European Security Culture

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European Security Culture

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European Security Culture Language, Theory, Policy

Monica Gariup Zayed University, UAE

© Monica Gariup 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Monica Gariup has asserted her moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Gariup, Monica European security culture : language, theory, policy 1. European Security and Defence Policy 2. National security - European Union countries 3. Military policy 4. European Union countries - Military policy 5. Europe Defenses I. Title 327.1’16’094 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gariup, Monica. European security culture : language, theory, policy / by Monica Gariup. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7555-6 1. European Union countries--Foreign relations 2. National security--European Union countries. 3. Rhetoric--Political aspects--European Union countries. 4. European Union countries--Military policy. I. Title. JZ1570.A5G37 2008 355’.03304--dc22 2008031806 ISBN 978-0-7546-7555-6

Contents

List of Tables List of Figures Preface   Abbreviations   Acknowledgements  

vii ix xi xiii xv

1 Introduction  

1

PART I The Grammar of Security: Cultural Assumptions, Preferences, and Policies 2

The Framework of Analysis: Security, Grand Strategy, and Culture  19

3

Is Talk Really Cheap? Language as an Interface between Culture and Behavior   

4 Analyzing Security Discourses and Practices: A Typology  

47 69

PART II The Discourse and Practice of the Esdp: Between Auto-communication, and Power Projection 5 Contextualizing the Discourse on the European Security and Defence Policy or the Elements of the Activity-Performativity-Connectivity Dynamics   97 6

7

“A Secure Europe in a Better World”: Syntax and Semantics of the ESDP  

121

Grand Strategy in Practice: Testing Coherence between Discourse and Action  

187

8 Conclusion  

239

Bibliography   Index

245 331

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List of Tables

1.1 Central Themes of the Book and Literature Clusters   6 1.2 Levels of Analysis and Units   10 2.1 Paradigms in Security Studies 28 3.1 Components of Discursive Syntax and Grammar   54 3.2 Simplified Syntax of Security   58 4.1 Traditional and Human Security Discourses    83 4.2 Security and Defense: Traditional Bureaucratic Division of Labor   85 6.1 Analysis of Referent Objects Devised for Public Opinion Use (EB 54.1 2000)   136 6.2 Vital and Value Interests (based on Gnesotto 2004b:13)   137 6.3 Threats to European Interests (EOS Gallup Report 1996)   146 6.4 Threats (IPSOS 2001)   147 6.5 Threats in the Eurobarometer of Autumn 2002 (EB 58)    147 6.6 EU Priority Actions 2004 (EB 61)   157 6.7 Role of a European Army (EB 54.1 2000: 18)   157 6.8 Summary of the Syntactical Structure and Meaning of the EU Security Discourse   183 6.9 EU-ISS Taskforce Scenarios 2004   184 7.1 Synopsis of ESDP Missions (including aims and means)   226 7.2 Discourse-Action Coherence   229 7.3 Comparison between Grand StrategyAims (ESS) and Missions Aims 232

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List of Figures

1.1 Outline of the Book 2.1 The Disciplinary Relationship between IR and Security/Strategic Studies 3.1 The Reality-Action Path in Policy-Making   3.2 Securitization or Security Discourse as Strategic Resource for Action   6.1 The Geographical Reach of the ESDP in Discourse   7.1 The Institutional Organizational Chart (with 2004 constitutional changes)   7.2 ESDP Geographical Stretch as of March 2007  

14 26 63 67 174 196 231

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Preface

The core idea behind this study was initially conceived in the summer of 2000 when the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was still in its “ad interim” phase, and when detractors would not bet on the future of what appeared to be a very fragile, ambiguous, and ill-fated experiment. Since then, a myriad of events have disrupted international life and, accordingly, the development of this research. The cataclysmatic changes induced by 9/11, the US-led war on terror, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Madrid and London bombings have prompted the European Union (EU) to quickly react and reflect on its position in a radically different international environment. In an amazingly fast pace, specialized institutions have been installed, missions have been deployed, and an ongoing discussion on the strategic requirements and implications of the EU’s role in the world has been kept alive through the production of forward-looking documents and guidelines. The release of the “European Security Strategy” (ESS) in June 2003, the results of the Convention on the Future of Europe, the 2004 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), the “Constitution for Europe”, the Lisbon Treaty, and the 2004 and 2007 enlargements represent the major landmarks of this incredibly quick progress. This state of affairs demands constant analytical attention to world events and begs the academic question of how research that tries to tackle very contemporary and highly politicized issues can survive the ambition of being “scientific” in any sense. Indeed, the greatest challenge encountered in the course of this endeavor has been one of control of the data set. Testifying for the importance of contextual environmental factors, events have triggered a constant re-assessment of the central hypotheses of this book, and they have been fuelling a condition of “insecurity” and anxiety, which a political researcher can hardly escape. Time is a very sensitive variable in this regard. One of the toughest decisions is to set a time limit for the intake of new empirical material in order to avoid the risk of being dangerously out-of-date or fatally disconfirmed. After an attentive observation of the magnitude of the developments in the field, the time frame for this research has been closed on September 2004, and thus covers a period of 5 years (since 1999). On the one hand, the EU enlargements and the ground-breaking approval of the “constitutional treaty” (despite the ratification hurdles haunting that text but also the following Lisbon Treaty rejected by the Irish referendum in June 2008), and on the other the investiture of a new Commission signalling a change in the leadership – the Italian President Romano Prodi has been substituted by Spanish Jose Manuel Barroso, British RELEX Commissioner Christopher Patten by Austrian Benita FerreroWaldner, while Javier Solana has remained as a symbol of continuity – have been interpreted as the signposts for the artificial conclusion of a phase. However, since

xii

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politics is in constant movement – and international politics even more so – this book should be considered as a preliminary exercise elucidating tendencies and theoretical underpinnings rather than establishing definite a-temporal and absolute results. The discussions presented in this work offer a comprehensive background to the ESDP and the issues at stake in view of the publication by Mr Solana of a review of the European Security Strategy by December 2008.

Abbreviations

ARRC Allied Rapid Reaction Corps CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CHODs Chiefs of Defense CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Civilian Management CIVPOL Civilian Police CJTF Combined Joint Task Force CME Civil Military Exercise Conops Concept of Operation CONV European Convention CONST European Constitutional Treaty COREPER Permanent Representatives Committee CPN Conflict Prevention Network CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe DG Directorate General DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EADS European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company EC European Community ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office ECMM European Community Monitoring Mission (in former Yu) ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDC European Defense Community EIHR European Initiative for Human Rights EP European Parliament EPC European Political Cooperation EPF European Police Force ERRF European Rapid Reaction Force ERRM European Rapid Reaction Mechanism ESDC European Security and Defence College ESDI European Security and Defence Identity ESDP European Security and Defence Policy ESS European Security Strategy EU European Union EU-ISS European Union Institute of Security Studies EUMC European Union Military Committee EUMS European Union Military Staff EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission EUPM European Union Police Mission

xiv

European Security Culture

EUROFOR European (Rapid Deployment) Force EUROMARFOR European Maritime Force Europol European Police Office EU15 European Union 15 members as of 1995 EU25 European Union 25 members as of 1 May 2004 EU27 European Union 27 members as of 1 January 2007 GAC General Affairs Council HFC Helsinki Force Catalogue HR/SG High Representative/Secretary General (see also SG/HR) IGC Intergovernmental Conference IGO Intergovernmental Organization IPTF International Police Task Force (UN) ISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) JHA Judicial and Home Affairs NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-governmental Organization NSS National Security Strategy OPLAN Operation Plan OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PfP Partnership for Peace PKO Peacekeeping Operation PPEWU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit PSC Political and Security Committee PSO Peace Support Operations QMV Qualified Majority Voting RELEX External Relations Directorate General RRF Rapid Reaction Force RRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism SEA Single European Act SG/HR Secretary General/High Representative (see also HR/SG) SHAPE Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe (NATO) SITCEN Situation Centre TEU Treaty on European Union UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council USA or US United States WEU Western European Union WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

Acknowledgements Writing a book is often a very intensive and solitary endeavor. However, a number of institutions and people have supported me in these last years, and I am most grateful to all of them. In particular, I wish to thank the “Europa Fellows I” Program at Collegium Polonicum (Slubice, Poland) and the Europa Universität Viadrina of Frankfurt Oder (Germany), and Prof. Michael Minkenberg for his continuing support. As a rather “exotic” element in a predominantly German-Polish interdisciplinary group – both because of my passport and my training as an IR political scientist – I have been exposed to fruitful discussions and stimulating interactions with many colleagues and faculties working under the all-inclusive hat of the so-called “cultural sciences”. I am indebted to them for opening up to me a new universe of ideas, some of which I decided to explore more in depth and integrate into my research. Caught in the midst of very exciting but contradictory intellectual inputs and projects, I still managed to learn a lot from a variety of experiences and people. I would like to mention in particular Prof. Richard Betts (Columbia University Institute of War and Peace), who gave me the opportunity to participate at the Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS 2002) at Cornell University. The intensive course and wonderful insights brought me back on track when I was lost in a fog of theoretical Pindaric flights. I am also indebted to the many commentators at several conferences and workshops where I presented my ideas and was challenged into very fertile debates. I always went home with precious suggestions and new perspectives. By the same token, I would like to thank those individuals in Brussels – both civilian and military – who sacrificed some of their time in order to provide me with important information and interesting points of view. Finally, I should not forget everybody who, especially in the final phase of this research, encouraged and convinced me not to despair and to give up. The friends at the European Public Law Centre (Athens, Greece) and the colleagues at Zayed University (Abu Dhabi, UAE) have offered me a shoulder in moments of desperation and disillusionment. Last but not least, my most sincere gratitude goes to my Italian and German families whose distant but incessant patience and tolerance contributed to remind me of my final goals, and to my husband whose continuing support and affection have proven invaluable.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

When I was talking about the European army, I was not joking. If you do not want to call it a European army, don’t call it a European army. You can call it ‘Margaret’, you can call it ‘Mary Ann’, and you can call it any name. (Prodi in The Independent, 4 February 2000). We have to move towards a more active and less declaratory foreign policy. Our words have to be matched by deeds. (Solana Nn01/99) We are trying to move from a foreign policy of communiqués and declarations full of strong nouns and weak verbs to something more substantive, more muscular, more focused, that can have more impact. (Patten SPEECH/02/134, SPEECH/02/76)

State of Affairs Security and defense have been critical – although rarely central – issues for the European Community (EC) before and for the European Union (EU) now. At the beginning of the European experiment in the 1950s security concerns counted among the primary considerations for integration. It was clear in the minds and consciousness of European elites that peace had to be cemented in a durable way and that, for what concerned the cocoon of the Western part of the old continent, the until-then-usual means of military supremacy and confrontation were not the solution to cope with the “anarchy” of interstate relations (Mitrany 1943; De Rougemont 1965). Nevertheless, the still warm memory of the disastrous Second World War, the division of the continent in two “enemy” blocs, and the need to reaffirm traditional forms of national power and sovereignty made it impossible to explicitly and successfully include security and defense on the agenda of the organization. The reference to the use and management of military force was exiled from the Community scope of responsibility and developed into a sort of taboo (Manners 2002a; Rummel 2002; Biscop 2002; etc.). The self-proclaimed normative identity of the EC/EU based on the values of peace, cooperation, multilateralism, and democracy led some analysts to define “the nature of the beast” in terms of “civilian” or “soft” power, whereby a positive connotation was evinced from the unfortunate – because incommensurable – analogy with the “evil” self-interested



European Security Culture

powers prone to use violence in order to enforce their will on the international or regional arena (Galtung 1973; Bull 1982; Whitman 1998; Rotfeld 2001). The development from Community to Union has not only been nominal or monetary. The often criticized neo-functionalist prophecies of spill-over from low politics to high politics appear to be in the advanced process of fulfilling themselves (or better to be fulfilled by the actors involved) and constitute l’ordre du jour in discussions about the political-constitutional future and the role of the EU in the world. The subject has cyclically caught the attention of policymakers throughout the history of European integration but has acquired particular resonance in connection with the international events of the last decade of the 21st century. The end of the Cold War and the re-discovery of old and new problems and threats have generated a debate concerning the availability, usefulness, efficacy and quality of the instruments the Community and the Union possess in dealing with external crises. The terms “security”, “defense”, and “military” have entered the discussions: the inability to efficiently cope with the situation in the Balkans and the realization of the need to re-conceptualize objectives and ambitions have contributed to the dissolution of the taboo. The invention of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been welcome not only as a step forward towards further political integration but also as the sign that the taboo concerning the use of force seems to be finally overcome. The setting up of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), with all the political, institutional, and bureaucratic implications that this new instrument entails is considered as the breaking point, the symptomatic indication of the final acceptance of the military in the EU-ropean forum. By 2008 a full institutional structure is in place with a force of the size of an army corps (50,000 to 60,000 troops) which has been deployed on the ground in a variety of formats in Macedonia, Bosnia and Congo among others. Despite internal disagreements among the Member States about a variety of foreign policy issues – first and foremost related to the war in Iraq and the U.S. government’s general approach to international relations – the Union managed to incorporate and expand the ESDP as a full component of the constitutional setup of the organization. Sensibly extending the range of the famous “Petersberg tasks” from traditional peacekeeping to a fully-fledged “peacemaking”, and opening the   Community and Union are not synonymous. The European Community has legal personality and is often identified with the competencies stemming from the so-called first pillar. The European Union should be the ‘temple’ comprising the Communities (Including ECSC and EURATOM), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Judicial and Home Affairs (JHA).   There is an abundance of acronyms. Initially the ESDP was also known as Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), and it should not be confused with the European Security and Defence Identity (a NATO initiative) or the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP).

Introduction



way to the possibility of a “mutual defense” clause among willing Member States, the controversial 2004 Constitutional Treaty and the successive Lisbon Treaty successfully brokered the integration of a military security dimension into the aims and means of the Union.

Questions and Aims What is the meaning of the terms “security” and “defense” in the same name European policy? Has the supposed taboo concerning military force really been broken or has it been reinterpreted because of a change in the identity or in the interests of the EU (or both)? What are the implications of rhetorical declarations for public policy and identity construction? This study attempts to enhance the understanding of the impact of ideas, norms, and values on the construction of security concepts in general and the EU security grand strategy in particular. The driving theoretical question is summarized by Ronnie Lipschutz in his book “On Security”: How do ideas about security develop, enter the realm of public policy debate and discourse and, eventually, become institutionalized in hardware, organizations, roles and practices? (Lipschutz 1995: 1).

Three different but interrelated levels and clusters of questions can be individuated at the basis of the current debate epitomized by Lipschutz’ query (see also Howorth 2004a): a. on the “philosophy of security”, or the source, importance, and weight of ideational variables (culture) in the construction of security issues (compared to the incidence of material determinants); b. on the “language of security”, or the role of language and discourse in the formulation of security concepts; and finally c. on the “politics of security”, or the impact of security discourses on institutionalization and action on the one hand and on identity and actorness on the other. This book has theoretical and empirical ambitions. The theoretical aim is, in the words of Barry Buzan, “to map the domain of security as an essentially contested concept (…) to define the conceptual sub-structures on which the mass of empirical studies by strategists and others rest” (Buzan 1997: 14) by providing a comprehensive framework of analysis against which the philosophy, language, and politics of the ESDP can be tested. Empirically this means to analyze the language of the ESDP in order to individuate a dominant logic and shed light on the cultural assumptions and the behavioral expectations which originate from rhetorical and policy formulations. In particular, the aim is to engage the debate



European Security Culture

on the nature of the EU as a security and strategic actor and to understand the dynamics of identity construction and self-conceptualization.

State of Research The literature on the ESDP is enormous but theoretically non-rigorous. The phenomenon is relatively recent and very young in terms of operational capacity and actual deployments. In addition, it is often downplayed for what concerns the width and depth of the overall policy aims and means or exploited as the banner of broader hidden political agendas of both scholars and policy-makers. As a matter of fact, much of the literature is purely descriptive, with a particular focus upon EU institutions and capabilities and factual policy-analysis. A number of works are dedicated to the repetitive narration of the historical developments of the ESDP and the successive institutional changes in declarations, decisions, and treaty implementations. Among other issues treated are also armaments and defense budgets, Member States’ attitudes and policies towards the ESDP, and technical operational details (Brenner 1998; Sjursen 1998; Croft 2000; Deighton 2000; Duke 2000; Giessman 2000; Groves 2000; Menon 2000; Stavidris 2001; Tanner 2001 Terriff 2001; Hunter 2002; Mueller 2002; Rynning 2002; Balis 2003; Gaertner 2003; Quille 2003; Sjursen 2003; Menon 2004; Peters 2004; Pilegaard 2004; Giegerich and Wallace 2004; Howorth 2007; Merlinger 2007b; Biscop and Andersson 2007; Engelbrecht and Hallenberg 2007; Giegerich 2007; and many others). Not surprisingly the EU is among the major producers – in the form of information sheets published on its website – and sponsors of this type of publications (Gambles 1991; Gnesotto 2000; Heisbourg 2000; Howorth 2000; Missiroli 2000; Missiroli 2001; Erhardt 2002; Lindley-French 2002; Faria 2004). A great deal of the literature is prescriptive or normative in nature and is centred around the debate over whether the EU should develop a security and defense dimension at all, and how it should develop it (what should the ESDP be like?) (Heisbourg 2000a; Naumann 2000; Guttman 2000; Biscop 2002; Howorth 2002; Becher 2004; Algieri and Bauer and Brummer 2005; Anderson and Seizt 2006). The policy-analytical approach is supplemented by discussions of visions, proposals, and implications not only for the development of the policy per se but also for the very character of the European Union as an actor or a power (Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Smith K. E. 2000; Stavidris 2001; Whitman 2002; Manners 2002; Hill 2003; Treacher 2004; Haine 2004; Hyde-Price 2006; Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006). The camp is generally divided into two broad factions: one cautioning against the development of an independent military capability because of the need to capitalize on “civilian power” strength (Rosecrance 1998; Smith 1998) or because of the need to cooperate with the United States and NATO (Glaser 1993; Greco 1996; Art 1996; Behnke 2000; Croft 2000; Kupchan 2000; Cornish and Edwards 2001; van Ham 2001; O’Sullivan 2001; Hunter 2002), while the other sees the ESDP as the litmus test of EU international actorness (Sjursen

Introduction



1998; Ginsberg 1999; Bertelsmann Foundation 2000; Ginsberg 2001; Cameron 2002) or even full-fledged federal integration (Hill 1993b; Koslowsky 1999; Von Bogdandy 1999). A smaller percentage of the literature provides a theoretical contribution to the study of EU external security (Waever 1995; Huysman 1996; Ginsberg 1999; Pollack 2000; Kelstrup/Williams 2000; Waever 2000; Geyer 2003; Sjursen 2004b; Hyde-Price 2006). Explanations of the ESDP are however in most cases included in liberal-institutionalist accounts where the EU member states are taken as central levels of analysis (Jakobsen 1997, 1998b; Regelsberger et al. 1997; Howorth 2001; Meyer 2004), or internal institutional mechanisms and their implications for the organization are analyzed at length (Van Staden 1994; Smith KE 1998; Andreani et al. 2000; Nuttal 2000; Win and Lord 2001; Smith ME 2003; Wagner 2003; Dietrichs and Jopp 2003). Exactly because of the continuing importance of traditional realist and liberal notions of state sovereignty – despite a number of attempts to challenge the orthodoxy (Caporaso 1995; King T. 1999; Cooper 2000; Smith ME 2003) – the EU is rarely taken seriously by mainstream International Relations (IR): it is underestimated or at a maximum considered as a case sui generis not useful in theoretical testing or development (Risse-Kappen 1996; but see Bronstone 2000 and Christiansen et al. 2000). In particular, security studies as a sub-discipline of IR only peripherically engage the theoretical challenges that the ESDP represents (Posen 2004), and strategic studies seem to be interested only in technical military accounts of a descriptive nature (Wolf and Zycher 2001; Andreani et al. 2001; McGinn and Liston 2001). An original effort to explain and conceptualize the ESDP by using existing theoretical paradigms and the idea of a strategic culture was however initiated by Cornish and Edwards 2001 and developed further by Howorth 2002, Rynning 2003, Martinsen 2003, Heiselberg 2003, Williams 2005, Meyer 2004 and 2007, and these in particular represent the background against which this book is set.

Theoretical Approach and Central Concepts Before engaging in an introduction to the theoretical approach adopted here, it is important to point out that this book is the result of a multi-/interdisciplinary and holistic approach. As a matter of fact, one of the fundamental objectives is to try to transgress the artificial compartmentalization between academic disciplines and to bridge the gap between Political Science, Sociology, International Relations, Security/Strategic Studies and European Integration Studies (with digressions into Linguistics, Anthropology, Philosophy and Psychology) by extrapolating and using “unorthodox” instruments in order to better understand security as a social condition on the one hand and as a political dynamic on the other. This is why this research can be situated in the context of the so-called “New European Security Theories” (NEST): a new generation of research moving among and across different schools of thought (Waever and Buzan 2007: 399).

European Security Culture



While efforts have certainly been made to theorize around aspects of the European security culture and policy, there are few systematic attempts to join together relevant theories and concepts. The background literature which inspired research and constitutes the backbone of this book can be classified according to its thematic central focus: The dominant approach is predicated on a number of general principles drawn from the theory of social action, and in particular, on tenets which can partially be reconducted to the meta-theory of social constructivism, since the security identity and interests of the EU are problematized (Jepperson et al. 1996: 67; McSweeney

Table 1.1 Themes Security

Culture

Central Themes of the Book and Literature Clusters Literature Critical security studies: Brown C. 1992; Krause and Williams 1997; Wyn Jones 1999; Weldes et al. 1999; CASE Collective 2006; and others; Copenhagen School and securitization: Buzan 1991; Waever 1995a, 1997 etc.; Buzan and Waever and DeWilde 1999; McSweeney 1999; and others Social constructivism: Kratochwil 1993; Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 1996b; Ruggie 1998; Risse and Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Christiansen 2001; Hopf 2002; Zehfuss 2002 Strategic culture: Booth 1979, 1990; Gray 1984, 1999a, 1999b; Duffield 1998; Snyder 1990; Klein Y. 1991; Johnston 1995a, 1995b; Lantis 2002a, 2005; Poor 2003; Glenn 2004

Discourse

International Actorness

European strategic culture: Cornish and Edwards 2001, 2005; Heiselberg 2003; Rynning 2003a, 2003b; Hyde-Price 2004; Meyer 2004 and 2007; Williams 2005; Matlary 2006 Linguistics in general: Connolly 1983; Fairclough 1992; Potter 1996; van Dijk 1997a and 1997b; Barker and Galanski 2001 Discourse and foreign policy: Thornborrow 1993; Chilton 1996b; Dalby 1997; Donahue and Prosser 1997; Larsen 1997 and 2000b; Huysmans 1998; Waever 1998b and 2000a; Diez 1999 and 2001; Milliken 1999; Nicloaidis and Howse 2002; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004; Howorth 2004b; Howarth and Torfing 2005; Hansen 2006 European IR: Hill 1990, 1993a, 2003; Hill and Wallace 1996; Rosecrance 1998; Cameron 1998; Ginsberg 1999; Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Smith KE 2003; Treacher 2004 Powerness: Galtung 1973; Gastgeyer 1996; Guttman 2000; Lauren 2001; Rotfeld 2001; Manners 2002b, 2006; Hill 2003; Salmon and Shepherd 2003 Giegerich and Wallace 2004; Haine 2004b; Maull 2005; Caseey 2006; Aggestam 2008; Hyde-Price 2008; Bailes 2008

Introduction



1999) and ideational factors (such as intersubjective meanings, norms, discourse, and epistemic communities) are seen to concur in the perception and definition of security (Ruggie 1998: 33). In addition, this research can be situated in the strands of “constructive realism” (as opposed to “constructive idealism”) whereby the agent is deemed to have an epistemic but not an ontological influence on the existence of the world (Ben Zeev 1995: 50) and “organizational constructivism” according to which interests and identities are originated by consensual knowledge (Haas EB 2001: 26). It is assumed that international reality is not merely the result of material and physical forces, but that it is a phenomenon socially constructed through discursive power, that is, the power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology, and language (Adler 1997a; Hopf 1998). Fundamental to this thesis is also the claim that the concept of culture is critical to understand many of the important issues underlying security as a value and as a policy. The general focus of this book is roughly sketched in the phrasing of the title which retakes the words of Peter Katzenstein’s “The Culture of National Security” (1996). All three terms – taken singularly or collectively – are essentially problematic and are particularly tricky when associated to the European Union. “National security” refers to a clearly delimited state-centered condition, while “culture” awakens nightmares of never-ending intellectual discussions related to the definition and boundaries of identity: an anathema for students of mainstream international relations and strategic studies who are not supposed to leave the safe ground of “scientific” analysis and “high politics” and cede to the corruption of less positivist and popular methods of inquiry (Booth 1997). In order to be theoretically tenable, this approach requires a definition of culture that on the one hand is material enough to make it observable, while on the other is both dynamic and non-deterministic, so that it is possible to establish a methodological relationship between security cultural assumptions (strategic culture) on the one hand and policy preferences (grand strategy) and behavior (security policy) on the other. The instruments of language and discourse intervene in the relationship between structure and agency (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992; Adler 1997b; Checkel 1998) and to solve the dilemma between culture as context and culture as behavior (Gray 1999; Johnston 1995a, 1995b). Using words as “thick signifiers” (Huysmans 1998b) and the concept of a dominant discourse as the constraining and enabling interface between ideas/culture/identity and policy/action/behavior, language is seen as a strategic resource for communication (or auto-communication) and the construction of identity and actorness (George 1994: 172–3; Buzan and Waever and de Wilde 1998; see also on communication: Diez 2001: 85; Habermas 1990). As a matter of fact, the analysis of discourse intended as a linguistic social product prompts on the one hand the drawing of inferences about the cultural assumptions existing at the input level and, on the other, the making of positive or negative predictions about the range of possible actions in terms of outputs and outcomes. A dominant discourse is indicative of dominant cultural assumptions – in this case, about security and the use of force – and it is constraining and enabling



European Security Culture

a particular set of policy options. Moreover, discourse and policy are interrelated in a dynamic and mutually constitutive process. If the actions are consistent with the dominant discursive “promises”, then the theoretical dilemma between culture as context or culture as behavior is solved in favor of the hypothesis that a circular relationship culture-behavior (via discourse) exists and that, for the sake of the analysis, it is possible to separate the two variables. By introducing discourse as an intervening variable and by bracketing the relationship culture-discourse, it is possible to complete the circle by looking at the relationship discourse-behavior (see Giddens 1994 and structuration theory). Simplifying, by syllogism, if culture (C) equals discourse (D) and discourse (D) equals behavior (B), then culture (C) equals behavior (B). The action made by the discourse (as a speech act) is one of delimiting, that is, setting boundaries to the meaning of the concepts implied. In this sense the discourse of the ESDP specifies the contours and scope of the policy by offering a context against which the terms should be interpreted. The question is not to assess whether the issues defined as threats to security are objectively dangerous for the referent object involved; rather, the aim is to highlight the components of intersubjective security: a social construct acquiring a precise meaning only within a specific social context and as a result of discourses and discursive actions (Doty 1996: 239). Finally, it should be stressed that the theoretical aim is not to demonstrate that a cultural explanation is superior to structural theories, but to highlight how cultural variables may complement the understanding of social phenomena in general and security in particular (Desch 1998). More than disaggregating the concept of culture as Meyer tries to do (2004), this research attempts to identify criteria to operationalize culture as a variable and transform it into a more “material” product (texts) that can be empirically studied. As a matter of fact, culture is merely used to support the neo-realist argument that by interacting in the international system, actors “will display characteristics common to competitors: namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialized to their system” (Waltz 1979: 128). This means in the EU case that the experience of the Union in international security will bounce back to influence the culture of the Union and the formation or consolidation of ambitions of statehood.

Level of Analysis and Empirical Assumptions The problem of the levels of analysis is directly connected to the choice and the relative weighting of explanatory variables. A clear-cut separation between the levels is not always the solution since the same variable can operate in a similar way on different levels (Jervis 1976). The internal/external dimensions and the dilemma concerning where to draw the lines between inside and outside constitute a central theme in the current debate about the future of security studies in particular and international relations in general, and considering the EU as the primary object of analysis does not facilitate the task. How far the Union is external to the

Introduction



member-states is a matter of perspective, whereby the traditional domestic/foreign dichotomy is being revised in all sectors of policy-making (see in particular the effects of globalization in Walker 1993; Sil and Dougherty 2000). In general, there are two ways to approach the security culture of the EU. On the one hand, one could consider the EU culture as the result of an addition of all the national strategic cultures. This presumes either convergence and/or uniformization: conflicting elements must be levelled and eliminated so that it is possible to identify a common strategy. In a bluntly simple algebraic equation, if you add different variables (x+y+n), you can obtain a result only if the terms of reference (measures) are the same, otherwise they have to be transformed (find a common denominator, calculated on the basis of a common variable – for instance x) in order to be summed. This process implies a “reduction”, a change in the perspective on how the elements are defined (see comparative approach: Heiselberg 2003; Meyer 2004 and 2005; Hyde-Price 2004; Merand 2006). On the other hand, the EU security culture can be considered as the product of a multiplication (see multiplier effect): the product is represented by the common position/policy/culture. Differences are not levelled (x*y*n), so that it is not possible to distinguish the inputs anymore. As shown in the Table 1.2, two different types of representations are possible: a traditional model whereby the EU is seen as an international organization; and a “federal” or unitary one (the ambition of the fore-fathers), according to which the European Union is considered as an entity in itself, as a product more than a sum. The most obvious criticism to this last approach is that the ESDP is an intergovernmental policy-area and that it is unsound to consider the Union as a unit in this field. However, as it will be argued, from an external point of view, the decisions and the operations on the ground, as well as the discourses about it, can be re-conducted in terms of legitimacy and responsibility to the Union as an entity as such, physically present through the symbol of the “starry-blue” flag. This is particularly true if one considers self-perception and discursive projections besides external recognition (Castano and Sacchi and Hayes Gries 2003). As a consequence, the border checkpoint is situated between the Union and the rest of the world. This means that, although in some cases inevitable, the policies of the individual member-states – the internal level – will not be problematized. More interesting in this context is the impact of the security construction on the development of a genuine overall EU-ropean identity (Delanty 1995; Whitman 1998; Morten 1999; Andrew and Crook and Waller 2000). In this sense, the external environment is populated by non-Member States (US, Russia, NATO and so on), member-states in their function as international actors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom…) and other governmental and non-governmental players; while the “domestic” level refers mainly to the EU institutions. For analytical simplification, the Union is considered as a proto-state: “literally” and functionally it possesses attributes which are comparable to characteristic federal-state features (Risse-Kappen 1996). This is in line with what has been called “methodological

European Security Culture

10

Table 1.2

Levels of Analysis and Units

Levels

Units – Traditional Model

Units – Federal Model

International

Other States and global IGOs, NGOS Council of Europe, NATO, NAFTA, ASEAN etc.

State Meso-Regional Micro-Regional

Other States and global IGOs (ex. UN), NGOS European Union, Council of Europe, NATO, NAFTA, ASEAN etc. Member States Sub-state regions Communities

Individuals

Citizens

Macro Regional

European Union Member States Sub-state Regions and communities Citizens

nationalism” or the fact that, independently from the theoretical color, the concept of state plays a pivotal role in studies of security (Beck 1997: 44). The analytical focus is thus on the particular construction of EU security as expressed in EU documents and speeches and in the associated discursive/ epistemic community. It is assumed that the EU security discourse has a relative autonomy and does influence the sub and supra level (Member States and the international level) (see for instance neo-institutionalism March and Olsen 1989).

Methodology One of the ambitions of this book is not only to contribute to better understanding the security narrative and identity of the European Union, but to develop a model for the analysis of security discourses in general and advance general knowledge of complex social and political phenomena. Critics may question the use of only one case-study in theory testing. In particular, within the positivist approach to science, single case-studies are seen as problematic because they do not provide sufficient bases for generalizations. However, this method allows the researcher to study a phenomenon intensively, interpret how theoretical elements are related to each other, and thereby arrive at a better understanding of complex problems and dynamic processes (Yin 1984: 23). It offers an illustration that gives a provisional indication of the relevance of the analytical framework proposed. In this sense, the analysis of the ESDP is not only useful for the policy implications that might derive, but it enhances the comprehension of the logic of the security dynamic in general. The EU discourse of security is here intended as the totality of texts (spoken or written) produced by the EU as an institution (or by its representatives), which reflect and reproduce a determined approach to security and where the EU speaks

Introduction

11

with a unique voice in the period 1998–2004. Different types of texts belong to this discourse, among others, the statements, declarations, speeches, lectures, and articles of CFSP/ESDP High Representative Solana, Commission President Prodi, and RELEX Commissioner’s Patten. Moreover, legislative instruments like treaties, common strategies, and joint actions enshrine the dominant discourse and are to be considered already part of the action. As a matter of facts, these texts are the final result of long diplomatic negotiations between Member States (with different historical, political, or social backgrounds), and they reflect the achieved consensus (for good or for worse). A central role is played by the European Security Strategy (ESS) as the point of arrival of a relatively long internal debate. However, this key document is in no way considered as the only text of reference since, as Milliken points out, “if the analysis is to be about social signification, a discourse analysis should be based upon a set of texts by different people presumed (…) to be authorized speakers/writers of a dominant discourse” (Milliken 1999: 233). It should be noted that the aim is not to analyze the personal worldviews of the individuals, but to highlight the “official” problem representations that result from the policymaking process. In addition, 32 off-the-record interviews conducted with EU officials, foreign ministry officials and diplomats, military personnel seconded to the EU, academic specialists and journalists in Brussels, Berlin, London, Rome, and Paris provide important qualitative inputs for the interpretation of the above-mentioned texts. The concept of EU-ropean security and defense can thus be constructed through the analysis of the discourse of the EU as a formal organization (the statements and declarations of its organs) and as expressed in informal communities of political decision-makers and military officers (see also Burgess and Tunander 2000). The use of primary resources – documentary evidence and interviews – however, is severely hindered by the regime of confidentiality which limits the public access to the decisions or reports related to the most sensitive issues connected to the ESDP. This lack of transparency is partially compensated by the recourse to secondary literature and, specifically, to the knowledge of the security epistemic community. For reasons which are explained at length in Chapter 5, the use of opinion polls or other statistical sources is very limited and referred to only as a tertiary tool for supporting evidence. A note on the language is important. The common technical jargon is the diplomatic language informed by “statal” notions and symbols which constitute the basic terms of reference and facilitate communication and common understanding of the terms used, independently of the particular language spoken. However, English, and at a lower degree French and German, is the language used in the business of CFSP and ESDP, that is, for communication to the external world, (what is obviously normal since the major receivers are located outside the Union).  ������������������������������������������������������������������������ See art. 4(1), Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (Official Journal L 145/43 of 31.05.2001).

12

European Security Culture

Although official declarations and statements as well as legislative documents are published in the pre-2004 11 official languages, the speeches – inside and outside the Union – are generally performed in English. The local language of the venue is used only in the case the speaker can speak it, and in any case, the personal rhetorical attributes of the speaker play quite an important role. The fact that the final texts are often the product of ghost-writers and/or team-work fortifies the hypothesis of a common linguistic system. Most interestingly, the websites of the CFSP High Representative as well as of the External Relations’ Commissioner are only in English, while for instance other websites of the Commission can be found in all the official languages. The use of English as a lingua franca is important because, as it will be discussed later, the speaking of a particular language may entail important conceptual differences in the respective political culture (Chilton 1996a: 29). The problem of understanding and meaning between mother-tongues and second language speakers as well as the differences among cultural contexts are in a way overcome by the assumption of the existence of an epistemic discursive community sharing and understanding a standard technical jargon. In the case of translations, apart from the fact that in general official translations are carefully drafted and must be finally approved for release, original texts in French, German, Italian and Spanish are compared for consistency with the official English version. The working assumption, confirmed in the analysis of the empirical material, is that there is a common language (the political-diplomatic jargon) across institutions (Council, Commission, and EP) and across sectors or pillars. For what concerns the method for the analysis of the actual texts and of the discourse in general, two observations are relevant here. In general, discourse analysis includes a variety of methods ranging from pure structural linguistics to semantics and pragmatics. One of the aims of this book is however to contribute to the development of empirical methods to study security discourses. After a selection of most important texts in terms of legitimacy and authority (legislative or official source), topic, and resonance in the public, texts are analyzed on the basis of a syntactical model. In particular, at the macro-level texts are contextualized, while at the micro level the elements of the texts are classified on the basis of the function played in the sentence. Inescapably, the researcher plays a determinant role in the selection and interpretation of the texts to analyze. From a quantitative content analysis perspective at the micro level, the frequency in which certain words and formulations appear in the texts is assessed and then evaluated according to the model (Jaworski and Coupland 1999: 36–38). Since the aim is to highlight the common logic behind the dominant discourse, the analysis is synchronic, that is, materials from different contexts, actors, and years are fitted into a “syntactical structure” like fragments fitted together in a puzzle, so that it is possible to individuate recurrent patterns, structural arrangements, and chains  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Interestingly, in particular in the Commission, the ghost-writers in this field were until 2004 all English mother-tongues.

Introduction

13

of equivalence (Skinner 2002). The time of production is relatively unimportant in this research because it is assumed that displayed beliefs tend to be consistent across the period of analysis: in fact, even an event of the proportions of 9/11 did not essentially change the dominant pre-existing assumptions and vocabulary, thus testifying for relative stability of focal concepts. In practice this means that texts are initially filtered through the use of boundary markers and Boolean combinations. In particular, the following key-words have been used: ESDP, security, defense, threat, challenge, danger, risk, military, force, civilian, war, peace, strategy, values, interests, global, territory, human, conflict, crisis. As it will be discussed more in length in the following, these terms are considered to be “classifier languages” of security or nouns which reveal the structure of conceptual categories (Lakoff 1987: 92). It is important to stress that discourse analysis works on public texts, and it does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the actors. The weakness of linking discourse to culture lies however in the fact that it is not possible to assess whether the texts do really represent ingrained meanings or beliefs, since they can be manipulated for rhetorical reasons. In order to avoid the complexity of referring to psychological and cognitive approaches, the dominant discourse is considered as a structure produced by social interactions that create public beliefs. At the same time, bias in the speeches and statements is controlled through cross-tabulation with writings intended for a variety of different audiences, triangulation of public sources, and confidential interviewing (see also Berger 1996).

Outline Since the main contribution of this study is the elaboration of a theoretical analytical model, the structure follows a deductive logic proceeding from the general to the particular, from the theory to the practice. Chapter 1 has introduced in brief the rationale, the aims, the research problematique, and the arguments that will be touched upon in the development of this work. The rest of the book is sub-divided in two parts of three chapters each. Figure 1.1 summarizes the organization of the narrative. Chapter 2 introduces the framework of analysis and discusses the basic analytical tools of this research (the philosophy of security). It traces the main lines of discussion in Strategic/Security Studies and International Relations Theory and assesses the validity of new approaches to the subject of international security. In particular, it establishes the relationship between culture (political and strategic) and grand strategy (policy preferences). Chapter 3 is dedicated to the presentation of the role of language and discourse in the construction of a security concept (the language and politics of security). Discourse is intended as both structure and behavior but the two conceptions are kept separated: on the one hand the elaboration of a discursive syntax is introduced as a model for the analysis of security (micro and macro), and on the

European Security Culture

14

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