Britain Secret War Against Japan (Studies in Intelligence)

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BRITAIN’S SECRET WAR AGAINST JAPAN, 1937–1945

This book provides the first comprehensive account of the pivotal role that intelligence played in shaping Britain’s conduct of its campaigns against the Japanese at a multitude of levels – strategic, operational and tactical. The British held an erroneous view of Japanese military capabilities prior to 1941. This was largely due to the high level of secrecy surrounding Japan’s war planning and the absence of prior engagements with the Japanese armed forces. The fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ in February 1942 dispelled any notion that the Japanese were incapable of challenging the West, and British military officials had to acknowledge the fact that their forces in the Far East were inadequate. Here, Douglas Ford explains how Britain’s defence establishment drew upon the Allied experiences in the Asia-Pacific theatres, and learned how to fight the Imperial Japanese Navy, Army and their respective air services. By the closing stages of the Pacific War, the effective use of intelligence on the strategy, tactics and morale of Japan’s armed forces played a key role in enabling the British to conduct a successful war effort in the Far East. This book will be of much interest to students of the Second World War, intelligence studies, strategic studies and military history in general. Douglas Ford is a Lecturer in Military History at Salford University. He holds a PhD in International History from the LSE (2002).

STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE SERIES General editors: Richard J. Aldrich and Christopher Andrew ISSN: 1368–9916

BRITISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN THE PALESTINE CAMPAIGN 1914–1918 Yigal Sheffy BRITISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1854–1856 Stephen M. Harris SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II Edited by David Alvarez KNOWING YOUR FRIENDS Intelligence inside alliances and coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War Edited by Martin S. Alexander ETERNAL VIGILANCE 50 years of the CIA Edited by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher Andrew NOTHING SACRED Nazi espionage against the Vatican, 1939–1945 David Alvarez and Revd. Robert A. Graham INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS How Ultra changed history Ralph Bennett INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT Edited by David Charters, A. Stuart Farson and Glenn P. Hastedt TET 1968 Understanding the surprise Ronnie E. Ford INTELLIGENCE AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE British intelligence and the defence of the Indian Empire 1904–1924 Richard J. Popplewell ESPIONAGE Past, present, future? Edited by Wesley K. Wark

THE AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION An unofficial history Frank Cain POLICING POLITICS Security intelligence and the liberal democratic state Peter Gill FROM INFORMATION TO INTRIGUE Studies in secret service based on the Swedish experience 1939–45 C. G. McKay DIEPPE REVISITED A documentary investigation John Campbell MORE INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE Christopher and Oleg Gordievsky CONTROLLING INTELLIGENCE Edited by Glenn P. Hastedt SPY FICTION, SPY FILMS AND REAL INTELLIGENCE Edited by Wesley K. Wark SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD New perspectives for the 1990s Edited by A. Stuart Farson, David Stafford and Wesley K. Wark A DON AT WAR Sir David Hunt K.C.M.G., O.B.E. (reprint) INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS Edited by Michael I. Handel LEADERS AND INTELLIGENCE Edited by Michael I. Handel WAR, STRATEGY AND INTELLIGENCE Michael I. Handel STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL DECEPTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR Edited by Michael I. Handel CODEBREAKER IN THE FAR EAST Alan Stripp INTELLIGENCE FOR PEACE Edited by Hesi Carmel INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE INFORMATION AGE Michael Herman ESPIONAGE AND THE ROOTS OF THE COLD WAR The conspiratorial heritage David McKnight

SWEDISH SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE 1900–1945 C. G. McKay and Bengt Beckman THE NORWEGIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 1945–1970 Olav Riste SECRET INTELLIGENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY Edited by Heike Bungert, Jan G. Heitmann and Michael Wala THE CIA, THE BRITISH LEFT AND THE COLD WAR Calling the tune? Hugh Wilford OUR MAN IN YUGOSLAVIA The story of a secret service operative Sebastian Ritchie UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Journeys in shadows Len Scott and Peter Jackson MI6 AND THE MACHINERY OF SPYING Philip H. J. Davies TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INTELLIGENCE Edited by Wesley Wark INTELLIGENCE AND STRATEGY Selected essays John Robert Ferris THE US GOVERNMENT, CITIZEN GROUPS AND THE COLD WAR The state–private network Edited by Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE New players, extended boundaries Edited by David Carment and Martin Rudner SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE A new instrument of war Edited by Mark Seaman MUSSOLINI’S PROPAGANDA ABROAD Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935–1940 Manuela A. Williams BRITAIN’S SECRET WAR AGAINST JAPAN, 1937–1945 Douglas Ford THE POLITICS AND STRATEGY OF CLANDESTINE WAR Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946 Neville Wylie

BRITAIN’S SECRET WAR AGAINST JAPAN, 1937–1945

Douglas Ford

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2006 Douglas Ford All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Ford, Douglas, 1972– Britain’s secret war against Japan, 1937–1945/Douglas Ford. p. cm.–(Studies in intelligence series, ISSN 1368–9916) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. World War, 1939–1945–Military intelligence–Great Britain. 2. World War, 1939–1945–Campaigns–Pacific Area. 3. World War, 1939–1945– Japan. 4. Strategy. I. Title. II. Series: Cass series on intelligence and military affairs. Studies in intelligence series. III. Series. D810.S7F63 2006 940.54⬘86410952–dc22 2005036630 ISBN10: 0–415–35846–9 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–00465–5 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–35846–0 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–00465–4 (ebk)

CONTENTS

List of illustrations Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

ix xi xiii

Introduction 1 2 3

4

5

1

Ambiguity and complacency: Britain’s assessment of Japan prior to the outbreak of war

12

The lessons of defeat and limited victories, December 1941 to January 1943

44

Gauging the balance of an unpredictable war: the evolution of British intelligence on Japanese strategy, January 1943 to August 1945

76

Material and technology versus methods of use: intelligence on the tactical and technical capabilities of Japan’s armed forces

113

Racial contempt or logical analysis?: British intelligence on Japanese military morale

152

Conclusion: the intelligence war in Asia and the Pacific, 1937–1945: the British and Japanese experiences in comparison

176

Notes and references Bibliography Index

193 234 250 vii

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures I.1 I.2 I.3

Organization of intelligence in Whitehall and East Asia, c.1940 Organization of army intelligence at SEAC, 1944 British naval intelligence organization, Eastern Theatre

9 9 10

Maps 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 3.1 3.2 3.3

The Far East and the Pacific, c.1937 The Imperial Powers in the Far East, September 1939 Japanese war plans, December 1941 Height of Japan’s conquests, summer 1942 Campaign in Burma, 1943–1945 Allied strategic plans, 1943–1944 Allied plans for the invasion of Japan

ix

18 22 30 50 93 99 110

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a pleasure to extend my gratitude to all those who have assisted me in writing this book. First I would like to thank the staff at the following archives: the United Kingdom National Archives in Kew; the India Office Library and the Manuscripts Collection of the British Library; the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King’s College London; the Imperial War Museum, London; the National Army Museum, London; the Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon; the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich; Churchill College Cambridge Archives Centre; Christ Church College Oxford Library; the Archives and Special Collections section at the University of Southampton Library; and the John Rylands Library at the University Manchester. They have made every effort to make my research an enjoyable and productive experience. Sections of this book have appeared in journal articles already published. The material dealing with British intelligence on Japanese strategy appeared in ‘Planning for an Unpredictable War: British intelligence assessments and the war against Japan, 1937–45’, in Journal of Strategic Studies – Special Issue on Intelligence and Strategy, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2004), pp. 136–67. Sections on British intelligence and the Imperial Japanese Army’s tactics appeared in ‘A Conquerable Yet Resilient Foe: British perceptions of the Imperial Japanese Army’s tactics on the India–Burma front, September 1942 to summer 1944’, in Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 65–90. The material pertaining to British naval intelligence appeared in ‘British Naval Policy and the War Against Japan, 1937–1945: distorted doctrine, insufficient resources or inadequate intelligence?’, in International Journal of Naval History, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2005), accessible via www.ijnhonline.org. Sections dealing with British intelligence on Japanese army morale appeared in ‘British Intelligence on Japanese Army Morale during the Pacific War: logical analysis or racial stereotyping?’, in Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 439–474. Citations and quotations from records kept at the United Kingdom National Archives appear by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Quotations and citations from the India Office Library xi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

and Records collection and from the Cunningham papers appear by permission of the Reproductions Office at the British Library. I would like to thank the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives for permission to use quotations for papers in their care; the Department of Documents at the Imperial War Museum and the individual copyright holders for the Grimsdale, Percival, Oliver Leese and V.W.H. Martin papers, the Department of Research and Information Services at the Royal Air Force Museum for the Peirse papers, the Curator of Manuscripts at the National Maritime Museum for the Fraser papers, and the copyright holders of the Mountbatten papers at the University of Southampton Library. The Auchinleck papers have been reproduced by the courtesy of the University Librarian and Director of the John Rylands Library, the University of Manchester. Every effort has been made to obtain permission to cite the Ismay papers and the Portal papers, and my most sincere apologies go to copyright holders whose names have been omitted. I would like to extend my gratitude to those who have assisted me and offered invaluable guidance in the production of this work. The book is derived from my doctoral thesis, and special thanks go to my supervisor at the LSE, Antony Best, for his patient and untiring efforts to help me write a dissertation worthy of a Ph.D. Richard Aldrich, David French and Joe Maiolo provided excellent feedback on how to convert my Ph.D. into a book. Last but not least, my appreciation goes to my friends, colleagues and students at the LSE, Aberystwyth and Salford who helped me navigate my way through the trials and tribulations of being a freshly minted academic. Finally, my family has provided support that has been indispensable for the success of my studies and the early stages of my career. This book is dedicated to my father and the memory of my mother.

xii

ABBREVIATIONS

AAFSWPA ACSEA ADM AHQ AIR ALFSEA ATIS BAD BJ BLMC CAB CCC CCO CCS CIGS COHQ COIS COS CTC DAWT DCO DGF DMI DNAD DNI EAC FECB FO FPS GCCS GHQ GOC HJA

Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area Air Command Southeast Asia Admiralty Files Air Headquarters Air Ministry Files Allied Land Forces Southeast Asia Allied Translation and Interrogation Service British Admiralty Delegation (Washington) Blue Jackets British Library Manuscripts Collection Cabinet Office Files Churchill College Cambridge Archives Centre Christ Church College, Oxford Combined Chiefs of Staff (Anglo-American) Chief of Imperial General Staff Combined Operations Headquarters Chief of Operational Intelligence Services Chiefs of Staff Combined Training Centre Director of Air Warfare and Training Directorate of Combined Operations Director of Gunnery Fire Director of Military Intelligence Director of Naval Air Division Director of Naval Intelligence Eastern Air Command Far Eastern Combined Bureau Foreign Office Files Future Planning Section Government Codes and Cypher School General Headquarters General Officer Commanding Handbook of the Japanese Army xiii

A B B R E V IATIO N S

HW IGHQ IIC IJA IJN IOLR IWM JAAF JAF JIC JNAF JPC JPS JRL JTWC LHCMA LRPG MEW MI2 MI2c MOI NAM NID NMM OIC OWI PREM PWD PWE PWJC RAFMH SACSEA SEAC SEATIC SIS SOE SUL SWPA UKNA USMC WEC WO

GCCS Files Imperial General Headquarters (Japanese) Industrial Intelligence Centre Imperial Japanese Army Imperial Japanese Navy India Office Library and Records (British Library, London) Imperial War Museum (London) Japanese Army Air Force Japanese air forces Joint Intelligence Committee Japanese Naval Air Force Joint Planning Sub-Committee Joint Planning Staff John Rylands Library (Manchester) Joint Technical Warfare Sub-Committee Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (King’s College London) Long Range Penetration Groups Ministry of Economic Warfare Far Eastern section of War Office’s Military Intelligence Directorate Section of MI2 responsible for Japan Ministry of Information National Army Museum (London) Naval Intelligence Directorate National Maritime Museum (Greenwich, London) Operational Intelligence Centre Office of War Information (United States) Prime Minister’s Office Files Political Warfare Division Political Warfare Executive Political Warfare (Japan) Committee Royal Air Force Museum (Hendon, London) Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Southeast Asia Command Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Centre Secret Intelligence Service Special Operations Executive Southampton University Library Southwest Pacific Area United Kingdom National Archives (Kew, London) United States Marines Corps Wireless Experimental Centre War Office Files xiv

INTRODUCTION

On 15 February 1942, the British garrison at Singapore surrendered to the Japanese, in what Winston Churchill described as ‘the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history’.1 The defeat dispelled the traditional view that Japan was a second-rate Oriental power, not possessing the military potential to challenge the West. For the following three and a half years, Britain struggled to regain its empire in the Far East, against an enemy whose fighting capabilities and will to resist surrender proved more resilient than ever believed possible. Intelligence enabled the British to understand their Japanese opponent, and played a crucial role in helping them develop the methods needed to conduct a successful war effort. Since professional intelligence organizations started operating at the turn of the twentieth century, their activities have taken on a rapidly growing role in shaping the conduct of international conflicts. Yet, the subject has remained largely unexplored. It is not an exaggeration to argue that historians have either taken intelligence for granted or overlooked it. To complicate matters, the majority of academics correctly believe that intelligence is a business carried out with exceptional secrecy, and those involved are reluctant to expose its activities, whether successful or otherwise. Nevertheless, a popular notion, and one not entirely accurate, is that the relevant documents remain forever closed or have been systematically incinerated, all in the interest of national security. A more realistic explanation has been put forward by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, who illustrated how intelligence remains the ‘missing dimension’ of history, mainly because official secrets laws have only recently allowed public consultation of the archival material.2 Thus, the assumption, that one cannot conduct a serious academic study on intelligence due to lack of evidence, is untrue. 1

IN TR O D U C TIO N

Intelligence activities undoubtedly had a significant impact on the Second World War, as revealed by F.H. Hinsley’s official history, which illustrated how effective intelligence speeded up the war effort against Germany by almost two years.3 On the Asia–Pacific front, there remains room for exploration.4 Much of the literature has focused on signals intelligence and the clandestine services. Richard Aldrich explained how inter-service rivalries hindered the performance of the British and US secret services.5 Edward Drea and Ronald Lewin described how signals intelligence aided the US forces in their island-hopping campaigns in the Pacific theatres.6 An equally pressing issue, namely qualitative intelligence, or assessments concerning the performance of Japan’s armed forces, has remained largely uncovered. Historians such as Arthur Marder, Wesley Wark, John Ferris, Antony Best and Thomas Mahnken have discussed Western perceptions of Japanese military capabilities before the outbreak of the Pacific War.7 The question of how Allied images of Japan evolved during the course of the war itself has yet to be answered. The existing historiography on the Pacific War does not contain many works on British intelligence for further reasons. When viewed alongside the existing literature on the war against Germany, Britain’s conduct of the Far Eastern conflict has not attracted much scholarly attention. This is mainly because the Asia–Pacific theatres were of secondary importance for Britain. The official histories on British grand strategy focused mainly on Europe and North Africa, devoting only a fraction of each volume to Asia.8 The literature on the campaigns in Southeast Asia has either emphasized how the theatre was a backwater in Britain’s global war effort,9 or tended to focus on filling the gap with detailed narratives describing the accomplishments of its forces.10 In addition, because the United States devoted significantly more resources, Britain’s contribution paled in comparison. The works on the Asia–Pacific conflict have treated the British participation as such.11 The official histories on British intelligence went as far as to argue that, because Britain’s engagement in the Far East was minor, its intelligence activities there do not demand scholarly research.12 The neglect is not entirely justified, and Britain’s operations against Japan were significant for other reasons. Recent studies by Williamson Murray have highlighted how British forces in the Far East, while having suffered some of the most severe military defeats to befall their nation, managed in the end to achieve a markedly higher standard of efficiency than their counterparts in Europe and North Africa.13 Consequently, by autumn 1944, while Montgomery’s armies on the Continent were stalled at Arnhem, General William Slim’s XIV Army in Burma was steadily advancing against determined Japanese resistance. Such an achievement begs a further investigation of the underlying reasons. The study aims to further fill the gap surrounding the impact of intelligence 2

IN TR O D U C TIO N

on the Second World War, and will analyse the evolution of the British defence establishment’s assessment of Japan’s strategy and war capabilities between the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and Japan’s final defeat in August 1945. At all levels of Britain’s war effort, the battlefields of Burma, the headquarters of General Slim and Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command), the corridors of Whitehall and Cabinet War Rooms, intelligence had a pivotal influence on strategy, operational planning and tactical doctrine. It showed the British how Japan’s armed forces were a resilient foe, but at the same time, one that could be overcome with adequate resources and proper methods of use. Two key questions will be tackled; the first is the way in which the British used intelligence to gain a realistic picture of their Japanese adversary. The term ‘intelligence’ will be used to describe the full range of information drawn upon to evaluate the enemy. To use a term coined by practitioners, the work focuses on ‘all source analysis’.14 The majority of studies on intelligence tend to concentrate on information obtained via human agents (humint), or the interception of enemy communications, commonly known as signals intelligence (sigint). Nevertheless, a number of sources provide vital intelligence, and yet do not receive due attention. For example, during the Pacific War, captured documents provided a unique insight into how the Japanese military operated. In addition, because sigint and humint were not always reliable, for a host of reasons, the Allies looked towards photographic reconnaissance, or imagery intelligence (imint). The particular conditions of wartime also enabled the British to draw upon types of intelligence not available in times of peace, the most important of which was observations of the Japanese armed forces in action. Incidentally, information obtained through firsthand encounters was the single most valuable source. The book will tend to focus less on how intelligence was used for daily planning purposes, and concentrate more on how the material was employed to formulate what has been called ‘net assessments’, or in simple terms, an overall calculation of the enemy’s strategy and capabilities. Second, the work will illustrate how the British used intelligence to plan an effective war effort in the Far East. It will illustrate further examples to support Michael Handel’s observation that intelligence is a ‘force multiplier’, or an instrument which allows the economical use of limited resources.15 At the same time, one needs to bear in mind that intelligence was only one factor which shaped Britain’s war effort. For starters, Handel has argued that intelligence is of little value unless accompanied by military strength. The British experience in Southeast Asia was no exception. In addition, Britain’s conduct of the Pacific War was influenced by a number of circumstances where intelligence rarely made a difference. No 3

IN TR O D U C TIO N

amount of good intelligence could compensate for the fact that commitments in the European theatres substantially limited Britain’s capabilities in the Far East. Because Allied policy during the Pacific War was largely dictated by the United States, British strategy often had to be formulated in accordance. Under the circumstances, intelligence was relegated to secondary importance in the decision-making process. These limitations notwithstanding, intelligence made a distinguishable contribution to Britain’s war effort. The prospects of accurately gauging the Japanese depended largely on the experience which Britain’s armed forces had in confronting the challenges they faced. One of the central arguments of the book is that Britain needed to fight Japan in order to understand what it was capable of doing. Prior to December 1941, the British miscalculated Japan’s war potential, mainly because in the absence of a direct confrontation, a realistic assessment was not possible. The evolution of British intelligence after the commencement of the war also illustrates the crucial role combat experience played. When the Pacific War broke out, the British were unfamiliar with their opponent. At the strategic level, the absence of previous engagements where British forces had to operate across the vast land and sea masses prevailing in the Far East, and against an enemy with substantial strengths, complicated calculations of the effort required. At the battlefield level, military commanders faced formidable difficulties developing the appropriate tactics. In certain areas, notably amphibious operations and jungle warfare, the British had to build up their capabilities virtually from scratch. The British were able to develop an adequate war plan only after gaining sufficient combat experience. The defeats at Malaya and Burma in early 1942 proved that British forces were inadequate. The turn of the tide after the US victory at Midway in June 1942, followed by the Allied counteroffensive in the Pacific theatres after the recapture of Guadalcanal in January 1943, revealed that the Japanese could be defeated. However, in Southeast Asia, the British continued to face a steep learning curve. The key lesson drawn from encounters with the Japanese was that they could be defeated only if British forces substantially enhanced their own strengths and efficiency. The failure of the first Arakan offensive in winter 1943, followed by the stalemate which prevailed until the early part of 1944, meant that British assessments concerning the Japanese demonstrated caution. It was only in the aftermath of the Japanese reverses at Imphal and Kohima in spring 1944, culminating with the total expulsion of Japan’s armies by the following summer, that apprehensions were substantially alleviated.

Themes and issues The subject of British intelligence during the Pacific War touches upon several themes which are crucial to any study of the conflict. Throughout the 4

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work, five issues will appear regularly: (1) Britain’s role in the Pacific War, and the place which the conflict took in British grand strategy; (2) the challenges which the Allies encountered in fighting the Japanese; (3) the organizational ethos of the British defence establishment, or what specialists in strategic studies have described as ‘military culture’, and the manner in which it influenced intelligence activities; (4) the nature of the AngloAmerican alliance; and last but not least, (5) the race issue. The first issue to be addressed, and one that is essential for properly contextualizing British intelligence during the Pacific War, is the contribution which Britain’s forces made to the Allied war effort. The war against Japan was mainly undertaken by the United States, Britain being a junior partner. The existing literature correctly argues that Japan was defeated in August 1945 first and foremost because the US brought to bear its economic and military preponderance.16 Britain’s operations in Southeast Asia did not deal a decisive blow, and its victory was due to the fact that it had aligned with the winning side. Nevertheless, Britain’s conduct of the Pacific War does form a significant area of military history and intelligence studies. After the fall of Singapore, Britain was by no means prepared to write off its presence in East Asia. On the contrary, Prime Minister Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff (COS) stood side by side with their American counterparts in demanding that the Pacific War end with Japan’s unconditional surrender and the total destruction of its war-making capabilities. Britain also continued to have imperial interests in the Far East, and one of its key wartime objectives was to regain its colonies in Burma, Singapore and Malaya. The achievement of this aim was essential if Britain was to remain a Great Power. Britain also had to secure its interests without over-relying on US assistance and allowing the latter to dictate the postwar settlement. Intelligence provided Britain with a valuable instrument for devising a strategy that was suitable for accomplishing its war aims. The second core feature is the challenges which the Pacific War posed. The intelligence obtained through combat experience accurately portrayed the obstacles the Allies had to face. The first of these was the unpredictable nature of Japanese strategic and operational planning. While intelligence provided Slim and Mountbatten with reliable information on current Japanese dispositions and strengths, the issue of future developments was a matter for guesswork. The British therefore had to formulate their plans on the understanding that the results could not be foretold, while ensuring that their own forces were prepared for a variety of scenarios. The uncertainty was compounded by the air of apprehension arising from a greater challenge, namely the resilience which Japan’s armed forces demonstrated. Indeed, the campaigns in Asia and the Pacific presented some unique problems for the Allies. Encounters with Japan’s forces revealed their capabilities to fight prolonged wars of attrition, in spite of their inferior numerical strengths and technological capabilities. The geographical expanse 5

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of Japan’s conquests and its ample forces precluded the prospects of an easy victory. The Japanese army, navy and air services employed tactics that inflicted substantial delay and damage. Added to this was the Japanese soldier’s insistence on fighting to the finish. The intelligence pointing to the various obstacles was used to enable the British to deal effectively with the situation facing them, and attain their war aims at an economical cost. The third theme alluded to will be the organizational ethos, or service culture within the British defence establishment. After all, if intelligence is to be employed properly, its consumers need to recognize its value. The subject of military culture and its effect on strategic practice during the interwar period and the Second World War has been explored by a number of historians, including Allan Millett, Williamson Murray and David French.17 One can detect a number of ways how service culture led the British defence establishment to use intelligence effectively. Among the most important was the fact that Britain was initially operating from a position of weakness, and this feature has been cited in a number of works comparing the Allied and Axis intelligence systems.18 Allied decision-makers needed to concoct a plan where their forces could overcome their opponent with limited resources. To achieve this objective, it was essential to know which enemy strengths to avoid and the shortcomings to be exploited. Hence, the Allies made a greater effort to improve their intelligence capabilities. Britain’s performance during the Pacific War clearly supports the above contention. The trauma arising from Japan’s victories in Southeast Asia during 1941–1942 led British commanders in the Far East, as well as the planning staffs in Whitehall, to admit the need to improve their own forces. British war plans were based on a calibrated evaluation of the Japanese, so that further reverses could be avoided, and victory achieved at an acceptable cost. Intelligence was therefore treated as an integral instrument. The British willingness to draw the appropriate lessons from its setbacks stood in stark contrast to the Japanese experience. Japan’s defence establishment scorned intelligence for a variety of cultural reasons, the most important of which was a widespread taboo against questioning the prospects of winning. The victories achieved by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) during the opening stages of the conflict reinforced the sense of superiority, and removed any incentive for conducting a methodical evaluation of the Allies. The neglect had some unfortunate effects on Japan’s war effort. The concluding chapter will compare how Britain and Japan used intelligence during their campaigns in Southeast Asia, and explain how military culture gave rise to some of the differences. The fourth theme which will appear frequently is the nature of the AngloAmerican alliance. One of the key indications of the state of inter-Allied relations was the collaboration achieved by their intelligence services, or lack thereof. Furthermore, Britain’s ability to obtain adequate information on the Japanese often depended upon the help of its American ally. 6

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Intelligence cooperation between the alliance partners reflected how their relationship was simultaneously one of harmony and competition. On one hand, the United States and Britain agreed that their ultimate objective was to secure Japan’s unconditional surrender. British intelligence reports demonstrated how Whitehall supported the Americans’ wartime goals. At the Cabinet level, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which held ultimate responsibility for intelligence assessment, was tasked to produce detailed analyses concerning Japan’s position in all theatres, including the Pacific, an area where the British were not heavily involved, but one which formed an integral part of the Allied war effort. At the same time, inter-Allied intelligence relations reflected some of the differences within the coalition, and indicated how the British and Americans were fighting separate campaigns against the same opponent. While the United States viewed the Pacific theatre as the focal point of operations, since it provided the most direct avenue for launching assaults against the heart of Japan’s empire, influential sections of the British government, notably Churchill and a large portion of his war cabinet, argued that the reconquest of Southeast Asia was a top priority. The discrepancy prevailed until the late stages of the conflict, and the disagreements manifested themselves in intelligence cooperation, especially at the theatre level. The Americans were in a position to share a large amount of intelligence with their British ally, since they had made significant progress in decoding Japan’s military communications and gained considerable experience dealing with the methods used by its armed forces. Yet, the sharing of material did not run smoothly. Cooperation appeared limited to the level of intelligence collection, with minimal efforts to coordinate efforts at the stages of the analysis, dissemination and implementation. The incomplete state of Allied cooperation had a number of significant effects on Britain’s intelligence activities. The fifth, and final theme is the contentious issue of race. Racial factors played a key role in shaping the conduct of the Pacific War. While the ethnic divide between the Allies and the Japanese visibly affected the opposing sides’ views of each other, few historians aside from John Dower have covered the subject.19 During the years preceding the outbreak of the conflict, one can detect a number of ways in which ethnocentric prejudices led the British to snub the Japanese. The outbreak of the conflict saw the British shift to a more rational view, and as the war progressed, racial stereotyping gave way to professional evaluation. Assessments of Japanese strategy focused on what the available intelligence had to tell, and one cannot detect any notable instances where racial biases tainted the process. At the battlefield level, the British did identify some cultural factors which influenced the performance of Japanese forces, and assessments often focused on the enemy’s ‘national characteristics’. 7

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At the same time, intelligence staffs and military officials painstakingly sought to base their hypotheses on a judicious analysis of the information they obtained, and were careful not to reach conclusions unless they could be proven by empirical evidence. For this reason, generalizations were made with reserve. Towards the end of the Pacific War, British views of the enemy were complex. The difficulties involved in defeating the Japanese created a certain level of animosity. At the same time, their dedication generated respect. The book will argue that while cultural views of the Japanese had a distinct impact, British intelligence was based more on logical analysis than racial prejudices.

Structure of the intelligence machinery No work on intelligence studies is complete without explaining the structure of the apparatus, and how the information passed through the four main cycles, namely collection, analysis, dissemination and decision.20 For much of the period covered by the study, intelligence operated at two separate but interconnected levels, in Whitehall and in Southeast Asia. Within Whitehall, after 1939, a central body in the form of the Joint Intelligence Committee was tasked to provide finished assessments to policymakers. The information was drawn from the service departments, namely the War Office, the Admiralty and Air Ministry, as well as civilian ministries such as the Foreign Office, Treasury and Board of Trade (Figure I.1). The service departments and government ministries relied on an array of raw intelligence, including sigint, reports prepared by attachés in British diplomatic and consular offices across Japan and East Asia, as well as military personnel and private citizens who provided information. The main problem facing the intelligence machinery was not the lack of centralization, but resource shortages. Because Britain was preoccupied with its war effort against Germany, European affairs received priority, and intelligence operations in the Far East were a secondary concern. The organizations operating in Southeast Asia also faced similar difficulties. The Far Eastern Combined Bureau (FECB) had neither the manpower nor facilities to collate the volumes of material it received. Clandestine organizations such as the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Special Intelligence Service (SIS) found themselves without the finances necessary to employ skilled agents and to foster useful contacts within Japan. The setbacks during the opening phases of the Pacific War led to the development of a more efficient apparatus. Within Whitehall, the organization remained more or less the same, with greater resources devoted to Japanese intelligence matters. At the theatre level, a marked difference existed in the efficiency of the different services’ intelligence directorates (Figures I.2 and I.3). Army intelligence’s machinery was the most elaborate, with air intelligence a close second, and naval intelligence remaining derisory until the 8

Cabinet

Chiefs of Staff f

Joint Planning Sub-Committee

Axis Planning Section

Joint Intelligence Committee

Air Ministry (AID)

Admiralty ((NID)

Malaya Command

War Office (MI2 and MI2c)

FO

MEW

GHQ India

FECB

Air Att Attaché é

Intercerpted Communications

Naval At Attaché

Military/Naval Observers

Military Attaché

Private Citizens

SIS

GCCS

Local informants

Intelligence services of Britain’s allies

Figure I.1 Organization of intelligence in Whitehall and East Asia, c.1940. Supreme Commander Allied Command Southeast Asia (SACSEA)

XIV Army Headquarters

India Command

Director of Intelligence

Assistant Director of Intelligence Operational Intelligence

GSO1

ID1

ID2

ID3

Intelligence on Japanese Tactics and Morale T ALFSEA

ID4

ID5

Counter-intelligence r

GHQ India

ID7–ID9 handling operational secutiry, civil censorship, co-ordination

Divisional commanders

SWPA P and Central Pacific Commands SIGINT units (WEC, FECB, Allied services)

Topographic Department

Photographic Interpretation Units

Clandestine Organizations

SEATIC A

ID1 = Secretariat; ID2 = Order of Battle; ID3 = T Technical and Tactica; ID4 = Far East; ID5 = Enemy Logistics

Figure I.2 Organization of army intelligence at SEAC, 1944.

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IN TR O D U C TIO N Admiralty

Chief of British Naval Intelligence, Eastern Theater

Chief Operational Intelligence Services, Eastern Fleet

Intelligence on IJN’s tactics and technology

Operational intelligence

Decrypted communications US Navy Department

GCCS

HMS Anderson

Deputy COIS

Encrypted communications

Naval commanders

OIC

Secretariat Security

Figure I.3 British naval intelligence organization, Eastern Theatre.

closing stages. The contrast was due to the fact that the British army bore the brunt of the fighting in Southeast Asia. Hence, it was in greater need for intelligence, and its apparatus was likely to be more sophisticated. The Royal Navy, on the other hand, remained inactive for much of the conflict, thus negating the impetus for creating a resourceful organization at the theatre level.

Note on sources A brief word on archival sources is in order. The secretive nature of intelligence activities means that the relevant documents often face destruction, and the available evidence consists only of the material which the producers have deemed fit for public inspection. Also, from a logistical point of view, it is physically impossible to find the space to house all of the paperwork. The result is often a fragmented collection, where gaps and mysteries emerge frequently. In the case of British intelligence during the Pacific War, there are a number of ‘black holes’ which the historian must confront. For example, the FECB’s records were destroyed at the start of the war so as to prevent them from falling into enemy hands, and hard evidence of its activities prior to December 1941 is difficult to obtain. A large part of the evidence on British intelligence is made up of finished reports, such as, JIC appreciations, service bulletins and memoranda written by senior military officers. While the material provides a reasonably clear idea of the tone of net assessments, information on more basic questions, such as the material on which the reports were based, is often left wanting. Equally mysterious are the bureaucratic processes which gave rise to the final report, and how differences over interpretation between the responsible individuals and parties were resolved. 10

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Likewise, at the bottom end of the cycle, there is plenty of raw intelligence indicating the type of information being received. However, many of the papers have been kept in their original form, and there is little hard evidence to show how they were processed. The consumers’ views remain open to conjecture. Despite these difficulties, the available records allow an informed study of how British intelligence operated during the Pacific War, and they suggest that its activities made a valuable contribution.

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1 AMBIGUITY AND COMPLACENCY Britain’s assessment of Japan prior to the outbreak of war

During Japan’s attack on Southeast Asia between December 1941 and early 1942, Britain found itself virtually powerless. The British and Commonwealth forces were ousted from the Malay peninsula in a little over two months, and in February, the IJA conquered the bastion at Singapore. The inadequate state of Britain’s defences played its part in facilitating Japan’s victories. Nevertheless, to state that poor intelligence was the primary cause for Britain’s setbacks is farfetched. Numerous historical works, as well as firsthand accounts by the commanders responsible for planning Singapore’s security, have debated whether the capitulation was inevitable.1 The final explanation must follow the postmortem of General Sir Henry Pownall, commander of the British forces in the Far East. According to Pownall, commitments in Europe and the Middle East took priority, and preoccupations with matters closer to home significantly diminished the prospects of using military force to protect Britain’s empire in Asia.2 Security thus had to be achieved by other ways. An understanding had to be sought where Japan agreed to respect the integrity of British interests.3 Of equal importance was to secure US support in placing diplomatic and economic pressure. By late 1941, Tokyo was determined to expel the Allied powers from Southeast Asia, and the prospects of avoiding war were slim. One is tempted to conclude that even the most accurate intelligence could not save Singapore. A more realistic argument is that poor intelligence led Britain to miscalculate the Japanese. The available evidence did not convincingly suggest that Japan had the intention and capacity to achieve Far Eastern hegemony. On the contrary, it gave good reasons to conclude otherwise. The result was a general air of complacency within the British defence establishment, which dictated that a conflict against Japan was unlikely, and even in such scenarios, Britain would not face acute problems in safeguarding its empire. While faulty intelligence did not cause Britain’s strategic shortcomings, it led the British to mistakenly believe that their strategy against Japan was adequate. 12

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Flawed analysis, structural deficiencies, or inadequate intelligence? Britain’s misperceptions of Japan prior to the Pacific War can be attributed to a lack of reliable intelligence. Some of the recent works have correctly argued that the British used a flawed method of assessment, which was based on the assumption that Allied forces would prevail in all circumstances, and Japan would not risk a conflict that it knew it could not win.4 While analytical defects were present, their significance cannot be understood without examining the nature of the intelligence that shaped British calculations. The main factor which prevented a forecast of Japan’s intention, to conduct a total conquest of Southeast Asia, was Tokyo’s ambiguous behaviour. Despite Japan’s aggression in China during the 1930s, along with exhortations for eliminating Western influence in the Far East, the government and military did not have a definite plan for southward expansion until the final months preceding the outbreak of war. The assumption that Japan wished to move cautiously was supported by credible intelligence. Following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in July 1937, Japan’s involvement in China restricted any enlargement of its operations. The occupation of French Indochina during 1940–1941 showed that the navy and army had sufficient resources to expand southward. Yet, Japan’s inability to prevail in a prolonged war of attrition, along with the government’s apprehension over confronting an Anglo-American coalition, gave grounds to conclude that Tokyo would not encroach upon British territories. Assessments of Japanese military capabilities were likewise affected by inadequate intelligence. The British did not understand how the IJA, IJN and Japanese air forces (JAF)5 had developed the capacity to challenge their Western counterparts. Japan had also successfully concealed its rearmament programme through military secrets laws and travel restrictions, thereby substantially limiting the information British intelligence could obtain. The material reaching intelligence staffs in the Far East and Whitehall mostly emphasized the difficulties Japan’s armed forces faced in subduing the Chinese. If suggestions of incompetence arose from faulty assessment, the available material did not help. The structural weaknesses of the intelligence machinery also have to be analysed in view of the lack of serious threat indications.6 Whereas past experience revealed that Germany could challenge Britain, Japan had to prove its potential. As a result, the service departments devoted their scarce intelligence resources towards European matters, and invariably placed secondary importance on Asia. Japanese security laws also discouraged efforts to collect intelligence from secret sources. The only area where British intelligence made significant progress was Japanese diplomacy. Starting in 1919, the Government Codes and Cyphers School (GCCS) regularly produced decrypts, known as Blue Jackets (BJ), of messages transmitted by 13

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the diplomatic services of Britain’s rivals. This source provided an insight of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s (Gaimusho) objectives. However, efforts to collect intelligence on crucial aspects such as military strategy and capabilities met limited success. Clandestine services were also unproductive. Throughout the interwar period, Whitehall faced a shortage of finances, which precluded adequate support for the SIS, and the latter could not operate effective agents in any part of the world. Personnel for Japan and its overseas possessions were not available in sufficient numbers until the mid 1930s. By then, Japanese travel restrictions severely curtailed espionage activities. The situation was further complicated because Colonel Piggott, the military attaché in Tokyo between 1937–1940, insisted that his aim was to foster closer ties with the Japanese, and the presence of British special operatives could alienate his hosts.7 As a result, SIS activities remained meagre. Operations in other areas, notably Malaya and Singapore, suffered a perennial lack of funds. Britain’s apparatus for intelligence analysis suffered equally from apathy. A central organization, the Far Eastern Combined Bureau, operated in Hong Kong since 1935 (Figure I.1). In 1938, following the Japanese advance into southern China, it relocated to Singapore. Aside from breaking Japanese army and navy ciphers, the FECB analysed the performance of Japanese forces, and was able to obtain a reasonable amount of information on their operations in China. Again, the main problem was that London could not provide proper financial support, hindering the acquisition of the manpower to thoroughly collate the intelligence. In addition, there were few personnel with the skills needed to evaluate an adversary using a complex language as Japanese.8 The organizations within Whitehall suffered similar problems. The War Office, Air Ministry and Admiralty maintained their own intelligence directorates. In addition, the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) handled economic matters. In September 1939, with the outbreak of war in Europe, the IIC was incorporated into the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW). The service departments collaborated with the IIC and MEW over matters concerning Japanese raw materials supplies and armaments production. In all of the above organizations, the sections responsible for Japan were poorly funded and under-staffed. At the highest level of the machinery were the Cabinet and its committees, with the Joint Intelligence Committee being the most important. Founded in 1936 to provide a centralized body for assessing intelligence used by the Cabinet, the committee’s functions grew throughout the late 1930s. Following its reorganization in summer 1939, the JIC became the chief producer of appreciations for the COS. In May 1940, with Churchill’s accession to power, it took the additional task of producing operational intelligence reports for Britain’s defence planners. Preoccupations with Europe limited the attention it could devote to the Far East. 14

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The final structural feature which deserves attention is the cooperation between Britain and its allies. Intelligence was exchanged periodically with the other European colonial powers in Asia, namely the French and Dutch, as well as the Chinese. However, the most valuable partners were the Pacific Dominions, namely Australia and New Zealand, and more importantly, the United States. In particular, the Americans achieved considerable progress in penetrating Japan’s communications, and were in a favourable position to aid the British. The latter’s collection capabilities were limited to traffic passing through listening posts in Hong Kong, Singapore and its island possessions in the South Pacific.9 The US services covered the gap with a chain of intercept centres stretching from Alaska to Hawaii, while their stations in the Philippines were closer to Japan’s home islands. Thus, AngloAmerican collaboration offered potential benefits. Yet, cooperation remained unsatisfactory for two key reasons, the first of which was the divergence of policy between Britain and its allies, and the level of exchange reflected some of the conflicting interests. Second, regardless of the amount of collaboration, Japanese security arrangements meant that the Allies faced persistent problems in obtaining intelligence. At the level of collection, the British made progress in securing expertise of Japanese ciphers from the United States. The Americans had made considerable inroads since the early 1920s, and possessed a clear lead. In summer 1940, following a request by Lord Lothian, British ambassador in Washington, President Roosevelt dispatched a high-level mission to London to discuss the standardization of arms.10 In August, General George Strong, representing the US Army, informed the COS that the Americans were about to break the Japanese diplomatic code, commonly known as Purple, and were prepared to share the secrets. The offer was made in the hope that the British would divulge information on the German Enigma ciphers which the Americans had been attempting to obtain. Shortly thereafter, in February 1941, the GCCS secured a replica of the Purple machine from representatives of the US Army’s cryptographic mission. The FECB also joined its counterpart in the US Navy, OP-20-G, in an effort to break the Japanese Navy’s JN-25b code. A few months later, in June, an agreement was signed whereby US military authorities passed on to Singapore all intelligence on Japanese communications. British cryptanalysts were thus able to overcome the obstacles they had faced since the Japanese introduced more complex systems in 1939. Nevertheless, the British and Americans were unable to coordinate their activities, mainly because they were conducting separate efforts to contain the Japanese, and as such, the interests of their services rarely coincided. Whereas in the Atlantic, there was agreement that the sea lanes were vital for Britain’s survival, ‘no such meeting of minds was visible in the Pacific’.11 British strategy centred around protecting the Empire. Its war plans called for defending Singapore and the sea communications to Australia and New Zealand. US strategy, on the other hand, aimed to stay on the defensive in the 15

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Pacific, and thereafter regroup for attacks on Japan’s main forces in Asia. The Americans regarded Southeast Asia as a British responsibility, and devoted minimal efforts towards intelligence activities there. During the weeks leading up to the attack on Malaya, US naval authorities could only point to indications of a possible attack on the Philippines and Thailand.12 Cooperation at the level of analysis also appeared minimal. The JIC and service departments rarely referred to conclusions reached by their US counterparts. As late as November 1941, British officials in Washington stated that they had yet to determine the reasons for lack of US assistance.13 The rigid demarcation of Anglo-American zones of interest continued to affect collaboration even after the outbreak of war highlighted the need for integration. The sharing of intelligence between Britain and its Dominions was also hindered by political wrangling. Whitehall was reluctant to let Australia and New Zealand pursue an independent strategy, and thus held back support for their intelligence communities.14 By the mid 1930s, the Dominions established their own naval intelligence services.15 Although their activities were constrained by lack of financial resources, they operated intercept stations which picked up Japanese radio traffic, and used direction finders to track the IJN’s movements. The Dominions also contributed codebreakers to the FECB; however, their intelligence capabilities were left wanting. At the outbreak of war, the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy were unable to decode any of the IJN’s signals, at a time when the material could have provided clues concerning the impending invasion of Malaya. Simultaneously, the Japanese restrictions on foreign intelligence activities meant none of the Western Powers could make a proper assessment.16 The problem was particularly apparent in the area of Japanese military capabilities. The US services faced the same difficulties as their British counterparts, namely an inability to collect reliable information on Japan’s rearmament programme.17 Under the circumstances, it was difficult to envisage allied cooperation enabling British intelligence to create a more precise image. British misperceptions were, for the most part, due to the lack of signs that Japan posed a danger. The analytical faults, along with the deficiencies of the intelligence machinery, were often byproducts rather than the cause of flawed images. To understand why Britain failed to predict the developments that transpired at the opening stages of the Pacific War, one must investigate the problems arising from the absence of credible threat indications.

Roots of British perceptions of the Japanese menace, 1931–1937 Britain’s preoccupation with Germany did not render it oblivious to the Japanese menace. Following the abrogation of the Anglo–Japanese alliance in 1922, British leaders were aware that war was a distinct possibility. However, for much of the 1920s, the USSR and Comintern, with its alleged 16

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sponsorship of subversive movements in India and China, was viewed as the principal challenge in Asia. Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931, followed by its withdrawal from the League of Nations, convinced Whitehall to alter its position. In 1933, the SIS placed Japan above the USSR as a power whose activities needed to be monitored, and stated that its attempts to enhance its political and economic control over China created some of the most pressing concerns for Britain’s security.18 Japan’s renunciation of the Washington naval arms limitations in 1934 and the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in 1936 provided further indications that Tokyo was aligning itself with the ‘revisionist powers’, and that its policies aimed to alter the status quo in East Asia. Despite Britain’s awareness of the growing dangers, the situation was complicated by the lack of resources to defend its worldwide empire.19 When the end of the Anglo–Japanese alliance became imminent, the Cabinet approved the Admiralty’s plans to construct a facility at Singapore, which was to serve as Britain’s main base in the Far East. The working assumption was that the Royal Navy would dispatch its main fleet to Singapore. Japanese incursions against Malaya were to be contained, and the final phase envisaged an advance towards Japan’s home islands in an attempt to sever its oceanic trade routes. Restrictions on defence spending delayed the construction of the base during the 1920s. After 1933, following Hitler’s accession to power and the commencement of Germany’s rearmament programme, Britain focused on Europe. The economic effects of the Great Depression also curtailed military spending, and jeopardized Britain’s ability to provide surplus forces for the Far East. As a result, during the 1930s, the British steadily downsized their war plans. The 1931 Naval War Memorandum reiterated the lynchpin of the Royal Navy’s strategy, namely that after arriving at Singapore, the fleet would proceed to Hong Kong, and then establish bases for the blockading campaign against Japan’s home islands.20 However, in 1934, at a COS meeting, the War Office and Air Ministry representatives informed the Admiralty that air and ground forces for operations north of Singapore were not available. As the decade progressed, the feasibility of dispatching a fleet to Singapore became questionable. At the June 1937 Imperial Conference, the COS informed the Australian and New Zealand representatives that the fleet’s size would depend on whether Britain was engaging Germany and Italy at the time. It was in these fragile circumstances that Britain found itself when the Sino-Japanese conflict erupted only a month later.

The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and its effect on British perceptions of the Japanese menace, 1937–1939 On 7 July 1937, following skirmishes at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking, the IJA launched a full-scale invasion of China in an attempt to secure 17

Map 1.1 The Far East and the Pacific, c.1937 (courtesy of the Department of History, United States Military Academy).

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dominance over the Asiatic mainland. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War confirmed suspicions that the subjugation of China was a key Japanese objective, and compelled Britain to pay closer attention to possible encroachments upon its interests. The conflict also provided the first test of Japan’s ability to wage a protracted war. By summer 1939, the available intelligence cemented the popular belief that the economic and military costs of the China campaign had significantly limited Japan’s capacity for further expansion. Thus, despite Britain’s difficulties in defending its empire, the threat of a Japanese invasion was considered minimal, so long as the China incident remained unresolved. The drain on Japan’s economy was the most notable consequence. Because the bulk of Japan’s resources was committed in China, ventures which entailed further costs were deemed unlikely. Observations following the outbreak of hostilities revealed that Japan’s finances could support its war expenditures only with the greatest difficulty.21 Economic intelligence also showed how Japan’s narrow production base disabled its industries from providing sufficient amounts of armaments and munitions.22 Although the effect on Japan’s war-making capabilities was open to conjecture, evidence of deficiencies hinted that additional ventures would impose strains that its economy could not absorb, and its policies would be shaped accordingly. In September 1939, the COS actually stated that a prolonging of Sino-Japanese hostilities was potentially advantageous, for the costs were most likely to prevent Japan from trespassing upon the British Empire.23 Japan’s dependence on imported raw materials also provided a means to aggravate its economic difficulties, and laid the grounds for predicting that its ambitions would be limited by fears of Western retaliation. Economic sanctions were a double-edged sword which presented challenges and opportunities. In their contribution to the COS’s Far Eastern Appreciation of 1937, the IIC confidently concluded that in the event of war against the British Empire and the United States, Japan’s economy could be disrupted through a distant blockade of its trans-Pacific trade route and shipping lanes to Europe.24 At the same time, to be effective, economic sanctions had to be imposed over an extended period, given Japan’s possession of stockpiles. In addition, because the United States was Japan’s most important trading partner, American participation was necessary to ensure that its economy was strangulated. Finally, until sanctions took their toll, Britain faced the possibility of Japanese attacks against its interests in the Far East. These points were brought forward in an enquiry conducted during autumn 1937, by the Cabinet’s subcommittee on trade matters.25 The government of PM Neville Chamberlain thereafter refrained from sanctions.26 Nevertheless, the mere prospect of economic isolation held prospects of moderating Japan’s policies. In winter 1939, signals intelligence revealed that 19

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Japan was reluctant to transform its Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany into a formal military alliance, owing to worries that Britain and the United States might cease the export of vital raw materials.27 Japan’s military commitment in China also hindered its ability to take on additional enemies, since the majority of its troops were tied down and the conflict showed no signs of ending. In early 1938, Dobbie, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya, and Percival, his chief of staff, warned that a Japanese overland attack against Singapore was likely, and in order to counter such scenarios, the defence of the entire Malay peninsula was vital. However, the War Office replied that Japan was too preoccupied to embark on such a complicated expedition.28 Although the conclusion was not based on accurate figures, it was based on observations suggesting that Japan’s operations in China were likely to continue absorbing its strength.

British intelligence on Japanese strategy, September 1939 to December 1941 British assessments of the Far Eastern situation following the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe continued to predict that Japan would behave cautiously. The available intelligence provided vague hints of further expansion. To complicate matters, the threat of British and American retribution appeared to be restraining Japan. A southward advance entailed a possible confrontation against Britain, in which case US intervention could not be discounted. Japan could not bear the costs of such a conflict, and the evidence pointing to its limited resources suggested that Tokyo would avoid confrontation with a combination of Allied powers. The optimism arising from indications of Japan’s weaknesses had two effects on Britain’s handling of the situation. First, policymakers maintained that the threat of economic isolation and military reprisals was sufficient to deter a Japanese advance into Southeast Asia, and that Britain did not need to substantially reinforce its territories. Second, by early December 1941, when intelligence provided reliable indications of an imminent invasion of Malaya, the British were accustomed to seeing such scenarios as unlikely, to the point of downplaying the danger signals. The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 complicated Britain’s position in the Far East, while at the same time giving Japan favourable opportunities to undermine Western interests. Germany’s conquest of France and Holland during spring 1940 exposed Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, and Japan lost little time in exploiting the power vacuum. Among Tokyo’s objectives were to improve its economic situation by obtaining privileged access to sources of raw materials, and bolster its strategic position by establishing bases in Southeast Asia. Japan also took advantage of Britain’s preoccupation with the defence of its home islands against Germany, by pressuring Churchill’s government to cease supplying arms to China. 20

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Even more alarming, the Japanese possessed sufficient forces for a southward advance, in spite of continued difficulties in liquidating their commitments in China. In an attempt to subdue Chiang Kai Shek’s nationalists, Japan’s military leaders attempted to strangulate China’s lifelines. In autumn 1939, Japanese troops occupied Hainan island, thereby severing China’s access to the sea. During summer 1940, through an agreement with the Vichy French government, the Japanese acquired bases in northern Indochina for conducting air raids against the Chinese hinterland, where Chiang had relocated his headquarters. Both moves indicated that Japan could extend its operations without significantly diverting manpower and equipment from China. At the same time, Britain’s involvement in the war against Hitler restricted its ability to contain the Japanese.29 In August 1940, the COS warned that the cumulative effect of Germany’s onslaught against the home islands and trans-Atlantic lifelines meant that even in an emergency, the Royal Navy could not protect Singapore.30 Despite the mounting evidence of Japan’s ability to invade Britain’s colonies, as late as autumn 1941, the available intelligence did not firmly point to such moves. While the JIC did forecast Japanese strategy precisely, this was due to intelligent guesswork rather than good intelligence.31 The fact of the matter is that until autumn 1941, the government and high command remained undecided over Japan’s long-term policy.32 The main objective was to subdue China, with southward expansion a secondary goal. Tokyo had acknowledged that further territorial annexations could result in hostilities with the United States and Britain, but was circumspect about such scenarios. For example, in June, after the trade delegation to the Dutch East Indies failed to secure oil concessions, General Sugiyama, the Army Chief of Staff, rejected invasion on the grounds that it could provoke Allied intervention.33 The army and navy also disagreed over Japan’s objectives. The IJA insisted on preparing for a confrontation with the Soviets on the Asian mainland, while the IJN envisioned an oceanic war against the United States and Britain. The Japanese did not view the occupation of southern Indochina in July 1941 as a prelude to a southward expansion. The aim was to place Japan’s forces in a favourable position to conquer the oil resources of Southeast Asia if the need arose, and in the meantime, continue with the China operations and remain on guard against the USSR. Only in September, after the United States and its allies imposed oil embargoes and froze Japan’s overseas assets, in retaliation for the conquest of southern Indochina, did policymakers in Tokyo decide that an occupation of the British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia was imperative. Nor was it until November that the high command approved Admiral Yamamoto’s plan for a pre-emptive strike against the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor. In any case, the secrecy surrounding Japan’s war plans negated any prospect of predicting its strategy.34 21

Map 1.2 The Imperial Powers in the Far East, September 1939 (courtesy of the Department of History, United States Military Academy).

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Britain’s miscalculation therefore did not result from a flawed reading of the Japanese leadership’s mentality. It was based on a mistaken notion concerning the rationale likely to guide the future course of Tokyo’s policy. The British assumed that Japan would seek all means to avoid war against an Allied coalition, and did not foresee how the presence of Allied forces in Asia, combined with the effects of the economic sanctions, would encourage rather than dissuade the government and military elite to take a gamble. Churchill held a deep-seated belief that the Japanese were inherently cautious, as illustrated in his remark to the War Cabinet Defence Committee in May 1941, ‘[the Japanese] would enter the war when they thought that [the British] are on the point of defeat, so that [Japan] could gather the spoils without danger . . . ’.35 In predicting that Japan would behave cautiously, the British relied on a method of analysis which intelligence theorists and practitioners have defined as ‘projection’,36 a tendency to project one’s values onto the adversary, or ‘mirror imaging’,37 that is, assuming that the other side would follow the same principles as oneself when facing a similar situation. Intelligence staffs and policymakers believed that, because they had concluded the losses Japan was likely to incur from a war against the Allies outweighed the costs, the Japanese leadership thought likewise. Without definite indications that the Japanese would resort to seemingly irrational moves, British assessments were unlikely to predict the outbreak of war. The ambiguous nature of Japan’s strategy meant the British could not provide firm answers whether further conquests were impending. Evidence of efforts towards increased economic and political influence in Southeast Asia did not indicate plans aside from the acquisition of French Indochina and Thailand. Assessments of Japanese expansion only spelled out the threats posed by the actions they undertook or were likely to execute. For example, when Japan occupied southern Indochina, the Admiralty simply warned that Japanese forces were in a favourable position for further advances.38 The FECB went as far as to state, ‘the primary objective . . . was to ensure that Japan obtains all of the resources from Indochina’, the acquisition of bases for southward expansion being secondary.39 The growth of Japanese influence in Thailand posed the greatest menace to Britain’s colonies. The increasing Japanese–Thai military cooperation, in the form of Thai base concessions in exchange for Japanese arms shipments, entailed the possible establishment of a direct land link with Malaya.40 In early August 1941, after the occupation of southern Indochina, the JIC concluded that troop movements and dispositions suggested Thailand was Japan’s next objective, and a logical precursor to an advance against Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.41 While the scope of Japan’s strategy was calculated correctly, the JIC could not forecast the timeframe in which the Japanese were likely to carry out their conquests.42 The fall of Holland led Japan to lure the Dutch East Indies into its orbit. 23

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However, Tokyo’s designs did not signify plans for occupation, and only revealed efforts to obtain access to the archipelago’s raw materials through economic penetration and diplomatic coercion. BJ decrypts showed the government’s desires to secure guarantees for imports of petroleum and strategic metals, and to ensure that the islands did not fall under US or British control.43 The IJN’s concentration of its main units in the Mandated Islands did not indicate an impending occupation. Godfrey, the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), and the Admiralty concluded that the manoeuvres were designed to compel Batavia to offer concessions.44 British assessments of Japan’s strategy were affected by factors aside from uncertainty. The ambiguity was compounded by indications of its questionable ability to confront the Allied powers. The available intelligence also suggested that Tokyo was hesitant to antagonize the United States and Britain. The cumulative effect was a sense of reassurance that Japan’s awareness of its own weaknesses would restrain any decision to advance southward. The British believed that, despite Japan’s ability to deploy numerically superior forces, its objectives were limited to a piecemeal conquest of Southeast Asia. Such a strategy provided the only way of avoiding a war in which Japan stood to be defeated by an Anglo-American coalition, possibly supported by the USSR. In retrospect, Japan’s lightning conquest of Southeast Asia vindicates the contention that the British were complacent. However, Japan was in fact at two minds about taking risks. Tokyo’s attitude concerning the Tripartite Pact, signed in September 1940 with Germany and Italy, indicated the undecided state of its policies. On paper, the pact obliged the signatories to aid each other if any of them became embroiled in a war against the United States. In reality, Japan’s actions continued to be dictated by its own strategic considerations. A BJ decrypt on 31 July revealed how an imperial policy conference had decided that military support for Germany’s campaign against the USSR hinged upon Japan’s policy requirements rather than any obligations to its Axis partners.45 The evidence pointing to Japan’s undecided strategy was reinforced by signs that fear of intervention by the offstage superpowers, namely the USSR and US, was limiting its willingness, as well as ability to advance southward. The Russo-Japanese border clashes at Changkufeng in 1938, and Nomonhan in 1939, brought home to Tokyo that the Soviets remained a threat. As long as war in Siberia remained probable, the IJA needed to keep a large portion of its forces on reserve in Manchuria. Nor did the nonaggression pact with Moscow in April 1941 eliminate the prospect of hostilities. Germany’s invasion of Russia in June raised the possibility of the USSR collapsing, in which case Japan’s armies needed to be ready to advance into Siberia, so as to share the spoils. On 16 July, the War Office disseminated the contents of a BJ decrypt which revealed how a policy conference held earlier in the month concluded that intervention in Barbarossa was not ruled out.46 24

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As late as autumn 1941, the overall consensus within the FECB and Whitehall was that Japan needed to protect its position vis-à-vis the USSR; hence, the retention of forces on the Manchukuo border precluded an expedition against Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. According to the FECB, aircraft movements suggested that Japan’s air forces had been withdrawn from Indochina for operations in the north.47 The JIC concluded that troop concentrations along the Soviet border pointed to offensive action, and an attack on Malaya was not feasible without a substantial reduction of Soviet strengths in the Far East.48 Japan also had to consider the probability of US intervention. An invasion of British and Dutch territories in Asia entailed the danger of the Americans aiding their European allies. From late 1940, the Roosevelt administration steadily departed from its isolationist policies and began to actively support Britain. The ‘destroyers for bases’ deal and Lend-Lease agreement committed the Americans to providing material help to their trans-Atlantic ally. In December, the United States and Britain commenced negotiations for naval cooperation, and in March 1941, the ABC-1 agreement called for the two powers to coordinate their action in the event the United States entered the war. When Japan occupied Indochina during 1940–1941, Washington initiated the imposition of economic sanctions. In August 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt signed the Atlantic Charter, which formed the basis for Allied war aims to rid the world of fascist aggression and secure national selfdetermination in the postwar world. With the United States taking a more vigorous role in world affairs, Japan was considered more likely to shun the military power the Americans could put up. While the FECB acknowledged that Japan viewed Britain’s preoccupation with Europe as an ideal opportunity, its intelligence summaries invariably closed with the reassurance that the possibility of provoking US naval action against its vulnerable lines of communication between the home islands and Southeast Asia was likely to limit its expansion.49 As late as August 1941, the War Office concluded that the fear of US retaliation precluded an attack on Malaya and the East Indies.50 Ten days before Pearl Harbor, the JIC reiterated the conclusion it had reached back in January 1941, namely, that fear of a US attack on the home islands would prevent the IJN from dispatching sufficient capital ships to support an amphibious operation against Malaya.51 In the light of evidence which suggested that Japan faced difficulties in confronting the Allied powers, assessments were likely to assume caution. The British also held erroneous views of the state of Japanese–American relations.52 In September 1941, in an attempt to secure a lifting of the economic sanctions, Tokyo ordered its ambassador in Washington, Nomura Kichisaburo, to commence negotiations with US Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The latter made it clear that the minimum price for rapprochement was a withdrawal from China. After five years of waging a costly war, the 25

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Japanese government was bound to reject such terms. While the British were aware that the talks were not proceeding well, they were largely unaware of how the US and Japanese positions were so incompatible as to rule out any conciliation. As late as November, when the newly arrived hard-line government of Tojo Hideki was finalizing Japan’s war plans, the prevailing view was that confrontation in the Far East could be avoided. GHQ India explained how, if Japan had to choose between commencing hostilities or sitting on the fence to await a favourable solution, past experience gave good reason to believe that Japan would take the peaceful option.53 Aside from strategic complications, Japan’s economic situation suggested that its ambitions were limited by the desire to avoid the consequences of sanctions. Japan’s dependence on imported raw materials could only be taken as evidence that Western embargoes were bound to cripple its warmaking capacity. The possibility that sanctions might induce Japan to solve its problems by occupying new sources of raw materials in Southeast Asia was examined, but invariably dismissed, since such moves were fraught with risks. An oil embargo potentially had the gravest effect. In May 1941, the MEW, the service departments and the Shell Oil Company concluded that if the United States and Britain ceased their exports, unless Japan obtained control over the Dutch East Indies, its stocks would be exhausted in less than a year.54 The cumulative product of the intelligence pointing to Japan’s economic vulnerability was the notion that the prospect of strangulation was likely to hold back its activities. In April 1941, the Axis Planning Section (APS) 55 predicted that fear of reprisals was likely to limit Japan’s actions to the peaceful annexation of new supplies of resources in areas beyond British and US control, i.e. Indochina, Thailand and Dutch Borneo.56 In August, the Joint Planning Subcommittee concluded that although the oil embargo and freezing orders may have increased the possibility of war, fears over the effects of continued restrictions were more likely to ‘make Japan pause and count the cost before taking another step forward’.57 On the eve of Pearl Harbor, the MEW suggested that unless Japan made sufficient concessions, it faced the prospect of suffering ‘an economic situation as to render her ultimately unable to wage war, and reduce her to the status of second rate power’.58 Although the Dutch East Indies were the only territories which could provide the required petroleum, the islands were not necessarily considered part of Japan’s immediate objectives. In light of the strategic difficulties which a southward expedition was perceived to entail, it was logical for British intelligence to surmise that the only realistic means to avoid economic collapse was through negotiations, and to conclude that the continued effects of the sanctions would deter, rather than goad, military action. For the purpose of strategic planning, the notion that the threat of Allied opposition could contain Japan led Britain to adopt a policy of relying on bluff. Policymakers believed that they could compensate for their inadequate 26

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strengths in the Far East by taking a firm stand, and dissuade Japan from further expansion. In July 1940, Japan seized the opportunity to exploit Britain’s preoccupation with the German onslaught, by demanding a closure of the Burma Road, which provided one of the main arteries for channelling supplies to China. The COS recommended the Cabinet to agree to a temporary shutdown. The incident marked one of the few occasions when acquiescence was advocated. Nevertheless, the decision was based on the premise that the interim period be used to secure a Japanese agreement to abstain from aggression.59 Similarly, the recommendation to reopen the Road in October, following Japan’s occupation of northern Indochina, was based on the belief that a show of strength was necessary to keep Japan in check.60 During 1941, the policy of deterrence gained further credibility, with the unfolding of events which suggested that the Japanese tended to back down in the face of confrontation. In February, concentrations of Japanese transports in the Gulf of Siam pointed to a possible invasion of Thailand. Although the war scare proved false, the Japanese government’s abstention from further territorial acquisitions involving the use of force, following Ambassador Craigie’s warning to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, was taken as an indication that when pushed to the brink, Tokyo preferred to avoid trouble.61 The occupation of southern Indochina in July 1941 did little to raise doubts that war with Japan could be avoided. The accepted belief was that so long as Britain synchronized its policy with the United States, and followed suit in imposing economic restrictions and hinting at further repercussions, the situation in the Far East could be stabilized. During the last week of November, Churchill made recommendations to Roosevelt for a joint AngloAmerican declaration, on the belief that conquests could be prevented so long as Japan knew clearly that such moves entailed hostilities.62 Diplomatic and economic measures were not the only weapons for containing Japan. By late 1941, the prevailing belief within Whitehall and Malaya Command was that if Britain undertook nominal improvements in its military position, Japan would lose confidence in the chances of conducting a successful invasion. Despite Britain’s inability to dispatch a fleet to Singapore, the reorganization of Malaya’s ground forces was viewed as a viable panacea.63 In April 1941, following months of plea-bargaining, the COS accepted a proposal by Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East, that Singapore’s defence perimeter be extended to northern Malaya, and approved preparations for a pre-emptive occupation of the Kra isthmus (codename Matador). The plan involved a slight increase in strengths, and Churchill consented on the condition that it did not entail a reduction of forces in the Middle East, which was treated as second priority following the home islands. By October, when preparations for Matador were approaching completion, British commanders became confident that Japan would not invade, as illustrated by a meeting at GHQ Malaya. The 27

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proceedings were described by B.H. Ashmore, a senior commander on Percival’s staff, who recalled that the FECB representative ‘painted a fairly indecisive picture’, and was unable to provide much information whether the occupation of Indochina portended further moves.64 Although the presence of enemy forces within proximity of Malaya raised worries, the upshot of the meeting was that the Japanese high command would refrain from an invasion after realizing that British beach defences and air opposition posed complications. The notion that the presence of Allied forces in Southeast Asia and the Pacific could deter the Japanese also pervaded Whitehall. In July 1941, responding to the COS’s suggestion to re-examine the possibility of further reinforcements for Malaya, Churchill reiterated his view that the Japanese were unlikely to go to war if the Americans intervened.65 Unable to present a strong counterargument, the COS gave in. The decision to dispatch the capital ships HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales to Singapore in October was the result of Churchill’s conviction that a token British fleet in Southeast Asia, alongside a US fleet in the Pacific, was sufficient to negate whatever optimism Japan had in its capacity to advance southward.66 The COS’s agreement to Brooke-Popham’s proposal, for dispatching Canadian battalions to Hong Kong, was based on a similar assumption that token reinforcements provided a valuable deterrent.67 The defence establishment’s adherence to its illusionary faith, that Japan could be discouraged by the prospect of opposition, was further underlined by Pound’s letter to the British Admiralty Delegation (BAD) at Washington, which suggested that the arrival of the capital ships at Singapore may well have made the Japanese hesitate.68 Given that war was bound to result in an ultimate defeat for Japan, combined with indications that its actions were being limited by apprehensions over confronting the Allies, the British were most likely to believe that they could avert war. Under the circumstances, it was logical to give minimal consideration for any substantial enhancement of Britain’s defensive capabilities in the Far East. Only the speed and scale of Japan’s victories in Southeast Asia convinced the British that their adversary could not be deterred. As late as the first week of December 1941, when the available intelligence clearly revealed Japan’s plans to declare war on Britain and the United States, the defence establishment maintained that such moves did not entail an invasion of Malaya. US and Japanese attempts to reach an understanding had reached an impasse. During the last week of October, port watchers in China reported that landing craft were being constructed in Shanghai.69 On 2 December, an intercepted telegram between the Gaimusho and the embassy in Berlin showed that Japan anticipated hostilities with the United States and Britain.70 Yet, the precise location of the attacks remained unclear. On 3 December, a BJ decrypt revealed that the Thai government had requested the Japanese to launch a landing at Kota Baru on the Kra isthmus, thereby compelling the British to counterattack via Thailand, giving the 28

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latter a valid pretext for joining forces with Tokyo.71 Even then, there were no clear indications whether Tokyo had agreed. Only the arrival of longrange bomber and fighter aircraft in Indochina, along with observations of Japanese ship movements, provided strong signs that Malaya was a potential target. The historiography suggests that British commanders in the Far East, as well as the planning staffs in London, became convinced that Japan would not undertake risky ventures, to the point of treating any indications of an impending attack with scepticism. The prevailing view was that Japan held apprehensions about war against the Allies, and would therefore avoid engaging their main forces in Asia; therefore the thrust of Japan’s operations was most likely to be directed against Thailand. The reasons for denying the truth are difficult to explain because the available documentation does not describe the thoughts of the people in question. The most plausible cause was a refusal to depart from ingrained beliefs, or a phenomenon which scholars have termed ‘cognitive rigidity’, or ‘cognitive dissonance’.72 Indications of an attack were explained away because the British were accustomed to believing that such scenarios were improbable, or they felt that to acknowledge the dangers would disrupt their peace of mind. The most reliable intelligence was unlikely to alter the beliefs of Britain’s defence planners, at least until the Japanese had landed in Malaya. In his history of the campaign, S.W. Kirby revealed that Brooke-Popham downplayed the FECB’s warnings that the convoys detected in the South China Sea were probably destined for the Kra isthmus and northern Malaya.73 According to Louis Allen, as late as the evening of 7 December, when British reconnaissance aircraft had been fired upon, the C-in-C Far East refused to acknowledge that hostilities were imminent.74 Recent works by O.C. Chung, Peter Elphick and Richard Aldrich have convincingly explained how Brooke-Popham and his staff ignored the signals pointing to a Japanese invasion.75 Attention has focused on intercepted ciphers between Tokyo and its embassies in London and Washington, ordering the destruction of confidential papers and encoding machines upon receipt of messages indicating an impending declaration of war. Equally important were the signals between Tokyo and its consul-generals in Bangkok and Singapore, revealing that by late November, fifth-columnists in Malaya had laid the groundwork for invasion. Concentrations of troops and aircraft in Indochina also indicated numbers well over those required for an invasion of Thailand. Yet, as late as 5 December, Brooke-Popham declined to order the pre-emptive occupation of landing sites on the Kra isthmus, on the grounds that no firm evidence existed that the convoy in the Gulf of Thailand was headed in his direction.76 Even on 7 December, when the convoy’s proximity to Singora rendered a landing most likely, the C-in-C Far East maintained that the force was possibly a Japanese ruse to induce Britain to breach Thailand’s neutrality, a move that could burden Britain with the 29

Map 1.3 Japanese war plans, December 1941 (courtesy of the Department of History, United States Military Academy).

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blame for provoking hostilities.77 Brooke-Popham was not alone in discounting the imminence of a Japanese attack. The COS were equally unable to determine whether the convoy was heading for the Kra isthmus or Bangkok.78

British intelligence on Japanese military efficiency prior to December 1941 While intelligence on Japan’s strategic problems provided convincing reasons to downplay the threat it could pose, the available information on its military capabilities did not raise concern. The problem stemmed from the lack of reliable intelligence. The absence of prior experience in engaging Japan’s armed forces also meant the British did not have a reliable yardstick for calculating the outcome of an Anglo–Japanese confrontation. By comparison, in the European theatres, defence establishments could draw upon the experiences of the First World War, which provided ominous indications of how the conduct of future conflicts could be affected by modern technologies such as aircraft, armour and naval power.79 Even then, the British could only speculate how the use of such weapons might affect the performance of their most likely enemy, Nazi Germany.80 British efforts to assess Germany were hindered by the rapid pace and secretive nature of its rearmament programme, as well as the shortage of resources and qualified intelligence personnel.81 Assessments were based on conjecture, and ‘untested preconceptions were too often interwoven with hard facts’.82 Among the most noteworthy of these presumptions was that Britain would face horrific casualties if it attempted to stand up to its enemies.83 The defeatist attitude was common among British policymakers and military officials throughout the interwar period, and stemmed from the losses suffered during the Great War.84 The lack of reliable information meant that German capabilities were overrated during the 1930s, and the exaggeration played a profound role in leading the British to take an indecisive stand against Hitler’s expansionist moves. Warfare against the Japanese in East Asia was an even more uncertain venture. There had been few opportunities to observe Japan’s armed forces in action since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Japanese operations during the Great War consisted of small-scale landings against German outposts in China and the Pacific. Intelligence collection during the interwar period was complicated by military secrets laws which shrouded Japan’s rearmament programme. The abrogation of the Anglo–Japanese alliance curtailed opportunities for collecting material through attachments to Japanese units. Without access to reliable intelligence, the British tended to base their judgments on preconceptions which dictated that Japan could not construct a military machine to match the West. The conclusion that Japan’s forces were second rate gained further credibility after July 1937, when the IJA and the air services faced visible difficulties in overcoming Chinese 31

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resistance. Finally, despite the Japanese navy’s numerical superiority, along with the army and air services possessing the additional advantage of having gained years of experience, Japan’s forces had only confronted weak Chinese opponents. As a result, assessments on the feasibility of an expedition against Malaya concluded with the view that British forces would prevail. Recent works on British prewar assessments of Japanese capabilities have explained how misperceptions were partly due to racist biases which deprecated the martial qualities of non-Western forces.85 Indeed, comments on the IJN and IJA often demonstrated myopic judgments. The Naval Attaché in Tokyo, Captain Vivian, reported in 1935 that the Japanese ‘have peculiarly slow brains’, and were therefore unlikely to effect any sort of surprise moves.86 Naval officers concluded that because of their slit eyes, Japanese pilots could not shoot straight. Remarks on the IJA’s performance were equally degrading. In December 1937, following a tour of northern China, Captain Marr-Johnson, a Royal Artillery officer, noted ‘various slight indications’ that the Japanese soldier’s morale was excellent while he was winning, but his fighting spirit tended to break down when ‘faced with a nasty situation’. When forwarding the report to MI2,87 the General Staff at the War Office minuted, ‘after all, the Japanese are Orientals!’.88 Such statements suggest that racial contempt was widespread. At the same time, racism was one of a myriad of influences, and its role cannot be properly understood without examining the obstacles which prevented a more informed verdict. Assessments of the IJN were based on racial stereotyping because the lack of reliable information precluded a knowledgeable judgment. In regard to the IJA and the air services, the available intelligence appeared to confirm the British disdain for Japan’s armed forces. The IJN was the branch which remained the greatest mystery. Not only did military secrets laws prohibit visits to naval bases and shipyards;89 the collection of intelligence was further complicated because the IJN played only a minor role in China. Efforts to obtain information on Japan’s naval services remained unproductive. For example, during spring 1939, the Naval Attaché admitted that he had little information with which to ascertain the types of vessels the IJN was planning to construct with the funds it procured through the Japanese Diet’s annual budget.90 Signals intelligence revealed that the Navy Ministry was requesting its attachés in Europe to secure contracts for badly needed imports of steel, ammunition, and radio equipment.91 While information on production difficulties correctly signified that the IJN was struggling to meet its construction targets, it tended to obscure the successes it had achieved in constructing a fleet capable of challenging its US and British counterparts. The shortage of raw intelligence on the IJN had two detrimental effects, the first of which was a lack of knowledge about the size and armament of Japanese capital ships. The Admiralty was aware that the IJN was constructing vessels with tonnages exceeding the Washington naval arms quotas, 32

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especially after Japan openly denounced the limits in 1934, and withdrew from the London Conference two years later.92 However, the extent of the breaches was never certain. In regard to the possible construction of ships with 18-inch guns and displacements exceeding 40,000 tons, the DNI simply stated that the possibility could not be ignored.93 In fact, British intelligence was unaware of the existence of the superbattleships Yamato and Musashi until 1942.94 The second damaging result of poor intelligence was a tendency to base assessments on dubious sources. The most basic aspects, such as the number and types of ships under construction, were left to guesswork. Calculations by the NID were premised on what the Japanese could produce with their limited resources.95 Information on armaments manufacture was left wanting. In January 1939, the DNI admitted that, although Kure Naval Dockyard was the only known site for building armour plate, his minute was based on a vernacular newspaper article obtained back in November 1937.96 In addition to the problems arising from lack of accuracy, production figures could never substitute qualitative information on Japan’s fleet. In light of the difficulties in obtaining dependable information, it was only a short step to a situation where the Admiralty relied on racial stereotyping. As Arthur Marder has illustrated, the estimate that the IJN’s efficiency was 80 per cent in comparison to the Royal Navy was arbitrary, and based on the presumption that the Japanese could never develop a fleet that was on par with its Western rivals.97 British efforts to assess the IJA faced obstacles of a similar nature to those which plagued naval intelligence. As with the IJN, information on the IJA was fragmentary, owing to security arrangements. The collection of information on crucial matters such as equipment, training and tactical doctrine was difficult.98 The available material tended to highlight the troubles facing the IJA. In particular, army commanders appeared slow to depart from their traditional practice of fighting set piece battles, and unable to develop methods for conducting a mobile war which required the proper use of mechanized forces. In 1937, MI2c99 reported to Inskip, the Minister for the Coordination of Defence, that despite massive increases in expenditure, the effectiveness of the IJA’s weapons and training in their use could not be compared with first-rate armies.100 Suggestions of inherent Japanese deficiencies turned out to be largely correct, particularly regarding the use of modern weapons. The IJA’s progress in this field did not merit praise, as was revealed in its confrontations against the Chinese and more importantly, the Soviets. In 1940, the War Office noted how the use of artillery at the Nomonhan border clashes was poor, with infantry units requesting fire to be delivered against targets well outside the range of guns.101 Antitank guns were also sited in a manner which disclosed their positions, ‘with the result that Soviet tanks were able to knock them out at the start of the attack’. The prospects of improvement appeared 33

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unpromising. In a report on an imperial ordinance calling for a rigorous effort to equip units with tanks and mechanized infantry, B.R. Mullaly, the Military Attaché, commented that the Japanese ‘lack of experience and the handicaps imposed by national characteristics’ were likely to ‘restrict the effective use of such formations’.102 As Alvin Coox has illustrated, the IJA high command realized in the aftermath of Nomonhan that the reverses against the Red Army were due to the shortage of heavy equipment, coupled with poor tactical skill.103 However, the IJA’s ineptitude in operating armour and artillery was bound to hamper its efforts to mechanize. Consequently, Japanese tactics centred on the infantry for the duration of the Pacific War, and the IJA never achieved anything similar to Western standards in the employment of mechanized forces. At the same time, reports which emphasized the IJA’s backwardness demonstrated how the available intelligence obscured one of its key strengths, namely, the efficiency of its infantry units. Their ability to advance long distances without relying upon transport or fixed communications, and overcome enemy defences with light weaponry, proved fatal for Allied forces in Southeast Asia during the opening stages of the war. The creation of an accurate image of the IJA was further hampered by its failure to achieve a decisive victory during the Sino-Japanese War, which in turn, reinforced the view that its capabilities need not be taken seriously. Assessments of the IJA’s performance in China revealed a misunderstanding of how it was confronting a number of unique obstacles, none of which was encountered later in Southeast Asia. First, the geographical expanse of the Chinese theatre meant that the IJA was more likely to contend with enemy counterattacks and logistical difficulties than in a battleground as compact as Malaya.104 Second, because Chinese armies were fighting on home territory and could draw upon an endless supply of reserves, they were more capable of effective resistance than a Western army operating thousands of miles from home base. Third, and most importantly, Chinese guerrillas, as well as regular troops, possessed a significantly higher standard of training than the British empire forces which defended Malaya. The British therefore faced difficulties in gauging the implications of Japanese weaknesses and strengths. Its misperceptions stemmed from a mistaken notion that the IJA’s problems in China were indisputable proof of its inability to challenge its Western rivals. Field reports illustrated in painstaking detail how guerrilla resistance had forced significant resources to be devoted towards ‘pacification duties’.105 The IJA’s difficulties in coping with this type of opposition gave rise to suggestions that the Japanese were hard pressed to defeat the most poorly equipped foes.106 Appraisals of Japanese morale provided another key example of a prevalent habit, within the British intelligence community and army establishment in general, to overestimate how the IJA’s troubles affected its worthiness. Events in China revealed that the morale of Japanese soldiers, which the IJA 34

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viewed as its most valuable asset, was liable to deteriorate in the face of prolonged conflict. Impressions of the IJA’s exceptionally high morale were largely a holdover from its performance during the Russo-Japanese war. However, from the earliest stages of the Sino-Japanese conflict, field reports noted how the majority of the IJA’s troops were conscripts who openly expressed disapproval of the war effort and regularly demonstrated apathy.107 Tours of battle areas carried out by British observers, such as Grimsdale and Captain Boxer, head of the intelligence branch in Hong Kong, revealed that unexpected reverses frequently caused a breakdown of discipline.108 By the eve of the Pacific War, the British correctly surmised that the Japanese soldier’s tendency to lose confidence in unforeseen situations rendered him vulnerable. In March 1941, Major Chapman, head of MI2c, minuted that a spate of Japanese defeats against the British or the Americans might burst the bubble of an ever-advancing army, with the effect being ‘so severe as to induce panic’.109 Nevertheless, allegations concerning the effects of Japanese shortcomings hinged on the optimistic prediction that the Allies would benefit from the opportunity to achieve a decisive victory at the initial stages of the war. In spite of the analytical faults which plagued British appraisals, one needs to take account of the fact that the only source of tangible intelligence was the IJA’s operations in China, which often laid the grounds for negative images. Grimsdale recalled that the reverse at Taierchwang in April 1938 formed the basis of Western beliefs that, given adequate equipment, the Chinese could defeat the Japanese.110 The corollary to this notion, that since the Chinese army was hopelessly inefficient, it followed that the IJA was also in a poor state, gained wide acceptance. Brooke-Popham’s conviction, that the IJA could not be viewed as a formidable enemy, was based on observations of Japanese frontier guards while on a tour of Hong Kong in late 1940.111 As postmortems on the Malaya campaign invariably admitted, the bulk of Japanese troops in China were second-rate conscript soldiers who did not fully represent the IJA’s capabilities.112 Britain’s underestimation therefore can be attributed to the lack of access to information on the training and efficiency of the armies which its forces were to encounter in Southeast Asia. Without a direct confrontation which could provide a full picture of the IJA’s capa-bilities, evidence of incompetence was taken at face value. The numerous indications pointing to the IJA’s questionable performance meant that assessments were rarely able to provide straightforward acknowledgements of its prowess. Consequently, no audience in the War Office and the British army was ever likely to take a serious view. As Ferris has illustrated, MI2 was the only section within the War Office which acknowledged how, owing to its experience in China, the IJA was a difficult foe if confronted in the battlefields of Asia.113 However, even MI2 never explicitly conceded that the IJA was capable of defeating its Western counterparts. For example, in May 1940, and again in December 1941, a few days following 35

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the outbreak of war, MI2 disseminated ambivalent accounts which closed with a warning that the IJA was ‘trained for and only required to fight in the Far East, where it will have inherent advantages’.114 However, before delivering such a discomforting observation, both papers stated that as a general conclusion, ‘the Japanese army [had] not yet reached the standards of western armies’. In addition, they contained a number of sharp criticisms concerning poor infantry–artillery cooperation and a tendency to downplay enemy strengths. Such statements were more likely to dilute any worries. A lecture delivered by Colonel Wards, the assistant military attaché in Tokyo, to a gathering of British officers at Singapore during 1941 which warned of the IJA’s efficiency, was not only discredited as a result of dismissive comments by Bond, the then GOC Malaya. More importantly, Wards recalled that the audience began to show doubts of his statements when he was at a loss for ways to explain the poor physique of Japanese POWs in China.115 The creation of negative images regarding the IJA was further propelled by the fact that it had conducted most of its operations against poorly equipped Chinese forces, and had yet to face its supposedly more advanced Western rivals. When evaluating the IJA’s performance in the event that it advanced into Southeast Asia, the British surmised that the Japanese were unlikely to enjoy the same fortunes. Assessments of Japanese capabilities in amphibious landings and jungle warfare highlighted this dilemma. Combined operations in China were conducted with sophistication. Landings took place with little warning, and advances against inland targets were launched before the defenders could counterattack. However, because the landings met minimal air and naval opposition, similar operations against well-entrenched forces were deemed to face less favourable results. Likewise, operations in southern China and Indochina gave the IJA invaluable experience conducting operations in undeveloped terrain. Its forces were able to advance rapidly through heavily wooded and mountainous country, where poor communications and difficulties in transporting heavy equipment required the efficient deployment of infantry units. However, because the Japanese had only confronted guerrillas who did not put up organized resistance, the accepted view was that they could not make significant progress against British forces in Malaya. The problem stemmed not so much from an inability to understand the IJA’s capabilities, as from a widespread ethnocentric view which blindly credited the efficacy of Western armies. The corollary to this belief was the assumption that British forces in Malaya were first rate and in good order. Japanese methods did suffer a number of weaknesses. For example, while amphibious forces had developed exceptional skill in landing on undefended coastlines, their capabilities against fortified positions were negligible.116 The first wave of landings in Malaya suffered heavy casualties caused by air interference, and the operations succeeded mainly because the invading troops persisted with their advance in spite of the losses.117 36

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The IJA’s jungle warfare capabilities were at a similar stage of infancy. The majority of troops embarking for Malaya were given virtually no training for warfare in tropical conditions.118 Japanese equipment was not made to withstand heat and humidity, and medical provision for malaria was rudimentary. As Edward Drea has illustrated, ‘for the Japanese army, the war in the South Pacific was one against an unknown enemy’.119 The successes in Malaya were in many ways attributable to the grossly unprepared state of British troops, coupled with good fortune. The IJA’s shortage of mechanized units meant that tactical doctrine focused upon the infantry, who were to rely upon speed and surprise to outflank enemy defences. Such tactics proved effective in Malaya, where the British did not have enough armour and artillery to cover their flanks. However, in the Philippines, the Japanese were often held up by better-equipped US forces. Thus, Japanese methods succeeded only against weaker opponents. British misperceptions resulted from a mistaken notion that Western forces would prevail in all circumstances. Yet, while reservations concerning the IJA’s efficacy suggest a certain naivety, an equally important factor was the lack of precedents for gauging the British army’s strengths against the Japanese. Under the circumstances, the British naturally evaluated the IJA in light of the fact it had yet to overcome the challenges it faced in Southeast Asia. Appraisals of Japanese amphibious warfare capabilities demonstrated a presumption that the IJA’s inexperience in operating against strong shore defences and air power entailed a risk of heavy losses and possibly failure. In his minutes to a report on the landings in the Yangtse Delta area during autumn 1937, the DNI noted, ‘the Japanese are gaining experience in combined operations and have shown originality in their preparation and construction of special craft’.120 However, he closed with a downplaying comment, that the absence of defending aircraft had probably inspired a false sense of confidence among Japanese commanders. The minimizing of the threat posed by Japanese amphibious tactics had a profound effect on assessments of the dangers facing British forces in Malaya. In April 1940, Bond warned that the Japanese development of special landing craft, along with their ability to carry out landings in adverse weather conditions, and in areas which were a considerable distance away from their home base, necessitated an improvement of the peninsula’s seaward defences. The General Staff at the War Office rebuffed, ‘regarding the Japanese ability to land on coasts anywhere, this is agreed with . . . although [their] ability to maintain forces like this against European troops and aircraft is questionable’.121 By winter 1941, the threat posed by Japan’s ability to land troops on the Kra isthmus was mitigated by the conception of Matador, which envisaged a forestalling of Japanese invasion by occupying the key beachheads and aerodromes.122 Major-General Playfair, the chief of staff for GHQ Far East, went as far as to suggest that so long as Matador was 37

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executed immediately after the Japanese attacked, a protracted land battle was highly unlikely.123 Assessments concerning the IJA’s jungle warfare capabilities were based on similar conjectures which professed British superiority. The prospects of an advance through the Malay peninsula towards Singapore was considered impossible, because the Japanese armies were doomed to face problems in advancing beyond their beachheads. Churchill was a prime supporter of this contention, as revealed in his minute to the COS in September 1940, suggesting that the ‘plight of the invaders, cut off from home base while installing themselves in the swamps and jungle would be all the more forlorn’.124 As late as the last week of November, the JIC contended that an overland expedition required the prior development of adequate communications, and a Japanese occupation of the Kra isthmus did not necessarily entail an immediate attack on Malaya.125 British commanders in the Far East demonstrated a similar level of laxness, and an inability to grasp the need to prepare their forces. In order to hold out against enemy advances in the jungle, infantry units had to conduct a mobile defence, since the poor communications did not permit the use of tanks in large numbers. Yet, as late as December 1941, only one unit, the 1st battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, had any real training in the jungle. The prevailing attitude was one of complacency. During summer 1941, Grimsdale overheard three senior officers, including a major-general, laughing at the efforts being made to improve existing methods, suggesting that the whole unit would ‘go sick from exposure or strike from overwork’.126 Command Headquarters, which based its conclusions on information supplied by the FECB, regularly told the troops how the Japanese would not be jungle trained.127 Intelligence staffs in Malaya played their part in promoting misinformed images, in spite of their occasional efforts to warn that Japanese methods necessitated proper training. For example, in March 1941, the FECB issued a pamphlet describing how the IJA had demonstrated its proficiency in advancing through undeveloped country, and provided comprehensive accounts of its skill in executing river crossings, enveloping movements and reconnaissance of enemy positions.128 The document has been cited as an instance when intelligence staffs propagated indisputable evidence of Japanese prowess, only to be dismissed by commanders.129 However, the report was prefaced with a disclaimer that Japanese operations were carried out against an inferior opponent, where the IJA ‘was able to take risks with her communications . . . which would have proved fatal against a more enterprising enemy’. Thus, the conclusions were to be treated with reserve. Dismissive evaluations of the JAF were based on similar factors that led to the discrediting of the IJA, namely, a lack of intelligence on overall capabilities, coupled with tangible evidence of incompetence. In a similar fashion to the army and navy, the collection of accurate air intelligence faced the 38

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handicap posed by restrictions on visits to Japanese regiments. Assessments by the Air Attaché in Tokyo were admittedly based on slim evidence.130 As was the case with the army, the main sources of information were observations of developments in China. The material provided credible indications of inefficiency, while at the same time obscuring the fact that Japan’s air services, particularly those attached to the IJN, were able to inflict crippling losses. Observations of the JAF’s performance in China frequently gave rise to suggestions that its pilots and equipment possessed a relatively low standard of efficiency. Japanese bombing attacks, which were mainly conducted by the naval air services, were noted for their inaccuracy and high losses suffered by aircrews. Attacks against railway lines revealed a failure to hit vital targets such as main junctions and to halt the flow of traffic, leading one British observer to conclude that the Japanese did not use their air power to achieve ‘any but minor results’.131 By 1940, the Air Ministry provided frequent accounts of the JAF’s difficulties in inflicting permanent damage. In spite of numerous attacks on factories, most of which had not met substantial opposition, the effect on industrial production was negligible, leading to suggestions that Japanese bombing techniques were poor.132 The Japanese fighter force received equally disparaging remarks. The use of barrage fire, a tactic that had been considered outdated in the West, gave rise to the view that the JAF’s methods were backward.133 Evidence of efficiency was overshadowed by the fact that successes had been achieved against minimal opposition. Although the Zero fighter proved highly effective owing to its speed and manoeuvrability, the Air Ministry merely praised the new type of aircraft for its ability to inflict attrition on the Chinese, whose equipment consisted primarily of obsolete Soviet aircraft.134 In reality, the JAF’s problems were not unique, and were due to a number of common notions held by air staffs around the world during the interwar period.135 The Japanese services were no less guilty than their European counterparts in taking for granted the all-powerful might of the bomber, and neglecting the need to develop fighter aircraft to protect their formations from enemy interception. Nor were they alone in failing to understand that the destruction of targets required accurate aiming, and the necessary technology had yet to be developed. Yet, accounts of operations in China treated the JAF’s weaknesses as ones that were prevalent only among the Japanese. The most notable example of this trait was the JIC report on the lessons of air warfare in China, which described how bombing operations failed to hit any significant targets. Instead of attempting to surmise how the experiences could be used to improve the RAF’s operational capabilities, the report obscured its findings with a dismissive preface, ‘caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions which may have little or no application to a war between first class powers’.136 The gross underestimation of the JAF’s capabilities eventually spread to the 39

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highest levels of the Air Ministry. By 1941, the consensus was that the JAF stood on a par with the Italian Regia Aeronautica.137 British assessments also reflected a nearly complete oversight of how operations in China had provided the JAF with invaluable training in conducting long-range air strikes.138 True, the Japanese derived some faulty lessons which had fatal consequences on their air doctrine against the Allies. The most notable was a false confidence that the tactics and equipment which had succeeded in China would achieve similar results against the Americans, whose air services possessed vastly superior resources and technology. However, during the opening stages of the Pacific War, these weaknesses were not apparent, mainly because the JAF possessed a number of decisive advantages. The heavy losses suffered during bombing raids in China led the Japanese to provide their aircraft with more adequate protection. As the Sino-Japanese conflict progressed, attacks against lines of communication also achieved enhanced accuracy, and the JAF managed to curtail a significant portion of the traffic on major railways and roads. Attacks against urban areas laid waste to a significant portion of China’s infrastructure. Of equal importance, while British intelligence correctly identified some of the JAF’s problems, it had little access to information on the Japanese naval air services’ development of tactics against Allied shipping targets. The Admiralty’s Naval War Memorandum for the Far East, prepared in winter 1939, surmised that, while total British and Dominion air strengths were inferior, there was little reason to fear Japanese combat capabilities.139 Owing to their inexperience dealing with antiaircraft fire, and lack of training in the functions of torpedo bombing, overseas reconnaissance and target spotting, the Japanese were judged to be inferior in these fields. As events were to show, by the outbreak of the Pacific War, the efficiency of the Japanese naval air services ranked first among the maritime powers. The effective employment of torpedo bombing and horizontal bombing tactics resulted in the destruction of the bulk of the British and US fleets during the opening stages of the conflict.140 Yet, British naval commanders had no compelling reason to believe their adversaries could perform advanced manoeuvres unless visible evidence of Japanese air capabilities was available. The decision to dispatch the Repulse and Prince of Wales on their fateful mission was based on misleading intelligence on what the Japanese air services could achieve.141 In January 1942, Pound admitted that prior to the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales, war experience did not suggest that torpedo attacks could be carried out at extended ranges.142 In his recollections of the Far Eastern conflict, Hillgarth, who served as the Chief of Naval Intelligence in the SEAC theatres, admitted that the gravest miscalculation regarding the force attacking Malaya was not on its strength and location, but the quality of the bomber convoy.143 40

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In addition to technical shortcomings, the JAF was considered likely to face logistical problems in supporting long-range operations across the expanses of ocean in Southeast Asia. In their appreciation of the forces which the Japanese could bring to bear against Malaya prepared in January 1941, the JIC reassured that even in the event of a Japanese occupation of bases in southern Indochina, Singapore was only within range of heavy bombers, while light bomber attacks required the establishment of bases in the Kra isthmus.144 Correspondence between Brooke-Popham and the COS suggested that fears of the possible scale of air attack were confined to local commanders, whose warnings were dismissed as unduly alarmist.145 British assessments of the JAF’s logistical capabilities reflected the lack of information on the extent to which the naval air services had made painstaking preparations to ensure that the convoys destined for Southeast Asia were fully protected by land-based air support, and planned their operations with a view to neutralizing Allied air power in the Philippines and Malaya at the earliest opportunity.146 Japan’s air services also had yet to prove their ability to provide support for operations conducted thousands of miles away from advanced bases. The difficulties involved in supporting operations across the South China Sea led the Air Ministry to predict that in addition to shortages of aircraft with adequate ranges, maintenance difficulties and wastage resulting from operations over large stretches of water were likely to limit the scale of attack.147 Without visible indications that Japan’s air services were a serious threat, the British were not going to raise unfounded concerns.

Conclusion The series of Japanese victories in Southeast Asia following the outbreak of war on 8 December 1941 (Malaya time; 7 December, London time), which culminated with the total elimination of Allied military power in the region, could only have arrived as testimony that the British misjudged their adversary. However, poor intelligence cannot be blamed for Britain’s failure to defend Singapore. British grand strategy was shaped primarily by its shortage of surplus resources, and the need to concentrate its efforts on containing Germany’s threat to the home islands. The second major concern was to protect Britain’s lifelines in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, as well as its vital Middle Eastern oil supplies. The defence of Malaya and Singapore was lowest in the list of priorities. A study of prewar intelligence on Japan therefore does not significantly affect the validity of existing arguments regarding Britain’s motives for pursuing the strategy that it did. One must also be judicious in condemning the British defence establishment for not understanding the situation they faced vis-à-vis Japan. In order to comprehend the reasons for Britain’s complacency, an examination of the circumstances which prevailed prior to December 1941 is crucial. 41

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Intelligence on Japan’s strategy failed to show any indications that an attack on Singapore was imminent. Developments following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict showed that Japan’s preoccupation with its objective of defeating China prevented it from taking on additional commitments which entailed a further drain on its resources. Despite evidence of Japan’s ability to extend its operations into Southeast Asia following the spring of 1940, its actions did not suggest any concrete objectives beyond the acquisition of greater political influence and increased access to the raw materials of the region. A military confrontation against the Western Powers was considered illogical, because such moves entailed strategic and economic risks which Japan was ill-prepared to afford. Most importantly, observations of Japan’s actions prior to the outbreak of war revealed that its leaders were hesitant to embark on moves which entailed war against the United States and Britain. The inaccuracy of British predictions does not negate the fact that evidence which suggested caution among Japanese leaders was accurate, and that firm indications of plans to seize control of Southeast Asia were lacking. The evidence pointing to Japan’s awareness of its own weaknesses, in turn, led Britain to conclude that Tokyo would act prudently. British policymakers and defence planners believed that the combined threat of economic restrictions and Allied military intervention would be sufficient to discourage Japan from encroaching upon Western interests in Southeast Asia. Only the total elimination of Allied military power from the Far East during the opening stages of the conflict could convince Britain that Japan could not be deterred. The available intelligence on Japan’s armed forces also failed to provide reliable indications that their capabilities posed a threat. Because military secrets laws shrouded developments within the Japanese army and navy, the main source of information became observations of their operations in China, which confirmed the belief that their performance was second rate. Although the available intelligence suggested that Japan’s forces enjoyed certain strengths, they also had yet to prove their capacity to defeat their Western rivals. In the absence of firsthand encounters, images of Japan’s military capabilities were more likely to be based upon false assumptions, and a mistaken belief regarding the ability of British forces to forestall their adversaries. Only a major setback could persuade Britain to discard the notion that Japanese forces were unable to defeat their Western counterparts. In the final analysis, Britain’s unreadiness in the face of the Japanese onslaught can be attributed to the lack of credible danger signals. Recent studies on the factors that determined the effectiveness of military preparations during the interwar period have argued that aside from adequate resources, a crucial ingredient for success was the presence of an identifiable threat against which a concrete plan could be drawn.148 Equally important were defence planners who possessed the intellect and imagination to predict 42

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the situation their forces were likely to face, and the ability to innovate new methods accordingly. Britain’s war plans in the Far East enjoyed neither of these benefits. Under the circumstances, the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Singapore, or that such an operation would succeed, was unthinkable. Hence, Britain’s defence planners adhered to their notion that a total war in the Far East could be avoided, and did not consider the need to enhance the capabilities of their forces.149 The fall of Singapore and the elimination of Allied military power in Southeast Asia was essential to compel a more accurate appreciation. As events during the Far Eastern conflict were to reveal, no amount of military intelligence could substitute combat experience as a means to gauge the implications of enemy strengths and weaknesses.

43

2 THE LESSONS OF DEFEAT AND LIMITED VICTORIES, DECEMBER 1941 TO JANUARY 1943

The Allies’ experiences of defeat and limited victories during 1942 highlighted the challenges which Britain was to face during the Pacific War, in three respects. First, Japan’s victories in Southeast Asia provided undeniable signs that its armed forces were able to inflict devastating losses. Second, the turning tide of the war after summer 1942, following the IJN’s defeats at Midway, dismantled the view that Japan’s forces were invincible, and proved that the Allies could defeat their opponent, given adequate resources and methods of use. Third, and most importantly, while Japan’s inferior industrial production precluded its prospects of winning the conflict in the long run, its army and navy were fully capable of fighting a protracted war of attrition. Allied operations in the South Pacific and Burma during the latter part of 1942 and early 1943 provided ominous indications of Japan’s capacity to put up tough resistance, as well as the substantial amount of time, effort and resources required to defeat the enemy. However, the British had yet to achieve significant successes, and did not have many helpful precedents for determining the most effective methods of defeating the Japanese. As late as the beginning of 1943, the appropriate strategies and tactics could be developed only through trial and error.

Transformations in methods of assessment The aftermath of Britain’s setbacks at Singapore and in Burma saw a shift in service culture, insofar as the means of gauging Japanese strategy and military capabilities were concerned. As illustrated previously, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the British did not have a great deal of reliable intelligence concerning Japan’s ability to wage war against the Allies. As a result, it was common practice to rely on racist views which downplayed the quality of non-Western powers, and the ethnocentric notion that British forces were likely to prevail. 44

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Following the fall of Singapore, the defence establishment felt compelled to take a less cavalier attitude, and realized the extent to which they had underestimated their enemy. Japan’s war effort did reveal a number of shortcomings, the most notable of which was the lack of resources to defeat the Allies. Nevertheless, the most important fact to bear in mind was that British forces in the Far East suffered a number of shortcomings which had to be repaired before they could overcome their opponent. The British thus conducted a careful re-evaluation of their own forces, and concluded that drastic reforms were required. At the strategic and tactical levels, the British army, Royal Navy and RAF demonstrated an acute need for improvements in their strength and efficiency. The Japanese military also held an exceptional level of morale, providing further reasons to conclude that British forces had yet to match their opponent. Economic intelligence revealed that the Allies had to undertake a substantial effort in order to bring about any serious depletion of Japan’s war resources. The shift in service culture did not mean that the British completely discarded their reliance on racial images. Assessments of the Japanese began to focus on the features which rendered them a difficult challenge. Insofar as Japanese strategy was concerned, the IJN and IJA demonstrated their propensity to undertake bold ventures and thereby endanger the Allies’ position, even if it entailed equally grave risks for Japan. Thus, in assessing Japanese strategy, the most important factor was the enemy’s capabilities rather than its intentions. Intelligence on the quality and performance of Japan’s armed forces revealed that discipline and tenacity were common traits. The British acknowledged the characteristics of the Japanese and the challenges they posed, and made an earnest effort to formulate a balanced picture. At the same time, proper account was taken of the fact that Britain was fighting an unfamiliar enemy. Intelligence staffs were careful not to reach conclusions that Japan’s forces would operate along definite patterns. The British were aware that they needed to be flexible in their methods, and to innovate in accordance with situations as they arose. The development of war plans took place on the understanding that mistakes were bound to happen. The British accepted the fact that they had to surmount a steep learning curve before they could engage their opponent in a proper manner.

Japanese strategy The magnitude of Japan’s advance into Southeast Asia convinced the British to adopt a more vigilant outlook. Prior to the outbreak of war, the accepted assumption was that, although Japan possessed the strength to conquer Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, its fear of provoking Allied retaliation would compel the IJN and IJA to conduct a piecemeal conquest of Southeast Asia in an effort to sound out British and US reactions. Thus, the Allies could 45

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take advantage of a breathing spell that would allow them to bolster their defences. Following Japan’s lightning conquests, the British based their forecasts on the expectation that the loss of Britain’s territories in Southeast Asia was a foregone conclusion. By March 1942, the Japanese had established bases within striking range of the Indian Ocean, thereby raising the possibility of operations against areas hitherto considered beyond their reach. In early April, the IJN launched a carrier-based sortie against the Royal Navy’s base at Ceylon, highlighting the vulnerability of Britain’s position. The situation was desperate because commitments in Europe and North Africa continued to limit the forces available for operations against Japan. Consequently, for the first half of 1942, the British resigned to the probability that any large-scale Japanese expedition would deal a devastating blow. Nevertheless, while Japan’s forces reigned supreme, as early as February, they began to face overstretch, and by June, the consequences became clear. The IJN stumbled from one unsuccessful operation to the next, first at Coral Sea and then at Midway, where the IJN lost its predominance over the US Navy. Yet, the Japanese continued to possess ample strengths to forestall Allied counteroffensives, and the situation warned against any underestimation of the strength that had to be built up before the Allies could liberate their lost territories. At the same time, inaction entailed the risk of enabling the Japanese to consolidate and render Allied operations more difficult. The cumulative result was the development of a strategy aimed to inflict attrition against weak spots on Japan’s outer perimeter. The strategy of limited offensives manifested itself in the decision to launch the disastrous Arakan campaign of winter 1942–1943. The speed of Japan’s advance convinced the defence establishment that Britain’s position in Southeast Asia was untenable. By mid January, Japanese troops completed their advance through the Malay peninsula and conquered the southernmost province of Johore, thereby gaining an opportune position for besieging Singapore. The COS discarded their notion that Britain’s bastion in the Far East could hold out against the Japanese. In response to Churchill’s question about the wisdom of sending reinforcements, Alanbrooke, the CIGS, replied, ‘the defence of Singapore is part of a delaying action’.1 The plan was to play for time while withdrawing to rear positions in the East Indies. The Allies faced equally poor chances of retaining their positions in other parts of Southeast Asia. Given the weak state of Allied defences, Japan was most likely to secure its conquests by establishing a defensive barrier stretching from the eastern frontier of India to the southwest Pacific, destroying all remnants of resistance. In January 1942, the JIC concluded that the conquest of the Malay barrier not only provided vital supplies of raw materials.2 From a strategic viewpoint, it also served to push the Allies 46

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to their rear bases in India and Australia, securing the outer perimeter of Japan’s empire. Any hopes of holding the Malay barrier were contingent upon last-ditch forestalling actions. In mid February, during the battle of the Java Sea, the British and Dutch fleets failed to intercept the Japanese convoy headed for the East Indies. Pownall, along with and Wavell, who had been appointed the C-in-C Southwest Pacific, concluded that the Allies simply did not have enough strengths to forestall a landing.3 While British intelligence deduced the scope of Japan’s ambitions in Southeast Asia, the possibility of operations beyond the Malay barrier remained open to conjecture. The available evidence was replete of information on Japan’s long-term strategy. The structure of intelligence collection and analysis did not undergo major changes at the start of the conflict. The GCCS continued to intercept diplomatic signals intelligence, which simply pointed to strategies that were under consideration. To illustrate a few examples, as late as the end of 1942, information on the possibility of Soviet–Japanese hostilities was contradictory and did not firmly indicate whether Japan intended to invade Siberia.4 Neither the JIC nor COS were able to produce conclusions.5 Signals intelligence also revealed that Japan was seeking ways to secure the Congress Party’s cooperation in establishing a pro-Axis government in India.6 The information came at a time when the political situation in the Indian subcontinent was precarious.7 The colonial government faced increasing difficulties in stemming the nationalists’ demands for full independence, and the circumstances seemed ideal for an Axis campaign of subversion. Nevertheless, information on Japanese intentions did not indicate whether a concrete strategy was likely to materialize, and the material simply exacerbated British fears of impending operations against India.8 Naval signals intelligence proved equally unreliable. When the fall of Singapore became imminent, FECB headquarters was relocated to Colombo in Ceylon. After March 1942, with the cooperation of the US Navy’s sigint unit, OP-20-G, British cryptanalysts deciphered the IJN’s JN-25 code.9 However, naval intercepts provided little apart from warnings of impending attacks. Prior to the Japanese attacks on Ceylon in early April, naval sigint alerted Admiral Sir James Somerville, C-in-C Eastern Fleet, who was able to evacuate his ships. The Japanese were prevented from launching another Pearl Harbor style air raid.10 Yet, long-term forecasts remained impossible, and defence plans had to be formulated on the understanding that enemy attacks could take place at short notice. The truth of the matter is that until April 1942, Allied efforts to predict Japanese strategy were complicated by the fact that the IJN and IJA had not decided what they were to do after their operations in Southeast Asia were completed. Japan’s leaders did not face an entirely favourable situation. The navy and army were stretched to their limit, and the China venture remained 47

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unresolved. The high command needed to make difficult decisions whether to consolidate or pursue further conquests. To complicate matters, no course of action held high promises of a decisive victory.11 An invasion of the Hawaiian islands was out of the question, given the state of alert the Americans were on after Pearl Harbor. An invasion of Australia was also difficult, because the IJA did not possess the strength to overcome the islands’ defences, nor the logistics to support such a complex operation. An occupation of Ceylon and outlying British bases in the Indian Ocean would have provided a springboard for invading the Middle East, and in turn enabled the IJA to link up with Rommel’s Afrika Korps. This move could have dealt a serious blow to the British Empire. Even then, Japan’s eastern flank would have remained open to US incursions. At the same time, consolidation was an equally questionable strategy, for Japan had yet to fulfil one of its main objectives, namely to neutralize US naval power in the Pacific.12 The failure to sink the carrier fleet at Pearl Harbor confronted Japan’s leaders with a situation they had not anticipated. To complicate matters, disagreements between the IJN and IJA commands hindered a decision. The navy wished to secure Japan’s conquests by occupying Hawaii or Australia and preventing their use as bases for an Allied counteroffensive. The IJA, on the other hand, maintained that Japan’s ultimate objective remained to conclude the war in China and prepare for action in Siberia.13 The army thus argued that its resources were insufficient strengths for large-scale offensives in the Pacific, and proposed to consolidate its southern conquests at the earliest opportunity. The IJA general staff premised its policies on the assumption that the Americans would be incapable of striking back for at least the first two years of the conflict, and hence a pre-emptive attack was unnecessary.14 The question of how to secure Japan’s empire in Southeast Asia had not been seriously considered. Within Yamamoto’s naval staff, there were disagreements as to whether Japan’s key to victory lay in a main fleet action against the United States or the elimination of British positions in the Indian Ocean.15 Finally, while the possibility of bringing India into Japan’s orbit was discussed at the high command level, the plan never transpired beyond a distant pipedream. At an imperial liaison conference held in January 1942, Japan’s leaders issued a document stating, ‘the Imperial Government has no hesitation in making wholehearted efforts to help the independence movement irrespective of whether inside or outside India’.16 Yet, the Japanese government did not have any direct contacts with Indian political parties, and was reluctant to support anti-British movements unless the Axis powers were willing to simultaneously send forces to the Indian subcontinent. Because neither Germany or Italy were ready to undertake operations east of Suez, a concrete strategy was unlikely to materialize. The difficulties Japan faced in making a decision meant that war plans 48

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were formulated ad hoc. The Combined Fleet did not order the expedition against Ceylon until the third week of March, when the buildup of the Eastern Fleet at Trincomalee convinced Yamamoto’s staff that British naval power in the Indian Ocean had to be neutralized. Only in late April did naval leaders decide to direct the IJN’s main thrust against the US Fleet in the Central Pacific, after the Doolittle air raids on the home islands had revealed how the Americans could bring carriers within proximity of Japan. The IJA’s plan to occupy Port Moresby was not drawn until mid spring, when mopping-up operations in Southeast Asia were approaching completion. Under the circumstances, no matter how thoroughly British intelligence tracked Japanese strategy, the evidence was bound to remain contradictory. The absence of conclusive intelligence required British forces to guard against attacks at all possible points. In assessing Japanese strategy, the British looked at the overall situation in the Asia–Pacific theatres, but tended to focus the larger part of their attention on the Indian Ocean areas. This was because the Pacific theatre, including Australia, was a US sphere of responsibility. The loss of Singapore severed Britain’s links with the Dominions, and the latter requested US military support in forestalling a Japanese invasion.17 Roosevelt accepted the request, and on 9 March 1942, Churchill agreed to the US proposal that the Dominions be placed under General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Command.18 Thereafter, the British entrusted the defence of Australia to the Americans, and were more concerned about the possibility of Japanese incursions against their imperial possessions in the Indian Ocean. British appreciations of Japan’s strategy reflected a growing realization that efforts to predict enemy strategy were futile. The most important factor to be considered was the enemy’s capabilities rather than intentions. The lack of indications of plans for an invasion was not taken to mean that such scenarios would not materialize. While an expedition against areas to the west of the Malay barrier entailed exposing Japan’s eastern flank, its forces still possessed ample strengths for operations against British positions in the Indian Ocean, and stood to reap tangible benefits through such actions. In February, the JIC warned that Japan could muster the necessary troops for an invasion of Ceylon at any time, and its naval power and shipping resources were more than adequate.19 On the question over the probability of such operations, the committee admitted that no data was available for making a definite forecast. However, the Japanese were likely to realize that the loss of Ceylon would deprive Britain of its main base in the Indian Ocean. The uncertainty which plagued efforts to predict Japan’s war plans, along with evidence of sufficient forces for further offensives, meant that the only way to ensure security was vigilance. The increasing likelihood of Japanese expeditions against the Indian Ocean necessitated a closer examination of the strategic balance, and the upshot was that the British were not in a favourable situation. The R Class 49

Map 2.1 Height of Japan’s conquests, summer 1942 (courtesy of the Department of History, United States Military Academy).

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battleships used to reinforce Somerville’s Eastern Fleet were relics of the Great War, and did little to help.20 The carriers Indomitable and Formidable were equipped with limited complements of aircraft whose performance did not match their Japanese counterparts. Nor was the garrison at Ceylon able to forestall a landing. To complicate matters, the war against Germany remained Britain’s top priority. Shortly after the United States entered the war in December 1941, the British and Americans held their first summit meeting (Arcadia) at Washington. Churchill insisted that the Allies needed to concentrate on Germany.21 The US representatives, in particular Admiral Harold Stark, the chief of the naval operations, argued that offensive operations against Japan should commence immediately. However, Roosevelt accepted Churchill’s view that Germany posed a greater threat. Nevertheless, the ‘Germany First’ strategy meant that Britain could not substantially strengthen its position against Japan until operations in Europe and North Africa had progressed sufficiently. Under the circumstances, no amount of intelligence could remedy the fact that British defences in the Indian Ocean were precarious, and the prospect of improvement in the near future were minimal. By March, the British conceded that few alternatives existed apart from accepting the consequences which could arise from a Japanese invasion, namely the loss of control over the territories adjacent to the Indian Ocean, and severance of the sea communications to the Middle East. Within India Command and the Eastern Fleet, the prevailing view was that Ceylon could not be defended without adequate air and naval reinforcements. In February, shortly after his appointment as C-in-C India, Wavell warned, ‘to attempt to provide against a large scale invasion [by strengthening Ceylon’s ground defences] would involve locking up troops which could be better used in offensive operations elsewhere’.22 The garrison in Ceylon was of little use if the Japanese gained control of the surrounding ocean and airspace, and the Eastern Fleet could not repel a Japanese foray until sufficient numbers of carriers and their accompanying aircraft could be deployed.23 However, the Joint Planning Section (JPS), COS and Churchill maintained that until Allied forces had neutralized Germany’s threat to the Middle East, and U-boat attacks in the Atlantic had ebbed, Britain could not provide the necessary forces for the larger part of 1942.24 The IJN’s sortie into the Bay of Bengal in April highlighted the vulnerability of British territories in the Indian Ocean. The ease with which the Japanese brought a fleet within striking distance of Ceylon reinforced the conclusions reached previously. Sir Richard Peirse, commander of Air Headquarters India, and Wavell repeated their warnings that Ceylon and the east coast of India were defenceless without substantially increased air strengths.25 The COS concluded that if the Japanese pressed westward, India would be placed in great danger, and the Middle East and essential supply lines via the Indian Ocean placed under threat.26 51

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At the same time, the difficulties involved in strengthening Britain’s position were acknowledged, and its strategy continued to be influenced by its global commitments. While Wavell insisted the defence of Ceylon be treated as a matter of the utmost urgency, the COS and Churchill replied that operations in the Middle East were more important, and hence the protection of sea communications with that theatre take priority. The Indian Ocean was to be secured by occupying Madagascar.27 As the official history on the war against Japan has pointed out, ‘Wavell’s difference of opinion with the COS was natural’.28 Churchill and his staff had to view the problem from the broader angle. The security of the UK had to take precedence, and the needs of India related to those of the Middle East. Churchill and the COS realized that Britain’s only hope of protecting the Indian Ocean, in the absence of an adequate Eastern Fleet, was to obtain US cooperation. Urgent requests were made for the US Pacific Fleet to either launch naval offensives on Japan’s eastern flank, or send warships to join Somerville’s fleet.29 Naturally, the Americans, who were reluctant to commit their limited strengths to defend the British Empire, made it clear that Britain’s proposals were out of the question.30 The visible indications of Ceylon’s vulnerability, and the difficulties involved in bolstering its defences, gave rise to a strategy of withdrawing major British units from the enemy’s striking range and minimizing potential losses. The Eastern Fleet was moved to East Africa on the premise that until adequate capital ships and carriers could be deployed in the Indian Ocean, its presence was more likely to lure further attacks.31 FECB headquarters was relocated to Kilindini on the assumption that the raids may have heralded an invasion.32 In reality, Japan had no plans for further incursions into the Indian Ocean. However, only after Japan’s defeats at Coral Sea and Midway had depleted the IJN’s surplus of naval and air forces, could the British conclude that the enemy was unlikely to muster the strengths needed to support large-scale invasions. The possibility of Japanese offensive operations could be dismissed only by evidence which pointed to a diminution of its capabilities. During May and June 1942, Japanese naval losses provided reasonable grounds to conclude that the peril of a seaborne landing on India and Ceylon had passed. Churchill minuted to Pound that the loss of four Japanese carriers at Midway had improved Britain’s position in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal, and that a ‘severe restraint [was] imposed upon the Japanese’ by their need to husband their extensive naval requirements.33 Pound responded that the position had improved ‘inasmuch as the Japanese are less likely to stick their head into [the Indian Ocean]’.34 Assessments of Japan’s strategy also emphasized how its forces had lost the initiative. In September, the JIC suggested that to win the war, the IJN and IJA had to ‘resist whatever counteroffensive Allies may put up’, and ‘build up her military machine’ in the hope that ‘the exhaustion of [Allied] resources 52

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would force the latter to sue for a negotiated peace’.35 The shifting balance of power in the Pacific, along with Japan’s shortage of surplus forces, meant that its strategy had shifted to one aimed to consolidate its outer perimeter. Nevertheless, Japan’s waning capabilities did not obscure the scale of effort required. The turning tide of the conflict, accompanied by evidence that Japan was turning to the defensive, meant that the Allies could begin contemplating a strategy for liberating the western Pacific and Southeast Asia. The IJN and IJA continued to possess ample forces to defend Japan’s conquests. While naval sigint began to provide comprehensive information on the IJN’s strengths and dispositions, information on the IJA remained patchy for much of 1942 and the early part of 1943, because the army employed a more complicated code system. This created continued difficulties for Allied cryptographers and intelligence staffs. However, the British could deduce that the Japanese armies which had successfully ejected the Allies from the Malay barrier remained unscathed, while British strengths in the Far East had not undergone any substantial increase. The scenario supported the contention that an attempt to dislodge the enemy from its conquests was premature. The situation was further complicated by the Allies’ adherence to the ‘Germany First’ strategy, which relegated operations against Japan to secondary importance in terms of resource allocations. The COS maintained that the Allies did not possess sufficient strengths for simultaneous operations against both Germany and Japan.36 Whereas Germany could become invincible if it was allowed to recuperate, the same did not hold true for Japan. The Allies thus needed to focus their efforts on a decisive German defeat, while diverting only the minimum force necessary to hold Japan. The argument that operations against Germany necessitated a limited commitment in the Far East was employed at the highest levels of Allied planning. At the January 1943 Casablanca Conference (Symbol), Admiral King, chief of naval operations, argued that while Germany was the prime enemy, the Allies should be prepared to move against Japan after the European war had been won.37 King suggested that the Allies double the quota for force allocations in the Asia–Pacific theatres from 15 to 30 per cent. Alanbrooke agreed, strictly on the condition that the effort against Germany would not be prejudiced.38 The decision to continue allocating priority to the European and North African theatres meant that British forces in the Far East were bound to suffer neglect and correspondingly limited capabilities. British appreciations concerning the practicability of large-scale counteroffensives warned that until numerically superior forces could be deployed, Japan’s defensive position was virtually impregnable. On 11 July 1942, the COS met with General Harold Alexander, the commander of British army on the India–Burma front, to discuss Wavell’s plans for recapturing Burma during the winter 1942–1943 campaigning season (Anakim).39 The plan called for an assault 53

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across the Assam border, accompanied by landings on the west coast. Wavell had already expressed concerns over the lack of air power and the shortage of aerodromes and communications.40 Without a clear British numerical superiority, defence planners tended to focus on the problems created by the substantial forces which the Japanese could put up. Alexander was not confident that a landing on the Burma coast was feasible since the British did not possess the resources for such a laborious process. The COS feared the plan committed British forces to extended operations supported by unreliable communications, while the Japanese could easily bring reinforcements from the southern regions. Although Churchill criticized his advisors for basing their assessments on worst-case scenarios, on 12 July, after extensive debates, he conceded, ‘unless the Japanese air forces available’ are ‘cut down below the present level and their military forces cannot be reinforced, we need not commit ourselves to Anakim’.41 At the same time, inaction could only allow Japanese forces to consolidate. In June 1942, the JPS warned that the defeat of Japan would become progressively more difficult if left too late.42 Its armed forces would have the opportunity to strengthen the defences of the conquered territories. The most economical strategy was to ‘concentrate sufficient force in one area to threaten Japan’s vital interests’, and attacks on sea communications were the best means to achieve this objective. The COS warned that it was important to seek measures to maintain pressure and thereby prevent the IJN and IJA from developing threats against Allied forward bases.43 The Allies also had to deal with the possibility of minor offensives against the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, as part of a Japanese attempt to disrupt Allied preparations for counterattacks, even though Japan’s offensive capabilities had faded. In August, the IJN and IJA staged a landing on the South Pacific island of Guadalcanal. The aim was to secure a base for conducting attacks on the lifeline between the US west coast and Australia, thereby hindering the Allies’ ability to use Australia as a base. The ensuing contest was not a guaranteed victory for the US Navy, which was unable to put up a numerically superior fleet. The IJN also demonstrated a high level of skill at conducting raids during hours of darkness, while US forces remained inept at conducting night engagements. The deadlock was not broken until mid November.44 Back in London, the JPS estimated the Americans would not achieve parity with the IJN until 1943.45 Without carrier support, the US Fleet had to remain on the defensive. On the India–Burma front, the Congress Party passed the ‘Quit India’ Resolution in August 1942, sparking civil unrest and threatening Britain’s hold on its main base for operations against Japan.46 The prospect of revolution rekindled concerns over the possibility of an invasion, and while Japan had no clear ideas how to exploit the ‘Quit India’ movement, the unrest came at a time when Congress leader Bose was in Berlin, courting Axis support.47 Germany never made a firm commitment to the campaign; however, Bose’s 54

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efforts created the impression that the European Axis powers were seeking to undermine Britain’s hold on India, and wished to see Japan attack in the near future. The JIC and India Command warned that Japan possessed sufficient forces for a landing in the Bengal regions, and the operation was most likely to coincide with local disturbances.48 Although there were no indications that the Japanese considered the prospects of success to be high, it was important to monitor the situation. Evidence of Japan’s capabilities for further offensives thus continued to warn that British forces needed to take the necessary precautions. The twin dilemmas of the shortage of forces for large-scale offensives, and the inherent dangers of staying on the defensive, led the British to conduct limited advances against Japan’s outer perimeter. While the strategy of steady attrition reflected a realization of the need to take all possible measures to gradually weaken Japan’s defences, it also signified an overestimation of how limited operations could affect the enemy’s war effort. In November, the COS decided to dispatch the carrier HMS Victorious to the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA).49 The move was based on the grounds that the Eastern Fleet’s strengths were insufficient to counter a Japanese incursion into the Bay of Bengal, and the carriers could be put to better use if they joined the US counteroffensive in the Pacific. While the US fleet achieved significant progress in pushing back Japan’s forces, by the end of 1942, the IJN’s defeats at Guadalcanal resulted in a depletion of its strengths, to the point where the Victorious’ presence was superfluous. Incidentally, the Victorious did not engage the Japanese fleet during its entire tour of duty. Decisions concerning operations on the Burma front revealed a similar lack of vision. In autumn 1942, Wavell concocted a plan to reconquer Japanese outposts in the Arakan regions. The plan stemmed from an oversight of the fact that Japanese armies in the region were well entrenched, and supported by a line of communication that enabled them to bring reinforcements from rear areas at short notice. Against such opponents, limited offensives were unlikely to yield favourable results. Operational ineptitude played an equally significant role in laying the grounds for Wavell’s decision. Prior to the Pacific War, Britain’s military involvement in the Far East was confined to policing actions in its colonies. British forces had not conducted campaigns in Southeast Asia which required the provision of substantial forces and logistics. In the expansive jungles of the region, mobility was restricted due to rugged terrain and poor communications. In close country warfare where movement was slow, attacks needed to be conducted on a wide front and accompanied by diversionary moves. Such measures were necessary to prevent the enemy from consolidating, and also to guard against interference with the attacker’s communications. Although Wavell realized the inherent dangers, his plan was based on the hope that a rapid advance could secure his objectives.50 In late August, he informed the COS that he planned an overland advance against Akyab, 55

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aimed to bring the Japanese air services into battle and inflicting losses.51 In addition to depleting enemy air strengths and thereby helping Allied operations in other theatres, the operation also appeared to hold prospects of preparing the way for further operations into Burma, and lessening the threat to India. In mid September, Wavell justified the operation on the grounds that Japanese army strengths in the frontier regions of Burma were weak, and the IJA was too tied down in the SWPA and China to provide any reinforcements.52 Although the COS replied that air requirements could not be met, Wavell maintained that risks had to be accepted. Despite their objections that British positions were likely to be untenable, the COS acquiesced.53 The operations faced further difficulties when diversionary attacks in the form of amphibious landings and long-range penetration operations behind the enemy’s positions were scrapped owing to shortages of landing craft and manpower.54 Thus, the attack was confined to a narrow axis on which British forces faced the risk of being held up and outflanked. The campaign was nonetheless launched on the belief that the attackers could prevail with their preponderance of strength. While the first Arakan offensive ranked as one of Britain’s greatest blunders during the Far Eastern conflict, the decision has to be viewed in light of the fact that adequate precedents for determining the effort required to deal with Japanese defences were lacking. British planning for counteroffensives during the opening year of the conflict reflected the fundamental dilemma which its military planners faced. In short, estimates of the strategic situation only permitted broad conclusions concerning the challenges faced by the Allies. The most effective methods for overcoming enemy opposition could be determined only with the help of adequate firsthand combat experience.

Tactical and technological capabilities of Japan’s armed forces The efficiency demonstrated by Japan’s forces during their invasion of Southeast Asia convinced the British to acknowledge their opponent’s tactical skill. The failure to hold out against the IJA, IJN and Japanese air services also highlighted how British forces needed to undergo extensive improvements in order to overcome their opponent. As far as the British army in the Far East was concerned, the prevailing opinion was that its tactical skill and discipline were no match for the IJA. In regard to the Royal Navy and RAF the British realized that they could not fight properly without significant steps towards re-equipment and modernization. Although Japan’s reverses during the latter half of 1942 dispelled the contention that its armed forces were invincible, they continued to demonstrate a high level of proficiency. Assessments on Japanese capabilities urged that a considerable level of caution be exercised when engaging the enemy. 56

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Most importantly, Allied successes had been entirely in the form of limited advances by US and Australian forces in the South Pacific. Britain’s forces in Southeast Asia, on the other hand, remained idle and lacked firsthand experience defeating their adversary. Consequently, while the opening year of the conflict provided reliable indications of the challenges which the British were likely to face at the battlefield level, even at the start of 1943, there remained a great deal of misunderstanding over the tactics and equipment that were needed to overcome the obstacles. Bureaucratic obstacles also continued to hinder the intelligence machinery. The FECB was forced to relinquish responsibility for handling material on Japanese tactics and technology as its headquarters at Singapore was forced to relocate in the face of invasion, and its activities fell into disarray. The British navy, air force and army began to set up their own intelligence services in the Far East, but their development was slow. The problem stemmed from the absence of an effective staff which could fully utilize the lessons which the British had learned from their defeats. This was especially true within the army. The intelligence directorate at General Headquarters in India had focused its attention on the possibility of a German invasion via the Middle East, and did not acquire a team of Japanese specialists until autumn 1942. Whitehall carried out the bulk of the analysis and dissemination, and its staffs were removed from the front lines. As a result, Japanese capabilities were often exaggerated and weaknesses not fully appreciated. At the level of dissemination, the more seasoned British staff officers in the Far East found it difficult to educate their subordinates on the lessons they learned, mainly because the rank and file lacked the experience needed to properly apply the information on the battlefield.55 True, a large number of British and Commonwealth officers who fought in Malaya and Burma ended up in captivity and were unable to share their stories. At the same time, a number of senior personnel, including Wavell and Pownall, did manage to escape. Drawing upon the information compiled from their field officers, they produced a fair number of critical accounts concerning the lessons to be learned. However, for much of 1942, the middle and lower ranks of Britain’s armed forces consisted of raw recruits who had little idea of the threat which the Japanese posed, nor could they fully grasp the proper countermeasures they needed to employ. The lack of battle experience meant that the British needed to climb a difficult learning curve before they could develop the capacity to overcome their opponents. Despite the difficulties, the aftermath of Singapore and Burma saw intelligence staffs and defence planners adopting a more judicious view of Japanese tactics. Due heed was paid to the fact that the Japanese possessed strengths which the British were yet incapable of coping with. For example, the Allies’ failure to halt the Japanese amphibious landings in Southeast Asia convinced the British that their enemy exerted a threat which was not to be ignored. B.H. Ashmore, a senior commander on Percival’s 57

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staff, noted how the Japanese amphibious forces at Kota Baru conducted their landings with little concern for losses, and commenced their inland advance without awaiting reinforcements.56 The efficiency demonstrated by Japanese amphibious methods was also acknowledged by intelligence staffs as well as the highest sections of the defence establishment. On one hand, the Japanese continued to carry out their landings against minimal resistance, and enjoyed complete security of sea communications, along with naval and air superiority. Because beach defences in Southeast Asia were often nonexistent, the IJA and IJN did not need to conduct opposed operations. However, as far as the British were concerned, the most noteworthy fact was that Japanese forces were fully capable of achieving their objectives with remarkable efficiency. In March 1942, the War Office propagated the conclusion, ‘the suitability of the Japanese landing equipment and the thoroughness of their preparations . . . largely account for the rapid attainment of the objective with small loss’.57 Japanese landing parties were likely to prevail in weakly protected areas, no matter how tenaciously the defenders fought. A report on the experience of American forces in the Far East in March received an ‘A’ grading, as it provided an accurate account of how Japanese landing operations were preceded by thorough reconnaissance of the beaches and hinterland, enabling amphibious parties to exploit weak spots while bypassing strong-points.58 Japanese army tactics on land forced similar reassessments. Although the IJA had not been particularly trained for operations in the jungles of Southeast Asia, its unimpeded advances proved that its infantry troops were capable of achieving a high level of mobility in undeveloped terrain. More importantly, the failure to hold out against the Japanese onslaught spawned a general consensus that British and Commonwealth armies possessed a lamentable standard of efficiency. Experiences in Malaya and Burma proved beyond doubt the IJA’s ability to outmanoeuvre British positions. In December, the War Office warned that enemy troops were capable of overcoming any natural obstacle.59 Scenarios of this nature quickly broke the myth that the jungle acted as a reliable barrier. The aspect which posed the greatest challenge was the IJA’s practice of outflanking Allied forces by circumventing the main roads. Ten days following the Japanese landing, Brooke-Popham conceded that in light of the Japanese army’s skilful manoeuvring, British forces had few choices apart from withdrawing and consolidating themselves in more tenable positions in southern Malaya.60 The IJA’s tactical skill entailed equally slim hopes for defending Burma. Poor communications had not deterred the Japanese from launching invasions. Hutton, the GOC, concluded that given the IJA’s practice of enveloping its opponents and their ability to live on the country without proper maintenance facilities, it was reasonable to assume that the enemy would ‘deploy the greatest possible strength’ on ‘as many approaches as possible’.61 58

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Postmortems on the British defeats in Southeast Asia invariably attributed the IJA’s successes to its high level of training, and credited the Japanese army as a top-rate force. Wavell cited the Japanese army’s practice of fully utilizing ‘the primary infantry virtues of marching and fighting’, which placed ‘minimum reliance on mechanized transport’, as one of its key assets.62 H.P. Thomas, an OBE (Order of the British Empire) from the Indian Army, acknowledged, ‘as an Asiatic power, maintaining European standards of efficiency, and at same time operating on Asiatic soil, the Japanese had a great initial advantage’.63 The most important lesson drawn from the defeats in Malaya and Burma, however, was that the combat effectiveness of British armies was substandard. The IJA did suffer a number of weaknesses, including a lack of concern for providing reinforcements, and a tendency to underestimate enemy opposition. However, the experiences of defeat forced the British to admit that their own forces faced problems, and had yet to develop the skills needed to exploit their opponent’s disadvantages.64 In contrast to prewar assessments which suggested that the IJA’s weaknesses undermined its ability to engage its Western rivals, appraisals following the setbacks in Southeast Asia signified a realization that poorly trained armies were not a match for the IJA. For instance, the British army’s traditional method of employing fixed defences was unlikely to work if the positions could be outflanked and were not held with adequate strength.65 The Japanese success in carrying out infiltration movements showed how the defenders needed to conduct an aggressive patrol of their surroundings, and in situations where poor communications restricted mobility, the proper use of infantry was vital. Jungle warfare was a ‘matter for feet rather than wheels’, and Japanese troops clearly demonstrated their skill.66 They wore rubber belts which could be inflated for use as river transport, and used captured bicycles for transport. British troops, on the other hand, depended on motor transport, and hesitated to march through the jungle by foot. This characteristic rendered them incapable of countering the IJA’s rapid movements. Major-General H.G. Bennett, commander of the Australian forces, alleged that British empire commanders suffered a ‘retreat complex’.67 As a result, the slightest Japanese attack was enough to compel defenders to abandon their positions. The development of adequate countermeasures against the Japanese not only entailed an alteration of methods. Equally important was to reassess the quality of troop training within the British army. Commanders in the Far East conceded that their failures were due to a prevailing lack of discipline. Pownall pondered upon the British soldier’s dependence on creature comforts and aversion to strenuous work, both of which gave rise to a situation where training was conducted without preparing troops for battle conditions.68 Brooke-Popham acknowledged that a key feature which enhanced the IJA’s efficiency was the way in which its indoctrination programme aimed to instil 59

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sentiments of hatred for the enemy, whereas British troops were not exposed to such types of instruction.69 British army commanders made urgent demands for measures to instil a more aggressive attitude among soldiers. Reflecting upon lessons drawn from encounters with the IJA, Wavell warned that British soldiers needed to overcome their fears of long periods of isolation in the jungle and the disorientation caused by the enemy’s deception methods.70 Field commanders in the Far East insisted that troops needed to develop individual initiative.71 Upon taking command of the 15th Corps in autumn 1942, Slim set up a programme at his headquarters in Ranchi to train infantry units to hold their ground in the face of the enemy’s encirclement and surprise tactics.72 The IJN’s establishment of superiority in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific led to reassessments similar to those which took place regarding the IJA. Encounters in Southeast Asia provided visible proof that the technology onboard Japanese capital ships and auxiliary vessels was top quality, while training among naval crews was high. Japanese capital ships were proficient at delivering fire over extended distances and outranging their Allied opponents. This achievement owed itself largely to the fact that for much of the interwar period, the IJN’s doctrine was fixated on securing its decisive victory by fighting a surface action along the lines of Tsushima. The Gunnery and Antiaircraft Warfare Division was aware of the extensive efforts which the IJN had made to equip its fleet with improved guns and stressed that, although there was no information regarding recent progress, there was ‘no reason why they [the Japanese] should not be superior’ in long-range direct fire and medium-range blind fire.73 In light of the IJN’s effective performance, the Admiralty was compelled to acknowledge the strong possibility that British vessels needed extensive modernization before they could stand up to their opponents. Capital ships had to be refitted with radio direction-finding equipment and longer-range guns if they were to possess adequate firepower and accuracy. Objections against the operation of the battleship Malaya with Somerville’s main fleet for the defence of waters adjacent to Ceylon were based on the grounds that it possessed low endurance and limited gun range, and only the most modern ships could engage a concentration of Japanese vessels.74 Naval operations also had to be undertaken by crews with adequate training. In February 1942, Somerville minuted to Pound that operations in the Far East needed to be commanded by flag officers who were well informed on gunnery matters.75 Assessments of Japan’s air services also revealed how combat experiences provided the British with unquestionable signs that the enemy’s performance posed a formidable contest. Japanese fighter aircraft demonstrated a high standard of manoeuvrability and an ability to undertake both coordinated and independent attacks against ground targets.76 The Air Ministry’s praise for enemy fighters was clearly reflected in a report on the Zero, titled ‘a formidable fighter’.77 The comment was based on inspections of downed 60

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aircraft, which revealed a high engine output and fuel capacity. Findings of this nature quickly dispelled the notion that the Japanese were unable to produce aircraft that could match their Western rivals. The failure to provide adequate defences against the JAF led both intelligence staffs and air commanders to reconsider whether their opponent’s weaknesses justified complacency. The Air Ministry continued to emphasize shortcomings by noting how the Japanese used a number of obsolete aircraft in Malaya.78 British commanders in the Far East took a less condescending view, and realized that and Allies were defenceless unless they remedied their own weaknesses, namely numerical inferiority and poor efficiency in the air.79 Wavell concluded that the JAF’s successes in Southeast Asia were largely due to its establishment of local air superiority.80 While Japanese fighter aircraft raised concern, British reactions to the IJN’s air arm was one of alarm. The sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales demonstrated the exceptional skill of Japanese torpedo bombers. Within a week after the capital ships were lost, the Air Ministry observed, ‘recent spectacular results . . . indicate that intensive training and practice have been carried out’.81 The aircraft involved was the Mitsubishi T-96, whose aiming was described as ‘very accurate’.82 The accuracy of Japanese attacks against naval targets also highlighted the necessity of bolstering the antiaircraft (AA) defences onboard British vessels. During the interwar period, the Admiralty did not fully grasp the extent to which aircraft could develop the range and striking power to attack capital ships in the high seas.83 The result was a misperception regarding the types of vessels the Royal Navy would have to operate when confronting the Japanese. Because Britain’s war plans in the Far East before December 1941 had been based on the assumption that the main fleet would operate under the cover of aircraft based in the Malay peninsula, the Admiralty adhered to its belief that the battleship was the centrepiece of its strategy.84 As a result, little attention was paid to the need to develop carrier tactics. Experiments during the interwar period also revealed that fighters were incapable of providing full protection. Naval officers concluded that AA cover provided the most reliable defence, with supporting aircraft filling the gaps.85 When adequate fighter cover was unavailable, ships were vulnerable against determined attacks. The Royal Navy’s AA capabilities were further handicapped by its lack of the resources and technology needed to develop accurate fire control systems.86 The devastation inflicted on Force Z gave rise to a dramatic rethinking about the threat which air attacks could pose. The incident demonstrated not only that aircraft had become a highly effective naval weapon, but that the Japanese had developed it beyond all expectations.87 The terms of reference for the enquiry into the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales explicitly stated that the main objective was to review the circumstances attending the loss of capital ships since the beginning of the war. In order to do so, it was of 61

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the utmost importance to consider the measures to be investigated or pursued, with ‘the intent to improve the defense of British warships against existing or anticipated enemy weapons’.88 During the IJN’s attacks on Ceylon in April 1942, its air arm managed to sink a number of British vessels, including the light carrier HMS Hermes, as well as the heavy cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall. The encounter reinforced British views that Japanese pilots and aircraft possessed a high standard of efficiency, while acting as a reminder that British vessels needed to be equipped with the most up-to-date radar and AA guns.89 Naval commanders in the Eastern Fleet were overawed by the force and precision of Japanese naval aircraft. The captain of the Dorsetshire was impressed with the way in which enemy pilots overcame British AA defences by exploiting blind spots. The captain of the Hermes commented that the attack on his ship was carried out ‘perfectly, relentlessly and quite fearlessly . . . ’.90 Within the Admiralty, opinions did not show the same level of trepidation; however, the incident reinforced the view that Japanese methods and technology were commendable. The Director of the Naval Air Division (DNAD) commented that the degree of accuracy achieved by the Japanese ‘could only be obtained by highly trained personnel’.91 The Director of Gunnery and AA Fire (DGF) noted how ships possessing inadequate armament and lacking proper radio direction finding and gunnery ranging sets had ‘little chance of survival against massed air attack’.92 All ships destined for the Far East had to be equipped with the most updated material before setting off. At the same time, efforts to provide adequate protection for seagoing vessels were complicated because British fighters such as the Seafire were too heavy for carrier-based operations, while the performance of aircraft with lighter designs such as the Hurricane could not compete with the Zero.93 The production of the Barracuda fighter, which had the right combination of speed, manoeuvrability and weight, had faced delays. Upon realizing that the British did not possess adequate fighters, Churchill lodged urgent requests to Roosevelt for the loan of suitable American aircraft.94 The JAF’s demonstration of its capabilities was not only taken as a reason to reassess the enemy. More importantly, the British realized that their forces were in need of extensive improvement. The turn of the tide against Japan’s armed forces during the latter half of 1942 dispelled apprehensions insofar as to prove that the enemy could be defeated at the tactical level. The IJA, IJN and air services continued to demonstrate skills that urged wariness. In addition, because the Allies had yet to acquire sufficient experience, precedents for gauging the effort required for success were patchy. To further complicate matters, British forces in Southeast Asia remained largely inactive for the latter part of 1942. Intelligence was thus mainly derived from reports on US and Australian operations in the Pacific theatres. The information did not permit accurate appraisals as to whether the British had developed the capabilities necessary 62

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to confront their opponent. Assessments on the matter revealed continued unease as well as a lack of understanding of the appropriate methods for defeating the Japanese. On the ground, the Allied successes in New Guinea and the Solomons during autumn 1942 proved that the IJA was not invincible. However, in both offensive and defensive operations, its performance continued to reveal competence. Accounts of US and Australian encounters in the South Pacific urged due caution. In the South Pacific, the IJA continued to demonstrate their proficiency, while US ground forces were ‘poorly prepared for what they had to face’.95 American soldiers, while high in morale, were not trained to conduct the battles of attrition they faced at Guadalcanal and New Guinea. Although Australian soldiers were trained by officers who had battlefield experience from the 1914–1918 conflict, their performance showed room for improvement. The Japanese army’s offensive operations continued to demonstrate their expertise at surprise moves. Engagements on the Kokoda Trail in New Guinea showed the enemy’s adeptness at deploying infiltrators to encircle Allied positions, often using jungle cover to conceal their presence so that the defenders could not notice.96 At the same time, Allied troops proved highly adaptable, and displayed ingenuity. The Americans and Australians managed to repel their attackers with increased frequency. Intelligence bulletins and field manuals thereafter highlighted a number of Japanese weaknesses that could be exploited. The War Office concluded that although enemy soldiers were skilful at conducting surprise moves, their success depended on catching opponents off guard.97 A chapter in the Handbook of the Japanese Army (HJA) in December 1942 pointed out that the tenacity with which the Japanese conducted their envelopment tactics frequently gave false impressions of their strength, and enabled the attackers to overcome considerably larger forces than their own.98 Combat experience also revealed that so long as the defending forces undertook a number of basic countermeasures, Japanese assaults could be repelled. A meticulous reconnaissance of the environs was important. At Milne Bay, US marines deployed scouts against enemy night attacks.99 The parties prepared to meet the Japanese onslaught, and the ensuing encounter often threw the enemy off balance. Such developments dispelled the view that Japanese forces were formidable in the attack. However, British forces had yet to prove their capabilities, and needed to practice due caution against the obstacles likely to be encountered. A chapter in the HJA, based on observations in New Guinea and Guadalcanal, summed up the situation: ‘Defense against Japanese attacks must be principally against infiltration. It must be organized with strong points properly adapted to terrain features. If possible, they should [provide] all round defense’.100 63

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Positions had to be protected with barbed wire and landmines, while intervals were to be covered by strong automatic fire. Most importantly, defending troops needed to fight without becoming panic stricken by enemy attacks. Evidence of the IJA’s weaknesses therefore did not obscure the arduous effort required to defeat it. Intelligence on the IJA’s defensive capabilities gave equally few reasons to alleviate images of a resilient opponent. Allied encounters during the Solomons campaign quickly disproved the preconception that the IJA’s lack of experience rendered its defensive operations ineffective.101 Experiences in the SWPA gave rise to the conclusion that the Japanese army was capable of inflicting significant delay and attrition on its attackers. Positions were made to provide all-round fields of fire and maximum protection from bombardment. Defences were laid out so as to create systems of mutually supporting bunkers, using whatever materials were available. The War Office disseminated an account of enemy fortifications at Buna and Sanananda in New Guinea, describing them as ‘simple, but effective’.102 Significantly enough, without visible indications of deficiencies open to exploitation, assessments focused on the obstacles arising from the IJA’s proficiency. For example, JIC appreciations and intelligence bulletins reinforced the contention that the IJA was a difficult adversary, regardless of whether the Allies achieved numerical superiority.103 A section in the Handbook of the Japanese Army in February 1943 exhaustively described how experiences in the Pacific had highlighted the need for thorough preparations against camouflage, surprise methods, counterattacks and defences prepared in depth.104 For British field commanders, the absence of sufficient combat experience tended to result in a misperception of how to surmount the challenges, in spite of their awareness that Japanese defences were difficult to reduce. After the Eastern Army was established in autumn 1942, field officers attempted to learn how to overcome the IJA, but their efforts encountered a number of initial setbacks. The problem stemmed from a habit which prevailed within the British Army, namely an undue dependence upon overwhelming firepower to neutralize enemy forces. The practice was a byproduct of the carnage suffered in the trenches on the Western Front during the Great War, which gave rise to an accepted belief that assaults against prepared positions could only result in mass casualties. While the doctrine of relying upon heavy weaponry aimed to avoid excessive losses, it had the unfortunate result of rendering British commanders slow to grasp the need to fight a combined arms battle, which was crucial when engaging a well-entrenched opponent. Enemy defences needed to be neutralized through a combination of artillery fire, aerial bombardment and armoured attacks, while ground troops mopped up the remnants of enemy resistance. The Eastern Army was certainly not alone in facing difficulties in scaling 64

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the tactical learning curve. Following the defeat at Dunkirk, British field officers in the home army and North Africa upheld the belief that heavy weaponry alone could overcome the Germans, and the misunderstanding resulted in further setbacks during the early phases of the desert campaign.105 Indeed, one of the British Army’s greatest shortcomings during its campaigns against the Wehrmacht was the absence of a uniform doctrine for combined arms tactics.106 Infantry units suffered excessive casualties because they were not trained to manoeuvre against enemy positions unless the defending forces had been completely neutralized. Although British forces in the Far East eventually achieved a higher standard of efficiency than their counterparts in Europe and North Africa, the Eastern Army’s experience during the opening stages of the Burma campaign reveals parallels. While the defeats in Malaya and Burma exposed the deficiencies British armies had suffered in defensive operations, precedents for planning counteroffensives against the IJA were nonexistent. The Japanese invasion of Malaya and Burma clearly highlighted how the skilful use of infantry often had a decisive effect on the outcome of battles in jungle conditions, where poor communications and the prevalence of natural obstacles restricted the use of heavy weapons. However, appreciations on the lessons to be drawn from the Allied setbacks were prepared at a time when Britain’s immediate objective was to forestall further Japanese advances. Even in the autumn of 1942, when British forces began to recover from the shock brought about by their defeats, commanders had not had enough time to come to grips with the lessons to be drawn from the IJA’s operations. The situation was further complicated by a lack of experience involving operations in jungle terrain, which in turn created difficulties in grasping the methods which the British needed to employ. Throughout the interwar period, the garrison in India remained committed to its traditional role of acting as a police force against local disturbances in areas such as the Northwest Frontier.107 Training was focused on mountain warfare against weakly defended guerrilla forces. Insofar as foreign invasions were concerned, the scenarios which raised the most concern were a German or Soviet advance via Afghanistan and Persia. Consequently, minimal efforts were made to prepare troops for operations in the jungles of Burma.108 British field officers were thus forced to concoct tactics for unfamiliar battlefield conditions. Any lessons which staff officers did learn from the early phases of the war were not enforced upon troops. The Directorate of Military Training did not commence creating a uniform doctrine in its manuals until autumn 1942.109 The absence of communication between the SWPA and India regarding the lessons that had been obtained during operations in New Guinea and the Solomons also negated the prospects of obtaining the necessary information.110 The tactics employed during the first Arakan campaign of winter 1942– 1943 illustrated the dilemmas facing the British. While army commanders 65

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were aware of the dangers posed by the IJA’s resilience, they did not comprehend the necessary countermeasures. The Eastern Army’s decision to advance down the Mayu Peninsula in November 1942 was made on the assumption that the Japanese soldier’s tenacity could be overcome by artillery fire and tank support.111 The stalling of the advance at Donbaik and Rathedaung during early January 1943 revealed how Japanese bunkers were impervious to bombardment. Following this, Wavell ordered Noel Irwin, the GOC of the Eastern Army, to launch a second attack on the peninsula, on the assumption that with a fresh British brigade and improved covering fire, enemy defences could be neutralized.112 Irwin and Lloyd, the GOC 14th Indian Division, executed the operation on the same conjecture. That British commanders based their plans on a faulty understanding of the tactics necessary to defeat the IJA, rather than an ignorance of the challenges their troops faced, is also illustrated by documentary evidence. In their correspondence between January and March 1943, Wavell and Irwin clearly stated that one of the main purposes of the operation was to acquire valuable experience of Japanese methods, which could allow for future successes.113 Reminiscing upon the first Arakan campaign, Wavell admitted that while the difficulties of launching the operations without properly trained troops had been realized, he miscalculated how numerical superiority and a rapid advance could help his forces attain their objectives.114 The decisions leading up to the first Arakan offensive therefore illuminate how evidence pointing to the IJA’s strengths could rarely provide accurate information on how to defeat the enemy. In the absence of combat experience, the evidence was open to various interpretations. The development of appropriate methods could take place only through experimentation. In regard to the IJN, the shortage of information, compounded by the Eastern Fleet’s lack of engagements, rendered accurate assessments virtually impossible. Naval intelligence continued to be a grey area. As late as December 1942, evidence was obtained primarily from US sources, which provided little beyond rough figures on Japan’s naval construction.115 The shortage of reliable intelligence precluded accurate estimates. For example, when Churchill ordered an enquiry into the reasons why Japanese carriers were able to hold more aircraft than their British counterparts, Pound was unable to go further than to suggest that the actual tonnage was probably greater than disclosed.116 The situation was further complicated because of the continued shortage of firsthand encounters between the Royal Navy and the IJN. An example of this dilemma arose in June, when the Admiralty disseminated possible methods of countering enemy submarines. The recommendations were accompanied by what amounted to a disclaimer that the report represented only the opinion of US commanders.117 In the absence of combat experience, the available intelligence could not provide a clear picture of the IJN’s capabilities against its British counterpart. Naval intelligence staffs hesitated to suggest 66

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that Japanese vessels possessed shortcomings open to exploitation, and were more likely to highlight evidence of the IJN’s proficiency. In the air, as late as the end of 1942, the available intelligence was thin on signs of weaknesses likely to hamper the JAF’s ability to challenge its British counterparts. Owing to the RAF’s relative inactivity following the defeats in Southeast Asia, information was primarily derived from accounts of Allied operations in the Pacific. Accurate evaluations continued to be hindered by the lack of data. Information on crucial aspects, such as the production of new prototypes, was scanty.118 Optimism was further precluded by continued indications that Japanese pilots and aircraft were capable of putting up a serious challenge. Commenting on the Battle of Midway, the DNAD noted how American fighters were particularly vulnerable owing to their practice of conducting individual attacks on enemy bombers.119 This practice enabled the Zero pilots to take advantage of their aircraft’s manoeuvrability, and pursue planes flying out of formation. When the Allies began to bolster their airpower in the South Pacific during autumn 1942, they did not immediately establish air superiority. According to Eric Bergerud, ‘for most of the time between spring 1942 and winter 1943–1944, neither side was completely dominant’.120 Because the topof-the-line US fighters were dispatched to Europe and North Africa, Allied air forces in the Pacific consisted mainly of P-39s, whose manoeuvrability, range and speed were inferior to the Zero.121 Only when the more advanced fighters of the US air fleet, such as the F4F Wildcat, P-51 Mustang, P-47 Thunderbolt and Corsair, were dispatched to the South Pacific in large numbers during late 1942, did the balance begin to gradually shift against the Japanese.122 The situation demanded due caution in assessing enemy capabilities. In December, the Air Ministry propagated an account of US encounters in Guadalcanal. US aircraft ‘could not stay with [the Zero] at all and dog fight at any altitude’.123 Japanese pilots were highly trained, and aircraft output had kept pace with losses.124 The only source of comfort was that intensified battles were likely to take a heavier toll on the enemy. The RAF’s ability to confront its Japanese counterpart was also questionable. In the absence of significant successes, the most notable feature was likely to be the high level of efficiency the enemy had demonstrated during the onset of the conflict. Pilots arriving in the Far East were inducted with tales by veterans who had confronted the JAF in the skies over Malaya, Burma and Ceylon. They almost invariably emphasized how enemy aircraft were manoeuvrable, and described Japanese tactics as ‘excellent’.125 Any indications of the JAF’s weaknesses had to be viewed alongside the fact that British pilots and aircraft in the Far Eastern theatres had yet to equal their opponent.

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Morale and materiel The available intelligence on the morale and economic strengths of Japan’s war machine was replete of indications that the enemy suffered deficiencies that would hinder its effort, at least for the first half of 1942. On the contrary, intelligence on the Japanese soldiers’ fighting spirit revealed their exceptional dedication and stamina. Economic intelligence showed how Japan’s conquest of Southeast Asia provided ample supplies of raw materials. The situation was further complicated because the enemy’s morale and war economy did not permit easy exploitation. Although Allied encounters in the Pacific theatres during late 1942 revealed that the Japanese soldier’s morale tended to deteriorate in the face of adversity, his will to continue fighting remained unbroken in the absence of overwhelming defeats. Japan’s difficulties in maintaining adequate production did not negate the fact that its war economy was unscathed without substantial attacks on its infrastructure. Most importantly, the Allies did not have precedents for assessing the possible effects of psychological and economic warfare against the Japanese. The only certain conclusion was that strategies such as the use of propaganda to erode military morale, and launching attacks against the enemy’s economic infrastructure, were unlikely to suffice in defeating the enemy. The Allies could win only by destroying Japan’s armed forces, and psychological and economic warfare had to complement rather than substitute operations on the battlefield. The performance of Japanese troops during their campaigns in Southeast Asia demonstrated their exceptional endurance. Whereas prewar assessments focused on indications of the IJA’s poor discipline during its operations in China, the tenacity which enemy soldiers showed in Southeast Asia eliminated all disdain. By the middle of 1942, the British already began producing a more objective picture of Japanese army morale. If assessments were distorted in any way, it was mainly because they tended to overlook the fact that the Japanese soldier’s psyche possessed shortcomings. This was natural in light of the overwhelming efficiency which the Japanese had demonstrated. The IJA’s operations in Southeast Asia during early 1942 highlighted a number of its characteristics. Action reports from Malaya and Burma conceded that, while the Japanese army’s successes in Southeast Asia could be attributed to skilled planning and tactical skill, the morale of its soldiers was a key factor which upheld the momentum of their advance.126 The Japanese soldier’s fighting spirit derived largely from his high discipline. This feature, in turn, was deeply embedded in Japanese traditions which demanded respect for one’s duty to his nation and people. Wavell concluded that while the ragged attire of Japanese troops and their thuggish behaviour towards civilians were definite indications of sloppiness, their respect for authority was commendable. Wavell’s admiration for these aspects was illustrated by his observation:

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. . . customary behavior such as saluting between superiors and subordinates is still rigidly maintained. Inter-unit rivalry and any other manifestations of competitive spirit is discouraged and virtually nonexistent. A strong army tradition, based on loyalty towards the Emperor, and an offensive spirit exists, and is the basis of morale. No inducements such as high pay and good food is ever offered, and . . . hard living is enforced as good for morale and discipline.127 The Japanese soldier’s willingness to maintain the offensive against all obstacles also rendered him a formidable opponent. Hutton noted that the cause for the IJA’s victory lay not only in its skill in jungle warfare. The fundamental cause was the extent to which the enemy had been imbued with the offensive spirit.128 The middle- and lower-ranking officers in the British army, who bore the brunt of the fighting, tended to pay attention to the contrasting levels of fighting spirit between Japanese and British Empire troops, the latter who held a passive attitude towards their enemy. As the campaigns in Malaya and Burma progressed and the Japanese achieved a spate of unbroken advances, the British were overtaken by defeatism. The gap in morale grew wider, thereby adding to the advantages already enjoyed by the IJA. Colonel Stewart of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders conceded, ‘emotional coldness made British troops slow and cautious against an eager enemy who were aggressive and fast’.129 An officer who participated in the Malaya campaign, from the time of the landings at Kota Baru to the fall of Singapore, noted that one of the fatal flaws of British and Commonwealth troops was their tendency to panic when faced with heavy bombardment.130 The image of the Japanese soldier’s exceptional level of morale was upheld by the tide of the war, which clearly stood in Japan’s favour during the first half of 1942. This meant that the enemy’s will to continue fighting was likely to remain intact. Under the circumstances, it was difficult to depart from the view that the IJA’s morale rendered it a formidable opponent. Observations of the Allied counteroffensives in the Pacific theatres in autumn 1942 revealed how the IJA’s morale was liable to certain levels of deterioration in the face of setbacks. The material dispelled the widespread notion that the Japanese soldier’s threshold of pain knew no limits. At the same time, the available intelligence did not provide signs that the enemy suffered peculiar weaknesses. For example, Japanese troops demonstrated their tendency to suffer depression when faced with food shortages. The Allied attacks on Japanese convoys during the Guadalcanal campaign prevented the IJA from obtaining supplies, and on a number of occasions, its performance was affected. Captured diaries revealed that many Japanese units were subsisting on jungle vegetation.131 In November 1942, the SIS, basing its findings on an article written by the IJA’s board on military education, reported that as early as July, supply shortages had caused malnutrition 69

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and with it, anxiety.132 In some cases, unit cohesion had deteriorated, with troops disobeying orders. However, the evidence was not treated as a sign that the IJA was suffering war-weariness. Commenting on the SIS findings, MI2 warned that similar pieces of evidence had been received, but these symptoms were ‘local and of no consequence’.133 The evidence went no further than to suggest that the IJA’s morale was suffering the same damage as any army facing similar situations. Intelligence obtained from Guadalcanal also revealed that Japanese troops who had faced defeat against Allied forces had suffered demoralization. Captured diaries revealed how the IJN’s failure to provide naval and air support after November, when the Allies gained control of the surrounding waters and airspace, had led troops to lose their will to advance against the US marines, and created a suspicion that the navy had abandoned the army.134 The increasing strength of the Allied garrison also led Japanese troops to abandon some of their operations. In January 1943, the War Office noted how a second lieutenant at Guadalcanal had resisted orders to stage a night attack, and commented, ‘it is heartening to see that Japanese disobedience of orders is being successfully carried out’.135 However, the evidence simply demonstrated that the enemy was not invincible, and was not treated as an indication that the morale of Japanese soldiers was prone to abnormal levels of demoralization. The Japanese soldier’s vulnerabilities also had to be assessed while bearing in mind that even the most overwhelming odds were unlikely to compel him to surrender. The IJA’s tenacity created images of an enemy whose morale immeasurably enhanced its defensive capabilities. In December, the War Office warned that, while the IJA was materially inferior to its Western opponents, ‘the core of [Japanese] military strength is unquestionably [its] high morale and plentiful supply of tough and hardy soldiers’.136 The JIC concluded that the Japanese soldier’s aptitude in jungle and amphibious warfare, combined with their offensive spirit, meant that in conditions of its own choosing in Southeast Asia, the Japanese army was ‘the most formidable in the world’.137 Combat experience in the Pacific theatres revealed an aspect which entailed one of the greatest challenges for the Allies, namely, the IJA’s institutionalized belief that surrender entailed social ostracization. The first implication of this attitude was that operations against Japanese armies were likely to see the enemy fighting to the last man and round, thereby requiring British and US forces to conduct laborious mopping-up operations.138 The second implication was that POWs were likely to be rare, and as a result, opportunities to obtain information from this source were low.139 While the IJA’s reverses proved that it was not the undefeatable enemy portrayed during the opening stages of the conflict, due attention was be paid to the fact that the Japanese soldier’s psychological strengths entailed additional obstacles for any Allied campaign. 70

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While the opening year of the conflict highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the IJA’s morale, assessments on the potential means to exploit the Japanese soldier’s vulnerabilities through propaganda and psychological warfare (psywar) remained a matter for conjecture. Until the Far Eastern conflict broke out, British propaganda operations had been concentrated on Germany, and the possibility of waging psywar against Japan received minimal consideration. The organization responsible for planning and executing psywar operations was the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), which had been set up under the Foreign Office’s auspices in August 1941.140 The executive was an amalgamation of the overseas propaganda sections of the SOE and the Ministry of Information (MOI), and worked under the Foreign Office’s supervision. The PWE also maintained liaisons with the service ministries and Cabinet to ensure that its activities accorded with British policy. The main problem concerning psywar operations against Japan’s armed forces was the absence of precedents for gauging the potential effects. The only certain conclusion was that weaknesses in the IJA’s morale provided opportunities for exploitation. For example, in May, the MOI suggested that as the tide of the war turned in Asia and the Pacific, enemy troops would become vulnerable.141 Among the themes that could be played upon were the overstretching of Japan’s armies, and its inability to match Allied industrial production. However, the paper did not venture to forecast the way in which propaganda could damage the IJA’s fighting capabilities. Similarly, the PWE could only conclude that one of the Japanese soldier’s key weaknesses was his dependence on orders from higher authority and inability to act on his own initiative.142 British intelligence staffs and propaganda organizations were reluctant to arrive at conclusions that were not based on factual evidence. The tide of the war had to turn significantly further against Japan before the potential damage could be knowledgeably calculated. Economic intelligence did not provide reasons to expect a deterioration in Japan’s war capabilities during the opening year of the conflict. Although accurate information was scarce, Japan’s acquisition of new resources in Southeast Asia laid reasonable grounds for concluding that its war economy had achieved self-sufficiency in most categories of vital raw materials. The JIC appreciation on Axis strengths prepared in February warned that while the extension of its scope of operations had forced Japan to draw upon its stockpiles, its conquests in Southeast Asia had ‘materially improved her position in respect of many important commodities’.143 Most importantly, material shortages were not a solid indication that Japan’s war effort was likely to suffer in the immediate future. The only certain conclusion was that the enemy could not outproduce the Allies in the long run. In May 1942, the MEW conceded that while Japan’s capacity for steel production was relatively low, there was ‘no reason to assume that [Japan’s] industry [was incapable] of maintaining and perhaps slightly expanding its potential’.144 71

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Evidence of economic weaknesses also did not permit exact calculations of the extent to which Japan’s industries were struggling to meet its requirements. For example, intelligence on shipping shortages did not provide accurate figures concerning Japan’s ability to obtain adequate raw materials. Signals intelligence simply indicated that the shipbuilding industry was facing difficulties in keeping pace with demand, and the government was expressing anxieties.145 Assessments on the situation could rarely go further than to state that Japan’s war production hinged upon its ability to maintain its lifeline between the home islands and Southeast Asia. The MEW concluded that because the bulk of the oil obtained in the Dutch East Indies had to be transported back to Japan to be properly refined, extensive tanker sinkings were likely to result in a corresponding decline of stocks.146 In summer 1944, the JIC prepared an assessment in conjunction with the MEW, admittedly based on ‘temporary estimates’.147 The evidence pointing to the deficiencies of Japan’s productive plant was equally replete of reliable data. Japan’s aircraft industry was an aspect which attracted the most attention. The available information only revealed that productivity was low by Western standards.148 During summer 1942, the Air Ministry went no further than to suggest that wastage was in excess of production.149 To provide a key example of the extent to which estimates were based on guesswork, in April, the MEW and Air Ministry conducted a joint effort to examine a list of figures on Japanese aircraft production which had been received by the Manchester Guardian, suggesting that the industries had increased output by up to 260 per cent between 1938 and 1941.150 The MEW and Air Ministry agreed that the figures were excessive, and that Japan’s industries were incapable of such production increases. However, at the same time, Portal admitted that evidence was ‘too scanty to allow an accurate estimate’, and provided a wide margin of 5,400 to 7,800 aircraft per annum. In the absence of accurate intelligence, assessments on Japan’s war production capabilities were unlikely to predict whether output was likely to increase or to slow down. Assessments of Japan’s economic situation also had to take into account the fact that the Allies were unable to exploit the enemy’s difficulties for the time being. Until adequate forces and bases could be developed, efforts to inflict damage on Japan’s productive capacity were unlikely to succeed. The Future Planning Section (FPS) concluded that Japan’s economy possessed vulnerable targets in the form of compact areas in the home islands in which a disproportionately high percentage of its industrial production was concentrated.151 In addition, the bulk of Japan’s raw materials travelled along extended sea communications that were exposed to interdiction. However, before attempting to sever the links between Japan and the East Indian archipelago, the Allies had to acquire submarine bases in the western Pacific. Evidence of Japan’s vulnerability to economic warfare was therefore of

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limited value unless the Allies possessed sufficient forces with which to capitalize on the situation. In addition, the absence of adequate precedents meant that the effects of economic warfare remained a matter for speculation. The failure of the Allied bombing effort to disrupt Germany’s war production, as well as the failure of the U-boat offensive to cripple Britain’s lifelines, provided grounds for predicting that economic warfare was unlikely to yield any substantial results when employed against Japan. In their comments on the JPS’s evaluation of the war against Japan, MO1a went as far as to conclude, ‘it is not now accepted that [the bombing of industrial targets] alone can prevent Germany from continuing the war, and it seems illogical to think that it can work against Japan’.152 In the absence of tangible evidence that economic warfare had caused serious damage to the enemy’s war effort, its potential value in the war against Japan was open to doubt.

Conclusion The first year of the Pacific War provided the British with clear indications of the obstacles they needed to overcome in order to vanquish Japan. The lessons of defeat and limited victories also compelled the defence establishment to adopt a more cautious outlook of their opponent. Most importantly, the British began to acknowledge the unsatisfactory state of their military capabilities vis-à-vis Japan. At the strategic level, Japan’s lightning advance into Southeast Asia, along with the overwhelming superiority of its forces, gave rise to the conclusion that the Allies faced negligible prospects of retaining their positions in the region. Japan’s establishment of a defensive barrier stretching from Burma to the Southwest Pacific, and acquisition of bases within striking range of Australia and the Indian Ocean, also raised the possibility of expeditions against areas previously considered immune to attack. The British undertook a closer examination of the strategic balance, the upshot of which was that they could not develop adequate defences in the Far Eastern theatres because their forces were committed to the war against Germany. In the meantime, Britain had few alternatives apart from accepting the devastating effects of a Japanese expedition against the Indian Ocean. The overstretching of Japan’s armies by mid 1942, as well as the depletion of its naval forces following their defeat Midway, alleviated the threat of further large-scale offensives. However, Britain’s forces continued to lack the capacity to overcome the opposition which the Japanese were able to put up, and the situation precluded major operations in the Far East. At the same time, inaction entailed the risk of allowing the Japanese to consolidate their defences. Consequently, a strategy needed to be devised to expose enemy forces to attrition, while at the same time avoiding confrontations that entailed unwanted losses.

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At the tactical level, Japan’s army, navy and air services proved their capability to outmanoeuvre their British and US opponents. More importantly, the British failure to provide adequate defences against the Japanese in Malaya and Burma led defence planners and military commanders to conclude that extensive retraining and modernization were necessary before Japanese capabilities could be matched. While the Allied victories in the Pacific during summer and autumn 1942 revealed that the IJA and IJN could be defeated, Japan’s armed forces continued to demonstrate their proficiency at inflicting significant delay and attrition. Assessments of enemy capabilities therefore focused on the obstacles which Japanese methods posed for the British. The available intelligence on the enemy’s morale and materiel revealed that Japan’s armed forces held exceptional powers of endurance against the adversities of warfare, while Japan’s conquests in Southeast Asia provided ample resources for sustaining a protracted war effort. Evidence of deterioration did not signify any serious faults that were likely to weaken Japan’s armed forces. While the IJA’s defeats in the Pacific theatres in late 1942 showed signs that its morale tended to decline in the face of adversities and setbacks, the Japanese soldier’s fighting spirit remained largely unbroken in the absence of a prolonged series of major defeats. Economic intelligence revealed that despite difficulties in maintaining war production, Japan was unlikely to face shortages that would seriously disrupt its prosecution of the war, at least until the Allies conducted large-scale attacks on its oceanic supply lines and launched bombing raids on its industrial infrastructure. While the first year of the conflict revealed the key challenges which were to be faced during the Pacific War, precedents for determining the appropriate means to overcome the obstacles were lacking, because the Allies had not achieved significant victories, apart from limited advances on Japan’s outlying territories. The shortage of adequate combat experience had two significant effects on Britain’s conduct of its war effort. First, while planning often took place with an awareness of the challenges, it showed a misunderstanding of the effort required to overcome them. On the strategic level, the decision to launch limited offensives against Japan’s outer perimeter did reflect an understanding of Britain’s need to reconcile the dilemma of its inability to launch large-scale counteroffensives on the one hand, and on the other, the risks inherent in remaining purely on the defensive. However, it also revealed an overestimation of how limited operations could achieve advances against the enemy’s positions, with the decision to launch the disastrous first Arakan offensive providing the key illustration of this dilemma. On the tactical level, assessments of Japanese capabilities demonstrated an awareness of the extent to which the IJA, IJN and their air service could be defeated only by the development of improved tactics and equipment. However, suggestions regarding possible countermeasures, especially in regard to the IJA, revealed a misunderstanding of the extent to which numerical 74

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superiority and overwhelming firepower could overcome Japanese defences. Once again, the most important manifestation of this dilemma was the decision to launch the Arakan campaign. Secondly, countermeasures could rarely be suggested with guarantees of success. Assessments regarding the efficacy of psychological and economic warfare provided a prime example. The absence of adequate precedents for gauging the possible effects of such strategies meant that assessments on the matter could not predict the extent to which attacks on Japan’s morale and economy were likely to erode its war-making capacity. Without further developments, the only certain conclusion was that psychological and economic warfare had rarely proven sufficient in themselves to achieve a victory. Therefore, such methods had to be employed in conjunction with, rather as a substitute for, victories on the strategic and tactical level. In the final analysis, firsthand combat experience was the only realistic means to accurately determine magnitude of the threat posed by the enemy’s capabilities and the most efficient methods to defeat them. Because the requisite experience during the opening year of the Far Eastern conflict was not present, an effective strategy could be developed only through experimentation.

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3 GAUGING THE BALANCE OF AN UNPREDICTABLE WAR The evolution of British intelligence on Japanese strategy, January 1943 to August 1945

Deductive guesswork, combined with a reluctance to lapse into undue optimism, shaped British assessments of Japanese strategy for much of the period after the first Arakan offensive of winter 1942–1943. The available intelligence seldom permitted intelligence staffs to predict the enemy’s longterm war plans and scale of opposition that British forces could expect. The ambiguity was compounded by intelligence which suggested that the Allies needed to devote a significant effort to achieve their objectives of vanquishing Japan. By 1943, the buildup of Allied forces in the Pacific theatres and the increasing scale of the US-led counteroffensives had decisively tilted the tide of the war against Japan. However, the British were wary not to write off the challenges they faced. Such mistakes could lead them to embark on operations that entailed further setbacks the defence establishment was unwilling to accept. Assessments of the war against Japan took into account three key features. First, in spite of mounting losses, the IJA and IJN continued to possess sufficient resources to sustain their war effort against the Allies. Second, Japan’s forces showed a determination to fight a war of attrition until they were physically ejected from their territories and the Allies occupied the home islands. Third, until summer 1944, Britain needed to bear in mind that its forces had yet to break the stalemate in Southeast Asia. British commanders in the Far Eastern theatres paid due attention to the dangers of advancing against a well-entrenched opponent. The Eastern Army’s reverses during the 1942–1943 Arakan offensive reminded the British that the Japanese could not be defeated unless their own forces could conduct a sustained campaign and oust the enemy from its positions. The unpredictability surrounding Japanese intentions also meant that the British had to prepare for the maximum possible scale of opposition. Operations 76

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were planned with a view to ensuring that the British were prepared for a range of contingencies. In addition to sufficient strengths, it was of the utmost importance to establish proper logistics so as to maintain the momentum of the operations. For the people in charge of planning Britain’s long-term strategy, namely Churchill and the COS, the interaction between intelligence and decisionmaking was slightly more complex. Intelligence had to be weighed up against the broader objectives which Britain sought to fulfil. Britain’s grand strategy against Japan was determined by three political and strategic factors. First, at the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, the British and the Americans stipulated that the only acceptable peace term was the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers and the complete dismantling of its empire. Second, the defeat of Germany remained Britain’s top priority, and commitments in Europe and the Mediterranean took precedence. Substantial forces for the Far East were not available, so Japan’s armed forces had to be defeated with limited resources. The third factor was the need to secure Japan’s defeat in the most economical manner, and fulfil Britain’s aim of avoiding an excessive expenditure of manpower and finances. Defence planners formulated their war plans accordingly, and intelligence on Japanese resilience gave rise to a cautious strategy. Intelligence began to form the basis for positive action only towards the closing stages, when the deteriorating state of Japan’s defensive capabilities paved the way for a British advance against Southeast Asia.

Structural reform, and the limits of intelligence In the wake of the defeats in Malaya and Burma, followed by the failure of the first Arakan offensive, Britain’s defence establishment devoted greater efforts to obtain reliable information on the strengths and movements of the IJA, IJN and the air services. However, efforts to improve the structure of the intelligence machinery continued to face bureaucratic obstacles until the closing stages of the conflict, particularly in the fields of naval and air intelligence. The organizational reforms were also not sufficient to overcome two features which hindered forecasts of Japan’s strategy. First, the Japanese high command conducted its war effort without a coherent strategy. Second, Japanese war planning continued to be veiled with a high level of secrecy. Signals intelligence was the most important source of data. In the area of naval intelligence, the FECB was responsible for intercepting Japanese traffic.1 Its headquarters was relocated to Kilindini in East Africa for a period of sixteen months after May 1942. In September 1943, when the threat of an invasion of Ceylon had passed, the FECB re-established its headquarters at Colombo, which came to be known as HMS Anderson. In Whitehall, the Far Eastern section of the Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC) collated 77

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Japanese naval signals and regularly updated the Admiralty on the IJN’s dispositions.2 Within India Command, army sigint quickly transformed into a sophisticated apparatus. In December 1942, Wavell lamented that his intelligence staffs had less than a year’s experience with Japanese ciphers, and were unprepared to provide any valuable information.3 Nor did India have the personnel to translate Japanese signals.4 Nevertheless, with backing from the SIS, Wavell developed an efficient system. In March 1942, the C-in-C India proposed to Stewart Menzies, head of SIS, that the signals intelligence organization for Asia be restructured.5 In May, Menzies produced a detailed plan whereby the Wireless Experimental Centre (WEC) at New Delhi was to become the focal point for handling Japanese army traffic. With a staff of over 1,000 and a chain of intercept units in the field, along with cooperation from American sigint staffs, by the end 1943, the WEC had decoded the majority of the IJA’s communications. The material provided detailed data on orders of battle, strengths and dispositions. In the area of coordination and dissemination, there was a marked contrast between naval and air intelligence on one hand, and army intelligence on the other, with the latter more successful (see Figures I.2 and I.3). One of the unfortunate byproducts was that army intelligence gained a predominant voice at SEAC, hindering the production of joint assessments.6 As far as naval intelligence was concerned, the Eastern Fleet’s efforts to obtain better access to sigint continued to face obstacles created by the poor state of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation, which ‘essentially did not exist’ in the Pacific between 1943–1944.7 When the Americans entered the war, their progress against German ciphers was hopelessly behind the British, while the GCCS could not match the US achievements against Japanese codes, mainly because its efforts focused on Europe. Rather than aiding each other’s codebreaking activities, the Allies opted for an arrangement where they took full jurisdiction over their areas of expertise, with exchanges of intelligence awaiting further negotiation. Efforts towards cooperation were made more difficult because the Allies held suspicions concerning their partners’ security arrangements. The lack of Anglo-American teamwork, in turn, led to wrangles between Bletchley Park and the FECB, further complicating the situation. At a conference held between representatives of the US and British services in October 1942, an agreement was reached where the US Navy’s sigint unit conducted the main effort against Japanese ciphers, and then passed the decrypted signals to Bletchley, which was then to forward them to FECB headquarters.8 The system entailed substantial delay, and Lieutenant Commander Burnett, an experienced cryptanalyst representing Somerville, attempted, without success, to arrange for US naval intelligence to forward the material directly to the FECB. The main stumbling block was Bletchley Park, which disapproved 78

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the link on the grounds that the Americans could demand reciprocal arrangements in the Mediterranean.9 The sharing of information was difficult because British and American interests covered widely separated areas, owing to geostrategic factors. Somerville and SEAC were primarily interested in Japanese traffic directed to the Indian Ocean areas, while the Americans concentrated on the Pacific. Clearly, Britain needed to establish a coordinated system where the Eastern Fleet could communicate directly with its US counterparts.10 The creation of such a network required Bletchley Park to provide a larger team of Japanese signals experts, as well as clerical staff to collate the material. Bletchley insisted the resources were unavailable. In September 1944, the situation was improved when the US Director of Naval Communications offered to install two teletype channels between Colombo and the US Navy’s intelligence centre at Pearl Harbor, via Guam. To implement the link, the FECB needed up to 130 additional signal ratings, who had to originate from Bletchley. Because the Far Eastern theatres were third priority after the Home Islands and Europe, the British could not provide the ratings. Bureaucratic obstacles continued to hinder Anglo-American intelligence cooperation until the closing stages. It was not until spring 1945, when the FECB accumulated the equipment and personnel to independently decode Japanese naval signals, that it could provide daily digests on the IJN’s movements in the Indian Ocean.11 Similar difficulties of management were common in air intelligence. The problem stemmed from the lack of a centralized apparatus. Because the IJN and IJA operated separate air arms, British naval and army organizations took divided responsibility and were unable to coordinate their activities. There was also a visible lack of communication within the army and navy intelligence services. As a result, information on the JAF was often not expedited to those who needed it. In November 1943, at a meeting between officials from the Air Intelligence Directorate, Figgis, representing the India Wireless Intelligence Service, explained how Japanese radio transmissions had been regularly intercepted since March, and the material provided useful details on aircraft movements and operational orders.12 However, the upshot was that the GCCS could not decipher the material received from India without a proper wireless communication link. Staff shortages also delayed proper analysis. In January 1944, the GCCS informed the WEC that it had not issued monthly reports for the IJA’s air arm since the previous October, because it was ‘seriously handicapped by the lack of people with experience of operational sigint’.13 The system was also hindered by poor division of labour. In June 1944, Hooper, the head of the Japanese section of AI4f, pointed out that the existing allocation of cryptographic duties between the GCCS and WEC did not allow local centres to decode the messages they intercepted.14 In an arrangement which appeared illogical, not to mention downright counterproductive, 79

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the GCCS worked on the cipher group operating in SEAC, with the WEC concentrating on high-grade codes not used in Southeast Asia. It was not until spring 1944, when the US War Department assumed full control over Japanese air intelligence matters on behalf of the Anglo-American services, that the British could expeditiously distribute intelligence to the main consumers at Air Command Southeast Asia (ACSEA). Starting in May 1944, regular editions of a book with details of all army air units were published. By autumn, intelligence summaries provided a breakdown of the deployments and type of aircraft in each sector in Southeast Asia.15 Towards the end of the conflict, the Allies probably had a more updated picture of Japanese air strengths and dispositions in the front lines than Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) in Tokyo.16 The management of army intelligence ran considerably smoother. Unlike the naval and air sections of the GCCS, which depended on their US counterparts, by late 1943, the military section had ‘expanded progressively’, and much of its work dealt with the actual decryption of Japanese signals, as well as breaking into new code systems.17 At the theatre level, the coordination of army intelligence was relatively easy because a centralized body was available to oversee its activities. In spring 1944, 11th Army Group became responsible for handling all operational intelligence.18 In November, Allied Land Forces Southeast Asia (ALFSEA) took jurisdiction.19 Mountbatten’s headquarters became the medium through which intelligence was channelled to British divisions operating in Southeast Asia, with the Director of Signals Intelligence at SEAC coordinating the work of the WEC and all special wireless groups in the theatre.20 The Intelligence Division (ID) was divided into several sections, each taking on specific matters ranging from operational intelligence, IJA orders of battle and logistics. Regular meetings were held to ensure liaison. At the battlefront level, Slim’s XIV Army headquarters received situation reports (sitreps), which were discussed at daily conferences between representatives of the Army and RAF.21 Field commanders were updated on developments on their fronts through periodic summaries and daily bulletins. In March 1945, after extensive interchange with the WEC, ALFSEA Headquarters decided to issue a standardized report, in which all pertinent information, including decodes and consolidated bearings, were incorporated.22 Despite the improvements in collection and dissemination, predictions of Japanese strategy remained difficult, because the available intelligence rarely went further than to provide information on the current situation, and occasional warnings of impending moves. Japan’s long-term plans were open to conjecture. The Asia–Pacific theatre was not the only area where the British faced problems in forecasting Axis strategy. In Europe and North Africa, intelligence from sigint, humint and photographic reconnaissance provided a plethora of data on matters such as enemy strengths, orders of battle and 80

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dispositions. The Allies also achieved notable success, as demonstrated by the accuracy with which German U-boats were hunted down, and the detailed knowledge Montgomery and Eisenhower obtained on the coastal defences in northern France prior to the Normandy landings. Nevertheless, the material did not enable projections of what actions German forces might take.23 The problem stemmed from the fact that Hitler and his generals rarely followed a consistent plan, especially after 1943, when the tide had turned against the Axis powers. In addition, the German high command’s intentions were guarded with secrecy. Nor were the British alone in struggling to assess Japanese strategy. While the US intelligence services obtained a general picture of Japanese forces and capabilities, the available information did not enable predictions concerning the level of opposition.24 Estimates could not be made unless movements of the IJN and IJA were constantly monitored and the most updated information regularly analysed. Two factors complicated Allied efforts to predict Japan’s moves, the first of which was the high command’s practice of conducting its war effort without a clear plan. Japan commenced the Pacific War on the understanding that, following its conquests in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the Allies would eventually regroup for a counteroffensive aimed to liberate their lost territories. The working assumption was that the IJA and IJN would inflict such high levels of attrition as to compel the United States and Britain to sue for peace.25 By early 1943, Japan’s leaders found their strategy thrown off balance, and their forces were fighting a war for which they were unprepared. Despite having acquired a reservoir or raw materials in Southeast Asia to support its war effort, the IJA continued to face difficulties in bringing the campaign in China to a close. The Japanese had not achieved their objective of eliminating enemy resistance and compelling the Nationalists to surrender. Because the bulk of Japan’s armies were tied down in the Asiatic mainland, large reinforcements could not be diverted to the Pacific, where Allied operations were building up with unexpected intensity. Nor did the Allies appear willing to abandon their war effort. At Symbol, Roosevelt and Churchill pledged that the only acceptable peace term for the Axis powers was the complete dismemberment of their empires and destruction of their war-making capabilities. The ‘unconditional surrender’ formula for Japan was restated at the first Quebec Conference in August (Quadrant) and again in November at Cairo (Sextant). Developments of this nature brought home to Tokyo its diminishing fortunes. The IJA and IJN pursued a policy of contending with Allied invasions wherever they appeared. Subsequently, IGHQ issued few orders aside from the General Outlines of Future War Direction Policy in September 1943, which called for a consolidation of defences on Japan’s outer perimeter (see Map 3.2, p. 100).26 The IJA’s sole aim was to impose casualties on the Allies 81

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as they moved through the Pacific and Southeast Asia, in the hope of wearing out their will to advance towards the home islands. The IJN, on the other hand, expected to fight a decisive showdown and deal its opponents a knockout blow. Under the circumstances, the Allies had little basis for predicting how their campaigns against Japan might unfold. The second factor which hindered a precise estimate was that certain categories of Japanese ciphers remained difficult to penetrate. Signals intelligence frequently provided sketchy information concerning the operational orders of the IJA and IJN. Material obtained from human sources and photographic reconnaissance also revealed limitations. Intelligence on the IJN was ambiguous. True, the more successful US naval sigint services were reluctant to share decrypted material with their British counterparts for a host of reasons, and this was a distinct obstacle to effective dissemination. However, SEAC was able to obtain, upon request, US estimates of Japanese naval dispositions and ship movements.27 The truth of the matter is that intelligence could only provide vague warnings of impending actions. For example, in June 1944, the OIC received a decrypt of an order issued by the C-in-C Combined Fleet, for the IJN’s air arm to attack the US fleet as it approached the island of Saipan in support of the Allied invasion. Although the upcoming operations were described as ‘decisive’, the OIC was unaware of their magnitude, and conceded, ‘whether this implies a willingness to risk a fleet action is not known’.28 The action in fact culminated with the Battle of the Philippine Sea, a landmark carrier engagement of the Pacific War, where Japanese aircraft losses were so high that American airmen nicknamed it ‘the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot’. The situation was further complicated by the IJN’s practice of sending messages that did not allow easy decryption. The maintenance of radio silence, and the transmission of brief orders before switching frequencies, complicated efforts to track enemy movements.29 The IJN’s success at employing indecipherable codes was illustrated by the events leading up to the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944. As early as July, IGHQ ordered preparations for the Sho (victory) operations.30 The Combined Fleet was to forestall a US invasion of the Ryukyus–Formosa–Philippines island chain, and the first variation, Sho-1, called for a decisive battle in the Philippines. However, as late as the eve of the Leyte landings, MacArthur could ascertain neither the enemy fleet’s location nor its intentions. The brief operational orders which the IJN transmitted were probably enciphered in the flag officer code which Allied cryptographers achieved little progress in cracking.31 On the British side, as late as August, the Admiralty could only deduce that the IJN was awaiting an engagement within closer proximity to the home islands, where it could fight in an advantageous situation.32 Naturally, as the Allies advanced, their lines of communication were bound to grow widespread and vulnerable, while the IJN’s contracted and became more defensible. Yet, the timing and location of the decisive engagement were open to guesswork. 82

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Assessments of Japan’s air services revealed similar ambiguities. The main source of information was sigint. Until mid 1944, the material did not provide a comprehensive picture because of the difficulties involved in decoding Japanese ciphers. For example, in 1943, when Wavell recommended the establishment of an Anglo-American combined intelligence centre to collate material concerning the JAF’s strengths, the COS replied they were ‘not satisfied that the proposed organization would achieve the desired result’.33 Whoever made the final estimate, the figures were based on deduction, and thereby prone to a certain margin of inaccuracy. Naturally, forecasts of Japanese air opposition were impossible. Ronald Lewin argued that the material enabled US air commanders in the China– Burma–India theatre such as Albert Stratemeyer and Claire Chennault to obtain vital information on enemy dispositions.34 However, such statements are not corroborated by evidence from the British side. For example, Somerville admitted that prior to the first raid on Sabang in April 1944, the interpretation of Y sources was erroneous. At the same time, he suggested that the opposition encountered during the raid suggested that the Japanese had deceived the British into overestimating the air forces available in the western Malayan Barrier.35 Subsequent bombing raids against the East Indian Archipelago provided further reason to deduce that poor intelligence had created undue fears.36 A plausible hypothesis is that the Eastern Fleet was not receiving the necessary information. The operations took place while Somerville was lodging vehement protests that Bletchley Park did not provide him the full picture.37 Nevertheless, the problems of calculating net Japanese air strength persisted even after a proper system for intelligence distribution was installed in spring 1944. Reliable data on the aircraft reserves of the IJN and IJA was difficult to obtain. Assessments had to be based on figures corroborated from a range of sources. Aside from sigint, captured documents and number plates from downed aircraft gave a rough indication of the quantity of aircraft the Japanese were manufacturing. The data was fragmentary, and did not allow firm calculations. Intelligence on aircraft production and wastage illustrated this dilemma. In May 1944, the COS reviewed the JIC’s contention that in spite of heavy aircraft losses, a rise in strength was possible, thanks to increased output. The Air Ministry representatives were unable to put forward an educated critique, and the final conclusion was based on the deduction that only a small portion of the Japanese air forces had been engaged, and given their policy of conservation, wastage was unlikely to be high.38 Most importantly, intelligence on current strengths did not permit predictions of future trends. One of the necessary ingredients for calculating the potential rise and decline of JAF’s strengths was information on aircraft production capabilities, which was lacking. In October 1943, the Air Intelligence Directorate admitted to Portal that information on production 83

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rates was ‘the best that can be given’ on present knowledge.39 Future strengths also depended upon the unpredictable factor of wastage, and figures were by necessity based on inferences. In February 1944, ACSEA suggested, ‘production figures and the present rate of losses only permit short bursts of activity’, and the hypothesis was based on the recent scale of Japanese operations in the SWPA.40 The only certain conclusion was that the increased weight of Allied operations was likely to accelerate wastage. Intelligence on enemy dispositions and strengths also left few alternatives apart from speculating how they could be deployed. To provide an anecdotal example, as late as February 1945, the NID commented on a decrypt concerning pilot shortages in the Philippines and orders for redisposition of crews, ‘it is not clear whether the Japanese are endeavoring to salvage from there what little remains’, or intended to replace and maintain their strength.41 Intelligence on the IJA was also incomplete and provided few concrete indications of its strategy. The WEC’s progress in cracking the IJA’s ciphers permitted the regular collection of data. By mid-1944, Slim’s divisions were receiving ‘much valuable information’ from sigint, and the material was ‘essential’ for assessing enemy strength.42 However, the historiography suggests that sigint did not always provide reliable information.43 Slim recalled that intelligence on the IJA’s intentions was scanty, leaving few alternatives aside from guessing what moves the enemy could make.44 Alan Stripp, on the other hand, argued that Slim was regularly receiving ULTRA decrypts and his complaint was directed mainly at human sources such as SIS.45 Yet, Stripp did not go beyond citing the findings of a visit paid to Slim’s headquarters by Winterbotham, a sigint distribution specialist, which revealed that sigint had been ‘invaluable throughout the campaign’.46 In fact, Winterbotham himself has limited his praise to the occasion when sigint showed how General Mutaguchi’s XV Army was facing desperate logistical problems during the battle of Imphal.47 Most importantly, Lewin has illustrated how the information was often too vague to permit anything beyond deductions regarding future developments.48 As Aldrich has argued, British cryptographers continued to face difficulties cracking the IJA’s operational codes until the closing stages of the conflict.49 This, coupled with the fact that Japanese commanders in forward areas were largely autonomous and rarely communicated their plans to rear headquarters, ensured that efforts to obtain accurate information remained unfruitful. The difficulties involved in deciphering sigint concerning the IJA’s strategy is further borne out by the absence of any evidence that the British were intercepting the correspondence between Southern Army Headquarters and IGHQ during January 1944, concerning plans for the spring 1944 Manipur offensive.50 Information from human sources was equally questionable. Clandestine organizations did not have the resources to operate in the IJA’s rear areas, 84

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and were hard pressed to collect intelligence on crucial aspects such as the movement of reinforcements to the front line.51 SEAC and Slim’s headquarters also faced difficulties in controlling the various services operating in Southeast Asia, many of which were under the jurisdiction of the SOE and SIS, both of which were reluctant to relinquish their control over humint operations. There were also various long-range reconnaissance organizations, codenamed V Force and Z Force. In the Far Eastern theatres, where manpower and transport were in short supply, clandestine organizations spent more time wrangling over resource allocations, diminishing the prospects of a successful intelligence effort.52 As late as December, Slim complained to ALFSEA Headquarters that he lacked control over paramilitary organizations, and as a result, his units were unable to obtain basic information on enemy dispositions.53 British secret services also had to deal with the other Allied powers operating in the region, namely the Americans and the Chinese. In October 1944, Mountbatten requested Stilwell to urge the Chinese to share intelligence on Japanese strengths in the vicinity of the Salween River, as the information was vital for ascertaining the divisions needed to cover the upper flank of the upcoming advance into central Burma.54 Given the absence of reliable sigint and humint, the British naturally looked towards photographic reconnaissance; however, this source was not entirely dependable for a host of reasons, the first of which was the climatic and topographical features of the Southeast Asia theatre. In Burma, flying conditions during the monsoon period were appalling, while in fine weather, the dense jungle and the IJA’s skill at concealing its positions limited the amount of intelligence that could be obtained.55 Efforts to collect photographic information in areas further afield, notably Sumatra and Malaya, were hindered by the lack of aircraft with adequate range. As late as February 1945, the JPS complained that photographic information on airfield development, conditions of beaches and the state of enemy defences was ‘nonexistent’.56 Captured documents were also of limited value. On one hand, the IJA’s belief in its own invincibility meant it often neglected the most basic security measures. Japanese troops habitually carried operational orders into battle, and whether captured dead or alive, were found with ample amounts of written information. The spring 1944 offensives against the Arakan and Manipur regions were predicted because captured papers enabled Slim and Scoones, the GOC 4th Corps, to piece together evidence pointing to a Japanese plan to invade the eastern border regions of India.57 When corroborated with information on the IJA’s dispositions in forward areas, the scope of Japanese intentions became clear. Deriving intelligence from enemy documents nonetheless encountered two significant problems. First, the IJA frequently issued orders which paid little attention to possible opposition, and the implementation of the plan remained open to imagination.58 Second, and more importantly, the evidence 85

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did not accurately indicate the timing of enemy moves. While British commanders predicted with remarkable accuracy that the attack on Kohima would follow the traditional Japanese strategy of a wide outflanking movement, the 17th Division was unable to obtain any solid information that could enable it to withdraw from the front line before the enemy commenced its operations.59 Under the circumstances, intelligence staffs could only speculate on the actions the IJA was likely to decide upon. Assessments regarding possible Japanese reinforcements for the occupied territories illustrated this dilemma. In September 1943, the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) India stated that the enemy could not expect to hold its positions with its existing strength of four divisions, and the arrival of extra divisions was entirely conceivable. However, it was ‘very difficult to determine whether Burma has or has not been reinforced except from [signals intelligence] sources’.60 Only in January 1944, when the Japanese had completed their transfer of divisions, could the British ascertain that the IJA had a total of five divisions in the Burma–India area.61 Accurate predictions of Japanese army dispositions were further hampered by the time needed to plan operations, and the possible changes that could occur in the meantime. In September 1944, the JIC admitted that its estimates of enemy deployments in the SEAC theatres for the following year were ‘speculative’.62 The problem of unreliable intelligence prevailed until the closing stages of the campaign. During the weeks leading up to the 15th Corps’ landings in Rangoon, information from special intelligence indicated that the garrison was being withdrawn; however, the progress and the subsequent effect on the level of opposition could not be foretold.63 Lieutenant-General Frank Messervy, commander of the 4th Corps during the final months of the Burma campaign, admitted that it was largely with good fortune that his staffs predicted enemy movements.64 The scale of opposition in areas along the Malay barrier also remained unforeseeable. In May 1945, the Director of Intelligence was unable to determine whether the Japanese intended to withdraw from Malaya, and recommended that while operational planning needed to continue on the assumption that the landings will encounter resistance, such plans had to be ‘sufficiently elastic to exploit any easy success’ that could arise from a premature withdrawal.65 In July, prior to the scheduled landings, the conclusion was that ‘on the available intelligence, one can speculate endlessly on the eventual location of Japanese formations’.66

Intelligence and operational planning – the IJN and JAF The shortage of intelligence on the IJN and Japan’s air services was compounded by indications of their abundant strengths to inflict delay and 86

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attrition on Allied operations. Without visible proof that Japanese reverses had disabled the enemy from providing effective opposition, the British were reluctant to dismiss the perils facing their own forces. This was a natural tendency in light of the heavy reverses suffered during the early phases of the conflict. In regard to the IJN, so long as the Japanese possessed active vessels, Allied naval crews could not ignore the threat of encounters. In the Pacific, the IJN’s numerical inferiority, coupled with the need to avoid risking further losses at the hands of the ever-expanding US Fleet, precluded offensive action.67 Efforts to use the fleet to defend Japan’s outlying territories were equally unlikely. However, as the Allies advanced towards the home islands the IJN’s continued inaction could not be guaranteed. The JIC warned that the attrition suffered by Allied fleets depended on the ‘success of air and surface reconnaissance in locating targets under conditions favorable for attack’.68 In June 1944, Somerville noted that a Japanese defeat by the US Pacific Fleet would greatly reduce the effort required by the Allies. However, so long as the IJN remained ‘in being’, superior forces needed to be deployed, the concentration of which inevitably delayed the general movement.69 In the Indian Ocean, the Royal Navy had yet to divert sufficient carriers and capital ships away from the Atlantic, so as to provide the Eastern Fleet with the numerical superiority needed to counter the IJN. Without foolproof evidence that Japan harboured purely defensive intentions, the possibility of sorties against British positions could not be dismissed. Although the move of the IJN’s capital ship fleet to Singapore in February 1944, following the US onslaught against the main base at Truk, aimed to keep the vessels out of harm’s reach, raids against shipping targets and ports in the Bay of Bengal could not be ruled out.70 The threat was enough to warrant the dispatch of the US carrier Saratoga and French battleship Richelieu, along with advanced torpedo bombers, to safeguard sea communications in the Indian Ocean areas until the Eastern Fleet could be properly reinforced.71 The absence of accurate intelligence also meant that naval interference with landings on the Malay barrier was an ever-present possibility. Churchill, who, along with Mountbatten and Somerville, staunchly advocated a landing in northern Sumatra, that is until the Japanese fleet moved to Singapore, conceded that the plans had to be shelved.72 The dangers could be minimized only by evidence that the IJN was incapable of disrupting Allied operations. To illustrate a key example, when intelligence revealed the arrival of two capital ships and a cruiser fleet at Singapore in January 1945, Mountbatten and Churchill asked the COS whether the situation was secure.73 Sir Andrew Cunningham, who had succeeded the deceased Pound as First Sea Lord, replied that with the weakened state of the Japanese fleet, he considered it ‘more improbable that the Japanese would send major units into the Indian Ocean’ and if they did, the British fleet was adequate to deal with the sortie.74 Although Churchill 87

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had the ‘greatest confidence’ in Cunningham’s judgment, he insisted that regular updates be provided.75 In the absence of accurate intelligence on enemy intentions, the only means of ensuring security was to provide forces sufficient for the resistance the enemy could offer. Intelligence on the Japanese air services urged similar levels of caution. The situation was particularly difficult because the available information merely gave the British a picture of the situation in forward areas. Reduced activity on the front line did not necessarily indicate an overall decline. On the contrary, the ambiguities concerning Japan’s air strengths in rear areas warned against complacency. Throughout 1943 and early 1944, the Air Ministry, ACSEA and the JIC voiced similar concerns that the continued quiescence in the SWPA and Burma was part of a calculated plan to avoid further losses, and conserve strength so as to bolster Japanese defences in more vital areas within the Inner Zone.76 As late as the end of 1944, when bombing raids against Rangoon and Bangkok met minimal opposition, intelligence summaries suggested that the JAF was waiting for the Allied air forces to thin out.77 While increased air opposition threatened the RAF’s operations in Southeast Asia, the British faced a difficult dilemma because the only guaranteed way to ensure a significant decline in the JAF’s strengths was to engage its aircraft. In October 1943, Portal warned Churchill that the JAF had managed to keep approximately 60 per cent of its aircraft out of the war, and this was a clear sign of the need to confront the enemy ‘with all the strength and at all possible points’.78 British commanders at the theatre level held similar concerns. In spring 1945, Power, the C-in-C East Indies Station, planned a pre-emptive strike on the Malay peninsula prior to the scheduled landings, on the premise that Japanese air opposition would provide the opportunity to eliminate more aircraft.79 Combat experience also revealed that apprehensions over the enemy’s ability to concentrate numerically superior forces along its perimeter were grounded in fact. During the bombing attacks against Burma during winter and spring 1944, Japan’s air services dispersed their fighters on a number of airfields, and then assembled concentrations against Allied bombing missions without being detected.80 While Allied sorties had inflicted a steady toll, the JAF was still able to put up resistance, indicating that ‘a satisfactory reserve and supply system [was] in being for the Burma theatre’.81 For British air commanders, the uncertainty urged due caution. The success of Crimson, the bombing attack on the fuelling station at Sabang on the northern tip of Sumatra in April 1944, was dependent on effective monitoring of enemy movements so as to avoid exposing British squadrons to attrition.82 Operations against the Malay barrier had to be planned on the understanding that the Japanese were able to transfer aircraft from Burma and thereby achieve local superiority against the RAF, whose resources had to be dispersed over a broad front.83 Most importantly, planning was under88

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taken while paying attention to the possibility that predictions could well turn out false. In estimating the scale of opposition to be encountered during the overland advance through Burma, the 3rd Tactical Air Force concluded that although the JAF was more likely to conserve its resources by retaining its aircraft in rear areas, it was ‘not possible to assess the probable buildup of the Japanese air force for the monsoon of 1945’.84 The lifting of apprehension was possible only in the wake of enemy losses that provided undeniable proof that the JAF had lost its capability to inflict serious attrition.

Intelligence on the IJA’s defensive capabilities in Southeast Asia, and its effect on British–Indian army’s operations on the India–Burma front Of the three branches of Japan’s armed services, the IJA’s defensive capabilities raised the greatest concern. In addition to ample forces, Japanese armies possessed interior lines of communication, which allowed them to bolster their forces in threatened areas at relatively short notice. Commanders in the British–Indian army were compelled to understand the substantial effort required to liberate Southeast Asia. The failure of the first Arakan campaign highlighted the casualties and losses likely to result when offensives were conducted with inadequate forces. Planning took place with a view to avoiding similar misfortunes, and taking all possible measures to ensure that British–Indian armies had adequate operational capabilities as well as logistical support. The task of producing assessments on the IJA’s strategic situation and intentions on the India–Burma front was primarily undertaken by GHQ India and the JIC. The War Office also occasionally put forward its views; however, Whitehall kept its eye on areas further afield such as Malaya and the East Indies. Until the IJA was defeated at Imphal and Kohima in spring 1944, intelligence highlighted its possession of sufficient strength to repel Allied invasions. The failure of the first Arakan offensive showed how the IJA held a well-entrenched position, while the stalemate which prevailed during 1943 and the early part of 1944 was taken by the British–Indian army as a reason to pay heed to their enemy’s advantages. Tangible evidence of the IJA’s loss of the initiative was vital for dismantling apprehensions. Although the IJA’s forces for the larger part of 1943 on the Burma front never amounted to more than four divisions, and this number was lower than what the British–Indian army could deploy, the British had to consider the inherent advantages which defending armies enjoyed. Furthermore, by the end of 1943, troop movements and concentrations revealed substantial reinforcements in the border regions of Burma. In March 1944, Japanese strength doubled from the previous year to eight divisions,85 of which six were stationed on the frontiers. 89

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In addition to ample forces the Japanese benefited from a relatively strong logistical base. Intelligence on the capacity of supply lines in Burma was rarely accurate, and as late as July 1944, the traffic on key arteries such as the Burma–Siam railway could not be determined.86 Nevertheless, the British could deduce that the IJA relied upon a comparatively developed road and rail system. The situation in Southeast Asia was also slightly different from the Pacific theatres. In New Guinea and the Solomons, Japanese island garrisons depended on sea communications, and the maintenance of supply lines in the face of Allied submarine and air attacks proved difficult.87 In Burma, operations were conducted on land masses where logistical factors did not hamper mobility to the same extent. One of the key points that arose from the Lethbridge Mission’s88 survey of battle conditions in the SWPA and Burma theatres was that in the Pacific, the Allies were fighting with all the advantages on their side. Neither side could live off the land, and the Allies had command of both the sea and air. On the other hand, in [Burma], the Japanese possessed all the valuable roads, rivers and railways. . . . That was a constant anxiety.89 Operations involving the blockade and interdiction of supply lines, which had proved successful in the Pacific, were questionable because Japanese garrisons in Burma were largely self-sufficient and obtained their supplies via land.90 In March 1944, the Director of Intelligence at SEAC concluded that overland routes from Thailand to Burma were sufficient for the IJA’s requirements, and attacks against supply lines were unlikely to immobilize its movements, because the enemy was able to divert traffic to alternative routes and quickly repair the damage caused to the infrastructure.91 Only the destruction of main bottlenecks in rear areas could achieve results. For British commanders in Southeast Asia, the IJA’s defensive capabilities were taken as a warning that operations had to be planned with ample strengths and logistical support. In April 1943, Irwin conceded that the first Arakan offensive had highlighted how the British–Indian army had to be ‘immeasurably superior’ before attempting to oust the Japanese from Burma.92 The Arakan offensive was quickly followed by the first Chindit expedition, also commonly known as the Wingate expedition, named after its leader, Major-General Orde Wingate. Long-range penetration groups (LRPG) were airdropped behind enemy lines. The LRPG then conducted raids against the enemy’s supply lines. The success of the operation dispelled the notion that the British were incapable of operating against the Japanese. Churchill was particularly impressed, and before setting off for Quadrant, he summoned Wingate to join the British delegation in an effort to sell the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan whereby LRPG would conduct large-scale attacks against targets across Southeast Asia. 90

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The vast majority of the British–Indian army establishment, however, was not receptive to the idea of relying upon Wingate’s Chindits, although their achievements gave rise to a renewed sense of self-confidence. The limited nature of the advances, coupled with the casualties incurred by Wingate’s forces, upheld the contention that operations against the Japanese could succeed only when the attackers possessed abundant fighting capabilities. Kirby’s contention that Wingate’s plan was based on a failure to understand that lightly armed infantry units amidst hostile territory were no match for the enemy’s main forces, reflects the views held by officers on the Burma front.93 True, Kirby’s criticisms were the result of antagonisms and prone to personal bias. The fact remains that infantry units supported by airdrop in hostile territory were considered ineffective against well-entrenched opponents.94 Until the British–Indian army amassed the necessary resources for largescale offensives, there were few alternatives aside from building up its capacity for offensives and lines of communication. In August 1943, Auchinleck, who had succeeded Wavell as C-in-C India, discussed with local army commanders the possibility of reducing the reserve divisions. The upshot was that such measures were not possible if the army was to carry out its tasks.95 The British–Indian army’s effectiveness was also hindered by widespread apathy. In June, Wavell met the War Cabinet to voice concerns that a large portion of servicemen were suffering defeatism. The soldiers also did not regard the Japanese as a threat to the same extent as the Germans. Under the circumstances, the willingness to prosecute the Far Eastern war was likely to dissipate, particularly once operations in Europe were completed.96 Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India, thus argued it was essential to indoctrinate troops in India with the belief that the defeat of Japan was vital for Britain’s survival. The situation was further complicated because commitments in Europe still precluded the buildup of forces in the Far East. As late as winter 1943– 1944, Mountbatten expressed concern that adherence to a ‘Europe First’ strategy could indefinitely delay any offensives which held a chance of dealing a decisive blow.97 Slim could not help but to doubt whether British forces were able to operate against an enemy who was being constantly reinforced.98 A drastic improvement of the communications on India’s northeast frontier regions was also necessary. Auchinleck and Slim both recalled that the most formidable obstacle to British forces taking the offensive was the shortage of communications with which to provide the necessary amounts of supplies and ammunition.99 The relatively strong condition of Japanese communications also meant that operations needed to be planned while bearing in mind the IJA’s ability to outflank the British–Indian army’s supply lines. Slim’s decision to withdraw to Cox’s Bazaar following the reverse of the first Arakan offensive was based on the belief that further enemy advances could be prevented most 91

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effectively by luring the Japanese into overstretching their lines of communication, thereby exposing them to counterattacks.100 The Japanese success in entrapping their numerically superior attackers during the first Arakan campaign also highlighted the dangers posed by the IJA’s ability to move reinforcements to threatened areas. Assessing the possibility of recapturing Akyab in summer 1944, Rear Headquarters SEAC warned that on previous occasions, the Japanese reaction to a British assault against the region was to conduct a ‘right hook’ against their attacker’s rear flanks and lines of communication.101 The 15th Corps therefore needed to ensure that it was able to reinforce frontline units in a timely manner. The questionable reliability of Allied communications also gave rise to warnings of the dangers posed by pre-emptive attacks. By early spring 1944, Japanese troop concentrations along the India–Burma frontier suggested that the enemy might launch an assault against the British–Indian army’s communications with its forward bases at Imphal and Kohima.102 The dispersal of the 4th Corps and their dependence on vulnerable supply lines placed the attackers at an advantage. Given the weight of attack and the speed with which the Japanese could invade, the 4th Corps faced the contingency of being cut off.103 The IJA’s failed offensives against the Arakan and Manipur regions during winter and spring 1944 resulted in a serious depletion of its capabilities, and encouraged the British–Indian army to seize the initiative. The XIV Army’s success in halting the Japanese invasions provided invaluable lessons of how a determination to hold ground and maintain the flow of supplies by airdrop could eventually turn the tide against the enemy.104 The stalling of the Imphal offensive also suggested that the progress of the battle was likely to be facilitated by the IJA’s inability to maintain its forces against a British army supported by ever-improving logistics.105 By the end of 1944, the British–Indian forces were able to conduct a two-pronged offensive against the central plains of Burma (Capital) and coastal regions of the Arakan (Romulus). The XIV Army’s advance inflicted further losses on the IJA and caused a rapid breakdown of its supply lines. However, field commanders warned against lapsing into complacency. Thanks to ample strengths and logistics, the XIV Army was in a position to dictate the tempo of the campaign, and press forward against what was becoming a more manageable level of opposition. At the same time, the IJA had not entirely lost its ability to consolidate and rapidly deploy for counterattacks. Operations were planned while remaining on guard against setbacks. British commanders insisted that it was imperative to seize the opportunity for further advances towards the central plains in order to maintain pressure and deny the enemy any opportunities to regain the initiative.106 The continuation of the advance was a necessity rather than an option, hence the decision in June 1944 to destroy the remnants of the Japanese 15th and 31st Divisions and prepare positions for the post-monsoon advance into central Burma.107 92

Map 3.1 Campaign in Burma, 1943–1945 (courtesy of the Department of History, United States Military Academy).

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Nor did the enemy’s deteriorating logistical situation ensure an easy victory. British–Indian forces needed to continue inflicting attrition on Japanese communications. Evidence from captured documents revealed that air attacks on railways and river transport caused serious disruption to enemy supply and reinforcement routes.108 However, the raids had to be sustained if the IJA was to continue facing difficulties.109 The developed state of Allied communications did not negate the need to avoid the dangers of overstretch. The outcome of Capital was most likely to be determined by the British–Indian army’s ability to maintain its momentum by establishing adequate air supply routes so that its front-line units could be reinforced at will.110 At the same time, because the Japanese were still able to stage counteroffensives, the XIV Army needed to avoid placing itself in a precarious position. Slim’s plan to stage an encircling movement on Mandalay in March 1945, in an attempt to force the Japanese into battle, was based on the premise that if enemy troops were allowed to withdraw to Rangoon, the British–Indian forces would have to face an engagement at a later stage when their own lines of communication were vulnerable.111 As the XIV Army approached Rangoon, it faced ever-increasing dangers of straining its supply lines. Mountbatten insisted on avoiding at all costs the IJA’s mistakes in failing to operate with ‘an adequate tail’.112 Until sufficient transport aircraft could be deployed to ferry the supplies to the front line, the British–Indian army was dependent on ‘a limited line of communications against which the Japanese [could] impose maximum delaying action and effort’.113 In May 1945, Slim decided to mount the amphibious landing against Rangoon (Dracula), out of fears that if the overland offensive were to be stalled with the onset of the monsoon, the XIV Army could be exposed to counterattacks.114 The possibility of the Japanese putting up effective resistance could not be dismissed until May 1945, when their lines of communication had been broken and their units scattered in small parties, able to offer only pockets of token opposition.115 Evidence pointing to the inferior condition of Japanese communications was a reassurance only insofar as it showed that the enemy’s defensive capabilities had declined. As long as the IJA could stage damaging counteroffensives, assessments on the matter warned against exposing British forces to unnecessary dangers.

Effect on British grand strategy For the policymakers and defence planners responsible for directing Britain’s grand strategy, namely, the COS and Churchill, the intelligence pointing to Japan’s defensive capabilities also created a reluctance to launch counteroffensives until Britain had developed the necessary resources. At the Cabinet level, apprehensions over Japan’s ability to defend its conquered territories had an additional effect, in that they fuelled the disagreements between the various parties. As H.P. Willmott has argued, the main hindrance to an 94

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agreed war plan was the wrangling between Churchill and the COS over how Britain was to achieve its political objective, namely, to play an important role in defeating Japan, thereby convincing the United States and the Dominions that it had earned the right to re-establish its imperial influence in Southeast Asia.116 Churchill, along with influential members of the War Cabinet, including Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Deputy PM Clement Atlee, believed that Britain needed to undertake an amphibious landing in the Malaya–Sumatra region if it wished to regain its possessions without having to rely on US arbitration. Mountbatten also advocated the Malaya–Sumatra strategy on the grounds that it was essential to maintain Britain’s prestige. The COS, on the other hand, maintained that if Britain failed to participate in the main operations in the Pacific, the Anglo-American alliance could be jeopardized. Intelligence on Japanese capabilities gave the opposing sides an instrument for strengthening their respective arguments, and the ensuing debate introduced additional delays into the decision-making process. Thus, strategic planning for the war against Japan did not achieve substantial progress until the final stages, at which point political and military considerations required Britain’s leaders to devise a concrete strategy for bringing the conflict to a successful conclusion. At the grand strategic level, the structure of the intelligence machinery and decision-making process was such that Churchill and his military advisors had access to a constant stream of updated information on Axis intentions and capabilities. The JIC was the main producer of intelligence assessments. The committee consisted of representatives from the service departments and government ministries who collaborated to provide the COS and War Cabinet with updates on the situation at the various theatres. Appraisals on the situation in Southeast Asia were also received from local commanders, including Wavell and Mountbatten. The power relationship between Churchill and the COS was one where strategies could be implemented only with unanimous consent. While the COS were the final arbiters of British strategy, the JPS was also responsible for determining the logistical and operational requirements for the plans proposed by the COS. The command structure provided ample room for open discussion over the direction of Britain’s grand strategy. Last but not least, while the system laid the grounds for delays and deadlocks, it had the advantage of enabling the COS to prevent the PM from going ahead with plans which his military advisors considered unsound. The JIC highlighted a number of features which British strategists had to contend with, the first of which was the strong possibility that Japan would attempt to retain its conquests until the very end. While Japan’s naval and air forces were likely to withdraw from the occupied territories in an effort to bolster the home islands, its armies were most likely to continue fighting until they were physically ejected by the Allies. Assessments of Japan’s strategy correctly deduced that it was in its interests to maintain control over its 95

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empire, and the IJA’s strategy would be formulated accordingly. A retention of the outer zone – i.e. the western Pacific, the East Indian archipelago, Malaya and Burma – could delay the Allied advance, while a withdrawal enabled the unopposed establishment of Allied bases within striking range of the home islands.117 Japan’s dependence on the raw materials of the southern regions provided a further reason not to anticipate a premature relinquishment. Most importantly, even in the event that Japan’s sea communications were severed and it lost access to the resources of Southeast Asia, abandonment was illogical because its leaders considered the IJA’s presence to be vital for negotiating a favourable peace settlement.118 The possibility of the Japanese fighting a war of attrition was compounded by the dangers posed by the sizeable strengths they were able to put up. Moreover, the unpredictable factor of Japan reinforcing its outlying territories had to be taken into account. As long as Japan possessed surplus forces and the mobility to transport them, their possible deployment in the southern regions could not be ignored. In September, in response to a COS enquiry on the opposition likely to be encountered in Burma during the following year, the JIC replied that operations in the region ‘will definitely draw Japanese reinforcements into the territory’, of up to two divisions.119 Predictions concerning enemy resistance in areas along the Malay peninsula and East Indian Archipelago revealed similar levels of caution. The JIC warned that Japan had to be expected to deploy its entire reserve to reinforce its garrisons, and that an attack on any point was likely to compel an immediate rise of strength in rear areas.120 In practical terms, an attack on Sumatra was most likely to be followed by an increase of Japanese strengths in Malaya. The evidence pointing to the resilience of Japan’s armed forces in Southeast Asia compelled Churchill and the COS to insist that operations not be launched unless the British were prepared to deal with the maximum possible scales of opposition. Because the Mediterranean and European theatres continued to receive priority, the provision of adequate shipping, equipment and troops for the Far East faced prolonged delays. Under the circumstances, strategic assessments invariably concluded that an attempt to reconquer Britain’s territories held minimal prospects of success. The development of a coordinated strategy was further complicated because of uncertainties surrounding the time which could lapse before Germany’s defeat enabled the British to divert forces against Japan. In September 1943, Churchill and the COS requested the JPS to report on the feasibility of various operations which had been proposed at Quadrant, including offensives against Burma, Malaya and Sumatra. The JPS replied that adequate troops and equipment could not be provided for Southeast Asia unless the Allies depleted their forces in the Mediterranean or the resources allocated for the impending cross-Channel landing in northern France.121 Because Britain’s defence planners wished first and foremost to avoid 96

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excessive costs, strategies that entailed unacceptable delays and casualties were bound to be rejected or shelved. Churchill and his COS were well aware that Japanese forces in Burma enjoyed certain advantages, and opposed extended operations in the region. At the second Washington Conference (Trident), in May 1943, the British delegation withdrew the commitment made to the Americans at Casablanca, for launching Anakim as the main operation for the 1943–1944 campaigning season. COS and Churchill wholeheartedly agreed with Wavell’s warning that advances against the outposts of the Japanese empire had proven slow and costly, and a campaign in Burma entailed protracted operations under conditions where enemy forces were able to rely upon a generous supply of reinforcements.122 Churchill commented, ‘going into the swampy jungles to fight the Japanese is like going into the water to fight a shark’.123 Intelligence on Japan’s defensive capabilities was also treated as a convincing reason to refrain from strategies that did not hold high prospects of achieving a decisive victory and weakening its war effort. The strategy put forward by the US staffs at Trident, namely an Allied effort to reopen the Burma Road, was considered an unnecessary commitment of resources that could be better used elsewhere. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff saw the opening of a channel for funnelling war supplies to China as an integral part of Allied strategy. As far as the British were concerned, operations in northern Burma committed them to an extended campaign which was unlikely to increase the flow of aid to China in time for it to play a decisive role in defeating Japan.124 The COS agreed to the idea at Quadrant only because Britain needed to uphold Allied solidarity.125 Even then, Churchill and the COS maintained that an excessive allocation of ground forces be avoided, hence the decision to implement the plan by increasing the capacity of the ‘Hump’ air ferry route and securing the necessary ground for its protection with LRPG.126 Mountbatten and his War Staff also viewed the reoccupation of Burma as an effort that was bound to prevent SEAC from taking timely and decisive action against Japan.127 The general consensus was that operations in Burma were to be limited to reopening the air ferry route, so as to enable the Allies to build up sufficient air forces in China for a strategic bombing campaign against the home islands. In April 1944, the US chiefs of staff requested British approval to issue a directive to Mountbatten, ordering operations to capture Upper Burma. The COS directive, which called for all possible measures to broaden the capacity of the air route from India to China, was based on a mutual understanding between Mountbatten and the COS that the operation was not to require the allotment of additional resources to the SEAC theatre.128 While the COS and Churchill agreed that operations in Burma were wasteful, they were divided over the question of where the thrust of Britain’s war effort should take place. The COS argued that Britain needed to join forces with the United States in the Pacific if the Anglo-American alliance 97

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was to be maintained. The PM, on the other hand, argued that if Britain played the role of junior partner to the Americans in the latter’s campaigns in the Pacific, its status as a Great Power would dissipate in the postwar era. Churchill therefore believed that the British needed to conduct an independent effort to regain their imperial possessions in the Malaya– Sumatra region (see Map 3.2, p. 100). The PM was not alone in advocating the Malaya–Sumatra strategy, which found strong backing from both the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office as well as the War Cabinet. In particular, Eden and Attlee were outspokenly adamant against any plan which enabled the United States to claim that it single-handedly brought about Japan’s defeat.129 Similar debates were echoed at the SEAC level. Mountbatten was the outspoken supporter of amphibious operations against the Malay barrier. His proposals were often opposed by the local commanders-in-chief, namely Somerville and Giffard, the commander of the 11th Army Group, who argued that the necessary resources were not available.130 Aside from political considerations, divergences of opinion over the importance of the Far Eastern conflict fuelled disagreements. Churchill believed that Japan was a secondary enemy in comparison to Germany, and wished that Britain avoid a total war in the Far East which was likely to entail excessive casualties. The PM therefore advocated peripheral strategies against areas such as Sumatra and Malaya, and hoped to rely upon the United States and USSR to bear the brunt of the effort against the heart of Japan’s empire.131 The COS proposals for a Pacific strategy, on the other hand, reflected how military planners had adopted the American view that Japan could be defeated only through the destruction of the IJN’s main fleet, followed by an assault on the home islands.132 An attempt to challenge the above arguments by stating that opposing views on Japanese capabilities acted as the primary obstacle would be an exaggeration. However, strategic considerations provided the conflicting sides with a strong argument to refrain from operations they did not favour. For the COS, assaults against Japanese strongpoints were inadvisable unless the attackers were prepared for the maximum scale of opposition. An accurate knowledge of Japanese defences was essential to plan operations effectively. The lack of good intelligence on beachheads and enemy dispositions lay at the heart of the COS’s scepticism over the landing on northern Sumatra (Culverin).133 The rejection of the proposal put forward by the February 1944 Axiom Mission headed by Mountbatten and Wedemeyer, whose purpose was to sell the merits of the operation to the British and US staffs, was based on the COS’s estimate that sufficient landing craft and shipping could not be provided until March 1945 at the very earliest.134 A landing on Sumatra also risked hinting to the Japanese that Malaya was the next objective, and exposing British forces to aerial attacks. The threat could be neutralized only by an immediate assault on Malaya and thereafter 98

Map 3.2 Allied strategic plans, 1943–1944 (courtesy of the Department of History, United States Military Academy).

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neutralizing the Japanese stronghold at Singapore before the enemy could counterattack.135 If the British were unable to divert sufficient forces from the Mediterranean and European theatres, the initiative was likely to be lost. Most importantly, the COS thought the operation was more likely to delay, rather than accelerate, Japan’s defeat. While Culverin held the prospect of diverting the enemy away from the Pacific, the protracted opposition rendered the operation a wasted commitment that could forestall the Allied invasion of the home islands by up to a year.136 Lessons obtained through Allied experiences in the Pacific were also seen as a reason for caution. US amphibious operations revealed that landings against Japanese beachheads required attacker/defender ratios higher than normally prescribed.137 In February 1944, the COS rejected Churchill’s plan for a landing in the Andaman islands (Buccaneer), arguing that the necessary margin of superiority of five to one had yet to be achieved.138 Opposing the COS was Churchill, whose support for a landing on Sumatra, followed by an advance on Malaya, was based on his belief that Culverin entailed a substantial commitment, but that the plan provided the most economical way to wrest Japanese control over Britain’s colonies.139 Finally, the PM estimated that the East Indian Archipelago was defended with comparatively low strength, and amphibious landings against the islands could therefore be conducted with ease.140 The PM’s attitude towards threat assessment also played an important role in laying the grounds for his optimism. Churchill was reluctant to acknowledge problems without concrete evidence of real danger, and he was therefore prone to frown upon undue pessimism. At Quadrant, the JPS warned that even if British plans were confined to minor operations against islands on the northern tip of Sumatra (Culverin Junior), Japanese attention would be drawn to the area, and before embarking on such operations, the British needed to be prepared to conquer the entire Sumatra–Malaya region.141 Churchill rebuffed that Japan needed to protect its eastern perimeter against the US onslaught and was therefore unlikely to reinforce the southern fringes of its empire. Without further evidence, the PM could not be convinced that he should count upon an increase in Japanese strengths.142 Even in October, when the JIC indicated that the Japanese had reinforced Sumatra, and the COS urged that Culverin be abandoned, Churchill insisted that measures be taken to develop the largest possible amphibious force in the Indian Ocean, so that if enemy strengths were weak enough when the operations were scheduled, British forces at least had the option of going ahead.143 Discrepancies of this nature not only illustrate the deadlocks that frequently arose between the PM, who was willing to accept the risks of attacking an enemy of unknown strength, and his Chiefs of Staff, who were prone to urging caution.144 They also demonstrate how the COS provided an effective check against the implementation of strategies that entailed the possibility of further setbacks. By paying due attention to intelligence on 100

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Japanese capabilities, Britain’s defence planners prevented Churchill from pursuing unsound operations.145 The COS’s proposals for the Pacific strategy were also open to criticism due to doubts whether British forces were able to cope with enemy opposition. Here, the absence of prior experience in conducting large-scale operations in the Far East gave rise to uncertainties. For Britain, the war against Japan was the first campaign where its forces had to engage a well-entrenched opponent, at the end of a line of communications stretching thousands of miles. As Marder has pointed out, ‘in Alanbrooke’s all too prescient phrase, the war that Britain was fighting after 1943 was “the biggest imperial war we are ever likely to be engaged in”, and experience offered little guidance . . .’.146 The lack of precedents for gauging the logistical requirements for operations in the Pacific was a distinct impediment to the COS’s efforts to sell their strategy. To start with, operations in the Pacific were costly, for they required the provision of substantial shipping resources and the expansion of storage and loading facilities in Australia. Throughout the conflict, Australia had suffered acute labour and resource shortages because a large portion of its manpower and capital had been deployed overseas. At a meeting in February 1944, the COS were unable to secure Churchill’s approval for the Pacific strategy because information on the capacity of base facilities in Australia had yet to be provided.147 As late as July, the COS did not have enough evidence to convince Churchill that Australia could develop the necessary bases for the ‘Middle Strategy’, which envisioned an advance towards the Philippines via Borneo.148 The lack of prior operational experience in the Far Eastern theatres often resulted in an incomplete picture of British logistical requirements, which in turn created further difficulties in proving that the proposed plans were feasible. Uncertainties over the capabilities of British forces acted as a distinct barrier to strategic planning until late 1944. However, towards the closing stages of the conflict, the probability that continued indecision could enable Japan to consolidate its forces and thereby place additional obstacles gave rise to the conclusion that positive action was imperative. The notion that an early engagement with the Japanese was necessary was the key impetus for a coherent war plan. The decision to concentrate efforts on an overland advance through Burma (Capital) provided a key example of this development. The turn of the tide following the Japanese reverses at Imphal and Kohima meant that British forces faced more favourable prospects of ousting the enemy from Burma. However, the IJA continued to possess sufficient reserves to consolidate its defences and thereby inflict setbacks on the XIV Army. Offensive action was necessary if Britain wished to defeat its opponent without incurring costs that could otherwise be avoided. The COS’s decision to go ahead with the advance against the central plains of Burma was made on the grounds that the operations were necessary, even 101

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if they entailed drawn-out commitments in conditions where the enemy was able to fight a war of attrition. Alanbrooke recalled that the decision was difficult and not ideal.149 The aide-memoire of 7 August 1944, and the minutes of the meeting held the following day, reflected the view that British forces could not remain quiescent, and that the momentum of the advance had to be maintained.150 The risks involved in remaining on the defensive were considered to outweigh the disadvantages of Capital. Similarly, the COS and Churchill agreed to Mountbatten’s recommendation for an amphibious advance down the Arakan coast (Romulus) as a complement to Capital because they realized that subsidiary operations were necessary to maintain pressure on the Japanese.151 Faced by the need to ensure that the Japanese were forced into retreat, and to conclude commitments in the theatre at the earliest opportunity, Britain’s defence planners placed their apprehensions over the costs of engaging Japanese forces aside. Under the circumstances, a concerted effort to uphold the momentum of the Allied advance offered the only practical means to neutralize the IJA. The decision to launch the landings against Malaya (Zipper) in summer 1945 revealed similar signs that the influence of concerns over enemy capabilities was waning in relation to the need for decisive action. By June 1945, the British faced a number of unforeseen obstacles. The combined effect of the War Office’s plan for early repatriation of British servicemen who had served more than three years and four months in the Far East (Python), along with the arrival of the Japanese 37th division in Malaya, was to reduce the Allied superiority to 8:5.152 The scenario entailed stiffer initial opposition to the landing than anticipated, and additional complications for British efforts to recapture Singapore.153 Mountbatten’s force commanders, who had planned on a speedy advance through Malaya, saw their strategy thrown off balance.154 Intelligence on beach defences also suggested that the threat of attacks from suicide boats had increased.155 Despite the mounting evidence of the obstacles, Mountbatten insisted that Zipper proceed as scheduled, since a delay could only give the Japanese an opportunity to bolster their defences, and further complicate British operations.156 Fortunately, British plans were never put to test. Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, days before Zipper was scheduled, thereby enabling the operation to take place without opposition.

Intelligence on Japan’s defences in the Home Islands British plans for its contribution to the Allied invasion of Japan’s home islands provided a key example of how strategic and political factors ensured that intelligence on enemy opposition was only one of a number of influences on the decision-making process. The available evidence on Japan’s defence plans for its main islands did not warrant optimism. The IJA possessed ample divisions to forestall an invasion. In addition, although the Japanese 102

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populace started to show indications of war-weariness, public discontent had a long way to go before it could affect the nation’s war effort. On the contrary, large sections of the population stood poised to join forces with the armed services in an all-out effort to repel the Allied invasion. Finally, while the Allied blockade and strategic bombing campaign had curtailed industrial production and brought the war economy to a virtual standstill, the armed forces were still able to draw upon a considerable stockpile of weapons and munitions. The intelligence pointing to the difficulties confronted Britain’s defence planners with difficult decisions. The initial reaction was to shelve plans for an invasion, and explore alternative ways to secure Japan’s surrender. However, in the end, the strategic necessity of concluding the Pacific War at the earliest opportunity, along with political considerations arising from the need to maintain the Allied coalition, compelled Britain to keep its policy in line with its US ally, and pursue a strategy of invading at the earliest opportunity. In planning the invasion of the home islands, the Allies had to prepare for an unprecedented level of resistance. The length and course of the campaign also could not be predicted. In August 1944, the JPS concluded, ‘the difficulties of transferring large forces from the European theatre to the Far East will militate against the rapid development of our final offensive’.157 Japan’s defeat was not anticipated until summer 1946, and if the Allied preparations faced delays, the date was likely to be pushed back. In August 1944, the JIC highlighted the key problems likely to be faced in an invasion of the southern island of Kyushu.158 The Allies had selected the island as the point of the initial landing because it provided a base for launching an intensified bombing and blockading campaign on the main island of Honshu, in preparation for a penultimate attack on Japan’s industrial heartland in the Tokyo region. In addition to a regular army of 80,000, the Allies also had to contend with opposition from the populace, which numbered approximately 9,000,000. The invading forces were bound to face a formidable security problem in addition to the task of defending their conquered positions. By 1944, an estimated 500,000 emergency troops could be drawn from either the reserves or various youth associations. Subsequent assessments clearly highlighted how the civilian populace was most likely to support their nation’s war effort, and this factor was taken into account when assessing Japan’s capacity to resist. For the duration of the Pacific War, the Japanese home front did not reveal signs of a deterioration that could lead to popular uprisings against the government, and a subsequent collapse in its war-making capabilities. Postwar studies have revealed that the populace was not entirely impervious to hardships.159 Nor did the public maintain its unquestioned belief that Japan could defeat the Allies, as revealed by the US Strategic Bombing Survey’s finding that by 1945, 68 per cent thought Japan had lost.160 103

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In contrast to its Axis partners, however, Japan managed to avoid an attempted overthrow of its regime, either by the populace or elements within the armed forced and government. A number of factors helped the militarist regime achieve this level of security. The first of these was the tradition of believing that Japan could not be invaded, and that divine intervention would guarantee an ultimate victory. The popular belief helped to maintain public confidence in spite of Japan’s declining fortunes.161 The second reason was the success with which the government and the military had coerced the populace into supporting the war effort. The Japanese people were receptive to orders from higher authority, and this rendered them particularly susceptible to indoctrination.162 The situation was further helped by the wholesale efforts the military police undertook to suppress dissent by arresting and interning anyone expressing antiwar sentiments.163 Third, and most importantly, the government manipulated the press and media, and were in a position to dictate what the Japanese people learned about the war.164 The government was able to prevent public anxiety arising from news of reverses on the battlefront. Under the circumstances, civilian discontent was unlikely to undermine Japan’s war effort. By 1945, the establishment of Allied bases within striking distance of the home islands brought home the possibility of an invasion. Nevertheless, the majority of the populace remained willing to support the military’s efforts to defend Japan. In January, government broadcasts announced a reorganization of army districts that was aimed at ensuring the coordination of national defence and enabling commanders of each district to mobilize their populace more easily.165 At Saipan and Okinawa, the Japanese demonstrated their ability to draw upon the populace, leading the War Office to warn, ‘one should not belittle their capacity to organize civilians in Japan itself’.166 Indications of a deterioration in civilian morale were treated with reserve. Efforts to undermine popular support for the war effort could be undertaken to soften Japan’s capacity to resist, but was unlikely to bring about a collapse. Assessments concerning air raids against Japan’s population centres reflected a clear understanding of this dilemma. When the Allies commenced their around the clock air raids on the Japanese homeland in 1945, there was little to suggest civilian morale was on the verge of collapsing. Accounts of the firebombing raid on Tokyo in March, which killed over 100,000 people, simply revealed that the damage had led many public services to shut down, thereby causing a substantial dislocation in civilian life. Press sources showed that order had been maintained, and that the evacuation of civilians to rural areas had proceeded smoothly.167 Mass air raids were therefore unlikely to have a substantial effect on Japan’s willingness or capacity to resist. It is worth noting that in assessing Allied grand strategy in July 1945, the JPS did not consider terror bombing the civilian population into submission.168 Assessments of Japanese resistance in the home islands also had to take into account its economic situation. While the Japanese economy grew more 104

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precarious as the war progressed and the deterioration placed limits on the armed forces’ operational capabilities, the decline had a considerable way to go before destroying Japan’s ability to resist. The JIC concluded that the Japanese government was unlikely to surrender unless the industries in Honshu and Hokkaido had been completely destroyed and even then, continued resistance was probable. Economic difficulties thus could not bring about a collapse in Japan’s war effort, as long as the IJA and IJN possessed active forces. The fundamental cause of Japan’s demise was its inability to match the Allies’ production of armaments.169 The US submarine attacks on Japan’s merchant fleet denied its industries of vital raw materials, to the point where production had ground to a halt by summer 1945.170 The most crippling blow was the sinking of Japan’s tanker fleet, which by war’s end strangulated the flow of oil supplies.171 Remarkably, in spite of the damage, and the difficulties which Japan faced in obtaining raw materials, its war economy remained functional until 1945, at which point the Allied bombing campaign decimated a large portion of its industrial plant. This was mainly because well into 1944, the merchant marine was able to maintain a minimum flow of imports, and the industries were able to draw upon an albeit dwindling reserve of resources. Developments within Japan’s aircraft industry demonstrated how raw material shortages did not necessarily entail a decline in war production. In fact, during 1943–1944, at a time when the merchant fleet was struggling to supply Japan’s industries, Japan was able to achieve a dramatic rise in output.172 The government took control over the armaments manufacturers and conducted a wholesale effort to divert resources from the civilian sector. The main beneficiary was the aircraft industry, whose production peaked during 1944. Because Japan’s war economy was able to maintain output in spite of numerous difficulties, the total destruction of the enemy’s productive capacity was a laborious process. The Allied track record in economic warfare also lacked success. The failure to destroy Germany’s war effort through attacks on its infrastructure created a certain disillusionment even before attacks on Japan had commenced.173 Such perceptions suggest that the Allies were not fully aware of the extent to which Japan’s sea lanes were significantly more vulnerable than the land communications Germany was able to depend on. However, the available intelligence correctly revealed that a total severance of its supply lines and the destruction of its productive capacity was bound to involve a substantial expenditure of time and effort. As late as autumn 1944, when merchant shipping losses had visibly restricted the flow of resources, the MEW concluded that Japan had probably increased its stores of finished munitions and raw materials.174 The war industry, within the limitations of its size, was considered buoyant. Most importantly, the destruction of Japan’s industrial base could not disable its armies from resisting an Allied invasion. Resource shortages did not prevent the Japanese high command from implementing its plan to 105

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prepare for the last-ditch defence of the home islands in summer 1945.175 While strategies of blockade and bombing inflicted significant attrition, they had not destroyed the enemy’s supplies of ammunition and equipment. As late as July 1945, the JIC warned that Japan continued to possess ample reserves in the home islands, and the Allied bombing offensive and blockade could ‘restrict but not eliminate [the] continuing accretion of strength’.176 Japan’s defensive capabilities could be diminished through a sustained and intensified campaign, and only then, if food stores, ammunition and equipment dumps were destroyed more quickly than they could be produced. The JPS concluded that a strategy of blockade and bombing would only prolong the conflict.177 Nor did strategies short of a full-scale assault guarantee a Japanese surrender. At the COS meeting in July 1945, Portal suggested that invasion be preceded by a period of blockade and aerial bombardment. Transport and industry could be disrupted, rendering an invasion less costly.178 Alanbrooke countered Portal’s suggestion by arguing that if invasion was deferred, the Japanese would be offered more time to train their defending forces, which was most likely to create further obstacles for the Allies. Estimates of the effort required to defeat Japan also had to take into account a number of considerations related to Allied grand strategy. The most important of these stemmed from the agreement reached by the United States and Britain at Casablanca in January 1943, demanding Japan’s unconditional surrender and the total destruction of its war-making capabilities. A modification of demands and the inclusion of a clause guaranteeing the Emperor’s integrity offered limited hopes of inducing the militarists to accept surrender. However, as the JPS conceded, modification was ‘a matter for decision by governments, and politically it was most desirable that any initiative should be taken by the Americans’.179 Churchill’s decision to leave the drafting of the Potsdam ultimatum to President Truman’s discretion also reflected a realization that any revision of the terms hinged on American approval.180 The prospects of coercing Japan to accept an unconditional surrender remained grim until the final days of the Pacific War. In May 1945, Hillgarth reported to Churchill that the majority view within the US Pacific Fleet was that an acceptance of Allied demands was imminent. However, the minute confessed that no evidence existed to support such views, and to anticipate Tokyo surrendering was ‘wishful thinking’.181 The available evidence suggests that Hillgarth’s contention was correct and remained so until the very end. The historiography on Japan’s policies during the final stages of the conflict reveals a growing war-weariness. Civilian and military leaders began to openly express a desire to seek an early termination of hostilities, and searched for opportunities to secure a negoti-ated settlement through its ‘peace feelers’ in neutral countries. However, prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs in August 1945, 106

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surrender remained unthinkable without a last-ditch battle against an Allied invasion.182 Under the circumstances, intelligence on Japanese policy was by definition unlikely to show signs of a willingness to accept Allied terms. On the contrary, numerous indications pointed to a determination to fight to the end. During late spring and early summer 1945, the US War Department’s intelligence service intercepted a stream of signals indicating that the IJA was reinforcing Kyushu with half a dozen divisions, most of which were being transferred from the Asiatic mainland as well as other parts of Japan.183 According to the US joint intelligence staffs, the island’s garrison was likely to number over half a million when the scheduled invasion took place in November. Evidence of defeatism was not accompanied by indications that Japan’s government and High Command had lost their will to continue resisting. Diplomatic signals intelligence showed in detail how the Gaimusho was instructing its embassy in Moscow to enlist Soviet aid in securing a negotiated surrender, by all possible means.184 The developments showed that Japan was particularly desperate, especially since Soviet intervention was being courted at a time when Moscow had announced its decision not to renew the Neutrality Pact. Again, the intelligence did not in any way hint an imminent surrender. In April 1945, the Director of Intelligence at SEAC contended that the USSR’s abrogation of the neutrality pact may well lead the cabinet of PM Koiso to fear Communist expansion in the Far East, and thereby compel efforts to seek an accommodation with the Western Powers. Nevertheless, evidence for such claims was ‘almost entirely lacking’.185 Intelligence assessments did not refer to specific evidence, thereby precluding conclusive remarks on how the material influenced views among the JIC and Britain’s defence planners. However, the documentation suggests that the overall product was a belief that a Japanese acceptance of unconditional surrender was virtually impossible without an invasion. As late as June 1945, the JIC concluded: the Japanese acceptance of unconditional surrender is unlikely to happen under a constituted authority, since the term probably implies to the Japanese mind the overthrow of the Emperor and the position of the imperial house, the extinction of Japanese traditions and ways of life and the abolition of the constitution.186 The militarist-led government considered Allied terms to entail the extinction of Japan’s national sovereignty, and the prospects of securing an unconditional surrender under such circumstances were negligible. The numerous indications that Japan’s armed forces possessed both the capabilities and intentions to provide formidable levels of opposition in the 107

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home islands led Britain’s defence planners to initially suggest strategies that could end hostilities at the earliest opportunity. The British also favoured plans that did not entail high casualties and an excessive commitment of resources. At Quadrant, the COS agreed in principle with their US counterparts that the redistribution of forces to the Far East should begin within four to six months before Germany’s defeat was anticipated.187 This move was essential if the Allies wished to avoid unnecessary delays. However, the COS did not accept the proposal to plan the defeat of Japan twelve months following Germany’s collapse, for this required the operation to be executed without any preliminary bombing. At the second Quebec Conference (Octagon) in September 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) recommended a plan to exploit Allied naval and air superiority, and avoid costly land campaigns if possible. Because the northern island of Hokkaido was lightly defended in comparison to Kyushu and Honshu, the JPS concluded that an initial landing in the north provided the most effective solution, and recommended that the COS propose this to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.188 Churchill’s reaction to the news of the successful testing of the atomic bomb, received during the July 1945 Allied conference at Potsdam (Terminal), illustrated how strategies aside from invasion were welcome as a way to achieve Allied objectives economically. Documentary evidence on the events at Terminal which relate to the decision to employ the atomic bomb is unavailable. London was informed in April that the US authorities intended to resort to the weapon ‘some time in August’.189 The US requested Britain’s agreement in June, and Churchill granted his approval with ‘never a moment’s hesitation’. The official history on grand strategy argues that Churchill conceded that operations in the Pacific were a US-led venture for which Britain’s role was to be purely consultative.190 The fact remains that neither Churchill, nor Atlee, who succeeded as PM after the July 1945 general elections, held reservations, on the grounds that the bomb held promising prospects of breaking the Japanese government’s will to resist surrender, without having to undertake a costly assault on the home islands.191 Nevertheless, the effects of the atomic bomb could not be foretold, and until Japan surrendered, the Allies had to base their war plans on the premise that an invasion was necessary. The strategic necessity of destroying Japan’s capacity to resist at the earliest opportunity compelled British planning staffs to comply with the plan proposed by the United States, which called for an occupation of the home islands at the earliest opportunity. In addition, Britain had to bear in mind the need to retain US support for the postwar re-establishment of its empire in Southeast Asia. The British offer to contribute a fleet to support US operations in the Pacific clearly illustrates this aspect. By late 1944, Churchill started to agree with the COS view that Britain needed to actively cooperate with the main thrust of the US war effort in order to maintain Allied goodwill. At Octagon, Churchill suggested to Roosevelt that the Royal Navy join the US Pacific Fleet in its 108

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operations against Japanese bastions in the western Pacific. American political leaders strongly believed that in order to remain an ally, British forces needed to be fully included in the war against Japan.192 If, on the other hand, Britain’s campaigns were confined to its imperial possessions, the American public was likely to accuse the British of pursuing their selfish interests, and the trans-Atlantic alliance could face dangers of collapsing. The American acceptance of the offer committed Britain to a Pacific naval strategy.193 Thereafter, the COS’s foremost concern was to secure the defeat of Japan at the earliest opportunity.194 Admiral Bruce Fraser, the C-in-C British Pacific Fleet, decided to operate his vessels alongside the US fleet’s naval offensive in the central Pacific, on the basis that the move provided the best way to bring the maximum force against Japan. Equally crucial was to ensure that British forces could be acknowledged for playing their role in the Allied war effort.195 The British Pacific Fleet was to participate in the operations against the home islands, and avoid sideshows in the Southwest Pacific that could be detrimental to Britain’s prestige.196 The decision to contribute a British ground force for the home islands was also driven by political considerations, with intelligence on Japanese opposition playing a secondary role. During the Allied summit at Yalta in February 1945, Churchill and his advisors were excluded from the negotiations concerning the USSR’s entry into the Pacific War. The British felt they were being left out of major decisions in the Far East, and were determined not only to participate in the invasion, but also to have some share in its planning.197 On 4 July, Churchill and the COS endorsed a plan where British Commonwealth land forces were to fight under MacArthur’s command, and the CCS accepted the proposal at Potsdam on 17 July. Likewise, the decision to contribute ground forces for the final assault on the Tokyo region (Coronet), despite the stiff resistance likely to be encountered, was based on the understanding that Britain could not risk criticisms from the United States and the Dominions for abandoning its commitments in the Pacific War.198 Because an invasion of Japan was a military as well as a political necessity, the desire to avoid moves that exposed British forces to heavy resistance had to be partially compromised. Under the circumstances, the fulfilment of longer-term goals was an equally pressing issue.

Conclusion Between the first Arakan offensive in winter 1942–1943 and Japan’s surrender in August 1945, intelligence on Japanese strategy shaped British war plans, in two noticeable ways. First, the available material did not permit forecasts of Japan’s long-term strategy and the level of resistance likely to be encountered. British forces needed to be prepared for a wide variety of scenarios. Second, the available intelligence revealed that Japan’s armed forces were 109

Map 3.3 Allied plans for the invasion of Japan (courtesy of the Department of History, United States Military Academy).

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able to put up a level of resistance which entailed incalculable delay and attrition for the Allies. To complicate matters, the balance between the opposing forces in the Southeast Asia theatre revealed that Britain needed to substantially improve its strategic capabilities before it could break the stalemate. Even after the tide had turned against the enemy following its defeats at Imphal and Kohima in spring 1944, operations were planned with a view to maintaining the momentum of the Allied advance so as to deny Japanese forces any opportunities to consolidate. Intelligence which pointed to the resilience of Japan’s defensive position was a vital asset. British field commanders used the material to formulate a realistic assessment of the potential dangers, and heeded the suggestions that operations be conducted with adequate strengths and logistics. Without concrete evidence that Japanese forces could no longer provide substantial opposition, a premature dismissal of the dangers was unlikely. At the apex of Britain’s defence establishment, one can argue that intelligence on Japanese strategy was a distinct hindrance for Churchill and his chiefs of staff. Because British forces were inadequate for large-scale offensives during much of 1942–1944, ambitious strategies were often postponed or abandoned. The decision in spring 1943 to shelve plans for Anakim provided a key example of this aspect. Strategies that were unlikely to accomplish Britain’s wartime objectives were also turned down. Britain’s allies, notably the United States, often proposed operations which Churchill and the COS did not favour, on the grounds that they were more likely to encounter heavy enemy resistance while at the same time not inflicting significant damage on Japan’s war effort, hence the insistence that efforts to improve the capacity of the Burma Road be minimized. The debate between Churchill and the COS over the feasibility of their respective Malaya– Sumatra and Pacific strategies provided another key example of how the dangers posed by Japan’s defensive capabilities provided a compelling reason to refrain from insensible moves. At the same time, to argue that intelligence was the primary obstacle to strategic planning is far from realistic. The official history on British grand strategy has aptly described the situation: The reasons for the apparent contrast in the progress achieved in the war against Germany by 1944 with that achieved in the war against Japan are not hard to find. [In addition to the fact that the two wars had reached different stages at the beginning of the year, moreover], the war against Japan was fought under peculiar difficulties. Three factors must constantly be related to: 1) the geography of the area and its effect on the area in which British forces operated, 2) the state of their supplies, and 3) the divergent interests of the Allies.199

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Far from painting an unduly grim picture, intelligence accurately illustrated Britain’s need to develop the strengths and capabilities to undertake major operations against its Japanese opponent. A more realistic argument is that so long as British forces were not sufficient to wrest the initiative, defence planners could not devise a coherent strategy. Because the ultimate objective of Churchill and his military advisors was to defeat Japan and to regain Britain’s empire in the Far East without incurring excessive losses, intelligence pointing to the enemy’s resilience was most likely to be taken as a warning to pursue a guarded course of action. The adherence to a policy of inaction meant planning did not achieve progress until the closing stages of the conflict, when military and political considerations required Britain to develop a coordinated strategy. Even then, operations were executed on the grounds that early action was necessary to defeat Japan’s armed forces, and that a passive stand was more detrimental. Britain’s overall objective, namely, to secure Japan’s surrender and regaining its colonies in the Far East, thus remained essentially consistent. Nor did the British significantly compromise their objective of defeating Japan’s forces without incurring excessive costs. In the final analysis, while assessments of the challenges posed by Japan’s defensive capabilities urged Britain’s defence planners to move cautiously, they paid due heed to the fact that the failure to take positive action could only negate the prospects of accomplishing their war aims. The recognition of the strategic and political necessity of securing Britain’s objectives at an acceptable cost acted as a powerful impetus for formulating a strategy that was both effective and feasible.

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4 MATERIAL AND TECHNOLOGY VERSUS METHODS OF USE Intelligence on the tactical and technical capabilities of Japan’s armed forces

British efforts to understand the tactical and technological capabilities of Japan’s armed forces do not allow easy generalizations. Overall conclusions are likely to reflect the challenges the Allies faced in estimating an opponent whose forces operated over a theatre stretching thousands of miles from Burma to the Southwest Pacific. In addition, each branch of Japan’s services posed a distinct threat, thereby further hindering an empirical evaluation. One can, nevertheless, detect three features which interacted to shape British assessments of the Japanese at the battlefield level, the first of which was the ethos which shaped Britain’s war effort in the Far East. In the aftermath of the debacles suffered during the early phases of the Pacific War, the British made a concerted effort to avoid further setbacks. The defence establishment sought to develop the methods necessary to achieve its ultimate objective of ousting the Japanese from their conquests, while at the same time avoiding an excessive expenditure of manpower and resources. The development of efficient measures, in turn, hinged on a detailed understanding of how Japan’s armed forces operated. Intelligence staffs were tasked to conduct a meticulous analysis of Japanese tactical performance and weapons technology, and draw an objective picture of their capabilities. At the same time, the British faced difficulties in discrediting their enemy’s aptitude because of a second factor, namely, the ambiguous nature of the available evidence. Raw intelligence, in the form of captured documents, POW interrogations and combat action reports of Allied operations in the Pacific theatres provided useful details concerning Japan’s forces. However, the material gave sketchy indications of how the Japanese would fare against their British opponents. Accordingly, the ability to provide realistic assessments on any branch of Japan’s armed services was proportional to the level of engagements the British had with them. Intelligence staffs hesitated to reach firm conclusions unless firsthand encounters provided the requisite information. 113

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In certain types of warfare, particularly defensive operations against amphibious attacks and to a lesser extent aerial combat, Japanese methods frequently did not follow set patterns, owing to the enemy’s albeit limited propensity to improvise to meet changing circumstances. Definite rules could not be laid out, and the possibility of improvements could not be dismissed. Thirdly, Japan’s ground, naval and air forces continued to demonstrate their tactical proficiency. The IJA proved capable of circumventing its disadvantages of material and technological inferiority, and carrying out manoeuvres that imposed significant delay and attrition on the Allies. In addition, Japan’s navy continued to possess a high level of technological capability. For this reason, intelligence pointing to the numerical inferiority and material weaknesses of Japan’s forces was not treated as a sufficient reason to downplay the challenges they could put up. Enemy tactics and technology were not discredited unless British forces proved their own ability to engage the Japanese. The situation had several implications for operational planning and tactical doctrine. British commanders were reluctant to adopt set methods until they had sufficient combat experience against the Japanese. The unpredictability of enemy methods also required the British to plan their operations so that their forces could fight effectively in a variety of circumstances. This rule applied especially in the case of amphibious operations. Finally, and most importantly, the Allies could not rely upon sheer numerical superiority. In order to defeat the IJA, the British considered it essential to devise a doctrine that relied less upon overwhelming firepower, and more on tactical manoeuvring. Against the IJN and Japan’s air services, the development of adequate equipment and methods of use was equally vital as numerical strength. The production of intelligence assessments on Japanese tactics and technology was influenced by additional factors worth noting. The first of these was the structure of the intelligence apparatus. By mid 1943, the focal point for handling intelligence on Japanese tactical matters shifted away from Whitehall, and separate directorates were established in Southeast Asia for each armed service. However, a noticeable difference in efficiency existed between army, naval and air intelligence (see Figures I.2 and I.3). The Eastern Fleet relied upon the Chief of Operational Intelligence Services (COIS), whose resources were not sufficient for a detailed study of the IJN. Naval intelligence therefore remained largely under the control of the Admiralty. The organizations responsible for the IJA were the intelligence directorate at GHQ India (and after its establishment in August 1943, SEAC). In addition, the Directorate of Combined Operations (DCO), India Command, investigated the IJA’s defences against amphibious attacks. Unlike its navy counterparts, army intelligence had the resources and manpower not only to handle the full array of information emanating from the Southeast Asia; they also dealt with considerable material obtained from the Allied forces operating in the Pacific, without depending on much assistance from Whitehall. Air 114

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intelligence, handled by Air Headquarters India, followed by ACSEA, achieved a level of efficiency not far behind army intelligence. The gap was mainly due to the differing levels of activity the three services engaged in. Throughout 1943, the British–Indian army and RAF drew up concrete plans for large-scale counteroffensives in Southeast Asia and after January 1944, both services were regularly confronting the Japanese. Thus, not only were they in a position to obtain a large amount of data on their counterparts; army and air intelligence needed an effective apparatus to produce reliable products for its consumers in the field. By contrast, the Eastern Fleet adhered to a policy of inaction for a large part of the conflict, mainly because it did not have enough vessels to conduct significant operations until late 1944. Naval intelligence therefore did not have the necessary impetus for development. The final feature which deserves mention is racial imaging, and its role in shaping British assessments of Japanese military performance. The efficiency demonstrated by Japan’s armed forces during the opening phases of the Pacific War erased virtually all traces of scorn the British had shown before the conflict. The prevailing view throughout the defence establishment was that contempt needed to be placed aside in order to evaluate the enemy accurately. In particular, opinions of the IJN and air services showed veneration for their tactical skill and technological prowess. Even during the later years of the conflict, when Allied warships and aircraft had become noticeably superior to their Japanese counterparts, and the latter demonstrated a marked inability to introduce significant improvements, the British refrained from attributing their opponent’s weaknesses to any cultural traits. Japanese shortcomings were considered to be mainly due to resource shortages, and the enemy continued to receive praise for making good use of what it had. British opinions of the IJA were slightly more complex, and demonstrated a more noticeable level of animosity. This was mainly due to the difficulties British troops faced in fighting the Japanese, and field commanders often used degrading terms to describe their enemy, such as ‘fanatics’, ‘savages’ and ‘man-sized soldier ants’. At the same time, the British praised the IJA’s tactical skills, and considered the Japanese a well-trained adversary.1 Attitudes were not solely shaped by hatred. On the contrary, by the closing stages of the war, the British adopted a professional outlook. The reasons have been summarized by General Slim: We began by despising our Japanese enemy; the pendulum then swung wildly to the other extreme. We built up our enemy into something terrifying, as soldiers always will to excuse their defeats, and frightened ourselves with the bogy of the superman of the jungle. Both attitudes were calamitous to us. It was not until we taught ourselves to take a balanced view of our enemy as a formidable fighting man, who nevertheless had certain weaknesses . . . that we won.2 115

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The rank and file of the XIV Army understood that success against the IJA depended upon an objective understanding of its methods, and racism was kept in check. Similar signs of practicality can be detected in the development of tactical doctrine. Methods for defeating the IJA were devised with a view to achieving the aim of destroying its positions and paving the way for Allied advances. Because Japanese troops insisted on fighting to the last man and round, success could be attained only by killing off the enemy in its entirety. Tactics aimed to exterminate Japanese armies were developed more out of military necessity than racial hatred.

The IJA’s ground warfare capabilities The main challenge posed by the IJA was its capacity to conduct protracted wars of attrition, in spite of its tactical and technological shortcomings. Hindsight has allowed historians to argue objectively that the Japanese army’s ‘Achilles heel’ was its over-reliance on infantry units, which resulted in a failure to match Western standards in the development of modern weapons and training in their use.3 While the practice of placing infantrymen at the centre of battlefield operations was logical in light of Japan’s narrow industrial base and subsequent difficulties in producing mass quantities of heavy equipment, the weakness was also due to perceptual faults. Field commanders failed to see that their methods could not always defeat betterequipped opponents.4 The Japanese army establishment was also imbued with an institutionalized preconception that the fighting spirit of its troops guaranteed victory. British and American soldiers, by contrast, were considered lacking in tenacity and unable to withstand the strains of prolonged combat. Social mores also discouraged commanders from suggesting that their troops suffered deficiencies.5 The IJA was therefore denied the impetus for improvement. Nevertheless, as far as British intelligence was concerned, the setbacks at the opening stages of the conflict, followed by the failure of the first Arakan campaign during winter 1942–1943, were continued reminders of the IJA’s tactical skills. Infantry units proved highly proficient in both offensive and defensive operations. Equally alarming was the Japanese soldier’s ability to use the vegetation and topographic features prevailing in the jungles of the Asia–Pacific theatres in a manner that hindered Allied operations. To counter Japanese tactics, field commanders in the XIV Army developed a combined arms doctrine, which relied less upon overwhelming firepower, and called for the proper deployment of infantry units, supporting arms and air support. Such measures constituted the only way to conduct advances against the Japanese without incurring unacceptable losses. Conventional methods that relied on firepower proved insufficient, due to the Japanese armies’ skill at constructing defences that could withstand heavy bombardment. The IJA’s failed offensive against the Arakan region in February 1944, 116

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followed by its reverses at Imphal and Kohima in June, did not discredit its fighting power. Apprehensions were alleviated insofar as the XIV Army had proven competent enough to surmount the challenges it faced. By early 1944, the machinery for processing intelligence on Japanese army tactics evolved into a centralized structure, with a clear division of labour. However, the measures to improve the quality of intelligence did not solve the problem entirely. The production of accurate assessments was only one of the prerequisites for effectively fighting the IJA. An equally important step was to gain the necessary combat experience, which the British–Indian army lacked. Information on the IJA’s tactics came in three common forms, the first two of which were captured documents along with POW interrogations. The central body responsible for interpreting these sources was the Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Centre (SEATIC). In addition, a parallel organization working under the US and Australian commands, the Allied Translation and Interrogation Section (ATIS), provided substantial material obtained through Allied operations in the Southwest Pacific. The third source was accounts of Allied operations against the IJA. Much of the intelligence arrived in the form of combat action reports written by British commanders. The organizations operating under the US War Department as well as the SWPA and Central Pacific Commands also provided valuable material. Especially during 1943 and early 1944, when British forces in the Burma– India theatre remained on the defensive, the information from the Pacific theatre proved helpful because American and Australian forces there were actively engaging the IJA. The focal point for analysis and dissemination was the intelligence directorate at GHQ India Command. When SEAC was established in November 1943, ALFSEA and GHQ India took joint control over tactical and technical matters on the IJA. Within Whitehall, the War Office’s directorate of military intelligence, in particular MI2, continued to handle Japanese army matters. While GHQ India and SEAC concentrated on issues specifically concerning the Southeast Asia theatres, the War Office handled intelligence from all areas where the Japanese were operating. The British were also able to formulate a more accurate image by employing a number of experts on Japanese military practices. A centre for analysing Japanese army tactics headed by Colonel G.T. Wards, the former Assistant Military Attaché in Tokyo, was set up in India and staffed by British officers who had served attachments and exchanges with Japanese army units during the interwar period. The centre provided GHQ India and SEAC valuable insights regarding the significance of the information obtained through all sources, and played a pivotal role in the process. Effective dissemination also facilitated the creation of a more precise image of the IJA. The War Office, as well as India Command and SEAC, regularly issued assessments based on Allied encounters in the Pacific and Southeast 117

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Asia. The two main channels were periodical intelligence summaries and the Handbook of the Japanese Army. The establishment of a more effective apparatus did not alleviate the difficulties arising from the fact that for the larger part of 1943, the British–Indian army establishment lacked experience in conducting jungle warfare operations against the IJA. Field commanders therefore did not have a realistic picture of the challenges facing them.6 While measures to enhance the training standards of British forces provided hopes that future operations would be more successful, the effect of the improvements on the outcome remained ambiguous. As Auchinleck stated to Alanbrooke in September 1943, in spite of the earnest measures taken to acclimatize British–Indian troops for warfare against the Japanese, ‘the only real test [of efficiency] is combat experience’.7 The situation was further complicated because sources aside from firsthand experience could only describe the elements British forces were likely to face. The value of POWs was questionable. On one hand, captured Japanese soldiers showed an unusual willingness to cooperate with their Allied interrogators. They drew accurate maps of their positions, and discussed the IJA’s tactics in detail. The phenomenon stemmed from the Japanese soldiers’ indoctrinated belief that when taken prisoner, they lost all ties with their country. In addition, because military traditions forbade surrender, the high command refused to even acknowledge the possibility of Japanese troops being captured. As a result, field service regulations did not contain any guidelines which instructed POWs not to divulge military secrets, at least until the very late stages of the conflict. For these reasons, Japanese prisoners demonstrated an earnest desire to win the favour of their Allied vanquishers.8 At the same time, POWs had to be treated with scepticism, because the soldiers who fell into Allied captivity usually represented the lower ranks, and lacked a grasp of the IJA’s doctrine. In January 1945, SEATIC prefaced its interrogation bulletin, ‘[the enclosed information] should be treated with reserve until confirmed from other sources’.9 Captured documents were more reliable, because they often explained the mechanics and principles of the IJA’s tactics in accurate detail. Japanese field manuals were praised for providing a ‘blueprint’ of the enemy’s doctrine, and the information was described as being ‘of more than immediate operational significance’.10 The IJA’s traditions, coupled with its lax security arrangements, ensured that the Allies could obtain ample information from captured papers. The rank and file of the IJA were highly dependent on the written word, and field manuals tended to explain every aspect of Japanese operations in detail.11 The situation was further helped by the army command’s faith that the Japanese language was too complex to allow translation. When coupled with the institutionalized myth that the IJA was invincible, a situation arose where the most basic precautions were overlooked, and troops went into battle carrying sensitive material. 118

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At the same time, captured documents could only illustrate the various elements Allied forces were likely to encounter. The material did not provide conclusive answers to the most pertinent issue, namely, the effectiveness of Japanese tactics against those of the British. For example, in February 1943, the War Office disseminated a Japanese appreciation of British tactics, obtained from the US War Department, with the comment, ‘possibly the most striking features of the tactics recommended are the great emphasis placed on aggressiveness and deception’.12 The Japanese also appeared to hold a respect for the superior firepower which British units possessed, which in turn led them to rely upon manoeuvre and speed. The paper was disseminated as a reliable description of Japanese doctrine; however, it did not provide a clear picture of the IJA’s relative performance. Likewise, field manuals on the IJA’s defensive tactics provided only vague indications of how its methods were likely to fare. A document captured in New Guinea described the 51st Division’s plans for defending Finschhafen, and provided a telling illustration of the IJA’s doctrine.13 The paper emphasized that one of the key aims was ‘supplementing an inferiority in men by taking advantage of the terrain, the establishment of earthworks, [and] exhaustive battle preparations . . . ’. Defensive positions were to be sited on hilltops so as to restrict access, and Japanese troops were to engage their attackers in close-range battles. As far as deficiencies were concerned, a booklet captured at Huon Gulf led the War Office to comment, ‘it is remarkable that . . . little emphasis is laid on idea of defence in depth’.14 The Japanese tended to concentrate their forces on the front lines, and did not take the trouble to construct reserve positions in rear areas. Yet, the attrition to be faced by British armies, or the extent to which Japanese weaknesses were to be exploited, could not be foretold. Captured documents provided concrete information on the relation between the IJA’s doctrine and its performance only in the aftermath of operations, when the results could be compared with the written word. Operational orders obtained during spring and summer 1944 revealed how the Japanese expected to overwhelm the British and force them to withdraw from the border regions of the Arakan and Manipur by conducting a series of rapid attacks and encirclement moves.15 Observations of Japanese methods corresponded with their plans. General Mutaguchi, commander of the XV Army in Burma, paid little attention to the improvements which Slim’s armies had made in tactics and equipment, leading the intelligence directorates at GHQ India and ALFSEA to conclude, ‘the [Japanese] plan . . . held the seeds for its own destruction’.16 Observations of Allied operations in the Pacific theatres provided another key source of intelligence, the value of which was ambivalent. The US and Australian forces were gaining valuable experience overcoming the IJA’s defences and operating in the jungle conditions prevailing in the Asia–Pacific theatres. Allied armies learned, through their gruelling encounters in New 119

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Guinea and islands of the Southwest Pacific that tanks and infantry needed to operate in close conjunction.17 In addition, when poor communications restricted the use of tanks, infantry units had to neutralize Japanese positions through the skilful use of mortars, grenades and light artillery.18 Central Pacific Command and SWPA Command regularly shared combat reports with their British counterparts. At the same time, the material provided an incomplete picture because it often went little further than to illustrate the challenges confronting Allied forces. The question of how the British could overcome the IJA in Southeast Asia remained unanswered. A large part of the explanation can be found in the inadequate communication among the Allied commands. The primary purpose behind the COS’s dispatch of the Lethbridge Mission was to remedy the handicaps posed by the lack of reciprocal knowledge between the US and British forces on the threat posed by the IJA’s methods and the means for overcoming them.19 The COS’s complaint, that the Allies were not providing the British sufficient information on their encounters with the Japanese, was often grounded in fact. The separation which existed between the US and British war efforts resulted in inconsistent liaison. When forwarding the information to the British, the Australians and Americans evidently did not see the need to include all the relevant details. For example, in September 1943, the War Office disseminated summaries of Australian officers’ accounts on the New Guinea operations, which concluded that success could be achieved ‘only by determination’, and that ‘more training is required in the actual firing of infantry weapons in order to achieve [greater] accuracy . . . ’.20 However, a large section, providing an extensive account of Japanese defensive tactics in the SWPA, was excluded from the summary.21 Again in January 1944, a British observer noted that defence works in the Solomons ‘do not justify any departure from standard nomenclature’, and the fortifications were not drastically different from those used by European armies.22 British troops had evidently been misled by ‘novel terms’ such as ‘bunker’ and ‘foxhole’, into thinking that they were unique features of the Japanese only. As a result of the incomplete sharing of intelligence between the Allied commands in the Asia–Pacific theatres, the British faced difficulties in clearing away their ambiguities concerning the IJA. Another reason why intelligence from the Pacific theatres did not provide a full picture was that Allied forces faced difficulties in prescribing fixed methods, since they often had to adapt to unexpected scenarios. In early 1943, the US Military Intelligence Service provided a detailed outline of measures which had helped repel Japanese offensives at Guadalcanal.23 The recommendations were passed on as ‘merely [representing] the opinions of the officers interviewed’, not as official doctrine. The commanding general of the Buna campaign described how the enemy’s skilful use of camouflage and natural obstacles forced the attackers to conduct piecemeal attacks on indi120

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vidual bunkers.24 The circumstances were such that ‘no particular method of attack could be generally adopted and tested in battle’. In the final analysis, however, regardless of the level of inter-Allied collaboration, the British were bound to face difficulties drawing lessons, mainly because the battlefield conditions in the Pacific were markedly different from Southeast Asia. During late 1943 and early 1944, the Lethbridge Mission made an extensive tour of the SWPA, and conducted a meticulous investigation of American and Australians operations. The final report, prepared in April 1944, noted that in areas such as New Guinea and the Solomons, where Japanese defences did not permit easy reduction, the most successful method had been to encircle enemy positions and cut off their supply lines, so as to isolate the defenders and leave them to starve. However, in the Pacific, encirclement tactics had been particularly easy to employ because the Japanese were fighting at the end of long and precarious lines of communication that were constantly bombarded from the air and by sea. The defenders were hard pressed to put up effective resistance. In Burma, the Japanese were able to rely on good overland supply lines which the British had not disrupted to any large extent.25 Tactics that were successful in the Pacific were not always applicable in Southeast Asia. The most reliable source the British–Indian army used was firsthand combat experience. In light of the setbacks suffered during the first Arakan offensive, followed by the stalemate which prevailed on the Burma front until February 1944, the British tended to err their estimates of the IJA on the cautious side, and focus on their own shortcomings. The development of adequate tactics against the Japanese not only required a studious examination of enemy methods. Equally important was to establish a training programme to enable the British to optimize their combat effectiveness and make good use of the lessons they learned. Although the first Wingate expedition during spring 1943 dispelled the popular notion that British troops were not fit to operate in the jungle,26 for field commanders, the salient fact remained that the majority of troops in India were not ready to confront their opponent. To remedy this shortcoming, India Command, which was responsible for organizing, training and supplying the forces operating on the India–Burma frontier, reformed the programme at the Staff College, and lengthened the periods of training.27 A special training centre was also established at Mysore in southern India for troops headed for the front line, as a complement to the one at Slim’s headquarters. In addition, a scheme was initiated where officers were attached to Australian units in the SWPA to gain practical experience fighting under jungle conditions. In September 1943, Auchinleck urgently requested that Alanbrooke consider the transfer of formations from the Middle East, to ensure that the Indian Army was manned by competent troops.28 Efforts to bolster the British–Indian army’s efficiency also entailed measures to help troops overcome the psychological setbacks suffered as a result 121

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of defeat. Slim recalled that one of the most formidable tasks was the restoration of morale within an army which could ‘only look back on a long line of unbroken defeat’.29 The IJA had been invested ‘with a reputation for invincibility’ that was ‘far removed from reality’, and the ‘myth had to be destroyed before the offensive spirit could be fully reestablished’.30 In practical terms, troops had to be trained to conduct aggressive patrols against the Japanese and thereby overcome their fear of the enemy.31 An adequate standard of training was viewed as a crucial factor needed to overcome the challenges. Aside from a more organized method of preparing troops for combat, the development of tactics against the IJA benefited from flexibility and a large degree of individual initiative. Officers right down to the brigade level were encouraged to develop their own tactics in accordance with the situation they faced, and share their ideas with their divisional and army headquarters. By early 1944, in addition to the intelligence summaries from Whitehall and SEAC, an array of bulletins were prepared by the intelligence staffs of units at the army, corps and sometimes divisional level. Field officers had access to a wide range of information and the freedom to apply it in a manner that they saw fit. In spite of a more efficient system of training, field commanders took heed of the fact that their troops had yet to prove their effectiveness. Wavell’s note to Alanbrooke in March 1943 exemplifies the attitude prevailing among British officers: The main cause of the failure to dislodge the Japanese from the Mayu river area has been the inferiority of our tactics . . . to the really skilful and enterprising opponents that the Japanese have shown themselves to be. [We] shall find it difficult to match enemy’s extreme mobility in the jungle or the fanatical spirit in defense but . . . methods can be found for taking advantage of their weak points and defeating them later on.32 The level of apprehension the British–Indian army establishment harboured was an inverse reflection of how its own tactics and weapons had proven adequate. The evolution of perceptions regarding Japanese offensive tactics provides a key example of this dilemma. Prior to the IJA’s failed attacks on the India– Burma frontier in spring 1944, field commanders invariably emphasized the need to improve countermeasures. In November 1943, Gracey warned that unless field officers conducted thorough patrols against enemy infiltrators and constructed defences strong enough to withstand encirclement, they would be ‘letting [their] troops down dreadfully’.33 The IJA also tended to vary its tactics at times, precluding the prescription of set methods. A War Office pamphlet on Japanese night attacks issued in June 1943 summed up the situation by concluding that the suggested measures were ‘only a few samples’, and that ‘the field for new ideas and tricks to play on in this game is 122

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wide’.34 One of the key recommendations of the paper was that, ‘if a soldier has [a technique] that is practical enough to surprise the Japanese, then he should let the intelligence officer know about it’. The failure of the Japanese offensive against the Arakan during spring 1944 played a critical role in enabling British officers to write off the dangers. The operation revealed how enemy methods were prone to failure against adequately defended areas. The IJA’s infiltration tactics also proved unable to overcome properly supplied forces who were resolved to hold their ground.35 Similarly, the 20th Indian Division’s conclusion that Japanese offensive operations were ineffectual hinged on encounters at Ukhrul which revealed that ‘attacks were often very poorly organized’, and ‘appeared to rely on sheer weight of numbers’.36 Japanese troops proved unable to improvise their tactics, as was shown by the numerous occasions on which ‘the failure to take a position [seemed] to increase [their] determination’ to conduct repeated frontal assaults, which often produced nothing apart from mass casualties. Suggestions for countermeasures against Japanese offensives were also based on experiences that provided concrete evidence of which tactics held chances of succeeding. For example, in June, Phillip Christison, the GOC 15th Indian Corps, proposed to strengthen British defences against a possible Japanese offensive against the Arakan during the 1944–1945 campaigning season by occupying all the ground up to the front lines and establishing prepared positions. The recommendation was inspired by past encounters which highlighted a Japanese tendency to be ‘reckless and somewhat inexpert in the attack’, to the point where their operations had ‘invariably been costly failures’.37 Field commanders needed visible indications that the IJA’s methods were open to exploitation by British–Indian troops before becoming confident in their own abilities. The importance attached to adequate training among British–Indian armies was further illustrated by the limited value placed on material superiority and overwhelming firepower. John Ellis’ account of Allied tactics and strategy has cited British operations in Burma as yet another example of how ‘brute force’ was the decisive weapon.38 However, the ability to employ ‘brute force’ was rarely sufficient to alleviate the British–Indian army establishment’s anxiety regarding the IJA. The ‘brute force’ argument also ignores how confident assessments depended upon concrete signs that British forces were able to conduct advances while at the same time avoiding unacceptable losses. The proper application of ‘brute force’ was frequently more important than the ability to employ it. The main aspect that diminished the importance of overwhelming force was the IJA’s ability to hold its ground solely by the virtue of its tenacity. Coupled with the challenges posed by Japanese tactics was the rugged terrain in Burma, which restricted the transport and utilization of heavy weaponry. Following the Japanese army’s repulsion of the first Arakan offensive and its 123

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success in regaining the lost territory, field commanders in the India–Burma theatre insisted that measures be taken to determine how to overcome the IJA’s tactics, and the British–Indian army be brought to the necessary level of efficiency. MI2 acknowledged that the Japanese were by no means superior, because they suffered visible weaknesses such as a tendency to be ‘overconfident’, ‘careless’ and ‘easy to surprise’, and he lacked the ‘weight of metal in tanks, guns and aircraft’ to fight a full-scale mobile battle.39 However, these shortcomings could be exploited only after overcoming the IJA’s advantages, namely its skill at surviving for extended periods in the jungle and using natural obstacles to minimize the effects of heavy bombardment and Allied mobility. Added to this was the Japanese soldier’s insistence on fighting to the finish. British forces had to be acclimatized for warfare in close country, where superior firepower played a less decisive role, and infantry units were needed to outmanoeuvre Japanese defences and kill off enemy troops who stubbornly continued their resistance. A War Office commentary on a US report in April 1943 summed up the challenges. The paper emphasized how the IJA was learning a painful lesson that its troops could not succeed without supporting arms. At the same time, the War Office warned, ‘the reverse is equally true’ and the best modern equipment could not win ‘without first class infantry’.40 Allied armies needed to keep infantry tactics at the forefront of their doctrine. British assessments concerning the IJA’s heavy weapons technology provide a key example of how Allied material superiority provided limited comfort. While Japanese armour and artillery was technologically underdeveloped, their light construction and simple design permitted easy transport and assembly.41 Most importantly, the Japanese practice of employing infantry units armed with light weapons was suitable for operations in mountainous terrain. The IJA also demonstrated an ability to improvise its armaments, even though their tactical employment remained backward. The probability that Japanese commanders would realize the need to improve their own weapons and subsequently undertake an albeit gradual overhaul of their units, warned against undue optimism. Captured equipment and observations of general developments in Japanese weaponry prior to the war had revealed that the IJA had closely observed Allied and German technologies and attempted to adapt them for its own needs. The War Office warned that the Japanese were slowly applying the lessons from their own setbacks as well as events during the European war, by equipping a larger number of their units with armoured formations. Thus, the Allies could meet ‘a substantial modification of [the IJA’s] traditional tactics’, and discover ‘new and more up to date weapons in [Japanese] hands’ before war’s end.42 The Lethbridge Mission concluded that while Japanese antitank measures had proved ‘elementary and on a small scale’, a gradual improvement was to be expected because armoured units 124

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had been used against them on all fronts.43 While a total mechanization was unlikely, the possible effect on Japanese opposition could not be ignored. Incidents where Japanese tanks demonstrated poor performance were treated with reserve. For example, commenting on its operations along the 4th Corps front during summer 1944, the 254th brigade noted that the ‘conspicuous defect of Japanese tanks . . . was their light armour’, and the enemy made little effort to use mechanized units to exploit infantry advances.44 However, generalizations were considered premature, and British forces needed to prepare for improved methods and equipment. The IJA’s proficiency in adapting its weapons for close country warfare continued to necessitate countermeasures that did not rely on firepower, until the closing stages of the Burma campaign. The most notable threat arose from antitank defences. During the second Arakan campaign, the tempo of operations was hindered by the skill with which the Japanese concealed their artillery and guns in the undergrowth.45 Tank crews often did not notice enemy guns until they were within close firing range, and were unable to take evasive action in due time. The casualties inflicted on the 3rd Carabiniers of the 254th tank brigade during the capture of Ningthoukong along the Tiddim Road led the unit’s colonel to suggest methods whereby enemy defences were neutralized beforehand either by sending forward advance parties or heavy artillery bombardment.46 The latter method had the disadvantage of rendering the ground impassable. Japanese suicide squadrons also demonstrated a high level of skill at remaining undetected and destroying their targets. British tanks needed to be adequately covered. During the assault on the Mayu peninsula, the 15th Corps had to provide infantrymen to act as scouts for its armoured units.47 The evolution of assessments on the IJA’s doctrine of ‘aggressive defence’ also illustrated how the use of proper tactics was crucial for success. In practice, the doctrine manifested itself in two tactics Japanese soldiers employed habitually. The potential damage became clear during the 1942– 1943 Arakan campaign. The first of these was the IJA’s use of counterattacks. In May 1943, GHQ India described the Japanese soldier’s tendency to charge at Allied forces immediately after his defence line had been penetrated, and the strength of the moves lay ‘solely in the speed with which [they] come in’.48 The second tactic which raised worries was the Japanese soldier’s tendency to hold his positions to the last man and round. Reflecting on the first Arakan campaign, the commander of the 71st Indian Brigade noted ‘it will be rare that the [enemy] can be maneuvered out of a position he has been ordered to [retain]’, and for this reason, ‘all plans must be laid to exterminate the enemy where he is’, rather than to compelling him to withdraw.49 In September 1943, Scoones suggested that during the upcoming operations in the Manipur regions, ‘the plan which will kill Japanese is the only one that will succeed’.50 125

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Without tangible proof that British troops were of sufficient calibre, success was frequently attributed to fortuitous circumstances. For example, during the second Arakan campaign, British–Indian forces encircled Japanese positions in an attempt to curtail the enemy’s supplies and reinforcements, the result of which was a withdrawal. However, the XIV Army qualified the success, by suggesting that the move may have been part of an organized plan.51 The threat posed by the Japanese practice of ‘aggressive defence’ could be dismissed only after British–Indian forces had proven capable of dealing with the obstacles. During the operations in the Chindwin Valley in early 1945, Tactical Headquarters ALFSEA attributed the effective use of surprise as the key factor that prevented the enemy from coordinating its counterattacks.52 While experiences in the Arakan and central plains revealed how Japanese counterattacks provided opportunities for inflicting further losses, British– Indian troops still needed to be properly trained to exploit the situation. During the third Arakan campaign, the occupation of areas which threatened enemy communications or flanks often compelled the Japanese to counterattack in strength, providing British–Indian troops the opportunity to eliminate opposition.53 Similarly, in reporting on its operations in north Burma, the 36th Division concluded that enemy counterattacks were planned without proper reconnaissance and intelligence on the attackers’ strength, and conducted by poorly armed troops.54 The result was usually the annihilation of entire Japanese units. Nevertheless, success hinged on the ability of British–Indian forces to compel their opponent to come out of his positions. Of equal importance was to deploy seasoned troops who could hold their ground and kill off the oncoming counterattack without being intimidated by its speed. In situations where firepower proved valuable, its utility was diminished unless properly used. The development of methods to overcome Japanese defence positions highlighted this aspect. Two features were necessary, the first of which was an effort to ensure that the right amount of supporting fire was delivered at the right place to pave the way for the final assault. The second essential ingredient was the use of infantry tactics to occupy Japanese positions and clear the remaining pockets of resistance. Until the British–Indian forces achieved battlefield victories that could be attributed to a sufficient standard of efficiency, commanders accepted the fact that their opponent posed significant obstacles. For example, in March 1943, following the failure of the Arakan offensive, Wavell warned Alanbrooke that the resilience of Japanese bunkers meant that mopping-up operations were ‘a slow and expensive process’.55 The XIV Army’s victories following the spring of 1944 did not alter the conclusion that overwhelming firepower alone was insufficient. The reduction of enemy defences remained laborious. During the attacks on Japanese fortifications at Razabil and Kyaukchaw, British–Indian forces launched a 126

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sustained artillery attack. However, the enemy still managed to forestall its attackers with counter-fire when the preliminary bombardment ceased. Infantry troops needed to position themselves for an immediate advance, so that they could capture Japanese defences before the occupants could reorganize.56 Experiences at Imphal and Kohima revealed that firepower was frequently of limited use against protected bunkers.57 In addition, while armour and artillery support was effective on many occasions, infantry units still needed to physically occupy Japanese positions and mop up the remnants of enemy resistance.58 As late as February 1945, following an attack on a Japanese position at Paungyi Kyaung in the mountains of central Burma, the commander of the 80th Indian Brigade noted that among the lessons learned was that enemy defences remained intact in spite of heavy artillery bombardment.59 Encounters with the IJA not only revealed the need to follow heavy bombardment with infantry attack. Thorough preparations were essential, and reconnaissance had to be conducted to ascertain the layout of enemy positions so that sufficient fire could be concentrated on the most crucial areas.60 In summer 1944, the Directorate of Tactical Investigation (DTI) concluded, ‘there was no existing weapon . . . entirely suitable for taking on the Japanese defences under difficult jungle conditions’, and their reduction had to be a ‘carefully prepared and deliberate operation’ which could take weeks of experimenting with different combinations of equipment.61 The 20th Indian Division instructed its troops to obtain a thorough knowledge of the targets, as well as the tactics the Japanese were likely to employ, so that infantry units would not face obstacles that could otherwise be avoided.62 Far from acknowledging overwhelming firepower as the sole guarantee for success, British commanders learned through experience that armour and artillery had to be used effectively as a means to set up the correct conditions for the final advance. The resilience of Japanese defences was enhanced by the practice of fully exploiting natural features. Experiences during the first Arakan offensive revealed the enemy’s adeptness at siting his defences on hilltops to obtain maximum fields of fire and restrict the attackers’ movements.63 In addition to terrain features, Japanese troops used jungle vegetation for concealment. Allied troops often approached within close range of enemy defences without knowing their strength or location.64 The IJA’s reverses did not negate its adeptness at exploiting terrain, which complicated the British–Indian forces’ efforts to neutralize enemy opposition. Field commanders noted how the siting of bunkers on reverse slopes, where artillery and tank fire could not easily be brought, gave enemy troops a high level of protection.65 To complicate matters, unless the bunkers were physically occupied, the attackers found it difficult to hold onto any ground they gained, as the Japanese forces often remained largely intact, and were thus in a position to counterattack and render the newly won ground a 127

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‘deathtrap’. Operations in mountainous ground also entailed restricted mobility. Advances in rugged terrain were confined to a single axis, and British formations, with their heavy equipment, had little scope for outflanking their opponents. The IJA’s proficiency in optimizing natural obstacles also continued to raise questions about the British–Indian army’s practices. During the third Arakan campaign, the 25th Indian Division found that Japanese artillery positions were ‘carefully sited’, and gun pits were often constructed at the summit of the highest hills.66 As a result, the attackers exerted a ‘considerable effort in preparation’ in bringing sufficient quantities of their own equipment to bear. Field commanders began to wonder whether it was a wise move to employ excessive numbers of guns, or whether ‘with more careful siting and the use of alternative positions’, equally effective results could be achieved. The evidence pointing to the difficulties involved in close country fighting led British commanders to favour operations in the plains of central Burma, where conditions favoured the employment of firepower and supporting arms. Conversely, encounters in the Irrawaddy plains invariably proved that the IJA’s inefficiency in mobile warfare impeded its defensive operations.67 The IJA’s ineptitude in employing modern weapons was exposed in its entirety. Artillery crews who had delivered accurate fire against fixed avenues of attack in the mountains of the Arakan and Manipur regions now demonstrated their inability to strike rapidly moving targets.68 Against the overwhelming quantity of armour the 4th Corps was able to deploy, the Japanese used infantrymen as human mines.69 While suicide tactics continued to inflict losses, in the long run, they failed to halt the advance of tanks, and achieved little aside from a wasteful expenditure of the IJA’s dwindling manpower. By April, the military intelligence directorate at ALFSEA concluded that while the Japanese had not yet used their armour on a large scale, their skill in using tanks could be safely discredited, because on the few occasions when the enemy had employed armour, its tactics had ‘lacked enterprise and [had] been ineffectual and hesitant’.70 Japanese tank crews tended not to employ their units in full force. The presence of a minimal number of British tanks and antitank defences often discouraged the enemy from providing close support to its infantry units. In defensive operations, tanks were often used as stationary pillboxes. Evidence of the IJA’s tactical inefficiency, rather than mere indications of its technological and numerical inferiority, was indeed a crucial catalyst in dismantling apprehensions regarding its capabilities. Of equal importance, however, was that field commanders continued to realize that an adequate standard of efficiency among their own forces was vital. Along with the advantages accrued from armour and firepower, mobility was viewed as an asset their forces were bound to possess once they commenced operating in the central plains.71 In February 1945, Oliver Leese, commander-in-chief of ALFSEA, ordered the 4th Corps to cross the Irrawaddy river against a numerically superior Japanese force. The decision 128

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was based not only on the 4th Corps’ ability to exploit its superiority in tanks and aircraft, but also the fact that British–Indian troops had proven their fighting value.72 The decision to cross the Chindwin was a ‘calculated risk’, taken for similar reasons.73 The evolution of British perceptions regarding the IJA’s ground warfare tactics illustrates how evidence of Japanese inferiority in the development and use of modern weapons was of limited value in dispelling pessimism. The Japanese armies’ talent at imposing delay and attrition in close country warfare taught British intelligence staffs and military commanders that under certain conditions, their opponent possessed certain advantages. In these circumstances, British–Indian forces faced difficulties in developing countermeasures that did not entail a significant expenditure of time and resources. At the same time, the confidence created by the successes achieved in open country warfare was largely due to the IJA’s low level of skill in employing modern weapons and holding its positions against better-equipped opponents. Most important, however, was the fact that British forces were of a sufficient calibre to exploit their enemy’s shortcomings.

IJA’s defences against amphibious attacks The prevalence of coastal targets in the Asia–Pacific theatres and the prominent role played by landing operations meant the British needed to devote considerable effort to determining the challenges posed by Japanese defence methods against amphibious attacks. Because British–Indian forces in Southeast Asia remained largely inactive until mid 1944, much of the intelligence was obtained from observations of US amphibious operations in the Pacific. Japanese opposition did not follow any definite pattern, and depended upon a variety of factors, including the strategic importance of the target, the topography of the landing site, and availability of resources. Encounters against Japanese coastal defences in Southeast Asia also revealed a lack of general rules. Operations were planned with a corresponding degree of flexibility and a view to enabling amphibious forces to cope effectively with a variety of circumstances. The evolution of the British–Indian army’s tactics for combined operations, and the role played by intelligence appraisals of Japanese methods, need to be examined against the wider background in which its amphibious capabilities had developed. When Britain entered the Far Eastern conflict in December 1941, its defence establishment had little comprehension of how to overcome Japanese coastal positions. The problem stemmed from the meagre effort made to develop amphibious warfare techniques during the interwar period. A byproduct of this neglect was a situation where the British did not make a serious effort to gauge the IJA’s ability to protect its coastlines. A host of factors led Britain to make minimal progress in developing its amphibious warfare capabilities. The failure of the Dardanelles expedition in 129

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1915 created a widespread disillusionment over the feasibility of assaulting defended beachheads, both within the Admiralty and War Office. Practical factors also hindered the process.74 The Royal Navy and the army were unable to achieve the level of cooperation necessary to conduct regular joint exercises. Financial constraints imposed by Parliament also denied the armed services the resources for conducting proper experimentation. Nor did Britain’s war plans seriously envisage the need to reconquer its territories in Southeast Asia by seaborne invasions. In short, amphibious operations were considered too problematic to warrant a serious effort. When the British had been expelled from Southeast Asia in early 1942, they were unprepared to plan and execute landings against Japanese occupied shorelines in Burma, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. To remedy the situation, India Command immediately set up an organization dedicated to devising the appropriate methods and equipment for seaborne landings. In February, the C-in-C India reported to the War Office that the existing combined operations centre at Poona was small, and a new site was being planned.75 Extra resources were devoted for training purposes as well as the development of amphibious craft. The War Office approved the plan to set up the Combined Training Centre (CTC) in India, which was managed by a nucleus staff of an Advisor on Combined Operations and representatives from the three armed services.76 Training was led by Rear-Admiral L.E.H. Maund, who had extensive experience in planning combined operations. By the summer, the Directorate of Combined Operations (DCO) was set up at GHQ in Delhi, under Captain Garnons-Williams, the senior naval officer who planned the landings in Madagascar.77 The establishment of a centralized body for researching and developing amphibious methods did not, however, reverse the fact that the bulk of Britain’s landing craft were tied up in the Mediterranean and Europe, and India Command had inadequate resources for proper training exercises. The British faced a difficult task in planning and executing their operations, regardless of the information they gathered on Japanese capabilities. British efforts to evaluate Japanese amphibious defences also produced mixed results. By 1943, DCO India, along with Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) in London became the focal points for processing intelligence concerning amphibious operations in the Asia–Pacific theatres. This is not to say that the War Office and army establishment in India relinquished responsibility. In Whitehall, the Military Intelligence Directorate periodically disseminated reports obtained from the US War and Navy Departments. The military intelligence organizations working under the XIV Army also played an important role in collecting and disseminating intelligence. However, COHQ and DCO India assumed the task of analysis and more importantly, determining how the material was to be used. The available intelligence did not reveal any set patterns in enemy methods. In many cases, the information tended to reveal how Japanese amphibious 130

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defences depended on a variety of factors. Aside from the importance of the target and the topographic conditions of the locality, there was an array of variables to contend with, such as the availability of manpower and equipment. Until the British commenced their landing operations in the western coastal regions of Burma in autumn 1944, intelligence on Japanese coastal defences came in two forms: first, captured documents, and second, observations of the ongoing Allied landing operations in the Pacific theatres. Captured field manuals laid out in meticulous detail the IJA’s doctrine on coastal defences. The main objectives were to minimize the effects of aerial and naval bombardment, and cover all possible avenues of approach with artillery fire and antitank obstacles.78 Tactics of this nature fit squarely with the Japanese principle of alleviating the effects of Allied firepower and heavy weaponry by restricting the attackers’ room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless, calculations of the resistance at individual localities were not possible because in many cases, Japanese defence plans became clear only after the attackers had landed. The material was propagated as nothing more than an indication of the elements Allied forces could face. Observations of Allied operations in the Pacific also revealed few discernible rules. On one hand, the information highlighted the types of Japanese coastal defences that had been encountered. The gathering of intelligence was aided by the extensive surveys conducted by the Lethbridge mission. In addition, starting in 1944, COHQ employed a team of combined operations observers, whose task was to accompany American units, and produce accounts of landings against Japanese strongholds in the Gilbert and Marshall islands, the Marianas and Philippines. The US Marine Corps’ (USMC) encounters also revealed many important lessons on how to overcome Japanese beachheads. During the interwar period, the Americans stood alone in developing amphibious tactics against defended coastlines. After the Allied counteroffensive in the Central Pacific commenced in late 1943, the USMC achieved a commendable level of efficiency.79 Enemy defences were neutralized through preliminary naval and aerial bombardment. Close air support was provided to enable the landing parties to maintain the momentum of their advance. Marines were also trained to physically occupy bunkers and eliminate resistance. The British made a concerted attempt to learn from US experiences and by mid 1944, COHQ and DCO India were regularly disseminating bulletins which highlighted the salient features. Nevertheless, the intelligence emanating from the Pacific did not permit a conclusive image because it showed how Allied forces faced an enormously wide variety of scenarios. The initial assessment after the US forces commenced their campaigns in the South Pacific areas in early 1943 was that the greatest challenge did not arise from enemy opposition, but more from the logistical difficulties involved in supporting operations over large 131

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expanses of ocean. The complacency arose largely from the thin defences encountered in the Solomons.80 Subsequent campaigns in the Gilbert and Marshall islands warned how Japanese beach defences could pose a formidable obstacle. In April 1944, the War Office disseminated an article based on a collection of US reports on the Tarawa landings, which noted how ‘Japanese installations held up to heavy bombardment longer than expected, and the softening up process did not do the damage that was thought possible’.81 Equally noteworthy were the elaborate offshore tetrahedra which obstructed nearly half the coastline. Once ashore, the US Marines encountered guns that were aimed at the most likely avenues of approach. Although defences in the Marshall Islands were not as intricate, they enabled a large number of Japanese troops to survive the preliminary bombardment and provide tenacious resistance to the Americans.82 An arduous effort was needed to mop up the pockets of stragglers and snipers. For intelligence staffs, the encounters in the Gilbert and Marshall islands were an ominous suggestion that future operations could meet similar levels of opposition. At the same time, the islands formed an integral part of Japan’s outer perimeter and were likely to be more heavily defended. The opposition at particular targets indicated individual circumstances. The only definite conclusion was that the Japanese were likely to hold onto islands of strategic importance with maximum strength. MI2 went as far as to suggest, ‘it is certainly not too much to assume that Japanese beach defences will be on a Western European scale’.83 At the same time, the conditions could not be determined without intelligence on the targets. The acceptance of these aspects was borne out by the way in which intelligence appreciations treated the resistance encountered by US forces in the western Pacific during the latter stages of the conflict. Experiences in the Marianas and the Philippines suggested that so long as the Japanese did not attempt to annihilate their attackers at water’s edge, they were likely to put up relatively light resistance. In the Marianas, the defending forces tried to forestall the Allied landings by establishing a series of artillery positions in the interior. Combat reports from Saipan, Guam and Tinian showed that the Japanese used ‘no new artillery weapons or tactics of any significance’.84 Because gun crews were not trained to coordinate their fire, shells often came in single rounds, and the damage on the US forces was ‘comparatively light’.85 At Leyte, Japanese forces withdrew to the mountains to fight a delaying action because the island was too large to allow the defences to be built along the entire coastline.86 US marines were able to establish their beachhead unopposed. However, the IJA’s demonstration of its tendency to put up weak defences was presented as incidental evidence. Neither COHQ nor the War Office ventured to suggest any general rules concerning future trends. For the purpose of operational planning, the main lesson derived from encounters in the Pacific was that Allied forces needed to prepare for varying 132

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circumstances. Landings had to be planned with flexibility so that the forces could operate in a range of scenarios. Detected patterns had been broken regularly, and plans could not be made without accurate intelligence on the particular problem to be faced.87 In autumn 1944, DCO India attributed the success of amphibious operations to the careful selection of the approach route and landing sites, both of which enabled the attackers to land on undefended beachheads and thereby inflict a decisive level of surprise.88 The successful neutralization of enemy positions with air power was attributed to the fact that pilots knew the area thoroughly, so that attacks ‘could be delivered and concentrated on any target’.89 Conversely, where thorough reconnaissance had not been undertaken, the Allies were alleged to have prevailed because Japanese defences happened to be weak.90 Operations were planned with a view to obtaining a sound knowledge of the target, rather than relying on overwhelming force and good fortune. Insofar as the value of superior firepower was concerned, landings needed to be supported by naval and air cover. However, sustained bombardment had to be conducted properly to achieve the desired effect. Recommendations by the DCO India, to soften enemy bunkers through naval and aerial attacks, warned that such measures had to be carried out over several days and continued until ‘the last possible moment’ before the initial assault in order to properly protect the landing parties from damaging counterattacks.91 Allied forces also needed to use different types of equipment to deal with the various situations they faced. The Lethbridge Mission illustrated how beach defences in the Pacific had ranged from a collection of lightly constructed pillboxes in New Guinea, to a highly sophisticated system of fortifications at Tarawa.92 The necessary amounts and types of fire support could not be determined ‘without full intelligence regarding the particular problem to be faced’. On the question of equipment for clearing beach obstacles, the Tarawa operations revealed how the varying strengths of Japanese defences required the Allies to employ a wider range of weapons.93 At the same time, it was important to achieve a degree of uniformity, and to procure devices that were usable in a number of conditions. British assessments of the opposition met in Southeast Asia also reflected how experiences in the Pacific were taken as a clear indication that attempts to detect fixed rules were futile. On one hand, the British–Indian army’s landing forces needed to be ready for worst-case scenarios. In April 1945, DCO India prepared a paper for the CTC, which aimed to provide directions regarding the type and scale of beach defences which assault groups were to be trained for. Training had to be based not only on what was known or believed to exist in Southeast Asia, but with a view to ‘catering for future developments, bearing in mind the lessons learned in the Pacific theatre’.94 Although Japan did not have the resources to construct large-scale beach defences, amphibious forces needed to deal with enemy counter-fire at the time of the landing, and to run up against obstacles covering a substantial 133

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portion of the beachhead. Inland advances were likely to be blocked by mines, requiring the construction of alternative exits, while counterattacks were an ever-present danger. Another feature which British commanders in Southeast Asia took notice of was the IJA’s practice of using every available opportunity to exploit natural obstacles. In June 1945, ALFSEA exhaustively described the Japanese methods encountered during the island-hopping campaign. The conclusion was that the ‘complete adoption of [similar] tactics in [Southeast Asia] is unlikely since much of the terrain with its low lying coastal areas and mangrove swamps differs considerably from the volcanic islands of the Pacific’.95 However, there was little doubt that the Japanese would ‘attempt a more flexible defence . . . using whatever high ground was available’. Yet, the evidence simply pointed to a certain feature the British had to prepare for. The 15th Corps’ experiences during Romulus and the pincer movement down the Arakan coast after late 1944 did little to alter the conclusion that Japanese methods revealed few definite patterns, and that enemy opposition could not be calculated without up-to-date intelligence. For example, the 26th Indian Division’s appreciation of the impending attack against Myebon deduced that given the absence of inland obstacles and limited landing sites, the most logical plan for the Japanese was to control the beachheads and main approaches.96 The successful execution of the plan, however, hinged upon whether the defending forces could muster enough battalions. The lessons obtained from landing operations in the Arakan were indeed replete of material that could permit accurate predictions of enemy resistance. At Myebon, the Japanese attempted to defend the island by bringing artillery fire from hilltops. The extended coastlines along the river delta complicated efforts to defend all landing points, and the hinterland offered an ideal location for siting guns.97 DCO India went no further than to explain that encounters to date had revealed such moves to be a common occurrence. Predictions that the Dracula landings would meet opposition on the river banks, where the initial assaults had been planned, were based entirely on observations of Japanese movements and coastal defences rather than deduction based on prior experiences.98 The unpredictable nature of Japanese defences precluded the prescription of set methods. Opinions were prone to disagreement. For example, commenting on the Ramree operation, Christison suggested that by landing on impassable points, the attackers achieved surprise, and the success provided a useful hint concerning methods which could be employed in the future. In response, Mountbatten stated that preliminary bombardment was the decisive factor.99 Operational planning was undertaken with a view to adapting to varying circumstances. Landing forces needed to be equipped with sufficient manpower and weapons so that they could avoid holdups while seizing opportunities to exploit weak spots. Christison recalled that the rapid 134

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changes in the situation precluded accurate predictions of methods required for particular operations.100 A careful survey of the targets was necessary, because the Arakan coast consisted of mangrove swamps and was devoid of beachheads that permitted an easy landing.101 Most importantly, amphibious parties needed to achieve surprise to take advantage of the enemy’s inability to cope with unexpected attacks, while preventing a concentration of its defending forces.102 Amphibious landings in Malaya and Sumatra were also planned with a full awareness of the need for accurate intelligence as well as preparations for varying levels of resistance. The JPS consistently warned that detailed planning could not take place without sufficient information on crucial features such as landing sites, enemy beach defences and the disposition of its forces.103 The difficulties involved in forecasting its strengths and dispositions meant that tactics could not be planned in advance. As late as summer 1945, Mountbatten’s joint planners emphasized that plans for amphibious operations against Singapore were ‘extremely tentative owing to many unknown factors’, including the progress of the battle and number of Japanese casualties.104 Neither factor could be ascertained until D-Day. The uncertainty surrounding Japanese amphibious defences required operational planning to be undertaken with flexibility. The ability of British landing forces to pursue a range of effective actions was the crucial ingredient for success, with material strength being one among a number of necessities.

IJN and naval air services British intelligence on the IJN needs to be examined together with its intelligence on Japanese air power for two reasons. First, the tactical skill of the IJN’s air arm was a key challenge the Allies had to contend with. While the IJN’s fleet lapsed into dormancy in early 1943, the naval air services remained active for the duration of the conflict. The second reason for lumping the subject of naval intelligence together with air intelligence is related to structural factors. Because air power formed an integral part of Japanese naval doctrine, the Admiralty took responsibility for matters related to both the IJN and the JAF. Likewise, the Air Ministry played an important role in investigating the Japanese naval air services. Any study of British intelligence during the Pacific War has to conflate, to a certain degree, the subjects of naval and air intelligence. The IJN was the branch on which the least information was available. Because the Japanese navy pursued a strategy of conservation following Guadalcanal, and maintained the bulk of its capital ships in home waters, its capacity to challenge the Allies was difficult to determine. The absence of major encounters between the IJN and Royal Navy following the raid on Ceylon in April 1942 created further uncertainties. To quote Marder, ‘Britain’s interests went no further east than Japan’s went to the west’.105 135

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Britain’s adherence to a strategy of defending India, at least until the very late stages of the conflict, minimized the prospects of an engagement. The Admiralty and the Eastern Fleet did not have a reliable basis for comparing the IJN with the Royal Navy. To complicate matters, there was little evidence to suggest that the efficiency of Japanese naval vessels had waned since the opening stages of the Pacific War. However, because British war plans did not envisage large-scale operations against the IJN, intelligence on its capabilities was likely to remain academic. Intelligence on the Japanese naval air force (JNAF) fared slightly better. Nevertheless, the British faced ambiguities because the evidence did not provide a full picture of the overall situation. The uncertainty was compounded by apprehensions arising from the JNAF’s success in remedying the disadvantages arising from its growing numerical and technical inferiority vis-àvis the Allies. Aircraft engineers proved adept at developing equipment that could achieve high levels of destruction on Allied warships, while pilots continued to demonstrate a level of tactical skill that could not be downplayed. Most importantly, British naval staffs acknowledged their lack of resources to provide adequate protection against Japanese air attacks. Nor could they forget the losses suffered by the Royal Navy during the opening phases of the Pacific War. The devastation of Force Z and destruction inflicted on the Eastern Fleet during the raid on Ceylon were reminders of the Japanese naval air arm’s prowess. Naval staffs and ship crews felt compelled to investigate effective countermeasures. Even at the closing stages of the conflict, the deficiencies of the IJN’s air arm were not taken as a reason to categorically dismiss its potential. The apparatus for processing intelligence on the IJN and JNAF went through some modifications during the course of the Pacific War. Since the Americans and Australians bore the brunt of operations against the Japanese, the main source of information was the flow of combat action reports obtained from the US Navy Department and Office of Naval Intelligence, along with Headquarters Allied Air Forces SWPA (AAFSWPA). In addition, the Admiralty employed a number of observers, most notably Commander R.M. Smeeton, who served an extended assignment onboard the carrier USS Essex. Because the Royal Navy was unable to gain firsthand experience, information from the Pacific theatres proved invaluable. The main body responsible for analysing the IJN’s performance and technology was the Admiralty’s naval intelligence directorate (NID). Within the Eastern Fleet, the office of the Chief of Operational Intelligence Services (COIS) handled Japanese naval intelligence matters. The Eastern Fleet did not develop the capacity to conduct independent assessments of their opponent to the same extent as its counterparts in the British–Indian Army, mainly because naval staffs did not have a lot of material to work with, owing to the absence of major encounters. The NID remained the focal point for intelligence on the Japanese navy and its air arm. Because the Admiralty 136

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was primarily concerned with the Mediterranean and Atlantic theatres, the Japanese navy was treated as an academic matter at least until late 1944, when Churchill committed a British fleet to the Pacific.106 This was not to say that the Admiralty downplayed the threat which the IJN could pose. On the contrary, Japanese naval capabilities were viewed with caution. The Air Ministry’s intelligence directorate also processed information on the IJN’s air arm. Duplicate copies of reports on the Japanese air services often appeared in the weekly intelligence summaries of the Admiralty and Air Ministry. Higher up, the Board of the Admiralty, along with the directorates responsible for weapons development, decided how to implement the intelligence. While Somerville and Mountbatten insisted that the IJN’s tactics required British vessels to undergo modernization, the Admiralty invariably responded that financial constraints and shortages of raw materials did not permit significant steps. At the apex of the hierarchy, Churchill and the COS were also responsible for pressing the Admiralty to help the Eastern Fleet enhance its capabilities. Again, Britain’s resource shortages meant their efforts did not always bear fruit. Naval intelligence was handicapped by the absence of engagements between the Allied and Japanese main fleets during the months between Guadalcanal and Leyte. Raw intelligence rarely provided an accurate picture of the IJN’s performance against its opponents. Basic aspects such as the composition of the IJN’s fleet remained a mystery. As late as May 1944, the OIC was unable to determine whether the Ise and Hyuga were being converted into carriers.107 Their conclusion was based on a collation of circumstantial evidence in the form of ship movements, along with the assumption that Japan was unlikely to be constructing carriers due its defensive strategy. Information on more detailed matters such as the equipment onboard Japanese vessels and the IJN’s tactics was equally inadequate. In March 1943, Australia Station disseminated the speed and measurements of the carrier Shokaku, and warned that the information originated from a POW and thus had to be treated with caution.108 Signals intelligence provided sporadic information on the IJN’s radar technology and cryptographic systems.109 The material could not provide definite indications of how Japanese vessels might perform in combat. The uncertainty surrounding the IJN’s capabilities was compounded by an air of concern. Although Japanese naval strategy after 1943 turned to the defensive, the Royal Navy’s wartime experiences in the Atlantic and Mediterranean demonstrated how enemy technology and equipment often posed a serious threat. The British adopted an ‘equipment first’ outlook when assessing the IJN,110 and acknowledged the need for proper countermeasures against Japanese naval technology. British assessments of the Japanese submarine fleet and torpedo equipment highlighted this practice. The IJN’s underwater fleet was handicapped not so 137

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much by technological factors as flawed operational doctrine.111 Despite the perilous situation Britain had suffered under sustained U-boat attacks against its oceanic trade routes during both world wars, Japanese admirals did not grasp the submarine’s potential to disrupt enemy supply lines. The accepted belief was that vessels operating beyond the cover of protecting aircraft and battleships were more likely to face destruction than inflict it. In addition, Japanese naval doctrine remained fixated on battlefleet actions. As a consequence, the submarine was viewed primarily as a weapon for attacking enemy warships. Aside from a neglect for the safety of Japan’s maritime supply lines,112 a major byproduct of the misperception regarding submarines was a failure to disrupt Allied logistics. Once the Pacific War broke out, the performance of Japanese submarines revealed problems. The IJN did not foresee Allied antisubmarine measures, and its vessels were not adequately protected against depth charges, while crews were inept at avoiding detection. Torpedoes were constructed to travel long distances with heavy loads of ordnance, to inflict attrition. Little effort was made to facilitate accurate aiming, and Japanese submarines were unable to conduct long-range attacks.113 However, as far as the Admiralty and Eastern Fleet were concerned, Japanese submarines were capable of significant damage. With its extended range, the Type 93 Long Lance was the most advanced torpedo deployed during the Pacific War. Japanese submarines also had greater endurance than their US counterparts until the later stages of the conflict, when the US Navy managed to catch up. In every action where Japanese torpedoes appeared, such as Guadalcanal and Savo island, their destructive capacity raised alarm.114 In spite of the IJN’s tendency to use submarines as auxiliary vessels, they occasionally targeted merchant ships, with devastating effects. As late as August 1944, the Directorate of Naval Operations Studies concluded that IJN submarines were roughly comparable to their American and German counterparts.115 The potential damage that Japanese torpedoes could inflict required British vessels to be properly fitted with sonar and antisubmarine devices. During spring 1944, when the Japanese mounted a brief offensive against Allied shipping in the Indian Ocean, Somerville lamented that the Eastern Fleet had been unable to provide escort protection.116 British vessels needed to keep enemy submarines at a safe distance and target them accurately at long range.117 As for the IJN’s capital ship and carrier fleet, they continued to demonstrate a high level of performance despite heavy losses, and British naval staffs were reluctant to become complacent. The IJN’s growing inferiority in comparison to the Allied fleets and reluctance to engage its opponents were not taken as reasons for discrediting its fighting capabilities. Following Midway, Japan was unable to replace its losses, and with the United States constructing a sizeable fleet of aircraft carriers and surface vessels, the IJN’s defeat was only 138

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a matter of time.118 Nor did the Japanese match the US Navy’s carrier tactics.119 Most importantly, Japanese admirals insisted on refraining from action until the IJN could fight a decisive engagement in the Inner Zone, diminishing any remaining hopes of re-establishing Japan’s naval dominance in the Pacific and Indian Ocean.120 A historical perspective shows that by the middle stages of the conflict, the IJN’s ability to forestall the Allied advance was severely limited. However, in the absence of direct encounters, the British were more likely to base their views on experiences during the opening stages of the conflict, which revealed that the IJN possessed technologically advanced vessels that were fully capable of outmanoeuvring their Western counterparts. For example, the JIC concluded in August 1943 that while production was ‘small for a first class power’, equipment was ‘of a high order’.121 As late as the end of 1944, intelligence summaries warned that the IJN’s capital ships and carriers were ‘worthy counterparts’ of the Allied fleets.122 The absence of British victories over the IJN dictated caution. In March 1944, the NID concluded, ‘ship for ship, there is little to choose’ between the British and Japanese fleets, with the IJN having a slight advantage in weight of broadside, and the Royal Navy possessing more advanced radar.123 The IJN’s shortcomings also had to be considered while remembering that the Eastern Fleet faced its own problems. In March 1944, following a visit to the battleship HMS Valiant, Somerville complained that British capital ships in the Far East were far from sufficient to engage the IJN, owing to the ‘extreme youth and inexperience of the ships’ companies, and the heavy dilution of officers’.124 In gauging the IJN’s air arm, the British demonstrated an awareness that in spite of its growing inferiority in technology and numbers, its tactical skill could not be ignored. As the conflict progressed, the JNAF suffered a shortage of resources and skilled manpower, both of which prevented it from maintaining an edge over its opponents. However, the Japanese continued to reveal their aerobatic skill, and managed to effect nominal improvements in their aircraft technology, both of which enabled pilots and aircraft to pose a significant menace. In order to provide adequate countermeasures, the British needed to rely on a combination of effective equipment and tactics, rather than sheer numerical prowess. As usual, information from sources aside from combat experience was of limited value. POW interrogations were unreliable unless analysed en masse. While captured aircrews provided valuable insights concerning the level of training among certain units, the low number of pilots who ended up in Allied captivity meant the information represented the experiences of a small handful. The information was propagated without comments on the overall situation.125 Captured documents provided equally limited guidance. In October 1944, the Air Ministry referred to documents which suggested that the Japanese 139

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had developed a dual propeller engine, Kasei, and that the Mitsubishi Type 97 light bomber had been refitted.126 However, the conclusion was that ‘no reports of sightings . . . by Allied pilots have been received, and therefore no estimates can be made’. The evidence was taken as a mere indication that the Japanese were equipping their aircraft with new engine types, and general trends which could not be confirmed without further investigation. While observations of Allied encounters with the JNAF were the most reliable source, they also revealed a notable problem which stemmed from the fact that Japanese air units demonstrated varying standards of performance. The available intelligence therefore had to be analysed thoroughly before the overall situation could be ascertained. Intelligence on the efficiency of Japanese pilots illustrated this dilemma. The JNAF’s defeats at Midway and the Solomons resulted in a substantial loss of skilled aircrews, which disabled the IJN’s air arm from maintaining its edge the Allies, and eventually resulted in its demise.127 The JNAF started the war with a pool of elite airmen who had undergone a highly selective and rigorous programme. Yet, the stringency of the IJN’s pilot training was one of its fatal flaws. Its recruits were too few to sustain the losses to be incurred in a protracted war. By autumn 1942, manpower shortages became acute, and the existing programme could not produce new pilots in a timely manner. A streamlined system was introduced, and the new generation of intakes sometimes entered active duty with less than a hundred hours of flight experience. A US intelligence report noted how ‘both bomber and fighter pilots ceased to display the aggressiveness that marked their earlier combat’.128 However, as far as the British were concerned, evidence of declining efficiency among certain units had to be weighed up against reliable indications that the JNAF continued to possess an albeit diminished reserve of skilled pilots. In December 1943, the Admiralty and Air Ministry warned of a number of cases where the gunnery and flying techniques of aircrews could be described as ‘excellent’. Although the shortage of trained crews was one of the JNAF’s handicaps, it was a mistake to conclude that ‘[it had] no good pilots or that Allied airmen as individuals [had] any reason for confidence’.129 The only source of comfort was that top-rate pilots were likely to appear less frequently. The evidence pointing to the JNAF’s continued possession of skilled pilots was accompanied by its skilful manoeuvring and ability to harm Allied fleets. What the JNAF lacked in technology, it compensated with tactical skill, often with alarming success. Japan’s air services faced difficulties in introducing improved models of aircraft, and the weakness stemmed from its narrow industrial and scientific research base. No new models of fighters were introduced until the Raiden appeared in 1944.130 The JNAF also failed to equip its bombers with enhanced armour and defensive armament. A single bullet was enough to put Japanese aircraft down in flames. The development of modern technologies such as radar was hopelessly behind the Allies. 140

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Nevertheless, against Allied forces in the Pacific, the JNAF remained adept at inflicting considerable damage on shipping targets not equipped with adequate AA defences. In January 1944, the Eastern Fleet noted how enemy reconnaissance pilots were skilled at deceiving Allied ship crews, and sometimes made ‘dummy or actual bombing runs from a direction independent’ of the one from which the raid was conducted.131 Level bombing tactics demonstrated Japanese ‘national characteristics’, namely ‘courage, indifference to losses, adherence to preconceived plans and considerable skill at familiar operations’.132 Attacks were carried out with a view to ‘sink, not cripple’ Allied vessels. For British naval staffs, the JNAF’s tactical efficiency was seen as compelling reason to continuously assess the question whether British vessels could cope with air attacks. Existing countermeasures proved unsatisfactory. To complicate matters, the Admiralty was unable to provide the resources needed to improve the Eastern Fleet’s air cover and AA defences. Britain’s limited industrial base also meant its rate of carrier construction was significantly lower than the United States. Because the Royal Navy’s vessels were built to operate in the narrow bodies of water prevalent in Europe where land-based air attack was a constant threat, the installation of heavier armour placed extra delays.133 Consequently, British carrier striking power was limited. After the Eastern Fleet’s carriers were diverted to the Mediterranean and Atlantic in spring 1943, no reinforcements arrived in the Indian Ocean until early 1944.134 Resource shortages also hindered British naval engineers from developing AA defences that could match the more advanced US and German types, whose accuracy was markedly enhanced by radar.135 An additional obstacle was operational ineptitude. Naval battles in the European theatres had been won primarily by battleships, and the role of carriers was minimal.136 When the HMS Illustrious and Victorious arrived in the Indian Ocean, their actions were confined to bombing raids on the East Indies. One of the main reasons why Admiral Fraser insisted the British Pacific Fleet participate in operations against the home islands alongside the US Fleet was that the Royal Navy was in desperate need for firsthand experience in warfare involving the use of carriers.137 At the same time, the underdeveloped state of British carrier tactics was one of the factors that gave US naval staffs doubts over the wisdom of allowing the Fleet to participate.138 British naval planners were cognizant that they faced difficulties in improving the fighting capabilities of their vessels. At the same time, they acknowledged the limited options they had for remedying the situation. Mountbatten made repeated attempts to secure the COS’s approval for measures to reequip British vessels operating in the Far East. However, operations in the Atlantic and Mediterranean continued to take precedence, thereby preventing the diversion of resources. In September 1943, Mountbatten explained to 141

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the COS the need to install radar on British vessels.139 Without advanced fighter direction sets and AA fire control systems, British fleets and amphibious forces were ‘liable to considerable and avoidable casualties’. However, Mountbatten conceded that technical research was unlikely to develop the equipment until 1944, and general modernization had to wait until the following year. At a COS meeting held a week later, Mountbatten’s proposal received a lukewarm reception.140 While the committee agreed the position was unsatisfactory, the only action they could guarantee was to investigate the requirements, and decide priorities ‘on a strategic basis’. The lack of positive action was not due to complacency, it was more a result of resource constraints that were beyond control. The damage inflicted on the US task force at Tarawa raised alarm both within the Admiralty and among British officers in the Far East. DCO India noted how the Japanese habitually relied on torpedo bombers to attack convoys, and the raids were usually conducted under cover of darkness.141 Efficient countermeasures had yet to be found. Within the Admiralty, views on the Tarawa naval operations were largely based on Commander Smeeton’s report, which warned that the Mitsubishi twin-engine torpedo bomber was ‘a constant menace to support forces’.142 British task forces needed to be equipped with the maximum amount of the modern carrier-based aircraft that could be brought to bear in order to protect themselves. However, the situation was a difficult one in which the British were aware of the dangers, but often at a loss for ways to cope with them. Naval staffs had few alternatives apart from acknowledging the threat posed by Japanese air tactics, while coping with the restrictions posed by their existing AA defences. For example, in April 1944, the Director of Air Warfare and Training (DAWT) minuted, ‘to combat [the menace from Japanese torpedoes], we need plenty of night fighters and the means, in as many ships as possible, of directing them efficiently’.143 Insofar as concrete measures were concerned, he could only state, ‘both requirements are being pressed on with’. Likewise, commenting upon the battle of Formosa, where Japanese aircraft managed to evade detection by flying below Allied shipborne radar cover, the DAWT noted, ‘the antiradar measures used by the Japanese which have been noted in many recent reports call for better low looking radar in [our] ships’.144 Again, effective countermeasures had to await the introduction of improved radar, at which point British vessels were to be refitted at the earliest opportunity. The British Pacific Fleet’s poor combat readiness at the start of its operations at Okinawa highlighted the consequences of the Admiralty’s slow progress in modernizing its vessels. Carriers held less than half the complement carried onboard US vessels. Fighters, such as the Seafire, which composed a fifth of the strength, were designed for land-based operations and had problems withstanding the abrupt stops of carrier landings.145 AA 142

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gunnery was hindered by outdated methods of fire control. That the Fleet did not suffer greater damage was due to three factors, the first of which was the relatively weak scale of air assault it faced in comparison to the US Fleet.146 Second, the armoured decks onboard British carriers enabled them to remain operational in spite of heavy damage.147 Most important, however, were the improvements made in the use of the available AA guns and carrier-based aircraft.148 By the end of 1944, Allied naval crews faced a new threat, namely the Japanese suicide bomber (Kamikaze). The Japanese began to employ Kamikaze tactics systematically at Leyte Gulf, and the Royal Navy’s first encounter with them was at Okinawa. British reactions to Kamikaze attacks illustrate how the Japanese air services’ proficiency at exploiting soft spots was sufficient to raise apprehensions about existing AA defences onboard naval vessels. From the viewpoint of long-term gains, Kamikaze attacks were of limited value, because they achieved a low rate of accuracy, and the losses in manpower and aircraft were disproportionate to the number of Allied vessels sunk or damaged. Kamikaze tactics also entailed a waste of scarce resources at a stage when Japan’s defeat was inevitable.149 However, when judged according to their ability to damage inadequately defended Allied naval forces, suicide tactics posed a menace that could not be ignored. Events at Okinawa suggested how Kamikaze bombers provided an opportunity to achieve results with a minimal commitment of resources. Fraser remarked, ‘the introduction of the suicide type of attack means that they can produce greater damage with fewer aircraft and less well trained crews’.150 The Director of Intelligence at AI3 noted how the training of Kamikaze pilots was a relatively easy process, since the only measures required were to instruct pilots to make a dive against the vulnerable parts of their target.151 Beyond this, little was needed apart from indoctrination. Allied countermeasures did not provide full protection. In December 1944, Somerville forwarded to Cunningham a report by Commander H.S. Hopkins, a Royal Navy observer attached to the US Pacific Fleet, warning that, while the armoured decks onboard British vessels afforded protection, ‘these would probably be quite ineffective if the Japanese used still larger aircraft and heavier bombs’.152 Nor did the available resources permit drastic improvements. In response to Churchill’s enquiry on the most effective methods, Cunningham replied that an adequate number of well-directed fighter aircraft and AA defences was essential.153 However, he lamented, ‘it will be some time before this gear can be supplied and fitted’. Once again, resource shortages gave the British few alternatives aside from improvising the use of existing equipment. The British Pacific Fleet’s performance at Okinawa demonstrated how naval staffs and ship crews were fully aware of their continued need to employ the available AA equipment in an efficient manner. For example, the damage inflicted on the carrier HMS Formidable during the second half of 143

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the Okinawa operations brought home the need to replace the existing 20 mm AA guns with heavier 40 mm devices.154 However, because an immediate refitting was not practicable, protection had to be provided by deploying destroyer pickets at further ranges. Rawlings conceded that air raid warning radar equipment had fallen ‘far short of what is required to combat Japanese suicide tactics’, but that ‘no early advance can be expected’.155 British naval crews also needed to adjust to Japanese air tactics. Deterrent fire, which had worked to ward off German dive bombers was unlikely to work against Kamikaze pilots, mainly because the latter had no wish to survive and return to base. AA crews had to bear in mind that Japanese aircraft were a menace until destroyed. The Director of Tactical and Staff Duties agreed that the main reason why the Japanese were able to successfully attack the HMS Indomitable and Formidable was because at the time of the attack, their aircraft were away on bombing raids against coastal targets, and destroyers provided the only means of AA support.156 The main lesson drawn was to ensure close mutual cooperation between ships. The damage inflicted by Kamikaze tactics thus continued to highlight the limited comfort that could be drawn from Japan’s inferior air power, until the closing stages of the conflict. British naval staffs took the lessons from combat experiences as a clear exposition of the shortcomings of their naval AA defences, and felt compelled to undertake a continued exploration of the means to improve the effectiveness of their vessels. Numerical superiority over the Japanese air services was considered inadequate for success. The Japanese had proved the importance of tactical skill and technology and similarly, the British learned to improve their own naval forces in these areas.

Japan’s army air services British intelligence on the Japanese army air forces (JAAF) echoed a key feature which characterized evaluations of the JNAF, namely, a tendency to conclude that growing Japanese inferiority in technology and numbers did not obscure the threat posed by enemy methods. While the army air services demonstrated a somewhat lower level of efficiency than their naval counterparts, they achieved notable successes in exploiting Allied weaknesses with skilful tactics. The threat could not be dismissed until British air forces had achieved adequate strength and efficiency. Intelligence on the JAAF operated under the purview of AHQ India, and after November 1943, its successor, ACSEA. The joint Anglo-American air command set up in December 1943, the Eastern Air Command (EAC), also handled intelligence on the army air services. Responsibility for assessing the JAAF was allocated to the air commands in Southeast Asia mainly because the IJA’s air arm conducted the bulk of Japanese air operations in the region. In a similar pattern to every branch of Japan’s services, information came in two forms, the first of which was material from enemy sources such as 144

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captured documents and equipment, as well as POWs, the second source being reports on Allied encounters. Again, accounts of the US air operations in the Southwest Pacific, another area where the JAAF took responsibility, provided important intelligence for the British. Especially during 1943, when the India–Burma front remained locked in a stalemate, information from US sources was important. The intelligence directorates at AHQ India and ACSEA were the main centres for analysing the material and thereafter disseminating it to air commanders on the India–Burma front. The Air Ministry’s intelligence directorate also provided periodic digests obtained from its US counterparts; however, its role in the analysis stage was secondary. In a similar fashion to developments within the British–Indian army, the improvement of air tactics was facilitated by the autonomy enjoyed by those responsible for operational planning. Air marshals and wing commanders in Southeast Asia were able to use the experiences of their respective squadrons to determine the appropriate methods, and to share their findings with their cohorts, without bureaucratic interference from the Air Ministry. By late 1944, the effective use of intelligence enabled ACSEA and the EAC to concoct the tactics necessary to neutralize the JAAF. For the large part of 1943, however, two factors prevented the British from writing off the threat posed by the Japanese army air services, both of which arose from its ability to adapt its capabilities in accordance with prevailing circumstances. The first of these was the imponderable possibility of future improvements in equipment, and the second factor was the Japanese air forces’ continued demonstration of their tactical skill. On one hand, the JAAF’s deteriorating state and its mounting losses provided AHQ India with reliable indications that the initial image of a technologically advanced opponent had been illusory. The JAAF’s reverses exposed a number of deficiencies in its aircraft. The most notable was the lightness of their armour and armament. In April 1943, the chief intelligence officer at AHQ India noted how the Japanese had followed a policy of constructing aircraft with a view to providing manoeuvrability and high performance.157 The measure often required aircraft to possess minimum weight, which inevitably entailed reduced armour and the absence of protected fuel tanks. The policy of light construction resulted in ‘a high state of vulnerability both to aircraft and crew’. The low opinion of Japanese aircraft performance also began to pervade the Air Ministry. In September, an intelligence summary contained a report which had appeared in the SWPA, detailing a series of accounts by US air officers who had conducted experiments with a captured Oscar Mk.II.158 The unanimous opinion was that the Oscar ‘was outclassed in most aspects’ by the P-47 and Spitfire, ‘except in maneuverability and low altitude combat’. However, current deficiencies did not provide a concrete indication of future trends. The introduction of improved aircraft types, or lack thereof, 145

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could not be forecasted. In January 1944, SEAC noted how the Japanese had suffered heavy losses of aircraft during their attacks in the Arakan region, and suggested that the employment of the Type 2F (Tojo) fighter, which had proven its worth in China, was the obvious solution.159 On the possibility of such scenarios, SEAC simply stated, ‘at the present stage, [the Japanese] are unlikely to have many of these available’. Conclusions by the Air Ministry’s Director of Intelligence and the JIC, which surmised that the Japanese were unlikely to achieve any significant improvements, were based on observations which revealed trends since the outbreak of the war, and represented speculation.160 When improvements in Japanese aircraft technology did appear, they often raised caution. This scenario became increasingly common during the closing stages of the conflict. In 1944, the Japanese government ordered the aircraft industry to embark on a massive construction programme, the result of which was the appearance of new models equipped with more powerful engines and increased armament. By 1945, Allied aircrews encountered a number of aircraft with noticeably improved performance. ACSEA noted how engine capacity had doubled, and that the Japanese had been able to ‘pattern excellent armor plate of the standard form’.161 The only source of comfort was that Japan could not match Allied aircraft production and technological development. The level of attrition the British were likely to incur in the meantime remained uncertain. The uncertainty surrounding future improvements was compounded by concerns arising from the JAAF’s proven capacity to challenge its Allied opponents by resorting to tactical manoeuvring. In February 1944, ACSEA disseminated an account obtained from the US South Pacific force, which concluded that while the Japanese could no longer conduct offensive operations, they remained ‘largely a defensive weapon, exacting the maximum toll it can as [the Allies] move forward’.162 In assessing the situation on the India–Burma front, the British were careful not to take their enemy’s declining power in the Pacific theatres as a reassurance that the Japanese air services were categorically ineffective. This aspect was illustrated by AHQ India’s detailed description of an air squadron based in the Malay peninsula, acknowledged as ‘one of the most efficient and versatile of the Japanese army air force’.163 As the unit showed every sign it would continue to operate in Southeast Asia, a study of its methods was valuable. Observations of the JAAF’s bombing operations revealed that its pilots were able to adjust tactics in accordance with the level of opposition and thereby exploit weaknesses in Allied air defences. In January 1944, SEAC Headquarters received from the US War Department, via the Air Ministry, an analysis of air operations in the Pacific theatres. While the Air Ministry intended to clear away some of the ambiguities, it also noted that the intelligence thus far had not revealed definite patterns, and that Japanese air tactics were dictated by the area where they operated.164 The JAAF’s operations in 146

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the India–Burma theatre also demonstrated its propensity to conduct coordinated attacks with high efficiency. During the first Arakan offensive, enemy aircraft launched a series of attacks against aerodromes, and managed to divert the British away from the front lines, thereby preventing them from providing close air support for the advance on the Mayu peninsula. The chief intelligence officer at AHQ India noted that the operations had been ‘planned to achieve a definite objective within a limited period’, and the report was disseminated by the Air Ministry and GHQ India with a similar undertone.165 By the early part of 1944, the prevailing opinion on the relative capabilities of the JAAF and RAF on the Burma front was one of reserved confidence. Japanese aircraft continued to conduct sporadic raids against airfields; however, they gradually learned that their operations could not achieve results after the Allies introduced radar and conducted regular air patrols.166 The Japanese proved incapable of attacking well-defended targets. The JAAF also appeared preoccupied with attacking airfields, and neglected the value of strategic bombing operations against Allied communications and port facilities in the east coast of India.167 This was largely because Japanese aircraft did not have sufficient range and bombing capacity. The JAAF’s combat effectiveness was also deteriorating. As in the Pacific theatres, heavy losses had led to a loss of skilled pilots. By mid 1943, the RAF replaced its obsolete Blenheim and Hurricane fighters with more advanced machines, most notably the Beaufighter, whose extended range and enhanced armament enabled the British to match their enemy’s technological capabilities. Nevertheless, the RAF could not gain ascendancy without providing larger quantities of its top-of-the-line aircraft to the India–Burma front. While tactical skill and technology were essential if numerical superiority was to neutralize the enemy, the reverse was equally true. At the start of 1944, the quantitative balance did not weigh heavily in the Allies’ favour.168 A large portion of their air strength was tied down in operations to protect the ‘Hump’ supply route from India to China. The Japanese operated on interior lines of communication, and were able to quickly assemble aircraft for minor raids. The Allied air raid warning system also contained gaps occasioned by the intervening mountains. The JAF’s ability to inflict damage on inadequately protected areas continued to warn against complacency. Moreover, until Spitfires could be deployed on a significant scale, even the RAF’s most advanced aircraft in the Burma theatre were roughly on par with their Japanese counterparts in terms of speed and range. Evidence of Japanese shortcomings was of limited comfort unless British forces were equipped to exploit them while at the same time neutralizing their opponent’s strengths. Air commanders dismissed the threat posed by Japanese raids only after they had received larger reinforcements of Spitfires.169 The dismissal of the JAAF’s ability to engage in air to air combat was also a gradual process, mainly because of its tactical skill. Although Japanese 147

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fighters were technically inferior due to their poor armour, its pilots were proficient at making use of their aircraft’s manoeuvrability. Because Allied aircrews were accustomed to relying upon speed and superior armament to overcome their opponents, they faced the danger of being caught off guard by surprise attacks against the rear and belly of the aircraft, both of which were directions in which AA guns had difficulty in delivering fire. In September 1943 the Air Ministry disseminated a report obtained from the US Army Air Force, which closed with a number of warnings, one of which was, ‘do not underestimate the Zeke. It is most maneuverable, fast and hard to hit’.170 Japanese pilots in the SEAC areas also demonstrated their adeptness at employing deceptive measures. In March 1944, the 3rd Tactical Air Force described to Headquarters ACSEA how decoy aircraft were often used to draw attention away from squadrons of Oscars.171 The move enabled enemy fighters to conduct surprise attacks, often compelling British formations to split up and lose coordination. Peirse recalled that the Spitfire’s advantages ‘were not immediately apparent’, because British squadrons ‘could not effectively employ their high overtaking speed’ against an enemy who skilfully exploited his manoeuvrability.172 Although tactical talent could not enable the JAAF to defeat its opponents in the long run, the Japanese continued to pose difficulties which the British were reluctant to downplay. For practical purposes, the tactical capabilities of the JAAF’s fighters necessitated an adequate standard of training among British aircrews. Encounters on the Burma front highlighted the need for vigilance against the moves enemy pilots were likely to make. During the second Arakan campaign, the Japanese provided fighter cover for their offensive. British squadrons followed their standard practice of operating independently and in rotation, enabling the JAAF to achieve local superiority over short periods. Japanese pilots often took advantage of the situation by following formations of Spitfires back to their base and attacking them when they were low on fuel. Headquarters 3rd Tactical Air Force warned, ‘we must not lapse into overconfidence’, as the Japanese could inflict considerable damage when Spitfires were outnumbered.173 The only guaranteed way to neutralize enemy fighters was to keep British aircraft in close formation and engage Japanese pilots at all times in order to deny them the opportunity to target individual aircraft or those operating in small groups. In September 1944, the RAF issued a tactical bulletin, warning that pilots arriving from the European and Middle East theatres had to discard their belief that Japanese pilots were easy opponents. Aircrews needed to avoid the fallacy, ‘to imagine that one can use the same tactics against the Japanese as were used against the Germans’.174 In order to outmanoeuvre enemy aircraft British pilots needed to match their opponent’s skill in conducting abrupt climbs and dives. Of equal importance was to remain alert to new manoeuvres. Indications of the enemy’s propensity to improvise its fighter tactics were a further reason for vigilance. During a bombing mission over Rangoon in 148

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January 1945, Japanese fighters managed to shoot down a number of B-29s with a level of precision they had hitherto not achieved. Headquarters ACSEA suggested that the Japanese had developed the capacity to employ ‘no allowance’ methods,175 and lodged a request that EAC furnish information on the future use of similar measures.176 Although EAC replied that there had been no evidence of the enemy using ‘no allowance’ firing, all units had been made aware of its possible employment, and prompt reports were to be forwarded whenever such tactics were observed.177 The possibility of improvements was often sufficient to give rise to warnings that British forces had to minimize their opponent’s ability to inflict losses.

Conclusion The evolution of British assessments regarding the tactical and technological capabilities of Japan’s armed forces reveals three general rules that determined how the defence establishment dismantled its image of the Japanese as a formidable opponent. First, while raw intelligence often provided crucial information on the underlying features of Japanese doctrine, the material could not substitute firsthand combat experience as a means of determining the challenges facing British forces. The prospect of formulating an accurate assessment was directly proportional to the level of engagement between the opposing forces. The absence of major naval encounters following the April 1942 raids on Ceylon prevented the Admiralty from making an educated evaluation of the IJN. By the same token, the success with which the War Office and British– Indian army command were able to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the IJA hinged on the numerous encounters on the Burma front. The second factor which shaped assessments concerning Japanese capabilities was the presence, or absence, of set patterns in enemy methods. The IJA’s defensive tactics against amphibious landings were a prime example of how inconsistency precluded a definite conclusion. Japanese methods depended on a wide variety of factors, ranging from the importance of the target and local topography, to the availability of resources. British intelligence staffs conceded that attempts to establish general rules were futile, and the level of opposition depended on individual circumstances. Operational planning was undertaken with a view to preparing for a wide range of scenarios. Third, and most importantly, the British could dismiss the threat posed by Japan’s armed services only when their own forces had proven capable of defeating their opponent without incurring excessive casualties. The IJA, IJN and air services proved adept at remedying their material and technological weaknesses, by employing tactics and weapons capable of inflicting attrition on the Allies. The Japanese could not be neutralized without adequate counter-measures. 149

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Combat experience revealed how superiority in numbers and firepower did not guarantee success. Assessments of the IJA highlighted this aspect. Before the tide on the Burma front turned in spring 1944, British forces had to prove their combat worthiness. The failure to overcome enemy defences during the first Arakan offensive in spite of superiority in manpower and equipment led commanders on the Burma front from Slim to Auchinleck to realize that the efficiency of their forces needed to undergo drastic improvements if they were to stand a chance of success. The IJA’s skill at employing its infantry to infiltrate and outflank Allied forces required British troops to employ countermeasures that relied on a meticulous patrolling of the battlefield. The IJA proved talented at constructing bunkers that could withstand bombardment. Its employment of natural obstacles to bolster the resilience of its positions showed ingenuity. British forces needed to use their supporting arms effectively to ensure the adequate destruction of enemy defences, and then pave the way for infantry units to conduct the final advance. Efforts to overcome Japanese defences invariably proved laborious. The XIV Army’s victories in the Arakan and Manipur fronts during 1944 did not owe themselves solely to material superiority. Of equal importance was the arduous effort made by British field commanders to draw upon the lessons of combat experience to devise and implement the appropriate tactics. Although operations in close country were viewed with disfavour owing to the difficulties of bringing to bear superior firepower, British field commanders made good use of the intelligence obtained through combat experience. The IJA’s adeptness in jungle warfare tactics led field commanders to avoid engagements in conditions where its own forces were at a disadvantage. The decision to engage the IJA’s main forces in Burma on the Irrawaddy plains resulted from an understanding that warfare in open country enabled British forces to employ their modern weaponry and mobility more effectively. The dismantling of apprehensions regarding Japan’s air services was also dependent on the extent to which the British proved their capability to avoid losses. However, in contrast to the IJA, where the importance of superior firepower and technology was diluted by the role of training and tactical skill, proper equipment played a crucial role in the air war against the Japanese. Despite the problems that they suffered as a result of their growing numerical inferiority and mounting losses of pilots and aircraft, Japan’s naval air services continued to possess a high level of skill in exploiting Allied weaknesses. Enemy bombers were able to inflict significant levels of damage on warships which were not adequately protected, with the devastating effects of the Kamikaze attacks providing the most notable example. British capital ships had to be refitted with modernized radar and AA defences. That a total refitting did not take place was more due to resource shortages and the difficulties involved in implementing the necessary technologies on a large scale, rather than an inability to acknowledge the dangers. The situation required naval crews to use their existing equipment in a more effective 150

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manner. British pilots also needed to achieve a sufficient level of skill at manoeuvring their aircraft in order to neutralize Japanese fighters. Last but not least, the RAF also had to provide adequate numbers of its most advanced aircraft for operations in the Far East. An overview of the manner in which apprehensions of Japanese capabilities were dismantled raises the final pertinent question, namely, as to whether Britain’s defence establishment properly used the available intelligence in its effort to determine the effort required to defeat the enemy. Insofar as British operational requirements were concerned, the most salient lessons were applied effectively. Military commanders paid due heed to the necessity of achieving victory at the lowest possible cost and avoiding further setbacks. Evidence of Japanese resilience was therefore most likely to warn against lapsing into over-optimism, and lay the grounds for the development of adequate countermeasures to neutralize the threat.

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5 RACIAL CONTEMPT OR LOGICAL ANALYSIS? British intelligence on Japanese military morale

British perceptions of Japanese military morale demand a dedicated chapter for two reasons. First, for Japan’s leaders, the fighting spirit of the armed forces provided a key weapon for fighting a prolonged war of attrition. The strategy of an attritional war, in turn, constituted Japan’s only hope of inducing Allied war-weariness and accomplishing its ultimate war aim of securing a negotiated peace, thereby circumventing the disadvantages accrued from its inferior economic productivity. Second, for the Allies, the IJA’s morale posed a distinct obstacle to an easy victory. Therefore, any study that covers British intelligence assessments is not complete without analysing how information on the psychological features of Japan’s war effort was dealt with. The available intelligence often did not permit accurate assessments because the behaviour and performance of Japan’s armed forces were unpredictable. The uncertainty was aggravated because one of the few definite conclusions was that weaknesses in the IJA’s morale were unlikely to cause a collapse in its war effort. Experiences in the Pacific and Southeast Asia theatres showed how adversity could only diminish the Japanese soldiers’ confidence in their ability to win. The Japanese army’s will to resist remained largely intact, in spite of the increasingly hopeless odds it faced. As a result, psychological warfare was conducted on the understanding that such strategies alone were insufficient if the Allies wished to accomplish their objective of destroying Japan’s war-making capabilities. The branch of Japan’s armed forces whose morale attracted the most attention was by far and away the army. The IJN’s inactivity after January 1943, followed by the destruction of its main fleet at Leyte, rendered intelligence on its morale superfluous; references were limited to passing comments.1 The morale of Japanese aircrews did not attract much interest until Kamikaze attacks emerged during the closing stages of the conflict.2 The morale of Japanese ground troops, on the other hand, sustained their resistance against the Allies in both the Pacific and SEAC theatres. 152

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Japanese military morale and the race issue The subject of British intelligence on the IJA’s morale is closely related to one of the most sensitive issues to emerge in the historiography of the Pacific War, namely the race factor, and how Western antagonisms against the Japanese influenced the Allied conduct of the conflict. In a cogent work titled War Without Mercy, John Dower illustrated how the unexpected success with which Japan’s forces ousted the Allies from Southeast Asia gave rise to an institutionalized hatred for the Japanese.3 The prevailing stereotype was that the Japanese were a barbaric and inhumane people, and the outlook, in turn, frequently distorted Allied assessments of the enemy. The Japanese soldier’s insistence on fighting to the finish fuelled animosity, and resulted in a situation where operations were planned solely with the aim of exterminating enemy troops.4 The use of propaganda to convince the Japanese to give up their fight against the overwhelmingly superior Allied forces was considered futile, because their values and respect for human life were in stark contrast to those held in the West.5 Similar views were echoed in Clayton Laurie’s article in a 1996 issue of War and Society,6 as well as Mark Johnston’s parallel account of Australian perceptions of their adversaries.7 Allied forces certainly viewed the IJA’s fighting spirit as a key impediment. The question arises as to whether cultural animosity distorted Western intelligence assessments of the Japanese soldier. In this respect, a comprehensive study recently completed by Allison Gilmore8 has exposed the one-sided nature of Dower’s hypothesis. Focusing on the US experiences in the SWPA, Gilmore illustrated how Western images of the Japanese were not driven by hostility to the extent Dower and his proponents have claimed, and she convincingly argued that the Allies made a concerted effort to defeat their enemy by means apart from annihilation. The evidence obtained through captured documents and POW interrogations, along with observations of the performance of Japanese troops, provided reasonable grounds for deducing that their morale was susceptible to damage. After the tide in the Pacific theatres turned decisively against the IJA in late 1942, demoralization became increasingly common and subsequently, Japanese performance declined.9 When employed in the correct circumstances, propaganda was a valuable weapon for diminishing the enemy’s self-confidence as well as its combat effectiveness. The British experience in Southeast Asia suggests that images of the Japanese soldier were based more on a logical analysis of the material obtained through encounters on the battlefield. The setbacks at Malaya and in Burma revealed how Japanese military capabilities had been underestimated, and for the remainder of the war, the British demonstrated an earnest desire to gain a balanced understanding of their enemy. At the same time, the IJA’s fighting spirit was largely the product of cultural factors, and the British paid attention to the fact that they were fighting an enemy whose

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mindset was different from their own. Yet, the British were inclined to undertake a professional assessment of their foe, and reluctant to reach mistaken conclusions not based on solid evidence. Racial animosity was therefore not the main driving force in shaping opinions of the Japanese. Despite Britain’s eagerness to understand the nature of the Japanese soldier’s fighting spirit, the absence of prior encounters resulted in a number of ambiguities. To complicate matters, the performance of Japanese troops revealed an unpredictability which often did not allow an empirical evaluation. Until summer 1944, intelligence organizations conceded that they could not formulate a clearer image without meticulously analysing the information obtained through POWs and captured documents, as well as observations of the enemy’s ways of fighting. The establishment of a special Cabinet subcommittee in early 1944 to investigate the Japanese soldier’s characteristics signified how the army leadership was committed to putting together an accurate evaluation of the enemy’s mindset. By late 1944, the British concluded that the IJA was prone to suffer demoralization and subsequent decline in efficiency when faced with defeats and prolonged adversities. At the same time, the overwhelming proportion of Japanese troops continued to resist surrender even when confronted by overwhelming odds. For the purpose of operational planning, the situation had a number of important implications, and British methods of coping with the IJA’s morale also revealed a clear understanding of the challenges and opportunities. First, propaganda organizations and field commanders viewed psychological warfare as a valuable weapon. Propaganda magnified the anxieties and depression the Japanese suffered as a result of hardships and setbacks on the battlefield, thereby creating lower levels of resistance. Second, the British recognized the low prospect of compelling large segments of the IJA to surrender, and drew up a plan where propaganda was used mainly to weaken enemy resistance, and victory achieved through the physical destruction of Japan’s armies. The fact of the matter is that the IJA’s morale was by no means invincible, and its soldiers proved as vulnerable to debilitation and war-weariness as their Western counterparts. The difficulties involved in formulating an empirical assessment of Japanese morale owed itself to the varying social and educational backgrounds from which its soldiers originated. The attitudes of the rank and file differed widely. A postwar study, conducted by the US Foreign Morale Analysis Division, revealed that only 10–15 per cent of Japanese servicemen were the hardcore fanatics who readily sacrificed their lives in the name of their divine Emperor.10 The remainder consisted of a range of personalities, including a considerable portion of career soldiers who saw armed service as a professional obligation, as well as conscripts who felt they had little choice apart from serving their duties. The circumstances were bound to complicate efforts to draw set patterns in the Japanese soldier’s behaviour. 154

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The Western image of the IJA’s aversion to surrender was grounded in reality. The enemy’s training rendered him more likely to persist even in the most unbearable conditions. Three factors laid the basis for this tendency. First, the IJA cultivated within its rank and file traditional Japanese values which called for an unquestioned acceptance of the duty to devote one’s life to the Emperor, and obligation to accept orders from higher authority.11 Second, and of no less importance, Japanese troops were instilled with the Bushido (warrior code) spirit which dictated that surrender was tantamount to the highest form of treason. Third, for Japanese soldiers who became disillusioned with the notion that surrender entailed dishonour, a powerful motivation to continue fighting was their deep-seated distrust of Westerners and belief that the Allies regularly tortured and mistreated POWs. The cumulative result was a situation where beleaguered enemy troops almost invariably conducted last-ditch suicide attacks.12 Under the circumstances, the available intelligence was likely to indicate that the IJA suffered weaknesses, while providing visible signs that only a minute percentage of its troops was likely to cease fighting voluntarily. The question arises as to how the British formulated their assessment of the IJA’s morale.

Ambiguities and apprehensions, winter 1943 to summer 1944 British evaluations of the IJA’s morale during the eighteen months following its landmark defeat at Guadalcanal reflected two key features, namely ambiguity and apprehension. The available intelligence frequently did not permit accurate assessments unless analysed en masse. Efforts to determine the interrelation between the enemy’s morale and his performance were frustrated by the difficulties of processing the substantial evidence, as well as the Japanese soldier’s unpredictable behaviour. The level of knowledge needed to appraise the significance of the intelligence could be obtained only after the Allies had accumulated sufficient combat experience. Assessments were prepared on the understanding that the intelligence did not readily provide a full picture. The mystery was compounded by apprehensions arising from the enemy’s continued avoidance of surrender at all costs. Indications of demoralization only proved that the Japanese soldier’s performance had been affected by the psychological damage he suffered through defeats and prolonged adversities. By late 1943, the British army’s effort to assess the IJA’s morale was facilitated by an efficient apparatus, staffed by personnel who could provide an insight into the enemy’s characteristics. Material on the IJA’s morale was handled by the same organizations within the War Office and GHQ India (and later SEAC) which dealt with Japanese army tactics.13 The sources of information and the manner in which the intelligence was channelled followed the same pattern. Naturally, for operational reasons, the British– 155

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Indian army had a vested interest in understanding their Japanese counterparts’ fighting spirit. However, air staffs also had a stake in the matter. ACSEA and the Air Ministry were eager to obtain information on issues such as the Japanese troops’ reaction to aerial bombardment. The air services were also frequently tasked to disseminate propaganda leaflets behind enemy lines, and were therefore anxious to know what their operations were achieving. For this reason, the air intelligence directorates both in Whitehall and the India–Burma front acted as key players in the process, and frequently exchanged material with their army counterparts. Despite the establishment of a more organized system, intelligence efforts concerning the IJA’s morale were complicated by two key factors not related to the structure of the machinery. The first was the nature of the raw intelligence. The evidence tended to reveal the attitude of individual soldiers and their respective units, and the masses of material had to be examined thoroughly before conclusions could be reached. Information from POW interrogations represented personal opinions. In February 1944, MI2 obtained an account provided by a POW captured at Bougainville. The prisoner suggested that when Japanese units faced encirclement and their supplies and ammunition were exhausted, the Allies could achieve results through propaganda which promised good treatment for prisoners.14 However, the information was not passed on as a representation of established facts unless corroborated by an accumulation of similar evidence. Captured documents also provided important information; however, their contents needed to be viewed with caution. On one hand, the value of documentary intelligence was enhanced by a habit which prevailed among Japanese troops. Because field service regulations discouraged open expressions of discontent, soldiers found solace by confiding in their diaries. When disease, food shortages and setbacks on the battlefield took hold, Japanese troops often recorded their thoughts in painstaking detail. In January 1944, SEAC noted how soldier’s diaries revealed an introspective view into their authors’ mindset and reaction to the features encountered in the battlefield.15 At the same time, the documentary intelligence frequently reflected only the thoughts of individuals. This aspect was illustrated by a pamphlet issued by Special Forces Headquarters in early 1945, which warned that the average diarist was ‘not necessarily symbolic of his comrades’.16 The contention put forward by the bulletin, namely that the Japanese soldier was equally prone to disease and fatigue as his Western counterpart, hinged on the fact that the vast majority of captured diaries made that point ‘clear as day’. The second, and more serious problem arose from the Japanese soldier’s unpredictable behaviour, coupled with the British army’s lack of experience in engaging the IJA. Even for the most informed analyst, the material revealed inconsistencies which begged explanation. For example, indications of the Japanese soldier’s exceptional level of tenacity were equally abundant as 156

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evidence of his tendency to suffer unusually high demoralization when faced with unexpected setbacks. The only certain conclusion was that the enemy’s erratic performance precluded a clear-cut hypothesis. For example, the Lethbridge Mission’s report noted that Japanese troops had proven not to be superhuman.17 At the same time, to describe the enemy as ‘second class Italians’, as Australian forces in the Pacific were doing habitually, was equally erroneous. The report concluded, ‘the truth lies somewhere between two extremes’. Without a clear picture of the enemy’s psyche, the dynamics of the Japanese soldier’s morale and its effect on his behaviour could not be determined. Intelligence staffs and field commanders avoided jumping into hasty conclusions. For example, in September 1943, GHQ India disseminated an officer’s account of his unit’s experiences during the second Arakan campaign.18 Enemy troops panicked and abandoned their positions on a number of occasions; however, the incidents were ‘not to be taken as the type of action to be expected’. The Japanese were frequently ready to defend their positions to the bitter end, and this aspect needed to be remembered if a balanced picture was to be achieved. The uncertainty surrounding the key aspects of Japanese morale was compounded by the pessimism arising from evidence which suggested that incidents of enemy troops surrendering were likely to remain rare. Gilmore has illustrated how the IJA’s mounting setbacks resulted in a significant decline in morale. The downturn was signified by the steady rise in the number of Japanese POWs. Whereas engagements during the early stages of the campaign in the Pacific theatres saw only a handful of enemy troops surrendering, the total number captured during the Philippines campaign rose to well over 10,000.19 The fact that 19,500 Japanese troops surrendered in the SWPA alone proves that their morale possessed vulnerabilities. However, the vast majority continued to insist on fighting to the finish, and the number of POWs therefore represented only a small percentage of enemy forces. Developments in the SEAC theatres revealed similar trends. The IJA’s failure to supply its troops in Burma, and the mounting difficulties the XV Army faced in holding out against Slim’s forces, resulted in a significant deterioration in morale. The increase in the number of POWs indicated how the enemy’s fighting spirit had declined. The figures rose from less than ten per month during early 1944, to a grand total of 300 in the aftermath of Imphal and Kohima.20 During the attempted breakout from the encirclement at Sittang in July 1945, 1,400 Japanese troops were captured.21 However, the approximately 1,700 or so22 POWs taken represented less than one per cent of the 300,000 troops sent to Burma.23 Indications the IJA’s demoralization appeared in three distinct forms, each of which revealed a vital component of its fighting spirit. The first aspect which attracted attention was the growing incidence of disease and 157

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starvation. This problem was significant because it showed how the IJA’s inadequate system for logistics not only affected its operational capabilities. Of equal importance, troops were losing their will to fight, thereby further diminishing their combat effectiveness. The second noteworthy feature was unit cohesion, which saw a rapid deterioration under the strains of mounting setbacks. Evidence of strained relations between officers and the lower ranks raised questions whether Japanese troops were likely to follow their tradition of unquestioningly executing their orders. The final, and most important component was the Japanese soldier’s confidence in his combat efficiency in relation to the Allies. Closely related was their dedication to Japan’s war effort. Both aspects formed a crucial basis for the IJA’s morale. Conversely, a prolonged bout of adversities often bred defeatism. The Japanese soldier’s susceptibility to declining fortitude in the face of defeat and hardships gave rise to optimism because it revealed that the Japanese soldier’s ability to provide effective resistance had been affected. At the same time, the level of hope to be drawn was limited because the enemy’s staying power was too resilient to be destroyed. For example, events in the Pacific theatres dispelled the myth that Japanese troops were immune to starvation and disease, and gave rise to the conclusion that they were prone to suffer ‘human weaknesses’. The contention that Japanese troops were less dependent on food supplies than their Western counterparts arose during the opening stages of the conflict, when the IJA’s logistical requirements were simplified because its troops lived off the country and hoarded supplies from the indigenous population. Especially in Southeast Asia, where local agriculture was developed, conquering armies could find plenty of rice fields and farms. The IJA’s requirements were also comparatively lower because its troops subsisted on more simple diets. However, conditions were not as favourable in the islands of the Pacific, where the undeveloped nature of the country meant there was little to plunder. At Guadalcanal and New Guinea, where Allied air and submarine attacks prevented the Japanese from obtaining supplies, morale had declined, and this was an important cause of their failure to hold out.24 The IJA’s medical care for its troops was equally poor. POW interrogations and inspections of captured field hospitals revealed an alarming incidence of malaria and sicknesses resulting from poor sanitation. In many units, medical supplies were virtually nonexistent and the standard of treatment appalled Allied observers. Developments of this nature dismantled the belief that prevailed during the opening stages of the conflict, namely that Japanese troops were immune from the elements of the jungle and thereby less likely to succumb to tropical diseases.25 However, the available intelligence did not reveal concrete signs that the IJA’s morale could collapse as a result of disease and starvation. At the JIC level, a report on overall Axis strengths concluded that while Japanese troops complained about poor food and sickness as much as any soldier facing 158

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similar conditions, it did not affect their tenacity and willingness to fight to the end.26 Encounters in the SEAC theatres also showed few reasons to believe that disease and starvation were anywhere close to destroying the IJA’s resolve. In October 1943, captured letters obtained from a Japanese unit based at Sumprabum told that, owing to poor communications in the mountain regions, the IJA’s supplies amounted to less than one-third of the authorized ration, and the available food was ‘unfit for consumption’.27 A Japanese soldier had discovered a package of British rations, and later noted how he wished he ‘could have a stomach full of such good food’.28 A medical officer described how during the spring 1944 Arakan offensive, soldiers in his unit were ‘climbing mountains with their heavy packs and ammunition all the time [and could] barely keep going; such [was] their hunger’.29 However, the material was treated as nothing more than a rough indication that the enemy’s fighting capabilities had weakened. The effects of declining unit cohesion were also gauged with caution. Intelligence staffs were reluctant to forecast an imminent crumbling of the IJA’s morale. The misfortunes suffered by Japanese troops led to an increase in incidents where discipline in the battlefield had faltered. In autumn 1943, the Vice-Minister for War delivered a lecture to a gathering of army commanders, voicing concern over the rising number of court martials. The offences consisted of violent actions against superior officers, desertion and nonattendance of duties. The War Office commented that, while the lecture may have been more of a ‘pep talk’, it did reveal the weaknesses ‘most feared by the High Command’.30 Evidence of anxieties within the IJA’s higher echelons also fit in with intelligence obtained from the field. When Japanese units faced mounting setbacks and troops lost their enthusiasm, relations between officers and soldiers had suffered strains. The dissatisfaction was aggravated by the officers’ practice of subjecting their troops to harsh discipline and strenuous work. A soldier whose unit was being driven out of New Guinea by Australian troops complained, ‘due to the ignorant platoon leader, men and NCOs do all of the suffering’.31 The diary continued a few days later, ‘had an argument with the platoon leader. Why must I be attached to a confounded, conceited, ignorant fool like him?’ Discipline in Japanese units had deteriorated; however, the information was passed on without venturing to guess whether a complete breakdown was to be expected. The Japanese soldier’s tendency to become dispirited in the face of reverses provided equally limited grounds for optimism. While the intelligence obtained from the Pacific and Southeast Asia revealed promising signs that prolonged setbacks had worn down the Japanese soldier’s morale, a continued weakening was unlikely to lead to a collapse in their capacity to fight, at least in the foreseeable future. Among the most noteworthy indications of declining confidence was the 159

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growing number of incidents where the Allies’ overwhelmingly superior firepower had brought home to Japanese soldiers their less than favourable prospects of prevailing. The increased weight of air attacks had some sobering effects. Diaries captured in Lae and Buna suggested that ‘the enemy was overwhelmed by the amount of bombing conducted’.32 A Japanese lieutenant in New Guinea mourned, ‘we were the target for a mammoth raid for the second time since landing. . . . We were boiling over with rage and resentment but there was nothing we could do about it’.33 Similar statements had accumulated for months, proving that Japanese troops who had set off fully confident of victory had eventually become preoccupied with the effects of Allied air superiority. Events on the India–Burma front revealed similar trends, and showed that air raids and shortages of equipment had highlighted the difficulties of conducting operations against better-equipped opponents. A diary captured at Imphal noted how British–Indian forces were able to receive supplies via airdrop while Japanese troops simply could not maintain their logistics, leading one commander to lament, ‘look at the state of my men without air support!’.34 Captured diaries obtained in the aftermath of the Manipur campaign revealed the contrast between the confidence with which the Japanese planned their offensive and the depression that resulted from failure. The War Office commented that the operation showed more reliance on the unconquerable spirit of Japanese than on the material considerations which might have made it successful. The orders of the day issued by the divisional commander for the offensive, and the jottings of a company commander who took part, show that the intention and execution were two very different things.35 Japanese troops were learning the harsh lesson that they could not defeat opponents who possessed superiority weapons and technology. As far as the IJA’s overall effectiveness was concerned, the material provided hints that a decline had taken place. However, there were few concrete indications that further misfortunes would compel enemy troops to surrender in large numbers. The evidence pointing to Japanese troops being overtaken by defeatism in the face of Allied material superiority was significant for a further reason. The IJA’s practice of indoctrination rendered its rank and file particularly prone to holding mistaken beliefs in their own superiority, and the inflated confidence often gave way to a sense of disillusion when faced with setbacks. Again, the material showed that enemy morale suffered weaknesses; however, there were few concrete signs of any fatal problems. For example, the IJA’s tradition of suppressing individual thought proved a potential disadvantage. While practices of this nature went a long way towards maintaining discipline, they also stifled initiative. In August 1944, 160

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the War Office noted how Japanese officers and soldiers were over-reliant on methods prescribed by higher authority, which created a tendency to ‘apply textbook solutions to tactical problems, and to be upset if the solution proves unsuccessful’.36 Junior commanders showed little resource in varying their plans, and troops frequently adhered to tactics which had failed repeatedly. On the other hand, because Western societies valued individual freedom, Allied armies were in a more favourable position to use ingenuity to outmanoeuvre their opponents. Intelligence staffs took appropriate steps to ensure that British officers were aware of how their opponent’s performance could be affected by shortcomings in their way of thinking. At the same time, the material did not contain any hints that the Japanese soldier’s difficulties in handling unexpected situations could cause morale to collapse. The IJA’s patriotism and unquestioned loyalty to the Emperor and Japan’s ‘sacred mission’, while portraying an exceptionally dedicated army, also tended to overshadow the extent to which such sentiments were particularly prone to deterioration. However, the evidence pointing to this problem was treated for what it was worth, and ungrounded conclusions regarding the IJA’s capacity for resistance were avoided. While the Japanese army’s programme for troop indoctrination went a long way in bolstering the fighting spirit of its units, it also laid the grounds for some faults.37 The majority of troops held an infallible confidence in their own potential, mainly because they were inculcated with a credulous belief that divine intervention guaranteed victory. As the Allied campaigns in the Pacific and SEAC theatres gained momentum, the Japanese soldier’s sense of superiority gave way to indignation. The War Office noted how ‘the superstitious outlook of Japanese fighting man is his weakness. He is blindly arrogant and stupidly overconfident so that revulsion is bound to follow when he meets the weight of superior Allied weapons’.38 While the comment reflected a visible contempt, the paper concluded with an empathetic remark, to the effect that the Japanese were bound to learn eventually that they were fighting an enemy whose material and technological resources precluded any chance of victory. Captured documents revealed a growing number of cases where soldiers and officers acknowledged how their operations had failed because they were unable to match the Allies’ material strength. At the same time, large segments of Japanese troops continued to hold onto their belief that spiritual bravery would see them through. The War Office warned that it was unwise to conclude that Japanese morale has, ‘except in one or two cases, been materially affected by evidence of superiority in Allied aircraft and artillery’.39 Evidence of disillusionment did not permit conclusions whether such sentiments had gripped a large portion of enemy troops, nor did it suggest that the IJA’s capacity for effective resistance had been significantly affected. British intelligence organizations thus paid proper heed to the absence of any credible evidence that further misfortunes could compel Japanese troops 161

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to surrender in large proportions. Incidences of the Japanese giving themselves up to the Allies and ceasing their fight were anecdotal, and did not permit conclusions that the enemy’s determination to persist had weakened in any substantial way. For example, the lowered fighting spirit among Japanese troops in New Guinea did not indicate an overall decline, since the IJA continued to possess a large reserve of divisions which remained unscathed. MI2 minuted, ‘there was undoubtedly local deterioration of morale at Lae and Salamaua, which was only to be expected in the circumstances’.40 The need to assess Japanese psyche by examining the quality of individual units was borne out by an intelligence summary issued by GHQ India in November 1943, which contained details of a division in the Myitkyina area whose troops were exceptionally loyal towards Japan’s cause.41 Most importantly, in spite of the damage the IJA’s fighting spirit had incurred, its troops continued to possess an exceptional level of dedication. In May 1943, the War Office concluded that the Japanese soldier reached the depths of ‘despondent depression’ only when soundly beaten, in which case the usual response was a suicidal counterattack.42 A section in the HJA contained a US report on the capture of Attu, which remarked, ‘no better example of intense indoctrination of Japanese youth in the principles of Yamato damashii has been exhibited in other theatres’.43 Less than one per cent of the garrison had surrendered, and the encounter proved how the most loyal Japanese troops were imbued with a desire to die for their Emperor. The IJA’s performance in Burma revealed similarly few reasons to conclude that a significant proportion of its troops could be expected to lay down their arms. Expressions of anxiety by Japanese commanders over declining morale and the surrender of an albeit a small number of enemy troops signified that the IJA’s efficiency was threatened by faltering discipline.44 Furthermore, in Burma, where campaigns were conducted on land masses and the defending forces could depend on a solid line of communications, the Japanese had the option of escaping to safety. A large number of overwhelmed Japanese units did pursue the option of retreating after the failure of the offensives against Imphal and Kohima. Japanese units on the retreat also saw discipline fall into disarray. However, developments of this nature were not taken as signs that Japanese troops had started to habitually surrender or withdraw. Occurrences of Japanese soldiers giving themselves up remained too few and far between. The 17th Division’s narrative on the Imphal campaign warned, It would be false optimism to imagine that Japanese morale was appreciably lowered by their earlier reverses in this campaign [Imphal]. Some thought the presence of 16 POWs significant after all the months that the Division had spent trying to capture a single Jap. It was not particularly significant because: a) 90 [per cent] of these taken were wounded when captured, b) 4,100 were killed before 16 POWs were taken . . . 45 162

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Operations against Japanese positions were likely to continue seeing the defenders fighting to the last man and round. Mopping up remained a slow process. British intelligence appreciations of the damage inflicted on the IJA’s morale during 1943 and the early half of 1944, during which time the Allied counteroffensive on all fronts steadily picked up pace, reflected a realistic analysis of the nature and magnitude of the enemy’s staying power. Intelligence staffs understood that accurate assessments on the Japanese soldier’s mindset and its effect on his performance could not be made without a patient examination of the available evidence. The absence of indications that continued adversities could cause a collapse in the enemy’s morale meant that deterioration simply signified a weakening in his combat effectiveness. The complex situation created by the ambiguities and the resilience of the Japanese soldier’s morale led the Cabinet’s committee on joint technical warfare (JTWC) to set up a commission to conduct a comprehensive study on the means to remedy the situation.

Cabinet subcommittee on Japanese morale clarifies the image By late 1943, the uncertainties surrounding the way in which the Japanese soldier’s characteristics governed his combat performance, combined with the obstacles arising from his insistence on avoiding surrender, led to urgent calls within Whitehall as well as at the Cabinet level for an examination of possible solutions. Dower’s work on Allied assessments of the Japanese soldier has largely focused on the ‘national character’ studies conducted in the United States, mostly by psychologists and social anthropologists.46 Their investigations concluded that insecurity and a craving for conquest were an integral part of the Japanese mentality, and that the behaviour of its soldiers manifested itself accordingly. Allied views were tainted by an implacable suspicion which resulted in a tendency to make degrading generalizations. Similar studies made by the British reveal that the primary aim was to obtain a refined knowledge of the enemy. In the agenda for the War Office meeting held with representatives from the Foreign Office’s Political Warfare against Japan Committee (PWJC) in December 1943, the key concern raised was the manner in which the strengths and weaknesses of Japanese morale had been exaggerated.47 The British needed, as a ‘matter of urgency’ to obtain and analyse the pertinent information regarding the underlying principles of the Japanese soldier’s behaviour and performance. The upshot of a subsequent meeting was to employ a trained psychiatrist to analyse the material from a scientific viewpoint.48 An equally pressing question was whether psychological warfare provided the nail in the coffin that could compel demoralized troops to surrender, or whether such weapons could only be used to further erode their staying-power. 163

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In February 1944, the JTWC accepted the proposal, submitted by the Scientific Adviser to the Army Council, to establish an inter-service subcommittee that was to comprehensively investigate the battle morale of the Japanese forces, and in particular their reactions to various weapons, tactics and types of battle experience.49 The committee was also to determine the ‘principles of the general nature and structure of Japanese morale’ and the methods of attack. In addition to an array of members with an expertise on the cultural characteristics of Japanese soldiers, the committee was staffed by specialists in battlefield psychology and combat propaganda. Developments of this nature testify the importance which the highest levels of the establishment attached to obtaining a balanced view of the IJA’s morale, and seeking the most viable means to resolve the situation. The process leading to the production of the final JTWC memorandum further illustrated the difficulties involved in determining whether Japanese soldiers possessed weaknesses open to exploitation. The volume of material that had to be studied, and the contradictory nature of the evidence, placed delays. The Chief of the General Staff (CGS) at GHQ India prefaced the series of draft reports produced by the subcommittee by warning that the conclusions were ‘of a very cautious and tentative nature’.50 A great mass of material awaited translation. The intelligence also had to be corroborated with observations of the enemy’s performance. Firsthand information was lacking, since much of the information had been obtained from captured documents and diaries. Written evidence did not clearly indicate how the Japanese soldier’s mindset manifested itself in his actions in combat.51 On matters such as upbringing, education and military training, the British had a reasonably accurate knowledge of the principles on which the Japanese worked. Much less was known of how the practical result differed from the intention, and how far the Japanese soldier followed the ideals set out in the training manuals. Nevertheless, the final JTWC memorandum, produced in September, reflected a painstaking study of the pertinent evidence. Comprising five chapters and dozens of pages, the paper helped clear away a number of ambiguities concerning the IJA’s cultural characteristics and prevailing stereotypes.52 The introduction noted how Allied soldiers often saw the Japanese in the light of norms accepted in the West, and this was the main reason why their behaviour appeared peculiar. As a result, Westerners tended to portray the Japanese as ‘superhuman’ or ‘primitive savages’. A more informed view could be constructed by taking into account the fact that the Japanese had been brought up with a fundamentally different outlook on life, and this attitude had a distinct impact on their performance on the battlefield. By introducing a more objective analysis of the mechanics which shaped Japanese troop morale, the JTWC report made an important step in dispelling the widespread notion that the Japanese were ‘incomprehensible freaks’. Intelligence staffs sought to provide detailed explanations of how the enemy’s 164

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unique thought patterns laid the foundations for both his strengths and weaknesses, out of concerns about the potential hazards that could arise if British field officers and soldiers continued taking the conflicting evidence at face value. The memorandum also attempted to dispel stereotypes which had become common among Allied troops. The section on the Japanese reaction to weapons and tactics warned that statements suggesting the Japanese soldier ‘cannot stand mortars’, ‘panics when shelled’, ‘will not face bayonets’, or was unusually affected by any particular weapon, had to be accepted only with the greatest reserve.53 While enemy troops had reacted badly to certain weapons in isolated instances, there was no convincing evidence of any weapon having a peculiar effect. In cases where Japanese troops appeared to panic, the reaction was more due to the fact that they were caught by surprise. The section on Japanese upbringing and education drew a logical link between the enemy’s mindset and his performance. Japanese soldiers were products of their parent society, in which education was geared towards instilling a strict adherence to a detailed set of rules, and an unquestioning acceptance of orders from superiors.54 The system, which had been in place for centuries, meant that the IJA faced a relatively easy task in indoctrinating its troops to dedicate their lives to their divine Emperor. This was the main factor which rendered the Japanese a dangerous opponent. Yet, the system also gave rise to a situation where troops were unable to think outside the framework set out in their training, hence the tendency to become disconcerted when faced with the unexpected. Although the paper did repeat previous suggestions that the enemy’s practice of instilling rigid discipline was simultaneously a liability and an asset, the paper did provide detailed descriptions of circumstances when the enemy’s characteristics had detrimental effects.55 The point to remember was that surprise moves threw Japanese troops off balance. The formulation of empirical statements concerning the IJA’s characteristics raises the question whether the material provided field commanders with a more educated view of their adversary. During the months following the completion of the report, the War Office began to disseminate similar conclusions. In December, a section in the HJA opened by stating, ‘the Japanese soldier is, after all, a human being’, and continued with a detailed explanation of his strengths and weaknesses.56 The bulletin concluded, ‘while [the enemy] is still fighting, remember his virtues and defects. Your best protection of all lies in your ability to think more freely than he can’. British intelligence staffs showed an earnest desire to promote among officers an understanding of the Japanese soldier’s characteristics, and enable their own forces to operate more effectively. Unfortunately, hypotheses on how intelligence summaries and manuals influenced perceptions in the field are difficult because official secrets laws have prohibited direct references to the material. Memoirs and soldier’s 165

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diaries therefore do not provide much insight. The vast majority of British field officers in Burma did remain mystified whether the tendency to stage repeated attacks against well-fortified positions and the adherence to methods that had proven ineffective were more due to the Bushido code which insisted upon a show of bravery, or a simple lack of initiative among the lower ranks.57 Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Carfrae, a Chindit officer commanding the 29th Column, recalled, ‘the hearts and minds of the Japanese were beyond our understanding’.58 Ambiguities of this nature suggest deficiencies in dissemination. A further reason to downplay the value of intelligence summaries is revealed by secondary accounts which emphasized how British white troops, in particular, held a deep-seated hatred for the Japanese.59 The enemy was not considered human, but equated with a pestilence that needed to be exterminated. Their bravery and spirit of self-sacrifice were seen as signs of insanity. Field officers and troops often spoke of the ‘relentless butchery’ demonstrated by Japanese troops. General Slim likened the Japanese to ‘ant like soldiers’ who showed no sense of initiative. The common view dictated that the Japanese soldier was a brutalized creature with little regard for human life. The cultural divide between British troops and their Japanese counterparts further fuelled the animosity. Nevertheless, as Louis Allen has illustrated, commentaries on the Japanese character were after all shaped by the adversities British troops encountered.60 When faced with visible indications of the threats the enemy could pose, British troops were likely to view intelligence summaries describing the Japanese soldier’s cultural traits as an interesting, but by no means definitive source of information. Perceptions in the field were largely shaped by what has been called the ‘the antagonism of battle’, and field commanders who bore the brunt of the fighting on the forward lines often developed their perceptions through experience. Allied troops regularly dehumanized the Japanese not only in Burma, but in the Asia–Pacific theatres as a whole. Nevertheless, accounts which focus on racial hatred have tended to ignore the more complex nature of British views. In spite of the frequent references to the brutality the Japanese demonstrated, many officers and troops learned to view the enemy as a human being with a unique set of strengths and weaknesses. Thus, efforts to promote a more balanced image did achieve some success. While Japanese soldiers were considered detestable for the brutal way in which they fought and their treatment of prisoners, at the same time, the British thought their enemy was respectable as a warrior. Captain Malcolm Monteith, of the 1st Battalion of the North Rhodesia Regiment, described the Japanese as unique, for they were a ‘barbarous and primitive enemy’, but one who paradoxically demonstrated the characteristics of a proper fighting force, equipped with modern arms and motivated by a genuine sense of patriotism.61 John Masters, who served with the Chindits, 166

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also commented on how Japanese soldiers were capable of demonstrating signs of cruelty and humanity, ‘they wrote beautiful poems in their diaries, and practiced bayonet work on their prisoners. Frugal and bestial, barbarous and brave, artistic and brutal, they were the dushman [enemy] . . . ’.62 A number of commanders also described the Japanese in an objective manner, without referring to their barbaric behaviour. Bernard Fergusson, commander of the 16th Infantry Brigade, recalled, ‘as a fighting man, [the Japanese] has two outstanding qualities: his courage and his quickness. He has shortcomings: his gullibility, for instance, and his close adherence to the book of the words’.63 Slim reflected upon why the Japanese were slow to readjust their tactics, and argued that the main reason was, while their commanders had plenty of physical courage, what they lacked was so-called ‘moral courage’, or the ability to admit their shortcomings when things went wrong.64 The feature that stuck to his mind was the IJA’s lack of flexibility, which exacted a heavy toll, and was one of the main causes of its defeat. British opinions of the Japanese went deeper than blind hatred, and demonstrated a considerable degree of impartiality. On the question of a possible collapse in the Japanese soldier’s morale, the JTWC memorandum revealed fewer breakthroughs, because most of its conclusions had already been reached by the War Office as well as the British army establishment in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the paper confirmed how the available intelligence, no matter how thoroughly analysed, was bound to show that the overwhelming majority of the IJA adhered to its determination to resist surrender. The section on ‘human weaknesses’ concluded, ‘the Japanese tends to overrate his abilities, both absolutely and relative to his enemy, and hence to overreach himself’.65 Setbacks diminished the enemy’s faith in his own invincibility, and the demoralization led Japanese troops to put up decreased levels of resistance. At the same time, until the enemy was faced with undeniable indications that his situation was hopeless and defeat imminent, his morale was largely unaffected. The ordinary difficulties of a campaign were not enough to significantly damage the Japanese soldier’s psyche because he had been taught to expect them, and he was a ‘good enough soldier to accept them stoically’. The IJA’s will to resist surrender did remain largely unbroken until the closing stages of the conflict. The disproportionately low number of surrenders at Leyte in comparison to North Africa and Europe gave rise to warnings that while the Japanese soldiers’ fighting spirit had worn thin on occasions, it had not yet broken, even by ‘a long chalk’.66 Due attention was paid to the fact that the enemy’s will to resist surrender remained high, in spite of indications that the IJA’s morale deteriorated. Following the fall of Mandalay, Tactical Headquarters ALFSEA noted how the IJA’s mounting reverses in Burma had created depression among Japanese troops.67 At the same time, the enemy was described to be fighting as ‘desperately as ever’. Western conceptions, that Japanese troops adhered to their cultural mores which 167

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forbade surrender, influenced perceptions primarily because observations of the enemy’s performance undeniably confirmed such notions.

Implications for Britain’s conduct of the Burma campaign For the British–Indian army’s operational planning and tactical doctrine, the IJA’s morale had two implications. First, propagandists and army commanders aimed to devise ways of exploiting the psychological damage suffered by Japanese troops, and psywar campaigns were planned to erode the enemy’s ability to resist. Field officers also used terror bombardment and surprise attacks to frighten and confuse Japanese troops. Second, the meagre hopes of securing mass surrenders meant that attacks on morale were conducted mainly to soften enemy opposition. The ultimate goal of defeating the IJA was achieved by destroying its capacity, rather than will, to continue fighting. Prior to summer 1944, the potential effects of propaganda on the India– Burma front could not be determined because of the prevailing stalemate. As Wavell pointed out in June 1943, propaganda had to be applied over an extended period, against armies who had suffered prolonged defeats.68 Assessments concerning the potential effects of psychological warfare often went little further than to describe how the Japanese soldier had certain characteristics that were open to exploitation. In January 1944, aircrews in ACSEA were given a lecture, in which one of the key points was that the Japanese had an exceptionally high literacy rate and were therefore receptive to written material.69 Propaganda leaflets were thus likely to have a significant impact; however, the extent of the damage remained open to speculation. The effectiveness of psychological warfare operations in Burma was further hampered by the inadequate machinery for planning and execution. Within Whitehall, planning was undertaken by the Political Warfare Japan Committee (PWJC), an interdepartmental board working under the Foreign Office’s auspices, staffed by experts on psychological warfare and specialists on Japanese military practices. As early as 1943, the committee drew a general strategy. In conjunction with representatives from the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, a detailed memorandum was prepared on possible ways to induce the enemy to surrender through propaganda highlighting Japan’s inability to win the war.70 The paper also pointed out some of the key challenges, namely the need to avoid arousing antagonism among Japanese troops, and to avoid making mockeries of the enemy’s bravery and patriotism. However, the PWJC provided vague answers as to how the challenges could be overcome. In order to formulate a more definite conclusion, the British needed a central organization in the SEAC theatre which could experiment with various types of propaganda and identify the most successful ones. An efficient apparatus was also necessary to implement operational 168

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plans at the battlefield level. Unfortunately, psychological warfare in the Far East was conducted by several competing agencies. In addition to the SOE, the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB) of the Foreign Office’s Ministry of Information, along with India Command, ran their own services.71 The lack of central direction created a divergence of strategy, as well as a lack of communication between the various agencies. British propaganda organizations also had to contend with the more experienced US Office of War Information (OWI), and the rivalry was a further impediment. The OWI was a valuable source of information, because it was able to draw upon a wealth of experiences. American propaganda against the Japanese had been in progress since Guadalcanal. However, conflicts of interest resulted in an unsatisfactory level of collaboration. In addition to demoralizing enemy troops, psywar operations in Southeast Asia aimed to win popular support for Allied efforts to wrest Japanese control. The material disseminated to the indigenous populations reflected the Allies’ differing postwar objectives. Whereas the British sought to promote the reconstitution of their Empire, US agencies were tasked to encourage an end to colonialism. The divergent goals created a mutual distrust which hampered successful joint efforts.72 The turning tide of the Burma campaign in early 1944 was a crucial impetus for building up Britain’s psychological warfare capabilities in the theatre. The IJA’s failed offensive against the Arakan raised promising signs that propaganda was useful. In February, Mountbatten persuaded the COS that the Japanese defeats presented ‘opportunities which should not be missed of softening enemy morale’. To achieve this end, a centralized propaganda division was necessary.73 The proposal was accepted, and Mountbatten announced the creation of the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD).74 Propaganda was treated as ‘an integral part of military operations’, and employed as an ‘auxiliary arm to defeat the enemy’. The division was headed by Sir John Keswick, a former senior advisor on Far Eastern matters for the SOE. Keswick was a strong supporter of psychological warfare. Shortly after taking office, he suggested, ‘there are encouraging signs that we are causing the enemy some anxiety, and we can do a good deal more to lower his morale, even if we do not induce him to surrender’.75 The British also made a concerted effort to establish an effective machinery for disseminating propaganda. The primary means of distribution were leaflets, either by airdrop, or mortar shells, known as ‘leaflet bombs’. The latter method was preferred, because the vegetation in the jungles of Burma meant that air crews could not easily identify their targets. The creation of a system for dissemination faced bureaucratic obstacles. In early 1943, the DMI India ordered the creation of an Indian Field Broadcasting Unit (IFBU).76 By early 1944, five units were operating in the field, all staffed by broadcasters fluent in Japanese. In jungle terrain where poor communications were the general rule, the transport of cumbersome broadcasting equipment was not 169

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an easy task. In addition, broadcasts had to be delivered over an extended period before they affected the audience, and written propaganda proved to have a more powerful and immediate effect.77 Consequently, IFBUs switched to leaflets. The material was produced on the spot, and distributed via mortar shells. To enable IFBUs to employ propaganda themes that were most likely to produce results, the PWD provided, on a weekly basis, background information on key matters such as news on the Burma front and histories of Japanese units.78 However, the effective use of IFBUs was hindered by India Command’s refusal to relinquish control over the units, to the dismay of Mountbatten and Keswick.79 Finally, in August, after months of wrangling, the PWD took command of IFBUs.80 An effective propaganda machine was only one requirement for a successful campaign. Operations were planned to fit the situation at various localities. To achieve this end, an accurate assessment concerning the weaknesses of individual IJA units was necessary. Sweeping generalizations were of limited value because Japanese soldiers possessed distinct traits. As Gilmore has illustrated, the production of assessments on the Japanese soldiers’ characteristics was only a part of a larger task.81 Attitudes of the IJA’s rank and file varied according to their age, level of education, social background and wartime experiences. Propaganda had to be tailored in accordance with the particular features of the audience, and was divided into several different themes, each used for different circumstances.82 The first type, ‘divisive propaganda’, aimed to aggravate the strained relations between officers and soldiers, and was used in areas where unit cohesion was known to be declining. The second type, ‘subversive propaganda’, questioned the validity of the beliefs Japanese troops were imbued with, for example, that surrender entailed the ultimate form of treason, or that the Allies tortured POWs. This type of propaganda worked against Japanese troops whose position became untenable. ‘Enlightenment propaganda’, the third type, tried to provide a more accurate picture of Allied capabilities and war aims. This type was least effective, and used infrequently, because the Japanese could rarely be convinced that the Allies were capable of defeating their nation, nor could they believe that the Americans and British held benevolent sentiments towards Japan. The fourth, and last type, ‘propaganda of despair’, highlighted Japan’s declining fortunes, and the mounting misery suffered as a result of its continued defeats and shortage of supplies. Despair propaganda proved most effective and was thus employed most often. British planning for psychological warfare between summer 1944 and Japan’s surrender in August 1945 was based on the key conclusions intelligence analysts had reached, namely, that adversities caused demoralization among Japanese troops, and concurrently, Japanese troops could not be expected to surrender en masse. Propagandists correctly concluded that the Japanese soldier’s vulnerability to disillusionment rendered him vulnerable to exploitation, and propaganda 170

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was useful for diminishing his fighting capabilities. When Japanese troops were on the run and their formations disorganized, the tempo of propaganda was stepped up to ‘the highest possible pitch’.83 Propaganda was fine tuned to highlight the situation at specific areas. During the Japanese retreat from Ukhrul in central Burma during August 1944, leaflets emphasized the lack of air cover and urged troops to surrender.84 In areas where the enemy was known to be suffering food shortages, the situation was exploited by leaflets which on one side described how the Allies gave their prisoners plenty of food, while on the other side, it listed the menu of jungle roots, grass and foul water on which the Japanese were subsisting.85 In December, when the XIV Army’s advance reached central Burma, Japanese troops were subjected to a barrage of leaflets titled ‘Kalemyo Falls’, which explained how the Japanese strongpoint fell owing to the relentless progress of the Allies, coupled with the IJA’s inferior supplies and incompetent leadership.86 The results of psychological warfare operations were largely favourable. While the exact results could not be calculated, since the incidence of surrenders admittedly due to propaganda were relatively few, the postwar memoir prepared by Slim’s headquarters concluded, ‘there is good reason to believe that the cumulative effect of this intense propaganda bombardment was not inconsiderable’.87 Captured documents showed that troops were warned to avoid falling for Allied propaganda, signifying that the material was at least raising anxieties among Japanese field commanders. British propaganda operations were not only effective. The campaigns were conducted on the understanding that the Japanese soldier’s weaknesses provided opportunities for manipulation, and psychological warfare was a useful complement to the XIV Army’s efforts to defeat the enemy on the battlefield. At the same time, the low prospects of compelling the enemy to cease fighting were acknowledged, and psychological warfare operations in Burma were based on an understanding that propaganda was unlikely to destroy the IJA’s morale. Japanese soldiers were indoctrinated with a revulsion towards surrender, and psychological warfare campaigns were planned on the understanding that efforts to convince the enemy otherwise were futile.88 Propaganda against the Japanese achieved relatively meagre progress in comparison to the German and Italian armies. The record militated against expectations of a dramatic increase in the percentage of enemy soldiers surrendering. In planning its operations for Capital and Romulus, the PWD stated that enemy reverses resulted in lowered morale, and propaganda could well have an unsettling effect on Japanese troops.89 However, the plan was also based on the premise, ‘it is too early to expect a complete breakdown in morale, or an entirely changed attitude towards surrender’. As late as summer 1945, the PWD conceded that only a minute portion of Japanese troops were convinced by leaflets assuring good treatment.90 For British field commanders, the Japanese soldier’s anxieties in the face of Allied heavy weaponry provided opportunities to employ terror bombing 171

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and surprise tactics to exploit his weaknesses. At the same time, the only guaranteed means to break enemy opposition was to destroy its forces, with attacks on morale playing a secondary role. The value of terror bombing had its limits. In November 1943, the War Staff concluded that owing to their vulnerability to surprise, Japanese troops would suffer disorientation in the face of a sudden artillery bombardment.91 However, the advantage to be gained depended upon ‘the speed with which any infantry attack could follow up the explosion’. Likewise, the Research Directorate at GHQ India noted that the Japanese soldier’s tendency to panic in unexpected situations provided an ideal opportunity to create confusion through heavy bombardment.92 However, victory required the physical destruction and occupation of Japanese positions, and measures to frighten the enemy had to be employed as a means towards the ultimate goal of killing him. In reference to the lessons learned from Kyaukchaw in January 1944, Gracey concluded that boxing-in methods were likely to have ‘a decisive psychological effect’, since Japanese troops did not like to be entrapped.93 However, if encirclement tactics were to succeed, the attacking forces required ample manpower to ensure that the garrison could neither escape nor be reinforced. For this reason, a direct assault had distinct merits. Similarly, tactical manoeuvring was necessary in order to properly exploit the enemy’s vulnerability to surprise. The time in which Japanese troops suffered disorientation was to be used as an opportunity for further advances. Tactics had to be based on an accurate understanding of the layout of the enemy’s positions and methods which he was likely to employ. In April 1944, the 20th Indian Division instructed its troops, ‘it is essential to know the tactics and characteristics of the Japanese, and to discover what he knows and has learnt of us, in order to be practical and realistic in our application of surprise’.94 The direction and timing of the attack had to be chosen correctly. Field commanders learned from combat experience that the Japanese soldier’s inability to operate effectively in unexpected situations in itself could not result in his demise. Despite the high level of demoralization which Japanese troops suffered upon encountering Allied tanks and air superiority in the Irrawaddy Valley, victory was primarily attributed to the 4th Corps’ effective use of mobility to achieve tactical victories rather than any damage inflicted on fighting spirit.95 Although by the closing stages of the conflict, the improved level of training among British troops enabled them to overcome the challenges posed by the Japanese soldier’s determination, field commanders continued to acknowledge the enemy’s insistence on fighting to the last man and round as the main obstacle. Extra precautions were needed to eliminate enemy opposition. In planning the advance against central Burma for the 1944– 1945 campaigning season, the key factor Slim had to consider was the Japanese soldier’s fanaticism, which made him the most difficult opponent which British forces had encountered.96 The absence of natural obstacles in 172

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the Irrawaddy Valley often forced Japanese armies to abandon their practice of fighting protracted battles of attrition and to conduct withdrawals so as to avoid annihilation by Allied armour and artillery. However, operations against important objectives such as Mandalay and Rangoon were still planned on the expectation that British forces needed to contend with enemy troops who held their positions until they were wiped out.97 As long as Japanese troops remained active, they were deemed a potential threat. The XIV Army’s postmortem recalled, ‘if [the Japanese] has offensive potentialities, he must be watched for like a hawk. No effort must be spared and no stone left unturned in trying to assess what he is up to’.98 Even when defeated, Japanese troops proved ‘irritatingly persistent’. According to N. Durant, a machine gun platoon commander serving in the Chindits, ‘[Japanese soldiers] need to be killed, not wounded, for as long as they breathe, they’re dangerous’.99 Memoirs by officers in the Burma recalled that in spite of his numerous weaknesses, the enemy’s refusal to surrender rendered him a formidable foe.100 Comments of this nature suggest an adherence to racial conceptions that portrayed the enemy as possessing a unique mindset which dictated that he fight until he was killed. However, operations against the IJA almost invariably proved such notions correct. In light of encounters which revealed that the Japanese soldier’s determination to continue fighting against all odds remained the key obstacle to easy successes, British commanders were most likely to place secondary importance on evidence of weaknesses. The most salient fact is that British commanders effectively applied the lessons learned through combat experiences, which revealed that enemy resistance could seldom be broken through attacks on its willpower, and subsequently planned their operations with the actual destruction of the IJA’s capabilities as the ultimate objective.

Conclusion The British–Indian Army’s experience in Southeast Asia suggests that racial animosity played a secondary role in shaping images of the Japanese soldier’s morale, thereby calling for an important reinterpretation of John Dower’s thesis. British assessments of the IJA’s psyche highlighted two key aspects which governed the defence establishment’s efforts to evaluate its Japanese opponent during the Far Eastern conflict. First, accurate assessments on the IJA’s morale and the challenges it posed for the Allies hinged upon whether intelligence staffs were able to obtain comprehensive evidence. As the Allied counteroffensive in the Pacific gained momentum during 1943, ample information became available on how the enemy’s morale tended to deteriorate in the face of prolonged setbacks and hardships on the battlefield. However, assessments were made while bearing in mind the difficulties 173

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involved in any attempt to produce any general rules regarding the Japanese soldier’s characteristics and their effect on his behaviour. Due to the sheer volume of intelligence and contradictory nature of the evidence, useful generalizations could not be made until the material was scrutinized meticulously. An understanding of the cultural factors which lay behind the enemy’s way of warfare was also crucial for explaining why the Japanese soldier’s actions revealed certain patterns. The level of knowledge necessary for making an informed conclusion could only be obtained via further combat experience. Assessments of the IJA’s morale also revealed a second and more significant aspect, namely the British defence establishment’s realization that Japan’s war effort could be destroyed only through the physical elimination of its armed forces. The ambiguity surrounding the Japanese soldier’s mindset was compounded by apprehension arising from his continued determination to resist surrender. The Japanese soldier’s tendency to suffer demoralization when faced with adversity merely suggested that his combat effectiveness declined under certain circumstances. Intelligence staffs assessed evidence of weakness in light of the fact that demoralization did not show any signs of seriously eroding the enemy’s exceptional willingness to persist. The establishment of a special Cabinet subcommittee to investigate the possible means to remedy the difficulties posed by the IJA’s morale reflected the British army establishment’s earnest desire to prepare a firm and accurate conclusion. The committee’s final memorandum explained the underlying reasons for some of the most noticeable aspects of the Japanese soldier’s character, such as his lack of individual initiative and tendency to panic in unforeseen contingencies. On the question whether the IJA’s morale was likely to deteriorate to the point of leading its troops to surrender en masse, the JTWC subcommittee’s conclusions reflected a clear comprehension of the overwhelming evidence which suggested that the Japanese soldier was most likely to fight to the bitter end. British intelligence staffs based their hypotheses on a logical appraisal of the available evidence as the Pacific War progressed. The realistic appraisal of the ambiguities and challenges emanating from the Japanese soldier’s psyche also laid the foundations for an effective plan to exploit the situation. British propaganda organizations and field commanders followed two courses of action, both of which aided their war effort in Burma. First, the enemy’s tendency to suffer demoralization and a subsequent decline in his efficiency provided an ideal opportunity to exacerbate the Japanese soldier’s anxieties by employing propaganda which pointed to the IJA’s mounting misfortunes. Propagandists concluded that the use of such themes would produce favourable results among Japanese troops who had been exposed to a prolonged series of defeats. Psychological warfare was to compel the enemy to question his prospects of victory and thereby put up lower levels of opposition. Second, efforts to undermine the enemy’s morale through propaganda were undertaken on the understanding that the 174

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prospects of convincing a large proportion of enemy troops to cease their resistance were low. British field commanders planned their operations with a view to conducting advances by physically uprooting the enemy from his defences instead of resorting to moves that aimed to compel withdrawals and surrenders. In the final analysis, British assessments concerning the psychological aspects of the IJA were adequate for the purposes of planning. First, the evidence pointing to the Japanese soldier’s deteriorating morale in the face of difficulties on the battlefield laid the groundwork for a strategy where propaganda was used as a weapon for manipulating the enemy’s weaknesses and thereby eroding its capacity to resist. Second, and of equal importance, the absence of weaknesses that were likely to result in a collapse of the IJA’s powers of resistance compelled propagandists and military commanders alike to place a limited reliance on strategies that involved psychological warfare. Subsequently, operations were planned with the destruction of Japan’s armed forces as the ultimate objective. These developments were perfectly logical in light of the enemy’s insistence of fighting to the finish.

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CONCLUSION The intelligence war in Asia and the Pacific, 1937–1945: the British and Japanese experiences in comparison

The previous chapters have described how the British defence establishment gauged Japan’s strategy and military capabilities with the help of wartime experiences. The creation of realistic intelligence estimates, in turn, played a critical role in paving the way for Britain’s victories in Southeast Asia. However, a pressing question has arisen: how did British intelligence compare with its Japanese counterpart, and how did this affect the outcome of the Pacific War? In Southeast Asia, contrasting intelligence capabilities made a significant, if not crucial, difference.1 Effective intelligence enabled the British to overcome their strategic problems, while poor intelligence analysis aggravated Japan’s dilemmas. Contrasts in military culture were the main cause for the inequalities. The interaction between military culture and intelligence capabilities comprises three broad aspects: (1) the value placed on intelligence activities and subsequent effect on the functions and organization of the apparatus, (2) the command structure and the role which intelligence organizations play in the decision-making process, and (3) the defence establishment’s willingness to use intelligence to improve its armed forces. In all areas, the British enjoyed more favourable conditions, mainly because they had a longstanding tradition of conducting intelligence activities. Japan’s experience, on the other hand, was in many ways the opposite. The British therefore viewed intelligence as a vital component of their war effort, while the Japanese generally scorned its importance. For Britain and Japan, Southeast Asia was a sideshow, yet an integral part of their overall strategy. Although Britain’s primary objective was to defeat Germany, the liberation of its empire in Asia was necessary to maintain its status as a world power. Likewise, for Japan, operations in Southeast Asia were of secondary importance in relation to its campaigns against the Chinese on the Asian mainland and the Allied forces in the Pacific. However, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies provided raw materials which were vital for Japan’s 176

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war machine, and Burma held the key to blocking a British counteroffensive via India. Both powers therefore had vested interests in the region, the securing of which required an adequate war plan. At the same time, Britain and Japan shared a number of problems which frustrated their objectives. The first of these was resource shortages. Both powers possessed narrow economic bases which limited the forces they could deploy. Second, the British and Japanese contended with strategic overextension, since they commanded vast overseas empires, the maintenance of which strained their already limited strengths. Third, neither power enjoyed the support of reliable allies during their campaigns in Southeast Asia. On the Axis side, Germany and Japan were too geographically separated to assist each other militarily. On the Allied side, the conflicting postwar objectives of the United States and Britain resulted in a corresponding divergence in strategy. Britain sought to re-establish its empire in Asia, while the United States wished to end European colonialism. While the Americans were willing to extend material aid for British operations in Burma and Malaya on an intermittent basis, they were reluctant to commit their forces to assist their ally. Consequently, Britain needed to conduct an independent campaign without counting on assistance from the United States. Fourth, and finally, neither Britain nor Japan entered the war with a clear knowledge of enemy capabilities. Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, the British defence establishment concluded that the IJA and IJN were not a match for their Western counterparts. The misperception resulted largely from ethnocentric prejudices regarding non-Western forces; however, the extreme secrecy with which Japan conducted its rearmament programme was largely to blame. Japan’s difficulties in its ongoing operations in China did little to raise alarm. The defeat at Singapore in February 1942 was necessary to dispel the misperceptions concerning the Japanese military. Japan entered the war with equally distorted views. On the eve of the conflict, policymakers in Tokyo believed the IJN and IJA could achieve victory by dealing a knockout blow at the onset, and thereafter inflict a level of attrition on the Allied counteroffensive which would eventually compel the United States and Britain to sue for peace. Little attention was paid to Allies industrial and economic strength, mainly because the working assumption was that war-weariness would disable the Americans and British from making full use of their preponderance. As events were to show, Japan’s assessment of its enemies proved wide off the mark. As the Pacific War progressed, the British coped with their difficulties more successfully than the Japanese. This was because the British made good use of wartime intelligence and were able to marshal their limited resources to defeat the Japanese. By the same token, flawed intelligence analysis led Japan’s leaders to launch a war which they were ill-prepared to fight, and incur an unnecessary expenditure of their strengths. A vital question, however, remains open: why was British intelligence so successful while Japanese 177

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intelligence was so weak? The reasons can be found in the military culture which shaped the British and Japanese war efforts. British intelligence during the Far Eastern conflict was successful firstly because the defence establishment followed a tradition of paying due attention to foreign enemies. As an imperial power who had maintained colonies and spheres of influence throughout the globe for centuries, Britain always needed to keep a lookout on potential adversaries. By the turn of the twentieth century, Britain had an elaborate network of human agents and listening posts within its empire, and was able to acquire a range of intelligence on matters concerning its overseas territories.2 Yet, the evolution was not an easy process. The First World War exposed Britain’s limited capacity to gauge the military and economic strengths of its Great Power adversaries. The interwar years saw the development of a more efficient intelligence apparatus. The service departments and Foreign Office established organizations dedicated to the task of handling information on Britain’s potential rivals, including the USSR, Germany and Japan.3 Nevertheless, owing to financial constraints arising from government limitations on military expenditure, the growth remained incremental. The outbreak of the Second World War confronted Britain with some serious challenges which led to a strengthening of its intelligence community. By May 1940, much of Europe was in German hands and Britain was the only Allied power capable of opposing Hitler, with the United States and USSR remaining neutral. Churchill and the defence establishment began to pour generous funds for developing systems that could track the movements and strengths of German forces, so as to enable the British to concoct an effective war plan. In the Far East, although the British remained complacent about the Japanese until the outbreak of the Pacific War, the defeats at Malaya and Singapore in early 1942 highlighted how their intelligence capabilities vis-àvis Japan needed improvement. For the remainder of the conflict, intelligence collection and analysis were treated as a top priority. An accurate appraisal of the enemy was considered essential to save Britain from further setbacks. Among the key manifestations of this mentality was a scenario where by 1943, British cryptanalysts working at Bletchley Park, the Far Eastern Combined Bureau, and the Wireless Experimental Centre in New Delhi, achieved considerable inroads at decoding Japanese ciphers and tracking the movements of the IJN and IJA. Intelligence organizations also devoted considerable manpower and resources to investigating the Japanese forces’ ways of fighting. Towards the latter stages of the conflict, the British formulated a realistic assessment of their Japanese adversary, which paved the way for a successful war effort in Southeast Asia. Japan’s military culture, on the other hand, held intelligence in low regard. This is not to say that precedents for conducting such activities were absent.

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For centuries, Japan was a war-torn feudal society, where spies, information gatherers and ‘purveyors of secrets’ were in high demand.4 For much of circa 1890–1945, the IJN and IJA were adept at collecting and utilizing battlefield intelligence, that is, information needed for immediate operational purposes. In doing so, the military followed a tradition passed down from the samurai warlords. However, as an island nation which had purposely isolated itself from the outside world until 1854, Japan had little experience in the wider realms of intelligence, especially in matters such as gauging the war capabilities and mindset of foreign enemies. To complicate matters, during the Meiji era of the late nineteenth century, the ruling elite concocted a national ideology which proclaimed the superiority of Japanese culture, and dictated that Japan had the preordained right to become Asia’s leading power.5 The ideology was promoted to rally public support for Japan’s push towards modernization and great power status. The swift victories against China in 1894–1895 and Russia in 1904–1905 confirmed the Japanese faith in their own ascendancy. The ideology continued to influence policy after the Meiji era ended, and played a leading role in propelling Japan’s aggression on the Asian mainland during the 1930s. Because the Japanese people were considered earmarked to dominate East Asia, it was not a long step to a situation where social mores forbade any open expression of doubts regarding the capabilities of Imperial armed forces. As early as 1908, when the IJA revised its military codes, field regulations stipulated that fighting spirit and ‘confidence in certain victory’ were the only essential ingredients for success.6 The general attitude towards intelligence can be summed up in a remark made by Prince Kan’in, the chief of the Army General Staff during the 1939 Nomonhan border clashes, ‘to rate the foe too highly tends to breed defeatism and cowardice and to erode friendly forces’ morale’.7 The most prestigious careers in the military dealt with operations. Intelligence lacked glamour, and was a job more suited for the cowardly and overcautious. Neither characteristic befitted Japanese military traditions which called for a constant show of bravery. Assessments of potential adversaries reflected an unmasked contempt for foreign military forces. Japanese views of the Anglo–Saxon powers were particularly distorted by prejudices. Although the United States and Britain had a higher economic potential, neither power was considered to have the stamina to fight a protracted war effort. America was isolationist and concerned with its own economic prosperity, and thereby unable to instil a sufficient level of fighting spirit among its populace.8 Britain was senile and in decline. In fact, the army held such deprecating views of the United States and the British Empire that their military prowess was not considered worthy of a meticulous study.9 While British intelligence capabilities against the Japanese steadily improved, Japan continued to invest a minimal effort to

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gauge its Anglo-American foes for the duration of the Pacific War. Negative opinions often prevailed even when events disproved the Japanese sense of superiority. Unlike the British, who followed a habit of producing net assessments based on a range of sources, the Japanese considered such practices tedious. Information on crucial matters such as Allied industrial production, technological capabilities, and military practices was never scrutinized in a calibrated manner. Intelligence efforts were geared towards obtaining information needed for operational planning, namely data on enemy dispositions and orders of battle. In certain areas, progress was commendable, given that the IJN and the IJA did not have the resources keep apace with their American and British rivals. The navy’s code research section broke a number of the US Fleet’s lower and middle grade ciphers, and on the eve of the war, the Imperial Navy had a highly sophisticated system of signal intercepts and direction finders, which placed the tactical intelligence network in a good position for operations against the United States.10 The most notorious coup occurred in documentary intelligence. In November 1940, the German raider Atlantis intercepted the British steam liner, Automedon, as it was heading towards Singapore.11 The Automedon’s cargo included a copy of a COS memorandum describing how Britain was too tied down in the war against Germany to dispatch a main fleet to the Far East. The Germans recovered the document and handed it to Tokyo, and one can speculate how the information emboldened the Japanese high command to press ahead with their southward advance.12 The area where Japanese intelligence excelled, however, was human intelligence. During the months before the outbreak of war, Japanese agents across Southeast Asia made painstaking efforts to collect every bit of information the IJN and IJA needed to carry out their operations smoothly. The military successes at Singapore and Pearl Harbor were made possible largely because planners within the navy and army had access to excellent data on matters ranging from the local terrain, strength and location of Allied forces, and layout of enemy bases.13 Propaganda and subversive operations also achieved alarming levels of success. When the Japanese entered Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and Philippines, the colonial administrations collapsed almost overnight, while thousands of Asian troops deserted their colonial masters to join forces with the IJA.14 Yet, while Japan’s operational intelligence enjoyed a noticeable lead over its Allied counterparts, when one looks at the broader picture, the IJN and IJA did not place high value on long-term intelligence concerning their enemies’ war potential. The army and navy operated their own intelligence arms, but their task was limited to handling information intended to help execute operational plans already decided upon by the General Staffs. Within the IJA, the Second (Intelligence) Division analysed foreign armies.15 When Japan’s leaders were finalizing their plans for the southward advance during 180

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late 1941, the Second Division was not asked for information on British and US army capabilities. Only after the decision for war had been made, was the division ordered to collect information on Allied dispositions in Southeast Asia. The talents and skills of the few individuals with a good knowledge of the United States and Britain were often squandered. For example, the IJA operated a special centre for training intelligence agents in the Tokyo suburb of Nakano from 1938. By the eve of the war, the school produced a cadre of graduates who were able to carry out a range of functions including espionage, sabotage and subversion. Many of its graduates also held a sophisticated knowledge of Western military practices. Unfortunately, the Nakano School, like all Japanese intelligence organizations, operated within ‘a hostile military culture’ which held a scant regard for its endeavours.16 For this reason, throughout the Pacific War, army intelligence remained focused on short-term operational data. Naval intelligence was also relegated to providing operational planners with a narrow range of information. The IJN’s main intelligence organs were the Third (Intelligence) Division and the Fourth (Communications) Division. Their function was limited to informing the Operations Division on current Allied dispositions.17 Any material which intelligence staffs collected on wider issues, such as Allied naval doctrine and more importantly, US industrial prowess, was brushed aside. In March 1941, the naval attaché in Washington, who had managed to foster close ties with Rear Admiral Turner, the Navy Department’s director of war plans, warned Tokyo that caution needed to be exercised before embarking on a war against America.18 The warning apparently went unheeded. To worsen the situation, after achieving a series of unbroken successes at the onset, Japan’s defence establishment saw few incentives to improve its intelligence capabilities.19 The IJN and IJA suffered what historians have coined ‘victory disease’,20 and became convinced of their invincibility. When the IJA completed its operations in Southeast Asia in spring 1942, the Southern Army amalgamated its Intelligence Section with the Operations Section, alleging that the former had lost its purpose.21 Between 1941 and 1945, expenditure for intelligence activities never amounted to more than 0.5 per cent of Japan’s total defence budget.22 Most importantly, even when the Allied counteroffensive in the Pacific picked up its pace in 1943, Japan’s leadership ignored the mounting indications which suggested that the IJA and IJN were doomed to defeat. In spite of the overwhelming amount of weapons and firepower the Allies were able to deploy, along with repeated pledges that the United States and Britain would continue fighting until Japan agreed to an unconditional surrender, the government and military elite in Tokyo failed to comprehend the magnitude of the forces ranged against them. There was an insufficient awareness that the Allies were fighting a total war, where the occupation of Japan’s 181

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home islands, along with the total destruction of its military power and overhaul of its political institutions, was the ultimate objective. Only when the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in August 1945, did Japan’s leaders discard their illusion that their nation could hold out. In a military organization which maintained an unquestioned faith in victory, few people were unlikely to face reality until all hopes were visibly lost. The second aspect of service culture which had a significant impact on British and Japanese intelligence capabilities was the organization of their command structure. In Britain’s defence establishment, ample room existed for an open consultation on matters concerning the war situation. As was the case with Britain’s intelligence machinery, the system for decision-making evolved over an extended period and encountered a number of bumps.23 The Chiefs of Staff system emerged during the First World War, and during the interwar period, it operated as a subordinate body of the Committee of Imperial Defence. With the outbreak of war in 1939, the COS was appointed as the arbitrator of British grand strategy. The COS was assisted by a host of subcommittees working on a range of matters including resource allocation, operational requirements and intelligence assessment. Under a decisive leader like Churchill, the system operated with the coherence required to manage a global war effort. Britain’s defence planners were able to thoroughly examine a wide range of strategies, and arrive at a decision only after the options had been weighed. Intelligence analysis was controlled by the Joint Intelligence Committee, in which representatives from a range of departments exchanged their views before arriving at a conclusion.24 British defence planners had constant access to well-informed opinions that were not excessively tainted by the biases of individual organizations. The system was one in which intelligence staffs played an integral role. By contrast, within Japan’s defence establishment, intelligence staffs took a subordinate position, and had virtually no voice in policymaking. Liaison between intelligence organizations and top-level officials was often nonexistent. During the run-up to the declaration of war, some Cabinet ministers, including Foreign Minister Togo, had no access to information concerning Japan’s prospects of victory.25 Although some ministers held doubts, they lacked any way of questioning the military’s assurances. Equally damaging, Japan did not possess a Cabinet-level organ for planning a national strategy in peacetime. This was in contrast to the British, whose COS system had evolved over a number of decades. The IJA and IJN general staffs drew up their own plans independently without consulting each other. The navy saw a confrontation against the United States and Britain as their key objective, while the army favoured gearing up for a war to liquidate Chinese and Soviet power on the Asiatic mainland. Only after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937 was a combined Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) established. The headquarters had separate sections for the army and navy, and both services had direct access to the 182

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Emperor. There were few means available for coordinating navy and army policies. Channels of communication included the privy council and imperial liaison conference. The meetings of these bodies usually saw representatives of the IJN and IJA attempting to win the Emperor’s approval for their own schemes, rather than attempting to coordinate a grand strategy. Inter-service rivalries had some adverse effects on the efficiency of Japan’s intelligence machinery. The Japanese never developed a centralized intelligence body equivalent to the British JIC system, and the organization of Japanese net assessment prior to Pearl Harbor has been aptly described as ‘relatively unsophisticated, parochial, fragmented, adamantine, spasmodic and often vague and waffling to boot’.26 The IJN and IJA found themselves reaching alarmingly contradictory assessments, without proper mechanisms for resolving their differences. The situation did not improve with the outbreak of war. In early 1942, when Japan was on the verge of completing its conquests in the southern regions, it needed to devise a strategy for protecting its empire against an Allied counteroffensive. The IJN advocated an advance on Hawaii and Australia, and assumed that US and British opposition could be easily overcome. The IJA, on the other hand, insisted that it did not possess the necessary strength nor logistics. Because the services were unable to compromise, Japan adopted a strategy of reacting to enemy moves, and lost the initiative. Thus, at a crucial moment in Japan’s war effort, inter-service rivalries and the lack of coordination between intelligence and policymaking eliminated any prospect of victory. The third, and most important aspect of British and Japanese military culture was the way in which their defence establishments used intelligence to develop their strategy, operational plans and tactical doctrine. At the policymaking and battlefield level, Britain’s conduct of the Far Eastern conflict was based on a calibrated evaluation of the Japanese. The British were determined to avoid a repetition of the setbacks suffered during the opening stages of the conflict, and wished to attain their war aims in an economical manner. Defence planners and field commanders were willing to take the measures needed to bring their forces to a sufficient level of efficiency, and intelligence was more likely to be properly used. Within Japan’s defence establishment, intelligence did not have a positive impact, largely because decision-makers preferred not to ponder over indications that their forces may face difficulties. British strategic and operational planning during the Far Eastern conflict faced the twin challenges posed by Japan’s insistence on retaining its conquered territories in Southeast Asia at all costs, coupled with the fact that the IJA and IJN possessed ample strengths to forestall the Allies. To complicate matters, Britain did not have sufficient strengths for large counteroffensives in the Far East, at least for the first half of the conflict, because its forces were tied down in Europe and North Africa. The failure of the Arakan offensive in 183

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winter 1943 highlighted how operations against the Japanese were unlikely to succeed unless British forces had the numerical superiority and logistics necessary to conduct a sustained advance against Japanese forces. Slim and Auchinleck insisted that British army and air strengths in India be substantially increased for an offensive into Burma, and overland communications be improved. The decision by Slim and his fellow commanders to advance into the Irrawaddy valley in summer 1944, and Mountbatten’s agreement to the plan, was based on intelligence revealing that Japanese losses at Imphal and Kohima had weakened the enemy to the point where British forces could go on the offensive. Even then, success depended on providing resources and logistics so that operations could be conducted with sufficient speed, thereby denying the enemy opportunities to consolidate its forces for counterattacks. At the highest levels of the establishment, planning staffs refrained from offensive action until the British could build up sufficient forces in Southeast Asia. Churchill and the COS heeded the JIC’s warnings that Japan possessed ample resources to defend its territories. Only in summer 1944, when the British had developed adequate capabilities, did its forces go on the offensive. Operations in the SEAC theatres were undertaken in the belief that inaction would enable the Japanese to bolster their defences and render future offensives even more difficult. Hence, the COS accepted Mountbatten’s proposal for an advance through Burma. Similar considerations lay behind the decision to launch a landing on Malaya in summer 1945. However, strategy continued to be planned with a view to minimizing costs and letting the United States bear the brunt of the effort against Japan’s main forces in the Pacific and home islands. The plan was logical, given Britain’s limited capacity to launch large-scale operations. By contrast, Japanese war plans were rarely based on a cautious evaluation of the situation facing its armed forces. True, when the Allied counteroffensive in the Pacific gained momentum in 1943, Japan did not have the resources to win, and no amount of good intelligence could improve its fortunes. However, the decision to embark upon a war against the United States and Britain reflected how Japan’s strategy was formulated without paying attention to enemy capabilities, and based on wishful ideas of how its enemies might react to its moves. The possibility of failure was not seriously considered, and Japanese leaders tended to engage in what Michael Barnhart has described as ‘best case analysis’. The high command in Tokyo was aware that the Allies had superior industrial production, but downplayed the fact that Japan’s economic capacity was so hopelessly minute it negated any chances of victory in a drawn-out war. At an Imperial Conference held in September 1941, policymakers agreed that if they could not secure a lifting of the Western embargoes, their only alternative for avoiding an economic collapse was to seize the oil and mineral resources of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.27 184

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The possibility of war against the United States and Britain was acknowledged, and Admiral Nagano, the Navy Chief of Staff, explained that the United States could be expected to make use of its abundant resources and thereby prolong the war. In such contingencies, Japan did not have the means to conquer America or Britain, and if hostilities were drawn out, defeat was a distinct possibility. However, what followed was a sanguine forecast of how the impending conflict might unfold. The representatives of the IJN and IJA suggested that so long as their forces managed to secure Southeast Asia and the western Pacific, Japan could create a defensive barrier which the Allies would find difficult to penetrate. The working assumption was that the outcome of the war hinged entirely on the initial operations. The Japanese only needed to provide the resources required for their immediate objectives, and thereafter inflict such a high level of casualties on the Allied counteroffensive that the latter would become war-weary and eventually seek a compromise peace.28 The assessment was noteworthy because it overlooked the economic balance between Japan and the Allied powers. As long as Japan’s forces could maintain their fighting spirit, the latter’s industrial capacity need not be seriously considered, so the Japanese believed. There was an incomplete awareness that Japan was facing a protracted war, where superiority in armaments production would play a decisive role. Japan’s leaders did not heed the principle expounded by Clausewitz, that statesmen were ‘to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking’, rather than mistaking it for the type of war they wanted to engage in.29 Policymakers composed what amounted to a script which outlined how their operations would transpire, without allowing room for setbacks. The lightning successes achieved during the opening stages of the conflict confirmed the high command’s conviction that its strategy would succeed. When the Allies began to turn the tide after 1943, Japan’s leaders sought to wear out their opponents through a strategy of attrition. IGHQ ordered the IJA to construct an ‘absolute national defence sphere’, comprising the islands of the western Pacific, the East Indies and Burma.30 The army was to hold its positions at all costs, and destroy Allied attacks by all possible means. The IJN, on the other hand, was fixated on fighting a decisive engagement within proximity of the home islands. The idea grew out of the experiences of the Russo-Japanese War during 1904–1905, when the Russians dispatched their Baltic fleet in an attempt to relieve Port Arthur, and the IJN decimated the armada as it sailed through the Straits of Tsushima. Thereafter, Japanese naval doctrine dictated that all future naval conflicts would replicate the successes achieved against Russia. A student at the Naval War College in Tokyo once criticized the doctrine, ‘how will the American Navy come out into the seas near Japan and stake a decisive battle under conditions obviously unfavorable to them? Such an idea is self complacent, self satisfying, a dream of a fool’s paradise . . . ’.31 Japanese naval leaders never seriously studied how 185

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the engagement would materialize, nor did they countenance the thought that the IJN could face defeat. The IJA’s strategy was equally based on wishful thinking, and demonstrated an oversight of the casualties and costs that their operations could incur. Japanese war plans against the British–Indian army in Burma after 1942 showed how complacent the army could be. The XV Army’s offensive against the India–Burma frontier in spring 1944 was undertaken on the assumption that the Japanese could force the British to abandon their forward bases at Imphal and Kohima, thereby establishing a foothold in the eastern Indian province of Manipur. The IJA was to then prepare for further operations and eventually dismantle Britain’s hold on the subcontinent. General Mutaguchi (the commanding general) and his staff paid little attention to the fact the British had substantially increased their strengths since the outbreak of the conflict.32 His greatest mistake was to attack the British–Indian forces, with their superior numbers of tanks and heavy artillery, while overlooking the IJA’s own weakness in firepower and equipment. Equally ignored was the need for proper logistics. The Japanese counted on meeting their supply requirements by capturing British depots. As events were to reveal, the IJA was barely able to support an advance on Imphal and Kohima, and the prolonged resistance put up by the British–Indian army negated all hopes of maintaining the momentum of the offensive. The IJA’s failed offensives resulted in crippling losses, which in turn, paved the way for the British advance across the mountainous terrain from India to Burma, which was to culminate with the collapse of Japan’s hold on Burma by summer 1945. At the tactical level, the British also demonstrated their willingness to adapt their methods to meet the challenges posed by the Japanese. The poor performance demonstrated by British forces during the opening months of the war convinced commanders that their tactics needed drastic reform. Japanese forces were adept at remedying their material and technological shortcomings by employing tactics which were capable of inflicting significant delay and attrition. The situation required countermeasures which relied less on sheer firepower, and more on the proper use of technology and equipment. The evolution of tactics against the Japanese air services clearly illustrated this aspect. Despite their growing numerical inferiority and mounting losses of pilots and aircraft, the IJN’s air arm, and to a lesser extent the army air services, were skilled at exploiting Allied weaknesses. The situation required British capital ships to be refitted with modernized radar and AA defences. That a total re-equipment did not take place was more due to resource shortages and the difficulties involved in implementing the necessary technologies on a large scale, rather than Britain’s inability to acknowledge the need for better countermeasures. The situation was thus dealt with by training naval crews to use their existing equipment more efficiently. The aerobatic proficiency demonstrated by Japanese fighters required British 186

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pilots to achieve a corresponding level of skill at manoeuvring their aircraft so as to avoid damage. The most noteworthy example of British success in adapting their tactics, however, can be found in the British–Indian army. The defeats at Singapore and Burma during early 1942 clearly demonstrated that the British possessed neither the skill nor efficiency to hold out against the Japanese. When the British launched a counteroffensive against the frontier regions of Burma in winter 1943, they learned that Japanese defences did not permit an easy advance. Japanese troops skilfully used the natural features of the jungles to bolster their defences. Positions were sited on hilltops to provide maximum protection and fields of fire. Bunkers were constructed of teakwood and earth so as to mitigate the effects of heavy bombardment. Japanese soldiers demonstrated their tendency to fight to the finish. Drawing upon these lessons, the British–Indian Army undertook a meticulous study of the countermeasures needed to overcome the Japanese army. While the British army in North Africa and Europe struggled to adapt its methods, in Southeast Asia, Slim managed to effect a complete overhaul of tactical doctrine.33 Under his leadership, field officers achieved commendable progress in fighting a combined arms battle where enemy defences were neutralized with a combination of tanks and artillery, and infantry units conducted the final advances and eliminated the remnants of enemy opposition. The success achieved in overcoming the IJA’s defences on the Arakan and Manipur fronts during 1944 did not owe themselves solely to material superiority. Of equal importance was the arduous effort made by British field commanders to draw upon the lessons of combat experience to enable their forces to conduct advances without incurring unacceptable losses. The British defence establishment’s good use of intelligence permitted its forces to pursue an effective course of action that was within their capacity to implement. Japanese commanders, by contrast, were reluctant to admit the shortcomings of their forces, and demonstrated a marked inability to undertake an objective assessment of their enemies. Overall, the IJA held a more skewed perception than the IJN. Army officials rarely used intelligence to improvise their methods because military traditions called for a strict adherence to established practices, along with an unquestioned acceptance of orders from higher authority. Soldiers were instilled with the Bushido code, which called upon them to sacrifice their lives for their Emperor and nation. Practices of this nature created an exceptional level of dedication. At the same time, the IJA’s rigid mindset stifled initiative, and hindered any improvement in tactics. Field officers were unable to think outside the intellectual parameters fixed by their military education, and were imbued with a conception that Western forces were not disciplined enough to withstand the strains of prolonged combat. The accepted belief was that in spite of their deficiency in modern weapons, Japanese troops would prevail in all circumstances solely by the virtue of their spiritual bravery. The IJA’s 187

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successes during the opening months of the Pacific War reinforced its faith in its own prowess. In reality, the conquest of Southeast Asia was quick and successful largely because the IJA faced poorly trained and ill-equipped opponents. Yet, the Allies’ failure to hold their positions in Malaya and the Philippines was taken as clear confirmation that British and US troops were inefficient. As a result, the IJA failed to match Western standards in the deployment of modern armaments. Even when the Allies managed to improve their tactics and equipment by 1943, the Japanese continued to launch infantry attacks against enemy positions with a disregard for the fact that their own strengths were inadequate for the task. The US War Department suggested that the practice was based on ‘the assumption of [the Japanese] so called military superiority’.34 Even when Japanese tactics failed, field commanders adhered to the belief that had been drummed into every soldier, namely that victory would go to the side with greater tenacity. Many officers shared the view of the widely read theorist, Lieutenant-General Sato Kojiro, ‘in point of discipline and skill in the art of war, the Americans are the worst of all nationalities’.35 The IJA’s rigid doctrine was encapsulated by a seminar held at the War College in Tokyo in August 1943. The commandant lectured his class, ‘from now on, the curriculum is changed. The main emphasis will be on countering US tactics, and will become the “A” course’. He paused and continued, ‘if anyone can teach this course, go ahead because frankly, I don’t know a damn thing about it’.36 The contempt for American tactical talent prevailed even when US forces began to clear the Japanese from island after island in the Pacific theatres. In defensive operations, troops were forbidden to withdraw even when their positions became untenable. This practice was based on the belief that by inflicting high levels of attrition, the Japanese could eventually compel the Allies to abandon their operations. As a result, beleaguered garrisons were more likely to conduct last-ditch suicide attacks. Against the US armies, who possessed superior weaponry and skill, Japanese tactics resulted in the annihilation of entire units. Even then, the IJA rigidly adhered to the belief that the practice of holding onto its positions at all costs would eventually work to forestall the Allies. Japanese tactics against the British–Indian army also reflected a misunderstanding of enemy capabilities. The IJA’s opinion of its British counterpart was reflected in a booklet issued to troops as they embarked on the Malaya campaign, titled, The War Can be Won Just by Reading This. It stated, ‘while the [British] commissioned officers are by and large white gentlemen, the majority of noncommissioned officers and rank soldiers are of indigenous race, as such, there is no spirit of solidarity in the army’.37 The low opinion of British empire forces proved correct when the Japanese invaded Southeast Asia. However, IJA commanders did not foresee their opponents learning from their setbacks. As a result, when Slim’s army began its offensive against 188

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Burma in 1944, Japanese commanders followed their practice of holding onto their positions at all costs. The fact that poorly armed troops, no matter how well trained, could not defeat enemies with superior equipment and methods of use, was not grasped. So long as the Japanese army establishment believed that it could achieve its ultimate goal of compelling the Allies to abandon their war effort, it saw few strong reasons to reform its tactics. The IJN and air services were marginally less blissful than the IJA, and their performance demonstrated an understanding that adequate technology was essential when fighting the Allies. Japanese capital ships and aircraft carriers possessed high endurance, and their gunnery outranged most of their British and American rivals. At the outbreak of war, the IJN’s air arm possessed a level efficiency superior to the competing maritime powers. In terms of speed and manoeuvrability, Zero fighters ranked among the most advanced combat aircraft of their time. However, Japanese navy and air doctrine possessed a number of flaws which reflected a failure to comprehend Allied capabilities, and the miscalculation led them into a war where the prospects of success were slim. Neither the IJN nor air services were built to fight a protracted conflict. The IJN’s main objective was to wipe out the bulk of the British and US fleets to achieve supremacy over the western Pacific regions, and thereafter await the opportunity to destroy the remainder of the Allied navies in a final showdown. Naval construction was geared towards vessels to be used for offensive operations, namely battleships, aircraft carriers and submarines.38 Japanese admirals gave minimal thought to safeguarding the oceanic trade routes between Southeast Asia and the home islands, on which Japan’s war industries relied for their raw materials. As a result, the IJN made almost no effort to step up the production of vessels and weapons systems for defending merchant shipping. The first escort squadron did not appear until April 1942. As late as 1944, when US submarines staged regular attacks on Japanese shipping, the IJN’s destroyers were too slow for effective patrols, and were armed only with the most rudimentary types of antisubmarine weapons and sonar.39 The air services were similarly plagued by skewed doctrine. The air arms of the IJN and IJA were not designed to conduct strategic bombing operations against the enemy’s communications and infrastructure, but to provide tactical support for their parent services. As a result, the design of Japanese aircraft was compact in relation to its Allied counterparts, while production targets were modest. This was natural, given Japan’s shortages of raw materials and productive plant, which prevented industries from putting out large quantities of aircraft. Nevertheless, the Japanese also held a mistaken belief that the quality of its aircraft was sufficient to overcome any material advantages the Allies enjoyed. In reality, Japan could maintain its lead only so long as its forces faced weaker opponents. Because aircraft and pilots could not be replaced at 189

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a rate equivalent to what the Allies could achieve, losses could be afforded only with the greatest difficulty. To make matters worse, the initial successes gave the Japanese a false sense of confidence, and the air services failed to modernize their aircraft.40 When the Japanese realized that the Allies were catching up both in quality and quantity by late 1942 and early 1943, it was too late. In the Pacific, losses mounted, and industries were unable to replenish wastage. In Southeast Asia, when the RAF turned the tide decisively after early 1944, the Japanese met a similar fate. Fearing further losses, the IJN and air services switched to a policy of conservation, and withdrew their forces from the front lines. The decision did not negate the fact that the Japanese had already embarked on a war for which they were not prepared, and in doing so, paid a high cost. In the final analysis, the British and Japanese experiences during the Southeast Asia campaigns reinforce a number of contentions regarding the interaction between intelligence and the conduct of warfare. The British experience illustrates how good intelligence is a force multiplier, while Japan’s performance shows how poor intelligence leads to the dissipation of scarce resources. This is not to say that efforts to use intelligence are guaranteed success. For centuries, strategists and commanders have wrestled with the problem of not being able to obtain a complete knowledge of the war situation. During the early part of the nineteenth century, Clausewitz wrote, ‘a great part of information obtained in war is contradictory, even more is false, and most are uncertain’.41 The ever-changing situation on the battlefield renders intelligence assessment a wasteful endeavour, and victory can be achieved only through boldness and an imaginative use of military force. Even present-day command systems, as Martin van Creveld has explained, are unable to produce greater certainty than their predecessors, for all of their sophistication.42 After all, the business of evaluating developments in combat is conducted by humans, and therefore prone to a degree of misperception. One can rarely make accurate predictions of how the war might progress, since the belligerents are able to pursue a wide range of actions, and to hide their intentions and capabilities from their opponents, thus precluding the prospects of achieving full battlefield awareness. Nevertheless, when analysed correctly, intelligence provides a more accurate picture than one would obtain otherwise. While the unpredictable nature of the enemy’s strategy and capabilities often hinders an error-free assessment, the task of intelligence staffs is to evaluate the available material comprehensively to formulate a conclusion that is as accurate as possible.43 Assessments based on a larger but albeit incomplete collection of intelligence are more likely to be correct. The most effective ones admit that complete precision is not possible, while attempting to spell out the range of situations that could develop, without placing undue emphasis on the worst-case scenario.44 At the same time, as John Keegan has argued, ‘intelligence may be 190

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usually necessary but is not a sufficient condition of victory’, and wars are more often won through armed strength.45 Conversely, while material resources are a prerequisite, the proper use of intelligence allows the development of a plan where one’s forces are able to use their resource economically by exploiting the enemy’s weaknesses and neutralizing its strengths.46 Intelligence in itself did not decide the outcome of the Second World War in Southeast Asia. A more accurate conclusion is that the good use of intelligence permitted Britain’s forces to pursue a strategy that was effective and, of equal importance, within their capacity to implement. Nor was Japan’s defeat attributable to poor intelligence. Japan was defeated because the bulk of its armies were tied down in a drawn-out conflict in mainland China, and the Allies, particularly the Americans, had vastly superior industrial prowess, which enabled them to deploy a superior numbers of troops, equipment, aircraft and ships against Japan’s forces in the Pacific. However, poor intelligence analysis led Japan to embark on a war effort for which it was ill prepared. Misperceptions of Allied capabilities also led the IJA and IJN to adhere to methods which entailed crippling losses of scarce resources, and their performance against the British was no exception. Finally, and most importantly, if intelligence is to be employed effectively, policymakers must acknowledge its value. One of the most critical phases in the intelligence process lies in convincing the military and political leadership to make use of the information supplied to them.47 Much depends on whether leaders are open minded enough to accept criticism and take in accurate, albeit unpleasant, information. The extent to which decision-makers are receptive to ideas put forward by intelligence organizations often depends upon the service culture prevailing within a particular military organization. The ability to adapt one’s methods of combat also depends on a realistic reading of the type of war being fought. Unless the measure of effectiveness is defined properly, military organizations are often unable to innovate their forces and methods of employing them.48 The performance of one’s own forces needs to be gauged by determining the ultimate goals of the defence establishment. Defence officials must not only ascertain whether their resources are adequate for the prescribed objectives. They also face the task of undertaking a careful study of the actions they need to follow at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The British experience shows how a progressive military culture, and one that promotes measures to overhaul of their practices and methods when necessary, is more likely to lead to an objective evaluation of one’s environment. Britain’s defence establishment understood that it needed to conduct a substantial war effort against the Japanese while simultaneously fighting Germany, and that its available resources were limited. War plans were formulated while paying due attention to the need to overcome a resilient enemy through the economical use of the forces at hand. The Japanese experience, on the other hand, illustrates how a stagnant 191

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military culture which insists upon an adherence to set beliefs and practices tends to have detrimental effects on the intelligence process. After all, Japan’s demise was not only due to its narrow resource base. It was also attributable to the fact that its leaders and military officials misread the scale of effort needed to fight a successful war. By doing so, the Japanese chose to employ a set of methods which were unlikely to help them achieve a victory against a coalition of enemies who were both determined and able to deploy vastly superior strengths and resources.

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INTRODUCTION 1 W.S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate, London: Cassell, 1951, p. 81. 2 C. Andrew and D. Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: governments and intelligence communities in the twentieth century, Chicago, IL: Illinois UP, 1985, pp. 1–2. 3 F.H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, 4 Vols, in series History of the Second World War: UK Military series, London: HMSO, 1979– 90. 4 D.C. Watt, ‘Work Completed and Work as Yet Unborn: reflections on the conference from the British side’, in I. Nish (ed.), Anglo–Japanese Alienation, 1919–52: papers of the Anglo–Japanese Conference on the history of the Second World War, Cambridge: CUP, 1982, p. 296, points out: ‘a further subject for investigation is the role of intelligence agencies on [the British and Japanese] side’. The statement remains largely true. 5 R.J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the politics of secret service, Cambridge: CUP, 2000. 6 E.J. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA: codebreaking and the war against Japan, 1942– 1945, Lawrence, KS: Kansas UP, 1992; R. Lewin, The Other ULTRA: codes, cyphers and the defeat of Japan, London: Hutchinson, 1982; also, J. Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: the secret history of American intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995; J. Winton, ULTRA in the Pacific: how breaking Japanese codes and cyphers affected naval operations against Japan, 1941–1945, London: Leo Cooper, 1993, thoroughly cover Allied naval codebreaking in the Pacific theatres. On the British side, M. Smith, The Emperor’s Codes: Bletchley Park and the breaking of Japan’s secret ciphers, London: Bantam, 2000, provides a nonacademic account of signals intelligence in Southeast Asia. 7 A. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1936–45, Vol. I, Strategic illusions, 1936–41, Oxford: OUP, 1981; W. Wark, ‘In Search of a Suitable Japan: British naval intelligence in the Pacific before the Second World War’, Intelligence and National Security, 1/2, 1986, pp. 189– 212; J. Ferris, ‘Worthy of Some Better Enemy?: the British estimate of the Imperial Japanese Army, and the fall of Singapore, 1919–1941’, Canadian Journal of History, 28/2, 1993, pp. 223–56; A. Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914–1941, London: Macmillan, 2002, Chs 8–9; T.G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: US intelligence and foreign military innovation, 1918–1941, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2002, Ch. 3.

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8 N.H. Gibbs et al. (eds), Grand Strategy, 6 Vols, in series History of the Second World War, London: HMSO, 1956–72; S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 3 Vols, in series History of the Second World War, London: HMSO, 1954–61. 9 Example: H. Probert, ‘British Strategy and the Far Eastern War’, 1941–45, in Nish (ed.), Anglo–Japanese Alienation, pp. 157–75. 10 Examples include: H. Probert, The Forgotten Air Force: the Royal Air Force in the war against Japan, 1941–1945, London: Brassey’s, 1996; D. Smurthwaite (ed.), The Forgotten War: the British Army in the Far East, 1941–45, London: National Army Museum, 1992; J. Winton, The Forgotten Fleet: the British Navy in the Pacific, 1944–45, New York: Coward-McCann, 1970. On the Burma campaign, the most notable works are L. Allen, Burma: the longest war, 1941–45, London: J.M. Dent, 1984, and S.W. Kirby, The War Against Japan, Vols II–V, in series History of the Second World War, London: HMSO, 1957–70. On the naval campaigns, A. Marder, assisted by M. Jacobsen and J. Horsfield, Old Friends, New Enemies: the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Vol. II: The Pacific War, 1942–45, Oxford: Clarendon, 1990, is the most thorough account. 11 Examples: J. Costello, The Pacific War, 1941–1945, New York: Rawson-Wade, 1981; R.H. Spector, The Eagle Against the Sun: the American war with Japan, New York: Vintage Books, 1985. The following works also contain sizeable sections on the campaigns in the Asia–Pacific theatres, but offer only short narratives on Britain’s contribution: P. Calvocoressi et al., Total War: the causes and courses of the Second World War, London: Viking, 1989; J. Keegan, The Second World War, London: Pimlico, 1989; A.R. Millett and W. Murray, A War to be Won: fighting the Second World War, Cambridge, MA: Belknap and Harvard UP, 2000; G.L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: a global history of World War II, Cambridge: CUP, 1994. 12 Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, passim. 13 W. Murray, ‘British Military Effectiveness in the Second World War’, in A.R. Millett and W. Murray (eds), Military Effectiveness, Vol. III: The Second World War, Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1988, pp. 90–135, and ‘The Collapse of Empire: British strategy, 1919–1945’, in W. Murray et al. (eds), The Making of Strategy: rulers, states and war, Cambridge: CUP, 1994, pp. 393–427. 14 M. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Cambridge: CUP, 1996, pp. 100–12. 15 M. Handel (ed.), Introductory Essay, in Intelligence and Military Operations, London: Frank Cass, 1990, pp. 65–6. 16 See Note 8 above; also, J. Ellis, Brute Force: Allied strategy and tactics in the Second World War, London: Andre Deutsch, 1990, Chs 9–10; P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000, London: Harper-Collins, 1988, pp. 451–9; R. Overy, Why the Allies Won, New York: Norton, 1995, passim; L. Allen, ‘The Campaigns in Asia and the Pacific’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 13/1, 1990, pp. 162–93. 17 W. Murray, ‘Innovation: past and future’, in A.R. Millett and W. Murray, (eds), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge: CUP, 1996, pp. 312–18, and A.R. Millett, ‘Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period’, in Ibid., pp. 349–59; D. French, Raising Churchill’s Army: the British Army and the war against Germany, 1919–1945, Oxford: OUP, 2000, pp. 184–211. 18 Handel (ed.), Intelligence and Military Operations, Introductory Essay, p. 24; Herman, Intelligence Power, pp. 150–1; D. Kahn, ‘Codebreaking in World Wars I and II: the major successes and failures, their causes and their effects’, in Andrew and Dilks (eds), Missing Dimension, pp. 154–5. 19 J. Dower, War Without Mercy: race and power in the Pacific War, New York: Pantheon, 1986.

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20 For a description of the intelligence cycle, see Herman, Intelligence Power, pp. 36–60. 1 AMBIGUITY AND COMPLACENCY: BRITAIN’S ASSESSMENT OF JAPAN PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 1 L. Allen, Singapore, 1941–1942, Newark, NJ: Delaware UP, 1977; H.G. Bennett, Why Singapore Fell, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1944; R. Callahan, The Worst Disaster: the fall of Singapore, London: Associated University Press, 1977; P. Elphick, Singapore: the pregnable fortress, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1995; S.W. Kirby, Singapore: the chain of disaster, London: Cassell, 1971, and The War Against Japan, Vol. I; A.E. Percival, The War in Malaya, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949; A.O. Robinson, ‘The Malayan Campaign in the Light of the Principles of War’ – Parts I and II, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 109, August and November 1964, 224–32 and pp. 325–37; I. Simson, Singapore: too little too late, London: Leo Cooper, 1970; A. Warren, Singapore, 1942: Britain’s greatest defeat, London: Hambledon, 2002. 2 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London (hereafter LHCMA), Pownall Diaries – February 25, 1942. 3 B.A. Lee, Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1939: a study in the dilemmas of British decline, London: OUP, 1973; P. Lowe, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: a study of British policy in East Asia, 1937–1941, Oxford: Clarendon, 1977; and N. Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War, Cambridge: CUP, 1996. 4 Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, Chs 2–5; Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge, Chs 8–9; Ferris, ‘Worthy of Some Better Enemy?’, passim. 5 In reality, there was no such organization as the Japanese Air Force per se. The navy and army operated their own separate air arms. However, for the purpose of the book, the acronym JAF will be used to describe the Japanese air services in general. 6 This analysis is based on deductions arrived at through archival research as well as published sources. Information on the bodies responsible for intelligence collection and analysis has been compiled from Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, passim; C. Andrew, Secret Service: the making of the British intelligence community, London: Heinemann, 1985; Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge, passim; P. Elphick, Far Eastern File: the intelligence war in the Far East, 1930–45, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1997; Ferris, ‘Worthy of Some Better Enemy’, passim; Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, passim, and ‘British Intelligence in the Second World War’, in C. Andrew and J. Noakes (eds), Intelligence and International Relations, 1900–1945, Exeter: Exeter UP, 1987, pp. 209–18; Kirby, The War Against Japan, Vol. I, passim; P. Lowe, ‘Great Britain’s Assessment of Japan Before the Outbreak of the Pacific War’, in E. May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies: intelligence assessment before the two world wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984, pp. 456–75; E. Thomas, ‘The Evolution of the JIC System up to and During World War II’, in Andrew and Noakes (eds), Intelligence and International Relations, pp. 219–34; W. Wark, ‘British Military and Economic Intelligence: assessments of Nazi Germany before the Second World War’, in Andrew and Dilks (eds), Missing Dimension, pp. 78–100; D.C. Watt, ‘British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe’, in May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies, pp. 237–70. All inaccuracies are the author’s responsibility.

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7 Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge, pp. 135–6. 8 Ibid., p. 135. 9 B.F. Smith, The Ultra–Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940–1946, London: Airlife, 1996, p. 73–4. 10 L.A. Gladwin, ‘Cautious Collaborators: the struggle for Anglo-American Cryptanalytic Cooperation, 1940–43’, in D. Alvarez (ed.), Allied and Axis Signals Intelligence in World War II, London: Frank Cass, 1999, pp. 119–20. 11 A.H. Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy: the triumph of Anglo-American naval intelligence, Lawrence, KS: Kansas UP, 1998, pp. 148–9. 12 United Kingdom National Archives, Kew, London (hereafter UKNA), FO 371/ 27913, F 13066/86/23, Telegram No. 6531: Foreign Office to Washington – 28 November 1941. 13 Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge, p. 194. 14 Ibid., pp. 176, 194. 15 Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy, pp. 141–6, 154. 16 For the US intelligence services in general, see Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War, pp. 42–85; For a concise account of US naval intelligence, see M. Muir, ‘Rearming in a Vacuum: US Navy intelligence and the Japanese capital ship threat’, Journal of Military History, 54/4, 1990, pp. 473–85. 17 Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War, pp. 83–4. 18 UKNA WO 106/5392, Order of Priority of MI2 Countries from SIS Point of View – (undated ?? 1933). (Cited in A. Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: avoiding war in East Asia, 1936–41, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 3.) 19 On Britain’s strategic dilemmas in the Far East, see Allen, Singapore; C.M. Bell, ‘How Are We Going to Make War?: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and British Far Eastern war plans’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 20/3, 1997, pp. 123–41; O.C. Chung, Operation Matador: Britain’s war plans against the Japanese, 1918–41, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1997; I. Cowman, ‘An Admiralty Myth: the search for an advanced Far Eastern fleet base before the Second World War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 8/3, 1985, pp. 316–26; P. Haggie, Britannia at Bay: the defence of the British Empire against Japan, 1931–1942, Oxford: Clarendon, 1981, and ‘The Royal Navy and the Far Eastern Problem, 1931– 1941’, Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, 106/4, 1976, pp. 402–14; I. Hamill, Strategic Illusion: the Singapore strategy and the defence of Australia and New Zealand, 1919–1942, Singapore: Singapore UP, 1981; Kirby, Singapore, passim; W.R. Louis, British Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939, Oxford: Clarendon, 1971; W.D. McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919– 1942, London: Macmillan, 1979; M.H. Murfett, ‘Living in the Past: a critical reexamination of the Singapore naval strategy, 1918–1941’, War and Society, 11/1, 1993, pp. 73–100; J. Neidpath, The Singapore Base and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919–1941, Oxford: Clarendon, 1981; G.R. Perras, ‘Our Position in the Far East Would be Stronger Without this Unsatisfactory Commitment: Britain and the reinforcement of Hong Kong, 1941’, Canadian Journal of History, 30/2, 1995, pp. 231–59. For an overview of Britain’s global strategy, see C.M. Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000; Gibbs, Grand Strategy, Vol. I; A. Gordon, ‘The Admiralty and Imperial Overstretch, 1902–41’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 17/1, 1994, pp. 63–85; M. Howard, The Continental Commitment: the dilemma of British defence policy in the era of two world wars, London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1972; P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, London: Macmillan, 1983; S.W. Roskill, British Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. I: The period of Anglo-American antagonism,

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20

21 22 23 24 25

26 27

28 29

30 31 32

1919–1929 and Vol. II: The period of reluctant rearmament, 1930–1939, London: Collins, 1968–76. C.M. Bell, ‘The Royal Navy, War Planning and Intelligence Assessments of Japan Between the Two World Wars’, paper presented at International Security Studies Symposium on Intelligence and International Relations, Yale University, 3 May 1996, pp. 8–9. I am grateful to Professor Martin Alexander, who was kind enough to supply a copy of the paper. UKNA FO 371/22183, F 11379/103/23, Enclosure – Annual Economic Report (B) for 1938, prepared by Sir G. Sansom. UKNA WO 106/5575, ICF/426, Some Observations on Japan’s Capacity to Wage War: prepared in conjunction by Department of Overseas Trade and IIC – 19 July 1938. UKNA CAB 80/3, COS (39) 52, Sino-Japanese Hostilities: Memorandum by COS – 28 September 1939. UKNA CAB 53/31, COS 596, Appreciation of the Situation in the Far East, 1937: Report by COS – 14 June 1937. UKNA CAB 47/5, ATB 154, Economic Sanctions Against Japan: Report by Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War (ATB) – 22 October 1937; ATB 155, Economic Sanctions Against Japan: Report by ATB – 5 November 1937; FO 837/528 (unnumbered): Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) to Department of Overseas Trade: Position of Japan in Regard to Oil – 28 October 1937; CAB 47/1, Minutes of ATB 25th meeting – 4 November 1937. UKNA CAB 47/5, ATB 158, Extract from minutes of 301st meeting of Committee of Imperial Defence – 18 November 1937. UKNA WO 208/859, BJ.073458: Tokyo to Berlin – 26 January 1939 (decrypted on the 29th) (cited in A. Best, ‘Constructing an Image: British intelligence and Whitehall’s perception of Japan, 1931–39’, Intelligence and National Security, 11/3, 1996, p. 419); India Office Library and Records, British Library, London (hereafter IOLR), L/WS/1/72, Weekly Circular by MI2 (War Office), for Military Intelligence Directorate, Army Headquarters India – 9 February 1939. Allen, Singapore, p. 44; Chung, Matador, p. 71. Chapters 2 and 3 of Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia, provide a comprehensive account of the complications arising from the creation of the power vacuum in French Indochina, Thailand and the Dutch East Indies, and the extent to which Britain’s possible courses of action were limited to securing cooperation from its Western allies in an effort to curb Japanese incursions. UKNA CAB 80/15, COS (40) 592, Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese Intervention: Report by COS – 15 August 1940. (Cited in Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. I, p. 33.) Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, pp. 55–6. M. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: the search for economic security, 1919–41, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1987; R.J.C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of War, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1961; N. Ike (ed.), Japan’s Decision for War: records of the 1941 policy conferences, Stanford: Stanford UP, 1967; A. Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, London: Longman, 1987; J.W. Morley (ed.), The Fateful Choice: Japan’s advance into Southeast Asia, 1939–41 and The Final Confrontation: Japan’s negotiations with the United States, 1941, both selected translations from series taiheiyo senso e no michi: kaisen gaiko shi, English translation – Japan’s Road to the Pacific War, New York: Columbia UP, 1983–94; I. Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869–1942, London: Routledge and Kegan & Paul, 1977; K. Sato, Japan and Britain at the Crossroads, 1939–41: a study in the dilemmas of Japanese diplomacy, Tokyo: Senshu UP,

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33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

47 48 49 50 51

1986; G.R. Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia 1894–1943, London: Longman, 1979. Ike (ed.), Japan’s Decision for War, p. 50. For an account of how the IJN’s plans for the Pearl Harbor attack were kept secret from both the Army and Cabinet until autumn 1941, see G.W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: the untold story of Pearl Harbor, London: Michael Joseph, 1981 and D.M. Goldstein and K.V. Dillon (eds), The Pearl Harbor Papers: inside the Japanese plans, Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1993, Ch. 6: ‘Extracts from the Diary and Duty Book of Captain Shigeshi Uchida’. Cited in Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge, p. 169. R. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for defence planning, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982, p. 120–2; M. Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence, London: Frank Cass, 1989, p. 242. M. Lowenthal, ‘The Burdensome Concept of Failure’, in A.C. Maurer et al. (eds), Intelligence: policy and process, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985, pp. 44, 49; Herman, Intelligence Power, p. 228; Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence, p. 250. UKNA ADM 223/15, Admiralty Weekly Intelligence Summary (hereafter ADMWIS), Nos. 72 and 73 – 25 July and 1 August 1941. UKNA FO 371/27765, F 6949/9/61, Cipher No. 21399: GSO 1 (Intelligence) to War Office – 26 July 1941. See R.J. Aldrich, The Key to the South: Britain, the US and Thailand during the approach of the Pacific War, 1929–42, Oxford: OUP, 1993, Chs 5–8, for a comprehensive account of the COS’s perceptions regarding this problem. UKNA CAB 81/103, JIC (41) 309, Japan’s Next Move: Report by JIC – 2 August 1941. For an alternative argument to the effect that the British accurately predicted Japan’s strategy, see Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, pp. 57–8. UKNA HW 12/251, BJ.079859: Tokyo to Washington – 15 April 1940; BJ.079933: Batavia to Tokyo – 18 April 1940; BJ.079940, BJ.080539 and BJ.080599: Tokyo to the Hague – 18 April, 16 and 19 May 1940, respectively. UKNA WO 208/1221, NID Nos. 0862, 0865 and J.19: Japan and the Dutch East Indies: by J.H. Godfrey (DNI) – 17, 18 and 31 May 1940, respectively; ADM 223/146, ADMWIS, No. 12 – 31 May 1940. UKNA WO 208/877, BJ.091114: Tokyo to Berlin – 31 July 1941 (decrypted on 6 August). UKNA WO 208/2259, War Office Weekly Intelligence Summary (hereafter WOWIS), No. 100 – 16 July 1941; for contents of the decrypt, see ADM 223/321, Admiralty Special Intelligence Summary (hereafter ADMSIS), NID 00266 – 5 July 1941. IOLR L/WS/1/96, Burma Monthly Intelligence Summary, Vol. V, No. 5 for the month ending 31 September 1941. UKNA CAB 81/104, JIC (41) 362, Japan’s Intentions: Report by JIC – 13 September 1941. UKNA WO 208/902, Japan at the Crossroads: FECB Intelligence Summary, No. 1824 – 5 June 1941; WO 208/889, Discussion of Japan’s Possible Objectives and Their Implications: FECB Intelligence Summary – 3 December 1940. UKNA WO 208/2260, WOWIS, No. 103 – 7 August 1941. UKNA CAB 81/99, JIC (41) 11, Sea, Land and Air Forces Which Japan Might Make Available for Attack on Malaya: Report by JIC – 6 January 1941 (hereafter JIC (41) 11, Forces Available for Attack on Malaya); CAB 81/105, JIC (41) 449, Possible Japanese Action: Report by JIC – 28 November 1941 (hereafter JIC (41) 449, Possible Japanese Action).

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52 Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, p. 89. 53 IOLR L/WS/1/317, GHQ India Monthly Intelligence Summary, No. 11, Appendix C – Some Notes on Japan’s position today: – 3 November 1941. 54 UKNA FO 371/2793, Japan’s Petroleum Situation: Report by MEW (Prepared in conjunction with Service Departments, Petroleum Department and Shell Oil Company) – 28 May 1941. 55 The Axis Planning Section (APS) was a subsection of the JIC, whose task was to evaluate the strategic situation from the Axis powers’ viewpoint and thereafter assess the moves they were likely to pursue. 56 UKNA CAB 81/101, JIC (41) 155, Future Strategy of Japan: Report by APS – 15 April 1941. 57 UKNA CAB 80/29, COS (41) 474 (Annex), Report by JPS – 3 August 1941. 58 UKNA WO 208/887, Japan – Economic Factors: Report by MEW – 6 December 1941. (Cited in Lowe, ‘Great Britain’s Assessment of Japan’, pp. 472–3.) 59 UKNA CAB 80/14, COS (40) 528, Policy in the Far East: Memorandum by John G. Dill (CIGS) – July 3, 1940; COS (40) 532, Policy in the Far East: Report by COS – 4 July 1940. 60 UKNA CAB 80/19, COS (40) 768 (JP), Burma Road: Aide-Memoire by JPS – 24 September 1940. 61 Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor, pp. 141–4. 62 Churchill College Cambridge Archives Centre (hereafter CCC), CHAR 20/44/ 117, and CHAR 20/46/2–3, Churchill’s Personal Telegrams to Roosevelt – 5 and 30 November 1941, respectively. 63 Chung, Matador, pp. 142–69. 64 Imperial War Museum, London (hereafter IWM), Percival Papers, P 49, Some Personal Observations of the Malaya Campaign, 1940–2: prepared by B.H. Ashmore – 27 July 1942. 65 Chung, Matador, pp. 167–8. 66 UKNA CAB 69/2, Cabinet Defence Committee (Operations), 65th meeting – 17 October 1941. (Cited in Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. I, p. 85.) The most comprehensive secondary accounts on this aspect include: I. Cowman, ‘Main Fleet to Singapore? Churchill, the Admiralty and Force Z’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 17/2, 1994, pp. 79–93; J. Pritchard, ‘Churchill, the Military and Imperial Defence in East Asia’, in S. Dockrill (ed.), From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima: the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941–45, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994, pp. 26–54 and Ch. 11 of S.W. Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, London: Collins, 1977. 67 C.M. Bell, ‘Our Most Exposed Outpost: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern strategy, 1921–1941’, Journal of Military History, 60/1, 1996, pp. 81–5. 68 UKNA ADM 205/9, Personal Letter from Pound to Little (BAD Washington) – 6 December 1941. (Cited in Best, Britain Japan and Pearl Harbor, p. 189.) 69 Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. I, p. 172. 70 UKNA HW 1/288, BJ.098452: Tokyo to Berlin – 2 December 1941 (decrypted on the 5th). This document, along with the ones cited in the following note, have also been referred to in one of the most recent works on British intelligence on the eve of the Pacific War by T. Wilford, ‘Watching the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth intelligence before Pearl Harbor’, Intelligence and National Security, 17/4, 2002, pp. 137–8. 71 UKNA ADM 223/321, ADMSIS, NID 00450 – 3 December 1941. 72 Betts, Surprise Attack, p. 123, and ‘Analysis, War and Decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable’, World Politics, 31/1, 1978–79, pp. 70–1; also see R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ:

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73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

82 83 84

85

86 87 88 89 90 91

92

93

Princeton UP, 1976, pp. 128–52; W.L. Dunn, ‘Intelligence and Decision-making’, in Maurer et al. (eds), Intelligence, pp. 225–6. Kirby, Singapore, pp. 123–5. Allen, Singapore, pp. 110–12. Chung, Matador, pp. 227–31; Elphick, Far Eastern File, pp. 310–24; Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, pp. 55–9. Chung, Matador, p. 231. Ibid., pp. 232–3; Elphick, Far Eastern File, pp. 317–8. LHCMA ALANBROOKE, 5/1/5, Diary entry – 6 December 1941. E. May, Concluding Essay – ‘Capabilities and Proclivities’, in May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies, pp. 508–9, 527. P. Kennedy, ‘British Net Assessment and the Coming of the Second World War’, in A.R. Millett and W. Murray (eds), Calculations, Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II, New York: Free Press, 1992, pp. 56–8. For a concise account of how net assessments of Nazi Germany were affected by the shortage of reliable intelligence, see Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 547–51; W. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939, London: I.B. Tauris, 1985, Ch. 8; also, for an explanation of the difficulties which the British faced in assessing the German navy in particular, see J. Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–39: a study in appeasement and the origins of the Second World War, London: Macmillan, 1998, Chs 8–9. Wark, Ultimate Enemy, p. 27. C. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, Gloucester: Sutton, 1984, pp. 424–5, 436–8. D.C. Watt, Too Serious a Business: European armed forces and the approach to the Second World War, London: Temple Smith, 1975, pp. 86–7; E.F. Ziemke, ‘Military Effectiveness in the Second World War’, in Millett and Murray (eds), Military Effectiveness, Vol. III, p. 278. On assessments of Japan’s armed forces in general, see Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan; Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge; on the IJA in particular, see Ferris, ‘Worthy of Some Better Enemy’; on the IJN, Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. I. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. I, pp. 345–6. MI2 was the Far Eastern section of the War Office’s Directorate of Military Intelligence. UKNA WO 106/5576, Report on Japanese Operations in North China: by Captain P. Marr Johnson (Royal Artillery) – 18 December 1937, and Minute by General Staff to MI2 Colonel – 4 March 1938. Wark, ‘In Search of a Suitable Japan’, passim, provides a concise account of this problem. UKNA ADM 1/9588, IJN Annual Report for 1938: Naval Attaché (Tokyo) to DNI – 4 April 1939; ADM 1/9973, Reference Sheet Nos. 54 and 80: Naval Attaché (Tokyo) to DNI – 11 March and 15 April 1939, respectively. UKNA HW 12/219, BJ.069195: Naval Air Department (Tokyo) to Naval Attaché (Berlin) – 9 September 1937, BJ.069197: Naval Technical Department (Tokyo) to Naval Attaché (Berlin) – 9 September 1937, and BJ.069249: Naval Technical Department (Tokyo) to Naval Attaché (Berlin) – 15 September 1937. I. Gow, ‘The Royal Navy and Japan, 1921–1941’, in I. Gow and Y. Hirama (eds), The History of Anglo–Japanese Relations, 1600–2000, Vol. III: The Military Dimension, London: Macmillan, 2003, pp. 118–9; Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. I, pp. 7–15. UKNA ADM 116/3735, Plans Division to DNI: Size of New Japanese Capital Ships – 22 December 1937.

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94 D.C. Evans, and M.R. Peattie, Kaigun: the strategy, tactics and technology of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997, p. 373; Elphick, Far Eastern File, p. 231. 95 UKNA ADM 1/9973, NID 0982/39, Minute by DNI – 20 November 1939; Japanese Warship Construction – ?? November 1938. (Cited in Wark, ‘In Search of a Suitable Japan’, p. 202.) 96 UKNA ADM 116/5757, Minute by DNI – 2 January 1939. 97 Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. I, p. 342. 98 Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge, pp. 115–18. 99 MI2c was the section of MI2 responsible for Japan. 100 UKNA WO 106/5643, MI2c Report for Minister for Coordination of Defence – 1 February 1937. (Cited in Best, ‘Constructing an Image’, note 47.) 101 UKNA FO 371/24724, F 5054/22/23, Annex to WOWIS, No. 64 – (undated – ?? October/November 1940). 102 UKNA FO 371/27970, F 4991/1296/23, Report No. 2: Comments by Military Attaché (Tokyo) on Imperial Ordinance No. 405 (Regulations Governing the Army Mechanization Headquarters) – 19 April 1941. 103 A.D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1985, pp. 1009–32. 104 Kirby, Singapore, p. 75. 105 UKNA WO 106/5576, Report on visit to North China by V.R. Burckhardt (DBE, DSO, GSO 1 (I), Hong Kong) – 30 August 1938; WO 208/276, Report on trip through guerrilla regions in North China by E.R. Lapwood – 21 January 1940. 106 UKNA WO 106/5576, Minute by Major, General Staff, for MI2 Colonel – 11 October 1938; WO 208/1445, B.R. Mullaly (Military Attaché, Tokyo) to Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO & I): Annual Report on Japanese Army for 1939 – 7 February 1940. 107 UKNA WO 208/1445, General Staff (Intelligence), Shanghai Memorandum, No. 24/124, Enclosure: Report on Operations and Activities of the Japanese Army in the Yangtse Valley, August 1937 – January 1938. 108 UKNA WO 106/5571, Extract from report on a visit to the Headquarters of the IV War Zone at Shiukwan (North Kwangtung), by Captain C.R. Boxer (GSO III (I)) and Captain H. Chauvin (RA) – April/May 1939; WO 208/506B, Report on Tour of Indochina, China and Burma, by Colonel G.E. Grimsdale (GSO1 Intelligence, FECB) – April/May 1940. 109 UKNA FO 371/27890, F 2569/17/23, Japanese Morale: Report by Major Chapman (GS at MI2c) – 31 March 1941. 110 IWM CON SHELF (Grimsdale Papers), ‘Thunder in the East’: by G.E. Grimsdale, p. 10 – 1947 (hereafter Grimsdale, ‘Thunder in the East’). 111 Allen, Singapore, p. 54. 112 UKNA WO 208/1529, Extracts from report by Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, formerly GSO 1 (OPS) Malaya Command – 30 May 1942, and Report on Malaya and Singapore: drawn up by Major H.P. Thomas (OBE, Indian Army) – 30 May 1942. 113 Ferris, ‘Worthy of Some Better Enemy?’, pp. 229, 238. 114 UKNA WO 208/2257, WOWIS, No. 41, Annex: The Japanese Army – 30 May 1940; WO 208/1445, Annex to WOWIS for 3–10 December 1941. 115 IWM Wards Papers, Private Letter from Wards to S.W. Kirby – 6 May 1964; for alternative interpretations which focus more on dismissive comments made by Bond, see Kirby, Singapore, pp. 74–5; Elphick, Far Eastern File, pp. 169–70. 116 A.R. Millett, ‘Assault from the Sea: the development of amphibious warfare between the wars – the American, British and Japanese experiences’, in Millett

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117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134

135 136 137

138 139 140 141

and Murray (eds), Military Innovation, pp. 68–9, 89–90, 93–4; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. 445–6. L. Barber, ‘Pearl Harbor Minus 95 Minutes: Japan’s attack on Kota Baru’ – Part I, Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, 125/1, 1995, pp. 5–13. M. Tsuji, Japan’s Greatest Victory, Britain’s Worst Defeat, New York: Sarpedon, 1993, p. 10. E.J. Drea, In the Service of the Emperor: essays on the Imperial Japanese Army, Lincoln, NE: Nebraska UP, 1998, p. 63. UKNA ADM 1/9589, Minutes by DNI to COIS SO (I) Shanghai to DNI: Japanese Landing Craft and Operations during the Yangtse Delta Campaign – 25 October 1938. UKNA WO 106/2440, Appreciation by General L.V. Bond (GOC Malaya) – 13 April 1940, and comments by General Staff, War Office – 5 May 1940. Chung, Matador, pp. 133–41; Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. I, pp. 76–8. LHCMA BROOKE-POPHAM, 6/1/26, Most Secret Cable No. 359/4: I.S.O. Playfair (Major-General of COS, GHQ Far East) to TROOPERS – 20 August 1941. UKNA CAB 80/18, COS (40) 732, Transfer of the Australian Division to India: Minute by Churchill for COS – 10 September 1940. JIC (41) 449, Possible Japanese Action. Grimsdale, ‘Thunder in the East’, pp. 45–7. Kirby, Singapore, p. 94. IOLR L/MIL/17/20/24, Japanese Army Memorandum: Pamphlet issued by General Staff (HM Naval Base, Singapore), and reprinted with additions and modifications by General Staff (India) – March 1941. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan, p. 62; Elphick, Far Eastern File, p. 158. UKNA FO 371/23570, F 2162/2161/23, Annual Report on Aviation in Japan for 1938, by Air Attaché (Tokyo) – 30 January 1939. UKNA WO 106/5363, Naval and Military Intelligence Summary, No. 37: by General Staff, Shanghai – 14 May 1938. UKNA AIR 22/74, AMWIS, No. 84 – 10 April 1941. UKNA AIR 22/72, AMWIS, No. 51 – 22 August 1940. UKNA AIR 22/74, AMWIS, Nos. 81, 85 and 107 – 20 March, 16 April and 18 September 1941; for an alternative interpretation, to the effect that the FECB received intelligence on the Zero fighter’s efficiency, but deliberately ignored the material and decided not to distribute it to aircrews, see Probert, Forgotten Air Force, p. 27; Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence, p. 138. M.R. Peattie, Sunburst: the rise of Japanese naval air power, 1909–1941, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001, pp. 107–15. UKNA CAB 56/4, JIC 90, Intelligence Regarding Air Warfare in Spain and China: Report No. 2 – Air Cooperation with Land Forces – 10 June 1939. UKNA AIR 22/73, AMWIS, No. 75 – 6 February 1941. (Cited in A. Best, ‘This Probably Over-Valued Military Power: British intelligence and Whitehall’s perception of Japan, 1939–41’, Intelligence and National Security, 12/3, 1997, p. 76.) Peattie, Sunburst, pp. 109–21. UKNA ADM 116/4393, Naval War Memorandum (Eastern) – undated (?? February 1939). Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. 340–3, 467–71. CCC DUPO, 5/5, Loss of the HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse on 10 December 1941: by Training and Staff Duties Division (Historical Section) – August 1948;

202

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142 143 144 145

146 147 148

149

R. Hough, The Hunting of Force Z: the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, London: Collins, 1963, p. 117. UKNA PREM 3/163/2, Report on the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse: Memorandum by Pound – 25 January 1942. UKNA ADM 223/494, Pearl Harbor and the Loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse: by Captain Hillgarth (Royal Navy) – 1946. JIC (41) 11, Forces Available for Attack on Malaya. LHCMA BROOKE-POPHAM, 6/1/6, Telegram from COS to Brooke-Popham: Signal X776 – 10 January 1941; BROOKE-POPHAM, 6/1/11, GHQFE/494: Brooke-Popham to Air Ministry – 1 March 1941; Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. I, p. 54. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. 343–6. UKNA AIR 22/75, AMWIS, No. 103 – 20 August 1941. A.D. Coox, ‘Military Effectiveness of Armed Forces in the Interwar Period, 1919–1941: a review’, in A.R. Millett and W. Murray (eds), Military Effectiveness, Vol. II: the interwar period, Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1988, pp. 256– 70; A.R. Millett, ‘Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period’, passim; W. Murray, ‘Innovation: Past and Future’, passim; W. Murray and B. Watts, ‘Military Innovation in Peacetime’, in Millett and Murray (eds), Military Innovation, pp. 369–415. M. Howard, ‘The Liddell Hart Memoirs’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 111, February 1966, p. 60. 2 THE LESSONS OF DEFEAT AND LIMITED VICTORIES, DECEMBER 1941 TO JANUARY 1943

1 UKNA CAB 79/56, COS (42) 4th Meeting (O) – 21 January 1942. 2 UKNA CAB 81/106, JIC (42) 26 (Final), Possible Japanese action against the Dutch East Indies: by JIC – 17 January 1942. 3 Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, London (hereafter RAFMH), Peirse Papers, AC71/13/73, Outward Cipher Cable No. 01326: Wavell to Churchill – 17 February 1942; LHCMA Pownall Diaries – 19 February 1942; J. Kennedy, The Business of War, London: Hutchinson, 1957, pp. 199–201; Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. I, pp. 296, 357–8, 424. 4 Examples: UKNA FO 371/31836, F 6022/858/23, Cipher No. 6725: 30 Military Mission (Moscow) to War Office – 21 August 1942; WO 208/847, BJ.107477: ?? Tokyo to Berlin – ?? late July/early August; HW 1/1192, Cipher No. 84862: War Office to 30 Mission (Moscow) – 7 December 1942. 5 UKNA CAB 81/108, JIC (42) 233 (Final), Japan’s Intentions towards Russia: Report by JIC – 21 June 1942; CAB 79/21, COS (42) 187th Meeting – 23 June 1942. 6 UKNA HW 1/504, BJ.103370: Tokyo to Berlin – 17 April 1942 (decrypted on the 20th); HW 1/546, BJ.104008: Tokyo to Berlin – 4 May 1942 (decrypted on the 7th). 7 M. Hauner, India in Axis Strategy: Germany, Japan and Indian Nationalists in the Second World War, Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1981, pp. 463–79. 8 For concise accounts of British concerns over Japanese plans for subversive activities in India, see Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, pp. 157–64, also W.J. Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Cassell, 1956), pp. 127–8, 136–7. 9 Elphick, Far Eastern File, pp. 348–50. 10 Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, p. 237; Elphick, Far Eastern File, pp. 353–5.

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11 H.P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific strategies to April 1942, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982, p. 437. 12 H.P. Willmott, The War With Japan: the period of balance, May 1942 – October 1943, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2002, pp. 4–8. 13 T. Ohmae, ‘Japanese Operations in the Indian Ocean’, in D.C. Evans (ed.), The Japanese Navy in World War II: in the words of former Japanese naval officers, 2nd edition, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986, pp. 106–8; S. Hayashi, in collaboration with A.D. Coox, Kogun: the Japanese Army in the Pacific War, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1959, pp. 43, 51–3. 14 Drea, In the Service of the Emperor, pp. 32–7. 15 P.S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–45, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978, pp. 98–9; Willmott, Empires in the Balance, pp. 439–40. 16 Hauner, India in Axis Strategy, pp. 392–3. 17 C. Thorne, Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain, and the war against Japan, 1941–1945, Oxford: OUP, 1978, pp. 252–9. 18 Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 142. 19 UKNA CAB 81/106, JIC (42) 57 (Final), Scale of attack on Ceylon: Report by JIC – 19 February 1942. 20 C. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely: the Royal Navy in the Second World War, New York: Norton, 1991, p. 863. 21 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, pp. 134–5; Costello, Pacific War, pp. 187–90. 22 IOLR L/WS/1/486, Most Secret Cipher Telegram No. 4231/G: Wavell to COS – 28 February 1942. 23 Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. III, Part 2, p. 482; CCC SMVL, 8/1, Secret and Personal Letter from Somerville to Pound – 11 March 1942 (cited in Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, pp. 108–9); SMVL, 8/7, Personal and Secret Letter from Wavell to Somerville – 20 April 1942, and Most Secret Reply by Somerville – (undated ?? 21 April). 24 UKNA CAB 84/44, JP (42) 335, India: Report by JPS – 31 March 1942; CAB 79/ 20, COS (42) 113th Meeting, Enclosure – Relation of Strategy in the Middle East and India: Report by JPS – 8 April 1942 (cited in Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. III, Part 2, pp. 484–5); Probert, Forgotten Air Force, pp. 115–16. 25 UKNA WO 106/3759, Cipher No. 8435/C: Wavell to COS – 8 April 1942; RAFMH Peirse Papers, AC71/13/74, Secret Cipher Message from Peirse to Portal – 7 April 1942, AC71/13/71, DMI 253: Most Secret appreciation by DMI (India) – 16 April 1942. 26 UKNA WO 106/3493, COS Appreciation of Situation in Indian Ocean Theatre – 23 April 1942. (Cited in Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. II, p. 128.) 27 Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. III, Part 2, pp. 487–9. 28 Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. II, pp. 127–30. 29 UKNA CAB 79/20, COS (42) 102nd Meeting – 1 April 1942; PREM 3/163/8, Naval Cipher No. 1204Z/3: Personal telegram from Pound to Admiral King – 3 April 1942; ADM 205/13, Churchill’s Personal Minutes T.547/2 and T.570/2 for Roosevelt – 7 and 15 April 1942, respectively; CAB 79/20, COS (42) 109th Meeting – 7 April 1942; Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. II, p. 29; Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, pp. 149–50; D. Fraser, Alanbrooke, New York: Atheneum, 1982, p. 252. 30 Costello, Pacific War, p. 249. 31 Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. II, p. 29; Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, pp. 137–42. 32 Elphick, Far Eastern File, p. 356.

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33 UKNA PREM 3/163/8, Serial No. M.242/2: Personal Minute by Churchill to Pound – 10 June 1942. 34 UKNA ADM 205/14, Minute by Pound for Churchill – 10 June 1942. 35 UKNA CAB 81/110, JIC (42) 339 (Final), Japan’s Intentions: Report by JIC – 9 September 1942. (Cited in Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV, pp. 79–80.) 36 UKNA CAB 80/66, COS (42) 212 (O), Future Strategy: Report by COS – 24 November 1942; CAB 88/8, CCS (43) 135/2, American–British Strategy in 1943: Memorandum by COS – 3 January 1943. 37 UKNA CAB 80/67, COS (43) 33 (O), Enclosure – ‘Symbol’: Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) 55th and 59th Meetings – 14 and 17 January 1943. 38 Ibid.; also see Costello, Pacific War, p. 418–9; Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV, pp. 245–52; Fraser, Alanbrooke, pp. 318–21. 39 UKNA CAB 79/56, COS (42) 72nd Meeting (O) – 11 July 1942. 40 CCC CHAR 20/76/83-5, and 20/77/96, Wavell to Churchill – 9 June and 8 July 1942, respectively; Probert, Forgotten Air Force, p. 125. 41 Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV, pp. 250–2. 42 UKNA AIR 9/472, JP (42) 537, Appreciation of the War Against Japan: Report by JPS – 17 June 1942. 43 UKNA CAB 80/65, COS (42) 345 (O), (Final) American–British Strategy: Report by COS – 30 October 1942. 44 R.B. Frank, Guadalcanal: the definitive account of the landmark battle, New York: Penguin, 1990, Chs 4, 7, 12, 17–8; Dull, Battle History of the IJN, pp. 187–251; Costello, Pacific War, pp. 335–403; Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. II, pp. 219–34. 45 UKNA CAB 84/50, JP (42) 949, Strategy in the Southwest Pacific: Report by JPS – 12 November 1942. 46 Hauner, India in Axis Strategy, pp. 532–41. 47 Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, p. 162. 48 IOLR L/WS/1/1270, Most Secret Cipher Telegram No. 25943/I: Wavell to War Office – 21 October 1942; UKNA CAB 81/111, JIC (42) 422 (O), Japanese Intentions: Summary of Conclusions reached in an appreciation in light of events since June 1942: by JIC (India) – 26 October 1942. 49 UKNA ADM 205/14, Carrier Reinforcement of the Southwest Pacific: appreciation by Director of Plans – 1 November 1942; CAB 79/58, COS (42) 163rd and 191st Meetings (O) – 28 October and 30 November 1942, respectively; Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, pp. 191–2. 50 UKNA CAB 106/59, Operations in the Eastern Theatre based on India from March to December 1942: dispatch by Wavell for War Office – 18 September 1946. 51 UKNA WO 106/2692, Operations in Burma 1942/43: Report by MO1 (Records). 52 LHCMA ALANBROOKE, 6/2/6, f. 8B, Operation Fantastical: Most Secret Memorandum by Wavell for Alanbrooke – 17 September 1942. 53 UKNA CAB 79/57, COS (42) 132nd Meeting (O) – 30 September 1942. 54 Slim, Defeat into Victory, p. 150. 55 J. Ferris, ‘Ground of Our Own Choosing: the Anglo–Japanese war in Asia, 1941– 1945’, in Gow and Hirama (eds), History of Anglo–Japanese Relations, Vol. III, p. 188. 56 UKNA WO 208/1495, Notes on war experience against the Japanese in Malaya: by Lieutenant-Colonel B.H. Ashmore, for Brigadier of General Staff Malaya Command – 13 January 1942. 57 IOLR L/MIL/17/20/25/3, Periodical Notes on the Japanese Army, No. 3 –

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58 59 60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67 68 69 70 71

72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

Combined Operations: Prepared by War Office under direction of Alanbrooke – 10 March 1942. UKNA WO 208/1417, Japanese Amphibious Operations: Issued by Intelligence Division Office of Chief of Naval Operations (US Navy Department, Washington) – 8 March 1942. UKNA WO 208/2260, WOWIS, No. 123 – 24 December 1941. LHCMA BROOKE-POPHAM, 6/1/44, Appreciation of situation in Malaya as of 18 December 1941. LHCMA HUTTON, 2/11, Appreciation by Hutton – 10 January 1942. UKNA WO 106/3311, Cipher No. 01229: Wavell to War Office – 15 February 1942. UKNA WO 208/1529, Malaya and Singapore: Report drawn up by Major H.P. Thomas (OBE, Indian Army) – 30 May 1942. LHCMA Pownall Diaries, Comments on a summary of points affecting the Japanese Army, obtained in the War Office in November 1941; HUTTON, 2/13, Reference No. 52/G: Commander of 17th Indian Division to Headquarters Army in Burma – 26 February 1942; HUTTON, 2/(Unnumbered), Reference No. 40/G: Reports on operations leading up to the crossing of the Sittang River on 22 February 1942: by Headquarters 17th Indian Division – 26 February 1942; GRACEY, 1/1, Reference No. 262/5/G: Memorandum for all officers of the 20th Indian Division on the Policy for Training and Operations – 13 April 1942. LHCMA Pownall Diaries, Note by Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips (formerly GSO1(O) Malaya Command) – (undated ?? March 1942). UKNA ADM 223/495, NID 001954/42, The Fall of Singapore: by G.W. Seabridge – 28 February 1942. IOLR L/WS/1/952, Cipher No. MC5694: CGS Australia to the War Office, enclosing a summary of Major-General Bennett’s report on the Malaya campaign – 2 April 1942. LHCMA Pownall Diaries, ‘Causes of Failure’ – 5 March 1942. IWM Percival Papers, P 74, Dispatch on the Far East: by Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham – 25 June 1942. IOLR L/MIL/17/20/28, Characteristics of Japanese Operations: compiled by Headquarters SWPA and forwarded by Wavell in March 1942. IOLR L/WS/1/952, Report of Operations of the 11th Indian Division in Kedah and Perak (by Brigadier W. Carpendale, Late Commander, 28th Indian Infantry Brigade) – (undated ?? summer 1942); UKNA ADM 205/13, Minute by the Lord Privy Seal for Churchill, covering Wavell’s dispatch on operations in the Far East – 16 February 1942; CAB 106/103, Dispatch on the operations in Burma covering the period from 5 March to 20 May 1942: by General H.R. Alexander – 16 June 1942. Slim, Defeat Into Victory, pp. 142–3. UKNA ADM 205/13, Most Secret Minute by Director of Gunnery and AA Warfare Division – 13 March 1942. UKNA ADM 205/13, Naval Cipher 1710B: Pound to Somerville – 9 April 1942; Naval Cipher 0241Z: Somerville to Pound – 11 April 1942. CCC SMVL, 8/1, Most Secret Minute from Somerville to Pound – 12 February 1942. UKNA AIR 22/75, AMWIS, No. 121 – 24 December 1941. UKNA AIR 22/75, AMWIS, No. 122 – 1 January 1942. UKNA AIR 22/75, AMWIS, Nos. 125 and 126 – 22 and 29 January 1942. UKNA WO 106/3759, Cipher No. 5782/C: Wavell to Alanbrooke – 14 March 1942; also Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 6–7.

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80 IWM Percival Papers, P 42, Dispatch by Supreme Commander ABDA area to CCS on operations in the Southwest Pacific, 15 January to 25 February 1942: HMSO – 1947. 81 UKNA AIR 22/75, AMWIS, No. 120 – 18 December 1941. 82 UKNA ADM 223/154, ADMWIS, No. 105 – 13 March 1942; also in AIR 22/75, AMWIS, No. 130 – 26 February 1942. 83 G. Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914–1945: a historical survey, London: Jane’s, 1979, Ch. 6, and ‘Perceptions of Naval Power Between the Wars: the British case’, in P. Towle (ed.), Estimating Foreign Military Power, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 173–4. 84 J.T. Sumida, ‘The Best Laid Plans: the development of British battle-fleet tactics, 1919–1942’, International History Review, 14/4, 1992, pp. 697–8. 85 G. Till, ‘Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: the British, American and Japanese case studies’, in Millett and Murray (eds), Military Innovation, p. 217. 86 Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 47–8. 87 P. Charrier, ‘British Assessments of Japanese Naval Tactics and Strategy, 1941– 1945’, in Gow and Hirama (eds), History of Anglo–Japanese Relations, Vol. III, p. 223. 88 UKNA ADM 205/13, Personal Minute for Churchill (unsigned ?? 1st Lord of the Admiralty) Enclosure: Terms of Reference for the enquiry arising out of the loss of HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales – 9 February 1942. 89 Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, pp. 148–9. 90 Charrier, ‘British Assessments of Japanese Naval Tactics and Strategy’, pp. 223–4. 91 UKNA ADM 199/623, M.07070/42, Minute by DNAD – 5 July 1942. 92 UKNA ADM 199/623, M.07070/42, Minute by DGF – 26 April 1942. 93 Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, pp. 175–6; LHCMA Pownall Diaries – 10 April 1942; CCC SMVL, 8/1, Personal Letter from Somerville to Pound – 29 June 1942; UKNA ADM 205/13, Minute by Pound for Alexander covering report by 5th Sea Lord – 14 May 1942. 94 UKNA ADM 205/13, Churchill’s Personal Telegram T.714/2 for Roosevelt – 12 May 1942. 95 E. Bergerud, Touched With Fire: the land war in the South Pacific, New York: Penguin, 1996, p. 148. 96 UKNA WO 208/1393, Cipher No. 202: Land Operations (Brisbane) to Wavell – 30 August 1942; WO 208/2262, WOWIS, No. 159 – 2 September 1942. 97 UKNA WO 208/2263, WOWIS, No. 177, Annex 2 – 7 January 1943. 98 UKNA WO 208/1394, HJA, Ch. 38: The Attack – 31 December 1942. 99 UKNA WO 208/2262, ‘Enemy Land Tactics in the New Guinea Area’ (extracted from Advanced Allied Headquarters Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 7), in WOWIS, No. 171 – 25 November 1942. 100 UKNA WO 208/1501, HJA, J.141 E(XIV)a: Tactics on Guadalcanal and New Guinea (unsigned) – (undated ?? late 1942 / early 1943). 101 UKNA WO 208/2262, WOWIS, No. 157 – 19 August 1942. 102 UKNA WO 208/2263, ‘How the Japanese soldier fights – Part III’, in WOWIS, No. 180, Annex 4 – 27 January 1943. 103 UKNA WO 208/2263, WOWIS, No. 177 – 6 January 1943; CAB 81/110, JIC (42) 368 (Final), Axis Strength, 1942–3: Report by JIC – 6 October 1942. 104 UKNA WO 208/1401, HJA, Ch. 39: The Defence – 9 February 1943. 105 S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Firepower: British army weapons and theories of war, 1904–1945, London: Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 224–7; French, Raising Churchill’s Army, pp. 189–95.

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106 T. Harrison-Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940–1944: from Dunkirk to D-Day, London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 168–70; A. Farrar-Hockley, Infantry Tactics, 1939–1945, London: Almark, 1976, pp. 19–20. 107 B. Bond, British Military Policy Between Two World Wars, Oxford: Clarendon, 1980, pp. 98–126. 108 T.R. Moreman, ‘Small Wars and Imperial Policing: the British Army and the theory and practice of colonial warfare in the British Empire, 1919–1939’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 19/4, 1996, pp. 105–31. 109 Ferris, ‘Ground of Our Own Choosing’, pp. 188–9. 110 R. Lewin, Slim: the standardbearer, London: Leo Cooper, 1976, p. 119. 111 Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 150–2. 112 Ibid., pp. 153–4; IWM Irwin Papers, 2/1, Personal Letter from Wavell to Irwin – 7 March 1943. (Cited in Allen, Burma, pp. 100–1.) 113 IWM Irwin Papers, 2/1, Secret and Personal Letter from Wavell to Irwin – 15 January 1943, and Periodic Letter No. 9 from Irwin to Wavell – 9 March 1943. 114 UKNA WO 203/4615, Dispatch on Operations in India Command, 1 January to 20 June 1943 by Field-Marshal Wavell. 115 UKNA ADM 223/347, DNI to Somerville – 9 December 1942. 116 CCC CHAR 20/67/3, Churchill’s Personal Minute M.136/2 for Alexander and Pound – 14 April 1942; UKNA ADM 205/13, Personal Minute by Pound for Churchill – 14 April 1942. 117 UKNA ADM 223/154, ADMWIS, No. 119 – 19 June 1942. 118 UKNA AIR 22/77, AMWIS, No. 166 – 7 November 1942. 119 UKNA ADM 199/1302, M.051432/42, Minute by DNAD, dated 16 September 1942, to Report by US Marine Corps of Midway Island Battle between 4–6 June. 120 E. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky: the air war in the South Pacific, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999, p. 466. 121 Ibid., pp. 248–50. 122 Ibid., pp. 251–62. 123 UKNA AIR 22/77, ‘Fighters at Guadalcanal’, in AMWIS, No. 175 – 9 January 1943. 124 UKNA ADM 223/156, ‘Japanese pilots’ (from a US report), in ADMWIS, No. 145 – 18 December 1942. 125 Probert, Forgotten Air Force, pp. 118–9. 126 UKNA WO 208/2261, WOWIS, No. 131, Annex 3 – 18 February 1942. 127 UKNA WO 106/3311, Cipher No. 01229: Wavell to the War Office – 15 February 1942. 128 LHCMA HUTTON, 2/40, Précis of Operations in Burma – (undated ?? late 1942). 129 UKNA ADM 223/495, NID 001954/42, The Loss of Singapore and its lessons for NID: Views of Colonel Stewart (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) – (undated ?? February/March 1942). 130 IOLR L/WS/1/317, Lessons from Malaya (Extracts from the observations of a New Zealand officer who took part in the operations in Malaya), in GHQIMIS, No. 9 – 7 September 1942. 131 UKNA WO 208/1446, HJA, Jap.XLVI.9(a): Extracts from captured Notebook, apparently the diary of a Japanese truck driver – (undated ?? December 1942); Extract from Personal Diary Captured at Guadalcanal, dated 1 September to 27 October 1942. 132 UKNA WO 208/1446, CX 37400 OX/Far East/181/G: Confessions of war-weariness by Japanese troops (based on article under caption ‘Psychology on the Battlefields’, written from material supplied by Supervisory Board of Military Education) – 2 November 1942.

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133 UKNA WO 208/1446, Minutes to the CX 37400 OX/Far East/181/G, by Captain (General Staff) at MI2, on behalf of Major – 5 November 1942. 134 UKNA WO 208/2263, ‘Japanese morale in Guadalcanal’, in WOWIS, No. 174, Annex 1 – 17 December 1942. 135 UKNA WO 208/2263, ‘How the Japanese soldier fights’, in WOWIS, No. 177, Annex 2 – 7 January 1943. 136 UKNA WO 208/2263, ‘One year of war’, in WOWIS, No. 172 – 2 December 1942. 137 UKNA CAB 81/110, JIC (42) 368 (Final), Axis Strength, 1942–3: Report by JIC Subcommittee – 6 October 1942. 138 UKNA WO 208/2262, WOWIS, No. 170 – 18 November 1942; WO 208/2263, ‘How the Japanese soldier fights – Part III’, in WOWIS, No. 180, Annex 4 – 27 January 1943. 139 IOLR L/WS/1/317, ‘Characteristics of Japanese POWs’, in GHQIMIS, No. 7 – 6 July 1942. 140 C. Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm: psychological warfare, 1938–1945, Oxford: OUP, 1977, pp. 30–2. 141 UKNA FO 371/31787, F 3579/2000/61, Political Warfare Against Japan: by Overseas Planning Section of MOI – 5 May 1942. 142 UKNA FO 898/269, Final Version of Plan for Political Warfare against Japan: prepared by PWE – 2 May 1942. 143 UKNA CAB 81/106, JIC (42) 40, Axis Strength and Policy in 1942: Report by JIC – 12 February 1942. 144 UKNA WO 208/1480A, Japan’s Economic Situation: Memorandum by MEW on DMI (India) Appreciation, dated 9 May 1942. 145 UKNA ADM 223/322, BJ.000104: Tokyo to Vichy, and SOIS Colombo 1000/ 11/3, in ADMSIS, NID 00771 – 13 March 1942; HW 1/437 BJ.102485: Fujio Sanko (Saigon) to Nichinan Unyu Kaisha (Tokyo) – 22 March 1942 (decrypted on the 25th); ADM 223/322 BJ.103212: Tokyo to Saigon, in ADMSIS, NID 00854 – 14 April 1942; HW 1/639 BJ.105460: Tokyo to Bangkok – 12 June 1942. 146 UKNA WO 208/1480A, Notes by the MEW on Memorandum on Japan’s Economic Position: Enclosed with DMI (India) Appreciation dated 9 May 1942. 147 UKNA CAB 79/22, COS (42) 220th Meeting – 28 July 1942. 148 UKNA AIR 40/2214, Minute by M.M. Du Merton (MEW) on Kawanishi Aircraft Factory – 25 June 1942. 149 UKNA AIR 22/75, AMWIS, No. 140 – May 7, 1942; CAB 81/108, JIC (42) 23, The Japanese air situation relating estimated losses to production: Note by the Secretary – 15 June 1942. 150 Christ Church College Oxford Library (hereafter CCO), Portal Papers, File 3, f. 16, MEW to Lord Cherwell – 7 April 1942; f. 16c, Secret Minute from Portal to Churchill, enclosing response to above – 19 April 1942. 151 UKNA CAB 84/40, JP (FE) (42) 3, Appreciation of the War Against Japan (Stage I): Summary of Conclusions by FPS – 14 March 1942. 152 UKNA WO 193/156, MO1a Comments on JP (42) 403 (O) – 17 April 1942. 3 GAUGING THE BALANCE OF AN UNPREDICTABLE WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ON JAPANESE STRATEGY, JANUARY 1943 TO AUGUST 1945 1 For documentation on the FECB’s progress, see file UKNA HW 4/29, Far East Y Organization Fortnightly Reports, August 1942 to April 1944. 2 UKNA ADM 223/297, NID VOL.42, Far East and Pacific, Part III, Special: Special and the War with Japan – Operational intelligence.

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3 IOLR L/WS/1/897, 31398/I: Most Secret Cipher Telegram from Wavell to Alanbrooke – 13 December 1942. 4 IOLR L/WS/1/897, 43164/I: Secret Cipher Telegram from Wavell to Alanbrooke – 21 March 1943. 5 IOLR L/WS/1/897, Memorandum by the Y Committee on the proposal from Wavell concerning reorganization of Y Services in India and Ceylon – 7 May 1942; Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, pp. 251–2. 6 UKNA WO 203/364, Telegram No. 184/36: Reorganization of planning – ‘I’ problems – 20 July 1944. 7 Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy, p. 207. 8 UKNA ADM 223/297, NID VOL.42, Far East and Pacific, Part III, Special: HMS Anderson and special intelligence in the Far East – Japanese ‘Special’ Research Centre at Washington. 9 Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, pp. 240–1. 10 UKNA WO 203/5042, SEACOS 43: Most Secret Message from Mountbatten to COS – 13 December 1943. 11 For documentation, see file UKNA HW 4/15, ULTRA/AND/JISD: Japanese Intelligence, Signals intelligence digest. 12 UKNA AIR 40/2716, Most Secret Report on meeting held at DDI4 office on 11 November 1943. 13 UKNA AIR 40/2716, Kodak 92219: GCCS to WEC – 28 January 1944. 14 UKNA AIR 40/2716, Proposed revision of allocated tasks in Japanese Army and Army Air systems – by Hooper (head of Japanese section, AI4f) – 10 June 1944. 15 Files UKNA AIR 40/2219–21, Eastern Air Command Weekly Intelligence Summaries, Sections 1, Estimate of Japanese Air Strength and Japanese Air Order of Battle. 16 A. Stripp, Codebreaker in the Far East: how Britain cracked Japan’s top secret military codes, Oxford: OUP, 1989, pp. 82–3. 17 UKNA WO 203/5042, SEACOS 82: Most Secret Message from Mountbatten to COS – 31 December 1943. 18 UKNA WO 203/364, Memorandum No. 10101/GSI(x): Division of Duties in 11th Army Group, Southeast Asia – 25 February 1944. 19 UKNA WO 203/297, 8953/GS/Sigint: Signals Intelligence Directorate, General Staff Branch, GHQ India – 28 November 1944. 20 UKNA WO 203/364, Appendix ‘A’ to GHQ(I) and SEAC paper DMI/6937: Responsibility for Intelligence – 3 March 1944; WO 203/3673, Organization of Intelligence, Headquarters SACSEA – 22 April 1945. 21 UKNA WO 208/147, Intelligence notes from Burma: published by GSI(x), GHQ India – October 1945 (hereafter, Intelligence Notes from Burma), Part I: Notes by Headquarters XIV Army on Intelligence During the Burma Campaign, May 1944 – May 1945. 22 UKNA WO 203/297, ALFSEA Signals Intelligence Report for March 1945 – Part II. 23 R. Bennett, Behind the Battle: intelligence in the war with Germany, 1939–1945, London: Pimlico, 1999, passim, and Intelligence Investigations: how ULTRA changed history, London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 71–93; R. Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War, London: Hutchinson, 1978, passim; F.H. Hinsley, ‘The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War’, in F.H. Hinsley and A. Stripp (eds), Codebreakers: the inside story of Bletchley Park, Oxford: OUP, 1993, pp. 1–14; P. Beesly, Very Special Intelligence: the story of the Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre, 1939–1945, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977, passim. 24 Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA, p. 235; Lewin, The Other ULTRA, pp. 197–8;

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25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, pp. 525–6; Winton, ULTRA in the Pacific, passim. M. Barnhart, ‘Japanese Intelligence Before the Second World War: best case analysis’, in May (ed.), Knowing One’s Enemies, pp. 440–55. Hayashi, Kogun, pp. 72–3. For example, see UKNA WO 203/5039, No. 89636: Commodore Rodgers to Admiral Cooke, via Mountbatten and Wedemeyer – 3 December 1943, and unnumbered telegram: Wedemeyer to Commodore Rodgers – 4 December 1943. UKNA ADM 223/23, OIC/SI/J.203: Japanese naval movements – 16 June 1944. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, p. 460. T. Koyanagi, ‘The Battle of Leyte Gulf’, in Evans (ed.), Japanese Navy in World War II, pp. 356–61; also S. Fukudome, ‘The Air Battle off Taiwan’, in Ibid., pp. 335–46. Drea, In the Service of the Emperor, pp. 131–2. UKNA ADM 223/163, Special contribution: ‘Tactical foresight’ (US Pacific Fleet Confidential Bulletin, dated May 1944), in ADMWIS, No. 233 – 25 August 1944. UKNA CAB 79/60, COS (43) 68th Meeting (O) – 7 April 1943 – Enclosure: JIC (43) 144 (O) (Final), Combined Intelligence in the SWPA and India: Report by JIC – 5 April 1943, Annex A – Telegram No. 43911/COS: Wavell to COS – 26 March 1943, Annex B – Reply to above. Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War, p. 256. CCC SMVL, 8/3, Top Secret and Personal Letter from Somerville to Mountbatten – 24 April 1944. British Library Manuscripts Collection (hereafter BLMC), Cunningham Papers, Add.52563, ff. 94–5, Somerville to Cunningham – 27 July 1944; UKNA PREM 3/164/6, Cipher No. 220629Z: Somerville to Admiralty – 23 May 1944. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, pp. 245–7. UKNA CAB 79/74, COS (44) 150th Meeting (O) – 9 May 1944. CCO Portal Papers, File 3, f. 31a, Appreciation of the strength and quality of the JAF at October 1943 and April 1944. UKNA AIR 23/2863, Japanese Bomber Offensive Potentialities: by Chief Intelligence Officer (ACSEA) – 7 February 1944. UKNA HW 4/7, Naval Air Signals Digest, No. 262 – 9 February 1945. Intelligence Notes from Burma, Part III: Intelligence in an army division, covering the period from February 1944 to January 1945. Lewin, The Other ULTRA; Stripp, Codebreaker in the Far East, pp. 80–9; Intelligence Notes from Burma, Part I: Notes by Headquarters XIV Army on Intelligence During the Burma Campaign, May 1944 – May 1945. Information on this issue has been obtained from Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, pp. 252–4. Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 210, 221. Stripp, Codebreaker in the Far East, pp. 165–72. Ibid., p. 167. F.W. Winterbotham, The ULTRA Secret, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974, p. 204. Lewin, The Other ULTRA, pp. 197–8. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, p. 253. Hayashi, Kogun, p. 95. Intelligence Notes from Burma, Part I: Notes by Headquarters XIV Army on Intelligence During the Burma Campaign, May 1944 – May 1945. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, pp. 220–1.

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53 Kirby, War against Japan, Vol. IV, pp. 32–3. 54 Southampton University Library (hereafter SUL), Mountbatten Papers, C253/ SC4/1653/S: Mountbatten to Stilwell – 12 October 1944. 55 Intelligence Notes from Burma, Part I: Notes by Headquarters XIV Army on Intelligence During the Burma Campaign, May 1944 – May 1945. 56 UKNA WO 203/216, JP (45) 35/1, Photographic Reconnaissance in Southeast Asia – 17 February 1945. 57 Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 232, 289–90; Allen, Burma, p. 396. 58 Intelligence Notes from Burma, Part II: Intelligence in a Corps (based on experiences gained by the 4th Corps on Assam–Burma frontier during the period May 1942 to July 1944). 59 Allen, Burma, pp. 188–9, 228; also see IWM Scoones Papers, Appreciation of the situation in the event of a major enemy attack materializing in the next two months: by General Sir G. Scoones – 29 February 1944. 60 UKNA WO 203/5037A, DMI/442, Japanese reinforcement of Burma: Summary of Military Intelligence views on information received and sources available – 11 September 1943. 61 UKNA WO 208/1148, Report by MI2c on Order of Battle of the Japanese Army – 1 January 1944; IWM Scoones Papers, Appreciation of the situation in the event of a major enemy attack materialising in the next two months: by Scoones – 29 February 1944. 62 UKNA CAB 81/125, JIC (44) 413 (O) (Final), Further Operations in SEAC: Report by JIC – 21 September 1944. 63 UKNA WO 203/1756, 15th Indian Corps Special Intelligence Summaries, Nos. 1 and 2 – 24 and 27 April 1945. 64 LHCMA MESSERVY, 9, Operations of the 4th Corps – 6 May to 15 August 1945: by Lieutenant-General Sir F.W. Messervy. 65 UKNA WO 203/5040, SAC (45) 73, Japanese overall strategy and its effect on Japanese strategy in Southeast Asia: by the Director of Intelligence – 19 May 1945. 66 UKNA WO 203/4400, Memorandum by Director of Intelligence (Headquarters SACSEA) to COS on the situation in Malaya – 24 July 1945. 67 UKNA CAB 81/114, JIC (43) 196 (Final), Japanese Strengths in the Pacific: Report by JIC – 30 April 1943; CAB 81/115, JIC (43) 282 (Final), Axis Strength, 1943–4: Report by JIC – 1 August 1943 (hereafter JIC (43) 282 (Final), Axis Strength, 1943–4); CAB 81/119, JIC (43) 494 (Final), Japanese Intentions: Report by JIC – 2 December 1943 (hereafter JIC (43) 494 (Final), Japanese Intentions); CAB 81/120, JIC (44) 43 (Final), Japanese Strength, 1944: Report by JIC – 17 February 1944 (hereafter JIC (44) 43 (Final), Japanese Strength, 1944). For an account of the situation from the Japanese perspective, see Dull, Battle History of the IJN, pp. 294–300. 68 UKNA CAB 81/120, JIC (44) 1 (O), Japanese Employment of Carrier Borne Aircraft in 1945: JIC Reply to FPS Appreciation dated 30 December 1943 – 1 January 1944; JIC (44) 14 (O) (Final), Japanese Intentions: Report by JIC – 12 January 1944. 69 BLMC Cunningham Papers, Add.52564, Diary of Sir James Somerville (hereafter Somerville Diary) – 2 June 1944. 70 UKNA CAB 84/61, JP (44) 55 (Final), Appendix – Security of Imperial Communications in the Indian Ocean: Memorandum by COS – 27 February 1944; CAB 81/121, JIC (44) 75 (O) (Final), Japanese Naval Moves: Report by JIC – 24 February 1944; CAB 84/61, JP (44) 54 (Final), Appreciation on Move of the Japanese Fleet: Report by JPS – 24 February 1944; Somerville Diary – 4 March 1944.

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71 CCC SMVL, 8/3, Personal Letter from Somerville to Mountbatten – 23 February 1944; UKNA CAB 80/81, COS (44) 202 (O) (Final), Move of the Japanese Fleet: Report by COS – 28 February 1944; PREM 3/164/6, COS (44) 211 (O), Battleship Reinforcement of the Eastern Fleet: Memorandum by Cunningham – 2 March 1944; AIR 23/2266, SEACOS 104: Mountbatten to COS – February 1944; Probert, Forgotten Air Force, p. 203; Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, pp. 289–91. 72 UKNA CAB 79/89, COS (44) 62nd Meeting (Confidential Annex) – 25 February 1944; CAB 120/518, Serial No. 78/4: Personal Minute by Churchill to COS – 7 March 1944 (cited in W.S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. V: Closing the Ring, London: Cassell, 1952, pp. 508–9); CAB 120/611, SEACOS No. 115: Mountbatten to Air Ministry, enclosing signal from Somerville – 17 March 1944. 73 UKNA PREM 3/164/4, SEACOS 292: Mountbatten to COS – 10 January 1945; Churchill’s Personal Minute to SEACOS 292 (Reference M.57/5) – 11 January 1945. 74 UKNA ADM 205/43, Cunningham’s reply to Churchill’s Minute M.57/5 – 12 January 1945. 75 UKNA ADM 205/43, Churchill’s Personal Minute M.73/5 for Cunningham – 14 January 1945. 76 UKNA ADM 223/495, NID 002351/43, Japanese aircraft strength on the India– Burma front (based on recent reports from AHQ India), in extract from Intelligence Summary by COIC (Wellington, New Zealand) – 2 January 1943; JIC (43) 282 (Final) Axis Strength, 1943–4; AIR 22/78, AMWIS, Nos. 187, 200 and 204 – 3 April, 3 and 31 July 1943; AIR 23/7720, Air Command Southeast Asia Weekly Intelligence Summary (hereafter ACSEAWIS), No. 14 – 20 February 1944; AIR 23/7722, ACSEAWIS, No. 33 – 2 July 1944. 77 UKNA AIR 23/7723, Japanese Air Forces: Review of enemy activity during November 1944, in ACSEAWIS, No. 55 – 3 December 1944; AIR 22/81, ‘Operation Eruption against Rangoon’, in AMWIS, No. 276 – 16 December 1944. 78 CCO Portal Papers, File 4, f. 31, Secret Minute by Portal to Churchill – 7 October 1943 79 BLMC Cunningham Papers, Add.52562, ff. 185–8, Power to Cunningham – 2 June 1945. 80 UKNA AIR 23/7720, ACSEAWIS, No. 8 – 9 January 1944; RAFMH Peirse Papers, AC71/13/122, Peirse to Browning – 26 May 1946; also see Probert, Forgotten Air Force, pp. 158–9. 81 UKNA WO 203/1710, SEAC and India Command Weekly Intelligence Summary (hereafter SEACWIS), No. 114 – 7 January 1944. 82 Somerville Diary – 5 and 7 April 1944. 83 UKNA WO 203/4893, Telegram No. 82270/SEACOS: Mountbatten to COS – 3 November 1943. 84 UKNA AIR 23/1995, XIV Army and 3rd Tactical Air Force Joint Appreciation and First Outline Plan for Operation Champion – 23 August 1944. 85 UKNA WO 208/1148, MI2c Report on Japanese Army Order of Battle – 1 March 1944. 86 UKNA WO 208/158, Capacity of Japanese lines of communication in Burma: report by Transport Division, Headquarters SACSEA – 25 July 1944. 87 UKNA WO 208/2263, WOWIS, No. 181, Annex 7 – 3 February 1943, No. 189 – 31 March 1943, No. 190 – 7 April 1943, No. 191 – 14 April 1943, No. 192 – ‘An unsuccessful Japanese reinforcement operation’ – 21 April 1943; ‘Japanese supply problems in the field’ (From G-2 Information Bulletin, No. 10, Headquarters US Army Forces in South Pacific Area), in WOWIS, No. 199 – 9 June 1943.

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88 The Lethbridge Mission was a special fact-finding commission set up under the COS’s auspices and headed by Brigadier J.S. Lethbridge. It conducted an extensive tour of the Pacific and Southeast Asia theatre during late 1943 and early 1944, the purpose of which was to obtain a firsthand account of US and Australian operations against the IJA in the Pacific theatres, and to determine the lessons which could be used by British forces in Southeast Asia. 89 LHCMA LETHBRIDGE 1, 220 Military Mission Report (Lethbridge Mission Report), Vol. I, Part 3, Chapter iv – April 1944. 90 UKNA AIR 23/7719, Operations in the Southwest Pacific (from GHQ India Weekly Intelligence Summary (hereafter GHQIWIS), No. 104, dated 29 October 1943), in AHQIWIS, No. 93 – 31 October 1943. 91 UKNA AIR 23/3021, SAC (44) 149, Japanese Lines of Communication and Supply Position in Burma: Report by Director of Intelligence (Headquarters SEAC) – 30 March 1944. 92 UKNA CAB 106/164, Note on our capacity to operate offensively against Burma: by Lieutenant-General Irwin – (undated ?? early April 1943). 93 Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. II, pp. 399–401; Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 221–2. 94 For examples, see National Army Museum, London (hereafter NAM), Molesworth Papers, Reference No. 6505-55-6-1, Most Secret and Personal Letter from Auchinleck to Molesworth (India Office) – August 24, 1943; Slim, Defeat into Victory, p. 218; J. Masters, The Road Past Mandalay, London: Michael Joseph, 1961, pp. 162–3 For alternative arguments regarding the validity of the criticisms levelled against Wingate’s strategy, see P. Mead, Orde Wingate and the Historians, Braunton: Merlin, 1987, pp. 93–110 and ‘Orde Wingate and the Official Historians’, Journal of Contemporary History, 14/1, 1979, pp. 55–82; S. Bidwell, ‘Wingate and the Official Historians: an alternative view’, Journal of Contemporary History, 15/2, 1980, pp. 245–56; P. Mead and S. Bidwell, ‘Orde Wingate – two views’, Journal of Contemporary History, 15/3, 1980, pp. 401–4; D. Rooney, Wingate and the Chindits: redressing the balance, London: Cassell, 1994, pp. 219–49. 95 John Rylands Library, University of Manchester (hereafter JRL) AUCHINLECK, 1034, A note on the size and composition of the Indian Army, c. 31 August 1943. 96 IOLR L/WS/1/1357, WP (43) 232, Morale and the War against Japan: Memorandum by Leo Amery (Secretary of State for India) – 5 June 1943. 97 SUL Mountbatten Papers, C50/10, dated 27 November 1943, C50/11 SC4/10/ C, dated 3 January 1944, both from Mountbatten to Alanbrooke; UKNA CAB 106/75, Report to CCS by SACSEA 1943–6 – 30 July 1947. 98 Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 226, 231–2. 99 JRL AUCHINLECK, 1351, File XLVIII: Despatches, etc. on the Indo–Burma front between 21 June and 15 November 1943 – supplement to London Gazette by Sir Claude J.E. Auchinleck for Secretary of State for War – 1947 (Auchinleck’s Dispatch on the Indo–Burma front between 21 June and 15 November 1943); Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 169–77. 100 Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. II, pp. 350–1. 101 UKNA WO 203/303, Appreciation on the Capture of Akyab: by Rear Headquarters SEAC – (undated ?? late June /early July 1944). 102 IWM Scoones Papers, Appreciation of the situation in the event of a major enemy attack materializing in the next two months: by Scoones – 29 February 1944; Narrative of 4th Corps operations between March–July 1944: by Scoones – Vol. III, Chapter XX: The Battles of Imphal and Kohima: The Japanese Advance Halted.

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103 IWM Scoones Papers, Draft Narrative on the reconquest of Burma; Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 290–2. 104 UKNA WO 208/146, The Japanese Campaign in the Arakan, December 1943 – February 1944: issued by GHQ India Military Intelligence Directorate; Probert, Forgotten Air Force, p. 172. 105 IWM Scoones Papers, Draft Narrative on the reconquest of Burma; UKNA CAB 79/75, COS (44) 171st and 177th Meetings (O) – 25 and 31 May 1944. 106 RAFMH Peirse Papers, AC71/13/79, SCM/322/44: Personal Memorandum for Commanders-in-Chief on Mountbatten’s visit to the Burma Fronts – 6 July 1944; Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 347–8, 351–2. 107 LHCMA GRACEY, 2/12, Appreciation of the Situation: by Lieutenant-General Montagu Stopford – 30 June 1944; Kirby, War against Japan, Vol. III, pp. 361–2. 108 UKNA CAB 106/112, Air Operations in Southeast Asia from 1 June 1944 to 2 May 1945: by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park (Allied Air C-in-C, ACSEA), for London Gazette – 12 April 1951; CAB 120/701, SAC 1375: Personal Telegram from Mountbatten to Churchill and COS – 23 January 1945. 109 UKNA AIR 23/3021, SAC (44) 149/1, Japanese Lines of Communication and Supply Position in Burma: Appreciation by Director of Intelligence (Headquarters SEAC) – 4 June 1944; WO 203/1338, Japanese Supply Position in Burma: by Director of Intelligence (Headquarters SEAC) – 24 December 1944; SAC (45) 42/1, Japanese Supply Position in Burma: by Director of Intelligence (Headquarters SEAC) – 20 March 1945. 110 LHCMA GRACEY 2/25, Joint Appreciation of the situation to cover offensive action in Burma during autumn 1944: by Commander of 33rd Corps and AOC 221st Air Group RAF – 18 September 1944. 111 Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. IV, pp. 164–7; UKNA WO 203/196, XIV Army/ 221st Group Planning Paper, No. 10 – 7 February 1945. 112 UKNA PREM 3/149/8, SAC 7296: Personal for Churchill from Mountbatten – 29 September 1944. 113 UKNA WO 193/907, SAC 12471: Mountbatten to COS – 22 December 1944. 114 Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 481, 487; Allen, Burma, pp. 459–60; Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. IV, pp. 327–8. 115 UKNA WO 203/1110, ALFSEA Weekly Intelligence Review, Nos. 31 and 32 – 4 and 11 May 1945. 116 H.P. Willmott, Grave of a Dozen Schemes: British naval planning and the war against Japan, 1943–45, London: Airlife, 1996, passim. 117 UKNA CAB 81/113, JIC (43) 73 (Final), Japanese Intentions: Report by JIC – 24 February 1943; CAB 81/122, JIC (44) 186 (O) (Final), Japanese Intentions: Report by JIC – 6 May 1944. 118 UKNA CAB 81/126, JIC (44) 491 (O) (Final), Possibility of Japanese Withdrawal from the Outer Zone: Report by JIC – 8 December 1944. 119 UKNA CAB 81/117, JIC (43) 370 (O) (Revised Final), Operations Southwards from North Burma in November 1944: Report by JIC – 27 September 1943. 120 UKNA CAB 80/73, COS (43) 471 (O), Enclosure – JS (Quadrant) 6, Operations in Sumatra: Report by JIC – 8 August 1943; CAB 81/117, JIC (43) 369 (O) (Revised Final), Operations Against Northern Sumatra: Report by JIC – 27 September 1943; JIC (43) 372 (O) (Final), Operations for the direct capture of Singapore: Report by JIC – 27 September 1943. 121 UKNA CAB 79/65, COS (43) 229th Meeting (O), Enclosure – Operations in Southeast Asia: Aide-Memoire by JPS – 28 September 1943; COS (43) 231st Meeting (O) – 30 September 1943; COS (43) 240th Meeting (O), Enclosure – Operations in Southeast Asia in 1944: Report by JPS – 6 October 1943.

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122 Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV, pp. 400–1, 437–8; Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. II, pp. 362–3, 368–70. 123 Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. II, p. 369. 124 UKNA CAB 80/70, COS (43) 286 (O), Enclosure – ‘Trident’: CCS 90th Meeting – 20 May 1943. 125 R. Callahan, Burma, 1942–1945, London: Davis-Poynter, 1978, pp. 76–8. 126 Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. II, pp. 420–1. 127 Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. III, pp. 67–9. 128 UKNA CAB 80/83, COS (44) 401 (O), Annex I – COS Directive to Mountbatten for approval by Churchill – 5 May 1944; COS (44) 405 (O), Minute by Churchill for COS on Draft Directive to Mountbatten – 7 May 1944; Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. III, pp. 163, 249–56. 129 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, pp. 412–13. 130 LHCMA ISMAY, 4/30/8a, Most Secret and Personal Letter from the Somerville to Ismay – 22 February 1944. 131 Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, p. 556. 132 For examples, see LHCMA ALANBROOKE, 6/3/9, Minute by Ismay for Churchill, enclosing COS proposal – 16 March 1944; A.B. Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey: the autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, New York: E.P. Dutton, 1951, p. 598. 133 A. Bryant, Triumph in the West: based on the diaries and autobiographical notes of Alanbrooke, London: Collins, 1959, p. 44; Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, p. 276, 301. 134 Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, pp. 295–6. 135 Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. II, p. 420. 136 Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. III, p. 163; Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, pp. 297–8. 137 LHCMA Pownall Diaries – 29 January 1944; UKNA WO 203/4894, Personal from Mountbatten to Churchill on troop requirements for Operation Buccaneer – 19 January 1944. 138 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, pp. 437–8; also for Churchill’s objections to Mountbatten’s calculation of the force requirements for Buccaneer, see CCC CHAR 20/125/21-2, Churchill to Mountbatten – 9 December 1943, and CHAR 20/159/23-5, Churchill’s Personal Telegram for Field Marshal Dill – 10 March 1944; LHCMA Pownall Diaries – 29 January 1944. 139 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, pp. 150–1. 140 Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV, pp. 439–40. 141 UKNA CAB 80/73, COS (43) 476 (O), Enclosure – JS (Q) 12, Operation ‘Culverin Junior’: Report by the JPS – 12 August 1943. 142 CCC CHAR 20/104/2, Churchill’s Personal Minute, D (Q) 13/3, for COS, enclosing his reply to JS (Q) 12 – 17 August 1943. 143 UKNA CAB 79/65, COS (43) 233rd Meeting (O) – 1 October 1943. 144 Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, p. 301. 145 Fraser, Alanbrooke, pp. 412–3. 146 Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, p. 556. 147 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, pp. 437–8. For the background to this problem and the uncertain value of Australia as a base for operations, see CAB 84/62, JP (44) 93 (Final), War Against Japan – Alternative Proposal: Report by JPS, Appendix I – Scale of Opposition – 12 April 1944, CAB 80/84, COS (44) 553 (O), Annex – Advance to North Borneo by way of Surabaya: Report by COS – 22 June 1944, CAB 80/85, COS (44) 623 (O), Annex – The Capture of Amboina: Staff Study by COS – 13 July 1944, Willmott, Grave of a Dozen Schemes, pp.

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148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163

164 165 166 167

168 169 170 171 172

71–112; Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, pp. 292; Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, pp. 470–8. UKNA CAB 79/77, COS (44) 236th Meeting (O) – 14 July 1944. Bryant, Triumph in the West, pp. 248–50. UKNA CAB 80/86, COS (44) 703 (O) (Final), Operations in Burma: AideMemoire by COS – 7 August 1944; CAB 79/79, COS (44) 264th Meeting (O) – 8 August 1944. Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. IV, pp. 109–10. Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. V, pp. 75–86. UKNA WO 203/2770, The Effect of the Arrival of 37th Division in Malaya on our plans for invasion: by Main Headquarters ALFSEA – 21 July 1945. Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. V, pp. 66–70. UKNA CAB 120/704, SEACOS 431: Mountbatten to COS – 10 July 1945. Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. V, pp. 87–8; UKNA CAB 79/36, COS (45), 192nd Meeting – 7 August 1945; CAB 69/7, Defence Committee (45) (Operations) 2nd Meeting – 8 August 1945. UKNA CAB 84/63, JP (44) 115 (Final), Second Phase of the War against Japan: Report by JPS – 30 August 1944. UKNA CAB 81/124, JIC (44) 348 (O) (Final), Kyushu – Scale of Opposition and Effects of Operation: Report by JIC – 12 August 1944. S. Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931–1945, New York: Pantheon, 1968, p. 196. Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 301. Ienaga, Pacific War, pp. 217, 222–3; T. Iritani, Group Psychology of the Japanese in Wartime, London: Kegan & Paul, 1991, pp. 23. Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 309. T.R.H. Havens, Valley of Darkness: the Japanese people and World War II, New York: Norton, pp. 69–71; B. Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, Oxford: OUP, 1981, pp. 11–15; Iritani, Group Psychology, pp. 60–1, 98; Ienaga, Pacific War, pp. 222–3. C. Thorne, The Issue of War: states, societies and the Far Eastern conflict of 1941–1945, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1985, p. 124; Shillony, Politics and Culture, pp. 101–2; Iritani, Group Psychology, pp. 70–1. UKNA WO 208/2267, ‘Army districts in Japan’, in WORIS, No. 79 – 15 March 1945. UKNA WO 208/2282, ‘Total resistance – Japanese civilians in the defence of their homeland’, in WOWIR, No. 95 – 13 June 1945. UKNA AIR 22/82, ‘The first 2,000-ton attack on Tokyo: preliminary indications’, in AMWIS, No. 291 – 31 March 1945; WO 208/1484, ‘Air raids and the maintenance of morale’, in Extract from Political Intelligence Directorate, Far East Intelligence and Propaganda Report, No. 8 – 11 June 1945. UKNA CAB 84/72, JP (45) 144 (Final), Grand Strategy in the War against Japan: Report by JPS – 6 July 1945 (hereafter JP (45) 144 (Final), Grand Strategy against Japan). Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 452, 454–6; Ellis, Brute Force, pp. 476–93. J.B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction, Vol. II of series Japanese Economic History 1930–1960, edited by J. Hunter, London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 58, 113–14. Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 229–30. A. Hara, ‘Japan: guns before rice’, in M. Harrison (ed.), The Economics of World War II, Cambridge: CUP, 1998, pp. 247–9; A.S. Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939–1945, London: Penguin, 1977, pp. 83–6.

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173 Milward, War, Economy and Society, pp. 320–1. 174 UKNA ADM 223/163, Japan: Economic developments (adapted from MEW survey of economic developments in the Far East during first half of 1944), in ADMWIS, No. 238 – 29 September 1944. 175 Drea, In the Service of the Emperor, pp. 147–53; Hayashi, Kogun, pp. 151–7. 176 UKNA CAB 81/129, JIC (45) 213 (O) (Final), Japanese Strategy and Capacity to Resist: Report by JIC – 2 July 1945. 177 JP (45) 144 (Final), Grand Strategy against Japan. 178 UKNA CAB 79/36, COS (45) 174th meeting – 11 July 1945. 179 JP (45) 144 (Final), Grand Strategy against Japan. 180 Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. V, pp. 189–90. 181 UKNA PREM 3/164/6, Personal Minute from Hillgarth to Churchill – 10 May 1945. 182 B.J. Bernstein, ‘The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, 74, January/February 1995, pp. 135–52, ‘Compelling Japan’s Surrender Without the A-bomb, Soviet Entry or Invasion: reconsidering the US Bombing Survey’s early-surrender conclusions’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 18/2, 1995, pp. 101– 48 and ‘Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: missed opportunities, little-known near disasters and modern memory’, Diplomatic History, 19/2, 1995, pp. 227–73; H.P. Bix, ‘Japan’s Delayed Surrender – a reinterpretation’, Diplomatic History, 19/2, 1995, pp. 197–225; R.J.C. Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1954; H. Feis, Japan Subdued: the atomic bomb and the end of the war in the Pacific, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1961; L.V. Sigal, Fighting to the Finish: the politics of war termination in the United States and Japan, 1945, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1988. 183 T. Allen and N. Polmar, Code-name Downfall: the secret plan to invade Japan and why Truman dropped the bomb, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995, pp. 222–3; R.B. Frank, Downfall: the end of the Imperial Japanese Empire, New York: Random House, 1999, pp. 211–13; D. MacEachin (ed.), The Final Months of the War with Japan: signals intelligence, US invasion planning and the A-Bomb decision, Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998, pp. 6–9; J.R. Skates, The Invasion of Japan: alternative to the bomb, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994, pp. 135–8. 184 For examples, see UKNA ADM 223/329, BJ.146965: Tokyo to Moscow – 30 June 1945, in ADMSIS, No. 2921/12 – 11 July 1945; BJ.147118 and BJ.147119: Tokyo to Moscow – 11 and 12 July 1945, respectively, in ADMSIS, No. 2922/12 – 14 July 1945; BJ.147692: Tokyo to Moscow – 25 July 1945, in ADMSIS, No. 2928/12 – 29 July 1945; BJ.147730: Tokyo to Moscow – 28 July 1945, in ADMSIS, No. 2929/12 – 31 July 1945. 185 UKNA WO 203/368, Japanese reactions to the abrogation of the RussoJapanese Neutrality Pact: by Director of Intelligence (Headquarters SEAC) – 12 April 1945. 186 UKNA CAB 81/129, JIC (45) 204 (O) (Final), The Japanese Attitude to Unconditional Surrender: Report by JIC – 27 June 1945. 187 Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV, pp. 540–1. 188 UKNA CAB 80/88, COS (44) 875 (O), Enclosure – ‘Octagon’: Operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944–5: Note by JPS on CCS 417/8 – 12 September 1944. 189 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 533. 190 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. VI, pp. 298–9. 191 W.S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI Closing the Ring, London: Cassell, 1954, pp. 552–3; P. Lowe and I. Nish, ‘From Singapore to Tokyo Bay, 1941–45’, in I. Nish and Y. Kibata (eds), The History of Anglo–Japanese

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192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199

Relations, 1600–2000, Vol. II: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1931– 2000, London: Macmillan, 2000, p. 143. For a revisionist argument, to the effect that Churchill viewed the bomb primarily as a means to intimidate Stalin and secure Soviet concessions in Eastern Europe, see G. Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, London: Fontana, 1995, pp. 370–1. N. Sarantakes, ‘One Last Crusade: the British Pacific Fleet and its impact on the British–American Alliance’, paper presented at Symposium on European Studies, University of Salford, 25 May 2004, pp. 12–13. Willmott, Grave of a Dozen Schemes, pp. 112–13. BLMC Cunningham Papers, Add.52562, ff. 189–92, Cunningham to Power – 15 June 1945. Willmott, Grave of a Dozen Schemes, pp. 130–1. Winton, Forgotten Fleet, p. 67. Fraser, Alanbrooke, pp. 491–3. UKNA CAB 79/36, COS (45) 192nd Meeting – 7 August 1945; CAB 69/7, Defence Committee (45) (Operations) 2nd Meeting – 8 August 1945. Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, pp. 123–4. 4 MATERIAL AND TECHNOLOGY VS METHODS OF USE: INTELLIGENCE ON THE TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF JAPAN’S ARMED FORCES

1 Ferris, ‘Ground of Our Own Choosing’, pp. 194–5. 2 Slim, Defeat into Victory, p. 539. 3 G. Forty, Japanese Army Handbook, 1939–1945, Stroud: Sutton, 1999, pp. 216–17; Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 221–3. 4 Drea, In the Service of the Emperor, pp. 59–60, 69–74. 5 A.D. Coox, ‘The Effectiveness of the Japanese Military Establishment in the Second World War’, in Millett and Murray (eds), Military Effectiveness, Vol. III, pp. 34–8. 6 LHCMA LIDDELL HART, 1/733, Liddell Hart to Wavell – 16 April 1943. 7 JRL AUCHINLECK, 1037, Auchinleck to Alanbrooke – 18 September 1943. 8 UKNA WO 208/2283, ‘Japanese POWs as a source of intelligence’, in WOWIR, No. 98 – 4 July 1945. 9 UKNA WO 203/1252, SEATIC Interrogation Bulletin, No. 14 – 9 January 1945. 10 UKNA WO 208/810, ‘The value of captured documents’, in GHQIWIS, No. 67 – 12 February 1943; IWM Papers of Major W.V.H. Martin, Through Japanese Eyes – Vol. II: issues of intelligence reports compiled by Special Forces Headquarters from captured Japanese documents – (undated ?? early 1945). 11 UKNA WO 208/2282, ‘Japanese captured documents’, in WOWIR, No. 87 – 11 April 1945. 12 UKNA WO 208/2263, ‘Japanese appreciation of British tactics’ (extract from US Technical and Tactical Trends, No. 14, dated 17 December 1942), in WOWIS, No. 182, Annex 2 – 10 February 1943. 13 UKNA WO 208/1403, HJA, Ch. XXXIX-3a: Japanese Infantry Tactics in Defence (extracted from instructions compiled by Commander, 51st Division at Finschhafen, and published by Staff Section, XVIII Army, dated 1 August 1943). 14 UKNA WO 208/2278A, ‘Japanese infantry tactics in defence’ (extracts from booklet prepared by staff of Japanese unit controlling campaign in Huon Gulf, New Guinea), in WOWIR, No. 40 – 17 May 1944. 15 UKNA AIR 23/7720, ‘The plan that failed – Japanese offensive in the Taung Bazaar/Ngakyedauk area’ (from SEACWIS dated 10 March 1944), in ACSEAWIS,

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16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

No. 17 – 12 March 1944; WO 208/2280, ‘Japanese failures and mistakes in the attack on India’, in WOWIR, No. 69 – 6 December 1944. UKNA WO 203/14, Manipur Operations of 1944: by Military Intelligence Directorate (GHQ India) and General Staff (Intelligence) ALFSEAC – 1 January 1945. Bergerud, Touched with Fire, pp. 222–31. Ibid., pp. 291–303. UKNA CAB 80/40, COS (43) 174, Military Mission to India and the Pacific: Memorandum by VCIGS – 13 June 1943. UKNA WO 208/2275, ‘Operations in New Guinea’ (from reports of commanders who took part in Australian operations during summer 1942), in WOWIR, No. 6 – 23 September 1943. For details of the excluded material, see UKNA WO 106/3448, Lessons from operations in the SWPA – 19 August 1943. UKNA WO 208/2277, ‘Nomenclature of Japanese defence works’, in WOWIR, No. 23 – 19 January 1944. UKNA WO 208/2263, ‘Lessons from Guadalcanal’ (extract from Military Reports on the United Nations, No. 3, issued by US Military Intelligence Service), in WOWIS, No. 190 – 7 April 1943. UKNA WO 106/3403, Report by Commanding General on the Buna Campaign: issued by Operations Branch (US War Department) – 16 September 1943. Lethbridge Mission Report, Vol. I, Part 3, Chapter v – April 1944. IOLR L/WS/1/1323, Most Secret Cipher Telegram No. 49300/C: Wavell to Alanbrooke, enclosing summary of Wingate’s report – 3 May 1943; Allen, Burma, pp. 147–9; Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 163. Auchinleck’s Dispatch on the Indo–Burma front between 21 June and 15 November 1943. JRL AUCHINLECK, 1036, Cover note to report on the size and composition of the Indian Army from Auchinleck to Alanbrooke – 9 September 1943. Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 181–9; CCC SLIM 3/4, ‘Morale’: by General Sir William Slim. Auchinleck’s Dispatch on the Indo–Burma front between 21 June and 15 November 1943. UKNA WO 106/4636, Campaign of the XIV Army, 1943–4: by LieutenantGeneral W.J. Slim; Kirby, War Against Japan, Vol. III, p. 33. UKNA WO 106/3807, Cipher No. 43231/C: Wavell to Alanbrooke – 22 March 1943. (Cited in Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV, p. 402.) LHCMA GRACEY, 1/8, Appreciation of the Situation on 4th Corps Front: by Major-General D.D. Gracey – 17 November 1943. IOLR L/MIL/17/20/25/6, Periodical Notes on the Japanese Army, No. 6 – Japanese Tactics at Night: Prepared by War Office under the direction of Alanbrooke – June 1943. B. Collier, The War in the Far East, 1941–1945: a military history, London: Heinemann, 1969, p. 412. LHCMA GRACEY, 2/23, Report on new features of Japanese tactics observed by 20th Indian Division – (undated ?? 28–30 September 1944). UKNA WO 203/1494, Appreciation of operations in the Arakan during 1944–5 by Christison – June 10 1944, and Minute by BGS (O) – 11 June 1944. Ellis, Brute Force, pp. 520–2. Similar arguments can also be found in Bidwell and Graham, Firepower, pp. 280–1; D. Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them: the British Army in the Second World War, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1983, pp. 319– 20. For alternative arguments which acknowledge the role of training and discipline, see Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 368–9, 538–43; M. Carver, Britain’s Army in the Twentieth Century, London: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 299–310; J.P.

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39 40 41 42

43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51 52

53 54 55 56 57 58

Cross, Jungle Warfare: experiences and encounters, London: Guild, 1989, pp. 59–76; Murray, ‘British Military Effectiveness’, pp. 120–1; Millett and Murray, War to be Won, pp. 489–93. UKNA WO 208/930, MI2 minute on Arakan operations – 25 March 1943. UKNA WO 208/2263, ‘Debunking the Japanese soldier’ (extract from Japanese Land Forces, No. 6, issued by Pacific Ocean Area (POA) Intelligence Centre), and War Office comment, in WOWIS, No. 191 – 14 April 1943. M. Baldwin, ‘Infantry Weapons in the Far East’, in Smurthwaite (ed.), Forgotten War, p. 88; Forty, Japanese Army Handbook, pp. 135–52. UKNA WO 208/2278A, ‘Some recent developments in the Japanese army’, in WOWIR, No. 34 – 5 April 1944; IOLR L/MIL/17/20/25/5, Periodical Notes on the Japanese Army, No. 5 – Japanese Tanks: Prepared by War Office under the direction of Alanbrooke – November 1943. Lethbridge Mission Report, Vol. I, Part 3, Chapter vii, Sections F and L – April 1944. LHCMA GRACEY, 2/17, Summary of the main lessons from the operation of tanks in the 4th Corps area between 1 March and 20 July 1944: by Headquarters 254th Indian Brigade and forwarded to 20th Indian Division – 30 July 1944. UKNA WO 203/1090, Report on visit to 15th Indian Corps front: by LieutenantColonel S.W.M. Whitehead (GSO1, Training, 11th Army Group) – 5–29 March 1944; WO 208/1401, Extracts from lecture, ‘Tank Operations in the Arakan’, by Brigadier S.H. Persse, BAFV, 11th Army Group – 15 September 1944. B. Perrett, Tank Tracks to Rangoon: the story of British armour in Burma, London: Robert Hale, 1978, pp. 122–4. LHCMA MESSERVY, 10, History of the Arakan Campaign of 1944–5 by the 15th Indian Corps: by Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Christison (Christison’s History of the Arakan Campaign of 1944–5), Chapter vi. UKNA WO 208/1403, ‘Japanese defensive tactics in Burma’ (extract from talk with British officer in India), in Extract from GHQ India War Information Circular, No. G.22 – 15 May 1943. UKNA WO 203/1167, Notes on Lessons from the Operations in Arakan during 1943: by Brigadier, Commander of 71st Indian Brigade – 29 May 1943. UKNA WO 203/120, Appreciation of situation on 4th Corps front: by Scoones – 20 September 1943. UKNA WO 203/1491, Appreciation of the Military Situation in the Arakan: (unsigned ?? Headquarters XIV Army) – 29 January 1944. IWM Papers of Lieutenant-Colonel J.E.M Bland (correspondence with Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese), Lieutenant-Colonel Ulick Verney (Tactical Headquarters ALFSEA) to J.E.M. Bland (Assistant Military Secretary, Main Headquarters, 8th Army) – 27 March 1945. UKNA WO 203/2692, Official Report on the Third Arakan Campaign, 1944–5, by 15th Indian Corps, Chapter xix: Conclusions on Operation Romulus. UKNA WO 208/1403, Japanese Tactics in the Withdrawal: by Headquarters 36th Division, SEAC – 6 March 1945. UKNA PREM 3/143/10, CIGS/PM/385: Wavell to Alanbrooke – 16 March 1943. IWM Scoones Papers, Draft Narrative on the reconquest of Burma; Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 227–30. UKNA WO 106/4757, Situation in the Imphal Plain: Report by Giffard to Mountbatten – 28 May 1944; A. Swinson, Kohima (London: Cassell, 1966), pp. 208–9, 222–3. D. Fletcher, The Universal Tank, Part II in series, British armour during the Second World War, London: HMSO, 1993, p. 63.

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59 LHCMA GRACEY, 2/23, Notes of an attack on a Japanese bunker position: by S.A. Greeves (Brigadier Commander, 80th Indian Infantry Brigade), forwarded to Headquarters 20th Indian Division – 12 February 1945. 60 K. Timbers, ‘Artillery in the Jungle’, in Smurthwaite (ed.), Forgotten War, pp. 103–4; LHCMA GRACEY, 2/23, Reports and Notes on Operations – Japanese methods: from Captain T.H.H. Hodgson (2nd Border) to the Adjutant – September 1944; UKNA WO 203/2525, Report on the attack on Hill 551 in the Arakan based on observation and interview with officers of 26th Indian Division: by the US Military Observer Group – 28 June 1944. 61 UKNA WO 203/1173, The attack on Japanese bunkers: prepared by DTI – (undated ?? June 1944). 62 LHCMA GRACEY, 2/24, 20th Indian Division Battle Instruction, No. 1, of 1944: Instructions for the advance when contact is imminent – 25 September 1944. 63 UKNA WO 203/1167, Notes on Lessons from the Operations in Arakan during 1943: by Brigadier, Commander of 71st Indian Brigade – 29 May 1943; AIR 23/ 7719, ‘Defence positions in the Kale and Myittha valleys’ (from GHQIWIS, No. 89), in AHQIWIS, No. 78 – 18 July 1943; WO 208/1403 ‘Japanese defensive tactics in Burma’ (extract from talk with British officer in India), in Extract from GHQ India War Information Circular, No. G.22 – 15 May 1943. 64 UKNA WO 208/2275, ‘Japanese conduct of defence’ (based on British experiences in Burma as described in article published by GHQ India), in WOWIR, No. 5 – 16 September 1943. 65 LHCMA GRACEY, 2/23, Reports and Notes on Operations – Japanese Methods: by Major D.S. Sole – (undated ?? October 1944); Note on Enemy Methods by G.C. Coppen – (undated ?? October/November 1944). 66 UKNA WO 203/1797, Lessons from Arakan Campaign of winter 1944–5: by 25th Indian Division – 21 March 1945. 67 LHCMA MESSERVY, 8, Operations of the 4th Corps – October 1944 to May 1945: by Lieutenant-General Sir F.W. Messervy; UKNA WO 208/1402, Reference 0185/134 (RAC1-b): ALFSEA Armoured Corps Liaison Letter, No. 3 – 23 May 1945. 68 UKNA WO 208/2279, ‘Japanese infantry artillery’, in WOWIR, No. 54 – 23 August 1944; WO 208/1404, HJA, Ch. XXXIX-4-a: Japanese artillery in the Arakan, March – August 1944 (from DTI questionnaire by Major O’Grady, Royal Artillery) – (undated ?? late 1944); WO 203/1112, ‘Capabilities of Japanese field artillery’, in Allied Land Forces Southeast Asia Weekly Intelligence Review (hereafter ALFSEAWIR), No. 43 – 27 July 1945. 69 E.D. Smith, The Battle for Burma, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979, p. 136; UKNA WO 203/6405, ALFSEAWIR, No. 24 – 16 March 1945; WO 203/6407, ALFSEAWIR, No. 26 – 30 March 1945; WO 208/2281, ‘Japanese antitank organization and weapons’, in WOWIR, No. 78 – 7 February 1945. 70 UKNA WO 203/959, Japanese Armoured Troops: Pamphlet issued by Military Intelligence Directorate (Headquarters ALFSEA and GHQ India) – April 1945. 71 Slim, Defeat into Victory, p. 374; Masters, Road Past Mandalay, p. 322; UKNA ADM 199/275, M.0441/47, Dispatch on Operations in Burma between 11 November 1944 and 15 August 1945: by Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese – 22 November 1950, Part I, Section 1. 72 Ibid. – Section 6. 73 Ibid. – Section 2; Lewin, Slim, p. 201. 74 D.F. Bittner, ‘Britannia’s Sheathed Sword: the Royal Marines and amphibious warfare in the interwar years – a passive response’, Journal of Military History, 55/3, 1991, pp. 345–61; K. Clifford, Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920–1940, Laurens, NY: Edgewood, 1983, pp. 30–

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75 76 77 78

79 80 81 82

83 84 85 86

87 88

89 90 91

85; B. Fergusson, The Watery Maze: the story of combined operations, New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1961, pp. 35–40; L.E.H. Maund, Assault from the Sea, London: Methuen, 1949, pp. 3–4, 6–8; Millett, ‘Assault from the Sea’, pp. 54–5, 59–64, 79–80. IOLR L/WS/1/1518, Secret Cipher Telegram No. 2656/G: C-in-C India to War Office – 10 February 1942. IOLR L/WS/1/1518, Note on the training of forces and research in India in connection with future amphibious operations both defensive and offensive: by General Staff Branch, India Command – 11 April 1942. Maund, Assault from the Sea, pp. 285–7; Fergusson, Watery Maze, pp. 362–3. UKNA WO 208/1403, India Translations: Notes on speeding up coastal defences (issued by CGS TATE 8413 Butai on 29 October 1943) – found near Buthidaung on 19 January 1944; WO 208/1409, Translations of document captured at Eniwetok atoll, enclosing information regarding the construction of special fire points (issued by the Commander of 3136 Butai, Engineer Company of 1st Amphibious Brigade): received at JICPOA on 5 April 1944. A.R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: History of the Unites States Marine Corps, New York: Free Press, 1980, pp. 402–9. UKNA WO 208/930, Minute by Captain, General Staff (MI2c) on Japanese beach defences – 26 October 1943. UKNA WO 208/2278A, ‘Japanese defence of the Gilbert islands’ (article based on several American reports), in WOWIR, No. 36 – 19 April 1944. IOLR L/WS/1/758, ‘Operations at Roi and Namur (Marshall islands) on 31 January 1944, in support of the landing’ (condensed from report of British observer, Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) Bulletin, No. Y/26), in DCO (India) Monthly Bulletin, No. 6 – 6 June 1944. UKNA WO 208/151, Minute by Lieutenant-Colonel (General Staff, MI2) on COS (44) 759 (O), Lethbridge Mission Report, Appendix A, Paragraphs 6, 14, 15, and 17 – 24 August 1944. UKNA WO 208/2280, ‘Japanese use of artillery in the Marianas – July 1944’, in WOWIR, No. 60 – 4 October 1944. IOLR L/WS/1/760, ‘US operations against Saipan and Guam in the Marianas’ (based on reports by British Combined Operations Observers), in COHQ Bulletin, No. Y14 – September 1944. IOLR L/WS/1/760, ‘Combined operations against Leyte’ (compiled from reports of three Combined Operations Observers attached to central Philippines attack force; also information obtained from reports of Australian liaison officers), in COHQ Bulletin, No. Y46 – April 1945. Lethbridge Mission Report, Vol. II, Part 5, Chapter xxviii, Sections C and D – April 1944. IOLR L/WS/1/758, ‘A general review of amphibious operations in the SWPA, December 1943 – April 1944’ (extract from report by Australian liaison officer attached to 7th Amphibious Force), in DCO (India) Monthly Bulletin, No. 9 – 15 September 1944. IOLR L/WS/1/758, ‘Air support of landing operations in the Pacific’ (Air Ministry [D.A.T.] Tactical Bulletin, No. 39), in DCO (India) Monthly Bulletin, No. 9 – 15 September 1944. IOLR L/WS/1/760, ‘Morotai island operation’ (compiled from reports of British Combined Operations Observers and of Australian liaison officer with 7th Amphibious Force), in COHQ Bulletin, No. Y45 – December 1944. IOLR L/WS/1/758, ‘Air action over Gilbert islands’ (from reports of landings in the Pacific), in DCO (India) Monthly Bulletin, No. 3 – 15 March 1944; ‘US comments and recommendations arising from Gilbert islands operations’ (based on

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92 93 94 95 96 97 98

99 100 101 102 103

104 105 106 107 108 109

110 111

112

report by C-in-C US Fleet), and ‘The Gilbert island operations – destruction of defences by air’ (extract from COHQ Bulletin, No. Y/26), in DCO (India) Monthly Bulletin, No. 7 – 15 July 1944. Lethbridge Mission Report, Vol. II, Part 5, Chapter xxviii, Section C: Fire Support – April 1944. Ibid., Section D: The Employment of Engineers. UKNA WO 203/3671, Reference No. DCO/1/9507 Japanese Beach Defences in Southeast Asia: by DCO (Headquarters India Command) – 10 April 1945. UKNA WO 203/1111, ‘Japanese coastal and island defence’, in ALFSEAWIR, No. 36 – 8 June 1945. UKNA WO 203/280, ‘Probable Japanese tactics for the defence of Minbya and Myebon on the Kaladan-Lemro river deltas’, in 26th Indian Division Force Intelligence Summary – December 1944/January 1945. IOLR L/WS/1/759, ‘Observer’s report on the defences of the Myebon peninsula’ (by DCO), in DCO (India) Monthly Bulletin, No. 16 – 15 April 1945. UKNA WO 203/1756, 15th Indian Corps Special Intelligence Summary, No. 2 – 27 April 1945; ADM 199/193, M.09253/45, Report on Operation Dracula: by the Office of the Flag Officer ‘W’ – 11 July 1945; Christison’s History of the Arakan Campaign of 1944–5, Chapter xviii; Smith, Battle for Burma, p. 151. SUL Mountbatten Papers, C49/67, Christison to Mountbatten – 18 February 1945; C49/7, SCM/174/45, Mountbatten to COS – 25 February 1945. Christison’s History of the Arakan Campaign of 1944–5, Chapter vi. Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 460–1; Fergusson, Watery Maze, pp. 372–5; M. Hickey, The Unforgettable Army: Slim’s XIVth Army in Burma, Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1998, p. 213; Winton, Forgotten Fleet, p. 180. J. Selwyn, ‘Aquatics in the Arakan’ – Part I, Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, 115/3, 1985, p. 347. UKNA WO 203/4893, JPS (India) Paper, No. 93 – Operations against Sumatra during spring 1944 – 7 October 1943; CAB 84/66, JP (44) 242 (O) (Revised Draft), Further Operations in SEAC – The Recapture of Malaya: Draft Report by JPS – 15 October 1944. UKNA WO 203/288, Appendix A to JPS 175, Operations against the southern beaches of Singapore: Appreciation by JPS (Headquarters SACSEA) – 15 July 1945. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies, Vol. II, p. 556. Charrier, ‘British Assessments of Japanese Naval Tactics and Strategy’, p. 222. UKNA ADM 223/23, OIC/SI/J.192: Conversion of 14-inch battleships Ise and Hyuga to aircraft carriers – (undated ?? 24/25 May 1944). UKNA ADM 223/347, Japanese Carriers: Extract from Australia Station Intelligence Summary, No. 65 – 25 March 1944. UKNA ADM 223/496, Japanese Naval Sigint: by R.T. Barrett – (undated ?? late 1945/1946); ZIP/J/5: Preliminary Survey of the scope of Japanese Naval Signals Intelligence by Naval Section – 4 January 1944; ULTRA/ZIP/J/17: Japanese– German Naval Signals Intelligence Exchange – 17 July 1944; also see M. Loewe, ‘Japanese Naval Codes’, in Hinsley and Stripp (eds), Codebreakers, p. 263. Charrier, ‘British Assessments of Japanese Naval Tactics’, p. 229. K. Torisu, assisted by M. Chihaya, ‘Japanese submarine tactics and the Kaiten’, in Evans (ed.), Japanese Navy in World War II, pp. 440–5; C. Boyd and A. Yoshida, The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995, passim; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. 430–3, 496–7. C. Boyd, ‘Japanese Military Effectiveness: the interwar period’, in Millett and Murray (eds), Military Effectiveness, Vol. II, pp. 148–53; A. Oi, ‘Why Japan’s

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113

114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122

123 124 125

126 127 128 129 130 131

132 133 134 135 136

Antisubmarine Warfare Failed’, in Evans (ed.), Japanese Navy in World War II, pp. 387–9, 399–401. UKNA ADM 1/12647, Minute by Director of Training and Staff Duties Division on document published by a Japanese torpedo school, showing effect of torpedoes fired by Japanese ships in Battle of Java Sea between February/March 1942 – 22 June 1943; Minute by Director of Torpedoes and Mining – 15 September 1943; ADM 223/347, Japanese U-boats: Extract from Eastern Fleet Intelligence Summary – 28 October 1943. UKNA ADM 223/494, Some aspects of the Japanese War: by Captain A. Hilgarth (RN), p. 74 – 30 December 1946. Charrier, ‘British Assessments of Japanese Naval Tactics’, p. 227. Somerville Diary – 8 and 18 March, 28 April 1944. Ibid. – 24 May 1944. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 454; Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 338–9; Ellis, Brute Force, pp. 478–84. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. 506–8; Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 62. T. Yokoi, ‘Thoughts on Japan’s Naval Defeat’, in Evans (ed.), Japanese Navy in World War II, p. 515; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. 515–16. JIC (43) 282 (Final,) Axis Strength, 1943–4. UKNA ADM 223/163, ‘Tactical foresight’ (US Pacific Fleet Confidential Bulletin, dated May 1944), in ADMWIS, No. 233 – 25 August 1944; ADM 223/ 164, ‘The Japanese navy today’ (reprinted from ONI Weekly), in ADMWIS, No. 240 – 13 October 1944. UKNA ADM 223/495, NID.0050468/43, Comparison of British and Japanese capital ships in Southeast Asia (minutes of meeting held on 10 March 1944, taken by DNI). Somerville Diary – 17 March 1944. UKNA AIR 22/80, ‘The story of a Japanese fighter pilot’ (obtained in ATIS interrogation of POW belonging to No. 153 Kokutai, stationed in SWPA), in AMWIS, No. 257 – 5 August 1944; ‘A Japanese naval pilot describes his training’ (prepared from information contained in ATIS Interrogation Report, No. 320), in AMWIS, No. 258 – 12 August 1944. UKNA ADM 223/164, ‘Japanese Aircraft Development’, in ADMWIS, No. 239 – 6 October 1944. Dull, Battle History of the IJN, p. 268; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 501; Peattie, Sunburst, pp. 133–34, 183–4. Cited in Peattie, Sunburst, p. 184. UKNA AIR 22/79, ‘Japanese naval pilots’ (from article in ONI Weekly), in AMWIS, No. 223 – 11 December 1943; also in ADM 223/160, ADMWIS, No. 195 – 3 December 1943. R.J. Francillon, Japanese Aircraft of World War II, New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970, p. 35; Dull, Battle History of the IJN, p. 342. UKNA AIR 23/2645, ‘Japanese aerial reconnaissance of shipping and reconnaissance aircraft’ (summary based on information contained in ACSEA and Headquarters AAFSWPA intelligence summaries), in Eastern Fleet Intelligence Summary – January 1944. UKNA ADM 223/159, ‘Japanese level bombing tactics’ (summarized from report by US Navy Department’s Bureau of Aeronautics), in ADMWIS, No. 180 – 20 August 1943. Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, pp. 75–6. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 868–9. Ibid., pp. 49–50. Till, ‘Adopting the Aircraft Carrier’, p. 223.

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137 Winton, Forgotten Fleet, p. 67. 138 M. Coles, ‘Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: the conference at Quebec, 1944’, Journal of Military History, 65/1, 2001, pp. 122–3. 139 SUL Mountbatten Papers, C48/32, Radar for ships in Southeast Asia: Memorandum by Mountbatten – 26 September 1943. 140 UKNA CAB 79/27, COS (43) 146th Meeting – 4 October 1943. 141 IOLR L/WS/1/758, ‘Air action over the Gilbert islands’ (from reports of landings in the Pacific), in DCO (India) Monthly Bulletin, No. 3 – 15 March 1944, also ‘Aircraft carrier operations – Tarawa’ (report from the Tarawa operations of 18–25 November 1943, reference commanding officer USS Essex), in DCO (India) Monthly Bulletin, No. 4 – 15 April 1944. 142 UKNA ADM 199/461, M.056426/43, Report by Commander R.M. Smeeton (RN) while stationed onboard carrier USS Essex – 20 December 1943. 143 UKNA ADM 199/461, NID.0946/44, Minute by DAWT – 9 April 1944. 144 UKNA ADM 199/1068, M.0633/45, Minutes by DAWT to Report on Battle of Formosa between 12–14 October 1944 by Carrier Task Group 38.3 – 10 March 1945. 145 Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 885–7. 146 S. Foster, Okinawa, 1945: assault on the empire, London: Arms & Armour, 1994, p. 154. 147 UKNA ADM 199/590, TSD.296/45, Report by Vice-Admiral Rawlings (2nd in Command, British Pacific Fleet) on proceedings of Task Force 57 during Second Phase of Operation Iceberg – 6 June 1945. 148 E. Gray, Operation Pacific: the Royal Navy’s war against Japan, 1944–1945, London: Leo Cooper, 1990, pp. 203–24; P.C. Smith, Task Force 57: the British Pacific Fleet, 1944–1945, London: William Kimber, 1969, pp. 114–56. 149 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 501; R. Inoguchi and T. Nakajima, ‘The Kamikaze attack corps’, in Evans (ed.), Japanese Navy in World War II, pp. 415–39; R. Lamont-Brown, Kamikaze: Japan’s suicide samurai, London: Arms & Armour, 1997, p. 174. 150 National Maritime Museum, Greenwich (NMM), Fraser Papers, C-in-C British Pacific Fleet’s Despatches – November 1944 to July 1945 – Enclosure: Section II – Special Features of the Pacific War. 151 UKNA AIR 40/2651, The Japanese Air Forces during the Okinawa Campaign: by Director of Intelligence (O) at AI3(d) – 10 August 1945. 152 BLMC Cunningham Papers, Add.52563, f. 104, Somerville (as head of BAD Washington) to Cunningham – 28 December 1944. 153 UKNA ADM 205/43, Personal Minute by Cunningham for Churchill – 22 January 1945. 154 Smith, Task Force 57, pp. 147–8. 155 UKNA ADM 199/590, TSD.296/45, Report by Vice-Admiral Rawlings, 2nd in Command, British Pacific Fleet on proceedings of Task Force 57 during Second Phase of Operation Iceberg – 6 June 1945. 156 UKNA ADM 199/590, TSD.296/45, Minute by the Director of Tactical, Torpedo and Staff Duties Division – 27 July 1945. 157 UKNA AIR 23/5275, AHQ(I)/JAF/6, Japanese Army Air Force aircraft types: issued by Group Captain, Chief Intelligence Officer, AHQ India – 26 April 1943. 158 UKNA AIR 22/80, ‘Impressions of the Oscar Mark II’ (reprinted from SWPA Intelligence Summary, No. 2), in AMWIS, No. 265 – 30 September 1944. 159 UKNA WO 203/1710, SEACWIS, No. 115 – 14 January 1944. 160 UKNA AIR 40/1743, Report on Japanese Aircraft and Weapons: issued by Director of Intelligence (O) at Air Ministry – 22 February 1943; JIC (43) 282 (Final), Axis Strength, 1943–4.

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161 UKNA AIR 23/7725, ‘New trends in Japanese aircraft – a desperate production race’, in ACSEAWIS, No. 78 – 13 May 1945. 162 UKNA AIR 23/7720, ‘Japanese air weaknesses in the South Pacific’ (air combat intelligence, US Pacific Fleet, South Pacific force, covering week between 26 December and 1 January), in ACSEAWIS, No. 14 – 20 February 1944. 163 UKNA AIR 23/7719, ‘The 98th Hikosentai’, in AHQIWIS, No. 92 – 24 October 1943. 164 UKNA WO 203/3389, Cover note by Air Ministry to Report on Japanese air tactics up to September 1943: received by Operations Section (Headquarters of SEAC) from US War Department – 9 January 1944. 165 UKNA AIR 40/2136, Operations over the Arakan: issued by Chief Intelligence Officer (AHQ India) – 19 April 1943; for disseminated versions, see WO 208/ 810, GHQIWIS, No. 75 – 9 April 1943, and AIR 22/78, ‘Japanese air force operations over Arakan – 15 March to 11 April 1943’, in AMWIS, No. 196 – 5 June 1943. 166 UKNA AIR 22/79, ‘The Japanese army air force in action’ (article reproduced from AHQIWIS, No. 79, dated 25 July 1943), in AMWIS, No. 223 – 11 December 1943, AIR 23/7720, Japanese air operations over Burma, in ACSEAWIS, No. 11 – 30 January 1944. 167 Probert, Forgotten Air Force, p. 158. 168 Ibid., p. 159. 169 Ibid., pp. 159–62; Auchinleck’s Dispatch on the Indo–Burma front between 21 June and 15 November 1943. 170 UKNA AIR 22/78, ‘Japanese fighter defence in the Southwest Pacific’ (by intelligence officer of USAAF heavy bombardment squadron), in AMWIS, No. 210 – 11 September 1943. 171 UKNA AIR 23/2500, Reference 3TAF/S/100/AT, Headquarters, 3rd Tactical Air Force to Headquarters ACSEA (Tactics) – 10 and 27 March 1944. 172 UKNA CAB 106/108, Despatch on Air Operations in Southeast Asia, 16 November 1943 to 31 May 1944, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse (Supplement to London Gazette) – 1951. 173 UKNA AIR 23/2500, Reference 3TAF/S/100/AT, Japanese tactics and countermeasures: Headquarters 3rd Tactical Air Force to Headquarters ACSEA – 27 March 1944. 174 UKNA AIR 23/4672, Notes on the Japanese and recent fighter tactics in Burma: RAF tactical information – 5 September 1944. 175 ‘No allowance’ methods entail the achievement of a flat trajectory, thus negating the need for calculated firing. 176 UKNA AIR 23/2500, Reference Air/739, Possible Enemy Employment of ‘no allowance’ Firing: Minute by Headquarters ACSEA for EAC – 27 January 1945. 177 UKNA AIR 23/2500, Reference EAC 373.13, Possible Enemy Employment of ‘no allowance fighting’: Minute by Headquarters EAC to ACSEA – 3 March 1945. 5 RACIAL CONTEMPT OR LOGICAL ANALYSIS?: BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ON JAPANESE MILITARY MORALE 1 Examples: JIC (43) 282 (Final), Axis Strength, 1943–4; JIC (44) 43 (Final), Japanese Strength, 1944. 2 UKNA AIR 22/81, ‘Japanese suicide squadrons and their ideological background’, in AMWIS, No. 278 – 30 December 1944. 3 Dower, War Without Mercy, passim. 4 Ibid., pp. 10–11. 5 Ibid., pp. 137–8.

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6 C.D. Laurie, ‘The Ultimate Dilemma of Psychological Warfare in the Pacific: enemies who don’t surrender and GIs who don’t take prisoners’, War and Society, 14, 1996, pp. 101–3. 7 M. Johnston, Fighting the Enemy: Australian soldiers and their adversaries in World War II, Cambridge: CUP, 2000, Chs 5–8. 8 A.B. Gilmore, You Can’t Fight Tanks with Bayonets: psychological warfare against the Japanese Army in the Southwest Pacific, Lincoln, NE: Nebraska UP, 1998. 9 Ibid., pp. 175–6. 10 Ibid., pp. 164–5. 11 Drea, In the Service of the Emperor, pp. 75–90; A.J. Barker, Japanese Army Handbook, 1939–1945, London: Ian Allan, 1979, pp. 7–10; Y. Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese war crimes in World War II, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996, pp. 198–9; R. Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: patterns in Japanese culture, Cambridge, MA: Riverside, 1946, pp. 29–35. 12 Benedict, Chrysanthemum and the Sword, pp. 40–1. 13 See pp. 117–18 in Chapter 4. 14 UKNA FO 371/41810, F 774/292/23, Minute by Lieutenant-Colonel, General Staff (MI2) on information obtained from Japanese POWs at Bougainville regarding Allied leaflets – 10 February 1944. 15 UKNA WO 203/1710, ‘Japanese morale’, in SEACWIS, No. 117 – 28 January 1944. 16 IWM Papers of Major W.V.H. Martin, ‘Through Japanese Eyes’ – Vol. I: issues of intelligence reports compiled by Special Forces Headquarters from captured Japanese documents – Introduction – (undated ?? early 1945). 17 Lethbridge Mission Report, Vol. I, Part 1: Introduction – April 1944. 18 UKNA WO 208/2277, ‘The Japanese soldier in action’ (from GHQ India War Information Circular, No. G.29, dated 1 September 1943), in WOWIR, No. 26 – 9 February 1944. 19 Gilmore, You Can’t Fight Tanks, pp. 149–54. 20 UKNA AIR 23/7722, ‘Psychological warfare – effects of Allied propaganda on Japanese prisoners’ (from Psychological Warfare Division Information Review, No. 5, dated 21 July 1944), in ACSEAWIS, No. 37 – 30 July 1944. 21 Allen, Burma, Appendix 1, p. 645. 22 This figure has been obtained from Ibid., p. 611. A thorough examination of the available documentation has not revealed competing figures. Unfortunately, a file which may contain the relevant details, UKNA WO 203/3941 (Enemy POW Monthly Intelligence Summaries), is missing. 23 Allen, Burma, Appendix 1, p. 640. 24 UKNA WO 208/2263, ‘Japanese ability to live in the country’ (from GHQIWIS, No. 76) and War Office Comment, in WOWIS, No. 195 – 12 May 1943; WO 208/2275, ‘What the Japanese soldier eats’, in WOWIR, No. 7 – 30 September 1943. 25 UKNA WO 208/1448, Extracts from ATIS, SWPA Interrogation Reports, No. 35 – 24 February 1943, No. 50 – 9 April 1943, No. 94 – 15 June 1943; Extract from Far Eastern Liaison Organization (FELO) Information Review, No. 18, on Japanese medical care in New Guinea – 1 October 1944. 26 JIC (43) 282 (Final), Axis Strength, 1943–4. 27 UKNA WO 208/2277, ‘The Japanese detachment at Sumprabum’ (from SEACWIS), in WOWIR, No. 24 – 26 January 1944. 28 UKNA AIR 23/7720, Japanese army rations (from War Information Circular, No. G.35, by GHQ India Military Intelligence Directorate, dated 1 December 1943), in ACSEAWIS, No. 7 – 2 January 1944.

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29 UKNA AIR 23/7722, ‘Conditions among Japanese troops on the Burma frontier – a medical officer’s revealing diary’, in ACSEAWIS, No. 33 – 2 July 1944. 30 UKNA WO 208/2276, ‘Discipline in the Japanese army’, in WOWIR, No. 15 – 24 November 1943. 31 UKNA WO 203/1709, ‘Extract from diary of 20th Division’, in SEACWIS, No. 108 – 26 November 1943. 32 UKNA AIR 22/78, ‘Japanese reaction to Allied air attacks’, in AMWIS, No. 212 – 25 September 1943. 33 UKNA AIR 22/80, ‘Sweet dreams and a nightmare’ (diary kept by Japanese Lieutenant in first half of 1943, ATIS Current Translation, No. 106, pp. 33–4), in AMWIS, No. 244 – 6 May 1944. 34 UKNA AIR 23/7721, ‘Japanese admit supply weakness on the Imphal front’ (from Tokyo broadcast account of officer’s impressions), in ACSEAWIS, No. 29 – 4 June 1944. 35 UKNA WO 208/2280, ‘The attack on Imphal – idea and reality’, in WOWIR, No. 61 – 11 October 1944. 36 IOLR L/MIL/17/20/25/1, Periodical Notes on the Japanese Army, No. 1 – General characteristics, morale and training: prepared by War Office under the direction of Alanbrooke – August 1944. 37 Drea, In the Service of the Emperor, pp. 70–4. 38 UKNA WO 208/2277, ‘The spirit of the Japanese fighting man’, in WOWIR, No. 25 – 2 February 1944. 39 UKNA WO 208/2278A, ‘Doubt dawns on the Japanese’, in WOWIR, No. 42 – 31 May 1944. 40 UKNA WO 208/3049, Minute on Japanese Morale: by Lieutenant-Colonel, General Staff (MI2) – 25 September 1943. 41 UKNA WO 203/1709, ‘Japanese morale’, in GHQIWIS, No. 106 – 12 November 1943. 42 UKNA WO 208/2263, ‘What the Japanese equivalent of ABCA teaches the Japanese soldier’, in WOWIS, No. 194 – 5 May 1943. 43 UKNA WO 208/1447, HJA, Ch. XLVI-9-a: Extract from US Publication Final Report on Attu – (undated ?? late 1943). A rough English translation of Yamato damashii is ‘the spirit of the Japanese race’. Yamato is the term used to describe the divine origins of the Japanese people, and the superiority of the Yamato race was the factor which Japanese soldiers were indoctrinated into viewing as the guarantor of victory. 44 UKNA ADM 199/189, M.06512/45, Dispatch on Operations in Burma and Northeast India between 16 November 1943 and 22 June 1944: by General Sir George Giffard (C-in-C 11th Army Group, SEAC) – Part I: Introduction. 45 J. Thompson, The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Burma, 1942–1945, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2002, p. 227. 46 Dower, War Without Mercy, pp. 121–33. 47 UKNA FO 371/35952, F 6698/403/23, Agenda for meeting on consideration of preliminary paper on Japanese morale to be held by War Office on 21 December 1943. 48 UKNA FO 371/41700, F 22/1/G61, Record of Political Warfare Japan Committee (PWJC) 85th meeting – 30 December 1943. 49 UKNA CAB 81/24, TWC (44) 18, Japanese Battle Morale: Memorandum by Scientific Adviser to Army Council – 10 February 1944. 50 UKNA WO 203/692, Cover note by CGS (GHQ India) to Reference No. 9329NZ/GSI(t): by Military Intelligence Directorate (GHQ India) – 11 October 1944. 51 UKNA CAB 81/24, TWC (44) 45, Japanese Battle Morale: Preliminary Statement by Subcommittee on Japanese Morale – 27 June 1944; CAB 81/25 TWC (44) 54,

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52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

Annex – The Reactions of the Japanese to his Environment: Report by Subcommittee on Japanese Morale – 6 August 1944. UKNA CAB 81/125, JIC (44) 408, Japanese Battle Morale: Report by Subcommittee of JTWC – 20 September 1944 (hereafter JIC (44) 408, followed by title of subsection). JIC (44) 408, Part III: Japanese reaction to weapons and tactics. JIC (44) 408, Part I: Japanese upbringing and education, and their results. JIC (44) 408, Part III: Japanese reaction to weapons and tactics. UKNA WO 208/1447, HJA, Chapter XLVI-9-a: The Japanese Soldier: Operational Research Pamphlet – (undated ?? December 1944). J.D. Lunt, ‘Know Thine Enemy’, Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, 118, 1988, pp. 318–19. Allen, Burma, p. 614. J. Ellis, The Sharp End of War: the fighting man in World War II, London: David & Charles, 1980, p. 320; A. Massie, ‘Burma and the British Soldier’, in Smurthwaite (ed.), Forgotten War, p. 59; F. Owen, The Campaign in Burma, London: HMSO, 1946, pp. 162–3. Allen, Burma, pp. 609–15. Ibid., p. 615. Thompson, War in Burma, p. 9. B. Fergusson, The Wild Green Earth, London: Collins, 1946, pp. 204–5. Slim, Defeat into Victory, p. 537; also see LHCMA LIDDELL HART, 1/645, Script of Broadcast Talk on ‘What is Courage?’: delivered by General William J. Slim at the Imperial Defence College – 24 November 1946. JIC (44) 408, Part II: Some ‘human weaknesses’ of the Japanese. IWM Papers of Major W.V.H. Martin, ‘Through Japanese Eyes’ – Vol. II, Chapter 4 – ‘Lords spiritual’: issues of intelligence reports compiled by Special Forces Headquarters from captured Japanese documents – (undated ?? early 1945). IWM Papers of Lieutenant-Colonel J.E.M. Bland (correspondence with Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese), Lieutenant-Colonel Ulick Verney (Tactical Headquarters ALFSEA) to Bland (Assistant Military Secretary, Main Headquarters, VIII Army) – 26 April 1945. UKNA FO 371/35889, F 3205/7/G61, Political Warfare in India: Minutes of meeting held at India Office on 11 June 1943. UKNA AIR 23/7720, ‘Leaflet propaganda in Southeast Asia theatre’ (extract of note of lecture prepared for delivery to aircrews in ACSEA), in ACSEAWIS, No. 8 – 9 January 1944. UKNA FO 371/35890, F 3553/71/G61, Inducement to Surrender of Japanese Forces: written by Foreign Office, approved by PWJC – 12 July 1943. C. Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East: the official history, Oxford: OUP, 1983, p. 222. Ibid., pp. 222–3; also Laurie, ‘Ultimate Dilemma of Psychological Warfare in the Pacific’, pp. 101–3. UKNA WO 203/2190, SEACOS 100: Mountbatten to COS – 24 February 1944. UKNA WO 203/2190, Report on Activities of the PWD, SEAC during February 1944. UKNA FO 371/41712, F 3605/1/61, Political Warfare in SEAC: Report on present position by Keswick – 19 July 1944. Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East, pp. 229–30. Ibid., p. 230. UKNA WO 203/2190, Report on Activities of the PWD, SEAC during February 1944.

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79 UKNA WO 203/3331, LOKAN 26: Telegram No. 4414, Mountbatten to Stilwell – 14 August 1944. 80 Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East, p. 222. 81 Gilmore, You Can’t Fight Tanks, pp. 38–9. 82 Ibid., pp. 6–8. 83 Intelligence Notes from Burma, Part I: Intelligence in Army Headquarters – Field propaganda. 84 UKNA FO 371/41710, F 2634/1/61, SAC 4767: PROPSIG report from Mountbatten to War Office – 1 August 1944. 85 UKNA FO 371/41710, F 2634/1/61, PROPSIG telegram from Mountbatten to War Office – 16 August 1944; F 2634/1/61, PROPSIG telegram from Mountbatten to War Office – 2 September 1944. 86 UKNA FO 371/41716, F 5098/1/61, PROPSIG letter, No. 13 – 4 December 1944. 87 Intelligence Notes from Burma, Part I: Intelligence in Army Headquarters – Field propaganda. 88 Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East, pp. 236–8; Gilmore, You Can’t Fight Tanks, pp. 168–70. 89 UKNA AIR 23/3023, SAC (44) 385, Psychological Warfare Plan for Capital and Romulus: prepared by PWD – 14 November 1944. 90 UKNA WO 208/2282, ‘The psychological war in Southeast Asia’ (from PWD Intelligence Review, No. 15) in WOWIR, No. 95 – 13 June 1945. 91 UKNA WO 203/545, Appreciation by War Staff (India Office) for CGS (GHQ India) – 1 November 1943. 92 UKNA WO 203/692, Weapons and their Moral Effect: by Research Directorate (GHQ India) – 4 January 1944; Minute by Lieutenant-Colonel H.F. McIntyre (GSO1, MT1), Director of Research – 11 April 1944. 93 LHCMA GRACEY, 1/11, Appendix A to the Account of Operations against Kyaukchaw, 17–25 January 1944: Replies to questionnaire. 94 LHCMA GRACEY, 2/24, 20th Indian Division Battle Instruction, No. 4, of 1944, on the practical application of surprise in battle against the Japanese. 95 LHCMA MESSERVY, 8, Operations of the 4th Corps – October 1944 to May 1945: by Lieutenant-General Sir F.W. Messervy – Summary of Phase IV. 96 Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 380–1. 97 IWM Papers of Lieutenant-Colonel J.E.M. Bland (correspondence with Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese), Leese to Bland – 26 February 1945; Allen, Burma, pp. 480–1; Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 481, 487. 98 Intelligence Notes from Burma, Part I: Intelligence in Army Headquarters – Conclusions: some main impressions from the campaign. 99 S. Bidwell, The Chindit War: the campaign in Burma, 1944, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1979, p. 124. (Cited in Allen, Burma, p. 612.) 100 Slim, Defeat into Victory, pp. 337, 538; Fergusson, Wild Green Earth, pp. 205– 7; M. Smeeton, A Change of Jungles, London: Hart-Davis, 1962, pp. 89–91. CONCLUSION: THE INTELLIGENCE WAR IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 1937–1945: THE BRITISH AND JAPANESE EXPERIENCES IN COMPARISON 1 This chapter was originally presented in the form of a paper at the 118th Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, held at Washington, DC, 8–11 January 2004. Although the views expressed are those of the author, I am grateful to Professor Sally Paine at the United States Naval War College, who provided

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2

3 4 5

6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

much valuable insight and feedback on the sections which deal with Japanese intelligence. R. Deacon, British Secret Service, London: Grafton, 1991; T.G. Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, 1870–1914: the development of a modern intelligence organization, London: Arms & Armour, 1984; R. Popplewell, Empire and Imperial Defence: British intelligence and the defence of the Indian Empire, 1904–1924, London: Frank Cass, 1995. See Note 6, Chapter 1, above. I. Nish, ‘Japanese Intelligence, 1894–1922’, in Andrew and Noakes (eds), Intelligence and International Relations, p. 129. C. Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: ideology in the late Meiji period, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1985, especially Chapters 1–2, 8 and Epilogue; W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945, Oxford: OUP, 1987, Chapter 3; Benedict, Chrysanthemum and the Sword, Chapter 4. Ienaga, Pacific War, pp. 48–9. Cited in Coox, Nomonhan, p. 1027. Hayashi, Kogun, p. 23. A.D. Coox, ‘Flawed Perception and its Effect Upon Operational Thinking: the case of the Japanese Army, 1937–41’, in Handel (ed.), Intelligence and Military Operations, pp. 242–3; A. Fujiwara, ‘The Role of the Japanese Army’, in D. Borg and S. Okamoto (eds), Pearl Harbor as History, New York: Columbia UP, 1973, pp. 193–5. E.J. Drea, ‘Reading Each Other’s Mail: Japanese communication intelligence, 1920–1941’, Journal of Military History, 55/2, 1991, p. 190. J.W.M. Chapman, ‘Japanese Intelligence, 1918–1945: a suitable case for treatment’, in Andrew and Noakes (eds), Intelligence and International Relations, pp. 160–61; Elphick, Far Eastern File, pp. 255–67. S. Hatano and S. Asada, ‘The Japanese Decision to Move South, 1939–1941’, in R. Boyce and E. Robertson (eds), Paths to War: new essays on the origins of the Second World War, New York: St. Martin’s, 1989, pp. 393–4. Barnhart, ‘Japanese Intelligence Before the Second World War’, p. 424; H. Tohmatsu, ‘The Imperial Army Turns South: the IJA’s preparation for war against Britain, 1940–1941’, in Gow and Hirama (eds), History of Anglo–Japanese Relations, Vol. III, pp. 178–9. Elphick, Far Eastern File, pp. 3–4, 48–51, 215–18. Barnhart, ‘Japanese Intelligence Before the Second World War’, pp. 428–9. S. Mercado, The Shadow Warriors of Nakano: a history of the Imperial Japanese Army’s elite intelligence school, Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002, p. 23. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. 415–16. S. Asada, ‘The Japanese Navy and the United States’, in Borg and Okamoto (eds), Pearl Harbor as History, p. 257. Chapman, ‘Japanese Intelligence’, pp. 168–72. Willmott, Empires in the Balance, p. 454. Hayashi, Kogun, p. 45. L. Allen, ‘Japanese intelligence systems’, Journal of Contemporary History, 22, 1987, p. 560. Murray, ‘British Military Effectiveness’, pp. 92–3. Thomas, ‘Evolution of the JIC System’, pp. 228–33. Ienaga, Pacific War, p. 39. A.D. Coox, ‘Japanese Net Assessment in the Era Before Pearl Harbor’, in Millett and Murray (eds), Calculations, p. 298. Ike (ed.), Japan’s Decision for War, pp. 135–63.

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28 K. Ikeda, ‘Japanese Strategy in the Pacific War, 1941–1945’, in Nish (ed.), Anglo– Japanese Alienation, pp. 132–3. 29 Cited in D.C. James, ‘American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War’, in P. Paret et al. (eds.), Makers of Modern Strategy: Machiavelli to the nuclear age, Oxford: Clarendon, 1986, p. 715. 30 Hayashi, Kogun, pp. 72–3. 31 Cited in M. Chihaya, ‘An Intimate Look at the Japanese Navy’, in Goldstein and Dillon (eds), Pearl Harbor Papers, p. 319. 32 Hayashi, Kogun, pp. 99–100. 33 Murray, ‘British Military Effectiveness’, pp. 120–1, 124. 34 US War Department, Handbook on Japanese Military Forces, Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State UP, 1991, p. 85. 35 Cited in Coox, ‘Flawed Perception’, p. 251. 36 Cited in Drea, In the Service of the Emperor, p. 72. 37 Cited in Tohmatsu, ‘Imperial Army Turns South’, p. 183. 38 Yokoi, ‘Thoughts on Japan’s Naval Defeat’, p. 511. 39 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. 495–6. 40 G. Krebs, ‘The Japanese Air Forces’, in H. Boog (ed.), The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War: an international comparison, Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992, p. 230. 41 C. von Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984, p. 117. 42 M. van Creveld, Command in War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1985, pp. 266–7. 43 Herman, Intelligence Power, pp. 104, 140, 226. 44 Andrew and Dilks (eds), Missing Dimension, Introductory Essay, p. 13; Handel (ed.), Intelligence and Military Operations, Introductory Essay, p. 68. 45 J. Keegan, Intelligence in War: knowledge of the enemy from Napoleon to AlQaeda, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, p. 334. 46 Herman, Intelligence Power, p. 155; also see E.N. Luttwak, Strategy: the logic of war and peace, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, Harvard UP, 1987, pp. 96–7. 47 Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence, pp. 252–3. 48 S.P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: innovation and the modern military, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1991, pp. 34–5.

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INDEX

Admiralty: Director of Air Warfare and Training (DAWT) 142; Director of Naval Air Division (DNAD) 62, 67; Director of Tactical and Staff Duties 144; Gunnery and Antiaircraft Warfare Division 60, 62; on IJN’s strategy for defence of Japan’s empire 82; insistence that all British ships heading for the Far East be modernized 60; Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC) 77–8, 82, 137, 138; on value of aircraft carriers 61; views on Japanese naval air services 62, 140, 142, 143–4; views on Japanese naval technology 137, 138; views on Japanese surface vessels 60; see also Naval Intelligence Directorate AHQ India 144, 145, 146, 147 air attaché 39 Air Command Southeast Asia (ACSEA) 80; on efficiency of Japanese army air forces 145–6, 148, 149; efforts to develop tactics against the JAAF 145; estimates of Japanese air strengths 84, 88; intelligence organization within 79–80, 115; takes responsibility for gauging Japanese army air forces 144–5; 3rd Tactical Air Force 89, 148 air intelligence: difficulties of coordination 79–80; difficulties of obtaining intelligence on the JAF 83–4; reorganization of 80, 83, 136; see also Air Command Southeast Asia; Air Ministry Air Ministry: Air Intelligence Directorate 83–4, 137; on JAF’s capacity to oppose Allied operations 88–9; on JAF’s performance in the South Pacific during late 1942 67; on Japanese air services prior to December 1941 39, 40; on Japanese aircraft losses 83; on Japanese aircraft production 72; on Japanese army air forces 145, 147, 148; on performance of Japanese naval air services 140, 142, 143, 146; reassesses capabilities of Japanese air services during early 1942 60–1

Alanbrooke, Field Marshal Sir Francis 101, 106; insists that Allies refrain from large scale operations against Japan 53; supports offensive operations against central plains of Burma 102; writes off prospects of holding Singapore 46 Alexander, General Harold 53 Allied Air Forces SWPA (AAFSWPA) 136 Allied Land Forces Southeast Asia (ALFSEA) 80, 119, 126, 128, 134 Allied summit meetings: Arcadia 51; Octagon 108–9; Quadrant 81, 90, 96, 97, 100, 108; Sextant 81; Symbol 53, 77, 81, 106; Terminal 106, 108, 109; Trident 97; Yalta 109 Allied Translation and Interrogation Section 117 Amery, Leo 91 Anakim see military operations Anderson, HMS see Far Eastern Combined Bureau Anglo-American alliance: efforts to develop combined strategy against Japan 5, 27, 49, 51, 53, 77, 81, 95, 97, 98, 100, 103, 106, 108–9, 141, 169, 177; intelligence cooperation within 6–7, 15, 16, 58, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 78–9, 82, 84, 85, 104, 106, 119–21, 130, 131–2, 133, 136, 140–2, 145–6, 148, 149, 156, 158, 159, 160, 162, 167, 169; see also Allied summit meetings Arakan region: winter 1942–3 offensive, miscalculations leading to 55–6, 65–6; lessons learned from failure of 1942–3 operations 76–7, 89–90, 92, 124, 125, 127; winter 1943–4 campaign, 92, lessons learned 123, 125, 126, 157, 159, 169; winter 1944–5 campaign 123, 125, 126, 128, 134; see also military operations, Romulus Arcadia see Allied summit meetings army intelligence: organization of 80; difficulties in obtaining intelligence on

250

IN D E X Japanese operational plans 81–2, 84–6; see also Government Codes and Cyphers School; MI2; MI2c; War Office; Wireless Experimental Centre Ashmore, Lieutenant-Colonel B.H. 57 Atlee, Clement 95, 108 atomic bomb 108 Auchinleck, General Sir John Claude Eyre: insists on improvement of XIV Army’s operational capabilities 91; views on XIV Army’s tactical effectiveness 118, 121 Australia: experiences of Australian forces in fighting the Japanese 59, 63, 64, 69, 119, 120, 121, 153, 157; IJN contemplates invasion of 48; intelligence cooperation with 15–16, 120, 121; US takes responsibility for defence 49; use as a base for Allied operations 54, 101 Automedon incident 180 Axiom mission 98 Axis Planning Section (APS) 26 Barbarossa see USSR Barracuda fighters 62 Beaufighter 147 Bennett, Major-General H.G. 59 Bletchley Park 78, 79; hinders the dissemination of Japanese naval cyphers 78–9; role in decoding Japanese air force communications 79; success in decoding Japanese army signals 80 Blue Jackets 13–14; see also signals intelligence Bond, General L.V. 36, 37 Bose, Subhas Chandra 54 Boxer, Captain C.R. 35 Britain: defence policy in the Far East prior to December 1941 17, 26–7; development of strategy against Japan 76–7, 94–102, 183–4; evolution of intelligence community 12–16, 178; inexperience in conducting operations against the Japanese, problems arising 55, 101, 118, 129–30, 154, 155, 156–7; learns lessons from defeats of early 1942 73–5; miscalculations of Japanese strategy prior to December 1941 24–6; misperceptions of Japanese military efficiency before December 1941 32, 33–7, 39–41, 177; rearmament policy 31; strategic overstretch 17, 46, 51, 54, 96, 111–12, 177, 183; see also British army; Royal Air Force; Royal Navy British army: attempts to reform tactics in wake of defeats in Southeast Asia 59–60, 187; difficulties in digesting lessons from Malaya and Burma 57, 65; inexperience

conducting operations in the Far East 55, 186; recognition of weaknesses as demonstrated in Malaya and Burma 59, 69; weak state of forces in Malaya 38; see also Eastern Army and Fourteenth (XIV) Army British–Indian army see Fourteenth (XIV) Army British Pacific Fleet: decision to dispatch 108–9; difficulties faced during Okinawa operations 142–4 Brooke-Popham, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert: acknowledgement of the IJA’s prowess 58; develops low opinion of Japanese troops 35; expresses concerns about possible scale of Japanese air attacks on Malaya 41; ignores indications of an impending Japanese invasion of Malaya 29; ponders over British army’s poor performance in Malaya 59; proposes the dispatch of additional battalions to Hong Kong 28; proposes reinforcement of British ground forces in Malaya 27 Burma: falls to the Japanese 46; IJA’s tactical skills demonstrated during invasion 58, 68–9; see also India–Burma front Burma Road: Japan demands closure of 20, 27; Allied plans to reopen 97 Cairo Conference see Allied summit meetings, Sextant Capital see military operations captured documents 3; intelligence on Japanese morale 154, 157, 159, 160, 164, 171; intelligence on Japanese operational plans 85–6; intelligence on Japanese tactical doctrine 113, 118–19, 131, 139–40 Casablanca Conference see Allied summit meetings, Symbol Ceylon: British assessment on island’s ability to hold out against Japanese attack 49, 50–2; Japanese attack on 49, lessons learned for the Royal Navy 62; Japanese plans for invasion 48; vulnerability of 51 Chennault, Claire 83 Chief of Operational Intelligence Services (COIS), Eastern Fleet 114, 136 Chiefs of Staff (COS) 5, 83; acceptance of fact that reinforcements for the Far East cannot be provided during 1942 51–2; advocate policy of acquiescing to Japanese demands for closing Burma Road 27; apprehensions of Japanese defensive capabilities in Southeast Asia 53–4, 55, 87; approve Mountbatten’s plan for an offensive against central Burma 102, 184; approve

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IN D E X participation of British ground divisions in invasion of Japan’s home islands 109; assessment of situation in the Far East prior to December 1941 19, 21; belief that Japanese invasion can be deterred if British forces in Malaya are reinforced 27; estimates Japanese aircraft losses 83; explain how Britain cannot go on the offensive in the Far East until Germany has been sufficiently defeated 53, 96; failure to acknowledge possibility of Japanese invading Malaya 31; ideas on British strategy in the Far East 54; offer British naval contribution in Pacific campaign 108–9; relations with Churchill 94–5, 97–8, 100–1; role in decision-making process 95, 100–1, 182; supports Pacific strategy, oppose Malaya–Sumatra operation 95, 98, 100; war plans in the Far East prior to December 1941 17 China: Allied efforts to support 27, 97; Japanese air operations in 39–40; Japanese military operations in 21, 31–2, 34–6, 37, 38, 47–8, 81; plans for use as a base for operations against Japan 97; see also Sino-Japanese War Chindit operations (Wingate expedition) 90–1, 121 Christison, Lieutenant-General Sir Phillip 123, 134, 135 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston: approves offensive against central Burma in 1944 102; belief that Japan can be deterred from provoking war 23, 27, 28; decision to dispatch HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse to Singapore 28; demands unconditional surrender of Japan 81; insists that Allies must adhere to ‘Germany First’ strategy 51, 52; enquiry on capacity of Japanese carriers 66; opinion on Japanese defensive capabilities in Southeast Asia 87–88, 96, 97; opinion on Japanese martial qualities 38; pushes for Malaya–Sumatra strategy 95, 98, 100; questions feasibility of Pacific strategy 101; relations with COS 94–5, 97–8, 100–1; reaction to news of successful testing of atomic bomb 108; reservations on Anakim 54; see also Allied summit meetings; Anglo-American relations clandestine intelligence organizations see human intelligence (humint); Special Intelligence Service; Special Operations Executive combined arms tactics 64–5, 116–17, 123–4, 126–7 Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), AngloAmerican 90, 108

Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) 130, 131 Combined Training Centre 130 Cornwall, HMS 62 Coronet see military operations Corsair fighter 67 Culverin see military operations Cunningham, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew 87, 142 Director of Air Warfare and Training (DAWT) see Admiralty Director of Intelligence, SEAC Headquarters 80, 86, 90, 107 Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), India Command 86 Director of Naval Air Division (DNAD) see Admiralty Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) 24, 33, 37 Directorate of Combined Operations 142; assesses Japanese methods of amphibious defence 132–3; recommends methods for landing operations 133–4; takes responsibility for developing amphibious methods for British forces in the Far East 130–1 Directorate of Military Training 65 Directorate of Tactical Investigation 127 Doolittle raid 49 Dorsetshire, HMS 62 Dower, John 7, 153, 163 Dracula see military operations Dutch East Indies: economic importance to Japan 26, 72; Japanese attempts to secure economic concessions 23–24; fall to the Japanese 46–7; see also military operations, Culverin Eastern Air Command 144, 145, 149 Eastern Army: defeat during first Arakan campaign 66; difficulties in developing tactics against the IJA 64–5 Eastern Fleet: difficulties in obtaining intelligence on the IJN 66, 79, 136; faces difficulties in matching the IJN’s capabilities 51, 87, 138, 141, 186; moves to East Africa 52 economic intelligence see Industrial Intelligence Centre; Ministry of Economic Warfare economic sanctions see Industrial Intelligence Centre; Ministry of Economic Warfare economic warfare: plans for, and potential effects on Japan 72–3, 105–6 Eden, Foreign Secretary Anthony 95 Eleventh (11th) Army Group 80 Ellis, John 123

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IN D E X Far Eastern Combined Bureau (FECB) 178; activities before December 1941 8, 14, 15; assessment of Japanese war plans 23, 25, 28; destruction of records pertaining to 10; difficulties in breaking Japanese naval codes 78–9; downplaying of Japanese army capabilities 38; relocation to Singapore in 1939 14; relocation to Colombo in January 1942 47; loss of capacity to assess Japanese military capabilities during early 1942 57; relocation to Kilindini in May 1942 52, 77; renamed HMS Anderson 77; warns of impending Japanese attack on Malaya 29 Force Z see Prince of Wales, HMS and Repulse, HMS Formidable, HMS 143–4 Fourteenth (XIV) Army 2; contends with Japanese troops fighting to the finish 172; Corps, 4th 85, 86, 92, 128–9, 172, 15th 86, 92; demoralization following defeats in 1942–3 91, 122; Divisions, 17th 86, 162, 20th 123, 127, 172, 25th 128, 26th 134, 36th 126; development of amphibious tactics against the IJA 133–5; development of ground warfare tactics against the IJA 114, 116, 118, 121–25, 126–29, 171–3, 187; efforts to gauge the IJA’s tactical capabilities in ground warfare 115, 116–29; efforts to understand characteristics of Japanese troops 155–6, 165–7; intelligence organization within 80; operations on India–Burma front 89–94, 101–2, 160, 183–4; see also Slim, General William Fraser, Admiral Sir Bruce 109, 141, 143 French Indochina see Indochina Future Planning Section (FPS) 72 Germany: Allied operations against, and influence on war effort against Japan 2, 3–4, 6, 8, 14, 17, 20, 21, 27, 31, 46, 51, 52, 53, 64–5, 71, 73, 77, 78, 79, 80–1, 87, 91, 96, 98, 103, 105, 108, 120, 130, 137, 138, 141, 142, 144, 148, 167, 171, 177, 178, 182, 184, 187; Japanese alliance with 17, 19–20, 24, 48, 177, 180 GHQ Far East 38 GHQ India: assesses likelihood of Japan going to war 26; on IJA’s capabilities in India–Burma theatre 89, 125, 157, 162; intelligence organization within 78, 114, 117; investigates possible means of overcoming the IJA 172; shortage of intelligence staff 57 Giffard, General Sir George 98 Gilbert Islands 131, 132, 133, 142

Government Codes and Cyphers School (GCCS): decryption of Japanese diplomatic signals 13–14; see also Bletchley Park Gracey, Major-General Douglas 122, 172 Grimsdale, Colonel Gordon 35, 38 Guadalcanal: Japanese invasion of, and strategic implications 54; lessons learned on IJA’s combat capabilities 63, 70, 120; lessons learned on IJN 138 Guam see Marianas Gunnery and Antiaircraft Warfare Division see Admiralty Handbook of the Japanese Army (HJA) 63, 64, 118, 162, 165 Hawaii 48, 183; also see Pearl Harbor Hermes, HMS 62 Hillgarth, Captain 41, 106 Hinsley, F.H. 2 historiography 1–2, 29–30; on race issue 153, 165–7; on signals intelligence 84 human intelligence (humint) 3; limits of 84–5 Hurricane fighters 62, 147 Hutton, Lieutenant-General T.J. 58, 69 Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ), Tokyo 81, 84, 182–3, 185 Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), morale: British expressions of negative opinions on 34; British reassessments of after Malaya 68–9; cultural background 68–9, 155, 164–5; defeatism 159–61; difficulties in analysis 154, 155, 156–7, 173–4, 163–4; difficulties in obtaining intelligence on 154, 155–6; evidence of demoralization 69–70, 153, 156, 157–62; exploitation of weaknesses 71, 153, 154, 168–71, 174–5; importance of morale in sustaining IJA 152; indoctrination 160–1, 165; observations during 1942 South Pacific campaign 69–70; practice of ‘never surrender’ 70, 155, 157, 161–3, 167–8, 171; reaction to Allied weapons and firepower 159–60, 165, 171–3; susceptibility to disease and starvation 69–70, 156, 158–9; unit cohesion 159 Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), strategy and operations: ability to defend India–Burma front 89–94; Guadalcanal operation 54; defensive capabilities on the India–Burma front, winter 1942–3 55–6; disagreements with the IJN 21, 48 183; Imphal operation 84, 186; logistics 90, 94; prepares for war against the USSR 21, 24, 48; prepares for war of attrition against the Allies 81–2, 184; prepares to defend the home islands against an Allied invasion 103, 105–6, 107

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IN D E X Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), tactics and equipment: ability to inflict attrition on attacking forces 64, 114; amphibious operations 36–7, 57–8; artillery 128; British miscalculations of prior to December 1941 33–8; capabilities in close country operations 124, 125, 127–8; defence methods against amphibious landings 132, 133–4; defensive tactics in ground warfare 64, 66, 119–21, 125–9; deficiencies in tanks and mechanized forces 33–4, 116, 124–5, 128–9; difficulties in improving tactics 33–4, 116, 123, 179, 187–9; infiltration and encirclement 58–9, 63–4; jungle warfare capabilities 38, 58–9, 124, 127; offensive tactics 33, 34, 37–8, 119, 122–3; performance during 1942–3 Arakan campaign 66; weaknesses exposed during 1942–3 campaigns in South Pacific 63–4 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) 6; air services 40, 41, 189; awaits opportunity to fight a decisive battle against the Allied fleets 82; British miscalculations of prior to December 1941 25, 32–3; British reassessment of during early 1942 60–1; Ceylon operation 48, 51; capital ship fleet 138–9, 189; carrier fleet 138–9, 189; convoy protection, lack of 137–8, 189; difficulties in obtaining intelligence on 32–3, 66–7; doctrine for surface operations 60; Guadalcanal operation 54; intelligence on construction programme 32–3; intelligence service 66, 181; Leyte operations 82; Midway operation, strategic implications of defeat 52; rivalry with IJA 21, 48 183; southward advance, plans for 21, 24; presses for further conquests in the Pacific and Indian Ocean after finishing operations in Southeast Asia 48; seeks decisive engagement against the Allies 82, 185–6; submarines 66, 137–8; switches to defensive strategy 82, 87, 139 Imphal see Manipur region India: Japanese plans for subversion 47, 48, 54–5; Japanese efforts to disrupt buildup of Allied forces in 54 India–Burma front: intelligence on IJA’s operations, difficulties in obtaining 84–6; intelligence organization in 78; logistics 90; operations during winter 1942–3 55–6, 65–6, 89–94; situation in late 1942 54; situation during run-up to Imphal 89–92; situation following IJA’s setbacks at Imphal and Kohima 92–4, 160, 162; Japanese attack in spring 1944 86, 160; RAF operations in 88–9, 146–9 see also Air Command Southeast Asia; Arakan

region; Eastern Army; Fourteenth (XIV) Army; Manipur region India Command: assesses strategic situation during 1942 51, 55; establishment of training center for amphibious forces 130; efforts to improve British–Indian army’s tactical efficiency 121 Indian Field Broadcasting Units (IFBUs) 170–1 Indian Ocean: vulnerability of British possessions in 49, 51–2; improving situation in 52; possibility of IJN disrupting Allied operations in 87–8; see also Eastern fleet; military operations, Culverin Indomitable, HMS 144 Industrial Intelligence Centre 14; assesses Japan’s vulnerability to economic sanctions 19 Indochina: Japanese occupation of 20, 21, 23 intelligence organization: prior to December 1941 8–10, 13–14; reforms undertaken during 1942 47, 57; structure in 1943 9, 10, 77–80, 114–15, 155–6 Irwin, General Noel 66, 90 Japan: air services see Japanese air forces; Allied plans for invasion of home islands 103, 107, 109; army see Imperial Japanese Army; economic situation 19; home front 103–5; intelligence services 180–1, 182; loses the strategic initiative 46, 52, 81; misperceptions of Allied military capabilities 81, 177, 179–80, 181–2, 184–5; navy see Imperial Japanese Navy; plans for overseas expansion 17, 21; strategy during opening months of the Pacific War 47–9; surrender of 106–7; system for war planning and strategic assessment 182–3; war economy 71–3, 104–6, 146; war plans 176–7, 184–6 Japanese air forces (JAF): British miscalculations of prior to December 1941 39–41; deficiencies 189–90; estimates of aircraft production 72; follows policy of conserving strengths 88–9, 190; observations of operations in the South Pacific 67; possible scale of opposition in Southeast Asia 88–9; qualities acknowledged 60–2, 67; see also Japanese army air forces; Japanese naval air forces Japanese army air forces (JAAF): British intelligence on 144–9; deficiencies in aircraft 145; deficiencies in operational doctrine 147; fighters 147–9; increases in aircraft strength, 1944 146; tactical skill 146–7, 148–9

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IN D E X Japanese naval air forces (JNAF) 84; British efforts to obtain intelligence on 136; deficiencies in technology 136, 139 140; pilot shortages 139, 140; tactical skill 136, 139, 140–1, 142 Java Sea, Battle of 47 JN-25 15, 47 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC): concludes that Allies have no hope of holding Southeast Asia 46–7; forecasts of Japanese naval opposition to Allied operations 87; on IJA’s combat capabilities 64, 70; on IJA’s defensive capabilities in Southeast Asia 86, 88, 95–6, 100, 184; on IJA’s morale 158–9; on Japan’s war production 72, 106; on Japanese aircraft losses and production 83; on Japanese strategy prior to outbreak of war 21, 25, 38, 41; on likelihood of Japan surrendering 103, 105, 107; opinions on the IJN 139; opinions on Japanese air services 146; on possibility of Japanese attack on Indian Ocean areas during 1942 49, 55; role of 8–9, 15, 95, 182 Joint Planning Committee 26 Joint Planning Section (JPS): argues that Britain cannot provide reinforcements to defend Ceylon 51; complains about lack of intelligence on Japanese defences in Southeast Asia 85; estimates of Japan’s capacity to resist Allied operations 54, 96, 103, 135; evaluates potential effects of economic warfare against Japan 73, 106; evaluates potential effect of strategic bombing against Japan’s home islands 104, 106; evaluates wisdom of modifying Allied demands for Japan’s unconditional surrender 106; proposals for strategy against Japan 54, 108 Joint Technical Warfare committee (JTWC): establishes special commission to investigate IJA’s characteristics 163, 164; produces memorandum on Japanese morale 164–5, 167, 174–5 Kamikaze attacks 143–4, 152 Keswick, Sir Kohn 169 King, Admiral Ernest 53 Kirby, S.W. 2, 29, 52, 91 Kohima see Manipur region Kokoda trail operations 63 Kra isthmus 29 Leese, Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver 128 Lethbridge Mission 120, 121, 124–5, 131, 133 Leyte Gulf, Battle of: difficulties in predicting appearance of IJN’s main fleet 82; lessons

learned from Allied operations 132, 143, 167 Long Range Penetration Groups (LRPG) see Chindit operations MacArthur, General Douglas 82 Malaya: loss of, and lessons learned on the IJA 57–60, 68–9; possibility of Japanese invasion 23, 25, 27; British reinforcement of ground defences in 27–8; Japanese invasion imminent 28–9; plans to liberate from the Japanese 86, 135; see also military operations, Culverin Manchuria: Japanese occupation of in 1931 17; IJA maintains large forces in, to prepare for invasion of Siberia 24–5 Mandalay 94 Manipur region: implications of IJA’s defeats at Imphal and Kohima 92, 101; Japanese attack imminent 86, 92; lessons learned from IJA’s reverses in spring 1944 92, 119, 126–7, 160, 162 Marder, Arthur 33, 101, 135–6 Marianas: Allies invasion of 82; lessons learned 132 Marshall islands 131, 132 Matador see military operations Maund, Rear-Admiral L.E.H. 130 Menzies, Stewart 78 Messervy, Lieutenant-General Frank 86 MI2: comments on IJA’s wartime performance 70, 124, 132, 156, 162; contributes to efforts to gauge the IJA’s tactical capabilities in Southeast Asia and Pacific 117; denigrates the IJA’s efficiency 35–6 MI2c 33, 35 Middle Strategy 101 Midway 52, 67 military attaché 34 military culture 6, 44–5, 113, 115–16, 176, 178–9, 180, 183, 187–8, 191–2 military intelligence see MI2; MI2c; War Office military operations: Anakim 53–4, 97; Buccaneer 100; Capital 92, 101; Coronet 109; Crimson 88; Culverin 98, 100; Dracula 94, 134; Matador 27–8, 37–8; Romulus 92, 134, 102; Zipper 102 Ministry of Economic Warfare: establishment of 14; estimates effect of economic sanctions on Japan 26; estimates of Japan’s ability to maintain war production 71, 72, 105 Ministry of Information 71, 169 Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis: attempts to obtain operational intelligence from Americans 85; orders invasion of Malaya

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IN D E X to take place in August 1945 102; persuades COS to establish propaganda organization in SEAC 169; raises concerns on Eastern Fleet’s capabilities to engage the IJN 137, 141–2; reorganizes intelligence at SEAC headquarters 85; supports plans for operations against Malaya–Sumatra region 87, 95, 98; voices concerns over XIV Army’s capabilities 91, 94 Mustang P-47 fighter 67 Mutaguchi, General Renya 84, 119, 186 Nakano school 181 naval attaché 32 naval intelligence: difficulties obtaining intelligence on IJN’s operational plans 81–3; organization of 78–9; see also Admiralty; Far Eastern Combined Bureau; Naval Intelligence Directorate Naval Intelligence Directorate (NID): attempts to calculate strategy of Japanese naval air services 84; difficulties in obtaining intelligence on the IJN 32–3, 66–7, 137; on Japan’s expansionist policy 23, 24; miscalculates the IJN’s efficiency 32–3; miscalculates Japanese naval air services 40, 41; praises IJN’s efficiency 139; remains focal point for handling intelligence on the IJN 136–7; also see Director of Naval Intelligence New Guinea campaign 63, 70, 90, 119, 120 New Zealand: intelligence cooperation with 15 Nomonhan 24, 34; British perception of IJA’s performance at 33 Octagon see Allied summit meetings Office of War Information (OWI), United States 169 Okinawa 143–4 OP-20-G (US Navy signals intelligence service) 47, 78, 79 Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC) see Admiralty Pacific theatres: operations in 87, 88, 90; tactical and operational lessons learned from 100, 119, 120–1, 131–3, 138, 141, 142, 145, 146, 148, 152, 156–7, 158, 159–60, 162, 167 Pearl Harbor 21 Peirse, Air Marshal Sir Richard 51, 148 Percival, Lieutenant-General Archibald 20 Philippines: Japanese plans for defence 82; lessons learned from Allied operations, 1944–5 132 photographic reconnaissance 85

Piggott, Colonel Francis 14 Playfair, Major General I.S.O. 38 Political Warfare Executive (PWE), role of 71 Political Warfare Japan Committee (PWJC): establishes committee to investigate IJA’s morale 163; investigates ways to erode Japanese morale 168 Port Moresby 49 Portal, Marshall of the RAF Sir Charles: estimates JAF strengths and Japanese aircraft production 72, 83–4; proposes defeating Japan by strategic bombing 106 Potsdam Conference see Allied summit meetings, Terminal Pound, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley: comments on implications of IJN’s defeat at Midway 52; suggests that arrival of capital ships in Singapore may have discouraged Japanese invasion 28; reflects on the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse 40 Pownall, General Sir Henry: contemplates reasons for British army’s tactical weaknesses 59; reflects on reasons for the fall of Singapore 12; writes off prospects of stopping Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies 46 Prince of Wales, HMS and Repulse, HMS: decision to send to Singapore 28; events leading to the loss of 40–1; lessons learned from loss, reassessment of Japanese naval air services 61–2, 136 prisoners of war (POWs): numbers captured by Allies, significance 157, 162; value as sources of intelligence 113, 118, 137, 139, 154, 157, 158 propaganda see psychological warfare psychological warfare: dissemination of propaganda 169–70; machinery for conducting propaganda campaign in SEAC 169–70; plans for use against IJA 71, 163–4, 170; problems of conducting propaganda campaign in SEAC theatre 168–9; results 171; types of propaganda 170; use against Japanese troops 153, 154, 168, 169–71, 174–5 Psychological Warfare Division 169, 170, 171 Purple machine 15 Quadrant see Allied summit meetings Quebec conference (1943) see Allied summit meetings, Quadrant Quebec conference (1944) see Allied summit meetings, Octagon race issue: effect on British soldiers’ perceptions of the Japanese 166–7; effect

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IN D E X on intelligence assessment 7–8, 32, 33, 44–5, 68, 115–16, 153–4, 161, 166–7, 173; national character studies 163–5, 167; see also Dower, John Rangoon 86, 88, 94 Repulse, HMS see Prince of Wales, HMS Romulus see military operations Roosevelt, President Franklin 51, 81 Royal Air Force (RAF): difficulties in defending Ceylon during 1942 51; struggles to achieve parity with Japanese counterparts 67, 88–9, 147, 148, 186; see also Air Command Southeast Asia; Air Ministry Royal Navy: difficulties in combating Japanese naval air services 61, 62, 141–2; strategy in the Far East 17; dispatches aircraft carriers to the SWPA 55; see also British Pacific Fleet, Eastern Fleet; Singapore Russo-Japanese War: effect on British perceptions of Japan 31, 35; effect on Japanese naval doctrine 185 Saipan see Marianas Scoones, Lieutenant-General Sir Geoffrey 85, 125 Seafire fighters 62, 142 service culture see military culture Sextant see Allied summit meetings Shokaku, IJN carrier 137 signals intelligence 72; British secure access to Japanese diplomatic and naval codes 15–16; collection of 77–8; dissemination of 78–80; on Imphal campaign 84; information on Japanese dispositions in Burma 86; Japanese achievements in 180; limits of 47, 53, 80–1, 82–4; provides indication of Japanese policies 19–20, 24, 107; provides indication of Japanese plans to defend home islands against invasion 107; provides indication of Japanese strategy during opening stages of the Pacific War 47; provides information on Japanese naval technology 32; warns of impending Japanese attack on Malaya 28–9; warns of IJN’s attack on Ceylon in April 1942 47; see also Bletchley Park; Blue Jackets; Government Codes and Cyphers School Singapore: fall of 1, 12, 46; British assess vulnerability of 20, 21, 23, 28, 38, 41; importance in British naval strategy 17, 21; repercussions of its loss on Britain’s strategic position 47, 49; IJN moves its main fleet to 87; see also Prince of Wales, HMS Sino-Japanese War: effect on British

perceptions of Japan 17–20; effect on Japanese economic situation 19–20; effect on Japanese strategic situation 20; IJA’s performance in 34–6, 37; JAF’s performance in 39–40 Slim, General William 2; attempts to improve quality of British–Indian army 60, 121–2, 187; complains about difficulties in obtaining operational intelligence on the IJA 84, 85; concerns over XIV Army’s capabilities 91–2, 122; opinion on IJA’s combat capabilities 115, 172; predicts IJA’s attack on Imphal and Kohima 85; remarks on characteristics of Japanese troops 167; remarks on effects of psychological warfare 171; see also Fourteenth (XIV) Army Smeeton, Commander R.M. 136, 142 Solomon islands campaign 63, 70, 90 Somerville, Admiral Sir James 47, 79; complains about lack of operational sigint 83; explains difficulties posed by Japanese naval opposition 87, 98; raises concerns on poor state of Eastern Fleet 60, 137, 138, 139 Southeast Asia: British plans to liberate from the Japanese 53–4, 55–6, 87–8, British interests in 7, 17; Japanese conquest of 45–6, 47; Japanese plans for defence 82; possibility of Japanese invasion 20–9; RAF operations in 83, 88–9; see also Southeast Asia Command; India–Burma front Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) 78, 79, 82; intelligence organization within 80, 85, 114, 117; opinion on Japanese army air force 146; plans for operations in Southeast Asia 92 Southeast Asia Translation and Interpretation Centre (SEATIC) 117, 118 South Pacific area: observations of IJA operations in 63–4, 70, 90, 131–2; observations of JAF operations in 67 Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) 49, 50 (map of); Japanese operations in 88; lessons learned on Japanese tactics 117, 119, 120–1; observations of IJA’s morale 158, 160; observations of Japanese air operations in 140, 145, 148 Special Intelligence Service (SIS) 69; identifies Japan as a prime intelligence target 17; operations in Japan, difficulties of 8, 14; operations in Southeast Asia 85; supports establishment of sigint organization on India–Burma front 78 Special Operations Executive (SOE) 169; operations in Southeast Asia, difficulties of 85; operations in Malaya and Singapore 8, 14

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IN D E X Spitfire fighter 147, 148 Stark, Admiral Harold 51 Stratemeyer, Albert 83 Sumatra see military operations, Culverin Symbol see Allied summit meetings Taierchwang 35 Tarawa see Gilbert islands Thailand, Japanese penetration of 23 theories on intelligence 1, 3, 6, 23, 29, 190–1 Tojo Hideki 26 Trincomalee 49 Tripartite Pact see Germany ULTRA see signals intelligence United States (US): effect on Japan’s expansionist strategy 20, 25–6; refuses to provide naval assistance to protect Indian Ocean areas 52; see also Anglo-American alliance; Pacific theatres; United States Marine Corps; United States Navy United States Marine Corps 131–2 United States Navy: achieves numerical superiority over the IJN 87, 139; attempts to disrupt Japanese invasion of Guadalcanal 54; see also Pacific theatres USSR: Japanese non-aggression pact with 24, 107; Japanese war plans against 24–5, 47; participation in Pacific war 109; threat to British interests in Asia 16–17; see also Nomonhan Victorious, HMS 55, 141 War Office: on IJA’s efficiency 58–9, 63, 64, 70, 104, 119, 120, 124, 132; on IJA’s morale 158, 159, 161, 162; IJA’s operations in the South Pacific during late 1942 63–4, 70; intelligence summaries 24;

on Japanese landing techniques 58; on lessons learned from fall of Malaya 58; on likelihood of Japanese invasion of Malaya 20, 25, 37; military intelligence directorate 9; training manuals 58, 122; see also MI2; MI2c Wards, Colonel G.T. 36, 117 Wavell, General Sir Archibald: admits mistakes in launching winter 1942–3 Arakan campaign 66; on British army’s poor performance in Malaya 60; on British–Indian army’s ability to fight the IJA 91, 122, 126; on IJA’s performance during Malaya campaign 59, 68–9; on JAF’s performance in Malaya 61; laments on poor state of signals intelligence within India Command 78; proposal for Arakan operations during 1942–3 campaigning season 53, 55; proposal for establishment of Anglo-American combined intelligence centre 83; recognition that Allies cannot hold the Dutch East Indies 47; warning that Ceylon is vulnerable to a Japanese invasion 51, 52 Wildcat F4F fighter 67 Wingate, Major-General Orde Charles 90–1 Wireless Experimental Centre (WEC) 178; decodes Japanese army signals 78, 84; establishment of 78; role in decoding Japanese air force cyphers 79–80 Yalta Conference see Allied summit meetings Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku 21, 48, 49 Yamato, Japanese super battleship 33 Zero fighter 39, 60, 67, 148, 189 Zipper see military operations

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