Reds, Greens, and Logical Analysis

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Reds, Greens, and Logical Analysis Hilary Putnam The Philosophical Review, Vol. 65, No. 2. (Apr., 1956), pp. 206-217. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108%28195604%2965%3A2%3C206%3ARGALA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A The Philosophical Review is currently published by Cornell University.

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REDS, GREENS, AND LOGICAL ANALYSIS

T

HE purpose of this paper is to explain why the statement:

( I ) "Nothing

is red (all over) and green (all over) at the same time" is analytic. The method will be to give two lines of argument, one informal and discursive, the other relatively formal and exact. Both will have essentially the same content. First, however, a brief statement of the significance of the problem. Philosophers1 have contended that the qualities green and red are simple and unanalyzable. Hence the a priori character of ( I ) cannot be explained on the ground of its analyticity-it is claimed -since its denial does not violate the principle of contradiction. By way of contrast, consider: ( 2 ) "All bachelors are unmarried," or, if you prefer: (3) "Nothing is both a bachelor and married at the same time." The concept bachelor is analyzable into unmarried man. Accordingly, ( 2 ) is analyzable into (4) "All unmarried men are unmarried" and the denial of (2), (3), or (4) is: (5) "Someone is both married and not married," which violates the principle of contradiction. The difficulty may also be stated in another way. An analytic sentence is one that can be reduced to a theorem of formal logic by putting synonyms for synonyms. If red and green are unanalyzable, then no replacement of their names by synonymous expressions in ( I ) will turn ( I ) into a theorem of formal logic. Hence ( I ) is not analytic, but it is a priori (as everyone admits). Before replying to this charming argument for the synthetic a priori (and its neatness and force are undeniable), I should like A. Pap, Elements of Analytic Philosophy (New York, rgqg), p. 422; M. Schlick, "Is There a Factual a Priori?" reprinted in H. Feigl and W. Sellars, Readings in Philosophical An&ir (New York, ~ g q g ) ,p. 280.

REDS, GREENS, AND LOGICAL ANALYSIS

to make a few preliminary comments, by way of orientation. I n the first place, the notion of "simplicity," unlike the notion of "analyzability," seems to be psychological rather than logical. Empirical studies by no means indicate universal agreement on what characters in experience are "simple." And yet, no criterion has been presented for simplicity (in the relevant sense) other than what people feel. However, the argument given above does not really depend on the simplicity of red and green, but merely on their unanalyzability; that is, on the fact that "red" and "green" do not possess any synonyms in English or in any other language, actual or merely possible, relevant to this problem (i.e., any synonyms whose substitution for "red" and "green" in ( I ) would transform it into a theorem of formal logic). This is established, of course, by reflecting on the sense of "red" and "green" and by "seeing" that any definitions that would make "red" and "green" logically dependent (by making "red" and "green" synonymous with some logically dependent expressions P and Q) would involve a violation of the intended meaning of these terms. Thus, to refute this argument, it is necessary to find expressions P and Q which are synonymous with "red" and "green" respectively, and whose substitution for "red" and "green" in ( I ) turns it into a theorem of logic,-but we must be sure that P is really synonymous with "red" in the intended sense, and likewise,