The Seventy Great Battles in History

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B

B EDITED BY JEREMY BLACK

CONTEN TS

Mughal army ar thefirsr barrieof Panipar, 1526.

Hopliresoldiersled rhe Greeks rovicroryar Mararhon, 490BC.

Contents

Medieval World Intr od ucti on

46

9

Poiti ers (732)

49

10

Lechfeld (9S5)

51

8

11

Hasti ngs (1066)

54

World map

10

12

Manzikert (1071)

58

Int rodu cti on

12

13

Hatti n (1187)

61

14

Liegnitz (1241)

65

15

Hakata Bay (1281)

69

16

Bannockburn (1314)

71

17

Crecy (1346)

74

18

Ankara (1402)

78

19

Agi ncourt (1415)

81

Contributors

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2 0 The Fall of Constantinople (1453)

85

21

89

Bosworth (1485)

Sixteenth Century

Ancient World

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Introduction

16

Marathon (490 BC)

19

22 Flodden (1 513)

95

Salam is (480 BC)

23

23 Tenochtitlan (1521)

98

Gaug amela (331 BC)

27

24 Pavia (1525)

103

Cannae (216 BC)

32

25 Panipat (1526)

107

Gaixia (203 BC)

36

26 Moh acs (1 526)

110

Act ium (31 BC)

38

27 Lepanto (1571)

113

Teuto burg Fore st (AD 9)

42

28 The Armada (1588)

118

Adrianopl e (378)

44

ISBN-l3, 97B-G-500-2S12S-6 ISBN-10: 0-500-25125-8

Printedandbound in China

ArCrecy, 734 6, Englisharchersthen knighrs slaughrered rheFrench.

Half-t itle RedArmy soldiersgo on rheorrock during Operari on Baqrato», tbeSoviet summer offensive of 7944 . Title page ThebarrieofWo rerloo, 78June 7875.

92

Introd uct io n

CON TE NTS

CON TENTS

US Sherman tank entering StL6in the Battle for Normandy, 1944.

Prince Eugenedefeats the Turks at the battl e of Belgrade, 1717.

Ninet eent h Century

Seventeenth Century

29 30 31 32 33 34

Intr oduction

122

Sekigahara (1600)

125

Breitenfeld (1631)

129

Nor dlinqen (1634)

133

Shanhaiguan (1644)

136

Naseby (1645)

138

Vienna (1683)

142

44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

Int roduct io n

180

Trafalgar (1805)

183

Leipzig (1813)

188

Waterloo (1815)

193

Ayacucho (1824)

198

Mexico City (1847)

200

Inkerm an (1854)

203

Antietam (1862)

206

Gettysburg (1863)

210

Sadowa (1866)

215

Omdurman (1898)

218

Modern Times

Eighteenth Century

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

Relief of thesiegeof Vienna, ' 683.

Introduction

146

Blenheim (1704)

149

Poltava (1709)

153

Belgrade (1717)

156

Rossbach (1757)

159

Plassey(1757)

163

Quebec (1759)

165

Saratoga (1777)

169

Yorktown (1781)

173

Jemappes (1792)

177

Thebattleaf Trafalgar, lB05.

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

Introduction

222

Tsushima (1905)

225

Tannenberg (1914)

229

Jutland (19 16)

232

Verdun (19 16)

236

The Western Front (19 18)

240

Battle of Britain (1940)

245

Battle for Moscow (1941)

250

Stalingrad (1942-43)

255

Midway (1942)

260

Battle of the Atlantic (1940-43)

264

Battle for Normandy (1944)

268

Operation Bagration (1944)

273

The American Air Attack on Japan (1945)

276

Huai-Hai (1948-49)

279

Dien Bien Phu (1953-54)

282

The Tet Offensive (1968)

284

The Iraq War (2003)

287

Further Reading

291

Sources of Illustrations

297

Sources of Quotations

298

Index

298

CONTRIBUTORS

Contributors

Camb ridg e and as an aut hor. His

incl ude TheOriginsofrheAmericanCivil

publicat ions incl ude Chronicleofthe

War (1996), TheAmerican Civil Warand the

the aut ho r of Medieval ChineseWarfare,

RomanRepublic (2003), TheEnemiesof

WarsoftheIndustrial Revolution (1999) and

300-900 (2002) and co-editor of A Mili tary

Rome(2004) and TheSonsofCaesar

Robert E. Lee:Icon for a Nation (2005). He is

HistoryofChina (2002). 4

(fort hcoming). 1,3,5,7,8

an elected Trustee of the US Society for Military History. 48 ,50

Jeremy Black is Professor of History at the

widely on many aspects of military history

Naval Muriniesoftne TwentiethCenrury: An

University of Exeter . Born in London, he

but specialize s in air power, the interwar

Inrernarionol Perspective, edited with

Ross Hassig isan historica l

Charles Messenger served in the Royal

was edu cated in Cambr idge and Oxford

era and World War II. His publications

Christopher Bell (2003). He is currently

ant hropo logist specializing in

Tank Regiment for 20 years before

Lawrence Sondhaus is Professor of

before teaching at the University of

include Air Pawer in the AgeofToral War

wo rking o n both a China history t extbook

Precolumbian and colonial Mexico. His

becoming a full-time military historian

History at the University of Indianapolis,

Durham. He received an MBEin 2000 for

(1999) and BririshArmour in tbe Normandy

and an edited book on naval blockades

pub licat io ns include Trade, Tribute, and

and defence analyst. He has wr itten

where he also serves as Director of the

services to stamp de sign. Professor Black

Campaign 1944 (2004). 59 , 63 , 66

wi t h S.C.M. Paine, as well as a naval

Transportation: TheSixteenth-Cenrury

numerous books , mainly on 20th -century

Institute for the Study of War and Diplomacy. His latest books are Naviesof

has appeared frequent ly on television and

hi story of China. 67

rad io, and has lectured in th e USA,

Bruce Coleman is a member of th e

Canada, Australia, New Zealand , Japan,

Department of Histo ry at the Univer sity of

Political Economy ofthe Valley of Mexico

warfare, and among his recent

(1985), Aztec Warfare:Imperial Expansion

publications are The D-Day Arias (2004)

Europe, 1815-2002 (2002) and Naviesin

Charles J. Esdaile has a Personal Chair at

and Political Control (1988), War and

and Call ro Arms (2005), an in-de pt h stud y

Modern World History (2004). 54 , 56, 62

Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and

Exeter. His w ork on 19th-eentury Briti sh

the School of History in the University of

Society in Ancienr Mesoamerica (1992),

oft he Brit ish Arm y 19 14- 18. 60 ,61 , 64,

France. His many bo o ks include War:

history incl ude s TheIdea ofrhe City (1973)

Liverpool. A leading expert on t he

Mexico and theSpanish Conquest (1994)

65

Tim Travers is Professor Emeritus at th e

Past, Presenr and Furure (2000), World War

and Conservatism and the Conservarive

Napoleonic Wars and , in particular,

and Time, History, and Belief in Aztecand

University of Calgary . He is the author of

Twa (2003) and RerhinkingMilirary Hisrory

Party (1988). 49, 53

Colonial Mexico (2001). 23

(2004). 33, 35, 39, 40, 41,42

Napoleonic Spain, he is the author of many books and art icleso n t he period

Michael Neiberg is Professor of History at

three books on World War I: The Killing

the United States Air Force Academy. His

Ground (1987), How the War Was Won (1992) and Gallipoli 1915(2001);a nd is co-

Philip de Souza is Lecturer in Classicsat

including The Wars of Napoleon (1995), The

Harald Kleinschmidt is Professor of the

recent books include Warfareand Society

Gabor Agoston is Associate Professor in

University College Dublin, specializing in

Peninsular War: A New Hisrory (2002) and

Hist ory of Int ernational Relat ions at the

in Europe, 1898 to the Presenr (2003) and

author of World History of Warfore (2002).

t he Department of History , Georgetown

Greek and Roman history. He is th e aut hor

Fighring Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and

Uni versity ofTsukuba, and Profe ssor of

Fighting the Great War:A Global History

Currently he is w rit ing a history of piracy .

Advenrurersin Spain, 1808-1814 (2004) . 46

European St ud ies at the University of

(2005). 4 7, 52, 55, 57

58

University, Washin gton, DC, w here he

of Piracyin theGraeco-Roman World

teaches cour ses on th e Ottoman Empire

(1999), Seafaring and Civilizarion: Maririme

and the Mi ddle East. His research interests

Perspecrives on World Hisrory (200 1), The

John France is Professor of Med ieval

Geschichteder intemati onolen

Gervase Phillips is Princ ipa l Lectu rer in

Spencer T. Tucker retired in 2003 aft er 36

include Ottoman history , early mod ern

Peloponnesian War 43 1-404 BC(2002) and

History at the Univ ersity of Swan sea,

Beziehungen (1998), TheNemesis ofPower

History at Manchester Met ropol it an

years of university teaching , t he last six as

Islami c and Euro pean w arfare and the

TheGreek and Persian Wars 499-386 BC

w hose special fiel ds of interes t are

(2000), Unders randing theMiddleAges

University. He is th e author of TheAnglo-

holde r of t he John Bigg s Chair in Mi litary

comparative study of t he Ottoman,

(2003). 2, 6

crusad ing histo ry and medieval warfare .

(2000, reissue 2003), Menschen in

Scots Wars 1513-1 550 (1999) and has

History at th e Virginia Military Inst it ute. He

His Vieroryin tbe Easr (1994) is a st udy of

Bewegung (2002), Fernweh und

contributed art icles to academic j ournals

is curr ently Senior Fellow in Milita ry

recent publication is Guns forrhe Sultan:

Michael Duffy is a Reader in British

the m ilitary history ofthe First Crusade,

Grossmachtsuchr.Ostasienim

including TheJournal ofMilitary History,

History for ABC-CLIO Publi shing , and is the

Milirary Pawer and tne WeaponsIndusrry in

History and Director of th e Centre for

while Wes rern Warfarein the Ageof the

europaischen Weltbild der Renaissance

War and Society, Warin History, The

author or editor of two dozen books of

the Orroman Empire (2005). 18, 20, 26, 27,

Maritime Histor ical Studie s atthe

Crusades 1000- 1300 (1999) analyzes the

(2003), People on theMove (2003) and

Scottish Historical Review and Technology

military and naval hi story , most recently

34,37

University of Exeter. He is also Vice

develo pm ent of Europ ean wa r asa w hole.

Charles V. TheWorld Emperor (2004). 15, 29

and Culture. 21 , 22 , 24, 25

President of the Navy Records Society . His

His lat est book, TheExpansion ofCarholic

Habsburg and Russian empires. His mo st

Tokyo. Among his many publicat ions are

th e fiv e-volum e Encyclopedia ofWorld War

II (2004) and Stephen Decatur: A LifeMost

Charles R. Bowlus is Profes sor Emerit us of

recent pub licat ions include TheGlorious

Christendom , 1000-1714 (2005) brings

Peter Lo rg e teaches Chin ese histo ry and

Michael Prestwich is Professor of History

Histo ry at t he University of Arkansas at

FirsrofJune:A Naval Battleand irs

together the themes of warfare and

film at Vander bil t University. He

at t he Unive rsity of Durham . His research

crusadi ng . 9, 11, 12, 13, 14

specializes in t he military and political

int erestscentre on 13th - and 14th -cent ury

Peter Wilson is Professo r of Early Modern Hist ory at th e Univ ersity of Sunderland.

Bold and Daring (2004). 51 , 68, 69 , 70

Little Rock and has published more t han

Aftermarh (2002), TheNaval Miscellany vol.

forty art icles in Eng lish and German on

6 (2003) and articles on t he battl e of

histo ry of 10t h- and 11th- cent ury China,

England . His books include TheThree

Medieva l Central European Histo ry. His

Trafalg ar in Mariner'sMirror and Journal for

Jan Glete is Professor of History at

and is the author of Warand Politicsin

Edwards (1980), Edward I (1988), Armies

His recent bo oks include Absolutism in

mo st im portant boo k is Franks, Moravians

Maririme Research (2005). 44

Stockholm Unive rsity . Among his recent

EarlyModernChino, 900-1 795 (2005). His

and Warfarein theMiddle Ages: TheEnglish

Central Europe (2000) and From Reich to

publicat ionsare Navies and Nations:

next project is a hi sto ry of th e effects of

Experience (1996) and Planragenet England

Revolution: German History 1558-1806

Danube (1995). His mo st recent study is

Bruce A. Elleman is an Associat e

Warships, Naviesand SrareBuilding in

g un pow der o n Asian wa rfare and society.

1225- 1360(2005). 16, 17, 19

(2004). He is curr ently w riti ng a history of

Augusr 955. The BarrieofLechfeld and rhe

Professor in th e Maritime History

Europeand America, 1500-1860 (1993),

32

EndofrheAgeofM igrarionsin the Wesr (in

Department oft he USNaval War Coll eg e,

Warfareor Sea 1500-1 650: Maririme

press 2005). 10

focu sing o n Chin ese naval, milita ry and

Con fliersand the Transformation ofEurope

Philip Ma tyszak studied ancien t history

Am erican Hist ory and Mi litary Institutions

diplo mat ic hist ory. Recent boo ks include

(2000) and Warand the Statein Early

at Oxford Unive rsity wh ere he received his

and Head of th e Depart ment of War

and Magyars. TheSrruggle far rheMiddle

8

Dav id A. Graff is Associate Professor of History at Kansas State Unive rsity. He is

th e Thirt y Years War. 30, 31, 36, 38 , 43, 45 Brian Holden Reid is Professor of

John Buckley is Senior Lect urer in War

Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989

Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic

doct orat e on the senate of the Lat e

Stud ies at King 's College, London. He has

Stud ies at t he University of

(2001). Wilsonand China: A RevisedHisrory

and Sweden asFiscal-Military States,

Roman Republ ic. He currently works as a

written extensively on American history in

Wolverhampton, UK.He has published

ofrhe 1919 ShandongQuesrion (2002), and

1500-1650 (2002). 28

computer systems administrator in

the mid-19th century, and his books

9

,.

...

60 Battle for Mo s ow

:; y

.

61 Stalmgrad

63 Battl e of the At lantic 41 Saratoga /

54 Tsushima

.\ 62 Mid way

" I

•'.

)

65 Operat .ion Bagration \.

47 Ayacucho

V I A1

1/

28 The Armada

y)

W~terlOo

19A9i n CO~ ~?/. i 3~Bl5 enh:~m

I

17 Crecy 64 Battle for Normandy 58 The Western Front

/-

,

t

•

.,

/

57 Verdun 43 Jemappes 10

I·

9 Poit iers

..

1

55 Tannenberg 7 Teutoburg Forest 33 Naseby 30 Breitenfe ld 59 Battl e of Britain / 14 Liegnitz 1 Hastmgs / . •• • 46

31

r li~j1

36 Poltava

\.

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

I

n th is collect ion, distingu ished scholarsseek to

give shape to th e chaos of war at its climactic moments. The boo k covers land and sea battles, aswell as sieges and campaigns in the air. Our range isglobal. We include not only the major and familiar battles such as Waterloo (1815) and 5talingrad (1942), but also less well-known but still very important battles. These include Hakata Bay (128!), in which a Mongol invasion force based in China was defeated when it sought to invade Japan. This ensured that Japan, unlike

Korea, would remain outs ide the orbit of the Chinese (then ruled by t he Mongols), and thu s that it would follo w a different course. 5ekigahara (1600), anoth er batt le included in this collection, was crucial in the consolidat ion of Japan at the close of the protracted civil warfare of the 16th century. This helped ensure in the long term that a united Japan would be in a position to retain its independence from Western control, whereas more divided areas found it difficult to do so. Another neglected battle, Panipat (1526) in India, led to the Mughal ascendancy of Hindustan , and thus created th e basic political unit in South Asia for two centuries. In discussing the nature of battle from ancient times to the present - itscauses, cour ses and con sequences - the contributors are reminding us not only that fighting is the crucial element of mil itary history, but also that battle hasbeen far fro m constant in character. Fighting is not some result of the corruption of human kind by society: it is integral to human society. From the outset, hum ans comp eted wi th other animals, and fed and protected themselves as a result of th ese strugg les. Yet, even the facts of death and mutilation have meant very different th ings to people in contrast ing cultures . From the physical immediacy of the hand -to-hand warfare between Greeks and Persiansat Marathon (490 Be) to the distancing of death in much (but by no means all) modern warfare, we are also reminded of the very different waysfighting hasoccurred.

Armoured

horsemen, such as this Turkish example of th e 15th century, were

prominent in late medieval warfare

inwestern and centralAsia.

12

Difference extends to the frequency of battle. In terms of large-scale engagements for which reliab le sources exist, battle has not been spread evenly across the world. Instead, part icular areas and cultures have engaged in battle, while for others, such as the Aborig ines of Australia, conflict was on a smaller sca le and is difficult to recover from the available sources.

Choice of battles Any select ion of batt les of course involves debate, and part of th e interest of reading t his boo k is decidi ng how you would have cho sen differently. We have been gu ided by a number of factors,among which reliable sources is very signifi cant: for certain important battles, there are no such sources. We have also sought to use the selection to indicate changes in the nature of war - some of these changes can be presented as developments in the art of war. Certainly, the greater complexity that stemmed in t he 19th cent ury from needing to respond to rail-borne tro ops and, in the 20th century from mechanized, aerial and submarine warfare, created problems for commanders. We have also sought to con-

sider key batt les that dete rmined the fate of peop le and affected the distribution of power, fo r example Quebec (1759), which ensured t hat French power and culture would not dominate

The defeat of the Spanish Arm ada

North America. The drama of these clashesvaried great ly, but all of them were crucial events in history. It is more difficult to assess what happened on

bottles in hista ry, leadi ng ul timately to English

in 1588wos one of the most

crucial naval

ascendancy at sea.

a battlefield than is generally appreciated. When several sources exist, the need to reconcile them suggests the problems (of omission ) facing scholars when they have on ly one source upon which to rely. When it is possible to move from a single source to consider several, there is a welcome deepening of understanding. This underlines the drawback of work that seeks to rely on a lim ited

13

INTRODUCTION

I NTRODUCTION

set. As a result, Weste rn forces were deplo yed at great distances, for example by the British (successfully) to Plassey in Indi a in 1757, and by the Russian fleet (unsuccessfully) to Tsushima in 1905.Thiswas clearly warfare acrossthe world . This fo rce projection, the n, did not necessarily entail success. Instead, t he abili ty to force a path along particular routesand to gain control of individual sites did not mean t he subjugation of a society. What was crucial was t he willingness to accommodate (even acculturate to ) conquerors. This has varied greatly, and will continue to do so, ensuring that battle has to be understoo d as an aspect of a wider process. For example, the Spanish conquest of the Aztec and Inca em pires in 1519-21 (see Tenocht itlan p. 98) and 1S31 respectively was follo wed by the arrival of colonists and th eir livestock, by Christian pro selytization and th e destruction of rival religious rit uals,by th e int roducti on of Spanish admi nist ration st ruct ures, and yet, also, by a degree of Spanish acceptance of local elites as well as of local adaptation to the Spaniards. As will be made clear in this book, each batt le, however small, has contributed to the state of today 's world and will continue to influence our ever-changing reactions to conflict. The so-called 'Bottl e of the Nations' at Leipzig, 14-19 Octo ber IBI3, marked the beginning of the collap se of the

Napoleonic empire since it fed to the expulsion of

Frenchforcesfrom Germa ny.

14

range of material, a point made by Hans DelbrOck (1848-1929), a key figu re in th e develo pme nt of German mili tary history, w ho em phasized th e value of the critical examinat ion of sources. This is also true for more recent battles , A paper on t he tank strength of German armoured divisions in 1942-43 produced for the official British histories of World War II argued that casualties and fluctuating replenishment priorities were important factors in variations and commented: 'It shows how misleading formal establishments can be compared with the actual - and

rabbits out of hat s, as an adj utant a long time ago!' Tank strength was a particular issue because,asCaptain BasilLiddell Hart pointed out,

wh ich conta ins discussion of battles that were im portant to the period and also indi cated key aspects of warfare. The organizat ion of th e

'To deduce correct lessons it is necessary, above all, to determine the tank strengths on either side in any important operations: Reconciling sources involved addressing issues such as how best to distinguish those tanks that were fit for action ,

volume - Ancient World, Medieval World , and the n a section each for 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th centuries and Modern Times, the last extend ing to includ e th e Iraq War of 2003 - reflects both the greater frequency of key battles over the last half-

and also the treatment of light tanks that were on ly appropriate for reconnaissance duties. This serves to underline some of the problems wi t h explaini ng what happened . To state that the con tributors have do ne their best is th erefore high

millen nium and the availability of sources. This greater frequency was in part due to the expansion in power projection stemming not only from the development of oceangoing ships, but also

fluctuati ng - establish ment of a divis ion, and illu stratesth e importa nce of keepi ng thi sfactor in min d. It doubtless applies to all armies at one time or another in their war careers: Brigadier C. 1. C. Molony added, 'I am apt to turn a rather jaundiced eye on strength returns -

Organization ofthe book

from the will ingness to use such vessels in order to create transoceanic maritime empires - a met hod particularly seen with the weste rn European powers, whose ships first circumnavigated the globe. Philip II of Spain (reigned 1556-98), after wh om th e Philippines were named, was th e

perhaps because of vague memories of conjuring

The book is divided into seven part s, each of

ruler of th e first emp ire on which the sun never

praise. These scholarly contr ib utions hig hlight what can be done in throwi ng ligh t on crucial episodes in world history,

Aerialcombat was a key innovation of20th-ce ntury

war. During the Battle ofBritain, summer 1940, the Spitfire figh ter

planeproved more than a match for the German

Messerschmitts.

15

-

.. . '.

Ancient

World erman nationalists in the 19th century

G

raised a great statue in 187Sof Arminius, a German tribal leader, wielding the sword

of vengeance to celebrate his victory in AD 9 over the Romans at Teutoburg Forest. This captured the continued resonance of the great battles of antiquity in the modern world. In 1914, German strategists planned to repeat, at the expense of the French, Hannibal 's victory over the Romansat Cannae (216 BC). Greek triumphs over the invading Persians, especially at Marathon and Salamis (490 and 480 BC respectively), are still used to indicate that larger forces could be defeated by those who were more 'civilized', although the depiction of the Persiansis often unduly harsh. We also consider other major battles in this open ing chapter. Gaixia (203 BCl. a key event in the rise of the longstanding Han emp ire in China, is a reminder that crucial clashesdid not occur onl y in Europe; while

"

Octavian's victory over Mark Antony and Cleopatra at Actium (31 Be) draws attention alongside Salamis to the key role of naval power. It led to Rome's dominance of the eastern Mediterranean. The batt les of antiqu ity present considerable difficu lties forthe historian, but new insightshave come from a variety of sources. For example , an increase in archaeological evidence makes it possible to cast fresh light on batt les such as that between Sparta and th e Persian invaders of Greece at Thermopylae, the prelude to the more major engagement at Sa lamis later in the year. Other insights come from study ing weapons and martial equipment. Thus, an assessment of the properties of galleys has proved very important

Theheavily armed Greek hoplite infantrymen - seen here in a Corinthian black-figure vase ofc. 625 Be- became the standard by which other soldiers were m easured in antiquity.

Marathon Date: August 490 BC Location: Attica , Greece At M ara thon we stood alone against Persia. And our courage in that mighty endeavour defeated the men of46 nations. (THEATHENIANSCLAIM THEPLACE OFHONOURAT PLATAEA) HERODOTUS9.27

arat hon was a batt le of opposites.

M

A tiny democ~atic city-state op~osed. a despotic empire hundreds of times ItS

size. One army was almo st entirely composed of armo ured infantrymen, the other of horsemen and archers.Thisclash of cult ures was profound ly to Full-scale reconstructionof

a trireme. the Olympias. The necessity for ma npo wer to propel the ship greatly limited the cruisingrangeof such ships, as rhey had ro srop to rake

on morewaterand food.Across the world, thiswasa

majorlimitation to oared warships, whethertriremes

orthe warcanoes of, in particular, thePacilic.

18

L

affect

the

subsequent

developm ent

of

fo r unde rstanding options and choicesat Salamis and Actium. Similarly, understanding of eques-

army based on th e adu lt males of the farmi ng popu lation, and this provided huge reserves of

Western civilizatio n. For the city-state was Athens, where a func-

trian factors has helped lead to questions about whether chariots charged en masse and were

manpower. The Romans used these against Carthage and also in the conquest of Greece. Alongside warfare with similar regular forces, the armies of th e more settled states fo und t hemselves in confl ict wit h nomadic forces.Thus, aft er

tioni ng democracy had been created just two decades previously. The previous ruler of Athens, Hippi as, had fled to the court of Darius I (521-486

t herefore really deadly in battle.The net impact of research has been to offer greater depth to knowledge currentl y stemming fro m a simple reliance on literary sources. For examp le, in con-

BC), king of Persia, whose empire stretched from the Aegean Sea to th e banks of th e Indus. Until they were conqu ered by Persia, the Greek colo nies in Asia Minor had been independent.

sidering Cannae, it is important to amplify the Classical historian Polybius's account in order to

the Han gained po wer in China in th e civil war, they were challenged by the Xiongn u confede ration of nomadic tribes, while the Romans were

move beyond a schematic depiction of the battle. The battles of antiquity are frequently discussed in terms of the 'great man' approach of

put under increasing pressure in the late 4th century, with the emperor Valens defeated and killed by the Visigoths at Adrianople in 378.

Unsurprisingly, they felt a greater affinity with their former homeland of Greece than with their ruler thousan ds of miles away in Persia. The Greeks of Asia Minor rebelled against the Per-

history, wi th commanders such as Alexander th e Great at Gaugamela in 331 BC, Hannibal at Cannae, and Armini us at Teutobu rg Forest. This

The major series of attacks between AD 250 and 500 known as th e 'barbarian' invasions th at

sians,and were assisted by Athenian soldiers w ho captured and burn ed Sa rdi s, the capital of Lydia,

destr oyed or weakened the empires in Eurasia and brought down the western Roman empire was, in fact, another stage in a longstanding

in 498. Herodo tus the histo rian te lls us:

approach frequen tly overlap ped with the literary genre of the epic and with the style of the romance, thus treating battle as theatre. A focus on great men is fascinating and - in each of the cases above - their generalship made a key difference to the battle, but it can ensure that second-rank commanders, or simply those over-

series of struggles and complex diplomacy between such empires and tribes. These invasions were also aspects of major migrations. Some of the invasions were mounted by cavalry, which is oft en held to have become more effec-

might p unish them ", ond he set a slave to tell him

shadowe d by th e more flamboyant or apparently noteworthy, are generally neglected. This makes it harder to evaluate command skills, let alone other factors in success. For example, the Romans, like the Han in China, believed in a mass

tive as a result of the stirrup in Central Asia, the region where the horse had first been domesticated. Not all 'barbarians' employed cavalry, but many of the most effective raiders and con querors we re horsemen .

'Darius enquired who these Athenians were, and on being to ld ... he prayed "Grant to me, God, that I three times as he sat do wn to dinne r "Master, remem ber the Athenians".'

Preparations for battle Accordingly, aft er crushing the rebellion in Asia Min or, in 490 BC a Persian invasion force landed at Right Persian infan trymen shown an a polychrome brickfaced wall in the royal polaceorSusa(fran). Theirprincipol weapon was the bow, which they used with deadly effect.

19

• MARATHON

A NC I EN T WO RLD

Marathon, some 32 km (20 miles) east of Athens. Modern research has moved the date of this landing to Aug ust from the trad itional date in early September. The size of the invading force is uncertain, with some estimates as high as 100,000 men. Probably there were about 20,000 men, including oarsmen and cavalry. Marathon was chosen because it was sufficiently far

Right Mosrof rhe Greek soldiersor Marathonwere bophtes, tbeir large circularshields offeringprotection and support ro

from Athens for an orderly disembarka tio n, and because the flat gro und suited the Persian cavalry, which outma tched t he Greek horse. Hippias, the former tyrant of Athens, accompanied the invaders. It was hoped that his presence

soldiers on their left. Bronzesrarue.

might inspire a coup by the conservat ive aristocrats of Athens and bring about a bloodless surrender. The rest of Greece was cowed into neut rality.

Belo w In tbe initio! srageof rhebarrIe on tneplain of Mararhan the

Atheniancentre movedforward firsr, carching tbe Persians by

Even th e Spartans,th e foremost mi lit ary power in Greece, discovered a number of pressing religious rituals which would keep them occupied

surprise.

for the duration of the crisis. Only Plataea, a tiny

marsh

depen dency of Athens, sent reinforc ements to the Athenian force which mustered before the plain of Marathon, in an area called Vrana betwee n the hills and the sea. The Athenians had about 7,200 men. They were mostly hop lites, a term which comes from the hop/on, the large circular shield which they carried. Each shield also offered support to the soldier on the shield bearer's left, allowing this man to use his protected right arm to stab at the enemy with his principal weapo n - t he long spear. The Persian infantry preferred the bow, and were fearsomely adept with it. They fired from behin d large wicker shields which protected them from enemy bowfire, but were of doubtful value against attacking infantry. Miltiades, th e At henian leader, knew his enemy, for he had once served in the Persian army. Now he had to convince a board of ten fellow generals that his plan of atta ck would succeed. Eachgeneral commanded for one day in

turn and, though they ceded that command to Milt iades, he still waited until his allotted day before ordering the attack. This delay was probably for military rather than political reasons. To neutralize the superior Persiancavalry the Athen ians might have needed to bring up abatis, spiky wooden defences, to guard the ir flanks. Or they might have waited for the Persian cavalry to consume their available supplies and be forced to go foraging. Or Datis, t he Persian commander, might have broken the deadlock by ordering a march on Athens. The Athenians deployed most of their strength on the wings , perhaps to buffer a cavalry thrust, or so that they could extend their line to counter a Persianenvelo pment. This left the centre dangerously weak, especially as the toughest of the Persian troops were deploye d against it. The engagement To min imize their exposure to enemy bowfire, the Athenians did someth ing unprecedented for a

Below ln rhe barrIe'sfinal srages, alrhough tne Persians had broken rhraugh in the centre. on the wingsthe Arhenianswheeled

inwards, crushing theenemyand forcing the Persians to flee.

marsh

:~,

G)~~~~:~=~~~~ ttlrowsthe Persiansoff balanceby advancing at a run.

20

21

• ANCI ENT WORLD

hop lit e army: the y charged down th e slight downhill slope at a run. The start led Persians misj udged the speed of th e Athenian advance, and

Salamis

many of the ir arrows sped over the hopli tes' headsand landed harmlessly behind them .

Date: Sept ember 480 Be Location: between Attica and the Peloponnese, Greece

Though caught off balance, the Persians were tough and resilient fighters. They bro ke th e Athenian cent re and drov e through to wards Athen s. But the hoplite force destroyed th e

At first the Persian lin e withstoad the attack; bu t quick ly The channel was cro wded with our ship s, and they Could not aid each o ther. Soon th eir armou red pro ws

wing s, and rolled them up in disorder before turning on th e Persian regula rs w ho had broken their centre . The fight boiled through th e Persian

Were crashing inta friendly hulls and sheari ng off the Ban ks of oars, while the Greek ships skilfully circled Round th em and attacked from all sides.

camp as the Persians struggled to regain their ships, with those who failed being driven into th e marshes behind the camp.

A ESCHYLUS, THEPERSIANS, LINES 412-1

8

The Athenians captured only six ships perhaps because the Persian cavalry belatedly reappeared. Nevertheless, it was a stunning victory. Over 6,000 Persians lay dead for the loss of 192 on the Athenian side.

Above right Attic red-figure pelike showing fight ing between Greek infantry and o Perslan cavatryman.

But there was no time for self-congratulation. The Persian fleet then started heading down the coast to where Athen s lay undefended. In th e subsequent race between the army on land and the army at sea the Athenians were again victorious. On seeing the Athenian army mustered to oppose the ir landing, the Persians hesitated briefly, then sailed away_ Outcome

Below Ancient Greekfunerary

tumuJusat Marathon today.

Without a Greek victory at Marathon, Athen s might never have produced Sophocles, Herodot us, Socrates, Plato or Aristotle. The world

n 480 BC the Persians again invaded Greece, King Xerxes leading a hug e army across from Anatolia, shadowed by a fleet of about 1,200

I

might never have known Euclid, Pericles or Demosthenes - in short, the cultural heritage of Western civilization would have been profoundly altered. Nor would a young runner called Phaedippides have brought news of the victory to Athens. Phaedippides had earlier gone to Sparta asking for help, and now his heart gave way under th e strain of his exerti on s. But a run of 41 km (26 mi les) is still named aft er the battl e from w hich he came - a marathon.

..------J"'fOM BATANTS'----.. Greeks • 10,000 men, of w hich 7,200 were Ath enian hop lite infant rymen • Commanded by M ilti ades and Callimachu s • 192 dead

Persians • 25,000 men • Commanded by Datis • 6,400 dead (accordinq to the Greeks)

22

Fifth -century BC lapis lazuli head of a young Persian prince, possibly representing XerxesI. son of DariusI.

warships. Many of the sout hern Greek city -states banded togeth er under Spartan leadership to resist him by land and sea. Coordinated attempts to block the advance of his army in th e narrow pass of Thermopylae and hold up his fleet at Artemision failed w hen the Greek land forces were outflanked and forced to withdraw. A small Spartan and Thespiaean rearguard resisted heroically, but wasoverwhelmed. The combined Greek fleet moved to the island of Sa lamis, abandoning th e citie s of Thebes and At hens to the enemy. A prophecy urging the Athenians to put their faith in a wooden wall caused some of them to fortify th eir Acropo lis wit h ti mber, but the major ity agreed wit h th e elected general Them istocles that the ir best hope lay in th e city's 200 wooden, trireme warships, the largest contingent in th e Greek fleet. After the evacuation of the Atheni ans to Salami s had been completed, the Greek fleet assembled in th e bay on the easte rn side of the island. When th e news came that t he Acropol is of Athens had been occupied , the Spartan commander Eurybiades ordered his captains to wi thdraw under cover of darkness to a more defensible position on th e Isthmu sof Corinth, but he changed his mind later that night and the Greeks sailed out to conf ront the Persians the

next morn ing. Herodot us claims th at Themistoc1es sent a secret message to warn Xerxesthat the Greeks were about to w it hdraw, causing him to send ships around Salamis to cut off the Greeks' retreat and forcing Eurybiadesto risk a battle. This story is a highly dubiou s one, assuming as it does th at King Xerxes and his commanders would tru st such a message, and that Them istoc1es would have thought it advantageous to provoke a Persian attack. It is more likely that th e Persians planned to surround the Greeks, as they had att emp ted once before at Artem ision. Their aim would have been to drive th e Greek ships northward s and westward s out of th e narrow

23

• 2

2

AN CIE NT WO RLD

channel between Salamisand th e mainland , into the open water s of th e Bay of Eleusis, and attack I.

th em from two sides. For th is purpose Xerxes despatched 200 Egyptian ships in the early evening to sail right round Salamis and come at the Greeks from the direction of Eleusis. He also sent a flotilla to cruise th e waters around the sout hern end of th e island, w hile his main fleet (around 600 ships) moved into posit ion at the eastern approaches to the narrow straits, ready to advance at dawn . The Greekswere made aware of these manoeuvres by Aristeides, an exiled Athenian politician who had returned to join in the fight against the Persians and had probably been sent on a scouting mission to determine whether the escape route to the west was clear. His news was greeted with dismay in the Greek camp, but the commanders resolved to sail out at dawn and take the Persians on in the narrows between Salamis and the mainland, hoping that the superior numbers of the enemy would count for less in such confined spaces. Th e ba ttle A Roman copyofa portrait bust of Themistocles from Ostia, possibly basedon a 5th·

centuryBeoriginal from Athens.

In eager anticipati on of a magn ificent victory, King Xerxes posit ioned himself opposite Salamis wit h a good view of the small island of Psyttaleia, where a detachment of Persian troops had been landed during th e night. But instead of wi t nessing his fleet 's fina l triumph over the Greeks, Xerxes saw a naval di saster unfo ld before his very eyes. The various ethnic cont ingents of the Persian fleet were lined up several rows deep across the narrow channel w it h the Phoenicians on the right w ing, nearest to Xerxes's position, and the lon ians on the left, nearest to Salamis. As they moved further into the channel their ships became so compacted and confused that they found it impossible to keep in formation. The crews were tired and to make matters worse a strong swell developed, making it even harder for the ships to make headway. Themistocles had anticipated th is and seemsto have persuaded the other Greek

24

commandersto delay engag ing t he Persians unt il they were clearly in disorder. With the Athen ian ships leadi ng, the Greeks rowed out from th e shore and turn ed to wards the enemy. On a given signal their fresh crews surged forward and broke through the Persian lines to ram individual ships asthey struggled to manoeuvre. The Persians would have been expecti ng the Greeks to flee before their superior force, according to the plan worked out the previous day. But, like all ancient battles, once the action had started it was impossible to keep to a specific plan, and the captains of the individual ships were forced to make decisions on the spot. The main decision made by many of Xerxes's captains was to turn away from the attacking Greeks, causing confusion as they encountered more of the ir own ships try ing to advance. In the resulting

chaos th e Greek captains urged on thei r much fresher crews and pressed the attack w it h great success. It is impossible to describe th e full course of the battle in detai l. Our main source, the writer Herodotus, offe rs on ly a series of anecdotes about various groups of combatants. It was claimed that 70 Corinthian ships under Adeimantos turned and fled towards th e Bayof Eleusis.lt is likely that this supposed cowardly northward retreat, which Herodotus presents asan Athenian slander against the Corinthians, may have been a deliberate move to engage the Egypti an squadron and prevent it from attacking the Greek rear. The Corinthians maintained that the ir ships did not encounter the Egyptians but returned to th e battle and acquitted themselves as well as any of the Greeks. One of the most colourful

anecdotes concerns Artemisia, the ruler of Herodotus's home city Halicarnassus, which was subject to the Persians. She was in command of her own shi p and in the front line of the Persian

A watetcolour ot thesea bailie of Salamis. This

fleet. When an Athenian tr ireme bore down on her she tr ied to escape, but found her path blocked by other Persian ships. In desperation she ordered her helmsman to ram on e of them ,

vividly conveysthe chaotic natu re of thebailiein the straits.

imaginative

reconstruction

wh ich sank with the lossof all its crew. The pursuing Athen ian captain assumed that Artemisia 's ship was on his side and changed course towards another Persian vessel. Xerxes and his advisors saw the incident and recognized Artemisia's ship by its ensign, but their belief that she had sunk a Greek trireme then earned her the king 's admira tion . Xerxes is also said to have remarked at this point, 'My men have acted like women and my women like men:

25

•• Z

ANC IENT WORLD

Gaugamela

Yetanother victory for the Greeksas thePersian tteet is

N 0

to Corinth

t

Adeiman to s then hea dsjjorth with

rouredand

70 CorinthianShips (whether a scouring mission or through pure cowardice is debatable), but shortly

GREEC E (A It ic a )

defea ted by nigh tfall.

- Megara

Bayof Eleusis

,...........,

,.J

~

,J

toA thens

'----, \ - - " - ,

®

L..,

posmon of (e. 200 Athenia n ~nd Spa rta n~ "~es ~ _ shlpsl ed by Themost ociesand --,.a..: 11 ~ '--..............r' Eurybiades) ~ -

V

-?

Sa~a -r>f1llS ~

At dawn the two 3

0

v-

Location : Mesopotamia (modern Iraq)

The Persian fleet

r,P l.....,.. Peiraieus •

Psyttaleia ~O

fleetsmeet in the__..., narrowchanneljust

Island of Salamis

BC

Alexandersaidthat Darius had relievedany anxietyhe might have had by bringinghismassed forces together so that in one day everythingcouldbe decided, and they would be spareda lang periodof difficulty and danger. D IODORUS Sicuius, BIBlIOTHECAH ISTORIA, 17.56.1

-~

sets off from the Bayof Phaleron the night before thebartle

r'

/1.

Saronic Gulf

Date : 1 October 331

GREE C E (A ttica)

'< ~

~ ~

c:::,

3 miles

0

;turnS baCk ta r~~ h e ma," fleet 4 ( / ~a

~

5km

1 - - - - - - - 11 1-

_ ... ~ PersIan Shl S

O

Persian guards of the king in flu ted hots . They hel d the centre of the

was comma nded by Darius III, king of kings,

Persian infantry

and master of all between the Euph rates and

line at Gaugamela. The elite Persian

n 1 October 331 BC two armies met in

Mesopotamia to decide the fate of an

north of Psyttaleia c;- ~

empire. The larger by fat of these armies

Afgha nist an. Once, his domains had reached

infantrywere

t he Med ite rranean, but these lands had been

known as th e 'tmm ort als'. The

conq uered by the invading Macedonians of

ceremonial dress

Alexander the Great. Darius had offered Alexan-

here was probably replaced wi th

Another story concerns the Persian sold iers on

Along the coast of Salamis, other Persians who

der a huge bribe in a desperate effort to secure

the island of Psyttaleia. They were placed there in

managed to get ashore from their foundering

peace. Parmenio , one of Alexander's generals ,

morepractical

anticipation of the bulk of the Greek fleet being

ships w ere killed or captured. Towards the end of

had comment ed, 'I wo uld take it if I were you :

driven north and westwards away from the

clothing on the battlefield. As well

the day the Persian fleet retreated in confusion to

and Alexander had replied sharply , 'Yes, I would, if

as spears with a

island . Instead they were isolated from their own

the Bay of Phaleron, having lost more than 200

ships and left vulnerable to attack from the

'pomegranate' counter-weight, likemost Persian

ships and having failed in its ob jec tive of forcing

I w ere you: His offer rejected , Darius collected a massive

nearby shores of Salamis. Right before Xerxes's

the Greeks away from Salamis. The Greeks had

army of about a quarter of a mil lion men, includ-

eyes his elite troops, includi ng three of his own

lost only about 40 ships and sent the enemy back

ing Scythians from th e shores of the Black Sea and

neph ew s, were slaughtered by th e Ath enians.

to t heir anchorage in disarray.

Bactrians from the foo thi lls of the Him alayas. He

infantry men th ey

also carried bows.

also recruited 6,000 Greek mercenaries as a per-

COMBATANTS

26

Afte rmath Xerxes took the rema ins of his fleet and much of his army back to Anatolia, leaving his general

so nal bodyguard. Darius chose his battlefield carefully. At Issusin 333 BC the terrain had not allowed him to use his

Gree ks

Mard onius wi t h a substantial army in central

superior numbers.This time, he chose the plain of

• Over 300 ships

Greece. The following year a Greek army led by

Gaugamela, near Irbil in modern Iraq. (The Greek

• Commanded by Euryb iades (Spa rta n). Themistocles (At he nia n). Ade ima nt os (Corinthian)

the Spartan king Pausanias defeated them at

histo rian Plutarch says that Gaugamela meant

Plataea, north of Athens , effectively free ing main-

'camel's home', being named after the beast that

land

had once taken a refugee king to safety th ere.)

· 40 ships lost

domination . Themistocles was hon oured by the

Darius's cavalry ranged from horse arche rs to

Spartans fo r his part in t he victory, but his own

armoured catap hract s, and was hi s main striking

helmets , but probably fo ught shieldless, needing

Persians

cou ntrymen seem to have t urned against him,

force. The wide plain gave his cavalry a good

bo th hands to control their long corn el-wo od

•c. 800 ships

chance of overwhelming Alexander 's ho rse.

spears (called sarissae). The cavalry who fought

• Commanded by King Xerxes

eventually fo rcing him to t ake refuge with the Persians. Xerxes's son Arta xerxes I made him gov-

Tho ugh the latter were superior in quality, they

alongsi de Alexandet we re called the 'Compan-

• Over 200 ships lost

ernor of Magnes ia on the Maeander River, where

numbered 7,000 against Darius's 40,000. The

he died around 4S9 Be,

Macedo nian cavalry wore body armour and

ions'. The hist orian Arrian put s the Macedonian

Greece

from

the

threat

of

Persian

27

• 3

ANCIENT WORLD

GAUGAM ELA

infantry at some 40,000 men, a fraction of Darius's host. But the Persian foot were mostly poorly

• I.

armed and almost untra ined, whereas Alexander was leading hardened veterans accustomed to victory. Some Macedon ians were conventionally armed hypaspist: (shield-bearers), but the backbone of the infantry were phalangites. These

Below Darius chose a battlefield in which he hoped

hischariots would disrupt th e

Mocedonian infantry, all owin g his huge

superiorityin numbers to swamp th e invaders befor e they could rally. Alexander counte red by refusing to attock his enemy headon, and moving his

force everfunher to the flank asthe

two sides closedin.

fought in ranks up to eight deep, yet every man could bring his immensely long pike to bear. When lowered, these pikes presented the enemy with a hedge of spearpoints . This 'phalanx' was formidable only if it retained its formation. If disordered , it could be overwhelmed and, to do this, Darius had scythed chariots. These chariots had two weaknesses. They were vulnerable to cavalry and they required the smoothest of terrain, since the ir huge scythes made any loss of forma tio n catastrop hic. Darius relied on his cavalry to protect hischariots, and on the battlefield he carefully prepared a number of obstacle-free runs to take the chariots into the heart of Alexander's infantry. There may have been a few elephants to follow up the chariots, and after the cavalry had broken up the phalanx yet further, the Persian infantry would fin ish the job with sheer weight of numbers.

3

.......-.......I' COM BATANTS ........_ _ Macedon ians

Left Porr of o

Macedonian phalanx in battle array. Themain funetionof

• 7,000 cavalry, 40,000 in fan try • Commanded by Alexa nder t he Great ' 300 dead

Alexander's ph alanx w as to pin the enemy forces un til the cavalry could exploit any

Persians • 120,ooof250,ooo me n, including 40,000 cavalry

• Commanded by King Darius III Artashata

weaknessesin the

• 35,000 dead

enemy's tine.

Belo w The angled

Macedonian

On the battlefield Alexander was soon on his way, He had taken an eclipse of th e moon earlier in the month as a sign presaging victory. Establi shing his main camp by the River Bou lemus, he pushed on with his men carrying only battle gear and a few days' supplies. The Macedonians reached Gaugamela in the early afternoon of 30 September and discovered the king 's army drawn up, with its batt le front extending kilometres across the plain . Alexander wanted to rush immediately into battle, but Parmenio urged restraint. This probably saved the

Macedonianarchers and javelinthrowers

Right flank guard, cavalry, javelin throwersand archers

army, since Alexander then took the time to scout and discovered the chariot runs of Darius's trap,

advanced, but obliquely and towards the Persians' left. This crabwise att ack to ok them away

But Alexander refused to countenance Parmenio's idea of fight ing at night, whe n darkness would mitigate t he Persian advantage of num bers.'I will not steal victory', declared Alexan-

from Darius's chariot runs and fo rced the Persian king to extend t he left wi ng of his army. Darius had to launch his chariot s earlier tha n

der haughtily, This forced Darius to keep his troops standing to all night j ust in case, while the Macedonians gained a night's rest. At dawn , Alexander's army formed up with parade-ground precision , slightly to the left of the Persian centre where Darius was stationed . They

planned. As they closed in, t he chariots were met by javelins and arrows, When the remnants reached the phalanx, the files opened smoothly and they passedharmlessly through. As Darius had planned, the phalanx was now vulnerable, But his chariots had attacked too soon, and the cavalry intended to exploit the

Alexander's discovery of the chariot runsfoilsthe surpriseattackof the Persians'main weapon:their scythed chariotsare stopped by Macedonian archersand spearmen.

advancemade Da rius launc h his chario ts early, and his cav alry force had to gallop from th edistant right flan k befor e th ey coul d engage. By

this time, Alexander ha d already hi t the opposite flank. and

wascutting through towards the centre and Darius himself.

Alexander strikes the charioteer behindDarius. triggeringa rout as the Persiansmistakenlybelieve their king hasbeen killed.

Persian cavalry

DARIUS'S ARMY

The Macedonianflank guardsmove to engage advancingPersian cavalry.

l

ALEXANDER'S ARMY

Left flank guard

andcavalry The Persian cavalryon the far sid e of the plainadvanceto join the action.

28

29

3

A NCI ENT WORLD

G A U G A M EL A

open ing of the phalanx was blocked by a counter-attack from Alexander's lancers. Hastily Darius ordered the cavalry on the right wi ng to

3

Alexander, as depicted an a

sarcophagus now in Istanbul. The

join the battle, but these had considerable ground to cover before the y reached the Macedon ian left, commanded by Parmenio.

sarcophagus WQS probably of the

Persiannoble Mazaeus, whom

Alexander jo ined th e battle personally, leading his Compan ions against the left w ing of the Persian infantry. According to Plutarch, 'The

Alexa nd er appoin ted ta govern Babylon

afterhisvictoryo t

barbarians were starting to scatter. Alexander followed up strongly, driving the enemy into the midst of the battle, and to where Darius was command ing at the centre of his line.'

Gau gam ela.

The batt le was finely balanced. Darius's chariots had failed, but his cavalry was pressing back the lancers.On the right flank, the Persiancavalry had struck the Macedonian left, which was fraying fast. If the cavalry could get among the phalangites and disorder them, Darius coul d smother the remnants with his infantry. What had been a generals' battle broke into a confused melee. The cavalry had created huge clouds of dust, blinding everyone from all but their own corner of the field. Alexander was too busy with his style of hands-on leadership to see the whole picture, wh ile Darius was hampered by the bulk and inexperience of his army.

Darius aga inst Alexande r Consequently, when the Persian cavalry broke through the Macedon ian left, they believed that victory was imm inent and charged on to take Alexander's camp. Meanwhile the Macedon ian right hit the left flank of the Persian army, following Alexander who wasintent on reaching Darius. As w it h chess, if the king was taken the game was won. The Sicilian historian Diodorus Siculus believed that Darius fought well :

The Persianking me t the Macedon ian attack on his chariot. raining javelins on his enemies, with his bodyguard at his back. As the two kings closed the range between them, a javelin hurled by Alexander missed Darius, but im paled the chariot driverstanding behind him, knocking him off the chariot. A shout went up at this from the Persians around Darius, and those further away from the scene thought their king had been brought do wn. These

30

people were the first to flee, and then those beside them, and so on until the ent ire Persian army disintegrated. With the enemy no w on both flanks, the king became worried. He drew back, and this was the signal fora general rout.' Alexander's biographers - Arrian, Curtius Rufus and Plutarch - have Darius fleeing at the mere sight of Alexander, but these accounts are not contemporary. A laconic account from a Babylonian astronomical calendar supports Diodorus's suggestion that Darius's army deserted him rather than vice versa.

Aft ermath News of Alexander's success was slow to reach the Macedonian left, where Parmenio was having a torrid ti me. He had swung his reserves about to cover the rear of the army, and was almost surrounded on th ree sides. Receiving Parmenio's call for help, Alexander promptly rushed to the rescue. But by the time he reached Parmenio's side, a spirited charge by the Thessalian cavalry, combined w ith bad news from the rest of the battlefield, had already caused the Persians to ret reat.

Alexander led a brutal chase towards the city of Arbela, slaying tens of thousands of fleeing Persians. He was haunted by the thought that Darius would raise another army with the se men and that he would have to fight again. But in fact Darius was later assassinated by Bessus, the general who had commanded the left wing of the Persian army here at Gaugamela. With the death of his rival, Alexander became und isputed lord of the Persian empire, and Greek influence stretched from its ancient homeland almost to th e Himalayas. 31

CAN N A E

Cannae Date: 2 August 2 16 Be Location: modern Cannosa, southeast Ita ly On the next day, w hen he had command, Varro did as expected an d, witho ut consulting his colleague in any way at all, ordered the men to p repare for battle. He th en dr ew up th e legions and marched them acrossthe river. Paullus fo llo wed, despite his deep disqu iet a t what was being done . (THE ROMAN COMMANDERS BEFORE CANNAE,

216 BC) LIVY 22.45

4

chain mail and carried sligh tly oval shields. Their main weapons were a heavy th rowing spear, th e pi/um, and a deadly short sword called th e gladius. The legionaries foug ht in close form ati on, almost shoulder-to-shou lder, stabbing und erarm wi th their gladii. Most of th eir opponents fought with longer swords and needed a greater

frontage so as to slash effective ly. This almo st guaranteed th e legionaries local superiority on t he battlefield, no matter w hat the overall odds, since the Romans could put th ree men against their enemies' tw o. Hannibal commanded a rag-bag of nationali ties. He had Lusitan ians and Celtiberians from

Right TheCapua bust. p resumed ta be of Hannibal. The Romans imagined Hann ibal to be vindictive and inhumanlyaue/, qualities which this artist ha scaptured well.

T

he Second Punic War (218-202 BC) is sometimes, quite just ifiably, called 'Hannibal's War'. Hannibal 's desire to avenge the defeat of Carthage in the First Punic War (264- 24 1 BC) inspired him to gather an army in

Spain, Gauls from the Alpine passes, recruits from Italy itself, a hard core of Libyan infantrymen, and cavalry from Numidia in north Africa. It is a testament to Hannibal's quality as a leader that in

Spain and, in one of the most famous marches in history, take that army over the Alps into Italy.

all the years he was in Italy the different components of his army remained well disciplined and completely under control. Only soldiers with

This invasion had a political aswell asa military objective. Hannibal hoped that once his army was on Italian soil the peoples of Italy would rise against Rome. This was realistic, for the Samnites of cent ral Italy had only recently been conquered.

complete faith in their commander could have carried ou t Hannibal's plan at Cannae. Hannibal could guess that Rome's formidable infantry would drive straight at his line, confi dent ly expecti ng to break it. Livy's reports of disagreements bet ween the Roman consuls about thi s tactic are probably to shift blame from

Many Greekcities in the south, such asNaplesand Taranto , chafed under Roman rule, and the Gauls of northern Italy were both unconquered and hostile .

th e patri cian consul Aemiliu s Paullus. The other consul was the plebeian Terentius Varro. Normally each Roman consul commanded his own army, fo r the consulship was the top political and

Though the Gauls floc ked enthusiastically to Hannibal's bann er, the rest of Italy remained unconvinced . Hannibal defeated the Romans at

32

once and for all and had mustered 16 legions,

In 216 Hannibal tried again, capturing Roman stores at Cannae (modern Cannosa) and positioning his army across the Roman supply lines, from where he dared them to dislodge him . Hannibal felt it necessary to resort to this because Fabius Maximus ('the Delayer') had adopted the tactic of

together with support ing auxiliaries and cavalry. This represent ed 80,000 infantry and a furth er 6,000 cavalry. To pu t this into perspect ive, 300 years later when Rome's power st retched from Britain to Mesopotamia, the empire had in total about 25 legions.

stalking Hannibal 's army - never offering battle, but never drawing off to allow the Carthaginians to forage unhindered.

The antagon ists To add to Hannibal 's problems, the Roman legion

However, unknown to Hannibal, Roman policy had changed . Rome had resolved to destroy him

was beyond doubt the finest fighting force in antiquity. At this time the legionaries fought in

Libyans, who wore mostly Roman armour won in earlier victories , and were an obvious choice to take th e first shock of the Roman charge. But instead Hannibal placed his Gallic and Spanish troops in th e centre , with the Libyans in t wo solid blocks on right and left behind the front line. The battle began wit h Hannibal's heavy

Part of tne reliei ofDomitius Ahenobarbus shawing soldiers

wearingchain moil and with shields.Note thar theseshields were longer and more avalrhan legionary shields in the empire. In the

cavalry breaking the Roman horse of Paullus wi t h a savage charge. This would not have surprised the Romans. Hannibal's superior ity in cavalry had

legions the arm our

better-known

commanding on alternate days.

been known ever since an action at the River Ticinus near Pavia in 218, w hen the Roman commander Publius Scipio (fat her of the great general

The day of battle

Scipio Africanus) had been wounded. Sowhile Terentius Varro led his cavalry against

At Cannae on the morning of 2 August 216 BC, Aemilius Paullus led the cavalry on the Roman right, facing the Spanish and Gallic heavy cavalry

Maharbal's Num idian horse, Paullus abandoned his routed troops and rejoined the main body of the army as it crashed into the Carthaginian line.

between the River Aufidius (the modern Ofanto) and the left flank of Hannibal 's infantry. On Hannibal's other flank was t he Numidian cavalry unde r Maharbal, a dashing commander with a string of

This bowed under the impact, starting slowly to

successful engagements to his name. Hannibal and his brother Mago commanded

and urging on his men. Hannibal, who had been in

the centre where the main blow would fall, and

exactly the same.'

mi litary posit ion in Rome. But so huge was th is Rom an army that both con suls were present, and

Trebb ia in 2 18, and again crushingly at Lake Trasimene in 217, but there was no general upr ising against Rome.

where total precision was required . Perhaps the most reliable of Hannibal 's troops were the

Oorica hamata) was eventually replaced by the 'Iabster plate'

armour (1orica segmentata), butir continued

;nuseamongthe auxiliaries.

give way. Polybi us tells us: 'Paul/us threw himselfinto where the fighting was fiercest in the centre of the line, smiting the enemy that place since the start of the battle, was doing

33

4

CA N N A E

A NCIE N T WO RLD

was close. The Carthaginian centre

For Hannibal it was crucial that his centre gave ground wi thout

was buckling . Roman reserves poured into the breach, bending the ir batt le line into a blunted

breaking . In ancient warfare, most casualties we re suffered when a battle line broke and th e routers were cut down.

Right Helmer worn by a Roman

cavalryman. This typeofhelmer was called Boeotian', presumablyafter rhecavalrymenof Thebes in Greece who developedit.

V.At the point of the V the Gauls and Spaniards were at the ir last gasp. But on each side were t he

When a line did break, those with the best chance of survival were t hose who ran fir st, so morale and discip line were essenti al in holdi ng a lin e under pressure and goi ng backwards. The Gauls and Spaniards, despite their reputati on for indiscipline, did

Belo w TheRoman

weakness in cavalrywasmore

exactly as Hann ibal required. Behind th e Romans, developments became ominous. The Carthaginian heavy cavalry rallied from its pursuit of th e Roman horse, and rod e across the back of the battle line to fall on Varro's

than compensated for by tne superior strengrh and numbersof legionariesin the Romancentre./r was rhisvery superiority thar Hannibal planned to useagainst the

cavalry. Attacked from two sides, the Roman cavalry bolted, leaving thou sandsof Carthaginian cavalry unchecked behind the Roman infant ry. The Roman comm anders still felt that victory

Romans.

Libyan infant ry, and before the Rom ans cou ld reorg anize, these Libyans turn ed and fell on th e Roman flanks. At t hat mom ent , th e Carthagin ian cavalry atta cked th e rear of the Roman batt le line.

Massacre

fought with the stubbornness that was the hall, mark of their republic. The slaughter, 'butchery

Hannibal remained in Italy for another 14 years, he never achieved another victory like Cannae or

rather than batt le' as Livy called it, lasted t he

l akeTrasimene. Eventually, Hannibal was recalled to Africa and was defeated at the battle of Zama in 201 BC. Fifty years later, Roman vengeance saw Carthage demo lished and salt sown on the foun -

entir e afternoon. When the victory waswo n, the plain of Cannae was a charnel house of some 60,000 corpses (including t hat of Aemilius Paullus, though Terenti us Varro escaped). Hannibal's advisors urged him to march immediately on Rome. But Hannibal's army was exhausted. The Carthaginians had

dations to prevent the city ever rising again. Belo w After driving off tne Romancavalry, rheCarthaginian

no siege equipment to use against Rome's walls and, in any case, Hannibal expect ed th at such massive defeat would finally force Rome to terms. Or if not, her allies and subjects in Italy would

horseswept into rhebock of tbe

Carthaginian.

Romanlines. This complered

• 50,000 men

the encirclement

• Commanded by Hannibal

surely now abandon Rom e?To Hannibal's object ions, t he exasperated Maharb al replied, 'No general is completely talented . You, Hannibal ,

• 8,000 dead

pered by the ir own numbers. Experienced infantry mig ht conceivably have fought the ir way out of the trap , but many of.the Roman legionaries were new recruits, fighting their very first

can wi n batt les, but you do not know how to use

• 86,000 men

your victory: He was rig ht. Rome neither sued for peace nor lost many of th e alliances which she had built as

• Commanded by Terenti us Varro, Aemilius

battl e. Though in a hopeless situation, th ey

durably as her roads. Rome rallied, and though

It was a classic envelopment manoeuvre. The Romans were surrounded , disordered and ham-

4

begun when tne Libyan infanrry closed like a viceon the disorganized Romans as rhey pushedrhrough rhemiddleof rhe Carthaginian barrieline.

Romans

Paulius ·50,000 dead

-' Spanish and Gallic cavalry (Hasdrubal)

"

"

, ..

.

CA1Qtm .. f.. •.-,-, - .... ,

....

CD

11111\11

INNI mill

1Ill1l1 1l1li m 1If11111l Spanish and Gallic heavy cavalry (Hasdrubal)

Libyans

Infantry is fronted by Celtiberiansand Gauls (Hannibal and Mago)

' ,

Numidian cavalry (Maharbal or Hanna)

.,

.'

.'

®

®

Numidian cavalry (Maharbal or Hanna)

o:NNA't -,. .. ..· .--, _

Libyan s

Q) Roman infant ry,joined now by Paullu s. burstthrough centr e o f Carthag inian infantry. which retreat in organizedfashion without routing.

,.'

...

.

strong cavalryto charge'theRemans.

@

34

,.

CD Hannibal opens·i hea etion ~Y sending ~is famously

.....

The weakerGallicand-Spanish. nfant;Ygive qrc end under the Roman legionaries. forming.the first part of Hannibal's plan.

infantry..

.

.. . .

~

-..

-

'.

. @

Gallic and Spanish

•

•

Carthaginian heavy cavalry rout Vano'shorse a n~ are noJ-'in a strong position behindthe Roman soldiers.

® P owerfu l lib yan infantJ'ton both fla~ks anack -" • the Romans, "9Wenveloped on all Sides.

..

..

,

.,

" "

. .. "

'.

35

Gaixia Date: 203

BC

Th e Chu- Han struggle After securing th e hig hland region around Xianyang, Liu Bang moved east to contest Xiang

Lo cat io n: near modern Guzhen, Anhui p rov ince, China

Hecalled hisenterprisethat ofa Hegemon King. intending to manage the world by meansof mighty compaigns. Afterfiveyears, hefinally lost hisstate and died himselfat Tung-ch'eng l Dongcheng),yet even then hedid not come to hissensesand blamehimself. What error! (A BOUT X IANG Yu) SIMA Q IAN, THEG RANOSCRIBE'SRECOROS, C. 100 BC

Right Thispainted pottery figurine of a cavalryman, Q Western Han burial abject. reflectsthe

transition fromthe useofchariots to the useofcavalry and infantryasthe main force in batt le.

Belo w Liu Bang pursuedXiong Yu

eastwardsacross the North China Plain to Goixia, where theChu army was trapped by the convergenceof threeother Han forces.

T

he batt le of Gaixia was th e fin al engagement of the pro tracted str uggl e between the rival generals Liu Bang and Xiang Yu for dom inance over China, follow-

valley kingdom of Chu, commanded t he most powerfu l mili tary fo rce and th e allegiance of most of the other leaders. But it was the wi ly Liu Bang, a former Qin functionary of humble birth, whose troops had

ing the collapse of the short-lived Qin dynasty . This encounter marked one of t he most significant turning points in

captu red the Qin capital Xianyang (near toda y's Xian). Xiang Yu assigned kingdoms to eighteen of th e rebel leaders, reserving fo r him self a posi-

Chinese history, w hen disun ity and internal strife gave way to a lasting imperial order. The contenders Soon after the death of the First Emperor in 210 BC, the harsh rule of the Qin dynasty was challenged by a series of rebellions . Two men eventually emerged as preeminent among th e rebel leaders. The fierce and impetuous Xiang Yu, scion of a line of hereditary generals in the Yangzi

tion as first among equals with the title Hegemon King of Western Chu. He compelled Liu Bang to evacuate the capital region and move his forces southward into t he Han River valley where he would assume the title of King of Han. A few months later, in th e summer of 206 BC, Liu Bang took advantage of Xiang Yu's distract ion elsewhere to reoccup y t he territory around Xianyang, precip itating the war betw een Chu and Han.

...---1 COMBATANTS '------. Han forces

• c. 300,000 soldie rs • Commanded by Liu Bang N

•

• Unknown casualt ies

I

- . Hanphase 1 - - . - Hanphase2 - -> Hanphase3 - . Chuphase t -r-e-, - - . - Chu phase2 - -> Chu phase3

o I

HuaiRiver"...,

~~

l 00 km I

o SO~iles ==--

Yangzi River

Chu forces

•c. 100,000 soldiers • Co m mand ed by Xiang Yu

•c. 80,000 dead

Yu's rule over th e Nort h China Plain. For two and a half years, t he two sides battled for contr ol of a series of forti fied posit ions at Xingyang, Chenggao and Gongxian, just south of the Yellow River in today's Henan province. While Xiang Yu focused on atta cking th ese Han posit ions fro ntally wi th his superior forc es, Liu Bang sent his best general, Han Xin, to defeat th e Hegemon King's allies nort h of the Yellow River, suborned another key Chu ally in the Yangzi valley, and set his ow n ally Peng v ue to work harassing the supply linesthat stretched eastward to Xiang Yu's home base in the modern prov inces of Jiangsu and Anhui. By th e autu mn of 203 BC, th e success of this mult i-pronged st rategy had left Xiang Yu's main army weakened, dispirited and short of provisions. At t his point Xiang Yu reached an agreement to divide the empire with his rival, and wit hdrew

eastward to wards

his capital

at

Pengcheng. The final battle Liu Bang's advisors now persuaded him to break the agreement and set out in pursuit of th e Chu army. Overtaken at Guling, Xiang Yu struck at his pursuers and thre w them on t he defensive. As armies led by Han Xin, Peng v ue and ot her Han allies converged on the area, however, the odd s against Xiang Yu became overw helming and his army was encircled at th e to wn of Gaixia, about 32 km (20 mil es) east of today's Guzhen, Anhui. There he gave battl e wi t h 100,000 men against a combined Han force of 300,000. The Han army deployed in three echelons, with Han Xin commanding from the cent re of the first echelon. The Han general's opening t hrust was repulsed, but the Chu counter-att ack was stalled by the divisions on his left and right flan ks, giving him the opportunity to return to the offen sive and defeat the Chu army. Surround ed in his camp at Gaixia and hearing th e sound of Chu songs from th e Han lines, Xiang Yu believed that his entire kingdom had been overrun. In despair, he broke out of th e encirclement with an escort of

36

800 horsemen and fled southwa rds, but was soon brought to bay near th e north bank of the Yangzi River. There he slit his own throat. Consequences The elimi nati on of Xiang Yu cleared the way fo r Liu Bang to take the imperial throne and establish th e Han dynasty. Where Xiang Yu had favoured a loose confe derat ion of autonomous regional kingdoms, Liu Bang and his heirs laboured to construct a more central ized imperial state. The

Painted pott ery figurinesoffight ly armoured Wes tern Han infantrymen burial objectsfrom a 2nd-Ir


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