Russian Civil-Military Relations (Military Strategy and Operational Art)

  • 70 0 8
  • Like this paper and download? You can publish your own PDF file online for free in a few minutes! Sign Up

Russian Civil-Military Relations (Military Strategy and Operational Art)

Russian Civil-Military Relations Robert Brannon Russian Civil-Military Relations Comes at just the right time. An im

1,195 287 3MB

Pages 352 Page size 402.52 x 600.944 pts Year 2009

Report DMCA / Copyright

DOWNLOAD FILE

Recommend Papers

File loading please wait...
Citation preview

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Robert Brannon

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Comes at just the right time. An important work that answers vital questions about Russian motives and military actions today. James Howcroft, United States Marine Corps

At a time of global economic crisis and sharply changing international relationships, Brannon’s perceptive evaluation of civilian-military relations within the Russian Federation permits readers to develop a clearer and more profound appreciation of the challenges faced by the United States and its Western Allies as they face the uncertainties of the future. David M. Glantz, The Citadel, Charleston, USA

Robert Brannon has produced an insightful, concise account of the evolution of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia. He draws well on the theoretical literature on civil-military relations and carefully shows how and to what extent civilian authority was actually exercised over Russia’s armed forces in the decade after the Soviet regime collapsed. This book is a valuable contribution to the literature and will be very useful for courses on Russian politics and on civilmilitary relations. Mark Kramer, Harvard University, USA

Military Strategy and Operational Art Edited by Professor Howard M. Hensel, Air War College, USA

The Ashgate Series on Military Strategy and Operational Art analyzes and assesses the synergistic interrelationship between joint and combined military operations, national military strategy, grand strategy, and national political objectives in peacetime, as well as during periods of armed conflict. In doing so, the series highlights how various patterns of civil–military relations, as well as styles of political and military leadership influence the outcome of armed conflicts. In addition, the series highlights both the advantages and challenges associated with the joint and combined use of military forces involved in humanitarian relief, nation building, and peacekeeping operations, as well as across the spectrum of conflict extending from limited conflicts fought for limited political objectives to total war fought for unlimited objectives. Finally, the series highlights the complexity and challenges associated with insurgency and counter-insurgency operations, as well as conventional operations and operations involving the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. Also in this series: Managing Civil-Military Cooperation Edited by Sebastiaan J.H. Rietjens and Myriame T.I.B. Bollen ISBN 978 0 7546 7281 4 Securing the State Reforming the National Security Decisionmaking Process at the Civil-Military Nexus Christopher P. Gibson ISBN 978 0 7546 7290 6

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Robert Brannon College of International and Security Studies, George C. Marshall European Center, Germany

© Robert Brannon 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Robert Brannon has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Brannon, Robert Burl Russian civil-military relations. - (Military strategy and operational art) 1. Civil-military relations - Russia (Federation) 2. Civil-military relations - Russia (Federation) - Case studies 3. Russia (Federation) - Military policy I. Title 322.5'0947

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Brannon, Robert (Robert Burl), 1950 Russian civil-military relations / by Robert Brannon. p. cm. -- (Military strategy and operational art) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7591-4 1. Civil-military relations--Russia (Federation) 2. Russia (Federation)--Politics and government--1991- I. Title.

JN6693.5.C58B73 2009 322'.50947--dc22 09ANSHT

ISBN 978 0 7546 7591 4

2008045693

Contents

List of Figures Dedication About the Author Foreword Preface Acknowledgements

vii viii ix xi xiii xv

1

Russian Civil-Military Relations in Transition

1

2

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

15

3

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

47

4 Case I: The Russians Are Coming! The Race to Pristina Airport, June 1999

73

5

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya: Dagestan, July-September 1999

99

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama: The Submarine Kursk Tragedy, August 2000

131

Conclusions

165

6 7

    

Epilogue: Russia and Georgia: The Summer of 2008

187

Appendices Appendix A  Russian Military Doctrine, November 1993 Appendix B  Russian National Security Policy, December 1997 Appendix C  The World Ocean: Concept Paper for Russia’s Naval Program  Appendix D  Russian National Security Concept, January 2000 Appendix E  Russian Military Doctrine, April 2000

191 193 215 243 269 287

Bibliography Index

311 329

This page has been left blank intentionally

List of Figures

1.1

Principal-Agent Relationship

2.1 National Security Strategy Framework

2 22

Dedication

This book is dedicated to Igor Sutyagin, who languishes today in a Russian prison cell for a crime he did not commit. Igor is a professional research scientist who worked closely with me in Moscow in my efforts to try to find clear and transparent reasons for some of the more inexplicable actions that happened in the chaotic later years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. Sutyagin fell victim to a modern purge aimed at ridding Russia of an imagined threat from journalists and scientists, especially those whose work was focused on the environmental legacies of the former Soviet Union. It is my fervent hope that Igor will someday once again breathe the fresh air of freedom, reunited with his family and friends, acquitted of all charges and free to practice his excellent skills in military research and analysis.

About the Author

Dr. Brannon is a Professor of National Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center’s College of International and Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, where he has served as Director of the Program in Advanced Security Studies, 2007-2008, the college’s largest and most comprehensive resident program. Previously, he was Chief of Naval Operations Chair and Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, National Defense University, in Washington, D.C. Retired from active duty as a Captain in the U.S. Navy, he has had the usual service at sea and in command, including assignments on the aircraft carrier USS MIDWAY (CV41), and in four different patrol aviation squadrons, culminating with command of VP-45 while deployed to Keflavik, Iceland. Shifting to service in political-military affairs, he worked for three years at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, helping to draft and implement the first framework documents for the Partnership for Peace. In June 2001, nearing three years of service at the American Embassy in Moscow as the U.S. Naval Attaché, he was unjustly expelled from the country in a round of diplomatic reciprocity related to accusations of espionage. Captain Brannon was in Russia during the economic crash of August 1998, the armed riots at the American Embassy in protest of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the submarine Kursk disaster on 12 August 2000. From 2001-2002, he was the senior National Security Fellow in residence at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Later, he was an International Affairs Fellow at MIT in the Seminar XXI Washington D.C. Class of 2004. He served on the faculty at the National War College for four years, where he developed and offered original courses in Russian politics and civil-military relations, taught core curriculum courses in the fundamentals of strategy and in international affairs, and led several field studies exercises with students to Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. Dr. Brannon speaks, reads and writes in Russian, has a PhD in World Politics, Russian Studies, as well as an MA in International Affairs from The Catholic University of America in Washington D.C. His research interests include civil-military relations in postauthoritarian states, and writing a definitive book about the political-military implications of the Russian submarine Kursk tragedy at sea in August 2000. Dr. Brannon, who prefers to be called Bob, is married to the former Stella Diana Boone of Atherton, California. They have three adult children (Stefanie, Christopher, and Alexandra), one son-in-law (Sam Eigen), one daughter-in-law (Kimberly), and two grandchildren (Kaitlin Rose and Jack Vincent Brannon), all of whom live in the United States.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Foreword

I first met Dr. Brannon when he was the Naval Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. I was part of a group led by Admiral Dennis Blair (at that time CINCPAC) on an official visit to Russia. It was clear to me he was different from the vast majority of navy officers I had known and served with over the years. He had an intellectual curiosity, a thirst for knowledge that set him apart from many others. In addition, it was clear that he was one of the few attaches I encountered over the years who understood the Russian military as well as its role within the Russian political system. He is a person who knows Russia, as well as its military and its political system. Working with Bob has been a joy. He was always open to constructive criticism, and the quality of his research, which eventually became this book, improved constantly. Equally important, Bob sees things not only through the prism of a scholar, but from that of an experienced naval officer. The former was useful in helping conceptualize the book (which relies to a large degree on Peter Feaver’s Agent Theory), while the latter enabled him to separate the “wheat from the chaff.” The two together produce an outstanding work, valuable to anyone interested in the Russian military or Russian civil-military relations. What this writer found most valuable in this book was Bob’s discussion of civil-military relations in Russia, especially his conclusion that the failure of the political leadership to provide direction or to provide the Russian military with even its minimal needs led the high command to exploit gaps in authority, particularly during the Yeltsin period. However, rather than undertaking a coup, the military pulled back politically and made its own decisions. Bob’s conclusion in each of these cases is as simple as it is profound. Either the civilian provides leadership or the Russian military (or any military) will make its own decisions. As Bob shows, Putin was burned by this laissez faire attitude vís-a-vís the military (during the Kursk affair), and decided that it was time to reassert political control. Equally important, is Bob’s ability to show the relationship between military doctrine and security strategy. Unfortunately, the two topics are often discussed, but seldom related as in this book. However, what is really valuable, and unusual about this book, are the three case studies in it. All of us who have written on the Russian military are familiar with the three cases he mentions. However, I don’t think anyone has looked at these cases in the detail that Bob has, nor related them to the broader question of Russian military doctrine and civil-military relations. My own view is that the Russian military is entering a new phase in its development. The new minister of defense Anatoli Serdyukov fired General Sergei Baluyevskiy, the Chief of the General Staff and appointed General Nikolai

xii

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Makarov in his place. As this book goes to press, Serdyukov is in the process of turning the Russian military upside down. The officer corps will be cut from 400,000 to 150,000 while a new, and potentially more effective non-commissioned officer corps is being introduced. Similarly, Serdyukov has launched a major campaign against wide-spread corruption, the military has been isolated from the weapons production process, and prosecutions of guilty officers are picking up. In addition, almost every Russian officer understands that Russia’s weapons and equipment are antiquated—I mean those that work at all. Consequently, Makarov, who was previously in charge of the Directorate of Armaments, has been charged with introducing a revolution in Moscow’s arsenal. This book is invaluable to anyone attempting to understand how the Russian military got to the dismal situation in which it now finds itself. Bob understands how complex civil-military relations have been in a country like Russia. It is not just a case of separating the two sides, with one containing those who wear uniforms and the other those in civilian clothes. Sometimes, individuals in uniform argue against the use of force while their civilian colleagues are for it. There are also major differences between soldiers on important issues of policy; a point that is often overlooked, but comes across clearly in this study. The result is an invaluable book. It lays the foundation for the study of contemporary Russian civil-military relations. In particular, it not only explains how the military responded to an aloof civilian leadership, it shows what a stronger hand can do if, and when, a person like Putin, Medvedev, and in particular Serdyukov is determined to use it. Dale R. Herspring Manhattan, Kansas, 2009

Preface

It has been said that Putin is Putin largely because Yeltsin was Yeltsin. Despite the simplicity of that statement, and the inevitable flaws that derive from such pithy shortcuts, it is particularly true in the area of civil-military relations. The Yeltsin years paved the way for everything that followed, especially with regard to national security policy and military doctrine, cornerstones of modern civilmilitary relations. This book is about the Russian military’s transition from the Soviet era to the present time. It is important because current processes aimed at revising and redeveloping national security policies are aimed directly at the documents that were enacted in the transition from Yeltsin to Putin. Most of these policies were in fact written during the Yeltsin years and signed into law by Putin after he took over. It is surprising that there have yet been only few, if indeed any, changes to these fundamental policies. Although Putin did much to lead change in the area of national security affairs, most of his policies derived from legislation put forward under Yeltsin, and most of this legislation remains in force today. In May 2008, Vladimir Putin, handed over power to his successor, Dmitri Medvedev, in peaceful transition following an election that, although contested by some as less than free and fair, was nonetheless at least fundamentally democratic. Almost immediately, the new president began to make a name for himself in the realm of civil-military relations by reinforcing the authority of his Defense Minister, Anatoliy Serdyukov. Barely one month after his inauguration, Medvedev, at Serdyukov’s request, removed General Yuri Baluyevskiy, Chief of the General Staff, in favor of General Nikolai Makarov, a man who is essentially an outsider, almost surely unfamiliar with Kremlin politics. Although in this case the views of the civilian minister of defense prevailed, that has not always been true. Putin regarded the armed forces highly, both in terms of professional responsibility and as symbols of the nation’s power and credibility, but his sense of accountability was flawed, and the military did not always return this faith and confidence in kind. On reflection, Putin’s record of implementing meaningful military reform is mixed and falls short of expectations. There is currently a proposal to redraft the nation’s military doctrine. Although work on the draft is apparently underway, and reports abound in the Russian press, there is as yet no new document available for public review. One of the primary aims of this book is to offer for examination a comparison and analysis of military doctrine and national security strategy in modern Russia. In some cases recalling the Soviet legacy, the security documents of the first fifteen years following disintegration of the Soviet Union tell a remarkable story of civil-military relations in transition from authoritarianism. This book examines several cases that reveal

xiv

Russian Civil-Military Relations

what really happened, especially in the turbulent phases of transition between Yeltsin and Putin. In the often anarchic environment of the 1990s, the nascent Russian Federation experienced misunderstandings and missteps in civil-military relations. During this critical juncture, were civilians really in control of the military in Russia? Did the military obey orders from civilian authorities, or was it merely giving lip service to those it served to protect, while implementing its own policies in practice? Who was really calling the shots? Several specific cases illustrate the question well. The Russian military has often followed its own course, making decisions about policy implementation that have had enormous ramifications. In Kosovo during the late spring of 1999, as NATO’s military intervention was in full swing, Russian troops moved to occupy the airport at Pristina, suggesting an attempt to garner a larger role for Russia in the anticipated NATO-brokered peace plan. The army’s move may have been a military initiative, absent civilian authorization. Later that same year, the army responded to attacks in Dagestan by rebel forces located in neighboring Chechnya, reinitiating the use of force into that region. As in Kosovo, there is reason to conclude that the decision to go to war again in Chechnya may have been made by the military acting on its own initiative. In both cases, President Yeltsin was weak and may have been manipulated by the military. After Putin’s election to the presidency in 2000, when the submarine Kursk sank in the Barents Sea, Western assistance was rejected because the navy lied to the president. Putin’s missteps in handling the incident might be attributed to the misinformation he received in this more subtle example of how the military can undermine civilian authority. Gaps in authority have existed when the defense establishment in Russia was unable or unwilling to provide the necessary direction and supervision to its armed forces. This was a dangerous condition, and it may not be over yet. Military adventurism represents initiatives that run counter to civilian will and authority, even when it appears to be in the best interest of the country. Examining relevant security documents and cases that illustrate civil-military relations during the Yeltsin and Putin eras helps to understand the latest developments in Russian political-military affairs. Although no one knows yet just where Medvedev will lead his nation, it is easier to consider the options when informed by Russia’s most recent past. As America’s Naval Attaché in Moscow I had a front row seat to history as it unfolded in the cases described in this book. Despite difficult relations between the United States and Russia during the period of my accreditation (1998-2001) I had excellent access to senior decision makers in the defense establishment, affording me unique opportunities to hear their views on a variety of challenging questions. I hope this book helps to bring many of those insights to light, allowing others to see what I have seen. Robert B. Brannon Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, 2009

Acknowledgements

This book is the result of a great deal of hard work and steadfast commitment, not only by the author, but also by many others. First and foremost is my mentor, coach, and head cheerleader, Joan Urban. Joan has seen me though all the times, good and bad, across the breadth and depth of my entire research experience, both in Russia and at home in the United States. Her unflagging enthusiasm for a subject in which we share a common passion made this project a labor of love. Michael Foley provided critical and essential insights and support by helping me to carefully navigate the rocks and shoals of comparative politics, especially in the field of literature associated with civil-military relations. Dale Herspring knows more about civil-military relations in Russia than anyone I have ever met. His contributions to this book, including writing the foreword, are so numerous it is simply not possible to enumerate them all. Despite the enormous significance of Dale’s advice on all aspects of the research that went into writing this work, his wise counsel about Russian strategic culture stands out. Bill Hardman stood beside me at every stage of writing this book. His steadfast support included many aspects of advice, but most important was his personal sense of who I am and why I wanted to do this. I simply cannot thank Bill enough for all he did for me. For their special assistance during many different portions of this effort, I also want to thank my colleagues at the National War College in Washington, D.C., including David Auerswald, Theresa Sabonis-Helf, Lani and Norman Kass, Harvey Rishikof, Cynthia Watson, Mark Pizzo, and many others. I also received superb support from National War College Research Assistant Patrick Bratton, now Dr. Bratton, currently a professor at Hawaii Pacific College in Honolulu. Finally, David Glantz deserves special recognition for his expert opinions, editorial advice, and wise counsel in helping me to turn the original rough draft into a proper book. This expression of appreciation would not be complete without recognizing my family, especially my wife, Stella, who stood by me even when I could not see the virtues of staying the course.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 1

Russian Civil-Military Relations in Transition

The question of whether or not the military in Russia (1996-2001) took civilian authority to heart, following orders and transforming itself into an armed force consistent with political aims defined by civilians in control, is the central question of this book. In practice, there are many shades of gray in the realm of loyalty and subordination. Traditional theorists concerned with civil-military relations have identified a number of ways to gauge the dynamics of civilian control. Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz identified ways of assessing civilian control of the military based on the ethics of professionalism. Simply stated, they concluded that military forces would remain loyal and subservient to civilian control primarily because they would be educated according to what was the “right thing to do.” This book rejects the application of traditional civil-military relations theories in contexts that might aptly be called transitions from authoritarianism. Widely regarded as the “deans” of civil-military relations theory, Huntington and Janowitz relied to a large extent on assumptions related to military professional ethics, a specific ethos that would predict certain outcomes in most cases. In postCommunist contexts these assumptions appear to be misunderstood, perhaps even inappropriate. Instead, taking a cue from Dale Herspring’s work on civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia, this book proposes to answer the question of whether civilians were in control of the military in Russia from 1996 to 2001 by testing newer civil-military relations models in three cases. This time period is particularly useful because it represents the transition between Yeltsin and Putin. It may also aid in predicting future dynamics of civil-military relations in Russia, especially in the post-Putin era, if that is really what exists today. The security documents that derived from the transition between Yeltsin and Putin remain in force today, unrevised as of this writing, despite persistent rumors that a new military doctrine is in the works. In a related question, the book also examines the extent to which infiltration of the military by security services (FSB, formerly KGB) impacts on military responses to civilian control. Peter Feaver’s “principal-agent” theory is based on his assumption that “the essence of civil-military relations is a strategic interaction between civilian principals and military agents.” Influenced by the degree and nature of civilian monitoring, as well as by their own value system, the military   Peter D.Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2003).



Russian Civil-Military Relations

Figure 1.1  Principal-Agent Relationship acts in varying degrees to fulfill (work) or undermine (shirk) civilian goals. The term “shirking” in this sense does not imply laziness or treachery, but describes a condition of less than full acceptance and cooperation that sometimes occurs between military agents and their civilian principals. Although the Russian military may be likely to “shirk” no matter what civilians do, it may do so less openly (or overtly) if civilian monitoring is intrusive; if nonintrusive, the military may be inclined to shirk more obviously, in some cases even challenging, or undermining, civilian authority. Military behavior (working or shirking) causes civilians to vary the degree of monitoring (more or less). Thus, civilian control of the military both causes, and is caused by, correspondent military behavior. Doctrine is one measure of civilian control of the military and is a primary focus of this book. Intrusive monitoring occurs when civilians assume the primary role in developing military doctrine. Non-intrusive monitoring occurs when the military is given or takes primary responsibility. Intrusive monitoring will include specific mission requirements and definitions related to actual performance, force structures, budgets and personnel policies. Non-intrusive monitoring is inadequately specific with regard to the same measures of effectiveness. The major question for the principal is the extent to which he will monitor the agent. The decision centers on the degree of intrusiveness that is acceptable to both sides in the process of monitoring. Feaver suggests that it depends on the cost: The higher the cost, the less intrusive the monitoring is likely to be. The agent’s incentives are affected by the likelihood that his shirking will be detected by the principal and that he will then be punished for it: the less intrusive the

Russian Civil-Military Relations in Transition



monitoring, the less likely it is that the agent’s shirking will be detected. Feaver acknowledges the unsuitability of the term “shirking” when describing the action of the military agent when it pursues its own preferences rather than those of the civilian principal. The phenomenon is no less harmful in the military than it is among civilians. The most obvious form of military shirking is disobedience, but it also includes foot-dragging, leaks to the press, or pleas to the Congress, all designed to undercut civilian policy or individual policy makers. 

In this book, civilian control is measured by tracing national security policy and military doctrine. Actual performance, force structure, budgets, and personnel policies are dependent upon military doctrine. The question of how national security strategy evolves into policy and doctrine is thus measured against actual performance. Several different versions of national security policy and military doctrine were developed and implemented in Russia during the 1990s. In some cases, a number of different drafts were exchanged between civilian authorities (such as between members of the Duma Defense Committee and senior military officers) in an effort to “negotiate” requirements, roles and responsibilities. Several iterations among these drafts (in fact, most) were vague and unclear about military roles and responsibilities. What had been Yeltsin’s problems eventually became opportunities for Putin’s solutions as these documents transformed the civil-military relations dynamic. Taken as evidence of civilian monitoring, doctrine establishes the norms of military behavior by addressing requirements and expectations, in terms of operational performance in battle, or in force structure, budgets, and personnel policies. Poor military performance in the first war in Chechnya during a period that was defined by vague and non-specific military doctrine, for example, supports a conclusion that the military was shirking under circumstances of non-intrusive civilian monitoring. This book examines three cases in light of the dynamic relationship between policy and doctrine and performance, force structure, budgets, and personnel policies, outcomes that are caused by normative responses to doctrinal requirements. An example is the Kursk submarine tragedy in August 2000. In this case, policy and doctrine had already evolved considerably since the early 1990s. The documents in force at the time of the Kursk disaster much more closely related military doctrine to national security policy than previously. Still, in critical areas such as service-specific roles and responsibilities, links between force structure requirements and funding or personnel policies were all vague and sometimes even contradictory.

2  Mackuben Thomas Owens, “Supreme Command,” review of Peter Feaver’s book: Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); National Review, 14 July 2003.



Russian Civil-Military Relations

The situation for the navy was particularly acute during the period leading up to the submarine Kursk disaster. Because the 1993 military doctrine simply did not address maritime requirements, the sea service was left to define its mission by means of its own doctrine, distinct and separate from the nation’s military doctrine. This naval doctrine, entitled “World Oceans Concept” was endorsed by the Security Council and the Duma, then signed by the President in 1997. In it, the navy was charged with a requirement to be ready to defend Russia’s interests along its borders and on the “world’s oceans.” Even the new military doctrine developed in 1999 and signed into law in 2000 still did not address service specific issues. Although the navy is used in this book to examine evidence of shirking in response to civilian monitoring, it was not alone in its dilemma. In Russia during the 1990s, and into 2000-2001, the armed forces were left to figure out on their own how they might best achieve the objectives set forth in the nation’s security policy and further specified in military doctrine. Reforms under Yeltsin, and later Putin, were not sufficiently specific to redress the shortfalls that led to incidents such as the Kursk disaster. Conclusions based on these cases are, of course, highly subjective and vulnerable to speculation. However, by interpreting these cases, outcomes and conclusions help to determine the significance and potential application of newer civil-military relations theories in post-Communist contexts. Information for this book was obtained by examining documents and published accounts based on memoirs, in both English and Russian languages, and by consulting notes from interviews with people who were present as participants in these events. Sources for this research include relevant western literature offered as an extensive annotated bibliography of references dealing with civilmilitary relations. Most importantly, evidence is based upon primary materials in the Russian language, including memoirs by key figures who were present and involved in political-military affairs in Russia during the period from 1996-2001 (Korzhakov, Akhromeyev, Shaposhnikov, and Grachev, for example), military journals such as Voenaya Mysl, Morskoiy Sbornik, press articles from Krasnaya Zvyezda, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Argumenty i fakty, and Komsomolskaya Pravda, and official military documents, including published versions of doctrine, as well as some previously undisclosed drafts. Evidence regarding national security policy and military doctrine was obtained as far as possible by examining official documents in the original Russian language and in the form of English language translations verified by the author. These source documents have been appended for ease of reference. Military performance, though not always apparent, can be measured to a certain extent by military journals and by documents that are readily available in the public record. Military matters of record in support of this research were obtained in a variety of ways. First, articles in military journals published in the Russian language that were written by senior military commanders about matters related to military affairs and battle readiness have been used extensively for the three primary cases that are part of this book.

Russian Civil-Military Relations in Transition



Finally, the author’s personal and professional experiences during three years at the American Embassy in Moscow as U.S. Naval Attaché (1998-2001) offer a richly diverse and valuable resource. Interviews and discussions with Russian military and civilian authorities including General Anatoliy Kvashnin, (then) Chief of the General Staff; Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, (then) Chief of the Navy; General (retired) Makhmut Gareyev, of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and long associated with military thinking and development of doctrinal work; General Colonel Leonid Ivashov, (then) Head of the International Relations Directorate of the Ministry of Defense; General Colonel (reserves) Victor Ivanovich Yesin, (then) Chief of the Security Council Directorate of Military Structure and Organizational Development; Dr. Sergei Rogov, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute for Canada and USA Studies; Alexei Arbatov (then) Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee; and well known political-military journalists such as Alexander Golts, Pavel Felgenhauer, and others. Exploiting an opportunity to fill a void in what is known about how civilmilitary relations models work in post-Communist systems this book breaks new ground. Civilian authorities sometimes behave insincerely in their dealings with the military, enhancing themselves or their positions by virtue of gaining the upper hand. For its part, the military may have motives that are less than noble, especially in view of the perquisites that are often associated with senior military positions. In an effort to generate greater support for the military point of view, senior officers may work to undermine civilian authority by foot-dragging, or shirking their duties. While unpalatable to the military culture of professional ethos, this phenomenon, if accurate, may be critical in understanding the peculiarities of civil-military relations in post-Communist political systems. As the future unfolds Russia remains a puzzle in many ways, not least in how national security policy and military doctrine will evolve. As President Medvedev implements what may be a new and different era, it is important to consider how civil-military relations have evolved in the recent past. There is no other way to gauge transformation than by examining the basis from which it evolves.

Civil-Military Relations in Transition The Cold War ended in 1989 in Germany when the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November. Two years later the Soviet Union collapsed, and the hammer and sickle flying atop the Kremlin walls in Moscow was replaced with the tricolor of the Russian Federation on 25 December 1991. The challenges of transition from communism to democracy are truly enormous, and have been researched in the context of a number of cases in Eastern Europe and former Soviet states. These challenges would have been daunting tasks even for a robust and invigorated system. But for Russia in the 1990s, many of the obstacles to democratization were so great that there was doubt whether or not the task was achievable.



Russian Civil-Military Relations

Absent practical evidence of any of the critical institutions of government that are common to liberal democracies, Russia had neither a market-based privateproperty economy, a polity that was internally and externally sovereign, citizens’ judicial rights, nor representative government. As if this were not enough, Russia was also faced with the question of how to shape civil-military relations to secure democratic control of its vast armed forces, or, at the very least, to obtain the acquiescence of the military to democratic transition. It is essential to understand what is meant by the term “military” in the context of this book. For this research, military is taken to mean the armed forces in uniform serving in military positions. Specifically, the term military means professional military officers, in particular those in authority as three or four-star rank who interface with senior civilian officials. The position of chief of the general staff is undisputedly a military position. Occupied by a uniformed member of the armed forces, this person is recognized as the leading authority on the military side of the civil-military relations equation. The minister of defense is not a military position. Rather, it is a position that is central to the legitimate authority of civilians over the military. When this position is occupied by a uniformed member of the armed forces the result can be confusion, undermining the balance in civil-military relations. In this case, perceptions of authority can be difficult to understand. When uniformed personnel occupy positions of authority that are, or normatively should be, associated with civilians, it can be hard to tell who is calling the shots. In August 1991, the military was complicit in a coup attempt that, although ultimately unsuccessful, did briefly wrest power from legitimate authorities and place it into the hands of the coup-plotters. Yazov, as a uniformed defense minister, was complicit in the coup, while many in the military, Gromov, Lebed, Shaposhnikov, and Grachev, argued the opposite and managed to keep the “military” out of the operation. What it might take to precipitate a similar reaction in the longer term approaches to democratic transition was a question that brought civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia sharply into focus during the 1990s. There were other reasons to be less than optimistic about the prospects for securing civilian control over the military in Russia. In the Soviet era, the military was an integral component of the ruling elite. Just as communist ideology blurred the lines of distinction between the state and the individual, so it was between the soldier and the state. Under communist rule, the military’s loyalty was guaranteed by a three-fold effort: penetration of the military by the Communist Party, political education, and the provision of substantial resources to support the needs and requirements of the armed forces. Although the Communist Party no longer existed (at least not in its traditional form), its presence continued to be felt at all levels of the military for a long time. The party’s mechanisms for monitoring military loyalty took different forms and transferred to other elements, but remained influential. Political education fell away, at least in a formal sense, as an element of training, but the sources of military doctrine still showed evidence of political influence long after the training had stopped. Finally, although the massive force structures that helped to make

Russian Civil-Military Relations in Transition



the Soviet Union a superpower had begun to diminish and decay long before the demise of the Soviet State, the military still possessed considerable infrastructure and means to implement national security strategy. In the broader context of political, economic and social transition, the challenges of reforming civilian relations with the military had to be conducted against a backdrop of both domestic and international instability. Anxiety about possible military intervention in domestic politics, ostensibly to “protect the achievements of socialism,” “maintain domestic order,” “secure national interests,” or to defend the military’s own interests (institutional or economic) was based on very reasonable assumptions about how the military might react to efforts aimed at asserting civilian control. Civil-military relations thus became one measure of Russia’s commitment to democratization. During communist times, civil-military relations were marked by civilian efforts to ensure military loyalty to the system’s values and institutions. As was the case for every branch of the state, the military was entirely subordinate to communist control. There was a framework of duality. Since all senior officers (and, almost all junior officers) were party members, subordination to the party was implicit in subordination to military leaders’ authority. Thus, even though communism had collapsed, the civil-military relations dynamic was not as easily transposed. One problem was the anarchic political environment that defined much of the decade—especially in the early years. In communist systems, in return for subservience and loyalty, the military was given a substantial amount of independence in the area of defining defense policy and military doctrine. In transition to democracy, the military in Russia needed to redefine itself in a number of ways. Military doctrine had to be rewritten, taking into account a new national security strategy based on new and different national interests as well as perceived threats to those interests.

Conditions in the Nascent Russian State After the December 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation became its largest successor state, inheriting its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, as well as the bulk of its foreign assets and debt. Boris Yeltsin was elected President of Russia by popular vote in June 1991. By the fall of 1993, politics in Russia reached a stalemate between President Yeltsin and the parliament. The parliament had succeeded in blocking, overturning, or ignoring the President’s initiatives on drafting a new constitution, conducting new elections, and making further progress on democratic and economic reforms. In a dramatic speech in September 1993, President Yeltsin dissolved the Russian parliament and called for new national elections and a new constitution. The standoff between the executive branch and opponents in the legislature turned violent in October after supporters of the parliament tried to instigate an armed insurrection. Yeltsin ordered the army to respond with force to capture



Russian Civil-Military Relations

the parliament building (known as the White House). In December 1993, voters elected a new parliament and approved a new constitution that had been drafted by the Yeltsin government. Yeltsin remained the dominant political figure, although a broad array of parties, including ultra-nationalists, liberals, agrarians, and communists, gained substantial representation in the parliament and competed actively in elections at all levels of government. Conditions in the military were very poor in the decade of the 1990s, especially at the outset and during the early stages of transition, when the economy was particularly weak and resource allocation was ill-defined. The defense budget declined by about 40 percent from 1989 to 1994. The standard of living for military personnel fell at a staggering rate. Research estimates indicate that in 1992, the standard of living was only about 25 percent of what it was in 1986, a troubling development for senior offices and others accustomed to the perks and privileges of the past. There was a particularly acute housing shortage, exacerbated by the repatriation of personnel from Russian military bases in newly independent states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Even worse, a system of hazing called дедовщина (dedovshchina) plagued the enlisted ranks so badly that suicide rates began to rise dramatically. These conditions bred bad morale and eventually led to widespread corruption, especially in the most senior ranks. Accordingly, concerns about the military’s propensity for adventurous mischief supported all the more efforts aimed at proceeding with haste toward reforms and new military doctrine based on a more relevant and realistic national security policy. The earliest part of the decade was characterized by a state of near political anarchy. Because it took several years to move away from split division of authority between the executive and the legislative branches, the military, like all other elements of government, suffered from indecision and stagnation. The test came in October 1993 when civilian control called upon the military to “restore order.” But which civilian controllers were really in charge was a question that was not easily answered. The Vice President, Alexander Rutskoi, occupied the White House on behalf of hard-liners who wanted to oust Yeltsin from power. Despite appeals for military forces to come to the aid of the “opposition,” the military remained loyal to the president, and eventually attacked the White House, ousting the rebels forthwith.

National Security Policy and Doctrine Boris Yeltsin’s presidential power rested on a system of duality. Termed ‘dvoyevlasti’ in Russian, meaning dual powers, political power was conflicted until after 1993 when Yeltsin successfully pushed through the first post-communist constitution investing most of the power into the presidency. Once ratified, Russia’s new   John P. Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian Military Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 2.

Russian Civil-Military Relations in Transition



constitution codified military subordination to civilian control—at least on paper. Yeltsin seized the opportunity to push through a new constitution (the old one was inherited from Soviet rule). One key element of this effort was development and implementation of a new military doctrine. The new doctrine was intended to be the basis for all of the elements that would define Russia’s armed forces for the future. This book examines Russia’s military doctrine in an effort to clarify the national interests, perceived threats, priorities, ends, ways, and means that formed Russian national security strategy in the 1990s.

Chechnya I In late 1994, the Russian security forces launched a brutal operation in the Republic of Chechnya against rebels who were intent on separation from Russia. Along with their opponents, Russian forces committed numerous violations of human rights. The Russian Army used heavy weapons against civilians. Tens of thousands of them were killed and more than 500,000 displaced during the course of the war. The protracted conflict, which received close scrutiny in the Russian media, raised serious human rights and humanitarian concerns abroad as well as within Russia. Conditions in the Russian Army were no better off than at the beginning of the decade, in fact, they were even worse. Troops were no longer equipped with reasonable supplies to carry out even the most rudimentary of missions. Senior officers slid deeper into corrupt behavior, trying to maintain the relatively high quality of life to which they had become accustomed in Soviet times. By the time the first war in Chechnya broke out in earnest, the Russian Army was in no shape to fight, much less to win. The battleground in Chechnya became rife with opportunities for the worst afflictions that plagued the military to work their will at an unprecedented pace. Still chafing at its poor performance in Afghanistan, the army failed again, setting the stage for further decline. When Boris Yeltsin ran for re-election in 1996, he turned to the Minister of Defense, General Pavel Grachev (not so affectionately known as “Pasha Mercedes” among the soldiers’ ranks) for help. Grachev probably expected some kind of worthwhile recompense for his efforts (which were of questionable significance), but Yeltsin surprised him when he was summarily dismissed as soon as Yeltsin won the election in a summer runoff. After this, Yeltsin took some pressure off the military when he enlisted the aid of Alexander Lebed, a recently retired senior Army General with solid credentials and a good reputation in the military, in brokering a peace deal in Chechnya. In return for special autonomy, short of independence, Chechen rebels agreed to stop fighting for a period of several years if certain conditions could be met.

 See Appendix A for full document.

10

Russian Civil-Military Relations

After numerous unsuccessful attempts to institute a cease-fire, in August 1996 the two sides negotiated a settlement that resulted in withdrawal of Russian troops and an agreement to hold elections in January 1997. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) played a major role in facilitating the negotiation. A peace treaty was concluded in May 1997.

Economic Context Already on shaky ground, the Russian economy crashed in August 1998 when the government defaulted on its central bank bonds (GKO). This led to severe restrictions in every branch of government. In the armed forces, conditions that were already strapped became even more desperate. Officers and men were not paid the salaries owed to them. Naval officers in Vladivostok took second jobs as taxi drivers at the airport. Ships and planes ran out of gas. Pilots were only able to fly a very small fraction (less than 10 percent) of the training flights routinely required to maintain even the most basic minimum skills proficiency. Military bases failed to pay their utility bills to host city civilian governments. In Petropavlovsk nuclear submarines managed to provide electricity to the navy base by hooking up the power grid to the submarines’ nuclear-steam powered generators. With pride and professional behavior shattered, morale hit new lows. The sight of military personnel panhandling in the streets became common. Sailors in Kaliningrad planted vegetable gardens alongside piers to grow their own food. Western intelligence agencies began to query their stations at embassies in Russia asking whether a military coup was imminent. But a coup did not happen.

Kosovo: Pristina Airport Despite assurances that NATO would not exploit Russia’s vulnerability, in March 1999 NATO military forces intervened in Kosovo. This action was perceived in Russia as directly consistent with a new and more aggressive NATO policy of expansion and extra territorial adventurism. During five consecutive days in the last week of March, Russian demonstrators took to the streets of Moscow to show their anger and frustration. On 27 March, more than 5,000 people assembled outside the American Embassy. Chants were led by Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Late that same afternoon there was an attempted attack on the “old” embassy building (Sadovoye Koltso) by two men using rocket propelled grenades. It certainly looked like Yeltsin was losing control. In truth this was not an indication of control at all, at least not in terms of military forces. Not until several weeks later, when a young army conscript scaled the embassy walls and hot-wired the Ambassador’s official car, did the military get involved. This incident was an anomaly, of course, and the Russian military remained subservient, even if they did not comply with the full intent of civilian direction and control. Senior officers

Russian Civil-Military Relations in Transition

11

held press conferences calling on the Yeltsin administration to take immediate steps of counter-force in response to NATO’s actions in the Balkans.

Chechnya II By the end of 1999, when Yeltsin was ready to concede the presidency and step down in favor of his hand-picked successor, Vladimir Putin, there was a new war in Chechnya. The war began under uncertain circumstances. Despite assurances from the government that long term peace with separatist forces could be maintained by building upon the peace deal brokered by Alexander Lebed in 1996, rebel incursions into neighboring Dagestan set off new fighting. It is not clear on whose initiative, the government’s or the military’s, the decision to react to the Dagestan incursion by going to war (again) was reached. Still, once the fighting was on, the situation quickly became even worse than it was when Lebed negotiated an end to hostilities two years earlier. Following an August 1999 attack into Dagestan by Chechen separatists and the September 1999 bombings of two apartment buildings in Moscow, the federal government launched a military campaign into Chechnya. Russian authorities accused the Chechen government of failing to stop the growth of rebel activities and curb the widespread banditry and hostage taking in the republic. By spring 2000, federal forces claimed control over Chechen territory, but fighting continues even today, as rebel fighters regularly ambush Russian forces in the region. Now, Russia has established a claim that there are links between Chechen separatists (Russians have consistently referred to them as terrorists or “bandits”) and foreign terrorist organizations.

Kursk By the summer of 2000, Russia’s armed forces were arguing among themselves for bigger shares of the meager defense budget. Earlier that year, in March during the run-up to the presidential election, President Putin took a ride in an Air Force fighter jet to demonstrate his resolve and military awareness. Later, Chief of the Navy, Admiral Kuroyedov, encouraged Putin to enjoy his affinity for the Navy by appearing publicly in a number of navy oriented photo opportunities. Shortly  A nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine of the Project 949A (NATO codename OSCAR-II), K-141 Kursk was designed by Rubin Central Design Bureau, principal designers I.L. Baranov and Igor Spasskiy. The submarine’s keel was laid down in 1992 at Sevmashpredpriyatiye (Severodvinsk); it was launched in 1994 and commissioned in 1995. Assigned to 7th SSGN Division of 1st Submarine Flotilla of the Northern Fleet, the submarine’s homeport was at the Vidiayevo settlement in Ura Guba on the Kola Peninsula near Murmansk.

12

Russian Civil-Military Relations

afterward Putin was photographed wearing part of a navy uniform (a sailor’s shirt and hat) while posing in the conning tower of a submarine at sea. Barely a month later, a terrible disaster befell a similar submarine. On 12 August 2000, shortly before mid-day, the Russian nuclear submarine missile cruiser Kursk sank in the Barents Sea at depth of only 54 fathoms, about 324 feet, (more shallow than the submarine was long) during a tactical exercise. The Kursk was armed with 24 supersonic cruise missiles called “Granit,” and twice as many torpedoes (all were armed only with conventional warheads). This submarine became the grave for 118 men, including their commander, Captain Gennadiy Lyachin—one of the best in Russia’s submarine fleet. The events happened so quickly that rescue proved impossible. Putin (having won election in March to a four-year term as president) was on vacation at a sunny resort on the Black Sea—far south of the icy Barents Sea where the Kursk lay dieing. When notified of the disaster, Putin did not return to work, nor did he appear in public at all, for several days. By the time he did return to Moscow, the story was already being interpreted by military officers eager to avoid looking bad. Admiral Kuroyedov blamed the incident on cold war tactics by Western submarines in the operations area to observe the exercise. Specifically, he said two U.S. submarines (Memphis and Toledo) and one British submarine (Splendid) “probably” caused the accident by colliding with the Kursk while conducting underwater operations. The subsequent investigation was conducted by a civilian official (Ilya Klebanov) at the Ministry of Defense. Over the next year, the incident and its investigation offer a particularly interesting and useful window into civil-military relations in Russia. Hearings were held at the State Duma and testimony revealed that Navy leaders had failed to comply with a number of key decisions directed by civilians, not only before the event, but also after the fact. The Russian Navy covered up its poor performance by lying and by deflecting blame. The full report on the Kursk disaster was released almost two years later in July 2002. There was much to say about material failures and mistakes made by many in the military’s most senior leadership ranks. Still, accountability was limited and the officers who blamed others were never disciplined. The civil-military relationship in Russia began to change dramatically shortly after the Kursk tragedy. By early 2001, there were increasing signs that Putin was ready to implement significant reforms in the military force structure, beginning  ��� On 4�� December ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2000, at an annual briefing for foreign naval attachés accredited to Russia, Admiral Kuroyedov shouted accusations at Captain Robert Brannon (the author of this book), representing the United States, to the effect that American submarines and their reckless spying had been responsible for the accident. Kuroyedov called on America and her allies to lead the way in introducing safety measures that would prevent the possibility of recurrence. The Admiral challenged Brannon to openly declare the location of operating areas for all submarines, a policy that is antithetical to submarine operations and incompatible with their missions.

Russian Civil-Military Relations in Transition

13

with the way in which it would be supervised. In March 2001, Putin sacked Marshal of the Russian Federation Igor Sergeyev as Defense Minister, appointing his former KGB colleague Sergei Ivanov as Russia’s first civilian charged with controlling the military. By the time 11 September 2001 had changed the way America looked at security from a primarily terrorist oriented threat, Russia was more than ready to exploit the international security environment along similar lines. Finally, as record high prices for oil on world markets afforded the Russian Federation unprecedented opportunities for economic renewal, commensurate opportunities emerged for policy and doctrine formulation as it related to military performance, force structure, and personnel policies.

 Sergei Ivanov had replaced Vladimir Putin as Secretary of the Security Council in November 1999, following Putin’s elevation to Prime Minister.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 2

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

For only the third time since the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia soon may have a new military doctrine. This document will once again attempt to clarify the military’s roles and missions, much as military doctrine in other states. But it will likely also do much more than that—it will set forth the circumstances under which the military instrument of Russia’s power and influence could be called upon to exert force. Traditionally, in many other parts of the world, military doctrine does not attempt to address the uppermost reaches of the national security strategy paradigm: world view, national interests and threats, primarily in the area of linking ends, ways, and means. Instead, it devotes itself to orienting military capabilities with national resources in support of political objectives. Because military doctrine in Russia derives in part from its Soviet past, at least in form, if not in substance, it represents more than just a road map of how to fight the nation’s wars. Russian military doctrine also specifies threats to national interests. In this case, the United States, NATO, and international terrorism are purportedly indicated by name, precisely in that order. According to an exclusive interview last September, published in the Russian language newspaper Gazeta, Sergei Ivanov, then Minister of Defense, gave details of the new document to journalists, calling it “more than just doctrine.” In fact, it may be more than the previous two iterations of doctrine in several key areas. Under the new plan, the defense minister will reportedly be elevated in importance by making that person commander-in-chief of the armed forces, placing the position second only to the president in security-related decision making. Against this background of politics and power, the military’s influence in the security sphere is a central and enduring issue. The debate over a new military doctrine may reveal as much about politics as it does the military. Besides military   The current military doctrine was first published in late 1999, subsequently ratified by the Duma, and signed by President Putin on 21 April 2000. It is only the second such document in post-Soviet Russian history, the first having entered into force in 1993. In October 2003 the Ministry of Defense released what has been called the Ivanov Doctrine, after Sergei Ivanov who was Defense Minister at the time. More accurately described as a defense white paper, this document never gained the legitimacy of doctrine. Accordingly, this author views the current initiative as potentially Russia’s third post-Soviet military doctrine as opposed to its fourth.   Gazeta (19 September, 2006).

16

Russian Civil-Military Relations

response options, it will probably also specify how (and more importantly, to whom) the armed forces will be subordinated to civilian control. Put another way, who will call the shots? Although there has yet been no draft published, several excerpts purported to be from the new document have been carried in the press. Significant features in the new version may address foreign threats, specifically identifying the United States and NATO, as well as “international terrorism.” Another difference lies in how nuclear weapons might be used. In previous iterations of national security policy and military doctrine, Russia has already managed to link its notion of defense to its perceptions of foreign aggression. President of the Academy of Military Sciences General of the Army Makhmut Gareyev has said Russia needs a new military doctrine because “there have been substantial changes in the direction and content of trends in the development of the geopolitical and military-political situation and in the nature of threats to the state’s defense security. Missions facing the armed forces and other troops have been updated today. The state management system, the level of the country’s socio-economic development, and its demographic potential have changed.” This author met and interviewed Gareyev in Moscow about the newly endorsed military doctrine that was rolled out in early 2000. Challenged to defend the rationale behind citing threats to Russia’s national security from NATO and deriving from that alliance’s enlargement, Gareyev said that although specific security threats had not yet emerged, they surely would do so, and probably over the next 5-10 years. Seven years after Gareyev made that remark, at an international security conference speech in Munich in February 2007, Putin used very strong rhetoric in denouncing what he called U.S. aggression. Russian press reports in March 2007 removed previous linkage between the requirement to train and equip the armed forces with the state of the nation’s economic resources, calling instead for unlimited support for military transformation. In response to United States’ announcement about its intent work with Poland and the Czech Republic to place parts of a missile defense system on their  Ibid.   Moscow Strana.ru 19 January 2007; reported in Open Source Center CEP20070119330001 “Russia: Military Sciences Academy to Hold Conference on New Military Doctrine.”  Author’s notes from interview with Makhmut Gareyev at the Embassy of Poland in Moscow, February 2000.  Victor Yasmann “Russia: Reviving the Army, Revising Military Doctrine”, 12 March 2007, (RFE/RL) Ivanov said he preferred not to use the term military “reform,” saying this word has an allergic reaction in Russia, opting instead to use the word “modernization.” Ivanov’s shopping list for new military hardware included new missiles, long range aviation bombers, tanks, submarines, and aircraft carriers, among other things.  The new system would expand on existing U.S. capabilities by installing 10 new anti-missile interceptors in Poland and a new radar system in Czech Republic. Although

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

17

territory, President Vladimir Putin had this to say in response to what he might do to retaliate: “We have to ensure our security … Of course, we must have new targets in Europe.” Putin later added in remarks to reporters that these new targets might include U.S. bases in Bulgaria and Romania as well as the proposed new missile defense facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia has since “suspended” observing the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, anticipating withdrawal on 12 December 2007. The relatively dormant Russian Air Force has resumed flights by its aging long range strategic aviation bomber aircraft into international airspace uncomfortably close to its former Cold War adversaries. Despite the fact that these flights are being conducted with aging aircraft that may be unsafe to fly, the operations have generated a great deal of press about Russian strategic interests. Against this backdrop, a looming debate over national security strategy and military doctrine takes on greater significance. There is a long history of strong rhetoric in security discussions in Russia. The military has in the past made strong statements that were later softened or even refuted by civilians in authority. In that light, Putin’s comments threatening to retaliate against U.S. missile defense plans by targeting Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as other sites in Europe, should not be taken to mean the Russian government is fully prepared to actually implement such plans. What it may mean, however, is that Russia is prepared to defend its national interests militarily in more specifically articulate ways. Those interests include security inside a “near abroad” sphere of influence that apparently still includes Central and Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Legacy in Security Strategy and Military Thought Citing Chief of the General Staff General Sokolovskii in 1962, Zoltan Barany has written in his new book about the Russian military that Soviet military doctrine often looked like strategy.10 According to Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov in 1977, military doctrine is “a system of views adopted in a state for a given period of time on the objectives and character of a possible war, on preparation of the country and the armed forces for war, and on the methods for

Russia perceives the augmentation in threatening terms, it would have no capability to threaten Russia’s deterrent forces because missiles launched from Russia would be far too close to the interceptors to be engaged in anything other than a tail chase—a scenario that even the most optimistic analysts of missile defense have called highly likely to fail.   Moscow ITAR-TASS 4 June 2007.   Toronto Globe and Mail, 4 June 2007. 10  Zoltan Barany, Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 46, citing V.D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963), originally published as Voyenaya Strategiya (Moscow: Voyenoye Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1962).

18

Russian Civil-Military Relations

waging the war.” If that sounds like a perfectly representative definition, read on. Ogarkov’s definition adds: Military doctrine usually determines the enemy who will have to be fought in a possible war; the character and objectives of a war in which a state and its armed forces will have to participate, and their missions; what armed forces are needed for successful conduct of a war and the directions in their development; procedures for preparing the country for war; and methods for waging war.11

Further examination of Soviet sources reveals several interesting aspects of Soviet military science, some still in play in contemporary Russian military thinking. In the Soviet Union, the basic provisions of military doctrine were determined by the “social-political and economic system, level of production, status of the means for waging war, and the geographic position of one’s own and the probably enemy’s country.” These provisions were said to derive “from a state’s domestic and foreign policies.”12 It may also be insightful to recall that of the two primary facets of Soviet military doctrine: political and military-technical, identified in Ogarkov’s work, the leading role is played, not surprisingly, by political objectives. While this might seem at the outset to be a perfectly logical extension of traditional civilmilitary relations, in the Soviet Union it was much more than that. Soviets used a hierarchy of terms when thinking about what policies might best guarantee the security of the state. This hierarchy might be summarized in terms of (1) military policy, (2) military doctrine, (3) military art and science, and (4) military strategy (including operations and tactics). Military policy was the responsibility of the Communist Party leadership (First Secretary and Politburo) and the state government (Prime Minister, President, and Supreme Soviet), providing the necessary context for developing the next stage of the hierarchy. The relationship is two-way and mutually reinforcing. In 1988, Red Army Colonel A.P. Dmitriev wrote in an article for Voyenaya Mysl (Military Thought): The more that military doctrine is based on the conclusions of military science, the more fully it responds to real conditions and posited requirements. Conversely, the less that the principles and recommendations of military science are used in military doctrine, the more often are encountered manifestations of

11  Soviet Military Encyclopedia, abridged English language edition, Volume 2, edited and translated by William C. Green and W. Robert Reeves (Westview, CT: Westview Press), 199. Original Russian language source document published in Moscow, 1977, edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov. Both references were consulted by the author for this book. 12 Ibid.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

19

subjectivism, departures from the requirements of reality, and the pursuit of fleeting advantages.13

Soviet military doctrine had two distinctly separate parts, including social-political and military-technical, and served as the precursor for military art (as informed by military science), which in turn became the necessary foundation for military strategy, operations, and tactics. (1)  Military policy was the highest term in the development of military thought. Representing the views of the state’s supreme leaders (the CPSU), military policy was the utmost expression of Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and peace, the realm of state security, the nation’s highest priority. Recalling Marshal of the Soviet Union Ogarkov, The military policy of states is made concrete in its military doctrine, in its military strategy, and in the practice of military development. The Communist Part of the Soviet Union’s military policy is to be integrally connected with the development of the economy, as well as with the internal and external policies of the state.14

Thus, the aims and objectives articulated by military policy drove all other factors in the hierarchy. (2) The basic provisions of military doctrine, deriving from the state’s domestic and foreign policies were to be determined by the social-political and economic system, level of production, status of the means for waging war, and the relative geographic positions of enemy states to the Soviet Union. Military doctrine distinguished two closely related and mutually dependent aspects: socialpolitical, and military-technical, with the leading role played by the former. The political aspect considered matters concerning the political objectives and character of a war, and their effect on the development of the armed forces and the country’s preparation for war. The military-technical aspect, in conformity with the political provisions, included matters concerning methods of waging war, military development, the technical outfitting of the armed forces, and keeping the armed forces combat ready. Doctrine determines the objectives and character of a possible war, preparation of the country and armed forces for waging war, and on methods of waging the war. Military doctrine thus determined the enemy who

13 A.P. Dmitriev, “Socialist Military Science in the System of Theoretical Learning,” Military Thought, 1988, no. 9 (September): 71, quoted in Kent D. Lee, Implementing Defensive Doctrine: The Role of Soviet Military Science, edited by Willard C. Frank and Phillip S. Gillette, Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991 (Westport CT and London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 271. 14 Ogarkov, Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 220.

20

Russian Civil-Military Relations

would have to be fought, and the missions of the armed forces that would do the fighting.15 (3)  Military art is military theory. It was the essence of military thinking in terms of the hierarchy of Soviet terminology. In Clausewitzian terms, we might consider it representative of the nature of war as it relates directly to the conduct of war. The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defined military art as the “theory and practice of preparing for and conducting military operations on land, at sea, and in the air.” In the context of this hierarchy, military art derives from military science.16 Whereas the definition of science was more intellectual: Military science is the system of knowledge dealing with the nature and laws of war, the preparation of the armed forces and the country for war, and the methods for waging war. Military science studies war as a complex sociopolitical phenomenon, whose data are used in developing military doctrine.17

(4)  Military strategy derived from and was subordinate to state military policy. In Soviet terms, strategy was the highest realm of military art, encompassing the theory and practice of preparing the armed forces for war, the planning and conduct of war and strategic operations, the utilization of the services of the armed forces, and their leadership. Strategy was the place where everything in the hierarchy of terms came together. Ogarkov said “strategy influences the development of operational art and tactics in a decisive way.”18 Operational art addresses the problems of preparing and conducting joint or independent operations (or combat actions) by (armed forces) at three levels, including operational-strategic, operational, and operational-tactical. Tactics addresses the theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat by subunits, units, and formations. David Glantz has described strategy, operational art, and tactics as distinct levels of war differentiated from one another by aims and objectives rather than by size of force.19 Western thinking places size of force at the top of the list in determining the level of war. In Soviet military thought, it is possible for a small force to have strategic importance and opportunity to shape and influence the outcome of wars. This view derives from Marxism-Leninism and has its basis in the revolutionary origins of the Soviet state.

15 Ibid., 199. 16 Ibid., 168. In Ograkov’s view, “the theory of military art was a branch of military science.” 17 Ibid., 242. 18 Ibid., 168. 19  David Glantz, Developing Offensive Success: The Soviet Conduct of Operational Maneuver, and Soviet Military Strategy: Context and Prospects (with Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.), in Willard C. Frank and Phillip S. Gillette (eds), Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991 (Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 133-174, and 325-342.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

21

Ideologically defensive in nature but offensive in practice, Soviet military thinking thus finds itself in the midst of conflicting orientation even in its own context. Perhaps the most significant departure of the military’s view from that of its political masters can be found in its offensive posture response to the Kremlin’s more defensive orientation. Because any military leader knows that wars are not won defensively, Soviet generals were not unlike their Western counterparts in that regard. Still, it is interesting, and perhaps prescient, to think that even in the Soviet era, regardless of the state’s view of the world, military thinking could be so far out in front of its civilian leadership. One example of this dichotomy lies in the policy on first use of nuclear weapons. Despite Gorbachev’s claims that his state might be willing to negotiate complete nuclear disarmament, military leaders at the time knew that this was absolutely out of the question. Still, Soviet military doctrine went far beyond anything comparable in the West. Relating military missions to preparing the population for war, mobilizing the industrial sector in support of strategic aims, and identifying specific threats to state interests are objectives that are simply not found in military doctrine anywhere else. It only makes sense when one considers its ideological background. Barany describes it this way: “In essence, the USSR’s military doctrine supported the basic tenets of its grand strategy, which is to say, the expansion of Communist influence beyond the Soviet Union’s borders in order to accelerate, as MarxistLeninist theory posited, the inevitable collapse of imperialism.”20 While the world has certainly changed significantly since the Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991, military thinking still bears some resemblance.

Strategy in Transition Russia’s world view changed dramatically during the 1990s. From Soviet views at the beginning of the decade (already changing because of Gorbachev’s so-called “new thinking”21), through a phase that could be described as Euro-Atlanticism, toward what could be described as a kind of neo-Eurasianist realpolitik by the end of the decade.22 Beginning with how a state sees the world, whether or not it perceives that power or people are at the forefront in making important decisions, national security strategy is the process of identifying threats to state security and devising plans to mitigate those threats. The process identifies national interests before addressing anything else. In the security dimension, national interests are usually those that define the parameters of survival: state sovereignty, individual security, and defensibility of borders. Threats to state security may derive from 20  Barany, 48. 21  Robert D. English, Russia and its View of the West (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2000), passim. 22  Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001), 13-34.

22

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Figure 2.1  National Security Strategy Framework

internal or external sources, and should link directly to the interests that are threatened. Finally, national security strategy incorporates ends (goals and objectives), means (instruments), and ways (methods) as efficiently as possible in an effort to maximize resources and optimize results. Strategic means include political, information, military, and economic instruments. Because resources are almost never unlimited, priorities are established. The strategic environment, or context, considers what is available, at what cost. It should address risks, opportunities, and potential consequences. The end result is a kind of interactive strategic framework that is constantly in flux because its elements and the environment in which it operates change. National security policy derives from this strategic security framework, and is focused primarily on the last three elements: ends, ways, and means (see Figure 2.1 above). Traditionally, military doctrine addresses how the military will execute its mission of state security, offensively or defensively. Barry Posen identified two important questions that should be addressed: What means shall be employed, and how shall they be employed?23 Priorities address the various types of military forces available. A set of prescriptions specify how military forces should be structured and employed to respond to recognized threats and opportunities. Ideally, modes of cooperation between different types of forces should be specified. Posen was talking about how militaries might be designed and structured (or redesigned, restructured) in the face of a state’s security requirements.

23  Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

23

Military force may be acquired and maintained for three purposes: to defend, to strike, or to deter. Based on a presumption of threats to state security, military force may be created or postured accordingly. Finally, military force may be described as innovative or stagnant. If military means become disconnected from political ends, the result can be disastrous. Posen describes innovation as a state of change, or, to use current terms, transformation, whereas stagnation implies a state of rigidity, or stability at the expense of change.24 It was in this axis of integration-innovation-stagnation, that Russia was embroiled in the 1990s, as the country struggled with transition from communism to democracy. Posen’s analysis emphasizes the relationship between politics and the military. The puzzle surrounding how the military secures the state without becoming an authority unto itself lies at the center of this debate. But it is interesting that Posen highlights the importance of military doctrine and its potential to impact on the “quality of life in the international political system” of the state. Of course he was right. Military doctrine does impact on the political system that is its host. It can also be conversely said that political systems influence military doctrine. Military reforms and the state of democracy in Russia have been closely intertwined since the fall of communism. In the early years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (1991-1993) there was concern that state security was particularly vulnerable to threats from the outside because aggressors might choose to take advantage of Russia’s apparent weakness and confusion to exploit political ends by military means. The question of how to reform the military sufficiently to fix its subservience firmly under civilian control while maintaining the strength and credibility of its essential fighting forces is central to this issue. Significant reforms had to be undertaken if fatal stagnation, or even worse, insurrection, was to be avoided. In Russia, efforts to redesign national security policy and military doctrine included plans to reform the armed forces. Although these reforms were, for the most part, never successful, they still formed key aspects of the doctrinal development process. Efforts to reform the military in Russia also suggest important insights into the central dynamics of civil-military relations in transition from communism. Shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed, Dale Herspring examined the critical role played by military doctrine in the context of national security. In his book on civil-military relations in near-term post-communist Russia, Herspring argued that doctrine “lays the groundwork for topics such as force structure, weapons 24 Ibid. Posen’s assumptions about military doctrine in the context of national security policy include the following assessment: Grand strategy is a chain of political and military ends and means. Military doctrine is a key component of grand strategy. Military doctrines are important because they affect the quality of life in the international political system and the security of the estates that hold them. Military doctrines may stress different military operations: offensive, defensive, or deterrent. Military doctrines may or may not be integrated with the political objectives of grand strategy. They may be innovative or stagnant.

24

Russian Civil-Military Relations

acquisition, and personnel policies. Decisions in this area influence heavily actions in other areas. An offensive doctrine requires one type of force structure, a defensive one another.”25 Herspring goes on to emphasize the importance of offensive and defensive points of view in the context of national security policy. A military doctrine that aims to train and equip a force to conduct operations beyond borders, operations that seek to destroy an enemy force, perhaps even before it strikes, is offensive in nature. It is easy to perceive the relationship between doctrine and force structure when it is explained in this way. Defensive doctrine, on the other hand, aims to hold what presently exists. Wars of attrition are fought largely on defensive terms, holding ground until an enemy force is depleted and no longer capable of fighting. This kind of strategy requires a depth of defense that is reinforced deep into the heartland, affording layers of capability designed to hang on no matter how much ground is lost to enemy actions. The idea behind defensive doctrine is to outlast and attack until the offending enemy has suffered more than the defending homeland. Again, the relationship between this kind of doctrine and required force structure is implicit. Herspring suggests that defensive doctrine is inherently more affordable, and thus should be the doctrine of choice in times of economic scarcity. But old habits die hard in the realm of military doctrine. In Russia during the decade of the 1990s, the military was very reluctant to let go of what had been its much more powerful status under the USSR. Even though Soviet doctrine was aimed at defense, eschewing offense as something that communism did not need, the military was trained and equipped to fight offensive wars by means of overwhelming force structure and well-trained personnel. This doctrine was funded with adequate resources, even at the expense of other needs of the state. This condition led to an attitude of denial in the early stages of postcommunism, an attitude that persisted throughout the decade. The military was not willing to reduce its bloated force structure to match the nation’s reduced economic conditions. Such a move would have required a shift in thinking from offensive capability associated with a superpower, to a more defensive posture, a leaner and meaner force along the lines of Britain. This shift in thinking did not happen until the end of the decade, and even then, it was sufficiently vague as to encourage misinterpretations at many levels in the national security process. The relationship between doctrine and force structure, personnel, and performance has been clearly established, but the evidence suggests that the military may have elected to go its own way, despite civilian direction. Before examining the evidence, it is useful to consider the underlying guidance. With military performance as the ultimate measure of effectiveness for any armed force, other factors also bear on its efficiency and success. Infrastructure, organization, personnel management, and training all determine how a military is formed and how it will do its job. In each of these categories, the challenges to reform 25  Dale R. Herspring, Russian Civil-Military Relations (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), xx.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

25

in Russia were exceptional, often unique, and almost always insurmountable. To the extent that military doctrine and national security policy shape the nature of civil-military relations in Russia, the process warrants examination in some detail. Understanding how Russia perceives threats to its security illuminates the process by bringing the various aspects of Russian national security strategy sharply into focus.

Russia’s World View Russia sees the rest of the world in threatening terms. There are various reasons for this, most deriving from historical experience. Since the time of Peter the Great Russia has eyed Europe with some measure of envy, at once an ally and an enemy. Throughout history, Russia’s alliances have often ended up being something else. In my experience, I often found a consistent thread in the arguments of government officials in Moscow about Russia’s international relations, that bi-lateral relations are easier to maintain than relations with multi-lateral organizations, especially large entities such as NATO and the European Union. Dmitri Trenin has described his country as a paradox: “Its geopolitical omnipresence goes hand in hand with a profound political solitude.”26 Despite its efforts to be “European,” to be a member of Europe’s various “clubs,” more often than not Russia perceives itself to be outside the mainstream of international politics, especially with the West. Initial close cooperation with the West early in the 1990s gave way to mistrust and confrontation. Instability in several former Soviet republics caused alarm among security professionals. Many believed that future threats to Russian security would derive mainly from its southern boundaries. Other causes for insecurity stemmed from NATO expansion and perceptions in Russia that NATO would eventually want to shift military forces and infrastructure into territory that had been Soviet, or countries of the former Warsaw Pact. Russia’s national security is not threatened by any immediate external threat. While its military potential is considerable, most of Russia’s armed forces are not fully operational and might not be reliable for offensive warfare. Still, they represent a formidable defensive asset. The military legacy of the USSR is in many ways still unstable. Nationalism both in Russia and the wider Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) area is a development threatening to dominate foreign relations and to further increase tension across the republics of former Soviet Union. But this should not be overstated. Territorial disputes exist with several of the states in the CIS that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, as well as with states further afield, from the Baltic to the Pacific. Uncontrolled migration both from and into Russia has been a security issue since the Soviet Union collapsed. 26  Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture,” in R. Craig Nation and Dmitri Trenin, Russian Security Strategy under Putin: U.S. and Russian Perspectives (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), 37.

26

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Terrorism presents a serious threat to Russia. Strategically, Russia has defined itself in terms of a world view that derives from a strong perception of threat. This view, or perception, has been consistent since before the Soviet Union collapsed, and continues today.

Military and Security Forces in Transition By the end of the 1990s the various branches of Russia’s armed and security forces had established their identities since the Soviet era but conflicts over mission area responsibilities and internal shake-ups continued to be a distraction. Despite efforts to dismantle Soviet era security structures, this had not happened. Instead, a complicated landscape of organizational design, resistant to change, evolved. Despite problems associated with its Soviet heritage, Russia’s security force structure remained barely adequate to the task of defending the state’s interests, both at home and abroad. Years of declines in funding and resources took their toll, however, and the decade of the 1990s saw Russia’s military forces decimated in almost every measurable category. At the time of Soviet collapse, troops numbered in the millions, aircraft, tanks, ships and submarines in the hundreds, but defense expenditures had fallen by more than 60 percent—from $130 billion to about $47 billion by the middle of the decade.27 Military performance was not positive. The war in Afghanistan ended (1989) in failure and was a stain on the Russian Army that left it demoralized and confused. With its mission closely tied to ideological and political interests, the army felt abandoned by its civilian leaders and blamed them for squandering what might have been a better outcome. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, the Russian Army had not recovered from defeat in Afghanistan. There were numerous problems, especially in the area of personnel management, attributable to that experience. Although the navy and air force each fared somewhat better, there were unmistakable signs of decay across every corner of Russia’s military and security apparatus. By the turn of the century there was little progress in defense reform and military infrastructure. In an early harbinger of the future, in 2002 Gregoriy Yavlinsky told this author he felt the threshold of reform was tied directly to the price of oil.28 Yavlinsky said if oil remained at approximately 21 dollars per barrel (as it was at that time) then Russia might be able to meet its foreign debt obligations. He offered his opinion that military reform could only be meaningfully undertaken in a fiscal climate beyond that figure. Looking back now on that comment, it is not difficult to consider the enormous possibilities of oil priced well above that figure. 27  Jane’s Defense Publications, “Executive Summary, Russia,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2003, 25 July 2003. 28 Author’s interview with Gregoriy Yavlinsky, formerly leader of the Yabloko political party and presidential candidate, at Harvard University, March 2002.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

27

Stages of Transition in Security Strategy and Military Thought Although often vague and sometimes highly theoretical, Russian military doctrine contains important indicators of policy under various scenarios. It is the statement of the military policy of the Russian government, arrived at after debate among interested parties, whose input reflects their relative political power. In Russia, military doctrine is roughly the equivalent of what might be a formal statement of the military policy of a presidential administration in the United States. The Russian definition of military doctrine is “a nation’s officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of armed forces in them, and also on the requirement arising from these views regarding the country and its armed forces being made ready for war.”29 Military doctrine answers five questions for the Russian armed forces: Who is the enemy in a probable war? What is the probable character of a war, and what will be its aims and tasks? What forces will be necessary to fulfill these tasks, and what direction will military development follow? How should preparation for war be carried out? What will be the means of warfare? Although Russian military doctrine does not set out the specific principles of war or military strategy, it is a useful insight into threat perception because it derives from national security policy. Together, national security policy and military doctrine illuminate the process of assessing Russia’s armed forces in the 1990s. Because they are so closely linked, policy and doctrine reflect the civilmilitary relationship. During the 1990s, there were debates about Russia’s new strategic environment, its interests and perceived threats. The documents that came out of these debates reflected the uncertainty and confusion that was characteristic of the period. In the beginning, policy and doctrine reflected the confusion and political chaos that defined the new Russian state. As events unfolded, military behavior demonstrated the systemic inadequacies of the time. By the end of the decade, new policy and doctrine incorporated lessons learned and reflected a more comprehensive grasp of national security strategy.

1993 Military Doctrine30 The collapse of the Soviet Union made the formulation of a new military doctrine to replace that of the Gorbachev regime an obvious necessity. However, urgent 29 V.N. Chernaven, Military Dictionary [in Russian] (Moscow: Ministry of Defense, USSR, 1990), 135. 30  “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” represents a document that was examined at sessions of the Russian Federation Security Council held on 3 and 6 October 1993. The Council approved the final document at its 2 November 1993 session, and it was adopted by presidential edict No. 1833 on the same

28

Russian Civil-Military Relations

political questions delayed the onset of deliberation on a new doctrine until May 1992. From that time, completion of the doctrine required seventeen months, much of which was filled with acrimonious debate. In November 1993, the final version was approved by the Russian Federation’s Security Council and signed by President Yeltsin as Decree Number 1833. The document included three main sections, entitled political principles, military principles, and military-technical and economic principles. The document’s introduction defined it as an interim policy covering the period of transition from the Soviet Union to the establishment of Russian statehood, continuing from the time of its adoption to 2000. From 1993 until 1996, the primary goal was to restructure and reduce the armed forces as units were withdrawn from locations outside Russia. The remaining four years would hopefully be devoted to conversion from a conscript-based armed force to a mixed (conscript and voluntary) system, together with the creation of new military infrastructure. The Russian Federation’s attitude toward armed conflicts was described in the first section of this doctrine, specifying how the armed forces and security troops were to be used. It defined what the Russian Federation perceived as military dangers, the sociopolitical principles supporting military security, and national policy for ensuring military security. The underlying goal was to maintain domestic and international political stability on the state’s borders while the Russian Federation was consolidating itself. In describing this goal, the doctrine made no reference to defending ideology, as was standard practice in all Soviet era military doctrines. Peaceful borders, especially in and among the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union, was part of the defensive strategy. The only departure from this self-interested approach was a stated willingness to participate in international peacekeeping efforts. Russian participation in the Bosnian Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1996 was justified by this clause of its military doctrine. The document contained no aspects of the international activism common to its Marxist-Leninist antecedents. Resolution of internal Russian economic, political, and social problems was to be the main order of business. The only recognized international obligations were the treaty obligations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), since 1995 known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation

day. It consists of an introduction and three sections: the political foundations, the military foundations, and the military-technical and economic foundations of the military doctrine, and conclusion. Translations are from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), currently on the internet at opensource.gov. In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original (in the Russian language) was examined for accuracy (access to documents obtained at the official Russian Ministry of Defense web site ru.mil). In a few cases, the translation quoted herein has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation. See Appendix A for full document.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

29

in Europe (OSCE); and those resulting from membership in the United Nations (UN).31 The paramount goal of this interim doctrine was simply to protect Russia from attack in the weakened condition in which it found itself in the 1990s. The principal threats to the Russian Federation were defined as wars and armed conflicts on its territory, the potential employment of weapons of mass destruction either against the state or its neighbors, the buildup of armed forces along Russian borders, or physical attacks on Russian installations or territories. The term “installations” referred to Soviet-era bases in the newly independent former Soviet republics that continued to be garrisoned by Russian troops.32 The 1993 doctrine set the primary objective for the armed forces as the prevention, early termination, and containment of military conflict through employment of peacetime standing forces. The principal areas of concern were identified as the territory and property of the Russian Federation, the areas contiguous to its borders, and the threat of nuclear attack by a foreign power.33 Military operations in Chechnya were justified under the paragraph on protection of the territory and property of the Russian Federation. Justification for a continued Russian military presence in the former Central Asian republics derived from the paragraph on protection of areas contiguous to Russian borders, as well as provisions of the CIS treaty. The military doctrine’s treatment of the military-technical and economic foundations of the armed forces (the process of providing and maintaining modern military hardware) is the aspect that showed the greatest gap between policy and reality. The document described a policy of preserving a military-industrial base capable of manufacturing modern military equipment in quantity. It also outlined a 10-15 year research, development, testing, and evaluation cycle for new weapons. In the mid-1990s, only a very fragmentary commitment to those goals was visible in Russia’s assignment of spending priorities. Defense policy on the subject of hardware acquisition was thus delayed until a future military doctrine might address the issue of technological and economic support.

31 There was no mention of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which in the 1990s was a key constraint on Russia’s deployment of military forces in certain areas such as Moldova. 32 The last Russian troops in Central Europe left Germany in August 1994. 33  The 1993 Military Doctrine enshrined Russia’s right of first use of weapons of mass destruction as a legacy of Soviet theory. This reservation was retained in response to Russia’s apparent uncertainty as to the intentions of its three neighboring states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) that were left with nuclear weapons on their territory after dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia’s dark suspicions about the nuclear intentions of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remained. Subsequently, Kazakhstan gave up its nuclear arsenal in 1995, with Ukraine and Belarus following suit in 1996.

30

Russian Civil-Military Relations

1997 National Security Concept34 Following shortly thereafter, this document was intended to orient Russian policy-makers under the new conditions of the post-Cold War period. It outlined Russian national interests, as well as the major threats to the country’s security, and established a set of domestic and foreign policy goals aimed at strengthening Russia’s statehood and geopolitical position. Citing at its very beginning lofty goals such as “reshaping the world into one that is multi-polar,” it was a political document reflecting the officially accepted views of the goals and state strategy in ensuring the security of the individual, society and the state against external and internal threats of a political, economic, social, military, technological, ecological, information and other character with account to available resources and opportunities.35 The concept was intended to be a guideline for use in developing other necessary documents such as military and economic security doctrines, and as the basis for military reform. It made an effort to clarify what armed forces Russia should have and what kinds of conflicts they should be prepared for. Russia’s capacity to influence international affairs was by that time greatly diminished. Some prerequisites had been created for demilitarization of international relations, strengthening the role of law in conflict resolution, and the danger of direct aggression against Russia had diminished. According to the concept, there were some prospects of greater integration of Russia into the world economy, including some Western economic and financial institutions. Russia shared common security interests with many states in areas such as nuclear non-proliferation, conflict resolution, combating international terrorism, and environmental problems.

34 The “Russian Federation National Security Policy” represents a document that was examined and approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and signed into law by presidential edict No. 1300 dated 17 December 1997. The Russian Federation National Security Policy is a political document reflecting the aggregate of officially accepted views regarding goals and state strategy in the sphere of ensuring the security of the individual, society, and the state from external and internal threats of a political, economic, social, military, man-made, ecological, informational, or other nature in the light of existing resources and potential. The document formulates key directions and principles of state policy. It is the basis for the elaboration of specific programs and organizational documents in the sphere of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation. Translations, by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-SOV-97-364, 30 December 1997), are from the original version as it appeared in the Russian language newspaper, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, on 26 December 1997, 4-5. In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original (in the Russian language) was examined for accuracy (access to documents obtained at the official Russian Ministry of Defense web site ru.mil). In a few cases, the translation quoted herein has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation. See Appendix B for full document. 35 Ibid.,. 1.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

31

The concept singled out three levels of national interests: the individual, society and the state. The interests of the individual focused on observance of constitutional rights and freedoms, personal safety, improved living standards and quality of life, as well as (vaguely defined) physical, spiritual and intellectual development. The interests of society were said to comprise consolidated democracy, the attainment and maintenance of public accord, the population’s greater creative activity and Russia’s spiritual revival. The interests of the state consisted of the protection of Russia’s constitutional system as well as its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It was in the state’s best interests to establish political, economic and social stability, to unfailingly observe laws, to maintain law and order and to expand international cooperation based on partnership. National interests in the foreign policy sphere required the implementation of an active foreign policy aimed at consolidating Russia’s position as a great power and as one of the (purportedly) emerging multi-polar world’s centers of influence.36 This policy would include: voluntary integration of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member-states; expanding relations of equitable partnership with other great powers and centers of economic and military power; promoting international cooperation to combat transnational crime and terrorism; and strengthening mechanisms for the collective management of global political and economic processes where Russia plays an important role (UN Security Council). The document stipulated that Russia faced no immediate danger of largescale aggression, and that, because the country was beset with myriad debilitating domestic problems, the greatest threat to security was now internal. This was a departure from previous concepts and doctrines. Along with internal threats, the document identified a number of dangers stemming from international dynamics. These included threats related to: territorial claims; attempts of foreign countries to use Russia’s domestic problems for weakening its international positions or challenging its territorial integrity; local conflicts and military build-up in the country’s vicinity; mass migration from CIS countries; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; international terrorism and drug-trafficking, and the growing activities of foreign intelligence services. The 1997 National Security Concept set up tasks: to develop the country’s economy and pursue an independent and socially-oriented economic course; to further improve the legislation and strengthen law and order and social-political stability of society, Russian statehood, federalism and local self-administration; to shape harmonious inter-ethnic relations; to ensure Russia’s international security by establishing equal partnership with the major states of the world; to strengthen 36 The notion that Russia might eventually be “one of the emerging multipolar world’s influential centers” reflects the thinking of men like Yevgeniy Primakov and Leonid Ivashov. By the late 1990s, Russian geopolitics was shifting away from so-called EuroAtlanticism and toward a kind of Neo-Eurasian Realpolitik. The 1997 National Security Concept reflects the debate surrounding this shift in thinking.

32

Russian Civil-Military Relations

state security in the defense and information spheres; and to ensure the vital activity of the population in a technologically safe and environmentally clean world. With regard to military policy, the national security concept served as justification for downsizing the armed forces, and for the continued restructuring that was envisioned for the future. By emphasizing domestic rather than foreign threats to Russia’s security, it seemed to justify the rapid strengthening of the country’s internal security forces relative to the regular army. In a related fashion, the document described an alleged threat to Russian economic interests posed by foreign competitors, and underscored the importance of the role played by intelligence services in countering it. The concept also emphasized the overriding importance of strategic forces to the country’s security and again disavowed the no first-use principle with regard to nuclear weapons.37 With regard to conventional weapons, the concept proclaimed a policy of “realistic deterrence,” discarding any effort to maintain parity with the armed forces of the world’s leading states. The concept highlighted the importance of Russian participation in international peacekeeping missions as a means of maintaining influence abroad. The concept also declared that in preventing war and armed conflicts Russia would prefer to use political, economic and other non-military means. However, defending the national interests would still require sufficient military might. Military force was considered appropriate under the following circumstances: 1. Russia reserves the right to use all the forces and systems at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, if the unleashing of armed aggression results in a threat to the actual existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state; 2. The armed forces of the Russian Federation should be used resolutely, consistently up to the point when conditions for making peace which are favorable to the Russian Federation have been created; 3. The armed forces should be used on a legal basis and only when all other nonmilitary possibilities of settling a crisis situation have been exhausted or proved to be ineffective; 4. The use of the armed forces against peaceful civilians or for attaining domestic political aims shall not be permitted. However, it is permitted to use individual units of the armed forces for joint operation with other services against illegal armed formations that present a threat to the national interests of the Russian Federation;

37 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� In reference to the 1993 Military Doctrine that enshrined first-use of nuclear weapons as a viable option.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

33

5. Participation of the Russian armed forces in wars and armed conflicts of different intensity and scope shall be aimed at accomplishing the priority military-political and military-strategic tasks meeting Russia’s national interests and its allied obligations.38

The concept indicated military-technical co-operation with foreign countries as an important priority of state security policy. A general plan on restructuring the defense industry with the aim of its substantial reduction and modernization was also outlined. The concept emphasized that Russia had no intention of entering into confrontation with any state or alliance of states, nor did it pursue hegemonic or expansionist objectives. Reiterating its opposition to NATO enlargement, the document called for multilateral organizations such as the UN and the OSCE to play a greater role in the ensuring of international security. The paper called on the international community to create a new Euro-Atlantic security system on the basis of the OSCE as well as to strengthen (with Russian participation) multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region. In more purely diplomatic terms, the national security concept stated formally what has long been a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy. Namely, that Russia would be best served not by passive diplomacy, but by aggressive and multifaceted diplomacy aimed at winning membership, or increasing influence, in various international organizations, while simultaneously striving to make Russia a player of importance around the globe. The document reinforced the Russian Security Council as the country’s premier agency in the formulation and implementation of national security policies, signaling a parallel rise in the political authority of its secretary.39 According to the concept, the Security Council would: analyze domestic and international developments through the prism of Russia’s national interests; prepare security policy recommendations for the President; draft national security legislation; make proposals for decision-making in emergency situations; coordinate the activities of the national security agencies; and control implementation of the Security Council’s decisions by the executive bodies. The document also demonstrated the executive branch’s willingness to cooperate with the legislative branch, which had complained about its isolation from national security affairs. According to this new national security concept, the Federation Council and the State Duma would: shape the legislative framework for national security policy; participate in taking decisions on the use of military force; review, ratify (or nullify) international treaties related to Russia’s national 38  Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 26 December 1997, 4-5. 39 The Secretary was, at the time of this concept, Ivan Rybkin. This new change in policy would bring to a close an approximately 18-month period—which began with a Kremlin move to limit the power of then Security Council secretary Aleksandr Lebed —during which the Council found itself relegated primarily to dealing with Kremlin policy toward Chechnya.

34

Russian Civil-Military Relations

security. If implemented, this would be an important step to establishing legislative control over national security strategy and a coherent security policy making mechanism.

2000 National Security Concept40 The next iteration of national security policy broadly defined Russia’s new concept as “a system of measures to preserve in the Russian Federation personal, public, and state security from external and internal threats in all spheres of life.” The concept referred to internal issues and identified state priorities in terms that sometimes gave rise to concerns for human rights, political freedoms, and the rights of foreigners in Russia. In many ways, it did not differ very much from the 1997 version, but its focus on external security raised international concern. This external security policy is the primary subject of the following summary. The document tacitly acknowledged that Russia no longer shared with the United States the status of superpower, and pointed to the end of the era of bipolarity. The Concept set forth two possible courses for future world development: the evolution of many economically strong countries and a multi-polar world; or the evolution of a world controlled by a U.S.-led Western coalition, dominated by American interests. In aiming its National Security Concept squarely at achieving the first outcome (a multi-polar world) Russia announced its intention to resume its role as a major player in international affairs. This concept argued that Russia remained one of the strongest countries in the world. Acknowledging its many internal problems, it insisted that the country still had the potential to play a leading role in international security. Frequent references to protecting the interests of Russia “and other states” suggested that Russia imagined itself as once again defending a sphere of interests beyond its own borders. While the new concept sometimes specifically identified this sphere 40 The Russian Federation National Security Concept represents a document that was examined and approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and signed into law by presidential edict No. 24 dated 10 January 2000. The document, called a “blueprint,” is a system of views on how to ensure in the Russian Federation security of the individual, society and state against external and internal threats in any aspect of life and activity. It defines the most important directions of the state policy of the Russian Federation. The national security of the Russian Federation is understood to mean the security of its multinational people, in whom reside sovereignty and the sole source of authority in the Russian Federation. Translations, by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBISFTS20000116000515) are from the original version as it appeared in the Russian language newspaper, Moscow Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (Internet Version) on 14 January 2000. In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original documents were examined for accuracy. In a few cases, the translation quoted herein has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation. See Appendix D for full document.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

35

as the CIS, it was often less explicit, leaving the implication that this sphere might extend more broadly. Threats included: NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and military buildup near Russia’s borders; international terrorism; the weakening of integrative processes in the CIS; the escalation of ongoing conflicts in the CIS. In order to preserve Russia’s security in the international sphere the new concept called for accurately estimating threats to Russia’s security (intelligence), and establishing the means for both immediate and long-term neutralization of such threats. The “means” would be based on “establishing and overseeing a sufficiently high level of military potential” for Russia, and greater investment in military science and technology as well as in the military-industrial complex in general. It asserted that “appropriate political, diplomatic, economic, and other non-military measures” would always be its first recourse, but nevertheless insisted that “the national interests of the Russian Federation demand that it have an adequate stockpile of military supplies for its defense.” The new concept insisted that Russia reestablish its ability to play a leading role in defense of the CIS, and also to play a security role in “various strategically important parts of the world.” It explicitly linked Russia’s military strength to the nation’s ability to be an active participant in international decision-making. This was the new document’s sharpest departure from the 1997 concept, which, as noted above, was primarily concerned with internal security. Consistent with the 1997 version, nuclear armaments remained a key element in the new concept, tacitly acknowledging that, given Russia’s economic crisis and the consequent decline in its ability to field effective conventional forces, nuclear armaments were its only real option. However, unlike in the 1997 concept, wherein the role of Russia’s nuclear arsenal was seen as deterring external “nuclear weapons attacks against Russia and her allies,” the new concept spoke of deterring aggression from “coalitions of states,” a clear reference to NATO, which is the only external threat to Russia that is explicitly identified in the document. Among the most ominous measures was language about lowering Russia’s threshold for use of nuclear weapons. The 1997 concept permitted nuclear use only “in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation,” but the new version permitted nuclear use to “repulse armed aggression, if all other means of resolving crisis are exhausted.” This is probably a reaction to the weakening of Russia’s conventional forces compared to NATO. Russian military exercises in June 1999 simulated a NATO conventional attack on Kaliningrad.41 The exercise demonstrated that Russian forces were unable to repulse such an attack without resorting to nuclear weapons. The new national security concept allowed for such a nuclear strategy. The new concept also called for emphasis on rebuilding Russia’s conventional forces, including the maintenance of a peacetime armed force adequate to “guarantee defense of the country from naval attack and to deal with other military arms and agencies employed for aggression in small conflicts,” and also for “strategic preparations for dealing with large-scale war.” 41 Termed Zapad-99; in Russian, the word “zapad” means “west.”

36

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Internal security issues identified in the new concept represented a curious balance between contemporary Western security priorities and Russian national chauvinism, including: 1. The reversal of Russia’s economic decline; wider integration of the Russian Federation in the world economy and greater collaboration in international economic and financial institutions; an increase in the standard of living of Russian citizens. 2. The establishment of a normative legal basis in Russia; the preservation of democracy and constitutional rights and freedoms. 3. Territorial sovereignty; securing Russia’s borders; halting illegal migration; halting destructive foreign economic, demographic, and “cultural-religious” influences in Russia. 4. Information security. 5. Eliminating terrorism. 6. Eliminating organized crime, drug trafficking, and corruption. 7. The control and regulation of regional conflicts within Russia. 8. Fixing existing ecological problems and preventing future ones.42 This new national security concept recognized Russia’s economic crisis as the most important factor in its security. Desperate economic conditions had undermined Russia’s security by destabilizing society as well as stimulating regional demands for the devolution of central political authority. At the same time Russia’s inability to adequately fund its armed forces, its military-industrial complex, and military research and development had, by then, left the country unable to deal with security crises as they might arise. The stress on greater integration into the global economy as a solution to the economic crisis echoed Russia’s preoccupation with the West, but it also spoke to growing fears of isolation. This is closely linked to fears of NATO expansion. The most serious issue related to sovereignty was identified as the status of various titular ethnic republics that remained part of Russia, including Chechnya. The new concept made it clear that Russia would not tolerate any increase in the autonomy of such regions. Concerns about terrorism in the new concept were certainly understandable, for terrorist acts were, by then, practically epidemic in Russia. A series of bombings in Moscow and St. Petersburg in September and October 1999 (usually credited to Chechen rebels, although no proof of this has been made public) caused a public outcry for greater domestic security. Whereas the 1997 National Security Concept accurately identified Russia’s deep and profound economic crisis as the foremost challenge to the country’s security, by 2000 there was some optimism. Throughout the 1990s social unrest, political uncertainty, and regional, ethnic, and national movements were all exacerbated 42 Excerpt from the 2000 National Security Concept, in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Gazeta, 14 January, 2000.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

37

by economic crisis, while the lack of state revenues hobbled government efforts to deal with security issues. The 2000 concept oriented many elements of Russian domestic policy toward ethnic and religious minorities and foreigners, but it also accurately identified critical internal security problems facing the country, in a hopeful first step toward their resolution. This new concept’s external goals gave cause for greater concern. In a sharp reversal from the 1997 version, the 2000 National Security Concept demanded for Russia a leading place in international security and based that claim on Russian military power. The explicit juxtaposition of Russian and NATO interests recalled Cold War posturing and potentially set the stage for a challenge to world security.

2000 Military Doctrine43 The military doctrine that came into force in 2000 represented a mix of traditional Soviet military thinking about threats and the General Staff’s reluctant acknowledgement that many security risks are internal. This doctrine made note of such positive developments as a perceived decline in the threat that a large-scale war, conventional or nuclear, might be unleashed. It also recognized several new sources of military danger: the strengthening of national, ethnic, and religious extremism; the spread of local wars and armed conflicts; an increase in the regional arms race; the spread of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems; the expansion of the scale of organized crime, terrorism, weapons and drug trafficking, and the multinational nature of these activities. While the term “world war” was not used, and the threat of a large-scale war was believed to have declined, the doctrine still postulated the necessity to prepare for a large-scale conflict that could degenerate into a nuclear war with catastrophic consequences. Closely linked to the new national security concept, the four key sources of potential military danger listed in the doctrine were a carryover from previous 43 The Russian Federation Military Doctrine represents a document that was examined and approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and signed into law by presidential edict No. 706 dated 21 April 2000. The document constitutes the sum total of the official views (precepts) determining the military-political, military-strategic, and military-economic foundations for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security. The Military Doctrine is a document for a transitional period, the period of the formation of democratic statehood and a mixed economy, the transformation of the state’s military organization, and the dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. Translations, by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-CEP20000424000171) are from the original version as it appeared in the Russian language newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 22 April 2000, 5-6. In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original documents were examined for accuracy. In a few cases, the translation quoted herein has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation. See Appendix E for full document.

38

Russian Civil-Military Relations

doctrines and were there to highlight a perceived continuing threat posed by the U.S. and its NATO allies. According to its military doctrine in 2000, Russians perceived that threats included: attempts to weaken the existing structural institutions (primarily the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) that were designed for safeguarding international security; the use of military force as a means of humanitarian intervention without the sanction of the UN Security Council in circumvention of the generally accepted principles and norms of international law; the use by entities in international relations of information and other, non-traditional, means and technologies for aggressive purposes. Likewise, the majority of actual military threats listed in the doctrine pointed to the General Staff’s fixation upon the danger posed by the U.S. and its NATO allies. These included: attempts to ignore the Russian Federation’s interests in resolving international security problems, and to oppose its strengthening as one of the influential centers in a multi-polar world; the creation and buildup of troops and force structure leading to the violation of the existing balance of forces close to the Russian Federation’s state border and the borders of its allies or on the seas adjoining their territories; the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation’s military security; the introduction of foreign troops in violation of the UN Charter on the territory of friendly states adjoining the Russian Federation; discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states; international terrorism. The new military doctrine indicated that the General Staff would continue to employ correlation of forces methodology in its threat assessments.44 Regarding force requirements and posture, in line with traditional Soviet/Russian military thinking, the new doctrine prioritized quantity over quality. It called for large armed forces capable of defending Russia’s long natural frontiers. It also called for continuous planning of counteroffensive operations on a continent-wide scale. At the same time, the new doctrine was vague about the Russian military’s longstanding plans for mobile forces. Nuclear weapons were still seen as the main deterrent, reserving the right to first-use if faced with a large-scale attack by conventional means. The new doctrine did not address many pressing issues facing the Russian military at that time. In particular, it did not include any discussion of counter-insurgency doctrine, nor did it mention the urgent need to prepare troops for operations-other-than-war, nor the need to raise tactical-level training standards. The new military doctrine elaborated on provisions pertaining to the limited use of nuclear weapons that were set out four months earlier in the new national security concept. In this regard, it marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of Russian nuclear doctrine. The first post-Soviet innovation in nuclear policy was 44  “Osnovnyye polozheniya voyennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 18 November 1993, 1, 4.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

39

introduced in the 1993 Military Doctrine, which allowed for the first-use of nuclear weapons.45 That document, however, assigned only one mission to the nuclear arsenal: deterrence (or preemption) of a large-scale attack that threatened the sovereignty and the very survival of the country. This aspect of military doctrine remained unchanged despite a flurry of proposals in 1996-1997 to increase reliance on nuclear weapons in the face of the first phase of NATO enlargement. The 1997 National Security Concept retained the plank about reserving “the right to use all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case an armed aggression creates a threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state.”46 In a review of an unpublished early draft of the new doctrine, which was produced in 1997, two officers of the General Staff noted that “some ‘specialists’ ... attempted to introduce into the documents language that would toughen nuclear policy,” but emphasized that these proposals were rejected by the Interagency Working Group on the new doctrine. It was decided, they said, to retain the 1993 language, “which had passed the test of time and was supported by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”47 At that time the Russian government adopted a series of documents, which confirmed earlier policy and laid out development and deployment plans based on the assumption that the sole mission of nuclear weapons was deterrence of a large-scale attack. Several decrees signed by President Yeltsin in 1997 and 1998 provided for deep reductions of the Russian nuclear arsenal, as missiles’ planned service lives expired, and limited modernization programs.48 Yet the debate over NATO enlargement had important consequences as it propelled nuclear weapons 45  Until then, the official Soviet policy, which was set in the 1970s and confirmed in 1982, allowed for the use of nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack. 46  Kontseptsiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsiy. Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 17 Dekabrya 1997 g. No. 1300. 47 Anatoliy Klimenko and Aleksandr Koltuykov, “Osnovnoy dokument voyennogo stroitelstva,” Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 13 February 1998, 4. 48 These included the presidential decree “On urgent measures toward reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” (July 1997), and two Security Council documents, “The Concept of Development of Nuclear Forces until 2010” and “The Foundations (Concept) of State Policy in the Area of Defense Development until 2005” (July-August 1998). These documents are classified in their original form, but their general thrust can be gleaned from newspaper publications: “Sovyet bezopasnosti RF reshil sokhranit trekhkomponentnyy sostav strategicheskikh yadernykh sil,” Interfax Daily News bulletin, No. 4, 3 July, 1998; “Russia to be Major Nuclear Power in Third Millennium, Official,” ITAR-TASS, 3 July, 1998; Ivan Safronov and Ilya Bulavinov, “Boris Yeltsin podnyal yadernyy shchit,” Kommersant-Daily, 4 July, 1998; Yuriy Golotyuk, “Yadernoye razoruzheniye neizbezhno,” Russkiy Telegraf, 11 July, 1998; Yuriy Golotyuk, “Moskva skorrektirovala svoy yadernyye argumenty,” Russkiy Telegraf, 4 July, 1998; Anatoliy Yurkin, “Perspektivy voyennogo stroitelstva,” Krasnaya Zvyezda, 5 August, 1998: 1, 3; Oleg Falichev, “Vpervyye so vremeni Miluykovskikh reform,” Krasnaya Zvyezda, August 18, 1998, 1, 2.

40

Russian Civil-Military Relations

into the center of attention and created the perception that they could be usable in a broader array of potential scenarios.49 The scale and the direction of the evolution of views with regard to the utility and the methods of employment of nuclear weapons can be discerned by comparing the relevant provisions of the 1993 and 2000 military doctrines.  The 1993 document defined the mission of nuclear weapons as “the removal of the danger of a nuclear war by means of deterring other states from unleashing an aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies.” They were supposed to be used only under conditions of a large-scale (global) war that put the sovereignty and very existence of Russia at risk. The 1993 doctrine, however, contained two important warnings: first, that even a limited conflict could escalate into a global war and, second, that any use of nuclear weapons risked an all-out, unrestrained nuclear exchange. This represented, in essence, deterrence of any (including limited) conflict by threat of world annihilation.  However, the credibility of such a threat was limited. The right to use nuclear weapons first was not specified. Rather, it was introduced by default, by not mentioning the previously traditional no-first-use assurance. Although the 2000 language sounded similar, it contained certain subtle, but important, changes: The Russian Federation regards nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence of aggression, of ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, and of maintaining international stability and peace. The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against itself or its allies and also in response to large-scale aggression involving conventional weapons in situations that are critical for the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies. The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against member states of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons that do not possess nuclear weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack against the

49  A meeting of Russia’s National Security Council in April 1999 (the first chaired by Vladimir Putin as Secretary), which came on the heels of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, apparently directed the military to revisit nuclear doctrine and develop ways to deter a similar use of limited force against Russia. New approaches were developed in a very short time, suggesting that the military had been thinking along these lines for some time, and deterrence of a limited conventional attack was tested for the first time during the “ZAPAD-99” military exercises in May-June 1999. A draft of the new Doctrine was published in the Fall of 1999, but the ensuing discussion did not lead to significant changes, including in the parts pertaining to nuclear weapons. “Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii: Proyekt,” Krasnaya Zvyezda, 9 October 1999.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

41

Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or a state toward which it has obligations with respect to security, unless that attack is conducted or supported by such a non-nuclear-weapons state together with a nuclear-weapons state or under alliance obligations with a nuclear-weapons state.50

First, the mission of deterrence was expanded to include the “military security” of Russia and “international stability and peace.” That language is extremely vague, but probably implied a broader political role of nuclear weapons, including in circumstances that do not constitute a direct threat of attack against Russia. Second, the right to use nuclear weapons first in response to a conventional attack was clearly spelled out. Third, the 2000 Military Doctrine allowed for the use of nuclear weapons in response to the use of other weapons of mass destruction (this provision is similar to one that was adopted by the United States). Perhaps the most important innovation was the broadening of conflict scenarios under which nuclear weapons could be used. The 2000 Military Doctrine distinguished between four types of warfare: (1) armed conflict (primarily ethnic or religious in origin, waged inside the country; other states might be involved indirectly); (2) local war (one or several other states as opponents; the scope and goals of the conflict are limited); (3) regional war (attack by a state or a coalition of states pursuing significant political goals); and (4) global war (attack by a coalition of states; survival and sovereignty of Russia are at stake). The use of nuclear weapons was specifically associated with the last two types of conflict, whereas in the 1993 Military Doctrine, nuclear weapons were only associated with global war. This new provision may have reflected concerns about the inability of the military to defeat a large-scale conventional attack without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. In other words, the inability to deter the Kosovo scenario.51 Like the 1993 document, the 2000 Military Doctrine warned about the potential for escalation of conflicts. According to a publication of the Academy of Strategic Rocket Forces, the most likely escalation path would follow directly from the 50  Russian Military Doctrine Part I.8, as published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 22 April 2000, 6. 51 V. Levshin, A. Nedelin, M. Sosnovskiy, “O primenenii yadernogo oruzhiya dlya deeskalatsii voyennykh deystviy,” Voyennaya Mysl, Vol. 3, May-June 1999, 34-37. A 1999 article in the leading military journal Voyennaya Mysl developed the notion that nuclear weapons could be used in order to “de-escalate” a regional war: “Even the limited use of nuclear weapons should increase the costs to the attacker sufficiently to outweigh expected political and economic benefits. Consequently, the attacker would prefer to terminate the conflict on the basis of maintaining the status quo. Accordingly, the threat to use nuclear weapons should be able to deter the attack by changing the cost-benefit calculation in the mind of the potential attacker. At the end of 1999, the Chief of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Vladimir Yakovlev, coined the term “expanded deterrence” to denote the mission of “de-escalation” of limited conflicts.

42

Russian Civil-Military Relations

first to the third type of conflict (referring to the types of conflict listed above).52 This view signaled that major foreign interference in the “antiterrorism operation” ongoing in Chechnya (the new doctrine was finalized against the background of the second Chechen war) could precipitate the use of nuclear weapons.  In late 1999, President Yeltsin explicitly referred to nuclear weapons during an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit, presumably to prevent external involvement in the second war in Chechnya.53

Recent Trends in National Security Documents and Nuclear Policy Russia’s view of the West has waxed and waned in recent years, but the trend has not been notably positive when measured in terms of security. Sharyl Cross described Russian efforts to move the world’s international relations paradigm from uni-polar to multi-polar in her research about Russia and NATO relations.54 Cross assessed the various security documents published in Russia between 1993 and 2000, comparing views on international relations and nuclear policy. She found that whereas early documents, including the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept and 1993 Military Doctrine, as well as the 1997 National Security Concept, were encouraging with regard to relations between Russia and NATO, later documents, including the 2000 National Security Concept and the 2000 Military Doctrine, were not. The same can be said for Russia’s perspectives on use of nuclear weapons. In the 1993 and 1997 publications the use of nuclear weapons was restricted (only in case of armed attack on the homeland), while security documents in 2000 lowered the threshold and broadened conditions under which nuclear weapons might be used (situations critical to national security … when all other means have failed).55 Whereas Cross concludes that these views reflect Russia’s decreasing military capabilities, and she was certainly correct in that analysis, there may be a broader underlying reason. The security environment in Russia in 2000 was much less inclined to rely upon good relations with the United States and NATO. After 2000, having experienced Kosovo, the onset of the second war in Chechnya, and the submarine Kursk tragedy, Russia simply did not trust its own defense and security institutions, much less those of the West. Since the last publication and presidential endorsement of military doctrine in 2000, this is not the first time we have considered the possibility that Russia 52 V. Prozorov, Yadernoye Sderzhivaniye v Teoriy Primeneniya RVSN (Moscow: Pyotr Veliki Military Academy, 1999), 19. 53  Breffni O’Rourke, OSCE: Summit Hears Clinton, Yeltsin Comment on Chechnya. Accessed at on 16 November. 2007. 54  Sharyl Cross, “Russia and NATO Toward the 21st Century: Conflicts and peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 15:2 (June 2002) 1-58. 55 Ibid., 43.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

43

may be developing a new one. In 2003 a draft document called the Ivanov Doctrine looked like it might become Russia’s third military doctrine since the Soviet Union collapsed.56 Matthew Bouldin published research on this document in 2004, pointing out the fact that, according to this new “doctrine,” the power of the Ministry of Defense would be increased at the expense of the General Staff.57 Bouldin also wrote that the document, which he concluded was genuinely representative of a new military doctrine, de-emphasized NATO and the U.S. as a threat, highlighting instead the significance of transnational threats against which Russia’s armed forces should be prepared to defend the nation’s interests.58 At the time of this research, it looked like Russia might be prepared to reorient its defense toward a more modern and contemporary security environment. Zoltan Barany has also written about the significance of this 2003 document in his recent book about the Russian military.59 Most significantly, Barany also noted that this document downplayed the threat to Russian security posed by NATO, calling for new ways of developing defensive measures against security threats from local or regional sources. Nonetheless, as Barany wrote, in a different section addressing nuclear forces and policy, the document mentions NATO as a primary threat and calls for maintaining Russia’s nuclear deterrent in order to ensure security on that front. This caveat probably gave clues as to the document’s fate. It wasn’t long after it was circulated that the General Staff began to downplay its significance. General Yuri Baluyevskiy, at the time First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, immediately under General Anatoliy Kvashnin, said the “brochure called Urgent Tasks could not be a doctrine since it was not approved by the president. The comments in the brochure made by the Defense Minister’s staff do not represent content of a new military doctrine.” Baluyevskiy added that “whereas the real military doctrine, signed in 2000, identifies both internal and external threats, this new brochure mentions something new, transborder threats.”60 Truthfully, neither Putin nor Ivanov actually suggested this new document was a new doctrine for Russia’s armed forces. Neither used the word “doctrine.” Ivanov called it a “vision,” saying it could be used as a basis for further discussion.61 Duma Deputy Alexei Arbatov, present as the Defense Ministry’s new “glossy” brochure was distributed, said it was a superficial meeting, with no opportunity 56  RIA Novosti, 3 October 2003, “Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” 57  Matthew Bouldin, “The Ivanov Doctrine and Military Reform: Reasserting Stability in Russia,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17:4, 625. 58 Ibid., 629. 59  Zoltan Barany, Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007) 50. 60  Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, 25 October 2003, “Russian First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Baluyevskiy Comments on Latest ‘Doctrine.’” Accessed on opensource.gov, 12 November 2007. 61  Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow 11 October 2003, “Media See Putin, Ivanov Presenting ‘New Military Doctrine’,” accessed on opensource.gov, 12 November 2007.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

44

to ask questions or offer an opinion.62 Looking back, it may be more accurate to interpret the 2003 “Ivanov Doctrine” in a different way. Having failed to achieve real reform in the military, Ivanov needed a new way to focus his leadership. The General Staff was reluctant to support reorienting defense industry toward less intensive transborder threats, preferring instead to remain attentive to the potential for large-scale conflict like war with NATO. This approach could allow the military to continue operating much as it always had, following a pattern of responding the national security threats inherited from the Soviet Union. Despite the Defense Minister’s call for change, the Russian military followed its own path.

Conclusions While it is somewhat unusual to describe cases that examine civil-military relations in terms of national security policy and military doctrine, in systems that are in transition from authoritarianism, this method may be especially useful. Because military reliance on ideology-based values and ideals represents the hallmark of professionalism in communist systems, when such systems collapse, the military is left with a particularly acute set of problems. Faced with a requirement to completely alter the ways in which it measures both its mission and its success, the military must also redefine the way it interprets the relationship it has with civilian authorities. In communist systems, the military might become well adapted to the presence of civilian “controllers” in the form of political observers who represent the party’s interests by appearing to operate in compliance with the rules, while at the same time going its own way, at least to some extent. But these adaptations may not translate well into a democratic system of governance. In some cases, especially when policy and doctrine allow for widely disparate interpretations of civilian intent with regard to national interests and threats to state security, the military may appear to be going its own way, at odds with civilian control. In reality, however, it may be that the military is merely adapting to its new circumstances by reinterpreting both mission and measures of effectiveness based on what it perceives to be the new rules. If we take the Yeltsin years as representative of the first stage of post-Soviet transition in security strategy and military thought, it is possible to conclude that the primary documents which have defined the dynamics of national security in Russia under Putin, in the first decade of the 21st century, are more representative of the 1990s. Putin certainly influenced security thinking from the beginning of his presidency in 2000, but it is probably fair to say that his opportunity to influence security directly has matured considerably since that time. Especially in view of the current effort to draft a completely new military doctrine, evidence points increasingly toward what could be a new stage in security thinking. Putin’s legacy, especially in terms of political-military affairs, may best be measured determined 62 Ibid.

Military Doctrine and Security Strategy in Modern Russia

45

as much by the national security documents he left behind. When he ceased to be president and transitioned to his new (and former) role as prime minister in 2008, Putin did not abrogate his opportunities to influence change. Putin’s style of governance derives, at least in part, from Yeltsin’s failure to govern. Although Medvedev may be in a better position to win significant gains in managing civilian control of his military than his predecessor, it will still be hard to tell when the military is speaking on its own initiative or at the behest of civilians who are supposedly in control. As it has happened before, and may again, there is room to doubt whether civilians or generals will call the shots when it comes to security in Russia.

This page has been left blank intentionally

chapter 3

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998 In September 1991, it seemed to us that it would take only a year or two at the most to build a new economic system in Russia. But as you know, miracles occur only in fairy tales. Sergei Stepashin, former Russian Prime Minister, July 1999.

If, indeed, Russia has returned to the international stage as a powerful force, where has it been? In its first decade as a new state in transition from communism, Russia struggled with many different kinds of problems. Among these, including political democratization, economic restructuring, information awareness, and military reform, the question of civilian control of the military loomed large. The transition years in the early part of the 1990s have been compared with Gorbachev’s efforts to stave off collapse as Yeltsin’s struggle to give birth to a new and different kind of nation. In the former case, forces were at work to unravel what had once been a mighty and solid, if flawed, state. In the latter, it was not clear whether or not any kind of state could be designed from what was left behind when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Despite some early optimism that a kind of chemical reaction might take place where the new Russian state might be born in some kind of big bang, events quickly deteriorated into what could be described as political chaos. The military was not immune to the negative side effects of transition. Absent the underpinnings of ideology, the armed forces suffered a general malaise deriving from loss of power and of prestige. It was not long before the military began to show strain from its decaying infrastructure as well as from confused directions and ill fitting missions. The uncertain and chaotic political environment of the 1990s witnessed much more than just the development of a series of new documents that addressed military doctrine and national security policy. It also spawned a new dynamic in civil-military relations. In September 1993, Boris Yeltsin issued Presidential Decree 1400 suspending the existing parliamentary bodies and calling for elections to a new bicameral Federal Assembly the following December, by which time the draft of a new constitution was to be prepared. The opposition’s takeover of the parliament   [FBIS] FTS19990712000311, Moscow, Sevodnya (Electronic Version) [in Russian], 8 July 1999, “End of Yeltsin Era Examined,” based on an article by Aleksey Vasilyev: “The Second Post-Yeltsin Government: a Tentative History of the Russian Thermidor.”  Thomas M. Nichols, “Presidentialism and Democracy in Russia: The First Ten Years,” Problems of Post-Communism 50:5 (September/October 2003), 1.

48

Russian Civil-Military Relations

building, the Russian “White House,” and the bloody clashes that ensued weeks later in October 1993 did not deter holding the elections for a new parliament or the referendum on the Yeltsin government’s proposed constitution in December. The crisis did, however, proceed with such haste that significant organizational disarray prevailed. The Communist Party was temporarily banned during the state of emergency that existed for two weeks in October surrounding Yeltsin’s siege of the opposition occupied White House. Despite all this, elections were held and results honored, and the constitution was confirmed. Article 96 of the constitution makes the process of elections subject to legislation and not part of the constitution itself. Yeltsin’s aim in dissolving the parliament and calling for new elections was to repudiate the past and generate greater support for reforms. In turn, he expected that the new body would help him to consolidate his position in the struggle with the republics and the regions over issues of autonomy and distribution of power between Moscow and the provinces. Instead, the elections in 1993 for Duma Deputies were disappointing for Yeltsin and pro-reform forces. Despite a series of setbacks, including the horrific events of Black October in 1993, the Russian electorate did not become turned off to politics. The decade of the 1990s reflected tensions between the two poles of Russian politics represented by a presidential system and a parliamentary system. Since one of the main jobs of Yeltsin’s administration was to write the first truly Russian constitution, the presidential system eventually won out. As Archie Brown has written, elections have now become a commonplace feature of the landscape that is Russian politics. Brown argues that while elections in Russia are free, they are not fair. Biases ranging from intensive slander and media corruptions to vote rigging and outright fraud made elections something of a puzzle in Russia. The Russian constitution of 1993 incorporated some of the same laws and practices common to the major states of Western Europe after World War II. Powers of the president were close to those of France’s 5th Republic under General de Gaulle. In Russia, the popularly elected president had the prerogative to determine the basic guidelines for domestic and foreign policy as well as to appoint a prime minister to oversee the administration of the government. Although not a true parliamentary system, the Russian Duma could approve (or not) the president’s choice of prime minister; but in the event of a deadlock, the president could simply dissolve the parliament and call for new elections. Also, in addition to the president’s authority to veto legislation, he could issue extensive decrees allowing

 It is interesting to note that this is why it was a relatively simple decision for President Putin to revise the process of electing representatives to the Duma. Shifting the election process toward a proportional representation system for all 450 Duma members required the enactment of legislation, not an amendment to the constitution.  Archie Brown (ed.), Contemporary Russian Politics (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 151-53.

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

49

him to rule essentially by fiat if he chose to do so. In this way, the Russian system of government was heavily weighted on behalf of the executive branch. The question of Russia’s future form of governance (emphasizing either executive or legislative power) divided both the elites and popular opinion, and the 1996 presidential election gave clear expression of this. In the 1990s, the majority of Russian public opinion consistently refused to endorse either alternative. The minority that did endorse one or the other did so with varying degrees of support. In the 1996 election for president, two rounds were necessary; the first was in June, and the second, runoff election, was in July. In the first round, Yeltsin won 35 percent and Zyuganov (representing the Communist Party) 32 percent. In the runoff election, Yeltsin took 54% to Zyuganov’s 40 percent. In the face of serious economic decline and voter dissatisfaction expressed in the Duma elections the previous December, this was a stunning victory for Boris Yeltsin. Still, the political atmosphere in Russia at this time was confusing, not least to the military.

Politicization of the Military The Defense Minister and the Chief of General Staff are appointed by and report directly to the President, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The 1993 Constitution and the 1992 Law on Defense give the President vast powers with regard to designing and implementing defense and military policy. With the exception of budgetary matters, these powers are largely unconstrained by either cabinet or parliamentary authority. The defense budget is jointly drawn up by the Defense Ministry, Presidential Staff, Finance Ministry and the State Duma’s and Federation Council’s defense and budget committees. However, it is the President, working through his staff advisers who decide on the armed forces’ structure and posture. The President’s direct control over the key security service—the FSB— gives him extra leverage over the military. The armed forces’ counter-intelligence service (the so-called “osobyi otdel”), which also performs military police   Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 11-16, passim.   Jane’s Defense Publications, “Executive Summary, Russia,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2003, 25 July 2003. The army (“sukhoputniye voyska,” ground forces) has traditionally been the largest and most significant arm of service. At its core, there are nineteen motorized rifle and five tank divisions stationed throughout the six military districts. The army is divided into five arms branches, plus a number of supporting forces. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been an apparent shift away from fixed regiment-divisions to a flexible brigade-corps style of force ­structure. The army has been tasked with planning and running all of Russia’s peacekeeping operations. The Army High Command does not exercise operational control over rapid deployment forces. The naval infantry regiments are subordinated to the fleet naval commands, and the airborne forces are directly controlled by the defense minister and the president.

50

Russian Civil-Military Relations

functions, is not subordinated to the defense minister but is a special directorate within the FSB. The General Staff is Russia’s principal organ of command and control over the armed forces, whose functions can be grouped into three categories. First, it exercises strategic and operational control over the armed services and branches. This is accomplished primarily through the Main Operations Directorate. Second, it manages the structure of military research and education. The General Staff Academy trains Russian senior commanders and is a center of military expertise on strategic and operational issues. The General Staff’s principal think-tank, the Center for Military-Strategic Research, is probably the single largest contributor to the formulation of Russian defense policy. Finally, the General Staff runs one of Russia’s two foreign intelligence agencies, the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate). Most of GRU’s human and electronic intelligence assets are thought to be deployed against the governments, armed forces and defense industries of the United States and NATO.

  Jane’s Defense Publications, “Executive Summary, Russia.” The FSB is Russia’s key security agency. Currently, it comprises counterintelligence and counterterrorism services, a signals intelligence element and a frontier patrol and immigration control force. The work of the FSB is regulated by the 1994 Statute on the Counter Intelligence (Security) Service of the Russian Federation. The FSB is tasked with counter-intelligence operations in Russia, protecting official secrets and assessing information on likely threats to Russian security. Its key function is to combat terrorism and drug trafficking. The agency is run by its director, currently Nikolay Patrushev, a first deputy director and a state secretary, and six deputy directors. FSB Headquarters in Moscow comprises 19 directorates and a secretariate. The FSB’s Special Forces Command controls three counterterrorist commando units: the Alfa Group, the Beta Group and the Zenit Group (approximately 4,000 commandos in total). Each region has an FSB Department (UFSB) directly subordinated to FSB Headquarters in Moscow. The chiefs of the Moscow and St Petersburg UFSBs are also deputy directors of the FSB. The FSB Academy in Moscow is the agency’s principal staff college. Since 1999, the FSB has seen a substantial expansion of its powers. The FSB Military Counterintelligence Directorate has been tasked with counter-proliferation work in the armed forces. The FSB has authorization to investigate corruption and financial crimes, including fund mismanagement and fraud within military and security agencies.   Jane’s Defense Publications, “Executive Summary, Russia.” The General Staff comprises some 14 directorates and main directorates, including the Main Operations Directorate, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), the 12th (Nuclear) Directorate, the Directorate of Communications (Signals), the Main Military Communications (Transportation) Directorate, the Main Directorate for Military Cooperation with CIS member states and the Baltic, the Directorate for Foreign Relations, the Troop Services and Military Discipline Directorate, the Military Science Directorate, the Radio Electronic Warfare Directorate, the International Law Directorate, the Topographic Directorate, and the Directorate for Restructuring and Military Reform.

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

51

Russia has always had a heavily centralized, top-down system of control over its armed forces, and the General Staff has always played the dominant role. As a result, the Russian decision-making process in war-time has traditionally been slow and inflexible, with tactical and operational level commanders stripped of initiative and powers to coordinate their actions with their counterparts from other services and branches. During the first Chechen war (1994-1996), for example, the General Staff acted as a center of operational command.10 There were allegations that the military might have tried to influence the 1996 election. But in retrospect, it seems that was probably not the case. Although the political-military atmosphere was certainly less than optimal, civil-military relations were not (yet) so risky as to indicate the likelihood of open insubordination. There was talk about the possibility that the election might have to be postponed. General Nikita Chalmidov, Deputy Commander of the Military General Staff Academy in Moscow, gave an interview to the foreign press that tried to refute any question of military intervention.11 Although Chalmidov was not a key figure in the military hierarchy, his comments are still insightful and representative of the discussion that was going on at the time. Chalmidov stated categorically that the military would not get involved with the election, other than to exercise their own rights to vote. Responding to allegations that the military was sharply split on the question of whether to back Yeltsin or the Communist Party candidate, Gennadiy Zyuganov, the General pointed that the nation itself was split on the same question and the military, as a cross-section of society, was in roughly the same position. Yeltsin had recently announced by presidential decree that military conscription would end in the year 2000, moving toward an all-volunteer force that would

  William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 16-19. 10  Recently, however, there have been signs of positive change. During the 19992001 Chechen campaign the operational-level decision-making power was transferred over to the North Caucasus Military District and then to the joint staff, comprised of commanders whose forces were actually in battle. The General Staff’s ability to exercise operational control was seriously undermined by President Putin’s decision in 2001 to establish the Army High Command (HQ) subordinated directly to the Defense Minister. The Army HQ now controls Russia’s six military districts as well as all Russian troops deployed overseas. The Army Intelligence Corps, including the 24 GRU commando reconnaissance brigades (Spetsnaz) up to a total of 20,000, are now subordinated to the Army HQ instead of the GRU (intelligence directorate) of the General Staff. 11  Senior army officers are trained in the General Staff Academy in Moscow. Army cadets are trained at numerous staff colleges. These include the Military University in Moscow (formerly the Lenin Military Political Academy), Frunze Military Academy, the Malinovsky Motor Rifle Troops Academy and the Military Artillery Academy in SaintPetersburg, as well as 12 army military colleges for infantry platoon commanders, and the elite Higher Airborne Troops Command College in Ryazan.

52

Russian Civil-Military Relations

represent a more professional military.12 Chalmidov said that the move was not welcomed by the army. In fact, several senior officers had already stated publicly that they did not support the president’s decision (to abolish conscription). The military was dependent on conscripts for the bulk of its manpower; moving to an all-volunteer force without first providing for the necessary incentives would not be practical.13 In order to have an effective personnel policy, the army would have to get political support for conscription at a time when the president wanted to reform the military along Western lines. The failure of the military to support the president on the question of an all-volunteer force is just one example of many reform initiatives in which the president and the military were at loggerheads.14 Still, the military was not always at odds with civilian leadership. Regarding the question of whether the army would react vigorously in the (increasingly 12  Jane’s Defense Publications, “Executive Summary, Russia.” The army remains a conscript service, and this fact is as unpopular as ever. Draft evasion among the struggling middle class means that it is mostly poor and underprivileged young people who end up in the army. As a result, the social and health profile of an average conscript reflects endemic health and nutrition problems facing the younger generation of Russians from deprived backgrounds. Conditions for conscripts and contract soldiers alike are exceptionally unfavorable. Four out of five conscripts will face beatings by their officers or fellow soldiers at some point in their service, which for one in three is serious enough to lead to hospitalization or a medical discharge. Over 100,000 draftees are referred for extra medical checks each year. Twenty percent leave the army chronically ill as a result of poor diet, overcrowding and minimal medical and sanitary provision. Two out of every seven conscripts become addicted to drugs or alcohol while serving out their terms, and a further one in twenty suffer homosexual rape. The suicide rate among soldiers in the army rose sharply in the second half of the 1990s. 13  Jane’s Defense Publications, “Executive Summary, Russia.” Most troops in Russia’s armed forces face low pay and bad working conditions. Senior leaders insist on maintaining a large (900,000) conscript army, though there are currently plans to cut back to perhaps only about half that. The Russian infantry suffers from poor morale and is infamous for “dedovshchina,” ritualized brutality by older conscripts against new recruits. The infantry’s share of modern weaponry has fallen since 1991 from 73 percent to 23 percent. Conscripts are often ill qualified to operate complex weapon systems. A large proportion of weaponry has an expired service life, thus causing an increasing number of fatal accidents. Poor social conditions have led to crime as well as drug and alcohol abuse. 14  The army has always been the service that is most difficult to reform. In the 1990s, its ­structure, force posture, planning and training patterns did not meet, being essentially a carryover from Soviet times. Soviet strategy during the Cold War was to gain conventional superiority over NATO forces in Europe. Emphasis was on using motorized infantry, tanks, heavy tube artillery and ballistic missiles. Tactical flexibility and initiative were discouraged, troops were not trained to operate in small unsupervised formations and were neither equipped nor trained for close range combat. Instead, troops mastered standard drills for launching large scale armored thrusts into the enemy’s territory. Morale of infantry soldiers was low, and their principal motivation was a harsh discipline and wish to complete their national service as quickly as possible.

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

53

likely) event that Yeltsin might fire the current Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev, on the eve of the election, Chalmidov again tried to argue that senior officers would not intervene in that decision: “Seeing that the top ranks in the armed forces were selected and appointed by Grachev, of course they might be upset because their careers will be at stake. But there are many other officers who do not think solely of their own careers, but of the future of the army, and that of Russia as well. If someone who is capable to leading the armed forces is appointed as Defense Minister, the majority of the military will react positively.”15 Grachev was in trouble on a number of counts, primarily because of the war in Chechnya. Despite the fact that cool heads in the military appeared to be prevailing over those who might be inclined to take sides, there were some who spoke out. The Commander of the Presidential Guard, Alexander Korzhakov, was recommending political compromise between Yeltsin and the Communist Party in an effort to defuse some of the controversy and enhance support for Yeltsin. Such a compromise might have paved the way for a clear victory for Yeltsin, but compromise would only make the choice more ambiguous. Yeltsin’s ultimate victory in 1996 has been attributed to his effective use of the media (television is the single most popular medium of mass communication in Russia), but there are other reasons as well.16 Before the election, two men working for the president’s campaign were caught leaving government offices with several cardboard boxes full of cash. But the extent that Yeltsin’s campaign may have tried to buy the election using government largess is probably only marginal.17 In the end, Yeltsin’s campaign, influenced by several American private citizens acting as professional advisers, won out because of voter optimism in the future of market reforms over returning to the old ways of authoritarian government. In any case, the polls showed that in the 1995-1996 elections most Russians supported continued strong role of government in the economy and in society. Even though many, if not even most, voters disliked Yeltsin, it appeared to them that he was the best choice. In the end, it was the choice itself that won clear victory because, as in 1993, the elections were held and the results accepted. The chaotic political scene that was prevalent during the earliest stages of the Russian Federation’s birth following collapse of the USSR almost repeated itself in the middle of the 1990s. Boris Yeltsin’s administration was characterized by a number of different problems, all of them serious. To begin with, Yeltsin’s health was afflicted with alcoholism, causing him to make mistakes in public that were 15  [FBIS] FTS19960524000451, Rome, Il Messagero, in Italian, 24 May 1996. Interview with Russian General Nikita Chaldimov by Roberto Livi in Moscow; date not given. “A High-Ranking Russian Commander Reassures the Kremlin: No Coups” [FBIS Translated Text] Abstract: Armed Forces Intervention in Election Campaign Ruled Out. 16  Vladimir Gelman, “The Iceberg of Russian Political Finance,” in Archie Brown (ed.) Contemporary Russian Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 191. 17  Reddaway and Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy, 15.

54

Russian Civil-Military Relations

widely reported and made Russia look as if it might be spinning out of control. The Kremlin was populated by a close association of “family” members, including several rich businessmen who came to be known as oligarchs. These influential people, Russia’s new elites, were responsible for virtually every decision that was made by the government.18 In the background at the center of it all was a man named Alexander Korzhakov, formerly KGB, Yeltsin’s bodyguard of longstanding tenure. While Korzhakov was not acting in any official government capacity, he was in a position to hear and see almost everything that happened around the president. Yeltsin and Korzhakov were extremely close to one another and their loyalty to each other was considered unimpeachable. Nonetheless, in the wake of the first election in June 1996, and prior to the election runoff scheduled for July, Yeltsin fired Korzhakov, along with a number of other close aides and officials who were considered to be hard-liners in the government. Yeltsin may have been prompted to do so because of widespread concerns about corruption and election tampering.19 Korzhakov fell from grace during the 1996 election campaign because of several missteps that involved other members of Yeltsin’s government. At one point, he had recommended to Yeltsin that he cancel the election based on Yeltsin’s own poor health. This caused a storm of protest when it leaked to the press, resulting in dissatisfaction with Yeltsin and his closest associates. In June, agents from the FSB detained two aides of Anatoly Chubais, at that time Yeltsin’s campaign manager. The aides, S. Lisovskovo and A. Yevstafyeva, were apprehended in custody of about half a million dollars in U.S. currency. Chubais called the detention of his aides a Soviet KGB style provocation, and implicated Korzhakov for his role in the episode. Finally, on 20 June, Yeltsin fired Korzhakov along with Mikhail Barsukov (head of the FSB), and Oleg Soskovets, a deputy prime minister.20 18 ��������������� Ibid., 491-504. 19 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19960625000506, Moscow, 25 June 1996 [FBIS Translated Text]. Commentary by Vladimir Dekterev under the “Opinion” rubric: “Generals Fired Over Interest in Yeltsin Campaign Funds”. “Most observers link last week’s dismissal of three “power” generals and a first vice premier to the presidential election, but is this really the case? There are certainly no questions as far as the defense minister is concerned. Almost everyone has had it in for him for some time now, and it seemed odd that Yeltsin hung onto Pavel Grachev despite everything. As we should have expected, the president was simply saving him up in case he needed to make a strong political move. That move has now been made: Yeltsin has concluded an alliance with Aleksandr Lebed in order to win over the latter’s voters in the second round of the elections.” 20 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19960625000506, Moscow, 25 June 1996, [FBIS Translated Text]. Commentary by Vladimir Dekterev under the “Opinion” rubric: “Generals Fired Over Interest in Yeltsin Campaign Funds.” “Aleksandr Korzhakov also got under some people’s skin. He screened those seeking access to the president and, it was assumed, thereby had the opportunity to influence the adoption of important political decisions. But this only rankled among those at the top, so his dismissal could not have any substantial impact on voters’ behavior—which is also true in Mikhail Barsukov’s case. Moreover, both generals

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

55

Korzhakov immediately set about writing his memoirs of service at Yeltsin’s side, promising to name important figures in the government and implicating them all in various scandals. His book was certainly sensational, but it did not name names. Insights, however, were plentiful, and interesting even without the scandals. Korzhakov relates a number of anecdotes that cast civil-military relations in a negative light. In one such narrative, Defense Minister (and Army General) Pavel Grachev is involved in a conversation with Korzhakov about Yeltsin’s drinking problems. Korzhakov is attempting to help his boss avoid situations where he would be tempted to drink too much. Grachev told Korzhakov, “It’s easy to set things up so that he has to drink. After all, who can say no when a toast is offered, especially to the homeland? I can think of many such opportunities and might also be in a position to avoid them if the right incentives were suggested.”21 Other information points to Grachev accusing Yeltsin’s cronies of trying to capitalize on the war in Chechnya by profiteering in various schemes. Grachev was personally implicated in a number of scandals, and he was fired by Yeltsin on 18 June, just two days before the shake-up involving Korzhakov. Shortly before Yeltsin fired Grachev, he installed Alexander Lebed, as Secretary of the National Security Council.22 As a recently retired army general, Lebed was (Korzhakov and Barsukov) were just recently elevated in rank by the president (Barsukov was also promoted to higher office), so nothing foreshadowed this turn of events. Still, it was unlikely to have been a political move. The reason probably lies elsewhere. The Kremlin has said that the immediate grounds for removing these people from office was the government’s arrest of Yevstafyev and Lisovskiy, members of Boris Yeltsin’s election campaign team. According to the official version, they were arrested while attempting to remove a large sum of cash (approximately $500,000) from a government building without the accompanying documents. There has been no official denial of this version.” 21 ��������������������� Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot Rassveta Do Zakata: Posleslovie (From Dawn to Sunset), in Russian (Moskva: Detektiv-Press, 2004), 314. 22 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Jane’s Defense Publications, “Executive Summary, Russia.” The Security Council of the Russian Federation is a consultative body tasked with threat assessments, doctrine formulation and drawing up proposals for the development of the armed forces. It is not an executive body, acting in an advisory rather than supervisory capacity, and it does not coordinate the work of Russia’s defense and security agencies. Although modeled on the U.S. National Security Council, its powers are limited and its resources are very modest. The ­Russian military views the Security Council as one of many channels of communication with the President, but the Council’s policy impact largely depends on the influence of its secretary within the Kremlin’s inner circle. The inherent weakness of the body as an institution lies in its largely undefined role in Russia’s overall security policy decisionmaking process. The Security Council operates on two levels. First, it acts as a forum for discussion between the Russian senior cabinet, presidential staff, military and intelligence officials. This is done through a number of inter-departmental committees. Very few, if any, major policy decisions have been attributed to the work of the Security Council’s interdepartmental committees, so it appears that in this respect the Council is little more than a place to perform consultations. The Council, as a special directorate within the Presidential Staff, also acts as a defense and foreign policy think-tank. The quality of its analytical

56

Russian Civil-Military Relations

popular in the military for his exceptionally straightforward style of leadership and rhetoric. Lebed first became well known in 1991 when he refused orders from the coup-plotting defense minister, Yazov, to attack the headquarters of the Russian Republic, under the command at that time of Boris Yeltsin as the country’s new president. When Lebed ordered his troops to defend the headquarters instead, surrounding the building with his tanks and then turning them around to face outward, he established his reputation for standing apart from direction (civilian or military) if he thought it was illegal or unethical. Lebed was again in the news the following year, 1992, when he led Russia’s 14th Army into the newly independent Republic of Moldova, ostensibly to protect the indigenous Russian population from an attack by Moldovan security forces. He later fell from favor with the ethnically Russian (separatist) leadership in Moldova when he accused them of corruption. Significantly, then Defense Minister Grachev sided with the maligned Russians in Moldova and had Lebed removed from his post. Shortly afterward, Lebed retired from the Army. Lebed had been one of the most senior military officers to condemn the war in Chechnya early on. Now that he was in charge of the security council, he was in position to bring about changes that could end the conflict. Grachev’s replacement as Minister of Defense, Army Colonel General Igor Rodionov, gave an interview shortly after his appointment.23 Like Lebed, Rodionov was pragmatic about Russia’s situation, especially in world affairs. Rodionov used the Russian word “tupik,” meaning “dead end,” to describe the country’s longstanding competition with the United States. He said Russia faced no threats from beyond its borders; rather, the nation’s threats were all from within, “Russia must be saved from itself, because it could break up any minute, just like the USSR. Too much money and too many resources have been spent on the arms race. Today, Russia can barely even defend its own borders. It’s no secret,” he said, “that there is currently not a single regiment in the Russian Army that could be prepared for combat within two or three hours.” Although Rodionov’s specific views about the war in Chechnya were not discussed, he said he planned to devote some time to “sorting out problems in the rebellious southern region.”24 Entering office with a mandate from the president to reform the military, certainly an impossible task for a variety of other reasons, Rodionov would not even finish one year in the job before he was fired. Meanwhile, Alexander Lebed had some ideas about how to end the war in Chechnya and Yeltsin gave him room to maneuver, at least initially.

assessments, however, has been far from impressive. The Security Council secretariate rarely employs professional analysts and is mostly staffed with either retired or seconded military and intelligence personnel. 23 ������������������������������������������������� David Hoffman, “Lebed Choice Gets Defense Post,” The Washington Post, 18 July 1996, A.22. 24 ����� Ibid.

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

57

Chechnya: War and Peace The first war in Chechnya (1994-1996) began as an effort to crush the Chechen independence movement that began in 1991, before the fall of the Soviet Union. In December 1994, Army General Eduard Vorobyov chose to resign as the first deputy chief of Russia’s ground forces rather than lead an ill prepared attack on Chechnya, which he felt was doomed to failure. “It was like walking into a quagmire,” Vorobyov told the Associated Press.25 The beginning of the first Chechen war is still mired in controversy, with Yeltsin’s aides blaming one another for sending troops. Although it is not clear whether the decision to go in was made by civilians or by the military, the initiative itself was almost certainly civilian. Either way, on 11 December 1994, tens of thousands of Russian troops were thrown into Chechnya without proper intelligence and planning. They were immediately stalled by bad weather and a hostile civilian population. Morale was exceptionally low. Just before the invasion began, then Defense Minister Pavel Grachev boasted that he could subdue Chechnya in two hours with just one paratroop regiment. Alexander Golts, a respected military analyst who writes for several magazines and newspaper columns in Russia, said, “They thought that sending in troops would be enough to have them all (the rebels) surrender.”26 Instead, hundreds of teenage conscripts were massacred three weeks later when Russian armored columns rolled into Grozny, the Chechen capital, in a hasty New Year’s Eve offensive timed to coincide with Grachev’s birthday. “It was a crime to send unprepared troops to battle,” Vorobyov told the associated press, “I still shudder when I remember that some conscripts didn’t even know how to load their guns.”27 The Grozny bungle epitomized the sloppiness and lack of coordination that contributed to Russia’s defeat in the first, twenty month long Chechen war. The level of degradation of the Russian military was exposed by its campaigns in Chechnya, and it was shocking. The Army’s combat performance, hampered by years of under investment in training and equipment, inflexible and outdated doctrines and rules of engagement, and the poor quality of the officer corps, was abominable. The federal troops that engaged Chechen rebels were inadequately 25  Margaret Shapiro, “Russia Probing Allegations That Officers Disobeyed Orders in Chechnya,” The Washington Post, 17 January 1995, A.14. 26 Alexander Golts in Moscow on 21 February 2001, speaking to a delegation from the United States at which the author was present. Golts described the arrogance of the General Staff, accusing them of sacrificing “hundreds, even thousands” of ill prepared, ill-equipped army troops in Chechnya because of underestimating the capabilities of the rebel forces and because the generals “did not even know the (diminished) capabilities of their own forces.” This conversation is documented in the author’s professional notes from service in Moscow as the U.S. Naval Attaché (1998-2001). 27  Shapiro, “Russia Probing Allegations That Officers Disobeyed Orders in Chechnya.”

58

Russian Civil-Military Relations

prepared for close combat and lacked motivation. Much of their combat equipment was old and needed replacement. Many combat units thrown into battle lacked cohesion because they had never participated in platoon and company level exercises. Artillery fire was often inaccurate and fire coordination extremely poor.28 Chechen ambushes succeeded because of the tactical incompetence, passivity, and poor command and control in the Russian Army. Chechens often outmaneuvered the MOD troops, deploying and retreating undetected. Russian surveillance and target acquisition systems were too outdated to be effective. Due to the lack of proper training, troops excessively relied on artillery fire and armored vehicles instead of engaging rebels in close combat. This allowed the rebels to inflict high casualties on the Russian infantry by hitting the armored vehicles carrying troops with rocket fire. In the summer of 1996, the newly appointed Secretary of the Security Council, retired Army general Alexander Lebed, was tirelessly working to negotiate an end to the war in Chechnya. Lebed was held in high regard among senior military officers, and even civilians in government respected him for the stand he took in support of protecting Yeltsin during the August 1991 coup attempt. In October 1996, Lebed gave an interview about conditions in Chechnya. In it he referred to his leadership of the Russian Army in Moldova’s Transdniester region in 1992. Lebed said he had “beaten up the opposition badly,” and then immediately offered them

28 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Jane’s Defense Publications, “Executive Summary, Russia.” The army of the new Russian Federation looked a lot like its Soviet predecessor. What few changes there were took place slowly and were barely perceptible. In the mid-1990s, it had not yet learned ­lessons from its performance in low intensity conflicts in Afghanistan and Chechnya and was not prepared to meet the challenges of asymmetrical warfare fought on difficult terrain and in an urban environment. In Chechnya, the infantry performed exceptionally poorly in close combat, ­taking heavy casualties. Most troops were not trained to operate in squads, and there was an acute shortage of combat specialists, particularly snipers, gunners and anti-tank guided missile operators. Fire control and coordination were poor, and Russian reconnaissance troops lacked night vision and other modern optical equipment. While the military ­constantly complained about the lack of new equipment, the real cause of the army’s poor combat performance was an acute shortage of competent and motivated personnel. The Soviet/Russian military tradition never attached great importance to the survivability and combat performance of individual soldiers. As a consequence, the infantry’s personal equipment was inadequate for modern warfare and caused high casualties. Russian flak jackets were too heavy, hindering the maneuverability of troops, shortening their tactical range and limiting the amount of munitions soldiers could carry. The standard combat helmet used by the army was uncomfortable, heavy, had poor ballistic protection, without recesses for radio headsets, little changed since World War II. Personal clothing was not layered and did not offer sufficient protection for harsh climate conditions. The standard issue outer jacket was not waterproof and most troops were not supplied with waterproof sleeping bags or even mats­ to protect them from the elements of weather. Conditions by the time of the second war in Chechnya had not changed very much.

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

59

his assistance to get back on their feet. He suggested that Russia had an obligation to rebuild Chechnya and warned that if this were not done the region would remain embittered in defeat. Lebed also described conditions in the army at that time, highlighting the very poor quality of troops, mostly untrained conscripts, who were fighting the war. Lebed believed that an army’s most important capability was its core values and professionalism. He did not like what he saw in Chechnya, calling the army’s conduct there an example of how far beneath its formerly high standards of conduct the army had fallen.29 With an image of solid integrity, refreshingly unimpeachable ethical standards, and a president who was mostly absent, Lebed worked through the Russian military commander on the scene in Chechnya, Major General Tikhomirov, and the Chechen military commander, Aslan Maskhadov, to achieve an agreement that 29  [FBIS] FTS19961022000678, Moscow, Argumenty i Fakty, [in Russian], 22 October 1996. Interview with Aleksandr Lebed, former head of the security council, by an unnamed interviewer; place and date not given: Aleksandr Lebed: ‘Cold and Calculating People Win.’ Selected excerpts from the interview: [Lebed] Now about Chechnya. First I examined the problem in detail and then visited Chechnya without too much publicity. I saw the true picture which saddened me greatly. [Question] Can you give me an example? [Lebed] Roadblocks manned by the Internal Troops are staffed with undernourished conscripts who care about nothing. They are dressed in women’s clothes and have sports shoes on. These are not troops, these are partisans. They are not carrying out military service. My driver once tested one of them by giving him 10,000 rubles and the conscript let him through. We crossed 12 posts and nobody stopped us. Now about contract servicemen. One is under the impression that all of them were recruited from among the homeless. They had not been paid for three or four months. They turned into robbers because they want to eat. Meanwhile, officers of the Internal Troops live according to the rule that if you have a drink in the morning, you can be off for the rest of the day. The rest is even sadder. Soldiers in Chechnya have no ideology whatsoever. Everyone shouts about a single and indivisible Russia and about constitutional order, but those who are directly involved in the fighting know nothing about this. There are no commissars, no newspapers, no television and no one to improve morale. So what are we fighting for, lads? Furthermore, all this is happening when there is no money for anything. [Question] Is there a similarity between Chechnya and Afghanistan? [Lebed] More than one would want to see. When we arrived there, 90 percent of Afghanistan’s residents welcomed us but when we left, 100 percent of them hated us. It is not difficult to understand why. When Afghan fighters fired on a Russian convoy from a village, for example, a Soviet commander used to simply raze that village to the ground. At first it was just a village, then 10 villages, then 100 villages, until half of the country was destroyed, and then there was a nationwide war, when local men were deeply upset by the fact that their children and wives were being killed and their houses being destroyed and that they were being deprived of means of survival. The same thing happened in Chechnya. When nine settlements were raised to the ground, the most uncontrollable and wild unit of fighters was formed from the residents of Bamut which had been destroyed. They had nothing to lose.

60

Russian Civil-Military Relations

would at least end hostilities and initiate a peace deal that would stretch across the next five years. Leaving the final issues of independence and sovereignty aside, the deal promised to break the stalemate, ostensibly in favor of the Chechen separatists’ point of view. The deal was struck in Khasavyurt, a town in the Russian region of Dagestan, which borders Chechnya. The deal came after a fierce band of several thousand Chechen guerrillas, increasingly well armed and well trained, humiliated Russian troops by retaking Grozny and inflicting heavy casualties. Russia’s government in Chechnya was already complaining. Its leader, Doku Zavgaev, had been trying wildly to blame Lebed for the fall of Grozny to a rebel assault on 6 August.30 Some 2,000 Russian soldiers were killed, wounded or went missing in the fighting that followed. A shaky cease fire was fixed on 22 August. Russian troops began to withdraw, leaving most of the city in the hands of the rebels. Following on the heels of a cease fire, and the continuing withdrawal of forces from Grozny, Lebed’s peace accord was the most ambitious attempt yet to end the war. Initially at least, there was no reaction to the deal from the Kremlin, and it was unclear whether Yeltsin had endorsed the accord. The agreement was not the first time that the rebels and Russian leaders had tried to end the conflict. On 27 May, just before the Russian presidential election, Yeltsin and Chechen leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev announced they had agreed on a cease fire. But that agreement broke down, as had several earlier accords.31 What made the Khasavyurt pact different was that Lebed and Maskhadov went beyond a cease fire to try to address the political issue at the heart of the conflict. The separatists had always demanded complete independence from Russia, which Yeltsin (urged on by his defense establishment) had always refused to grant. The document signed by Lebed would put off the issue of Chechnya’s status until the last day of the year in 2001, assuming the peace could hold that long.32 Even so, General Lebed’s agreement faced many hurdles, not the least of which was resistance in Moscow. Yeltsin had only vaguely given his backing to Lebed’s efforts. Critics had recently expressed alarm that Lebed’s actions could be interpreted as ceding control of Chechnya to the rebels, and a debate about who lost the war was sure to follow. Moreover, all previous cease fire agreements had dissolved in a sea of mistrust, with both sides accusing each other of violations. If, however, the deal could hold, it would almost surely propel Alexander Lebed beyond his position as Secretary of the Security Council, something Yeltsin would almost surely resist. Before this, Lebed had been Yeltsin’s opponent, finishing third in the race for president, behind Yeltsin and Zyuganov. Having run for president on a promise to end the war, Lebed bluntly acknowledged the weakness of Russian military forces in Chechnya and throughout the Russian Federation.

30  The Economist, London, 31 August 1996, 340:7981, 42. 31  Ibid. 32  Of course, the peace did not hold. The subject of the decision to go to war the second time in Chechnya is addressed in detail in Chapter 5 of this book.

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

61

The force of General Lebed’s peace accord in Chechnya created a window of opportunity for the Russian government, but it was wasted. Instead of using the time to define its goals in the region, working out a policy to achieve them, and developing an appropriate strategy that might secure long term peace and, dare say, even prosperity, Russia squandered the chance. Dmitrii Trenin has written that if the government in Moscow had used its financial levers, the economic incentives of its markets, it could have achieved both peace and prosperity.33 If the government had adopted a policy aimed at supporting moderate leaders like Aslan Maskhadov, isolating radicals, and providing as much of the necessary material incentives to get things moving again in Chechnya, and most importantly, recognizing that an independent Chechen state was not going to be a threat to Russia, then Russia might have been able to do so while negotiating economic, security, and other arrangements beneficial to both sides. Russia’s main leverage, argues Trenin, would have been the geographical facts of Chechnya’s relative isolation, allowing Russia to impose sanctions that would have strangled Chechnya if it failed to live up to its bargains. But instead, following the Khasavyurt peace accords, nothing like this was done. In October 1996, Yeltsin sacked Lebed from his short-lived post as head of the Security Council. Despite brokering one of the most significant security related agreements in the brief history of the Russian Federation, his outspoken candor was not welcome in the Kremlin’s inner circles, and Lebed’s political fate was soon sealed. By bringing General Lebed into the Kremlin in June, Yeltsin may have secured the margin of support among nationalists that he needed to clinch reelection. By throwing him out barely four months later, Yeltsin allowed Lebed to reclaim his natural role of political maverick, boosted by his new standing as a national policy maker and with his reputation hugely enhanced by the peace he made in Chechnya. Lebed’s replacement on the council was Ivan Rybkin, described by Dmitrii Trenin (among many others) as a “political lightweight” who was not up to the task of managing the nation’s security interests. National security policy with regard to Chechnya began to drift dangerously and inexorably toward another war.

Impact of Political Economics on the Military The Russian economy underwent tremendous stress as it moved from a centrally planned economy that had collapsed almost entirely before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, toward a free market system. Difficulties in implementing fiscal reforms aimed at raising government revenues and a dependence on short-term borrowing to finance budget deficits led to a serious 33  Dmitriy Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 181.

62

Russian Civil-Military Relations

financial crisis in 1998. Lower prices for Russia’s major export earners (oil and minerals) and a loss of investor confidence due to the Asian financial crisis exacerbated financial problems. The result was a rapid decline in the value of the ruble, flight of foreign investment, delayed payments on sovereign and private debts, a breakdown of commercial transactions through the banking system, and the threat of run-away inflation. Struggling to establish a modern market economy, modernize its industrial base, and regain strong economic growth, the Russian economy during the decade of the 1990s was marked by a poor business climate, deterioration in already threadbare living standards, and failure to institute modern market reforms. Conditions improved markedly in the period from 1999-2001, with annual output growing by an average six percent, and with some progress in structural reforms. Russia is heavily dependent on exports of commodities, particularly oil, natural gas, metals, and timber, which account for over eighty percent of exports, leaving the country vulnerable to swings in world prices. The industrial base was increasingly dilapidated and had to be replaced or modernized if the country was to achieve economic growth. The banking system, still in its infancy, was small, undercapitalized, inadequately supervised and dominated by state banks. Wild and unregulated in the early stages of post-communist transition, fortunes were made and lost with alarming speed and careless abandon. The lack of available credit to enterprises, particularly for small and medium size companies constrained growth. Sustained implementation of reforms was seen as vital to diversify the economy, reduce Russia’s vulnerability to commodity price shocks, raise living standards and underpin a further improvement in sovereign credit worthiness. The taxation system was either too tight or too loose. While many escaped taxation entirely, others suffered so badly that it was practically impossible to make a profit. Reforms had to take place, but none were forthcoming, at least not in the 1990s. Tax evasion and capital flight were rampant features of the Russian economy during the 1990s. Other problems included widespread fraud and corruption, lack of a strong legal system, and brain drain. When the Soviet Union collapsed, so did civilian supervision of the armed forces, at least for a time. To a great extent, centralized controls on resources and infrastructure had placed natural constraints on the military and made it inconvenient, if not difficult, to misappropriate funds and equipment. Liberalization and commercialization promoted unprecedented corruption and led to the formation of a military faction of bureaucratic capital. From 1991 to 1996, the government largely ignored issues related to military reform, reorganization, and defense industry conversion. The war in Chechnya forced attention to the dark side of the military, exposing a great deal of evidence that pointed to widespread misconduct.

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

63

Nodari Simonia describes the Western Group of the armed forces in the 1990s as a hotbed of corruption and embezzlement of state property.34 Scandalous abuse connected with illegal sale of cigarettes and liquor, the sale of military property, technology, weapons, and the illegal use of transportation by senior military commanders for their own personal use was reported widely in the press. Generals used conscripts to build luxury dachas for themselves and their families. There was another source of mass enrichment. The trade in arms and ammunition on Russian territory. Simonia reports the strange phenomenon of using explosions as cover for mass theft of military equipment. Warehouses storing expensive military equipment were intentionally bombed by military personnel who then claimed the explosions were accidental. In the ensuing confusion, the desired equipment would be removed and sold on the black market, while senior officers reported the equipment as lost in the fire. In February 1998 there were explosions in military warehouses in Volgograd and Saratov.35 Russians are fond of saying that a fish rots from its head. It has been suggested that a good example of this was Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. General Grachev was fond of “commercial diversions.” In February 1992, when he was Chairman of the State Committee on Defense and First Deputy Commander In Chief of the CIS Armed Forces, he joined a group of other general officers and founded a limited liability company called Aviakoninfo, set up to sell construction materials, buy timber, run cafes and restaurants, and other business enterprises. This company, Aviakoninfo, was not successful, reportedly because of “interference from the top.”36 Soon after Grachev was appointed Minister of Defense. One of his first actions was to create, October 1992, a state company called Voyentech for the sale of vast surpluses of arms, military technology and army property. Beginning in 1993, Grachev allowed the Russian Air Force to transport commercial cargo for profit. In the Navy, ships and submarines were simply “written off,” with their remains scavenged and sold openly for profit. Military commanders were encouraged to be as imaginative as possible in an effort to supplement their meager wages and funding. In one of Russia’s more ironic consequences, when Grachev was fired as Defense Minister in the summer of 1996, he was appointed as head of Rosvoorozheniye, Russia’s new (since 1993) clearing house of the sale of military hardware. Of course, this created an atmosphere that was ripe for corruption.37

34  Nodari Simonia, “Economic Interests and Political Power in Post-Soviet Russia,” in Archie Brown (ed.) Contemporary Russian Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 276. 35  A. Shafurkin and A. Serenko, Moscow, 24 February 1998, “Noviye Vzrivi na Armeiski Skladak” (“New Explosions in an Army Warehouse”) Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 36  Simonia, “Economic Interests and Political Power in Post-Soviet Russia,” 277. 37  [FBIS] FTS19960901000410, Moscow, Argumenty I Fakti, 1 September 1996, [in Russian], based on an article by A. Kuzmin: Rosvoorozheniye: Splitting the Legacy. [FBIS Translated Text, edited by the author]: “After the resignation of people close to Yeltsin, his chief bodyguard Aleksandr Korzhakov, Mikhail Barsukov, director of FSB, and their

64

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Rosvoorozheniye was able to feed on the defense industry only thanks to the grievous state the industry had been in for six years. A seventy percent reduction in military expenditures over the two year period 1991-1992, coupled with no civilian supervision, produced the neglect that led to serious crisis. Everyone was talking about defense conversion, but it never really worked. Despite efforts to develop commercial applications for military technology, by 1996, fully two thirds of these companies were unprofitable. The government remained mostly aloof from the whole issue of defense conversion. Money earmarked in the budget was distributed only in limited fashion in 1993-1994, and not at all in 1995-1997.38 ‘spiritual father’ Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets, a rich legacy was left and a serious fight for it has now developed. Now there are criminal allegations about Rosvoorozheniye, a super secret government company for the export and import of weapons and military equipment. By a letter from Yuri Skuratov, the prosecutor general of 7 June 1996, there will be an investigation into a criminal case involving concealment of revenue from taxation in very large amounts and illegal deals with foreign currency. During an investigation of Rosvoorozheniye by the Control and Auditing Administration of the Ministry of Finance of Russia, it was discovered that, in 1995, Rosvoorozheniye concealed profits in the amount of more than 137 billion rubles from the tax agencies. Additionally, the company’s budget had a shortfall of about R44 billion and illegal transactions worth $90 million involving foreign currency. The president has repeatedly ordered investigations of Rosvoorozheniye, by decree 1353 of 30 December 1993, edict 2109 of 24 November 1994, and directive 75 of 17 February 1995. The company’s suspicious activities include trafficking in some individual models of the newest T-80U tank, the Tunguska antiaircraft missile installation, with a set of rockets, ammunition, and other military equipment with a total value of $10.7 million. Evidence also indicates that some of the newest secret models of weapons were given away as gifts to members of foreign delegations, in some cases even before the weapons went into series production. It was specifically such a task that was set for his subordinates by the secret curator of Rosvoorozheniye, Aleksandr Korzhakov. Now, however, it would be difficult to fulfill. After Korzhakov’s resignation, a fight began for that tasty morsel of the foreign currency pie. Not just various Kremlin groups joined in the struggle for positions of influence in the company but criminal organizations as well. Banks controlled by Podolsk and Solntsevo criminal organizations, for instance, are attempting to establish control over the arms business by positioning their proteges at the head of Rosvoorozheniye. As of 7 July 1996, however, presidential directive 1553, addressed to Viktor Chernomyrdin and Aleksandr Lebed, by Boris Yeltsin ordered: ‘I consider it unfeasible at this stage to conduct any organizational or personnel changes in the effectively operating system of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries, particularly in the Rosvoorozheniye government company.’ As early as August, however, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, was recalled from the post of representative of the president in that company and his place was to have been taken by Matvey Burlakov, former commander of the Western Group of Forces. It was only at the very last moment that the appointment was canceled when Aleksandr Lebed intervened. There have always been plenty of contenders for positions in Rosvoorozheniye because officers and generals there receive commercial wages and bonuses.” 38  E. Titova, Moscow, 30 December 1997, “Budzhetniye Dolgi Oboronke Otlozheniye na Polgoda” (“Defense Budget Debts Deposited in Half Year”). Finansoviya Izvestia.

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

65

In sum, economic reforms aimed at executing important and needed executive branch civilian supervision of Russia’s military-industrial complex simply never happened. There was much impressive rhetoric, but very little action. The military was drifting closer and closer toward complete dysfunctionality based on corruption as well as lack of supervision and funding. All this before the economy crashed in the summer of 1998.39 In March 1998, Boris Yeltsin fired his entire government. Displeased with the rapid rise in popularity and influence of his latest Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, Yeltsin’s chose Sergei Kiriyenko, then a completely unknown and inexperienced bureaucrat who was only 35 years old. With the International Monetary Fund (IMF) teetering on the brink of withholding loan installments based on the uncertainty of Russia’s precariousness, Kiriyenko was handed responsibility of a ship of state that was about to go aground. A giant pyramid of short term treasury bonds, called “ГКО” (GKO) had built up enormous debt. Ever increasing interest rates had to continue climbing in order to lure investors who were increasingly nervous about Russia’s stability to keep floating the government’s debt. In 1996-1997, the government acted to open the market for GKOs to foreign direct investment, without having to go through dummy corporations in Russia. Shortly after Kiriyenko took over, net returns from these GKO short term treasury bonds came down to zero. By the middle of August 1998, the treasury was paying out the equivalent of almost one billion U.S. dollars each week to service the debt on previously issued GKO bonds, and on the 16th, it made the decision to stop issuing new ones. 39  Jane’s Defense Publications, “Executive Summary, Russia.” Military safety is still practically non-existent. More recently, according to Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, in 2002, 20,000 servicemen were wounded or in injured as a “Budzhetniye Dolgi Oboronke Otlozheniye na Polgoda” result of accidents and criminal activity in the armed forces. Financial and social conditions of service for contract soldiers and officers have marginally improved since 2000 but still remain far from those needed to boost esprit de corps. Recently, there has been some improvement in pay for military personnel, probably due in large part to better financial conditions as a result of higher oil prices. Since 2002, salaries have generally been paid on time, while contract soldiers’ pay has increased by about 70 percent. The officer corps, however, continues to experience financial hardship. Many officer families lack adequate accommodations, while the positive effect of recent pay increases has been offset by simultaneous withdrawal of social benefits. Situations have become even more exacerbated recently as all military personnel now have to pay income tax. Following the subordination in 2001 of Russia’s six military districts to the Army High Command, at the Military District of Moscow, the six regional Army Command Headquarters have merged with the Military District Headquarters. The process of streamlining and simplifying the chain of command could make the system of operational control over army troops more efficient. The levels of equipment in operational use have been steadily falling, while certain types of equipment, particularly many MI-24 attack helicopters and artillery pieces belonging to various military districts, have been transferred to Chechnya. Little or nothing is held in reserve.

66

Russian Civil-Military Relations

On 17 August 1998, when Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko announced that henceforth the Russian government would no longer defend the Ruble by propping it up with hard currency reserves, declaring a moratorium on debt service, he tried to reassure his audience that Russia would stand behind its obligations. But there was no mistaking the true meaning of Kiriyenko’s statement: the Russian government had effectively declared bankruptcy. What had begun as an exciting experiment in market reforms in transition to capitalism had ended in defeat. With debt spiraling seemingly into infinity, the economy was out of control and there was no way out. The effects of this announcement were predictably harsh. Lives were shattered over night as banks closed, settlements froze, and pensions and payments simply stopped. The faltering economic recovery that had been so long awaited after the debacles of “shock therapy” did an immediate turn back into negative territory. The country’s gross domestic product (GDP) that had begun to recover now lost ground. The Ruble went from 6:1 against the U.S. dollar to 30:1 before the slide finally stopped almost a year later. Inflation ravaged the markets and prices rose practically by the hour. Currency just dried up, and it was not possible to exchange dollars for rubles outside big cities. In Vladivostok it was impossible to pay a hotel bill; the author had to resort to barter in order to check out of the hotel Версаллес (Versailles) on 27 August40. People lost their jobs, businesses went bankrupt. Before it was over, 20 banks had simply ceased to exist. During the first post-Soviet economic crisis in 1992 the big losers were the elderly and retired, anyone who relied on pensions for health and well being, as well as anyone with any money in savings. This time it was Russia’s young and fledgling middle class, the employees of Russia’s new market economy, who lost the most.41 Kiriyenko was only 35 years old, Yeltsin’s third prime minister, appointed to his post just four months previously. Observers had heralded his government as a sign that Yeltsin was serious about reform. But that was not to be, the fish was already rotten at the head and it was far too late for the likes of young Kiriyenko to do anything that might save Russia’s shaky economy from precipitous default. Still, Russians were not ready to revolt. Instead of taking to the streets, they simply hunkered down and settled in to this new condition, appalling as it was. Russians began saying they felt they might be alright just as long as things did not get any worse. Instead of the aged and indigent getting hurt, this time the casualty list began with the relatively comfortable, those who had risked everything in order to start a new company—and a new life. Some significant markets survived 40 As U.S. Naval Attaché to Russia in August 1998, having been accredited only one month earlier, the author was at this time on travel to the Russian Far East to engage in meetings at the Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Vladivostok. The event regarding no currency with which to pay the hotel bill took place on 27 August 1998, just ten days after the onset of economic crisis happened on 17 August 1998. 41 Simonia, “Economic Interests and Political Power in Post-Soviet Russia,” 281.

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

67

and even did quite well after the crash. Exports continued to be strong; oil and gas brought in lucrative shares of hard currency. The devalued ruble generated opportunities for Russian products at home. When foreign items became prohibitively expensive, consumers turned to much cheaper domestic products. This, in turn, led to increased manufacturing which actually added jobs in a time of general malaise. In the armed forces, the most immediate effect was in pay. Soldiers asking for money had already become a common sight, but seeing officers in the same light was rare. Now officers joined their troops. Worse, some officers began using troops to enhance their own conditions. Conscripts were hired out to construction projects as cheap labor, a practice that had already been used by senior officers for some time. Military equipment was bartered or sold. What had been a furtively expressed shadow market in arms became much more open and bold. In Nakhodka, near Vladivostok, sailors scavenging out of service submarine hulks for precious metals and copper tubing they could sell for cash were killed when they encountered residual toxic waste and succumbed to lethal fumes from leaking chemical disposal canisters. Conditions surrounding the economic crash in 1998 were dominated by mismanagement. While the impact of all of this on the rest of the country is not disputed, the effect on Russia’s armed forces was severe. Military bases were not able to pay their utility bills. In Petropavlovsk submarines were lashed together using their nuclear reactors to power the naval base’s electrical grid.42 Desperate times seemed to beg for desperate measures, but none were forthcoming. As the months went by, a kind of normalcy settled in. Russians found endless ways to cope. Thane Gustafson wrote: “Despite a blow that would have crushed a normal market economy, Russia somehow resumed muddling along, under a succession of caretaker governments whose main virtue was that they did little to rock the boat, while the country waited for new elections and whatever a new leadership would bring.”43 As former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin said during a visit to Washington, D.C. in July 1999, “Russia’s exit from the August crisis was much faster than any of the experts had predicted.”44

42  Descriptions of each of these incidents were based on personal observations by the author, documented as official reports at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia during the months following the onset of economic crisis in August 1998. 43 Thane Gustafson, Capitalism Russian-Style (Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3. 44  Sergei Stepashin, remarks at the U.S.-Russia Business Council, 26 July 1999; the author was present.

68

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Impact of Foreign Policy on Military Civil-military relations in transition from communism were off to a very bad start in Russia, based on the negatives forces of impact by political uncertainties and crises of leadership. After the economic crisis of 1998, even as the economy began to turn more positive in 1999, the damage to the military had already been done. Civilian confidence in the military was lost and it was not seen as an honorable profession by the majority of Russians. In turn, the military had lost faith with the ability and intent of civilians to exercise competent authority over the defense establishment. Military leaders did not trust civilians to make good decisions about foreign policy, despite protestations to the contrary. In the Kremlin, notwithstanding the usual boastful rhetoric about the might of Russia’s armed forces, there was little faith that the military could deal effectively with threats to Russian interests. Richard Sakwa argues that post-communist Russian foreign policy has evolved through several phases.45 Outlining this evolution in terms of six main stages, the first two describe how foreign policy moved from undermining the viability and precipitating the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the third and fourth stages, from January 1992 to December 1995, foreign policy was at first overly enamored of the West, then overly estranged from it. Initial trust in Western styled post-communist transition failed to generate enough positive results to justify the faith and confidence that was at first devoted to it. This was followed by a period of Russia reasserting itself, with the result being failure to develop stable and predictable relations with the rest of the world. Throughout the period of Sakwa’s first four stages of post-communist Russian foreign46 policy, the primary emphasis of government was internal. Economic reform was the preeminent focus of attention. Finally, Sakwa’s last two stages: first the “new pragmatism,” and then the “new realism,” describe the period from 1996 to 2001, the timeframe in which this book is focused. By 1996 there was a new sense that Russia’s path of transition should be more pragmatic, depending on policies that recognized Russia’s domestic and foreign affairs priorities. Andrei Kozyrev was replaced as foreign minister by Yevgeniy Primakov in January 1996. Primakov was a pragmatic and realistic politician who understood great power politics and believed that Russia deserved to be taken seriously as a world class player, if not a great power of the stature held by its predecessor, the Soviet Union. The nature of these assumptions required that Russian foreign policy should have a European-Atlantic orientation because the world’s only remaining super-power was the United States, and U.S. power was most often exercised in terms of its European-Atlantic priorities. Primakov was very critical of the West, particularly the United States. His appointment as foreign 45  Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 349. 46  Ibid., 355.

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

69

minister, following what had been perceived by communists and nationalists in the Duma as Kozyrev’s commitment to constructive relations with the West at the expense of Russia’s best interests, was well received.47 In the military, there was a feeling that Primakov’s policies might signal improved civil-military relations and better conditions. But that did not happen. In September 1998, after the disastrous economic policies supervised by Prime Minister Kirienko proved to be the country’s fiscal downfall in August, Yevgeniy Primakov took over. He was replaced as foreign minister by Igor Ivanov. Primakov’s pragmatic influence continued to guide the nation’s foreign policy, but Ivanov was more cautious. In Kosovo, during the crisis of 1999, itself the subject of one of this book’s case studies, Ivanov’s rhetoric was tough, but he was careful not to go too far. Expressing sympathy for Serbia and for Milosevich, Russia did not commit troops or material in support of their cause. Russian foreign policy under Ivanov, with Primakov at the government’s helm, was unwilling to do more than merely express strong hopes that Serbian forces would prevail. Thus, the direction of Russia’s foreign policy remained “pragmatic,” in Richard Sakwa’s words, even after Primakov’s forced retirement in May 1999.48 By the summer of 1999, a new stage in development of Russian foreign policy was underway. What Sakwa describes as the “new realism” explains a move away from Euro-Atlanticism toward what has been called neo-Eurasianist realpolitik. Still pragmatic, this new stage also takes into account the essentially uni-polar nature of world politics at the present time. By the time Vladimir Putin’s presence began to make its mark in government, the focus of foreign policy was changing. Whereas the Primakov era had insisted that the world recognize Russia’s great power status, separate and distinct, even isolated, from the West, the new policy favored integration. Putin still insisted that Russia was, and would remain, a great power in world politics, but his commitment in support of broad integration with international systems, dominated by Western influence, was firm. The impact on the military was, ultimately, profound. While Sakwa’s fifth stage of foreign policy, so-called “new pragmatism,” appealed to the darker side of nationalism, one in which the military’s role might be to defend the national interest abroad in places like Kosovo, or at home in Chechnya, the sixth stage, “new realism,” signaled a more reasonable approach. This meant greater reliance on international military cooperation, something that was not welcome in the higher echelons of military leadership. General Colonel Leonid Ivashov, Head of the Defense Ministry’s Department of International Military Cooperation during most of the 1990s, was (and still is) a vocal spokesman on the subject of geopolitics and Russia’s world view.49 47  Ibid. 48  Ibid. 49  Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott (eds), Russian Military Reform, 19922002, Cass Series on Soviet (Russian) Military Institutions (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), 72. Henry Plater-Zyberk, The Russian Decision Makers in the Chechen

70

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Intelligent and erudite, General Ivashov was nevertheless one of the most antiWestern officers on the General Staff. His position allowed him to torpedo many initiatives which might have proven beneficial to Russia and its potential partners. In the 1990s he became the Ministry of Defense’s principal expert on NATO and one of its strongest critics. In spite of his hard-line image Ivashov retained his position because of his analytical skills and the ability to present his view clearly and concisely. Before NATO enlargement, he was invited to speak at closed hearings of the defense and security committees in the Duma. During these hearings, he made several predictions concerning NATO, based on what he perceived to be threatening expansionist behavior.50 NATO’s subsequent military intervention in Kosovo appeared to prove that his warnings were correct. During the conflict in Kosovo General Ivashov accompanied Yeltsin’s representative and former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Yugoslavia, contradicting him frequently and occasionally making his views clear to the media, independent from the views of government ministers.51 General Ivashov believes the world would be a better place if Russia resumed its role as one of primary influence. Ivashov was happiest when Russian foreign policy was based on assertiveness and strength. He was afraid of the impact on stability if the power and influence of the United States could not be checked. Ivashov perceived that integration with the West would represent what international relations scholar Kenneth Waltz calls bandwagoning behavior.52 Officers like Ivashov, and there were many in the latter half of the 1990s, advocated a multiConflict. Colonel General Leonid Grigorevich Ivashov, Head of the Main Directorate of International Military Co-operation of the Russian Defense Ministry, was born on 31 August 1943 at a state farm in the Kirghiz Republic. After graduating in 1964 from the Taskhent Higher All-Arms Command School, Ivashov served in the Carpathian Military District and then in the Soviet Group of Forces. In 1974 he graduated from the Frunze Military Academy and held the position of deputy commander of a regiment in the Moscow Military District. After working as a researcher at the Lenin Military-Political Academy, in December 1976 he was given a position in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), where he remained for the entire duration of his career in the army. After the August 1991 coup Ivashov lost his position as the head of the Administration Directorate of the MOD because of his alleged loyalty to the arrested Defense Minister Yazov. In July 1992 he was the Secretary of the Defense Ministry’s Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). His present position as head of the interrnational military cooperation department was bestowed on him by Boris Yeltsin in October 1996. 50  Aleksei Georgievich Arbatov and George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya, The Marshall Center Papers (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Deutschland: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2000), passim. 51  This episode is the principal subject of examination in this book’s first case study in Chapter 4: “Pristina Airport, Kosovo: The Russians Are Coming!” 52  Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Series in Political Science (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), passim.

Past as Prologue: Setting the Scene, 1996-1998

71

polar world as a more stable environment for international relations. Because of Russia’s legacy of Soviet era strength and world-class supremacy Ivashov believed that Russia had an obligation to uphold in seeking to balance the West, in general, and the United States, in particular. His argument resonated well with hard-liners in government, those who did not like Putin’s pragmatic version of realpolitik that appeared increasingly to place Russian foreign policy in the context of a world dominated by Western influence. Never mind that Putin believed Russia’s place should be integrated with the West because the national interest would ultimately be best served if it were indeed part of the West.53 In the late 1990s there were still plenty of senior policy makers in government who considered that Russia had been ill served by its evolution since the fall of the Soviet Union. These people want to renew the country’s strength and by way of military power return the nation to its former status. The impact on the military of such a move would be an improvement over the impoverished status to which it had already succumbed during a political environment characterized by uncertainty and what had been, for the most part, a generally pro-Western outlook in foreign affairs. Alexander Dugin is an example of the modern Russian nationalist. Unlike Vladimir Zhirinovsky, well known to most in the West for his bombastic rhetoric, Dugin might be called the “intellectual soul” of Russian nationalism.54 Dugin holds that there exists a spiritual connection between Russia and the destiny of the world. His argument appeals to nationalists in Russia who favor foreign policy that would emphasize Russia’s special role. Dugin is not active politically, but manages to influence the conduct of foreign affairs to some extent by means of his writings and activities in think tanks and institutes such as Moscow’s Institute for Geopolitical Studies. Since his retirement from active service in the army, Ivashov has served as the institute’s director. Alexander Dugin is a member of the institute’s board of directors. By 1999, Russia appeared to be somewhat precariously poised on the brink of a new millennium with little promise for optimism about what the future might hold. There is a saying in Russian that captures the negative outlook shared by so many at the time: “Na Rossii nikogda neperevedutsa duraki i plokhiye dorogi,” or 53  During an interview in May 1999 at the Ministry of Defense, General Colonel Leonid Ivashov, then Head of the MOD’s Department of International Cooperation, reminded the author that NATO was sending strong signals about new and aggressive threatening behavior that were unmistakable to Russia. He pointed out recent NATO initiatives such as restructuring of military forces, a new doctrine and strategic concept that allowed for out of area operations in some cases, and the recent “invasion,” as he put it, of the Balkans. 54  Attributed to Dr. Jacob Kipp during an interview with the author at the Foreign Military Studies Office in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on 6-7 July 2005. Dr. Kipp feels strongly that Western scholars generally underestimate the influence of Alexander Dugin in what he (Kipp) considers a rising, if nascent, nationalism in contemporary Russian politics. Kipp emphasized to the author Dugin’s influential role in Ivashov’s education, having served as a member of Ivashov’s doctoral book committee.

72

Russian Civil-Military Relations

“Russia will never rid herself of fools and bad roads.”55 It seemed as if the phrase had never been more accurate in describing Russia’s prospects. Russia’s politicalmilitary climate was no less acutely strained. Despite the warnings of hard-liners like Ivashov, NATO was enlarging, implementing a new concept of operations for its security forces that allowed for military operations outside NATO borders. In the Balkans, the situation was intolerable as ethnic cleansing appeared to be the modern incarnation of genocide on the European continent. Serbians, led by Slobodan Milosevich were threatened by NATO military intervention if they did not stop what they were doing to the Albanian population in Kosovo. Russian sympathy was with Serbia, if only passively. Despite openly pro-Serbian demonstrations in Moscow, mostly aimed at NATO embassies, Russia did not commit military support. Slobodan Milosevich was represented in Moscow by his brother, Borislav, as Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Chechnya demonstrated increasing signs that the tenuous peace deal that had been brokered by General Lebed at Khasavyurt was fraying fast. Many observers felt that renewed hostilities between Chechens and Russians were probably inevitable. Corruption in the military invited criticism from all sides and demanded reform. But reform was slow in coming. Uncertainty about who was really calling the shots led to bad decisions and misinterpretations by the military. It was increasingly difficult to discern the intentions of Boris Yeltsin’s government and the military appeared quite content to go its own way. In extraordinary efforts to garner enhanced leverage in bureaucratic budget battles, the military began taking inordinate risks. The navy saw opportunities to improve its weakened position by showing how well it could perform in an elaborate exercise set to sail in the Barents Sea in August 2000. But success was not forthcoming. Decisions to risk the navy’s blood and treasure by using an obsolete exercise torpedo resulted in loss of one of the country’s most valuable submarines and all 118 lives aboard the Kursk. In the 1990s civil-military relations in Russia became a barometer for politicalmilitary frustrations. The government of Russia had to deal with many conflicting priorities. Military reform was necessary, but reform never comes easy, not least in post-communist transitions. The next three chapters illuminate the dynamics of several factors involved in Russian civil-military relations during the late stages of the country’s first post-communist decade.

55  Attributed to Russian historian Vladimir Gilyerovski.

Chapter 4

Case I: The Russians Are Coming! The Race to Pristina Airport, June 1999

By the spring of 1999, the epicenter of crisis in the Balkans was in Kosovo. While Serbian forces loyal to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Slobodan Milosevich conducted a relentless campaign of ethnic cleansing, there was increasingly grave concern that Kosovar Albanians might be wiped out in the modern equivalent of genocide. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), on behalf of Europe and the United States, was prepared to conduct an air bombardment campaign to wrest power from Milosevich and pave the way for peace. Russian sympathy was with Serbia, but this view had not, so far at least, led to active military support. Despite assurances that NATO would not exploit Russia’s vulnerability as it struggled with transition from Soviet era communism, alliance military forces intervened in Kosovo. This action was perceived in Russia as consistent with a new and more aggressive NATO policy of expansion and extra-territorial adventurism. On 24 March, as (then) Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov was flying en route to Washington for meetings aimed at staving off NATO military intervention, the bombing campaign began. Primakov turned his airplane around and headed back to Moscow. During five consecutive days immediately after the first bombs fell in Kosovo, Russian demonstrators took to the streets of Moscow to show their anger and frustration. Following months of high level diplomacy since the initial NATO bombing campaign began, Russian Army peacekeepers were finally present in the Balkans.  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� NATO had only recently published and implemented a new concept of operations allowing for use of force outside the borders of NATO allies (so-called “out of area” operations) if such actions were considered appropriate as defensive measures in NATO’s interest. Russia resisted this change in NATO’s strategic vision, claiming it threatened the peace of Russia and other countries in the region formerly known as the Warsaw Pact.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ In the Russian Army, peacekeeper duty was considered to be a plum assignment. Not only did it offer a way to escape the routine hazards of army life, it also came with pay, something increasingly unreliable in military service in Russia, especially following the economic crisis of August 1998. NATO was nervous about the quality of Russian soldiers and insisted on training prior to service in the Balkans. A NATO-standard training camp was set up near Moscow, under the supervision of the Moscow Military District Commander. Ostensibly, the training conducted there would prepare troops for duty by helping them to gain appreciation for the value of protecting human rights, avoiding the kinds of abuses attributed to the Russian Army in Chechnya during the period 1994-1996. Suspected

74

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Their limited role represented tenuous relations between Russia and NATO, ostensibly under the auspices of the NATO’s Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The PJC was created in 1997 in conjunction with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, aimed at providing a venue for closer and more effective relations. It never worked very well, and both sides remained frustrated during the events leading up to NATO’s decision to intervene actively in the Balkans crisis. High-level diplomacy was underway almost daily, as Russian President Yeltsin made many phone calls to his American counterpart, suggesting in strong terms that the only chance for long-term peace would be through Russian participation. NATO’s Balkans strategy demonstrated its new doctrine. Before the end of the Cold War, the Atlantic alliance’s posture was aimed solely at defeating the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Now there was a new “out of area” element in the doctrine that allowed for the use of military force in places that were not directly related to defense of a member nation. At the same time, NATO wanted to enlarge itself by considering the membership candidacies of several former Warsaw Pact countries made newly independent by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Together, the new out of area doctrine and NATO enlargement, these elements seemed threatening to Russia. In the military, senior officers called on the president to oppose NATO. Some of these officers even made speeches about the “true nature of America’s intentions,” emphasizing NATO’s Balkans policy and its apparently irreversible policy of enlargement as evidence. Because Russia’s military doctrine was defensively oriented, acting in direct support of Serbia was perceived by the military to be part of its remit. Some Russian Army generals believed that NATO would use Kosovo to try out its new “expansionist” doctrine and even some of its latest “offensive” weaponry before using it against Russian forces later on. A kind of defensive paranoia sprang up among many in Russia’s senior military leadership, and pressure mounted to do something about NATO’s aggressiveness before it was too late. When NATO undertook to wage war in Kosovo, the defense establishment in Russia was mostly weak and in disarray. President Yeltsin, moving from one unacceptable prime minister to another, tried to consolidate his power over the armed forces by appointing effective managers to key positions. Vladimir corruption was later confirmed when General Lieutenant Nicolai Makarov, Chief of Staff to the Moscow Military District Commander, travelled to the United States as a member of an official delegation (Harvard University’s Russian Generals Program in February 2000). While visiting a U.S. Army post in Virginia, the general took out a large roll of hundred dollar bills to pay for an item. When his escort officer, a U.S. Army Major, asked where he got so much money, the general responded there were certain “opportunities” that went with his job. Later, after some considerable evening libations, the general confided to his escort that families of soldiers in Russia were willing to pay to get their sons into NATO peacekeeping service because of its inherent advantages over alternative forms of duty.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ General Colonel Leonid Ivashov, head of International Military Cooperation at the Russian Ministry of Defense, speaking to foreign military attachés at the Ministry of Defense in March 1999.

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

75

Putin was Secretary of the National Security Council, serving simultaneously as Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor organization of the former Soviet KGB. Marshal (equivalent to a five-star general officer) Igor Sergeyev was Minister of Defense, having held that position since Yeltsin fired General of the Army Igor Rodionov early in 1997. Rodionov had replaced General Pavel Grachev after Yeltsin’s reelection in 1996. Sergeyev was from the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) instead of the mainstream Army, a fact that made it difficult for him to earn respect from the army’s senior officers. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, Sergeyev was not inclined to undertake serious military reforms, preferring instead to maintain the less confrontational status quo. Chief of the General Staff was General of the Army Anatoliy Kvashnin, an old school general officer brought up under the Soviet system and schooled in the traditional Soviet

 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Putin was already serving as director of the FSB, having been appointed to that post in July 1998. At approximately the same time as NATO’s military intervention (bombing campaign) in Kosovo began, March 1999, he was assigned additional duties as secretary of the security council. On 9 August, Yeltsin once again reshuffled the deck, elevating Putin to the post of first deputy prime minister, then to (acting) prime minister (following Sergei Stepashin’s ouster on the same day). Putin remained secretary of the security council until mid-November, when he was replaced by Sergei Ivanov. Finally, Putin became (acting) president when Yeltsin resigned on 31 December 1999. Thus was established Vladimir Putin’s somewhat meteoric rise to power.  ���������������������������������������������������������� Pavel Felgenhauer, “Degradation of the Russian Military,” ISCP 15:1, . “Once he became Defense Minister, Sergeyev did his best to channel all available resources into the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). From 1997 to 2000, up to 80 percent of Defense Ministry (MOD) procurement money was spent on SRF-related research and development projects and to buy new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the period from 1998 to 2000, Russia was procuring 20 to 30 new ICBMs each year, the most modern SS-27 (Topol-M) and also the Soviet-designed SS-25 (Topol). Russia was building more ICBMs per year than all of the other world nuclear powers put together, but not buying any new conventional weapons. Sergeyev also promoted a focused military reform plan that was mainly aimed at enhancing the SRF. By 1998, the Space Forces that conduct space launches were merged with the SRF. By manning commercial launches of satellites, the Space Forces were earning millions of extra-budgetary dollars. The main idea of the merger with the SRF was to put Sergeyev and his supporters in control of the income that was being generated by these commercial launches. Several years later, after Sergeyev was ousted, the merger was called off and the Space Forces were reinstated as an independent agency. In November 1998, Sergeyev urged Yeltsin to sign a decree to create a Joint Main Command of the Strategic Deterrence Forces, which would enhance the SRF by transferring command of the entire Russian nuclear triad: land, naval, and air (strategic bombers) away from the General Staff. This presidential ‘ukaz’ was never enacted and the new command was not formed. Kvashnin mobilized opposition to the SRF in the defense ministry, outplayed Sergeyev in Kremlin intrigues, and prevented the formation of this Joint Main Command that could have seriously diluted the power of the General Staff.”

76

Russian Civil-Military Relations

world view that placed Russian power at the center of world politics. Kvashnin’s principal assistant for strategic planning and operations was General Colonel Yuri Baluyevskiy, a cool headed professional soldier who was less inclined than his boss to tilt at the political windmills of the day. On the State Duma Defense Committee, there were calls for revising the country’s National Security Policy and its Military Doctrine. Both would need to be rewritten to take into account NATO’s new “offensive” strategy and doctrine. Roman Popkovich was chairman of the committee, his deputy was Alexei Arbatov. Arbatov’s father, Georgiy, was instrumental in crafting Soviet strategy and military doctrine during the period when Mikhail Gorbachev was trying to change the system in order to stave off collapse. The Arbatovs were “new thinkers” who believed changes were essential. During the development of Russia’s new and revised national security policy and military doctrine, Alexei Arbatov occasionally met with military attachés from the American Embassy to discuss his views about the contents of various drafts. Arbatov felt the U.S. underestimated the Russian point of view regarding threat perceptions, emphasizing that Russia would have to respond if NATO expansion led to conflict in Eastern Europe.10 Early in 1999, at a diplomatic reception hosted by the Indian Embassy to celebrate the country’s National Day, (then) Duma member Alexei Arbatov engaged the author in conversation. He said that the atmosphere in the Duma was tense because there was concern that military officers might take advantage of perceived weaknesses in the government to “try out a more aggressive response to the crisis in the Balkans.” Arbatov expressed an urgent need for better national security policy and military doctrine that would be more specific about the differences between offense and defense, among other things. He said he was working at that time on a new draft doctrine, and invited the author to meet with him soon to review it. Arbatov said he was not concerned about military coup, doubting that possibility, but about another symptom of military insubordination—the military’s inclination

 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Kvashnin and his boss, Minister of Defense Sergeyev were constantly at odds over reform. Kvashnin blamed Sergeyev for misunderstanding the requirements of Russia’s ground forces because Sergeyev was from the rocket forces. Much later, in the spring of 2001, Putin eventually replaced Sergeyev with a civilian, Sergei Ivanov (Secretary of the Security Council following Putin’s elevation to Prime Minister).  ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Late in 2004, President Putin finally sacked Kvashnin as Chief of the Army, replacing him with Baluyevskiy.  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Referring to the fact that doctrine established in 1993 was based largely on outdated values, and national security policy in 1997 had outstripped the doctrine in its validity.  ��������������������������������������������������� The author was often present for these discussions. 10 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Aleksei Georgievich Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, Robert Legvold, and East-West Institute, Russia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment (‘Eurasia in the 21st Century’ series) (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

77

to go its own way in the event that civilian authorities did not correctly perceive (and act on) threats to Russian interests.11 The security environment in the summer of 1999 was thus to some extent confused and disoriented because there was so much uncertainty, and because of tensions deriving from harsh conditions. The military may have perceived that civilian control was not as relevant as it should have been. The situation in the Balkans was a particular flash point because it accentuated Russia’s weakness and inability to defend its interests in the region. If defense of the homeland could be extended to imply defense of neighboring regions inhabited by proRussian populations such as in Serbia, there might be an opportunity for military adventurism. The army’s reputation was still suffering from its poor performance in the first Chechen war and it may have concluded that the crisis in the Balkans offered an opportunity for redemption. Alexei Arbatov told the author he considered improved U.S.-Russian relations key in avoiding unwanted confrontations between the Russian Army and NATO forces in the Balkans because good relations might deter military adventurism.12 But U.S.-Russian relations did not improve. After NATO began bombing in Kosovo in March 1999, anti-war demonstrations in the streets surrounding the United States Embassy in Moscow eventually spread to the embassies of other NATO countries in the Russian capital. Some of these events erupted in violence. On March 27th, more than 5,000 people assembled outside the American Embassy. Anti-American chants were personally led by Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Later that same afternoon there was an attempted attack on the embassy building by two men using rocket propelled grenades.13 To Western observers, it looked like Yeltsin might be losing control of the situation. In truth this was not an indication of control at all, at least not in terms of military forces. Not until several weeks later, when a young army conscript scaled the embassy walls, did the military get involved at all.14 This incident was an anomaly, of course, and the Russian military remained subordinate throughout the affair.

11 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Moscow’s Radisson Slavyanskaya Hotel, 26 January 1999, reception honoring India’s Republic Day. Details of this conversation were reported to the Defense Intelligence Agency (unclassified) and are chronicled in the personal and professional notes of Captain Robert Brannon, formerly U.S. Naval Attaché in Russia (1998-2001), author of this book. 12 ����� Ibid. 13 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ The “old” American Embassy was at that time located on Sadovoye Koltso, Moscow’s Garden Ring Road. Although construction of a new embassy building located next door was by this time complete, the new facility was not yet occupied at this time. 14 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Although the military officially denied any connection with these activities, there were signs that it was aligned, at least in sympathy, if not in support. The only actual breach to the American Embassy’s security happened when one slightly inebriated soldier managed to scale the embassy’s security fences, hot-wired the Ambassador’s Cadillac and drove it into a security guard-house, causing very limited damage. Embassy marines fired on the soldier and he was wounded. In debriefs after the fact, the soldier said he had been

78

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Strongly opposed to NATO’s new war against a people for whom Russia held particular affection, senior military officers began to hold press conferences calling on the Yeltsin administration to take immediate steps of counter-force in response to NATO’s actions in the Balkans.15 As negotiations continued with NATO about how best to involve Russia in post-conflict Bosnia and Kosovo, tensions grew on both sides. NATO insisted that no force should operate outside NATO command and control. Allowing Russia to operate independently, under its own command and control authority, would represent de facto partition of Kosovo. At the Yugoslavian Embassy in Moscow, Borislav Milosevich was his brother Slobodan’s ambassador to Russia, Captain Milutin Ognyanovich was defense (and naval) attaché, and Colonel Mikhail Petrovich was the military (Army) attaché. Because official communications had been halted between Yugoslavian diplomats and their counterparts from NATO countries after the outbreak of the war, it fell to “back channels” between Ognyanovich and his American counterpart to pass along questions and answers on behalf of both governments.16 Each time the two officers met in Moscow they were subjects of surveillance by Russian military intelligence (GRU) observers. The Russian Army may thus have had access to sensitive information either exclusively or in advance of civilian defense authorities.17 It is possible that this may have contributed subsequently to the army’s decisions about its conduct in Kosovo. According to Ognyanovich, the Russians were anxious to help, keen to find a way to be assigned some form of after-action responsibility in the Kosovo peace plan that would guarantee long term Russian presence on the

“put up” to the act. At the time, practically no credibility was given to his statements, but suspicions remained. 15 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� One of the most vocal of these spokesmen was General Colonel Leonid Ivashov, then head of the Ministry of Defense’s Directorate of International Military Cooperation. 16 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Because Milutin Ognyanovich, an ethnic Serbian from Montenegro, was a Captain in the Yugoslavian Navy, both sides decided the most logical counterpart at the American Embassy would be the naval attaché, Captain Robert Brannon, the author of this book. From the summer of 1999 until Brannon was expelled from Russia in June 2001, the two officers met “unofficially” more than a dozen times to discuss questions and concerns about the war. Topics included President Slobodan Milosevich’s political opposition and the possibility that someone might succeed in ousting him, as well as potential locations of war crimes evidence. Ognyanovich persistently complained to Brannon that the U.S. was making negotiations more difficult by shifting priorities, calling on Milosevich’s government to comply with first one demand and then another. He often expressed frustration that his country would never be able to satisfy American demands. Ognyanovich also insisted that whatever happened in post-conflict Kosovo, Russia would have to be included if Serbian cooperation was to be expected. These items of interest were reported back to Washington at appropriate levels and are documented in the author’s professional files. 17 ����������������� Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2001), 194 General Clark was suspicious that Milosevich must have been getting intelligence from the Russians on a number of occasions. This arrangement may have been reciprocal.

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

79

ground, with a commensurately important position in negotiations with NATO in Brussels. Milosevich reportedly appreciated this effort and tried to give certain unspecified advantages to Russian forces. The extent to which this may have assisted the Russian Army’s dash to Pristina is not clear, but the implications are there, nonetheless. Recalling concerns about aggressive military plans to exploit perceived weaknesses in government by demonstrating adventurism, when the Russian Navy announced its intention to send combatant ships from the Black Sea Fleet into the Adriatic Sea, the decision was met with concern in the United States.18 These ships would purportedly show Russian resolve and lend support to Serbia forces by conducting surveillance against NATO forces in the area. This caused alarm at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The American Embassy in Moscow was asked to ascertain the credibility of these claims. Because there were very few ships in the Black Sea Fleet that were actually capable of operating at sea at this time, only a small intelligence collection vessel (an “AGI” in NATO parlance), the Liman, was dispatched. When the ship arrived in the Adriatic, NATO was concerned not only about intelligence gathering capabilities, but also whether the Liman might attempt to shoot down low flying aircraft such as the air force C-130 Hercules or navy P3 Orion.19 Because of this concern, U.S. Embassy officials made every effort to learn as much as possible about the ship’s capabilities. In a conversation with Igor Sutyagin, a research scientist at the Russian Academy of Science’s USA-Canada Institute, the American naval attaché learned that the only weapons capability the ship likely had was the SA-7 “Grail,” a hand-held, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile.20 Sutyagin stressed the fact that this was merely a capability, since there was no evidence the ship actually had the weapons on board. While the SA-7 could certainly threaten low flying aircraft, there was no reason to suspect offensive intent, and there was certainly no precedent for using weapons of this kind against

18 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The Black Sea Fleet was in a state of crumbling disrepair in 1999. Ships’ crews were growing vegetables at gardens in town (Sevastopol) to augment meager food supplies. A young Navy Lieutenant (name intentionally withheld) told the U.S. Naval Attaché he did not believe junior officers were still capable of operating ships at sea because training had been practically eliminated. “If we have to put to sea now they will have to bring the old Captains out of retirement because we don’t know how to do it anymore,” he said. This information is documented in the author’s professional files. 19 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Originally designed as an anti-submarine warfare aircraft, the Orions were by the late 1990s increasingly being deployed in support of surveillance and reconnaissance roles and missions. 20 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Igor Sutyagin was subsequently arrested by the FSB and charged with treason and espionage by passing sensitive information to the United States and to Britain. A telephone call, placed from the American Embassy in Moscow to the Russian Academy of Sciences, about the ship LIMAN was taped by Russian intelligence services and used in court and in a television news report to incriminate both Sutyagin and the American naval attaché.

80

Russian Civil-Military Relations

either NATO or the United States. Furthermore, Sutyagin said he did not believe Russia would do such a thing.21 As U.S.-Russian relations reached new lows, the two leaders began to reach out to each other. In the United States, the Clinton administration remained committed to Yeltsin and his government as the best available option to avoid even greater problems. An ailing Boris Yeltsin was growing increasingly more unreliable and unsteady. Telephone calls between Russian and American heads of state revealed Yeltsin’s conversational rambling and seemingly pointless pleas for Clinton’s help in resolving the “mess” that was going on in Kosovo, while Clinton looked for ways to get Russia involved in a meaningful way without allowing them too much sway in the decision making process. Strobe Talbott wrote about some of these conversations. In one, on Sunday, 25 April, 1999, Yeltsin told Clinton there were “forces in the Duma and the military that were agitating to send a flotilla into the Mediterranean in a show of support for Serbia, and to provide arms to Belgrade, including anti-aircraft systems that would endanger NATO pilots.” Apparently outraged at the military’s aggressiveness, Yeltsin reportedly told Clinton he had recently fired a military commander in the Russian Far East who was preparing a battalion for combat in Serbia without being directed to do so.22 The fact that Yeltsin told Clinton he had fired a military commander who was getting ahead of Yeltsin’s policy is particularly insightful in view of what happened later at the Pristina Airport in Kosovo. Yeltsin wanted Clinton to help him by strengthening U.S.-Russian relations under the auspices of Gore-Chernomyrdin, and by endorsing the idea of Russian assistance in resolving the Balkans crisis. At Petersburg, Germany, during the first week of June, Strobe Talbott described meetings with the Russian envoy on the Balkans crisis, former Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin, and the senior military representative, General Colonel 21 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Patrick E. Tyler, “That Russian Espionage Tape Was Not Quite All It Seemed,” The New York Times, 30 March 2001, A-8 Abstract: The tape, aired recently in a television news program on Moscow’s RTR, consisted of a conversation in English between the scholar, Igor Sutyagin, and the American naval attaché, Captain Robert Brannon, accompanied by a voice-over in Russian that was presented as a translation of the conversation. The difference between the Russian narration and the actual conversation beneath it raised concerns among Mr. Sutyagin’s friends and supporters that the Federal Security Service had taken the opportunity of the broadcast about alleged American espionage to strengthen its case against Mr. Sutyagin, who is on trial for espionage and treason, charges that stem from his role in contributing to a book on Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal and in providing consultant services to foreign organizations on Russian military affairs. The bulk of the 44-second audio recording consists of friendly chat between Captain Brannon and Mr. Sutyagin. Brannon asks, “Have you received the fax I tried to send you?” Sutyagin replies that he has, and then adds, “the best was that envelope.” (Author’s note: The envelope in this conversation contained an invitation to dinner at the author’s home and did not in any way imply secrecy.) 22 ���������������� Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York, NY: Random House, 2002), 310.

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

81

Leonid Ivashov, in terms of disappointment and dismay. Talbott recalled Ivashov as “the military intelligence officer who had done his best to scuttle agreement in the final rounds of negotiations over the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997.23 Now, Ivashov threw himself with verve into his new task of driving a stake through the heart of a NATO-led international force.” In his book, Talbott refers to Ivashov as “Evil-Shoff.”24 As the two sides tried to hammer out agreements on Russian participation, the principal negotiators on the Russian team, Chernomyrdin and Ivashov, appeared to be at logger heads with each other. Ivashov expressed discontent with the way Russians had been treated in the Bosnia peace accords, avowing not to repeat the same mistake again. In one particularly disturbing exchange, Talbott related overhearing the two shouting at each other in the next room, Chernomyrdin apparently threatening to leave, allowing Ivashov to continue on alone. Talbott took this to mean that Chernomyrdin may have been letting Ivashov play the heavy intentionally so that when he failed, Chernomyrdin could then get the political leadership in Moscow (unsure of whether that would be Yeltsin or his Prime Minister, Sergei Stepashin) to overrule the military.25 In subsequent exchanges it appeared that the deal was about to be finalized. But, as Strobe Talbott related in his memoirs, “We were just about to get up from the table and shake hands when General Ivashov made a formal statement dissociating himself from the document since the Minister of Defense had not cleared it.” According to Talbott, Chernomyrdin “pursed his lips and his face turned red at this final display of insubordination, but he said nothing.” For the Americans, the moment was “as disturbing as it was dramatic: Chernomyrdin represented the President of Russia, who was also the commander in chief of the Russian military. Ivashov was committing an act of virtual mutiny. He was certainly flouting the principle of civilian control of the military.”26 In Helsinki, Finland, to wrap things up, all sides in the negotiation seemed at last to be in sync, at least sufficiently in sync to attempt a joint communique. But trouble was brewing back in Moscow. In Chernomyrdin’s absence, Ivashov was holding press conferences denouncing the plan, accusing Chernomyrdin of treason. Although Yeltsin had vested in Chernomyrdin plenipotentiary powers, his endorsement was apparently contained in a top-secret document not available to the Duma. Because of this, Chernomyrdin was not able to defend himself and the allegations threatened to undermine everything. Chernomyrdin hurried back to Moscow and the others soon followed. In Moscow, during the second week in June, a delegation that included Steve Covington, from NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and U.S. Army Brigadier General George Casey met at the Ministry of Defense. On 9 June, as Strobe 23  24  25  26 

Ibid., 321. Ibid., 345. Ibid., 325. Ibid., 326.

82

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Talbott’s plane was en route to Moscow for the eighth time in ten weeks, Covington and Casey were engaged in discussions about arrangements for postconflict peacekeeping operations in Kosovo with a Russian delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Avdeyev and General Colonel Ivashov. While civilian diplomats continued to stress the need for greater Russian influence in the area, Ivashov consistently advocated the application of military force as the only way to guarantee Russian influence. At one point in the discussion, Covington told Ivashov that the “KFOR27 train had already left the station and the Russians had better cooperate or else they’d miss the train entirely.” After a short break, Ivashov reentered the debate with the assertion that “Russia had decided to take her own train.”28 It is not known what communications might have taken place while Ivashov was out of the room, but he almost certainly was not discussing his options with civilians. During the talks that followed, there were hints, by way of questions asked, that Pristina Airport (known more accurately as Slatina Airport, the two are one and the same) might be the object of Russian military operations in some way. The Russians laid claim to a sector in post-war Kosovo, mentioning Pristina Airport as a possible site for deployment of troops. As the talks progressed, Avdeyev softened his position, arguing for a political-track solution in support of long term Russian interests in the region. Ivashov held a hard line, insisting that Russia could not be well served with anything less that its own territorial sector. As the talks ended, Ivashov told Casey that within six hours of NATO forces entering the area, Russian troops would “go into the north and take the sector we want.”29 Despite the fact that Russian troops had become part of NATO’s peacekeeping force in the Balkans, Russia had no real say in their mission once deployed. In Brussels, NATO authorities refused Russia any opportunity to negotiate for greater influence, fearing a veto in the event military actions were undertaken directly against the Serbs. As it turned out, these fears were justified. In June 1999, when Russian troops moved into the airport at Pristina, occupying the airfield and demanding a greater role for Russia in post-conflict Kosovo, the ensuing confrontation between Russia and the West became the closest brush with war since the Cuban Missile Crisis almost forty years earlier.

What Happened Following what seemed like good progress in the Moscow talks, Strobe Talbott’s plane was en route back to Washington on 10 June. The plan was coalescing around Russian participation in Kosovo in return for assistance in getting President 27  NATO title for the peacekeeping force that would operate there—the Kosovo Force, or simply “KFOR.” 28  Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, 371-75. 29  Ibid., 377.

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

83

Slobodan Milosevich to step down and surrender himself to peacekeepers. But as early as the evening of the 10th, there were rumors that Russian troops in Bosnia might be moving toward Kosovo. The stakes were higher now and the peace plan was in trouble. Talbott turned his plane around and headed back to Moscow. On the night of 11 June, a force of about 200 Russian paratroops, mostly mechanized infantry, moved quickly from Bosnia into Kosovo, occupying the Slatina Airport, about 12 kilometers southwest of Pristina, in the early morning hours of the 12th. The immediate effect was to preemptively block the scheduled arrival of the NATO peacekeeping force. Although the Russian troops soon ran short of supplies, and ended up asking the NATO contingent for food and water, at the time the action was seen as a fearsome show of strength. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (Europe), U.S. Army General Wesley Clark, reacted strongly. Clark told his military commander in theater, British Lieutenant General Michael Jackson, to enter the airport with sufficient forces to counter the Russian presence and to get them to back down. Jackson was reluctant to confront the Russians so openly, afraid of “starting world war three.”30 On the Russian side, military forces in the Balkans were commanded by General Lieutenant Victor Zavarzin. Shortly after the move into Kosovo, Zavarzin was promoted by President Yeltsin to General Colonel.31 As the struggle for position developed in the days immediately after the Russian move, because of Zavarzin’s rank, not only did the Russian Commander outflank the NATO Commander, it now appeared he outranked him as well. Although this did not impact on any decisions that followed, it certainly rankled the nerves of Clark and Jackson. The 200 or so paratroops that occupied the airport were part of a larger Russian peacekeeping battalion, about 1,200 strong in total. The force was not well supplied, at least not independently. Sufficiency was dependent on NATO because the peacekeepers were ostensibly operating under NATO’s command authority. Any independent operation such as the one at the airport in Pristina would be difficult to undertake for very long because supplies 30  Ibid., 394. 31  Craig R. Whitney, “NATO Ties With Russia Soured Before Bombing,” The New York Times, 19 June 1999, A-6. Much was made at the time of this act representing tacit (after the fact) approval of the operation by the president, but in the Russian Army’s personnel system, it is more likely that Zavarzin was recommended for this promotion, quite possibly long before this incident, by the General Staff. The president’s approval would have been easy to get. It should also be noted that there is disparity in the terms used for military rank between Russia and most Western countries. Whereas the rank of Colonel General in Russia is perceived to be equivalent to Western four star officers, Generals and Admirals, it actually represents a lower rank—equivalent to three stars, Lieutenant General or Vice Admiral. Thus the perception, in Russia, that Zavarzin’s new rank made him senior to Lieutenant General Jackson. In actuality, the act placed them on par with each other. In Russian terms, the lowest ranking general officer is a General Major, (1 star), followed by General Lieutenant (2 stars), General Colonel (3 stars), General of the Army (4 stars), and Marshal of the Russian Federation (5 stars).

Russian Civil-Military Relations

84

would soon run out. The operation was significant, not least for its boldness. The question is who made the decision to go in? In this critically important and highly visible application of the military instrument, who called the shots? The incident was interpreted differently in Russia. As the story broke in the press, some correspondents reported concerns in government that the military might have overstepped its bounds, others were pleased that the Russian Army32 might be able to restore national pride after a string of humiliations the country had suffered.

The Russian Perspective Because it reveals the narrative from the Russian point of view, a short synopsis of events as reported by General Zavarzin’s contingent in one of Moscow’s popular journals, Komsomolskaya Pravda, edited by the author, follows: Wednesday, 9 June: The Day Before NATO troops were preparing for a ground operation in Kosovo, paying no attention to Russia’s demands for coordinated participation. Russian intelligence reports from Yugoslavia to the General Staff in Moscow said that the Kosovo Serbs were hurriedly preparing to flee north and were already beginning to torch their homes. The first columns of refugees were observed. Ivashov and other generals were summoned for intensive consultations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ivashov gave journalists a significant hint: unless we are given a sector of responsibility on amicable terms, we will not be asking for one. The General Staff learned that at precisely midnight on Friday British convoys supported by an American landing force were to burst into Kosovo: the latter were already at the approaches to an Adriatic port. The headquarters of British General Michael Jackson, commander of the NATO peacekeeping contingent, were be located at the airport near Pristina. The best minds of the General Staff racked their brains over how to get out of this hopeless situation. Thursday, 10 June: The Plan In the morning General Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff, got in touch with General Zavarzin, Russia’s representative at NATO headquarters in Brussels, to hear his proposals. Zavarzin, who was at that time at the headquarters of our peacekeeping contingent in Bosnia, asked the chief of the General Staff for time to think. He reported his idea to Kvashnin. Kvashnin notified Defense Minister Sergeyev, Prime Minister Stepashin, and President Yeltsin. The latter

32  There were actually a number of “Freudian slips” in the press, notably in an interview with National Security Council Secretary Vladimir Putin on 15 June, referring to the Russian Army as the “Red” Army.

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

85

said, delightedly: “This is all we can do in this situation.” Zavarzin got the go ahead and set about preparation of the operation. Disinformation The biggest difficulty for General Zavarzin was to prepare to move out a column of battalion strength from Bosnia in secret. Several armored transport vehicles heated up their engines and “kicked up dust” around the place where the main forces were stationed, creating among their neighbors the appearance of the customary peacekeeping bustle. At this time the men hastily refueled, preparing for the march and repainted on their “foreheads” the letter “K” in place of the letter “I” (this being the designation of combat equipment participating in the Kosovo settlement).33The General Staff maintained fake communications with our Bosnia contingent, cursing out the commanders for “burning fuel for nothing” and giving strict orders that they allow no liberties to be taken. The Americans subsequently acknowledged that they had picked up this session, but they conveyed it in a way that showed them in a good light: “we heard an order to the ‘Russian Bosnians’ for them to quit jumping about, but they don’t give a damn even for orders from the General Staff.” For General Zavarzin the sudden double-quick dash of the battalion of peacekeepers to the borders of Kosovo was meaningful in one further fundamental way: he had a small “debt” to pay the NATO people for their having, contrary to the established rules, failed to notify him in March, when they had embarked on the bombing of Yugoslavia. The general was chewed out by his superiors at that time, some even wanted his recall from Brussels. Friday, 11 June: The Start The most experienced officers, warrant officers, and men were at the controls of the armored personnel carriers and other vehicles. The almost 500 kilometer route south that was chosen was the shortest, and the convoy drove right up to the speed limit. At times they went at over 100 kilometers per hour, ignoring the demands of the signs. Yugoslavian “gunner-sighters” sat in the lead vehicles, it was hard-going because the main highways were torn up with craters from exploded NATO bombs and missiles. Communications with Moscow were expressly forbidden at this time. When they rushed through the first localities, the Yugoslavians would merely stare in bewilderment. But then they figured out what was going on. The rumor about Russian brothers flying south rapidly overtook the convoy. As it approached Kosovo, its speed fell, Yugoslavians were just about hurling themselves beneath the wheels from joy. Some Serbs with tears of joy in their eyes kissed the dust covered Russian armor. Completely ticked off by the unexpected march of the Russians, foreign television reporters dashed off to transmit their accounts to their editors. Western intelligence officers, on the other hand, unhurriedly “trimmed” everything, even the fact that 33  Clarifying the NATO term for forces operating in Kosovo as KFOR, forces operating in Bosnia and elsewhere in Serbia under previous accords were called “IFOR”— referring to “implementing (the peace accord) force.”

86

Russian Civil-Military Relations among those who greeted the Russian convoy in one city were five members of the Yugoslavian Government. Saturday, 12 June: The Finish Line By agreement with the Yugoslavian military, it was arranged that to conceal the entry of the “Zavarzin battalion” into Kosovo a Serb military convoy would an hour before zero hour begin to move out from there to Serbia and in this way manage in the darkness to confuse the NATO people. The British military column, which was to have been the first to enter Kosovo, was still in place; it was waiting for the American landing force, which was having a hard time “giving birth” in the mountains following an amphibious seaport landing. Having received a report from their intelligence on the appearance of the Russians, the British officers, not giving a damn for the requirement that they speak on the air “in code,” openly used strong language to christen the Americans. Michael Jackson gave the order for his subordinates to begin a double-quick move on Pristina without waiting for the Americans. At approximately 0215 hours the Russian peacekeeper battalion burst into Pristina and, passing through the exultant streets (although, together with flowers, stones were sometimes flung at the armor also), sped toward the airport. And there everything was done “as they had been taught”: the armored personnel carriers covered all the entrances and exits at the airport and blocked the runway. The words “I am in place” flew as a coded shot by satellite communications to the General Staff. Zavarzin was not authorized to say anything further. When the lead vehicle of the British convoy approached the Pristina airport at dawn, the Russian commandos had already made themselves at home. Sunday, 13 June: Confrontation General Jackson arrived at the airport in the morning. He was clearly upset. He called the premature appearance at the airport of the Russians “strange.” Stepashin, Ivanov, Sergeyev, and Kvashnin met with Yeltsin in the Kremlin. The president was in excellent spirits. He showed Kvashnin his greatest grace and favor and had kind words for Ivashov also. When, however, it came to Zavarzin, he swiftly caught on to the overall frame of mind of the generals, who reminded him that a recommendation that had been submitted had been with the Kremlin for a long time. The president immediately signed an edict conferring on him the rank of Colonel General. The NATO people are continuing to insist that the Russians make room. These demands are proving unsuccessful. Zavarzin is holding on to the airport by his teeth. His main mission is to control the runway for his military-transport aircraft. British General Jackson conveyed to Colonel General Zavarzin through his subordinates that he wished to discuss the situation with him. And he invited him to his headquarters. Zavarzin delayed for some time, referring to fact that he was very busy (the latest directives from the General Staff had to be received, furthermore). But he did not go to Jackson for negotiations—he proposed that they meet on his territory. When the Briton arrived at his staff vehicle, Zavarzin proposed that they talk directly in the latter. Jackson reluctantly agreed that a small part of the airport would be allocated the

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

87

British. Zavarzin’s battalion is having problems. It has provisions for five days, three have already passed. The local Serbs know about this and are pulling up eatables from their basements. Joking aside, what’s next? The NATO people have already begun their stunts with the commandos: now they are tapping into the radio frequencies, then they are baiting them with endless maneuvers around the airport, preventing them sleeping. Also showing up with increasing frequency are armed Kosovars, from whose single gangster appearance it is clear that they will never be coming to show hospitality. The NATO generals are making no secret of the fact that the Russians have stolen their victory from them and have “given NATO a poke in the eye.” And they are already saying openly that it is “now our move.” Our peacekeepers can in this situation be spared serious trouble only by the politicians and diplomats.34

However insightful, the Russian version (preceding) is not born out entirely by other credible accounts. Piecing together details from several memoirs written by Western diplomats, including General Wesley Clark, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Finnish President Martti Ahtissari, and others, a different story appears. The central question of whether or not civilians had control of the military is more doubtful seen from the perspective of these observers.

The Western Perspective On the evening of 10 June, Russian peacekeeping troops in Bosnia received orders to move to Pristina Airport.35 Despite the presence and participation of Avdeyev in the talks in Moscow, there is evidence that senior civilian officials in Yeltsin’s government either were not aware of the orders to move into the airport, or when they did become aware of them, countermanded the orders directly. In Moscow on 10 June, shortly after his “re-arrival,” Strobe Talbott met with the Secretary of Russia’s national security council, Vladimir Putin. During the meeting, Talbott was passed a note that said the military negotiations (between Covington/Casey and Avdeyev/Ivashov) had broken down, and that “Ivashov had issued—not once but three times—what could only be characterized as a threat: if NATO entered Kosovo from the south, from Macedonia, without a final agreement on Russia’s participation, then Russian forces would unilaterally enter Kosovo from the north, through Serbia.”36 When Talbott informed Putin of this fact, Putin 34  [FBIS] FTS00061599, Komsomolskaya Pravda, [in Russian], Moscow, 15 June 1999, report by Victor Baranets, “Drive to Pristina Airport Chronicled” [Translation by FBIS]. 35  According to the U.S. military’s liaison officer stationed with the Russians in Bosnia, the orders read: “occupy Pristina Airport and receive reinforcements.” Based on author’s interview on 15 March 2005 with the officer who was at that time serving as General Clark’s Aide De Camp, who prefers to be anonymous. 36  Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy, 336.

88

Russian Civil-Military Relations

reportedly said “Who, by the way, is this Ivashov?”37 Putin went on to say that this purported statement (by Ivashov) should be taken as an emotional outburst, not a reflection of Russian policy or intention. If Putin was involved in some kind of secret deal to encourage military adventurism in Kosovo, he offered no hints to Talbott. On the ground at an airport in Macedonia on the evening of the 10th, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright engaged her counterpart in Moscow, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, in discussion by telephone. Ivanov insisted that Russian troops had not been ordered to deploy beyond their assigned peacekeeping duties in Bosnia. At noon on Friday Ivanov again told Albright that troops were not moving. Meanwhile, NATO forces in the area confirmed that Russian troops were in fact on the move, headed north, apparently in the direction of Pristina Airport. As direct confrontation between Russia and NATO loomed ever closer, General Clark began to marshal support for denying access to the Russians. Reports of reinforcements began to surface and Moscow asked for overflight permission from Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. General Clark telephoned Defense Ministers in each country that Russia had asked for help and asked them to deny permission.38 Each obliged, and reinforcements did not happen, even though Moscow did not stop asking. On Friday, 11 June, throughout the day and in the evening, Kremlin officials continued to deny that anything unusual was going on. Spokesmen insisted that the president’s intention was for Russian peacekeepers to be present in Kosovo under an agreement with NATO that allowed for independent Russian control of its own forces, maintaining overall NATO command and control. When Secretary of State Albright confronted Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivanov by telephone with specific information about what Russian troops were doing in Kosovo, Ivanov still denied it. Insisting instead that the information was wrong, Ivanov hinted to Albright that a military “mistake” might be underway. As late as 11:00 pm, Ivanov told Albright that Russian troops did not have permission to enter Kosovo and reaffirmed that, no matter what General Colonel Ivashov was saying, under no circumstances would they do so on their own accord.39 This evidence alone tends to confirm the act as one of military adventurism, or even outright insubordination. Strobe Talbott was with Ivanov, as well as Minister of Defense Sergeyev, Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin, and the ubiquitous General Colonel Ivashov in Moscow on Friday night. In the early morning hours of 12 June, Russian troops did enter Kosovo, occupying the airport at Pristina and receiving what was reported as a “hero’s welcome” by Serbians. As news of the Russian move became widely 37  Strobe Talbott also expressed disbelief that Putin could possibly not have known about Ivashov since the General had been in the press almost daily for the last several weeks regarding his views about Russian participation in the Balkans, denouncing the government’s negotiated positions. 38  Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, 387. 39  Ibid., 383.

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

89

known, Ivanov at last admitted to Talbott that the incident had indeed taken place. Talbott reported that Ivanov was stiff with acceptance and inner rage as he spoke the words, making it visibly clear that he had not been involved in the decision. After this, Talbott wrote, “We never saw Sergeyev, Kvashnin, or Ivashov again that night. I was later told that Sergeyev was so incensed over having been lied to by his own people, and put in the position of repeatedly having to lie to us, that he couldn’t bring himself to look us in the eye.”40 In the middle of the night of 11/12 June, U.S. and NATO leaders achieved consensus regarding what would be General Clark’s reaction in the event Russian troops did move into Kosovo. There was to be no confrontation. Instead, Washington and Brussels would pursue some method of allowing for Russian presence and participation within the NATO framework. The fuse was thus disarmed before it ever ran down. Evidence that the military might be calling its own shots mounted. On Saturday morning, 12 June, in Moscow, Foreign Minister Ivanov delivered a public statement saying that Russian troops in Kosovo represented an “unfortunate mistake,” adding that they would be “withdrawn immediately.”41 At the same time, NATO forces in the area reported that the Russians appeared to be digging in for a long stay. On television, scenes of the incident at Pristina ran almost continuously. By the time Washington woke up on Saturday morning, there was considerable information in the press about how U.S. and NATO forces were poised in what appeared to be direct confrontation with Russian troops in Kosovo. The mood was tense. On the morning of 12 June, at a small hotel near Colonial Williamsburg in Virginia, a delegation from Moscow was having breakfast. Among the small group of State Duma legislators, military officers from the General Staff, and a few members of the national security council, was General Colonel Victor Yesin.42 Seated at a table with his escort officer, the author, Yesin asked about a scene that he saw on the screen of a small television set nearby. On a broadcast of CNN headline news there were pictures of Russian troops and their equipment, apparently at an as yet unidentified location in Kosovo. General Yesin asked Brannon to interpret the newscast for him. When the American naval attaché reported that Russian troops had just entered Pristina in Kosovo, occupying the airport there, apparently in confrontation with NATO forces already deployed to the same area, Yesin was visibly shocked, spewing his coffee into a napkin and exclaiming loudly to his colleagues to pay attention to the newscast because this was extraordinary information.

40  Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy, 342. 41  Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, 390. 42  General Colonel (reserves) Victor Ivanovich Yesin was at the time of this event head of the National Security Council’s Directorate of Military Organizational Development. Yesin was a frequent guest in Brannon’s home and was comfortable in expressing himself to Brannon.

90

Russian Civil-Military Relations

The delegation had only recently (two days before, at mid-day on 10 June) departed from Moscow for this visit to the United States, having been involved in briefings and routine government business that same morning and of course in the days preceding. The implication that the Security Council (or at least this member of the Security Council) had not been informed about the decision for these troops to occupy the airport in Pristina was not lost on Brannon.43 Asked later whether he thought President Yeltsin knew about this plan in advance and approved of it, Yesin commented that almost certainly he had. Yesin said it was disappointing that the affair had been conducted with such secrecy that members of the Security Council, such as himself, knew nothing about it. Yesin hastened to add, however, that he would have agreed with the idea if he had been asked. When Russians tuned in to television stations on Saturday morning the 12th, they learned what had apparently happened from reporters. “All sources in the power ministries, the government, the Kremlin and most importantly at the Defense Ministry indicate that the order to introduce Russian forces into Kosovo earlier than NATO was given by General Anatoliy Kvashnin, the Chief of the General Staff. Kvashnin was acting through the two Russian generals (Zavarzin and Barmyantsev) located on the ground in Yugoslavia, and through the head of the International Cooperation Directorate of the General Staff, General Leonid Ivashov.”44 With the Russian Foreign Minister still saying the move was a mistake and troop withdrawal imminent, the General Staff now called for reinforcements and resupply. Issuing a bold statement to the effect that Russia intended to “protect Serbs in northern Kosovo and did not intend to cooperate with NATO,” General Colonel Ivashov placed himself in direct opposition to orders from civilian authorities. Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev was silent on the matter. The military had apparently mounted, on its own initiative, a military offensive that would de facto partition Kosovo into two sectors, one controlled by NATO, the other by Russia. Worse, the military was releasing its own press statements contradicting those of civilians who were supposedly running the government. Strategically, Russia’s position began to unravel when requests for overflight permission in support of resupply missions were denied. Supplies eventually ran out and Russian forces had to ask NATO for help. In Bosnia, the Russian military commander said he would redeploy as many as 10,000 troops, not only from his own force, but also using reinforcements from Russia. That number eventually amounted to only about 3,600 troops in total, almost none of whom were further redeployed into Kosovo. 43 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Reported to the Defense Intelligence Agency in June 1999, and documented in the professional notes and files of the U.S. Naval Attaché, Captain Robert Brannon. 44 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Dmitriy Krichevskiy and Anton Khrekov, “Chief of Staff Kvashnin Said to Have Ordered Troop Deployment,” Translated transcript of original Russian language television broadcast, 12 June 1999 (Moscow, Russia (NTV): Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)).

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

91

General Clark has since said he thinks the Russian military made the decision to go into Kosovo and to occupy the airport in Pristina as much as four days earlier, possibly on the evening of 8 June.45 This places the decision in a timeframe that would have put National Security Council member Yesin in Moscow at work on matters that would normally involve civilian authorization for defense activities of this kind. Since it seems Yesin did not know anything of the military’s plans until he saw the incident on television on 12 June, Clark’s view appears to be correct. If the military was acting on its own initiative instead of at the behest of civilian controllers in this case, then there was indeed risk that military confrontation in Kosovo between Russia and NATO might precipitate a broader conflict. Recalling that relevant military doctrine in Russia at that time called for a defensive posture in support of the national interest, rather than offensive moves aimed at expansive aggression, interpreting the defense of Serbia to be in Russia’s interests exceeded the military’s authorization, and might therefore have led to a war of unintended consequences. Civil-military relations in Russia remained dysfunctional throughout this entire episode, even after tensions calmed down. Weeks after the initial events, Foreign Minister Ivanov was still saying one thing, General Colonel Ivashov another.

Conclusions Although in this case, it seems the Russian military called the shots, there are mitigating factors. With military doctrine not clear beyond traditional defense of the homeland operations, there may have been reluctance to embrace new kinds of situations deriving from peacekeeping operations, especially when cooperating with multinational organizations like NATO. At the nation’s premier armed forces institute for higher education, the Military and General Staff Academy (MAGS), the subjects of peacekeeping and post-conflict are not addressed in any course of instruction. The Russian military may have perceived a vacuum in its direction from civilians and filled it by acting on its own initiative, concluding that military action in Kosovo would be best for Russia and its Serbian allies. The former President of Finland, Martti Ahtissari, described how he, as the European Union peace emissary to Belgrade, and the Russian emissary Victor Chernomyrdin went to Belgrade on 2 June 1999 to present the international community’s peace plan to the Yugoslavian president, Slobodan Milosevich. Ahtissari said that at first Milosevich resolutely refused to negotiate the peace plan but that the following morning he suddenly agreed to accept it. Ahtissari surmised the logical explanation for this about face would have been that Milosevich had

45  Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, 392.

92

Russian Civil-Military Relations

concluded a secret deal with the Russian generals to make northern Kosovo a Serbian zone.46 While the incident at Pristina Airport in Kosovo may have been an example of using military means to put pressure on NATO to help get Russia its own sector of responsibility in which to deploy its troops, Roy Allison has written that it may also have demonstrated the assertiveness of the Russian General Staff, circumventing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entirely.47 Strobe Talbott, in his own account of the event, said it may have been planned by the Chief of the General Staff, General Colonel Anatoliy Kvashnin, in an attempt to exploit what he perceived as a chance to enhance the Russian position and insult his NATO counterparts.48 These two views are consistent and appear to point to the same conclusion. Having brought Vladimir Putin to Moscow from St. Petersburg because of Putin’s reputation for skilled and reliable management, Yeltsin had placed his trust in this man who could get things done.49 Putin may have listened to Kvashnin’s advice and then opted to keep the information held to a tight circle of insiders, excluding rank and file members such as General Yesin. Whether or not Putin briefed Yeltsin personally will likely never be known, but it is entirely possible that he did. Still, there is no evidence that the military acted on the authority of civilians in this case, and considerable evidence to the contrary. Following the incident at Pristina Airport, the Russian government made several statements that tried to show Yeltsin’s approval in advance of the army’s decision to take the airfield and secure a Russian sector in Kosovo. Vladimir Putin, at the time serving both as Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and as Secretary of the National Security Council, was interviewed by Nikolay Svanidze on the RTR television program Podrobnosti on 15 June 1999. In the interview, Putin expressed his dismay at the army’s independent actions but in the end supports what they did as it was, in his view, acting in Russia’s “best interests.” Selected excerpts from Putin’s interview are particularly significant in explaining what happened. His 46  Response to written question: P-3933/00 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council of Europe (7 December 2000); Subject: Common Foreign Policy and Kosovo; as documented in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This point of view was apparently not shared by the Council of Europe. The record shows that they did not believe sufficient evidence existed to form the conclusion that the Russian military was conducting secret deals with Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevich. Still, it is compelling that Martti Ahtissari, from the vantage point of a man who was on the scene at the time, arrived at this conclusion on his own. . 47 ������������������������������������ Steven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin, The Russian Military Power and Policy, American Academy Studies in Global Security (Cambridge, MA. and London: American Academy of Arts and Sciences MIT Press, 2004), 147. 48 ��������� Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy, 345. 49 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Recall Putin’s rapid rise to power by way of several key positions in government. In each case, Putin demonstrated that his reputation for management, for “getting things done,” was well deserved.

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

93

remarks, based on a translation provided by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), edited by the author, are as follows: Responding first to a direct question about who gave the order for Russian paratroops to move into Kosovo, Putin said, “Let me recall a bit of our recent history. I think very many would agree with me when I say that the collapse of the Soviet Union began at precisely the moment when the country’s former political leadership began to pretend that it had nothing to do with the orders which were given to the military in the so-called former hot-spots. I am referring to the notorious events in Tbilisi, Vilnius and certain other places. I shall not venture now to assess whether these orders were correct or not. Right now we are discussing a different subject. As soon as the military see that they are being left in the lurch, they cease to carry out these orders. A bit later destructive forces emerge, which realize that the country’s political leadership does not have a power-wielding component. Then processes begin which tend, in such cases, to be called irreversible. You can say what you like about Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. You can love him. You can hate him. You can abuse or praise him. But there is one thing you cannot accuse him of. He has never hidden behind the backs of those to whom he has given instructions. He has never done that. This occasion is no exception either. The supreme Commander-in-Chief knew about everything which was being planned and he endorsed, so to speak, the strategic plan for the development of the situation. As far as the direct execution, in terms of time, hour by hour, is concerned, this was done by those who carried it out. But they did not go beyond the endorsed plan.”

Putin then described what he knew to be the facts surrounding the case. He emphasized that NATO forces had moved first, with Russian troops following afterward, albeit only by one hour. He did not comment on how Russian troops could have moved within an hour of NATO forces absent significant planning for such an operation. There was a sharp exchange between Putin and his interviewer regarding a question about NATO’s public demands that Russian troops leave the area. Putin cited close cooperation between the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and the U.S. State Department in Washington. He did not mention the Russian Army’s seemingly independent initiative in Kosovo in connection with this cooperation. Throughout the interview, Putin insisted the army was not acting independently, certainly not aimed at confrontation with NATO: The only question is that we must always see what the next step is going to be. We believe, not just believe, we are sure, that our servicemen did not go there to create a new bridgehead for confrontation with NATO. We must never forget that we are part of Europe and we recognize the policies of the main countries, the leading countries of the world, from what they do on this issue. We hope that our joint actions with the alliance in Kosovo will, on the contrary, create a

94

Russian Civil-Military Relations basis for increasing trust between Russia and the alliance countries, between our military, and not just between politicians. That is what we are counting on.

Putin’s comments about Russia’s relationship with Europe in this context are especially revealing. He used the occasion to reinforce the notion that Russia wanted to cooperate not only in the political dimension, but also with regard to military operations. However, that was not the signal being sent by Russia’s armed forces. At the same time as Putin was speaking, men like Ivashov and Kvashnin were still calling for reinforcements to bolster the operation at Pristina Airport. While the interviewer pursued the question of who gave the order to occupy the airport, Putin continued to avoid answering directly. Instead, he repeatedly took advantage of the opportunity to emphasize issues like trust and cooperation with Europe. Finally, Putin used the interview to comment on Russia’s special relationship with Serbia. Interestingly, he also commented on NATO’s obligations to ethnic Albanians in the region: Of course, the Serbs are drawn to Russian peacekeepers. However, we also need representatives of the alliance because Albanians also live there, and they are drawn to NATO. As regards the events of the past few days, we know that there were attacks against British troops, and our servicemen gave them their help. There was also an attack against an airport. Just look how active the British were while rendering assistance to our soldiers. There will be mutual cooperation there, without fail. As I already said at the very beginning of our conversation, a plan of our military presence was being drawn up at yesterday’s [14th June] meeting of the Security Council. There are several possible options of deploying our peacekeeping forces. A final version will be worked out during the talks which Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Defense Minister [Igor Sergeyev] and their colleagues will hold with the U.S. defense secretary [William Cohen] and the U.S. secretary of state [Madeleine Albright] in Helsinki.50

Putin’s remarks are especially interesting in light of the fact that when he met with Strobe Talbott on the day before the incident took place, he expressed uncertainty about who Ivashov was. But his comments linking civilian control of the military to the disintegration of the Soviet Union may be the most insightful. During the interview Putin said, “When the military sees that they are being set up, they stop fulfilling orders.” By this he seems to be endorsing the possibility that the military 50 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Russian Television Network (RTR) [in Russian] 15 June, 1999. The Russian Television Network (RTR) was (and still is) a state controlled television channel broadcasting in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and several other large cities. At the time, it reached approximately 93 percent of Russia’s television audience. Podrobnosti is a Russian word meaning “details.” This studio interview with Vladimir Putin, Secretary of the Russian Security Council and Director of the Russian Federal Security Service, was conducted by correspondent Nikolay Svanidze in Moscow.

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

95

might need to be mindful of the strength and credibility of civilian authorities in deciding whether or not to do its duty. He goes on to defend his boss, President Yeltsin, by emphasizing how Yeltsin had endorsed the strategic plan before it was implemented by the military. But the record shows that Yeltsin had more likely approved a plan to operate a contingent of Russian forces within the broader context of a NATO orchestrated peace plan. Putin remains pragmatic and resourceful in his statement. By referring to the mission in Helsinki to be conducted with NATO in an effort to negotiate how to resolve the issues of cooperation in Kosovo, Putin confirmed that Russia would be represented by its two most senior government officials, Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov, and Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev. Putin’s confidence was aimed at restoring faith in the civil-military relationship, but Putin’s detractors remained in the spotlight. Colonel General Ivashov, the most visibly outspoken proponent of the army’s move into Kosovo, gave a statement to the press on 16 June, the day after Putin spoke with Podrobnosti. Ivashov’s remarks were aimed at examining the question of why the military had apparently acted on its own initiative. Ivashov confirmed that plans for the Kosovo operation had been drawn up by the Chief of Operations Administration on the General Staff, General Yuri Baluyevsky. Sounding somewhat defensive, perhaps because of Putin’s statement the day before, Ivashov said: After the plan was approved by Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Anatoly Kvashnin, and Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev, the document was submitted to President Boris Yeltsin on June 10. After examining it, the Commander in Chief, to his credit, instantly grasped all the proposed plan’s advantages and immediately gave the military the go-ahead.51

During the interview Ivashov went on to document a number of specific details about how the plans were developed and transmitted to the army in Kosovo.52 Ivashov’s statement about the incident represents an example of one of the strongest tensions in civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia. When a system such as the Soviet Union collapses, the values and ideals that form the most important foundations of military professionalism vanish as well. In the vacuum that is left

51 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Igor Korotchenko and Vladimir Mukhin, “Russians Steal a March on NATO in Kosovo,” Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 51, no. 24 (14 July 1999): 4. 52 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ibid. “Immediately afterward, General of the Army Kvashnin signed a General Staff directive that was transmitted by encoded telegram to the headquarters of the Russian brigade at Uglevik (the telegram was addressed to General Lieutenant Victor Zavarzin and Col. Nikolai Ignatov) and to the staff of the Russian Federation’s military attaché in Belgrade (addressed to General Lieutenant Yevgeniy Barmyantsev). Barmyantsev was charged with coordinating the route with the General Staff of the Yugoslavian People’s Army, as well as escorting the Russian column across Yugoslavian territory. Colonel Mikhail Petrovich, Yugoslavia’s military attaché in Moscow, was also notified of the plans, which he immediately reported to Belgrade.”

96

Russian Civil-Military Relations

behind, men like Ivashov are left to interpret what is expected of them and how they will conduct themselves. Where military doctrine specifies how military conduct is to be accomplished, in support of what goals and objectives, and with what instruments it is to be applied, the outcome may be more positive. But in this case, Ivashov, representing many (possibly even the majority, although that is not quantifiable) senior military officers, opted to take a position that was, at least in his opinion, in Russia’s best interests. The fact that (some) civilians did not agree was of no great consequence to him. In taking the airport at Pristina, Kosovo, it appears that military means were used in support of achieving political ends, and that is certainly not an unusual or errant practice. But when the political side of the equation is not aware of the plan, and, worse, when civilian authorities specifically countermand the operation, then the conclusion that civilians did not have control of the military is inescapable. At Pristina Airport in June 1999 the military acted on its own initiative, shirking its responsibility to follow the orders of civilian authorities. Even though General Colonel Ivashov continued to exceed his authority, he eventually tried to show that President Yeltsin had in fact approved the operation. But Yeltsin never admitted this. What is more likely is that some of Yeltsin’s inner circle did know about it and kept the plan secret, briefing Yeltsin either in a moment when the president was incapacitated or else in such a way that he could not have acted responsibly. Either way, this incident hints broadly at weakness that was exploited by the military. The military doctrine that was in effect at the time of this case was hastily drafted in the wake of Soviet collapse. It was related to a national security policy that was in itself flawed. The military was doctrinally bound to defend the nation from threats, including the threat of NATO expansion. Ivashov’s perception that Russia’s interests were not served by subordinating peacekeeping forces to NATO command is thus derived. Arguably, although Ivashov and others may have acted in Russia’s best interest, the situation could easily have deteriorated beyond the military’s fragile capabilities. The extreme result might have been war with a vastly better trained and equipped NATO force. The context of political uncertainty that was present in Russia in the summer of 1999 also may have contributed to the Army’s decision to go into Kosovo. Samuel P. Huntington argued that military loyalty rests on professional values that derive from civilian ideals. Absent professionalism that is loyal to competent authority, the military may go its own way, in some cases acting to usurp authority outright. Because President Yeltsin was so weak, power moved away from the center of government, into the hands of provincial fiefdoms and oligarchs. The authorities who controlled the government were often hired and fired capriciously. George W. Breslauer wrote that Yeltsin was a patriarchal ruler, dispensing favors much as a father might to his children, and punishing them harshly when they misbehaved.53 But Yeltsin’s rule was so subjective that there was no real sense of accountability. 53 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� George Breslauer, “Boris Yeltsin as Patriarch,” in Archie Brown (ed.) Contemporary Russian Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 70-81.

Case I: The Russians Are Coming!

97

The president called for military reform, but reform did not happen. By the summer of 1999, Yeltsin’s power had diminished to such an extent that his government was perhaps not capable of executing civilian control of the military, at least not in the traditional sense. Principal-agent relationships generally assume unanimity and uniformity of action on both sides. In reality, however, neither civilians nor the military speaks with one voice. In fact, there may be several different actions going on at the same time. For example, because such relationships are usually not monolithic, pairs of principals and agents may form independently of one another. These assumptions may limit the utility of Feaver’s theory in its application to civil-military relations. In this case, it is possible to explain how the principal-agent relationship worked by examining the evidence illustrating civilian and military interaction at several different levels. Neither unanimity nor uniformity is assumed. Instead, the civilmilitary relationship is examined based on the dimensions in which it is expressed. Chapter Seven of this book addresses these issues and examines all three cases in terms of principal-agent theory. Finally, whether or not Yeltsin actually approved the operation may be beside the point. Civilian control of the military presumes competent authority. Given Yeltsin’s well documented state of health at the time, he may well have been incompetent to make such a decision. Since the operation was ultimately a failure (Russian troops had to withdraw after they became dependent on NATO forces for support) Ivashov may have been trying to deflect blame away from the General Staff and onto civilian authorities. In the end, regardless of the questionable veracity of Ivashov’s claims that Yeltsin approved the plan, “competent” civilian authority appears to have been on the margins of the decision, if it was present at all. Writing for the Wall Street Journal (European edition) on 17 June 1999, Michael McFaul described the incident as “Russia’s Pyhrric Pristina Victory.”54 McFaul correctly infers that, despite appearances to the contrary, the Russian Army was almost certainly not operating entirely independently of Kremlin supervision. Citing the move into Pristina as having been ordered by Ivashov and Kvashnin, McFaul stated that military commanders may have been acting mostly ­on their own because they had been ill-served by political authorities, stating that “Russia’s generals decided to create their own facts on the ground by moving into Kosovo before a political agreement about Russian military participation in the peacekeeping mission had been reached.”55 Yeltsin had deliberately set up two opposing “camps” within his administration, one side favoring military action and the other side supporting negotiations. It is therefore highly possible, indeed even probable, that Yeltsin may have been manipulated by his advisers. Military shirking can take the form of manipulation 54 ����������������������������������������������������� Michael McFaul, “Russia’s Pyhrric Pristina Victory,” Wall Street Europe, 17 June 1999, 4. 55 ����� Ibid.

98

Russian Civil-Military Relations

of the facts in an effort to influence civilian decisions. In this case, Yeltsin was almost certainly predisposed to support plans that would leave Russia in a stronger position with regard to NATO. The true intent of Yeltsin’s endorsement was not aimed at risking open confrontation. The operation at Pristina Airport was badly planned and poorly executed. If the military had followed procedure, remaining true to the president’s intentions by coordinating with NATO, things might have turned out differently. But men like Kvashnin and Ivashov did not allow that to happen. Instead, they chose to operate in the shadows, out of reach by civilian authorities who might have contributed a different point of view. The extent to which these officers may have been working behind the scenes with civilians in key positions may never be known for certain. While there is evidence that Putin may have been involved, there is also evidence that he did not know, or could not have known, what the military really had in mind. Still, it is probably naive to think they could have gotten away with this operation completely without Putin having at least some visibility of the details. When the military goes its own way in this manner, it is insubordinate in the extreme, demonstrating just enough support for civilian goals and objectives to avoid calling attention to itself, but not enough to achieve the kind of relationship that is required in a democracy. The president of Russia, or of any other country that is in transition from authoritarianism, is thus not allowed the benefit of good military advice that is both consistent with national security policy and subordinate to civilian control. This kind of military, while not likely to mount a coup in open insurrection, is also not likely to reform itself without very strong direction from civilians in charge. In June 1999, with regard to Russia’s participation in the Balkans crisis, that was not the case.

Chapter 5

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya: Dagestan, July-September 1999 The Defense Ministry, which already has suffered so much grief in Chechnya, is offering only lethargic opposition to the new spiral of war in the North Caucasus. It appears that the train has already left the station, and General Staff Chief Anatoliy Kvashnin, if he doesn’t want to lose the points he won in the Bosnia-to-Kosovo dash will have to jump on board the last car to Chechnya. Yevgeniy Krutikov reporting

Chechnya has been called “The Tombstone of Russian Power.” That may be true, but it is also true that Chechnya has been a kind of laboratory for transition of the armed forces of Russia as it moves beyond its Soviet past. In the failures of its experiences during the first Chechen war, as well as lessons learned from the Balkans crises, the military in Russia forged new doctrine and struggled with reform. But, in 1999, the decision to go to war, perhaps the most critical decision any government can make, was subject to the influences not only of national security interests and threats, but also by the military’s desire to redeem itself from the poor reputation it earned during the last conflict. At a time when civilian authority in Russia was somewhat uncertain, with an ailing Boris Yeltsin searching for an appropriate successor, and the new Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, seeking to establish himself, the military (and other security agencies) may have exploited the situation by manipulating the facts in evidence, possibly misrepresenting conditions in Chechnya in an effort to gain support for a new war. It is at the cusp of uncertainty during the transition from Yeltsin to Putin that this research is focused. The first war in Chechnya began in 1994, and ended with a precarious peace deal that was negotiated with the Chechen opposition by retired Army General Alexander Lebed and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the end of 1996. The uneasy peace that ensued for almost three years was broken repeatedly by violations on both sides, but attention was

  [FBIS] FTS19990707001308, Moscow, Izvestiya [in Russian], 8 July 1999.  ��������������� Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).

100

Russian Civil-Military Relations

diverted from Chechnya, at least briefly, during this time. By 1999, the situation in Chechnya once again had reached a critical level. The political-military environment in Moscow during the summer of 1999 has already been described in this book. Many of the factors that led to the confusion surrounding the army’s march to Pristina Airport were also factors in events leading up to the decision to go to war again in Chechnya. Arguably, the first war never really ended, despite Lebed’s peace deal. Chechnya was never rebuilt, reforms did not take place, and elections were, for the most part, a sham. Aslan Maskhadov was elected “President” of Chechnya in the only election that was considered by Chechens to be free and fair. Maskhadov had a reputation as a moderate, preferring to negotiate with Moscow rather than to fight, but his aim was still autonomy for the Chechen Republic, if not complete independence from the Russian state. During the time between the two wars in Chechnya, Maskhadov consistently tried to meet with Yeltsin in Moscow for the purpose of discussing a long-term settlement of the conflict. By the summer of 1999, the meeting still had not taken place. Although Maskhadov remained hopeful, his military commander, Shamil Basayev, was not. Basayev’s reputation was much more hard-line, and his preference for violence was well known. In close association with Basayev was another figure, knownonly as Khattab. Reputed to be Saudi Arabian, Khattab may have had connections with

 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Aslan Aliyevich Maskhadov was born in 1951 to Chechen parents in exile in Kazakhstan. His family returned to Chechnya in 1957. He joined the Soviet army, serving in both Hungary and Lithuania. After rising to the rank of Colonel in the army, and after the Soviet Union had collapsed, he retired and eventually became Chief of Staff of the insurgent Chechen Army in 1992. He fought against Russian forces in the first Chechen war of 19941997, and was credited by many with what was perceived by Chechens as a victory which secured temporary de facto independence for Chechnya. In January 1997, after the death of Dzhokar Dudayev, Chechnya’s first leader, Maskhadov was elected President of Chechnya on a platform including demands for independence from Moscow’s rule. Following the start of the second war in 1999, he returned to leading a guerrilla movement against the Russian Army. He was reported killed in a village in northern Chechnya in March 2005. .  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Shamil Salmanovich Basayev was born in the town of Vedeno in south-eastern Chechnya. His family is said to have had a long history of involvement in Chechen resistance to Russian rule, and suffered reprisals in the process. His grandfather fought for the abortive attempt to create a breakaway North Caucasus Emirate after the Russian Revolution. Other family members were killed during the Second World War. Along with the rest of the Chechen population, the Basayevs were deported to Kazakhstan on the orders of Joseph Stalin as collective punishment for alleged collaboration with Nazi Germany; they were not allowed to return until 1957. Basayev is leader of an armed group of rebel insurgents acting in the north Caucasus region of Russia, principally in Chechnya. Although some call him a “separatist” for his goal of achieving independance from Russia, many call him a “terrorist” for his intentional killing of unarmed civilians, including women and children. .

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

101

foreign terrorist organizations. As of the time of this writing, no specific evidence linking Khattab to Osama bin Laden is known to exist, although there have been rumors to that effect. The conflict in Chechnya had become international because of Khattab and others, many of whom used web sites to inflame foreign interests and solicit financial support. One web site, the Kavkaz Center, has been particularly adept at conducting information operations in support of the Chechen point of view. Throughout the summer of 1999, Chechen rebels, led by Shamil Basayev, attacked Russian forces at outposts located across Chechnya’s border inside neighboring Dagestan. The Russian Army responded by attacking with measured and ferocious force that was characteristically distinct from its conduct during the first war by its deliberateness and consistency. These actions led to the second war in Chechnya, a conflict that continues as of this writing. The Kremlin said that the threat of terrorism from Chechnya had changed from domestic, internal violence perpetrated by indigenous separatist rebels to a terrorist enterprise that was at least partially infiltrated and funded by international terrorist organizations. Appointed Prime Minister at the very outset of Russia’s response to the crisis, Vladimir Putin hailed the new war in Chechnya as an example of the rising tide of terrorism throughout the world, especially on Russia’s southern flank. In his book about Chechnya, specifically, about the cross border incursion of August 1999, Dmitriy Trenin writes: “Interestingly, information about the planned raid spread across the North Caucasus like wildfire.” Trenin cites the  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Reportedly born in Arar, a northern province of Saudi Arabia, in 1969, Ibn-ulKhattab, whose real name was Samir Saleh Abdullah Al Suwailem, died in combat on 19 March 2002. He was deputy military commander to Shamil Basayev, leader of the Chechen rebel insurgency. .   .  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� In August and September 1999, Basayev and Ibn-ul-Khattab led a small army (some sources claim up to 2000 strong) of Islamic fundamentalists in an unsuccessful attempt to take over the neighboring Republic of Dagestan and establish a new Chechen-Dagestan Islamic republic (with a later invasion of Ingushetia planned as well).  ��������������������������������������������������������� G.D. Bakshi, “The War in Chechnya: A Military Analysis,” Strategic Analysis XXIV:5 (August 2000) “Since the first Chechen War had been something of a poor stand-off, it provided a tremendous boost to Islamic morale on an international scale. A large number of former Afghan Jihad veterans had entered Chechnya. By mid-1999, these Islamic Jihadis were not only tampering with the oil pipelines passing through Chechnya, they were also busy trying to spread Islamic influence into the other areas of the Caucasus. Chechen rebels also have close links with Pakistan’s ISI and the Taliban. The Taliban officially recognized the Chechen regime and senior Chechen officials occasionally visited Kabul and Islamabad to seek arms aid and reinforcements.”  ���������������������������������������������������� Dmitriy Trenin, A.V. Malashenko, and Anatol Lieven, Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Distributor, Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 34-35.

102

Russian Civil-Military Relations

founder of the Islamic Democratic Party, Abdrashid Saidov, in support of his claim that Russian intelligence almost certainly knew about the operation well in advance: “Anyone who traded on the Grozny market in May-June 1999 was taking account of the imminent war in Dagestan.”10 By 1999, Basayev and his followers in Chechnya were not inclined to support continued allegiance to frustrated efforts aimed at regional stability and peace with Russia. Shamil Basayev believed he could enlist the aid of neighboring Dagestan by conducting anti-Russian activities there. Basayev reportedly felt that if Dagestanis were given the chance to oppose Russia they would do so, falling in with Chechnya, thus widening the war. But Basayev’s strategic gamble failed. Dagestanis did not rally behind the Chechens who crossed the border, and it soon became clear that military intervention from Moscow was imminent. Information about rebel activities and intentions before the Dagestan incursion contributed to the decision to go to war. In the Russian system at the time of these events, intelligence was compartmented to such an extent that what the military knew was not necessarily shared with civilians in government. A legacy of the Soviet system, the intelligence apparatus in Russia was separately structured (and fire walled) between the Federal Security Service (FSB) and military intelligence in behalf of the Ministry of Defense (GRU). In the unreformed structure that was still dominant in Russia in the late 1990s, the Soviet system of collecting and distributing intelligence information remained largely intact. Thus, Yeltsin’s decision to shift responsibility for resolving the Chechen crisis to his new FSB Director, Vladimir Putin, may have contributed to the confrontation of two competing security organizations, the FSB and the GRU. Historically, little is known about the competition between Russian security services, especially between FSB and GRU, representing two influential parties with different interests reflecting, political, geopolitical, and military concerns. During Soviet times, military intelligence remained under the General Staff and was independent of the KGB. Its strategists were concerned with global affairs. The modern-day GRU is one of the few Russian agencies that was almost unaffected by Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s reform periods. Yeltsin excelled at counterbalancing different interests within his administration, shuffling cadres between and among the FSB and GRU on several occasions. Nevertheless, the GRU survived as a militarized, secretive agency with political ambitions and an ideology of Sovietstyle derzhavnost (statehood in the sense being a great power state). The FSB is seen as representing the former KGB, as well as interests of the other successor agencies which emerged from the KGB, including the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Communications Agency (FAPSI), and the Federal Guards Service being chief among them. The FSB, as the direct descendant of the KGB, also inherited the old rivalry with the GRU. 10 Abdrashid Saidov’s unpublished manuscript entitled: Таina Vtorzheniye (o nachale voenniye destvii na Каvkaze v Avguste 1999), in English: Secret Intrusion (about the beginning of military activities in the Caucasus in August 1999), 80.

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

103

Having failed to win the last war in Chechnya, the Army was determined to get it right this time. Like all the service branches in Russia’s armed forces, the army had fallen on hard times and was losing out to the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) under the leadership of Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev.11 The army needed to prove it was still effective and reliable after the humiliation it had experienced in the first war, having been caught in the midst of major organizational upheaval and systemic transition. Based upon the lessons learned in the first Chechen campaign, the army began to formulate a new doctrine for fighting a limited war on largely urban terrain. The major shortcomings of the first campaign include: (1) command and control, coordination between the federal forces12 of the Defense Ministry (MOD) and the Interior Ministry (MVD); (2) manning and mobilization, units committed were badly under-manned, resulting in the requirement to transfer personnel from other units and formations, eroding unit cohesiveness and formation effectiveness; (3) training, infantry troops were not trained specifically for fighting in cities and mountains; and (4) information management, inability to shape the global, regional or even national information environment, Russian public opinion was wholly against the war, and Chechens proved more skillful at projecting their viewpoint.13 The Russian military views operational art as a category that bridges strategic and tactical levels of military planning. Operational concepts set out guidelines for conducting combat actions by formations above division-level. Up until the second Chechen campaign, the General Staff relied on the old Soviet system of operational command and control that was originally designed for theater-scale, heavy armored operations against NATO forces.14 All chains of command would lead to the strategic level headquarters in the General Staff, stripping division commanders of resources and powers to take autonomous decisions in rapidly 11 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Henry Plater-Zyberk, “The Russian Decision-Makers in the Chechen Conflict,” in Anne C. Aldis (ed.) The Second Chechen War (Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, U.K.: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2000), 68. The appointment of General Igor Dmitrevich Sergeyev as Minister of Defense in May 1997 was seen as an interim measure after his predecessor General Igor Rodionov was dismissed for publicly criticizing insufficient funding and the defense policies of the political leadership. Sergeyev was acceptable to Yeltsin because of his detached position in the Ministry of Defense (as commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, “his” forces were for the all out war only), his quiet, self-effacing manners, and because he was reaching the statutory retirement age. Regarded originally by many observers as a quick fix before a new, obedient reformer was found, Sergeyev managed to survive. 12 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ The term federal forces refers to the fact that Russian troops involved in Chechnya represented both the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Interior Ministry (MVD). The commander of troops in the war reflected which ministry had the most troops involved at the time. Accordingly, operational command shifted from time to time between general officers of the MOD and MVD. 13 ��������������������������������������������������� Bakshi, “The War in Chechnya: A Military Analysis.” 14 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Recall the hierarchy of terms outlined in Chapter 2 of this book on p. 27.

104

Russian Civil-Military Relations

evolving combat situations. Instead of having theater headquarters consisting of a joint staff with a single commander-in-chief, each army branch, and troops subordinated to the Interior Ministry, reported directly to the strategic level headquarters back in Moscow. Russian experts on operational art still seem to draw heavily on the Red Army experience in the Second World War.15 Beyond these challenges, proliferation of non Ministry of Defense (MOD) troops during the Yeltsin era caused further complications to interoperability. In the first Chechen campaign, poor coordination between units subordinated to different government ministries resulted in disastrous overall performance of all the federal forces.16 Lack of standardized equipment as well as joint doctrines often brought about total collapse of command and control over the forces conducting joint operations. The Russian Army’s performance in the second Chechen campaign points to positive improvements in operational art. Federal forces moved to a joint staff principle of operational command which greatly facilitated coordination between troops. A joint staff was set up under the name of the Joint Grouping of Russian Forces in North Caucasus.17 In a dramatic departure from Soviet era doctrine, a single Commander-in-Chief was appointed, with powers to make operational level decisions without consulting the General Staff. Other branches and forces were represented through deputies, explicitly denied authority to appeal over Commander-in-Chief’s head to their own headquarters in Moscow. These arrangements helped to ensure that a single chain of command remained in place. Despite these significant reforms, basic deficiencies in staff officers’ training still occasionally caused command and control problems. To avoid coordination 15 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Visiting the General Staff Academy (MAGS) in Moscow on numerous occasions between 1998 and 2001, as the U.S. Naval Attaché, this author observed many examples of the Russian Army’s outdated approach to training and education. Case studies relating to the nature, character, and conduct of modern warfare almost always used narrative details of battles that were fought during World War II, or, as Russians prefer to call it, the Great Patriotic War. In 1999, army staff colleges and training schools continued to teach Soviet principles of operational art and tactical doctrines. By and large, the lessons of the first war in Chechnya had not been incorporated into manuals and textbooks, leaving officers unprepared for “operations other than war” and urban fighting. There was a pressing need for more specialist training and improvement in individual combat skills. While preparing for the second Chechen campaign to some extent raised the army’s awareness of this problem, education in the Russian military was still grossly insufficient, and a perennial victim of budget constraints. 16 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ The army’s poor performance prompted a decision to order federal troops in Chechnya to shift from large-scale offensives to intelligence-gathering and special operations targeting rebel leaders and their supply channels. This was performed by the FSB and MVD (Interior Ministry) Special Forces which were better trained and funded than the Ministry of Defense infantry units manned by conscripts. 17 ����������������������������������������� Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, Russian Military Personnel Organizational Directory (Washington DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2000, 31 August), 44-52.

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

105

problems, all of the various military (federal) forces fighting in Chechnya were divided into separate operational groups, each with its own individual tactical objective. While the interior troops and army special forces troops might lead an attack on the capital city of Grozny, for example, airborne troops may storm Chechen positions in the mountains nearby. Operational planning during the second Chechen campaign indicated that the General Staff’s preferred method of warfare would be a long range battle in which overwhelming firepower is employed to destroy the bulk of enemy forces before Russian troops move into a hostile area.18 This represents significantly improved operational planning based on the new military doctrine that was being developed in 1999.19 As part of the process of developing a new and more relevant national security policy, there was now a new nuclear doctrine. The new policy ruled out first-use of nuclear weapons, but left open the possibilitythat they could be used to defend the homeland from external and/or internal threats. It was not clear whether this policy might be used to defend a nuclear action in Chechnya.20 Russian tactical posture was, in the past, based on a Soviet principle of restricting the capabilities of tactical units (companies, battalions and regiments), and concentrating firepower and reconnaissance resources at the operational level. After the end of the first Chechen campaign in 1996, a more flexible posture was adopted. Combat would henceforth be conducted by “tactical groups.” These tactical groups would be a new type of army formation, built around a traditional unit, but with a considerable degree of autonomy. The degree of autonomy and the level of resources given to these tactical groups represented a major shift in military thought. The departure from previous doctrine is significant and derives from the kind of thinking that led to the development of the new military doctrine. The army seems to have realized that to offset the infantry’s poor performance in local conflicts, it had to exploit its firepower superiority. The stated objective was to keep an enemy outside the close combat range of approximately 300 meters, the range of an assault rifle. Consequently, the tactics employed during the second Chechen war bore little resemblance to the urban warfare, anti-insurgency, doctrines used by Western armies. Russia’s new military doctrine called for massive and often indiscriminate artillery and missile fire in an effort to obliterate enemy 18 ��������������������������������������������������� Bakshi, “The War in Chechnya: A Military Analysis.” 19 �������������������������������������������������������������������� See Appendix at Tab D for Military Doctrine approved in April 2000. 20 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990825001696, Moscow, Moskovskiy Komsomolets [in Russian], 26 August 1999, article by Igor Flore: “Strategic Missile Commander in Chief Preparing Nuclear Strike on Chechnya.” [FBIS Translated Text Summary]: “Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev, Commander in Chief of the Strategic Missile Troops is considering using a nuclear option in Dagestan. Yakovlev, writing for Krasnaya Zvezda, said “While there has been a significant reduction in the likelihood of a large-scale war being unleashed against Russia, there has at the same time been a sharp increase in the threat of its being drawn into local conflicts. Russia’s economic position is not conducive to the development of conventional forces. There remains reliance on the nuclear deterrence forces, which are maintaining their combat readiness.”

106

Russian Civil-Military Relations

positions before the infantry moved into hostile areas.21 Artillery sweeps covering the entire area of the enemy’s deployment became a favorite battle plan. Because the enemy was concentrated in civilian population centers, heavy bombardment of those areas would be required, resulting in very high civilian casualty rates. Weapons that burned a fuel and air composite were to be used to destroy bunkers and fortified areas on the city outskirts.22 Incompetence and tactical weakness prompted the army to switch from targeting the rebels’ mountain strongholds to conducting brutal operations in towns and villages. At the same time, practically no attempt was made to win the trust of the local population. The air force targeted centers of civilian population and denied rebels the use of countryside by scattering land mines. Air support was inaccurate due to the air force’s limited ability to engage point targets, resorting instead to non-guided fuel-air explosives and cluster bombs, dropped by ground attack aircraft that did not have all-weather or night operations capabilities.23 The army also suffered from the poor quality of conscripts that made up most of its troop strength. As mentioned in a previous chapter, dedovschina, the systemic hazing that plagues all branches of the military in Russia, but is much worse in the army, robs troops of any sense of professional pride of service.24 But in Chechnya, the problem was even worse. Exacerbated by inadequate funding, shortages of ammunition and supplies led some “enterprising” senior officers to develop entire 21 ����� Ibid. 22 ���������������������������������������������������������� Jane’s Defense Publications, “Executive Summary, Russia,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2003, 25 July 2003. To avoid close range combat, a new tactical posture was adopted before the assault on Grozny in late 1999. Again, combat planning did not address the issues of safety of civilian population and infrastructure. Indeed, the unspoken objective was to minimize the risk of casualties by destroying all city buildings that could be used as enemy strongholds before sending in the infantry. When it came to “mopping up” operations, again referring to operations against Grozny in late 1999, the tactical order employed was as follows. Motorized rifle tactical groups were restructured into assault detachments consisting of three company size assault groups supported by tank and helicopter fire. Advancing assault detachments were supported by two combat trios, each consisting of a rocket propelled grenade gunner, a machine gunner and a sniper drawn from the special forces. As soon as the assault detachment advanced, the tanks would move into the middle of the street to engage enemy positions on the upper levels of buildings. Meanwhile, armored personnel carriers covered the flanks of advancing groups, while two blocking groups of infantrymen guarded the armored vehicles from surprise attacks at the rear. While these tactics paid off in terms of lower casualties, they could only partially compensate for the lack of combat skills among conscripted troops, as well as the gross incompetence of many officers. 23 ����� Ibid. 24 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� One of the most notable problems is desertion from the army, which in most cases can be explained by humiliation of soldiers by their seniors. Hazing, called dedovschina in Russian, is a more complex term that addresses the system of hazing, as opposed to the incident itself. Every year, thousands of deserters turn to the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee for help.

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

107

networking systems for marketing their men in exchange for goods, services, or simply for money.25 Widespread practices of this kind included selling soldiers to Chechens for cash. The Chechens then offered to free the men in exchange for ransom that might be paid by worried families back home. This lucrative scheme yielded money for both sides, only occasionally mitigated by criminal prosecution of the military officers responsible. Another chronic problem was the lack of funding and resources for both individual training and also major unit exercises.26 But, during the time leading up to the second war in Chechnya, there were several notable exceptions. In July and August 1998, fully one year before the start of the next war in Chechnya would begin, there was a military command post exercise (a CPX) designed to sort out command roles in Chechnya in the event that military action was required. In the exercise scenario, the precipitating event was a defensive reaction to attacks by rebel insurgents. Tactically, the aim was to buffer and quarantine an insurgency. The outcome of the exercise not only demonstrated military readiness, it also appeared to reinforce military action over diplomacy. Besides achieving its military training objective, it was also aimed at preparing the minds of Russian people to accept a decision to go to war in Chechnya.27 Also in 1998, a film funded by oligarch Boris Berezovskiy attempted to show how Chechens were at fault for attacking and terrorizing Russians. The film includes a scene with a Russian soldier being crucified by Chechens for his

25  [FBIS] CEP19990829000032, Moscow, Russian Public Television First Channel Network, 28 August 1999 [in Russian], “Russian military in Caucasus sells soldiers to kidnappers” From the “Novosti” newscast, [FBIS Translated Text Summary]: “The military prosecutor’s office of Vladikavkaz garrison is carrying out an investigation of the sale of six servicemen, from the 503rd Motor-Rifle Division, who were taken hostage on 9 August 1999. The suspects in the case, Lieutenant Khurda, Sergeant Plevunov, and Private Balakhov, have already been arrested. The servicemen sold into captivity spent two weeks as “hostages” of Chechen rebels. Meanwhile, the military prosecutor’s office is continuing an investigation into the kidnapping of another serviceman who has just been released from Chechen captivity. A Russian Army Lieutenant who is suspected of involvement in the crime has been arrested.” 26 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Combat training and staff exercises are expensive, and the army has explored ways of adopting lower cost teaching methods, such as fire training and command and control exercises using computer simulators. There have been reports about the positive changes in platoon-level and company-level training programs. The army has allegedly adopted a three-tier system which is more appropriate for the kinds of tasks the infantry is currently expected to perform. First, individual recruits are trained as combat specialists. Second, there is a tactical skills course aimed at developing cohesion of squads or gun teams. Finally, there is platoon-level and company-level training. 27 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Author’s interview with Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, Director of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, on 6-7 July 2005.

108

Russian Civil-Military Relations

“crimes.”28 Retired General Alexander Lebed denounced the film as propaganda. Lebed said the movie unfairly showed Chechens perpetrating acts they did not commit, remarking that, in truth, there were “scoundrels on both sides.”29 The film was an example of how information management was different in the second conflict, as opposed to the first. In the first war the media was free to investigate and report, but that was not the case in, and after 1999. The army was ordered not speak with reporters, thus only the Chechen point of view was usually reported. In June 1999, Russia mounted “Zapad-99” (West-99), its largest exercise since 1985, involving 50,000 troops from all military districts. Disconcertingly, the exercise was based around a notional invasion from the West by a higher technology military coalition clearly modeled after NATO. In the context of NATO’s military interventions in the Balkans earlier that year, however, this may be understandable.30 Moscow was alarmed at how quickly NATO had managed to go from an organization designed to defend itself from external threats, to one that appeared willing and able to extend its security reach beyond its own boundaries. There is a broadly strategic argument that supports why Chechnya matters so much to Russia. It centers on the region’s importance from the standpoint of location and resources. A more popular reason centers on what has been called a “brush-fire” theory that relates to Chechen independence acting as a catalyst for similar drives by other republics in the Russian Federation.31 Robert V. Daniels put it this way: Chechyna, of course, is an extreme instance in the relations between Moscow and its regions. However, it serves as a warning that federalism may fail in the Russian republic just as it failed in the Soviet Union as a whole, ground up between the millstones of imperial centralism and ethnic particularism.32

28  Chistilishche (Purgatory), a film written and directed by Aleksandr Nevzorov and produced by Boris Berezovsky, ORT [Russian Public Television] Video, 1998. 29 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Jacob W. Kipp, “58 Tectonic Shifts and Putin’s Russia in the Security Environment,” Combined Arms Center Military Review, March-April 2002, 2, . 30 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� During an interview in May 1999 at the Ministry of Defense, General Colonel Leonid Ivashov, then Head of the MOD’s Department of International Cooperation, reminded the author that NATO was sending strong signals about new and aggressively threatening behavior that were unmistakable to Russia. He pointed out recent NATO initiatives such as restructuring of its military forces, as well as a new doctrine and strategic concept that allowed for out of area operations in some cases. Ivashov also pointed out NATO’s recent “invasion,” as he put it, of the Balkans (referring to NATO’s military intervention that began on 24 March 1999). 31 ���������������� John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 23. 32 ������������������������ Robert Vincent Daniels, Russia’s Transformation: Snapshots of a Crumbling System (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

109

Russia’s national security concept refers to the possibility that internal conflicts might represent one of the nation’s greatest threats.33 Some believe one of several conspiracy theories about how Chechnya was used, first by Yeltsin, and then by Putin, to inflame public opinion, paving the way to successful elections. Others attribute the reasons for the war to the “historical and structural legacy of the Soviet system.”34 In any case, there are many reasons why Chechnya was so important to Russia that it was willing to devote thousands of lives and considerable resources to, not one, but two wars in an ongoing effort to avoid its loss. In addition to the military’s poor performance in the last Chechen war, the army’s reliability was also questionable. Although it is certain that Chechen rebels did attack in Dagestan, there may have been Russian provocation. Although the military’s counter-attack in August 1999 was sanctioned by the National Security Council at a meeting after the fact, it is not clear whether or not the military acted on its own initiative at the outset of hostilities. There are a number of inconsistencies and new evidence exists that casts doubt upon civilian control of the military in this case. As in Kosovo earlier that summer, it appears that although President Yeltsin approved of the operation in advance, he may have been manipulated into doing so. When Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin sent the army into Chechnya after rebel attacks in Dagestan, he was supported immediately by the government and eventually won promotion because of his actions. Still, it is not clear who was “calling the shots” when the army went to war, shattering the fragile peace and placing the country back on a path of violence in resolving the conflict in Chechnya. It is also not clear the extent to which the Kremlin may have been involved with several precipitating events that contributed to the crisis.35 Controversy still surrounds the facts associated with several apartment and shopping center bombings that happened as the decision to go to war was underway. There is some evidence that points to possible complicity among the so-called power ministries (the FSB, MVD, and even the MOD), although the government has consistently maintained that the bombings were carried out by Chechen terrorists.36 What is clear is that these events served to rally public support for the war. By the time Putin became acting Prime Minister, there was already considerable enthusiasm on the part of government officials and private citizens to act 33 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� At the time of the decision to go to war in Chechnya in 1999, a new national security concept document was under development. Although it would finally differ considerably from the older version, the point about internal sources of conflict would remain the same. See Appendix D for the full document. 34 ��������������������� Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 3. 35 ��������������������������������������������������������� Jacob W. Kipp, “Putin and Russia’s Wars in Chechnya,” in Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain (ed.) Dale R. Herspring (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 220. 36 ������������� Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? 67.

110

Russian Civil-Military Relations

decisively in Chechnya in order to stem the tide of violence that was increasingly associated with terrorism in the North Caucasus.37 Later on, when Putin was running for president in early 2000, the issue of doing something about Chechen terrorism became one of his primary campaign pledges. Even though Putin’s early involvement in the crises that eventually precipitated the second Chechen war is uncertain, it is almost certain that he knew what was going on as the army debated whether or not to act during the summer of 1999. Meanwhile, Yeltsin continued sending mixed signals to his military by frequently changing the civilians who were supposed to be in charge.38 Sergei Stepashin was still Prime Minister when Shamil Basayev first led his army of Chechen rebels into Dagestan, but he did not have the full support of the president and his political demise was thought to be imminent. When Stepashin went to Chechnya to speak with Maskhadov, no one truly felt there was much chance he could achieve peace with the increasingly restive Chechens.

What Happened Although the second Chechen war actually began in Dagestan in August 1999, there was considerable activity leading up to the open exchange of hostilities between Russian federal forces and Chechen rebel insurgents. On 2 July, at a meeting of cabinet-level officers in the Kremlin, “shocking statistics” about

37 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990826000125, Moscow, RIA Novosti, in English language, 26 August 1999, “Dagestan Developments Seen as Triumph for Putin.” [FBIS Transcribed Text Summary]: “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was good on his word, as federal troops coped with the Dagestani operation within two weeks to destroy extremist invaders. Experts see it as the new federal cabinet’s first major success.” 38 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990810001010, Moscow, Izvestiya, [in Russian], 11 August 1999, 1, report by Vladimir Yermolin: “President Gives Defense Minister Confidence in Future: Dagestan May Hurt Rushaylo Career, Boost Kvashnin.” [FBIS Translated Text Summary]: “By tradition, the day after an edict dismissing a premier is issued the president receives the leaders of the power departments at the Kremlin. This time, the first person to meet with the supreme commander in chief was Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev. The subjects discussed, as officially announced by the President’s Press Service, were the state of affairs in the armed forces, peacekeeping problems, and the situation in the North Caucasus. The president reassured the defense minister, guaranteeing his seat in the cabinet. The president expressed his desire to prevent the power structures, above all, the army, from feeling unstable in a period when so many members of the government have the black mark of “acting” hanging over them. The president is more interested than ever in today’s monolithic armed forces. The problem of defending national interests in the North Caucasus has become so acute that the army, which has retained a kind of neutrality with regard to Chechnya for almost three years, will, it seems, once again have to push the Internal Troops (MVD) into a secondary role and get right down to tackling the restoration of constitutional order in that region.”

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

111

ethnic Russians being robbed, kidnapped or killed in Chechnya were disclosed.39 Ministers discussed whether the current policy with regard to Chechnya was working; perhaps it might be time to either let the region go its separate way, or else take much more strident measures to secure peace and stability. The next day Prime Minister Stepashin said “The North Caucasus is a tangle of problems, historical problems, and to unravel it you should try not to pull on the first thread that comes to hand.”40 But Stepashin’s tangle of problems was actually a Gordian knot that would eventually have to be cut, and the events that would precipitate the act were already underway. An MVD envoy, General Gennadiy Shpigun, kidnapped by Chechens in March 1999, was still in captivity. While Stepashin continued to insist that Russia was not on the road to war (again) in Chechnya, he issued an ultimatum demanding Shpigun’s release. There was talk of “preventive strikes” in advance of possibly more aggressive actions against Chechnya.41 Stepashin may have ordered military planning in support of an invasion as early as April-May 1999. Because of his background as a former head of the security service, he was somewhat conflicted about his views on going to war. During the first war, from 1994-1996, Stepashin was certainly “hawkish” in his outlook. The second time around, however, found him in a different position. By his own admission, he said he believed that rebel force operations would eventually require federal forces to respond. But the record seems to show that he simply did not believe that was what Yeltsin wanted.42 On July third, Interior Minister Rushaylo ordered the deployment of a provisional group of forces (MVD) consisting of 17,000 men to the North Caucasus.43 Of that number, 10,000 were to take up positions along the Chechen 39 ������ [FBIS] FTS19990702000622, Moscow, Russian Television Network (RTN), [in Russian], 2 July 1999, “Russian Cabinet of Ministers Discuss Caucasus Strategy,” from “Vesti” newscast presented by Dmitriy Borisov. 40 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990705000209, Moscow, Izvestiya, [in Russian], 3 July 1999, 2, report by Svetlana Babayeva: “Caucasus Tangle That Doesn’t Want To Go Anywhere.” 41 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990715001806, Moscow, Russian Television Network (RTN) [in Russian], 15 July 1999, “Russian Official on Security in Chechnya,” interview with Ivan Golubev, Russian Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, by Tatyana Khudobina from the “Podrobnosti” (Details) program [FBIS Translated Excerpt]: “Our guest today is Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Ivan Golubev, whose area of responsibility for the Northern Caucasus, a region which has not been producing good news for a long time. An interior ministry meeting today discussed the situation in the areas bordering Chechnya. Gangs have reportedly attacked police posts 73 times in the last six months, 45 police have been killed and 85 injured.” 42 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Michael R. Gordon, “A Look at How the Kremlin Slid Into the Chechen War,” New York Times International, February 2000, 6. 43 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Plater-Zyberk, “The Russian Decision-Makers in the Chechen Conflict,” 76 Colonel-General Vladimir Borisovich Rushaylo, the Minister of Internal Affairs, is one of the more controversial appointments made by Boris Yeltsin. He is a professional policeman

112

Russian Civil-Military Relations

border.44 Stressing the fact that these preventive measures did not place Russia on the path to war, the MVD used the American response to genocide in Serbia as an example of why Russia had to act. If terrorists perpetrated such heinous acts inside the very state in which it belongs, then surely no one could oppose efforts by the state to secure itself by eliminating the terrorists on their own turf. Or so the logic went. Russians were beginning to feel threatened by Chechen bandits to such an extent that arguments for war became increasingly more compelling. In the early morning hours of 5 July, interior ministry (MVD) troops attacked a cluster of Chechen gunmen on the Chechen border with Dagestan, ostensibly to “prevent” the armed men from attacking the local civilian population. Reports said the Chechens, who numbered between 150 and 200, had been shelling a hydroelectric plant in the nearby Dagestani town of Kizlyar when the MVD responded with a helicopter-borne rocket attack. Fatalities reported on the Chechen side were not confirmed.45 Two days later another skirmish took place in the same area, this time more helicopters were involved, and Chechen casualties were reportedly heavier (although still unconfirmed). General Ovchinnikov, Commander of the North Caucasus MVD forces, flew to Moscow on 7 July to explain what was happening.46 While insisting that there with unorthodox links with business and the political world. He owes his job partly to his excellent contacts in the Upper Chamber of the Russian Parliament, the Federation Council. Born on 28 July 1953 in Tambov, Rushaylo joined the Ministry of Interior at the age of 19 and four years later graduated from Omsk Higher Militia School. Between 1976 and 1988 Rushaylo worked in the criminal investigation branch of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow. In 1988 he headed the department responsible for combating organized crime and between 1993 and 1996 was responsible for combating organized crime in Moscow region as a whole. In 1996 Rushaylo was temporarily on attachment to the Duma upper chamber, where he worked as a legal consultant to the chamber’s speaker. He returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in May 1998 as a deputy minister and in May 1999 became the Minister of Internal Affairs. 44 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990703000316, Moscow, RIA Novosti, in English language, 3 July 1999, report by Andrei Galkin: “Moscow Ready for Emergency Regime in North Caucasus.” [FBIS Transcribed Text]: “Moreover, an agreement has been reached to involve reserve forces of the Defense Ministry and of the Federal Frontier Service—up to 7,000 men, if the situation worsens. Rushaylo said that the whole perimeter of the Chechen border is now being monitored to ensure its security. A decision has been taken to strengthen the law-enforcement bodies in Chechnya’s neighboring regions. The minister also believes that it is necessary to build fortifications on this border as soon as possible, as well as to form additional mobile fire groups in the region, and increase the number of checkpoints. The practice of engaging local civilians to maintaining public order has justified itself in Makhachkala, Stavropol, and in the Ingush districts adjacent to Chechnya.” 45 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990706001238, Moscow, Izvestiya, [in Russian], 6 July 1999, 2, “MVD Anti-Chechen Preventive Strikes Eyed,” article by Yevgeniy Krutikov: “MVD Proposes Its Strategy for Combating Chechen Gunmen.” 46 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Plater-Zyberk, “The Russian Decision-Makers in the Chechen Conflict,” 77 Colonel General Vyacheslav Viktorovich Ovchinnikov was born in 1946 in the Tambov

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

113

were no plans to deploy additional troops to the region, said that he was “fully prepared to use even more serious weapons” if Chechen bandits continued to conduct raids there.47 By this point, the size of Russia’s federal forces amassed in the region made its intentions clear. Reports in the Moscow press questioned the government’s intentions, asking whether there was not some alternative to another war. But there were efforts underway on the information front as well as the hostile activities taking place on the ground. Ministers were engaged in trying to prepare the Russian population for what seemed increasingly to be an inevitable military conflict in Chechnya.48 By mid-July, travel to and from the North Caucasus had been essentially choked off by the heavy congestion of armed forces present in the region. With forces on heightened alert all along the border between Chechnya and Dagestan, it is hard to imagine how any Chechen rebel activity could have taken place without immediate response in retaliation by Russian federal forces. Reports of skirmishes were described in the press as “fighting phantoms.”49 But skirmishes did happen, and, in fact, were happening with alarmingly increasing regularity. During the three month period of May-July 1999, there were “more than twenty attacks, region. He chose a military career and joined the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), where he served his entire career. He went through several command positions in the Internal Troops. In 1996 he was appointed a deputy head of the Main Staff of the MVD and was the Commandant of Groznyy after the Khasavyurt agreement. In March 1999 Ovchinnikov was appointed First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Internal Troops and on 5 April 1999 Yeltsin, unhappy with the performance of the Internal Troops dismissed their Commander in Chief, Colonel General Pavel Maslov, replacing him with Ovchinnikov. Ovchinnikov eventually lost his job, in January 2000, because he was reportedly “unable to accomplish the tasks allocated to him.” 47 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990707001308, Moscow, Izvestiya [in Russian], 8 July 1999, 1, report by Yevgeniy Krutikov: “Retaliatory Strike. Russia and Chechnya on Brink of War Again.” 48 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990707001308, Moscow, Izvestiya [in Russian], 8 July 1999, 1, report by Yevgeniy Krutikov: “Retaliatory Strike. Russia and Chechnya on Brink of War Again.” [FBIS Translated Text Excerpt]: “It would appear that the federal government is already mentally prepared to use, if not this entire force, at least part of it (the aviation and MVD units) to prevent attacks on the border and the spread of terrorism beyond Chechnya’s borders. Ideological and propaganda preparation for strong arm operations, whose exemplary character, according to General Ovchinnikov, will amount to “preempting attackers,” is proceeding at full pace. After a few weeks of methodically parading the atrocities of the kidnappers on central television, Russian society is gradually leaning toward approving a military operation, although, as recent public opinion polls show, there is still not overwhelming support in Moscow. However, Sergey Stepashin will not likely allow defeat in the propaganda war (possibly it is partly for this reason that a new propaganda ministry is being created). From the psychological point of view Chechnya has already lost the propaganda war.” 49 ��������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS1999071900984, Moscow, Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy [in Russian], 19 July 1999.

114

Russian Civil-Military Relations

including the shelling of federal forces, police outposts, and border control points on the perimeter of Chechnya that borders Dagestan. Six military servicemen and ten policemen have died.”50 On the night 24-25 July more gunfire was exchanged in the vicinity of a hydroelectric plant at Kopayevskiy in Dagestan. Reports of the incident cited provocation by Chechen attackers as the reason troops opened fire.51 Several days later, on 29 July, an explosion took place at a military gas station in Girey-Avlakh, Dagestan; three soldiers were killed and Russian forces responded by deploying helicopters out of their base in nearby Buynaksk.52 Although serious, these skirmishes were, so far, contained to the immediate area surrounding the border between Chechnya and Dagestan. Despite the violence of incidents leading up to this point, the situation became much more tense as Chechens crossed the border into Dagestan on 31 July, seizing three villages. Beginning on the second day of August, fierce fighting followed. Eventually, the “bandits,” as Russians called them, withdrew. In August, television stations in Moscow were reporting that a new weapon, fuel-air bombs, were being used for the first time.53 This new explosive device was said to be playing an important role in the operation’s success because its use resulted in near evaporation of its victims, thus reducing the casualties of Russian troops. On 2 August, the operation to remove Shamil Basayev’s rebels from Dagestan began in earnest. Although full-scale operations inside Chechnya did not begin until September, 2 August is a good choice for the beginning of the second war because it marked the first open clash between Russian troops and Chechen rebels. Official statements by Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, First Deputy Chief of the

50 �������������������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990718000560 99R06531A, Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, [in Russian], 13 July 1999, article by Vasiliy Safronchuk based on a press briefing by unidentified interior ministry officials on 12 July in Moscow. 51 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990726000360, Moscow, Radio Rossii Network [in Russian], 26 July 1999. 52 ����������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS199907290000813, Moscow, Kommersant [in Russian], 29 July 1999, 3, report entitled: “Khattab’s Gunmen Blow up Truck Carrrying Soldiers.” 53 ��������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990813000514, Moscow Kommersant [in Russian], 13 August 1999, 13, “Dagestan Clash Becoming Full-Scale War,” report by Crime and Politics Desks under the general heading “First Phase of Occupation of Dagestan Is Complete, Fuel-Air Bombs Annihilate Bandits.” [FBIS Translated Text Summary]: “The conflict in Dagestan is rapidly developing into a full-scale war in the North Caucasus. Russian aircraft have bombed the Chechen villages housing the gunmen’s bases. Official Grozny has appealed to the United Nations, demanding that the republic be protected from the aggression. All the Chechen formations in border areas have been put on heightened combat readiness. Meanwhile, Division General Shamil Basayev is saying that the first phase of the operation to ‘liberate Dagestan from Russian troops’ has been completed ahead of schedule. The second phase is now beginning: the capture of the entire republic. The federal authorities are urgently moving special assault forces into Dagestan.”

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

115

General Staff, support this fact.54 Manilov confirmed the onset of hostilities and set forth the military objectives to be achieved: the systematic annihilation of all Chechen terrorists (meaning all Chechens).55 From 1999 through 2001, Manilov became the General Staff’s most articulate spokesman about the second Chechen War, arguing carefully and compellingly in support of an uncompromising view that favored military action over negotiation. Among his numerous arguments, one centered on the legality of Russia’s cause in Chechnya. There was, in his view, simply no legitimate reason for Chechen separatism, certainly there was no legal basis for Chechen independence, nor for its protection from Russia since it was a part of the Russian Federation.56 Manilov often met with this author, as well as others at the American Embassy in Moscow, to discuss Russia’s position in the war. He was an engaging discussant, fond of promoting the new realpolitik that best describes Russia’s world view at the time. Manilov believed a uni-polar world was dangerously unstable, prone to abuses by the reigning super-power of the moment. He favored balancing 54 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Plater-Zyberk, “The Russian Decision-Makers in the Chechen Conflict,” 69. Colonel-General Valeriy Leonidovich Manilov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was the most politically experienced of all Russian General Staff officers during the 1990s. He was born on 10 January 1939 in Vinnitsa into a military family. Manilov enrolled at the Odessa Higher All-Arms Command School, from which he graduated in 1962. He was active in the Communist Youth Movement (Komsomol), which allowed him to enroll at the Lenin Military Political Academy. He graduated from the academy in 1972 and worked in the military media and propaganda bodies, including the military daily “Krasnaya Zvezda.” Manilov served in Afghanistan from 1981-1983, although his precise position and responsibilities are not clear. He then studied at the General Staff Academy, from which he graduated in 1985 with distinction. From then until 1993 he held top positions in the USSR/CIS/Russian military information and propaganda establishments. At the end of the 1980s, Manilov served as one of the secretaries of then Minister of Defense Marshal Dmitri Yazov which, after the failed coup of August 1991, slowed down his career. He worked for a while as the speechwriter for the last Soviet Minister of Defense and later Commander in Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, Air Marshal Shaposhnikov. His political, analytical and presentation skills were recognized in 1993 by Boris Yeltsin, who appointed him deputy secretary of the Security Council. As an experienced political officer, Manilov was able to communicate successfully with politicians and the military. In comparison with the simplistic public pronouncements of Defense Minister Grachev, for example, especially during the first Chechen conflict, Manilov sounded informative and erudite. The nomination of General Aleksandr Lebed to the post of Secretary of the Security Council in August 1996 spelled the end of Manilov’s tenure there. Lebed was not fond of political officers and made quite clear that he did not like what he referred to as “political chameleons.” A month later Manilov was transferred to the General Staff. He was a good writer, and he was instrumental in developing and presenting the Military Doctrines of 1993 and 1999. 55 ����������������� Scott and Scott, 12th Edition, 44. 56 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Steven J. Main, “Counter-Terrorist Operations in Chechnya: On the Legality of the Conflict,” in Anne C. Aldis (ed.) The Second Chechen War (Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, U.K.: The Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2000), 19-37.

116

Russian Civil-Military Relations

U.S. hegemony in a variety of different ways, all of which involved recognizing Russia’s unique and potentially significant contributions to geopolitics. As United States Naval Attaché, this author escorted Manilov to and from the United States on several occasions. In February 2000, Manilov said that Russia’s new military doctrine made it easier for the military to act in Russia’s defense under circumstances like Chechnya involving internal conflict.57 On 3 August 1999, General Manilov said, “Dagestani police commandos, a police battalion, a rapid deployment task force, and officers of the territorial police were dispatched to the battle area to render support in combat operations. Helicopter gunships of the Russian Interior Ministry (MVD) mounted three attacks on several concentrations of gunmen. Combat operations ceased at 2100.”58 Immediately after the war began, on 3 August, Manilov said 11 federal service men had been killed, and another 55 wounded, in Chechnya during the previous week (27 July -3 August). He added that the figures were only representative of the casualties sustained by personnel from the defense and interior ministries.59 In the days that followed, there were more bloody clashes between federal forces and Chechen insurgents. On 8 August, Prime Minister Stepashin spent the morning conferring with Dagestani leaders, trying to achieve a solution to the crisis in Chechnya that was spilling over into Dagestan. Stepashin was joined by Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin, and MVD operations commander Ovchinnikov.60 The next day, 9 August, President Yeltsin announced Stepashin’s dismissal, appointing Vladimir Putin as Acting Prime Minister (pending his confirmation by the Duma).

57 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 19-20 February, 2000, Cambridge, MA, Harvard Faculty Club, Manilov to Brannon, following dinner in honor of a delegation from Russia, of which Manilov was a member. 58 ����������������� Scott and Scott, 12th Edition, 44. 59 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� During the war, Manilov issued many such statements, becoming the official “body-count” spokesman on behalf of the General Staff. The veracity of Manilov’s statistics was often questioned, and he sometimes appeared to contradict himself about the numbers of casualties suffered on both sides. 60 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Plater-Zyberk, “The Russian Decision-Makers in the Chechen Conflict,” 77. Colonel General Vyacheslav Viktorovich Ovchinnikov was born in 1946 in the Tambov region. In 1968 he graduated from an Artillery Air Defense School and several years later from the Artillery Academy. He was transferred to the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), where he served the rest of his career. In 1996 he was appointed as a deputy head of the Main Staff of the MVD, and was the Commandant of Groznyy after the Khasavyurt agreement (1996-1997). In March 1999, Ovchinnikov was appointed First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Internal Troops, and on 5 April 1999 President Yeltsin, unhappy with the performance of the Internal Troops, dismissed their Commander in Chief, Colonel-General Pavel Maslov, replacing him with Ovchinnikov. Ovchinnikov eventually lost the job himself in January 2000 because, according to official statements, he was unable to accomplish the tasks allocated to him.

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

117

By the middle of August, with cross border skirmishes now almost a daily (or nightly) occurrence, the inevitability of war became increasingly apparent. In Chechnya, Maskhadov imposed a state of emergency on 16 August in response to Russian military actions (gunfire and mining of roads) against rebels forces in the border area.61 The next day, Russians denied that troops were moving into Chechnya.62 Command and control of federal forces in the region was sometimes uncertain. On 17 August, operational command was transferred from the MVD to the MOD, apparently because the MVD was not able to retaliate with sufficient venom to the cross-border incursion. However, 10 days later, operational command was transferred back to the MVD, for operations against Chechen rebels in Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi and Kadar. This operation was also deemed to be a failure, however, and operational command was restored to the MOD on 4 September.63 On Wednesday, 25 August, Russia launched the heaviest assault so far, as air strikes were conducted against rebel forces inside Chechnya from bases in the

61 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990817000424, Moscow, Kommersant, in Russian, 17 August 1999, 1-3, article: “Russia, Chechnya on Brink of War” [FBIS Translated Text Excerpt]: “Maskhadov, who has unsuccessfully sought a meeting with Boris Yeltsin over the past few months, now finds himself between a rock and a hard place. As head of a state which no one recognizes, he is obliged to respond to Russia’s bombing of border villages. His appeals to the United Nations and the Russian Foreign Ministry have gone unanswered. Now he is having to take retaliatory measures. Right now this is just saber-rattling but that cannot go on for long. Many Chechen field commanders are demanding that the aggressor be rebuffed immediately. It is impossible to predict how long Maskhadov will withstand their pressure to go to war. Russian federal troops are also preparing for that turn of events. Military transports carrying airborne troops, spetsnaz, soldiers, policemen, and military hardware are constantly landing at Makhachkala Airport. Such forces are obviously not needed to oust from Dagestan gunmen who have already been surrounded and robbed of vitality (according to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Press Service, they have lost around 400 men during the fighting). At the same time, detachments of volunteers are still being formed from among some Dagestanis loyal to the Russian authorities. According to reports coming in from Dagestan, around 10,000 people have already enlisted.” 62 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990817000970, Moscow, ITAR-TASS [in Russian], 17 August 1999, report from Vladikavkaz by correspondent Valeriy Shanayev, “Russian Army Denies Reports of Troops Entering Chechnya” [FBIS Translated Text Excerpt]: “The reports from Grozny that a column of federal troops’ armored equipment has crossed the administrative border of Chechnya in the vicinity of the village of Bratskoye are not true, based on a report from the headquarters of the 58th army. Some army units that have experience in fighting in mountainous localities are taking part in military operations in Dagestan, but most of the troops remain permanently stationed on the territory of the North Caucasus region. 63 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Steven J. Main, “North Caucasus Military District: Defending Russia’s Interests in the Caucasus,” in The Second Chechen War, (ed.) Anne C. Aldis (Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, U.K.: The Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2000), 55.

118

Russian Civil-Military Relations

North Caucasus.64 At first, Moscow denied the actions, as Minister of Defense Sergeyev told the press on the 26th that no such activity had in fact taken place.65 Even after the event was confirmed, there was confusion about who had ordered the air strikes.66 The press speculated that Sergeyev might have been “out of the loop” in the decision to conduct the operation. One report, in particular, recalled the earlier incident at Pristina Airport in Kosovo, when Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin had apparently gone over Sergeyev’s head in ordering the military to seize the airfield.67

64 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP19990827000105, Moscow, Sevodnya [in Russian], 26 August 1999, 1-2, report by Aleksandr Koretskiy: “Sergeyev Discomfited Again. Defense Minister Turns Out To Be Unaware of Night Bombing Raid Against Chechen Territory” [FBIS Translated Excerpt]: “Late on Wednesday 25 August, federal troops delivered a series of air strikes against Chechnya’s Vedenskiy Region in the vicinity of the villages of Serzhen Yurt (35-40 km southeast of Grozny), Bani-Yurt, Kenkhi, and Vedeno Gorge. According to witnesses, a total of eight air strikes were delivered against the territory of Chechnya.” 65 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP19990827000105, Moscow, Sevodnya [in Russian], 26 August 1999, 1-2, report by Aleksandr Koretskiy: “Sergeyev Discomfited Again: Defense Minister Turns Out To Be Unaware of Night Bombing Raid Against Chechen Territory” [FBIS Translated Excerpt]: “Last night, 25 August, spokesmen of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry’s joint forces temporary press center in Dagestan confirmed the bombing raid of 25 August to Interfax. However, the press center changed its report the next day based on testimony by Defense Minister Marshal Sergeyev, who said that federal forces had not delivered any strikes against Chechnya. The possibility that this could have been a misunderstanding is doubtful. The fact is, for the second time in the last six months, the defense minister has turned out to be unaware of what combat missions are being conducted by the army of which he is in charge.” 66 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990826000179, Moscow, Interfax, in English language, 26 August 1999 (2330 in Moscow), “Russian Defense Ministry Confirms Bombing of Chechnya” [FBIS Transcribed Text]: “During an operation to liberate villages in the Botlikh district, mines were cleared from two arms depots in the village of Ansalta and from an arms depot in the village of Shadroda. A total of 120 82-millimeter mines, 82 120-millimeter mines, 55 152-millimeter projectiles, 200 grenades, 23 field mines and 500 pieces of other ammunition were confiscated, the press center said. Six explosive devices were defused. On Thursday, interior ministry (MVD) troops will carry out cleansing operations in the villages of Ansalta, Rakhata and Shodroda, and clear mines from roads, the press center said. People are returning to the liberated villages.” 67 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP19990827000105, Moscow, Sevodnya [in Russian], 26 August 1999, 1-2, report by Aleksandr Koretskiy: “Sergeyev Discomfited Again. Defense Minister Turns Out To Be Unaware of Night Bombing Raid Against Chechen Territory” [FBIS Translated Excerpt]: “There is absolutely no doubt that the “Pristina incident” has recurred within the Russian military leadership. Only two people could have given the order to bomb Chechnya, Colonel General Viktor Kazantsev, commander of the joint federal forces in Dagestan, and Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin. The latter had already put the defense minister in an embarrassing position when he prepared and implemented the operation to seize Pristina airfield. It is possible that the same scenario was used yesterday too.”

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

119

On 31 August, a bomb exploded at Okhotny Ryad, a popular shopping mall immediately adjacent to the Kremlin in Moscow. Just days later, on 4 September, in the Dagestani town of Buynaksk, 52 people were killed in a bomb blast at an apartment building. During the period from 9 to 13 September, bombs ripped apart two large apartment buildings in Moscow, killing more than 300 people, and on 16 September, an apartment building was partially destroyed in a similar blast in the southern Russian town of Volgodonsk.68 As discussed earlier in this chapter, these events served to alert the general population in Russia to the crisis looming on the horizon in the North Caucasus. Although it was never proven who the perpetrators of the acts were, the implication was clear that responsibility lay with Chechen terrorists. On 15 September, Prime Minister Putin announced that the people who blew up the apartment buildings were hiding in Chechnya. Events now began to happen faster. The Ministry of Defense announced it was drawing up plans for largescale operations to destroy Chechen forces at their bases inside Chechnya. On 20 September, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Manilov said Russian forces might have to invade the republic of Chechnya. The next day the border with Chechnya was sealed.69 With deliberate force and impressive tactical precision, Russian troops turned back the Chechen incursion into Dagestan, pursuing the rebels all the way to Chechnya’s capital city of Grozny. On 1 October, ground troops entered Chechnya to set up a security zone. Within one week, Russian federal forces were encamped on the Terek River, barely 20 kilometers from the outskirts of the capital city. By November, it was clear that Grozny was to be destroyed soon. In December, it was. Military doctrine practiced in this war was aimed at executing deliberate force directly at the capital city in an effort to render Chechnya a headless entity, wholly without the means to govern, or to perpetuate a war of insurgency. The military believed it could act decisively, and with sufficient force so as to completely annihilate Chechnya. During the first Chechen war, MVD Commander, General Kulikov, said that every time Russian troops had cornered one of the key figures in Chechnya’s insurgency, politicians intervened and made the operation fail. Kulikov reportedly said “politicians must not be allowed to do this again.”70 In the waning months and weeks of 1999, officials repeatedly claimed the war was being won, despite the fact that casualties were mounting and control of Chechnya’s borders was in the hands neither of Russia nor of the insurgency. By the time Yeltsin handed over the reins of the country to Putin on 31 December, it was clear that the 68 ������������� Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?, 67. 69 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� M.A. Smith, “The Second Chechen War: The All-Russian Context,” in Anne C. Aldis (ed.) The Second Chechen War (Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, U.K.: The Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2000), 4. 70 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Author’s interview with analyst Timothy Lee Thomas at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 6 July 2005.

120

Russian Civil-Military Relations

war in Chechnya was not over, not even close. Instead, the conflict simply dragged on and on, bleeding dry Russia’s already severely strapped defense resources and manpower.

Decision Makers The person responsible for making the decision for Russia to go to war, in Chechnya or anywhere else, was Boris Yeltsin. As President, he was responsible for the nation’s security, and he was also the military’s Commander-in-Chief. However, as has been suggested throughout this work, it is possible that Yeltsin did not have sufficient control of the military during the summer months of 1999. When Yeltsin passed responsibility for the crisis in the Northern Caucasus to his appointed successor, Vladimir Putin, civilian control of the military began to tighten once again. Both Yeltsin and Putin were surrounded by many advisers in 1999, some of whom believed that war was the only answer to the crisis in Chechnya, others did not. As uncertainty about who was supposed to be controlling the military prevailed in 1999, advice about security of the Russian state was subject to influence based on the disposition of the adviser. Principal among the president’s advisers was, of course, the prime minister. In 1999, there were three. Yevgeniy Primakov was replaced in May by Sergei Stepashin, who yielded to Vladimir Putin in August. Reasons for Primakov’s ouster range from the benign to the ridiculous, but most likely, he was perceived to be politically threatening at a time when the president was not very sure of himself. Stepashin was seen as Yeltsin’s close confidant. Politically inexperienced, Stepashin had been the Director of the Interior Ministry during the years when that agency was assigned the lead role in implementing the details of Lebed’s peace deal in Chechnya. Although Stepashin was a political light-weight, he was committed to doing the best he could to salvage the tenuous peace. But because he did not adequately manage the perils of Kremlin politics at a time when the president was exceptionally vulnerable to influence, he did not guard access to the president as carefully as his predecessor, Primakov. By the time Putin took over, following the incident at the airport in Pristina, and with the new war looming on the horizon to the south, the issue of civilian control of the military was sharply in focus. Boris Yeltsin’s patriarchal style of leadership led to occasional uncertainty about the hierarchical priorities of access to the presidency, and, ultimately, about who was in charge. Despite the authority of a prime minister, a national security secretary (adviser), and a minister of defense, each of whom would under ordinary circumstances be presumed to have a more intimate professional relationship with the head of state, the military had open entrée to Yeltsin and his inner circle.71 71 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The Law on Defense of 1994, amended in 1996, is relevant because it prescribed the relationship between the president and his most senior defense establishment leaders,

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

121

As in the case of Pristina Airport in Kosovo, Kvashnin may have exploited the opportunity to get next to Yeltsin because he wanted to undermine Sergeyev. Kvashnin’s long standing dispute with Sergeyev about the primacy of nuclear forces over conventional, ground, forces may have been a causal factor in the decision to go to war again in Chechnya. Certainly, if the army did well this time around, Kvashnin’s position would be enhanced, possibly at Sergeyev’s expense. As Minister of Defense, Igor Sergeyev should have been a key figure in the decision to go to war. Sergeyev was a relatively easy going and quiet defense minister, coming on the heels of the colorful Pavel Grachev. Between Grachev and Sergeyev, from 1996-1997, Alexander Lebed, based on his success in achieving peace in Chechnya, had succeeded in getting “his man,” Igor Rodionov, installed by Yeltsin as Minister of Defense. Despite being committed to implementing military reforms, cutting back forces and streamlining force capabilities, Rodionov did not have much support, and very little reform was accomplished. Although he had very close and highly credible ties with the army (less so with Kvashnin and Ivashov, who thought he was soft), Lebed’s closeness to Yeltsin was short-lived, and Rodionov was quickly replaced. Selected for his ability to find a viable balance between the needs of the country and the demands of the military, Sergeyev was ideally positioned to offer the president advice about security in the Northern Caucasus. But Sergeyev did not enjoy the full trust and confidence of his senior officers, including in particular General Lieutenant Leonid Ivashov (whose influence was critical during the Pristina Airport incident described in the previous chapter), and Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin. By 1999, the feud between Sergeyev and Kvashnin was sharp and divisive.72 Because the Defense Law of 31 May 1996 allowed the Chief of General Staff “independent” access to the president, bypassing the Minister of Defense, Kvashnin was able to exploit opportunities to influence decisions.73 The law is somewhat the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. This document is assessed in further detail, especially as it relates directly to the question of access to the president, in the final chapter, 7, of this book. 72 ������ [FBIS] FTS19990723000635, Moscow, Moskovskiy Komsomolets (Electronic Version), [in Russian], 22 July 1999, “Rivalry Between Sergeyev, Kvashnin Eyed,” based on an article by Viktor Sokirko, “President Shows Sergeyev His Place: Dyarchy in the Russian Army” [FBIS Translated Text Excerpt]: “The rivalry between Defense Minister Marshall Igor Sergeyev and Chief of General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin has been carefully camouflaged. In the presence of others, they speak of each other exceptionally courteously. According to the official Ministry of Defense version, the marshal and the general do not have any differences. But that is only the tip of the iceberg, and what is hidden from outsiders’ eyes is more reminiscent of a web of intrigue, and in no way represents unified command of the military.” 73 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ Federalniy zakon�������������������������������������������������������� “Ob ������������������������������������������������������� Oborone,” prinyat Gosudarstvennoy Dumoy 24 Aprelya 1996 goda, Оdobren Sovetom Federatsiy 15 Maya 1996 goda (Federal ��������������������������� Law “On Defense,” enacted by the State Duma on 24 April 1996, approved by the Federation Council on 15 May 1996.) .

122

Russian Civil-Military Relations

vague in that it addresses the nature of this access as special and extraordinary, only to be used under circumstances that require urgency in support of the national defense. Despite several rumors following enactment of the law that the president did not intend for the general staff to actually go around the minister of defense, the policy remained unchanged. This access was a key factor in why Yeltsin may have been manipulated by his military officers into making the initial decisions that led to the second war in Chechnya in 1999.74 At the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), the mood was similar to that of the military.75 Former MVD Director, Anatoliy Kulikov, having had his efforts to win the first war in Chechnya nipped in the bud by Lebed’s peace plan, was itching to get back in the fight. Before being replaced by Vladimir Rushaylo, Sergei Stepashin served as interior minister from 1996-1998, and it fell to him to implement the details of Lebed’s peace plan in Chechnya.76 Stepashin, now prime minister, was Yeltsin’s chief negotiator, arguing for peace through diplomacy. Thus, at the time of the onset of open hostilities in Chechnya in 1999, two former ministers of the interior were actively lobbying for opposite approaches toward conflict resolution; Kulikov on behalf of a military solution, and Stepashin for a negotiated peace of some kind. The current director, Rushaylo, was as much in favor of war as 74 ������ [FBIS] FTS19990723000635, Moscow, Moskovskiy Komsomolets (Electronic Version), [in Russian], 22 July 1999, “Rivalry Between Sergeyev, Kvashnin Eyed,” based on an article by Viktor Sokirko, “President Shows Sergeyev His Place: Dyarchy in the Russian Army” [FBIS Translated Text Excerpt]: “A little-known fact concerns the direct access to the president that is afforded to the most senior military officer in the army. In 1996, the president signed an order in accordance with which Chief of General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin can approach the supreme commander in chief on urgent matters directly, bypassing the defense minister. You would think that in our country the defense ministry and the general staff exist in different dimensions and carry out different tasks, and that Marshal Sergeyev is not General Kvashnin’s immediate chief, but that is seemingly not the case.” 75 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Plater-Zyberk, “The Russian Decision-Makers in the Chechen Conflict,” 76. The Ministry of Interior (MVD) is the second most important power structure involved in the war in Chechnya. On paper, the ministry is well equipped to cope with local conflicts, but, in practice, despite conducting several joint exercises with the Ministry of Defense (MOD), it has never been really ready to perform the role it had to play in Chechnya. The leadership of the MVD was selected, to a large extent, for the ability to work with the army. Command of all troops in Chechnya was decided based on which organization (MOD or MVD) had the most troops in theater. Thus, before the battle of Grozny in December 1999, most troops were army, commanded by the MOD; after Grozny it was a police action; thus, the MVD took charge. Two out of the last three interior ministers have been career soldiers “on loan” from the army (Kulikov and Rushaylo). At the time of the onset of hostilities in the second Chechen War, the minister was Vladimir Rushaylo. His immediate predecessors were Sergei Stepashin (July 1998-May 1999), and Anatoliy Kulikov (July 1995-July 1998). 76 ����������������������������������� Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 526-27.

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

123

Kulikov. The MVD commander on the ground in the Northern Caucasus, General Colonel Ovchinnikov, as mentioned earlier, was an outspoken protagonist for war, although his primary message was that everything was fine, his forces were doing everything to guarantee security, especially on the Chechnya-Dagestan border. On the General Staff, senior officers were planning the new war. To be sure, it is the responsibility of any armed forces general staff to be ready to act. But in this case, the army was highly motivated to acquit itself of previous failure by demonstrating combat effectiveness. A new war in the Northern Caucasus would certainly afford that opportunity. Chief of the General Staff, General Colonel Anatoliy Kvashnin, had been military commander of the North Caucasus District in the first Chechen war. Like Kulikov, Kvashnin was still bitter at being forced off the field when Lebed succeeded in making peace late in 1996. During the first war, one of Kvashnin’s operational planners, Colonel Andrei Dimurenko, developed and briefed a proposal for securing peace in Grozny by dividing the city into sectors that would be patrolled by elements taken from various battalions of armed forces and law enforcement personnel from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The plan never got past Kvashnin’s desk and died before Moscow ever had a chance to review it.77 A traditional general officer in the Soviet mold, Kvashnin was wholly unreconstructed in the post-communist era. His allegiance was first to his army, of course to his country, and last to his civilian masters. His deputy, Valeriy Manilov, although more intellectually gifted, was equally devoted to the cause of promoting a military solution in Chechnya. Kvashnin’s head planner, (then) General Lieutenant Yuriy Baluyevskiy, was fully prepared to do his job, armed with well staffed contingency plans. Baluyevskiy’s plans were exercised in 1998 in a scenario aimed at responding to a Chechen incursion across the border into Dagestan. The role of the Federal Security Service (FSB) was not significant during the first war, but the situation was different this time. By the summer of 1999, Vladimir Putin, having been brought to Moscow from St. Petersburg in 1997, was Director of the FSB. At the height of Boris Yeltsin’s shuffling of his government, in July and August, Putin was moved to Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC), and then made Acting Prime Minister. For a brief period of time, Putin was thus the head of Yeltsin’s government, as well as director of both the FSB and the NSC. General (retired) Kulikov, Minister of the Interior Rushaylo, Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin, and his deputy, General Manilov, as well as General Ivashov from the Ministry of Defense, all provided Yeltsin with a steady stream of argument in support of military action in Chechnya. General (retired) Lebed, Ministers of Defense Rodionov and Sergeyev, as well Prime Ministers Primakov and Stepashin, all wanted peace through compromise. The latter group did not 77 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Author’s interview with Senior Analyst Timothy L. Thomas, at the Foreign Military Studies Office in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 7 July 2005. The story of Colonel Andrei Dimurenko’s peace plan was related personally to Thomas by Dimurenko.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

124

believe that military action could succeed in fighting a war with an insurgency such as the one in Chechnya. The former group advocated total war in an effort to utterly annihilate the Chechens, regardless of their military strategy or political aims.78 Already an important figure in Russian politics, even as early as the spring of 1999, Putin was apparently initially not certain with which point of view to align, but he soon began to speak out in favor of war. Putin’s early comments emphasized Stepashin’s efforts to negotiate and seemed to indicate that he would support continued peace under the Lebed plan, or perhaps some other plan that could be arranged by Yeltsin and his Prime Minister, Sergei Stepashin.79

Decisions In the spring and summer of 1999 no one thought that the options for dealing with Chechnya would involve anything long term.80 Lessons learned from Kosovo (the NATO air campaign in particular) lent credibility to the doctrinal view that fast and deliberate military action that would pave the way for peace. Yeltsin saw the worsening situation in Chechnya as a crisis to be defused. While the president’s emphasis was on negotiating a viable settlement, avoiding military action, the military was preparing to go to war. On 8 July, Yeltsin told a reporter how proud he was of the way law enforcement agencies were conducting themselves in handling the situation surrounding Chechnya. Of late the law enforcement agencies have become much more active, have begun to act more decisively and harmoniously, in the North Caucasus region. The bandits who are terrorizing the population have finally begun to receive a worthy rebuff. But don’t take this to the point of war.81 78 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Author’s interview with Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, Director of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6-7 July 2005. 79 �������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990811000766, Moscow ITAR-TASS [in Russian], 11 August 1999. 80 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Stepashin has said he told the MVD to begin planning an operation into Chechnya as early as May 1999. This was probably in response to the Shpigun kidnapping in March, and was not directly aimed at conducting operations any time soon. Still, it cannot be said that Stepashin was unaware of the military option for dealing with the crisis. 81 ����������������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990708000291 (FBIS), Moscow, ITAR-TASS news agency, Vyacheslav Bantin reporting [in Russian], 8 July 1999. [FBIS Translated Text Excerpt]: “Yeltsin addressed a ceremony at the St Catherine’s Hall of the Kremlin at which top officers of the armed forces and other military formations were present. Referring to the situation on the border with Chechnya, the Russian president stressed that law enforcement agencies had ‘to intensify the war against organized crime, whose leaders are straining to get their hands on power. This is particularly noticeable the closer the parliamentary elections get.’”

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

125

Yeltsin’s admonition that actions not progress to the point of war is particularly telling and insightful in light of events that followed. From May to July civilian authorities kept saying that the crisis in Chechnya would have to be handled, or managed, somehow to avoid war. Although that message was reassuring, the political environment in Russia was in disarray at the time, and it was uncertain whether or not the president believed that a political solution in Chechnya was indeed possible. Appointed Prime Minister in May, Stepashin certainly thought Yeltsin believed it. But Stepashin was inexperienced and was not mindful of the way the military was managing the message. The stage was set for Stepashin’s ouster.82 Even as he continued to work for peace, the army and the MVD were working to undercut his efforts. In Vladivostok on 26 July 1999, Stepashin sat next to the American Consul General and Naval Attaché (the author of this book) in the reviewing stands to observe Navy Day exercises in the bay just beyond the shoreline. Stepashin evoked an air of quiet self-confidence that belied his troubled uncertainties. He told his American guests that President Yeltsin was committed to finding some way to avoid war in Chechnya, even though that might be hard to do. Asked whether the army was already preparing to act, Stepashin said, “No, of course not. The situation in Chechnya is in the hands of law enforcement forces.”83 82 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990810000797, Moscow, Moskovskiy Komsomolets [in Russian], 10 August 1999, 2, “Dagestan Seen As Pretext for Ousting Stepashin,” article by Valeriy Batuyev. [FBIS Translated Text Summary]: “The fact that Yeltsin has gotten rid of Stepashin without any obvious grounds still does not means that Chechnya has proved to be the most convenient terrain for directing a blow at the premier. It is clear to every military analyst that the war that has now broken out in the Caucasus has been engineered. The Chechen breakthrough into southern Dagestan has been expected for almost a year now. Nightly exchanges of tracer fire along the border from Kizlyar to Khasavyurt these last three months (May, June, and July 1999) have been an indication that Chechen terrorists are practicing their marksmanship on our border troops (MVD). Both Prime Minister Stepashin and Minister of the Interior Rushaylo have reported the intensification of military cover on the border. An Interfax report received on 5 August reported that a number of Chechen field commanders, together with some Dagestani extremists, plan in the very near future an armed rebellion in the republic, including actions in its capital, Makhachkala. This hypothesis was confirmed by informed sources in the Russian special services. Correspondents nosing around in the corridors of the Internal Affairs Ministry in the middle of last week (1-7 August) were told to be patient, something interesting would soon happen in the Caucasus.” 83 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� On 26 July 1999, the Acting U.S. Consul General in Vladivostok was Michael Scanlon. The author routinely visited Vladivostok because of its maritime and naval orientation. On this occasion, the author was invited to be a guest of the Russian Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Mikhail Georgiyevich Zakharenko, at the annual celebration of Navy Day. The event included several ships deployed in the bay, easily observed from the reviewing stands a few hundred meters distant. Prime Minister Stepashin was visiting Vladivostok on his way to the United States via a Pacific route. Seated together in the same VIP box of the central reviewing stand, Stepashin and his aides engaged in casual conversation with the author and Consul General Scanlon.

126

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Three days earlier, speaking in Yekaterinburg, Stepashin told reporters: “There will be no war in Chechnya. Nobody wants to make the same mistake twice.”84 On August 8th, Stepashin met with the president to report on his recent visit to Chechnya. Although it is not clear why Yeltsin ousted Stepashin abruptly the following day, it seems that the president’s perceptions about his prime minister may have included weakness and inability to manage the looming crisis. When Yeltsin sacked Stepashin on 9 August, he installed Putin as Acting Prime Minister (pending Duma confirmation). Putin was prepared to act quickly in Chechnya and eventually made it a key position in his political campaign for president after Yeltsin’s resignation in December. Putin (at the time serving simultaneously as both director of FSB and head of Security Council) was certainly in agreement with Yeltsin’s strategy for Chechnya. The challenge to military activists and adventurists was how to make the new war palatable to the Russian people, how to manage information about conditions in Chechnya to prepare them for conflict, especially bearing in mind that many in the military believed that war would be over quickly if they used deliberate and overwhelming force. But after Putin became Prime Minister on 9 August, he began almost immediately to support the army’s view in favor of going to war. There were signs that Putin was beginning to shift his views by late summer toward the notion that the only solution to the Chechen problem was total war. Military officers such as Kulikov, Kvashnin, and Ivashov were saying war was inevitable. Putin said the war in Chechnya was the most important issue on the nation’s security agenda. He said intelligence revealed the fact that Chechnya was “full of terrorists and that these terrorists received funding from international organizations, some of which were based in Saudi Arabia, Central Asia, Europe and even in the United States.” Putin called on foreign leaders to join him in fighting terrorism by first recognizing the inherent “rightness” in Russia’s cause.85 The West was not very much impressed by Putin’s claims, and allegations of human rights abuses in Chechnya continued. In 1999, those who wanted war in Chechnya advocated it based on the need to fill a perceived vacuum in security. There was some concern that if Russia did not act, then the U.S. might. Chief of General Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin warned that NATO might be willing to use force on the territory of the former Soviet Union: Not only the growing military-political activity in the former Soviet Union but also the evident attempts to declare these regions a sphere of NATO security interests are alarming. Kosovo and Iraq were the first examples of NATO’s

84 �������������������������������������������������������������������� FTS 19990723000257 (The Foreign Broadcast Information Service—FBIS) Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS news agency, Ivan Ivanov reporting in English language, 23 July 1999. 85 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Kipp, “58 Tectonic Shifts and Putin’s Russia in the Security Environment,” 5.

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

127

growing readiness to use armed force, and one may therefore expect that other territories, including former Soviet territories, will be no exception.86

Resolving the Northern Caucasus crisis was not “a play in which people knew what was going to happen.”87 In Dagestan and Chechnya during the summer of 1999 the aim was to herd and control rebel forces back into central Chechnya, and then attack with deliberate force in accordance with military doctrine. As the debate heated up, even the hard-liners challenged one another; Kvashnin accused the interior ministry of not being ruthless and decisive enough. The decision to conduct military operations in Chechnya was ultimately aimed at ending Chechnya’s capacity for a legitimate state by denying its capital the means to exist. Hence, the plan was eventually to take Grozny by flattening it and destroying the “terrorists” who lived (and fought) there. Military operations in Chechnya compared between the two wars went from ad hoc and reactionary to the deliberate use of measured and powerful force. In early August, Putin apparently did not believe the insurgency was being adequately dealt with. Putin seemed to be saying two things: (1) Lebed’s peace deal had to be abrogated or eliminated entirely, (2) the Russian people had to be prepared for war by managing the message.88 While no one will likely ever know for sure who, or what organization, executed the bombings in Dagestan, Ryazan, Volgodonsk, and Moscow, it is highly likely that the barracks attack in Dagestan was indeed the work of Chechens. But it is less certain who were the perpetrators of the apartment bombings in Ryazan, Volgodonsk, and Moscow. It is possible, based on evidence related to the kind of explosives that were used and the methods that were employed, to conclude that the FSB might have had a hand in these incidents.89 Either way, these incendiary episodes certainly contributed to public outrage at Chechen terrorism. A clamor began to rise in support of going to war. In mid-September, with heavy concentrations of Russian troops massed on the Chechnya-Dagestan border, Defense Minister Sergeyev said the army was “fully ready to repel any new incursions (by Chechens into Dagestan).”90 Sergeyev claimed there were several thousand Chechen rebels concentrated just across the border. But, instead of waiting for a rebel incursion across the border, Russian federal forces attacked. Initial assaults included air bombardments (recalling

86 ����������������������������������������������� Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Inc. (RFE/RL), Newsline (16 November 1999). 87 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Author’s interview with Dr. Jacob Kipp, Director of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6-7 July 2005. 88 ������������� Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?, 64-65. 89 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Colonel Alexander Litvinenko, “Russia: Former Agent Points Finger at FSB,” CDI Russia Weekly, 25 July 2002, at www.Cdi.Org/russia/216-6.Cfm. 90 ���������������������������������������������������� “Islamic Militants Expelled From Dagestan?,” RFE/RL Newsline, 3:181, pt. 1 (16 September, 1999).

128

Russian Civil-Military Relations

NATO in Kosovo) that were aimed at ammunition depots, the airport in Grozny, oil refineries, industries, and communications facilities.91 Confusion surrounding the decision to launch a significant air assault operation against Chechnya in September is unresolved. Defense Minister Sergeyev was reportedly not involved in some of the high-level discussions about how the operation was to be conducted. Whether this was because it was essentially a military decision to be implemented, following legal authorization to do so by senior civilians running the government is uncertain. Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin and Interior Minister Rushaylo may have simply been acting on their own initiative, confident that they had the support of Yeltsin and Putin.92 In any case, when ground forces rolled into Chechnya in September and October, the decision to reduce the capital city of Grozny to rubble appears to have been supported by all of the key figures in Russia’s government at the time. By November, there were noises in the Kremlin that a negotiated settlement might be possible in Chechnya. Western nations pressured Moscow to stop destroying property and killing civilians in what had by then become a particularly brutal campaign. Confronted with the possibility that military activity in Chechnya might have to cease, Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin led what amounted to a minor revolt by military commanders.93 Kvashnin remembered well what happened the last time the government tried to negotiate peace in Chechnya, leading to Lebed’s peace deal that forced Kvashnin and MVD Director Kulikov to withdraw in humiliation. No one in uniform wanted to experience a repeat performance in that regard. The Defense Ministry and General Staff apparently refused to make the same mistake again. To the Kremlin’s surprise, General Kvashnin took a tough, uncompromising line about the requirement for sustained military actions in Chechnya. The Ministry of Defense later denied the event ever happened. But the denial was thinly disguised and faint compared with credible reports from 91 ������������� Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?, 67. 92 ����� Ibid. 93  [FBIS] FTS19991104001487, Moscow, Moskovskiy Komsomolets [in Russian], 05 November 1999, “Mutiny on the General Staff-Chief Was Set to Resign Over Kremlin Duplicity,” report by Aleksandr Khinshteyn. [FBIS Translated Text Summary]: “President Yeltsin has returned to Moscow from his vacation at the news of a conflict between the Kremlin and the defense ministry. Chief of General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin was set to resign. Not only him but, allegedly, a number of army generals, the planners of the Chechen campaign, as well. Concerned about Russia’s negative image in the West, Kremlin Chief of Staff Voloshin informed the generals that there might soon be talks between Maskhadov and the Kremlin and recommended that they prepare for them. Clearly, such talks would mean curtailing combat actions, letting representatives of international organizations into Chechnya and Ingushetia, and changing Russia’s foreign policy stance. It was also clear that this might lead to a repeat of 1996. Kvashnin contacted Yeltsin on the army’s emergency hot line and said he was prepared to resign unless the administrators’ recommendations were repudiated.”

Case II: The Second Road to War in Chechnya

129

several key witnesses. One observer offered the suggestion that the military was “out in front” of civilian authorities, avoiding compliance with what the president really wanted.94 When Yeltsin returned to Moscow, he met with his new Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, and settled the matter, essentially in favor of the generals. There would be no attempts to negotiate “with terrorists.” Whether this episode represented Yeltsin’s true position or not, he apparently found it inconvenient to “quarrel with his generals” at that time. Still, the incident calls into question “who was calling the shots.”

Conclusions In this period of political and military uncertainty, who was in charge of Russia’s decision to go to war? It seems that the federal forces (MOD and MVD) may have acted overtly and covertly to undermine civilian authorities (mainly the prime minister) early on as the crisis developed with increasing intensity, convincing the president that the best course of action in Chechnya would be to resort to immediate and overwhelming military force. But, as the reins of power began to pass from Yeltsin to Putin, there was a sense that civilian supervision (of the military) was becoming more “intrusive.” Using the military’s own measures of effectiveness and accountability, by means of military doctrine that was based on a new national security concept, the role of monitoring by civilians might become more sharply felt. The decision to go to war in Chechnya the second time was the subject of open discussion both publicly and privately. Still, there were several “pairs” of principalagent relationships at work during the process: Yeltsin and Putin, Kvashnin and Rushaylo, Sergeyev and Kvashnin, for example. Examined another way, these pairs may have operated not only between themselves but with other pairs, often even at the same time. Thus, the question of accountability may have been mitigated somewhat based on alliances and deals that were crafted and entered into between and among these pairs of relationships. Because conditions in the military were so terrible, after years of neglect by civilians who were supposedly in charge, the military felt itself estranged from government and abused by the system it served. Tim Thomas at the Foreign Military Studies Office has suggested that the military in Russia during 1999 was experiencing a challenge of professional loyalty.95 The challenge never resulted in open confrontations or power struggles, such as an attempt at military coup, but it did reflect the fact that the military needed to do something to call attention to its 94 Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, speaking with the author at a diplomatic reception at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow on 11 November 1999. 95 Author’s interview with Timothy L. Thomas, senior analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 July 2005.

130

Russian Civil-Military Relations

strengths, and to demand support for its needs. In sum, civilians had exploited the military, and the military had lost faith in civilians. Beyond doubt, the military wanted to go to war. With civilians teetering between peace initiatives and saber rattling, there was sufficient uncertainty to justify an atmosphere of confusion in which the military could easily influence the decision. Critical to the issue, however, is the question of how far the military might be willing to go to get its own way in Chechnya. Under Yeltsin, as was the case in Kosovo a few months earlier, it was not very difficult for the military to convince the commander-in-chief of its point of view. Under Putin, however, the military may have sensed a move toward greater control. Coupled with national security policy and military doctrine that clarified the role and mission of the armed forces under circumstances of internal conflict, the military was on solid ground in moving toward a war footing in the North Caucasus. But once again, as in Kosovo, the military’s initiative played well into political hands. Putin’s willingness to support what the military was doing in Chechnya enabled him to exploit a fearful mood on the part of the public. Putin’s assurance that he would act firmly and decisively in Chechnya helped to get him elected to the presidency in March 2000. On the surface, the situation in this case appears to be little different from what happened in Kosovo. But that is not sufficient to explain what happened. On balance, Putin’s influence on the dynamics of civil-military relations in Russia was increasing by summer’s end in 1999, and this fact was not lost on the military. Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin, in particular, appears to have been very much impressed by Putin’s abilities and by the strength of his will. Perhaps Kvashnin initially undertook to exploit the opportunity to influence the decision to go to war in Chechnya based on his rivalry with Sergeyev, perhaps he simply wanted to vindicate his past performance. In either case, by the time Putin became the responsible civilian in charge, Kvashnin was less inclined to call his own shots. At least not as boldly as before.

Chapter 6

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama: The Submarine Kursk Tragedy, August 2000

This case is a window into civil-military relations in Russia on the far side of the transition from Yeltsin to Putin. Zoltan Barany warns in his writing on the Kursk disaster that while it is possible to assess the dynamics of what happened, it may not be possible to generalize about the extent to which this case illuminates the broader context of crisis management. Barany’s work is insightful and stands as perhaps the best scholarship to date in the literature on this subject. Even though his focus was on crisis management, Barany suggests, and this author agrees, that what happened to the Kursk, how the crisis was managed by civilian and military authorities, illuminates the dynamics of civil-military relations in Russia at the end of its first decade since the Soviet Union collapsed. The tragedy marks the end of a transitional period between development of national security policy and military doctrine, and placing the documents into practice. The presidency had undergone a transition as well, from Yeltsin to Putin. Coming close on the heels of Yeltsin’s era of political uncertainty, the Kursk disaster was the first serious, time-sensitive, crisis for Putin’s nascent administration. The navy handled the crisis badly, losing faith within its own ranks and losing credibility with the civilians who were supposedly in charge. How the military handled the crisis, how it dealt with civilian authorities, and how the president and his administration responded, both to the information it received, and to the military as it disclosed information, forms the basis of a case study in civil-military relations that is rich in detail and exciting in its implications. In March 2000, having served as acting president since Boris Yeltsin’s resignation on 31 December 1999, Vladimir Putin easily won election to the presidency in his own right. The state of the Russian Federation was poor in almost every measurable category, not least in its armed forces. Military reforms, having been hailed as necessary and forthcoming by the Yeltsin administration throughout the decade of the 1990s, had not been taken seriously. The Russian military in 2000 looked a lot like it had in 1991, before the USSR collapsed, only shabbier. Efforts at restructuring the armed forces were actively and consistently resisted by the military’s senior leadership. Civil-military relations were tense and  ����������������������������������� Zoltan Barany, “The Tragedy of the Kursk: Crisis Management in Putin’s Russia,” Government and Opposition, 39:3 (2004), 476-503.

132

Russian Civil-Military Relations

essentially unreconstructed since Soviet times. The war in Chechnya, instead of being resolved as promised, raged on, sucking up the nation’s blood and treasure with no end in sight. Simply stated, President Putin began his administration facing many exceptionally daunting challenges. Whether or not he was up to the task was a question on everyone’s mind, especially the military’s. Most of the cast of characters in the military hierarchy during the previous two scenarios were still in place at the time of the Kursk incident. Infighting was still going on between the army, with Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin as its principal protagonist, and the Ministry of Defense, led by Marshall Igor Sergeyev. Military reform lay dormant while the fight for supremacy of ground or strategic rocket forces continued. Budgets were extremely tight, and the various branches of Russia’s armed forces fought for their fair share of a very meager defense allowance. The navy, never at the top of the pecking order when it came to resource allocations, was particularly vulnerable because of its aging and incompetent fleets. The mood at the navy’s helm was not good. Commanderin-Chief, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, worked tirelessly to achieve parity with the other branches of the armed forces, or at least to win a relatively equitable share. But in the summer of 2000, the outlook was bleak.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The navy is one of Russia’s three principal branches of armed service. Its Commanderin-Chief is subordinated directly to the Minister of Defense. All naval formations, including Marines and naval aviation, are controlled by the headquarters of one of the four Russian fleets: Northern, Pacific, Baltic and Black Sea. Fleet Headquarters, which are the navy’s equivalent of military districts, are centers of operational and strategic command. In wartime, these headquarters are expected to organize the defense of Russia’s coastal areas. The Navy High Command, or Naval Staff, in coordination with the General Staff, exercises control over the navy’s four fleets, naval aviation and naval infantry (Marine Corps), as well as naval academies and training centers, the coastal defense service, the auxiliary supply fleet, naval air and sea rescue service, hydrographical service, rear services and units from the construction troops attached to the navy.  ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19970328000785, Moscow, Morskoiy Sbornik, in Russian, July 1996, interview with Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief. “Vladimir Ivanovich Kuroyedov was born 5 September 1944 in Bamburovo Station, Maritime Kray. He completed studies at the Pacific Higher Naval School (S.O. Makarov) in 1967. In the Pacific Fleet he held positions as head of a patrol ship navigation department, first lieutenant of a patrol ship, assistant chief of staff of an anti-submarine warfare ship brigade, commander of a patrol ship, senior assistant chief of a naval base section, and chief of staff of an offshore defense force ship brigade. After completing the Naval Academy (for senior officers) in 1978 he resumed service in the Pacific Fleet as chief of staff of an offshore defense force ship brigade, commander of a minesweeper brigade, and chief of staff of a flotilla. He completed the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy (MAGS) in 1989. Admiral Kuroyedov commanded a Pacific Fleet flotilla and was chief of staff and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Baltic Fleet. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet in February 1996.” Author’s note: Admiral Kuroyedov was appointed to command of the entire navy in November 1997, and was promoted to Fleet Admiral on 21 February 2000. In September 2005, Kuroyedov was retired from active service. As U.S.

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

133

The Russian Navy was never fully trusted, not in Soviet times, not even in prerevolutionary times. In 2000, the Navy was respected, but still marginalized. This was reflected in national security policy and in military doctrine. For a number of reasons, not least because it felt itself becoming irrelevant, the navy had begun to develop its own doctrine. Entitled “World Oceans,” this treatise set forth the navy’s goals and objectives in terms that were directly related to its parent documents: the national security concept and military doctrine. Despite an aggressive approach to marketing itself as a critically essential element of Russia’s defense posture, the navy did not fare particularly well. Admiral Kuroyedov believed the only way he could win the budget battles that afflicted his service would be to win the president’s favor directly. Thus ensued a marketing effort of sorts during which the navy sought to acquit itself well enough to garner enhanced support. Russia has never been a great naval power. Even during the Cold War the Soviet Union did not seek absolute parity with the U.S. Navy. The Soviet Navy never developed a true strategic capability, although it did maintain a large fleet of strategic nuclear submarines. Non-nuclear capabilities of the Russian Navy have always been limited due to a lack of sufficient number of naval ground attack aircraft, aircraft carriers, and a very limited stock of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. The Russian Navy’s strategy has always been to search for asymmetric, that is more economical and compact, responses to NATO’s naval strength. In the past, it invested heavily in the submarine fleet, heavy destroyers armed with antiship cruise missiles, and anti-ship or anti-submarine aircraft. While the Ministry of Defense repeatedly promised to allocate additional funds for upgrading the nation’s maritime and naval assets, by 1999 the navy’s numerical strength had already been steadily declining. It had lost all but one of its aircraft carriers and could deploy only thirteen strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs). The fleet of nuclear submarines is regarded as the navy’s top priority; yet it suffered from inadequate funding and poor maintenance, and was operated by underpaid and largely unmotivated personnel. In Soviet times, service on nuclear submarines was considered premier duty for sailors and naval officers alike. But after the Soviet Union collapsed, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the submarine force declined in much the same way as the rest of Russia’s armed forces. Consequently, it wasn’t long before disasters became frequent. Although problems endemic to all the Russian armed forces seriously hampered the navy’s performance as well, Putin appeared to favor a more robust naval posture. This translated into what Kuroyedov called “a promise for the Navy’s long term future.” The Naval High Command said that by 2007 it would be in a

Naval Attaché to Russia (1998-2001) the author met with Kuroyedov on nine different occasions, each of which is documented in the author’s professional journals, filed with the Defense Intelligence Agency as official reports of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.  ��������������������������������������� See Appendix C for the entire document.

134

Russian Civil-Military Relations

position to expand its presence on the high seas and to project security in sea areas adjacent to the Russian territory. Following the decade of the 1990s, when almost every aspect of the navy’s inventory, equipment and personnel, fell so sharply that reliability could not be assumed under any circumstances, extra money was needed both to maintain its decaying hardware and to substantially increase the operating time of its combat surface vessels. Higher levels of funding would be required in order to achieve dramatic improvements in naval combat training programs. Scenarios of naval exercises indicate that most of the navy’s missions were still based on a gross overestimation of security risks posed by the West. Kuroyedov claimed that Russia should reassert itself as a “great oceanic power” in the face of the growing military threat from the U.S. and NATO. He claimed the navy had to train for missions such as repelling an attack by a U.S. aircraft carrier group from the Norwegian Sea. By the year 2000, Russia appeared to be increasingly interested in asserting itself as a significant maritime power. Indeed, for the first time since the Cold War, Russia seemed to view its navy as an instrument of foreign policy. The submarine fleet has always been the backbone of the Russian Navy. While the ballistic missile, or strategic, force (SSBN) had been contracting, there was still considerable effort in developing and supporting the attack submarine (SSN) fleet. Newer submarines such as the Akula and Severodvinsk classes were replacing outdated Victor I, II, and III class submarines. The construction of surface vessels, by contrast, was slow and largely limited to smaller combatant ships. Per military doctrine, the navy’s main role is to provide sea-based nuclear deterrence and to defend the nation’s interests in the areas adjacent to its territorial waters. It is supposed to be a fairly compact defensive force with limited c apabilities to project power onto the high seas. The General Staff does not have an elaborate joint sea-land operations doctrine, and naval power has not been deployed in any of the armed conflicts in which Soviet/Russian forces participated over the past few decades. New doctrine for the navy, finally developed in 1997, then revised and reissued in 2000, suggested a more articulate vision for naval operations, but remained focused primarily on sea denial and the protection of coastal waters. The only exception was the submarine fleet, which would continue to conduct exercises in support of interdiction missions. The navy’s decision to preserve all of its battle cruisers in service suggested how Russia envisioned the use of sea power in the early 21st century. The  ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20000128000050, Moscow, Morskoiy Sbornik, in Russian, 1 December 1999, 3-8: “Admiral Kuroyedov on The Navy’s Future.” [Translation by FBIS]: “In the year 2000, as before, the Navy is ready to protect Russia’s national interests in a reliable fashion. ‘There are no difficulties that the Navy cannot overcome and no missions beyond our capabilities’, declared the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral V. Kuroyedov in his report at the Navy’s Military Council on 13 November 1999.”  ����� Ibid.  ������������������������������������������ The World Oceans Concept is at Appendix C.

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

135

extensive investment involved in keeping these high-maintenance warships in service demonstrated Russia’s continued commitment to “blue water” operations involving large missile cruisers deployed far away from coastal waters. This force posture implied that the new naval doctrine would continue to reflect the Soviet era concept of layered defense, keeping enemy naval forces as far away from home waters as possible. Heavily armored and highly weaponized attack submarines were a key element in this strategy. The navy suffered from many of the same personnel problems that afflicted the other military services. As mentioned earlier in this work, the plague of senior personnel hazing juniors, called in the Russian language “дедовщина” (dedovschina), is also present in the navy, although not as severe as in the other services. Conscripts have traditionally served longer in the navy than in other services. Conscripts are mostly absent in the submarine force. Submariners have long been highly motivated personnel, often themselves the sons of submariners. Nevertheless, in 2000 the navy was experiencing the same problems as the other services in developing adequate levels of technical and professional skill, not least of which was the lack of funds for modern training facilities. Submarines and their crews are very important in the context of military doctrine and national security policy. Naval forces defend access to and control of vital sea lines of communication, militarily and commercially. Freedom to navigate and exploit these sea lines of communication would be essential if Russia’s interests were to be protected. Despite Kuroyedov’s efforts to convince his government that a larger share of the budget should be allocated to the navy if the nation were to realistically depend on it reliably in the future, there was little funding available for defense in general in 2000, even less by the time the Navy finally received its meager share. Although doctrine called for naval forces to deter the enemy at sea and defend the nation’s extensive coastlines closer to home, there was no mention of or linkage to budget authority as a requisite source of funding. Kuroyedov tried to find new and innovative ways of generating money for wages, housing, training, and supplies. Even though the submarine force was at the top of his list, it was still pitifully lacking much of what was needed. Militaries train by conducting exercises. Navies must train as they expect they will fight. Because they must fight

 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Currently, all services require a minimum of two years of duty, whereas formerly the rule was three years for army and four years for navy personnel.  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� There are eight higher naval education institutions: the Frunze Higher Naval School, the Higher Naval School of Submarine Navigation, the Higher Naval School of Electronics, the Dzerzhinsky Higher Naval School, the Higher Naval Engineers’ School, the Lomonosov Naval School of Education (all located in St. Petersburg), the Pacific Ocean Higher Naval School (in Vladivostok) and the Kaliningrad Higher Naval School (in the Russian exclave Kaliningrad, home to the Baltic Fleet). There is also a Nakhimov Naval School in St. Petersburg for junior cadets.

136

Russian Civil-Military Relations

at sea, they must train at sea. In 2000, in an era of impossibly tight budgets there was practically no money for training. Sea time is expensive. Ships need parts and constant repairs in the best of times, but in austere budget climates, these requirements are always among the first to be cut. Even when men are not paid, they can still go to sea as long as their ships have food for them to eat and fuel with which to operate. Sailors love to go to sea. Even when times are hard and they are not well paid, even if they are not paid at all, still they love to go to sea. Housing shortages and angry wives are quickly forgotten as the pier recedes into the distant horizon when a ship gets underway and leaves its port. Exercises at sea had become so rare by 2000 that junior officers complained they could not operate ships at sea reliably because they had practically no experience. There had been a number of highly visible demonstrations of naval combat power, some of which were complex and involved forces from other branches of the armed forces. Zapad,10 for example, had once been an annual demonstration of this kind. Although the navy, and all other branches of the military for that matter, had fallen behind during the decade of the 1990s, this event was still the most sought after opportunity to demonstrate the utility of armed forces and, of course, the need for more money. Not nearly as robust as during the Cold War, Zapad exercises still got the West’s attention, and senior leaders in the Russian military used them to rattle their sabers in front of civilians who were at least ostensibly “calling the shots.” Zapad-99 was one such exercise. In June 1999, the military’s strategic command and staff exercise, Zapad-99, was the largest war game held since collapse of the Soviet Union. The exercise involved five military districts, five fleets, and 23 combined task forces. Designed to try out the application of new draft concepts for national security and military doctrine, the exercise would afford an opportunity to evaluate escalation. According to Defense Minister Sergeyev, all other measures were eventually exhausted in the course of the exercise, and “the decision to use nuclear weapons was made.”11 Russia’s nuclear doctrine was an issue at the heart of the bitter and long standing disagreement between Sergeyev and Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin. But one thing both officers agreed on was the assumption that there still existed a threat from the West in general, from the United States in particular. The decision to use nuclear weapons in this exercise scenario was an expression of the hard-line antiAmerican views of the military establishment led by Sergeyev and Kvashnin.

10 ������������� In Russian, “zapad” means “west.” These exercises were aimed at demonstrating Russian muscle flexed against a perceived Western threat. 11 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] FTS19990705000404, Moscow, Kommersant, in Russian, 3 July 1999, 12. [FBIS Translated Text] “Boris Yeltsin personally opened a meeting of Defense Ministry leadership personnel devoted to investigating the results of last week’s Zapad-99 strategic command and staff exercise. The scenario supposed a blockade of Kaliningrad followed by a ‘preventive’ Russian nuclear strike.”

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

137

Immediately after the exercise, Yeltsin visited senior government and military leaders and congratulated them on a successful exercise but declared that the threat of large-scale military aggression against Russia “is something for science fiction books.”12 Jacob W. Kipp has suggested that this could be interpreted as Yeltsin’s rejection of the exercise’s basic premise.13 Kipp also wrote that another interpretation might be that Russia’s concept of de-escalation would function only in the face of limited intervention in a local war. Kosovo seemed to confirm the General Staff’s assessment of the operational limitations that would apply to U.S.NATO intervention in local wars on the Russian periphery.14 More than a year passed before the next major exercise took place. In the context of a comprehensive and fully integrated exercise at sea, on 12 August 2000, the Northern Fleet Oscar II class nuclear powered cruise missile submarine (SSGN), Kursk (K 141), suffered a catastrophic explosion and sank in the Barents Sea. Ten days later, Russian authorities finally admitted that all 118 personnel onboard the submarine were probably dead. Besides a national catastrophe and a political scandal that tarnished Putin’s reputation, the Kursk disaster threw into serious doubt Russian efforts to project a more confident naval posture. The Northern Fleet’s handling of the incident came under attack from the Russian media, which criticized the speed of the rescue effort and the decision to decline foreign offers of assistance for several days. The navy also came under fire for releasing misleading and often contradictory statements on the causes of the accident and the prospects for saving the submarine’s crew. Russian authorities publicly pursued the line that the likely cause of the disaster was a collision between the Kursk and a foreign body, suggesting the involvement of a U.S. submarine, but no evidence was found to support this theory. Conversely, American surveillance reported two explosions at the time of the disaster, which gave strong evidence that the Kursk’s difficulties 12 ������������������������ Ilya Bulavinov, Moscow, Kommersant, in [in Russian], 3 July 1999, 1-2. 13 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Jacob W. Kipp, “Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons” (2001), 27, in August 2005. 14 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ibid. “Immediately after NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, General Makhmut Gareyev, as president of the Academy of Military Sciences (a nongovernment organization closely linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff), hosted a conference on the role of military science in determining national defense requirements. In his remarks to the conference, Sergeyev explicitly linked studying past military experience to formulating new concepts of military operational art. He stressed the need to analyze the forms and means of use of armed forces of the United States and NATO against independent Yugoslavia. Sergeyev had observed specific shortcomings in operational and combat training during Zapad-99. The exercise employed Russian nuclear forces in a pre-emptive strike against an aggressor using advanced conventional forces, underscoring one of Gareyev’s major points. Nuclear forces would retain their deterrence capabilities and preclude their massed employment, but they could not exclude using advanced conventional weapons in a local armed conflict. What emerged was a focus on the impact of precision-strike systems on local wars and the employment of non-strategic nuclear weapons in deterring such attacks.”

138

Russian Civil-Military Relations

were caused by a torpedo malfunction.15 Suggestions that the Kursk may have been testing a new weapons system were denied by the navy. The navy’s commander-in-chief, Admiral Kuroyedov, was responsible for sending an ill-prepared submarine to sea. Despite this fact, Kuroyedov was never disciplined.16 Russia’s naval doctrine, bearing Kuroyedov’s stamp, was aimed at more robust operations in support of a force that would be capable of deploying on the high seas, far from the Russian homeland. In that regard, his views were close to his colleague on the general staff, General Anatoliy Kvashnin. When the submarine sank Kuroyedov lied to the minister of defense and to the president about the true nature and extent of the disaster, especially about the possibilities for rescue and recovery, making the president vulnerable to accusations of mishandling that reflected poorly on his reputation as supreme commander-inchief. Taken in this context, the Kursk submarine disaster is a good example of civil-military relations in Russia at the time. The episode is especially revealing because it took place almost exactly one year after Putin took over from Yeltsin and civilian authority passed from one style of leadership to another.

What Happened Although there were other exercises involving naval forces and personnel between Zapad-99 and this one, none approached the comprehensive complexity that took place in August 2000. By comparison, it had been a very long time since the Navy had been afforded a chance to show what it could do. There was also another factor. Boris Yeltsin had resigned, and a new president, Vladimir Putin, was at the nation’s helm. Admiral Kuroyedov sensed that Putin had an affinity for the Navy, and he was right. The new president enjoyed exploiting the armed forces for photo opportunities. Earlier in the year, he had flown in the back seat of a fighter jet. Asked by ABC’s Ted Koppel why he did that, Putin responded “sure it was fun, but it is also important to show the armed forces, and the country, who is in charge.”17 At the helm of the nation’s navy, Vladimir Kuroyedov was aware of the president’s fondness for naval affairs and wanted similar opportunities for the Russian Navy.

15 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Documented in the professional files of the author, acting in the capacity of U.S. Naval Attaché in Russia at the time of the incident, August 2000. 16 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Although Kuroyedov did offer to resign in the wake of the disaster, the President did not endorse the request. He continued to serve as the navy’s commander-in-chief until September 2005. 17 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Interviews conducted in March 2000 for a six-part documentary series by the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Nightline television program. This quote is taken from Part VI.

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

139

As August’s planned maneuvers loomed ever closer on the horizon, despite austere budgets, training was increasingly conducted at sea.18 In the Navy, morale climbed because of the anticipation associated with sea duty aimed at demonstrating the navy’s capabilities. Personnel could not help but be buoyed by the optimism. Although the exercise would be held in the Northern Fleet’s operating areas, under the direct authority of the Northern Fleet Commander, Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, other fleets certainly felt the attention being paid to the Navy, and were no doubt also encouraged about the possibilities. As the August exercise drew closer, the Navy made every effort to prepare. Parts and equipment were in short supply. Under normal circumstances, readiness levels can easily be masked because there are few visible indications of combat preparedness. Naval gunfire training, for example, can only be conducted at sea. If ships are not going to sea because of fuel shortages, then naval gunfire support is a mission essential skill that suffers. In Western navies, absence of demonstration of such skills result in grades of “not observed,” or perhaps “not applicable.” In the Russian Navy, however, the previous grade stands until it is replaced by a new observation. This leads to carrying over old performance indicators unless someone in higher authority notices the practice and speaks out. In the summer of 2000, no one was inclined to do that. The exercise scenario selected was reminiscent of Soviet-era Cold War exercises, based on a clash between two very large opposing naval forces. Participants would include several submarines, cruisers and destroyers, as well as approximately 8,000 personnel. Tactically oriented operations would involve gunfire and torpedo exercises, some with live ammunition.19 One of the most important participants in the exercise was the Kursk, a nuclear powered cruise missile submarine of the Project Class 949A, also known as K-141.20 18 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Because it is very expensive to operate large naval forces at sea, training in the budget strapped Russian Navy was either accomplished ashore, in crude and ill-equipped simulators, or not at all (a much more common case). 19 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Training, or exercise, munitions were in short supply and not well maintained. Accordingly, events that required demonstrating the use of weapons in support of naval exercise activity often led to using live supplies. 20 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� The submarine’s vital statistics were as follows: Displacement: 14,700 tons surfaced, 24,000 tons submerged; Length 155 meters (about 500 feet), beam 18.2 meters, draft 9.2 meters; Top speed: more then 30 knots; Main propulsion: two OK-6506 nuclear reactors (190 megawatts each), two OK-9 steam turbines (49,000 horsepower each), 4 turbo generators (3,200 kilowatts each), 2 diesel generators (190 kilowatts), 2 propellers; Doublehull construction, 10 watertight compartments (I torpedo, II Control Room, III different combat stations, Radio Room, IV quarters, V and V-b different stations, VI reactor, VII and VIII turbines, IX electric motors); Standard personnel complement: 107 men (including 48 officers), although more could be carried if required; Rescue devices included emerging camera for all crew (in the outer conning tower), personal dive-suits, and an emergency signal buoy; Emergency hatches located in the first and ninth compartments; Reserve buoyancy: 30 percent (4.5 tons water); Weapons: 24 cruise missiles (P-700 Granit) fitted

140

Russian Civil-Military Relations

The Kursk was designed by Rubin Central Design Bureau principal designers I. L. Baranov and Igor Spassky. Her keel was laid down in 1992 at Sevmashpredpriyatiye shipyard in the city of Severodvinsk. Launched in 1994 and commissioned in 1995, she was assigned to the Seventh SSGN Division of the First Submarine Flotilla of the Northern Fleet. Home based at Vidyayevo settlement in Ura-guba (bay), the submarine was intended to attack enemy aircraft carrier battle groups. The Kursk was capable of delivering massive missile blows from a submerged position at long ranges with a very high degree of accuracy. The submarine left base on 10 August 2000 at 10 o’clock in the morning under the command of Captain First Rank Gennadiy P. Lyachin, with 118 men aboard.21 The crew was acclaimed for its excellent performance at sea, having recently won a citation as the best submarine crew in the Northern Fleet. Recalling the previous discussion of how readiness is measured, however, this excellent performance record did not necessarily reflect an accurate assessment. The last message from Kursk was at 08:51 a.m. on 12 August. The submarine had requested permission to conduct a training torpedo launch and received “dobro” (good) in response. The exercise target (simulated) for this training torpedo “attack” was probably the heavy nuclear missile cruiser Pyotr Velikiy.22 A radio message with results of the torpedo launch was expected soon thereafter. Shortly before mid-day, The Russian nuclear submarine missile cruiser Kursk sank in the Barents Sea at 54 fathoms depth, about 324 feet (less deep than the submarine was long) during a tactical exercise. The submarine was armed with twenty four supersonic cruise missiles and twice as many torpedoes.23 The Kursk became a grave for 118 men, including their commander, Captain Gennadiy Lyachin, one of the best in Russia’s submarine fleet. The events happened so quickly that rescue proved ill-fated. Despite offers of assistance from several other nations that were well equipped and ready to help, Russia rejected international aid until after it was already too late. The findings of the official inquiry into the sinking of the Kursk, published in August 2002, revealed negligence, incompetence and mismanagement within the navy.24 The Kursk was sunk by a torpedo blast that was caused by hydrogen leaking with either conventional or nuclear warheads; Four 650 millimeter and two 533 millimeter torpedo tubes capable of firing torpedoes or ASW rockets (normal complement of torpedoes: 28). 21 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 111 crew members, 5 officers of Seventh SSGN Division Headquarters, and 2 design engineers. 22 ������������������� The ship’s name is Pyotr Velikiy in Russian, Peter the Great in English. Where applicable, Russian names have been used in this manuscript for Russian ships. 23 ����� The “granit” cruise missile, NATO codenamed “shipwreck,” is routinely armed with a 1600 pound conventional warhead. 24 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The final report was published in August and both the report and commentary on its veracity were carried widely in the Russian press. This research is based on the author’s personal notes, as U.S. Naval Attaché in Moscow at the time of the events, and on the final investigation reports that were published [in Russian] in Rossiskaya Gazeta on 29

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

141

out of cracks in a torpedo casing. The inquiry found, among other things, that rubber seals designed to prevent leakage had not been checked before the exercise, that unqualified staff had loaded the torpedoes, and that the rescue operation was unjustifiably delayed. The torpedo that exploded on the Kursk was 10 years old. Although it underwent repairs in 1993 and 1994, some of its parts had, by 2000, an expired service life. The report revealed that the Kursk’s crew had not been taught how to use hydrogen peroxide torpedoes and had no previous experience of handling such extremely volatile weapons.25 The order authorizing operational deployment of hydrogen peroxide fueled torpedoes was reportedly signed by naval officers who did not have the authority to do so.26 The tragedy was triggered by an explosion that sparked a fire setting off the submarine’s ammunition, precipitating a second blast that ripped through the vessel’s forward sections, quickly killing most of the crew. A handful of survivors gathered in the submarine’s ninth compartment hopeful for a rescue that never came. The Northern Fleet commander, Admiral Popov, ordered a search nine hours after the first explosion.27 The public record today is replete with information about this terrible tragedy. There are literally hundreds of Internet web sites offering details and insights purportedly related to the event. Quite possibly no other submarine disaster has ever been afforded the kind of interest the press has given to the Kursk. As is often August 2002, available online at , translated into English and reprinted in Johnson’s Russia List on 23 September 2002. The author assisted in the unofficial translation of this document as published in Johnson’s Russia List. 25 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� The author confirmed this information (about leaking torpedo fuel) during interviews (September-October 2000) with several personnel who had been assigned to pier side loading details on the day the Kursk received munitions. These persons (names withheld) reported that they had expressed doubts about the exercise torpedoes based on the fact that the seals were visibly leaking propellant. These persons also told the author that junior officers who were notified of the leaks were reluctant to report the matter to superiors because of the importance of the mission. This report is documented in the professional notes and papers of the author based on service as U.S. Naval Attaché in Russia at the time of the event. 26 ��������������������������������������������������������� Nikolai A. Cherkashin, “Tragedy of the Submarine Cruiser Kursk,” published in the Russian language, Submarine Fleet, 5 (2001), 23. 27 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20000815000046, Moscow, Sevodnya [in Russian], 15 August 2000, 12, report by Oleg Odnokolenko: “Kursk May Not Surface: “Who Caused Underwater Trauma to Northern Fleet’s Best Boat?” [FBIS Translated Text Summary]: “On Sunday, 13 August, the Kursk, a multi-role nuclear submarine, which was taking part in Northern Fleet exercises in the Barents Sea, was forced to put down on the seabed as the result of an emergency. The report of the emergency involving the fleet’s best boat (based on the results of the year’s combat training) only appeared on Monday morning when contact with the submarine was re-established during an emergency rescue operation. This operation was led by Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Vyacheslav Popov. The boat was found at a depth of 107 meters. Communication with the crew and maintenance of vital services were provided yesterday via the ‘Kolokol’ rescue system.”

142

Russian Civil-Military Relations

the case with sensational stories that grab headlines and capture the public interest, among the facts are many fallacies. Finally, the Russian government’s commission charged with investigating the incident published its final report, offering answers to many of the questions about what really happened. The veracity of that report will have to stand the test of time, and it is already being challenged.28 Despite the fact that the submarine sank because of internal explosions related to exercise torpedoes and their propellants, allegations of collision with a foreign submarine were stridently pressed by the Russian Navy, and were not finally given up for almost two years after the fact. The official investigation attributes the cause to “damage inflicted by a torpedo malfunction.” Still, however, some mysteries remain. There were two explosions detected at approximately 69 degrees 38 minutes north latitude, 37 degrees 19 minutes east longitude on 12 August 2000.29 The first explosion was at 11:29:34 (Moscow time) and had magnitude of 1.5 on the Richter scale (corresponding to about 100 kg of explosives). The second explosion happened at 11:31:48 (Moscow time) with a much larger magnitude of 3.5 Richter. Similar data was obtained by Norwegian seismic stations as well as others in Canada and Alaska. Two American submarines, the USS Memphis and the USS Toledo, and one British submarine, HMS Splendid, were operating in the area to observe the Russian exercise. International observers also included two surface ships, America’s USS Loyal, and Norway’s Marjata. All detected the same explosions. Although two Russian ships, one submarine and the heavy cruiser and flagship Pyotr Velikiy, reported noises that might have been considered explosions, the sounds were not interpreted as such at the time.30 Among the most strident questions is whether or not the survivors could have been saved if Russia had accepted Western offers of assistance more quickly. When the first human remains were recovered it was apparent that at least some among the crew of 118 did survive what must have been an explosion of horrific proportions. The official investigation, released in 2002, finally confirmed that 23 men took refuge in the aft compartments, finally succumbing after a time that is estimated at between 5 hours and 5 days. Almost certainly, none lived as long as the latter parameter. If shreds of notes written by survivors in the last moments of their lives are to be believed, they lived for at least several hours. In that event, given the fact that even the Russian Navy did not initially know for certain exactly where and when the submarine went down, it is doubtful that any rescue attempt 28  Rossiskaya Gazeta, 29 August 2002, available online at , translated into English and reprinted in Johnson’s Russia List on 23 September 2002. 29 ����������������������������������� According to the ship’s log of the Pyotr Velikiy two days later, the submarine Kursk was located at position 69 degrees, 40 minutes north latitude, 37 degrees, 35 minutes east longitude in an area where the seabed was said to be “oozy sand” at a depth of 108 meters (54 fathoms), heeling 25 degrees to the port side and down 5-7 degrees by the bow. 30 �������������� Robert Moore, A Time to Die: The Untold Story of the Kursk Tragedy (New York: Crown Publishers, 2002), 69-73.

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

143

could have been effective, no matter how capable the equipment. If, however, the survivors lived as long as several days, it is possible that Norwegian or British help might have reached them in time, had the Russian Navy allowed them to enter the operating area as planned. The actual fate of those 23 survivors is perhaps even more intriguing. How long did they live, and how did they die? Moore puts their death at perhaps as late as Thursday 19 August.31 Truscott estimates they perished by 19:00 on 12 August.32 Both agree the cause of death was flash fire resulting from an accident related to the oxygen regeneration cartridges being used as emergency sources of breathable air. This conclusion is probably accurate, based on the author’s own research. Vice Admiral Vladislav Ilyin, well known to the author, headed the Kursk Incident Cell at Navy Headquarters. One year after the disaster took place, in September 2001 during a visit to the United States, Ilyin told the author he believed the 23 survivors of the initial explosions lived for about three days in the ninth compartment before they succumbed to oxygen deprivation and died. Ilyin confirmed the information publicly in March the next year after the final investigation was released by Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov.33 When investigators entered the compartment after it was recovered they found a large quantity of oxygen regeneration canisters that appeared to reinforce this opinion. Interviews with primary sources who were present during recovery operations disclosed the condition of Lieutenant Dmitrii Kolesnikov, head of the submarine’s seventh compartment. His body was said to be badly burned from below the waist all the way up, with severe burns and disfigurement to his neck and head.34 31 ����������� Ibid., 325. 32 ���������������� Peter Truscott, Kursk: Russia’s Lost Pride (London New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 190. 33  The Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles, CA: 21 March 2002, A.10. “Twenty-three sailors in the stricken Kursk submarine may have suffered through three days of agony in freezing darkness, waiting to be rescued, a senior Russian admiral said Wednesday. ‘I personally think that life in the ninth compartment came to an end on the third day,” Vice Adm. Vladislav Ilyin, the first deputy chief of the Russian navy’s staff, said at a news conference. His statement contradicted the conclusion of the prosecutor general’s investigation, which said that sailors in the stern could have lived only several hours before succumbing to fumes after the two explosions that sank the vessel in August 2000. All 118 crew members died. Most of the crewmen were killed instantly by the blasts. However, 23 crewmen remained alive for at least several hours, according to letters found later by rescuers. The government hesitated for several days before accepting foreign aid, even as Russian submersibles were unsuccessful in opening the escape hatch. When foreign divers reached the Kursk more than a week after the catastrophe, it took them only hours to open it. ‘It’s even more painful to hear that 23 people might have survived for three days, and they failed to rescue even one of them,’ said Anatoly Safonov, whose son, Lt. Maxim Safonov, died aboard the Kursk.” 34 �������������� Ramsey Flynn, Cry from the Deep: The Submarine Disaster That Riveted the World and Put the New Russia to the Ultimate Test (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 186;

144

Russian Civil-Military Relations

At first glance, it may seem skeptical that the note, supposedly found wrapped in wet plastic inside his breast pocket, could have been genuine; it must have been incredibly difficult to write, under the circumstances:35 I am writing blindly. The time is 1315. All personnel from sections six, seven and eight have moved to section nine. There are 23 people here. We made this decision because none of us can escape. It’s too dark to write here, but I’ll try. It looks like we have no chance, maybe 10-20 percent. I hope that someday someone will read this. Don’t despair.36

It now appears that the note was real. Lieutenant Kolesnikov probably wrote it, then secreted it carefully away until the final moments of his life were extinguished in a flash fire that resulted from igniting the very chemical apparatus that was prolonging his life and the lives of his fellow survivors by cleaning the air they were breathing. Those survivors who lived through this final blast almost certainly died soon thereafter due to oxygen deprivation resulting from the fire having consumed all remaining breathable air. In a chillingly prescient video tape made on board the Kursk just a few weeks before the submarine sailed for the last time, Lieutenant Kolesnikov showed off his pride of service to his wife of just four months, Olga. In one sequence on the tape Kolesnikov lies on the deck and jokes to his bride about how he usually just sleeps when the ship is at sea, that is, unless there is an emergency. In the scene, the lieutenant shows Olga what he would do if there was an emergency, jumping up from his slumber to fight to defend his ship.37 It is important to understand how long these men might have lived because it helps to illuminate the question of rescue. On balance of the available evidence, based on examination of the human remains following the submarine’s recovery in 2002, it may be concluded that they probably lived as long as one full day after the accident. Investigators examining the interior of compartment nine after the submarine was recovered found “many” chemical scrubbers.38 This fact supports a longer survival estimate. The crew was far too experienced to have used them all up at once. Instead, they would have opted for scheduled, or rationed, use, offering maximum survival time to allow rescuers to reach them. It is possible they may

Moore, A Time to Die: The Untold Story of the Kursk Tragedy, 304. 35 ������� Moore, A Time to Die: The Untold Story of the Kursk Tragedy, 305. 36 ������� Flynn, Cry from the Deep: The Submarine Disaster That Riveted the World and Put the New Russia to the Ultimate Test, 187-91. The original note was not shown to Kolesnikov’s widow when it was discovered, but rather to his father, in an apparent effort to spare her grief. The copy that was shown to her was seen by the author in person while at the Submariner’s Club in St. Petersburg the following year. 37 ��������� Ibid., 4. 38  Rossiskaya Gazeta, 29 August 2002, accessed August 2003; also available in Johnson’s Russia List 23 September 2002.

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

145

have lived until Sunday night (13 August) or Monday morning (14 August), a day and a half or even two days after the explosions that blew up the submarine happened. Since the incident was not even made public by the Russian Navy until Monday morning, there was never any real chance of Western help being successful in rescuing the survivors. Even so, at the time of the crisis, none of this information was known. In the end, the Kursk died with her pride intact. For whatever reasons, probably related to mistrust, resentment and fear, the Russian Navy chose to reject every effort by the United States to help. Despite the fact that it took more than 48 hours to obtain written correspondence offering concrete assistance from Secretary of Defense William Cohen to Russian Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev, when it did arrive on Tuesday evening 15 August, the letter was politely but very firmly rebuffed. The only chance the crew might have had would have been at the hands of the Russians themselves, using outdated and ill-performing equipment. Western assets were simply too far away to have arrived at the scene in sufficient time to effect a successful recovery. Despite the insistence that help was available, the Russian Navy was not willing to cooperate, no matter what civilian authorities said.39 Several photographs of the submarine after it was raised in salvage provide chilling evidence of the nightmare that happened that day in the Barents Sea. Engineers involved in the submarine’s design never considered defense against an explosion from inside the submarine’s double hull to be a priority. Russian sailors and shipyard workers watched as the submarine Kursk, now essentially a ghost ship, entered port afloat on a submerged pontoon.40 With the sail visible above the waterline, the enormity of the submarine was apparent, even with the bow removed, after the dry dock was floated to the surface. Scaffolding assisted the effort in examining the emergency escape hatch located aft near the ninth compartment. Remains of about half of those who survived the explosions were still inside. The entire bow portion of the submarine was cut off before the hulk was removed from the seabed. The first two compartments would remain on the

39 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Captain Brannon, memorandum for the record: 15 September 2000: “For whatever reasons, probably related to mistrust, resentment and fear, the Russian Navy chose to firewall every single effort on our part to help them. Despite the fact that it took more than 48 hours to obtain written correspondence offering concrete assistance from Secretary of Defense William Cohen to Russian Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev, when I delivered the letter on Tuesday evening 15 August, the U.S. offer was politely but very firmly rebuffed. The Brits faired somewhat better, but I believe the only chance the crew might have had would have been at the hands of the Russians themselves, using outdated and ill-performing equipment such as the submersible Priz. Western assets were simply too far away to have been brought to the scene in sufficient time.” 40 ������� Flynn, Cry from the Deep: The Submarine Disaster That Riveted the World and Put the New Russia to the Ultimate Test, 201.

146

Russian Civil-Military Relations

bottom for at least another year. Partial recovery has since taken place but the debris has been classified as a state secret.41 At a memorial that is located shore side in Vidyayevo, Kolesnikov’s name is on the fourth panel of a simple black granite stone that represents the torn bridge of a submarine.42 The men who died on the Kursk have been immortalized in Russian maritime lore, alongside other shipmates whose eternal home will ever be the ocean’s deep. In an epilogue to this story, Lieutenant Kolesnikov’s widow, Olga, was interviewed for a documentary about recovering the remains of the submarine.43 She suggested that the Russian Navy had not yet gone far enough to prevent future such tragedies. In particular, she said she did not feel the navy’s senior leaders had been held sufficiently accountable for what happened. Although this is certainly predictable coming from a young widow under such circumstances, her views were not by any means unique. In the navy, a number of admirals were saying the same thing. At the very top, Admiral Kuroyedov had begun the process of lies when he told the president that everything was fine, there was no reason to worry, rescue operations to save the stricken submarine were already underway and success was assured. He was wrong, and the men on board the Kursk paid for his lies with their lives.

Decisions The Kursk disaster was President Vladimir Putin’s first serious crisis. Certainly, Chechnya remained at the forefront of Russia’s security concerns, but because the war seemed to drag on intractably the situation lacked the sharpness of an urgent crisis. Kursk was a desperately time sensitive situation, commanding instant press coverage in a way that Chechnya did not. The president was expected to act, to do something immediately. Putin did act, but he was handicapped by misinformation fed to him by military officers who were reluctant, possibly even afraid, to tell the truth. Decisions about Kursk were made absent essential facts that might have influenced different conclusions. Putin’s defense minister, Marshall Igor Sergeyev, had been in place since before Yeltsin’s resignation. Sergeyev was frequently at odds with the rest of the military. Specifically, he was in constant disagreement with the Chief of the General Staff, General Anatoliy Kvashnin. By the summer of 2000, there were rumors of Sergeyev’s imminent demise at the top of the nation’s defense pyramid. Speculation about candidates for his replacement included Kuroyedov. The relationship between Kvashnin and Kuroyedov, although not exactly close, was professionally amiable. On more than one occasion, Kvashnin sought Kuroyedov’s 41 ����������� Ibid., 202. 42 ���������������������������� BBC News, “Russia Remembers Kursk Disaster.” Accessed online at 12 August 2002. 43 ����������������������������������������� The Learning Channel, Discovery VHS Tape #657239, ��������� Raising the Kursk, 2002.

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

147

alliance in his efforts to move away from Sergeyev’s focus on nuclear weapons and the strategic rocket forces as the nation’s preeminent defense, toward greater reliance on conventional ground and naval forces. Despite Kvashnin’s own ambitions, he probably would have supported Kuroyedov as defense minister, even if he himself was not the president’s first choice. Though not as uncertain as in the previous summer, the dynamics of civilmilitary relations in Russia remained in a state of flux in the summer of 2000 when the submarine Kursk provided the military and defense establishment, as well as the entire national security apparatus, with one of its sharpest crises in a decade. Despite extensive coverage, what has been absent to date is a genuine effort to examine the event for the comprehensive saga that it was, important both to the Russian Navy and to the fledgling president of the Russian Federation who had only just begun to lead a nation already wracked by many difficult stress points. Zoltan Barany has made a serious and important effort to assess the episode from the perspective of process, and his work is considered fundamentally in this book.44 Barany concludes that the incident exposes the Russian military in general, and the navy in particular, as essentially unreformed since Soviet times, unwilling and incapable of accepting responsibility for the welfare of its personnel.45 That said, this author observed the story play itself out from the vantage point of the United States Embassy in Moscow, replete with all of the drama and emotion befitting such a tragedy, and there are a number of aspects that have not been adequately addressed in the literature to date. In particular, questions such as what the navy told the president, why the navy lied, why the president believed the navy, at least for a time, and why no one was punished for what happened, have not yet been examined adequately. The navy’s handling of the affair began with the kind of stonewalling that characterized the Chernobyl nuclear accident almost twenty years before. From Navy Headquarters in Moscow, Captain First Rank Igor Dygalo broadcast updates beginning with an initial announcement on Monday morning just before noon, two days after the submarine was lost. Dygalo said a submarine was in fact down but was not lost. He reassured his audience that the Navy had things well in hand with rescue for the crew imminent. Reporters who asked about calling for Western assistance were rebuffed, told that the navy had everything that was needed to conduct a first-rate operation. More lies followed quickly: that tapping was heard from the submarine’s location, for example.46 Initial reports of the accident were, of course, conflicting, as is the case in almost all such events, regardless of the country involved. But, rather than reporting honestly, stating what was known and admitting what was not, the navy 44 ���������������������������� Barany, “The Tragedy of the Kursk: Crisis Management in Putin’s Russia.” 45 ����������� Ibid., 503. 46 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20000815000046, Moscow, Sevodnya [in Russian], 15 August 2000, 12, report by Oleg Odnokolenko: “Kursk May Not Surface: Who Caused Underwater Trauma to Northern Fleet’s Best Boat?”

148

Russian Civil-Military Relations

lied, repeatedly distorting the facts and misrepresenting details. For example, the composition of the crew was certainly known to the staff at Northern Fleet Headquarters in Murmansk, if not, perhaps, to the staff at Main Navy Headquarters in Moscow. Nonetheless, information about who was on board, and whether or not they might be alive or dead, was not forthcoming from either headquarters. It would be many days before a crew list was released, and then only because it was published in the press after the information was obtained by bribing an unnamed navy official.47 On 18 August, the press in Moscow published a “chronicle of lies” that purportedly listed all of the areas in which the navy had, so far, avoided telling the truth.48 Outlining the charges in sections that included comments on the veracity of the navy’s official reports on the time and location of the accident, as well as the weather in the vicinity, the amount of oxygen that might be remaining to the survivors, if indeed there were any, the report likened the navy’s response to the crisis to the “Soviet” style of covering up the truth, as had happened during the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986. Information about the crew, including its size and composition, was questioned, as was what communications were actually taking place with the stricken submarine. The navy was off to a bad start in telling the truth about what had happened. The author was present at Main Navy Staff Headquarters in Moscow for most of the official press briefings that were given by Admiral Kuroyedov’s chief spokesman, Igor Dygalo. Although the United States Embassy was not afforded the same access to information that was given to Britain and Norway, the author, in his official capacity as the American Naval Attaché, was allowed to listen to Dygalo’s reports and to observe the process from the same vantage point as the press. The following is a summary of the navy’s initial prevarications about the crisis, based 47 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20000818000034, Moscow, Interfax, in English language, 18 August 2000, “Russian Paper in Severomorsk Publishes List of Submarine’s Crew,” [FBIS Transcribed Text]: “There are 118 people on board the Kursk submarine lying crippled in the Barents Sea since August 12. Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper published a Murmansk supplement on Friday listing them. There were 86 commissioned and warrant officers, 31 non-commissioned officers and sailors and one civilian inside the submarine at the time of the disaster. There must have been 43 people, including the commander of the 7th Division of the Northern Fleet and divisional chief of staff Capt. 1st Rank V. Bagryantsev, in the two forward compartments that were destroyed the most quickly and severely. Having failed to obtain the list through official channels, the newspaper’s journalists paid 18,000 rubles for it.” 48 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20000817000248, Moscow, Komsomolskaya Pravda [in Russian], 18 August 2000, article by Zinaida Lobanova: “We Were All Bamboozled: Lies about the Kursk Crisis” [FBIS Translated Text Summary]: “All this reminds us of Chernobyl. Not because the first thing everyone worried about was an ecological disaster, only afterward thinking about the people, but because we were constantly being lied to. In keeping with the seemingly intractable ‘Soviet’ customs, our navy has followed the course of hushing things up so as not to let the general public get wind of the truth.”

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

149

on the author’s perceptions, press reports, and interviews with observers at the time as well as after the fact. This list is representative of the kind of information the navy was giving to the minister of defense and, thus, to the president.49 The Time of the Catastrophe Reports of the accident did not appear until Monday, 14 August. At that time they said the date of the tragedy was Sunday, 13 August. It was still not called a tragedy at that time. In fact, the tragedy occurred on Saturday, 12 August at approximately 11 o’clock in the morning, and Western information agencies were the first to report it. On Sunday, the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Popov, gave an interview to representatives of the mass media in which he gave high marks to the results of the training exercise, the mastery of the seamen, and the condition of the combat equipment. It was as though he did not know that by that time there were no communications with the Kursk or that this had been reported to the Navy Staff Headquarters. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov did not sign the directive to create a commission to investigate the causes of the disaster until Monday. More than 48 hours had passed since the catastrophe had occurred. The Number of Crew Members Surprisingly, nobody reported precisely how many submariners were onboard. At times the navy news service asserted that there were 107 on board, at other times 130, and at still other times 116 or 117. Wednesday evening Putin announced that there were 118 on board. That became the final figure. Communications with the Submarine The navy news service initially reported to the mass media, “communications have been established with the submarine, we have contact with the personnel.” An anonymous source from the Murmansk Oblast administration even told Interfax news agency that oxygen and fuel were being delivered to the submarine. After a certain amount of time it was clarified that the contact was nothing more than a periodic tapping on the hull of the ship from within; SOS: three dots, three dashes, three dots. During the day on Wednesday there was a report that the crew had stopped its acoustic communications. First Deputy Chief of the Navy Staff, Vice Admiral Vladislav Ilyin, at the same time, in a separate statement, said that 49 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ U.K. Naval Attaché, Captain Geoffrey McCready, met with the author frequently during the crisis. When the Russian Navy granted special access to the U.K. on Wednesday, 16 August, McCready was able to see and hear briefings the navy was giving to authorities at the ministry of defense. McCready told the author at the time he felt the navy was not telling the full story about the facts of the crisis.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

150

everything was exactly the opposite; “We have contact, it is not true that they have stopped tapping; they are tapping,” he announced.50 The Weather According to information from weathermen, on Saturday and Sunday the weather over the Barents Sea was completely normal. But immediately after the rescue work began there were reports of a storm. As navy spokesman, Igor Dygalo, told Interfax, “as of 2300 hours on Monday the weather sharply deteriorated. The wind was from the north, northwest at a speed of 15 meters per second, and the choppiness of the sea was measured at 4-5 points. But at approximately the same time Interfax reported, “all conditions are favorable for rescue work.” Throughout all of Tuesday evening reports were coming in that the weather was improving and the storm was 2-3 points. But then, when nothing was accomplished, the weather, as if by special order, started to get worse again. And since that time, according to the weather reports, the storm has not ceased. Oxygen Admiral Kuroyedov stated that there was enough oxygen onboard the submarine Kursk to sustain the life of crew members until 25 August. At a news conference in Severomorsk the general designer of nuclear powered submarines carrying “cruise” missiles at the Rubin Central Design Bureau reported that before going out to sea the crew had been provided with reserve provisions, drinking water, and air enough for five or six days, that is, until Thursday, 16 August.51

If the navy was lying to the public, it may have been lying to civilian authorities in the defense establishment as well. Certainly, it appears that the navy was not telling the president everything that was known about the crisis. Shortly after the incident took place, on Saturday evening, 12 August, a conversation between U.S. and Russian counterparts on the respective security councils took place.52 U.S. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger spoke with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. Berger discretely asked whether there had been an incident at sea involving one of Russia’s submarines. Ivanov denied that anything was amiss. These early conversations preceded public announcements in Russia on Monday 14 August admitting that Kursk was down. Even after the news was out, the Russian side insisted that the navy had things well in hand. Instead of talking about how to save the crew, hotlines between Washington and Moscow were used to exchange charges and countercharges about what had caused the accident. Russia warned the United States to stay away from the scene of the accident. 50 ����������� Ibid., 127. 51 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20000817000248, Moscow, Komsomolskaya Pravda [in Russian], 18 August 2000. 52 ������� Flynn, Cry from the Deep: The Submarine Disaster That Riveted the World and Put the New Russia to the Ultimate Test, 87.

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

151

Accusations about foreign involvement in a collision that might have caused the accident were made almost immediately. Although three foreign submarines (two from the U.S. and one from Britain) were in the area, neither were within miles of the Kursk at any time.53 Even if there had been a collision underwater between the behemoth Kursk and either of the much smaller and more light-weight American or British submarines, the loser would almost certainly not have been the Kursk. Still, it was not long before word of the accusations reached the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Despite press reports implicating foreign involvement in a collision, the situation was still a crisis of major proportions, one that warranted extraordinary measures. In Moscow, news of the disaster went public on Monday morning. At the American Embassy routine morning meetings had just been concluded when a duty officer informed the U.S. Naval Attaché of the news. After initially thinking the report might refer to seismic activity in the area, a not uncommon occurrence, attention was eventually drawn to the naval exercises. By noon the author was briefing the American Ambassador, James F. Collins, on what was happening. Immediately, calls went through to Washington, suggesting strongly that the United States should signal the Russians at once of unrestricted offers of assistance in any way possible. Regardless of the timely availability of appropriate equipment, the author urged authorities to make every effort to convince the White House that offering assistance immediately would cast the United States in the most favorable light.54 Quite possibly Russia might be convinced to accept the offer, or so the feeling went on that day. But neither side was convinced. At this point, the author did not yet know about weekend conversations between Sergei Ivanov in Moscow and his counterpart, Sandy Berger, in Washington. The two heads of security councils were already wary of one another based on accusations and suspicions. In Washington, the Clinton administration felt it would be inappropriate to offer assistance without being asked.55 Still, the author, as naval attaché, pushed for the U.S. to lean forward in its efforts to help. It took another day before the department of defense sent an official offer of assistance to Moscow. On Tuesday, 15 August, at about 7:30pm in Moscow, a letter signed by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen was faxed to the American Embassy switchboard. Dear Marshal Sergeyev, I must extend my deepest thoughts of concern to you and your valued crew members aboard the Kursk. I know I speak for the entire U.S. Department of Defense in expressing our sincerest hopes for the best possible outcome. In the

53 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Documented in the professional files of the author, acting in the capacity of U.S. Naval Attaché in Russia at the time of the incident, August 2000. 54 ����� Ibid. 55 ������� Flynn, Cry from the Deep: The Submarine Disaster That Riveted the World and Put the New Russia to the Ultimate Test, 121.

152

Russian Civil-Military Relations meantime, our thoughts are with you and the crew’s families; we wish them strength during this most troubling time. My department stands ready to provide any assistance you may need: please do not hesitate to ask. Sincerely, [signed] Bill Cohen56

The letter was translated into Russian immediately and the duty officer at the Ministry of Defense was told by telephone to expect an urgent communique from Washington within the hour. On arrival at the ministry, the attaché was denied the opportunity to deliver the document to Sergeyev, who was known to be still in the building, working at his desk. Because it was thought that there still might be some chance of saving the men who were trapped inside the Kursk, the situation became confrontational. When the attaché insisted, a visibly emotional young Russian duty officer finally allowed the attaché entry. The letter was left with Sergeyev’s administrative aide, at a desk just outside the minister’s office.57 No answer was forthcoming during the long night’s vigil that ensued. The following morning, in a tersely written communique delivered by fax to the Defense Attaché’s office at the American Embassy, Minister of Defense Sergeyev declined the U.S. offer, emphasizing that the Russian navy had the situation well in hand, and that rescue was imminent.58 Hours later, the U.K. Naval Attaché, Captain Geoffrey McCready, Royal Navy, was invited to visit Main Navy Headquarters to discuss how Britain might be allowed to help. When he met with the author later that day, McCready said that talk had centered primarily on how to allow Britain to help to some extent, while still keeping them at a “safe distance” from the submarine. At no point, according to Captain McCready, was Britain to be allowed direct access to the Kursk. Although he knew this would not be possible, McCready agreed to the terms and U.K. assistance was set in motion.59 Sergeyev’s version is different. In Moscow on 21 August he gave an interview that disclosed his account of foreign offers of assistance for rescue and recovery during the Kursk crisis. Asked why he did not accept and use foreign assistance, Sergeyev responded

56 ����������� Ibid., 127. 57 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� This account, based on the author’s personal involvement as the U.S. Naval Attaché, has been documented and verified by a number of other sources. The most complete account is found in: Flynn, Cry from the Deep: The Submarine Disaster That Riveted the World and Put the New Russia to the Ultimate Test, 127-28. 58 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The author holds the original (faxed) letters from Secretary of Defense Cohen and Defense Minister Sergeyev’s response. 59 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Documented in the professional files of the author, acting in the capacity of U.S. Naval Attaché in Russia at the time of the incident, August 2000.

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

153

Foreign help. This is all recorded. On Wednesday 16th August, there was the first offer and it was immediately accepted by the navy’s commander-in-chief. It was from British Naval Attaché Captain Geoffrey McCready. The offer was accepted immediately. I will say openly, that I may have exceeded my authority by taking that decision. I should have first asked the president. When Kuroyedov rang me and said that a political decision was needed, meaning to accept the help offered by many, but the most effective help, in our opinion, could have been rendered by the English, meaning the LR5 apparatus, and by the Norwegians, who not only had special equipment for deep-sea work but also the vast experience of such work. We immediately replied, not having turned down any other offers of help, neither from [U.S.] Defense Secretary [William] Cohen, nor from French Defense Minister [Alain] Richard, the Italian and German defense ministers. We did not turn down any offers of help. However, we needed to focus all the efforts on rescuing the crew. We had all the needed equipment more or less, decompression chambers, medicines, and medical staff. We nevertheless did not turn down any offers of help, thinking that we may need it at a certain point in the development of events and we would then request that help. This is why I can say with confidence that there were no delays in taking a decision. I reported to the president later, and he approved that decision, of course, and there could not have been any delays. We are accused of keeping some secrets; you must understand that it is quite painful for us to hear these accusations, especially since there were none.60

Sergeyev did not tell the truth when he said he had not turned down any offers of foreign assistance. The Russian Navy had adopted a position whereby Britain would play the role of savior, while the U.S. would continue to be the foil. Regardless of the fact that both nations had submarines in the area of the accident, the Russian Navy was convinced that Britain was innocent, while allegations against the United States continued unabated. These allegations reached a pinnacle on 4 December 2000, not yet four months after the accident, when Admiral Kuroyedov took advantage of a public event to berate the American Navy for its failure to operate submarines safely. In his opening statement at the annual briefing for foreign naval attachés, Kuroyedov railed at the Americans, shaking his fist at this author, citing U.S. recklessness at sea as reprehensible and unforgivable.61 Although he never mentioned the Kursk by name, he said that recent events had served to reinforce the urgent need for submarine safety. Tempted to walk out of the room in protest,

60 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20000821000342, Moscow, Russian Public Television ORT1 [in Russian], 21 August 2000, interview with Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev by Vremya correspondent Aleksandr Anasovskiy on 21 August in Moscow [FBIS Translated Text, edited by the author]. 61 ������� Flynn, Cry from the Deep: The Submarine Disaster That Riveted the World and Put the New Russia to the Ultimate Test, 197.

154

Russian Civil-Military Relations

the author stood firm, listening to Kuroyedov without flinching. In the receiving line, moments later, the two officers did not, however, shake hands. Despite the drama of foreign affairs throughout the crisis, rescue was probably doomed regardless of whether or not Russia accepted international offers of assistance. In light of evidence uncovered during Klebanov’s investigation, and by examining the salvaged submarine years after the fact, it is likely that survivors perished within no more than one or two days after the explosions took place. While the author was pressing the U.S. side to offer assistance, and the Russian side to accept, all of the men on board Kursk had probably already expired. Still, the drama of foreign assistance made for sensational press. In Moscow there were allegations that Putin was allowing “Soviet” style paranoia about defending state secrets to trump his obligation to rescue the stranded sailors from the stricken submarine. Putin must have been somewhat confused by this. The military establishment, Sergeyev and Kuroyedov, were telling him that everything was in order, that there was nothing to worry about. The president was urged not to accept foreign assistance because there was a strong possibility that foreign submarines had actually caused the collision. By the time Kuroyedov stated publicly that there was little hope that any survivors might be rescued, implications of foreign involvement in the accident were so strong that Putin must have felt that he could not entertain proposals from the West. When Putin went to Vidyayevo naval base near Murmansk one week later he was convinced his navy was doing all it could do to help. He was wrong. As Putin met with the families of the Kursk crew members he was ambushed by an avalanche of emotionally charged accusations.62 The event had a significant impact on how the president perceived what had happened, and what he had been told about it. Because the president gave no press interviews about the event, the following transcript, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and edited by the author, represents the only primary account of Putin’s observations regarding the early stages of the Kursk tragedy.63 62 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20000822000342, Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English language, 22 August 2000, report by Denis Pinchuk, “Putin Meeting With Kursk Families Lasts Over Six Hours,” [FBIS Transcribed Text]: “A meeting of Russian President Vladimir Putin with families of the deceased crew of the Kursk nuclear powered submarine has been on for six hours. The meeting is taking place at the Vidyayevo naval base officers club and cultural center. In particular, we have been told by a source inside the room at where the meeting is taking place, they are discussing the Russian government’s assistance to the families. The president is meeting with more than 400 people. Vidyayevo is the home port of the Kursk submarine.” 63 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20000830000201, Moscow, Kommersant-Vlast [in Russian], 29 August 2000, “Transcript of Putin’s Meeting with Kursk Relatives,”[FBIS Translated Text]: “The story of how the transcript was obtained is interesting. At the meeting, no one was allowed to use Dictaphones. Moreover, even notepads provoked extreme irritation among the military and Federal Security Service (FSB). The sole television camera was at the very top of the auditorium, in a movie slit, behind glass. The sound was transmitted to a

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

155

Putin’s opening statement to the families and loved ones of the submarine’s crew highlighted the fact that hew was not familiar with the situation from the technical and engineering standpoint. For this reason, Putin had to rely on advice and opinion from his experts, the naval officers who sat next to him: Unfortunately, I’m as much of a naval specialist as many of you who have come here from all over the country, therefore I am basing everything I say and do on the observations of the specialists. Like you, I had hoped, and to be honest, deep down in my heart I kept hoping until the end. As for the mourning, it has been declared because we know for a precise fact that people have perished. I am speaking of those who definitely perished and about whose death no one has any doubts. We know this is to be so. This doesn’t mean we should abandon everything and stop hoping or working. For this not to happen again, we have to live within our means. We have to have a smaller army, better equipped, technically improved. We should not be haggling over money, maybe we shouldn’t have a million 300, maybe we should have a million or 800, we should have 30 ships there, maybe more, but they have to be well equipped, the crews have to be well trained, and they have to have rescue equipment. All this has to be done.64

Putin shied away from assigning blame to the navy or to anyone on particular, emphasizing his need to remain calm and “in charge” of the situation. Referring to calls on him to punish someone on the armed forces, Admiral Kuroyedov in particular, Putin had this to say: They are advising me to fire someone immediately. Put someone on trial immediately. You know, that would be the easiest thing in the world to do now. Maybe someone would be satisfied and think that we had done the right thing. But I think you and I have to sort out the true reasons for the tragedy. Do we have to understand what happened, whose fault it was, who is guilty? If someone really is guilty, and if this is not the confluence of tragic circumstances, and bus of the German TV company RTL, whose satellite antenna was deployed in front of the House of Officers garrison in Vidyayevo with a feed from the filming crew of the Russian television company RTR. The RTR had discovered that it needed a satellite dish, and since it didn’t have one, employees quickly rushed to the checkpoint in front of the entrance to Vidyayevo naval base, where there were several such satellite dishes belonging to foreign broadcasting firms. RTR chose a German crew to provide the needed equipment. After the event took place, the German crew agreed to provide this newspaper with an unedited transcript of the event. Because RTR’s broadcast transcription is heavily edited to show only the president speaking, removing many contentious exchanges between the president and the Kursk families, Vlast thus possesses the only more or less complete transcript. It is made from a Dictaphone belonging to the German television crew that was running the full 2 hours and 40 minutes the meeting lasted.” 64 ����� Ibid.

156

Russian Civil-Military Relations make a decision with a clear eye and on the basis of accurate information. That is what ought to be done.65

Throughout the crisis, Putin tried to avoid micro managing the situation. Of course in retrospect it seems things might have gone better if the president had managed the situation more closely. Still, Putin resisted the urge to appear to be telling the admirals what to do. Asked why recovery operations had not gone beyond the ninth (aft) compartment, Putin deflected the question completely, feigning ignorance of “naval affairs.”66 Regarding the key question of foreign assistance, Putin was particularly defensive. In response to a pointed question about why he did not call for assistance from foreign specialists immediately, Putin had this to say (his first words were apparently directed to an admiral seated with him at the podium):

65 ����� Ibid. 66 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ibid. [Woman] Please tell me why work was stopped in the seventh and eighth compartments? After all, they opened the ninth compartment! There was water in there. Maybe there isn’t in the eighth or seventh. Why hasn’t anyone gone there? [Putin] You know, I’m just like you. That’s exactly the kind of question I ask the specialists. Every few hours I call them up and ask. I’d like to call them every half-hour, but I just feel uncomfortable tugging at their arms. I just felt that if I kept calling every halfhour for clarification I’d only be taking them away from the work that needed to be done to save your boys. That means this is their opinion. It’s not my opinion. I’m not a specialist in naval affairs. [Shout from the hall] But why didn’t you go there? [Putin] You know, I ask myself the same question: Are you sure it’s all over? Can you prove to me that it’s all ended? Both our specialists and the foreign specialists say that’s so. I met with the chief builder of the submarine and I asked him myself, “(Igor Dmitriyevich Spassky) can you tell me with confidence that it’s all over there?” He said, “I think it is.” The Norwegian specialists say the same thing; and the English. I’ll answer as best as I know it myself. So far, yesterday we held talks with the deep sea divers, who work on oil platforms, as you know. These are not naval officers, not divers from the British navy, not divers from the Norwegian navy. These are commercial divers who work on drilling and oil platforms. They don’t work like our rescuers do; they don’t work at the risk of their own lives. Our divers work and risk their own lives; foreigners will not do that. Unfortunately, they won’t go as far as the hatch between the eighth and seventh compartments. Their equipment, their hoses, just won’t let them. That’s it. Not one country in the world; I’ve spoken with Tony Blair, the prime minister of Great Britain, I’ve spoken with U.S. President Clinton, not one country in the world owns equipment, including Russia, that would allow them right now, tomorrow, to raise the whole thing and open it up. I can tell you specifically and definitely that we will not abandon them and we will be working. I’m telling you, today it’s impossible to get to the eighth compartment. If I could, I’d climb in there myself. I’ve crawled around in there before, as you know. So neither our specialists nor the foreign specialists reached the eighth compartment. I’m telling you like it is. This is the hard truth, but it’s the truth. Neither our specialists nor the foreign specialists are reaching the eighth compartment.

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

157

I’ll answer that. About the fact that we knew we didn’t have rescue ships and divers. You see, these ships were built in the late 1980s, and the means for the boat’s individual rescue were built right into them. That means, the ship gets built and all the means of rescue are in it. The Northern Fleet had these means of rescue. Therefore, to my first question, Sergeyev called me on the 13th (August) at seven in the morning.67

The question of foreign assistance bedeviled Putin and his navy team almost from the beginning of the crisis. Russia’s defense has always rested upon the logic of timing, there was simply no opportunity to bring foreign assistance into the decision about how to effect rescue and recovery. When an unidentified man shouted that the submarine had sunk on Saturday the 12th (August), asking why the president was not notified until the next day, Putin said: They lost contact with the submarine at 2300 hours on Saturday the 12th. That is when they started searching. At 0430 on the Sunday the 13th they found it. That means I knew nothing about it until Sunday. The Defense Minister called me on the 13th at seven in the morning and reported that during training exercises there had been an irregular situation, resulting in loss of contact with a ship. Sergeyev then told me that the lost ship was a submarine and that it had been found lying on the bottom of the sea. Finally he said that the sub had been identified and that it was ours. Sergeyev told me that he had already deployed rescue operations. My first question was what about the reactor? And what can we do to save the men? Do you need anything additional? Do you need any assistance from any ministry, department, or the country? The entire country is ready to assist you. What needs to be done? We will do everything in our power. And if it’s not in our power, tell us what else? We’ll do it immediately. Actually, the military felt that they had all the means of rescue in hand because these boats. Because they felt that they had on hand all these means of rescue. Since the boat, I repeat, was built with them originally. And there are both these apparatuses in the Northern Fleet. That was their reasoning. Now, with respect to foreign assistance, right away, as soon as foreign assistance was offered, Kuroyedov agreed to it immediately. On the 15th for the first time foreign military attachés officially offered assistance. On the 21st they climbed into the ninth compartment; it was the sixth day. We think that if our military had not initially relied on their own rescue equipment, which they naturally did, if immediately on the 13th they had gone to the Norwegians, maybe on the 19th they would have climbed into the boat.68

Putin’s audience consisted of families and loved ones of the stricken submarine’s crew. Many of these people had extensive experience with what Putin referred to as naval affairs. Because of this they felt acutely the loss of what had been a strong 67 ����� Ibid. 68 ����� Ibid.

158

Russian Civil-Military Relations

and capable Soviet Navy. Many felt like they had been neglected and abused since the Soviet Union collapsed. The Kursk tragedy was just the latest chapter in a sad and depressing story for them. At Vidyayevo Putin was treated to a predictable diatribe of vindictive jeers about how he could preside over such a disaster and not hold someone accountable. Accountability became a strong sub-theme to the issue of rescue and recovery operations. One specific area that many addressed centered on the failure of the Russian Navy to maintain a viable system of rescue in the event of crises during submerged operations. Putin admitted that deep-sea diving capability had suffered from lack of attention and inadequate funding.69 One woman broke down at this, demanding to know how it had come to pass that the Russian Navy could not field even the most basic of recoveries because conditions had been allowed to decay to the point of ineffectiveness.70 Putin then returned to the question of foreign offers of assistance when he said, “We have asked specialists, all the ones that could help. We did call in specialists, and the specialists came. The Norwegians came and they said they would not go past the eighth compartment.” Questioners wanted to know how this could have happened to one of the finest submarines in all of Russia’s naval fleets. Regarding the perception that the submarine was essentially invincible against foreign weapons, people asked the president what caused the boat to sink. Putin reportedly dropped his voice, speaking softly he said: You know, we don’t have any other information or any other versions of the story. Either there was a collision, or a mine, possibly an explosion inside the boat, although the specialists don’t think so, it’s unrealistic practically but possible theoretically. In addition to the military I’ve also talked with technical specialists, you see, so, the hole in the submarine is apparently very large, a meter and a half or two meters wide, caused by an explosion evidently. The explosion was so powerful that of course the tragedy in the first compartments was over in one and a half or two minutes.71

The rest of the meeting involved more of the same litany, tearful outbursts, demands for information and accountability, and a steady stream of invectives against the president for allowing Russia’s navy to “sink” to such a deplorable

69 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Ibid. [Putin] What can I say? With respect to deep sea divers, we used to have them in the Soviet Union, and today, I don’t know what we have. With respect to the immediate rescue of this boat, the calculation was that the rescue means installed in these boats would automatically activate. As for the deep sea divers, the Norwegians did come. 70 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ibid. [Woman (shouting, her voice breaking at every sentence)] You have to tell us honestly. You mean we really don’t have the specialists? We are going through such agony! People are sobbing nonstop! Tell us honestly! They (the admirals) should take off their epaulets! Find the specialists! Our men believed in you and you have failed them in their hour of desperate need. 71 ����� Ibid.

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

159

state.72 In all, the meeting lasted for about two and a half hours, quite long for such an emotionally charged encounter. One man accused the president of knowingly allowing conditions in the navy to deteriorate to the point that a crisis such as this was bound to happen sooner or later.73 Putin defended himself well, under the circumstances, emphasizing that the navy was doing its best and that the nation was ready to help. Putin consistently said that he had made every effort to involve foreign assistance in the crisis, something that was simply not true, although at the time he probably did not know that it was not true. The navy was lying to the president about its own mess and about its reluctance to accept help from international sources until long after it was too late to do any good.74 In closing the session, Putin allowed himself the briefest of emotions when he expressed his feelings about the tragedy. He had just been asked why Russia could not find suitable specialists, either foreign or domestic, to assist in saving the submarine and its crew. Putin concluded ruefully:

72 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ibid. [Man] They (pointing at the admirals) didn’t receive a single report from the crew! They didn’t even establish contact! If you already knew what you’d need later, since they were following their orders, since there wasn’t anything else, then why didn’t you act? [Putin] Just a second. They were following orders; they were doing what they were supposed to. When they were convinced that these means were not effective, they used others. That’s it. [Shouts] You’ve let the emergency rescue service go to pot! [Putin] So, let’s assume you don’t trust our military, which, in your position, I understand, is probably natural. But do you trust neutrals? They established that there was a crack there. That’s why they couldn’t go in. [Woman] Eight days! It was obvious on the second day that nothing would come of it, correct? The Norwegians came and worked for eight hours! Explain that to us! How are you going to comment on that? Does this mean that the command didn’t see that nothing was working for eight days? That they didn’t see this? Or they did see and they lied to us? [Putin] Nothing worked for eight days not just because they did or didn’t see. Nothing worked for eight days because the storm wouldn’t let them work. [Man] The Norwegians got in there in one hour! Why the games, the secrecy? [Putin] The Norwegians came on the fifth day and climbed in on the sixth. By the way, the government of Norway doesn’t have divers like these, they hired commercial ones. 73 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Ibid. “As far as living conditions and support for the Navy go, you know this isn’t the first time I’ve been here and it won’t be the last. But you’ve touched on a cardinal issue. It was to this problem, the condition of the Navy, the correlation to what we need, that the last Security Council meeting was devoted. And decisions were taken”. 74 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� Ibid. Responding to a question about why work had stopped at the ninth compartment, Putin said, “You know the Norwegians stopped work because they said they had a contract to save the crew, alive.” Quoting the Norwegians, Putin said, “In our opinion it’s over, the tragedy has ended. So if we’re talking about raising bodies, then we don’t have a contract for that.” Putin added, in conclusion, “And we’re asking the government of Norway to issue us a license for these other operations.”

160

Russian Civil-Military Relations There aren’t any specialists of this kind in the whole world. This is a tremendous tragedy. You realize that a boat that surfaces to periscope depth, you have to forgive me, you asked the question and I have to answer it, the entire crew was on battle alert; 75 percent of the crew was in the first, second, and third compartments, which were destroyed instantaneously by the explosion, an explosion of tremendous force that made a hole about two meters across. And it’s because of that. Here is the truth. You can talk about reasons and searching for those reasons. We are obligated to do that. Therefore we will drag them out, to get the boys. Whether we succeed or not, we’ll take it to shallow water. We are not going to abandon them. We are going to do this. But to say we’ll do this in a week, no one can do that in a week, not us, not even the Americans. What you just said isn’t a question but a task for us. As for our conversation today, we are going to do everything possible. I embrace you.75

The extent to which Putin was either ill-informed or professionally naive is unknown. Still, it seems he was at least taken aback by his emotional encounter with these people. Perhaps what he heard at Vidyayevo was not consistent with what he had been told by his naval experts. Putin’s experience in speaking with these people proved significant. It is possible that he became convinced that the navy had been lying to him all along and that he could not trust Kuroyedov to tell him the truth. Putin’s management of the situation changed after Vidyayevo. He became more assertive with the navy about what was to be done. Although all of the navy admirals associated with the disaster tendered their resignations shortly after the accident, none were accepted by the president.76 Putin said he did not believe this would be a good time to make any changes in the navy’s senior leadership. Eventually, he did “fire” the fleet commander, Admiral Popov, promoting him laterally into another position at the Ministry of Atomic Energy.77 Admiral Kuroyedov remained unscathed for four more years. Not only did the navy lie to the president in an effort to deflect blame, it also lied to the public about foreign involvement. The navy consistently emphasized to the press that, despite several hypothetically possible scenarios, the United States’ reckless seamanship had likely caused the accident. The public did not believe it. 75 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20000830000201, Moscow, Kommersant-Vlast [in Russian], 29 August 2000, “Transcript of Putin’s Meeting with Kursk Relatives” [FBIS Translated Text, edited by the author from the original 23 page version]. 76 ����������������������������������� [FBIS] CPP20000823000136, Beijing, Xinhua, in English language, 23 August 2000 [FBIS Transcribed Text]: “Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev and commanders of the Navy and the Northern Fleet have tendered their resignations to President Vladimir Putin over the Kursk submarine accident, the Interfax news agency reported Wednesday. The resignations, offered following the botched rescue efforts of 118 crew members aboard the Kursk nuclear submarine, have not been accepted by Putin, Interfax said.” 77 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20011206000257, [in Russian], 6 December 2001, “Putin Navy Purge Seen as Reformist Step,” based on an unattributed article: “Why Putin Shook Up the Northern Fleet: Theories and Comment.”

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

161

Polls since the accident have consistently shown that the public in Russia believed that the president should have accepted all international offers of assistance.78 In his first serious and time-sensitive military oriented crisis, Putin looked bad, but he learned from the experience, and embarked on a long-term, deliberate, program of military reform that would eventually alter the dynamics of civil-military relations in Russia in favor of civilian control. Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov was placed in charge of conducting a thorough investigation into the accident. Working in support of Prime Minister Kasyanov, himself a Yeltsin holdover who was not popular with Putin, Klebanov installed himself as the principal civilian responsible for all aspects of the accident’s aftermath. Finding out what had happened was not the only area of his concern. Klebanov was also charged with determining if the navy had misrepresented the facts. It would be two years before Klebanov’s investigation would be finished.

Conclusions In December 2001, more than a year after the crisis, shortly after the submarine was recovered, Putin met with his new defense minister, Sergei Ivanov,79 Chief of 78 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20000822000071, Moscow, Sevodnya [in Russian], 22 August 2000, 3, “Moscow Poll Blames Military, Putin for Failure of Kursk Rescue,” based on a report by Avtandil Tsuladze [FBIS Translated Text]: “Public Opinion and Market Research Institute, 39 percent of respondents consider mistakes by the people responsible for making decisions to be the main reason for the critical situation regarding the Kursk. In all, 28.4 percent of Muscovites attribute the setbacks in the course of the rescue operation to a combination of tragic accidents, and 12.6 percent consider both to be the cause of the rescue operation crisis. Other respondents either put forward different theories or could not make up their minds. But which specific ‘decision makers’ should be accountable for the rescue operation crisis? In the opinion of 34.9 percent of Muscovites, the navy leadership should be accountable for the setbacks in the course of the operation, while 22.5 percent consider President Vladimir Putin personally responsible, 15.1 percent the Defense Ministry, and 7 percent the Russian Federation Government. Thus, the public have pinned the main blame on the military. However, Putin has failed to keep aloof. The president’s public relations people acted on the premise that he should not intervene directly in the course of the operation and should not ‘get in the way of the work.’ But the scale of the catastrophe proved so great and the shock for the entire country so monstrous that Putin’s behavior could not help but give rise to questions. The president repeatedly stressed that everything possible was being done to rescue the crew. However, for the population these words proved unconvincing. Some 62.2 percent of respondents think that the Russian authorities wasted time and did very little to rescue the seamen. A total of 19.8 percent of respondents believe that the authorities achieved a great deal but not everything. And only 11.2 percent are sure that everything possible was done to save the people (6.8 percent of citizens could not make up their minds).” 79 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Civilian (formerly head of the security council, having followed Putin in that position). Sergei Ivanov replaced Marshall Igor Sergeyev as defense minister in March

162

Russian Civil-Military Relations

the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin, and Navy Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Kuroyedov to discuss the aftermath of the disaster.80 Initially lauding the superior achievements of those involved with the successful recovery operation, Putin then demanded a list of those primarily responsible for the submarine’s fate. Kuroyedov dutifully complied. Northern Fleet Commander, Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, his chief of staff, Admiral Mikhail Motsak, and the fleet’s submarine flotilla commander, Vice Admiral Oleg Burtsev were all relieved of their positions effective immediately.81 Although most of these officers were given other assignments in government, Putin had made his mark and his authority was undisputed. In the case of the Kursk, there was a distinction, especially with regard to the expectations of punishment, between rescue and recovery. Specifically, it may have been perceived by the navy that it was more acceptable to lose men than to lose state secrets.82 The navy was, in this case, more willing to risk incurring the president’s ire over a bungled rescue effort than it was to tempt his wrath over compromising state security by allowing foreign interference. After one year in office, President Putin had already made an impression on the military that he was a man of toughness, someone who would remain soberly in command of the nation’s security interests. The army and the navy certainly understood that this president was quite different from the last. Putin’s official statements emphasized his support for the military by highlighting the positive aspects of the military’s record of accomplishment. By pledging to address the 2001, most likely as a result of his long standing difficulties with Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin, but also as a result of his mishandling of the Kursk submarine disaster. 80 ������� Flynn, Cry from the Deep: The Submarine Disaster That Riveted the World and Put the New Russia to the Ultimate Test, 203-04. 81 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20011206000257, [in Russian], 6 December 2001, “Putin Navy Purge Seen as Reformist Step,” based on an unattributed article: “Why Putin Shook Up the Northern Fleet: Theories and Comment:” The vigorous shake-up of naval personnel is nearly over. Vice Admiral Gennadiy Suchkov, who has been commander of the Pacific Fleet for less than six months, has been sent to command the Northern Fleet instead of Vyacheslav Popov, banished to the Ministry of Atomic Energy. He has been replaced by Viktor Fedorov, Pacific Fleet chief of staff. With his dramatically accelerating career Gennadiy Suchkov becomes the main contender for the post of naval commander in chief if Vladimir Kuroyedov goes. By all the bureaucratic criteria, he should have retired already. The reshuffle in the navy is President Putin’s most decisive personnel action to date and an unprecedented instance of the mass dismissal of military top brass. There have been various reactions to the Popov and Motsak dismissals. The reasons have not been announced. It has been said that the dismissals are not linked to the tragic loss of a submarine, but are due to the general state of affairs in the Northern Fleet, according to the defense minister, to the organization of combat training and exercises. It is perfectly clear that the dismissals are intended to make a point. There is a widespread view that those who were dismissed were designated as being responsible for the Kursk disaster. 82 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Author’s interview with Dr. Jacob Kipp at the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 6-7 July 2005.

Case III: High Seas Tragedy and Military Melodrama

163

needs of the nation’s armed forces in tangible ways such as increases in quality of life and equipment requirements, Putin earned the respect and loyalty of the uniformed services. Despite the fact that Putin’s calls for military reform went largely unanswered, he was still taken seriously. The military’s perception of the likelihood of punishment for misconduct was greater than it had been under Yeltsin. Dimitri Trenin, of Moscow’s Carnegie Institute, said he believes the personnel actions taken by Putin reflected the president’s desire to punish the military for behaving badly during the Kursk crisis. Trenin said, “The Popov and Motsak dismissals are a signal that the armed forces have a strict commander in chief, who is keeping a sharp eye on the situation and is prepared to take the most serious personnel decisions.” The dismissals, Trenin said, are “Putin’s answer to the army’s stonewalling over the ideas of military reform. Aware of the grumbling, the president took absolutely the right step, reprimanding the military in this brazen manner. We know that both Popov and Motsak fought for the orthodox theory of a collision with a foreign submarine. Announcing the purge, Putin repudiated this theory, making a point of saying that it has not been confirmed. This disharmony is one reason for the dismissals, but probably not the main one.” Trenin added that he does not believe that Popov was dismissed for “misunderstanding the president’s foreign policy.”83 Aleksei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, pointed out that Admiral Kuroyedov kept talking about a collision as if it were an established fact, but still, even when this theory was proven to be out of the question, the admiral kept his job. Arbatov’s conclusion is that the designated scapegoats were punished, while those on good terms with the leadership were protected from punishment.84 Trenin offered a different conclusion, suggesting that Putin needed Kuroyedov, “He is lopping off branches, but is leaving the trunk for the time being, and that is his mainstay. So the naval commander in chief has been put in a position where he is forced to back the supreme commander in chief’s line. Kuroyedov’s subordinates have messed up very badly. As a military man, Kuroyedov certainly knows that he is responsible for this, so it would have been absolutely logical for the president to start with him. If the president started lower down it would mean that Kuroyedov is left in a vulnerable position and must serve even more loyally.” Trenin saw the purge in the navy as an important reformist step by the president, aimed at “changing the institutional ethical foundations in the army,” where, as he put it, “they continue to turn out officers who prepare for World War III with America.” Putin, according to this theory, not only recognized the vital need for

83 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20011206000257, [in Russian], 6 December 2001, “Putin Navy Purge Seen as Reformist Step,” based on an unattributed article: “Why Putin Shook Up the Northern Fleet: Theories and Comment.” 84 ����� Ibid.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

164

structural military reforms, but also kept an eye on the ideological side, at the same time showing the military who was in charge.85 Kuroyedov was in the running to be Sergeyev’s replacement as defense minister, but he lost credibility with Putin after Vidyayevo and was never again spoken of seriously in those terms. Putin went from seasoned security professional to mature chief executive during the course of this drama. His experience with the navy’s misrepresentations led to his being more guarded in his relationship with the military. In 2001 Putin finally got rid of Sergeyev as defense minister, replacing him with his trusted friend and confidant, Sergei Ivanov. To be sure, there were many reasons for this decision, but Putin’s mistrust for the kind of advice he was getting from the military was almost certainly reinforced by his experiences with the Kursk tragedy. Responding to a wake-up call imposed on him by the realities of the Kursk, Putin was, by now, ready to get serious about military reform. If the military, in this case, the navy, was calling its own shots before the Kursk, it was less likely to do so in the future.

85 ����� Ibid.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

In between the Yeltsin and Putin eras of government in Russia, and on both sides of the transition between the two, there existed gaps in authority that were exploited by the military. Because it had been so ill-treated by civilian leaders for so long following collapse of the Soviet Union the military lost faith in the ability of civilians to lead. However, instead of resorting to perpetrating a coup, or to some other extreme action, sometimes the military simply went its own way. Rather than follow the intentions expressed or implied by civilian authorities, the military found its own solutions to some of the critical security situations that faced the country. By means of its own planning and decision-making, consistent with national security policy and military doctrine, the military shirked its duty to carry out the will of the national security apparatus, opting instead to call its own shots. The military suffered because of the failure of the Russian government to provide even the most basic of its needs. Personnel were neglected and defense infrastructure, not unlike the rest of the country, crumbled and fell into disrepair. After years of struggle to find ways of reforming itself, given the constraints and demands that were placed upon it, the military eventually lost faith in the ability of government to govern. Because the Soviet military had been completely dependent on the political system in which it served, when the ideology of communism fell apart, so did the military’s own ethos. A vacuum was left behind when the old system collapsed that was not filled by the system that replaced it. Searching to find a suitable set of professional values to replace the loss of its ideological underpinnings, the military in Russia became morally and ethically corrupt, as well as professionally incompetent. Christopher Donnelly has described conditions in civil-military relations of nascent democracies that are still in transition from authoritarian rule as unsatisfactory. In Russia, civil-military relations still suffer from the country’s Soviet past; Marxism-Leninism placed the Communist Party in the primary position of authority. Ideologically, because the party was committed to permanent conflict with capitalism, the military was thrust into a position of great importance and prestige. Because the military lost its source of pride when the Soviet Union collapsed, it also lost its prestige. The state itself was possibly even weaker than its institutions, such as the military. Donnelly wrote, “Large bureaucratic institutions  ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Christopher Donnelly, “Civil Military Relations in the New Democracies,” in David Betz, and John Löwenhardt (eds), Army and State in Post-Communist Europe (London Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 9.

166

Russian Civil-Military Relations

continued to function irrespective of the lack of government. The armed forces hierarchy was increasingly determining its own agenda.” As morale fell sharply, so did traditional forms of control. Richard Sakwa, writing in 2002 about civil-military relations in Russia, said, “Military intervention in politics can take different forms. For some it means resolute action against the civilian leadership. However, there are softer forms of intervention, primarily taking the form of undue influence over the budget and policy process, visible above all in foreign relations.” This book shows that Sakwa’s description is accurate, but it also shows the relationship between civilian monitoring and military response. As the Yeltsin era transitioned to the Putin era, the military perceived a likelihood for better treatment, and increased civilian control. Non-intrusive monitoring of the military by civilians gave way to intrusive, and more effective monitoring, especially as policy and doctrine became better defined, more carefully articulated, and more assertively enforced. The Yeltsin era was defined by uncertainty, sometimes even chaos, that was allowed to develop and grow because the Russian Federation was new and did not yet have an adequate framework with which to govern itself entirely. This led to a perception of gaps in authority based on who was in charge and their proximity, or access, to the president. Yeltsin’s patriarchal leadership style encouraged opportunities to manipulate and exploit his administration. Gaps in authority existed when the defense establishment in Russia was unable or unwilling to provide the necessary direction and supervision to its armed forces. Sometimes this happened when the president was not clear with regard to what he wanted; other times it happened when the government’s policies suggested inappropriate links between the goals and objectives of the national interest and use of the military instrument. National security policy is supposed to specify what is in the national interest and how threats to interests are to be addressed. Military doctrine should derive from national security policy by providing a framework for application of the military instrument of power. When civilians do not adequately frame national security policy it is correspondingly difficult for the military to know what to do, what missions to undertake and how to operationalize national security strategy. In the three cases that are examined in the body of work presented in this book there is ample evidence that conditions such as these led to military adventurism, initiatives that ran counter to civilian will, but nonetheless were thought to be in the best interests of the country. It has been said that “harmonious civil-military relations reflect stable social conditions, while social crisis gives rise to tension.” Samuel Huntington wrote  ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Christopher Donnelly, “Evolutionary Problems in the Former Soviet Armed Forces,” Survival, 34:3 (1992), 37.  ��������������� Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 409.  ����������� Ibid., 413.

Conclusions

167

about the politicization of societies and militaries in his seminal work about political order in societies that are in transition from one kind of political system to another. Huntington suggested that a “praetorian society might reflect the political participation not only of the military, but of other social forces as well.” In Russia there was tension between the military and civilian authorities as the military tried to find the right balance between participation and politicization. Richard Sakwa writes, “Under Yeltsin the role of the military, despite occasional flashes of military adventurism, remained mostly marginal. Under Putin, however, there was a clear pattern to rely on the security establishment, marginalizing career military officers.” Under both presidential administrations, the military perceived opportunities to be exploited, initiative took the form of adventurous and risky behavior, and mistakes were made. Sakwa concludes, “The fact that the military could sustain a policy of their own suggests that Russia still has a long way to go before the military can be considered under complete civilian control.” The military was ill-treated by civilians in Yeltsin’s government and the parliament who failed to give them even the barest of what they needed to defend the nation’s security interests. Accordingly, the military lost faith in civilian ability to govern. Rather than undertake to overthrow the government, the military instead opted to call its own shots in many cases, but it did so less often and to a lesser extent when civilian control was exercised with greater skill and efficiency. Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in Russia was marked by strength of character and a commitment to pragmatism. These attributes were well understood, and much appreciated, by military professionals. But Putin’s command of the armed forces suffered initially because of the mess he inherited. By the time Putin became supreme commander-in-chief, the military had grown accustomed to abuse and neglect at the hands of civilian controllers. Resorting to an old Soviet habit of functioning in a dysfunctional political system by finding ways to navigate the massive and cumbersome bureaucracy, skirting the rules, and avoiding confrontation while still getting things done, the armed forces of modern Russia were by 1999 familiar with alternatives to subordination. Putin did not have to wait long before examples of the military calling its own shots came sharply into the national focus. From Kosovo to Chechnya, the military in Russia took advantage of non-intrusive monitoring to demonstrate that national security was best understood and executed by military professionals, absent civilian interference. Finally, a great naval tragedy proved to the new president that Russia’s armed forces might be out of control, practicing adventurous behavior and operating on the margins in dangerous and risky fashion. The time for increased monitoring of the military had arrived. It is less likely that the military will exercise initiative to act independently from civilian control under circumstances when there is more intrusive monitoring.  ��������������������������������������������� Samuel P. Huntington and Harvard University, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 195.  ������� Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 413.

168

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Policy and doctrine under development in 1999 were approved and implemented in 2000. If monitoring is related to military doctrine, deriving from national security policy, then it is possible to trace military behavior in terms of its response to national security crises. The three cases examined in this book trace the process of military response in three different sets of circumstances. These cases reveal how the military in Russia avoided working in support of the intentions of civilian authority, shirking the duty to protect and placing the nation’s security at risk.

Pristina Airport, Kosovo In the first case, the army’s decision to occupy the airport at Pristina, the military interpreted approved national security policy and doctrine as justification for defending a state that was threatened by aggressive Western (NATO) interference. The defense establishment was at odds over the issue. Minister of Defense Sergeyev did not want Russia to intervene independently, preferring to wait until Russia’s role could be determined within the context of NATO’s military strategy. Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin, on the other hand, did not agree. Kvashnin felt that Russia should intervene on behalf of Serbian interests. Arguing in support of Russia’s right to act in its own behalf in Kosovo, Kvashnin, and his articulate spokesman, Ivashov, made a case for the operation that related the threat of NATO intervention directly to Russia’s national interest. A weakness of principal-agency theory lies in its assumption of unanimity, a presumption that military means military and civilian means civilian. Simply stated, that is not always the case. Sergeyev was a military officer in a position that should have been held by a civilian. Kvashnin was thus locked in combat with a principal who was, like himself, a military officer. The fundamental presumption, therefore, of defining the military as those in uniform, and civilian authorities as defense establishment officials who were not military, was flawed in post-Soviet Russia. The relationship between Sergeyev and Kvashnin illustrates an example of principal-agent pairs. Sergeyev acted in a civilian role as defense minister, while Kvashnin was the nation’s chief military officer. In theory, this relationship should have been workable. In practice, however, it did not work very well. The fact that these two men were consistently at odds with one another has been established. Sergeyev favored a reformed military establishment that relied heavily on the nuclear capabilities of his own strategic rocket forces (SRF). This strategy would have demanded most of the already meager budget and personnel resources that were available, all of which would come at the expense of the ground (and naval) forces. Kvashnin believed this to be a flawed strategy of military reform. Instead, he supported less reliance on nuclear forces and increased support for ground (and naval) forces. As new military doctrine was being developed in 1999 these two competing views often caused rifts in the defense establishment, and the general angst that already existed between the ministry of defense and the general staff was exacerbated. By the summer of 1999, conditions were ripe

Conclusions

169

for confrontation. With the president’s administration relatively weak, based on the uncertainty precipitated by frequent changes in leadership, there were gaps in authority as perceived by the military. In the case of Kosovo, while each thought he was aligning himself with the president, each acted differently. Sergeyev sided with Foreign Minister Ivanov in support of a diplomatic solution that would allow for a Russian role in Kosovo within the NATO framework. Kvashnin, aided by Ivashov, implemented a military solution aimed at garnering a stronger and more independent role for Russia as guarantor of Serbia’s national interests. The result was that the military exercised its own initiative. In this case, events were particularly visible to the public, with Sergeyev and Kvashnin at odds in such a visible way that it was impossible for the president not to take sides. When he was finally confronted with the army’s fait accompli in Kosovo, Yeltsin sided with Kvashnin, ignoring Sergeyev. In this case, Kvashnin interpreted military doctrine, and national security policy, in such a way as to give him a reason to act in Russia’s behalf, while at the same time dealing a blow to Sergeyev. He was able to shirk his responsibility to support the intentions of the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, opting instead to go his own way, albeit with the ex post facto blessing of the president. The fact that Kvashnin was actually rewarded by the president, instead of being punished in some manner, made it that much easier for him to do it again shortly thereafter.

Chechnya II As in similar cases, the decision to go to war in Chechnya the second time, in the summer of 1999, was made gradually, rather than all at once based on a single specific and spectacular event. As has been shown, the defense establishment in Russia was eager and ready to do something about the insecurity and instability in its southernmost region. If there was a tipping point leading up to the decision, it was probably two-fold. Rebel incursions into Dagestan, coupled with the various bombings attributed to Chechen terrorists, created a feeling that something had to be done. What had long been a smoldering and highly unstable security dynamic was made the more unacceptable when Chechen rebels moved across their own border into neighboring territory. As had been the case in Kosovo earlier in the summer, the situation was complicated by the fact that there was a dual track approach toward resolving the security challenges of Chechnya. One side wanted peace through negotiation, the other wanted war as vindication for past performance. Because most of the same actors were still involved in making national security policy in the case of Chechnya, many of the same dynamics were still at work in civil-military relations. Kvashnin and Sergeyev were still at odds with one another and the president was still largely incoherent. The decision to go to war in Chechnya the second time, according to Pavel Baev, should be seen “not just as an attempt by the top brass to take revenge for the defeat of three years earlier, but

170

Russian Civil-Military Relations

as part of their larger effort to restore the proper place of the army in society and check further degradation of the military structures.” While Kvashnin’s military thinking was a direct descendant of his Soviet forebears, essentially unreconstructed in the post-communist era, Sergeyev was more professional. Fresh from humiliation at Kvashnin’s hands in Kosovo, when Sergeyev’s efforts, working together with Foreign Minister Ivanov, failed to achieve a negotiated solution with NATO before the army occupied the airfield at Pristina, Sergeyev’s credibility with Yeltsin was lowered. Kvashnin seized another opportunity to reinforce his own position, as well as his support for increased emphasis on conventional forces, by attacking Chechen rebel forces when they crossed the border into Dagestan. Sergeyev dared not challenge the move. Because Kvashnin was not punished for his actions in Kosovo, he did not expect to be punished in Chechnya. One thing had changed, however, and it would eventually prove to be Kvashnin’s downfall. The new president was a career security service professional. Unlike his predecessor, Putin was less likely to tolerate ill-advised military adventurism. Increased and more active civilian monitoring of the military seemed highly probable under Putin. The instruments of civilian control of the military, in the form of a new national security concept and military doctrine, were in place by 2000, but in practice, little had changed.

Kursk By the summer of 2000 the lessons of Kosovo and Chechnya had seasoned the new president, and the dynamics of civil-military relations were somewhat different. Despite the fact that Putin held the military in generally high regard, there were conditions at work that would undermine the relationship. When the submarine Kursk sank, the president was not even informed until it was already too late to do anything. Additionally, the navy lied to him, making matters worse when foreign assistance was offered and rejected. When the president spoke with families of the victims he was not able to explain the circumstances of the disaster because he was not informed correctly of the facts. He made statements that proved he did not know the truth and the military officers who were responsible sat silently by his side while he embarrassed himself. The actors in this case, aside from the president, were still largely the same as in the two previous cases, but the principal-agent pairs were slightly altered. Although Sergeyev and Kvashnin remained locked in a battle of opposing wills, the protagonist this time was the navy chief, Admiral Kuroyedov. Because he was close to Kvashnin, and because he was widely considered to be a possible contender for Sergeyev’s eventual replacement, Kuroyedov behaved in this case  ����������������������������������������������������� Pavel Baev, in David Betz and John Löwenhardt (eds), Army and State in PostCommunist Europe (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 23.

Conclusions

171

much as had Kvashnin in the past. His regard for keeping state secrets, possibly because he perceived that the president’s security service background would yield such a priority, superseded his regard for men and material. Because his service had been so badly neglected, Kuroyedov exploited an opportunity to enhance the navy’s position by taking unnecessary risks. Gambling that the navy’s performance in a high-visibility exercise would pay off in terms of a bigger share of the defense budget, as well as a chance to improve personnel conditions and equipment inventories, Kuroyedov made bad decisions during the crisis. Although his actions cost the president political credibility in Russia and internationally, Kuroyedov was not punished for his actions. Kursk became a turning point for Putin’s relationship with the military, much as the submarine’s namesake, the city named for one of the greatest land attack battles ever fought, marked a significant shift during the Great Patriotic War (WWII). Putin was not able to ignore the fact that Kuroyedov had badly misrepresented the national interest, and then lied about it.

Legislation Because the constitution of 1993 places defense and foreign policy into the president’s hands, a law was needed that would provide for a more specific framework of relationships. According to the constitution, the president is, of course, supreme commander-in-chief of Russia’s armed forces. His power is to be executed through the general staff. The national security council is supposed to be the heart of the political-military relationship, blending the requirements of both and matching means to ends in support of the president’s policies and vision for the country. Although the constitution does not address who will craft national security strategy, it is implied that this would be one of the duties of the council. The ministry of defense is charged with the largely administrative burdens of developing and implementing military, technical, and personnel policies. Finally, the last element of the defense establishment in Russia is political. Sakwa wrote that “the prime minister and the parliament can exert considerable practical influence over defense policy through control of budgets and the Duma’s defense committee.” Military issues were debated at length, especially on the Duma’s defense committee. Drafts of national security policy and military doctrine that would be considered by the president’s security council were also reviewed by the state Duma. Collectively, these are the principal actors in the civil-military relationship. The armed forces as an institution are administered by the Law on Defense of 24 September 1992 (amended in 1996). It is possible that the law may have contributed to uncertainties, or at least the perception of uncertainties, associated with the question of who had direct access to the president. While the law defines  ������� Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 409.

172

Russian Civil-Military Relations

the responsibilities of both the general staff and ministry of defense in terms of requirements and capabilities, it falls short of specifics about who trumps whom in the pecking order. The question of whether the chief of the general staff may approach the president directly, or whether he is required to conduct liaison via the defense minister, is not addressed in detail. Instead, the law leaves the issue somewhat open to interpretation, thus affording an opportunity for misunderstanding and exploitation. Two articles in the Law on Defense are particularly relevant in this context. Excerpts are highlighted as follows. Article 4 outlines the powers of the president with regard to defense. Section 14 of the article gives the president the power to appoint (and to dismiss) both the minister of defense and the chief of the general staff directly. Sections 1517 further specify presidential authority to include subordinate elements of all of Russia’s armed forces, including unit commanders. Because the president has a direct relationship with each of the officers appointed by him as defense minister and general staff chief, this article also gives the president the right to go directly to each as he chooses, without first consulting the other. The article does not, however, grant reciprocal authority to each of these positions; neither one has direct access to the president at the expense of the other, at least not by virtue of this article of the law. Article 13 addresses the administration of Russia’s armed forces. Consisting entirely of just four sections, the article specifies that the responsibility for administration lies with both the defense ministry and with the general staff. Despite vague generalities about the defense ministry acting in a primarily managerial role, while the general staff would occupy itself with operational matters, the article falls short of answering the question of access to the president. In this article, both officers have roughly equal rights in that regard.10 Because legislation, constitutional and subsequent, did not settle the question of primacy between the defense minister and the chief of the general staff, especially regarding the all-important question of presidential access, there were gaps in authority to the extent that both were able to practice somewhat independently of each other. The result was a perception that the only credible civilian authority was

 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Obtained from a Russian government Internet web site, in the original Russian language, these articles from the Law on Defense of 1992 (as amended in 1996) were translated directly by the author. . 10 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The interpretation that neither the defense minister nor the chief of the general staff has legally specific direct access to the president is disputed. Some have suggested that the Law on Defense gave Kvashnin the legal authority to approach Yeltsin directly. This author interprets the law to give each position, the defense minister and the chief of the general staff, equal access. In either case, however, it is certainly possible that neither Sergeyev nor Kvashnin felt the need for legislative authority regarding their relationship with the president in practice. Possibly due to Yeltsin’s patriarchal leadership style, both officers may have felt they had the same rights and privileges.

Conclusions

173

the president. Yeltsin encouraged individual relationships between the officers in these positions and himself. Putin did not.

Policy and Doctrine Because “Soviet military doctrine functioned as a virtual surrogate for what the West would call national security policy,” military strategy is inextricably connected with foreign policy in modern Russia.11 Military doctrine has been in a nearly constant state of change since the fall of the Soviet Union. The first postcommunist effort merely sought to revise Soviet era thinking slightly, eliminating discussion of class-struggle in its design, remaining essentially defensive in nature.12 The focus of attention was still aimed at coping with threats from states (the U.S.), or coalitions (NATO), bent on seeking world domination. Sakwa mentions that an early draft of this document, a version that ultimately was not adopted, provided for direct military intervention on behalf of Russian-speaking populations in places where Soviet interests had previously been preeminent.13 This military doctrine was updated in 1997, with few changes, at about the same time as publication of Russia’s first post-Soviet national security policy.14 One key aspect of the newer version, however, was its insistence that outside interference in the affairs of states (not only the Russian Federation, but other states as well) was to be resisted in every possible manner, including militarily. Although this language was probably aimed at preventing outside interference in Chechnya, it also paved the way for Russian military intervention in support of Serbian interests in Kosovo. Unlike comparable Western documents of this kind, Russia’s military doctrine is replete with references to Russia’s obligations on behalf of states that are victims of aggressive foreign military interference. This thinking came directly from the defense ministry, from officers like Ivashov and Manilov. It was interpreted in practice at the general staff by men like Kvashnin, Kuroyedov, and Baluyevskiy. Other documents related to military doctrine and national security policy were developed and implemented during this period. Several were aimed specifically at the navy. The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea was ratified in 1997 with a view to restoring Russia’s position as a maritime power. Shortly thereafter, a new federal program, “World Oceans,” based largely on the UN 11 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Scott McMichael, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine,” RFE/RL Research Report, 1:40 (9 October 1992), 45; and Andrei Kokoshin, “Armiya i Politika: Sovetskaya VoyennoPoliticheskaya i Voyenno-Strategicheskaya Mysl: 1918-1991” (“Army and Politics: Soviet Military-Political and Military-Strategic Thought: 1918-1991”) (Moscow, Mezhdunarodniye Otnesheniye (International Relations), 1995), passim. 12 ����������� Appendix A. 13 ������� Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 413. 14 ����������� Appendix B.

174

Russian Civil-Military Relations

model, was approved.15 In 1999, the Russian Federation joined the Peace to the Oceans charter. By far the most effective steps toward upholding Russia’s maritime national interests, however, were the presidential edict “On Advancing Maritime Activity in the Russian Federation,” and the government resolution “On Measures to Improve Maritime Activity in the Russian Federation,” both issued in 2000 (after publication of the country’s new national security policy and military doctrine). Pursuant to these documents, the “Russian Federation Maritime Doctrine for the Period Until 2010” was developed and approved on 27 July 2001 as a complex set of scientifically substantiated views on the objectives, tasks, and character of the development of the state’s activity in the world oceans and adjacent water (including fresh water) areas, as well as methods and instruments of their implementation and support, taking into account the country’s economic capabilities, shipbuilding requirements, the rules of international law, and national interests.16 Another important document was the “Basic Guidelines of the Russian Federation Naval Policy for the Period Until 2010,” laying out fundamental principles and provisions of the state’s naval policy in the interest of maintaining and developing the navy, drafted in August and approved in September 2001. At the same time, the government adopted a resolution establishing a Maritime Board to coordinate Russia’s entire maritime activity and implement the Maritime Doctrine. Work then got underway to draft laws regulating maritime activity, whose status, trends, and progress would be monitored and analyzed on a continuous basis with the results due to be reported annually to the president.17 As the decade of the 1990s began to end, new policy and doctrine were under development for implementation in 2000. The new security concept was drafted by the security council under Putin’s direction.18 Although the new military 15 ����������� Appendix C. 16 ��������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20010729000017, Moscow ITAR-TASS, [in Russian], 29 July 2001, “Putin signs Russian Naval Doctrine.” “President Vladimir Putin on 27 July signed the naval doctrine of the Russian Federation. He said this today, greeting the navy men of the Black Sea Fleet aboard the Moskva missile cruiser.  Addressing the navy men, the president said the document should become an efficient tool in a state-wide system for regulating and managing naval activity and help consolidate Russia’s national interests and its international prestige as one of the leading naval powers. ‘This is Russia’s long-term political course in the field of naval activity,’ Putin said. ‘The naval commission which is being set up under the Russian government will be made responsible for the practical implementation of the naval policy.’” 17 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20010820000180, Moscow, Internet [in Russian], 20 August 2001. “The doctrine’s section entitled Implementation of Naval Activity includes the following wording, which is of fundamental importance to the further existence and development of the Russian Federation Navy:  Naval activity connected with defending and ensuring the national interests and security of the Russian Federation and its allies in the World Ocean belongs to the category of the highest state priorities.” 18 ����������� Appendix D.

Conclusions

175

doctrine was drafted by the general staff, Putin’s influence is apparent.19 Still, there are inconsistencies between the two documents. Sakwa suggests, and this author agrees, that these inconsistencies failed to adequately address the issue of military reform in its most fundamental sense. Specifically, “It was this gap [between the two documents] that allowed the very public clash between Defense Minister Sergeyev and Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin in July 2000 over the relative priority of strategic forces (defended by Sergeyev), or whether they should be cut to provide extra resources for conventional forces (Kvashnin’s view).”20 In sum, national security policy and military doctrine, rather than assisting, guiding, and directing national defense were instead battlegrounds for civil-military relations in Russia in the 1990s. Rather than providing the basis for reform, as they should have done, these documents reflected their authorship: defending an outdated concept of national interest that was preoccupied with a Western threat that no longer existed. The question of balance between conventional and nuclear forces, as well as other difficult issues such as personnel and infrastructure reform, were left mostly untouched.21

Calling the Shots The first two cases (Pristina Airport and Chechnya II) suggest military opportunism in an environment where there were gaps in political authority. Rather than resorting to open hostility or perpetrating a coup, the military opted instead to go its own way by acting on behalf of what it considered to be the national interest, regardless of the position supported by civilian authorities. Rather than back down and fall in line with civilian intent, the military in these two cases expressed itself in terms that might be described as adventurism. Because the military had already lost faith in the system that was controlled by civilians in the post-Soviet state structure, it felt no obligation to behave consistently with the restraint that was being shown by the ministers of defense and foreign affairs. The president, Yeltsin, was weak in these two cases, allowing his administration to drift into uncertainty. The military might have chosen to follow the lead of the president’s administration, but, instead, opted to call its own shots, convincing the president, either before or after the fact, that he was being misled and misrepresented 19 ����������� Appendix E. 20 ������� Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 414. 21 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The Russian armed forces now consist of three armed services: army, air force and navy. The strategic rocket forces (SRF) have been downgraded below the status of a branch of armed services. Many of the SRF assets have been transferred to the newly created space and space-defense forces, while around 35 percent of all nuclear launchers are controlled by the navy. The rest of the SRF is expected to pass to the air force by 2005-2006. The air force and air defense force have merged and the airborne forces is now a separate service directly responsible to the defense minister and the chief of the general staff.

176

Russian Civil-Military Relations

by his civilian advisers. Yeltsin’s patriarchal style of political leadership created a basis for misunderstanding on both sides, but when he was confronted with what had happened, the president supported the military (Kvashnin, Ivashov), at the expense of those who had opposed the initiatives (Sergeyev, Ivanov, Stepashin). These cases support this book’s hypothesis that the military in Russia, under conditions of neglect, including shaky and non-intrusive civilian control, shirked its duty to serve and protect, demonstrating adventurous and opportunistic behavior that placed national security at risk. In the presence of civilian monitoring that is not intrusive, not particularly clear, concise, nor understood, the military in Russia shirked its professional responsibility, opting instead to express initiative in a different direction from that favored by civilian authorities. Increased civilian monitoring in the form of new national security policy and military doctrine was being researched and written at the time of these events. Although the defense establishment, military and civilian, was certainly aware of what was in the new documents, there was little impact on military decision making. Instead, senior officers interpreted the intentions of policy and doctrine to give them the impetus to act as they did. This interpretation could only have been undertaken in a weak and uncertain political environment; the kind of environment that produces gaps in authority that can be exploited by adventurous opportunists. The third case, Kursk, is different. Vladimir Putin had been running the country, either as prime minister or president, for almost exactly one year when the crisis happened. In the summer of 2000, Putin’s influence in government was growing stronger. Early on, he showed himself to be the kind of leader the military might more easily fall in line behind. His sober, upright bearing, strong sense of loyalty and commitment, and calm demeanor all spoke highly of Putin’s military appeal. Still, his ability to get the military to do what he wanted was limited by a number of factors. Despite leading the charge back into Chechnya, Putin was not yet feared, nor was he respected, by his defense establishment, at least not entirely. Presidential demands for military reform went unheeded, and the nation’s armed forces continued to spiral downward in disrepair and moral decay. In August 2000, Putin had as yet done nothing to quell the debate between Sergeyev and Kvashnin regarding the very fundamental direction in which the country’s defense should be oriented. Notwithstanding the fact that new national security policy and military doctrine were by this time completely in effect, ratified by the parliament and signed into law by the president, there had as yet been no showdown between the military and its civilian controllers. The case of the Kursk marks the dividing line between the kind of gaps in authority that the military perceived in opportunistic fashion and the tighter, more intrusive monitoring, enabled by interpreting policy and doctrine, that was demonstrated by Putin after the crisis. Having been lied to and misrepresented by his military, in this case, the navy, Putin was thereafter not inclined to tolerate military initiative. In real terms, expressed as budget authority, personnel actions, and operational decision making, after Kursk, Putin and his administration exercised greater control. Intrusive monitoring led to less opportunistic military

Conclusions

177

behavior and practically no examples of adventurism, at least not of the magnitude of these three cases (Pristina Airport, Chechnya II, and Kursk). Coupled with Putin’s penchant for pragmatism is his predisposition for patience. Where Yeltsin was mercurial in his relationship with the military, Putin is staunch and seemingly predictable. Putin wants military reform, and he has been willing to wait for it. In the end, Putin’s military detractors proved to be little more than distractions. Putin has consistently demonstrated his support for civilian control of the military. Arguably, had he not witnessed first hand the controversial events of the summer of 1999, had there not been a submarine crisis in the summer of 2000 to precipitate a sea change in the president’s perceptions of monitoring his military, gaps in authority might have persisted that could have led to other calamitous and risky misadventures. It is doubtful that history might witness a repeat of the kind of military behavior that was shown during this period. Civilians, having understood the lessons of civil-military relations and accepted the obligations of intrusive monitoring, appear to be increasingly in control of the military in Russia. With civilians “calling the tune,” there is less chance that the military will “call the shots.”

Putin’s Detractors—Medvedev’s Opportunities The individuals who are the principal actors in each of three cases illustrating military shirking might be called Putin’s detractors, those who made it difficult for him to get things done. They include: Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, who was replaced by Putin’s close confidant, Sergei Ivanov in 2001; Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin, replaced by his operations deputy, General Yuri Baluyevskiy, in 2004; Director of International Military Cooperation General Leonid Ivashov, replaced by his deputy, General Anatoliy Mazurkevich in 2002, and Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, who was finally replaced in September 2005. These men stood in the way of Putin’s initiatives, blocking his ideas and slowing down the pace of change. For example, in 2002, when Putin called for an end to military conscription by 2007, then Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin announced that the president’s goal might best be achieved by 2011.22 The general did not even mention the president’s 22 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20021211000416, Moscow, Yezhenedelnyy Zhurnal [in Russian], 11 December 2002: Having carefully written the latest quaint “flourish,” Russian military reform has returned to the starting point. Based upon the results of the 21 November government session and the Armed Forces command assemblies that were completed on 26 November, the Ministry of Defense was tasked to conduct experiments and continue to develop the Federal Program for the Transfer of the Army to Service on Contract.  The only specific obligation that the military department has assumed consists of the fact that the military department, may, if circumstances are favorable, transfer 92 permanent readiness units to a contract basis either by 2007 or by 2011.

178

Russian Civil-Military Relations

mandate for reform in a shorter time. If the president wanted reform, he would have it, but at a time convenient for the military, not necessarily what was best for the country. Although this is just a single example, there are many others. Putin was patient, however, and soon after the Kursk disaster he slowly began to move his detractors out of the way. By March 2001, Putin had observed Sergei Ivanov’s success in the position of security council secretary, and he elevated his close friend and former KGB colleague to defense minister. Tired of presiding over the endless squabbles between Sergeyev and Kvashnin, the president opted to remove Sergeyev. Finally, there was a civilian in charge of defense, Ivanov’s security services background notwithstanding. Although his decision appeared to give the upper hand to Kvashnin, it is worth remembering Dimitri Trenin’s observation when Putin declined to fire Kuroyedov at the same time he purged the navy of those who were directly involved in the Kursk disaster. Trenin suggested that Putin needed a “mainstay,” someone whose loyalty could be co-opted, bought with the president’s support, even if support was not enduring. This may be an indication of Putin’s own unique style of leadership, at least with regard to exercising control of the military. Whereas Yeltsin had been patriarchal, Putin was more pragmatic. The president was silent when Kvashnin announced in 2002 that Ivashov would be retired from his position at the ministry of defense, removing a major anti-Western voice that was consistently opposed to integration with the West, one of Putin’s key foreign policy objectives. Ivashov was moved to a new job coordinating the security interests of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), far removed from his previously influential job as head of international military cooperation. Kvashnin lost an ally in Ivashov, but the new head of the military cooperation department, General Anatoliy Mazurkevich, soon showed that his views were not far removed from those of his predecessor. The office has continued to block integration, but without the viscerally anti-Western rhetoric of the past. Ivashov remained influential as the Vice president of the Academy of Geopolitics, a conservative, nationalist-leaning Moscow think tank.23 His visceral attitude about threats to Russian interests from Western sources has grown even

23  The Russia Journal, 21 May 2004, Leonid Ivashov interviewed by unattributed journalist during a presentation at the Moscow Institute for International Relations. “General Says NATO is Planning an Attack on Russia.” “Vice President of the Academy of Geopolitical problems, retired Colonel General Leonid Ivashov says that NATO is fast approaching Russian borders. Because younger generations of Russians doubt that this is a threat to Russia, Ivashov was asked about threats to national security. Ivashov: ‘As for young people’s opinions, I know that students are given too much contradictory and scarce information. Professors have a shortage of textbooks interpreting different doctrines, opinions and approaches. Young people are confused, they are disoriented and cannot see the long-term threat. Yes, NATO troops do not shoot and bomb Russia today, and this creates the impression that the threat is not real. In addition, Western values are being planted in Russia, while its own historical and cultural roots are disappearing.’”

Conclusions

179

more strident, and his intellectual alliance with nationalist Alexander Dugin is still strong.24 When Putin announced Kvashnin’s retirement, one of the president’s main detractors was removed. Kvashnin, more than any other military officer in the postSoviet era, made it impossible to undertake serious military reforms. Although his replacement, Yuri Baluyevskiy, initially demonstrated a much more forward thinking approach to how the military should be run, his record of military reform over all is not much better than Kvashnin’s. Nonetheless, there was progress. For example, based on his views about the war in Chechnya, Baluyevskiy said early on in his term that he was willing to support a negotiated solution there, something Kvashnin steadfastly refused to do. Another example is Baluyevskiy’s support for military cooperation with the United States. Although not always successful, security oriented engagement began once more to move forward, something else that would never have happened under the watchful anti-American eyes of Kvashnin and his cohort in the MOD Leonid Ivashov. Putin wanted a military that would be mindful of the West, not demonstrably inferior to it. In Baluyevskiy and Mazurkevich, that was what he aimed to get. Finally, Admiral Kuroyedov, the navy’s commander-in-chief, was dispatched into retirement following yet another submarine crisis that nearly ended in disaster. In September 2005, operating in the Pacific Ocean near the Kamchatka Peninsula, the submersible Priz (AS-28) became entangled in cables that nearly caused its death. The Priz was operating in support of a mission directly related to Russia’s maritime doctrine, “World Oceans,” working on a surveillance system related to defending Russia from its former Cold War threats.25 Almost exactly five years to the day since the submarine Kursk disaster, Putin immediately ordered that all possible efforts, including foreign assistance, were to be availed in rescuing the stricken craft. The Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet went out of its way to cooperate with foreigners, ultimately leading to a successful recovery enabled by British sailors and equipment, assisted by Japanese and American assets as well. Curiously, the Russian Navy had actually bolstered its rescue capability during the period after the Kursk crisis, just in case such a disaster ever happened again. But the equipment could not be used because its crew was not available. The specially trained crew was away on annual leave at the time of the crisis and could not return in sufficient time to effect a rescue. Even so, despite its own inability to act, the navy’s response was decidedly different than it was in 2000. The Priz was saved, not by Russian forces, but by foreigners. Humiliated, Kuroyedov finally ran out of chances to redeem himself and Putin fired him, ostensibly because the 24 ���������������� Charles Clover, The London Financial Times, 2 December 2000, “Tracing the growing influence of the right-wing theories of Alexander Dugin. One of Russia’s main military diplomats, General Leonid Ivashov, who, as head of the international department at Russia’s Ministry of Defense, had been the mastermind of Russia’s takeover of the Pristina airport in Kosovo in 1999, is one of Dugin’s converts.” 25 ����������� Appendix C.

180

Russian Civil-Military Relations

admiral was already one year past the statutory retirement age of 60.26 Kuroyedov was the last of the officers responsible for the Kursk disaster and its politicalmilitary aftermath to be retired from service. Ironically, he was replaced by Admiral Vladimir Masorin, the very officer who first called for foreign assistance in the case of the near catastrophe of the submersible Priz.

Recent Developments Military reform efforts in the years since the events described in this book have focused primarily on financial, personnel and procurement issues. Defense spending rose from about two percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) to about three percent in the fiscal year 2003, and has remained roughly constant since that time.27 The 2003-2015 arms procurement programs promise increased investment in research and development of advanced weapons systems, command and control and fire coordination complexes, and a new multi-purpose fighter aircraft. Salaries are generally being paid on time, and servicemen taking part in combat operations receive special cash bonuses. The pay level in the army has increased and is now slightly above the civil service average. However, many families of many Russian officers still live below the poverty line. The Ministry of Defense still does not provide its officers with adequate living quarters. For most military families, the officer remains a sole income earner as spouses are unable to find jobs at or near military bases and there are few, if any, family-support state benefits available. The Ministry of Defense favors a program to phase out conscription by 20072010. The present conscription system is not working. Hazing persists, and conscription does not encourage specialization, creating an acute shortage of snipers, gunners, artillery staff, and fire controllers. Experienced soldiers spend most of their time training new conscripts while most units are still under-manned. Military blunders in Chechnya were often caused by poor command and control, as well as by inadequate coordination. The general staff remains a vocal opponent of scrapping the conscription system, seeking to derail reforms by overstating the costs of transition to a contract, or volunteer, army. The highly touted experiment

26 ���������������������������������������������������� Victor Litovkin, military commentator reporting for RIA Novosti, Moscow, in English language, 5 September 2005. 27 ���������������������������������������������������������� Jane’s Defense Publications, “Executive Summary, Russia,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2004, 31 July 2004. This percent of GDP has grown enormous in real terms during the years since, as the price of oil has driven up the actual value in lock step with Russia’s over all growth. Three percent of GDP was roughly equal to 214 billion rubles in 2003; whereas it stands currently at about 821 billion rubles. Source for these figures is Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance, 2007.

Conclusions

181

to turn the elite 76th Pskov Airborne Division into Russia’s first fully professional unit is experiencing mixed results.28 Despite unprecedented opportunity, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s reform plans overlooked three key issues. First, the current system of contract service does not address the military’s need for a corps of non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Regular officers are routinely expected to undertake even minor tasks. Second, the military still makes little distinction between a short-term unqualified contract soldier, basically a mercenary, and a Western-type contract soldier for whom military service is a skilled profession. To change this, contract soldiers must receive higher pay and better training. Third, radical changes in the professional military education system are badly needed. Staff colleges and military academies leave Russian officers unprepared for modern warfare challenges. Officers are still taught Soviet-style doctrines and operational principles designed for a major war with NATO. The emphasis is on conducting massive operations on a continental scale and on preparing for general mobilization. Military academies perpetuate strong anti-U.S. and anti-NATO views within the army. On the rare occasion when a military officer is afforded the opportunity to receive an education in the West, at the U.S. National War College, for example, he is often marginalized upon return to service in Russia. However, many of these officers have been able to take advantage of their new skills in the private sector, in some cases for lucrative civilian salaries, a not unattractive side effect of receiving professional military education in the West.29 The notion that the military in any country might exploit perceived gaps in civilian authority begs the question of accountability. The likelihood of punishment is something that military officers should consider when, and if, shirking is an option. Another factor might be to what extent the military may, or may not, perceive that civilian monitoring is intrusive, or not. If intrusive monitoring carries with it a perceived likelihood that there will be appropriate punishment, commensurate with misdeeds committed, then there may be less likelihood that military shirking will take place. In view of cases involving militaries that respond favorably (working) to conditions of increased accountability, there may be a

28 ���������������������������������� [FBIS] CEP20021227000158, Moscow, Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (InterfaxAVN), in English language, 27 December 2002—“The Defense Ministry is concerned with proposals of several lawmakers regarding abolition of active-duty service and their attempts to meddle with the experiment on transition to professional service that is underway in an airborne division near Pskov. The Pskov division is considered today (2007-2008) to be an all-volunteer unit, despite the opinion of many of its officers that endemic disciplinary offenses and the general failure to meet even the minimum standards often leads to dismissal of as much as 40 percent of the contract soldiers after only 4-5 months of service. Contracts are supposed to be for 3 years.” 29 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Based on the author’s own experience as U.S. Naval Attaché in Moscow, 19982001. This perception has not changed substantially since the author’s departure from the U.S. Embassy—colleagues in service at this time, 2008, report similar results.

182

Russian Civil-Military Relations

corollary theory in principal-agent civil-military relations that concludes thusly: Increased monitoring that leads to military working, as opposed to shirking, must, of necessity, address the question of the likelihood for punishment or accountability in some fashion. Finally, there is the presumption of unanimity inherent to principal-agency theory. This is a weakness, especially in cases of political systems that are in transition from authoritarianism. Addressing the puzzling balance between the protectors and the protected in political systems of this kind is especially difficult. Authoritarian political systems, such as those under communism or totalitarianism, are almost always driven by ideologies that are not appropriate in democracies. Military reforms necessary to shift away from these regimes toward democracy require significant changes. From the standpoint of ideology, the legacy of the old system may be too much for the military to bear in transition, resulting in problems that range from insubordinate adventurism all the way to military coup.

Toward a New National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine In November 2007, answering a question posed by journalists as to whether or not the world could count on Russia to defend it from “insidious American plans,” General Baluyevskiy, (then) Chief of the General Staff, replied, “Today, there is no need to be afraid of the Russian Armed Forces. However, I do not believe that the Russian military is obliged to defend the world from the evil Americans.”30 What do we know about the new and improved version of military doctrine purportedly under development now? We know that Putin had been considering the requirement for a long time, well before he left the presidency this year.31 At a National Security Council meeting in June 2005, Putin tasked the leadership of Russia’s armed forces to prepare a new military doctrine. Since we do not currently have a draft document to consider, we might well begin with Makhmut Gareyev, who has called the existing (2000) Military Doctrine “unexemplary,” even at the very moment it was written.32 As President of the Academy of Military Sciences, Gareyev has a role in advising how the military leadership might undertake to accomplish the task. He is a first rate strategist, even if his view of the world sometimes seems antique. He certainly understands the essential elements of national security strategy and military thought, and he also knows that Moscow and Washington are more like partners than enemies. His comments on the need for a new military doctrine are 30  RIA Novosti, Moscow, 13 November. 2007. Accessed on 18 November 2007 at . 31 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Although Putin signed the current national security documents, concept and doctrine, into law early in 2000, both were developed during the Yeltsin administration. 32  Strana.ru, Moscow, Open Source Center CEP20070119330001, 19 January 2007.

Conclusions

183

as much about transformation as they are about perceived threats, something that has been sorely lacking in previous military doctrine. In former iterations of these security documents the linkage between national resources and national security strategy was weak. With oil prices where they are today, and no indication that they may decline any time soon, Russia has tremendous economic means at its disposal. If military doctrine in 2008 can be rewritten to more accurately assess the needs of the armed forces, avoiding lies about false readiness claims and rhetorical posturing, there is a good chance the military could emerge as a very different force from what it is today. Gareyev’s advice could be a road map for the future of Russia’s armed forces: “We have to find a clear answer to the question of the nature of modern threats to Russia’s security and of defense missions stemming from them. Then we have to determine what kind of military organization our state needs to neutralize potential threats and repel them if necessary.” Recalling his own Soviet past and the legacy of military thought to which he has long been such a key contributor, he added, “We have to prepare the country for defense as a whole, in the economic, military industrial, and moral-political sense above all.” Finally, coming back to the present, he recommends that Russia get away from the rhetoric of ideology and find ways to strengthen the armed forces in preparation for what he believes will be increasingly environmental and energy related sources of conflict over the next 10-15 years.”33 Andrei Kokoshin, a deputy of the State Duma and long-time resident academic at the Russian Academy of Sciences, also commented on the new military doctrine. Kokoshin said he does not believe that Russia needs to defend itself directly from NATO or from the United States. He does, however, favor a more robust military force that could defend Russia against instability related to NATO enlargement, or the practice of U.S. foreign policy in Russia’s neighboring regions.34 In 2000, Kokoshin told this author that “the U.S. should be mindful that democracy unleashed in an open sphere of influence such as Russia’s southern flank could lead to severe outbreaks of disturbance resulting in authoritarian crackdowns in response.”35 More recently, Kokoshin told reporters that the increasing role of the military in supporting Russia’s national security strategy is unavoidable. He said, “The development of the new military doctrine should assess current short and long term trends in political and military spheres, as well as development of defense technologies.” 36 He also advocates a stronger role for military doctrine in combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, especially coming from such a traditionally moderate practitioner of 33 ����� Ibid. 34  Interfax, Moscow, Open Source Center CEP20070309950300, 9 March 2007. 35 Author’s interview with Andrei Kokoshin at the State Duma, Moscow, December 2000. Oddly prescient of U.S. forces operating in Central Asia following the 9/11 attacks the following year, Kokoshin’s comments are, in retrospect, particularly interesting. 36  Interfax, Moscow, Open Source Center CEP20070309950300, 9 March 2007.

184

Russian Civil-Military Relations

public policy, Kokoshin warns of increasing closeness between Russia and India and China, predicting “increased mutual understanding by boosting cooperation within the framework of the Russian-Indian-Chinese triangle and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”37 Pavel Felgenhauer is a respected military journalist who has been writing about national security in Russia for a long time.38 Recently, Felgenhauer wrote an article about the developments of a new doctrine, describing the influence of Sergei Ivanov, close confidant of Putin and Defense Minister from March 2001 until February 2007.39 In the article, Felgenhauer warns against the usual approach that begins with the military’s own interpretation of threats to national security, advocating instead a more comprehensive view that relies upon political elements and civilians in authority to articulate threats based on national interests. Since 2000, there have been many presidential initiatives aimed at revising the country’s national security policy, and there has been much talk of the pressing need for military reform. Nonetheless, despite Putin’s efforts to lead change, nothing much has been done. Although this may seem surprising, there are reasons. The General Staff has called for major increases in defense spending to meet perceived threats. Gareyev, cited previously, has also called for a “major concentration of national resources, comparable with the Soviet nuclear arms program under Stalin, to create modern weapons in order to rearm Russia’s military forces.” Felgenhauer wrote that the military budget in 2007 increased by 23 percent and reached 860 billion rubles (about 35 billion dollars), and “the top brass wants much more.” 40 Unfortunately, the effort to rewrite military doctrine may be directly related to the military’s desire to rearm itself.41 Citing Ivanov’s reluctance to embrace the initiative, Felgenhauer predicted widespread resistance to change based on competition for resources. Russia’s vast oil and gas wealth, although significant, may not be enough to satisfy both its military and civilian elites. Recalling Ivanov’s “glossy brochure” of 2003, outlining his vision for the future and calling for a transformation of Russian armed forces to reflect different kinds of threats compared with the traditional variety deriving from NATO and the United States, it is possible to conclude that Ivanov remained frustrated by the General Staff’s less than enthusiastic performance. Ivanov is no 37 ����� Ibid. 38 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� He was present with this author during the aforementioned interview with General Makhmut Gareyev about the 2000 Military Doctrine. 39 �������������������������������������������������������� Pavel Felgenhauer, “The Russian Military After Ivanov,” Moscow Times, 21 May 2007. 40 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� General Rukshin, Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff, quoted in Pavel Felgenhauer’s article “The Russian Military After Ivanov,” The Moscow Times, 21 May 2007. 41 ������������������������������������������������ In February 2007, the popular Moscow newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, wrote in an editorial: “Money for defense reform is not the problem … however, Russia is spending it like it was twenty years ago. We need to change the mentality of Russia’s top brass. Otherwise, the Russian Army will remain the Red Army.

Conclusions

185

longer Minister of Defense, although he remains powerful and may yet be able to lead change in defense reform. 42 If there is to be a new military doctrine, Russia may wish to precede that development with a new national security concept, as has been done in the past. Absent a new national security framework document, there is risk that the defense minister may be persuaded that the key to balancing national resources in support of a comprehensive and broad based security strategy lies in satisfying the demands of the military.

Opportunities The inauguration of Dmitri Medvedev as Putin’s successor, on 7 May 2008, represents a policy of continuity with the Putin regime—a conclusion that is perhaps most evident by Putin’s installation as Prime Minister on the day after the new president’s inauguration. It is too soon to know if his policies will be very new or different with regard to military reforms. There have, however, been several indications of change. Exactly three weeks into his presidency, on 3 June 2008, Medvedev fired General Yuri Baluyevskiy—Chief of the General Staff. This is certainly not the first example of a defense minister sacking a chief of the general staff—nor is it even particularly unusual. It has already been noted that Serdyukov’s predecessor, Sergei Ivanov, sacked Baluyevskiy’s predecessor—Anatoliy Kvashnin—over a series of long standing feuds, many related to military reforms. Serdyukov and Baluyevskiy fought over several specific areas—all directly related to reform initiatives: • • •

civilians assigned to implement reforms from inside the general staff—a move seen as a direct challenge to the authority of senior military leaders; shifting military infrastructure—in particular an unpopular proposal to relocate the naval headquarters from Moscow to St. Petersburg; and finally, Serdyukov’s move to replace a number of military positions with civilian professionals such as doctors, lawyers, judges, and journalists.43

Most importantly, in each of these recent cases, the civilian defense minister came out on top, and that is one significant measure of success in the field of defense reform. Putin’s conception of military reform differed sharply from that of Yeltsin, 42 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Sergei Ivanov, who was formerly Defense Minister, was removed and made First Deputy Prime Minister in 2007. Subsequently a solid front runner in the race for Putin’s successor in 2008, he eventually lost to Dmitri Medvedev during the general election, Medvedev having been endorsed by Putin. Ivanov was replaced as Minister of Defense by Anatoly Serdyukov. 43 ����������������������������������� Simon Saradzhyan, staff writer for The Moscow Times, 4 June, 2008. “Armed Forces Chief Shown the Door.”

186

Russian Civil-Military Relations

whose half-hearted reform attempts were aimed at slimming down the military without transforming it. Putin will always be remembered for the fact that he saw the armed forces as not only protectors of state security, but also as living symbols of the revival of a strong and capable state itself. President Medvedev seems committed to following through on his pledge to finally bring lasting and meaningful reform to Russia’s defense sector—at least that is what he says—and with oil hitting new record prices almost daily, he will certainly have many options. His recent decisions appear to suggest what could be a new and different era in Russian political-military affairs. Nonetheless, Russia’s generals have decades of experience in avoiding direct confrontations with civilian authorities and they have always managed to call most of the shots themselves. It remains to be seen whether Medvedev will have any greater success than his predecessors, but there is at least some cause for optimism. In 2008, once again, Russian influence matters in the realm of international relations, if for no other reason than the exceptionally high price of gas and oil. Still, however, it is not a superpower by any measure, at least not yet. Whether it is prepared to work with the rest of the world by integrating its security interests with those of others, or not, remains an important question. It is not in Russia’s national interest to pursue a strategy aimed at confrontation with Europe and the United States. Confrontations with the West weaken Russia’s international influence and wastes valuable resources. Russia needs to balance its requirements, beginning with security sector reforms that are achievable, meaningful, and enduring. Only by recognizing that there is no threat from the U.S. or Europe, or from alliances such as NATO, even if enlarged to include states that are in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, can Russia achieve real security in the 21st century.

Epilogue

Russia and Georgia: The Summer of 2008

On 7 August, 2008 the Russian Federation invaded the Republic of Georgia in the region known as South Ossetia. Georgia had recently taken steps to increase its hold on the territory, and Russia claimed that Georgian forces had killed or injured unspecified numbers of Russian citizens living there. In the weeks that followed the world watched in horror as Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers brought troops and various other heavily armed forces deep inside Georgian territory in a well orchestrated military operation. Casualties on both sides mounted quickly. Shortly after its initial actions in South Ossetia Russia intervened further, into Abkhazia, another of Georgia’s regions with a majority population of ethnic Russians. Before it was over, this short but powerful war spread beyond these two enclaves, into other areas of Georgia closer to the capital of Tbilisi, and at sea off the coastal port city of Poti. Claiming its actions were entirely supportable in defense of its own citizens, Russia quickly consolidated its positions and recognized the two breakaway regions as independent states. It is tempting to conclude that, once again, Russia’s military may have acted on its own, perhaps in support of perceived foreign policy objectives. Although it is certainly too soon to form any conclusions about this case, there is little doubt that civilians in authority over the military were in control of the major events associated with the campaign. It is not clear, however, whether the pre-invasion moves represented military initiative, adventurism, or perhaps opportunism. Six months earlier, in February 2008, Kosovo declared itself independent of Serbia, setting off a chain reaction of recognitions and non-recognitions that resulted in diplomatic confrontations. Russia’s support for Serbia led to sharp rebuttals that accused the principal champions of Kosovo’s move, the United States and Europe, of fomenting separatist movements worldwide. Many states drew parallels, pro and con, between Kosovo and other regions. Senior military officers in Moscow made statements about protecting Russia from Western aggression. In the debate on missile defense Russian generals said that European cities would, once again, be targeted by strategic missiles if the United States were to succeed in its plans   Previously, the Russian government issued passports to ethnic Russians living in several regions inside Georgia (including Abkhazia, and South Ossetia), thus identifying these persons as Russian citizens. This and other Russian policies eventually resulted in most ethnic Georgians leaving the enclaves, preferring to live somewhere else (in Georgia) rather than submit to Russian rule.

188

Russian Civil-Military Relations

to install sites on European territory. Poland and the Czech Republic grew colder in their waning support for an initiative that seemed doomed to fail in response to visceral Russian opposition. In the spring and summer of 2008 President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin appeared to be competing with each other in an effort to reassert Russia’s importance. NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April rejected membership action plans for Georgia and Ukraine, but said in its closing communiqué that NATO membership for both countries was inevitable, paving the way for invitations later this year. Russian perceptions that NATO threatens its security were enhanced, even inflamed. On May 9th ceremonies in Moscow commemorated Victory Day with parades on Red Square as in former Soviet times, fueling concerns in the West that Russia might be rearming itself in some kind of 21st Century Cold War. Newly inaugurated President Medvedev said “The Russian military is gaining in strength and power like all of Russia.” In July Russia called for a new alliance (to replace NATO and other Cold war era security institutions) that would stretch from “Vancouver to Vladivostok,” not a particularly original idea, but certainly provocative in its context. Despite the controversial tone of Russia’s announcement, European leaders, in particular French President Sarkozy, reacted with open-minded interest. At NATO Headquarters, Russian Ambassador Rogozin reminded his colleagues on the NATO-Russia Council of Russia’s disdain for organizations in which Russian membership or participation was only marginal. By early August a series of provocations in the Caucasus ensued that ultimately led to war. Although events leading up to Russia’s invasion remain unclear at this time, early evidence is compelling. Russian forces may have perpetrated cyber attacks against unspecified elements of Georgia’s national security apparatus weeks before its forces actually entered Georgian territory. Russian troops may have been across the border inside the Roki Tunnel the night before Georgia’s earliest armed interventions. In the pre-war phase of the campaign Russian military activities took various forms, ranging from moving equipment and forces forward, to cross-border incursions and aircraft over-flights. Increasingly, anti-Georgian rhetoric in Moscow openly supported increasingly restive separatist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia eventually reacted by sending forces to South Ossetia to shore up its territorial sovereignty. It is not clear who acted first. Russia claims it was responding to attacks by Georgian forces. Georgia claims it was provoked into action by Russian aggression. In the end there was widespread death and destruction before international pressure led to a cease fire and eventual military withdrawal.  The April 2008 summit was Putin’s last appearance with NATO as President of Russia, having nominated Medvedev as his successor (Medvedev ran for president and handily won absent meaningful opposition) and installed himself as Prime Minister. In closing statements, Putin said of the summit’s communiqué, “the appearance of a powerful military alliance on our borders will be taken by Russia as a direct threat to the security of our country,” leaving little doubt as to Russia’s views.

Epilogue

189

Russia promptly announced recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Practically no other state followed suit and Russia quickly stood alone in its position. International condemnation was rapid and severe. Russia’s naked aggression against a smaller neighboring country reinforced claims by many former Soviet states that Russia still poses a threat to state sovereignty and national security. Poland quickly agreed to accept installation of U.S. missile defense interceptors on its territory. The question of military opportunism, especially in the context of pre-invasion provocations, looms large. There is mounting evidence that Russia had a military presence inside Georgia before the early morning invasion took place on August seventh. It would have been difficult if not impossible to mount such a complex force in such a short period of time without considerable effort and a good deal of luck. This kind of opportunism is not without precedent. In the Caucasus, before the second war in Chechnya began in late summer 1999, the Russian military acted on its own to prepare the battle space for the events that followed, making it easy for politicians to choose war. As was the case when General Zavarzin took the initiative to enter and occupy the airport at Pristina in Kosovo, while Yeltsin’s authority waned in favor of his heir apparent Putin, the military may have perceived gaps in civilian authority as the transition of presidential power shifted from Putin to Medvedev in 2008. Circumstances of Medvedev’s election to the presidency by way of uncontested presidential nomination, essentially unopposed candidacy, and Putin’s subsequent announcement that he would remain in government as the prime minister, gave rise to questions about who was really in charge. Although the balance of presidential power in these two cases seems to be in opposite directions, weak to strong in 1999, strong to weak in 2008, perceived uncertainty of the transition remains. Significant events such as war are often precipitated by a tipping point of some kind. To be sure, Russia’s decision to invade Georgia was probably tipped by Georgian President Saakashvili’s initiative to strengthen his hand in South Ossetia. There is little doubt that the ultimate decision to respond was made in the Kremlin by civilians in authority over the military, but precursors to the decision began much earlier. Recall that one of Medvedev’s first actions as president was to fire Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluyevskiy. The decision to replace Baluyevskiy followed a long track record of resistance to reform initiatives called for by both presidents, Putin and Medvedev. Civilian authorities pressed the military to change and the military pushed back, often in open opposition. Ultimately, military subordination was reinforced by the political decision to sack the country’s top general. It is tempting to consider the possibility that senior military officers may have exploited the political situation by demonstrating independent initiative. Many wondered who was really in charge—the quiet but apparently effective Medvedev, or resolute and rhetorical Putin. As the first volleys of war were exchanged on 7 August, Medvedev was near Moscow, enjoying a river cruise on the Volga, and Putin was at the Olympics in Beijing. As with similar situations in Kosovo and

190

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Chechnya in 1999, in the summer of 2008 the military may have exploited political uncertainties by going its own way, following its own path, this time across the border into Georgia. Civilian authorities might have then found it hard to resist the chance to take advantage of the situation. As the military shaped the political environment, on its own initiative, the Kremlin may have simply acquiesced, following through with policy after the fact. If true, then this case could be for Medvedev what the Kursk submarine tragedy was for Putin in 2000, a sea change that ultimately helped him to see what the military was really doing—lying, cheating, and stealing. The track record of Russia’s military over the past decade is replete with examples of behavior that is not consistent with the central tenets of contemporary civil-military relations. Recalling Huntington in The Soldier and the State, and others since who have modified or reinforced his work, if measured against modern expectations, the post-Soviet Russian military must be found wanting. Huntington said military officers should offer professional advice to civilians in authority. Undermining authority, Peter Feaver would call it shirking, erodes military professionalism and corrodes the civil-military bargain of accountability. Putin’s record of aggressive support for military reform is impressive but inadequate. Medvedev has so far demonstrated a different approach, less flamboyant but in many ways more tenacious and effective. Although it is too soon to form conclusions based on Medvedev’s limited time in office, and it is still not clear the extent to which Putin may remain in control, it is apparent that military reform needs to remain at the top of the agenda in Russia. Although the president and his generals are still arm-wrestling over who will determine the outcome, what lies ahead will certainly pave the way for the next generation of military professionals. Russia’s war with Georgia may be Medvedev’s defining moment. It is time for change and Russia needs to shape the future of its defense posture by endorsing a new military doctrine that transforms its armed forces away from the Soviet legacy. As Russia’s Commander-in-Chief, Putin tried to reassert civilian control over a military that had been allowed to run its own show under Yeltsin. Forcing the old guard on the general staff to reform and adapt to some extent, Putin still did not succeed in this important step. Now it is up to Medvedev. Simply stated, the military must be subordinate to and mindful of guidance from the defense minister and the president. The obligation to offer professional advice should not extend to dangerous opportunism. Anything else is tantamount to allowing the generals to call the shots themselves, something that should be repugnant to Russia’s leadership, unacceptable to Russia’s international partners, and at odds with Russia’s future.

Appendices

The five appendices that follow represent a full set of Russia’s national security documents from 1993 to the present time. Many of these documents can be found in various versions and most are available today on Russian government web sites. It is difficult, however, to find all of them in one place and it is especially valuable to be able to see them together for the sake of comparison. The documents contained in these appendices have been translated from the original Russian by the Open Source Center (formerly the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, or FBIS). All translations have been edited and proofed by the author for accuracy and readability. In each case, the text has been verified by means of reference with the original sources on Russian government web sites. Any errors are not intentional and are the sole responsibility of the author.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Appendix A

Russian Military Doctrine, November 1993

“The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” represents a document that was examined at sessions of the Russian Federation Security Council held on 3 and 6 October 1993. The Council approved the final document at its 2 November 1993 session, and it was adopted by presidential edict No. 1833 on the same day. The document consists of an introduction and three sections: the political foundations, the military foundations, and the military-technical and economic foundations of the military doctrine, and conclusion. Translations are from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original (in the Russian language) was examined for accuracy (access to documents obtained at the official Russian Ministry of Defense web site ru.mil). In a few cases, the translation quoted herein has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation.

1  Introduction The “Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” are an integral part of the security concept of the Russian Federation and constitute a document of the transitional period, the period of establishing Russian statehood, implementing democratic reforms, and shaping a new system of international relations. They constitute a system of views officially adopted in the state on the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, on military organizational development, on the country’s defense preparation, on the organization of countermeasures to threats to the state’s military security, and on the utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops for the defense of the Russian Federation’s vitally important interests. The Russian Federation’s vitally important interests in no way impinge upon the security of other states and they are secured within the framework of equitable and mutually beneficial interstate relations. The implementation of the provisions of the military doctrine is achieved by means of coordinated measures of a political, economic, legal, and military nature with the participation of all  ������������������� Presidential Edict ���������������������������������������������������������� #1833 (Yeltsin). “Osnovnyye Polozheniya Voyennoy Doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 18 November 1993, 1, 4.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

194

organs of state power and administration, public organizations, and citizens of the Russian Federation.

2  Political Basis of the Military Doctrine This section: • • • •

expounds the Russian Federation’s attitude to armed conflicts and the utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops; defines the basic sources of military danger: contains the political principles and basic guidelines for the sociopolitical support to the Russian Federation’s military security; formulates the state’s tasks in the sphere of ensuring military security.

2.1.  The Russian Federation’s Attitude to Armed Conflicts and the Utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and Other Troops At the contemporary stage of development of the international situation when confrontation generated by ideological antagonism is being overcome, partnership and all-around cooperation are expanding, confidence in the military sphere is strengthening, and nuclear and conventional armaments are being reduced politicaldiplomatic, international legal, economic, and other nonmilitary methods and collective actions by the world community regarding threats to peace, violations of peace, and acts of aggression assume paramount importance in preventing wars and armed conflicts. Ensuring the Russian Federation’s military security and its vitally important interests depends first and foremost: • •

in the domestic policy sphere on resolving economic, political, and social problems and successfully implementing reforms; in the foreign policy sphere on the state of relations with the surrounding world, primarily with our immediate neighbors and the leading powers.

Proceeding from this premise, the Russian Federation: •

• •

is committed to the principles of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, noninterference in their internal affairs, inviolability of state borders and other universally recognized principles of international law; regards no state as its enemy; will not employ its Armed Forces or other troops against any state other than for individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack is made on the Russian Federation, its citizens, territory, Armed Forces, other troops,

Appendix A





195

or its allies. cooperates in the efforts of the world community and various collective security organs in preventing wars and armed conflicts and maintaining or restoring peace; participates in the further development of international law and in the drafting, adoption, and implementation by all countries of a range of effective measures to prevent wars and armed conflicts.

The aim of the Russian Federation’s policy in the sphere of nuclear weapons is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by deterring the launching of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. The Russian Federation: •







will not employ its nuclear weapons against any state-party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, dated I July 1968, which does not possess nuclear weapons except in the cases of: (a) an armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces, other troops, or its allies by any state which is connected by an alliance agreement with a state that does possess nuclear weapons; (b) joint actions by such a state with a state possessing nuclear weapons in the carrying out or in support of any invasion or armed attack upon the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces, other troops, or its allies; actively advocates the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and promotes the establishment of dialogue on this question with the ultimate goal of achieving a comprehensive ban; seeks the reduction of nuclear forces to a minimal level which would guarantee the prevention of large-scale war and the maintenance of strategic stability and, in the future, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; takes, jointly with other interested countries, the requisite measures to strengthen the regime governing the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and render it universal in nature.

The Russian Federation’s policy regarding other types of weapons of mass destruction consists of: •





promoting the full implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction and the maximum expansion of the parties to it; ensuring compliance with the regime of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction; preventing the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction and the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, storage, or proliferation of means, materials, and technologies which help create these weapons;

Russian Civil-Military Relations

196



maintaining readiness to counter effectively the consequences of the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction and providing guarantees of the security of citizens, society, and state.

The Russian Federation ensures its military security by means of all the means at its disposal with priority accorded to political, diplomatic, and other peaceful means. In this context, the Russian Federation deems it necessary to possess Armed Forces and other troops and to employ them for the following purposes: •





protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and other vitally important interests of the Russian Federation in the event of aggression launched against it or its allies; the conduct of peace-keeping operations by decision of the UN Security Council or in accordance with the Russian Federation’s international commitments; the termination of armed conflicts and any unlawful armed violence on the state border or the border of another state in accordance with treaty commitments, or within the bounds of the territory of the Russian Federation that threaten its vitally important interests.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops are employed in accordance with the Constitution, the laws, and other normative acts of the Russian Federation. The utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops in support of individual groups of people, parties, or public associations is not permitted. The document provides a classification of the basic sources of military danger. In this regard it is stressed that the immediate threat of direct aggression being launched against the Russian Federation has considerably declined in contemporary conditions. At the same time the danger of war does remain. Social, political, territorial, religious, national-ethnic, and other conflicts and the desire of a number of states and political forces to resolve them by means of armed struggle constitute the main reasons for its persistence and for the emergence of armed conflicts and wars. Armed conflicts which arise on the basis of aggressive nationalism and religious intolerance pose a special danger. The existing and potential sources of external military danger for the Russian Federation are: • • •



the territorial claims of other states on the Russian Federation and its allies; existing and potential local wars and armed conflicts, particularly those in the immediate vicinity of the Russian borders; the possibility of the use (including the unsanctioned use) of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction which a number of states have in service; the proliferation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction,

Appendix A



• • • • •

197

their delivery systems, and the latest military production techniques in conjunction with the attempts by certain countries, organizations, and terrorist groups to realize their military and political aspirations; the possibility of strategic stability being undermined as a result of the violation of international accords in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction and of the qualitative and quantitative buildup of armaments by other countries; attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of and destabilize the internal political situation in the Russian Federation; the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states; attacks on military installations of the Russian Federation Armed Forces sited on the territory of foreign states; the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation’s military security; international terrorism.

The document then goes on to identify factors which help transform a military danger into an immediate military threat to the Russian Federation: •









the buildup of groupings of troops (forces) on the borders of the Russian Federation to the point where they disrupt the prevailing correlation of forces; attacks on facilities and installations on the state border of the Russian Federation and on the borders of its allies and the launching of border conflicts and armed provocations; the training of armed formations and groups on the territory of other states which are intended to be transferred to the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies; the actions of other countries which hinder the functioning of Russian systems for the support of the strategic nuclear forces and of state and military command and control of, above all, their space component; the introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states of the Russian Federation (if this is not connected with measures to restore or maintain peace in accordance with a decision of the UN Security Council or a regional organ of collective security with the agreement of the Russian Federation).

The main internal sources of military threats which the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops may be used to counter are regarded in the document as: •

illegal activity by nationalist, separatist, or other organizations which is aimed at destabilizing the situation in the Russian Federation or violating its territorial integrity and which is carried out using armed violence;

Russian Civil-Military Relations

198

• • • • •



attempts to overthrow the constitutional system by force or to disrupt the functioning of organs of state power and administration; attacks on nuclear power, chemical, or biological production facilities or other potentially dangerous facilities; the creation of illegal armed formations; the growth of organized crime or contraband activity on a scale threatening the security of citizens and society; attacks on arsenals, weapons stores, enterprises producing arms or military or specialized equipment or property, or organizations, establishments, or structures possessing authorized weapons with a viewing to capturing them; the illegal distribution on the territory of the Russian Federation of weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other means for carrying out sabotage or terrorist acts, and also the unlawful circulation of narcotics.

Additional factors increasing the degree of threat to the military security of the Russian Federation are the fact that a number of sectors of the state border of the Russian Federation have not been properly determined in treaty form and the settlement of the legal status of the presence of Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops outside its borders is incomplete. The document determines the following basic guidelines for safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation: •



• •



• •

the maintenance of the qualitative state of the Armed Forces and other troops and their combat readiness and combat capability at a level guaranteeing the reliable protection of Russia’s vitally important interests; the development of a system of bilateral and multilateral accords among states on renouncing power politics and precluding the use or threat of military force; the inclusion of the Russian Federation in collective security structures or the establishment of relations of cooperation with such structures; the improvement of existing international mechanisms for monitoring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles and the creation of such new effective mechanisms; the creation of the conditions for the indefinite operation of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and also the adoption of measures to expand the number of parties to this treaty and also to include in the arrangements for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction all states possessing the potential to develop them; the promotion of the multilateralization of talks on nuclear disarmament; the establishment of dialogue between states possessing nuclear weapons on problems of nuclear tests with a view to cutting them to the minimum necessary for the maintenance of nuclear safety but precluding he improvement of nuclear weapons, and with a view to their eventual

Appendix A









• •

199

complete prohibition; the broadening of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, including the exchange of information of a military nature on a mutual basis and the coordination of military doctrines and military organizational development plans with allies and partners; the prevention of damage to the security of the Russian Federation as a result of the violation of previously achieved accords in the field of the limitation and reduction of nuclear and conventional arms; the consistent implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990 and the promotion of the inclusion of states in Asia and other regions of the world in the process of the limitation and reduction of conventional armed forces and arms; the activization of dialogue on the preparation and adoption of effective international accords in the field of the reduction of naval forces and arms and the limitation of naval activity; the settlement of the status of Russian troops and military bases and facilities on the territory of other states on the basis of interstate agreements; the development of mutually advantageous cooperation with foreign states in the military field, first and foremost with the states belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the states of Central and East Europe.

Basic Principles of Russian Federation Policy in the Field of Military Security: • • •







the safeguarding of the security of the Russian Federation without detriment to the security of other countries or universal security; the maintenance of stability in regions adjoining the borders of the Russian Federation, neighboring countries, and the world as a whole; the matching of the organizational development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops to the political objectives and economic potential of the country and to the course of reforms; the observance of international commitments and the promotion of the achievement of the objectives of the treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party; the effective utilization of international mechanisms to maintain the arrangements for trading in weapons and military technologies without detriment to the security of the Russian Federation and the world community; the interdiction of supplies of arms and military equipment which could exacerbate a crisis situation, undermine regional stability, or violate an embargo or other relevant international accords to which the Russian Federation is a party;

Russian Civil-Military Relations

200

In the matter of maintaining international peace and security and preventing wars and armed conflicts the Russian Federation regards as partners all states whose policies do not harm its interests and do not contravene the UN Charter, and will cooperate: •





within the Commonwealth of Independent States with its members in resolving problems of collective defense and security and agreeing military policy and defense organizational development. This dimension of cooperation is the priority for the Russian Federation; at the regional level with the countries party to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and also other states and military-political structures in adjoining regions with existing and emerging collective security systems; on a global scale with all member-states of the United Nations, first and foremost within the framework of the UN Security Council, on the basis of the principles and norms of international law.

The nature, conditions, and forms of the Russian Federation’s participation in peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations and other international organizations are determined by the legislation of the Russian Federation and international commitments and agreements, including within the framework of the CIS. 2.2.  Basic Directions for Sociopolitical Support for the Military Security of the Russian Federation: • • •

• • • • • •

the creation and improvement of the legal foundations of the safeguarding of the military security of the Russian Federation; the improvement of a military policymaking mechanism ensuring state control over the adoption and fulfillment of military-political decisions; the ensuring of the requisite manning of troops (forces) taking account of demographic factors and opportunities for service under contract and the utilization of civilian personnel and female service personnel; the ensuring of the social protection of servicemen and members of their families and also of people discharged from military service; the implementation of a package of state measures to raise the prestige of military service; the creation and improvement of a system of military-patriotic upbringing and pre-draft training; the shaping in citizens of moral and psychological readiness to protect the fatherland; the creation and improvement of a system for the upbringing of Armed Forces servicemen and other troops; cooperation between military command and control organs and state organs

Appendix A

• • •

201

and social and religious organizations; the prohibition, in accordance with legislation, of activity in the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops by political parties, organizations, and associations and also of the propagandization of violence and war; the provision of information for Armed Forces servicemen and other troops of the Russian Federation, and openness in relations with the public and the mass media.

The state performs the following tasks in order to safeguard military security: In peacetime: •





• •



the maintenance of the country’s defense potential at an adequate level to meet existing and potential military threats and taking account of the country’s economic potential and the availability of manpower resources; the qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces and other troops, the ensuring of their combat and mobilization readiness guaranteeing the country’s military security; the priority allocation of appropriations for the most promising scientific and technological defense developments in terms of safeguarding the security and developing the economy of the country; the rational conversion of military production; the ensuring of the readiness of organs of state administration and the economy of the country to mobilize men, equipment, and weapons for preventing wars and armed conflict and ensuring the reliable protection of the state border and, in period of threat and wartime, to perform the tasks of defense and security; the suppression of possible provocations and encroachments on the security of citizens, the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and other vitally important interests of the Russian Federation.

In a period of threat and with the commencement of war (armed conflict): •





the timely declaration of a state of war, the introduction of a state of emergency or martial law in the country or in individual areas with the simultaneous bringing of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops (or part thereof) to the requisite degrees of combat readiness, the adoption of decisions, and issuing of orders for the preparation and implementation of specific operations; the mobilization of the necessary men, equipment, and weapons for repulsing the aggressor, the conducting of political, economic, armed, and other means of struggle to prevent aggression, repulse an attack, and defeat an aggressor; the coordination of the efforts of all organs of power and administration

Russian Civil-Military Relations

202





and public organizations and the country’s population to repulse aggression and inflict the kind of damage on the enemy that will force him to renounce further combat operations on terms which accord with the interests of the Russian Federation; the fulfillment of the international commitments of the Russian Federation to provide military aid to countries allied with it and participate in peacekeeping operations; the provision of support for actions by the UN Security Council and other international organizations to maintain or restore international peace and security at the earliest possible stage in the development of a threatening situation or conflict.

The supreme organs of state power and administration of the Russian Federation, organs of state power and administration of all components of the Federation, and organs of local self-government bear, within the bounds of the duties and powers defined by the Constitution and legislation of the Russian Federation, full responsibility for the ensuring of military security, the state of the country’s defense capability, the combat and mobilization readiness and combat capability of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops. All activity to perform the tasks of ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation is organized, controlled, and coordinated by the president of the Russian Federation He heads the Russian Federation Security Council the constitutional organ which prepares the decisions of the Russian Federation president in the field of safeguarding the security of citizens, society, and state.

3  Military Foundations of the Military Doctrine This section examines: • • •

the foundations for the use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, the missions of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops and the organization of their command and control; the main objectives, principles, and tasks of the organizational development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops.

3.1  Foundations for the Use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and Other Troops In conditions where the threat of world war (both nuclear and conventional) is considerably reduced, even if not entirely eliminated, the main danger to stability and peace is posed by local wars and armed conflicts. The likelihood of their arising in certain regions is growing.

Appendix A

203

Military operations in armed conflicts and local wars may be conducted by peacetime groupings of troops (forces) stationed in the conflict zone. Where necessary they will be reinforced via the partial deployment and redeployment of men, equipment, and weapons from other sectors (regions). The main objective of the use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops in armed conflicts and local wars is to localize a seat of tension and terminate military operations at the earliest possible stage in the interests of creating preconditions for the settlement of the conflict by peaceful means on conditions which accord with the interests of the Russian Federation. Military operations in armed conflicts and local wars may be characterized by: •

• •

the broad range of forces enlisted to conduct the armed struggle, from irregular enemy formations and limited troop contingents on the part of the Russian Federation to operational-strategic groupings of troops (forces) on both sides; the use of various means and forms of conducting military operations on a tactical and operational scale; the use of the entire available arsenal of means of armed violence, from light small arms to state-of-the-art arms and military hardware, including high-precision weapons systems of the combatant sides.

Armed conflicts and local wars can in certain conditions escalate into a large-scale war. Deliberate actions by the aggressor which aim to destroy or disrupt the operation of the strategic nuclear forces, the early-warning system, nuclear power and atomic and chemical industry installations may be factors which increase the danger of a war using conventional weapons systems escalating into a nuclear war. The document contains the thesis that any, including limited, use of nuclear weapons in a war by even one side may provoke the massive use of nuclear weapons and have catastrophic consequences. Internal armed conflicts, which threaten the vitally important interests of the Russian Federation and may be used as an excuse for other states’ intervention in its internal affairs, pose a considerable danger. The aim of using the troops and forces enlisted for the localization and suppression of such conflicts is to most speedily normalize the situation, restore legality and law and order, safeguard public security, provide the population with the necessary aid, and create conditions for the settlement of conflicts by political means.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

204

3.2  The Missions of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and Other Troops and the Organization of Their Command and Control In order to prevent wars and armed conflicts and ensure the deterrence of potential aggressors from unleashing any wars which threaten the interests of the Russian Federation, its Armed Forces are assigned the following tasks: •









the prompt identification, jointly with the manpower and resources of the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, of an impending armed attack or a threatening development in the situation and the warning of the state’s supreme leadership thereof; the maintenance of the composition and status of the strategic nuclear forces at a level ensuring guaranteed intended damage to the aggressor in any conditions of the situation; the maintenance of the combat potential of peacetime general-purpose groupings of troops (forces) at a level ensuring that aggression on a local (regional) scale is repulsed; the ensuring, within the framework of the state measures to switch the country from a peacetime to a wartime footing, of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and other troops; the protection of the state border in the air and underwater.

The performance of the aforementioned and other tasks is carried out by the Armed Forces in close cooperation with other troops of the Russian Federation, whereby the Border Guard Troops are assigned the protection of the state border on land, sea, rivers, lakes, and other reservoirs, the Internal Troops are assigned the protection of important state facilities and the suppression of particularly dangerous offenses, sabotage, or terrorist acts. The Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops are utilized in accordance with the Constitution and existing legislation of the Russian Federation, the Geneva Conventions on the Defense of Victims of War of 12 August 1949, and other international law commitments of the Russian Federation applied in a period of armed conflict. Overall leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops is exercised by the president of the Russian Federation, the supreme Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Constitution and existing legislation of the Russian Federation. The Council of Ministers/Government of the Russian Federation bears responsibility for the state of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops. Direct leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces is exercised by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Appendix A

205

The main organ for the operational leadership of the Armed Forces is the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Direct leadership of other troops is exercised by the corresponding commanders (chiefs) in accordance with existing legislation. In the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies the Russian Federation Armed Forces are assigned the following missions: • •



the repulsing of enemy attacks from air, land, or sea; inflicting destruction on the enemy and the creation of conditions for the cessation of military operations at the earliest possible stage and the conclusion of peace on terms which accord with the interests of the Russian Federation; the conduct of military operations jointly with the armed forces of allied states in accordance with the international commitments of the Russian Federation.

When participating in peacekeeping operations carried out by decision of the UN Security Council or in accordance with the inter national commitments of the Russian Federation, the contingents of its Armed Forces may be assigned the following main tasks: • • •

the separation of the conflicting sides’ armed groupings; the ensuring of deliveries of humanitarian aid to the civilian population and their evacuation from the conflict zone; the blockading of the conflict area with a view to ensuring the implementation of sanctions adopted by the international community.

The performance of these and other possible tasks should be aimed at creating conditions which ensure the political settlement of the armed conflict. When performing the above operations in regions adjacent to the Russian Federation, the Border Guard Troops, and internal affairs organs and Internal Troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs within the confines of the Russian Federation state border may perform the task of safeguarding the passage and return of peacekeeping forces. The Russian Federation bears responsibility for the material/technical supply, instruction, training, planning, and operational command of the Russian contingents in accordance with UN standards and procedures and agreements thereon within the CSCE and the CIS. To this end the Russian Federation Armed Forces use the experience accumulated in this field by other countries and international organizations and carry out military maneuvers, staff exercises, and exchange visits and information. In order to prevent and suppress internal conflicts and other actions using means of armed violence on the territory of the Russian Federation, which threaten its territorial integrity and the other interests of society and Russia’s citizens, internal

Russian Civil-Military Relations

206

affairs organs and Internal Troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs are assigned the following tasks: • • • • • •

the ensuring of the protection of public order and the maintenance of the legal regime of the state of emergency in the conflict zone; the localization and blockading of the conflict area; the suppression of armed clashes and the separation of the conflicting parties; the implementation of measures to disarm and eliminate illegal armed forces and confiscate weapons from the population in the conflict area; the strengthening of the protection of public order and security in areas adjoining the conflict area; the implementation of operational-investigative and enquiry measures in the interests of eliminating the threat to internal security, and also the performance of other tasks envisaged by existing legislation.

Individual formations of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops may be enlisted to aid internal affairs organs and the Internal Troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs in localizing and blockading the conflict region, suppressing armed clashes, and separating the conflicting sides, and also in defending strategically important installations in accordance with the procedure prescribed by existing legislation. The Border Guard Troops, securing the state border, help law enforcement organs in the struggle against organized crime, terrorism, and the smuggling of weapons and narcotics, and in preventing internal armed conflicts from extending beyond the confines of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation Armed Forces may be assigned missions of assisting the Border Guard Troops in guarding the state border of the Russian Federation and helping other forces in guarding maritime lines of communications and important state installations and economic zones, and in combating terrorism, illegal traffic of drugs, and piracy. The tasks of other troops of the Russian Federation enlisted in defense are determined in accordance with existing legislation. The men, equipment, and weapons of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops may be enlisted to help the population eliminate the consequences of accidents, catastrophes, and natural disasters. 3.3  The Main Objectives, Principles, and Tasks of the Organizational Development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and Other Troops The main objective of the organizational development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops is to create and develop troops (forces) capable of defending the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country, the security of the citizens, and the other vitally important interests of society and

Appendix A

207

state in line with the military-political and strategic situation in the world and the real potential of the Russian Federation. The main principles of the organizational development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops: •



• •

• •

• •

subordination of organs of military command and control and officials to the supreme organs of state power and the Council of Ministers/Government of the Russian Federation; the observance of general civil political rights and freedoms and the social protection of servicemen in accordance with the specific nature of military service; the centralization of military leadership and one-man command on a legal basis; the matching of the organizational structure, combat strength, and numerical strength of the troops (forces) with their assigned missions and the legislation, international commitments, and economic potential of the Russian Federation; the ensuring of the high level of professionalism of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops; the ensuring of potential to build up the combat might of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops in keeping with the increase in the military threat, and the timely buildup and preparation of a mobilization reserve; the calculation of the country’s geopolitical and geostrategic position; the use of national and world experience of military organizational development.

The organizational and other development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops are carried out in line with the concepts for their organizational development in accordance with coordinated and agreed programs and plans. The main efforts in the organizational development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces are concentrated on performing the following tasks: Through 1996: • • • •



the creation of groups of troops (forces) on the territory of the Russian Federation in accordance with their mission and tasks; the improvement of the troops’ branch structure; the completion of the withdrawal back to Russian territory of formations and units stationed outside Russia; the continuation of the switch to the mixed system of manpower acquisition, which combines voluntary service, under contract, with service based on drafting citizens for military service on the exterritorial principle; the reduction in the numerical strength of the Armed Forces to the established level.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

208

In the period 1996-2000: •

the completion of the reorganization of the Armed Forces structure, the switch to the mixed system of manpower acquisition, and the creation of groupings of troops (forces) and a military infrastructure on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The priority is the development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops intended for deterrence against aggression as well as the mobile forces of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops able to redeploy within a short period and to mount and conduct maneuver operations in any sector (any region) where a threat to the security of the Russian Federation may arise. The interests of the security of the Russian Federation and other states belonging to the CIS may require troops (forces) and resources to be deployed outside the territory of the Russian Federation and mixed troop formations to be set up manned by servicemen of the Commonwealth states, generally on a contract basis. The terms of this deployment and manning are determined by the corresponding international legal documents. The troops (forces) of the Russian Federation may be outside its territory within joint with the troops (forces) of other states or Russian groupings and individual bases (installations). Regardless of the terms of deployment, Russian military formations on the territory of various states are part of the Armed Forces and when performing their assigned missions, act in accordance with the procedure prescribed for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, taking into account bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. The Russian Federation Armed Forces must be trained to regroup within minimal timeframes to areas under threat and for active operations, both defensive and offensive, in any scenario where armed conflicts and wars are unleashed and conducted, and amid the massive use of modern and future weapons. Training must address the forms, methods, and means of conducting combat operations which best accord with the prevailing situation and ensure that the initiative is seized and the aggressor defeated must be chosen. The men, equipment, and weapons of other troops are trained to perform the missions which are assigned to them by existing legislation in peacetime and wartime. Particular significance here is attached to: •

• • •

the ensuring of the stable functioning of intelligence, command, and communications systems and the winning and maintenance of superiority in various spheres; the isolation of the aggressor’s incursionary groups of troops (forces); a flexible combination of delivery of fire and troop mobile actions; close cooperation between branches, combat arms, and the special troops of the Armed Forces, the coordination of plans for the use of the Armed

Appendix A



209

Forces and other troops in armed conflicts and wars and in performing joint missions; the destruction of command control installations of the enemy’s troops and weapons.

4  Military-Technical and Economic Foundations of Military Doctrine The following are examined in this section: • • •

the aims and asks of military-technical support for the military security of the Russian Federation; the basic directions of development of the defense-industrial potential of the Russian Federation; military-technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and foreign countries.

4.1  Aims and Tasks of Military-Technical Support for the Military Security of the Russian Federation The main aim of military-technical support for the military security of the Russian Federation is the prompt supply and material provision for the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops of efficient weapons systems, military and special hardware, and other equipment in quantities necessary and sufficient for the guaranteed protection of the vitally important interests of society and the state. The basic ways of achieving this aim are: •







the creation of the best possible system of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment ensuring the enhancement of combat efficiency by means of qualitative indicators and based on plans for the organizational development and operational use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops; the supplying of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops with efficient models of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment and provision for their everyday maintenance; the application of the latest scientific and technical achievements, advanced technologies, and progressive materials in conducting scientific-research and experimental design work for the preferential creation of new generations of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment, and the maximum use of mathematical models for the assessment of their combat efficiency before starting series production; the ensuring of the production and mobilization capacities needed by industry for the output of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

210

The principles of satisfying the requirements of the Armed Forces and other troops in terms of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment are: • • • •



correspondence between the level of technical supplies and the requirements of ensuring military security; consideration for the state’s scientific, technical, and economic potential; the maintenance of the system of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment in a state of operational readiness; the anticipatory operational, scientific, technical, and economic justification of the requirements for weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment, and also the overall requirements of these, taking into consideration the long-term financing of research, development, and production; the concentration of financial and material-technical resources for priority spheres of the military-technical supplying of the Armed Forces and other troops.

The basic directions of military-technical support for military security and the rational use of the defense-industrial potential are: •















the development and implementation of long-term weapons and military hardware programs (up to 10-15 years) and the state defense order financed by the state; the structural restructuring of industry, ensuring the military-technical and economic independence of the Russian Federation in the conditions of transition to a market economy; the improvement of the system of state management of the development and production of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment in conditions of changing forms of ownership; the introduction of a system of financial-economic regulators and mechanisms aimed at ensuring all types of resources for defense orders, as well as the creation of an economic interest for enterprises under various forms of ownership to conduct work to create and manufacture weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment; anticipatory compensation for the possible negative consequences of any reduction in the volume of military developments and the manufacture of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment; the guaranteed provision of financial and material and technical resources for work to create weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment; the introduction of the contract and competitive principle in the system of orders and the development and manufacture of military output and military-purpose output; the organization of scientific-research and experimental design work of

Appendix A

• •

• • •

211

competitive technologies and advanced technologies to replace imported ones, including dual-use technologies; the constant exchange of dual-use technologies and their joint utilization, with the interests of the state and the producers taken into account; the optimization of the system of orders for scientific/ technical output, the list of supplied models of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment, and their unitization and standardization; the implementation of a credit-financial policy ensuring the implementation of the defense order; the maintenance of the pace of the rearming of troops to meet the requirements of reliably ensuring military security; the planned modernization of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment.

Priorities of military-technical support for the military security of the Russian Federation: •





• •

the preferential development of fundamental and applied research and experimental-design developments making it possible to react effectively to emerging military threats and military-technical breakthroughs; the development and production of highly efficient systems for the command and control of troops and weapons, communications, intelligence, strategic warning, electronic warfare, and precision, mobile, nonnuclear weapons, as well as systems for their information support; the maintenance of the entire complex of strategic weapons at a level ensuring the security of the Russian Federation and its allies, strategic stability, and deterrence of nuclear and conventional wars, as well as nuclear security; the enhancement of the individual level of technical equipment providing servicemen’s means of warfare, communications, and protection; the improvement of the ergonomic features of weapons and military hardware in the “man-machine” systems.

The supplying of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops with weapons and military hardware is ensured by the defense-industrial potential formed by the Russian Federation Council of Ministers/Government. Its material base is made up of enterprises (organizations) which carry out research, development, production, warranty inspection, and the salvaging of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment. 4.2  Basic Avenues of Development of the Defense-industrial Potential: •

ensuring the level of fundamental, basic, and applied research, advanced scientific, technical, and technological developments, the development

Russian Civil-Military Relations

212







of the scientific-experimental, testing, and production base of enterprises (organizations) which would guarantee the implementation of the state defense order; the rational balanced development of the defense-industrial potential and its infrastructure, taking into consideration the requirements of ensuring the country’s military security, the implementation of the program for the conversion of military production, and the efficient functioning of the economy as a whole; the creation and development of capacities for the production and repair of weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment necessary for ensuring the full cycle of the production of their basic types; the elaboration and implementation of a package of measures to ensure the mobilization readiness of the economy and the creation of state mobilization reserves.

4.3  Military-Technical Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and Foreign Countries In the organization of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries, the Russian Federation proceeds from the need to ensure its military-political and economic interests in a balanced way. Military-technical cooperation is the state’s prerogative and is structured on the basis of Russian legislation and interstate agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party. Military-technical cooperation includes the following: •

• • • •

supplies to foreign countries and the export and import of weapons and military hardware, military technologies, and the results of scientific and technical activity in the military sphere; sending military advisers and specialists on official trips; conducting commissioned and joint scientific-research and experimental design work to create new models of weapons and military hardware; giving technical assistance in the creation of military facilities and defense industry enterprises; carrying out other work and services of a military-technical nature.

The Russian Federation is giving priority significance to the restoration and expansion on a mutually advantageous basis of cooperation ties between enterprises forming the defense-industrial potential and sectoral scientific research institutions of CIS member states. The aims of military-technical cooperation are: • •

strengthening the Russian Federation’s military-political positions in various regions in the world; earning foreign currency for state requirements, the development of

Appendix A

• •



213

conversion, military production, the dismantling and salvaging of weapons, and the structural restructuring of enterprises in the defense sectors of industry; maintaining the country’s export potential in the sphere of conventional weapons and military hardware at the necessary level; developing the scientific, technical, and experimental base of the defense sectors of industry and their scientific-research and experimental design work institutions and organizations; providing social protection for the personnel of enterprises, institutions, and organizations developing and producing weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment.

5  Conclusion The Russian Federation guarantees the implementation of the basic provisions of the military doctrine. It is strictly observing the UN Charter and universally recognized international law norms and principles and will continue to do so. The “Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine” determine the strictly defensive orientation of activity to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, enshrine the Russian Federation’s commitment to the aims of averting wars and armed conflicts, their elimination from the life of humankind, universal disarmament, the elimination of military blocs, and affirm its determination to strive for the materialization of the ideals of humanism, democracy, social progress, and universal security and peace. The “Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine,” as a constituent component of the overall concept of security, which determines ways and means of ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation in the transitional period of its development, will be supplemented, adjusted, and improved as Russian statehood is established and a new system of international relations is formed.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Appendix B

Russian National Security Policy, December 1997

The “Russian Federation National Security Policy” represents a document that was examined and approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and signed into law by presidential edict No. 1300 dated 17 December 1997. The Russian Federation National Security Policy is a political document reflecting the aggregate of officially accepted views regarding goals and state strategy in the sphere of ensuring the security of the individual, society, and the state from external and internal threats of a political, economic, social, military, man-made, ecological, informational, or other nature in the light of existing resources and potential. The document formulates key directions and principles of state policy. It is the basis for the elaboration of specific programs and organizational documents in the sphere of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation. Translations, by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-SOV-97364, 30 December 1997), are from the original version as it appeared in the Russian language newspaper, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, on 26 December 1997, pages 4-5. In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original (in the Russian language) was examined for accuracy (access to documents obtained at the official Russian Ministry of Defense web site ru.mil). In a few cases, the translation quoted herein has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation.

I  Russia Within the World Community At present the situation in the international arena is characterized primarily by the strengthening of trends toward the formation of a multi-polar world. This is manifested in the strengthening of the economic and political positions of a considerable number of states and their integration-oriented associations and in the improvement of mechanisms for multilateral control of international political, economic, financial, and informational processes. While military force factors retain their significance in international relations, economic, political, scientific   Presidential Edict #1300 (Yeltsin). Official source: “Kontseptsiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsiy,” [Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 17 Dekabrya 1997 g. No. 1300] available at the official Russian government web site, accessed online in August 2005 at .

216

Russian Civil-Military Relations

and technical, ecological, and informational factors are playing an increasing role. At the same time international competition to secure natural, technological, and informational resources and markets is intensifying. The formation of a multi-polar world will be a lengthy process. Relapses into attempts to create a structure of international relations based on one-sided solutions of the key problems of world politics, including solutions based on military force, are still strong at the present stage of this process. The growing gap between developed and developing countries will also affect the pace of and directions in the formation of a new structure of international relations. The present period in the development of international relations opens up for the Russian Federation new opportunities to ensure its security, but entails a number of threats connected with the change in Russia’s status within the world and the difficulties in carrying out internal reforms. The preconditions for demilitarizing international relations and strengthening the role of law in settling disputed interstate problems have been created and the danger of direct aggression against the Russian Federation has decreased. All this opens up fundamentally new opportunities to mobilize resources to solve the country’s internal problems. There are prospects of broader integration of the Russian Federation with the world economy, including international credit and financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. A trend toward increased cooperation between Russia and a number of CIS member states has emerged. There has been an expansion in the commonality of Russia’s interests with many states on problems of international security such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, settling and preventing regional conflicts, countering international terrorism and the drugs business, and solving acute global ecological problems, including nuclear and radiation security. This significantly increases the opportunity to ensure Russia’s national security by nonmilitary means, by means of legal treaty, political, economic, and other measures. At the same time Russia’s influence on resolving cardinal questions of international life which affect our state’s interests has decreased significantly. In these conditions the desire of a number of states to weaken Russia’s positions in the political, economic, and military spheres has increased. The process of creating a model of general and all-embracing security for Europe on the basis of principles advanced in many respects on Russia’s initiative entails considerable difficulties. The prospect of NATO expansion to the East is unacceptable to Russia since it represents a threat to its national security. Multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace and security at both the global (United Nations) and regional (OSCE, CIS) levels are still insufficiently effective, which limits our potential when using such mechanisms to ensure Russia’s national security

Appendix B

217

interests by political and legal means. Russia is in a certain degree of isolation from the integration processes under way in the Asian and Pacific region. All this is unacceptable to it as an influential European-Asian power with national interests in Europe, the Near East, Central and South Asia, and the Asian and Pacific region. The positive trends in the internal development of the state and society are still not stable enough. The main reason for this is the preservation of crisis phenomena in the Russian economy. Production has declined and its structure has deteriorated in comparison with the pre-reform period. Investment and innovation activity is declining. Russia is lagging increasingly far behind developed countries in terms of science and technology. Dependence on imports of food, consumer goods, equipment, and technologies is increasing. The external and internal state debt is growing. There is an exodus of skilled personnel from the sphere of material production and from the scientific sphere. The number of man-made emergencies is increasing. The property stratification of society is increasing, and the living standards of much of the population are declining. The level of crime and corruption is still high. The country’s economic, scientific, and demographic potential is declining. The markets and raw material infrastructure of Russian industry have shrunk. Despite the unprecedented increase in the share of GNP accounted for by foreign trade, Russia’s integration with the world market often takes place on terms that are not to our country’s advantage. Social accord has not been achieved, and the process of establishing a unifying national idea that defines not only the philosophical basis but also the long-term goals of the development of multinational Russian society and the main ways and means of achieving them has not been completed. The former defense system has been disrupted, and the creation of a new one is proceeding slowly. Long unprotected sections of the Russian Federation state border have appeared. At the same time Russia has all the preconditions for maintaining and consolidating its position as a power capable of ensuring its people’s prosperity and playing an important role in world processes. Russia possesses a considerable economic and scientific and technical potential which determines the country’s capacity for stable development. It occupies a unique strategic position on the Eurasian continent and possesses considerable reserves of raw materials and resources. The main institutions of democratic statehood and a mixed economy have been established in the country. Measures are being taken to stabilize the economy and create the preconditions for production growth on the basis of the structural restructuring of industry. Russia is one of the biggest multinational states and has an age-old history and culture and its own national interests and traditions. All these factors, bearing in mind that the Russian Federation has a powerful nuclear force potential, create the preconditions for ensuring reliable national security for the country in the 21st century.

218

Russian Civil-Military Relations

II  Russia’s National Interests Russia’s national interests are based on the national assets and national values of the Russian Federation’s peoples and are ensured by the potential of the economy, the political and military organization of the state, and the spiritual-moral and intellectual potential of the multinational Russian society. The system of Russia’s national interests is determined by the aggregate of the basic interests of the individual, society, and the state: Individual At the present stage the interests of the individual consist in the real safeguarding of constitutional rights and freedoms and personal security, in improved quality of life and living standards, and in physical, spiritual, and intellectual development. Society The interests of society include the consolidation of democracy, the attainment and maintenance of social accord, the enhancement of the population’s creative activeness, and the spiritual renaissance of Russia. State The interests of the state lie in protection of the constitutional system, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, the establishment of political, economic, and social stability, the unconditional implementation of laws and the maintenance of law and order, and the development of international cooperation on the basis of partnership. The aggregate of the basic interests of the individual, society, and the state determines Russia’s national interests in the sphere of the economy, in the domestic political, international, defense, and informational spheres, and in the social sphere, spiritual life, and culture. Economy Russia’s national interests in the economic sphere are crucial. A comprehensive solution of the problems connected with implementing Russia’s national interests is possible only on the basis of the stable functioning of multi-sectoral hightechnology production capable of providing leading sectors of the economy with good- quality raw materials and equipment, the Army with armaments, the population and the social sphere with consumer goods and services, and foreign trade with competitive export goods. An exceptionally important factor is the ability of the economy to provide all citizens with worthy living conditions and a worthy quality of life and with the

Appendix B

219

opportunity for them to realize their creative efforts, spiritual needs, and material requirements. Poverty as a social phenomenon must be excluded from the life of Russian society. We must ensure a worthy life for veterans, invalids, and old people, and also access for the whole population to education, culture, medical services, transportation, communications, and municipal services. From the viewpoint of national interests the most urgent task in the sphere of the economy is to ensure its expansion, protection of the interests of domestic producers, the enhancement of innovation and investment activity, constant controls over the country’s strategic resources, and the maintenance of a scientific potential capable of asserting Russia’s independence in strategically important spheres of scientific and technical progress. A most important condition for implementing national interests in this sphere is the transition of the economy to a model of stable development with a certain level of state regulation of economic processes which guarantees the stable functioning and development of a mixed economy and ensures the balanced solution of socioeconomic tasks and the problems of conservation of the environment with a view to satisfying the needs of present and future generations. The unity of the economic area and the existence of a large and diverse internal market are a most important national asset for Russia. Its preservation and development in the light of regions’ production specialization are of consolidating importance to the Russian economy. In the foreign economic sphere Russia’s national interests lie in establishing for Russian producers economic ties that ensure the realization of Russian enterprises’ interests and promote the enhanced competitiveness of Russian output, production efficiency, and economic growth. Russia rejects forcible methods in foreign economic activity. Internal Political Sphere In the internal political sphere Russia’s national interests lie in ensuring civil peace, national accord, territorial integrity, unity of the legal area, stability of state power and its institutions, and law and order and in completing the process of establishing a democratic society, and also in neutralizing the factors and conditions promoting the emergence of social and inter-ethnic conflicts and national and regional separatism. The coordination of the interests of the peoples inhabiting the country, the organization of comprehensive cooperation among them, and the implementation of a responsible and balanced state nationalities policy are extremely important tasks whose solution will make it possible to ensure internal political stability and Russia’s unity. The comprehensive resolution of these tasks must form the basis of internal state policy and ensure the development of the Russian Federation as a multinational democratic federative state. The Russian Federation’s national interests in the sphere of the fight against crime and corruption require the consolidation of the efforts of society and the

Russian Civil-Military Relations

220

state, the sharp restriction of the economic and socio-political basis of these illegal phenomena, and the elaboration of a comprehensive system of legal, special, and other measures in order to put an effective stop to crimes and offenses, ensure that the individual, society, and the state are protected from criminal encroachments, and create a system for monitoring the level of crime. The efforts of society and the state should be directed toward forming a system of effective preventive social measures and raising law-abiding citizens. The fight against organized crime, corruption, terrorism, and banditry should be oriented toward preventing and cutting short unlawful actions, ensuring the inevitability of accountability for any crime, and protecting every person’s right to personal safety regardless of nationality, citizenship, religion, views, or convictions. Spiritual Life, Culture, Science National interests in the sphere of spiritual life, culture, and science largely determine the course of reforms and their result. Society’s spiritual rebirth and its moral values directly influence the level of development of the economy and all spheres of life. It is extremely important to establish in society the ideals of a high level of morality and humanism and to develop the centuries-old spiritual traditions of the Motherland. The realization of this [goal] requires a state policy whose implementation rules out the possibility of damaging Russian culture and ensures the preservation and augmentation of its [Russia’s] national values and national assets and the further spiritual and intellectual development of society. International The Russian Federation’s national interests in the international sphere require the implementation of an active foreign policy course aimed at consolidating Russia’s positions as a great power one of the influential centers of the developing multipolar world. The main components of this course are: • • • •

the formation on a voluntary basis of an integration-oriented association of CIS member states; the development of equal partnership with the other great powers the centers of economic and military might; the development of international cooperation in combating transnational crime and terrorism; the strengthening of those mechanisms of collective management of world political and economic processes in which Russia plays an important role, and first and foremost the strengthening of the UN Security Council.

Appendix B

221

An undoubted priority in Russia’s foreign policy course is and will remain activities to ensure the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of the state and to protect its constitutional system against possible encroachments by other states. The realization of Russia’s national interests in the international sphere is largely determined by the nature of relations with the leading powers and integration-oriented associations of the world community. The development of equal partnership relations with them accords with the Russian Federation’s status and its foreign policy interests and is intended to strengthen global and regional security and create favorable conditions for our country’s participation in world trade and in cooperation in the scientific-technical and credit and financial spheres. It accords with Russia’s national interests to develop dialogue and all-around cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, America, the Near East, West Asia, Africa, and the Asian- Pacific region. Russia’s national interests in the international sphere also include the protection of the life, dignity, and internationally recognized civil rights and freedoms of citizens of Russia and our compatriots abroad. Defense Russia’s national interests in the defense sphere lie primarily in ensuring the security of the individual, society, and the state against military aggression by other states. The safeguarding of security in the defense sphere requires the efforts of society and the state to be concentrated on systematic military organizational development. The existing military organization is burdensome to the state. It must be reformed in the course of military organizational development, which should take account of the changed balance of forces in the world arena and make effective use of the state’s economic potential to ensure an appropriate response to military threats to the Russian Federation’s national interests. Information Russia’s national interests in the information sphere are determined by the need to concentrate the efforts of society and the state on carrying out such tasks as the observance of citizens’ constitutional rights and freedoms in the sphere of obtaining and exchanging information; the protection of national spiritual values; the propagandization of the national cultural heritage, ethical norms, and public morality; the safeguarding of citizens’ right to receive reliable information; and the development of modern telecommunications technologies. Systematic activity by the state to perform these tasks will enable the Russian Federation to become one of the centers of world development in the 21st century. At the same time the use of information to manipulate the mass consciousness is impermissible. The

222

Russian Civil-Military Relations

state’s information assets must be protected against leaks of important political, economic, scientific-technical, and military information. Russia’s national interests are long-term in nature and they define the main objectives on its historical path, shape the strategic and current tasks of the state’s domestic and foreign policy, and are realized through the system of state administration. A necessary condition of the realization of Russia’s national interests is the ability to resolve domestic political, economic, and social tasks independently, irrespective of the intentions and positions of foreign states and communities of states, and to maintain a standard of living for the population such as to ensure national accord and socio-political stability in the country.

III  Threats to the National Security of the Russian Federation A geopolitical and international situation that is new to Russia, negative processes in the country’s economy, the deterioration in inter-ethnic relations, and the social polarization of Russian society create a direct threat to the country’s national security. Economy The critical state of the economy is the main cause of the emergence of a threat to the Russian Federation’s national security. This is manifested in the substantial reduction in production, the decline in investment and innovation, the destruction of scientific and technical potential, the stagnation of the agrarian sector, the disarray of the monetary and payments system, the reduction in the income side of the federal budget, and the growth of the state debt. An undoubted threat is posed by the increase in the share of the fuel and raw materials sector and the formation of an economic model based on the exportation of fuel and raw materials and the importation of equipment, food, and consumer goods, which could lead to the conquest of Russia’s internal market by foreign firms. These threatening phenomena are characterized by an increase in the exportation from Russia of foreign currency reserves and strategically important raw materials along with extremely inefficient or criminal utilization of the profits, an increase in the exodus of skilled personnel and intellectual property from Russia, uncontrolled outflow of capital, growth in the country’s dependence on foreign producers of high-tech equipment, underdeveloped financial, organizational, and information support for Russian exports, and an irrational structure of imports. The decline in the country’s scientific and technical potential leads to Russia’s loss of its leading positions in the world, a fall in the quality of research in strategically important areas of scientific-technical progress, the decay of high-tech production facilities, a decline in the technical standard of physical production, an increase in the probability of man-made disasters, Russia’s becoming technologically

Appendix B

223

dependent on the leading Western countries, and the undermining of the state’s defense potential, and makes it hard to achieve a radical modernization of the national technological base. A particular threat is created by the low level of large-scale investment in the Russian economy. The economic revival of Russia is impossible without major capital investments in the strategic spheres of the economy. A threat to Russia’s security in the social sphere, in consequence of the critical condition of the economy, is posed by the increase in the proportion of the population living below the poverty line, the stratification of society into a small group of rich citizens and the vast bulk of poorly-off citizens, and the escalation of social tension. The growth of negative phenomena in the social sphere leads to a reduction in Russia’s intellectual and production potential, a decline in population numbers, and the depletion of the main sources of spiritual and economic development, and could lead to the loss of democratic gains. The formulation of a national social program is necessary in order to eliminate this threat. The threat posed by the depletion of natural resources and the deterioration of the environmental situation in the country is directly dependent on the level of economic development and society’s readiness to recognize the global nature and importance of these problems. This threat is particularly great for Russia because of the preferential development of the fuel and energy sectors of industry, the underdeveloped legislative basis for nature conservation measures and their high resource-intensiveness, the absence or limited use of environmentally sound technologies, and the low level of environmental awareness. There is an increasing trend toward the use of Russia’s territory as a burial place for environmentally dangerous materials and substances and toward the positioning of harmful production facilities on Russian territory. The slackening of state oversight and the absence of effective legal and economic mechanisms for the prevention of emergencies and elimination of their consequences increase the risk of man-made disasters in all spheres of economic activity. The negative processes in the economy exacerbate the centrifugal tendencies of Russian Federation components and lead to the growth of the threat of violation of the country’s territorial integrity and the unity of its legal area. Inter-ethnic Relations The ethnic egotism, ethnocentrism, and chauvinism that are displayed in the activities of a number of ethnic social formations help to increase national separatism and create favorable conditions for the emergence of conflicts in this sphere. Apart from increasing political instability, this leads to the weakening of Russia’s single economic area and its most important components manufacturing, technological, and transportation links, and the financial, banking, credit, and tax systems.

224

Russian Civil-Military Relations

The factors intensifying the threat of the growth of nationalism and national and regional separatism include mass migration and the uncontrolled reproduction of human resources in a number of regions of the country. The main reasons for this are the consequences of the USSR’s breakup into national-territorial formations, the failures of nationalities policy and economic policy both in Russia and in the CIS states, and the spread and escalation of conflict situations based on national and ethnic grounds. Other factors are the deliberate and purposeful interference by foreign states and international organizations in the internal life of Russia’s peoples, and the weakening of the role of Russian as the state language of the Russian Federation. The adoption by Russian Federation components of normative legal acts and decisions that are at variance with the Russian Federation Constitution and federal legislation is becoming an increasingly dangerous factor eroding the single legal area of the country. Social Polarization The continuing violation of Russia’s single spiritual area, economic disintegration, and social differentiation provoke the escalation of tension in relations between the regions and the center, thereby constituting a patent threat to the federal structure of the Russian Federation. The threat of criminalization of the social relations that are taking shape in the process of the reform of the socio-political system and economic activity takes on a particular urgency. The mistakes made in the initial stage of the implementation of reforms in the economic, military, law-enforcement, and other spheres of state activity, the weakening of the system of state regulation and control, the imperfect legal base and the absence of a strong state social policy, and the lowering of the spiritual and moral standard of society are objective factors helping to preserve crime and corruption. The consequences of these errors are manifested in the weakening of legal monitoring of the situation in the country, the fusion of the executive and legislative branches with criminal structures, and their penetration into the sphere of management of the banking business, major production facilities, trade organizations, and commodity production networks. The criminal world has in essence thrown down a challenge to the state, entering into open competition with it. Therefore the fight against crime and corruption is not only legal, but also political in nature. As a result of the large-scale, often conflict-ridden division of property and the aggravation of the struggle for power on the basis of group, political-ideological, and ethno-nationalist interests, the threat of terrorism is increasing. The weakness of preventive measures for averting criminal phenomena, legal nihilism, and the outflow of skilled cadres from the organs for safeguarding law and order are increasing the degree of this threat’s impact on society.

Appendix B

225

The threat to the nation’s physical health is perturbing. Its sources lie in virtually all spheres of the state’s life and activity and are manifested most graphically in the critical state of the systems for health care and the population’s social protection and in the rapid rise in the consumption of alcohol and narcotics. The consequences of this profound systemic crisis are the drastic reduction in the birth rate and average life expectancy, the deterioration in people’s health, the distortion of the demographic and social composition of society, the undermining of manpower resources as the basis for the development of production, and the weakening of the fundamental cell of society the family. This development of demographic processes is causing a reduction in society’s spiritual, moral, and creative potential. International Threats to the Russian Federation’s national security in the international sphere are manifested via the attempts of other states to counter Russia’s consolidation as an influential center of the multi-polar world that is taking shape. This is reflected in actions aimed at destroying the Russian Federation’s territorial integrity, including actions involving the use of inter-ethnic, religious, and other internal contradictions, and also in territorial claims involving allusions in individual cases to the lack of the precise registration of state borders in treaties. By their policy these states are seeking to reduce the Russian Federation’s importance in the solution of key problems of the world community and in the activity of international organizations. As a whole this could lead to the limitation of Russia’s influence, the infringement of its most important national interests, and the weakening of its positions in Europe, the Near East, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia. The threat of the emergence or aggravation in the CIS states of political, ethnic, and economic crises capable of delaying or destroying the integration process is acquiring special importance for our state. These countries’ establishment as friendly, independent, stable, and democratic countries is extremely important to the Russian Federation. Defense Despite the positive changes in the world, threats to the Russian Federation’s national security remain in the defense sphere. Considering the profound changes in the nature of the Russian Federation’s relations with other leading powers, it can be concluded that the threat of large-scale aggression against Russia is virtually absent in the foreseeable future. At the same time we cannot rule out attempts at power rivalry with Russia. The most real threat to Russia in the defense sphere is posed by existing and potential hotbeds of local wars and armed conflicts close to its state border.

226

Russian Civil-Military Relations

The proliferation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and the technologies for their production and means of delivery poses a serious threat, primarily in countries adjacent to Russia or regions close to it. At the same time the spectrum of threats connected with international terrorism, including with the possible use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, is expanding. The conservation or creation by major powers (and their coalitions) of powerful groupings of armed forces in regions adjacent to Russia’s territory remains a threat to Russia’s national security in the defense sphere. Even when there are no aggressive intentions with regard to Russia, these groupings present a potential military danger. NATO’s expansion to the East and its transformation into a dominant militarypolitical force in Europe create the threat of a new split in the continent which would be extremely dangerous given the preservation in Europe of mobile strike groupings of troops and nuclear weapons and also the inadequate effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace. The technological upsurge of a number of leading world powers and the buildup of their potential for creating new-generation arms and military equipment could lead to a qualitatively new stage in the development of the arms race. Threats to the Russian Federation’s national security in the defense sphere also lie in the incomplete nature of the process of the reform of the state’s military organization, the continuing gulf between political aims and their implementation in military and military-technical policy, inadequate financing for national defense, the lack of elaboration of modern approaches toward military organizational development, and the imperfection of its normative legal base. At the present stage this is manifested in the extremely acute nature of social problems in the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops and military formations and organs, the critically low level of operational and combat training of the troops (forces) and staffs, the intolerable decline in the level of provision of the troops (forces) with modern and promising types of weapons and military equipment and in general in the reduction of the state’s potential for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s security. A trend has emerged toward the buildup of the threat of foreign intelligence services’ agent and operational-technical penetration of Russia. The organs of state power, political parties and other public associations, banks and other credit organizations, industrial enterprises, scientific research organizations, and the mass media are becoming targets for their activity. The results of this activity could be the intensification of resistance toward the course chosen by Russia, the undermining of its economy through involvement in unprofitable trade and economic deals, irrational military-technical cooperation, the development of scientific research and experimental design work in unpromising fields, Russia’s involvement in regional conflicts, and the destabilization of the domestic political situation in the country.

Appendix B

227

An analysis of the threats to the Russian Federation’s national security shows that the main ones right now and in the foreseeable future do not have a military orientation and are of a predominantly internal nature and are concentrated in the domestic political, economic, social, environmental, information, and spiritual spheres. The development of qualitatively new relations with the world’s leading states and the virtual absence of the threat of large-scale aggression against Russia while its nuclear deterrent potential is preserved make it possible to redistribute the resources of the state and society to resolve acute domestic problems on a priority basis.

IV  Safeguarding the Russian Federation’s National Security Safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security through joint targeted activity by state and public institutions and also by citizens taking part in the detection and prevention of various threats to the security of the individual, society, and the state and in their countering is a binding and essential condition for the effective defense of Russia’s national interests. The main avenues of the activity of the state and society in safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security are: • •





the objective and comprehensive analysis and forecasting of threats to national security in all spheres of their manifestation; the definition of criteria of national security and their threshold values and the elaboration of a package of measures and mechanisms for safeguarding national security in the spheres of economic, foreign, and domestic policy, public security and law and order, defense, and the information and other spheres; the organization of the work of the legislative (representative) and executive organs of state power of the Russian Federation in implementing a package of measures aimed at averting or weakening the threat to national interests; the maintenance of the state’s strategic and mobilization resources at the necessary level.

The main aim of safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security is the creation and maintenance of an economic, political, international, and militarystrategic position for the country which creates favorable conditions for the development of the individual, society, and state and rules out the danger of the weakening of the Russian Federation’s role and importance as a subject of international law and the undermining of the state’s ability to implement its national interests in the international arena.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

228

The most important tasks for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security are: • •

• •



the boosting of the country’s economy and the pursuit of an independent and socially oriented economic course; the improvement of Russian Federation legislation, the consolidation of law and order and the socio-political stability of society, Russian statehood, federalism, and local self-management; the formation of harmonious inter-ethnic relations; the safeguarding of Russia’s international security through the establishment of equal partnership with the world’s leading states; the consolidation of the state’s security in the defense and information spheres; the safeguarding of the population’s vital activity in a technogenically safe and environmentally clean world.

The basic principles for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security are: •



• •



the observance of the Russian Federation Constitution and Russian Federation legislation while implementing activity to safeguard national security; the unity, interconnection, and balance of all types of security and the alteration of their priority depending on the situation; the priority of political, economic, and information measures to safeguard national security; the feasibility (considering available resources, forces, and facilities) of the proposed tasks; the observance of norms of international law and Russian laws when implementing measures of an enforced nature (including those involving the use of military forces); the combination of centralized management of forces and facilities for safeguarding security with the transfer of some of the powers in this field, in accordance with Russia’s federative structure, to the organs of state power of the Russian Federation components and the organs of local selfmanagement.

The safeguarding of Russia’s security and the protection of its national interests in the economic sphere are the main content of the state’s policy aimed at boosting the economy and implementing an independent and socially oriented economic course. Economy The main avenues for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security in the state’s domestic economic activity are legal backup for the reforms and

Appendix B

229

the creation of an active mechanism for monitoring the observance of Russian Federation legislation and the adoption and implementation of the necessary measures to overcome the consequences of the economic crisis, to preserve and develop the scientific and technical and production potential, to switch to economic growth while reducing the level of man-made disasters, and to improve the competitiveness of industrial output and boost the people’s welfare. The transition to a highly effective and socially oriented market economy should be implemented as a gradual process of formation of optimum mechanisms for organizing the production and distribution of the social product with a view to the maximum possible growth of the welfare of society and every citizen. Here tasks like the elimination of distortions in the structure of the Russian economy and the overcoming of the progressive reduction in the production of highly processed output, and support for sectors which are the basis for expanded reproduction and for the safeguarding of the population’s employment are advanced to the fore. For that it is essential to step up state support for investment and innovatory activity, to take steps to facilitate access for enterprises to long-term credits for financing capital investments, and to exercise real state support for targeted programs for the structural restructuring of industry. The most important tasks in the field of ensuring economic security are the preferential development of competitive sectors and production facilities and the steady expansion of the market for high-technology output. To that end steps should be taken encouraging the transfer of new military technologies to civilian production and a mechanism should be introduced to uncover and support the assimilation of progressive technologies whose development will ensure the competitiveness of Russian enterprises on the world market. This presupposes the concentration of financial and material resources along priority avenues for the development of science and technology, support for leading scientific schools, incentives to attract private capital on the basis of organizing funds and utilizing grants, the implementation of programs for the development of territories with a high concentration of scientific and technical potential, the creation with state support of infrastructures ensuring the commercialization of the results of scientific research studies with simultaneous protection of intellectual property within the country and abroad, and the development of a universally accessible network of scientific, technical, and commercial information. The state promotes the establishment and development of private enterprise in all spheres where this might help the growth of social prosperity, creates equal conditions for economic competition between enterprises in all forms of ownership, and ensures protection of consumer rights, an adequate level of social guarantees, conditions for progress in science and education and for society’s spiritual and moral development, and the effective operation of mechanisms of market selforganization. It is necessary to introduce certain restrictions on the activity of foreign banking and insurance companies and on the transfer of deposits of non-renewable natural

230

Russian Civil-Military Relations

resources, telecommunications, and transportation and commodity-carrying networks for exploitation by foreign enterprises. Foreign companies must not be allowed to establish control over strategically important sectors of the economy, the defense industry, or natural monopolies. It is necessary to elaborate and implement targeted programs for the economic upsurge of depressed regions and to introduce preferential conditions for economic activity, including preferential rates for transportation and communications services ensuring the unity of the country’s economic area. In conditions of foreign trade liberalization, it is necessary to protect the interests of the country’s producers in the foreign market. The state must decisively strive to eliminate discriminatory restrictions on the importation of Russian products into developed countries in the West, and it must not allow the imposition of any political decisions on Russia which might inflict economic or moral damage on its citizens and enterprises. The creation of favorable conditions for the Russian economy’s international integration and for the expansion of markets for Russian products constitutes an important task in the sphere of foreign trade activity. It is necessary to advance further along the path of forming a single economic area with CIS member countries and to dismantle the trade barriers erected in the way of cooperation with former CEMA countries. Effective measures must be adopted in the sphere of foreign currency regulation with a view to creating the conditions to stop settlements in foreign currency in the domestic market and preventing the uncontrolled exportation of capital. For this purpose, and in parallel with ensuring macro-economic stabilization, it is necessary to form an effective system of foreign currency control and oversight to ensure compliance with Russian Federation legislation in foreign economic activity. In the international financial sphere it is necessary to pursue a balanced credit and finance policy aimed at the stage-by-stage reduction of Russia’s dependence on credit borrowing and at the consolidation of its positions in international financial and economic organizations. Improve Legislations, etc. It is fundamentally important to recognize the priority of economic factors in the social sphere as the most important conditions for strengthening the state, ensuring the real fulfillment of social guarantees on the basis of state support, and developing mechanisms for collective responsibility, democratic decision-making, and social partnership. The most important task in this process is to pursue a socially fair and economically efficient incomes distribution policy. The organization of the work of federal organs of executive power and the organs of executive power in Russian Federation components to implement specific measures aimed at preventing and overcoming the threats to Russia’s national interests in the economic sphere also requires further improvement of

Appendix B

231

Russian Federation legislation and the ensuring of strict compliance with it by all economically active bodies. The strengthening of society’s socio-political stability is a most important factor for achieving efficiency in the measures undertaken by the state to ensure the Russian Federation’s national security. The basis of this stability must be, in addition to economic upsurge, public accord regarding the ways to consolidate federalism and strengthen inter-ethnic relations in the country. The idea of national and social accord, expressed through private, public, corporate, national and social interests, will create additional conditions for forming a socially oriented market economy, will become a most powerful instrument for struggle against nationalism and ethnic and regional separatism, and will promote society’s consolidation in the interests of Russia’s development. The strengthening of the unity and solidarity of peoples in multi-ethnic Russia provides the basis for the education of its citizens and must become a most important principle for the development of social relations and the country’s modern culture. The implementation of the idea of national and social accord will enable our country to enter the new age as a power which has achieved economic and spiritual progress and enjoys a high growth potential based on democratic principles of state structure, internal harmony of social relations, and responsibility for the maintenance of global stability and stable development of pan-human civilization. The strengthening of Russian statehood and the improvement and development of federalism and local self-government are most important tasks whose solution will lead to the ensuring of the Russian Federation’s national security. The main objective in this sphere is to elaborate and implement a comprehensive approach toward the solution of legal, economic, social, and ethno political problems while ensuring that the interests of the Russian Federation and its components are observed. The implementation of the constitutional principle of people’s power, under which the multiethnic people exercise their power both directly and through organs of state power and organs of local self- government, requires the ensuring of coordinated functioning and collaboration by all organs of state power, a rigid vertical structure of executive power, and unity of Russia’s judicial system. This is ensured through the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, the introduction of a more clear-cut functional distribution of powers among state institutions, and the strengthening of Russia’s federal structure by improving its treaty relations with Russian Federation components within the framework of their constitutional status. The strengthening of Russian statehood presupposes the enhancement of the state’s role in the basic spheres of social life, the improvement of Russian Federation legislation as the universal basis of state activity in the conditions of building a rule-of-law state, the ensuring of the supremacy of the Russian Federation Constitution and federal laws over other legal acts, the formation and

Russian Civil-Military Relations

232

development of organizational and legal mechanisms to prevent breaches of the laws, and the adoption and execution of state decisions in crisis situations. The building of a rule-of-law state depends largely on the correct definition and clarification of the extent of the responsibilities and powers of organs of state power, the specific categories and status of promulgated normative legal acts, the procedure for their amendment or repeal, the improvement of the mechanism and procedures for mutual relations between state and society, and the procedure for taking into account the interests of Russian Federation components. The protection of Russian federalism includes purposeful activity to block any encroachments on the country’s state integrity, the system of organs of state power, and the unity of Russia’s legal area. The main objective of the protection of Russian federalism is to prevent the transformation of federal relations into confederal ones. The main avenues for the protection of Russian federalism are: • • • •



ensuring the supremacy of federal legislation and, on this basis, improving the legislation of Russian Federation components; elaborating organizational and legal mechanisms to protect the state integrity, the unity of the legal area, and the national interests of Russia; developing and implementing a regional policy which ensures the best possible way of taking federal and regional interests into account; improving the mechanism for preventing the emergence of political parties and public associations pursuing separatist and anti-constitutional objectives and for blocking their activity; pursuing a considered and balanced nationalities policy.

The efforts of society and the state in the struggle against crime must be aimed at creating an effective counteraction system to ensure reliable protection of the interests of the individual, society, and the state. The following tasks are paramount: •

• •

to enhance the state’s role as guarantor of national security and to create the legal basis necessary for this purpose and the mechanism for its application; to strengthen the system of law enforcement organs; to involve state organs, within the limits of their powers, in activity to prevent illegal actions.

Glasnost is the most important condition for a successful struggle against all manifestations of crime. Society is entitled to know about the decisions and measures adopted by organs of state power in this sphere.   Referring to transparency of government, as opposed to Gorbachev’s 1980s initiative.

Appendix B

233

They must be open, specific, and comprehensible to all citizens, they must be preventive, they must ensure the equality of all before the law and the inevitability of punishment, and they must rely on society’s support. In order to prevent and combat crime, it is primarily necessary to develop the legal infrastructure as the basis of the reliable protection of citizens’ rights and legitimate interests, as well as to observe Russia’s international law commitments in the sphere of the struggle against crime and protection of human rights. It is important to deprive crime of the breeding ground created as a result of shortcomings in legislation and the crisis in the economy and the social sphere. It is necessary to make more active use of the methods of operational and investigative activity to eliminate the corrupt links of organized crime. With a view to preventing corruption in the state apparatus and eliminating the conditions for legitimizing capital accumulated by criminal means, it is necessary to create an effective system of financial monitoring and inspecting the property status, sources of income, and expenditures of officials and other state employees. The struggle against terrorism, drug trafficking, and smuggling is an important component of ensuring both the Russian Federation’s national security and the security of the world community as a whole. The crisis situation in society and the economy, the existence of contradictions in interstate and inter-confessional relations, and the flaws in the normative legal base which regulates disputed international and regional problems all this promotes the emergence of these types of criminal activity on Russian Federation territory and dictates the need to elaborate a special package of countermeasures. The struggle against terrorism, drug trafficking, and smuggling all of which are evolving into a global international phenomenon must be waged by using the potential of all branches of state power on the basis of broad cooperation between Russian Federation services and their counterparts in other countries at interstate level. The main factor in successfully countering these categories of crime is the elimination of the causes which engender them. Cultural, Spiritual, Moral The ensuring of the Russian Federation’s national security also includes the protection of the cultural, spiritual, and moral heritage and the historical traditions and norms of social life. Russia needs to ensure the safety of its great cultural wealth, and specifically the museum and archive stocks, the main library collections, and historical and cultural monuments. Special attention must be given to the use of the mass media in propagandizing the work experience of creative and teacher training schools, cultural and ethnic centers, communities, unions, and other institutions, including institutions for children, adolescents, young people, and students, as well as to propagandizing the ethnic cultures of Russia’s peoples and the spiritual, moral, and historical traditions and norms of social life.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

234

A most important role in the preservation of traditional spiritual values is played by the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church and the churches of other confessions. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the destructive role played by sundry religious sects which inflict considerable damage on Russian society’s spiritual life and pose a direct threat to the life and health of Russia’s citizens, and are often used as cover for illegal activities. Society’s spiritual rebirth is impossible without enhancing the role of the Russian language. Its proclamation as state language and the language of international contacts between the peoples of Russia and of CIS member states is a most important factor for unifying the people of multi-ethnic Russia. With a view to ensuring the preservation and development of our cultural and spiritual heritage, it is necessary to create the best possible economic conditions for pursuing the most important categories of creative activity. The ensuring of the Russian Federation’s national security in the sphere of protecting and improving the health of citizens presupposes greater attention by society and by legislative (representative) and executive organs of state power in the Russian Federation to the development of state (federal and municipal) social and private medical services, the pursuit of state protectionism for the country’s medical and pharmaceutical industries, and priority funding for health care and federal programs in the spheres of public health and epidemiology, children’s health care, emergency medical services, and disaster medicine. Environment The ensuring of the Russian Federation’s national security in the ecological sphere is becoming a priority avenue in the activity of the state and society. The priority avenues in the sphere of ensuring ecological security include: •

• • •

struggle against pollution of the environment by enhancing the safety level of technologies involving the burial and recycling of toxic industrial and domestic waste; struggle against radioactive pollution; creation of ecologically clean technologies; rational utilization of natural resources.

Since the solution of ecological security problems demands considerable funding, it is necessary to ensure stable finances, the sources of which must be provided by budgets at all levels. In order to enhance the effectiveness of environmental protection activity, there is a need for urgent measures including the adoption of legislative acts ensuring the legal basis of ecological security, organizational and administrative measures aimed at improving the management of environmental protection activity in the country, and the implementation of ecological feasibility studies for all programs and projects elaborated at federal and regional level.

Appendix B

235

Foreign Policy The pursuit of a foreign policy aimed at asserting equal partnership between world community countries and at stepping up their cooperation is a most important component in ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security. Russia does not intend to enter into confrontation with any state or alliance of states whatsoever, nor does it pursue hegemonic or expansionist goals. As an influential Eurasian power, it will support relations of partnership with all interested world community countries. The Russian Federation’s foreign policy gives priority to ensuring the most important national interests, developing Russia’s relations with leading states in the world, comprehensive cooperation and integration within the CIS framework, organizing effective bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Union of Belarus and Russia and with the parties to the Treaty Between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on the Deepening of Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Spheres. The deepening and development of relations with CIS member states is a most important factor promoting the settlement of ethno political and inter-ethnic conflicts, ensuring sociopolitical stability along Russia’s borders, and ultimately preventing centrifugal phenomena within Russia itself. Russia is also interested in fully equal participation in world, European, and Asian economic and political structures. Therefore, in its striving for mutually advantageous cooperation, the Russian Federation will continue to develop constructive partnership with the United States, the EU, China, Japan, India, and other states. This is in line with the Russian Federation’s political and economic interests and will ensure an opportunity for Russia’s full-scale inclusion in all organizations and institutions for collective management of global political processes. The creation of a model for ensuring global, regional, and sub-regional security geared to the 21st century and based on the principles of equality and indivisible security for all must become an absolute condition for the implementation of Russia’s foreign policy efforts. This presupposes the creation of a fundamentally new system of European-Atlantic security in which the OSCE will play a coordinating role; the stepping up of efforts to create multilateral structures ensuring cooperation in the sphere of international security in the Asia-Pacific region and South Asia; Russia’s active participation as permanent member of the UN Security Council in the settlement and prevention of regional crises and conflicts; further improvement of the regime of international arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles; and firm protection of the legitimate rights and interests of Russian citizens living abroad in strict compliance with the norms of international law.

236

Russian Civil-Military Relations

One important avenue for the Russian Federation’s activity to ensure its national security in the foreign policy sphere is to assist in the settlement of regional and local conflicts through peace-keeping activity. In this process it is necessary to make maximum use of collective efforts along this avenue by the CIS, the United Nations, and the OSCE in the long term. Russia will firmly and consistently honor its commitments in the sphere of reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and conventional armaments, will implement measures to strengthen confidence and stability and to ensure international monitoring of deliveries of military technologies and dualpurpose technologies, and will assist in the creation of zones free from weapons of mass destruction. The Russian Federation will also direct its efforts in ensuring national security in the foreign policy sphere into resolving problems of international and economic cooperation, first and foremost from the viewpoint of strengthening its positions in international financial and economic organizations. Defense Ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security in the defense sphere is a most important area of state activity and an object of constant public attention. The main aim of the practical activity of the state and society in this sphere is to improve the military organization of the Russian Federation in order to ensure the potential for an appropriate response to the threats that could arise in the 21st century, in conjunction with rational levels of expenditure on national defense. The nature of these threats requires the clarification of the tasks of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, military formations, and organs, the optimization of their structure and composition, the expansion of their professional nucleus, and the improvement of the legal bases and planning mechanism for military organizational development and the formulation of up-to- date approaches to economic and financial support for it in the light of the need to form a collective security system within the CIS framework. Russia does not seek to maintain parity in arms and armed forces with the leading states of the world, and is oriented toward the implementation of the principle of realistic deterrence, at the basis of which is the determination to make appropriate use of the available military might to avert aggression. In seeking to avert war and armed conflict, the Russian Federation gives preference to political, economic, and other nonmilitary means. However, until the non-use of force becomes the norm in international relations, the Russian Federation’s national interests require the existence of a military might sufficient for its defense. The Russian Federation Armed Forces are the basis of the state’s military organization. They play the main role in safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security by means of force.

Appendix B

237

The most important task for the Russian Federation Armed Forces is to ensure nuclear deterrence in the interests of preventing both nuclear and conventional large-scale or regional wars, and to implement alliance commitments. In order to perform this task the Russian Federation must have nuclear forces with the potential to guarantee the infliction of the required damage on any aggressor state or coalition of states. The protection of the state’s national interests requires comprehensive counteraction of military threats on a regional and local scale. The Russian Federation Armed Forces in their peacetime combat composition should be capable of ensuring the reliable defense of the country against air and space attack and the performance of tasks to rebuff aggression in a local war, and of deploying a grouping of troops (forces) to perform tasks in a regional war. At the same time the Russian Federation Armed Forces must ensure the Russian Federation’s implementation of peace-keeping activity both in its own right and within international organizations. The interests of ensuring Russia’s national security and the evolution of the geopolitical situation in the world predetermine, in certain circumstances, the need for Russia’s military presence in certain strategically important regions of the world. The stationing of limited troop contingents (military bases) there on a treaty basis and on the principles of partnership should demonstrate the Russian Federation’s readiness to fulfill its alliance commitments, promote the formation of a stable military-strategic balance of forces in the regions, and give the Russian Federation the potential to react to a crisis situation at the initial stages of its emergence. The long-term objectives of ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security determine the need for wide participation by Russia in peace-keeping operations. The implementation of such operations should be an important means of preventing or eliminating crisis situations at the stage of their emergence and development. Ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security in the defense sphere requires its participation in the treaty process for nuclear and conventional arms reduction and control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery. A most important area in ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security in the defense sphere is the clarification and optimization of the tasks of the system of ensuring national security. In performing tasks in preventing and countering internal threats to the Russian Federation’s national security, priority belongs to the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation Federal Security Service, and the Russian Federation Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Natural Disasters, which must have the appropriate forces, resources, and organs capable of fulfilling specialized tasks. The restructuring of defense industry potential with minimum losses to [use] new technologies and scientific-technical potential, the amalgamation of companies that develop and manufacture arms and the most important types of

Russian Civil-Military Relations

238

civilian output and the creation of world-standard corporations and firms on their basis, support for and development of research, experimental, and design work, the modernization of arms and military equipment, and the introduction into practice of a system of orders for arms and military equipment that meets today’s needs should be directed toward improving the defense industry complex in the interests of ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security. It is also necessary to improve cooperation in the military-technical sphere, which will give Russia the opportunity to represent its interests on new international markets. The human factor and the social status of the serviceman plays a special role in ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security in the defense sphere. Therefore the tasks that come to the fore are such tasks as the implementation of a range of measures to ensure social protection of servicemen, increase the prestige of military service, and develop public awareness in the spirit of the need for the armed protection of the country’s national interests and the mobilization of the efforts and potential of the state, society, and the citizen for the implementation of military reform. The Russian Federation examines the possibility of using military force to safeguard its national security on the basis of the following principles: •









Russia reserves the right to use all the forces and systems at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, if the unleashing of armed aggression results in a threat to the actual existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state; the utilization of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces must be effected in a decisive, consistent, and planned manner until conditions beneficial to the Russian Federation for the conclusion of peace are created; the utilization of military force must effected on a legal basis and only when all nonmilitary measures for resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective; the utilization of military force against civilians to achieve domestic political objectives is not permitted. At the same time, joint actions by individual formations of the Armed Forces and other troops, troop formations, and organs against illegal armed formations posing a threat to the national interests of the Russian Federation is permitted in accordance with the Russian Federation Constitution and federal laws; the participation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in wars and conflicts of different intensity and scale must be effected in order to resolve priority military-political and military-strategic tasks meeting Russia’s national interests and also its commitments as an ally.

A most important condition for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security in the defense sphere must be the targeted allocation of budget resources

Appendix B

239

for the program-driven development of forces, systems, and organs carrying out the defense of Russia’s national interests by forcible methods. Particular importance for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security is attached to the timely detection of threats and determination of their source. This is achieved by continuous tracking, with the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service playing the coordinating role, of the political, military, economic, informational, technological, social, and other external threats which affect the Russian Federation’s national security and the condition and combat readiness of its Armed Forces and other troops, troop formations, and organs. The significance of counter-intelligence activity in safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security is also growing. Border Russia’s geopolitical situation and the size of its territory are of special significance when resolving tasks linked with safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national interests and security in the sphere of the defense and protection of its state border. This necessitates the pooling of the efforts of all federal organs of executive power, with the Russian Federation Federal Border Service playing the coordinating role. The safeguarding of the Russian Federation’s national interests and security on its state border and in the border area presupposes the improvement of the formalization of the Russian Federation’s state border in international law, the development of interstate border cooperation, and the implementation of collective security measures on the external borders of the CIS member states. Natural Emergencies The increase in number and broadening of the scale of man-made and natural emergencies entailing significant material and human losses, which are often comparable with the losses in armed conflicts, make the problem of safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security in the spheres of nature, human activity, and the environment extremely acute. The qualitative improvement of the unified state system for the prevention and elimination of emergencies and its further integration with the CIS member states’ analogous systems assume special significance in this connection. Information In current conditions of universal computerization and the development of information technology the significance of safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security in the information sphere is growing sharply. The most important tasks here are:

Russian Civil-Military Relations

240

• •







the establishment of the requisite balance between the need for the free exchange of information and permissible restrictions on its dissemination; the improvement of the informational structure, the acceleration of the development of new information technologies and their widespread utilization, and the standardization of systems for the retrieval, collection, storage, processing, and analysis of information taking account of Russia’s becoming part of the global information infrastructure; the formulation of an appropriate statutory legal base and the coordination, with the Federal Government Communications and Information Agency Under the Russian Federation President playing the leading role, of the activity of federal organs of state power and other organs resolving information security tasks; the development of the Russian telecommunications and information systems industry and the priority dissemination of these systems on the domestic market in comparison with foreign counterparts; the protection of state information assets [resources], primarily in federal organs of state power and at defense complex enterprises.

The system for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security is created and developed in accordance with the Russian Federation Constitution, federal laws, Russian Federation presidential edicts and directives, Russian Federation Security Council decisions, Russian Federation Government decrees and directives, and federal programs in this field. The foundation of the system for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security consists of national security organs, forces, and systems implementing measures of a political, legal, organizational, economic, military, and other nature aimed at safeguarding the security of the individual, society, and the state. The powers of organs and forces for the safeguarding of the Russian Federation’s national security and their composition and structure are defined by corresponding Russian Federation federal acts. The creation of organs and forces for the safeguarding of the Russian Federation’s national security which are not prescribed by federal laws, and also the use of unlawful means of safeguarding national security are not permitted. Special significance in safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security is attached to the organization of the system for the preparation and adoption of preemptive decisions to protect the country’s national interests. The following participate in the determination and implementation of national security policy: President The president of the Russian Federation—within the limits of his constitutional powers—exercises leadership of the Russian Federation’s national security organs and forces; authorizes actions to safeguard national security in various spheres;

Appendix B

241

forms, reorganizes, and disbands—in accordance with Russian Federation legislation—subordinate national security organs and forces; and produces messages, appeals, and directives on national security problems; Federal Assembly The Federation Council and State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, on the basis of the Russian Federation Constitution and taking account of the Russian Federation National Security Blueprint they form the legislative base in this sphere, adopts decisions within the limits of their powers on questions of the use of forces and systems for the safeguarding of national security; and examine and adopt federal laws on questions of the ratification and denunciation of the Russian Federation’s international treaties in the field of national security; Federation Government The Russian Federation Government ensures the implementation of the Russian Federation National Security Blueprint and the fulfillment of targeted federal programs, plans, and directives in the field of safeguarding national security; implements measures to provide financial and material resources for the Russian Federation’s national security forces, systems, and organs; and guides the activity of the federal organs of executive power subordinate to it and, within the limits of the powers granted to it, coordinates the activity of Russian Federation components’ organs of executive power; Security Council The Russian Federation Security Council examines strategic problems of Russian Federation domestic, foreign, and military policy, questions of safeguarding security in the economic, social, defense, border, informational, ecological, and other spheres, and questions of the protection of public health, the prediction and prevention of inter-ethnic and social conflicts and emergencies and the elimination of their consequences, and the safeguarding of social accord, legality, and law and order; prepares recommendations and proposals for the formation of the Russian Federation National Security Blueprint and the implementation of strategy and current policy for safeguarding national security; coordinates the activity of the system for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security with respect to formulating strategy in the field of domestic, foreign, and military policy, militarytechnical cooperation, and information security; and monitors the implementation of strategy and current policy in these fields by federal organs of executive power and Russian Federation components’ organs of executive power. The Russian Federation Security Council is responsible to the Russian Federation president for the timely identification of threats to the Russian Federation’s national security and for the preparation of prompt decisions to avert emergencies

242

Russian Civil-Military Relations

and formulate basic guidelines for the strategy for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security; Federal organs of executive power. They ensure the observance of Russian Federation legislation and the fulfillment of decisions of the Russian Federation president, the Russian Federation Government, and the Russian Federation Security Council and of federal programs, plans, and directives in the field of safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security; and, within the limits of their powers, formulate statutory legal acts on the safeguarding of national security and submit them to the Russian Federation Security Council. Federation Components Russian Federation components’ organs of state power cooperate with federal organs of executive power with a view to ensuring observance of Russian Federation legislation and the fulfillment of decisions of the Russian Federation president, the Russian Federation Government, and the Russian Federation Security Council and of federal programs and plans in the field of safeguarding national security; conduct in conjunction with organs of local self-government measures to enlist citizens, public associations, and other organizations to assist in safeguarding national security in accordance with Russian Federation legislation; and submit to federal organs of state power proposals for improving the safeguarding of the Russian Federation’s national security. The Russian Federation president, the Federation Council and State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, the Russian Federation Government, the Russian Federation Security Council, federal organs of state power, Russian Federation components’ organs of state power, and organs of local self-government operate within the limits of their powers and coordinate efforts with a view to safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security. In the event of the emergence of a direct threat to the Russian Federation’s national security the Russian Federation Security Council formulates the necessary proposals for adopting decisions. The Russian Federation intends to resolutely and firmly strengthen its national security on the basis of both historical experience and the positive experience of the country’s democratic development. The legal democratic institutions that have been created, the structure of Russian Federation organs of state power that has become established, and the extensive participation of political parties and public associations in formulating the strategy for safeguarding national security make it possible to safeguard the Russian Federation’s national security and progressive development in the 21st century. As Russia continues to develop and a new system of international relations based on equal partnership is formed and strengthens, individual provisions of the Russian Federation National Security Blueprint will be augmented, clarified, and made concrete in the Russian Federation president’s annual messages to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly.

Appendix C

The World Ocean: Concept Paper for Russia’s Naval Program

The Russian Federation World Ocean Concept represents a document that was examined and approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and signed into law by presidential edict No. 11 dated 11 January 1997. Primarily a scientifically oriented paper, the document notes Russia’s forced curtailment of oceanographic activities, and highlighted the need for restoration of Russia’s formerly primary position in the geostrategic maritime sphere, calling the goal an issue of national importance. Aimed at providing a comprehensive solution to the problem of exploration and effective use of the world’s ocean environments in the interests of economic development and for the national security, the concept suggests specific details about what kind of force the navy should maintain and how it should operate in support of the country’s vital national security interests. In an oft-quoted portion of the document, the principal task of the first phase (1997-2002) would be “to stop the uncontrolled decline, and stabilize the main parameters characterizing activity of Russia in the World Ocean.”

I  General The necessity of the exploration and rational use of World Ocean resources and potential is economically justified. The World Ocean is an additional source of mineral, biological and other resources required for the social and economic development of nations. The Ocean in many respects affects the climate and  �������������������������������� Approved by Presidential Decree #11, ������������������������ January 11, 1997. accessed online in September 2005.  With this document, Russia began, on the state level, to formulate national maritime policy as a longterm, comprehensive, and consistent state policy in the sphere of maritime activity, designed to consolidate Russia’s domestic and international interests in developing and using the resources of the world oceans. Maritime policy, along with the foreign, domestic, social, military, economic, and other policies that are traditionally pursued by a state, emerged as a distinct policy in its own right. The determining factors in the development and adoption of the maritime doctrine were as follows: the importance of the world oceans for sustainable development of the Russian Federation, the necessity to protect the country’s vital national interests, and the need to promote maritime culture in the state and society as a whole. The doctrine highlighted the requirement for naval military forces to ensure Russian primacy in this sphere of activity, hence its impact on the navy.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

244

weather on our planet. Sea communications and transportation systems are the most powerful and developed in the world. Military and strategic importance of the World Ocean stems from: •

• •

Location in it of a considerable part of the strategic nuclear forces of maritime powers. Modern battle fleets equipped with aircraft and long range missile systems are capable of controlling the situation in the World Ocean and considerably affecting military and political stability in the world. Dependence of the world economy on sea communications. Concentration of 75 percent of the world’s industrial potential and population in the 500 km wide coastal zone.

The World Ocean is a very promising region for economic activity on one side, and the most important factor in geopolitics, as well as a region of inevitable rivalry and potential division into spheres of influence. Traditionally, Russia is considered to be one of the great maritime powers that play an important role in the exploration and use of the World Ocean. For the economic and social life of Russia, the World Ocean, and the seas surrounding the country in the first instance, is of paramount importance. There are objective considerations for that: the length of the sea border of Russia is 38,800 km (the length of the land border is 14,500 km); the shelf area is 4.2 million square kilometers, of which 3.9 million square kilometers are prospective for hydrocarbons (at least 80 percent of Russia’s oil and gas reserves are in the shelf of its northern seas); the vital activity of Russia, especially of its coastal regions, depends on uninterrupted operation of the sea transport and the proper support of cargo and passenger traffic. Currently Russia is in a completely new situation in terms of the establishment of the bases for sea policy as well as the realization and protection of its interests in the World Ocean. The crisis in the national economy has seriously deteriorated the opportunities for Russia to keep its presence in the World Ocean at its former level. Forced curtailment of activities in the World Ocean goes without any order, which aggravates the negative consequences of this process, and decreases the efficiency of the use of allocated resources. Restoration of Russia’s position in the World Ocean is a task of national importance. Activities of state, economic, scientific and defense-oriented organizations in exploration and use of the World Ocean shall be performed as an essential part of the integrated national policy in the economy, finance, defense, ecology, science and technology, international relations and utilization of natural resources. Russia’s activities in the World Ocean can considerably affect its competitive power in defense, financial, commercial, scientific and social spheres, since economic activity on the territory of Russia, due to its geographic position and objective natural and climatic factors, with all other conditions equal, calls for significant expenses and investments.

Appendix C

245

To solve these strategic problems, it is necessary to integrate the efforts of various Russian administrations. This task is to be accomplished with the Federal Purpose-Oriented Program “World Ocean” (hereinafter called “World Ocean Program”) aimed at the creation of conditions required to materialize national and geopolitical interests of Russia in the World Ocean.

II  Problem Status The World Ocean is the field of various economic, scientific technical, humanitarian, defense and political activities performed by states and their unions, intentional organizations, and transitional corporations where interests of subjects of sea activity intersect, straining contradictions between them. Principal subjects of sea activity in Russia are: •

• •



Sea economic complex, comprising fisheries, trade navigation, mining of mineral resources on the sea bottom and other types of economic use of the ocean. Scientific and technical complex for exploration of oceans and seas having significant scientific potential and highly qualified personnel. Navy, Federal Frontier Service of the Russian Federation, Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Calamities that provide protection of national interests in the World Ocean. Population of the Arctic and Pacific coasts, including small native nationalities for which the sea is the main source of life support.

Prerequisites for the successful development of each type of sea activity, and preservation of the environment and biologic diversity, are the combined efforts of individuals, society and the state, as well as a new mechanism of inter-industry and interagency co-operation for performing sea activities. In recent years, under conditions of sharp changes in the geopolitical situation and widened inter-industry and regional disproportion, coordination of the efforts of parties involved in sea activity in Russia has been disturbed. •

• •

An analysis of the structural features and the scale of natural resources of the World Ocean, inland seas and territories adjacent to the border leads to the following conclusions: Supply of the Russian economy with natural resources became worse, and certain types of mineral resources are in short supply; There is a threat that this country will lose its leading position in the exploration and rational use of resources of the World Ocean, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation;

Russian Civil-Military Relations

246



The use of conventional and comparatively new sources of natural resources (mineral and raw material, energy and biological) shall be essential for the stable and balanced development of the Russian economy;

Competition for the right to use natural resources unevenly distributed in the World Ocean and its coastal zone results in conflicts between industries, regions and states that can transform potential challenges into threats and conflicts, and thereby affect the security of Russia. Some unique deposits are close to the sea border of the Russian Federation, and natural borders of deposit areas do not coincide with state borders or borders of subjects of the Russian Federation. With the worsened geopolitical and economic situation, the weakened sea component of its geopolitical position, new sea borders, and keen competition between countries for the right to use ocean resources and space, the scale, complexity and importance for Russia of problems associated with activities in the World Ocean require that a program and purpose oriented approach be used for their solution. In compliance with international law and legislative practice, the Russian Federation has sovereign rights to and jurisdiction over main types of activities on the continental shelf and in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation. A justified selection of effective directions for strengthening the sea power of the Russian Federation must provide the harmonized and stable development of this country and contribute to the strengthening of national security.

III  Purpose of the World Ocean Program The World Ocean Program is aimed at a comprehensive solution of the problem of exploration and effective use of the World Ocean in the interests of economic development and provision for the national security of this country. The policy of Russia in this field is directly affected by the level of social and economic development of the country that determines economic priorities of development of various types of sea activity and by the international situation that affects the selection of a strategy for the realization and protection of national interests in the World Ocean. The World Ocean Program shall become a tool to be used to harmonize Federal and regional programs associated with the solution of separate problems of the World Ocean, and direct these programs to the accomplishment of common goals of the state policy stipulating the improvement of the economy and provision of national and geopolitical interests of the country. Implementation of the World Ocean Program shall also: •

make Russia more active in the World Ocean in line with the goals and tasks of the country’s development;

Appendix C

• •

247

direct the activities of Russia in the World Ocean at obtaining specific practical results in the nearest perspective; provide maximum coordination and improve the efficiency of activities undertaken by federal executive bodies and executive bodies of subjects of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean, with material and other resources actually available for them taken into account.

In the process of the development of the World Ocean Program, it will be necessary to specify principal guidelines for Russia’s activities in the World Ocean. They will establish the basis for: • • • • •

realization and safeguarding of the national and geopolitical interests of Russia; social and economic development of coastal regions; stabilization of the sea economic complex; improvements in safety for various types of sea activities; preservation and further development of the scientific and technical potential related to World Ocean problems.

IV  Principal Guidelines for the World Ocean Program and Expected Results from the Implementation of the Program Within the framework of the World Ocean Program, a common harmonized state policy aimed at the consolidation of national and international approaches of Russia to the exploration and use of the World Ocean, and integration of efforts on the development of sea activity shall be formed in each state of the Program implementation on the basis of the proper selection of high-priority sub-programs and concentration of funds allocated for them. To do that, it is necessary to establish a process of continuous and effective harmonization of specific interests, measures and steps that concern relations between the Russian Federation and subjects of the Russian Federation, state and non-state subjects of economic activity, and civil and military structures. Currently this country lacks common mechanisms of such harmonization and interaction. Development of the indicated mechanisms within the framework of the World Ocean Program is one of the most important conditions that will enable Russia to preserve its national interests in the World Ocean. Limited resources and capacities of Russia require that they be concentrated on the most important activities in the World Ocean, in terms of the solution of problems related to the internal development of this country. Moreover, each phase of the Program implementation should provide for scientific research, including fundamental research that would lay the foundation for the implementation of subsequent phases.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

248

Taking into account the variety and complexity of the problems to be solved within the framework of the World Ocean Program, it is appropriate to divide the whole period of tile Program implementation into phases and assign tasks accordingly. In the initial phase, within such guidelines of the Program as “International and legal problems, their political aspect and tactics for upholding interests,” “Military and strategic interests of Russia in the World Ocean,” “Utilization of biological resources of the World Ocean,” and “Transport service lines of Russia in the World Ocean,” the main focus shall be on the following problems: • • • • •

Establishment of the legal base that will provide the materialization of Russia’s rights in the World Ocean; Settlement of disputable points on sea borders with neighboring countries; Strengthening national, regional and global security; Forming a scientific basis for the development of technology and techniques to be used in immediate sea activities; Reaching the justified levels of the supply of the country’s population with fish and other sea foodstuffs, and provision of the necessary freight and passenger traffic.

The subsequent phase of the World Ocean Program provides for the realization of such guidelines as “Research of the World Ocean nature”, “Mineral resources of the World Ocean, Arctic and Antarctic”, “Humanitarian problems”, and “Development and use of the Arctic, and exploration of the Antarctic”. The aims of this phase are: • • • •

Production of mineral raw materials in industrial scales; Adequate supply of the country’s coastal regions with energy; Comprehensive management of the country’s coastal regions; Monitoring and forecasting the weather and climate conditions.

The final phase of the Program comprises “Trade relations and provision of equal opportunities in the world market of goods and technologies”, “Creation of technologies for the development of resources and space of the World Ocean” and “Establishment of the common nation-wide system of information about the situation in the World Ocean”. The final phase shall provide for: • •



The strengthening of the economic position of Russia in the world market of goods and services through intensified activities in the World Ocean; Improvement of the space and functional potential of the nation through tile use of underwater territories of the World Ocean and ocean processes on the basis of novel technologies; Balanced functioning of the nature systems on the Russian territory;

Appendix C



249

Stabilization of economic, environmental and social processes in the country based on the interaction and interdependence of natural and anthropogenic processes in the World Ocean.

To materialize the World Ocean Program, it is necessary to put the whole set of measures into effect in the following fields. 1.  International and Legal Problems, Political Aspect and Tactics for Upholding Interests Problems of the sea space demarcation and, therefore, jurisdiction over resource utilization, nature protection and other types of activities occupy an important place in intrastate relations and to a considerable extent determine the character of these relations since they affect the interests of the parties involved. Russia is the acknowledged sea power that traditionally plays a significant role in the exploration of the World Ocean space and resources. Its activity in this field was and is the sphere of cooperation and contradiction. Recently the problem of upholding the interests of Russia in the World Ocean and the coastal zone has become seriously complicated. New independent states are formed on the territory of the former USSR, and a part of the Russian sea border has the status stipulated by the earlier signed international agreements. Ukraine, Georgia and the Baltic states became independent and new sea borders appeared. However, they are not sealed by international agreements with Russia. Moreover, they feature different degrees of protection and explosion risk. The process of demarcation is still underway with Norway, the USA, and Japan. There are specific problems in relations with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran that result from the fact that the legal status of the Caspian Sea is unsettled. The Caspian is not legally a part of the World Ocean and does not have sea borders for the time being. Changes in the legal regime of the sea space off the Russian coast, the use of this space under new conditions and dynamics of geopolitical processes require from Russia the adequate response to the current situation with the World Ocean. Both currently and in the long-term, of high priority for the provision of Russian interests in the World Ocean are: • • • •

Maintenance of peace and security; Defense of sovereignty, rights and interests of Russia in the appropriate sea space, including the demarcation of the sea space; Protection and preservation of the sea environment in line with international obligations; Development of economic, ecological, legal, and scientific and technical cooperation on the World Ocean problems with other nations and international organizations.

250

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Of the highest importance for the establishment of the legal regime of the sea space is the UN Convention on the Sea Law of 1982 that became effective on November 16, 1994. The Convention was signed but has not yet been ratified by Russia. The UN Convention confirms free navigation in the open sea, the right of passage through straits used for international navigation, free fishing in the open sea and special rights of coastal states to use animate and inanimate resources, and protect and preserve the sea environment. To implement provisions of the UN Convention, an international body on the sea floor was established. As to the tactics of upholding the interests of Russia in the World Ocean, with economic difficulties in this country taken into account, the most important is to further develop the rather close cooperation established in recent decades within the framework of meetings of the six leading sea powers (Russia, the USA, Japan, Germany, France and Great Britain). Although Russia and these countries for a long time may have had differences of opinion on certain military, political and economic aspects of the use of the World Ocean, they are together in striving to get the UN Convention provisions fulfilled by those developing countries that still try to illegally expand their jurisdiction over the World Ocean including economic zones and international straits. It is also appropriate to continue the established regional cooperation with coastal states in the Baltic Sea and the Barents Sea (including a joint use of the Spitsbergen island), in the Bering Sea and the Japan Sea, in the region of the Kuril Islands, in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea (including issues related to the right of passage in Black Sea straits) as well as in the Arctic and Antarctic. During the establishment of the new legal status of the Caspian Sea and the settlement of problems associated with production and transportation of oil and gas, the interests of Russia can be observed only in the active interaction with other interested parties, with Turkmenistan and Iran in particular. Taking into account a wide spectrum of the interests of Russia in the use of the World Ocean, it is essential for Russia to further actively participate in the discussions of these problems at the appropriate international organizations. It is also important to exert influence on the activity of those non-governmental organizations which are often used to sound the attitude of states towards new legal, economic and scientific concepts of tile exploration and use of oceans and seas. The strategy of Russia in the protection of national interests in tile World Ocean must be based on legislation that provides the Russian Federation with the necessary legal basis to exercise its rights and liabilities in the internal and territorial waters, in the exclusive economic zone, on the continental shelf and in the regions beyond the national jurisdiction, with international liabilities taken into account. In the context of international and legal issues, their political aspects, and upholding the interests of Russia, the World Ocean Program shall stipulate:

Appendix C



251

Preparation of recommendations on the use of the sea space and resources that take into account the existing internal and international economic and political conditions, and long-term national and geopolitical interests of Russia, as well as recommendations on the protection of the interests of Russia in the World Ocean regions that are beyond its national jurisdiction;

Assessment of the compliance of the operating Russian sea law with the existing international legal rules, and drafting additional laws concerning navigation and the use of sea resources, if such a necessity arises, with the aim of establishing the integral legal basis; •

Provision of the observance of the established regime of the national sea border, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation.

2.  Trade Relations and Provision of Equal Opportunities in the World Market of Goods and Technologies Overseas transportation is critical for the provision of economic relations of Russia with foreign countries and life support of the northern and far-east regions of this country. The volume of foreign trade carriage by the Russian marine fleet in 1995 amounted to 81.6 million tons, of which 26.2 million tons were transported by oil carriers. Coastal sea transportation of goods to northern and eastern regions of Russia in 1995 amounted to 7 million tons. However, Russia does not fully use the capacities of sea transport for the expansion of foreign economic relations. New advances in forms of trade and cooperation are under slow development. The experience of other countries in the establishment of special and free economic zones that take into account specific features of coastal regions is insufficiently studied and used. By now Russia has lost the best ports (in terms of the climate available technical facilities) in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, which has sharply increased the dependence of Russian foreign trade relations on the servicing of Russian ships at ports located on the territory of newly independent states, former USSR republics. As a matter of fact, in 1995, the share of these ports amounted to 26.6 million tons (about 33 percent of the entire external cargo turnover). New Baltic states and Ukraine are aware of the fact that Russia is interested in using their ports and are trying to impose economic pressure on Russia. The weakening of the economic and political position of Russia results in the desire of certain countries to expel Russia from the world markets of services, high finishing goods, defense-related equipment and high technology products, and complicated operation and servicing of Russian ships on international lines and at ports. Rules for the passage of sea vessels, and tankers first of all, through straits, especially in the Black Sea, became tougher.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

252

At the same time, Russia has a considerable potential in the sea transport that must find an adequate reflection in the process of appropriate bilateral and multilateral negotiations (including those in the framework of the World Trade Organization). All measures should be taken to ensure equal rights in the multilateral trade system of sea transport. Therefore, the aims of the World Ocean Program’s implementation are to: •

• • •

• • •

• • • • •



Establish a mechanism that will regulate and promote an active participation of Russia and its subjects in the international division of labor in the World Ocean; Ensure a stable position of Russia in international markets of sea transportation and high technologies, including defense-related technologies; Establish special and free economic zones with specific Russian features and international experience taken into account; Use to the maximum extent opportunities of the international trade and foreign investments for the improvement of coastal regions’ economic efficiency; Ensure an effective use of international legal mechanisms to support equality in trade; Ensure the national interests of Russia while organizing and performing foreign economic activity in coastal regions; Create a system of protecting production and consumer markets of goods and services that complies with international requirements and national codes of the Russian Federation; Update the legal control of the Russian foreign economic activity to completely include the national interests; Ensure free navigation of Russian vessels in the ocean and their servicing at ports; Maintain technical conditions of the Russian fleet at a level meeting international requirements; Settle legal, economic and technical issues related to the use of ports located in new Baltic states and Ukraine; Develop Russia’s own port facilities in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea to decrease the dependence of Russia on countries that own former USSR ports; Construct ports in ice-free areas with the requirements of appropriate conventions taken into account.

3.  Research of the World Ocean Nature The modern science of the natural environment of the World Ocean is one of the fields of knowledge that exert the most significant influence on the development of mankind. This sphere of activity offers opportunities for the solution of many scientific, economic and social problems.

Appendix C

253

The scale and significance of the World Ocean for all spheres of human activity stem from its fundamental role of an important Earth system, a source of mineral, biological and strategic resources, a principal factor of stability and changes in the Earth climate as well as an important element of the defense potential. Objectively, the importance of mineral and biological resources extracted by man from the ocean will steadily grow. However, the World Ocean must be considered as an exhaustible source. That necessitates a balance between the extraction and the reproduction of biological resources, and between the intensity of economic activity in the ocean and the efficiency with which the sea environment is protected from pollution. Moreover, the ocean and sea environment present a threat as the source of emergency situations of the natural and man-induced character, dangerous for vital activity of man. Many nations combine their efforts, and establish large international programs and projects to solve the problems of the World Ocean. Participation of Russia in such programs was obviously insufficient in recent years due to a significant cut in allocations for scientific research. However, active participation in international projects gives the right to get experimental data, and the value of experimental data is many times higher than the costs of participation. The scope and character of Russian involvement in such cooperation must be related to the accessibility of new data banks for Russia and Russia’s ability to use this information in the national interest. To gain new fundamental knowledge in the rational and ecologically safe use of natural resources, support navigation, and to ensure the defense capability of the nation, Russia for the last 20 years has been implementing a nation-wide comprehensive program for the exploration and use of the World Ocean aimed at research of natural processes. In recent years the program has been experiencing considerable difficulties caused by economic and other problems. The number of sea scientific missions and research projects was sharply cut. The scientific fleet was practically inactive, and scientific specialists are leaving. However, the scientific foundation laid in the preceding years and the scientific personnel still involved in these activities maintain the Russian ocean science at a rather high level. Further curtailment of ocean research activities will inevitably make Russia fall behind in the exploration and practical use of the World Ocean, and result in consequential strategic losses for the economy and security of the nation. Thus, to ensure the most effective use of funds and accelerated practical output of research activities, the World Ocean Program shall include a gradual transition from the subject matter approach to the problem approach, while forming scientific problems and specifying their financial support. The World Ocean Program in its research of the ocean nature section shall be aimed at the accomplishment of tasks related to the following high priority fields:

Russian Civil-Military Relations

254

• •

• •



• •

• •

Research of the natural environment and critical processes in the World Ocean and adjacent Earth systems; Fundamental research of problems related to the interaction of the ocean and atmosphere, including those of a global character (greenhouse effect, energy and mass transfer, carbon-carbon biochemical cycle, etc.); Exploration of the continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, territorial sea and coastal zone of the Russian Federation; Study and monitoring of the state of the World Ocean and the hydro meteorological situation of the Russian seas, with the aim of supporting economic and defense activities; Study of the history of ecosystems and biological resources, and identification of new areas for the extraction of sea foodstuffs based on the evaluation of the reproductive capacity of various World Ocean areas; Study of the structure and development of the sea and ocean bottom earth crust, and prediction and evaluation of mineral resources; Provision of safe navigation, navigational, hydro geographical, meteorological and hydro meteorological support of defense- and national economy-related activities; Investigation of natural and man-induced calamities in the sea areas and coastal regions (earthquakes, tsunami, fires, floods, eruptions, oil spills, etc.); Development of material and technical base for scientific research.

Special attention should be paid to the exploration of seas surrounding the territory of Russia. That includes investigation and protection of the sea environment, study of issues related to justified rational use of biological, mineral and power resources, and preservation of the recreative potential of land and sea. It is also appropriate to develop research of the open ocean resource potential and the role of the open ocean in global processes. The indicated tasks can be successfully accomplished, provided that the Russian scientific research fleet is maintained at the proper level of functioning capability. 4.  Military and Strategic Interests of Russia in the World Ocean The Navy is essential for Russia. It is one of the most important tools intended to ensure national interests of Russia in the World Ocean, accomplish national tasks, and support military and political stability in the sea and ocean space, military security and international prestige. On the security issues, the policy of Russia is based on political, economic and other non-military methods. However, military power, as one of the components of national power Ill the modern world, retains its significance as the means of containment, securing national interests and goals, and the means of checking aggression, if such a necessity arises.

Appendix C

255

Analysis of the state of the Russian Navy shows that it gradually is losing its ability to safeguard political and economic interest of the nation, and its ability to ensure full-scale security on the sea border. Currently the Navy is able to accomplish only limited tasks in the most important areas of the nearest sea zone. With the weakening of the Navy, the most real threats to the national interests of Russia in the World Ocean may come from: • • •

aggravation of political and economic instability; failure to settle sea border problems; territorial claims.

In the tactics of upholding its interests in the World Ocean, Russia proceeds from the idea that its Navy must not be considered by any nation of the world as a threat to its security. Development of the Russian Navy boils down to retaining to a maximum degree the combat potential necessary to defend the nation. It is valid, first of all, for maritime strategic nuclear forces, the most effective containment means, and general purpose forces Thus, the tasks of the Navy in the context of safeguarding the interests of Russia are to: a. Contain possible threats and ensure safe defense sea activity. That implies the maintenance of maritime forces of nuclear containment as a part of the strategic triad at a level ensuring a reasonable defense capability of the nation, and the formation of sufficient maritime general-purpose forces; b. Ensure national influence and safe economic activity in the World Ocean. Aims of Navy activity in this field are to ensure strategic stability in various regions of the Russian Federation, adequately respond to challenges to security, national interests and goals of Russia, support of Russia’s efforts directed at the settlement of international political problems, and provide protection of economic activity of the nation in the sea space that falls under its jurisdiction. Navy activity shall be performed in compliance with international law. c. Ensure timely defense and repelling of aggression. The Navy shall be able to counteract aggression from the sea. If a threat of nuclear attack arises, necessary measures are to be taken to eliminate the threat and ensure inevitability of the proper countermeasures. With the aims of this section of the World Ocean Program taken into account, it is necessary to: •

develop a military doctrine of Russia that includes the importance of the Russian Navy in settling issues of the military and economic security of the nation;—work out issues of the construction, and military and economic justification of development of the Navy; capabilities of maritime strategic

Russian Civil-Military Relations

256



nuclear forces and general purpose forces, fleet coastal infrastructure, search and rescue service, scientific and other services shall be developed and maintained proceeding from specific features of the sea and ocean space in various regions and long-term perspective; work out issues of ensuring ecologically safe operation of Navy facilities.

5.  Mineral Resources of the World Ocean, Arctic and Antarctic Many types of mineral resources of the World Ocean and adjacent territories are much superior to those of land in quantity, properties and accessibility. Many nations consider them to be a natural source to provide today’s welfare and offer stable development in the future. For separate nations and the world community as a whole, free use of conventional and comparatively new sources of natural resources is the basis of stable and balanced economic development, and meeting vital needs of individuals, society and the nation. Mineral raw materials of the continental shelf are an important part of the national property of the Russian Federation. Russia performs sea geologic and geophysical surveys, and search and prospecting activities identify the geologic structure and regularities in the location of mineral resources in the shelf zones of seas and oceans with the aim of increasing the mineral resource potential of the nation and preparing the most promising zones for industrial development, especially those with mineral resources of strategic importance. For the survey, development and preservation of the sea floor’s mineral resources, the most urgent issues are sea border delimitation, and identification of the sea floor and continental shelf borders of the Russian Federation. Regions with potential sources of danger that may jeopardize national interests of Russia in the field of exploration, development and use of mineral and energy resources on the continental shelf are mainly adjacent to sea borders of the Russian Federation with new and old foreign countries in the Barents Sea, Chuckchee Sea, Bering Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, Black Sea, Sea of Azov and Baltic Sea, as well as in the region of the Arctic Ocean. The Russian Federation has the biggest areas of the coastal zone used for the mining of various mineral resources, construction of hydro technical facilities, intensive fishing, development of recreational facilities and defense activity. It is obvious that the “land-sea” natural and economic interface is the zone of an intensive interaction of the population, economy and natural environment. The coastal areas are a small part of the ocean. However, their effect on the ocean is significant. Materialization of this section of the World Ocean Program will give impetus to the streamlined development of coastal regions of the Russian Federation. Implementation of the World Ocean Program shall promote:

Appendix C





• •

• •





257

industrial development of mineral resources of the ocean, supply of the national economy with critical raw materials, first of all with manganese and cobalt, and preservation of renewable resources for future generations; settlement of social problems at enterprises of the Kola Peninsula, the Urals and Siberia involved in the processing of mineral materials mined on the continental shelf, creation of new jobs resulting from the establishment of new sea mines; formation of the legislative base to regulate economic and other activity Ill tile coastal zone and harmonize local, regional and national interests related to the development of the coastal regions; development of an economic stimulation system to make regions more interested in the development of the coastal zones’ economic potential; development of a mechanism for coordination and implementation of coastal zone management and environmental control programs that also include control over resources and man-induced changes in the coastal zone; solution of certain ecological and economic problems stemming from the ban ill using an additional land fund for the construction of mining enterprises and metal works, extraction of a considerable amount of rock, replacement of copper-nickel-sulfide ore with iron-manganese compounds that lack harmful impurities such as sulfur; settlement of political and legal problems related to the use of mineral resources of the sea bottom beyond the national jurisdiction of Russia in compliance with international law.

6.  Creation of Technologies for the Development of Resources and Space of the World Ocean Development of World Ocean resources is a task commensurate with the scale and material expenditures, expected scientific, technical and economic output with exploration of space. Furthermore, any field in the modern science of ocean (investigation of geologic and geophysical processes and distribution laws for mineral resources, research of ecosystems and biological resources, and study of the World Ocean’s influence on the global climate) is a separate problem task to accomplish. Availability of advanced technologies adequate to the tasks is an extremely important prerequisite for the successful solution of World Ocean problems. Advanced facilities that meet specific requirements imposed on ocean application equipment can be developed on the basis of modern conversion technologies. Principal tasks of the advanced technology development program shall be to: •

ensure technical and technological capabilities for deep water drilling, develop technologies for deep water, shelf and sea bottom activities,

Russian Civil-Military Relations

258

• •

• • • •

and develop materials for operating under extreme conditions of the hydrosphere-lithosphere boundary, develop methods and means for processing geophysics data in real time; update existing maps using advanced instruments and methods for exploration of the World Ocean to support research, applied and economic activities: develop remote sensing technologies for measuring main parameters of the ocean from satellites and orbiting stations; develop advanced navigational, hydrographical and hydro meteorological equipment to ensure safe sea activity; develop systems of meteorology and regulatory support of activities on the exploration of the World Ocean; develop a system intended to diminish the consequences of natural calamities such as tsunami, storm pileup, sea-quakes, eruption of underwater volcanoes, etc.

The World Ocean Program shall be aimed at the protection and preservation of the sea environment, maintenance and development of the existing scientific and production base, modernization and renewal of the Russian oceano-logic fleet intended to support a considerable amount of research activity on World Ocean problems, and development of the basis for industrial production of instruments and tools for long-term monitoring of sea biological resources, and monitoring of pollution and other effects induced by activity of man. Implementation of the World Ocean Program shall provide for: • • •

• •

• •

development of technologies and techniques for deep water, shelf and sea bottom activities including deep-water drilling; development of new materials operating under extreme conditions of the hydrosphere-lithosphere boundary; thorough environmental control in the areas of radioactive waste burial and location of sunken vessels with nuclear power stations and weapons aboard; coordination of projects aimed at the prevention of radioactive pollution of the sea that are included in special programs; development of proposals on the protection of man’s activity in the World Ocean from natural calamities and man-induced emergency situations, and collection of data banks on potentially dangerous underwater facilities; forming of interagency specialized teams for activities at dangerous underwater facilities; availability of specially-equipped research ships for underwater activities.

Appendix C

259

7.  Utilization of Biological Resources of the World Ocean Russia is one of the leading countries in commercial fishery that determines the strategy of the world fisheries. The fish industry of the Russian Federation plays a significant role in the national food complex. In a number of regions (first of all in coastal regions such as Primorski Krai, and Kamchatka, Sakhalin, Kaliningrad and Murmansk regions), the fish industry brings cities to life and is the principal source of jobs for local people. In the nearest perspective, as is the case now, biological resources of the exclusive economic zone will make up the main part of the Russian sea foodstuff resource. However, over utilization of internal resources may result in sharply reduced national fish reserves. Over extraction is most critical for bioresources that are in demand in the foreign market. This is especially valid for crabs, prawns, cad and pollack. This fact calls for tougher regulations oil fisheries in conventional fishing areas of the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, Barents Sea and Bering Sea. New regulations shall comply with existing international law. Immediate tasks of the national fishery within the framework of the World Ocean Program are: •



rational development of bioresources in the Russian exclusive economic zone, open ocean, waters under conventions, exclusive economic zones of other nations with the aim of reaching a justified level of supply of Russian people with fish and other sea foodstuffs; development of sea farming facilities in regions with a favorable environment for artificial growing of valuable hydrobionts in commercial quantities.

Reduced interest in fishery in foreign zones resulting from insufficient economic benefits, and forced low participation of Russia in international scientific research activities (inventory missions of research ships, and monitoring of fish and sea product reserves) are fraught with further expulsion of Russian fishery from zones belonging to other coastal nations. Undesirable changes in the world fishery policy have been taking place recently. Following the United States and some other developed nations, many countries of Africa and Latin America have started pursuing policies aimed at complete expulsion of foreign fish fleets from their zones. In such a situation, it is essential for Russia to consolidate Russian priority in the identification and development of bioresources in the open part of the World Ocean, and retain and develop ties in the field of fishery with other coastal states that have exclusive economic zones rich with fish. A significant part of conventional fishery areas is under the Jurisdiction of coastal nations, and fishery there is controlled by regional international organizations on fishery. It follows that it is necessary to sign bilateral fishery agreements with the

Russian Civil-Military Relations

260

many countries whose coastal zones were conventionally used by Russian fishing ships. Russian position in international fishery organizations and in multilateral fishery organizations shall be built proceeding from the necessity to settle the issue of the membership of the Russian Federation in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as well as from more active participation of Russia in activities performed by international fishery organizations with the aim of safeguarding the interests of the national fishery. Under such conditions, the World Ocean Program shall be aimed at: • • •

improved efficiency of the use of biological resources; modernized capital assets of fishing and search fleets, and coastal enterprises; renewed fleet (through construction of new ships and leasing).

8.  Transport Service Lines of Russia in the World Ocean Recent years have seen a completely new situation with respect to the transport service lines of Russia. The situation is characterized by the following: • •





Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea is minimized and, thus, its access to main sea trade ways was made difficult. Termination points of Russia’s land transport lines in Europe and Middle Asia are found to be in other countries, particularly in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the new Baltic states. As a result, Russia has been moved considerably in the north-east direction. On the west side of the post-Soviet territory, Russia has borders with countries that essentially try to use their geopolitical position to gain political and sometimes other benefits. Internal and foreign routes connecting Russia with the external world, especially in the south and west, are partially in conflict zones (Transcaucasus region and Tadzhikistan) or in zones of either potential or actual instability.

About half of the Russian export/import cargo is transported by sea. Moreover, almost all cargo traffic goes through Baltic and Black Sea ports. Russia has only two (instead of seven, as in former times) ports at the Baltic Sea, Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. The port of Kaliningrad is cut from Russia by the territory of Lithuania, and the port of St. Petersburg is frozen in winter seasons. At the Black Sea, Russia keeps for itself only two of the most important ports, Novorossisk and Tuapse, which have limited capabilities. The ports of Odessa and Iliyechevsk, as well as other ports that were important for the national sea trade, are now beyond the territory of Russia. The ports of Reni and Ismail that earlier

Appendix C

261

provided Russia with access to tile Danube and, therefore, to Central Europe through the Danube-Main-Rhine canal are also lost. Sea ports left in Russia are capable of handling not more than 60 percent of the required amount of cargo transfer activities. The situation is aggravated by the intention of Turkey to impose limitations on free passage of vessels through Black Sea straits, especially for large tankers. As a result, Russia has to use ports of the new Baltic states and Ukraine for transit transportation of cargo. Transit costs and settlement of organizational issues as well as other problems associated with transit depend to a considerable degree on the position of these countries. Facilities available in the north of Russia cannot compensate for the lost transportation capabilities in the west and south (although they are in need of thorough development). Thus, the task for Russia now is not to be pushed aside from world transportation ways and not to get a number of its most important transportation lines cut. Radical geopolitical changes have resulted in setting tough limits on all possible efforts of Russia to use western, southern and northern directions of sea navigation. Under such conditions, of special importance for Russia are the Far East direction and the availability of free access to the Pacific. As never before, Russia is interested in the more rational utilization of its resources and territories. The area of the Russian Far East exceeds 6 million square kilometers. The Russian coastal line of the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Knots is more than 4000 km long. The existence of many bays enables Russia to further develop port facilities. Russia’s Eastern lands adjacent to the Pacific Ocean are extremely rich in natural resources, and are insufficiently developed and thinly populated. The fast economic development of the Asian-Pacific region makes it promising for cooperation. Russia is expanding its relations with nations of this region. However, that does not exclude the necessity of thorough activity in the other directions—ill the Baltic, Black Sea, Caspian and Arctic regions. To remove the threat of transportational (and, thus, economic) isolation of Russia, the Would Ocean Program shall be aimed at: • • •

economically justified and ecologically allowable development of new port facilities at the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and on the Kola Peninsula; provision of free navigation in Black Sea straits; settlement of the issue on the development of an integrated transport center at the Pacific.

9.  Development and Use of the Arctic and Exploration of the Antarctic The Arctic is a complicated regional system with the interests of Russia and other nations closely interwoven there.

262

Russian Civil-Military Relations

The interest in the Arctic comes from the opportunities the region offers for the development of transportation routes, the availability of oil, gas and other natural resources already ready for development, the necessity of performing scientific investigation of the region’s environment that influences Earth’s weather and climate, and aggravation of the ecological balance problem. The North Sea route is an important part of the Extreme North economic complex infrastructure and a link between the Russian Far East and western regions of the country. It involves Siberian river systems in an integrated transportation network. For certain arctic areas (Chukchi region, islands in arctic seas and a number of settlements in the coastal areas of Krasnoyarsk and Tumen regions), sea transport is the sole means of supporting cargo deliveries in large amounts. Reserves of mineral raw materials in the shelf of the Russian North are considerable. They are concentrated in unique, in scale, deposits. Resources such as hydrocarbons, noble, nonferrous and rare-earth metals, valuable minerals and forest affect the balance of the Russian economy. In the current environment the national economy cannot manage without certain mineral resources of the North and its Arctic zone. Exploration of natural resources and the development of productive forces in the Russian North (including the arctic zone) are important components of the national long-term economic strategy. International interests of Russia in the Arctic consists of the establishment of external conditions favorable for the materialization of internal economic, social and other transformations. It is necessary to stress the importance of international cooperation for the settlement of economic and legal problems within the framework of the Arctic Council that is being established now, the Barents Sea Board and its working group on the Arctic Sea Way, the Arctic Initiative, and the Strategy of Arctic Environment Protection. Although the Antarctic plays an extremely important role in forming climatic process on the Earth, it is the less explored region. Evaluation of its economic potential and consequences of full-scale development does not exist now. It should be taken into account that the mining of mineral resources on land and in the shelf if forbidden by the Protocol on environment protection of 1991 to the Agreement on the Arctic signed in 1959. Therefore, ways of ecologically safe development of allowable fishing, scientific and tourist activity have to be selected under conditions of unavailability of adequate information and, thus, of uncertainty. As to the Antarctic, there are national teams of many countries (the lumber of which is growing) working there now. However, territorial problems are not settled yet. Territorial claims of nations are frozen for the time being. One cannot exclude that when considerable resources are revealed in the region and economically promising means of their extraction are made available, serious conflicts may arise. Proceeding from the economic, political, international, ecological and social importance for Russia of the exploration and development of the Arctic and Antarctic, as well as the military importance of the Arctic, the World Ocean Program shall:

Appendix C

263

a.  formulate: • •



principles of the single national policy on the Arctic as a special region of long-term vital interest of Russia affecting many aspects of its life; requirements for the development of energy supply capacities capable of properly supporting social and economic development of the Arctic region; that also includes a wider use of unconventional and renewable energy sources; tasks of development of a transport service system for the Arctic sea route.

b.  specify: •



measures aimed at the development and improvement of international cooperation in the area of the Arctic sea route that take into account an increasing interest of foreign countries in its use for transit cargo transportation between European and Asian ports, as well as measures aimed at the protection of the Arctic sea environment from navigation induced pollution that take into account the high vulnerability of Arctic nature; measures aimed at maintaining the existing status of the Antarctic stipulated by the Agreement on the Antarctic of 1959, and measures on safeguarding long-term interests of further presence and practical activity of Russia in the Antarctic region.

10.  Establishment of the Common Nation-wide System of Information about the Situation in the World Ocean Information on World Ocean issues is the basis for the accomplishment of scientific, technical, economic, political and military tasks. Currently such information is collected and stored by various agencies. Agencies do not jointly analyze results obtained during accomplishment of these tasks and they do not exchange data on a regular basis. In such a situation, it is appropriate to consider the idea of the establishment, within the framework of the World Ocean Program, of a single nation-wide system of information about the situation in the World Ocean. It must be based on the existing information systems of the Federal Service of Russia on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information at the President of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Communication of the Russian Federation, State Committee of the Russian Federation on Fishing, Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Calamities, Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation, State Committee on

Russian Civil-Military Relations

264

Environment Protection, State Committee of the Russian Federation on Science and Technologies, State Committee of the Russian Federation on Standardization, Meteorology and Certification, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Russian Space Agency, with the application of advanced information handling technologies. The above system is to offer: • • • • • •

improved management over activities in the exploration and use of World Ocean resources and monitoring of the state of the World Ocean; supply of users with real time data needed to make decisions and perform various activities; establishment of data banks of regulatory documentation and the means of meteorologic support; development of various types of monitoring with the aim of supporting exploration of the World Ocean and sea activities; presentation of generalized and special information that does not require data processing in real time; data exchange among similar systems within the framework of international cooperation.

The principal functions of the information systems are to be: • • • • •

acquisition, processing, storage and distribution of data and information oil the World Ocean; long-term guaranteed storage of information and generation of specialized databases; generation of information on products and supply of interested end users with them; information support of programs and projects related to the exploration and practical use of oceans and seas., performing functions of information centers in international programs.

The common nation-wide system of information about the situation in the World Ocean shall not substitute for the existing information systems of the entities working on World Ocean problems. The system is to ensure their full-scale and effective utilization and interaction, and access to data banks with the appropriate demarcation of powers/liabilities taken into consideration. 11.  Humanitarian Problems Large scale activities in the north and east entail certain problems associated with labor and every day life accommodations both in the ocean and in coastal areas. Activities in the ocean involve durable sea missions, long-term in-field operations in thinly populated, high-latitude and remote areas, and operations on sea platforms.

Appendix C

265

Thus, people involved in such activities are exposed to environments of isolation from their usual life and to increased occupational risk. Therefore, the World Ocean Program is to provide for: • • •

settlement of such issues as labor protection, public health and social protection for people involved in sea activities; better prestige of sea occupations; creation of conditions that prevent the outflow of labor forces from coastal regions of the Russian north and far east, intake of specialists from continental Russia and Russian speaking people from new independent countries formed on the territory of the former USSR, and determination of a reasonable level of labor force migration, including that from abroad.

Since availability of skilled personnel for all types of sea activities (including scientific research) is the task of the highest priority, the World Ocean Program shall be aimed at: •





retaining and recovering personnel, and reorienting the education system to the training of personnel for the most important sea activities on the exploration and use of World Ocean resources and territory; improving the system of financing educational institutions to allow a combined use of budgetary and non-budgetary funds, and resources resulting from commercial activity of these institutions; strengthening the material and technical base, and developing production and social infrastructures of educational institutions.

The Russian North and Pacific coast are vast territories featuring unique flora and fauna with many endemic species. There are many historical and cultural monuments and artifacts of various nationalities that witness the development of these regions. Preservation and study of historical and cultural heritage, and natural environment of tile coastal regions and islands of the Arctic Ocean, as well as of the Pacific coast are to be an integral part of the World Ocean Program. To accomplish these tasks, the World Ocean Program is to provide for: • •

the system of control over the state of cultural and natural heritage of the Russian North; measures aimed at the preservation of natural and cultural values of the North.

Native and small nationalities living on the Arctic and Pacific coast are in a tough situation resulting from mindless development of land and sea territories, worsened economic situation and impossibility to use resources of the World Ocean.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

266

The World Ocean Program shall specify measures intended to solve problems of the small native nationalities of the North. Main tasks are to: •



protect the lives and health of native people from destructive exposure to economic activity on the development of the World Ocean by minimizing the influence of industrial development of the ocean upon the native population of the coastal regions; create conditions for retaining ethnic features of small nationalities with their cultural traditions taken into consideration.

The World Ocean Program shall provide a measure on the development of tourist activity in the wild nature regions of the North and Far East. The world experience in this field shall be taken into account. To do this, it is necessary to: • • • •

work out principles of establishing tourist and recreation zones in coastal regions; evaluate the recreation potential of coastal regions for the development of national and international tourism; evaluate allowable ecological stress in these regions; identify an optimum level for the utilization of the tourist and recreation potential of the northern territories and seas.

V  Ways to Accomplish the Tasks Set The current situation of the activity of the Russian Federation ill the World Ocean requires that measures be taken to materialize national Interests in this field. The actual state of the economy and economic reforms enables Russia to support only an evolutionary development of processes associated with safeguarding national and geopolitical interests of Russia in the World Ocean. State support and rational use of scientific and technical potential in the market economy environment, concentration of material and financial resources on high priority sub-programs will make it possible to carry out, within the framework of the World Ocean Program, activities on the exploration and use of the World Ocean at a qualitatively new level. Currently there are more than 20 federal purpose-oriented programs under development, developed and approved for implementation, that directly or indirectly concern the World Ocean. Besides projects developed within the framework of the World Ocean Program proper sub-programs of the World Ocean Program may also include the most important projects from other federal programs that are already in the implementation stage. In tile initial phase of the World Ocean Program, it is appropriate to identify, on the tender basis, the most promising and short-term projects in the above federal programs that concern sea activity and offer accomplishment of specific tasks in the nearest term.

Appendix C

267

Each subprogram shall identify goals achievable within the established time period through the realization of special measures. The World Ocean Program shall harmonize program plans and the plan implementation sequence with available allocations, and ensure a harmonized comprehensive accomplishment of industrial and regional tasks. Program implementation plans and their financial support are to be specified for the nearest one or two years.

VI  Phases of the World Ocean Program The comprehensive solution of problems related to the exploration, development and use of waters, resources and coastal territories of the World Ocean is an extremely difficult task to accomplish. The task cannot be accomplished within the nearest five years and, thus, it must be planned for a much longer period. The World Ocean Program is supposed to be implemented in several phases. In the current quickly changing conditions, it is difficult to expect a high degree of accuracy in long-term estimations and plans. It is obvious that each specific phase of the World Ocean Program is to be updated on the results achieved to ensure successive realization of the whole Program. Taking into account that the Program will be implemented phase by phase, some I Omits of the Program cannot be specified. The principal task of the initial phase (1 997 through 2002) is to stop the uncontrolled decline, and stabilize main parameters characterizing activity of Russia in the World Ocean. The next phase is designed for a medium-term perspective (2003-2007). It shall provide for opportunities to update the Program on the basis of the results obtained. The tasks of this phase is to establish and develop bases for financial, legal, political, environmental protection, scientific technical and other sea-related activities of Russia with the aim of meeting current needs and ensuring long-term interests and needs. The final phase shall form a new structure of Russia’s activity in the World Ocean in accordance with the strategy of internal development of the nation, the position of Russia ill the world, and prospective needs. The most effective projects of the Program have to be implemented, as a rule, within three five years. Implementation of the World Ocean Program will enable Russia to retain a deserved position in the world, effectively solve economic problems and facilitate the safeguarding of national interests in the World Ocean.

VII  Social and Economic Importance of the World Ocean Program Implementation of the World Ocean Program shall provide improved defense capabilities of the nation on sea borders, strengthened economic and raw material

268

Russian Civil-Military Relations

potential, improved supply of the population with foodstuffs, and better protection of the population from natural calamities and emergencies caused by human activity in the World Ocean.

Appendix D

Russian National Security Concept, January 2000

The Russian Federation National Security Concept represents a document that was examined and approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and signed into law by presidential edict No. 24 dated 10 January 2000. The document, called a “blueprint,” is a system of views on how to ensure in the Russian Federation security of the individual, society and state against external and internal threats in any aspect of life and activity. It defines the most important directions of the state policy of the Russian Federation. The national security of the Russian Federation is understood to mean the security of its multinational people, in whom reside sovereignty and the sole source of authority in the Russian Federation. Translations, by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBISFTS20000116000515) are from the original version as it appeared in the Russian language newspaper, Moscow Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (Internet version) on 14 January 2000. In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original documents were examined for accuracy. In a few cases, the translation quoted herein has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation.

  On 10 January 2000, Acting President of Russia Vladimir Putin (later elected president in March 2000) signed the new National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. Officially, the new document was classified as a “revision” of the previous, 1997 concept; this status was probably intended to emphasize the continuity of policy between the Yeltsin and Putin administrations. The work on the new version of the National Security Concept began soon after the appointment of Putin as secretary of the Security Council in the early 1999. An earlier draft was published on 26 November 1999 in the Russian language newspaper Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye No. 46. By its nature, the concept establishes only broad guidelines for national security policy, and thus addresses nuclear strategy only briefly and in general terms. These guidelines are developed in detail in the new Military Doctrine, which was approved four months later. ������������������   Official source: Kontseptsiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsiy. Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 17 dekabrya 1997 g. No. 1300 (v redaktsii Ukaza Prezidenta RF on 10 yanvarya 2000 g. No. 24) .

270

Russian Civil-Military Relations

I  Russia in the World Community The situation in the world is characterized by a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. Following the end of the bipolar confrontation era, two mutually-exclusive trends took shape. The first of these trends shows itself in the strengthened economic and political positions of a significant number of states and their integrative associations and in improved mechanisms for multilateral management of international processes. Economic, political, scientific and technological, environmental and information factors are playing an ever-increasing role. Russia will facilitate the formation of an ideology of establishing a multipolar world on this basis. The second trend shows itself in attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under U.S. leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (above all via the use of military force) of key issues in world politics circumventing of the fundamental rules of international law. The formation of international relations is accompanied by competition and also by the aspiration of a number of states to strengthen their influence on global politics, including by creating weapons of mass destruction. Military force and coercion remain substantial aspects of international relations. Russia is one of the world’s powers, with centuries of history and rich cultural traditions. Despite the complex international situation and its own temporary difficulties, Russia continues to play an important role in global processes by virtue of its great economic, scientific, technological and military potential and its unique strategic location on the Eurasian continent. There are prospects for the Russian Federation’s broader integration into the world economy and for expanded cooperation with international economic and financial institutions. The commonality of interests of Russia and other states is objectively preserved in many international security problems, including opposing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, settling and preventing regional conflicts, fighting international terrorism and the drug trade, and resolving acute ecological problems of a global nature, including providing for nuclear and radiation safety. At the same time, a number of states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways. Attempts to ignore Russia’s interests when solving major issues of international relations, including conflict situations, are capable of undermining international security and stability, and hinder the positive changes achieved in international relations. Terrorism is transnational in nature and poses a threat to world stability. This issue has been exacerbated sharply in many countries, including in the Russian Federation, and to fight it requires unification of efforts by the entire international community, increased effectiveness of existing ways of countering this threat, and also urgent action to neutralize it.

Appendix D

271

II  Russia’s National Interests Russia’s national interests are the combined and balanced interests of the individual, society and the state in economic; domestic political, social, international, informational, military, border, and ecological security. They are long-term in nature and define the main goals and strategic and short-term goals of the state’s domestic and foreign policy. The national interests are secured by institutions of state authority, which may also act in coordination with public organizations operating on the basis of the constitution and legislation of the Russian Federation. The interests of the individual lie in exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms and provision of personal security; in an improved quality and standard of living; and in physical, spiritual and intellectual development. The interests of society lie in strengthening democracy; creating a rule-of-law and social state; in achieving and maintaining public harmony and in the spiritual renewal of Russia. The interests of the state lie in the inviolability of the constitutional system and of Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; in political, economic and social stability; in unconditional assurance of lawfulness and maintenance of law and order; and in the development of international cooperation on equal terms and to mutual benefit. Russia’s national interests may be assured only on the basis of sustainable economic development. Therefore Russia’s national interests in this sphere are of key importance. Russia’s national interests in the domestic political sphere lie in stability of the constitutional system and of state authority and its institutions; in ensuring civil peace and national accord, territorial integrity, unity of the legal domain, and law and order; in completing the process of establishing a democratic society; and in removing factors causing and feeding social, intercommunal and religious conflicts, political extremism, national and religious separatism, and terrorism. Russia’s national interests in the social sphere lie in assurance of a high standard of living for its people. The national interests in the spiritual sphere lie in preservation and strengthening of society’s moral values, traditions of patriotism and humanism, and the country’s cultural and scientific potential. Russia’s national interests in the international sphere lie in upholding its sovereignty and strengthening its position as a great power and as one of the influential centers of a multipolar world, in development of equal and mutually beneficial relations with all countries and integrative associations and in particular with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Russia’s traditional partners, in universal observance of human rights and freedoms and the impermissibility of dual standards in this respect. Russia’s national interests in the informational sphere lie in observance of its citizens’ constitutional rights and freedoms to receive and make use of information,

272

Russian Civil-Military Relations

in the development of modern telecommunications, and in protecting the state’s information resources from unsanctioned access. Russia’s national interests in the military sphere lie in protection of its independence, sovereignty and state and territorial integrity, in the prevention of military aggression against Russia and its allies and in ensuring the conditions for peaceful and democratic development of the state. Russia’s national interests in border policy lie in the establishment of political, legal, organizational and other conditions for ensuring reliable protection of the state border of the Russian Federation, and in observance of the procedure and rules laid down by Russian Federation legislation for the carrying on of economic and all other kinds of activity within the borders of the Russian Federation. Russia’s national interests in the ecological sphere lie in the preservation and improvement of the environment. A vital component of Russia’s national interests is protection of the individual, society and state from terrorism, including international terrorism, and also from extraordinary situations, both natural and man-made, and their consequences, and in times of war from the dangers arising from the conduct and consequences of military action.

III  Threats to the Russian Federation’s National Security The condition of the national economy and incomplete nature of the system and structure of the authorities of state and of society, social and political polarization of society and criminalization of social relations, the growth of organized crime and terrorism, and a deterioration in intercommunal and international relations are all creating a broad range of internal and external threats to the country’s security. In the economy, these threats are of a comprehensive nature and are caused above all by a substantial contraction in the gross domestic product; reduced investment and innovation; diminished scientific and technological potential; stagnation in agriculture; a distorted banking system; growth in the state’s internal and external debt; and domination of exports by fuel, raw materials and energy components, and of imports by food and consumer items, including consumer essentials. A weakened scientific and technological potential, reduction in research in strategically-important areas of science and technology and departure abroad of specialists and intellectual property mean that Russia is faced with the threat of loss of its leading world positions, decay of its high-technology industries, increased dependence on foreign technology and the undermining of its ability to defend itself. Adverse trends in the economy lie at the root of the separatist aspirations of a number of constituent parts of the Russian Federation. This leads to increased political instability and a weakening of Russia’s unified economic domain and its

Appendix D

273

most important components—industrial production, transportation links, and the finance, banking, credit and tax systems. Economic disintegration, social stratification and the dilution of spiritual values promote tension between regions and the center and pose a threat to the federal structure and the socioeconomic fabric of the Russian Federation. Ethnoegoism, ethnocentrism and chauvinism as manifested in the activity of a number of public formations, and also uncontrolled migration promote nationalism, political and religious extremism and ethno separatism, and create a breeding ground for conflicts. The country’s single legal domain is being eroded by nonobservance of the principle that the Constitution of the Russian Federation should prevail over other legal standards and that federal law should prevail over laws of constituent parts of the Russian Federation, and also by poor coordination of state management at various levels. The threat of criminalization of the society that has emerged from reform of the socio-political system and economy is becoming especially acute. Serious mistakes made in the initial stage of economic, military, law-enforcement and other reform, weakened state regulation and control, imperfect legislation, absence of a strong state social policy, and a decline in society’s spiritual-moral potential are the main factors aiding growth in crime, especially organized crime, and corruption. The consequences of these miscalculations can be seen in weakened legislative supervision of the situation in the country; in the merger of certain elements of executive and legislative authority with criminal structures; and in their infiltration of the banking system, major industries, trade organizations and supply networks. In connection with this, the fight against crime and corruption is not only legal but also political in nature. The scale of terrorism and organized crime is growing because of the conflicts that frequently accompany changes of ownership and also an increased struggle for power along clan and ethnic or nationalist interests. The lack of an effective system in society for preventing legal infringements, inadequate legal and logistic support for the battle against organized crime and terrorism, legal nihilism and the departure of qualified personnel from the law-enforcement agencies are all increasing the impact that this threat has on the individual, society and the state. Stratification of society into a narrow circle of the rich and preponderant mass of the needy and increasing numbers of people below the poverty threshold and growing unemployment pose a threat to Russia’s security in the social sphere. A threat to the nation’s physical health can be seen in the crisis in the systems of public health and social protection of the population, in increasing consumption of alcohol and narcotics. The consequences of this profound social crisis are a sharp drop in the birth rate and average life expectancy, distortion of the demographic and social composition of society, an undermining of the workforce as the foundation for industrial development, a weakening of the fundamental nucleus of society—the family—and a decline in society’s spiritual, moral and creative potential.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

274

Deepening crisis in the domestic political, social and spiritual spheres could lead to the loss of democratic gains. The fundamental threats in the international sphere are brought about by the following factors: •

• • • • • • •

the desire of some states and international associations to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and the OSCE; the danger of a weakening of Russia’s political, economic and military influence in the world; the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO’s eastward expansion; the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military presences in immediate proximity to Russian borders; proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles; the weakening of integrational processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States; outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of CIS member states; territorial claims on Russia.

Threats to the Russian Federation’s national security in the international sphere can be seen in attempts by other states to oppose a strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centers of a multipolar world, to hinder the exercise of its national interests and to weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific Region Terrorism represents a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. International terrorism is waging an open campaign to destabilize Russia. There is an increased threat to the national security of the Russian Federation in the information sphere. A serious danger arises from the desire of a number of countries to dominate the global information domain space and to expel Russia from the external and internal information market; from the development by a number of states of “information warfare” concepts that entail creation of ways of exerting a dangerous effect on other countries’ information systems, of disrupting information and telecommunications systems and data storage systems, and of gaining unauthorized access to them. The level and scope of military threats are growing. Elevated to the rank of strategic doctrine, NATO’s transition to the practice of using military force outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could destabilize the entire global strategic situation. The growing technical advantage of a number of leading powers and their enhanced ability to create new weapons and military equipment could provoke a new phase of the arms race and radically alter the forms and methods of warfare.

Appendix D

275

Foreign special services and the organizations they use are increasing their activity in the Russian Federation. Adverse trends in the military sphere are being assisted by delays in reforming the military and the defense industry of the Russian Federation, by inadequate funding for defense and by a poor regulatory and legal framework. At the present time, this can be seen in the critically low level of operational and combat training in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and of the other troops and militarized formations and agencies, and in the impermissible drop in equipment stacks of the troops with modern armaments and military and special hardware, and in the extreme acuteness of social problems; this leads to a weakening of the military security of the Russian Federation as a whole. Threats to the national security and interests of the Russian Federation in the border sphere are caused by the following: • •

economic, demographic and cultural-religious expansion by neighboring states into Russian territory; increased activity by cross-border organized crime and also by foreign terrorist organizations.

The threat of a deteriorating ecological situation in the country and depletion of natural resources depends directly on the state of the economy and society’s willingness to appreciate the global nature and importance of these issues. For Russia this threat is especially great because of the domination position in industry of the fuel and energy sector, inadequate legislation for environmental protection, lack or limited use of energy-saving technologies, and low environmental awareness. There is a trend for Russia to be used as a place for reprocessing and burying environmentally dangerous materials and substances. Against this background the weakening of state supervision and inadequate legal and economic levers for averting and relieving emergencies are increasing the risk of man-made disasters in all sectors of the economy.

IV  Ensuring the National Security of the Russian Federation The following are the principal tasks for ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security: • • •

to promptly detect and identify external and internal threats to national security; to take short- and long-term action to avert and remove internal and external threats; to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and the security of its border lands;

Russian Civil-Military Relations

276

• • • •



• • • • •

to improve the economy and pursue an independent and socially-oriented economic policy; to overcome the Russian Federation’s scientific and technological dependence on external sources; to ensure citizens’ personal security and constitutional rights and freedoms in Russia; to improve the system of state power in the Russian Federation, the system of federal relations and local self-government and legislation; to create harmonious relations between communities, and to strengthen law and order and preserve socio-political stability in society; to ensure unwavering compliance with Russian Federation legislation by all citizens and officials, state bodies, political parties and public and religious organizations; to ensure Russia’s cooperation, especially with the world’s leading countries, on equal and mutually advantageous terms; to increase the state’s military potential and maintaining it at a sufficient level; to strengthening the regime of nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles; to take effective action to identify, avert and intercept intelligence and subversive activities by foreign states against the Russian Federation; to fundamentally improve the country’s ecological situation.

It is an important priority of state policy to ensure national interests and uphold the country’s economic interests. The following are important tasks in foreign economic activities: • • •

to pave the way for international integration of the Russian economy; to expand markets for of Russian products; to create a single economic domain with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Against a background of liberalization of Russia’s foreign trade and increased competition on the global market for goods and services, there must be greater protection of the interests of Russian producers. An important factor is a balanced monetary policy designed to gradually reduce Russia’s dependence on external borrowing and to strengthen its presence in the international financial and economic organizations. The state must play a stronger role in regulating foreign banking, insurance and investment companies and impose definitions and justified limitations on the transfer for use by foreign companies of Russia’s natural resources, telecommunications, transport and production infrastructures.

Appendix D

277

Effective action must be taken in currency regulation, to pave the way for an end to payments in foreign currency on the domestic market and to end the uncontrolled export of capital. The main directions for ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation in matters of the domestic economy are: • • •



legal support for reforms and creation of an effective mechanism for monitoring observance of Russian Federation legislation; strengthening state regulation in the economy; taking measures essential to overcoming the consequences of the economic crisis, and preserve and develop scientific, technological and production potential; effect a transition to economic growth with a diminished likelihood of man-made disasters, a transition to greater competitiveness of industrial products and to improved wellbeing of the people.

The transition to a highly effective, socially oriented market economy must be carried out as a gradual process of forming optimum mechanisms for organizing production and distribution of goods and services for maximum possible increase of the wellbeing of society and of every citizen. The most pressing tasks in this respect are to remove structural distortions within the Russian economy, ensure high growth of output of high-technology products and products involving a high degree of processing, while supporting sectors which are the basis of expanded output and ensuring employment. It is of great importance to strengthen state support for investment and innovation, act to create a stable banking system that meets the interests of the real economy, to assist business to obtain long-term loan finance for capital investments, provide real state support for special programs for the structural reorganization of industry. Vital tasks are to achieve rapid development of competitive sectors and industries and expand the market for science-intensive products. To this end, there must be encouragement for transfer of new military technologies to the civilian sector and a mechanism must be introduced for identifying and supporting advanced technologies which will ensure competitiveness of Russian enterprises in the world market. This entails channeling financial and material resources into priority areas of development of science and engineering, supporting the leading scientific schools, and accelerated creation of a science and technology resource of completed research and a national technological base, attracting private capital including through the use of foundations and grants. It also entails programs for developing territories with a high concentration of scientific and technological potential, establishing with state support an infrastructure ensuring commercial use of the results of scientific research, with simultaneous protection of intellectual property

278

Russian Civil-Military Relations

within the country and abroad, and developing a generally accessible network of scientific, technological and commercial information. The state should promote the creation of equal development and expansion opportunities for businesses under all forms of ownership, including private enterprise in all areas, where this is beneficial to public wellbeing, scientific and educational progress, society’s spiritual and moral development, and protection of consumer rights. Ways of supporting the vital activities and economic development of regions and areas of the Far North that are especially subject to crises, and a tariff policy ensuring uniformity of the country’s economic domain, must be developed in the shortest possible time. The priority of economic factors in the social sphere is fundamentally important for strengthening the state, ensuring real implementation of social safeguards based on state support, and developing mechanisms for collective responsibility, democratic decision making, and social partnership. In this respect, a socially fair and economically effective income distribution policy is very important. Organization of the work of federal executive authorities and of executive authorities of the constituent parts of the Russian Federation in implementing specific measures aimed at preventing and overcoming threats to Russia’s national interests in the area of the economy also requires a further improvement of legislation and assurance of its strict observance by all economically active entities. A convergence of interests of the peoples populating the country, organization of full and comprehensive cooperation between them, and conduct of a responsible, considered national and regional state policy are very important tasks, accomplishment of which will permit ensuring Russia’s domestic political stability and unity. A comprehensive approach to accomplishing these tasks should be the basis of the state’s domestic policy and should ensure development of the Russian Federation as a multinational, democratic, federal state. Strengthening of Russian statehood and improved federal relationships and local self-government should promote the national security of the Russian Federation. A comprehensive approach is essential for resolving legal, economic, social and ethnopolitical issues while ensuring that the interests of the Russian Federation and its components are observed. Implementing the constitutional principle of government by the people requires assurance of the coordinated functioning and interaction of all state authorities, an improvement in the organization and activities of representative entities, of strict hierarchy of executive authority, and unity of Russia’s judicial system. This is ensured by the constitutional principle of division of powers, by establishment of a more precise functional distribution of powers among state institutions, and by the strengthening of Russia’s federative system through improved relations with constituent parts of the Russian Federation within the framework of their constitutional status.

Appendix D

279

The following are the fundamental directions for protecting Russia’s constitutional system: • • • •

to ensure the priority of federal legislation and improve to this effect the legislation of constituent parts of the Russian Federation; to develop organizational and legal mechanisms for protecting the integrity of the state, and unity of the legal domain and Russia’s national interests; to develop and implement a regional policy that ensures an optimum balance of federal and regional interests; to improve the mechanism for preventing the appearance of political parties and public associations that pursue separatist and anticonstitutional goals and for stopping their activities.

Efforts aimed at fighting crime and corruption require consolidation. It is very much in Russia’s interests to uproot the economic and socio-political causes of these socially dangerous phenomena and to draw up a comprehensive system for protecting the individual, society and the state against criminality. The formation of a system of effective social preventive measures and education of law-abiding citizens is of a top priority task. These measures must be subordinated to the interests of protecting every person’s right to personal security regardless of race, nationality, language, origin, property interests or official status, place of residence, religion, membership of public associations or other circumstances. It is vital when fighting crime to: • •

• •

identify, eliminate and prevent causes and conditions engendering crime; strengthen the state’s role as guarantor of security of the individual and society, and create the legal framework necessary for this and the mechanism for applying it; enlist state authorities, within the bounds of their authority, in the prevention of illegal actions; expand mutually-beneficial international collaboration in law and order, primarily with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Decisions made and steps taken by state authorities in the fight against organized crime must be open, specific, and understandable to every citizen, they must be preventive in nature, they must ensure equality of all before the law and inevitability of liability, and they must rely on society’s support. The development of a legal base as the foundation for reliably protecting citizens’ rights and lawful interests, as well as observance of Russia’s obligations under international law in the sphere of fighting crime and protecting human rights are needed first and foremost for preventive measures and for crime-fighting. It is important to deprive crime of the sustenance it derives from shortcomings in legislation and the economic and social crisis.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

280

An effective system for financial control, enhanced administrative, civic and legal levers and ways of verifying the assets and sources of income and expenditures of state officials and other employees must be created to prevent corruption in the state apparatus and to eliminate conditions for legalizing criminally acquired capital. The fight against terrorism, the drug trade and smuggling must be based on a special state-wide set of countermeasures designed to put an end to such activities. Using the framework of international agreements, there must be effective collaboration with foreign states and their law-enforcement and special agencies, and also with international organizations tasked with fighting terrorism. Broad use must be made of international experience of dealing with this phenomenon and there must be a well-coordinated mechanism for countering international terrorism, closing all available routes for illicit weapons and explosives within the country and preventing their import from abroad. The federal state authorities should pursue within the country persons involved in terrorism irrespective of where acts of terrorism damaging to the Russian Federation were conceived or carried out. Assurance of the Russian Federation’s national security also includes protecting the cultural and spiritual-moral legacy and the historical traditions and standards of public life, and preserving the cultural heritage of all Russia’s peoples. There must be a state policy to maintain the population’s spiritual and moral welfare, prohibit the use of airtime to promote violence or base instincts, and counter the adverse impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries. A spiritual renewal of society is impossible without preserving the role of the Russian language as a factor of spiritual unity of the people of a multinational Russia and as the language of intercourse among CIS member states. To ensure the safekeeping and development of our cultural and spiritual heritage, socioeconomic conditions must be created to promote creativity and cultural institutions. In the area of protecting and strengthening citizens’ health there must be greater attention paid by society and by Russian Federation legislative (representative) and executive authorities toward the development of state (federal and municipal) insurance and private healthcare, state protectionism for the Russian medical and pharmaceutical industry, and implementation of federal programs in preventive medicine and epidemiology, children’s health protection, ambulance and emergency medical care, and disaster medicine. The following are among priority directions for ensuring ecological security: • •



rational use of natural resources and fostering of environmental awareness prevention of environmental pollution by raising the level of safety of technologies connected with the burial and recycling of toxic industrial and household wastes; prevention of radioactive contamination of the environment and relief of

Appendix D



• •

281

the consequences of earlier radiation accidents and disasters; ecologically safe storage and elimination of arms removed from the order of battle, above all nuclear powered submarines, ships and vessels with nuclear power plants, nuclear munitions, liquid missile propellants, and fuel of nuclear power stations; storage and destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles in a way that is environmentally safe and safe for public health; creation of ecologically clean technologies, a search for ways of making practical use of environmentally friendly sources of energy, and urgent action in environmentally-vulnerable areas of the Russian Federation.

A new approach is essential for the organization and conduct of civil defense in the Russian Federation and there must be a qualitative improvement to the unified state system for early warning and removal of emergency situations, including its further integration into equivalent systems of foreign countries. The foreign policy of the Russian Federation should be designed to: • • • • •

• • •







pursue an active foreign-policy course; strengthen key mechanisms, above all of the UN Security Council, for multilateral management of world political and economic processes; ensure favorable conditions for the country’s economic and social development and for global and regional stability; protect the lawful rights and interests of Russian citizens abroad, through the use of political, economic and other measures; develop relations with CIS member states in accordance with principles of international law, and developing integrative processes within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States that meet Russia’s interests; ensure Russia’s full-fledged involvement in global and regional economic and political structures; assist in settling conflicts, including peacemaking activities under UN, OSCE and CIS aegis; achieve progress in nuclear arms control and maintain strategic stability in the world through states’ compliance with their international obligations in this respect; fulfill mutual obligations to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, carrying out confidence- and stabilitybuilding measures, ensure international oversight of the export of goods and technologies and over the provision of military and dual-purpose services; adapt existing arms-control and disarmament agreements in line with the new climate in international relations, and also develop when necessary new agreements especially for enhancing confidence- and security-building measures; assist in establishing zones free of weapons of mass destruction;

Russian Civil-Military Relations

282



develop international cooperation in the fight against transnational crime and terrorism.

Ensuring the Russian Federation’s military security is a crucial direction of state activity. The main goal in this respect is to ensure an adequate response to threats which may arise in the 21st century, with rational spending on defense. In preventing war and armed conflicts, the Russian Federation prefers political, diplomatic, economic and other non-military means. The national interests of the Russian Federation, however, require the presence of military power sufficient for its defense. The Russian Federation armed forces play the main role in ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation. A vital task of the Russian Federation is to exercise deterrence to prevent aggression on any scale including the use of nuclear weapons, against Russia and its allies. The Russian Federation must possess nuclear forces that are capable of assuring the infliction of the desired extent of damage against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances. In their peacetime order of battle the Russian Federation armed forces should be able to provide dependable protection against aerial attack; to perform jointly with other troops, military units and entities missions to repulse aggression in a local war (armed conflict); and to carry out strategic deployments for missions in a large-scale war. The Russian Federation armed forces should also ensure Russia’s ability to carry out peacemaking duties. One of the vital strategic directions in providing for the Russian Federation’s military security is effective collaboration and cooperation with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The interests of ensuring Russia’s national security predetermine the need, under appropriate circumstances, for Russia to have a military presence in certain strategically important regions of the world. The stationing of limited military contingents (military bases, naval units) there on a treaty basis must ensure Russia’s readiness to fulfill its obligations and to assist in forming a stable military-strategic balance of forces in regions, and must enable the Russian Federation to react to a crisis situation in its initial stage and achieve its foreign-policy goals. The Russian Federation envisages the possibility of employing military force to ensure its national security based on the following principles: •



use of all available forces and assets, including nuclear weapons, in the event of need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective; use of military force inside the country is allowed in strict conformity with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and with federal laws in the event of emergence of a threat to citizens’ lives and also of forcible change to the constitutional system.

Appendix D

283

An important role in ensuring Russia’s national interests belongs to the defense industry. Restructuring and conversion of the defense industry should proceed without detriment to the development of new technologies and science-andtechnology opportunities or to modernization of armaments, military and special equipment and the presence of Russian manufacturers on the world markets. The way should be paved for organization of the priority fundamental, forecasting and original research, which ensure the existence of a promising and advanced science-and-technology sector in the interests of defense and the state’s security. The following are principal tasks as regards border security: • • • • •

to establish the required regulatory and legal framework; to develop international cooperation in this area; to counter economic, demographic and cultural-religious expansion into Russian territory by other states; to intercept transnational organized crime and illegal migration; to engage in collective measures to ensure security in the border zones of member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The following are crucial tasks for ensuring the Russian Federation’s information security: • • •

exercise of citizens’ constitutional rights and freedoms in the sphere of information; improvement and protection of the domestic information infrastructure and integration of Russia into the world information domain; countering the threat of opposition in the information sphere.

The use of intelligence and counterintelligence resources for the timely discovery of threats and identification of their sources is of particular importance when ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation. The system for ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security is created and developed in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, Russian Federation presidential decrees and directives, Russian Federation government decrees and resolutions, and federal programs in this area. The basis of the system for ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security consists of the agencies and resources for ensuring national security that carry out political, legal, organizational, economic, military and other measures aimed at ensuring the security of the individual, society and the state. The powers, composition, principles and operating procedure of the agencies and forces ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security are defined in the relevant Russian Federation legislative instruments. The following are involved in forming and implementing policy for ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security:

Russian Civil-Military Relations

284













the president of the Russian Federation, who within the bounds of his constitutional powers directs the agencies and resources for ensuring the Russian Federation’s national security; sanctions actions to ensure national security; in accordance with Russian Federation legislation forms, reorganizes and abolishes subordinate agencies and forces for ensuring national security; issues messages, appeals and directives on national security issues and in his annual message to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly specifies individual provisions of the Russian Federation National Security Blueprint and defines the directions of the country’s current domestic and foreign policy; the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, which on the basis of the Russian Federation constitution and on representation by the Russian Federation president and government forms the legislative framework for ensuring the state’s national security; the Russian Federation government, which within the bounds of its powers and in consideration of priorities in the area of ensuring the country’s national security formulated in annual messages of the president to the Federal Assembly, coordinates the activities of federal executive authorities as well as of executive authorities of the constituent parts of the Russian Federation, and forms items of the federal budget for implementing specific special-purpose programs in these areas; the Russian Federation Security Council, which works for the advance identification and assessment of threats to national security, drafts operational decisions to prevent them for the president; develops proposals for ensuring the country’s national security and proposals on updating individual provisions of the Russian Federation National Security Concept; coordinates the forces and agencies for ensuring national security; and monitors implementation of decisions in this area by federal executive authorities and authorities of the constituent parts of the Russian Federation; federal executive authorities, which ensure compliance with Russian Federation legislation and implementation of decisions of the Russian Federation president and government in the area of national security; within the bounds of their competence develop regulatory legal instruments in this area and submit them to the Russian Federation president and government; executive authorities of the constituent parts of the Russian Federation, which coordinate with federal executive authorities in implementing Russian Federation legislation and decisions of the Russian Federation president and government in national security, and implementing federal programs, plans and directives issued by the Supreme Commander in the area of Russian Federation defense security; with institutions of local government act to involve citizens, public associations and other organizations in helping to resolve national security problems in accordance with Russian Federation

Appendix D

285

legislation; make proposals to federal executive authorities for upgrading the system of ensuring national security. The Russian Federation intends to decisively and firmly uphold its national interests. The existing legal democratic institutions and structure of Russian Federation state authorities and the broad involvement of political parties and public associations in implementing the Russian Federation National Security Concept serve as a guarantee of Russia’s dynamic development in the 21st century.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Appendix E

Russian Military Doctrine, April 2000

The Russian Federation Military Doctrine represents a document that was examined and approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and signed into law by presidential edict No. 706 dated 21 April 2000. The document constitutes the sum total of the official views (precepts) determining the military-political, military-strategic, and military-economic foundations for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security. The Military Doctrine is a document for a transitional period, the period of the formation of democratic statehood and a mixed economy, the transformation of the state’s military organization, and the dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. Translations, by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBISCEP20000424000171) are from the original version as it appeared in the Russian language newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 22 April 2000, pages 5-6. In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original documents

 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Intended to replace the 1993 Military Doctrine and to elaborate on the military policies outlined in the new Russian national security concept, released four months earlier, the new doctrine, which has been described as defensive in nature, states that it was designed for a period of transition in both Russian politics and international relations. It addresses a broad range of topics, including the nature and causes of modern wars, the internal and external military threats facing Russia, the organization and funding of the Russian military, and the principles governing Russia’s use of force. It also addresses a variety of specific, militarily relevant issues in the technical, political, social, and economic spheres, including the implementation of arms control treaties, the threat posed by “illegally armed formations” within Russia, and the effective imposition of international sanctions. In keeping with the security concept it was intended to complement, the new doctrine appears to lower the threshold for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons below what was stated in the national security concept that was issued in 1997. Whereas the 1997 concept allowed the first use of nuclear arms only “in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation,” the new doctrine allows nuclear weapons use “in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” It also explicitly states for the first time that Russia “reserves the right” to use nuclear weapons to respond to all “weapons of mass destruction” attacks. Furthermore, the doctrine reaffirms Russia’s negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states and reiterates Russia’s extension of its nuclear umbrella to its allies.

288

Russian Civil-Military Relations

were examined for accuracy. In a few cases, the translation quoted herein has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation.

Introduction The Military Doctrine develops the Basic Guidelines for the Russian Federation’s Military Doctrine of 1993 and fleshes out in respect of the military sphere the precepts of the Russian Federation National Security Concept. The provisions of the Military Doctrine are based on a comprehensive evaluation of the state of the military-political situation and a strategic forecast of its development, on a scientifically justified definition of the current and longer-term missions, objective requirements, and real potential for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security, and also on a systematic analysis of the content and nature of modern wars and armed conflicts, and Russian and foreign experience of military organizational development and the art of war. The Military Doctrine is defensive in nature, which is predetermined by the organic combination within its provisions of a consistent adherence to peace with a firm resolve to defend national interests and guarantee the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies. The legal basis for the Military Doctrine is provided by the Russian Federation Constitution, Russian Federation federal laws and other normative legal acts, and the Russian Federation’s international treaties in the sphere of the safeguarding of military security. The Military Doctrine’s provisions may be clarified and supplemented taking account of changes in the military-political situation, the nature and makeup of military threats, and the conditions underlying the organizational development and utilization of the state’s military organization, as well as being fleshed out in the Russian Federation president’s annual messages to the Federal Assembly, in directives on planning for the use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, military formations, and organs, and in other documents on questions of safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security. Implementation of the Military Doctrine is achieved through the centralization of state and military command and control and the implementation of a range of political, diplomatic, economic, social, information, legal, military, and other measures aimed at safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

  Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoy Fedeeratsiy. Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 21 aprelya 2000 g. No. 706

Appendix E

289

I  Military-Political Principles Military-Political Situation 1. The state of and prospects for the development of the present-day militarypolitical situation are determined by the qualitative improvement in the means, forms, and methods of military conflict, by the increase in its reach and the severity of its consequences, and by its spread to new spheres. The possibility of achieving military-political goals through indirect, non-close-quarter operations predetermines the particular danger of modern wars and armed conflicts for peoples and states and for preserving international stability and peace, and makes it vitally necessary to take exhaustive measures to prevent them and to achieve a peaceful settlement of differences at early stages of their emergence and development. 2. The military-political situation is determined by the following main factors: • • • •

a decline in the threat of the unleashing of a large-scale war, including a nuclear war; the shaping and strengthening of regional power centers; the strengthening of national, ethnic, and religious extremism; the rise in separatism; the spread of local wars and armed conflicts; an increase in the regional arms race; the spread of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems; the exacerbation of information confrontation.

3. A destabilizing impact on the military-political situation is exerted by: •



• •

• •

attempts to weaken (ignore) the existing mechanism for safeguarding international security (primarily the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]); the utilization of military-force actions as a means of humanitarian intervention without the sanction of the UN Security Council, in circumvention of the generally accepted principles and norms of international law; the violation by certain states of international treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament; the utilization by entities in international relations of information and other (including nontraditional) means and technologies for aggressive (expansionist) purposes; the activities of extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements, organizations, and structures; the expansion of the scale of organized crime, terrorism, and weapons and drug trafficking, and the multinational nature of these activities.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

290

The Main Threats to Military Security 4. Under present-day conditions the threat of direct military aggression in traditional forms against the Russian Federation and its allies has declined thanks to positive changes in the international situation, the implementation of an active peace-loving foreign-policy course by our country, and the maintenance of Russia’s military potential, primarily its nuclear deterrent potential, at an adequate level. At the same time, external and internal threats to the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies persist and in certain areas are increasing. 5. The main external threats are: • •

• •

• • •









territorial claims against the Russian Federation; interference in the Russian Federation’s internal affairs; attempts to ignore (infringe) the Russian Federation’s interests in resolving international security problems, and to oppose its strengthening as one influential center in a multipolar world; the existence of seats of armed conflict, primarily close to the Russian Federation’s state border and the borders of its allies; the creation (buildup) of groups of troops (forces) leading to the violation of the existing balance of forces, close to the Russian Federation’s state border and the borders of its allies or on the seas adjoining their territories; the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation’s military security; the introduction of foreign troops in violation of the UN Charter on the territory of friendly states adjoining the Russian Federation; the creation, equipping, and training on other states’ territories of armed formations and groups with a view to transferring them for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies; attacks (armed provocations) on Russian Federation military installations located on the territory of foreign states, as well as on installations and facilities on the Russian Federation’s state border, the borders of its allies, or the high seas; actions aimed at undermining global and regional stability, not least by hampering the work of Russian systems of state and military rule, or at disrupting the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, missile-attack early warning, antimissile defense, and space monitoring systems and systems for ensuring their combat stability, nuclear munition storage facilities, nuclear power generation, the nuclear and chemical industries, and other potentially dangerous installations; hostile information (information-technical, information-psychological) operations that damage the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies; discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate

Appendix E



291

interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states; international terrorism.

6. The main internal threats are: • •



• •



an attempted violent overthrow of the constitutional order; illegal activities by extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements, organizations, and structures aimed at violating the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and destabilizing the domestic political situation in the country; the planning, preparation, and implementation of operations aimed at disrupting the functioning of federal organs of state power and attacking state, economic, or military facilities, or facilities related to vital services or the information infrastructure; the creation, equipping, training, and functioning of illegal armed formations; the illegal dissemination (circulation) on Russian Federation territory of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other means which could be used to carry out sabotage, acts of terrorism, or other illegal operations; organized crime, terrorism, smuggling, and other illegal activities on a scale threatening the Russian Federation’s military security.

Safeguarding Military Security 7. Safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security is the most important area of the state’s activity. The main goals of safeguarding military security are to prevent, localize, and neutralize military threats to the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation views the safeguarding of its military security within the context of building a democratic rule-of-law state, implementing socioeconomic reform, asserting the principles of equal partnership, mutually advantageous cooperation, and good-neighborliness in international relations, consistently shaping an overall and comprehensive international security system, and preserving and strengthening universal peace. The Russian Federation: •

• •

proceeds on the basis of the abiding importance of the fundamental principles and norms of international law, which are organically intertwined and supplement each other; maintains the status of nuclear power to deter (prevent) aggression against it and (or) its allies; implements a joint defense policy together with the Republic of Belarus, coordinates with it activities in the sphere of military organizational development, the development of the armed forces of the Union State’s member states, and the utilization of military infrastructure, and takes other

Russian Civil-Military Relations

292



• •









measures to maintain the Union State’s defense capability; attaches priority importance to strengthening the collective security system within the CIS framework on the basis of developing and strengthening the Collective Security Treaty; views as partners all states whose policies do not damage its national interests and security and do not contravene the UN Charter; gives preference to political, diplomatic, and other nonmilitary means of preventing, localizing, and neutralizing military threats at regional and global levels; strictly observes the Russian Federation’s international treaties in the sphere of arms limitation, reduction, and elimination, and promotes their implementation and the safeguarding of the arrangements they define; punctiliously implements the Russian Federation’s international treaties as regards strategic offensive arms and antimissile defense, and is ready for further reductions in its nuclear weapons, on a bilateral basis with the United States as well as on a multilateral basis with other nuclear states, to minimal levels meeting the requirements of strategic stability; advocates making universal the regime covering the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, resolutely enhancing the effectiveness of that regime through a combination of prohibitive, monitoring, and technological measures, and ending and comprehensively banning nuclear testing; promotes the expansion of confidence-building measures between states in the military sphere, including reciprocal exchanges of information of a military nature and the coordination of military doctrines, plans, military organizational development measures, and military activity.

8. The Russian Federation’s military security is safeguarded by the sum total of the forces, means, and resources at its disposal. Under present-day conditions the Russian Federation proceeds on the basis of the need to have a nuclear potential capable of guaranteeing a set level of damage to any aggressor (state or coalition of states) under any circumstances. The nuclear weapons with which the Russian Federation Armed Forces are equipped are seen by the Russian Federation as a factor in deterring aggression, safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, and maintaining international stability and peace. The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against states party to the Nonproliferation Treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons except in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation Armed Forces or other troops, its allies, or a state to which it has security commitments that is carried out

Appendix E

293

or supported by a state without nuclear weapons jointly or in the context of allied commitments with a state with nuclear weapons. The main principles for safeguarding military security are: • • • • •

the combination of firm centralized leadership of the state’s military organization with civilian control over its activities; effective forecasting, the timely identification and classification of military threats, and appropriate responses to them; sufficient forces, means, and resources to safeguard military security, and their rational utilization; the correspondence of the level of readiness, training, and provision of the state’s military organization to the requirements of military security; the refusal to damage international security and the national security of other countries.

10.  [Author’s note: number is as published; there is no number 9] Main content of safeguarding military security: (a)  Peacetime: • •

• • •





formation and implementation of a single state policy in the sphere of safeguarding military security; maintenance of domestic political stability and protection of the constitutional system, integrity, and inviolability of the territory of the Russian Federation; development and strengthening of friendly (allied) relations with neighboring and other states; creation and improvement of the system of defense of the Russian Federation and its allies; all-around support for and qualitative improvement of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, military formations, and organs (hereinafter the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops) and maintenance of their readiness for coordinated actions to avert, localize, and neutralize external and internal threats; preparation of a system of measures to transfer the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops to a war time footing (including their mobilization deployment); improvement of the economic, technological, and defense industry base; enhancement of the mobilization readiness of the economy; creation of conditions ensuring the timely switching of industrial enterprises stipulated in the plan to the production of military output; organization of the preparation of the organs of state power, enterprises, institutions: and organizations, and the country’s population for performing missions in safeguarding military security and conducting territorial and civil defense;

Russian Civil-Military Relations

294







• • • • •



protection of the Russian Federation’s facilities and installations on the high seas, in space, and on the territory of foreign states; protection of shipping, fishing, and other types of activities in the adjacent maritime zone and in distant regions of the ocean; protection and defense of the state border of the Russian Federation within the limits of border territory, airspace, and the underwater environment and of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation and their natural resources; support (where necessary) for political acts of the Russian Federation by means of the implementation of corresponding measures of a military nature and [by means of] a naval presence; preparation for territorial and civil defense; development of the necessary military infrastructure; safeguarding the security of Russian Federation citizens and protecting them from military threats; development of a conscious attitude among the population toward safeguarding the country’s military security; monitoring of the mutual fulfillment of treaties in the sphere of arms limitation, reduction, and elimination and the strengthening of confidencebuilding measures; ensuring readiness to participate (participating) in peacekeeping activities;

(b)  Periods of threat or on the commencement of war (armed conflict): •



• • •

• •

the timely declaration of a state of war; imposition of martial law or a state of emergency in the country or in particular localities within it; full or partial strategic deployment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, or units thereof; bringing them into readiness to perform their missions; coordination, in line with federal legislation, of the activities of the federal organs of state power, the organs of state power of Russian Federation components, local self-government organs, public organizations, and citizens in the interests of repulsing aggression; organization and coordinated implementation of armed, political, diplomatic, information, economic, and other forms of struggle; adoption and implementation of decisions on the preparation for and pursuit of military operations; the switching of the country’s economy and of individual sectors of it, enterprises and organizations, transportation, and communications onto a footing of work in the conditions of a state of war; organization and implementation of territorial and civil defense measures; provision of aid to allies of the Russian Federation; enlistment and realization of their potential for achieving joint objectives in a war (armed conflict);

Appendix E

• •

295

prevention of the enlistment of other states in the war (armed conflict) on the side of the aggressor; utilization of the potential of the United Nations and other international organizations to prevent aggression, force the aggressor to end the war (armed conflict) at an early stage, and restore international security and peace.

The State’s Military Organization 11. The objectives of safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation are served by the state’s military organization. 12. The state’s military organization includes the Russian Federation Armed Forces, which constitute its nucleus and the basis of safeguarding military security; other troops, military formations, and organs designed for the performance of military security missions by military methods; and their command and control organs. The state’s military organization also includes that part of the country’s industrial and scientific complexes that is intended for performing missions relating to military security. 13. The main aim of the development of the state’s military organization is to ensure guaranteed protection of the national interests and military security of the Russian Federation and its allies. 14.  Basic principles of development of the state’s military organization: • • • •

• •

appropriate consideration of conclusions drawn from the analysis of the state of and prospects for the development of the military-political situation; centralization of leadership; sole command on a legal basis; attainable correspondence, within the limits of the country’s economic potential, between, on the one hand, the level of combat and mobilization training, the preparedness of organs of military command and control and of the troops (forces), their structures, fighting strength and strength of the reserve, and reserves of material means and resources, and, on the other hand, the missions of safeguarding military security; unity of training and education; implementation of servicemen’s rights and freedoms and safeguarding of their social protection and appropriate social status and living standard. The development of all components of the state’s military organization takes place in accordance with normative labor acts governing their activity and on the basis of agreed and coordinated programs and plans.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

296

15.  Main priorities of development of the state’s military organization: • • •



creation of an integrated system of command and control of the state’s military organization and the ensuring of its effective functioning; development and improvement of the troops (forces) ensuring strategic deterrence (including nuclear deterrence); creation and maintenance in necessary readiness of structures for preparing mobilization resources and for ensuring the mobilization deployment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops; manning, equipping, all-around support, and preparation of combined units and troop units for a state of permanent combat readiness of generalpurpose forces for performing missions of deterrence and the conduct of combat operations in local wars and armed conflicts.

16.  Basic principles of development of the state’s military organization: •





• •



• • • • •

bringing the structure, composition, and strength of components of the state’s military organization into line with the missions of safeguarding military security taking into account the country’s economic potential; increasing the qualitative level, effectiveness, and security of functioning of the technological basis of the system of state and military command and control; improving military-economic support for the state’s military organization on the basis of the concentration and rational utilization of financial and material resources; improving strategic planning on the principle of unity of use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops; increasing the effectiveness of functioning of systems of personnel training, military education, operational and combat training, education of servicemen, all types of support, and military science; improving the system of manning (on the basis of the contract and draft principle, with a gradual increase as the necessary socioeconomic conditions are created in the proportion of servicemen carrying out military service under contract, first and foremost in the posts of junior commanding officers and specialists in the leading combat specialties); increasing the effectiveness of the system of operation and maintenance of arms and military equipment; improving special information support for the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops and their command and control organs; strengthening the rule of law, order, and military discipline; implementing state policy in strengthening the prestige of military service and preparing Russian Federation citizens for it; developing international military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation;

Appendix E



297

improving the normative legal base for the organizational development and the development and utilization of the state’s military organization and its system of relations with society.

17. An integral part and a priority task of the present stage of military organizational development is the implementation of comprehensive military reform determined by the radical changes in the military-political situation and the missions and conditions of safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation. Within the framework of military reform, an interconnected, coordinated reform of all components of the state’s military organization takes place. Leadership of the State’s Military Organization 18. Leadership of the organizational development, preparation, and utilization of the state’s military organization and of safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation is exercised by the president of the Russian Federation, who is supreme commander in chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. 19. The Russian Federation Government organizes the equipping of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops with arms and military and special equipment and their furnishing with material means, resources, and services; exercises overall leadership of the operational equipping of the territory of the Russian Federation in the interests of defense; and carries out other functions established by federal legislation to ensure military security. 20. The federal organs of state power, organs of state power of the Russian Federation components, and local self-government organs exercise the powers vested in them by federal legislation in safeguarding military security. Enterprises, institutions, organizations, public associations, and citizens of the Russian Federation participate in safeguarding military security according to the procedure laid down by federal legislation. 21.  Command and control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops is exercised by the leaders of the corresponding federal organs of executive power. 22. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry coordinates the activity of federal organs of executive power and organs of executive power of the Russian Federation components on questions of defense, the formulation of concepts for the organizational development and the development of other troops, and orders for arms and military equipment for them, and formulates with the participation of the corresponding federal organs of executive power the concept of development of arms and military and special equipment and the federal state armaments program and proposals on the state defense order.

298

Russian Civil-Military Relations

The Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff is the main organ of operational command and control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, coordinating the activity and organizing the collaboration of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops in performing missions in the defense sphere. The directorates of the commanders in chief (commanders) of branches (arms) of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (troops) carry out the formulation and implementation of plans for the organizational development and utilization of branches (arms) of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (troops) and their operational and mobilization training, technical equipment, and personnel training, and carry out command and control of the troops (forces) and their day-to-day activities and the development of the basing system and infrastructure. The directorates of military districts (operational-strategic commands) carry out command and control of inter-branch groups of general-purpose troops (forces) and the planning and organization of measures relating to joint training with other troops, military formations, and organs for safeguarding military security within the established limits of responsibility taking into account their missions and the integrated system of military-administrative division of the territory of the Russian Federation. 23. In order to carry out command and control of coalition groupings of troops (forces) the corresponding joint organs of military command and control are set up by a coordinated decision of the organs of state power of the countries participating in the coalition. 24.  With a view to centralized leadership in safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation, integrated strategic and operational planning takes place in relation to the utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops in the interests of defense, as well as program-targeted planning of military organizational development envisaging the formulation of long-term (1015 years), medium-term (4-5 years) and short-term (1-2 years) documents. 25. Organization of the leadership of safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation in a period of threat and the creation and functioning of the corresponding organs of state power and organs of military command and control are regulated by corresponding legislative and other normative legal acts of the Russian Federation.

II  Military-Strategic Principles Nature of Wars and Armed Conflicts 1. The Russian Federation maintains a readiness to wage war and take part in armed conflicts exclusively with a view to preventing and repulsing aggression,

Appendix E

299

protecting the integrity and inviolability of its territory, and safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security as well as that of its allies in accordance with international treaties. 2.  The nature of modern wars (armed conflicts) is determined by their militarypolitical goals, the means of achieving those goals, and the scale of the military operations. In accordance with this modern war (armed conflict) may be: •

• •

in terms of military-political goals just (not contravening the UN Charter and the fundamental norms and principles of international law, and waged as self-defense by the party subject to aggression); unjust (contravening the UN Charter and the fundamental norms and principles of international law, falling within the definition of aggression, and waged by the party undertaking the armed attack); in terms of means utilized using nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction; using only conventional weapons; in terms of scale, local, regional, or large-scale.

3. The main general features of modern war are: • • •

• • •









its impact on all spheres of human activity; its coalition nature; the extensive use of indirect, non-close-quarter, and other (including nontraditional) forms and means of operation, and long-range effective engagement and electronic engagement; a desire on the part of the sides to disrupt the system of state and military command and control; the use of highly efficient state-of-the-art systems of arms and military hardware (including those based on new physical principles); highly maneuverable operations by troops (forces) in disparate areas with the extensive utilization of air-mobile forces, airborne troops and specialpurpose forces; attacks against troops (forces), rear-service and economic facilities, and means of communication throughout the territory of each of the warring parties; the implementation of air campaigns and operations; the catastrophic consequences of hitting (destroying) power-generation enterprises (above all nuclear), chemical and other dangerous production facilities, infrastructure, means of communication, and vital installations; a high likelihood of new states being drawn into the war, the escalation of warfare, and the expansion of the scale and range of the means employed, including weapons of mass destruction; the participation in the war of irregular armed formations alongside regular

Russian Civil-Military Relations

300

units. 4.  Armed conflict can arise in the form of an armed incident, an armed action, and other armed clashes on a limited scale and be the consequence of an attempt to resolve national, ethnic, religious, or other differences with the help of the means of military conflict. Border conflict is a special form of armed conflict. Armed conflict can be international in nature (involving two or several states) or international [author’s note: as published] and internal in nature (with armed confrontation being conducted within the territory of a single state). 5.  Armed conflict is characterized by: • • • • •



a high degree of involvement and vulnerability of the local population; the use of irregular armed formations; the extensive utilization of sabotage and terrorist methods; the complex moral and psychological atmosphere in which the troops operate; the enforced diversion of considerable forces and assets to safeguard the security of transportation routes or areas and locations where troops (forces) are sited; the threat that it may be transformed into a local ([in the case of an] international armed conflict) or civil ([in the case of an] internal armed conflict) war.

6.  Unified (multi departmental) groups of troops (forces) and command and control units may be set up to perform missions in an internal armed conflict. 7.  A local war may be waged by groups of troops (forces) deployed in a conflict zone, being reinforced if necessary by transfers of troops, forces, and assets from other areas and the implementation of the partial strategic deployment of armed forces. In a local war the sides will operate within the borders of the warring states and pursue limited military-political goals. 8.  A regional war may result from the escalation of a local war or armed conflict and be waged with the involvement of two or several states (groups of states) in a single region, by national or coalition armed forces utilizing both conventional and nuclear weapons. In a regional war the sides will pursue important military-political goals. 9.  A large-scale war may result from an escalation of an armed conflict, local or regional war, or from the involvement in them of a significant number of states from different parts of the world.

Appendix E

301

A large-scale war utilizing only conventional weapons will be characterized by a high likelihood of escalating into a nuclear war with catastrophic consequences for civilization and the foundations of human life and existence. In a large-scale war the sides will set radical military-political goals. It requires the total mobilization of all the material and spiritual resources of the states involved. 10. A large-scale (regional) war may be preceded by a period of threat. 11. A large-scale (regional) war may have an initial period, the main component of which is an intense armed struggle to gain the strategic initiative, preserve stable state and military command and control, achieve supremacy in the information sphere, and win (maintain) air superiority. In the event of a prolonged large-scale (regional) war its goals will be achieved in the subsequent and final periods. 12.  The Russian Federation consistently and firmly strives for the creation of an effective system of political, legal, organizational, technical, and other international guarantees to prevent armed conflicts and wars. Principles Governing the Use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and Other Troops 13. The Russian Federation considers it lawful to utilize the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops to repulse aggression directed against it. The Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops can also be used for protection against unconstitutional actions or illegal armed violence threatening the integrity and inviolability of Russian Federation territory, to perform missions in accordance with the Russian Federation’s international treaties, and to perform other missions in accordance with federal legislation. 14. The goals of the use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops are: •



in a large-scale (regional) war in the event that it is unleashed by a state (group or coalition of states)to protect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies, to repulse aggression, to effectively engage the enemy, and to force it to end its military operations on terms according with the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies; in local wars and international armed conflicts to localize the seat of tension, to create the prerequisites for ending the war or armed conflict or for bringing it to an end at an early stage; to neutralize the aggressor and achieve a settlement on terms according with the interests of the Russian

Russian Civil-Military Relations

302





Federation and its allies; in internal armed conflicts to rout and liquidate illegal armed formations, to create the conditions for a full settlement of the conflict on the basis of the Russian Federation Constitution and federal legislation; in peacekeeping and peace restoration operations to disengage the warring factions, to stabilize the situation, and to ensure the conditions for a just peace settlement.

15. The main ways of utilizing the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops are: • • • • •

strategic operations, operations, and combat operations in large-scale and regional wars; operations and combat operations in local wars and international armed conflicts; joint special operations in internal armed conflicts; counterterrorist operations in the fight against terrorism in accordance with federal legislation; peacekeeping operations.

16. The Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops should be prepared to repulse aggression, effectively engage an aggressor, and conduct active operations (both defense and offensive) under any scenario for the unleashing and waging of wars and armed conflicts, under conditions of the massive use by the enemy of modern and advanced combat weapons, including weapons of mass destruction of all types. At the same time, the Russian Federation Armed Forces must ensure the implementation of peacekeeping activities by the Russian Federation both independently and as part of international organizations. 17. The main missions of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops are: (a)  in safeguarding military security: •





the timely disclosure of a threatening development in the military-political situation or of preparations for an armed attack against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies; maintenance of the composition, condition, combat and mobilization readiness, and training of the strategic nuclear forces, and of the forces and assets ensuring their functioning and utilization, as well as of command and control systems, at a level guaranteeing a set level of damage for an aggressor under any circumstances; maintenance of combat potential, combat and mobilization readiness, and preparation of peacetime general-purpose groups of troops (forces) at a

Appendix E

• • •

• • •



• • • • • •

303

level ensuring the repulsing of aggression on a local scale; maintenance of arms and military (special) equipment and reserves of material resources in readiness for combat use; carrying out of alert duty (combat service) by assigned (appointed) troops, forces, and resources; high-quality and complete fulfillment of plans and programs for operational, combat, and mobilization training and education of personnel of the troops (forces); maintenance of readiness for strategic deployment within the framework of state measures to put the country onto a wartime footing; protection and defense of the Russian Federation state border; development of the air defense of the Russian Federation as an integrated system based on centralized command and control of all air defense forces and resources; creation of the conditions for the security of economic activity and protection of the Russian Federation’s national interests in the territorial seas, on the continental shelf, and in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation as well as on the high seas; protection of important state facilities; prevention and termination of acts of sabotage and terrorism; prevention of ecological and other emergencies and elimination of their consequences; organization of civil and territorial defense; safeguarding of technical cover and restoration of means of communication; safeguarding of information security.

The performance of missions in defense of the Russian Federation’s national interests on the high seas takes place in accordance with the Fundamentals of Russian Federation Policy in the Sphere of Naval Activity. All missions in safeguarding military security are carried out by the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops in coordination, in close collaboration, and in accordance with their functions as stipulated by federal legislation, (b)  in rebuffing an armed attack (aggression) on the Russian Federation and (or) its allies: • •



partial or full strategic deployment; conduct of strategic operations, operations, and combat operations (including jointly with allied states) to rout the invaders and eliminate groups of troops (forces) that have been (are being) created by the aggressor in regions where they are based or concentrated and on communication routes; maintenance of readiness for utilization, and utilization (in cases envisaged by the Military Doctrine and in accordance with the stipulated procedure)

Russian Civil-Military Relations

304

• • • •

of the nuclear deterrent potential; localization and neutralization of border armed conflicts; maintenance of the regime of martial law (state of emergency); protection of the population, economic facilities, and the infrastructure against the enemy’s weapons; fulfillment of the Russian Federation’s allied commitments in accordance with international treaties.

The performance of missions in repulsing an armed attack (aggression) is organized and implemented in accordance with the Plan for Utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Mobilization Plan of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, edicts of the Russian Federation president on military security issues, orders and directives of the supreme commander in chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and other normative legal acts, plans, and directive documents; (c)  in domestic armed conflicts: •

• • • • • • •

the routing and liquidation of illegal armed formations and bandit and terrorist groups and organizations and the destruction of their bases, training centers, depots, and communications; restoration of the rule of law, and of law and order; safeguarding of public security and stability; maintenance of the legal regime of a state of emergency in the conflict zone; localization and blockading of the conflict zone; termination of armed clashes and disengagement of the warring parties; confiscation of weapons from the population in the conflict zone; strengthening of protection of public order and security in regions adjacent to the conflict zone.

The performance of missions in the prevention and termination of domestic armed conflicts, the localization and blockading of conflict zones, and the elimination of illegal armed formations, bands, and terrorist groups is entrusted to joint (multidepartmental) groups of troops (forces) created on an ad hoc basis and their organs of command and control; (d)  in operations to maintain and restore peace: • • • •

disengagement of the conflicting parties’ armed groups; safeguarding of the conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the civilian population and their evacuation from the conflict zone; blockading of the conflict zone with a view to ensuring the implementation of sanctions adopted by the international community; creation of the preconditions for a political settlement.

Appendix E

305

The performance of missions in operations to maintain and restore peace is entrusted to the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In order to prepare for these missions, specially appointed combined units and troop units are identified. Alongside their preparation for utilization for their immediate purpose, they are trained according to a special program. The Russian Federation carries out rear and technical support, training, and preparation of Russian contingents, the planning of their utilization, and operational command and control in line with the standards and procedures of the United Nations, the OSCE, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 18.  Forces and resources of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops may be enlisted to provide assistance to the organs of state power, organs of local self-government, and the population in eliminating the consequences of accidents, disasters, and natural disasters. 19. In order to perform the missions facing the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, groups of troops (forces) are created on the territory of the Russian Federation taking into account: • • • •

• • • •

the degree of the potential military danger in specific strategic sectors; the nature of the Russian Federation’s relations with contiguous states; the location of the Russian Federation’s vitally important industrial regions and regions of strategic resources and specially important facilities; the potential for strategic deployment in the threatened sectors in conjunction with the lowest possible volume of transport movements, and also inter regional maneuvering; the potential for the timely withdrawal of troops (forces) and material and technical reserves out of range of probable missile and air strikes; the conditions for the billeting and provision of essential services for troops and for resolving social and living problems; the presence and status of the mobilization deployment base; the sociopolitical situation in specific regions.

20.  With a view to forming and maintaining stability and ensuring an appropriate response to the emergence of external threats at an early stage, limited contingents of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops may be deployed in strategically important regions outside the territory of the Russian Federation, in the form of joint or national groups and individual bases (facilities). The conditions for such deployment are defined by the appropriate international legal documents. 21.  When mixed military formations of the CIS are created, they are manned by servicemen of the member states in accordance with their national legislation and

306

Russian Civil-Military Relations

the interstate agreements adopted. Servicemen who are citizens of the Russian Federation serve in such formations, as a rule, under contract. Russian troop formations located on the territory of foreign states, irrespective of the conditions of deployment, form part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops and operate in accordance with the procedure there established, taking into account the requirements of the UN Charter, UN Security Council resolutions, and the Russian Federation’s bilateral and multilateral treaties. 22. In order to create and develop the state’s military infrastructure so as to support the strategic deployment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops and their pursuit of military operations, the operational equipping of the Russian Federation’s territory with a view to defense is carried out under the leadership of the Russian Federation Government and on the basis of a federal state program. 23. The stockpiling and maintenance of reserves of material resources is organized by the Russian Federation Government in accordance with plans for the creation of state and mobilization reserves approved by the Russian Federation president. The Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops and organs of executive power, in accordance with federal legislation, carry out in peacetime the stockpiling, echelonment, disposition, and maintenance of reserves of material resources to support the mobilization deployment of troops (forces) and their conduct of combat operations in the initial period of a war (for certain types of material resources also for a longer period, based on the time scale for switching the economy of the country and its individual sectors and enterprises onto working according to the established plan), and the formation, preparation, regrouping, and utilization of strategic reserves. The planning of the stockpiling, echelonment, and disposition of operational reserves of material resources and their maintenance for other troops that are made operationally subordinate to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry during a special period are carried out by the said ministry. 24. The planning of citizens’ preparation for military service, military registratio3n, and registration of means of transport made available to the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops are carried out under the overall leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff. 25. In both peacetime and wartime, preparation of the country for territorial and civil defense is carried out and a range of measures are implemented to ensure the stable functioning of economic facilities, transportation, and communications and ensure readiness for emergency rescue and other work in stricken [contaminated] areas and zones of accidents, disasters, and natural disasters.

Appendix E

307

III  Military-Economic Principles Military-Economic Provision for Military Security 1. The main aim of military-economic provision is to meet the needs of the state’s military organization for financial and material resources. 2. The main missions of military-economic provision are: • •



• •

• •

• • • •

to ensure timely and full financial provision for the missions being performed by the state’s military organization; to optimize expenditure of the material resources and funds channeled into safeguarding military security, and to enhance the efficiency of their use on the basis of the interlinked and coordinated reform of all components of the states’ [as published] military organization; to develop the scientific, technical, technological, and production base of the country of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, and of the military infrastructure in the interest of safeguarding military security; to ensure legal protection for the intellectual property contained in military products and in the techniques used to develop and produce them; to integrate the civil and military sectors of the country’s economy and to coordinate the state’s military-economic activity in the interest of safeguarding military security; to create the state’s infrastructure taking account of the performance of missions to safeguard military security; to enhance the level of social provision for servicemen and civilian personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, as well as citizens working in the defense-industry complex; to ensure the functioning of and improve systems of mobilization readiness and mobilization preparation of the country’s economy and population; to build up and maintain stockpiles of material resources; to implement mutually advantageous international military (militarypolitical) and military-technical cooperation; to implement the Russian Federation’s international treaties in the militaryeconomic sphere.

3. The priority missions of military-economic provision are: to ensure timely and full (within the limits of the state’s existing financial resources) financial provision for plans for the organizational development, development, and combat and mobilization training of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, and of the requirements for all components of the state’s military organization; •

to ensure economic and financial provision for upgrading strategic and

Russian Civil-Military Relations

308





conventional arms and military and specialized equipment; to create the economic and financial conditions for the development and production of highly efficient standardized command and control of troops and control of weapon assets, communications, intelligence-gathering, strategic-early warning, and electronic warfare systems, and precision mobile non-nuclear weapons and the information support systems for them; to enhance living standards and implement the social guarantees laid down by federal legislation for servicemen and their family members;

4. The main principles of military-economic provision are: •

• •



to bring the level of financial and material provision for the state’s military organization into line with the requirements of military security and the state’s resource potential; to focus financial, material, technical, and intellectual resources on resolving the key tasks of safeguarding military security; to provide state support for enterprises (production facilities) and institutions (organizations) determining the military-technical and technological stability of the defense-industry complex, factory-town enterprises, and closed administrative territorial entities; to ensure scientific, technical, technological, information, and resource independence in the development and production of the main types of military output.

5. The basic guidelines for the mobilization preparation of the economy are: the preparation of an economic management system to ensure stable functioning during the period of transition to work under martial law conditions and during wartime; •

• • • •



the creation, improvement, and effective functioning of a system of mobilization preparation for organs of state power, as well as organizations and enterprises with mobilization missions; the optimization and development of the requisite mobilization capacity and facilities; the creation, accumulation, preservation, and renewal of stockpiles of material resources in mobilization and state reserves; the creation and preservation of fallback stocks of design and technical documentation for wartime; the preservation and development of the economic facilities required for the stable functioning of the economy and the population’s survival during wartime; the preparation of the financial, credit, and tax systems and the moneysupply system for a special system of functioning

Appendix E



309

the development and improvement of the normative-legal base for mobilization preparation and the transition of the Russian Federation economy, Russian Federation components, and municipal formations to work in accordance with the established plans.

International Military (Military-Political) and Military-Technical Cooperation 6. The Russian Federation implements international military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation on the basis of its own national interests and the need to ensure the balanced performance of the missions of safeguarding military security. International military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation is the state’s prerogative. 7. The Russian Federation implements international military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation on the basis of foreign-policy and economic expediency and the missions of safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, in accordance with federal legislation and the Russian Federation’s international treaties, on the basis of the principles of equal rights, mutual advantage, and good-neighborliness, and observing the interests of international stability and national, regional, and global security. 8. The Russian Federation attaches priority importance to the development of military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation with CIS Collective Security Treaty states on the basis of the need to consolidate the efforts to create a single defense area and safeguard collective military security. The Russian Federation, reaffirming its fundamental adherence to the ideas of deterring aggression, preventing wars and armed conflicts, and maintaining international security and universal peace, guarantees the consistent and firm implementation of the Military Doctrine.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Bibliography

Primary Sources Arbatov, Alexei. Conversations with the author at the Radisson Slavyanskaya Hotel, Moscow, 26 January 1999; and at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow, 11 November 1999. Feaver, Peter D. Interview by the author (telephone), 13 June 2005. Felgenhauer, Pavel. Interviews with the author in Moscow, February 2000 and May 2001. Gareyev, Makhmut. Interview by the author at the Embassy of Poland in Moscow, February 2000. Golts, Alexander. Interviews with the author in Moscow, December 2000 and February 2001. Ilyin, Vladislav (Admiral, (then) First Deputy Chief of the Russian Navy Staff). Interview by the author at Harvard University, March 2002. Ivashov, Leonid (General Colonel, then Head of the Department of International Cooperation, Ministry of Defense). Briefing for foreign military attachés diplomatically accredited to the Russian Federation, at the Ministry of Defense in Moscow, March 1999; Interview by the author, at the Ministry of Defense in Moscow, Moscow, May 1999. Kipp, Jacob. Interview by the author at the Foreign Military Studies Office in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6-7 July 2005. Kuroyedov, Vladimir. Annual briefing for foreign naval attachés diplomatically accredited to the Russian Federation, speaking to the author, Central Navy Headquarters in Moscow, 4 December 2000. As U.S. Naval Attaché to Russia (1998-2001) the author met with Kuroyedov on nine different occasions. Kvashnin, Anatoliy (Colonel General, Chief of the General Staff). Interview by the author in Moscow, 12 June 2000. Manilov, Valeriy Leonidovich (Colonel General, Deputy Chief of the General Staff). Interview by the author, Harvard Faculty Club, Cambridge, MA, 19-20 February, 2000. McCready, Geoffrey (Captain, Royal Navy and U.K. Naval Attaché). Interview by the author at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 16 August 2000. Rogov, Sergei (Director, USA and Canada Studies Institute). Interviews with the author in Moscow, June 2000, December 2000, and May 2001. Scanlon, Michael (Acting U.S. Consul General). Interview by the author in Vladivostok, 24-27 July 1999.

312

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Stepashin, Sergei (Prime Minister of the Russian Federation). Conversation with the author in Vladivostok, Russia, 26 July 1999. Thomas, Timothy Lee (Senior Analyst). Interview by the author at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 July 2005. Yavlinsky, Gregoriy. Interview by the author at Harvard University, March 2002. Yesin, Victor Ivanovich (General Colonel, National Security Council Directorate of Military Organizational Development). Conversation with the author at Williamsburg, VA, 12 June 1999.

Russian Sources Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Interfax-AVN). [FBIS] CEP20021227000158, “Defense Ministry Concerned About Pskov,” Interfax-AVN, Moscow, in English language, 27 December 2002. Anasovskiy, Aleksandr (Vremya Correspondent). [FBIS] CEP20000821000342, “Interview with Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev,” Russian Public Television ORT1, Moscow, in original Russian language, FBIS translated text, edited by the author, 21 August 2000. Babayeva, Svetlana. [FBIS] FTS19990705000209, “Caucasus Tangle That Doesn’t Want To Go Anywhere,” Izvestiya, Moscow, in original Russian language, 3 July 1999. Bantin, Vyacheslav. [FBIS] FTS19990708000291, “To Intensify The War Against Organized Crime, Whose Leaders Are Straining To Get Their Hands On Power,” ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, reporting in original Russian language, 8 July 1999. Baranets, Victor. [FBIS] FTS00061599, “Drive to Pristina Airport Chronicled,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow, 15 June 1999, original report in Russian language, translated by FBIS, edited by the author. Batuyev, Valeriy. [FBIS] FTS19990810000797, “Dagestan Seen as Pretext for Ousting Stepashin,” Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Moscow, in original Russian language, 10 August 1999, 2. Borislov, Dmitriy. [FBIS] FTS19990702000622, “Russian Cabinet of Ministers Discuss Caucasus Strategy,” Vesti news program, Russian Television Network (RTN), Moscow, in original Russian language, 2 July 1999. Brannon, Robert. Final Report on the Submarine Kursk, research based on the author’s personal notes, as U.S. Naval Attaché in Moscow at the time of the events, and on Ilya Klebanov’s final investigation reports as published in Russian language in Rossiskaya Gazeta in August 2002. The author assisted in the unofficial translation of this document, and subsequent commentary, as published in Johnson’s Russia List in September 2002. Brannon, Robert. Memorandum for the record: “For whatever reasons, probably related to mistrust, resentment and fear, the Russian Navy chose to firewall

Bibliography

313

every single effort on our part to help them,” U.S. Embassy, Moscow, 15 September 2000. Bulavinov, Ilya. [FBIS] FTS19990705000404, “Zapad-99 Strategic Command And Staff Exercise Scenario Supposed A Blockade Of Kaliningrad Followed By A Preventive Russian Nuclear Strike,” Kommersant, Moscow, in original Russian language, 3 July 1999, 1-2. CDI Russia Weekly. “Russia: Former Agent (Colonel Aleksandr Litvinenko) Points Finger at FSB,” accessed at 25 July 2002. Cherkashin, Nikolai A. “Tragedy of the Submarine Cruiser Kursk,” published in the original Russian language, St. Petersburg Sailors and Submariners Club Submarine Fleet, 5 (2001), 23. Chernaven, Vladimir N. Military Dictionary (Ministry of Defense, Moscow, USSR, 1990), in original Russian language. Clover, Charles. “Tracing the Growing Influence of the Right-Wing Theories of Alexander Dugin: Ivashov was Mastermind of Russia’s Takeover at Pristina Airport, Kosovo in 1999,” The Financial Times (U.K.), 2 December 2000. Cohen, William. Letter from U.S. Secretary of Defense to Russian Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev, documented in the professional files of the author, acting in the capacity of U.S. Naval Attaché in Russia at the time of the incident, August 2000. The author holds the original (faxed) letters. Dekterev, Vladimir. [FBIS] FTS19960625000506, Moscow, 25 June 1996 [FBIS translated text]. Commentary by Vladimir Dekterev under the “Opinion” rubric: “Generals Fired Over Interest in Yeltsin Campaign Funds.” Felgenhauer, Pavel. “Degradation of the Russian Military,” ISCP 15 (10 November 2004), 1 accessed in September 2005. Felgenhauer, Pavel. “Russian Military After Ivanov,” Moscow Times, Moscow, in English language, 21 May 2007. Flore, Igor. [FBIS] FTS19990825001696, “Strategic Missile Commander in Chief Preparing Nuclear Strike on Chechnya,” Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Moscow, 26 August 1999, in original Russian language, translated by FBIS. Galkin, Andrei. [FBIS] FTS19990703000316, “Moscow Ready for Emergency Regime in North Caucasus,” RIA Novosti, Moscow, in English language, 3 July 1999. Gazeta (unattributed). Russian News Journal, Gazeta, Moscow, September 19, 2006. Gordon, Michael R. “A Look at How the Kremlin Slid Into the Chechen War,” New York Times International, February 2000, 6. Interfax, Open Source Center CEP20070309950300. 9 March 2007. Interfax. [FBIS] CEP20000818000034, “Russian Paper in Severomorsk Publishes List of Submarine’s Crew,” Interfax, Moscow, in English language, 18 August 2000.

314

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Interfax. [FBIS] CPP20000823000136, “Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev and Commanders of Navy and Northern Fleet have Tendered their Resignations to President Vladimir Putin over Kursk Submarine Accident,” Interfax News Agency, in English language, 23 August 2000. Interfax. [FBIS] FTS19990826000179, “Russian Defense Ministry Confirms Bombing of Chechnya,” Interfax, Moscow, in English language, 26 August 1999. ITAR-TASS (without by-line). [FBIS] CEP20010729000017, “Putin Signs Russian Naval Doctrine,” ITAR-TASS, Moscow, in original Russian language, 29 July 2001. ITAR-TASS. [FBIS] FTS19990811000766, ITAR-TASS, Moscow, in original Russian language, 11 August 1999. Ivanov, Ivan. [FBIS] FTS 19990723000257, “Situation in Chechnya Intensifies,” ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, reporting in English language, 23 July 1999. Kavkaz Center. Accessed on numerous occasions during the period August-September 2005 to obtain the views of Chechen rebels. Khinshteyn, Aleksandr. [FBIS] FTS19991104001487, “Mutiny on the General Staff: Chief Was Set to Resign Over Kremlin Duplicity,” Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Moscow, in original Russian language, 5 November 1999. Khudobina, Tatyana. [FBIS] FTS19990715001806, “Russian Official on Security in Chechnya,” interview with Ivan Golubev, Russian Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, on “Podrobnosti” (Details) news program, Russian Television Network (RTN), Moscow, in original Russian language, 15 July 1999. Klebanov, Ilya. Final Report on the Submarine Kursk, Rossiskaya Gazeta news journal, Moscow, in original Russian language, 29 August 2002, accessed online at translated into English (by many different sources, including this author) and reprinted in Johnson’s Russia List on 23 September 2002. Klimenko, Anatoliy, and Koltuykov, Aleksandr. “Osnovnoy dokument voyennogo stroitelstva,” Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 13 February 1998, 4. Kokoshin, Andrei. “Armiya i Politika: Sovetskaya Voyenno-Politicheskaya i Voyenno-Strategicheskaya Mysl: 1918-1991” [Army and Politics: Soviet Military-Political and Military-Strategic Thought: 1918-1991], Moscow, 1995. Kommersant. [FBIS] FTS19990817000424, “Russia, Chechnya on Brink of War,” Kommersant, Moscow, in original Russian language, 17 August 1999, 1-3. Kommersant. [FBIS] FTS199907290000813, “Khattab’s Gunmen Blow up Truck Carrrying Soldiers,” Kommersant, Moscow, in original Russian language, 29 July 1999, 3. Kommersant. [FBIS] FTS19990813000514, “Dagestan Clash Becoming FullScale War: First Phase of Occupation of Dagestan Is Complete, Fuel-Air Bombs Annihilate Bandits,” Kommersant, report by crime and politics desks, Moscow, in original Russian language, 13 August 1999, 13.

Bibliography

315

Kommersant-Vlast. [FBIS] CEP20000830000201, “Transcript of Putin’s Meeting with Kursk Relatives,” Kommersant-Vlast, Moscow, in original Russian language, FBIS translated text edited by the author, 29 August 2000. Komsomolskaya Pravda (unknown author). [FBIS] CEP20000817000248, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow, in original Russian language, 18 August 2000. Koppel, Ted. “Russian Revolutions,” American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Nightline television program, six part documentary series, interviews, quote from Part VI, March 2000. Koretskiy, Aleksandr. [FBIS] CEP19990827000105, “Sergeyev Discomfited Again. Defense Minister Turns Out To Be Unaware of Night Bombing Raid Against Chechen Territory,” Sevodnya, Moscow, in original Russian language, 26 August 1999, 1-2. Korotchenko, Igor, and Mukhin, Vladimir. “Russians Steal a March on NATO in Kosovo,” Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 51:24 (14 July 1999), 4. Korzhakov, Aleksandr. Boris Yeltsin: Ot Rassveta Do Zakata : Posleslovie (From Dawn to Sunset) (Moskva: Detektiv-Press, 2004), in original Russian language. Krasnaya Zvezda. “Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii: Proyekt,” (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation) Krasnaya Zvyezda, Moscow, 9 October 1999. Report on a meeting of Russia’s National Security Council in April 1999 (the first chaired by Vladimir Putin as Secretary). Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow 11 October 2003, “Media See Putin, Ivanov Presenting ‘New Military Doctrine.’” Accessed on 12 November 2007. Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow 25 October 2003, “Russian First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Baluyevskiy Comments on Latest ‘Doctrine.’” Accessed on 12 November 2007. Krichevskiy, Dmitriy, and Khrekov, Anton. “Chief of Staff Kvashnin Said to Have Ordered Troop Deployment,” television broadcast on NTV, Moscow, 12 June 1999, transcript of original Russian language television broadcast, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Krutikov, Yevgeniy. [FBIS] FTS19990706001238, “MVD Anti-Chechen Preventive Strikes Eyed: Strategy for Combating Chechen Gunmen,” Izvestiya, Moscow, in original Russian language, translated by FBIS and edited by the author, 6 July 1999, 2. Krutikov, Yevgeniy. [FBIS] FTS19990707001308, “Retaliatory Strike. Russia and Chechnya on Brink of War Again,” Izvestiya, Moscow, in original Russian language, translated by FBIS and edited by the author, 8 July 1999, 1. Kuzmin, A. [FBIS] FTS19960901000410, “Rosvorozheniye: Splitting the Legacy.” Argumenty i Fakti, Moscow, 1 September 1996 [in Russian], FBIS translated text, edited by the author. Law on Defense. Federalniy zakon “Ob Oborone,” prinyat Gosudarstvennoy Dumoy 24 Aprelya 1996 goda, Оdobren Sovetom Federatsiy 15 Maya 1996

316

Russian Civil-Military Relations

goda. (Federal Law “On Defense,” enacted by the State Duma on 24 April 1996, approved by the Federation Council on 15 May 1996.) Originally obtained in the Russian language, accessed August 2005, translated directly by the author. Learning Channel. “Raising the Kursk,” produced by Cine Nova Productions for The Discovery Channel, VHS Tape #769539, 2001. Lebed, Aleksandr. [FBIS] FTS19961022000678, Moscow, Argumenty i Fakty [in Russian], 22 October 1996. Interview with Aleksandr Lebed, former head of the security council, by an unnamed interviewer; place and date not given. Levshin, V., Nedelin, A., and Sosnovskiy, M. “O primenenii yadernogo oruzhiya dlya deeskalatsii voyennykh deystviy,” Voyennaya Mysl, 3, May-June 1999, 34-37. Litovkin, Victor. RIA Novosti, Moscow, in English language, 5 September 2005. Livi, Roberto. [FBIS] FTS19960524000451, Rome, Il Messagero, in Italian, 24 May 1996. Interview with Russian General Nikita Chaldimov by Roberto Livi in Moscow; date not given: “A High-Ranking Russian Commander Reassures the Kremlin: No Coups.” [FBIS translated text] Abstract: Armed Forces Intervention in Election Campaign Ruled Out. Lobanova, Zinaida. [FBIS] CEP20000817000248, “We Were All Bamboozled: Lies about the Kursk Crisis,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow, in original Russian language, 18 August 2000. Los Angeles Times (author unknown). “Twenty-three sailors in the stricken Kursk submarine may have suffered through three days of agony,” Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles, CA, credit to Associated Press, 21 March 2002, A.10. McMichael, Scott. “Russia’s New Military Doctrine,” RFE/RL Research Report, 1:40, 9 October 1992, 45. Morskoiy Sbornik. [FBIS] FTS19970328000785, “Interview With Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief: Vladimir Ivanovich Kuroyedov,” Morskoiy Sbornik (official journal of the Russian Navy), Moscow, in original Russian language, July 1996. Morskoiy Sbornik. [FBIS] CEP20000128000050, “Admiral Kuroyedov on The Navy’s Future,” Morskoiy Sbornik (official journal of the Russian Navy), Moscow, in original Russian language, 1 December 1999,3-8. Nevzorov, Aleksandr, and Berezovskiy, Boris. Chistilishche [Purgatory], a film, ORT Russian Public Television video in original Russian language, Moscow, 1998. Novosti, Public television news broadcast [FBIS] CEP19990829000032, “Russian military in Caucasus sells soldiers to kidnappers,” First Channel Network, Moscow, in original Russian language, translated by FBIS, 28 August 1999. O’Rourke, Breffni. OSCE: Summit Hears Clinton, Yeltsin Comment on Chechnya. Accessed at 16 November 2007. Odnokolenko, Oleg. [FBIS] CEP20000815000046, “Kursk May Not Surface: Who Caused Underwater Trauma to Northern Fleet’s Best Boat?” Sevodnya, Moscow, in original Russian language, 15 August 2000, 12.

Bibliography

317

Ogarkov, Nicolai. V. (Marshall of the Soviet Union). Soviet Military Encyclopedia, abridged English language edition, Volume 2, edited and translated by William C. Green and W. Robert Reeves (Westview CT: Westview Press). Original Russian language source document published in Moscow, 1977. Pinchuk, Denis. [FBIS] CEP20000822000342, “Putin Meeting With Kursk Families Lasts Over Six Hours,” ITAR-TASS, Moscow, in English language, 22 August 2000. Presidential Decrees (various #s Yeltsin Presidency). “On urgent measures toward reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” (July 1997), and two Security Council documents, “The Concept of Development of Nuclear Forces until 2010” and “The Foundations (Concept) of State Policy in the Area of Defense Development until 2005” (July-August 1998) were classified as secrets in their original form, but their general thrust was gleaned from newspaper publications including: “Sovyet bezopasnosti RF reshil sokhranit trekhkomponentnyy sostav strategicheskikh yadernykh sil,” Interfax daily news bulletin, 4, 3 July 1998; “Russia to be Major Nuclear Power in Third Millennium, Official,” ITAR-TASS, 3 July 1998; Ivan Safronov and Ilya Bulavinov, “Boris Yeltsin podnyal yadernyy shchit,” Kommersant-Daily, 4 July, 1998; Yuriy Golotyuk, “Yadernoye razoruzheniye neizbezhno,” Russkiy Telegraf, 11 July, 1998; Yuriy Golotyuk, “Moskva skorrektirovala svoy yadernyye argumenty,” Russkiy Telegraf, 4 July, 1998; Anatoliy Yurkin, “Perspektivy voyennogo stroitelstva,” Krasnaya Zvyezda, 5 August, 1998, 1, 3; Oleg Falichev, “Vpervyye so vremeni Miluykovskikh reform,” Krasnaya Zvyezda, 18 August, 1998, 1,2. Presidential Decree #11 (Yeltsin Presidency). The official document “The World Oceans” signed by the president on January 11, 1997 by decree #11, accessed online via the Russian Navy’s official web site, via the Ministry of Defense web site in September 2005. The translation used in the book was taken from the web site, also accessed online in September 2005. In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original documents were examined for accuracy. In a few cases, the translation has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation. See Appendix C for full document. Presidential Decree #24 (Putin). The Russian Federation National Security Concept represents a document that was examined and approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and signed into law by presidential edict No. 24 dated 10 January 2000 (an earlier draft was published on 26 November 1999 in the Russian language newspaper Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye 46). Translations, by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-FTS20000116000515) are from the original version as it appeared in the Russian language newspaper, Moscow Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (Internet version) on 14 January 2000. In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original documents were examined for

318

Russian Civil-Military Relations

accuracy. In a few cases, the translation has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation. See Appendix D for full document. Presidential Edict #706 (Putin). The Russian Federation Military Doctrine represents a document that was examined and approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and signed into law by presidential edict No. 706 dated 21 April 2000. The document constitutes the sum total of the official views (precepts) determining the military-political, military-strategic, and military-economic foundations for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security. The Military Doctrine is a document for a transitional period, the period of the formation of democratic statehood and a mixed economy, the transformation of the state’s military organization, and the dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. Translations, by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-CEP20000424000171) are from the original version as it appeared in the Russian language newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 22 April 2000, pages 5-6. In the Russian language, “Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoy Fedeeratsiy, Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 21 Aprelya 2000 g. No. 706 was accessed online at in August 2005. In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original documents were examined for accuracy. In a few cases, the translation quoted herein has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation. See Appendix E for full document. Presidential Edict #1300 (Yeltsin). Official source: “Kontseptsiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsiy,” Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 17 Dekabrya 1997 g. No. 1300 available at the official Russian government web site, accessed online in August 2005 at . The “Russian Federation National Security Policy” represents a document that was examined and approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and signed into law by presidential edict No. 1300 dated 17 December 1997. Translations, by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-SOV-97-364, 30 December 1997), are from the original version as it appeared in the Russian language newspaper, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, on 26 December 1997, pages 4-5. In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original (in the Russian language) was examined for accuracy. In a few cases, the translation has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation. See Appendix B for full document. Presidential Edict #1833 (Yeltsin). “Osnovnyye Polozheniya Voyennoy Doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 18 November 1993, 1, 4. “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” represents a document that was examined at sessions of the Russian Federation Security Council held on 3 and 6 October 1993. The Council approved the final document at its 2 November 1993 session, and it was adopted by presidential edict No. 1833 on the same day. Translations are from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), accessed August 2005.

Bibliography

319

In cases where interpretation appeared to the author to be in doubt, the original Russian language version was examined for accuracy by accessing the document at the official Russian Ministry of Defense web site In a few cases, the translation has been changed to reflect the author’s interpretation. See Appendix A for full document. Prozorov, Vladimir. Yadernoye sderzhivaniye v teoriy primeneniya RVSN (Moscow: Pyotr Veliki Military Academy, 1999), 19. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Inc. (RFE/RL). “Islamic Militants Expelled From Dagestan?” Newsline, RFE/RL, 3:181, 16 September, 1999. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Inc. (RFE/RL). Newsline, 16 November 1999. Radio Rossii Network. [FBIS] FTS19990726000360, Radio Rossii Network, Moscow, in original Russian language, 26 July 1999. Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy. [FBIS] FTS1999071900984, independent voice radio news program, Moscow, in original Russian language, transcribed and translated by FBIS, 19 July 1999. RIA Novosti (unattributed source). Accessed online at 13 November 2007. RIA Novosti, 3 October 2003, “Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” RIA Novosti. [FBIS] FTS19990826000125, “Dagestan Developments Seen as Triumph for Putin,” Moscow, in English language, August 2005. Russia Journal (unattributed author). “General Says NATO is Planning an Attack on Russia,” Leonid Ivashov interviewed by unattributed journalist during a presentation at the Moscow Institute for International Relations, The Russia Journal, Moscow, in English language, 21 May 2004. Safronchuk, Vasily. [FBIS] FTS19990718000560 99R06531A, “Press briefing by unidentified interior ministry officials,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moscow, in original Russian language, 13 July 1999. Saidov, Abrashid. unpublished manuscript entitled: Таina Vtorzheniye (o nachale voenniye destvii na Каvkaze v Avguste 1999), in English: Secret Intrusion (about the beginning of military activities in the Caucasus in August 1999), 80. Sergeyev, Igor. Letter from Russian Minister of Defense to U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, documented in the professional files of the author, acting in the capacity of U.S. Naval Attaché in Russia at the time of the incident, August 2000. The author holds the original (faxed) letters. Shafurkin, A. and Serenko, Andrei. “Noviye Vzrivi na Armeiski Skladak” (“New Explosions in an Army Warehouse”). Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow [in Russian]. 24 February 1998. Shanayev, Valeriy. [FBIS] FTS19990817000970, ITAR-TASS (report from Vladikavkaz by correspondent), “Russian Army Denies Reports on Troops Entering Chechnya,” Moscow, in original Russian language, 17 August 1999. Sokirko, Viktor. [FBIS] FTS19990723000635, “Rivalry Between Sergeyev, Kvashnin Eyed: President Shows Sergeyev His Place: Dyarchy in the Russian

320

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Army” Moskovskiy Komsomolets (electronic version), Moscow, in original Russian language, 22 July 1999. Strana.ru, Open Source Center CEP20070119330001 “Russia: Military Sciences Academy to Hold Conference on New Military Doctrine”, 19 January 2007. Svanidze, Nikolai. Studio Interview with Vladimir Putin, (then) Secretary of the Russian Security Council and Director of the Russian Federal Security Service, television broadcast on RTR, Moscow, 15 June, 1999, transcript of original Russian language television broadcast, translated by FBIS. Titova, Ekaterina. “Budzhetniye Dolgi Oboronke Otlozheniye na Polgoda” [Defense Budget Debts Deposited in Half Year], Finansoviya Izvestia (Financial News), Moscow, in original Russian language, 30 December 1997. Tsuladze, Avtandil. [FBIS] CEP20000822000071, “Moscow Poll Blames Military, Putin for Failure of Kursk Rescue,” Sevodnya, Moscow, in original Russian language, 22 August 2000, 3. Tyler, Patrick E. “That Russian Espionage Tape Was Not Quite All It Seemed,” The New York Times, 30 March 2001, A-8. Unattributed Source. [FBIS] CEP20011206000257, “Putin Navy Purge Seen as Reformist Step: Why Putin Shook Up the Northern Fleet - Theories and Comment,” Accessed online at in original Russian language, 6 December 2001. Vasiliyev, Alekseiy. [FBIS] FTS19990712000311, “End of Yeltsin Era Examined: “The Second Post-Yeltsin Government: a Tentative History of the Russian Thermidor.” Sevodnya, Moscow [in Russian] 8 July 1999. Vesti. [FBIS] CEP20010820000180, “Russian Federation Navy:  Naval Activity Connected with Defending and Ensuring the National Interests and Security of the Russian Federation and its Allies in The World Ocean Belongs to the Category of the Highest State Priorities,” accessed online at Moscow, in original Russian language, translated text by FBIS, edited by the author, 20 August 2001. Whitney, Craig R. “NATO Ties With Russia Soured Before Bombing,” The New York Times, 19 June 1999, A-6. Yasmann, Victor. “Russia: Reviving theArmy, Revising Military Doctrine”, 12 March 2007, (RFE/RL) Moscow, ITAR-TASS 4 June 2007. Yermolin, Vladimir. [FBIS] FTS19990810001010, “President Gives Defense Minister Confidence in Future - Dagestan May Hurt Rushailo Career, Boost Kvashnin,” Izvestiya, Moscow, 11 August 1999, in original Russian language, translated by FBIS. Yezhenedelnyy Zhurnal (unattributed). [FBIS] CEP20021211000416, “Having Carefully Written the Latest Quaint Flourish, Russian Military Reform has Returned to the Starting Point,” Yezhenedelnyy Zhurnal (Weekly Journal), Moscow, in original Russian language, 11 December 2002.

Bibliography

321

Bibliography Agüero, Felipe. Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. Aldis, Anne C., and Roger N. McDermott. (eds), Russian Military Reform, 19922002. Cass Series on Soviet (Russian) Military Institutions, London Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003. Anderson, Richard. Post-Communism and the Theory of Democracy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. Arbatov, Aleksei Georgievich, Army War College (U.S.), and U.S. Army War College Conference on Strategy. The Russian Military in the 21st Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997. Arbatov, Aleksei Georgievich, Karl Kaiser, Robert Legvold, and East-West Institute. Russia and the West the 21st Century Security Environment. Eurasia in the 21st Century, Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999. Arbatov, Aleksei Georgievich, and George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya. The Marshall Center Papers. GarmischPartenkirchen, Deutschland: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2000. Auerswald, Philip E., David P. Auerswald, and Christian Duttweiler. The Kosovo Conflict a Diplomatic History Through Documents. Edited by Christian Duttweiler, Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, 2000. Avant, Deborah D. Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. Baev, Pavel. Army and State in Post-Communist Europe. Edited by David Betz. and John Löwenhardt, London Portland, OR: F. Cass, 2001. —. “The Evolution of Putin’s Regime: Inner Circles and Outer Walls.” Problems of Post-Communism 51:6 (November/December 2004), 3-13. Baev, Pavel, and Oslo International Peace Research Institute. The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, London: Sage, 1996. Bakshi, Gitanjal D. “The War in Chechnya: A Military Analysis.” Strategic Analysis XXIV:5 (August 2000), 4. Baranets, Victor. “Drive to Pristina Chronicled.” Komsomolskaya Pravda, 15 June 1999, 4. Barany, Zoltan. Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, 50. — “The Tragedy of the Kursk: Crisis Management in Putin’s Russia.” Government and Opposition, 2004, 476-503. Barany, Zoltan D., and Iván Völgyes. The Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe. Edited by Zoltan D. Barany, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.

322

Russian Civil-Military Relations

Barany, Zoltan D., and Robert G. Moser. Russian Politics Challenges of Democratization. Edited by Zoltan D. Barany, New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Barylski, Robert V. The Soldier in Russian Politics: Duty, Dictatorship and Democracy Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998. Bebler, Anton (ed.),Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States Central and Eastern Europe in Transition Westport, CO: Praeger, 1997. Blank, Stephen. “The Great Exception: Russian Civil-Military Relations,” World Affairs, 165:2 (Fall 2002), 91-105. Bouldin, Mathew. “The Ivanov Doctrine and Military Reform: Reasserting Stability in Russia,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17:4, 625. Breslauer, George. “Boris Yeltsin as Patriarch,” in Contemporary Russian Politics, Archie Brown (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 574. Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security 25:3 (2000 Winter), 5-53. Brown, Archie (ed.), Contemporary Russian Politics, Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Brown, Michael E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. (eds), Debating the Democratic Peace, International Security Readers, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. Burghart, Daniel L. and Theresa Sabonis-Helf (eds), In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the 21st Century, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2004. Chehabi, H.E. and Alfred C. Stepan, Politics, Society, and Democracy Comparative Studies: Essays in Honor of Juan J. Linz, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Cherkashin, Nikolai A. “Tragedy of the Submarine Cruiser Kursk,” published in the Russian language. St Petersburg Sailors and Submariners Club Submarine Fleet, 5 (2001), 23. Chernaven, Vladimir N. Military Dictionary, Moscow: Ministry of Defense, USSR, 1990) [in Russian]. Cherniayev, Anatoliy S., Robert English, and Elizabeth Tucker. My Six Years With Gorbachev. Edited and translated by Robert English, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. Clark, Wesley K. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, New York: Public Affairs, 2001. Cross, Sharyl. “Russia and NATO Toward the 21st Century: Conflicts and peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 15:2 (June 2002), 1-58. Colton, Timothy J. and Thane Gustafson (eds), Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Bibliography

323

Cottey, Andrew, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster. (eds), Democratic Control of the Military in Post-Communist Europe: Guarding the Guards, One Europe or Several?, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002. Daniels, Robert Vincent. Russia’s Transformation Snapshots of a Crumbling System, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998. Desch, Michael C. Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. Diamond, Larry Jay, and Marc F. Plattner. (eds), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy. A Journal of Democracy Book (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). — (ed.) Democracy After Communism. A Journal of Democracy Book (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). Donnelly, Christopher. “Evolutionary Problems in the Former Soviet Armed Forces,” Survival Autumn (1992), 37. — “Civil-Military Relations in the New Democracies,” in Army and State in Post-Communist Europe, edited by David Betz and John Löwenhardt, London Portland: Frank Cass, 2001, 9. — “Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies,” The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 17:1 (March 2001), passim. Dunlop, John B. Russia Confronts Chechnya Roots of a Separatist Conflict, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Dunn, John. The Cunning of Unreason: Making Sense of Politics, London: HarperCollins, 2000. English, Robert. Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Evangelista, Matthew. The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002. Farrell, Theo, and Terry Terriff (eds), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. Feaver, Peter. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2003. Feaver, Peter, Richard H. Kohn, and Triangle Institute for Security Studies. Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security. BCSIA Studies in International Security, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. Feaver, Peter D. “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,.” Armed Forces and Society 23 (Winter 1996), 149-78. Felgenhauer, Pavel. “Degradation of the Russian Military.” ISCP 15 (10 November 2004), 4. . Flynn, Ramsey. Cry from the Deep: The Submarine Disaster That Riveted the World and Put the New Russia to the Ultimate Test, New York: HarperCollins, 2004. Frank, Willard C. and Phillip S. Gillette, Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991, Westport, CT and London, Greenwood Press, 1992.

Russian Civil-Military Relations

324

Gelman, Vladimir. “The Iceberg of Russian Political Finance,” in Archie Brown (ed.) Contemporary Russian Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 574. Goldgeier, James M. and Michael McFaul. Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. Gordon, Michael R. “A Look at How the Kremlin Slid Into the Chechen War,” New York Times International, February 2000, 6. Gustafson, Thane. Capitalism Russian-Style, Cambridge, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Herspring, Dale R. “The Future of the Russian Military,” Problems of PostCommunism 44 (March/April 1997), 47-56. — East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949-72. Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government, New York: Praeger, 1973. — The Soviet High Command, 1967-1989: Personalities and Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. — Russian Civil-Military Relations, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. — Requiem for an Army: The Demise of the East German Military, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998. — Soldiers, Commissars, and Chaplains: Civil-Military Relations Since Cromwell, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001. — (ed), Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. Herspring, Dale R. and Iván Völgyes (eds), Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, Westview Special Studies on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1978. Hoffman, David. “Lebed Choice Gets Defense Post,” The Washington Post, 18 July 1996, A.22. Hunter, Wendy. Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of CivilMilitary Relations, Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Har