European Security in Transition

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EUROPEAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION

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European Security in Transition

Edited by GUNTHER HAUSER Austrian Defense Academy, Austria and FRANZ KERNIC University of Innsbruck, Austria

© Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data European security in transition 1. National security - Europe 2. European Union countries Foreign relations I. Hauser, Gunther, 1968- II. Kernic, Franz 355'.03304 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data European security in transition / edited by Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN-13: 978-0-7546-4961-8 ISBN-10: 0-7546-4961-X 1. Security, International. 2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Europe. 3. European Union. I. Hauser, Gunther, 1968- II. Kernic, Franz. JZ6009.E94E97 2006 355'.03304--dc22 2006021149 ISBN-13: 978-0-7546-4961-8 ISBN-10: 0 7546 4961 X

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd. Bodmin, Cornwall.

Contents List of Tables List of Authors Introduction 1

European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture since the End of the Second World War – An Overview Franz Kernic

vii viii 1

5

2

EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation Peter van Ham

23

3

The ESDP: The European Security Pillar Gunther Hauser

39

4

The New EU – A “Military Pact”? Solidarity – Neutrality – “Irish Clause” 63 Waldemar Hummer

5

Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition Arnold H. Kammel

6

From Reflections to Power: Implementing the European Security Strategy 87 Sven Biscop

7

US Defense Transformation and its Implications for Europe Benjamin Schreer

8

Plug to Operate: Command and Coordination of Armed Forces in Europe in Times of Transformation Ralph Thiele

9

Regional Approaches to Comprehensive Security in Europe Gunther Hauser

73

103

115

135

vi

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The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Ethno-territorial Conflicts, Russian Interests, and the Access to Energy Resources Martin Malek

11

Turkey’s Role in Post-Cold War European Security Policy ebnem Udum

12

European Union and the Greater Middle East: Economic Relations, Political Issues and Future Challenges Michele Brunelli

145

161

175

Conclusions

195

Index

201

List of Tables Table 10.1 Table 10.2 Table 10.3 Table 10.4

The South Caucasian Republics at a Glance The Armies of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan Separatist Armies Russian Bases

146 148 151 154

List of Authors Sven BISCOP, Dr., is a senior research fellow at the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB) in Brussels, and a professor of European Security at Ghent University (Belgium). Michele BRUNELLI, Dr., is a researcher at the Research Centre on Southern System and Wider Mediterranean, Università Cattolica di Milano (Italy), and a research fellow at the Università degli Studi di Bergamo (Italy). Peter van HAM, Dr., is a director of the Global Governance Research Program at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” in The Hague (The Netherlands), and a professor at the College of Europe in Bruges (Belgium). He is a member of the Advisory Council on International Affairs to the Dutch Government. Gunther HAUSER, Dr., is a researcher at the National Defense Academy, Vienna (Austria), and a director of the International Security Order Department, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, Dusseldorf (Germany). Waldemar HUMMER, Dr., is a professor at the Institute of European Law and Public International Law, University of Innsbruck (Austria). Arnold H. KAMMEL, Mag., is a researcher at the Austrian Institute for European Security Policy, Maria Enzersdorf (Austria). Franz KERNIC, Doz. Dr., Colonel (Oberst), is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Innsbruck (Austria), at the Bundeswehr University Munich (Germany) and at the National Defense Academy (Austria). Martin MALEK, Dr., is a researcher at the National Defense Academy, Vienna (Austria). Benjamin SCHREER, M.A., is a research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Policy/ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin (Germany). Ralph THIELE, Colonel (Oberst iG), is a director of faculty, Bundeswehr Command and Staff College, Hamburg (Germany). ebnem UDUM, M.A., is a researcher at the International Relations Department, Bilkent University, Ankara (Turkey).

Introduction The project of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was launched within the framework European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) during the Austrian EU presidency in 1998. With the evolution of the CFSP and ESDP, the enlargement process of the EU, the Union’s increasing role on the global stage, and today’s War on Terrorism, security and defense issues have dramatically gained weight and importance in international politics. The tremendous changes in the security agenda since the end of the Cold War make a revision of Europe’s security and defense system inevitable. Since the early 1990s, all established security and defense organizations in Europe have been subject to major reform processes and radical changes as well. Their traditional functions and tasks have been replaced by new ones and new threat perceptions have caused a new political debate on the future design of the European security system. The primary task for the European Union is now to increase and coordinate capabilities both for its own security and for the stabilization of the European continent in order to fulfil the whole spectrum of EU Petersberg tasks – ranging from peacekeeping to peace enforcement actions. Therefore, the EU will also need efficiently coordinated advanced military capabilities to close capability gaps between the United States and the European allies. The general aim of this volume is to provide an interdisciplinary reference or handbook focusing on the development and current status of the European security system as well as on selected key issues of today’s security agenda. It has been written particularly for graduate and undergraduate students of the social and political sciences as an introduction into the current debate on Europe’s security system and agenda. It aims at giving a general overview of the historical development of the European security system since the end of the Second World War and particularly its transition in the post-Cold War era. The contributions are written by researchers from well known think tanks and practitioners from military institutions. The authors analyze and discuss major developments as well as present and future challenges related to the general topic of European security and defense. Franz Kernic describes and analyzes in his introduction European Security in Transition the development of the European security landscape and the emerging European security system since the end of the Second World War. The beginning of a coordinated European security system was characterized by the Western Union, the failed construction of a European Defense Community, the Western European Union, and, of course, by NATO. The author also scrutinizes the role of the CSCE

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and UN during and after the Cold War and finally examines major changes in the European security system during the early post-Cold War period. Peter van Ham analyzes in his chapter about EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation, the objectives and approaches toward a coordinated European security system as well as the development of the cooperation between the main European security institutions – NATO, OSCE and EU. The author compares the mechanisms of cooperation and their effectiveness. This chapter focuses on the problematical relationship between Europe’s key security institutions: the EU, NATO, as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These organizations have a markedly different membership, different capabilities, and, perhaps most importantly: different “security cultures.” Gunther Hauser compares in his contribution about The ESDP: The European Security Pillar the political and legal aspects and framework conditions of ESDP and analyzes the military and civil instruments in the framework of the transatlantic security relations. Possibilities and ways of enhanced security cooperation between ESDP and NATO are discussed as well as the civil-military coordination (CMCO) in this field. In his chapter on The New EU - a “Military Pact”? Solidarity – Neutrality – “Irish clause”, Waldemar Hummer analyzes the different political interpretations and meanings of neutrality and non-alliance in the context with duties of so-called neutral and non-aligned states in the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy. In the context of the reformation of the European Union (EU) into a “new EU” through the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (“Constitutional Treaty”) of 29 October 2004, a vital problem especially for the six neutral and non-aligned or non-committed member states of the EU – Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden as well as Malta and Cyprus – is being discussed. Arnold H. Kammel focuses in his contribution about Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition on JHA policy as an important pillar to achieve comprehensive security facing threats like terrorism, illegal migration, organized crime, and human trafficking. Mr. Kammel analyzes today’s challenges for JHA bodies. The author also compares links between JHA and ESDP. Sven Biscop underscores in his chapter From Reflections to Power: Implementing the European Security Strategy, the aspects of the European Security Strategy relating to those of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. He analyzes major security aspects of the so-called European Security Strategy and shows deficits of EU member states facing today’s security challenges. The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), A Secure Europe in a Better World, by the European Council on 12 December 2003 was a major step for the EU, though not necessarily one with lasting impact. For the very first time, the Member States solemnly adopted a common strategic vision for the whole spectrum of EU foreign policy. Benjamin Schreer scrutinizes in his contribution on US Defense Transformation and its Implications for Europe the phenomenon of Network Centric Warfare – the key instrument to transform European and American armed forces. He compares the

Introduction

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multinational needs and possibilities of armed forces in transition in the transatlantic security framework from a strategic point of view. Ralph Thiele focuses in his article about Plug to Operate: Command and Coordination of Armed Forces in Europe in Times of Transformation on the transformation of the armed forces in the EU from an operative point of view. His chapter compares today’s transformation aspects based on case studies in the context of peace support operations and major challenges for future joint operations. Gunther Hauser compares in his contribution about Regional Approaches to Comprehensive Security in Europe different regional examples of comprehensive security cooperation and underscores the importance of regional approaches facing today’s security threats – e.g. on the Balkans through the European Stability Pact, in Southeastern Europe through the European Neighborhood Policy as well as ways and means of well-coordinated cooperation among armed forces and civilian bodies to achieve comprehensive security goals. Martin Malek scrutinizes in his chapter The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Ethno-territorial Conflicts, Russian Interests, and the Access to Energy Resources the roles of the different political actors in this region. The European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies the South Caucasus as one of the regions, in which the EU should take a “stronger and more active interest”. Cooperation between the EU and this region is also on the way to be developed in the area of energy – as the Southern Caucasus is an important region both for the production (the Caspian basin) and the transit of energy. EU is the world’s largest energy (oil and gas) importer and the second largest consumer. Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Therefore, a stabile region of Caucasus is of strategic European interest. ebnem Udum analyzes in her contribution about Turkey’s Role in Post-Cold War European Security Policy the role of EU candidate country Turkey in European crisis management. She discusses the Turkish point of view relating to European security issues. Finally, Michele Brunelli focuses in his contribution about European Union and the Greater Middle East: Economic Relations, Political Issues and Future Challenges on European security relations to the Greater Middle East region and explains the relevant aspects of EU policies toward the Middle East. As the European Security Strategy states, the Middle East is of great security importance for Europe. The current and future challenges for European security are manifold, so that for all Europeans, a well-coordinated comprehensive approach to tackle security risks and uncertainties is pivotal. This publication will easily guide interested readers through the general landscape of the European security architecture.

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Chapter 1

European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture since the End of the Second World War – An Overview Franz Kernic

Over the sixty years since the end of the Second World War, Europe’s security landscape and architecture has changed dramatically. The Cold War split much of the world into two camps siding with either the United States or the Soviet Union. As a result, ideological, economic, and military rivalry dominated security considerations from 1945 until 1989. Each of the superpowers had its own sphere of influence; two strong military alliances, opposed to one another, shaped the political landscape of Europe. As the Soviet Union collapsed and the Berlin Wall fell, formerly communist Central and Eastern European countries gained independence and launched their transformation toward democracy and market economy; a new post-Cold War era was proclaimed. During this time, the Warsaw Treaty Organization dissolved and many opponents of the past suddenly became allies and partners to the Western powers. Undoubtedly, this radical transformation of the international system and global order also had a tremendous impact on the European security and defense agenda. At first, the post-Cold War era was perceived by many as a chance to spread “democratic peace” around the globe and to establish a new global system of international security. Some even phrased it the “new world order,” put into place and guaranteed by the only remaining superpower, the United States of America, though in close cooperation with the international community. However, much of this optimism quickly disappeared, when the US as well as other regional powers and smaller states saw themselves increasingly confronted with a number of newly emerging security threats. Within the blink of an eye, post-Cold War security became an issue of major political and societal concern. The so-called “certainties” of the past changed into “uncertainties”; indeed, in the post-Cold War era, uncertainty itself came to be seen as a new threat. In addition, other security concerns emerged, ranging from regional instabilities and conflicts (even in parts of Europe) to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, asymmetric warfare, and terrorism.

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In particular, the outbreak of various major international crises and wars, e.g. in the Gulf and the Balkans, forced the European countries to rethink their traditional approaches to security and defense. The tremendous changes in the political landscape of the post-Cold War world, particularly in Europe, not only caused a new debate on security and defense issues, but also resulted in the radical transformation processes of established European military alliances and security organizations as well as national armed forces. Suddenly, there was a new impetus for re-looking at the existing European security architecture, i.e. for creating alternative structures for European and/or North Atlantic security. There was no doubt, for instance, that with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, NATO had to be given a new role and function. At the same time, some of the old plans, concepts, and ideas regarding a stronger European pillar in the field of security and defense experienced a revival. All of a sudden, all of Europe seemed to be ready to take further decisive steps toward European integration; governments across the EU not only began to deliberately embrace security and defense issues but also began work to open up the EU framework for new member states from the former Eastern bloc. Thus, a European security and defense agenda gained new momentum. Today, consolidation seems to be on its way, although the whole transformation process must still be regarded as “work-in-progress”. However, a general orientation has been regained and important decisions have been taken, thus giving the traditional security and defense organizations of Europe, particularly NATO, a new “face”, i.e. new tasks and a new organizational design. At the same time new organizational frameworks, such as, for example, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), have been established. But not only organizational structures have been transformed, the way of thinking about security, in general, and European security, in particular, has radically changed as well. In comparison with the Cold-War era, security is today defined in a much broader context, mostly as “comprehensive security” that combines efforts in all fields of political and societal life to guarantee the health and survival of a given society and state. Security is no longer narrowly defined as “military security,” with a predominant, almost exclusive focus on the armed forces and on armed conflict between nation-states. Even the question of “actorness” in International Relations theory, as related to security, has led to a tremendous shift away from a narrow state-centric view to a more open “capabilities”-approach, which also gives space for analysing the impact of certain actions of individuals, small groups, or networks on European security. This chapter aims at reviewing the development of the European security system and architecture since the end of the Second World War and scrutinizing the political landscape that has shaped the security and defense agenda in Europe from the ColdWar period until today. It focuses on institution-building processes with respect to European security and defense as well as the various reconfiguration processes, which have not only transformed established institutions and organizations over the years, but also led to the creation of new ones. The chapter will start by looking at the

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security and defense institution-building process of the early Cold War years. Then, the European debate on “alternative models” for European security will be reviewed, ranging from the Soviet efforts to establish a European collective system to the idea of creating a new forum for multilateral security dialogue, i.e. the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Finally, the post-Cold War era with its radical transformation of the whole European political and social landscape needs to be examined in detail, particularly with respect to its implications for the European security and defense system. Building New Security Institutions in Europe The traumatic experience of two world wars has shaped Europe’s security and defense agenda since 1945, resulting in the very strong desire of the European people to avoid future wars and conflicts among European nations. The Second World War left Europe divided, however, and exposed to the threat of another military confrontation between the recently emerged “European” powers of that time, the Soviet Union and the United States. Europe even felt threatened with becoming the battlefield of such a military conflict, which even carried the potential of becoming a nuclear war. This nuclear dimension of the East-West confrontation increased the significance of security and defense issues. On the one hand, it accounted for a new arms race and military competition between the two blocs starting already in the first years after the Second World War, but, on the other hand, it also made conflict prevention and the search for peaceful coexistence and conflict resolution, particularly with respect to Europe, an important political goal – even necessity – for both sides. These post-war security concerns also accounted for an increasing number of political efforts to strengthen peace and security in Europe. At the same time, the new political landscape encouraged all remaining post-war powers to engage in closer security and defense cooperation in order to guarantee peace and stability in the region. In 1948, European defense cooperation began to develop within the Brussels Treaty Organization.1 On 17 March 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The five signatories agreed upon an “unconditional mutual defense commitment” making provisions for mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack. Thus, the Brussels Treaty was in fact the first European defense organization set up in the aftermath of the Second Word War, establishing a European security and defense cooperation, which was known as the “Western Union”. The Treaty was, of course, also a response to the increasing expansion of the Soviet Union’s political influence over Central and Eastern Europe and to the United States’ reluctance at this time to become too heavily involved in European defense arrangements. Negotiations between the five defense partners and the United States and Canada followed. Their main goal was to build a new European security and defense

1

For treaty text, please see http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/appendices/2b.htm.

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architecture upon the solid ground of a strong transatlantic pillar. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal joined in and on 4 April 1949, the twelve parties signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington.2 The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) must be seen as a milestone in post-War European history. NATO was to become Western Europe’s most powerful and influential security and defense organization of the Cold War period. Its political and military structures have remained powerful and vital even after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today, it still forms one of the key pillars – if not the main pillar – of European security, even though its functions, roles, and members have changed dramatically over the years. The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty not only reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of peaceful conflict resolution and the promotion of peace and stability in the North Atlantic area, they also expressed their determination to unite their efforts for collective defense and, in Article 5, agreed: that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently […] that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (Treaty 1949)

Greece and Turkey joined the organization a few years later. After West Germany’s accession to NATO took place in 1955 (via the ratification of the so-called “Paris Agreements”),3 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization found itself facing a new, powerful, and important opponent: the Warsaw Pact or Warsaw Treaty Organization, officially named the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance”.4 The creation of this organization in May 1955 was, of course, prompted by the integration of West Germany to NATO and, according to the Soviet point of view, was nothing more than a response to the “re-militarization” of Germany in order to meet the new threats and challenges from the NATO alliance. All of the newly established communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia, signed the Treaty, which was prepared by the Soviet Union and designed as a mutual defense pact for their respective territories in case of an armed attack against one of the member states (the Soviet Union, Albania,5 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and, finally, East Germany, which joined in 1956). Though confrontation between these two military alliances quickly became the predominant pattern of the European Cold War security and defense structures, other forms of military and defense cooperation among European states continued 2 3 4 5

For treaty text, please see http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. Text is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b541023a.htm. Treaty text is available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955warsawpact.html. Albania withdrew from the alliance in 1962 and formally left in 1968.

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to develop. For instance, discussion about a specific European pillar in the overall transatlantic security system was kept alive and from time to time even played an interesting role, particularly as a potential driving force for the European integration process among Western states. To give one example, the debate on the future European security architecture had – five years before the creation of the Warsaw Treaty – already led to a very ambitious proposal for creating a “European army”. This plan was presented by the French Prime Minister, René Pleven, in October 1950. It was related to the question about West Germany’s future involvement in Europe’s security and defense system. An important step in this direction was then in fact taken when Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed a treaty establishing the European Defense Community (EDC). This treaty was signed on 27 May 1952 in Paris. It included the idea of integrating the parties’ national armed forces into a European structure under the guidance of a single European authority. Two years later, however, the project came to a sudden end when the French Parliament rejected the proposal to set up the EDC. At the same time, the five Western Union governments decided to invite Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948. The Paris Agreements of October 1954, which modified and completed the original Brussels Treaty, led to the establishment of the “Western European Union” (WEU). This multi-body organization, including a parliamentarian assembly, was built upon a binding commitment of mutual defense in the case of an armed attack in Europe. Article V of this modified treaty clearly states: If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

From the very beginning, the establishment of the Western European Union was linked to NATO. The treaty clearly called for close cooperation with NATO and stated that the WEU Council and its agency would “rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters” (Article IV of the Modified Brussels Treaty). In this context, it must be noted that this same Article IV already recognized the “undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO” – an issue that has never lost its relevance and that even became increasingly important in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, this development clearly showed that the overall transatlantic security structure of the Cold War era was in fact also accompanied by a number of regional efforts to strengthen security and defense cooperation among a certain number of European states, thus leading to specific parallel structures and institutional linkages in the security and defense domain.

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The Idea of a European Collective Security System and Other European Defense Cooperation Plans In the early 1950s, the question of creating a collective European security system caused a broad political and public debate. It was related particularly to the danger of Europe being torn into two parts, of creating a “divided Europe” that, in the worse case, could even turn into the battlefield of a major military confrontation between the two heavily armed military alliances. The emerging bloc confrontation, which later became the predominant pattern of international and European security during the Cold War, started to cause new security concerns on both sides. Closer defense cooperation among “friends” and the establishment of new alliances seemed to be one path toward increasing security and guaranteeing stability and peace in Europe. Later, the concept of deterrence aimed at underpinning this specific security concept based on hard power according to the old idea of “Si vis pacem, para bellum”. However, another path or alternative security concept seemed to be closer cooperation – politically and economically as well as militarily – between the counterparts themselves, regardless of whether such a structure would rather be based on a “common security” or a “collective security” concept. The increasing gap between Eastern and Western Europe, which became more and more visible as a result of the German question; the German Democratic Republic was formally established in 1949, making the idea of re-establishing a unified country seem much less likely by the early 1950s. This development not only raised new security concerns, but also prepared the ground for a new search for and debate on alternative security concepts for Europe. Undoubtedly, the emerging political and military cooperation and integration in Western Europe and the newly emerging security and defense systems in the West increasingly worried the Soviet Union. The public debate about ways of integrating the Republic of Germany into the newly established Western alliances and organizations, particularly NATO, quickly turned into a breeding ground for new ideas and concepts concerning the future European security and defense architecture. One of the most interesting concepts of this time was the Soviet proposal for establishing an all-European “collective security system”. This system was to be designed in a way that would have allowed all European states to participate without regard to their political, social, or economic systems. It was based on assumptions similar to those of the collective security concept of the United Nations Charter but followed a specific regional approach. A draft for a treaty on collective security in Europe was submitted by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to the Berlin Conference on 10 February 1954 but was rejected by the Western powers. This draft listed a number of basic provisions, including a collective defense clause, according to which an armed attack in Europe against any one or more of the parties to the treaty by any state or group of states was to be considered an attack against all the parties. In such a case, each one of the parties, in exercising the right of individual or collective self defense, would have had the duty to assist the attacked state or states by all means at its disposal, including the use of armed force.

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Through presenting this proposal, the Soviet Union tried to change the direction of the emerging European security agenda of the 1950s. At that point, it had become obvious that the Western countries wanted to head toward closer political, economic, and security cooperation, which also embraced defense and military issues and based on a mutual defense clause. The transatlantic umbrella, of course, posed an increasing threat to the Soviet Union with respect to its role and influence on the European continent. That is why, for example, the first version of the Soviet proposal clearly aimed at the exclusion of the United States from the all-European collective security treaty, although the Soviet government later declared that it had no objection to setting this question in a positive way. Soviet efforts to join NATO before establishing its own military alliance and to change NATO’s character into a collective security system followed the same track. Of course, rejection of the Soviet proposal boosted the formation of the two blocs that came to be the main counterparts of the Cold War’s East-West confrontation in Europe, NATO and Warsaw Pact. The formation of the two military alliances, i.e. of two groups of European states facing off against each other, could not be prevented through any alternative security system due to a general lack of credibility and trust in such concepts or systems. Of course, this new setting, based on hard power politics and deterrence, gave rise to new tensions, frictions, and strained relations among European states. From this point on, all efforts to safeguard peace and security in Europe had to take into account the structural “bipolarity” and confrontation as well as the nuclear capability of the newly emerging political and military Cold War system. Nevertheless, the 1960s also brought to light a few ideas and concepts aiming at establishing a strong “European pillar” in order to break up the icy structure of the bipolar world. In 1961, Charles de Gaulle promoted the idea of setting up a system of European foreign policy cooperation outside the institutions provided for in the Treaty of Rome. This proposal, commonly known as the Fouchet Plan, was rejected by the majority of the other member states for many reasons. However, this concept reflected the general idea, prevailing in France at that time, of building a common European foreign policy and European diplomacy as a kind of third force between the two competing superpowers of the Cold War. The Fouchet Plan was implicitly based on the idea of a strategic triangle of world powers: the US, Europe, and the Soviet-Union. In the early 1970s, a system of “Political Cooperation” was established within the framework of the European Community, which might be seen as the progenitor of what later became the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It emerged from a number of informal meetings at the presidential level. The Belgian Political Director of the EC at that time, Davignon, might be seen as one of the key diplomats promoting informal discussions on foreign policy cooperation alongside the daily Community business. In terms of organization and structure, Political Cooperation was more of a loose consultative arrangement than an efficient and functioning machinery for a Common European Foreign Policy. EPC was an informal, transgovernmental means of addressing political issues by the EEC/EC member states. However, it provided

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at least a “forum” in which the separate foreign policies of the Member States and key security issues of mutual interest could be commonly discussed. It must also be seen as an important platform that enabled member states to identify common grounds and common national interests. Thus, despite its informal character, the system of Political Cooperation turned out to be a useful instrument for the European Community to harmonize, at least in some cases, the foreign and security policies of its member states with respect to some specific areas of Community business. Of course, the system itself has changed tremendously since 1970. There cannot be any doubt that it underwent considerable development, which must be seen as an integral part of the radical changes in Europe’s political landscape that took place in the late 1980s and 1990s. The most important step was made in the mid-1980s, when the Single European Act established a treaty basis for foreign policy cooperation. The SEA first formalized political cooperation in the security and defense realms. This treaty was the result of initiatives taken by the three major political powers in Western Europe, e.g. the French, German and British governments. However, this step must be seen as just a first timid attempt by the European Community to put security and defense issues on its agenda and to increasingly deal with such issues, despite the fact that clearly defined military alliances and organizations already existed. In real politics, the EG only played a minor role in the European security and defense domain until the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union. However, the 1970s and 1980s brought to light another idea for a broader, over-arching East-West security organization, which surprisingly developed into a quite successful endeavour. From the mid-1950s until the 1970s, one of the moot questions that had always remained on the agenda was the idea of establishing an overall European “security umbrella” in the form of a European security conference, which would bring together – at one table – all parties, Eastern and Western, in order to discuss important measures to improve European security and strengthen mutual cooperation. During the 1960s, the Cold War conflict escalated (Cuban crisis, Vietnam, etc.) and prevented any substantial progress in this respect. But the situation changed in the early 1970s, when the need for comprehensive arms limitation and reduction talks was recognized by both sides in order to prevent further escalation and to slow down the ongoing arm race between the two superpowers. Talks concerning a future Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) started in Helsinki in 1972, leading to an initial three-stage conference, which became known as the “Helsinki process”. (This expression was later also used for the whole CSCE process leading to the follow-up conferences of the late 1970s and 1980s). The conference itself started in July 1973 with 35 participating states, the US and Canada among them. The second stage of the conference took place in Geneva from September 1973 until July 1975. This was the main working phase, where the final document was elaborated and prepared. This document, the Helsinki Final Act, was signed by all 35 states participating in the third stage of the conference, which was held in Helsinki from 30 July until 1 August 1975. The Helsinki Final Act contained a number of key commitments on political, economic, social, and military issues, including a reference to human rights. As

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a non-binding document in terms of international law, it carried the character of a “declaration,” expressing the sincere intention of all signing parties to follow the outlined principles and key commitments. The so-called “Decalogue” of the Helsinki Final Act, a number of listed fundamental principles, was supposed to guide and govern the future behaviour of the signatories toward their citizens as well as towards each other. The participating states also agreed on evaluating the principles’ implementation into practice through follow-up conferences, which were in fact held in Belgrade (1977–78), Madrid (1980–83), and Vienna (1986–89). The New Environment: The Post-Cold War Era and European Security With the end of the Cold War, more than four decades of East-West nuclear confrontation and permanent tensions between the two military blocs appeared to come to an end, giving way to East-West cooperation and new security arrangements. The United States appeared stronger than ever, as the only remaining hegemonic power on global stage, still holding its “protecting hands” over the European continent. However, the changed political landscape also called into question the US traditional role in European security and defense. The first years after the Berlin Wall was brought down were perceived by many Europeans as a chance to transform and reconfigure the existing security and defense organizations and alliances, which represented nothing more than the former East-West bloc rivalry and confrontation. But Europeans squandered most of the opportunities of the early 1990s due to a general lack of a clear vision about their future security architecture. As a result, the drive to transform the European security system once again came from outside, namely the United States. The US priority was to strengthen NATO’s role and to reconfigure its role and function. The NATO alliance, at the end of the Cold War, initially went through a period of questioning its continued relevance following the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the military threat it had been established to address. Nevertheless, demands for membership by former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe could not be ignored and the question of NATO expansion became an important issue for all Europe. When the idea of enlargement to the East became more politically acceptable in the mid-1990s and some Western powers even started to campaign for the idea, the “Partnership for Peace” Program (PfP) provided a useful umbrella organization for slowly establishing closer cooperation and preparing partner countries for future membership. NATO expansion was also linked to modernization processes of national armed forces, with the primary aim of setting up smaller, modern and more flexible military organizations and guaranteeing “interoperability” with other NATO forces. Consequently, other ideas, concepts, and visions for a new European post-Cold War system – outside the NATO framework – were pushed aside and the United States made it clear to their European partners that alternatives were not on offer. Political agreements with Russia made the political decision to expand toward the

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East possible in the late-1990s. Since then, NATO has expanded twice (1999 and 2004), thus increasing its membership to 27 states. On the conceptual level, the post-Cold War era led to a shift away from a strong emphasis on external military threats, opening the door to a new understanding of security. With the dawn of a global “common risk society” (Beck 1999), an enlarged or broader security concept could emerge, which is no longer limited only to “the absence of military threats” or to defense of the state’s territory as the most important goal of national security and defense policy. As a result, the term “risk” came into use, and more and more often, replaced the old term “threat”. Increasing awareness of the effects of globalization also made post-Cold War societies more sensitive to the idea that they might have to deal with “non-territorial” threats and risks in the future. These changes in general threat perception and security requirements were followed by a re-evaluation of the traditional means and instruments of security and defense policy. As a result, NATO, the WEU, the OSCE, and all other existing security organizations on the national and international level started to reconfigure their organizational design and adapt to the new strategic and security environment. Transnational and non-governmental organizations and actors joined in and were increasingly confronted with security and defense matters. Civil-military relations turned out to be crucial in the development of a safer and peaceful post-Cold War Europe. The new global security environment of the post-Cold War era also changed public attitudes toward the project of “European integration”, which in the past had been seen as a purely civilian and economic endeavour. It became clear that, from now on, the European integration process would also deal intensively with security and defense issues, although from the outset it was obvious that the EU had to make a clear distinction between its own role and function within the broader security context and that of NATO. The transformation process of the European security architecture again gained momentum. Transatlantic or/and European? The Foundation of a CFSP and ESDP In the mid-1990s, former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd pointed out that the concept of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in Europe: is not a glass palace, which descends whole and perfect from heaven as a result of the Maastricht Treaty. It can only be built brick by brick on the basis of shared national interests. (Hannay 1996: 2)

From today’s perspective, ten years on, Hurd’s statement seems to provide an adequate description of a process that has, over the last decade, in fact led to the establishment of a functioning CFSP and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) pillar. There can be no doubt that it was extremely hard work to bring the Europeans together and to move on toward a common European security and defense policy that was not just rhetoric.

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In the past, the European experience was that many efforts to develop a specific “European” security and defense community were unsuccessful due to controversial opinions and views among the European states, specifically with regard to the question of the future political weight and importance of the transatlantic relationship for any form of closer European security and defense cooperation outside NATO. Some member states, like the United Kingdom, publicly portrayed the idea of CFSP/ESDP and of an improvement of European military capabilities for crisis management as a reinforcement of the European contribution to NATO. According to the British view, such efforts are meant to strengthen the transatlantic partnership and not to jeopardize the Atlantic alliance in any way. The French, on the other hand, tended to be relatively straightforward about the perceived need for a purely European force that could be used to better manage European crisis management without the involvement of NATO, particularly the United States of America. The decisive step toward the establishment of a specific European security and defense system within the framework of the European Community was taken in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed. Maastricht officially established the system of the “European Union” with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the “second pillar” of the Union. Furthermore, the treaty also referred to the eventual drawing up of a common defense policy, which might even lead to a common European defense, but left the specifics deliberately vague because of lack of widespread support among EU members concerning this issue. It also tightened up the requirements for coordination and introduced the concept of joint actions of the member states. According to the treaty, the CFSP aims to fulfil five fundamental objectives: 1. to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence, and integrity of the Union while respecting the principles of the United Nations Charter; 2. to strengthen the security of the EU in all ways; 3. to preserve peace and strengthen international security; 4. to promote international cooperation; and, finally, 5. to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Treaty). To pursue these goals, the CFSP was given two major instruments, i.e. common positions, where each member state would coordinate their policies to ensure a common European front, and joint actions, for member states to actively work together. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, and particularly since the late 1990s, the construction of a CFSP and ESDP has moved ahead dramatically. The initial groundwork required various NATO members, most importantly the US, to move toward acceptance of European efforts to construct a European pillar that was more than rhetorical. The NATO Oslo Summit of 1992 and the Berlin Summit of 1996 saw major decisions taken by NATO to support the development of links with the WEU, OSCE, the EU, and others. This opened the door for the EU to proceed with its own security and defense project without challenging NATO too much. In March 1996, an Inter-Governmental Conference was set up at Turin in order to explore ways to strengthen Europe’s CFSP. This conference witnessed a huge number of different approaches toward European security. On the one hand, a number

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of member states wanted to see the second pillar as an integral part of the traditional European Community’s law, with wide-ranging authority for the Commission and the European Parliament. On the other hand, many proposals gave preference to a smoother way of harmonizing foreign and security policies. Some countries – France, for example – favoured the idea of setting up a Mr./Ms. CFSP in order to give the European security and defense endeavour a voice and a face. In general, a wide variety of suggestions were made, ranging from the idea of establishing a new European defense system (based on the principles of collective security), thus implementing gradually a origin “European” defense identity, to the concepts of building up the WEU as the future EU defense system or giving preference to a new strategic concept within the framework of an enlarged NATO. In the late 1990s, there was more common ground among European Union member states over the general proposition that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) needed to be strengthened than there was over the political way this might be achieved. The public debate about the future European security system showed a wide variety of diverging proposals and opinions. In this respect, the specific “European” dilemma of quite sharp divergences between Member States, the Commission, and the European Parliament about the pace, scope, and limits of such a common policy was the result of the immense diversity of Europe itself, the differing European political systems and ways of political thinking, and, finally, a general lack of new guiding political ideas. These discussions led to the next important milestone in the development of the CFSP, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. The treaty brought a number of changes in order to make the CFSP more workable. CFSP’s capacity for action was reinforced particularly through the introduction of more coherent instruments and more efficient decision-making (e.g., “constructive abstention”). It also introduced a third instrument of CFSP, common strategies, and the treaty’s new Article 26 established the post of the High Representative for the CFSP, which was intended to give the Union’s common foreign and security policy a higher profile. Of course, the EU’s failure to respond effectively to the Balkan crisis of the 1990s was a spur for the EU to take decisive action to resolve its deficiencies in the area of “hard power” politics and to speak with one voice in foreign and international security matters. The first major step for the Union’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was taken with the St Malo Declaration6 of 1998, when France and the United Kingdom, long time opponents of the ESDP idea, jointly declared the need for a common European defense policy backed up by credible armed forces. In fact, the Declaration removed major European obstacles, particularly the controversial attitudes of the United Kingdom and France, to the development of an EU capability to conduct autonomous operations where NATO was not inclined to be involved. However, the debate on how far the European intention to establish a specific European, and less transatlantic, security system should go remained in place. 6 For more information, please see http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=Op enMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&aid=1013618395073.

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The Treaty of Nice,7 which came into effect in 2003, contained new CFSP provisions. Article 17 was amended to state that the: CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. (Treaty of Nice)

Article 17 now also included a reference to all humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. In December 2002, the European Council decided on a course of action to deepen NATO/EU links. This was followed in March 2003, when the Berlin Plus arrangements were concluded, giving the EU access to NATO capabilities and assets for EU military operations. NATO had already furthered ESDP development by declaring its readiness to define and adopt necessary arrangements for ready access by the EU to NATO capabilities and assets at its Washington Summit of April 1999. In December 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted, giving the EU a framework security strategy for CFSP and ESDP. In May 2004, the Union expanded to 25 member states. This round of enlargement was not only driven by economic interests but also by security concerns. It concluded a series of “Euroagreements” with Central and East European states aiming at regional stabilisation, which came into place in the 1990s. These changes in the European post-Cold war security landscape also forced the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the former CSCE, to adapt to the new environment. CSCE adaptation occurred rapidly and during the 1990s included membership enlargement, organizational changes, new functions, and the development of a close linkage to NATO and the EU. Gradually the OSCE not only expanded from 35 states to more than 50, but also expanded its roles and functions, primarily by turning into a “soft power” aiming at conflict prevention and crisis management. To carry out its new roles of early warning, minorities’ protection, re-building of war torn societies, humanitarian aid, conflict prevention, and crisis management, the OSCE has developed specific tools such as confidenceand security-building measures, observer missions, and preventive diplomacy. Today, the OSCE adds to the European security architecture a very important element of soft power that is needed to address all aspects of security issues and to meet a number of new security challenges and threats of the post-Cold war era.

7

Treaty text available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/index.htm.

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Conclusions and Outlook Since the end of the Second World War, the European security system has changed dramatically. Although the main security and defense organizations, particularly the North Atlantic alliance, founded and established in the early years of the Cold War, are still in place, their organizational designs, structures, goals, and functions have been radically transformed. The Cold War’s “bipolarity” has changed to a more “multipolar” world and the security concept itself has been widened. The notion of security has lost its narrow focus on military organizations and armed conflict between nation states. Today, civil-military relations and a proactive as well as preventive policy toward future crisis and conflicts play a much more decisive role with respect to safeguarding European security and guaranteeing peace and economic prosperity. In the last decade, Europe’s security architecture has developed a multi-level structure of close security and defense cooperation among all European states and the US and Canada, i.e. a system that aims at integrating a stronger European pillar into a broader defined transatlantic structure with strengthened cooperation and integration in the security and military domain among all European states. As a result, security and defense have become an integral part of the EU’s daily business, thus, gradually eroding the rigid distinction between foreign and security as well as defense cooperation and other Union policies. Although the Union’s military weakness is still a fact, continued efforts over the past ten years have led to the establishment of permanent political and military structures and to the development of civilian and military capabilities. The Union has also defined with NATO the framework of relations between the two organizations, allowing the Union to have access to NATO’s assets and capabilities. Generally speaking, the Union’s general approach to security and defense cooperation might be characterized as a cautious way of achieving the general goal by promoting so-called “evolutionary changes”, e.g. emphasizing smooth and slow development, both functionally and institutionally. There is, of course, a constant danger of duplicating Europe’s security and defense structures and capabilities, particularly with respect to NATO and CFSP/ESDP. It is clear that duplication must be avoided; this is a crucial issue for the future relationship between NATO and CFSP/ ESDP as fear of duplication is sure to remain controversial issue in the near future. The main problem in this respect is twofold: First, it is linked to the transatlantic question, particularly the definition of the US role in the European security system. Second, it has to do with the fact that CFSP/ESDP is in fact not just identical with the “European pillar” of NATO. Both organizations follow different rules and serve different purposes. Not all European NATO members are EU members and participate in the CFSP/ESDP. Denmark, for example, does not participate in the CFSP/ESDP but is a member of NATO; Turkey is a member state of NATO but does not (at least not yet) belong to the European Union. The current discussion about the future European security and defense system focuses on how to gradually design and develop such a new system within the

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global framework, so that external powers do not gain the perception that this new system poses any threat to them. Another important issue in this context is the idea of keeping a door open for an “opt-out” for those states not wishing or willing to participate in future EU military operations. The EU still comprises a number of socalled “militarily neutral countries,” which still wish to reserve the right to “opt out” through a general solidarity clause, as included, for example, in the draft for the EU Constitution. The overall patterns of today’s transformation process in Europe’s security and defense architecture are also apparent in the current public debate. When discussing the future European security system, references are mostly made to the two different, but in reality overlapping, concepts of European security: The first one is the traditional concept of security and defense as was generally understood and accepted as the prevailing idea during the Cold War era. Whoever still follows this path focuses on the primacy of national security and military defense. This view is clearly state-centric but allows security cooperation among states as long as this is in a mutual interest. According to this concept, the primary and overall task of the armed forces is to defend state territory against any external threat. For these people, European security policy is built on cooperation between sovereign nation-states, which may act together, bi- or multilaterally, and through alliances as long as they have a common interest in doing so. The second concept is built around the idea of shared responsibility of common values (a rather normative approach) as well as shared risks in a global society, in which the role of the state as an actor in world politics is rather limited. In this perspective, European security policy is viewed from a “supra-national” or even “global” point of view, binding societies together in order to guarantee peace and stability. This view is rather society-centric (in some cases even human-centric), following a “comprehensive security” concept, according to which societal forces and elements increasingly need to deal with security issues. Today’s ongoing European integration process puts a special emphasis on the second approach, although the intergovernmental structures still remain extremely active and important within the European Union. As a result, a wide array of different concepts and ideas concerning the future security and defense policies of the European continent are on the table and influence the current debate. It is obvious that there are a wide variety of different proposals; there are also quite sharp divergences between the 25 member states of the European Union and the 27 members states of NATO, just to name two of the key players, about the pace and scope of the changes that ought to be introduced in the near future. Nevertheless, the former, current, and emerging security system must always be seen as embedded in a broader political order, which forms an integral part of any continuing political, economic, or social transformation process that takes place in Europe. Furthermore, public debates on security and defense are always part of general public discourse about the present situation and future development of the political order. Any kind of policy directly derives from specific human perceptions and attitudes toward the political realm that reflect mutual interdependence between human societies and states and common as well as controversial approaches toward the question of how to meet new risks

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and non-territorial security threats on a wide scale. Conceptually speaking, today’s security preoccupations and perceptions are very different from the possibilities envisaged during the Cold War or in the first years after the fall of the Iron Curtain. They also ensure that the European security architecture will remain a “work in progress” encompassing a number of new efforts toward reforming and rebuilding the European security system. References and Suggested Reading Borawski, J. and Young, T.-D. (2001), NATO after 2000: The Future of the EuroAtlantic Alliance (Westport-London: Praeger Publishers). Bothe, M., Ronzitti, N. and von Brill, A. R. (eds) (1997), The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security (The Hague: Kluwer Law International). Cuthbertson, I. M. (1992), Redefining the CSCE: Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe (Boulder: Westview Press). Duke, S. (1994), The New European Security Disorder (New York: St. Martin’s Press). Dunay, P., Kardos, G. and Williams, A. J. (eds) (1995), New Forms of Security : Views from Central, Eastern and Western Europe (Aldershot: Dartmouth). Gärtner, H., Hyde-Price, A. and Reiter, E. (eds) (2001), Europe’s New Security Challenges (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). Gnesotto, N. (ed.) (2005), Die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU. Die ersten fünf Jahre (1999-2004) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies). Haine, J.-Y. (2003), ‘From Laeken to Copenhagen: European Defence: Core Documents, Volume III’, Chaillot Papers 57 (February) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies). Hannay, D. (1996), CFSP. The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Menu for Reform (London: Action Centre for Europe). Hoffmann, S. (2000), ‘Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?’, in Journal of Common Market Studies 38:2 (June), 189–98. Howorth, J. and Keeler, J. T. S. (eds) (2003), Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Hunter, R. E. (2004), The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion – or Competitor? (Santa Barbara: RAND). Jones, E. (2004), ‘Debating the Transatlantic Relationship: Rhetoric and Reality’, in International Affairs 80:4, 595–612. Kernic, F. and Hauser, G. (2006), Handbuch zur europäischen Sicherheit (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2nd edition). Lewis, D. W. P. and Lepesant, G. (eds) (1999), What Security for which Europe? Case Studies form the Baltic to the Black Sea (New York: Peter Lang). Lindley-French, J. (2002), ‘Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma post-11 September’, Chaillot Papers 52 (May) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies).

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Missiroli, A. (2003), ‘EU Enlargement and CFSP/ESDP’, in European Integration 25, 1–16. Moens, A., Cohen, L. J. and Sens, A. G. (eds) (2003), NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers). Nuttall, S. J. (1992), European Political Co-operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Park, W. and Rees, W.G. (eds) (1998), Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe (London-New York: Longman). Reinhardt, R. (2002), ‘From Weakness to Power with ESDP?’, in European Foreign Affairs Review 7, 453–471. Rutten, M. (comp.) (2001), ‘From St. Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents’, Chaillot Papers 47 (May) (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union). Rutten, M. (comp.) (2002), ‘From Nice to Laeken: European Defence: Core Documents, Volume II’, Chaillot Papers 51 (April) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies). Smith M. (2004), Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). The Eisenhower Institute (ed.) (2006), NATO at Fifty. Online at http://www. eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/securityandterrorism/ coalition/usandnato/NATOatFiftyBook/index.htm. Yost, D. S. (1998), NATO Transformed: The Alliances New Role in International Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press). Yost, D. S. (2002), ‘Transatlantic Relations and Peace in Europe’, in International Affairs 78:2 (April), 277–300. Official Publications The NATO Handbook of Documentation (Brussels: Office of Information and Press, NATO), online at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm (updated version, 17 June 2004). The OSCE Handbook (3rd edition, 2002). Online available at http://www.osce.org/ item/13858.html. European Defence. A Proposal for a White Paper. Report of an independent Task Force, ed. EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, May 2004.

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Chapter 2

EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation Peter van Ham

Introduction: Rearranging Europe’s Institutional Deckchairs The senior diplomat I spoke with in the summer of 2005 shook his head in despair: “The EU and NATO are two security institutions working within Brussels’ city limits, but they might as well be on two different planets!” NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was equally clear in his assessment of EU-NATO relations: [S]trong and trusting NATO-EU relations are a strategic necessity. And yet, NATO-EU relations remain caught in an ambivalence that prevents both organizations from working closer together. Why? Because there are still too many who look at NATO-EU relations from the angle of competition rather than cooperation. (…) This must change. (de Hoop Scheffer 2004)

Of course this should change. But these calls for cooperation could already be heard a decade ago. One is therefore left wondering why European security institutions just don’t seem to get along. This article analyzes the problematical relationship between Europe’s key security institutions: the EU, NATO, as well as the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It focuses mainly on the complex and at times conflict-ridden process of institutional collaboration, with a specific emphasis on the last five years. The key challenge for Europe’s main security institutions is to reinforce each other in a constructive manner, rather than to get in each others way in useless (and wasteful) competition. The dreaded scenario is that of so-called interblocking institutions, frustrating each other without effectively addressing concrete European (and global) security challenges. Behind this saga of unsteady relationships, lies a mundane fact which needs to be clarified in advance. Although all three institutions deal with European security, they have a markedly different membership, different capabilities, and, perhaps most importantly, different security cultures. The concept of security has different meanings within these three institutions, and their different capabilities and policy tools taint their preferences and privileges certain policy responses. NATO has a clear comparative advantage in conducting military operations, the EU in economic

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and diplomatic responses, whereas the OSCE mainly deals with conflict prevention and post-conflict reconciliation. The reason for many inter-institutional problems is that these niches are not watertight compartments. It remains unclear which institution is responsible for what, when, and how. Moreover, there is also considerable institutional envy and a certain apprehension that one institution may crowd others out. For example, all three institutions now have their own security platforms for the Middle East and North Africa, which have overlapping tasks and goals (OSCE News, 11 February 2004). Many officials discuss the same matters in all three fora, but without a decent system of feed-back and consultation. For all institutions it is an existential question to be present and visible on the security issue du jour, since it underlines their relevance and therefore assures their ultimate survival. Many more examples can be given of issues and areas of significant duplication. And this overlap is not getting less, but even seems to be growing. Several other examples will be analyzed below. Perhaps the most vexing problem is that member states use (or abuse) Europe’s key security institutions to further their own national foreign policy and security agendas. France, for example, pushes the EU as a security actor in its own right, without too much love lost for NATO. The United Kingdom, the United States and others (e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, and Poland) support NATO’s role as the primes inter pares of European security, and see the EU (as well as the OSCE) as security actors of only marginal relevance. The OSCE has no member state which is keen to champion its cause. This is a considerable handicap for the organization as a whole, especially in its “competition” with other European security institutions. Institutional interaction is therefore imbued with national policy preferences, which, if they clash, may well result in institutional discord and even paralysis. This should make it clear from the onset that the workings of Europe’s security institutions are a reflection of a struggle for power and a jockeying for strategic position amongst Europe’s key national actors. At least in the security and defense field, Europe has not gone far beyond the Realist paradigm. The EU-NATO-OSCE triangle obviously has three sides. I will address each of these relationships, examine recent developments and evaluate the state of affairs of inter-institutional cooperation. NATO and the EU: Clash of Strategic Cultures? NATO’s relationship with the EU is clearly the most important side of this institutional triangle. With the slow decline of the WEU, the EU took over the task of organizing and implementing a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This was agreed in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, and the subsequent European Council meeting (in June 1999) decided to give the EU the means and capabilities to implement ESDP. The EU’s Helsinki Headline Goals (of December 1999) indicated that the EU was committed to having its own troops to conduct military and crisis management operations. The EU also created its own permanent political and military structures, which closely resembled NATO’s: a Political and

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Security Committee (PSC), a Military Committee (MC), and its own Military Staff (MS). Since then the NATO-EU relationship took on a new dimension since it now became clear that the EU was finally taking its military aspirations seriously. Before, the division of labour between the EU and NATO was rather obvious, whereby the Alliance remained the ultimate coordinator and guarantor of European and transatlantic security. The arrival of ESDP therefore led to confusion on both sides of the Atlantic: Will the EU now compete with NATO; will it duplicate NATO; how will both organizations cooperate? Even now, these questions remain largely unanswered, despite the progress made over the last five years. The dialogue between the EU and the Alliance took off in January 2001, when a special cooperation arrangement was signed. Since then meetings have taken place at Ministerial level at least every six months (i.e. once during each EU Presidency), and at least three meetings per year at Ambassadorial level. During times of crisis these get-togethers would of course intensify. Regular meetings between the EU’s PSC and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) have also taken place since then. Joint EU-NATO Ad Hoc Working Groups have been established and meet since mid-2000 to discuss shared security concerns, as well as many technical matters such as the exchange and sharing of classified information and intelligence, the modalities of the EU’s access to NATO assets and capabilities, etc. The first formal meeting of EU and NATO Foreign Ministers took place in May 2001 during NATO’s Budapest Summit. In March 2003, the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangement was agreed whereby the EU was granted access to NATO planning assets and equipment. This came after many years of acrimonious debate over the exact modalities of EU-NATO military cooperation. The final compromise now means that the EU can make use of NATO planning and military assets, with only very few political strings attached. This arrangement was immediately put into practice when NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony in Macedonia was taken over by the EU (the so-called Operation Concordia) in March 2003. In December 2003, the European Council also approved a document called “European Defence: NATO/EU Consultations, Planning and Operations”, which has formed the basis for the Union’s operational relationship with NATO. Following this EU-NATO rapprochement, it was agreed at NATO’s Istanbul Summit (June 2004), that the EU would also take over NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2004 (Operation Althea), using the same Berlin Plus arrangement. Operation Concordia was important for the EU since it proved the practical merit of the Berlin Plus understanding and offered the EU an opportunity to gain experience and some self-confidence. Concordia – subsequently followed up by the EU Police Mission named Proxima, in December 2003 – gave insight in the practical problems of daily EU-NATO cooperation. These problems were frequently minor and easy to solve (e.g. security clearances), but at times also of a more structural nature, such as the reluctance to share information and intelligence, as well as the unclear role of the Allied Forces South Europe (AFSOUTH), NATO’s regional command in Naples. When the chain of command for Concordia was devised, an EU Command Element

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was included in AFSOUTH to ensure that consultations with other NATO operations in the Balkans would take place. A similar arrangement is now in place with EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But especially France has felt that this EU Command Element was not truly and fully under EU control, and too much dominated by US (and, one could say: hence NATO’s) military strategic culture. For the EU, Operation Althea is the biggest military-security challenge to dater. EUFOR comprises some 6,200 troops (down from the initial 7,000 troops), whereas previous operations were much more modest in size (Concordia only involved some 400 military personnel). EUFOR includes troops from 22 EU member states, as well as from regional partners (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), and further afield (e.g. Argentina, Canada and New Zealand). But links with NATO have remained close. For example, Althea’s HQ has been situated at SHAPE, and NATO’s deputy supreme allied commander for Europe, the German Admiral Rainer Feist, has functioned as the EU’s first operation commander. Moreover, NATO continues to have a small mission in Bosnia mainly to apprehend indicted war criminals and combat terrorism, whereas the US maintains its own base near Tuzla for similar reasons (Patrick Moore 2004). To a large extent, Althea’s success has been contingent upon the implementation of practical arrangements with NATO. But with Althea going as well as it does, the EU has proven both to itself and the outside world that it can merge its nascent military capabilities with its tried-and-tested economic and diplomatic instruments. One could therefore argue that the EU has passed the litmustest for the frequently made claim that the EU is well-equipped to deal with complex civil-military crisis management operations. But despite the ongoing success of Althea, the compromise of Berlin Plus will most likely be temporary since the pressure on the EU to develop more independent military capabilities, including its own military headquarters, will mount. Several EU member states – particularly Germany, France and Belgium – already favour the idea of establishing an EU operational planning staff and HQ. The argument for such an initiative is that the EU should be able to conduct autonomous military operations and therefore requires (or will require in future) its own operational planning capabilities. Most other EU member states disagree, arguing that the EU can now rely on NATO and the planners at SHAPE through Berlin Plus. They also argue that the EU’s permanent cell at SHAPE and the EU’s own civil-military cell within the EUMS (carrying out early-warning, situation assessment and strategic planning), already offer sufficient “autonomy” for a still fledgling ESDP. Moreover, the EU can also use national military HQ’s, a method used quite effectively with the EU-mission (named Artemis) for Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in June–September 2003, where a French HQ took the lead. Named after the initial Belgian idea to locate an EU HQ in the Brussels’ suburb of Tervuren, the “Tervuren governments” deny that more autonomous EU military planning capabilities will undermine NATO. But since this debate emerged most heatedly during the early stage of the American-led war on Iraq in early-2003, the Tervuren-option was generally seen as an attempt to develop a military counterweight against the US. For a while, conservatives in Washington even considered the

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Tervuren proposal as a ploy to form an alternative to NATO and to marginalize the US from European security in general. US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns (now Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs) described the Tervuren proposal as “one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship” (NATO News, 17 October 2003). The debate entered into calmer waters in 2005, but is essentially unresolved since the pressures to develop a more operational and effective ESDP remain. The acrimonious debate on Berlin Plus has been continued in a tussle to define an effective and efficient relationship between NATO’s Response Force (NRF) and the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Since both NRF and the EU’s RRF draw from the same (limited) pool of deployable forces, competition is almost inevitable. There is concern that the NRF may undermine the EU’s RRF and thereby hamper the development of the ESDP. Another risk is a division within the Alliance of countries favoring the NRF while others favour the RRF (Riggio 2003, de Wijk 2003-04). A concrete example of this dilemma has followed the African Union’s request to both NATO and the EU for logistical assistance to the AU’s peacekeeping operation in Darfur, western Sudan, in April 2005. Both organizations stressed that they planned to work closely and harmoniously together to help the AU, but this rhetoric proved difficult to realize. There was some discussion whether the EU and NATO could perhaps manage this operation jointly, but no agreement could be reached on such essential elements like a common planning centre, or a joint chain of command. Finally, NATO plans through SHAPE, and the EU uses the Strategic Airlift Coordination Center (SALCC) in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. This is the first time the EU and NATO operate alongside each other, but without using the Berlin Plus framework. Both the EU and NATO are offering the AU similar assistance, from strategic airlift, logistical support, to planning and technical expertise. Not surprisingly, France operates only through the EU, whereas the UK uses both NATO and the EU (“Support for the African Union in Darfur: A Test For EU-NATO Strategic Partnership”, ISIS Europe European Security Review, no. 26 (June 2005)). All these unresolved and contentious matters indicate that the EU-NATO relationship remains unsteady. “Tervuren” in particular has set much bad blood, confirming the stereotypes of French anti-Americanism and alleged American reluctance to accept Europe as a mature strategic actor. Clearly, the Tervuren-episode and the earlier difficulties to get to the Berlin Plus arrangement in the first place, may explain the continued and mutual EU-NATO suspicions which NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer was referring to in July 2004. But behind the headline-grabbing difficulties between both organizations, one should not overlook that day-to-day cooperation on key security takes place unabated. Two reasons may explain why cooperation continues regardless. First, the membership of both organizations has never overlapped so much as since the enlargement of the EU toward Central Europe in May 2004: no less than nineteen of the EU-25 are now also NATO member states. This implies that few European states can afford that both institutions remain at loggerheads with each other. Instead, they actively encourage both institutions to work together in a complementary fashion. Operation Althea illustrates how harmonious this relationship may be, whereas the

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messy response to the Darfur crisis indicates that the EU-NATO strategic partnership still requires much work. Second, since 9/11 the US-led “war on terror” puts pressure on all security institutions to be more output-oriented: what do they actually do to address key security challenges, and how effectively do they operate? The key word here is “effective multilateralism”: making institutions work, rather than mainly talk. This puts pressure on all Western states to set aside their national agendas and commit themselves to use Europe’s security institutions effectively. A clear case in point is the shared EU and NATO commitment to make sure that Afghanistan will take further steps on the difficult road toward stability and democracy. NATO took over command and coordination of ISAF in August 2003, its first ever military operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area. ISAF was initially limited to providing security in and around Kabul, but the Alliance has expanded over the years, and is now offering security assistance in 50% of Afghanistan’s territory with nine Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the South and North of the country. NATO’s (and ISAF’s) task is to provide security for other international organizations and NGOs to offer humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid. Another major task has been to provide security support for the presidential and parliamentary elections in the country (which took place in October 2004 and September 2005). Close cooperation with the EU, and the European Commission in particular, has proven essential. The EU is the main donor to Afghanistan, backing the current reconstruction process. The European Commission has earmarked €1 billion for reconstruction over 5 years (2002–2006), focusing mainly on institution-building, rural development, health and infrastructure, but also to support demining, human rights and civil society in Afghanistan. The EU and NATO therefore need each other in Afghanistan, since economic reconstruction and security go hand in hand (Brok and Gresch 2004). One other issue is the fight against WMD proliferation, which now tops the security agenda of both the EU and NATO. A transatlantic consensus on how to best deal with these new security challenges seems to be gradually emerging. However, it is indicative that the real dynamic of transatlantic cooperation no longer lies in NATO, but in the EU-US summits. In a joint EU-US statement on WMD proliferation on 25 June 2003, transatlantic leaders pledged to “use all means available to avert WMD proliferation and the calamities that would follow” (The White House 2003). Following their June 2005 EU-US summit, both partners agreed to “enhance information sharing, discuss assessments of proliferation risks, and work together to broaden global support for and participation in non-proliferation endeavors” (“European Union and United States Joint Program of Work on the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass-Destruction”, EU-US Summit, Washington DC, 20 June 2005). Although it remains to be seen whether these declarations will go beyond rhetorics, it indicates that NATO’s role as the strategic platform for a transatlantic security policy is eroding. Obviously, Washington sees merit in working directly with the EU (rather than through NATO) to address key security issues, be they HIV/Aids programs, airline and port security, WMD proliferation, or political reform in the

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Middle East. Calls for a more political NATO – i.e., turning the Alliance in a more effective forum for political debate – may well have come too late (Rühle 2005). Shared membership and threat assessments between the EU and NATO may therefore ameliorate the animosity between Europe’s key institutions. But it is unlikely that the bickering will end before too long. Both NATO and the EU are claiming a global role in the broad area of peace support operations. The EU is also gradually taking over NATO’s role as a collective defense organization since the European Constitution (now still in a comatose condition) included a so-called “solidarity clause” which obliges all member states to “act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster” (Article I-43). This covers NATO’s famous Article 5 collective defense clause which has been severely weakened since its invocation after 9/11 failed to turn the Alliance into the center of political gravity in the ensuing “war on terror”. Moreover, since the EU is acquiring more military tasks and NATO is increasingly focused on the non-military elements of security, both institutions will almost inevitably get in each others way. Now that NATO no longer has any qualms to go way “out of area” (e.g. into the Middle East), it will increasingly meet the EU as an institutional partner and occasional rival. EU-OSCE Relations: Soft Power and Conflict Prevention Both the EU and the OSCE are in the business of soft power, using economic, diplomatic, and other non-military instruments to reach political objectives (Cameron 1995). The main goal of the OSCE is to establish structures of cooperation in Europe (and beyond) to defuse tensions, prevent conflict, and reconcile enemies. Both institutions lack military capabilities and have a particularly civilian take on dealing with security challenges. The EU’s European Security Strategy makes it clear that “for the EU, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE – and the Council of Europe – has a particular significance”. EU member states closely coordinate their positions within the OSCE (as a part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’s commitment to speak with one European voice in international fora), and provide the bulk of the OSCE’s funding in all three dimensions of security (the OSCE’s three baskets: politico-military security, the economy, and human rights) across the entire OSCE region. The EU also provides a large share of the OSCE’s field operations staff. Especially the so-called human dimension of security as developed by the OSCE, is of interest to the EU. The EU therefore funds the bulk of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and many of ODIHR’s program’s in Central Asia. The potential for EU-OSCE cooperation is most obvious in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. The EU and the OSCE work closely together on the ground, most notably in the Balkans and the southern Caucasus. EU and OSCE programs, projects, missions, and other policy ventures largely overlap in their objectives as well in their methods. The OSCE’s activities in Central Asia give

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it a specific security niche, since this is an area where the EU’s has little experience and expertise. In 2006, the OSCE has seven field missions, and eight centres and offices in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, as well as in Central Asia. This OSCE presence offers the organization eyes and ears and a real expertise. Rather than seeing the OSCE as a direct rival, the EU is actively involved in developing this OSCE-expertise. For example, at the OSCE’s Istanbul Summit (November 1999) the EU supported the establishment of REACT (Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams), which includes a database of experts who can be used during crisis situations. Like the EU-NATO dialogue, the EU and OSCE have institutionalized political contacts at the Ministerial and Ambassadorial level. At the political level the EU is represented at most OSCE meetings by the delegation of the member state that holds the EU Presidency. The European Commission has its own delegation to most international organizations based in Vienna, the OSCE included. With the adoption of the 1999 Platform for Cooperative Security, the OSCE declared its firm intention to cooperate with other security institutions, the EU and NATO included. The first formal working group level exchange between both organizations took place in 2003, which indicates that the EU-OSCE dialogue is not very intensive until now. The troikas of both EU and OSCE meet twice annually and there is staff-to-staff contact on most levels. However, both organizations have committed themselves to improving the exchange of information as well as cooperation on a practical level. Ideas are also circulating to establish a permanent EU-mission to the OSCE and to strengthen the EU Council OSCE Working Group in Brussels. EU-OSCE cooperation in the field has developed gradually since the early1990s. For example, the OSCE was actively involved in the implementation of the Brioni Accords of July 1991, as well with the EU’s subsequent Monitoring Missions in the Balkans. The EU and the OSCE also worked closely together in implementing United Nations sanctions imposed on the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska. For Albania, both organizations initiated a so-called Friends of Albania-group (in September 1998) which coordinates the international efforts to support Albania in its development efforts. Moldova offers another example of successful EU-OSCE cooperation, since the OSCE Mission collaborated with the European Union TACIS program to encourage the Government of Moldova and the Trans-Dniestrian authorities to begin reconstruction projects. The EU and the OSCE have also worked closely and effectively together in implementing the 2001 Ohrid Agreement which works toward the stabilization of Macedonia. In 2004, the European Commission even lauded: the excellent cooperation which the EU has enjoyed over the years with the OSCE Spillover Monitoring Mission in Skopje. The work of the OSCE Mission has been a decisive factor in promoting stability and democracy in the country and complements the Union’s own efforts in this field. We remain confident that in the future this mutually reinforcing cooperation will continue (EU statement in response to the Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia made in the Permanent Council of the OSCE, 5 February 2004).

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But given the continued hitches between both organizations, both within the EU (European Commission and European Council) and the OSCE Secretariat, the possibilities for improving inter-institutional cooperation remain on the agenda. Areas of specific attention are cooperation in civil crisis management and the modalities of the EU’s contribution to OSCE-led missions; joint selection and training programs for field staff; and cooperation in the planning of new operations. Since both organizations focus on conflict prevention and stabilization, seeking more synergies would seem commonsensical. However, at the moment the EU seems to develop its own policies and capabilities in areas where the OSCE has been active for many years. For example, in the Balkans the EU seems to ignore the OSCE’s missions. The EU’s Althea operation has made it more difficult for the OSCE to call upon EU member states to assign staff for other civilian crisis management missions. Moreover, in the context of its new European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the EU has appointed special representatives for Moldova, the southern Caucasus as well as Central Asia. These are regions where the OSCE has developed much expertise based on its long-established missions. Another example is the launch of the EU’s first rule of law mission to Georgia (known as EUJUST Themis) in July 2004. Themis involves some 10 international civilian experts plus local staff to support the local authorities in reforming the Georgian criminal justice system. This EU mission clearly overlaps with the OSCE’s REACT mechanism, which aims to pool civilian experts for rapid deployment. It has therefore been suggested that the EU should coordinate its contribution of national experts to OSCE missions via an EU pool, or that the EU could function as a sub-contractor to the OSCE and start EU-missions under EU-command at the OSCE’s request (Biscop 2005). Whatever the mechanism that will be chosen, the scarcity of civil crisis management experts simply requires more and closer EU-OSCE cooperation. It should be clear that with the EU’s enlargement the prospect for a larger EU role in the OSCE has grown; of the OSCE’s 55 participating states, 25 are now EU members. The EU has managed to speak with a single voice (of the rotating Presidency) in OSCE when there is an agreed position. But this good habit has eroded since the EU’s 2004 enlargement, and it is now all too often that other EU member states take the floor to air a dissenting opinion, which of course tends to dilute the EU’s overall message. It remains unclear what impact EU enlargement will have on the OSCE itself. Some observers believe that EU enlargement will gradually marginalize the OSCE, whereas others argue that it will prove that both organizations are “natural-born partners” (Wohlfeld 2003, OSCE 2002). As long as a country has a realistic prospect to accede to the EU, the pull of membership will offer Brussels a significant lever to steer this country toward democracy and a market economy. In this respect, the EU has much more soft power than the OSCE. But for some countries EU membership is not on the cards. To assure cooperation with these countries, the EU introduced its European Neighborhood Policy in May 2004. The EU will now focus more political attention (and limited financial resources as well) on countries such as Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine as well as the southern Caucasus. Some countries (such as Belgium, which holds the OSCE Chair in 2006),

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see this as an opportunity for the EU to serve as a bridge between the US and Russia within the OSCE (Michel 2004). Indeed, the EU recognizes that for the ENP to be successful, close cooperation with the OSCE is important. European Commissioner Chris Patten therefore argued (in July 2004) that “EU enlargement inevitably means that we need to develop a very close and co-operative relationship to make the best of what the EU and regional organizations like the OSCE can bring to security and cooperation in Europe” (OSCE News, “EU External Relations Commissioner Patten praises level of cooperation with OSCE”, 15 July 2004). Monika Wohlfeld, the OSCE’s Head of Mission Program, even claims that “the EU’s new neighbors initiative is in fact a very important test case, also for the EU’s relations with the OSCE” (Wohlfeld 2003: 54). The OSCE will have to reconsider its role and place in Europe’s dynamic security architecture. In an influential report Common Purpose: Towards a More Effective OSCE (published in June 2005), a “Panel of Eminent Persons” argued that the OSCE “should focus on what [it] does best and where its value added lies” (Common Purpose: Towards a More Effective OSCE, final report and recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons, June 2005). Since the EU and OSCE have similar security visions, a more strategic partnership between both organizations would be politically pertinent. With Romania’s and Bulgaria’s EU-membership (in 2007) in sight, the EU’s influence in the OSCE will increase accordingly. What is more, three EU member states will hold the OSCE chairmanship between 2006 and 2008 in a row: Belgium, Spain and Finland. This would offer a good opportunity to strengthen the EU-OSCE relationship, for example by holding regular meetings between the EU Presidency, the EU’s High Representative for CFSP, the EU’s External Affairs Commissioner and the OSCE’s Chairman-in-Office. The logical focus of cooperation would be to incorporate the OSCE in developing the EU’s Neighborhood Policy. The President of the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly, Bruce George, argued in September 2003, that: the enlargement of both the EU and NATO cannot remain without significant consequences for other organizations. We must remember that the OSCE remains the most flexible and responsive Euro-Atlantic foreign policy instrument for non-military contingencies. (OSCE News, “OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President calls on OSCE to reassert its role in enlarging Europe”, 3 September 2003)

He may well be right, but the OSCE’s niche capabilities are increasingly also filled by the EU, as well as by a more ambitious and extravert NATO. NATO and the OSCE: Cooperative Security and its Limits After the end of the Cold War, both NATO and the OSCE had to reconsider their fundamental rationale, and subsequently devised quite successful strategies to remain relevant to a significantly changed European security environment. Although both

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organizations are very different in their strategic culture and capabilities, they have been competing with each other in the area of cooperative security. With the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991, NATO developed a major new outreach-program to the Soviet successor states, initially under the institutional umbrella of the so-called North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC); later through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). NATO’s PfP – which was launched in 1994 – was aimed at deepening the political and military ties with Central Europe and to forge a partnership with NATO on the basis of shared interest, joint values, and mutual trust. Although the OSCE has tried to reach similar objectives by somewhat different means (i.e. the monitoring of ethnic rights, free media, rule of law, etc.), the PfP process and the OSCE have overlapped significantly in their efforts to establish and strengthen a system of cooperative security in the region. Especially the US has privileged NATO’s PfP efforts, often at the detriment of the OSCE’s capabilities. With the signing of the NATO-Russian Joint Permanent Council (JPC) in May 1997, the OSCE even lost a bit of its comparative advantage of being the only European security institutions incorporating Russia. In 2001, the OSCE Troika started an initiative to enhance OSCE-NATO/EAPC relations, but without too many results until now. Since January 1998, NATO and OSCE staff meetings have taken place regularly. NATO officials have been invited to participate at senior level in OSCE Ministerial meetings, and at Ambassadorial level regular briefings take place as well. Since the adoption of the OSCE Charter for European Security (at the Istanbul Summit of November 1999), OSCE-NATO cooperation has further developed. In this Charter the OSCE clarifies its role in Europe’s security framework and sets out ambitions to develop its operational capabilities, especially in the field of peacekeeping, police operations, and conflict prevention. Practical cooperation in the field (especially in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Albania) has shown the possibilities, limits, and problems of OSCE-NATO relations. For example, in Kosovo the OSCE and NATO were assigned complimentary verification tasks prior to the NATO-led war against the Milosevic-regime, which included the exchange of intelligence with regard to the security situation on the ground. OSCE and NATO staff cooperated closely, which was also the case after the return of the OSCE in July 1999, after the Kosovo war had halted. But the sharing of classified information has since proven complicated. NATO staff and the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre have cooperated since 2000, but intelligence and information sharing has remained limited, which has put a brake on OSCE-NATO cooperation in the field. A first OSCE-NATO staff level meeting to discuss the Mediterranean platforms of both organizations was held in 2003. In a subsequent meeting in 2004, it was agreed that both organizations should cooperate more closely on the fight against international terrorism, disarmament issues, and small arms and light weapons. Joint OSCE-NATO conferences have been organized on issues high on both organizational agendas, for example on the disposal of rocket fuel components (in Kiev, July 2005), and combating terrorist financing (in Vienna, November 2005). OSCE-NATO

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cooperation is also developing in the economic and environmental dimension. NATO, through its Science and Peace Program, joined the OSCE’s Environment and Security Initiative as an associate in 2004. (This initiative is supported by the OSCE, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)). This initiative (set up in 2002) aims to address environmental issues that are a threat to stability and peace, using environmental cooperation as a confidencebuilding exercise in the regions involved. Dimitrij Rupel, Slovenia’s Chairman-inOffice of the OSCE, argued in January 2005 that environmental cooperation between the OSCE and NATO can “make a real difference to those affected. It would be good to build on this work as well as the successful experience of the joint NATO-OSCE South Caucasus River Monitoring Project” (Statement by H.E. Dimitrij Rupel, Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 26 January 2005). This has become all the more important after 9/11, since both the OSCE and NATO refocused their attention to the fight against international terrorism, as well as to the role and place of Russia and Central Asia. In its Budapest Plan of Action (December 2001), the OSCE pledged that it “will assist states in their implementation efforts in those areas in which it has expertise, where useful and appropriate in cooperation with the Council of Europe, the EU and NATO” (OSCE Budapest Plan of Action, December 2001). The OSCE’s long-standing presence in Central Asia made it a more interesting and useful partner for NATO than before. Former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson therefore argued in 2003 that: geographically, beyond our joint efforts in the Balkans, I see scope for greater cooperation with regard to the Caucasus and Central Asia, strategically important regions where the OSCE has on-the-ground experience. We should also look for synergies in our work in the Mediterranean region. (Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at the OSCE Permanent Council (Vienna), 6 November 2003)

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer equally argued that “there is scope for NATO and the OSCE to cooperate more effectively in engaging the countries of Northern Africa and the Broader Middle East”, building upon the positive experiences of NATO’s support of the OSCE “with its monitoring of the Afghan Presidential elections [of 2004], as well as the [2005] parliamentary and regional elections” (ibid). All in all, contacts between both institutions are developing but still remain rudimentary, and certainly not as effective as they should be. In November 2005, NATO’s Secretary General therefore called for closer NATO-OSCE cooperation on all institutional level, arguing that “we can, and must, do a lot better” (Speech by NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer at the OSCE Permanent Council (Vienna), 3 November 2005). But what prospects are there for OSCE-NATO relations? The OSCE’s Chairmanin-Office, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy argued in January 2004, that practical cooperation should drive OSCE-NATO cooperation (Speech by Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Solomon Passy to the North Atlantic Council, 21 January 2004). The list of potential practical interaction between both organizations is

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extensive. For the time being, OSCE-NATO cooperation will focus on the so-called soft security issues, such as the trafficking of human beings and general human rights issues. For example, at NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Summit, it was agreed that: all personnel taking part in NATO-led operations should receive appropriate training to make them aware of the problem and how this modern day slavery trade impacts on human rights, stability and security. (NATO Issues 2004)

For the OSCE, NATO’s interests in these soft security matters are a mixed blessing. On the one hand it offers possibilities for closer cooperation, but at the same time is will increase the overlap between both organizations and may well give rise to renewed bickering over mandates. Clearly, NATO is a newcomer in this area and will give the OSCE the right of way for the time being. But how the EU, NATO, and the OSCE will divide up and manage their overflowing and overlapping security agendas will remain a contentious issue. Conclusions and Prospects Europe’s main advantage over other continents is that it can rely on a dense network of institutions that encourage stability, transparency, and a high level of mutual trust. Europe has set itself high standards of effective multilateralism, and rightfully so. Europe’s key security institutions face serious challenges over the coming decade. Will Iran continue to develop nuclear weapons? Will Afghanistan and Iraq develop into stable democracies? Will the transatlantic relationship survive the imbroglio of the Bush-era? How will the EU and NATO react to a new terrorist attack? And, perhaps most importantly: how will Europe’s institutions adapt to the mounting pressure on the very idea of effective multilateralism? Since 9/11, the US considers itself the primes inter pares of the global community, and is increasingly wary to limit its scope of action by international law, international institutions, or the well-meaning advice of allies. Washington now prefers to act through coalitions of the willing, also known as the international community, or even less concrete, the club of civilized nations. The Wall Street Journal aptly characterized these set-ups as follows: “There’s no headquarters, no secretarygeneral, no talkfests – and, perhaps most important of all, no French or Russian veto” (“The New Multilateralism”, The Wall Street Journal, 8 January 2004). The Bush administration breathes a general distrust of multilateral institutions, and is keen to work around them. John Bolton, US Ambassador to the United Nations, made it very clear that: [t]he idea that we could have a UN Security Council resolution or a nice international treaty is fine if you have unlimited time. We don’t, not with the threats out there … We [don’t] want to engage in an endless legal seminar. (Roberts 2003)

This means that Washington follows a policy of multilateralism “by invitation”, asking others to work with the US, follow its leadership, and trust its judgment.

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But this trend toward flexibility is not limited to the US. In Europe, the enlargement toward the EU-25 has led to a new system of structured cooperation which allows member states to develop small sub-groups within the EU of like-minded countries willing to engage in a certain (foreign) policy endeavor. The willingness to accept the lowest common denominator-solution by working endlessly inside international institutions, has waned quite dramatically. Bolton’s warning that there simply is not sufficient time to indulge in the luxury of multilateralism is obviously also heeded in Europe. What will this trend imply for Europe’s institutional architecture? Will we see more directoires such as the EU3 (France, Germany and the UK) leading the Union’s diplomatic attempts to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons? What will emerge over the coming decades is a Europe not of concentric circles, in which some countries are at the centre and some at the periphery, but a European security framework that consists of Olympic circles in which all countries are involved in one way or the other. Like the five circles of the Olympic flag, there will be no single centre, but three or four; there will be no single periphery, but most countries will find themselves on the margins of some activity or some arrangement, either out of free will or because of necessity. As Javier Solana – in his capacity of NATO’s Secretary General – formulated it in February 1998: I would like to erase from our consciousness the words “dividing lines”. These are words from the Cold War. They meant that some countries were “in” and some were “out”. Today, none are in or out – some are only partly in and partly out. (Quoted in The Washington Times, 10 February 1998)

For many (if not all) European countries, NATO and the EU will remain the core of Europe’s developing security framework, but the flexible and ad hoc arrangements that will become increasingly more prevalent after enlargement, will gradually blur the practical distinctions between full membership and other institutional relationships. The borders between European countries in the Olympic model will not be static and cut in stone, but will be modified to reflect changing circumstances. References Biscop, S. (2005), “The EU, the OSCE and the European Security Architecture: Network or Labyrinth?”, Helsinki Monitor Conference, Vienna (9 September 2005). Brok, E. and Gresch, N. (2004), “Afghanistan – Lehren für ein Zusammenwirken von NATO und EU im internationalen Krisenmanagement”, Europäische Sicherheit, vol. 53 (July 2004). Cameron, F. (1995), “The European Union and the OSCE: Future Roles and Challenges”, Helsinki Monitor, vol.6, no.2 (1995). de Hoop Scheffer, J. (2004), NATO Secretary General, Speech at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, 12 July 2004.

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Michel, L. (2004), Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Speech in Prague (2 March 2004). Internet: http://www.diplomatie.be/nl/press/speechdetails.asp? TEXTID=15925 (4 August 2004). Moore, P. (2005), “EU Peacekeeping in Bosnia: What’s in a Name?”, RFE/RL (18 July 2004). Internet: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/07/03751b379c8d-4041-90a1-28155fa5df6f.html (5 August 2005). NATO Issues (2004), “Trafficking in Human Beings”, 9 July 2004. Internet: http:// www.nato.int/issues/trafficking/index.html (3 August 2004). OSCE Press Release (2002), “Javier Solana Describes the OSCE as a ‘Natural-born Partner’ of the EU”, 25 September 2002. OSCE News (2004), “OSCE CiO Proposes Closer Cooperation with EU and NATO on Mediterranean Issues”, 11 February 2004. Riggio, D. (2003), “EU-NATO Cooperation and Complementarity between the Rapid Reaction Forces”, The International Spectator, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003). Roberts, C. A. (2003), “The U.N.: Searching For Relevance”, The Wall Street Journal, 21 October 2003. Rühle, M. (2005), “A More Political NATO”, NATO Review (Special Issue Winter 2005). The White House (2003), “Joint Statement by President George W. Bush, European Council President Konstantin Simitis, and European Commission President Romano Prodi on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 25 June 2003. de Wijk, Rob (2003–04), “European Military Reform for a Global Partnership”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 1 (Winter 2003–04). Wohlfeld, M. (2003), “EU Enlargement and the Future of the OSCE: The Role of Field Missions”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 12, no. 1 (2003).

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Chapter 3

The ESDP: The European Security Pillar Gunther Hauser

Introduction When the European Union Treaty entered into force on 1 November 1993, the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) became one of the main objectives of all member states of European Union (EU), including the so-called neutral and non-aligned states of Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. In CFSP, security policy is a part of foreign policy, not separate from it. Upon achieving CFSP, Europe should finally be able to speak with one voice. Achieving this goal shall also include the creation of a common defense policy, if the European Council so decides. The concept of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was launched during the Austrian EU presidency in the second half of 1998. French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair decided in Saint Malo (3– 4 December 1998) to strengthen the European defense pillar. In Saint Malo, both political leaders accepted the French position that the “union must have the capability for autonomous action” on defense matters, whereas the United Kingdom was keen to stress the organic link between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (van Ham: 6). Before, at the informal European Council meeting in the Austrian town of Pörtschach, 24–25 October 1998, the United Kingdom for the first time publicly referred to its altered position on European defense cooperation. Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that Europe’s policies relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were “unacceptable” and marked by “weakness and confusion” (ibid, 5). In the spring of 1999, the NATO air attacks against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to stop “ethnic cleansings” in Kosovo made it clear that Europe depends on US military capabilities. Pörtschach, therefore, symbolized the first, explicit step by EU member states toward establishing a European crisis management capability backed by a more effective military infrastructure (ibid). At the Cologne and Helsinki European Council Summits in 1999, heads of state decided that the European Rapid Reaction Force (EU RRF) – about 60,000 troops – should have the capacity to undertake autonomous actions until 2003 so the European Union “can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged” (North Atlantic Council 1999: para. 9a). To fulfill the whole spectrum of EU Petersberg tasks – from peacekeeping to peace enforcement actions – the European Union will need advanced military capabilities to close

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capability gaps between the United States and the European allies. The primary task for the European Union is now to increase and coordinate capabilities both for its own security and for the stabilization of the European area. Defining European Security and Defense Policy With the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union on 1 November 1993, the CFSP became essential part of EU Treaty as an intergovernmental pillar in Title V (Articles 11 to 28 of the EU Treaty). Article 11 sets out its five main principles of CFSP. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: •

• •

• •

To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; To promote international cooperation; To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

These principles were extended by the European Convention in the European Constitutional Treaty (Article III-292) as follows: to safeguard security; to preserve conflicts; to foster the sustainable economic, social, and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; to encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; to develop international measures to preserve and to improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources in order to ensure sustainable development; to assist populations, countries, and regions confronting man-made or natural disasters; and to promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. These objectives emphasize the European security model of comprehensive multilateral cooperation. This is evidence by Paragraph 2 of Article 11 in the EU Treaty which states that “the Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.” The CFSP is also mentioned in Article 2 of the common provisions of the EU Treaty, which stipulates that one of the Union’s objectives is:

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to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense [...].

Title V constitutes a separate pillar of the European Union, since the way it operates and its intergovernmental nature distinguish it from the traditional pillars of the Community, such as the single market and trade policy. This difference is most striking in the decision-making procedures, which require member state consensus, whereas in traditional Community areas, a majority vote suffices. Article 301 of the EC Treaty combines the first (European Communities – EC and Euratom) and second pillar (CFSP) by allowing the Council to apply economic sanctions on behalf of the Union. NATO obligations of EU member states are not in contradiction with engagement in EU security and defense issues: The policy of the Union [...] shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework.

Furthermore, “The progressive framing of a common defense policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments” according to Article 17 (1) of the EU Treaty. Within the CFSP, it is possible to adopt measures by a qualified majority vote, with the dual safeguards of “constructive abstention” in Article 23 (1): Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions. [...]

and the possibility of referring a decision to the European Council if a member state resorts to a veto. This is known as the “emergency brake”. The Military Integration of the Western European Union into the European Union Specifically, Article 17 (1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam stated that the CFSP covers: all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, [...] which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide.

In this article, Western European Union (WEU) was “an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability [...]” for Petersberg crisis management operations. Article 17 (1) introduced a “possibility of

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integration” for the WEU to join the EU, “should the European Council so decide”. In Article 17 (3), the European Union “will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications”. In case of Petersberg tasks, Article 17 (3) states that: [...] all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU.

With the Amsterdam Treaty, all of the Petersberg tasks have been incorporated into new structures of the Union, as have subsidiary bodies of the Western European Union such as the Satellite Center in Torrejón, Spain, and the Institute for Security Studies in Paris, which have been operational within the European Union since January 2002. The role of the WEU has not developed further since the majority of its powers have been transferred to other international institutions, notably NATO and the European Union. The WEU’s main responsibility relates to Article V (taken together with Article IV) of the modified Brussels Treaty, collective defense with all military assets, and its transfer to the European Union seems to have been postponed. In contrast, Article 5 of NATO’s Washington Treaty (4 April 1949) states that member states take collective defense measures only “as it deems necessary” to them. In fact, Article V embodies the only binding European mutual defense commitment. Nevertheless, the Western European Union played an important role in implementing the initial Petersberg tasks, such as the sending of police to Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and cooperation with the police in Albania. The Cologne Summit Declaration of 4 June 1999 confirmed that the European Union will take over the crisis management and conflict prevention function of the WEU to strengthen the European security and defense pillar. The Helsinki Summit of December 1999 launched the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and proposed the later creation of an EU Rapid Reaction Force. In the Marseilles Declaration of 13 November 2000, the WEU Ministerial Council decided to formally disband all of its organizational structures and hand them over to the European Union as of 30 June 2001. Therefore, a decision was endorsed by the European Union at the Nice Council (Presidency Conclusions Nice European Council, Annex VI, “Presidency Report on the European Security and Defense Policy”). Toward a European Security and Defense Policy The Franco-British meeting in Saint Malo, and subsequently the Cologne European Council summit (3 and 4 June 1999), gave the political impetus to and set out the guidelines required for the strengthening of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In Cologne, European governments declared that:

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the Union must have the capability for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO (Cologne EU Presidency Conclusions, 3–4 June 1999).

EU leaders saw the need to strengthen European capabilities in the fields of intelligence, strategic transport, and command and control, which implies efforts to adapt, exercise, and bring together national and multinational European forces. The capacities and structure of the ESDP, which have developed significantly since 1999, are divided into three components. The first two, military crisis management and civilian crisis management, are known as the Petersberg tasks. Conflict prevention, dealing with pre-conflict preventive diplomacy, is the third component of the main aims of EU external policy. The Petersberg tasks have been incorporated into Title V of the Treaty of Amsterdam. This was a crucial step forward at a time when there had been a resurgence of local conflicts posing a real threat to European security, even though the risk of large-scale conflicts had fallen significantly compared to those of the Cold War period. The Petersberg tasks represent a very fitting response by the Union, enshrined in Article 17 (2) of the EU Treaty and embodying the member states’ shared determination to safeguard security through operations such as humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; and peace enforcement. The incorporation of the Petersberg tasks in the Treaty of Amsterdam was based on a Swedish and Finnish initiative put forth by the so-called non-aligned countries. Peacekeeping forces should be deployed to regions where crises may escalate into conflicts, but before acute crises arise. Therefore, the European Union will be able to define its leadership role by preventing conflicts and will be empowered to use all instruments, “from conflict prevention measures of various kinds to armed peacekeeping actions” (Hjalm-Wallén/Halonen 1996) to do so. In 1997, Italy obtained a UN Security Council mandate (UNSC Resolution 1101, 28 March 1997) and implemented a stabilization program, Operation Alba, though this was supported by a joint force of some 7,000 soldiers drawn from Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain, and Turkey. This was the first crisis management conducted in Europe by a multinational military force comprised of units from exclusively European countries. In June 1999, the Cologne European Council placed crisis management at the core of the process of strengthening the CFSP. This action led to priority being given to conflict prevention two years later at the Gothenburg Summit. Conflict prevention does not only mean preventing the initial outbreak of violence, but also its escalation and later recurrence (International Crisis Group 2001: 2). Major efforts were underway to assess and improve the EU’s capability to act, as evidenced, for example, by the joint report on conflict prevention presented to the Nice European Council in December 2000 by the Secretary-General (who is also the High Representative and so called Mr. CFSP) and Commission, and the endorsement at the Gothenburg European Council in June 2001. This report outlined the EU program for the prevention of violent conflicts. Yet, conflict management

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also deals with how to respond to a crisis that has crossed the threshold into armed conflict, to prevent it from escalating and to bring it to a conclusion. NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999, launching air-strikes against Yugoslavia. On 12 June 1999, NATO deployed the 40,000-strong Kosovo Force (KFOR). In June 2003, the North Atlantic Council confirmed that NATO would maintain an adequate level of forces to ensure a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. On the basis of the declaration at the NATO summit held in Washington in April 1999, the Union should be able to conduct operations with recourse to NATO resources and capabilities. To implement this category of operations, specific arrangements were agreed upon with the Alliance. At the Helsinki European Council meeting of 10–11 December 1999, the heads of state and government confirmed that they intended to give the European Union autonomous capacity to make decisions and made clear their intention, where NATO as a whole was not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises worldwide. Military Component The military component was introduced by the Helsinki (10–11 December 1999) and Nice (7–9 December 2000) European Councils. First, Helsinki established the headline goal for the EU Rapid Reaction Force to be deployable within sixty days and to sustain for at least one year, up to fifteen brigades (or 50,000 to 60,000 persons). However, the member states should also be able to deploy smaller rapid response elements with very high readiness. These forces must be self-sustaining, with the necessary command, control, and intelligence capabilities; logistics; other combat support services; and, additionally as appropriate, air and naval elements. A provision taking effect in 2004 requires a 5,000-strong military force to be kept in a state of permanent readiness for humanitarian operations and for actions to rescue populations under immediate threat. The EU RRF does not intend to establish a European army. The commitment and deployment of national troops are based on sovereign decisions taken by member states. Since 20 November 2000 when member states took part in a Capabilities Commitment Conference (CCC) and one year later participated in a Capabilities Improvement Conference (CIC), the member states committed themselves, in the framework of their national reforms, to continue to strengthen their capabilities to implement multinational solutions, including better ways to pool resources. The CCC confirmed the creation of the EU RRF to deploy peacekeeping and enforcement operations by 2003. At the Laeken Summit of December 2001, EU member states launched the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) in order to close the shortfalls in military capabilities; this plan was based on the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue (HHG) which is regularly adapted to new security challenges. This development was accompanied by new military structures introduced in Nice, the most important being the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Replacing the Political Committee, the PSC keeps track of international developments, helps define

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foreign policies, and monitors implementation of agreed upon policies. It exercises, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of all EU-led crisis management operations. The PSC is authorized by the European Council to take appropriate actions exercising political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations carried out in the context of ESDP. Composed principally of national representatives with the rank of Ambassador, it is the linchpin of crisis management activities that has a central role in the definition and follow-up of EU response to a crisis. Relating to Article III-307 of the EU Constitution: [...], a Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the latter, or of the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the powers of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations, further clarification of which is found in Article III-309 (ex 17). Compared to Article 25 of the EU Treaty, in the last sentence, “the Presidency” and “the Commission” have been replaced by “the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs.” The PSC is assisted by a politico-military working group, a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, as well as the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMC provides military advice to the PSC and the High Representative and exercises military command over all military activities. On 22 January 2001, the EUMC, a body of military representatives comprised of member states’ Chiefs of Defense, was established as a Council group to give military advice to the PSC and to direct the work of the EUMS. The EUMC is the forum for military consultation and cooperation between EU member states in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. It is not legally subordinate to the PSC, but advises it on the Concept of [Military] Operations (CONOPS) developed by the Operation Commander and the associated Operation Plan (OPLAN). It is the Operation Commander, especially appointed for a new crisis management operation, who supervises the actual military planning. The planning for the actual military operations will be a decision of the Committee of Contributors, an ad hoc group to be formed from countries contributing military units to an EU force. The EUMS, which is part of the Secretariat of the Council, supplies military expertise. The task of EUMS is to provide early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for crisis management operations, including the identification of national and multinational European forces, and to implement policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC. The EUMS works under the military direction of the EUMC, but it is a Council Secretariat Department directly attached to the Secretary General/High Representative (Mr. CFSP). The structure of the military staff

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includes five divisions: Policy and Plans, Intelligence, Operations and Exercises, Logistics and Resources, and Communications and Information Systems. In May 2005, a civilian/military cell became fully operable within the EUMS in order to improve coordination and to boost planning capabilities both between military and civilian institutions in crisis management – from disaster response to post conflict rehabilitation. The member states of the European Union have also established common capability goals in command and control, reconnaissance, and strategic transport. For those member states which are also members of NATO, their military capabilities must allow them to play their full role in NATO operations, as well. At the EU Foreign Ministers meeting at Kastelorizo, Greece, in early May 2003, ministers ordered Mr. CFSP, Javier Solana, to work on a statement of purpose for the EU security doctrine to be presented at the Porto Carras/Thessaloniki, Greece summit on 19 June 2003. The EU’s first global security strategy brought its security concerns broadly in line with those of United States. As in the US security strategy, European Union force could only be used as a last resort, in contrast to US strategy, EU enforcement actions should be authorized by the UN Security Council. The Union intends to strengthen the role of multilateral organizations (“effective multilateralism with the UN at its core”, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 17 and 18 June 2004, para. 50) and the role of international law. Effective multilateralism is a key aspect of EU foreign policy. The EU’s strategy paper, “A Secure Europe in a Better World” – prepared by Mr. CFSP Javier Solana and adopted during European Council on 12 December 2003 – identifies terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, and organized crime as key threats for EU security. As part of the implementation of the European Security Strategy, the Council also adopted an EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery by promoting the universalization and reinforcement of multilateral agreements, by reinforcing export controls, and by enhancing physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. In the aftermath of the Madrid terror attacks of 11 March 2004 in which 191 people died and about 1,500 were injured by attacks on city trains, the European Council adopted the declaration on terrorism guiding anti-terrorism activities and created the office of a European anti-terrorism coordinator. On 25 March 2004, Mr. Gijs de Vries from the Netherlands was appointed to counter-terrorism coordinator to improve coordination and visibility of the EU’s actions in this field. The United States is leading the global fight against terrorism. Key issues of counter-terrorism are improved cooperation between intelligence and security services and between these services and the police, timely implementation of existing instruments, and implementation of improvements based on the results of member state evaluations in the field of terrorism and the fight against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. The fight against international terrorism has become an important task of the ESDP since 11 September 2001.

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The EU Council agreed on 12 December 2003 to move forward work on the establishment of a civilian/military cell within EU Military Staff (EUMS). The cell began its work in May 2005. At NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), a small EU cell was established – heading also the NATO liaison arrangements with the EUMS. The European Council agreed to move forward work on establishing an operations center – available by 1 January 2006 at the latest. There will not be a standing headquarters; the main option for autonomous military operations remains national headquarters. Civilian Component The civilian component, developed at the Feira European Council (June 2000) and Gothenburg European Council (June 2001) with extensive contributions by the Commission, aimed to improve actions in a field where the international community has shown itself to be lacking. In order to provide added value, the European Union intended to establish, before 2003, four main instruments that are mutually dependent: •

• •

•

Police cooperation which would provide up to 5,000 policemen, including 1,000 within thirty days, for tasks ranging from restoring order in cooperation with a military force to the training of local police (candidate countries and NATO members Iceland and Norway participate in this cooperation by providing police capacities); Strengthening the rule of law by providing up to 200 judges, prosecutors, and other experts in the field; Civilian administration which would provide a team to establish or guarantee elections, taxation, education, water provision, and perform similar functions; and Civil protection which would assist humanitarian efforts in emergency and other operations and would require the European Union be capable, within three to seven hours, of providing two to three assessment teams consisting of ten experts as well as intervention teams consisting of 2,000 people.

Therefore, the Feira European Council resolved to set up the Civilian Crisis Management Committee (CIVCOM), which was formally established by a Council decision on 22 May 2000 and met for the first time on 16 June 2000. CIVCOM provides expert advice on civilian crisis management. It reports formally to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), but receives guidance from and provides information to the PSC. Since then, conferences on the improvement of civil capabilities have been organized and a plan of action adopted for police capabilities. On 10 May 2001, Mr. CFSP, Solana, confirmed that a unit for police operations would be established in the External Action Division of the External Relations Directory General of the Council Secretariat. In June 2001, the Gothenburg

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Council approved more specific requirements for the planning and execution of police operations. These included a planned police ministers’ summit for resolution of strategic planning issues, for development of draft status of forces agreements to provide legal cover for deployment, for development of command and control procedures, for enhancement of interoperability, and for financing arrangements. On 19 November 2002, the conference on civilian crisis management capabilities noted that voluntary commitments by the member states had outstripped the specific goals set for 2003 by the European Council for priority areas (police, rule of law, civil protection, and civil administration). With the goal of promoting peace and stability, the four main objectives are: • • • •

To make more systematic and co-ordinated use of the Community’s instruments; To identify and combat causes of conflict; To improve the capacity to react to nascent conflicts; and To promote international cooperation in this area.

(“The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Introduction.” The European Union Online (11 Nov. 2004)). A rapid reaction mechanism, developed by the Commission, was created in February 2001. Used to provide rapid financing for crisis management, the mechanism may be implemented where there is a threat to public order or public safety, or in other similar circumstances that might destabilize a country. This aid is provided in the short term, takes the form of grants, and encompasses all of the activities not covered by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). In this way, the European Union was able to launch the political, economic, and social rebuilding of Afghanistan. Moreover, the Union does not intend, in most cases, to use its crisis response assets independently, choosing instead to recognize the lead role of the United Nations in orchestrating the international community’s response to security crises in which the European Union is most likely to be a player. The operational capability that the European Union acquires under the ESDP may prove to be an important element in conflict prevention and crisis management operations conducted by the United Nations. The establishment of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided an opportunity for practical cooperation with the United Nations to effect the transition between the two operations. The EUPM followed the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) which had been in place since December 1995. In accordance with the objectives of the Paris-Dayton Agreement of 1995, EUPM monitors, in cooperation with Bosnian police units, combat organized crime and corruption and prosecute terrorists. Thus 530 police officers from thirty-tree countries – about 80 percent from EU member states and 20 percent from third states – perform monitoring, mentoring, and inspection activities. The EU Council decided on 11 March 2002 to take over this mission from the UN; subsequently, the UN’s Peace Implementation Council Steering Board agreed that the European Union take over this mission, which is

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evidenced in UN Security Council Resolution 1396. Launched on 1 January 2003, EUPM represents the EU’s first-ever civilian crisis management operation under the ESDP. Since the 2001 Gothenburg European Council, the EU has worked to operationalize civilian ESDP and has launched: •

• • • • •

Four police missions: the EU Police Mission in Bosnia (EUPM), EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia, EUPOL Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories; Two EU Rule of Law missions, EUJUST Themis in Georgia and EUJUST LEX for Iraq; A security sector reform mission (EUSEC DRC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo; Action to support the African Union’s Mission (AMIS) in Darfur, Sudan, helping the African Union strengthen its civilian policing capacity; A monitoring mission in Aceh, Indonesia in partnership with five ASEAN countries – Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; A Border Assistance Misssion (EU BAM) at the border crossing point between Gaza and Egypt at Rafah.

EU Relations and Cooperation with NATO NATO formed a strategic partnership with the European Union so that both could bring their combined assets to bear in enhancing peace and stability. From 26 September 2001 to 31 March 2003, this partnership has successfully demonstrated its capabilities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The European Union and NATO combined to prevent civil war, and in Kosovo, their intervention helped to defuse conflict. Both the European Union and NATO created forums for enhanced comprehensive cooperation with Russia, the Ukraine, and within the Mediterranean Dialogue. The ESDP cannot be defined without making reference to NATO. Since 1 May 2004, nineteen European Union member states are members of NATO and are bound by a collective defense clause by virtue of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Those states, with the exception of Denmark, are also members of the WEU and have, therefore, entered into a similar, if not wider, commitment under Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty. Six EU member states (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden) define their security policies as neutral or non-aligned. Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden cooperate with NATO under the PfP Program and take part in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). They also have observer status in the WEU. Denmark enjoys special arrangements in the EU framework by virtue of a Protocol annexed to the EU Treaty. Pursuant to that Protocol, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the

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Union which have defense implications and does not prevent the development of closer cooperation between member states in this area. Article 17.1 of the EU Treaty makes explicit reference to the obligations arising from the North Atlantic Treaty for those member states which are members of NATO: The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and policy established within that framework.

That means that under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will the ESDP be used against any ally and that NATO military crisis management will not undertake any action against the European Union or its member states (European Council Presidency Conclusions 2002). At the EU Council Nice summit (7–9 December 2000), it was agreed to create permanent consultations with European non-EU members in security, defense, and crisis management issues. Therefore, a Committee of Contributors should be created to play a key role in preparing EU operations. Relating to the EU RRF, arguments between Greece and Turkey over the use of NATO assets and possible deployments in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus threatened the existence of the EU Rapid Reaction Force. At the European Council of Brussels (24–25 October 2002), Greece gave up its resistance. The “Berlin plus” agreement, which would guarantee access to NATO capabilities for the European Union, was concluded by the signing of the EU-NATO agreements on 14 March 2003. Arrangements were adopted at the Brussels European Council of 24–25 October 2002 for the involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led operations when using NATO assets and capabilities. The “Berlin Plus” arrangements (Paragraph 10 of the 1999 NATO Washington Summit Declaration) contain four elements: assured EU access to NATO operational planning, presumption of availability of NATO capabilities and common assets to the EU, NATO European command options for EUled operations including the European role of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and adaptation of the NATO defense planning system to assess the availability of forces for EU operations. On 23 September 2002, four European headquarters were designated within NATO as international rapidly deployable headquarters at NATO’s European strategic command, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE), in Mons, Belgium. These rapidly deployable command elements can be quickly dispatched to lead troops sent to a crisis area. Each corps-size headquarters can command up to 60,000 troops. The four land-based headquarters are the Rapid Deployable German/ Netherlands Corps in Münster, Germany; the Rapid Deployable Italian Corps in Milan, Italy; the Rapid Deployable Spanish Corps in Valencia, Spain; and the Rapid Deployable Turkish Corps in Istanbul, Turkey. More than one billion euro had already been invested by European NATO members in creating such capabilities. The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was the first deployable headquarters,

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based in Rheindahlen, Germany, since 1992. The ARRC framework nation is the United Kingdom; its first operation was leading forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR) following the Dayton Peace Accord (Operation Joint Endeavor) in 1995/1996 and to Kosovo in 1999 (KFOR, Operation Joint Guardian). These are examples of NATO’s non-Article 5 missions. The ARRC was concluded at NATO’s Rome Summit in 1991 in the framework of the strategic concept. In peacetime, the ARRC consists of 5,000 troops from seventeen nations, including Belgium, Denmark, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Including the ARRC, there are five deployable headquarters. The sixth command was formed with the Eurocorps in Strasbourg consisting of Belgian, French, German, Luxembourg, and Spanish units. The Eurocorps has signed a technical agreement with NATO; therefore, it also can be under NATO command. At the NATO Summit in Prague on 21–22 November 2002, the transformation of NATO was concluded to respond to new threats. A NATO Response Force (NRF) comprised of 25,000 troops, exhibiting high readiness, and planned to be deployable within five days had been partially operational since 13 October 2004 and has reached full operability by October 2006. The NRF consists of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable force, including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, and it will be complementary to the EU RRF. While the EU RRF is a low-tech, small peacekeeping force which would only be capable of handling low-level peacekeeping operations in a crisis with no prospect of escalation, the NRF will be able to deal with crises where the possibility of escalation is great. The NRF is, therefore, more of a deterrent force. With a threepronged approach to improving alliance defense capabilities – a new capabilities initiative (the NATO Prague Capabilities Commitment), the creation of the NRF, and a streamlining of its military command structure – NATO should be equipped to respond to the full spectrum of modern military missions. Recognizing that the traditional, more static forces of the Cold War are no longer valid, NATO is creating forces that are able to be moved faster and further afield, to apply military force more effectively, and to sustain themselves in combat. Moreover, the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the European Union’s efforts to develop military capabilities are intended to be mutually reinforcing. All this should help to close the capabilities gap that has opened between the United States and its allies. The EU member states decided to reinforce military capabilities by developing the Union’s new military capabilities objective, the Headline Goal 2010, to set new requirements for rapid deployment, sustainability, and interoperability by developing criteria and standards for measuring improvements in this field. On 17 May 2004, during the Irish EU presidency, EU defense ministers also approved proposals by Mr. CFSP Javier Solana concerning to realise the concept for rapidly deployable battlegroups. From 2007 onwards, these forces – thirteen military units each comprising 1,500 troops – should be available for deployment to crisis areas outside Europe. The battlegroups are planned to be deployed to crisis theatres as far as 6,000

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kilometers away from Brussels. Strong contingents would be deployable within ten days and able to stay on the ground for a few months in response to a UN request. At the informal meeting of EU defense ministers in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, on 17 September 2004, the member states agreed to establish EU battlegroups and to harmonize EU battlegroups and the NRF. EU defense ministers also agreed to consider the possibility of third countries participating in EU battlegroups. In Noordwijk, the ministers of defense of France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands signed a Declaration of Intent concerning the establishment of a European Gendarmerie Force (EGF). The EGF will be a police force with military status, deployable within one month, and suited to deployment during or immediately after a military operation for maintaining public order and safety and in situations where local police forces are not (sufficiently) deployable. It will also be possible for the rapidly-deployable EGF to conduct operations in support of the fight against organized crime and the protection of participants in civil missions. The EGF is a multinational unit that is not only allocated to the European Union, but also to the UN, the OSCE, and NATO. The initiative for establishing EGF was taken in 2003 by the French minister of defense, Michèle Alliot-Marie. The force headquarters in Vicenza, Italy, was established in 2005. By 2007, the EGF should consist of 3,000 troops. The Globalization of EU and NATO Missions EU-NATO arrangements initiated on 16 December 2002 permitted the EU to take over NATO’s Task Force Fox/Allied Harmony mission in Macedonia – the first EU military operation (31 March–15 December 2003). This was the first concrete implementation of the Berlin Plus arrangements in support of EUFOR’s Concordia, a small peacekeeping operation mounted using NATO assets and with NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in command. This operation was requested by Macedonia and backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1371. EUFOR Concordia was composed of 350 troops from thirteen EU countries and fourteen non-EU states. At first, EUFOR had a six-month mandate to oversee the political reforms stated in the Ohrid Peace Agreement and to monitor the security situation. It was also responsible for the protection of international monitors from the European Union and the OSCE. Finally, Concordia was succeeded by a police operation, EUPOL, also run by EU Proxima (as the 200-strong EUPOL is called), and it was launched on 15 December 2003 on the basis of a Joint Action adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council held on 29 September 2003. It followed an invitation from Macedonian Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski to the European Union through Mr. CFSP Javier Solana. This operation helped Macedonian authorities develop their police forces to European and international standards and also focus on supporting the government’s efforts to fight organized crime. The EU-NATO arrangements allow the organizations to work closely together to manage crises in Europe and beyond. The development of this partnership is

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important for the further stabilization of the Balkans. The first NATO-EU joint crisis management operation started in 2003 when the European Union took over NATO’s Allied Harmony operation in Macedonia. In 2003, the European Union also expressed its intention to take on the SFOR command in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO has been running this peacekeeping operation in the country since 1995 in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1031. As decided at the NATO Istanbul Summit at the end of June 2004, NATO handed over command of the former SFOR mission to the European Union on 2 December 2004, the first major EU-led military crisis management operation called EUFOR Althea. EUFOR is commanded by a British Army two-star general and stay under the oversight of NATO’s Deputy SACEUR in the Terms of Reference for Strategic EU Command, as defined in the Berlin Plus Agreement. NATO continues to maintain a presence through a Military Liaison and Advisory Mission (NATO HQ Sarajevo) and assists with specific competencies such as defense reform and preparations for the country’s potential future membership in the NATO PfP program. On 12 June 2003, the Council adopted a decision on the launching of the EU military operation (Operation Artemis) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This decision followed the Council’s 5 June 2003 adoption of a joint action on this operation in accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of the EU Treaty. France acted as the framework nation for the operation. The operational headquarters were located in Paris and included staff members from the General Secretariat of the EU Council, as well as officers from several participating member states. Under the authority of the Council, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercised the political control and strategic direction of the operation. Fully 1,800 troops, most of them French, were sent to the north-eastern Congolese region of Ituri to stop fighting and atrocities, to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and of the humanitarian situation in and around the city of Bunia, and to ensure the protection of the airport and the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if required, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel, and the humanitarian presence in the town. Artemis was an EU-led military operation which was conducted in accordance with the mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003. This resolution authorized the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia in close co-ordination with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) until 1 September 2003. Now MONUC is provided with a wider mandate, more robust rules of engagement, and an 16,000-strong multinational force. In Afghanistan, ISAF was set up by the United Nations in December 2001 weeks after US-led forces ousted the Taliban. On 11 August 2003 and at the request of Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada, NATO took the leading role in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan, under its existing UN mandate, by assuming strategic co-ordination, command, and control (C3). This was NATO’s first direct involvement in peace or support missions in Central Asia, although individual NATO member countries – originally the United Kingdom and Turkey – had provided the backbone of the ISAF since

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it was established. Before NATO took over the ISAF III and following missions, Germany and the Netherlands shared lead nation responsibilities and commanded a multinational force of approximately 4,600 troops drawn from twenty-nine nations. The goal of NATO’s mission was to continue to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) headed by Hamid Karzai in maintaining security in Kabul and the surrounding area so that the authority and United Nations personnel can carry out their work in a secure environment. On 9 August 2004, Europe’s five-nation military force, Eurocorps, took command of the ISAF VI – the NATO-run peacekeeping force – for six months. French General Jean-Luis Py, assisted by German General Wold-Dieter Loeser, commanded Eurocorps to help safeguard the presidential elections on 9 October 2004, the first since the radical Islamic Taliban regime was forced from power. Eurocorps is made up of detachments from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain. This multinational 60,000-man force was created in 1992 by France and Germany (La Rochelle Report) and later put at the service of the European Union and has been certified since 2002 by NATO as a rapid deployable corps. Starting in 2002, those NATO and/or EU member states that so desired could also contribute to the Eurocorps staff at Strasbourg headquarters. Therefore, officers from Austria, Canada, Finland, Greece, Poland, and Turkey have been integrated into the Eurocorps’ staff. Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have liaison officers with the headquarters, but they are not integrated into its structure. The Afghanistan operation was its first outside Europe. Eurocorps troops took part in the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1998 and 2000. The Eurocorps mission in Afghanistan remained under the political and military authority of NATO in Kabul. In March 2005, ISAF further had been expanded into the West of Afghanistan. On 8 December 2005, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed a revised Operational Plan, which is guiding the ISAF to expand the operation to include six additional provinces in the southern part of Afghanistan. In 2006, ISAF was increased up to 6,000 personnel potentially bringing the total number to approximately 15,000. The Crisis over Iraq The crisis and war in Iraq in 2002/2003 caused rifts within the European Union and NATO member states in relation to crucial foreign policy matters that had serious consequences for the CFSP. Deep divisions among EU governments over the war against Iraq were apparent, ranging from Britain’s firm support of the US line to firmly anti-war France and Germany. In the view of the US and British governments, the Saddam regime became a threat to world security planning to produce weapons of mass destruction. The US administration regarded the Iraqi Baath regime as a threat in the aftermath of 9/11. Eight European leaders called on France and Germany to stand united with America in the battle to disarm Iraq, while warning the United Nations that its credibility was on the line. On 30 January 2003, the leaders of Britain, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and, one day

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later, Lithuania combined to make an unprecedented plea for unity and cohesion. This joint appeal was suggested by former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld denounced France and Germany as “old Europe”, for he thought that the center of gravity was shifting to Eastern Europe (new Europe) whose states supported US policy toward Saddam Hussein. The European Union officially had no union-wide position on dealing with war on Iraq, and member states were split. Austria declared itself neutral, because the UN Security Council had not mandated the US-led war against the Saddam Hussein regime. The Presidency’s Statement on Iraq, given in Athens on 16 April 2003, implored the United Nations to “play a central role including in the process leading toward self-government for the Iraqi people, utilizing its unique capacity and experience in post-conflict nation building”. The United States had a different standpoint, believing the United States and United Kingdom should play a central role. A compromise was found in UN Security Council Resolution 1483 which was adopted by the Security Council on 22 May 2003: UN agencies would co-ordinate humanitarian and reconstruction assistance with the support of nongovernmental organizations. The United Nations recognized the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of the United States and the United Kingdom as occupying powers under unified command. UN Security Council Resolution 1511 calls for enhanced cooperation within the international community to restore peace and stability to a sovereign, democratic and independent Iraq as soon as possible. During EU-US Summit, which took place in Dromoland Castle, County Clare, Ireland, on 25–26 June 2004, President Bush declared an end to differences between the United States and Europe over the Iraq war and secured an EU promise to assist the incoming Iraqi government. The Dromoland Castle Summit pledged a common commitment to Iraq’s future and a continued an expensive engagement of the UN in Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty, including support for “the training and equipping of professional Iraqi security forces” (EU-US Declaration of Support for the People of Iraq, Dromoland Castle, 26 June 2004) as requested by the interim Iraqi prime minister Ilyad Allawi in a letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer from 22 June 2004. The Alliance, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1546, responded positively to this request. On 30 July 2004, two days after the United States handed over sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) reached agreement on the establishment of a NATO Training Implementation Mission (NTIM) in Iraq. NTIM was a distinct mission under the political control of the NAC and initially comprised approximately fifty officers and non-commissioned officers from several NATO nations. NTIM tasks included working closely with the Iraqi authorities to support them develop their organizational infrastructure, in particular in the Ministry of Defense and Military Headquarters. For this purpose, the NTIM started training personnel for selected Iraqi headquarters and training Iraqi security personnel. These decisions reflected NATO’s commitment to implement as quickly as possible the decisions taken in Istanbul on 28 June 2004 which was the first NATO summit after 2003 rift over

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Iraq. Through the NTIM, NATO started to contribute substantially to the goal shared by the entire international community: to help Iraq provide for its own peace and security in order to arrive at the day when international forces are no longer required in Iraq. Since August 2004, NATO has been working on the ground in Baghdad to train and mentor senoir-level personnel from the Iraqi security forces, and to help equip the nascent forces. NATO – through the NATO Training Misssion in Iraq (NTM-I) – had been providing training to about 1,000 senior Iraqi officers in the country, and to about 500 outside Iraq, as well as a significant amount of military equipment (like 77 T-72 tanks from Hungary to Iraq) (NATO, www.nato.int). The Changes of the CFSP in the European Constitutional Treaty The Creation of an EU Minister of Foreign Affairs At the end of 2002, Working Group VII on external action recommended that greater coherence of EU action and clarity in EU representation could be found by creating a double-hatted position together ad personam the functions of the High Representative, who acts as the Union’s external face in the framework of CFSP and ESDP, and those of the Commissioner for External Relations. Draft articles on external action in the Constitutional Treaty of 23 April 2003 (The European Convention, Brussels, 23 April 2003, CONV 685/03, Chapter 1.A) had already foreseen the need to create the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, appointed by the European Council with the agreement of the president of the Commission. This new minister should exercise tasks previously assigned to the High Representative, the Presidency, and the Commission. The Minister of Foreign Affairs will have the right of proposal for CFSP matters (former first pillar issues) and an explicit role in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions. According to Article I-40 (4), the CFSP will “be put into effect by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the Member Sates, using national and Union resources”. The CFSP will be implemented by the Union’s Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister may be granted a mandate by the Council of Ministers and the European Council to act on behalf of the Union on the international scene. He will defend the Union’s positions and conduct a dialogue with third countries and international organizations. The right of initiative is shared by the Minister for Foreign Affairs – alone or together with the Commission – and the member states. Article I-40 (2) defines the role of the European Council in this field as being to: identify the Union’s strategic interests and determine the objectives of its common foreign and security policy. The Council shall frame this policy within the framework of the strategic guidelines established by the European Council [...].

This text partly reproduces Article 13 (2) of the EU Treaty on common strategies, with the change in name relating to decisions on strategic interests and objectives. Article III-305 underscores that:

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Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the Union’s positions in such fora. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall organize this coordination.

The ESDP as an Integral Part of the CFSP The Constitution clearly states in Article I-41 (1) that the ESDP is an integral part of the CFSP: It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

For that purpose, the Petersberg missions have been updated, and the provisions for crisis management provide for a more coherent use of civilian and military instruments. Article I-41 (2) states that: the common security and defense policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defense policy. This will lead to a common defense, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

As stated in Article 17 of EU Treaty, the policy of the Union does: not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework.

Extending Petersberg Tasks The European Convention decided in its draft constitution in Article III-309 to adapt the Petersberg tasks to the new challenges and threats in security policy. The tasks in the performance of which the Union may use civilian and military means include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks contribute to the fight against terrorism, including actions to support third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. The European Convention Working Group VIII on Defense recommended this new definition of Petersberg tasks.

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Improvement of Capabilities As the EU Constitutional Treaty states, Member States shall improve their military capabilities. The establishment of an agency in the field of defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defense Agency) has been foreseen to identify operational requirements, to promote measures to satisfy those requirements, to contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defense sector, to participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and to assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities (Art. I-41 (3) in accordance with Art. III-311). Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make those forces available to the CFSP (Art. I-41 (3)). This agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. Military and civilian capabilities should be made available to the CFSP. These are the multinational military units which have already been created by Member States, and which have headquarters or general staff. This is the case with Eurocorps (land forces: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain); Eurofor (land forces: France, Italy, Portugal, Spain); Euromarfor (maritime forces: France, Italy, Portugal, Spain); European Air Group (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom); Multinational Division (Center) (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom); and the General Staff of the German-Netherlands First Corps. There are also other multinational forces established between Member States, but which do not have joint headquarters – for example the British-Netherlands Landing Force and the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force) and multinational military units (like the Scandinavian NORDCAPS, with the participation of three Member States – Denmark, Finland and Sweden – and also of Norway). The European Defense Agency (EDA) was established on 12 July 2004; it evaluates, for example, the pledged military contributions of the EU member states. The EDA also promotes further multinational cooperation and prevents the fragmentation of European defense efforts. The steering board of the EDA met for the first time on 17 September 2004 in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, under the chairmanship of the High Representative of the EU, Javier Solana. Mainly EU states cooperate within the framework of OCCAR (France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy) and in the “Letter of Intent (LoI) Group” (France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden). There is no interest by LoI countries in including EU states that have less clout in terms of their armaments industry. In view of the establishment of the EDA, European armaments cooperation takes place within the EU, so there was no longer need for activities in the framework of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) within the Western European Union (WEU). The Ministers of Defense of the 19 WEAG nations held their last meeting in Brussels on 22 November 2004.

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“Mutual Assistance” and “Structured” Cooperation In their contribution to the European Convention, Austrian governmental members supported in conformity with the Austrian Security and Defense Doctrine (Resolution of 12 December 2001) future efforts to realize the possibility of a common defense including a mutual security guarantee in the Treaty on European Union. When British Prime Minister Tony Blair began to support the introduction of mutual assistance in the EU Constitution in October 2003 after negotiating an agreement with US President Bush for this path, Austria changed its opinion and proposed, together with the neutral and non-aligned states Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, to introduce a limited mutual assistance. Therefore in the Union framework, limited mutual assistance is given in case of armed aggression: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have toward it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States. (Art. I-41 (7))

The second part of this sentence continued to be effective due to the role of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden to be neutral or non-aligned states. Austria proposed in 2000 to introduce a mutual assistance defense clause into the EU Treaty; this proposal was rejected by all EU states – during a time when fourteen EU member states supported political sanctions against the Austrian government. The reason for the sanctions was the participation of the nationalist Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in the coalition government with the conservative Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP). The sanctions started on 4 February 2000 and ended on 12 September 2000. Only France could entertain the idea of introducing a mutual assistance clause in the EU Treaty during this time. After British political leadership started to support the idea of introducing mutual assistance in the EU Constitution in October 2003 together with France and Germany, the Italian EU presidency submitted a proposal for mutual military assistance to be included in the EU Constitution during the EU summit in Naples on 28 November 2003 – along with the idea of replacing the WEU Treaty’s policy of robust mutual military commitment. Suddenly, the Austrian government began to oppose this project by emphasizing Austria’s neutral status. Former Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner underscored the necessity of coordination with the governments of the other neutral and non-aligned countries: Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. The compromise of the EU Summit on 12 December 2003 was to agree to mutual assistance, but with consideration given to “the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States”. That’s why Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, former Foreign Minister Benita FerreroWaldner and Minister of Defense Günther Platter emphasized compatibility of neutral status and mutual military commitment. As Austrian President Heinz Fischer declared, EU security policy has to take into account the specific constitutional characters of Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland (Interview with Heinz Fischer,

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Wiener Zeitung 4 September 2004). In Article I-41 (7), military means are no longer explicitly mentioned as an element of that aid and assistance. There is again uncertainty about the manner in which the security of the six EU member states which are not NATO members – Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden – is to be guaranteed. In 2006, ten of the EU’s member states were members of the WEU and were, therefore, bound by a robust mutual defense commitment under Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty. That is undoubtedly a form of cooperation outside the framework of the Union; hence there is a need to introduce closer cooperation enabling those wishing to do so to repeat the commitment already entered into under Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty in the Union framework. Member states who wish to engage in closer cooperation with others could take up in the Union framework the mutual assistance commitment made by Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty. Relating to Article I-41 (6): those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article III-312.

The concerned states should notify their intention to the Council and to the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council acts by a qualified majority after consulting the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (Article III-312 (3)), but only members of the Council representing the participating member states take part in the vote. This qualified majority is defined as at least 55 percent of the members of the Council representing the participating member states, comprising at least 65 percent of the population of these states. A blocking minority must include at least the minimum number of Council members representing more than 35 percent of the population of the participating member states, plus one member, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained (Article III-312 (4)). Participating member states could also make use of Union structures such as the PSC and the Military Committee. However, operations undertaken by that group of member states would not be Union operations. The New “Solidarity Clause” A “solidarity clause” will enable member states to mobilize all the necessary military and civilian instruments within the Union to prevent terrorist threats. Article III-294 (2) reads, “The Member States shall support the common foreign and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.” Furthermore: they shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

This formulation also exists in Article 11 (2) of the EU Treaty. Article I-40 (1) reads:

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The European Union shall conduct a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States [...].

The requirement to consult and cooperate is stronger than in the EU Treaty, which reads as follows in Article 16: Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union’s influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.

Article I-43 (1), in accordance with Article III-329 of the Constitution, contains the “solidarity clause” which reads: The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: • • • •

prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

Articles I-43 and III-329 follow directly from the EU Convention Working Group VIII on Defense Issues’ recommendations for the inclusion of a solidarity clause in the Constitution. As regards assistance to a member state following a terrorist attack, states need to take action immediately after the event. Accordingly, the second paragraph provides that assistance should be triggered automatically at the request of the member state in question. The affected member state will need to specify its requirements, and the other states, meeting in Council, will co-ordinate the action and resources needed to remedy the situation. Conclusions European security and defense is continually developing in both military and civilian aspects. The main objective of ESDP is to achieve a coordinated approach to crisis management and to strengthen civilian/military cooperation (CMCO). However, NATO is a relevant security partner by supporting EU crisis managment operations with military and civilian assets. Through the EADRCC – the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Centre – NATO responds to natural and man-made disasters including CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) issues. In September 2000, the NATO PfP Trust Fund was established to help states like Ukraine, Albania or Moldavia to destroy stockpiles of surplus munitions, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

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The European Union and NATO share common interests in stabilizing Europe, by integrating Russia, the Ukraine, Central Asia and the Mediterranean countries in North Africa and in the Middle East into a Euro-Atlantic stabilization process exporting stability in these regions. In this context, both the European Union and NATO are mutually reinforcing. Relating to this EU-NATO security cooperation, neutrality as an EU member is not the way to strengthen comprehensive trans-Atlantic and common EU security initiatives. Nevertheless, all neutral states in the world have pledged to support the goals and resolutions of the United Nations, up to and including military actions. Therefore, coordinated force planning in the EU and trans-Atlantic contexts are based on the Headline Goal Catalogue 2010, the EU Framework Nation Concept, and the criteria of force planning within the NATO Partnership for Peace. International crisis management now contains the following scenarios: Conflict Prevention (CP), Separation of Parties by Force (SOPF), and Steady State (SS). The European Union defined the length of CP and SOPF scenarios as lasting eight to twelve months. European forces have to improve their performance in respect of availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability in the framework of crisis management. The coordinated development of the ESDP will strengthen the Union’s contribution to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of UN Charter. References European Council Presidency Conclusions (2002), Annex II, ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European Allies, paragraph 2, Brussels, 24 and 25 October 2002. van Ham, P., “Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia”, The Marshall Center Papers No. 1. Hauser, G. (2005), “ESDP and Austria: Security Policy between Engagement and Neutrality”, in Bischof, G., Pelinka, A., and Gehler, M. (eds), Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context, Contemporary Austrian Studies, Volume No. 14, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers), pp. 207–245. Hjalm-Wallén, L., and Halonen, T. (1996), Swedish-Finnish Initiative Designed to Strengthen the EU’s Conflict Management Capability, Published in Finland (Helsingin Sanomat) and Sweden (Dagens Nyheter) on 21 April. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2001), EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report No. 2, Brussels, 26 June. North Atlantic Council (1999), Washington Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Press Release NAC-S(99)64, 24 April.

Chapter 4

The New EU – A “Military Pact”? Solidarity – Neutrality – “Irish Clause” Waldemar Hummer

The Obligatory “Mutual Defense Commitment” in the Constitutional Treaty (2004) In the context of the reformation of the European Union (EU) into a “new EU” through the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (“Constitutional Treaty”)1 of 29 October 2004, a vital problem especially for the six neutral and non-aligned or non-committed member states of the EU – Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden as well as Malta and Cyprus – is being discussed (Hummer 2001a: 443ff.). It is the question if these member states consent to a system of “collective self defense” or not when the Constitutional Treaty becomes effective. This question is also a matter of special importance for third nations because these have to know whether the neutral and non-aligned EU member states abandon or not their status of permanent neutrality (Austria) or at least their neutrality as a mere maxim of foreign policy in the sense of a status of non-alignment (Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Malta and Cyprus) as soon as the Constitutional Treaty becomes effective. Art. I-41 para. 7 subpara. 1 of the Constitutional Treaty provides the following: If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

By this obligatory (military) mutual defense commitment, the “new EU” clearly changes to a system of “collective self defense” in the sense of Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter, commonly known as a “military pact”, after the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty. In the hitherto existing international law doctrine, the status of a permanent neutral state is incompatible with a full membership in a “military pact”, even if it is “asymmetrical”, what means that the neutral state will 1 CIG 87/05 of August 6th 2004; the original version CIG 50/03 which was adopted by the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on June 18th 2004 was accordingly altered and improved by the legal and language experts and several Addenda and Corrigenda were attached.

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be collectively defended by the other members of the “military pact” in the case of a military aggression against its territory but does not have to participate in a collective retaliation in the case of a military assault against any other pact member. But as the four neutral or non-aligned member states did not see any legal obstacles when initialling the Constitutional Treaty in the course of the Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004 on July 18th and also were ready to sign the Constitutional Treaty on October 29th 2004 (EU Official Journal 2004, No C 310, 1ff) in Rome – in order to be able to ratify it without a problem subsequently – the interesting question arises what made the four neutral and non aligned states so sure to be able to do this. This question is all the more justified as the four neutral and non-aligned states were not completely convinced to be allowed to do this during the “drafting-phase” of the Constitutional Treaty because they had jointly tried to prevent the establishment of an “obligatory” mutual assistance guarantee in the Constitutional Treaty and made every possible effort to arrange this guarantee in an “optional” version. Thus, at first one has to take a look at the “drafting phase” of the Constitutional Treaty. The “Close Cooperation”: Clause as Mere “Facultative” Mutual Assistance Guarantee The Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004 on the amendment of the treaties and on the establishment of the text of the provisional Constitutional Treaty (CT) which was adopted by the so called “Convention on the Future of Europe” (EU Official Journal 2003, No C 169, 3ff.) on July 18th 2003 established some new obligations to act in solidarity in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP): a. A “closer cooperation” in the sense of a mere “facultative” model of “collective self-defense” (Art. I-40 para. 7 CT); b. A (permanent) “structured cooperation” between member states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions (Art. I-40 para. 6 CT); c. A “Solidarity Clause” to combat terror, natural disasters and other catastrophes (Art. I-42 CT); d. An extension of the so called “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) to four new fields of activity (disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation) (Art. I-40 para. 1 CT); e. The possibility to enforce the “Petersberg tasks” by entrusting a “group of member states” to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests, which were appointed by the Council (Art. I-40 para. 5 CT);

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f. The establishment of a “European Defence Agency” in the field of defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (Art. I-40 para. 3 subpara. 2 CT). Of all these incentives only the “mutual defense commitment” of Art. I-40 para. 7 CT and the “permanent structured cooperation” of Art. I-40 para. 6 CT require the enactment of primary EU legislation for their establishment. All the other “solidarity obligations” can be implemented by mere secondary legislation (Hummer 2005: 257ff.). In this context especially the “solidarity obligation” of the “closer cooperation” is of a significant importance because of the change of its material content. The (former) Art. I-40 para. 7 CT stipulated a mutual defense commitment and developed it further through the implementation rule of Art. III-214 CT. Within the scope of this “closer cooperation” between member states, “the other states concerned” had, in the case of an armed aggression on the territory of a state which is part of this cooperation – according to Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter – an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power. Thus, Art. I-40 para. 7 CT in its previous version enabled a cooperation of some member states of the Union by giving them the possibility to set up a system of “collective self defense” among themselves, however only inter se, that means only for the member states which consented to this system. By the wording “the other states concerned” it was guaranteed, that the mutual defense commitment should be a mere facultative, optional obligation which does not commit all EU Member States (obligatorily) to a collective self-defense against a military aggression. The former Austrian Foreign Minister, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, arguably had such a system of “closer collaboration” in the sense of a mere “facultative” defense commitment in her mind as she pronounced the following in a speech in September 2000: The Federal Government therefore argues for the incorporation of a support guarantee between the EU member states into the legislative acquis of the EU. This could be done by formulating a facultative protocol to the EU-Treaty…. (Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000: 100)

Thus, she prompted the establishment of a mutual assistance guarantee in a (facultative) “additional protocol” – and not in the EU-Treaty itself – to give Austria the option not to have to take part in the “collective self-defense” mechanism of the EU. While the above cited former version of Art. I-40 para. 7 subpara. 7 CT gave the member states the option to participate in the “closer collaboration” (facultatively), the proposal of the Italian presidency for the text of this clause for the so called “Conclave of Naples” of the EU-Foreign Ministers on 28–29 November 2003 – where those diplomats tried to reconcile the different wordings which were still controversially debated at the Intergovernmental Conference – sounded more hortative:

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If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall aid and assist by all the means in their power, in accordance with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter. (CIG 52/03 ADD 1, Annex 17, 24)

Finally, in their definite formulation of this article the Foreign Ministers even went beyond this proposal of the Italian presidency and agreed to confirm the binding character of the “casus foederis”, stating a clear mutual defense commitment: If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter. (CIG 57/1/03 REV 1, Annex I, 4)

The “Joint Letter” by the Four Neutral and Non-aligned States In the aftermath of the “Conclave of Naples” Finland and Sweden took the initiative and presented an alternative proposal to Art. I-40 para. 7 subpara. 1 CT by merely wanting to establish a “right”, but not an “obligation” to collective support in the case of an armed aggression against a member state of the EU. A state, that has been a target of an armed aggression, should (merely) have the “right” to ask the other member states for aid and assistance. Thus, Finland and Sweden wanted to replace the intended support “obligation” by a (mere) “right to ask” the other member states for collective assistance. Finally, Austria also followed this initiative.2 After Ireland had also got used to this idea, the Foreign Ministers of these four neutral and nonaligned states tried to propagate the following text version for Art. I-40 para. 7 subpara. 1 CT in a “joint letter” of 4 December 2003: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression it may request that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter. (CIG 62/03 of December 5 2003 (DELEG 30))

Explaining their opposition to a mandatory support obligation in their “joint letter”, the four neutral and non aligned states, interestingly enough, did not bring forward any concerns about the law and politics of neutrality but rather mere national security and constitutional law considerations: Moreover, we are prepared to underline the principle of EU solidarity more widely in the field of security, including in situations referred to in Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, provisions containing formal binding security guarantees would be inconsistent with our security policy or with our constitutional requirements.

2

“Neutrale wollen Abschwächung der Beistandsklausel”, in FAZ of December 9 2003.

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The “Irish Clause” as Sheet Anchor of Neutrality? In the definite formulation of the henceforth Art. I-41 para. 7 subpara. 1 CT the request of the four neutral and non-aligned states to merely formulate a “facultative” mutual assistance guarantee was only fulfilled partially. The “obligatory” support obligation was not commuted to a mere “facultative” one, but the so called “Irish Clause” was annexed to it as an immediately following sentence, without any break: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have toward it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. (CIG 60/03 ADD 1 PRESID 14 of December 9th 2003, 33)

The following subpara. 2 states accordingly: Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation.

The close textual and systematic correlation between the mutual assistance obligation and the thus unprejudiced “Irish Clause” – as immediately following sentence and not as until then by special recourse to Art. I-41 para. 2 subpara. 2 CT (“The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”) – should obviously be an even more substantial argument for the four neutral and non-aligned States for the “non violation” of the concept of neutrality by the mutual assistance obligation than it was up to now. The Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs tries to underline this fact on its official homepage by stating:3 As a result of the hitherto process of the negotiations, Austria assumes that the “Irish Clause” is acceptable for all EU Member States – and in particular also for our EU partners Finland, Ireland and Sweden which are non-aligned and non-committed – and also should be part of a final consensus about the EU-Constitution.

Therewith the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to insinuate that the insertion of the “Irish Clause” into Art. I-41 para. 7 subpara. 1 CT was a “concerted” modus operandi between the four neutral and non-aligned states and the other EU-Member States. Therefore there remains no doubt that the neutral and non aligned member States are under the obligation to mutual (military) assistance in case of an armed attack. However, hereafter we have to examine how this “commitment of non violation” of the “Irish Clause” is to be understood and if it really can be used as a panacea for all legal problems stemming from the obligations of the concept of neutrality. 3

http://www.bmaa.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=53&LNG=de&version.

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“Mutual Defense Commitment” Versus “Irish Clause” The so called “Irish Clause” – which was already enshrined in Art. J.4 para. 4 first half sentence of the EU-Treaty in the version of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) as well as in Art. 17 para. 1 subpara. 2 of the EU-Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and which can also be found in the third consideration of the Preamble of the “Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation” in the Final Act of the Conference of Rome of 29 October 2004 (CIG 60/03 ADD1 (Fn. 13), 33 ff.) – can be attributed to a demand of Ireland [on the occasion of the elaboration of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992)] for making its mere “military neutrality” compatible with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. At this very moment Ireland was only prepared to agree to the abrogation of the restriction – still contained in Art. 30 para. 6 lit. a) Single European Act (1986) – of a collective security policy in the framework of the “European Political Cooperation” (EPC) to (mere) “political and economic aspects” of the security policy in the new CFSP. In the present academic literature the “Irish Clause” is interpreted in different ways. On the one hand it is stated that the “Irish Clause” “does not put the neutrality into question, but on the contrary explicitly accepts it as being in accordance with the agreement” (Cremer 2002: 192). On the other hand it is argued that the “Irish Clause” currently “leaves the question of neutrality open” which, however, will have to be decided – according to the given modalities of a collective defense policy – in due course (Kaufmann-Bühler: 6). A further perception, being in line with the above mentioned argumentation, assumes that the consequences of taking reference to the “Irish Clause” are not yet arranged and thus unclear. The formulation does not commit the EU to focus its defense policy on: the special character of the security- and defence policy of certain Member States, but merely leaves this character untouched (…). If the regulation had an autonomous meaning, the involved member state could have the possibility to refuse the participation in the defense policy without having to block corresponding resolutions. (Burghardt/ Tebbe/Marquart 2003: 222; Regelsberger/Kugelmann 2003: 82 do not mention the Irish Clause at all (sic))

In contrast to these rather hesitant respectively undetermined commentaries regarding the effects of the “Irish Clause” Austria qualifies the “Irish Clause” as a “Conflict Rule” in the sense of an absolute “non violation”-clause, what means that Austria’s permanent neutrality is not affected by the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” as well as the “Defense Policy” of the EU in the case of a collision and therefore neutrality prevails. Such a qualification of “non violation” in terms of Austria’s obligations stemming from the legal institute of neutrality taking “priority” over the obligations deriving from the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” and the “Defense Policy” of the EU, clearly shows – according to the “ordinary meaning” of the concept of “non violation” – that Austria’s permanent neutrality is not affected by primary and secondary law of the “Second Pillar” of the EU, but does not mean that Austria

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thereby is enabled to support resolutions concerning the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” or “Defense Policy” of the EU which are (flagrantly) adverse to neutrality obligations. In the (scarce) relevant literature it is often overlooked that the “Irish Clause” does not authorize a permanent neutral state to implement a legal act in one of the two legal areas (“neutrality” versus “solidarity”) (Hummer 2001b: 157ff.) – in the case at stake “solidarity obligations” within the Common Foreign and Security Policy or Defense Policy of the EU – which is clearly against neutrality law and at the same time still to feel bound by the law of permanent neutrality. According to Art. I-41 para. 7 subpara. 1 CT, this would certainly be the case when deliberately joining a “collective self defense alliance” in terms of Art. 51 United Nations Charter. The “non violation”-clause only protects against a violation of the permanent neutrality of individual Member States by secondary law of the “Second Pillar” of the EU, but does not enable these (permanent neutral) Member States to support actively resolutions issued within the framework of “Common Foreign and Security Policy” or “Defense Policy” of the EU which are clearly against neutrality law and which then – as secondary law of the EU – have repercussions on them. The special characteristic of the “Irish Clause” results from the fact that the relevant acts of secondary law in the “Second Pillar” of the EU – which can be issued only unanimously – are to be carried out deliberately and consciously agreed with the consent of the permanent neutral member states as well, even if they were adverse to neutrality law. It would be a classical “petitio principii” to enforce such secondary law of the EU, which Austria as a permanent neutral member also consented to, which clearly violates certain neutrality obligations and to deny (the “non violation”-effect of the “Irish clause” under consideration) at the same time its impact on the rights and duties of Austria under the law of permanent neutrality. Austria cannot “immunize” its voting behaviour – consenting to secondary law of the EU – which clearly would be in contrast to neutrality obligations, by claiming that this does not affect its status of neutrality on the basis of the “Irish clause”. Since Austria agreed to it voluntarily and deliberately this behaviour would be a classical (material) “venire contra factum proprium” and would lead (procedurally) to an “estoppel”. For this reason Austria developed – in addition to the “Irish clause” – the so called “solidarity doctrine” and tried by this doctrine to separate both (incompatible) “areas of obligations” adequately. “Solidarity” Versus “Neutrality” Early in 1995, the permanent neutral Austria did not only join the EU without making a reservation of neutrality, but also accepted – in a special “Joint Statement”, enshrined in the Final Act of the Conference of Corfu in June 1994 (EU Official Journal 1994, No. 241, p. 21) – the obligation to actively contribute to the further elaboration of the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” within the “Second Pillar” of the EU and not to hinder its progressive development in a spirit of solidarity. Therewith Austria accepted not only the duty of cooperation in good faith, enshrined in Art. 10 of the

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Treaty establishing the European Community but also the obligation of “solidarity” in the “Second Pillar” of the EU – which is formulated both in a general (Art. 11 para. 2 subpara. 1 Treaty on European Union) and also specific (Art. 23 para. 1 subpara. 2 Treaty on European Union) way. According to the general obligation of solidarity “the Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” and refrain from, according to the above mentioned specific obligation of “solidarity” – despite the recourse to the “escape clause” of the so called “constructive abstention” in terms of Art. 23 para. 1 subpara. 2 Treaty on European Union – “any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action in a spirit of mutual solidarity”. In Austria, scientific doctrine and state practice subsequently developed various strategies to “immunize” the indissoluble dichotomy between “neutrality” and “solidarity”: at first (a) it developed altogether eight (!) restrictive doctrines of neutrality,4 then (b) the Austrian Government and National Assembly adopted the so called “Austrian Security- and Defense Doctrine (2001) and in a final step (c) the so called “Solidarity doctrine” was elaborated. Ad (a) Among the restrictive doctrines of neutrality two deserve special mentioning in this context; on the one hand the assumption (aa) of the (mere) “military key elements” of neutrality which was formulated by the Austrian government as follows: There is no antinomy between the obligations of a EU Member State in the common foreign and security policy and the key elements of neutrality. By joining the EU Austria is neither committed to take an active part in wars nor does Austria have to join a military alliance or to agree to the formation of military bases of foreign states on its territory, hence this key element of Austria’s neutrality remains untouched. (Explanatory Remarks to the government bill of the so called “EU-Beitritts-Begleit-Bundesverfassungsgesetz” of December 1994 (BGBL Nr 1013/94); compare also 1600 enclosures to the Stenographic Protocols of the National Assembly, XVIII. LP, 122 f.)

On the other hand (ab) one has to mention in this context the view held by the former Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Willibald Pahr, and the former Director of the “Bureau of Public International Law” of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Franz Cede, that the European security system in the EU: is not a military alliance but on the contrary a defense community and likewise the installation of military bases of foreign states is rather to be seen as a military activity of a community of which Austria is a part (…) In such a coherent community the individual right of self defense de facto merges into a collective one (sic).5

4 Those restrictive doctrines of neutrality not only served for the “immunization” of the participation of Austria in the process of European integration but also as far as the membership in the UN was concerned; compare Türk 1994, 439 ff., and Hummer 2003: 227 ff. (271 ff.). 5 Die Presse of July 27th 1996, p. 4.

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Ad (b) On 3rd May 2000, the Austrian government appointed a commission of experts to elaborate a new “Security- and Defense Doctrine” which should replace the old “National Defense Doctrine” of 1975 as well as the “National Defense Plan” of 1983. Referring to the essential conclusions of the analysis which had been compiled by the Commission of Experts, the National Assembly on 12th December 2001 passed the “Austrian Security- and Defense Doctrine” (ASDD/ÖSVD) (Archiv der Gegenwart of 12th December 2001, p. 45357 ff) (only) with the votes of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The most significant political as well as legal statement about the Austrian permanent neutrality contained in this doctrine reads as follows: (…) Austria has – by its unconditional participation in the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” of the EU at the latest – sustainably modified its international law status of permanent neutrality. That’s why, in an international comparison, Austria’s international law status does not correspond with the status of a neutral state but with one of a nonaligned or non-committed state.

Therefore the essential statement of the new “Austrian Security- and Defense Doctrine” (2001) reveals that Austria – like Finland, Ireland and Sweden (but also like Malta and Cyprus) – is no more a (permanent) neutral but merely a “non-aligned” or “non-committed” state. Furthermore Austria has the right to decide autonomously if it wants to remain “non-committed” or if it prefers to join a “defense alliance” in the future. Ad (c) Taking the effect of “non violation” of the “Irish Clause” - which is to be understood in an absolute sense – into consideration, Austria at last also developed a so called “Solidarity Doctrine” – which means to be “solidary within the EU and neutral outside of it” – due to which two separate areas of legal obligations exist for the permanent neutral Austria: on the one hand a “solidarity area” within the EU – which is not affected by neutrality – and on the other hand an area of public international law outside the EU where neutrality prevails. It remains to be seen whether the community of states will understand this legal “salto mortale” or not – by accepting the view that a permanent neutral state at the same time can be bound by two dichotomous obligations: “solidarity” and “neutrality” – and to remain in this double status vis-à-vis two different groups of States. References Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.) (2000), Documentation Nr. 4/2000, October 2000. Burghardt, G., Tebbe, G. and Marquart, S. (2003), Art. 17 EUV margin No. 9, in von der Groeben, H., and Schwarze, J. (eds), Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Kommentar, Vol. 6 A. Cremer, H.-J. (2002), Art. 17 EUV margin No. 5, in Callies, Ch., and Ruffert, M. (eds), Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag, 2. ed.

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Hummer, W. (2001a), Österreichs dauernde Neutralität und die “Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik” (GASP) bzw. “Gemeinsame Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik” (GESVP) in der Europäischen Union, SZIER 4/2001. Hummer, W. (2001b), Solidarität versus Neutralität. Das immerwährend neutrale Österreich in der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (GESVP) der EU, ÖMZ 2/2001. Hummer, W. (2003), “Austria’s Permanent Neutrality and the ‘Security and Defense Architecture’ in Europe”, in Hummer, W. (ed.), Europarecht im Wandel (Wien: Braumüller). Hummer, W. (2005), Zum weiteren Schicksal des Vertrages über eine Verfassung für Europa, JRP 4/2005. Kaufmann-Bühler, W. Art. 17 EUV margin No. 12, in Grabitz, E., and Hilf, M. (eds), Das Recht der EU. Kommentar, Vol. 1, loose-leaf. Regelsberger, E., and Kugelmann, D. (2003), Art 17 EUV margin No. 12, in Streinz, R. (ed.), EUV/EGV. Türk, H. (1994), “Neutralität und Mitgliedschaft bei den Vereinten Nationen”, in Ginther, K., Hafner, G., Lang, W., Neuhold, H. and Sucharipa-Behrmann, L. (eds), Völkerrecht zwischen normativem Anspruch und politischer Realität. Festschrift für Karl Zemanek zum 65. Geburtstag, (Berlin: Edition Duncker & Humblot).

Chapter 5

Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in Transition Arnold H. Kammel

Cooperation in the field of JHA is one of the most recent policies of the EU. Due to its sensitive character, the will of cooperation among Member States was rather limited at the beginning and so this area was not explicitly mentioned in the founding Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957 (Council 2005: 8) which gave the impetus for the European integration. Meanwhile, however, the customs union and a common market were gradually established. JHA policy first appeared as such in the Treaty of Maastricht and was further elaborated until the draft European Constitution. The Main Stages of Development of JHA The TREVI Group In the 1970s the need to strengthen the cooperation between the Member States of the European Community emerged due to the threat of terrorism of the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades. The European Council of Rome on 1 December 1975 initiated the TREVI1 Group which met for the first time on 29 June 1976 at ministerial level to address questions related to combating terrorism. The self-given objective was exchanging information on the terrorist threat and working out coherent and complementary strategies between Member States. (For further information about TREVI see: Milke 2003: 23–28.) During the following years, the group met regularly and brought together the Home Affairs and/or Justice Ministers, senior officials and experts outside the framework of the European treaties. In 1985, the objectives of the TREVI Group were extended to illegal immigration and the fight against organized crime. The TREVI Group constituted the basis for JHA policy, especially in matters of counterterrorism (TREVI I), police cooperation (TREVI II), the fight against international crime (TREVI III) and the abolition of borders (TREVI 1992).

1

Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et Violence Internationale.

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The Schengen Area During the 1980s, Germany and France started initiatives to abolish border controls on persons within the European Community. The first Schengen Agreement was signed on 14 June 1985 in Schengen by Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The Agreement entered into force on 2 March 1986 and laid down the principle of abolishing controls at common borders and postponed the implementation of this principle to a subsequent convention. The Schengen Convention implementing the before mentioned Schengen Agreement was signed on 19 June 1990 by the same five Member States. The Convention established the implementing conditions leading to the abolition of internal border checks. The Schengen area and the removal of internal borders became reality on March 26th 1995, beginning with Germany, Benelux, France, Spain and Portugal. Over the years, Italy (1990), Spain and Portugal (1991), Greece (1992), Austria (1995), Denmark, Finland, Sweden (1996) and the ten new Member States (2004) ratified the Schengen Agreement. Besides, non EU members like Iceland and Norway subscribed to the Schengen Agreement in 1996. Even Switzerland submitted an application to join the Schengen area, whereas two EU Member States, Ireland and the United Kingdom opted out of becoming members of the Schengen area. With the Schengen Agreement, an automated network was established enabling all police stations and consular agents of the Schengen members to obtain data on individuals or lost or stolen goods called the Schengen Information System (SIS). The SIS aims to strengthen police and judicial cooperation related to criminal matters, visa, immigration and free movement of persons. The SIS is currently operational in 13 Member States (Council 2005: 28). The Treaty of Maastricht and the Third Pillar of the European Union With the Treaty of Maastricht signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993, the European Union was created. The new entity was built upon a three-pillar structure (Apap 2004: 15) the European Communities, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA policy). In the JHA policy, the intergovernmental cooperation that has been developing since the 1970s, is incorporated and organized. The legal basis is laid down in Title VI of the Treaty of Maastricht (Apap 2004: 17). Nine matters of common interest were defined (Neisser/Verschraegen 2001: 119): • • • • • •

Asylum; Crossing of external borders; Immigration; Policy relating to nationals of third countries; Fight against drugs and drug addiction; Fight against fraud on an international scale;

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Judicial cooperation in civil matters; Judicial cooperation in criminal matters; Customs and police cooperation, including the creation of Europol.

Furthermore, the common provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht mention the creation of a citizenship of the European Union connected with specific rights. The Treaty of Amsterdam Substantial work in the area of JHA was carried forward during the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996-1997 (Isak 2000: 30). The aim was to facilitate the free movement of people while making international security a fully-fledged objective of the EU. With the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 2 October 1997, the legislative procedures for JHA affairs were made more effective and democratic and clarified the legal basis of decisions in the field of JHA. With Amsterdam, a large part of cooperation in the area of JHA was put under the Community Method such as the participation of all the institutions, control of legality by the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the use of legal instruments best adapted to the objectives sought. The “Communitization” (Fischer, Köck, Karollus 2002: 967) concerns visa policy, conditions for issuing residence permits to immigrants, asylum procedures and rules for judicial cooperation in civil matters. Now, the third pillar covers only police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the Schengen Convention into the Union’s single institutional framework and terminated the existence of two separate systems (Gusy, Schewe 2004: 346). With Amsterdam the EU put the “enhanced cooperation” mechanism in practice for the first time. The 13 States involved (the EU-15 except the United Kingdom and Ireland) have been pursuing their cooperation according to the legal basis of the new Treaty. A special regime has been established for Denmark. The provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters were put under title VI TEU. On 3 December 1998, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted an “Action Plan of the Council and Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice”. This Action Plan was endorsed by the Vienna European Council on 11–12 December 1998 (Gusy, Schewe 2003: 185). On 20 May 1999 the Council determined the legal basis for the provisions related to Schengen and constituted the Schengen acquis (Council Decision of 1999/435/EG, OJEC 1999 Nr 176 17-30, see Fischer, Köck, Karollus 2002: 969). The Tampere Program The area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) was created gradually and as a consequence, the Treaty of Amsterdam established a period of five years from its entry into force (May 1999) during which the Council would continue to act

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unanimously when adopting common measures in the fields of asylum, immigration and controls at the Union’s external borders (Council 2005: 11). As the importance of JHA grew steadily, a special European Council was held in Tampere on 15–16 October 1999 under the Finnish Presidency to focus on this important area. At the Council, the Heads of States or Government launched a promising five-year-program for implementing the area of freedom, security and justice. In the Council Conclusions2 the importance of internal security was stated which should be a priority for the Union and guarantee that European citizens are at the heart of the AFSJ. A follow-up mechanism was started in form of a “scoreboard” to be updated every six months by the European Commission to give an overview of the progress in the AFSJ and to list the measures still needed (Council 2005: 11). The main issues of the JHA program have remained the same since the Tampere Council: • • • •

Implementation of a European asylum and immigration policy; Creation of a European area of justice; Combating crime at Union level; Stronger external action.

Regarding asylum and immigration, the aims are the development of a Common European policy based on cooperation with migrants’ countries of origin, a common European asylum system, fair treatment for nationals of third countries residing legally in the Union and the fight against illegal immigration (Council Conclusions Point A). In the European judicial area (Council Conclusions Point B), special focus was given to the citizens’ effective access to justice and on the development of mutual recognition of judicial decisions. This can be seen as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters between Member States, as a complement to the approximation of criminal law. In the Tampere Council Conclusion the creation of Eurojust, a new judicial cooperation unit, was mentioned as well. There are three guidelines directing the fight against organized and cross-border crime: a prevention policy at Union level, closer cooperation between Member States police and judicial administrations as well as specific actions by the Union to fight money laundering (Council Conclusions Point C). The Treaty of Nice and the Charter of Fundamental Rights In 2001, the Treaty of Nice was signed, and like in other matters, did not appreciably modify the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty concerning matters of JHA as various first pillar decisions like visas, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters, were switched to qualified majority and Eurojust was explicitly mentioned in the Treaty of Nice for the first time (Council 2005: 12). More important than the Treaty of Nice was the proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2 Council Conclusions, European Council of Tampere, 15.-16. October 1999: http:// ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm [20.03.2006].

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December 2003. The text contains all the personal, civil and political, economic and social rights guaranteed to European citizens. The legal value was put in conjunction with the final adoption and ratification of the draft Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty on the Future of Europe A lot of important changes in JHA are being introduced by the European Constitution drafted by the Convention (Guild, Carrera 2005: 2-8). As already stated, when the Constitutional Treaty comes into force, the Charter of Fundamental Rights acquires constitutional value. Furthermore a bill of rights was introduced. These rights can constitute the basis of judgements before the Court of Justice of the European Communities. The draft Constitution also removes the “pillar structure” with the consequence that all issues and policies related to JHA will be “communitized” if the draft Constitution is ratified by all 25 Member States (Council 2005: 13). The new policy can be found in the third part of the new text entitled “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” and covers border regimes, asylum, immigration as well as police and judicial cooperation. With the new Constitution, the proposed JHA policy will not be subject to the rule of unanimity except a limited number of issues in the field of criminal and civil judicial cooperation and operational cooperation between police authorities. Concerning the objectives of JHA policy, the Constitution has another important impact. The concept of “common system” is replaced in various areas with the idea of “minimum standards” (Council 2005: 13). The Union develops a common policy on asylum and temporary protection and should elaborate a common immigration policy. The actions are based on the principle of solidarity and fair responsibility sharing, including financial implications. The Commission has no exclusive right of initiative on the judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, as there exist shared competences with the Member States. The principle recognition of judgements and judicial decisions is laid down in the Treaty. Minimum rules can be established in issues concerning mutual admissibility of evidence, the rights of individuals in criminal procedures, victims’ rights and the definition of sanctions for particularly serious crimes (e.g. terrorism and organized crime). This list can only be adapted in case of an unanimous decision of the Council. The Hague Program3 On 5 November 2004 the European Council approved the Hague program defining the Union’s future action in the area of JHA. The Hague program builds on the program adopted at the Tampere European Council in 1999 and it is planned to review the program by the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty with a view 3 Council of the European Union 16054/04, Brussels, 13. December 2004 http://europa. eu.int/comm/justice_home/funding/doc/the_hague_programme.pdf [20.03.2006].

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to incorporating the additions provided for in that Treaty. The Hague program groups the various JHA policies around the three values of freedom, security and justice underlying the area to be developed. The program states that fundamental rights have to be respected and it aims at making real and substantial progress as regards enhancing mutual confidence and promoting policies to the benefit of all EU citizens. Actors in JHA Policy JHA is embedded in a complex institutional framework (Fischer, Köck, Karollus 2002: 961). Through history, the Member States were the driving forces behind the development of JHA policy. With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the role of the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice have been strengthened. Due to the difficulties reaching unanimous agreements between 25 Member States, the Community method gains more and more importance (Council 2005: 13). The main body in the third pillar is the European Council which defines the priorities and objectives and gives the impetus necessary for further development. The Council of the European Union, meeting in JHA matters in the format of the Justice and/or Home Affairs Ministers constitutes an essential decision-making body in JHA. Together with the European Parliament, the Council has the power to adopt or reject legislative texts proposed by the Commission or the Member States. Therefore the Commission attends the Council meetings to present and defend its proposals. Since 1 May 2004 the Commission holds the exclusive right of initiative in matters of JHA under the Community pillar. It shares this right with the Member States for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (third pillar). One Member of the Commission is specifically charged with JHA. Since 1 May 2004 the European Parliament has been co-legislator with the Council for visa, asylum and immigration policy. The European Parliament together with the Council is also co-legislator in various areas of judicial cooperation in civil matters. The European Parliament holds an annual debate on progress achieved in this field (Council 2005: 15). With the Treaty of Amsterdam the Court of Justice got the power to issue preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation in the first and third pillar. Furthermore the Court decides on disputes between Member States over the interpretation and application of measures adopted in the area of JHA. With the adoption of the European Convention, the Court would have the opportunity to judge on the basis of the Charter of Fundamental Rights which is incorporated in the new Treaty. Legal Instruments in the Area of Justice and Home Affairs The beginnings of legal instruments in JHA date back to the 1950s when the Member States adopted conventions under international public law such as the European Convention on Human Rights of 4 November 1950 or the 1951 Geneva Convention

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on Refugees (Council 2005: 17). The Treaty of Amsterdam helped clarifying and simplifying the instruments. The legal instruments of the area of freedom, security and justice must be differentiated between the Community (first) pillar and the third pillar (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters). The legal instruments of the third pillar were originally copied from the second pillar concerning CFSP. Before the Amsterdam Treaty, the most important instruments in the field of JHA were the classic international conventions with their slow and difficult implementation. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced two new types of instruments namely decisions and framework decisions (Fischer, Köck, Karollus 2002: 960). Now, the community instruments are gaining importance in implementing JHA policies. Community Instruments Regulations are obligatory in their elements and directly applicable in all Member States and must not be implemented by national measures. They have a general scope and are binding for all Member States. Other important instruments are directives. Member States must achieve certain objectives or results set up by the directive by national legislative or other appropriate measures. Decisions are binding and can be directed to one or more Member States in particular or to all Member States, to enterprises or individuals. Recommendations and opinions are not legally binding and are no proper legislative instruments. They are often addressed to the Member States and set a general objective or define a set of measures recommended by the Council. Resolutions, declarations and conclusions are non-binding instruments with which the Council gives its point of view on certain issues. They often have quite a substantial and important political impact. “Third Pillar” Instruments Conventions are the traditional instrument of international law. The Council of the EU may draw up conventions and recommend their adoption by the Member States. All national parliaments had to ratify these conventions before the Treaty of Amsterdam. Since then, the majority of conventions apply as soon as at least half the Member States have ratified them. Framework decisions are binding the Member States in terms of a result to be achieved, but they have no direct effect and cannot constitute the basis for judicial proceedings by individuals. They are used to approximate the laws and regulations of Member States. Decisions are compulsory without having direct effect. Normally they are accompanied by implementing measures. Decisions can be used for any purpose other than the approximations of national laws and regulations. When adopting framework decisions and decisions, the Council acts unanimously. However, certain implementing measures may be adopted by qualified majority. Common positions define the Union’s approach to a given issue which Member States must defend in international organizations and at international conferences.

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Aims and Objectives in the Field of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) Art. 29 TEU defines the aims and objectives of the cooperation: Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union’s objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia. (Art. 29 TEU in the version of the Treaty of Nice, OJEU Nr. C80 10 March 2001)

Fields of cooperation in the PJCC (Satzger 2003: 115-116) are: Preventing and combating crime a) General Remarks Art. 29 TEU comprises explicitly organized and not organized crime in its scope. Due to the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 2 par. 2 TEU) the Union will limit its work only to the area of organized cross-boarder crime (Satzger 2003: 116). b) Terrorism Terrorism has become one of the major threats these days. In 1996 already the Council adopted a Joint Action (JA 96/610/JHA, OJ 1996, L 273/1) where the Member States were obliged to share their knowledge and capacities in the fight against terrorism with all other Member States. In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA, the Council adopted a framework decision (OJEC 2002 L 164/3, 2002/475/JHA) defining uniformly the term of “terrorist offence”. After the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 (Hauser 2004:104) the EU adopted a declaration for the fight against terrorism (Council Declaration 7906/04). On the basis of Art. 42 of the draft Constitutional Treaty and according to the European Security Strategy the Member States committed themselves to cooperate closely and effectively against terrorism. The action plan against terrorism comprises the strategic aims of the Union and the solidarity clause as per Art. 42 draft Constitutional Treaty obliging the Member States to use all instruments at their disposal to prevent a terrorist threat in the territory of a Member State as well as to protect the democratic institutions and the civilian population and to assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities in case of a terrorist attack. Moreover, Mr. Gijs de Vries was appointed the first EU Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator. c) Drug Trafficking The work of the EU in the field of combating drug trafficking based on various Action Plans dates back to the early 1990. Following the European strategies on drugs 2002–2004 and 2005–2012 which were endorsed by the European Council of 16-17 December 2004 and the action plan on drugs (COM (2004) 707 final), the EU pursues the approach to combining demand and supply reduction and

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focuses on international cooperation in this matter as well as on research, evaluation and information. d) Corruption and Fraud To secure the financial interests of the Union an action plan 2001–2003 (COM (2001) 254 final) was adopted strengthening the issue of prevention of corruption and fraud. The cooperation in the area of combating corruption and fraud was originally stated within the third pillar, but due to the nonratification of agreements by the Member States, the Commission (COM (2001) 273 final) decided to secure its financial interests with a directive based on Art. 280 par. 4 TEC (Satzger 2003: 116). Other important measures to fight corruption and fraud are the European arrest warrant (Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002) and the second money laundering directive (OJEC 2001 L 344/7682). Besides, Eurojust and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) created in 1999 (OJEU L 136/20-22), are working in this matter. Other Criminal Offences In addition to the before mentioned fields of cooperation the EU also started working in fields like trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug and arms trafficking. Furthermore Art. 29 TEU declares preventing and combating racism as well as xenophobia as objectives of the Union. European Police Cooperation Art. 30 TEU stipulates that common action in the field of police cooperation shall include (Isak 2000: 38): a. Operational cooperation between the competent authorities in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences; b. The collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information on reports on suspicious financial transactions; c. Cooperation and joint initiatives in training, the exchange of liaison officers, secondements, the use of equipment and forensic research; d. Common evaluation of particular investigative techniques related to the detection of serious forms of organized crime. The Role of Europol The idea of creating a European police office with broad powers already arose in 1989 due to a proposal made by Germany. Taking up this proposal, but limiting it in its scope, the principle of a European police office was for the first time written down in the Treaty of Maastricht in its Art. K.1.9. Already in 1993, the Europol Drugs Unit was created by a ministerial agreement as a transitional organ for the time necessary to formalize and implement the Europol Convention and has been operating since January 1994.

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Europol is an intergovernmental organization created by the Europol Convention based on Art. K.3 of the Treaty on the European Union of Maastricht in order to simplify European police cooperation (OJEU C 316 of 27.11. 1995, p.2). All Member States ratified the convention which came into force on 1 October 1998. Following a number of legal acts related to this Convention, Europol started its work on 1 July 1999. The organization was established in The Hague. Mandate Europol supports the law enforcement activities of the Member States mainly against: • • • • • • •

Illicit drug trafficking; Illicit immigration networks; Terrorism; Forgery of money and other means of payment; Trafficking in human beings; Illicit vehicle trafficking; Money laundering.

Other main priorities include crimes against persons, financial crime and cybercrime. This applies only where an organised criminal structure is involved and at least two Member States are affected. Function Europol serves four functions: •

• •

•

Facilitating and coordinating information exchange between Europol liaison officers (ELOs) who are seconded by the Member States as representatives of their national law enforcement agencies; Providing operational analysis in support of operations; Carrying out and generating strategic reports and crime analysis on the basis of information and intelligence supplied by the Member States and third parties; Providing expertise and technical support for investigations and operations carried out within the EU, under the supervision and legal responsibility of the Member States concerned.

Europol also plays an important role in promoting crime analysis and harmonization of investigative techniques within the Member States. Structure, Finance and Control The Directorate of Europol is appointed by the Council of the Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs. Europol is composed of a central unit divided into services and an exchange structure (Petri 2001: 31). The services of the central unit correspond to the different criminal phenomena mentioned in the Europol mandate. The exchange structure is composed of a platform of ELOs, the Europol National Units (ENU) that serve as transmitters of information and

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information request between the national authorities and the Europol and finally the meetings of the heads of the ENUs (HENUs). Europol is funded by contributions of the Member States according to their GNP. In 2005, the budget was €63.4 million. Europol is accountable to the Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs. The Council guides and controls Europol, appoints the Directorate and approves the budget. The Europol Management Board is set up by one representative of each Member State and has the task of supervising the activities of the organization. The Joint Supervisory Body consists of two data protection experts of each Member State and supervises the contents and use of all personal data held by Europol (Petri 2001: 32). European Judicial Cooperation Due to Art. 31 TEU, common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include: a. Facilitating and accelerating cooperation between competent ministries and judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation of proceedings and the enforcement of decisions; b. Facilitating extradition between Member States; c. Ensuring compatibility in rules applicable in the Member States to improve the cooperation; d. Preventing conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States; e. Progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalities in the fields of organized crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. The Role of Eurojust The European Council of Tampere in 1999 established the basis for Eurojust with the intention of: facilitating the proper coordination of national prosecuting authorities and of supporting criminal investigations in organised crime cases, notably based on Europol’s analysis.

While waiting for adoption of the final text, the Council implemented a provisional unit named Pro-Eurojust which was based on a 14 December 2000 decision and started working on 1 March 2001. The Treaty of Nice included the mission to create a judicial cooperation unit in its Art. 29 TEU in conjunction with Art. 31 TEU. On 29 April 2003 the inauguration of Eurojust headquarters took place in The Hague. Jurisdiction and Composition The jurisdiction corresponds to that of Europol, but was extended by the Council to other forms of crime like computer crime and fraud against the financial interests of the Community (Milke 2003: 282). Eurojust has a

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broader scope of action than does Europol (competence for combating certain types of crime related to organized crime) but narrower than that of the European Judicial Network (competence for combating all types of crime). Eurojust is composed of 25 National Members who form the Europol College, one seconded from each Member State in accordance with its legal system being a prosecutor, judge or police officer of equivalent competence (Milke 2003: 280). Additionally, there is an Administration Group led by the Administrative Director who reports to the College through the President. Remits and Powers Following the Tampere Conclusions and the Council Decision setting up Eurojust of 28 February 2002 (OJEC 2002 L63/1), the tasks of Eurojust can be divided into tasks of Eurojust itself, tasks of Eurojust acting through its national members and finally, tasks of Eurojust acting as a College. The main tasks are promoting and improving the coordination of cross-border investigations and facilitating the international legal assistance and extradition (Milke 2003: 282). The Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 establishing the European arrest warrant extended the powers also to issues related to the European warrant. Evaluation and Future Perspective for JHA Within the last twenty years, the will of cooperation in the area of JHA among EU Members increased steadily as a reaction to crisis situations which the Member States experienced. The area of JHA as well as institutions like Europol and Eurojust, which guarantee a good cooperation among Member States and an efficient implementation of the AFSJ, developed quite well and dynamically. Inspite of JHA having become the EU’s most active policy area, it still ranks among the least known or understood. However, there is strong public support for European countries to cooperate against the new threats and common concerns (Grabbe 2002: 1). Although there have been many achievements in the area of JHA, the foundations of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice need to be revised. Unfortunately, the future of the Constitutional Treaty which would have improved the area of JHA substantially and would have facilitated and promoted democratic and judicial accountability, remains unclear. One of the biggest problem is the fragmentation of JHA within the EC First Pillar and the EU Third Pillar: The abolition of the duality in pillars would lead to increasing legal certainty, a set of uniform legal acts, stronger involvement of the European Parliament in the decisionmaking process, as well as the widening of the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to review and interpret those policies. (Guild, Carrera 2005: 13)

Furthermore, the Constitution would have incorporated the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The need of putting these fundamental rights in a strong and uniform legal framework is evident in order to guarantee a high degree of protection for the

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individual. Irrespective of the Constitutional Treaty’s entering into force, reform work needs to be done in the area of JHA. In 2006, there will be an evaluation of the implementation of the Schengen acquis by the ten new Member States in order to start abolishing controls at internal borders as soon as possible after the Schengen Information System II (SIS II) will become operational in 2007. Therefore the need of strengthening the external borders of the Union and the collaboration between the 25 Member States becomes more and more important so as to meet the expectations of EU citizens: Securing freedom and protecting individual rights within the framework of effective democratic control are at the heart of a successful European Union. (Hagedorn 2002: 4)

The future will show us if the European Union will be as successful in this area as it has been so far! References Apap, J. (2004), Problems and Solutions for New Member States in Implementing the JHA Acquis, CEPS Working Document No. 212/October 2004. Baldus, M. (ed.) (2000), Polizeirecht des Bundes mit zwischen- und überstaatlichen Rechtsquellen, C.F. Müller. Council of the European Union (2005), Living in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Fischer, P., Köck, H. F. and Karollus, M. M. (2002), Europarecht. Recht der EU/EG, des Europarates und der wichtigsten anderen Organisationen, Edition Linde. Grabbe, H. (2002), Justice and Home Affairs: Faster Decisions, Secure Rights, Centre for European Reform Policy Brief. Guild, E., and Carrera, S. (2005), No Constitutional Treaty? Implications for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, CEPS Working Document No. 231/ October 2005. Gusy, Ch., and Schewe, Ch. S. (2003), “Polizeiliche und justizielle Zusammenarbeit”, in Weidenfeld, W. and Wessels, W. (eds), Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2002/2003, Edition Europa Union, pp. 185–193. Gusy, Ch. and Schewe, Ch. S. (2004), “Polizeiliche und justizielle Zusammenarbeit”, in Weidenfeld, W., and Wessels, W. (eds), Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2003/2004, Edition Nomos, pp. 173–180. Gusy, Ch., and Schewe, Ch. S. (2004), “Die Rechts- und Asylpolitik der Europäischen Union”, in Weidenfeld, W. (ed.), Europa-Handbuch, Bd I, Edition Bertelsmann Stiftung, pp. 342–358. Gusy, Ch., and Schewe, Ch. S. (2006), “Polizeiliche und justizielle Zusammenarbeit”, in: Weidenfeld, W., and Wessels, W. (eds), Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2005, Edition Nomos, pp. 185–192.

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Hagedorn, F. (2002), Reforming Justice and Home Affairs. A Question of Balance: The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, CAP EU Reform Convention Spotlight 2002/09. Hauser, G. (2004), Die Sicherheit Europas im Wandel transatlantischer Beziehungen, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 5/2004. Isak, H. (2000), Europarecht I. Strukturen-Institutionen-Verfahren, Edition Orac. Milke, T. (2003), Europol und Eurojust. Zwei Institutionen zur internationalen Verbrechensbekämpfung und ihre justitielle Kontrolle, Osnabrück: Universitätsverlag. Monar, J. (2003), “Justice and Home Affairs after the 2004 Enlargement”, The International Spectator 1/2003. Neisser, H., and Verschraegen, B. (2001), Die Europäische Union. Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, Edition Springer. Petri, T. B. (2001), Europol. Grenzüberschreitende polizeiliche Tätigkeit in Europa, Edition Nomos. Satzger, H. (2003), “Titel VI. Bestimmungen über die polizeiliche und justizielle Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen”, in Streinz, R. (ed.), EUV/EGV. Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Beck, pp. 113–172. Streinz, R. (2003), Europarecht, Edition C.F. Müller. Thun-Hohenstein, Ch., Cede, F., and Hafner, G. (2005), Europarecht, Edition Manz. Websites Official Website of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, http://www.emcdda.eu.int Official Website of Eurojust, http://www.eurojust.eu.int Official Website of Europol, http://www.europol.eu.int

Chapter 6

FROM REflECTIONS TO POWER: IM P LEM ENTING THE EUROP EAN SECURITY STRATEGY Sven Biscop

The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), A Secure Europe in a Better World, by the European Council on 12 December 2003 was a major step for the EU, though not necessarily one with lasting impact. For the very first time the Member States solemnly adopted a common strategic vision for the whole of EU foreign policy. Yet reluctant Member States could still hope, as a number of observers did expect as well, that soon after its adoption the ESS would disappear into some dusty drawer – the key of which some would probably have liked to present to NATO for safekeeping. There was indeed a risk that the adoption of the ESS, which was accompanied by the necessary pomp and circumstance, would be nothing more than a one-off demonstration of regained unity after the intra-European divide over Iraq, a step of high symbolic value but with little impact on actual policy-making, a stratagem rather than a strategy. The ESS has certainly not disappeared however. Quite the contrary, it is omnipresent in EU discourse. In many policy documents and decisions on different aspects of foreign policy, especially those relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its military dimension, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the guidelines fixed by the ESS are constantly being referred to. They also serve as the connecting thread throughout the trainings organized by the European Security and Defense College (ESDC) for practitioners from the Member States.1 In the decision-making process, Member States as well as the European institutions make good tactical use of the ESS: the more convincingly a proposed initiative can be linked to it, the more difficultly it can be opposed. A strategic culture is thus developing at the EU level, i.e. the habit of automatically referring to the strategic framework of the ESS when taking decisions, and the willingness to undertake the actions and commit the means required to achieve those strategic objectives.

1

The ESDC was formally created by Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP of 18 July 2005.

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A Strategy is Born Contrary to the views of those observers who are perhaps too strongly influenced by the “strategic studies” of the Realist school (Heisbourg 2004; Toje 2005), the ESS effectively is a strategy, as it is defined in public management terms. A strategy is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of in this case the EU, outlines the long-term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment and it guides the definition of the means – i.e. the civilian and military capabilities – that need to be developed. A strategy thus obviously is not meant to be an operational document, another reason used to dismiss the strategic claims of the ESS (Maull 2005). It is a mission statement, which has to be translated into sub-strategies for specific policy fields and then into concrete policies and actions; it thus has an inspirational function vis-à-vis policy-making (Bailes 2005: 14). This mission statement does contain a number of explicit choices. Not all of these choices are new of course. The EU was able to build on an extensive foreign policy acquis, so many of the strategic choices contained in the ESS were already evident as emerging orientations in actual EU policies. Rather than adopting a fundamentally new orientation, to a large extent therefore the ESS must be seen as the codification of existing foreign policy guidelines. In other words, although the context of the Iraq crisis would suggest a deep division between Member States, the ESS actually builds on a strong consensus on the basic orientations of EU foreign policy. Because it builds on the past, on existing guidelines established during ten years of CFSP, and even before, the ESS has been able to transcend the context of its adoption. It thus has the potential to have a durable impact on the future of EU foreign policy-making. A comparison can be made with the codification of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the predecessor of the CFSP, in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. The SEA did not really strengthen the informal mechanisms of EPC, but by giving them a legal basis did prevent that they would be weakened. Codification creates a framework from which it is afterwards more difficult to depart; it circumscribes the room for manoeuvre of future policy-making. Naturally, the ESS is not perfect. It could only build on consensus in areas where that existed. On a number of issues it remains particularly vague because consensus was absent or not yet strong enough. Many issues are mentioned in the ESS, because not to do so would have invoked strong criticism, but no more than that. Most notably, no real choice has yet been made on the nature of the transatlantic partnership and the degree of autonomy of the EU as an international actor vis-àvis NATO and the US. The real intra-European divide over Iraq did not concern the substance and principles of policy. Based on an assessment of past policies, it can safely be argued that all Member States agree that in principle the use of force is an instrument of last resort which requires a Security Council mandate. The real issue at stake was the nature of the transatlantic partnership. If the US reverts to the use of force in a situation in which the EU in principle would not do so, or not yet,

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what then has priority for the EU: steering an autonomous course, based on its own principles, or supporting its most important ally? This divide remains a fundamental obstacle to a fully cohesive and resolute CFSP (Dassù/Menotti 2005). Nevertheless, the ESS does contain a number of clear choices and thus certainly has the potential to serve as a strategic framework for EU foreign policy. An Integrated Strategy The ESS can best be characterized as a holistic, integrated or comprehensive approach (Biscop 2005). This comprehensive approach can be conceptualized through the notion of global public goods (GPG), which emerged in the context of the UN at the end of the 1990s. GPG have traditionally been seen in the context of development, but currently the concept is being used more and more in more general political terms, e.g. by Joseph Nye (Nye 2002). Starting point of this approach is the assumption that there are a number of “goods” that are global or universal in the sense that it is generally felt – at least in Europe – that every individual is entitled to them.2 Like in the “human security” approach, the individual is the point of reference. If to a certain extent the definition of the core GPG is a political and normative choice – Rotberg uses the term “political goods” (Rotberg 2004) – many elements have been recognized as being universal beyond any doubt, notably in the field of human rights. These goods are public in the sense that their provision cannot be left to the market but should be supervised by government at the different levels of authority (local, national, regional and global). These core GPG can be grouped under four broad headings: • • • •

physical security or “freedom from fear”; political participation, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; an open and inclusive economic order that provides for the wealth of everyone or “freedom from want”; social wellbeing in all of its aspects – access to health services, to education, to a clean and hazard-free environment, etc.

These GPG are strongly interrelated: ultimately, one cannot be ensured or enjoyed without access to the other; the four categories are therefore equally important. Effective global governance means ensuring access to GPG; a system that fails to provide the core GPG lacks legitimacy. Global stability, and therefore the security of all States, depends on the availability of sufficient access to the core GPG. Rather than terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other military threats, the 2 GPG are sometimes defined more narrowly as comprizing only those public goods which cannot be provided but through international cooperation, excluding public goods of which the State is or should be the main provider, such as education or political participation. See e.g. the International Task Force on Global Public Goods, http://www.gpgtaskforce.org.

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most important threat is the ever growing gap between haves and have-nots, a gap which can be best expressed in terms of access to the essential GPG. While this gap and the feelings of exclusion, marginalization and frustration resulting from it certainly do not justify conflict, they do help to explain it, which is a prerequisite for prevention and resolution of conflicts. The gap between haves and have-nots is foremost among the challenges of the globalized world, because it is a threat of a systemic nature, i.e. it results from the malfunctioning of, and impacts on, the global order itself. For unless mechanisms of governance are created or rendered more effective that can alleviate this situation, at a certain level of inequality, the resulting political upheaval, extremisms of all kinds, economic uncertainty and massive migration flows will become uncontrollable. Because of this interdependence GPG are non-exclusive, like true public goods: ultimately maintaining our access to GPG requires improving others’ access. Since it denies access to core GPG to a large share of the world’s population, the status quo is not an option. Against this background, specific politico-military challenges do stand out. They include regions of chronic tension and long-standing disputes and conflicts, failed States and civil wars, proliferation of WMD and excessive militarization, and terrorism. These challenges directly threaten people, States and regions. They have to be tackled head-on, but as they are symptoms of the “dark side of globalization”, effective global governance, improving access to GPG, must be pursued at the same time as the key to preventing such threats. “Security is the precondition of development”, the ESS States, but this works the other way around as well. Of course, the strength of the causal relationship between, on the one hand, the gap between haves and have-nots in the broadest sense and, on the other hand, specific politico-military issues differs from case to case. Nonetheless, in the long term no durable solution of politico-military problems can be achieved unless the stability of the world system itself is assured. Implementing a comprehensive or holistic approach, based on the notion of GPG, has evident policy implications. The first is integration. Because the core GPG are inextricably linked together, action must be undertaken to address all of them simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion, by all relevant actors, in all fields of external policy, putting to use all the instruments at their disposal, including trade, development, the environment, police, intelligence and legal cooperation, diplomacy, and security and defense. In the words of the ESS: Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

The same plea for a comprehensive approach could be found in the objectives of EU external action as formulated in the draft Constitutional Treaty (Article III-292), which put additional emphasis on aspects of global governance, such as sustainable economic, social and environmental development, the eradication of poverty, the

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integration of all countries into the world economy, and the abolition of trade restrictions. In its recent communications on development, the Commission has explicitly mentioned the provision of “universal public goods” as a basic factor.3 Although policies in all of these fields must be integrated under the same overall objective of increasing access to GPG, in order to avoid contradictory actions being undertaken, each policy should continue to operate according to its own rationale and dynamic. “Securitization”, i.e. the instrumentalization of non-military dimensions of foreign policy in function only of “hard” security concerns or “freedom from fear”, must be avoided, for it ignores the intrinsic importance of the other GPG. Here a difference can be seen between the ESS and the National Security Strategy of the US (NSS). The latter actually devotes more space to issues such as democracy, human rights and trade than the ESS, but these fields are all instrumentalized in function of the one near exclusive priority of US strategy: the “war on terror”. An integrated approach deals with all GPG simultaneously, but does not require that all issues must be put under the label of security. On the contrary, although this may raise their importance in the eyes of States, it also blurs the distinctions between policy areas. Poverty or HIV/AIDS are of a different nature than terrorism, proliferation or conflict: they can be life-threatening but they do not imply a threat of violence and cannot be tackled by politico-military means. Accordingly, rather than including all challenges under the label of security, issues must not be dealt with as security threats unless they pose an effective threat of violence. In that sense, the ESS has perhaps not really been aptly named. It really is a foreign policy strategy rather than just a security strategy, a title which apparently has been chosen in reference to the NSS (Toje 2005). The second policy implication is that by thus addressing the root causes of conflict, a policy oriented on the core GPG emphasizes structural conflict prevention. This presents a formidable challenge: it implies dealing with more issues, related to all core GPG, at an earlier stage, before they become security threats. Effective prevention is much more than mere appeasement: it demands a proactive stance, aiming to change circumstances that induce instability and conflict. Mark Duffield analyzes how structural prevention in effect amounts to the “merging of development and security”: [Development] is no longer concerned with promoting economic growth in the hope that development will follow. Today it is better described as an attempt, preferably through cooperative partnership arrangements, to change whole societies and the behaviour and attitudes of people within them. (Duffield 2002: 42)

In this broad sense, development “not only leads to the reduction of poverty, more political freedom, and greater affirmation of human rights, but also lays the foundation for more durable peace and security” (Culpeper 2005: 4). In the terms of the Commission: 3 COM (2005) 132 final, Speeding up Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. The European Union’s Contribution.

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A policy oriented on GPG will thus in fact be quite intrusive, which can make it rather contentious with the target countries (Hurwitz/Peake 2004). But as it is in the very nature of GPG that pursuing them is in the mutual interest of all concerned, it is at the same time a very positive approach, contrary to other, threat-based strategies. “For whom” rather than “against whom” is the question that determines policy. The sincere pursuit of GPG will bring greatly enhanced legitimacy. As Nye advises the US: “we gain doubly from such a strategy: from the public goods themselves, and from the way they legitimize our power in the eyes of others” (Nye 2002: 143). Thirdly, as effective action in all policy fields concerned requires the cooperation of a wide range of actors at many different levels, a GPG-oriented policy implies multilateralism: an intricate web of States, regimes, treaties and organizations, i.e. multi-level governance, implicating all levels of authority in a coordinated effort to improve people’s access to GPG. Although in the spirit of human security the individual is taken as point of reference, the State remains a primary partner, for no effective arrangements can be made with weak and failed States. In the words of the ESS: “The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic States.” Third States must therefore be seen as partners for cooperation rather than as mere subjects of EU policies; the aim is to influence rather than to coerce, to use the carrot rather than the stick. There will be cases where the use of force is inevitable, for not all actors are amenable to preventive initiatives and security threats will arise. But in the framework of multilateralism, the use of force can only be a measure of last resort to be mandated by the Security Council. In those cases, the legitimacy acquired through the pursuit of GPG can be capitalized upon. The EU is not the only actor pursuing an integrated approach. The Outcome Document of the UN’s Millennium+5 Summit of September 2005 puts forward the linkages between security, development and human rights, dubbed the three freedoms by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his preparatory report.5 The important contribution of the EU to the debate on UN reform and its central role at the actual Summit has certainly influenced this outcome. Individual States as well are developing integrated approaches and have set up new structures in that light, such as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit in the UK and the Office of the Coordinator 4 COM (2005) 311 final, Proposal for a Joint Declaration by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the European Union Development Policy. “The European Consensus”, p. 8. 5 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary General for Decision by Heads of State and Government in September 2005, 21 March 2005.

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for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the US. At the same time critics of the NSS are calling for an integrated approach (Haas 2005). In the development of integrated or holistic policies and institutions, the EU undoubtedly is a trend-setter. The Integrated Approach in Practice: The Neighborhood Policy The December 2003 European Council called for the mainstreaming of the ESS into all relevant policies. Integration, of all dimensions of foreign policy, is indeed the key to its implementation: “coherence is the key to all success”, in the words of Javier Solana (Solana 2004). Promoting everyone’s access to the core GPG can serve as the overall objective. In fact, the EU has at its disposal the full range of instruments to that end; only it does not always manage to use them in a coherent manner. Trade policies often have negative implications for development for example, or maintaining relations with certain regimes is sometimes difficult to reconcile with promoting democracy and respect for human rights. Bringing the integrated approach of the ESS into practice seems furthest advanced in the context of long-term policy vis-à-vis the EU’s direct neighbors: the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was launched in the same period as the ESS with the aim of building a “ring of friends” around the EU, the second objective mentioned in the ESS. With each neighboring country a comprehensive bilateral action plan incorporating all dimensions of relations is negotiated. The founding principle is “positive conditionality”: in return for progressive liberalization of the movement of persons, goods, services and capital (the “four freedoms”) the EU expects political, military, social and economic reforms and cooperation. The ENP, in spite of its contractual nature, thus reflects the intrinsically intrusive nature of the integrated approach. So far action plans have been agreed with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine; those for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia and Lebanon are in preparation. Although the basic philosophy of the ENP seems sound, implementing “positive conditionality” is far from evident, witness the fact that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) after ten years of operating along the same lines has only very limited results to show for it. On the one hand the proverbial carrot offered by the EU is probably not substantial enough to convince the target States to make significant concessions. Those measures that probably would have more potential for the time being surpass the political will of the Member States, e.g. accepting more immigration into the EU or abandoning protectionist agricultural policies. Furthermore most of the neighbors on the European continent really aspire to full membership. On the other hand even a substantial carrot will not produce any influence on policy without a stick, i.e. if allocation of the carrot is not effectively conditional on the achievement of the reforms subscribed to in the action plans. But for that purpose the action plans seem insufficiently operational: rather than providing specific actions, a timeframe and clear benchmarks, they list general principles. Also it is not always clear how the process will be judged (Smith 2005).

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Effective conditionality requires a degree of political courage which the EU is not always able to muster and the corporate culture of the Commission seems averse to it. A common strategy on the use of conditionality must still be elaborated (Youngs 2005). Consequently, in many Mediterranean countries e.g. the EU is perceived as preferring stability over democracy and therefore as dealing mainly with the regimes, while the US is considered the true champion of freedom. In the sense that in practice therefore the link between different aspects of relations is not always made, the ENP is insufficiently integrated or holistic. Furthermore certain challenges, such as the excessive militarization of the Middle East, require multilateral dialogue, but the ENP does not offer any reinforcement of the weak multilateral dimension of the EMP. It must be noted that “even though the carrot could be juicier, few partner countries haven chosen to absent themselves from the process” (Leigh 2005: 110). But perhaps there is an upper limit to what can be achieved through the consensual ENP. Many of the target States are ruled by authoritarian regimes serving only their own interests. In such States incremental progress can probably be achieved in terms of human rights and the rule of law without fundamentally attacking the regimes’ power base. Democratization however de facto amounts to regime change – and which regime would voluntarily abandon its power, regardless of the carrot on offer? The EU does not seem to have resolved what should be the desired endstate of the ENP: incremental progress while preserving stable relations with the regimes in place, or effective democratization and the at least temporary instability implied by every transformation? Recent events have highlighted the urgency of this dilemma. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine that marked the beginning of 2006 will probably lead to renewed attention on the part of the EU for its continental neighborhood, notably the Black Sea area. In that sense, if Russia’s aim was to mark its sphere of influence, its actions seem to have been counterproductive. Bringing in the energy perspective, which hitherto was not very prominent in European strategic thinking, will however complicate the difficult balancing act of building relations with these States even further. In the EU’s Mediterranean neighborhood, the victory of HAMAS in the Palestinian elections on 25 January 2006 demonstrates that even the probably most democratic elections in the Arab world bring problems of their own. Building on established EU policies toward the region and the Middle East peace process, careful diplomacy should stimulate the HAMAS leaders to renounce violence and capitalize on their victory to effectively pursue their objectives via political means. Effective Multilateralism: The Integrated Approach at the Global Level Effective multilateralism is the third objective mentioned in the ESS: “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order”. This can be translated as a network of multilateral mechanisms and institutions that together manage to provide everyone access to

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the essential GPG or, in other words, effective global governance. Although this is the approach propagated by the UN as well, it proves to be even more difficult to implement at the global level then in the EU’s neighborhood. Much can be done at the country-specific or “global-bilateral” level. As in the framework of the ENP, agreements between the EU and the ACP countries increasingly link different dimensions of relations through conditionality mechanisms and have thus become more “political”. At the Millennium+5 Summit the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was decided, which in the postconflict phase would bring to the table all relevant UN and other actors on a countryspecific basis. Although it should not be considered a panacea, as certainly in the first stage it will deal with only a few countries every year, the PBC creates the institutional forum to bring the integrated approach into practice. By contributing financially and operationally, the EU should play an exemplary role in this context. An issue meriting particular attention is the exchange of information on specific countries. Like the UN, the EU collects a wide range of country-specific data. The Commission’s Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit assesses the conflict indicators in the Country Strategy Papers, for which the Commission Delegations in the field are a vital source of information, and in close cooperation with the Council Secretariat and the Joint Situation Centre provides a watch list of potential crisis States. The watch list is confidential, but in the framework of EU participation in the PBC, an arrangement should be found allowing for the complete sharing of all information available, in order to ensure its optimal use. Ideally, joint action plans integrating different actors’ programs would eventually be drawn up. It is not entirely sure thought that all actors involved subscribe to the integrated approach and the conditionality which, to a certain degree, it inevitably implies. An integrated approach of cross-border issues is rendered problematic by the fragmentation of the multilateral architecture, which sees different organizations dealing separately with each policy field. Although objectively the agendas are often linked, decision-making in e.g. the World Bank or the IMF does not necessarily take into account the Security Council, nor does the WTO always look to the ILO. Ecosoc, the Economic and Social Council of the UN, has not managed to fulfil the coordinating role that in principle it has been assigned and essentially remains a talking shop without any impact on the ground, in spite of a multitude of reform proposals. Effective socio-economic governance thus seems notably far away. Yet the question is whether country-specific policies can be successful in the long term without reform of the multilateral structure. Perhaps in due course positive experiences in the PBC can stimulate integration at the “global-multilateral” level. A related problem is that the EU Member States still do not speak with a single voice in the different UN and multilateral bodies, even if there is a trend toward increasing coordination, e.g. in the Security Council. The opportunity e.g. to have a single EU seat in the organizational committee of the PBC has not been grasped. The coordination between Member States’ delegations in different bodies remains minimal, so that even when Member States speak with a single voice in one organization, the same States often take a different position in another.

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Again as in the framework of the ENP, effective multilateralism demands an effort on the part of the EU, including financially, notably achieving the 0.7 percent target for ODA, increasing the efforts in the field of debt relief and abandoning dumping and protectionism in trade policies. Crisis Management: An Integral Part of the ESS? Since the adoption of the ESS the EU has launched several operations, military, civil and civil-military. In early 2006 no less that 11 EU operations were ongoing, which demonstrates a growing awareness of the possibilities and responsibilities of the EU as a global actor. It is often overlooked that if all operations are taken into account (EU as well as NATO, UN, national and coalitions of the willing), on average 50 to 60,000 troops from EU Member States have been deployed at any one time in 2003–2006, including 4 to 5,000 for UN-commanded operations (blue helmets) and another 30 to 35,000 for UN-mandated operations (ISAF in Afghanistan, Althea in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo); the remainder are mostly in Iraq. EU Member States are thus certainly not averse to deploying their forces. Yet the large majority is deployed on the Balkans, where the EU and its Member States logically assume responsibility, and in Afghanistan and Iraq, as a follow-up to the invasion initiated by the US and a number of EU Member States themselves. The number of European troops in sub-Saharan Africa on the contrary is marginal, certainly when set against the political and economic weight of the EU. Nevertheless, in sub-Saharan Africa except for the African Union the EU seems to be the only actor potentially willing – at least on paper – to implement peace support operations, reason why the UN is likely to appeal to Brussels. In January 2006 e.g. the UN requested the EU to consider making available a deterrent force during the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This request for a potentially risky operation was certainly not well-received by all Member States. Before Solana voiced a favourable reply – but stressing that the force might stay on alert outside the country – the German parliament e.g. was notably quick to voice its objections. In view of the responsibilities of the EU as a global actor, future force planning ought to take into account a greater contribution to peace support operations worldwide; that Member States prefer “sub-contracted” operations under the EU-flag to contributing blue helmets to UN-commanded operations is less important as long as the boots are on the ground. If Member States are indeed deploying their forces, there still is no consensus on deployment under the EU flag where crisis management is concerned. Although legally the Petersberg Tasks include all operations except collective defense, but including peace enforcement at the high end of the spectrum of violence, politically the Member States are still divided over the EU’s level of ambition in this field. As long as in a crisis situation some Member States will look to Washington before taking a position, the EU cannot be a consistently resolute actor. Even though with Operation Artemis in the DRC in the summer of 2003 the EU has proven that it can

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mount high-risk operations if the political will is present, other EU-led operations are mostly low-intensity. To some extent therefore the criticism is justified that the EU takes on important but mostly “easy” operations, in the post-conflict phase, in reaction to a settlement of a conflict. The slow reaction to events in Darfur demonstrates that this criticism can in fact be applied to the international community as a whole. The EU should work proactively working toward conflict resolution, through its diplomacy, and when necessary contributing forces in earlier stages of a crisis or conflict. EU policy toward Iran is an example of such a proactive stance. Nevertheless one must question whether in view of this lack of consensus on highintensity operations, all Member States are willing to fully accept the implications of their strong diplomatic support for the principle of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) that was endorsed at the Millennium+5 Summit. R2P implies that if a State is unable or unwilling to protect its own population, or is itself the perpetrator of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity, national sovereignty must give way to a responsibility to protect on the part of the international community. In such cases, the Security Council must mandate intervention, if necessary by military means. It is to be expected that to that end the UN will appeal to the recently created “battlegroups”, which are configured for high intensity operations and which the EU has declared will be primarily deployed at the request of the UN. Rapid reaction and use of force can be required in other scenarios as well, notably in the event of a renewed escalation on the Balkans. Will all Member States readily accept the risks associated with such per definition high intensity operations and will they be willing to contribute the forces and command and control capability required? Integrated Capabilities In the framework of ESDP the building of command and control structures and the transformation of Member States’ armed forces is steadily progressing. There is however a missing link between ESDP and the ESS. Quantitatively, ESDP remains limited to the capacity of deploying a maximum of 60,000 troops, as per the original 1999 Headline Goal, which as shown above corresponds to the number of troops that the Member States are already deploying today. Together the five “illustrative scenarios” as well, on which the EU Military Staff bases the definition of capability requirements, concern only 200,000 troops, one third of which to be deployed at any one time, in view of rotation, while the 25 have almost two million men and women in uniform. Setting aside this quantitative limit, and abandoning the customary comparison with the US, the political objectives of the ESS should be translated in a realistic military level of ambition, based on the full military potential of the 25 and on the responsibilities of a global actor of such weight. Which forces do the 25 want to have available at any one time for rapid response in crisis situations? Which forces do they want to contribute to long-term peacekeeping operations, on the Balkans and in Afghanistan, but also at the request of the UN, e.g. in Africa? Which over the horizon reserve does that require? Which capacity for territorial defense must

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be maintained? The long-term vision which the EU Military Committee is drafting should offer a first response to these questions in 2006. Essentially however this is a political choice. On the basis of that choice, capability requirements for a comprehensive military capacity at the aggregate level of the 25 could be drawn up. No longer would each Member State separately have to invest in a wide range of capabilities organized at the national level, often in small and therefore inefficient quantities. Within such a framework, top-down coordination would allow those that are willing to opt for specialization, i.e. abandoning certain capabilities altogether, and pooling, i.e. offering a capability only through contributing to a multinational formation. Only the larger Member States, which have a sufficient scale by themselves, should logically continue to offer a broader range of nationally organized capabilities. Top down coordination is the only way to end the fragmentation of and useless duplications within the European defense effort and generate more “usable” forces within the current combined budget of the 25, which stands at about €180 billion. Such farreaching integration is only possible in the framework of the wider political project of the EU, not in the exclusively intergovernmental context of NATO, although the integrated capabilities could of course still be deployed for NATO operations. In the meantime the EU has taken the lead in building integrated civil-military structures in which both the Commission and the Council Secretariat are represented. After the joint Situation Centre, the Civil-Military Cell, including an Operations Centre, has become operational, and a concept for civil-military planning has been elaborated. Efforts are underway to improve the availability of police, civil protection and other civilian experts. As a consequence of its leading role, EU expertise is increasingly in demand, e.g. for the monitoring mission in Aceh, which became operational on 15 September 2005. The clearest indication of the EU’s success is perhaps the desire by some in NATO and the US to recuperate its achievements and gain access to EU civil-military capabilities. Faced with the necessity that even high-intensity military operations must incorporate a civil dimension from the start, to which is added the fact that many interventions currently in demand are of a primarily civilian nature, the Alliance has realized that it will need to adapt or risk obsolescence. The, in itself very welcome, relief operation in Pakistan following the earthquake of 8 October 2005, including airlifting supplies and deploying medical units and engineers from the NATO Response Force (NRF), must also be seen in this light. The same holds true for the NATO Katrina Support Operation in September 2005, following the hurricane that struck New Orleans, which also saw the deployment of NRF capabilities. NATO is limited however in what it can do in this area by its very nature, i.e. that of a military Alliance. Developing deployable civilian capabilities in such fields as police, the rule of law and human rights seems to be beyond its scope and would certainly not meet with the approval of all Allies. Hence the idea has been raised to create an “inverse Berlin Plus” arrangement that would give NATO access to the EU’s civilian capabilities, in particular the Civil-Military Cell and the deployable capabilities. This option has been rejected from the start by most EU Member States however,

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who do not want to relinquish control over civilian assets forming an integral part of the EU to a military organization. Thus a new duplication debate arises, for the other option would be for NATO to add on a civil element of its own to its command and control structure. Neither option would alter the basic fact that NATO covers only the politico-military dimension. Even if the Alliance were to be equipped with a civilian crisis management capacity, it could never acquire the development and trade instruments that are vital for the post-intervention stabilization and reconstruction efforts. In that sense the centre of gravity seems to be shifting to the EU. The next challenge for the EU is to forge the link between the progressively integrated crisis management capabilities in the second pillar and the long-term policies in the first pillar, notably in the post-conflict phase of stabilization and reconstruction. Reinforcing the authority of the EU Special Representative vis-à-vis other EU and Member State actors in any given country seems the way ahead. A related question is how the EU presence will relate to the PBC if both are active in the same country. On a more fundamental level the integration of all EU institutions involved in foreign policy has suffered a serious setback with the non-ratification of the draft Constitutional Treaty. Without treaty basis, it is probably impossible to create the position of EU Minister of Foreign Affairs, who would join together the first and second pillar at the highest level of decision-making. Steps could perhaps be taken though toward the establishment of the European External Action Service, which was envisaged to comprise all relevant services at the administrative level. Conclusion: Strategic Reflection The ESS certainly constitutes a most ambitious agenda: redrawing the multilateral architecture in order to assure effective global governance and, within that framework, stabilizing States and regions via intrusive bilateral partnerships. As the ESS states, the EU with 25 Member States, over 450 million people and a quarter of the world’s GNP is inevitably a global player. To be a true global power, the EU must further strengthen its emerging strategic culture, i.e. muster the political will, including in demanding situations, to take decisions true to its strategic objectives and to put to use all necessary instruments to implement them. In this the EU can only succeed if all Member States come to recognize what really is an evident truth: individually no Member State, the permanent members of the Security Council not excepted, has sufficient impact to safeguard its interests. A balanced partnership with the US, global economic governance, strategic partnerships with China and India, etc. require the weight of a united EU. Institutionalizing the strategic reflection in the EU could contribute to the consolidation of its strategic culture. The drafting of the ESS, spearheaded by Solana and the Policy Unit, was a successful one-off exercise, including the three seminars organized in the fall of 2003, which brought together practitioners, academics and NGOs to discuss the draft document before its final adoption by the European Council. But the mechanisms and institutional capacity for permanent strategic reflection

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to feed decision-making seem to be insufficient. Certain specific initiatives not withstanding, decision-making consequently tends to be mostly ad hoc and focussed on the short term, while issues such as energy security or relations with China and India demand fundamental reflection. The initiator of strategic reflection should be the EU Foreign Minister, but in the meantime, and eventually in combination with the Minister, a systematic strategic debate could be institutionalized. Every two or three years the whole of EU foreign policy, across the pillars, could be evaluated in function of the objectives of the ESS (Grevi 2004). One the one hand, this would result in a systematic overview of past policies. On the other hand, the aspects of the ESS still requiring further translation into concrete policies and actions, or the fields requiring further fundamental strategic debate, could be identified. On the basis of reports by all relevant Council and Commission services, the High Representative (eventually the Foreign Minister) and the Policy Unit could draft a paper for discussion. This could be presented to a seminar similar to those organized in 2003, and to the CFSP Committee of the European Parliament, which for the occasion could be expanded with invited national MPs. In combination with the Policy Unit paper, reports of both deliberations could then feed a strategic debate in the Political and Security Committee and the Council. The aim of such an exercise need not necessarily be to re-write the ESS – the identification of the priority challenges and actions will remain valid for at least the next few years – but to promote integration and stimulate new policy initiatives. Without a strategy, without strategic culture, the EU can only react to events – with a strategy Europe can shape them. References Bailes, A.J.K. (2005), The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History, Policy Paper No. 10. Stockholm, SIPRI. Biscop, S. (2004), ‘Able and Willing? Assessing the EU’s Capacity for Military Action’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 509–527. Biscop, S. (2005), The European Security Strategy – A Global Agenda for Positive Power. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing). Culpeper, R. (2005), Human Security, Equitable and Sustainable Development: Foundations for Canada’s International Policy, NSI Paper on the International Policy Review. (Ottawa: The North-South Institute). Dassù, M., and Menotti, R. (2005), ‘Europe and America in the Age of Bush’, in Survival, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 105–122. Duffield, M. (2002), Global Governance and the New Wars. (London: Zed Books). Grevi, G. (2004), European Security: No Strategy Without Politics. Idea No. 4. Brussels, Ideas Factory, European Policy Centre. Haas, R.N. (2005), ‘The Case for “Integration”, in The National Interest, No. 81, pp. 22–29.

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Heisbourg, F. (2004), “The ‘European Security Strategy’ is not a Security Strategy”, in Everts, S., Freedman, L., Grant, C., Heisbourg, F., Keohane, D. and O´ Hanlon, M. (eds), A European Way of War. (London: Centre for European Reform), pp. 27–39. Hurwitz, A., and Peake, G. (2004), Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice Since the 1990s, Conference Report. (New York: International Peace Academy). Leigh, M. (2005), ‘The EU’s Neighborhood Policy’, in Brimmer, E., and Fröhlich, S. (eds), The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement. (Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University). Maull, H.W. (2005), ‘Europe and the New Balance of Global Order’, in International Affairs, Vol. 81, 2005, No. 4, pp. 775–99. Nye, J.S. (2002), The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Rotberg, R.I. (2004), ‘Strengthening Governance: Ranking Countries Would Help’, in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2004, No. 1, pp. 71–81. Smith, K.E. (2005), ‘The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, in International Affairs, Vol. 81, 2005, No. 4, pp. 757–773. Solana, Javier (2004): ‘Preface’, in Gnesotto, N. (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy. The First Five Years (1999-2004). (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies). Toje, A. (2005), ‘The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, 2005, No. 1, pp. 117–133. Youngs, R. (2005): ‘Engagement: Sharpening European Influence’, in Youngs, R. (ed.), New Terms of Engagement. (London, Foreign Policy Centre), pp. 1–14.

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Chapter 7

US Defense Transformation and its Implications for Europe Benjamin Schreer

Europe’s main ally has embarked on an ambitious path of transforming its military in order to address the 21st century security environment. Inevitably, this development has profound yet uncertain implications for European security and defense. In many ways, US defense transformation is the basing point for European armed forces’ own transformation efforts. Washington has been the driving force behind adjusting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to meet a new strategic environment. US transformation concepts such as network centric Warfare (NCW) and Effectsbased Operations (EBO) have also largely become the guiding operational principles of European armies. The question is not if European armed forces align themselves to US defense transformation but to what degree. At the same time, US defense transformation harbours risks for European security and defense. For one it might widen the so-called “capability gap” between US forces and their European counterparts, thereby reinforcing the problems of interoperability and cooperability already hampering transatlantic defense cooperation. Also the question is if US defense transformation coincides with key European allies’ perspectives on the need to follow the American direction, particularly after the Iraq War (Boyer 2004). Finally, US defense transformation might well lead to a fragmentation among European members in terms of their military capabilities and their strategic perspective of when and how to use force. Given this, the purpose of this article is to discuss in more detail the character of the US defense transformation process and its likely implications for Europe. It proceeds in two main parts. The first part identifies the aims and central pillars of US defense transformation, and reflects on the progress achieved so far. This sets the stage for the second part, which deals with the implications for Europe. Is NATO still relevant to the United States? Is US defense transformation leading to a transatlantic divide in security and defense policy? What might be done? US Defense Transformation: Definition and Concept Defense transformation carries the risk of becoming just another buzzword in the strategic debate on the future of armed forces. To avoid this, an understanding of the

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term “defense transformation” and the origins of the concept is necessary. In line with the US Department of Defense (DoD), “defense transformation” is understood as: a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations […]. (Department of Defense 2003: 3)

The main goal is to dramatically increase the combat potential and military effectiveness of the US armed forces to serve as an important tool of US statecraft. Defense transformation, however, is by no means an invention of the 21st century strategic debate. In fact, its origins can be traced back until at least the Vietnam War and the use of laser-guided weapons. In the early 1980s, Soviet Marshal Nicolei Orgakov introduced the concept of a Military Technological Revolution (MTR) to counter perceived US military supremacy. The US debate built upon the concept of a MTR. In 1993, following the dramatic effects of US stealth and precision during the Gulf War of 1990/91, the head of the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), Andrew Marshall, came up with the concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (Marshall 1993). The basic idea of an RMA was that new technologies and ways of their employment would lead to a paradigm shift in the character and conduct of military operations (Hundley 1999: 9; Krepinevich 1994: 30) – and consequently to a new American “way of war”. In the late 1990s, the term “defense transformation” emerged to describe the lengthy process of “creating and harnessing” a RMA (Binnendijk 2002). The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) set the goal of “transforming” the American military (Cohen 1997: Section VII). The central pillars of this transformation process were based upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Vision 2010 of 1996 (Shalikashvili 1996), which was to determine the principles of US defense transformation for the years to come.1 The basic goal was to achieve full spectrum dominance by exploiting the information revolution and technological advances to create a highly integrated and networked force. Defense transformation in this respect was merely the military analogy to the “information revolution”, characterizing today’s modern societies. In other words, the network is the future organizing principle of all modern forces, be they American, European or Chinese. But it is the US military which advances most strongly in implementing the concept of network centric warfare (NCW). What is NCW? On a military-technological level its main element is a complex C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) architecture which integrates sensors, command and control (C2) systems, as well as shooters to an unprecedented level – leading to a high degree 1 In 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published the Joint Vision 2020 (Shelton 2000). It was almost identical with the Joint Vision 2010 with the exception that now the necessity to maintain interoperability with US allies was now included. The Bush-Administration also builds its defense transformation efforts on the premises of the Joint Vision.

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of battlespace awareness and information superiority. This enables an increased tempo of operation and precision engagement. In addition, the single services will no longer operate in a fragmented but “joint” way, making use of the shared battlespace awareness (Alberts et al. 2002). NCW thereby leverages the capabilities of the entire process and, from a US perspective, saves manpower in favour of technology. NCW should be regarded as an enabler of so-called effects-based operations (EBO), which aims at achieving the politically desired effect of kinetic and non-kinetic military operations in a more integrated and effective way (Davis 2002). In sum, US defense transformation should lead to a faster, more agile, more rapidly deployable, more lethal, and more effective military. Particularly for the ground forces, this concept means restructuring into smaller, lighter and more flexible units. All services have initiated ambitious transformation programs, such as the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) or the Air Force’s Global Strike concept. To fund transformation, recent years have seen a steady increase of the US defense budget reaching just over $440 billion in 2006. Implementation: An Unfinished Business It is a difficult task to determine how far defense transformation has been implemented, particularly since the process often is described as an “open ended” to allow for readjustments. Nevertheless, recent conflicts provide at least some indicators. Undoubtedly, the wars in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001/02), and Iraq (2003) have demonstrated the unmatched power of US forces in conventional warfare and the value of a highly networked force and precision-engagement. Particularly, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) saw an unprecedented level of speed and precision in US operations, underlining the validity of concepts such as NCW and EBO (Schreer 2003). Thus, some observers were quick to herald a “new American way of war” (Boot 2003). But there is reason for caution. First, in Iraq the US fought largely a conventional war against a militarily weak and tactically incompetent adversary. Second, US forces faced hardship in the irregular campaign against insurgents following the end of major combat operations in Iraq, and are locked in a long protracted conflict in which transformation tenets such as speed and information superiority face severe constraints. In addition, the post-conflict phase demonstrated the need to sustain large numbers of US ground troops, capable of conducting highly complex stability operations. This seems to contradict Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s transformation vision of substituting personal for high-technology in order to do “more, with less”. Thirdly, OIF disclosed the increased difficulty of the US military to remain interoperable with even its closest ally Great Britain. British forces were given their own area of operation in Southern Iraq, but were still dependent on the US particularly in terms of precision engagement and C4ISR (Ministry of Defense 2003). Moreover, US information sharing with its British ally, most critical to the idea of NCW, remained quite restrictive (Schreer 2003). Finally,

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US defense transformation still remains primarily focused on improving capabilities in the area of high-intensity warfighting, despite the lessons from Iraq and despite the fact that the Pentagon now declares irregular challenges on equal footing with traditional challenges. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) of February 2006 failed to produce a coherent vision of how to adjust the defense transformation process to a new strategic setting (Flournoy 2006). Taken together, Iraq did not reflect a new “American way of war”, but rather a new way of battle (Echevarria 2004). Events in Iraq have reopened the American debate on defense transformation with mutual consent by commentators that the process is in need of a serious review to better prepare US forces for irregular challenges (White 2005; Owens 2006; Pena 2006; Flournoy 2006). In addition, experts have long warned that the current defense transformation programs are financially not sustainable (Kosiak 2006). Thus, despite progress US defense transformation largely remains an unfinished business. Nevertheless, it is gradually taking shape and has profound implications for European security and defense. NATO: Still Relevant? US defense transformation has a direct impact on America’s European allies. One core question for Europeans is if NATO still relevant to the United States. In other words, what are US expectations with regard to European armed forces transformation and can or should they be met? A starting point to address this issue is to consider US defense transformation in the context of overall US grand strategy. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, United States foreign and defense policy has been focused on winning the so-called Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The recent National Security Strategy of the Bush-Administration provides clear evidence in this regard (Bush 2006). For the US military the implications are twofold. First, defense transformation should be aimed at generating capabilities for conducting global operations, if necessary without resort to allies and partners. Second, the main theatres of operations are no longer in Europe but in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. This implies a new understanding of alliances, which are to be more flexible and global in scope. The 2006 QDR informatively speaks about changing “static alliances” into “dynamic partnerships” (QDR 2006: vii). European allies are only to maintain their strategic relevance if they transform their armed forces similar to US standards and prepare them for global deployments. The US expects European NATO members to invest more in defense in order to address the existing “capabilities gap” between the US and the Europeans (Flanagan 2004). A few facts and figures help to illustrate this problem: The Kosovo campaign of 1999 made painfully clear that Europeans lacked substantial capabilities in all areas of modern warfare such as mobility, surveillance and precision targeting. Only 10 to 15 percent of NATO’s forces are deployable. Moreover, the United States in recent years has steadily increased its defense spending – in 2006 the White

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House will spend over $440 billion, more than half of the whole of Europe. With the exception of Great Britain and France, European defense budgets are either falling or stagnating. Particularly striking is the disparity in spending on research and development (R&D), the most critical area for defense transformation. The US spending on R&D of about $ 70 billion in 2006 is close to six times of what European nations are investing. Thus, in recent years Washington has been urging its European partners to invest more in NATO’s military transformation. At the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002, Washington pushed for the so-called Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). PCC followed the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) of 1999 which aimed at improving NATO’s capabilities in the areas of: (1) mobility and deployability; (2) sustainability; (3) effective engagement; (4) survivability; and (5) interoperable communications. However, European NATO members by and large did not meet this commitment. Under PCC, NATO members agreed to improve capabilities in the areas of: • • • • • • • •

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense; Intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; Air-to-ground surveillance; Deployable and secure command, control and communications; Combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses; Strategic air- and sealift; Air-to-air refuelling; and Deployable combat support and combat service support units.

While there were certain improvements such as the development of a CBRN battalion, the PCC has largely suffered a fate similar to DCI, with Europeans unable or unwilling to provide adequate funding (Defense News 2004; Wall Street Journal 2004). The future of NATO transformation programs such as Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) or Active Layered Theater Missile Defense (ALTMD) is uncertain. Thus, the United States repeatedly critized European NATO members for not spending enough on defense (Rumsfeld 2006). It should be noted, however, that the US sometimes has not been very supportive either, particularly when it came to providing C4ISR assets. More successful was the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF). At an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Warsaw in September 2002, Rumsfeld surprised his European colleagues by proposing the creation of a NATO response force. Otherwise he warned, NATO would become irrelevant to the United States (Erlanger 2002). This high readiness force of up to 25,000 troops would be capable of performing worldwide missions across the whole spectrum of operations. It should be deployable after a five day’s notice and sustain itself for operations lasting 30 days. At the Prague Summit, European NATO members endorsed Rumsfeld’s

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proposal and set an ambitious deadline to reach a full operational capability (FOC) of the NRF by October 2006 (NATO 2002). The NRF is the closest equivalent to US defense transformation. It is expeditionary, rapidly deployable and highly flexible. In short, it can be seen as a catalyst for NATO transformation. Considering the complex force generation process in NATO, implementation of the NRF so far has been remarkable. By October 2004 it reached its initial operational capabilities (IOC) of 17,500 troops. In October this year, it will likely be declared to have reached its FOC. The negative side is, however, that the NRF is predominantly made up of European forces with the US contributing only marginally with regard to ground troops, since these will largely be withdrawn from the European theatre. This will complicate a consensus within NATO on when and how to use this force – as evident in the conflict on a possible NRF deployment to Afghanistan.2 However, it should not be overlooked that the NRF will remain criticically dependend on the US in terms of strategic airlift and C4ISR. Thirdly, the most important US instrument to influence European force transformation has been the establishment of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia, were the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is also located. The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), General Lance Smith, is also heading JFCOM, the primary motor of US defense transformation. Through ACT, the United States is able to influence NATO transformation to a great degree, particularly since ACT is the primary test-bed for new transformation concepts and capabilities, the so-called Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) process. ACT is also of great benefit to European NATO member states which can draw on the first-hand experience of new US transformation concepts. It is for this reason, that countries like France – which in principle are sceptical about US defense transformation – are quite active in ACT. Finally, with the new Allied Command Operations (ACO), NATO has streamlined its military structure to be able for flexible and rapid deployments. In sum, since the Prague Summit NATO’s military transformation has come quite a long way in adapting its forces to a changing security environment, despite still existing shortfalls and caveats. European members benefited greatly from US defense transformation initiatives which served as a reference model. Nevertheless, Europeans should recognize that from Washington’s perspective the Atlantic Alliance will be increasingly relevant only in the context of “coalitions of the willing” or as a contributor to peace-keeping mission. European Allies: Merely Peacekeepers? There are military-technological and political-strategic arguments to support the assumption that the United States views European allies mainly in terms of their 2 The US proposed deployment of the NRF to support the ISAF-mission in Afghanistan. Particularly France rejected this idea on the grounds that the NRF should be used only for high-intensity operations.

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contribution to peacekeeping missions. While the technological problems of interoperability might be compensated for with certain work-arounds, the divergence of strategic interests might be much harder to reconcile. US defense transformation will very likely exacerbate the problem of maintaining interoperability with even its closest ally, as evident during the Iraq War. In NCW theory, given adequate capabilities allies could “plug-in and play” with US forces. But in the real world, the high operational speed and the emphasis on information superiority will likely make the US increasingly reluctant to integrate allies in its missions, particularly when it comes to high-end warfighting. For one, it is already difficult for the US military to realize a smooth operation by networking their own single services. In addition, not only do most European allies lack the adequate capabilities (especially C4ISR) but NATO’s decision-making process also seems illprepared to match with the increased speed of operations which requires real-time decision-making (Young 2003). Particularly in a multinational context, NCW is a great challenge with regard to maintaining political control over military operations, since the high-operational tempo, process of self-synchronization among the units, and real-time decision-making might relegate politicians to the side lines during the course of action. In a NATO of 26 members this can impose severe constraints on the conduct of operations. It is doubtful that the US military would accept such constraints, particularly since it might in fact pose risks for its own troops during high-speed operations. A solution to this problem could be greater cooperability between the US and its allies such as work-arounds (e.g. providing equipment). In fact, during OIF the US military provided the British army with blue-force tracking systems in order to avoid casualties by friendly fire. However, it is questionable whether the US would be willing and able to provide a larger number of allies, which are potentially more unreliable than the UK, with such systems. Finally, the US traditionally has a bad track record in sharing information with its allies, fearing information leaks. It now operates the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) which is not open to foreign sources (NORFOR). The more important information superiority (and security) becomes in US defense strategy, the more restrictive the US military will likely become in sharing critical information with its allies. US defense pundits have thus repeatedly highlighted the fact that US defense transformation would require the US military to accept certain operational restraints in coalition operations (Bensahel 2003). But even if the US would be willing to take steps in these directions, European allies as a whole would be of no great use to US strategic purposes. The simple reason is that only a few European states will have adequate military capabilities and the political will to contribute to US operations. As mentioned earlier, individual European member states proceed with different speed and emphasis in their defense transformation efforts, leading in effect to a multi-tiered alliance regarding military capabilities. While only Great Britain and France (and potentially the Netherlands) might retain the capability of a full spectrum force, the rest of European armies will have either have some expeditionary capabilities or can only contribute to

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stabilization missions (de Wjik 2004: 119). That means that only a few allies actually qualify for participating in high-intensity operations. Much more important than the question of military capabilities, however, is the strategic perspective on when and how to use military power. In other words, defense transformation for what political purpose? US defense transformation is an instrument of a US strategy of preventive and/or pre-emptive defense to address the new threats of terrorist networks and rogue states acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. The 2006 National Security Strategy of the Bush-Administration confirms this strategic approach (Bush 2006). While such an approach might be necessary under certain circumstances it does not sell easily with European allies, especially after Iraq. Thus, only a few allies such as the UK, Poland or Italy might have the political will to join the coalition. Experts have therefore pointed out, that NATO must pursue a “dual-track” strategy that combines military with a political transformation (Binnendijk; Kugler 2004). Very likely though, the US will continue to regard NATO as a “tool box” in an approach of “coalitions of the willing and able”. While it is not impossible that in addition to the UK other European NATO member states will operate alongside US forces in the future by providing military niche capabilities such as mine-clearing or CBRN-defenses, NATO as a whole hardly come into question for larger joint military operations. In contrast, the United States sees NATO’s European member states increasingly as contributors to stability and reconstruction missions such as ISAF. The 2006 QDR is seminal in this regard. The report criticizes most European members states for not spending enough on defense and suggests the creation of a NATO stability and reconstruction capability as well as European constabulary forces (QDR 2006: 88). European armed forces as a whole are thus primarily thought of carrying the burden of peace-keeping operations while the US remains committed to high-intensity operations. In general, US defense strategy favours ad-hoc coalitions and regards time-consuming decision-making processes within alliances such as NATO as rather burdensome. Instead, priority will be given to a flexible, heterogeneous mix of allies and partners which is pragmatic, results-oriented, and might involve individual European allies contributing to high-intensity operations. Conclusions US defense transformation presents Europeans with major challenges in terms of their own security and defense. What should be the European response? Is US defense transformation a danger to the European Security and Defense (ESDP) as some commentators have suggested (Boyer 2003)? Should Europe establish its own defense transformation? It is beyond the scope of this chapter to address these questions in detail. However three main conclusions can be drawn: The first conclusion is that Europeans should welcome US defense transformation since it strengthens their own armed forces. The primary goals and basic tenets of US and European defense transformation efforts are identical: to create more

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deployable forces that can conduct military operations more quickly and decisively with less risk for friendly forces and collateral damages. US transformation concepts such as NCW and EBO are primary tools for achieving such capabilities, being a reflection of 21st century military warfare. It is important to note in this regard that these transformation concepts will strengthen European military capabilities across the full spectrum of military operations, not just in the area of high-intensity warfighting. Thus, Europeans have benefited from US defense transformation efforts particularly in the context of NATO, and will continue to do so. Secondly, Europeans could and should not “import” entirely US defense transformation concepts, doctrine, and equipment. Multinationality requires that the pillars of defense transformation are adjusted to the specific needs of the individual member states. In fact, this was clear from the beginning of NATO’s transformation ((Kujat 2003). And this is exactly what happens – as evident in the British concept of Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC), the German Vernetzte Operationsführung (NetOpFü), the Swedish Network-Based Defense (NBD), or NATO’s EffectsBased Approach to Operations (EBAO). This will also serve the force generation process for the ESDP (e.g. the EU battle groups), since there is only a “single set” of European forces. Therefore, if properly managed, US-led NATO transformation is not a threat to ESDP. Finally, US defense transformation increases the need for a transatlantic transformation which leads to a better NATO-EU security structure. Based on the assumption that a strong transatlantic defense partnership is still needed to take on the global security challenges which affect both the United States and Europe, neither an US nor a European-centric approach to defense is sound strategy. A transatlantic division of labour with the US doing major combat operations and the Europeans providing troops for long-term stability and reconstruction mission is politically not sustainable and will likely increase the transatlantic rift on defense policy. Likewise, an indigenous European transformation process which sees the transatlantic defense relationship and ESDP as being mutually exclusive is also bound to fail. Surely, greater European cooperation on defense such as provided by the European Defense Agency (EDA) or the development of the EU battle groups are vital steps toward the maturity of ESDP. But efforts to establish European transformation as opposed to the US and NATO are not only beyond Europeans’ scope, but will also increase the divergence among European member states in terms of their strategic orientation. Instead, new approaches by NATO and the EU which allow for joint planning and force generation are needed to use the full transatlantic potential of defense transformation and bring their complementary capabilities to bear (Burwell et al. 2006). The key for transatlantic success therefore lies not so much in a military-technological revolution but in the willingness across the Atlantic and within Europe to engage in a true strategic dialogue on the role of military force in the 21st century.

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References Alberts, D.A., Gartska, J.J., and Stein, F.P. (2002), Network Centric Warfare. Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd edition (revised), CCRP Publications Series. Bensahel, N. (2003), “Preparing for Coalition Operations”, in Davis, L.E., and Shapiro, J. (eds), The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), pp. 111–128. Binnendijk, H. (2002), “Introduction”, in Binnendijk, H. (ed.), Transforming America’s Military (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University). Binnendijk, H., and Kugler, R.R. (2004), “The Next Phase of Transformation: A New Dual-Track Strategy for NATO”, in Hamilton, David S. (ed.), Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations), pp. 35–73. Boot, M. (2003), “The New American Way Of War”, in: Foreign Affairs 82 (JulyAugust) 4, pp. 41–58. Boyer, Y. (2004), “The Consequences of U.S. and NATO Transformation: A European View”, in Hamilton, D.S. (ed.), Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century (Center for Transatlantic Relations: Washington, D.C.), pp. 75–90. Burwell, F.G., Gompert, D.C., Lebl, L.S., Lodal, J.M. and Slocombe, W.B. (2006), Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture, Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, Policy Paper, March, www.acus.org/ docs/0603-Transatlantic_Transformation.pdf. Bush, G.W. (2006), The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C., March, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf. Cohen, W.S. (1997), Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May, www. defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/. Davis, P.K. (2002), Effects-Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_ reports/MR1477/. Defense News (2004), “NATO: Allies in Action? Results Fall Far Short of Visions, Promises”, 19 July. Echevarria, A.J. (2004), Toward an American Way of War, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, March, www.strategicstudiesinstitute. army.mil/pdffiles/PUB374.pdf. Erlanger, S. (2002), “Rapid-Reaction Force Gets Support From NATO Ministers”, in New York Times, p. 1. Flanagan, S.J. (2004), “America’s Aspirations for NATO”, in Internationale Politik (Transatlantic Edition) 5 (Fall) 3, pp. 7–12. Flournoy, M.A. (2006), “Did the Pentagon Get the Quadrennial Defense Review Right?”, in Washington Quarterly 29 (Spring) 2, pp. 67–84.

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Hundley, R.O. (1999), Past Revolutions, Future Transformation: What can the History of Revolutions in Military Affairs tell us about Transforming the U.S. Military?, MR-1029-DARPA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND). Krepinevich, A.F. (1994), “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions”, in National Interest, 37 (Fall), pp. 30–42. Kujat, H. (2003), The Transformation of NATO’s Military Forces and its Link with U.S. Transformation, Speech at SACLANT’s Seminar “Open Road”, Norfolk, VA, 21 January 2003, www.nato.int/ims/2003/s030121e.htm. Marshall, A,W. (1993), Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions, Memorandum for the Record, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Office of Net Assessment, July 27, 2003. Ministry of Defense (2003), Operations in Iraq: First Reflections, London, July, www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/0A6289F6-898B-44C5-9C9D-B8040274DC25/0/ opsiniraq_first_reflections_dec03.pdf. NATO (2002), Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November, www.nato.int/docu/ pr/2002/p02-127e.htm. Owens, M.T. (2006), “A Balanced Force Structure To Achieve a Liberal World Order”, in Orbis 50 (Spring) 2, pp. 307–325. Pena, C.V. (2006), “A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror”, in Orbis 50 (Spring) 2, pp. 289–306. Rumsfeld, D.R. (2006), Speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security, 4 February, www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_konfere nzen=&sprache=en&id=164&. Schreer, B. (2003), Die Transformation der US-Streitkräfte im Lichte des Irakkriegs, S 48 December (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). Shalikashvili, J.M. (1996), Joint Vision 2010, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, www.dtic.mil/jv2010/jv2010.pdf. Shelton, H.H. (2000), Joint Vision 2020, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm. US Department of Defense (2003), Transformation Planning Guidance, April, www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_129_Transformation_Planning_ Guidance_April_2003_1.pdf. US Department of Defense (2006), Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C., February 6, www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf. Wall Street Journal (2004), “NATO is Stretched to the Limit”, 21 June. de Wijk, R. (2004), “The Implications for Force Transformation: The Small Country Perspective”, in Hamilton, D.S. (ed.), Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations), pp. 115–145. White, J.W. (2005), Transformation For What? U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, December, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ PUB635.pdf.

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Young, T.-D. (2003), “The Revolution in Military Affairs and Coalition Operations: Problem Areas and Solutions”, in Defense & Security Analysis 19, 2, pp. 111– 130.

Chapter 8

Plug to Operate: Command and Coordination of Armed Forces in Europe in Times of Transformation Ralph Thiele

Security The Third World War would possibly have started somewhere between the German towns of Mellrichstadt and Bad Soden-Allendorf – i.e., in the so-called Fulda Gap. Starting from here, the Warsaw Pact tanks were supposed to head toward the Atlantic via Frankfurt and Bonn. Fortunately, this Cold War threat remained pure theory. However, if we look at the quantity and quality of tanks, aircraft, warships and missiles stockpiled in the inventory of the Warsaw Pact it must be considered the decisive force determining NATO and European defense requirements for decades. Now that the East-West confrontation has ended and the iron curtain has fallen, we are faced with war on a global scale – the global war on terrorism. The terrorist attacks on the New York Twin Towers and other targets on 11 September 2001 have fundamentally altered security strategies. Over the past two centuries, the main objective of international order was the limitation of inter-state wars. This is no longer true. Security in the 21st century is in permanent flux. It is complex and global. Plenty of factors that determine the security situation are not only challenging by themselves, but even more so when they are interrelated or combined. Just imagine terrorists getting access to weapons of mass destruction, for example. These profound changes are illustrated in some regions of the world by the fact that state structures are dissolving or do not exist at all. Wars are waged beyond state structures, and are increasingly characterized by economization and ideologization − conditions similar to those in early medieval Europe or during the Thirty Years’ War. Many of today’s risks such as terrorism and organized crime are transnational in nature and originate from problems, which exist within rather than between states. The rise of non-state actors ready to use force and the lack or failure of state structures in various regions of the globe coincide with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ongoing regional conflicts.

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Non-state actors prefer an asymmetrical use of force. The security challenges they pose are less visible than the security challenges we traditionally faced. They are more distant, more difficult to identify and much too ambiguous to be predictable. Non-state actors do not observe international standards nor do they comply with arms control agreements. They make use of territories where they do not have to expect any sanctions because there is no functioning state system which would apply sanctions or because the state in question is too weak to impose sanctions. Many use organized force – including war – as a means of enforcing their economic interests and those of their clients. In most cases, their objective is to exploit resources in the territories under their control, exploit the population or siphon off international assistance. Quite often, these activities involve forms of internationally organized crime. As a result, corruption and organized crime are encouraged, and the national and international economies are undermined. A Paradigm Change The altered security environment has led to a paradigm change in the way to define security needs. Unusual types of conflict and adversaries keep forcing to adjust concepts and instruments of ensuring security. The most probable future enemy will not be equal – neither in numbers nor in technology. But he will consistently try to exploit the weaknesses of the modern knowledge and information society. Critical infrastructure has become a security issue of key importance. Under these conditions, the distinctions between key concepts of traditional security policy – “domestic” and “foreign”, “war” and “peace” as well as “combatants” and “non-combatants” – become blurred and potentially dysfunctional. In the wake of recent terrorist attacks and natural catastrophes, individual nations – as diverse in nature as the USA, Sweden, Singapore and Australia – have started to adapt their security concepts, capabilities and capacities to meet the new challenges. Yet, almost five years after 11 September 2001, many Europeans still believe in traditional security, particularly in the tripartite categorization of military defense, civil protection, and consequence management. International risks, however, that cross boundaries and have the potential for inflicting mass casualties, definitely require new approaches and close interaction between a large number of public and private stakeholders. The growing relevance of non-state actors in their multiple, frequently enigmatic variants has weakened or even broken up the traditional, nation-state based patterns of relations between security actors. The formerly existing division of responsibility and labour is no longer adequate when it comes to dealing with the given security challenges, providing the necessary degree of inter- and intra-agency coordination and ensuring a smooth cooperation between the public security sector and non-state actors relevant to security. Nation states are no longer able to ensure their internal and external security on their own. They are no longer the only driving force for political processes.

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Rather, they need to interact with a diverse group of security actors. Peace, security and prosperity are more interconnected than ever. Nations need to cooperate with other nations and organizations to prevent state failures and contribute in time and effectively to peace and security, democracy and prosperity, development and the rule of law. Close cooperation and coordination between international organizations – particularly between the United Nations, the European Union and NATO – is of utmost importance with regard to their respective roles in crisis prevention and crisis management. Obviously, former military concepts and capabilities no longer meet the new challenges to security. In the past, military components fought more or less independently from each other – under command and control which was joint only at a comparatively high level. Unity of effort was predominantly achieved through coordination and de-confliction. A sequential planning cycle aimed at attrition. Targets were attacked more or less indiscriminately. Collateral damage was rather the rule than the exception. In contrast, a much stronger integration of effort, services and agencies will be needed in future. The new challenges require better and different capabilities to provide for security. “Asymmetrical” threats by their very nature aim at the vulnerability of an entire society. A dramatically increased complexity in combination with strikingly reduced reaction times delivers a clear message: internationally orchestrated, interdepartmental network centric capabilities are the answer to the upcoming asymmetric security challenges. This requires a government networking policy which is geared toward strengthening interagency leadership and builds on the notion of network centric, effects-based, and capability driven security governance. “Governing by network” is the conceptual response to the nature of the altered security situation. It is based on a comprehensive security concept which is aimed at preventing crises, combating them once they have escalated, mitigating their impacts, and providing stabilization in their aftermath. The relevant security instruments include, e.g. diplomacy, information, military, law enforcement, and economy. The range of security tasks to be accomplished in this context includes conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilization. A systematic networking of all relevant security actors and levels of decision-making and implementation – from the international level within NATO, the EU and the United Nations to local levels of interaction – drastically improves situational awareness and understanding. It increases transparency, shortens decision-making cycles, and enhances the ability to employ instruments rapidly (Thiele 2005). It ensures a deliberate and superior exploitation of one’s own possibilities and optimises − also in an interagency context − the cost-benefit equation through speed, precision, selectivity and parallel, integrated action. The transformation of the national security architecture aims at pushing interagency interaction to levels not seen before. The application of military, diplomatic, and economic power needs to be part of a comprehensive concept. Otherwise it is hardly possible to build a lasting peace, as was illustrated by operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Military capabilities need to be embedded into a grand

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strategy, an “overall package” of governmental and/or international measures. The military contributions need to be well harmonized with other governmental or international instruments. Consequently, armed forces cannot longer focus primarily on traditional combat operations but need to reorient themselves toward greater flexibility as this will enable them to deal with the whole spectrum of asymmetric challenges. The measures they may take to counter these challenges range from de-conflicting joint operations to integrated and even interdependent operations – the motto is: massing effects rather than forces. Particular stabilization operations have seen a shift from combat tasks to policing tasks. Addressing the root causes and the consequences of these new conflicts requires new types of operations. Thus, there is a need for operational concepts that help blending civil and military capabilities on the one hand and the integration of non-state actors on the other. Capabilities for interagency and joint planning are required as well as command and coordination capabilities which ensure that the most appropriate means are employed. In this context it is quite obvious that better information is needed, as better processes and tools to design and conduct network enabled operations in an interagency context, including international and non-governmental partners. Interagency action needs to be focused on those elements within the opponent’s system, which are most important to decision making. In this context, it really does not matter who provides the capabilities. Diplomatic, economic, police or military instruments will be chosen with respect to their specific impact on the opponent’s will and with a view to the overall strategy. Flexibility and adaptability are crucial elements. An early employment of non-military instruments of power is essential. Much expertise resides in civilian agencies and non-government organizations. To this end, the transformation of our security architecture – including the armed forces – cannot do without a realignment of the overall security mechanisms toward the new challenges. This has become a prerequisite for remaining politically relevant. Our security institutions need to be able to set up, implement, assess and further develop security strategies that adequately mirror today’s and tomorrow’s security risks. Doctrine, concepts and security planning in general have to be correlated with likely missions. Restructuring the security architecture and providing for integrated security management should thus become a key task for NATO and the European Union. It becomes obvious that the security structure in most European countries and beyond is in need of a serious overhaul. An effects-based approach to security – as has been initiated for NATO through the North Atlantic Comprehensive Guidance of December 2005 − requires an all-government enterprise architecture that effectively bridges current organizational stovepipes. Transformation The process of future-orientated, long-term transition is meant when we speak of the “transformation” of the armed forces. It aims at integrating the military into

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an overall concept of government and multinational actions through modernization and structural adjustment. Innovative concepts must be elaborated in parallel with technological developments and in close cooperation with coalition partners. The nature of transformation itself results from a combination of profound technological changes and adequately developed tactics and doctrine, which are designed to exploit the new technology. They must be complemented by a reconfigured defense organization, which provides institutional support in terms of coordinating military needs and industrial efforts (Scruggs 2006). Military innovations are transformational in nature when they make existing modes of warfare obsolete. Machine guns made Napoleonic tactics and organizations obsolete. Tanks made trench warfare obsolete. Transformational armed forces make traditional armed forces obsolete as they are better deployable, more agile and adaptable to the dynamic developments in theatre. Apart from that, they are more precise than their predecessors when it comes to achieving the desired effects. Consequently, the defense transformation embraced by several nations, induces considerable changes. In fact, the armed forces of these nations have gone a long way in redesigning their concepts, capabilities, processes and structures. Today, the transformation process is about to enter a new stage, which is aimed at transferring transformational core principles from service levels to interagency and political levels. Technology Nations and security related organizations are taking advantage of emerging technologies to improve operational effectiveness through the networking of capabilities in a step by step approach. Information and communication technologies provide the tools which enable us to interlink specific elements to meet the requirements of a given task, even if these elements belong to different organizations and are located on different continents. There is a quantum leap of improvements. They allow an organization to more closely align its network with its processes, making the network more responsive, more flexible, and more effective at addressing everyday operations, as well as high-tempo operations and emergency responses. And they enable an organization to embed security deep within its infrastructure, to protect assets and respond quickly to challenges. Appropriate security mechanisms allow to use the efficiencies and effectiveness gained by moving to a networked environment, without placing operations at risk i.e. vis-à-vis hackers. Modern networks streamline and synthesize the flow of information, integrating a complex array of proprietary networks, systems, and applications. Based on standards-compliant components and technologies, they can interoperate smoothly with existing systems. And they can scale to support thousands of users on the network at the same time. Sophisticated information technology systems ensure that all relevant data are globally available in real time. Intelligent, web-based benchmarking systems considerably improve the learning curve of organizations. High-performance knowledge management systems make

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the acquired knowledge available wherever it is needed. Information technology enables to bundle particularly administrative tasks and perform them in almost any corner of the world. In the business world, those who can make immediate and most efficient use of the available information and take the right decisions turn this information into competitive advantages and thereby gain an edge over their competitors. By enabling critical relationships between people, organizations and technological entities it has become possible to accelerate the speed of processes, decision-making and subsequent actions dramatically. This approach can and needs to be transferred to the armed forces as it will enable them to meet future challenges. Military network centric concepts constitute a military equivalent to this business approach as they translate information advantages into superior combat power. By putting timely, accurate information in the hands of the right people in the right location, a force can gain a significant competitive advantage. This type of mission-critical information plays an even more crucial role today, as defense establishments look to new technology to extend the power of information to every aspect of their organizations. Defense agencies and armed forces are redefining themselves by investing in information technology to create a closely integrated, tightly synchronized force. Consequently, networking sensors, munitions, logistics and command and control systems became the focus of US transformation. Priority issues included development of very high-tech capabilities geared to information superiority, longrange precision strikes and space control.1 In sum, the Pentagon reconfigured its entire institutional framework for war-fighting methods based on Network Centric Concepts. Step by step, the scope was broadened to include improved jointness, more expeditionary capabilities, training, personnel and logistics. Finally, strategies to counter opponents in non-traditional warfare and a possible employment of weapons of mass destruction were added. US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have – despite all the improvements that are still necessary – underlined the power of network centric approaches. A Common Relevant Operating Picture in near real time has become reality. The 1st Cavalry Division demonstrated in Baghdad between March 2004 and March 2005 its deployed ability to display operational manoeuvres to commanders scattered over the battlefield. This took place via a secure net, in real time and while they were on the move (Hollis 2005: 7). The sensor data available down to the platoon commander level were fused to include geospatial information systems databases. This provided for a much richer situational awareness than ever seen before (Murphy 2005). A number of operational advantages could be generated. Routine command decisions were pushed down the chain-of-command. Command staffs needed less time for collecting information and could invest more time in analyzing and acting on the commanders’ decisions. More knowledge was passed horizontally across 1 Andrew Krepinevich, “Transforming The American Military”, speech given at George Bush School of Government on 1 September 1997.

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forces. This proved particularly useful in counterinsurgency operations where a quick passing of information has always been critical. Military leaders were able to transmit detailed observations about insurgent tactics and locations within minutes and hours. Network Centric Network centric capabilities are the core element of the transformational armed forces as they significantly enhance the military capability profile. At the heart of Network Centric Operations are the information processing and communication technologies that have revolutionized commercial business. Leveraging these technologies for defense purposes has altered the relationship between the military services, the defense administration, supporting institutions and industry. These alterations result from the fact that they make it possible to reach a hitherto unprecedented level of synchronization of forces and supporting activities. Command and control, surveillance and systems automation have increased by orders of magnitude in the past decade. Command and coordination is the nexus of Network Centric Operations. In fact, it may be one of the few areas where reality is matching or exceeding our huge expectations. “Network centric operations” is a visionary concept for military operations. It is based on a joint, interoperable information and communication network that connects sensors, decision makers and weapons. Recent developments in the field of information and communications technology permit the integration of all areas relevant to security, including the fusion of data and knowledge gained through reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence, in federations of networks. Each network consists of components with clearly defined open interfaces. This guarantees interoperability and permanent stepwise innovation. An appropriate information and communication infrastructure provides all participants with access to high-quality information services. Three networks are of particular importance: • •

•

In the information network, information for joint and combined armed forces is received, processed, transmitted, memorised and protected; The sensor network provides the sensors required for the respective task. It comprises not only the typical warfare sensors such as radar but also integrates, for example, logistic sensors or satellites. It is specifically tailored to the specific task on hand; The effects-producing network likewise connects weapons systems, planners, decision makers and the employed instruments of power, which have to convey the desired effect to the target. It is dynamic and combines sensors and effectproducing systems in accordance with the task on hand.

All networks are closely interconnected with often overlapping components. This approach leads to a number of central considerations:

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Distance Doesn’t Matter In the past, armed forces and their support elements had to be near the target to be engaged. Otherwise they could not develop their full combat power because of the immanent constraints in terms of communication, movement and effect projection. Armed forces had to be massed because geographically dispersed troops were weak and not able to react quickly, launch a concentrated attack, maintain cohesion or ensure logistic support. This involved considerable risks in terms of vulnerability and sustainability. Moreover, movements, communication, coordination, etc., were quite time-consuming and cost-intensive. Due to the extended range of sensors and weapons and because of the everimproving efficiency of communication and information systems, geographical restrictions keep shrinking. With network centric capabilities, the efficiency of a sensor or weapon can be exploited in different battlefields and sometimes even different regions at the same time. Information, as well as the resulting decisions and effects can reach the desired destination “with the speed of light”. Information can be collected, analyzed and evaluated anywhere, decisions can be taken and effects can be planned anywhere – yet, they are available where they are needed. Concentration of Effect Modern information and communication technologies enable armed forces to contribute to the terminal effectiveness while they keep moving and remain geographically distant from the adversary. It is not the concentration of forces but the concentration of effect in terms of time and space which is becoming the key to success. Condensing Time Modern information technologies drastically condense the time dimension. This primarily concerns the time needed to receive, collect and evaluate information. At the same time, the quantity and quality of the available information increase. In view of the little time nowadays needed for processing, evaluation and consideration, the decision-making process itself is becoming a bottleneck. Consequently, network centric approaches are making efficient use of modern information technology to achieve a higher speed and better quality in decisionmaking. When fighting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the US armed forces needed 20 minutes for the sensor-to-shooter process, 18 minutes of which were required for the command and control process. Of these 18 minutes 8 minutes were needed to pass hierarchical levels. This clearly indicates the urgent need for decentralization and flat hierarchies. Improved Situational Awareness The network gives defense forces the ability to better understand a situation, and allows dispersed personnel to simultaneously and accurately evaluate and respond to each situation. The network improves communications, coordination, and collaboration, to create greater operational efficiencies. And it boosts the effectiveness of military personnel in achieving goals or targets never achievable before. In the future, it will play a vital role in

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creating environments that empower the military to take proactive measures such as minimizing the impact of a natural disaster, or dissuading a potential adversary from taking a threatening course of action. Forces will be able to access information quickly enough to anticipate the impact of a situation and positively influence the outcome. An adequately designed network provides the foundation to integrate surveillance, reconnaissance, military intelligence, weapon and IT systems, and applications required to run successful command and control operations. It enables the protection of sensitive information, helping to ensure that sensitive communications and data are available only to authorized personnel. It streamlines the delivery of information, even from multiple sources and locations. By offering support for data, voice, and video transmissions, it gives forces a complete picture of a combat situation. Inside the Adversary’s Decision Cycle Information operations support one’s own capability to collect, process and distribute data in an uninterrupted information flux while denying such capabilities to the adversary or impeding his respective efforts. Information superiority is of decisive importance as it not only increases the effectiveness of one’s own actions, but also boosts one’s own competitiveness visà-vis friends and adversaries. A particular challenge is to shorten the decision cycle to operate inside the adversary’s decision cycle with quality, dynamic, and missioncritical information. Mission Orientation A well-informed, controlled and supported unit organizes its activities on the battlefield itself. This is a modern variant of mission-oriented command and control. The required information about the commander’s intent and the situation on the battlefield is provided via the network. This enables the units to synchronize themselves within the overall operational context and operate with great efficiency on the basis of accepted solid rules of engagement. Responsibility and the respective missions are assigned dynamically and as is appropriate to the respective situation. On the other hand, this further reduces the time needed for the command and control process and on the other it accelerates the tempo of one’s own operations. Managing the Battle Space Command and control under network centric conditions means a broad-scale, detailed “management of the battle space”. This is particularly true for stabilization operations. The dramatically increased transparency of the battlefield in combination with the still existing black areas which are characterized by their very low information density are the particular conditions of a 4-block-war. The necessitate a high adjustment flexibility, improvization and mission-oriented decentralization. A flexible manoeuvre system must permanently adapt itself to rapidly changing situations and move data rather than units. People and sensors identify and report what can be detected. Software-based decision support, modeling

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and simulation meet time and decision quality requirements, fill information gaps and facilitate rapid and adequate decision-making. Virtual Organizations As networks reduce the significance of the location of sensors, decision makers and effectors, the possibilities for cooperation and integration increase. Virtual organizations bring together the participating governmental and non-governmental actors, with weapon systems and other instruments of power, sensors and decision makers for a specific task. Once the task has been completed these resources are available for new tasks. Virtual organizations support a comprehensive and nevertheless shortened command and control process and thus enable us to increase the operational tempo, which is the key element when it comes to obtaining a competitive advantage on the battlefield. They are able to achieve this by turning an 8-hour or 12-hour-day into a 24-hour-day as they reduce the non-productive time in the processes and are able to run processes in parallel. Effects Based Given the multi-faceted character of current security challenges, an effects-based approach has become the key philosophy. This approach involves the comprehensive and orchestrated application of all instruments of Alliance power – military as nonmilitary instruments – to create effects that will achieve desired outcomes. “EffectsBased Operations” (EBO) are closely related to the network centric concepts and constitute the emerging NATO concept for dealing with all aspects of security operations. This approach includes an enhanced situational awareness, timely operational planning and decision-making and an improved linking of command and coordination with sensors and instruments of power. These features become visible on the tactical and the operational, on the strategic and the political level through a common relevant operational picture. Crossfunctional information sources and services like meteorological data, geodetic data, intelligence and open sources information will feed an information pool that holds all available information for operations. On the tactical and operational level functional services select the various products from networked databases with regard to clearly selected criteria and route it to a role based operational picture that displays all relevant information for a given mission. Through linking commanders with military units and weapon systems the available information and knowledge may be used for battle management, command, control, communication and engagement missions. A system of system analysis capability collects, stores and displays information and assessments needed from the strategic to the political level for their respective awareness, but also provides the necessary information for the tactical and the operational level. “Effects-based operations” (EBO) integrate the effects of military action into a “grand strategy” with its intended results. Based on an integrated politico-strategic guidance, a coherent plan with military and non-military elements of governments

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and NGOs is developed. A subsequent strategic framework provides a proper structure for the effects-based operations of all actors involved. The elements to be considered include common and updated documentation, multinational training, a closing of interoperability gaps, an awareness of cultural sensitivities, and a standardized terminology. The core capability of EBO is a superior command and control process which − based on a network of governmental and non-governmental expert knowledge and instruments of power − makes it possible to project all available instruments of power at an early stage and in an integrated fashion in order to achieve a maximum effect. As a rule, this effort will employ the means best suited for attaining an objective. The latter needs to be clearly defined well in advance. The effects-based approach amalgamates planning and decision-making, which used to be independent processes, into a single coherent, simulation-based process. Effects can be defined as outcomes resulting from the deliberate use of a coordinated set of actions involving all relevant state and non-state capabilities, primarily those based on measures in the fields of diplomacy, information, economy and the military. The aim is to shape the behaviour of actors and to influence conditions with a view to the overall goal to be achieved. Minimizing damage caused by military operations as well as avoiding collateral damage as far as possible facilitate reconstruction in the post-conflict phase. Therefore, this is a key goal of national and international efforts. Consequently, the effects-based approach envisages close civil-military interaction. In order to create the desired effects, a systems approach is necessary. In such an approach, the key actors are analyzed from various perspectives, with particular attention paid to political, military, economic and social, information and infrastructure aspects. Effects-based thinking is about increasing coherency by integrating the various instruments of state power and non-governmental capabilities. This cannot be done without integrated strategies. Coming up with strategies that are genuinely joint and combined and reflect a well orchestrated inter-agency approach is, however, not a trivial job (Drechsler 2005). It requires a common understanding of and agreement on the risks and challenges to be met, the tasks to be accomplished and the contributions to be delivered together and by each individual department and service. Integrated strategies require integrated planning processes and cycles. In practice, this means that the planning of tasks and duties has to be reallocated. Effects-based operations require new knowledge which is to be based on a holistic analysis of the target to be addressed. This profound and broad knowledge base needs to enable planners to include all aspects of an adversary system in own planning and decision-making processes. The inclusion of relevant expert knowledge must be ensured. Providing relevant insights requires intensified cooperation with academic disciplines in terms of social, cultural, and regional studies − in particular those disciplines which are not part of the normal intelligence repertoire. In addition, there is a serious need to manage open sources professionally. In this context, it is essential to take account of the knowledge requirements of all stakeholders in the broadened spectrum.

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Today, the primary hurdle is the question of how to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence data – at a interdepartmental level within the respective governments, at an allied and NGO level (Borchert 2005). On top, intelligence services need to cooperate with new stakeholders in order to get access to untapped sources of information. For many years, intelligence cooperation has been a stepchild of NATO, and the situation in the European Union is hardly better. However, the intelligence community must play a key role, particularly when it comes to building and maintaining the knowledge base for effects-based operations. Terrorists cannot be identified via satellite or other remote imagery. We may know where suspected terrorists are but our sensors cannot tell us their intent, which is contextual in nature. The fact that the focus is put on interagency interaction means that the intelligence community has to serve several new clients, most importantly in the fields of stabilization operations and homeland security. Sharing knowledge is the key to solving this problem. There is an obvious need to establish policies, technologies and procedures for multinational information sharing. Transformation Tools “Concept development and experimentation” (CD&E) allows us to keep pace with the requirements of a dynamic, challenging security environment (Thiele 2004). It is the underlying method and tool of the transformation process. A successful change from the traditional platform centric attrition warfare of the past to a network centric and effect centric employment concept necessitates numerous adjustments in the structure and process organization, especially in the military command and control culture. The respective concepts with their necessary changes of structures and capability profiles need to be tried and tested in terms of practicability, efficiency and weak points. These tests must take place prior to the implementation of these concepts. This is the function of a systematic, persistent experimental process, which conveys transformation into the remotest areas of the armed forces. In this context, modeling and simulation are of particular significance. By applying the tool of modeling and simulation, innovations in technology, conceptual ideas as well as operational and organizational options can be critically reviewed with regard to their feasibility, reliability and political or military effects. Thus, control can be gained of the complexity, costs can be limited and our own response capability can be improved. Organization As the defense enterprise is transforming, it has to achieve concrete improvements in the quality of technical infrastructure, organizational alignment and procurement sourcing practices. All of these areas rely – either directly or indirectly – on the Network Centric Capabilities. These are changing the institutional culture of the military by enabling defense establishments to respond quickly to the changing landscape. To this end, national capabilities and contributions need to be gradually

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linked into federated, coherent, accessible, and operationally focused information networks. Efficient military capabilities will be concentrated in future in smaller and ever more specialized units of a modular structure, including commando troops and special forces such as paratroopers and the naval infantry. This reorganization affects all services, prominently army structures. While for decades corps and divisions were the cores of army structures, these are now tailored to future operations primarily employing brigades with a personnel strength of 1,500 to 3,000 troops. This development reflects network centric principles that envision smaller, lighter, more agile forces, which concentrate firepower when needed and then redeploy quickly to meet new challenges. The adoption and integration of new or improved technologies, capabilities, concepts, and processes into planning and operational activities will determine future success. To possess information superiority, an organization must have a robust network that can support the demands of today’s operations, and that provides a foundation of existing investments that can evolve and grow as technology and needs change. Today’s security networks increasingly reflect these requirements. Infrastructure and mindsets are migrating from sequential, point-to-point, and compartmentalized to an agile, collaborative environment that is rapidly evolving. Proprietary solutions are being replaced by open, interoperable systems. The networks are becoming robust, resilient, flexible, and secure. To keep pace with global technological and economic developments the transition of defense administrations into a defense enterprise is a fundamental requirement. This fact becomes particular visible in the outsourcing of major elements of support functions as seen in US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the in-theatre ratio of contractors to uniformed personnel was 1 to 100 during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the respective ratio was 10 to 100 in Operation Iraqi Freedom during its major combat operations in 2003. In 2006, the ratio of contractors to uniformed personnel is 35 to 100 in Iraq – this includes everything from personal security to food services or logistics to IT installation (Uttley 2005: 1). This development is not very different from the situation in the British Armed Forces. Never before have contractors provided support to the military on such a large scale. The scope of services has grown, too. Leveraging information processing and communication technologies for defense purposes not only requires but also facilitates much closer relationships among the military services, and also between defense administration, military services and defense industry. The driving forces of this interdependency are the rising cost of personnel, equipment and infrastructure, the decreasing access to resources, particularly money and – last but not least – experiences in current stabilization operations. Becoming leaner in terms of fighting capabilities and the ability to deploy rapidly for non-combat missions has its price. The consequence is a much greater dependency on the private sector in terms of sustainment. Many fundamental questions have still to be solved. What is an inherent government function? What are the rights

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of non-combatants supporting combatants on the battlefield? What authority has the government over contracted civilians in wartime environments? What are the principles of leadership in transformational organizations? The foreseeable complex operational environments inevitably require a well developed, adequate command and coordination that allows us to deal with both, complexity and responsiveness in a superior manner. Consequently, command structures should, above all, be characterized by decentralization and mission orientation to allow units to adjust to the new parameters rapidly and flexibly. Rigid, centralistic leadership structures mainly serve the purpose of preserving the status quo so that any new approach that includes innovation, tempo and flexibility can hardly be implemented. Consequently, military organizations have to move away from traditional centralized thinking and planning, and toward an decentralized approach to information sharing and availability. The network provides the principal elements, such as collaborative tools, storage, security, messaging, and mediation, creating a common platform that supports the full array of services and applications used by military forces. These services can be used across service or agency boundaries – transparently to the user. Users can pull the information they require, without relying on a top-down, “push” approach to intelligence and decision making. Decentralization and mission orientation means for the personnel involved that they need to be enabled to make decisions, meet targets and build up competence more quickly and better tailored to the situation than before. Like a seismograph, they are in a position which allows them to record any changes at a given location much earlier than slowly reacting centralized troops. They fuel creativity in the units much more directly than any central organization. At the same time, they support a modern, direct and motivating leadership approach. However, their most important advantage lies in the fact that they have profound knowledge of the conditions prevailing in their respective operational areas. As they are in direct contact with the other actors in their operational environment they understand the situation best. Against this background, information technology must explicitly be taken as an instrument which provides for decentralization. Up to now, information technology has rather been understood and used as a medium for centralization. In this context unified command and cost-efficiency are the desired goals. In reality, however, central agencies rather resemble a virtual “commander’s vantage point”, where electronic devices are used to compile ever more information. Moreover, central agencies are always geared toward standardizing information and procedures wherever possible in order to minimize their complexity and the cost of transaction. However, the standardization process neutralizes the specific requirements of local users so that specific capability potential – which is most important in terms of time, creativity and quality – is lost. This potential could be more than well exploited by means of state-of-the-art information and communication technology. Delivering desired effects across various agencies requires redesigned processes and organizational structures. Traditional hierarchies must not impede new interagency processes and bodies. To this end, it will be necessary to make sure

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that key processes and the allocation of resources, i.e. finance, human resources, technology, information and knowledge, and others follow a functional approach. Consequently, the NATO community and individual nations should – together with the European Union and other international organizations and non-governmental actors – enter into a serious debate about the impact of transformation on national security-related decision-making, interagency interaction, and political leadership, intelligence, training and education, and the role of the security and defense industry. Industry The defense environment benefits in times of transformation particularly from entrepreneurial flexibility, self-financed risk taking and the provision of integrated services. To turn technological breakthroughs into full-fledged capabilities requires close coordination between the military, industry and the defense administration. It takes quite some years before supporting tactics and doctrine follow a significant technological advance. Afterwards, procurement and sustainment methods have to be developed to make these systems decisive. Industry provides critical expertise, services and equipment to the armed forces. Transformation requires from the armed forces openness to new technologies, concepts and procedures and close cooperation with industry. But it affects industry almost in the same way. Process orientation as well as the emphasis on cost cutting and just-in-time production have motivated companies to integrate suppliers, distributors, clients and even competitors into corporate value chains. The extended enterprise has become more flexible, but also more dependent. Consequently both, governments and companies have to adopt more holistic approaches in order to realign their goals with dynamic changes in the relevant environment, the demands of different stakeholders and the organizational architecture required to accomplish their key missions. Today’s defense industry has – unfortunately – different opinions when it comes to the issue of transformation. Some have strong interests in new technologies and focus their influence and investments accordingly. Others have invested for decades in so-called legacy systems and are reluctant to abandon them. Transformation requires the defense industry to come up with new business models. The focus on platforms and large volumes has no future. It needs to be replaced by capabilitybased system-of-systems approaches that allow for a swift integration of technology into armed forces and security forces. Consequently, there must be a serious concept development and experimentation phase prior to fielding of any new equipment. Of course, some legacy systems will stay in the inventory for decades and still need maintenance, upgrading, etc. Another transformational aspect in the industrial sector is the fact, that the generation of intellectual property in the form of scientific and technological knowhow is becoming a driving force of innovation. Europe and its nations should build on this development and establish intellectual property clusters in the security and

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defense technology industry. Using these clusters would allow us to take a systematic approach and coordinate the capabilities and capacities of the various players from the scientific and research sector, from the political domain, the governmental realm and from the economy. In particular, these clusters would allow optimum exploitation of the synergistic effects produced by the various scientific and technological fields. Besides the traditional and the upcoming transformational defense business, there is a new security business starting up. Its driving forces are mainly interagency and homeland security requirements.2 Unlike the defense sector, where there is – more or less – only one key client, the new, expanded security market requires companies to act at different federal and sub-national levels and to understand the requirements of different clients, such as police and law enforcement forces, fire fighters, emergency medical services and others. Making Military Transformation Real The NATO Response Force and the Battle Groups are fundamental tools and the catalysts (Schneiderhan 2006: 12) of transformational developments in NATO and the EU. Both organizations need network enabling capabilities for their security and defense policy. The NATO Response Force is the core of the emerging capability of the European NATO members for effects-based, network centric operations. It will not only ensure military interoperability in the information age. Far beyond the ability to “plug to operate” this is the very foundation for political cooperability. It is the entry ticket to political relevance, to having a voice at the table when it comes to developing strategies and policies in key multinational fora. The NRF is supposed to become a highly effective, high-readiness force and, therefore, an essential building block of joint European preventive security. Having reached Full Operational Capability in October 2006 the NRF will have the capability of a “Demonstrative Force Package” or, within the scope of major NATO operations, of an “Initial Entry Force”. Within the scope of “Non-combatant Evacuation Operations”, “Crisis Response Operations” and “Embargo Operations” as well as in support of “Consequence Management” or “Counter-Terrorism Operations” it will be self-sustainable. Within the scope of the Battle Group Concept it is intended to start in 2007 with two permanently available, high-readiness Battle Groups which will be rapidly deployable and have a strength of approximately 1,500 troops. They will be at the disposal of the European Union to improve its capability for rapid crisis management within the next few years. Hence, Europe is obtaining a military instrument, which will play in the same league as the NATO Response Force. Thus, the capability of NATO and the European Union for rapid crisis reaction will substantially gain in weight and relevance.

2

See: The Security Economy (Paris: OECD, 2004).

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The EU and NATO have repeatedly stressed the importance of de-conflicting member state commitments to the EU Battle Groups and the NATO Response Force. In fact, they should rather search for options to make capabilities available for prospective operations. As soon a crisis escalates both organizations would soon be dependant on each other’s support. Although the NRF and the Battle Groups have both reached the “initial operational capability”, they currently struggle to reach full operational capability. At least a coordinating mechanism is necessary to ensure that the two organizations become able to react to mounting crises. A merging of both concepts in the mid- or long-term perspective would be even better. While a strength of roughly 20,000 personnel makes the NRF possibly too bulky to succeed, the Battle Groups with their focus on land forces and their lack of jointness – along with their small size – will be inappropriate to succeed vis-à-vis modern security challenges. Both concepts need to be developed toward a highly responsive, integrated, joint force with inherent network centric capabilities. Both should operate on the same doctrinal foundation and within the same set of interoperability standards as they are provided out of single sets of national forces. Within the European Headline Goal Germany has earmarked a maximum of 18,000 troops for an initial crisis intervention contingent. This includes the German contribution to the EU Battle Group. The German contribution to the NATO Response Force consists of 5,000 troops which are to be deployable at any given time. This necessitates a total of 15,000 soldiers in view of the fact that there must be a national preparation phase, followed by NATO certification, and the stand-by phase itself. In addition, 1,000 to 2,000 soldiers need to be reserved for operations under the United Nations Standby Arrangements Systems and for national evacuation purposes. Consequently: •

•

•

Response forces of up to 35,000 troops are earmarked for high-intensity, combined joint network centric operations. They will be capable of undertaking peace enforcement operations against an adversary that is predominantly organized along military lines. Response forces are made up of land, air and maritime components with joint support assets. Stabilization forces for joint multinational operations of low and medium intensity and longer duration consist of about 70,000 personnel. Up to 14,000 of these will be available for a maximum of five parallel operations at any given time. They are capable of monitoring ceasefire agreements, separating the parties to a conflict, enforcing embargo measures, eliminating peace disturbers and can perform many other measures, too. Operations for conflict prevention and crisis management may require the simultaneous or successive employment of response and stabilization forces, between which there is an operational interplay. Support forces comprise a total of some 147,500 personnel. This number includes soldiers undergoing training and 2,500 posts for reserve troops. Yet, their main task is to provide comprehensive, sustainable, joint support of

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Bundeswehr operations at home and abroad, including the organizations for command and control and training. Peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces differ in their specific characteristics. Unfortunately, the dividing line between the two types of forces is not always clearcut. The missions can merge with one another or overlap within the same theatre of operations. As a consequence, network centric capabilities will become the key feature of the Bundeswehr transformation process. Forces capable of enforcing peace have to overwhelm the adversary rapidly while minimizing their own losses. This requires them to be joint, interoperable and network centric capable. Stabilization forces also have to be network centric capable, but to a lesser extent. They operate predominantly against an asymmetric threat, separating warring factions, protecting civilians, and securing governmental authority and infrastructure. Already the Defense Policy Guidelines published in 2003 and the Concept of the Bundeswehr published in August 2004 emphasize the growing international role of Germany’s armed forces and the need to provide adequate capabilities. Therefore the envisaged capability profile of the Bundeswehr puts a prime focus on command and control, intelligence collection and reconnaissance, mobility, effective engagement, support and sustainability, and survivability and protection. In parallel, Germany has assumed leading roles in key transformation areas such as concept development and experimentation and information operations. In sum, the German transformation is consistently geared toward an improved Bundeswehr mission performance in the most probable operational scenarios: conflict prevention and crisis management, including international anti-terror operations. To this end, tasks, capabilities and equipment have to be harmonized with the available financial resources. Bundeswehr transformation is designed as a continuous proactive advancement process – a process of continuous renewal, a process toward structural flexibility and learning ability. Europe’s Transformational Future Europe is vulnerable. It has global interests. The spectrum of security challenges – particularly cross-national threats – exceeds existing capabilities. Consolidating peace and preventing war are the key security challenges that Europe and its transatlantic partners are facing. In its Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003, the European Union states that it is “inevitably a global player”.3 Consequently, the strategy calls attention to global issues, i.e. terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts state failure and organized crime. And the strategy urges to “develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention”. To this end the European states have to coordinate their respective policies and instruments to make them both more effective and 3 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 1.

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efficient. The EU now needs to optimize, orchestrate, and network its plentitude of instruments. Its potential is unmatched, particularly when it comes to stabilization operations, but it currently still suffers from a lack of coherence and the duplication of strategic options in the civilian, police and military sectors. Thus, it is essential to push forward the development of common capabilities in terms of an integrating, transformational approach. A dedicated and well-coordinated transformation process is needed, one that enables the Europeans to take the necessary big step forward toward becoming a serious security actor. The key ingredients to such a transformation strategy are not difficult to identify. A comprehensive political guidance would set the frame. The strategy itself would focus on providing for stability in a broad, interagency approach to pave the way for integrated civil-military capabilities. A joint philosophy needs to include all instruments of private and public power. This transformation strategy would feature a coherent architecture where every security-relevant public and private agency can plug in to operate. It would build on network centric and effectsbased concepts and create common situational awareness and understanding among all actors involved. The transformation process needs to be supported by a viable Concept Development and Experimentation process and powerful Modeling and Simulation tools. All of this is available and established in several member nations of NATO and the EU. Particularly civil-military and public-private interaction can and must be drastically improved. Even though structures have been established to ensure that civilian and military aspects are taken into account in the decision-making process, it is quite obvious that the lack of a codified concept hampers full civil-military coordination despite all progress made up to now. Today’s security risks no longer fall into the confines of either military or civil authorities or single national governments. A plentitude of private actors – in particular multinational companies and operators of critical services – play a key role. By improving their own safety and security they help improve national and international security as well. Consequently, a strong emphasis will have to be put on improved civil-military and interagency interaction; it has to be complemented by consequent transformation activities. Transformation aims at adapting existing governance instruments and processes to meet the challenges of the 21st century. To this end, transformation advocates a strategic, multinational, multilevel, and future-oriented interagency process that helps increase the coherent use of diplomatic, informational, economic and military instruments of power. Cooperation between NATO and the EU needs to be advanced in order to synchronize these security activities (Smith 2006). This is particularly important for civil-military cooperation, which plays a key role in effects-based operations. This, however, depends to a major degree on the EU’s own responsibilities in this area. Having a good policy document such as the European Security Strategy is not enough. The strategy requires further detailing and translation into actual capabilities including command and coordination. Security in the 21st century demands a degree of excellence higher and broader than ever before. The contribution of armed forces makes their ability to cooperate

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a fundamental requirement. Interoperability therefore needs to be a focal point of the armed forces’ development along with agility, flexibility, responsiveness and effectiveness. But the armed forces are not going to act by themselves. The orchestration of all available civil and military, governmental and non-governmental capabilities in the transatlantic and European context is critical to European security. Deconfliction and coordination are necessary first steps on the transformational road. But these steps will not be enough. Integration and even orchestration of these capabilities are essential. Not all of the involved instruments need to be new and front end, but they need to be able to “plug to operate” and produce the desired outcome in a synergistic manner. References Borchert, H. (2005), “Die unterentwickelte Beziehung: Zur Zusammenarbeit von Wirtschaft und Nachrichtendiensten”, in Borchert, H. (ed.), Verstehen, dass die Welt sich geändert hat, pp. 113–121. Drechsler, D. (2005), “Reconstructing the Interagency Process after Iraq”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 28:1 (February 2005), pp. 3–30. Hollis, P.S. (2005), “The 1st Cav in Baghdad: Counterinsurgency EBO in Dense Urban Terrain”, FA Journal, US Army, Sept–Oct 2005. Murphy, D. (2005), “Network Enabled Operations”, OIF: Initial Impressions, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, March 2005, Vol. 06–05. Schneiderhan, W. (2006), “Die Streitkräfte im Transformationsprozess”, Europäische Sicherheit, 2/2006. Scruggs, D. (2006), “Transforming the Security Sector”, CSIS, US-German Bilateral Dialogue, Energy and Security, Washington, D.C., February 2006. Smith, J. (2006), “Partners or Rivals? The EU-NATO Relationship”, CSIS pmg, Energy and Security. Thiele, R. (2004), “Transformation und die Notwendigkeit der systemischen Gesamtbetrachtung”, in Borchert, H. (ed.), Potentiale statt Arsenale, pp. 46–50. Thiele, R. (2005), “Transformation, Vernetzte Operationsführung und die Rolle des Weltraums”, in Borchert, H. (ed.), Europas Zukunft zwischen Himmel und Erde, pp. 85–88. Uttley, M. (2005), “Contractors Deployed on Military Operations: UK Policy and Doctrine”, US Army War College, Sept 2005.

Chapter 9

Regional Approaches to Comprehensive Security in Europe Gunther Hauser

Regional security cooperation is a must to reach efforts when stabilizing insecure regions. In this context, regional organizations strengthen global governance. Since 1995, many European nations are directly involved in a comprehensive security partnership in NATO- and EU-led military peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) stabilizing the region. European security and political situation today is directly linked with developments in the EU and NATO. The enlargements of the EU and NATO has brought both changes to European political geography. These changes offer new opportunities to deepen existing relations between both EU and NATO and the neighbors to the East and South – particularly in the Central and Southeastern European as well as in the Black Sea region. As a result of increasing globalization, societies are becoming increasingly complex and interdependent. However, in foreign and security policy great importance is attached to preventative measures in order to counter the threat of the development and spread of military conflicts, as well as to overcome the problem of illegal migration and human smuggling with regard to inner security. A comprehensive security policy cooperation to secure regions of concern is therefore indispensable for Europe. The current threats to security cannot be countered by any single country, but only through wide international and regional cooperation within international (reliable) security partnerships. The threats Europeans face in today’s security environment are common accross the globe. Drugs, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as the illicit flow of weapons and their financing are global security threats. In an age of globally linked goods, passenger and communications traffic, the geographical distance between conflicts is increasingly losing importance. For that reason, an increasing number of systematic regional and global cooperation and alliance-like coalitions are being formed to overcome these uncertainties and risks. In Southeastern European region, the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe is a typical example of enhanced regional security cooperation. This stability pact was approved on 10 June 1999 at a conference of the foreign ministers of the participating

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states – the EU member states, the USA, Russia, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia (FYROM) and Romania – and the facilitator states Canada and Japan, as well as representatives of the UN, UNHCR, NATO, WEU, OECD, IMF, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and regional initiatives that included Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), the Royaument Process and the Central European Initiative (CEI). The primary goal is to create a zone of free trade and to integrate the Balkans into Euro-Atlantic security architecture – by creating a comprehensive security concept of internal and external security, armaments control, confidence building measures, border security and security against cross-border crime. The OSCE forms the umbrella for this process. Both the EU and NATO developed a framework for an enhanced dialogue on and a concerted approach to security and stability in the Balkans. In June 2003, the Greek EU presidency launched at the Porto Carras/Thessaloniki Summit a new political forum creating a Balkans European Integration Process that should increase the visibility of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) with five Western Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Serbia and Montenegro. First steps were initiated in November 2000 at the EU Zagreb Western Balkan summit promoting regional political and security cooperation and free trade. On 22 May 2003, five Western Balkan countries subscribed in Ohrid to a Common Platform for improving border security in the region to combat organized crime which was creating ideal conditions for drug smuggling, gun-running, human trafficking, terrorism, and political violence. This Platform was developed by the European Union, NATO, the OSCE, and the Stability Pact. In June 2004, Croatia has already been granted candidate status at the European Council in Brussels. This development “should be an encouragement to the countries of the Western Balkans to pursue their reforms. It reaffirms its commitment to the full implementation of the Thessaloniki agenda, which makes clear that the future of the Western Balkans rests within the European Union.”1 On 3 October 2005, Croatia was given the green light to proceed to the next stage of membership talks. Talks on an Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia and Montenegro began on 10 October 2005. Eleven days later, Bosnia and Herzegovina was given the green light to begin talks on SAA. On 9 November 2005, Macedonia (FYROM) was given a positive avis (Judah 2006: 26). This led at the EU summit in Brussles on 15 and 16 December 2005 to candidate status with conditions albeit without a date to start accession talks. The SAA with Albania which has been negotiating since early 2003 was signed in February 2006. During the 1990s, NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) developed mechanisms of enhanced security cooperation. In September 2000, the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund Policy was established as a mechanism to assist NATO Partner Nations in the safe destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines under the 1997 Ottawa Convention. To date, more than two million landmines have been 1

Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 17 and 18 June 2004, para. 39.

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successfully destroyed within the framework. The first Trust Fund project was launched in January 2001 for the destruction of Albania’s landmine stockpile. In total 1.6 million landmines were destroyed in Albania. The project was completed on schedule and within budget, and it paved the way for subsequent Trust Fund projects for the destruction of landmines in the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Tajikistan. While The Trust Fund policy was initially aimed at assisting partners to meet their obligations under the Ottawa Convention, over the time the scope of the policy has been extended to include a number of other areas of defense reform. NATO PfP Trust Fund project has been also established to help states like Serbia, Montenegro and Ukraine destroy stockpiles or surplus munitions, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). In 2005, the Trust Fund launched a project that now responds to Ukraine’s request for assistance in eliminating 133,000 tonnes of munitions and 1.5 million SALW.2 One of the Trust Fund projects was addressing the destruction of large anti-aircraft missiles in Georgia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the principal task of NATO Headquarters Sarajevo is to provide advice on defense reform and assistance to the Bosnian authorities in reforming the armed forces and moving toward a single military force. These steps are necessary for Bosnia and Herzegovina to achieve its objective to join EuroAtlantic security structures. On 18 July 2005, with the signing of the draft laws on a single military force, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made an important step in support of its ambition to join NATO PfP. At their Summit at Istanbul in 2004, NATO heads of State and Government referred to progress in defense reform and in particular toward the establishment of a single military force, and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as key conditions for PfP membership. Both EU and NATO security interests are mainly focused on stabilizing neighboring regions. Therefore, European nations are providing regional cooperation by joining international security operations to prevent civil war and to defuse conflicts. Examples of Regional Security Cooperation in Europe In Europe, there are many examples of enhanced regional security cooperation and coordination to make contribution in enhancing the capability of European and partner nations to meet more efficiently in crisis management operations as follows: •

The Multinational Peace Force in South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE). Particpants: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, FYROM, Romania and Turkey. Observers: Croatia, Slovenia and USA. Objectives: further development of cooperation and dialogue on regional security and stability in Southeastern

2 Source: NATO/PfP Trust Fund project to destroy surplus weapons and ammunition in Ukraine, NATO Press Release (2005)021, 19 February 2005.

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•

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Europe, fostering good neighborly relations among the countries in the region. The MPFSEE was created under the SEDM (South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial) process auspices. The Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) was signed by the Defense Ministers of seven Nations in Skopje on 26 September 1998. The Southeastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) represents the operational “arm” of MPFSEE along with the Engineer Task Force (ETF). In May 2001, SEEBRIG became fully operational. Tasks: peace support operations under UN or OSCE mandate as stipulated by the Security Council resolutions, based on the UN Charter. The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR). Members: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine. Aim: to enhance confidence and mutual understanding between the participating countries and to develop cooperation and interoperability between their naval forces. Tasks: search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, de-mining and environmental protection operations. The Romanian-Hungarian Joint Peacekeeping Battalion. The battalion became operational on 1 January 2000. Tasks: peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions under UN or OSCE mandate, led by NATO or EU. The Hungarian-Italian-Slovenian Brigade. On May 20, 1997, the prime ministers of Hungary, Italy and Slovenia met in Budapest within the framework of the Central European Initiative (CEI) to agree upon measures to achieve closer cooperation in the areas of military policy, environmental protection as well as on border and policing issues. Hungary, Italy, and Slovenia are now working closely together to achieve EU Battle Group interoperability. Central European Nations’ Cooperation in Peace Support (CENCOOP). In 1998, Austria put forward an initiative to improve the regional cooperation among the Central-European countries, according to the UN Stand-By Arrangements. Members: Austria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland. “Information Partner”: Czech Republic and Ukraine. For Switzerland, the perspective offered by CENCOOP was a crucial factor behind the decision to participate in NATO-led KFOR. CENCOOP serves as a tool for regional operations and as a forum of regular meetings to exchange information and opinions on security policy issues – e.g. about peacekeeping operations – or provide modules for humanitarian aid, for a joint observer pool, for joint military police modules or for military personnel and soldiers for European crisis management operations. The Multinational Engineer Battalion between Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine (Tisza-Battalion). At the trilateral meeting of the ministers of defense from Romania, Ukraine and Hungary (Ujgorod/Ukraine, January 15, 1999), the Ukrainian minister proposed the establishment of a joint engineer unit in the Tisa river area. After the major environmental disaster on the Tisza caused by a goldmine in Romania, the countries in the region – Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Hungary – agreed in October 2001 to establish a brigade with 200 soldiers from each participating state especially

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for disaster operations, international peace operations and the planning of joint operations. The Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) is a tri-national peacekeeping unit which was established by the Baltic states in 1994. BALTBAT has developed extensive peacekeeping experience, working both in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the auspices of the IFOR/SFOR program, and in Lebanon within the UNIFIL program. BALTBAT is a standard infantry battalion which contributes to regional security. In the Balkans, BALTBAT has deployed a contingent at company level since 1998. BALTBAT has enjoyed strong support from Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) was established in 1997 among the Baltic naval forces. Primary goals include mine clearance activities, search and rescue operations in the Baltic Sea, the development of Baltic navies in compliance with all relevant NATO standards, and coordination of efforts in pursuit of other naval tasks. BALTRON, with support from Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, has already engaged in extensive mine clearance operations in the Baltic Sea, and a considerable amount of mines and other explosive materials have been destroyed. NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support) as a Nordic arrangement to further develop cooperation within the area of military peace support. Particpating nations are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The cooperation with third parties is based on defined requirements on a case-by-case basis. Up until today NORDCAPS cooperation has been focused mainly on concept development and multinational training. One of the concrete results of NORDCAPS work is the concept for a “Nordic Force up to a Brigade size”, which was declared to have an Initial Operational capability on July 1, 2003. Furthermore, NORDCAPS has also been used for coordination in relation to real life Peace Support Operations. Three Nordic countries have been conducting common sustainment flights to the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan) operation since spring 2002, which were initiated by NORDCAPS. The arrangement has also been used to support the planning of common Nordic participation in a restructured Kosovo Force (KFOR). Regional cooperation to achieve interoperability of EU Battle Groups, of the European Gendarmerie Force (between France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and the NATO Response Force (NRF).

Many European nations decidied to coordinate military and civilian capabilities to reach interoperability for international peace support missions – in all areas of NATO and ESDP military and police operations. European forces have to improve their performance in respect of availability, deploayability, sustainability and interoperability and strengthen essential operational capabilities in the framework

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of a crisis-management operation. As decided at the Istanbul Summit at the end of June 2004, NATO handed over command of the former SFOR mission to the European Union on 2 December 2004, the first major EU-led military crisis management operation called EUFOR Althea. NATO HQ Sarajevo also undertakes certain operational tasks, including counter-terrorism whilst ensuring force protection, support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), with regard to the detention of persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs) and intelligence sharing with the EU. In EU and NATO-led operations, also troops from Australia, New Zealand, as well as from Mediterranean Dialogue countries like Jordan and Morocco are/were involved. In June 2005, Mediterranean Dialogue countries also participated with troops in the field training exercise Cooperative Best Effort 2005 in Ukraine (Egypt and Israel), as well as with rescue personnel in NATO’s major submarine escape and rescue exercise Sorbet Royal 2005 (Israel). Mediterranean partners also can observe NATO manoeuvres. So the Mediterranean Dialogue became: an integral part of the Alliance’s cooperative approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean.3

NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) launched at the Alliance’s summit in June 2004, aims to contribute to a long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO – starting with the individual members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Within the common European security cooperation and coordination, interoperability of forces is a key requirement. The main objective for regional military cooperation is to strengthen the coordination of EU forces for international peace operations and to enhance effective cooperation within ESDP. This is why EU member states have been promoting the harmonization in planning military needs and demands within the European Defense Agency (EDA) strengthening the industrial and technological basis of defense to harmonize operation standards. The Declaration of Saint Malo in December 1998, that called for the much faster development of a ESDP within the EU, requires all EU and NATO participants to concentrate their resources on a credible contribution to the development of EU Rapid Reaction Forces (EU RRF), EU Battle Groups or NATO Response Forces. The EU member states decided to reinforce military capabilities by developing the Union’s new military capabilities objective, the Headline Goal 2010, to set new requirements for rapid deployment, sustainability, and interoperability by developing criteria and standards for measuring improvements in this field. On 17 May 2004, EU defense ministers approved proposals by “Mr. CFSP” Javier Solana concerning to realize the concept for rapidly deployable battle groups. From 2007 onwards, these forces – thirteen military units each comprising 1,500 troops – should be available 3 North Atlantic Council – Heads of State and Government Meeting, Washington Summit Communiqué, NAC-S(99)64, para. 29, Washington, 24 April 1999.

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for deployment to crisis areas outside Europe. The battle groups are planned to be deployable to crisis theatres as far as 6,000 kilometres away from Brussels. The Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 has since been superseded by objectives set in the Headline Goal for 2010, which, inter alia, envisages the launching of rapid reaction units composed of joint battle groups. Coordinated force planning in the EU and transatlantic contexts are now based on the Headline Goal Catalogue 2010, the EU Framework Nation Concept, and the criteria of force planning within the NATO Partnership for Peace. International crisis management contain the following scenarios: Conflict Prevention (CP), Separation of Parties by Force (SOPF), and Steady State (SS). The European Union defined the length of CP and SOPF scenarios as lasting eight to twelve months (Bundesheerreformkommission 2004: 81–82). The ENP and Comprehensive Security Approaches One essential part of European comprehensive (regional) security cooperation is the newly created ENP (European Neigborhood Policy). Within ENP, the EU’s external borders and partner countries should become the focus of enhanced cooperation. ENP partner countries are invited to enter into closer political, economic and cultural relations with the EU to reach increased stability, security and well being, to enhance cross border cooperation and to share responsibility in conflict prevention and resolution. The list of partner countries includes the neighboring countries which do not currently have an accession perspective: • • •

Four Western so called Newly Independent States (NIS): Belarus; Moldova; Russia, Ukraine; Ten Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority; This list has been extended, following the Brussels EU Council of 17–18 June 2004, to include three countries of the Southern Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The speed and intensity of this process will depend on the will and capability of each partner country to engage in this following broad agenda: •

• • •

The development of political institutions based on values like democracy, the rule of law, human rights (as stated in Partnership and Cooperation Agreement – PCA); Regional stability and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA); Economic and social reforms; Further liberalization of trade and for gradual participation in the Internal Market.

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ENP Action Plans define a set of priorities, whose fulfilment will bring them closer to EU – covering a number of key areas for specific actions: • • •

• • •

• • •

• •

Political dialogue and reform; good governance; rule of law; Trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s Internal Market; Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) – fight against organized crime and corruption, money laundering and all forms of trafficking, as well as with regard to issues related to migration; Energy, transport, information society; Environment and people-to-people contacts; Effective border management – support for the creation and training of corps of professional non-military border guards and measures to make travel documents more secure; Cooperation with Europol and Eurojust; Conflict prevention and crisis management; Fight against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related systems, illegal arms exports – effective multilateralism to strengthen co-ordination in combating security threats; Exchange of information, joint training and exercises and possible participation in EU-led crisis management; The ENP should reinforce the EU’s contribution to promoting the settlement of regional conflicts (Commission of the European Communities 2004).

The drawing up of an Action Plan and the priorities agreed with each partner will depend on its particular circumstances. These differ with respect to geographic location, the political and economic situation, relations with the EU and with neighboring countries. The EU also has a strong interest in the stability and development of the Southern Caucasus. The European Security Strategy (ESS) clearly identifies the Southern Caucasus as one of the regions, in which the EU should take a “stronger and more active interest”. Cooperation is also planned to be developed in the area of energy – as the Southern Caucasus is an important region both for the production (the Caspian basin) and the transit of energy. EU is the world’s largest energy (oil and gas) importer and the second largest consumer. Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. In Broader Black region, there are the world’s most important reserves of oil and natural gas (Russia, Caspian basin, Middle East and North Africa). Dependence on energy “will increasingly depend on imports, from its current level of 50% to 70% by 2030, on present projections” (Commission of the European Communities 2004: 17). The Council of Europe, the Baltic Sea Council, the CEI, the ENP, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) – with the objective to create an area where persons, capital and goods would move freely – and the Stability Pact have an important part to play when stabilizing the regions concerned.

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Conclusion Typical tasks of regional security policy in Europe today are conflict prevention, conflict avoidance and overall peacekeeping. To perform these tasks, the armed forces require innovative methods of operation, organizational forms and training programs. The need for soldiers is taken for granted, which is why there are intervention troops. Without armed forces it is impossible to conduct a policy in crisis regions. Today, however, more active and coherent policies are required at an earlier stage. Conflict and threat prevention through a variety of means ranging from financial and administrative measures to political and economic pressure, humanitarian missions, civilian crisis management and military peace-enforcement are needed. Furthermore, the Northern Dimension of the EU, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (Barcelona process), the OSCE and NATO Mediterranean Dialogues, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) with Eastern European countries and the Caucasus region as well as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) between NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states illustrate necessary instruments of multilateral regional security cooperation – where all European countries are embedded. The European Union and NATO coordinate action in comprehensive security issues, from policies toward enlargement to crisis management operations. NATO and EU also share common interests in assisting the countries of the Balkans with their future integration into Euro-Atlantic political structures. Both EU and NATO have pivotal interests in integrating Eastern and Southeastern European states as well as partner countries into Euro-Atlantic economic and security structures – by regional approaches. References Bundesheerreformkommission (2004), Bundesheer 2010, Bericht der Bundesheerreformkommission, Wien/Vienna. Commission of the European Communities (2004), European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12.5.2004, COM(2004) 373 final. Hauser, G. (2002), “Visegrad and Austria – Comprehensive Relations”, in Marek, S. (ed.), Visegrad Countries in an Enlarged Trans-Atlantic Community (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs), 113–138. Judah, T. (2006), “Background Brief 1 – Borders and Politics”, in Kostovicova, D., and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V., Austrian Presidency of the EU: Regional Approaches to the Balkans (Vienna: Center for the Study of Global Governance and the Center for European Integration Strategies), pp. 24–34. NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund (2006), Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, http://www.nato.int/pfp/trust-fund.htm, printed on 10 February 2006. NORDCAPS (2006), A Coordination and Planning Tool for Peace Support Operations, http://www.nordcaps.org, printed on 10 February 2006. Riga Summit Steering Committee (2002), Cooperation of Baltic States, Riga, http:// www.rigasummit.lv/en/?id=40.

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Romanian Armed Forces (2006), NATO Interoperability, Bucharest, http://english. mapn.ro/map/natocompatible.htm, printed on 10 February 2006.

Chapter 10

The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Ethno-territorial Conflicts, Russian Interests, and the Access to Energy Resources Martin Malek

From Central Europe, the South Caucasian capitals can be reached by aircraft within about four hours, but comparing patterns of thought one could guess that one came to another planet. Western categories of democracy, human rights, civil society, integration of ethnically diverse societies, political thinking and political culture (leaving out political correctness), conflict resolution attempts, dispositions to use force for the achievement of political goals, perceptions of friend and foe and so on hardly fit for the Caucasus. This background of the following analysis has always to be kept in mind. The South Caucasian region is, unfortunately, of only very limited interest to the Western public. However, this does not mean that events there have no supra-regional relevance. On the one hand, the ethnically and religiously highly heterogeneous South Caucasus is itself the scene of a number of crises; on the other, it is close to other trouble spots such as Chechnya, the Kurdish areas of eastern Turkey and Iraq. The South Caucasus is a kind of “hinge” between Europe and Asia, orient and occident. The zones of interest of several great powers also overlap here, not least of all due to the region’s role as a transport corridor, in particular for oil and gas. The most important challenges for the internal and external security of the South Caucasus are: Unresolved political and ethno-territorial conflicts, refugee movements, the continuing economic and social crisis, the weakness and ineffectiveness of state institutions (especially in Georgia), crime and corruption and the modest quality of democracy. These six problem areas are so self-evidently linked that it hardly appears possible to tackle and solve them individually. The Main Players The main security policy players in the South Caucasus are:

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• • • • •

The independent and recognized states Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; The states bordering the region – Russia, Turkey and Iran; The United States; International organizations such as the UN, OSCE, the Commonwealth of Independent States or CIS, GUAM and NATO; International oil and gas companies.

One could also include the unrecognized, but de facto existing states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan among the players. However, Azerbaijan denies that Karabakh is an independent, i.e. separate factor from Armenia and it is a widely held belief not only in Georgia that Abkhazia and South Ossetia owe their position solely to Russian support. Security Policy Orientations of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan Georgia Between Russia and the US Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, who was ousted during the “rose revolution” in 2003, had high hopes of bilateral cooperation with the US. Since April 2002, US military instructors train Georgian forces in anti-terrorist operations as part of the so-called Train and Equip Program. In April 2005, the Sustainment Stability Operations Program (SSOP) started. It is a new US military assistance program, designed to upgrade the Georgian Armed Forces. The Americans will be withdrawn after completing their mission, i.e. there are no plans for a permanent military presence in Georgia. Nevertheless, Moscow viewed their deployment as a move by Washington to counter Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Russia has repeatedly accused Georgia of giving shelter to Chechen rebels, especially in the Pankisi Gorge (not far from the Chechen section of the RussianGeorgian border) and even supporting them. At the height of the Pankisi crisis in summer 2002, Moscow openly threatened Georgia with war; Russian newspapers even published operational plans (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13 September 2002, pp. 1, 11).

Table 10.1

The South Caucasian Republics at a Glance Area Land Population Life (sq km) boundaries (mill.), expectancy (km) 2006 est. (years)

Georgia 69,700 1,461 Armenia 29,800 1,254 Azerbaijan 86,600 2,013 Source: CIA Factbook 2006.

4,661 2,976 7,962

76,1 71,84 63,85

Major religion

State language

GDP (PPP), billion $ in 2005 Christianity Georgian 15,55 Christianity Armenian 15,7 Islam Azerbaijani 37,03

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Georgian membership in CIS is another controversial issue between Tbilisi and Moscow. Georgian legislators have suggested for a long time that their country should leave the organization, which is widely considered as a tool in Moscow’s hands, designed to maintain and to enhance Russian influence in the so-called “post-Soviet space”. But Presidents Shevardnadze and Mikheil Saakashvili have consistently rejected that opinion – until 2 May 2006, when Saakashvili announced that he has asked his government to submit within two months an assessment of the benefits Georgia can expect from remaining a CIS member, compared with probable implications if it does indeed quit. A few days later, Modest Kolerov, head of the Department for inter-regional and cultural relations with foreign states in President Vladimir Putin’s Office, said that “Georgia will bear the consequences, primarily from the point of view of labor”, if it indeed should withdraw from the CIS (RFE/ RL Newsline, Vol. 10, No. 86, Part I, 12 May 2006). This means that the Kremlin threatens to send home the 250,000–300,000 Georgians currently living and working in Russia. If forced to return, they would swell the ranks of the unemployed in poor Georgia. By this means, Moscow apparently hopes to destabilize the Saakashvili administration. Armenia: Russia’s Last Reliable Ally A well-known Moscow newspaper described the paradoxical foreign policy situation of Armenia as follows: It “is the only country that receives weapons from Russia and money from America and cooperates with Iran” (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 December 1999, p. 5). However, the US has little influence over Yerevan’s political course, notwithstanding the fact that it also finances some Armenian military programs. Instead, there is much talk of an “axis” Moscow – Yerevan – Teheran. At first sight it seems astonishing that the Islamic Republic of Iran supports Armenia, the oldest Christian state in the world, against Shiite Azerbaijan. Upon closer inspection, however, the background to the congruence of interests becomes clear: like Moscow and Yerevan, Teheran wishes to keep Western (and Turkish) influence in the region as small as possible. Azerbaijan’s Difficult Neighborhood Azerbaijan is in a very difficult geopolitical position. Georgia is the only neighboring country which maintains cordial relations with Baku, but Tbilisi has a lot of problems on its own. Armenians have occupied parts of Azerbaijan, the relations with Iran turned sometimes quite strained (in July 2001, an Iranian warship threatened to open fire upon two Azerbaijani ships, conducting prospecting operations for BP in an oilfield more than 100 kilometeres north from the former Soviet-Iranian sea border). While relations between Azerbaijan and Russia were temporarily tense, cooperation – particularly in military affairs – has never broken off. Thus, the Defense Ministers of Azerbaijan and Russia have signed several agreements, which,

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Table 10.2

The Armies of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

Manpower Battle Armoured Artillery Aircraft Helicopters Navy tanks vehicles (combat capable) Georgia 11,320* 86 180 109 7 17 17 Armenia 48,160 110 244 229 16 34 – Azerbaijan 66,490 220 595 270 47 35 17 Source: The Military Balance 2005-2006. London 2005, p. 108-111, 120-121. * The Georgian Defense Ministry provided a totally different figure – 21.468 (http://www. mod.gov.ge/?l=E&m=6&sm=3, assessed 10.5.2006).

among other things, provide for the training of Azerbaijanis in Russia. Azerbaijani officers at Russian military academies repeatedly ran into Armenians from separatist Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2002, the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia, Heydar Aliyev and Putin, signed an agreement, according to which Russia would lease the “Daryal” base (near Gabala) for ten years for the comparatively small sum of 7 million dollars a year. This installation is a part of the Russian early warning system against missile attacks. According to the Russian military newspaper “Red Star”, 72 Russian serviceman and 600 citizens of Azerbaijan work at the base (Krasnaya zvezda, 26 January 2006). The Relationship to NATO All three states in the South Caucasus belong to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly as associate members and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In 1994 they signed the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Georgia and Azerbaijan have since 1999 small contingents in the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping force in Kosovo, and Armenia in 2004 also sent a platoon (as a part of the Greek contingent). Georgia was the first South Caucasian country to sign in December 2004 an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO, soon to be followed by Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, the similarities in relations with the alliance end here. Armenia clearly has no intention of joining NATO, although it does not reject a certain degree of cooperation – undoubtedly with the intention of obtaining funds and in order not to leave the field to Azerbaijan. The first NATO exercise in Armenia, “Cooperative Best Effort 2003”, took place in the second half of June 2003. It was also remarkable because for the first time Turkish troops, albeit only three of them, set foot in independent Armenia. Another reason why the manoeuvres attracted attention is that Yerevan and Ankara have no diplomatic relations and their common border is still closed. 19 members of NATO and the PfP, including Russia, sent 400 troops in order to act out a fictitious scenario in which they provide military support for an international peacekeeping operation. In contrast to Armenia, Azerbaijan and especially Georgia have committed themselves to join NATO. Thus, President Saakashvili predicted in his state-of-thenation address to the Parliament on 14 February 2006 that Georgia will receive an

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official invitation to join NATO by the end of 2006 and be accepted into the alliance in 2008. But there is a profound disparity between the upbeat declarations of the president, the government and the public opinion (according to opinion polls, about 70 percent of the population supports the country’s entry into NATO) on the one hand and the desolation of the Georgian military on the other, which falls far short of the minimum NATO standards, even though reaching this standard has been made a policy goal. The level of corruption in the armed forces is high, and the state of the military reform is unsatisfactory. And NATO demands that candidates solve all their territorial problems, which will definitely not be the case in Georgia and Azerbaijan in the near future. Furthermore, the “Russian factor” must not be neglected: “The Kremlin is determined to use all means available, including the issue of energy dependence, troop deployments, Russia’s de facto control over breakaway republics, immigration policy and vast intelligence resources, to keep the Caucasus states outside NATO’s reach” (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 6 October 2004, p. 29). Finally, the alliance has no desire to strain its sometimes awkward relations with Russia for the sake of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Treaty on Collective Security and GUAM The 1992 Treaty on Collective Security (or “Tashkent Treaty”) contains an assistance clause which explicitly refers to military means. Georgia and Azerbaijan did not extend their membership of the Treaty on Collective Security in 1999, leaving Armenia as the only country in the South Caucasus to belong to the treaty. It was expanded in 2002/2003 to an “Organization of the Treaty on Collective Security”, which was supposed to constitute a full military alliance consisting of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In Moscow and Yerevan, GUAM (after the first letters of the member states Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) had always been regarded as an “antiRussian” organization and “Trojan horse” of NATO in the CIS. Despite preparations for the establishment of a joint peacekeeping unit, the security policy relevance of GUAM has so far remained insignificant. There is no military assistance as provided for by the Treaty on Collective Security. Only on 23 May 2006 it was agreed to create a Permanent Secretariat, based in Kiev. Ethno-territorial Conflicts South Ossetia already seceded violently from Georgia in 1989–92. Abkhazia followed in 1992–93. Since a ceasefire in the fighting over Karabakh in 1994, the Armenians control some 13.6 percent of the territory of the former Azerbaijani Soviet Republic. Negotiations for a solution to the conflict have now been going on for more than a decade and nothing indicates that a solution is in sight. Abkhazia and South Ossetia insist upon their independence or on becoming part of Russia, Karabakh on its independence or unification with Armenia.

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Georgia has repeatedly accused Moscow of abusing its internationally recognized role as peacekeeper and of obstructing a political conflict solution in a bid to preserve its influence in the South Caucasus. Specifically, Georgian officials have blamed Russia for channeling financial and military aid to South Ossetia and Abkhazia and of abetting large-scale smuggling that helps to keep the unrecognized republics afloat. The refugee problem remains unsolved. In 1993 some 250,000 Georgians (i.e. almost half the population) were expelled from Abkhazia or had to flee, some 800,000 Azeris (from Armenia, Karabakh and other Armenian occupied territories of Azerbaijan) are refugees in Azerbaijan. The rulers in both Abkhazia and Karabakh will probably never agree to a complete return of the refugees, because they consider the Georgians and the Azeris respectively as a threat to their claims to secede. From the point of view of Baku and Tbilisi, it seems to be unlikely to solve the refugee problem before Azerbaijani or Georgian jurisdiction respectively has been established over Karabakh or Abkhazia. This, however, can be ruled out in the near future. In Armenia and Russia, but also in various Western sources, fears are expressed that Azerbaijan could use its oil revenues to arm its military in order to at least threaten a violent solution of the Karabakh problem. However, this overlooks the fact that Armenia could use its ballistic missiles against Azerbaijani oil fields, pipelines and/or refineries, an action that would undoubtedly result in an inferno (deliveries of Russian arms to Armenia between 1993 and 1996, said to have been worth 1 billion dollars, included SCUD-B missiles; see Malek 2000: 11; Malek 2001: 56). Of course, in the event of war, Western corporations would immediately withdraw their investments from the Azerbaijani oil industry. Baku is well aware of this fact. For that reason, the current de facto independent status of Karabakh becomes safer with every dollar invested in the Azerbaijani oil industry by Western companies. The figures in Table 10.3 should be treated with reserve. Some Russian sources differ significantly. For example, one Moscow-based daily estimated the number of South Ossetian tanks and armoured vehicles at 87 and 180 respectively (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 February 2006, p. 3), but this seems to be exaggerated. A comparison of the figures in Tables 10.2 and 10.3 indicates that the bulk of Armenian military potential is stationed in and around Karabakh. It should, however, be pointed out that these figures come from Baku. They are firmly denied by the vast majority of Armenian and Karabakh politicians, media and other observers. They have not provided their own official data on the Karabakh separatist military. But there are some Armenian observers who make use of the Military Balance figures (see, for example, Samvel Martirosyan in the Russian periodical VPK – Voenno-promyshlenny kuryer, 25 August 2004; Cheteryan 2003: 100). Of course, no reference is made to the Karabakh military potential (like the forces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) in the quotas of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Karabakh has expressed its readiness to put its military under CFE control, but this, of course, implies the international recognition of its independence – which is almost impossible in the near future.

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Table 10.3

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Separatist Armies

Manpower (1,000) Battle tanks Armoured vehicles Artillery 5,000 50+ 80+ 80+ 2,000 5–10 30 25 18,000 316 324 322 (some 40,000 on the mob) Source: The Military Balance 2004-2005. London 2004, p. 82, 88. This source does not comprise any information about Abkhazia’s air force and navy. Abkhazia South Ossetia Nagorno-Karabakh

From time to time, tensions run high in the South Georgian region SamtskheJavakheti which is predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians. They have on numerous occasions demanded a stop to what they call a “policy of pressure” of the Georgian authorities. Moreover, many Armenians want the central government to make Armenian a state language equal to Georgian in Samtskhe-Javakheti. Reiterating the alleged threat to the rights of Armenians in Georgia, the appeal also demanded political autonomy for the region. The content and tone of some statements by certain radical Armenian organizations recall the language used by the Armenian community in Karabakh in its relations with the Azerbaijani communist leadership before violence broke out in 1988. Russia has tried to capitalize on the ethnic problems in Samtskhe-Javakheti, where it maintains the Akhalkalaki military base. The majority of the servicemen of this facility are ethnic Armenians with Russian citizenship. Russian Policy in the Region Russia and Ethno-territorial Conflicts Any examination of the ethnoterritorial conflicts on the southern periphery of the USSR/CIS is incomplete without taking into account the “Russian factor”. Without military support from Moscow, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Karabakh relies mainly on Armenia) could hardly have been able to tear free from their central governments: Moscow rendered political support and made massive deliveries of arms. The Russian army openly intervened in Abkhazia in 1992–93 (by the way, as strange at it sounds today, together with Chechen “volunteers” under Shamil Basayev, now one of Russia’s most wanted terrorists). Furthermore, it is a well-known fact that so-called Russian “volunteers” and Cossacks fought for the South Caucasian separatists. Russia obviously uses double standards in handling separatist movements: On the one hand, it has repeatedly warned Tbilisi against a new war against Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia. On the other hand, Moscow is trying to solve its own problem with separatism in Chechnya by solely military means, i.e. to “exterminate”, “erase” or “crush” – to use the most popular official terms – the rebels there (officially referred to only as “bandits” and “terrorists”). Well-known Moscow-based political observer Andrei Piontkovsky depicted the Russian double standards as follows:

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European Security in Transition With a touching degree of intellectual naivety, the absolute majority of Russian politicians and mass media outlets view the decade-old war in Chechnya only in terms of territorial integrity, and the conflict in South Ossetia solely within the context of the Ossetian people’s right to self-determination. (Piontkovsky 2004)

There are various voices not only in Russian media and politics, but especially from the nationalist hardliners in the Rodina (Motherland) party, Vladimir Zhirinovskys Liberal-democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and the Communist Party (KPRF) demanding the incorporation of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and another separatist entity, the so-called Dnestr Republic (PMR) in Moldova, into Russia. Finally, these calls reached the official level: Gennady Bukayev, assistant to the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, told a joint session of North Ossetia’s and South Ossetia’s governments in Vladikavkaz on 22 March 2006 that Moscow has “decided in principle” to merge the two entities into a single republic “Alania” within Russia. This, however, would mean a gross violation of international law and the final territorial breakup of Georgia. The pro-Kremlin chief editor of the “Moskovskie novosti” (Moscow News) weekly, Vitaly Tretyakov, described the background of the Russian support for breakaway regions on the southern periphery of the CIS as follows: The current borders of the Russian Federation are unnatural or are at least perceived as such by the majority of the political class of the country. (Moskovskie novosti, 3 March 2006, p. 3)

Officials from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Karabakh, and the PMR come and go regularly in Moscow. They are received in Parliament, the Foreign Ministry and the Russian Security Council whenever they wish. Almost the entire adult population (and of course the political elite) of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has long held Russian citizenship. Consequently, Moscow could intervene militarily – in the event that Tbilisi was ever to attempt to solve the conflict by force – under the pretext of protecting Russian citizens. The currency in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the rouble (Karabakh uses the Armenian Dram), Moscow pays Russian pensions, Russian tourists have started coming back to Abkhazia, where Russian companies and ministries are renting out guest houses and sanatoria. Russian officials have always occupied top positions in the power structures of Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. For example, from 1993 on, Russian General Anatoli Zinevich was Chief of Staff of Karabakh’s highly efficient and well-organized separatist army. In 2005, several Russian citizens were appointed to high-ranking positions in South Ossetia: Anatoly Yarovoy, the former head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) branch in the Russian Autonomous Republic Mordovia, now runs the Security Service, General Anatoli Barankievich is Minister of Defense, and oil industry manager Yuri Morozov even became Prime Minister of the breakaway entity.

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Russian Bases Moscow used to call its troops in the South Caucasus a “stability factor” and was very reluctant to withdraw them, because it feared that Georgia could more easily join NATO or that the alliance (or the US) could fill the “vacuum” after its troop withdrawal, but Georgia has assured that it has no plans to host any foreign military bases on its territory. Nevertheless, Russian media outlets have for many years predicted the imminent appearance of American bases in Georgia and Azerbaijan (see, for example, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 February 2006, p. 9). In the Final Act agreed upon at the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, Russia agreed in a joint statement with Georgia to withdraw a part of its military equipment from its bases on Georgian soil. Moscow promised to disband its military bases in Gudauta and Vaziani by 1 July 2001. While the Vaziani base was closed on time, withdrawal from the Gudauta base in Abkhazia was not completed within the agreed upon time frame. According to official Russian sources, the main hurdles are the refusal of separatist Abkhaz authorities to allow the presence of international observers as well as widespread local opposition to the operation. After years of dissensions between Moscow and Tbilisi, on 30 May 2005 Georgia’s then-Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili and her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov signed a document on the cessation of functioning of the Russian bases and installations and withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia by 2008. The withdrawal started in early August 2005. On 31 March 2006, Georgia’s First Deputy Defense Minister, Mamuka Kudava, and Russia’s Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief, Colonel-General Alexei Maslov, signed agreements on the withdrawal of Russian forces from the bases and other military installations in Georgia. The first military hardware left the 62nd Base in Akhalkalaki on 3 May 2006. It is to be emptied of most of its heavy equipment during 2006 and to be completely closed by 1 October 2007, with a possible extension until 31 December 2007, subject to weather conditions. The 6th Base in Batumi, the regional capital of Adjara, is to ship out most of its heavy equipment during 2007 and to be completely closed before the end of 2008. In Armenia, Moscow has the 102 base (headquartered in Gyumri) with fighter aircraft (in Yerevan) and S-300 air defense complexes. Russia is currently transferring military personnel from Georgia to Armenia, which Azerbaijan – without being able to prevent it – has severely criticized with references to the unresolved Karabakh conflict. Border Troops Within the context of its integration efforts in the CIS, Moscow followed a “strategy of two borders”: It only wished to guard – with its own soldiers if possible – the so-called “external borders” of the CIS (i.e. the borders of the former USSR), while wanting borders between two CIS states to remain as open as possible. However, this strategy failed: most CIS states (including Georgia) have long since sent the Russian

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Table 10.4

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Russian Bases Manpower Battle tanks 3,000 65

Armored Artillery vehicles 200 139

Combat aircraft –

Combat helicopters 5

Georgia* (Batumi, Akhalkalaki) Armenia 3,500 74 228 84 14 MiG-29** – (Gyumri) Source: The Military Balance 2005–2006. London 2005, pp. 166-167. * Some Russian sources report even up to 5,000 servicemen, 115 tanks, 220 armored vehicles and 170 artillery systems and mortars (Kommersant VLAST, 25 April 2005, Gazeta, 26 April 2005; p. 17; Kommersant, 31 May 2005, p. 10; Krasnaya zvezda, 27 January 2006). A well-known pro-Kremlin newspaper quoted even 150 tanks (T-72), and some 200 armoured vehicles only at the base in Akhalkalaki (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 January 2006, p. 5). ** Some Russian sources contain information about “at least” 30 MiG-29 (VPK – Voennopromyshlenny kuryer, 25 August 2004).

border troops home. Russian soldiers are now only stationed on the Armenian border to Turkey and Iran. Peacekeeping Missions Without UN Mandate The Russian operations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia are clearly not in line with the approved principles of UN peacekeeping missions. Thus, the peacekeeping unit in South Ossetia has Russian, Georgian and Ossetian contingents, which ignores the traditional non-inclusion of soldiers from the (former) warring parties. This force is based solely on a bilateral agreement concluded in June 1992 between the Presidents Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin in the Black Sea village of Dagomys. In the following years, Georgian officials and mass media frequently reported that the Russian peacekeepers are supplying the separatists with weapons and ammunition in violation of demilitarizing agreements. They also accuse them of threatening the lives of Georgian citizens living in the conflict zone, carrying out sabotage raids against Georgian targets, and taking an active part in smuggling operations to and from South Ossetia. On 15 February 2006, the Georgian Parliament voted unanimously in favour of demanding that the government embark on measures to secure the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping force (with 530 servicemen) and its replacement by international peacekeepers. However, it is unlikely that this decision will exert influence on the further developments in the conflict zone. The resolution is nonbinding, and the Parliament gave the government no deadline. Moscow and South Ossetia are not going to even discuss the issue of the pullout. Mikhail Babich, deputy chairman of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee, stated that both Moscow and Tbilisi understand that there will be no withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping force (Torbakov 2006). And South Ossetian separatist leader Eduard

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Kokoity told Russian journalists that South Ossetia would react violently to the inclusion of Western forces in the conflict zone: We will regard all other formations – under whatever aegis, except for the Russian peacekeepers – as aggressors and will eliminate them, anyone who comes here, except the Russian peacekeepers. These countries have no moral right to take any part in our peacekeeping process because, we all know very well, all of them are on Georgia’s side. They are supporting Georgia militarily, they are arming Georgia, not with defensive weapons but with offensive weapons. (Martin 2006)

There has never been a UN-mandated mission where a single country mustered all the personnel for a peacekeeping contingent. However, in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone on the Inguri river just this is the case: About 1,600 Russian serviceman have been stationed there since June 1994 under a CIS mandate. Tbilisi occasionally wished for a change to the mandate of the Russian peacekeeping troops that would allow them to escort Georgian refugees back to Abkhazia. Russia, and of course Abkhazia, always categorically rejected this as well as the replacement of the Russian contingent by Turkish and/or Ukrainian peacekeepers. Russia evidently does not wish to surrender control of the “peace mission”, arguing that without its troops the Georgian-Abkhaz war would flare up again. However, this concern for peace is hardly plausible given that Moscow is conducting a bloody war in Chechnya itself. The real reason why Moscow is determined to remain present on the Inguri is clearly geopolitical: The Russian peacekeepers act as de facto “border troops” for separatist Abkhazia. As long as they are there, a restoration of Georgian jurisdiction over Abkhazia is virtually impossible. Moreover, Moscow can act as a “referee” between Tbilisi and Abkhazia. The UN-mandated force in the conflict zone, the United Nations Missions of Observers in Georgia, or UNOMIG, with 134 total uniformed personnel since its creation in 1993 remained a passive factor without any real influence on the Russian activities in Abkhazia. The Importance of Economic Security Gas Pipelines The so-called “gas war” between Russia and Ukraine in the first days of January 2006 left no doubt that Moscow is ready and capable to raise the price for energy resources for political reasons. This was obviously a Russian “punishment” for the “orange revolution” in Kiev in the fall of 2004, which brought to power allegedly “pro-Western” opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko, defeating pro-Moscow candidate Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. Furthermore, Moscow doubtless intended to convey to the Ukrainian voters that it would be reasonable to vote for pro-Russian parties – like Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions and the Communist Party – at the elections to Verkhovna Rada, or Parliament, on 26 March 2006, if they

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want prospects of a cheap and reliable gas supply. And the Party of the Regions won a convincing victory with 32 percent of the votes. However, the Russian-Ukrainian “gas war” triggered a discussion about the future of energy supply of the EU. Putin’s Russia does not even hide its intention to put as many as possible countries in the CIS and in the EU in an energy dependence – firstly, in order to increase its revenues, secondly, to gain the possibility to capitalize on its position as the most important energy supplier sooner or later. It should not be ruled out that Moscow sometime in the future threatens to cut off not only CIS member states, but also EU members if they should take unwanted initiatives. According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, Russia controls at least one quarter of the global gas reserves. It is the main energy supplier of the EU and covers about 44 percent of the gas import and 18 percent of the oil import of the EU-15 (Westphal 2004: 45). The following figures demonstrate the dependence of especially Central and Eastern European countries from Russian natural gas (2004): Moldova, Serbia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Finland – 100 percent, Latvia und Lithuania – 94, Azerbaijan – 89, Hungary – 85, Greece and Slovakia – 80, Austria – 70, Romania – 70, Czech Republic and Poland – 69, Ukraine – 50 (for comparison: Germany – 41, Italy – 35, France – 30 percent). Some scholars take the view that the European dependence from Russian gas would decrease in the future due to the construction of new pipelines from North Africa and the so-called “Nabucco-Pipeline”; moreover, it would be possible to make use of liquefied natural gas, which can be delivered by ship. According to EU data, the dependence of the European states (outside the CIS) from Russian gas from 69 percent in the year 2000 will decrease until 2020 to 40 percent. The share of gas from Africa, the Near East and the Caspian region will increase at the expense of the Russian share (Götz 2006: 4). However, it has to be taken into account that all these regions cannot be called stable. Moscow considers the Caspian region as its “area of strategic interest” and has always denounced all proposals to demilitarize the region. In August 2002, the Russian armed forces – and especially the Caspian Flotilla – conducted one of the biggest exercises in post-Soviet times which 60 vessels, some 10,000 servicemen and 30 aircraft, allegedly devoted to the “antiterrorist struggle”, although so far nothing has been heard about terrorists who tried to highjack oil rigs in the Caspian Sea. Therefore it is quite clear that the issue was not about “terrorism” but about Russian power projection and geopolitics – doubtless, not without regard to the energy resources of the region. The “Nabucco”-Pipeline should run from the gas fields of Iran through Turkey and the Balkans to Central Europe. Though, Teheran with its weapons of mass destruction development programs is no reliable partner: senior officials in Teheran repeatedly threatened to raise the oil price in the case of sanctions on their country. And a final decision about the construction of “Nabucco” has not been taken yet. But if built from 2007 or 2008 on, it should from 2010 or 2011 on carry 30 billion cubic meters of gas a year. Assessing the future EU energy demands, it has also to be taken into account that the gas and oil production of the UK, Norway and the Netherlands will significantly

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decrease in the near future. In addition, EU member states will shut down much more nuclear reactors than are being built in the next decades. Renewable energy resources (solar, wind and biomass energy, hydropower, geothermal power) are a factor of minor importance so far: in 2004, they covered only 6 percent of the primary energy consumption of both the EU-15 and the EU-25 (Erneuerbare Energien in Zahlen, p. 24). At the same time, conditions are created for more EU gas imports from Russia. An important example is the construction of the North European gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, linking the town of Babayevo and Greifswald in Germany. Poland and the Baltic States were not even consulted prior to the signing of a treaty about this subject a few days before the general election in Germany (on 18 September 2005), when the defeat of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s Social Democratic Party already seemed to be inevitable. Poland and Baltic States now face the fact that their EU and NATO ally Germany proved its unwillingness to consider their economic security interests when it came to the conclusion of economic agreements with an obvious political background with Putin’s Russia. The pipeline Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Energy policy – and specific issues concerning the production and transport of oil and gas – is of tremendous security policy importance in the South Caucasus. Today the main focus of attention is the 1,760-kilometer Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, costing 3.6 billion dollars. It starts at the Sangachal Terminal near Baku in Azerbaijan, passes through Georgia and ends at a new maritime terminal at Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast in Turkey. Construction of the pipeline began in 2002, it was officially opened on 25 May 2005. The first tanker-load of Caspian oil to flow through the BTC is scheduled to leave the Mediterranean port of Ceyan in June 2006. The pipeline should transport up to one million barrels of oil per day. Azerbaijan was dependent upon two export routes for the sale of its oil: the Baku-Supsa pipeline through Georgia and the Baku–Novorossiisk pipeline through Russia. It is a matter of common knowledge that the US is also very interested in BTC – undoubtedly because it is routed to avoid both Russia and Iran. For the same reason, these states reject the pipeline. No less important for the BTC project is the question of whether there are sufficient oil deposits in Azerbaijan to fill the pipeline. It is conceivable that it will only be able to work profitably if it can carry additional oil from Kazakhstan. Armenia has proposed to build a section of the pipeline across its territory, but it was, of course, an illusion to expect that Azerbaijan could accept such a dependence from its archenemy. Nevertheless, the Armenians benefit from the pipeline. The Azerbaijani armed forces are still too inadequately equipped and trained to be able to successfully mount an assault on Karabakh, but in the theoretical case of a new war for the breakaway region it would quite easy for the Armenians to halt the gas transit from Baku, because the pipeline runs only several kilometers from the Armenianoccupied territories of Azerbaijan. In other words: The BTC has turned out to be a

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crucial factor ensuring the Status quo between Azerbaijan and Armenians with their de facto “independent” Karabakh. And Russia as the main ally of Armenia makes use of this state of affairs. Moreover, the BTC runs close by South Ossetia, Russian bases in Georgia as well as the Kurdish areas of eastern Turkey. For that reason, the defense of the pipeline even in peace times is one of the greatest security policy challenges facing those countries with an interest in it. The Fragile Energy and Economic Security of Georgia To date, Georgian energy security has been defined by a focus on pipeline security, with too little attention devoted to seeking energy diversification, promoting greater self-sufficiency, and pursuing alternative suppliers. Two explosions in North Ossetia near the Nizhny Lars border post between Russia and South Ossetia on 22 January 2006 seriously damaged both strands of the main gas pipeline that supplies gas to Georgia and Armenia. A third explosion in the Russian Republic of KarachaevoCherkessia damaged the main power line supplying electricity from Russia to Georgia. Saakashvili and his Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili implicitly blamed Russia for the sabotage of the gas pipelines, noting that the explosions occurred in a region under Russian control. It was a widespread opinion in Tbilisi that the blasts were deliberate retaliation for Georgia’s efforts to reduce its total dependence on Russian gas supplies by securing alternative supplies from Azerbaijan and Iran. This profound energy crisis has again demonstrated the fundamental vulnerability of the Georgian state, especially in the face of Russian pressure and intimidation, raising questions about Georgian security in general and energy security in particular. Moreover, Russia tries to damage Georgian foreign trade. Thus, since 27 March 2006 Russia, which has been by far the biggest market for Georgian wine and spirits, has blocked their imports. Six weeks later, Moscow banned imports of the popular Borjomi mineral water from Georgia, citing again public health concerns. However, the majority of political observers outside Russia agree that Moscow only intends to “punish” a country, which has almost nothing to export than agricultural commodities, for Saakashvili’s pro-Western course. Conclusion and Outlook The three South Caucasian republics are far from being the unit that many in the West wish to regard them as. The leaderships of both Georgia and Azerbaijan already at the beginning of the 1990s lost any control over parts of their territories. There are still no solutions in sight for these ethno-territorial conflicts, as Moscow tries to manipulate them in its own self-interest. Western powers show only a small (or no) degree of commitment to achieving enduring and just solutions to these conflicts. It is widely assumed that Russia hopes to benefit from making Georgia look like an unstable country. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian peacekeepers

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promote the preservation of a “Status quo”, which is advantageous for the separatist regimes. They equate “self determination” solely with territorial separation. Not least because of that, the postulation of ethnoterritorial conflict and separatism playing a central part concerning the decay of Azerbaijan and Georgia is to be regarded legitimate. Thus they may be considered as “failed states” also due to the fact that in the foreseeable future there is no apparent chance to restore their territorial integrity. Notwithstanding a certain US presence, Russia will remain the dominant power in the South Caucasus for the foreseeable future, thus setting the limits for its further integration in European and Euro-Atlantic organizations. Tbilisi’s and Baku’s pursuit of NATO membership may be seen more as a delusion of grandeur than a realistic goal. The Caspian region with its 34-billion-barrel oil potential is no formidable rival to OPEC with its proven reserves of over 800 billion barrels, and it would be unfounded to assume that the BTC pipeline is crucial in lessening Western dependence on oil from the Middle East: it will supply only one percent of global oil demand at first stage. However, the pipeline will help to diversify the global oil supply and so will insure to an extent against a failure in supply elsewhere. The problem of diversification of EU oil and gas supply will remain on the agenda in the near future. References BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2005. , accessed 19 January 2006. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (2005), Erneuerbare Energien in Zahlen – nationale und internationale Entwicklung. Internet-Update. Berlin , accessed 16 January 2006. CIA (2006), The World Factbook. , assessed 29 May 2006. Cheteryan, V. (2003), Malye voyny i bolshaya igra. Caucasus Media Institute, Yerevan. Götz, R. (2006), Nach dem Gaskonflikt. SWP–Aktuell, no. 3, January 2006. Malek, M. (2000), Determinanten der Sicherheitspolitik Armeniens. Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, no. 11, 2000. Malek, M. (2001), “Armenia”, Giessmann, H.J. and Gustenau, G.E. (eds), Security Handbook 2001. Security and Military in Central and Eastern Europe. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp. 43–58.

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Martin, K (2006), “Caucasus”, in The ISCIP Analyst. Volume XII, Number 3, 17 March 2006. Piontkovsky, A. (2004), Russia’s Dead End in South Ossetia. IWPR’S Caucasus Reporting Service, no. 248, 25 August 2004. Torbakov, I. (2006), “Moscow Says Georgian Parliament’s Vote on Peacekeepers Inconsequential”. Eurasia Daily Monitor (The Jamestown Foundation), Volume 3, Number 34 (17 February 2006). Westphal, K. (2004), Handlungsbedarf. Die Energiepolitik der Europäischen Union. Osteuropa, no. 9–10, 2004.

Chapter 11

Turkey’s Role in Post-Cold War European Security Policy ebnem Udum

Introduction Despite the debate on whether Turkey belongs to Europe or not, in terms of European security, the answer is a clear affirmative. In the pre-World War I era, the Ottoman state was part of the European system of security arrangements, and accordingly Ottoman defense policy was based on alliances with the great powers of Europe. Since the establishment of the new republic in 1923, Turkey sought security through alliances, and devoted its efforts particularly to embracing the West. After World War II, Turkey aspired to join NATO against the looming Soviet threat, and became a member of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1952. As a result, NATO membership established a long-lasting institutional and functional link with the West (Karaosmano lu 2000: 199, 209). During the Cold War, Turkey contributed to European security, which was defined in terms of the Soviet ideological and territorial expansionist threat with massive conventional and nuclear capability. Placed in NATO’s southern flank and sharing borders with the USSR and the Middle East, Turkey shouldered substantial burden of security by providing military bases and other capabilities to NATO. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War put an end to the ultimate threat of a nuclear standoff between superpowers, while paving the way for a more difficult array of security threats and risks that created instability. These included non-military or mixed military-civilian threats, such as inter-ethnic/ intra-state conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, organized crime, terrorism, illicit arms and drug trade, illegal migration and transnational environmental risks. The international community had little experience and limited means to cope with them. Still, the first ten years of the end of the Cold War could be deemed as a successful period in which institutions and capabilities were built to deal with the sources of instability. In the context of Europe, the Treaty on the European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) incorporated two new pillars to the European Community: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).

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As a result of the burden-sharing debate in NATO and the inclusion of these new pillars in the EU, the EU started in 1994 to devise its policy on the European security and defense. The aim was to create a force that would carry out Petersbergtype1 operations, which would include EU-led or EU-only operations, but would have access to NATO assets and capabilities if needed. The Western European Union (WEU) would be the security and defense pillar of the EU and the European pillar of NATO. However, throughout the evolution of European security framework, the emphasis shifted from WEU to the EU, particularly after 1998, for operations having access to NATO assets and capabilities decided autonomously by the EU. Until 2001 and extending into 2002, Turkey blocked the development of EU-NATO institutional links on the grounds that its vital national security interests in the Aegean and on Cyprus are threatened, and its acquired rights via the WEU Associate membership is abrogated. Basically Turkey opposed any EU operation that threatened its interests and which it would not have a say in the decisionmaking process. After the Turkish veto problem was solved by a joint effort of the United States and Britain, the remaining task of the EU was to go on to complete these institutional links and reach the Headline Goal for a rapid reaction force by 2003. However, the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States brought a dramatic change to US foreign and security policy, and European security policy as well. The threat of attacks by transnational networks of terrorist organizations that induce “informal violence” (Keohane 2002) and that ultimately seek weapons of mass destruction to use against the United States and its allies created a new security agenda: Threat assessments and responses included a new type of terrorism and securitized previously-nonmilitary fields. The new terrorism is an apocalyptic-type of war which aims at demolishing the international economic and political system created and sustained by the West and especially the United States. The ideology of these terrorist groups takes the current system as the source of all suppression and evil in the world. Thus, as opposed to the traditional terrorist acts that resulted in limited number of casualties and politically significant targets, new terrorism is focused on creating shocks through mass murder and an eventual collapse of the United States and the international political and economic system that maintains the Western dominance over the Muslim world. To achieve their ends, the ultimate means would be weapons of mass destruction, i.e. chemical, biological, perhaps radiological, and nuclear weapons. Though it is hard for non-state groups to acquire a nuclear device, the idle know-how and material from the Soviet space can be obtained on the trade routes that these groups conduct their arms and drug trafficking. The United States, in response, devised its strategy as the “war on terror”, that included options ranging from ideological/psychological war, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, to military means. As the closest allies of the United States, 1 Agreed at Petersberg, Germany, by the June 1992 Western European Union Ministerial Council, these tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

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the Europeans gave support in the aftermath of 9/11, and were hit by terrorist attacks in Istanbul, Madrid and London. A paradox in the US strategy concerns the definitions and conceptualizations. The underlying concepts in both the United States and new terrorism are placed as dichotomies, as black and white concepts, which yield no room for negotiation, common interests, and especially for deterrence. The United States depicts its war as the war between good and evil, that eventually corroborates the hypothesis of a clash of civilizations, that of Islam and Christianity. Thus, in the face of an ideological, non-state, non-territorial and apocalyptic war, Cold-War type policies, strategies and means become ineffective. Nonetheless, the United States does not refrain from employing them in this strategy. Therefore, the key to formulate effective and sustainable policies is to revise the “black and white” depictions of civilizations, cultures and religions. The European Security Strategy of 2003 outlined the threats and responses, which included measures emphasizing cooperative security approach and multilateralism in addressing the new threats. Turkey has an invaluable potential to contribute to this strategy not only with its material capabilities within NATO – military, intelligence, geographical location, communication – but also moral/ideational capabilities as a candidate country to the EU with a 90 percent Muslim population. It has a unique position to serve as a bridge between cultures, civilizations and religions – which is the critical aspect of the post-9/11 world – and prove that the post-9/11 security is not necessarily driven by a war between Islam and Christianity. Broadly Turkey’s role in providing for Europe’s security in the post-Cold War security policies of the EU can be explained with regards to its geographical proximity to the regions of instability that affect European security, and its historical, cultural and religious ties to the states in those regions, namely, the Balkans, Caucasus, the Middle East, Black Sea and the Mediterranean. This chapter will answer the following questions: What is European security policy in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era? What is Turkey’s role in accomplishing the main tasks and reaching the targets in this policy, in maintaining and applying it? Why is Turkey’s role integral in Europe’s post-9/11 security policy? To that end the first part will look at the European security in the post-Cold War by examining the security agenda and the European security policy to address the items in this agenda. Turkey’s role and contribution as well as the Turkish issue in the evolution of this policy will be presented. The second part will be devoted to the impacts of the events of 9/11 on international, hence European security. 9/11 is a turning point in many aspects of international relations and international security, which highlighted the significance of Turkey for Europe, particularly in Europe’s security strategy after 9/11. In this sense, Turkey’s contributions to NATO and EU operations after the Cold War and after 9/11 will be given to demonstrate the role of Turkey in Europe’s strategy in different regions and issue areas that pertain to European security. The concluding remarks will include prospects and draw attention to the mutual benefits of Turkish-EU cooperation for European security and its reflections on the process of Turkey’s full membership to the European Union.

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Turkey and European Security in the Post-Cold War After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, European security underwent a radical change of character. The threat of a nuclear-armed superpower with communist ideology was replaced by a variety of mixed military-civilian type security issues that created instability as a result of the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. The ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia demonstrated that NATO’s collective defense fall short of addressing post-Cold War crises which require enhanced capabilities in crisis management and crisis prevention. To that end, both NATO and the EU started to devise new means to cope with the new security risks, particularly inter-ethnic/intra-state conflicts, the ensuing humanitarian crises and peacekeeping, peacemaking processes, and conflict prevention. Although proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, organized crime, terrorism, illicit arms and drug trade, and illegal migration occupied the security agenda of Europe, they did not rise to prominence until 9/11. As a response, NATO and the EU started developing new concepts and strategies not only to effectively address post-Cold War security issues, but also to solve the burden-sharing debate that the Europeans should shoulder more of the burden now that the Cold War is over, but at the same time should not take actions that would decouple the United States from continental Europe. Thus, NATO in its New Strategic Concept, engaged in a task to create the means for reinforcing the ability of Europeans to take security actions without the direct intervention of the Atlantic Alliance. The EU, along with NATO launched the European Security and Defense Initiative/Identity (ESDI) within NATO, the EU and the WEU. Within the context of the CFSP pillar, the EU would put together a range of instruments and mechanisms including a Rapid Reaction Force and a conflict prevention network, that would enhance their ability to respond to crises that affect Europe’s security. After the Franco-British declaration in St Malo in 1998, and the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the European initiative was given firmer shape in the Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999), Feira (June 2000) and Nice (December 2000) European Councils. ESDI waned and was replaced by the ESDP when the EU members worked on mechanisms and capabilities for autonomous EU military operations having access to NATO assets, and when eventually the EU absorbed the WEU in November 2000. The main bulwark facing the development of ESDP was the Turkish veto in NATO for the establishment of EU-NATO institutional links, between 1998 and 2001/2002. Turkey objected to the way the ESDP was being constructed because the status of non-EU European allies of NATO was not considered in essence. Institutionally, The Treaty on the EU (1992) had established several links between the EU and the WEU enabling EU recourse to WEU to draw up and implement decisions related to defense matters. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) bolstered EU’s security profile by arguing that “… the WEU might also be possibly integrated into the Union, should the European Council so decide” (Amsterdam Treaty, Article 17). Thus, it signaled that the EU was beginning to construct the ESDP as a substitute for the WEU. The

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1998 St Malo summit declaration that implied the intention to improve European defense capabilities within the framework of the EU itself (British-French Joint Declaration 1998), created the possibility for an EU-only military action outside NATO and without NATO assets. Thus, in such operations Turkey would not be able to block decisions contrary to its national interests, hence it cast its veto to the NATO-EU cooperation for the ESDP. Moreover, its associate membership status in the WEU was abrogated after the EU took over the functions of the WEU in November 2000, in the Marseilles WEU ministerial meeting. Turkey’s overall uneasiness over its exclusion from the decisionmaking mechanisms of the ESDP stemmed from the particular problems with Greece, which is an EU member. In the worst-case scenario, Turkey was worried that the EU might intervene in Cyprus without consultation. Thus, it wanted to ensure that it would have some control over EU-led military operations in its immediate region, especially because of the differences over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea with Greece. The EU continued to advance with the ESDP in 1999 Cologne and Helsinki European Councils: The Cologne European Council endorsed the idea of creating a “capacity for autonomous action” as stated in St Malo summit, and of supporting it with credible military capabilities and appropriate decisionmaking bodies (Cologne European Council Conclusions 1999). The Helsinki European Council, the EU agreed on a common European Headline Goal of creating a Rapid Reaction Force to carry out the Petersberg-type tasks by 2003. This force underpinned ESDP militarily: It would be composed of 50,000–60,000 troops, deployable in sixty days, and sustainable for one year. The June 2000 Feira European Council decided that in an EU-led operation with recourse to NATO assets, the authority of decisionmaking would rest with the EU along with provisions to alleviate the concerns of the non-EU NATO members.2 The latter, especially Turkey were not satisfied, nor at the December 2000 Nice European Council, because in an EU-only operation (when NATO is not involved as an Alliance), decisionmaking would rest with the EU organs. As a result, Turkey continued to block the establishment of EU-NATO institutional links until a final settlement was found in so-called Ankara Document in December 2001. It was negotiated by Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States and defined the procedures of participation of non-EU European Allies in the ESDP. The Ankara agreement was agreed in Seville, Spain in 2002, which specified that the no EU-led operation would be made against a NATO ally (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs).3 During the October 2002 Brussels European Summit, the document was endorsed – with minor changes – by the EU Heads of State and Government, with the title “ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the non-EU European Allies” (Brussels European Council 2002). Fortunately Turkey offers more than vetoes to European security endeavors and operations. It participated in all operations led by NATO since 1995: The IFOR and 2 Then, they included Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey. 3 It was proposed by Spain and agreed between Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

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SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo and Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony in Macedonia. Dating back to the Ottoman period, Turkey has historical, cultural and religious ties with various ethnic groups and states in the Balkans, where they could enjoy their differences. The Turkish contingents were welcome in their operational zones basically because of these ties and the positive memories of the Ottoman political system which respected the exercise of cultural and religious practices in the empire. In such peace operations that include conflict prevention and peacekeeping, the consent of the public is also very important for the effectiveness and successful completion of the mission. Therefore, the Turkish contribution made a difference in former Yugoslavia, and especially for Europe. Broadly Turkey’s role in providing for Europe’s security in the post-Cold War security policies of the EU can be explained with regards to its geographical proximity to the regions of instability that affect European security, and its historical, cultural and religious ties to the states in those regions, in addition to the Balkans; namely Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Black Sea. As mentioned above, the Turkish presence in the Balkans dates back to the period of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey attaches great importance to stability in the Balkans as any ethnic conflict or instability can trigger humanitarian crises that would directly affect Turkey, because of religious and ethnic ties with the peoples in the Balkans. Turkey therefore participated in NATO operations and contributed to other international efforts to settle the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, with troops, police officers and observers. Turkey played a leading role to start initiatives in Southeastern Europe, such as the Southeastern European Cooperation Process (SEECP) for regional cooperation to create regional stability, and the Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe (MPFSEE)/Southeast Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) – a multinational peace force at brigade level to participate in peace operations. Turkey is also a partner country to the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative. Turkey assumed the Chairmanship of the Coordination Committee of the Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial Process (SEDM/CC) in July 2003, and during the Turkish Chairmanship, the Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) of the MPFSEE took important steps about the deployment of SEEBRIG in NATO- and EU-led peacekeeping operations (Ni ancı 2005: 3). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia started to occupy a prominent place in the security, political and economic strategies of international and regional powers. The rivalry of influence in these regions between Russia, the United States, China, Iran, and the UK and Turkey to a lesser extent deprives these regions of stability. Europe has been dependent on the Middle Eastern oil, and for economic strategy it is necessary to diversify the sources. The vast oil and gas fields in Southern Caucasus and Central Asia offer a supplementary option. The issue is their transportation to European markets, therefore stability and security is of utmost importance for secure and unabated flow (Udum 2001).

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Turkey has historical, cultural, religious and linguistic ties with the Newly Independent States (NIS) in those regions, and has played an important role to achieve stability in the region by engaging in political and economic relations, as well as providing educational programs. It also assisted Central Asian countries in their efforts in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program. Considering that the Turks originated in and migrated from Central Asia, the EU and NATO has Turkey as an asset to go beyond economic interests, and have influence in this region (Ni ancı 2005: 3). Developments in the Mediterranean and the Middle East have been historically relevant for European security, because the vital naval, air and land routes pass from these regions. The EU has lucrative trade relations with the countries in the Middle East, and meets the bulk of the energy demand with the oil imports from the Middle East. Thus, for Europe, the security of the energy supply is of utmost importance. The significance of Turkey about security in the Middle East has increased after 9/11, which will be dealt in greater detail in the next section. Still, it is important to note here that Turkey’s potential to play the role of an intermediary thanks to its historical, cultural and religious ties with the Middle Eastern countries offers more for European security than its borders in this region with Syria, Iraq and Iran. In the aftermath of the Cold War, it was important to see a spirit of cooperation flourish in the NIS in Caucasus and the Black Sea region as the interests of great powers lied in the transportation routes. Historically, these countries had a conflictual background since they had perceived each other as adversaries. To override this background, Turkey launched the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) initiative in 1992, bringing energy producing and consuming countries together, around objectives consistent with those of the SECI and Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. Out of this cooperative spirit, came out the BLACKSEAFOR in 2001, composed of the littoral states to the Black Sea (6). European Security After 9/11 and Turkey’s Significance The terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001 on targets of political and economic significance opened a new era of international security and strategy. The major threat to international security was identified as transnational networks of informal violence, driven by religious fundamentalism and ideology against the United States and the Western values it champions: Democracy, liberal economy, human rights, and freedom, which these organizations claimed as the source of all suppression and evil in the conflict-ridden regions of the world. Taking advantage of the globalized political and economic system of the post-Cold War, and the secular, open societies of the liberal democracies, these networks could globalize informal violence. They pose asymmetrical threats and have the advantage over the West in terms of belief systems and information (Keohane 2002: 1): What they uphold is not the survival of people, but that of their ideology. They operate in small, closed structures that are hard to be identified and detected. Moreover,

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modern technology for communication allows them to be mobile and without a return address. Therefore, deterrence as a strategy became obsolete to address this new type of terrorism. Different from traditional terrorism, it is not geared toward certain political figures but to the United States, and allied nations. Their aim is to create shock waves to put an end to “American and Western dominance”. To that end, these groups would not refrain from using weapons of mass destruction to induce terror. Overall, the fear of the United States and its allies is a probable terrorist attack with WMD use (Mueller 2003: 28–37). 9/11 was the second attack on US soil after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. It showed the Americans and the international community as a whole that if an attack on the homeland of a continental country was possible, then the traditional conceptions of the Westphalian state eroded, and strategy should adapt to reality. As traditional conceptions of war and peace changed, i.e. use of conventional weapons, the barrier conception of borders, territoriality of the state, deterrence and defense, etc., threat assessments and security strategies of the United States and the EU changed. American policymakers concluded that those states that have anti-American or anti-Western positions and which seek or have WMD capability could cooperate with terrorist groups for access to material and know-how. Or these groups, by the economic income of organized criminal activities and with the help of middlemen, could obtain them especially in the former Soviet Union space, where unsafeguarded and unaccounted material abound. Therefore, the US strategy was formulated to address terrorism, WMD, organized crime/failed states axes that form the new threat triangle (The National Security Strategy of the USA 2002: 5–7, 13–16). Similarly, the European Security Strategy of 2003 lists these threats by this order and outlines the strategies to cope with them (European Security Strategy 2003: 3–5). The initial US and EU response strategies differed in terms of their methods. The differences emanate from the security cultures and capabilities (material and other) of the two sides of the Atlantic: While both sides agree on the utility and importance of cooperative security approaches and multilateralism, the United States does not exclude military options besides counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation measures. The European Union on the other hand, underlines the relevance of diplomacy and sees the use of force as a last resort. The difference between existential and potential threats seems to have disappeared in the US threat assessments as the United States is focused on prevention of future attacks. The United States makes a motivational-based analysis of threats, because it understands from 9/11 that anti-American or anti-Western motivations/intentions will qualify a state or a group to seek for and eventually acquire capabilities to hit in the future. Generally, the American way of war is not one that is focused on a limited end, rather it is a war of liberal values. Strategically, what is important is the actual operational stage rather than the aftermath of the war, because it is assumed that a successful operation will prepare the favorable grounds for the purpose of the war (Weigley 1973). The NATO operation in Afghanistan and Iraq proved that the American way of war did not necessarily bring favorable consequences for the

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Western values to flourish. In this respect, the United States realized the significance of the European “soft power” with the experience of diplomacy and its image in the regions like the Middle East, where the US undertakings are regarded with suspicion. Basically, European security policy after 9/11 evolved as the United States adapted to the changing security environment: Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was operationalized immediately after the terrorist attacks, and NATO undertook the operation against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. When the United States brought the issue of Iraq with the argument that the Saddam Hussein regime maintained clandestine WMD and delivery capabilities, Europe was divided in giving support to the United States. The European states that participated in the US-led coalition in the operation against Iraq started to re-evaluate their support as a result of the terrorist attacks in Istanbul (2003), Madrid (2004) and London (2005). Thus, European states prioritized non-military measures, cooperative security approaches and multilateralism including cooperation in internal security/intelligence, inserting new provisions in international conventions and agreements regarding terrorism, and new initiatives for post-conflict reconstruction, peacekeeping, nation-building, and defense measures for possible WMD attacks (European Security Strategy 2003: 6–10). Within the post-9/11 strategy, it is integral to back up material capabilities and measures with moral/ideational ones, because “new terrorism” is an apocalyptic war that has an attraction in the poverty-conflict-religion axis, and that creates the dichotomy of the Muslim world vs. the Western world. Unfortunately, what deepened this divide has been the policy of the Bush administration, which constructed the “war on terrorism” as the war between “good and evil” (President Bush’s Remarks 2001). Such a conceptualization yielded no room for negotiation or deterrence, but only for preventive measures that were unprecedented in method and procedure. As a result, the US approach of prevention turned one of unilateralism over multilateralism at times, and created anti-American sentiments even in friendly nations, because the United States left no third way other than being with or against the United States. More troubling is that the European allies found themselves in the dilemma to support the United States at the expense of being the target of terrorism. Thus, it was very important to demonstrate for Europe that their strategy was not based on “clash of civilizations” despite their deep-rooted relationship with the United States and Allied support in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this sense, Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union since 1999 has never been so instrumental to show the European stance to the Muslim world. The opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005 was a landmark development, which refuted the argument – or moral weapon – of terrorism that the West is rejecting Muslims and prospering at their expense. Turkey is unique as a secular democratic country with around 90 percent Muslim population, and this status offered a model for a strategy to break the circle of instability and violence in the broader region of the Middle East (including the states with Muslim populace in North Africa). Turkey demonstrated its readiness to facilitate the efforts for peace and stability. In this sense, Turkey’s role is noteworthy in NATO’s

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Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) launched in the 2004 NATO Istanbul summit. In this summit, NATO decided to strengthen its relations with its partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue and with countries in the broader Middle East to cooperate in defense reform, terrorism and nonproliferation issues (NATO Istanbul Summit 2004). It was important for NATO to hold the summit in Istanbul, which geographically and historically straddles Europe and Asia, and hosts Christian, Judaic and Muslim civilizations. The closing speech of President G.W. Bush by the view of the Bosphorus bridge was a conscious choice in this regard. Turkey’s role in European security after 9/11 is not limited to its significance as a cultural bridge between civilizations. It is observed in several multilateral efforts and initiatives to respond to the post-9/11 threats. Here again, NATO and the EU benefit from Turkey’s intermediary role in the Muslim world, and its geographical location to deal with the various security issues that occupy European security agenda. Turkey’s Role in NATO and EU Operations After 9/11 Since the end of the Cold War, NATO and the EU engaged in regional conflicts that pertain to European security, and Turkey played in an important role with its military, police forces and observation missions, etc. The events of 9/11 provided the casus belli for US-led operation, Operation Enduring Freedom, in Afghanistan to target the members of the al-Qaeda (the terrorist organization which carried out the 9/11 attacks) and the Taliban regime, which was alleged to provide support and shelter to al-Qaeda. Following the operation, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established under the UN mandate in 2001 to assist the Afghan government in providing security in Kabul and its vicinity. Turkey was one of the first NATO countries that volunteered to send forces to ISAF. Turkish forces participated in ISAF I (December 2001–June 2002), and Turkey led ISAF II (June 2002–February 2003). In August 2003, NATO took over the command and coordination of ISAF, which is NATO’s first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. ISAF also functions in the post-conflict restructuring phase, and helping in the development of Afghan security structures, providing a secure environment for elections and the spread of rule of law. Turkey took the lead again for ISAF VII (February–August 2005) with around 1,400 troops, and maintained the security of the Kabul International Airport during that period. In addition, it has provided four general utility helicopters for the ISAF mission since May 2004. Last but not least, NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul, Hikmet Çetin, is a former Foreign Minister of Turkey and the Chairman of the Turkish Parliament. In addition to Turkey’s military contribution, its relations with Afghanistan and religious and cultural ties played a significant role for ISAF in the country’s reconstruction (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). After the conflicts in formerYugoslavia, and within the emerging European security structure, Europe is sharing more responsibility as NATO operations are terminated and the EU forces take over. Welcoming the adoption of the European Security Strategy document and the emphasis on effective multilateralism, Turkey continued

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to participate in these operations. After the Operation Allied Harmony came to an end, followed by the EU military crisis management operation, Concordia, Turkey provided 11 personnel, and eight personnel to the successive EU police mission, Proxima. 101 Turkish police officers serve in the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Since the beginning of 2003, 14 Turkish officers work for the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is the first EU civilian crisis management operation. The 28–29 June 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit decisions started a new period in NATO-EU cooperation in operational level: After NATO’s SFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was terminated, to be followed by the EU operation EUFOR-ALTHEA with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, Turkey maintained its contributions under this operation as well. Turkey also participates to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) with 23 gendarmerie officers. As of 2005, around 800 Turkish troops are serving in BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Turkey has participated in all EU-led military operations under the Berlin Plus arrangements, and various police missions, as listed below: • • • • •

EUFOR-CONCORDIA in Macedonia 31 March–15 December 2003 2 liaison teams and headquarters personnel; EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1 January 2003 8 police officers and 6 gendarmerie; EUPOL-PROXIMA in Macedonia since 15 December 2003 6 police officers and 2 gendarmerie; EUFOR-ALTHEA initiated at the end of 2004 in Bosnia-Herzegovina Over 370 troops and 23 gendarmerie (IPU); EUPOL in KINSHASA in the Democratic Republic of Congo 1 police officer (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Turkey sent staff and personnel to join the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM),4 which was established following the decision at the 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit to assist Iraq with the training of its security forces. It also offered courses to Iraqi personnel in Turkey. Turkey also subscribed to participate in EUJUST LEX, the integrated rule-of-law mission for Iraq, within the framework of the ESDP. Turkey is experienced in the fight against terrorism due to the acts of secessionist violence in Turkey’s east and southeast regions. In the context of other European initiatives and efforts of counter-terrorism, it subscribed to numerous commitments, such as the Prague Capabilities Commitment,5 European Capabilities Action Plan

4 It was first established as the NATO Training Implementation Mission on July 30, 2004 and later changed to NTM. 5 PCC was launched in NATO’s Prague Summit in November 2002, which the NATO members seek to improve capabilities in more than 400 fields, including most notably, CBRN defense and intelligence.

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(ECAP) projects,6 and EU Battle Groups Concept,7 and expressed the intention to contribute to the efforts under the European Union’s “Declaration on Combating Terrorism” (March 2004), the “EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism” (June 2004), and the “Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension of the Fight Against Terrorism” (December 2004). Turkey also has the potential to contribute to the European strategies for counterterrorism and counter-proliferation: The routes of illicit trade in arms and drugs pass through Turkish territory, therefore cooperation in border controls and export control measures can play a tremendous role to interrupt the economic base of the terrorist networks, and more importantly the smuggling of WMD-related material. Regarding counter-terrorism, preventive measures would be bolstered with intelligence sharing and cooperation of police forces. Out of such cooperation can develop mutual understanding of terrorism in different countries across Europe, creating favorable ground for effective strategies (Udum 2003: 87–92). Conclusion The Cold War concept of security, focusing mainly on the material capabilities for the survival of the state, was widened as the new era generated new threats and risks to state security. Relieved from the Realist and Neo-Realist explanations, the discipline (of International Relations) and international relations began to discuss and include non-military fields that affect the well-being of the state with its economy, society and environment. Territorial conceptions of state security with traditional approaches to war and peace started to erode as states became much more connected through globalization in economic, political, military and civil-society sectors. Though the state is still the main actor, it is not the only one in world politics. The ten-yearperiod between the end of the Cold War and 9/11 was enough of a transition for the recognition and adaptation to such trends, but not until 9/11 was everybody aware of the urgency for the adaptation in responses and strategies. The transition from traditional concepts of security, such as barrier conception of borders, purpose of war and maintenance of peace, require new frameworks of analysis and methods, both in the discipline and in international relations. The above analysis presented a one-way contribution of Turkey to European security for the purposes of the broader approach of European Security in Transition. However, it would be incomplete if the reverse direction were left out. Therefore, it

6 Turkey took part in ECAP Project Groups on strategic air lift and air-to-air refueling; and had an observer status in combat search and rescue, theater missile defense and humanitarian rescue and evacuation operations. It applied for membership in other ECAP projects such as NBC and strategic sealift. 7 Turkey intended to contribute to the Battle Groups Concept at the Military capabilities Conference in Brussels (2004) highlighting the value of its experience in the NATO Response Force (as the leader of the land forces in its first two rotations).

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is important to note here that Turkey’s contribution to European security policy takes place in an interaction and constructs perceptions about the Turkish component in the European integration project. Traditional theories fall short of explaining the process of the construction of a social relationship through interaction, hence the foreseeable process of the development of mutual understanding and links between Turkey and Europe. It is very important to address the identity question in EU-Turkish relations, because the European identity perceives the Turkish identity as the “other”, which is basically the source of the debate on whether Turkey should eventually be a member of the EU. Turkey’s contributions to European security policy after the Cold War and especially after 9/11 in various operations and initiatives have been the first steps for the construction of this mutual understanding that Turkey is not necessarily the “other” and the “buffer” that keeps security threats away from Europe, but the unique partner with which Europe addresses these threats, and realizes its interests as Europeans. References Karaosmano lu, A. (2000), “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, (Fall 2000), pp. 199–216. Keohane, R. (2002), “Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics and the Liberalism of Fear”, Paper, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29-September 1, 2002. Also published in Understanding September 11th, Calhoun, C., Price, P., and Timmer, A. (eds) (New York: New Press). Mueller, H. (2003), “Terrorism, Proliferation: A European Threat Assessment”, Chaillot Papers, No. 58, March 2003. Ni ancı, . (2005), Turkey’s Role in NATO in the Post-Cold War Security Environment, NATO Research Paper, Rome: NATO Defense College-Academic Research Branch, March 2005. Udum, . (2001/2002), “The Politics of Caspian Energy Resources: A Challenge for Turkish Foreign Policy”, Perceptions, Vol. 6, No. 4, (December 2001February 2002) . Udum, . (2002), “Turkey and the Emerging European Security Framework”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, (Autumn 2002), pp. 69–103. Udum, . (2003), The Impacts of Turkey’s Response to Proliferation Threats in the Middle East on Its Integration With Europe, Master’s Thesis, Ankara, Bilkent University. Weigley, R. (1973), The American Way of War: A History of the US Military Strategy and Policy (MacMillan: New York).

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Other Sources Amsterdam Treaty, 1997 (Entry into force: 1999). A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003. British-French Summit, St. Malo 3–4 December 1998 Joint Declaration. Brussels European Council Conclusions, 24–25 October 2002 . Cologne European Council Presidency Conclusions, 4 June 1999. International Security Assistance Force, . The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002, . NATO After Prague, NATO Website: . “NATO Elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a Genuine Partnership, Launches Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,” NATO Update, . President Bush’s Remarks, Address to a Joint Session to the Congress and American People, United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20 September 2001. . Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “European Security and Defense Identity/Policy and Turkey’s Contribution” .

Chapter 12

European Union and the Greater Middle East: Economic Relations, Political Issues and Future Challenges Michele Brunelli

In the last few decades there has been a radical shift in the European policy perception toward the Mediterranean; a sea that has been considered for centuries the point of contact and of division/opposition, between the Christian Europe – an in fieri concept since the Carolingian era – and the Islamic East. Actually, the European Union has gradually – but constantly – tried to recover an original and specifically European action toward the Mediterranean countries and the Near East, by performing a series of acts aimed at emphasizing and implementing relationships, in a delightfully economical dimension at the beginning, and in a geopolitical dimension soon afterwards. This phase of renewed interest is based on three crucial elements: 1. The necessity for the European Union (EU) to play a greater political role in the Middle-East scene, in order to gain more visibility and to be in the condition of bargaining power; 2. The need to represent an alternative to the United States in the attempt to play a major role in such a strategic area. One of the tools is trying to solve the conflict between Israel and Palestine; 3. The important changes in the Middle East geopolitics, mainly related to the policy led by Ariel Sharon, to pacification and to the democratic reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. In spite of its frequent incapacity to express itself univocally at a political level – as the 2003 Iraqi war proved, the European Union managed to combine its economical power with the traditional and special relationships with some coast countries (e.g. Italy, Libya), by using a variety of tools and ad hoc programs, which revealed to be very effective, and sometimes, innovative. An active economical aids strategy is the central thread of the European policy toward the Mediterranean countries and those of the Greater Middle East. This strategy consists of concrete measures to support the national economies, as to consolidate

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that commune bonum (Gemeine Wohlfahrt) which is necessary to guarantee national and regional stability. This policy is implemented by some instruments, which have proved to be efficient and valid over the years, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the MEDA Program. These provide for a series of smaller programs, such as ECIP to support the small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and MEDA-Democracy for the promotion of human rights. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is based on the Declaration of Barcelona, signed on the 25 November 1995 by the Foreign Ministers of the 15 European Union Countries and by those of the 12 Mediterranean Partners benefiting from the MEDA Program.1 Its contents were confirmed and strengthened by the Second Ministerial Conference that took place in Malta on 15 and 16 April 2004. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a political agreement between the European Union and some Southern Mediterranean countries. Its aim is to intensify the relationships with the south coast countries, as to counterbalance the European relationships with Eastern European countries that have been developed from 1989 onwards. The main objective is to establish a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean partnership in order to turn the Mediterranean into a common area of peace, stability and prosperity through the reinforcement of political dialogue and security, an economic and financial cooperation and a social, cultural and human partnership. The new, comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean partnership focuses on three key aspects. i) Political and security aspect It aims to establish a common area of peace and stability through a comprehensive, regular political dialogue to complement the bilateral dialogue provided for, in the association agreements. It also aims at setting out a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability and to promote regional security and to work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, through adherence to and compliance with international and regional non-proliferation regimes and the various arms control and disarmament agreements. In addition in the last years we have assisted to the growing urging need to stress on the cooperation in the field of illegal immigration, the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime and corruption. ii) Economic and financial partnerships The economic and financial aspects hope to allow the creation of an area of shared prosperity; the social, cultural and human aspect aims to develop human resources and promote understanding between cultures 1 The latest EU enlargement, on 1 May 2004, has brought two Mediterranean Partners (Cyprus and Malta) into the European Union, while adding a total of 10 to the number of Member States. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership thus comprises 35 members, 25 EU Member States and 10 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). Libya has an observer status since 1999.

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and exchanges between civil societies. This should be a Free Trade Area (FTA) in which the following points are desirable: 1. the adoption of suitable measures as regards rules of origin, certification, protection of intellectual and industrial property rights, and competition; 2. the pursuit and the development of policies based on the principles of market economy and the integration of their economies taking into account their respective needs and levels of development; 3. the adjustment and modernization of economic and social structures, giving priority to the promotion and development of the private sector, the upgrading of the productive sector and the establishment of an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework for a market economy. They will likewise endeavor to mitigate the negative social consequences which may result from this adjustment, by promoting programs for the benefit of the neediest populations; 4. the promotion of mechanisms to foster transfers of technology (Barcelona Declaration). iii) Social, cultural and human partnership According to the Barcelona Declaration, the partners agreed to establish a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs with a view to bringing peoples closer together, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other. This partnership is based on the delicate compromise between, on the one hand, the existence, recognition and mutual respect of diverse traditions, cultures and civilizations throughout the Mediterranean and, on the other hand, the promotion of common roots. EU strategy to achieve these goals passes through the fulfilment of the following points: 1. The importance of dialogue between cultures and religions; 2. The importance of the role the media can play in the reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures; 3. The development of human resources in the area of culture: cultural exchanges, knowledge of other languages, implementation of educational and cultural programs that respect cultural identities; 4. The importance of health and social development and respect for fundamental social rights; 5. The essential contribution civil society can make to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the need to strengthen the instruments of decentralized cooperation to encourage exchanges between those active in development. The MEDA Program is the principal instrument of economic and financial cooperation under the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. It enables the European Union to provide financial and technical assistance to the countries in the southern Mediterranean. The MEDA program takes the place of the various bilateral financial protocols that exist with the countries in the Mediterranean basin. It is inspired by the PHARE

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and TACIS programs, especially as regards transparency and information. A budget heading is established for financing the program. Actions under the MEDA program aim to fulfil the objectives of the three sectors of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership: 1. Reinforcing political stability and democracy; 2. Creating a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area and the development of economic and social cooperation; 3. Taking due account of the human and cultural dimension. The MEDA Program supports the economic transition of the so called Mediterranean non-member countries (MNCs) and the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by promoting economic and social reforms for the modernization of enterprises and the development of the private sector, paying particular attention to: i) support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and job creation; ii) the opening-up of markets; iii) promotion of private investment, industrial cooperation and trade between the various partners; iv) upgrading of economic infrastructure, including the financial and taxation systems; v) consolidation of the major financial balances and creation of an economic environment favourable to accelerated growth (support for structural adjustment). The MEDA Program also supports sustainable socio-economic development, in particular through: i) the participation of civil society and populations in the planning and implementation of development measures; ii) the improvement of social services (education, health, housing, water, etc.); iii) harmonious and integrated rural development, including agricultural development; iv) the strengthening of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; v) the protection and improvement of the environment; vi) the upgrading of economic infrastructure, especially in the sectors of transport, energy and the information society; vii) the development of human resources (vocational training, improvement of scientific and technological research). In addition, MEDA supports regional, sub-regional and cross-border cooperation, in particular through: i) the establishment and development of structures for regional cooperation between Mediterranean partners and between them and the EU and its Member States; ii) the establishment of the infrastructure necessary for regional trade in the areas of transport, communications and energy; iii) exchanges between civil society in the Community and the Mediterranean partners within the framework of decentralized cooperation through the networking of civil society actors (universities, local communities, associations, trade unions, the media, private business, nongovernmental organizations, etc.). All these actions are intended to be fulfilled in the area of the Mediterranean basin – especially in its eastern part (the so-called Middle East), in order to face out some geopolitical and geoeconomical issues. But due to its very closed linkages and common issues with the neighboring regions, the Mediterranean area is nowadays no more geographically limited to the water basin. A geographical connotation of what is nowadays considered “Middle East” will follow. It could be useful to better

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understand the extent of the European policy toward Mediterranean countries and Middle East. An Exhaustive Definition of Middle East In the common sense, the expression Middle East defines a relatively recent geopolitical concept. Up to the 20th century, the word “Orient” was related to those territories, which were formerly under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. At that time, a political apparatus – that is, the administration of the Sublime Porte – and a geographical area perfectly coincided with each other. Moreover, the boundaries of this geographical area were clearly determined and easy to identify. At the start of the Western colonization of China, the neologism “Far East” was created. In reaction to it, the expression “Near East” was used to identify those countries, which stretch from the Mediterranean coast to the arid inlands areas. Starting from the beginning of the XX century, the Asian territory between these two well-defined geographical areas has been called “Middle East”, referring to the area included between the western borders of India and the Egyptian coast of the Red Sea. In 1902 it was the American naval historian Alfred Mahan who used the word “Middle East” for the first time, referring to “that particular area, which has always been an opportunity for rivalry among Russia, Great Britain, Germany and Iran” (Mahan 1987). Later on, it is the correspondent for the London Times in Teheran, Mr. Chirol, who institutionalized the word by using it in a series of articles about “The Middle East Question, or rather on the political defense of India”, thus helping the term to become part of everyday speech. Nowadays both the expression “Middle East” and “Isl m” are largely abused, and they have a definite “vulgar” connotation in western vocabulary. First of all, these concepts are perceived as negatively connoted. This can be explained by the typical attitude of Europeans to analyze the following of historical events from a Eurocentric and deforming point of view. Indeed European perspective suffers from the atavistic and stereotyped image of the “Turk”, considered as the personification of conqueror, destructor, invader and a plague for Mediterranean Europe. Fear toward “the only civilization which put the West’s survival to risk even twice” (Huntington 1996), and which “for almost one thousand years has represented a constant threat for Europe, from the first Moorish landings in Spain up to the second siege to Vienna” (Lewis 1995), has been revived during the 1970s, when the Palestinian question and the loathing toward Israel became international as a consequence of the several terrorist attacks in the core of Europe.2 Perpetrated by 2 We remind here of the attacks in Munich and Amsterdam, 1972; in Paris, 1974; in London and in Rome, 1982; in Athens, 1983 and 1984; in Madrid, Rome, Vienna in 1985, plus the dramatic hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in the same year; in Berlin and Istanbul in 1986.

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some armed groups first, and directly sponsored by different “Rogue States” later on, it is just this terrorist matrix who instilled in western common sense the equation “Terrorism = Middle East fundamentalism” or “Isl m” in general. Furthermore, the identification of Isl m with Terror brought with itself the erroneous belief that Isl m is a sort of monolith, the mirror of the Mecca’s black stone, a unitary ensemble, a potential colonizer, a power based on religious fanaticism and obscurantism of its dictates. In the last two decades Islamic fundamentalisms have been indeed the only power who managed to strongly oppose the West, and particularly after the implosion of the Soviet system. Thanks to their charismatic leaders – who managed leverage on several social classes, if not on the whole population of different nations – the countries of the Southern Mediterranean “provided the West with a bumper crop of leaders to be hated: Gamal ’Abd al-N ir, Mu’ammar Al-Qaddaf , Ruhollah Khomein’i” (Fuller/Lesser 1995) and lastly Usamah Bin Mohammad Bin Laden, one of the most extraordinary examples in western demonology.3 However, the Middle East is not at all a unicuum, it is rather the meeting point of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa, three different cultures which express themselves in as many religions – Christian, Jewish and Muslim, the religions of the so called “People of the book” (Ahl al-Kitab). This includes the possibility of a compromise in the classic Muslim doctrine, and the establishment of a protection relationship (dhimmah) among this people is considered to be possible, and a pacific human society and cultural interchange become desirable. The Middle East has many contrasting aspects and is dissimilar from different points of view: geographically, it stretches from the Pamir mountain chain to the arid and deserted regions of Arabia, up to the fertile Mesopotamian valleys; as far as economics are concerned, capitalist, socialist and “Islamic”4 systems coexist with each other; historically it is the result of European colonial policy, French assimilation, British Indirect Rule policy and of German Drang nach Osten; from a political point of view military regime, parliamentary republic, absolute monarchy and theocracy followed each other; linguistically speaking Arabic, Hebrew, Farsi, Turkish, Kurdish, Pashtu and Uzbek are spoken; and most of all from a religious point of view Muslim (Shiite, Sunni, Ismailite, Alawite); Sufism, Christian (Greek orthodox, Syrian, Armenian, Roman, Melikite Catholic, Chaldean, Coptic), Baha’i, Zoroastrian and Jewish religions coexist. Moreover, society is characterized by the strong opposition between the Islamic ruling class – which is rich and pro-Western – and the working class, which is mainly made up of foreign, poor and anti-Western unskilled labour. In addition to these differences, it is also difficult to locate the Middle East from a geographical point of view, and to identify the countries that are really part of it. 3 In the occasion of the propaganda campaign during the 1990–91 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein was skilfully and meaningfully associated to Adolf Hitler. 4 On the particular role of economy and financing in Islamic countries please consult: I. Warde; “Paradoxes de la finance islamique,” Le Monde Diplomatique, September 2001, p. 20.

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A proposal for an exhaustive list of countries, which can be considered part of the Middle East, will follow, considering of course geographical but not structural similarities among countries: 1. al-maghrib (Maghreb): “the land in which the sun goes down”. It consists of small Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) and greater Maghreb (Mauritania, Libya); 2. al-mashriq (Mashrek): “the land in which the sun rises”. It is also called the Near East and includes Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Cyprus; 3. Middle East: it includes the Near East, Iraq and Iran; 4. Persian Gulf Countries: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen; 5. Greater Middle East: Maghreb, Mashrek, Middle East, Persian Gulf Countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan, centre-southern Asia (former Muslim soviet republics and, by extension, India). 6. Wider Mediterranean: Maghreb, Mashrek, Middle East and by extension the stripe of Islamism, which stretches to the heart of Asia.5 The Present Situation: Risk Factor and European Response Nowadays the Greater Middle East is in the process of radical transformation. This transformation has been in part due to: i) the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–91) and the consequent end of the static bipolar logic, which provoked a huge power vacuum in the area; and ii) Iraq’s attempt to annex Kuwait (1990) and the following definite twilight of Iraqi hegemony in the area (Operation Desert Storm 1991; Operation Desert Fox 1998; Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003). On the one hand, these facts facilitated the birth or the growth of new regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Iran), whereas on the other hand they provoked the consolidation or the rebirth of a new “force” – Isl m – which aims at filling the present ideological and religious vacuum. To that may be added the western intervention in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom 2001) and the collapse of the Taliban regime, which gave the so-called “Great Game of Central Asia”6 new vigour. The Greater Middle East presents three main areas that can be defined as critical: 1. The Middle East with its complexity linked to some “strong personalities” states, such as Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran; 5 This also includes the Asian-Caucasian area, which moves in the circles of some European Institutions (EU, NATO). 6 It was the British writer Rudyard Kipling who made this expression become famous in his novel, Kim, and used it to represent the clash between the British Empire and tsarist Russia for the supremacy in Iraq.

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2. Afghanistan, the keystone of the “Great Game” and confrontation element for the national welfare of Iran, Pakistan, Russia and United States; 3. The direct confrontation between two nuclear powers at the boundaries of the “Empire”: India and Pakistan. In spite of all the differences characterizing this area, it is possible to identify some common questions, which make the area to be constantly under great strain. Besides the single national questions, there are several other destabilizing elements; crosswise involving not only the three specific areas mentioned before, but also the global powers, sending ripples through the whole international scene. These are: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The Peace process and the Palestine Question; Terrorism; Nuclear Powers and horizontal proliferation; Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation.

The Peace Process and the Palestinian Question The claim to a self-governing and independent territory has been for ages the ideological flag for the Arabic states. On the one hand this claim is aimed at blocking the Western’s advance in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf countries, but on the other hand it has also been the excuse for most acts of terrorism. After US troops deployment in the Persian Gulf (1990–91, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm) even Saddam Hussein embraced the cause of Palestine in the attempt to mobilize the Arabic masses to his benefit. Similarly, on his first appeal on television Usamah Bin Laden guaranteed the carrying on of the war against the United States till the liberation of Palestine.7 The Palestine Question has been often used by third States or insurgent groups as a pretext for justifying a wider aggressive policy, putting the Palestinian people’s legitimate ambition to self determination in the shadows or, more often, exploiting the legitimate ambition of the State of Israel to guarantee security for its own people. Since the 1996 Oslo Agreements have to be considered the direct consequence of the second Gulf War, the Western military intervention in Afghanistan seemed to arouse a renewed interest in the actual US administration, which tried to impose the acceptance of a real Palestinian State on Israel. But later on, this sentiment has progressively disappeared as the US involvement in the “Iraqi muddle” went along. Based on the physical control of terrorist infiltration through to the so called defensive “Security Fence” (2002), the policy of Ariel Sharon caused quite a stir in 7 “To America, I say only a few words to it and its people. I swear by God, who has elevated the skies without pillars, neither America nor the people who live in it will dream of security before we live it in Palestine, and not before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him”, speech broadcast by the Qatari television Al Jazeera, 7 October 2001.

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Europe, particularly since the International Court of Justice in The Hague ruled it to be unlawful, because it violates International Human Rights (International Court of Justic 2004). No doubt, the Palestinian question is very tricky for the security of the whole region, as documented by the dramatic escalation of the second Intifadah (14 January 2001) and by the tragic events of 11 September 2001. The accomplishment of the peace process might constitute the keystone on which founding an economical development policy for the whole region. The peaceful economic cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian would be convenient to both communities, since it guaranteed to Israel a cheap but invaluable skilled labor and the enlargement of the internal market, whereas the Palestinian people could gain an adequate social development. Moreover, the re-establishment of peace in this region could attract foreign capital investments, thus fostering the re-birth of new markets. European intervention is strongly oriented in this direction, believing that economic growth inexorably leads to social growth and to the consequent rise in the welfare of society. As follow-on from it, the revenge sentiment that inspires some social classes would diminish instead of growing, nourished by poverty as it happens nowadays, and a lower and middle class with moderate tendencies could finally emerge. In the last few years, Europe has gone in the direction of economic growth indeed, seeing it as basic factor and element of the re-establishment of peace in the region. Europe has therefore tried to implement its trade and to give a series of development projects the go-ahead in the wider Mediterranean area. The temporary period of peace between the two Palestinian violent movements (from 1996 to 2001) did really cause the frail economy of the new born national entity a remarkable development, and the effective state of peace – though temporary – made the volume of trade between Europe and the Mediterranean coast countries grow (+25 percent between 1995 and 1997). But some organizations, both institutional and extra legem, seem not to share the common and indefeasible need to guarantee an effective and permanent security in Israel and Palestine – and consequently in the whole area – thus hindering the International Community in its efforts. The European Union’s choice to carry out an economics aid policy toward the Palestinian ruling class produced damaging effects, such as the pernicious division of people from the élite ruling class. Furthermore, the latter grew rich out of all proportion to the detriment of those development programs that were expressly planned for common people.8 In this way the very fiduciary relation, which is vital to

8 Corruption is one of the main issues affecting Palestine ruling class. According to some internal sources, in 1997, the Palestinian National Authority (PA) received US$548,727,000 from the international donor community. It also received more than US $800 million in tax revenues collected by Israel from Palestinian Arabs. At the end of 1997, when the PA released its annual financial report, US$323 million – nearly 40 percent of the annual budget – was missing. See: http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_pa_corrupt.php. See also: F. Forgione, The Chaos of the Corruption. Challenges for the improvement of the Palestinian

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any democracy, is danger. The need of the European Union for a stronger involvement in Near East affairs has to cope with the deep internal splits – the 2003 Iraqi War is an example) and it also conflicts with Washington policy, oriented toward a monopolistic handling of Middle Eastern affairs, merely aiming at American national welfare. Since 2004 two main facts contributed to alter the fragile status quo in West Bank/Gaza: the death of Arafat (November 2004) and the HAMAS Palestinian election victory (January 2006). The Arafat Legacy Arafat’s death opened a new era of hope in the international community for the Middle East Peace Process. But Arafat left to his successor, Mahmud Abbas, a.k.a. Abu Mazen, a very delicate internal political situation: his legacy was a regime based on a broad coalition between the various political and terrorist factions. The foundations for this inter-organizational coordination were established during the second Intifadah with the establishment of the “Nationalist and Islamic Forces” – an umbrella for joint operations by Fatah, HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, and other secular Palestinian groups. Abu Mazen’s need to rely on such a broad coalition has neutralized any possibility that he could emerge as a strong leader with the same stature that Arafat had. Abu Mazen’s leadership has been threatened by numerous political forces that limit his ability to manoeuvre politically, such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the military-terrorist wing of al-Fatah, which did not transferred their total and unconditional loyalty to Abu Mazen and his political agenda, even though they gave their eventual approval for his candidacy on behalf of Fatah; HAMAS – which is the acronym of Harakat al-Muq wwama al-Isl miyya, Islamic Resistance Movement, and in Arabic means “zeal” – and Islamic Jihad, which demanded participation in the decision-making process and a proportional share in the new Palestinian regime; the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure that have thrived and expanded over the last four years, increasing its power. With such a delicate internal situation, it soon appears clear that new government needed an external aid, in order to promote and to support the Middle East Peace Process. In 2005 the EU launched a four step economic aid plan, consisting of these elements: i) addressing immediate needs of the Palestinian population ( 192 million), which included the support for the Palestinian Authority, to sustain reforms ( 70 million),9 and the Refugees and humanitarian aid ( 122 million); ii) establishing an infrastructure facility ( 40 million); iii) building the institutions of a Palestinian state ( 12 million), providing support to the strengthening of the Palestinian Authority’s reform process and to the creation of conditions for an environment conducive to Society, October 2004, in http://www.phrmg.org/Corruption%20in%20the%20Palestinian% 20Authority.htm. 9 In the EU perspective this financing will help to ensure that the Palestinian Authority will be able to sustain public services in the face of the continuing severe fiscal crisis.

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Palestinian economic recovery; iv) supporting social services ( 35 million), such as the development of mental health services in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as support to civil society initiatives in East Jerusalem and in support of the Middle East peace process. The EU aid program is situated in a wider political strategy, known as the “two state solution”. In the EU perspective this financing will help to ensure that the Palestinian Authority will be able to sustain public services in the face of the continuing severe fiscal crisis. At the end of 2005, EU Commission adopted a very significant document, the EU-Palestinian Cooperation beyond Disengagement, representing – for the first time – some ideas for a comprehensive assistance strategy. The focus is on ensuring both the political and economic viability of a future state, through the achievement of political viability and economic viability. The first one requires reinforcing legitimacy and accountability of administrative structures, strengthening rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as improving security, engaging civil society, and making public administration more efficient. Protecting the status of the Arab population of Jerusalem, and addressing the refugee issue beyond immediate humanitarian needs will also be important. The second one will be achieved through the development of bilateral and trade relations, the building up of a customs administration, reconstructing and rehabilitating West Bank and Gaza Strip, through the creation of an enabling environment for private sector investment, through the improvement of the management of public finances, and through the development of a knowledge based economy. HAMAS Palestinian Election Victory The EU aid strategy represent a serious and a concrete tool to promote the nation development and to support the Peace Process, but the 2006 HAMAS victory at the Palestinian elections risk to have a pernicious influence on the EU-Palestine future relations,10 since it is considered by the 25-nation bloc a terrorist organization. HAMAS victory revealed the deep fracture between the Palestinian ruling élite and the populace, which voted for the hardliners, calling for a rupture with the Abu Mazen’s policy, a vote against the chronic and endemic corruption. But its victory is also due to the social and assistance policy to the low/very low Palestinian classes it has carried out in the last years, acting as an “institutional actor”.11 10 On 26 January 2006 HAMAS obtained 74 of 132 Parliamentary seats in Palestine General Elections. See also Central Elections Commission Palestine, http://www.elections. ps/template.aspx?id=291. 11 The same role has been played by Hezbollah in the southern part of the Lebanon, in the Bekaa Valley and by the Italian Mafia in some southern areas of the country in the first half of the 20th century. HAMAS policy is to create a social infrastructure but a framework for terrorism as well. According to Israeli analyst Reuven Paz, HAMAS “zealots” spend US$60 million a year on schools, orphanages, mosques, hospitals, soup kitchens, and gymnasiums. The help given by HAMAS to the poorest people was part of a clear-cut strategy, aiming at preaching its policy, creating consensus and enlist volunteers for the terrorist attacks against

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Applauding the democratic conduct of the political elections, the HAMAS victory left a bitter taste in the international political panorama, because of its goals, expressed in its Covenant, aiming at the destruction of Israel;12 and the Anti-Semitic incitement (art. 7); the Rejection of a negotiated peace settlement (art 13); the condemnation of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (art 32), reaffirming the exclusive Moslem nature of the area.13 EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, in a first reaction to the HAMAS victory, declared: “the EU is happy to cooperate with any government if that government is prepared to work with peaceful means to pursue the goal of peace”, but at the same time, the EU, calling HAMAS to clarify its political intentions in an eventual Palestinian government, affirmed that: the onus is now on HAMAS to renounce violence, to accept that the fundamental democratic principle is that matters are pursued by arguments and peacefully and not by violence.14

On a short visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories, German Chancellor Angela Merkel – the first world leader to visit the region since HAMAS’ success – said it was “unthinkable” for Germany and the EU to give financial support to the Palestinian Authority if it does not recognize Israel, renounce violence and disarm. This has also been the US view. President Bush declared in an interview: I made it very clear that the United States does not support political parties that want to destroy our ally, Israel, and that people must renounce that part of their platform.15

HAMAS is now invested by a unique opportunity: it must show the world that it could act as an institutional political player, thinking of the commune bonum of the people but in a framework of peaceful and constructive relations with other Institutional actors, such as EU, US and all its neighboring countries – Israel included. The first step could be to isolate the extremist wing, following the model experimented by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and, to some extent, by Hezbollah, even if this action could entail the loss of a part of its more radical voters. The second one should be to recognize as the unique institutional actor of the Palestinian National Authority in charge of the security of the territory, and to Israel. As “resistance fighters,” the Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades, HAMAS armed branch, have organized 350 terrorist attacks against Israel, and their suicide bombers have killed over 500 innocent people, mutilating thousands. 12 “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it”; see Preamble of HAMAS Covenant. 13 “The land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf [Holy Possession] consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgment Day. No one can renounce it or any part, or abandon it or any part of it”, (Article 11). 14 British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, 30 January 2006. 15 26 January 2006. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/jan-june06/bush_126.html.

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enhance its power, in order to fulfil a complete disarming of the military groups. This could lead to an internal consolidation of the internal power, avoiding HAMAS being at the mercy of some non-institutional actors. The third step should be not exclude the former ruling class élite from the power, but to use its government experience acquired during the last years, in order to elaborate a new political Agenda. The fourth step should the acknowledgement of Israel, as a Sovereign State, and so the right to its existence, as a fundamental precondition to obtain international aids and so to work for the building of a new Palestinian State. Terrorism Since the terrorist attack to the World Trade Center in New York, terrorism has become a priority not only for the US national interest, but also for the main international political actors’ interests. The galaxy of Islamic terrorism is fragmented and operates in several countries. A thin red line leads most claiming of responsibilities for attacks launched by different armed groups, which fight generally for one of the following chief causes: i) the creation of new Islamic nations; ii) the liberation of the West Bank territories from Israeli occupation; iii) the opposition to pro-American and pro-Western countries policy, because subordinate to “Zionism”; v) the attempt to influence or even modify the political leadership, both in the Muslim and in Western countries. The relative ease with which the Westernized government of Shâh Reza Palhavî was substituted by a theocratic regime in 1979 is amazing. The collective imagination of the Islamic masses was favorably impressed by this episode, and since then many attempts to create new Islamic states have followed one another. Most of these attempts have rarely contemplated the political procedures: they rather consisted in warmongering, authoritarian, revolutionary or terrorist turning points. In Egypt the Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and the Islamic Jihad operate to this end: apart from fighting for the fall of the Mubarak government and its substitution with an Islamic regime, these groups want to put an end to Western influence on Islamic countries, and support the liberation of the Holy territories.16 Along the lines of this example, in the Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), in Algeria (GIA-Algerian Islamic Group and Islamic Salvation Army) and more recently in the Saudi Arabia (some insurgent groups closely linked to al-Q ’ida), several organizations fight to the finish not only against institutions, but also against the defenseless civil population, with the aim of upseting the traditional system of government and to put a theocratic regime into power. Furthermore, there is another important goal, in strict connection with the Palestinian question: the achievement of “sovereign, independent and free” status for the territories of the West Bank. Among the principal terrorist opposition forces, we can rate HAMAS, now in power; the once lead by Abu Nidal Al Fatah al-Qiyadah 16 In this case, they ask for the withdrawal of American troops from Saudi military bases.

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al-Thawiryyah, which considers the fight against Israel a sacred and necessary value; the Hezbollah (The Party of God), or the Islamic Palestinian Jihad, mainly formed by radical Shiite groups. Hezbollah’s hardliners condemn the State of Israel as alien to the region, as a direct threat to Isl m and to the Muslim people. As a consequence, the destruction of Israel and the liberation of al-Quds (Jerusalem) are a religious duty. However, in the globalization era, even the most traditionalist and conservative Isl m tries to give the movement a trans-national dimension by spreading its political ideals and terror attacks all over the world, not only in the ummah (the Islamic Community). During the soviet occupation in Afghanistan, al-Q ’ida (“the Base”)17 was a militant organization housed in Afghanistan that became the direct expression of jihadaist salafism.18 This new Islamist ideology was aimed at overthrowing the “corrupted and heretical governments of Muslim countries” and their substitution with a theocratic regime, which is subject to the rigid sharaitic precept, following the Taliban model. To that end it tries to radicalize the existing fundamentalist organizations and to found new ones in every Arabian state. It professes the destruction of the United States of America, which is believed to be the substantial obstacle to the “reform” of Muslim countries. Al-Q ’ida operates through a close net of terrorist organizations, grouped in 1998 by Usamah Bin Laden on a worldwide scale in an “umbrella organization” called “The Islamic Worldwide Front against Hebrews and Crusaders” (al-Jabbah al-Islamiyyah al-Alamiyyah li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin) – a meaningful name. The Pakistan group Harakat ul-Mujahedin, the Egyptian armed groups al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad are part of it. Disposing of huge capital, which has been administered through several dummy companies, spread all over the world, and thanks to the unscrupulous use of technology, Usamah Bin Laden struck the sanctuary land of the United States of America, bringing about the reaction of civilized society and the US military intervention in Afghanistan. The terrorist attack on 11 March 2004 in Madrid provoked in Europe a shock similar to that caused by the attacks in Washington and New York. Although the victims were (fortunately) fewer in number, the attack in Madrid was a greater political success, since the bombs in the Atocha railway station had the power to play a predominant role in the next elections, and the socialist candidate José Luis Rodrigues Zapatero surprised everyone by coming to power. The withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq was part of his political program.

17 In 1988 Bin Laden created a database with the names of all the jihadists and the volunteer combatant who were trained in the several training camps. The name “base” takes its origin from this database. 18 al-Q ’ida borrows its extremist ideology from salafism, a school of thought of the second half of the 19th century, that fought for returning to traditional values of the “sacred ancestors” (salaf), misinterpreting some concepts and mixing them with some precepts of the fundamentalists of Wahhabism.

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Fortunately the Spanish withdrawal did not bring about the awaited “dominoes effect” on the other European Union countries. Anyway, this episode sets an important precedent, since terrorist groups awareness of having a strong influence on the electorate has increased. As a logical consequence of this, violent acts in the European Union might record an exponential growth. EU Response to Terrorism Following the London bomb terror attacks (7 July 2005), the EU elaborated a new anti-terrorism strategy, issued in December 2005. The strategic commitment, reflecting the EU policy is “to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice”, achieved through four strands of work: 1. To prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalization and recruitment, in Europe and internationally; 2. To protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack, including through improved security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure; 3. To pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders and globally; to impede planning, travel, and communications; to disrupt support networks; to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and bring terrorists to justice; 4. To respond the threats and to prepare ourselves, in the spirit of solidarity, to manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack, by improving capabilities to deal with: the aftermath; the coordination of the response; and the needs of victims (The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2005). Across these four categories, the strategy seeks to link strands from different policy areas and emphasize the close interaction of measures at member state, European and international level. European Arrest and Evidence Warrants The European arrest warrant introduced in January 2004, replaces old extradition procedures and has been implemented in all member states. Through the December 2005 Justice Council, EU try to create a standard form warrant for obtaining objects, documents and data in cross-border cases. Exchange of Information Specific criminal and therefore anti-terrorist measures are within the competence of the member states only. The main role of the EU is to coordinate and to put the greatest emphasis on the exchange and sharing of information

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among member States. So EU wants to create a Legal Enforcement Network (LEN), which will facilitate exchange of information between police forces. Border and Travel Security Since 2005, biometric data is to be included in passports and, eventually, visas, which will be made computer-readable, in order to monitor non-EC people’s access to the EU. Data Retention In September 2005 the Commission published a new proposed directive whereby phone call data (mobile and fixed) would be kept for one year and internet communications for six months, as an improved form of control. CBRN/Prevention and Readiness Following the US anthrax threat, fears have been raised that terrorists could resort to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The EU Council has finalized a new CBRN program that sets out steps to be taken to prevent an attack and (were an attack to happen) to limit its consequences. Terrorist Financing A third money-laundering directive has been adopted by the Council on 20 September 2005. It extends the existing provisions to terrorist crimes and is designed to reflect the recommendations of the International Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. Recruitment and Radicalization In September 2005, the Commission published a communication which analyzes ways in which the radicalization of individuals can be deterred through education (both in schools and through the Internet), integration policies, interfaith dialogue and the promotion of inter-cultural understanding. External Policies EU has pledged to deal with the roots of terrorism, i.e. the social economic and political problems on which Islamic fanaticism is built. The action plan involves using trade agreements to reduce the poverty that can lead to radicalization. Technical aid will also be given to build up anti-terrorism capacity. Work with third countries, the US in particular, and with international agencies continues to be of fundamental importance. Fundamental Rights EU action against terrorism has been predicated on the preservation of fundamental rights and liberties as enshrined by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Some of the member State actions, however, have been heavily criticized for riding roughshod over these principles and EU policies have been questioned for being overly influenced by the US, which has pushed its own approach at international level through the G8. In June 2005, Commissioner Franco Frattini announced that a European Agency for Fundamental Rights would be established by extending the remit of the existing European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (Euroactiv 2006).

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Nuclear Powers and Horizontal Proliferation In the Greater Middle East subcontinent there are three nuclear powers: India, Israel and Pakistan, whereas on its border there are two other nuclear superpowers: China and Russia. Israel promotes a “deliberate ambiguity” policy, according to which the very existence of the State of Israel is in the hands of strategic force geared to demythologize the isolation that characterizes it since its formation. Indian nuclear policy was adopted specifically to counter China. Actually, Indian nuclear military strength is distributed on a wider strategic plan which prospects a post-Cold-War macro-security model, with a hexagonal structure including US, Russia, China, European Union, Japan and India on its sides. Complete disarmament is neither desirable nor a practicable plan. Pakistan uses its nuclear doctrine with an anti-Indian purpose. India and Pakistan are ancestral enemies, and this is a deep-rooted and never forgotten conflict: on one hand, the Indian missile is called Prithvi-raj Chauahn, a Hindu King from Delhi, who lived in the 12th century, whereas on the other hand the Pakistan missile was called Ghuri, the name of the Islamic warrior who defeated Prithvi in 1192. At the explosion of the Indian atomic bomb in 1974, the then Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Alì Bhutto reacted in extremely explicit terms: “We are ready to eat the grass, if necessary. But we must have the atomic bomb too”. The achievement of the status of nuclear power also had a psychological implication. The success in Pakistan experiments was looked on as a redemption possibility by the developing countries; it exalted the Islamic masses and was considered an international promotional vehicle. The bomb represents for Pakistan the possibility to rise to the status of midsize-power in the Asian subcontinent, where Pakistan is squeezed between the two big giants – India and China. After the nuclear experimentation in 1998 the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif released a meaningful statement: “I threw away the beggar basin and Pakistan can at last rise to the role it is entitled to”. The status of “nuclear nation” acquired by Pakistan opens up new scenarios: in this case the principal danger is represented by the Pakistan doctrine of employment, which provides for the use of nuclear weapons even in conventional conflicts. This reflects in part the so called “Samson Option” envisaged by the nuclear policy of Israel, according to which nuclear weapons can be used in case an Arabian massive attack destroyed the Israeli armed forces, thus menacing the very existence of the country. The second issue is about proliferation. This phenomenon can be either vertical or horizontal. We have vertical proliferation when the number of nuclear warheads owned by the same and unchanged group of powers rises; we have horizontal proliferation when the group of countries owning nuclear weapons expands. In case of the Greater Middle East there’s a long-term tendency toward the horizontal proliferation. According to an information note passed from the Israeli military intelligence service, Iran could have taken possession of nuclear weapons by 2005 – a forecast that has evidently been disregarded.

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The main danger is represented by the possibility that terrorist groups might take possession of some tactical nuclear weapon, or even more realistically, of some nuclear material. In the latter hypothesis, terrorists might mix a certain quantity of uranium with common explosive, thus creating the so-called “dirty bomb” to be used in terrorist acts. Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation Bacteriological (BW) and chemical weapons (CW), as well as nuclear weapons, are seen as symbols of power, strength, prestige and international promotion. They are instruments of military policy and of intimidation, which can be used also from a small country against a bigger neighbor country. Actually, weapons of mass destruction guarantee a deterrent effect and fill the security vacuum generated by the growing military potential of Israel and Iran, by the fear for the birth of a new rouge regime that could threat moderate governments and, lastly, by the uncertainty of the inclination of a new US intervention in the area on a large scale. The acquisition of these particular kinds of weapons is furthermore boosted by different factors: the relative ease with which a non-conventional weapon can be created (there is plentiful supply of devices belonging to the agricultural or to the chemical-pharmaceutical field), the substantial inexpensiveness of the project and its high military and psychological impact. Because of all of these reasons, the weapons of mass destruction are both an ambitious attraction and they represent a fundamental priority for some developing countries. Many countries in the area dispose of chemical weapons or carry on researches for the creation of bacteriological weapons.19 Only very few nations of the area did sign the various treaties for the banishment of such systems.20 Besides WMD proliferation there is the question of missile proliferation (surface-to-surface missiles or SSM). Those missiles, used in several regional conflicts – particularly during the Iraq-Iran21 war and the Yemeni civil war – SSM and most of all Sovietmade SCUDs represent nowadays the principal starting point for the creation of weapons of mass destruction and for their delivery. In order to cope with the dangerous consequences implied in the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons or in the widespread diffusion of chemical components, the European Union planned a security strategy called “A Secure Europe in a Better World” that was adopted on 12 December 2003 by the European Council. This strategy identifies a number of threats for the next decade, one of these major threats being the proliferation of WMD, and provides a fully fledged-roadmap for immediate and future action in the fight against proliferation of WMD. The EU approach toward WMD can be resumed in the following points:

19 Nowadays 20 nations carry out research programs on bacteriological war. See: http:// www.globalresearch.org. 20 Only Algeria, India, Iran and Pakistan sign the treaties. 21 More than 360 missiles had been launched between 1980 and 1988.

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Regional security trends; Specific security dynamics around any particular proliferation concern; Developing a dialogue with the states under suspicion; Application of all EU instruments and resources in support of preventing, halting, deterring and if possible eliminating WMD.

This policy represents the most high profile and significant manifestation of the EU’s new WMD Strategy, and this kind of approach is particularly meaningful if it is seen in relation to EU efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. From a more pragmatic point of view – as the European Security Review has well resumed22 – the EU strategy envisages: •

• •

•

•

•

•

Linking EU assistance with improved export controls EU compiled a prioritized list of third countries that could benefit from EU assistance vis-àvis export controls. A “Non-proliferation clause”, to be included in agreements with third countries, was drawn up and it has been included in agreements with Syria, Tajikistan, Albania, the African Caribbean and Pacific Ocean States; there are also ongoing discussions to include the clause agreements with Gulf Cooperation Council and MERCOSUR; Criminalizing proliferation within the EU The EU is also working toward the criminalization of activities that contribute to proliferation; Improving nuclear security One of the main EU priorities is to enhance the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, and to ensure that better controls are in place on the use, storage and disposal of radioactive sources. EU adopted a Joint Action in support of the nuclear security action plan of the IAEA that is designed to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, allocating 3.3 million to the IAEA during 2004; Enhancing the UN’s verification role EU Member States on the UN Security Council co-sponsored Resolution 1540 on WMD non-proliferation, and contributed actively to its adoption by consensus; Interdiction of criminal proliferation activities Exercises in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to which all EU member states, have been organized; Strengthening the Chemical and Biological weapons regimes It is necessary to reach a common position on CWC challenge inspections, and to promote universalization and implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC); Securing future EC financial commitments On 29 September 2004, the Commission adopted a Communication on Instruments for External Assistance under the Future Financial Perspective 2007-2013, proposing a new Instrument for Stability. It is aimed at tackling crises and instability

22 “The EU Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD: Past, Present and Future”, in European Security Review, no 25; 25 March 2005.

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in third countries, including trans-border challenges (nuclear safety, nonproliferation, organized crime and terrorism). In the last few years the application of the strategy based on the support of business and economical development to obtain security and political stability has born fruit, contributing to the increase of new proposals, ideas and projects geared to the support of a unified Mediterranean area. This area is wanted to be in the future economically and socially less patchy but more egalitarian, with mutual benefits in terms of trade, stability, security and democracy. Given the high extent of interests that are at stake, an imminent resolution of the previously exposed problems in the short run is Utopian as well as unfeasible, because of the opposition of national, macro-regional, international, religious, political and – most of all – economical interests. Anyway, the re-definition of a common policy is needed, geared to the supporting of an area with a huge economical potential, and whose oil reserve amounts to 25–35 billion barrels, but also with wide pockets of poverty and serious problems of distribution of wealth. The way to pacification goes also – or better, goes most of all through economical development, democratization and society modernization, always in respect of cultural and religious traditions, which are the main source of wealth for each country. To reach this ambitious goal, EU must learn to speak to one voice, to act as a single actor, exploiting its historical experience and its single country’s diversity that is the most important worth of the Union. References Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995), European Union, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r15001.htm. Euroactiv (2006), EU Anti-terrorism Policy, January 19. Fuller, G.E., and Lesser, I.O. (1995), A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West, RAND Corp. Huntington, S.P. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster). International Court of Justice (2004), Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, July 9. Lewis, B. (1995), The Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster). Mahan, A.T. (1987), The Influence of Sea Power upon History (New York: Dover Publications). The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005), Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 1 December 2005.

Conclusions The overall European security and defense system is continually developing and changing. This is true for both the military and civilian realm. In comparison with the Cold War era, today’s security policies follow a much broader and less militarily defined concept of “comprehensive or integrated security”. One of the most important changes with respect to the European security agenda, is the European Union’s increasing role in the security and defense domain. The main objective of today’s ESDP is to achieve a comprehensive and coordinated approach to crisis management and to the strengthening of civil-military cooperation (CMCO). However, NATO is still, and will remain a significant security partner by supporting EU crisis management operations with military and civilian assets. Since 9/11, the United States of America has been leading the global fight against terrorism. US administrations prefer to act through coalitions of the willing. Terrorism has become one of the major threats recognized since the attacks of 9/11. Key issues of today’s counter-terrorism are improved cooperation between intelligence and security services and between these services and the police, especially relating to evaluations in the field of terrorism and the fight against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. In 1996, the Council adopted a Joint Action obliging the EU Member States to share their knowledge and capacities in the fight against terrorism with all other Member States. On the basis of Article 42 of the draft Constitutional Treaty and according to the European Security Strategy, the EU Member States committed themselves to cooperating closely and effectively against terrorism by using all instruments at their disposal, including military assets. The primary aim is to prevent a terrorist attack in the territory of a Member State as well as to generally protect the democratic institutions and the civilian population and to assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities in case of a terrorist attack (“solidarity clause”) or a natural or man-made disaster. Since the Greek EU Presidency in spring 2003, the EU has been granted access to NATO planning assets and equipment through the so-called Berlin Plus arrangement. As a result of the transatlantic rifts and shifts during the crisis over Iraq in April 2003, some EU members – Belgium, France, Germany (under the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder), and Luxembourg – made pressure to develop more independent European military capabilities, including its own military headquarters. The main argument for such an initiative was that the EU should be able to conduct military operations autonomously and therefore would require its own operational planning capabilities in order to emancipate from NATO and US influence. Most other EU member states disagreed, arguing that the EU could now rely on NATO and the

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planners at SHAPE through Berlin Plus; and duplication of capabilities would never lead to a positive effect when coordinating military capabilities. The operational capability of European institutions and forces may prove to be an important element in conflict prevention and crisis management operations. While NATO and EU seemed to be in a kind of military competition in 2003, both the EU and the OSCE were competing in the field of soft power politics, using economic, diplomatic, and other non-military instruments to reach political objectives. Today, the EU seems to develop its own policies and capabilities in areas where the OSCE has been active for many years. Moreover, in the context of its new European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the EU has appointed special representatives for Moldova, the Southern Caucasus as well as Central Asia. These are regions where the OSCE has developed much expertise based on its long-established missions. Another example for this new trend in European security policy was the launch of the EU’s first rule of law mission to Georgia (known as EUJUST Themis) in July 2004. In order to achieve interoperability among European forces, US transformation concepts such as Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) and Effects-based Operations (EBO) have largely become the guiding operational principles for conducting global operations. For the US, alliances will be quite flexible. The 2006 QDR informatively speaks about changing “static alliances” into “dynamic partnerships”. In order to prepare European allies for global deployments, the US expects European NATO members to invest more in defense in order to address the existing “capabilities gap” between the US and the Europeans. NRF can be seen as a catalyst for NATO transformation consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable force, including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, and it will be complementary to the EU Battle Group Concept. US transformation concepts such as NCW and EBO are primary tools for achieving such capabilities. The EU has already taken the lead in building integrated civil-military structures in which both the Commission and the Council Secretariat are represented. In 2005, the Civil-Military Cell has become operational and a concept for civil-military planning has been elaborated. Efforts are underway to improve the availability of police, civil protection and other civilian experts. As a consequence of its leading role, EU expertise is increasingly in demand. Relating to this coordinated trans-Atlantic security cooperation within EU and NATO as well as NATO PfP states, neutrality is not the way to strengthen comprehensive trans-Atlantic and common EU security initiatives. Therefore, coordinated force planning in the EU and trans-Atlantic contexts are based on the Headline Goal Catalogue 2010, the EU Framework Nation Concept, and the criteria of force planning within the NATO Partnership for Peace. European forces have to improve their performance in respect of availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability in the framework of crisis management. The coordinated development of the ESDP will strengthen the Union’s contribution to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.

Conclusions

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Both EU and NATO security interests are mainly focused on stabilizing neighboring regions. Therefore, European nations are providing regional cooperation by joining international security operations to prevent civil war and to defuse conflicts. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) certainly constitutes a very ambitious agenda: redrawing the multilateral architecture in order to assure effective global governance and, within that framework, stabilizing states and regions via intrusive bilateral partnerships. Regional security cooperation is a must to reach efforts when stabilizing insecure regions. In this respect, regional organizations strengthen global governance. The enlargements of the EU and NATO have brought both changes to European political geography. These changes offer new opportunities to deepen existing relations between both EU and NATO and the neighbors to the East and South – particularly in the Central and Southeastern European as well as in the Black Sea region. The EU, NATO, and OSCE share common interests in stabilizing Europe, by integrating Russia, the Ukraine, Central Asia and the Mediterranean countries in North Africa and in the Middle East into a Euro-Atlantic stabilization process. In this context, particularly both the European Union and NATO are mutually reinforcing. In EU and NATO-led operations, also troops from Australia, New Zealand, as well as from Mediterranean Dialogue countries like Jordan and Morocco are/were involved. NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) launched at the Alliance’s summit in June 2004, aims at contributing to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO – starting with the individual members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, the Northern Dimension of the EU, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (Barcelona process), the OSCE and NATO Mediterranean Dialogues, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) with Eastern European countries and the Caucasus region as well as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) between NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states illustrate necessary instruments of multilateral regional security cooperation – where all European countries are embedded. NATO and EU also share common interests in assisting the countries of the Balkans with their future integration into Euro-Atlantic political structures. Within NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, the NATO PfP Trust Fund project has been established to help partner states like Serbia, Montenegro and Ukraine to destroy stockpiles or surplus munitions, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). One of the Trust Fund projects addressed the destruction of large anti-aircraft missiles in Georgia. Particularly ENP Action Plans define a set of priorities, whose fulfilment will bring them closer to the EU – covering a number of key areas for specific actions: political dialogue and reform; good governance; rule of law; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s Internal Market; Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) – fight against organized crime and corruption, money laundering and all forms of trafficking, as well as with regard to issues related to migration; energy, transport, information society; effective border management – support for

198

European Security in Transition

the creation and training of corps of professional non-military border guards and measures to make travel documents more secure; conflict prevention and crisis management; fight against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related systems, illegal arms exports; exchange of information, joint training and exercises and possible participation in EU-led crisis management. The ENP should reinforce the EU’s contribution to promoting the settlement of regional conflicts. In the Broader Black region, there are the world’s most important reserves of oil and natural gas (Russia, Caspian basin, Middle East and North Africa). From a geo-strategic point of view, Turkey has been gaining importance. Despite the debate on whether Turkey belongs to Europe or not, in terms of European security, the answer is affirmative. Placed in NATO’s southern flank and sharing borders with the USSR and the Middle East, Turkey shouldered a substantial burden of security by providing military bases and other capabilities to NATO. Broadly speaking, Turkey’s role in the post-Cold War security policies of the EU can be explained with regards to its geographical proximity to the regions of instability that affect European security, namely, the Balkans, Caucasus, the Middle East, Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The EU has to play a greater political role in the Middle-East scene, in order to gain more visibility and to be in the condition of bargaining power – relating to the important changes in the Middle East geopolitics, to pacification and to the democratic reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. In 1995, the EU launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership based on the Declaration of Barcelona, signed by the European Union and by 12 Mediterranean Partners countries benefiting from the MEDA Program. Since the mid-1990s, the main objective of this program has been to establish a comprehensive EuroMediterranean partnership in order to turn the Mediterranean into a common area of peace, stability and prosperity through the reinforcement of political dialogue and security, an economic and financial cooperation and a social, cultural and human partnership. The MEDA Program is inspired by the PHARE and TACIS programs, especially with regards to transparency and information. In Europe, the enlargement toward the EU-25 has led to a new system of structured cooperation which allows member states to develop small sub-groups within the EU willing to engage in a certain (foreign) policy endeavour. In this context, some new questions need to be answered: What will this trend imply for Europe’s institutional architecture? Will we see more directoires such as the EU-3 (France, Germany and the UK) leading the Union’s diplomatic attempts to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons? Nowadays, the European Union’s main advantage is that it can rely on a dense network of institutions that encourage stability, transparency, and a high level of mutual trust. Europe has set itself high standards of effective multilateralism. However, the EU’s key security institutions will face serious challenges over the coming decade. Will Iran develop nuclear weapons? Will Afghanistan and Iraq develop into stable democracies? How will the transatlantic relationship between Europe and America be developed in the future and relating to effective multilateralism?

Conclusions

199

As the ESS states, the EU with 25 Member States, over 450 million people and a quarter of the world’s GNP is inevitably a global player. To be a true global power, the EU must further strengthen its emerging strategic culture, i.e. muster the political will, including in demanding situations, to take decisions true to its strategic objectives and to put to use all necessary instruments to implement them. A balanced partnership with the US, global economic governance, strategic partnerships with China and India, etc. require unity among EU Member States.

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Index

Abbas, Mahmud (Abu Mazen) 184, 185 Abkhazia 146, 149, 150, 151–3, 154–5, 158–9 Abu Mazen 184, 185 Aceh 49, 98 ACO see Allied Command Operations ACT see Allied Command Transformation Afghanistan 117, 168–9, 181, 182 ISAF 28, 53–4, 96, 139 Network-Centric Operations 120, 122 NRF deployment 108 reconstruction of 48, 175, 198 Soviet occupation of 188 Turkish troops in 170 US defense transformation 105 African Union (AU) 27, 49, 96 AFSOUTH see Allied Forces South Europe al-Qaeda 170, 187, 188 Alba, Operation 43 Albania 30, 42, 61, 193 landmines 137 MPFSEE 137 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe 136 Stabilization and Association Process 136 Turkish police officers 171 Algeria 141, 181, 187 Aliyev, Heydar 148 Allawi, Ilyad 55 Allied Command Operations (ACO) 108 Allied Command Transformation (ACT) 108 Allied Forces South Europe (AFSOUTH) 25–6 Allied Harmony, Operation 25, 52, 53, 166, 171 Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 50–51 Alliot-Marie, Michèle 52 Althea, Operation 25–6, 27–8, 31, 53, 96, 140, 171 Amsterdam Treaty see Treaty of Amsterdam

Ankara Document 165 Annan, Kofi 92 Arafat, Yasser 184 Armenia 141, 146, 147, 159 army 148 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 157–8 ethno-territorial conflict 149, 150, 151 NATO relationship 148 Russian bases in 153, 154 separatist armies 151 Treaty on Collective Security 149 ARRC see Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Artemis, Operation 26, 53, 96–7 asylum 74, 76, 77, 78 asymmetrical warfare 116, 117, 132 AU see African Union Austria CENCOOP 138 dependence on Russian gas 156 Eurocorps 54 Iraq crisis 55 “Irish Clause” 67, 68–9 “joint letter” 66 mutual assistance guarantee 59–60, 65 neutrality 49, 63, 70, 71 Schengen Area 74 Security and Defense Doctrine 59 solidarity doctrine 69–71 Azerbaijan 141, 146, 147–8, 159 army 148 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 157–8 ethno-territorial conflict 149, 150, 151 NATO relationship 148–9 Russian bases in 153, 154 separatist armies 151 Treaty on Collective Security 149 Aznar, José María 55 Babich, Mikhail 154 Bahrain 140, 181, 197 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 157–8, 159

202

European Security in Transition

Balkans 6, 26, 117, 143, 197 EU-NATO cooperation 53 European troops in 96 OSCE activities 29, 30, 31 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe 136 Turkey 166, 198 see also Bosnia and Herzegovina; Yugoslavia, Former Republic of Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) 139 Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) 139 Baltic Sea Council 142 Baltic states 157 BALTRON see Baltic Naval Squadron Barankievich, Anatoli 152 Barcelona Declaration (1995) 176, 177, 198 Battle Groups 51–2, 139, 140–41 defense transformation 130–31, 196 Turkey 172 UN appeals to 97 Belarus 31, 141 Belgium Brussels Treaty 7 EU operational planning 26 EU-NATO relations 195 Eurocorps 54 European Defense Community 9 OSCE Chair 31–2 Schengen Area 74 “Berlin Plus” arrangements 17, 25–7, 50, 52, 171, 195–6 Berlin Wall 5, 13 Bezhuashvili, Gela 158 Bhutto, Zulfikar Alì 191 Bin Laden, Usamah 180, 182, 188 biological weapons 107, 176, 190, 192, 193, 195 see also weapons of mass destruction Biscop, Sven 2, 87–101 Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 142, 167 Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) 138, 167 Blair, Tony 39, 59 Bolton, John 35, 36 border controls 74, 85, 172, 190 Bosnia and Herzegovina 26, 39, 42, 96, 135 Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 51 BALTBAT 139

EU Police Mission 48 PfP membership ambition 137 SFOR 25, 53, 54 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe 136 Stabilization and Association Process 136 Turkish police officers 171 see also Balkans; Yugoslavia, Former Republic of Broader Black region 142, 198 Brunelli, Michele 3, 175–94 Brussels Treaty (1948) 7, 9, 42, 49, 60 BSEC see Black Sea Economic Cooperation BTC see Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline Bukayev, Gennady 152 Bulgaria 32, 136, 137, 138, 156 Bundeswehr 132 Burns, Nicholas 27 Bush, George W. 55, 106, 169, 170, 186 C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) 104–5, 107, 108, 109 Canada 7–8, 54, 136 “capabilities” approach 6, 51, 58, 117, 126–7 Capabilities Commitment Conference (CCC) 44 capability gaps 1, 39–40, 51, 103, 106–7, 196 Caspian region 156, 159 CCC see Capabilities Commitment Conference CD&E see Concept Development and Experimentation CEI see Central European Initiative CENCOOP see Central European Nations” Cooperation in Peace Support Central Asia 62, 166, 167, 181, 197 European Neighborhood Policy 31, 196 OSCE activities 29–30 OSCE-NATO relations 34 see also South Caucasus Central and Eastern Europe 5, 197 dependence on Russian gas 156 EU enlargement 17, 27 NATO membership 13

Index PfP process 33 Soviet influence over 7 Warsaw Pact 8 Central European Initiative (CEI) 136, 138, 142 Central European Nations” Cooperation in Peace Support (CENCOOP) 138 Çetin, Hikmet 170 CFE see Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CFSP see Common Foreign and Security Policy Charter of Fundamental Rights 76–7, 78, 84 Chechnya 145, 146, 151–2, 155 chemical weapons 107, 176, 190, 192, 193, 195 see also weapons of mass destruction China 99, 100, 191, 199 Chirac, Jacques 39 Christianity 163, 180 CIS see Commonwealth of Independent States CIVCOM see Civilian Crisis Management Committee civil society 177, 178, 185 civil-military capabilities 26, 98–9, 139, 196 defense transformation 118, 133 ESDP objective 61, 195 EUMS 46, 47 civil-military relations 14, 18 civilian administration 47 Civilian Crisis Management Committee (CIVCOM) 47 “coalitions of the willing” 35, 108, 110, 195 Cold War 5, 8–9, 10, 11, 18, 115 end of 13 escalation 12 regional cooperation 9 security concept 19, 20, 172 Turkey 161 collateral damage 117, 125 collective defense 8, 10–13, 29 Brussels Treaty 42 Constitutional Treaty 63–4, 65, 69 Washington Treaty 42 command and control 117, 132 Effects-Based Operations 124, 125 Network-Centric Operations 120, 121, 122, 123

203

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 1, 6, 14–17, 18, 161 Constitutional Treaty 56–61, 64 European Security Strategy 87, 89 “Irish Clause” 68, 69 Maastricht Treaty 39, 40 origins of 11 solidarity doctrine 69, 71 see also European Security and Defense Policy Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 146, 147, 153–4, 156 “comprehensive security” 6, 19, 117, 135, 195 Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) 108, 126, 133 “Conclave of Naples” 65–6 Concordia, Operation 25–6, 52, 171 Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 12, 17 conflict prevention 17, 24, 43–4, 62, 141, 164 Bundeswehr 132 “comprehensive security” concept 117 EU-OSCE cooperation 31 European Neighborhood Policy 141, 142, 198 global public goods 91 OSCE Charter for European Security 33 Petersberg tasks 43, 57 regional cooperation 143 response and stabilization forces 131 Western European Union 42 conflict resolution 7, 8, 97 Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC) 26, 49, 53, 96 Constitutional Treaty see Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe Convention on the Future of Europe 64 corruption 81, 116, 197 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 176 Palestinian ruling class 183n8, 185 South Caucasus 142, 145, 149 Council of Ministers 82, 83 counter-terrorism EU strategy 46, 80, 189–90, 195 NATO 140 TREVI Group 73 Turkey 171–2

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European Security in Transition

US strategy 162, 168 counterinsurgency 121 crisis management 17, 26, 139–40, 164 Battle Groups 130 Bundeswehr 132 civilian 48 “comprehensive security” concept 117 EU-OSCE cooperation 31 EUMS role 45, 46 European Neighborhood Policy 142, 198 European Security Strategy 96–7, 99 Headline Goals 24, 62, 141 Petersberg tasks 43, 57 response and stabilization forces 131 Western European Union 41, 42 Croatia 136 Crvenkovski, Branko 52 CSCE see Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe cultural dialogue 177 Cyprus EU Rapid Reaction Force 50 Mashrek 181 mutual assistance guarantee 60 neutrality 49, 63, 71 Turkish interests 162, 165 Czech Republic 156 Darfur 27, 28, 49, 97 decentralization 122, 128 decision cycle 123 defense industry 129–30 defense transformation 2–3, 103–14, 118–34, 196 Concept Development and Experimentation 126 concept of 103–5 effects-based 124–6 Europe 108–10, 132–4 implementation of 105–6 industry 129–30 NATO relevance 106–8 network-centric 121–4 organization 126–9 technology 119–21 democracy 15, 40, 145 European Neighborhood Policy 141

MEDA Program 178 Western values 167 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 26, 49, 53, 96 democratization 94, 194 Denmark NATO 8, 18, 24 NORDCAPS 139 Schengen Area 74 special EU arrangements 49–50 Desert Storm, Operation 127, 181, 182 deterrence 10, 11, 168 development 91–2 Dnestr Republic (PMR) 152 DRC see Democratic Republic of Congo drug trafficking 80–81, 82, 83, 135, 164, 172, 176 Duffield, Mark 91 EAPC see Euro-Atlantic Partnership Cooperation Eastern Europe dependence on Russian gas 156 OSCE activities 30 regional cooperation 143 see also Central and Eastern Europe EBO see Effects-Based Operations ECAP see European Capabilities Action Plan ECHO see European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office ECHR see European Convention on Human Rights economic partnerships 176–7 Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) 95 EDA see European Defense Agency EDC see European Defense Community Effects-Based Operations (EBO) 117, 124–6, 130 European transformation 133 US transformation 103, 105, 111, 196 EGF see European Gendarmerie Force Egypt 49, 141, 181, 187 EMP see Euro-Mediterranean Partnership energy 3, 142, 155–8 see also gas pipelines; oil ENP see European Neighborhood Policy EPC see “European Political Cooperation”

Index ESDI see European Security and Defense Initiative ESDP see European Security and Defense Policy ESS see European Security Strategy Estonia 156 ethno-territorial conflicts 145, 149–51, 159, 166 EU see European Union EU Treaty see Treaty on European Union EUFOR see European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina EUJUST Themis mission 31, 49, 196 EUMC see European Union Military Committee EUMS see European Union Military Staff EUPM see European Union Police Mission Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 33, 49, 148 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 93, 94, 143, 176–7, 197, 198 Eurocorps 51, 54, 58 Eurojust 76, 83–4 European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) 44, 171–2 European Commission CFSP development 16 civil-military structures 98, 196 development 91–2 EU-NATO relations 28 EU-OSCE relations 30 information exchange 95 Justice and Home Affairs 77, 78, 81 Palestine strategy 185 Tampere Program 76 “universal public goods” 91 European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) 48 European Constitution 19, 29, 45, 77, 84 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 190 European Council Brussels Summit 50, 165 civil-military structures 47, 196 Cologne Summit 39, 42, 43, 164, 165 Congo operations 53 counter-terrorism 46 Eurojust 83 European Security Strategy 93

205

Feira Summit 47, 164, 165 Gothenburg Summit 43, 47–8, 49 Hague Program 77 Helsinki Summit 39, 44, 164, 165 Justice and Home Affairs 78 Nice Summit 43, 50, 164, 165 qualified majority voting 41, 60 regional cooperation 142 “Third Pillar” instruments 79 European Court of Justice 75, 77, 78, 84 European Defense Agency (EDA) 58, 65, 111, 140 European Defense Community (EDC) 9 European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) 52, 139 European integration 14, 19, 173 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 3, 141–2, 143, 196 EU-OSCE cooperation 31, 32 integrated approach 93–4, 95 priorities 197–8 European Parliament 16, 78, 84, 100 “European Political Cooperation” (EPC) 11–12, 68, 88 European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) 164 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 1, 6, 14–17, 18, 39–62, 196 civilian component 47–9 Constitutional Treaty 56, 57, 64 defining 40–41 EU-NATO relations 24, 25, 27 European Security Strategy 87 implementation 24 integrated capabilities 97 military component 44–7 regional cooperation 140 Turkey 164–5 US defense transformation 110, 111 see also Common Foreign and Security Policy European Security Strategy (ESS) 2, 17, 87–101, 132, 133, 199 ambitious agenda 197 counter-terrorism 80, 195 crisis management 96–7 effective multilateralism 94–6, 170–71 European Neighborhood Policy 93–4 global public goods 89–92 integrated capabilities 97–9

206

European Security in Transition

OSCE role 29 South Caucasus 3, 142 terrorist threats 163, 168 European Union (EU) Battle Groups 130–31 capability gaps 1, 39–40, 51, 103, 106–7, 196 comprehensive security 141–2 defense transformation 132–4 energy supplies 156–7 enlargement 17, 31, 32, 36, 135, 197, 198 European Security Strategy 87–100 globalization of missions 52–4 impact of transformation 129 intelligence 126 international cooperation 117 Iraq crisis 54–6 Israel/Palestine conflict 183–6 Middle East 175–94, 198 NATO relations 23–9, 36, 49–52, 61–2, 111, 133, 195–7 neutral countries 19 OSCE relations 29–32 regional cooperation 137–41, 143 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe 136 state membership of NATO 18, 27 terrorism 189–90 Turkey 162, 163, 164–7, 169–70, 173, 198 Western European Union integration into 41–2 WMD policy 192–4 European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) 26, 52, 53, 140 European Union Military Committee (EUMC) 45 European Union Military Staff (EUMS) 45–6, 47 European Union Police Mission (EUPM) 48–9 Europol 81–3, 84 failed states 46, 90, 92, 115, 159, 168 al-Fatah 184, 188 Feist, Rainer 26 Ferrero-Waldner, Benita 59, 65, 186

Finland dependence on Russian gas 156 Eurocorps 54 “joint letter” 66 mutual assistance guarantee 59, 60 neutrality 49, 63, 71 NORDCAPS 139 OSCE 32 Schengen Area 74 Fischer, Heinz 59 Fouchet Plan 11 Fradkov, Mikhail 152 France Brussels Treaty 7 defense budget 107 EU operational planning 26 EU-NATO relations 15, 24, 26, 27, 195 Eurocorps 54 European Defense Community 9 European Gendarmerie Force 52, 139 full spectrum capability 109 Iraq crisis 54 mutual assistance 59 NRF deployment 108n2 Rumsfeld denunciation of 55 Russian gas 156 St Malo Declaration 16, 39, 164 Schengen Area 74 Single European Act 12 Frattini, Franco 190 fraud 81 Free Trade Area (FTA) 177, 178 full spectrum dominance 104 FYROM see Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya 187, 188 gas 94, 155–7, 158 Gaulle, Charles de 11 Gaza 49, 185 GCC see Gulf Cooperation Council George, Bruce 32 Georgia 145, 146–7 army 148 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 157–8 BLACKSEAFOR 138 energy security 158 ethno-territorial conflict 149–50, 151

Index EUJUST Themis mission 31, 49, 196 European Neighborhood Policy 141 NATO relationship 148–9 PfP Trust Fund projects 137, 197 Russian bases in 153, 154 Russian peacekeeping forces 154–5, 158–9 separatist armies 151 Treaty on Collective Security 149 Germany contribution to NRF and Battle Groups 131–2 EU operational planning 26 EU-NATO relations 195 Eurocorps 54 European Defense Community 9 Iraq crisis 54 ISAF 54 mutual assistance 59 NATO 8, 10 Rapidly Deployable Corps 50 Rumsfeld denunciation of 55 Russian gas 156, 157 Schengen Area 74 Single European Act 12 global public goods (GPG) 89–92, 94–5 Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 106, 115 see also “war on terror” globalization 14, 90, 135 governance 90, 95, 99 defense transformation 133 European Neighborhood Policy 142, 197 regional organizations 135, 197 GPG see global public goods Greece Cyprus 50, 165 dependence on Russian gas 156 Eurocorps 54 MPFSEE 137 NATO 8, 50 Schengen Area 74 GUAM states 146, 149 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 140, 143, 193, 197 Gulf War (1990-91) 6, 104, 127, 182 GWOT see Global War on Terrorism Hague Program 77–8 Ham, Peter van 2, 23–37 HAMAS 94, 184, 185–7, 188

207

Harakat ul-Mujahedin 188 Hauser, Gunther 2, 3, 39–62, 135–44 Headline Goals 51, 62, 140, 141, 162, 196 Helsinki Final Act (1975) 12–13, 40 Herzegovina see Bosnia and Herzegovina Hezbollah 185n11, 186, 188 homeland security 130 De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap 23, 27, 34, 55 human rights 12, 15, 92, 94, 190 European Neighborhood Policy 141 European Security Strategy 90 global public goods 89 MEDA Program 178 OSCE-NATO cooperation 35 Palestine 185 Western values 167 human security 29, 89 humanitarian assistance 17, 28, 47, 57 Hummer, Waldemar 2, 63–72 Hungarian-Italian-Slovenian Brigade 138 Hungary 136, 138–9, 156 Hurd, Douglas 14 Iceland 8, 74, 139 ICI see Istanbul Cooperation Initiative ICTY see International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia immigration 74, 76, 77, 78 India 99, 100, 181, 182, 191, 199 Indonesia 49 industry 129–30 inequalities 89–90 information and communication technologies 119–20, 121, 122, 127, 128 information exchange 95, 142, 189–90, 198 institution-building 6, 7–9, 28 intellectual property 129–30 intelligence 33, 126, 132 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 137, 140 International Police Task Force (IPTF) 48, 171 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 28, 53–4, 96, 110, 139, 170 IPTF see International Police Task Force IRA see Irish Republican Army Iran 97, 181, 182 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 157

208

European Security in Transition

Islamic Revolution 187 Nabucco-Pipeline 156 nuclear program 36, 191, 193 South Caucasus 146, 147 war with Iraq 192 Iraq 49, 54–6, 117, 168–9, 181 European troops in 96 intra-European divide over 87, 88 Kurdish areas 145 Network-Centric Operations 120 outsourcing of support functions 127 reconstruction of 175, 198 transatlantic rift over 195 Turkish staff 171 US defense transformation 105–6, 109 war with Iran 192 Iraqi Freedom, Operation (OIF) 105, 109, 127, 181 Ireland “joint letter” 66 mutual assistance guarantee 59, 60 neutrality 49, 63, 68, 71 Schengen Area 74 “Irish Clause” 67, 68–9, 71 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 186 ISAF see International Security Assistance Force Islam 163, 169, 179, 180, 181, 188 Islamic Jihad 184, 187, 188 Israel 141, 179, 181 nuclear weapons 191 Palestine conflict 175, 182–7 terrorism against 188 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) 140, 143, 170, 197 Istanbul terrorist attack (2003) 163, 169 Italy Eurocorps 54 European Defense Community 9 European Gendarmerie Force 52, 139 Hungarian-Italian-Slovenian Brigade 138 MPFSEE 137 mutual assistance 59 NATO 8 Operation Alba 43 Rapidly Deployable Corps 50 Russian gas 156 Schengen Area 74

Japan 136 JHA see Justice and Home Affairs al-Jihad 188 Jordan 141, 181, 197 Judaism 180 judicial cooperation 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80–81, 83–4 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 2, 73–86, 142, 161, 197 Amsterdam Treaty 75 Charter of Fundamental Rights 76–7 Constitutional Treaty 77 evaluation and future of 84–5 Hague Program 77–8 judicial cooperation 80–81, 83–4 legal instruments 78–9 Maastricht Treaty 74–5 Nice Treaty 76 police cooperation 80, 81–3 policy actors 78 Schengen Area 74 Tampere Program 75–6 TREVI Group 73 Kammel, Arnold H. 2, 73–86 Karabakh 146, 150, 151, 152, 153, 157–8 Karzai, Hamid 54 Kernic, Franz 1–2, 5–21 KFOR see Kosovo Force knowledge 119–20, 125, 126 Kokoity, Eduard 154–5 Kolerov, Modest 147 Kosovo 33, 39, 44, 49, 135, 164 Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 51 European capability shortcomings 106 Turkish police officers 171 UN Mission 171 US defense transformation 105 Kosovo Force (KFOR) 44, 96, 138, 139, 148, 166 Kudava, Mamuka 153 Kuwait 140, 181, 197 landmines 136–7 Latvia 156 Lavrov, Sergei 153 leadership 128 Lebanon 139, 141, 181

Index legacy systems 129 Libya 141, 181 Lithuania 156 Loeser, Wold-Dieter 54 London terrorist attack (2005) 163, 169 Luxembourg Brussels Treaty 7 EU-NATO relations 195 Eurocorps 54 European Defense Community 9 Schengen Area 74 Maastricht Treaty see Treaty on European Union Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of (FYROM) 30, 49, 52–3, 135 MPFSEE 137 NATO operations 25, 166 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe 136 Stabilization and Association Process 136 Turkish police officers 171 Madrid terrorist attack (2004) 46, 80, 163, 169, 188–9 Maghreb 181 Mahan, Alfred 179 Malek, Martin 3, 145–60 Malta 49, 60, 63, 71 Marshall, Andrew 104 Mashrek 181 Maslov, Alexei 153 Mauritania 181 MEDA Program 176, 177–8, 198 Mediterranean Dialogue 49, 140, 143, 170, 197 MERCOSUR 193 Merkel, Angela 186 Middle East 3, 62, 175–94, 197, 198 definition of 179–82 diplomacy 169 HAMAS victory 94 inter-institutional problems 24 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 140 militarization 94 nuclear proliferation 191–2 OSCE-NATO cooperation 34 peace process 182–7 terrorism 187–90

209

Turkey 166, 167, 198 military pact concept 63–4 Military Technological Revolution (MTR) 104 Minister for Foreign Affairs 56, 60, 99, 100 missiles 191, 192 mission orientation 123, 128 modeling 123–4, 126, 133 Moldova 30, 31, 61, 137 dependence on Russian gas 156 Dnestr Republic 152 European Neighborhood Policy 141, 196 GUAM 149 Montenegro 136, 137, 197 Morocco 141, 181, 197 Morozov, Yuri 152 MPFSEE see Multinational Peace Force in South-Eastern Europe MTR see Military Technological Revolution multilateralism 28, 35, 36, 46, 168, 198 counter-terrorism 169 European Neighborhood Policy 142 European Security Strategy 94–6, 170–71 global public goods 92 Multinational Engineer Battalion 138–9 Multinational Peace Force in South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) 137–8, 166 mutual assistance 59–60, 63–6, 67 Nabucco-Pipeline 156 NACC see North Atlantic Cooperation Council Nagorno-Karabakh 146, 148 National Security Strategy (NSS) 2, 91, 93, 106, 110 NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO Response Force (NRF) 27, 51, 52, 98, 130–31 regional cooperation 139 St Malo Declaration 140 US defense transformation 107–8, 196 NATO Training Implementation Mission (NTIM) 55–6 NCW see Network-Centric Warfare Netherlands Brussels Treaty 7 European Defense Community 9

210

European Security in Transition

European Gendarmerie Force 52, 139 full spectrum capability 109 ISAF 54 NATO 24 Rapidly Deployable Corps 50 Schengen Area 74 Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) 2–3, 117, 120, 121–4, 196 Bundeswehr 132 European transformation 133 NATO Response Force 130, 131 organization 126, 127 United States 103, 104–5, 109, 111 networks 118, 119, 127 neutrality 19, 49, 59, 63–4, 196 “Irish Clause” 67, 68–9 solidarity doctrine 69–71 “new world order” 5 Newly Independent States (NIS) 141, 167 Nice Treaty see Treaty of Nice 9/11 terrorist attacks 115, 162–3, 167–9, 172, 183, 195 NIS see Newly Independent States non-state actors 115–16 NORDCAPS 58, 139 North Africa 24, 34, 62, 197 North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 33 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2, 6, 8, 10 CFSP/ESDP development 15, 16, 17, 18 civil-military capabilities 98–9 compatibility with CFSP 41, 57 defense reform in Bosnia 137 effects-based approach 118, 124 enlargement 13–14, 135, 197 EU relations 23–9, 36, 49–52, 61–2, 111, 133, 195–7 globalization of missions 52–4 impact of transformation 129 intelligence 126 international cooperation 117 Iraq crisis 54–6, 168–9 “Irish Clause” 67 Kosovo intervention 39, 44 Mediterranean Dialogue 143, 170, 197 OSCE relations 32–5 regional cooperation 140, 143 SHAPE 26, 27, 47, 50, 196

South Caucasus 146, 148–9 Soviet proposals 11 Turkey 161, 163, 164–7, 170–71, 198 US defense transformation 103, 106–8, 109, 110, 111 Western Balkans 136 Western European Union relationship 9 see also NATO Response Force; Partnership for Peace Program Norway 8, 74, 139 NRF see NATO Response Force NSS see National Security Strategy NTIM see NATO Training Implementation Mission nuclear weapons 107, 176, 190, 191–2, 193, 195 see also weapons of mass destruction Nye, Joseph 89, 92 OIF see Operation Iraqi Freedom oil Broader Black region 142, 198 Middle East 159, 166, 167, 194 Southern Caucasus 142, 147, 150, 156, 157–8, 159, 166 Oman 140, 181, 197 Operation Alba 43 Operation Allied Harmony 25, 52, 53, 166, 171 Operation Althea 25–6, 27–8, 31, 53, 96, 140, 171 Operation Artemis 26, 53, 96–7 Operation Concordia 25–6, 52, 171 Operation Desert Storm 127, 181, 182 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 105, 109, 127, 181 Orgakov, Nicolei 104 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2, 14, 17, 24, 196 Charter for European Security 33 EU relations 29–32 Mediterranean Dialogue 143, 197 NATO relations 32–5 South Caucasus 146 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe 136 organized crime 46, 52, 73, 75, 76, 116 Balkans 136 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 176 European Neighborhood Policy 142, 197

Index new security agenda 164, 168 police and judicial cooperation 80–82, 83–4 transnational nature of 115 OSCE see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Ottawa Landmine Convention 136, 137 PA see Palestinian Authority Pahr, Willibald 70 Pakistan 181, 182, 188, 191 Palestine 49, 94, 175, 179, 181, 182–7 Palestinian Authority (PA) 141, 183n8, 184–5, 187 Paris Agreements 8, 9 Paris Charter 40 Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program 13, 33, 49, 62 Central Asia 167 force planning 141, 196 South Caucasus 148 Trust Fund projects 61, 136–7, 197 Passy, Solomon 34 Patten, Chris 32 PBC see Peacebuilding Commission PCC see Prague Capabilities Commitment peace enforcement 43, 131, 132 peace process 182–7 Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) 95, 99 peacekeeping 108–9, 110, 164, 169 CENCOOP 138 CFSP provisions 17 OSCE Charter for European Security 33 peace enforcement distinction 132 Petersberg tasks 43, 57 Rapid Response Force 51 regional cooperation 143 South Caucasus 154–5 Persian Gulf countries 181 Petersberg tasks 1, 39, 96 Amsterdam Treaty 42, 43 Constitutional Treaty 57, 64 PfP see Partnership for Peace Program Philippines 187 Piontkovsky, Andrei 151–2 Platter, Günther 59 Pleven, René 9 PMR see Dnestr Republic Poland 24, 54, 156, 157

211

police cooperation ESDP 47–9 EUPOL 52 JHA policy 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81–3 “Political Cooperation” 11–12, 68, 88 Political and Security Committee (PSC) 25, 44–5, 47, 53, 100 Portugal 8, 52, 74, 139 poverty 40, 91, 92 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) 107, 171 pre-emptive/preventive war 110 PSC see Political and Security Committee Putin, Vladimir 147, 148, 156, 157 Py, Jean-Luis 54 al-Qaeda 170, 187, 188 Qatar 140, 181, 197 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 104, 106, 110, 196 R&D see research & development R2P see “responsibility to protect” Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) 27, 50–51 Helsinki Council 39, 42, 44, 165 St Malo Declaration 140 REACT (Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams) 30, 31 Realist school 24, 88, 172 refugees 145, 150, 185 regional cooperation 3, 9, 135–44, 178, 197 Republika Srpska 30 research & development (R&D) 107 “responsibility to protect” (R2P) 97 Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 104 risk 14 RMA see Revolution in Military Affairs Robertson, Lord 34 Romania 32, 136, 137, 138–9, 156 Romanian-Hungarian Joint Peacekeeping Battalion 138 Rotberg, R.I. 89 Royaument Process 136 RRF see Rapid Reaction Force rule of law 15, 40, 47, 89, 94 European Neighborhood Policy 141, 142, 197 European Security Strategy 90 MEDA Program 178

212

European Security in Transition

Palestine 185 Rumsfeld, Donald 55, 105, 107 Rupel, Dimitrij 34 Russia 33, 34, 49, 62, 197 Armenia relationship 147 Azerbaijan relationship 147–8 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 157 BLACKSEAFOR 138 European Neighborhood Policy 141 gas pipelines 94, 155–7, 158 Georgia relationship 146, 147 South Caucasus 146, 149, 150, 151–5, 157, 158–9 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe 136 see also Soviet Union Saakashvili, Mikheil 147, 148–9, 158 Saddam Hussein 54, 55, 169, 180n3, 182 St Malo Declaration (1998) 16, 39, 140, 164, 165 SALCC see Strategic Airlift Coordination Center Samtskhe-Javakheti 151 SAP see Stabilization and Association Process Saudi Arabia 140, 181, 187, 197 Schengen Convention 74, 75, 85 Schreer, Benjamin 2–3, 103–14 Schröder, Gerhard 157, 195 Schüssel, Wolfgang 59 Science and Peace Program 34 SECI see Southeast European Cooperation Initiative Second World War 7 security concept 14, 18, 19–20, 23–4 Cold War 172 “comprehensive security” 6, 19, 117, 135, 195 paradigm change 116–18 SEEBRIG see Southeastern Europe Brigade SEECP see Southeastern European Cooperation Process Separation of Parties by Force (SOPF) 62, 131, 141 September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks 115, 162–3, 167–9, 172, 183, 195 Serbia 136, 137, 156, 197 SFOR see Stabilization Force

SHAPE see Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Sharif, Nawaz 191 Sharon, Ariel 175, 182–3 Shevardnadze, Eduard 146, 147, 154 simulation 123–4, 126, 133 Single European Act (SEA) (1986) 12, 68, 88 situational awareness 120, 122–3 Slovakia 138–9, 156 Slovenia 138 Smith, Lance 108 soft power 17, 29, 31, 169, 196 soft security 35 Solana, Javier 36, 46, 47, 51, 52, 58 battle groups 140 European Security Strategy 93, 96, 99 solidarity 29, 60–61, 64, 65, 66, 69–71 SOPF see Separation of Parties by Force South Caucasus 3, 145–60 energy supplies 155–8 ethno-territorial conflicts 149–51, 159 European Neighborhood Policy 31, 141, 142, 196 main players 145–6 NATO relationship 148–9 OSCE activities 29, 30 Russian policy in 151–5 Treaty on Collective Security 149 Turkey 166, 198 see also Central Asia South Ossetia 146, 149, 150, 151–2, 154–5, 158–9 Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) 136, 166, 167 Southeastern Europe 135–6, 137–8, 143, 166, 197 Southeastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) 138, 166 Southeastern European Cooperation Process (SEECP) 166 Soviet Union (USSR) Cold War 5 collapse of 8, 33, 161, 164, 181 collective security system proposal 10–11 post-war concerns 7

Index Warsaw Pact 8 see also Russia Spain Eurocorps 54 European Gendarmerie Force 52, 139 Madrid terrorist attack 46, 80, 163, 169, 188–9 OSCE 32 Rapidly Deployable Corps 50 Schengen Area 74 SS see Steady State Stability Pact for Southeast Europe (1999) 3, 135–6, 142, 166, 167 Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) 136 Stabilization Force (SFOR) 25, 53, 54, 139, 140, 166 Steady State (SS) 62, 141 Strategic Airlift Coordination Center (SALCC) 27 strategic culture 87, 99, 100, 132, 199 strategy 88, 100, 124–5 see also European Security Strategy Sudan 27, 28, 49, 97 support forces 127, 131–2 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 26, 27, 47, 50, 196 sustainable development 40, 178 Sweden “joint letter” 66 mutual assistance guarantee 59, 60 neutrality 49, 63, 71 NORDCAPS 139 Schengen Area 74 Switzerland 74, 138 Syria 141, 181, 193 Tajikistan 137, 193 Tampere Program 75–6 Tashkent Treaty (1992) 149 technology 119–21, 122, 127, 128, 129 terrorism 90, 116, 135, 164 Balkans 136 EU strategy paper 46 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 176 European Neighborhood Policy 142, 198 HAMAS 185–6

213

intelligence 126 Middle East 179–80, 187–90 nuclear weapons 192, 193 OSCE-NATO cooperation 33, 34 Petersberg tasks 57 police and judicial cooperation 80, 82, 83 solidarity clause 60, 61 TREVI Group 73 Turkey 167–9, 171–2 “war on terror” 1, 28, 29, 91, 106, 115, 162–3, 195 see also counter-terrorism Tervuren proposal 26–7 TEU see Treaty on European Union Themis mission 31, 49, 196 Thiele, Ralph 3, 115–34 transatlantic relationship 15, 18 European Security Strategy 88 Tervuren proposal 27 US defense transformation 108–9, 111 Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 16, 24, 41–2, 164 “Irish Clause” 68 Justice and Home Affairs 75, 78, 79 Petersberg tasks 43 Treaty on Collective Security (Tashkent Treaty) (1992) 149 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 150 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) (2004) 2, 40, 56–61 Charter of Fundamental Rights 77 counter-terrorism 80, 195 global governance 90 Hague Program 77–8 “Irish Clause” 67, 68–9 “joint letter” 66 Justice and Home Affairs 77, 84–5 mutual defense commitment 63–6, 69 non-ratification of 99 see also European Constitution Treaty on European Union (TEU/Maastricht Treaty) (1992) 12, 14, 15, 161 anti-racism 81 CFSP 39, 40–41 “Irish Clause” 68

214

European Security in Transition

Justice and Home Affairs 73, 74–5 NATO 50 police and judicial cooperation 80, 81, 82, 83 solidarity clause 60–61, 70 Western European Union 164 Treaty of Nice (2001) 17, 76, 83 Treaty of Rome (1957) 11 Tretyakov, Vitaly 152 TREVI Group 73 Tunisia 141, 181 Turkey 3, 161–74, 198 Armenia relationship 148 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 157, 158 BLACKSEAFOR 138 Cyprus 50, 162, 165 Eurocorps 54 ISAF 53–4 Kurdish areas 145, 158 Mashrek 181 MPFSEE 137 NATO membership 8, 18 Rapidly Deployable Corps 50 South Caucasus 146 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe 136 Udum, ebnem 3, 161–74 UK see United Kingdom Ukraine 31, 49, 62, 197 BLACKSEAFOR 138 European Neighborhood Policy 141 “gas war” with Russia 94, 155–6 GUAM 149 Multinational Engineer Battalion 138–9 PfP Trust Fund project 61, 137, 197 UN see United Nations uncertainty 5 United Arab Emirates 140, 181, 197 United Kingdom (UK) Ankara Document 165 Brussels Treaty 7 defense budget 107 Eurocorps 54 full spectrum capability 109 Iraq war 54, 55, 105, 109 ISAF 53–4 London terrorist attack 163, 169 mutual assistance 59 Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit 92

St Malo Declaration 16, 39, 164 Schengen Area 74 Single European Act 12 support for NATO 24, 39 United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council 95 international cooperation 117 International Police Task Force 48 Iraq crisis 55 Mission in Kosovo 171 Missions of Observers in Georgia 155 Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 53 requests for troops 96, 97 sanctions against Yugoslavia 30 South Caucasus 146 use of force mandate 92 United Nations Charter 9, 10, 15, 40, 62 Constitutional Treaty 57, 63, 65, 66 coordinated development of the EDSP 196 mutual assistance 59 NATO 8 United States (US) Ankara Document 165 Armenia relationship 147 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 157 balanced partnership with 199 capability gaps 1, 39–40, 51, 103, 106–7, 196 “coalitions of the willing” 35, 108, 110, 195 Cold War 5 Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 92–3 defense transformation 2–3, 103–14, 120, 196 EU counter-terrorism policies 190 European Security Strategy 88 Georgia relationship 146 Iraq crisis 54–5 Islamist hatred of 188 Israel/Palestine conflict 182, 184 National Security Strategy 2, 91, 93, 106, 110 NATO formation 7–8 outsourcing of support functions 127 post-Cold War era 13 post-war concerns 7

Index South Caucasus 146 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe 136 support for NATO 24 Tervuren proposal 26–7 war against terrorism 46, 162–3, 167–9, 195 see also transatlantic relationship USSR see Soviet Union vetos 41 virtual organizations 124 De Vries, Gijs 46, 80 “war on terror” 1, 28, 29, 91, 106, 115, 162–3, 195 Warsaw Pact 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 115 Washington Treaty (1949) 8, 42, 49, 169 WEAG see Western European Armaments Group weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 28, 90, 115, 135, 164, 192–4 EU CBRN program 190 EU strategy paper 46 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 176 European Neighborhood Policy 142, 198 terrorism 162, 168, 169, 195 Turkey 172 US defense transformation 120 West Bank 185, 187–8 West Germany 8, 9, 10 Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) 58

215

Western European Union (WEU) 9, 14, 16, 60, 162 integration into EU 41–2 NATO members 49 Turkey 164–5 WEAG 58 Western Union 7, 9 WEU see Western European Union WMD see weapons of mass destruction Wohlfeld, Monika 32 Yanukovich, Viktor 155 Yarovoy, Anatoly 152 Yeltsin, Boris 154 Yemen 181 Yugoslavia, Former Republic of 30, 39, 164, 166 see also Balkans; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Macedonia Yushchenko, Viktor 155 Zapatero, José Luis Rodrigues 188–9 Zhirinovskys, Vladimir 152 Zinevich, Anatoli 152 Zourabichvili, Salome 153