Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies

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Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies

Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies lays down foundations for the analysis of media, information and information technology in twenty-first century information society, as well as introducing the theoretical and empirical tools necessary to the study for the critical study of media and information. Christian Fuchs shows the role classical critical theory can play for analysing the information society and the information economy, as well as analysing the role of the media and the information economy in economic development, the new imperialism and the new economic crisis. The book critically discusses transformations of the Internet ( web 2.0'), introduces the notion of alternative media as critical media and shows the critical role media and information technology can play in contemporary society. c

This book provides an excellent introduction to the study of media, information technology and information society, making it a valuable reference tool for both undergraduate and postgraduate students of subjects such as Media Studies, Sociology of Media, Social Theory and New Media. Christian Fuchs is chair professor for media and communication studies at Uppsala University's Department of Informatics and Media Studies. His research interests are social theory, critical theory, IGTs and society, media and society and information society studies. He is the author of numerous academic publications, including Internet and Society (Routledge 2008).

The information and communications media are absolutely central in the new globalized world of the twenty-first century. To understand their role requires a renewed assessment of the way we analyse and understand the media, information and communications. Christian Fuchs has performed an invaluable task in reconsidering classic Marxist theory and political economy to help understand critically the place of the internet, the 'knowledge economy', and class in ways that afford illuminating insight into contemporary crises and capitalist development.' - Peter Golding, Pro Vice-Chancellor (Research and Innovation), Northumbria University, UK É

'Christian Fuchs is a demanding and able young scholar who insists on the relevance of old traditions of thought. Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies is a forceful reminder that we forget at our peril the legacy of Marx - not to mention Theodor Adorno, Hébert Marcuse, Oskar Negt... indeed, the range of Critical Theory. For those who believe the Internet, iPhone, web 2.0 and web 3.0 changes everything, Dr Fuchs' treatise will make for a very sobering read.' - Frank Webster, Head of Sociology Department, City University London, author of Theories of the Information Society, 3rd edition (2006) 'Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies by Christian Fuchs is a superior and sophisticated introduction to critical analysis of communication. It provides an accessible yet deeply informed understanding of media history and theory. In particular, Fuchs has a remarkable facility with Marxist theory and economics, and he makes a compelling case for their singular importance to our times. After reading this book, no student or scholar in communication will look at globalization, the Internet and participatory democracy the same again. This book should be required reading for all who care about media and democracy' - Robert W.McChesney, co-author, The Death and Life of American Journalism 'Christian Fuchs systematically and relentlessly disposes of the false starts and pseudo critique fettering not only media theory, but critical social theory more broadly. Reinstalling the Marxian components vital to rigorous thought, he establishes the conceptual groundwork necessary for a political understanding of communicative capitalism.' — Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, and author of Blog Theory and Democracy and other Neoliberal Fantasies 'Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies provides a well argued and theoretically sound critique of the march of the one-dimensional, instrumentalist adoption of modern ICT that reinforces existing structures of domination and economic and political injustices. With its theoretically and empirically grounded critical perspective, the book is an important contribution to the literature on social media, information, ICT and information society. The book shows how classical critical theories of Marx, Marcuse, Horkheimer, Adorno and others can help us understand the developments in information economy and society and envisage alternative roles that media and ICT can play. It also reflects on celebratory and uncritical hailing of the Internet, web 2.0 and social networking as democratizing technologies, dominant in the public media. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the Internet, social media and ICT and how we can use them to make a better world/ - Dubravka Cecez-Kecmanovic, Professor of Information Systems, Australian School of Business, The University of New South Wales, Australia

'This is a courageous and important work of critical theory for the 21st Century. In an era of small-scale and local theory Christian Fuchs's book stands out in its willingness to make overarching claims about the failings and pathologies of capitalist society. Thankfully Christian Fuchs has met the timely challenge of developing a critical theory of the information society that matches the scale and reach of this society itself.' - Mark Andrejevic, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Critical and Cultural Studies, University of Queensland 'This book skillfully combines theoretical rigour with precise empirical research to provide an outstanding guide to the critical analysis of media and information. It is must reading for those interested in social theory, informational capitalism and the uncertain future of the global economy' - Vincent Mosco, Canada Research Chair in Communication and Society, Queen's University, Canada

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Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies Christian Fuchs

Ö Routledge jjj^

Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2 0 1 1 Christian Fuchs Typeset in Baskerville by Book Now Ltd, London Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham, Wiltshire All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Fuchs, Christian Foundations of critical media and foundation studies/by Christian Fuchs. p. cm. 1. Mass media—Social aspects. 2. Mass media. 3. Critical theory. 4. Information society. 5. Information technology—Social aspects. I. Title. HM1206.F83 2011 302.23'1—dc22 ISBN: 978-0-415-58881-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-83086-4 (ebk)

2010033866

Contents

List of List of tables

figures

xiii xv

1 Introduction

1

PARTI Theory

9

2 Critical theory today

11

2.1 What is critical theory? 11 2.2 The problem of immanence and transcendence in critical theory 26 2.2.1 The positivist notion of critique 28 2.2.2 The postmodern notion of critique 29 2.2.3 Critical theory as immanent transcendence 34 2.3 The debate on redistribution and recognition: the problem of base and superstructure in critical theory 43 2.3.1 Eraser andHonneth: the debate on redistribution and recognition as a reframing of the problem of base and superstructure in critical theory 43 2.3.2 Base and superstructure reconsidered: towards a dialectical model of society and a dialectic-materialistic moral philosophy 48 2.4 Dialectical philosophy and critical theory 53 2.4.1 Dialectical thinking as ideology 53 2.4.2 Negative dialectics: Adorno and Bhaskar 55 2.4.3 Marcuse, Bloch and beyond: the subject-object dialectic 58 2.5 Conclusion 71 3 Critical media and information studies 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Information science and media and communication studies Critical media, communication and information studies Dialectical philosophy and critical media and information studies Information society theory and informational capitalism Conclusion

75 75 93 112 121 132

x Contents 4 Karl Marx and critical media and information studies

135

4.1 Introduction 135 4.2 The Marxian circuit of capital 137 4.3 Karl Marx on media and communication 141 4.3.1 The role of the media in commodity production 141 4.3.1.1 Media technology as technology of rationalization 142 4.3.1.2 The specific process of capital concentration and centralization in the realm of the media 143 4.3.1.3 The specific role of media capital in the production of media contents 144 4.3.1.4 The general role of the media in intra-organizational corporate communication 146 4.3.1.5 The general role of the media in the globalization of capitalism 147 4.3.2 The role of the media in commodity circulation 148 4.3.2.1 The specific junction of media infrastructure capital in the accumulation by transmitting media contents 148 4.3.2.2 The media as carriers of advertising messages that advance commodity sales 149 4.3.2.3 The general role of the media in reducing the circulation and turnover time of capital 149 4.3.2.4 Media and the globalization of world trade 151 4.3.2.5 The spatial centralization of capital by means of transportation and communication 151 4.3.3 Media and ideology 152 4.3.4 Alternative roles of the media 154 4.4 Conclusion 155 PART II Case studies

161

5 The media and information economy and the new imperialism

163

5.1 Introduction 163 5.2 Theories of new imperialism and global capitalism 167 5.3 An empirical analysis of the new imperialism 176 5.3.1 The concentration of capital 176 5.3.2 The dominance offinancecapital 111 5.3.3 The importance of capital export 181 5.3.4 The economic division of the world among big corporations 185 5.3.5 The political division of the world 197 5.4 Informational capitalism and the new imperialism: an empirical analysis 203 5.4.1 The concentration of capital in the information sector 203 5.4.2 Finance capital and information capital 207 5.4.3 Capital export and the information industries 208

Contents xi

6

5.4.4 The economic division of the world and information corporations 5.4.5 The role of information in the political division of the world 5.5 Conclusion

217

The new crisis of capitalism and the role of the media and information economy

223

6.1 Introduction 6.2 The new capitalist crisis 6.2.1 Economic crisis - a consequence of regulation failures? 6.2.2 Crisis asfailure of capitalism 6.2.3 Karl Marx and the crisis economy offinancecapitalism 6.3 Capitalist crisis and the capitalist information economy 6.4 Conclusion 6.5 Data appendix 7 Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Participatory democracy 7.3 Ideology critique of claims about participatory web 2.0 7.4 Class, exploitation and the Internet 7.5 Conclusion

215 217

223 224 225 226 230 233 240 245 255 255 260 265 279 290

PART III Alternatives

293

8 Alternative media as critical media

295

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 9

Introduction Theories and concepts of alternative media Alternative media as critical media Critical media and the counter-public sphere Atypologyof critical media An alternative Internet Conclusion

Conclusion

295 297 298 304 307 310 322 323

9.1 (Sidelinesfor critical media and information studies 9.2 Towards a commons-based Internet? 9.3 Strugglesfor a commons-based society? References Index

323 328 341 350 375

Figures

2.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12

Society as dynamic, dialectical system Four paradigms of social theory identified by Burrell and Morgan (1979) A refined version of Burrell and Morgan's typology A typology of communication theories A model of the communication process in the media system Three causal logics of technology assessment: technological/media determinism, SCOT and the dialectic of technology/media and society Major perceived opportunities of social networking sites Major perceived risks of social networking sites A typology of information society theories Annual growth of world GDP Wage share in selected countries and regions World gross capital formation Market capitalization of listed companies Growth of total capital assets in the EU15 countries and the United States Share of selected industries in total capital assets of the world's largest 2,000 corporations in 2008 The Marxian circuit of capital accumulation The capitalist media economy = the processes of media production, circulation and consumption in the capitalist economy Capital concentration in industry and services in the EU27 countries (2007) Value of mergers and acquisitions in US$ million Total number of mergers and acquisitions Total number of mergers and acquisitions in selected industries Total financial asset transactions (in per cent of GDP; currency, deposits, securities, loans, shares and other equity) World FDI inflows and outflows World FDI instock World imports as share of world GDP World exports as share of world GDP Distribution of FDI inflows Distribution of FDI outflows Share of FDI inflows - developed regions

49 82 82 85 91 115 119 120 122 123 124 125 125 126 132 137 158 177 178 179 179 180 182 182 184 184 186 187 187

xiv Figures 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18 5.19 5.20 5.21 5.22 5.23 5.24 5.25 5.26 5.27 5.28 5.29 5.30 5.31 5.32 5.33 5.34 5.35 5.36 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 7.1 7.2 9.1

Share of FDI inflows - developing regions Share of FDI outflows - developed regions Share of FDI outflows - developing regions Shares in world imports Shares in world exports Shares in world imports Shares in world exports Shares in world imports Shares in world exports FDI in Afghanistan FDI in Iraq Fuel export from Iraq Fuel imports by the United Kingdom Fuel imports by the USA Share of the number of large corporations in the total number of corporations in the EU27 countries Share of large companies in total employees in EU27 countries Share of turnover controlled by large companies in the EU27 countries Share of value added (at factor costs) controlled by large companies in the EU27 countries Media concentration in the USA Share of selected industries in total capital assets of the world's largest 2,000 corporations in 2007 Share of selected industries in total capital assets of the world's largest 2,000 corporations in 2008 Selected sectors of FDI (inflows) Share of specific product groups in total exported goods Share of creative industries in world exports Sales of the world's 2,000 largest corporations Assets of the world's 2,000 largest corporations Profits of the 2,000 largest global corporations Market value of the world's 2,000 largest corporations Annual growth rates of the world's largest 2,000 corporations The information economy and the capitalist crisis An expanded class model Internet advertising revenues in the USA, 1997-2008 The dialectic of multitude and capital

188 189 189 190 191 191 192 192 193 200 200 201 201 201 204 204 205 205 206 208 209 209 214 215 234 234 234 235 235 241 284 289 340

Tables

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 4.1 5.1 5.2 5.3

5.4 5.5

Readership of daily and evening newspapers in Ireland Readership of daily and evening newspapers in Ireland structured by ownership groups Readership of newspapers in Austria Readership of daily and evening newspapers in Austria structured by ownership groups Michael Burawoy's typology of social science approaches A typology of instrumental and critical academic knowledge A typology of qualities of three notions of critique Nancy Fraser's perspectival dualism Axel Honneth's normative monism Dimensions of a moral philosophy that is based on immanent transcendence Results from a Delphi study on how to define information science - six models of information science Seven approaches of communication theory according to Craig (1999) A typology of different media types A typology of critical and instrumental media, communication and information studies A typology of critical media and information studies Wages and profits in Europe and the U S A Distribution of employees in four economic sectors Distribution of value added in four economic sectors A systematic account of the role of media in the Marxian circuit of capital Distribution of employees in four economic sectors (2006 data, total employment) Distribution of value added in four economic sectors (2006 data, value added at current prices) Employees by occupation (in thousands), classification: International Classification by Status in Employment (ICSE-1993), International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), data for the year 2008 Value of mergers and acquisitions in US $ billion Countries with the largest shares of FDI inflows

3 4 4 5 13 16 35 44 45 52 79 84 93 98 102 109 131 131 156 166 166

168 178 188

xvi Tables 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11

Countries with the largest shares of FDI outflows Countries with the largest shares of world imports Countries with the largest shares of world exports Percentage share of selected countries and regions in world GDP Transnationality index of the world's largest information corporations Indicators of the degree of transnationality of the world's largest information corporations 5.12 The spatial dimension of the world's largest 2,000 corporations 6.1 Percentage share of single industries in total profit of the world's largest 2,000 corporations in 2008 6.2 The 20 most profitable global corporations in 2008 6.3 The 20 global corporations with the highest losses in 2008 6.4 Analysis of the capitalist crisis based on a sample of 210 global information corporations 7.1 Information functions of the top 20 websites in the USA in 1998 and 2008 7.2 Web 2.0 platforms that are among the top 50 websites in the USA 7.3 Some characteristics of the most popular web 2.0 platforms in the USA 7.4 Fiscal data for four web 2.0 (parent) companies 7.5 Common stock ownership of four web 2.0 (parent) companies 7.6 Ownership rights and advertising rights of the 13 most-used web 2.0 platforms in the USA 7.7 The most viewed videos on YouTube of all time, October 17, 2009, 21:00 C E T 7.8 Blogs with the largest attention and influence 8.1 Potential dimensions of traditional and critical media 8.2 A typology of alternative media 9.1 Percentage of population groups who have attended demonstrations 9.2 Percentage of population groups who would never attend demonstrations

190 193 194 195 212 213 216 236 237 238 239 271 273 274 274 275 275 277 278 299 308 346 346

1

Introduction

The social networking site Facebook introduced a feature called Beacon in November 2007. The technology collected data about user activities on Facebook and on external sites (such as online purchases) and reports the results as stories on a newsfeed to the users' Facebook friends. Beacon collected usage data about users on other partner websites, even if the user is logged out from Facebook and uses this data for personalized and social advertising (targeting a group of friends) on Facebook. The partner sites included, for example, eBay, Livejournal, New York Times, Sony, STA Travel or TripAdvisor. Users can opt out from this service, but it is automatically activated and legalized by Facebook's privacy policy. Many users were concerned that Beacon violates their privacy. The civic action group MoveOn (http://www.moveon.org) started a Facebook group and an online petition for protesting against Beacon. Many users joined the online protest, which put pressure on Facebook because the corporation became afraid that a large number of users would leave Facebook, which would mean less advertising revenue and, therefore, less profit. In December 2007, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg wrote an email to all users and apologized. A privacy setting that users can opt out of the usage of Beacon was introduced. However, it was an opt-out solution and not an opt-in solution, which meant that many users will not deactivate this advertising feature, although they had privacy concerns. An online survey among students who used Facebook showed that 59.9 per cent had not opted out of Facebook Beacon (Fuchs 2009a). Facing continued criticism, Facebook shut down Beacon in September 2009. Facebook automatically uses targeted advertising. There is no way to opt out. We allow advertisers to choose the characteristics of users who will see their advertisements and we may use any of the non-personally identifiable attributes we have collected (including information you may have decided not to show to other users, such as your birth year or other sensitive personal information or preferences) to select the appropriate audience for those advertisements. (Facebook Privacy Policy; October 5, 2010) Hearing such stories about Facebook has led many users to believe that Facebook and other profit-oriented social networking sites are large Internet-based surveillance machines (Fuchs 2009a). The Pirate Bay (http://thepiratebay.org) is a Swedish web platform that indexes BitTorrent files and enables users to search for torrents. BitTorrent is one of the most widely used Internet peer-to-peer file sharing protocols. In December 2009, the Pirate

2 Introduction Bay was the 107th most accessed web platform in the world; approximately 1 per cent of all Internet users accessed it within 7 days (data source: alexa.com web traffic statistics, accessed on December 5, 2009). The Pirate Bay has approximately 4 million registered users. This shows that it is a very popular tool. In 2008, Swedish prosecutors filed charges for operating a site that supports copyright infringements against the owners of the Pirate Bay. The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry sued the Pirate Bay for copyright infringements in individual lawsuits. In April 2009, the Pirate Bay operators were found guilty. The fixed penalties included prison sentences and fines in the amount of several million Euros. The Olswang Digital Music Survey, conducted by Entertainment Media Research in 2007, showed that 57 per cent of Internet users aged 13-17 and 53 per cent of Internet users aged 18-24 say that they have illegally downloaded music from Internet file-sharing sites (data source: Office of Communications: Communication Market Report 2008, 81; JV= 1,721). A total of 66 per cent of Internet users aged 15-24 say that it is morally acceptable to download music for free and 70 per cent say that they do not feel guilty for downloading music for free (Youth and Media survey 2009, jV= 1,026, Office of Communications: Communication Market Report 2009, 278). The Swedish Pirate Party achieved more than 7 per cent of Swedish votes at the elections for the European Parliament in 2009. One of its demands is the reform of copyright law: All non-commercial copying and use should be completely free. File sharing and p2p networking should be encouraged rather than criminalized. Culture and knowledge are good things, that increase in value the more they are shared. The Internet could become the greatest public library ever created. (Pirate Party Sweden, Principles, http://www.piratpartiet.se/international/ english, accessed on December 5, 2009) In September 2009, the German Pirate Party achieved 2 per cent of the votes in the German Federal Elections. At the end of 2009, Pirate Parties existed in more than 35 countries. The popularity of Pirate Bay and the relative success of Pirate Parties, on one hand, and the legal measures taken by the recording industry and the film industry, on the other hand, show that there is a fundamental conflict of interests between many young Internet users and the media industry. In October 2009, student protests against the commodification and economization of higher education emerged at all Austrian universities. The students squatted lecture halls and demanded more public funding for higher education and the introduction of democratic decision-making structures in the universities. The protests spread to other countries such as Germany and Switzerland. The students made use of social media such as Facebook and Twitter for organizing and communicating their protests (see http://www.unibrennt.at). They also used Internet live video streaming for transmitting the discussions in the squatted lecture halls to the public. At several universities, the debate emerged whether Internet live streaming brings primarily public support or poses the danger that the planning of protest activities is monitored and that as a result protests will be disrupted by political opponents. A solution that was taken at some universities was that the Internet live stream was turned off when crucial organizational debates were conducted but apart from that remained online.

Introduction Neda Agha-Soltan, a 27-year-old Iranian woman, was shot on June 20, 2009, by Iranian police forces during a demonstration against irregularities at the Iranian presidential election. Her death was filmed with a cell phone video camera and uploaded to YouTube. It reached the mass media and caused worldwide outrage over Iranian police brutality. Discussions about her death were extremely popular on Twitter following the event. The Iranian protestors used social media such as Twitter, social networking platforms or the site Anonymous Iran for co-ordinating and organizing protests. The newspaper vendor Ian Tomlinson died after being beaten to the ground by British police forces when he watched the G-20 London summit protests as a bystander on April 1, 2009. The police claimed first that he died of natural causes after suffering a heart attack. However, a video showing police forces pushing Tomlinson to the ground surfaced on the Internet, made its way to the mass media and resulted in investigations against police officers. Austria and Ireland have two of the most highly concentrated newspaper markets in the world (Hesmondhalgh 2007, 173). The Herfindahl index allows measuring market concentration: n

5>

2

i=l

h{. absolute value of the reach achieved by media group number i H > 0.18: high degree of concentration 0.18 < H < 0.10: medium degree of concentration H < 0.10: low degree of concentration (Heinrich 1999, 230f.) Tables 1.1-1.4 show the readership shares of daily newspapers in Ireland and Austria and a grouping by ownership groups. The Independent News & Media group controls more than 50 per cent of the Irish newspaper readership and the Mediaprint group more than 50 per cent of the Table LI Readership of daily and evening newspapers in Ireland Newspaper name Owner Irish Independent Independent News & Media Irish Daily Star Independent News & Media The Irish Times Irish Times Trust Evening Herald Independent News & Media Irish Sun News International (News Corporation) Irish Examiner Thomas Crosbie Holdings Irish Daily Mirror Trinity Mirror pic Irish Daily Mail Associated Newspapers Ltd (Daily Mail and General Trust pic) Total Source: Joint National Readership Survey 2007/2008.

Readership Share (%) (in thousands) 508 460 319 317 289 238 219 131 2,481

20.48 18.54 12.86 12.78 11.65 9.59 8.83 5.28 100

3

4

Introduction

Table 1.2 Readership of daily and evening newspapers in Ireland structured by ownership groups Owner

Readership Number of Total share (%) (in thousands) holdings

Independent News & Media Irish Times Trust News International (News Corporation) Thomas Crosbie Holdings Trinity Mirror pic Associated Newspapers Ltd (Daily Mail and General Trust pic) Total

1,285 319 289 238 219 131

3 1 1 1 1 1

51.79 12.86 11.65 9.59 8.83 5.28

2,481

100

Table 1.3 Readership of newspapers in Austria Newspaper name

Owner

Kronen Zeitung

Readership Share (%) (in thousands)

Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 2,962 Zeitschriftenverlag Gesellschaft m.b.H &CoKG Kleine Zeitung Styria Medien AG 820 Osterreich Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH 699 Kurier Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 612 Zeitschriftenverlag Gesellschaft m.b.H &CoKG Der Standard Oscar Bronner 352 Oberösterreichische Nachrichten J . Wimmer GmbH 336 Moser Holding Tiroler Tageszeitung 291 Krone Kärnten/Neue KTZ Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 273 Zeitschriftenverlag Gesellschaft m.b.H &CoKG 254 Salzburger Nachrichten Salzburger Nachrichten Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H. Die Presse Styria Medien AG 252 TOP Vorarlberg Vorarlberger Medienhaus 222 Vorarlberger NachrichtenVorarlberger Medienhaus 202 Wirtschqflsblatt Styria Medien A G 97 Neue Vorarlberger Tageszeitung Vorarlberger Medienhaus 58 Kärntner Tageszeitung Kärntner Druck- und 57 Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H. Total 7,487

39.56 10.95 9.34 8.17 4.70 4.49 3.89 3.65 3.39 3.37 2.97 2.70 1.30 0.77 0.76 100

Source: Media-Analyse 2007/2008.

Austrian newspaper readership. The Herfindahl index is H— 0.318 for Ireland and H— 0.308 for Austria. This shows that the newspaper markets in Ireland and Austria are very highly concentrated. I see power as 'transformative capacity', the capability to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them (Giddens 1985, 7), the 'capability to effectively decide about courses of events, even where others might contest such decisions' (ibid., 9); and domination as the employment of means of coercion for influencing the course of events against the will of others. Power is a fundamental process in all societies;

Introduction

5

Table 1.4 Readership of daily and evening newspapers in Austria structured by ownership groups Owner Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GeseUschaft m.b.H & Co K G Styria Medien A G Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH Oscar Bronner J . Wimmer GmbH Moser Holding Salzburger Nachrichten Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H. Vorarlberger Medienhaus Kärntner Druck- und Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H. Total

Readership Number of Total share (%) (in thousands) holdings 3,847

3

51.38

1,169 699 352 336 291 254

3 1 1 1 1

15.61 9.34 4.70 4.49 3.89 3.39

482 57

3 1

7,487

1

6.44 0.76 100

domination is a form of coercive asymmetric power relationship between dominant groups or individuals and dominated groups or individuals. Given these definitions, the examples just given show that the media in contemporary society are fields for the display of power, counter-power, domination and sites of power struggles (for a discussion of communication power see Castells 2009; Fuchs 2009b). Facebook controls millions of personal user data that it makes use of to accumulate capital. Capital is a form of economic power; the Internet is a communication power tool that Facebook uses to accumulate economic power. Facebook users cannot directly influence Facebook's management decisions and policies, so there is an asymmetric power relation between Facebook and its users. However, the example shows that Facebook users have tried to exert counter-power against Facebook's domination by making use of cyberprotest. The multimedia industry makes money profit by selling media products. File sharers argue that a democratic media structure requires that media products should be freely available to all and, therefore, engage in sharing and downloading such goods over the Internet. The interests of these two groups conflict: the media industry tends to see file sharers as thieves of private property who negatively impact their profits, and file sharers tend to see the media industry as exploiters of the cultural commons. Legal suits and continuous downloading are practices that shape the power struggle between these two groups. This struggle is oriented on setting the conditions for the access to cultural goods. The Internet is a field of conflict in this power struggle. The protesting Austrian students perceived the lack of public funding for higher education and undemocratic decision-making structures within universities as forms of domination that they questioned and that they wanted to transform. They made use of social media for exerting counter-power against dominant structures that negatively impede their conditions of studying and living. Also, the examples of the use of social media in Iran and the United Kingdom show that the Internet and mobile phones can be used as tools for exerting counter-power against domination. The examples of the Irish and Austrian newspaper markets illustrate that media concentration is a concentration of economic capital in the hands of dominant corporations who have the power to influence public opinions, policies and consumer decisions.

6 Introduction The media are tools for exerting domination, power and counter-power; they are power structures themselves and spaces of power struggles. Critical media and information studies (CMIS) conduct analyses of the power and domination structures of the media. The overall aim of this book is to discuss what it means to study the media and technology in a critical way. Information and communication technologies have transformed the ways we live, work, communicate, inform ourselves, engage in social relationships, form values, tackle political problems and so on. This book outlines foundations of a critical social theory of the media that is applied to example studies. It introduces basic theoretical concepts and questions of a critical theory of the media and explains how critical empirical media research works with the help of case studies. I am convinced that CMIS needs to operate on three interconnected levels: critical social theory, critical empirical research and critical ethics. CMIS consists of a critical theory of the media and information, critical media and information research and critical media and information ethics. On the basis of this distinction, this book consists of three parts: Part I (Theory) discusses theoretical foundations, Part II (Case Studies) provides example case studies and Part III (Alternatives) discusses potential alternatives to dominative media structures. CMIS is based on the insight that academia is not separate from politics but that political interests in heteronomous societies always shape academic knowledge production. If this is the case, then it is impossible for academic knowledge to be value-free, neutral and apolitical. The claim that academia should remain apolitical is itself an ideological claim that frequently legitimates positivistic and uncritical research, which celebrates society as it is and wants to delegitimize critical studies that aim at contributing systematic knowledge to the transformation of structures of domination into structures of co-operation and participation. CMIS is deliberately normative and partial; it supports and wants to give a voice to voiceless and oppressed classes of society. The task of this book is to ground foundations for the analysis of media, information and information technology (IT) in twenty-first century information society. Theoretical and empirical tools for CMIS will be introduced. I discuss which role classical critical theory can play for analysing the information society and the information economy. I also analyse the role of the media and the information economy in economic development, the new imperialism and the new economic crisis. The book critically discusses transformations of the Internet ('web 2.0 , 'social media' and 'participatory media'), introduces the notion of alternative media as critical media and shows which critical role media and IT can play in contemporary society. Part I (chapters 2-4) deals with theoretical foundations of CMIS. Chapter 2 focuses on how a critical theory of society should be conceived today and why such a theory is needed. It focuses on the role of base and superstructure in critical theory, the role of classical critical theory (Marx, Marcuse, Bloch, Horkheimer, Adorno, etc.) for contemporary critical theory and the difference between instrumental and critical theory. The role of the debates on public sociology (Michael Burawoy and others) and recognition/redistribution (Nancy Fraser, Axel Honneth) for contemporary critical theory are discussed. Furthermore, three different understandings of what it means to be critical are identified, various definitions of critical theory are compared and a definition of critical theory that has an epistemological, an ontological and an axiological dimension is suggested. The role of dialectical philosophy for critical theory is discussed. 5

Introduction In chapter 3, the theoretical context and a typology of CMIS are elaborated. Critical studies of media and information are distinguished from other forms of studying these phenomena. A typology of critical media and communication studies is constructed. Example approaches for the commodity hypothesis, the ideology hypothesis, the alternative media hypothesis and the alternative reception hypothesis are discussed. It is argued that integrative bridging approaches can be found and that a disciplinary matrix can enhance the dialogue about commonalities and differences within CMIS. Chapter 4 shows that Marx's works are important theoretical foundations for studying media, information and technology in contemporary society. A systematic discussion of the role of the media in Marx's works is elaborated. This discussion aims to show that other than assumed by many communication scholars, Marx provided foundations for the critical analysis of media, information and society that can be reactualized for analysing media and information in contemporary society. A model that allows showing the connection of the role of commodity and ideology aspects of media and information, media reception and alternative media in capitalist society is introduced. Part II (chapters 5-7) provides example case studies that show how CMIS operate as theoretically grounded empirical analyses. It is shown how methods such as statistical analysis and empirical ideology critique can be applied for studying the media in a critical way. In recent years, the notions of imperialism, global capitalism and capitalist empire have gained importance in critical globalization studies. Within the context of this discourse, chapter 5 deals with the question if the new imperialism can be characterized as informational/media imperialism. The problem of most approaches that speak of new imperialism, global capitalism or capitalist empire is that they do not have a theoretically grounded notion of imperialism. Therefore, the notion of imperialism is discussed and re-actualized. On the basis of this discussion, it is tested with macroeconomic statistical analysis of existing data if contemporary capitalism is a new form of imperialism and what role media and information play in this context. Chapter 6 analyses the role of the media and information industry in the new crisis of capitalism that was triggered by the collapse of the asset-based mortgage system and developed into a global economic crisis. Two broad groups of explanations for the new capitalist crisis are distinguished. For answering the question how the global information economy has been affected by the new economic crisis, economic data of 210 global information corporations for the fiscal years 2007 and 2008 are analysed. The empirical sample allows drawing conclusions for the effects of the economic crisis on large corporations in the information economy as a whole and for various sub-industries. The component industries of the information economy that are analysed in detail are the media content industry, the semiconductor industry, the software industry, the high-tech industry and telecommunications. The rise of web 2.0, 'social networking sites' and 'social software' has resulted in techno-optimistic claims that the Internet will bring about participatory democracy. Optimistic observers interpret the fact that consumers of information also become producers (= prosumers, produsers) as the rise of a participatory culture and participatory media system. Chapter 7 argues that such approaches have an unclear notion of participation and that participation should best be defined with the help

7

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Introduction

of participatory democracy theory (Carole Pateman, Crawford Brough Macpherson). On the basis of this theory, the claims of contemporary approaches that we now live in a participatory media age are tested by contrasting them with the empirical political-economic reality of the contemporary media landscape. It is, therefore, argued that it is an ideology to claim that we live in a participatory media age and that it is more feasible to assume that the media have participatory potentials that can only be realized based on fundamental societal changes. The corporate-dominated web 2.0 is conceived as a class-structured, exploitative space. The chapter gives an example of how to apply theoretically grounded empirical ideology critique to media studies. The media are not only structures of domination and fields for the exertion of domination but also potential tools that are used for struggling against domination and organizing and communicating protest. Part III (chapters 8 and 9) discusses potential alternative usages of the media. Chapter 8 discusses the notion of alternative media. It aims at developing a definition and to distinguish different dimensions of alternative media. The notion of alternative media as critical media is introduced. The characteristics of alternative media are explained based on critical theory. The category of critical media is connected to Oskar Negt's and Alexander Kluge's notion of the counter-public sphere. Critical media are seen as the communicative dimension of the counter-public sphere. Chapter 9 identifies guiding principles for CMIS. The dominative media structures that are characteristic for capitalist society are contrasted with the vision of commonsbased media in a commons-based society. This vision is explained by discussing how an alternative Internet could look like and how struggles for an alternative media landscape are connected to struggles for an alternative society.

Parti

Theory

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Critical theory today

The task of this chapter is to discuss foundations of critical theory. First, the notion of critical theory will be introduced (section 2.1). Then the problem of immanence and transcendence in critical theory will be analysed (section 2.2). The debate on redistribution and recognition in critical theory will be considered (section 2.3). The relation of dialectical philosophy and critical theory will be discussed (section 2.4). Finally, some conclusions will be drawn (section 2.5).

2.1 What is critical theory? Certainly, all scholars want to be and claim to be critical. It seems to me that critique is one of the most inflationary used terms in academia. This issue was already at the heart of the positivism debate in German sociology in 1961. Karl R. Popper (1962) argued that the method of the social sciences consists of gaining and differentiating knowledge by testing solutions to problems. Popper considered this method as critical, because scholars question the works of others to improve knowledge in trial and error processes. For Popper critique was an epistemological method that shows logical contradictions. Theodor W. Adorno (1962, 551) argued in contrast to Popper that contradictions are not only epistemological (in the relation of subject-object) but can be inherent in objects themselves, so that they cannot be resolved by acquiring new knowledge. Adorno (ibid., 560) stressed that Popper's ideal of value-free academia is shaped by the bourgeois concept of value as exchange value. He said that positivism is only oriented on appearance, whereas critical theory stresses the difference between essence and appearance (Adorno 1969, 291). He pointed out that Popper's notion of critique is subjective and cognitive (ibid., 304). There is a fundamental difference between epistemological critique (Popper) and the critique of society (Adorno). Paul F. Lazarsfeld (1941/2004, 169) argued that critical research in Horkheimer's sense seems to be distinguished from administrative research in two respects: it develops a theory of the prevailing social trends of our times, general trends which yet require consideration in any concrete research problem; and it seems to imply ideas of basic human values according to which all actual or desired effects should be appraised. Although Lazarsfeld (1941/2004, 169) sees that contemporary society is a 'period of increasing centralization of ownership' shaped by the 'technique of manipulating large

12 Theory masses of people (ibid., 169) and the development towards a 'promotional culture' (ibid., 171), it does not suffice to argue that critical communication research consists in the analysis of 'the general role of our media of communication in the present social system' (ibid., 169) and in taking a normative position, because this means that, for example, normative research that argues for the prohibition of trade unions or abortion or for the reintroduction of slavery must also be seen as critical. Critical theory, therefore, not simply discusses norms, but analyses how society is related to processes of oppression, exploitation and domination, which implies a normative judgement in solidarity with the dominated and for the abolishment of domination. Dallas Smythe and Tran van Dinh (1983, 117) are, therefore, right in arguing that in distinguishing administrative from critical research besides these two factors 'a third factor is also involved: the ideological orientation of the researcher'. 5

By 'administrative' researchable problems we mean how to make an organization's actions more efficient, e.g., how best to advertise a brand of toothpaste, how most profitably to innovate word processors and video display terminals within a corporation, etc. By 'critical' researchable problems we mean how to reshape or invent institutions to meet the collective needs of the relevant social community, through devices such as direct broadcast satellites, terrestrial broadcast stations and networks, and cable TV, or, at a 'micro' level, how to conduct psychotherapy and how to study rumors. By 'administrative' tools, we refer to applications of neopositivist, behavioral theory to the end of divining effects on individuals. By 'critical' tools, we refer to historical, materialist analysis of the contradictory process in the real world. By 'administrative' ideology, we mean the linking of administrative-type problems and tools, with interpretation of results that supports, or does not seriously disturb, the status quo. By 'critical' ideology, we refer to the linking of 'critical' researchable problems and critical tools with interpretations that involve radical changes in the established order. (Smythe and Dinh 1983, 118) The important stress here is that critical studies have the goal of 'radical changes in the established order'. Eileen Meehan (1999) termed administrative research 'celebratory research', arguing: If we begin with a shared valuation that 'although some problems may exist, capitalism is fundamentally good', our research thereby takes a celebratory stance toward media products, audiences, and institutions. If our shared valuation suggests that 'despite some progress, capitalism is fundamentally flawed', a critical stance is an integral part of our research. Attempts at dialogue across these mutually exclusive valuations seem bound to fail. (Meehan 1999, 150) This debate suggests that critical theory should be considered as having a normative dimension that aims at fostering research and theories that can help advance the public good. A recent debate in American sociology on critical and public science can, in my opinion, positively inform discussions about critical theory today. Michael Burawoy (2005a,

Critical theory today 13 2005b, 2007) argues that neo-liberalism has resulted in the privatization of eveiything. As a consequence, conducting public social science that tackles real-world problems would become ever more important as society would become more precarious and reactionary. In the 1970s, the social sciences would have lagged behind the radical character of social movements and, therefore, the task would have been to create a critical academic science. Today, society would be more reactionary, and society would lag behind academia. Therefore, the primary task for academia would be to transform society. In traditional public sciences, scholars would write in the opinion pages of national newspapers. In organic public sciences, scholars would work 'in close connection with a visible, thick, active, local, and often counterpublic' (Burawoy 2007, 28). Policy sociology is sociology in the service of a goal defined by a client. . . . Professional sociology . . . supplies true and tested methods, accumulated bodies of knowledge, orienting questions, and conceptual frameworks. . . . Professional sociology consists first and foremost of multiple intersecting research programs . . . Critical sociology attempts to make professional sociology aware of its biases and silences, promoting new research programs built on alternative foundations. Critical sociology is the conscience of professional sociology, just as public sociology is the conscience of policy sociology. . . . Public sociology brings sociology into a conversation with publics. (Burawoy 2007, 28, 31-33) 'Critical sociology is a normative dialogue, primarily among sociologists and conventionally directed to professional sociology, whereas public sociology is dialogue primarily between sociologists and publics about the normative foundations of society' (Burawoy 2005a, 380). This distinction is based on two questions: For what is research conducted (instrumental knowledge or reflexive knowledge)? For whom is research conducted (academic audience or extra-academic audience)? Burawoy (2007, 34) bases the first distinction on Horkheimer and Adorno. Instrumental knowledge would be oriented on means to reach ends, whereas reflexive knowledge would be concerned with the ends of society. This means that reflexive knowledge is inherently ethical, political and partisan (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Michael Burawoy's typology of social science approaches Instrumental knowledge

Reflexive knowledge

Academic audience

Extra-academic audience

Professional sociology: research conducted within research programmes that define assumptions, theories, concepts, questions and puzzles Critical sociology: critical debates of disciplines within and between research programmes

Policy sociology: public defence of research, human subjects, funding, congressional briefings Public sociology: concern for the public image of the sciences, presenting findings in an accessible manner, teaching basics of science and writing textbooks

14 Theory Burawoy (2007, 30) argues: 'Public sociology has no intrinsic normative valences, other than the commitment to dialogue around issues raised in and by sociology. It can as well support Christian fundamentalism as it can liberation sociology or communitarianism.' Max Horkheimer did not distinguish between instrumental and reflexive reason, but between instrumental and critical reason. He termed academic thinking that is based on the first traditional theory and academic thinking that is based on the latter critical theory (Horkheimer 1937/2002). He also made clear that the second type of reason is not just any type of normativity and partisanship but a specific kind of it. Instrumental reason means that human cognition is manipulated in such a way that humans tend to behave like an automatic machine. The human brain then reacts to certain stimuli in a predetermined manner and sees reality only from one perspective that neglects alternative qualities, possibilities and viewpoints. The more ideas have become automatic, instrumentalized, the less does anybody see in them thoughts with a meaning of their own. They are considered things, machines. Language has been reduced to just another tool in the gigantic apparatus of production in modern society. Every sentence that is not equivalent to an operation in that apparatus appears to the layman just as meaningless as it is held to be by contemporary semanticists who imply that the purely symbolic and operational, that is, the purely senseless sentence, makes sense. Meaning is supplanted by function or effect in the world of things and events. In so far as words are not used obviously to calculate technically relevant probabilities or for other practical purposes, among which even relaxation is included, they are in danger of being suspect as sales talk of some kind, for truth is no end in itself. (Horkheimer 1947/1974, 15) For Horkheimer, it does not suffice to ask questions or to address the public in academia. Instrumental reason would be oriented on utility, profitableness and productivity. Critical reason would be partisan and would operate with the Marxian categories of class, exploitation, surplus value, profit, misery and breakdown. These categories would constitute a whole that is not oriented on 'the preservation of contemporary society but . . . [on] its transformation into the right kind of society' (Horkheimer 1937/2002, 218). The goal of critical theory would be the transformation of society as a whole (ibid., 219), so that a 'society without injustice' (ibid., 221) emerges that is shaped by 'reasonableness, and striving for peace, freedom, and happiness' (ibid., 222), 'in which man's actions no longer flow from a mechanism but from his own decision' (ibid., 229), and that is 'a state of affairs in which there will be no exploitation or oppression' (ibid., 241). Horkheimer argued that critical theory wants to enhance the realization of all human potentialities (ibid., 248). It 'never simply aims at an increase of knowledge as such'. Its goal is man's 'emancipation from slavery' (ibid., 249) and 'the happiness of all individuals' (ibid., 248). These quotations show that Horkheimer's critical and public academic work is not just normative, partial and addressing the public, it is partial for the oppressed, demands their emancipation from oppression and opposes with intellectual means those classes that are responsible for this oppression. Critical theory is intellectual class struggle. It is

Critical theory today 15 anti-capitalist and opposed to domination. It struggles for a classless, non-dominative, co-operative, participatory democracy. Instrumental reason is for Horkheimer (1947/1974) the dominant type of rationality in which reason becomes an instrument for advancing external, dominative, alienating interests. In an instrumental society, human beings would not be themselves but serve alien interests. In critical rationality, humans would be self-determined and enabled to become themselves. Thought and academic knowledge that support Christian fundamentalism are for Horkheimer a false form of partisanship and a form of public knowledge that supports a dominative and instrumental society. They are based on instrumental reason and are, therefore, in the case of academia part of instrumental policy academia and not of reflexive public academia. What is needed is not just public academia but critical, Marxian-inspired, left-wing, progressive public academia in Horkheimer's sense. I, therefore, agree with Francis Fox Piven (2007), who argues for a 'dissident and critical public sociology'. Public academia should not only speak to the public but also to the public in, a specific way and in defence of certain interests against oppressive interests. I propose as a guideline that we strive to address the public and political problems of people of the lower end of hierarchies that define our society. . . . Their felt problems should become our sociological problems. If we do this, then public sociology becomes a dissident and critical sociology. (Fox Piven 2007, 163) On the basis of these assumptions, I want to further develop Burawoy's typology into a Horkheimerian direction. The notion of critique employed in this context is not just a critique of dominant academic traditions but rather a critique of dominative society and class structuration as such. The public sciences envisioned here constitute a strong form of Burawoy's public sociology - a strong objectivity that should best be termed public critical academic knowledge. Public critical academic knowledge is opposed to the now-dominant public uncritical academic knowledge. In the purely academic world, critical academic knowledge challenges dominant uncritical, positivistic professional instrumental academic knowledge. What Burawoy defines as academic socialism should be stressed more explicitly as the desirable form of public academic knowledge, whereas instrumental public sciences that advance dominative interests should be seen as undesirable. We might say that critical engagement with real Utopias is today an integral part of the project of sociological socialism. It is a vision of a socialism that places society, or social humanity, at its organizing center. . . . If public sociology is to have a progressive impact it will have to hold itself continuously accountable to some such vision of democratic socialism. (Burawoy 2005b, 325) Burawoy's distinction between traditional and organic public sociology does not account for Horkheimer's insight that the first type is based on instrumental reason and is undesirable (Table 2.2). If there is no counter-public because protest and activism are ideologically forestalled, then public academic knowledge as public criticism is still necessary. The

16 Theory Table 2.2 A typology of instrumental and critical academic knowledge Academic audience

Extra-academic audience

Instrumental knowledge Professional instrumental academic knowledge: research conducted within research programmes, represents dominative interests Critical knowledge

Public uncritical academic knowledge: academics speak with the public in the interest of dominative interests such as capital interests or conservative political interests Public critical academic Critical academic knowledge: analyses conducted in the interest knowledge: scholars that of the abolishment of domination address and speak with the public in the interest and the establishment of of the abolishment of participatory democracy domination and the establishment of participatory democracy

definition of critical knowledge does not and should not necessarily depend on the existence of a large number of activists and social movement groups — although this is desirable but not always possible - because this would silence critical academics once citizens are silenced. Academia certainly possesses resources that better equip scholars to act critically and that better protect them from being silenced than ordinary citizens. Therefore, this terrain should make use of its privileged position to struggle and try to create a critical public no matter how the general public looks like. It is possible for the consciousness of every social stratum today to be limited and corrupted by ideology, however much, for its circumstances, it may be bent on truth. For all its insight into the individual steps in social change and for all the agreement of its elements with the most advanced traditional theories, the critical theory has no specific influence on its side, except concern for the abolition of social injustice. (Horkheimer 1937/2002, 242) Burawoy argues that because of power constellations and powerful interests, instrumental sociology dominates over reflexive sociology. Academia would be a power field, but this power field should not be the ultimately accepted state of academia. One should struggle for the end of the division of labour, so that all academia become critical and, therefore, non-instrumental. The goal then is a unified critical academic system. Dialectical negation is not just the struggle for the acknowledgement of the other but also the struggle for negation of the negation and sublation, so that a new whole that is a differentiated unity of plurality can emerge. Burawoy (2007, 53) dismisses such arguments saying that the social sciences 'since their very definition . . . partake in both instrumental and reflexive knowledge'. Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) have pointed out that instrumental reason is characteristic for dominative, class societies because mechanisms for legitimizing and knowledge for enforcing alienation and exploitation are needed. If this is the case, then instrumental academic knowledge has a historical character and should come to an end once instrumental

Critical theory today 17 society comes to an end. Burawoy essentializes the division of labour of the contemporary academic landscape. Critical thinkers in many cases are discriminated by dominant institutions and, therefore, have to worry about attaining degrees, tenure, professorships, research funds and so on. Given the domination of instrumental reason in the academic system, it is not so easy to establish the structural foundations that enable engaging critically in the public. Therefore, the liberal democratic pluralism of the academic system that Burawoy envisions is worth struggling for in the first instance, but one should not only stop there but also struggle for the establishment of an academic system that is no longer instrumental at all. The struggle for a non-instrumental academic system is at the same time the struggle for a non-instrumental society and vice versa. Immanuel Wallerstein (2007) argues that all science has an intellectual, a moral and a political function and that all scholars are always doing all three functions. The ideology of instrumental positivistic sciences is that they deny the second and the third function, whereas critical sciences deconstruct this ideology, they are partisan in favour of the oppressed. Their partisanship is active. All three functions are always being done, whether actively or passively. And doing them actively has the benefit of honesty and permitting open debate about substantive rationality (ibid., 174). The ultimate goal should not be a division of academic labour with equal subfields based on liberal pluralism, but a unified field of critical academic and public knowledge and institutions. If reflexive or critical academic knowledge is just understood as a critique of dominant approaches that provides alternative outlooks, then this means that if progressive social sciences are dominant, one should support conservative and reactionary approaches for the sake of pluralism. My argument counter to that is that politically conservative approaches and instrumental academia should not be supported, but pushed back, and that the goal is not liberal pluralism but the overall critical character of academia - an academic system oriented on societal problems and the advancement of participatory democracy. The notion of critical theory has a general and a specific meaning (Macey 2001, 74f; Payne 1997, 118). Critical theory as a general term means theories that are critical of capitalism and domination. Critical theory as a more specific term means the work of the Frankfurt school, and particularly of Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Jürgen Habermas and Herbert Marcuse. Its starting point is the work of Karl Marx (Held 1980, 15; Macey 2001, 75; Payne 1997, 118; Rush 2004, 9; Wiggershaus 1995, 5). For Horkheimer and his colleagues, critical theory 'was a camouflage label for "Marxist theory (Wiggershaus 1995, 5) when they were in exile from the Nazis in the USA, where they were concerned about being exposed as communist thinkers and, therefore, took care in the categories they employed. First, there are definitions of critical theory that remain very vague and general. So, for example, David Macey provides a definition that is circular, which defines critical by being critical without giving a further specification what it means to be critical. By critical theory, Macey (2001, 74) means a whole range of theories which take a critical view of society and the human sciences or which seek to explain the emergence of their objects of knowledge . Unspecific definitions of critical theory include approaches that do not define a certain normative project but argue that critical theory is about political engagement or about showing the difference between potentiality and actuality. So, for example, Michael Payne sees political engagement as the central characteristic e

5

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18 Theory of critical theory. He defines the latter as 'research projects in the social sciences and/or humanities attempt to bring truth and political engagement into alignment' (Payne 1997, 118). Craig Calhoun conceptualizes critical theory as a project that shows the difference between potentiality and actuality and argues for potential futures. Critical social theory exists largely to facilitate a constructive engagement with the social world that starts from the presumption that existing arrangements - including currently affirmed identities and differences - do not exhaust the range of possibilities. It seeks to explore the ways in which our categories of thought reduce our freedom by occluding recognition of what could be. . . . It helps practical actors deal with social change by helping them see beyond the immediacy of what is at any particular moment to conceptualize something of what could be. . . . By taking seriously the question of what it would mean to transcend the current epoch, critical theory opens more space for considering the possibility that the world could be different than it is than does any simple affirmation of existing differences or claim that postmodernity is just a matter of perspective. (Calhoun 1995, xiv, 9, 290) It is certainly true that critical theory focuses on society, wants to foster political engagement and shows the difference between potentiality and actuality in society, but these specifications do not suffice for speaking of critical theory. Further characteristics need to be added to avoid, for example, that theories, which argue for right-wing extremist or nationalist goals and futures, can be considered as being critical. Second, there are definitions that are so specific that they only consider one approach or a few approaches as critical theories and exclude other important approaches. So, for example, Rainer Forst gives a definition of critical theory that is clearly focusing on a strictly Habermasian project. Critical theory would explain and question factors that constrain communication: As normative theory, Critical Theory thus argues for the integrity of a sphere of communicative, normative integration as well as for the realization of the possibility of social and political discourse; as social-scientific theory, it explains the factors and structures that impair the communicative social infrastructure and that hinder discourse (e.g., by the exclusion of actors from political argumentation and decision making); and as participant in social struggles, it argues for those norms and institutions that can be defended to all those who are 'subjects' of these norms and institutions. (Forst 1999, 143) Axel Honneth puts two concepts at the heart of critical theory: disrespect and malrecognition. He sees critical theory as an analysis of structures that cause disrespect and malrecognition: critical theory analyses 'social relations of communication . . . primarily in terms of the structural forms of disrespect they generate', it focuses on 'the damage and distortion of social relations of recognition' (Honneth 2007a, 72). Honneth (2004, 349) says that all critical theorists share the assumption that 'the process of social rationalization through the societal structure unique to capitalism has

Critical theory today 19 become interrupted or distorted in a way that makes pathologies that accompany the loss of a rational universal unavoidable'. So, on the one hand, if one defines critical theory in a very broad sense, the normative aspect of critical theory as critique of domination gets lost. On the other hand, if one defines critical theory in a very strict sense by focusing on specific theories, scholars or single concepts, then one risks advancing a narrow-minded definition that weakens the academic and political power of critical theory by isolating approaches. A third way of defining critical theory is to see it as analysis and questioning of domination, inequality, societal problems, exploitation in order to advance social struggles and the liberation from domination, so that a dominationless, co-operative, participatory society can emerge. Some examples of such definitions are given below. Fred Rush sees critical theory as the analysis of domination and inequality for fostering social change: It is an account of the social forces of domination that takes its theoretical activity to be practically connected to the object of its study. In other words, Critical Theory is not merely descriptive, it is a way to instigate social change by providing knowledge of the forces of social inequality that can, in turn, inform political action aimed at emancipation (or at least at diminishing domination and inequality). (Rush 2004, 9) David Held argues that the critical theorists Adorno, Habermas, Horkheimer and Marcuse have aimed at establishing a free society and at exposing the obstacles for this development: Following Marx, they were preoccupied, especially in their early work, with the forces which moved (and might be guided to move) society towards rational institutions - institutions which would ensure a true, free and just life. But they were aware of the many obstacles to radical change and sought to analyse and expose these. They were thus concerned both with interpretation and transformation. (Held 1980, 15) Douglas Kellner defines critical theory as a project that confronts societal problems and domination and seeks liberation from these conditions: Critical Theory is informed by multidisciplinary research, combined with the attempt to construct a systematic, comprehensive social theory that can confront the key social and political problems of the day. The work of the Critical Theorists provides criticisms and alternatives to traditional, or mainstream, social theory, philosophy and science, together with a critique of a full range of ideologies from mass culture to religion. At least some versions of Critical Theory are motivated by an interest in relating theory to politics and an interest in the emancipation of those who are oppressed and dominated. Critical Theory is thus informed by a critique of domination and a theory of liberation. (Kellner 1989, 1)

20 Theory Alvesson and Deetz define critical studies as the disruption of domination that provides impulses for liberation from it: Critical research generally aims to disrupt ongoing social reality for the sake of providing impulses to the liberation from or resistance to what dominates and leads to constraints in human decision making. . . . Critique here refers to the examination of social institutions, ideologies, discourses (ways of constructing and reasoning about the world through the use of a particular language) and forms of consciousness in terms of representation and domination. Critique explores if and how these constrain human imagination, autonomy, and decision making. Attention is paid to asymmetrical relations of power, taken for granted assumptions and beliefs. (Alvesson and Deetz 2000, 1, 8f.) For David Harvey (2010a, 46), critical theory is 'a mode of investigation and inquiry that can uncover the deep structure of capitalism and suggest alternative value systems based on radically different kinds of social and material relations . The notion of critique advanced by critical theory is a Marxian one in the sense laid out in the Introduction to the critique of HegeVs philosophy of right 5

Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. But, for man, the root is man himself. . . . The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest essence for man - hence, with the categoric imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, despicable essence, relations which cannot be better described than by the cry of a Frenchman when it was planned to introduce a tax on dogs: Poor dogs! They want to treat you as human beings! (MEW 1, 385) 1

Marx s understanding is that critical theory is radical, which means that it questions the root causes of domination, and that it is a critique of domination and, therefore, of dominative societies. If we understand Marxian critique as the critique of all forms of domination and all dominative relationships, then all critical studies are Marxianinspired. M y argument is that this heritage should not be denied, but taken serious and positively acknowledged. Based on Marx s writings, one can identify three central aspects of Marxian critique that are ordered according to three dimensions of academic knowledge. If we conceive ontology as the philosophical question about being (What exists?), epistemology as the philosophical question about the cognition of being (How do we conceive and perceive reality?) and axiology as the philosophical question about human praxis as the consequence of the cognition of being (What form of existence is desirable for humans and how can it be achieved?), then we can say that an academic field has three dimensions. Based on this insight and on Marx s notion of critique, we can identify three important elements of critical theory. 5

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Critical theory today 21

Epistemology - dialectical realism Realism assumes that a world exists that is larger than the human being and its imaginations. The material world is seen as primary and it is assumed that humans are able to grasp, describe, analyse and partly transform this world in academic work. Analyses are conducted that are looking for the essence of societal existence by identifying contradictions that lie at the heart of development. Critical theory analyses social phenomena not based on instrumental reason and one-dimensional logic; it operates: (1) with the assumption that phenomena do not have linear causes and effects, but are contradictory, open, dynamic, and carry certain development potentials in them and hence should be conceived in complex forms; (2) based on the insight that reality should be conceived by assuming that there are neither only opportunities nor only risks inherent in social phenomena, but contradictory tendencies that pose both positive and negative potentials at the same time that are realized or suppressed by human social practice. Dialectic analysis in this context means complex dynamic thinking, realism an analysis of real possibilities and a dialectic of negative and positive potentials of society. In a dialectical analysis, phenomena are analysed in terms of the dialectics of agency and structures, discontinuity and continuity, the one and the many, potentiality and actuality, global and local, virtual and real, optimism and pessimism, essence and existence, immanence and transcendence, and so on. Such an analysis assumes that the world is not as it is presented to us, but that there is a larger essence underlying existing phenomena.

Ontology — dynamic

materialism

Critical theory is materialistic in the sense that it addresses phenomena and problems not in terms of absolute ideas and predetermined societal development, but in terms of resource distribution and social struggles. Reality is seen in terms that address ownership, private property, resource distribution, social struggles, power, resource control, exploitation and domination. To make a materialistic analysis also means to conceive society as an interconnected whole (totality) and as negativity, to identify antagonisms means to take a look at contradictory tendencies that relate to one and the same phenomenon, create societal problems and require a fundamental systemic change in order to be dissolved. To analyse society as contradictory also means to consider it as dynamic system because contradictions cause development and movement of matter. In order to address the negativity of contemporary society and its potentials, research also needs to be oriented on the totality. That dialectics is a philosophy of totality in this context means that society is analysed on a macro-scale to grasp its problems and that reasons for the necessity of positive transformations are to be given.

Axiology - negating the negative All critical approaches in one or the other respect take the standpoint of oppressed or exploited classes and individuals, and make the judgement that structures of oppression

22 Theory and exploitation benefit certain classes at the expense of others and hence should be radically transformed by social struggles. This view constitutes a form of normativity. Critical theory does not accept existing social structures as they are, it is not purely focused on society as it is, but interested in what it could be and could become. It deconstructs ideologies that claim that something cannot be changed and shows potential counter-tendencies and alternative modes of development. That the negative antagonisms are sublated into positive results is not an automatism, but depends on the realization of practical forces of change that have a potential to rise from the inside of the systems in question to produce a transcendental outside that becomes a new whole. The axiological dimension of critique is an interface between theory and political praxis. It is based on the categoric judgement that a participatory, co-operative society is desirable. Critical theory 'opens more space for considering the possibility that the world could be different than it is (Calhoun 1995, 290). So, critical theory tries to uncover unrealized potentials of society. Hegel and Marx saw alienation theory as the analysis of the non-identity of essence and existence of society and the realization of society's essence as the goal of society. Therefore, Marx speaks of revolutionary transformation as 'reintegration or return of man to himself, the transcendence of human selfestrangement', and 'the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man'. A free society is 'therefore . . . the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being' (Marx 1844, 102). Given Calhoun's definition of critical theory, one must see all critical social theory as (at least) Marxian-inspired. 'Marx took much more seriously than most postmodernists what it would mean to transcend an epoch. We need to follow every specific of his theory to learn from him a similar seriousness' (Calhoun 1995, 289). Critical theory by 'taking serious the question of what it would mean to transcend the current epoch' opens 'more space for considering the possibility that the world could be different than it is' (ibid., 290). Alex Demirovic (2003b, 2007) sees interdisciplinarity, the historicity of theory and the unfolding of critique in the form of models as three characteristics of Frankfurt school critical theory. Critical theory would see concrete phenomena in the context of the critique of society as a whole and try to show how society as a whole shapes these phenomena and how and to which extent conditions for freedom, reason, pleasure, happiness and free time develop for all (Demirovic 2004b). Questions about who controls the means of production would have been very important for critical theory, but the means of production for critical theory would not determine aspects of society (Demirovic 2004a, 479). Marx would have seen capitalism as a whole that is constituted by autonomous parts (Demirovic 2004a, 480). I agree with Demirovic that the economy does not determine society, but to assume that society consists of autonomous parts means to argue for a plurality without unity. Counter to this view, I suggest to see the economy as a dominant system that is necessary for all other systems and unites the plurality that these systems give to society by giving them a unified logic (the one of accumulation in capitalist society) (Fuchs 2008). Wolfgang BonB (2003) sees empirical critique, immanent critique and normative critique (the critique that society could and should be other and better than it is) as three versions of critique. Newer forms of critique, such as the theories by Ulrich Beck and Scott Lash, would have dropped the normative element of critical theory, which would result in the renouncement of the idea of a critique of society. 5

Critical theory today 23 David Rasmussen (1999) argues that Marx had a deterministic, ideological philosophy of history. Horkheimer would have partly questioned this view in his essay Traditional and critical theory, but would have also held on to aspects of Marxism such as economic determinism, class analysis and the possibility of revolution. Horkheimer and Adorno would have completely broken with this Marxist eschatology in The dialectic of the enlightenment by arguing that rationality must result in a negative history of domination. Adorno would have later partly saved the notion of rationality by arguing for the possibility of an alternative form of rationality in art. But only Habermas would have succeeded in combining the critique of rationality with the early Horkheimerian demand for an emancipatory rationality by introducing his notion of communicative rationality. If the claims of critical theory can be rehabilitated on a transcendental level as the claims of a philosophy of language, then it would appear that philosophy as such can be defined vis-à-vis a theory of communicative action' (ibid., 36). Other scholars challenged the focus on critical theory understood as Habermasian discourse ethics, as presented by Rasmussen, as reformist. William Wilkerson and Jeffrey Paris (2001) in their edited collection New critical theory: Essays on liberation advocate a new critical theory. This account is contradictory. On the one hand, the author of the preface speaks in favour of a postmodern theory that focuses on the 'antiimperialist, receptive, open, and radically pluralized nature of refusals' (Matustik 2001, xi). This position is also confirmed by the two editors, who argue in their introduction that they accept 'the ideal of dynamic and highly mediated relations between partial and disunited attempts to think the whole' (Wilkerson and Paris 2001, 2), that no grand unified theory of all of society should be sought, that plural voices are important and that there is no necessary need to refer to Hegel, Marx and Weber. On the other hand, some contributions in the book, such as the ones by the two editors, contradict this position (Paris 2001; Wilkerson 2001). Jeffrey Paris (2001, 27), one of the two editors, argues that Habermasian critical theory and postmodernism have lost the 'oppositional spirit of critical theory' and engage in a 'tacit legitimation of the existing state of affairs'. It would be necessary for critical theory to pose radical alternatives and to 'enact the negation of current systems of exploitation and greed' (ibid., 31). William Wilkerson, the other editor, says that new critical theory 'seeks liberation from domination and alienation' (Wilkerson 2001, 70). James Marsh (2001, 50) argues that postmodernism and Habermasian theory are not 'truly radical, critical social theory', but 'a liberal tinkering with a New World Order'. New critical theory would have to point towards social transformation and democratic socialism. Marx would today be more relevant than ever. 'Habermasian critical theory, we could say, to a great extent is a critical theory without Marx and is thus a critical theory that is insufficiently critical' (ibid., 57). This tension between a modest, reformist, postmodern, pluralist position and a radical, revolutionary, Marxist position on how to define critical theory might be because of the fact that two different versions of critical theory have been included in the book, and that the least common denominator presented in the introduction has been the postmodern position. Paris, Wilkerson and Marsh in contrast argue for a radical, revolutionary, Marxist critical theory and use the term new critical theory for this endeavour. They stress the importance of Marx and Marcuse for achieving this goal. In my opinion, the term new critical theory is not wisely chosen, because novelty has become a postmodern ideology itself that tries c

24 Theory to present fundamental societal change and revolution as outdated and contemporary capitalist society as fundamentally novel. Therefore, I would rather speak of the need of a reconstruction of Marxian thinking and a return to the original definition of critical theory given by Marcuse (1937b) and Horkheimer (1937/2002). Why is Marx important for studying society today? Has the author of this book not learned from history? Is he too young to comprehend the historical errors of Marxism? Why should we return to Marx and rethink and reconsider Marxian categories? Is there anything left of Marxism after the fall of the Soviet Union? Has this fall not invalidated and falsified Marxian thinking? Has it not been shown by history that there are no alternatives to capitalism, that it simply is the more powerful system, that it is here to stay and that it poses an end of history? Has Marxian critique and class analysis not been invalidated by postmodern criticism? The interesting thing about Marx is that he keeps coming back at moments, at which people least expect it, in the form of various Marxisms that keep haunting capitalism like ghosts, as Jacques Derrida (1994) has stressed. It is paradoxical that almost 20 years after the end of the Soviet Union, capitalism seems to have falsified itself because its neo-liberal mode of development has intensified global problems, caused severe poverty and a rise of unequal income distribution, and as a result has brought a return of the economic in the form of a worldwide economic crisis and with it a reactualization of the Marxian critique of capitalism. Michael Burawoy and Erik Olin Wright (2002, 460) argue in this context that it is despite 'renewed attempts to bury Marxism important to 'build Marxism , which would involve seeing that 'class continues to be at the core of the dynamics and reproduction of capitalism . Although a persistent refrain is 'Marx is dead, long live capitalism , Marx is coming back again. 'At a time when a new world disorder is attempting to install its neo-capitalism and neo-liberalism, no disavowal has managed to rid itself of all of Marx s ghosts (Derrida 1994, 37). 'True ideas are eternal, they are indestructible, they always return every time they are proclaimed dead (Zizek 2008, 4). This return certainly needs to rid itself of its historical errors that should not be repeated. But these errors are not immanent in Marxian works (Fuchs 2008), rather only in specific interpretations of Marx. These circumstances enable us to rediscover Marx as theorist of radical egalitarianism and 'co-operative self-regulation (Burawoy 2000, 172). The relevance of Marx today can be observed and has already been reflected in a number of ways: 5

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The globalization of capitalism that is seen as an important characteristic of contemporary society by many social theorists is an important aspect in the works of Marx and Engels (Gallinicos 2003a). Connected to this topic is also the Marxian theme of international solidarity as form of resistance that seems to be practised today by the altermondialiste movement. The importance of technology, knowledge and the media in contemporary societywas anticipated by the Marxian focus on machinery, means of communication and the general intellect (Dyer-Witheford 1999; Fuchs 2008; Hardt and Negri 2005; McChesney 2007). . The immiserization caused by neo-liberal capitalism suggests a renewed interest in the Marxian category of class (Harvey 2005).

Critical theory today 25 •

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The global war against terror after 9/11 and its violent and repressive results like human casualties and intensified surveillance suggest a renewed interest in Marxian theories of imperialism (Hardt and Negri 2000; Harvey 2003; Wood 2003b). The ecological crisis reactualizes a theme that runs throughout Marxian works: that there is an antagonism between modern industrialism and nature that results in ecological destruction (Fuchs 2006; O'Connor 1998). The new global economic crisis that started in 2008 has shown that Marxist crisis theory is still important today. Capitalism seems to be inherentiy crisis-ridden.

Recent developments of society have resulted in a 'renaissance of Marxist political economy' (Callinicos 2007, 342). There is a respectable interest in Marxian or Marxian-inspired thinkers like Giovanni Arrighi, Jacques Bidet, Nick Dyer-Witheford, Michael Hardt, David Harvey, Robert McChesney, Antonio Negri or Slavoj Zizek. Zizek (2008, 428) has recently argued that the antagonisms of contemporary capitalism in the context of the ecological crisis, intellectual property, biogenetics, new forms of apartheid and slums show that we still need the Marxian notion of class and 'a proletarian position, the position of the "part of no-part'". This would be the only way for breaking the 'sound barrier' that presents global capitalism as fate without alternatives (ibid., 459). Zizek's (ibid., 6) suggestion is to renew Marxism and to defend its lost causes in order to 'render problematic the all-too-easy liberal-democratic alternative' that is posed by the new forms of a soft capitalism that promise and in their rhetoric make use of ideals like participation, self-organization and co-operation without realizing them. Goran Therborn (2008, 61) argues that the 'new constellations of power and new possibilities of resistance' in the twenty-first century require retaining the 'Marxian idea that human emancipation from exploitation, oppression, discrimination and the inevitable linkage between privilege and misery can come only from struggle by the exploited and disadvantaged themselves'. 'Since neither capitalism nor its polarizations of life courses appear very likely to disappear in the foreseeable future, there is a good chance that the spectre of Marx will continue to haunt social thought'(ibid., 110). The core of the relevance of Marx today is normative: the critique of capitalism and the envisioning of real alternatives. 'Building Marxism as an intellectual project... is deeply connected with the political project of challenging capitalism as a social order' (Burawoy and Wright 2002, 461). That there is a capitalist world economy out of control, in which many are worse off than before, suggests 'an opening for Marxism - a renewed critique of capitalism and its protective superstructures' (Burawoy 2000, 152). We can observe today 'stark injustice reflected in the horrifying inequalities in life-chances' (Callinicos 2006, 251). 'Doesn't this demand from us a certain kind of partiality? In this riven world, isn't the appropriate standpoint to take that of the victims of injustice, those excluded and denied access to the resources to which they are entitled?' (ibid., 251-252). 'There have rarely been times when the intellectual resources of critical social theory were more needed' (Callinicos 2007, 352). These are the reasons why Marxian theory and analyses are needed today. The discovery of Marxian theory can give the perspective of political relevance to the contemporary studies of phenomena like global communication, knowledge labour, media and globalization, media and social struggles, media capital accumulation,

26 Theory media monopolies and media capital concentration, information theory, information society studies, or media and war.

2.2 The problem of immanence and transcendence in critical theory Marcuse (1937b) explains that critical theory differs from traditional theory, because it is oriented on material changes of society that produce reason and happiness for all. Critical theory is concerned 'with human happiness, and the conviction that it can be attained only through a transformation of the material conditions of existence' (ibid., 135). Traditional philosophy would be idealistic and individualistic, because it would conceive freedom and reason as a state of mind, not as a material state of society. Based on its materialism, critical theory would be oriented on social struggles of subordinated groups. Marcuse sets out that critical theory is objective and normative in the sense that it opposes the subordination of humans under the economy (exploitation of labour) and demands a new, different totality. The common element of idealist philosophy and critical theory would be that they both negate capitalism, the first by the notion of the free thinking individual that is more than an economic subject, the second by the interpretation of freedom as a general state of society that humans have to struggle for. Horkheimer (1937/2002) argues that traditional thinking is oriented on instrumental reason. It would be an analysis of that which is positively given and would affirm domination through its ideal of ethical neutrality. Critical theory in contrast would reflect the difference between possibility and existence. Marxian critique from its beginning was a critique of religion and domination. Marx's critique of capitalism can be considered as an enhancement and concretization of the critique of religion and domination that shows the historical and ideological character of capitalism. As Marxian critique analyses the inherent contradictions of capitalism that produce crises, it shows that capitalism through the antagonism between productive forces and relationships of production contains and develops its own negativity. Such a method of critique is immanent critique: it starts from the conditions of capitalism without appealing to transhistorical values or religious sense. However, such an interpretation of Marxian critique as pure immanent critique has historically resulted in deterministic interpretations of history that have been historically falsified. Therefore, it has been stressed that Marxian critique also contains transcendental elements (Lukes 1985; Sayers 1997) - the vision of a co-operative society as the best form of human existence. Marxian critique is transcendental not in an idealistic or religious sense; the transcendence that it imagines is a not-yet existent society that is anticipated by the existence of the proletariat and that has its material preconditions in capitalism itself. It is an immanent transcendence coming from the inside of society. Marxian critique can in this sense be best interpreted as dialectic of immanence and transcendence. Since the late 1970s, Marxian critique and transcendentals in general have come under heavy attack by postmodern thought, which has argued that all notions of truth and essence are totalitarian. Marxian critique was increasingly superseded by strictly immanent critiques (Deleuze 2001; Foucault 1977; Lyotard 1979) oriented on identity politics and local reforms. Postmodernism has in recent years been challenged by various approaches that show a new focus on transcendental

Critical theory today 27 notions of Marxist critique: examples are the concepts of transfactuality by Roy Bhaskar (1993), transcritique by Kojin Karatani (2003), or the transempirical as totality of the world that is given reason for by dialectical philosophy in the works of Hans Heinz Holz (2005). Fotini Vaki (2005) has argued that transcendental elements in Marxist thinking, especially Habermas's notion of communicative rationality in dominationless discourse, are unhistorical, idealistic, fetishistic and based on the notion of an essential and pure identity. An alternative would be a complete immanent critical theory. He sees such an immanence realized in Adorno's work Negative dialectics, which focuses on internal contradictions and negations of capitalism and does not assume a transcendental outside. However, it can be argued that, in Adorno s theory, non-identity realized in the position of the critical theorist who maintains a position outside of instrumental reason and autonomous art in his Aesthetic theory constitute transcendentals, because they are considered as resisting moments that question the repressive totality. A l l Marxist thinking to a certain extent contains transcendental elements. Some observers have argued that Horkheimer's and Adorno's critical theory was an immanent critique (Calhoun 1995, 23; Honneth 2007b, 61, 64). But for both Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, transcendental elements of critical theory are important. So, for example, Horkheimer (1937/2002, 221, 241) speaks of the need for a society without injustice or conditions without exploitation and oppression. In the chapter on The concept of enlightenment in the Dialectic of enlightenment, Horkheimer argues that transcendentalism is important and is destroyed by positivist thinking that is based on pure immanence: 5

The pure immanence of positivism, its ultimate product, is nothing other than a form of universal taboo. Nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the 'outside' is the real source of fear. . . . Enlightened thinking has an answer for this, too: finally, the transcendental subject of knowledge, as the last reminder of subjectivity, is itself seemingly abolished and replaced by the operations of the automatic mechanisms of order, which therefore run all the more smoothly. (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/2002, 11, 23) These passages show that Horkheimer considered transcendentalism very important and as a form of non-identity that needs to be upheld against positivism. Immanence for Horkheimer and Adorno was not a positive feature of critical theory, but was seen as the feature in society that critical theory questions. Even those who argue that capitalism produces crises through its inner contradictions and thereby its own demise, which will result in communism, have the notion of a not-yet existing outside. The question is only to which degree this transcendentalism is stressed and how it is related to agency or potential agency. On this point, various traditions of Marxian thinking differ. Some are more action-theoretic, some more structuralistic, some rather dialectically balanced. All of them have in common that the transcendental elements are not posited outside of society, but are anchored in the inner contradictions of capitalism, such as the antagonism between the productive forces and the relation of production. Hence, Marxist transcendentalism is materialist

28 Theory and based on a societal immanence, it is an immanent transcendentalism or transcendental immanentism. Structural Marxists tend to argue that the future of society is mainly shaped by the internal contradictions of capitalism, which are seen as constituting a potential outside and/or a repressive ideological affirmation of the status quo. Humanist Marxists tend to argue that the potential outside is constituted mainly through class struggles. A third position tries to combine both structural and agencyoriented immanent transcendentalism. Next, I will try to show that the two main definitions of critique besides Marxist critique - positivistic critique and postmodern critique - are both based on immanence without transcendence.

2.2.1 The positivist notion of critique The difference between traditional theory and critical theory and between immanence and immanent transcendence were also the implicit categorical difference in the positivism debate in German sociology in 1961. Popper's (1962) understanding of critique is purely immanent in the sense that it focuses on epistemological and methodological procedures without taking into account how academia is shaped by worldviews, political goals and the world outside of academia. Popper can be considered as a representative of traditional theory, because he sees critique and truth as individual and subjective concepts. These are idealistic notions for him. Adorno's (1962, 1969) notions are materialistic, because he sees them as oriented on society as totality and its material conditions. There are standardized psychological tests, such as the California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory (CCTDI) or the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA), available that aim at measuring critical thinking. However, most of these tests are based on a purely positivistic notion of critique. Aspects of questioning domination, as typical for Marxian thinking, are missing. The authors of the C C T D I test define critical thinking based on the results of a Delphi project that was conducted by the American Philosophical Association in 1990. The C C T D I is made up of 75 six-point Likert scale items and seven scales (Facione et al 1995; Giancarlo and Facione 2001): 1. truthseeking (desire for best knowledge, inclination to ask challenging questions), 2. openmindedness (tolerance for new ideas and divergent views), 3. analyticity (anticipating difficulties, alertness for the need to intervene and solving problems), 4. systematicity (inclination to be organized), 5. critical thinking self-confidence (trust in one's own reasoning), 6. inquisitiveness (intellectual curiosity for learning new things) and 7. maturity of judgement (judiciousness in complex decision-making). Most of these seven scales can be mapped to three central elements of positivistic thinking: assessment and opinion formation (4, 5, 6), asking questions (1), constructive change (3, 7). The second scale reflects the postmodern quality of plurality. Elements of Marxian critique are missing. Another limit of this test is that it is purely quantitative and, therefore, cannot take into account qualitative arguments and opinions that can only be observed if respondents are asked to write answers to questions. There are also more qualitatively oriented tests of critical thinking such as the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test (Ennis and Weir 1985). The respondents are asked to read a letter to the editor of a newspaper and to write a response paragraph

Critical theory today 29 for each paragraph of the letter. The tested characteristics of critical thinking are again either positivistic (such as 'stating one's point', 'seeing the reasons and assumptions', 'getting the point', 'offering good reasons') or postmodern ('seeing other possibilities (including other possible explanations)') (ibid., 1). Burbules and Berk point out the difference between Critical Thinking approaches and Marxian-inspired Critical Pedagogy in education: The Critical Thinking tradition concerns itself primarily with criteria of epistemic adequacy. . . . The prime tools of Critical Thinking are the skills of formal and informal logic, conceptual analysis, and epistemology.... The primary preoccupation of Critical Pedagogy is with social injustice and how to transform inequitable, undemocratic or oppressive institutions and social relations. (Burbules and Berk 1999, 46f.) Henry Giroux has characterized the Critical Thinking approach as positivistic and ideological: The most powerful, yet limited, definition of critical thinking comes out of the positivist tradition in the applied sciences and suffers from what I call the Internal Consistency position. According to the adherents of the Internal Consistency position, critical thinking refers primarily to teaching students how to analyze and develop reading and writing assignments from the perspective of formal, logical patterns of consistency . . . While all of the learning skills are important, their limitations as a whole lie in what is excluded, and it is with respect to what is missing that the ideology of such an approach is revealed. (Giroux 1994, 200f.)

2.2.2 The postmodern notion of critique The main postmodern critique of notions such as essence, ground, foundation, truth, unity or universals is the argument that such categories can be used for legitimating grand narratives of domination. Especially, Soviet Marxism would have used such a strategy. Therefore, it would be better to assume that all social structures are pure social constructions, that history is fully relative and open to chance, and that there are no forms of unity and universal commonalities of humans or society. Judith Butler (1990, 19) in this context argues against dialectical thinking that dialectical causation introduces a primacy of certain categories that she sees as 'imperializing gesture of dialectical appropriation'. 'Dialectical appropriation and suppression of the Other is one tactic among many, deployed centrally but not exclusively in the service of expanding and rationalizing the masculinist domain' (ibid., 19). The poststructuralist critique of universal essence has most clearly been formulated by Foucault and goes back to his interpretation of Nietzsche. Rainer Winter (2007) argues that the validity of critical theory depends on its recipients and whether they are strengthened by it in their action capacities or not. Not only Habermas's theory but also Foucault's genealogy would be a continuation of critical theory. Foucault's

30 Theory focus on micro-practices and the micro-structures of power is for Rainer Winter a foundation for the claim that in a society where classical critical theory has lost its transcendental revolutionary subjects, 'cultural studies accept the inheritance of critical theory' (ibid., 32). For Foucault (1977, 142), the method of genealogy is opposed to the search for origins, things would 'have no essence or . . . their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms'. History would not have the inherent potential for freedom and reason: Humanity doesn't gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination. (Foucault 1977, 151) Genealogy 'refuses the certainty of absolutes' (ibid., 152), history is for Foucault negative, dominative, chance, conflict, lost and an error. Genealogy would be directed against the notion of history as: (1) reminiscence or recognition; (2) continuity or representative of a tradition; (3) truth and knowledge (ibid., 160). Things should for Foucault (2002, 53) be defined 'without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance'. Rorty (1998) formulated similar ideas. 'So we have come to distrust the people who tell us that "you cannot change human nature" - a slogan that was employed against the education of women, interracial marriage, and gay liberation.' It is certainly important and true that the notion of essence has been used as an ideology that legitimates oppression. So, for example, Hitler argued that the inner essence of Jews is parasitism. He wrote in Mein Kampf that the Jew in 'order to carry on his existence as a parasite on other peoples, . . . is forced to deny his inner nature' (Hitler 1925, 335). Herbert Marcuse (1941) has argued that the Nazi notion of essence is based on particularism and is opposed to the Hegelian and Marxian notion of essence that assumes the existence of universal qualities of humans and society. For Hegel, essence is not a particularistic but a universalistic concept. He argues 'The Absolute is the Essence' (Hegel 1830, §112). 'Essence is the ground of existence. The ground is the unity of identity and difference . . . It is essence put explicitly as a totality' (ibid., §121). In Marx's philosophical writings, Hegelian essence is interpreted as sociality and cooperation. 'The individual is the social being' (Marx 1844, 105). 'By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals' (Marx and Engels 1846/1970, 50). The implication of this assumption is that co-operation is something that all humans share, that capitalism alienates co-operative potentials, and that societal conditions should be created that allow all humans to participate and to have equally realized rights and to live in equity. It is this stress on universal equity that led to the Nazis' hostility towards Hegel and Marx. So, for example, in the main work by Alfred Rosenberg (1930), the Nazis' primary ideologist, Hegel was opposed because for him the state was a universal concept. Rosenberg (1930, 525) argued that Hegel's and Marx's writings were foreign to the notion of blood ('blutfremd'), whereas he celebrated Nietzsche as someone who destroyed all values and stood for the breeding of a higher race 2

Critical theory today 31 ( rassische Hochzucht'). Herbert Marcuse summarized the Nazis' opposition towards Hegel's universalism: c

The state as reason - that is, as a rational whole, governed by universally valid laws, calculable and lucid in its operation, professing to protect the essential interest of every individual without discrimination - this form of state is precisely what National Socialism cannot tolerate. (Marcuse 1941, 413) The postmodernist enmity towards universalism and essence makes it impossible to envision a state of society, in which there is universal wealth and well-being for all, and impossible to assess such conditions as normatively desirable. Postmodernism does not have a political vision. Butler (1990) and Rorty (1998) argue that an emerging unity is acceptable if it is not a priori envisioned, but emerges spontaneously. Foucault (1977) argues that human history is a sequence of domination, he sees no possibility for the realization of universal reason and happiness. That something emerges spontaneously from below does not guarantee that it benefits all. Butier's and Rorty's postmodern anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism are relativistic; their position equalizes all societal conditions, for example, fascism and participatory democracy. In my opinion, it, therefore, trivializes the bestiality of fascism, because it does not provide categories that allow normative judgements about such conditions. Foucault's anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism result in a negative concept of history. Although he opposes universalism and essentialism, he essentializes human history as necessary dominative. Foucault's method of genealogy does not know the possibility of human and societal betterment, wealth and equity for all. For postmodernists, there is also no essence of struggles. They, therefore, tend to postulate a plurality without unity of struggles that results in local reforms and identity politics as political strategies. Slavoj Zizek has in this context in my opinion correctly said that postmodernism and post-Marxism have by assuming an 'irreducible plurality of struggles' accepted 'capitalism as "the only game in town'" and have renounced 'any real attempt to overcome the existing capitalist liberal regime' (Butler et al 2000, 95). An alternative to postmodern relativism is to assume, as Herbert Marcuse did, that there are universal human characteristics such as sociality, co-operation, or the desire for wealth, happiness, freedom, reason and that conditions should be created that allow the universal realization of these qualities, that societies that do not guarantee the realization of these human potentials are false societies and that consciousness that wants to perpetuate such false societal conditions is false consciousness. Such a form of universalism is not totalitarian, but should be read as a form of humanism that struggles for universal equity. Only the assumption that there is something positive that all humans have in common allows the envisioning of a state where all humans are guaranteed equal fundamental rights. Such essential conditions are not given and envisioned automatically, they have historical character and under given economic, political, cultural and technological conditions they can be reached to a certain degree. Humans have the ability to struggle and to act consciously in transformative ways. Therefore, each societal epoch is shaped by the question if humans will or will

32 Theory not act to create and realize the epoch's inherent and dynamically developing potentials or not. They shape and potentially enhance the space of possibilities and at the same time act or do not act to realize these created possibilities. Human essentials are substantial, if they are achieved or not, and to which extent they can be realized and how they develop is completely historical, which means that it is based on human agency. In Marx's works the negativity of reality becomes a historical condition which cannot be hypostatized as a metaphysical state of affairs. . . . The given state of affairs is negative and can be rendered positive only by liberating the possibilities immanent in it. . . . Truth, in short, is not a realm apart from historical reality, nor a region of eternally valid ideas. . . . Not the slightest natural necessity or automatic inevitability guarantees the transition from capitalism to socialism. . . . The revolution requires the maturity of many forces, but the greatest among them is the subjective force, namely, the revolutionary class itself. The realization of freedom and reason requires the free rationality of those who achieve it. Marxian theory is, then, incompatible with fatalistic determinism. (Marcuse 1941, 314f., 318f.) Marcuse (1937a, 45) anticipated the critique of postmodern relativism when he argued in 1936 for a Marxist notion of essence: A theory that wants to eradicate from science the concept of essence succumbs to helpless relativism, thus promoting the very powers whose reactionary thought it wants to combat.' It makes practical political sense to argue that there is a truth immanent in society that is not automatically realized and that this truth is given in the need and possibility for a good life for all. What one can take as an important insight from postmodern theory is that oppression takes on different forms and contexts and that oppressed individuals and groups frequently stand in contradictory relationships to each other. Bringing both arguments together allows assuming that truth is subdivided into partial truths that are interconnected. Oppressed groups and individuals share common interests because they are all confronted by the same global system of oppression, at the same time they also have differing sub-interests, because oppression is contextualized in many forms. What is needed is a differentiated unity, a form of politics that is based on unity in diversity. There are a number of typologies of critical theories that consider postmodernism as always critical and Marxian theory only as one among several types of critical theories. Lois Tyson (2006, 6) conceives critical theory as a method of analysing texts: when we interpret a literary text, we are doing literary criticism; when we examine the criteria upon our interpretation rests, we are doing critical theory'. She distinguishes between 11 types of critical theory that can be applied to the deconstruction of texts: psychoanalytic criticism; Marxist criticism; feminist criticism; new criticism; reader-response criticism; structuralist criticism; deconstructive criticism; new historical and cultural criticism; lesbian, gay and queer criticism; African-American criticism; and postcolonial criticism (ibid.). Douglas Tallack has established a similar typology of different forms of critical theory. For him critical theory is characterized by deconstructive self-reflexivity, immanent critique and the examination of truth as the primary focus for analysis (Tallack 1995, 3). Tallack differentiates between five c

Critical theory today 33 forms of critical theory: Marxism, structuralism and post-structuralism, psychoanalytic theory, feminism, post-foundational ethics and politics. David Hoy (2004) criticizes Frankfurt school critical theory as a totalizing meta-narrative and suggests that postmodernism should be considered as a new form of critical theory. He speaks in this context of critical pluralism (Hoy and McCarthy 1994, 200) and of post-critique (Hoy 2004). Post-critique would be characterized by permanent self-critique, the questioning of its own foundations. Hoy (2004) discusses Nietzsche, Deleuze, Foucault, Bourdieu, Levinas, Derrida, Laclau, Mouffe, Zizek. Post-critique is a synthesis of Derrida's ethics and Foucault's politics that Hoy also terms 'deconstructive genealogy'. Tyson's and Tallack's typologies are informed by postmodern thinking. They both argue for a plurality of different notions of critique. The main focus lies on the examination and deconstruction of truth. According to this point of view, texts, and the truths that they embody, can be analysed from different perspectives like feminism, structuralism, queer criticism, postcolonial criticism, and so on. This shift from power and domination to truth as the central category of critique means a major change in the form of critical analysis. Steven Best and Douglas Kellner (1991, 356) have argued in this context that such endeavours have led to relativistic approaches: 'Postmodern theories can be used to attack or defend modernity, to reconstruct radical politics or to declare their impossibility, to enhance Marxian theory or to denounce it, to bolster feminist critiques or to undermine them.' Best and Kellner (1991, 289) point out that postmodern theories limit themselves to the observation of different forms of oppression without placing them into a societal context: 'Postmodern theory splits capitalist society into separate and unmediated realms, analyzing culture in isolation from the economy, or politics apart from the conjuncture of business and government.' As we live in a capitalist society, considering the societal context always means also looking at the economic dimension of societal problems. This does not mean a reduction to the economic realm, but the awareness that different forms of oppression, besides of having distinctive features, cannot be considered as unmediated and are linked by the societal context in which they take place. Thus postmodern approaches that do not take into consideration the societal context, and therefore the economic dimension of certain societal problems, should not be understood as critical theories. This means that I only consider postmodern approaches as critical if they connect their analyses to aspects of class and economic exploitation. Not all postmodern approaches are critical in this sense of the term, only some or even few of them. Especially those that give a specific attention to class and Marxian theory should be considered as critical. For example, Michael Hames-Garcia (2001, 218) argues in this context that most of contemporary queer theory is uncritical because it has 'consistency resisted the consequences of a truly substantive, thorough and ongoing engagement with theories that are more centrally concentrated with race and class'. I therefore suggest that another task for a critical queer theory should be a reintroduction of materialist questions of class and capitalism. . . . The goal of a critical theory of gay and lesbian identity . . . should be to elucidate those connections that exist between capitalism and the regulation of sexuality. (Hames-Garcia 2001, 216)

34 Theory Positivism and postmodernism are both based on the figure of immanence without transcendentals. There is also the figure of transcendentals without immanences, as, for example, in all religious and esoteric knowledge that claims certain existences that are not grounded in the immanence of matter or in political Utopias. Such thinking promises types of society that are not materially feasible given certain states of society and certain states of development of the productive forces, the political

system and the cultural system. Examples are the Utopian socialists that Marx and Engels criticized in the Communist Manifesto (MEW 4, 482-493). A viable alternative to immanence without transcendence and transcendence without immanence is a critical theory that is based on the dialectic of immanence and transcendence, immanent transcendence.

2.2.3 Critical theory as immanent transcendence I favour a normative Marxian definition of critique, decline the positivistic definition of critique as ideological, and see postmodern thought only as critical if it acknowledges the central importance of class analysis. It should have become clear that there are three competing major understandings and definitions of critique at work today: 1

2

Representatives of a positivistic notion of critique argue that it is important that each individual engages in discourse, assesses arguments, forms his/her own opinion and articulates her/his views. It would be wrong and even dangerous for democracy if individuals passively accept opinions. This position is strictly individualistic, as can be seen in formulations like: 'Critique means to engage in a debate, to assess the arguments, and to form one's own opinion.' Postmodern critique is always oriented on challenging hierarchies, it does not accept the notions of truth and objectivity, and argues for liberal pluralism. It, for example, typically argues: There is no ultimate standard of judging what is true because such standards are themselves socially constructed and shaped by power relations. Therefore, there is no objective standard in society, only a plurality of different meanings and identities. It is, therefore, important to deconstruct truth claims, to accept other opinions as possible and legitimate ones and formulate one's own as equally reasonable.

3

Marxist critique is a specific form of objective knowledge that is achieved by being partial and not denying, but engaging in and showing the interconnection of academia and politics. It takes the standpoints of the oppressed. It is characterized by normative, objective and political standpoints of the speakers, it speaks for whole groups, not just for individuals. It argues not just that one should form certain opinions, but that there are true and false opinions corresponding to true and false states of society. Typically, terms like domination, exploitation, class, power or capitalism are used as negative terms. An ideal type of such a position is the following one: 'Critique means to see all forms of domination and exploitation as repressive and to struggle against these conditions. It points towards a state of non-domination, a classless society'

Critical theory today 35 Table 2.3 A typology of qualities of three notions of critique Individual opinions Positivism

Assessment and opinion formation Postmodernism Acceptance of a plurality of views and knowledge as legitimate Marxism Partisanship for the oppressed, dominated and exploited

Interaction

Transformative action

Asking questions

Constructive change Questioning dominant Local reforms and views identity politics Anti-capitalist praxis Revolution

Individual opinions (cognition), interaction (communication) and transformative action (co-operation) can be considered as three informational levels of defining critique (Table 2.3). This understanding is based on the notion of information as threefold nested process of cognition, communication and co-operation (Fuchs 2008; Hofkirchner 2002). The three aspects of information form a triad: first, there is an individual aspect describing which opinions are formed by a person; then there is an interaction, the actor communicates with others concerning a specific question; third, there is action that aims at transforming social reality. Such transformations are again the foundation of the formation and reproduction of opinions, so that a dynamic process of cognition, communication and co-operation emerges. This relationship can be interpreted as a dialectical Hegelian triad of identity (being-in-itself), beingfor-another (negation) and being-in-and-for-itself (negation of the negation). In respect to the three notions of critique, each of the three dimensions (individual, interaction, transformation) can be read as a dialectical triad, in which the Marxist position sublates the positivistic and the postmodern standpoints. Positivism is very general. It argues that any sort of opinion, questioning and change is desirable. Postmodernism is more specific, it argues for a plurality of opinions and identities. Marxism sublates this contradiction between the general and the specific by arguing for a concrete unity (specific) that is considered as a universal norm (general). It not just engages in assessing and forming opinions, asking questions, and constructive change, and in establishing plurality, but rather it argues for a unity in plurality of all oppressed groups and individuals that is partisan, anti-capitalist, non-dominative and revolutionary. Marxist critique is also seen as an integrative form of critique by Wolfgang BonB (2003), who considers it as the unity of empirical (positivistic), immanent and normative critique, and by Axel Honneth (2007b), who sees it as the unity of normative (constructive), immanent (reconstructive) and genealogical critique (deconstruction of truths). The typology of the three understandings of critique can be employed for empirically measuring the critical awareness of students (for an empirical example measurement, see Fuchs and Sandoval 2008). The following categories are employed in the typology (see also Table 2.3): •

Positivistic individual opinion: This aspect is applicable if an actor describes critique as the individual evaluation of other statements to form a personal view and position himself/herself.

36 • •

•

•

•

•

•

•

Theory Positivistic interaction: This dimension is given if critique is described as asking questions to others to clarify the consistency of statements. Positivistic transformative action: This quality is positively given if it is suggested in a unit of analysis that critique must always be positive, that it must make suggestions how to improve a situation immanently. There is an orientation on dialogue, improvements and finding better solutions. Postmodern individual opinion: Plurality of knowledge and opinions form one central aspect of postmodernist thought. This attitude is held if it is stressed that it is important that different opinions can be voiced and should be recognized as legitimate. Postmodern interaction: This notion is applicable if critique is described as challenging authorities, absolute knowledge, universalism, the notion of truth, or dominant opinions. Postmodern transformative action: Desirable change in postmodernist thought is conceived as the acknowledgement or struggle for acknowledgement of the identity of certain groups or as local reform politics. It is a politics of difference and plurality. Marxist individual opinion: This quality can be found if a normative notion of critique that stresses partisanship for oppressed, discriminated, exploited, or dominated groups or individuals is present. Marxist interaction: This form of interaction is present if questioning and practical negation in terms of class interests, injustice and exploitation is present in an analysed unit of analysis. Marxist transformative action: Marxist views hold that the totality of contemporary society needs to be fundamentally transformed (sublated) in class struggles to overcome societal problems and establish a just, fair, co-operative, participatory society.

In their debate on Redistribution or recognition? (Fraser and Honneth 2003), critical theorists Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth both argue for the philosophical position of immanent transcendence. Fraser characterizes this position as seeking for a foothold in the social world that simultaneously points beyond it (ibid., 202). Honneth speaks of the dialectic of immanence and transcendence (ibid., 238). Honneth (2007b, 57-69) distinguishes between a constructive, transcendental critique, a reconstructive, immanent critique and a Foucauldian genealogical critique. Critical theory would combine all three forms. In the debate with Fraser, he characterizes this combination as immanent transcendence. Transcendence c

5

must be attached to a form of practice or experience which is on the one hand indispensable for social reproduction, and on the other hand - owing to its normative surplus - points beyond all given form of social organization. . . . 'transcendence should be a property of 'immanence itself, so that the facticity of social relations always contains a dimension of transcending claims. (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 244) 5

5

The difference is that Fraser sees the immanent element of contemporary society that can transcend it in social movements that engage in political struggles (ibid., 205),

Critical theory today 37 whereas Honneth is very critical of new social movements (ibid., 114—125), considers them as rather affirmative, and sees immanent transcendence in an objective morality that should be legally implemented in the form of laws. For Fraser, the orientation towards social movements is a central aspect of critical theory: A critical social theory frames its research program and its conceptual framework with an eye to the aims and activities of those oppositional social movements with which it has a partisan though not uncritical identification. The questions it asks and the models it designs are informed by that identification and interest. Thus, for example, if struggles contesting the subordination of women figured among the most significant of a given age, then a critical social theory for that time would aim, among other things, to shed light on the character and bases of such subordination. It would employ categories and explanatory models which revealed rather than occluded relations of male dominance and female subordination. And it would demystify as ideological rival approaches which obfuscated or rationalized those relations. (Fraser 1985, 97) But what if the most significant and only social movement of a time is fascism and all anti-fascist movements and forces are contained or all of its members have been killed? Should critical theory then be aligned with fascism just because it is a political movement? Certainly not. The example shows that critical theory needs to be able to make political judgements, even if there are at certain moments no movements that it can align itself with. For Fraser, specifically the feminist movement is of importance for critical theory. Therefore, she has criticized Habermas and has argued that his theory of communicative action is gender-blind. 'The struggles and wishes of contemporary women are not adequately clarified by a theory which draws the basic battle line between system and lifeworld institutions' (ibid., 130). Honneth argues that Fraser's strong focus on gender and sexuality as examples creates the image that 'capitalist societies are marked primarily by social conflicts driven by demands for cultural recognition' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 120). The problem for Fraser is that there can be situations in society, where political protest is forestalled, but where nonetheless essential criteria forjudging what is politically right and wrong are needed. Fraser's approach is non-foundational and deontological. Her neglect of assuming a stable ethical reference point poses the danger of relativism, especially in situations where political opposition is forestalled. Her reference point is purely dynamic and historical. The problem for Honneth is his pure reliance on law, which will fail in situations where laws are highly unjust (as in fascism), which requires social movements to protest and overthrow institutionalized injustice. The resolution of this dilemma is to argue for essential norms of judgement that can guide thinking and action under all societal circumstances and to see it as a further task of critical social theory to try to find ways to politically realize these norms by creating a theory/praxis connection that involves a combined effort of civil society and political parties. That morals are part of all institutions is not enough for an argument saying that they are primary in society For Honneth, consciousness determines being. Alex Demirovic

38 Theory (2003a, 13) criticizes that with Habermas, who is Honneth's most important influence, critical theory has strongly turned from a critique of societal totality into a moral critique. Before one can experience malrecognition subjectively, conditions that have caused the situation of malrecognition must exist and must have been created. Fraser argues that 'recognition monism' is blind for phenomena that 'cannot be reduced to cultural schemas of evaluation', such as supply and demand of labour, power relationships between labour and capital, the outsourcing of labour, and so on (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 215). Therefore, there would be struggles over distribution, which are not struggles over recognition. Fraser characterizes Honneth's approach as 'truncated culturalism' (ibid., 216). For Fraser, immanent transcendence is pure struggle, purely political, historical and relative, for Honneth it is cultural and psychological. He builds on Habermas's shift from the focus on labour to the focus on interaction in such a way that immanent transcendence becomes moralistic, cultural and symbolic. An alternative strategy is not to assume a political or a psychological reference point for immanent transcendence, but a societal one so that society is considered as providing its own moral values and essence and can, based on historical circumstances, more or less approximate or diverge from the realization of this essence. Such an approach is crucial for the writings of Marcuse and young-Marx. It is both static and dynamic, foundational and historic. Marx and Engels considered morals as ideologies that try to legitimate religious, economic and political domination and oppression and serve class interests by postulating the authority of an absolute subject. Marx considered religion and morals as opium of the people and right (the defence of morals in the form of laws by the state) as a mechanism for protecting private property. Marxists like Antonio Gramsci, Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Louis Althusser have further elaborated this aspect of Marxism as ideology critique. Marx and Engels argued that morals are an expression of coercive societies and that morality will vanish with the disappearance of class antagonisms, because there will be no fundamental conflicts of interests that have to be legitimated ideologically. Moral theories would be a consequence of the economic conditions of society and morality would be class morality. They argued that their approach is not a moralistic but a scientific one, because they identified tendencies of the development of the productive forces that produce the potential for communism as a higher form of existence. The alternative to preaching morality here seems to be the identification of deterministic laws of history. Steven Lukes (1985) has pointed out that the writings of Marx and Engels on moral questions are paradox, because besides the stress on historical laws instead of morals one can find a lot of moral expressions that condemn capitalism as oppressive, exploitative, alienating, estranging, heteronomous and present the vision of a better world ('the realm of freedom') that is characterized by well-rounded individuality, pluralistic activities, abundance, the abolition of hard work and wage labour because of technological productivity, the disappearance of the performance principle and exchange, the free production and distribution of goods ('. . . from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs . . .') and free time for idle and higher activity. The concept of freedom that Marx and Engels put forward questions freedom as the freedom of private property ownership in means of production and understands it instead as freedomfromscarcity and domination and as a community of

Critical theory today 39 associated individuals that provides wealth, self-ownership, self-realization of human faculties and self-determination for all. They considered the bourgeois concept of freedom as narrow and as reducing freedom to free trade, free market, free buying and free wage labour - to the sphere of money that radically constrains the practical alternatives of action. Bourgeois freedom would make the producers free from their product and would hence, in fact, be a form of unfreedom. In this context, the notion of alienation arises and signifies compulsory wage labour, dispossession and the crippling of human faculties. Especially Stalin took up Marx and Engels's concept of morality as class morality and of social development as lawful, predetermined process. Determinist readings of Marx argue that a better society does not come about because it is ethically justified, but because it is causally produced. Paradoxically, this ended up in a new morality that became an ideology that legitimated an oppressive regime (Fuchs 2005a, 140-150; Marcuse 1958). Stalinism recoded bourgeois values such as family, performance and hard work to arrive at a morality that argued that under a socialist rule old values serve higher principles. The result was a moral that resembled the protestant ethics of capitalism but was characterized as socialist ethics. The results of such thinking were monstrous worldviews and policies, as, for example, formulated in the 1936 Soviet Constitution by Stalin: 'In the U.S.S.R. work is a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat". The principle applied in the U.S.S.R. is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work"' (ibid., §12). The humanism of Marxian thinking got completely lost here. The original Marxian formulation said, 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.' Soviet ethics were based on the idea that privations and dictatorship were needed for estabHshing a free society and for developing the productive forces. . The idea of communism became an ideology and a transcendental absolute idea that legitimated a coercive system that was not all too different from capitalist principles of domination. The idea that history is a lawful process and that hence socialism follows capitalism became an ideology that allowed Stalin to persecute all critics by arguing that the Soviet system in any form is a socialist society, because it is a social formation following capitalism and that any criticism of the system is counter-revolutionary and means critique of socialism and to suggest a return to capitalism. The alternative to a determinist interpretation of Marx and Engels is to acknowledge a certain importance of morality in Marxism, expressed by the Marxian categoric imperative, and to understand it as a philosophy of praxis that aims at the sublation of domination and exploitation by the practice of human emancipation and self-organization. For Hegel, the essence of things means that they have fundamental characteristics and qualities as such that frequently are different from their appearance. For Hegel, truth is the direct correspondence of essence and existence, only true existence is real and reasonable. In Marxism, especially Herbert Marcuse has taken up Hegel's notion of essence and has stressed that essence is connected to possibilities and that a true society is one that realizes the possibilities that are enabled by structural aspects such as technological forces, economic productivity, political power relationships, worldviews and so on (Fuchs 2005a, 20-37; Marcuse 1937a, 1964a). Essence in society is connected with what humans could be (Marcuse 1937a). Ernst

40 Theory Bloch (1959) utilizes in this context the ontological category of 'not yet to signify concrete potentials that can be realized but have not yet been realized. Marcuse has characterized the essence of man and society: 5

Measured against their real potentialities, the facts reveal themselves to be the 'bad manifestations of a content which must be realized by doing away with these manifestations in opposition to the interests and powers connected with them. Thus, even in the first form in which we encounter it, the dialectical concept of essence is distinguishable from phenomenology s conception of neutral essences as well as from positivism s neutral leveling of essence. In place of a static epistemological relationship of essence to fact emerges a critical and dynamic relationship of essence to appearance as parts of a historical process. Connecting at its roots the problem of essence to social practice restructures the concept of essence in its relation to all other concepts by orienting it toward the essence of man. (Marcuse 1937a, 71) 5

5

5

What humans can be in a given situation can be described when taking the following factors into account: the measure of control of natural and social productive forces, the level of the organization of labor, the development of needs with respect to possibilities for their fulfilment (especially the relation of what is necessary for the reproduction of life to the 'free needs for gratification and happiness, for the 'good and the beautiful ), the availability, as material to be appropriated, of a wealth of cultural values in all areas of life. (Marcuse 1937a, 72) 5

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For Marcuse (1964a, 106), ethics is connected with questions of what can and should be, because society can reduce pain, misery and injustice, and use existing resources and capacities in ways that satisfy human needs in the best possible way and minimize hárd labour (ibid., 112). A false condition of society or of a social system would mean that its actuality and its potentiality differ. Marcuse stresses that, in capitalism, oppressed humans are alienated because they do not possess the means of production and the fruits thereby produced. He says that alienation means that humans and society are alienated from their essence. The sublation of the alienation of labour and man by establishing a realm of freedom means the realization of the human and social essence. One can read the works of Marx as a deconstruction of ideology, the identification of potentials that strengthen the realization of human freedom and the suggestion that humans should act in ways that realize potentials that increase the co-operative character of society. Here, both chance and necessity are important: existing structures, social relationships and forces of production in economy, polity and culture determine certain potentials of societal development (necessity). The human being in its social practices realizes potentials by creating actuality (chance). Freedom here is freedom to create novelty that is conditioned (enabled and constrained) by societal reality. Marx s works can be interpreted as ethics of liberation and 5

Critical theory today 41 co-operation in so far as they suggest that humans should act in ways that bring society closer to the latter's co-operative essence. Marx's stress on socialization (Vergesellschaftung) shows that he saw co-operation as an essential societal phenomenon and considered the realm of freedom as the realization of the co-operative essence of society. This is what Marx (1844, 103) means when he, for example, speaks of 'the return of man from religion, family, state, etc., to his human, i.e., social, mode of existence', the 'complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being' (ibid., 102), 'the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man'. For Marx, co-operation is an objective principle that results in a categorical imperative that in contrast to Kant stresses the need for an integrative democracy: Marx argues that critique ends with the insight that 'man is the highest essence for man - hence, with the categoric imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, despicable essence' (MEW 1, 385). Critique of domination and ideology is the consequence of this categorical imperative. Such an interpretation of Marx and Engels stresses that morals do not fade if injustice vanishes but that there is a potential for the emergence of an alternative co-operative ethics/morality, a 'really human morality' (MEW 20, 88). Such a reading of the Marxian works implies the ethics of co-operation. Co-operation (as originally defined by Marx in Capital (MEW 23, 344£, 350f.)) is a type of social relationship for achieving social integration that is different from competition. Co-operation is a specific type of communication and social relationship in which actors achieve a shared understanding of social phenomena, make concerted use of resources so that new systemic qualities emerge, engage in mutual learning, all actors benefit, and feel at home and comfortable in the social system that they jointly construct. Co-operation in this sense is (or at least can be visualized as being) the highest principle of morality] it is the foundation of an objective dimension of ethics, co-operative ethics. All human beings strive for happiness, social security, self-determination, selfrealization and inclusion in social systems, so that they can participate in decision processes, co-designing their social systems. Competition means that certain individuals and groups benefit at the expense of others; there is an unequal access to structures of social systems. This is the dominant organizational structure of modern society; modern society hence is an excluding society. Co-operation as it is understood here includes people in social systems; it lets them participate in decisions and establishes a more just distribution of and access to resources. Hence, co-operation is a way of achieving and realizing basic human needs, and competition is a way of achieving and realizing basic human needs only for certain groups and by excluding others. Co-operation forms thus the essence of human society, whereas competition alienates humans from their essence. For Hegel, essence means things really are not what they immediately show themselves. There is something more to be done than merely rove from one quality to another, and merely to advance from qualitative to quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that permanence is in the first instance their Essence. (Hegel 1830, §112)

42 Theory Essence is the sum total of all realities' (Hegel 1812, §810). The truth of being is essence', essence is the 'background [that] constitutes the truth of being' (Hegel 1830, §807). One can imagine a society that functions without competition; a society without competition is still a society. One cannot imagine a society that functions without a certain degree of co-operation and social activity. A society without co-operation is not a society, it is a state of permanent warfare, egoism and mutual destruction that sooner or later destroys all human existence. If co-operation is the essence of society, then a truly human society is a co-operative society. Full co-operation is just another formulation for participatory democracy. Co-operation as the highest principle of morality is grounded in society and social activity itself, it can be rationally explained within society and, for doing so, there is no need for referring to a highest transcendental absolute principle such as God that cannot be justified within society. Co-operative ethics is a critique of lines of thought and arguments that want to advance exclusion and heteronomy in society, it is inherently critical and it subjects commonly accepted ideas, conventions, traditions, prejudices and myths to critical questioning. It questions mainstream opinions and voices alternatives to them to avoid one-dimensional thinking and strengthen complex, dialectical, multi-dimensional thinking. Co-operation is the immanent essence of all societies. It is grounding human existence. Competitive class societies estrange society from its very essence. To transcend estrangement and the false state of society means to constitute transcendental political projects that struggle for the abolition of domination, so that the immanent essence of society can be realized. This transcendence is grounded in society itself, in the co-operation process of humans. It is an immanent transcendence. The notion of immanent transcendence as the dialectic of essence and existence is based on Hegel's notion of truth and actuality as correspondence of essence and existence. Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of essence with existence, or of inward with outward' (ibid., §142). Not all existence (Sein) is actual (Wirklichkeit), only existence that is reasonable corresponds to its essence and, therefore, has become true. It has already been mentioned that Marx saw the lack of control of the means of production, the labour process and the results of labour by the immediate producers as an alienation of society and humans from their essence. e

c

Estranged labour turns thus man's species-being, both nature and his spiritual species property, into a being alien to him, into a means to his individual existence. It estranges man's own body from him, as it does external nature and his spiritual essence, his human being. (Marx 1844, 76) One of the first critical scholars, who have seen the logic of essence as foundation of immanent transcendence in the twentieth century, was Marcuse: The fact from which the critique and the interpretation set out was the alienation and estrangement of the human essence as expressed in the alienation and estrangement of labor, and hence the situation of man in the historical facticity of capitalism. This fact appears as the total inversion and concealment of what the critique had defined as the essence of man and human labor. . . . Regarding

Critical theory today 43 the situation and praxis from the standpoint of the history of man's essence makes the acutely practical nature of the critique even more trenchant and sharp: the fact that capitalist society calls into question not only economic facts and objects but the entire 'existence' of man and 'human reality' is for Marx the decisive justification for the proletarian revolution as total and radical revolution, unconditionally excluding any partial upheaval or 'evolution.' The justification does not lie outside or behind the concepts of alienation and estrangement - the justification is rather precisely this alienation and estrangement itself. (Marcuse 1932, 536) Crawford Brough Macpherson's (1973) theory of participatory democracy is also based on the Marxian notion of essence. He considers the essence of humans as 'the capacity for rational understanding, for moral judgement and action, for aesthetic creation or contemplation, for the emotional activities of friendship and love, and, sometimes, for religious experience' (= developmental power; ibid., 4). Participatory democracy would be the realization of human essence, which would presuppose the sublation of private property and the technological maximization of free time.

2.3 The debate on redistribution and recognition: the problem of base and superstructure in critical theory 2,3.1 Fraser and Honneth: the debate on redistribution and recognition as a reframing of the problem of base and superstructure in critical theory The question how economy (base) and polity/culture (superstructure) are related is an old problem of critical theory. It has recently been renewed by a debate within critical theory on the categories of redistribution of economic resources and recognition of cultural identities between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003). Tables 2.4 and 2.5 summarize the two approaches. Both Fraser and Honneth question the uncoupling of political demands for the recognition of identities from demands for redistribution. For Fraser, gender domination, race domination and class domination are two-dimensional categories that have economic and cultural aspects. For her, all three categories are processes of malrecognition of status and maldistribution. For practical purposes, then, virtually all real-world axes of subordination can be treated as two-dimensional. Virtually all implicate both maldistribution and misrecognition in forms where each of those injustices has some independent weight, whatever its ultimate roots. To be sure, not all axes of subordination are two-dimensional in the same way, nor to the same degree. Some, such as class, tilt more heavily toward the distribution end of the spectrum; others, such as sexuality, incline more to the recognition end; while still others, such as gender and 'race,' cluster closer to the center. (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 25)

44 Theory Table 2.4 Nancy Eraser's perspectival dualism Sphere ofMoral values society

Problems

Political processPrinciple(s) of morality

Economy Distributive justice: 'The distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants' independence and "voice". . . . It precludes forms and levels of economic dependence and inequality' (Eraser and Honneth 2003, 36)

Culture

Class subordination: Redistribution Participatory socio-economic of wealth: class parity: inequality and 'according to politics maldistribution this norm, (Eraser and Honneth justice 2003, 13, 19), 'social requires social arrangements that arrangements institutionalize that permit deprivation, all (adult) exploitation and members of gross disparities in society to wealth, income and interact with leisure time, thereby one another denying some people as peers' the means and (Fraser and opportunities to Honneth interact with others 2003, 36) as peers' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 36) Reciprocal recognition, Status subordination: Recognition of cultural domination, different status equality: identities: institutionalized patterns misrecognition of status, disrespect for identity politics constitute actors as identities (Fraser and (gender, peers, capable of participating on a part Honneth 2003, 13, sexuality, 19), 'Institutionalized nationality, with one another in patterns of cultural ethnicity, race) social life' (Fraser and value constitute some Honneth 2003, 29) actors as inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 29)

Source: Fraser and Honneth 2003, chapter 1.

Fraser treats economy and culture, maldistribution and malrecognition as two equal levels of society and domination. Her position of perspectival dualism sees the two poles as impinging on one another (ibid., 64). Her approach is a form of interactive dualism in which two phenomena are autonomous but interact in certain cases. In contrast, in a dialectical relationship, two phenomena form a differentiated unity in plurality, which means that they necessarily encroach each other and that there is a force that besides the difference creates a certain unity (Holz 2005). M y suggestion is to see the economy as the sphere of society that forms this unity in society and class as the process that forms this unity in processes of domination. Economy and class are foundations of society and domination. In contemporary society, you can act outside and without certain forms of malrecognition; for example, by implementing gender parity or a 50-50 sharing of housework you can achieve gender equality in institutions and households without having necessarily to abolish the capitalist system. A capitalist

Critical theory today 45 Table 2.5 Axel Honneth's normative monism Sphere of society Intimate relationships

Moral valuesProblems

Love: recognition of needs

Denial of emotional attachment or disrespect of a person's physical integrity (Honneth 1992, 193, 190)

Legal relations Legal equality: recognition of equal legal treatment

Structural exclusion from or denial of the possession of certain rights (Honneth 1992, 190, 194)

Labour

Denial of social acceptance that enables selfesteem (Honneth 1992, 191, 195)

Social esteem: recognition of achievements

Political process

Principle^) of morality

Surplus of validity of recognition of love (socialization): 'Moral progress in the sphere of love might then mean a step-by-step elimination of the role-clichés, stereotypes, and cultural ascriptions that structurally impede adaptation to others' needs' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 188) Surplus of validity of recognition of legal equality (legalization): 'expanding the principle of equal legal treatment' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 188) Surplus of validity of recognition of social esteem: moral progress in the sphere of social esteems means 'radically scrutinizing the cultural

Recognition of needs, emotional recognition, love

Recognition of legal equality, universalism

Recognition of achievements, solidarity, sympathy

constructions that, in the industrialcapitalist past, saw to it that only a small circle of activities were distinguished as "gainful employment " (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 188) 5

Source: Fraser and Honneth 2003, chapter 2.

system without patriarchy and racism is in principle imaginable but not one without class. In such a system, men and women, people with different sexualities and those with different ethnic background are all recognized as being equally valuable for

46 Theory attaining positions as owners, managers and workers. There is then no status malrecognition based on gender, sexuality or race but certainly a class exploitation and class malrecognition in which exploiters engage equally in exploiting labour. Gender and race always have a class aspect, but class exploitation (frequently, but) not always and not necessarily has aspects of patriarchy and racism. The economy is the foundation of society that forms a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of the political and the cultural system. It sets limits and exerts pressures on these systems, which feed back onto the economic foundation. Equal recognition of certain identities is compatible with class exploitation. Especially in an age that is dominated by the neo-liberal intensification of socio-economic inequality that affects ever more people, it is important to stress the specific role of class and the capitalist economy in contemporary society. Fraser argues for a unity of demands for recognition and redistribution in political struggles ( no redistribution without recognition , 'no recognition without redistribution , Fraser and Honneth 2003, 65f.). This stress is important but neglects that redistribution must always be a foundation for recognition, whereas cultural recognition of different identities is not always a foundation for redistribution but can also act as a foundation for more socio-economic inequality, which shows a certain order of valences. Fraser refuses to ground her approach in one general normative principle but wants to provide 'multiple points of entry into social reality (ibid., 205). The problem with such an approach is that it establishes a plurality without unity. Fraser gives good examples for how class infuses racism and patriarchy (ibid., 58, 64, 83f.), whereas the examples with which she tries to show that sexual subordination impinges on class subordination are much less convincing (ibid., 65, 84). Honneth in my opinion is right in pointing out that Fraser gives no reasons for why she conceives society as consisting of economy and culture (ibid., 156, 179). One could especially add the political system, because everyday processes not only consist of economic production and cultural values but also of the reaching of binding collective decisions, by which all members of collectives are affected. To be precise, one must say that Fraser mentions the possibility of a political realm of society that is confronted by the problem of political marginalization that can be solved by processes of democratization (ibid., 68), but she only introduces this idea ex-post as concluding reflection, after having introduced social theory foundations that focus on economy and culture and in which political aspects are missing. Fraser argues for deep economic and cultural transformations. In the economic realm, this would be the perspective of socialism: 'In today s neoliberal climate especially, it is important to retain the general idea of economic transformation, even if we are currently uncertain of its precise institutional content (ibid., 75). Fraser s cultural deconstructivism in my opinion is too radical. It suggests that all status distinctions are 'oppressive per se (ibid., 76). The danger here is that difference as such is considered as always oppressive and that the goal is not only to blur the boundaries but also to eliminate the differences between men and women, homosexual and heterosexual, animals and humans and technology and humans as is suggested, for example, by cyborg-politics, the animal liberation movement or actor network theory. Certain differences are sources of oppression in stratified societies but can be a source of pleasure in a liberated society. The problem is not difference as such but oppressive £

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Critical theory today 47 difference. Especially the blurring of the boundaries between humans, animals and technologies, as undertaken by cyborg theory, animal liberation activists and actor network theory, is a dangerous endeavour, because it risks reducing humans to the status of animals or machines in an instrumental, anti-humanist and potentially biologistic or technocratic way that could erect new fascist forms of domination. Nancy Fraser grounds a pluralistic theory of society that is missing a certain sense for unity. But she is right in my opinion in arguing that Axel Honneth advances a reductive culturalist view of distribution' (ibid., 34). Honneth argues that with the exception of Habermas and Gramsci, critical theory has had a tendency to antinormativism (ibid., 128f.). The greatest problem for humans would be the 'withdrawal of social recognition, in the phenomena of humiliation and disrespect' (ibid., 134). While Fraser wants to base critical theory on two equal dual categories, redistribution and recognition, Honneth looks for a normative monism that is based on one central category, the one of recognition. He bases his theory on the assumption that humans are psychological beings that strive for 'self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem' (Honneth 1992, 196) and suffer if they are disrespected. A moral-theoretical monism would be needed because 'the central institutions of even capitalist society require rational legitimation through generalizable principles of reciprocal recognition, their reproduction remains dependent on a basis of moral consensus - which thus possesses real primacy vis-a-vis other integration mechanisms' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 157). Honneth subdivides recognition into three forms (love, equality and achievement). He argues that especially achievement has been problematic right from the start of modern society because it is part £

of an influential ideology insofar as it simply expressed the one-sided value horizon of those social groups which, because they possessed capital, had the means to reorganize economic reproduction. Thus, what 'achievement' means, and what guarantees a just distribution of resources, was measured right from the start against an evaluative standard whose highest reference point was investment in intellectual preparation for a specific activity. (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 147) Distribution struggles are for Honneth 'a specific kind of struggle for recognition, in which the appropriate evaluation of the social contributions of individuals or groups is contested' (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 171). The overall aim of society for Honneth is 'enabling individual self-realization' (ibid., 177). For Honneth, morality is the foundation of society. This assumption explains his strong emphasis on recognition. Protest would be based on 'moral conviction' (ibid., 157). Fraser accordingly argues that Honneth inflates the concept of recognition 'beyond all recognition' (ibid., 201). She characterizes his approach as 'moral psychology of prepolitical suffering' (ibid., 202). There are certainly values and conflicting values in all social relations and struggles. So, for example, workers striking for wage increases or against lay-offs have different values than their employers. Nonetheless, the central aspect of the conflict is not the definition of values but the distribution of money. A n immediate need for survival that has become threatened drives the protests, not conflicting value patterns, which are a result of objective material conditions. Certainly,

48 Theory all institutions, as argued by Honneth, have not only moral aspects but also economic aspects; there are no institutions without resources. Value patterns determine how these resources are distributed, but to form such values, resources first need to exist. Cognition is oriented on objects. Honneth criticizes Fraser for her ungrounded assumption of economy and culture as the two spheres of society. But in his own approach, he also does not argue why he assumes the existence of the three spheres of personal relations, law and labour. These three spheres could roughly be equated to culture, politics and economy. But civil society is missing in the political system, and the cultural system lacks institutions such as the mass media, the education system, the academic system, the medical system or religion. Honneth provides, just like Fraser, an incomplete and ungrounded model of society. Despite his monistic claim, Honneth argues in the end that his conception of justice is pluralistic, because it is based on three principles (ibid., 258). There is a strange and unresolved tension between monistic recognition and pluralism in Honneth's approach. In a dialectical move, he could say that monism and pluralism can be dialectically united in the figure of unity in plurality (a plurality of spheres and principles united by the category of recognition), but he does not do that. It is the other way round with Fraser: She argues for a pluralistic approach with two spheres but ends up postulating one overall principle of participatory parity without arguing dialectically.

2.3.2 Base and superstructure reconsidered: towards a dialectical model of society and a dialectic-materialistic moral philosophy How should the relationship of base and superstructure be best conceived? Models that see society as being composed of independent subsystems, such as Luhmann's (1984) theory of functional differentiation, face the problem of explaining phenomena that are characteristic for the global network society. So, Luhmann, for example, cannot adequately grasp in his theory that today economic logic influences large parts of society. In contrast to reductionistic and relativistic social theories, dialectical social theories have proved successful in conceiving society as being composed of relative autonomous subsystems that all have their own specificity but nonetheless depend on each other and influence each other. The subsystems are conceived as distinct and at the same time mutually interdependent, which is the fundamental logical figure of dialectical thinking. Society can be conceived as consisting of interconnected subsystems that are not independent and are not based on one specific function they fulfil but are open, communicatively interconnected and networked. The ecological system, the technological system, the economic system, the political system and the cultural system can be conceived as the subsystems of a model of society (Fuchs 2008; see Figure 2.1). Why exactiy these systems? To survive, humans in society have to appropriate and change nature (ecology) with the help of technologies, so that they can produce resources that they distribute and consume (economy), which enables them to make collective decisions (polity), form values and acquire skills (culture). The core of this model consists of three systems (economy, polity and culture). This distinction can also be found in

Critical theory today 49

economization ECONOMIC SYSTEM

form ation

POLITICAL SYSTEM CULTURAL SYSTEM

Nature Figure 2.1 Society as dynamic, dialectical system Source: Fuchs 2008.

other contemporary sociological theories: Giddens (1984, 28-34) distinguishes between economic institutions, political institutions and symbolic orders/modes of discourse as the three types of institutions in society. Bourdieu (1986b) speaks of economic, political and cultural capital as the three types of structures in society. Jurgen Habermas (1981) differs between the lifeworld, the economic system and the political system. Human actors and social structures that are produced by the actors and condition the actors' practices shape each of these systems. Each subsystem is defined and permanently recreated by a reflexive loop that productively interconnects human actors and their practices with social structures.

50 Theory The economic system can only produce goods that satisfy human needs by human labour power that makes use of productive and communication technologies to establish social relationships and change the state of natural resources. The latter are transformed into economic goods by the application of technologies to nature and society in labour processes. Hence, the economy is based on a dialectical relationship of natural resources and labour that is mediated by technology. Hence, we can argue that socially transformed nature and technology are aspects of the economic system. This allows us to make a distinction between the base and the superstructure of society. The economic base is constituted by the interplay of labour, technology and nature, so that economic goods are produced that satisfy human needs. The superstructure is made up by the interconnection of the political and the cultural system, so that 'immaterial goods emerge, which allow the definition of collective decisions and societal value structures. Does it make sense to speak of base (nature, technology and economy) and superstructure (polity and culture) in society, or does this mean that one reduces all social existence to economic facts? The superstructure is not a mechanic reflection, that is, a linear mapping, of the base, that is, the relationships and forces of production. It cannot be deduced from or reduced to it. Orthodox Marxism for a long time did not realize this. That the base is not the mechanic reflection of the superstructure has for a long time not been realized by philosophical idealism. All human activity is based on producing a natural and social environment; it is in this sense that the notion of the base is of fundamental importance. We have to eat and survive before we can enjoy leisure, entertainment, arts and so on. We will survive for a while without leisure, art, entertainment, education and decision-making but only for a very short time without water and food. This shows that the economy is more fundamental and grounding in society than the political and the cultural system. The base is a precondition, a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the superstructure. The superstructure is a complex, nonlinear creative reflection of the base, the base a complex, nonlinear creative reflection of the superstructure. This means that both levels are recursively linked and produce each other; economic practices and structures trigger political and cultural processes; cultural and political practices and structures trigger economic processes. The notion of creative reflection grasps the dialectic of chance and necessity/indétermination and determination that shapes the relationship of base and superstructure. There is not a content of the superstructure that is 'predicted, prefigured and controlled by the base; the base, as Raymond Williams (2001, 165) in his well-known paper Base and superstructure in Marxist cultural theory says, 'sets limits and exerts pressure on the superstructure. Stuart Hall (1983) has in this context spoken of a determination in the first instance exerted by the economic system on superstructures. A critical theory of society questions conditions in which structural resources such as property, decision-making capacities or value definition capacities are asymmetrically distributed, certain actors are excluded from participation and the one derive benefits at the expense of others. We can speak of participation in cases, where humans are enabled by technologies, resources, organizations and skills to design and manage their social systems all by themselves and to develop collective visions of a better future, so that they can make use of their collective intelligence in designing social systems (Fuchs 2008). A participatory 5

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Critical theory today 51 social system is a system in which power is distributed in a rather symmetrical way, that is, humans are enabled to control and acquire resources such as property, technologies, social relationships, knowledge and skills that help them in entering communication and co-operation processes in which decisions on questions that are of collective concern are taken. Providing people with resources and capacities that enable responsible and critical activity in decision-making processes is a process of empowerment; participation is a process of empowering humans. How are participation, co-operation and sustainability connected? Participation is structure oriented; it is a process in which social structures are designed in such a way that individuals are included in the constitution of the social systems they live in and actually take part in these constitution processes. Go-operation is an intersubjective process within participatory structures. Participation is a logical and necessary but not sufficient precondition for co-operation. Go-operation is the social process by which sustainable systems can be produced. Sustainability concerns the long-term form and effects of a social system. Participation means the structural enablement, co-operation, the inter subjective social process and sustainability, the long-term condition and effects of social systems, in which all benefit and have a good life. Abstractly spoken, a participatory, co-operative and sustainable society is a society that guarantees a good life for all. A participatory, co-operative and sustainable information society (PGSIS) is a society in which knowledge and technology are together with social systems shaped in such ways that humans are included in and self-determine their social systems collectively, interact in mutually benefiting ways and so bring about a long-term stability that benefits all present and future generations and social groups. Such a society is necessarily non-capitalistic and non-dominative. Table 2.6 shows the various dimensions of such a society. Recognition in this model is a cultural process that produces wisdom. Redistribution can be considered as not just an economic process but also as the process of establishing a more participatory society by redistributing economic resources, power and definition capacities from dominant groups to oppressed groups. Recognition is a cultural redistribution process. But these processes are not independent. Similarly, democratization is a redistribution of political power. Establishing a more fair society requires the redistribution of economic resources as a material foundation. A just society can only be a society in which private property of the means of production ceases to exist and all humans have enough material resources to live in wealth. Equity is a foundation for redistribution within the superstructure. Superstructural redistribution without redistribution at the base is an incomplete process, just like the other way around. Political redistribution means to give power to the powerless. A free society is one in which all affected persons are involved in decision-making. Cultural redistribution means to abolish cultural status hierarchies that privilege the worldviews of certain groups or individuals in the formation of collective identities. A society is only wise if all people can have voices that are heard and are active parts of collective identity-formation processes. Glass relationships play an important role in this moralphilosophical model, because the establishment of a more participatory society requires as a foundation material equity - the abolition of classes. Without economic resources, people will not have influence in decision-making and cultural recognition becomes an empty phrase. But equity is not enough. It is a necessary but not a

52 Theory Table 2.6 Dimensions of a moral philosophy that is based on immanent transcendence Dimension

Ecology: preservation

Technology: human centredness

Economy: equity

Polity: freedom

Culture: wisdom

Definition

Under the condition of ecological preservation, humans treat nature in ways that allow theflourishingof natural systems; the autopoiesis of living systems is maintained and not artificially interrupted or destroyed and natural resources are preserved and not depleted. That technology is human centred means that technological systems should help humans in solving problems, fit their capabilities, practices and self-defined needs, support human activities and co-operation and involve users in definition, development and application processes. Economic equity means that there is wealth for all, defined material living standards should be guaranteed for all as a right, nobody should live in poverty and the overall wealth should be distributed in a fair way to avoid large wealth and income gaps between the most and the least wealthy. Freedom can in line with the critical-realist thinking of Roy Bhaskar (1993) be conceived as the absenting of domination, of the asymmetrical distribution of power, so that humans are included and involved in defining, setting and controlling the conditions of their lives. It is the absenting of constraints on the maximum development and realization of human faculties. Freedom then means the maximum use and development of what C.B. Macpherson (1973) has termed human developmental power. A culture is wise if it allows the universal sharing and co-operative constitution of knowledge, ideas, values and norms and sets standards that allow literacy and the attainment of educational skills for all, physical and mental health of all, the maximization of life time in health for all, communicative dialogue in which all voices are heard and influential, a culture of understanding that allows finding common values without compromising difference (unity in diversity), the experience of entertainment, beauty, the diversity of places, mental challenge and diversity, physical exercise for all and building communities, relationships, love and friendships for all.

sufficient condition for a participatory society. Collective decision-making and collective identity formation require resources as their foundations. If these processes shall be free and wise, then first of all the establishment of a classless society is needed. Democracy and identity politics are empty phrases in a capitalist society if they do not acquire an anti-capitalist dimension. I am neither arguing for a separation of the concepts of recognition and redistribution (Fraser) nor for the subordination of the redistribution concept under the recognition concept (Honneth) but for a moral philosophy that is based on the notion of redistribution and considers recognition as a superstructural kind of redistribution. The dimensions of participation do not exist independently but are interdependent. This means that a lack of a certain dimension eventually will have negative influences on other dimensions, whereas enrichment of one dimension will provide a positive potential for the enrichment of other dimensions. So, for example, people who live in

Critical theory today 53 poverty are likely to not show much interest in political participation. Another example is that an unsustainable ecosystem advances an unsustainable society and vice versa: if man pollutes nature and depletes non-renewable natural resources, problems such as poverty, war, totalitarianism, extremism, violence, crime and so on are more likely to occur. The other way round a society that is shaken by poverty, war, a lack of democracy and plurality and so on is more likely to pollute and deplete nature. So, sustainability should be conceived as being based on the dialectics of ecological preservation, human-centred technology, economic equity, political freedom and cultural wisdom.

2.4 Dialectical philosophy and critical theory 2.4.1 Dialectical thinking as ideology Herbert Marcuse (1958) argued that the dialectic was schematized, reified, dehistoricized and interpreted as a mechanistic and deterministic law in the Soviet Union. It lost the dimension of liberation. The concept of the negation of the negation was no longer seen as an aspect of dialectics, because radical transformation was considered as undesirable in the Soviet Union. Soviet Marxism assumed that the Soviet state would develop automatically by natural law into a free society. The Soviet system abandoned dialectics and destroyed dialectics' explosive potential and its subjective factor. [In Soviet ideology] the consciousness and action of the proletariat then are largely determined by the 'blind laws' of the capitalist process instead of having broken through this determinism . . . the capitalist development, the transition to socialism, and the subsequent development of Soviet society through its various phases is presented as the unfolding of a system of objective forces that could not have unfolded otherwise. To be sure, strong and constant emphasis is placed on the guiding role of the Communist Party and its leaders . . . The subjective factor no longer appears as an integral element and stage of the objective dialectic. (Marcuse 1958, 147ff.) The categories sublation (Aufhebung) and negation of the negation are not discussed in Stalin's (1938) programmatic writing Dialectical and historical materialism. Manfred Buhr and Georg Klaus argued in the Philosophical dictionary of the German Democratic Republic that the negation of the negation 'is not the fundamental law of the dialectic' (Klaus and Buhr 1964, 381). They argued that the dialectic analyses natural phenomena and that dialectical laws are (1) the interdependence of all things, (2) permanent emergence and transformation, (3) the sudden turn from quantity into quality that results in a progressive line from simpler to more complex structures and from lower to higher qualities and (4) the struggle of opposing tendencies and inner contradictions. Buhr and Klaus considered proletarian revolution and socialism as natural and inevitable developments, because the dialectic and historical progress were considered as laws of nature. Raya Dunayevskaya (1958, 63) stressed that although Marx saw the negation of the negation, the Hegelian transcendence, as an objective movement', Soviet Marxism 'made it "mystic" and "subordinate" to the c

54 Theory struggle of opposites'. She argued that the repressive state of Soviet society required to limit the intellectual influence of the revolutionary principle of the negation of the negation: 'It is that actual world of Russia with its forced labor camps that compels this Russian attack against Marxism' (ibid.). Stalin's dialectic was functionalistic and structuralistic. The human subject as active transformer of society was unimportant in this approach, and societal change was considered as being independent of the human will. The human subject was considered as being subordinated to objective structures by natural laws to legitimate the repression of human freedom in the Soviet Union and for advancing an anti-humanistic ideology. Stalin did not take into account the dialectic of chance and necessity that shapes the development of society. Existing societal structures result in a space of possibilities for future developments. The actual realization of certain possibilities depends on human practice, there are no automatic results of societal developments and there is no automatic historic, progress and also no automatic historic regression. The possibility to actively shape society conditioned by a structural space of possibilities constitutes an important aspect of human freedom. Stalin's dialectic in contrast was an ideology that pretended that the Soviet system means socialism and freedom, because it would be a natural law that a free order succeeds capitalism. Actual unfreedom was interpreted and presented as freedom. The deterministic vulgar dialectic allowed Stalin (1938) to claim that 'the U.S.S.R. has already done away with capitalism and has set up a socialist system' and that in the Soviet Union 'the relations of production fully correspond to the state of productive forces'. Stalin's own words reveal the unfree character of the Soviet system: The basis of the relations of production under the socialist system, which so far has been established only in the U.S.S.R., is the social ownership of the means of production. Here there are no longer exploiters and exploited. The goods produced are distributed according to labor performed, on the principle: 'He who does not work, neither shall he eat.' (Stalin 1938) A society, in which people who cannot or do not want to work are not given to eat and are, therefore, not able to survive, cannot be considered as a free society. Such a society is likely to be based on exploitation. Stalin's claim that the Soviet Union is a free society deconstructs itself, and it becomes clear that the worldview underlying the system is oppressive. Stalin's argumentation is also a form of technological determinism. He reduced societal development to technological progress and argued that technological developments result automatically in a new formation of society: 'First the productive forces of society change and develop, and then, depending on these changes and in conformity with them, men's relations of production, their economic relations, change' (ibid.). For Stalin (ibid.), 'the spiritual life of society is a reflection of this objective reality'. His view of the world of ideas is simplistic. A more complex analysis is that a certain state of society does not result in a predetermined pattern of ideas but creates a conditioned plurality of ideas that can stand in contradiction to each other. By defining ideas as the mechanic reflection of matter, it became possible for Stalin to define views that opposed his own dogmas as reactionary and bourgeois. Stalin considered

Critical theory today 55 his own ideas as naturally corresponding to the material state of socialism, and any deviation and opposition was considered as not corresponding to the state of socialism. The repression of alternative approaches was ideologically legitimated by a mechanic interpretation of the reflection theorem. Stalin (ibid.) did not differ between the dialectic of nature and the dialectic of society; he conducted the extension of the principles of philosophical materialism to the study of social life . But society is the sublation of nature; the logic of society is based on the logic of nature but also has specific, differing qualities. Humans are active, self-conscious, reflexive, creative and co-operative beings that can choose from different options and can anticipate decisions and potential effects of actions. Humans are capable of freedom. The dialectic of society needs to take human essence into account. The simple application of natural laws and of the dialectic of nature to society vulgarizes the complexities of society. The undialectical logic of mechanistic determinism became a terrorist ideology under Stalin. The history of Stalinism has resulted in a rejection of dialectical philosophy also by progressive scholars. Antonio Negri (2004) argues, for example, that the dialectic is a deterministic schematism of reason, a reformist teleology and that it implies a deterministic concept of history (Hardt and Negri 2000, 51), although his own work together with Michael Hardt can be seen as a reformulation of the dialectic of the productive forces and the relationships of production in an age of knowledge and information technology (for a detailed discussion of Hardt, Negri and dialectical philosophy see Fuchs and Zimmermann 2009). Wolfgang Fritz Haug (1985, 52) has characterized the dogmatic dialectic as passive dialectic. Jean-Paul Sartre (1963, 181) saw the dialectic of nature as 'a dogmatic metaphysics . c

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2.4.2 Negative dialectics: Adorno and Bhaskar Adorno (2001, 208) argued that, for Hegel, history is universal salvific history. 'The doctrine of positive negation is exactly and strictly the point, where I deny Hegel my loyalty (Adorno 2006, 224). Adorno (ibid., 224) said that the principle of the determined negation is an affirmative ideology, because it is for him the 'belief that negation by being pushed far enough and by reflecting itself is identical with the position (see also Adorno 2003, 27). The problem of the category of the positive was for Adorno (ibid., 33) that moral attributes such as the good resonate with it. He said that such a dialectic is anti-dialectical, a form of traditional thinking and derived from mathematics (ibid.). Negation of the negation does 'not or not automatically, not by implication result in something positive (ibid., 32). On the basis of the critique of the category of determined negation, Adorno developed his negative dialectics. Non-identity and contradiction are the central notions of this version of dialectical philosophy (ibid., 15-17). Adorno (ibid., 16, 32f.) considered the Hegelian notions of identity and synthesis as problematic. Negative dialectics mean critique of identity thinking, it is a form of ideology critique and a critique of the antagonistic reality and its annihilation tendencies (ibid., chapter 2). Adorno (2001, 210) was certainly right when he argued that 'progress should be just as little ontologized . . . as decay (see also Adorno 1977, 622). But he argued against this insight in his own works and thereby created the impression that he assumed that history is mechanically determined. In a few instances, such arguments take on the 5

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56 Theory form of a belief in progress: It is part of the dialectic of progress that setbacks in society that are themselves instigated by the principle of progress . . . also provide the condition that humanity can find means to avoid them in the future (Adorno 2001, 244; see also Adorno 1977, 630). In most cases, historical determinism takes on the form of cultural pessimism in Adorno s works: He argued that the meaning of 'universal regression is today attached to the concept of progress (Adorno 2001, 240). c

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No universal history leads from savagery to humanity, but one indeed from the slingshot to the H-bomb. . . . Hegel is thereby verified by the horror and stood on his head. If he transfigured the totality of historical suffering into the positivity of the self-realizing absolute, then the One and the whole, which to this day, with breathing-spells, keep rolling on, would ideologically be absolute suffering. . . . The world-spirit, a worthy object of definition, could be defined as permanent catastrophe. (Adorno 1966, 314) Adorno wrote a negative universal history that contains absolute suffering and the permanent catastrophe as the telos of the process of history. Although Adorno s negative dialectics radically differ from the political intentions of Stalin's dialectic, both approaches share a structuralist-functionalist position that does not see the important role of the human subject in history, a role that allows creating liberation just like it allows creating barbarism or affirmation. Humans are self-conscious beings who select consciously from structurally conditioned, enabled and constrained possibilities of action. If there are degrees of freedom in human action, then the course of history cannot be mechanically determined but must depend on class struggles and societal structures. History is neither universal history of liberation nor universal history of decay but is rather shaped by human actions, incompleteness, relative openness and the dialectic of chance and necessity. Roy Bhaskar (1993) has elaborated a contemporary form of negative dialectics in his book Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. Negativity would be primary; negative being would be possible without positive being but not vice versa (ibid., 239). Bhaskar s dialectical critical realism and Adorno s negative dialectics share the criticism of Hegel's positivism: 'Positivity and self(-identity), the very characteristics of the understanding, are always restored at the end of reason. Hegelian dialectic is un-Hegelianlydialectical (ibid., 27). Bhaskar (ibid., 400) speaks in this context of ontological monovalence ('a purely positive account of being ). Real negation is the most important category of dialectical philosophy for Bhaskar. It means the presence of absence in space and time (ibid., 38). Bhaskar (ibid., 43) defines dialectics as the transformative elimination of absence, the process of absenting absence. 5

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The central category of dialectic is absence and absenting: for example, in the absenting of mistakes in dialectic conceived as argument, and of the absenting of constraints in dialectic conceived as the drive for freedom. Absentings are transformative and/or distanciating (mediating) negations, including disemergence and divergence. Dialectic can thus easily be seen as an onto-logic of change. (Bhaskar 1993, 27)

Critical theory today 57 Absenting is the causally efficacious transformative negation or spatio-temporally distanciated (or rhythmically processual) or (more or less) holistically totalizing intentional change (ibid., 176). Absenting absence corresponds to the category of the negation of the negation that Bhaskar (ibid., 152) considers as the most important principle of dialectics and that for him has to do with the geo-historical transformation of geo-historical products. There are four central principles of dialectics for Bhaskar: non-identity, the ontological primacy of absence over presence, open totality and transformative praxis (Bhaskar and Laclau 1998, 11). Bhaskar ignores that absence is only one aspect of negativity. So, for example, on one hand, the antagonism between the poor and the rich and between labour and capital is characterized by the absence of property (non-ownership) but, on the other hand, an important characteristic is that the absence of property of one side is connected and depends on private ownership rights and accumulation on the other side. The accumulation of capital can only reproduce itself through the activity of the proletariat. There is no capital without labour; capital and labour form a unity in which the two poles exclude each other because their interests are not compatible within the existing totality. This example shows that dialectics are not only about absence but also about difference, interdependence and mutual constitution. Hegel, therefore, described the negative as contradiction that contains difference and connection at the same time. The 'negation is at the same time a relation, is, in short, Distinction, Relativity, Mediation (Hegel 1830, §116). 5

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The one is made visible in the other, and is only in so far as that other is. Essential difference is therefore Opposition; according to which the different is not confronted by any other but by its other. That is, either of these two (Positive and Negative) is stamped with a characteristic of its own only in its relation to the other: the one is only reflected into itself as it is reflected into the other. And so with the other. Either in this way is the others own other. (Hegel 1830, §119) Thus, for example, debts and assets are not two particular, self-subsisting species of property. What is negative to the debtor, is positive to the creditor. A way to the east is also a way to the west. Positive and negative are therefore intrinsically conditioned by one another, and are only in relation to each other. The north pole of the magnet cannot be without the south pole, and vice versa. (Hegel 1830, note to §119) For Hegel, negation was what, for Bhaskar, is the dialectical contradiction. For Bhaskar, not all beings are contradictory, but each being is negative in the sense of difference and absence. But each one has an other, the one and the other constitute each other mutually. Therefore, we can say that Hegel was right in speaking of the universality of contradictions. Absence is one aspect of a contradiction, but it is not the universal characteristic of dialectics. Camilla Warnke has, therefore, defined the contradiction in the following way:

58 Theory The thing exists in its substantiality as independent by its interdependence to something other. . . . In a contradiction, the opposites condition each other, and just like they mutually exclude each other, they also reciprocally require each other. Their relationless duality that remains external is sublated in their unity. (Warnke 1977, 37, 57) Bhaskar's caution with dialectics is appropriate for questioning the assumption that history is linear, but it fails to grasp the dialectic of the negative and the positive as the simultaneous difference and interdependence of things that Hegel described. Alex Callinicos (2006, 192) argues in this context that it is an important task for Marxist dialectics to liberate the concept of internal dialectics from Hegel's idealistic teleology. Although Bhaskar (1993, 5f.) fails to grasp the richness of dialectics, his distinction of three kinds of the negation is useful. Real negation characterizes absence, nonbeing, non-identity, being other and non-existence - it is distanciation without transformation (ibid., 5, 401). Transformative negation is the 'transformation of some thing, property or state of affairs' (ibid., 5). It 'may be essential or inessential, total or partial, endogenously and/or exogenously effected' (ibid., 5f). Radical negation means 'auto-subversion, transformation or overcoming of a being or condition' (ibid., 6). Bhaskar argues that Hegel's determinism results from the combination of all three forms of negation in the concept of the determinate negation. Not all negations would be transformative or radical, frequently negations would only be connecting or separating. Real negation is, for Bhaskar, the most general concept, a subset of real negations is also a form of transformative negation, and a subset of transformative negations is also a form of radical negation (real negation > transformative negation > radical negation, ibid., 6, 402). Sublations as 'species of determinate transformative negations, may be totally, essentially or partially preservative' (ibid., 12). Other dialectical results include 'stand-offs, the mutual undoing of the contending parties, the preservation of the status quo ante, retrogression and many other outcomes besides sublation' (ibid., 12f.). Bhaskar has tried to differentiate dialectics, so that it can account for various forms of transformations and invariability. Transformative negations result in the change of form and/or content of a system; parts and relations between parts of a system change. Given a radical negation, a system changes fundamentally, its root parts, structures and condition are re-constituted, old systems vanish and new ones emerge. In society, radical negation is revolutionary transformation.

2A.3 Marcuse, Block and beyond: the subject-object dialectic Both Stalinist dialectics and negative dialectics underestimate the role of human subjects in dialectical processes. Dialectics are reduced to a structuralist-functionalist schematism that dominates the will of humans who, it is argued by dogmatic dialecticians, cannot shape the dialectic. To avoid a deterministic dialectic, a conception is needed that is based on the dialectic of subject and object, human actors and social structures. Such a conception can be found implicitly in the philosophical writings of Marx and was in the twentieth century explicitly formulated against deterministic Marx interpretations by Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse opposed passive dialectics by active dialectics - dialectics as the art of 'not getting captured by the contradictions, but to translate them possibly into directed moving forces' (Haug 2007, 12).

Critical theory today 59 Marcuse pointed out that, for Marx, capitalist crisis is a negating moment of economic structures by which capitalism develops itself. Crisis is for him an aspect of objective dialectics: Capitalist society is a union of contradictions. It gets freedom through exploitation, wealth through impoverishment, advances in production through restriction of consumption. The very structure of capitalism is a dialectical one: every form and institution of the economic process begets its determinate negation, and the crisis is the extreme form in which the contradictions are expressed. (Marcuse 1941, 31 If.) Marcuse considered private property and alienated labour as other objective contradictions of capitalism: Every fact is more than a mere fact; it is a negation and restriction of real possibilities. Wage labor is a fact, but at the same time it is a restraint on free work that might satisfy human needs. Private property is a fact, but at the same time it is a negation of man's collective appropriation of nature. . . . The negativity of capitalist society lies in its alienation of labor. (Marcuse 1941, 282) Marcuse wanted to avoid deterministic dialectics and to bring about a transition from a structural-functionalist dialectic towards a human-centred dialectic. Therefore, he argued that capitalism is dialectical because of its objective antagonistic structures and that the negation of this negativity can only be achieved by human praxis. The negativity and its negation are two different phases of the same historical process, straddled by man's historical action. The 'new' state is the truth of the old, but that truth does not steadily and automatically grow out of the earlier state; it can be set free only by an autonomous act on the part of men, that will cancel the whole of the existing negative state. (Marcuse 1941, 315) Necessity happens only through societal praxis. . . . In the Marxian dialectic, thought, subjectivity, remains the decisive factor of the dialectical process. . . . The result [of the development of society] depends on the conditions of possibilities for struggle and the consciousness that develops thereby. This includes that its bearers have understood their slavery and its causes, that they want their own liberation and have seen ways of how to achieve this. . . . The necessity of socialism depends on the societal situation of the proletariat and the development of class consciousness. (Marcuse 1966, 224ff.) The antagonisms of capitalism necessarily create crises and class relationships. The sublation of capitalism and the realization of human essence can only be achieved

60 Theory based on necessity and the possibilities created by the necessity by the free activity of humans that try to transform possibilities into concrete reality. The dialectic of society is shaped by a dialectic of freedom and necessity. Not the slightest natural necessity or automatic inevitability guarantees the transition from capitalism to socialism.... The revolution requires the maturity of many forces, but the greatest among them is the subjective force, namely, the revolutionary class itself. The realization of freedom and reason requires the free rationality of those who achieve it. Marxian theory is, then, incompatible with fatalistic determinism. (Marcuse 1941, 318f.) Hegel pointed out with his concept of the determinate negation that the negative is at the same time positive, that contradictions do not dissolve into nothingness, but into the negation of its particular content. Negation is the negation of a specific subject matter' (Hegel 1812, §62). The new contains the old and more; therefore, it is richer in content (ibid.). To stress the importance of human subjects in the dialectic of society, Marcuse (1964b, 221) argued that determined negation is 'determinate choice'. Marcuse did not, as incorrectly argued by Hans Heinz Holz (2005, 109, 499), refuse the notion of determinate negation, but rather embedded this concept into subjectobject dialectics. Also, Wolfgang Fritz Haug (1995, 690) mistakes Marcuse in claiming that Marcuse assumed that the ideology of capitalism outdated the determinate negation historically. In the passage that Haug criticizes, the epilogue to Reason and revolution, Marcuse (1941, 437) does not, as claimed by Haug, say that determinate negation is impossible today but rather that repressive ideology enables capitalism to absorb its negativity' and that at the same time the 'total mobilization of society against the ultimate liberation of the individual . . . indicates how real is the possibility of this liberation' (ibid., 439). The determinate negation of capitalism would be objectively possible but would be forestalled subjectively, which would be no necessity. This dialectical hypothesis was later worked out in more depth by Marcuse (1964b) in Onedimensional man; it is far from any deterministic logic. The historical reality of fascism and world war curbed Marcuse's belief that revolution would take place soon, but it never resulted in pessimism or defeatism. In the late 1960s, the emergence of the student movement convinced Marcuse that there are not only potentials for liberation in late-capitalist society but also actual forces that aim at liberation. For Marcuse, only specific contradictions that relate to material and mental resources and the degree of freedom in a societal situation are determined. These are objective aspects of dialectics based on which alternative possibilities for development result. Humans make their own history based on given conditions. Freedom is comprehended and apprehended necessity. Humans can shape society under given conditions if they have understood necessity, the possibilities that are inherent in society. The c

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determinate negation of capitalism occurs if and when the proletariat has become conscious of itself and of the conditions and processes which make up its society. . . . None of the given alternatives is by itself determinate negation unless and until it is consciously seized in order to break the power of intolerable

Critical theory today 61 conditions and attain the more rational, more logical conditions rendered possible by the prevailing ones. (Marcuse 1964b, 222f.) Conscious human activity within existing conditions is, as subjective factor, an important aspect of the dialectic of society. Marcuse understood that the concept of human practice is needed for conceiving dialectics in a non-deterministic form and that thereby the notion of freedom can be situated in dialectical philosophy. It is a wrong claim that there is a tendency in Marcuse's works to 'dissolve the objective contradiction into subjective disagreement and that he neglects immanent contradictions of capitalism (Schiller 1993, 115f). For Marcuse, objective contradictions condition, constrain and enable subjective action and objective reality is the result of the realization of possibilities that are constitutive features of objective reality by human practice. Dialectics are, for Marcuse, based on the dialectics of subject and object, freedom and necessity. Dialectics are the unity of the subjective dialectic and the objective dialectic. By having elaborated such a meta-dialectic, Marcuse was able to work against the ideas and political practice of deterministic dialectics. Determinate negation can be forestalled by ideology or direct violence, which means that society becomes all-totalitarian and contradictions are suppressed. But there is always the possibility for determinate negation. If negating forces are forestalled, it becomes the task of political praxis to restore the conditions for protest by protesting. Also Ernst Bloch conceived history as open process that is shaped by class struggles and societal structures. 5

Dialectic in the world that is made by humans is subject-object-relation, nothing else; it is elaborated subjectivity that overhauls and tries to explode its own objectification and objectivity over and over. Latterly, the needy subject is always the driver of the historically emerging contradictions by finding itself and its labour inadequately objectified. (Bloch 1962,512) For Bloch, the important category for describing the subject-object dialectic was matter, whereas for Marcuse it was the notion of human essence. For Bloch (1962,409), matter was dialectical, processual and open. In relation to society, this means that humans 'exist in the ensemble of conditioning societal relations and can at the same time act as 'producers and transformers of these relations (ibid., 415). Subjective and objective factors 5

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are always interlaced, in dialectical interplay, and only the isolating overemphasis of the one (whereby the subject becomes the ultimate fetish) or the other (whereby the object becomes the ultimate factum in a seemingly automatism) tears subject and object apart. (Bloch 1962, 286) For Bloch (1962, 515), the objective dialectic included in the form of illness, crisis, barbarism has also the possibility of an 'obliterative negation , nothingness and annihilation. Therefore, the negation of the negation is no automatism and 'by no means 5

62 Theory capable of developing itself out of its own objectivity' (ibid., 516). Bloch saw the possibility of active hope in situations where S (subject) is not-yet P (predicate). He concluded that human intervention is necessary to consciously make history and to subíate alienation, so that the world becomes the home of humans (ibid., 519). One must correspondingly calculate and act with the algebra of revolution, and negative forces are, just like the night, not untreated the human being's friend. . . . The contradiction must be seized and must be actively seizable; . . . Especially the algebra of revolution does not know an antagonism of all negative factors that unstruggles itself; it also does not know this automatism. (Bloch 1962, 149) The negation of the negation was, for Bloch, only possible by class struggle. It unites objectivity and subjectivity - 'the factor of subjective contradiction in combination with the objectively erupted ones' (ibid., 150). The subjectively negating power was, for Bloch (ibid., 150), the 'advancement of the productive explosive character of the objective contradictions'. Stalinist dialectics and negative dialectics underemphasize the role of human subjects in dialectical processes and, therefore, advance structuralist-functionalistic approaches that conceive humans as being imprisoned within structures and surrendered to automatically developing structural conditions. The advantage of Marcuse's and Bloch's subject-object dialectics is that these approaches are human centred, take into account the conditioned transformative capacities of human subjects and help to give a realistic account of human existence in general and human existence in capitalism. Frederic Jameson (2009, 5) argues that the orthodox dialectic of nature speaks of 'the dialectic' with a definite article 'to subsume all the varieties of dialectical thinking under a single philosophical system, and probably, in the process, to affirm that this system is the truth, and ultimately the only viable philosophy'. Anti-foundational critiques of this position take the position that there are 'many dialectics' with an indefinite article, 'multiple dialectics' (ibid., 15) that contain incommensurable elements. A third position that is favoured by Jameson is the one that replaces 'the noun, singular and plural alike, definite as well as indefinite, with the adjective' (ibid., 50) 'dialectical'. Jameson (ibid., 66-70) argues in this context for the importance of analysing spatial dialectical processes in contemporary society. His version of the dialectic is rather eclectic; he does not elaborate interconnected elements of a dialectical philosophy or a philosophical ,system. But Jameson's ideas about dialectical processes can be used as stimulus for thinking about how dialectical philosophy explains various levels of reality. A dialectic of dialectics assumes that there are general dialectical principles, such as negation and permanent development through negations of the negation and sublations, but also contends that these general principles take on different forms on different levels of reality (such as nature and society or different types of society). So in capitalist society, there is a difference between objective capitalist contradictions (such as the ones between use value and exchange value, production and consumption, the worker and the machine, the social character of production and the individual character of the appropriation of economic products) that produce crises and subjective contradictions (struggles against the system for transforming or preserving

Critical theory today 63 the system). Marcuse and Bloch have shown that the objective dialectic and the subjective dialectic of society are dialectically related in a dialectic of dialectics, a metadialectic that shapes society. Structures and agency in society form two poles and levels that create each other and thereby enable the existence and reproduction of society. In capitalism, the dialectic of object and subject, structures and actors takes on the form of a dialectic of crisis and social struggles. A systemic crisis creates the conditions for struggles, but struggles from below (by dominated groups) against the system do not emerge automatically, whereas the continuation or transformation of struggles from above (from dominant groups against dominated groups) is the likely result of the emergence of a crisis. Crisis creates the conditions for structural changes that are achieved by agency. But it is undetermined if this change of strategies and struggles results in the reproduction of the overall system or a decisive break and fundamental transformation. Jameson terms this relative openness of the dialectical process Valences of the dialectic': For Marx many features of capitalism - the division of labor ('cooperation'), the expansion of firms in the direction of monopoly - constitute what one may characterize as negative, yet potentially positive, phenomena. They are now in this system places of exploitation, yet in the revolutionary change in system they become positive. (Jameson 2009, 48) The negative is 'the potential source of new social initiatives and new social organization', 'the very space of the imaginary, and thus of the future or, in our sense, of Utopia, as yet unrealized although a conceptualized possibility' (ibid., 49). So, for example, economic crises produce negative results such as the increase of unemployment, precarious living conditions, lower wages and so on, but they can also trigger the emergence of spaces of active hope that allow imagining alternatives to capitalism and anti-systemic struggles. Complex systems are non-linear: small causes can have large effects and large causes small effects; one cause can have many effects and one effect many causes. Naive realism in contrast portrays human existence, and especially human consciousness, as the one-dimensional result of outside reality. Hans Heinz Holz (2005) confronts the criticism of Lenin's metaphor of cognition as reflection of matter by arguing that reflection is not only an epistemológica! fact but also a fundamental characteristic of matter. Reflection means that 'a system of material relations should be understood as system of interactions between the manifold worldly elements in the sense of a transfer of determinations of shape (informaré)' (ibid., lOOf.). 'A affects B und creates a change of movement or state in B that can be seen as "expression" or "projection" or "image" of the impact of A. The transformed B retroacts on A so that the effect from A to B now retroacts on A' (ibid., 239). 'If the mirror image is itself also a mirror, so a double mirroring emerges, in which mirror image and mirror change their functions in the mirror relation in each instance' (ibid., 534). In my opinion, an analysis of the kind of causality that underlies the described relationship (linear or complex, non-linear causality) is missing in Holz's account. This question is important to conceive the relation of base and superstructure, productive forces and relationships

64 Theory of production, being and consciousness, economy and history, object and subject and so on, not as mechanic and being determined in the last instance, but as complex and dialectical, or, as Stuart Hall (1983) says, as being determined in the first instance, so that boundary conditions, constraints and a space of possibilities for entities of the superstructure emerge. The metaphor of the mirror can explain interactions of systems, but both the metaphor of the mirror and the mirror image are connoted with passiveness, linearity, unambiguousness, mathematical exactness, predictability, mechanistic causality and injectivity. Complex causality, in contrast, implies activity, non-linearity, ambiguity, incompleteness and unpredictability. Dialectics of chance and necessity, subject and object, the many and the one shape the causality of complex systems. Complex systems are dialectical systems. Complex causality is a form of multidimensional and ambivalent reflection. It is not an arbitrary relation, but a relation that is varying within certain possibilities. In a complex system, the space of possibilities is determined, whereas the realization of possibilities is open. Therefore, one should not speak of mirrors or mirror images for describing dialectical relations, but rather of complex, non-linear reflection. To avoid deterministic dialectics, it is not sufficient to integrate the idea of the interaction of systems into dialectical philosophy, also the form of the relationship between opposing poles (linear, non-linear, etc.) is important. If one conceives the relationship of parts of a whole and the relationship of wholes as relationship of interactive reflection and the causality of this relationship as complex and non-linear, then one arrives at a universal dialectical principle of complex-causal interaction: each system interacts with systems in its environment, which means that they mutually change each other's state in ways that are complex and not predetermined. Other systems determine a space of possibilities for the future development of a system by reflection processes. The further development of the system is constituted by activities of the system itself, so that existing possibilities that are part of the space of possibilities can be realized. Hans Heinz Holz (2005, 176, 186-190) considers the encroaching (übergreifen, ineinandergreifen) of a category or thing into its opposite as an important dialectial principle. Identity and difference are contained in each other. 'Something is by being manifest in its opposite' (ibid., 187). This means that a dialectical relationship consists not just of two poles that are connected and separated at the same time but also that there is interaction: A acts on B and causes structural changes in B, B acts on A and causes structural changes in A . Dialectical relations contain two negating poles. If the contradiction between the two poles develops, then the negative relation of the two mutually negating poles is negated, which means that the contradiction results in a new result. Hegel speaks of this process as the negation of the negation. Negation of the negation is 'the effected coincidence of each with its other' (Hegel 1812, §1343). The negation of the negation produces a new unity of two negating poles: What we now in point of fact have before us, is that somewhat comes to be an other, and that the other generally comes to be an other. Thus essentially relative to another, somewhat is virtually an other against it: and since what is passed into is quite the same as what passes over, since both have one and the

Critical theory today 65 same attribute, viz. to be an other, it follows that something in its passage into other only joins with itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and in the other, is the genuine Infinity. Or, under a negative aspect: what is altered is the other, it becomes the other of the other. Thus Being, but as negation of the negation, is restored again: it is now Being-for-self. (Hegel 1830, §95) The negation of the negation produces positive results, it is determinate negation: 'the negation of the negation is something positive' (Hegel 1812, §168). The negation of the negation is the process by which being develops infinitely. Hegel (ibid., §517), therefore, speaks of an infinite process of unification: the negation of the negation is 'an infinite unity', an 'infinite unity of the negativity with itself (ibid., §1326). 'Something becomes an other; this other is itself somewhat; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum' (Hegel 1830, §93). I have stressed that, in society, negation of the negation is only constituted through human action. The exact result of this process is not determined. There is permanent change in society, but how fundamental or affirmative these changes are is not predetermined but depends on the political consciousness and the availability and mobilization of resources for struggles. Therefore, the determinate negation of society does not automatically produce a morally positive result. Society is moving, there is always change at some level of reality Fundamental change is possible but not certain. If there is fundamental change, then it is also not predetermined if this change is morally positive in character. Hegel (1812, §372) connects the notion of the negation of the negation to the one of sublation (Aufhebung): Being 'is self-mediated through negation of the negation; being is posited as the unity which pervades its determinatenesses, limit, etc., which are posited in it as sublated'. Sublation is at the same time 'coming-to-be and ceasingto-be' (ibid., §180). 'We mean by it (1) to clear away, or annul: thus, we say, a law or regulation is set aside; (2) to keep, or preserve: in which sense we use it when we say: something is well put by' (Hegel 1830, §96). 'To sublate' has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its influences, in order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated. (Hegel 1812, §185) Sublation is at the same time uplifting, preservation and elimination. Roy Bhaskar has, as we have seen, in my opinion correctly stressed that there are different kinds of sublations and negations of the negation. There are real negations, transformative negations and radical negations (real negations > transformative negations > radical negations). A l l of these negations are forms of negating the negative and sublating contradictions. There are different kinds of sublations that produce different kinds of results. This means that in sublation there are varying degrees of preservation and

66 Theory elimination of qualities of the two poles of a dialectical relation. Not all negations of the negation produce radical novelty, only some of them are revolutionary sublations of the status quo. Other negations of the negation are only transformative, they do not create novelty at a fundamental level of social systems or society but at a more superficial level (at a smaller level of granularity of social or societal reality), so that the overall existing system can reproduce itself. The collapse of the Soviet system shows that Adorno, Bhaskar and Negri are to a certain extent right in questioning deterministic accounts of the dialectic of history. History is neither universal progress nor universal retrogression, it is a history of possibilities that can be realized or missed. It is, therefore, important to conceive structure and action, necessity and chance, the negative and the positive, dialectically and to situate these dialectics within the actual possibilities of human praxis. Both Marcuse and Bloch understood in contrast to many other dialecticians how to conceive of a truly dialectical dialectic. An important problem in social theory is how to conceive the relationship of structures and human agency Action theories tend to overestimate agency and to underestimate the effects of structures on actors. Structuralist and functionalist theories tend to overestimate the constraining effects of structures on actors and to underestimate the conditioned freedom of human agency. Integrative social theories are approaches that aim at overcoming the divide between structuralism and action theory in social theory (for a detailed discussion see Fuchs 2003a, 2003b, 2008, chapter 3; Fuchs and Hofkirchner 2009). The elements of general social theory that can be found in the works of Marx can be interpreted as an early integration approach. For example, Marx (1844, 103) argued that 'just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him . This means that social structures create and permanently recreate the sociality of the human being, which enables the latter to create and differentiate social structures, which again create and recreate human sociality and so on. The notion of the dialectic of structures and actors can be found in some important contemporary dialectical social theories. Marcuse and Bloch's social philosophies were already mentioned. Other examples are the social theories of Bhaskar, Archer, JeanPaul Sartre, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens. In his Transformative Model of Social Activity, Bhaskar (1993, 153) introduces the notion of the 'dialectics of structure and agency': 'social structure is a necessary condition for, and medium of, intentional agency, which is in turn a necessary condition for the reproduction or transformation of social forms'. Margaret Archer distinguishes between 'people's emergent properties' (PEPs), 'structural emergent properties' (SEPs) and 'cultural emergent properties' (CEPs). Her approach of Social Realism is based on the 'dialectical relationship between personal and social identities' (Archer 2002, 18), 'a synthesis such that both personal and social identities are emergent and distinct, although they contributed to one another's emergence and distinctiveness' (ibid.). Bhaskar and Archer understand society as the permanent emergence of structures based on human identity and activity. Jean-Paul Sartre (1947, 22) in his later philosophical writings about dialectical philosophy to a certain extent relativized his earlier, more individuaHstic assumptions, as, for example, that 'man is nothing other than what he makes of himself, that 'man is condemned to be free' and 'free, because once cast into the world, he is responsible 5

Critical theory today 67 for everything he does' (ibid., 29), or that human existence precedes human essence (ibid., 49), and elaborated a dialectical social theory. The task for existentialism was therefore, for Sartre (1963, 83), to 'reconquer man within Marxism' after the 'expulsion of man' from 'Marxist knowledge' (ibid., 179). Sartre (1976, 36) conceived the dialectic as both constituted by man and as structuring man: 'man must be controlled by the dialectic in so far as he creates it, and create it in so far as he is controlled by it'. Thus we encounter a new contradiction: the dialectic is the law of totalisation which creates several collectivities, several societies, and one history - realities, that is, which impose themselves on individuals; but at the same time it must be woven out of millions of individual actions. We must show how it is possible for it to be both a resultant, though not a passive average, and a totalising force, though not a transcendent fate, and how it can continually bring about the unity of dispersive profusion and integration. (1976, 36) Sartre (1963, 92) also said that 'man is the product of his product', 'at once both the product of his own product and a historical agent' (ibid., 87). Sartre spoke of the 'dialectic of the subjective and the objective', 'the joint necessity of "the internalization of the external" and "the externalization of the internal'" (ibid., 97). Sartre's progressive-regressive method considers simultaneously 'the objective result' and the 'original condition' of social processes (ibid., 154). The first is the structural result of human action; the second are structural conditions of action. Both aspects are interdependent. Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens are two other scholars who have based their theories on the dialectic of structures and agency. Bourdieu argues that there is a dialectical relationship between the objective structures and the cognitive and , motivating structures which they produce and which tend to reproduce them, . . . these objective structures are themselves products of historical practices and are constantly reproduced and transformed by historical practices whose productive principle is itself the product of the structures which it consequently tends to reproduce. (Bourdieu 1977, 83; see also Fuchs 2003a) For Bourdieu, the concept that establishes the connection between structures and agency is that of the habitus. Giddens (1984, 25) has formulated the dialectic as duality of structure: According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize' (see also Fuchs 2003b). One aspect that these approaches have in common is that they consider themselves as realist theories that are not naive but dynamic and acknowledge the importance of active humans and their social relationships in society. However, not all of these approaches are critical theories. The approach, which most clearly can be considered as a critical theory, is Bhaskar's Dialectical Critical Realism. For Bhaskar, there is a

68 Theory normative feature in dialectical thinking that he terms Moral Realism. Its central feature would be absenting absence. This encompasses the absenting of constraints, including ills generally, which comprise lack of freedoms. . . . Dialectic is the process of absenting constraints on absenting absences (ills, constraints, untruths, etc.) (Bhaskar 1993, 102, 297). Dialectic would be the axiology and pulse of freedom (Bhaskar 1993, 378, 385). 'Dialectic is the yearning for freedom and the transformative negation of constraints on it' (ibid., 378). Also Sartre's dialectical philosophy can be considered as being critical. Sartre (1963, xxxiv), for example, considered Marxism as 'the one philosophy of our time', elaborated a form of humanist Marxism and argued that both Marxism and existentialism want 'to situate man in his class and in the conflicts which oppose him to other classes' (ibid., 173). Besides being an ontological principle that constitutes the world and society, the dialectic also constitutes an epistemológica! method of seeing, conceptualizing, analysing and presenting the world or parts of the world and society. David Harvey (2010a) stresses, for example, Karl Marx's dialectical mode of presentation in Capital, Volume I. This involves 5

a gradual unfolding of the argument that works through oppositions that are brought back into unities (like the money-form) that internalize a contradiction which in turn generates yet another duality . . . This is Marx's dialectical method of presentation at work, and it continues throughout the whole of Capital. (Harvey 2010a, 26) What are the advantages of grounding a critical theory of society in dialectical philosophy? 1

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Complexity: The concept of dialectical contradictions allows to avoid one sidedness and to analyse society as complex system. In dialectical thinking, two categories that describe reality are conceived as standing in relations of absence, difference, interdependence, mutual constitution, relation and mediation. The logic of 'both . . . and' is superior to the logic of 'either. . . or', because it enables complex thinking. One-dimensional thought and reductionism are characteristic for dominative societies that want to legitimatize the domination of one group or class over another and use simplifications of reality for doing so. Critical theory opposes ideology, fetishism, reification, false consciousness, instrumental reason, technological rationality and one-dimensional consciousness by the concept of dialectical thinking. Dialectical thinking sees reality as complex, a developing process, full of potentials for change and as contradictory. It assumes that to each pole of reality there is a second pole that opposes (negates) thefirstpole and points towards a different reality. Dialectical thought is, therefore, 'two-dimensional' (Marcuse 1964b, 85). It operates with 'transcendent, critical notions' (ibid.): 'The dialectical concepts transcend the given social reality in the direction of another historical structure which is present as a tendency in the given reality' (Marcuse 1937a, 86). Dynamics: Dialectical philosophy conceives reality as dynamic. It avoids conceiving society as static and unchangeable. Dialectical thinking is, therefore, suited for

Critical theory today 69 describing change processes such as social struggles and crises. It is oriented not only on what society is but also on what it can potentially become. Static descriptions in the analysis of society fulfil frequently the role of describing the status quo as the only possibility of existence to forestall potential changes. For Marx, descriptions of society as being unchangeable are ideologies. He said that ideology misrepresents reality to console humans and forestall societal change. He formulated, in this context, his well-known critique of religion, in which he said that religion is the 'opium of the people (MEGW 3, 175). For Marx, an ideology is a partial, simplified and distorted representation of reality. He, therefore, also spoke of 'an inverted consciousness of the world (MECW 3, 175) and said that 'in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura (MEGW 5, 14). Marx (1867, 1885, 1894) developed the critique of domination and ideology critique into a critique of capitalism that he most prominently formulated in his main work Capital: Critique of the political economy. He argued that capitalism is an unjust society, because workers produce goods, surplus value and money profit that they do not own but that are owned by capitalists. Also, workers would not own the means that they use for producing goods. He, therefore, spoke of class relationships and the exploitation of human labour power that is needed for the accumulation of capital. Marx (1867, 874) identified the 'complete separation between the workers and the ownership of the conditions or the realization of their labour . He characterized these conditions as alienation. Marx reformulated ideology critique in Capital as fetishism of commodities: commodities and capitalism advance a logic that tries to make people believe that they cannot live without things such as money and commodities. Marx said that money and commodities are only the results of the social relationships of human beings and that capitalism creates the impression that human conditions are determined by things and not by social relationships. As a result, it would seem like capitalism, commodities and money are natural forms of human existence, although they are in reality historical expressions of dominative social relationships. Marx (ibid., 164) speaks in this context of 'the mystical character of the commodity and that in capitalism 'the definite social relation between men assumes 'the fantastic form of a relation between things (ibid., 165). Georg Lukacs reformulated Marx s concepts of ideology, alienation and commodity fetishism with the category of reification. For Lukacs, reification meant that humans are treated like things or relegated to the status of things. He said that the effect of reification on consciousness is that some humans perceive reality different from how it is actually. Reification means 'that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires "phantom objectivity , an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people (Lukacs 1923/1972, 83). Max Horkheimer reformulated the concept of reification in his notion of instrumental reason. Instrumental reason means that human cognition is manipulated in such a way that it tends to behave like an automatic machine. It reacts to certain stimuli in a predetermined manner and sees reality only from one perspective that neglects alternative qualities, possibilities and viewpoints. 5

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70 Theory The more ideas have become automatic, instrumentalized, the less does anybody see in them thoughts with a meaning of their own. They are considered things, machines. Language has been reduced to just another tool in the gigantic apparatus of production in modern society. Every sentence that is not equivalent to an operation in that apparatus appears to the layman just as meaningless as it is held to be by contemporary semanticists who imply that the purely symbolic and operational, that is, the purely senseless sentence, makes sense. Meaning is supplanted by function or effect in the world of things and events. In so far as words are not used obviously to calculate technically relevant probabilities or for other practical purposes, among which even relaxation is included, they are in danger of being suspect as sales talk of some kind, for truth is no end in itself. (Horkheimer 1947/1974, 15)

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Herbert Marcuse used the term technological rationality for describing the phenomenon of instrumental reason. He wanted to express that ideology and manipulation try to make human consciousness and human behaviour function like an automatic machine that has only a limited set of available response behaviours. Technological rationality contains Elements of thought which adjust the rules of thought to the rules of control and domination' (Marcuse 1964b, 138). Technological rationality denies that reality could be other than it is today. It neglects alternative potentials for development. It aims at 'liquidating the oppositional and transcending elements' (ibid., 56). Technological rationality causes a one-dimensional thinking, in which 'ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe' (ibid., 12). Chance and necessity: The causal logic of mechanistic determinism explains historical development as being predetermined. Human capabilities for transformative action are thereby underestimated. The causality underlying the logic of indeterminism explains societal development as purely accidental, human capacities for action are overestimated. The concept of dialectical determination is based on the causal figure of chance and necessity. The development of society is seen as the conditioned realization of possibilities that are structurally inherent in a certain state or phase of development of society. History is conditionally open, it is shaped by existing structures and existing actions, which means that its diversity is enabled and constrained by existing structures. Therefore, Marx argued that 'Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past' (MEW 8, 115). Individual and society: If society is conceived as being based in essence on a dialectic of human actors (and their practices) and societal structures, it can be avoided to conceive the dogmatization of individualism (capitalism: individual economic liberties without social justice) and the dogmatization of collectivism (totalitarianism, fascism: homogenization without individuality) as desirable forms of society and the principle of a co-operative society (individuality by socialization, socialization based on well-rounded individuality) can be grounded.

Critical theory today 11 5

Accusation, demand, praxis: Dialectical concepts demand a different reality - one in which essence and existence of society do not diverge. The realization of such a society is seen as the practical task of humans in social struggles: The dialectical concepts transcend the given social reality in the direction of another historical structure which is present as a tendency in the given reality. The positive concept of essence, culminating in the concept of the essence of man, which sustains all critical and polemical distinctions between essence and appearance as their guiding principle and model, is rooted in this potential structure. (Marcuse 1937a, 86) So, for example, positive bourgeois concepts such as entrepreneur, profit, wage, employer or employee are confronted by critical categories such as the one of surplus value with their own negativity. Critical categories include their negation of the negation - in the case of the category of surplus value, this is a co-operative society without surplus value. Critical categories are, therefore, also political demands for the transformation of society and for political struggles that realize these demands. If, for instance, it is said that concepts such as wages, the value of labor, and entrepreneurial profit are only categories of manifestations behind which are hidden the 'essential relations' of the second set of concepts, it is also true that these essential relations represent the truth of the manifestations only insofar as the concepts which comprehend them already contain their own negation and transcendence - the image of a social organization without surplus value. All materialist conceptions contain an accusation and an imperative. When the imperative has been fulfilled, when practice has created men's new social organization, the new essence of man appears in reality. (Marcuse 1937a, 86)

2.5 Conclusion What is today widely known as critical theory is rooted in the works of Karl Marx (Ritzer 2008, 283). The notion of critical theory is today also widely associated with the works of the so-called Frankfurt school that consisted of critical scholars such as Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse and Jiirgen Habermas (Held 1980; Jay 1996; Wiggershaus 1995). The works of the Frankfurt school were grounded in the works of Karl Marx and the Marx interpretation of Georg Lukacs. I have stressed in section 2.1 of this chapter that critical theory questions all forms of domination in society (critique of domination) and thought systems that legitimatize domination (ideology critique). It was also argued that all critical theories are rooted in Karl Marx's works and that this legacy of critical theory should be renewed. I have argued in section 2.2 that there is a difference between positivist critique, postmodern critique and Marxist critique. Only the latter is able to provide a satisfying

72 Theory approach for the philosophical problem of how to relate immanence and transcendence in society. Potentials for the future development of society are immanent in the structures of society and social systems that are created by human beings. How future society can look like is shaped and conditioned by existing society how it will actually look like is determined by human actions and political struggles that are conditioned, which means to a certain extent constrained and to a certain extent enabled by existing structures. To create a society that is different than the existing one, humans need to transcend the current epoch. That a participatory society is the best and most desirable form of existence for humans and society is grounded in the co-operative essence of society and humans. Such a society can only be realized, if humans create a successful transcendental project that establishes a correspondence of essence and existence of society. I have argued in section 2.3 that the debate about the relationship between base and superstructure has been renewed in critical theory in the discussion about redistribution and recognition between Nancy Eraser and Axel Honneth. Fraser advances a dualistic approach in which redistribution and recognition are two important but separate goals. Honneth argues for a moral monism in which recognition is the central value and covers both cultural and economic aspects. I have argued for an approach in which questions of how resources are distributed are of central importance. Recognition has been considered as a cultural form of distribution, and it has been argued that there are also economic and political forms of distribution in society. Clearly, Frankfurt school scholars have been very important influences in Marxist theory In section 2.4, I have especially stressed that the dialectical philosophies of Herbert Marcuse and Ernst Bloch allow conceiving the relationship of human subjects (agents) and societal objects (structures) as dialectical, so that existing structures enable and constrain human action and open up a field of possible developments for society and social systems, based on which humans reproduce existing structures or create new structures. The possibilities and the likelihood of fundamental social change are, therefore, based on existing power structures. The subject-object dialectic of Marcuse and Bloch is a viable alternative to structuralist-functionalist forms of dialectic that underestimate the importance of humans in the dialectic of society and reduce societal development to automatic processes without human subjects. Jacques Derrida (1994, 110) characterizes the dialectical method as 'systemic, metaphysical or ontological totality'. He has introduced the concept of difference to stress 'that there is a non-oppositional difference that transcends the dialectic' and that there is an element in a dialectical relationship 'that does not let itself be dialecticized' (Derrida 2001, 32). He speaks of a 'dialecticity of dialectics that is itself fundamentally not dialectical' (ibid.). Kojin Karatani (2003, 4) uses the notion of the parallax for describing oscillations between positions, between two poles. It is 'a transversal and transpositional movement' (ibid., 4) and a 'constant transposition' (ibid., 3) that is at the heart of his concept of transcritique. He argues that Kant grounded the parallax between subject and object and that this parallax became extinguished in Hegel's philosophy (ibid., 2f.). Zizek has, based on Karatani, further elaborated the concept of the parallax. He defines the parallax view as a 'constantly shifting perspective between two points between which no synthesis or mediation is possible' (Zizek 2006, 4). There is

Critical theory today 73 an 'irreducible gap between the positions itself (ibid., 20). He not only sees the parallax view as the 'first step in the rehabilitation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism' (ibid., 4) but also points out the proximity of this concept to Derrida's difference (ibid., 11). Badiou (2007b) says that the 'dialectical theory of negation' is 'outdated'. In trying to clarify the political situation, we also need to search for a new formulation of the problem of critique and negation. . . . Contrary to Hegel, for whom the negation of the negation produces a new affirmation, I think we must assert that today negativity, properly speaking, does not create anything new. It destroys the old, of course, but does not give rise to a new creation. (Badiou 2007b) For Badiou (2007a), negation is destruction and subtraction. Destruction is the negative part of the negation, subtraction the affirmative one. In any case we name subtraction this part of negation which is oriented by the possibility of something which exists absolutely apart from what exists under the laws of what negation negates. So negation is always, in its concrete action — political or artistic - suspended between destruction and subtraction. (Badiou 2007a) For Badiou, 'there is no possible universal sublation of particularity as such' (Badiou and Zizek 2009, 29), every universal is 'a singularly that is subtracted from identitarian predicates' (ibid., 30). These authors not only share criticism of Hegel's dialectic, of Hegelian-Marxist dialectics and of the concept of the determinate negation but also have tried to overcome these perceived limits by introducing elements into the concept of the dialectical relationship that constitute a difference gap between the two poles that is irreducible, non-dialectizable, non-integratable. No matter how different the philosophies of Derrida, Karatani, Zizek and Badiou might be, they converge in what Frederic Jameson (2009) has characterized as postmodern 'multiple dialectics' that stress incommensurable elements. But what if the antagonism between exploiters and the exploited is overcome and a classless society emerges? Classes will vanish (destruction), nonowners will become collective owners (new quality), and the existing wealth and instruments of production will remain important material foundations of society that take on new forms (preservation). In this Hegelian Aufhebung (sublation) difference does not vanish, because in the dialectical process new qualities emerge. Incommensurability is built into the concept of the Hegelian dialectic itself. What is the irreducible, incommensurable, non-dialectizable, non-overcomeable, subtractable parallax gap of the dialectical relation between exploiters and the exploited? There is none. The relationships all resolve around private property, the control and noncontrol of private property. This relationship can be overcome; private property is dialectizable and does not constitute an 'irreducible gap' (Zizek) that cannot be synthesized or mediated. The overcoming of the gap between control and non-control of private property is the process of revolutionary politics. To assume that there is a nonovercomeable gap between the exploiters and the exploited so that we can only shift

74 Theory between the different positions of these two groups takes the revolutionary potential out of dialectical philosophy it reduces dialectics to affirmation of class society and considers class antagonisms as eternal. By using the logic of concepts such as difference, the parallax view and subtraction, even a radical thinker such as Slavoj Zizek ends up with philosophical concepts that imply postmodern reformism at the political level (which contradicts the goals and categories of his own political philosophy). The alternative to postmodern dialectics is to assume with Marcuse and Bloch that the determinate negation is not a deterministic, but a revolutionary concept, to assume with Bhaskar that there are different forms of negation (real negation > transformative negation > radical negation), and to see determinate negation not as a systemic or natural law but as something that must be created by humans in social struggles against capitalism and other forms of domination. Determinate negation is a possibility and not an automatic necessity; it is transformed from possibility into actuality only by revolutionary politics. The parallax view might be able to explain that two elements in a dialectic cannot be reduced to each other (such as the economy and politics), but it cannot renew dialectical materialism and dialectical philosophy, because it misses the element of the determinate negation and the negation of the negation, which constitute the possibilities for change and radical change. If you apply the notion of the parallax gap as 'new dialectical materialism to the situation of the relationship between exploiters and the exploited, then you end up oscillating between the positions of the two groups without considering the revolutionary sublation of this relationship as real possibility in the categorical universe. You end up with postmodern reformism in philosophical terms at the political level. The foundations of critical theory that have been elaborated in chapter 2 allow us to next discuss some theoretical foundations of critical media and information studies. 5

Notes 1 Translation from: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/ intro.htm (accessed on September 30, 2008). 2 'Er muß, um sein Dasein als Völkerparasit fuhren zu können, zur Verleugnung seiner inneren Wesensart greifen. 5

3

Critical media and information studies

The basic idea of this chapter is to reflect on how the notion of critical theory can be applied to information studies and media studies. What does it mean to study information and media in a critical way? First, some theoretical foundations of media and communication studies and information science are outlined (section 3.1). Then some theoretical foundations of critical media and information studies are discussed and a typology of approaches in this field is introduced (section 3.2). It is shown how dialectical thinking can be used as an epistemological and methodological tool for critical media and information studies that question technological determinism (section 3.3) and for theorizing the informatization of society (section 3.4). Some conclusions are drawn in section 3.5.

3.1 Information science and media and communication studies 'The title "Communication Studies" covers a vast area of interest and embraces many different disciplines, including journalism, telecommunications, social psychology, physiology, linguistics and semantics' (Gill and Adams 1998, vii). Communication studies 'seeks to understand the production, processing and effects of symbol and signal systems' (Berger and Chaffee 1987, 17). McQuail (2005, 18) identifies six types of communication studies: intrapersonal communication studies, interpersonal communication studies, intragroup communication studies, institutional and organizational communication studies, and mass communication studies. Media studies deal with the production, diffusion and use of communication technologies such as 'television programmes and/or adverts, photographs, films either on video or in the cinema, newspaper articles (or the newspapers themselves), radio programmes and/or jingles, billboards, video games or web pages' (Rayner et al. 2004, 3). These definitions show that communication refers to a symbolic interaction process between human subjects, whereas a medium is an artefact/object/technology that enables communication. Information science is that discipline that investigates the properties and behavior of information, the forces governing the flow of information, and the means of processing information for optimum accessibility and usability. It is concerned with that body of knowledge relating to the organization, collection, organization, storage, retrieval, interpretation, transmission, transformation, and utilization of information. (Borko 1968, 3)

76 Theory 'Information science deals with specifically oriented information techniques, procedures, and systems' (Saracevic 1999, 1056). First, information science is interdisciplinary in nature, however, the relations with other disciplines are changing. . . . Second, information science is inexorably connected to information technology. . . . Third, information science is, with many other fields, an active participant in the evolution of the information society. (Saracevic 1999, 1052) 'Information science is the study of the characteristic of information and how it is transferred or handled. It is concerned with the way people create, collect, organize, label, store, find, analyse, send, receive and use information in making decisions' (Tenopir 1985, 5). 'The task of information science can then be defined as the exploration of this world of objective knowledge' (Brookes 1980, 125). In many definitions of information science, one finds the aspect that this field deals with the analysis of the need, production, collection, storage, organization, diffusion, transformation and use of information. Information science covers phenomena such as cognition, semiotics, information classification for libraries, information behaviour, the design and the study of the effects of IT, and information society. Information science and media and communication studies have different histories and traditions, but their topics of study are to a certain extent overlapping. In information science, there is a strong focus on computer technologies and library science, whereas in media and communication studies computer technologies are just one area of study besides other media. Topics such as information, human cognition, human communication, ITs and information society can be found in both media and communication studies and information science. As these two academic fields seem to have overlapping topics of research and teaching, it is important to establish critical approaches in media and communication studies as well as in information science. I therefore use the term critical media and information studies and am trying to contribute some foundations of how critical theory and critical research can look like in both traditions. Phenomena such as models of information and communication, computer and Internet usage, the effects of contemporary media and new media on society, or the information society are important topics in both information science and media and communication studies. If one considers critical studies as important for analysing and theorizing these phenomena then the task arises to discuss and diffuse critical theory and critical research in both these academic traditions. An engineering perspective and a social sciences and humanities perspective shape information science. In media and communication studies, one finds various disciplinary perspectives about the media (legal, economic, political, psychological, cultural, social, technological, etc.). Both fields are multidisciplinary in character. The study of the interrelationship of information and communication technologies (IGTs), mobile technologies, the Internet, and so on, and society has been labelled with categories such as Internet research, IGTs and society, social informatics, informatics and society, new media research, information society theory, information society research/studies, community informatics, Internet studies, web research, and so on. Basarab Nicolescu (2000) speaks of transdisciplinarity in the context of the analysis of different levels of

Critical media and information studies 11 reality that are united in transdisciplinary research. The need for transdisciplinary research arises in contemporary society because of the complexity of its problems that affect many interconnected realms of existence (Klein 2004; Lawrence and Despres 2004). Social science and computer science are the two different levels that are united in IGTs and society research. Nicolescu (1997, 2000) identifies three central aspects of transdisciplinarity: the concept of levels of reality, the logic of the included middle ('there exists a third term T which is at the same time A and non-A', Nicolescu 2000), and complexity. Transdisciplinarity concerns the dynamics engendered by the action of several levels of Reality at once. The discovery of these dynamics necessarily passes through disciplinary knowledge. While not a new discipline or a new superdiscipline, transdisciplinarity is nourished by disciplinary research; in turn, disciplinary research is clarified by transdisciplinary knowledge in a new, fertile way. In this sense, disciplinary and transdisciplinary research are not antagonistic but complementary. (Nicolescu 1997) For connecting computer science and the social sciences, a unity that maintains the disciplinary diversity can be constructed by an included third, by social philosophy. Based on such a general mediation, concrete studies of IGTs and society are possible that are grounded in theoretical foundations. Transdisciplinarity or 'mode 2 research means 5

the mobilization of a range of theoretical perspectives and practical methodologies to solve problems. But, unlike inter- or multi-disciplinarity, it is not necessarily derived from pre-existing disciplines, nor does it always contribute to the formation of new disciplines. The creative act lies just as much in the capacity to mobilize and manage these perspectives and methodologies, their 'external' orchestration, as in the development of new theories or conceptualizations, or the refinement of research methods, the 'internal' dynamics of scientific creativity. (Nowotny etal 2003, 186) IGTs have resulted in the tendency of the convergence of traditional media in the digital medium. They shape and create changes in all realms of human society. IGTs and society is a field that is very important for both information science and media and communication studies. It tends to overcome a clear separation between these two fields; research and theory in the new transdisciplinary field are conducted based on both perspectives. Although some scholars claim that the field of IGTs and society is an interdiscipline (Duff 2000, 180), a new discipline (Vehovar 2006), or an indiscipline (Shrum 2005), a widely held position is that it is a transdisciplinary field (Fuchs 2008; Hunsinger 2005; Lamb and Sawyer 2005; Sawyer and Tyworth 2006). IGTs and society is both part and no-part of information science and media and communication studies: it is an important research topic for both fields, but at the same time requires that they acquire a transdisciplinary methodology. In this context, William

78 Theory Merrin (2009) argues that media studies 1.0 is based on the broadcast model and tends to ignore or downplay the importance of digital media: Although mainstream media studies has not ignored digital media it has, however, largely treated it as a topic that can still be understood through its broadcast-era concepts and categories: as an addition to the broadcast media ecology rather than as a fundamental transformation of its systems of media production, distribution, consumption and use. Digital media is too often included as a last chapter of textbooks: a location simulating contemporary relevance whilst ignoring the impact of digital technologies and use upon all the preceding chapters. It is also still seen as an optional knowledge within the discipline for lecturers and for students - best positioned as a final-year specialist module students may work their way up to, having been tutored in the core of the discipline. Despite growing up within and living in a digital media environment, and despite their excitement at that environment driving them to the subject, first-year students are rarely allowed near digital media in their introductory modules. (Merrin 2009, 2 If.) Merrin concludes that, for studying digital media, an updated version of media studies (media studies 2.0) is needed. The same can be said about information science. For analysing digital media, both fields need to acquire a transdisciplinary character, which also means that their disciplinary boundaries become blurred and that they tend to converge. Ellis (1992) identifies a physical and a cognitive paradigm in information science. Hjorland and Albrechtsen (1994, 41 Off.) distinguish the following paradigms of information science: the object paradigm, the communication paradigm, the behavioural paradigm and the cognitive paradigm. These four approaches would be 'distinctly individualistic . They suggest the approach of domain analysis as collectivist counterpart in information science. Over the last few decades, information science has experienced a shift from a predominantly objectivist view of information theory to focus on the phenomena of relevance and interpretation (Gapurro and Hjorland 2003). Various detailed reviews (ibid.; Cornelius 2002; Machlup and Mansfield 1983) identify three approaches to information: the mechanistic approach, the cognitive approach and the constructivist approach. Capurro and Hjerland (2003) make a distinction among (1) information theory, (2) the cognitive view and (3) domain analysis, sociocognitivism, hermeneutics and semiotics. They interpret the first as objective, the third as subjective, and the second as position between the two. This mapping stands in contradiction to the one given by Hjorland and Albrechtsen (1994), who consider cognitive approaches as individualistic/subjectivistic and domain analysis as collectivistic. Saracevic (1992, 1999) argues that there are three general characteristics of information science: (1) its interdisciplinary character, (2) its connection to IT and (3) it is an active participant in the information society. Saracevic (1992) says that information science vacillates between human and technological ends. The objectivistic focus on IT as tools for transmitting data, as represented by Shannon s and Weaver s information theory, was challenged in information science by 5

5

5

Critical media and information studies 79 Table 3.1 Results from a Delphi study on how to define information science — six models of information science Scope

Domain

Mediating

Model (1) Hi-Tech

Data

Information Knowledge

Message

Focusing on the mediating aspects of D-I-K-M as they are implemented in computer-based technologies Model (2) Technology Focusing on the mediating aspects of D-I-K-M as they are implemented in all types of technologies Focusing on the mediating aspects of D-I-K-M as Model (3) Culture/ they are implemented in human societies Society Inclusive (all Model (4) Human Focusing on all aspects of D-I-K-M as they are aspects) World implemented in the human realm Model (5) Living World Focusing on all aspects of D-I-K-M as they are implemented in the living world Model (6) Living and Focusing on all aspects of D-I-K-M as they are Physical Worlds implemented in all types of biological organisms, human and non-human, and all types of physical objects Source: Zins 2007b, 341.

a turn towards understanding information as a quality of cognizing human subjects. Bertram Brookes (1980) argues that a knowledge structure can be subjective or objective and is changed by the addition of information, so that a transformed knowledge structure emerges: K(S) + AI = K (S + AS). The central feature of this formula is that cognitive states of knowledge (Popper's world 2) are transformed by external information (documents, Popper's world 3). This means that information science, according to Brookes, is interested in how Popper's world 3 shapes world 2. The physical paradigm takes as its primary focus the artefacts, whereas the primary focus of the cognitive paradigm is the people' (Ellis 1992, 60). The cognitivist paradigm was later again challenged by a number of information science scholars. Hjorland and Albrechtsen (1994) argue that cognitivism is individualistic and that a realistic and collectivistic approach is needed. According to them, domain analysis is an information science approach that analyses knowledge in discourse communities. Capurro (1992) argues for a pragmatic turn in information science that conceives information as holistic, hermeneutic, social and pragmatic. He stresses the social character of information and the importance of information sharing. Capurro, Hjorland and Albrechtsen argue for a social science turn, a turn towards society, in information science. Chaim Zins conducted a Delphi study of how to define information science and its basic concepts. Fifty experts participated in defining information science. Zins (2007b) summarized the results in six models of how to define information science (see Table 3.1). Twenty-eight experts participated in mapping the field. Zins (2007a) characterizes 26 of the resulting maps as reflecting the culture model, one as reflecting the living and physical world model, and one as being very general. Zins' study shows that it is an important question for information science in which domains of reality information can be found. Physical systems, biological systems, c

80 Theory human systems, society, technological systems and computer systems are levels of reality that experts in information science consider important for discussing information. The information theory paradigm in information science operated with information models (1) and (2). The cognitivistic turn brought about an extension of the understanding of information towards the inclusion of model (4). The turn towards society has created interest in model (3). Models (5) and (6) can also be found in information science, but according to Zins they only play a minor role. In recent years, the possibility of combining critical theory and information science and information systems research has been stressed (Gecez-Kecmanovic 2005; Day 2001, 2005, 2007; Howcroft and Trauth 2005). Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) have distinguished three approaches in information systems research: positivist, interpretive and critical approaches. They have shown that the positivist approach is the dominant one and have introduced critical information systems research as the third type of approach in information systems research. 'Critical studies aim to critique the status quo, through the exposure of what are believed to be deep-seated, structural contradictions within social systems, and thereby to transform these alienating and restrictive social conditions' (ibid., 5f). In the years following the publication of the foundational article of Orlikowski and Baroudi, critical information systems research has been further elaborated and has especially been connected to Frankfurt school critical theory. Advances in critical information systems research have been documented in the Handbook of critical information systems research (Howcroft and Trauth 2005). However, 'critical IS research is not yet established as a valid and legitimate option' in information systems research (CecezKecmanovic 2005, 19). Critical information system researchers 'assist in demystifying the myths of technological determinism and inevitability of particular IS designs' (ibid., 35). Critical IS research specifically opposes technological determinism and instrumental rationality underlying IS development and seeks emancipation from unrecognized forms of domination and control enabled or supported by information systems. . . . Critical IS researchers produce knowledge with the aim of revealing and explaining how information systems are (mis)used to enhance control, domination and oppression, and thereby to inform and inspire transformative social practices that realize the liberating and emancipatory potential of information systems. (Cecez-Kecmanovic 2005, 19) Ronald E. Day (2001, 120) argues that information science has treated information mainly as a 'reified and commoditized notion'. The unwillingness of research on information to actually attempt to situate a culture of information and communication in terms of interested and powerful social and historical forces is evident by even a brief glance at journals in information management or information studies or in policy papers. Coupled with the dominant tendency of such research to be 'practical' in the service of professional and business organizations and in the service of military and industrial research projects, research in information simply shies away from critical

Critical media and information studies 81 engagement, as well as from foundational, qualitative, or materialist analyses, especially from that which is seen to employ 'pretentious , 'political', or, equally, 'foreign' vocabulary, let alone philosophical or Marxist analyses. Pay 2001, 116f.) 5

Ajit K . Pyati (2006) suggests that critical information studies should be based on a Marcusean infusion because Marcuse's notion of technological rationality allows explaining why information is primarily treated as a commodity and thing in contemporary society and contemporary library and information studies. Marcuse's notion of one dimensionality would allow deconstructing the neoliberal discourse that argues for the privatization and commodification of information and libraries as ideologies. These approaches show that questions of power and domination have thus far been rather ignored in information science and information systems research, but that there are promising approaches that have worked towards establishing critical information studies. Information science does not primarily engage in the task of the intellectual deconstruction of power structures that shape information. If the turn from information theory towards cognitivism is characterized as the first turn in information science and the turn from cognitivism towards society as the second turn in information science, then we can argue what is now needed is a third turn in information science from considering information in society towards considering the power structures of information in society. The third turn of information science is one towards a critical theory of information, IT and information society. Anthony Giddens (1984, xx) sees the 'division between objectivism and subjectivism' as one of the central issues of social theory. Subjective approaches are oriented on human agents and their practices as primary object of analysis, objective approaches on social structures. Structures in this respect are institutionalized relationships that are stabilized across time and space (ibid., xxxi). Integrative social theories (such as the ones by Roy Bhaskar (1993), Pierre Bourdieu (1986a), Anthony Giddens (1984) or Margaret Archer (1995)) aim at overcoming the structure-agency divide in social theory. Burrell and Morgan (1979) combined the distinction between subject and object with the distinction between continuity and discontinuity to identify two axes that set up two dimensions so that four different approaches can be identified in social theory: radical humanism (subjective, radical change), radical structuralism (objective, radical change), interpretive sociology (subjective, continuity) and functionalism (objective, continuity) (see Figure 3.1). The problem with this approach is that in contemporary social theory there are approaches that cross the boundaries between the four fields and that the four paradigms therefore can no longer be strictly separated. The distinction continuity/ discontinuity remains valid in political terms. So for example the approaches by Roy Bhaskar (1993), Pierre Bourdieu (1986a), Anthony Giddens (1984) and Margaret Archer (1995) have in common that they are based on a dialectical subject-object integration. Bhaskar and Bourdieu are overall critical of class society that they want to abolish, whereas Giddens and Archer want to transform modernity, but overall aim at its continuation. The approaches by Bhaskar and Bourdieu could therefore be described as integrative-radical change models, the ones by Giddens and Archer as integrative-continuous theories. This requires certain changes to the typology of Burrell and Morgan that are shown in Figure 3.2.

82 Theory Radical change RADICAL HUMANISM

RADICAL STRUCTURALISM

Objective

Subjective

INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY

FUNCTIONALIST SOCIOLOGY

Continuity

Figure 3.1 Four paradigms of social theory identified by Burrell and Morgan (1979) Radical change RADICAL HUMANISM

RADICAL STRUCTURALISM

RADICAL CHANGE INTEGRATION ISM Subjective

Objective

CONTINUOUS INTEGRATIONISM

INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY

FUNCTIONALIST SOCIOLOGY

Continuity

Figure 3.2 h refined version of Burrell and Morgan's typology A number of communication scholars have stressed that it makes sense to use the typology developed by Burrell and Morgan for identifying different approaches in communication studies and communication theory (Deetz 1994; McQuail 2002; Rosengren 1993, 2000). 'This scheme is equally helpful in mapping out the main alternative approaches to media theory and research, which have been

Critical media and information studies 83 seriously divided by their chosen methodologies and priorities, as well as by their degree of commitment to radical change' (McQuail 2002, 5). 'It is highly relevant when trying to understand different traditions within the study of communication' (Rosengren 2000, 7). Robert T. Craig (1999) has identified seven traditions of communication theory that are based on how communication is defined (see Table 3.2). Although Craig's approach is very relevant and his article (ibid.) has been one of the most frequently cited articles in communication studies in the 2000s, he does not specify an underlying distinctive criterion for his typology, which gives it a rather arbitrary character. Therefore, it makes sense to combine his seven traditions of communication theory with the refined version of Burrell and Morgan's typology. The results are shown in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 shows that critical communication studies are primarily characterized by their radical change perspective, the analysis of how communication contributes to domination and how ways can be found that communication can take place in a dominationless way within a participatory society. This also means that there are subjective, objective and subject-object-dialectical approaches within critical communication studies. Craig mentions several boundary-crossing approaches that can be considered as representing attempts at combining some of the four fields in Figure 3.3: Kenneth Burke, David S. Kaufer and Kathleen M . Carley (rhetoric-semiotics); Briankle Chang and Richard L . Lanigan (phenomenology-semiotics); David S. Kaufer and Brian S. Butler (cybernetics-rhetoric); Klaus Krippendorff (cyberneticsphenomenology); John C. Heritage, Gerald T. Schoening and James A . Anderson (sociocultural studies-phenomenology-semiotics); W. Barnett Pearce (sociocultural studies-rhetoric-cybernetics); Rayme McKerrow (critical studies-rhetoric); Robert Hodge, Gunter Kress and Norbert Fairclough (critical studies-semiotics). For Craig, the characteristic that distinguishes critical communication studies from rhetorical, semiotic, phenomenological, cybernetic, sociopsychological, and sociocultural traditions of communication theory is that for critical communication theory, the basic 'problem of communication' in society arises from material and ideological forces that preclude and distort discursive reflection. . . . Fundamentally, in the tradition of Marx, its point is not to understand the world . . . Its point is to change the world through praxis, or theoretically reflective social action. (Craig 1999, 147f.) Craig worked out the specifics of critical studies and other traditions in communication studies. It should be added to Craig's account of critical communication studies that this approach is not only about the analysis of those conditions that distort communication, the ways how communication is embedded into relations of domination, but also about finding alternative conditions of society and communication that are non-dominative and about struggles for establishing such alternatives. Craig (1999, 120) argues that 'communication theory has not yet emerged as a coherent field study' and that this fragmentation can be overcome by constructing 'a dialogical-dialectical disciplinary matrix' that enables the emergence of a conversational community,

Table 3.2 Seven approaches of communication theory according to Craig (1999) [the examples are mentioned in Craig (1999) or Craig (2007)] Type of approach:Rhetorical

Semiotic

Phenomenological

Cybernetic

SociopsychologicalSociocultural

Critical

Expression, interaction and influence, behaviour in communication situations Subjective

Discursive reflection

C ommunication theorized as:

The practical art Intersubjective of discourse mediation by signs

Experience of otherness; dialogue

Information processing

Subject/object

Subjective

Subjective

Objective

Examples

Aristotie, Lloyd Roland Barthes, E Bitzer, Wendy LeedsKenneth Burke, Hurwitz, John Thomas B. Locke, Charles Farrell, Sonja Morris, Charles Foss, Cindy Sanders Peirce, Griffin, Stephen John Durham W. Littiejohn and Peters and Plato Ferdinand de Saussure

Martin Buber, Briankle G. Chang, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Algis Mickunas, Joseph J . Pilotta and John Robert Stewart

Gregory Bateson, Annie Lang, Niklas Luhmann, Claude Shannon, Paul Watzlawick, Warren Weaver and Norbert Wiener

Objective

Symbolic process that reproduces shared sociocultural patterns Objective

Subjective/ objective Albert Bandura, Peter L. Berger, Theodor W. Charles R. Berger, Deborah Adorno, Stanley Richard J . Cameron, A. Deetz, Jürgen Calabrese, Carl Thomas Habermas, Max Hovland and Luckmann, Horkheimer and Marshall Scott George Sue Curry Poole Herbert Mead, Jansen Mark Poster and James R. Taylor

Critical media and information studies 85 Radical change RADICAL HUMANISM: Critical communication studies

RADICAL STRUCTURALISM: Critical communication studies

RADICAL CHANGE INTEGRATIONISM: Critical communication studies

Subjective

Objective

CONTINUOUS INTEGRATIONISM

ACTOR THEORIES: Rhetorical communication, Phenomenology, Socio-psychological communication, Socio-cultural communication

FUNCTIONALISM: Cybernetics, Semiotics

Continuity

Figure 3.3 A typology of communication theories a common awareness of certain complementarities and tensions among different types of communication theory so it is commonly understood that these different types of theory cannot legitimately develop in total isolation from each other but must engage each other in argument. (Craig 1999, 124) The same can be said about critical communication studies as a subfield of communication studies: a disciplinary matrix of critical communication studies can enhance the dialogue between various subfields of the subfield, such as critical theory, critical political economy, cultural studies, feminist theory, postcolonial theory, queer theory and new social movement approaches in critical communication studies, so that common assumptions and differences about what it means to conduct critical studies of communication can emerge. Diana Iulia Nastasia and Lana E Rakow (2010) characterize the mainstream of communication studies as puzzle-solving science or investigation: the object or problem of analysis is taken for granted, it is a form of hypothesis testing, promotes measurement and the search for laws of communication, it extends the model of the natural sciences to communication studies, and disavows opposition and crossdisciplinary dialogue - it is positivist in character. Based on the study by Horkheimer (1937/2002), we can therefore say that the mainstream of communication studies is a form of traditional science that operates with instrumental reason (Horkheimer 1947/1974) and technological rationality (Marcuse 1964b) as underlying principles. Nastasia and Rakow see critical communication studies as puzzle-making inquiry that is opposed to the puzzle-solving positivist mainstream. 'Theory as puzzlemaking or map-making is an oppositional approach, one that challenges status-quo and questions the settled, one that calls for cross-disciplinary readings and trans-disciplinary

86 Theory flexibility' (Nastasia and Rakow 2010, 8). Critical communication studies (puzzleand question-making inquiry) are seen as being challenging, oppositional, disruptive, subversive and as uncovering power relations and empowering the oppressed (ibid., 1 If.). Todd Gitiin (1978, 206) characterizes the mainstream of media sociology as taking for granted that the media 'exist in a corporate housing and under a certain degree of State regulation' and that they thereby justify 'the existing system of mass media ownership, control, and purpose' (ibid., 205). It would be based on a fetishism of facts, abstract empiricism, an administrative point of view, marketing orientation, and an hierarchic ideology. It ignores that research driven by countability too easily becomes hostage to the political project deemed thinkable, fundable, and feasible at the moment - which often, not always but often, turns out to be precisely the political project that can be quantified on a relatively safe issue. (Gitiin 1990, 189) The ignorance of broader societal issues and of the critique of power is characteristic not only for the two-step flow model of communication but also for other approaches that have shaped media and communication studies, such as the hypodermic needle model of communication, the uses and gratification approach, the agenda setting approach or certain versions of cultural studies. Stuart Hall (1982) describes the existence of a behavioural approach in media studies that he characterizes as ignoring class formations and economic processes, assuming that the media have to play the function of expressing and reflecting an achieved consensus in society. It is based on 'brutal, hard-headed behaviouristic positivism' (ibid., 59). On the one hand, Hall argues that this approach was very early challenged within media studies by the Frankfurt school approach, and on the other hand, he describes a late break with the emergence of what he terms the critical paradigm of media studies. He associates this paradigm with the assumption that the media also favour and legitimatize 'the existing structure of things' (ibid., 63). For Hall, the critical paradigm is bound up with cultural studies, the rediscovery of the ideological dimension of the media, struggles over meaning, the view that the media are not reflections of consensus, but institutions that 'help to produce consensus and which manufactured consent' (ibid., 86), and 'the return of the repressed' (ibid., 88). The analysis of the repressive role of the media and how they shape the lives of repressed individuals and groups and of the media's role in the stabilization of the status quo is characteristic for all forms of critical media studies, such as critical political economy approaches, Frankfurt school critical theory or critical cultural studies. However, Hall sees the analysis of ideologies as an important quality of the critical media studies paradigm that he describes and he sees the analysis of the commodity aspects of the media as rather problematic (ibid., 68). This shows that his understanding of critical media studies is too narrow and tends to exclude critical political economy approaches that are in some cases (e.g. Dallas Smythe, Nicholas Garnham) more interested in the analysis of media capital accumulation strategies, media concentration and so forth than in ideology critique. Although Hall's understanding of critical media studies is too narrow, his discussion shows that a significant difference between information

Critical media and information studies 87 science and media studies is that critical approaches have besides positivist approaches shaped the history of twentieth century media studies and have become important forces within media studies, whereas they have rather remained peripheral and marginalized within information science. Objective notions of information, such as the classical Shannon-Weaver model, see information as a thing that can be treated in certain ways. It can be no accident that such a definition has become the mainstream model of information in the Western world during the twentieth century. In contemporary information society, the 'meaning of information is reduced to the exchange of knowledge about the world. It is neither related to the formative sensory processes themselves nor to moral enhancement (Gapurro 2009,130). If information is seen as a thing then it is obvious to argue that it should be treated as a commodity. Just like humans, who sell their labour power as commodities, milk that is sold in a shop, cars that are sold by car dealers or stocks that are sold on financial markets. The objective notion of information is the foundation of the rise of ITs that are based on the computer and therefore on binary logic. IT has become an important commodity itself, and a medium of advertisement for commodities, and for the selling and transport of information commodities. Therefore, information in its IT form is close to the commodity form and has therefore undergone a process of reification that can also be termed commodification (Fleissner 2006). Commodification, the treatment of social relations as commodities, certainly is not the only type of reification today. One can for example see rape, warfare, media manipulation, racism and xenophobia and so forth as other forms. But commodification is certainly a central form of reification, with which all other forms of reification are articulated. The logic of technological determinism that argues that there are technological fixes to societal problems is an expression of reified consciousness. Klaus Fuchs-Kittowski (2002, 2008) has in contrast to reified information concepts stressed the importance of the unity of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects of information. He considers information as a triad of form (syntax), content (semantics) and effects (pragmatics). The very logic of IT is itself one of reification: computers are based on mechanistic logic. Each input produces an exactly determined output. Computers do not have freedom of action, there is no chance and indeterminacy in binary logic. Computers are undialectical systems. They know no blurring of boundaries, just the logic of either/or. Dialectical logic in contrast operates based on the logic both/and. Therefore, the computer could also be seen as a reified system, one that is based on technological rationality and instrumental reason. The danger in speaking of a computerized society, an information society, a virtual society, a cybersociety a digital society or an IT society is that we reify society itself, that the metaphors of IT or the computer result in a generalization of the undialectical qualities of the computer to society. Lukacs (1923/1972,89) sees calculability as a central aspect of reification processes. In such processes, humans have to function like parts of a machine (ibid.). Each time when humans are reified, for example, if they are manipulated by the media or have to sell their labour power to survive - processes that were described with the category of instrumental reason by Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) and the category of undialectical one-dimensionality by Marcuse (1964b) - we could also say that humans are computerized, they are reduced to the status of things. The logic of the computer - its 5

88 Theory strict instrumental separation - generalized to society is a process of establishing fascism. In a provocative manner, one could therefore say that fascism is inscribed into the computer, and to avoid a fascist society we need political regulation of society that avoids negative effects of computer usage. In an even more provocative way one could say that the computer scientist is the prototype of instrumental reason and therefore always a potential (but not necessarily an actual) fascist. To avoid the realization of these fascist potentials, ethical, normative and critical thinking is needed already in the education of computer scientists. The mass extermination of Jews in extermination camps such as Auschwitz is the ultimate form of reification - the treatment of humans no longer as human, but as things that can be arbitrarily used, abused and killed. Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) argued that Auschwitz is the ultimate result of the modern unfolding of instrumental reason. If instrumental reason is also the immanence of the computer then also Auschwitz is potentially inside of the logic of the digital machine, but not only there. Auschwitz constructed a terroristic binary either/or: Jew/Aryan - dead or alive. Auschwitz itself was a giant negative machine, a machine of destruction of humans based on digital logic. Auschwitz is the ultimate digital machine of capitalist society Auschwitz is the computer of modernization. Defining information as thing advances foundations of reifying information. Such definitions should therefore be considered as being ideologies. Lukacs (1923/1972, 100) stressed that reification of information is an aspect of the reification of humans and society. Reification stamps its imprint upon the whole consciousness of man; his qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of his personality, they are things which he can 'own' or 'dispose o f like the various objects of the external world. (Lukacs 1923/1972, 100) In summary, it can be said that capitalistic computationalism (the techno-deterministic view that humans and society are (binary or dual) machines that are reducible, programmable and calculable) is based on instrumental reason (Golumbia 2009; Weizenbaum 1976). If we want to avoid a second Auschwitz, then we certainly need not abolish IT, but we need to shape society and techno-social systems in ways that avoid the reification of humans and establish a new form of rationality that is based on the notion of cooperation, a logic in which all benefit. The information society is in its capitalistic form (informational capitalism) a highly instrumental society. Therefore, a second Auschwitz might be dawning and needs to be circumvented by all means. Exclusion, oppression, exploitation and warfare are omnipresent and ubiquitous in contemporary society. These phenomena can turn into massive projects of repression. Information and IT are functional parts of repression (Fuchs 2008). The precondition for establishing a humane society is that we put an end to reification. The end of reification is at the same time certainly the end of class society and capitalism. A second type of definition of information is the subjective one. The most prominent subjectivist approach in my opinion is radical constructivism that sees all knowledge as strictly individually constructed. Radical constructivism is therefore based on the worldview of individualism. Individualism is also the ideology that underlies bourgeois society in the form of the notion of private property of the means of production.

Critical media and information studies 89 This fundamental bourgeois human right conflicts with another human right, the one of equality. Capital accumulation has again and again resulted in socioeconomic inequality, as the history of capitalism has shown. If you consider knowledge as an individual creation, you are bound to celebrate individual creativity. A standard legal argument is that individual inventions and creativity need to be protected by property laws. If knowledge is considered as individual creation then the call for intellectual property rights that make sure that knowledge is treated as commodity, that is sold on markets to generate money profit, can easily be legitimated. At the end, subjectivist notions of information turn out to be ideologies that legitimate private property and the commodity form of information. Information is reified to the status of a commodity. Therefore, subjectivist notions of information should be seen as being ideological. A non-reifying notion of information is neither objectivist nor subjectivist. If we consider information as subject-object-dialectic then it is a dynamic processual relation between agents. In human society, it must then be considered as social co-production and co-operation process that transforms systems. If social information is always the result of the social interactions of many interacting humans then there is no natural or moral owner of it. Knowledge is a social, co-operative good. New knowledge is based on old, historical knowledge. Those who produce novel qualities of knowledge stand on the shoulders of giants and use the prior history of all knowledge for free to add something new. If there is no true owner of knowledge then it must be considered as a commons, an aspect of society that is needed for its existence and reproduction and should therefore not be limited or restricted to guarantee the reproduction of society and humans to a full extent. Reifying knowledge, treating it as commodity or limiting it in another way, means to partly destroy the commons of society and therefore to destroy basic necessary resources of society. Reifying knowledge is unjust because it gives certain individuals and groups (who for example have more money) more control of knowledge so that they can derive material benefits from the usage of knowledge, it is undemocratic because it restricts knowledge production and access to certain groups and individuals and excludes others, and it is a form of malrecognition because it denies people knowledge that could be important for creating change, new insights or worldviews. Not just limiting access is ideological but also providing false, useless, unnecessary, stupefying, manipulative knowledge is a form of ideology that is unjust, undemocratic and an expression of malrecognition. The information concept is today connoted with the primary meaning of a message. Messages are entities that can be stored and transmitted. Therefore, this understanding advances a reified and an objectivistic notion of information. Etymologically, the notion of information stems from the Latin word informare, which means to shape something, to give form to something, to bring something into a form. Therefore, information can also be understood as the process of forming and shaping. Based on the notion of informare, information can be conceived as a threefold process of cognition, communication and co-operation (ibid.; Hofkirchner 2002): human information is stored in the brain (cognition), cognitive patterns of individuals form the foundation of and are changed by symbolic interaction processes between two or more humans (communication), based on communication humans can transform the social world and can create new structures (co-operation). Communication is always based on cognition, co-operation is always based on communication and cognition.

90 Theory Anthony Giddens (1984, 25) argues that social structures 'are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize'. Structures are 'always both constraining and enabling' (ibid.). Social structures are properties of society that allow social practices to exist across temporal and spatial distances so that a certain regularity of social actions can be achieved. On the basis of Giddens' argument, we can define a medium as a structure that enables and constrains human action. This is a fairly general understanding of media that has been used in social theory by authors such as Jurgen Habermas (1981) and Niklas Luhmann (1997). For Luhmann (1997), money, power, scientific knowledge, art, love, morals, language and other social structures are symbolically generalized communication media. For Habermas (1981), money and power are steering media. Media organize human actions and enable social relations. A medium connects two entities. In society, a medium is a structure that connects two or more humans. It organizes social relationships. Natural resources (ecological structures), tools (technological structures), property (economic structures), power (political structures), and definition capacities (cultural structures) are the media that we find in all societies (Fuchs 2008, 338f.). In information science and media and communication studies, a strong emphasis is given to specific types of media, those media that enable mass communication, information diffusion to and communication between a large number of humans. Luhmann (1984, 22 If.) speaks of distribution media (Verbreitungsmedien) that enlarge the number of participants of a communication (e.g., writing, print, radio). Habermas (1981, Vol. 2, 573) says that the mass media are media that create publics, enable communication over spatiotemporal distances and make messages available for different contexts. Media in this narrower sense of the term are structures that store, process and diffuse symbolic materials that represent parts of reality. They are communication technologies. Media operate at the structural level of society, whereas information is a property of the actor level of society. Media are structural properties of society that enable and constrain human cognition, communication and co-operation (information processes). Human information processes are form-giving processes in society: in the threefold process of cognition, communication and co-operation, humans transform, create and re-create social structures. Information and media are two levels of reality that are dialectically interlinked: information processes are conditioned (enabled and constrained) by media; media are re-created by information processes. Human knowledge is externalized by humans with the help of media that store representations of this knowledge (sounds, images, writings, moving images, multimedia, etc.). Media are complex objectifications of human knowledge. They store and diffuse these objectifications and thereby create direct or indirect relationships between humans, which can extend across spatial and temporal distances. Other humans make use of these media to give meanings to the informational content. They subjectivize the objective representations of reality in complex ways. The whole information process is therefore based on the dialectic of the objectification of subjective knowledge (=encoding process) and the subjectification of objective knowledge (=decoding process) that is enabled and constrained by media (media). Information and the media are based on a subject-object dialectic that takes place within society: there is no subjective information (cognition, communication, co-operation) without media structures, and there are no media

Critical media and information studies 91

Actor level

Dominant reception

Negotiated reception

Oppositional reception

Critical reception

Manipulative reception

Figure 3.4 A model of the communication process in the media system structures (that objectify, i.e. represent, subjective knowledge) without human cognition, communication and co-operation. In the mass media system (see the model in Figure 3.4), journalists are actors who produce with the help of specific rules, procedures, structures and technologies content that is aimed at informing a broader public. Informing the public in this context means that the journalists aim at a transformation of the consciousness of the public. The content provided can have news value, entertainment value or artistic-aesthetic value. Mass media content is a representation of reality, either a transposed description of certain parts of reality or a description of fictive, constructed realities. There is a certain degree of correspondence between actual reality and specific media content. So for example the correspondence level of a fictive movie that plays in a fantasy world is low, nonetheless it is a product of society and hence as a constructed product tells us something about the society (its relations of production, power relations, cultural relations) in which it has been produced. For distributing content so that it reaches the public and potential recipients, the content information is stored and transmitted with the help of storage and transmission technologies (such as for example satellite transmission, CDs, DVDs, videos, records, computer hard disks, fibre optic transmission cables, computer networks) and organizational structures (e.g. sales and marketing departments, marketing strategies, etc.). Content distribution is the foundation for reception. Production is only possible based on reception and distribution; if reception stops, there is no further need for production. Produced goods are only meaningful if they are consumed. Production implies a need for distribution and consumption. Reception is itself a production process, the production of meaning. In reception, users/ audiences/recipients interpret media content based on their lived experiences and societal contexts. The meaning of objects always depends on the social and historical

92 Theory context, meanings are never unhistorical or transcendental, but social and historical. They are determined by the social context of the production and use of sign systems. They change along with the historical and social change of society. Different meanings can be ascribed to the same object. Stuart Hall (1999) pointed out that a certain degree of determinism in the form of hegemonic meaning as well as a certain degree of indeterminism in the form of negotiated meaning and oppositional meaning is present in the cultural reception process. The category of dominant meaning is applied if 'there exists a pattern of "preferred readings"; and these both have the institutional/political/ideological order imprinted in them and have themselves become institutionalised' (ibid., 513). Negotiated means decoding that 'contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements' (ibid., 516), oppositional meaning means 'to decode the message in a globally contrary way, . . . within some alternative framework of reference' (ibid., 517). The main achievement of Hall is that he has shown that there is no necessary correspondence between encoding and decoding. Different interpretations can exist in parallel and even in opposition and antagonism to each other. I have added to these three forms of reception a fourth and a fifth one, critical reception and manipulative reception, that can be partly overlapping with the other types in certain situations. Klaus and Thiele (2007) ask in this context the question if a neo-Nazi group's interpretation of a documentary on Nazi concentration camps as fabrication should also be considered as an oppositional reading. With this example, they want to stress the importance of the relativity of Hall's categories and argue for a relativistic (and therefore uncritical) communication model that cannot make normative differentiations. For me, this interpretation is not sufficient, because under any circumstances the Nazis' interpretation is an expression of false consciousness and manipulation. A more objective criterion for reception is needed to designate normative aspects of the encoding and decoding processes. Hence, the notion of critical reception is introduced: an interpretation of media content is critical if the consumed form or content causes subjective insights that allow the recipients to question certain forms of domination, develop ideas of alternative models of existence that advance co-operation and can potentially be guiding in transformative actions and social struggles. The important aspect here is that there is an objectivist judgement that co-operation is the true, original, essential form of human existence (see Fuchs 2008). Manipulation in contrast to critical reception means that recipients interpret content and as a consequence reality in forms that do not question domination, but further advance, legitimize or leave untouched dominative/ heteronomous structures. The categories of critical and manipulative consciousness refer to states of consciousness. The communication model of the mass media just introduced connects to an actor level and a structure level. Journalists as actors produce structural content, information that is distributed in objective form and comes from the structural level back to the actor level by the way of distribution and consumption. The actors involved are journalists, media workers and recipients. The structures are media products, media institutions, technologies for production, distribution and reception. The production of media structures by media producers is the foundation for the distribution and reception process. Distribution and reception are conditions for further production and reproduction of media structures. One can therefore assume that there is a permanent dynamic process in the mass media system in which media actors and

Critical media and information studies 93 Table 3.3 A typology of different media types Media

Production

Reception Formats

Print/visual

Hands

Eyes

Audio media Mouth Audio media Mouth

Ears Ears

Time

Space

Newspapers, journals, books, pamphlets, leaflets, comics, satirical prints,flyers,visual art, graffiti, dress, textiles, pins, buttons, stickers, murals, etc. Radio, telephone Conversation, talks, lectures, songs Concerts

Asynchronous Distance

Sound recordings (records, music cassettes, CD, MP3, etc.) Audio-visual Mouth, body Eyes, ears Theatre, media performance, happening Audio-visual Mouth, body Eyes, ears Film, video media Audio-visual Mouth, body Eyes, ears Live television media Multimedia, Hand, mouth, Eyes, ears Digital text, digital computer, body audio, digital video, Internet real-time text/audio/ video chat, online radio, online TV, wikis, blogs, Internet art, etc.

Asynchronous Distance

Audio media Mouth, body Ears Audio media Mouth, body Ears

Synchronous Synchronous

Distance Presence

Synchronous

Presence

Synchronous

Presence

Asynchronous Distance Synchronous

Distance

Synchronous Distance or asynchronous

media structures produce each other. The important aspect for critical media studies is that the media communication process is framed by the economy, the political system and the culture. Power structures shape and are shaped by the media and condition communication processes. Table 3.3 presents a typology of different types of media in human society. Media are classified according to the body parts that are mainly utilized for production and reception and according to whether production and consumption are temporally synchronous or asynchronous and based on spatial co-presence or communication at a distance.

3.2 Critical media, communication and information studies Why is it important to define critical media and communication studies and to provide a typology that shows which approaches are part of this research field? To assume that

94 Theory there are critical media and communication studies also means that there are uncritical approaches that are opposed to critical studies. Mainstream scholars frequently criticize approaches that could be considered as critical, such as Frankfurt school cultural theory, cultural studies, or critical political economy of the media and communication, in academic debates. An example is that many communication scholars tend to argue that Chomsky is simplistic, atheoretical, and cannot be taken seriously (see McChesney 2007, 42f). It is therefore an advantage to try to develop a clear identity of critical studies and to distinguish this identity from mainstream studies and to conceive itself as a research field. Many discussions of critical media studies tend to arbitrarily select certain approaches and are not focused on mapping the whole. So, for example, Paul Taylor and Jan LI. Harris (2008) in their book Critical theories of mass media: Then and now discuss the approaches of Benjamin, Kracauer, Adorno, McLuhan and Debord. Such approaches do not help in trying to map critical media and communication studies as a distinct research field. In twentieth century critical studies, the critical analysis of media, communication and culture has emerged as a novel quality due to the transformations that capitalism has been undergoing. First, there have been subjective approaches that primarily stress how humans produce, reproduce, consume or transform media and culture. Early twentieth century approaches include the theory of Antonio Gramsci on the one hand, and Frankfurt school approaches by authors such as Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse. German critical theory on the one hand had more structuralist representatives such as Adorno and Horkheimer and more subjectivist representatives such as Bert Brecht and Walter Benjamin. Adorno and Horkheimer had a strong focus on ideology critique. The Gramsci-inspired line of thought has later been continued by the emergence of cultural studies with scholars such as Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart or Stuart Hall. The Frankfurt school approach was carried on and transformed by scholars such as Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth. Louis Althusser's theory of ideological state apparatuses had a strong influence on critical media and communication studies. It was one of the main influences on cultural studies, but also had effects on the emergence of post-Marxist and post-structuralist approaches. Another important current of critical media and communication studies are critical political economy approaches that emerged with the works of people such as Dallas Smythe and Herbert Schiller. Critical political economists such as Dallas Smythe or Nicholas Garnham challenged the focus on ideology and stressed the economic function of the media, whereas others such as Vilém Flusser, Noam Chomsky, Edward S. Herman or Herbert Schiller have continued to stress the role of media as producers of ideology. Cultural studies in the 1980s took a turn by the emergence of a specific American version that established its own interpretation of British cultural studies. One of the most important works in this context has been the one of John Fiske. This overview is far from complete, but it is intended to show that critical media and cultural studies have their own complex history. Because all history is shaped by contradictions (as Marx knew), also the development of critical media and communication studies is shaped by conflicts. The debate between cultural studies scholars and critical political economy scholars in communication studies (Ferguson and Golding 1997; Garnham 1998; Grossberg 1998) has for example shown that there are large differences between research schools. But the danger that lies in such conflicts is that

Critical media and information studies 95 critical studies become fragmented and self-centred and therefore weakened in questioning the uncritical mainstream. Therefore, basic categories and a typology can help to unite various critical approaches by showing their connectedness and at the same time their differences (unity in plurality). Edwin Black (2001) in his book IBM and the Holocaust has shown that International Business Machines (IBM) assisted the Nazis in their attempt to extinguish the Jews, ethnic minorities, communists, socialists, gay people, the handicapped and others by selling punch card systems to Germany. These systems were used for numbering the \dctims, storing and processing where they should be brought, what should happen to them, and for organizing their transport to extermination camps such as Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Majdanek, Mauthausen, Ravensbruck or Sachsenhausen. I B M made an international business out of mass killings by accumulating profits from selling data storage and processing machines to the Nazis. The punch cards covered information on where a victim would be deported, the type of victim he/she was (Jew, homosexual, deserter, prisoners of war, etc.) and his/her status. Code Status 6 was 'Sonderbehandlung' (special treatment), which meant death in the gas chamber. Black has shown that the system was delivered and maintained by I B M and that rental contracts between IBM New York and the German Nazi state were made. Black (2001, 9) says that there was a 'conscious involvement - directiy and through its subsidiaries - ' of I B M 'in the Holocaust, as well as . . . in the Nazi war machine that murdered millions of others throughout Europe'. 1

Solipsistic and dazzled by its own swirling universe of technical possibilities, I B M was self-gripped by a special amoral corporate mantra: if it can be done, it should be done. To the blind technocrat, the means were more important than the ends. The destruction of the Jewish people became even less important because the invigorating nature of IBM's technical achievement was only heightened by the fantastical profits to be made at a time when bread lines stretched across the world. (Black 2001, 10) Irving Wladawsky-Berger, then vice president of technical strategy of I B M , commented on Black's book: 'Generally, you sell computers, and they are used in a variety of ways. And you hope they are using the more positive ways possible.' The example shows that corporations in general, and IT corporations such as I B M in particular, are driven by profit interests and will support the worst horrors if they can draw economic profits from it. Wladawsky-Berger's reaction is a typical technocratic one: corporations that have committed moral crimes against humanity argue that they are not responsible for what their customers do with the commodities they sell to them. Critical reasoning such as the one by Edwin Black intends to show in this context that corporations are not always unknowing of what is going on and do have responsibility that they abandon in many cases due to their instrumental interests. The example also shows that the media and communication industries are not innocent, but deeply embedded into structures of domination. And this is exactly the reason why a critical theory of media and information is needed. Karl Marx summarized the imperatives and convictions of corporations in the following words: 2

96 Theory Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets! . . . Therefore, save, save, i.e, reconvert the greatest possible portion of surplus-value, or surplusproduct into capital! Accumulation for accumulation's sake, production for production's sake: by this formula classical economy expressed the historical mission of the bourgeoisie. (MEGW 35, 652) The accumulation imperative stops at nothing. Here are some definitions of critical media, communication and cultural studies: •

•

•

•

Oscar H . Gandy (1982, 2) argues that a central characteristic of critical scholarship on media and communications is to 'see the primary role of mass media as one of control'. For Hanno Hardt (1992, x, xi), critical communication studies are focusing on 'solving social problems', 'the improvement of society' and 'thinking about freedom and responsibility and the contribution that intellectual pursuits can make to the welfare of society'. He stresses that this approach is not only linked to 'socialism and Marx's critique of political economy' (ibid., x). Douglas Kellner and Meenakshi Gigi Durham (2006, xiv) in the introduction to their anthology Media and cultural studies define critical media and cultural studies as analyses that see and stress that 'all artifacts of the established culture and society are laden with meaning, values, biases, and messages that advance relations of power and subordination'. Douglas Kellner (1995, 4) defines critical cultural studies as analyses that conceptualize society as a terrain of domination and resistance and engages in critique of domination and of the ways that media culture engages in reproducing relationships of domination and oppression. A critical cultural studies is concerned with advancing the democratic project, conceptualizing both how media culture can be a tremendous impediment for democratizing society, but can also be an ally, advancing the cause of freedom and democracy.

•

Manfred Knoche (2005a, 105): Foundational questions of media economics as critique of the political economy of the media include the analysis of the relationship of media and capitalist society, i.e. the role of the media for the whole material, economic, societal, social, political, and cultural human life. Central focuses of analysis are hence on the one hand the specific developments in media production, -distribution, and -consumption, on the other hand their functions for the development of the total capitalist economic and societal system.

•

Rainer Winter (2004, 118, 120): Cultural studies is an interdisciplinary project which uses qualitative methods to subject the cultural forms, practices and processes of contemporary society to critical investigation and analysis. . . . It is the goal of cultural studies to understand economic processes better, using whatever theoretical resources and empirical investigations are available, and then, as a second step, to

Critical media and information studies 97 contribute to a change in their context. . . . They . . . may be interpreted as a critique of power. •

Critical media studies are generally concerned with determining whose interests are served by the media, and how these interests contribute to domination, exploitation, and/ or asymmetrical relations of power. . . . The central aim of critical scholarship is to evaluate the media's role in constructing and maintaining particular relationships of power. (Ott and Mack 2010, 15)

What many definitions of critical communication and media studies share is a focus on the analysis of media, communication and culture in the context of domination, asymmetrical power relations, exploitation, oppression and control as object of study. Such analyses are undertaken with all intellectual means necessary to contribute to the establishment of a participatory, co-operative society. From a praxeo-ontoepistemological perspective on science (see Hofkirchner et al 2005, 78—81), we can then define critical information, communication and media studies as studies that focus ontologically on the analysis of media, communication, information and culture in the context of domination, asymmetrical power relations, exploitation, oppression and control by using epistemologically all theoretical and/or empirical means necessary for doing so in order to contribute at the praxeological level to the establishment of a participatory, co-operative society. Given such a definition, critical communication and media studies are inherentiy normative and political. This definition is fairly broad and allows to combine different concepts that come from different critical backgrounds, such as - to name just some of many - audience commodity, media accumulation strategies, commodity aesthetics, culture industry, true and false consciousness/needs, instrumental reason, technological rationality, manipulation, ideology critique, panopticon, synopticon, silent silencing, dialectical theatre, critical pedagogy, aura, proletarian counter-public sphere, multiple publics, emancipatory media usage, repressive media usage, alternative media, radical media, fetish of communication, ideological state apparatuses, the multitude, the circulation of struggles, hegemony, structure of feelings, articulation, dominant reading, oppositional reading, negotiated reading, capital-accumulation function of the media, commodity circulation function of the media, legitimatizing function of the media, advertising- and public-relations function of the media, regenerative function of the media, propaganda model of the media, communicative action, dialogic communication, discursive communication, communication empire, transnational informational capitalism, working class culture, subculture and so on, under one united umbrella definition that sees them as differentiated unity in plurality that is termed 'critical communication and media studies'. Critical media and communication studies should be in line with the most recent developments of social theory to show that this field can be connected to current debates. One of the major debates in the social sciences in the past years has been the one on public sociology (see section 2.1). Critical studies have been discussed as a part of this debate; therefore, it seems to be particularly suited as a point of reference and further development of critical information, media and communication studies.

98 Theory Table 3.4 A typology of critical and instrumental media, communication and information studies Academic audience Instrumental knowledge

Extra-academic audience

Professional instrumental information, media and communication studies: research on media, communication, information and culture conducted within research programmes that are shaped by dominative interests

Public uncritical information, media and communication studies: research on media, communication, information and culture that enters discourse with the public in the interest of dominative interests such as capital interests or conservative political interests Critical knowledge Critical information, media and Public critical information, communication studies: analyses media and communication of media, communication, studies: addresses and speaks information and culture in the with the public on issues that context of domination, relate to media, communication, asymmetrical power relations and information and culture in the control conducted in the interest context of domination and in the of the abolishment of interest of the abolishment of domination and the domination and the establishment of participatory establishment of participatory democracy democracy

The typology of social sciences approaches that is shown in Table 2.2 and that is based on Burawoy's discussion of public sociology and a distinction between instrumental and critical knowledge can be applied to information, media and communication studies (see Table 3.4). Applying critical theory to information and the media can be characterized along the three dimensions of critical theory:

Epistemology - dialectical realism A critical theory of media, communication and information that is dialectical and realistic identifies antagonistic tendencies of information phenomena and the media. The media and information are conceived as complex and dynamic processes that are contradictory, developing and produce results. Media and information are seen as parts of the material world that can be grasped, described and analysed by humans in academic work.

Ontology — materialism To make a materialistic analysis of the media and information means to see media and information neither as purely subjective nor as purely objective, but as attributes of matter. It requires a materialistic monist position that sees information as matter in movement, a productive, contradictory, dynamic relationship between material systems that have development potentials so that higher-order qualities that sublate (Aufhebung) the underlying systems in a Hegelian sense can emerge. Information is

Critical media and information studies 99 based on a subject-object dialectic. That information is contradictory means that in society it is embedded into the antagonisms of capitalism. Therefore, information and the media reflect societal problems and potential solutions to these problems. The analysis of the media and information needs to be related to the broader societal context. A critical information and media theory is negative, because it relates information to societal problems and what society has failed to become and to tendencies that question and contradict the dominant and dominative mode of operation. These tendencies have the potential to become positive forces of societal change towards the better. Such a theory looks for ways of how information and the media can support practical forces and struggles that aim at transcending capitalism and repression as a whole. Based on the insight that the basic resources are highly unequally divided in contemporary society, to construct a critical information and media theory also means to show how information and the media are related to questions concerning ownership, private property, resource distribution, social struggles, power, resource control, exploitation and domination. In such an endeavour, a reactualized notion of class is of central importance (see Fuchs 2008, chapter 7.3).

Axiology - negating the negative A critical information and media theory shows how the two competing forces of competition and co-operation (or other contradictory pairs of the negative and the positive) shape information and the media and result in class formation and produce potentials for the dissolution of exploitation and oppression. It is based on the judgement that co-operation is more desirable than competition, which is just another expression for saying that structures of exploitation and oppression need to be questioned, criticized and sublated. As there are numerous information phenomena, one can distinguish numerous sub-domains and sub-theories of critical information and media theory. Scott Lash (2002) has argued that critical theory in the information society must be immanent critique, because there is no outside space for transcendental critical reflection due to the immediacy of information (the speed and ephemerality of information would leave almost no time for reflection), the spatiotemporal extension caused by informatization and globalization processes, the vanishing of boundaries between human and non-human and culture as well as between exchange value and use value. Information critique would have to be an immanent critique without transcendentals. Critique of information would be in information itself, and it would be modest and also affirmative. The arguments of a critical theory of information, as outlined thus far, proceed in a different way (see Fuchs 2008): I argue that the information society has potentials for co-operation that provide a foundation for the full realization of the immanent essence of society — co-operation. Co-operation is seen as the very essence of society (an argument that can be found in the writings of young-Marx, Marcuse and Macpherson), it is an immanent feature of society and the human being as such, but this potential is estranged in modern society. This immanence is in contemporary society transcendental because the existence of society is different from its essence. The information society promises a new transcendental space - a co-operative society

100 Theory (or participatory democracy) - that is immanent in society as such (but not existent in alienated societies) and potentially advanced by information and IT. But such a society is not reached automatically because there is an antagonism between co-operation and competition immanent in capitalism and hence also in the capitalist information society that threatens the potentials for co-operation. Hence for establishing an outside of and alternative to global informational capitalism, transcendental self-organizing political projects are needed that have alternative goals, practices and structures of organization and make use of existing structures (such as communication technologies) to transcend these very structures and create a new global space - a participatory democracy. Information produces potentials that undermine competition, but at the same time also produce new forms of domination and competition. The philosophical argument is based on the logic of essence and on the dialectic of immanence and transcendence. The line of argument assumes a formal identity of immanence and transcendence with society as the system of reference. Transcendence is not something that is externally given to being, but comes from the immanent essence (and thus Wirkhchkeit) of that being. Transcendentals are societal forces that represent needs and goals that form the immanent essence of society, but are repressed within the existing antagonistic totality and cannot be realized within it. Hence I do not agree with Lash that transcendental critique and dialectical critique (similar to the one of the Frankfurt school) are outdated. A dialectical framework of critique is needed for understanding the interconnected opportunities and risks of global informational capitalism. Facing Paul A . Taylor's (2006) critique that Lash's information critique is media-determinist and risks becoming uncritical and conformist due to the lack of transcendentals, Lash (2006) seems to argue for the dialectic of immanence and transcendence. One of my main points is that, due to informatization, the dialectics of thinkers such as Hegel, Marx and Marcuse gain a new topicality in transposed forms. Ott and Mack (2010) discuss 11 forms of critical media studies: Marxist analysis, organizational analysis, pragmatic analysis, rhetorical analysis, cultural analysis, psychoanalytic analysis, feminist analysis, queer analysis, reception analysis, erotic analysis and ecological analysis. However, they do not discuss why there are exactiy 11 forms, how these 11 types differ and are connected, what the combined grounding theoretical foundations of all these approaches are, and how exactly different forms of domination are connected in the media. On the one hand, I would not consider all approaches that Ott and Mack list as being critical in their entirety. On the other hand, some approaches are missing or their importance is downplayed. So for many feminist approaches, media analysis is a very general term that also includes liberal feminist approaches that are content when more women become owners and managers in media corporations that exploit female and male workers. In the media ecology chapter, the authors positively discuss the approaches of technological determinists such as Neil Postman and Marshall McLuhan. In the chapter on psychoanalysis, the importance of Jacques Lacan for grounding a critical psychoanalysis is mentioned but the works of Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse are ignored. In the discussion of critical psychoanalytic media studies, the huge influence that Slavoj Zizek's Lacanian-Marxist approach has played in recent years is not mentioned. Critical theory (Frankfurt school) is only discussed briefly and its strong influence on

Critical media and information studies 101 critical media studies is thereby downplayed. So, for example, Jiïrgen Habermas is not at all mentioned. Alternative media scholars such as John Downing and Chris Atton are not mentioned and their approaches are ignored. Critical new media studies approaches are hardly discussed. These are only a few examples of what is missing. The book has a specific American focus (which might explain, but does not justify, the lack of consideration of critical theory), but a discussion on the influential integrative approach of Douglas Kellner, who brings together critical theory and cultural studies, is missing. Ott and Mack's book is an introductory course book, but students who read this book only get a partial and distorted picture of critical media studies. An example for critical information theory as immanent transcendence is the antagonistic form of information in contemporary capitalist economy. New media as such do not have clear-cut effects; they are antagonistically structured and embedded into the antagonisms of capitalist society. The antagonism between co-operation and competition that shapes modern society and limits self-determination and participation, also shapes the techno-social Internet system. Under the current societal conditions that are characterized by the colonization of society by the instrumental logic of accumulation, risks and competitive forces dominate over realized opportunities, cooperation and participation on the Internet. The dialectical antagonistic character of social and technical networks as motor of competition and co-operation in informational capitalism reflects Marx's idea that the productive forces of capitalism are at the same time means of exploitation and domination and produce potentials that go beyond actuality, point towards a radically transformed society and anticipate a fully co-operative design of the means of production (Fuchs 2008). The productive forces of contemporary capitalism are organized around informational networks that bring about new forms of exploitation and domination and are at the same time germ forms of a co-operative economy (ibid.). For constructing a typology of critical media studies, the Marxian distinction among three dialectically mediated spheres of the economy can be utilized: production, circulation and consumption. In the process of production members of society appropriate (produce, fashion) natural products in accordance with human requirements' (MEW 13, 620). In capitalism, the role of goods is determined by their exchange value that dominates over their use value and constitutes their commodity form. Marx describes circulation as 'an intermediate phase between production . . . and consumption' (MEW 13, 630). In the circulation sphere, money is exchanged with commodities, entrepreneurs realize profit by selling commodities, consumers exchange money for goods. The commodity then leaves circulation and enters the sphere of consumption, 'where it serves either as means of subsistence or means of production' (MEW 23, 129). The starting point of analysis for Marx is production, which is 'the decisive factor' (MEW 13, 625): 'The process always starts afresh with production' (MEW 13, 625, 630f). The three moments are interconnected. Consumption creates new needs, which are produced in commodity form (MEW 13, 623). Consumption creates production. Production 'supplies the material, the object of consumption . . . therefore, production creates, produces consumption' (MEW 13, 623). Production is a consumption of means of production, consumption is a (re)production of the human body and mind. Production is based on circulation of the means of production and labour forces that are consumed by capital. Therefore, production is circulation. c

102 Theory Table 3.5 A typology of critical media and information studies Production sphere Repression hypothesis Repression hypothesis

Circulation sphere Consumption

Commodity hypothesis: media as commodities for accumulating capital Manipulation and ideology hypothesis: media as means of manipulation for the ideological enforcement of class interests

Emancipation hypothesis

Alternative media hypothesis: media Reception hypothesis: as spheres of grassroots production media reception as and circulation of alternative content contradictory process involving oppositional practices

Unification

Integrative critical media theories/studies

Circulation produces a distribution of money and commodity capital in a certain distribution between classes. In the realm of the media we find: 1 2 3

the organization of the journalistic production of content that is generated and stored with the help of media tools the distribution of content with the help of transmission technologies, so that recipients consume cultural content.

Production is a consumption of journalistic labour power and fixed media capital, distribution is a production of the class-stratified allocation of wealth and information and consumption is reproduction of labour power and the production of meaning and needs. Those who follow the emancipation hypothesis assume that the media function primarily as means of criticizing domination and as tools of class struggle. Those who advance the repression hypothesis argue that the media are primarily means for enforcing and deepening domination and class rule. Next, example approaches for the different approaches in critical media and information studies will be mentioned. These are only examples, the discussion does not want to make the claim to describe all important existing representatives and approaches because space is too limited for achieving this task. Representatives of the commodity hypothesis argue that the media are not primarily ideological means of manipulation but spheres of capital accumulation. Examples are Dallas Smythe's (1978/1997) notion of the audience commodity, Nicholas Garnham's (1990, 2000, 2005) stress on the economic role of media as creators of surplus value through commodity production, exchange and advertising, or Wolfgang Fritz Haug's (1971, 1975) notion of commodity aesthetics. The basic contention underlying the manipulation and ideology hypothesis is that the media are used as tools that manipulate people; advance ideologies; forestall societal transformations; and create false consciousness, false needs and a one-dimensional

Critical media and information studies 103 universe of thought, language and action. Examples are Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno's (1944/2002) theory of the culture industry Leo Lowenthal's (1964) notion of manipulative mass culture, Heinz Steinert's (2003, 2007) theory of the commodified and administered culture industry Gunther Anders' (1956/1980) theory of the outdatedness of humanness, Herbert Schiller's (1976, 1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1997) notions of the mind managing media machinery and cultural imperialism, and Lee Artz's (2006) notion of the media as hegemonic tools that reproduce capitalist relations of production. A recent formulation of the ideology hypothesis has been given by Thomas Mathiesen (2004), who considers the corporate mass media and the corporate Internet as systems of silent silencing of political opposition. Mathiesen (1997) has in this context coined the notion of the synopticon. Scholars who argue that there are alternative ways of doing and making media for critical ends advance the alternative media hypothesis. Such approaches have a strong subjective orientation. The discourse on alternative media was anticipated by Bertolt Brecht's (1932/2000) radio theory, Walter Benjamin's (1934/2002) notion of the author as producer, Hans Magnus Enzensberger's (1970) model of emancipatory media usage, and Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge's (1972) theory of the proletarian counter-public sphere. Armand Mattelart (1971/1979, 1979, 1983) and Mattelart and Siegelaub (1979, 1983) stressed the role of socialist media in class struggles. Examples for contemporary alternative media theories are the approaches by Chris Atton (2002), who focuses on self-managed media, and John Downing (2001), who speaks of radical media. Nick Dyer-Witheford (1999) conceptualizes cyberspace (besides and in contradiction to being a commodified space) as autonomous medium for the circulation of struggles. Representatives of the reception hypothesis argue that reception is a complex and antagonistic process that provides potentials for oppositional interpretations and actions. The most prominent representatives of this hypothesis can be found in cultural studies. Many works in cultural studies focus on cultural practices of everyday life and the interpretation of texts within this sphere (Bennett 1992, 23; Johnson 1986/1987, 43; Nelson et al 1992, 11). In some forms of this hypothesis, we find a deterministic optimism that assumes that domination automatically must produce counter power. So, for example, John Fiske (1989a, 1989b, 1996) in a deterministic mode of causal argumentation sees resistance as an automatic feature of popular culture: The reading relations of popular culture are not those of liberal pluralism, for they are always relationships of domination and subordination, always one of top-down power and of bottom-up power resisting or evading it. . . . Popular culture in elaborated societies is the culture of the subordinate who resent their subordination, who refuse to consent to their positions or to contribute to a consensus that maintains it. (Fiske 1989b, 168f.) 'Discursive struggles are an inevitable part of life in societies whose power and resources are inequitably distributed.... A media event, then, as a point of maximum discursive visibility, is also a point of maximum turbulence' (Fiske 1996, 5, 8). Douglas Kellner warns cultural studies about being too optimistic:

104 Theory Neglecting political economy, celebrating the audience and the pleasures of the popular, overlooking social class and ideology, and failing to analyse or criticize the politics of cultural texts will make media/cultural studies merely another academic subdivision, harmless and ultimately of benefit primarily to the culture industry itself. (Kellner 2009, 19f.) The pure repression hypothesis poses the threat that potentials for change are excluded and that humans are tempted to hold a defeatist attitude. Robert McChesney (2007), who argues in favour of a media reform movement, stresses this argument (McChesney and Nichols 2004). The pure commodity hypothesis ignores ideological aspects of the media, which are stressed by representatives of the manipulation hypothesis. The pure manipulation hypothesis leaves out aspects of capital accumulation with the help of the media. The pure emancipation hypothesis is too optimistic and overlooks that alternative media and alternative reception frequently remain ineffective, unimportant, marginalized and without influence. Structural inequality in the access and use of media caused by the class and ownership structure of capitalism are not enough taken into account. Theories of alternative media hardly discuss possibilities of alternative usage or reception of existing mass media. Reception theories hardly consider the possibility for creating collective alternative media projects in the realms of production and distribution. The shortcomings of existing approaches can be overcome by integrative multidimensional critical media theories/studies that try to bring together some or all the various levels of critical media studies. One can identify some existing approaches that point into this direction. Integration and unification does not mean that difference is abolished at the expense of identity. It rather means a Hegelian dialectical sublation (Aufhebung), in which old elements are preserved and elevated to a new level. New qualities emerge by the interaction of the moments. Such a dialectical integration is a differentiated unity that is based on the principle of unity in diversity It is a dialectical relation of identity and difference. In the German tradition of the critique of the political economy of the media, Wulff Hund and Barbel Kirchhoff-Hund (1980) stressed that capitalist mass communication has an economic and an ideological function. Horst Holzer (1973,131; 1994,202ff.) and Manfred Knoche (2005a) distinguish four repressive functions of the media: (1) capital accumulation in the media industry; (2) advertising, publication relations and sales promotion for other industries; (3) legitimization of domination and ideological manipulation; (4) reproduction, regeneration and qualification of labour power. Hund, Holzer and Knoche have tried to integrate the commodity and the ideology hypotheses. These approaches go into an integrative direction. However, aspects of alternative media are missing in the two (Hund and Kirchhoff-Hund) respectively four roles (Hölzer, Knoche) of the media in contemporary society and it remains unclear why exactiy there are two respectively four aspects and how they are connected. A theoretical justification is missing. It is no surprise that these authors tend to use the notion of media functions and thereby go into the direction of media functionalism that neglects potential alternatives. Graham Murdock and Peter Golding (1973/1997; see also 2005) have stressed that the mass media have a commercial and an ideological dimension.

Critical media and information studies 105 The obvious starting point for a political economy of mass communications is the recognition that the mass media are first and foremost industrial and commercial organizations which produce and distribute commodities. . . . In addition to producing and distributing commodities, however, the mass media also disseminate ideas about economic and political structures. It is this second and ideological dimension of mass media production which gives it its importance and centrality and which requires an approach in terms not only of economics but also of politics. (Murdock and Golding 1973/1997, 3-5) In the United States, Robert McChesney, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky established the integrative approach of the Political Economy of Communication (Chomsky 2006; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Herman and McChesney 1997; McChesney 1992/1997, 1993, 2000, 2004, 2007; McChesney and Nichols 2004). Herman and Chomsky (1988, 1-35) argue that the capitalist mass media are characterized by five filter functions: (1) profit orientation, (2) advertising, (3) dominant information sources, (4) flak and (5) anticommunism. The first filter corresponds to the commodity role of the media, the other four to their ideological role. Herman and McChesney (1997) stress both the capital economic and the ideological role of global media corporations. Although Herman, McChesney and Chomsky are not optimistic concerning alternative developments, they stress that alternative media can exert counter-power against capitalist media corporations (see Herman and Chomsky 1988, 307; Herman and McChesney 1997; McChesney 2007, chapters 22, 23; McChesney and Nichols 2004). This approach attempts to integrate the commodity, the ideology and the alternative media hypotheses. By trying to combine culturalism and structuralism in cultural studies, Stuart Hall (1999) established a unity of the reception and the ideology hypotheses in his model of communication encoding and decoding process. In newer publications, Hall together with colleagues works with a cultural circuit model that is based on the moments of production, consumption, representation, identity formation and political regulation of the media (Du Gay et al 1997, 3). Similar to Hall, also Douglas Kellner (1995, 1997, 1999, 2005a) argues for a unity of the manipulation and the reception hypothesis. He suggests a multiperspectival synthesis of critical theory and critical political economy on the one hand and cultural studies on the other hand. Thus one should attempt to avoid the one-sided approaches of manipulation and resistance theory and to mediate these perspectives in analysis. In a way, certain tendencies of the Frankfurt School can correct some of the limitations of cultural studies, just as British cultural studies can help overcome some of the limitations of the Frankfurt School. (Kellner 2009, 18) This combination should be accompanied by some positions of postmodern theory, feminism and multicultural theory (Kellner 1995, 9). Such an approach combines the analysis of the political economy of communication and culture, text analysis and

106 Theory reception analyses (Kellner 1999, 357). For Kellner, critical media/cultural studies is 'a diagnostic critique' that 'uses media culture to diagnose problems, hopes, fears, discourses and social struggles current to the social moment' (Hammer and Kellner 2009, xxxv). Vincent Mosco (2009, 2) defines political economy of communication as the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources, including communication resources'. It décentres the media by 'viewing systems of communication as integral to fundamental economic, political, social and cultural processes in society' (ibid., 66). Mosco (ibid., 211-236) argues for building bridges between this approach and approaches on its intellectual borders, especially cultural studies, public choice theory and science and technology studies. In establishing such an integrative approach, a return to class power as starting point of all analyses would be needed (ibid., 232£). Shane Gunster (2004) argues that seeing Adorno's and Benjamin's theories as complementing allows a balanced view on culture and the media that identifies contradictory manipulative potentials and imaginative alternative Utopian potentials. Thinking together Adorno and Benjamin would re-dialecticize the thesis of the culture industry. With the help of Grossberg's notion of articulation, Gunster tries to link cultural studies' reception hypothesis to the Frankfurt school's manipulation hypothesis and to Benjamin-inspired alternative media theory. For Habermas (1981, Vol. 2, 572-573), the mass media have an authoritarian character caused by the potential colonization by steering media on the one hand and an emancipatory potential that can advance consensus-oriented communicative action in the mass media public sphere on the other hand. Habermas's theory can both account for repressive media (colonization) and alternative media (communicative action). In The structural transformation of the public sphere, Habermas (1989) describes both the commodity- and the ideological character of modern mass media. In the book's last chapter 'On the concept of public opinion', he sees a counter-force and speaks of the potential for a critical publicity, which can be interpreted as an aspect of alternative media. Habermas's theory can be seen as an attempted integration of the commodity, the manipulation and the alternative media hypotheses. Vilém Flusser (1996a, 1996b) has distinguished dialogic and discursive forms of communication that can result in a participatory telematic society or a totalitarian media society. Flusser's communicology can be read as a critical theory that integrates the manipulation and the alternative media hypotheses. On the one hand, he argues that media manipulate by withholding information and limiting communication and, on the other hand, that media can support grassroots potentials. For Herbert Marcuse (1964b), media on the one hand advance ideologies by simplifying reality and representing reality in one-dimensional, positivistic, undialectical ways, so that antagonisms are factored out and false consciousness is created (for a detailed discussion of Marcuse's theory see Fuchs 2005a, 2005b). The capitalist mass media for him are an expression of a technological rationality that limits and instrumentalizes human thought and activity. They would be 'agents of manipulation' that are used for 'the defense of the established reality' (Marcuse 1964b, 8, 68). The result would be one-dimensional thought, which means a lack of negativity and the suppression of thinking about potentials that transcend existing society c

Critical media and information studies 107 The means of mass transportation and communication, the commodities of lodging, food, and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and emotional reactions which bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole . . . Ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe. (Marcuse 1964b, 12) On the other hand, Marcuse considers as antagonistic counterpart to the ideological character of the media the possibility that protest movements appropriate the media as a means of struggle. Marcuse stresses that alternative media and alternative institutions are needed for counter-information, counter-intelligence and counter-enlightenment — institutions for establishing a 'resisting intelligentsia (Marcuse 1975, 156). The mental space for negation and reflection would have to be re-established. The main problem of the political left would be its lack of access to mass media and public institutions because of a lack of funds. An important strategy would therefore be 'working against the established institutions while working in them', 'the development of radical, "free" media', and the 'development of independent schools and "free universities'" (Marcuse 1972, 55). One should remember that for Marcuse contemporary culture is at the one hand in its one-dimensional form an expression of repressive desublimation — an invalidation of 'the cherished images of transcendence by incorporating them into . . . [capitalism's] omnipresent daily reality' (Marcuse 1964b, 70), and on the other hand, in the form of counterculture an expression of 'a new sensibility' that in its aesthetic dimension 'can serve as a sort of gauge for a free society', opens up imagination for 'a universe of human relationships no longer mediated by the market, no longer based on competitive exploitation of terror', and allows to 'see, hear, feel new things in a new way' by creating a new aesthetic environment (Marcuse 1969a, 27, 37). Furthermore, for Marcuse, the aesthetic form of authentic art is autonomous and revolutionary because it is 5

subversive of perception and understanding, an indictment of the established reality, the appearance of the image of liberation. . . . The truth of art lies in its power to break the monopoly of established reality (i.e., of those who established it) to define what is real. In this rupture, which is the achievement of the aesthetic form, the fictitious world of art appears as true reality. . . . Art cannot change the world, but it can contribute to changing the consciousness and drives of the men and women who could change the world. (Marcuse 1978, xi, 9, 32f.) Marcuse's account of the media can be understood as a unity of the manipulation/ ideology, the alternative media and the reception hypothesis. In his analysis of culture, he stresses both its affirmative and transcendent potentials. This discussion shows that there are approaches that try to integrate the commodity and the ideology hypothesis; the commodity, the ideology and the alternative media

108 Theory hypothesis; the ideology and the reception hypothesis; and the ideology, the reception and the alternative media hypothesis. However, all these approaches leave out certain aspects of the repressive or emancipatory character of the media. An integrative critical theory of media and society can make use of dialectical logic to establish a dialectical unity of repressive and emancipatory aspects of the media and a dialectical unity of aspects of production, circulation and reception. The underlying line of thought is that the media reflect the antagonisms of capitalism and therefore have an antagonistic character (Fuchs 2008). In a given societal situation, they are not to the same extent emancipatory and repressive, the distribution is based on the results of political struggles and tends to be uneven. Generally, the ideology and commodity form of the media are predominant because dominant groups in capitalism have more resources, power, money and means of mobilization. As a consequence, the probability that media are used in repressive ways is today larger than the possibility of emancipatory media usage. The existing distribution of capital and power advances commercialization and ideologization of the media. Besides the question about the reality of the mass media, there is also the one about their potentials. This question cannot be expressed in terms of possibilities. Possibilities are immanent potentials that can only be realized by activities and in class struggles. There are immanent possibilities to use, organize and design media in alternative ways, participatory and critical potentials, and to interpret their contents in critical ways. These potentials are only partly or hardly realized today. In principle, there are possibilities to politically set structural conditions so that alternative media, critical production and reception of content are funded and supported. But such endeavours contradict capital interests because critical media question the capitalist totality. Alternative media politics are only realizable as politics of class struggle that make demands for redistribution and partial expropriation of capital (in the form of increasing capital taxation) to use the obtained resources for creating and supporting alternative projects and spaces. Herbert Marcuse (1964b) argued that the antagonism between potentials and actuality is tightening in late capitalism. This means that media in contemporary capitalism have large potentials for the socialization of the mental means of production, especially based on global computer networks. But these potentials exist only as such in themselves and are only partiy realized as long as they are subsumed under dominant interests and structures (see Fuchs 2008). The emergence of new media technologies and products is the result of capital interests and political interests. A new media technology such as the Internet is under the regime of capitalism always a sphere of capital accumulation, circulation and consumption as well as a sphere of ideology production, circulation and consumption (ibid.). At the same time, new media technologies also pose potentials for the development of alternative forms of organizing media and alternative media contents that are characterized by transformed conditions of production, circulation and consumption. One and the same media technology (such as Internet, TV, newspaper, radio, film, video) can be shaped by different interests and usage forms that contradict each other. So, for example, the Internet in the Iraq war 2003 was on the one hand a sphere, in which established mass media conducted global war propaganda and transformed war images into capital. On the other hand, with the help of the Internet also the phenomenon of war blogging emerged that allowed anti-war activists to share

Critical media and information studies 109 Table 3.6 Wages and profits in Europe and the USA Tear

USA EU 15 wage USA wage EU15 net operating surplus asnet operating surplus share (%) share (%) percentage of GDP at current as percentage of GDP at current prices prices

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009

63.3 67.5 66.0 62.7 61.4 59.5 58.7 57.7 57.0 57.3

65.9 64.0 65.3 63.4 63.3 62.3 64.0 61.1 60.8 60.7

27.2 22.8 22.0 24.2 24.8 24.6 23.9 24.6 25.0 24.5

22.2 22.8 21.8 24.0 24.1 24.6 22.4 23.6 24.7 25.0

Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO), European Commission.

their views and to network. Of course two contradicting events are not automatically of equal relevance, new media structures always have a dominative character under capitalism, and if and to which extent alternative structures can emerge from them is uncertain and depends on the results of political struggles. The commodity and ideology functions of the media are almost automatically dominant and omnipresent, whereas the alternative media and alternative reception function is first of all only an unrealized potential. Only if it is possible to attain a certain freedom of action for critique by political demands and struggles, the probability that these potentials can be realized can be increased. Frequently, alternatives remain marginal, precarious and unrealized because there is a structural dominance of uncritical thinking and dominative interests. To improve the conditions for realization, media politics should be politics of criticizing capitalism and of aiming at overcoming this very system. The struggle against the dominance of capital interests is also a struggle to create spaces for free thinking and action that allow humans to engage in critical discourse and to organize themselves against the existing totality. The central political problem underlying media politics today is that public structures are eroded because the state gives tax incentives to corporations and redistributes income towards corporations and the rich by deregulating working conditions and creating the juridical conditions for the existence of low-paid precarious jobs. As a consequence there is an increased centralization of wealth also in the realm of the mass media. Corporate profits have in the past decades increased relatively fast because wages have relatively decreased. It is a general tendency in Europe and the United States that decreasing the wage share has increased profit rates. Table 3.6 shows that, in the United States and Europe, profits have remained at continuous high levels in the past 30 years, whereas wages have relatively declined. This implies that profit growth has been achieved by an increase in the rate of surplus value, an intensification of the exploitation of labour by relatively decreasing wages.

110 Theory The centralization of ownership and wealth results in a situation in which a few actors dominate national and international public opinion and have a huge influence on public institutions such as the media, education, politics, culture and welfare. If demanding partial capital expropriation by high capital taxation was successful, the obtained material resources could be used for supporting public affairs, such as education, health, social care, information, communication, and for decoupling them from capital interests. For the realm of the media this means that by capital taxation non-commercial, non-profit, free access media projects could be created and supported. If in addition a certain share of labour time became free from the exposition to capital by the introduction of a universal unconditional basic income guarantee financed by capital taxation and taxing the rich then material and temporal resources could be obtained that could function as foundation for critical action in critical media projects. Another precondition is the support of critical pedagogy and education that are decoupled from capital interests and enable young people to question domination and exploitation. Struggles for change are not hopeless. They pose the only chance for abohshing the existing totality. If . . . [capitalism] is to change, and in a positive way, it is important that people who are dissatisfied with the status quo should not be overcome and rendered truly powerless by a sense of hopelessness and cynicism. As Noam Chomsky said, 'if you act like there is no possibility for change, you guarantee that there will be no change'. (Herman and McChesney 1997, 205) The approach advanced in this book is one that considers the media as antagonistic: They pose at the same time potentials for emancipation and repression. Mass media in capitalism automatically have a repressive character; they take on commodity and ideological forms. But they also carry potentials for alternative production, content, distribution and reception that are marginalized and only existent as immanent potentials that are not automatically realized. There are structural inequalities that decrease the possibilities of realization for these alternative potentials. Politics of class struggle that primarily aim at redistribution and expropriation are a way for increasing the possibilities and structural conditions for realizing these potentials. Therefore, the position advanced in this book is neither a hypothesis of emancipation nor a hypothesis of repression, but rather a political perspective that situates the media within the societal totality and sees them as being embedded into political struggles. To take this position means to décentre the media, to avoid media essentialism, and to see that there is a dialectic relationship of the media and society. For Marx, there is a threefold task of critique: (1) the critique of the contemporary dominative form of society, capitalism, which is achieved by revealing the laws of motion and contradictions of modern society by dialectical analysis (critique of the political economy), (2) the critique of academic and everyday consciousness that sees capitahsm/dominative realities as unhistorical, endless, self-evident and natural by showing how the categories of this thinking have a social and historical character (ideology critique) and (3) the connection of analyses to the interests and (potential or actual) struggles of dominated and exploited groups (practical critique, revolutionary critique) that have an objective interest in the establishment of a free society. Marx therefore says that (1) 'it is the ultimate aim of this work [Capital] to reveal the economic law of motion of modern society' (Marx 1867, 92). 'The work to which I am

Critical media and information studies 111 referring is Critique of Political Economy, or, if you like, the system of bourgeois economy critically presented. It is at once a presentation, and, thereby, a critique of that system' (Marx 1979, 423). This method involves showing the essence behind 'the form of appearance of things' (Marx 1894, 956). (2) Marx criticizes the academic discipline of traditional political economy that investigates 'the real internal framework of bourgeois relations of production' (Marx 1867, 174f.) and proclaims the qualities of this framework as 'everlasting truths' (ibid., 175). This critique is not only a critique of bourgeois academics, but of all forms of 'bourgeois consciousness' (including everyday consciousness) that see capitalist reality as 'self-evident and nature-imposed necessity' (ibid.). (3) The dialectic is 'in its very essence critical and revolutionary' because 'it includes in its positive understanding of what exists a simultaneous recognition of its negation' (ibid., 103). Therefore, the critique of bourgeois economics 'represents the class whose historical task is the overthrow of the capitalist mode of production and the final abolition of all classes - the proletariat' (ibid., 98). This allows imagining (and potentially or actually struggling for) historical alternatives: 'Let us finally imagine, for a change, an association of free men' (ibid., 171). Karl Korsch (1963, 86) has stressed the three aspects of Marxian critique: (1)

[Marx] specifies bourgeois society and investigates the tendencies visible in the present development of society, and the way to its imminent practical transformation. [Marx uses] throughout Capital and in his other works too, . . . the concept and principle of 'contradiction', especially the contradiction between what is called 'essence' and what is called 'appearance'. (Korsch 1932) ( 2 )

.

It is generally accepted that the critique of political economy - the most important theoretical and practical component of the Marxist theory of society - includes not only a critique of the material relations of production of the capitalist epoch but also of its specific forms of social consciousness. (Korsch 1970, 86) Marx was the first to represent that fundamental character of the bourgeois mode of production as the particular historical stage of material production, whose characteristic social form is reflected reversedly, in a 'fetishistic' manner, both in the practical concepts of the ordinary man of business and in the scientific reflection of that 'normal' bourgeois consciousness - Political Economy. (Korsch 1963, 136) (3) The critique of Political Economy, which Marx began in Capital, can . . . only be completed by the proletarian revolution, i.e., by a real change of the present bourgeois mode of production and of the forms of consciousness pertaining to it. It is only after the full accomplishment of this revolution that, in the further development of the Communist society, all 'fetishism of commodity production' and the whole 'fetishistic' science of Political Economy will be finally merged into a direct social theory and practice of the associated producers. (Korsch 1963, 157)

112 Theory For critical studies of media and information, the structure of Marxian critique implies that it (1) analyses and criticizes modern society and the media and information in modern society by revealing the contradictions and laws of motion of media and information in modern society, (2) analyses and criticizes the role of the media and information in creating and reproducing bourgeois consciousness that conceives reality as self-evident and nature imposed, and that it (3) specifies and practises the role of the media and information in contributing to the overthrow of the capitalist mode of production, the abolition of all classes, and the establishment of an association of free men. Critical media and information studies are a critique of the political economy of the media, ideology critique of the media and alternative media analysis and practices. The gap between the commodity hypothesis, the ideology and manipulation hypothesis, the reception hypothesis and the alternative media hypothesis can be bridged. A way of establishing the connection is finding a theory that contains and connects all elements. In my opinion, grounding critical media and information studies in Marx's works can provide such an approach. In chapter 4, critical media and information studies will be connected to Marx's works and the Marxian cycle of capital accumulation.

3.3 Dialectical philosophy and critical media and information studies I have stressed in section 2.4 that dialectical thinking is important for a critical theory. It is therefore important to discuss how dialectics can be used as epistemological procedure in critical media and information studies. Dialectical philosophy enables complex technology assessment. One of the reasons why critical theory is important for analysing media, technology and information is that it allows to question and provide alternatives to technological determinism and to explain the causal relationship of media and technology on the one hand and society on the other hand in a complex way that avoids one-dimensionality and one-sidedness. Technological determinism is a kind of explanation of the causal relationship of media/technology and society that assumes that a certain media or technology has exactiy one specific effect on society and social systems. In case that this effect is assessed positively, we can speak of techno-optimism. In case that the effect is assessed negatively, we can speak of techno-pessimism. Techno-optimism and technopessimism are the normative dimensions of technological determinism. The problem of techno-optimistic and techno-pessimistic accounts is that they are only interested in single aspects of technology and create the impression that there are only one-sided effects. They lack a sense for contradictions and the dialectics of technology and society and can therefore be described as technological deterministic forms of argumentation. Technological optimism and pessimism assume that technology leads to a situation of inescapable necessity. . . . To optimists, such a future is the outcome of many free choices and the realization of the dream of progress; to pessimists, it is a product of necessity's iron hand, and it points to a totalitarian nightmare. (Marx and Smith 1994, xii)

Critical media and information studies 113 Rob Kling (1994) characterizes technological optimism as technological utopianism. These are 'analyses in which the use of specific technologies play a key role in shaping a benign social vision' (ibid., 151). Technological pessimism/anti-utopianism 'examines how certain broad families of technology are key enablers of a harsher and more destructive social order' (ibid.). The main problem of these approaches is for Kling that they see certain effects of technologies as necessities and are based on linear logics, the absence of contingencies and on causal simplification. Many scholars therefore consider technological optimism and technological pessimism as forms of technological determinism. Technological determinism sees technology as developing independently from society, but as inducing certain societal effects with necessity (Cohen 1978, 147; Kling et al 2005, 13, 188; Lister et al 2003, 391; Shade 2003). Technological determinism assumes that 'technologies change, either because of scientific advance or following a logic of their own; and [that] they then have effects on society' (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999a, 3). It is based on 'a simple cause-and-effect sequence' (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999b, xiv). 'Such determinism treats technology as both panacea and scapegoat' (Shade 2003, 433). Technological determinism is a fetishism of technology (Robins and Webster 1999), 'the idea that technology develops as the sole result of an internal dynamic, and then, unmediated by any other influence, molds society to fit its pattern' (Winner 1980/1999, 29). Technological determinism is 'typified by sentences in which "technology," or a surrogate like "the machine," is made the subject of an active predicate: "The automobile created suburbia." . . . "The robots put the riveters out of work'" (Marx and Smith 1994, xi). These arguments are frequenuy accompanied by the assumption that technology drives history (Marx and Smith 1994). Technological determinism can therefore also 'be taken to mean that the laws of nature determining human history do so through technology' (Bimber 1994, 87). Classical examples of technological determinism are the assumptions that modern technologies result in the forgetting of being (Seinsvegessenheit, Martin Heidegger), desensualization (Arnold Gehlen), inherent technological necessities and the end of politics (Helmut Schelsky), a dominative megamachine (Lewis Mumford), the decline of the Occident (Oswald Spengler), technological tyranny Jacques Ellul) or to the emergence of a global village (Marshall McLuhan). Marien (2006) applies the distinction between techno-optimism and techno-pessimism to the information society discourse to discern between information society enthusiasts and information society critics. An alternative to technological determinism is the social construction of technology (SCOT) approach: Pinch and Bijker (1987) argue that technologies are socially constructed, that their design is a manifestation of how groups interpret the social world, which problems they see, and which solutions to these problems they consider adequate. The SCOT approach suggests that technical things do not matter at all (Winner 1980/1999). There is a neglect of the ways that technologies shape society (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999a, 22f.). The S C O T approach reverses technological determinism: it is no longer technology that fully determines society, but society that fully determines technology. Both approaches are based on one-dimensional causality. An alternative that avoids technological and social determinisms is to conceptualize the relationship of technology and society as dialectical: society conditions the invention, design and engineering of technology and technology shapes society in complex

114 Theory ways. Technology is conditioned, not determined, by society and vice versa. This means that societal conditions, interests and conflicts influence which technologies will emerge, but technology's effects are not predetermined because modern technologies are complex wholes of interacting parts that are to certain extents unpredictable (Perrow 1999). Technology shapes society in complex ways, which means that frequently there are multiple effects that can stand in contradiction with each other. Because society and technology are complex systems, which means that they have many elements and many interactions between these elements, it is unlikely that the interaction of the two complex systems technology and society will have onedimensional effects. Based on a structuration theory framework, one can argue that technology is the medium (enabling and constraining) and the outcome of society (Fuchs 2008). Thomas P. Hughes (1994, 102) says that 'social development shapes and is shaped by technology'. Lievrouw and Livingstone (2002, 8) argue that 'new media technologies both shape, and are shaped by, their social, economic and cultural contexts'. Hofkirchner (2007) terms such dialectical accounts of the relationship of technology and society mutual shaping approaches. A critical theory of technology and society is a specific mutual shaping approach that adds the idea that technological development interacts with societal contradictions. A critical theory of media and technology is based on dialectical reasoning (see Figure 3.5). This allows to see the causal relationship of media/technology and society as multidimensional and complex: a specific media/technology has multiple, at least two, potential effects on society and social systems that can co-exist or stand in contradiction to each other. Which potentials are realized is based on how society, interests, power structures and struggles shape the design and usage of technology in multiple ways that are also potentially contradictory. Andrew Feenberg says in this context: Critical theory argues that technology is not a thing in the ordinary sense of the term, but an 'ambivalent' process of development suspended between different possibilities. . . . On this view, technology is not a destiny but a scene of struggle. It is a social battlefield, or perhaps a better metaphor would be a 'parliament of things' in which civilizational alternatives contend.. . . Critical theory holds that there can be at least two different modern civilizations based on different paths of technical development. . . . Technologies corresponding to different civilizations thus coexist uneasily within our society. (Feenberg 2002, 15) A critical theory of media and technology is based on dialectical reasoning. It allows to see the causal relationship of media/technology and society as multidimensional and complex: a specific media/technology has multiple, at least two, potential effects on society and social systems that can co-exist or stand in contradiction to each other. Which potentials are realized is based on how society, interests, power structures and struggles shape the design and usage of technology in multiple ways that are also potentially contradictory. The dialectical critical theory of technology is grounded in the works of Karl Marx, who said that technology has contradictory potentials and that under capitalism the negative ones predominate:

Critical media and information studies 115 Technological/media determinism: Cause

Effect

MEDIA/ TECHNOLOGY

t j m i s m

-=Technopessimism

SOCIETY

Social construction of technology: Effect MEDIA/ TECHNOLOGY

Cause ^

SOCIETY

Effect

Cause

MEDIA/ TECHNOLOGY

SOCIETY

Figure 3.5 Three causal logics of technology assessment: technological/media determinism, SCOT and the dialectic of technology/media and society The contradictions and antagonisms inseparable from the capitalist application of machinery do not exist, they say, because they do not arise out of machinery as such, but out of its capitalist applications! Therefore, since machinery in itself shortens the hours of labour, but when employed by capital it lengthens them; since in itself lightens labour, but when employed by capital it heightens its intensity; since in itself it is a victory of man over the forces of nature but in the hands of capital it makes man the slave of those forces; since in itself it increases the wealth of the bourgeois economist simply states that the contemplation of machinery in itself demonstrates with exactitude that all these evident contradictions are a mere semblance, present in everyday reality, but not existing in themselves, and therefore having no theoretical existence either. Thus he manages to avoid racking his brains any more, and in addition implies that his opponent is guilty of the stupidity of contending, not against the capitalist application of machinery, but against machinery itself. (Marx 1867, 568f.) Also, Herbert Marcuse (1941/1998, 41) is a representative of a dialectical critical theory of technology that identifies contradictory potentials of technology: Technics by itself can promote authoritarianism as well as liberty, scarcity as well as abundance, the extension as well as the abolition of toil.' The difference between a deterministic and a dialectical analysis of the media can be shown with the help of an empirical example study. Social networking sites (SNS)

116 Theory are web-based platforms that integrate different media that allow at least the generation of profiles that display information that describes the users, the display of connections (connection list), the establishment of connections between users that are displayed on their connection lists, and the communication between users. SNS allow the establishment of new friendships, communities and the maintenance of existing friendships. Examples are Facebook, MySpace, Xing, Friendster, studiVZ, Linkedln, hi5, Orkut, Vkontakte or Lokalisten. One can distinguish three kinds of SNS research: (1) techno-pessimistic SNS research, (2) techno-optimistic SNS research and (3) critical/dialectical SNS research. Techno-pessimistic approaches conclude that SNS are dangerous and pose threats primarily for the users, especially for kids, adolescents, and more generally young people (Acquisti and Gross 2006; Dwyer 2007; Dwyer et al 2007; Gross et al 2005). Acquisti and Gross (2006) and Gross et al (2005) argue that the SNS users in their studies showed a very low concern for privacy. Dwyer et al (2007) conducted a quantitative survey (jV= 117) of Facebook and MySpace users. They found that Facebook users were more likely to reveal identifying information and MySpace users more likely to reveal relationship status. Dwyer (2007) conducted interviews with SNS users and concluded: 'While most social networking sites did offer privacy options, most participants did not make much of an effort to customize who could view their profile.' Frederic Stutzman (2006) undertook a survey (jV= 200) of students who use Facebook. He found that a 'large number of students share particularly personal information online'. One can also characterize this approach as victimization discourse. Such research concludes that SNS pose threats that make users potential victims of individual criminals, such as in the case of cyberstalking, sexual harassment, threats by mentally ill persons, data theft, data fraud and so on. Frequently, these studies also advance the opinion that the problem is a lack of individual responsibility and knowledge and that as a consequence users put themselves at risk by putting too much private information online and not making use of privacy mechanisms, for example by making their profile visible for all other users. One problem of the victimization discourse is that it implies young people are irresponsible, passive, ill informed, that older people are more responsible, that the young should take the values of older people as morally superior and as guidelines, and especially that there are technological fixes to societal problems. It advances the view that increasing privacy levels technologically will solve problems and ignores that this might create new problems because decreased visibility might result in less fun for the users, less contacts, and therefore less satisfaction, as well as in the deepening of information inequality. Another problem is that such approaches implicitly or explicitly conclude that communication technologies as such have negative effects. These are pessimistic assessments of technology that imply that there are inherent risks in technology. The causality underlying these arguments is one-dimensional: it is assumed that technology as cause has exactiy one negative effect on society. But both technology and society are complex, dynamic systems (Fuchs 2008). Such systems are to a certain extent unpredictable and their complexity makes it unlikely that they will have exactly one effect (ibid.). It is much more likely that there will be multiple, at least two, contradictory effects (ibid.). The techno-pessimistic victimization discourse is also individualistic and ideological. It focuses on the analysis of individual usage behaviour

Critical media and information studies 117 without seeing and analysing how this use is conditioned by the societal context of ITs, such as surveillance, the global war against terror, corporate interests, neoliberalism and capitalist development. Techno-pessimistic accounts are contradicted by other studies. So, for example, Jones et al (2008) conducted a content analysis of MySpace sites (jV= 1,378) and concluded: 'This study did not find any evidence of widespread disclosure of information that would be easily used for stalking or other forms of offline harassment.' Ybarra and Mitchell (2008) conducted a survey of SNS users (N= 1,588) that showed that 4 per cent of users reported an unwanted sexual solicitation. Alice Marwick (2008) therefore argues that politics and the media have created an overdrawn moral panic about online predators who want to sexually abuse kids with the help of MySpace. This panic in her view does not correspond to the reality of SNS. Such data allow us to conclude that the victimization discourse is a construction that serves ideological purposes. It distracts from more serious issues such as corporate interests and state surveillance. Techno-optimistic SNS research sees SNS as autonomous spaces that empower young people and help them to construct their own autonomy that they need to become adults and to strengthen their personality (boyd 2006, 2007, 2008). The techno-optimistic discourse is one of empowerment. It stresses the potential of technology for autonomy, personal development, freedom, the formation, maintenance and deepening of communities, love or friendships. This discourse assesses SNS fairly positively, it mainly sees advantages and considers disadvantages as ideological constructs or as minor issues. Techno-optimistic accounts focus on positive effects of SNS. Some examples of this discourse can be given, boyd (2008) argues that teenagers are controlled in school by teachers and at home by parents and therefore seek autonomous spaces that they need for identity formation and their personal development. SNS would be such autonomous spaces. Ellison et al (2007) conducted empirical research on the quality of social connections in the social networking platform Facebook. Their method was a quantitative empirical online survey with a random sample of 800 Michigan State University undergraduate students, of which 286 completed the survey. The major result of the study was that 'participants overwhelmingly used Facebook to keep in touch with old friends and to maintain or intensify relationships characterized by some form of offline connection such as dormitory proximity or a shared class'. Valkenburg et al (2006) conducted a psychological survey of SNS users (jV= 881) and found that positive feedback on profiles enhances adolescents' self-esteem and wellbeing. Raacke and Bonds-Raacke (2008) conducted a study that showed that the majority of college students use SNS for making new friends, locating old friends, and staying in touch with existing friends. Just like techno-pessimism, techno-optimism is a one-sided discourse that ignores the multiple, contradictory causality of complex systems (Fuchs 2008). Just like it is unlikely that SNS only put users at risk, it is one-dimensional to assume and unlikely that SNS only empower users. The empowerment discourse is also individualistic because it focuses research primarily on how individuals use SNS for making connections, maintaining or recovering friendships, falling in love, creating autonomous spaces and so on. It does not analyse how technology and technology use are framed by political issues and issues that concern the development of society, such as capitalist

118 Theory crises, profit interests, global war, the globalization of capitalism or the rise of a surveillance society (ibid.). The problem of techno-optimistic and techno-pessimistic accounts is that they are only interested in single aspects of SNS and create the impression that there are only one-sided effects of these platforms. They lack a sense for contradictions and dialectics. Critical SNS studies are viable alternatives to techno-optimistic and techno-pessimistic SNS research. David Beer (2008, 523f.) says that most studies of SNS are overlooking the software and concrete infrastructures, the capitalist organisations, the marketing and advertising rhetoric, the construction of these phenomena in various rhetorical agendas, the role of designers, metadata and algorithms, the role, access and conduct of third parties using SNS, amongst many other things. . . . Capitalism is there, present, particularly in the history, but it is at risk of looming as a black box in understandings of SNS. . . . This is what is missing, a more political agenda that is more open to the workings of capitalism. One important aspect of critical studies is that they focus on the critique of society as totality. They frame research issues by the macro context of the development dynamics of society as a whole. Herbert Marcuse (1937b, 134) has argued in this respect that critical research analyses and criticizes 'the totality of the established world'. 'It is more due to the theory's claim to explain the totality of man and his world in terms of his social being' (ibid., 134f). SNS usage is conditioned by the capitalist economy, the political system and dominant cultural value patterns and conflicts. I conducted an empirical case study on the relationship of surveillance society and SNS usage by students in Salzburg (Fuchs 2009a). The survey used a questionnaire that consisted of 35 (single and multiple) choice questions, three open-ended questions and five interval-scaled questions. The questionnaire was implemented as an electronic survey with the help of the online tool SurveyMonkey. Two open questions asked the respondents about the main advantages and disadvantages of SNS. In a complex, dialectical research approach (complex technology assessment), one assumes that there are not only advantages or disadvantages of these platforms, but that there are multiple effects that contradict each other. I received 557 qualitative answer texts to the question that addressed advantages and 542 texts relating to disadvantages. I identified 17 categories for the advantages and 16 categories for the disadvantages and analysed the answers to the two open questions by content analysis (Krippendorff 2004) so that each text was mapped with one or more categories. The respondents tended to list more than one major advantage and disadvantage. Therefore, each answer was mapped with more than one category in most cases. Figure 3.6 presents the major advantages of SNS that our respondents mentioned. Figure 3.7 shows the major perceived disadvantages of SNS. The data of the survey show that 59.1 per cent consider maintaining existing contacts and 29.8 per cent establishing new contacts as major advantage of SNS, whereas 55.7 per cent say that surveillance as a result of data abuse, data forwarding or a lack of data protection is a major threat of such platforms. Communication and the resulting

Critical media and information studies

119

Most important advantages of social networking sites, N = 557 0.1% I 0.3% 1 0.7% "3 0.9% ~Z3 1.3% 1.3% • 2.9% • 2.9% • 4.1% Z D 5.6% • 8.4% • 11.7% Z Z ) 13.7% I 17.8% • 19.9%

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Major perceived opportunities of social networking sites 1 : Maintaining existing contacts, friendships, family relations, etc. 2: Establishing new contacts with unknown people or with people whom one hardly knows and can easier contact online 3: Finding and renewing old contacts 4: Communication in interest groups and hobby groups 5: Communication and contacts in general (no further specification) 6: International and global character of communication and contacts 7: Sharing and accessing photos, music, videos 8: Entertainment, fun, spare time, amusement 9: Source of information and news 10: Browsing other profiles, 'spying' on others 11 : Free communication that saves money 12: Reminder of birthdays 13: Business communication, finding jobs, self-presentation for potential employers 14: Being hip and trendy 15: Mobility, access from anywhere 16: Self-presentation to others (for non-business reasons) 17: Flirting, sex, love

Figure 3.6 Major perceived opportunities of social networking sites (jV*= 557)

reproduction and emergence of social relations are overwhelmingly considered as major advantage, potential surveillance overwhelmingly as major disadvantage. The impression of the majority of the respondents is that SNS enable communicative advantages that are coupled with the risk of surveillance and reduced privacy. How can we explain that they are willing to take the surveillance risk that they are knowledgeable and conscious about? Communication and surveillance are antagonistic counterparts of the usage of commercial social networking platforms: our data show that students are heavily using SNS and are willing to take the risk of increased surveillance although they are very well aware of surveillance and privacy risks. The potential advantages

120

Theory

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Major perceived risks of social networking sites 1: Data abuse or data forwarding or lack of data protection that lead to surveillance by state, companies or individuals 2: Private affairs become public and result in a lack of privacy and privacy control 3: Personal profile data (images, etc.) are accessed by employer or potential employers and result in job-related disadvantages (such as losing a job or not getting hired) 4: Receiving advertising or spam 5: Lack or loss of personal contacts, superficial communication and contacts, impoverishment of social relations 6: Stalking, harassment, becoming a crime victim 7: Commercial selling of personal data 8: Data and identity theft 9:1 see no disadvantages 10: It is a waste of time 11: Virus, hacking and defacing of profiles, data integrity 12: Internet addiction, increase of stress and health damages 13: Unrealistic, exaggerated self-presentation, competition for best self-presentation 14: Disadvantages at university because professors can access profiles 15: Costs for usage can be introduced (or exist in the case of some platforms) 16: Friends can get a negative impression of me Figure 3.7 Major perceived risks of social networking sites (JV= 542)

seem to outstrip the potential disadvantages. It is not an option for them not to use social networking platforms because they consider the communicative and social opportunities associated with these technologies as very important. At the same time, they are not stupid, uncritical or unaware of potential dangers, but rather very conscious of the disadvantages and risks. They seem to fear that they miss social contacts or will have disadvantages if they do not use platforms such as studiVZ, Facebook or MySpace. Not using these technologies or stopping using them is clearly not an option for most users because it would result in disadvantages such as reduced social contacts and the feeling

Critical media and information studies 121 of not participating in something that has become important for the young generation. The crucial aspect of the antagonism between communicative opportunities and the surveillance risk is that alternative social networking platforms that are non-commercial and non-profit and therefore do not have an interest in economic surveillance, and that see privacy as a fundamental right that needs to be well-protected under all circumstances, are hardly available or hardly known. Commercial profit-oriented sites such as studiVZ, Facebook or MySpace have reached a critical mass of users that is so large that the platforms of these commercial providers have become cultural necessities for most young people. For non-commercial platforms, it is hard to compete with these economic corporations because the latter have huge stocks of financial means (enabled by venture capital or parent companies such as News Corporation or Holtzbrinck), personnel and technological resources. Capitalist business interests and the unequal distribution of assets that is characteristic for the capitalist economy result in the domination of markets by a handful of powerful corporations that provide services and that make influence by non-commercial, non-profit operators difficult. Given the fact that students are knowledgeable of the surveillance threat, it is obvious that they are willing to use alternative platforms instead of the major corporate ones if such alternatives are available and it becomes known that they minimize the surveillance threat. Not students are to blame for potential disadvantages that arise from their usage of social networking platforms that in the opinions of our respondents threaten privacy and advance surveillance, but the corporations that engage in surveillance and enable surveillance are to blame. Corporate social networking platforms are for example not willing to abstain from surveillance for advertising because they have profit interests. The antagonism between communicative opportunities and the surveillance threat is not created by students' and young people's usage of social networking platforms, but by the economic and political logic that shapes social networking corporations' platform strategies. A dialectical analysis of SNS shows that they neither advance only opportunities nor only risks, but that SNS usage is framed by power structures of society and therefore by phenomena such as capitalism and surveillance. As a result, there are both actual advantages and disadvantages for the users. The advantages (communication and community) can only be achieved through the disadvantages (data surveillance, commercialization and commodification). This shows the antagonistic structure of communication technologies in capitalism and suggests the impossibility that capitalism poses advantages without disadvantages.

3.4 Information society theory and informational capitalism The information society theory discourse can be theoretically categorized by distinguishing two axes: the first axis distinguishes aspects of societal change and the second one the informational qualities of these changes. There are theories that conceive the transformations of the past decades as constituting radical societal change. These are discontinuous theories. Other theories stress more the continuities of modern society. Subjective social theories stress the importance of human individuals and their thinking and actions in society, whereas objective social theories stress structures that transcend single individuals (Giddens 1984, xx). Subjective information society theories stress the importance of human knowledge (thought and mental activities)

122 Theory Radical change, discontinuity knowledge economy, post-industrial society, postmodern society, knowledge-based society

network society, Internet society, virtual society, cybersociety

Transnational Informational Capitalism Technology CONTEXT: CAPITALISM c

Subjective

Objective

Cognition, Communication immaterial labour, multitude vs. empire, cognitive capitalism, reflexive modernization

MP3 capitalism, virtual capitalism, informatic capitalism, high-tech capitalism, digital capitalism Continuity

Figure 3.8 A typology of information society theories in contemporary society, whereas objective information society theories emphasize the role of ITs such as the mass media, the computer, the Internet or the mobile phone. Figure 3.8 shows a typology of information society theories. Discontinuous subjective concepts are for example the knowledge economy (Drucker 1969; Machlup 1962; Porat 1977), the post-industrial society (Bell 1976; Touraine 1971), the postmodern society (Lyotard 1979) or the knowledge-based society (Stehr 2001). Objective discontinuous notions that stress the importance of ITs are for example the network society (Gastells 1996, 2000; van Dijk 2006), the virtual society (Buhl 2000; Woolgar 2002), cybersociety (Jones 1998) or the Internet society (Bakardjieva 2005). Discontinuous information society theories prefix certain terms to macrosociological categories such as society or economy, which implies that they assume that society or the economy have undergone a radical transformation in the past decades and that we now live in a new society or economy. These approaches stress discontinuity, as if contemporary society had nothing in common with society as it was 100 or 150 years ago. If there is just more information then it is hard to understand why anyone should suggest that we have before us something radically new' (Webster 2002a, 259). Therefore, Nicholas Garnham (2004) characterizes information society theory as ideology. Such assumptions have ideological character because they fit with the view that we can do nothing about change and have to adapt to existing political realities (Webster 2002b, 267). Peter Golding (2000, 170) argues that information society discourse is an ideology that 'anticipates and celebrates the privatization of information, and the incorporation of IGT developments into the expansion of the free market'. The danger in sociology's fascination of the new would be that it would be distracted from the focus on radical potentials and the critique of how these potentials are suppressed (ibid., 171). c

Critical media and information studies 123

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I agree with these critiques that discontinuous information society theories occlude viewing the continuity of capitalist structures. But such critiques tend to assume that the capitalist character of contemporary society is self-evident and therefore do not or hardly ground their criticism of discontinuous information society theories in empirical data. Qualities of society can only be presented in a convincing manner if theoretical assumptions are supported by data. It therefore needs to be shown that we have been living in a capitalist society in the past decades and that therefore there is a continuity of capitalist structures. Karl Marx characterized capitalism with the following words: 'The driving notion and determining purpose of capitalist production is the self-valorization of capital to the greatest possible extent, i.e. the greatest possible production of surplus-value, hence the greatest possible exploitation of labour-power by the capitalist' (Marx 1867, 449). Capitalism is a dynamic economic system that is based on the need for permanent capital accumulation to continue to exist. Capital can only be increased by the extraction of unpaid labour from workers that is transformed into money profit. 'The employment of surplus-value as capital, or its reconversion into capital, is called accumulation of capital' (ibid., 725). A central characteristic of capitalism therefore is the class relationship between capitalists and workers, in which surplus value is produced that is objectified in commodities that are sold on markets so that surplus value is transformed into profit and the initial capital is increased and reinvested. This is a dynamic process. To show the continuity of capitalism, we therefore need to analyse the development of capital and labour in time. Figure. 3.9 shows the development of the worldwide gross domestic product (GDP) in the years 1961-2008. GDP growth seems to develop in cycles that include upswings and downswings. The combination of these cycles can result in longer waves of GDP

124 Theory 80

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— • — A d j u s t e d wage share U S A (% of GDP)

Adjusted wage share Japan (% of GDP)

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growth or sudden phases of stagnation/crisis. Except for the year 2008, there was an overall growth of the world GDP, which is an indication for continuous capital accumulation in the outlined period. But GDP is an indicator that contains both wages and profits and therefore obscures the class relations that are at the heart of capitalism. To analyse the development of class relations, we therefore need to refer to other data. Figure 3.10 shows the development of the wage shares for the EU15 countries, the United States and Japan in the years 1960-2009. The wage share measures the share of total wages in the GDP. The wage share decreased from 65 to 75 per cent in the mid-1970s to 55 to 60 per cent at the end of the first decade of the new millennium. This means that wages have relatively decreased to profits: lowering wages has radically increased profits. In the past 35 years, capitalism has been characterized by an intensification of class struggle from above: corporations have combated labour by relatively lowering wages. They have been supported in this endeavour by state policies that deregulated markets, labour laws, and decreased corporate taxes. Capital accumulation has therefore remained continuously at high levels for most of the time in the years 1960-2008. An indication for this circumstance is that world cross capital formation, which measures the total value of additions to fixed assets, has remained at more than 20 per cent in all these years (Figure 3.11). The combined value of all stocks has remained continuously at rates above 40 per cent of world GDP in the years 1960-2008 (Figure 3.12). Figure 3.13 shows the growth of total capital assets in the EU15 countries and the United States for the years 1960-2009. The continuous growth of capital assets shows that capital accumulation has continuously yielded profits in the past decades. The continuous growth of world GDP, capital assets, cross capital formation and stock market values in the past decades is an indication that we live in a capitalist economy. The tendency for the growth of profits by decreasing the wage share is an indication for an intensification of class

Critical media and information studies 125 30

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struggle by capital in the past decades, which shows the continuous class character of the contemporary economy. Continuous information society theories stress that we still live in a modern capitalist society but that certain changes of the forms that express basic capitalist structures have taken place. Subjective continuous information society concepts are for example reflexive modernization (Beck et al. 1994), cognitive capitalism (Vercellone 2007), semio-capitalism (Berardi 2009a, 2009b) and general intellect and immaterial labour

126 Theory 450

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Figure 5.13 Share of FDI inflows — developing regions Source: UNCTAD.

Table 5.5 Countries with the largest shares of FDI inflows Country

1980 (%)

2007 (%)

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In 2006, Europe accounted for 55.0 per cent of FDI outflows and North America 21.9 per cent (see Figure 5.14). North America's leading position at the beginning of the 1970s has vanished; its capital exports have decreased by 40 per cent from a 60 per cent share to a 20 per cent share. Developing economies in Asia have become more important in capital export (Figure 5.15): they accounted for only 0.007 per cent of FDI outflows in 1970 and for 9.6 per cent in 2006. China (including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) accounted for 5.3 per cent of these 9.6 per cent in 2006. The rise of China as important capital exporter and importer has been the most significant change in the past 30 years in the world economy. In terms of capital export, China is now more important than Japan, which accounted for 3.8 per cent of capital exports in 2006. Latin America increased its share in world capital exports from 0.2 per cent in 1970 to 4.0 per cent in 2006; Africa's share changed from 0.21 per cent to 0.7 per cent. Africa is de-facto excluded from capital export and import. A country-level comparison of the dominant economic actors in capital export for the years 1980 and 2007 (Table 5.6) shows dramatic decreases for the United States, important decreases for Canada and the Netherlands and important gains for China, France, Italy and Spain. This confirms the analysis that Europe has become more important in capital export than the United States and is the dominant actor in this area in the early twenty-first century.

The media and information economy and the new imperialism 189 90

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World imports have remained rather constantly divided in a relationship of 65-70 per cent and 30-35 per cent between developed economies and developing economies in the years 1948-2007 (Figure 5.16). The share of world exports of developed countries has dropped from 70 per cent around 1945 to 58.6 per cent in 2007 (Figure 5.17). Europe's share in world imports changed from 43.0 per cent in 1948 to 40.4 per cent in 2007 (Figure 5.18), North America's share dropped from 20.1 per cent to 17.11 per cent (Figure 5.18). Africa's import share dropped from 8.8 per cent to 2.4 per cent

190

Case studies

Table 5.6 Countries with the largest shares of FDI outflows Country

1980 (%)

2007 (%)

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- a - Developing economies in Africa

Figure 5.16 Shares in world imports Source: UNGTAD.

(Figure 5.20), Latin America's share from 11.0 per cent to 5.3 per cent (Figure 5.20), whereas the share of developing economies in Asia increased from 12.1 per cent to 25.11 per cent (Figure 5.20). Very significant changes occurred in the structure of world exports: Europe increased its share from 31.0 per cent in 1948 to 40.4 per cent in 2007 (Figure 5.19); in the same time, North America's share dropped from 31.7 per cent to 11.4 per cent (Figure 5.19), the share of developing economies in Asia increased from 11.7 per cent to 29.0 per cent (Figure 5.17), Africa's share dropped from 8.0 per cent to 2.9 per cent (Figure 5.17) and Latin America's share dropped from 12.6 per cent to 5.5 per cent (Figure 5.17). The data show that the world trade structure has undergone significant qualitative changes in the past 50 years: Europe has remained the leading importing and exporting

The media and information economy and the new imperialism 191

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region. North America has remained the second largest import region but has significandy lost (—20 per cent) in exports, where it is now only the third largest region, because Asian developing countries have become the second largest export region (+17 per cent). Africa is today almost entirely excluded from world trade. Latin America has lost in imports and exports and is now also rather marginalized in world trade. The two most important changes are the deterioration of exports by North

192

Case studies 60

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America and the rise of Asia as the second most important export region and as significant import region. In 2007, China accounted for 6.8 per cent of the world's imports and for 8.8 per cent of the world's exports. It has become the leading Asian import and export nation that is now more important in world trade than Japan and is the country that has most accounted for the significant changes of the world trade structure in the past 50 years.

The media and information economy and the new imperialism 193 18

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Figure 5.21 Shares in world exports Source: UNGTAD.

Table 5.7 Countries with the largest shares of world imports Country

1970 (%)

1980 (%)

2007 (%)

Canada China France Germany Italy Japan The Netherlands The United Kingdom The United States

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Source: UNCTAD, listed are all countries that had a share of >4 per cent in one of the displayed years.

A country-level analysis of world imports for the years 1970, 1980 and 2007 (Table 5.7) shows that the most important change has been the rise of China, which was the third largest import country in 2007. A country-level analysis of world exports for the years 1970, 1980 and 2007 (Table 5.8) shows important decreases for the United States, which was the largest exporting country in 1970 and the third largest in 2007, and large increases for China, which was unimportant in world exports in 1970 and 1980, but was the second largest exporting nation (behind Germany) in 2007. Table 5.9 shows the distribution of world G D P in selected years. It shows that Eastern countries such as China and India dominated the early economic world history. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the classical age of imperialism, Europe became the economic geography's centre. The United Kingdom, France and Germany were the dominant economic nations. After the Second World War, there was another shift: the United States became the dominant

194

Case studies

Table 5.8 Countries with the largest shares of world exports Country

1970 (%)

1980 (%)

2007 (%)

Canada China France Germany Italy Japan The Netherlands Saudi Arabia The United Kingdom The United States

5.3 0.7 5.7 10.8 4.2 6.1 4.2 0.8 6.1 13.6

3.3 0.9 5.7 9.5 3.8 6.4 4.2 5.0 5.4 11.1

3.0 8.8 4.0 9.5 3.5 5.1 4.0 1.7 3.1 8.4

Source: UNCTAD, listed are all countries that had a share of >4 per cent in one of the displayed years.

economic nation. In 2006, the United States still was the nation with the largest share of the world's GDP. However, if one treats regions as collective economic actors (which is possible because there are free trade agreements that signify cooperative economic relationships within regions), then East Asia is more important than North America and Europe. This is because, since 1990, China has more than doubled its share of the world GDP and is now the second largest economic nation in terms of the share in world GDP. Since the 1950s, the US share has absolutely declined by more than 7 per cent. The largest compounded labour productivity growth rate in O E C D countries in the years 1970-1980 was in Iceland (5.2 per cent), Ireland (4.8 per cent) and Spain (4.8 per cent). In the United States, this rate was 1.8 per cent. In the years 1995-2007, the largest OECD-wide growth rate was in the Slovak Republic (5.4 per cent), Korea (4.6 per cent), Poland (4.6 per cent) and Ireland (4.1 per cent). In the United States, this rate was 2.1 per cent. The highest growth of multi-factor productivity within the O E C D in the years 1985—1990 was in Ireland (3.2 per cent) and Japan (3.1 per cent). It was 0.8 per cent in the United States. The highest growth in the years 1990-2000 was in Ireland (4.0 per cent) and Finland (1.9 per cent). It was 0.9 per cent in the United States. In the years 2001-2006, the highest growth was in Sweden (2.6 per cent) and Ireland (2.3 per cent) (US: 1.7 per cent) (all data: O E C D statistics). These data show that, in the past 30 years, US productivity increases have been rather low in comparison with other O E C D countries. Ireland was most successful in terms of productivity growth. The world economy has in the past 50 years remained a geographically strongly divided class system. World system theory's distinction between core, periphery and semi-periphery (Wallerstein 1974) can still be applied to the world economy (Arrighi 2005). 'The core-periphery structure of the global political economy shows few signs of being superseded by other forms of stratification' (ibid., 33). Lenin's fourth characteristic of imperialism, the asymmetric spatial division of the world economy, is valid today. However, some important qualitative changes have taken place, especially the rise of China as important actor in the world economy and the deterioration of North America's position that benefited both Europe and Asia. FDI inflows are stratified in a relation of 70:30 between developed and developing economies, world imports in a relation of 65:35, world exports in a relation of 60:40. Europe is

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Participatory web 2.0 as ideology

7.1 Introduction I have tried to ground foundations of a critical theory of the Internet in my book Internet and society: Social theory in the information age (Fuchs 2008). Critical Internet studies elaborates theories and conducts empirical research that aim at uncovering the structures of domination into which the Internet and Internet usage are embedded and it tries to show ways of how the Internet can support liberation from oppression. Critical Internet studies forms a subfield of the emerging transdisciplinary field ICTs and Society. Mark Andrejevic (2009) terms this subfield critical media studies 2.0, Paul A . Taylor (2009) speaks of critical theory 2.0. Critical Internet studies is different from what Tim Berners-Lee et al. (2006) have termed web sociology which forms a part of web science. The basic question of web sociology is 'What do people and communities want from the web, and what online behaviour is required for the web to work?' (ibid., 80). This framework is reductionistic: it focuses on micro-level analysis and ignores the macro and intermediate levels of society and sees users as consumers who are offered goods on the Internet and who have to function in certain ways so that the web can 'work'. The approach is therefore functionalistic and instrumental. It ignores aspects of power, domination, exploitation and struggles for liberation on the Internet. Critical Internet studies in contrast contextualizes Internet usage in the totality of society, sees users as active human beings whose freedom is limited by corporate and other dominative Internet structures, and argues for a co-operative, non-dominative, commons-based Internet. Only a few other representatives of critical Internet studies can be mentioned here. Nick Dyer-Witheford (1999) suggests reinventing Marxism for the analysis of twentyfirst century techno-capitalism. He uses the autonomist Marxist concepts of the composition, decomposition and recomposition of the working class to show that 'new information technologies therefore appear not just as instruments for the circulation of commodities, but simultaneously as channels for the circulation of struggles' (ibid., 12 If). He analyses how the new high technologies - computers, telecommunications, and genetic engineering - are shaped and deployed as instruments of an unprecedented, world wide order of general commodification; and how, paradoxically, arising out of this process appear forces which could produce a different future based on the common sharing of wealth — a twenty-first century communism. (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 2)

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David Hakken (2003) argues that, to establish a good information society, knowledge in cyberspace needs to be theorized independent from capital and pro-capitalist theories. Hakken argues for a knowledge theory of value that is grounded in Marxian theory. He sees cyberspace as being shaped by Vast contradictions' (ibid., 393). New information and communication technologies 'are better viewed as terrains of contestation than as ineluctable independent forces. Technologies do have politics, but like all politics, they manifest multiple, contradictory tendencies' (ibid., 366). Trebor Scholz (2008) speaks of the 'web 2.0 hype' and says that 'the suggestion of sudden newness' of web 2.0 'is aimed at potential investors'. Jodi Dean (2004, 281) argues that Internet communication and other forms of communication in 'communicative capitalism . . . [are] rooted in communication without communicability'. She says that the Internet thereby becomes a technological fetish that advances post-politics. Dean bases her work on Georgio Agamben and Slavoj Zizek. She disagrees with seeing network technologies and immaterial labour as immanently advancing political struggles. 'The view I advocate is less optimistic insofar as it rejects the notion that anything is immediately political, and instead prioritizes politicization as the difficult challenge of representing specific claims or acts as universal' (Dean 2005, 57). Dean argues that politics on the Internet has to be organized and that there is a primacy of political parties: 'A proper Net politics, however, realizes that what happens on the Net has to be made to matter. One has to link the Net to state- and interstate-level actors and actions' (Dean 2004, 284). She makes in this context use of Zizek's discussion of Lenin's political strategy in which the political party is of central importance in making political revolutions happen. 'In acknowledging the appropriateness of Zizek's prioritizing of class struggle, we might also think of the challenges of political organizing in the intensely mediated terrains of communicative capitalism: it requires lots of time and money' (Dean 2006, 59). Eran Fisher (2008) argues that the network technology discourse that involves phenomena such as crowd sourcing is the new legitimation discourse of post-Fordist capitalism. Marcus Breen (2002, 166) says that Smithian principles in the Internet policy world argue for self-regulated Internet markets, whereas 'Marxian principles' argue for 'shared societal goals'. The interplay of private innovation, public use and public policy would have resulted in the Internet as a 'complex capitalist system played out on private keyboards and monitors' (ibid., 179). Mark Andrejevic (2009, 48f.) says that 'related to the development of techniques for making sense out of the glut is the need to develop an updated critique of exploitation'. He speaks in this context of exploitation 2.0 (Andrejevic 2009) and has coined the notions of the digital enclosure (Andrejevic 2002) and the work of being watched (Andrejevic 2002, 2007). The digital enclosure signifies that interactive technologies generate 'feedback about the transactions themselves' and that this feedback 'becomes the property of private companies' (Andrejevic 2007, 3). Andrejevic argues that 'those who are increasingly subject to surveillance are prevented from learning about the details of the surveillance process itself (ibid., 8). The work of being watched means 'the ability of the interactive technology to gather information about individual viewing habits' so that a cybernetic commodity emerges that contains 'information about transactions and viewing habits' (ibid., 14). Commercial and state surveillance of consumers would be the result of the digital enclosure. They 'foster asymmetrical and undemocratic power relations. Political and economic elites collect information that

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 257 facilitates social Taylorism rather than fostering more democratic forms of shared control and participation' (ibid., 257). Andrejevic (ibid., 2) sees the Internet as a virtual digital enclosure. Jonathan Beller (2003, 92) uses the term the cinematic mode of production to suggest that the cinema and its succeeding, if still simultaneous, formations, particularly television, video, computers and Internet, are deterritorialized factories in which spectators work, that is, in which they perform value-productive labour'. Human attention would be exploited. Therefore, Beller speaks of the attention theory of value. Rafael Gapurro (2005) argues that information ethics questions moral values, information myths, contradictions, ethical conflicts and the creation of new power structures in the network society. Geert Lovink and Pit Schultz (1997) argue that "net critique' analyses the organization of power in the immaterial sphere (ibid., 6) as well as imperialism and ideology on the Internet (ibid., 11). Hartmann (1999, 107f.) sees the questioning of information fetishism, the critique of the political economy of information society technologies and the analysis of the virtual class as the task of what he terms 'data critique'. M y contribution to the critical study of the Internet is the approach to explicitly reactualize and 'reload' Marxian theory. The task is to create not just a critical theory of the Internet but also a Marxian theory and Marxian-inspired critical research of the Internet. The Marxian circuit of capital (Capital Vols 1 and 2) that is also a circuit of exploitation needs to be related to the phenomenon of Internet produsage. Changes in society, such as the emergence of new economic strategies, new ideologies or new technologies, bring about a change of human experiences because humans observe and enact these changes. As a result, these experiences and observations are transfigured into narratives of society that can be observed in spheres such as popular culture, the media, or the academic system. Experience 'exerts pressures upon existent social consciousness, proposes new questions . . . It is experience (often class experience) which gives a coloration to culture, to values, and to thought' (Thompson 1978, 8, 98). The rise of popular Internet platforms that are based on user-generated content, co-creation, information consumers/users as producers (prosumers, produsers), such as Facebook (created in 2004), YouTube (2005), Wikipedia (2001), MySpace (2003), Twitter (2006), Flickr (2003), hi5 (2004), Photobucket (2003) or Youporn (2005), and usage experiences have created such narratives about changes of the Internet and society. Two spheres, where we can find these narratives, are the mass media and academia. The notion of participation is of particular importance in the new claims and narratives about web 2.0: c

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'The age of participation. . . . With participatory media, the boundaries between audiences and creators become blurred and often invisible' (Among the audience, The Economist, April 20, 2006). "Whereas Web 1.0 users' characteristic activity was surfing static Internet pages, Web 2.0 is more participatory: Users upload content and actively shape their environment. Blogs are the best-known evidence of this shift' (Welcome to Web 2.0, LA. Times, June 24, 2007). The web 'is by nature a participatory medium, in which customers demand a more personal stake in the products they consume' (The web users' campaign, New York Times, December 9, 2007).

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Case studies 'Web 2.0: Participatory Future (Bild Zeitung, 2007 Internet Special). 'The world wide web has ushered in a new age of digital democracy (The Times, February 18, 2008). 'Open for Questions, developed by a Google employee, is meant to be an open civic participation tool Americans get to go online, ask questions of Obama's transition team and rely on crowd sourcing to get the best questions to the top of the priority list ([email protected], The Guardian, December 15, 2008). 'Web 2.0 is the network as platform . . ., an "architecture of participation'" (O'Reilly 2005b). O'Reilly (2005a) argues that web 1.0 was characterized by publishing, whereas web 2.0 is characterized by participation. 'In practice, services dubbed Web 2.0 reflect open standards, decentralized infrastructure, flexibility, simplicity, and, perhaps most importantly, active user-participation. Examples: blogs, wikis, craigshst.com, del.icio.us, and Flickr' (Stefanac 2007, 237). Tapscott and Williams (2006) speak of the 'new web', which they define as 'a global, ubiquitous platform for computation and collaboration' that is about 'communities, participation, and peering' (ibid., 19). 'Web 2.0 is participative. The traditional Web has tended to be somewhat onesided, with a flow of content from provider to viewer. . . . Web 2.0 applications have been quick to spot the value of user-generated content. It is useful to facilitate participation in the way a messaging service might, but it is a lot more valuable to fold the output of that participation back into the application and make it available to all of the application's users. This is a substantial part of the attraction of services such as Flickr over previous photo-album applications' (Miller 2005). 'Blogs, e-mails, personalized websites on MySpace and YouTube - all involve an unprecedented degree of interactivity and participation' (McNair 2009, 223). 5

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These examples show that participation is a popular notion in narratives about contemporary culture and the contemporary Internet. The term 'to participate' stems etymologically from the Latin word 'participare , which means to take part in something. To speak of participation makes a normative and political claim because it assumes an inclusion of persons into processes and structures that concern them. Participation is therefore a question of democracy and claims about participation need therefore to be judged based on democracy models and theories. Gastells (2009) argues that mass self-communication is a new aspect of the contemporary Internet (for a detailed review of Gastells book Communication power see Fuchs 2009b): 5

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It is mass communication because it can potentially reach a global audience, as in the posting of a video on YouTube, a blog with RSS links to a number of web sources, or a message to a massive e-mail list. At the same time, it is selfcommunication because the production of the message is self-generated, the definition of the potential receiver(s) is self-directed, and the retrieval of specific messages or content from the World Wide Web and electronic networks is self-selected. The three forms of communication (interpersonal, mass communication, and mass self-communication) coexist, interact, and complement each other rather than substituting for one another. What is historically novel, with

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 259 considerable consequences for social organization and cultural change, is the articulation of all forms of communication into a composite, interactive, digital hypertext that includes, mixes, and recombines in their diversity the whole range of cultural expressions conveyed by human interaction. (GasteUs 2009, 55) The question arises if mass self-communication is inherently a form of democratic participation or not. For answering this question, the technological capacities of the Internet need to be related to democracy theory. Held (2006, 4) argues that liberalrepresentative democracy and direct-participatory democracy are the two basic notions of democracy. Based on this distinction, Held (1996, 2006) introduces a number of models of democracy: classical Athenian democracy, liberal democracy (protective democracy, developmental democracy), direct democracy, competitive elitist democracy, pluralistic democracy, legal democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy and democratic autonomy/cosmopolitan democracy. Jan van Dijk (2000) builds on Held's models of democracy and distinguishes six models of digital democracy: legalist digital democracy, competitive digital democracy, plebiscitary digital democracy, pluralist digital democracy, participatory digital democracy and libertarian digital democracy. He argues that discussion lists, teleconferences and electronic town halls are typical technologies used in participatory digital democracy. In my own approach, I have distinguished based on three models of democracy between representative digital democracy, plebiscitary digital democracy, and grassroots digital democracy (eParticipation) (Fuchs 2008, 225-247). Other than van Dijk, I see especially cyberprotest and social movements as characteristic for participatory digital democracy (ibid., 277-294). This discussion of the role of models for democracy and digital democracy shows that if the role of participation in contemporary culture and the Internet are discussed from a democracy theory perspective, the model of participatory democracy is a suitable discourse for framing the analysis. In democracy theory, the notion of participation is most prominently featured in models of participatory democracy. It is therefore feasible to evaluate claims about the role of participation on the web with the help of participatory democracy theory. This is the task of this chapter. The research question posed is: Can web 2.0 be considered as participatory within the discourse universe of participatory democracy theory? The method used for answering this question is ideology critique. The claims made about web 2.0 are confronted with empirical data to test whether there is evidence and/or counter-evidence to these claims. This chapter can be understood as a contribution to the 'renewal of ideology critique in media studies that Downey considers necessary because of media studies narrowness — its 'lack of engagement with both classical and contemporary social theory - and its 'deep-seated uncertainties and confusions concerning questions of ethics, epistemology, and political praxis (Downey 2008, 60), which have resulted in a lack of philosophical and political ambition on the part of media studies (ibid., 72). This chapter is structured in the following way: section 7.2 presents basic assumptions of participatory democracy theory and how they can be applied to the media. In section 7.3, examples for the claims made in the academic discourse on the participatory web are discussed and the method of empirical ideology critique is introduced and applied to the notion of participatory web 2.0. In section 7.4, an alternative e

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way of theorizing 'web 2.0' is introduced. In section 7.5, some conclusions are drawn.

7.2 Participatory democracy Staughton Lynd introduced the notion of participatory democracy to the academic debate in 1965. Lynd (1965) used the term for describing the organization principle of the Students for a Democratic Society. David Held (1996) argues that Carole Pateman and Crawford Brough Macpherson are the two main representatives of participatory democracy theory. In an age where many say that participation becomes a central feature of culture and the media, it is therefore feasible to engage with the key ideas of these two thinkers. The notion of participatory democracy that was advanced by Macpherson and Pateman will be discussed at some length because it is largely forgotten in the discussion about participatory culture and media today, which in my opinion is also one of the reasons why the notion of participation is frequently used in rather restricted and uncritical ways today. Held (1996, 271) says that a key feature of participatory democracy is the 'direct participation of citizens in the regulation of the key institutions of society, including the workplace and local community'. It also means that 'democratic rights need to be extended from the state to the economic enterprise and the other central organizations of society' (ibid., 268). The central idea of participatory democracy theory is that individuals should be enabled to fully take part in collective decision processes and in the control and management of structures in the economic, political and cultural systems that concern and affect them. Participatory democracy has to do with grassroots decisions, bottom-up communication, self-management, self-determination, self-realization and self-organization of humans. Participatory democracy is an extension and intensification of democracy. Based on this insight, participatory democracy theory makes a number of claims that are justified with the help of theoretical, logical and empirical reasoning and that we can summarize as nine basic principles (Macpherson 1973; Pateman 1970). 1

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The intensification and extension of democracy: Participatory democracy involves the 'démocratisation of authority structures' (Pateman 1970, 35) in all decisionmaking systems, such as government, the work place, the family, education and housing. 'If individuals are to exercise the maximum amount of control over their own lives and environment then authority structures in these areas must be so organised that they can participate in decision-making' (ibid., 43). Participatory democracy theory uses a wide notion of the political that extends beyond the sphere of government into the economy and culture. 'Spheres such as industry should be seen as political systems in their own right' (ibid.). Participation takes place 'in all areas' (ibid.). The economic system is seen as the fundamental sphere of participation. 'The most important area is industry; most individuals spend a great deal of their lifetime at work and the business of the workplace provides an education in the management of collective affairs that it is difficult to parallel elsewhere' (ibid.). Developmental powers as the essence of man: Man's essence is understood as consisting of a number of positive capacities that include the capacity for rational understanding,

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 261 moral judgement and action, for aesthetic creation, contemplation, emotional activities (friendship, love, etc.), the capacity for the transformation of nature, the capacity for materially productive labour, the capacity for wonder and curiosity, the capacity for laughter, the capacity for controlled physical, mental and aesthetic activity, civil and political liberties, and so on (Macpherson 1973, 4, 14, 54). The human being is seen as a doer, a creator, an exerter of energy, an actor' (ibid., 54). Macpherson (ibid., 39) speaks in this context of developmental power, understood as the 'ability to use and develop human capacities'. The maximization of human developmental powers: Participatory democracy is conceived as the maximization of the exertion and realization of human developmental powers and the abolishment of structures that limit the full realization of these powers. Democratic theory is the "claim to maximize men's developmental powers' (ibid., 50). Democracy is not seen as a system of government, but a kind of society that is based on the egalitarian principle 'one man, one equal effective right to live as fully humanly' (ibid., 51). Participatory democracy can be measured by assessing how nearly society 'attains the presently attainable maximum . . . level of abilities to use and develop human capacities given the presently possible human command over external Nature' (ibid., 58). External impediments that must be abolished to realize participatory democracy are the lack of adequate means of life (physical and psychological energy), the lack of access to the means of labour and the lack of protection against invasion by others (ibid., 59—70). Extractive power as impediment for participatory democracy: Macpherson (1973) argues that capitalism is based on an exploitation of human powers that limits the development of human capacities. The modern economy c

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by its very nature compels a continual net transfer of part of the power of some men to others [for the benefit and the enjoyment of the others], thus diminishing rather than maximizing the equal individual freedom to use and develop one's natural capacities. (Macpherson 1973, lOf.) What is transferred, from the non-owner to the owner of the means of labour (i.e. of the land and capital), is the non-owner's ability to labour, i.e. his ability to use his own capacities productively, during the time contracted for. The owner purchases that ability for a certain time and puts it to work. The ability, the labour-power is transferred. The actual work is owned by the owner of the capital. . . . He also owns the product, including the value added to the materials by the work. (Macpherson 1973, 64f.) For Macpherson (1973), capitalism is based on the individual right to unlimited accumulation of property (ibid., 17) and unlimited appropriation (ibid., 18), which allows a small group to develop their powers at the expense of others, who are deprived of these powers. The result would be an unequal distribution of property (ibid., 34) that prevents 'an effective equal right of individuals to exert, enjoy, and develop their powers' (ibid., 35). Macpherson speaks of extractive power, defined as the 'power over others, the ability to extract benefit

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Case studies from others' (ibid., 42). He describes an antagonism between extractive and developmental power as characteristic for modern society. Extraction limits human development. Land and capital would be the two central forms of extractive power (ibid., 44). Macpherson argues that extractive power can be measured as 'the excess of the value added by the work over the wage paid' (ibid., 65). This means that the money profit achieved in a corporation, an industry or the total economy is a numeric measure of extractive power and of the absence of economic developmental power. Participatory decision-making. One central aspect of participatory democracy is collective decision-making. In the participatory theory "participation" refers to (equal) participation in the making of decisions, and "political equality" refers to equality of power in determining the outcome of decisions' (Pateman 1970, 43). Pateman speaks of full participation as a process where each individual member of a decision-making body has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions' (ibid., 71). Participatory economy: Another central aspect of a participatory democracy is a democratic economy, which requires a 'change in the terms of access to capital in the direction of more nearly equal access' (Macpherson 1973, 71) and 'a change to more nearly equal access to the means of labour' (ibid., 73). In a participatory society, extractive power is reduced to zero (ibid., 74). A participatory society equalizes the access to the means of life, the means of labour and the protection against invasion by others (access to civil and political liberties). 'Genuine democracy, and genuine liberty, both require the absence of extractive powers' (ibid., 121). Participatory democracy therefore requires for Macpherson that the means and the output of labour are no longer private property, but become common property, which is 'the guarantee to each individual that he will not be excluded from the use or benefit [...]; private property is created by the guarantee that an individual can exclude others from the use or benefit of something' (ibid., 124). Participatory democracy involves 'the right to a share in the control of the massed productive resources' (ibid., 137). A democratic economy furthermore involves 'the democratising of industrial authority structures, abolishing the permanent distinction between "managers" and "men"' (Pateman 1970, 43). Pateman terms the grassroots organization of firms and the economy in a participatory democracy 'self-management'. Technological productivity as materialfoundation of participatory democracy: The realization of democratic capacities requires as material foundation a high level of technological productivity that is used in such a way that a post-scarcity economy, in which all people live in wealth, is realized. £

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I am arguing that we are reaching a level of productivity at which the maximization of human powers, in the ethical sense, . . . can take over as the criterion of the good society, and that in the present world climate it will have to be an egalitarian maximization of powers. (Macpherson 1973, 20f.) For Macpherson, the material foundation of participatory democracy is a technological revolution in energy generation and communication technologies that

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 263 could provide the means of realizing the democratic concept of the human essence. . . . It could, that is to say, by releasing more and more time and energy from compulsive labour, allow men to think and act as enjoyers and developers of their human capacities rather than devoting themselves to labour as a necessary means of acquiring commodities. At the same time the technological revolution could enable men to discard the concept of themselves as essentially acquirers and appropriators. (Macpherson 1973, 37) Participatory democracy requires 'conditions of economic security (Pateman 1970, 40) and that humans are Treed for the first time in history from compulsive labour (Macpherson 1973, 37). Participatory democracy is a society in which the abilities are realized by increasing the application of the natural forces and not by the exploitation of humans (ibid., 48). Macpherson s notion of democratic technology parallels Herbert Marcuse s remarks on the role of technology in liberation. Marcuse imagined the stage 5

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where continued progress would demand the radical subversion of the prevailing direction and organization of progress. This stage would be reached when material production (including the necessary services) becomes automated to the extent that all vital needs can be satisfied while necessary labor time is reduced to marginal time. From this point on, technical progress would transcend the realm of necessity, where it served as the instrument of domination and exploitation which thereby limited its rationality; technology would become subject to the free play of faculties in the struggle for the pacification of nature and of society. (Marcuse 1964b, 16) Marcuse says that technology 'becomes the potential basis of a new freedom (Marcuse 1961, 51). Participation as education in participation: The level of technological productivity and the availability of free time are also important foundations for the availability of the time and the energy that are in combination with the achievement of a high general level of education necessary for fostering democratic discourse and participation in collective decision-making and public affairs. Pateman (1970, 25, 42£, 105) argues that humans in the participation process itself develop the qualities needed for participatory democracy so that participatory democracy improves itself. 'We do learn to participate by participating (ibid., 105). Pseudo-participation as ideology: In contemporary society, participation is also frequently employed as ideology that pretends situations of participation without democratizing decision-making to contain struggles and to realize corporate interests. Pateman speaks of pseudo-participation, which she defines as 5

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techniques used to persuade employees to accept decisions that have already been made by the management. . . . A typical example would be the situation where the supervisor, instead of merely telling the employees of a decision, allows them to question him about it and to discuss it. . . . the concern . . .

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Macpherson and Pateman coined the notion of participatory democracy in the early 1970s and did not deal with aspects of communication and communication technologies. They wrote at a time where the Internet (then called the ARPANET) was a small network that interconnected computers at nine locations in 1970 (the year Pateman's book Participation and democratic theory was published) and at 40 locations in 1973 (the year Macpherson's Democratic theory was published). Today, computer-mediated communication has become more important and it is therefore important to think about how the nine tenets of participatory democracy can be applied to the realm of communication. 1

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The intensification and extension of democracy: Communication technology is a sphere of society that is structured by power relations. In a participatory democracy, communication technology is therefore itself a sphere of participation, which requires that it is freely available to all, that it is treated as a common good, can be developed by all who wish to participate in co-operative processes, which requires open sources, and that the organizations that develop and operate communication technologies are self-managed and collectively controlled. Communication technologies can help to enable, support and mediate participation processes in all spheres and at all levels of society. Developmental powers as the essence of man: Communication is an important developmental power of the human being. The maximization of human development powers: Participatory democracy requires the creation of situations of uncoerced, dominationless communication, in which humans can say all things that are important for them, are heard by others, and where their voices have transformative effects. Extractive power as impedimentfor participatory democracy + 6 Participatory economy: In a participatory society, the production and operation of communication technologies that are available to the public are not based on private property, wage labour and money profit, but on technology as common property of society, voluntary activities in a post-scarcity economy and societal benefits for all. Participatory decision-making. In a participatory democracy, the development and operation of communication technologies is a democratic process, in which all users and developers can equally take part. Technological productivity as material foundation: Computers are not only means for participatory communication, but also means for increasing technological productivity to a level that could bring about the transformation of wage labour, hard work and scarcity into well-rounded free activities, the abundance of life, and a post-scarcity economy.

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Participation as education in participation: Participation as learning process is a highly social and therefore communicative process. Communication technologies, such as blended learning technologies, can support participation as learning process. Pseudo-participation as ideology: Ideology is always a communication process, it communicates to people that a certain situation should be perceived in a certain way that does not correspond to factual reality. Pseudo-participation can also be fostered in relation to communication technologies, which means the creation of mythologies about the democratic effects of communication technologies, although the latter function within a non-participatory environment in nonparticipatory ways.

On the basis of this discussion of participatory democracy in the next section I will use selected principles of participatory democracy to test whether claims that are made about participation and web 2.0' in the academic debate correspond to the notion of participation advanced by participatory democracy theory. Specific attention will be given to the economic aspects of participation because both Macpherson and Pateman have stressed the central importance of a participatory economy for a participatory society, which implies that a lack of economic participation collapses claims about the overall participatory state of social systems. c

7.3 Ideology critique of claims about participatory web 2.0 Empirical ideology critique tests whether certain claims about reality can be questioned by looking for counter-evidence that supports the assumptions that the claims are mythological and contradict evidence about the state of reality. It introduces a different level of reality to claims about reality and thereby tries to increase epistemological complexity. It is based on the assumption that reality is complex and contradictory and that one-dimensional representations of reality lack complexity and should therefore be questioned. For Georg Lukâcs (1923/1972, 50), ideology 'by-passes the essence of the evolution of society and fails to pinpoint it and express it adequately'. Slavoj Zizek (1994, 305) argues that '"ideological" is a social reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence'. Empirical ideology critique is a method of immanent critique: Adorno argued that this method analyses certain ideas' pretension to correspond to reality. Immanent criticism of intellectual and artistic phenomena seeks to grasp, through the analysis of their form and meaning, the contradiction between their objective idea and that pretension. It names what the consistency or inconsistency of the work itself expresses of the structure of the existent. (Adorno 1981, 32) The notion of ideology that is represented by Lukâcs, Zizek, Adorno and others is a political one that is different from the epistemological concept of ideology (Eagleton 1991, 11). To test the ideological character of claims about the 'participatory web',

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I will now give an overview of popular narratives that can be found in the academic debate on web 2.0 and will then confront these claims based on principles of participatory democracy with counter-factual data. Henry Jenkins (2008, 331) defines participatory culture as culture "in which fans and other consumers are invited to actively participate in the creation and circulation of new content . It also involves 'participants who interact with each other (ibid., 3). Participation for Jenkins involves 'forms of audience engagement that are shaped by cultural and social protocols rather than by the technology itself (ibid., 331). Jenkins argues that convergence culture enables 'new forms of participation and collaboration (ibid., 256). Although Jenkins is aware that corporations exert greater power than consumers (ibid., 3, 175), he focuses in his books on the presentation of hundreds of examples that want to assert to the reader that contemporary media empower consumers because they enable production processes and that consumers successfully resist corporatism. Media prosumption is inherently conceived as being participatory. Jenkins argues that increasingly 'the Web has become a site of consumer participation (ibid., 137) and sees Hogging as 'potentially increasing cultural diversity and lowering barriers in cultural participation , 'expanding the range of perspectives , as 'grassroots intermediaries that ensure 'that everyone has a chance to be heard Jenkins 2006, 180f). Jenkins hardly gives examples for corporate domination in culture and on the Internet, therefore the notion of participatory culture takes on a reified character in his works. So, for example, Jenkins argues that on YouTube 'participation occurs at three distinct levels . . . - those of production, selection, and distribution (Jenkins 2008, 275), without considering the fact that YouTube is owned by Google and that the revenues that are accumulated with online advertising on YouTube do not belong to the immediate content producers, but to the shareholders of Google. Jenkins neglects ownership as aspect of participation. He argues that participatory culture advances cultural diversity (ibid., 268), but overlooks that not all voices have the same power and that produced content and voices are frequently marginalized because visibility is a central resource in contemporary culture that can be bought by powerful actors such as media corporations. Jenkins assumes that diversity is the linear result of prosumption. Axel Bruns (2008, 21) sees the rise of produsage - the 'hybrid user/producer role which inextricably interweaves both forms of participation - as the central characteristic of web 2.0. He argues that produsage 'harnesses the collected, collective intelligence of all participants (ibid., 1), that it allows 'participation in networked culture (ibid., 17), that 'open participation (ibid., 24, 240) is a key principle of produsage, that a reconfiguration of democracy may result from web 2.0 (ibid., 34), and that Flickr, YouTube, MySpace and Facebook are environments of 'public participation (ibid., 227f). He envisions a 'produsage-based, participatory culture (ibid., 256) and 'a produsage-based democratic model (ibid., 372). In the 400 pages of his book Blags, Wikipedia, Second Life, and beyond, Bruns uses the terms 'participation and 'participatory in such an inflationary way that you will hardly find any page that does not mention one of the two terms. He does so without ever reflecting on the social theoretical foundations of the notion of participation, which results in a shallow usage of the term so that participation seems to be synonymous with produsage for Bruns. He says for example that in produsage 'usage is necessarily also productive: participants are produsers (Bruns 2007, 101). 5

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5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 267 For Clay Shirky (2008, 20£), the central aspect of web 2.0 is a remarkable increase in our ability to share, to cooperate with one another, and to take collective action'. There would be a 'linking of symmetrical participation and amateur production'. 'Symmetrical participation means that once people have the capacity to receive information, they have the capability to send it as well' (ibid., 107). This would mean the 'democratization of production' (ibid., 297). Also for Shirky, participation means the emergence of produsage supported by web 2.0. Shiffman (2008) sees the emergence of the 'age of engage' as a result of web 2.0. He says that web 2.0 is based on engaging instead of informing (ibid., 14) and that 'marketing 2.0' must engage and let people participate to create profit. c

Millions of people are participating in the user-generated content (UGG) groundswell. Digg, Second Life, Flickr, MySpace, and YouTube epitomize the user centricity of the Live Web. . . . The Live Web is about more than connecting people, but enabling them to create and participate in the conversation. (Shiffman 2008, 19f.) 'Marketing today is more about participation than selling' (Shiffman 2008, 127). Tapscott and Williams (2006) identify seven business models for capital accumulation with the help of web 2.0 and argue that these models advance participation and a democratic economy. They suggest that capital can be accumulated by collaboration, the provision of free access, peering, sharing, networking, communicating, and opening resources. Consumers become producers of surplus value: 'In each instance the traditionally passive buyers of editorial and advertising take active, participatory roles in value creation' (ibid., 14). There are 'models where masses of consumers, employees, suppliers, business partners, and even competitors co-create value in the absence of direct managerial control' (ibid., 55). The question is whether the result is the emergence of 'a new economic democracy . . . in which we all have a lead role' (ibid., 15), as Tapscott and Williams claim, or a subtly operating, coercive and highly exploitative capitalist economy that tries to reduce labour and other investment costs by the global dynamic outsourcing of labour to prosumers, competitors and subcontractors with the help of web 2.0. Shiffman and Tapscott/Williams understand participation as a capital accumulation strategy. Chris Atton (2002, 155) defines alternative media as inherently participatory and says that they are based on a participatory ethos. 'They emphasize the organization of media to enable wider social participation in the creation, production and dissemination than is possible in the mass media' (ibid., 25). Atton stresses on the one hand that 'the decentralized, participatory mechanisms' of alternative media 'enable a diversity of voices to be heard through a wide range of media' (ibid., 131) and have resulted in 'multiperspectival journalism' (Atton 2008a, 80), and on the other hand, he especially argues in his later works that there is a danger that alternative mechanisms, especially user-generated content on the Internet and citizen journalism, become incorporated into corporate mass media (ibid., 140-142). For Atton (2008b, 217f), media participation is not a good in itself and not a normative concept. Yochai Benkler (2006) argues that the Internet advances the emergence of commons-based peer production systems (such as open source software or Wikipedia) that are 'radically decentralized, collaborative and nonproprietary; based on sharing

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Case studies

resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely connected individuals who cooperate with each other without relying on either market signals or managerial commands' (ibid., 60). For Benkler, culture becomes more democratic because more people can produce content. He employs the notion of participation in this context and understands it as meaning the emergence of active prosumers. He says that on the Internet 'many more of us participate actively in making cultural moves and finding meaning in the world around us' and that 'we can say that culture is becoming more democratic: self-reflective and participatory' (ibid., 15). He also argues in this context that the networked information economy . . . makes the process of cultural production more participatory, in the sense that more of those who live within a culture can actively participate in its creation. We are seeing the possibility of an emergence of a new popular culture, produced on the folk-culture model and inhabited actively, rather than passively consumed by the masses. Through these twin characteristics — transparency and participation - the networked information economy also creates greater space for critical evaluation of cultural materials and tools. The practice of producing culture makes us all more sophisticated readers, viewers, and listeners, as well as more engaged makers. (Benkler 2006, 275) Nico Carpentier distinguishes between participation in the media and participation through the media. 'Participation in the media deals with the participation of nonprofessionals in the production of media' (Bailey et al. 2008, 113), it means that people 'organise their own participation' in the media (Carpentier 2007, 113). 'Participation through the media deals with the opportunities for extensive participation in public debate and for self-representation in public spaces' (Bailey et al. 2008, 11). Carpentier also discerns between micro- and macro-participation. Participation through the media is about giving ordinary people 'the opportunity for their voices to be heard' (ibid., 14; see also Carpentier 2007, 117) that can be advanced through four kinds of alternative media. Here also the notion of alternative media acting as a 'third voice' (Bailey et al. 2008, 23; Carpentier 2007, 117) is important. At the micro level, participation refers to the ability to produce content, co-decide on content and policy, receiving and interpreting content, and evaluating content (Bailey et al. 2008, 13f.)* Carpentier's notion of participatory media is more nuanced than other concepts. However, he does not include questions concerning ownership and the equal distribution of economic resources and outputs into his notion of media participation. Furthermore, the question if alternative voices are effectively heard in the contemporary capitalist media landscape is treated only as subsidiary question that is subordinated to the dominant focus on citizens' enablement for producing content. In summary, Jenkins, Bruns and Shirky understand the participatory web as the contemporary web that advances produsage, user-generated content, online collaboration and information sharing. Also Shiffman, Tapscott and Williams employ the notion of participation as produsage and in addition claim that produsage can and should be used for marketing and profit generation. Atton shares the notion of participation as produsage, but is less optimistic because he argues that only alternative

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 269 media participation is politically progressive. Benkler's position is close to the one by Atton, with the difference that he does not stress alternative media participation, but participation on commons-based, nonproprietary peer-production Internet platforms. Carpentier provides a more complex understanding of online participation that not only covers aspects of production, but also decision-making, reception and interpretation. However, questions concerning ownership and the control of economic resources are neglected. All these approaches share a certain optimism that web 2.0 and other new media bring about a more participatory society, which they see evidenced by the emergence of Internet produsage. Notions such as participatory web and participatory culture are used inflationary in the academic discourse about web 2.0. In the discussed approaches, there is a strong focus on positive examples, which creates the impression that there are almost only advantages posed by contemporary culture and technologies. The problem is that, as argued in section 7.2, participation is a term that in participatory democracy theory is antithetic to the notion of exploitation, and that the discursive strategies that seem to predominate the academic discourse on web 2.0 by their focus on participation, and the neglect of issues such as exploitation, capital accumulation, class and surplus value, strongly affirm society as it is, which is for the time being capitalism. Critiques of web 2.0 optimism have for example stressed the following points: online advertising is a mechanism by which corporations exploit Internet users who form an Internet prosumer/produser commodity and are part of a surplus-value generating class that produces the commons of society that are exploited by capital (Fuchs 2008; Fuchs 2010); web 2.0 is based on the exploitation of free labour (Terranova 2004); most Internet users are part of a creative precarious underclass that needs economic models that assist them in making a living from their work (Lovink 2008); blogging is mainly a self-centred, nihilistic, cynical activity (ibid.); the Internet economy is still dominated by corporate media chains (Stanyer 2009); web 2.0 is contradictory and therefore also serves dominative interests (Cammaerts 2008); web 2.0 optimism is uncritical and an ideology that serves corporate interests (Fuchs 2008; van Dijck and Nieborg 2009); web 2.0 users are more passive users than active creators (van Dijck 2009); web 2.0 discourse advances a minimalist notion of participation (Carpentier and de Cleen 2008); corporations appropriate blogs and web 2.0 in the form of corporate blogs, advertising blogs, spam blogs and fake blogs (Deuze 2008). Many of these critiques are theoretical in nature and are to a more or less degree philosophically sophisticated and theoretically grounded or show a feuilleton character in writing and reasoning. There is a lack of critical empirical studies about web 2.0.1 am not arguing that information society critiques should become positivistic or atheoretical, but that sophisticated theories can and should be supported by available data to be more convincing in the public debate and less boring. The problem is that most critical scholars stop at theoretical elaborations and do not bother to go into the world of data. M y argument is that theoretical ideology critique should be combined with empirical ideology critique. The notion of web 2.0 has in recent years been used to express the claim that the world wide web has become predominantly based on communication, community building, user-generated content, information co-production and information sharing.

270

Case studies

Web 1.0 is in contrast seen as being primarily based on sites that provide information, but do not support communication, co-production and virtual communities. I have introduced a distinction among cognition, communication and co-operation as the three aspects of information in chapter 3. According to these three qualities, web 1.0 is a system of human cognition and web 2.0 is a system of human communication. To assess whether there have been transformations of the web, I have compared the top 20 websites used in the United States in 1998 and 2008 according to whether they technologically support cognition, communication and co-operation. The results are shown in Table 7.1. One first observation is that, from 1998 to 2008 in the United States, the number of unique visitors of the top 20 websites more than tripled. Concerning the functions of the top 20 websites, one can observe that in 1998 there were 20 information functions and nine communication functions available on the top 20 websites. In 2008, there were 20 information functions, ten communication functions and four co-operation functions on the top 20 US websites. The number of websites that are oriented on pure cognitive tasks (like search engines) has decreased from 11 in 1998 to ten in 2008. This shows that in 1998 the world wide web in its technological structure was predominantly a cognitive medium (sociality 1), although communicative features (sociality 2) were also present. In 2008, the number of websites that also have communicative or cooperative functions equals the one of the pure information sites (10). This shows that the technological foundations for sociality (2) and sociality (3 = co-operation) have increased quantitatively. A feature of the web in 2008 that was not present on the top 20 websites in 1998 is the support of co-operative tasks: collaborative information production with the help of wikis (Wikipedia, answers.com) and social networking sites oriented on community building (MySpace, Facebook). There is at the same time continuity and discontinuity in the development of the world wide web. There is today still a predominance of information sites and functions, but the importance of communicative and co-operative features has increased. The web has changed, but these changes have not produced an entirely new or radically new system. One method for ranking website access is to count the number of unique visitors per website in a country for a duration of 1 month. Table 7.2 shows, based on this method, which web 2.0 platforms are among the top 50 websites accessed in the USA in July 2009. If we define web 2.0 platforms as world wide web systems that are not predominantly sites for information consumption or search, but offer functions that support social networking, community building, file sharing, co-operative information production or interactive Hogging - platforms that are more systems of communication and co-operation than systems of cognition - then this allows us to analyse the role web 2.0 platforms play on the www: 13 of the 50 websites can be classified as web 2.0 platforms (=26.0 per cent). These 13 platforms account for 532 million out of a total of 1,916 million monthly usages of the 50 top websites in the USA (=27.7 per cent). If 26.0 per cent of the top 50 US websites are web 2.0 platforms and these platforms account for 27.7 per cent of usages, then this means that claims that the web has been transformed into a new web that is predominantly based on sharing, cooperation and community building are vastly overdrawn. The predominant usage type of the Internet in the U S A is the access to sites that allow information search

Table 7.1 Information functions of the top 20 websites in the USA in 1998 and 2008 1998

2008

Rank Website

Unique users Primary Rank Website Unique users Primary in 1000s functions in 1000s functions (December (February 2008) 1998)

1

aol.com

28,255

2

yahoo.com

26,843

3

geocities.com

18,977

4

msn.com

18,707

5

netscape.com

17,548

6

excite.com

14,386

7

lycos.com

13,152

8

microsoft.com

cogn, comm cogn, comm cogn, comm cogn, comm cogn

1

yahoo.com 125,000

2

google.com 123,000

3

aol.com

56,000

4

54,000

6

youtube. com microsoft, com msn.com

48,000

7

eBay.com

48,000

13,010

cogn, comm cogn, comm cogn, comm cogn, comm. cogn

8

myspace. com

46,000

9

bluemountainarts. 12,315 com

cogn, comm

9

wikipedia. org

44,000

10

infoseek.com

11,959

10

altavista.com tripod.com

11,217 10,924

41,000 41,000

cogn cogn

13 14

xoom.com angelfire.com

10,419 9,732

cogn cogn

13 14

38,000 34,000

cogn cogn

15

hotmail.com

9,661

15

30,000

cogn

16 17

amazon.com real.com

9,134 7,572

cogn, comm cogn cogn

mapquest. com live.com amazon. com about.com verizon. com adobe.com

43,000

11 12

cogn, comm cogn cogn

cogn, comm, co-op cogn, comm, co-op cogn

16 17

bizrate.com 29,000 facebook. 28,000 com

18 19

zdnet.com hotbot.com

5,902 5,612

cogn cogn

18 19

go.com answers, com

20

infospace.com

5,566

cogn

20

wordpress. 27,000 com 961,000

260,891

cogn, comm cogn, comm cogn

5

11 12

51,000

28,000 27,000

cogn, comm cogn

cogn cogn, comm, co-op cogn cogn, comm, co-op cogn, comm

Sources: Comcast Press Release January 20, 1999, Quantcast web usage statistics March 16, 2008.

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and provide information, shopping and email services. Web 2.0 platforms have become more important, but they do not dominate the web. Twelve of the 13 web 2.0 platforms that are among the top 50 US websites are profit oriented, 11 of them are advertising based. An exception is Wikipedia, which is non-profit and advertising free. Advertising and targeted advertising are the two most important business models among these web 2.0 sites. However, there are some sites that combine the advertising accumulation model with the accumulation model of selling special services to users. So, for example, Flickr, an advertising-based photo sharing community, allows uploading and viewing images for free, but sells additional services such as photo prints, business cards and photo books. WordPress not only uses advertising but also generates revenue by selling VIP blog hosting accounts that have monthly subscription rates, and services such as extra storage space, customized styles, a video Hogging service, ad-free blogs and blogs with an unlimited number of community members. Twitter did at the time of analysis in August 2009 not use advertising. In April 2010, Twitter announced that advertising will be introduced in the near future (see http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8617031.stm, accessed on October 31, 2010). On June 8, 2010, Twitter changed its privacy policy in anticipation of an advertising-financed business model. As a result, Twitter's terms of use significantly grew in length and complexity, and set out the company's ownership rights with respect to user-generated content. According to my empirical sample, 92.3 per cent of the most frequently used web 2.0 platforms in the USA and 87.4 per cent of monthly unique web 2.0 usages in the USA are corporate based, which shows that the vast majority of popular web 2.0 platforms are mainly interested in generating monetary profits and that the corporate web 2.0 is much more popular than the non-corporate web 2.0. Table 7.3 shows that, if one analyses data for the dominant web 2.0 platforms in the USA, one finds a strong income, educational and age digital access divide on web 2.0. In my empirical sample, only 22.8 per cent of the web 2.0 users are low-income earners, whereas 60.9 per cent of the US population are low-income earners; 41.6 per cent of the web 2.0 users have a low education level, whereas 71.3 per cent of the total US population has such a status; and 17.7 per cent of the web 2.0 users are aged over 50, whereas 31.8 per cent of the total US population is over 50. Users who are young and have high incomes and a high level of education dominate web 2.0. Old, poor and low-educated individuals are strongly excluded from web 2.0, which shows that web 2.0 is stratified by income, education and age. Four of the 11 analysed web 2.0 organizations are public-listed companies, one is a non-profit organization and six are private companies. For the public companies (Google, News Corporation, Answers and Yahoo), detailed financial data and ownership information are available. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 present some economic data of these four companies. Eighteen human and corporate legal persons own 98.8 per cent of Google's common stock; Google's 20,000 employees, the 520 million global Google users, the 303 million users of YouTube and the 142 million users of Blogspot/Blogger are nonowners of Google. Three legal persons own 82.8 per cent of News Corporation's common stock; its 55,000 employees and the 74 million global MySpace users are non-owners of News Corporation. Fourteen legal persons own 97.0 per cent of the Answers Company's common stock, whereas Answers' 70 employees and its 12 million global users are non-owners of the corporation. Twenty-one legal persons own 2

3

4

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology Table 7.2 Web 2.0 platforms that are among the top 50 websites in the USA Rank Website

Ownership

Country Tear of domain creation

4

Facebook

Facebook Inc.

USA

2004

6

YouTube

Google Inc.

USA

2005

8

Wikipedia

Wikimedia Foundation

USA

2001

9

MySpace

USA

2003

14

Blogspot

MySpace Inc. (News Corporation) Google Inc.

USA

2000

19

Answers

1996

22

Wordpress

Answers USA Corporation Automattic Inc. USA

2000

23

Photobucket

USA

2003

26

Twitter

Photobucket. com LLC Twitter Inc.

USA

2006

31

Flickr

Yahoo! Inc.

USA

2003

32

Blogger

Google Inc.

USA

1999

44

Demand Media USA Inc. USA eZineArticles SparkNet Corporation

1998

49

eHow

1999

Economic orientation

Unique users per month

Profit, advertising Profit, advertising Non-profit, nonadvertising Profit, advertising

91 million

Profit, advertising Profit, advertising Profit, advertising Profit, advertising Profit, no advertising Profit, advertising Profit, advertising Profit, advertising Profit, advertising

72 million 67 million

63 million

49 million 39 million 28 million 28 million 27 million 21 million 20 million 14 million 13 million 532 million

Source: quantcast.com, US site ranking, August 13, 2009.

42.07 per cent of Yahoo's common stock, whereas the company's 13,600 employees and the 32 million global Flickr users are non-owners of Yahoo. All analysed web 2.0 platforms have to guarantee for themselves a right to display user-generated content, otherwise they are unable to operate as corporations because they need to accumulate capital. However, Table 7.6 shows that ten of the 13 web 2.0 sites guarantee themselves in their terms of use also a licence for usage of user-generated data, which is a de facto ownership right of the data because such a licence includes the right to sell the content. Furthermore, 11 of the 13 web 2.0 platforms guarantee themselves the right to store, analyse and sell the content and usage data of their users to advertising clients that are enabled to provide targeted, personalized advertisements. This means that the vast majority of the web 2.0 companies in our sample exert ownership rights on user-generated content and user behaviour data. Web 2.0 companies own the data 5

273

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Case studies

Table 7.3 Some characteristics of the most popular web 2.0 platforms in the USA

1

Rank Website

Share of low Share of users Age 50+ NonFemale (%) income users with a hw leve I (%) Caucasian (%) of education (%) (%)

4 Facebook 6 YouTube 8 Wikipedia 9 MySpace 14 Blogspot 19 Answers Wordpress 22 23 Photobucket 26 Twitter 31 Flickr Blogger 32 44 eHow 49 eZineArticles> TOTAL WEB 2.0 TOTAL USA

16 20 18 22 56 22 23 21 21 19 18 18 17 22.8 60.9 (2006)

44 48 18 56 39 41 36 53 42 43 37 43 42 41.6 71.3 (2007)

12 19 18 9 24 29 26 9 19 19 20 22 20 17.7 31.8

23 30 26 31 18 22 20 33 22 25 17 20 23 24.8 18.6 (2007)

54 50 47 57 48 50 47 54 55 46 47 53 51 51.1 50.7 (2007)

Sources: web usage data by quantcast.com, calculated on a 6 month average, January-June 2009; population data by US Census Bureau.

Table 7.4 Fiscal data for four web 2.0 (parent) companies Corporation

Profit rate 2008Profit 2008 Member of US revenuesDividends (profit/cost of (US$ in employees 2008 (%) paid (US$ in revenues) billions) millions)

Google Inc. News Corporation Answers Inc. Yahoo Inc.

0.44 0.18 -0.33 1.38

6.63 5.38 -7.11 4.19

20 222 55 000 70 13 600

49 51.5 100 72

0 373 92 0

Source: SEC Filings Form 10K 2008.

of the users, whereas the users do not own a share of the corporations. This is an asymmetric economic power relation. In 2007, only 8 per cent of the US Internet users had ever uploaded a video file online and 36 per cent had ever uploaded photos online (data source: Pew Internet & American Life Project). In 2009, 63 per cent of US Internet users had never created a profile on a social networking site (data source: Pew Internet & American Life Project). In 2009, 49 per cent of the U K Internet users created or updated a social networking profile, 22 per cent wrote a blog, 44 per cent uploaded pictures, 33 per cent posted messages to discussion boards, 20 per cent maintained their own websites, 66 per cent of the male Internet users and 56 per cent of the female Internet users

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 275 Table 7.5 Common stock ownership of four web 2.0 (parent) companies Corporation

Common stock ownership

Google Inc.

All 17 executive officers and directors: 93.1% Fidelity: 5.7% Murdoch Family Trust: 37.2% H R H Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud: 7.0% Rupert Murdoch: 38.6% All 10 directors and executive officers: 41.02% Redpoint Ventures: 33.17% Marlin Sams Fund L.P.: 8.69% Outboard Investments Limited: 8.78% Crossfields Fund I LP: 5.34% Capital Research Global Investors: 10.54% Capital World Investors: 9.75% The Growth Fund of America: 6.46% All 18 directors and executive officers: 15.32%

News Corporation

Answers Inc.

Yahoo Inc.

Source: SEC Filings Proxy Statements 2008.

Table 7.6 Ownership rights and advertising rights of the 13 most-used web 2.0 platforms in the USA Rank Website

Ownership of data

Advertising

4 6 8 9 14 19 22 23 26 31 32 44 49

Licence to use uploaded content Licence to use uploaded content Creative commons Licence to use uploaded content Licence to use uploaded content Licence to use uploaded content Licence to use uploaded content Licence to use uploaded content No licence to use uploaded content Licence to use uploaded content Licence to use uploaded content Licence to use uploaded content No licence to use uploaded content

Targeted advertisements Targeted advertisements No advertising Targeted advertisements Targeted advertisements Targeted advertisements Targeted advertisements Targeted advertisements No advertising Targeted advertisements Targeted advertisements Targeted advertisements Targeted advertisements

Facebook YouTube Wikipedia MySpace Blogspot Answers Wordpress Photobucket Twitter Flickr Blogger eHow eZineArticles

Source: terms of use and privacy policies, August 2009.

listened to music online, and 54 per cent of male users and 38 per cent of female users watched videos online (data source: Oxford Internet Survey 2009). Although there has been a respectable growth of the number of social networking site users in the U K (2007: 17 per cent, 2009: 49 per cent), only a minority of U K Internet users engages in more complex active tasks such as uploading content or blogging. In 2008, a study found that only a minority of social networking site users are 'alpha socializers' who flirt and meet new people online or 'attention seekers' who post photos to get comments from others, whereas the majority are 'followers' who use social networking sites

276

Case studies

(SNS) for keeping up with friends (data source: Office of Communication, 2008, Social networking - A quantitative and qualitative research report into attitudes, behaviours and use, 28). In 2009, 18 per cent of U K households used the Internet for uploading content, 31 per cent watched videos online and 39 per cent downloaded files (data source: Office of Communication, 2009, The communications market, 22). In 2008, a year characterized by a huge interest of the US public in politics due to the presidential election and the grassroots appeal of the Obama campaign, only 10 per cent of US Internet users posted political comments on social networking sites and 8 per cent on blogs (data source: Pew Internet & American Life Project: The Internet's role in campaign 2008). Sixty-four per cent of online political users in the USA got their information about the November elections from network T V websites such as cnn.com, abcnews.com or msnbcnews.com; 54 per cent visited portal news services such as Google or Yahoo; 43 per cent visited the websites of local news organizations; 40 per cent read someone else's comments in a news group, website or blog; 34 per cent visited the websites of major national newspapers; 26 per cent visited political or news blogs; and 12 per cent visited the website of an alternative news organization (data source: Pew Internet & American Life Project: The Internet's role in campaign 2008). If we assume that the general interest in online politics is in general somewhat lower than at the time of presidential elections, then these data give a realistic picture of political information and communication online: the major platforms for political information are the online versions of the established news sources and corporate mass media; political 'mass selfcommunication' (Castells 2009) is clearly present and forms an important tendency that nonetheless remains subsumed under and dominated by established powerful media actors. Visibility is a central resource on the Internet. Dominant actors such as corporations, political parties or governments control a vast amount of resources (money, influence, reputation, power, etc.), which allows them to gain and accumulate visibility on the Internet. Although everyone can produce and diffuse information in principle easily with the help of the Internet because it is a global decentralized many-to-many and one-to-many communication system, not all information is visible to the same degree. Table 7.7 shows that 11 of the 15 most viewed YouTube videos of all time are provided by large media corporations such as Sony Music Entertainment, Vivendi, Walt Disney Company, ITV pic and Movie Records. Large corporations dominate the 'Internet attention economy'. Table 7.8 shows that the blogosphere is dominated by start-up companies that aim at capital accumulation. Nine of the top ten blogs are corporate blogs. The only noncorporate top ten blog is a political think tank funded by individuals who are politically close to the Democrats. A power elite that is formed by capital and political actors dominates the blogosphere. None of these blogs reaches as much attention on the Internet as the large information platforms operated by large corporations: Yahoo: 25.699 per cent, M S N : 11.768 per cent, AOL: 2.253 per cent, BBC: 1.594 per cent, C N N : 1.404 per cent (data source: alexa.com, percentage of global Internet users who visit web platforms, 3 month average, accessed on November 1, 2009). There is repressive tolerance (Marcuse 1969b) on the corporate web 2.0: everybody is free to say whatever s/he wants, has the means of production available for doing so, no physical coercion is exerted that hinders free expression, but the produced content does not have much significant political effects in society because companies control resources (money, brand names, reputation) that help them advancing their online visibility.

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 277 Table 7.7 The most viewed videos on YouTube of all time, October 17, 2009, 21:00 GET Rank Video

Number of hits Originator

1

Evolution of Dance

128,350,731

Judson Laipply

Private, noncorporate

2

Avril Lavigne — Girlfriend

127,518,607

RCA Records

3

Charlie bit my finger — again! Miley Cirus - 7 Things

127,370,584

Rihanna - Don't Stop the Music Chris Brown - With You

101,501,290

Harry and Charlie Hollywood Records Universal Music Group Jive Records

Sony Music Entertainment Private, noncorporate Walt Disney Company Vivendi

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

102,979,855

99,195,687

Panda - Disculpa los Malos 98,309,779 Pensamientos (Evangelion) Lo qué tú Quieras Oír 98,204,841 Jeff Dunham — Achmed the 97,015,666 Dead Terrorist Hahaha 93,906,757 Leona Lewis — Bleeding Love Lady Gaga - Just Dance

Movie Records Guilermo Zapata Comedy Central Spacelord72

91,243,811

Syco Music

80,633,974

InterscopeGeffen-A&M Jive Records

Britney Spears — Womanizer Timbaland - Apologize

78,448,761

Susan Boyle - Singer Britain's Got Talent 2009

77,121,404

78,400,330

InterscopeGeffen-A&M ITV

Corporation, owner

Sony Music Entertainment Movie Records Non-corporate, creative commons Viacom Private, noncorporate Sony Music Entertainment Vivendi Sony Music Entertainment Vivendi ITV pic

Although everyone can produce and diffuse information in principle easily with the help of the Internet because it is a global decentralized many-to-many and one-to-many communication system, not all information is visible to the same degree and gets the same attention. The problem in the cyberspace flood of information is how in this flowing informational ocean other users draw their attention to information. So, for example, Indymedia, the most popular alternative online news platform, is only ranked number 5,266 in the list of the most accessed websites, whereas B B C Online is ranked number 46, C N N Online number 58, the New York Times Online number 93, Spiegel Online number 137, Bildzeitung Online number 183, the Guardian number 224, or Fox News Online number 237 (data source: alexa.com, top 1,000,000,000 sites, October 31, 2010). This shows that there is a stratified online attention economy in which the trademarks of powerful media actors work as powerful symbols that help the online portals of these organizations to accumulate attention.

278

Case studies

Table 7.8 Blogs with the largest attention and influence Rank Blog

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Operator

Huffington Post Gizmodo TechCrunch Engadget Boing Boing Mashable! Think Progress

Huffington Post Inc. Gawker Media TechCrunch AOL Time Warner Happy Mutants LLC Mashable Center for American Progress Action Fund The Daily Beast RTST Inc. The Corner on National Review, Inc. National Review Hot Air Hot Air LLC

Character

Alexa Traffic Rank (3 month average of visits by global Internet users)

Corporate #274, 0.3192% #760, 0.1434% Corporate Corporate #495, 0.2117% Corporate #562, 0.1829% Corporate #2301, 0.058% Corporate #517, 0.2142% Non-corporate, #9259, 0.0166% political think tank Corporate #4390, 0.0277% Corporate #5740, 0.0211% Corporate

#5039, 0.0217%

Source: Technorati Authority, October 17, 2009.

To sum up the empirical findings, corporations that are profit oriented and accumulate capital by online advertising and in some cases by selling special services operate the vast majority of web 2.0 platforms. Corporate web 2.0 platforms attract a large majority of users. Web 2.0 is shaped by information inequalities, it is a space that is stratified by class, education and age. A few legal persons own the companies that operate web 2.0 platforms, whereas the millions of users have no share in ownership. With the help of legal mechanisms (terms of use, privacy policies), most web 2.0 corporations acquire the ownership rights to use and sell user-generated content and to analyse user data and behaviour for implementing third-party operated targeted advertisements to accumulate capital. There is a highly asymmetrical ownership structure: web 2.0 corporations accumulate ever more capital that is owned by a few legal persons and not by the users, whereas user data are dispossessed by the firms to generate money profit. Only a minority of Internet users engages in more complex active tasks, such as uploading videos, music, blogging and writing wikis, whereas a majority is focusing on simpler tasks such as information seeking, information consumption, watching videos and listening to music. Large mass media corporations dominate political news provision on the Internet; alternative online media and blogs play a subordinated role. Web 2.0 does not extend democracy beyond the political sphere into culture and the economy (principle 1 of participatory democracy). It does not maximize the developmental powers of humans, it mainly maximizes the developmental powers of an economic class that owns web platforms and holds the extractive power to dispossess users and to exploit workers and users to accumulate capital (principles 2, 3, 4 and 6). Because of information inequalities, not all citizens can equally take part in web 2.0 (principle 5). The web is predominantly used not in a complex active way, but in rather simple ways; sophisticated discussions on blogs and collaborative information production are an exception from the rule. Because web 2.0 is embedded into structures of capital accumulation, where a few benefit at the expense of the many, it does not contribute to the establishment of a democratic economy (principle 7). Therefore, web 2.0

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 279 does not massively advance education in participation (principle 8). We can conclude that, from the perspective of participatory democracy theory, web 2.0 is not a participatory techno-social system because it is based on capitalist ownership and accumulation structures that benefit the few at the expense of the many and because access is stratified. From the position of participatory democracy discourse, the claim that web 2.0 brings about more participation because it is based on produsage must be rejected. If we apply participatory democracy theory to the mainstream academic discourse about web 2.0, then there are empirical indications that the notion of participation that is used in this discourse is one of pseudo-participation. We therefore have to conclude that an empirical analysis shows that the claims made by the academic mainstream about web 2.0 are from the perspective of participatory democracy theory false and uncritical claims that have ideological character, exclude discussions about a democratic economy, and thereby affirm society as it is and forestall potential changes.

7.4 Class, exploitation and the Internet Given these results, it seems feasible to theorize the contemporary 'web 2.0' not as a participatory system, but by using more negative critical terms such as class, exploitation and surplus value. Such an alternative theory of web 2.0 can here only be hinted at briefly. Marx (1867,449) highlighted exploitation as the fundamental aspect of class in a passage where he says that 'the driving motive and determining purpose of capitalist production' is 'the greatest possible exploitation of labour-power by the capitalist'. He said that the proletariat is 'a machine for the production of surplus-value', capitalists are 'a machine for the transformation of this surplus-value into surplus capital' (ibid., 742). Although Marx had in his time to limit the notion of the proletariat to wage labour, it is today possible to conceive the proletariat in a much broader sense as all those who directly or indirectly produce surplus value and are thereby exploited by capital. This includes besides wage labour also house workers, the unemployed, the poor, migrants, retirees, students, precarious workers — and also the users of corporate web 2.0 platforms and other Internet sites and applications. Hardt and Negri (2005) use the term multitude for this multidimensional proletariat of the twenty-first century. If one defines economic exploitation as the existence of an exploiting class that deprives at least one exploited class of its resources, excludes it from ownership, and appropriates resources produced by the exploited, one stays within a Marxist framework of class, but must not necessarily exclude the 'underclasses' from this concept if one considers knowledge labour as central to contemporary society. Knowledge labour is a labour that produces and reproduces information, communication, social relationships, affects, and information and communication technologies. It is a direct and an indirect aspect of the accumulation of capital in informational capitalism: there are direct knowledge workers (either employed as wage labour in firms or outsourced, selfemployed labour) who produce knowledge goods and services that are sold as commodities on the market (e.g. software, data, statistics, expertise, consultancy, advertisements, media content, films, music, etc.) and indirect knowledge workers who produce and reproduce the social conditions of the existence of capital and wage labour such as education, social relationships, affects, communication, sex, housework, common knowledge in everyday life, natural resources, nurture, care, and so on. These are

280

Case studies

forms of unpaid labour that are necessary for the existence of society, they are performed not exclusively, but to a certain extent by those who do not have regular wage labour - houseworkers, the unemployed, retirees, students, precarious and informal workers, underpaid workers in temporal or part-time jobs and migrants. This unpaid labour is reproductive in the sense that it reproduces and enables the existence of capital and wage labour that consume the goods and services of unpaid reproductive workers for free. Therefore, both capital and wage labour exploit reproductive workers - which is just another term for indirect knowledge workers. Capital could not be accumulated without activities in a common societal infrastructure in the areas of education, spare time, health and social care, natural resources, culture, art, sexuality, friendship, science, media, morals, sports, housework, and others that are taken for granted and do not have to be paid for by capital (in the form of shares of its profits). Marx (1894, 175) remarks in this context that the increase in the rate of profit in one line of industry depends on the development of the productive power of labour in another sector of the economy. This can also mean that accumulation in the wage labour economy is not only based on its own advances but also on the non-wage labour economy. 'What the capitalist makes use of here are the benefits of the entire system of the social division of labour' (ibid.). This system of the division of labour also includes a non-wage economy that is dialectically separated from and connected to the wage economy and is exploited by capital. By consuming reproductive labour and public goods and services, wage labour is reproducing itself. Wage labourers exploit reproductive workers to be able to be exploited by capital. Therefore, we can define the multitude, the contemporary proletariat, as the class of those who produce material or knowledge goods and services directly or indirectly for capital and are deprived and expropriated of resources by capital. Such exploited resources are consumed by capital for free. In informational capitalism, knowledge has become a productive force, but knowledge is produced not only in corporations in the form of knowledge goods but also in everyday life, for example by parents who educate their children, citizens who engage in everyday politics, consumers of media who produce social meaning and hence are prosumers, users of MySpace, YouTube, Facebook and so on who produce informational content that is appropriated by capital, radio listeners and television viewers who call in live on air to discuss with studio guests and convey their ideas that are instantly cornmodified in the real-time economy, and so on. The production process of knowledge is a social, common process, but knowledge is appropriated by capital. By this appropriation, the producers of knowledge become just like traditional industrial labour an exploited class that can with reference to Hardt and Negri (2000, 2005) be termed the multitude. The multitude is an expanded notion of class that goes beyond manual wage labour and takes into account that labour has become more common. Hardt and Negri (2000, 2005, 2009) never outlined the subclasses of the multitude. The multitude as the class of all those who are in some sense exploited, in my opinion, consists of the following class factions: 1

2

Traditional industrial workers: These workers are wage labourers and produce physical goods. Capital appropriates the physical goods of these workers and the surplus value contained in them. Knowledge workers: These workers are wage labourers and produce knowledge goods and services in wage relationships or self-employed labour relations. Capital

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 281

3

4

5

6 7

8

appropriates the knowledge goods and services of these workers and the surplus value contained in them. One must note that public servants in areas such as health, education, transport, social care, housing, energy and so on are not under the direct command of capital. Most of them are waged knowledge workers who produce parts of the commons that are a necessary condition for the existence of society and capital. The latter exploits these public goods in an indirect way. Houseworkers: These workers - who are still predominantly female - produce knowledge in the broad sense of communication, affects, sexuality, domestic goods and services that are not sold as commodities, but consumed by capitalists and wage labourers for free to reproduce manpower. The unemployed: This class is deprived of job assets by capital and wage labour. It is the result of the tendency of the organic composition of capital to rise (the relationship of constant and variable capital), which is due to technological progress. The unemployed are, just like houseworkers, involved in unpaid reproductive knowledge labour that is a necessary condition for the existence of capital. Furthermore, the unemployed are frequently forced to take on very low-paid jobs and often precarious or illegal jobs and hence are also subjected to extreme economic appropriation. Unemployed persons are in numerous instances forced by the state to perform extremely low-paid, compulsory over-exploited work. Migrants and workers in developing countries: Migrants are frequently subjected to extreme economic exploitation in racist relations of production as illegal, overexploited workers. They are exploited by capital. A certain share of wage labourers who hope to increase their wages and to reach better positions if migrants can be forced to do unpaid or extremely low-paid unskilled work ideologically supports this exploitation. Developing countries are either completely excluded from exploitation or they are considered as a sphere of cheap, unskilled wage labour that is over-exploited by capital by paying extremely low wages and ignoring labour rights and standards. Retirees: Retirees are exploited to the extent that they act as unpaid reproductive workers in spheres such as the family, social care, home care and education. Students: Students are exploited in the sense that they produce and reproduce intellectual knowledge and skills that are appropriated by capital for free as a part of the commons. Furthermore, students are frequently over-exploited as precarious workers, a phenomenon for which terms such as 'precariat', 'generation internship' or 'praktikariat' (from the German term 'Praktikum', which means internship, combined with the term precariat) can be used. Precarious and informal workers: Part-time workers, temporary workers, the fractionally employed, contract labour, bogus self-employment and others constitute work relations that are temporary, insecure and low paid. Hence, these workers are over-exploited by capital in the sense that such jobs would cost much more for capital if they were performed by regularly employed workers. The same situation can be found in the case of racist labour relations and compulsory work performed by unemployed persons. Self-employed persons who do not employ others themselves are forced to sell their own labour power by contracts. They control their means of production, but produce surplus for others who control capital and use the appropriated labour for achieving profit.

282

Case studies

I have used the term over-exploitation several times. Capital can gain extra surplus value by over-exploitation. Extra surplus value is a term coined by Marx for describing relations of production, in which goods are produced in a way that the individual value of these articles is now below their social value' (Marx 1867, 434). By employing illegal migrants, unemployed compulsory or illegal workers, students, and precarious and informal workers, capital can produce goods at a value that is lower than the average social value because its wage costs are lower than those in a regular employment relationship. As a result, the commodities produced contain less variable capital, but are nonetheless sold at regular prices so that an extra profit can be obtained. By employing or outsourcing labour to over-exploited workers, the wage costs for capital are lower than in the case that the same work is conducted by regularly paid wage labour. As a result, more profit can be achieved. The total value of a commodity is V = c + v + s (constant capital + variable capital + surplus value). By over-exploitation, variable capital and the total value of the commodity are lowered, the commodity can be sold at regular market prices and thus extra profit can be achieved. Those who are outside regular employment, such as students, pensioners, the unemployed and illegal immigrants, are particularly active in reproductive labour that produces the social, educational and knowledge commons of society. All these activities indirectly benefit capital accumulation. If capital had to pay for this labour, its profits would probably decrease drastically. Therefore, it can be argued that capital accumulation is advanced by outsourcing reproductive labour from corporations to the private and public realm, where especially groups such as young people, parents, teachers, the unemployed, pensioners and illegal immigrants engage in producing the commons of society that are a necessary condition for the existence of the capitalist economy. This process of outsourcing is free for capital, the informal workers are over-exploited to an extreme extent (if they receive no money at all, the rate of exploitation is infinite). Capital makes use of gratis labour, which is just another formulation for saying that capital exploits all members of society except for itself. Luxemburg (1913/2003, 363) argued that capital accumulation feeds on the exploitation of milieus that are drawn into the capitalist system: 'capital feeds on the ruins of such organisations, and, although this non-capitalist milieu is indispensable for accumulation, the latter proceeds, at the cost of this medium nevertheless, by eating it up'. This idea was used for explaining the existence of colonies of imperialism by Luxemburg and was applied by Marxist feminism to argue that unpaid reproductive labour can be considered as an inner colony and milieu of primitive accumulation of capitalism (Mies 1986; Mies etal. 1988; Werlhof 1991). Non-wage labour 'ensures the reproduction of labour power and living conditions' (Mies et al. 1988, 18). It is labour spent 'in the production of life, or subsistence production' (ibid., 70). Primitive accumulation 'is overt violence, with the aim of robbery wherever, whenever, and against whomever this is "economically" necessary, politically possible and technically feasible' (ibid., 102). In post-Fordist capitalism, the inner colonies of capitalism are expanded so that profits rise by generating milieus of low-paid and unpaid labour. The formation of these colonies is a form of ongoing primitive accumulation that uses violence for expropriating labour. 'Women, colonies and nature' are 'the main targets of this process of ongoing primitive accumulation' (ibid., 6). This phenomenon has been termed 'housewifization' (ibid.; Mies 1986): more and more people live and work under precarious conditions that have traditionally been characteristic for patriarchal

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 283 relations. People working under such conditions are like housewives a source of uncontrolled and unlimited exploitation. Housewifization transforms labour so that it bears the characteristics of housework, namely, labour not protected by trade unions or labour laws, that is available at any time, for any price, that is not recognized as 'labour but as an 'activity , as in the 'income generating activities , meaning isolated and unorganized and so on. (Mies etal. 1988, 10) 5

5

5

Housewifized labour is characterized by 'no job permanency, the lowest wages, longest working hours, most monotonous work, no trade unions, no opportunity to obtain higher qualifications, no promotion, no rights and no social security (Mies et al. 1988, 169). Such informal work is 'a source of unchecked, unlimited exploitation (Mies 1986, 16). Housewifized labour is 'superexploitation of non-wage labourers . . . upon which wage labour exploitation then is possible (ibid., 48) because it involves the 'externalization, or ex-territorialization of costs which otherwise would have to be covered by the capitalists (ibid., 110). Negri (1982, 209) uses the term 'social worker for arguing that there is a broadening of the proletariat that is 'now extended throughout the entire span of production and reproduction . The concept of the social worker has been combined with the one of immaterial labour in the category of the multitude. According to Hardt and Negri, relationships, communication and knowledge are goods that are produced in common, but appropriated by capital for economic ends. Hence, exploitation today is 'the expropriation of the common (Hardt and Negri 2005, 150). Exploitation today is also the exploitation of human creative capacities. The multitude or proletariat is formed by 'all those who labour and produce under the rule of capital (ibid., 106), 'all those whose labour is directly or indirectiy exploited by and subjected to capitalist norms of production and reproduction (Hardt and Negri 2000, 52), the 'entire cooperating multitude (ibid., 402). The formation of the multitude can be seen as the colonization and housewifization of all societies. Marxist feminism and autonomist Marxism share the view that the exploitation of non-wage labour is a crucial feature of class in capitalism. Rosa Luxemburg's work showed that capital generates new spheres of exploitation. Marxist feminist analyses applied these accounts to housework. We can base our analyses on these insights, but need to go beyond them because these accounts did not discuss the role of knowledge and new media in capitalism. Hardt and Negri s work can be read as expanded concretization of Luxemburg and the notion of reproductive labour. Their category of immaterial labour broaches the issue of knowledge labour in capitalism, but still remains at a level of high abstraction so that their account does not identify which groups exactiy belong to the multitude and lacks a theoretical class model. It is therefore necessary to build on and go beyond these approaches. Glass relationships have become generalized. The production of surplus value and hence exploitation are not limited to wage labour, but reach society as a whole. Houseworkers, the unemployed, migrants, developing countries, retirees working in reproduction, students, and precarious and informal workers should, besides wage labour, be considered as exploited classes that form part of the multitude. The latter is antagonistic in character and traversed by inner lines of exploitation, oppression 5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

284

Case studies Relation tomeans of production Owner

Non-owners, employees, wage-labour

Non-owners, irregular or non-wage-labour

Many

Capitalists

Expert

Skilled

Nonskilled

House-

Un-

managers

managers

managers

workers

employed

Migrants

Retirees

0) 0) > o

CL

E a o

_ Few

Small employers

Expert

Skilled

Nonskilled

supervisors

supervisors

supervisors

i_

O

n

E

Self-

3 z

employed labour

Expert

Skilled

Nonskilled

workers

workers

workers

Experts

Skilled

Nonskilled

Students, public servants

Precarious workers

None

Relation t os c a r c e skills

I

I

Multitude

Capitalist class

Figure 7.1 An expanded class model

and domination that segment the multitude and create inner classes and class factions. Nonetheless, the multitude is objectively united by the fact that it consists of all those individuals and groups that are exploited by capital, live and produce directly and indirecdy for capital that expropriates and appropriates resources (commodities, labour power, the commons, knowledge, nature, public infrastructures and services) that are produced and reproduced by the multitude in common. The growing number of those who produce the commons and are exploited outside of regular wage relationships can be included in a class model as exploited classes (see Figure 7.1). In this model, wage labour is subdivided by the amount of skills and authority that it possesses in the production process (Wright 1997). Note that an individual can be positioned in more than one class at a time. Class positions are not fixed, but dynamic, meaning that in informational capitalism people have a fluid and transit class status. So, for example, female wage workers are frequently at the same time houseworkers, many students are also precarious workers, many precarious workers form a type of self-employed labour, and so on. That class positions are antagonistic also means that there is no clear-cut separation between the multitude and the capitalist class, so, for example, managers can be considered to have a contradictory class position: they work for a wage, but at the same time execute the command over workers in the name of capital. Knowledge is a social and historical product; new knowledge emerges from the historical heritage of knowledge in society and is in many cases produced cooperatively. Hence, Marx argued that knowledge is 'universal labour' that is 'brought about partly by the cooperation of men now living, but partly also by building on

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 285 earlier work' (Marx 1894, 199). Nature, knowledge and societal infrastructures due to their collective or natural form of production are common aspects of society. They are not produced by single individuals. 'Communal labour, however, simply involves the direct cooperation of individuals' (ibid.): Marx stressed the co-operative character of knowledge production. Knowledge and infrastructures can only exist due to the collective activities of many. Nature produces itself and is transformed into resources by metabolic processes organized by many. Knowledge, nature and infrastructures are collective goods that cost nothing for capital, but they are a necessary condition for capital accumulation. They enter production processes and capital profits from them. Capital consumes the commons for free; it exploits the results of societal and natural production processes such as education, science, health, reproductive labour and so on. The essence of the commons is its social character, but in capitalism the commons are individually appropriated by capital. In categories of the Hegelian logic, one can argue that essence and existence of knowledge and the commons are non-identical. Exploitation alienates the existence of the commons from their essence and their truth, reason and reality. All humans benefit from knowledge in society that was produced in the past (inherited, historical knowledge) in the form of organizations that allow the development of skills (educational knowledge), cultural goods (music, theatre performances, literature, books, films, artworks, philosophy, etc.) that contribute to mental reproduction (entertainment knowledge), and in the form of traditional practices as aspects of education and socialization (practical knowledge). These four forms of knowledge are handed over to future generations and enriched by present generations through the course of the development of society. All humans contribute and benefit therefrom (although to different degrees under the given circumstances). Another form of knowledge is technological knowledge that is objectified in machines and practices that function as means for reaching identified goals so that labour processes are accelerated and the amount of externalized labour power can be reduced. Not all humans and groups benefit from the five types of knowledge to the same extent. Especially corporations consume a share above average. Educational, entertainment and practical knowledge are aspects of the reproduction of manpower. Individuals and society perform these processes to a large extent outside of firms and labour time. Technological progress helps corporations to increase their productivity, that is, the ability of capital to produce ever more profit in even less time. Technological knowledge does not enter the production process indirectly as the other three forms of knowledge do; it is directly employed in the production process by capital. Technological knowledge is produced by society, but it is individually appropriated as a means of production by capital. One argument that some scholars employ is that corporations pay for technological progress in the form of machines, software, hardware and so on that they buy as fixed capital. But the value produced by labour with the help of technology is much larger than the value of technology as such, and each individual item of technology is based on the whole history of technology and engineering that enters the product for free. Another argument is that technological knowledge and progress are created in an industry that produces technology and in the research departments of corporations. This argument is deficient because a certain part of knowledge is produced in public research institutions and universities

286

Case studies

and each technological innovation is based on the whole state of the art of science, for which one does not have to pay and which is consumed by research departments and technology-producing corporations for free as an external resource. The result of this discussion is that corporations consume the commons of society that consist of nature, inherited knowledge, educational knowledge, entertainment knowledge, practical knowledge, technological knowledge, and public infrastructures (labour in the areas of health, education, medical services, social services, culture, media, politics, etc.) for free. Hence, one important form of exploitation in the knowledge society is the exploitation of the commons by capital, which is also exploitation of the multitude and of society as a whole. But are capitalists and small employers not as well part of the multitude in the sense that they contribute to the production and reproduction of the commons in everyday life? There is no doubt that all humans contribute certain shares of unpaid labour to the production and reproduction of nature, knowledge and services. But the capitalist class is the only class in society that exploits and expropriates the commons - it is the only class that derives economic profit and accumulates capital with the help of the appropriation of the commons. All humans produce, reproduce and consume the commons, but only the capitalist class exploits the commons economically. Hence, this class should not be considered as a part of the multitude. With the rise of informational capitalism, the exploitation of the commons has become a central process of capital accumulation. The immediate effects of surplus-value production in class relations are that the product belongs to the capitalist and not to the worker and that surplus value 'costs the worker labour but the capitalist nothing, and . . . becomes the legitimate property of the capitalist (Marx 1867, 731). If you do not produce cotton, the example mentioned by Marx (1867, 251) for defining surplus value, but knowledge, such as the Microsoft Windows Vista operating system, the decisive quality is that knowledge only needs to be produced once, can be infinitely reproduced at low costs and distributed at high speed. There is no physical wear and tear of the product, knowledge is not used up in consumption, can be reworked and built on. There are high initial production costs, but once knowledge as for example software is produced, it can be cheaply copied and sold at high prices. The constant and variable capital costs for reproduction are low, which is beneficial for sustained capital accumulation in the knowledge industries. The situation again changes a little if knowledge is produced for new media and carried and distributed by it. A central characteristic of networked digital media is that the consumer of knowledge has the potential to become its producer. Alvin Toffler (1980) spoke of the emergence of the prosumer within the information society. 'We see a progressive blurring of the line that separates producer from consumer. We see the rising significance of the prosumer (Toffler 1980, 267). Axel Bruns (2007, 2008) applied this notion to new media and speaks of produsers - users become producers of digital knowledge and technology. Philip Graham (2000) argues that hypercapitalism s immediacy and pervasiveness have resulted in the entanglement of production, circulation, consumption, material and non-material production, productive and unproductive labour, base and superstructure, forces and relations of production. Therefore, value creation 'becomes an immediate, continuous process (ibid., 137). New media are simultaneously used for the production, circulation and consumption 5

5

5

5

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 287 of knowledge. They support cognition (thought, language), communication (one-toone, one-to-few, one-to-many, few-to-one, few-to-few, few-to-many, many-to-one, many-to-few, many-to-many) and co-operation (peer production, sharing, virtual communities, social networking, cyberlove, online collaboration, etc.) by combining the universal digital machine of the computer with networking functions as structural principles (Fuchs 2008). In informational capitalism, the brain and its bodily mediations are enabled to engage in organic practices of economic production, surplus-value generation, co-production, communicative circulation and productive consumption by new media. The production of knowledge is based on the prior consumption of the same, in co-production as well on communicative interchange as a co-ordinative mechanism. Consumption of knowledge produces individual meaning and incentives for further social production and communication. Circulation of knowledge is the consumption of bandwidth and technical resources and the production of connections. For Marx, the profit rate is the relation of profit to investment costs: p = s/(c 4- v), surplus value/(constant capital + variable capital). If the users become productive then in terms of Marxian class theory this means that they become productive labourers who produce surplus value and are exploited by capital because for Marx productive labour generates surplus. Therefore, the exploitation of surplus value in cases such as Google, YouTube, MySpace or Facebook is not merely accomplished by those who are employed by these corporations for programrning, updating and mamtaining the software and hardware, performing marketing activities, and so on, but by these employees, the users and the produsers that engage in the production of user-generated content. New media corporations do not (or hardly) pay the users for the production of content. One accumulation strategy is to give them free access to services and platforms, let them produce content, and to accumulate a large number of produsers that are sold as a commodity to third-party advertisers. Not a product is sold to the users, but the users are sold as a commodity to advertisers. The more users a platform has, the higher the advertising rates can be set. The productive labour time that is exploited by capital on the one hand involves the labour time of the paid employees and on the other hand all of the time that is spent online by the users. For the first type of knowledge labour, new media corporations pay salaries. The second type of knowledge is produced completely for free. There are neither variable nor constant investment costs. The formula for the profit rate needs to be transformed for this accumulation strategy: p = s/(c+vl + v2) where s is the surplus value; c, constant capital; v l , wages paid to fixed employees; and v2, wages paid to users. The typical situation is that v2 => 0 and that v2 substitutes v l . If the production of content and the time spent online were carried out by paid employees, the variable costs would rise and profits would therefore decrease. This shows that produsage in a capitalist society can be interpreted as the outsourcing of productive labour to users who work completely for free and help maximize the rate of exploitation (e = s/v, surplus value/variable capital) so that profits can be raised and new media capital may be accumulated. If the wages paid to users converge towards zero then the rate of exploitation e = s/v converges towards infinity. Capitalist produsage is an extreme

288

Case studies

form of exploitation, in which the produsers work completely for free and are infinitely exploited. Produsage in a capitalist society can be interpreted as the outsourcing of productive labour from wage labour to users who work completely for free and help maximize the rate of exploitation (e = s/v, surplus value/variable capital) so that profits can be raised and new media capital can be accumulated. This is a situation that converges towards infinite exploitation: e = s/v: v => 0 => exploitation => infinity. That surplus value generating labour is an emergent property of capitalist production means that production and accumulation will break down if this labour is withdrawn. It is an essential part of the capitalist production process. That Internet prosumers conduct surplus-generating labour can also be seen by imagining what would happen if they would stop using platforms such as YouTube, MySpace and Facebook: the number of users would drop, advertisers would stop investing in online advertising because no objects for their advertising messages and therefore no potential customers for their products could be found, the profits of the new media corporations would drop, and they would go bankrupt. If such activities were carried out on a large scale, a new economy crisis would arise. This thought experiment shows that users are essential for generating profit in the new media economy. Furthermore, they produce and co-produce parts of the products, and therefore parts of the use value exchange value, and surplus value that are objectified in these products. Dallas Smythe (1981/2006, 233, 238) suggests that, in the case of media advertisement models, the audience is sold as a commodity to advertisers: 'Because audience power is produced, sold, purchased and consumed, it commands a price and is a commodity. . . . You audience members contribute your unpaid work time and in exchange you receive the program material and the explicit advertisements. With the rise of user-generated content, free-access social networking platforms, and other free access platforms that yield profit by online advertisement — a development subsumed under categories such as web 2.0, social software, and social networking sites - the web seems to come close to accumulation strategies used by the capital on traditional mass media such as T V or radio. The users who Google data, upload or watch videos on YouTube, upload or browse personal images on Flickr, or accumulate friends with whom they exchange content or communicate online via social networking platforms such as MySpace or Facebook constitute an audience commodity that is sold to advertisers. The difference between the audience commodity on traditional mass media and on the Internet is that in the latter case the users are also content producers, there is user-generated content, the users engage in permanent creative activity, communication, community building and content production. That the users are more active on the Internet than in the reception of T V or radio content is due to the decentralized structure of the Internet, which allows many-to-many communication. Because of the permanent activity of the recipients and their status as prosumers, we can say that in the case of the Internet the audience commodity is an Internet prosumer commodity. The category of the Internet prosumer commodity does not signify a democratization of the media towards a participatory or democratic system, but the total commodification of human creativity. During much of the time that users spend online, they produce profit for large corporations such as Google, News Corp. (which owns MySpace), or Yahoo! (which owns Flickr) and other Internet firms. Advertisements on the Internet are frequently personalized; this is made possible by surveiUing, storing 9

Participatory web 2.0 as ideology 289 25.0 20.0

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Internet advertising revenues in the U S A ,

1997-2008

Source: IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report 2008.

and assessing user activities with the help of computers and databases. This is another difference from T V and radio, which provide less individualized content and advertisements due to their more centralized structure. But one can also observe a certain shift in the area of traditional mass media, as in the cases of pay per view, tele-votes, talkshows, and call-in T V and radio shows. In the case of the Internet, the commodification of audience participation is easier to achieve than with other mass media. Marx anticipated the exploitation of prosumers by arguing that as a result of the development of the productive forces a time of capitalist development will come, in which 'general intellect', the 'power of knowledge, objectified', 'general social knowledge has become a direct force of production' (Marx 1857/1858, 706). The productive forces would not only be produced in the form of knowledge but also as 'immediate organs of social practice, of the real life process'. Marx here describes that, in a knowledge society, social life becomes productive. That knowledge labour, such as the one performed online by produsers, is productive, and also means that under capitalist class relations it is exploited and that all knowledge workers, unpaid and paid, are part of an exploited class. By putting the means of production into the hands of the masses but withholding from those masses any ownership over the products of their communal work, the World Wide Computer provides an incredibly efficient mechanism for harvesting the economic value of the labor provided by the very many and concentrating it in the hands of the very few. (Carr 2009, 142f.) Figure 7.2 shows the rapid growth of profits from Internet advertising in the USA. These profits amounted to US$ 23.4 billion in 2008, which make up 11.0 per cent of the total US advertising profits (data source: IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report 2008). The online advertising profits were higher than the profits made by radio- and cable TV-advertising in 2008 and were only exceeded by profits in newspaper and T V distribution advertising (data source: IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report 2008).

290

Case studies

Internet users come from all backgrounds. So, for example, the relative majority of YouTube users in the USA is aged 18-34 years (36 per cent); 13 per cent have obtained graduate degrees. Forty-nine per cent of US MySpace users come from lower income classes ( FOR A C O M M U N I S T INTERNET IN A COMMUNIST SOCIETY '

capital exploits surplus value and the commons

the multitude resists against capital

MULTITUDE

CAPITAL, 'EMPIRE' = actuality: necessary for capitalism = potentiality

Figure 9.1 The dialectic of multitude and capital

the same time excludes it. The multitude does not similarly relate to capital. Unfortunately Hardt and Negri create the impression that the multitude always and automatically struggles against capital, so for them the effect from multitude on empire is not a mere potential but a deterministic necessity (Fuchs and Zimmermann 2009). Commonwealth, a new self-managed form of communism that is based on the common wealth created by immaterial labour, is the vision of the negation of the negative relation of capital and empire. Also David Harvey (2010b) argues for a democratic re-invention of communism. He says that 'questioning the future of capitalism is an adequate reaction to the new global economic crisis, but that there seems to be only 'little appetite for such discussion (ibid., 217). But that there is no oppositional movement present should in the view of Harvey not preclude the articulation of an alternative (ibid., 227). 'We need new mental conceptions to understand the world' (ibid., 237). Such mental conceptions could translate into becoming a material force. Harvey argues for a revival of the 'communist hypothesis (ibid., 225): 5

5

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Contemporary attempts to revive the communist hypothesis typically abjure state control and look to other forms of collective social organisation to displace

Conclusion 341 market forces and capital accumulation as the basis for organising production to displace market forces and capital accumulation as the basis for organising production and distribution. Horizontally networked, as opposed to hierarchically commanded, systems of coordination between autonomously organised and self-governing collectives of producers and consumers are envisaged as lying at the core of a new form of communism. Contemporary technologies of communication make such systems seem feasible. (Harvey 2010b, 225) I have shown in chapter 2 that Marcuse argues that determinate negation is only a possibility in the dialectical process, not a necessity. The negativity and its negation are two different phases of the same historical process, straddled by man's historical action.. . . Not the slightest natural necessity or automatic inevitability guarantees the transition from capitalism to socialism. . . . The revolution requires the maturity of many forces, but the greatest among them is the subjective force, namely, the revolutionary class itself. (Marcuse 1941, 318f.) The negation of the negation needs to be politically organized; it can only emerge as the result of the struggles of a political movement. Such a movement does not emerge automatically - it is a mere potential.

9.3 Struggles for a commons-based society? A commons-based Internet is only possible in a commons-based society. Therefore its establishment depends on the emergence and success of a political movement that struggles against commodification and economization of the commons. Marx argued that 'material conditions for . . . new superior relations of production' mature 'within the framework of the old society' (MESWOVJ 174). 'The productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution to this antagonism' (ibid.). Marx's mistake was to assume in some passages that the transformation of the economic conditions of production 'can be determined with the precision of natural science' (ibid.). Marcuse has argued that there is no automatic necessity that creates a new society out of the mature structures of the old society. There are 'relations of circulation as well as of production' that are 'concealed in society' and 'mines to explode' bourgeois society within that society (Marx 1857/1858, 159). Networks such as the Internet in combination with the computer and mental and communicative labour create networked productive forces that on the one hand point beyond capitalism by creating a non-commodified gift economy that makes resources freely available. But the networked gift economy is entangled into capitalist relations of production and thereby the principle of the gift becomes subsumed under the commodity economy so that new capital accumulation strategies that I have termed the gift commodity economy (Fuchs 2008, section 7.2) have emerged: access to networks and resources is given for free by corporations, but they commodify users, their

342 Alternatives communication processes and their self-generated contents in ways that generate profits by making use of surveillance and targeted advertising. The Internet gift economy is subsumed under the Internet commodity economy and thereby the Internet gift commodity economy is created (ibid.). The Internet gift economy is a communist potential that exists within capitalism, but it is complexly entangled into the capitalist forces of production. Networking, sharing and co-operation on the Internet form networked productive forces that point beyond the capitalist relations of production, but cannot entangle themselves. Only political agency can create an alternative Internet in an alternative society. Contemporary society and the contemporary Internet contain communist seeds but are not themselves communist in character. I disagree with Richard Barbrook (2007, 290) that 'cybernetic communism is here and now' because the Net provides 'tools of sociability and self-expression' and with his assertion that 'cybernetic communism is quite compatible with dotcom capitalism' (ibid., 291). That the Internet commons are exploited by and subsumed under capitalism shows that the Internet is predominantly capitalist in character. Communism is the movement that negates capitalism and the establishment of a co-operative society as well as that society itself. Movements struggling against corporatism and the corporate Internet for a commons-based society and a commons-based Internet and the non-corporate technologies they use constitute communist seeds. Cyber-communism is an alternative vision and movement, not the newest form of capitalism. A commons-based Internet needs to be based on an architecture that does not allow capitalist corporations to store, analyse and commodity user data and user behaviour (e.g. in the form of advertising-financed capital accumulation). Eben Moglen, who is professor of law and legal history at Columbia University, gave a talk on 'Freedom in the cloud: Software freedom, privacy and security for web 2.0 and cloud computing' on February 5, 2010. He suggested an Internet architecture, in which every user has a personal web server that he or she can put in his or her pocket, plug in at any place, that stores all personal online data, keeps log files, connects to the Internet and sends encrypted back-ups of data to the users' friends' servers in case that they communicate with them. The architecture would be easy to realize, all hardware and systems software would be available and could be operated with the help of free software. Moglen describes a way for restoring the autonomy of users as owners of their data. If such an Internet architecture is implemented, this will inevitably require struggles for the release of personal data to users and the cleanup of these data on the servers of Google, Facebook, MySpace, Yahoo and so on, because one can bet that these corporations will rather be unwilling to decommodify the Internet prosumer commodity. Moglen (2003) argued in The dotCommunist manifesto that 1

creators of knowledge, technology, and culture discover that they no longer require the structure of production based on ownership and the structure of distribution based on coercion of payment. Association, and its anarchist model of propertyless production, makes possible the creation of free software, through which creators gain control of the technology of further production. He calls for the 'abolition of all forms of private property in ideas', the 'withdrawal of all exclusive licenses, privileges and rights to use of electromagnetic spectrum' and

Conclusion 343 'the free circulation of knowledge, and the restoration of culture as the symbolic commons that all human beings share'. Societies contain both elements of private property and common ownership. Common ownership resources are elements that are co-created by many or all members of society, are freely available (without charges) to all individuals in a society and benefit all individuals. Economies are therefore to certain degrees private and communist in character. These degrees are variable, historically changing and context dependent. Different societies have different degrees of private, public and common ownership and these degrees also depend on the results of political struggles and political constellations. There are also communist elements within capitalist societies. Examples are public health, public education, public retirement systems, public transportation, public universities, auxiliary fire brigades, voluntary social civil society organizations such as the Red Cross, worker-owned factories, cooperatives, citizens and consumer groups, free software, Internet-based file sharing, Internet-based open access and open content projects, creative commons-licensed content, Wikipedia and so on. However, I would not designate these elements as 'communism of capitalism' (Virno 2004, 17, 11 Of.) because such a concept implies that communism is already fully enveloped within capitalism and advances a deterministic optimism that communism arises relatively automatically from capitalism. I rather think that there are communist seeds within capitalism. It is in no way guaranteed that communist seeds can mature and flourish within capitalism; only fundamental societal change can advance conditions that allow the transformation of communist seeds into communist flowers. Communist elements exist to varying degrees in contemporary societies. Neoliberalism is a project that aims at the large-scale expropriation, commodification and privatization of the commons and thereby at a destruction of communist elements. But at the same time when the commons are destroyed, new forms of the commons have also been established, as for example on the Internet. Communism is not a fully transcendent, Utopian society, it already exists to a certain degree today. These elements are not dominant but are nonetheless existent and have potentials to spread and intensify. If struggles against the expropriation of the commons and for the protection and strengthening of the commons emerge, then these are automatically communist movements, although they might not perceive themselves as such: they struggle for the strengthening of the free availability of resources to all individuals and for collective ownership structures of goods and services that benefit not just a few but all. Online co-operation, the free sharing of knowledge with the help of file sharing platforms on the Internet, Wikipedia, creative commons, open content, free software and so on are examples that show that there are communist potentials within the existing Internet. But the overall Internet is predominanuy capitalist in character. How can a political transition be achieved? The answer is that this is not a technological but a political task. If struggles for a non-commodified commons-based society are successful, then it becomes more likely that a non-commodified, commons-based Internet will emerge. Governments use billions of dollars and euros for bailing out banks, whereas they have for years continued to privatize and withdraw public funding from societal commons such as the education system, health care, universities, public housing, transportation and so on. They have engaged in a neo-liberal politics of 'socialism for

344 Alternatives the rich : the rich and corporations have been made richer by tax cuts and subsidies and are now saved by taxpayers money. Crises are situations of hardship and precariousness; they make material survival harder for many ordinary people. But at the same time crises are times of change. They are likely to result in the renewal of capitalism and the emergence of new capital accumulation strategies directed against workers, but there are also potentials for the opening up of critical debates that question capitalism, for workers /prosumers struggles, and protest movements. The current crisis opens up the possibility for questioning the use of public resources and to demand the strengthening of the commons of society instead of the financial strengthening of corporations by the state. Demands can be voiced to use public money not to bail out banks but for enabling public education, public housing, public universities, public health, public retirement plans, strengthening the media and Internet commons, relieve the debts of the third world, create jobs in the public sector and so on. It is an interesting paradox that Barack Obama has faced conservative resistance against the plan to implement a more public health system in the United States, whereas the same conservatives support the use of public money for bailing out banks. This shows that neo-liberalism holds an instrumental view of the public and dislikes the idea of the commons that are available to all for free. Neo-liberalism only is interested in the public if public money is used for benefiting the few (the rich, corporations) at the expense of the many. It supports 'socialism for the rich but opposes communism for the masses. A commons-based society is the foundation for a non-commercial, commons-based Internet. Therefore struggles for the strengthening of the commons are directly related to the likelihood that such an alternative Internet can be established. In late 2009, student protests emerged in countries such as Austria, Burundi, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. In Austria, students protested and squatted lecture halls at all main universities in October 2009. One month later, the protests spread to Germany and students at all major German universities also started to squat lecture halls. Students in other countries followed. The causes of the protests were relatively similar in many countries: the economization of universities, the commodification of higher education, high tuition fees, undemocratic decision-making structures in universities that exclude students, precarious working conditions for university personnel, lay-offs of university personnel, lack of public funding for universities and education in general and so on. The destruction, economization and commodification of the education commons, which have been caused by neo-liberal policies in countries and universities all over the world, were now questioned by students. The new economic crisis resulted in bailouts of banks and corporations in the amount of billions of dollars in many countries. Public money was available for banks, whereas governments did not invest enough public money in universities and education in recent years and legitimatized this move by arguing that public money is scarce and that the state must save costs and downsize. The protests were directed against this asymmetry, they were struggles for the strengthening of the education commons and the commons in general. Students are part of the multitude, they create part of the knowledge commons, many of them work in precarious jobs, and many of them are future knowledge workers 5

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Conclusion 345 who work for a wage to earn their living. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show in that selected Western countries there is a tendency for students and academics to be more willing to protest than people with lower education and for white-collar workers to be more willing to protest more than blue-collar workers. The data indicate that 'immaterial workers', who form the new working class, tend to protest more and have a more critical consciousness than traditional industrial workers. This shows that immaterial work is not only important because of its overall predominance in terms of its share of employees in total employees but also because immaterial workers tend to be easier to organize politically. It is no surprise that students protested against the destruction of the commons and the effects of the new economic crisis. However, whether they will be able to increase and extend their struggles and acquire an anti-capitalist perspective that questions the root causes of economization is undetermined. A youthful, student-led revolutionary movement, with all of its evident uncertainties and problems, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to produce that revolution in mental conceptions that can lead us to a more rational solution to the current problems of endless growth. The first lesson it must learn is that an ethical, non-exploitative and socially just capitalism that redounds to the benefit of all is impossible. (Harvey 2010b, 239) The creation of a commons-based Internet will only be possible as part of such struggles and if it is possible to establish a commons-based society. Internet produsage reflects 'the transcritical moment where workers and consumers intersect' (Karatani 2003, 21). For political strategies this brings up the actuality of an associationist movement that is 'a transnational association of consumers/workers' (ibid., 295) and engages in 'the class struggle against capitalism' of 'workers qua consumers or consumers qua workers' (ibid., 294). An associationist movement tries to combine students, intellectuals, knowledge workers, traditional workers in struggles against capitalism. A first move for an alternative Internet is to join struggles for a commonsbased society on one hand and to help create communist Internet projects that anticipate a communist Internet in a communist society on the other. Such projects need to be connected to political movements. They include peer-to-peer platforms, open access projects, open content projects, free software, open source projects, alternative online news media, collective digital art projects, cyberprotest, public online media, public access projects, the struggle for net neutrality, the creation of free wireless networks (free nets), non-commercial and non-profit virtual communities and so on. Capitalist societies are only to a certain degree and threshold capitalist. In recent decades, the degree of capitalist ownership has been increased in many societies by strategies of privatization, liberalization, deregulation and commodification that have resulted in the expropriation of the commons, accumulation by dispossessing the commons, and the decrease of the degree of communism of society. Struggles for strengthening the commons of society are struggles for increasing the degree of communism of society. Struggles for strengthening the commons of the Internet are also struggles for increasing the degree of communism of the Internet and society. It is uncertain if such struggles will emerge at a larger scale and if as a result commonsbased projects can grow to such an extent that the capitalist dominance of society is

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Conclusion 347 questioned. The global crisis of capitalism that emerged in 2008 is a possibility and historical opportunity to question capitalism, consider alternatives and start acting to create an alternative future. Such opportunities should not be missed. Communists are all those who work incessantly to produce a different future to that which capitalism portends. . . . While traditional institutionalised communism is as good as dead and buried, there are by this definition millions of de facto communists active among us, willing to act upon their understandings, ready to creatively pursue anti-capitalist imperatives. If, as the alternative globalisation movement of the late 1990s declared, 'another world is possible , then why not say 'another communism is possible ? (Harvey 2010b, 259) 5

5

'Capitalism will never fall on its own. It will have to be pushed. The accumulation of capital will never cease. It will have to be stopped. The capitalist class will never willingly surrender its power. It will have to be dispossessed (ibid., 260). A sustainable future requires a transformative political movement, it will not emerge on its own. Can there be a combined political project of the multitude that aims to overthrow capitalism? As Marx knew, a class-in-itself is not automatically a class-for-itself, there can be classes without class consciousness and without class struggles because defining the existence of a class based on the existence of a specific consciousness or practical political project is a philosophically idealistic, subjectivistic and therefore also reductionist move that negates Marxian analysis. The task is to construct political projects that aim at the connection of the multiplicity of subject positions that are immanent in the multitude and have the potential to advance struggles that transcend capitalism and anticipate a participatory alternative to capitalism, that is, grassroots socialism. Such projects can be organized around particular political demands (as for example the demand for a redistributive universal basic income that is financed by capital taxation) as part of a politics of radical reformism that creates frameworks that work within established institutions against these institutions. Workers consciousness, demands and struggles are not automatically progressive, but there can be no emancipation without abolishing the proletariat, which makes the task of advancing emancipatory proletarian struggles important. A widely given condition today is that the proletariat is a 'revolutionary class "in-itself but not "for-itself , objectively but not subjectively (Marcuse 1969a, 54). Classes exist as objective economic groups that have certain subjective practices (in economic, political and everyday popular settings) that to certain extents allow the class subjects to perceive their economic relationships as common or uncommon. Class such as political class emerges if a class as a group perceives itself as a common economic and political entity, builds a common identity and starts to act based on this entity. The subjective and the objective class dimension interact, class structures produce human practices that reproduce and (potentially) differentiate class structures, but there is neither automatic guarantee that these practices acquire a political character nor that they acquire an emancipatory political character. Classes owe 'as much to agency as to conditioning (Thompson 1968, 8). The political task is to create a political unity in plurality of the multitude so that the internal antagonisms are externalized and can by synergistically combining the 5

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348 Alternatives strength of the now fragmented powers be directed against the capitalist class. An objective foundation for a political unity in plurality of the multitude is the experience of the lack of control of the commons and the lack of affluence that generates precariousness in one or the other sense. Communism is not an existent state of society but requires struggle. Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence. (MEW 4, 35) Such projects of creating unity in plurality are open and complex experiments without guarantees for success or failure but at best trial and error approaches that have learned from the lessons taught by political history. Fundamental social change might be triggered, but it cannot be determined, which also means that emancipation can only be the result of the self-activity of the proletariat. 'It is the business of socialists to draw the line . . . between the monopolists and the people - to foster the "societal instincts" and inhibit the acquisitive (Thompson 1960a, 8). Either the proletariat makes its own emancipation and thereby creates grassroots socialism through its own destruction as class and the destruction of classes as such or there can be no emancipation. Informational capitalism is an antagonistic system that by transnationalization and informatization produces at the same time new potentials of class domination and class struggle (Fuchs 2008). Class domination can be observed in our everyday life, whereas class struggle from below is the exception from the rule. The forces of emancipation are only developed rudimentarily, and it is not determined how the future will look like. The multitude lacks the control of the commons of society, and all of its members lack the actual experience of affluence. The multitude is connected by its poverty, its position in the production of the commons, by the confrontation with the expropriation and exploitation of the commons, as well as the lack of affluence, and the control of the commons. This exploitation of the commons also poses a threat of the destruction of the fundamental foundations of life itself (nature, health, education, etc.). These are common experiences that distinguish the multitude objectively and subjectively from the capitalist class that possesses the commons and the means that enable the class own affluence by dispossessing the multitude and exploiting the commons in order to accumulate profit. The proletariat constantly creates and recreates spaces of common experience, such as the Internet, educational institutions, knowledge spaces, culture and so on, through their practices. These spaces and experiences are appropriated and thereby expropriated and exploited by capital. The commons that are enclosed by capital are the commons of culture, the commons of external nature, the commons of internal nature and common wealth. 5

5

It is this reference to 'commons which allows the resuscitation of the notion of communism: it enables us to see their progressive enclosure as a process of 5

Conclusion 349 proletarianization of those who are thereby excluded from their own substance; a process that also points towards exploitation - for instance, that of anonymous 'knowledge workers' by their companies. (Zizek 2009b, 54; see also Zizek 2008, 429) The privatization and exploitation of the commons of culture, external nature and internal nature and the exclusions of humans from wealth dispossesses them of the foundations of life, it 'renders us all proletarians' who are 'in danger of losing everything' (Zizek 2009a, 92). The new capitalist world crisis shows that the power elite has ruthlessly engaged in exploitation of the commons and human labour for dramatically increasing the profits of capitalists, ruthlessly uses taxpayers' money for trying to save capitalism and is willing to restore capitalism in an even more shamelessly violent and exploitative form. Therefore today as a response it is permitted to know and to fully engage in communism, to again act in full fidelity to the communist Idea. . . . the time for liberal-democratic moralistic blackmail is over. Our side no longer has to go on apologizing; while the other side had better start soon. (Zizek 2009a, 7f.) Twenty-first century democratic communism is a potential. Communist media require a democratic communist society.

Note 1 http://wwwyoutube.com/watch?v=QOEMvOS8AcA (accessed on February 19, 2010).

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Index

absence: absenting 56-7, 68 accumulation: capital see capital accumulation accumulation imperative 96 achievement 45, 47 action theories 66 activist media 320 actuality 42; potentiality vs. 17-18 administrative research 11-12 advertising 149, 239-40, 288-9; online 269, 272, 287-9; opt-in 313 affluence: lack of 348 Afghanistan: FDI in 199, 200; war in 199, 202,217 age of engage 267 AIG 223, 241 alienation 39, 40, 69 alienation theory 22 alternative Internet 309, 310-21, 337-9; access 315-17; architecture 342; benefits 314; economic wealth for all 314—15; journalistic production 311; media distribution structures 314-15; media product structures 312; need for commons-based society 341-2, 344, 345; non-commodified usage 314; organizational media structures 313¬ 14; projects 317-19; reception 315-17; as surveillance-free 313; usage 315-17 alternative media 154—5, 156, 159, 244, 295-322; content 299, 301, 303; as critical media 298-304; definitions 297; distribution structures 299, 300; form 299, 301, 303; models 320-1; need for 107; objective approaches 298; organizational structures 299, 300; as participatory 267; potential dimensions 298-9; reception practices 299, 301,

301; small-scale 298; subjective approaches 297-8, 304—5; theories of 297-8; as 'third voice' 268; typology 307-10 alternative media hypothesis 102, 103, 104 alternative reception practice 133 Alternet 321 American Empire 197, 199 Answers: financial data 274; ownership 272, 275 antagonisms 329 anti-Apartheid media 304 anti-essentialism 31 anti-foundationalism 31 ARPANET 264 art: aesthetic form 107; alternative 310; autonomous 310 asset-backed securities (ABS) 232, 233 associationist movement 345 audience commodity 149, 288 Austria: newspaper ownership 3-5 authority structures: democratization 260 autonomy 117 axiology 20,21-2, 99-100 banking capital 230 banks: economic power 179 base: and superstructure 43, 48, 50-3 Beacon (Facebook) 1 blogging 269 blogs: largest attention 276, 278 bourgeois consciousness 111, 112 calculability 87 California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory (CCTDI) 28

376 Index capital: constant 138-9, 145; multitude and 339-40; speculative financial 148, 180-1; variable 138 capital accumulation 124—5, 128-9, 137—41; by dispossession 170-1; circulation sphere 138, 139; and participation 267; primitive 170, 282; production sphere 138-9 capital assets: growth 124, 126; of largest corporations 131-2; share of selected industries 208, 209 capital centralization 109-10, 151-2; in media 144 capital concentration: empirical analysis 176—7; in information sector 203-7; in media 143-4 capital export: importance 181-5; and information industries 208-15; see also FDI capital taxation 110 capitalism: characterization by Marx 123; continuity of 123-4; critique of 25, 26, 69; Fordist 174, 218; zero-point of 243-4 capitalist class 286 capitalist crisis 59; see also new capitalist crisis capitalist development 128-9 capitalist media economy 158 causality 63-4; complex 64 chance: and necessity 70 child labour: exploitation 290 China: exports growth 193-4; FDI inflows growth 186-7; imports growth 193; rise as economic actor 194—6 Christian fundamentalism 15 cinematic mode of production 257 circulation 101-2 circulation time 139, 149-51 class 24; abolition 51; broadening notion of 329; emergence 347; expanded model 284; and exploitation 279-80, 283-6, 289-90; as foundation of domination 44—6; negation 330; widening divisions 164 class struggle: critical media and 306; and economic crisis 226, 229-30, 233; intensification 124; new potentials of 348 cognition 35, 89; new media support for 286; as reflection of matter 63; website support for 270

cognitive capitalism 127 cognitivism 81 collectivism 70 commodification 87 commodities: fetishism of 69, 153 commodity circulation: role of media 148-52, 156 commodity hypothesis 102, 104, 159 commodity production: role of media 141-8, 156 common ownership 343 commons 336; exploitation of 243, 285-6, 306, 329, 339, 348-9; privatization of 337, 343, 349 commons-based Internet 318, 341—2, 345-7; see also alternative Internet commons-based society: struggles for 341-9 commonwealth 339-40 communication 35, 89; asynchronous 319; dialogic vs. discursive forms 106; and domination 83; as essential to society 336; many-to-many 319; mass self-communication 258-9; new media support for 286-7; and surveillance 119-21; synchronous 319; website support for 270 communication networks: global 213 communication studies: definition 75; mainstream 85; types 75; see also critical communication studies; media and communication studies communication theory: approaches 83, 84; typology 85 communism 330; central elements 338; as common ownership of means of production 330-2, 338; as co-operative form of production 330, 338; definition 335; democratic re-invention of 340-1, 349; as emergence of well-rounded individuals 332-4, 338; as political movement 334; seeds within capitalism 343 communist economy 331—2 communist Internet see alternative Internet community: dialectic of 333 competition 41—2; co-operation vs. 99-100, 101, 303; as lever of centralization 144 complexity 68

Index 377 computer networks 129 consumption 101-2; media content 91, 93 contradictions: universality of 57 convergence culture 266 co-operation 35, 41, 51, 89; competition vs. 99-100, 101, 303; ethics of 41-2; new media support for 287; strengthening 302; website support for 270 counter-institutions 304 counter-public sphere 305; critical media and 304-7 Creative Economy Database 214 creative reflection 50 credit system 231-2 crisis 63; as time of change 344 critical awareness: measuring 35-6 critical communication studies 83-6; definitions 96-7; historical overview 94 critical cultural studies: definitions 96-7; historical overview 94 critical empirical research 325-6, 327 critical ethics 325-6, 327-8 critical globalization studies 164—5 critical information studies: guidelines 323-8; typology 102 critical information systems research 80 critical information theory: as immanent transcendence 101 critical Internet studies 255-6 critical knowledge 15-16, 98 critical media: alternative media as 298-304; content as materialistic 303; and counter-public sphere 304—7; qualities 302-3; typology 307-10 critical media studies: definitions 96-7; forms 100; guidelines 323-8; historical overview 94; integrative multidimensional 104—8; paradigm 86-7; typology 102-4 Critical Pedagogy 29 critical pluralism 33 critical political economy 94 critical psychoanalysis 100 critical publicity 296 critical reason 14—15 critical reception 92 critical research: administrative research vs. 11-12

critical social networking sites (SNS) studies 118 critical sociology 12-13 critical theory 11, 325-6; definitions 17-20; elements 20-2; goal 14; integrative 108; meanings 17; new 23; as radical theory 20; typology 32-3 critique: empirical 22; epistemological 11; immanent 22, 26-7; Marxist 34-6, 110-12, 301-2; normative 22; positivist 28-9, 34-6; postmodern 29-36; of society 11; threefold task 110-11; transcendental 26-7 crowd sourcing 256 cultural circuit model 105 cultural deconstructivism 46 cultural imperialism 167, 216-17 cultural studies 86; optimism in 103-4; see also critical cultural studies culture: in perspectival dualism 44—6 cybernetic communism 342 cyberprotest 319-20 data critique 257 decoding 92 democracy: intensification and extension 260, 264; models of 259; see also participatory democracy democracy theory 259 democratic economy 267 demonstrations: attendances by population group 346 deregulation: financial 224—6, 227 destruction 73 determinism: mechanistic 70; technological 54, 87, 112-13 developing countries: workers in 281 developmental powers: as essence of man 260-1, 264; maximization 261, 264 Dialectical Critical Realism 67-8 dialectical development 243 dialectical model of society 48-54 dialectical philosophy: advantages of grounding critical theory in 68-71; and critical media and information studies 112-21; as ideology 53-5 dialectical realism 21, 98; at content level 302; at form level 303 dialectics: definition 56; dialectic of 62—3; important for CMIS 323, 324-5; negative 55-8

378 Index dûTerence 72; oppressive 46 digital democracy: models of 259 digital dialectic 323-4 digital enclosure 256-7 discrimination: Internet 312 dispossession 170-1 disrespect 18 distribution media 90 dominant meaning 92 domination: analysis of 19, 291-2; communication and 83; critique of 26, 69; dialectic of 324; information in 134; naturalized by dominative media 153; power vs. 4—5; questioning 300, 304 dynamic materialism 21 dynamics 68-9 ecological crisis 25 economic competition 197-8 economic division of world 185-96; and information corporations 215-17 economic sectors 130-1, 165; distribution of employees in 165-6; distribution of value added in 165-6 economic security 263 economy: as dominant system 22; as foundation of society 44—6; in perspectival dualism 44-6 education commons 344 educational knowledge 285 Egalitarian principle 261 egalitarian society 306-7 emancipation hypothesis 102, 104 empire 169, 339-40; theories of 173-6 empirical research: use 325-6, 327 empowerment discourse 117 encoding 92 Engels, Friedrich: on alternative media 154-5 Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test 28 entertainment knowledge 285 epistemology 20, 21, 98 equality 45, 47 equity: economic 52 essence 29-32, 39-40, 41-3, 71; see also human essence ethics 325-6, 327-8 existentialism 67, 68

exploitation 261, 279-90; class and 279-80, 283-6, 289-90; critique of 256; dissolution 303 exported goods: share of product groups in214 extractive power 261-2, 264 Facebook 1; user profiles 290 fascism 88 FDI 130, 181-5; by economic sector 208-11; growth 181-2, 183, 185; inflows distribution 186-8; outflows distribution 186-90 fictionalization 232 fictitious capital 227, 231 file sharing 318 finance capital 131-2, 177—8; crisis tendency in 218, 230, 231-2; dominance 177-81, 207; as fictitious capital 231; and information capital 207-8; and new economic crisis 236; and territorial conflicts 197-8 finance markets: volatility 181 finance sector: concentration 177 financial assets transactions: growth 180 financial crisis (2008) see global economic crisis financial deregulation 224—6, 227 financial expropriation 227 financial market capitalism 227 financialization 207, 215, 227, 240-1 First World War 202 Flickr 272 Fordist capitalism 174, 218 fossil fuels 131-2, 207 Frankfurt school 17, 71 freedom 38-9, 40-1, 52, 332; dialectic of 60-1 functionalism 81, 82 genealogy 29-30 General Intellect 126-7, 145 geopolitical competition 198 gift commodity economy 342 global capitalism: theories of 171-6 Global Cities approach 152 global corporations see transnational corporations global economic crisis (2008) 25, 181, 207-8, 218; key events 223^; see also new capitalist crisis

Index 379 global economy: epicentre shift 196 global information network 148 global neo-liberalism 197, 198 global network capitalism 129-30 globalization 128-9, 163-4; of capitalism 24, 147-8; capitalist 172; definitions 129, 163, 165; optimism concerning 164; of world trade 151 Google: financial data 272, 274; ownership 272, 275; user profiles 290 greed 232 gross domestic product (GDP): worldwide see world GDP Habermasian critical theory 23 habitus 67 hegemonic meaning 92 hegemony 153 Herfindahl index 3 high-tech industry: capitalist crisis and 238 historical knowledge 284, 285 housewifization 282-3 houseworkers 281 housing bubble 226-7 human actors and social structures: dialectic of 325 human agency: structures and 66-7 human essence 260-1, 263, 302 hypercapitalism 129 hyperindustrialism 131-2, 207 IBM 95 IGTs and society 77 ideological state apparatuses 94 ideology 69, 152-4; media and 152-4, 156, 159 ideology critique 259, 265, 269, 326, 327 ideology hypothesis 159 immanance: without transcendentals 34 immanent transcendence 36-43; moral philosophy based on 52 immaterial labour 126, 145, 283, 338, 339-40, 345 imperialism 25, 163; colonies of 282; as crisis ridden 217; cultural 167, 216-17; definitions 174-5, 176; media 167, 216-17; theories of 165, 172-6; see also new imperialism

imperialist capitalism 131-2 incommensurability 73 individual: and society 70 individualism 70, 88-9 individuality: dialectic of 333 industrial workers 280 Indymedia 320-1 informal workers 281 information: definition 165; and ITs 90; non-reifying notion 89; objective notions 87; subjective notions 88-9 information capital: finance capital and 207-8 information corporations: analysis of capitalist crisis based on 237-40; assets in 2007 and 2008 244-54; economic division of world and 215-17; with high losses in 2008 236; with increased profits in 2008 236; market value in . 2007 and 2008 237, 244-54; profits in 2007 and 2008 244-54; transnationality 211—15 information economy 131, 165-6; capitalist crisis and 233-40, 241; definition 233; networked 268; subindustries 237 information ethics 257, 326 information science: approaches 78; characteristics 78; definitions 75-6, 79; models 79; paradigms 78; topics 76 information sector: capital concentration in 203-7; capital export and 208-15; importance 214—15; large companies' share of employees 204; large companies' share of number of companies 204; large companies' share of turnover 205; large companies' share of value added 205 information society 87-8, 99 information society theories 121-34; continuous 125-6; discontinuous 121, 122-3; as ideology 122; objective 122, 126; subjective 121-2, 125-7; typology 122 information systems research 80; approaches 80 information theory 78, 80 informational capitalism 127—32, 348; and new imperialism 203-17 informatization 132, 207 instrumental knowledge 13, 16, 98

380 Index instrumental reason 14-15, 17, 69-70, 87-8 integrationism: continuous 82; radical change 82 intellectual property rights 89 inter-imperialist rivalry 197 interactive dualism 44 Internal Consistency position 29 international solidarity 24 Internet: access 315-17; advertising profits 289; audience commodity 288; benefits 314; commons-based 318, 341-2, 345-7; as corporate-dominated 337; différences from traditional mass media 319; economic concentration 314—15; electronic surveillance 256-7, 313; as global information system 148; globality 319; journalistic production 310— 11; mass self-communication 258-9; media distribution structures 314—15; media product structures 311— 12; organizational media structures 312— 14; potentials 291; predominant usage type 271-3; reception 315-17; usage 274-6, 315-17; user fees 314; see also alternative Internet; critical Internet studies Internet attention economy 276 Internet co-operatives 313 Internet gift economy 342 Internet literacy 316 interpretive sociology 81, 82 intra-organizational communication: role of media 146 Iraq: FDI in 199, 200; fuel exports 199, 201; war in 170-1, 198, 199, 202, 217 Ireland: newspaper ownership 3-4 ITs: information and 90 journalism: citizen 299, 301; elite 299; multiperspectival 267; radical online 321 journalists: as actors 91, 92 knowledge: circulation of 286-7, 343; commodification of 338; as commons 89, 328, 337-8; consumption of 286-7; critical 15-16,98; forms of 285; instrumental 13, 16, 98; as productive force 280; reflexive 13, 16-17

knowledge labour 144, 279, 289 knowledge society 289 knowledge structures 79 knowledge workers: direct 279, 280-1; indirect 279-80 labour: division of 280; immaterial 126, 145, 283, 338, 339-40, 345; productive 141; surplus 140-1; unpaid 280 labour productivity: growth 194 largest corporations: assets 233, 234; capital assets 131-2; growth rates 235; market value 233, 235; profits 233, 234; sales 233, 234 left-wing media 312 Lenin, Vladimir: theory of imperialism 172-6 love 45, 47 malrecognition 18 manipulation and ideology hypothesis 102-3, 104 manipulative reception 92 Marx, Karl: and crisis economy of finance capitalism 230—3; importance for communication studies 135; on media and communication 141—55; relevance today 24—5 Marxian circuit of capital 137-41, 171, 257 Marxian ethics 328 Marxism: humanist 68 Marxist critical theory 23 Marxist critique 34-6, 110-12, 301-2 Marxist feminism 283 mass media 90—3; authoritarian character 106; communication process 91; filter functions 105 mass self-communication 258-9 materialism 98-9 matter 61 media: antagonistic character 108, 110; commodity aspect 156—8; creation of human-centred 325; distribution structures 299, 300; domains of potential effect 325; form and content 299; globalization 211-13; and globalization of world trade 151; and ideology 152-4, 156, 159; organizational structures 299, 300; potential dimensions 298-9; reception

Index 381 practices 299, 301; repressive functions 104; role in commodity circulation 148-52, 156; role in commodity production 141-8, 156; as structures 90; types 90, 93; see also alternative media media-based capitalism 142 media capital: in media contents production 144-6 media and communication studies: topics 76 media content industry: capitalist crisis and 237-8, 239-40 media imperialism 167, 216-17 media infrastructure capital 148-9 media prosumption 266 media sector: concentration 206-7 media studies: behavioural approach 86; definition 75; digital media in 78; see also critical media studies media technology: as technology of rationalization 142-3 mergers and acquisitions (M&A): numbers 177, 179; value 177, 178 messages 89 migrants 281 military expenditure 200 military power 198 mobilities paradigm 214 monetary system 146 monism: normative 45, 47-8; and pluralism 48 Moral Realism 68 morality 37-8; as class morality 39; as foundation of society 47 movement of movements 306 multitude 279, 283-4, 306, 329, 339-40; and capital 339-40; class fractions 280-1; definition 280; political unity in plurality 348 MySpace: user profiles 290 naïve realism 323 Nazism 30-1, 95 necessity: chance and 70; dialectic of 60-1 negation: determinate 60-1, 65, 73^, 341; obliterative 61; radical 58, 65; real 58, 65; transformative 58, 65 negation of negation/negative 53, 55, 57, 64-6, 340-1; at content level 302; at

form level 303; as axiology 21-2, 99-100; need for human action 61-2, 65, 341; results 64-6 negotiated meaning 92 neo-liberalism 197, 198, 242, 337, 343-4 net critique 257 network idealism 323 network technologies 129 networked gift economy 341 networked information economy 268 new capitalist crisis 224—33; and capitalist information economy 233-40, 241; as consequence of regulation failures 225-6; as failure of capitalism 226-30; Marx and 230-3; as opportunity to question capitalism 347; see also global economic crisis new economy crisis (2000) 224, 232 new imperialism: capital concentration 176-7 (in information sector 203-7); capital export (importance 181-5; and information industries 208-15); economic division of world 185-96 (and information corporations 215-17); empirical analysis 176-203; finance capital (dominance 177-81, 207; and information capital 207-8); informational capitalism and 203-17; political division of world 197-203 (role of information in 217); theories of 167-76 new media 108-9, 286-8 new socialism 336 News Corporation: financial data 274; ownership 272, 275 news-media system 240 newspaper markets: concentrated 3-5 normative monism 45, 47-8 Obama, Barack 344 objectivism: subjectivism vs. 81 occupational groups: employees by 166-8 oil and gas industry: and new economic crisis 236 online advertising 269, 272, 287-9 online attention economy 276 online politics 276 ontology 20, 21, 98-9 open publishing 321 OpenDemocracy 320, 321 opportunities and risks: dialectic of 324

382 Index oppositional meaning 92 oppositional media 297-8 oppression 32; dissolution 303 oppressive difference 46 Out There News 321 outsourcing: of reproductive labour 282 over-exploitation 282 overaccumulation 170, 228, 229, 240-1 overproduction 228, 230 ownership: questions concerning 268, 269 parallax 72-3, 74 participation 257-9; and capital accumulation 267; as education in participation 263, 265; as empowering process 50-1; in media vs. through media 268; symmetrical 267 participatory, co-operative and sustainable information society (PGSIS) 51 participatory culture 266 participatory decision-making 262, 264 participatory democracy 43, 100, 260-5, 316, 330; basic principles 260-3; communism as 333; principles applied to communication 264-5 participatory economy 262, 264 participatory web 2.0: ideology critique of claims 265-79; see also web 2.0 peer production systems 267-8 perspectival dualism 44 Pirate Bay 1-2, 317-18 Pirate Parties 2 pluralism: and monism 48 plurality: unity in 347 political division of world 197-203; role of information in 217 political economy: critique of 111, 334-5 Political Economy of Communication 105, 106 political information: online 276 positivism 11; notion of critique 28-9, 34-6 post-critique 33 post-industrialism 214 postmodern dialectics 73-4 postmodernism 23; notion of critique 29-36 potentiality: actuality vs. 17-18 potentials 40, 108

power: domination vs. 4—5; doubleness of 339 practical knowledge 285 pragmatics 87 preservation: ecological 52 press: duty of 303; essence of 302 printing industry 143 private property 343 production 101-2; effects dimension 332-41; media content 91, 93; objective dimension 330-2; subjective dimension 330; see also commodity production production time 139 produsage 266-7, 268-9, 286, 287-8, 305; free 311 profit rate 287; tendency to fall 226, 228-9 profits: largest corporations 233, 234; shares of single industries in 233, 235-6; wages and 109 proletariat 279, 283, 306; emancipation 347, 348 prosumption 130, 268, 286, 305, 319 protest movements 305, 319 protests 2-3, 319-20, 344-6; virtual 320 pseudo-participation 263-4, 265, 279 public critical academic knowledge 15 public sociology 12-14, 15 public sphere 295-6; bourgeois 296; fragmented 316; manipulated 296; proletarian (counter) 296, 306-7; universal 317; see also counter-public sphere public uncritical academic knowledge 15 queer theory 33 radical constructivism 88 radical humanism 81, 82 radical structuralism 81, 82 rationality 23; communicative 23 reception 91-2, 159; critical 301; manipulated 300 reception hypothesis 102, 103-4 recognition: forms 45, 47; redistribution and 43-8,51-2 redistribution: and recognition 43-8, 51-2 reflection 63-4

Index 383 reflexive knowledge 13, 16-17 regulation: and new capitalist crisis 224-6, 227 reification 69, 87-8, 153 religion: critique of 26, 69 repression 88 repression hypothesis 102, 104 repressive tolerance 320-1 reproductive labour 280, 282 resistance 339; communication networks of 320 retirees 281 securities 231, 232-3 securitization 226 self-employment: bogus 281 semantics 87 semi-colonies 197 semiconductor industry: capitalist crisis and 238 semio-capitalism 126 shadow banks 225-6 shock doctrine 242 'smart mobs' 320 social construction of technology (SCOT) 113 social movements 36—7 social networking sites (SNS) 115-21, 270; advantages/opportunities 118-21; disadvantages/risks 118-21; user types 275-6 Social Realism 66 social responsible capitalism 242 social science: typology of approaches 13 social theory 297; critical 326; paradigms 81-2 social worker 283, 306 socialism 46, 336; grassroots 347, 348 socialization 41 society: individual and 70 software industry: capitalist crisis and 238 Soviet Marxism 53—5 speculation 231, 232 stagnation 229-30 Stalinism 39, 54-5 stock market values: growth 124—5 structuration theory 114 structures: and human agency 66-7 struggles: channels for circulation of 255; social 63, 339; see also class struggle

student protests 344—6 students: exploitation of 281 subject-object dialectic 58, 61—3, 128 subjectivism: objectivism vs. 81 sublations 53, 58, 65-6, 128, 340 subprime mortgages 226-7, 233 subtraction 73 superstructure: base and 43, 48, 50-3 surplus value 139-41, 286; extra 282 surveillance 256-7, 313; communication and 119-21 sustainability 51, 53 symbolic forms 146 synopticon 103 syntax 87 techno-optimism 112-13, 323; approach to SNS 117-18 techno-pessimism 112-13, 323; approach to SNS 116-17 technological determinism 54, 87, 112-13 technological knowledge 285-6 technological productivity 262-3, 264, 332 technological rationality 70, 81, 106 technology: human-centred 52; role in liberation 263 technology assessments: causal logics 115 telecommunications industry: capitalist crisis and 238-9 theory and practice: dialectic of 323 TNI 182-3, 212-13 totality: orientation on 21 transcendentals 100; without immanance 34 transdisciplinarity 76-7 transmission technologies 148 transnational corporations (TNCs) 130; with highest losses in 2008 236, 238; importance 183;most profitable in 2008 235, 237; see also largest corporations transnational organizational model 129 transnationality index (TNI) 182-3, 212-13 transportation of commodities 146, 150-1 truth: examination of 33 Twitter 272 unemployed 281 United Kingdom: fuel imports 199, 201

384 Index United States: fuel imports 199, 201; media concentration 206-7; military power 198; military spending 200; public health system 344 universal machine 319 universalism 30-1 value: attention theory of 257; definition 137; exchange 137, 159-60; knowledge theory of 256; money 139; surplus see surplus value; total 282; use 137-8, 159-60 victimization discourse 116 videos: most viewed 276, 277 virtual realism 323 visibility 266, 276-7,316 wages: and profits 109; repression 229 war blogging 108-9 warfare: role of information in 217 wealth see capital web 1.0 270 web 2.0 269-70; advertising rights 273, 275; characteristics of most popular platforms 272, 274; data ownership rights 273-4, 275; fiscal data for companies 274; mass selfcommunication 258-9; ownership of

companies 272-4; platforms among top websites 272^ 273; produsage 266-7; see also Internet; participatory web 2.0 web sociology 256 websites: information functions 270, 271 well-rounded individuals: emergence 332-4, 338 Wikipedia 272, 317 wikis270 wisdom 52 WNET312 WordPress 272 world exports: distribution 189-94; growth 183-4 world GDP: distribution 193-4, 195; growth 123-4 world imports: distribution 189-93; growth 183-4 world system theory 194 world trade: geographical stratification 215-17 Yahoo:financialdata 274; ownership 272-3, 275 YouTube: most viewed videos 276, 277; user profiles 290