks of effecting normative commitment through repeated appeals to nationalism, the functional need for compulsion and its implementing institutions remains.(3) Aside from the functional rationale for the maintenance of a strong political police in socialist Romania, there are also compelling cultural, historical and idiosyncratic variables which help to explain its persistence. PRE-COMMUNIST ROMANIA Stephen Fischer-Galati and Paul Shapiro, among others, have noted the continuities in pre- and post- "revolutionary" Romanian politics.(4) This historical perspective is a sensible caution for those tempted to infer from evidence of a "revolutionary breakthrough" a profound change in Romanian political culture.(5) In fact, Romanian politics are socialist in form, but remain profoundly national in content. It is a system of dramatic distance between the rulers and the ruled; of paternalism and nepotism; of ceremonial participation and ubiquitous civic rituals; of extensive corruption and incompetence; of Byzantine intricacies and harem conspiracies; and, of personal ism and centralism. The conspiratorial culture which characterized politics for the first seventy years of Romanian independence was congruent with the Leninist model imposed upon the RCP by its Bolshevik mentors. Plots and counterplots, both real and fantasized, were constantly hatched and refined over cups of what passes for coffee in the sidewalk rumor mills of the capital and lesser cities. The conspirators were almost always the declasse intellectual sons and daughters of the ruling oligarchy. Few plots reached fruition, at least in part because the oligarchy not only provided the conspirators but also the potential victims of radical change. The ruling elite feared ideas and words. Had not the carnage of the 1907 peasant revolt justified their fears that in every intellectual there lurked a revolutionary eager to incite the peasant masses against the landowners?(6) In the aftermath of the

137 revolt the government had established the "Siguranta," a political police charged with gathering information on subversive groups, infiltrating them, and defusing any political or real infernal machines they might toss at the established order. It was only natural that the "Siguranta" was part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under Romania's Franco-Belgian constitutional system the ministry exercised significant powers, including the appointment of county prefects and commune mayors who "managed" elections for the party in power, the centralization of public administration which effectively restricted distributive political power to the Bucharest oligarchy, and the supervision of state security through various police organizations.(7) Among the latter were the "gendarmerie," a national uniformed police force similar to those of France and Italy, the judicial police which had investigatory and penal jurisdiction, the ordinary police, and the "Siguranta." (8) A late interwar official source lists the "Siguranta's" functions as: 1) collecting information on elements dangerous to public order; 2) preventing them from doing harm; and, 3) repressing them.(9) The conventional wisdom on the operation of the pre-World War Two Romanian regime is that it was hardly a model of honest and efficient government. However, contemporary commentaries and historically deduced evidence would seem to indicate that the "Siguranta" was the exception to the rule. One leftist polemic of the 1920s described the "Siguranta's" methods and efficiency in terms a Romanian of the 1980s would recognize.(10) It was a political prophylaxis, the suspicions of which were especially drawn to the ethnic minorities of Greater Romania.(11) It maintained a vast network of agents, informants and "agents provocateurs" who made private political conversations, even in cafes and on the streets, nearly impossible. Because it supervised both internal identification documentation and the issuing of passports, it was able to keep track of who was where, when and with whom one had contacts. It was continuously discovering seditious plots and espionage rings — usually "Bolshevik" — and fabricating evidence tying political dissidents to them. Members of the RCP were particularly critical of the "Siguranta's" methods, about which Anna Pauker (!) complained in a 1925 polemic. She and her comrades, frequent victims of the "Siguranta's" efficiency, decried the torture and psychological terrorizing of political detainees.(12) Lucretiu Patrascanu described still

138 another method used by the "Siguranta" to intimidate the extreme left. He charged that the "Siguranta," which was, after all, somewhat constrained by legal convention, encouraged the extreme right to vent their anti-Semitic bile against the Communists, among whom, coincidentally, were many Jews. The mystic-nationalist Iron Guard in its various incarnations was thus a willing "Siguranta" tool until King Carol turned his secret police against their former stooges in the late 1930s.(13) Before delving into the last years of Carol's reign when the "Siguranta" took on additional duties, it may be useful to functionally evaluate its role during the 1920s and 1930s. The world economic crisis had only served to exacerbate the grossly inequitable distribution of wealth in Greater Romania. Therefore, the material prerequisites for political legitimacy were not abundantly available for distribution. Marginal normative commitment was maintained through ritualistic participation and by the regime's manipulation of nationalism accompanied by shrill warnings that the revisionists — Bolsheviks, Hungarians and Bulgarians and their domestic allies — posed a constant threat to dearly won national unity. But, in order to perpetuate the credibility of the threat — whether it was real or imagined was of little consequence — revisionist and Communist conspiracies had to be unearthed and had to be shown to be dangerous.(14) The "Siguranta" provided these services and justified its own growth in the process. Retrospective deduction also provides convincing evidence of the efficiency of the "Siguranta." Its parent bureaucracy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, amassed mountains of intelligence on every conceivable political activity and everyone of the remotest political importance. Recent Romanian historical literature on the interwar period frequently cites the rich archives of the ministry. The detail of the cited material stands in stark contrast to the incompetence usually associated with interwar governments. In the first years after World War One suppression of the socialist left, especially the fledgling RCP, was a priority of succeeding governments. Using as pretexts the violent confrontations between striking workers and police, occasional terrorist acts, the RCP's ties to Comintern, and Soviet irredentist activity in Bessarabia, the "Siguranta" made wholesale arrests with predictable mistreatment of Party activists and potential troublemakers alike. The coercion used against the left, which we may deduce from the

139 historical literature was thoroughly penetrated by "Siguranta" agents, was not terror because it was directed against individuals whose political activities were openly hostile to the established order. However, given recent estimations of the left's strength,(15) we may also deduce that the arrests and mistreatment of prisoners and the almost daily discovery of "Bolshevik plots" was entirely disproportionate to the actual threat. Thus, the internal security apparatus cast a wide repressive net in order to demonstrate the consequences of any anti-systemic behavior. That the response dwarfed the danger and that words weighed as heavily as deeds in the assessment of guilt was in keeping with Romanian tradition. During the reign of King Carol II (1930-1940) the "Siguranta" became more important. Disdainful of the limited democracy which existed and alarmed by the increasing appeal of the crypto-fascist right, Carol abolished political parties and the Constitution in February, 1938, and established a vaguely Mussolini-like royal dictatorship. Carol, however, proved to be more of a Sigmund Romberg caricature of a Romantic archduke than a "Duce." One reason for the popularity of the Iron Guard and its charismatic leader, Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, was its condemnation of the scandalous lifestyle of the king, especially his relationship with the Jewess Elena Lupescu (Magda W o l f f ) . Initially Carol bought off the Guard through contacts made by members of his "camarilla," often administrators of his security agencies.(16) When, however, Codreanu became too much of a threat, Carol had the "Siguranta" murder him and thirteen of his comrades.(17) That impetuous act unleashed a virtual civil war between the king's security agencies and the Iron Guard which deepened Carol's dependence on the police and the army. When, following the humiliating territorial concessions of 1940, these security forces lost confidence in Carol, he was forced to abdicate in September, 1940. With the advent of the royal dictatorship, the "Siguranta" took on the additional duty of keeping track of and suppressing the king's numerous detractors, even going so far as compiling a list of imprisonable anti-Carolists during the first months of 1940.(18) A second innovation of the period with relevance for contemporary Romania was the establishment of a special secret police, under the Russian emigre M. Moruzov, to protect the king's "personal interests."(19) In effect, Carol's Byzantine approach to internal security fractured the "Siguranta" and the parent Ministry of Internal Affairs, producing competing groups which first

140 resented and then turned against their would-be manipulator. Immediately after Carol's abdication in favor of his son Michael, the Iron Guard shared power with General, later Marshal, Ion Antonescu. From September, 1940, to January, 1941 the Guard took bloody vengence against their former oppressors, including many of the former monarch's security chiefs. (20) In turn, Antonescu eliminated the Guard in January, 1941, and established a military dictatorship which willingly joined Germany's invasion of the O.S.S.R.. Unlike Carol II's ludicrous attempt at personal rule, Antonescu's reformist authoritarianism enjoyed considerable popular support, as much because of his unassailable integrity and his eschewal of the more brutal accouterments of totalitarian rule as his vigorous pursuit of the war to regain Bessarabia and Bukovina lost to the Soviet dictate of June, 1940. While democratic politicans, such as Iuliu Maniu and Dinu Bratianu, remained at liberty and even free to make contacts with the allies, Commmunists were ruthlessly hunted down and imprisoned by the "Siguranta" under its chief Eugen Cristescu.(21) Naturally, the "Siguranta" kept track of other potential enemies, including the young King Michael, but despite its close cooperation with the Gestapo, it did not resort to the terror tactics of its Nazi mentors. Indeed, while the four key police chiefs were not party to the "coup d'etat" of August 2 3 , 1944, the "Siguranta" did not actively oppose the king's initiative although it must surely have had prior knowledge of conspiracy.(22) The political culture of pre-Communist Romania allowed for the existence of a political police which functioned, even under the most democratic of the interwar governments, in a restrictive manner, gathering political intelligence, infiltrating subversive groups and repressing those deemed most threatening to the established order. With the possible exception of certain episodes during the royal dictatorship, it never was an instrument of prescriptive terror. Its application of coercion was neither arbitrary nor socially atomizing. It was, in short, the predictable product of a series of regimes unsure of their legitimacy and keenly aware of their vulnerabilities. The very fact of its existence, however, set an historical and cultural precedent for its reincarnation under the Communists when it became an instrument of terror. COMMUNIST TAKEOVER Because Communist party rule in Eastern Europe

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was and, to a large extent, still is illegitimate, the Soviet-animated Parties sought control of the states' coercive power — police, army, courts and prisons — as an initial priority. In Romania the outcome of the struggle for control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs defined the transition from what Hugh Seton-Watson has called the "genuine coalition" to the "bogus coalition" stages of the East European "revolution."(23) While the post-coup (August 23, 1944) governments of General Constantin Sanatescu had purged the security services of their most proNazi officers, the organization and personnel of the political police remained intact. The Minister of Internal Affairs in Sanatescu's second government (November 4-December 2, 1 9 4 4 ) , Nicolae Penescu, became the special target of the Communists, in part because he had formed an anti-Communist intelligence unit within the ministry and in part because his deputy, RCP leader Teohari Georgescu, coveted the position. Much to the Soviets' chagrin, when, at their insistence, Sanatescu ceded the prime ministry to General Nicolae Radescu, the latter retained the portfolio of Minister of Internal Affairs for himself. Radescu and Georgescu, still Deputy Minister, fought for control of the ministry. The RCP mounted street demonstrations against Radescu when he tried to dismiss Georgescu. At length Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky arrived in Bucharest and demanded that Radescu be replaced as head of government by the fellow traveler Petru Groza. The Groza government, with Georgescu as Minister of Internal Affairs, was installed on March 6, 1945.(24) A key element in the Georgescu-Radescu confrontation had been the Prime Minister's instruction (January 1 5 , 1945) to disband the "Patriotic Guards," a sizable organization of opportunistic thugs covertly established and trained by Emil Bodnaras, one of the RCP leaders, and by NKVD supervisors.(25) As under-secretary in the Prime Minister's office, Bodnaras had taken over the Moruzov, or special, secret police which he operated independently of Radescu's control.(26) Bodnaras' shock troops, drawn from both organizations, became the backbone of a purged security apparatus which, in the months following the installation of the Groza government, harassed and terrorized opponents of the new regime.(27) Under Georgescu the Ministry of Internal Affairs was thoroughly purged, its personnel reduced by some 30-40% in 1946 alone. At the same time Party activists and fellow traveling opportunists filled the vacated posts. Some agencies, such as the gendarmarie, rapidly expanded.(28)

142 Staffing the reorganized police forces was not a problem. Georgescu and Bodnaras did not shrink from using some of Antonescu's security and army personnel. For example, former "Siguranta" chief Eugen Cristescu reportedly worked for Bodnaras after he testified against his former patron at the Antonescu show trial (May, 1 9 4 6 ) ; (29) Alexandru Petrescu, Antonescu's chief prison administrator, presided over Iuliu Maniu's show trial (November, 1947) and later became Director of the Political Department of the Military Court of Justice;(30) and, Colonel Victor Draganescu, former field commander on the Eastern Front and POW, became a major general and commander of the uniformed security troops.(31) Non-Romanians were also employed. Emigre sources, Cold War era analysts and former political prisoners to whom this writer has spoken believe that NKVD agents supervised every aspect of the security services' operations.(32) One study identifies two high officials as Russians: 1949 police chief Lt. Gen. Pavel Cristescu and mid1950s secret police chief Lt. Gen. Gheorghe Pintilie. (33) Bodnaras, who became Minister of Defense in 1947, was also of questionable ethnic origin. While born in what became Romanian Bukovina, he was reportedly of Ukranian-German extraction and, after deserting the Romanian army, had attended NKVD schools and had served as a Red Army political officer. (34) Exiled Romanian dissident Paul Goma claims that Greek Communists were integrated into the secret police after their arrival in Romania (1949-1950). (35) From former prisoners' accounts and, by implication, from recent journalistic sources, one may hypothesize that Romania's ethnic minorities were as disproportionately represented in the security organs as they were in the pre-1952 RCP leadership.(36) In any event, one may assume that a social and ideological transformation process similar to that of the army was carried out in order to insure the reliability of the police.(37) By the early 1950s, it has been estimated, the strength of the uniformed security forces had reached 165,000 men divided into five functional organizations. Among these was the General Directorate of People's Security (the D G S P ) , or secret police, itself divided into eight functional sections, the most feared of which being the Discovery of Hostile Elements section. The DGSP also maintained a huge network of informers.(38) The recognizable elements of the takeover stage terror were ushered in by the Groza government. At first there was petty harassment, beatings, vandalism and censorship. By 1947 these had given

143 way to arrests, show trials, imprisonment and even a few executions. The dictatorship of the proletariat efficiently eliminated the most threatening remnants of the ancien regime: democratic politicians, journalists, clergymen and "bourgeois intellectuals" along with landowners and industrialists. Most were charged with conspiring with the West to overthrow the new regime or with espionage. Some few of the accusations were true. Most were not. Romania's "Red terror" set itself the goal of utterly destroying the country's past so the Party alone could determine the future. Once the "class enemies" were eliminated, the security forces and their ever-present NKVD "counsellors" turned their attention to the Romanian Workers Party (RWP, created by the forced fusion of the Social Democratic Party with the RCP in 1948) itself. Lucretiu Patrascanu, an RCP veteran and Minister of Justice, but more importantly Romania's potential Tito, was purged and arrested in 1948 but not executed until 1954. In 1950 a "verification campaign" purged 30% of the RWP membership. COMMUNIST MOBILIZATION The "mobilization stage," which began with the nationalization of the country's economic institutions and the launching of the collectivization of agriculture (1949-1950), ushered in a period of Stalinist terror characterized by arbitrary arrest, extra-legal imprisonment and prescriptive control. A careless phrase or an unhealthy friendship often condemned hapless victims to prison or to one of many labor camps. Ghita Ionescu estimates that there were 180,000 forced laborers in the early 1950s with some 40,000 working on the infamous Danube-Black Sea Canal alone.(39) Peasants — the security forces called them "kulaks," not even bothering to change the Russian word — were another category of prisoner. They had fiercely resisted collectivization despite the armed coercion applied by the army, the police and the occupying Red Army.(40) In a 1961 report to the RWP Central Committee, First Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej admitted that 80,000 peasants had been arrested and some 30,000 publically tried during the early collectivization drive.(41) The peasants' bloody resistance and the resulting rural social disintegration led both to a temporary lull in collectivization and to an intra-Party power struggle from which Gheorghiu-Dej emerged triumphant. The 1952 contest for control of the RWP resulted in the victory of "nativist" Gheorghe

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Gheorghiu-Dej over "Moscovites" Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and Theohari Georgescu and in an arbitrary purge of the Party's intellectual and non-Romanian (mostly Jewish) components. The Party activists who once defiantly justified police terror now found themselves its victims. The confusion of loyal party members of the period is reflected in the apocryphal story of three prison inmates who discuss why they had been arrested. The first relates that he was an enemy of Vasile Luca. Surprised, the second reveals that he was a supporter of Vasile Luca. And the third, somewhat bemused, says, "I am Vasile Luca." The purge of Georgescu and his replacement as Minister of Internal Affairs by his deputy Alexandru Draghici coincided with the separation of the DC-SP from the Ministry.(42) However, following the unfolding of the Beria Affair in the Soviet Union, the two were reunited.(43) The power of Georgescu's former fief was further diluted by the establishment of the Procuracy in June, 1952. This agency established its own network of agents and informers — in effect, a second and, one may assume, a competing political police force.(44) At the time when the RWP leadership was reluctantly adopting the "new course," the DC-SP lost its power to convene "special boards," the military courts effectively ceased to hear cases involving political offenses, and a 1955 amnesty freed a significant number of political prisoners.(45) Prison conditions, which had matched the brutality of any in the Soviet bloc, improved from 1955 to 1957. (46) The gradual diminution of institutionalized terror in the mid-1950s was neither an indication that "breakthrough" had been achieved nor a testimony to Gheorghiu-Dej's acceptance of Khrushchevian "liberalism." Rather, it was the obedient response of a thoroughly "penetrated system" in which the leader still had viable competitors. In fact, Gheorghiu-Dej was a convinced Stalinist. The elevation of hard-liners Alexandru Draghici and Nicolae Ceausescu to the Politburo in December, 1955, was at once an indication of his determination to resist further backsliding "a la Khrushchev" and his desire to outmaneuver RWP "intellectuals," such as Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisinevski. In May, 1956, the Romanian Stalinists launched yet another anti-intellectual campaign which, with the convenient restraints the Hungarian Revolution placed upon Soviet meddling in RWP affairs, ended with the purging of the Constantinescu-Chisinevski group in June, 1957. The second anti-intellectual (and anti-Semitic) purge was completed by the fall of 1958.(47) The regime's

145 forces of coercion were strengthened with consequent political power accruing to Draghici. The "Patriotic Guards" were reborn in the guise of "Workers Guards" which were subordinated to the RWP secretariat and worked closely with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.(48) The prison improvements of the mid-1950s were reversed and the number of political prisoners was swelled by suspect Hungarians from Transylvania and rearrested individuals amnestied in 1955.(49) Paradoxically, it was precisely Gheorghiu-Dej's consistent Stalinism which eventually led to the atrophy of institutionalized terror. A new source of political control emerged during the early 1960s. The Romanian adaptation of the Stalinist model of economic development, most elaborately exposed by Gheorghiu-Dej at the Third RWP Congress in 1960, was inherently nationalistic.(50) Khrushchev's program of bloc economic integration, which would have condemned Romania to perpetual underdevelopment, only confirmed the RWP leadership's determination to pursue a national course to socialism. The people, whose passivity could not contain their deep antiRussian nationalism, supported the RWP's increasingly assertive autonomy. While GheorghiuDej was surely appreciative of the popularity he thus obtained, he correctly feared that "bourgeois nationalism" rather than normative commitment to Romanian socialist values lay at the heart of his new support. In 1961 he gave Draghici the responsibility of eradicating these retrograde attitudes while at the same time he reinterpreted the first years of Communist rule to place the blame for their terroristic exesses on the victims of the 1952 and 1957 purges. Collectivization, pursued by firm persuasion rather than coercion from the late 1950s on, was pronounced completed in 1962. There were virtually no political prisoners left after the 1964 amnesty and former "enemies of the people" flocked to the national cause almost as soon as they were released from confinement. The "mobilization stage" terror had ended, but at a terrible cost. Thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, including the cream of the pre-Communist political and cultural elite, had perished in the prisons and camps.(51) The frayed Romanian social fabric, strengthened by the new nationalism, was still rent by the atomization and alienation produced by the terror. And, like a looming spectre, a huge and omnipresent security apparatus survived under the ambitious Alexandru Draghici.

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CEAUSESCU ERA

(1965-1983)

Therein lay the predicament of Nicolae Ceausescu when he succeeded Gheorghiu-Dej in March, 1965. On the one hand the regime enjoyed the support generated by its identification with the Romanian national cause. On the other hand, the Party, which had retransformed itself into the RCP, was still associated with the worst abuses of the terror and Draghici's security forces remained a potent reminder of that connection. The support was tentative, the collective memory of the terror and its costs was ingrained.(52) Unwilling to abandon the stringencies of Stalinist development, and thus providing material inducements for legitimacy, Ceausescu explored other avenues of eliciting normative commitment. One such solution, which continues to the present, was to step up political socialization campaigns designed to instill Romanian socialist values among the citizenry. That these efforts have been less than ringing successes was evidenced in the periodic reintensifications of the campaigns during the "mini-cultural revolution" of the last half of 1971, the extraordinary preparations for and the programs resulting from the first Congress of Political Education and Socialist Culture of June, 1976, and the criticisms aired at the Central Committee plenum on ideology of June, 1982. A second avenue was to attempt to mitigate the popular association of the regime with the terror. Such a course had both initial institutional and long-term systemic complications. The initial problem revolved around Draghici's entrenched position at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and that bureaucracy's resistance to party control. The security forces had, in fact, lost some of their value during the 1960s as a function of the regime's manipulation of nationalistic support. A new more "democratic" constitution promulgated in 1965 declared an implicit end to the dictatorship of the proletariat and set the tone for legal reforms which culminated in a new penal code enacted in 1968. The principle enunciated in these documents was "socialist legality." It included the regularization of law which invested more power in the courts and popular institutions at the expense of the organs of state security.(53) Concurrently, Ceausescu moved to reassert Party authority over the Ministry of Internal Affairs, an intention announced at the June, 1967, Central Committee plenum and facilitated by the purge of Draghici and his associates. Still, Ceausescu did not eschew the utility of the security forces which were, once

147 again, divided between a Council of State Security and the ministry in 1968. However, as he told the ministry's activists in July, 1967, the modus. operandi of the security organs had to change to reflect the regime's commitment to "socialist legality." The class struggle was over and while hostile elements remained, they were isolated if still dangerous. Transgressions of "socialist legality" had occurred in the past because of erroneous (i.e., Soviet) guidance. The Party must control the activities of the police and the Party demanded the rational use of coercive force as a last resort only. The relationship of the security organs with the people must be one which reflected the new stage of Romania's socialist development, one based on mutual trust and support.(54) While the reforms of 1965-1968 announced the end of terror, the reorganized and purified (i.e., deRussified) bureaucracy of terror remained. The implementation of restrictive control, it seemed, would require just as many policemen as had the exercise of prescriptive control. The longer-term systemic consequence of the attempt to elicit legitimacy through partial deStalinization was the fostering, especially among the ever-troublesome intelligensia, of an expectation of broader liberalization. Such a radical departure from Stalinist norms was never Ceausescu's intention. Dissent, which was initially muted in the general enthusiasm for the national cause, particularly after Ceausescu's defiance of the Soviet Union in 1968, began to surface in the 1970s. The regime did not hesitate to crush it. Dissident workers, intellectuals, neo-protestants and ethnic minorities, were harassed, shunted around the country, and deprived of work. If these measures had no effect, they were arrested and tried under the vague stipulations of articles 166, 325, and 349-3 51 of the Penal Code and either sent to prisons or psychiatric "hospitals" or to forced labor camps under the ingenious provisions of antiparasite Decrees 24 and 25 of 1976. (55) The DanubeBlack Sea Canal, after a twenty year hiatus, is now being pushed to completion with manpower supplied by the army and forced laborers. Still, as one exiled dissident imprisoned in both the 1950s and the 1970s reports, police methods and policemen have changed. Gone are the thick-necked bullyboys with Slavic accents, replaced by articulate, even jolly, interrogators who only seldom use physical force on their "clients." Arrest, too, is a last resort with peer pressure, reeducation and harassment being the preferred methods of altering anti-systemic behavior. Most importantly, the application of

14 8

coercion is predictable.(56) After all, Romania, the autonomy of which is so dependent on Western support, cannot afford to cultivate a bad public image. Clearly, then, there are limits imposed upon the reformist expectations generated in the late 1960s. The state has not abrogated its right to use coercive force. The RCP has no intention of loosening its grip on Romanian society. The institutions of terror remain intact and the collective memory of any power is intermittently reinforced. These institutions have undergone almost continuous reorganization since the early 1970s when the Council on State Security, the "Securitate," was reintegrated into the Ministry of Internal Affairs. (57) Frequent personnel changes in the upper echelons of the Ministry reflect not only Ceausescu's policy of "cadre rotation" but also periodic dissatisfaction with performance.(58) High-level defections have rocked the security organs' reputations.(59) Rumors of corruption pervade the public's perception of the police. With the emergence of the Ceausescu "personality cult," the security organs, like all other government and Party agencies, have become Secretary's unchallenged image as both a brilliant socialist statesman and an historically legitimate national leader has become a priority preoccupation of the "Securitate," the long arm of which, if French sources are to be believed, reaches out to silence emigre critics in Western Europe.(60) In keeping with current nepotistic practices, the General Secretary's brother, Nicolae A. Ceausescu, is a Lieutenant General in the "Securitate" and a highranking bureaucrat in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The most recent anti-intellectual campaign, rumored to be the pet project of Ceausescu's wife, Elena, and their son, Nicu, was initiated in the ministry's in-house organ.(61) One exiled dissident claims that there is no Central Committee section overseeing the security organs and that they report directly to Ceausescu himself.(62) It is facile to write off Ceausescu's close supervision of the security apparatus as the product of megalomaniacal paranoia. If nothing else, Nicolae Ceausescu has proved himself an astute politician. He had to fight to bring the police under Party control in the 1960s and he has had to contend with frequent Soviet and Western attempts to penetrate its highest echelons. He curries the favor of his secret policemen, paying them well and giving them access to the best amenities the Socialist Republic can offer.(63) Ministry of

149 Internal Affairs generals are disproportionately represented on the RCP Central Committee.(64) Of all the government and Party agencies Ceausescu's policemen are the most loyal and reliable. As long as the material prerequisites for legitimacy are unavailable and as the regime's nationalist support withers under deteriorating economic conditions, the maintenance of a strong and personally loyal security apparatus is the best insurance against both his potential rivals and an increasingly restive public. The very fact that Ceausescu's Romania retains Stalinist socio-economic goals, if not methods, would offer another explanation of the persistence of an omnipresent secret police. In economic terms Romania has not yet clearly entered the postmobilization stage in which Dallin and Breslauer have noted a diminution of political terror.(65) Ceausescu himself defines Romania as a developing country in which extensive industrialization has yet to be achieved. Mobilization is still required and, therefore, the instrumentalities of mobilization must be kept at the ready, even if conditioned fear need only be intermittently reinforced to elicit the desired behavior. Conversely, one should not be content with idiosyncratic, systemic and developmental explanations of the perpetuation of what may comparatively seem an anachronistic symbol of totalitarianism. The ruler's use of the political police in suppressing subversive ideas has a long history in Romania. Democratic pluralism and protection of civil liberties do not. Kenneth Jowitt's insight on the compatibility of GheorghiuDej's authoritarian rule with Romanian tradition bears repeating in relation to the Ceausescu regime, It is important to note that this kind of regime was not entirely unfamiliar or alien to the experience and social composition of Romanian society. In fact, one might hypothesize that the stability of (Ceausescu's) regime (is) partially due to the congruence between the structure and ethos of his rule and the historic experience, social composition, and notion of authority held by large sectors of Romanian society.(66) Romania is a Communist Party state in which terror has disappeared but where the institutions of terror remain.

150 NOTES 1. Bernard Marguerite reported that a Western diplomat has estimated that some fifteen to twenty percent of the population were participants in the security network. See Le. Figaro. August 4, 1982, p. 4 Emil Suciu, a Romanian refugee, was more circumspect in regard to numbers but relatively typical in his description of the network's function in his testimony before a U.S. Senate subcommittee: "... a sizable proportion of the population has been recruited by the Secret Police to inform about the well being of the rest of the population. The Secret Police would like to know what the population thinks, if people tell political jokes, if the most beloved son of the people, comrade Ceausescu, is talked about and quoted with enough respect, whether or not the people complain ..." U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade Of the Committee on Finance. 94th Congress, 2nd Session, September 8, 1976, p. 380. 2. For a slightly more optimistic but no more empirical view see Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," American Political Science Review, v. LXVIII, #3 (September 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 1171-91. 3. Here and elsewhere in this chapter the reader will recognize the author's debt to Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970) . For this paradigm of "political control," see pp. 2-5. 4. E.g., Stephen Fischer-Galati, Twentieth Century Romania (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970) , passim, Paul A. Shapiro, "Romania's Past as Challenge for the Future: A Developmental Approach to Interwar Politics" in Daniel N. Nelson, editor, Romania in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1 9 8 1 ) , pp. 17-67. 5. For the definitive "breakthrough" analysis see Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: the Case of Romania. 1944-1965 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1 9 7 1 ) . 6. In fact, it did not, although one might argue that Vasile Kogalniceanu's populism may have intensified the peasants' resentment. See Philip G. Eidelberg, The Great Rumanian Peasant Revolt of 1907: Origins of a Modern Jacquerie (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 205-219. 7. Enciclopedia Romania. Vol. I, "Statul" (Bucharest: Institutul Social Roman, 1 9 3 8 ) , pp. 2339, Robert Braham, "The Government" in Stephen

151

Fischer-Galati, editor, Romania (New York: Mid-European Studies Center for the Free Europe Committee, Inc., Atlantic Books and Frederick A. Praeger, 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 34. 8. J.H. Vermuelen, "La police generale de l'Etat" in H. Levy-Ullmann and B. MirkineGuetzevitch, La vie juridique des peuples. Roumanie. Vol. IV (Paris: Librarie Delagrave, 1 9 3 3 ) , pp. 111-13. 9. Enciciopedia Romania, v. I, p. 318. 10. Paul Held, Quer durch Rumänien (Vienna: Munster Verlag, 1 9 2 5 ) , pp. 18-32. 11. On this point see Stephen Fischer-Galati, Twentieth Century Rumania, p.33. 12. C.E. Costa-Foru, editor, Alis den Folterkammern Rumäniens: Dokumente und Enthüllungen Uber die rebrechen der rumänischen "Siguranza" (Vienna: Kulturpolitischen Verlag, 1 9 2 5 ) . 13. Lucretiu Patrascanu, Sjib frei dictaturi (Bucharest: Editura politica, 1970) , passim. Curiously enough, Const.-Titel Petrescu in his Socialnul in Romania. 1835-6 septembrie 1940. (Bucharest: Biblioteca socialista, n.d.), p. 359, claimed that "Siguranta" "agents provocateurs" were partially responsible for the founding of the RCP in May, 1921. 14. Particularly instructive in this respect is the frequent mentions of such uncovered plots in Grigore Filiti's chapters on the interwar period in George Cioranesco et.al., Aspecto des relations russo-roumaines; retrospective et orientations (Paris: Minard, 1 9 6 7 ) , pp. 89-132. 15. E.g., Robert R. King, History of the Romanian Communist Party (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1 9 8 0 ) , pp. 9-38. 16. Walter M. Bacon Jr., "Nicolae Titulescu and Romanian Foreign Policy, 1932-1934" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Denver, 1 9 7 5 ) , p. 133 on Gabriel Marinescu's Guardist connection, Al. Gh. Sava, Dictatura regala (1938-1940) (Bucharest: Editura politica, 1 9 7 0 ) , p. 7 9 , for "Siguranta" Chief Cernat's connection, and M.D. Ereshchenko, Koroleskaia diktatura y Rumynii, 1938-1940 gg. (Moscow; Nauka, 1 9 7 9 ) , p. 112, for the ties of M. Maruzov, Carol's personal secret police chief. 17. Al. Gh. Sava, Dictatura regala. pp. 226-7. For an excellent synopsis of the various theories about Carol's motivations, see Henry L. Roberts, Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State (n.p.: Archon Books, 1969) , p. 208n. 18. Al. Gh. Sava, Dictatura regala, p. 350. 19. Nicholas Nagy-Talavera, The Green Shirts and the Others. A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1 9 7 0 ) ,

152

p. 297. 20. Nicholas Nagy-Talavera, Greenshirts. p. 313, Henry Roberts, Rumania, p. 234. 21. Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution. 3rd. Edition (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1 9 5 6 ) , pp. 85-7, Nicolette Franck, La Roumanie dans 1'engrenage (Paris and Brussells: Eloevier Sequoia, 1 9 7 7 ) , pp. 15, 48-9, and 221-2. 22. Nicolette Franck, Roumanie, pp. 24 and 39. 23. Hugh Seton-Watson, East European Revolution, 167-71. 24. Henry Roberts, Rumania, pp. 262-3; Franck, Roumanie. pp. 101-31, and, Stephen Fischer-Galati, Twentieth Century Rumania, pp. 81-90. 25. Ghita Ionescu, Communism in Rumania 19441961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) , p. 102n. 26. Hugh Seton-Watson, East European Revolution, p. 301, Ithiel de Sola Pool et.al., Satellite Generals: A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 5 5 ) , pp. 857. 27. For an official version of the "Patriotic Guards" during this period see Cols. Leonida Loghin and Alexandru Petricean, Garzile patriotice din Romania (Bucharest: Editura militara, 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 5495. 28. Lawrence S. Graham, Romania, a Developing Socialist State (Boulder: Westview, 1 9 8 2 ) , pp. 40 and 42. 29. Ghita Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, p. 98n. 30. Nicolette Franck, Roumanie, pp. 221-2, Ithiel de Sola Pool et. al., Satellite Generals, p. 90. 31. Ithiel de Sola Pool, et. al., Satellite Generals, p. 85. 32. E.g., Ghita Ionescu, "The Pattern of Power," in Alexandre Cretzianu, editor, Captive Rumania (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1956) , p. 391, Hugh seton-watson, East European Revolution, p. 302; and, Ithiel de Sola Pool et. al., Satellite Generals. p. 90. 33. On Cristescu's position see Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Times (New York: W.W. Norton, 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 461, on Pintilie's, see Serge Aronovici, "National Security," in Stephen FischerGalati, editor, Romania, p. 124, and on their ethnicity see Ithiel de Sola Pool et. a l . , Satellite Generals, p. 91. 34. Stephen Fischer-Galati, editor, Romania, p. 345, Ithiel de Sola Pool et. a l . , Satellite

vivre

35. Paul Goma, Le tremblement des hommes. Peuten Roumanie aujourd'hui (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979) , p. 46.

153 36. Le Monde, September 6, 1982, p. 14. 37. For the details of that process see, Walter M. Bacon Jr., "Civil-Military Relations in Romania: Value Transformations in the Military," Studies in Comparative Communism, XI, 3(Autumn, 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 237249. 38. Mircea Carp and Basil Ratziu, "The Armed Forces," in Alexandre Cretzianu, Captive Rumania, p. 368; Serge Aronovici, "National Security," in Stephen Fischer-Galati, editor, Romania, pp. 123-124. 39. Ghita Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, p. 199. 40. ibid., pp. 200-1; Lawrence Graham, Romania. p. 42. 41. Amnesty International, Prison Conditions in Rumania; Conditions for Political Prisoners 19551964 (London: Amnesty International, 1 9 6 5 ) , p. In. 42. Serge Aronovici, "National Security," in Stephen Fischer Galati, editor, Romania. p. 92. 43. Ghita Ionescu, "Pattern of Power," in Alexandre Cretzianu, editor, Captive Romania, p. 392. 44. Virgil Veniamin, "The Judiciary," in Alexandre Cretzianu, Captive Rumania. pp. 311-4. 45. Amnesty International, Prison Conditions, pp. 2-5. 46. Ibid., p. 21. 47. Stephen Fischer-Galati, Twentieth Century Rumania, pp. 146-154. 48. Leonida Loghin and Alexandre Petricean, Garzile patriotice. pp. 96-102; Paul Goma, Tremblement des. hommes, p. 99. 49. Amnesty International, Prison Conditions, in Rumania. pp. 2, 5 and 15. 50. For the logic of this statement see Francois Fejts, "Socialisme et nationalisme dans les démocraties populaires (1971-1978)," Defense Nationale, (August/September, 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 25-26. 51. One emigre source places the toll at more than 400,000. U.S. Senate, Hearings, p. 155. 52. For the costs of terror see Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems, pp. 127-13 3. 53. Stephen Fischer-Galati, Twentieth Century Rumania, p. 205 54. Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania on the Way of Completing Socialist Development. Vol. II (Bucharest: Meridiane Publishing House, 1 9 6 9 ) , pp. 369-86. 55. Amnesty international Index. EUR 39/01/77, March 3 0 , 1977: pp. 1-3; Amnesty International USA, Romania; Forced Labor, Psychiatric Repression of Dissent. Persecution of Religious Believers, Ethnic Discrimination and Persecution, Lav. and the Suppression Of Human Rights in Romania (New York: Amnesty International USA, 1978). The latter, a 45-page booklet, is the best available documentation on the

154 suppression of human rights in contemporary Romania. 56. Paul Goma, Le tremblement des hommes. passim. For an opposite view, that of Father George CalciuDumitreasa, see U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the. Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means. 96th Congress, 1st Session, June 22 and July 9, 1979, p. 259. 57. Radio Free Europe Research, Situation Report, Romania/12, May 1 1 , 1978, pp. 10-13, carries an excellent summary of the reorganizations and restaffings to that date. 58. Ibid.; for an explanation of "cadre rotation," see Robert King, History of the Romanian Communist Party, pp. 94-7. 59. The most devastating of these was that of Ion Pacepa. See Radio Free Europe Research, Situation Report. Romania/22, September 8, 1978, pp. 12-13. 60. For the details of the curious Tanase-Haiducu affair, see The New York Times., September 1, 1982, p. 12 and Le Monde. September 1, 1982, pp. 1 and 8. 61. Radio Free Europe Research, Situation Report, Romania/9, May 21, 1982, p. 2. 62. Thomas Pate and Andrea Darvi, Secret Police, the inside Story of a Network of Terror (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1 9 8 1 ) . p. 104. 63. Ibid., p. 39. 64. Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report 24/1980, "The New Romanian Communist Party Central Committee," p. 18. 65. Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems, pp. 81-102. 66. Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," American Political Science Review, v. LXVIII, #3 (September 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 1188.

6 Czechoslovakian Secret Police Condoleezza

Rice

The intensity, duration and institutionalization of political terror in communist societies vary greatly across national contexts. Like almost every other aspect of their development, the use of terror as a tool of political change and control varies enough to dismiss assertions that there is only one road to Communism. National differences and international circumstances continue to be important factors in the nature of Communist rule. Within this diverse universe of Communist states, Czechoslovakia stands as an important anomaly; it is still the only state with a rich democratic and pluralistic heritage to come under Communist rule. Consequently, Czechoslovakia is a promising case for the study of political terror in Communist development. The Czechoslovak case allows the researcher to dismiss at least one explanation for the rise and continuation of political terror in the society. The "cultural heritage" explanation which seeks to reduce the victory of Communism and its subsequent reliance upon terror to the failure of the enlightened age of democracy to reach the east must be dismissed in Czechoslovakia. In fact, the political system which Czechoslovakia adopted after independence in 1919 was pluralistic and democratic. Political parties, including the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, operated freely and elections were completely unfettered. In this free political atmosphere, the Communist Party often fared well, gaining as much as 10.3% of the vote and 30 assembly seats in 1938. (1) The existence of political terror, arbitrary or systematic, was not an important part of the political landscape. Further, there was little in Czechoslovakia's past to suggest that this would ever change. There was no Okhrana to foreshadow the development of institutionalized police terror and no Black Hundreds or People's Will to suggest that violence was an acceptable means of political change.(2) The young Czechoslovak state faced many

156 difficult problems, including a restless and largely unintegrated minority in Slovakia, but the use of institutionalized, centrally directed terror to forge the new nation was virtually absent. Therefore, it is necessary to look elsewhere to explain the rise of political terror in Czechoslovakia. Yet, institutionalized terror, when it did become a part of Czechoslovak politics, was pursued with an intensity and ferocity matched only a few times in the history of Communist development. The beginning of the reign of terror coincides with the development of Communist rule. But it is not enough to explain the rise of terror as just in the nature of Communism. Though some would make this argument, Czechoslovak Communism and political terror have not always gone hand-in-hand. A closer look at 3 5 years of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia shows that the ruling Communist Party has often been uneasy with the use of terror and that the intensity of political terror has swung wildly between extremes. This chapter examines the history of political terror and the security apparatus in Czechoslovakia and seeks an explanation for the intensity of terror in the system. Both coercion and purge within the Party and terror in the larger society are examined. POLITICAL TERROR:

THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT THESIS

Communism is a revolutionary ideology. It promises to bring about a new order, based on new relationships, and to destroy remnants of a hostile past. Above all, it is an ideology of conflict. The lofty ideas of those followers of Karl Marx who interpreted his revolutionary philosophy as one of evolutionary, passive and mystical change were shouted down throughout the history of the Communist movement. The victory of Communism was inevitable, but those who would pursue it came to believe that struggle too was preordained. Both Marx and Lenin believed that the ruling bourgeoise would not give up without a fight, so the road to victory was presumed to be neither easy nor bloodless. (3) Moreover, victory was in three stages: the overthrow of the existing order, a period of consolidation called the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the final victory, the creation of the Communist order. Lenin and Marx were clear in their admonition that the victory would have to be won and protected at each stage. The threat of counterrevolution was present until the very last breath of the old order had been drawn and the stateless, classless society created. A number of Western scholars have drawn upon this concept of struggle as an explanation for the

157 use of political terror. Students of the "totalitarian school" explain the rise of terror in terms of the Party's drive to rule absolutely. Students of the "totalitarian school," such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Carl Friedrich, explain terror as an instrument of total control.(4) The Party seeking to direct every aspect of the society's development can ill-afford to allow dissent and terror is the most effective and efficient means of absolute control. The totalitarian school fails to focus, however, on the Party's desire for political change, emphasizing almost exclusively the iron fist of control. The control factor, devoid of reason, has been dismissed by other scholars as simplistic. Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer argue that terror and coercion are instruments employed by the Party to bring about a new order (political change) and then to protect it (political control).(5) Terror is a means by which the society is mobilized for the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in which class enemies must be sought out and destroyed. According to Dallin and Breslauer, the arbitrary and often excessive use of terror must be explained as overkill and in some circumstances, like the Great Purges of the 1930s in the Soviet Union, in terms of the personality of the ruler. The development of institutionalized political terror in Czechoslovakia can be explained, in part, by reliance upon this thesis, but it is important to point out unique features of Czechoslovakia's road to Communism. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) came to power by "constitutional means" from within the coalition government of Edvard Benes. During the latter stages of the war with Germany, Czechoslovakia's President in exile, Edvard Benes, made plans for a post-war democracy. Benes understood that Czechoslovakia's chances for reinstitution of democracy rested heavily on good relations with the Soviet Union, and with close cooperation with the KSC. There was every indication that the Communist Party, a legitimate and popular party prior to the war, would continue to be popular after the war. Consequently, the KSC was given an active and central role in Benes' blueprint for government, the Kosice Plan. The interim government which returned to Prague in 1945 featured strong Communist participation. Communists or Communist-fellow-travelers occupied many important positions including the Prime Minister (Zdenek Ferlinger, a fellow-traveler), the Ministries of Interior, Education, Defense, Information, Industry and Social Welfare. In the 1946 elections, domestic popularity and control of these key sectors brought

158

the Party a controlling 38% of the vote, and Klement Gottwald, the Communist Party secretary, was named Prime Minister.(6) The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia functioned as a legitimate part of this coalition government. There were, however, indications that the Party was pursuing policies which would aid in the institution of Communist rule when the opportunity presented itself. And as the Cold War hardened, it became clear that Czechoslovakia's delicately balanced government was in trouble. Functioning within the government, though, it was difficult for Gottwald's political party to play the role that Lenin's party played from the outside in 1917. Rather, the Communist Party needed an instrument to lay the groundwork for communization of the society which would not compromise the ability of the Party to continue to do business within the government. This separation of function was manifested in the Party's attempt to communize rapidly the power instruments and then to employ them in the creation of a basis from which to bring about a Communist Czechoslovakia. For a number of reasons, the armed forces could not be rapidly communized and used in this fashion. They were largely unreliable, infiltrated but not controlled by the Communist Party.(7) Though efforts continued to create reliable armed forces, they were frustrated by numerous pro-Western officers within them, slow Sovietization of the forces and the watchful eye of the Benes government. Consequently, the power of the Party gravitated to two other instruments, the Party militia and the police. Of the two, the militia was more thoroughly reliable, but very small, its development checked at every turn by members of the coalition. In fact, it was not until January, one month before the revolution, that Gottwald found it politically feasible to create a militia in name, though one had existed in reality for some time.(8) The final alternative, the police, did not prove to be a perfect solution either. Many elements of the pre-war police establishment returned to Czechoslovakia to resume their functions in 1945. Rather than openly confront the Benes government and demand communization of the police, actions that would have been politically untenable, the Party employed other tactics. First, the police were reorganized into sub-groups so that certain groups could be "stacked" with loyal Communist and proSoviet elements.(9) Within the Ministry of Interior, for example, a new organ was created called the State Secret Security Forces (Statni Tajna Bezpecnosti). The highly secretive STB was authorized to conduct investigations and arrest those suspected of crimes

159 against the state. A second group was placed in the Ministry of Defense, but operated quite independently of it. This group, the Committee of Defense Security Information (Obranné Bezpečnostní Zpravodajsvi) was headed by Colonel Bedřich Reicin. Concerned primarily with military personnel, Reicin was nonetheless given jurisdiction over civilians suspected of security breaches. Interestingly, the creation of two organizations with similar powers set the STB and OBZ on parallel courses, and tension and rivalry between them was considerable. Generally, the STB was thought to be the more powerful of the two organizations, but Reicin was purported to have excellent connections in Moscow and great personal power.(10) A second tactic was simply to enlarge the police forces in order to dilute the influence of pro-Benes elements and allow recruitment of new, working-class men. According to U.S. intelligence sources, the size of the Czechoslovak police forces almost doubled during the coalition period, and most of the increase was in the ranks of the state security police rather than in the civic police forces.(11) Through these tactics and control of the Ministry of the Interior, the Communist Party was able to seek out and harass class enemies during the period of coalition rule. Connections with the KGB were also fostered, creating a police establishment which was very thoroughly intertwined with Moscow. At one time, late in 1947, it was suggested that Czechoslovakia's secret police desist from any activity on the German border, even that activity attending the transfer of German populations out of Czechoslovakia—and allow that function to be carried out by Moscow.(12) This direct interference was rather successfully resisted by the coalition government. Reputedly, though, the STB simply turned over these functions to the Soviet security forces without authorization from Prague. By all accounts, the secret police were becoming a very powerful, but foreign body within the body politic. Some Communist historians would claim later that the police were often out of the control of Gottwald and the central Party leadership. (13) This would seem to suggest that they were acting instead on orders from Moscow. The expanded activities of the new police forces caused considerable furor within the coalition government. Charges of abuses against the population and coercion of non-Communist political leaders abounded. The KSC resisted efforts of the coalition to curb police power, but it was not always easy for the police to operate in this open atmosphere. Their effectiveness was also curbed by considerable bickering between the OBZ and STB mentioned earlier.

160 Nonetheless, the creation of these instruments and their activities against the coalition played an important role in the Party's rise to power. As 1948 approached, Czechoslovakia's position between East and West was becoming untenable. Increasingly, Czechoslovakia was asked to take sides as European states moved to one pole or the other. In response to Cominform's revival of "class struggle and international class solidarity," in 1947, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia began to pursue more aggressive political policies within the coalition. As a result, the KSC and other parties in the coalition began to clash repeatedly.(14) The KSC introduced a series of reforms, including a "millionaire's tax," on all landowners holding property valued at more than 1 million koruny, a radical land reform program and a proposal for health insurance, free of charge, to every citizen. The growth of police terror was also becoming more marked. Explosives were sent to three democratic ministers, Jan Masaryk, Petr Zenkl and Prokop Drtina, and the democratic Minister of Justice branded the Communist-controlled Ministry of Interior as responsible. In response, the Ministry did not answer, but sent out a call that the police be given more powers to "protect" the country against external enemies. The existence of such enemies was supported by numerous discoveries of plots against the national security and pro-Soviet elements of Czechoslovakia. The coalition government was breaking up, and the Communist Party was preparing to take control. Reputedly, Gottwald actually approached Benes, telling him that increasing difficulties in cooperation within the government might make it necessary to purge non-Communist elements. Benes answered, "You will have to start with me."(15) In January 1948 the crisis peaked. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Drtina reported on police abuses. A commission of investigation was established and certain members of the Ministry of the Interior were targeted for dismissal. The action by the democratic members of the coalition brought a threat from the KSC to mobilize the trade unions for "political action." Under the pressure, the cabinet was paralyzed and twelve democratic ministers submitted resignations. They assumed that they would not be accepted, that there would be a dissolution of the parliament and new elections. The plan backfired, however, when the Communists orchestrated letter campaigns by trade unions, police and militia demonstrations, and when Valerian Zorin, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, contacted Benes to explain that this situation was "intolerable."(16) After several days of crisis, Benes accepted the

161

resignations. They were replaced, in February 1948, with Gottwald's own candidates, one-half of whom were Communists. Within a few months, the Communists had ousted all remaining non-Communists from the government and consolidated their rule. As the revolutionary developmental thesis would suggest, the growth of terror in Czechoslovakia accelerated after the Communist takeover. The need to consolidate Communist rule through terror was made more urgent by the obvious presence of "hostile elements," pro-Western political leaders who did not flee and by a period of about six months during which the Party faced industrial sabotage, assassination attempts, and even an alleged military coup.(17) The second stage of the victory was proving to be quite difficult. But by June of 1948, the growth of police activity in Czechoslovakia levelled off. The situation had stabilized, and those responsible for "anti-government" activities had been interned or executed. Additionally, most of the remaining proWestern opposition had been liquidated or had fled West. Finally, the Social Democrat, Benes, was dead of natural causes. The Party's rule seemed secure and there was a period of lull in the police terror. Though the level of police activity was still higher than at any time in Czechoslovakia's past, the mobilization of the society did not bring about massive executions or whole-scale internnment and extermination of the population. In fact, the KSC began to pursue quite a different path of Communization. There were massive attempts to fill the ranks of the Party, the army, and the educational elite with workers. Special schools for working class children and massive retraining efforts were begun. The literacy level of the general population made such efforts possible, but even the illiterate were given the chance to be upwardly mobile.(18) In light of the stabilizing situation and the Party's emphasis on a less coercive road to Communism, one would expect that institutionalized terror would recede into Czechoslovakia's past. It would not, on the basis of the revolutionary development thesis, be possible to predict what would follow: the initiation, just a little over a year later, of the most extensive blood purges in East Central Europe. Further, the purges were not initiated against remnants of the old ruling class, but against the vanguard of the revolution, the KSC. The revolutionary development thesis is not sufficient to explain either the resumption of terror or the target of the terror. It is necessary to rely on another set of tenets, those provided by an examination of the external circumstances of

162 Czechoslovak Communism. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: UNION

THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET

While the international circumstances of Czechoslovakia explain, in part, the road of the Communist Party to power, it is a less potent explanation in this case than in the others of Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia's Communist Party was long a legitimate institution, and it came to power not by power of the Red Army, but through an internal usurpation of power. Clearly, the presence of the Soviet Union aided Klement Gottwald's rise to power, but the KSC's ability to maneuver against a viable democratic opposition sets the Czechoslovak case apart. But if the role of the Soviet Union is an insufficient explanation for the success of the KSC in seizing power, it is a very important explanation for the resumption of terror in 1949. The evidence supports the thesis that the scope of the terror instituted in Czechoslovakia and even its initiation was in response to Soviet fears that Gottwald's Party was not brutal enough and that compromise with impure elements might weaken the grip of Communist rule. Perhaps suspicious of the many "fellow-travelers" who converted after the takeover, Stalin insisted that a campaign to purify Czechoslovak Communism be undertaken.(19) According to Czech sources, the KSC came under virulent attack in 1949 from the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary, for failure to actively conduct a struggle against residual anti-socialist elements in the CSR.(20). The real target of the attack were members of the Party, considered to lack resolve or at worst to be disloyal. The environment was charged with the break of the Yugoslav Communist Party and Tito's deviation. Further, because of an intensifying cold war, all East European satellites were encouraged to unmask anti-Soviet, bourgeois nationalists in their own parties. The most substantial effort against "nationalists" was launched in Hungary, where a leading Communist, Laszlo Rajk, was implicated in crimes against the state and arrested. Throughout the bloc, "conspiratorial centers" were discovered in which Titoists were said to be operating. In preparation for the Rajk trial, the Hungarian Party Secretary, Matyas Rakosi, asked Gottwald for the arrest of several Czechoslovaks whom the Hungarians did not trust. Gottwald apparently resisted, but increasingly, the Soviets and Poles joined the Hungarian attack, claiming that Czechoslovakia was

163 not vigilant in dealing with "Titoists" in the KSC. At a Cominform meeting in November 1949, Czechoslovakia was rebuked, called the "weak link in the socialist alliance" and told to pursue antiSoviets more diligently. Actually, Gottwald was criticized on two counts. The first was the fact that Czechoslovakia was not engaged in purges within the Party; the second was that there were no Soviet troops on Czech soil. While effectively resisting the demand for Soviet troops being stationed, the Czechs agreed to be relentless in pursuing bourgeois nationalists. In order to aid in unmasking reactionaries, 26 Soviet security advisers led by Generals Likhachev and Markov, were sent to Czechoslovakia to direct the purge(21). There was still another reorganization of the security services of Czechoslovakia, which the Soviet advisers denounced as "soft" on class enemies. A special department was created within the Ministry of the Interior to deal with the cases of Party members and a special subdivision was created solely for the purpose of investigating military officers. As had been the case during coalition rule, the security apparatus was set up as an institution through which the Soviet Union did its bidding. It is particularly noteworthy that the Party was the victim, rather than the instigator, of the police terror. Though the Party assumed responsibility for the security apparatus through a new Defense and Security Affairs Committee within the Central Committee, the presence of Soviet advisors and the role of the police in purging the KSC itself meant that the police often operated almost independently of direct Party control. Only Gottwald through his personal control was able to exercise any authority over the police. The security apparatus, unlike the Party, was a group on which Cominform and the U.S.S.R. could count. With the changes accomplished, the search for a "Czechoslovak Rajk" began and eventually blossomed into the most comprehensive postwar political trials in East Central Europe. But before the trials could get underway, still another incidence of "renegade" Czechoslovak behavior fueled anti-KSC sentiment within the Cominform. Just as "Titoism" and "bourgeois nationalism" became rallying cries on the heels of the Yugoslav split, subsequent difficulties between the Soviet Union and Israel added "Zionism" to the list of sins. Czechoslovakia, an ardent supporter of Israel, was once again suspect.(22) Anti-semitism joined bourgeois nationalism and, not surprisingly, the first targets of the purges were Slovak Jews, among them the General Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party, Rudolph Slansky.

164

The new twist also affected the nature and role of the police. In the early days, the police had been drawn from disaffected elements of the Czechoslovak society. Many of them were of Jewish descent. But with the rise of anti-semitism in the Eastern Bloc, a number of loyal police officers were purged, though the Jewish head of the OBZ, Reicin, survived for a while; within two years, however, Reicin was also accused and executed. These Jewish officers were replaced, for the most part, by lowerclass Czechs, some of whom had earlier joined the militia. The ethnic dimension of the problem in Czechoslovakia must be emphasized. The Slovak Communist Party was absolutely devastated by the purge, losing most of its important members. In fact, the purge in Slovakia was so massive that Party membership had not recovered at the time of the 1968 crisis. (23) This was a demoralizing blow for a Slovak minority which had hoped that many of its problems would be helped by Communist rule. The Communist Party had long criticized the nationality policy of the democratic governments which proceeded it, promising that Communist rule would employ Lenin's "self-determination" concepts. Though the meaning was never clearly specified, many Slovaks assumed that their long-muffled desire for at least federation, if not independence, would be heard. The purge of the Slovak leadership laid that hope to rest. Though Slovaks bore the brunt of the terror, they were not alone. The great purges engulfed every aspect of Czechoslovak society. The scope of the purges is only partially reflected in the number purged. By 1949, 6,136 people in the Czech lands alone were serving time for crimes against the state, and by 1950 this number was about 9,800. The numbers in Slovakia were reportedly almost three times as high.(24) About 3% of all people serving prison sentences were classified as workers, suggesting that class mattered little. At one time there were so many death sentences pending that the Ministry of Justice gave the following reason to delay further prosecutions: "Earlier convictions in all these cases are impossible, because we should (not) have death sentences accumulating in too short a time."(25) More importantly, police activity began to invade every part of life in Czechoslovakia. There was the initiation of a reign of terror against churches, particularly in Slovakia, and against most educational institutions. Police units were included in most Party industrial cells and down to the unit level in the military. The police apparatus was at the zenith of its power. Indicative of that strength

165 was the fact that the Ministry of Interior's budget was about one billion dollars higher than the 11% of the budget devoted to military spending.(26) The KSC cannot, in spite of the international circumstances, be absolved of responsibility for the purges, however. Commissions of inquiry during the Dubcek regime bluntly accused the Party of undertaking its pursuit of disloyal elements further than necessary. The decisions were made "by the appropriate Party committees, the Security Commission of the Central Committee, and later the Political Secretariat of the Central Committee," according to one source. Further, "alongside justifiable measures against adversaries, illegal practices were spreading rapidly."(27) Apparently, in an effort to prove that it was loyal, the KSC thought it necessary to show that it could be unabashedly coercive. Further, as the terror progressed, it developed a momentum of its own, and those responsible fought to make sure that any who would remember that responsibility would be silenced. For four years the reign of terror proceeded, engulfing an ever-widening circle of Communists and non-Communists within the population. Indications are that another wave of terror was about to be launched in 1953 when Stalin's abrupt demise left East European leaders, dependent upon a divided leadership in Moscow for their cues, without direction. The relaxation of terror seemed welcome in Czechoslovakia, where even in the atmosphere of the great terror, questions were surfacing about the conduct of the Party. The outcry from within the Party was fierce enough to lead, already in 1952, to the closing of the infamous "Cottage," a detention center notorious for its torture of military officers thought to be guilty of activities against the state.(28) Czechoslovakia was somewhat slower to take the path of rehabilitation of victims and persecution of those who had propagated the terror than were Hungary and Poland. The storm that followed de-Stalinization in 1956 leading to revolution in Hungary and reform in Poland, left Czechoslovakia relatively untouched. The slowness of the reform was due in part to relative economic well-being, a luxury which Hungary and Poland did not enjoy, the timely death of Klement Gottwald, and the ability of some in power to suppress evidence of the extent of the Party's role. The failure to get the truth into the open would cost the Czechoslovak leadership dearly, however, and the stench of the political terror of the 1950s became a major catalyst for Czechoslovakia's second Communist revolution. During the 1960s a noticeably freer political

166 atmosphere began to emerge in Czechoslovakia. By August 1968, Communist rule in Czechoslovakia would be virtually free of terror, and the Party would denounce it as a means of political rule. This development, too, is inexplicable in light of the explanations which have been pursued. Czechoslovak Communism had not reached its final stage; indeed, it was still in the socialist phase and the need to remove hostile elements, cited in 1949, could arguably have been still present. There was certainly no indication that the popularity of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was increasing and/or that Communist rule was legitimizing. In fact, the opposite was true. The Party was having difficulty recruiting members, and there was general dissatisfaction with Communist rule. Even members of the ruling Communist Party worried that the distance between the Party and the people was growing. Gradually, younger members of the Party, particularly in the still-devastated Slovak Communist Party, began to argue for a new direction and for a new road to Communism. The call took several forms, but most importantly, it was argued that rule based upon coercion was alien to Czechoslovakia and that "socialism with a human face" should replace what had been since 1949 a brutal and alienated Party. It was obvious that the leadership of the Party under Antonin Novotny was out of touch and out of step. He faced, within time, a crisis of leadership and denunciation from within the ranks of the Communist Party. Every aspect of Czechoslovak life from economic policy to the role of the secret police and the army were questioned. A new Czechoslovakia was emerging, and it was very clear that coercion and terror were thought, by reformist elements of the Party itself, to have no appropriate role within it. While Moscow watched with increasing alarm, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia began to pursue the reformist course. By April 1968, when the victory of the reformers in the Party was complete, it was clear that Czechoslovakia was pursuing a road to Communism unique in the Soviet bloc. The Hungarian revolution had been too brief and the Polish crisis too controlled by the moderate Gomulka to approach the scope and depth of the reform in Czechoslovakia. Controls were lifted from the media, Party members asked to defend their policies openly and the dark secrets of the great terror opened for public inspection. The Party was at the forefront and though the reform sometimes skirted out of control, there were few attempts to insulate any aspect of life from the reform. Nevertheless, at times it seemed that one-party rule was threatened as in the freer atmosphere, elements of pluralism were

167 unmistakably present. In this atmosphere, much of the attention focused upon the security apparatus and the police. The security instrument was viewed as foreign, completely corrupt and without any redeeming value. This instrument of state power, which according to the explanations which we have pursued, is the Party's instrument of change, consolidation, and control, was suddenly isolated and at odds with every segment of Czechoslovak society. Even the Party itself turned against it. Clearly, another set of explanations must be employed to analyze the dramatic decline of terror and coercion as instruments of Party rule. One feasible and seemingly viable explanation is that the alien nature of terror in the Czechoslovak society, even in Communist Czechoslovakia, made it a hindrance rather than an aid to the Party in its attempt to govern effectively. In other words, a Communist Party, relying on coercion and terror, could not come to terms with the Czechoslovak people. "WE CANNOT RULE BY THE OLD METHODS" Political terror was slowly disappearing as an instrument of Party policy during the revolution of 1968. Citizens, Communist and non-Communist, were allowed to participate freely in the political life of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the first hesitant steps were taken toward dismantling the institution of terror. Terror and coercion were denounced by the Party as unacceptable methods. An exhaustive discussion of these developments cannot be undertaken here. It is enough, however, to list a few of the most startling reforms. A number were never adopted, but had they been, Czechoslovakia would have been undeniably the most terror-free society in the Communist world. More importantly, the Party, in denouncing terror, pointed squarely at the crisis of confidence which it caused, supporting the thesis that it was dysfunctional for Czechoslovakia's Communist rulers. According to Party officials, the reliance on terror "had brought about a clash between law and morality in the minds of the society."(29) Though the Party continually reaffirmed the commitment to one-party rule, the commitment to finding a new basis for the relationship between ruling and ruled was clear. For some, the Action Program was too cautious, but it was a start, for as it stated, We are not changing our basic orientation. The general objective though is to embark on the

168 building of a new model of socialist society, one which is profoundly democractic and conforms to Czechoslovak conditions. This cannot be achieved by following old paths or by using means which have long become outdated. It is now our assignment to blaze a trail under unknown conditions, drawing on creative Marxist thinking...but relying on a correct understanding of socialist evolution in Czechoslovakia...and its incontestable democratic traditions.(30) In keeping with the attempt to find a Czechoslovak road to Communism, considerable attention was given to the questions of basic civil rights and the right of the citizen to be free from terror and coercion. The Action Programme, the Party's blueprint for governing, stated that civil rights would be a high priority for Czechoslovakia.(31) Additionally, it was important to guarantee legality in the judicial, investigatory and police systems. The Party also promised to reduce substantially the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and to subordinate it to the government. Remarkably, the Party planned to give control of security and defense to the government and abolish its Committee for Security and Defense. A number of changes were suggested. Among the more important were proposals to divide the Ministry of Interior's corps of national security (SNB)into public security (VB) and state security (STB), the latter having reduced powers. They hoped that this would also weaken the hold of the Ministry, which according to the Piller Commission had become "an enormous power apparatus which was to control everything and everyone."(32) The preparation of trials based on evidence collected by the police was to be taken completely out of the hands of the Ministry. Another interesting development in 1968 was the degree to which the Party undertook the task of investigating wrongdoings of the past. The leadership believed that it would not be possible to start anew until the abuses of the past were examined, dealt with, and amends made. Therefore, starting as early as 1962, but accelerating after 1967, commissions of inquiry were formed to investigate wrongdoings in the purges and to order reparations for victims and families of victims. The activity surrounding the dismantling of the instruments of terror was distressing for many within the old guard of the Party. Rather than slow the pace of rehabilitation, however, the new Party leaders spoke freely and frankly about those who were not willing to go along with the reform, often

169 purging the worst offenders. Links to the Soviet Union were not generally made public in condemnation of the old guard, but on at least one occasion, J. Rypel, a Deputy Minister of the Interior, stated in Prace that the continued presence of Soviet advisers in the Ministry was making it difficult to undertake some reforms.(33) Generally, when it was not possible to purge reactionary elements, they were simply circumvented, and the reform of the security apparatus proceeded at a fairly rapid pace. This policy of simply ignoring residual proSoviet and other old line elements backfired in the long run, however. The reactionaries, isolated from the reform and from power, took it upon themselves to lobby full-time with the Soviets, filing alarmist reports about the state of affairs in Czechoslovakia. More importantly, as the Soviets moved closer to the decision to invade and reverse the reform, these elements became an important internal network. This process accelerated as the Soviets themselves were increasingly cut off from legitimate rulers in Czechoslovakia and as inter-governmental relations deteriorated between the CPSU and the KSC. It is not surprising, therefore, that the security forces have been accused by a number of historians of complicity in the invasion of the Warsaw Pact forces.(34) A few sources claim that members of the STB actually helped plan and carry out the invasion.(35) Clearly, they were involved in the arrest of Dubcek and other leaders of the reform after the initial intervention in August 1968. As a consequence of their loyalty to the Soviet Union and the conservative forces in Czechoslovakia, the security forces enjoyed rebirth and considerable influence as the "normalization" and then "consolidation" proceeded. During the difficult year following the invasion, when reformist elements were still alive in the CSSR, the police acted as the instrument of purge within the Party, and even as watchdog over a military establishment devastated by the rapid reversal of the reform. During that year, while Czechoslovak leaders fought to hang on to some of the reforms, the security apparatus was a constant problem. Occasionally, the security forces would incite trouble in order to discredit the liberals in the Party. The most serious case was the "ice-hockey riot" in April, 1969, which is widely believed to have been propagated by conservative forces and the police. As the normalization progressed, the police enjoyed enhanced influence at the expense of the military. The border guards, long a part of the CLA, were transferred to the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior and units of the Ministry were formed

170 and given heavy military equipment (light tanks and self-propelled artillery).(36) The security forces became, as in the early days of 1948, a counterweight to a military establishment about which the Soviet Union and conservative leadership of Gustav Husak had reason to have doubts. Within a year of the invasion, the reform was crushed. Czechoslovakia returned to a Soviet-styled system of Communist rule and by most accounts, an extensive network of coercion and reliance on political terror. It is ironic that some two years after the revolution of 1968, Czechoslovakia would be cited by most as one of the most Stalinist states in the Soviet bloc. Any doubt that political coercion and absolute obedience to Party dictates had returned was removed by events in 1977. About ten years after the movement to political freedom had begun in 1967, Czechoslovakia experienced another upsurge of sentiment for a more democratic society. This time, however, the Communist Party was not in the lead. A group of intellectuals, some of them Communists, signed a document asking for a renewal of the process of restoring human rights to Czechoslovakia. Known as the Charter of 7 7 , the plea fell upon deaf ears and members of the group were rounded up and interned, others demoted, and still others allowed to escape into exile. The experimentation with rule by consensus and cooperation was not to be repeated again. The lessons of 1968 in Czechoslovakia provide the student of Communism with a wealth of evidence that Communist rule can take many forms. One of the most important lessons is to be found in the approach which the Communist Party took to the question of political coercion and terror. Candid and open about abuses in the past, this Communist leadership undertook to find other means of rule, methods more in accord with Czechoslovakia's own heritage.

A discussion of the rise and use of terror as an instrument of political control must rely on a number of explanations. The developmental thesis, which suggests that terror emerges in the pursuit of victory and then as an instrument of consolidation, is only partially satisfactory. If, as Dallin and Breslauer suggest, terror is a functional instrument, Czechoslovakia provides an interesting counterargument. In this society, where terror was not a part of the heritage, the Communist Party in a period of great political challenge, the revolution of 1968, decided that terror and coercion were dysfunctional instruments of change. This attempt to replace coercion with political consensus and rule by

171 mandate suggests that Czechoslovakia's past is also an important factor. Further, the fact that terror was implemented most extensively when the Soviet Union was unhappy with Communist leaders in the CSSR is also instructive, suggesting that international circumstances like the Cold War and membership in the Soviet alliance are also significant. In sum, terror and coercion, on the scale associated with Soviet-type societies, were found to be detrimental rather than beneficial in long-term governance, though effective as a means of short-term consolidation. Unfortunately for Czechoslovakia, the attempt to find a different course brought about a flirtation with pluralism which was unacceptable for a member of the Soviet bloc. The KSC was unable to harmonize the requirements for a society free of coercion with the requirements of Communist rule in the Soviet bloc. This problem of ruling Czechoslovakia has been complicated by the existence of a security apparatus which can hardly be called an instrument of Czechoslovak Communist power. Tied as closely, if not more closely, to the Soviet Union as to the Party, the security forces have at times enjoyed power which is disproportionate. On at least two occasions, the security apparatus has been used to purge the Party and to install a government more acceptable to the Soviet Union. The security apparatus is, like terror itself, a very foreign element within the Czechoslovak state and one which has at times skirted out of the Party's control. But the effort to rein in the instrument of coercion quickly escalated to a level which reactionary elements could not accept, threatening the influence of the U.S.S.R. itself. This, in turn- produced a violent backlash which doomed the revolution. The story of Czechoslovakia is thus unique, but instructive in understanding the role of political terror in Communist societies. The level of terror has not remained constant, nor has it declined as Czechoslovak Communism has matured. The society has, instead, swung wildly between a rather pluralistic political system relatively free of terror and monolithic unity imposed by coercion. The stand of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on this issue at any time has depended largely on whether there is enough distance from the international Communist movement to pursue accommodation with the Czechoslovak people on its own terms. NOTES 1. Josef Korbel, Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia: The Meaning of Its History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 9 7 6 ) .

172 2. Okhrana was the secret police organization of the Romanov dynasty known for its brutality. The Black Hundreds and Peoples' Will were right and left wing terrorist organizations respectively which operated in 19th century Russia. 3. Marx's revolutionary strategies are detailed in a study by Alan Gilbert, Marx's Revolutionary Politics (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981). 4. Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 5 6 ) . 5. Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1 9 7 0 ) . 6. Josef Korbel, Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia: The Meaning of its History. 7. See the forthcoming book by this author, The Politics of Client Command (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 8 3 ) . Also discussed in Jiri Valenta and Condoleezza Rice's "The Czechoslovak People's Army," in Jonathan R. Adelman, editor, Communist Armies in Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1 9 8 2 ) . 8. Ministerstvo narodni obrany, Ke vzniku a. vývojy československé lidové armády (Prague: Nase Vojsko, 1 9 7 6 ) . A rudimentary militia had been formed in 1946 to guard the factories. See Prague Embassy to the Department of State, May 5, 1946, 860F. 113/1145-12. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Jiri Pelikán, The Czechoslovak Political Trials (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 7 1 ) . This suppressed report of a commission under the Dubcek government discusses in detail the activities of the police in the early days. 14. Josef Korbel, Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Jiri Valenta and Condoleezza Rice, "The Czechoslovak People's Army", in Jonathan R. Adelman, editor, Communist Armies in Politics. 1 8 . Ibid. A more detailed account is available in the forthcoming book, The Politics of Client Command by this author. 19. Jiri Pelikán, The Czechoslovak Political Trials. 20. Ibid. 21. Karel Kaplan, "Thoughts About the Political Trials," Nova Mysl (July, 1 9 6 8 ) . 22. Ibid.

173 23. H. Gordon Skilling discusses the Slovak dimension of the Prague Spring and attempts to correct the situation in Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1976) . 24. Jiri Pelikan, The. Czechoslovak Political Trials. 25. Ibid. 26. The New York Times, January 6, 1953. 27. Jiri Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials. 28. A-Revue. no. 1 0 , June, 1968. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Akcni program komunistické strany Československa přijaty na plenárním zasedaní UV KSC dne 5. dubna. 1968 (Prague: 1968) . 32. H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution. 33. Ibid. 34. Karel Kaplan, "The Secret Prague," Panorama r July 1 1 , 1978. 35. Ibid. 36. Cited in Peter Gosztony, editor, Paramilitaerische Organisationem in Sowjetblock (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Hohwacht Verlag, 1 9 7 7 ) .

7 Hungarian Secret Police: The Early Years Ferenc Vali

Among the instruments of coercion at the disposal of the People's Democracy in Hungary during the Stalinist era, special treatment must be reserved for the state security police, a necessary concomitant of any Communist or other totalitarian regime, for which terror and purges are essential ingredients.(1) The Hungarian security police had grown out of the political section of the state police. In March 1946 it was detached from the ordinary police and put under the authority of the Minister of the Interior. Its abbreviated name then was AVO (Allamvedelmi Qsztaly, or State Security Section). In December 1949, it was severed from this Ministry and made into a special department, AVH (Allamvedelmi Hivatal, or State Security Authority), subject only to the Council of Ministers. Ever since the occupation of Hungarian territory the close co-operation between Hungarian and Soviet security police had been clearly discernible. At the very outset, Communists who did not fall in with Rakosi's Stalinist line were arrested;(2) and the arrests were made either by the Hungarian political police or by the Soviet MVD. When the occupation status was technically abandoned, the Hungarian security police appeared to act on its own authority, but the cooperation persisted. Of course, this was not a cooperation between equals; it was between higher and lower administrative organs.

Reprinted by permission of the author and publishers from RIFT AND REVOLT IN HUNGARY: NATIONALISM VERSUS COMMUNISM by Ferenc A. Vali, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright (c) 1961 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College

176 A V H — S T A T E WITHIN THE STATE From the date of its independent existence the AVH enjoyed a prolific growth. In accordance with the Soviet model, the frontier guard was placed under its jurisdiction and special internal security troops were organized under its authority. At the apogee of its power, from 1950 to 1952, the AVH harbored seventeen clerical divisions in its central office. These offices handled the widespread affairs of the security police: the elimination of internal opposition; the conduct of investigations; the arrests and interrogations of prisoners; the surveillance of foreigners; and the supervision of government offices, the army, religious bodies, and youth, social and cultural organizations. Further activities of the AVH included espionage and counterespionage, the keeping of secret files, the maintenance of labor discipline, the continual checking on Party members, and protection of leading Party and government personnel. There also fell into the competence of this mammoth department the administration of political prisons, which were transferred to its domain from the Ministry of Justice, and the administration of internment camps and labor camps and their ancillary economic affairs. (3) The AVH's activities embraced the life of the whole nation; its personnel file system included one million names out of a population of less than ten million. (4) We can infer that an army of voluntary and involuntary informers had provided information as to the acts and pronouncements of all these individuals. The Hungarian security police was at its very beginning permeated with Muscovites. Long before the Hungarian army adopted Soviet methods or organization and training, the security agency had already been streamlined to correspond with its Soviet elder brother. Moscow was especially interested in the results of investigations; therefore "confessions" of persons detained by the AVH were made out in seven or nine copies, and one copy invariably found its way to the central record office of the Soviet security police.(5) The AVH was directly dependent on intercommunications with the Soviet MVD and MGB; channels of communication might bypass top Party leaders when Moscow wished to contact its Hungarian agency and vice-versa. But decisions of principal importance were, of course, taken in consultation with the Hungarian Party leaders. The agency was headed by Gabor Peter, who held

177 the title of Lieutenant General of the AVH and participated in the sessions of the Council of Ministers. He grew into the Hungarian version of Yezhov, Yagoda, and Beria, and closely cooperated with Soviet security authorities. We can assume that Peter, in order to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the Hungarian Party leadership, was only too willing to receive orders and instructions from Moscow. The AVH was working under the control of the Party Politburo, or more accurately, under the personal direction of Rakosi himself, though another member of the Politburo (during the Stalinist era it was General Mihaly Farkas) was formally in charge of security police operations. The crucial decision of making arrests generally rested with Peter, but important Party leaders could be arrested only with the approval of the Politburo, or, when the leader was a Politburo member himself, the approval of Rakosi personally. But even Rakosi did not always have his own way: the interdependence of the AVH and the Soviet security organs could sometimes thwart Rakosi's orders. Thus when Lieutenant General Sandor Nogradi was to be arrested (he was already under house arrest), he was able to ask for help from the MVD, and was quickly released and reinstated.(6) The AVH extended its menacing surveillance over all Party organizations, including the Central Committee. The purges administered against leading Communists under Rakosi's personal dictatorship demonstrated than even Politburo members (other than Muscovites) were not safe from the security police's clutches; the fate of the leading indigenous Communist, Laszlo Rajk, remains the most striking example. RAJK:

A VICTIM OF ANTI-TITOISM

Laszlo Rajk, the indigenous Hungarian Communist leader, as Minister of the Interior, was instrumental in achieving Communist domination in Hungary. It was a surprise for many when this man was suddenly relieved of his duties and given the less weighty post of Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 3, 1948. The date is significant: five weeks earlier the Cominform excluded Yugoslavia from its ranks, and the anti-Yugoslav campaign by the Soviet Union and its satellites was brewing. Rajk was known to have entertained friendly relations with his Yugoslav comrades, but so had many Communist leaders, and obviously this was not the whole reason for his demotion. After the death of Zhdanov, head of the

178 Cominform, which occurred about this time, Rakosi's star rose in the Communist camp. The Hungarian dictator became recognized as a leading figure of the Cominform. And he was ready to please his master in Moscow. The idea of sacrificing Rajk as a propaganda scapegoat for the drive against Tito must have been hatched out between Rakosi and Stalin. The personal selection of Rajk must have engendered in Rakosi's head; thereby he could rid himself of a dangerous rival who had already crossed his path. An alternative choice, Imre Nagy, had probably been discarded because he had been a Muscovite.(7) It would have been more difficult to assemble fabricated accusations against this modest theoretician than against the resolute Rajk. Rajk was arrested on June 8, 1 9 4 9 — w h i l e still a Politburo member and Minister—and on September 24 was sentenced to death, together with some "accomplices," after a theatrical trial lasting several days. The military members of the "Rajk conspiracy," headed by General Gyorgy Palffy, Inspector General of the Hungarian Army, received their death sentences from a military court. Rajk admitted in the course of his wellarranged trial that he had been an informer for the Horthyist police against Communists, that he had conspired with Tito to overthrow the Hungarian Communist regime, to murder Rakosi and his associates, and to restore capitalism in Hungary with the help of the "imperialists." Rajk's confessions were confirmed by an array of witnesses. Dr. Gyula Bokor, a former police officer, testified that Rajk had been an informer for Horthy's police.(8) Istvan Stolte, a former colleague of Rajk, reproached him for having betrayed the existence of a Communist cell in the Eotvos College. (Stolte had been delivered to the prosecutors by the Soviet MVD, which had lured him from Germany to Vienna and kidnapped him there.) (9) Noel Field, an American Unitarian missionary who had been arrested in Poland and brought to Budapest for the trial, testified that Rajk was in the service of American intelligence. Antal Klein, a former member of the National Assembly, gave testimony that Rajk had secretly met Rankovic, the Yugoslav Minister of Interior, on his (Klein's) farm in Budapest. Field, who had been arrested in disregard of his diplomatic immunity, declared that Rajk was Tito's agent. All the witnesses had been arrested before the trial, and all later were sentenced or disappeared. The accusations against R a j k — a s it was openly admitted at the time of his posthumous

179 rehabilitation in the summer of 1 9 5 6 — w e r e falsehoods, carefully devised though semitransparent, whose objective was to compromise Tito and the Yugoslav leadership, unmasking them as Western agents before the whole world in order to bring about their downfall. It was the most grandiosely staged trial of Stalin's reign, inside or outside Russia. Whereas the prewar rigged trials in the Soviet Union had served internal Soviet politics, the Rajk trial was intended to bear fruits in the foreign field and have an impact on international events to come. The Rajk affair was a common Soviet-Hungarian venture with Stalin and Rakosi as chief entrepreneurs. Their managers were General Bielkin, from the Russian side, and General Gabor Peter, from the Hungarian. General Bielkin personally conducted the briefing of witnesses, and General Peter personally directed Rajk's tortures and brainwashing. Rajk, who himself had staged rigged trials in his time, knew what results a confession would have, and in spite of the pressures brought against him, refused to play his role in the trial-show. He was finally persuaded to do so when Rakosi sent Janos Kadar into his cell. Kadar, an old friend of Rajk's, had succeeded him as Minister of the Interior. Speaking on behalf of Rakosi, he promised Rajk his life, reunion with his family, and a new existence in the Soviet Union under some assumed name. Eventually Rajk consented to play the role Rakosi had planned for him. Despite the promises made, he and his "accomplices" were duly hanged on October 1 5 , 1949. Rakosi had the Kadar-Rajk conversation taken on a tape recorder without Radar's knowledge.(10) The discrepancies between Radar's report and the tape contributed toward Rakosi's enmity against Radar, and precipitated Radar's later downfall. The Grand-Guignol story of Rajk's liquidation and its staging by Soviet and Hungarian officials throws striking light on the political morality of the Stalinist era in Hungary and on the methods and goals of the chief protagonists which, if not corroborated by reliable sources, would appear unbelivable for a student of twentieth-century history. Although there had been show trials and mass arrests prior to the Rajk affair, the Hungarian Yezhovshchina prefigures its ominous course with this event. TERROR:

INSTRUMENT OF COHESION AND DISRUPTION

The methods and means of terrorism employed by the Hungarian security police closely resemble their

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Soviet patterns of inspiration. A study of Soviet terrorism as a source of power reveals a most striking identity between the Soviet model and its Hungarian counterpart, not only in the techniques of mass arrests, executions, deportations, and forced labor, but also in rationale—or rather irrationality.(11) In 1945 and 1946 the terroristic methods of the Hungarian security police were employed mostly to eliminate real or alleged pro-Nazi elements and war criminals. In 1947-1948 the terrorism was employed to support the Communist Party's struggle for power; it was, together with overtly Soviet intervention, the most effective instrument for achieving the required result. The terror and purges were thereafter initiated against remaining forces of resistance: churches, political parties, and foreign (Western) economic interests. The most important spectacles purporting to demonstrate the sinister influences of Western capitalism were the rigged trials against church dignitaries; the "MAORT trial" against the management of the American-owned Hungarian Oil Company; and the "Standard trial" against the directors of the American-owned Standard Electric Company and International Telephone & Telegraph Company, among whom were a United States and a British citizen. After Rajk's arrest the wholesale and indiscriminate purges and arrests against former Social Democrats, and simultaneously against "reactionary" elements and "foreign agents," ran their full course. Most of the Western and indigenous Communists shared their fate in 1951. Among those arrested were Janos Kadar (now no longer Minister of the Interior), Gyula Kallai (former Minister of Foreign Affairs), Geza Losonczy, and Ferenc Donath. All these survived and were able to play a role during subsequent events. Another indigenous Communist, Sandor Zold, who had succeeded Kadar as Minister of the Interior, preferred death to arrest. At a cabinet meeting on April 2 1 , 1951, he received the impression that he was about to be arrested; so he drove home, killed his wife and children, and then shot himself. The number of purge victims is not precisely known. About 4,000 former Social Democrat functionaries are estimated to have been arrested by the summer of 1950.(12) Data furnished by prisoners who had been in various prisons, internment camps, or forced labor camps provide a basis for estimating that at the time of Stalin's death the number of political prisoners (including internees, inmates of labor camps, and people

181 uprooted from the homes and confined to some other locality) had reached 150,000, one and one-half per cent of the population.(13) At least 2,000 are believed to have been executed outright. To explain Rakosi's purges is just as difficult as to provide a satisfactory explanation for the seemingly senseless excesses of the Soviet Yezhovshchina of the 1930's.(14) The elimination of real or potential enemies of the regime, and also of persons having connections with the West, may have contributed to the strengthening of Communist rule—directly by removing the forces of opposition, and indirectly by spreading terror in the ranks of relatives, friends, or sympathizers. But the rationale for the proscription of such a number of faithful Party members seems more difficult to establish. Some of these Party members (but only a few) might have been possible rivals to Rakosi's power. Some might have borne the dictator's grudge for present or past opposition to his will. Still others might have been suspected of cherishing independent—possibly anti-Soviet—views. Sadism and cynicism on the part of the main protagonists of the terror, Rakosi, Gero, and Peter, may also be cited as contributing causes. (15) Nevertheless, the great number of victims can ultimately be explained only by the fact that the terror itself had an independent role to play within the precincts of a totalitarian dictatorship. It was the hallmark of power. Here much weight has to be attributed to the towering presence of the Soviet example. Stalin had displayed his unrestricted power by creating havoc among kulaks, Party members, or army officers through mass purges; and so the petty dictator also had to tamper with the lives, liberties, and human dignity of his subjects. Stalin easily gave his place to this sort of competition between the Soviet and the Hungarian security agencies. And when the engine of persecution gathered momentum, feeding on its own devices of mass denunciations and accusations fabricated by blackmailed informers or by AVH agents themselves, it became a law unto itself. Otherwise it would be hard to explain the arrest of so many dedicated Communists in the middle and lower Party ranks.(16) The impact of all this on Party members, intellectuals, workers, and peasants cannot be properly assessed by large numbers of victims alone. For it was multiplied by the fact that these thousands upon thousands, enduring the ordeal of AVH interrogations and torture, exchanged their impressions with one another in their cells or

182 camps. The steadily growing collective experience created a potentially disruptive force which proved to be of decisive importance when eventually Pandora's box was opened.(17) Thus the Stalinist terror brought about more submission and more discipline in the Party and country for the time being only. The treatment inflicted upon so many innocent and influential Party members, intellectuals, and industrial workers was to become a source of fatal weakness. The victims and their families, friends, and compatriots attributed these purges and terror to their real cause: the Soviet domination over Hungary. RELIGION:

A SECURITY POLICE PROBLEM

The atheist Communist regime knows that it cannot extirpate religious feeling overnight; consequently, religion must be made subservient to the state, in order to render it incapable of forming a center of resistance. Furthermore, much care has to be taken to exclude all religious influences from youth groups and Party members, and to separate the churches from all their ties abroad. Stalin could mold the Russian Orthodox Church into a pliable instrument with relative ease. It had already served as such for the Tsars, though to serve an atheist autocrat might seem a less easy task. But the internationalism of the Catholic Church, its ties of allegiance to Rome, and the Western orientation of the Protestant churches in Hungary prevented a simple reiteration of methods utilized in the Soviet Union to subjugate the Church to the needs and requirements of a Communist government. Rakosi set himself to provide a model for how to deal with the recalcitrant churches of the West. Jozsef Mindszenty, the Cardinal Primate of the Hungarian Catholic Church, was arrested and, having "confessed" his crimes at a rigged trial, was sentenced to life imprisonment on February 8, 1949. (18) This martyrdom rendered its hero the chief personification of resistance against Soviet Communism; churches became crowded not only with the "religiously" religious, but with "politically" religious people. The government resorted to mass arrests of priests; it transported most of the members of religious orders to concentration quarters. In the summer of 1950 the Clerical Peace Movement was founded, ostensibly to support the Stockholm Peace Congress, but in fact, to create a collaborationist faction in the Catholic Church. The bishops

183 disapproved the movement, and few priests joined. Then an Office of Church Affairs was formed (the former Ministry of Religion and Public Education was simply renamed "Ministry of Education"), and it soon openly interfered in diocesan affairs. Mindszenty's see, the archdiocese of Esztergom, was being administered by a vicar capitular. When this man died, the canons elected as his successor the Auxiliary Bishop Meszlenyi; he was arrested, and so was another prelate who was elected in his stead. Then a "peace priest" was elected, as suggested by the AVH, but he remained unrecognized by Rome. Instead the Vatican appointed Bishop Endre Hamvas, of the see of Csanad, as Apostolic Administrator of the Esztergom archdiocese; thereupon Bishop Hamvas was put under house arrest.(19) Up to then the Archbishop of Kalocsa, Jozsef Grosz, had led the Catholic bishops of Hungary in their resistance. He was arrested in May 1951, and after the usual show trial was sentenced to life imprisonment on June 2 8. A number of bishops were placed under house arrest and the next chairman of the reduced episcopate, Gyula Czapik, Archbishop of Eger, moved the acceptance of the government's terms. From then on representatives of the Office of Church Affairs assisted the vicars (deputy bishops) who themselves were mostly peace priests. The bishops were reduced to the role of puppets; their mail was opened, their correspondence supervised, and if they refused to sign any paper, it was done by the vicar. The representatives of the government assigned to assist the diocesan vicars (mostly former AVH officers, nicknamed by the people "mustached bishops") were authorized to transfer priests to remote villages, remove popular parish priests, and issue circulars advising pastors what to do and what not to do. The government announced that it would recognize only those bishops whose appointments it had approved. Since the Hungarian government entertained no relations with the Vatican, and since the Vatican refused to appoint unreliable priests to diocesan posts, the bishoprics gradually became vacant, and were administered by vicars who had received the blessing of the Communist regime. Though churches were not closed, and mass and sacraments were not interfered with, those who attended were carefully watched and checked, and sermons were censored. The number of seminaries was reduced, and their inmates carefully screened; the "mustached bishops" carried out inspections, and frequently expelled seminarists who met with their disapproval. Religious orders were disbanded,

184 except for the Benedictines, Franciscans, and Piarists, which were allowed to function on a restricted scale. The evicted monks and nuns took up jobs in factories and farms; they still considered themselves to be members of the "silent" Church, and their example attracted many workers. The oppression of Protestant denominations and of the Jewish community was equally drastic; but since their superiors were not appointed from abroad, the task was less complicated. Church leadership was forcibly purged, and the electing bodies were pressed to choose persons approved by the regime. Many hundreds of clergymen, both Catholic and Protestant, were inmates of prisons and internment camps. The atmosphere of religious persecution made many people think of the predicament the early Christians had faced. TERROR COORDINATED The Stalinist terror, whether in its Moscow or Budapest version, was all of a piece. Stalin's machine had exterminated most of the leadership of the Communist parties of East-Central Europe during the Yezhovshchina or in the course of World War II. (20) Nor were Communist leaders of the Spanish Civil War spared. One may only guess at the rationale of such actions: Stalin wanted to rid himself of local Communist leaders who might not be responsive to his doctrine of Soviet supremacy; in fact, many of the Comintern leaders were among his victims—for example, Bela Kun, the leader of Hungarian Communism in 1919. Without such foresight, he might have faced greater difficulties in establishing the Soviet satellite empire. The synchronization of the security machinery of the whole Communist camp was clearly demonstrated by the purges and trials following Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform. Stalin embarked upon his campaign to extirpate all antiStalinist (e.g., anti-Soviet Russian) Party bosses and their adherents all over the satellite area. At the same time, this was intended to be a propaganda drive against Tito; forceful examples were to be made in order to deter any attempt at independence from the prescribed Soviet line. Although the purges and trials (whether theatrical or secret) were not carried out simultaneously, and individual requirements of each satellite state were respected, the general uniformity of style and arrangement is clearly discernible. Beria and Abakumov, in conjunction with local security chiefs, shaped the development of events, and General Bielkin, the traveling salesman of terror,

185 acted as stage manager wherever he took up his provisional headquarters. The earliest genuinely Titoist victim was the Deputy Prime Minister of Albania, Koci Xoxe, who was executed on June 10, 1949. Patrasceanu of Rumania had been arrested earlier (his earlier demotion is attributed to a refusal to consider the "voluntary" incorporation of Rumania into the Soviet Union),(21) but for the unknown reasons his physical liquidation was delayed a long time. The Rajk trial (September 1949) was followed by Traicho Rostov's trial in Bulgaria (December 1949). General Markos, leader of the Greek Communist insurgents was also demoted in January 1949, and his liquidation remains shrouded in mystery.(22) Gomulka in Poland was expelled from the Party on November 1 4 , 1949; he admitted having had "Titoist doubts," but he denied other charges and said that his eyes had been opened as a result of the Rajk trial.(23) Although preparations for this trial were made and his parliamentary immunity was lifted, he was spared.(24) The Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia (November 1952) was combined with the eradication of anti-Soviet, national Communist elements; Slansky himself can hardly be counted as anti-Soviet, falling victim instead to the antiSemitic drive of the senescent Stalin. The delay of the purge in Czechoslovakia is remarkable because Rakosi as early as September 1949 had foretold it.(25) Gottwald was more apt to have become the victim of such a purge than Slansky, but he was nevertheless spared.(26) The last international Stalinist purge, culminating with the Doctors' Plot in Moscow, was staged with the active participation of Rakosi. The final arrangements, following Slansky's execution, which was to be the prelude, were made in Moscow in December 1952 where Rakosi had gone to explore the situation. Rakosi, himself a Jew, was ready to participate in an anti-Semitic plot. The purge was to be combined with the liquidation of the top "Jewish" leaders of the AVH in Hungary. General Gabor Peter, who entertained special contacts with Beria, had complained against Rakosi, and this was revealed to Rakosi by Abakumov.(27) In January 1953, General Peter and many of the AVH officers were arrested. In full synchronization with the Doctor's Plot, Lajos Stockier, president of the Hungarian Jewish community, was also arrested. Stalin's death, however, brought these arrangements down with a crash; and while the subordination of the AVH to the whims of the Soviet Security Police still persisted, the disappearance of one-man rule in Moscow and the subsequent

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downfall of Beria did not fail to have their repercussions on the AVH in Hungary and elsewhere in the satellite area. 1953-1956 The previous role of the security police in the maintenance of Soviet Communist domination, its methods of purge and terror, and the hatred which it provided have been outlined earlier. The AVH had been formally reincorporated into the Ministry of the Interior in the fall of 1953, resuming its former name of AVO, but had maintained its independent and important status. However, even after Imre Nagy's demotion in 1955, it practiced some self-restraint; leading Party members in particular were relatively secure from its clutches. Otherwise the security police kept its whole apparatus of spy networks, economic privileges, and special ties with the Soviet security organs. The AVO personnel consisted of professionals (officers, noncommissioned officers, detectives, clerks) and of recruited personnel organized into military units (internal security services). These recruits generally served three years and then were demobilized if they did not reenlist as professionals. Reliability and devotion toward the regime varied greatly as between the professionals and the recruited personnel. Only the professionals proved to be reliable tools of the regime—though not without exceptions. Few were fanatic devotees; the majority fought for reasons of self-preservation and for fear of punishment for past abuses. Had the full military strength of the security police been a trustworthy force for suppressing the rebellion, they could probably have defeated the revolutionaries. However, the AVO, in general, proved to be poor fighters. The recruited element wavered and in many cases deserted unless forced at gun point by the officers. And the officers themselves, frightened by the magnitude and force of popular wrath, quickly panicked.(28) Soon, all over the country, the AVO was forced to the defensive although this did not prevent them from provocative actions stimulated by orders from their headquarters—actions that increased the fury of the masses. We have previously indicated how the security police's first shots ignited the flame of rebellion, and how the massacre two days later on Parliament Square drove the masses into a frenzy. In the provinces it was also the AVO which by its panicky action brought death to many innocent persons. By such behavior the security police

187 rushed to its own ruin. The security police also attempted to infiltrate the ranks of the Freedom Fighters. Civilian AVO agents posed as insurgents, but chiefly preferred the role of snipers, shooting unarmed civilians in order to compromise the revolution. Most of these agents when attempting to join revolutionary units were discovered, because their speech and behavior revealed their occupation. During the first phase of the revolution (October 23 to about October 2 8 ) , the AVO's cooperation and collaboration with the intervening Soviet forces was slipshod. Suspected by the Russians, who fought under unfamiliar circumstances and could not distinguish foe from friend, the security police were more an encumbrance than an aid to the Soviet tank units roaming the streets of Budapest. After the Soviet attacks diminished and the cease fire was declared on October 28, the Freedom Fighters, assisted by the ordinary police, continued their mopping up operations against the remnants of the security police. The members of the AVO fled, tried to hide, or gave themselves up voluntarily. On October 29, the government declared the dissolution of the agency,(29) thus acceding to one of the principal demands presented by workers' councils and other revolutionary institutions. The security police had been such a target of indignation and hatred that its alignment to the revolutionary movement had been out of the question. The recruited members of the AVO were generally released after they reported to the police or to revolutionary organizations, but most officers were detained. The Kadar regime subsequently stated that over 3,000 in all had been imprisoned.(30) During the fighting, and subsequently until about November 1, sporadic lynchings of security police officers and agents occurred. The victims of these popular outbursts were mostly snipers or defenders of public buildings who were either caught flagrante delicto or gave themselves up after prolonged fighting. The Kadar regime later declared that there were altogether 234 victims of the "white terror."(31) This is a remarkably low number, considering that at least a hundred AVO men must have died in regular action. The number of those who fell victim to popular revenge was infinitesimal when compared with the over two thousand executed victims of the Rakosi era, or the number killed in the revolution (estimated by Prime Minister Nehru at 25,000 Hungarians and 7,000

188 Russians).(32) The security police, as a fighting force, had been annihilated by the first days of November; their most daring and most deeply compromised elements, however, went into hiding. After the second Soviet intervention, when the imprisoned AVO officers were liberated, the others reappeared and offered their services to the Soviet forces and to the new government. In the Soviet operations against the guerrilla Freedom Fighters, officers and agents of the AVO proved more successful than before. AFTERMATH OF REVOLUTION The Hungarian regular police had proved to be the weakest link in the chain protecting the Communist regime. Nevertheless, no large-scale purges of its officers and men were reported as in the case of the army. Evidently, all the blame for the passivity of the police was to be heaped on the shoulder of a few leading police officers, prominently on Sandor Kopacsi, the Chief of Police. The reorganization that was carried out concerned mostly questions germane to the incorporation of the security police into the regular police. During the revolution the dissolution of the security police (AVO) became a plank of the governmental platform, and afterward the move was endorsed by the Kadar regime. Though no formal document implementing the dissolution is known, a governmental decree of December 3 0 , 1956, recognized its termination and allotted "investigations of crimes against internal and external security" to the jurisdiction of the regular police.(33) It appears, however, that the AVO did not really vanish. It only stopped being a separate section, and without leaving the Ministry of the Interior was placed in toto within the section that controlled the regular police. It acted, henceforward, as the "Political Investigation Division" of the Central Office of the Police.(34) We can also assume that most of its functionaries continued in their jobs, and that only a few of them were purged or dismissed. The enormous tasks of repression and investigation of "counterrevolutionaries" and other opponents of the regime had made the maintenance and stability of the government dependent on the operation of trained and seasoned security police personnel. The security police in the prerevolutionary period was not restricted to investigation and interrogation officers; it also included an armed force, placed under the authority of the AVO,

189 specially trained and indoctrinated to perform praetorian services for the Communist regime. This military arm was divided up and given various names at the beginning of the Kadar restoration. These units were known as "Security Force Regiments" (Karhatalom); the "R" groups, short for "Riado Csoport" (Alarm Group); "Home Guards" and "Factory Guards." Still others formed the core of an organization subsequently called the "Workers' Militia." The functioning of these units was supported by the Soviet command, and their collaboration was close during the first year of the Kadar regime.(35) Eventually, these security forces were brought back under the control of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior, which handled them as part of the police. They are, nonetheless, militarily trained and organized armed forces that do not perform ordinary police duties but are kept in reserve for the defense of public buildings and in case of major disturbances. The popular wrath so violently expressed against the security police during the revolution was a lesson to this organization and to the government. At first, to be sure, when investigating real or presumed "counterrevolutionaries" and other opponents of the regime, the "new" security police showed itself as ruthless as during the Stalinist era. During Radar's first year, it was often accused of brutality in its treatment of prisoners, and there is not doubt that the repression after the revolution was carried out with the usual totalitarian methods of torture and "brain-washing" that must have led to a number of extorted confessions, the victimization of innocents, and illegalities on a large scale. After this initial year of terrorism the activities of the security police became more discreet and less provocative. Indiscriminate and arbitrary arrests were stopped, and those who kept themselves aloof from politics seemed no longer to have reason to fear arrest.(36) Though the concepts of rightism or counterrevolutionary mentality are somewhat vague, they do not appear to be given such a wide interpretation as in the Rakosian era or immediately after the collapse of the revolution. Orders for arrest for political crimes are given out more sparingly and probably not by the head of the security police alone but with the consent of the Prosecutor General or persons in high Party echelons. Since the liquidation of most of the counterrevolutionary cases, complaints against security police terrorism have become more scarce. But lack of constitutional guarantees and the secrecy that covers the activities of this

190 organization always leaves open the possiblity of a recrudescence of mass arrests and unbridled brutality. The confidential cooperation between the Hungarian security police and similar Soviet organs was demonstrated by the handling of the Imre Nagy case. NOTES 1. See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The. Permanent Purge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 5 6 ) , pp 2 8 , 175. 2. Aladar Weisshaus and Gyorgy Demeny, nonMuscovite Communist leaders who refused to cooperate with the Soviet-sponsored Rakosist Communist Party, disappeared in 1945 and 1946. Demeny was still in prison in 1956 (personal recollection of the present writer). Both were personal enemies of Rakosi, which also accounts for the treatment reserved for them. See CURPH (Columbia University Research Project on Hungary), interview no. 152. 3. Ernest Helmreign, editor, Hungary (New York, Praeger, 1 9 5 7 ) , pp. 136-141. 4. CURPH, interview no. 526. The interviewee, a historian-archivist, visited the AVH record offices when they were abandoned during the Revolution in 1956. He reports that their records, though still permeated with Communist phraseology, seemed more realistic than Communist Party or political papers but at the same time revealed the cynicism of the machines of terror. Despite their factualness, many of the reports he saw were distorted, full of stupid and muddled thinking. The interviewee concluded that the AVH was far from being the omniscient apparatus it claimed to be. The present writer's personal experiences also confirm such a conclusion; the results achieved by the AVH and its successors are due only to the ruthless and brutal powers of which they can freely avail themselves, powers which are not at the disposal of any police bound by the rule of law. 5. George Paloczi-Horvath, The Undefeated (Boston: Little, Brown, 1 9 5 9 ) , p. 194. 6. Nogradi, also a Muscovite who prior to his return to Hungary worked for many years in the NKVD's service, had a mistress who was the wife of a former Horthyist officer. He reported his "liaison" to the Party. In 1952 the woman was arrested as an American spy, and it was then that Rakosi struck out to liquidate Nogradi. CURPH, interview no. 500. See also General Bela Kiraly, "Hungary's Army under the Soviets," East Europe. March 1958, p. 12. 7. Miklos Molnar and Laszlo Nagy, Imxe. Nagy:

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Reformateur on Révolutionnaire? (Geneva: E. Droz, 1959), p. 28. 8. George Paloczi-Horvath, The Undefeated, pp. 160-163. 9. Istvan Stolte told his story personally to this writer in a prison cell in September-October 1956. See also George Paloczi-Horvath, The Undefeated, p. 194. 10. Concerning the tape recording, see CURPH, interview no. 152. The use of tape recorders to secure subservience and to supervise security police personnel has apparently been used in other cases within the Soviet orbit. At Colonel Rozanski's trial in 1957 in Warsaw (the former Deputy Chief of the Polish security police was accused of torturing prisoners) a tape recorder produced by the prosecutor refuted the denial of the accused (information provided by Professor Zbigniew K. Brzezinski to this writer). 11. See, in particular, Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1 9 5 3 ) , pp. 365-389; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge, pp. 65-97. 12. Imre Kovacs, editor, Fact About Hungary, (New York: Hungarian Committee, 1 9 5 9 ) , p. 188. 13. This is a considerably smaller proportion of the population than is estimated to have been imprisoned or deported in the Soviet Union during 1937-1939 or after World War II, where even percentages running from 7 to 14 were mentioned (see Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, p. 3 8 5 ) ; but Hungary had no Siberia to which prisoners could be deported. On the other hand, the proportion of intellectuals and high-skilled workers among prisoners must have been considerably greater in Hungary than in the Soviet Union. 14. For Merle Fainsod's interpretation of the Yezhovshchina, see his How Russia is Ruled. pp. 373374. 15. For instance, when Gyorgy Faludi, a writer of renown who returned to Hungary (having served in the American Army) after World War II, and who admitted under torture of having "spied for Edgar Allan Poe and Walt Whitman," was brought before the presence of Gabor Peter, the AVH Chief, he was told by the latter: "Aren't you an idiot to have come back, to return home, to this filth!" CURPH, interview no. 506, George Paloczi-Horvath, The Undefeated, p. 224. 16. To cite one example we refer to the case of Endre Havas, a Communist writer who, when tortured for some months, never ceased "to praise socialism" and to repeat that "Rakosi cannot be aware" of what is done to him. His torturers, having received instructions from Rakosi himself, and believing that

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e

Havas was making fun of them, increased the torture. Eventually he succumbed to his pains and died in the prison hospital. Istvan Meszaros, La Rivolta degli Intellettuali in Ungheria (Torino: G. Einaudi, 1 9 5 8 ) , p. 175, George Paloczi-Horvath, The Undefeated , p. 224; Francois Fejto, Behind the Rape of Hungary (New York: D. McKay, 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 121. 1 7 . For personal impressions of the AVH prisons, among many reminiscences the following seem most trustworthy and instructive: George PalocziHorvath, Tne Undefeated. Jozsef Kovago, You Are All (New York: Praeger, 1959), Lajos Ruff, The Brainwashing Machine (London: R. Hale, 1 9 5 9 ) , "The Muted Horror in Hungary" (anonymous), East Europe. August 1958, pp. 11-26. 18. See Bela Just, Un Procès Préfabriqué: L'Affaire Mindszenty (Paris: Editions du Témoignage Chretien, 1 9 4 9 ) ; William Juhasz, "Church and Society in Hungary" in Joseph Moody, editor, Church and Society. (New York: Arts, Inc., 1 9 5 3 ) . 19. The story is related by Jozsef Magyar in Robert Finley Delaney, This is Communist Hungary (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1 9 5 8 ) , pp. 49-54. 20. See Franz Borkenau, European Communism (New York: Faber and Faber, 1 9 5 3 ) , pp. 226-229. 21. Survey of International Affairs, 1947-1948 (London: Oxford University Press, 1 9 5 2 ) , pp. 194-195. 22. Milovan Djilas wrote in the Borba (June 1 4 , 1 9 4 9 ) , that Rajk, Gomulka, General Xoxe, and General markos were being disgraced because they resisted subjugation of their countries to the Soviet Union. 23. Survey of International Affairs, 1949-195Q. p. 206. 24. A partial explanation emerged at the Eighth Plenum of the Polish Central Committee in October 1956. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The. Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 6 0 ) , p. 96. 25. Rakosi on September 30, 1949, in a speech before top-level Party functionaries in Budapest, exclaimed: "The lessons of the Rajk trial were not learned by us only, but by the worker movement of the whole world. During the trial it became clear that the American imperialists and their Yugoslav colleagues made similar plans in all the People's Democracies. Rajk, Palffy, Brankov exposed these plans in great detail. They exposed the special role played by the Catholic reaction and the Vatican which prepared the downfall of democracy not only in Hungary but also in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Brankov reported that he was scolded by Rankovic, because the work of the traitors did not make as much progress in Hungary, as it did in Czechoslovakia." Szabad Nep. Oct. 1, 1949; see also

193 Bela Fabian, "Hungary's Jewry Faces Liquidation," Commentary. October 1951, pp. 330-335. 26. Franz Borkenau, World Communism, p. 543, Richard Lowenthal, "Why Was Slansky hanged?" 20th Century. January 1953, pp. 18-23, H. Jaeger, "Der Tiefere Hintergrund des Falles Slansky," Deutsche Rundschau. December 1951, pp. 1079-1080. 27. CURPH, Heltai report, pp. 2^3. The emergency of anti-Peter investigations within the AVH was already noticed by prisoners in the spring of 1952; see Jozsef Kovago, pp. 74-77. These investigations coicide with those led by Malenkov, Bulganin, and Khrushchev against Beria as early as 1951-52, see Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney, The Secret World (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1 9 5 9 ) , p. 167. 28. Potoczky manuscript, pp. 284-285. 29. U.N. Report, p. 135. 30. See Judgment in the Imre Nagy "trial", Nagy Imre es Buntarsai Ellenforradalmi Osszeeskuvese (The Counterrevolutionary Conspiracy of Imre Nagy and His Accomplices), Hungarian White Book (Budapest, 1 9 5 8 ) , p. 14. 31. Ibid. 32. Nehru's estimates in Annual Register of World Events. 1956 (London: Longmans, Green, 1957) , p. 102. 33. Decree No. 35 of 1956; its Section I announced: "As a consequence of the dissolution of the Office of State Security of the Ministry of the Interior..." (Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe ) Library of Congress, January 1958, p. 26. 3 4 . This appears from an article in Nepakarat, May 3 1 , 1957. 35. U.N. Report, p. 104. 36. The. Times (London), April 29- 1960. r

8 Cambodian Secret Police Kenneth

Quinn

The Socialist Revolution aims to completely eliminate the manners, mores, ways, and conventions of the former society from our military, our people and all our cadres.(1) That sentence taken from the notebook of a Khmer Rouge officer states the raison d'etre behind extensive use of terror and violence in Pol Pot's Cambodia. The document which contained notes taken at a meeting of Kampuchean Communist Party cadres, saw as critical party missions, 1. . . . to build up the secret Party core leagues, particularly the Party youth league and the Party farmers'league. These secret Party core leagues must be strengthened and expanded to extend down deep and to reach all of the people in the country and all of the soldiers in the armed forces. 2. The Party must lead the struggle to completely eliminate all vestiges of the former society that remains. The Party must ensure that all traces of the old society are completely eradicated from the general population and the armed forces.(2) Pol Pot's goal was to totally change Khmer society, which he found based on greed and individual property and corrupted by Western influences. He saw those factors as responsible for the decay of the pristine Khmer culture of the Angkor period which he described as "primitive Communism." His enunciated objective was to restore the magnificence of this earlier time by establishing a totally egalitarian agricultural society composed of self-sufficient production units organized along the lines of a factory and military brigade. Realizing that the accomplishment of this task would meet resistance from the old society, peasantry and Communists, Pol Pot utilized terror and violence to overcome

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objections and reticence. To carry out his policies, Pol Pot relied upon the Party and military structures, a secret police organization and Party youth leagues which provided much of the manpower that actually implemented much of the violence at the village level. (3) Having defeated the forces of President Lon Nol in April 1975, Pol Pot proceeded to implement one of the most sweeping and swiftest revolutions in history. In a matter of days following the capture of Phnom Pehn, all of the cities and towns in the county were evacuated with the population dispersed to rural communes where people were impressed into agricultural work. The regimen in these new work camps was reportedly harsh with long hours, short rations and a strict system of discipline. Concomitant with this emptying of the cities, the Khmer Rouge embarked on a campaign to identify, arrest and, in many cases, execute persons connected with the former government as well as those perceived to be a potential threat to Pol Pot's continued rule. In many instances there is evidence that not only was the head of the family killed, but also the spouse and children. Mass executions of former military officers and government officials reportedly occurred in a number of instances. Over the next several years the lack of medical facilities and the lax sanitary conditions, combined with the rigors of the new communal farms and the paucity of food available, evidently produced epidemics and near famine conditions, killing large numbers of people. These deaths, when added to those people thought to have been executed, have produced staggeringly high estimates of the number of persons who died in Cambodia during Pol Pot's short period of control. The estimates range from several hundred thousand to about four million dead by 1979 out of a 1970 population of about seven million. Vietnam's "Christmas attack" of 1979 and its subsequent capture of Phnom Pehn ended Pol Pot's r e g i m e — a t least temporarily. In the aftermath of his rule, there are many questions yet unanswered about what actually happened inside Cambodia during this tumultuous period: what specific objectives did Pol Pot and his followers hope to achieve? Why was speed such a necessity; what was the model for their new society; why was violence so extensive; and who carried out terrorist and violent acts? MAOIST AND STALINIST ANTECEDENTS OF CAMBODIAN COMMUNISM The radical Communist programs in Cambodia were derived almost in toto from left wing Chinese Communism; especially Mao's Great Leap Forward and

197 the Cultural Revolution. Pol Pot's policies were designed to achieve immediate transition to a "pure Communist" society. Extreme violence, terror and purges were utilized to ensure that the elements which prevented "success" in achieving the transition to pure Communism in China would be successfully overcome in Democratic Kampuchea. Both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, it would have been apparent to Pol Pot, failed to make the final transition to pure Communism. The peasant's desire to retain individual plots, the emergence of a new "intellectual class" within the Communist Party, and the difficulty of communizing the cities hampered the transition. Cambodia's Communist leaders sought to overcome, by force and fear, these "contradictions" which kept their patrons from reaching this final plateau. There is significant evidence establishing this ideological Chinese connection and the thesis that Pol Pot was embarked on an effort to make the transition to pure Communism. At a press conference in Peking in late 1977, Pol Pot acknowledged an early link between the development of the Cambodian Communist Party's line and the thought of Mao. Pol Pot revealed that shortly after his return from France, "We set up a committee in 1957 to formulate the line and policies of the party."(4) This at a time when the Pracheachon Party (as the Communist Party was known) was still more concerned with winning seats in the new national assembly than fighting a guerilla war in the countryside. This committee, Pol Pot continued, decided that the parliamentary road will get nowhere. We also learned from the experiences of the world revolution and in particular Comrade Mao. Tsetung's works and the experience of the Chinese revolution played an important role at that time. (Emphasis added). After summing up the concrete experiences of the world revolution, particularly under the guidance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's works, we have found a road conforming with the concrete conditions and social conditions in our country. Therefore, the committee for formulating our Party's line has worked out a program concerning the Party line and submitted it to the first Party Congress held on September 3 0 , 196 0 for examination and adoption.(5) Pol Pot acknowledged the key role of Mao's thought over the years. Addressing a banquet hosted by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 1977, he said: "In the concrete

198 revolutionary struggle of our country, we have creatively and successfully applied Mao Tse-tung thought — from the time we had only empty hands to April 1 7 , 1975..."(6) Similarly, Prince Sihanouk described Pol Pot and his senior advisors as "intellectuals" with "a passionate love for the People's Republic of China and a boundless admiration for Chinese Communism in its most extreme and terrible f o r m — t h e Cultural Revolution." He added, In Peking in 1975 we visited Zhou Enlai already seriously ill - in his hospital room. I heard him advise Khieu Samphan and Ieng Thirith (Mme. Ieng Sary) not to try to achieve total Communism in one giant step. The wise and perspicacious veteran of the Chinese revolution stressed the need to move 'step by step' toward socialism. This would take several years of patient work. Then and only then should they advance toward a Communist society. Premier Zhou Enlai reiterated that China itself had experienced disastrous setbacks in the fairly recent past by trying to make a giant leap forward and move full speed ahead into pure Communism. The great Chinese statesman counseled the Khmer Rouge leaders: 'Don't follow the bad example of our great leap forward. Take things slowly: that is the best way to guide Kampuchea and its people to growth, prosperity and happiness.' By way of response to this splendid and moving piece of almost fatherly advice, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Thirith just smiled an incredulous and superior smile...(7) Not long after we got back to Phnom Penh, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen told me their Kampuchea was going to show the world that pure Communism could indeed be achieved in one fell swoop. This was no doubt their indirect reply to Zhou Enlai. 'Our country's place in history will be assured', they said, 'we will be the first nation to create a completely Communist society without wasting time on intermediate steps.'(8) In his eulogy after Mao's death in 1976, Pol Pot also indicated his close affinity to his teachings. Pol Pot described Mao as "the most eminent teacher. . . since Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin." In an earlier message, Pol praised the Cultural Revolution against the "counter-revolutionary headquarters of Liu Shao-Chi and Teng Hsiao-ping."(9) In 1977 Pol Pot journeyed to Peking, after formally announcing that Cambodia was in fact being ruled by a Communist Party. As one

199 observer noted: In a rare show of warmth, a top trio of the Peking leadership, Chairman Huo Kuo-feng and Vice-Premiers Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Hsien-nien, turned up at the airport to receive Pol Pot and Vice-Premiers Ieng Sary and Von Vet. The next five days of their stay were also marked by signs of unusual comraderie and solidarity in which Peking repeatedly affirmed that the friendship with Cambodia is 'unbreakable' — a description so far reserved for Albania in the heady days of that relationship. (10) In his welcoming speech at a banquet Chairman Hua complimented his Cambodian guests for being equally good in "destroying the old world" as in building the new, and complimented them on "smashing the disruptive schemes of enemies at home and abroad." A Peoples Daily editorial noted that the Cambodians had overcome "the conspiratorial activities of enemies both at home and abroad." These statements were seen as an indication of an inner Party struggle where the "opponents of Pol Pot's overtly pro Mao Tse-tung line might have been defeated." In response to Hua's speech, Pol termed Mao's thought as the "brilliant beacon" for revolutionaries and also as "the most precious aid" that was provided by China. It was also revealed that Pol Pot had secretly visited Mao in Peking in June 1975, just two months after the capture of Phnom Penh.(11) Still additional indications of the linkage between the Cambodian Communist revolution and Mao's thought came in a Phnom Penh radio commentary following the June 1978 visit of Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary to Peking. In it, Ieng Sary was quoted as saying that "China and Kampuchea are comrades-in-arms sharing weal and woe." The commentary concluded by stating that "The great Kampuchean-Chinese fraternal, revolutionary friendship and militant solidarity ...are based on Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Tse-tung thought..."(12) Two representatives of the Chinese Marxist-Leninist Institute reportedly told a Congressional Committee staffer that Pol Pot and his followers were "following the Gang of Four" and "implementing the Cultural Revolution" in Cambodia. Apparently Mao was well pleased with what Pol Pot was able to achieve for upon Pol Pot's arrival in Peking after the fall of Phnom Penh Mao reportedly told Pol "You have achieved in one stroke what we failed with all our masses." Mao was also said to have told Vietnamese Communist Party First Secretary Le Duan that his Party ought to "learn from the Khmer Rouge

200 how to carry out a revolution."(13) Mao's death and the subsequent purge of the "Gang of Four" led to a loss of Chinese support for Pol Pot's policies. In a 1979 meeting with a delegation of American governors, Teng Hsiao-peng said: "We don't agree with some of Pol Pot's policies. Frankly, some of those policies were unpopular." (14) Earlier in 1979, when Pol Pot and Ieng Sary flew in Peking after being deposed by the Vietnamese, they reportedly told Teng that "Our mistake was following the line of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four."(15) There were numerous similarities between the Cultural Revolution and Pol Pot's Cambodian policies. Both followed similar foreign policy, restricted the age of marriage and the relationship between the sexes, stressed the poor and lower middle class peasants as the basis for the new society, and disdained long haired students and those affecting western dress. In both countries youth played a critical role, redness was stressed over expertise, vested interests were attacked and individual incentives were eliminated. Even the involvement of the wives of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Son Sen (Khieu Ponnany, Ieng Thirith and Yun Y a t ) , who while not as powerful or instrumental as Chiang Ching, or Yeh Chun (Lin Piao's wife) clearly played important roles in the revolutionary organization, was similar. The Cultural Revolution was, however, distinctly different from the Cambodian revolution in several critical ways. Even though large numbers of people were forced back to the countryside, cities were never totally emptied in China as in Cambodia. Moreover, China never experienced the scale and scope of violence and death of Cambodia under Pol Pot. In China, the Cultural Revolution "failed," in part because of the opposition of key Party leaders, the enduring strength of Chinese social and economic institutions and the sheer size of the country which made control and implementation of the revolutionary process in the provinces extremely difficult. Much smaller Cambodia, with a more delicate social structure and with no Chou En-lai or Teng Hsiaoping to provide a moderating influence, provided fewer obstacles to Pol Pot's implementation of the Maoist strategy. Still, Pol Pot, no doubt, realized there would be opposition to his plan and that this resistance would come from virtually every level of Cambodian society; the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh, non-Communist allies in his coalition against Lon Nol, the Khmer Hanoi, Prince Sihanouk, urban dwellers, the peasants, and eventually cadres from within his own party. The reasons why the full transition to pure

201 Communism was not achieved in either the Soviet Union or China were readily apparent to Pol Pot particularly during his trips to China in the wake of the Great Leap Forward and the advent of the Cultural Revolution: the near impossibility of establishing communes in the cities, the strong opposition of the peasants to losing their individual plots of land, the tendency to rely on the profit motive and the rich peasants to spur agricultural production at the expense of emphasizing social change, the emergence of a new "intellectual" (i.e. educated) class within the Party itself which having attained status by virtue of its technical expertise became satisfied with the status quo and drifted toward 'revisionism', the dissidence of families or members of the old ruling class, the loss of energy and momentum and the emergence of new vested interests wherever the transitions followed a gradual process. The plan implemented by Pol Pot addressed all of these factors and appears to have been devised to eliminate every locus of resistance, achieve the acquiescence of the peasantry and completely change Cambodian society within the course of a few years. To do so Pol Pot added two components to his revolution that were absent in China — the widespread use of force and the total emptying of the cities. By taking these two extraordinary steps, Pol sought to succeed where the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward had failed. Another factor in explaining Pol Pot's brutality may be his exposure to Stalinist methods. Virtually the entire top leadership of the Cambodian Communist movement came under the influence of the French Communist Party at a time when European Communism was taking a tough, hard line. Stalin was still the world Communist leader when Pol Pot arrived in France. His harsh legacy of brutal methods had yet to be repudiated when most Cambodian students were being inducted into the Communist controlled Khmer Student Association in Paris. As William Shawcross pointed out, Pol Pot and his fellow students "learned their socialism from the French Communist Party in its most Stalinist period."(16) Moreover, violence, terror and secret police tactics were still being practiced in the eastern bloc countries to which Pol Pot was exposed during his years of work with the International Youth Brigade and his visits to Yugoslavia. While there is little written evidence linking Pol Pot's reign of terror to Stalinist influences there are enough similarities between Pol's methods and those employed in the Soviet Union in the 1930's to suggest a relationship between them:

202 First, both Stalin and Pol Pot moved with brutal swiftness in seeking to collectivize the rural agricultural sector. Stalin was committed to the simultaneous destruction of traditional authority, reintegration of the peasantry into one dominant type of organization and economic exploitation.(17) Pol may have benefitted from Cambodia's much smaller size as well as the lesson Stalin learned in 193 0 when he was sharply critized because of resistance to his collectivist policies. Second, the levels and scope of violence and terror during both the Stalinist peasant mobilization phase and that in Cambodia were quite similar. Whole classes of people, including spouses and children, were marked for elimination in both. Between 1929 and 1936, the kulaks "were exterminated wholesale with their families; whole regions suffered famines caused both by nature and the government...estimates (of) deaths (were put) at more than 10 million men, women and children."(18) Pol Pot likewise followed a policy aimed at eliminating whole groups that had been a part of the old society. Third, in both Cambodia and the Soviet Union, the number and type of persons who were viewed as potential members of the new society were sharply limited. As Dallin and Breslauer point out: ...whereas Maoist strategy defines outgroup...so narrowly as to leave open the possibility of re-educating most class alien elements, the Stalinist is marked by a far narrower definition of the in group; those who can be trusted, and those who can be made into 'good Communists'.(19) In this respect Pol Pot hewed closer to the Stalinist model than to the Maoist model which held that the urban bourgeoisie and landowners could be transformed into useful members of society. But there was a political price to pay for this more lenient Chinese approach which Pol Pot sought to avoid: The Chinese failed to eliminate potentially rival elites before embarking on its major movilization tasks...Once the Maoist failed, in key spots within society there remained... alienated survivors whose counterparts elsewhere in the Communist world would have been purged.(20) To ensure that these elements did not survive to challange his authority, Pol Pot appears to have turned to the more encompassing Stalinist approach to

203 eliminating potential dissidents and enemies. A fourth similarity between Pol Pot's regime and that of Stalin was the extensive purges of top Party cadres and the use of false confessions to justify political executions. During the Great Purges about two-thirds of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Central Committee "was liquidated" and about half the office corps was arrested.(21) One estimate put the number of party members "sent to the Gulag" in the millions, with about 1.4 million executed.(22) Within this process, Stalin made extensive use of false confessions and contrived conspiracy plots to justify these arrests and executions. The Party purges in Cambodia, particularly in late 1976 and 1977, bear a remarkable resemblance to the Stalinist model. Many of those tortured and killed at the Tuol Sleng jail were Party officials and cadres. Before execution each had to write and sign a confession. Moreover, by 1978 Pol Pot's purges of senior cadres had been so extensive that policy decisions were essentially handled by "The Gang of Six" (Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Son Sen and their wives Khieu Ponnany, Ieng Thirith and Yun Yat) with Khieu Samphan in an auxiliary role. Overall, Pol Pot implemented Mao's plans with Stalin's methods. THE PATTERN AND STAGES OF VIOLENCE As in other totalitarian regimes, terror, violence and purge were selectively and systematically used by Pol Pot for two distinctly different purposes: 1) to gain and maintain control of the organizations and institutions which vie for power and control of the government and 2) to bring about change in the rules and patterns of economic and social life in the society at large.(23) In each instance the target and the type of violence used was different. Seizing Political Power In their effort to gain political power, the Pol Pot Communists went through a four step process, each of which involved some use of violence or purge. The first step was to gain control of the Cambodian Communist Party, which had slipped into lethargy following its abortive parliamentary battles with Sihanouk in the mid-1950's. Upon returning to Phnom Penh in 1955 from studying in France, Pol Pot (who was then known as Saloth Sar) was appalled to find the Party in disarray and lacking leadership and direction. The Party's foray into electoral politics had been a disaster as the Praecheachon candidates obtained only 3% of the vote in the 1955 National

204 Assembly elections, compared to 82% for Prince Sihanouk's Sangkum candidate. Furthermore the great bulk of the Vietnamese oriented cadres which had supported the Party's efforts during the war with the French had been withdrawn to Hanoi. Only a few of the old Party leaders remained, primarily Touch Samut and Sieu Heng. Having achieved their major goal of the past 10 years - i.e. drawing the French from their country - these men, at least in Pol Pot's view, were now less inclined to pursue the rigorous path of the revolutionary effort. Into this vacuum of Party leadership and activity stepped Pol Pot and his fellow students from Paris. While working by day in teaching positions and government jobs, in their free time they began their efforts to reinvigorate the Party and to achieve control of it. They began by splitting the Party along rural-urban lines in order to isolate Sieu Heng, who was later purged from the party. This allowed Pol Pot to come into the number two position in the urban committee behind Touch Samut. The "disappearance" of Touch Samut, the Vietnam-oriented Party chairman in 1962, possibly as a result of violence initiated by Pol Pot, opened the way for the achievement of control of the Party. Step two, which lasted from 1968 to 1973, was to achieve the leading role in the coalition formed to oppose the Lon Nol government. While at the outset, this involved friendly cooperation with pro-Sihanouk forces, the "Khmer Hanoi" and North Vietnamese military forces, by 1971 Pol Pot cadres at the village level were moving vigorously by means of purge and outright military confrontation to take complete control of the entire oppositionist governmental and military structure. After achieving total military victory in 1975, Pol Pot then moved to the third step of destroying all potential opposition to his rule by imposing a totalitarian system of government. He sought to "break" the former system by destroying the institutions, organizations, and elements from the "old society" which posed even a remote threat to his continuing in power. Ironically it was at this stage, after the war ended, that the greatest uses of terror and violence occurred. In the fourth and final step, Pol Pot turned on his own Party, seeking to purge "deviationists" and "reactionaries" from within its ranks. Those who were opposed to the radical reforms Pol Pot was committed to implementing were eliminated, including such well known revolutionary figures as Koy Thoun, Hu Nim, Hou Yuon, Vorn Vet, Toch Phoeun, So Phim, Sievay An, Nhim Ros, Chang An, and Non Suon.(24)

205 Mobilization and Changing Society Terror and fear also served as the main vehicle for accomplishing change in the rules and patterns of the society at large — the second major purpose for which violence was employed. As the revolution advanced, the identity of the impediments to the new society changed as well. In the first phase of the struggle (1967-73) the "feudalist" and capitalist elements were the target — landowners, money lenders, rich merchants and other individuals against whom the peasants might hold grudges. Land reform, re-education and selective terrorism were the main weapons against these targets. The aim of this first stage or revolution was to obtain the peasant support for the war against the central government. The second stage of the process involved the uprooting of the urban population and those living in towns or villages. Begun in the middle of 1973, this action was designed to achieve the "breakthrough" to the new economic order and to remove people from a setting in which they were viewed as unproductive and difficult to organize into communes. Moreover, by forcing the population to leave without being able to take any of its possessions, the new authorities were decisively cutting people from virtually all of their attachments to the old society. Having driven the Lon Nol army from large parts of the countryside, Pol Pot and his Party Central Committee decided to move to a new phase of the revolution. In June 1973, the Party began implementing the "cooperative farms" movement in which large numbers of villages were uprooted (in many cases burned) and consolidated on new communal farms. In what was a harbinger of the mass evacuations that were to be put into effect in April 1975 after final victory was achieved, the Khmer Rouge forcibly and virtually instantly changed the pattern of life for thousands of villages. For the first time violence and terror were openly used against large segments of the population. Where heretofore it had been reserved for "class enemies," now it was used against those who refused to comply with the new social order or who tried to escape. It was during this period that many traditional Cambodian social institutions first came under attack. The third stage of the social transformation had the peasants as the target. Having defeated their primary enemy, the government in Phnom Penh, Pol Pot and his followers turned on the most conservative element in the society itself — the peasantry. The history of Communism in the 20th Century is replete with examples of peasant opposition frustrating the Party's dreams of attaining the complete transition

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to socialism: The kulaks resisted Stalin, Chinese farmers resisted Mao. Pol Pot appeared determined that the Cambodian peasant would not frustrate his plans for a new society. He burned villages, banished religion, and moved the peasants from individual plots of land to agricultural communes. He tried to overcome resistance and to create a new psychological mindset that would readily accept his radical reforms. Pol Pot's programs were remarkably similar to the efforts of Mao and Lin Piao during the Cultural Revolution when they sought to "fundamentally transform the values of the old society." Mao and Lin believed if this was not done that the progress they had made would be "halted by inertia due to localism, regionalism and familiarism."(25) In order to create the "new socialist man" to inhabit his new society, Pol Pot sought to strip away the cultural, religious and social infrastructures of traditional Khmer society and to replace them with a new socialist order based on total acquiescence to "the organization" (Angkar) and subjugation of the individual self to the collective good, similar to the Cultural Revolution's campaign to destroy the "four olds" (old thoughts, old culture, old customs, and old habits),(26) this process had several distinct elements, all aimed at the destruction of the institutions and organizations of the ancien regime. First came the attack on organized religion. Buddhist pagodas were closed, statues and icons destroyed and monks forced to take up secular work or join the army. Some monks who resisted the new order were executed. Other religious groups, such as the ethnic Cham Moslems, also experienced severe restrictions on their religious practices. Formal education also came under violent attack. The campaign to identify, arrest and in some cases execute former teachers, students and educated persons was aimed at eliminating the educational system, which was viewed as a link to the old society. During a 1978 press interview, Pol Pot acknowledged, There are no schools, faculties or universities in the classical sense or as existed in our country before the liberation because we want to put an end once and for all is all remnants of the past.(27) (emphasis added) The attack same ideology. the Minister of spouse of Party

on organized religion sprang from the A Yugoslav journalist quoted Yun Yat, Education and Propaganda and the leader Son Sen, as saying:

207 Under the old regimes peasants believe in Buddhism, which the ruling class utilized as a propaganda instrument. With the development of revolutionary consciousness, the people stopped believing and bonzes (priests) left the temples. The problem gradually becomes extinguished. Hence there is no problem.(28) Dragoslav Rancic, the journalist to whom Yun Yat made these statements, wrote that based on his two week tour of Cambodia, "priests were considered social parasites...(and) their fate was not known." Rancic added that during his stay "we saw pagodas turned into storage houses for rice or into barns for storing farm equipment."(29) While religious shrines were attacked, the Khmer Rouge were careful to guard and preserve the Angkor Wat Complex as a national shrine, apparently seeing it as a relic of an earlier primitive Cambodia that they respected and hoped to emulate. Another institution under attack was the family. The evidence strongly suggests that many young teenagers were often separated from their families and sent away for rigorous ideological training. Upon returning to their homes these young people were described by refugees as fierce in their condemnations of the "old ways", contemptuous of traditional customs and ardently opposed to religious and parental authority. (30) In other instances families were segregated by sex and compelled to live in dormitories with large numbers of other persons. The end result was a severe lessening of parental control — which along with monastic authority had formed two of the strongest pillars in the foundation of the Cambodian village. The burning of old natural villages and the emptying of cities and towns were accompanied by the abolition of a money economy and the prohibition of most individual possessions. Individuals were totally cut off from their previous way of life and any wealth they may have accumulated. In one stroke every member of Khmer society was ineluctably reduced to the same economic and social level. The "contradictions" between rich and poor, educated and illiterate — and rural and urban — built up over years, were to be wiped out. Next, and perhaps the most basic change of all, the pattern of land holdings and agricultural cultivation was completely transformed. Individual plots of land and reliance on kinship ties for assistance in planting and harvesting gave way to the production brigade and huge communal farms. The peasant farmer's direct personal relationship with

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the land, which had developed and endured for generations as a hallmark of Cambodian society, was definitively ended in a matter of a few days. The final institution which the Khmer Communists sought to eliminate was the monarchy. While Prince Sihanouk had his critics and detractors in Phnom Penh, he and his predecessors on the royal throne were still esteemed in the countryside. Ironically, without Sihanouk on their side, the Khmer Rouge might never have attracted peasants to their cause. But, just as the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists were able to utilize nationalist anti-Japanese, antiFrench and anti-American feelings to attract individuals to join their cause, so too were Pol Pot and his followers able to use the restoration of the Prince as a rallying cry during the first years of the united front against Lon Nol. (31) Their true anti-monarchical feelings began to surface in some areas as early as 1971, however, when at the village and hamlet level cadres began to villify the Prince for his "grandoise life style" in Peking. Strong peasant reaction to this line caused the Khmer Rouge to beat a hasty retreat on this issue, but after June, 1973, there was little doubt that Sihanouk was no longer accepted within the country even as a figurehead by the Communists. While the Khmer Rouge continued to acknowledge him as the head of state in their international propaganda and internal radio messages, on the collective farms and cooperatives where the Communists were firmly in charge, Sihanouk was eliminated from any role in the government or society. (32) In 1976, with the adoption of the new constitution and the death of Chou En-lai — Sihanouk's chief supporter in China — it was made plain that the monarchy was abolished. Thus, in a few short months following their April 1975 victories, the Khmer Communists were able to bring about a dramatic change in the nature of many of Cambodia's oldest and most enduring institutions: religion, the family, cities, natural villages, private property, land tenure, money, and the monarchy. It was upon these structures that Cambodian society had been built. Yet through the application of terror and force they were all extensively changed in a short time. New York Times journalist Sidney Schanberg described the new Cambodia this way: The Draconian rules of life turned Cambodia into a nationwide gulag, as the Khmer Rouge imposed a revolution more radical and brutal than any other in modern history...attachment to home village and love of Buddha, Cambodian verities, were replaced by psychological re-

209 orientation, mass relocation and rigid collectivization. Families were separated, with husbands, wives and children all working on separate agricultural and construction projects. They were often many miles apart and did not see each other for seasons at a time. Sometimes children were separated completely from their parents, never to meet again. The practice of religion had been forbidden by Khmer Rouge; all statues of Buddha had been destroyed; monks had been either killed or made to work in the fields as common laborers.(33) But the Khmer Communists were not concerned only with the organizational structure of Cambodian society. Pol Pot tried to create a new socialist person whose actions would no longer be based on individual profit, but rather on selfless dedication to the collective well-being. Pol Pot sought to remove all incentives for individual accomplishment, hence the elimination of money, individual plots of land and any differentiation in housing, clothing and personal property. But beyond that, Pol strove to inculcate in each person's mind that any deviation from the general Party line — any selfish act — would result in the most severe punishment and probable death. Cambodian society was to become a giant agricultural factory with each person filling a distinct, specific function like a small part of a machine. To accomplish this, Pol Pot created an atmosphere of terror in which people were in some cases afraid to even talk with each other and in which families feared to speak even in their own homes or in front of their children for fear of being taken away and never being heard of again. Again quoting Schanberg, "Fear and suspicion became the essence of existence. To trust anyone was to risk one's life. People stopped having meaningful conversations, even inside their own family."(34) To some it is a curious phenomenon of the Pol Pot regime that executions did not take place in public. Most persons who were killed by the authorities were taken away to forests, the mountains or to such places like the Tuol Sleng. The fear of an unknown fate and what experience was waiting may have cowed the population more than a public execution in the middle of town. With a public execution there is a body to be buried and the family knows with finality what has happened to their relative. But by never knowing for sure, unless the body were found or an acquaintance had buried the

210 body, the family would constantly be wondering what had happened to their loved one and thus constantly be reminded that they too could be taken away. The available evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the end result of this terror campaign was a docile compliant population made up of individuals almost totally isolated from each other and reduced to a relationship with the central authority based on physical survival. As Dallin and Breslauer put it, in such totalitarian situations an individual may "depoliticize his existence as if operating by the formula, Non Cogito Ergo Sjmi." (3 5) The moment people decided that above all else they wish to survive and will do anything the Party says to accomplish that goal, then Pol Pot would have won. He would have been able by means of terror to psychologically control and reorient his people in the direction he desired. After that, it would only be a matter of time while the new values, rules and attitudes are learned and then passed on to younger generations. At the end of the process, the new socialist individual and the new socialist society will have been created. The Cambodian "cultural revolution" would be complete and the "great leap" to pure Communism accomplished. One early analysis of this process described it in this way: The (Khmer Communist) programs have much in common with those of totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union — to psychologically reconstruct individuals as members of society. In short, this process entails stripping away, through terror and other means, the traditional bases, structures and forces which have shaped and guided an individual's life until he is left as an atomized, isolated individual unit, and then rebuilding him according to Party doctrine and substituting a series of new values, organizations and ethical norms for the ones taken away. The first half of this process can be found in the (Communist) attack on religion, the destruction of vestiges of the Sihanouk regime, attacks on parental and monastical authority, prohibitions on traditional songs and dances and the use of terror. Psychological atomization, which can result from these practices and which causes individuals to feel effectively isolated from the rest of their community can be seen to have actually occurred. Refugees from Kampot and Kandal Provinces have said they

211 were so afraid of arrest and execution that even in their own homes they dared not utter a critical word and obediently complied with every (Communist) directive.(36) In sum, what Pol Pot sought to obliterate was individualism, for just like Mao he believed that for Communism to succeed it must eliminate individualism. (37) Pol Pot saw that to achieve the full socialist transformation he had to strip the concept of individualism from the collective Cambodian psyche. He believed that only by destroying every root, every vestige of individualist thought could a new society of persons totally dedicated to, and knowing only, a collectivist regimen emerge. After learning about mass executions in Cambodia, many concluded that they could only have resulted from irrational, purposeless madness. In fact, the killing appears to have had a clear, distinct purpose — the systematic eradication of those persons who embodied or perpetuated the notion of individualism. Pol Pot felt it was necessary to kill professional or well educated persons, wives of military officers and government officials, and children. All posessed the ethical and philosophical heritage by which the individualist system operated. Pol Pot evidently feared that they would always seek to return to it later in life. One refugee who escaped after learning that his entire family was to be executed, put it this way: "The Communists kept telling the people about the Maoist principle, that if you want to tear out the weed you must go for the roots."(38) This rationale also explains the Khmer Rouge emphasis on allowing "poor peasants" to hold positions of responsibility even when technical expertise was required. They alone were believed to least embody the most exaggerated aspects of individualism — ambition, achievement, wealth and avarice. All others in society were not trustworthy and the evidence strongly suggests that from 1975 to 1978 Pol Pot followed a course of progressively executing many people from all but the bottom level of the old society. First, right after the fall of Phnom Penh, the senior officials and military officers of the Lon Nol government, and often their families, were killed. They were followed a few months later by teachers, highly educated persons and professionals such as doctors and engineers. Too, lower level military personnel were singled out for elimination, and then later, persons who had served in the Republican military, even if it was only as a private or in the village militia. Finally, the

212 campaign was initiated to identify and eliminate the "new people" — that is, those who had lived in the non-Communist zones at the end of the war. Apparently, all of the above classes were tainted in the eyes of the Khmer Communist leadership. To them, the new collectivist, socialist society could only be achieved when a new generation — imbued only with the philosophy that a human being's sole function in society is as an interchangeable part of a large collective entity — emerged. Once that occurred the socialist transformation would be complete. The new socialist man and woman would pass on this new value system to their children and the new society would be institutionalized. To be sure that this plan would not be deterred, the Khmer Rouge appeared to have planned to systematically eliminate those whom they judged not capable of fitting into their new system. For example one refugee, who just barely escaped death told how in 1978 the Khmer Rouge entered his village and began to systematically execute all people who had come from towns. He said people were led off into the woods in small groups and then ... the Khmer Rouge pointed guns at us and tied the entire group of us together. There was one old man, one male adult and the rest were women and children. We could see that the others had been killed. I saw the body of my father in the heap. The Khmer Rouge said, 'You will be killed, because you are wrong.' We were ordered to sit on the ground, then the Khmer Rouge began to hit us with poles and hoes. The Khmer Rouge beat five or six people before me. Then they hit me on the back of my neck and on my back. I fainted. They thought I was dead.(39) After spending the night in the forest among 77 corpses, this man managed to walk for two weeks until he reached safety in Thailand. There when asked why the Khmer Rouge wanted to kill all these people, he answered: I cannot imagine any reason the Khmer Rouge wanted to kill 27 families. We were 'new Cambodians' from the town and the Khmer Rouge don't like people from the town. When I was working in the rice fields with my brother, I heard the Khmer Rouge say, 'All new people are the enemy.' All 77 who were killed were 'new Cambodians.' Neither I nor my family had previously had any trouble with the Khmer Rouge. (40)

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Actually, the underlying rationale for this campaign to eliminate the parts of the population that were suspect was contained in Pol Pot's major address on September 2 7 , 1977 commemorating the "17th Anniversary" of the founding of the Khmer Communist Party. In that 299 minute peroration, Pol Pot reminded his followers that certain "contradictions" continued to exist in new Democratic Kampuchea with which they would have to deal. Pol told his listeners that ...we should ask whether there are any more social contradictions in this great new society of ours. We also should want to know more about these contradictions, if any, so that we can work out ways to solve them. We pose these questions in order to correctly assess and define our revolutionary duty for our new revolutionary phase. Pol Pot answered his own question by saying, Contradictions do exist within the ranks of our people. These contradictions stem from the differences in the nature of the remaining class vestiges. It is understandable that each person can not easily shed the vestiges of the class to which he belonged for generations and which he has just recently renounced for the proletarian nature of the revolution. These contradictions are regarded as contradictions within the people's ranks. Pol Pot added that even more importantly, The people must be constantly and profoundly instructed and educated in collective, socialist ownership and asked to gradually shed and finally eliminate the idea of private ownership. Earlier in the speech, Pol Pot had given his assessment of how many Cambodians fell in each class in the new Cambodia: We estimate that workers, peasants and other working people number more than 90 per cent of population, because we know the peasant class alone represents 85 per cent of the people... among (the remaining) 10 per cent (are) capitalists, landowners or members of other special strata...(41) While Pol Pot advocated dealing with these

214 "contradictions" through "serious education, criticism, self-criticism and inspection of the revolutionary life style," the preponderance of evidence suggests that he saw violence and terror as the means of eliminating the contradictions. Pol Pot saw other contradictions as well, as was indicated when he said that, The actual situation clearly shows that imperialism and foreign reactionaries harbor the strategic and fundamental intention of threatening and attempting to grasp our Cambodia. This brings about contradictions, contradictions in which foreign enemies want to encroach upon, threaten and annex our Cambodian territory.(42) While this reference appeared directed at the Vietnamese Communist Party, Pol also saw threatening conditions within his own Party and inside Cambodia: In our new Cambodian society there also exist such life and death contradictions as enemies in the form of various spy rings working for imperialism and international reactionaries are still planted among us to carry out subversive activities against our revolution. There is also another handful of reactionary elements who continue to carry out activities against, and attempt to subvert, our revolution. These elements are not numerous, constituting only 1 or 2 percent of our population. Some of them operate covertly while others are openly conducting adverse activities.(43) Pol Pot's prescription for dealing with these internal dissidents was harsh and to the point, These counterrevolutionary elements which betray and try to sabotage the revolution are not to be regarded as being our people. They are to be regarded as enemies... We must thus deal with them the same way we would with any enemy, that is, by separating, educating and co-opting elements that can be won over..., neutralizing any reluctant elements..., and isolating and and eradicating only the smallest number...who determinedly oppose the revolution... and collaborate with foreign enemies to oppose their own nation.(44) Pol Pot's references to the "contradictions" which continued to exist in Democratic Kampuchea,

215 even two years after the Khmer Rouge victory, would seem to further link him to Mao's Cultural Revolution and to Mao's tract "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." Mao's view, that there continued to be contradictions among the classes even after the socialist transformation of ownership, was viewed by Cultural Revolution radicals as a major extension of the theoretical work of Lenin and Stalin. (45) Moreover, it provided the rationale for continued use of violence and purge, since they were viewed as necessary to eliminate those contradictions. An analysis of Pol Pot's speech indicates that he identified four major contradictions, each of which he dealt with means of violence: 1. The contradiction between the peasants and the upper classes and ruling strata of the old society which continued to exist even in the new agricultural communes. To eliminate this contradiction, Pol embarked on a campaign to identify and eliminate former soldiers, government workers, intellectuals and anyone with an education. 2. The contradiction between Democratic Kampuchea and foreign "imperialists and reactionaries", which presumably included Thailand, the U.S., the Soviet Union and Vietnam. To deal with these potential problems, Cambodia sought self sufficiency and a constant vigilance to protect its borders and brutal treatment of those who represented them, i.e. former members of the Lon Nol government. 3. The contradiction between individualism and collectivism, i.e. between private ownership of land and "socialist ownership". Here the targets of Pol Pot's efforts were the peasants including the poor peasants who had to be forced to accept the new economic regimen and produce goods under it. Pol Pot used terror, executions and the threat of death to force villagers and peasants to conform to his new society. 4. The contradiction within his own Party between those supporting him and those opposing him, whom he saw as siding with the Vietnamese. Prince Sihanouk saw this originally as a split between the army and the Party. Pol implemented violent purges deep into the Party in an effort to resolve this contradiction. (46) Whether there were any links between the Vietnamese and Cambodian Communist cadres in September 1977, Pol Pot clearly saw such a connection as the major threat to his power, for he referred to it as a

216 "life or death matter."(47) He sought to eliminate this contradiction through a second purge. Eventually it drove some members of his own senior Party councils and military leadership into cooperation with the Vietnamese. This, combined with Pol's predilection for irritating Hanoi through increasingly serious border confrontations, eventually convinced Vietnam to attack on Christmas Day of 1978 and end the three and one-half years of Pol Pot's rule. IMPLEMENTING VIOLENCE While Pol Pot and his most trusted subordinates designed and developed the violent revolution that Cambodia experienced, they could not carry out all of the executions and harsh policies by themselves. In dealing with dissent in the Party and major opposition figures, Pol Pot employed a secret security organization known as Nokorbal, which among other functions ran Tuol Sleng prison. To carry out policy and executions in the communes, the Party extensively used very young "Red Guard" type cadres (often 12-15 years old) under the direction of the commune administration. These youths, who were almost always strangers to the area which they served, were organized in squads known as Chlorbs. They provided security in the communes, gathered intelligence about potential dissidents and carried out executions and punishment. The Secret Police Unlike the "Secret Police" or public security organs which tend to have a well defined place and an encompassing role in a "western" type revolution (e.g. Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany), in countries like Cambodia following the "eastern" model the secret police apparatus tends to exist in a much more nebulous circumstances.(48) The evidence circulated suggests that a special secret police apparatus did exist within Cambodia but that its primary functions were limited to maintaining security within the party apparatus and handling high level political dissidents and fewer government officials. It does not appear that the existence of Nokorbal — as it was called — was widely known by the general population. For them, the authority that implemented Pol Pot's Policies was the Communist Party leadership and the village militia or Chlorbs. the youthful cadres who were usually recruited from other areas and then inserted into villages previously unknown to them and where they would have no compunctions about carrying out tough

217 or harsh policies. Nokorbal seems to have a prominence shortly after the attempt to overthrow Pol Pot in late 1976.(49) Nokorbal carried out the extensive Party purge that followed the coup attempt and probably conducted a second purge in 1978 aimed at those who might be considering transfering allegiance to Hanoi. This first purge actually seemed to take place in several phases. In late 1976 some of the most senior of the suspected conspirators were taken to the Tuol Sleng school in Phnom Penh which was Pol Pot's main "torture and execution center." It seems certain that Hu Nim — the former Minister of Information — was executed there as well as Hou Yuon and probably most of the other plotters. According to one report: When Pol Pot's former Information Minister Hou (sic) Nim was executed in 1977, his torturers reported to Brother Deuch (the Center's head) that they had 'lashed him four or five times to break his stand, before having him filled up with water'. (50) Public acknowledgement that Hou Yuon was also executed came from four former members of the Khmer Communist administration who reportedly told a conference in France that "the former Minister of the Interior and the Minister for Co-operatives in Kampuchea had been accused of 'treason' and 'shot'."(51) These executions of senior officials were followed by many others according to a prisoner who worked at Tuol Sleng. Documents found after the Vietnamese captured Phnom Penh indicated that more than 20,000 other Cambodians were systematically killed at Tuol Sleng from 1975 to 1979.(52) According to one report the victims, passed over iron beds on which they were beaten and tortured with electrical shocks, passed through tiny cells where they were left in chains without food to starve and rot, among them Khmer Rouge Ministers, Ambassadors and high functionaries who were accused of 'treason.' The report continued that among the records at Tuol Sleng are more than 16,000 dossiers on victims, dozens of boxes of photographs of people prior to and after execution, among them 1200 pictures of children, some of them under 10 years of age. (53) Another report by a Westerner who was able to visit Phnom Penh after the defeat of Pol Pot,

218 indicated that "four out of five prisoners brought to Tuol Sleng were Khmer Rouge supporters..."(54) Still another report indicated that "Brother" Deuch, the head of the "torture center," was a well educated university graduate from Kompong Thorn; he was also reported to be head of Nokorbal. the secret police system in Cambodia and as such "responsible for the deaths of as many as one million people."(55) Deuch had "200 likeminded interrogators and torturers" working under him. His right hand man was Mam Nay, "a former teacher," Peng, "who used a butcher's knife to kill prisoners," and "a woman known as 'Yek' who was in charge of killing women." According to the report: Thousands of prisoners were tortured into making preposterous confessions, often that they were agents for the CIA, the Soviet KGB and the Vietnamese — all at once. Then, ever the schoolmaster, Deuch would carefully go through the confessions 'correcting' them with a red pen and suggesting improvements here and there, which meant further torture. Finally the victims would be killed, often in gruesome fashion. Ing Pech, the lone survivor of the Center, said that when Deuch indicated someone had made an "error" and had to be re-educated, that meant they would be "crushed to bits after torture."(56) After disposing of the coup leaders at Tuol Sleng, and learning the names of other coconspirators in the provinces, Pol Pot moved to the next step in his purge, the mass removal and execution of Party leaders in those provinces and eventually throughout the country. Beginning in March 1977, "new" Khmer Communist cadres descended upon selected areas and arrested large numbers of Party officials, village and hamlet leaders and, even soldiers. They were tied up and led away, often to be executed. For about four months this purge continued with formerly trusted Party cadres disappearing overnight. In some instances the new leadership, which for the first time included women at some villages and districts, explained that the "old" officials had been removed because they were lax in not executing all the former officials of the Phnom Penh government. Others, near the Thai border, were accused of secret trading relationships with Siamese businessmen or allowing too many people to escape across the border. Still others were more straightforward in saying that the former officials had tried to revolt.

219 According to one former Communist official, Hui Pan, who served as a village chief in Siem Reap Province, the purge began in February, 1977 when 50 or so Siem Reap officials were ordered to Phnom Penh. They were soon replaced by "new Khmer Rouge" leaders.(57) Many other changes took place during the time the Khmer Rouge leaders were preparing to celebrate the second anniversary of their coming to power. Khem Chhommali, a refugee from Kampong Cham, said that: Between the 6th and the 17th of April, all of the 'Old Khmer Rouge' were suddenly removed. We don't know what happened but they say the old srok. (district) chief had died and that the old Khmer Rouge had tried to make a new revolution. I heard that 500 village chiefs and 1,000 soldiers were taken away in Damban (region) 106.(58) Chuk Han, a Khmer Communist military who fled to Thailand, added that

commander

In my province of Oddor Meanchey, many people simply disappeared. Five hundred military chiefs and ordinary soldiers linked to the Khmer Rouge had their hands tied up and were taken away for execution. The arrests continued throughout May, June and July.(59) Khem Chhommali offered additional evidence that many of these "old cadres" were put to death, claiming that he saw a mass grave containing the bodies of about 70 former Khmer Rouge leaders.(60) Refugees Im Vin and Chhoeng Sokhom Theavey from northeastern Cambodia reported that the purge was carried out in that part of the country as well during April and May of 1977. A local Party cadre admitted that the commanders of the northern and northeastern regions had been executed along with some senior Party officials "accused of revisionism and plotting to overthrow the government."(61) Im Vin recounted overhearing Khmer Rouge soldiers at Stung Treng discussing the execution of 25 Party cadres for participation in a conspiracy headed up by some "ministers." (62) Purifying the Population With the purge mostly completed by the end of summer in 1977, Pol Pot turned his attention to upgrading agricultural cooperatives to larger communes, and eliminating the remainder of the population with connections to the "old society."

220 While the new leaders in the communes seemed more lenient at first, it soon became more apparent that if anything, they would be more violent than their predecessors. Refugee Hui Pan said, Under the old Khmer Rouge, only about 30% of the soldiers who had served in Lon Nol's army had been killed. But the new Khmer Rouge is worse, and under their rule all the Lon Nol soldiers are being hunted down. The new Khmer Rouge is killing all former policemen, soldiers, government officials, teachers, students, monks. If anyone is found to be an agent, he must be killed.(63) Refugee Theavey, himself a former school teacher, echoed this philosophy, "The Communists would keep telling the people about the Maoist principle that if you want to tear out the weed, you must go for the roots." Khem Chhommali added that during meetings the "new Khmer Rouge" repeatedly emphasized that Phnom Penh was dedicated to destroying "the old rich classes." As one cadre put it, "we must destroy these people to destroy the class". (64) Henry Kamm, the Pulitzer prize winning reporter from the New York Times who covered Cambodia from 1975 to 1980, concluded after interviewing numerous refugees that, Detailed narratives of mass killings of enemies give rise to an impression that the regime had lost what inhibitions it may have had in its early stages and is conducting mass slayings without regard to the presence of witnesses. A number of refugees reported that officials were more and more openly speaking of a need to kill great numbers of Cambodians. Mr. Sen Smean (from Battambang Province's Ampil District) said that Nan, the late District Chief, had announced early last year (1977) that of the 15,000 people of the district, 10,000 would have to be killed as enemies and that 6,000 of them had already perished. 'We must burn the old grass and the new will grow', Nan said, according to Mr. Sen Smean.(65) Kamm pointed out that "the principal targets for extermination" continue to be intellectuals, soldiers in the Lon Nol army and former government officials. But Kamm added that

221 A devastating new element that emerges from the refugees accouts of the last year (1977-1978) is that the regime now appears to be methodically killing wives and children, many long after the husbands were killed. Mr. San Daravong said that toward the end of last year he had witnessed the killing of 108 wives and children of former soldiers outside the village of Chba Leu, situated about 10 miles east of the town of Siem Reap in the midst of the Angkar temple complex. He said the victims had been led to a dike, their arms tied to their sides and pounded to death with big sticks in groups of 10 by a small group of soldiers. Some of the small children, he said, had been thrown into the air and impaled on bayonets; others were held by their feet and swung to the ground until dead.(66) Other refugees indicated to Kamm that even living in proximity to former government leaders could be sufficient cause for elimination. For example, Mr. Okeum said that he came from the district of Siem Reap Province where former President Lon Nol was born. He said that to celebrate the second anniversary of their victory in April 1977, the Communists had killed the entire population of the former leader's village ...(Okeum) said that the district chief, who was later killed himself, announced that the villagers had been slain because all were relatives of Lon Nol. Throughout the district, Mr. Okuem said, about 350 families had been killed on that occasion, their family names recorded by authorities and displayed at the anniversary rally.(67) Kamm's analysis pointed out that, in addition to deaths by execution, the constant hunger and disease caused considerable suffering and death in the new larger agricultural communes with their communal kitchens and poor rice crops.(68) In Siem Reap, Malaria, cholera, diarrea, tuberculosis and enfeeblement from pervasive malnutrition took a catastrophic toll in the district of Banteai Srie...(A) former (medical) student said that children, particularly infants, suffered the most cruelly from illnesses and died in frightening numbers. He said that infant mortality was

222

particularly high because mothers, as a result of malnutrition had little milk and no substitutes were available.(69) Tuay Mien, the commune head from Thma Poek, said that as early as April he was ordered to survey the 900 families in his cooperative to identify "suspicious elements." The list was to include "all individuals and their families — who were former regulars in the Lon Nol army, minor officials, school teachers, village headmen of 10 family units in areas under Lon Nol's control and anyone educated or trained in Thailand or Vietnam." After conducting a house to house census, relying on every third house to cross check the others, Tuay Mien finished with 700 families on his list. (70) The Youth Movement Pol Pot, Khieu Samphan and the relatively small number of Khmer students that studied in Paris could not carry out all of the executions and harsh practices by themselves. In forming these Chlorbs (militias) to carry out these tasks, the Khmer Rouge turned to the youngest members of the poorest levels of Cambodian society to recruit cadres who would willingly destroy the old society because they resented it and had little stake in it. As Mao turned to youthful cadres and Red Guards in carrying out both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Pol Pot sought out those from the bottom rung of society. Here Pol appears to have been relying on the underlying concept of ressentiment — "the secret envy against those more favored than myself," articulated by Nietzche.(71) Pol Pot may have found such a group in the hill people and poor Khmer living in northeastern Cambodia. In the 1960's Pol Pot's main base of operation was in this area and he sought to exploit many of the grievances these people felt toward the central government. In an interview with Yugoslav journalists in 1978, Pol Pot said that after leaving Phnom Penh in 1963, "My backing was in the region of the national minorities, that is the north-east region."(72) It was there that Pol Pot came in direct contact with the peasants and mountain people that comprised perhaps Cambodia's poorest, most disadvantaged and illiterate population. Pol Pot later recounted how he found some women in Phum Krava village whose husbands had been arrested and taken away by the Sihanouk police. Pol Pot stated that he advised them to "fight peacefully through the Parliament," but they retorted "How could they fight through the

223 Parliament if they had never seen Phnom Penh?" Pol said he gave them precise directions on how to get to the home of Chau Sen Kosal, the Speaker of the House, and the women went there and staged a sit in for three or four days. As Pol Pot told it, Chau Sen Kosal finally saw that he would have to help these women in order to get rid of them and finally helped them get their husbands back. Pol then explained that the point of the story was that these ...completely illiterate people who did not have even the slightest idea of the cities, automobiles, Phnom Penh and Parliament, dared to fight under the guidance of the Party. This force was invincible. It could succeed in everything.(73) Pol Pot had discovered the untapped power of one of the most malleable elements in Cambodian society — the uneducated, mountain peasant. His experience in dealing with the women of Phum Krava helped develop an ideological bond between perhaps the most highly literate group of people in Cambodia — the former Parisian students — and the least educated. It was a partnership that Pol was to develop and cultivate over the years and ultimately it provided the force which carried out the campaign of violence that Pol Pot designed. Pol Pot had discovered a group of people with little stake in the monarchical society and whom he perceived could be easily convinced to follow his plans. In short, they were the perfect revolutionaries. Gerald Brisse has written that the Khmer Rouge had been cleverly playing on old historic grudges of the minority population in Cambodia's high plateaus (the Khmer Loeus). This was a fairly nomadic population planting burnbeat fields (in Ratanakiri, Mondolkiri), or picking cardamom pods (in Pur sat, Koh Kong, Kompong Speu, and Kampot). They envied the much more prosperous inhabitants of the plains (Khmer Kandal). The people of the high plateaus were much sought after, much worked on by special services of every variety; they formed the pool from which the Enmer. Rouge fo_und it£ future cadres. They were uneducated cadres, used moving around. Instructed in hatred, they behaved like. brutes.(74) (Emphasis added) Sihanouk himself echoed this point by stating that "the most fanatic Khmer Rouge soldiers were from the mountain and forest regions." (75) At another

224 stage in the same volume, Sihanouk advanced three reasons why the Khmer Rouge were so successful in developing fierce soldiers and cadres: The Method of Recruitment: Poor peasants, mountain people, the inhabitants of forest regions, and the most remote villages, those most 'neglected' by the old regime, were exclusively recruited. To what end? Clever propaganda filled their hearts and minds with a seething, unquenchable hatred for the 'upper classes': those who were well housed, clothed and fed; who could send their children to school, not needing them at home to help in the fields or tend the cattle or buffalo; who owned real and personal property, had servants etc.; who could easily pay their taxes or who collected them; those who administered or governed — in a word- the 'oppressors'. The Use of Children: Once they were enlisted in the revolutionary army, these children were separated from their families, removed from their home villages to Pol Pot's indoctrination camps. They began their military careers at the age of twelve. Taken in hand so young, these Yotheas (youth) were convinced before long that the Party was doing them the greatest of honors by naming them Oppakar Phdach Kar Robas Pak, literally, 'the dictatorial instrument of the Party.' The School for Cruelty... Pol Pot and Ieng Sary quite rightly thought that if they trained their young recruits on cruel games, they would end up as soldiers with a love of killing and consequently of war. During the three years I spent with the Khmer Rouge under guard, I saw those guarding my "camp" constantly take pleasure in tormenting animals... The Khmer Rouge loved to make their victims suffer as much as possible...(76) Further confirmation of this emphasis on youth and the recruiting and training of them came from an early assessment of the Khmer Rouge activities in the villages. It pointed out that as early as 1973 the Khmer Rouge: ...began a program of intensive political training for young men and women which involved taking them from their home hamlets to remote indoctrination centers...youths returning from these sessions were fierce in their condemnation

225 of religion and 'the old ways'; rejected parental authority; were passionate in their loyalty to the state and party; were critical and contemptuous of customs; and had a militant attitude which expressed confidence in mechanical weapons and rejected the mystical aspects of religion. (77) Later in his book, Sihanouk provided details of the kinds of cruelty practiced by those young cadre and how they got that way: As early as the 1960's, Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan had made up their minds to eliminate any obstacles in their path toward total domination of Kampuchea. Torture games became their principal training tool. Young recruits began 'hardening their hearts and minds' by killing dogs, cats and other edible animals with clubs or bayonets. Even after their April 1 7 , 1975 victory, the Khmer Rouge kept in practice with a game consisting of throwing animals into 'the fires of hell", since they had no human victims handy. I witnessed one instance of this at the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh where I was under house arrest in 1976. The. . .political commissar. . . and his men took great pleasure in catching mice, shutting them in a cage and setting fire to it. They seemed to love watching the mice run around in circles, desperately and hopelessly looking for a way out, then die in the flames. They played this game every day. Another favorite game was torturing monkeys, so much like humans in their reactions. Their tails were hacked off. They were chained by the neck and strangled as they ran behind their young captors, who pulled harder and harder on the chains. The screams of the poor beasts were heart rendering. The sight and sound of them were unbearable. But the young Khmer Rouge Yotheas couldn't get enough of it.(78) These young cadres put their torture to work on humans as well, as Sihanouk explains: Khmer Rouge atrocities in Cambodia from 1975 through 1977, involving the innocent inhabitants of border villages, can be explained by the fact the Yotheas were addicted to. torture (emphasis added). For years their chief entertainment had been the physical suffering of men and animals . . .the Khmer Rouge Yotheas were given the go

226 ahead to do whatever they wanted to any Vietnamese men and women they encountered. . . Khmer Rouge soldiers would rape a Vietnamese woman, then ram a stake or bayonet into her vagina. Pregnant women were cut open, their unborn babies yanked out and slapped against the dying mother's face. The Yotheas also enjoyed cutting the breasts off well endowed Vietnamese women. Vietnamese fishermen who fell into the hands of the Khmer Rouge were decapitatad.(79) Other evidence tends to support the thesis that the Khmer Rouge used very young, often illiterate cadres to carry out their programs. Peang Sophi, a Cambodian refugee who escaped to Thailand described most of the Khmer Rouge cadres he had contact with as "real country people, from far away"—illiterate, out of touch and ill at ease. (80) To make his point, Sophi indicated that the cadres were so unused to even the most rudimentary aspects of modern life that They were scared of anything in a bottle or tin can. Something in a tin can had made one of them sick, so they mistook a can of sardines, with a picture of a fish on it, for fish poison, and one of them asked a friend of mine to throw it out. I saw them eating toothpaste once, and as for reading, I remember them looking at documents upside down.(81) A long time European observer of Indochina echoed Peang Sophi's observation of the background of these Khmer Rouge cadres, when he reported that refugees said "red guards" who guarded the new agricultural communes under Pol Pot . . .are very low level cadres, summarily indoctrinated; most of them come from the poorest, most backward regions. . .Incapable of carrying on a discussion with better educated and more perceptive people, they tend to take to hitting rather than discussing. They envisage a physical liquidation of the 'class enemy'. . . The guards are, indeed, very conscious of the general hostility of the population, which they cannot manage except through terror.(82) Yean Sok, another refugee, described the Chlorbs (those who ensure security) and their power this way: . . .they have complete supremacy over people (in the village): children, women, young girls and boys. Most of the chlorbs are themselves

227 boys less than 15 years old and belonging to the 'old' population.(83) Dith Pran, a New York Times employee who remained inside Cambodia during the entire rule of Pol Pot, stressed that these young Khmer Rouge cadres were the most brutal. In comments made to Sydney Schonberg, with whom he worked prior to the fall of Phnom Penh Pran says he was always most afraid of those Khmer Rouge soldiers who were between 12 and 15 years old; they seemed to be the most completely and savagely indoctrinated. 'They took them very young and taught them nothing but discipline. Just take orders, no need for a reason. Their minds have nothing inside except discipline. They do not believe any religion or tradition except Khmer Rouge orders. That's why they kill a mosquito. I believe they did not have any feelings about human life because they were taught only discipline'.(84) Dith Pran told of other ways in which the senior Khmer Rouge made use of the young cadres: Children were encouraged, even trained, to spy and report on their parents for infractions of the rules. 'The Khmer Rouge were very clever', Pran says. 'They know that young children do not know how to lie to keep secrets as well as adults, so they always ask them for information'. Informers, old and young, were everywhere; betrayal could be purchased for a kilo of rice.(85) To demonstrate just how total the control the Khmer Rouge had over these youths was, Dith Pran told Schanberg that Sometimes Khmer Rouge youths were ordered to kill their teachers or even their own parents. Some carried out these acts without apparent qualm. Others were devastated. Pran remembers a case in his district in which a man was identified as an enemy of the commune and his son, a Khmer Rouge soldier, was told to execute him. He did so, but later alone, he put the rifle to his own head and killed himself.(86) All of the above information strongly suggests that Pol Pot and his highly educated followers in the Cambodian Communist Party relied on the youngest and least literate elements of Khmer society to impose their programs and policies. Furthermore, these

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228 young cadres, as a result of strict indoctrination and discipline and a minimum stake in the existing society, were willing to use terror, violence and execution to enforce their will and carry out the orders given them by their superiors.

Thus there emerges an explanation for the terror and violence that swept Cambodia during the 70's. A small group of alienated intellectuals, enraged by their perception of a totally corrupt society and imbued with a Maoist plan to create an egalitarian socialist order, recruited extremely young, poor and envious cadres and instructed them in harsh and brutal methods perhaps learned from Stalinist Russia. Then they used them to destroy the cultural order of Khmer civilization and to impose the new order in as short a time as possible. NOTES 1. Translation of a document belonging to the Khmer Rouge Deputy Commander of the 2nd Company, 712th battalion, 603rd Regiment, 174th Brigade, North Region. 2. Ibid. Two other "missions" for the Party were listed as leading the work to reconstruct the economy and controlling the armed forces to defend the borders of the country. 3. FBIS. Asia and Pacific (October 4, 1 9 7 7 ) , pp H1-H5. This is a translation of a radio broadcast of a speech by Pol Pot on September 27, 1977. It is the single most important and revealing speech made by any Khmer Rouge leader. 4. FBIS, People's Republic of China, Vol. I, (October 3, 1977) pp. A 20-21. 5. Ibid. Pol Pot added that the Congress, held in Phnom Penh City, was attended by 21 deputies from around the country. 6. FBIS, People's Republic of China, Vol. I, (September 29, 1 9 7 7 ) , p. A-19. 7. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, War and Hope: The Cambodia, translated by Mary Feeney, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 7. 8. Ibid. p. 86. 9. "Cambodia's Organization," Far Eastern Economic Review. October 29, 1976. 10. Nayan Chanda, "Pol Pot Plays Up To Peking," Eat Eastern Economic Review. October 1 4 , 1977. 11. Ibid. 1 2 . FBIS, Asia and Pacific, (22 June 1 9 7 8 ) , p. H-l. 13. The author learned of these quotes directly from a Congressional staffer who visits China

229 often, speaks Mandarin and has established contacts with the Chinese officials involved. Hereafter cited as "Congressional Staffer." 14. The author attended the meeting which took place in Peking in Teng's office in late October, 1979. 15. Congressional Staffer. 16. William Shawcross, "Paradise Lost," New. Times., Nobember 1 3 , 1978, p. 25. 17. Basil Dmytryshyn, USSR: A Concise History. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 168. See also Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Comunist Systems, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970) p. 65-77. This study points out Mao's loss of power in 1958 because of the disastrous consequences of the Great Leap, which no doubt were also on Pol Pot's mind. 18. James Ring Adams, "How Did 13 Million Russians Disappear?". Des Moines Register, July 28. 1980, reprinted from Wall Street Journal. 19. Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems, p. 7. 20. Ibid. pp. 51, 59. 21. Ibid., p. 29. 22. James Adams, "How Did 13 Million Russians Disappear?" Des Moines Register. July 28, 1980. 23. See Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems, p. 6. 24. Prince Sihanouk, Hat and Hope., pp. 78-79, and Ben Kiernan, "Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement," Journal of Contemporary Asia, 10 (January 1980) . 25. Michel Oksenberg, "China: Forcing the Revolution to a New Stage," Asian Survey. 7 (January, 1967), p. 13. 26. Richard Baum, "Revolution and Reaction in the Chinese Countryside, the Socialist Education Movement in Cultural Revolutionary Perspective", China Quarterly. 38 (April/June 1969) , p. 101. 27. Slavko Stanic, "Cambodia, A Path Without a Model," Tanjug News Service (Belgrade) April 19, 1978, in FBIS, Asia and Pacific, (April 21, 1978) p. H-l. 28. "Cambodian Priests Gone, Temples Turned into Barns," Des Moines Register, April 1, 1978, quoting as Associated Press summary of Dragoslav Rancic's reports in Politika (Belgrade). 29. Ibid. 30. Kenneth Quinn, "Political Change in Wartime: The Khmer Rouge Revolution in Southern Cambodia, 19701974," Nasal Hat College Review. 28(Spring 1976). 31. "View From The Other Side," Asia Week. Hong Kong, December 2, 1977. For example, refugee Chek

230 Win, a former Khmer Rouge soldier who fled to Thailand told reporters that "Until 1975 we all thought we were fighting for Sihanouk." 32. See Kenneth Quinn, "Political Change in Wartime," Naval War College Review. 28(Spring 1 9 7 6 ) , for a detailed discussion of this process in villages in southern Cambodia. 33. Sydney Schanberg, "The Death and Life of Dith Pran," Tna New York Times Magazine. January 20, 1980. 34. Ibid. 35. Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems, p. 124. 36. U.S. Department of State, "The Khmer Krahom Program to Create a Communist Society in Southern Cambodia." 37. FBIS. Asia and Pacific, (October 4, 1 9 7 7 ) , p. H-30. 38. "Cambodia, How True?" Asia Week. December 2, 1977. 39. U.S. Department of State, telegram, Bangkok 18277, June 2 7 , 1978. 40. Ibid. 41. ZB1S, Asia and Pacific (October 4, 1 9 7 7 ) , pp. H-27, H-28. Others, including those Cambodians with allegiance to Hanoi, would argue that the Party was founded in 1951, making it the 26th anniversary. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., p. H-28. It is worth noting that 2% of the 1970 population of Cambodia would equal about 150,000 people trying to "subvert" the revolution. 44. Ibid. 45. Wen Shun Chi, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Ideological Perspective," Asian Survey. 9 (August 1 9 6 9 ) , p. 577. 46. Prince Sihanouk, Hat and Hope. p. 75 and p. 23. 47. FBIS, Asia and Pacific (October 4, 1 9 7 7 ) , p. H-28. 48. In a full discussion between "eastern" and "western" models of revolution see Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1 9 6 8 ) . 49. Patrice DeBeer, "Cambodia's Radical Secrecy," La Monde, August 21-22 and reprinted in the Guardian. September 4, 1977. This report states that General Kringsak Chamanand announced on August 19, 1977 that "an attempted coup d'etat" took place in Phnom Penh in February 1977. Other sources have suggested that it may have occurred in September 1976 which is the time that Pol Pot disappeared from public view. See Kenneth Quinn, "Cambodia 1976: Internal Consolidation and External Expansion," Asian Survey. 17(January 1 9 7 7 ) . 50. "Pol Pot's Hatchet Man," Newsweek. September

231 8, 1980, p. 42. 51. FBIS, Asia and Pacific (July 3, 1 9 7 8 ) , p. K-13, quoting a Radio Hanoi report on testimony given by Ear Soth and three other former Khmer Communist officials to a meeting of the International League for the Rights of Man in Paris. 52. Tiziano Terzani, "I Still Hear Screams in the Night," Der Spiegel. Hamburg, April 1 4 , 1980, carried in FBIS, Asia and Pacific, April 18, 1980, p. 15. 53. Ibid. 54. Peter T. White, "Kampuchea Wakens From a Nightmare," National Geographic, vol. 161., no. 5. (May, 1 9 8 2 ) , p. 600. 55. "Pol Pot's Hatchet Man," Newsweek. September 8, 1980 p. 42. 56. Ibid. 57. Barry Kramer, "Cambodian Communist Regime Begins to Purge Its Own Ranks While Continuing a Crack Down," Wall Street Journal. October 19, 1977. 58. "Cambodia: How True?" Asia Week, Hong Kong, December 2, 1977. 59. Michael Chinoy, "Killings Mark Cambodia Power Struggle," Los Angeles Times, November 16, 1977. 60. Barry Kramer, "Cambodian Communist Regime," Wall Street Journal. October 19, 1977. 61. "Cambodia, How True?", Asia Week, December 2, 1977. 62. Ibid. These "ministers" may have been a reference to Hu Nim who had not been mentioned publicly since January 1977, perhaps confirming that it was at that time that he was arrested, but more certainly to Koy Thoun whom the Cambodian Black Book identified as the assassination ring-leader. 63. Michael Chinoy, "Killings Mark Cambodia Power Struggle," Los Angeles Times, November 16, 1977. Interestingly, the Khmer Rouge also began to turn on ethnic Chinese and eliminate them as capitalist exploiters. 64. "Cambodia, How True?", Asia Week. December 2, 1977. 65. Henry Kamm, "Cambodia Refugees Depict Growing Fear and Hunger," New York Times. May 13, 1978. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. One refugee from Oddar Meachey province said the two daily meals in the communal kitchen consisted of "a watery rice gruel mixed with a few shoots and little vegetable." See "Cambodia, How True?", Asia Week. December 2, 1977. 69. Ibid. 70. Nations, "Another 40,000 'CIA Traitors'," Ear

232

Eastern Economic Review. August 25, 1978. 71. Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 505. 7 2 . Democratic Kampuchea, "Interview of Comrade Pol Pot to the Delegation of Yugoslav Journalists in Visit to Democratic Kampuchea," pp. 22-23. 73. FBIS, Asia and Pacific (October 4, 1 9 7 7 ) , p. H-14. 7 4 . Gerard Brisse, introduction, Prince Sihanouk's War and Hope. p. xxix. 75. Prince Sihanouk, War and Hope, p. 155. 76. Ibid., pp. 27-30. 77. Kenneth Quinn, "Political Change in Wartime," Naval War College REview. 28(Spring 1976), p. 13. 78. Prince Sihanouk, War and Hope. pp. 82-83. 79. Ibid., pp. 82-83 and p. 91. 80. David Chandler, Ben Kierman and Muy Hong Lim, The Early Phases of Liberation in Northwestern Cambodia: Conversations Kith Peang Sophi, (Melbourne: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Working Papers, No. 10. Undated), p. 3. 81. Ibid. 82. Jean Barre, "Le Cambodge au Pouvoir de Tout Petits Chefs" (Cambodia in the Hands of the Little Chiefs), Journal De eneve. March 4, 1976. 83. Yean Sok, "Letter to Mrs. Gaetana Enders," Chlorb is also a term used to designate soldiers, militia and defense forces at different levels of organization. The "old" population refers to those under Khmer Rouge control before April 1 7 , 1975 — those people were the most trusted by the Khmer Rouge. 84. Sydney Schanberg, "The Death and Life of Dith Pran," The New York Times Magazine. January 20, 1980. 85. Ibid. 86. Ibid.

9 Toward Creation of a Just Social Order: Politics of Education in the Chinese People's Republic Marshal Y. Shen

Terrorism and secret police are highly charged words. The persistence of such phenomena are fundamental to the development of the increasing power of the state. (1) Ironically, the more industrialized, the more "developed," the more "modern" a country becomes, the greater it falls into the trappings of the "national security syndrome;" and this is especially true of the world situation in the 20th century. The "national security syndrome" could be defined as those patterns of education and value learning, and of development of political, economic, social and cultural institutions which contribute to the alienation/self-alienation of a society, its primary symptoms are heavy emphasis on national security to the point of being paranoid, burgeoning mistrust accompanied by deceit, cynicism toward humankind in general, strong belief that one's survival depends upon one's ability to out-fox, outmaneuver one's opponents. Enemies are perceived to be ubiquitous (some would even cite Mao Zedong Thought); thus security is understood in terms of one's determination to engage in seemingly unending power struggles with the enemy. "Terrorism" is a major concern. Development of military and police power becomes paramount, hence a lopsided dependence on such forces. The outcome of this syndrome is in the final analysis, increasingly diminished security for the individual. Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen noted that in the international state system, "the balancing of police and military power continues to dominate policy."(2) This chapter examines how China responded to this This study draws on my doctoral dissertation, "Human Rights in the People's Republic of China: A Developmental Strategy," which will be completed at the University of California, Riverside at the end of 1984.

234 unfortunate development from an education perspective. It begins with an overview of oppressive and authoritarian elements in traditional China, followed by a brief look at the liberation of the Chinese masses from oppression and injustice of the Guomindang compounded by imperialism. The main focus of this study is liberation and education with particular attention on Mao Zedong Thought and how it compares to Western thinking, ideology and concepts. The chapter concludes with an analysis of Chinese politics and the perspectives from which it has been observed and interpreted. OVERVIEW OF OPPRESSIVE AND AUTHORITARIAN ELEMENTS IN TRADITIONAL CHINA Notwithstanding humanistic tendencies, oppression and authoritarianism in traditional China were sharp and primarily the results of three powerful forces: 1) the impingement of traditional customs; 2) the paramountcy of status and rank; and 3) the tyranny of the Chinese language and education.(3) Phillip Chen observed that in China, more than any other civilization, the pervasive influence of customs shaped the ordinary person's awareness and acceptance of ethical norms.(4) Chinese social thought or custom placed a premium on obligations and duties rather than on rights and prerogatives of the individual in relation to society.(5) Through this process feudalism in China was developed and maintained. In traditional China, "rights of an individual are all but unthinkable if in fact they jeopardize society or the state," commented Charles Moore.(6) Obligations and duties in turn were codified in a body of approved behavior patterns, li (forms of decorum), which were based on broad moral principles believed to be rooted in human nature. Hence, a dyadic code of law, li and fa. (law), prevailed in traditional China: the former was for the purpose of prevention of crimes, and the latter was punitive, dealing with crimes that had been committed.(7) It was believed that only through li could an orderly society be attained. According to Confucian ideology an orderly society was premised on the idea that a person's status must be clearly defined. Social status in effect determined an individual's rights, obligations and duties, and her or his entire way of life; and specific laws were enacted for this purpose.(8) Tung-tsu Chu explained that the Confucian school of thought denied that there ever could exist a society of uniformity and equality because intelligence, ability, and morality vary from person to person.(9) A natural hierarchy of people existed, distinguishing xiaren (inferior people) and junzi

235 (superior m e n ) . The latter, who were involved in mental work, were believed to have assumed greater responsibilities, and thus, received more abundant rewards and belonged to the ruling classes; while the former, who performed physical and menial tasks, were considered inferior and accordingly, received less and were the ruled. Ancient Chinese philosophers have argued that there was a scarcity of things and an abundance of desires and wants, hence that a division of labor plus differentiated consumption had to be established. Distribution was to be carried out in accordance with prescribed social status; in this way unity and a kind of harmony would be preserved. Contention was thought to incite disorder, thus causing poverty in the land. And if all things were made equal (i.e., social status), disorder would prevail. Li was then a basis of order and a function of status; and fa. was invoked when infraction of li occured.(10) In traditional China if one were lucky enough to overcome all other obstacles (especially difficult for women who were considered lower class people), language and education became vital tools which could enable a person to attain prestige and a better life. However, classical Chinese language, or wenyan. as opposed to the vernacular, or baihua, is extremely difficult and highly rigid; it cannot be appropriately expressed by interchanging to terms or use of synonyms. This "tyranny of language," as John Fairbank put it, was reinforced by an educational method that was both arduous and impractical, one which placed heavy emphasis on rote learning. Typically, students were first compelled to memorize the classics without comprehension; and only after characters had been mastered were their meanings defined and explored.(11) This kind of learning was invariable difficult, time-consuming, and required a high degree of perseverance. For those who labored long hours daily just to subsist, such education was nearly impossible. Such was the lot of the overwhelming majority of people in traditional China. They were hard working peasants, but were perpetually destitute, permanently indebted, and at the mercy of local tyrants, politicians and monopolists.(12) This abominable condition, later complicated by the insidious and merciless exploitation of imperialism abbetted by indigenous elements, extended well into the 20th century until the dormant anger and power of the suffering and oppressed masses ignited and swept across the country. In order to more fully appreciate the politics that had prevailed in China for millennia, Tung-tsu Chu offered this thought: "The ruling class and the ruled class dichotomy is a key concept in Chinese social and political thought, and its sociological significance should not be overlooked."(13) 1

236 LIBERATION OF THE CHINESE MASSES Defenders of the status quo frequently palliate existing oppressive and unjust conditions with the threat of instability, uncertainty, turmoil, confusion, and danger. Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang often told this to the masses of Chinese people prior to their debacle in 1949. Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists did not accept this reasoning. For Mao, instability, uncertainty and danger almost always accompanied change and transformation; and it was precisely change and transformation that China needed most. Conditions that beleaguered the majority of the Chinese people often times paled beyond the horror of our imagination. Injustice, cruelty, brutality, and degradation were everyday occurrences for millions upon millions of Chinese. (14) Although the Republican Revolution of 1911 ushered in a new form of government, Chinese society remained unchanged until the Chinese Communists took power. In the Republican period local landlords and officials continued to rule as before, except now they owed loyalty to presidents, generals, and warlords. In the "new" cities foreigners still enjoyed their special privileges and having their gunboats patrol Chinese waterways. (15) Consequently for Mao and the Chinese Communists their first priority was to eliminate foreign and feudal oppression. Mao stated that, All Communists and sympathizers with Communism in China must struggle to achieve the objective of the present stage; they must struggle against foreign and feudal oppression to deliver the Chinese people from their miserable colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal plight and establish a proletarian-led new democratic China whose main task is the liberation of the peasantry, a China of the revolutionary Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a China which is independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful. (16) Ultimately, conditions for the majority of the Chinese reached a point where they had nothing more to lose other than their own lives. National liberation rapidly swept the countryside and into the towns and cities. After China was declared a People's Republic on October 1, 1949, the new Chinese leadership was confronted with the enormous task of curing "the sick man of Asia." In battling the Guomindang forces since the late 1920s the Chinese Communists were able to learn many lessons with regard to the importance of organization, social and economic development, and

237 politics in command. Throughout their struggle with the powerfully equipped and U.S. backed GMD troops, Mao had persistently stressed that social and economic revolution went hand-in-hand with the taking of political power.(17) Priorities had to be established immediately after Liberation. The Chinese Communists faced overwhelming domestic and foreign problems. China was a large but poor and decrepit country, torn apart by a century of civil strife and foreign oppression. Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power relatively swiftly after the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, China was still not unified. Many people were still starving, sick and lacked attention, medical treatment and care for minimal human existence. To right the wrongs, to engender individual well-being, to set China on a path to recovery and growth, the Chinese Communists realized that mutual aid and self-reliance among the Chinese people were crucial. Ostensibly simple, cooperation among the Chinese was not easy to establish. Sun Yat-sen was so exasperated by the lack of unity and cooperation that he likened the Chinese people to a "heap of loose sand." The new leaders of China recognized that unity, cooperation, mutual aid and service and self-reliance come from cultural development and ultimately, from education.(18) If the Chinese people were to enjoy individual well-being the masses had to be liberated and transformed; and if China as a whole were to reconstruct, develop, and transform, its people must learn to share and cooperate with one another and work together as a collective force. This in essence was the dictum of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party. David Milton, Nancy Milton, and Franz Schurmann put it succinctly, Over 80 percent of China's population is rural its 20 percent urban population is greater than that of all Japan. One need only look at comparably big nations such as India, Brazil, or Indonesia, for example, to see what could have happened if China's liberation had not come in 1949. While the advanced urban sector might have leaped forward as it has in Brazil, the mass of the peasantry would have remained in rebellionbreeding stagnation. Though in the 1950's there were some leaders in China who advocated developing wherever feasible and taking care of the rest of the country later, Mao Tse-tung never departed from the conviction that the p e a s a n t s — all half billion of t h e m — w h o had given Chinese Communism victory had to move ahead as well s the city people.(19)

238 THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION Although there has been greater understanding of the Chinese Communist movement and its impact on China, Chinese people frequently were described by scholars and observers as being terrorized and driven like "blue ants" by highly organized and oppressive secret police networks.(20) These portrayals were derogatory, fallacious, and chauvinistic. All analyses must succumb to the level of consciousness of each analyst irrespective of their skill, intelligence and status. As our human societies became more industrialized and "modern," human elements (e.g., kindness, trust, community spirit, collective effort) were increasingly lost in the gush of "progress" and "growth." Human interests were superseded by the glitter of technology. We lost faith in ourselves, in the people around us, and in the belief that a better life is shared rather than divided and compartmentalized by private property and egocentrism. Although China was an immensely underdeveloped and "backward" country, its leaders and its people were relatively unimpressed with and not caught up in this "technology-crazed" syndrome. They perceived a unity in human interests however diverse, which "developed" societies had forgotten. They refused to be shackled by the so-called "legitimacy of conflict of interests" because such a framework could only serve to separate,divide and alienate people rather than unite them in a community. At the core of Chinese world outlook lay the belief that human interests cover an expansive common ground; and albeit the unity of human interests there is much diversity. We cannot appreciate Chinese radical humanist development if we don't understand our values, our outlook, and our priorities in a society, whose ideological principles are based on very different assumptions of life vis-a-vis the Chinese. Ruth Gamberg put it well, At this point of realization, we are forced to question some very basic assumptions about our own interpretations of life. As with any experience that shakes a well-established prejudice, we begin to look for the reasons for such taken-for-granted blinders. In my own case, the discovery of a people who seem to all say similar things, which are deeply meaningful to them but which would be mere slogans to most people in my own society, turned my attention to our use of certain key words and our feelings about them. Indeed, we may learn much about ourselves by actually encountering people like

239 the Chinese, who behave in ways so dissimilar from what we have been taught to expect of them. (21) Comparative Outlook on. Human Nature A critical aspect in understanding Chinese politics and their social system is to be able to comprehend their Weltanschauung, or rensheng guan. We need to understand our perceptual framework and come into contact with our own point of reference, paradigm, world view. Victor Li, in referring to his own study of Chinese law, put it eloquently, "The study of Chinese law provides not only a window into China, but also a mirror onto ourselves."(22) China historically had been predominantly a rural and agricultural country. Notwithstanding a few early inventions such as paper, block printing, gun power, the Industrial Revolution that so dramatically transformed Europe and North America basically had little impact on the Chinese society through the first two decades of the 20th century. An overwhelming majority of the population lived off the land, families stayed at a single locality for several generations, and folks shared a unifying cosmic philosophical outlook that comprised elements of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, yin-yang. and fengshui (geomancy). Development in the West, however, took a dramatic turn. Beginning in the 16th and 17th centuries in England and later spreading to continental Europe and still later to North America, the agricultural, commercial, and scientific and industrial innovations gradually but in a forceful and totalistic way transformed Western societies politically, economically, socially.(23) Along with the changes in social patterns these innovations eventually transformed people psychologically and psychically, particularly with the advent of mass migration off the land and into the towns and cities. This historical transformation of the human mind and spirit became increasingly crystallized in the form of alienation.(24) To understand alienation, particular attention must also be fiven to the all-pervasive Christian concept of "original sin." Although many "sophisticated" individuals insist that they are not encumbered by such a parochial idea, Western cultural parameters however challenge and refute such contention. The "original sin" concept has evolved into such a highly "developed" state that it is automatically diffused and synthesized into individual thought and emotional patterns.(25) Chinese ideological underpinnings, on the other hand,

240 had never been dominated and influenced by this concept other than the attempted super imposition by Western missionaries such as the Franciscans, the Dominicans, and the Jesuits beginning in the 16th and 17th centuries. For centuries the dominant belief in China was that human nature is basically good, and capable of being good. Mencius, the renowned champion of Confucianism, observed that, When left to follow its natural feelings human nature will do good. This is why I say it is good. If it becomes evil, it is not the fault of man's original capability. The sense of mercy is found in all men; the sense of shame is found in all men; the sense of respect is found in all men; the sense of right and wrong is found in all men.(26) The above passage revealed a sense of malleability in which the Chinese perceived human nature. Thus it was left to Mao to conclude that, There is only human nature in the concrete, no human nature in the abstract. In class society there is only human nature of a class character; there is no human nature above classes. We uphold the human nature of the proletariat and of the masses of the people, while the landlord and bourgeois classes uphold the human nature of their own classes, only they do not say so but make it out to be the only human nature in existence. The human nature boosted by certain petty-bourgeois intellectuals is also divorced from or opposed to the masses; what they call human nature is in essence nothing but bourgeois individualism, and so, in their eyes, proletarian human nature is contrary to human nature.(27) In the West the conception of the sinful nature of human beings had been reinforced by the Industrial Revolution, which created a qualitative change in the way in which a person's worthiness was perceived. People were increasingly measured on a basis of external elements (e.g., production for the sake of production, capital for the sake of capital, art for the sake of a r t ) . A things-oriented, as opposed to human-oriented, "can do" syndrome evolved. Increasingly, people were judged according to what they can do in terms of "industry"—and not according to the kind of person they are, their goodness with regard to how they treat others, their environment, as well as how they regard themselves. The dramatic changes prompted people to alienate

241 themselves as individuals from themselves as well as from one another. In its extreme forms alienation is qualitatively as well as quantitatively equivalent to terror and oppression. Alienation at best evolves into the "mefirst" syndrome in the West. It is praised because it is considered to be "innovative" and "creative," and condemned, not because of the fact that mainstream Western culture and its political, economic, and social institutions breed as well as thrive on such a syndrome, but because it is considered human nature. Unwilling to resolve sharp and fundamental systemic contradictions (e.g., freedom and license), the "mefirst" orientation had gradually evolved to become the standard on which democracy and freedom are measured in mainstream American politics. "And justice for all" often becomes justice for the powerful and the elite. That confusion over human rights has become an issue and a controversial subject demonstrates the depth of our alienation. The Chinese, however, suffered brutal consequences of alienation derived from Chinese feudal institutions (e.g., traditional family system) and later from foreign influences. They challenged the claim that inhumanity was innate in human beings, asserting that people were basically rational and humanity comes by way of people or human-oriented living and through nurturing and developing human consciousness along educational lines. It human nature is not "sinful," rigid or intractable, then the way which we perceive and treat each other, as well as regard ourselves, would be infinitely different. And if human nature were otherwise conceived, our political, economic and social institutions and culture can be radically different from established and existing patterns. The May 4th Movement in 1919, born out of outrage against Western and Japanese imperialism, ironically helped rekindle, renew as well as redirect faith in humanity that the Chinese had lost in the midst of foreign encroachment and civil strife. Li Dazhao (1888-1927, often referred to as the father of Chinese Marxism and Mao's mentor at Beijing University), Lu Xun (pseudonym of Zhou Shuren, 1881-1936, one of the most gifted and progressive radical writers in recent Chinese history), and Mao were most relevant to this process. Most Chinese intellectuals of the May 4th movement, regardless of their ideological persuasion, agreed that if China were to regain its independence and sovereignty, foreign encroachment, imperialism and many disparaging traditional modes of thinking (e.g., "dead-book" learning, inequitable social institutions and stratification) had to be removed

242 and expelled.(28) Most Chinese of Mao's generation would not have disagreed with his assessment of the two main contradictions that confronted China prior to 1949. Mao said in 1945 that, "today, two big mountains lie like a dead weight on the Chinese people. One is imperialism, the other is feudalism."(29) Many even agreed with him that pre1949 problems of China were more of the self-inflicted kind than of an exogenous nature; and therefore, what was needed to cure China of its sickness was structural and cultural revolution. However, not many of Mao's comrades were able to grasp the true meaning of "continuous revolution" or transformation at the personal and cultural levels. Mao perceived culture to be a vitally important aspect in the process of social transformation. Hence, in the development and creation of a just and humane social order an appropriate culture must emerge through the continuous liberation of individuals from their alienated and unfree past. Through education a new consciousness that is at the same time humane, unselfish and "mass-oriented" and resolutely determined—often referred to as the proletarian consciousness—must be developed. Mao declared, Any given culture (as an ideological form) is a reflection of the politics and economics of a given society, and the former in turn has a tremendous influence and effect upon the latter; economics is the base and politics the concentrated expression of economics. . . It follows that the form of culture is first determined by the political and economic form, and only then does it operate on and influence the given political and economic form.(30) From such a standpoint, one could readily perceive Mao's emphasis on the primacy of politics. Politics in Mao's thinking cannot be understood in the mainstream Western sense of the term. The often quoted, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," is probably one of the most misconstrued and misused statements. For Mao, socialist politics or politics of the "new person," cannot be devoid of moral, humane, and people oriented consciousness. Politics, understood as fundamentally involving social choices, also embraces our lives; the way we treat each other, as individuals, as groups, as governments. It is the way we treat our environment and all the things in it; the way we regard our selves. Politics relates to our perception of the world and how we develop and nourish it, and to the work and activities we do. It involves our attitudes, our values, and our being as a whole.

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Liberation and Education: Mao Zedong Thought* Of all things in the world, people are the most precious.... As long as there are people every kind of miracle can be performed. Mao Zedong (31) For Mao, liberation (jiefang) coupled with education were fundamental to development and transformation. Jiefang, means to untie, undo and let go, set free. The choosing of the term liberation, and not freedom, democracy, or human rights was not fortuitous but quite deliberate. Jiefang. a term avoided by Chiang Kai-shek, implies the involvement of oneself in the emancipation of oneself. People cannot be free if they are not determined to make themselves free and resolutely struggle for that freedom. Moreover, Mao did not believe genuine freedom could come about through partial liberation, diffused, trickle-down or otherwise. Liberation for one Chinese meant liberation of all Chinese. Therefore, liberation of the Chinese people can only come about through the liberation of the masses of peasants. Commenting on their decrepit condition, Mao said, It was under such feudal economic exploitation and political oppression that the Chinese peasants lived like slaves, in poverty and suffering, through the ages. Under the bondage of feudalism they had no freedom of person. The landlord had the right to beat, abuse or even kill them at will, and they had no political rights whatsoever. The extreme poverty and backwardness of the peasants resulting from ruthless landlord exploitation and oppression is the basic reason why Chinese society remained at the same stage of socio-economic development for several thousand years.(32) Education for Mao is total or holistic development of the person. Education in China is designed to develop and raise one's consciousness and awareness as well as learning new skills; it is the development of rational and humane consciousness (often referred to as "politics") toward the manner *With regard to this section, I would like to express thanks to Melvin Gurtov for his thoughtful suggestions. Of course, the responsibility for the ideas and manner of presentation is solely mine.

244 in which one's applies one's skills, the how, when, and where. Mao understood education as the process through which knowledge of oneself and the "objective reality" is obtained. It is a continuous process since change is constant and infinite. Because of the continuity and persistence of change, theoretical knowledge (through formal schooling and linear observations) is one-dimensional, lags behind objective reality and is therefore dependent on practical knowledge (active participation and involvement in work, manual labor, and activities of society). Only through the unity of these two types of knowledge, i.e., theory and practice, can one's consciousness achieve a kind of tangibility with objective reality. In this sense the unity of liberation and education is a concept not easily comprehended by linear-thinking oriented minds; hence that only through our involvement in changing reality that we can come to witness reality. Change and reality have become one. Mao put it this way, If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of things directly, you must personally participate in the practical struggle to change reality, to change that thing or class of things, for only thus can you come into contact with them as phenomena; only through personal participation in the practical struggle to change reality can you uncover the essence of that thing or class of things and comprehend them. This is the path to knowledge which every man actually travels...(33) Ultimately, education served the purpose of continually awakening and enlightening a person. This was particularly important in light of China's deep-rooted feudal past that unconditionally stressed harmony, self-repression and compromise, characteristics which in the past nostalgic Westerners frequently mistook as Chinese docility. Richard Solomon noted that hostility and quarreling according to traditional principles were impermissible and often invoked swift punishment. In Confucian family tradition children were brought up with the emphasis on harmony,and in arguments the issue of right and wrong was often made secondary and circumvented by the idea of rang (to yield, give ground). Yielding and harmonious behavior were instilled into children as great virtues. (34) Human will and Voluntarism Implicit in Mao Zedong Thought is the idea that through education one achieves awareness and

245 consciousness which in turn induce a person to take action and change reality. Knowledge, the outcome of education, is unified with action. This assumption is not unique in post-Liberation China. NeoConfucianist, Wang Yangming (1472-1529) in replying to one of his students said: "I have said that knowledge is the crystallization of the will to act and action is the task of carrying out that knowledge; knowledge is the beginning of action and action is the completion of knowledge."(35) However, the linkage of knowledge, will and action did not become an inspiration to the Chinese people until the forming in 1921 of the Chinese Communist Party, of which Mao was one its founding members. To Mao, the human will was elemental to all endeavours of life. Characteristically, Mao recalled the ancient Chinese fable, "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains," for his illustration, It tells of an old man who lived in northern China long, long ago and was known as the Foolish Old Man of North Mountain. His house faced south and beyond his doorway stood the two great peaks, Taihang and Wangwu, obstructing the way. He called his sons, and hoe in hand they began to dig up these mountains with great determination. Another greybeard, known as the Wise Old Man, saw them and said derisively, 'How silly of you to do this! It is quite impossible for you few to dig up these two huge mountains.' The Foolish Old Man replied, 'When I die, my sons will carry on; when they die, there will be my grandsons, and then their sons and grandsons, and so on to infinity. High as they are, the mountains cannot grow any higher and with every bit we dig, they will be that much lower. Why can't we clear them away?' Having refuted the Wise Old Man's wrong view, he went on digging every day, unshaken in his conviction. God was moved by this, and he sent down two angels, who carried the mountains away on their backs.(36) What emanates from a person's liberation, knowledge, determination, and conviction is something often described as voluntarism. Mao stated that, We must first raise the political consciousness of the vanguard so that, resolute and unafraid of sacrifice, they will surmount every difficulty to win victory. But this is not enough; we must also arouse the political consciousness of the entire people so that they may willingly and gladly fight together with us for victory. We should fire the whole people

246 with the conviction that China belongs not to the reactionaries but to the Chinese people.(37) Stuart Schram observed that voluntarism accented by conscious action was apotheosized in Mao's concept of revolution (i.e., liberation and transformation). (38) From such a standpoint it becomes evident that the unity of liberation, education and human will emerges out of voluntarism through which human beings become the creators of objective reality: Men are not the slaves of objective reality. Provided only that men's consciousness be in conformity with the objective laws of the development of things, the subjective activity of the popular masses can manifest itself in full measure, overcome all difficulties, create the necessary conditions, and carry forward the revolution. In this sense, the subjective creates the objective.(39) Liberation and transformation cannot be truly realized without continual and conscientious struggle. Contradictions. Identity. Struggle Basic to Mao's concept of liberation and transformation are contradiction and struggle. To Mao, contradiction is universal and absolute and it carries a two-fold meaning. It exists in the process of development of all things, while at the same time, in the process of development of each thing, a movement of opposites exists from the beginning to the end. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction, and nothing could exist without it. A contradictory aspect cannot exist in isolation because without its opposite, that aspect loses its existence or identity. Hence he variously called these pairs of contradictions "interconnected," "interpenetrating," "interpermeating," and "interdependent." It is only through contradiction that identity emerges.(40) Struggle persists in identity, and the struggle of contradictory aspects, as well as their interdependence, determines the life or conditions of all things and pushes their development forward. So for Mao, the pivotal issue is what specific kinds of contradictions are present in a thing or situation, and how things in contradiction transform into their opposites. Consequently, it was only in the context of oppression and oppressors that the first statement, "Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?" was made in Mao's works.

Moreover, different kinds of contradictions (e.g., "antagonistic" and "non-antagonistic") cannot all be treated in the same way since each has its own particular essence and each aspect in the contradiction has its own characteristics. For Mao, qualitatively different contradictions could only be resolved by qualitatively different methods (e.g., personal struggle, educational struggle, redistribution struggle, armed struggle, e t c . ) . It was precisely through the understanding of contradictions that enabled Mao and comrades to reach out to and provoke the masses into examining their wretched and debilitating existence and doing something about it. Liberalism and Individualism versus Liberation and Community An important issue in Mao's concept of liberation and transformation is freedom or the will to be free. Mao does not perceive freedom as it is understood in the Western laissez-faire democratic tradition. Freedom is something genuinely positive; it is not taken at the expense of other people but achieved with them and with their interests in mind. Freedom, therefore, is highly rational as well as moral, and is judged by its humanity. For Mao, genuine freedom can only be attained through continual and conscientious struggle by a community of people and with a kind of socialist orientation and order. It is not enough simply to understand the necessity of liberation and philosophize on issues of justice, compassion, equality, fairness and human rights. Mao said, Mankind is still in its infancy. Engels spoke of moving from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, and said that freedom is the understanding of necessity. This sentence is not complete, it only says one half and leaves the rest unsaid. Does merely understanding it make you free? Freedom is the understanding of necessity and the transformation of necessity — o n e has some work to do too... When you discover a law, you must be able to apply it, you must create the world anew... Thus it is that only by transformation can freedom be obtained... It won't do just to understand necessity, we must also transform things.(41) Mao was not at all interested in or impressed by society that functions on the basis of a priori notions or theoretically in conformity with a variety of legal codes and institutions. Such social-legal

248 formulation grants freedom to all, but in reality institutional patterns and arrangements are biased in such a way that freedom and rights are monopolized by an elite minority whose power and dominance are results of the political-economic relations of capital and property accumulation. For Mao, "freedom is won by the people through struggle, it is not bestowed by anyone as a favour."(42) A primary focus of Mao and his comrades throughout their struggle for liberation of the Chinese masses was the inequitable land system. The rapid allegiance of the people to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was to a large extent achieved through effective and fair methods in dealing with the land problem. CCP land reform policies were successful mainly because they were premised on the principle of "self-reliance," or zili gengsheng, and on the belief that genuine change comes about only through people desiring to be masters of their own lives and destinies, and accordingly, wanting to make changes. As Mao put it the role of the CCP should only be like that of a facilitator who "draw(s) the bow without shooting, just indicate(s) the motions. It is for the peasants themselves to cast aside the idols, pull down the temples to the martyred virgins and the arches to the chaste and faithful widows; it is wrong for anybody else to do it for them."(43) While attaining a high level of political consciousness should be guided by the CCP, as the embodiment of humane and moral principles and practices, the initiative of removing exploitative and inhumane institutions and practives must be left to the people themselves. The CCP should not give them orders or do it for them. For instance, Mao noted that, "to bestow rent reduction as a favour instead of arousing the masses to achieve it by their own action is wrong, and the results will not be solid."(44) Ultimately, said Mao, We must bring about a political climate which has both centralism and democracy, discipline and freedom, unity of purpose and ease of mind for the individual, and which is lively and vigorous. We should have this political climate both within the Party and outside. Without this political climate the enthusiasm of the masses cannot be mobilized. Without democracy there cannot be any correct centralism because people's ideas differ, and if their understanding of things lacks unity then centralism cannot be established... If there is no democracy, if ideas are not coming from the masses, it is impossible to establish a good line, good general and specific policies and

249 method. Our leading organs merely play the role of a processing plant in the establishment of a good line and good general and specific policies and methods.... If we fail to promote democracy in full measure, then will this centralism and this unification be true or false? Will it be real or empty? Will it be correct or incorrect? Of course it must be false, empty and incorrect. (45) Therefore, only through unity, democracy and struggle can freedom be truly realized, and only through unity and discipline can that freedom be maintained. Ruth Gamberg said it this way, Freedom and discipline appear as opposites, and in one sense they are for the Chinese. But they also say that at the same time, freedom and discipline are united because the one is meaningless and retrogressive without the other. Like hot and cold or any other set of opposites, freedom cannot be meaningfully known with discipline and vice versa. Freedom itself is also seen dialectically. Freedom from sets the precondition for freedom to. The Chinese consider their new freedom from want, hunger, disease, and ignorance as a real liberation, a profound and essential aspect of any genuine freedom. This, they say, allows them, for the first time in their history, to all be free to live, experiment, cooperate, and progress. Discipline to most Chinese does not limit this freedom. On the contrary, it assures that their new freedom may florish.(46) From understanding the dialectical relationship of freedom and discipline, or self-discipline, one could readily perceive of the relevance of the formula, "unity, criticism, unity." Mao said, This democratic method of resolving contradictions among the people was epitomized in 1942 in the formula ' u n i t y — c r i t i c i s m — unity.' To elaborate, that means starting from the desire for unity, resolving contradictions through criticism or struggle, and arriving at a new unity on a new basis. In our experience this is the correct method or resolving contradiction among the people.(47) The basis of individual choice or freedom is laid on the foundation of community or a mass perspective (i.e., mass line). Mao said,

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He want unity together with individuality, (underline mine) If local enthusiasm is really to be aroused, every place must have the individuality appropriate to its conditions. This individuality is not Kao Kang's kind of individuality, which amounted to striving for an independent kingdom; it is the individuality necessary in the interest of the whole country and to strengthen national unity.(48) Mass line is the crucial link to freedom and democracy without which elitism, dogma, subjectivism, sectarianism will emerge and reemerge. Thus for Mao, it was imperative after Liberation that everyone, especially people in leading positions, critically examine their attitudes and values in order to maintain the mass line. And to facilitate the process of liberation meant, To link oneself with the masses, one must act in accordance with the needs and wishes of the masses. All work done for the masses must start from their needs and not from the desire of any individual, however well-intentioned. It often happens that objectively the masses need a certain change, but subjectively they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet willing or determined to make the change. In such cases, we should wait patiently. We should not make the change until, through our work, most of the masses have become conscious of the need and are willing and determined to carry it out. Otherwise we shall isolate ourselves from the masses. Unless they are conscious and willing, any kind of work that requires their participation will turn out to be a mere formality and will fail.... There are two principles here: one is the actual needs of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and the other is the wishes of the masses, who must make up their own minds instead of our making up their minds for them.(49) Implicit in the mass line concept is the idea that individuals must be constantly aware of the fact that, although human activity is founded on a common ground, there are diversity and variety in human interests and needs and one's own interests and needs are not paramount, especially if they were egocentrically motivated and selfishly conceived. Mao strongly believed that the only way to maintain one's own freedom is by respecting the freedom and dignity of others and being caring and considerate of

251 them. By perceiving freedom from a mass perspective, the accent is quite obviously on community. In other words, individual freedom is interlocked with the freedom of all members of a community, and people's lives are closely linked where common needs are collectively developed and shared, conflicting individual interests are made known, worked out and resolved rather than compromised away, and where genuine caring and concern for one another prevail. It was from this vantage point that Mao vehemently opposed and indicted liberalism. Mao described eleven principal forms in which liberalism manifested itself. Summarily, these faces of liberalism are characterized by duplicity, apathy, lack of forthrightness, overcautious passivity, arrogance and egotism, petty contentiousness and conflicts, indifference, lack of genuine care and concern, sterile perfunctoriness, self-aggrandizement and condescendence, unself-consciousness, self-indulgence, and indiscipline.(50) Equality and freedom in China are understood within the context of u n i t y — n o t the "equality" in which each individual can go ahead and do their "own thing," nor each person's opinion, however selfish and inappropriate, is equally "valid" as other opinion which are derived through self-conscious efforts. In China, efforts have been continuously and persistently exerted to link freedom, equality and diversity on a unitary and complementary basis so that none will be in a position to undermine the other two. This endeavour has not been easy, especially when many people have not yet developed the consciousness to really appreciate the importance of such unity. In this regard education plays a critical role. David Milton, Nancy Milton and Franz Schurmann put it this way, No conception of China was ever more offensive and more utterly wrong than that of the 'blue ants' propagated some years ago. Not leveling of individual differences but fitting them all into a working social context is a major function of education and the moral and ethical values it teaches.(51) Expertise vs Red and Expert From Mao's vantage point, development is inextricably and intimately linked to the entire array of aspects that constitute the complete social picture: the political, the economic, the cultural, the educational, etc. The various aspects develop their own identity but are simultaneously interlocked as well. The Chinese put it this way,

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Building socialism requires more than just increasing China's productive capacity in the areas of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. It requires that the process of national regeneration itself be conducted in a way such that basic attitudes toward the quality of life undergo change.(52) Development does not simply mean growth and expansion of the economy but implies that economic progress involves improvements in health and education. China did not choose to follow the pattern of development in which democracy was confused for economics, a pattern imitated by many countries of the third world. At a 1981 U.N. conference on development V.K. Rao of India noted that, The results of this purely economistic approach to development, based on a model unsuited to their (third world countries) social, economic and resource conditions, led to the creation of a highly inegalitarian society with pockets of affluence mainly confined to urban areas, rural stagnation, growing unemployment, and continuing poverty for their masses.(53) Without a strong holistic orientation to development, the outstanding achievements in health, particularly rural health, for instance, in China would not have been possible.(54) A holistic orientation does not come aoout through the indiscriminate emphasis on expertise. Expertise without a high degree of human consciousness is not expertise. Expertise without political-moral consciousness tends to be destructive rather than constructive, violence-prone rather than securityproviding. Consequently for Mao and his comrades, red and. expert was considered a necessary exigency for its developmental goals. Although red and expert is a model to be emulated by all, it is especially important to people in leading positions. Western analysts have been predisposed to dichotomizing the unity into "red vs expert", following the lead of Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, Deng Xiaoping. The debates which periodically took place were not over whether the "generalist" or the "specialist" should prevail. As Mao explained, Only by speaking for the masses can he (the specialist) educate them and only by being their pupil can he be their teacher. If he regards himself as their master, as an aristocrat who lords it over the "lower orders," then, no

253 matter how talented he may be, he will not be needed by the masses and his work will have no future. At the same time, we should work effectively to encourage worker and peasant cadres to study hard and raise their cultural level. Thus worker and peasant cadres will at the same time become intellectuals, while the intellectuals will at the same time become workers and peasants.(55) David Milton, and others, described the process this way, Education also has another fundamental meaning different from that in America. The Chinese have always regarded education as a way of infusing values into the young. That education should be a marketplace in which 'ideas are exchanged' never made sense to them. They believe that the values inculcated by education are decisive in determining the kind of leadership the nation will get years hence. Much of the ideological struggle that seemed so obscure to outsiders yet made sense to people in China was over the issue of what values should govern the educational process.(56) Like the mass line concept, the unity of red and expert is crucial to "correct" and responsive as well as responsible leadership; "red" could be perceived as involving "from the masses," and expertise as "to the masses." Hence Mao stated that, In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily 'from the masses, to the masses.' This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time.(57) Inherent in the red and expert ideal is the

254 value of "service." R.F. Price noted that, "'serving the people' is now qualified to 'the overwhelming majority of the people', to be contrasted with serving the interests of a privileged stratum of society as it is alleged is the case in the Soviet Union."(58) Often times the idea of service in China was exemplified by the people's hero, Lei Feng, the gentle, nonviolent, hard working, and dedicated member of the People's Liberation Army. Mao believed that leadership, akin to service to the masses, must be integrated with the masses. Such leadership concept is atypical in liberal Western societies. In the United States, leadership qualities include charisma, appearance, articulateness, expertise, effectiveness, unflappability and dispassion, doggedness and competitiveness, egotism, the ability to "balance" otherwise antagonistic interests.(59) In contrast, Norman Bethune, a Canadian surgeon who gave his life to the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people, epitomized the unity of red and expert: Comrade Bethune's spirit, his utter devotion to others without any thought of self, was shown in his great sense of responsibility in his work and his great warm-heartedness towards all comrades and the people...We must all learn the spirit of absolute selflessness from him. With this spirit everyone can be very useful to the people. A man's ability may be great or small, but if he has this spirit, he is already nobleminded and pure, a man of moral integrity and above vulgar interests, a man who is of value to the people.(60) "To serve the people" does not necessarily mean the vulgarized "screw spirit" that Chen Ruoxi portrayed as being characteristic of Chinese politics. (61) The service ideal does not suggest blind sacrifice or the "martyrdom complex," both of which are more compatible with the Freudian "death wish." Such kind of "service" was more like the type that the "Gang of Four" advocated.(62) For Mao, "to serve the people" is more like the Chinese dictum, zhu ren wei le (finding happiness and pleasure in helping others). Fundamental to the service ideal exemplified by Lei Feng, for example, are the virtues of compassion, humility, gentleness, thoughtfulness, and considerateness which were frequently mentioned in Guomindang circles but more often lacking in preLiberation China. Ultimately in Mao's thinking, "to serve the people" was intended to promote a new political consciousness not founded on the "me-first" or "limelight" mentality.

255 Status Quo vs Change In any liberation movement as Mao perceived it, removal of exploitative social structures must also be accompanied by personal transformation by everyone, the oppressors as well as the oppressed. In the process of liberation one is confronted by oppressors in the form of individuals, social structures, and thoughts and ideas. The first two types of oppressors are objective while the third is subjective. To Mao the world is in a continuous flux. Even after a revolutionary or liberation movement, things continue to change despite their outward "motionless" appearance. Thus, revolutionary achievement could very well revert to revolutionary conservatism, or even regression. This phenomenon had been of utmost concern for Mao. Even if the economic base had been transformed and rectified, old political, ideological, cultural forms still remain, making liberation far from being complete. For example, referring to the awesome task of overcoming "backwardness" and the lack of "self-consciousness," Mao observed that, "it is often more difficult to combat the enemies inside people's minds than to fight Japanese imperialism."(63) Because of a conservative tendency derived from loss of an originally natural spontaneity, people are inclined to cling blindly and uncritically to things to which they are accustomed—what Mao called the "baggage" syndrome.(64) Mao was highly disdainful of self-complacency, seeing in it a type of bourgeois-liberalism that he had often condemned. Although the exploitative social structures have been destroyed, it is nonetheless still quite easy for the subjective "enemies" to reappear or appear in different guises. Mao stated that, With victory, certain moods may grow within the Party—arrogance, the airs of a self-styled hero, inertia and unwillingness to make progress, love of pleasure and distaste for continued hard living. With victory, the people will be grateful to us and the bourgeoisie will come forward to flatter us. It has been proved that the enemy cannot conquer us by force of arms. However, the flattery of the bourgeoisie may conquer the weak-willed in our ranks. There may become Communists, who were not conquered by enemies with guns and were worthy of the name of heroes for standing up to these enemies, but who cannot withstand sugar-coated bullets; (underline mine) they will be defeated by sugar bullets. We must guard against such a

256 situation. To win country-wide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li. Even if this step is worthy of pride, it is comparatively tiny; what will be more worthy of pride is yet to come....The Chinese revolution is great, but the road after the revolution will be longer, the work greater and more arduous. This must be made clear now in the Party. The comrades must be taught to remain modest, prudent and free from arrogance and rashness in their style of work. The comrades must be taught to preserve the style of plain living and hard struggle. We have the Marxist-Leninist weapon of criticism and self-criticism. We can get rid of a bad style and keep the good. We can learn what we did not know. We are not only good at destroying the old world, we are also good at building the new. Not only can the Chinese people live without begging alms from the imperialists, they will live a better life than that in the imperialist countries.(65) Mao's concern for the problem of regression can be felt throughout his writings; his emphasis on continual and conscientious struggle was part and parcel of this concern and was a major reason for launching the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-69). The Cultural Revolution was perceived as a mass education and re-education effort, showing the important role of culture. Like Marx, Mao believed that a person's consciousness is solely and necessarily derived from her or his social being which in turn is largely a result of the impact of culture. Realizing that liberation is not simply overthrowing and removing tangible "enemies," but defeating subjective ones as well, Mao advocated the primacy of politics. Quite perceptively, Stuart Schram noted that, "however important politics was for Marx, it was not, as it is perhaps in the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the key to progress, and the most important single dimension of human freedom." (66) According to Mao the problem of regression, which is most critical in leadership, can be handled and circumvented by continuous criticism and selfcriticism, by conscientiously and continuously maintaining a mass perspective (mass l i n e ) , and by continuously struggling for unity. Dealing with subjective "enemies" in particular, Mao advised that, First, 'learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones', and second, 'cure the sickness to save the patient.' The mistakes of the past must be exposed without sparing anyone's sensibilities;

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it is necessary to analyze and critize what was bad in the past with a scientific attitude so that work in the future will be done more carefully and done better... Our aim in exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings, like that of a doctor curing a sickness, is solely to save the patient and not to doctor him to death. (67)

The Chinese are aware that education plays a critical role in determining the kind of structure and culture of a society, that the education process is the mainstay for China's development toward a humane, socialist and modern society. Ralph Tyler put it this way, In one aspect the Chinese expect even more than we. Their commitment to a classless society in which all citizens 'serve the people' requires the inculcation of new values that are at the very heart of personal and social development. In the traditional family most children throughout the world are reared in an environment that emphasizes self-preservation and responsibility for other family members. As a result children grow up with a strong sense of self-interest and responsibility for members of their group, especially their family, but without a compelling urge to serve people who are not identified with the family. To shift this priority of personal values, attitudes, and habits is a difficult educational task, yet it is central to communist ideology. (68) Analysts of Chinese politics have a deep-rooted tendency to perceive development on a singledimensional, narrow-gauged and parochial basis. For development to be genuine, it must proceed on a total or holistic basis. Without total development the astounding achievements in national health could not have happened in China. Each link, big or small, to education, to collectivization/communization, to liberation of the sexes, to liberation of children and minorities, to bureaucratic and industrial reforms, to leadership reforms, to politics in command and consciousness raising contributed to the success of health services. Similarly, health service contributed to collectivization and many other areas. Yet some Western analysts, who can readily praise China's health accomplishments, denigrated vital policies and reforms because they don't fit the principles of development of the "economistic" model. They "alienated" the meaning

258 and essence of development. This is a very serious analytical shortcoming, and it emanates from their ideological orientation. One of the primary causes of the "singledimension" tendency in mainstream Western analytical outlook is the "internalization" of the stimulusresponse (S-R) concept, often times appearing in the guise of "pragmatism." If and when an action is taken purposefully and "effectively," the immediate net result must point quite positively in the direction of success of the action after statistical analysis. If not, the action is simply considered not viable and unsuccessful and to be discontinued even though past experience has shown a degree of success over time plus the fact that the action is morallypolitically correct and appropriate. According to the S-R model, feasibility studies based on costeffective analysis are the basis on which policy implementation and action are determined and initiated. The alleged logic of this process is to arrive at a less costly, if not more "effective," method to achieve a given goal. Cost-effective analyses ignore and overlook as well as palliate important implications of political economy. For the Chinese however, if the method is the most compatible method with the basic and established principles of development (e.g., human interest, self-reliance, holistic development, unity of manual and mental labor) then the method is considered feasible regardless of the material cost (although constant attention is given to cutting costs). From the Chinese standpoint of development, if the strategy is correct and appropriate, development requires various basic and fundamental methods working together to achieve the desired result, not just a single track. Moreover, any real development takes time to nourish and time to grow. But the effort and struggle for development must be continuous and persistent. Sometimes, development even appears to have stopped or seems to be regressing despite conscientious efforts; but such instances as the Chinese would reason are merely the zig-zags of the process which cover a long time span. This kind of comprehension of development is entirely missing in the S-R approach. Clearly to the Chinese, development is multi-dimensional, whereas based on the S-R model it is one-dimensional. The Chinese believe that a multitude of factors are interacting upon one another in the process of development. Success comes to the Chinese when their hard work transforms itself into a unifying and creative link to the socialist vision. The Dazhai and Daqing projects exemplified their mode of development. (69) Another major defect in the S-R scheme is the

259 implicit assumption that development originates exogeneously rather than from the internal contradiction of a thing vis-a-vis external factors, as Mao had perceived it. S-R analysis is heavily influenced by Western psychology in which learning was understood as primarily a process of conditioning (e.g., "behavior modification"). Behavior, thus, was believed to be a result of various external manipulations and maneuvers rather than a consequence of one's consciousness which is developed not through fabricated stimuli and subtle maneuvers. Consciousness develops and evolves in a nonlinear way and through combinations of a multitude of things. A person's consciousness under natural conditions is unitary or holistic but not uniform. Value-change and value-development are derivatives of one's consciousness-development and change rather than derived from mere communication and persuasion. Communication and persuasion can achieve relative compliance from people but their consciousness could very likely remain unchanged. Consciousness development and change take time and conscientious commitment on the part of the individual; they cannot be taught, persuaded in the S-R fashion, much less forced. With regard to China studies, analytical confusion and deficiency are generated when analysts based their theoretical assumptions on the S-R scheme. The impact of the S-R model of development has led to some highly negative assumptions in Western political, economic, and social concepts. We have learned from the Chinese experiment that leadership does not necessarily entail elitism; that authority does not necessarily produce hierarchy; that political power does not necessarily result in highly centralized decision-making and power structures; that administration does not necessarily give way to bureaucratization and bureaucratism; that development does not pertain to only economic and organizational development. Last but not least, the influence of the S-R model helped to instill a stability-minded orientation in mainstream Western ideological outlook that is exemplified by the thrust of the social sciences. Victor Li observed that, In the United States and in the West in general, stability is regarded as a 'normal' and preferred state... Our approach to law reflects these attitudes. The great bulk of our laws and legal institutions have developed gradually over centuries. They not only define the status quo but support it as well...

260 Comtemporary China presents a completely different picture. Change and not stability is regarded as the normal state... It should not be surprising that Western-style law, which presupposes stability and restrains changes, has not fared well in the People's Republic of China. (70) The fascination with "stability" has also implanted a rather sharp totalitarian orientation that is implicit in mainstream Western analytical assumptions. Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang were quite kind in saying that, "we have come a long way from the totalitarian model of Communist politics that prevailed in official and academic circles during the 1950s and most of the 1960s."(71) The continuing and persistent keen interest in secret police and terrorism in official and academic circles is symptomatic of this mind-set—that we are in fact ourselves subjects and objects of totalitarian politics.(72) And when we compare politics, for example in the case of Chinese politics, we tend to see our own unself-conscious image rather than glimpse their reality. Our overwhelming concern for compliance and stability is not dissimilar to the traditional Chinese totalitarian bent for harmony. With regard to the Western literature on Chinese politics there are generally three schools of thought (i.e., schools defined more on a basis of orientation than substance). The "totalitarian" and the "convergence" schools of thought are well known.(73) The third school of thought utilized the exploitation-liberation continuum as its basis of analysis; and it has focused on transformation rather than stability, common human interests rather than conflict of interests, decentralization of decisionmaking rather than centralized, humane politics rather than pro-violence power politics, political economy rather than econometrics, innovation rather than bureaucratization and routinization, justice rather than legal systems, and human security rather than military-industrial complex. To be sure, China has many unsolved problems and there will be still more to come. Feudalistic proclivities and bureaucratic-capitalism are deeply imbedded in many of China's leading circles. (74) There are human rights issues (e.g., civil liberties vs "counter-revolution") that need urgent attention and prompt action.(75) Many economic and social problems loom very large over the Chinese masses of a billion. The perennial problems that relate to the acute differences in rural and urban life, in agriculture and industry, in manual and mental labor are far from resolved. But what is most unique of

261 the Chinese system, particularly that which was inspired by Chairman Mao, is that in confronting the awesome difficulties that China had, many of its leading members were able to recognize the problems in a profound way and decidedly took innovative measures to resolve them as opposed to letting them slide and "work themselves out." Edward Friedman said it well: Mac's innovations should help re-dedicate political and other social scientists to their original task. We should become less enthralled with our constitution, more open to the variety of the universe. Liberated (through an empathetic study of other areas such as China) from a belief that what is here is all that is possible, one is better able to understand what limits movement towards a just society here and everywhere. If so poor and weak a society as China's with its enormous problems could still achieve so much, then rededicating ourselves to our original promise may be less unrealistic than it often seems. Great achievements require great faith. Seeking to keep alive that hope by linking the end vision of a good society with the concrete dillemmas and demands of real people was Mao's major innovation.(76) NOTES 1. The state comprises powerful subsystems such as formal government institutions, the military-industrial complex, institutions of education and religion, and the media. See Melvin Gurtov, Making Changes: The Politics el Sell Liberation (Oakland, California: Harvest Moon Books, 1 9 7 9 ) , pp. 49-50, 108-109. 2. Myres McDougal, et a l . , Human Rights and world Public Order: The Basic. Policies el an International Law of Human Dignity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 47 3. For a discussion on traditional Chinese humanism, see Charles A. Moore, editor, The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967). 4. Phillip M. Chen, law and Justice: The legal System in China, 2400 B.C. to 1960 A.D. (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., 1 9 7 3 ) , pp. 12-13. 5. Y.P. Mei, "The Status of the Individual in Chinese Social and Practice," in Charles Moore, editor, The Chinese Mind, p. 6. 6. Charles Moore, "Introduction: The Humanistic Chinese Mind," in Charles Moore, editor, The Chinese

262 Mind, p. 6. 7. See Phillip Chen, Law and Justice in China, pp. 28-29. 8. Ibid., pp. 26-27. 9. Tung-tsu Chu, "Chinese Class Structure and Its Ideology," in John K. Fairbank, editor, Chinese Thought and institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 235. 10. Ibid, pp. 235-237 11. See John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) , p. 69. 12. Regarding conditions that beset China's countryside, see R.H. Tawney, Land and Labour in China (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1 9 3 2 ) , pp. 51-77. 13. Tung-tsu Chu, "Chinese Class Structure and Its Ideology," in John Fairbank, editor, Chinese Thought and Institutions. p 250. 14. See Edgar Snow, Red S_tat over China (New York: Grove Press, 1 9 7 3 ) , Jack Belden, China Shakes the World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1 9 7 0 ) , Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 7 2 ) . 15. See Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, editors, The China Reader, Republican China; Nationalism, war. and the Rise of Communism, 1911-1949 (New York: Vintage Books, 1 9 6 7 ) , p. xiv. 16. Mao Zedong, Selected Works, Vol. Ill (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967) , p. 232. 1 7 . For instance, see Mao Zedong, "Pay Attention to Economic Work, August 20, 1933," in Selected Works, Vol.1 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 129-136 (hereinafter cited as SW I) , Mao Zedong, "We Must Learn To Do Economic Work, January 10, 1945," and "On Coalition Government, April 2 4 , 1945," in SE III, pp. 189-195, 205-270. For a perceptive analysis of the tremendous importance of social and economic revolution in the countryside to the success of the Chinese Communists, see Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. 18. Regarding some of the tremendous work that the Chinese Communists did in transforming China, see John G. Gurley, "Rural Development in China 1949-72, and the Lessons To Be Learned from It," World Development. Vol. 3, nos. 7 & 8 (July-August, 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 455-471, Joshua S. Horn, Away with All Pests: An English Surgeon in People's China. 1954-1969(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1 9 6 9 ) , U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, An Economic Profile of Mainland China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2 vols., 1 9 6 7 ) . 19. David Milton, et. al.,_, editors, The China Reader. People's China: Social Experimentation. Politics. Entry onto the World Scene, 1966 through 1972 (New York: Vintage Books, 1 9 7 4 ) , p. xxi.

263 20. See for instance the fourteen essays in Frank N. Trager and William Henderson, editors, Communist China, 1949-1969; A Twenty-Year Appraisal (New York: New York University Press, 1970) , especially, L. La Dany, "Problems of Administration and Control," pp. 45-61. 21. Ruth Gamberg, Red and Expert; Education in the People' s Republic of China (New York: Schocken Books, 1 9 7 7 ) , p. 165. 22. Victor Li, Law without Lawyers; A Comparative View el Law in China and the United States (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1 9 7 8 ) , p. 17. 23. For a vivid description of this development, see Robert L. Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society. 5th edition, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1975). 24. The literature on alienation is voluminous as well as diverse; see Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964) , Claude Steiner and Hogie Wyckoff, "Alienation," in Claude Steiner, et. a l . , Readings in Radical Psychiatry: An Anthology (New York: Grove Press, 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 17-27, Erich Fromm, editor, Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1 9 6 5 ) . 25. See for instance, Raymond L. Whitehead, Love and Struggle in Mao's Thought (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1 9 7 7 ) , pp. 119-120; and Victor Li, lau without Lawyers, p. 26. 26. From The Works el Mencius, as reproduced in William T. de Bary, el a l . , editors, Sources of Chinese Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960) , p. 104. 27. Mao Zedong, SH III, p. 90. 28. For a detailed and incisive account of the May 4th Movement, see Chou Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: intellectual Revolution in Modern china (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). 29. Mao Zedong, SH II, p. 272. 30. Mao Zedong, SH II, p. 340. 31. Mao Zedong, Selected Works. Vol. IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969) , p. 454. 32. Mao Zedong, SM II, p. 308. 33. See Mao Zedong, "On Practice," in SM I, pp. 295-309. 34. See Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 61-81. 35. From Yangming Zhuanshu. as reproduced in William de Bary, el a l . , editors, Sources el Chinese Tradition, p. 579. 36. Mao Zedong, SM III, p. 272. 37. Ibid., pp. 271-272. 38. See Stuart R. Schram, editor, The Political

264 Thought af Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1 9 7 0 ) , p. 135. 39. Ibid. 40. For a thorough discussion of contradictions, see one of Mao's major theoretical works, "On Contradiction," in Mao Zedong, SW I, pp. 311-347. 41. Mao Zedong, "Talk on Questions of Philosophy," in Stuart Schram, editor, Chairman Mao Talks to the People. Talks and Letters 1956-1971 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 228. 42. Mao Zedong, SW III, p. 243. 43. Mao Zedong, SE I, p. 46. 44. Mao Zedong, SW III, p. 131. At the time rent reduction played a critical role in helping to solve China's land problem. According to Mao around 70 percent of the entire rural population of China during the Guomindang reign comprised poor peasants, tenants or part-tenants, and agricultural workers. See "Interview with Mao on Land Distribution," (July 19, 1936) in Edgar Snow, Bad Star over China, p. 445. 45. Mao Zedong, "Talk at an Enlarged Central Work Conference, 30 January 1962," in Stuart Schram, editor, Chairman Mao Talks fa the People, pp. 163-164. 46. Ruth Gamberg, Bad and Expert. p. 163. 47. Mao Zedong.Selected Works. Vol. V (Peking; Foreign Languages Press, 1 9 7 7 ) , pp. 389-390. 48. Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Great Relationships," in Stuart Schram, editor, Chairman Maa Talks fa fha People. p. 73. Kao Rang, as Chinese Communist Party leader of Northeast China (Manchuria) and later fifth ranking member of the Politburo, was accused of having undermined Party and solidarity in his attempt to set up an independent kingdom in the Northeast area. He was also charged with uncritically applying the Soviet model in a wholesale manner. Kao was removed from leadership in 1955. 49. Mao Zedong, Quotations. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976) , pp. 124-125. 50. Mao Zedong, SW II, pp. 31-32. 51. David Milton, et. a l . , editors, The China Reader, People's China, p. xxiv. 52. As described by Gregory R. Anrig, "Curriculum," in Ronald Montaperto and Jay Henderson, editors, China's Schools in Flux, (White Plains, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1 9 7 8 ) , p. 79. Anrig held the position of Massachusetts Commissioner of Education during his trip to China in 1977. 53. V.K.R.V. Rao, "Development, Equity and Freedom," U.N. Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (December, 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 2. 54. See for instance, Victor W. Sidel and Ruth Sidel, Serve the People; Observations an Medicine

in the People's Republic of China (New York: Josiah P. Macy Foundation, 1 9 7 3 ) . See also, infra., pp. 44-45. 55. Mao Zedong, SH II, p. 303. 56. David Milton, at a l . , editors, The China Reader, People's China, p. xxiii. 57. Mao Zedong, SH H I , p. 11958. R.F. Price, Education in Modern China (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979) , p. 9. 59. For an interesting look at the American idea of leadership, see Michael Maccoby, The Gamesman: The New Corporate Leaders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 9 7 6 ) . 60. Mao Zedong, SH II, pp. 337-338. 61. See Chen Ruoxi, Democracy Hall and the Unofficial Journals. Studies in Chinese Terminology, No. 20 (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1 9 8 2 ) . 62. The "Gang of Four" was a tyrannical ultraleftist faction led by Jian Qing, Zhang Zhongqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan. They were arrested and disgraced as the current leadership under Deng Xiaoping took charge. 63. Mao Zedong, SH III, p. 185. 64. Ibid., p. 173; and Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in Robert Tucker, editor, The Marx-Engels Reader. 2nd edition (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 66125. 65. Mao Zedong, SW IV, p. 374. The li to which Mao referred is a Chinese measurement for distance, a little more than a kilometer but less than a mile. 66. Stuart R. Schram, "The Marxist," in Dick Wilson, editor, Mae Tse-tung in the Scales el History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 7 7 ) , p. 37. 67. Mao Zedong, SH III, pp. 49-50. 68. Ralph Tyler, "Conclusions" in Ronald Montaparto and Jay Henderson, editor, China's Schools in Elux, p. 164. 69. Dazhai community, located in Shanxi Province, comprises a small number of poor peasants, who transformed arid and hilly surroundings into relatively rich cornfields through soil improvements and irrigation projects. Daquing community, located in Heilongjiang Province, developed its huge oil reserves without foreign assistance that enabled China to become energy self-sufficient. Dazhai and Daqing epitomized self-reliance and hard work. See Frederic M. Kaplan, Julian M. Sobin, and Stephen Andors, editors, Encyclopedia of China Today (Fair Lawn, New Jersey: Eurasia Press, 1 9 7 9 ) . 70. Victor Li, Law. without Lawyers, pp. 2, 4. 71. Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China

266 under Threat. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) , p. 1. 72. See Herbert Marcuse, One-Diroensional Man, for example, p. 3. 73. The theme of the "totalitarian" school is quite well-known and obvious and needs not be repeated here. The "convergence" school adheres to the principle that sooner or later political systems converge toward a common structure which is characterized by bureaucratization and routinization of politics in the Weberian tradition. See Thomas Schroder, "Mao Zedong's Theory of Development," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Riverside, 1979, chapters 1 and 9. 7 4 . For an interesting collection of documented Chinese articles, some of which are highly critical of the Chinese Communist system and leadership, see Minzhu Zhonghua: Collection of Articles fey Arrested Dissidents or ihe Democratic Movement in Mainland China. Hongkong Chinese University Students' Association, comp. (Hongkong: Chuan Zhen Guanggao Publishing Co., 1 9 8 2 ) . This collection includes articles by the "radical" activist, Wei Jingsheng, as well as the famous essay addressed to Chairman Mao by Li Yizhen, "Guanyu Shehui Zhuyi De Minzhu Yu Fazhi: Xian Gei Mao Zhuxi He Si Jie Ren Da." 75. Although taken from a Western legalprocedural perspective, see James D. Seymour, editor, The Fifth Modernization: Chinese Human Rights Movement, 1978-1979 (New York: E.M. Cole, 1 9 8 0 ) . 76. Edward Friedman, "The Innovator," in Dick Wilson, editor, Mao. Tse-tung in the Scales of History, pp. 312-313.

10 Conclusions Jonathan

R. Adelman

From a variety of viewpoints (including totalitarianism, traditional political culture and structural-functionalism), the authors in this volume have examined the role of terror and the secret police in six diverse Communist states over time. They have both tested the validity of various applicable theories and provided valuable additional information on the Communist states under study. Despite the diversity of perspectives of the authors and sharp differences in the experiences of these six Communist states, certain common patterns do emerge from this study. In all of these states for most of their existence the secret police have constituted a significant, legitimate and often powerful societal and political force. It has generally amassed a surprising number of functions, often ranging far beyond merely performing surveillance on the population and identifying, isolating and even liquidating real or potential political opponents. Far from always being "secret" or mysterious in nature, it has often been publicly praised, commended and rewarded for its work. It is an institution which Party leaders have usually felt essential to the continuation of their rule. A measure of the significance accorded to the secret police is the lavish and early attention focused by the Communist leaders on the functioning of the secret police forces soon after, and sometimes even before, the seizure and taking of power. With real and often serious domestic and foreign opposition to their rule and grandiose socialist transformation tasks to be performed in the future, this is hardly surprising. In Russia the Cheka was formed under Felix Dzerzhinsky already in December 1917 and by September 1918, less than a year after the October Revolution, was launching a major and bloody "Red terror" to counterattack "White terror" which had killed Voldarsky and Uritsky and seriously wounded Lenin. In Poland both the military Informacja and civilian Bezpieka secret police forces were formed in 1944, even before the creation of the

268 new Communist Polish government. Similarly in Rumania in 1944 Emil Bodnaras' "Patriotic Guards" and Moruzov's special secret police forces formed the basis of a strong Romanian secret police effort. In Czechoslovakia's 1945-1948 democratic interlude Colonel Bedrich Reicin's OBZ (Committee of Defense Security Information) was already laying the basis for the powerful Czechoslovak secret police after 1948's February Revolution. A similar process was under way in Hungary with the early creation of a powerful secret police under Gabor Peter. And, finally, in Cambodia a shadowy secret police system known as Nokorbal was already carrying out massive executions and genocide in the countryside less than two years after the coming to power of the Khmer Rouge in April 1975. Indeed, in most of these cases the secret police emerged as a legitimate and effective institution before the armed forces. This was true throughout most of Eastern Europe where armies were kept small and subordinated to the Russian army, as in Poland with 10,000 Soviet advisors and Russian Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky as its leader until 1956. In Czechoslovakia in 1949 the Ministry of Interior actually received a larger budget than the military. In Russia the efficient secret police by 1921 had a 100% Communist leadership and 50% Communist membership while the bumbling Red Army had only 20% of its officers and 3%-4% of its soldiers as Communists. Overall, then, Communists devoted great e f f o r t s — i n Eastern Europe with active Soviet participation—to making the secret police forces powerful and effective. Perhaps the ultimate testimony to the power of the secret police forces in Communist countries has come from their enemies. At the height of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union the secret police, as epitomized by Khrushchev's "secret speech" in 1956, became the primary villain for past excesses. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution brought the burning of secret police headquarters in Budapest, lynchings of secret police officers and death of over 100 secret policemen. Popular indignation led the reformist Hungarian government to dissolve the secret police and detain 3,000 of its members. In the 1968 Prague Spring the reformist Czechoslovak government under Dubcek denounced terror, isolated the secret police and, in Condoleezza Rice's words, "the first hesitant steps were taken toward dismantling the institution of terror." The secret police performed numerous and varied functions in most Communist states. Its critical political role included watching over the population, identifying, isolating and deterring hostile elements. Too, all have liquidated "enemies of the regime," numbering from the thousands in countries such as

269 Hungary to hundreds of thousands in the Soviet Union and possibly even more in Pol Pot's Cambodia. The secret police gathered important information for the Party leadership on the true state of the society. It staged show trials of prominent "dissidents," both Communists and non-Communists, and arrested top leaders when necessary, Overall the secret police provided important assistance to top Party leaders in running the country. The military function of the secret police was very important. In both Poland and Russia the secret police forces numbered in the hundreds of thousands of men, a veritable armed force of some significance. While the Cheka helped crush the Tambov revolt and other uprisings in the civil war and NKVD divisions fought in World War II, Polish secret police units helped smash "Solidarity" in December, 1981. A number of forces, such as the Soviet secret police and Czechoslovak secret police since 1969, have been given the important task of protecting and fortifying the border. Too, these forces are given the key task of setting up secret units within the armed forces to monitor their officers and soldiers, isolate and deter treasonous behavior and, in general, prevent any Bonpartist military moves against the regime. In this regard, too, the secret police units, often armed with tanks, artillery and even planes, provide an important counterbalance to any independent action by the regime. A third important secret police function was the economic one. The labor camps run by the secret police formed an important economic empire, especially in the Soviet Union. They provided manpower for laborintensive projects largely in remote areas. In the legal economy, they fought corruption and they monitored the second "black" economy. In wartime they helped provide evacuation of plants from endangered areas. Another role, that of providing governmental functions, was quite important. In the Soviet Union by 1921 the Cheka was busy fighting typhoid, clearing the snow from railroad tracks, taking care of orphans and attacking corruption. By the late Stalin era it was involved in guarding communication lines, running atomic research, drawing and protecing maps and even keeping vital statistics. Key governmental appointments usually had to be cleared with the secret police. Overall, important governmental functions were assumed by the secret police in many Communist countries. Finally, important intelligence and foreign tasks were provided by Communist secret police forces. As we have seen, the Soviet secret police played a key role in helping win World War II. After the war they were joined by new Eastern European secret police forces in

270 extensive work abroad and at home. Similarly, the Cambodian Nokorbal was engaged in trying to protect Cambodia from Vietnamese intrigues. Given the power wielded by secret police chiefs such as Nikolai Yezhov, Lavrentiya Beria, Gabor Peter, Semyon Davidov and Bedrich Reicin, how did the Party leaders contain the challenge of the secret police to their leadership? For although various Eastern European secret polices, especially in the early 1950s, achieved a certain independence, the authors have stressed that secret police forces never became a dominant force independent of the Party and, in some cases, of the Soviet Union. A number of factors inhibited secret police dominance of Communist systems in the way that armies have frequently achieved power in non-Communist developing countries. The leaders of the secret police were frequently loathed and hated by the general population and rival bureaucratic institutions. The military, which resented the secret police cells in its midst and the independent armed secret police units, served as a counterbalance to secret police ambitions in most cases—although the support of the Russian military leaders for Yuri Andropov's ascession to power in 1982 and the Polish secret police leaders for General Jaruzelski's imposition of martial law in 1981 showed this rivalry may be breaking down. Repeatedly, the Party leaders resorted to purges of secret police leaders, from Yagoda (1936) , Yezhov (1939), and Beria (1953) in Russia to Reicin (1951), Peter (1953), Rankovic (1966) and Draghici (1967) in Eastern Europe. They were helped in this process by rivalries between different secret police forces. In Poland the Bezpieka challenged the Informacja. in Romania the Council of State Security fought the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in Czechoslovakia the STB fought the OBZ, in Russia in the 1920s the GRU clashed with the Cheka. Finally, there was an interesting ethnic component of the secret police leadership, especially in the early years of state power in many Communist states. Minority nationalities, often alienated from the dominant nationality, tended to play an important role. In Russia the first two Cheka chiefs were Poles (Dzerzhinsky and Menzhinsky) and in the last 14 years of Stalin the Georgian Beria filled the NDVD with fellow Transcaucasians. Similarly in Cambodia the Nokorbal was dominated by a semi-nomadic mountain people from northeast Cambodia. And, perhaps more importantly, the authors note a strong Jewish leadership stratum in Russian and Eastern European secret police forces in the early years of state power. In Russia Jews such as Meyer Trilisser and Mikhail Shpiegelglass ran the Cheka's Foreign Department. In Eastern Europe men such as Semyon Davidov (Poland),

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Bedrich Reicin (Czechoslovakia) and Gabor Peter (Hungary) were important secret police leaders. When Stalin decided to openly promote anti-semitism in the postwar era, these Jewish leaders were among the first to be purged and replaced. The authors make clear as well the limitations of the capabilities of the secret police. It can intimidate and at times paralyze opposition but it cannot create active support for the regime. The actions of the secret police also create hatred of the regime. In 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia popular hatred of the secret police was so great that the Party leaders had to repudiate it. Furthermore, secret police action cannot by itself quell broad based opposition. In October 1956, as Ferenc Vali makes clear, the AVO disintegrated in the face of massive popular action. Similarly, in 1968 the Czechoslovak secret police could not handle the situation without Soviet military intervention. For the first seventeen months the Polish secret police were impotent in the face of the ten million member "Solidarity" union. And even after it helped suppress "Solidarity" in December, 1981, it could not reverse the massive political apathy and economic deterioration of the last two years. Thus, there were serious limitations to the capabilities of the secret police. Next, we turn to an examination of the relevance of the theories used in this book to a broader theory of terror and the secret police in Communist states. Clearly such a theory needs to encompass a very complex and diverse reality. Terror has gone from the heights of Stalin's Great Purges and Pol Pot's "purification" campaign to the relative quiescence of Khrushchev's Russia and Radar's Hungary. Similarly the secret police has ranged all the way from being a very powerful and dangerous actor to a relatively "normal" bureaucratic actor, one among many in a relatively pluralist environment. In resolving these tasks, the relatively simplistic and unidimensional theories, notably the totalitarian and barbaric theories, provide little guidance. These static theories are quite similar in predicting permanently high levels of terror and secret police prominence in Communist systems. They are based only on the Soviet case, and, even then, mainly on the Stalin era. They cannot explain what Condoleezza Rice has noted in Czechoslovakia where "The society has, instead swung wildly between a relatively pluralistic political system relatively free of terror and monolithic unity imposed by coercion." The low levels of coercion in Russia during NEP in the 1920s and in the three decades after Stalin's death under Khrushchev and Brezhnev are inexplicable in terms of the barbaric and totalitarian theories. So too is the relative lack

272 of terror in Radar's Hungary where market socialism and adoption of the slogan "He who is not against us is with us" gained support for the regime. Overall, these theories are simplistic and of value only during the mobilization stage. Perhaps the greatest difficulty with these two theories is their unremittingly hostile attitude towards Communist countries in general and the Soviet Union in particular. The totalitarian theorists, writing at the height of the Cold War, likened Soviet Russia to Nazi Germany. And Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, an admirer of Tsarist Russia who had spent years in Stalin's labor camps for an unflattering remark about Stalin in a letter, conceived of Communism as representing an unholy barbarism and tyranny maintained only by coercion and force. Perhaps Pol Pot's brief reign of mass terror and liquidations, ended only by Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia, can be at least described in terms of these theories. But those Communist countries which have experienced revolutions—such as Russia, China, Yugoslavia, Vietnam and C u b a — a n d to a lesser extent those which have n o t — mainly those in Eastern Europe—have also made notable progress in a number of areas. It is precisely in these areas that Marshall Shen's essay on China is particularly instructive. A number of positive benefits have flowed from Communist rule, especially in the revolutionary countries. A country such as China, which had been wracked by internal strife and weakness for over a century, gained its first strong centralized, unified government in 1949. Tsarist Russia had been beaten by the Japanese in 1905 and the Germans in World War I while Imperial and Kuomintang China had been repeatedly ravaged by Western powers for over a century and humiliated by Japan in 1895 and especially from 19311945. Under the Communists a regeneneration took place which saw the Red Army after initial setbacks decisively defeat the German army in World War II and occupy Berlin, Vienna and Prague in 1945. Similarly, the Chinese People's Liberation Army in October 1950 drove the American and South Korean armies out of North Korea and then stalemated them at the 37th parallel, despite overwhelming American military technological superiority. Furthermore, the Communists in nearly all countries instituted massive social programs which made major progress in the areas of health, education and social welfare. Finally, in some countries, most notably the Soviet Union, the Communists managed to carry out a massive industrialization program which transformed Russia from a weak and backward country to a modern, advanced superpower. The totalitarian and barbaric theories, therefore, miss much of the complex picture of Communist

273 development. They focus on and magnify (even exaggerate) the negative aspects of the regime while totally ignoring the positive aspects. They present an image of Communist regimes without indicating their strong bases of popular support and the often positive social goals for which the leaders are striving. These theories create a static image of Communist states, frozen in time, when change is their very essence of these regimes. Furthermore, even when Communist regimes needed to use terror for the very real purpose of preserving themselves, these theories deny the legitimacy of such use of force. For as Roy Medvedev has astutely written about Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and his fellow cohorts, Unfortunately there were a number of situations where Red terror was the only way of avoiding the total destruction of the Soviet state and the triumph of White terror that would certainly follow. Solzhenitsyn, Shafarevich and Naum Korzhavin (from his current perspective) understood this well e n o u g h — i t is simply that they find Kornilov or Denikin preferable to Lenin and Sverdlov, White terror preferable to Red. (1) Two other theories—traditional political culture and personality theories—also have been discussed in this book. Each has problems in attempting any general explanation of terror and secret police in Communist states although there are particular facets of the problem which each theory has utility in helping explain. Traditional political culture is a relatively static concept of limited relevance to modernizing, change-oriented Communist regimes. As Condoleezza Rice shows, it has little relevance in Czechoslovakia where major violence and repression were initiated by the Party in a country with a rich democratic heritage in the intrawar period. The traditional political culture of Cambodia, with its emphasis on family, religion and monarchy, offers little guide to the paroxysms of violence under Pol Pot, who sought to obliterate traditional society and carry through an immediate transition to pure Communism. Given that the traditionalist forces tend to be under unrelenting attack by the Communists who perceive them as the clear enemies of the new order, it is hard to see how traditional political culture can provide a comprehensive explanation for Communist, and especially revolutionary, states. Similarly, personality theory is of limited value in providing such an overall explanation for Communist behavior. Such a theory stands in danger of ignoring social forces, ignoring the interaction and relationship of personality with social structure and

274 political situation and trivializing complex political issues by reducing them to a more modern and sophisticated revival of the "great man" theory of history. Personality does not achieve decisive significance either in most takeover stages or postmobilization stages. In the takeover stage the problems are clearcut, the solutions forceful and the Party relatively united. In the post-mobilization stage the Party has achieved great successes, the revolution is now consolidated, powerful bureaucratic institutions have arisen and the scope for personal impact been severely reduced. The last nearly two decades of consensual pluralist decision making in Russia have clearly demonstrated this point. This is not to argue the irrelevance of traditional political culture or personality of the leader in affecting the development of Communist states. Clearly, as these essays have made clear, there are periods in which they can play an important role or become, as Lenin wrote about Stalin's personality in his last testament, "a decisive trifle." Thus, we will incorporate both these factors as intervening variables at times significant and decisive but more often of lesser relevance. Overall, structural-functionalism, with significant modifications, emerges as the best theory to explain a complex and varied reality of terror and secret police in Communist states. It avoids the heavy political animus of the totalitarian and barbaric theories and emphasizes the key factors of social change and bases of political support ignored by these theories. Unlike the other four theories it is changeoriented, which is important in understanding the dynamism of Communist states. It rates terror and the secret police as integral to the political process, rather than external. By presenting stages of development, structural-functionalism allows for a critique of the evolution of Communist states over time. At the same time, the case studies in the book have pointed to some serious deficiencies in the capacity of this theory to explain certain crucial events in the history of various Communists. What was the functionality of anti-Semitic bloody purges in Eastern Europe in the early 1950s, the Great Purges in Russia and the mass liquidations in Cambodia under Pol Pot? Too, why did the secret police emerge as a more powerful and coherent force in Russia and Eastern Europe than in China and Vietnam? In order to answer these and other problems, we suggest the use of a series of intervening variables which define the specific, concrete national and temporal characteristics of a state to which the general abstract theory of structural-functionalism is applied.

275 These intervening variables fall logically into the schema of m a n — n a t i o n state—international system developed by Kenneth Waltz. (2) They can be summarized as follows: 1. 2. 3.

man—personality of leaders nation-state—traditional political culture —revolutionary political culture international system—relationship to powerful ally (Soviet Union/ Vietnam) — d e g r e e and nature of external threats to systemic survival

On the first level of human qualities of the leaders, there is little question that personality of the top leader or leaders can become important, particularly at the mobilization stage. The genesis of Pol Pot's chiliastic and genocidal vision of immediate transition to pure Communism (and restoration of the "primitive Communism" of Angkor W a t ) , so at variance with the visions of other Asian Communist leaders such as Ho Chih Minh and Zhou Enlai, must be sought in the realm of psychology. So, too, the Great Purges in Russia, destroying many talented army commanders (as Tukhachevsky, Blyukher and Y a k i r ) , economic managers and Party leaders on the eve of World War II, were functional only for Stalin and his immediate clique. As the bulk of the Party and military leadership had voiced their opposition to these moves at the Central Committee Plenum in 1936, the roots of this violence (named, interestingly for Yezhov rather than Stalin) must be sought in Stalin's psyche and his drive for absolute power. The importance of personality of the leader can be seen in the sharp changes that took place in both Russian and China within three years of the deaths of Stalin and M a o — a n d the attendant deStalinization and de-Maoization campaigns. Too, personality has been important in the last years of life of an aging revolutionary leader. Stalin in his last years relied heavily on the secret police to eliminate the top Leningrad Party leaders (1948), liquidate leading Jewish poets (1952) , prepare the fabricated "Doctors' Plot" (1953) and initiate planning for a massive new purge suspended only on his death. Similarly, Mao Zedong in his last years launched the violent Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) , eliminated his two proclaimed heir-apparents (Liu Shaoyi, 1966 and Lin Biao, 1971) and played off the moderates versus the Gang of Four. In both cases dissatisfied with what they had wrought, the aging leaders resurrected earlier periods for their inspiration. For Stalin it was the Great Purges, for Mao it was the Yenan era. Thus,

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personality can become an important factor under certain circumstances. At the second level, that of the state, political culture becomes a consideration. Traditional political culture is primarily important in Communist states which have not undergone an indigenous revolution and where power was achieved through external intervention. As Walter Bacon shows in Romania, there is significant congruence between traditional political culture and Communist culture, between the "Siguranta" and Communist secret police. For the most part, though, as in Czechoslovakia and Poland, it is Communist resistance to traditional political culture which is the problem, not the assimilation of tradition in Communist rule. In successful revolutions certain elements of tradition become integrated into the new mass Communist culture. Thus, in the Soviet Union traditional educational and social norms and Russian chauvinism became part of the new system in a synthesis of old and new. It is also important to mention the impact of the revolutionary political culture on enduring policies. The "Yenan spirit" remained important in Chinese politics for several decades and helped inspire the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. The sprit of "war communism" and the Russian civil war were a seedbed of ideas and inspirations for the radical socialist transformation of the Soviet Union in the 1930s. The prominent role of the secret police in Russian revolutionary political culture and obscurity of secret police forces in Chinese revolutionary political culture were to be a factor in the development of Russian and Chinese politics for several decades after the seizure of state power. (3) The absence of such a revolutionary political culture, as in most of Eastern Europe and North Korea, also impacts on state development. Finally, the international environment, both of allies and enemies, helps set the overall context for Communist policies. The Eastern European Communist Parties, which came to power with Soviet help and without benefit of a revolution, (except in Czechoslovakia), have been heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. This has been especially true of the local secret police forces which were created by the Soviet secret police forces. In Poland, for example, SMERSH in 1944 created the Polish Informacja in its image, with the bulk of its early leaders being Russians. Similarly in 1944 the NKVD in Kuybyshev began training operatives for the Polish Bezpieka. As a result, Michael Checinski has found that "The main outlines of the organizational scheme and the modus operandi of the Polish security services were patterned after the NKVD." Similarly, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary

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and Rumania, Soviet influence predominated in the local forces during the Stalinist era. The bloody elite and often anti-Semitic purges of the last years of Stalin the Rajk (Hungary), Slansky (Czechoslovakia) and Pauker (Rumania) p u r g e s — h a d their origins in Moscow as much as in Budapest, Prague or Bucharest. In Czechoslovakia, for example, Condoleezza Rice has found that Klement Gottwald resisted any purges but yielded only after violent attacks on him in 1949 by the Soviet Union. As a result she noted "the presence of Soviet advisors and the role of the police in purging the KSC itself meant that the police often operated almost independently of direct Party control...the security apparat, unlike the Party, was a group on which Cominform and the U.S.S.R. could count." The other authors found a similar pattern elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Thus, the Eastern European secret police forces functioned more as extensions of Soviet power than domestic forces in the early years. The Polish secret police forces, after achieving some independence from Moscow in the 1956-1959 period, again have come under Moscow's influence in the last two decades. Michael Checinski argues that in the early 1960s Soviet influence became again predominant with the elevation of Mieczyslaw Moczar as Minister of Internal Affairs and Teodor Kufel as head of military counterintelligence. And he sees a strong role for the Polish secret police forces, under Soviet influence, in combatting and ultimately crushing "Solidarity." In Czechoslovakia the secret police was one of the strongest backers of the pro-Soviet conservatives during the "Prague Spring" of 1968. After the Soviet invasion in August 1968, the Czechoslovak secret police arrested Dubcek, helped purge the Party and probably incited the "ice hockey riot" which led to the final crushing of the reformers. And in Hungary the secret police fought on the Soviet side, later repressing the rebels and helping liquidate Nagy in 1957. Thus, the Eastern European secret police forces repeatedly chose Soviet interests over national interests in times of crisis. There have been limits to Soviet interference. After Romania moved away from the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, the Romanian secret police likewise moved under the direct control of Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu. In the early 1950s Polish leaders successfully avoided a trial of Gomulka, thereby saving his life. Too, the Hungarian secret police in 1956 could not repress the revolutionary forces without Soviet military intervention nor could the Polish secret police repress "Solidarity" without the imposition of martial law. The level of international tensions also seems to have contributed, especially in the mobilization stage,

278 to the level of intensity of repression. The frantic pace and extensive repression of the Great Purges from 1937-1941 may well have partly been dictated by the tensions of the approaching World War II and Stalin's desire to consolidate his power before it started. Similarly the massive extent of terror in Cambodia may have been partly prompted by Pol Pot's fear of Vietnamese invasion and internal collaboration. On the other hand, a low level of international tensions, such as seen in Hungarian and Romanian ties to the West, may promote a lower level of repression and terror. Overall, then, these intervening variables, when integrated with the structural-functional theory, should provide a more accurate depiction of the development of terror and the secret police in Communist states. One further conclusion is apparent from these case studies. In those countries where the regime has achieved neither a revolutionary breakthrough nor an accomodation with the population, the secret police remain an omnipresent and powerful force. Thus, in Poland, which has seen nine political shakeups in less than 40 years, and in Romania, with its quasi-Stalinist social policies, and in Czechoslovakia, our authors find no breakthrough and a strong secret police presence. The same was true of Hungary before 1956. But, in the Soviet Union, which achieved a revolutionary breakthrough after the massive socialist transformation of the Stalinist era, terror, repression and the role of the secret police declined markedly under Khrushchev. While the secret police became a more legitimate actor under Brezhnev, "socialist legality" and minimal terror remained Soviet reality. The other possibility, an accomodation with the population, was achieved by Janos Kadar in Hungary. With market socialism and lenient treatment of the population, the Hungarian Party managed to achieve some genuine popularity at the expense of visible secret police presence and terror. This accomodation, which the Soviet Union repressed in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980, was allowed to develop in Hungary only after the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. This book has hopefully contributed to the study of terror and secret police in Communist states, filling the void between academic interest and the paucity of academic studies in this area. It has provided a series of case studies and some testing of theories on the role of terror and the secret police. A number of modifying intervening variables have been suggested to improve the capacity of structuralfunctional theorizing to describe and analyze the complex reality of terror and secret police in Communist states. Much further work needs to be done. Case studies on such important countries as China,

279 Cuba, Vietnam and Yugoslavia remain to be written. The relationship of terror and secret police in Communist states to those in non-Communist states need to be explored. Perhaps most importantly the study of these topics needs to become integrated into the general field of comparative communism and not be relegated to the periphery. Hopefully this book has contributed to that process. NOTES 1. Roy Medvedev, On Stalin and Stalinism, translated by Ellen de Kadt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) , p. 186. 2. Kenneth Waltz, Man. The. State. and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 9 6 2 ) . 3. For an analysis of the impact of divergent revolutionary political cultures on the development of civil-military relations in Russia and China, see Jonathan R. Adelman, The. Revolutionary Armies (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1 9 8 0 ) .

About the Contributors JONATHAN R. ADELMAN, editor, is an assistant professor in the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver. After receiving his Ph.D. in Soviet politics from Columbia University in 1976, he served as a Charles Phelps Taft Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Cincinnati and visiting assistant professor at the University of Alabama. He has written The Revolutionary Armies (1980) and edited Communist Armies in Politics (1982). His articles on comparative communism and Soviet politics have appeared in a number of journals, including Studies in Comparative Communism. Armed. Forces and society. Air. University Review, Survey, Russian History, Military Affairs, and PS. WALTER BACON is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska at Omaha. He has translated the volume, Behind Closed Doors: Secret Papers en Romanian-Soviet Negotiations. 1931-1932 (1979). His articles on Romanian politics have appeared in various scholarly journals. MICHAEL CHECINSKI is a research fellow at the Soviet and East European Research Center, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. From 1947 through 1967 he served in Polish military counterintelligence and as a senior researcher and lecturer at the Military-Political Academy in Warsaw. He has written Poland: Communism. Nationalism. Anti-Semitism (1982). His articles have appeared in several journals, including Problems ef_ Communism. ALEXANDER DALLIN is a professor of history and political science at Stanford University. He has taught at Harvard University and the University of California, Berkeley and served as director of the Russian Institute and Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations at Columbia University. He is the author and co-editor of numerous books, including German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945 (1957), Soviet Conduct in World Affairs (1960), The Soviet Union At the United Nations (1962), Diversity in international Communism (1963), Politics in the Soviet Union (1966), Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev (1968), Political Terror in Communist Systems (1970), Twenty-Fifth Congress &£ the CPSU: Assessment end Context (1977) and Women in Russia (1977). His articles have appeared in many scholarly journals. KENNETH QUINN is with the United States Mission to the

282

United Nations Organizations in Vienna, Austria. He has recently completed his doctoral dissertation at American University. CONDOLEEZZA RICE is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Program at Stanford University. Her doctoral dissertation, "The Politics of Client Command," will be published shortly as a book. Her articles have appeared in various scholarly journals, including Studies in Comparative Communism. MARSHALL SHEN is completing his doctoral dissertation in the Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside. FERENC VALI is professor emeritus in the Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts (Amherst). He has written a number of books, including Servitudes of international Law: A Study of Rights in a Foreign Territory (1958), Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism (1961), Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (1971), The Turkish straits and NATO. (1972) , and The Politics af the Indian Ocean Region: The Balance of Power (1976).

Index ABAKUMOV, Victor, 2 4 , 112, 118, 122, 184-185 ABEL, Rudolf, 124 ADELMAN, Jonathan, 1, 1 7 , 79, 267 AFGHANISTAN, 69 AGRANOV, Yakov, 9 7 , 105 AKULOV, Ivan, 96 ALBANIA, 56, 120, 199 ALEKSANDROVICH, V.A., 82-83 ALIYEV, Geydar, 127 ALKSNIS, Yakov, 113 ALSTER, Minister, 42 ALTER, Viktor, 113 AMALRIK, Andrei, 126 ANDERS ARMY, 22 ANDROPOV, Yuri, 2, 125127, 270 ANGKAR, 206 ANGKOR WAT, 207 ANTIPOV, 113 ANTONESCU, General Ion, 140, 142 ANTONOV-OVSEENKO, Anton, 6, 107, 109 ARENDT, Hannah, 1 ARMIJA KRAJOW, 20 ARMIJA LUDOWA, 2 5 , 3 1 , 44 ASTRAKHAN, 85 AUSTRIA, 93 AVANESOV, Varlaam, 80 AVM, 175-176, 181, 183, 185-186 AVO, 175, 186-188, 271 BAADER-MEINHOF GANG, 12 BACON, Walter, 135 BAGIROV, Mir, 104 BAKOWSKI, Colonel Karol, 28 BALITSKY, Vsevold, 96 BALTIC COAST, 17 BARBARIC THEORY, J, 7, 88, 93, 103, 111, 117, 121, 127, 271-274 BATTAMBANY PROVINCE, 220 BEIJING, 93, 197, 199, 241 BEIRUT, 124 BELENSKY, Abram, 97

BELGIUM, 110, 111, 115, 137 BELGRADE, 34 BELORUSSIA, 113, 119 BENEDICTINE ORDER, 184 BENES, Edward, 157-158, 160-161 BERIA, Lavrentiya, 2, 24, 34-36, 40, 46, 104-105, 109, 112-113, 118-119, 122-123, 144, 177, 184186, 193n, 270 BERLIN, 272 BERMAN, Jakub, 24, 34-3 6, 3 8 , 72n BERZIN, Ian, 105, 109 BETHUNE, Norman, 254 BEZPIEKA, 30-33, 42, 267, 270, 276 BIALER, Seweryn, 3, 104, 108 BIELKIN, General, 179, 184 BIERUT, Boleslaw, 24, 34-36 BLAGONRAVOV, Georgi, 9 8 BLAKE, George, 124 BLUNT, Sir Anthony, 102 BLYUKHER, Marshal Vasili, 225 BODNARAS, Emil, 141-142, 268 BOETZEL, Colonel, 116 BOKOR, Doctor Gyula, 178 BONAPARTISM, 98 BRANDT, Willy, 126 BRANKOV, 192N BRATIANU, Dinu, 140 BRESLAUER, George, 1, 4, 38-39, 71n, ±27, 149, 157, 170, 202, 210 BREZHNEV, Leonid, 2, 4, 125-126, 271, 278 BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew, 1, 3, 5, 45, 157 BUDDHISM, 239 BUKHARIN, Nikolai, 91, 93, 105-106 BUKOVINA, 140 BULGANIN, Marshal Nikolai, 30, 193n BULGARIA, 39, 13 8

284

BURGESS, Guy, 102, 117, 120 BYDGOSZCZ, 54

COMINTERN, 88, 98, 102, 138, 184 CONFUCIANISM, 239-240, 244-245 CONQUEST, Robert, 96, 100, CALCIV-DUMITREASA, 104, 107-108 Father George, 154n CONSTANTINESCU, Miron, 144 CAMBODIA, 6-8, 1 2 , 195CONVERGENCE, Theory of, 232 CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY, 120 260 CANADA, 117 CREMET, Jean, 93 CAROL, King, 139 CRIMEAN AFFAIR, 118 CARMICHAEL, Joel, 2, 95, CRISTESCU, Lieutenant General Pavel, 140, 142 99, 105, 107 CUBA, 8, 1 3 , 1 5 , 272, 279 CATHOLIC CHURCH, 20, 66, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 6, 8, 182 1 2 , 103, 197, 200, 215, CAUCASUS, 109 256, 275-276 CEAUSESCU, Elena, 148 CULTURE, Political, 3-4, CEAUSESCU, Nicolae, 135, 7-8, 1 3 , 88, 9 3 , 103, 1 4 4 , 146-149, 277 111, 117, 121, 124, CEAUSESCU, Nicu, 148 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 126-127, 140, 267, 273-275 53, 120, 218 CUSTINE, Marquis de, 4 CHALIDZE, Valery, 126 CYRANKIEWICZ, Josef, 34 CHANG AN, 204 CZAPIK, Archbishop Gyula, CHARTER OF, 7 7 , 170 183 CHBA LEU, 221 CZARS, 103 CHEBRIKOV, Viktor, 127 CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 13, 1 5 , CHECHENS, 113 CHECINSKI, Michael, 1 7 , 3 4 , 3 7 , 39-40, 65, 6 8 , 72n, 155-173, 268-269, 277 271, 273, 276-278 CHEK WIN, 229n, 230n CHEKA, 79-90, 95, 269-270 DALLIN, Alexander, 1, 3-4, CHEN, LUNG-CHU, 233 38-39, 71n, 127, 149, CHEN, Philip, 234 157, 170, 202, 210 CHEN RUOXI, 254 DALLIN, David, 2, 9 1 , 109 CHERNENKO, Konstantin, DANIEL, Julii, 126 125 DANUBE-BLACK SEA CANAL, CHHOENG SOKHOM THEAVEY, 147 219-220 CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 236, 246 DAQUING, 258-265 CHISINEVSKI, Iosif, 144 DAVIDOV, Semyon, 25, 270 CHLORBS, 216, 222, 226, DAZHAI, 258, 265 DEIGHTON, Len, 1 232n DEMENY, Gyorgy, 190n CHOU SEN KOSAL, 223 DENG XIAOPING, 198-200, CHU TUNG-TSU, 234-235 252 CHUBAR, Vasilii, 106, 113 CHUK HAN, 219 DENIKIN, Anton, 273 CHUN, Yeh, 200 DENMARK, 110 CHURCHILL, Winston, 95 DERIABIN, Peter, 123 COLD WAR, 27 2 DEUCH, Brother, 217-218 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 117 DHIMKIS, 86 COMECON, 62 DITH PRAN, 227n DJILAS, Milovan, 75n, COMINFORM, 160, 163, 177192n 178, 184, 2/7

285

DJUGASHVILI, Joseph, 6 DMITROV, Georgii, 110 DOCTORS' PLOT, 2, 118, 122, 185, 275 DOMINICAN ORDER, 240 DONATH, Ferenc, 180 DRAGANESCU, Colonel Viktor, 142 DRAGHICI, Alexandru, 144146, 270 DRTINA, Prokop, 160 DUAN, Le, 199 DUBCEK, Alexander, 268 DUKES, Paul, 80 DULLES, Allen, 37 DUMOULIN, Octave, 102 DUSZYNSKI, General Zygmunt, 30, 46 DZERZHINSKY, Felix, 80-85, 87, 90-91, 93, 267, 270 DZIEKAN, Tadeusy, 55 EAR SOTH, 23In EASTERN EUROPE, 7, 1 1 , 13, 15, 20, 3 7 , 64-65, 120, 148, 276 ENGELS, Friedrich, 98, 247 ENGLAND, 102, 110, 116 ERLICH, Heinryk, 113 ESZTERGOM, 183 EVDOKIMOV, Grigorii, 96 FAIRBANK, John, 235 FALUDI, Gyorgy, 191 FAR EAST, 100 FARKAS, Mihaly, 177 FEDORCHUK, Vitaly, 127 FELFE, Heinz, 123 FERLINGER, Zdenek, 157 FIELD, Noel, 3 7 , 178 FINDER, 36 FISCHER-GALATI, Stephen, 136 FLEMING, Ian, 1 FOMIN, Vasilii, 81 FOOTE, Alexander, 116 FRANCE, 20, 2 5 , 111, 115, 137, 1 4 8 , 204, 208, 217 FRANCISCAN ORDER, 184, 240 FREEDOM FIGHTERS, 187-188 FRIEDMAN, Edward, 261 FREIDRICH, Carl, 1, 3, 157 FRINOVSKY, Admiral, 108 FUCHS, Klaus, 117, 121

GALIEV, Sultan, 90 GAMBERG, Ruth, 249 GANG OF FOUR, 199-200, 265 GDANSK, 1 5 , 17 GEORGESCU, Teohari, 141142, 144 GEORGIA, 90, 118 GERMANY, 1 2 , 1 5 , 20, 68, 101-102, 106-107, 110115, 113, 119, 123, 126, 140, 157, 159, 178, 272 GERO, Ernest, 181 GESTAPO, 36 GHEORGIU-DEJ, Gheorghe, 143-146, 149 GIEREK, Edward, 46, 48-52, 67 GINSBURG, Aleksandr, 126 GINSBURG, Eugenia, 1, 115 GOGLIDZE, 105, 122 GOMA, Paul, 142 GOMEL, 87 GOMULKA, Wladyslaw, 2 4 , 2 8 , 34-40, 42-46, 48, 6 7 , 72n, 185, 192n, 277 GOSPLAN, 100 GOTTWALD, Klement, 158163, 165, 185, 277 GPU, 20, 90-92 GRABSKI, Tadeusy, 7 6n GREAT LEAP FORWARD, 196, 222, 229N, 276 GREAT PURGES, 2, 6, 8, 101, 103-113, 157, 271, 274, 275, 278 GREECE, 142, 185 GRIGORENKO, Petr, 126 GROSZ, Archbishop Jozsef, 183 GROZA, Petru, 141-142 GRU, 102, 105, 270 GRUNWALD, 26, 53, 57, 70n, 73n GUILLIAUME, Gunter, 126 GULAG, I, 7, 11, 51, 99, 108, 114, 117, 123 GUOMINDANG, 234, 236, 250, 272 GURTOV, Melvin, 243, 260 HAM VAS, Bishop Endre, 183, 191n HANOI, 204 HERMAN, Franiszek, 2 4 , 27

286

HO CHIH MINH, 275 HOLLAND, 110 HOLLAND, Henryk, 45 HONECKER, Ericn, 2 HOTSUMI, Osaki, 102, 111, 115 HOU YUON, 204, 217 HOUGH, Jerry, 89, 107-108 Hü NIM, 204, 211, 231h HUA GUOFENG, 2, 199 HUI PAN, 219-220 HUNGARY, 1 2 , 1 5 , 3 7 , 3940, 6 8 , 72n, 110, 138, 145, 162, 165-166, 175193, 268-269, 271-272, 276-278 HUPALOWSKI, General Tadeusy, 55 HUSAK, Gustav, 39, 170 HWANG, Byong-Moo, 260 IENG SARY, 199-200, 203, 225 IENG THIRITH, 198, 200, 203 IGNATIEV, Semen, 118, 121 IM VIN, 219 INFORMACJA, 21-30, 3 5 , 3 7 3 8 , 267, 270, 276 INDIA, 252 ING PECH, 218 INGUSH, 113 IONESCU, Ghita, 143 IRAN, 22 ISINEV, Gregory, 125 ISLAM, 12 ISRAEL, 39 ISTANBUL, 93 ITALY, 1 2 , 137 JABLONSKI, Henryk, 38 JACOBSEN-LEVINE, Pauline, 102 JAPAN, 101-102, 106-107, 111, 115, 119, 208, 255, 272 JAROSZEWICZ, Stanislaw, 3 5 JARUZELSKI, Wojciech, 2, 47-48, 51, 5 4 , 60, 6 2 , 64-65, 69 JESUIT ORDER, 240 JEWS, 43-46,53-54,70,115, 118,138-139,144,163-164, 164.184-185,270-271,275

JIAN QING, 265 JOWITT, Kenneth, 149 KADAR, Janas, 39, 179-180, 187, 189, 271-272, 278 KAGANOVICH, Lazar, 106 KALININ, Mikhail, 94 KALLAI, Mikhail, 94 KALMYKS, 113 KALOCSA, 183 KAMENEV, Lev, 90, 105-106 KAMM, Henry, 220-221 KAMPOT PROVINCE, 210, 223 KANDAL PROVINCE, 210 KANIA, Stanislaw, 2, 52 KAO KANG, 250, 264 KARACHAI, 113 KATYN FOREST, 113 KAZAKHSTAN, 118h KAZAN, 86 KEDROV, Mikhail, 81, 105 KENNAN, George, 4-5, 107 KERENSKY, Aleksandr, 79 KGB, 1 2 , 20-21, 26, 28-30, 36-37, 39-43, 48, 5 2 , 54, 6 7 , 124-127, 218 KHALKIN-GOL BATTLE, 111 KHEM CHHOMMALI, 219-220 KHIEU PONNANY, 200, 203 KHIEU SAMPHAN, 198, 203, 222, 225 KHMER HANOI, 200, 204 KHMER LOEUS, 223 KHMER ROUGE, 95, 196, 205, 208, 211-213, 215, 219220, 223-227, 268 KHRUSHCHEV, Nikita, 2, 1 5 , 36, 41, 71n, 105, 121127, 144-145, 193, 268, 271, 278 KIRCHMAYER, Jerzy, 2 4 , 27 KIROV, Sergei, 9 4 , 105 KISHKIN, N.M., 98 KISZCZAK, General Czeslaw, 55 KLEIN, Antal, 178 KLISZKO, 38 KOBULOV, 105 KOGALNICEANU, Vasile, 151n KOH KONG, 223 KOKOSHKIN, Minister, 83 KOLAKOWSKI, Leszek, 4a KOLYMA, 100 KOMPONG SPEU, 223

287

KOMPONG THOM, 218 KONEV, Ivan, 122 KOPACSI, Sandor, 188 KOR, 50, 53 KORCZYC, General Wladyslaw, 24 KOREA, 110, 272, 276 KORIN, Alexander, 105 KORNILOV, Lev, 273 KORZHAVIN, Naum, 273 KOSICE PLAN, 155 KOSSIOR, Stanislaw, 106 KOSTOV, Traicho, 3 5 , 185 KOSYGIN, Alexsei, 5 KOY THOUN, 204, 231n KRASNOV, General, 82 KRASNOYARSK, 8z KRASZEWSKI, Jerzy, 65 KŘESTINSKY, Nikolai, 107 KRINGSAK, Chamand, 23 On KRIVITSKY, Walter, 113 KRUGLOv, öergei, 112, 118, 122 KSEFUNTOV, Ivan, 81 KUFEL, General Teodor, 43, 46-49, 277 KÜHL, Colonel Stefan, 24 KUIBYSHEV, Valerian, 30, 94, 105 KUN, Bela, 184 KURON, Jacek, 45 KUTYEPOV, General, 102 KUUSINEN, Otto, 110 KUZNETSOV, Aleksei, 118 KWANGTUNG ARMY, 115

LIN BIAO, 200, 275 LIU SHAOYI, 198, 252, 275 LOBOV, Semyon, 91 LOCKHART, Bruce, 80 LOGANOVSKY, 78 LONDON, 93 LON NOL, 196, 200, 205, 208, 211, 220-222 LONSDALE, Gordon, 124 LOS ALAMOS, 117 LOSONCZY, Geza, 180 LC XUN, 241 LUBYANKA PRISON, 70 LUCA, Vasile, 144 LUCY NETWORK, 115-116 LUPESCU, Elena, 139

MACLEAN, Donald, 102, 117, 120 MACMILLAN, Harold, 124 MAKAROV, 3 4 MALENKOV, Georgii, 105, 118, 122, l93n MAM NAY, 218 MANIU, Iuliu, 140, 142 MANKIEWICZ, General Czeslaw, 47 MAO ZEDONG, 6, 13, 103, 185, 196-200, 202-203, 206, 211, 215, 220, 222, 228, 229n, 233-234, 236237, 240-249, 251-256, 264n, 265n, 275, 278 MARGUERITE, Bernard, 151n MARTIN, William, 124 MARX, Karl, 156, 198-199, 256 LAOS, 7 MASARYK, Jan, 160 LASSWELL, Harold, 8, 233 MASLENNIKOV, General, 113 LATIN AMERICA, 12 LATSIS, Martin, 81, Ö3-84, MAY, Alan Nunn, 117 MAZUR, Granciszek, 24, 3586 36 LE CARRE, John, 1 MCDOUGAL, Myres, 233 LECHOWICZ, Wlodzimierz, MCNEIL, Hector, 120 35, 3 8 , 72n MEDVEDEV, Roy, 6, 111, LEI FENG, 254 118, 273 LEND LEASE, 117 MEKHLIS, Lev, 96, 105, 108 LENIN, Vladimir, 56, 83, MENCIUS, 240 86-87, 8a, 91, 93, 95, MENSHEVIKS, 100 97, 103, 106, 158, 198MENZHINSKY, Vyacheslav, 199, 215, 267, 273-274 90-91, 93, 95-96, 270 LENINGRAD, 275 MERCADOR, Roman, 110 LEVYTSKY, Boris, 2, 80 MERKULOV, Fyodor, 104-105, LI DAZHAO, 241 122 L I K H A C H E V , ueneral, 3 4 , 161

288

MESSING, Karl, 98 MESZLENYI, Bishop, 183 METRO-VICKERS TRIAL, 100 MEXICO CITY, 113 MGB, 118 MIETKOWSKI, Mieczyslaw, 30 MILITARY COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SALVATION, 59-60 MILLER, Evgeny, 111 MILTON, David, 237, 251252 MILTON, Nancy, 237, 251 MINDSZENTSY, Cardinal Jozsef, 182-183 MINGRELIAN AFFAIR, 118, 122 MIRBACH, Count, 83 MITCHEL, Bernard, 124 MOCZAR, Mieczyslaw, 42-46, 49, 51-53, 73n, 277 MODZELEWSKI, Karol, 45 MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav, 119 MONDOLKIRI, 223 MOORE, Barrington, 2, 9 4 , 103 MOORE, Charles, 234 MORUZOV, M., 139, 141, 268 MOSCOW, 5, 20, 28-30, 3 4 3 5 , 4 2 , 82-83, 112, 124 MURAVIEV, Mikhail, 83 MUSSOLINI, Benito, 139 MVD, 118, 176, 178 NAGY, Imre, 178, 186, 190 NATOLIN FACTION, 42 NEBRU, Jawaharlal, 187 NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM, 89 NHIM ROS, 204 NICOLAEVSKY, BORIS, 2, 91, 107-108 NIETZSCHE, Friedrich, 222 NIKOLAYEV, Leonid, 111 NIN, Andres, 110 NIZHNII NOVGOROD, 82 NKVD, 2 0 , 30-31, 96-98, 101, 103-104, 107-109, 112, 114, 141-142, 276 NOGRADI, Lieutenant General Sandor, 177 NOKORBAL, 216-218, 268, 270

NON SUON, 204 NOVOTNY, Antonin, 166 NOWOTKO, 3 6 OBZ, 159, 164, 268, 270 OCHAL, Edward, 72n ODDOR MEANCHEY PROVINCE, 219, 231 OKHRANA, 79-80, 88, 155, 172 OLSZOWSKI, Stefan, 52 ORDZHONIKIDZE, Sergo, 94 ORENBURG, 83 ORLOV, Alexander, 97 ORMO, 47-48 OSS, 3 7 , 117 OSTER, General Hans, 116 OTT, Colonel ttugene, 111 PALFFY, General Gyorgy, 178, 192n PANIN, Dmitrii, 114, 119 PARIS, 2^3 PATRASCANU, Lucretiu, 137, 143, 185 PAUKER, Anna, 137, 144, 277 PAUKER, Karl, 97-98 PEANG SOPHI, 226 PENESCU, Nicolae, 141 PENG DEHUAI, 252 PENKOVSKY, Oleg, 123 PEOPLE'S WILL, 155, 172 PERSONALITY THOERY, 1, 3, 6, 7, 13, 88, 93, 103, 117, 121, 127, 273-275 PETROGRAD, 82-83 PERKOWICZ, Professor Edward, 4» PERM, 82, 85 PETER, Gabor, 177, 179, 181, 185, 191n, 193n, 268, 270-271 PETERS, Yakov, 81-82, 84-86 PETRESCU, Alexander, 142 PHILBY, Kim, 102, 117, 120, 124 PHNOM PEHN, 196, 198, 205, 208, 211, 217, 221-223 PHUM KRAVA, 222-223 PIARIST ORDER, 184 PILLER COMMISSION, 168

289 PINTILIE, Lieutenant General Gheorghe, 142 PIPES, Richard, 5 POE, Edgar Allan, 191n POLAND, 8, 1 5 , 17-77, 93, 162, 165-166, 185, 267-269, 271, 278 POL POT, 2, 6, 1 2 , 195204, 206, 211, 213214, 217-219, 222-223, 225, 229n, 269, 271275, 278 PONTEVORVO, Bruno, 117, 121 POPE JUHN PAUL, 6 4 PO PROSTU, 4 5 , 73 POSKREBYSHEv, Aleksandr, 99, lu4, 122 POUM, 110 POWELL, David, 17 POZHAN, 17 PRACHEACHON PARTY, 197, 203 PRAGUE, 1 5 , 3 6 , 272 PRICE, R.F., 254 PRIOTROWSKI, General Czeslaw, 54-55 PROTESTANTS, 184 PULAWSKA FACTION, 42 PURSAT, 223 PYATAKOV, Grigorii, 90, 106 RADEK, Karl, 106 RADESCU, General Nicolae, 141 RADKIEWICZ, Stanislaw, 30, 36 RADO, Alexander, 116 RADOM, 50 RAJK, Laszlo, 34-35, 363 7 , 162-163, 177-178, 180, 185, l92n, 277 RAKOSI, Hatyas, 162, 175, 178-179, 181-182, 185, 187, 189 RAMZIN, Professor, 100 RANCIC, Dragoslav, 207 RANKOVIC, Aleksandr, 2, 178, 192n, 270 RAO, V.K., 252 RATANAKI, 223 RED ARMY, 79, 81-82, 89, 272

RED BRIGADES, 12 RED ORCHESTRA, i n n. REDENS, 105 Reicin, Colonel Bedrich, 159, 164, 268, 270-271 REILLY, Sydney, 80, 92-93 REISS, Ignace, 110 RICE, Condoleezza. 271 273, 277 RIGHT OPPOSITION, 91 ROESSLER, Kudolf, 116 ROKOSSOVSKY, Konstantin, 2 4 , 105, 268 ROMANIA, 135-154, 26b, 277-2/8 ROMANOV DYNASTY, 5 ROMBERG, Sigmund, 13 9 ROME, 182 ROMKOWSKI, Roman, 3 0 RUDZUTAK, Ian, 105 RYAZAN, 83 RYKOV, Aleksei, 9±, 107 RYPEL, J., ±69 RYUMIN, 118, 122 RZECZYWISTOSC SAN DARAVONG, 221 SANTANESCU, General Constantin, 141 SARATOV, 83, 87 SAVINKOV, Boris, 92-93 SCHAFF, 45 SCHANBERG, Sydney, 20 8, 227 SCHELIHA, Rudolf von. 111 SCHIRMAN, 59 SCHOLMER, Joseph, 115 SCHRAM, Stuart, 246, 256 SCHURMANN, Franz, 237, 251 SECRET POLICE, Cambodia, 195-232 Czechoslovakia, 155-173 Hungary, 175-193 Poland, 17-77 Romania, 135-154 Soviet Union 79-133 SECURITATE, 148 SEJM, 59 SEMICHASTNY, Vladimir, 122, 125 SEN SMEAN, 220 SEROV, General Ivan, 30, 122

290 SETON-WATSON, Hugh, 141 SHAFAREVICH, Igor, 273 SHAKHTY TRIAL, 93 SHALYGIN, Colonel, 24 SHAPIRO, Paul, 136 SHAWCROSS, William, 201 SHCHARANSKY, Anatoly, 126 SHCHERBAKOV, Aleksandr, 118 SHELEPIN, Aleksandr, 122, 125 SHEN, Marshall, 233, 272 S H I N G A R E V , Minister, 83

SHTEIN, 113 SHPIEGELGLASS, Mikhail, 102, 270 SIBERIA, 8 7 , 115 SIEM REAP, 219, 212 SIEU HENG, 204 SIEVAY AN, 204 SIGURANTA, 137-140, 276 SIHANOUK, Prince, 198, 203-204, 208, 215, 223225 SILICON VALLEY, 126 SINYAVSKY, Andrei, 126 SIWICKI, General Florian, 55 SKULBASHEVSKY, Colonel Anatoly, 25 SLANSKY, Rudolf, 35-37, 39, 163, 185, 277 SLOVAKIA, 156, 164 SLUTSKY, Abram, 102, 105, 109 SMERSH, 22-24, 26, 112113, 120, 276 SMITH, General Beddell, 120 SMOLENSK ARCHIVES, 92 SMUSHKEVICH, Yakov, 113 SO PHIM, 204 SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARY TRIAL, 93 SOFINOV, P.G., 87 SOKOLNIKOV, Grigorii, 106 SOLIDARITY, 1 8 , 26, 51-59, 77n, 269, 271, 277 SOLOMAN, Richard, 6, 244 SOLZHENITSYN, Aleksandr, 1, 7, 99, 119, 126, 272273 SON SEN, 198, 200, 203, 206, 225

SORGE, Richard, 102, 111, 115, 120 SOVIET UNION, 1-8, 1 1 , 13 16, 1 8 , 20-77, 138, 141 142, 147-148, 157-158, 160, 162-167, 175-176, 178-180, 182, 187-189, 197, 201-202, 215, 267269, 2/2, 276-278 SPAIN, 25, 3 7 , 110, 184 SPYCHALSKI, Marshal Marian, 23-24, 27-28, 35, 3 8 , 40, 43, 46-48, STAHL, Lydia, 102 STALIN, Joseph, 5-6, 1 3 , 1 5 , 20, 26, 34-36, 3 8 40, 43, 48, 71n, 73n, 85, 90-91, 93-96, 9 8 , 101, 103-106, 111-112, 118-119, 121, 127, 135, 143-145, 162, 165, 175, 179-182, 184-185, 196, 198, 201-203, 206, 215, 268, 271-272, 274-275, 277-278 STB, 159, 168, 270 STOCKER, Lajas, 185 STOLTE, Istvan, 178 STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL THEORY, 1, 3-4, 7, 13, 88, 93, 103, 112, 117, 121, 127, 267, 274 STUNG TRENG, 219 SUCIU, Emil, 151n SUKOLOV, Victor, 111 SUN YATSEN, 236-237 SVERDLOV, Yakov, 85, 273 SWIANIEWICZ, Jozef, 5, 99 100, 108 SWIATLO, Jozef, 36-37 SWITZERLAND, 3 7 , 93, 110, 116 SZCZECIN, 17 TAMBOV, 87, 269 TAOISM, 239 TATAR, Stanislaw, 2 4 , 2728 TATARS, 114 THAILAND, 212, 215, 218219, 222, 226 THMA POEK, 222

291

TITO, josip Broz, 2, 343 5 , 110, 143, 162-163, 178-179, 184-185 TOCH PHOEUN, 204 TOGLIATTI, Palmiro, 110 TOKYO, 110 TOMSKY, Mikhail, 91 TOTALITARIANISM, 3-4, 7, 11-12, 88, 93, 103, 111, 117, 121, 1 2 7 , 149, 157, 189, 260, 266, 267, 271-274 TRANSYLVANIA, 145 TREPPER, Leopold, 111, 115, 120 TRILISSER, Meyer, 8 7 , 91, 9 2 , 98, 270 TROTSKY, Leon, 90, 105, 106, 110, 113 TRUST, The, 92 TSANAVA, 105 TUAY MIEN, 222 TUCKER, Robert, 2, 6, 103, 127 TUKHACHEVSKY, Mikhail, 275 TUOL SLENG JAIL, 203, 209, 216-218 TURKESTAN, 112 TYLER, Ralph, 257 UNITED STATES, 117, 192n, 208, 215, 237 UKRAINE, 86-87, 9 2 , l07, 113, 118-119 UNSHLIKHT, Yosef, 81 URITSKY, Moisei, 83, 89, 267 URSUS, 50 USPENSKY, 105 VALENTA, Jiri, 125 VALI, Ferene, 175-193, 271 VATICAN, 183 VIENNA, 123, 178, 272 VIETNAM, 7, 8, 196, 200, 204, 208, 214-218, 222, 226, 272, 274, 278-279 VITEBSK, 87 VOLODARSKY, V., 83, 88, 267 VORN VET, 199, 204 VORONEZH, 87

V I R O S H I L O V , Klement, 106,

119 V O Z N E S E N S K Y , Colonel

Dmitrii, 28 V O Z N E S E N S K Y , Nikolai, 118 VYATKA,

85

V Y S H I N S K Y , Andrei, 9o, 105,

141 W A C H O W I C Z , Henryk, 24 WANG HONGWEN, 265 WANG YINGMING, 245 W A R S A W , 25, 48, 50, 110 W A R S A W P A C T , 21, 30, 169

W E I S S H A U S , Aladar, 190n WHITE

SEA

CANAL,

100

W H I T E S , 80, 83-84, 88 W H I T M A N , Walt, 191n WIDY-WIRSKI,

38

X O X E , Koci, 185, ly2n Y A G O D A , Genrikh, 90-91, 93-99, 101, 104-105, ±07 YAKI1, Petr, 126, 275 Y A K U S H E V , Alexander,

92

Y A L T A A C C O R D , 68 Y A N E L , 86 YAO WENYUAN, 265 Y A R O S L A V L , 83 YEAN SOK, 226 YENAN, 276

Y E Z H O V , Nikolai, 96-97, 101, 104-105, 109, 177, 179, 181, 184, 270, 275 Y O T H E A S , 224-226 Y U D E N I C H , General, 86 YUGOSLAVIA,

8,

24,

43,

56, 6 1 , 120, 162, 177, 1 8 4 , 192n, 2U1, 222, 272, 279 Y U N Y A T , 200, 203, 206207 ZAKOVSKY,

105

Z B L E A - C O D R E A N U , Corneliu,

139 Z E N K L , Petr, 160 ZHANG

ZHONGQIAO, 265

Z H D A N O V , Andrei, 118, 177 ZHOU

ENLAI,

198,

2o3,

2U8,

275 Z H U K O V , Marshal Georgii, 122

292

ZINOVIEV, Grigorii, 86, 105-106 ZIONISM, 36-38, 43, 45, 163 ZOLD, Sandor, 180

ZOLKIEWSKI, 45 ZOMO, 62 ZURIN, Valerian, 160 ZYMIERSKI, Marshal Michal, 24, 35