Civil War Generalship: The Art Of Command

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L WAR The Art of Command

W. J. Wood

Ail rights resewed. No part of this publication may be rqroduccla, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, elwtronic, mechanical, photocopy-

ing, rwording, or othemise, without the prior wrften permission of the publisher. Printed in the Unit& States of h e r i c a . Library of C o n g r ~Catalogislg s in Publication Data to come

ISBP4 0-306-80973-7

Civil fiVar Gmmalship: The Art o f h m a n d was originally publishd by Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1997. This &ition by arrangement with Greenwad Publishing Gmup, Inc. AIX rights esenied. First Da Gapo Press Edition 2 W Published by Da Caps P m s A Member of the &meus Book Croup http:/ /ww.dacapopmss.com

for Barbara

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Contents IHustratians Preface Aebowledgmen ts Part One: The Sandwiched War Chagter 1: The h e r i c a n Civil War in W s t e m Histaw Cfiqter 2: Pre-Civil War Axnerican Mifitav Thought Chapter 3: "hssons" from Napoleonic Wadare Chapter 4: Defining an M of Command Part Two: Cedar Mournbin: Meeting Engagement

Chapter 5: Stonewall Jackson Plans and Conducts His Camp&@ Chqter 6: Nathmiel Baaks and the f i a n c e to Cedar Mountain Chapter "I The Battle of Cedar Mountain Chapter 8: What flappemd at Cedar Mountain? Part Three: Chickamauga: h s t Command, h s t Victory Chapter 9: Roseerans and His Chickamauga Campaign Chapter 10: Braton Bragg, Confederate Strategy, and the Tactical Offensive

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Chqter 11: The Battle of Ghickamauga Chapter 12: The Two Perspectives of Chickamatrga

Par8 Four: Nashville: The Last Great Adwenlure Chapter 13: John B. Wood and GerZain Differences in Confederate Strategy Chapter 14: The ‘Back of Chickamauga" Prepares a New Kind of Battle Chapter 15: The Battle of Nashville Chapter 16: Why Thomas Won M O Tthan ~ a Vietor)i

Part Five: KefXectiions Chapter 17: Reflections Notes Selected Bibliagaphy Index

Illustrations

Map 1.1

Map 5-1

Map 5.2 Map 6.1 Map 7.1 Map 7.2 Map 7.3 Mtnp 7.4 Map 9.1 Map 9.2 Map 923 Map 9.4 Map 10.1 Map 10.2

Jackson" Advance Jackson" Plan of Maneuver y of Virginia k e a of Operations

The Ba~lefield BanhpInitiaf Depfoyent Banks' BBrigalde Attacks Jackson's Reaction a@erCradard"s Attir@k The Tws fieaters of War h e a aE Oprations: Terzn.&eor@a-Aabrtma Eosecrans%ver Crossing and Plan of Maneuver Area of Operations, 4-18 September Confederate: Strate@cConcentration Area sf QperaGons, G18 September Map 11.1 Chicbmauga Battlefield Map 11-24 Union and Confederate Forces by Dam, 19 September Map 11.3 The Battle by AM., 20 September Map 11.4 Critical Phases, 20 September

Map Map Map Map Map Map

11.5 13.1 1/32 13.3 15.1 15.2

Figure 3.1 Figure 5.1 Figure 6.1 F i ~ r 9,f. e Fi*re 10.1 Fimre I1.i Fiwre 13.1 Figure 14.1

Thornas' Defensive Battle Hood-Sheman Area of Operations Area of Operations, Fforene+Nashville Batde of Franklin Bade of NwhvilXe, 15 December P.M. Battle of Nashville, X6 December, Find Bay

The Batailton Cam6 in Action f wkson3sCorps Organimtion Banks' i f l~lo~ps Organization Rasecrrtns"my of the Cumberland

bngstreet's Attack Fornations Haod"s of Tennessee Organization of Thorn='

Linear Fornations As the DriXX Manuals Poflrayed Them Linear Famations As They ActudIy Appeared in BaeIe A Line of Skimishers, the Precursor of a Redis~cZnfantxy Fornation A Givit War H a 5 Enkenchment under Enemy Fire Stonewall jwkson NathanieI Banks WiXliam S. RClosecrans Brmton Brag John B, Wood

Preface At a time when h e r i c a n rrrilita~leaclers are confronting the problem of develqing gloM strategies that were inconceivable less than a decade ago, it may seem less than useful to look back ts our Givif War for direction in

guiding military thou&t for the future. Vet it may pmw instntctiw to r e c d that Ewe American nations were engaged in the greatest war, in terns of both manpower and human sacfifice, &at Americans have ever had to fight-including the two World Wars. With that recolleetian it is also usehi to reeomize that, for the first time in our histor?;., massed armies, made up of hundreds of thousands of civilian soldiers, had to be orpnxtzed and trained to fi&t a w2r in which bath sides were detemined to settle for nothing Iess than totat m i l i t a ~victory, And when those amies were Ied to battle, the leaders on both sides were confronted with problems of skateg)t and tactics that were as inconceit~ableas had been their vvar Iess &an a decade before. How those leaders dealt with those problems became the subject and the substance of this wiring, To describe the legacy that their military* thought leaves for k h r e leaders then became the god of this book; whether that god has been attained is left to the judgement of the reader The journey toward the goal takes the f o m af an exploration through five progressive parts. Part One defines the underlying problem that the commanders of both Union and Confederate forces had to come to m p s with. and maps the ground for the exploration sf an art of' command which the cornmanders in question had to create for thernselves, Parts Two, Three, and Four present the campaigns and battles wherein the reader can obsewe the cornrnalzders are each confronted his opponent md used his art to conduct his

xii

Preface

campaign and fight: its climactic battle. Part Five reviews the character of each af the six commanders as it ageeted his devetoprnent of an art of command, and ends by presenting ~oxlclusionsregarding the legacy left by the founders of a pragmatic art,

In ewressing patitude fsr the help I've gatten thmughout the pains of pmducing this book, I find it hirer to reverse the traditional order of things and first thank my wife, Barbara, for the continued suppod, material and inspiratr'ond, without which this W& would never have been completed, II owe a great deal to Laurence Hull and Elimbeth Clontz of the Cannon Memorial Libraw in Concord, No& Carolina for obtaining and processing the hund~edsof sources so essential to the resraamh upan which the faetud material of h i s work depends; my obligation for their semices can never be expressed in mere words. In like manner, I am indebted, as always, to Martin L. ("'M~alrty'" WVVilkerson for his prtZience and cartographid skills in convel-ting my words and cmde drafts into the Anished maps and figures that help the reader to follw the htrn of evants in the ampaims and battles, So also my debts extend to the professional sklls, patience, and plain human understanding of my editor Daniel E d e s and his colleagues Jason Azze and Seott Wieh at the Greenwood PtrbXishing Croup, Another professiond to whom I: am indebted is my computer consufbnt-mm if you \x;iU--Timothy Smith, who, on less &an rnenzoralle occasions, prevented me from taking m axe to my computer and its associated hardware and sofhare, thus saving 'this creation far vvhose shortcomings and imperfections 1 alone r e m ~ nresponsible.

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PART ONE

THE SANDWICHED WAR The best way I h o w of persuading you of any&ing is not to plead wi& you to tmst me, not to invoke author;iv in generd, to even d I upon s m e expert., but to show you just what it is that persuaded me* ---Dr. Philip Mo~soxl,Massachusetts Ins~t-ute: of Technoloe

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The

erican Civil War in Western History

'"I want Pope to be suppressed." n o s e six vvords were the essence of Rabert E. Leek orders to Stonwall Jackson, &ready itching to strike out on his o m in independent cctrnnland agiinst a new oppontfnt in a campaign just beginning to take shape. In this fateful summer of 1862 the month ofJuly had seen the ending of the Seven Days Battles, in which Lee had thrown back McClellan's svercautious advance against Richmond, as well as the stdcmate that followed. Now, on 21 July as he wit,%witing his orders ta Jackson, Lee had h e w n to conceive the strategy he would employ to keep McGfelXan off balance while he and Jackson jointly took the strategic ogensive against Union forces in nortbern Virginia. An essential element of that stratem had been Lee's doubling the strength of jackson's cceforehe took to the saddle in the early morning of 8 August: General: I am not rntlking much progress. The enemy's cavalry yesterday and last night also ttireatened my train. . . . f-filf (A.P.), though at Orange Court House yesterday morning, having encamped in a mile uf the t o w on the other side, reported last ni&t that he was not more than a rriile on Lfiis side, tfius making onfy 2 miles ysterday. Ewell's division, which is near this paint (12 mites &am Culpeper Gaurt House) and in front, rnarctied about 8 miles. Yesterday was opprcssivcly hot [g6 degrees F.]; severd men had sunstrt~kes,. . . f fear that the expedition will, in consequence of my tardy movements, be productive of but little good. My pIan was to have been at Cullpeper Co~~rt-Egouse this forenmn, Should I learn that Bumside has gone in the direction of Richmond I will try to eut him off. . . . The enemy" infantry., fmm reports bruud~tin last night, is about 5 miles in front; his cavajv near otlrs.18

The order of march of Jackson" corps, as it renewed its no&hward advmce, was ROW as fo'llows (see Figure 5.1): Ewe115 division in advance, followed by Winder, with Z3iliX's division bringing up the rear. The carps cavalry e o v e ~ d the advance, four regiments and WO detachments under Brigadier Cenerd Beverly H. Robertson, Unfortunately for Robertson-and the corps as a who2e-Jackson had taken a personal dislike to Robertson, pehaps brought on by the Xa~er's haphuard performance as the ctrrnn~andcrof the corps' major reconnaissance element. Earlier in August Rdertson had ridden up to Jackson, who, in one of his few light motrlents, had been joshing his medical ofliicer about eating a rdw onion to allay his thirst. When he recognized Robertson, Jaekson at once drowed the levity, and wheeled on him with the question always uppermost in his mind in regard to his cwalq, 'WVVhere is the enen-ty?"Xn appamntEy unernbarrasscd R o b e ~ s o nreplied, ""Ireally da not know." Though he n~ighthave gotten an A for honesty, Robertson's answer left much to be desired from a h r c e commander's viewoint. Jacksan" rreaction spoke his disgust; be turned his back on the cat~alryrnanwi-thout anotI.rer ward, The disgust n ~ a yhave still rankled Jackson, for from early morning onward be was persistent in pushing Robertson h r information about the enexny, ancl getting back only the word that his men were straggling, news that was sure to turn Sto~1ewal1~s dyspeptic. stomach even more sour. Meanwhile the infantv, blessedly unaware of the eava1.r?f7ssloppy performance, had stepped out smartly, in spite of the rising heat of the day. Ewe'll's

Jackson Plans arrd C:onduels His Campaign Figure 5.1 f aekson's Corps Organization

division was preceded by one of his brigades made up of five Louisiana regiments and the 12th Georgia, and commanded by Jubd A, EarlJP, "Old Jube" to his troops. Eady had dropped off security pickets on both sides of the road as he dvaneed, foXlwing the instmctions of Ewell, who shared Jackson's caneern ai2out the threat of Union cavalry, Early"s leading regiment came to a halt about midmorning, when its commander found units of Robertsonh sevalr).i in the process of scouting out Union ewafrlj to their hod, some of which could be seen crossing a ridge about 800 yards to the right frant. Soon Early vvas on the scene, joined sho&ly by Ewetl. While the two were meeting, a battev of QXd Jube" artillery had unlimbered and was firing ranging rounds at the enemy cavalry, When the Union cavalry disappeared behind the ridge, sonledling happened that was to halt the fsrw d march of jackson's lead elements. The fire of EarIy" a d i l l e ~was suddenly returned by &at of Union gtlas. So, if enemy artillery was already there in firing position, there must be enemy infantry somevvhere out there too! h d

40

Cedar Muurrtain

waiting for a R&t? Ewe11 wasted no time in ordering Early to reeonnoiter to the front. While Early and Ewe11 were nleeting, fackson, following his custom, had already ridden fowdrd ta see things for himself. He had left his foward headquarters to establish a command post at the house of the widow Petiy while he and his command group rode on to a hilltop &ere he got his first glimpse of enemy cavatry. They seemed to be scouting o E to his right front, to the east of the main Orange-Culpeper highwdy, new the so-caUed Crittenden Line, a farm road leading from the highway to the Grittenden house. Jackson then rode on to catch up with Ewelt, who, while waiting for Jackson, had disrrkoullted and vvils playing with the children on the porch of a famhouse. When Jackson came up to the porch and an aide had handed him his map, the two generals spread it out before them and begdn a map study of the terrain. The chief feature of the terrain, one that would largely influence any battle plan, was the Orange-Culpeper highway, which bad fomed the axis of advance of Jackson's e o v s . .A close inspection of that road shows (see Map 5.2) that its southern extrerne is marked by the Crooked Run Church, From tht-tr point the main direction of the road runs generdly no&h-northeast until it reaches the Gatc (so labefed on the map) to the lane leading to the Cgttenden hause. Then, from the Gate, the highway runs nor~heastfor a mile and a half before it finafly turns strai&t northward. Other significant features include the Y in the highway where a leg splits off to run to Madison Court House. There were some open farm fields enclosed in large part by woods (dt to figure later in the battle), a couple of smaH streams (no militav obstacles), and the dominant topographical feature, Cedar Mountain, also known at the time as SLau&teis Mountdin, named after the original, owner of the land, It was Cedar Mountain that cm&t Jackson's eye as the critical miEitw feature of the area, the one on which he had begun to form a plm of action. The other Eactor influencing his upcoming decisions was his assumption that the main enemy force-if there really were one-was waiting east of the Omnge-Cufpeper highway. h o r n that assr~mptionnnd his tenain study, Jackson conceived his plan, He decided to deploy whatever part of his corps would be myuired as follows: first, he w u l d swwp aside any small Union forcc that might be impeding his carps' advance; second, if a larger enemy force were to be uncovered, he would maneuver his divisions in a double envelopment to destroy it, It is important to note that fackson, in keeping with his assumption about the loeation of the enemy main force, did not order a reconnaissance hy any cmmander to c w e r his corps? left Aank. iiecmdingly, the main eRort would be made irritially by Ewell, who would employ tvvo brigades to sweep past the west slope of Cedar Mountain, thus ensuring its retention by following elements, and continue his maneuver to turn the enemy's left Aank, Early, with Ewell" remaining brigade, was to continue to move fowaird, using the main highway as his axis of advance.

Jacks011PIans and Conducts His Campaign Map 5.2 Jackson" Plan of Maneuver

Couflesy Marlin

L. Wikerson,

Windel-"$division wii~ to fotXow Early, supporting him. At the same time Winder would extend elements of his division wesward in order to turn the enemy's right flank. Hill's division was to serve initlafly as the e o q s resewc, until the emplvment of its elements could be determined. A final essential factor in the plan-certainly stemming from Jackson's eye for terrain and from the

42

Cedar k%.founEain

n~indof jac.kson the artiHerlst-~~outd bc Aanking fire from Confedemtt: batteries that would enfilade the enemy from \Vinder"s left Bank and from EweU's guns on the commanding slopes of Cedar Mountajn on the corps' rl&t, The orders gven, botb Jackson and Ewe11 toak a break in the shade of the famhouse porch. That Jackson eould edmiy snatch brief rest periods, even in the course of an action, is wXl bowm. What ~"emajn~ u n h o m is what might have gone &rough his mind as he stretched out to relax, It is templing to wonder if he refiected on an earlier moment of h a t morning when Hunter McGuire, his staff medicd oaeer, had asked him if he expected to fight a battle before the day was over, Jaekson had smiXed and replied, 'Bmks is in our f x ; o and ~ he is generally willing to &&t, arrd he generally gets whipped."

Nathaniel Banks and the Advance to

Cedar Mountain Indied it was Banks in front of Jackson--Nathaniel Prentiss Banks, Major Cened, U.S. Volunteers, eomnlanding IiI Carps, y of Vir@nia. It was the same franks who was still smarting from the outmmeuvering and defeats suffered at Jacksan's hands in the $henando& Valley less than three months b f a r e &is coming confrontation. How Banks amived at: Cedar Mounhin shapes the story ofwhat follows. Back m 26 June, the same clay that Lee moved to attack McClelllan in the Seven. Days Battles, Lineofn signed the executive order that created the af Virginia and appointed Major Cenerd John Pope as its commander. The order, in eEeet, consolidated widleEy spread farces in the Slrenandoah and south of Washington into one army made up of three a m y COTS: f C o q s under G n e r d Sigel, Xf Corps under Gener and TXX Corps under General McDowell. The new wmfs rnissia sly misintewreted in some histories--was spelled out clearjy enough in LincoXn's order: y of Vir@nia. . . while protecting Western Vir@;inia and the nat-iond eapili-tl from h g e r or insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack arid overcome the rebel forces under jacksan and Ewe'tl, threaten the enemy in the direegon of CbarlottesviHe, and render the most eEective aid to relieve Generd MeGlellsln and capt-ure

The order dso implied that the army's operations, urhile they were shielding Washingon from the threat of enemy forces, should draw away a part crf b e ' s forces, thus aiding Meclellan in any renewed oEensive apinst the Csnfederac9s capital, an implication not lost on Pope, While all this seems cXear ertough in retrospect, the tasks confronting Pope were not so simple, Me was

Banks and the Advance l u Cedar Mountain

45

Map 6.1

taking cnmmand of forces that, in fate June, were scattered from the Shenmdoah Valley to Manassas and thel-ree to the upper Rappahannock River (see Map 6.1). While his first concern was to concentrate the corps of his new % m yeast of the Blue Ridge Morxntains, he had to bear in mind the requirement to coordinate his upcoming operations with McCleIl~n,who characteristieally regarded any other force's operations on the North American continent to be automaticaE1y satellited upon his intentions and plans, John Yope characteristically SW h& role as an army cornmanner placing him on an equal hating with McCiellan, who kad already demanded of Lincoln a reinh m e m n t of 35,000 troops in order to contend with Lee's imagined army of

46

Cedar %ountain

200,000 standing b e ~ e e nhirn and Richmond. So, when Pope made a telegraphic overture to McGlellan suggesting that the two amies coordinate their upcoming operations, the "Little Napoleonv-who, during his botched operations in the Seven Days Battles, had managed to antagonize everyone of importance in Lincoln's war dministration-replied only with the comment that Pope should mncentrate his forces while, at some tirne in the future, he (McClellan) might move against Richmond in the event that Lee should move his main force a s i n s t Pope, The rebuffed Pope, while still in Washington, began to fornulate his own strategy. Following meetings with Lincoln and Halleck, the president's commander of the amies, Pope telegraphed his initial orders to his field cornwanders that would start the concentration of the mdjor forces of his Army of Virginia: SigeX's I Corps was directed toward S p e v i i l e ; Banks21 X o v s was to move to the viciniw of Little Wahington, rzorheast of Spe McDowell's 111 Corps' two divisions were positioned initially with Rickett's division near Waterloo while King" division remained around Fre&ricksburg. Another part of Pope's aggressive strateli~ywas a directive to Bmks to push foward with the cavalry of his 11 C o p s toward GordonsviXXe, to seize that t o m and destroy the railroad east of it in order to dismpt Gsnfederdte eommunications. Although Banks did order Brigadier Genera! Hakh, his cavalry commander, to c a q out that mission, Hatch managed to bungle things right &am the start, Instead of moving out with a mobile, purely cavalry force, he mwed with a command that included both afiillev and supply trains, thus m&ing such slow progress that, as we saw earlier, Stonewail Jackson" oRensive stratea had already enabled his foward elements to occupy CordonsviHe in mid-July. When Pope was infamed sf the aborled effort, he was dletemined to offer Banks a chance to show renewed aggressiveness by instructing hirn to send Hatch out again, this time to destroy the railrods west of Gardsnsville in the direction of Charlottesville. Again Banks dispatched Hatch on. the mission, and again Hatch-for reasons that are not clear-made such a feeble eEort that he had to be recalled, Pope wasted na tirne relieving Hatch and replwect him with Brigddier General John Bufard as Banks' new chief of cavdr>i, Finally, Pope was ready ta leave Washington and take command in the field, By 29 July he had joined Banks at the latter's command post southeast of Little Washington Eclr a find look at the situation before issuing his latest orders to his three c o q s cammanders. What opinion Pope might have fomed of Banks' cornpet-ence as a commander at this paint is u n b o r n , but aside from that particular v i e ~ o i n there t is enou& background information to provide us with a picture of Banks, the man and the general, in 1862. To his soldiers, as he rode past their regimenkd ranks, he was (with deference to Gilbert and Sullivan) ""thevery no del of a modem Major-General,"" in immaculately hilored unifom deaaning with rows of brass buttons and the

Banks and Ule Advance to Cedar Muuntairl

47

twin stars of his rank, yellow dress gloves that contrasted snlartfy with the dark blue of his uniform coat, and his saher at his side. Moreover, he had the comportment to rnatcjlr his martid appearance. Seeming taller tlrdn his five feet, eight inches, he had an erect, gacefrxl car~age,an earnest look about him, and a melodious but powedul speaking voice, He rode his horse well, having tau&t himself to keep an erect posture on horseback, and to maintain a set jaw and stem &meanor befitting the soldiers' image of their general. His neady brushed dark hair, heavy brows, and militav moustache served to complete the picture. Behind the image, however, there mrnained the hard fact that he had no nrilitaxy experience at all prior to his appointment by Lincoln, who had no other recourse at the time than to appoint political. backers to high military rank-afkr having exhausted his meager supply of regular anlly p~ssiblesIn Banks7case, Lincoln's political debt was a huge one-to a nationdfy recognized antislavery Republicm leader who had sewed in ten sessions of Congress and had risen to Speaker of the House of Representatives, a position only matched by his subsequent election as governor of Massachusetts, an ofice which he held kern 1858 to Jarkuary 18431. Afier the fdl. of Fort Sctmter he had been v i c k to tender his sertrices to the president, who eommissioxxed him a majior general of volunteers in May 1861. Banks' rise to high political ofxice was as traditionally American as Foudh o f July speeches and bunting-decked speakers? platforms. Born one of seven children to hardwtjrking, lower-middle-dss parents in Wdthcrm, Massachusetts, he was fortunate to have gatten even the barest of common-school education~before he liad to go to work in the cotton mill where his father served as a foreman. Earning two dollars a week as a bobbin boy, he not only bad Itegun to find his start in life but was able to cash in, later in his mature years, on the politicd nichame "'the Bobbin Boy of Massachusetts." P~ushedby insatiable ambition, he pursued two interests that were to take him out of the mill and form the bases which worlld teud to a real future. First, he took part in local. Abates and even began lecturing against inteqertince. Second, he unrlertolok studies on his own that would eventuaXXy enable him at age tvventythree to win admittance to the bar, and though he never practiced law in the courts he had opened a doof to a career in politics. The door, at first, didn't open easily, Dufing those formative years-aside from a brief Niag at studying acting which naay have contributed to his public speaking L-ibilities-he was a six-tin-ie, unsuccessful candidate fir the lower hsuse of the Massachusetts legislature, His seventh try in 1848, howewr, landed him a seat in that legislative body, and he was on his way----on his way to the only profession whi& (o&ide of his Civil War rnifitav servicef would provide him with an income for life. Aft-er four years this self-made man, at age thirly-seven, w a s ready to try for bigger things. In 1853he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he made such a name for himself that, in only three year?;, he was

proposed for the leadership role of Speaker of the House. His assumption of that role was not any easier than had been his seven attetnpts as a candidate for his first election; it took no less than 133 ballots-sometihing of a record in itself-before he was confimed as the Speaker. Xn spite of what must have been a stomy in-house batde, Banks soon proved 1nirnsd.f to be a political leader to be reckoned with on any gmund. He soon gained recognition for outstanding qualities h a t were to seme him well throughout a lifetime in politics. Not only rated as a brilliantly egective public speaker, he became widely h o w n as a skillEu1 negt~tiator,a tactful administrator, and a pragmatic party leader who, in his role as Speaker of the Hotlse, never had a decision ovemled-and that in a period of tempestuous pa&isanship. In fact, Banks\eputation as a political leader bad by naw become so fimly established that he was o&md his party's noonlirlation fsr the prttsidency in the campaign of 1856. Banks, however, declined the nomination, and in the following year looked homeward to another nomination-for the governorship of Massachusetts. He accepted the chdlenge and, against a fimly entrenched, three-time incumbent, took the innovative step of taking to the hustings in person, a move considered averly risky by politicians of the day, Banks, however, won by a large nnajarib, and took office- in 1858. &.though his tern in the governorship proved him to be a capable and efifective executive, when Banks finished his tern he oEered his services in a mi1it;zr)r capaciv PQ President Lincoln, following the fall of Fort Sunrter. When one considers Lincoln's ~vemi&tappointment of a prominent political figure with no military expemience to high militav rank, the inevitable questions come to mind: HOWdid he manage the adjustment? How well would he &netion in high command? It may not be suvrising to find that Banks sraded his miiEiby career by gaining an immediate populariw with his raw amateur soldiers of 1861. The personal. appearance of such a srna~fyturned-out general was bound to impress the g e e n f a m boys ancl working-class volunteers who made up t)le ranks of the regiments on parade. h d the personal picture was rounded by the backaound of a splendidly mounted staff and the generdk bodyward of redPfezzed Zhtuaves decked out in scarlet trousers and vvhit~fegings. Such a martid show ww not m uncommon practice among amateur generals of the t i m , who thought they had to substihte image Eor lack sf professiond knowhow. In spite of the martid s h w and image cmation, it would only be fair to point out that Banks s h w e d a number of redeeming qudities tkat b e c m e evident soon after he took eommand, M e showed a real and persistent interest in leaking out far his men by seeing that they had such basics as rations and clohing. Also, he set a personal example of temperance, and put d a m rampant dmnkenness by throwing out the whiskey and its suppliers. He stamped out prostitution rings in his camps by having the women rounded up md shipped back by the wagon load to Washington-where they no doubt found sinful employment.

lEZankrs and the Advance to Cedar Mountain

49

He was not as efrective overall in deding with discipline, due to a tendency toward indecisiveness-even reversing deeisioris on occasion-in dealing with serious problems like desedion and looti~lg,In one case, that of an oEender in the 2nd Massachusetts who was ordered stmng up by the thumbs as an example to the regiment, Banks approved the sentence, and ordered cavalv and adiflery units to back up the execution of the sentence, However, when an outcry of objections came h m a nei&f>aring regiment, Banks called off the outside units, changed the location of the demonstration to a secluded area, and then failed to witness it in person. The colonel of the 2nd didn't hide his disgust, and another ogcer sclunded off publicly, with words to the eEect that their general lacked the militay bxkbone to e a w out his own orders. biter cm, in the Shenandoh campaign, Banks issued strict orders against the boting of Vafley famsteads, but the orders were never eCf;tetively enforced, leading campfire wags to observe that "oEeers shut their eyes whenever a rooster crowed." In ather matters relating to command, Banks was either plain unlrreb or a victim of his lack of militav acumen. When it came to selecting and organizing a st&-a matter whose importance to a commander could hardly be overemphasized-he was faced with a problem shared by all Civil War cornmanders: bained, pmfessiond sst& oEcers simply did not exist; thus, evev commander was thrown back on his awn resources. Banks tried to make do with what he considered the best available, but it seems that his basic criteria for sefection of staKoficers were based on outward qualities such as obvious intelligence, evidence o f an educated background, and a confident bearing to mahh. What vvas lacking was professional training and experience, but equdty damaging to BmXes~ornrnandstmctum was the fact that too much selfassurance in a staff ~Ecer'sbearing-when viewed Erorn '%below,"' from the vietvgoint of subordinate commanders, their stags, and the trooys-waa; taken as amogance, and thus reflected badly on the commander and his cornmmd relationships. In another command aspect, Banks has been compared vvith Stonewdl Jaekson in his manner af conceding his operatioml plans frum his subordinatct commanders,m Wbile it is probably true that Banks may, on occasion, have confused his subordinates w%thincomp1et.e or faulty orders or filed to confide in them in cleadng up matters, the m p a r i s o n with Jackson's madus operandi does not shnd up in the light of histodcd evidmce. Jackson, while keeping fuh~reoperations to himself u n d o u b d y had a cornple~econcept of operation in mind, thus bowing exactly what he wnted accomplished-when, where, and by whom. Banks, an the other hand, m s t have appeared secretive, when in all probabili~he was hiding the fact that he hadn? fomulated a coherent plan or that he was unsure of the orders he should issue to execute a pXm. In either case-or in a combination of the two-he must have kept his thoughts to himself until the sibation forced him ta act. In assessing a tacsticd situation, Banks showed other shortcomings in fiefds

50

Cedar Mountain

that are essentid parts of a combat commander’s capabilities: he was not g o d at reading maps nor at the conjoint skill of terrain and combat reconnaissance, that is, the ability to assess the significance of terrain features in relation to the movement of troops on the graund. And although those capabilities might have been acquired-even the hard way through trid and error in active campaigning-it seems that Banks never did master those skills, at least to the degree of being confident of his ability to outmaneuvman opponent before or during an engagement. All things considered, Major General Banks, the poiitician-cum-soldier, had to struggle with so many obstacles in making the transition f?om a skilled political Ieader to a high-level military commander that one wonders that he was able to manage at dl. But manage he did, and therein lies the key to understanding his ability to function in the job: he was essentially a manager and not a leder of soldiers whose fate in war was his responsibility. if that seems to be a singular way of looking at Banks’ attempt at making the tram sition, one should be aware that today’s U.S. Army still has to cope with the problem-even though restricted nowadays to professional soldiers-of sorting out the differences between management and leadership. In looking at Banks”problems fkom any angle, it becomes evident that-in spite of his undoubted personal courage, the fact that he w a s able to inspire men through his oratory, and his ability to oversee their well-being-his generalship was about to be tested in the crucible of battle in ways that he had never faced before and would never again face in the same way, Turning again to Pope’s Army of Virginia operations, by the end of July Pope had determined ta begin concentrating his forces in the Culpeper Court House area. He had earlier disposed his cavalry to cover his army’s &orit, all the way f?om the Blue Ridge Mountains in the west to the juncture of the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers in the east. Specificany, Buforcs cavalry covered the western portion of the army front h r n Madison Court Mouse to Barnett’s Ford; while Bayard*scavalry covered the eastern front along the Rapidan River from Barnett’s Ford (where he had linked up with Buford’s cavalry pickets) to Rapidan Station, At this point it is important to note that, while the Army of Virginia’s official strength returns showed an overall total of 12,ooO troops, the troop strength in the area of operations (i.e., where Pope was now concentrating his three corps) was actually slightly less than 44,000. Even more important, Banks had, on 31 July, reported I1 Corps total strength at some €5,000 fmops, but his actual strength on the ground was actually only 8,800 men.21Such a discrepancy would, when viewed from a tweatieth-eentury military viewpoint, be nothing less than incredible. fn Banks’ case, the difference has never been hlly expfained, but the shock is lessened when one takes into account the num6er of detachments Banks would have made to guard his logistid rear (a worrisome burden that seemed always uppermost in his mind), involving sizeabIe combat units detached to safeguard his communications,

Banks and the Advance to Cedar Mounlain

53

On 6 August two of Pope's three corps had begun their march toward Culpeper Court House. McDowell was directed to move Rickett's division of his III Corps from Waterloo to Culpeper; Banks to move his II Corps from Little Washington tu the point where the Sp crossed the Hazel River. Xnitidly, Sigel was dir until odered to move foward, As a result of m e ' s march orders, by 7 all of his infantly and artillery (with the exception of King's division of McDowell's III Corps at Fredericksburg) was strung out along the axis of the tumpikt! From Sperville toward Culpeper. On that same day, 7 August, Pope had arrived at Sperryville, where he had gone to check on Siyel's I Corps. While there he received cavalry reports that enemy infantry had begun to cross the Rapidan River between Liberty Mills and Bamett's Ford. Bayard also reported that he was pulling back his cavalry screen in the direction of Culpeper. So, by now there was little doubt that the enemy was moving in force toward Culpeper, and Pope rode forward himself to make his own estimate of the situation, By the morning of 8 August he was at Culpeper, where he decided on his next moves. Banks was ordered to accelerate his m c h to Culpeper and Sigel was directed to follow Bmks aatd join the concentration of the amy's brces in the Culpeper area, Moreover, Banks was further directed to send faward Cradorclk brigade in the elements d i ~ e t i o nof Cedar Mountain with orders to suppoft Ba)?.ard"sc a v a l ~ m they withdrew, Although Banks was prompt in getting his corps on the road, the marches of 7 and 8 Augrzst went fonvard under rough csnditiclns due to the extreme August heat. George El. Cordon, one of Banks' best brigade commanders, recalled that ""eloudsof dust hung over us, there was riot a breath of air, and the road was like a furnace. . . . many of our men fell out from ~ e a h e s s , " ~ The experience of Gordon's bbrigade was typical, but. in spite of the adverse eunditions Banks had pushed forward resolutely and dosed his march at. Culpeper on 8 August, In contrast, Sigel w s so slow in getting his l: Corps on the road (if one e m imagine a corps commander yuerying the a m y staff on which road to take when there was only one, the turnpike from Sp to CulpeperI) &at he w s a day latex than Banks to reach the Culpepa vital fslctur in any pending engagement, since Pope must have been relying on Sigd's corps as his chief means of reinforcing Banks if the need arose, As Banks oversaw the foward movement of the two divisions of his corps (see Figure li.l), he must have had at feast two pressing bits af counsel Erom Pope in the back af his mind, The first had been that par infamous bulletin addressed to the ogee-rs and soldiers of the shortly after he had assumed command: "Let us disregard such ideas [of taking strong positions m d holding &em. . . of lines of retreat]. The strongest p s i tion a soldier should &sire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance ag;tinst the enemy.'" The other, in a letter fiam Pope to Banks, admonished him that '"retlreat is over. I shall not in any ease act on. the de-

Cedar klounbin Figure 6.1 Banks-XZ Corps figanization

9 CORPS

fensive, but should the enemy advance against us, 1 shall . . . do the attackng rnyselE . . , Impress upon your troops the certainty that the attack will bereder always be made by us, teaeh them to Xoak faward and not b a c b ~ d , How "~ much those admonitions occupied Banks' thoughts during 8 and 9 Aumst is, of course, unknown, but the course of events has shown that he had taken the warning to heart. That he did so with confidence in his abiIit)l- to f o H w them is e\lident in the letter that Banks w o t c to his wife in the evening o f 8 August: 'The day we have waited far so long has tlt last come, I am glad,"% By the early morning of 9 August the Iast elements sf Bankskorps had reached their assembly areas near Cutpeper, and by that time Pope had made up his mind to direct Banks &ward ts block the advancing Confederates until he could complete the concentration o f his m y around Culpeper and, presumably in keeping with his spirit sf the offensive, move against his opponent. Accordingy, he sent a senior aide, Colonel Louis H. Marshalf, over to Bartks to deliver verbal orders to that eEeet. Banks, however, was carehi to see that the orders were transmitted irk writing and had an adjuhnt take them down at MarshaIl"~dictation: CuIpeper 1 9:45 AM., Aug V62 / from Col h w i s [sic] Marshall-Genl Banks to move to the front irnmediatety, assume command of &!l. farces in the front-deploy his

Banks and the Advancc to Cedar Mountair1

53

skirrlrishers if the enenzy approaches and attack hirn imrnedi;iteci.ly as so011 as be ilpproaches-and be reinforced from. hereeZh

Banks then issued his march orders to stmt X I Corps f o ~ a r c ftoward the Cedar Motxntain area, wlrere f6rawford"s brigade was already taking up positions to , his corps had been set in motion, Banks rode support Bayardls e ~ v d yOnce over to the army command post for a Anal cheek with Pope on the situation. Upon his arrival Pope infom~edhim that he had dready sent faward Bnlgadier General Benjamin S, Eoberts, Pope" chief of sbR, who knew the Cedar Mountain terrain and who would ""cfesigrzak the ground you are to hold." Ifff at this time, Banks questioned the tern '"to ha1d"-in the light of Pope" jjutissued order and his repeated admonitions about staying on the offense-it appears that he kept any misgivings to himself, In any wse, he rode on toward Cedar Mouartain, prepared to deploy the two divisions of his corps with the help of General Roberts. It was shortly after noon when Banks met up with Roberts, and the tula began to look over the ground on which Banks wuild deploy his divisions, Because lRabe&s was hmiliar with the area and because Crawford had already drawn up his bfigade in line of battle, b b e r t s pointed out Cedar Run (actualfy the north fork of Cedar Bun) as a temain feahre which Banks could use initially as a mide for sb&ing his deployment, Gordon" account of the meeting includes the folXwing exchange: "When Banks came up, he said to Roberts, 'General Pope said you would indicate the line I m to occupy7-*I have been over this ground tfiorou&ly," replied Roberts, knd I believe this line," meaning the one which C r a d o d s brigade then held, 'is Lhe best that can be takenp--'In this opinion I concurred with him,' says Banks, 'and placed my command there. During Ranks' knain ride with Roberts the latter apparently dropped a comment that seems not only uncalled far but one that rzlnkled Banks to the extent that be remembered it in correspondence m d testimony some Wenty. years Inter. RQberts, a We& Pointer who was k n o w to dislike political generals, reportedly remarked ta Banks that '"Chere must be no backng out this day." The remark stuck in Banks' memory because, he later wrote, ""Xear the sound of his voice. It referred to our retreat from Strasburg [following defeats by Jackson in the V d l q C a m p ~ g nsome turo months earlier] heforc the same Stonewall Jackson Small wonder then that the two commanders who were about to confront each other again in battle would recall the other with such contrasting feelings: Jackson with professional scom for an old adversav; Banks still smarting from a well-recalled d~xbbitlg,md burrling to rwerse the score.

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e of Cedar Mountain When Jackson and Banks first became mare that each was confronted by a sizeable enemy force, their overriding and eornxnsn concerns were. the deployment o f their troops and the temain over which they were to move, Xn Jackson" case we have had a cursory look at the remain on which he had bewn ta plan the msneuver of his corps' lending elements, Xt would be helpful now if we could take a doser look at the ground (see Map ?.I), first as Jackson would have seen it.

THE TERMIN The Orangexuipeper highway, on wrllich the advance of his d o l e corps now depended, extended kom the Y' (mwked by Major's School House) to the northeast. As Jwkson looked up the road bwwd Culpeper, off to his right at a distance of &out a mile and a hdf was Cedar Mounbirr, which W= almdy being secured by Ewelt"s division on the right Bank of Jaeksonk soqs. To jackscln's left, on tbe mrth side of the highway, were, farm fields in the shape of an inveded L; thess fields were surrounded on three sides by dense woods, with the open side of the fields adjoining the ki&hwrty. F ~ h e up r the road, on its ri&t side, were cornfields whose dl-sbnding corn could provide con~eajimentfor t m p s inside them. In general terns, the terrain (voi,th the exeeption of the woods) was open tjnougt.1 for manewer and to p v i d e BeIds of fire, That is not to say, howver, that the pound w s an ideal battlefield. Thou& its nahre was gently rolling, it was made up of many low ridges or folds which could provictf; hoop cover, and the woods not only m r e thick with trees but dso contained dense underbrush, featurns which were tactically

f:erlar Mountain

s i ~ i f i e a nbecause t they c o d d conceaf troop nlovements and at the same time could slow down those movenrents, while obscuring fields of fire, Turning to Banksa viewp~int,when he w s reconnoitering the ground in the conrpalry of Gener-aX Roberts he had obsewed that Crawford's brigade had deployed with its line rou&ly parallel to the north fork of Cedar Run and north of the hi&way, Looking to his front he could see the: near edge of the woods described ftbove; he could SO see that the saxne woods extended hr enough to his ri&t to eoneeal either the advance of his troops or that of a p p w h i n g enemy troops. Also, when he looked foward from Crawhrd's tine he would note that the grouncl sloped gently d o m to the north fork of Cedar Run and kern thence rose gently up to that w o d s to his &ant. To his left lay the bigllway and beyond it the cornfields. From his location at Cra\vford's line neither Banks nor his troops could see the cleared fields north of the hi&wq because they were obscured by the woods to their front. By the sarrle token, Conl;;tderate troops on the far side of the cleared fields were prevented h r n obsertring any advancing Unian hoops :because the 1ar;tcr would be hidden by the same woods.

The Battle of Cedar Morxntaln

ADVANCE GUARD ACTLBNS AND REACTIONS Jackson's plan of maneuver was to develop the situation with the lead elements of Ewell" and Winder's divisions in a manner desi*ed to (1)o v e m n any small enemy force in their front and (2) if a major enemy force were encountered, to destroy it by a double envelopment. After he had this plan firmly in mind, he began to oversee the operations to his front. The first development to demand his attention was the action taken by Early's brigade of Ewers division. It \?;ill be r e d l e d (near the end of Chapter 5) that it was Early's brigade whose advance ward had first encountered enemy cavalry to its front, and it w s Early who had deployed his leading regiments to advance and drive off the pesky cavalry screen. It was then that Early's infantry was first taken under fire by Union artillery, and thus Early and Ewell were alerted to the fact that there had to be more than just c w a l v opposing them. After Ewell had conkrred with Jaeksorr (end of Chapter 5) he had given his orders to Early, who proceeded to carry out his part of the mission. In doing so he made a quick reconnaissance to his fmnt and decided that he could deploy his leading regments on tho open grourld south of the Cutpeper-Orange highway, that is, in a line perpendicular to the highway. Once he had deployed he advanced his line to drive the enemy cavalry off the low ridge to his front. When his leading troops crossed the crest of the ridge they were immediately t h e n under )ire by batteries of Union astillery. The batteries had ranged in so cjtlickly and accumkly that Early's lead regiments began to suEer gaping holes in their ranks, and E d y halted the dvance. He pulled his line back under cover of the ridge and sent back for rcl?inforc.ementsto come up on his left. The s u s p d e d advance was not due to hesihney on Early's gart-his daracter and reputalion fll&c&e qrtite the opposite-mther it was the necessie to wait for units of Winder" division to cover his left Bank and advance in line with him. As far ;as Jackson's scheme: of maneuver was concerned, it appears that he had, in keeping with his secretive nature, communicated his plan of battle only to EwelX and Winder and no one. else in the chain of command. Notably unnotified was A. P. HiXl, whose &er-action report reveds that, at the time, he h e w only that he was to send a briga-de -foward to reinForce a part of Ewell's division. As Jaekson's arlvanee guard units were becoming engaged and reinforcing units began to deploy to Early's left, Jackson was surely aware &at his entire hrce of over 2 0 , O men had to advmce and deploy from one single road, the Culpeper-Omngt;. hi&way. If there was ever a need for a Napoleonic type of advance to contact over a wide road nehork, this was it, Jaekson, however, had to deal with a score: of limitations that even a Napoleon could not have conceived; that aspect will be considered in due time, For n w , it is important to obsertre that the three brigaeXes of Windeis division were moving up into 'battle positions between 3:W P.M. (the approxizwte time h a t Early had made his forced halt) and 4:OQ P.M. Winder's lead brigade, corrlnlanded by Coland

58

Cedar k'luuntain

T. S. Camett, moved fomard and was foXtowed by Wilfiam B, Taliafer~o's brigade, and the two deployed initially on the left side of the highway, facing south at ri&t angles to Early" front. This odd deployment was supposedly part of a maneuver intended to strike the: enemy batteries in flank and clear the way for Early to advance. Gamett soon saw thk impracticability of attacking across Early's front, and called off the maneuver, In the meantime, as Gamett and Tdiafem changed front to face toward the enemy, General Wincier s~ fit to turn his personal attention to getting supporting artillery into firing positions, rather than huwing his t h i d brigdde into a pmition on his Ieft flank-a key position, since that bdgade would not only anchor Winder's division's left Aank, hut that of Jackson" whole force as well. Windeis concenl with supporting artiHery was justified. He had obsemed enemy batteries mming to position from which they could pose a real threat to his deploying brigades. Brigddier General Charles S. Winder was not only a skilled tactician but atso one of Jackson's mast trusted commanders, He had lived up to Jacksonss expectations as commander of the famed Stonewall Brigade duGng the Valley Campaign, arid was the logical successor to wmmand Jackson's division upon Stonewall's promotion to covs commander, W e had gotten out of a sickbed-with Jackson" seIuctant pemission-to resume cammand of his division as it took up its march on this same day. In fact, Winder had ridden foward as far as possible in an ambulance until he could mount his horse nnd take conimnd in the front. h a t h e r part of his immediate concern was the atfl toa evident fact that an intense artiflel-y ""duel"was in progress, and incorning enemy rounds were already beginning to fall uncomfortably close to Poague? battev, whielr Winder was overseeing at the time. Wanting to obseme the enenly while directing &c: fire of a section of the battery, Winder had dismounted and, with his field glasses to his eyes, had s t a ~ e dto call out a command when he was horribly wounded by an incoming shell. There was no doubt that the wounds were n~orzaI;his Ieft a m and side were torn to shreds, and aAer being carried to the rear he later died, That Winder's so&d wounding would impact seriously on the course of events was soon to became obvious. His designated successor in command was Brigadier General William B, Taliafemo, whose brigade we have dready seen going into ztion alongside that uf Camett. Though Taliafem was quiclz%yinformed of his succession to division c m mmd, he knew nothing at all of Jackson's battte plan, since it appears that Winder had had neither the time nor the opportuniw to pass on what little he knew, In any erne, Tdiafemo at once took matters into his own hands, and took stock o f the situation as he could personalty assess it. Dun"ng t-he shifting of brigade positions following the aborted atbck across Early's kont, Taliafeno had redeployed his brigade to the left of Early's, which meant that Taliafeno's brigade was then on line bekeen Early and the Itsighway, At about the same time Gamett had begur~to deploy his brigade to the felt of the highway and facing the chafed fields to his front, which would p1ac.e his br-igade left Bank

The, Ratlte af Cedar Mounhin

59

somewhere in the woods surrounding the cleared fields, That "somewl~ere" now became Talilafe~o?sinmediate concern as the new division commander, and he wasted no time in riding towdrd the leg to contact Carnett and find out things Esr himself. He Eailed to find Garnctt but did meet up with Garnett's leftmost unit, the 1st Virginia Battalion, an Irish-American urrit which had gone into fine in the woods and had not yet made contact with the regiment to its right. Gfiafeno continued his reconnaissance to his right front and carne out on the highway, where he could set: m r e dearly and direct his operations. While Taliakrro wais making his way througil thc: woods, Jackson had been infomed of Winder3swounding, and had ridden h w a r d to check on matters gersondly. Tl~ou& he didn? find Taliafeno be did come across Carnett, whom he wrned to pay careful attention to his left flank and to flsyuest reinforcements from his new division commander. Cdmett at once sent a eouple of aides to find Taliafeno, and one eventually found him at the front near the hi&way. Jackson was e q u d y concerned with getting up Hilt? division, which nttt only constitllted his force" sreewe, hut also comprised half the strength of his carps, He had already had Hill dispatch one brigat;, Ttlomas3,tto reinhme Early. Thornas had gone into position on Early's right and was thus committed into action, Consequently jackson tl~enwished to turn his aQentit-ion to the rendying of Hill's other brigades for commitment in the e o q s eerrter or on its left. Unfo~unateXyfor Jackson's pplans, the situaNon on his left was SOOR to change so mpictly and viulentiy that it would require all of his personal powrs to restare the situation. While Jackson's lead units were making their deployments, Banks had dready a&ved in the area with Augur's division and directed it to depfr>y to the left of Cradord"s bdgade (see M a p 7.2). AugrrrSsinitial kployment placed his division in a line behind the cornfields, so that it was left of and perpendicular to the Orange-Gulpeper highway and kcing the enemy. Augur was putting his troops in position sta&ing around 2:00 P.M., about an hour before Early had made his first advmce. When Augur's three brigades came on line they were in order from ri&t to left: Gt3ar)l on the right vvitfr his right Aank near the highway; Prince's brigade to Geary's left; Greene's brigade on the exbeme left and somewhat farther reaward. The first WO brigades were relatively strong units, while Creem's was a srndl unit with onIy two weak re&iments, These troop mavements wem made under Banks' watchful eye, for he had taken a f o w a d post just across (nor& of) the higIlway cz~-"po"it":the right Bank of Augur's division. He was there during the first phase of the artillery duel, when be got an opportunitry to show his physicd courage, We was leaning against a tree when an artilley solid shot stmck it dmut a foot and a half above his head. He was uninjured but also unshaken, even when it was revealed that the round had left a gaping hole in the tree. Soon he was Ale to

Map 7.2

BANKS'

INITIAL

DEPLOYMENT

make a dashing ride dong his front hnes, to show his presence while checking on his troop dispositions, An important part of Augur's deployment was the ordering out (kom Prince's brigade) of the 8th and 12th U.S. fnf'antry Bathlions to act as skirnrishers. These regular y units covered the entire front afAugrrr's division, fanning out into and under cover of the cornfields, from which they did a superb job of skirmishing, as their enemy was soon to realize, Takng full &antage of the lalil corn, they kept Early's and other Confederate troaps under constant sniping fire. They were even able to seare the drawers off of the cannoneers of Pegram" sand Hardy"s batteries (in firing positions and firing toward the cornfields), to the extent of the latter having to be saved by Earfy himself ordering an infantry regiment to their rescue, Banks' l[Z Cops' totid fighting strength consisted of his two divisions: Augur's, whose deployment we have just observed, and Wilfiarns2ivision of two brigades. Crawford? bhrigade, as already related (Chapter bi), was on the field initially to back up Bayard9se a v a l ~screen, and we have also noted the battle position that it now occupied. The two divisions wem mughly equal in their

Tlre Rattle of Cedar Mountain

81

fighting strengths: Augur's rounding off at 3,200, WilXiarnsbt about 395W,2Q thus britzging Banks' If Corps total to some 6,700. When one corrlpares that corps actually totaf to Jackson" available strength of some 20,aQO Q;-t@lcson9s numbered al~out24,OQO,but two brigades of Hill's division had been detached to p a r d the corps\upply trains), one can see that the disparity on the fiefd could have n'sexz to as much as three to one in Jackson's favor. Be that as it may, military historians and analysts are quick to point out that numbers alone do not deternine the outcome of battles: there are a host of other factors influencing an outcome, not the Ieast of which are the massing of force at a critical point, ~ a f i t y of leadership, morale or? bath sides, and so on. Moreover, one can he certain that neither Banks nor Jackson would have had anwhere near an aceurate accounting of his oppnentk saetual &rength. In fact, it may be recalled, Banks didn? have even an accurate accounting of his o w corps strength during his strategic moves before his corps moved towrd Cedar Mountain, Strength in numbers aside, Banks' obvious concern after Augur's division's deplopent was the positioning of the WO brigades of Wililiams' division. Craiwfordk l~rigadewas moved fomard about 400 yards, across the north fork of Cedar Run and into the strip of woods in its front. In that part of the woods the brigade could face an oncoming enemy across the cleared fields (in this case a wheat field) while remining ccrnceded in the west edge of the strip of woods. Cordon's b't-rrjgade was deployed to the ri&t of Gradorzs, and about a half mile to its rear. n e s e movemen& were completed b e h e e n 3:W and 4:00 P.M. At about the sanle time $1 of Banks2supporting atillery, f o r e - ~ o guns in all, had occupied firing positions across the front: three batteries on the left af the highway, four on the right, All of the batteries were activeiy engaged from 3:W P.M. to 5:00 P.M., thou&, with the wception of the Union skimishers-ring, there were no major infanty units engaged during the same period. By this time, though Banks' disposition of his force may have appeared to have assumed a defensive posture, his concept of his role in the coming engagement was to prove mything but passively defensive, As events were soon to show, he did not intend to sit tight in his present positions and wait for his enemy to aaack him, Whatever his ultimate intentions might have been, at 2:25 PM, he sent a message to Pope infoming him of H Corps>itwation and dispositions; the general tenor of the repovt indicated that, thou& the enemy seexned to be "taking positions," he did not appear to "intend immediate attack." However, the next message Banks sent to Pope, at 4:50 PM,, did reveal the IX Corps cornander's ogensiw spirit-that same spirit so fiequently conveyed by Pope to his commanders and troops: About 4 o'etaek shots were exchanged by the skimishers, Artillery. opened fire on bath sides in a few minutes. One regiment of rebel infantry advsrneing now deployed in

62

Cedar Mountairz

front as skirmishers, I have ordered a r.t.@ment on the right, WilliarnsXDivision, to ntect them, ancl one f m n ~the left, augur"^, to advance an the Ieft and in front. 5 ~.bf,-They are I ~ U Wapproaching each athersx)

Whether Banks' message m s intended to create a sense of suspense in bis army commander's mind is, of course, indeteminate, but Pope" reactionafter listening to the sounds of cannonade that reached him at Cutpeper, and taking heed of the ominous note of impending action in Banks\epo~-was both prudent and prompt. He immediately ordered &ekettsAivision of McDowell's scoqs to move fomard to Banksy support. Thong11 the order was recrteived in timely fashion, Ricketts' reaction was not so timely, Despite the faet &at his commmd was only a few miles from Cedar Mountgn, his division's lead elements didn" &five on the field until 7;00 FA,, far too late to influence the action. Xn the meantime, while Banks was about to issue his next orders ta his division commanders, Jackson was fully occupied with overseeing the exeeution of his b;tttle plan. As he saw the situation foXla\;ving Faliafewok assuming command of Winder" division, it was imperative not only that the division secure its left frank-and that of the corps-tlut also that it get its leftmost units sorted out in order that the corps could advance as a cohesive force. So, just what was going on in that woods on the corps left-and what o f the enemy beyond the woods?

THE FORCES ENGAGE AND THE IBAmLE TAKES A CIEEXTIGAL TURN AS we have seen, Jackson's closest enemy was not beyond the woods but alreadiy in them in the form of CrawforZs brigade, fully prepared to advance to the attack should the order be given, And Banks had been preparing himself to give That order. Either b e h r e or immediately after getting off his 4:50 P.M. message to Pope, he had been facillg the weightiest decision of his command career, His decision depended upon his answers to two dl-important q e s tians. First, was the enemy force confronting him too weak-as it now seemed-to take the initiative and attack him? Second, were those orders from Pope that he had made Colonel MarshaB convert ta writing C'deeploy his [Banks'] skimishers if the enemy approaches, and attack him immediately as soon as he vproaches'" really broad enough to permit him to attack Jackssn at this critical time? Banks' answer to the: first question depended upon his perception of what he h d sa h r observed of the enemfs acl-ions in front of his deployed brigades. His answer, from id1 indications, was in the a&mative: yes, because there were still no s i p s that a major enemy attack was massing, nor had the enemy shown any signs of activih other than light skirmishing and artillery firing, Banks' answer to the second question w s also in the aBrmative, as clearly

The Battle of Cedar Mountain

63

Map 7.3

s h o w in his command decision. There may have been a tbird question regarding the avdability of sufficient reserves to suppart a 11 C o q s attack: &ere was none, since, as it happened, both Aulil;ur\ and WillkmsWGsions were fully committed to action, Moreover, Pope's assurance in his orders to Banks that you will ""b reinforced from here" would depend on the mander's cqahility sf getting major elements of the c o v s to BanksGajd in a timely manner-a capabifib he did not possess, as demonstrated by tfie failure e time to support Banks" actions. As st result, of Ricketts' division to a ~ v in Banks apparently downplayed or disreerded the need for a coxps reserve ta back up an aitack by his whole force. Banks did anive at a clear-cut decision, for his next action was to order an attack by both Augurts arid Williarns' divisions (see Map 7.3).Aumr"s division (less Greene's brigade, which was left behind to secure the corps' left flank) launched Ceary's brigade and Prince" b ~ g a d eabreast. The attack of Wil!iamsP division was led by CrawfordPsbll-gade, which attacked across the apen w h a t

field and into the woods beyond it; Crawford was to he supported by Gordon's brigade. The advance of the two divisions was clearly divided by the highway: Ausr's to the left af the road, Wi11iarnszto the right of the road. Both attacks were launched b e ~ e e n5:00 and 5:30 P.M,, and fell upon jackson" fonvard elements. To the south of the highvvw, Augur's brigades struck the Confederate brigades of Early and Taliaferro, the latter now commanded by another Tdiafemo, Colonel A. G. Tztiliafemo, the uncle of William B, Tdiaferro, who had succeeded Winder in commmd of the division. To the north of the highwa;y and in the woods east of the wheat field, Crawford"s brigade smashed into Garnett's bhrigade and (subsequently, as will be seen) into Randd"s brigade, which had been located to the left rear of Gamett. m e n one looks at the whole picture afier the opposing forces had become hlly engaged, it might appear that Cr~wford"sbrigade was making the main attack of Banks' corps and Augur" division was making a seeondaly. ox supporting attack. Such was not the ease for two reasarrs: one, Banks probably could neither have planned nor executed such a coordinated atpack; bvo, the initial success of flrawford"~attack was .Fortuitous from Banks' vieqaint because, in both senses of the word, it was accidental and fortunate. m a t . happened on the Confederate side was this, When Taliaferro had to assume command of Winder" division, there was unavoidable eonhsion, not only because "I"a1iaferrowas ignorant af Winder" snlission (as received from Jackson; see Chapter S), but also because be had to ride throu& a dense woods tqing to locate other leaders and sort things out on his awn. At &out the same time Jacksan, having been informed of \Tinder's W, Rad gone forward to find the new division commander. Mter failing to find Taliiiferrosmdl wonder, considering that all concerned were hindered by the woods and the unfolding situation-jackson did find Carnett and, it will be recdled, after warning him to watch out for his left flank, rode back to his foward command post, Shady after Jackson had lefi, Gamett hrtd looked to his front, and there corning across the fields was the long blue line of Union infantry advancing to the attack, He sent an aide galloping to the division commander with an urgent warning, The long blue Line was the leAmost Xine of the three regiments of Crawford"~ brigade. On the brigade commander" order bayonets were fixed, and the line emerged from the woods, the men hqping over a fence at their edge of the woods and continuing their advance across the open fields, At the same time, the ri&t flank regiments in the blue line w m passing rapidly through the woods to their front, so that their Iine overlapped the Confederdte left and twk it in Aarrk. The fired-up Tinion attack had struck the unprepared Confederate units of Gamett's bhrigde with such foree that disorder reimed throughout, conlpourtded by the tbnnge of division command at just the WOG time, with both commanders and regiments out of conpact in the deep woods. As soon as Tdiaferro, as the new division commander, had received Garnett's word of the oncoming Union attack-indeed, he now saw it hirnself

The Battle of Cedar lulotxntain

65

from his fomard post-be sent a courier galtoping to order Ronald to I-zrirrg up h i s brigade on Garnettk left Bank. It w2s too fate. The leftmost rsiments of Gamett's brigade had broken, and their dissolved remnants were streaxning to tlte rear. Then as 1Ronald"s brigddc, the famed Stonewall Brigade, tried to make its way foward to link up with Carnett" lbrigde, it was met in the woods by Cravvford" hitrd-charging line, which paused only long enough to send a volley crashing into the FZices of Ronaldk dumbfounded men. The Stonewall Briwde felf back in corzh~sionthat was soon turned into panic by the 1st Vir@nia Battdion and the 42nd Virginia, wl-tose men broke ranks and Aed reaward, The contagion of panic spread as the Union volEeys could be heard crashing througb the woods. Colonel Andrews, eornmmding the 2nd Massachusetts af cordon"^ brigdde, recalled &at ""sdddenly, at about forty minutes after five o'cloek, there burst forth from the direction of the wheatfiefd [the field and the m o d s being over 1,W yards &am Andrews' position] the heaviest and most eorrtinu~ussound of muskett-gr T have ever heard, It was not preceded by scattering shots, but at once beearne a steady roar+"31 CrawforZs attad, fiowever, did not confine its success to breaking up the Confederate left in the woods. Indeed, the attack gathered momerztum as its spearheaded units swept out of tlie woods, and wheeling south crahed into the leA Aank of A. 6, Taliafeno's sbrigade, \\rhich was fully engaged in tving to fight oE the attack of Ceary's brigade of Augur" division in its front. This latest coup of CrawjFOrClls attack enat3led his men, exuberant with their continued successes, to pour tlteir fire into Fdliafeno's and Early's regintents, dready with their hands full in delivering defensive fire against Cernv's and Prince's advancing brigades, The combined fire of Union volleys from front and flank was more than TaXiaferra? and Early's troops could stand, One historian noted that "both. tbe Forty-seventh and For~y-eighthAfabaxna, fmm opposite ends of the brigade 6. Tdiaferro's], collapsed and fell back "in utter similar fate "ufell the regiments of Early's b ~ g a d eon its left, whose ranks fmgmented m d broke away to the rear. At this critical poir-rt in the battle, one may well ask: Was not Banks' decision to attack eonfimed bepxatf his greatest hopes? Was Jackson confronted with a looming disaster, one that was inconceivable to a commander of his stature?

BANKS-mAGK RECOVERS

AT CLLMM-JACKSON"

S L L Y AND

When Jackson" combat intelligence and inherent battle sense combined to alert him to impending disaster, his maetion w s characteristic--immediate but: with no sim of d a m , He rode reaward and hund A. P. E-TiXI, The tenseness of the situation, now keenly redized by both men, was ripe for an instant renewal of their famous feuding, "Within a few moments Jackson found Hill and went after him, "ackson shaqXy told him he was behind time," an eyewitness repo&ed, knd ordered him to deploy his regiments.' A. P, Hifi had

66

Cedar Mountain

in fact been doing just that as rapidly as his men arrived and already had Hill, hwever, accepted the reason ta bciieve that Jackson dealt ~rrJustly.''~~ unneeded urging and went on with his duties. Jaekson d e e l e d his horse around and hastened hack toward the scene of action. On his way to the front he came across Brigddier General L, 0. Branch, a Southern political generat, who was in the middle of practicing his oratorical skills on the men of his brigade. Jackson internufled him only long enough to order hinl to "push foward, General, push &ward!" "ckssn didn"t wait to oversee Brancfn's compliante, but gallaped on to c m e up to the Gate, where Crittenden Lane joined the highway, the critical point of the mtion as J d s o n now saw it. M a t met his eyes didn't tsurpise him, men jamming the road in panicked flight, but it did arouse him to enact one of the mast ren o w e d scenes in his personal histoq. With his inherent instinct for being at the ri&t glace, at the right time, he ma& use of a dramatic flair that was as eKective as it seemed foreign to his nature. Pushing his horse into the midst of the milling crowd on the h i g h a y , he meant to drtw his S \ Y Q ~in~ a gestuw intended not only to rally his m n but, if neeessar).P, to use the Bat of it on the backs of the fugitives. At this point, hovvever, the gesture switch& h r n the dramatic to comic opera: the sword had rusted in the scabbard from nonuse, and he couldn't withdraw it, In another time m d place the heroics-gone-av would have seemed right out of Gilbert arld Sullivan, but in this case Jackson was tlndeterred by any such mishap, ""S hhc deliberately unsnappcd it from his belt hoXdings and used it scak~bardand all on the heads of the fleeing panic stl.lcken t m o p ~ . "Ttle ~ scabbard wielding, however, was not the end of Stonewall's rallying efforts. He grabbed a Confederate battle Rag and, w;wing it overhead, cried out in a shout that could be heard up and dawn the highway, ""Rally, brave men, and press foward! Your general will Iead you. Jackson will Iead you. Follow me!''= Incredible as it may seem to today's more worldly reader, the eKeet on the troops ' h a s electric," Many of the men, ever sensitive to the Jackson charisma, halted and turned back to find their regiments. While the eEwt of Jacksan" rallying was wreding, another developmentas b q n d Jackson's control as it was inevitable-wa the slowing down of Grawford"~attack from a toment to a trickle, At the same time that Crawford's men were running out of steam after their amazing feats, their ammunition was also running out. Moreover, Banks had no reserves, at either division or e o v s level, to feed in or pass through Crawfads brigade tn exploit the success of the attack, linsuvrisin$y, then, the momentum of Crdwford"s attack ground to a hdt, and as a result* so did that of Gearqrk and Prince7sbbrigades. Consequently, the whole of Banks" corps was becoming increasingly vulnerable to a Confederate counterattack (see Map 7.4). These developments had become at1 too evident to Jaekson immediateXy after his personal involvement in the eEods to rally the broken units of his e o v s left and center. By 6:30 FA., not over half an hour after Grawford's

"fe Battie of Cedar Mountain

67

Map 7.4

CONFEDERATE

~~Lrtrrs~ il.ful-tirz L. \Vilker,ton.

atpack had reached its zenith, Jackson's rallying was beginning to pay off as he began to recover control of the Confederate situation, On Jackson" left, Bra~lchhad taken his cows commander's words ta heart and was indeed ""pushing frzward"" with his brigade in pedeet order as it launched into its

part of a counterattack, As Branch's North Carolina regiments advanced toward the Unirjn right Aaak they were met by the fugitives from the broken tinits of Ronald" Shaevvall Brigade, m o d y from the 27th Virginia. The Tar Heels kept heir ranks intact, only qetling them enough t-u Iet the Ileeing Virginians through, no doubt with some unkind remarks to the e@ect that it was a s h m e that the latter should be running in the w o n g direction over the sacred soil of their native state. On Jackson" sI.i&t, where A. 6. Faliafemc>'sand Early's brigades had t&en blotvs from their front, left Aank, and rear, regimental d e e r s were repining control uf their companies and beginning to refom their b;bttle lines, In fact,

68

Cedar Mountain

on Early" right, Tbomas' brigade (having gone into a reinforcing position on

Early's right Aank) and Early's 12th Georgia had held steaastly and had never fallen back a single pace, Back in the Confederate center and on the left, A. P, Hill was living up Ctr his reputation as a fi&ting general. He had stripped ofrf his unifom jacket to reveal his famous red battle shirt, and had gone to work ta get his available brigades into action. It will be recalled that Thamas' brigade was engaged on Early's right and Branch was already advancing to attack the Union right, Now HilX tvas making sure tlzat two more of his brigddes, Archecs and Pender's, were being deployed and advancing into action. Archer led off, followed by finder, and the two were launched agdinst the Union rigkt (in the meantime, Braneh had inclined his brigade's sadtrance to the right in order to take any pressure off of rearenizing units in the center and to l e d the eounteratrick in that area). Hill was coming into his owl as the salvager of the situation. In the words of one historian, he had already "forgtld a powerful shining weapon in the form of the Light Division, which even now was an its scrippy way to becoming the best in the entire Confederate sewiee.""" The Light Division, totdijting half the corps strength, had now tlecome the ideal weapon to turn the battle around, perhws even turning defeat into victory. Qn the Union side, as related, the rnornentrlm of Grawford"~attack had con~eto a halt-and e r h fearful losses, Not only had Crawfard lost his regimeiltal commaxlders and most of his field oSficers; his brigade losses in killed, wounded, and eqtux-edi came to a staggering 53 percent. The cnormiv tof such a loss may be appreciated when viewed in the light of today's professiond war-gaming cdculations, when a unit sustaining more than 30 percent easualties is considered no longer eEective in combat and is cornnted out of xtion. Banks7osses did not end with the eEects on Cra%vford"sbrigade. Augur and C e a v were both badly ufounded and out of xtion, and Prince was taken prisoner even before becoming awaE that the division command bad fallen on him-a revealing picture of how Civil War higher comn~andersgot personally involved in leading their troops from the front, along with what has already been seen of Jackson" rallying efforts on the Confederate side. Looking now Erom Banks' overall command v i e ~ o i n tGeaq's , briede had taken 40 percent casualties, while Prince's h d sustained losses of some 30 percent as their attack actions came to a halt. Banks, of course, had no wa)r of calculating percentages of losses & the time, hut he was certain to have realized that the oEensive capability of IT C o v s was shot, and the point was being driven home by tthe hrther realisation that Jackson's counterattacking forces were threatening him from both Aanks and even against his center, The threat, in fact, was becoming so evident that Banks had to displace his artillery batteries reaward and to look to Cordan's brigade, on the right, to save h a t flank from being overnun by Hill" three brigades that Jaekson cvas tbrodng against it. Another sign of the mounting threat to Bankshhde force was his ordering-at the urging of' Colonel Clark of the corps $&@-the desperate

The Battle of Cedar Mountain

charge of the 1st Pennsylvania Camfry, laullched he&-on against Branch's advancing 'tsl-igade. The gdlant charge, full tilt in a column af fours dam the highway, was at once taken under: lire by Bmnch's men from the h n t and by three other Confederate regrnents firorn the flank. This miniature Bdaclava ended as quieMy as it h& been begun, with men and horses falling right and left, and the remnants (71 cwalrymen out of the original 164) falling back behind the fOth Maine Infantry, which had made a stand nem the hi@way. At about the same time that the cavalry was matring its charge, Cordon's brigade was moving up to positions along the east edge of the woods overlookng the wheat field. From there his three regiments would attempt to cover tllc wihdrawd of Gradord" survivors, who were retracing the s m e path they had taken in their attack, At the same time Gordon was expected to act as a bulwark against the ever increasing threat of HifYs three brigades against Banks%&t Aank and center, And to the left of that ttenter, the brigades of Ceary and Priltce were nralring a credihbly orderly withdrawal, also retracing the same ground over which they had attacked. In summing up the result of the actions d e n lay both sides during this critical period (i.e., from about 6:3Qto TO0 F.M.), Baakshll-out attack hadaAer stunning and unexpected successes-Iost its momentum due to the ahaustion of the troo~3sand their heavy ctsualties. Banks' corps was making a steady withdrawal so far, afiter his I-raving pulled hack his artillery, and eovering his right Aank with Cordon's brigade, which, it was hoped, would hold off' the looming &reat from that direction. Also, in Auguis division the brifades of Ceary and P ~ n e were e makng an orderly withdrawal-orderly esnsidering their casudties and the loss of some unit integri-ty that inevitably occurs during retrograde actions of the kind, As for jackson, he had literally snatched recovery .from near disafter, and was m&ing his command presence felt all across the field as he urged fomard his corps resewes, in the f o m of Hill's saw committed four bripdes, He had resbl-ed order in his center, where his once broken brigsdes could now add weight to his counterrrttack. And findfy, he could order Ewe1l"s division to advmce and turn the Union force" left flank. In short, Jacksan was now in command of the situation to the extent of being able to rnalce a force counterattack that mi&t ovewhelm Banks' corps, The big question at this pivotaf point: could fackson then fallow up a suecessftd caunterattack by mounting a pursuit &at w u l d assure the destruction of BanksYfczrce3

JACKSON ORGANIZES A PURSUIT: BANKS MANAGES A. VVETICLDMWAX, Jackson must Erwe seemed omnipresent to his subordinate commanders as he tried to m& his presence felt e v e v h e r e , giving orders t.o gatEler his force far an organized pursuit. tt also seemed &at he hacl lost none of his

70

Cedar Mountain

e n e r a or off-ensive spirit after his ordeal in gersondly rallying his troops. After putting Hill in charge of spearheading the pursuit, he had turned his attention to atfier urgent mstlters: seeing that Ewe11 got his division drit;ing fowdrd. in a tontinued eifV"ort t0 get around Banks' left flank and cut off any of the Union fclrce's withdrawal, and getting all the artiflely he could moving fotward to suppol-t the pursuing infantv. Severd &tors cnmbined, hotveer, to limit JacksmYscapability of carving out a Napoleonic pursuit that would destroy his enemy. First of all, he had no assembled major eavdx-y force to fill upon and cut up a defeated enemy., ~ had anived an the field after tfie battle, but they Several m v d regiments wre few in numbers and l a h d an overall eonrmand, so that they could be discounted. Second, it was already growing dark (sunset was about 7:00 P.M.) and Jackson was vvell aware of the diEculties that go with mounting any night operation, evcn when well planned and arganixed, Third, the Orange-Gulpeper fri&way, which had figured so prominently in the batrle, while not e s s e n ~ dto the advance of jackson's infantry, was needed for &c: fomard movement of Conkderate artille~ybatte~es.This was because the banks of the north Eork of Cedar Run were too e e p to pemit tlle OR--roadpassage of the mns, espeeidliy &er nightfatl-a factor about which Jmckson, the h m e r artilleryman, needed no counsel, Lastly, the Auglst heat had not app~ciably diminished (the thermorneter stilf read. eighty-six degrces an hour after sunset), so mueh so that its eEects on the troops continued to be wutefy felt and added to their fatime after the marching and fighting of the day, Yet, in spite of d l the diEeulties jackson? drive, in tandem with Hill's leadership, managed to mount increasing pressure on Banks' lacerated brigades, Hi11 had even managed to press &ward with his leading brigade for as much as a mile and a half beyond Cedar Bun after nightcall, until his vaneard encountered resistance in some woods to its front, At that point Jackson reluctantly called rr halit tong enough for advance artilltev to shefl the woods. M e r dislodgng the enemy troops, the advance tvas resumed, only to encounter a repeat pedomance with increased resistance. This time Jackson ordemd fonward figram's hattcv, supported by Hill's leading brigade, to drive oE the: enemy, Instead of a scampexing enerny, Begram was gl-eeted by the fire of three Union batteries. Pegram WAS dram into ton artiflerqr exchange that lasted for nearly an hour, after which he was hrced to displace his battev in order to swe his men and guns. By this time it was after f l:O0 P.M. and even facksorr had to concede that the action of the day was over, since the exhausted troops couldn't be counted on to adbrance another l W yards. Jaekson hinnslf w s so physically and m n t d l y exhausted that his shiFltad to seek out a famhouse for a night's rest kxr their chief, But &ere was no such place to be faund; eveT house was filled with wounded awaiting a surgeon" scare. Finally, as Freeman noted, ""Presendy in the moonlight he Uackson] observed by the roadside a grass plot that seemed to invite sleep. He drew win and announced that he would go na Faflfxer. A fang coat was spread for him, He

'fhe Battle of Cectar Mountairr

12

threw himself down on his stomach, and when sorneotle offered him food, he muttered: WO, X: want rest, nothing hut rest.' Efn a moment he was slumbering.y'37 From Banks' vievuyoint, his hoops had fought i\ praiseworthy actim throughout the whde aftmoon, and now their conduct in fdling baek under intense enemy pressurn was no less creditable. Mow much, m d i t Banks desenies fbr an orderly withdrawal-and how much shoufct go to the troops and their regimentd and brigade ofieers-mtity be arwable, but the fact remains that the Union regiments did not break and lose their unit integrity when the whole 11 Corps was counterattacked in its font and on both flanks. That is not to say that Banks' brigades executed a parade gound reaward maneuver, far from it. There were plenw of casudties (which incfuded prisoners ~aken by the enemy), hequerrtly braken m k s , and all the disorder that goes with troops trying to move to rear positions white under continuaus fire, Yet both infantq and a r t i l l q units managed to hold aff their attczckel-s and still fdl baek in orderly eaou& fashion to take up a succession of' reaward positions. Grdan's tobrigade desewes special mention far ccave~ngthe c o q s right Bank by fending off attack after altack by Hilf's brigades, In Codon" own words, "From the edge of the wood across the wheatfield, not over four hundred yards, the long tines of the enemy, who, having now advanced into clear ground, opened upon us a heavy fire, which was responded to. . . . The woods opposite us must have been literally packed with Rebels, and they must have extended far beyond our right to have enabled even one third of the [their] men to get to the front,""3 Eventually Cordon's bk>riaade-&er a succession of fdbacks, ranies, and regrouping-was relieved, on Pope's order, by General Tower of Rickttsy division. It was Rickg~ts'division, belatedly arfiving after 7:00 P.M., which d l o w d most Qf Banks21roops to pass through to the rear, where they were eventually assemtoled, f t was also Rickettshartillerqr that had &ken Pegram's bbattev under fire and Ricketts' supporting infantfy &at had caused fackson to decide that his worn-out melt couXd no longer attempt m y kind of pursuit. The battle was over. Jaekson was clearIy unable to continue a pursuit, and faanks3II Corps bad been taken out of action, relieved by Ricketts' divsion and late-a~vingunits of Sigel" corps. The immediate outcome of the battle w u l d be seen on the fbllowing day, 10 August, when Jackson would be confronting the concentration of Pope? newly arn'ved forces,

This page intentionally left blank

at Happened at Cedar Mountain? Because attention has been faeused on Cedar Mount-din for the purpose of observing the art: af command in action, the immediate outcome of the hatttle-indeed its place in Civil War history--may be dealt with summarily. f i e bare fircts w r e that both sides remained in a nlutud standoff through 10-11 August, maintaining a truce while the wounded were recovered, the dead buried, and Corces were regrouped. jackson remained in conkol of the hattlefield while Pope continued the caneentmtion of his y until it was clear to Jackson that he was outnumbered to the extent that his present position was dangerously untenzlble. Accordingly, he witfrdrew his corps to his base at Cordonsville, from whence be had launched his intended str.ike apinst Pope on "Iugust. The Cedar Mounhin phase of the campllign was over. This lewes us to deal with our reIevant question: what happened before arrd during Cedar Msuntaln that can provide i n s i d ~ ixito t the ways that f ackson and Banks exercised command? In both a mifitaq and a personal sense the one faerilr that remkns uppermast in the mind of m y commander is his mission. Its constant presence is as mueh a part af his being as the act of breathing-md as ineseap&le, So, while the mission is an obvious starting point for examining the command ztiolas of the two oppanents, the contwst in the way each received and e d uated his mission becomes not only interesting but essential to understanding what hapnened at Cedar Mountain. Jackson, it will be reedled, got his nnission horn Lee in the form of letters which were the equivalent, in todii,v's military doctrine, of ""mission type orders," orders that give the commander flexibilib of a t i o n by telling him what to do, but not huw to do it. Curlsidering the close command relationship between h e and Jaekson, it was entirely appropriate that the latter then became free to deternine what course of action he

Cedar Mountain

74

would take to accomplish his mission. Such freedom of aclion, in this case, placed Jackson in the de facto status uf independent command, the only other time in his wartime career (the other being his Vdley Carnpdp) that he would be in such a position. And, as histow has s h o w , Jackson was at his professional best when acting on his own. Banks, in contrast, as one of three of Pope's s o v s commanders, received his mission directly from his a m y commander, just as he would any other order or directive. Exactly haw Banks carried out Pope" orders at Cedar Nlountgtin then becomes a matter of primay interest because of the obvious eEects on his command aetions. When Jackson had received Lee's letter of 7 August (wherein he bad assured Jackson of' his confidence in his ability to act independently: ""Being on the spot you must deternine what force to operate againstty),he had dready decided on "what Eorce to oper&e against." That being so, he had alrmdy fornred his concept of the operation, which was: based on striking Pope's farward elements around Culpeper before Pope could concentrate the rest of his a m y in that area. As has been seen, two unfowseen obstacles cropped up that w r e to frustrate Jackson" intended skike-and-destroy operaGon. The first was the incredibly slow advance of his three divisions on 8 August, the day before the enemy was encountered in force. The other was Pope" moving Banks" GOVS foward on the same day in order to block ihe advance of any major enemy force in his direction. M a t can be seen now af an inevibble result was the meeting af the apposing forces at Cedar Moanpain. Xn order to compare the command methods of the opposing commanders it would be helpful to heed the classic advice of A~stotiethat the whale of a work should have a beginning, a middle, and an end. Wi& that in mind, Cedar Mountain may be summarized as foflows: Tkc: &ginning-advance

guxd actions and the initial depl~ymentsof both sides

The mddk-Bankskztttacks, Jacksan's near disaster and recovey * The ed-Jackson"

counterattack, Banks' retrograde actions, Jackson's pursuit

THE BEGINNING Once Jaekson had became aware of an enemy blocking few (but with no knwledge of its real strength) he wasted no time in arriving ai a course of action, namely, ei&er to sweep aside any light resistance or to envelop m d destroy his enemy, using a preponderance of force. When he hund that he would have to take the latter course of action, he gave orders to his two division commanders, Ewell and Winder, to make &e necessary deployntents. lip to this tin~eone woukl probahly not lake issue with Jackson" actions or reactions. There are two points, however, that now deserve attention beelzuse they impacted criticalb on the course of events, One unexplained

M a t Happened at Gdar Mauntairt?

15

factor was fackson's a p p a r d eonvictian that the main enemy hree lay to the right (east) of the Orange-Cubeper hi&way. That part of his estimate of the situation, in d l probability, caused him to pay inadequate attention to his left Amk.As Freeman noted, "This plan [Jackson's battle plan] assumed that all the Feder2 forces were East of the Culpeper Road. So far ais the records show, Jackson did not reconnoiter the w d e d country West of the road, nor did he order any reconnaissance by the brigade commanders sent to the lefiFt,""3"" That piece of negligence was to cost him dearly when his lefi and center forces came under an unexpectedly overlpowering anwk. The other point eoneems Jackson's orders to his division commanders in the opening sbge of the engagement. We know that Jackson a d EwelI studied a map of the area whift: they confenred (near end of Chapter S), so it is ce&dn that Ewe11 got his orders at the time, In Winder's case, however, the details of fackson's adders we not k n o w (Freeman, Vol. 2, 2h), but it is certfill.n &at Winder, as nar-rated, did not haw the time or q p r t u n i v befolie his m o d wunding to pass on ta Tdidemo, his successor in command, his division mission and plan. h for A. P, Hill, the evidence shows that all he knew, befsl-e the acgon unhlded, was that his division, as c o q s reserve, was to move faward, ready to suppart Winder and to send a brigade to reinforce Early, Of any averall force plan he h e w not-hing, In efict, jackson"s orders to his d-ivisisn cammanders were at best hagmenkq and at worst too sketchy. In fairness to Jackssn, however, one should note that the lack of planning time and combat intelligence that exert pressure on a commander in the opening p h s e of a meeting engagement could have hindered him kom @;livingdetailed orders to his commmders, Moreover, one can never discount &at part of Jaekson7s nature that seemed to underlie all his cmmand relationships--his reticence, even secretiveness, that kept him from shming his pitans with his subordinates. To sum up Jackson's exercise of command in tbe beginning phase of Cediar Mountain: As an independent commander, he surveyed the situation, made his evduation of it, fomed his battle plan, and put it into execution. His decisions and subcyuent actions were both timely and sound, Bawed only by his faul~yestimate of his enemy" situation ancl consequent inattent;ion to his left flank elements-and possibly by incsmplete orders to his subordinate commanders. When compafing Banks7methods with Jackson's, one should bear in mind the conkast bettveen their cclmmand positions. Jaelison, due to his unique relationship with Lee, ww relativek free to exereise command of an independent colps. Banks, on the other side of the coin, was only one of &ree corps commanders under Pope, an m y commander who preached command initiative-and practieed hi&ly cedrdized control. A case in point was the command relationship b e ~ e e nBanks and Pope that was manifested when Banks rode foward lirorn Culpeper to "assume command of dt forces in the front." In order to keep B a d s on a leash Pope had sent: faward Brigadier General RObe~ts,his chief of staff, to designate the pound on which Bmks was to

76

Cedar Mountain

deploy his force, For a higher commander to tell a subordinate leader how to dcploy his okm troops could he m unthinkaljle aRront to a pmfessional soldier, but in L3a11ks' case the amateur gerleral swms to have accepted the intmsion into his command prerogatives, Yet it does seem strange that Banks would hwe piken offense at Rohertshemark to the eEect that "'there must be no l2acking out this &y7' while not being (~Eendedat being told how to manage his o m agairs on his o m grczund. At any rate, Banks did pmseed to deploy his two divisions as already described, He then had General Williams move Cravvford's brigade &ward far enough to occupy the woods on the edge of the wheat field. From that point on, Banks appears to have t a h n full charge of his situation without fi.rrt.her intederence by Rober~sor Pope. His next move, as skirrnishers and ail-tillely went into action, was to order foward twrt regiments, one from the right (from Wijliarns' division) and one from the left (fmm Auff~r'sdivision), as he infomed Pope in his message at 4:50 P.M. Whether this initiative was meant memty to drive olt" enemy skirmishers or to develop the situation across the front is not clear. Qn the other hand, what Banks intended next has been evidenced in his subsequent orders, How be had ta contend with the most critical decision of his cornmarrd career has afready been recounted. f t is unquestionably clear that he would not wait for his old enemy to take the h i tiative. He would attack first, !$That the results of his attack were, Eram a cornrnmd perspective, rernains to be secn. in the next pltase of the engagement.

THE MIDDLE The greater part of historians' criticism of Cedar Mountain (hard to come by conside~ngthe relative unimporkance of the battle in eomparisoit to the so-called siecisive or great battles of the war) has centered upon Bmks7ogensiw xtion, and rightly so, However, the seareh for insi&t into command methods and the reasoning of the man hehind them demands closer examination of the tacticc~lfjctors invofved, Xn the first place, it is easier to appreciate the fom af Banks' attacks if they arc secn from his vie~rgoint:as r n d e by brigictes, He had four (after discounting Greene3swe& X ~ r i ~ dwhicl~ e, was left behind to secure the left fiank) and he used three, leaving Cordon" h i gade in a supporting role. We launched the three brigades, three-fourths of his comb& power, in dilrect frontal attacks. This was done without adetjuate reconnaissance and without a real plan of maneuver, The fact that Crawfc3rd9s brigade atkdck succeeded in enveloping the enemy's teft Bank and raising hell There were no such plans. in generd cannot be credited to Banks"1ans. Indeed, as we have seen, the success of that attack was entirely fortuitous. h s h e r hetieal factor is the nature of an attack, once the farces have been designated, the orders given, and the enemy has been engaged. Frarn that point on, the eltpability of the commander to influence the course of battle

What Happened at Cedar 3;fo~nbin:~

77

can be eonlpared to the actions of an engineer who has opened tire floodgates of a dam. He cannot close the Aoodgates to cut off the torrent he has unleashed, He is onfy eqalale of opening other gates to increse the Aow-if other gates are available. But in no way can he stop the Aood he has released, nor can he change its direction, That was Banks" situation after his three brigades had been cornrnitted to their attacks. He had opened all his Boobgates bemuse he had no reserves to commit, nor were any fo'orthcorning in. time to exploit any success of his attacks. In the case of army resewes that: might have aided Banks, the con~mandprospects of Pope and Banks became i n t e ~ i r a e d . The fomer's transcribed orders to the latter included the assumnce that "you wilt be reenforced fmm here," an assurance that eoufd not have been realized. Then too it will he remembered that those orders dss included the phrase '"deylq his [Banks'] skimishers if the enemy approzhes and attack him immediately as soon iw he appm;zcbes." Mueh has been made by histor-ians af Pope's sodent. intel~tthat he expected Banks merely to thwa& any significant cnemy slpproach action and to hold his ground until he codd be reinkreed. But history is made up of actions, not intentions; this is a good place to recall the axiom attributed ta Napoleon: if an order can be misunderstocrd, it will be misunderstood. In stun, three things resulted frorn Banks' r-eception of bpe's orders, First, Banks chase to make a command decision to atbck, Irased in part on his interpretation of an aml~iguouslywarded order. Second, Banks launched his attacks knovving that there were no resemes available to exploit a ma,jor attack by his force, Thid, the attacks succeeded initially, in ail probabiliity jeyond Banks' expectatio~~s, To deternline why those attacks were at first s s suceessfuf it is essentid that one see the reasons-from the Confederate side. Crawford's b a a d e attak struck, in rapid succession, the Confederate brigades of Gamett, Ronald, and A, C. Tafiaferro. Regimental-size units of the three brigades were thrown into confusion, and the resulting panic spread rapidly, threatening the krning m d even destxnction of Jackson" entire left. f i e threat reached such proportions that Jackson had to intesvenr personally to rally the tide of fleeing troops in an attexnpt to restore order. It became evident that he was forced to t&e such an ation if he was to recover and renew his planned attack. Not so evident was his negiigence in securing his Ieft Aank, vvhich, in turn, was the cause of his being surprised. And suvrised he was in the military sense, since his enemy had strrlck him at an unexpected time and place. It was a case ofthe supriser being suqrised or, as the British historian David Chandler mi&t have put it, a case of the biter hit. That Jackson made a dramdie and timely Rcovery in no way condones the fact that he was caught with his guard df~wn-and that the subsequent rallying could not have been accomplished withsut the eEorts of the: bfigade and regimentd of-licers. Xt must he said, however, that the near disaster on the Confederate left eannot be laid entirely at Jackson's dsor when one looks beyond his command

responsil;rility. The unk'nrtrxnate facts are that the Union attacks hit the Confederate left and center at the exact time that the change of command of Winder's division was still up in the air, due to Winder's rrtor~alwounding and his successor Talbitferrok desperate attempts to determine the situation and piece things together, All of this was compczunded by brigade and regimental units being out of contact and tving to organize their attack in the midst of a dense woods. Needless to say, Crawforcs attack-assisted by those of Ceary? sand Princess brigades-was as much a bonanza to Banks as it was a sliock to Jackson, a shock from which he was quick to recover, A brilliant facet of Jaekson" sodus operandi was his seeming a b i l i ~ to make a ubiquitous presence felt throughout his fsnnrard elements wherever dmger threatened or inspiration was needed to get things moving. Tbat wdit-y was clearly manifest during and following his rallying of his broken forces at C e h Mountain. Certainly, as pointed out, the rdlyiag was-lrad to be-canied out by re@menbl oBcers, but it was Jackson's charismatic genius that inspired the rally, and it had to be Jackson who personally directed the reorganimtion of both his engaged and resertre forces to get a timely counterattak under way. That he did so, including spunting on leders like Hill md Branch along the way, has already been dernonstmted. Once he had made his presence felt, recovefy, reorganimtion, and counterattack merged as though a skilled hand had rejoined the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle which had hlfen on the Boor.

THE END There can be no question tbat Jackson reorganized his combat power and turned it into aur eEective counterattacking force, Jackson's eract vearjbal orders (written orders were obviously out of the question at critical times like these) and how he gave them have not been recorded, but it is certain that the leadership af the now committed reserve farces in the left and center was given to the capable A. P, Hill. On the right of Jackson's colys, one can be sure that orders were also given to Ewell to move his bri@des foward to try to outAank the Union bdgades on Banksyeft, which had atready lost their attacking capabili~and were Mling back under pressure. How much Ewell ~netualiyaccnrnylisfred in his counterattacking and pursuit roles has never been made clear-and that unanswered westion raises athers concerning the part that Ewell" division played dlrou&od the battie, questions that will be addressed in this summation, Looking at the situation after Jackson h d mounted his counterattack, one notes several salient points. That Jsrkson wris becoming the victor was clearly evidenced by the 6e.t drat he had swept his enerny off the baltlefieitd and was driving him back under mounting pressure. The record also shows, however, that jaeksorr was never able to bring an ovewhelming force to bear that w u l d & s h y that enemy, that is, to shatter Barrks' withdrawing brigades so that they could no lmger be considered a fighting fbrce, Moreover, Banks" regi-

M a t Efappened at Cedar Mountain?

79

~nents,however severely mauled and crippled, did not lose their colors-as they would have had they been overrun and wiped out-nor did the Union ,?rtiflery fose their guns or have thetn put out of &ion. In het, the Union batteries, hough continually displacing to rear positions, did a fine job of covering the tslithdrawd of many infantw regiments. In any event, Jackson did manage to tarn counbrattack into pursuit, though at best the pursuit never amounted to more than continued pressut-e on a defeated enemy. In fact, Colonel hdrcrtws, d o s e 2nd Massachusetts taok 34 percent casualties during Jackson's counterattack, went so far as to record that "the pursuit by the enerrty was very feeble."M Whether Andrews could have spoken for the whole of Banks' force would be arguable, but we do k n w that eventudfy the pursuit faad to be cdled off* mainly duet to the exhmstion of the t.roops and the inherent diEculties h a t go with tving to carry out an u~iplannednight operation, The difXieulties that jackson had to contend with have been described; all that might be added would be to say that ifJacksonYs drive and offensive spirit could not have enabled an all-out destmctive pursuit, then it was jusC not possible under the p ~ v a i t i n gconditions, Of all the aspects of command that have been observed-mission evaluation, cornbat irltelligence, decisions, orders, supervision of operations-the one that rnost demands attention at the end of Cedar Mountain is the commander's mission. Irclnicdly, such a refocus bewmes more intei-esting when it reveals that neither commander had ae~omplishedhis mission in the operation. In Jackson's case, he had set klimself a deduced mission, namely, t~ upset Pope's s t r a t e a by stdking an exposed part of his a m y at Culpeper before Pope could concentrate the bulk of his force to counter the strike, After Cedar Mountain and after the opposing forces had withdrawl from the areaPope toward the north and Jackson to CardansviltIe, behind the Rapidan River-it became clear that Jackson bad failed in his deduced mission: he had not destroyed an exposed part of Pope's army, nor had he even gotten to Culpeper. In Bankskase, he had appafently tried to exceed his (zsangd mission, but his all-out ogensive actions had failed; moreover, he had not succeeded in blocking an enemy force until Pope could bring a, preponderance of force to bear on the battle. Probably the next rnost important element of command after the mission would be that of "'the warriar &e to control events," as Jomini puts it in the epigraph to this part of this book. Clearly Banks relinqished controt of events after he had committed three-fourths of his conlbat power to the attack, without resewes to reinforce it. Mter his attack ground to a hdt, his exhausted hrYigtdes were powertess to do anything e x e q t fall back against ;tn overpwering counterattack. Frunl that point on, Banks' only attempt at cclntrof was to see that the remnants of his corps could Fe withdram to safe5 behind Pope's late-arriving "reinfi~rcements." Jackson appears to have fared no better in the matter of exercising control.

Consider the jtldgemeiit of Douglas Southall Freeman, the Southerner whose appraisal of Lee's lieutenants continues to serve as a model for Bdancing insight against fairness: ""At Cedar Mounbin, thou& he outnumbered his adversary two to one, he rJackson] did not utilize anything like his entire force, Nor did he dominate the field. Except for a hand in raflying the celrter after it broke, Jackssn had small part in the criticd operations of the day.""" Another aspect of ccmtrcrl concerns the employment of Ewell's division during the E~eightof the battle. The record clearly shows that Ewell's two uncommitted brigades sat out the battle on the slopes of Cedar Mounkdin like spectators on the fifw-yard line at a football game. The reason has been advanced that had E~ivellsbrigades been committed to an &tack against Bmh' left they would have been exposed to the cross fire of Confederate artillery firing a g ~ n s t Banks' infanty and artillev. Such a rationale can be dismissed out of hand, even when one takes into account that cease-fi-rt: orders to the artillery w u l d have had to he sent by mounted messenger; there was p l e n ~of time for even that kind of communications to be effective. In fact, instead of letting Ewell's brigades sit idly by, Jackson was capable of launching them in a Napofeonic attc~qzled&hort;Zante,a powe&l thmst against Banks' exposed left flank-and at a critical time when such an action could well have brned the tide of battle. The prospect of appXying an example of Napoleonic tactics in a Civil War situation calls to mind the reafity that Jackson was one of the more Iikelyor most likely-of the Confederncy's generals to have been capable of' doing so, And as the history of the war shows, Cedar Mountinin may have presented him with his fast opportuniv to use a lesson from Napoleonic vvarfare. That Jzkson had studied Napoleon's campaigns has been made clear by Cdanel 6, F. R. Renderson, the first and most perceptive of Jackson's milibv hiographers, in his observations of Jackson's prewar career when he was a professor at Virginia MiJikry Institute: "In the well-stocked library of the Institute he found every opportunity of increasing his professional knowledge. He was an untiring render, and he read to learn. The wars sf Napoleon were his constant study. He was an enthusiastic admirer of his genius; the swiAness, the darirlg, and the e n e r a of his movements appeafed to his every instin~t."'~~ Wow far Jackson was able to pursue those studies in his later, wat-time career, indfited if such a pursuit was redly needed, mmains doubthl, despite the persistent myth that he carried a copy of Napoleon's Mhifaxirns in his saddlebags for his readr reference, Freeman has dispelled that part of the myth which assumes that Jackson really referred to the book: '"Jaekson put the volume [1VapoleooPsMaxim oft;var, which Jeb Stuart bad given him as a giftl carefully with his personal baggage, bUt neither then nor thereafier, so far as the pages Freeman confimed the fact when, in 1907, indicate, did he ever read it.""."-3 he went to the trouble of exanlining the copy in the Confederate Museum at Richmond. Even when the possibility of Stonewall Jac.ksonFsmissed opportunities is set aside, Cedar Mountain continues to present two phenomena for reflection,

What Napperled at Cedar Mountain?

81

The battle and that part of the campaim leading to it may have been the last oecasion where a skilled commander could have used Naydeonic models as guides for gaining a decided advantage in maneuver warfare in. the early years of the war, Beyond that possibifit-y, however, the batde shows us a eertdnw: a skilled professional met a courageous amateur, and the professional came vvithin a razois edge of disaster, saved by strong resemes and the rashess of his opponent, who had attacked vvithout them.

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PART THREE

CHIC

AUGA: LOST COMMAND, LOST VICTORY There i s a! tide in the aEairs of men, Which, taken at the flood, feads on to f\sr.trune; Omitted, alf the voyage of their life Is bound in shdlows and in miseries. -Shakespeare, Julim Gaesar, TV1 iii,

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William S. Rosecrans

Rosecrans and His Chickamauga Campaign This is the story of ~o men, apposecl in war, each of whose human hilties eventuaily compromised his ability to command, The result--one lost his cornmand, the o h e r last a victov. The former, William Starke Rosecrans, Major General, United States Volunteers, commanded the A m y of the Cumberland; the other, General Braton Bragg, Confederate States Army, commanded the Army of Tenrtessee. Befare their stories can be told it would be helphl to take into account the national stmtegies which guided each commander in developing his plan of campaign. The basic aims at the heart of each side's national strategy are simply stated, In order for the: No&h to restore the Union. it had to subjugate the South to its will. The South, since it did not have the means to subjugate its opponent, had to resist the North until it cauXd be forced to recognize the Confederacy as a separate nation. This meant that the Nor~h,with its suwrior industrid and manpower strengCh, could a.gord to take the stratefl;icaloffensive and eontinue to invade the South. The South, though forced on the strategical defensive as a nation, used its amies to strike back oHensiveXy and even invade the North when the opport.unity was presented. Unfortunately for bath sides in the earlier years of the war, their national strategies were Awed because eacb lost sight of what should have been its basic aim--to destroy its opponent's will to fig&. Instead, their objectives in the early stages were based on such strategies as caphring or defending Richmond, in the illusory expectafion that the other side would then give up the contest. It was only after a long and bloody series of indecisive battles that the Union W ~ S&reed to redize that a combination of militaw strategies-eventuaIly carried out by Grant and Sherman-alrned directly at destroying the Confederacy" a m k s zlnd its people's will to fight was the only way to win the war.

Rosecrans and IIis (;ampaigx~

87

Wit11 the prolonged and attrited struggle that ensued a n l e the realization that both natio~~aX strategies, in having to deal with two &eaters of war, eastern and western (see Map 9,1),would be s i d e d by gcagraphy instead of politic4 boundaries or places. Thus the two theatcrs were defined primarily by the great chain of the Appalachians, which meant that the western Bank of the Confederacy should be tutned by Union armies seizing and exploiting the vital axis sf Chattanoaga-Atlanta, The appreciation of these redities had b e e n to dawn on the Union's llational stratea team-Lincoln, his seclretay of war Stanton, and his general-in-chief Hafleck-by the summer of 1863, when the strategic impo&ance of Chatknooga-Atlanta was beginning to gain reeognition. In the opening days of that year Roseeraas and Bragg had hugfit the battle of Stones River (also know1 as Murfreesboro, especially in the South), one of the war's bloodiest slugftests, which bad resulted in Bragg withdrawing the amv of Tennessee southward toward Tuflahorna while Rosecrans was consojtiiclalirlg the positions of his Army of the Cumberland around Muhecsboro. The two armies continued to c o n h n t each other in those areas for dmost six monhs, but the reason far the apparent stalemate was not lethara on the part of either commander, B r a s was fully a w m that, in his strategc defensive role, be had to take eveT measure to ensure that his enemy would not capture Chattanooga. That vital railroad juxlcti~nwas not only the link to Atlanta but also the strategic gateway which, if lost, would lay open the heart of the Confederacy to invasion, But Bragg was equdfy aware that he was outrzumbered by his enemy, in gre& part due to the higler prioriq for traops having to be sent to reinforce Vicksbue a e n s t Cmnt's oEensive, Hence, his mission as fie saw it at the time was to rely on cavalry raids against his opponent's carnmunications until he could again build up his forces and resume the offensive* Rosecrans, though equtllly aware of the importance of seizing Ghattanooga, saw fit to remain in place because, in his words, "the winter rains made the countxy roads impassable for large militav operations. . . , Meanwhile we hardened our cavalry, drilled our infantv, fortified Nashville and Muheesborn for secondary depots, and amanged our plans for the coming campaign upon the opening of the rods, which were expected to be good by the? 1st of May, 18m."'44 Unfortunately for Rosecmns, two members of Lincoln's stwegic triumvimte didn't share Hosecrdns' carefully laid plans For the next p h u e of the campaign. Stantoxx and Hatleek became inetteasingy impatient with what they saw as a relaxed a m y commander stalling for time until he was good and ready to move, The basic thrust of the stratea they envisaged at the time entailed a simuXtaneouis advance of Rosecrans-my of the Cumberland and Ceneraf Bumside's a m y kczm his Depadment of the Ohio to sweep the Confederate forces out of middle Tennessee, There were, as one might expect, tvvo sides to the story of Rosecrans4dlel a p d operation. On the Washington. side of the picture, one sees Halleck, the

Map 9.1

LIE

THE TWO THEATER$ OF WAR

miiihry operative of the strateu team, tqing to control operations from a desk in fararnlw Washington, relying on the telegraph to transmit plans and orders for evew major strategic move. The 't~ardfact of the matter was that Halleck-and the rest of the team-had not yet devised a workable overall s t r a t e a that they would entrust to a single theater commander to implement in the field, Rosecmns, an the other hand, was the commmder on the ground who could see a road n e h o r k on the raap transfomed overnight by rains into quagmires that were obstacles to infa'antxy marches and impossible for the movement of artilXerqr and wagan trains. But the difficulties of the mgged, mountainous termin we=, in Rosecrans* view, only a part of the larger stra-te@c pickre, As he saw the picture, there were two major problems that had to be solved before he should move against B r a s . First there was the Iogistical problem, involving the building of forlified supply bases that were invulnerable against walr): raids, and organizing and expanding his supply wagon trains /he argued that he needed over 40,000 animals and some 1Q,a80wagons as the minimum required to sunporl an arnly of over 50,00Q men in hoslib territ@tr]u. which, until summer, was barren of any kind of forage); also it was necessaw to wait until the corn and other crops were ripe enou& for forage, The other problem that he envisaged, far more open to arwment, was that '"we must not drive Bragg out of middle Tennessee until it shall be too late for his command to reinforce Johnston9s [Central Jsseph E. Jaknston's forces operating against Grant in his Vieksburg campaign]." The tatter argument Failed to hold water with Halreck & Coxnpany, who continued to urge Rosecrans to get u p and get moving. The disagreement resulted in a continuing tussle of telegrams b e h e e n Washington and Rosecrans" headquarters, with I3alleck increasingily impatient: and Roseerans increasindy obstinate. Finally, on 2 June the latter received the following teleaaphic threat: "If you can do nothing yourselfl a portion of your troops must be sent to Grant's relieEt7 Even then Roseerans waited three weeks to finalize his plans for e a w i n g sut the opelliulg phase of his operation to oust Bragg from Ttmnessee. In spite of his pmelairned reluckance to move against that gentleman, Roseerans had arrived at a concept of opemtion which wss to prow both simple and workable on the ground. When Bragg had moved his m y ' s m n t d elements to TulIhoma, he had entrenched one corps around Shelbyvifle and the other sirnilarly around Wa&r;3lce, with c a v a l ~ securing ~i both Aanks and outposts in the mountain passes throu&out the area (see Map 9.2). Rosecrans planned to Rzaneuver apinst B r a g and force him to face being cut off fi-om his base at Chattanooga. Ife had a well-conceived strategy, and it worked. For d l his seeming delaying, Rosecrans showed that he could be as swift in execution as he was metieulaus in planning, His plan was based on deception and rapid manewer. Starting on 26 June, he used Stanleyk cwalsy c o v s and Cranger's E s e m cows to swing around Bras's left Aank near ShelbyviXle

Map 8.2

and deceive Bragg into believing that to be the Union main attack. At the same time the real Union main eEort, made by the other three e o q s of the h m y of the Cuderland, poured through the mountain gaps to envelop Bragg's right Bank. In spite of all of Rosecrans' worries about rains and rough countv roads both mmeuvers succeeded. There were indeed h e a q rains and muddy mads plus stiff resistance in the defended passes. But despite it all, Roseeranskeorps had accomplished their missions and were concentrating their united stmngth around Manchester by 30 June, In four days Rosecrans had not only deceived B r a g but had forced him to pull back ali of his forces into what could be called the "TuIXahoma Pocket."' But Rosecrans had Rnisbed only the opening phase of his operation. Without pause he continued to outmaneuver Bragg. He moved swiftly to try to get enough of his main force behind Bragg ta seize the crossings over the Elk River. Had this part of Rosecr;znsYmaneuvers succeeded; Bragg would have been trdpped and cut off from his base at Chattanooga. fisugl:l,.the trap was not spmng (Bragg \vas well aware of the dangers of maintaining defensive positions with the Elk River at his back), Bragg was .forced back across the river. Rosecrans' forces, however, had moved so rapiay that Bragg was left with no time to defend the river Xine, and he continued to withdraw ajtI rbc: way to Chattanooga. By 4 July Ifragg had completed his withdrawd across the Tennessee River, and Rosecrans had halted his a m y corps dong a line, McMinnviXle-Manchester-Decherd-Fayettevile Here he hafted and began preparations for his next moves. When he took stock of his accomplishments to this point, be could believe that he may have even satisfied Washington, In nine days he had continued to outmaneuver Brag, forcing him out of middle Tennessee, driving him across the Tennessee River and back into Chat~anoaga-all with a foss of only 568 casudties to the Union amy,& If, at this pause in Eosecrans' operations, his mastery of stratee has been r n d e clear, one should look even ft~rtherback if he is to be @ven full credit for his abilities. Earlier, when Rosecrans had conceived his overall plan of eampdgn, he ha$ asked General Bumside, commanding the Dcparcment of' the Ohio, to "rurange for his hrces to cooperate with ours fRoseeransP of the Cumberland] h r the relief of East Tennessee." Burnside did cooperate by sending his second-in-commaad, Major Genera1 Hsrtsuff, to hear at first d Rosecraurs' headqua~ers,his hand Rosecran;s7plans. M e n Ifa&suff a ~ v e at host sat him down and took him into his confidence: "l eexplained to Hartsuf my plan, the details of which E w e to no other." The details, typieing the author's meticulous style of planning, were laid out in six dearly defined steps, folfokng each other in logicd progession. In essence, Roseerans-ever mindful of Bragg's concern fsr prdmting his rear. and lines of communieatian-intended to cross the Tennessee River, turn B r a g out of Chattanooga, l and B r a g , and ""fit him, if possible, on get his a m y b e ~ e e t Ghatbnooga gfound of our o w choosing, and if not, upon such ground as we can."& Steps in the plan also envisioned Burnside's ccoogewting by advancing m Rosecrans'

Rosecmns and Etis Campaign

93

left and tl-iereby securing that flank while dierting Bragg" attention to the north of Ghattanooga and away from Rosecrans' farces crossing the Tennessee. Atso vpical of Rosecrans' strategical vision was his concern that the main thrust of' his campaim sfiould be timed to ensure that his next moves against Bragg would demand the latter's full attention and thus prevent him &om sending any of his forces to reinforce the Goritfedemte forces operating against Grant at Vicksburg. After General HartsuE returned to Bumside's headquarters at Cincinnati, it was not long until IRoseerans was assured af Bumside" cooperation in the next phase of his campaign, This hapyy nevvs, however, was soon ogset by a resumption of pressure from Washington. The pressure was r e n w e d in the sarne way and for the sarne reason that it had been applied during the winter and spring. In Rosecrans' view, Stanton and Haflecrk were hking the same old fine: yes, you have accomplished much, but there is so nluch yet to be done arrd so little time in which to do it that p u have got to get movingnow, In eEect, Roseerans had to agree with the first part of the StantonHalfeck Xine; it was the "get moving now" part that caused him to get his back up, What 6arawd;y Washington saw as the obstinate unwillingness of an a m y commander to carry out his part of a nationd strategy, Rosecrans saw as the ir-rability of the high comxnand to recognize rediv, the redity of logistics and getzgraphy, The ultimate reality was that both Washington and Pcosecmns had logic on their side. Both saw Chattantdoga as the key to the strategic outflanking of the Appalachians and the dooway to the Deep South. With the r&Xroad l-tub of Chattannoga in their hands, Union amlies would be free to liberate Unionist sympathizers in east Tennessee (one of Lineafn's cherished hopes) and, more importmt in the strategic sense, to split the South, eventually striking at the heart of the Confederacy itself. Conversely, with Chattmooga still in Confederate hands, Unio1-t forces had no hope of invading and conquering the Deep South. In the minds of Linwln, Stantou and Halleck those strategic 15cts of life overrode all other questions of stratea; moreover, time was of the essence in carving out the natiand aims. Xn their view, time had become a critical factor since 4 July, when the Win victon"es of C e t ~ s b u r gand Vieksburg bad made possible a strategic momentum that lid to be maintained at all costs; mci a prirnaw cost was that the y of &e Cumberland continue its advance 2gaitrst Bragg-even if its commander declared it unready to move, MThile Rosecms was fully aware of the impdance of taking Chat~anooga and defeating Bragg, he neve~helesssaw that he would be unable to aceompiish that mission unless his a m y cauJd survive in a region that was hostile in every sense. Not only did he have to csntend with an emmy a m y on its own ground, but the terrain presented logistical problems that had to be solved before he couXd even start to move his a m y and carry out his strategy, He bad made a thorough terrain s b d y that showed him only too clearly what lay at the heart of his prohlerns. Before his f o r ~ e scould reach the Temessee

River they had to cross the Ctrn~bcrlandMountains, made up of r u s e d , ridges covered with scrub oak, and having few streams and even fewer roads. The roads were rough trails, barely useable by wagon trains, that zigzagged their way throtlgh a few gaps. The tenain east of the river was of a similar nature: a series of s h q , mountainous ridges and deep valleys mnning parallel to the Tennessee. Xn military tern~sthese ridges and valleys constituted crosscompdrtments, abstdcles peqendicular to a strategic advance-in contrast to avenues of approach, which facilitate an advance against one's enertly, Moreover, the series of cross-cornpartmcnts supparted only scaltered and isdated Fdtms scratched out of sparse soil to raise subsistence e r w s af corn and wheat. It was this forbidding searciw of potential forage that concerned Rosecrans as much as the mgaed terrain. He had to depend on his wagon trains, made up of thousands of draft animals, to trallsport the sustenance far his army of over 58,000 men: ""Our trains must carry hent-)I days' rations and ammunition enough for two great: battles. We have not trains to taw anything beyond this, and hence feed for our animals must be obtained from the coming corn crop of the country into which we are going, or our camp&gn will be a Fail~re.'*~T Looking even further back to his sources of supply, his likfine was the Nashville and Chattantlogd Railway, which had to be repaired all the way from Tu1Eahoma to Stevenson and Blt-ldgepart on the Tennessee River before those so esserttial wagon trains could move east of the river. And not only lnust that vital railway be repaired, it had to be protected from the forays of Confederate cavalry, which outnumbered Roseeransheaker cavalry force, Since the Army of the Gumbedand couldn? tAFord detachments to provide the protection, its commander had to scratch for ways to find reinforcements ta do the job. He took the step-inconceivable to a modern-day military commander-of obtaining the support of the governors of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Xllinois to reenlist seven regiments of veterans which wauld join the Army sE the Cumberlmd as mounted infantw, provided that the federat government would h n d the project. Rosecrans submitted the: proposd and request for the hrtding in a letter to ~ ~ , with an explanation showing ""hw very important Secretary S ~ d n t o along w u l d be the semices of such a body of men in guarding the long and exposed Xine of aur cornmunl'cations, soon to be lengthened by out- advance to Chatl d us tanooga, . . . [and] that e v e v such mounted man in that move ~ ~ o u give three infantv men at the front," The letter was hand-carried to Stanton, by Major Generd Lovelt Ftousseau, who was stunned by the reaction of the secretav of war: ""1~iould rather you would came to ask the command of the &my of the Cumberland, than to ask reenforcemerrts for General Rosecrans. He shall not have another damned man." S~tanton'scaustic reaction not only assured Rosecrans that federal funding for the prdect was at an end, but convinced him that Stanton was openly hostile to him and that his performmce as m a m y commander would never escape the scnxtiny of the see-

Roseerans and His Campaign

85

retafy of'war. His apprehension in that regard would be borne out in the days that followed during the next phase of his campaign, It would be misleading, however, to think of Rosecrans as gisng way to an apprehension that was tantamount to fear. It wasn't a part of his nature. He was a eurrrpficats-d man whose charater r e y u i ~ insight s ta make him credible to an obsenrer in our times. But insight is hard to come by, as his biographer, WiXliarn M, tamers, has complained: his was a ""popular image distorted with error, an unfriendfy ea~cature""cause, in great part.>his public history was M t t e n by enemies, induding such prominent figures as the secretary sf war, his assistant secretary, Charles A. &)all&,and even Grant himsellf,4"n Edimess, it can be said that sometimes the "enemies"' Bray have been created by Bosecrans himself. In any ease, it would be enlightening to kake an overview of his life in order to gain a clcarer insight into his character. William Sbrke Rosecrans came from solid Geman and Dutch stock, his f'orebears having first settled in the Wyoming Valley of Pemsylvania, then relocating in Delaware County, Ohio, His father Crandell was originally a Earner who had moved up to make a living fi-orn real estate and the income from his countv store. WilIiam could have been seen as the ideal son of a solid, middle-class Gather; he was not only intelligent beyond his years but hardworking m d eager to learn both from books and dom-to-earth experience. By the time he was fourteen he had gatten ail the schooling available in the county and had gone on to keeping his &therYsbasks and collecting bills. At fifteen he had bewme the head clerk in another store m d might haw setited into the retail business had he not hired out in his off time to drive b v e r 3'. W. BarHey to Colurnbus. During the long drive and their ensuing Iang talk, Barkley had become so impressed with the boy that he told him, "Your conversation has been so intelligent that X skongly urge you to get more education." Young Rosecrans really didn't need a lot of urging; he had atready become so fweinated with mathematics and scientific subeets that be longed to go to coBege, but his family couldn't aKord the expense at the time, But an ideal solution was at hand, West Point appeded to him not only far the four-year cur~culumthat oRered math, engneering, and history-his favorite subjects-but the promise of a miltitav edreer as well. So the youhhl Rosecrans went dX-out in pursuit of the required appointment. He so irnpressed his congressman, hlexander Harper, in an interview that Haver &cibed to norrlinate Rosecrans instead csf his own son, for whom he had been holding back the appoinbent. After sending the required papers to Harper he waited for three arrd tt hdf months urithwt getting a reply, Chafing at the bit, the imptient Rosecrans applied directly to Swretav of War joef R. Poinsett, who eventudly made the appointment himself, Finally, in June 1838 the eightcren-year-o)d cadet-to-be a ~ w at d the boat landing at West Point. He was one of 112 pXebes in the incoming class of L842. West h i n t in the late 1F330s, c o n t r a ~to pwufar comeption, was anything but a military college preparing hture generals for war by giving them a

thorough schooling in the strate@c and tactical principles required to guide them in conducting campaigns and winning battles. Actually the cetumiculum was devoted p~ncipallyto engneering, mathematics, and the n a t u d sciences (in that order); and, as Jalnes L. Morrisoa's &udies have reveicfed, "71 per cent of the total number of classroom hours in the four-year progam was devoted to these three subjects, compared to 29 per cent for alf the others, including military tactics. . . . The etzystone of the academic program was Professor Dennis H. Mahan's Civil and Militav EnGneering and the Science of W= which df First Classmen [the senior class] studied daily. . . . The science ctf war vvtlich followed [all tile civil and militav engineering classes] was only nine bours in length.'"@ Dr. Morrison, a West h i n t graduate and later a frrcul~member of the Military Academy, concluded that "it seems highly unlikely that one nine-hour period out of an entire Four-year program would so impress a s~uderltthat it would colltinue to govern his thinking years Why then, one may ask, if West Point was tmly til militaq academy, all the emphais on ellgineerilzg and math'? It appears that there are several answers to the question. First, as Dr. Morrison has dso pointed out, West Point was a child of the Amy's Corps of Engineers and, accordindy, the superintendent was m ol7ficer of that branch; moreover, the ehief of engineers in the War Departlnent was charged with staff supervision of the academy. Second, one should remain aware that the acadealy was dedicated to graduating educated gntlemen who would becorns. oflflcers in all branches of the amy, and the proven w;zy to make them , in engineering, math, think and reason in the real world was to ~ o u n dtliern and the sciences. Then too, it is important to bear in mind the daily regimen of strict rnilibry discipline and training that was designed, then as now, to transform boys into men. Yet, "dl .the other" subjects-academic as weIl as training in "minor tactics," which amounted to strict adherence to the dril manuals-were smdl potatoes compared to the cadetskconstmt awareness that their class stmding and fulure assignment to their braneh of the a m y depended primarily on their proficiency in engineering and math. It followed then that the first choices of branch of service for the gradu;lting cadets went by class s~anding-and those choices went almost invafiably to the ""suientific covs": first the Engneers, then the Topographical Engineers, then the Ordnance Corps. Findly, after all the coveted first selecgsns, came the line-the s and the other bran&es of the amy. Wow did raw young Rosecrms fit into &is hamework of cadet life? The short answer is-very well. A deeper look reveals that the boy Rosecmns, sn precocious in mathematics and its basic applications, became an ideal cadet who came to excel in all the scientific subjects, He dso adapted we11 to cadet life, though his brother cadets at first &ought him almost a reduse because of the time he spent alone at his studies. That image, hhowewr, changed with time as they began tu see him as the "brilliant Rosy," who could not only be sociable when he wanted to be, but even chaming, fun-loving

and a fellow who was "good at c v e ~ t h i n gand who talked 'inter-ttstin$y, daily, His roommate was j a m s Longstreet, who wds East, his imagination racing,' no role model when it came to academics, but who wd:s later dubbecl the handsomest man in his class at the same time? that Roseerans was considered the most studious. There is an inescapable irony in noting that the WO roammates were fated to meet as geneials on the Geld of Chiekanrauga, with one ~ e in the defeat of the other. becoming a p ~ n instmment Among Rosy's other classmates were John Pope, kbner Doubteday (the inventor-to-be of baseball), George H, Thomas, WiEIiam T. Sheman, and Ulysses S. Grant, The Xast-named was a fjresh new plebe in the summer of 1839 when he encountered the cadet ogcer of the day under circumstances that neither would have chosen. Roseerans, while makng his rounds as O.D., found the naive plebe standing p a d over a p m p in the yard. Crmt explained, ""l've orders to stand here until after the next eall." Rosecrans, taking pity on the duped recruit, odered him to return to barracks, douse his li&ts, and get some sleep, But a conksed Grant persisted, "But how do X h o w that pu're not pjaying a trick on me too?" "See my chevrons. I'm o%eer of the day.'"The two future generals had met for the first time; ðer the meeting w;ts to agect any future relationship remains an open question. There is na question, however, about Rosecx.ansYprogress in his studies and his class starrding, M e r the June 1840 exminations he ranked third highest in his class, and in the following year he stood fifth in class rankings and was promoted to cadet lieutenant, ranking second out of eighteen cadet ofgicers in that grade, a top honor at the time. Yet, the studious you& who tvas proving a leacler in an instihtian where XearZwship was regafded as the Holy CrdX had another serious side. He had been raised in a shuxzch Methodist family and had remained deeply reli@ous, in an America that held religion as a high socid standard. But young Wifliarrr held even hipher starldarcts in his dievtttion to religion. At some time during his cadet career be was converted to Catholicism. Actudly, '"Rasecrans moved by slow deeees toward his new faith. He accepted it over strong parental objection before his graduation from West P ~ i n t , "He ~ was to remain deeply devoted to his Faith througl~uutthe rest of his life, In his final academy year as a first classmrn, his future was to be influenced by a pawe&l worldly fact.or in the fom of Dennis Hart Mahan, the awesome professor of civil and nlilitaw engineeriq and the science of w r . In the fat1 of 1841, Rosecrans was enmlled in Mahan's engineering classes, and later became one of the selected few to be accepted in Mahan's "Napoleon Club." Founded by Mahan, an admirer of the emperor, the club was actually an afterduty-hours seges of inhmal '"seminars" whereby Mahan hoped to expose a gifted few to the higher principles of stratee that had been so short-changed (as brought out in Dr, Morrr'son" findings) in the curriculum. Yet it is impossible to deternine to what extent Maflan was able to bridge the g*-for even a tiny cadre of seleetees-between a nine-hur class and a fuur-year pmgram

through the sessions of the Pu'apoleon Club. Even so, in Roseerans' case, his biogrqher was xm doubt on firm ground when he found that "it is clear that Mahan fired Rosecrans?interest in stratee and made him a lifelong student of the campaigns not only of Napoleon, but also of Frederick the Great,''54 bVhetEter the master personally took Rosecrans under his wing may be doubted, but it is certain that Mahan did exert a very rea7 influence on Rosecrans' mi1ital-y career. Finally, after "the brilliant class of 1842" had made its graduation parade on the Plain, Rosecraris was one of the seven (out 05:a class of fifty-one) to be commissioned a second lieutenant in the C o q s of Engineers, the find proof of his achievements at the Military Academy. Yet, while it may have been interesting to fdlsw Rosecrans>edomanc.e as an outstanding cadet, it is far xnore important to pike note of what had happened to the green adolescent whn had stepped off the boat landing in June of 1838. West Point had not only take11 n boy in his fornative years and turned him into a man; more significantly, it bad rnolded a youthful intelIigenee into an ""engineer's mind,'" perhaps the most impa~antof aU the factors that were to shape Rosecrans' character and career as a commander, His first assignment as an engineer officer was to aid in repairing the seacoast fortifications at Fastress Monroe in Virginia, His rnain interest, however, was to gain a professorship back at his alrna mater, and in the summer of 1843 he was accepted to teaeh engineering in Mahalls department. Not only had he gotten the career q p o i n h e n t he so desirecl, but he took on another big responsibili~as well, In August of that year he was m a ~ e dto Ann Eliza Hegeman, the daughter of a New York City judge. After four years of academic duty at West Point, he was assigned to engineer duties at the Washington Navy Yard, Following that and during tlte nest ten years of routine duty assignments, mostly in New EngXmct, he missed being one of the thirty-eight members of his class who saw combat service in the Mexican War. G less signifcant but interesting one of his '"misses" "happened after the war in 11851 when Rusecrans applied for the pvofessorship in tactics and nahral philosophy at the Virginia Militav Institute. The appointment, however, went to a native Virginian, one Thornas J. Jacksc~n. During his nearly twelve years of milital-)i semice, Rosecrans and his wih had become increasingly unhappy with his rnilihry career, In all that time he had been promoted only once and now had h u r children to raise, and worseas the coupte had eoncluded-a resourceful mind was going to waste Fdcing a dreary and unprurnishg firture. Finally, in April 1854 Ere resigned from the army, W had so many fellow agcers in the prewr yems, and went on to pursue a mixlure of business and professional enteqrises in which he became increwingly sctecessfirl, mostly in his native Ohio. After turning liis mind to experiment and inventions, he fitresaw rp breakthrou& in the production of refining coal ail, and he became the head of a fim and its plant in Cineinnati. He had been working by himself in the plant lab orator)^ on an experimental

product when a safety lamp exploded, set the building ablaze, and bumed hin~terribly, With his clothes orz fire, his flesh seared, he managed to put out the fiarnes by himself, save the plant, and then walk a mile and a hdf to his home. Needtess to say*wife and doctors, after treating his burns, got Aim to bed, &ere his fife hung in the batax~cefar the first months of the next year and a half. H e came through tllr ordeal, due in m a t part to his detemination, but ~vasleft with burn scars over his body and several on his face, most EIE which were later covered by his beard, except for one on his forehead that rerrtained visible for years. By the time he was back on his feet and working to &et his business back on track, the news of Fort Surnter reached Cineinnati, and Ohio" politicd leaders were looking fir military pmfessiods who could organize md train the ~nilitiavolunteers, Roseerans answered the call, first by sewing as ddImaster of the local "Marion I;iiAes,'"oon, however, his abilities were put into red ser-t-ice, first as chief engineer of Ohio, then as colonel of the 23rd Ohio VoXrnx~teerfnfiantry. Tl~atcommand was cut short by his recognition as generd oficer materid when he was appointed a brigadier general in the regular army and called to head a brigade by McClellan, who w7as then commanding in Ohio and preparing for his first campaign. Rosecrans led his brigade into his irrtroduction to war as a combat commander under McCfelIan, who had the mission of invading western Virginia to drive rebel forces out of the region and ""liberate"its pctwte, who were mainly loyal to the Union, Roseerans distinguished himself at the battie of Rich hilor~ntdn-the first real engagement of the Civil War-in July 1861, when his brigade outflanked and encircled a Confederate force which was forced to surrender. The minor vietow (the Confederate command under Lieutenait~tColonel John Pegram f ~ t a l e d only 553 t>%cc.rs and mex;l) was publicized out of a11 proportion 1,y the north er^^ press, which was keenly aware of the public's need for any militay success after the disaster at Brdl Run, &ifcCteXlan's reputation was n~adeas a national figure and Rosecrans too was on his ~ d toy higher command. September of the follotving year found Roseerans commanding the left wing of Grant's forces near Corinth, Mississippi, the command to which he had been promoted ta succeed General John h p e , who had been cdXed east to command the new Anxky of Virginia. When Grant took the oRensive to strike at Confederate general Sterling Price's army at Zuka, Rosecrans was directed to mtlneuver around Price" south Aank and cut him off, while Grant sent General Ord e a w a r d to keep Price fixed in place. On 19 September, when within W Omiles of luka, Rosecrans was attacked 'by Price's left wing, In the fierce little batt-te that ensued, Rosecrans beat off tfie attack, costing the enemy twice as marty casualties as his 103s of 780. Price, learning of Qrd's sadvmce, withdrew, and Roseerans arxd Ord retrxmed to Corinth, On 3 October the combined forces of Van Dorn and Price (Van Dam in command) attacked Rosecrans' farce of 23,000 at Corinth. Although the opposing forces were almost equaf in strength, the Confederates succeeded in

driving back Rosecranshexterior lines, but on the bllowing day Rosecrans counterattwked and decisively defeated his enemy. Van Dorn was driiven brtck to Holly Springs, and Roseerans followed, but was unable to force Vilrt Dom into another ensgement. Rosecrans' reward was a promotion to major generd of volunteers and a reassignment to replace BueXl, who had fkledl to defeat. Brdgg or drive him out of Kentucky and Tennessee. Ptosecrans relieved Buell in early November and reorganized the Union forces into the A m y of the Cumberland, with a total strength of $7,000, divided bekeen three army corps. For most of the months of November and December Rasecrans and B r a g faced off' while orgmizing their farces and prepa~ngto take the ogensive, The weeks of preparation so irked the hi& commands of both sides that the two commanders were continually prodded to take the field, In Xate December Rosecrans moved against Bragg, and the two amies met on Sbnes River at Mu&eesboro. Both commanders took the ogensive, each having planned to envelop his opponent's right Bank, On the first day, 31 December 1862, Bragg's attack almost camied the thy, but his initial success was spoiled by his failure to exploit his reserves in a decisive stroke. Because both sides were Iigtlting astride Stones River, the shifting of resmes at critical times b e c m e the dominmt feature of a battle that was distinguished f u ~ h e by r the beaw losses sushiaed by each side. Mter Rosecrans was farce4 on E-he defensive he showed himself at his best, shiEting and reorgmizing his corps ttnd divisions so eEectively that evcy Confederate att;itek-too often made in piecemed fashion-was beaten off with heavy casudties, Brdgg's last matjor attack on 2 Januav suffered such a bloody repulse that he p u l l 4 back and that night started his forces in retreat toward Tullhoma, thim-six miles to tbe south. Tactically it could be temed a d r a w battie, but since B r a g had retreated such a distance, the N o d e r n press could tnrmpet i t a s a strategic victory. Actually it wss one of the bloodiest and hardest fought batdes of the whole war, Rosecrans having taken a t d loss of 31 percent against Brag" ccasualtics of 33 percent. Cold shtistics such as rhese, bowcwr, only begin to indicate the time-and-again f&lure of Civit War gc3neralship to main decisive results, dong with the attendant shock to the m d e of their suwiving soldiers who had hu&t alongside the dead and wounded. As we have already seen, Roseerans redeemed his tactical impasse at Stones River by his brilliant-Iy conceived and executed strategeal manewers that resulted in forcing Bragg to withdrawi dindly across &c Tennessee River and into the key cenbr of Chattanooga. At this point it would be helpful to take a further look and see the forty-four-year-old a m y commander as his staE and others saw him in the late summer of 11263. He was uf medium build? ereet in posture, carrying hmself well, both in the saddle and in personal contacts with his officers. His dark hair was beginning to show tinges of gray above a high farehead which knded to look vvhite against his generally ruddy complexion. His features, most of which were

Rosecrans and His Campaim

101

ettvered by his heavy beard, were distinguished by his long Roman nose and were usually outlined by his peculiar habit of wearing his Ismad-brimmed felt hat tilted back on his head until the brim rested on his collar. Prominent too wem his clear, @ay eyes d i c h never s e w e d to restf shifting swiftly &orn one person to arlodler as he d k e d to a group. No had another habit whi& he seemed to have shared-unconsciously, to be sure-with Grant. In the field he always had a cigar in his mouth, and even if it had gone unlit he continued to tlold it b e b e e n his teeth, m o v i n g it only to @W an order or ask a rjfuestion. He was neat in his personal appearance, a careful but unshovvy dresser who demanded the same of his st&, who made an impressive anay on fomal occizsions such as reviews and inspections, where the gmug was dways preceded by an escort with, his ttvo-sbr flag, His personal neatness and sense of order w a mirjrored in his relations with his staEand the daily mnning of & m y headquarters, Mter the briefest hours of sleep he was up and by 8:00 AM, was taking his morning devotions with his chaplain-priest, A short breakfast followed; then the day's routine of reports, staff briefings, and issuing of orders lasted until 2:OO P . M . At that time he mounted his horse and led his staff on his round of inspections af camps and visits to subordinate commanders, These rounds continued unintempted (Roseerans took no time for lunch, having only two meals a day) until 4:08 PM., when a cornbination lunch-dinner with his staff ended that part of the heildquarters day. The Infomal meal -clas a pleaant interlude, enlivened by good conversntion led by the commandcjr's lively interests and remarks. Mter a short break to enjoy a cigar and a quick reading of the newspapers, it cvas back to work, throu& sundown and on through the night. He then eondueted the business of a m y headquwters, with intemptions alXowed only to introduce shifis of his attention to reports, courtmartid reviews, administrative decisions, and dictating of a valurninous eorrespondence, all the endless details that went with the running of an a m y . His attention to dekdil never wavered. He was the very devil of a work tyrant; his boundless e n e r a wore down WOshifts of staE oEccers eveT night, much in the sanle fashion that Napoleon was noted for driving sets of secreta~esto exhaustion, His only diversion seemed to be his delight in map study, in which he excelled, even having invented a photopaphic process for duplicating maps which he flad distfibuted to subordinate headqua&ers. By midnight, the day's business taken care of, he relaxed in the company of gratefu'l st&oRcers who could then relax in an atmosphere "knot unlike college 'bull sessions"where1 the commanding geneml tvas blithe, facetious, happy, almost ~haming."~"" These lively interchanges invd~ablylasted until at least 2:00 AM., since &e commander never retired before that time, Xn fact, in the field Roseerms was known to go far days at a time with little or na sleep, lSuz--inghis hours of refaation he was a witv csnversationalist>never ceasing to impress his &aE> particularly the junior oscers, with his penetrating comments on histo~cai and literdry tqics. In both fields he was norably impressive in his cl.iticisms

of authors of' the classics. Vet liis txrbane conversatior~afstyle, as several obsewers have rzoted, seems to have been clR:~l=t by another characteristic. m e n addressing a large a s s e d l y of troops he often embarrassed his staEl>v stammeril~g-almost stuttering at times. This ct~riousdrawback, howewr, seems not to have been noticed by his troops, who were devoted to ""OldRosy," especially for the ways in which he became esteemed for his dedication tcl their welfare. Few Union army emrmanders seenled to have gained the universal trust, even a kind of father-son relationship, that Rosecrans had with his soldiers. In wneral, he shared a confidence in his leadership with junior officers and soldiers throughout the amy, The same confidence in his style of leadership ntight have been equally shared by his staff and hi&er-level subordirtates had it not been for a shortcoming that was unknown to the troops-his tendency to lose control of his temper when he became angq, most often at an oEcer who had failed to execute one of his orders. On such an occasim, he could become upset, even at the very time when he should have shown restraint. Then, despite his religious disposition, he eouid explode in p r o f a n i ~shuuting ~ and stammering, seeming momentarily to lose all control. On one measion, while in camp, he found that a brigade commander, John Beat@, had failed to execute an order from a m y headquaders. When called on the caqet in fmnt of Rosecrans, Beat& tried to explain that he thought that the order had been intended for another, namely Brigadier General Smucl Bcatty, who coxnmanded a brigade in another division, The apparent conhsian and Beate" astteml3t at explanation sewed onfy to trigger Rosccrans' notorious temper, "Why in he11 and damnation didn't you mount your horse and come to headquaders to inquireYS Rosecraxls helfowed, as his irritation boiled into a rage. He went an-in front of General Gadeld, the army chief of staff5and other shK ofgcers-to humiliate Beatv with such violent Xanguage that the latter recorded in his diary that he had been publicly exposed to language that was "uf~gentlemanIy,abusive and insulting'" to the degree that '"for an instant f was tempted to strike hin~,'"But Beatty eAitsited the restraint that his amxy commander had clearly lacked, and he turned and left the room. Later, when the two met on the drill field, Eoseerans greeted Xfeatv cheerfully, apparently indiating that the inddent was c l t o ~ e dNeedless ,~ to say, the h a m had been done, and the mernorqr of the incident continued to stick with those who had ~ t n e s s e dthe scene and those who had heard about it. Indeed, the case may well have served as an omen of a similar one that would take place on the hatdefieitd. Unfortunately, this shodness of temper wss not confined to the "'chevving out" o h hapless subordinate, Xt extended to Rosecrans' relations with higher authoritl~,especially when he thou&t that his command prerogatives were being invacrled, as on the occasions that General Halleck or Secretary of War Stanton !lad '"ntedered with"' his plan of campaign by ordering him into what he considered premakre action. It appews that Rosecrans"testiness with bath subordinates and superiors had deeper roots than mere irripation and suhse-

Rosec~;lr~s and Ifis C;ampaign

103

quent loss of temper. His energetic drive, wl~etlcorufitined witlr his orderly engixteer" mind and its systematic organization of detail, simply could not brook intederexlee whet1 he was bent on puttir-tg a plan into execution. Tlren the brilliant strategist seemed transfor~nedinto a temperamental brant who could turn on the ogcxlder with a vengeance. Yet this rernarka1,te n1an7scbarwter contained another trait that not o111y followed an outt~urstof temper, but seerned to carry a reverse image of it, After a lzricf ixstenial, once his anger had cooled, he tended to thrust aside any rccollectior~of his display of temper and would act toward the irljured party as thc~ughthe incident had never occurred, just as he had demonstrated on his ex~counterwith Beatty, This odd combination of display of tenrper and its seerrling absolution coutdrl? help but serve him ill, especially during the Glriekarnaugd campaign. To recapitulate Rosecrans' campaign at this point, it will be recalled that by 4 July 11863 he had succeeded in ontmaneu\iering Bragg betweert TuXlahoma and the Tennessee River, thus flareir-tg Rragg to tvithdraw across the river. As a result, with Bragg"s arrny apparently redeploying east af the river to cover the vital strategic link of Chattanoogd-Atlal~ta, Rosecrans could move to impfenlent the next phase of his stratem. In essence, his plan envisioned crossing t l ~ eTennessee, initiaIly with the three fi~nvardcox-12s of his army, and turning Bragg out of Chattatnooga hy cutting his collltnunicatians with Atlanta, To get his c o p s across the unfordahte Tenriessec, he was counting on Burnside" Army of the Ohio to cotrer his left Hank by advancing on KnoxtrifIe, and on elexxtents of Grant's farces from Mississip~jito wver his right flank, Among Rosecmnshnrajor concerns were deceiving Bragg about the Union am~y's river-crossing sites and how to take on Bragg in a rnajor battle when and where that became neeessa?. As recounted, Rosecrans had made detailed tenrain and Xogistical stt~diesin preparation for carrying out tlze next phase of h i s campajgn east of the Tennessee River. His prepamtions for canying out that phase now became the focus of a renewed hassle with FVashington: the 11igh comrnand wtnted no delay in the resumption of Rosecrms' successful operations that had driven B r a g out of Tennessee-and, more importantly, they wisfied to maintain the rnomentunl resrrlting from the Gektysburg arrd Vieksburg victories or the precious time ~vouldpass when the Union could strike the Corxfederacy to its knees. In view of the strategic urgency, an 4 ilugust Walleck sent Rosecrarxs a direct order: " b a r forces nlust move foward without delay, You will daily report the inovemenf of each m q s till you cross the 'rennessee River." 3'0 the shod-tempered Rosecrans this vvas mol-e than irrterference with his operations; it was a slap in the face, probal~lywith the knowledge ar connivance of a hostiie Slanton. Here was an army cornrnander up to his ears in restoring a vital raiIrwd line, clearing mountain roads, pushing to cstahlish essential supply dumps, asselnbting and training a pontoon b r i d s train in secrecy, accumulating ammunition for two major battles, preparing thousands of wagons and draft animds for the vital supply trains that would enable the

Figure 9.1 Roseerans%rrny of the Cumberland

army to operate far h m its supply bases beyond the Tennessee-a11 the preparations rewired to move m a m y over tilrcr: rnountajn ranges, cross an unfordable river, and rnstre to outmaneuver and defeat a wily enemy on his ov~ngmund. AII this, and then being ordered to report all his plans and actions to "Old Brains'" ;~t his desk in Washington! XI was more than this army cammander could stand. Rasecrans fired offa tetegrdm that ended with a demand to know of the general-in-ehief "if your order is intended to take aww my discretion as to h e time and manner of moving my troops." HalIeeFs response was clear and ta the point: "The orders for the advance of your amy, and that it be reported daily, are peremptory."""' Rosecrans took the reply as a challenge, He called together his chief of staff and his five corps eammanders (sec Figure 9.1) Thornas, Grittenden, MeCook, Stantey (the cavalry COTS),and Granger (the resewe corps) at his headvarters at Winchester Springs, and after reiterating the main p i n t s of his conwpt of

Koseerans and His Garnpalg~~

105

the up"un"ing operation, read them the telegram he intended to send to Hafleck, The nressage ended, "If? therefore, the movement which E prqose can not be regarded as obedience to your orders, li respectfully reqtrest a modiReation of it or to be relieved h r n the command," Then, having gained the assent of his commanders, Rosecrans sent off' the telegram. The cumulative eEects of it-too dietdfed to relate here-could be summed up as one mufd elrpect-negatively electric, However, after the president had caused the dust to settle, he restored calm a11 around, and sent Rosecrans a letter, fatherly in tone, which smoothed mBed feathers and, in egect, put the army commander back in the sadde to conduct his campaip as planned. So finany, on 16 Auwst a prepamd Rosecrans set his corps in motion. A look at Map 9.3 shows that Rosecrans had advanced his three h w a d corps (MeCooKs XX CBQS, Thorn=' XifV Corps, Crittenden" Corps) on a broad front. There were at feast two reasons for his maneuver, For the first we can be certdn; the other may be eontroversid. First, advancing his eoqs in such a manner allowed the cops ccrmmanders to avoid rewding their actual crossing sites until the last moment; meanwhile the enemy could be deceived about the real sites until it w a s too late for him to t&e preventive action, The other reason becomes apparent after a second glance at the map. The picture of the three corps moving independentfy over such a. wide area brings to mind an application of Napoleon's hdillon cam$ system, We hotv that Rosecrans had studied Napoleonic stratee under Mahan and on his own. Moreover, Roseerans made reference to trhose methods in the opening sentence of his o w stow of his campdgn: '"X avail myself of the oppoflunity to p e p t u a t e testinlolly concerning the stratee and grand tactics [italics d d e d ] 05-that wonderftil campaim . . . in which the battle of Chickamsttlm was an it may be argued that this conception of emptoying inevitable in~ident."~Tet a variation of a batailton earn4 m;ily be countered by the fact that the mgged, mauntAnous texrain would impede mutual support b e ~ e e ncoqs; dso, the corps commanders would need to have expenIenee, or at least training, in the employment of such a system for it to work, and history shows no evidence of Roseerms' commanders having the requisite experience or training, In any case, major elements af the Amy of the Cumberland had reached the Tennessee by 20 August, and by 29 A u s s t the pontoon bridge train was laying the crossing bridge at Caperston's Ferry. In only four and a half hours the pontoon engineers had completed lqing the bridge, and the lead elements of MeGoclEs ?G% Corps were crossing the river and heading toward their first oi>jectiveat Valley Head. Thornas' XIV Coqs followed, crossing at .three sites: Caperston's, Bridgeport, and SheIlmound; then it moved on its first objective at Trentan, Cril-tenden's XXX Corps moved east, then converged southward and crossed at Sheffmound, heading toward Chattanooga, the critical objective which, when secured, would assure that Bragg had been turned our sf &at strategic center. All of these successfut mwes had been made possible by careful planning,

Map 9,3

Rosecrarrs and f Iis Campaign

1 Q7

rapid rrloverrrent, and well-laid deceptive measures, From the start Rosccrslrls hacl planned to deceive Bragg into thinking that the Uniorr forces would make their nxain eEort agdinst Chattanooga by crossing the river aljove the city and earning down on it from the north, Deception was aided in this regard by carefully s t a s d demonstrations by a three-hril;;lde fbrce of Crittenden's along the river to the north of Chattanooga and by a shelling of the city from across the river, a cannonade which lasted until X. September. Xn the end, it was apparent that Bragg had been holed, realizing only too late that Rosecmns had gotten miljor forces across the Tennessee sau~J-~ of Chattanosga and, what was cqudly dangerous, that they were moving eastward with the obvious intent of cutting him of1 from his corntnunications with Atlmta. By 8 September it was clear to Rosecsans that Eragg had avoided entrapment and was giving up Chattanooga. Qn the following day Crittsndcn's leading division entered the city. NOW came ;z pivotal stage in Rosecmns' campaign, one in which intelligence of the enemy was to play a critical mle; therefore, be had to rely heavily on his cavalry.? reconnaissance capability, Unfortunately, not only was h a t a m weaker in strezlgtll than his opponent?, its c;tudity was significantly lower. While Rasecrans was uxtderstandably concerned about screening his army's flanks, he badly needed the ir~formation that could come from cavalry reeonnaissarrce. Once across the river he was employing most of Sbnley" cavalry corps to cover McCsak"s corps and the dde-apen Aank to the south. The only remaining edvitlry l~rigdde(plus a mounted infantry brigade) was covelltng Crittenden's cows on the nodh. As rt result, Thornas' corps in the eenter had to move on its objectives without caval~y.cover. Though Rosecrans chose to accept that risk, he had to face the fact that not only was Thornas' corps moving with~llti~ cavalry screen, the army commander was being denied essential infom~atiortfrom that corps?front in his amy's senter. XI appears (from our invdluable hindsiglrtt vantage point) that the resulting lack of strategic/tactical intelligence led Rosecrans to draw a fatehl, erroneous conclusion: Bragg. having abandoned Chattanoogd, was indeed withdrawing the whole of his outrnaneuvered army toward Dalton and possibly toward Atlanta. Rosecrans' conclusion was aided, albeit urrwittix-tgly, by interrogations of deserters whose "reports" appeared tcr agree &at Bl-agg's demomlized a m y w i s in hlf retreat totyard DaIton, As w i l be seen, a retrogade move was the last thing in Bragg's mind. The deserters were carefully prirned agents who were all too willing to unload their Filse information about the Confederate alm)iss withdrawal, Jn retrospect it would seem that Rosecrans and his staff should have exercised more care in their analyses of this source of intelligence. One of the staE later wrote, "Whether he [the deserter) told thc truth or a fie, he was almost equally sure to deceive. He was sotnetimes a real desert.er and sometimes a n~ockdeserter. In either ease he was sure to be As a consequence of his intepretation of his tactical intelligence, by 9-10 S e p t e ~ b e rRosecrans was pushirrg his still widely dispersed corps in what

amounted to the strategic pursuit uf the retreating Confederate forces, On the right (soutjl) hfcCook was directed to press fuward toward itlpine and tn enlpfoy his cavalry aggressively in a thrust to cut the railroad at Restlea. Crittenden on the left (north), after seizing Chattanooga, was to head southeast'bliad. through Einggold in his continued advance. Thornas, in the center, was to continue pushing foward toward Lafayette. XR Fact the advance of Thornas' leading division, Negley's, now sewed to stir up d1 sorts of aetivity on the part of the Confederates. Negle). had been artvanced by 7'homas, without the cover of a m v d v screen, through Sevens' Cap to a position neilr Dug Gap on the far (east) side of McLemore's Cove, actually a long valley formed by West Cfaiekamauga Creek, which ran between Missionarq. Ridge on the west and Pigeon 34ountain on the east, Once in position in the cove Negley could cover the advance of Thomas' other divisions coming towrd Dug Gap. However, all of the concerned Urliorx commanders-Negfeyf Thorns, and Rosecrans-were unaware that the division was about ta become the victim of a trap in MeLemare's Cove. During the next several days (9-18 September), while his three e a q s were continuing to move, Rosecrans was becoming increasingly exposed to intefligence that must have shown him that he had not only been defuding himself in regard to the precipitate retrcat of Bragg's hrces, he had also dispersed his three corps to such an extent that several of his major elements could be attacked in de~ailbefore he eoufd concentrate the bulk of his amy. The scary ease in point was Negley's division, which, once it was realized that it was in danger of erttrapmerzt, was 'fiurriedly withdraw, This namow escape and concurrent events finally convinced Rosecrans of his errors*In his words he began to concentrate his forces (see Map 9.4): By the 12th I found that the enemy was concentra;ting behind P i s o n Mountain near Mayette. When Crittenden" reconnaissance in force, of the 12th and 13th, showed the rest of Braggs retiling columns near the Chickamauga, I inshtly ordered him to move wesward within supporting distance of Thomas as speedily and secretly as possible. At the same time orders were dispatched to MeCook to join Thornas . . . with the utmost celeriltl~.~

h o t l t e r significant development, resulting &am Grittenderr" nnlaneuvering af his coqs, was his moving Woob"s dilrision to Lee ancl Cordon's Mills while his other two divisions were moving toward Reed's Bridge. When Crittenden's reconnaissance sources (and Rosecrans' orders) convinced him that he should cancentrate his corps, be moved his other two divisions to the vitliniv of Woodls position* Even before the other two divisions were moving toward him, Wood had informed Rssecrans, late on 10 September, that the enemy was ntassing large forces to the east of his front. By the night of 17-18 September Rosecrans had moved his three corps vvithin supporting disknce of each other: hfcCosk near StevensSGap, Thomas

Map 9.4

Courtesy ~Ma9-iiiszL IVikersan.

center-ed around Pond Spring, and Critterkden in the vicinity of t e e and Cordon's stills. Of equal importance to Rosecrails' moves is his state of mind at this point, His later accour~tof the campaign and his ofXicial reports at the time disclose an army commander whose spirit of the ogensive, once the drivi~igfarce behind his plan of campaign and the agressive mmeuvering of his forces, had shifted to that of a commander intent on positioning his forces to ward off m attack by an enenby who now tf~reatenedto overrun1 his o&nsive s t m t e a . What we have been observing is a sequellee of trmsformatians: once across the river, the chess master became the hunter in pursuit of his q u a w ; but when the hunter sighted his taxget he fired and missed, only to find that his prey had turned and was fiunting him; now the hunter W~ZS hastily tving to r d o d belitre his ersmhile quarry could come borlnding out of hiding to charge him, Thus, in a certain sense Rosecrans was no longer acting but reacting. Indeed liis enemy was now one who had become even more dmgerous becatlse the whereatjouts uf his preponderance of force-and its movements-could only be presumed, A e i n , Rosecransy own wads give us an insight into his reactions: At last, an the 18th, McCnok's corps came within reach of the errerny, whcr was then ntovirrg thraugll gaps in the Pigeon Mountain to atitad us, Over the tree-tops we saw clouds of Just moving toward our left. Bragg warzted to get between us and Chattanooga. We had no tinle t-o lose,B1

Then fotlowec-2his account of his movement orders, which directed the closer concentmtion of his forces on Thomas' csrlps, which cvas moved to the: northeast to positions aemss the Ringgold Road and the more wesward wads leading to Chat~anooga.At the same time, '"fittenden and McCook were to fulfow w b n &e enemy's p k ~ ndeueloped [italics added]." T b s e five words say all that is needed about the a m y commander% state of mind on the eve of battle,

Braxton Bragg, Confederate Stratea, and the Tactical Offensive If Rosecrans bad believed that Bragg had \nrithdrawn from the Ghattnooga area to regroup his forces instead of retreating towad Ddtan and Atlania be would have been right, If he had believed that Bragg wa,$ about to attack as a result of a tactical decision based on a stnltef5y of Bragg's own making, Rosecrans would have been hoth right and wrong. Ta understand what underlay Brag%>aims it i s necessary to look back to the roots of a Confederate nationd stratea that had brought him to this conhntation with Rosecrans' now concentrating a m y . By the summer of 1863, following the Win disasters of Cett-ysburg and Vicksbtxrg, it w u l d scarcely seem surprising to a fate-~entieth-century obsemer if the South" leadership had adopted a stmtegy that would gain time to tighten up the Confederacy's defenses white arousing the national wilt to resist renewed invasions of their land. In actuality, a defensive stratea was far from the minds-and strong urgngs-of the most inff~lentialof the South's mihtav and political voices. And those voices were anything but a cacophony of demmds; they came instead from a widespread netufork of fwtions or blocs, the nlost prominent af which was the so-called western concentration bloc. This infomal group, gaining in influence since the fall of 1862, bad the ear of Jarnes A. Sebdon, the secretary of war, and was listened to by President Davis Inimse1.f: Although corrlposed of a diversity of individual interests-poliitied, social, financial, and militay-the members were united in one cornrnon lobby: to reinforce an army in the west which could then exploit a strategic thrust that woutd split ~ S U E I & P the Unioll amies and destroy them and any Northern hopes for fu&her invasion of the South. If that reinforcement meant taking fol-ces from Lee in Virginia, so be it, espeeidly in mid1863 when Union forces, east and west, seemed to be resting on their laurels

Braxton B r a g

Bcagg, S t r a t e ~and , the Tactical Offertsive

113

and showing no signs of moving to e a r y out a ur-rificd thrust against new strategic objectives. The most influential of all the voices in the western eoncentration bloc was that of General Pierre Gustave Toubnt Beauregard, The Creole general, though spe5fking at the tirne from a nonstrategic command position in Chai-leston, carfied a name that ufas not only a holrsehdd w r d throughout the South but one which c a ~ e weight d in high circles, He had been a national figure ever since that astounding victoq at First Manassas, and what was more, many of the higher-level commanders had served with or under him since that tirne. A colohl, if at times flamboyant, fie;ure, he had been a professiond soldier, even a protege of Mahan's at West Point, as well as a disciple of Napoleon and Jomini and the author of w r k s that were respected in antebellurn militav thou&t, During the war his advice an strategic matters was often sou&t (when it wasn?, it wa5 of?fercd anpay), and though some of his proposals reached the scde of the grandiose and unattainable, he did consistently recognize and advocate the use of two strategic instmments in which his vision was above that of most of his peers. He continued to push for the joint ernployrnent of the teegraph and the railroads far the rapid cancentration of forces to exploit strategic m o b i l i ~ In . a more specific sense, in the wards of the scholars Hattaway and fones, ""Hebecame both the strategist and the publicist of &c; westem concentmtion bloc, not only because of his extensive overlapping conbets but beeailse he perceived the Tennessee and Kentucky area as the Union's weak paint and he wished to direct a surprise Confederate concentration aeinst Rosecsans's amy,"6Wf equd imporbnce, in his eomespondence with Bragg, Beauregrd found that the commander of the Am); of Tennessee was in full agreement with him on that score. Bragg, however, began ta have second thoughts when he reflected on how lacking in troop strength his army was to take the oEensive against Rosecrans. During the same period (before Rosecrans Xat~nchedhis ogensive in June 1863), Davis hecame convinced that a western concentration and offensive cautd be undemken, md Cooper, his adjutant general, even urged him t-o direet Bragg to take the of3F"ensive. Davis, the f'omer professiod soldier and fcderd secmtasy of w r , rejected the recommendation in keeping with his policy of making sugestions rather than giving orders to his eornmmders in the field, ConsequenGy, h r a A i l e the proposal for a western eoncerrtratian and oEensive lay in iabeyance, destined to be resurrected when Rasecrans succeeded in threatening bolfi Elragg's a m y and the Chattanooga gateway to the heart of the Deep South. Then, aAer mid-August, &er developments combined to force a ctecisbn on the Confederacy> k b n g the oEensive in the west. First, when Burnside moved his a m y to coaperate with Roseeranss plan af eampaigtl, Bragg became &lamedenough to use his newly extended a u t h a r i ~ to direct Generd Simon B, Buckner to move his corps to join his forces near Ghattanoaga, thus abandoning Knoxville to Burnside, who tvas now moving into east Tennessee from Kentucky. Bras's orders meant not only that he

had begun a emcentration of h r c e on his own, I,ut also that Ire had, bp giving up Knoxville, lost the iInportant direct railroad link between Riclimond and Chattarlooga, the consequences of which will he seen. Second, on 21 August> the same day that he diwcted Buckner to join him, Bragg made an urgent =quest of Ceneral Joseph E. Johnstsn filr reinforcements. Bragg" request was now hacked rip Ily Rkhmond, and on the following day Johnstcm started moving half of the infantry (9,000 men) of his small army by rail through daharna towad Ckrattanooga. Another development which was to bear directly on the question of a western oEensive was Davisv &ling Lee tc, Richmond in late Augrrst to advise him on matters relating to national str;tteR)r. During more than a week of eonfewnces Lee was at first rrndersbndably reluctant (as one of several department commanders) to assent to reinhming Bragg with troops &am thc Army of' Northern Virginia. But as he began to see things &on1 Dwis' national perspective and rc;aIized that the Union had weakened Meacfe's forces (hcing Lee's army), he werat along with the president's inclination to reinforce h a a - t h a t inclirlation no doubt due in no small part to lobbying frorn the \vestern concentration bloc, The find decision was to send Longstreet" seorps of hvcl divisions by riil to the Chattanooga area. Though Lee ardered the rail reinforcement upon his return to his army headquarters, the movement was d a r n e d to be sIowed by Burnside's cutting d ~ Richnlt~nd-Chitttanc~oga e railway link. As a result Longstreet's overaH rail mileage was almost doubled: ""Instead of traveling 500 miles directly to Cbatkdnooga, the x-cinforcernents took a circulitaus path through North and South Cartjlina ancX Georgia, a dis~ancestretching nearly 1,008 rnifes over ten dig ferent n'ckety raitrwads, Despite enomous di6eut ties, the first of Lorrgstreetvs men reached Bragg in ten days, and half the force arrived in As will be seen, that first detachment arrived in the nick of time to he committed to action. Now the pictufe af the western concentration a n be seen in its entifetg (see Map f 0.1). B u c h c r had already moved &on1 the northeast to join Brdgg, Johxlst-urak rreinforceme~ltwas nroving from the sr>uthwest toward tlile Chat*&nooga area. l,ongsttect's two divisions were coming from the east via tlie roundabout route just described. En spite of its appamnt; pieeemed e m m i t ments the Confederates\ailway stratem was a surprising success, both in the rapidit). of its execution and the secrecy that managed to conceal its troop mavcments f.iorn Union intelligence-until it was too Iate far the high eornrnand in bVashingto11or its currzmanders in the field to react egectively. Taken all in all, it was nu less than a rrzastcr stroke of strategic surprise, one that Bragg might exploit to xhietfe a victo~)~; ~n the west. TWCIquestions then emerge: How well equipped was Bragg to handle this bonanza? Would he be capable of achieving a vietoxy that wouXd turn the tide of the war to oflFset the Union successes at Cettysburg ancl Vicksburg? The answer ta the first pestion lies irr two closely related fiejds-Bragg's relations with his subordinate commanders and his own character. 1Er1 the first

Kragg, Stratem, and the nctical Offensive

If5

Map l0.l

place, the Army of Tennessee was as unlike Lee's Army of Northern Virginia its one could imagine. The mw iron that made up k e y sforctes had been forged in the heat of biillles into a sr,v~nfthat was instantly resi~onsiveto the hand of its master. tn the west, though the same raw metds were the=-Tennessee mount-aineers, lugged farm boys front Aabama and Georgia, tough volunteers horn Mississippi and Louisiana---thq had never become fnrged into one resilient weapon, in spite of the spirited toughness of the soldiers alld their oficers, Thou& the army had fought through its share of h t a l battles, it had also suEered a series of changed comn~anders,lost and recovered eletnents, and reorgitnizations that had left it without the espdt c o p s that it d e s e w d . Then, after its terrible bloodletting at Mul-freesboro, the Arnly af Tennessee was badly in need of a leader who could breathe life into it and make it the force that tlre Conf'ederaey so badly needed in the west. What it got instead was Braxton XZragg, the same commander who liad dragged it back in retreat after retreat following the cc~nlirseclcombats of Pexvville and Mudreesboro* In the six months of inactivity after the latter the army did recover its physical well-being thanks to Bragg's administrative skills and rigid enforcement of discipline. At the highest e m n a n d levels, ho\vevcr, a cancerous tamm was eating afvay at the base of the army's byrain, A major cause of the turnor was one of' the Factions that m& up the aforementioned tvestern concentration bloc, one that historians have Iaheled the anti-Bragg bloc. This clique was composed mainly of corps and division conllnanders within the Arnly of Tennessee who shared a distrust of Bragg's

gex~erallshipand a cr~mbinedfear and loathing o f his tendency to blame operational hilures on his sukordinatcs. In its fornative stage the Faction might have been called a cabal, though later its activities-confined to confidential exchanges and correspondence with political leaders, the secretay of war, and JeEerson Davis himsejf-never assumed the form. of an uutri&t conspiracy. As will be seen, however, the relations behecn Bragg and his unhappy commanders eventually came to an open break. Among the more prominent dissidents were two corps commanders, Generals Leonidas Polk and William J. Hardee, as well as two division commanders, Generds John 6. Breckinridge and Patrick R. Cletrturne, There were others of equivalent or lesser rank, though it should be made clear that the tern "anti-Brag blocy'held true only wihin the Army of Tennessee and did not include other officers, inside or outside that amy, who simply disliked Bragg. also deserving emphasis is the fact that the anti-Britgg bloc was essentially a faction. or clique, though its infomal nature in no way made it less of a poweduf force, a force that came close to removing Bragg from command. Following the retreat frum Mu&eesboro and through the wirlter and spring of 1863, the EesterJng resentment of Bragg by the bloc had broken aut into open quarrels bc3~eenBragg and senior members of the bloc, In great part the break was brought about by Bragg's g w i n g distfust of his generals, like Folk and Hardee, and by his suspicious natrure. The clashes beheen personalities became so intense and prolonged that an observer could not help but note that Bragg was waging war on bvo fronts-against Rosecrans as well as the Confederate generals who wdnted him ousted from command. Mattem came to a head after B r a g came under caustic criticism in the press regarding his alleged mishandling of his operations that bad led to the botched battles ilIe and Mugreesboro and particularly the retreat following the latter. 'The generd tone af most of the pressss criticism pointed toward the char@ that B r a g had lost the confidence af his commanders and that of the a m y in general. The fuel that fired Bragg's anger c m e aftcr he learned h m other sources that mmors wgre Nyirlg that he was about to he replaced by another of his generals or even by Beauregard. hll this spurred B r a g into taking steps that wem as unprecedented as they were to prove damaging to his command relationships. By 10 Jrznuay Bmgg ha$ decided to put matters directfy to his a m staff; evidently to use hose oBcers as a sounding board to deternine whether or not the mmors and criticism were unfounded and what action might be indictlted on his part, To his suvrise and c h a g h the shfiCI having confemed in private, rehrned a consensus that he should relinquish eommmd. Far frsm being humHed, on tbe fbllowing day Bmgg decided to challenge once and for dI the chief dissidents and either gain their support or make them lay their cards on the table, He sent a circular letter to his corps and division commanders asking them, in eEect, to acquit him of the charge that he had gone against their wishes in ordering the retreat kom MuAeesboro and t b e r e h

Bragg, Stratw, and the Titctieal Offensive

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to solicit their support. in opposition to the wave of ctritieism in the press. The cireuIar might have had the effect that Bragg was seeking, had he not naade the mistake of ending the letter as follaws: ""Zesire that you will consult your subordixlate commanders and he candid with me. . . . I shall retire without regret if JI find X have lost the good opinion of my generals, upon whsm f have ever relied as upon a foundation of rock." The historian Slzelby Fsote in his distinguished narrative history has sumnted up the impact of the letter on its addressees: 'This last was what opexked the fioodgates. . . . his closing statement that he would retire if he found that he had lost their good vinian presented the generals with a once-in-a-lifetirnr: opportunity, which they did not neglect.p'f"4Harl-dee, for example, replied immediately that he and his division commanders, Breckinridge and Cleburne, were of one mind-that he should resign. Polk was a w y on leave and in his absence his W O division commanders merely acknowledged @resumably awaiting X)t>lk"sreturn) that Bragg had fallwed the advice of his commanders in withdrawing &er MurIl-eesbom. When filk, a widely known opponent of Bragg md a leader in wishing Bragg ousted, returned, he replied to the circular asking, in effect, wheitfser Bragg wanted to know who had counseIed the retreat or whether the m y cornmmder wanted to know if he had lost the co~lfidenceof the army. It would seem that, after a subsequent exchange ol" letters, the two generds were content to let the nlatter rest. A i i ~ f elater, however, when Polk learned &at Hardee and his generals thoul;ht that he had sidestepped the issue, Polk wrote dirccdy to his goad friend JeEerson Davis and attached to his letter copies of all the eomespondenee bekeen him and Bragg, including a copy of the latter's circular. Parts of Palk"s cover lelter included his opinion (and that of his senior commanders) that Bragg be transfemed to Richmond and that the command of the Rnny of Tennessecs go ta Genefa1 Joseph E. Johnston. President Davis, who was aware of the existence of tbe mti-Brag bloc, sent Johnston to Bragg's headquarters at Tullahorna in fate January to deternine "whether he had so far lost the confidence of the army as to impair his usefulness in his present position. , . . By conversatiuxl with Cenerd Bmgg and others of his command, to decide what the best interests of the sewice require, m d to give me the advice X need at this juncture."&5 Johnston, who tvas the de facto commander of the western theakr, camied out his directed visit, but with mental resemations. He was well aware that Davis and others redly wanted him to take pwsonal cmmand of the A m y of Tennessee, but there were very strong opposing feelings &at tugged at his heart. First, he continued to hold Braass generalship in high regard. Second, a corollary of the first, how could he-personally present in Efr;tg7sown headquarters-make an unhimed investigation of his host's fitness and then make puhXic findings that would include the recommendation that he himself be appointed ta replace Bragg as army camrrtander? Tke result of johnston's Ohsewations (and the tug-&war with his conscience) was the closing aE his letter to Davis: ""Im sure that you will a q e e .cwith me that the part I have

borne irr this investigatir,~~\vould rclrctcr it irrcorr~ister~t with rrv jlersctrtaf Bragg shouIcf,~ r t he ~ t ~-e~~lo\leci," f~ouol-to occupy that position. . . . Ge1~c~ra1 \Vith that, one would assklrne the natter closed. Iltavis and Sedrlotl, l-towever, took a differerit view of the !natter, It would heern that by now the presiknt and his sesrctczry of war had rtrade up their rrlincts that indeed k h n ston should take over cornxrland o f the tbmy of Tenlzessee, and on 9 %fareh Davis 0rdet-c.d Juhnsttm to take command and Bragg to report to Kichrnond for reassignment, But f'ate interverred for Bragg in the h r m of' two unpredictal~lehappenings. Bragg's wife came down with ty13floid fever st>danger-ous that it threatened her Lifc, and Bragg was constantly at her bedside. 1"ihorrt the same time Johnstorr had to take to his bed with a ffaw-up of the wounds that had removed him from command at the start of' the Seven Days Battles. A third ilrfiuence then intex-tiened in the Ibrrir of another visitor to Wntgg's headquarters. On L2 March Davis sent his mi1itar)l aide, Gofmef Wiltiarml P. fohnston, to Bragg's headqtiarters to check on matters, The upshtzt of these seernindy unrelated events was that the two patiexlts sotm recovered, and Colonel Johnston returned a repart that skirted arourrd the dissexrsirzn within the army coxnmax~dwhile othewise giving Bragg a &lvoral>lereport. The resuft kvas that the Davis administration appamntly decided to treat the whole aRair as a series of misunderstandings; Bragg cvotxXd remain in cornrnaxld ancl matkrs would be pat&ed over, The red outcomc, howet~er,was that though the govemnlerlt had put the lid on the pot, the contents continued to stew and could boil over when the Xicl was x-errkovert. iltfeaxlwhilc the rank and file of the arrrly remained (most fortunatejy for their co~xnt~y) rlnaware of the cantroversy involving their Itigller eonljnanders and went about their duties as might be expected. A11 that i s not. to say, however, that the dissident generals had forgotten-or forgiverti-their grievances. O n the contrary, the basic distlxst of their chief was in restlily intexksificd and dissension arid dissonance continued, even though srrhdued, right thrctugh the spring and surnmer, ix~tcrrtlptedfiwally by the itrtewention of axlother general. xlarned Rosecrdns. Behrc our strrr): carx be t h e n up at that poirtt, flowever, one should look into the other cause of the contention between Bragg and the disaRected gener-als-thc inside and outside of B~xgg'sown character-for that is the ordy wajr that one can begixl to understand this most compticatecl of all the Cunf'ederacy's ger~erals. To begin at the heginrsing, Braxtoxl Brdgg was born and bred a Soutllern gendeman, even hough his family may not have been one of the 15,(10(1plant&im ewers who made up the so-called aristwracy that: the Anreriean public nowadays associates with Cone with the Wit& and other novels and ntovies of that genre. Braton's father, Tht)mas, was a contractor and builder who could count anlong his aecon~plishxxlentsthe reeonstruetion of the state capitol at lialeigh, North Carolina, after it had burned cXr~wnin 1830. His mother was Margarct Crossland Bmgg, a lady rsotccl for her- exlergy arrd i~~tetligence, qualities she managed to pass on to Braxton, who was one of twelve chiXdren, six: sarss and six daughters. Brz~xtotr%as burn in F%7arrer7rton,n'ortll Carolina, ir-t

.

Rragg Strdkem, and the Tactical Offerrsir/c

119

X817 and was educated at the academy there. The academy had an excellent =putation, one that must have l-teen deserved, for of all tlre RI-agg dtildren wIzo attended, John went on to become a member of Corrgress and a skate suprexne corrrt judge, htother older brother, Thomas, tc~ok:tlg the law, was elected governor and later a U.S. senaror, and finally was *pointed attorney general of the Confederate States. Mter Bfaxton bad graduated from the academy, he applied for and got an appointment to \Vest Point ffom General M. T. Elakvkins, his colrgressrrlarl h m the Wamnton district He arrived at West Point on l July 1833 to bceon~ea nterrzber of the class of 11837, 'The boy B r a s was hardly two morlths past his sixteerlth birthday; &ere were oxlly two boys younger in ar class that nun-rbered eight;):-five, His youthfulness, however, proved to be tnone of an incenZrjve than a handicap, fnr at &.c; end of his plebe year Bragg rated fifteenth irr his class, His progress in his class standing was as prclgressive as it was outstanding. At the end of his second year he stood rrwnber eleven out of the sumiving seventy-five. In Ais third year he was nrxrnber seven out of fifty-eigf~t,and he graduated fifth in a class of fifty. Among his classmates were general oficer material, Union and Confederate, such as John Sedmick, John C. Bemberton, Juhal A. Early, and Joseph Hooker. The last-nanled has left us insight into the young Braggvs character when he wote an appraisal of Bragg for the Annud of the Assoeiation of Graduates in the eighth reunion of the class ixz 2877. Skipping over ftower)r phra~eology('"the minds of all of his eountlymen who admire and sympathize with mawifieent achievements, for which that oficer deservedly held a conspicuous position in the public estimation"") one can find insi&tful Asemtions: "tall, ungainly in his gait. . . . [Feeling] free to express his opinion on all. occasions and all subjects, utterly regardless of its influence on himself, he appeared to be conscious of his own rectitude, and therefore free in agproving or condemning h e acts of others. To those who enjoyed his more intimate acquaintdnee this harshness of character disappewed, and he appeared ts them a genial, generous, brave and clever companion. To others of his associates he sometimes appeared brusque even to rudeness.""" Those &ank insights, written by a classmate who also became an army cornmmder, tell one a great deal about how Elragg" doiaute-sided persondity could have had such vaying impressions on his peers. Among his clas Bragg ranhd second in tactics, seventh in artiilerq., and fifth in engneering and tire science of war; the last two, it will be recalled, were &$&an" chief strbjects. When he left West Point in 283Wragg left behind him a top record, if not one of distinction; and he wds remembered by his classmates as ""equal, ihoot sttperior, to any member of their class.'" Upon graduation he was assigned as a second lieutenant to the 3rd Artillely Regiment, and so Bragg .found himself-like so many other brand-new shavetails-no longer a high-rankfcing first classman and cadet officer, but the lowest of the low among regirinental ofEeers, His first duties were the ordinary garrison chores at Fodress Monroe, where Bragg remained for only seven

months. 111 F e l ~ r u a v1838 he was reassigl~cd,along with his artilletcy company, to Fort %Jarion at St. Augustine, Ffaricita. The Seminofe War was g ~ n d i n g down toward its end, and in the few antiguerrilla operations that were still going on, there was little if any need for artillev support. As a result, Bragg saw no combat aetioll during his tour of duty. What he did see was that the rrrilihry environment in Florida in the 1830s was anything but a land of bright sun and tropical beaches, Inland the country seerrzed to consist of m n r b swamps, mosquitoes, and fevers that struck down the hardy as quickly as thc weak. Unfortunately for Lieutenant Bragg he was to find himself counted anlong the latter as far as his health was concerned. It was there that the first of the illnesses that were to dog him all his life dragged him dmm, In the spring of 1838 he was so sick that be was given three months sick leave to go home and recuperate. Thou& his recovery was corndete enough for him to return to duty, that illness could have been a sign that his body would not afways keep up with his mind's dedication to his militav senrice, Followirxg his retr11-n ta duty and subsequent service in Florida, Bragg was transferred, along with the regimenkaf headquarters, to Fort Moultrie on! the sandljar called Sullivan's Island in t l ~ eharbor of Charleston, South Carolina, h o n g his rrlessrnntes were three future Union generds: Lieutenarrts George W, Thc~mas,J , F, Reynulds, and WiHiam l'. Sherman. The last was to became not oiily a comrade hut a good friexld of Brzkgg's throughout their prewar careers, Their assignment with the 3rd Artillev at Fort Motnltrie was to last aInlost three years. Garrison duty on a sandbar in Cfrarlestars harbor might bc the deadliest bore in any Irieutcnant's career if all his oRduty hours were spent in watching the surf brellking on the beach or gawking at cotton ships dumping their bdlasts in the harbor, where Captain Bowman of the army engineers was supervising the raising of the foundations of what would become Fort Surnter, Ft3rtunately for Bragg and his fellow oscers they were welcomed in Charleston society, then oxre of the South" highest social centers. So, b e b e e n the rounds of b d s , eotillions, teas, and other social aRairs, time rolled dong smoothly for the young oficers, broken only by the tectiurn of drill and routine garrison duties, Vlilliclx have their way of intermpting the social lifc: of lieutenants in peacetime, Braggs garrison routine, however, didn't t f w q s wXf along so smoothly when it came to getting along with his superiors, for he was anything but a brocvnnosing junior omcer. It seenls that his tendency to expect perfection--presumably in others as weft as himself-was not limited ta his brother ogeers, but extended to his superiors. Braggasregimental. eornmauider, Colonel Williarn Gates, was to prove no exception. Gates couldx-t? help but notice that, for some u n h o m remon, Lieutenant Bragg was speaking to him only in the line of duty, m unacceptable breach of the customs of the sewice. Instead of calling the upstart on the c a v e t ras a thick-skinned C.O. would have done, Gates ebt~seto breirk the ice in a gentlemanly manner. One evening at

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the past oEeers' club, Gates cncsrtntered Bs;tgg as the latter was corni~~g in the door. "Lieutenant Bragg, a glass of wine with you, Sir!'" The reply: "ColoneE Gates, if you order me to drink a glass of wine with you, I shall have to cfu it," An o&cer today couldn? help but wonder how Gates would have recalled the incident when it came to writing a certain part of the lieut.r=x.rant9ssEcieney report. Not long after the incident had passed into regimental memories something happened to intervene in both the social life and careers of Bragg and all his companions: the outbreak of war b e b e e n Mexico and the Unit_ed States took them to new assignments. Bragg, Sheman, and Thornas went to join General [Zaehaly Taylork army, which, when built up with regiments of volunteers, invaded nr~rthernMexico. Ifragg" gdfarrt conduct at Fort Brown and Montemey quicMy won him brevet pmmotims. But it was his key role in the battle of Buena Visb that hrau&t him not only recognition! of his professiond qudities but even national fame. The battle became imminent when Santa Anna, the Mexican dictator-generd, rntlrched northward with an army of 14,UOQ with the intention of ovewhelming Tayfor's ssmdl arrny and clearing narthern Mexico of the invaders. When Taylor learned of Santa h n a ' s approach he took up a defensive position with his 4,800 men across a defile about: eight miles south of Sdtillo. &thou& Santa h n n i s force of 14,oW was still trying to recover from its hardships and losses, its commander attacked on 22 Febmary 11847, driving in Taylor" ouQosts. On the follsulz'ng day he attacked TayIar's main body in what became the complicatd and confused batde of Buena Wista. The regular a m y batteries of Major J. M. Washington and Cqtains Sherman and Bragg were to play decisive roles in. haldixzg ORand eventuaJly defeating the repeated attacks of Mexican infanw and ewalry, On the morning of the 23rd, one of the heaviest Mexican a m s t s so threatened Ere Indiana and Arkansas vallunteer re@ments that they broke and Aed. Bragg later wrok of this part of the action, '"[XI kept up my fire until X obsewed our teR flank turned, and the enemy rapidIy gaining our rear. . . , Two whole regiments In&ana & ArEEarlsas ran fafter] the first fire and none returned." Brag% seeing his opportunity, Zimbered up and went into a new firing position, unfimbering on the far side of a ravine on the attacking enemy"s Aank where he was joined by Sherman's p a s . Xa Taylor? own r q o r t of this part of the action, 'The 2d Kerttucky Regiment and a section of arrillev under Captain B r a g . . . arrived at a most opportune moment. . . . The batteries of Captains S h e m m and B r a g , . , did much execution. . . particularly upon the masses which had gained our rear," And in Efraggs' words, ''SO destructive was our fire that the enemy column W% divided, and n large podion of it mtreated, leaving &use in front. . . totalk cut OK."" Throughout the morning and into the afternoon Santa Anna made repealed atkmpts to turn the h e r i e a n left, and then made thrusts a g ~ n s its t center. During the shifitng focus of action B r a s was lirnbering and udimbering, in and s ~ tof t oae fidng position after another, dl the

while delivering Eire effective enough to turn back an attaetc, His three guns fired an average of 250 rounds, a phenonlenal expenditure of ammunition. for the muzzle-loading "Napoleons" of the day. By early afternoon Bragg's cannoneers and drivers were wearing down and the horses were so tired that they could only be made to move at a walk, At this critical. juncture, Cofsnel Jefferson Davis had arrived at the American center with his regiment sf Mississippi volunteers. Davis deployed his regiment and acXvanced ahead of the artillery--Bragg had had the hresight t s move into position to bolster up the eenter-to check the coming Mexican main attack. Davis at the head of his regiment took a w u n d in the foot but remained in the saddle. The next enemy volleys, howver, not only stopped the attaek but forced Bavishmen to withdrdw, leaving Bragg's guns exposed to the now advdncing Mexican attack. It was at this eritieal point that Bravton Bngg was ahorxt to become a national hero. The story that w a s to be r q e a t e d by a news-hungv pubfic (perhaps originating in the illew Orleans Daily Delta) held that Tayhr had uttered the famous line, ""a little more grape, Capbin Bragg*" There are several gclod reasons that the kind of exhortation k m ""Old Rough and Readyshould have been more like ""dluuble-shot your guns and give kern hell, Bragg." h the first place, Bragg himself would later, when irx good humor and relating the stow to f ~ e n d s say , that the latter version w s the right one, Moreover, Bras needed no such order. Here was a prokssiond hard at work who had already given the fire commands to load with canister. Then, in the words of Lew Wallace, the Civil War generat and author of Ben Hur, who was there at Buena Vista as a lieutenant in the 1st Indiana, "When he [BraggJ wheeled his guns into battev, the enemy was within a few yards of their nluzzles and at first he [the enemy] gave ground as the pieces recoiled." After the second and third rounds from Bragg's guns the enemy did more than give ground, Davis" Mississippians had rdtIlied, and now joined by Kentuctiy, TXlinois, and Indiana regiments, were adding volleys of musketry to Bx-agg's volleys of canister. The camlained fire Erom front and Aank was more than the Mexiean infantry could stand, and after severe losses, Santa Anna"s men broke and fled in wild disorder. Buena. Vista wds won, Santa Anna was finished in northern Mexico, and Brag-already recommended to brevet major for meritorious sewice at Monterrey-was again recommended h r promotion, this time to brevet lieutenant colanel. After one gets past the h d o s and military $odes of the incredible American victory at Buena Vista--the defendm, against three-to-one odds, utterly defeated the attackers-it seems more pertinent to us, as debched observers, to find whether there were tactical lessons to be learned from the battle. Even more pertinently, what did Bragg himself learn that would profit him in mmman$ positions during the Civil I%r? Perhaps not the lessons that some have sumised. FVhilc: it is true that Bragg undoubtedly took advantage of the opportunity to survey the battlegeld and

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relive his experiences, some of his conclusions may have been misleading in regard to lessons that might have been applied in the Civil War. In the first place, Bragg had to be keenly aware that it was the m o b i l i ~of the light artiXXev that enabled it to get to the rigfit place at the right time and play a decisive role in the battle, Litter reflection, llowever, trvould have led him to realize that if (a big if) the Arxlerican force h d had su%cient mtiflery units continuousty in s y p p o ~ of the same infantv formations &ere wulld have been no need for artillely batteries to be d l o p i n g h m one fix.ing position to another to provide the needed support, Indeed such a lesson was learned on Civil War battlefields like Malvern Hill and Gettysbut-g where the defense employed prepositioned artillery with deadly eEect. Secondly, Bragg's observations also led him to infer that artilleq had accounted for ""inn-tenths of the kr'lled and wounded," a conclusion that may have been misleding in the fight of the yet-to-come impact of ~ $ eErepower in tile defense, tlaough that tactical clout was, of mttrse, one that Bragg eould not have then experienced, since Mexican War infantr~pwere armed mainly with the smoothbore musket. Irr any case, the foregoing may he thou&ht of as intellectud baggage that Bragg, in coming home from the war, could have stored in his mental attic, when compared to a ccrtainfr). that Bragg w u j d always c a v in his mentd wallet. The ee*int_v was founded an his corrternpt fur the behavior of' volunteer infantry who had broken and run, at times even on the first exchange of fire with the Mexicans. Xn Bragg's mind, and those of ather GVest Pointers, when one compared the conduct of the volurlceer militia to that of remlar infantv (which Tayfor didn't have at Blrena Ksta), the brmer were as unreliable in battle as they were dangerous to a cornander's pupuses. The intensity of Brag's conclusions irr this regard were clearly expressed in a letter that Bragg later wrote to Cump Sherman: "And yet that [Buena Vista] was a volunteer victov!! Xf any action in the vvhole war, Cump, pmws the ineffieiency of Vols. that is t11e one.""inWhat is i~nportarlthere is not Bragg's inference that regular artillery saved the day at Buena Vista when the volunteers almost lost it, but the certainty that it was the Eack ofrlkcipline that fay at the heart of the problem of the vofunteers" disgrceful bchavior. It was the keen a\%?arenessof the ncccssit). to instil1 discipline in his t r o q s that was to permeate Bragg" character all his life, and it. was the relentless drive to achieve perfection in this regard that was to stamp him -with the reputation of a harsh disciplinarian. And later it was the harsh part that was to separate him from other commanders in the minds of Civil War ogcers and soldiers. M a t was not apparent to others was how the need for discidine fitted into Bragg's nature, It WM as much a part of him as the standards that: he consistently applied to others: a person was either right or wrong, either competent or incompetent, careful or careless; thereftore were either disciplined or they were undisciplined-and if the latter held true, the most stringent measures had to be taken to earrect. the fault. Unfortunately for Bragg's sinifitav image, his discipline was not adrnjlnistered with the ""kindness, fimness and

rows

justict." advised in army rqtrl;ttions; it nas dispensed more like prrrtisllnlent. kgareover, it was not acconlpaniecl with the wurnlt11 of soldierly unclerstanding, nor was it brtcked up by a charislrra like that of Stonewall Jackson, who cotxld c bebe a tough disciplinarian, It.rtt one wlxlose strictness cctuld l ~ overlooked cause he won his battles. Though Taylor's victory had ~lradehirn srrch a national hem that it wcrtxld also make him president of the Lirlitecj States in tlie 11ext election, it did nothing to change the government's strategy of throwing 311 its rniljitar?, weight behind Scatt's campaign in ceritral ZLlexieo. m7hatlbrces rentairled with Taylor tvere mlcgated to keepirlg order in northern Mexico. Since that territory remained quiet, the war had petered out for Bmgg and his brotlier regulars, and they were eontezlt to retut-tl to the States fur reassignment. "Contentl'" however, until they had to settle in on small posts and take up garrison duties that were to become dull and duller in their isolated little worlds. Bragg's routine was no exception; he remained with his regiment, the 3rd ArtiIlev, where he found that the artm of wrtirlie fame, like that of so inany wartime heroes, quickly disftppertmed, In Bragg's case, however, he was ta find reafimtion of a wish he had confided to only his closest co~rrrades.Since he came from a middle-class fanlily of twelve children, his a m y pay was hiis only income; his secret wish wiis to find 21 wife with xnoney. Exr the year after the war more t h m Iiis materiaf hopes bccarne real, He fell iril love with, eourtecl, and married Elisa Brooks Elfis, daughter of a wealthy bjuisiana planter of Evergreen Plantation in Terrebonne Parish. She X~ecamehis June bride in June 1849 when they were married at Evergreen, Thou& Bragg migl~thave realized a dreanl of becoming ti man of independent means, the truth was that he was a bigantist of sorts, wedded to the Gvornan of his dreams-and ta the anny. Eiisa, it seems, went dong with the affair, fallowing him as an arxny wife, making da in less than eonlfartable ganison quarters and putting up with all the hardships of army life, an existence that was to last for aver five years, Two months after their marriage, Bragg and his bride moved to JeEerson Basracks or~tsideof St. Louis, where he took up his old command of Battery C, 3rd Artillery. Reassignxnents were to fiallow, to frontier posts like Fort havenworth, Kansas, and Fart Gibson in Indian JTenitor)l, where B r a g seems to have divided ntuch of his time betvveen his gmfessimd studies, h t ; n g essays, a r d squabbling with his snpedors aver mamm which his bro&er officers thought of as ""minutiae of the service." Findly, a minor digerence soon grew to what Bragg considered a ma,ior dispute when he took on his f i e n d Jefferson Davis, the secretaq of war, over Brag's ~ n d i n kans-Eer g from Fort Gibsan to Fort Wasl~ita.Though B r d g had accumulatr=d a host of other annoyances, this disagreement. seems to have been. the one that forced him make a career decision. On 3 January. 1856 he resimed his commission and left the arnry. H e deeply resented what he considered Davis' take-it-or-lewd attitude in the matter, and exl7ressed

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his resentment in a letter to Sherrnan when he referred to Davis as abmdonin$ him at Fort Wastlita to ""chase Indians with six-pounders." Regrets or not, in exactfy a no nth Brafig v w in Louisiana fulfilling his dream of becoming an independent planter, In a letter of 3 February he was bringing Elisa up to date on his negotiations with a Mr. Shriver to buy "Leesh r g " a aI,6mac= plantation near Tllibo&ux and not too fidr from Evergreen, The purchase was being made with Elisa's money, hut according to custom and legdlities Rragg would be the sole new owner. In his letter he explained, "Their- terns are at a cash ca1cuEation about $145,000. $30,000 now, the balm e at dif-fierent amounts at from I to 8 years. . . . Negroes 104, 65 [field] hands. Mules, oxen, cows, sheept implements, corn, hay, etc., plenty. After examining all I accepted the oaiFe~."'~~ TWOdays later he w o t e Elisa that the d e d was dosed. The proud new owner rerzarned the plantation ""Bivouac" "hat a longs u f f e ~ n gElisa: thou&t of the name after five years in the army has not been recorded), and got down to the business of being a full-time Fdmer. And over the next four years he became a suct;ess&l one, By the end of 1859 he coufd assess a net profit of $30,OC)Q,and in the following year his estate was valued at $5;20,000.By the measure of his times, Bragg was a wealthy planter, and suc.cessfut enough to go into local pdties, He was elected cox~tmissionerof public works for the second district of b u i s i m a , and during his term he managed to plan and implement a systerrl o f drainage that was to reclaim a gmat deal of land far faming, But after a year in ofice he was heartily tired of the deds, forced compromises, and political maneuvers needed to get things done; he was no doubt Longng for the mifitay, where an order was dl that was required ta convert: a plan into acrticm. Tllough coming out of his ""rtircmentS3ta r e k m to military life may not have occupied his thctughts at the time, the turn of events in I8E;iO worlld soorz ml1 it to mind. With the "cedainty af war growing daily, Rragg was quick to o%r his services to the governor of buisiana, who immediately appointed him a colonel in the state militia aad made him his militav aide, In short order Bragg was promoted to major generdl in the militia, and m 23 Febmav 186l JeEerson Davis s i p e d his commission as a brigadier generd in the Confederate States Army. His first C.S,A. assimment cvas to command the forces being raised in the Pensacda-Mobile area, Operating from his heddgua&ers at: Pensacola Bragg soon erne into his real metier, training traops and organizing hrees. He did such an outstanding job that he attracted nationd attention-and that of JeKerson Davis* In September he W promoted to major general and given coxnmand of d l the forces in dabama and west Roriela. It wasn't long until Bra% perceived the fault in Davis' national stratem in deplwing forces for coastd defense instead of concentrating Etlenz where they were badly needed to counter the invading Unian armies in areas like Tennessee. Bragg expressed himself forcefully in letters to Richnlond, where Davis soon recognized the vvisdom of Bragg's advice, and in late Februav be

was orderecf north to join General Albert Sidrzcy Jotlaston, who was planrling to car-tcentrate Confederate forces around Corinth, Mississippi. "At this time Bra% was one of the higllest-rated generals in the Confederacy. Almost everyone seemed to have a good opinion of him, artd even Jefferson Dwis was coming to rank him nearly equd to Albert Sidney J ~ h n s b n . Johnston "~ himself so highly regarded Bragg's abilities that. he gtve him command of one of his corps arld atso nrade him his pro tern chief of staff Brdgg- soon showed Johnstorr tbat he had made wise illspointn~ents,for hc proved to be an invaluable asset in both roles, particularly in orgzlrrizing the far-Bung forces h a t Johnston was concentrating to take the oEensive against the then divided forces of' Grant ancl Buell. By late blarch L862 Johnston had beconie increasingly aware that he would have tct strike Crar~t'ssix divisim, etleaazped aromld Pitthurg Landing on the Tennessee River, bcfsrc the united forces of Grant and Bzlelf (75,000) could attack his army of' 40,000 at C o ~ n t hOn . 2 April Johnshn gave his orders to march, and by the evening a f the 5th his a m y was deployed to attack in what was to become the battle of Shilofz. The army that he had &played in the dense "fenr~esseewoods wa~probably one of the most itl trained and poorly organized that the South bad ever massed for a major batde. Despite the organizing abilities of Bragg and the tactical skill of Hardee, there simply had riot been ettough time to currect d l the glaring deficiencies before: the ~cnty-five-mifemareh from Corinth. To make matters really worse, Johnston's three c o v s were deployed in a manner-thanks to Ueauregard"~ bumbling handiwork-which became, a recipe for disaster. Instead of each eorps rnassing in its own zone for the attwk, the three were strurtg out, one behind the other, in parallel fashion that w a s sure to see their units becoming intem~ixedin the heat of battle, so tbat all tactical control would be lost when it was most rreeded. By some Atlke of fortune, Grant's divisions were as tactically unprepared as their enerny, having set up camp in a bend af the river without field fartifiations or even adequate outposts. Thus, by some miracle of' fate, lohnston's atbeking army actually achieved tactical s u ~ r i s eThe , tvhooping anfederate infantly at first swept al! before them, capturing guns and thwsands o ~ E ) ~ s oners, A great part of the Confederate success un the first day was due to Bragg's vigorous command actions, partioularly on the right, h e r e his personal sexpewision kept up the momentum of the attack, But after severe losses, the battered Union divisions-with units often as mixed u p as their enerny'sfell back and managed to hold until niglltfafl. During the fierce fighting, fohnston, up front where he should not have been, was mortalXy wounded. Then two command actions we1.e to change things on both sides: Beauregard assurncd command aAer Johnskn" fall, and Grant arrived late in the day to take charge and revive his hdf-beaten forces until Buellk rapidly appmaching a m y could link up with him, On the next day Grant" iron will and eafming hadership had so reinforced

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his arn~y'swill to fight that the Union forces, reinforced by Buell's fresh troops, counterattacked and tfrovc back the exhausted Confederates, Despite Bragg's brilliant performance on the first day, he and rhe other corps commanders relrrctantly had to follow Bearsregard" orders to witlldriiw and, take up a dismal retrograde march back to Coridh. The near vietov and its disheartening dtermath, accompanied by the lass of the irreplaceable Johnston, called for a high-level ctomrr~andshake-up. Under the eircumstanms Bragg stood out as the most vduable candidate for the eamxnand; he had already been promoted to full generai, to rank from 12 April. The pmmotion placed him at the top of the Cunfederacy*sxnilitav hieratrhy. There wcrt: few others ever to attain the same rank: Samuef Cooper, Joseph E. folznston, Robe& E, Lee, P. G. T. Beauregard, Edrnund Kirby-Smilrfi, and Alhtert Sidney Johnstan. For this and other reasons, including h g g ' s outstanding perfomance at Shiloh and Beauregard"s mishandling a f matters in the same batfrte, on 27 June XSragg reiieved Beaureerd and took command of the Army of Tennessee, From that date on, one cannot fail to coritlpare Bragg" noothle performance as a cows commander with his fi~xlctioningas an army commander. On 20 July Bragg met with Major General Kihy-Smith, tl~exlcommanding the Department of East Tennessee, in a command conference at KnoxviIXe. During their talks Bragg learned of the threatened Union caphrre of Chattanooga as well as Kirt~y-Smith'spropczsaf. that Bragg strike into mid-Tennesset. and save the situation. The idea so intrigued IFragg that he conceived a strdtegic plan that was as bold as it was @and in concept. He would take his a m y of two coqs (30,000 strong) and, in a strategic tt~mingmovement, "gain the enemy's rear, cutting off his supplies and dividing his hrces so as to encounter them in detail." Meanwhite, Kirhy-Smith with his force of 18,000 would turn the Union forces at Cumberland Gap, advance wesward into Kentucky, m d march to join forces with Bragg. The overall scheme, alxtiost Napalesnic in concept, not only lacked a Napaleon to carry it out, but also faeked tvvo fundamentd spects: a: defined final objective (that of meeting and defeating the main Union force), and unity of command (because Brdgg did not command Kjrby-Smith's department.). Moreover, the plan had no real rnilitnry objective since it was really founded on the idea of invslding Kentucb in the somewhat nebulous hope that its citizens wo~x'td:rise up and take that border state into the Confederay, Thus Bragg's "invasion'* w s actzrdly a gigantic raid with politicd overtones, its marches dependent in part m seizing and using key secfions of: the railrwdd nehork. In regard to Bragg's generdship, the campaign vvas intended to show Bragg's critics and the prrblic that his tdents were not limited to his recognized skills as an organizr and trainer of troops, but that be also yassessed superior qualities as a strategist and Eo@stician. In late Aupst Brllgg moved, and by I"1eeptember had captured Munfordville, Kentucb, thus placing his a m y b e ~ e e nBuelf"s Union army and its base at huisvifIe. At this point a disciple of Napaleon would have grasped a

double oppartuniv: to attack Buell while his forces were divided, or ta seize Buefrs base at LouisviXle, then IBaneuver in Buell's rear and force him to fight an his enemy's terms. Bragg did neither. His fears overcame his chance to exploit his opgortuniv; be feared that he was not strong enough to attack Bueff's exposed a m y and he felt that he caultin2 t o r d to let slip a politicd goal, that of &king the state capital, Frankfo.l-t, and installing a Confederate governor. He chose the latter course? of action, thus in eEect letting the role of raider take the place of the commander dealing with matters of stratea. Xt wsrs a fateful decision, far when Bragg marched to Frankfort, Buell fell back to huisville, incovorated reinforcements into his army, and prepared to drive B r a s back into Tennessee, In the meantime Kirby-Smith bad defeated a green, unprepared Union force at Eichmond, Kentucb, and moved on to occupy kxington. By this time, however, Buell was on the rnovclt and by 1 October was marching to the southeast with widely dispersed forces (totaling E;j0,000) against Brag" a m y of 22,500, then at Bardstown. Brag, in part misled by faulty intelligence, misjudged the overall situation and sent a detachment eastward to link up with Kirby-Smith, leaving a main brce of only lG,Qo0 at Pewviffe. The battle that ws fou&t there oil 8 October tctok on the character of a meeting engagement for which neither major commander was prepared, both having dispersed Earns that couldn't arrive in time to aged the action, Thus the battle of Perwilfe, though a hrcefy hught load action, became a tactically drawn batde, with Union losses of over 4,200 killed, wounded, and missing, clompared to a total Confederate foss of nearly 3,400. That night B r a g , knowing that his small army would be greatly outnumbered, started withdrawing into Tennessee. If Bragg the strategist had continued to show his generalship after he had taken Munfordvifle instead of yielding to his politic4 aspirations, his original s t r a t e e rnifSht have succeeded, The historian Archer fones has aptly surnmarized Bragg's perfomance: "The Kentuck eampaiw showed that B r a g , the brilliant strategist and organizer and administrator, did not p e d o m we11 when operating close to the enemy. He often failed to understand the situation arld his judgrllent b e e m e unreliable."71 Ahnother way of looking at Bragg"s sho&eorning as an arrny commander would be to say that he failed to exploit his strategic xrlaneuvers with tactical decisiveness, a failing that was to cost him dearly in wming campaigns. In m y way of assessing it, Braggk Kentucky eampaip was an unqudilied flop. It had failed to bl-ing Kentucky into the Confederacy: h e r e were no signs of pubtic dernonstrdions for joining the South and no rush of volunteers to enlist, with over 15,000 stands of a m s for volunteers remaining unissued. Bragg had to admit in his doorny repod to his government, ""Iregret to say that W are sadly disqpointed in the want of aetion by our friends in Kent ~ + . We have so far received no accession to this amy."72 Bragg2s immediate withdrawal after Perryville did nothing to diminish his

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generalsy(and the anxry'ss) perceptiorr of a eon~manderwho had s~lEerednear defeat and subsequent retreat due to his own ineptitude. The perception continued to grow, adding fuel to the fires of resentment that sn~olderedin the minds of lthe generals of the anti-Bragg bloc, which, as we have seen, became more and more active in the follokving spring and surrrlrrer. Bragg's ret-eat after Pervville took his a m y all the way back to Mudreesboro in centrat Tennessee, where this recounting took up the stov of Rosecrans and Bragg with their first major encounter in the battle of Stones River at the end sf 18621. Behre we return to the coming confrontation of the two commanders on the eve of Chickamauga, it would be he1phI to see how ISrmton Bragg's persond history had contributed to the image of Bmgg, the army commander. Over the years Bragg*shigh standards af pedomance in his militav duties had hardened into a model of perfection that calls to mind the story of Frocmstes in Creek rnytholo~,the tyrant who made his captives fit his bed, either by stwching them if they were too short or by lopping off fegs if they w r e too long. In Bragg's case the pe&ectionist lacked one esssntid quafi~; rbe modeler ddn? always fit his own model, and that missing quafiv seems to lie at the heart of Brag's di%culties wi& his subordinates. He FAIed to recognize the fact that they were human with human shortcomings which should be kken into aeeaunt when they didn2 rmeaure up or the fault corrected by tltctful counsel. To make matters worse, when there were recriminations following failures like those in the Perryvifle or Muheesboro operations, B r a g tended to Hame the failures on his subordinates. In the minds of his pnrtrals that was the unforgivable act of a eommmder who in the find m;l)ysis is rcjsponsible for evesything his c m m n d does orfaiXr to do. Hence the gap of misundersittlndings b e ~ e c nBragg and many of his generals couldn't help but vviden, since neither side would. try to communicate Mth the other* On a brighter part of the pol-trait, Bragg's personal courage was unquestionable. He had stood alongside Zachaw FayXor as a nationd hero &er Ruexla Vista, and there can be little doubt that his moment in the sun must have reinforced his self-esteem, a most forgivable foible in any mm. To add to his reputation as a professiond soldier and tbe ouitsbnding artillerist in the antebellum amy, his administrative sklls as a Confederate connmanhr were as admired as they were widely known, In spite of his reputtllion as an unfor@ving disciplinarian, his genius for training troops and organizing fi&ting forces was univerfally recognised by both subordinates and superiors. When given time and latitude he unfailingiy turned out a carps or amy that was unmatched in the Confederate ser\iice for emciency and sbndards of [email protected] was also a commander who constantly looked out for the health of his command in assuring that his same hi& sbndards were followed in the sanitdv measures of troop units in camp and in the field. In the fields of lo@stics and s t d management he created innovations that were models of effectitreaess. At the outset of his Kentucb camp&@, in order to outmaneuver

his opponent Buell, he colzceived ancl executecl a IogistieaX xtlarveI when lxe "secretly moved 35,C)OO ~ n e nh?; six rail lines on axr alI1x;tost 800-mile circrxito~is route south tltrough MolliXe to get in front of Buelf at Chattanoo*." Earlier when he took eomrnand of the k m y of Slississippi, l ~ tXirt5ctecf e eaclt corps to augment its headquarters with a "cornparry of cavalry of not less than fifty effective men assigz~edto their heiid(gt1arters to act as escort and c o t ~ r i e r s , " ~ ~ The augmenkation was not a sectlrity measure, hut a very real impmveem~~t in shff cornmunicatio~~s with subordinate conl~narldersancl staRs that woulcf prove an irzvaluak~lecomnland asset. In addition to his administrative genius Bragg had few peers ixi the grasp of strategy and its application on the hidlest military level, It was mainly his concept of rapid concentration fofnrlo\+redby a swift and aggressive ogense that had made possible the tactical surprise of Grant's s m y at Sl~ifoh.Unfortunately, as dernoxlstrated ill his Kentucky campaign, kc sonrehow lost his aggressiveness in failing to expfcrit a str;ztegic success at the exact time that he should have ~tltlsteredall his energies to fallow it thrr~ugh.He was like a boxer who has his oppolretst on the ropes, then suddenly I~acks011-1 as thclrtglx the m m would ohli#ragIy collapse at his feet, A .fatal flaw like this, cornbined with his poor health, made him the wrclng choice for field eom~nand.Because of his other outstanding capabilities he tvould have p e d o m ~ e dsuperbly as the amy's inspector general or the president's chief sf staff in arr advisoty role like that sf Hdiec.k"s later reilatiolzship with Lincoln. In sueh a high position, if Jeflersursr Davis had realized it early in the war, his qualities of intelligence, patriotism, and diligence-when combined! with his administrative s k i k and strategicad insight-could have been of insrmeastrrable value to the Confederacy. There can be IittXe doubt that good health and energy !rave been essexltial attributes in the makeup c~fany general who has tleerl snccessft~lin applying an art of command. "When General Grant was asked wlwt he thougSht were the qualities that most sustrtined him throtigilout his Civil War campaigns, he replied that health and energy should head the list. In his words they gave him 'the p o w r to endilure anything,' ''X Good health was certainly a prerequisite to Bragg" eefXectiveness as a11 army commander, but his bad health continued to handicap him thratiglzout his nlilitary career. Alrrvrlg the a i h e n t s that contributed to (or were a part of) the stress that seemed to t a m e n t him at t,ritic.aE times were migraines, rheuxrzatism, boils, and dyspepsia, or severe indigestion, One of the patent medicines of the day that Bragg kept on hand was ealornel, a purgdtive wfxose continrrred use '"caused severe g:rstrointestinal imitation (Bragg's dyspepsia?) and central xnewotrs systems of letharm or restlessness,"~~ In the same study of Bragg's contrihtxtion to the ConfederacyZs defeat, the historian Cracly blcWhiney has pointed out perceptively, "'Xlfness hampered Bragg all his life; it was as n ~ u c ha part of him as ambition, w o w , dissatisfaction, and contentiousness, His various sicknesses, which became more pronounced as his responsibilities increasecf, seern to have beex1 partly

Bragg, S t r a t e ~and , the 'ractieal Offe~kslve

13 1

psychosr>inr.ttiL.,for they kequeiltly occurreci when he was despondent or frustrated. Too ambitio~xsto be satisfied with hirnsclf or with otliers, he sought peffection, and was disappointed when be failed to find or achieve it. Authoritarian hinlselE he nevertheless resented his superiors' a u t h o r i ~ .Yet Bmgg won and held the friendship and admiration of some of the a r n ~ f sbest minds, despite his can~nkemusness,He =presented an unusual combination It would seem that of poten tiallly dangerous eccentricities and high aE~iIit~?."~ the state of" Bragi;" health reflected in his personal appearance, as an observer, Lietxtenant Colonel Frentantle of the British army, noted when visiting Bragg at his headquarters at Tullahorna: ""He is very thin; he stoops, and has a sickly, cadaverous, haggard appearance, rather plain features, bushy black eyebrows which unite in a tuft at the top of his nose, and a stubby irongrey beard; hut his eyes are bright and piercing. He has the reputation of being a rigid disciplinarian, and of shooting freely for insubordination, I undersrarzci he is rather unpopular on &is account, and atso by reason of' his oecasiorral acerbity of manner."" Fremande's observation is noteworthy, not only for revealing the connection X3e~eenBraggk health and his appearance, but also f'or the picture that Bragg, the commander, presented to his officers and men in the Ghiekamaugd campaign. And in the end, the eornbilzation of ""ptentialtlIy dangerous eccentricities tznd high abiliiy" &at MciQ~ineyhas perceived reached its zenith during the later phases of tlie campaign, especially when Bras's poor health aEected his ;tbili.t)l to act decisively in correctir~g the tactical fiailures of subordinate commanders, or in his failing to take aggessive comrnand action when it W ~ Sso bidly needed to follow up a successful maneuver of his own. It is to those maneuvers-Rragg's operations from 8 to 18 Septe~nberwhich led Rvseerztns to a series of urgent reactionsthat we should redirect our attention. ft vvas a&er Eosecrans" successful river crossings and the subsequent rnavements of his three corps that Brdgg's intelligence S O U ~ G C S(niainly Fornestis and Wheeler" ccavaXry sereerzs) gave him barely enorrgh inbrmation to forni an estimate of what his enemy was &out. Bragg's combination of strate@c sense and limited combat intelligence told him that Roseerans was seekirig to accomplish one or both of two okjjeetivcs: (l)to gain Bragg's rear. or to outflank him and turn the Army of Tennessee out of its positions east of the Tennessee River; then (2) perhaps to attack Bragg on ground Eavoral2le to Eosecrans once he could reunite his widely separated forces. ft was those "widely sepdrated forces" that caught Brag's strategic eye. He was well akvare that the otierall situation-the cornparzrrlenkd mctuntainous terrain (see Map 10.2),Roseeram' scattered corps, and the new reinforeerrlents still arriving (the strate@c concentration of Confederate forces already recounted)-vvouldd dXow him to strike at Rosecrans' forces with the whole of the Army of Tennessee, still in the process of regrouping. But an alternative course of action was within his powers. He had suEcient h c e to enable him to cut off ma~orelements af

Map 10.2

Kosecrans" separated corps (as much as Wenty miles apa& in m g e d terr&n) and destroy &em in detdl* It would be unrealistic to assume that Bragg immediately seized the opportunity to act out a Napoleonic concept and regroup his fofces tc_, d e s h y his divided enemy with a series of decisive actions. What really happened was that Bra% had made a painhl decision to evacuate Chattanooga and march toward Rome to reorenize and prepare ta meet Rosecram with a stronger and more compact army. After his columns were moving south on 8 September, Bragg w i s trying to piece together bits of infornation that would enable him to ascertain the aetud movements of Roseman's three corps. By midnll;ht of 9 September, Bragg bad learned enough to see that advance elements af Thornas' corps, numbering b e ~ e e n4,OW and 8,OW infantq, had entered McLcmore7sCove that morning and were moving toward Dug Gap. That rright of 9-10 September Bragg decided to haft his march toward Rsrne and strike

Bxtagg, Stratw, and the Tacticat Offensive

133

at the enemy force in the Cove. He called Major General Thornas C. flindn~an to his temporary headquarters at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and after a command conference sketched out his plan. Hirrdrnm would take: his division (of Polk's corps) and move into the Cove from the north while Cleburne's division of Hill's scows (Lieutenant General D. H. Hill had just arrived from Wrginia to take over command of the cows from the replaced Nardee) would move through Dug Cap to attack the enemy from the east. Accordingly, orders were scnt to HiU, hut the orders, like Hindman", were incomplete and vapely worded-charneteristic of most of Bnlgg's orders ofthe next few days. If Bragg were to seize the ixdvantagt~over his enemy's dispersed farces, he would have to strike rapidly and decisively. The success of such an opewion dexnand@d two critied components: bold brce commanders cqable of acting independently and clearly defined missions in simply stated orders. Neither factor would be evident in the next two days. Bragg took up an observation post on Pigeon Mountain on the morning of 1Q September to obseme how his plan w u l d be carpied out. "It was, as one of his siEcers described it, art opportunit-y "hi& comes to most generals only in their dream~."'~gIn the early morning of f O September, however, Bil~dman had already begun to demonstrate a lack of boldness and indepencllont judgement. He marched only as far as Pond Spring, witing there in bivouac while sending &ward scouts to locate the enemy. Hill, thou& a senior commander with combat experience in the A m y of Northern Virginia, was to show Bragg that he was no more deyendable in this operation &an was Hindman. For reasons of his o w he f&jed to press foward Clebume's ddivisbn to &tack &rough Dug Cap, hwing sent a rrtessagct to Hindman silying that CIebume had been ordered to Dug Gap m d that if the enemy attacked CEeburne, Hindman should attack the enemy's rear. So Hindman w ~ t e das , he tried to explain to Bragg later, for Hill to attack, since t l ~ elatteis message led him to beliew that he should wait far Cleburne" action before he should attmk. In the meantime the Union commander bad deployed a lead regiment and d ~ v e noff the Confederate cavalry covering Clebunze" advance, Tl~enHindman learned from civilians that a large Union force was h u w i n g to reinforce the force in Mchmore's Cove (ac-tudly Baird's division sent by Thorn= to the supgo& of Nedey's division). This infornation md lack of firrther word kern Hill added to Hindman's hesitatfan. Consequently each of Brag" force cammanders held back, waiting Eor the other to act, while an impatient B r a g "paced back and forth in his anxiety, dug his spurs into the s a u n d , smote the air, hoped and despaired."78 The conhsion was complicated by the Union comxnander"~Wtians when he reaiized his dmger and deployed his division to defend against attacks h r n the nmCh and east while preparing to receive reinforcements. W e n Hindman learned of the coming t i n h p of the enemy's farces he began to take counsel of his fears in a council of war with his subordinate commanders, In the meantime Bragg, w r r i e d about If-re l& of action on the part of

Hindman and )%ill,dircctetl Euekncr to send ;z force firm his corps to reixlforce Mindn~an.By 130 P.M. of IQ Septen~berHill had started Cleburne's division through Dug Cap, and by 5:00 13.5r. Btrckner lzad joined Hindrnan about h u r miles north of a crossroads below Pond Spring. By this time it was evident that Bragg should have been present at the h n t to see in person that his plan was being executed. Instead he was at his new command post at Lagkyette, where he had nzoved on the night of 20 Septeml~er.On that same xlight he ordered Elixxdman, Ruckner, and Hill to coordinate an attack in S4ehrnore" Cove. Agai~r,Bragg's orders cvcrrre discretionary in nature, resulting in rncrre cotrncils of- wax at stlbordinates' headquaders where it was voted to hold off oheyixig Bragg's orders until "more information was received," thus proving two of Napoleon's dicta-councils of war do not fight and if a eammander's orders can he disobeyed, they will he disoI2eyed. And again, due to Bragg's vefbal orders (which were sulrseriwntly miscunstr~~ed, whether puqosely or not isn't clear), Hindrnan timidly aclvarrced only a couple of mifes, while Cteburne sent foward couriers to inform him when Ifind~nan's guns were heard, s s that he could then move to attack. But no guns were Ileard because Hindrnan had retreated nortlr%vardon the next moniing (It1 September) in alarm tvhen he heard that the rjniorl forces in the Cove had been increased to 15,000 (actually only about 8,000 were there at the time). Later Hindman reversed his march after leanling of the actual strength of the enemy, but not until 5:UO r.ra did he again advance-tj~irteen Etortrs after receivilrg Bragg's origirral order! While Hindmarz was vaciltatixrg, Bragg had joined XIifl and Cteburne at Dug Gap, only to pace Izack ancl forth in renewed frustration. FindIy, after Cleburne had advanced, only to encounter a Union rear guard, Bragg rode foward and met Hindman at the crossroads in the Cove allout 6:00 P.M. The enemy had disappeared, withdrawirig safely to Stevens" Cap. A brious Bragg gave IXit~dmanthe dressing-dowri fie deserved, but it was obviously too late to do anything hurt order the troops back to their previous positions. When Bragg returned to his eommand post at Ldayette on the evening of 11 September, he ascedainecil f m n ~liable reports from Fonest that Crittenden's corps was still separated from the rest of Kosecrans' army. He was quick to realize that here was the chance to recoup the opporluniv so disastrously lost at McLemore's Cove. During 12 September he firmed up his plan ta att~tekCrittenden, especially Wads exposed division now near Lee ;m$ GordonysMills. On the same day he directed Polk to take his c o y s and Walker's and attack Grittenden early on 13 September, OR the night of 12-23 Septenzber, however, ttlirlgs were dready beginning to go awv: at l1:00 PAL Bmgg received a message from Polk saying that Crittenden had concentrated his divisions and that it: was impassible for Polk to attack under the conditions. About midnight, despite previous directives to attack, Bragg sent another vaguely worded order-more permissive than imperative-including the amazing clause that ""hehoped that Polk would not maintain the defensive

i?ragg, Stratem, and ttre 'betical Offertsi'i't"

"135

'ttnless the enemy attacks early."'" k~raggdid assure Polk, however, that he tvsttld personally Xead Brickner's troops fowdrd to support an attack. On the rnorning of 13 Septe~nFerBragg and his staff rode ahead of Brxckner's lead divisictn towzrrd Polk"s command post at Rock Spring Church, When be arrived tn meet Polk about 9:00 A.M. Bragg learned that Polk had not even fully depfoyed his troops br an atrack, despite the fact that the total attack force (induding Bu&xlerrs two divisions) would otttnumber the enemy$ divisions by five against three. An angrJs Bragg got a reluctant Polk moving, albeit Fir too slowly t d e r the circumstances, and an attack was mounted about midday, But it wasrt2tuntil 2:QO P.M. that Walker's corps was nloving fi-rward, and by midaAernr~onscouts reported that the roads in front of them were bare of Union troops. It soon becanle clear that Crittenden had escaped, just as cleanly as had Thon~as'troops at MeLemore's Cc~ve.Twice in three days Bragg's opportr~nitiesto dcd Rssecrans a defeat in detail had slipped atvay. During the next five days (14-18 SepteniE~er)Bmgg bad to deal with the ever increasing problems that threatened to ovewhefm this army commander who was on the ve.r$e of confronting his opponent in what was cer'tain to become a m@or engdgemer-rt. Not only was he being cons~atlybombarded with bits and pieces of information that he had to evduate into a credible intelligence picture that he could act on, but: at the same time he had to control at: least three other vitd components of command. Operationdly he had to continue directing the n-raneuver of his major hrces, his a m y corps. Logistieally he had to see that those forces had been assipned feasible march routes and that their supplies were moving over the best means and routes availhfe. And he had to assure that divisions and brigades were assigned places under the right commanders, in a workable command structure. The problenl o f organizing the Army of Tennessee for combat w s not a simple paper-andchart exercise; it was complicated by newly arriving brigades and divisions that had to join their corps while their commanders had to End their places in command struetrrres that were physically on. the mavc. Bragg's pprolblexn in this regard can be comt,-tarc?dto the situation Faced by a battleship caphin who has ta bring boatloads of Itis crew ai3onrd and assim them battle stations while mneuvering his ship to engafr;ethe enemy Tllat. is why the organization chart (see Figure X0,1) should be regarded as being in a state of change until the actual day of battle. In the midst of the problems that were besetting him Bragg didn't fail to lose sight of the latest cdpportunity that would allaw him to remain on. the offensive and maneuver against a n~lljorpart of Roseem's forces. Me saw that, in bringing major parts of his army north to attack Crittenden, he was getting into a position from d i c h he could still &back and defeat part of his opponent's a m y while there was time to do so hefort: he eolmld react to prevent it. Moreover, if Bragg moved quickly and in the right direetion, he could envelop Roseeras' left (northern) Hank while simntt;tnecrusly cutting his a-

Figure f 0.1 Bragg's Army of Tennessee

Bragg, Strategy, and lte Tacticall Offensive

137

rn?/\ scornmultications with its new supply base 211. Chattanooga. The initial phases of Brdgg's new clpration hwe been summarized in his own words: '"As so011 as his movemexlts [Rosecransl] were sulFficiently developed f marched on the 17th instant 117 September] h r n b f a j ~ e t t etct meet him, throwing my fctrees along the cltickamaug~[West Cki~kanfaugaCreek] between him and r r l y supplies at Ringgold, , . . Immediate measures were taken to place our trains artd limited supplies in safe positions, when all our forces were concentrated along the. Chickamauga, threatening the enemy in front.''81 With his newly reorgdnized a m y concentrating ts strike its enemy in its first al1-out offensive of the campaign, Bragg was prepared to do far more than threaten Rosecrans. What was to fallow would soon become one of the greatest battles of the vvar,

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The Battle of Chickamauga

Historians have refemed to the ground over whieh the battle of Chickamauga was fought as generdly mgged and tending to have had an inAuenee on the actioxrs of. 18-20 September. Thelie are underaatements, The n z i i i t ~eEects of the tewain on the course of bat"t.le at all cornmad EeveEs can hardly be overemphasized., The effects were shared by both sides; the very nature af the terrain w;ls equdly hastile to both Union and Confederate operations, In their respective cammand waluatians of the area, it may be said that Bragg had the ahantage. While Roseerarzs was seeing the area for the first time, Bragg had h u w n it years before, in his first year after graduating h r n West Point. In 1838, be had been stationed at a small post in the area white the army was overseeing the forced migration of the Cherakee Nzztion wesward out of Geor@a and N o ~ hCarolina. His advantage was balanced to a degree, however, by the passage cjf a quarter centuv and Etoseerans" shll at map reading and terrdin analysis.

It would be helpful to appreciate the remain from tvvo pefspectives: the general topography of the area and a close-up took at the wtud ground over which the soldiers had to fight (see Map 11.1) Xn general tenns, the battle was fbugbt in an area about ten miles south of Chatbnooga, on the floor of the valley that lay between Missionary Ridge on the west and Pigeon Mountain on the east. The battle area was bounded on the north by the RossvilleRinggold Road, and on the scttitki by Lee and Gardon's Mills. With the exception of the few mgjor routes like the bfayette Road, the roads were mtted dirt trails, barely useful for wagons and artiliery, The road net was

The Ratklc of f:hickamauga

141

sparse, corlsistirlg mainly d r.oc?ds leading to and from the bridges and fords that afforded crossir~gsover West Chickamauga Creek, as well as connecting with the gaps In Pigeon Mountain and kfissiona-y Edge. In more specific or ti~cticalterms, the major actions were faught b e ~ e e n Lafa)~etteRoad (running north from Lee and Gordon's Mills) on the west, aad on the east tty West Chickamauga Creek, I~eredterrekned to simply as the Chickarnauga. The Chickarrrarrgd, actually more a small river than a creek, aptly fitted the definition of a mi1itar)i obstacle.. Though it appemed sluggish and meandering, it was ten feet deep in parts and had many steep banks which not only made it uncrossable for artillery, cavalry, and compaet Esrrnations of infantry but further limited their passage to "one of the five blidges or nine fords that ogered access to the field of hattlte,'"2 The Cf-rickamauga,however, would pose a major prolskxrr to Bragg only in tbe event of a forced withdrawd, since the hulk of his major forces were engaged bettveen tafayette Road and the Chiekanrau,~a,after they had cross& the stream on the night of IS-19 Septerntier. The red problem afyecting combat at afl levels was caused by the vegetation which covered the greater part of the region. Dense &rests overlay the *nth rolling ground, broken only by cleared h m s k a d s v a ~ i n ggreatly in size and shape, planted mostly in mm or furnishing sparse pasture for cattle or hogs which were usually turned Loose to &rage in fields or forest. But it was the nature of the woods themselves that caused the militav heahches. They were made up of '"thickets, with a low growth of dowood, scrub oak, cedar, and pine, nlatted with underbmsh af blackl,err)l briars, honeysuckle, poison oak and tmmpet vine."83Thus it was the underbrush, interlaced bebeen the trees, that Iztl:cantc the reit1 obstacle to the attack-iag Confederate infantv, Not only was visibility limited to a few feet or at most some fifty yards, but the individual soldier had to struale hward, forcing his way through tandes of thickets and briars, maHrrig it impossible for him to keep his place in ranks, No longer could regiments mareh foward in shoulder-to-shoulder formations, halting ott corrlmand to fire directed vollieys, and continue to advance on order, Instead, the underbmsh and trees broke up close-ordered formations and forced companies and regiments into loose skirmish Xirres &ere the Southern soldier ofkn came into his own as an individual skimisher, His enemy, on the other hand, could take cover-his dark btue unifom coat blending into the brushy cover-and fire defensively from behind trees, brush, or throwtogether ftl-eas~orksof logs and earth. Thus, from a ~tctieianksiewoint, limited visibility so restricted fields of fire that conkolled firepower was out of the question, as would be the execution of the planned maneaxver of large trrxits above the regirnentd level. If the statement sounds a bit stuQ, it mi&t be said that the thick woods forced higher commanders to hope for the best and rely on supports and resewes once their brigades or divisions disappeared out of sight in the wiXdemess,

BRAGC CQIMklZTS HIS FORCES, 18 SEPTEMBER Brdxtsn Bragg may have had his personal m d militaw Eaults, but his decisions that had assured him of' retaining the initiative tzn the oEense were not: among them. Undaunted by the mgged terrain (perhaps even aided by it) and the pressing denrands of feeding newly arriving forees into his reorgdnizit~g army, he l-rad decided in the early morning of 18 September to clarify his earlier orders tu resume the oEerzsive, this time intetzding to use most of his availthle strengtk ,His resolve frad been reinforced by the amival that same morning of the first three brigades of hngstreet's coqs. They would be cornmanded by Major General John B. Hood, the gallant and much-admired leader who still carried his left arm in a sling because of his wound at Cettysburg. Two more brigades were due to arrive on the Nth, to be followed by the fast four and the artillery train on the 20th. Bragg lost no time in h u q i n g IIaod into action. When; his trairr pulled into Rirrggold Station, Hood was met by a courier carrying Bragg's dispatch directing him to take over eonlrnand of the right (northemmost) column from Brigadier General Bushrod Johnson, arld seize Reed's Bridge to cross the Ghickar~rauga,'X~oodhtlrried to the freight car that held his horse, With his left a m in a sling, he mounted axrd held onto the reins with his right hand. Hood applied the spurs, and his horse leapt from the train and galloped out the Reed's Bridge road."tw Bragg's amended orders of the 18th spelled out his new plan to envelop Rascerans' left (xiortlt) flank, whictr Bragg beEieved to be held only by Crittenderr's unsupported corps. By so doing, Bragg expected to cut the mutes to Rossville and McaE'arIa-ndk Gap, which would cut Roseerms' communic&ions with his new base at Chattanooga. He wolxld then roil up Crittenden's GOVS from north to south, droqs appeared to be in the center around Crawfish Springs and CIass' Milt; and McCooXi's corps seemed to be on the south, in ar beyond McLen~ure'sCove, Hence Bmgg believed that he had ajready outflanked Rosecrans on the north, but vvas also dangerously unaware of the night march of Tf!orrras\oqsI wfii~Xrw ~ t l l dend with him in positions that extended XTZosecrans7ilefi flank far northward, By the sanle token, he was ec~ilalXyignorlznt of the rnovcs of McCook's divisions, which would close his corps ~xpon CMttellden's right. This tmawawtless war; compounded by Bragg's rc;jeetion of a report ti-om Martin's cavalry division that reconnaissance elements on Pigeon Mountain had obsewed dust clouds raised by coIurnns of Union irrfaxzty marching northward orrt of %4cLemore'sGave to\vard Lee and Cordon's Mills. The end result of Bragg's Faulty intelligence and his deductions was ""evident irr his [Bragg's] orders issued that night for the nirzetcenth. No general attack order was issued, but merely a series af vague instnx~tioxss."~~ "rhe egeets of such ""instructions"' eot~ldchallenge the ixnagirlation of mill'-

Map 1-2.2

148

Chickamauga

tary obsewers. 'Fhou& Buckner knew he was expected to dvance his corps, he had no orders telfing him to coordinate his moves with Hood, In fact the latter had sat down on a log outside his headquarters on the morning of the IYth, discussing with Walker the coordination of their force movements, M e a n h i l e Bragg had ridden foward from his command post at Lee's Tanyard to observe Cheatham's division erossing at Tedforrt"~Ford to join Bucher across the Chichmauga. It was at that spot near the ford that a h u d e d messenger from PoEk caught up with Brag to infom him that reports had been canfirmed i~ldieatingthat columns of Union infantq had been marching n o ~ h ward, west of the Chi~kaWdul;a,moving owosite Bragg's ~.ightmostelements, Bragg apparently chose to ignore the warning, and merely sent Pofk further instructions to until he heard B r a g begin to attack, and then to move his command toward Tedforgs Ford as a general reseme. ""As for his own plians, Bragg vaeeIy remarked that he was moving to attack the enexny where he could find him."@ As it turned out, Polk wouldn't have to wait for the sounds of Bragg" forces engaging the enemy; instead the enemy was about to take the initiative in the matter of attackng. As recounted, on the 18th Walker had been stalled on his crossing of the Chickamarxga by the? encounter of Liddell" division of his corps with the Spencer repeating riffes sfWildeernper exploded, unleashing all the morning's hstrations on Wood. Elis voice rising, he is reported to have roared, ''What is the meaning of this, sir? You have disobeyed my specific orders, By your darnnhle negligence you are endangering the safety of the entil-e a m y , and by Cod, I will not tolerilte it. Move your division at once, as X have itlstlucted, or the eonfequerlces will not he pleasant for y o ~ r s e l f . "Whatever ~ his exwt words, their intent and impact were unmistakable, What makes the reprimand so notewo&hy is not only its severity, but the hct that it was delivered in &ant of W a g s own staff: ObviousEy, Rosecrans' rage had overridderr his reason in his failure ta call Wood aside, to rebrtke him in private and get him moving as directed. The immediate result was that Woad merely saluted, turned, and gave the orders for his troops to move fomard. Clsineidentalfy, at about 9:30 AM,, as Wood's leading .files trooped in to take

The Battie uE I:frickamauga

161

over the breashvorks from Nedey's men, the ever increasing sounds of canx~on and musketr). could be heard coming from the north, No one was more aerxtcly aware of their meaning than the army corn~nander.Rssecrans was giving his full attention to assuring himself that his divisions were presenting a solid kont to whatever attdcks Bragg could now rrroullt agtlirzst thexr~,So now the overriding question: just where would the attacks conie?

THE BAmLE TAKES A GRITlCAL TURN Of the several unusud features of the battle of Chickamauga, none is more remarkable than the eontrat b e ~ e e nthe handling of command and coritrol by the commanders of the two wings of Bragg's s m y on the morning o f the 20t.h. As relaled, matkrs in Polk's wing got only mort: confirsing as time wore on, with flriction b e ~ e e ncommanders resulting in a11 sorts of mistmderstandings and delays that extended d o m through corps, division, alzd brigade levers. In Longstreet's wing h e r e one would have e q e c t e d the "fig of war"" to have ovewhelmed a carnmander arriving in the middle of the night in strange territoq, instead order became the rule of the day, extending from the wing commander down to ewly brigade, F o l l o ~ n ghis rnidnigltt conference with Bragg and before he could take to his mu& bed on the g;round, bngstreet bad given orders to find a soldier wha h e w the local area and could serve as his guide, One Tom Brotherton, who knew "'every pig trail thrau& the wmds," reported to the new commander and did a masteh1 job of guiding 'Qld Pete" ta all the commanders and units he would visit in .the morning. tee's "old war horse," the stolid professional, uiasted no time in familiarizing himself with the terrain, his major commanders, and their troop dispositions, bdunatefy he was able to turn the tirrle being consumed by delays in Polk"s k n g to his own advantage, managing to use every minute from dayligl-rt to 11:W A.M. in learning the sit-uation on the ground, making his plans, and giving his orders. Cdntly and methodiedly he proceeded to organize his forces and form an attacking force in depth, It w s apparent that he must h a w had the lesson of Gettysburg uppermost in mind when he farmed his fclrees for his attack (see Figure: f 1.1).Instead of afigning his divisions on a broad &ant he employed Hocld's carps as the central mass, with its three divisions in depth, most with two brigades forward. Thus, Bushrod Johnson's division led the formation, foflowed next by Hood"s old division, now commanded by Brigadier General Law; and third in depth was McLws' division, composed of the brigades of Kershaw and Humphrey, which had just detrained and made a forced march to the field that morning. Atkckng on the right of Hood's sofurnn of divisions was Stewart's division of Bucher" carps, and on Haod"s left was Hindman" division, also of Bucknefs corps. Preston's division was to follow on the exbeme left, acting as wing resewe,

Figure t L. I. bngstreet's Attack Formatians

t PRESTON'S I)I\IISION L------.,.-...-.-?'"--."J I

(WING RESERVE)

C,'uzrrtesy $farfin L. %%'ilkerson.

Urrfbrtu~~atefy &EBuckner, the three divisions of his corps (Stewart's, Windman's, and Preston's) had been widely separated on the previous day by their cornmitn~entsto battle; and now the integriw of his carps had to he stlcrificed, since time and the press r>f' everlts would not atlow Longstreet the f u x w of regrouping his wing's divisions to suit the former command structure. What hngstreet was able to do, ho~vever,was to assemble a main attack column of over 11,0410 men 0x1 a front of less than h d f a mile, with its Xead elements only a half mile east of the hfayette Road-and pointed at that part of the Union line where Wctod7sdivision vvas wrnpleting its relief of' NegXey's division, I ~ n g s t r e e thad also been able to take advanrtagc of the thick wooded cover to move up and deploy tlis hrces willrout being detected by Rosecrans' forces on the Union right. &thou& he could corint an only fare-WO guns for artillev support, "Old h t e " was not in the least dismayed because the thick woods severely reduced the e&ct of a~%iUev fires and movement of the guns. Additionally, tlis infantrqi would achieve a measure of suvrise without the kind of artillery preparation that had preceded his e o q s h t t a c k at Cet~ s h r l r g .By 11:00 AM. he was able to send a nressage to Bragg "indicating that tie I3elieved he could break the enemy line if he advanced without waiting for Folk's atta~k.''~~?~ Before hngstreet could get a reply from Bragg a series of events intervened, events that \would seem to have enabled the fanner ta act without an answer to his recommendation. At some tirne in the late morning Bragg had I~ceomeso averconle with disgust and f~xstrdtionat the delays of PoXk and his gerrerals that he is said to have sent aides to Fhe division commanders of tbe right wirig, directing them to make their attxks as soon as they were ready. WThiXe it sccnls rtncertain how anc31 when such orders were received and executed, it is ce&ain that Brdgg did send orders directly to Major General Stewart of Buekner's col-ps to take his division into action. Though Stewart made a e l l a n t eEort Izis atkrck was stalled by the f ier= resislr-tneeof Branna~ls Union divisiolr. By this time Longstreet had become &lily aware of the general fai1ur.e of the right wing's pieeexned atpacks as well as the necessity to attack before any more enemy forces in his front could be reinforced, Mow the cornxnitxnent of Stewart of his own wing sent a clear ntessage to b~ngstreet that the tirne had eonte for action, and bngstreet was nlaking final preparatioxrs far his attack. Probably the busiest eornmancf post on either side on the morning of the 20th was that of Rosecians at the Wido~wGIenn's house. From hours before sunrise txntif late morning, Genera1 C a h e l d and his assistants were eoxtstantly occupied in receiving messages, dispatching couriers, pasting maps, writing orders, ill! the myriad activities that ga with mnning an army headquarters in the midst of battle, Bosecrarrs fends an insiglrt in his after-action report, refen-ing to activities after he had returned .from checking on his line, sometime after midmorning: "The battle, in the meanwhile, roared wit11 increasing fury,

and approached [i.e., increased] from the left to the center. Two aides arrived successively within a few minutes from Cmerril Thsmas, =king fnr reenforcernents, . . . [another] message from Generd Thornas soon foElawed, that he was heavily pressed, Captain Kellogg, aide-de-camp, the bearer infoming me at the same tirne that General Braanan [Brannan's division] was out of line, and General Reynolds' right was exposed. Orders were dispatched to General Wood to close up on Reynolds, and word was sent to Generd Thornas tbat he should he supported, even if it took away the whole corps of Crittenden and McCook.""%e hi&ly sig,nif-icsntplhmse "that General Brannan was out of line, and Ceneml Reynoldshight was exposed"' btlecornes ominous in the light of what folfowed Captain Keflogg's r e p m b Rasecrans. So rnmy fateful events follwed h e warning that a close look at what led up to itand what was set in motion by it-desepves closer attention. Gagkin Sanford C. Kellogg had come up from the ranks, rising Eram a sergeancy in the 37th New York to an appointment as an aide-de-camp to General Thornas just before the Tullafnorna p b s e of the eampaim. As mentioned in Etosecralzs' repox.t, Kellogg was delivering a message from m a m a s requesting reinforcements, and had amived about XO:30 A.M. Tbere are varied accounts of the obsematians that Kellogg made en route, mainly the eonclusisn that he could not have seen Brannan" battle line-actually extending from Repoldss "'exposed rightm-because of the thick woods that intemened b e k e e n that line and the wad dong which he was riding at the time. It theredtitre appears best to rely s n the account and findings of Generd John B. Turehin, who was not only a professional militav observer but d s o the cornmander of the 3rd Brigade of Reynold's division during the battle: Capt. KelXagg, an ai&-de-c~mp of Gen. Thornas? coming to Gen. Rosecrans with another request. far reenforcements for the Eefi, reparted at the sane time &at ""Brannan's division was out of Eine, and that f"feynofdsn&t:was exposed." Gdlaping along the line and being in a hurry to reach Gen. Bosecrans, Kellogg stopped ta hear the statement from Gen. Reynolds &at his flank was in the air and expsed. Accepting it as a fact, Kellog reported it to the general eornmmding. But there was no brerrk in the Eine. . . , Brannan" division stood in line with King"s brigade of Reynalds. Pressed so much with business, Rosecrans credited the report: and ordered his ad&-de-camp Maj. Band to write that order to Wood, which proved so fat4 to us.103 In a moment, mare a b u t the fatal order. It is important to note &at aut-horities agree that Rosecmns was understandably quite busy at the tim, and moreover that Gdr=ld dso W= occupied at the tirne with d t i n g orders to Generals Sheridan and Davis. Yet it is qestionable that Rosecra~~s should haw been too busy to turn his attention to getting a &U exp1an;rtion h r n Kelfogg in de'cemining how and why such a dangeraus gap could have existed in his amy's line. In m y case, it is clear that Rosecrans did turn to Major

Bond, insted of Ga$eU, and told him to write an order, which Band cornposed and wrote in his own words: Headquarters Department of CumberXmd Septe~nkrY;?Oth-10:45 AA. Brigadier-General Wood, Commanding Division:

The general commanding directs that you close up on ReynoXds as fast as possible, and supporZ him. Respeetfirlly, etc. Frank S. Band, Ma~orand Aide-de-camp.

Then, withoat Rusgcram r'zrruing rgad the order, Bond labefed it '6Gdlop9" gave it to Lieutenant Colonel Lyme Sbrfing, md asked him to deliver it to Generd Woad. It took Starling only about five minutes ride ta reach Woad, and he handed it to him personafly at 19:55 A.M. Wood is reported to have read the order carefully and placed it in his pocket notetowk. W%at happened-and didn't happen-in the next few minutes determined the outcome of the battle of Chiehmmga. Brigadier General Thornas f. FYood was a thorough pmfessiand who had graduated liAh in his West Point class d e n Ulysses S. Grant (graduating thirty-eighth in his class) had been his roammate. Be had served with distinction in the Mexican War, distinguishing himself at Buena Vista, and later became a lieutenant colonel of cavalry. iiZ. the shrt: of the war he helped raise @,Q00 Indiana volunteers, and soon rose to general affrcer rink, He commanded his division under Rosecrans at Stones River, where his was the only division that had steadily held its position in the Union center, solid proof of his mord courage. And, it is inlportant to note, this was also the man who WM still smarting from his humiliating c h e l ~ n gout in front of his own staff only a short time before, m a t Wood could have done, as a professiond soldier and a general officer, was to question the order, since his division" skimishers had been hotly engaged to their immediate front and he knew that pulling his command out of Xine with an enemy attatk imminent would create a hi&ly dangeruus situation (see Map l f .4). He aIso h e w that the Widow Glenn's hhouse was only 600 yards to his rear, and it would have taken him anXy five minutes ta ride back to Rosecrms and voice his concern in person about such a qestionabfe orcfer," What Wood did do, &er pocketing the? order, was to send immediate orders to his three brigdde e o m m d e r s , diwcting &em to face their brigades about, march them to the rear, put them in march columns, march around the rear of Brannan's divisian, and move io aecuyy support positions in rear of Reynalds" division. While such a decision and the orders that followed it appear no less than incredible from a $etached vievoint, it can only be said for our immediate concern with the battle that, while Wood's orders were being executed, a gap of several hundred yards was being opened in the Union

Map 11.4

The Battle of Chlckamauga

167

fine at the very marnent when it cautd he exptczited by tfic acfvancing mass of bngstreet" divisions. FVherr Longstreet heard the sudden outbreak of firing to his right front, his apprehension was somecvhat relieved after he teamed that B r a g bad sent orders directly to Stewart to attack with his division, Stifling his annoyance at the interkrenee with his chain of command, Longstreet immediately sent for Generals Hood and Busflrod. johnsc~rr,and at 11:10 4 , ~ gave . them the order to attack at once. Johnson's lead brigades, Fultan's and McNair's, led out smartly, their advance through the thick woods taking them tokvard: the Brotherton farm directly ahead. They took only ten minutes to reich and cross the Lafayette Road. What followed when Johx-tson" leadix-tg trclol3s crtrne upon the gap created by Wood"s withdrdwal has been related vividly by Shelby Fsote: "As they surged across the dusty road and tlie open field beyand. . . they enct~untered galling fire fi-orn the lefi and right, where Nindnlan and b w [Stewartv were hotly erzgaged, but almost none &om directly ahead, Welcome thaugl~this was, they found it strar~geuntil they found out why. Entering the woods on the b r side, they scrambled over the desertred b r e a s ~ o r k sand taught sight, dead & e d and still within easy reach, of the last of 'CVood's bbrigades in the act of c a r ~ i n gout the order to 'close up on and support' ReystoIds. Yelling, the Confederates stmck the vulnerable blue column Bank and rear, sittingduck fashion, and, as Johnson described the brief action, 'cast the shattered 6agInents to the right and left.""""OS It seems that Bushrod Johnson was not only a superb leader but ~dlentedwhen it came to dramatizing the sudden success af his men after they had broken through the Union line: "The scene now presented was unspedkably grand, The resoIute and impetuous chturge, the msh of cltxr heavy columns sweeping out from the shadow and doam of the forest into the open 6eEds Wooded with sunlight, the glitter of arms, the onwdrd dash of artillery and mounted men, the retreat of the h e , the shouts of the hosts of our army, the dust, the smoke, the noise of firearms-ofvwhistling balls and @apeshot and of bursting shelf-made a battle scene of unsurpassed grandeur,"l"M)In less dramatic terns Johnson's brigades were able to maintain the momentum of their attack until they had penetrated dmost a mile beyond their first encounter. In fore-five minutes they had destroyed a Union brigade and captured nineteen grrns and a large bag o f prisoners. Remarkable as that breakthrou& had been, it was being rivded by the smashing success of Hindmanss division on the left of hngstreet's attack, Hindman was reaping a stroke of good fo&wnc: that exceeded even fohnson". His leading briPdes, those of Deas and Manigawlt, followed dosely by Anderson's, caught the divisions of both Davis and Sheridan in march column as they were moving north to close up and support: Tl~omas,Coming on with the rebel yell, the Confederates stmck Davis first, whose men got off only a few random shots before their eolurnns were shattered. The fugitives fleeing reaward spredd panic throclgh She~dan'smarching brigades, which were swept away to min-

$e with the Wood that rzow lla~xredreamrard and u p the road toward McFarXanZs Cap. The overall result of the debatcIe was that, in the words of i.2 Union omcer who ohsewed the spectacle, McCook's corps was wiped off the The scattered islands of field without any attenlpt at any real resi~tance,~' resistance that h m e d were swept a w q "like flecks of h a n ~upon a river." As Foote oizsellred, Mecook himself became one of those Becks, and Sherihn and Ravis were RNO more. In contrast to Johnson's dramatic description of events Longstreet's accounting was a masteqiece of laconic summation: ''As we approached a seco~ldline [Davis' and Sheridan's divisions], Jobnson"~ divisiorl happened to strike it while in the act uf changing position of some of the t m p s , charged upon and carried it, capturing some artiller)., Hood's and Hindman's troops pressing in close wnnection, This atpack forced the pa&s of the Twentietlt and Twenty-first Corps from that part of the field, back over in d i s d e r e d retreat, and part of NegJey's division of the M i s s i o ~ l aRidge, ~ Fou~eenthCorps by the same impulsion,""""' At some point during the disaster to the Union right, a Canfedemte shell struck the Widow Clenn" house, setting it afire. As events had unfolded, it no longer mattered to Roseerans and his staff. They had taken to the field, and now, at the height of the rout of the divisions of Davis and Sheridan, were hHy m u p i e d in tqing to haft and r l l y the flood of ffu@tives,Although they had waded into the Asod with drabm sabers, desperately trqiing to stop the frenzied horde, they too became "flecks of foam" on the rushing river that had cal-ried away Dwis, Sheridan, and McCook. By noon Roseerans had given up, and though he md Cafield. and three others of his staff were no longer carried 01-1,the crest of a toment, they rode along with it toward McFarland's Cap. When his par@ rrexhed a fork in the Dry Vdley Road-a fork that would beconle more symbolic in the commander's decision than a physied feature on the ground-Roseeran says in his o%ciaX r e p o ~that after ""krdring the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the fefi had held its ground, and started for RossviXIe, On csnsultatian [with Ca&eld] and reftection, however, I detemined to send General CaAetd there, whife 1 went to Chattanooga, to give orders for the security of the pontoon bI-idges at Batde Creek and Bridgeport, and to make prelirnina~dispositions either to foward arnnlunition and supplies, shouId we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position."1t""In his personal story. of the battle, witten ~ e n t y - f o u ryears later, Rosecrans not surpfisinglly went into detail in his version of the hurried conference that followed after they had halted at the fateful fork, He states that he made clear to Gnrfield and Major Bond his fears that hngstreet wouId exploit his success by capturing their supply trains and then "hwill turn the rear of our left [Thornas~ernhattleddeflemsef, seize the gap at Rossville, and disperse us." Hlrle then went on to cite a series of six detailed orders intended ""L) provide agAxrst what may happen." At this point one can imagine Cafield's consternation in tr)ring to cope with such a flood of orders while tving to cateh his breath, just &er dismounting at the raad-

'I'lkcr: Battle of Chlekamauga

168

side. Rosecrans must have redized his chief of stars dismrzy, far he paused to ask, ""Cenerd Cafield, can you not give these orders?"' GafieXd is related to have replied, "General, there are so many of them, I fcar 1 might make some mistake; but I can go to General Thornas for you, see bow things are, tell him what you will do, and report to you." car field"^ answer must have been convincing, frtr Rosecrms states h a t he then told Garfield, ' V e v well. I will take Major Bond arrd give the orders nnyselJ: X will h in Ghag~nuogn as soon us posgibb" "[italics added]. He went on to rcmind Garfietd &at the army had a telegraph statiun at Rossville from kvhich repods could he sent to him; then the two vvent their separate wayselm There is a great deal more behind the wording in the ogcid report and Rosecrans' later version of events than merely showing Bosecrans, the logisticim, &ing over from Rcrsecrans, the tactician. One sees revealed behind the words the cornmnder who has giver1 up the I>&fle, and, instead of going foward to lead his other corps and tving to save the rest of his embattled amy, sends his chief of staff to find out what has happened and re~fortbaek. Such a decision pints a sad pictul-e inbed, though there have been substantial argurrlents defending bsecrans' actions in the Xight of an u~~dersbndablc concern fir saving all his forces in the face of the threat of' a ~ w e r f uenemy l expf oitation. How greatly the combination of menbl despair and physical stress may have influenced Rosecrans' thoughts and decisions by the time he and Cadeld were confening at the roadside can only be sumised. Aeeording to tucker"^ sources, Rosecrans w s "physicdly exhausted, broken in spirit, errrotionally jamed and confused. Rasecrans had to be helped kom his horse when he reached the house where department headquarters had been set up [the new a m y command post in Chattanooga]. . . He sat with his head in his hands, as beaten and shattered as his right wing,''tmThough this description is based on the account of one obsewer (Captain Affred L. Hough of Cenerd Rfegley's stam, it is nut unreasonalbie to conclude that Rosecrms" decisions and actions, at those critical times afier the collapse of his amy's right, were not those af a commander who still had command of all his personal powers-or command of his forces that were still fully engaged with the enemy, If Rosecrans was driven to despair dter the coUapse of his .rr'gbt, one might expect that B r a would be wercorne with joy at Longstreet's suecess and eager to shift fumes to exploit the breakthrou& by his left wing. Strange ns it seems, sornettling quite the opposik was to Eollow, When S-xzngstreet realized the full extent of the resulks of his breakthrough, he was quick to perceive that the time had come to take advanhge of the apportuniv presented. As a skitfed tactician, he knew what was expeekd of a conixnander under the eircumstances-after all, the wl-iole object of rrraking a penetration was to create wtificiaf Banks in the enemy's front, Banks that had to be enveloped in order to roll up the enemy's 1Iine and finis11 him off. With that realization uppermost

in mind, fangstreet was cager to report to B r a s that the time had corne to &eel his forces to the right and exploit his breakthrough. Since bngstreet had not heard &orn his m y commander since midmorning, he wasted no time in complying with Bragg's ssurnntons to meet with him at 3:W P.M. Mter describing the results of his breakthrough and the immediate steps he had taken on his own, hngstreet, in his own words, went on as fdlows: "Ithen oEered a suggestion of the way to finish our work that he abandon the plan for battle by our right wing, or hold it in defence, draw off a force from that front. , .join them with the left wing, move swiftly down the Dry Vdley road, pursue the retreating forces, land] occupy the gaps of the Ridge behind the enemy standing betbre our ri&t [Thornas' defensive positions]," Brag's reaction to the recornmendation must have taken Longstreet completely aback, as he went on to describe it: 'Be was disturbed by the fdlure of his plan and the setrere repulse of his right: wing, and was little prepared to hear suggestions from subordinates from other moves or progressive work. His words, as f recall them, %re: 'There is not a man in the right ~ n who g has any fighit in him.' Fmm accounts of his other operations f tvas prepared fbr halting work, but this, when the battle was at its tide and in partid success, wm a little smvrising. His hrrmar, however, was such that his subordinate was at a loss for a reopening of the discussion. I-Ze did not wait, nor did he express approval or disapprt~valof the operations of the left ~ n g but , rode for his head-qustet-s at Reed's Br-idge. There was nothing for the left ~ n togdo but work along as best it In spite of Langstreet's talent for undersbtement and his use of "work"Yor planning and executing operations, his description of the meeting (as well as that of several observers) and Its outcome a-flows one to draw three conclusions: Bmgg did not or did not want to comprehend the significance of his subordinate's astounding success; he would not listen to recommendation for exploiting the success of his left wing; and, for all apparent purposes, he had sumendered control of the battle, leaving a, major force commander to Iris own resources. In other words, there would not be a general pursuit of the beaten Union right, no major move by Confederate forces to cut off the routed enemy, nor a reinfomement of the left wing to enable it to defeat the stilf-standing forces of the enemy. THOMAS BECOMEIS THE "ROCK OF CHlCUMAVGA''

Throughout the Stones River and the Chickamauga campdms Rasecrans had ir~creasinglyrelied cm the judgement and general character of M@or Cenera1 Ceorge Henry Thon~ar;,the commander of the XTV C o q s and the general who cotxld be considered the amy"s secand-in-command, so much was the tmst p l z e d in him. Rosecms' rellanee on Thornas must have had its bundations in the ol;>posing facets of their two natures. As Peter Cozzens has obsewed, "Where Rosecrans was impulsive and excitable, George H. Thsmas

was rrlethudical and phlegmatic, where Roscwans was voluble and moody, Thornas chose his words carefuHy and dways seemed in good Moreover, Thornas was a solid professic>nal, a waduate of the West h i n t class of 1840 wht9 had stayed in the regular a m y up through the start of the war, despite the h t that he was a native Virginian, one of the few who Inad chosen to stay with the Union, His rocklike character was matched by his physicd appearance, ''Pap" "'TIzornas,as llis troops cdled him, was a huge man, standing a solidly ereet six feet, and weighing 200 pounds, with what a srafl: officer &led a "lmnirte appearance.'"His solidity was accentuated by his brad shoulders, his square jaw, heavy brows, a d piercing blue eyes, He was as honest and fctrthri&t as he was unassuming, having no overridirsg ambition or thirst h r dory, even eontirluing to wear a cojonel's eagle far so~netime after he had been promoted to brigadier general, He canre as near to being bved bp his troops as any Union genel-ttl, nut only from his Xlrequent appearance anrrong them, but more for the care he took for their wetfa=. This was the man on whom Roseemns had relied to fowl the bullval-tr of the army's defense from the first day of the battle, and who was ROW having to shouXder the responsibility for not only haldir~gthe positions of his carps against heavy odds, but saving what could be raflied of the whde of the army, He did all that with the courage and tactical skill that earned him the title "Rock of Chickamauga. " As might he expected of a general of Tkomas' capabilities, the cornmancf of the army could not have been thrust upon him as a suvrise; on the contrary, he became increasingly aware of the collapse of the Union right throu& reports, encounters with subordinate commanders, nlld personat &sewation of what had happened. Aec~rciingly,as he k~~xnd his right flank being forced back at an ever increasing angle, he was taking measrxres to raEIy the scattered units of the divisions of Wood, Melfley, and Van Cleve to bolster his right against the threat of hngstreetk iirnpex~ding&tack. His main anchor on his extreme right was Brannan's division, on which he had to form the elements from the ixforernentioned divisions. At the same tin~ehe was striving to bolster his left and center-the latter being forced into an arc-shaped defensive postureagainst the attacks of the divisions of Folk on Bragg's right wing (see Map l1.5)' As shown, the whole of Thornas' defensive line was eventually bent into a rough semicircIe, facing, on the north and ewt, Forrest's eavalry and the attacking divisions of Polk, and on the south the divisions of Longstreet, which had beconle the greatest threat by miMtemoon. Longstreet's attacks were thrown at TllomasP right (initially Brannan's division and a large part af Wood9s) and that exposed flanfr. First there were attacks, led by Kershaw's division, which were repeatedly repulsed, then a series of attacks by Bushrod Johnson's and Hindman's ddivisioxzs which came within a r;azar"s edge of sueeess, only to be beaten back by unexpected help which, in the nick of time, saved Thornas' force from being cut QEand encircled. Major Cenerd Cordon

Map 11.5

The Rattle of Chiekamaugs

173

Crdnger, commanding the reserve corps an the far north, heard and obsewed the battle raging to the south. Acting on his own, in a deservedly ;acclaimed show of initiative, he sent Brigadier Genera1 James Stecdmtrrl southward on a forced march to arrive and deploy into line on Brannan's right, just in time to throw back the Confederate assault that would have sn~ashedthe exposed Union flank. hngstreet's attacks continued throuffh the late aftenlaon-bngstreet admitted later to no less than ~ e n t y - f i v eattacks by various elements-until he had committed the last of his divisions, Preston", in attacks that were also thrown back, They were repulsed tty a grimly detem~ineddefense that was bolstered throu&out by Thornas' show of personal leadership along the line. Zn the meantime, GaAeXd had made his now fanzous ride (one that wuXd be refemed to years later during his candidacy for the presidency) to amive at Thomas' side by 3:35 P.M. "W7e have repulsed e v e v attack so far," Thornas told him, ""and we can hold our ground until the enemy cm be kept from our reltreWH3 Cadeld wisted no time in writing a detailed report to Rosecrans, infoming him of the masterftll dcfense that Thomas' troops were making, even stating, ""Ihink we may in the main retrieve our morning disaster," adding that there w a a r e d need for the replenishment of animunitiotl, and dating the dispatch 3:45 F.M. When the exhausted Roseerans had r e d Garf"iel$'s report, he sent back a message to Thornas at 4:li5: Major-Cenerd Thornas: Assume command of all the farces, and with CrittencEen and McCoak, take a strong position arid assume a threatening attitude at RosstPilIe. Send aZ1 the unorgmized force to this place for re-arganimtian. 1: wit1 examinc the ground here and make such dispositions for defense as the case may require and join you, Have sent ammunition and rations, W. S. Rssecrarls Major-Cenerdlk4

Clearly this was not an order from a commander who would go foward and take contrs) of hmes that were still enga:aged with repulsing an enemy obviously detemined to finish off his amy. It was a directive from a cornmstnder who (I) has turned over command of his renldning combat power to his second-in-eummand and (2) has on his mind only preparations h r defense on the momow, As for Thornas, it was equdly clear that he wds Eully occupied with ''taking up a strong defense and assuming a threatening attitude." At last, as late afternoon was turning into dusk, Thamas was able to withdraw his battered divisions from the east side of his perimeter, beginning with ReynoIds on the south, followed praglressively by the three divisions to the nodh, and Endly the o&ers from the south side of his line. It was a brilliantly conceived apemtion and well executed, especially with nearly exhausted

troops in the face of all eneltly ~Icterrninedctn their destruction, It is to Thenlas' enciurixlg credit that he Esad sat.cct the entire arnry and had followed that hi eve merit by getting his divisioras safc.1~w a y by wily of McFarfanrll';~Gal;, md Rassville. Back in Clsattilnougii, Rosecrans hacl followed his orders to Thornas with another dispatelz, this time a te1egran-r to \iZhasfiington: Ciiattar~ooga,Tcnn,, September 20, 18W-5

r,M.

M ~ J Gen. . H, IJalXeck Ccnerat-in-ChieE 'tVe havc nret with a serious disaster; extent not yet ascertained, Thc enenly ovemrl~elmrvf, rrs, drove our rigl~t,pierced our ccnter, and scattered trr~ogsetreyvhere, Thornas, who bad se'tc'er~divisions, remained intact at fast news. Granger, with two brimdes Irild gtJne to support ?rhornas on the left. Every t-esexw was used when the rnen staml2ected. Burnside will he notified of the state of thirxgs at once, and you wiff be infoi-~nedi.'Prr~opsfrom Charlcston, Floridit, Virginia, md all along the seaboard are forrrld among the r~risoncrs.It seems &at even. abailat3le man was tlzrown against us. W. S. Roscerans

Major-General, Commanding"""

AFTERMATH

The roudl and ever ready Xathan Bedford Farlest was in the sacldfe by dwvn of the %Tst, and by early morning had his t r o o ~ ~ e rsecluting s within a mile of Wossville. On a spur of Misslonar). Rirlge his troopers had caught four Union Signal Corps nsen ititerally up a tree in their improvised signal stdtion. field gjasses, and clirnt->edthe tree to Forrest c ' 2 ~ ~ r r ~a ~pair ~ ~of' d ca12tured ly sec thi~lgsfor himself. At 9:00 A.M. when he came down, he sent a galloper to Itis wing eor~~maadcr witEl a report, asking Polk to fc~~~warcl it to Bragg: Cen'X We are in a mile of ElossviIlie. f-Irxve beer) on the point of Missionaq Ridge can see Chattanoogii ancl eveytlting around. The Enexrxqs trains are leaving going arouxxd the Point of hokout Mountairr. The prisoners captured report k o pontoons thrown across for the pusflose of retreating. I think they are evacmting as Eiard as they can go. They are cutting timber down to otsstrrlet otlr passage, I think we ought to push fogward as rapidly as possible, Res~>ectfrxlly etc. N. B. Forrest Brig Cen [To] Lt. Cen L. Folk Ptease fonvnrd to Cen BraggIl6 Forrest waited in vain for a reply, When he realized that one wasn't eoxning, he sent a second dispatch directly to Bragg, urging immediate action, clirnaxing it with the arssertion that Chattarluoga could be taken with a brigade of infantry if the opportuni.t-y could be seized, After getting no reply to either

The Battle of (:hitkarnauga

175

Blessage, Forrest rode back to remonstrate with Bt.ttgg in persoxl, Despite Forrest" surging, Bragg still tltorrght he had good reasons to hesitate before making what miiy have seemed to [rim an impetuous advance. His losses had been frightful, his troops were exl~artstedafter the heaviest figl~tingmost l i d ever seen, there were as yet ncl trains far Longstl-eet's troop sul>fiy, and all of the army's soldiers were about to go on half' rations until the supply tririns eottld catch up. 111 short, there would be no authorimt.ion for a pursuit of Rosecrans' hrces. Xf the rest of tlre generals----ancl the army-had brown of the decision at the tinre, they would have shared Fornest's disgust as he rode t~ackto his command, All that was yet to come. What followed the clirzraetie events of 20 Septcmf7er has been summarized in the Mfest h i n t Atln~ofl Arnericgn Wars: ''By the night of 21 September, Rosecriins had withdri~kvninto Chatt-anooga, He lzad succvrx-tbed to a defeatist attitucje, wecpted investxnet~t,and tllrrs surrcndered his ability to maneuver, His troops occupied and been to strengthen the fortifications left e;-trlier by the Confederates; his eavdw was posted. . . to protect lzis line of supply . . . and to wart1 of Confederate attenlpts to crctss the river. , . . By the same night Bragg had invested Ci-rattanooga,posting the brigade of Brig, Gen. E, blcIver Law in tlze valley to the s o u t h ~ e s t . " ~ ~ ~ By the next day, it was becoming evident to Bragg that he watxld have to choose between three courses of action, none of which xnust have seemed palatable to him. First, being in positicsn to manerrIrer (in comparison t s Rosecrans' unenviable situation), he eould adapt a lesson learned from his opponent and outflank Rosecrans by crossing the Tennessee, thus cutting his coxnmunications arzd isolating his army. Second, he could move in force agairzst his enerxry's as yet incomplete befelzses, storm the fortificatiorzs, and destroy Rosecransharrxzy or force it to surrender. Third, he could ocetxpy the high s o u n d which looked down on Gl~attarrooga,besiege the Ux~ionarmy, and stame it into stirrer~der.IXe decided on the third, thus Ieading to the siege of Ghattanooga and its disastrotrs outcome for the Confederacy.

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The ?tYo Perspectives of Chickamauga One of the surest ways to turn an Amer;iean sbdent away from a love of history is for him to find in his textbook such passages as "Xn September of f86i3, 66,00Q Confederate troops under General Braxton Bragg defeated 58,000 Union troops under Genera1 William S. Rosecraos in the battle of Chickamauga," C~eainXythe facts are there, but to say that they leave the bored student unimpressed is an understatement. Even if he were forced to swdlaw this stale art9he would never digest it. So it would be with us if we were left with merely finding out how close Bragg's a m y came: to destroying Wosecrans" farces vvithout discovering the "'why" behind each arnmander's ability to control events, From what we have seen in the early stages of the campaign, each a m y commander had a deduced mission to guide his planning and operations*""Deduced"" because each was operating under general, directives kom his government teHing the commander &at was expected of him, but leaving the details of its execution to him. In Rosecrans' ease, despite his reeuming run-ins with the hi$ commmd in Washington, it was unhrstood &at he w s expected to clear the Confederates out of east Tennessee and open the South .to invasion. by way of Chatbnooga. Bragg's mission evolved through several sbges, beginning with the strategic concentration of forces to reinforce his a m y in the Ghattanool;a area to enable him to take the oEensi.ve against Union forces in the tvestern theater, Unfortunately for Bragg, his oEensive was greempted by Rosecrans, who took the initiative by crossing the Tennessee Ever and advatneing in farce with the evident intent of cutting Brag's esmmunimtions and caqturing Chattanooga. Brag, thou& farced temporarily on the strate@c defensive, set an o13jective af first trying to attack and destroy widely separated forces of Roseeranshmy. When those eEorts fiailed, he altered his missian

by setti~zghimself new ol~jeetives:to cut his opponent's vital Iink to Chattanooga by turning his northern Bank, then destroying his army irt t k valley bebveen the Chickamauga and Missionay Ridge. Bemuse both cornmandershuperatiorrs had to be redirected &er 4 Septernbcr (the day that Roseerans began crossing dre Tennessee), it suits our puqose to see how each commander proceeded to c a r q orrt his niission aAer tlxat date. During the critical two weeks that follocved, each had to reconsider fris I ence reconcept of operation, based mainly on how he e d u a t e d his intttl'g gardirlg his enemy. To begirl, each had tlre hult of overestirrrating his enemy's strength, though nut to the heights of hyperbole that Cenemf George B. MeClellan flad raised to an art form. fn Rosecms\ease, his irltelfige~lcecapability was clippfed by his thinly stretched cavl-11~ screen, which was hcId at bay by Conkclcrate cavdf?~that was superior in numbers and in quality. In Bragg's case it a13pears that he allowed his cavalry carps ledders, Fonest a ~ r dFVheeler, too much Latitude in securing the army's flmks, while not placir~genough emphasis on @thering infom~ationon the movexnent of Union forces in the amy's hnt-in the valley & b e e n the Ghickanrauga and bfissionav Ridge. Then tao, Bragg himself may have been at h u l l when he chose to downplay the signitiance of reports from Wheeler and Polk indicating that ntajor erlenly forces were moving on the Dry. Valley Road, In weighing the impact of each commander's evaluation of intelligence tm his opemions, significant changes enzerge: a marked shift in each leader's coxlcept of aperdtion after the Uniorr arrlty had goitten across the Tennessee. We have already seen the impact on Masecrans when he linalEy credited his intelligence with the fact that Bragg was no longer retreating in disarray taward Dalton and Atlanta, but was instead regrowping his forms to get heheen the Union army and Ghattanooga and even attack one or Inore of its widely separated corps. The shock of this realization seexns to have aKected Roseemns>~ate of mind-to the extent that he no Ionger thought of hixnself as the hunter, but the hunted, In comparison to his opponent, Bragg's transition &on? a corrrmsxtder who was leading a forced retrograde to one who turned an his enerny and attacked him was progressive in nature, more of a seqticnec of responses to a developing situa.ti;on, DouhtEess frc was caught off guard by the success of Kc~secrans' river crossing, which came suddenly and was unopposed by Bragg's unprepard forces, But when he was forced to give up Ghattanooga, Bragg not only made an orderly withdrawat to recoup his fc~t-ces,but also enlpfoyed deceptive measures (like the programmed ""deserters" who did a good job of misleading Bosecrans) that, for a time, caused his enenly to ~ u s hhis widely spread corps in "pursuit," Yet even while be was falling back and had temporarily deceived his enemy &out his intentions, Bragg showed Mashes of indecision before he made ttp his rrtind on the night of 9-10 September to atbck Thomas' exposed force, Negiey's division in MeLemore's Cove. After that abortive attack, Bragg still sought to dekat his opponent in detail, this

The 'hvo Perspectiv~sof Ghtckamauga

1 79

tirnc on a larger scale, by attacking Grittenden" corps on the 13th. Though that attack also Fdifed, Bragg deserves credit for his resoXve to ctontinue the offensive by committing his entire m y to the all-out puvose of cutting OR Rosecrans' army ancl destroying it. Thus Bragg lzad managed to make the transition frorn an autnzaneuvered commander to one who could take the oEensive when the situation presented the opportuni9, Regardless of how the circurnsbnces m y have been hrced on him-through his own shortcomings or the failures of some subordinates to c a v out his plans-he showed b t he could make tile reversd of roles frorn hunted to hrrnter. That fie failed to pursue the latter mle to its final end has to be the subject of closer examination. It is obvious that the decision-making process had dready been set in xnotion once each commander had revised his concept of operation. It should be borne in mind, however, that a Civil War a m y commander, like most commanders thrt~u&out histov, had to make his decisions under two vastly difiisrent sets of circtarnstances, When sleveloping (or changing) his concept of operation, he was dlowed plenty of time fsl- reflection and, if he wished it, consultation with staE and subordinate commanders. On the other hand, when he had to m&e timely decisions during a battle, his whole art of eornmmd was challenged, involving not only his professional skills but his whole intellect as wet1 as his physical stamina-all having to respond at the same time under the stress of battle. When considering Elosecrms' handling of the art, his persond chwaeter appears to intervene in a discernible way under both sets of circumstances. Them can be no doubt resrding his skXXs as a strategist, He continued to displq them from the time he outrnmeuvered Bragg in the TuIlahonsa pbme of the campaign to the subsequent phases when he crossed the Tennessee and forccred Bragg to give up Cl-\att.anoo@and withdraw into Georgia, Yet, as we have seen, his boldness as a strategist turned to caution when he decided that he must go on the tactical defensive because he could no longer bring his enemy to battle on his terms. Because of that pivotd decision d X his actions as a tactidaxl became reactions to his enernyts maneuvers. Whe&er the decision was caused by a failure of mord courage is debaeable, but it is certain that a facet of his character-mnnifcsted by his changed slnte $mind---inkenced his decision. IVI-zatever that eharacte~stiewndy have been, it shows up even more markedly under the latter circumsbnces-Rosecransf decjsicrns made during the heat of battle. rrhroughout the most critical periods, when the b a ~ l ewas at its hei&t an the 2Oth, he continued to demonstrate that he w s in full contmt. of events on his sick. He was out and making a personal inspection of his lines at ditybrenk, visiting his commanders and their tmclps, riding past ~ g i ments in their battle positions (the 6th Ohio of his native state cheering him as he rode past), and m&ing on-the-spot adjustments to ensure that his defensive fines were intact. Back in his headquarters, he made sure that he was lbllwing ever)" development in the situation; he made decision after decision

without hesitation, and, with one hteful exception, issued coherent and timely orders. He continued to show confidence in his conduct of aEairs, and it showed when his florees continued to repulse one major attack after a11ot:her. Then evevthing changed when Longstreet's breakthrough piled disaster upon disaster on the right of the Union line. It is easy to understand that ttne personal ef\farts of Rosecrans t.o quell the panic and rally his troops had to be useless in the face of the ovewhelming Rood of fugitives, but what. happened aAer he and Garfield had time to dismount and catch breath is another matter. His decision to abandon the battle by riding off to Chattanooga, while sending GaheXd to Thornas, was as darnaging to his image as a cornrrtander as it was to the fate of his anny. It showed the world, as Tfuclcer has pointed out, "that Rosecrans had an ematic tesnpemrnent incompatible with the high responsibilities of a m ~ yleadership, His superior talents might c a him ~ through nine times out of ten, but a great general allnot faif SO utterfy in the tenth emcrgeney."'18 If '"emtic temperament" sseems too gene& a tern, one cannot dismiss a failure of nerve, which calls to mind a maim of Napoleon's that should have come up in the discussions in Mhan's Napoleon Club in Rosecrans' West Point days; "The first quality for a commander-in-chief is a coo1 head, which receives a correct: impression of things. He sklozlld not allow himself to be confused by either good or bad Much has been macte of the egeets an Rosecrans' demeanor in the hours after his disaster when he had retired to Chattanooga. "Helped from the saddle," "'a sknned appearance,'band the like are common among the descriptions of his reactions-all dramatizing the distress of a leader who has suffered a devastating blow of ill fortune, WhiIe one cannot fail to empathize with Rosc-tcrdns' plight, the cold logic of Napoleon's s m i m desewes to be the pn'mary consideration, as Tucker has pointed out. In any case-character flaws or Napoleonic maxims asidethe fact remains that Rosecrans made the decision that resulted in his leaving the field and relegating conduct of the batrfe to a subordinate. In Brmton Bmgg? case, there is a curious dichotomy bet-uveen his hility to make vitd lieeisions in a reflective, strategical sense and his capability under the stress a f command in battle. This singular diEerenee was manifested when he made the decision to concentrate his forces after the evacuation of Chattanooga and take the ogensive with a new objective of cutting off Rosecrans' a m y and destroying it, While it has seemed fashionable to denigrate Bragg's abilities as a field commander, his percipience and flexibility of mind as a strategist should not be overlooked in this phase of the campaign. When it came to m&ing decisions in the midst of battle, the diEerence b e ~ e e nBragg's and Rosecranst state of mind becomes evident in their reactions to criticaf krns in the hattfe: Bragg appeared to be unbending in his adherence to his original plans, while Rosecrans seemed to react: continually to perceiwd changes. The latter didn? hesitate to make rnarly changes in the deployment of his farces, constantly shifting divisions-even brigades-to meet what he pemeived to be the denlands of the tactical sitrxation.

The Wo brspeclives of Chickannauga

181

Conversely, once Bragg had made his tacticd decisions and issued his orders he appeared to take on an doofness to unfolding events. On more than one accasion, after eonsufting with a commander during an action, he vvould retire ta his command post, where he sometimes ignored repo&s from subordinates or failed to act in response to them, As a result, he sometimes put off making a decision or failed to make one in time to change the course of events. No doubt, his reluctance to respond in several eases may have been influenced by person& mimosity, particularfy in the case of his dealings with Yolk and HiXl, Findly, Bragg's failure to arr;ive at a warbhXe decision at the erisis of the battle (&@m the Confederate vievoint) was nearly as Fdteful as that sE Rosecmns when he chase to retire from the field. 111 Bragg's case, there were at least two decision points which have dready been related. The first was Longstreet" meeting with him at midafternoon of the 20th, when he had urged Bras to "abandon the plan for battle by our ri&t wing,'beinforee Longstreet's left wing, and pursue the routed Union forces to their destmetion, It will be recdled that Bragg then broke off the discussion, and, in bngstreet's words, '"rode for his head-qaders at Eieerl"~Bl-idge." "aggk decision represented both his inflexible refusal to abar~donhis original plan as wet1 as iic rejection of any egective pursuit that would have destroyed not only the enemy amy, but dso any Union hopes of an early opening of the gatewtay to the he&& of the Confederacy, Thus, it was surely one of the most fatehf decisions ever made by a Confederate commander in the west. The second occasion, the rejection of Forrest's urging for a pursuit on the following day, only sewed to confim Brqg's fglure, thus losing the vie.tor)l. that his a m y had &u&t so hard to achieve-as well as doming that army to the siege of Ghattmooga and its subsequent defeat in the battles of bokout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. There were also notable diEerenees in the way that the two cornnlanders formufated and issued the orders that translated their decisions into ztetions. Bragg's orders tend to reveal short.csmings in this regard, At times, his witten o&rs tacked clarity, at others they were incomplete, leaving their recipients to make their own interpretation or to request the next hi&er commander for clarification. It appears that seldom, if ever, did a subordinate commander go directly to B r a g with a qtlesthn regarding an order; the dissension and distmst bettveen Bragg and his generals had d r e d y closed the door tr, such open communication. As a consequence, if there were ermrs or omissions in their orders, the recipients either canied them out to the letter or fiiiled to execute what the a m y commander had intended. fn fairness to Bragg, the faulty sfol-dingor transmission of an order was not always due to a personaf kvlt for two reasons: he lacked the communicative skills of a chief of staff who-like Napoleon's Berthier or Rosecrans' G~afield-could translate his dictated commands into w~+ttenorders that would not be misunderstood. Moreover, Bras's relations with his staff laeked the warm ""family" mpport

that would have allowed a continuing exd~angeof ideas and questions. In the latter regad, the lack of mutual confidence has been made clear in the recounting of Bragg's questioning his staff about his remaining in cornmand and the staFs reply that he should indeed resign, An oppmite case seems to have ruled in Rosecrans' headqt~arters,The eommander of the h m y of the Cumberland h& been fortunate indeed in finding Brigadier General James A. Carfield for his chief of staE Fmm the time of his selection, Carfield maintained a close, personal relationship with his fellow Qhioan, even accepting Rosecrans' invitation to share his quwters in camp and in the Geld. His chief treated Gadeld more like a son or younger brother than a stag oflfieer, and Carfield responded by honing his skills at converting Rosecrmsbvrbal directives into written orders that were models of e l a ~ t y and csncisexress. An example of his competence has been cited with r e p r d to the command conference at a m y headquarters on the eve of the battle. Garfield took notes during his cornmandeis briefing of his corps commanders, composed the notes into drafts of orders which he then read and circulated to all present. After questions had been resolved, he had the drafts rewriaen into GnaI orders which he handed to the commanders before they left the command post. With such an eficient alter ego Rosecrans was Ale to concentrdte fdly on his own problems, but with one unfodunate drawback: while B r a g may have issued too few or incomplete orders, Rosecrdns tended to issue too many, Even though Carfield could translate Raseerans' thoughts into clear orders, he couldn't dog his ehielFzs footsteps and convert every verbal order into writing, As a result, Rosecrans felt free to bombard his cows and division cornmanders with a stxccession af orders during his rounds of inspections and command visits. nougln this practice didrtt i-tpgedr to result in conhsion or mishap, it tended to make Rosecrans a Little careless in the number of orders that he issued verbally in or outside his headquarters. It \nlas this habit, unwittindy abetted by CariFIeld" efxiciency, that could have led to issuing the fatal order which caused General Woad to take his division out of the line of battle, thus creating the gap through which Longstreet7sdivisions poured and routed the right of Rosecrans' army, It has already been recounted that Carfield WB busy writing orders to Cenerds Sheridan and Davis at the time when Cqtain Kellogg was infbrming Rosecrans about the suppused gap in the line, and further that Rosecmns was too occupied to interrupt Ca&eld and have him w i t e the order to Genexdl FVood. Xnsteab Roseerdns directed Major Bond tcr write the order, which he did and then sent it out by courier withmt Rusecmns having read t t . M e r reviewing all the circumstances, it becomes clear that the responsibility for writing and sending the order rests ultimately where it shouldwith Roseerans himself. W~enan a m y commander accepts a verbal report that a dangefous gap exists in his battle line, then i'ails to investigate the circumstances, and neglects to have his chief of staff mite the corrective oder,

The Two Perspectives of Chickamauga

183

it is clear that the Fiult lies *eh the cornxrrander, No matter how athewise occupied were the commander and chief of sta& in this instance it can hardly be qtlestioned that Rosecrans should have given his full &tention to the matter, first to ctetennining the accuraey of dle report, then to seeing that clearly worded orders were issued to ensure that timely and adequate measures were taken to correct the fatilt, There is no need to go into the dekiIs of how the commander ( m d h his chief of stafjf)should have gone about tahng the proper measure% it is sufficient to say that they were not taken-with the fatal results we have dready ohsemed. We have also been able to observe that most critical function of the cornmarlder &er issuing his orders, that of seeing to it that his orders are being exeeuted as he intended. In Bragg's instance, WO factors, both linked to his persond makeup, adversely ~ e c t e dhis capability to supervise personally the execution of his orders, First, as we have seen, was his curious tendency to remain a t o d from actual operations, once his commanders had been @ven their orders and their forces had been committed to battle, TEris characteristic was the sul?jeet raised in private huddles b e ~ e e nBragg's ggenerds, and it unfortunateb becdme all too evident at Ghiekilnrauga, The other factor, closely tied to the underlying cause of Bragg's aloofness, tvas the stmined relationship of the commander with his senior generals, which underlay an attitude seeming to say, "'All rigItt, you've got your orders, 1%be watching to see what you do wit11 them." This ill-starred characteristic was most apparent in the latihde that Bragg gave his two wing c o m a n d e r s in the exeetition of his battle plan at its most crucial stage, This was eonlpouxlded when Bragg, apparently inflamed when he learned that the attacks intended to crush the Union left had failed, resorted to the ill-considered issuing of orders directly to several division commanders, thereby bypassing the carnrnaild channels of both wing and c o q s commanders. As we have seen, the only thing that saved the Confederate army from this illbemation was bngstreet's breakthrough of the Union right, Nosecrans, on the other hand, didn't hesitate to exercise personal supemision of his operations whenever time and circumstances allowed. When command responsibilities demanded his presence at he:adquart.ers, he took cdre to select a location for his cornmarld post that was as close to his front tine as passible, as evidenced by his being only some 600 yards behind Wood"s division when the fatal order was issued, As for his relations with. his subordinate commanders, Roseeranu had managed to mainbin a mod professiond wrking ~lationsltipwith tfzm througllout: the campaign, Although the Aaring of his bad temper was common k~~owledge, it was also recognized that the oEender who brought on a displv of wrath usually deserved what &flowed. Vet Bosecrans3abitual cheedulness, even a bluff heartiness on occasion, made him generally well liked, and tended to more than offset any fear of his short temper. His show of gerriali~,however, never extended to creating a warn Nelsonian ""harrd of brothers" among his higher commanders. As much as his

generals might have fatiored sucft. a fetlowship, any feeling in this re@rd tvas kept at hay by their being overawed by their chief S irrtellectual powers, which were never restrained in any meetings, public or private. Unfortunately for Rosecrans, any promise of =warding command relations disappear-ed Iike smoke on the wind after he had revealed his despair and loss o f control by retiring into Chattanooga. He hadn? yet drained his cup of despair when he resigned himself to defending the city, for an even greater blow was not long in coming. In Washington, Secretary of War Stantor~,who was anything hut an admirer of Roseerans, had made up his mind onIy three days after the battle that the A m y of the Cumberland needed a new commander, and the sooner the better. We was alarmed by frantic telegrams from his assistant, Charles A. Dana, who had been with Rosecrans' stag during the campaign and he had Lincoln's ear; it was only a matter of days until the president would consent ta relieving Rosecrans. By 30 September, Stanton had wired Dana, "All that the the CunlberEmd can need will be a competent commander, The merit of General Thomas and the debt of grgtitude the nation owes to his vailor and skill is fully appreciated here mcI f wish you to tell him so. It is not my fault that he was not in chief comnland months ago."lgG Lincoln, who had been reflecting on the oxrall s t r a t e a and command problems in the west, had decided to combine the departme~ltsof the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio under one new command, the Mititav Division of Mississippi, and glace Grant in over41 command. The president then left the crucial decision up to Grant: should Rosecrans remain in command a r should he be relieved by Thsmas? Grant chose Thornas. On 19 October Grant's orders relieving Rasecrans and replacing him with Thomas were received in the headqultrters of the A m y of the Cumberland, That evening Rosecrms handed the orders to Thomas in a scene that must have been painhl for both of them. Alter conferring late into the night with Thornas, Rosecrans depinrted early in the morning flor assignment to the ignorninious command of the D e p a ~ m e n tof Missouri. On the other side of Missionary Ridge, things were in no happier state in the headquarters of the Army of Tennessee. The wild jubilation that ignited the am~y"vic~urybonfires and sent the rebel yell ringng up the valleys w s not long shared by the generats in higher command. h y exhilaration that might have accompanied their arllazillg suceess was quickly dampened by the word that Bragg had decided not to follow up their victory. That dampening was only the beginning .-fourthin a class of fifty-WO,and was commissioned a second lietxtenant in the 4th Infantly Regiment. He sewed two years in the 4th in Califcirnia before he '"escaped""o art assignment in the 2nd C a d r ) . in Texas, a posting which an undistinguished shavetail cotxld hardly have earned, but one which the anlhitious Hood grasped as the opportunity that it =presented. The officers of the 2nd Cavalry w r e handpicked (why Hood was among them remains a mystev): the regimental cornander was Colorlet AIbert Sidrley Johnston; Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lee was secand-in-command; and George H. mamas and William J. Hardce: were majors. Hood's most vivid mernol-ies of his experiences in the 2nd would include his sewice under Lee, who acted as a mentor to the green fieutenant, thou& their associatior~was never closer than that of a senior advisor to a junior oEcer. IXe worxfd also rexnember the occasion Ml'bich brought him a department commendation for gallantry and leadership in action. Haod led his troop against an Xndim war party that outnumbered I-iis little command by three to m e , While he led the chwge an amow pierced his left hand, pinning it and his bridlie rein to the saddle. Without hcsi~l-tting,Hood broke off the arrow shafi, pulled out his hand, and corrtinued to lead his men after they had withdrawn to r e l a d their eal-i~ines. RThcn the Indians galloped off' in retreat, he rallied his troop and retunled to gamison in triumph. It was highly indicative of the kind of leadership that was to characterize Hood"s latcr career-dashing, reckIessly f~ravein leading his troops with no regard for his own person. In 1861, still a first lieuterzant, he turned down the career plum of an assignment as cavah-y instructor at West Point, and in April resigned to offer his semiees to the Confederacy. He rose r~pidlyf o m a mere first Iieutenmt, being commissioned a brigadier general in ?vltarck 1862 to pike command of the '"Texas Brigde" in h e " Army of Northern Virginia. He led his brigde to gain b e by breaking the Union Iine at Caines' Mill in the third day of the Seven Days Battles. He went on to gain even greater reputation at Second Manasas and again at Shaqsburg. Because of his gallant canduet and leadership in the Maryland campnip, even Stonewall Jaeksvn didn't llesitate to recommend his prarnotian to major general, which was confirmed on 11 October 1862, dter which he was assiped to command a division in Lsngstreetys corps. On the second day at Gettysburg, while leading his division in an &tack up the Emmitsburg Road, he was badly wounded in his left arm, and had to be taken &om the field. While colrvaleseing at Richmond, Hood engaged in what Steven Woodworth has edled "an unfortunate campaign of his own'' with the c~bjectiveof winning ""Buck" Reston, Sally Buchanan Preston, a southern belle

Hood and Differences in Clonfederate Strcltefi~i

199

from an aristrocratie South Carolina family. Hood was smitten with the Airtatious Buck, who saw only what has been desel-ibed as " 'a tall, rawboned eountq-looking man who looked like a raw b a h a o d s m a n dressed trp in an ill-fitting uniform and who had a Iong face, a Iong tawny beard, a large nose, and eyes with the sad expression of a hound dog, in spite of his being one of the most celebrated division commmders in Lee's famous army."m30Thou$ he was, then and later, to contime his pursuir of Buck, it was vvithout the sueeess he had gained on the battlefield; eventually she turned down his proposal of madage. When he rdoined the a m y he W=, as we have seen, destined to lead the attack of Longsbeet\ s i n g at Chickamauga, where, at the head of his successful attack, he took an even more serious wound, this time a mini6 bdf that shattered his ri&t leg at the thi&. The leg had to be amputated on the field, leaving him with a stump only a few inches long, Though he made a full recovey-in Richmond there were at first fdse reports of his death-he was doomed to being strapped in the s a d a e in the field, with an aide foll~wing m d c a w i n g his crutches, D u ~ n ghis recovewy he was promoted to lieutenant generd to date fmm the day af his wounding at Chictcanrrtltrga, A few days later he joined Joseph E. Johnston"s A m y of Temessee as a llew corps commander. The aissiwment and his service under fohnston during the Atlanta campaign were to bring on two conditions that wofd proCourldly aAFect his pedomance in the field. The first was physical; his disabled arm and his missing leg assured that ""h would always he impaired in rnclving about the battlefield to control and direct his troops. He might tire more quickfy, and if so his judment might often be clouded by fatime as well as pain fiom his old w~unds."'f3~ The other eEect m s gsychologicaf in nature, stemming directly from his senrice as Jofinstort's subordinate, Knowing only the oEensive in war, he had to senre under a chief who was committed to a eamprtip based on retrograde and defensive operatians. "Under Joe Johnston, every time the Confederates halted, they got out their sgzldes and axes and eonstn~ctedpits, trenches, and other earthworks. . . . Hood deplored this practice because he thou&t it; impaired the m o d e and fighting spir*it of the men. . . , from the moment he took command of the A m y of Tennessee, Wood detemined &at his a m y was p i n g to have to go on the offensive if it ever hoped to defeat the bluecoats and their ovewhelming numbers, and he was resdute &at his men must team to get out froni behind their b r e a h o r k s and go on the attack, even if it killed them."1"32Findly, as recounted, fefferson Bavis, yronlpted by the public's outcry and his a m d i s h s t of Jufrmston, relieved him of command and replaced him M.itb Hood on 1 V d y 1864. In spite of some inner misgivings, Davis e n h s t e d Hood with the command, m&nly because he had become convinced that Mood's eombat expet-ience and style of leadership would assure that he would take the o&nsive. By the time that Huod had begun to implement his own s h t e g y and had led his a m y to its blayed stay at Tuscumbia, he had become mare and more

Figure 13.1

Hwd" Army of Tennessee

Courtesy h i a ~ i nL WiEkerson.

aware of the deficiencies of the poor logistical system he had inherited from Johnston, and his ineptitude with logistics did little to ready the army for its next move. To make matters worse, the command stmcture of his a m y was no longer functioning as a well-ordered system, in part due to the mutual mistmst that had begun to grow b e h e e n Hood and his senior commanders. 'rhough he was not hated as Bragg had been-he could still be the "gallant ZXoo&' to the anny at large-some of the old uncertainties and qualms that h& once permeated the army9sleadership seemed tci m m back to haunt its new comn~ander,Not only was he haunted by those uncertainties, but he also had to wow about the rickety railroads, the heavy r;?ins that had continued to hinder movement, the looming threat of the concentration of Thon-tas" forces, ancl the absence of Fornest's cavalry, Bemuse he feared intervention with his new operations, Hood continued to avoid Beauregard-and the threat he posed to Hood's freedom of action-by ignoring his superior, even to the point of moving his cerrlmand post across the Tennessee River when Benuregard was about to make a visit to Tuscumbia. Finally, however, a great: I,urtfen was lifted from Wood's mind by the arrival of Forrest on 18 November. The next day Hood issued his orders for his army to cross the Tennessee, The amy's effective strength came to &out 38,000, comprised of about 30,00C) inFdntry and 8,WO cavalry. Its major components were three infantv corps (see Figure 13,lj, eonzmanded respectively by Lieutenant Cerleral Stc-

H o d and Differenct?~ in Confederate Stralw

203

phen D. Lee, Lieutenant General Alexander P. Stewad, and Major General Benjanrin F. Cheatham; the cavalry corps was commanded by Major General Pilathan B, Fouest. The army's marale, in opposition ts Hood's sis@vings, wits generally good-the bands played and the men of Lee" corps cheered as they led the warch across the pontoon bridge over the Tennessee Rivermd being the veterans they were, the troops were rertdy to grove themselves against a new enemy. Their commander dready haid plans to cut off a major force of that new enemy just as fast as their marches would move them to accomplish that end, Hoad ~ l a n n e dto cut off the Union forces at Pulasfci from Thornas (at Nashville) by capturing the crossings ofthe Duck River at Columbia (see Map 13.2).To do so, his three i n h n t ~coqs, prececfed by Forresl's cadr)l, vvould move over pardllel routes on an axis of advance west of the Nashville and Deeatrrr Railroad, Forrest, with his usud aggessiveness, would cover the advance, driving before him the enemy's cavalry screen, and push on to seize the Duck River crossings before Union foxes could escape. It was a. goad plan, m d it should have worked as intended if the cavalry and the other three cows could have moved rapidly enough to keep the enemy off balance. Unfortunately far the Confederates the capricious, late autumn weather played havoc with the traops and the roads. Cofd rains interchanged with snow and sleet to make the dirt roads switch kom frozen ruts to quagmires, at times bofding back infantry marches to less than ten miles a day. Amazindy, despite all the adversities, Haod did achieve a degree of surprise: his enemies had thought that he would be scarcely able to mave at all, But Fairest was doing a superb job of using superior numbers to drive back WatcKs Union cavalry wlrile screening Hooci"s abance, and by 22 November, Stewart's c o ~ had s reached Lawrenceburg, sixteen miles west of Pulaski, In the meantime, however, Schofield, the Union commander, t&ing heed ofrFhomasbaming about the threat to his right and becoming suddenly aware of that threatss progress on the %2nd,rushed two divisions to Columbia, Their lead elernents arrived on the 24th, in the nick of time to prevent the agmessive Fornest from seizing the bridges over the Duck River, By 27 November, Hood wds confronting Schofield just south of Columbia, Schofield, f e a h l that Hood could (rtm him out of his precarious position with the river at his back, wirzfndrew across the river &ring the night of 27-28 November. Schofield had amplc rcason to be concerned; thou& he had for the moment escaped Hmd, t off. This t h e Wood bad planned the latter had readied a new plan to c ~ thim a turning mwement to the east by crassing Cheatham's and Stewart's eorps at Davis' F~"orcrfwhife leaving b e ' s corps to attack SehodieId and lead him to believe that he was dealing with the whole Confederate amy. Schofield, however, had Iearned from Wlsorb (the new and skillhf Union cavalry cornmander) early on 29 November of the Confederate large-scale movements threatenixlg his withdrawal route, and had dispatched two divisions to secure Spring Hill and cover the withdrawal of his wmaining fomes from Columbia.

Map 13.2

FLORENCE

--

NASHVILLE:

Houd and Differences in Confederate Stra;lL@a

203

What follow4 was typical of many of EIood's operations as an a m y cornmander-brilliant conception and f a u l ~execution, this time leading to what has been cdled the 'spring HiU &@air,"whiclx ""became perhaps the most controversial of the nonfighting events of the entire war."""3"t about noon af the 29th Schofield started the rest of his forces and wagon trains towdrd Spring Hill, &err; they might have been intercepted by Cheatham, whose lead elements arrived near Spring Mill by 3:00 F,M., in time to attack Wagner's Union division covering the withdrawal. FVhat resulted instead was a series of confused events-misunderstandings caused by faulty or even ur~delivered orders as well as plain old sluggishness-led off by Cheatham's half-earted, piecemeal attaeks. The latter failed utterly to halt the enemy's march along the Columbia-FranMin Turnpike, stow as it was moving at the pace of wagon trains, Tn his official report Mood asserted, Major-Cenerd Cheatlhm was odered to attack the enenly at once vigorously and get passession of this pike, and, althou& these ordcrs were 6equendy and earnestly repeated, he made but a feebIe and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Had my instmctions been camied out there is no doubt that we skorlfd have possessed ourselves of this mad. Stewrt's corps and lobnson's division [of Lee's corps] were miving upon the field to support the attack, Thou& the golden oppoeunity had pdssed with dsrylight, r did not at dark &andon the hope af dealing the enemy a heivy blow.!%

Hood went on in his later account of S p ~ n gHill to relate that, once night had faljen, be had received repo&s that: the enemy was marching along the trrmpike unmolested, thou& '"almost under the Xight of the campfires of the main body of the [Confederate] am~y.'"Ancl continuing in his of-ficial.report to sum up his fmstration, he would claim, "Thus was lost a great opportuniv of striking the enemy [the blow] for wl~iehwe had Iabored so long-the greatest this campaign had oEered, and one of the greatest during the war." Even if Hood can be suspected, in both his oEeia1 and unoEeid accounts, of stating a one-sided erne, he must bear the command responsibility for the failure at Spring Hill. In fairness, it should be recognized that personal supewisian of his widely separated forces had to be constrdined by his physicd handicap: after a day of being strapped in the saddle white having to endure the pain from the stump of his missing leg, he no doubt would coXlapse vvith a fatigue that would prevent him fram making night rounds to cheek cm matters in person. However, even if one can set: aside the controverrsy aver the Spring Hill aEair, it is still clear &at the failures there fed directly to the battle of Franklin on the following day, Sehafield, taking evev advantage of his good fofiune, hurried his troops a ~ trains d up the Columbia Pike to FranMin, There he hastily entrenched a perimeter around the south side of Fra~~klin, with his flanks secured on the Haqeth River (see Map 13.3).Itfeanning earliy on the same morning of the 30th, Hood followed, gushing his troops relendessty up

Map 13.3

the pike: Stewdrt's s o q s in the Xeacl, followed by Cheathm, with h e farther to the rear. When Hasd arrived to find an entrenched enemy wailing him, he hastily deployed Stewart's corps, then Cheatham's on its left, and begm preparing an 41-out at& on the entrenched enemy. He chose to ignore Furrest's recommendation for a brning movement as well as the Fact that two of Lee's divisions wouldn't be available for some time. Whether Hood was still hurniw from the humiliating debacle at Spring Hill or was overcome with a passion to destro)r the enenly this time before he could again escape is still eunjecturaf. What is ce&ain, however, is that Hood launched a s e ~ e of s frontal a t t d s at 3:30 P.M. with his two corps (plus French's division), resolved to overmn the enemy positions with main force. His corps and division cornrrianders, still sxnaeing &on1 I"iaoc[i"s rancur after Spring Will, were fhtty determined to acquit themseives and their soldiers like the brave fighters they were: "TThaugh logic dictated agauirtst a kontal assault, they vowed to demonstrate that their troops coulXd s t s m fortifications as bravely as any,"7u3" Again and again the ConfGderate ranks were t h r w n ag;linst the entrench-

Hood

a ~ l dElTfferences Lrt

Corrf~derg~te Strateg)

205

ments, only to srxEer one bloody repulse after another. Only oncc did they succeed in penetmting the Union lines when they broke and drove hack \Wagner's clivision (deployed in front of the Xines as a coveri~lgforce), making a gap irr the enemy line, t.~rxtthat was rdpidly closed by a desperate Union counterattack, By 4:00 u.sr, Lee had arrived and was ordered to continue the attack with Joh~tson'sdivision of his corps. This auglnentrttion failed to redeem the repulses of the other attacks. The fierce fighting-unexcelifed by any other in the war-went an for five hortrs, even though srtnsct on this late autumn day was at 5:li"i12,nz, F-inrrlXy,darkrress and crippling losses mused even Hood to reconsider, though his only action by 9:00 was to order late-arriving artillery into positions frfm which it could fire a preparation in the early moming, presumably to support a renewed attack by the other two divisions of Lee's c a q s which he had not con~mittedt c ~the attack. But when the frigl~t&I toll of casualries began to be totaled at army headquarters, even the reluctant Hood was forced to call an end to a battle that should never have been fought. The losses were frightening: Schofietd's canle to 2,326 out of 2r?,000 t m q s xtualIy eng;ed, but EZoodYsexceeded his enemy's by three times, amauntiag to 6,252, out of 30,000 infalltry, a loss of %lpercent. And the Confederate total included twelve generals and fifty-four regimental corttrnanders, a grim reminder of the commitment of Sautherrl leadership to the senseless slaughter. Yet, incredibly, when Hood learned that. the Union brces were evzuating Franklin that night, crossing the Harpeth on newly repaired bridges, he was determined to pursue at first liglt. He was only deterred by the rediz;.rtion that his a m y was in complete disawq from its losses and the conhsion resulting fron~night attacks as well as the grim fact that the troops were nearing exhaustion. Nevertheless Hood managed to reorganize md st.al-t his army toward Nashville on the morning of 1 December: Lee's eecsqs in advance, foXlowed by Stetvart's, and then by Cheatham". At about 2:QO P,M. of the next day, the Confederate lead elements arrived before Nashville, where Ifood saw for hirnseif the extensive entrenchments behind which Thornas had assembled a fomidable force. Hood deployed his forces and started them preparing their own entrenchments. Since there has been mueh discussion about Hood"s reasons br his moving to Nashville, fbllowed by contention m e r his gmunds for entrenching before NashviXXe and ""chaXlen&ng7' Thorn= to battle, it could prove helpful to our p u q o s e to consider Hood" sown rationale for his decisions: I remained with an effective force of only twenty-three thousmd and fifty-three. I was therefare aware of our inability to atbek the Federats in their new stronghold with any hope of success, althou& Schofield's troops had abandoned the field at Fmklin, leaving their dead and wounded in our possession, and had hatened with considerable alarm into their fortifications fat N;zshvitZe]. . . . E knew equally welX in the absence of the prestige of complete victory, f could not venture with my small force into Kentuekjr,

without first: receiving reinfnrccrr~ents,. . . Thrrs, urlfess strengthened by these Xonglooked-far reinforcements, the only remaining charrce of success in the campi.rign, at this juncture, \Y&S to take position, entrench around Nashville, and awdt Thornas's athck whiehi, if harxdsonlely repulsed, might agord us arx opporhrniv to follow up our advantage on the spot, and eater &c city an the heels of the enemy.. . . In tmth, our A m y was in that co~lditionwhich rendered it more judicious the men shorrld face a decisiw issue rather than retreat-in other words, rather than renounce the honor of their cause, without ha%fingmade a Iast trnd manful efljort to lift up the sinking fortunes of the C o n f e d e r ~ y . ' ~

If one discounts the vvishful thinking &out reinforcements-wit-h the Confederay nearing its death thrum, only a being higher in siatiorl than Jegersorr Davis could have provided Hood with the forces he had envisioned for c a v ing out the threat of invading Kentucky and Ohio-one can stilE appreciate Hood's dilemma and his reasoning to deal with it, however unredlistic that reasonimrg may now appear, Whatever his other reasons, it is a certainty that Hood, when he positioned his army to conkont Thontas, fully intended to make ""a Iast and manful effort tto lift up the sinking fo&unes of the Confederacy ."

CHAPTER 14

The "Rock of Chickamauga" Prepares a New Kind of Battle It will be recatled that after Hood had worked out a skatem with fefferson Davis at Palmetto back in September, Cenerd Shennan w s understandably uncooperative with the aims d the Confederate president and his commander of the iZrmy of Tennessee. Among Sheman's uncooperative mmsures was his regard .For his vulnerable eomrnunications which stretched all the way back to Major Cenerd Ceorge H. Thorn=' base at Nashville. hlthou& he was eager to gain Grant" approval for his projected ""march to the sea,""Sheman, was keenly aware &at, in marching an a m y to Savmnah, he would have to be assured-and that meant first assuring Grant-that Hood would not be left free to threaten either Sheman's communications or an invsion of Kentucky. And that is why Sheman, on 26 October, sent Stanfey's t'll" C o v s af three divisions to reinforce Thornas, while directing him to take all other measures neeessav to unite his forces into one mmy in order to d e d deeisivefy with Hood, Four days later Sheman, ~ s h i n to g reinforce Thornas with everything he could spare, dispatched Schofield's m111 Corps of two divisions to Thomas. Then, after receiving CrantPs approtfd on 2 November, Sheman left Atlanta on the 12th with an army of 62,000 and started his march to the sea. In Tennessee, Thornas had meanwhile entmsted a provisiond farce, cornposed of IV Corps and mIII Corps (a total of five ditiisions with a strength of about 32,000), to the command of Major Generail John M. SclzofieXd to deal with Hoad"s advance toward Nashville, As we have seen, Schsfield succeeded in eluding E1EoocX"s t-urning m~vementsat Columbia and Spring Hill, then fought a successf"ut defensive battle at Franklin, one that proved disastmus to both Hood" plans m d his arrrry. In spite af his successful defease, Schofietd was forced to leave his dead and wounded on the field-a blow to the morale of any force afld its commander-but redeemed hirllseIf at least in part, by

A New Kind of Battle

209

safely withdrwing the whole of his command and uniting it under Thornas' command at Nashville on I_ December. Sehofield"~force had been preceded on the same day by Major General h & e w J, Smith's XVI Cows, which had come up the Cumberland River by stemer from Missouri, That evening another reinforcement reached Nashville, the pravisiond detachment, District, of the Etowah, untfer Major General Jarnes El. Steedman, consisting of a provisiond division and two brigades of black soldiers, With a3X those reinforcements paur.i~lginto Nashville one might have thou&t that Thornas would make immediate preparations to organize his new esmmand and sortie forth to ovewhelm Hood before he could make any further forays around Tennessee. In fact, no such oEensive operation was about tio be undertaken in the near future-not until the Union army commander was good and ready, Thornas had indeed been doing everything in the Nashville area to build up a force to defend his strategic base at the cityorganizing the Post of Nashville into provisiond units made up of coaks, clerks, and quadermaster employees-to carry out Grant's tteegraphed instructions: " A m and put into the trenelnes your quartermaster exnployes dtizens, &c," What he was not huwing to do, however, was to implement the other part af Grant's advisory, "With your citizen employes a m e d you can move out of Nashville with all your army md force the enemy to retire or fight upon gound of your o m choosing." *What ensued instead was reminiscent of Roseerans>reparations for his Tullahoma and Clrickamauga camp&gns, when Thornas had been a cows commmder under him. XI was not that lRosecrans7genius b r logistical md topopaphie detail had mbbed off an Thornas (tbough he was a stickler for detaifs in some respects). Rather, there were at least three areas of concern that must have remained uppemost in his mind. The first was an innate part of his style of command: even thou& he might seem a ""podider" in getting ready, he was going to make sure that every step was being t&en to assure that he bad d l avdlabfe combat power at hand when he faeed Hood in ;in all-out battle. The second, a coraUay af the first, W= organizing his forces for cambat whiEe they continued tc, stwngaen the entrenchments they w u l d occupy &&re he moved against Hood. The third concern wm that Major Gneral James H. Wilsan's ceaalry corps must have the mounts: and equipment it needed to contend with Fornest. Wilson, recently reassigned fmm the east, was a brilliant and energetic cavalry commander with a reputatian to match, and Thorn=" concern fctr his command was evihnt in his telegrqhed report t-o Halleck: "Mter General SchofieXdk fi&t of yesterdv [30 November], feeling that the enemy very far outnumbered him in infantry and cavalry, I detemined to retire [him] to the foeifications around Nashville, until General Wilson can get his cavdry equipped. He had but one-fourth the number of h e enemy, and consequendy is no match. for him.''137 Thamas9elegram had a far greater impact in Washington Chan its s d i d sender could have envisioned, It set off a chain reaction resulting in the same

kind of pressure that Washington had applied to Rosecrans, a volley of dispatches intended to get the recipient moving at once, in keeping ~ t what h served as the national strategy at the time, Hdleck had shown the telegram to Lincoln md Stanton, and on 2 December the latter telegraphed Crallt as follows: "The President feels solicitous about the disposition of General Thornas t s lay in fo&ifications for an indefinite perjiod "until Wilsan gets equipment~.'This toaks like the McClellan and Rosecrans strateB of do nothing s ts consider the and let the rebels raid the country, The President ~ s h e you matter,"u"8rant did consider the matter in a telepam to Thornas that, Crantlike, came right to the point: ""IHood is pemitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will lose all the road back to Ghatt.rcnoaga and possibly have to abandon the line crf the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he foflifies,"1a9 Grant, at the tirne concerned with both national stratem and the operations of tile A m y af the Poton,= in the east, naturalfy shared Lincoln's and S h ton's womies about Hood"s threat to Ohio, especially at a tirne when Congess was about to convene. The specter of E-fooZs breaking loose and temarizing loyal citizens at the very time when the adminisbation" war aims were about to be redized. also haunted Crant. This caused him to pressure Thornas relenllessly to leave his provisional fume of "~casuals'"to m m the Nashville fortifications whife he took his a m y of three c o v s to the field to eliminate the threat of Hood once and for all. Thus, the banage of Grantss telegraphic advisories, counsels, and instmetions fell upon Thorn= at the time when he was 'busied with what he considered vital preparations far his operations. As a result we again have to wibess the spectacle of faraway strategists badge~ng the man on the graund to get moving, while the man an the ground is facing at first hand a host of obstacles invisible to his remote superiors. And like the case of Xtosecrans versus Washington, the interchange of telegrams reached a climm with a permptory order. Qrx G December Crant telepaphed TThomas, ""Attack Hood at once, and wait no longer for a remount af your cavalv. There is ged danger of' delay resulting; in a campaign back to the Ohio River."1a Thornas retplied, like the good soldier he was, that he would aMaGk Hood as ordered, but added that "'1 believe it wilI be hamrdous with the small force of cavalry now at my service." Yet, even with Crmt's order hanging over his head, Thomas' conscience was pressing him even more to deal with the &stacks at hand ind g o s t p e launching his offensive for at least three or four days, until 9 or 10 December. fn appreciating Thomas' situation, it is essentid to realize that the pressure from his superiors was no less than that exeded by his o w conscience. To undersbnrl his dilemma it would be helpful, indeed necessav, to gst-in an insi&t into the background o f i i s character, Ceorge IXenfy Thornas w s born md bred a Virginian every bit as much as Robert E. h e and Stonwafl Jaekson, thou& later he was to decide that his 1o)ialt;v to his state was overridden by a greater loyalty. He was born in 1816 and raised in sowtheastern Virginia,

iZ New Kind of Rattle

21 1

in the heart of slave country, where, at age fificen, he aad his family were caught up in Nat Tumer's rebellion, and once with his widowed mother and two sisters he had to flee their home and hide in the woods until they were safe. He got his early education at Southampton Academy, and began serving his uncle as a law clerk. Thomas had no taste for the law, md when his uncle could get him an apwint.ment to West h i n t , he jumped at the opportuniq. He reported as a cadet in 1836, just shy of his ~wentiethbirth&y, and therefore &out two years older than the average plebe. Compared to most of his classmates his appemance was that of a g r o m man, standing five feet, ten inches tall, muscular m d well built, with a flair for good horsemanship. FeIXaw cadets saw him as a handsome fellow who, accsr&ng to Cadet WifXiam Starke Rosecrans, ""bore a mrnarkable resemblance to Stua&'s portrait of Wmhington, Dignified, selEpossessed, and steady in manner, Thamas became know to the cadets as 'Old Tomknd Ceorge Wa~hington."'~~~ He shared a room with kenty-one-year-old Stew& Vm Vliet and red-hGred "Cump"" Sheman. It turned out that Van VXiet and Thorn= became model cadets, beping themselves, their equipment, and their roorn in pedect regulation order, and garnering mlly the minimum of denterits, The newus, jumpy Sheman was slipshod in dress and conduct, accumulating 109 demerits in his plebe year. In contrast, Van Vliet got only XO and Thornas 22. M e r a year Sherman had had his fit1 of his two made! roommates and nloved to other quaders. Thorna went on to become a good thou& not outstanding student, graduating helfth out of the forty-ha members of the 1840 class, while Sheman ranked sixth, h a n g the other cadets Thornas knew during his four yems were those with n m e s like Crmt, Roseeraas, Buell, and Hooker; others to become famous for other reasons bore names like Bras, Bushrod Johnson, Wilfiam J, Hardee, and Danief H. HiU. His first assignment after graduation was to the 3rd MiElery Regiment, then serving in Florida in the Second Serninole War. Among his messmates were Brat-on Bragg and (lump Sherman. Like his comrades, Thorns saw little combat action and eventually began a series of assignments in the artillery that would last for the next fifieen years, Like B r a s and Sheman he saw service in the Mexican War under & c l x a ~Tayior, s t a ~ i n gout as a first Xieutenant in Brrda's battery of the 3rd AdilXery, He received two brevet promotions, mainly for galfantry, to captgn at Monteney, then to major far "gallant and meritorious semice" un&r fire at Buerra Vista. 1i)un"ngthat action, Thornas continued to d i ~ c the t Ere of BR isolated section of Captain Brag's battery, holding off repeated Mexican infantry attxks until, as Captain $herman recded, "I joined Lieutenant Tbomas, who had been constantly engaged drx~ngthe forenoon in the presewation of that important position, and whom I kund closely engaged with the enemy, and too, in a very advanced position . . . Lieutenant Thornas more than sustained the repuhtion he has long enjoyed in his regiment as an accurate and scientific a&illerist."'1f42 That part of the battle where Thornas was so "elosely engaged"" has been described as

being so violent that arnortg ""the roar of mmsketq Xoud and continuous; it was impossible above the general claxnor and din, to distingvish the report of any singie gun. . . . The whok air vibrated with the rushing eument of balls." After the m a y similarly dramatic histories of the artillery's part in the battle, "fhonras' personal account stands out as starkly characteristic: "The Battle of Buena Vista was fought on the 22 Feb. '44and I was under fire from 6 o.c, A.M. until 4 P.M.'''~~ Mter the war his sewice incXuded a three-year tour as an adillery and e ~ v i l r yinstructor at West Point kom I851 to 1854, duxing which he met and married Frances KeXIogg, described by his fellow instmctors as a "noble woman, good natured ancf congenial." Durlng his honeymoon, the bridegoam received notice of his promotion to his regular rank of q t a i n . A later assignment in 1855 wis to the newIy organized 2nd Caval~y,where nom;ns was deli&ted to find himself not only among FeiXow horsemen, but dso one of the regiment" sew majors. His new coionel was hlbel.t S i d n q Johnston, the rt3gimenfs lieutenant colonel was Robert E. Lee, and among the lieutenants was one John B. Hood, The regiment" service in Texas was taken up with protecting settlers from Indian raids and generally keeping peace on the &ontier, On one of his peacekeeping missions, Major Thorn= led a demhment against a not so peaceful pam of Indian w a ~ o r s and , during the encounter the major took two Indian arrow, one in the chest and another on the chin, neither of which proved to be sedous wounds, Beginning in November I8W Thornas was dlowed twelve months' leave, most of which he spent with his wife in the east, until he had to rnake the most hea~-wexlchingdecision of his life, Like t e e and Jackson, Thomw wm faced with the choice of going with his native shte of Virginia into the ConCederacy or kewing his commission in the U,S. k m y . Unlike his f a s u s fellow Virginiaas, Thornas chose to hanor the oath of allegiance he had taken when he bad accepted his commission upon his graduation &am West Point. He confimed his decision by declining the offer of Governor h t c h e r to become the chief of ordnance of Virenia's newly foming sbte forces, This formal break. with his stat-e must have seemed a simple act compared to the agony that he had to endure when his family turned against him for his decision. Et was csnsidered the act of a traitor, and his sisters never spoke to him or othemise esmmunicated with him for the rest of their lives. In SWof his personal troubles and the suspicion that hung over him when criGcs in the Union a m y refened to him as "'that Virginian,""Thornas rose rapidly in rank as the war pmgressed, He comnmnded a brigade in the Shenandodh during the first Bull Run campaign, being made a brigadier generd of vofurlteers in Awgust 1861. En November he assumed command of a division in. the Army of the Ohio. In Januay l862 he led a smdl force of 4,WO to attack a comparable tbrce of Confederates and win the banle of Mill Springs, the ""most severe setback suffered by the South up to that time.""M e then saw action at Shiloh under Buelf, followed by his sewing as Buell's secand-in-

,4 New. a n d of Battle

213

command in the B e r ~ i l l eoperations, whickk resulted in driving Bragg out of Kentucb. Having been promoted major general of volunteers in 1862, he protested serving under Rosccrans -when the latter uras appointed arrlty cornrnander to replace BuelE, on the grounds that he was senior to Rosecrans. However, when the president antedated Rosecrms" commission to give him seniorit-y, firtmas served him loyally, as we have seen, as commander of XZV G o v s dur;ing the Chickamauga cdmpaign. We witnessed him becoming a national hero on the second day of the battle, when he saved the Amly of the CrzmherXand from disaster and earned the title "Rock of Chickamauga,"' which has distinguished him to this day, It will be recalled too that he repltteed Rosecmns as a m y cornmandtcr in the month following the battle. Upan receipt af Grant2$directive that Chattanooga be held 'ht all hazards,"" Thornas\eply &at "'we will hold the town tifl we starve" was carried out almost literally, his anay holding out against Bragg" siege until relieved in November BB, after which Grmt got ready to assume the oEensive, Then in the battles at Ghattanooga, Thomas>~ommand played a major role in defeating I3rslf;gk army when it was overrun on b o k o u t Mountain and Missionary Ridge, Beginning in May 1864, Thornasp A m y of the Curnberland, consisting of nine infaatv and three cavalry divisions, faught under Salerman in his Atlanta campaign, taking an oEensive role throughout all the major operations. It was Thornashmy that successfulty beat back Hood's counterstroke at Peachtree Creek on 2.0 July. Later Thomas took the surrender of Atlanta and marched his traops into the city on f September. Then, as recounted, when Sheman had gotten Grant's assent for his march .to the sea, it was Tharnas who was made respansible for the safemarding of Sheman's communications, a mission which included defeating Hood wherever he might take the offensive, Now, at Nashville, Tl~ornlzs.was beirlg reminded of the irony of the position in which he had been placed by Sherman and Grant-ironic because neither of those two superiors h& been there on the ground with him to appreciate the problems of assembling, equipping, and organizing a makeshift a m y of dispamte elemcots into a h r c e t h t caufd overnight destrop its enemy in one engagement. Yet, as one is assured from his tlackground, the meklike Tixornas was the man ibr the job, despite all the pressure afjrytied by Grant and the War Department. The summing up of his character by Thornas Robson Hay gves ane m insi$t into the man who would, in his ow way and time, move to attack his enemy; Thomas was a man of resewed power, of poise and self-control; a somewhat co2d and impassive man, usually little subject: to human passions and infimities, In spite of this make-up he was hum= in every sense of the ward. He had ambition, but few men seem to be freer kern its subtle influence. . . . A gentle voice and manner, quick hi& temper, unconquerable courage, inflexible wilf, dejicate sensit.liveness, and a commanding sense of duly, hamonized into a well-rounded character. He was a man of few words and was by no means a rapid thinker or a brilliant eanversatitionalist, but

h i s mind was always vigorous, altvt, quick tcl perceive, to deeidc, tu act. . . . He was a

rnan of deep retigi:iclus convictions and his woncicd~llhold upon the cstlfide~~ce and aKection of his a m y was due to the fact illat all realized that to him everyone was aiways a man and a soldier. . . . Zrr spitc of his apparent intligerence to ~~errional preference and advzincement Thornas was humar~enough to write [before the battle of Nashville]: "This will he the only opporttrnity f shall have to distinguish ntyself and not to be able to avail myself of it Is too bad."""""

7'0 TilomasYmminent peril, that opportunit?; was about to slip a w q . By 8 December Grant, exasperated by pressure from Stanton, was about to replace Thornas, as he indicated in a telegram to Halleck on that date: '"If Tfiomas has not struck yet, he ought to be ordered to hand aver the contmand to Schofield. There is no better man to repel an attafc than Thornas, but I fear he is too cautious to ever take the initiative.'' Fod.~tlnatelyfor Thomas, the order to relieve him was never sent; it was set aside in the press of events and the continued exchange of telegrams b e ~ c e nall coneel-ned, Then on 9 B e c m b e r an act of natum intewened, and Thonras telegraphed both Gmnt and Halleek, ""A, terrible storm of freezing rain has come on since dayfight, which wiXE render an attack inipossible until it breaks," MTI-r,e;'hHalleck en received the messag, he wired Grant inf'orming him that it had been thought better to hold up the orders relieving Thornas-unless Grant wished them to be sent. Grant replied to the eEcct that the orders should be suspended "until it is seen whether he will do anything," On the following day Thornas was indeed s t a ~ i n gto do something. One of Thomas' well-known eonlrnand methods was his practice of Xistexting to the recommendations of his s t i i f f and commanders, then ~nakinghis decisions in priv&e and sticking to thern once they had been announced. On 10 December, howek~er,Thornas called a eclmmand cor-tferenceat his qrxarters at the St. Clo-rxd Hotel and reversed his usud procedure: instead of asking for his c o q s commanders' recorx~mendations,he ax~nounceda decision, then asked far their opinions on it, In efrect, he told therr-r aborxt Grant's peremptory order to attack and his decision "'that oljedience was impr~eticable'' at the time due tcl the ice-covered ground. Each corps commander (see Figure 14.J) was then asked to give his views on the matter. His generals unanirnorxsly upheId his decision. ""Then, after listening to all they had to say, he handed to each of then2 his Special Field Orders Xo. 342, outlining precisely what each of the bodies of troops were expected to do,"""5 Three days later there were clear signs that the ice had begun tc:, melt, and orders were issued to unit cammandcrs h r their men to be ecltlipped for action-haversacks filled with three days' ratioxts, and each infantr-grxnm earr)Pirrg sixty rounds of ammunition, At 3:00 F.M. nn 14 December Thomas called a final eornmand conference at liis f-readquarters, where he went over his

A Bew Mnd of Battle

Fif$ure 14.1 Organization of Thornas' A m y

previously isstred battle plan in detail. The attack ~ v a sset fbr the next morning; reveifle would be sounded for all troops at 4:00 AM. The Rock of Chickamauga svas about to become a missile that would shatter forever the last hopes of the Confederacy in the west.

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CHAPTER 15

e of Nashville Hood's Army of Tennessee was ready for battle and it was not ready for battle. In one sense it was ready, not with the dash and spir.il with which it had started its march from Flarenee, but with an urge for any kind of action after the weeks spent suEering behind the frozen breast-warks in the pseudo-siege of Nashville. The paor1y equipped Confederate soldiers had shivered for the past two weeks, exposed to cold rains, sleet, and snow; a great many were without blankets, warn1 clothing, and even shoes. 'Tllousands of Hood"s men remained barefooted as the steer and snow pelted down on their bare heads and froze their threadt~are,ragged Small wonder that the men were ready for any change that would take their minds off their present woes. In mother sense, tbe Confederates were nat ready Cor an attack in the predawn hours of the rnonling of 15 December, when their senkies h e a d the strange echoes of Yankee fiufSles sounding reveille in the pitch-black darkness. The sentries, however, were more concerned with keeping their feet out of the dinging mud that had aceurnutated since the fmzen ground had begun to h a w over the past two days.

TIEIRMIM AND WEATHER When daylight broke, Thamas bvas already riding towasd afie spot he had selected far a command obsewation past, a high knoll in the sdient in the entrenchments bekeen the Hillsbciro Pike on the west and the Cranny White Tumpikt: to the east (see Map 15.1). He and his staff had to pi& their way carefuHy through the dense fag that had cavered the ground since daybreak. It was a chilly, late autumn day that w u l d remain dry after the fog lifted, which would occur by midmorning. When the fog did clear, the army conl-

Map 15.1.

The Battle of Ns'ashvffle

219

mander was able to take advanhge of the panoramic view &at his Q.P. afforded. W e n he looked south toward his enemy's entrenchments, he could see, about a mile to his left (to the east), the valley of Brom" Creek and two miles to the southwest was another valley, &at of Richland Creek, The two creeks originated within about a mile of each other in the Brentcnrood Hills, tlireetly to the south at: a distance of about four miles frtam the t o m of Nashville, Both creeks Rowed into the Cumberland River on opposite sides of the t o m , The ground was mostly hilly famland broken by numeraw ridges and holls which tended to rise from 200 to 3300 feet above the level of the river. In general, the temain was open, aEording room for maneuver and good fields of fire except for scattered stands of timber. As would be expected in late autumn, the fields were bare, but the ground sudace had tunled muddy due to the thawing kom the ice storm. Thornas could also observe mueh of the five-mile-long series of breastvvtarks that made up the Confedefate line, starting from the NashviHe and Chaaanooga Railroad on the east, extending wesward in a long, caneave cume all the way to the HilIsbora Pike. At that point the line made a s h a q ~&t-;m);le t-urn to the south, foming a sdient with its west side running along the pike, ttacing acdvantage aE the stone wall dongside the road, On the opposite sslde of the pike Wood bad erected a serles of three detached redoubts, supplemented by two mare on hilltops, also west of the pike, He had dso outposted the front of his line with covering elements extending from the Hilfsbaro Bike e a s ~ a r dalong the erest of Montgomery Hill, then al-rding bxk to csnnect with the center of his main line. THOMAS' P U N AND THE MUNCHING OF HIS A n A C I K

Thomas>pXan and its execution were once refemed to as a "rather oldfwhioned battle." If that were true, Nashville could be so caregodzed dong with Cmnae and huthen-simple but remarkable. Thornas' concept of the operation was to m&e a secondar)~,feinting attack against )Pood"s right while the main and heavily weighted at~tickwould make an envelopment aE the Confederate left with the dual puqose of rolling back and destroying Hoo$"s forces wbile cutting his amy" sommunications to the south, To accompIish this, the main attack waf made by two corps, SmitX?'sXVZ Corps on the right and Wood"$ XV Corps on Smitfi's left. Initially, Smith W= assisted on his right by Hakh's cavalry division fpom Wifson's cavalry covs, HatcKs mission wm not the simple cavalry role of covering Smith's (and the His troopers fou&t dismounted, using their seven-shot repeating rifles, thus adding a tremendous dimension of firepower to the attwk, Steedman" pmvisional detachment ktually amounting to an army e a v s with the equivalent of two divisions) made the secandav atkck, Schofield"~X,X111 Corps was initially in general reserve, with the mission of fallowing the main atbck, being prepared for commiment to the attack on order. Wilsan's cavalry corps (minus

220

Nashville

FXateh's division) was prepared irritiallty to sng3port the main attaek while debching one division to protect the arnzy's right and rear is1 the direction of the Charlotte Pike, this division also being prepared to support the main attack on order. When Smith" XVI Corps and k'trood's IV Corps had left their entrencbxnents to mow to the attack, General Donaidson" force of quwtemaster troops m d amed civilims would move in and occupy the errtrencbments. By first light, around 6:W AM,, all of Thomaskttaeking forces were ort the move, though their movements were slowed considerably by the dense fog and muddy ground. Despite the obstacles of ground and weather, St-eedman was able to launch his attack by 8:00 A.%r. and rrranaged to keep Cheatham's Confederate corps fully occupied far the next several fzours, Xn the rnear-rtime, Wood and Smith had advanced their corps, rn&ing a gigantic wheel pivoting on FVoorl's IIV C o q s in order to bring Smith's XVX Corps pmllel to and advancing on the Confederate left dong the Miflsboro Pike. While Smith was completing his ma~~euver., Beatty's division of GVor>cl"s wqs assaulted and carried the Clonfedellate psitions or? Morztgomerqi Hill. By noon, Smith's XVI Corps, powehlly assisted by Hatch's divisioti, had stormed and overmn the =doubts west of the Hillsboro Pike and had advanced to the pike itself. At about 1:W P,%. Thomas, seeing that the battle had reached a enitical phase, isstred three sets of orders: F V o d to continue his attack beyond Mont@mew Hitl and hwak through the salient in Hood" line held by StewarlZs coqs; Schofield to come into action on. Smith" right to continue the nlain attack in that area; \Vilson to commit the rest of his e a v a t ~euz23s, and, along with Match's division, to shift southward and get arotxrtd the el-resny left to seal off the Gmnny WI~iteTmmpike. By 1:30 P.M. Satevvart's colys, which had held the left of the Confederate fine, was being battel-ed by the repeated assaults of the combined combat power of FVood, Smith, Scklofield, and Wifson, Findty, after Smith's troops Xmd carried the stctne wall that liad made rtp the Confederate defenses along the Hilisburo Pike and Wood" sattacking units had broken through the salient ta their front, the Confederate left began to collapse, By late afternoon the br&n elements of Stewart's sovs were straming to the southeast toward the Cranny White Turnpike, and before nightfall Nood"s forces had been driven back a full two nrifes soutb of their entrenchments. dthough allmost routed, Hood's shattered forces were saved by a p p r o d i n g ni&tf"atl. Thomas' forces-elated by success but &ustrated by disorganized and intermixed attacking tlnits in the falling darkness-hd to hold up their attack until they could get rearg,?nized to continue the attack the next morning.

HOOD'S REACTIONS TO THOMAS-mACIKS Of all the problems that beset Hood on the first day of battle one of his greatest vvas caused by a miscalculation of his own. Nine days before he was attacked by Thomas, he had detached a force of 6,560 under Forrest to take

The Battle of Nashville

22 1

Murfreesboro, ~ e n t y - f i v erniles to the east of Nashville, The reasoning behind Hood's action is still indeter~ninate;in his ogcial report he says only that I had sent Major-General Fornest, with the greatest part of his edvalry and Bate's division sf infantry, to Mudreesbara, to asceeain if it was possible to take the place. After a careful emminatian and a reconnaissance in force. . . . it was deterninecl that nothing mufd he accomplished by assault, Bate's division w s then withdram [back to Nashvillle], leaoing Fmest- with Jackson$ and BufmdBs diukiom of cnoaky in obsemation [itaiics added].M7

That last phrase has been emphasized because it shows clearly that Hood, by t far away, had, as the militay cliche goes, deprived himself sending F o ~ e s so of his eyes, ALXthough Chalmers' division of Forrest's cavalry corps hiad remained under Hood"s direct command, the sad fact was that the invdualale Fornest was not present in person with his corps to direct and coordinate the intelligence eEort of the army before NashviIle, One of the immediate consequences of Fonest" absence was that in the early morning hours of L5 December, Ghalmels found himself being ovewhelned by Wilson" ccavalqf corps as it maneuvered to cover the Union infantv forces while they advanced in their g ~ a wheeling t movement to attack the Conhderate left. Even more importrant than Chatmers>inabili~to cope with Wilson the lack of early warning that should have alerted Hood to all the masses af enemy forces tnatreuvering to threaten his left, even allowing for the fact that the early morning fag had obscured much of the Union movements. Another factor that added to Hood" problems was that Steedman's secondary attack-Thornasyeint-did succeed in deceiving him into thinking that it was actuafly the Union mail1 at~dck.Thus, Thornas had succeeded in at-faining a degree of tacticd surprise; that is, his feint had struck his enemy at an unexpected time- and place, cirusing Hood to react too late to counter eEectiveXy the r e d main attack. Due to Steedman's efforts, Gheatharn9scorps an the Confederate right was fully occupied until noon in mpulsing a series of Union assaults. This development-plus the lack af early wait-ning, the moming fog, and the delays that held up the initial Union movements-kept Hood's attention fixed an Iris right, The distraction resulted in a fatal tacticd assessment: Hood was delayed in detaching urgently needed forces from Cheatham to reinforce Stewal.t's corps at a crisis in his defense against Thomas' main attack. A contributing &tor to Hood" delayed rmtions was his being out of touch with his corps c~mm;l~lders during the criticd phases of the battle, He had located his command post at a famhouse, at least four rniles jtj-om the salient in S t e w a ~ ' sline, the same disbnce Ifrom Cheatham on the right, and a good six miles from Chdmers' eavdlry. command covering the left. These distances in combination with the .factors already mentioned were bound to thwdrt:

HoocE's pperso~lalcorltact with his eontrrra~lciersat the times when most needed by both. When f Iood was able to exercise personal control of his forces at the center of events, it was too late to do anything but reorganize them to continue the action on the marrow. For Hood, the hard-charging figheer, any other course of action at this stage was unthinkable. He had gone through the last spages of his can~paignwith no other purpose than to bring Thornas to battle, to force his enemy to leave his Nashville defenses and attack lliun. Thornas had done just that, and the consequences were anythizlg but what Hood had planned, To Xlood's minct, half a battle had been forrght, and now there was nothing left to do but get every last veteran of the &my of Tennessee into the line of battle and ready to recoup what had been lost-and turn an unfortunate series of events into a victor)l that would at least allow a change of campaign objectives. Accordingly, he was directing his energes to making new rfcrploymentsand throwing up hasty fieldworks-for the coming day, W e moved Cheatham's relatively intact colps to replace Stewart's on the 1eA o f his new and shortexled line, about two miles south of his oliginaf defenses (see Map 15-2).To make place for Cheatham and to take some of the pressure off $tewart9s battered divisians, Hood shifted that c o v s to the centcr, then deployed S. D. b e ' s es>rpsto the right of the new line, Both Nanks were =fused, (i.e.,turned back) in order to contend with any enemy attempt to m&e a new envelopment. Chalmers' ccvalr). was deployed to screen the army's left rear.

THE SECOND DAY: UNION AmACKS OVEXZWHELM CONFEDERATE RESISTANCE By the; night of 15-L6 December, Thornas believed that his tmops would

he a13Ie to finish the job of cmshing Hoodls fi~rcesthe next morning, That was to prove an overly optimistic assessment. "fhe muctciy graund and the necessity to ready a l forces to launch them into a renewed attack we= to put a. brake on Thornashplans for much of the morning of the 16th. Moreover, the muddy ground stowed the movement of horse-dram artillery to the firing positions from which it was to fire the preparation fir the renewed atkacks. And, as events were to prove, Thonas' artillev was to play a central role in the battle of the 116th. Thornas had rightly conclrrded it unnecessary to change his basic concept of the operation, to maintain the main attack to envelop the enemy left while throwing the renlainder of his combat power in converging attacks against his right and center. Moreover, be wds well aware that Hood" original line of five miles of entrenchments had now shrrtnk to three miles of a thromtogether defensive line that could he broken at weak places. Accordingly, when vietved from east to west, Thomas' five major conlmands would continue their attacks: Steedman and Wood against the enemy right, Smith against its

Map 15.2

center, Schofield against the Confederate left, and Wifson's cavalry to drive off the enemy cavalry and cut oil' tlme last akraitable Confederate route of withdrawal, the Franklin Fike. By 9:W A.M. the Union artiller): had con~mencedfiring its preparat-l'on, which was to continue thr-oughout the next two hours, Its heaviest fire was directed against the cume of the Confederate line on its left and in a lesser degree against the enemy right on and around Peaeh Orchard Hill, Beginning at 1Q:00A.hr. Steedman's leading brigades were launched against the enemy right. This series of secondav attacks was repulsed, mainly by Ctayton's division of Lee's eoqs. By early aftcrr-roon,CVoocZ"scorps had joined in the attack affainst h e ' s corps, but his attacks dso faif& to drive the Conkderate right from its improvised entrenchments. On the Confederate left, however, the strength of Thon~ashmainattack-nw being made by Stnitk's XVI C o p s Rorn the north and Sehofield's XXIII G o ~ from s the west-was converging on the curving salient held by Cheatham" soqs. The iaritial phase of that massive attack was preceded by an artifles). preparation that reached the climax of its eRectiveness when the Union batteries opposite Stewart's Confederates were able to wedge themselves into firing positions from vvhich they could almost: enfilade Cheatham" corps from the east, By 3:30 P.M. they Faad so neutrdtized the firepower of fieatham's def'ending infant? that it could no lonlfer withstand the massed force of the assaulting waves of Union infantv, which then broke through and overran the regiments defending the salient foming the bulwark of the Confederate left, Cheatham's scovs, attacked horn front and fiank, was shattered into frdgments that broke and Aed to the rear. While Smith's and Schofielgs forces were being launched into their attacks against Hood's left, Wilsan had dismounted the greater part of his cavaX1-y corps and sent its horses to the rear-too fiar to the rear, as it turned out-while his troopers atpacked their enemy with the firepower of their repeating rifles. Mter 4:OQPM. the remnants of both Cheatham's and Stewart" corps uPerepoufing reaward, and only Lee Inad managed to hold together the divisions of his corps and make a somewhat orderly withdrawal while swing the rest of Hood's a m y h r n complete dissotution, Thamas Lawence Connelly in his history of the A m ~ yof Tennessee has described Lee's actions: 'Qnly Lee's corps retained any organization. Stunned to see the army ebraporating before his eyes, Lee skiflhlly pulled back his tmops to the Overton Hills. While a young drummer beat the long rttfl, Lee held firm until his entire corps could be put in wtreat. Stiff the end hacl come so swiftly that sixteen of he's guns had been captured before the arti1ler.y horses could be brou$t u p from the rear,""'& Nevertheless, before ni&teall the ba-ttle sf NashwiXle was over and Hoad's see had sugered the worst defeat in its histow.

AFTERMATH In spite of the magnitude of the disaster, Hood managed to salvage what rmained of his army. It was saved mainly by nightf'all and the digcutties that

The Battle of Nashriille

225

Wilson Failed to overcome in reassembling his cavalry corps into a compact Eorce that might have made possible an ovcnqowring Napoleonic c;lwalr)ppursuit that would have des~royedthe enemy when his dernordized forces were most wlnerable. ft could be said, in defense of Wilson? failure, that three things combined to thwart his caprtljili~to organize an immediate pursuit, First, in deploying his dismounted units to m ~ m i z etheir firepotver, they were so dispersed that a great ded of time had to be sacrificed in reassembling them. Second, preciuus tinle was last in bringing up the ~roopers'horses, which had been held in areas much too far to the rear. Third, both of the foregoing diBculties were multiplied by the early coming of the late autumn darkness, which w a asccompauied by a heavy rain. On the folofloeng morning, 17 December, Wilson bid take up the pursuit, but was slowed by the mud and the rearguard actions of the remains of Cbdmers' c a v a l ~supported by in6antlt.r elements. Thornas also sent m o d to fallow and support Wilson, yet those combined forces were fu&ber checked by the amival of Farnest and his cavalry when he joined Hood at Columbia on the 18th. With Fonest cove~ng his retreat far the next week, Hood maslaged to get the remainder of his broken forces to the Tennessee River, where they made the saddest of crussings an Christmas Day, The Union pursuit ended eEeetively at the baxzks of the Tennessee. The remnants of fi[ood["sarmy reached Tupelto, Mississippi, on 10 January, and on the 14th Beauregard arrived to ""Xearn the stunning truth. Hasd bad only about fifteen thousand infantrymen remaining with the army. Of Ifiese, fewer than half were still equipped or considered egeetive, A large part of the amy" sfiillery had been captured, abmdoned, or destroyed. Some thirteen thousand small a m s w r e missirrg, and w p n tmnspop.tatiotl had been anniBeauregard also found that, for the few thousand hilated on the long n~arch.'"~ '"eRecti\resS2left, there was no food, still no winter clothing, and only a few blankets. But by far the most demoralizing fact of all for the Confedierate cause in the west was that the y of Tennessee no Ionger existed as a fighting force. And its commander, the greatest fi&ter of them all, redized that he too was no longer an eEective fighting force. On 13 Januav, the day before Beauregard" snivd, Hood had written to Izis president requesting that he be relieved from cornmand. JeEerson Davis accepted the request,

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CHAPTER 16

y Thomas Won More than a Victory OF all the egeets of the art of command on the Tennessee campa;ign none could have bad more impact than Haod's interpretation of the? strategic mission t h t he bad proposed to Jeftersan Bavis and which Dwis had acceptedsubject to a mutual understanding. In the discussion that took place be&een the two at Palmetto, Georgia, on 25 September, Bavis had a p p m v d Hood's proposds and added the condition that Hood, if threatened by She~man's trrming hack to drive Hood off his communications, would withdraw into northern Afabama and continue to threaten those eommunicatians. Even mare impo~ant,an extension of Davis' condition was &e understanding b i e ~ e e n the WO that whatgoer happened; Hood was to follow S h n w n wlzerevw he went, nod12 or south. Yet it became evident, at a critical turn in his strategicd spaming with Sheman, that Hood chose to put a diEerent inteqrebtion on his mission; in the jargon of modem-day journalists, he put his own spin on it. In so doing, he won the reluctant approval af Beauregard, his theater commander, for his invasion of Tennessee. Hood"s new interpretation-W revealed by Beauregard3sdismay when Hood first disclosed it to him-was no less than an abandonment of the mission of following Sheman (while cutgng his communications) in exchange For approval to turn his back on Sheman and venture into Tennessee with a new objedive of defeating Thomas"\'scattertsd fomes," Moreover, the extended objective of invading Kenhzcb and threatening Ohio-and if ovevawexad there by the farces of Sherman and Thamas-to march to join Lee in 'Virginia, was not simply an alternative course af aietion. Xt was in reality an operational and 1oliF;isticalfmtasy that depended on the tacit eoopedion of Union strategists who would p e m i t their enemy to range at will across border states, while he depended upon undisturbed communications that were hard enough to sustain in his own territory.

The efects of the revised mission became increwinglly manifest as Mood moved northwrd after he had crossed the Tennessee River. At first he attained a degree of strategic suprise as his forces moved rapidly under conditions of weather and terrain that his enemies thought too adverse for mobile wadare, He was able to exploit his new stratelttfy to outmsneuver his enemies, but failed at Columbia and again at Spring Hill to entrap Schafielcf"~ force, in part due to the inadequacy of his command supervision of operations and his flawed relationships with his major force commanders. Then, apparently obsessed with an urgency to attain his strategic aims and disgusted with the performance of several commanders, he threw away a great part of his operational capability in the battle of Franklin when he persisted in squandering the combat pawer of his a m y by a series of fronhl attacks that wasted thousands of brave mm--bloody mpulses that were bowd to fail in the face of dehnsive firepwer that muId Boon even the &&s of the mast gailant of at~ackers.In spite of FrankSin he seems to have lost none of his offensive spirit, which drove him to confront Tharnas at Nashville, where he enbenched his forces--redwed, by his own =counting, from 3 2 , W to 23,000 eEectives-in a siege that persisted in name only. In the meantime Thornas was using valuhle time t-o build up and prepare his forces to take the oRensive. During the "siege" Hood's command intellect seems to have been submerged in a sort of dream world where reality gave way to the id@@ fi*e that once Thornas emerged from his field fortifications, he could be defeated and his base cdptured. In contrast to Hood's intergretatian of his mission, Thomas seems to have been so firmly grounded in the meaning of his that he o&en appeared at odds with his superiors in executing it. His aaerence to ,the letter of his mission might have appearcd to supeliors like Grant or Sheman as sluggishnws or obstinacy, In reatiiy, his methodic4 procedures w r e only the outvvd signs of his deteminatian to taw out his mission as he saw it-and it was eharacteristic of him that he never undertook an assignment until he ww sure that he could see it through. This seeming conflict b e ~ e e nsubstance and appearance was never more evident than in Thomas' situation at Nashville when, for two weeks, he was subjected tir a constant, telegaphed needling from an impatient Crdnt &we patience wre thinner by the day, To provide bdance to the picture, the record shows that Grant perceiwd Thornas as an indomitable esmrnander in the defense but one who couildn" be counted on to tike the ogensive on his own initiative. That Grant was wrong in his presumption regarding Tkomas' offensive spirit was clearly shown by Thomas' ptanaing mdl execution af a battle that was won entirely by a s e ~ e of s hard-pushed attacks. Vet Grant's anxi* to get things moving at Nashville is understmdable d e n vimed from the perspective of a natimd strateg).. that $wed an overfiding impo~aacean getting the western theater cleared of any obstacles which could hinder ShermanYsending the war in the Deep South, Hence Grant's tenden~yto minimize Thomas' lagiistical and organimtiond problems, while

Why 'ntontas Won More than a Victov

229

the man on the ground doggedly persisted in completing the preparations that would in his mind assure stding everything on one find battle. Those differences were rendered meaningless by Thornas' victory and its elimination of any hrther threat to Union strategic aims in the west. M e r each commander bad evaluated his mission it followed that the next step in conceiving operational plans would depend upon his evduation of his enemy's capabilities to appose those plans* In Hood"s ease it is evident that his strategic intelIigeace estimde of Tbomas' disposition of forces was Wawed even before he stafied his a m y aemss the Tennessee River, One of his basic assumptions in the revised strateu he had proposed to Beauregard in order to @in his approvd of' an advancc into Tennessee was that he could defeat Thomas"'"scattered forees"' befort: his enemy could concentmte a superio~ty of force against Aim, As it turned out, instead of scattered forces Hood was opposed by Schofie1d"s two caps, which actually amounted to an army with a skength of some 32,W. hnd Schofield's force, as it proved, was fully capable of conducting a series of delaying actions against the 38,000 until the entire Uniorl force withdrew into the N~tshviffeentrenchments. There is no need t s dwell on the far-reaching eEects of that flawed element in Hood's strategy; what happened to his a m y at Nashville and the aftemath speak for therr;lselves. There was, however, also a breakdown in Hood"s combat intelligence capabiliiey that contributed to his failure to react eKectively to Thamashttaclcs. His error in dispatching Fornest to Mudreesboro and the cansequences of Forreds absence could be seen in the cripplin& e&cts on H o d s lack of intelligence of his enemy's impending attacks. Moreover, the other resdts can only he imagined in the possible eRFects that Forrest and his cavalmy corps mi&t have bad in upsetting the role of Wilson's cavdry in T h o m a s h h attack ag&nst Hood"s left flank at Nashville, As for Thomas' intelligence estimates, he suRered more from an inadequacy: af the collection of intelligence: than from his evduation of it. ?'fiere is ample evidence to show that, as an old cavalry oEeer, he was acutely aware of the weakness of his cavdry a m , both in its q u d i v and ~ m r i when v compared to its eountevart; hence he was cqiirally aware of the ~ s u l t i n gwaknesses in the intelligence that w s provided him. That awareness was d e d y dernonsbated in his telegram to Grant on f December, when he expressed his a m iety fbr the time needed to get Wilson's cavalry equipped (read horses, forage, and accoutrements) because the strength of his command was only one-fourth of that of his enemy. But Thomas' inadequacy in the collection of intelligence shouldn't excuse his inclination to exercise that shortcoming so common among many Union commanders-sverestimating the enemy's strengh at critical times during an operation. Overestimating, in such cases, meaning not "safesiding," but unrealistic exaggerations. For example, following the arrival of Hood's Eorces before Nashville Thomas estirnded their strength at over 50,OW despite the facts &at the A m y of nnnessee codd not have mustered those numbers at the start of the camipaign and it had suEered sewre losses

230

Nasftt itte

in its disastrous attacks at Franklin. Yet, as we have seen, Hood at Nashville was bemoaning the fact that Itis amty's strength had fdlen to less than half' that number. Fortunately for Thsmas his planning lfor battle was not adversely agected by his overestimate of his enemy"s numbers, and perhaps he was doubly fortunate in knowing his enemy's dispositions, since they were tied to field fortifications. Once each of the WO commanders had evaluated the intelligence available to him he had to realize his objectives before he could conceive an aperationd plan. Martin V;zn ereveld in his pertetrati~lgstudy of command has made an insighlful observation in t h i s regard: 'The objectives selected mu& be both desirable and feasible, two requirements that are not dways compatible, The dtemative ways of action presented to the commander and his staff, should be real, not just subterfuges p ~ s e n t e das a rtlatter of fc~m.(As Maltke remarked to his aides, the enemy always seemed to have three dternatives open to him and he usually chose the fourth.)."lm Since histov has borne out the soundness of Van Creveld's observations, our evidence indicates that Hood could have profited &om observing the two requirements for oI3jectivcs when fie was planning his campaign. The evidence shows, however, that he chose to select two campaign objectives that appeared hifihly desirable but which proved to be anything hut feasible. The discussion of Hoodss mission in the opening of this chapter has atready pointed out the infeasibility of both, First, instead of defeating Thclmas' supposedly scattered farces in detail, Hood was confronted fronr the start by Schofield? co~lcentratedcops, which fou&t successful delaying actions a11 the way to Nashville. Second, extending the earnp a i into ~ Kentuck-based on the assumption that Thon~as'forces eorild be defeated and eliminated as obstacles-would have become, even under the assusned conditions, an operational and Zogistical nightmare. Regrettal3ly for X-Xood, an unsound selection of objectives did not end with the at>ovechoices. Wren he entrertelied his a m y to confront Thornas at Nashville, Hood was counting on Tllorrlas to attack him in his ectlrenchxnents; and he believed that during the ensuing batde he w u l d defeat the Union army and capture Nashville, Even if a historian could set aside, for the moment, the record of the Confederate disaster, it would still be clear that Hood had decided on an inkasible objective. How could an army of some 23,060, s u s r i n g under wintry, icy rains widlout wint.er clothing, defeat an emmy of mare than Wice its numbers-a warmly clothed and well-fed enemy secure behind prepared fortifications and whose numbers were being reinforced almost day by day? How could Hood himself prttf?ose to defeat an enemy who o d d employ his superior strength to strike at will on the Confederate front or flanks? These were pestions that Hood could have asked behre he entrenched and avaited Tt-tomass attack, Instead he let his arnbition overcome his reason whex7i he decided, in his words, that it was "mare judicious that the rnexr face a decisive issue rather than =treat . . . wilhoua Irwing nlade a fast and martfir1 effort: to lift up the sinking fortunes of the Confederacy.'7T"llese were more like the w r d s of

Why 'fhomas Won More Char1 a Vietow

23 1

a King Arthur on the eve of' his last battle than tbase of a general planning the commitment of a nirxeteentk-centuxy army to a critical phase of a campaign. The objectives that Thornas decided on when he conceived his campaign to deal wit11 Hood were practiedhle as well as logically set in terns of time, We chose to provide Schofield with a WO-cows force of 32,900 to delay E3EoocX"s no&hward advance while he, Thornas, organized his mixed bag af Nashville garrison and incoming reinforcemerib into a cohesive h r c e &at could buiXd field fortiEctztions while they \Were being orgmized for combat, Those two interdependent ohjeetives, when set as goals k t h i n The same time & m e , could buy Thorn= the time he so urgently needed-tilne wherein he could redize a third and final objective: to organize a poweduX striking force that he could employ to maneuver against arzd defeat Hood"s a m y in its defensive positions. As events have shown, the three main objectives were not only attainable but hrtber fomed the bases for plans that worked when put into execution, A final consideration that follows from Thornas' decisions regar&ng objectives could well be the most important of all to our interest, centered as it is on the mabration of a Civil ~ i commander's r art of command. In this case the focus is an Thornas' planning and conduct of the battle itse1E His planning is noteworthy not only fir its thoroughness but for the fact that he continued to bring his major force commanders in on the planning stages, both to heed tlxeir questions and ideas and to ensure their eomp2et.e understarzding of the operational plan and thus their full cooperation in its execution. Yet even the siwificance of these in-?pr>rtantfactors fades when mother condusion e r n e r s s from the execution of Thornas' battle plan: Nashville was the only Civil War battle which assumed and foreshadowed the character of a battle of the First Wodd War, over a half centuv later, Attacking units moved into attack posilrions under cover of darkness and fog. An artilew prepardion preeeded the launching of both main m d secondav attacks. At prearranged times, waves of assaulting infanm left their trenches to slog their way thro~lghmud to tllrow themselves against defending infaaztrynren in their trenches. Massed units of the main attick succeeded in making a breakthrough through a c ~ t i c a l poixlt in an enemy salient, The breakthrough was cguiekly exploited by at&ing units from a corps which had been held in resewe. The a m y colnrnmder remained in control of events tbmu&out the two days of the batlie, receiving timely reports &am m Jor forcc commanders, nrking decisions and issuing appropriate orders when the situation warranted. It may be argued that the foregoing picture 1;ickcs the hardware that charaterized the First World War battlefield-the magazine rifle, machine gun, indi~ct-firingartillev, electronic communications-h that is simply a part of the rationale of the theorists who contend that: the rnateriel of the Ameniean Civil War was the deteminant of the "modern. battlefield," The essential meaning of Nasht.ilfe remains-it was the tbught behind Thornas' art of com-

mand that detcmined the form and meaning of the battle. Vet evcrz setting aside the nature of the battlefield, there rclnaills a far more imporbnt featurn of the battle that resulted from Thamas' foretbougbt. Two scholars and military historians have jointly reached a eonctusion in this regard: "Thornas came close to fig)rting the battle of mnihiIation which had f'or so long existed in the rFhomas only ""came minds of the public, politicians, and J"aurnatist~."~~""fhat close" was due, as we have seen, ta the fact that his cavalry could not be reorganized in time to deliver a Napoleonic coup dR grme at the critical time when most of Hood" s m y was shattered and in full flight. The fact remains, however, that Nashville was the only Civil War battle where the objective of mnihilation was made possible by the victor" deliberate intent being c a e e d through to its end.

PART

FLECTIONS Generdship in war would be the easiest d a r t s to practice-if only the general could get his oppme"t.s to cooperate. -W. J. Woad

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Chapter 17

Reflections The story goes that when iafexmder the Great had subjugated the Greek states to Macedonism rule he took time to wdk the streets of Athens and see at first hand the center of Greek culture and resiskance to the conqueror, Xn his tour he came upon the philosopher Diogenes, sunning himself as he sat on the ground outside the baml that fomed his only abode, As he towered over the seated philosopher, AEexander asked Diogenes if there ww anything he could do for him, Dioenes replied, "You can take your shadlaw out of my sun." Alexander stood aside, The god of this M t i n g has been to keep the art of commmd exposed to the sunliglnt of common sense while taking it out of the shadow of what Clausewik called 'in M;assachusetts Militav H i s b ~ e a Society, l Papers of the illilihry I-fkto&aE Societg o_fMarsael~use#s, Vol. If: The Irirginia Gmpaiggz of 1862 u d e r General Pope (reprirrfedt Wilmington, NC, 18911; originally published 1895), 416. 30, Sbcbole, 63-44. 31. Andrews, 42W24. 32, Robert K. Kriek, StmwaEl Jackson at Cedar Mr~zhnt.uz"n(University of North Carolina Press, 11990), 1139. 33. Kric-k, 20S204, 34. Cited in Kriek, 205. 35, Douglas Sottthdl Freeman, b e > Ueufelzants: A. Study in C=ornmrzd,3 vols., Vol. If (New York, 1942), 37-38. 36. Stacbofe, 70. 37. Freemtm, If, 41. 38, Grdon, C30W08. 39. Freeman, IX, 26 and note 53. 46, Andrews, 439. 41. Freeman, I I, 46. 42. C, F". R. Henderson, Stot-onewallJacks~nand the A m ~ c a nCiuik War, 2 vols., Vol, I (Seeaueus, N j , f987), 58, 43. Freeman, XI, 2 and note 6, 44. WilXiam S, Roseesans, "The Campaign for Cbattrmooga," Centuq Maggzine (May f887), X2%130. 45. The West Point Adas ofA?wficun Wars, 1Ci8%19@, Vol. I, edited by Vince~~t J, Esposito (New York, 1959), 108, 46. Roseerans, 130,

Notes

249

41, Ibid., 131. 48. Willlam M. hmers, The Edge c?f Glory: A Biography of Gemral WilEiam S. Roseeruns, U,S.A. (New York, 1961)-5-43, 49, jarnes L, Morrison, Jr., ""Educating the Civil kVar Cenemls: West Point, 1833I%X," MdZitary Aflairs (September 1974), 108-1 11. $0. Ibid., 109, 51. Lamers, 15. 52. Ibid., 13, 53. Glcnn Tucker, 6/7hickamaz&g~: Bloody Battk in the West (Indimapofis, lyfjl), 35. 54, hmers, 15. 55. Tucker, 40. 56, Ibid., 3-9. 57. As cited in Gozzens, Thb " r e d & S m d : The Bask of Chickamuga (University of Illinois Press, 1Y92), 24. 58. Roseerm~s,128. 59. Cited in Heman Harttaway and h e h e r Jones, How the N&h Wan:A. M.ilitaq History of the Cioil War (University of Illinois Press, 1983),$44, 60. Rosecrans, 132. 61. Ibid. 62. Hattaway and Jones, How the North Wm, 279, 63, Ibid,, 444. 64. Shelby Faate, The Civil Wars a Narratioe jFre&rickshrg to Meridd~n)(New York, 195tl), 171, 65, Ibid., 1E. 66. Don C. Seitz, Braz$m B r a g : GerzeraI ofthe Confehracy (Columbia, SC, 1@24), 24. 67. Grady McWhiney, Brax&a B r a g and ConfeArate Dqfgat, Vol. X: Fdeld Corn ( C O I U ~University ~ ~ Q Press, 1969), 82, 68, Ibid., B r a s to Sheman, March 1, 1848, cited in note 21, p. 88. 69. Seitz, Bruxton Brag, $5. 70. Steven E. Woodwar&, Jeflersclpl.Dau& and H& Gemrah (tfniversil.)rPress of Kmsas, lm0), 94 (citing Mcwiney, 20%203). ?l. Archer Jones, Civil War C o r n m d and Strategy: The Process of Vic.tory and Dg;lfead (New York, 19921, 92, 72. &@leg a d Ln;uders .sf the Civil War (Secaucus, pJ,J,) E X , 13. 13. Edwrd Hagcr~nan,T'k Amdcan Ciuil W a r G& the W g i w WIModemz Warfare: Ideas, eganization, a d FdeM C o r n m ~ d(Indiana Universiy Press, 19881, 178. 74. W. 3. Wood, LRadgrs a d Battkes: The Ad of Militaq fRaz"nC3rghip (Noveto, CA, 19%)- 272. 75. Judith Lee HaEEoek, Br~xgoraB r ~ ag d Cofifehrate Dejgat, Vol. 2, (fi-niversiw of Allabama Press, lWl), 271. 76. McWhiney, 28. 7'7. Arthur J, L. Fremantle, Three &nth in tht? Southm Stabs (Loncfon, Edinbur&, 1863), 145-146. 7%. Tucker, 66, 79, Ibid., 67.

250

Notes

80, Thomas Lawrence Connelfy, Aittvrmn of Glory: The Army uf Tennessee, 186218m7(buisiana State University Press, 19711, 188. 81. O.R., I, XXX, 11, 24,27, 31-32. 82. Cazzens, 92. 83. Tucker, 123. 84. Cozzens, 111. 85, Connelly, 197. 86. Cozzens, 116. 87. Conneuy, 201. 88, Ibid., 199. 89. Ibid., 202. 90. Tucker, 140. 91. Q.R., I, xxx, I, 57. 92. General James Longstreet, F r m Manassas to Appmtton (reprint, New York, 1992), 438. 93. Cozzens, 302.

94, Ibid., 300. 95. Lamers, 334. 96, Coazens, 295; based on O.R., I, XXX, I, 6Qs 97. Tucker, 198-199. 98, Foote, 719. 99. Tucker, 219. 100. Ibid., 2W2U7. 101. ConnelIy, 223. 102. O.R., I, XXX, I, 58-59, 103. John B, Turchin, Chickapnauga (Chicago, 1888), 112. 104. Tucker, 251-259; Cozzens, 360-367; Turchin, 112-115. 105, Foote, 738, 106. Ibid. 107, Longstreet, 448-449. 108. O.R., I, X X X , I, 60. 109. Rosecrans, 134. 110. As cited in Tucker, 314, based on AIfked Lacey Hough, SoMk in the West: The Civil War Letters of Alfred b e g H q h (University of Pe&ylvania Press, 1957}, note 151. 111. congstree& 452. 112. Cozzens, 9. 113. Cited in Cbzzens, 469. 114. O.R., I, XXX, I, 140. 115. O.R., I, XXX, I, 142-143. 116* Cited in Tucker, 381. 117. West Pdnt Atlas of American Wars, 1, Map [page] 115. 118, Tucker, 389. 119. Lama, Ccrnrad H., Napoleon and Modem War: His Military Maxims (Harrisburg, PA, 1949), Maxim 73,p. 96. 120. Cited in Cozzens, 523. 121. Ibid., 531. 122. Ibid.

Notes

251

123. Steven E. Woodworth, Jefferson Dauis and His Generals: The Failure of Cortfederate Comrrtand in the West (University Press of Kansas, 19901, 241. 124. Ibid., 291. 125. John B. Hood, Acluunce and Retreat (Indiana University Press, 1959), 254. 126. Woodworth, 292. 127. West Pdnt Atlas of American Wars, I, 149. 128. Ibid., 150. 129. Richard M, McMuny, John Bell Hood a d tlw Warfor Southern Independence (University Press of Kentucky, 19821, 8. 130. Waodworth, 268. 131. Ibid., 271. 132. Winston Groom, Shrouds of Glory: From Atlanta to Nahuille: T h Last Great Cnrnpaign of the Civil War (New York, 1995), 48-49. 133. Hattaway and Jones, 646. 134. O.R., I, XLV, I, 652. 135. West Point Atlas of American Wars, I, 152. 136. Mood, Advance and Retreat, 299-300. 137, Cited in Hattaway and Jones, 649. 138. Citcd in Stanjiey F. Horn, The Decisive Battb of Nushoilk (Louisiana State University Press, 1956), 45 (from O.R., I, XLV, 11, 3, 15-16). 139. Ibid., 45. 140. Ibid., 48. 141. Freeman Cleaves, Rock of Chickamauga: The Lqe of General George H. Thomm (University of Oklahoma Press, 1948), 9. 142. Thomas B, Van Horne, The L@ of Major-General George H. T h o r n (New York, 1882), 6, 143. Cleaves, 42. 144. Thomas Robson Hay, £Iood$ Tenwssee Campaign (New York, 1929), 32-33. 145. Won1, 62. 146. Ibid., 44. 147. O.R,, I, XLV, 1, 654, 148. Connclly, 512. 149. Ibid., 513. 150. Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Harvard University Press, 1985), 8. 151. Hattaway and Jones, 653-654. 152. Clausewitz, 169 and 156. 153. Hdloek, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat, 11, 270. 154. Grady McWhiney, Bruxton Brag and Confederate Defeat, I , 390. 155. Freeman, 11, xxviii-xxx. 156. Cited in Cleaves, 179.

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ected Bibliography THE ART OF WAR: HISTORY3THEOBY, COMMAND Aiger, John 1, The W s t for Vktory: T k Hbtoq of the Primipbs o f War. WesQort, CT, 1982. AIZG: Art and Requirements of Command, Department of the Amy Technical Reprt. f-191, 4 Vols. Joel N. Bloom, Adele M. Farber, et al. The Franklin Instihte Research hborntories, 1967. Prepwed for the OEce of the Director af Special Studies, Q@cc of the Chief of SbB, Depa~mentof the (Cont~actNo. DG 4%092-ARo- 154). Ardaat Du Pieq, CbarEes 5. J. 5. Ba~tieStudim. Hamisburg, PA, 1946. Bdek, WiIhelm. Deuebment of Tact&$-Wwld W@r,Ft. havenworth, KS, 1922. Bassford, Cfrristopber. Cbu8ewitz in English: The Raception of Ciaitasewi~in B ~ t a i n and Arwrica, .82 l 5-1 945. New York, 1994, Beaumont, Roger A. "Command MeLkod: A Cap in Militav Historiopaphy," N~ua2 War College Review (Winter lY"19 61-74. Becke, A, F. An htroduc~ionto the Hhtorg of Tmtics, 174&1905, London, 1W. Blumensan, Ma&in, and Stokesbuv, fames L. 1Wmters of the Art @Of C m m d , New Vark, 1975. Bradley, Bmar N. A SoUier's S$-. Mew York, 1951, Brinton, Crane; Craig, Gordon A.; and Cilbert, Felix. "jomini." h Indward Mead Ea1e fed,), Makers of &&m Strategy: Military r h g h t from Mmhiazielli to Hitler, 77-92, P~ncetonUniversity Press, 19443, Bucholz, Arden. Ham DeZbak and the Ge in C~rzjiczt.University of Iowa Press, 1985. Bume, dfred H. l e Art of War on h a d , Harrisburg, PA, 1941. Camon, H. h Gwwe Napoldonienne: L e g Syst&mesds@&rations,TUorie et Techniqw. Paris, 1907,

. Quund et G o m e a t Yapolhon u Cungu Son Syst6rne & Bataille, Pdris, 1935, -------.

Quand et Carnment M~polkcma C"ongu Sun Sgstdnw LEe Nanc~eume,Paris, 1931. Chandler, David C, The Campaigm of Napokon, New York, 19%, . Dictiunarg c?f the Napoleorric Wars. Xew York, 1979. . On the Mctpokonic Wars: Collected Essays. Meehanicsbrrrg, FA, 1994. Clark, Mark W. Gakzdlated Risk. New York, 1950. Glausewitz, Car1 van. Qn Wur. Edited and translated by Miehaei Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, 1916. Colin, Jezln L. A. h Tucfique et la Bsciphm duns bs Amdes de la Rkvolution (Carrgspodance dzr Un&ralSchauenboar&. Paris, 1W2, . The Trawforrwtionsof W@r,London, 1912. B7Aguifar,Ceorge C. The iWil6tary hfaxinzs of Napoleon. New York, 1988. DeXbri'lek, Hans. Elktc;tq of the Art Q I War: With672 the Framework of htitical H & t q , 4 vols. Translated by Colonel. WdXter J, Renfroe, Jr. Westport, CT, 1985, Dixon, Noman. On the Psycblogy of Militaq fncmpelence. hndon, 1976, Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Dttpuy, Trevor N. I"he Eneycbedb of itlilitaq Hbtmg-from 3500 B,C. to the Present, New York, 19863, h p u y , Trevor M. The EtsoZution of W e a p m and 1;Vagare. New York, 1980. . A Genius for War: The Gemzan A m y and General Stag 1807-1945. Endewood Cliffs, NI, 1977, Earle, Edward Mead (ed,). Makers of Modern Strategy: Militatary ITho&tfwm Machiauelli do Hitler. Princeton flniversiv Press, 1943. Eisenhower, h i & t D. C m d e in Etlrope. New York, t948. EXting, Johxl R. ""Jmini: Disciple of Napoleon?' -1Mililary Aflairs 28 (Spring l=), 1726. . Swmcils aroud a Throne: N;zpoEeoa"srarzHe Anade. New York, 1988. E&r&, WaIdemar, Surprise. Warrisburg, PA, 1943. Finley, M, I. Ancbnt H 6 t q : Euidence a d AWodeb.New York, 1986. Fuller, J. F. C. The Conduct of War, 178SX96;d. Rutgers Universily Press, 1961, . Geseraliship: Its Esemes and "rCEeir Care: A S t d y of $he Y e r s d F d w s in Commad. Hadsburg, PA, 1936. , A Militaq Hktory of the Wesbm Warld. 3 vols. %l. f 1. New York, t955. Galf~el,Richard A., and Sak~age,Paul L. in Conzmand: nagement in the A m y . New York, 1978. Gies, Joseph. CrzIsis 1918: The h d i n g Act.ions, Strategies, md Euents in t h Ge Mctorj @.PE $fieWestem Front, New York, 1974, Gamble for Gaertitz, Wdt-er, History of the G e m n General Stag f Ii5T-19c15. New York, 1953. GriEth, Pddy. f"'omard into Bat-tke:Fighting Tacticsfrom Wa&rloob I-fieNear Future. Movata, CA, 1992. Gudmundsson, Bmce X, Stom T r ~ w Tactks: Innovation irz the Cemun Amg, f 91419f8. New York, 1W. Hays, Samuel H,, and Thornas, WiIliam N. Taking Cornmad: The Art a d S&enee rjlf Militaq badership. EIanrisht~rg,PA, 1967. Nittle, J. D. Jmini ancl' H& Surnrnary ofthe Art Q$ War. Hanisburg, M,1947. . The Mikt~ryStag Xts X-lbbry and Deoelopment, Hadsburg, Ph, 1949, Hooker, Richard D,, Jr. (ed,),Manc?ur;erWa$are: An A T I . $ ~ oNovato, ~ o ~ ~ CA, . 1993. Howrd, Michaef. "jornini and the Classicd Tradition in Militaw Thou&t." In Miehael

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Howard (ed.),The T h e m and P'ructlse of\Var, 3-20. Indiana University Press, I 965. . The Franccr-Bmsian War. New York, 1962. "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the OEensive in 1914." h Peter Paret with Cordon A. Craig and %fix Citibert (eds.),Maircers ofMocilern ftrateyfmm Mwhiaoellli to the NwIear &e, 51%526. P~ncetanUniversity Press, 1986, Jomini, Atitoine Nlenri, The Art of War. Translated by G. NI. Mendetl and W. P. Craighill. Philadelphia, 1862. Jones, Archer. The Art of W Gin~the Western W r U . University of Illinois Press, 1987. Keeen, John. The Face of Battk, New York, 1976. . T k M w k o_f Cumtwnd. New York, 1987. Lanza, Conmd H. Napokm and ~Mo&?rm War: His Milihw Maxirm. lila~isburg,P& 1949, hckie, Rohert. The Wars ofAnzgrica, New York, 1981. Liddell Hart, B. H. The Ghost of Napaleon. Yale Universiv Press, 1934. . Strategy, New York, l$57. l s y d , E. M. A Rezzkw of the Hkt-ory of' lnfantrg. h a d o n , 1908. Lossow, Waiter von. "Mission-Type Tactics versus Order-Tme Tactics.'%iIz"ttlry &vigm Gun(: 19777, 87-91. MacMunn, Cearge, kdership through the Ages. Freeywd, NY, 1935. Maude, I", N. The Jerzrr Campaign 1806. New York, 19m, McNeiXi, WiIlianz H. T h Perguit of Power. University of Chicago Press, 1982. Millet, Mlan R., md Maslawski, Peter. For the Common Dgense: A Militaq History of t h United States of Atweca. New York, 1984. Msltke, Helmuth van. MoEtke m the Art of War: Selected Wrz'tilzgs,Edited by Daniel J, Hu&es. Novatso, CA, 1993. Stralegg: Xb T h e m a d AppIicat.ion: The Warsfor German Un$ficution, 186G 2871. Westport, m, 1971. Morisorz, Samuel Eliot. The &ford lfhtury oft& xbmrican People, Oxford University Press, 19%. Murray, Williarnson; k%dlaceegor,Knox; and Bemstein, &vim (eds.). % Mding of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. Cambridge University Press, t994. Q'Connor, Raymond G. Anzericm Defense Policy in Perspectliuie: From ColmhE Times fu the Presetzt, New York, 1965. Paret, Peter. ""Napoleon and the Revolution in War." In Peter Paret with Gordan A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), Makers of Mu&nz Strategy from Mwhiaoetlli to the Nuclear &G, 12S-142. fiinceton University Press, 1986, Paret, Peter, with Graig, Gorda~~ A,, md CiIbrt, Felix (eds.). Makers ojModem ftratggz~f i m Machhuelli to the Muckear Age. Plinceton University. Press, 1986, Pattan, Ceorge S., Jr. War As f Knew It. Boston, 1947. Quimby, Robert S. The B3ackground of Mapobunic Wggure. Columbia Universiv Press, 1957. bmmel, Envin. Attacks. Vienna, VA, 1979, Roots of Strategy, Book 3:3 Military Clmsies: uon &eeb"sdD@feme*:" 00n Freytaghrzl'nghoe;.en"s6ThePwer of Personahty in War'":Efisth's "'Stbv&e, "Xarrr'sburg, PA, 1991. Ross, Steven. From FEitztlock to R@@:Zafantry "ractics,1 Tri&l86ei, Cranbuw, Nj, 1979. hthenberg, Cunther E,. The Art of Wagare in lrhe Age of Nap~ileon,h n d o n , 1977.

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Senger und Ettcrlin, Frido van. Neither Fear nor Xfope. Novata, CA, 1989, Shapirrz, David, Neurotic Styles, New York, 1965. Shy, John. ""Jomini." h Ineter Paret with Gordon A, Crstig and Felis Gifbert ( c ~ s . ) , Makers of Modem Strategy frclm Maehtacelli to the Mglear &g, 19SlbZFi. Princeton University Press, 1986. Tuehman, Barbara W, Slitwell and the Aw&ean Experienw in China, 191145, New York, 1971. United States A m y . Fkld Manual, FM 10G5. 1986, United Stiktes War Department, Military Intelligence Service, Speeid Serries No, 8, Gemwn Tmical Bactencl. 11942.. Regdatbnsfar the Army of the United Statgs, 1857. New York, 1857. Van Grevefd, Maflin. Cmmand in War. Hamard Universiv Pwss, 1985. -. Sumlying War: bgi~tic.9from Wallenstein to toa~on.Cambridge University Press, 1977. . Tecibmohgy a d War-Frm 2009 B.(;:to the Present, New Yark, 2989. Veaudv, Wd1ace F., and Campbell, John G , ""A New Look at Leadership Evaluation." A m y (Febnlau 19141, 2%2fli, Weigley, Russell F. The Age of Ba~les:T b w s t f o r Decbiue WagarefrclrnBreitenfeZd to Watccz-rEoa.Indiana University Press, 1991. . " h e r i c a n Stmtegq'.from Its Beginnings through the First Work! War.'"etcr Paret with Gordon A, Craig and FeIix Gilbert. (eds.),Makers ofnilodern Strutem fwm Machiaaelti to the Nwkar Age, 40W43. Princeton Universiw Press, IQfXi, . Ilktoq r?f the Uni&d States A m y . Indiana University Press, f 984, -. TaullarA an Aw&an Amy: Military Tbught from %vmfzing~an ;tQ Ma-&@W. Columbia University Press, 1962. Wilkinson, Spencer, m e Brain of an Amy: A. Popukilr Account of the G g m ~ General n h n d e n , 1890. Wilfiams, T. Harry. Amem'eam at War: The B e u e l o ~ of ~ tthe Am&can Militarg Syst~m,Louishna Shte Universiv Press, 1962. Wood, Wifliam f . "Forgotten Sword." Militaq Afiirs R, No. 3 (October 18701, 77-82. Woods, Davirf L. A Hhtory of Ta&kal Communkation Techniques, Orlanda, FL, X%5. Wylie, J. C. Mildtaq Strategy: A Gnerak Theory ~f Fmer Control, Rutgers Universib Press, 1967.

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: CAMPMGNS, BhmLES, COMMANDERS A b s , Michaef C. 6, Our Materg the Rebek: A. Speculation an Uizion Military Fuitz~re in the East, 1861-1865. IImrrrd Universiw Press, 1918. &mane, Alan C., and Barbara, A tasler"sui& to the *&all IZecorrls ofthe Amdcan 6d&l1;Vtr, Shippensburg, P& 1993, A l e a d e r , Bevin, How Cwat Gewrals Win. New York, f9@3. h b r e s e , Stepben E. HaIkck: LincoEnXGhiefof Stafl. buisiana State University Press,

IS@. hderssn, Archer. " f i e Gampign and Battle of Ghickamauga." Virginia Pamphlets 52 (18811, 1-38, Charlottesvifte, W.

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Artnub of the A m y c?f the Czctderlgd, PhiXadelphi;s, ISM. Bean, W. G, Sbnewallj. Man: S a d i e Pendkbn, University of North Carolina Press, 1959. Benet, Stephen Vincent, John Brown"s~ody. New York, 1948. Bennisan, R. T, "GneraI Braton Brag." The Field Artillery Journal (NovernberDecember, 1931), M l 4 l l, Fort Sill, OK. Beringer, Richard E.; Hattaway, Heman; Jones, Areher; and Still, WifIiam N., Jr. Why the Smth b s # the 62oil War. Universiw of Gesrga Press, 2986. Blilek, Robrztrt G. 111. The Railrod ofthe Coafederacy. UniversiQ of Narth Carolina Press, 1952. BlaeHord, Charles M, Ill1 (ed.). &@erg from b e " s m y , New York, 1947. Bsatner, Mark M. 111. The Civil War Dictbwry. New York, 1959. Boswefl, Fame5 Keitb, 'The Diary of a Confederate St& OfFieer," Ci2iit War T i m s lillwtrahd (April 1976). d the CmfedBowers, John. Chickamgga and Chttawoga: The XPa~iesT h t eracy. Mew York, 1994, "The Rack of Chiekamauga." MHQ: The WrterEy Journal ofMiE2~a-q 3 (Winkr 1991),5W9. Brag, Bmton. ""Genera!Braton Bragg's Repart of the Battle of Chickamauga.""Ozlr Lidng and @r Dead: W k E &gan, M C , Branch? Suutlzltm H&i~&al Snckty I (2875). Neigh, NC, Gain, Marvin R, "'A Face of Battle Needed: An Assessment of Motives and Men in Civil W m Historiogaphy." liudl War Hbtov 28 (1982), 5-27, Galidwell, Robert Granville. J a w 8 A. @a$eld: P&y Ghdeflai~.Mew York, 1931. G s e y , Sifas, Infintry "ractks for the I n s t m t h ? Ezarcke and Mameuoers of the Soldier, a Cm~pany,Line of Skimishrs, flagalh, w a & , or Corps d l i m d e . 3 vols. New York, 1862, Cbmbers, Lenoir. S t w w d l Jmksm. 2 vols. New York, 1959. y in the C%'uilW r . VoE. I X X : The A m y of the C a d e r b d . Cist, Henry M. T h New York, 188Sl885, S -

versity of QkI&oma Press, 1948, Glehume, Patrick. "General Gleburne" Beport of the Battle of Glnicbmau~."'In T h h n d We h u e , 249-254, Charlotte, MC, 1MG. Clopton, J , J. The 4"wStonewall J a c b m , Baltimore, 1913. Commager, Henry Steele. The BEw and the Gray: The ftm of the Civil VVar As TOM by Padicipants. 2 vols. New York, L9m. Connelly, Thornas hwence- Autum of GEsry: T h A m y of Tennessee, 2862-1 8 s . Louisiarra-State University Press, 1911. . Civil War a"e~tws8ee:Baeles and tc?&rs. Universiw uf Tennessee Press, 197@. Gonnelly, momras h w e n e e , and jones, Archer. The: Patitkg czf C o m m d : Facil"iow and Ideas in Cmfederate te~tra~szgy. buisiana State University Press, 1973, ip St. George. Caualrg Twtks: or Ragulat.imfor the ImtwWon, a d Movemnts @of the Caualq r?f the A m y a d tTOEanteers of the Stc1tes. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1862. Gozzens, Peter, Thk TeTP"ibk S a ~ n dUniversity , af XIlinois Press, 199%. Crabb, Alfred bland. "Twili&t of the Nashville Gods." Tenmssee HhtorZcal Quarterly 15 (December f 9561, 291405.

Crdrie, Stephen. The Red Badge of Courage. Kew York, 1944, 61-ow, Vernon H. '"Confederate Indecision and Delay: The Empty Victory of Chickamauga." The Kepi (February-March 1984), 16-21. Dabnc)P, R. L. L@ nta! Gan~paignsof fieut.-Gen. Thorw 1. Jackson. New Uork, 1866, Dana, CharIes A, R~"c0lIecdio7~~ of the Ciuil War. New York, 1898, Davis, Woilliam C. Rebek dr Yankees: The Commanders of the Civil 'GVar. New York, 19W. . Rebe& d7. Yankees: The Fighl.ing Men of the Civil War. New York, 1988. Dktionary ofAmePlican Bhgraphy, Edited by Allan Jahnson and Dumas Malone, New York, 1931-1932. Dolton, Ceorge E. ""Points of Dispute regarding Chickamauga." In Blue and Gmy, Vol. XI, 402405, 1893. Douglas, Ffenr)l. K$. I Rode with Stoeo~zewali.University of North Carolina Press, 1940. Dowdey, CLi,fiCord.The b a d They Fmght For. Garden Gib, NY, 1955. (ed.). The Wadime Papers c?fR. E. b e . New York, 1Y61, Dowey, Faidw. Stormkg of the Gateway: Chaltanooga, 18fi3. New York, 19W. Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Dupuy, Trevor N. Brave lMen a d Great C~ptatns.Fairfm, VA, 1984. Durham, Walker T. NmhuiEle: The Ocmpied City. Nashville, 1985. . Reluehnt Padners: Mmhville and tiw Union, July 1, f81i3 Ito June 30, L&@. NashviXXe, n,d. Dyer, John P, The Calkant Wood. Indimapolis, New York, 1950. Eckenrode, 13, J. and Conrad, Byan. J a w s Longstreet: h e m a r Hurse. University of North Carolina Press, 1936. Etlswr>rth,Eliot, Jr. West Poitzt in the Confederacy. New York, 1941. Endish, John Alan. '"Confederiite Field Communications.""M.A. thesis, Duke University, 19M. Fame@,Byron, Stowwall: A. Biography of General ThornasJ. J t ~ k s a nNew . "York, 1W2. Fieberger, G . J. Campaigns of the A m ~ c a nCivil War. West Point, NU, 1914. Fisk, Wilbur. Hart1 Marching Eoery Day: The Civil War Leg-ters of2"ecate Wilhr F&k, Ijrxiversily Press of Kansas, 1992. Fmte, Shelhy. The Chit U"ar: A Nawatztzje. 3 vols. New York, 1974, Freeman, Dortglas Southall (ed.). A C ~ l e d a orf Confederate Papers: With a Biblhgraphy of S o m Corz_federatePdlkatiom. Richmond, 1908. . be"sievt-tenants: A S t d g .in Commnd. 3 vols. New York, 1942. Fremmt-Le, Arthur, J. L, Three Months in the Southern States. Edinhur&, bndon,

1863, French, Samuel C. Two Wars: An Aa~obbgmphyof Gen. Samwl G. French. Nashville, 19011, Fuller, CbuJe E. The?Eifid Mwket, IIarrisburg, PA, 1958. Gibbon, John. The Ar~iUed~lk Manual, New York, 1860. Gibbs, Shiriey M, "Lee's Command Procedures." M.A. I-hesis, Duke University., 196.2. Gifmare, f ames R. "Ga@eld"sSe at Chtckanzauga," McClure "sagazine 5, (1895), 357460, Cittings, John C. hrsunal Eczcullections of Stowwall Jackson. Cincinnati, 1899. Glattbaar, Josepb T. Plzewrs in Command: The Relatiomhip h e w e n ha&rs in the Giuil War,. New York, 1991.

Cordon, C:eorge H. Brook I;clrr-/l to Ceciar Mountain, in the Vd"arc;tfthe Grgat Rebellinn, _ZRIi_7-62.Boston, 1883. C:racie, Arehibald. The Truth abwt Cfzickanzauga. Boston, 1911, Grant, U. S. firsnnal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. New York, 1895. Griess, Thornas E. "Dennis Wart Mahan: West Point Professor and Advocate of Mifibw Professionalism, 1830-1871." Ph.D. dissertation, Duke Universiv, 1968, Crifithi, Paddy. Rat& Ozce &@in: Bag!@ITactics of the American Ctioik Urar. Ramsbuy, Wiltshire, England, 1989. Groom, 'S.Vinston. Shrc~udsof Gbrg: Front Atlaknt~to Nmhoille: The Lrzft Great Ca17~puign of the Cilliil War. New York, 1995. Hagermall, Edward. The Amerr"can Qoil Wctr artrr! the Origins of Noclem2 Wa$arc: Ideas, flrganization, and Field Cc~nzrnad,Indiana University Press, 1988, EIagermn, Edward, "From Jomini to Dennis Wart Mahm: The Evolution of Trench C4jarfare and the Americart Civil War." EXR John T. Hubbefl (ed,), BagIes h,qt and Won: Essaysfm~lzGizlil War Hktury. Westpoe, CT, 1975, f ialleck, H. FVager. Elements I$ .WiEitarg Art and Sdence, or Course of fmtruetbn in Strategy, Xiort$ccrtinn, Ta~tic~q of Battles, etc. New York, 1846. Haflock, Judith Lee. Braxton B r a g and CsrferEeratc3 Dgest. Vol. I f . University of Alai3ama Press, 1995. I-iardee, W. J. Rge and Light Infan@ Tcicties' fir the Exerebe and Maweuuers of Roctps W'hen Acting us Light Itgantry or IIZ@e?aen.Memphis, 1861, I farrirzgton, Fred Hamey. Fi& ting Politicz'm: Major Gelzeral N; P, Banks. Reprinted hy pem~issionof tiniuersib of Pennsylvania Press, 1970. (Ori@nallypublished by American Historical Association, L948.) Harsh, Joseph L. ""Batt.lesword and Rapier: Cliausewitz, Jomini, and the American Civil FZ7ar." Military Ag~irs38 (1974), 133-138, Itfattaway, Xierman, and Jones, Archer- How the Nosh Wotz; A. ~MlitaryH k t ~ ofthe q Civil War. University of IXiirrois Press, 1983. Hay, Thornas El;ol>son. ""SZr;lxton Bragg and the Southern Confederacy." Gorgiu Ni's.torical Qweerky XX, No, 4 (Deeenlber 1925), Savwn;rh, GA, 1925. -------, "The Davis-Hood-Jobnston Cantrovcrsy of 1864," M h s & & p ~ %Uey Hktc~rk~il Reciew X f (19241, 54-84, . H~od'~s [Pen~zegseeCunzpaign, New York, 1929, Helniak, Raman J,, and EIewitt, I ~ w r e n c eL* (eds.). The Confederate 1F-fghCommand 61 Related Tc~pim.ShippensX,urg, FA, 1990, Hendcrson, 6. F, R, Stonewall Jackson and the Arw~cataCiuil War. 2 vois. Secaucus, NJ, 1987. Ilerxnessy, John J, Return b Bull Run: The Campnigtx and Batik of Second LMCL~ws~~. New York, 19Y3. Hieks, Roger W,, arld Schultz, Fra~~ces E. (eds,).Baltke$el& ofthrr Civil War.Topsfield, ?rlXA,1989. Hill, L). H. ""Cen? X, EX. Hill's Report of the Battle of Chickamaug." h I n r Lis;.ing untl Our DeacE: Ofiz'al &gan, P3.C. Branch, Southern Hisb-clra'enlSo&ety. Vol. I, RaleigIl, NC, 1875. Elood, John B. Adoance cmd Retreat. Indiana University Press, 1959. Horn, StanXey F. The A m y of Tennessee?.University of OklAorna Press, 1952. . The Decbiue Battle of Nashvilk. Louisiar~aState University Press, 1956,

2Cia

Selected Bibliography

Hotehkiss, Jedediah. Make Me a &gap of the Valley: The Cioil War JmmEof $&newall Ja&son"sopographer. Southern Methodist University Press, 1973, Hou&, Al&erS becy. Soldier in lrhe West: The Civil War hlters ofAqred h e y Hmgh. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957. EIubbelX, John T, (ed,). Battles h s t a d Won: Essaysfrorn Cioil Wur Hklic~ry.Westpod, CT, 1975, Ifurst, Jack. Natlzun Bedford Fornest: A Bhgraphy. New York, 1W3. Jmieson, Perry Ravid. "fie Development of Civil War Tactics." Fh.D. disseeatian, Wayne State Unlversit,v, 1979. Johnssn, Riefiard W, Memob of Maj. - a n , Gemge H. PhifadeXphia, lBt3&"b. f olxnston, Joseph E, Nawatioe of Military Operations. rk, 1874. Jones, Archer. Ciud War Gommgld a d Strategy: The h c e s of ~ VCtoq and Defeat. New York, 1992. -. ""Somini and the Stratee of the he.f-icdnCivif War, A Reinterpretation,"" XMiiZituq Aflairs 34 (19702, 12F131. Kennedy, Frances H, (ed.). Civil War Bnekjeld Guide. Boston, 1W0. Korn, Terry. The Rght for Cha~ailnooga.Afexandria, 1985. Kriek, Robe& K. Stomwall Jrilckson at Cedar Mountain. Universiw of Na&h Carolina Press, 1990. ers, Wifliam M. The Edge of Glory: A Biogruphy of G e ~ r aWillkm l S, Rmemam, 1I.S.A. New York, 1961. Lindeman, CeraId F. Embattled Csurage:: The Ezpen'ence of C d a t in .Ehe A m & ~ a Cioil War. New Vark, 1987. Livemore, Thornas L. M u d ~ r sa d bs8ep; ia the Ciog War Amlriea, Boston and New Vark, 19W. bngstreet, James. F r m Marmsas do Appomaeox. (Reprint). New York, 1992. L u v w , Jay. T h Militaq Legacy of the Gidl War: The European InfteTlt&wg. Universiw of Chicago Press, 1959, M&an, Dennis Hart. Adaanced-Gwrd>Qut-Posty and Dgtmhrnent Semke of Troops, ws"8h $the E,~sendialfdmip&?sof Strakgy a d Grand Twtk8 $W Ihe Lrse of @&er~a~ the nnf-itiaa d Volunteers. New York, 1847; and 2nd edition, f &a. e on F<l! Fo&$catit.n. N e w York, IEi36, Marshall, AIbert 0, fife; From a Sokdierwmmal, 1862-M, Qoliet, XL, 1884. y's S i e d Corps."' In Max L, Marsh&! (ed.), The S b r y ofthe U.S. A m y Signal C q s . New York, l@=. Marshall, Max L. (ed.). T b Story of the US. A m y Sigml C q s . New York, X=, M&in, W. l". ""A Refense of Generd B r a s at C=I.richmauga,"" t h m Z-flis Society Papers XI (1883). Massachusetts Militav Histoned Society, Papers of the Mdlitaq Hbto7-tcal S ~ c k t gof Mmsm!gmedls. Vol. 11: T h Virginia Campaign of 1862 un&r Gene& Pope, (Original, 1895). Repsnt, Wif mington, NC, 1898, McClelIan, George B. R e g d a t i m and Imtmctions f w tk FieHd Se Cavalry in 2"iwof W r . Philadelphia, 1861. McKinnq, Francis F', Education in Vhknce: The Lije of Gemge H. His* of t h Army of 8h.he Caderhnd. Wayne State University Press, 1961. MeMurry, Richard M. Job BeEl E ~ o dand the W ~ r f o Southem r I&pe&nce. University Press of Kentucb, 1982,

Selected Bibliography

261

. Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in C"unfi&rateMilitary Hi9t-or-y-Universilty of North Carolina Press, 1989. MePherson, f ames M. (ed,), The A t h of the CiaiE War. New York, 1 (ed.). Bcttdk CFEroniGlles of lthe Civil 1"Var 1864, Mew York, 1989, McWiney, Crady. Braxton Brag a d Cmfecigratg teefeat. Vol, X : FieM CmmneE. Columbia University Press, 1969, "Who Whipped Whom? Confeder* Defeat Reexamined." h John T. Hubbell (ed.), B~~ltles b s t and Won: Essags from Cioik War Hiswry, 261-282, Westport, CT, 1925.

McWhiney, Crady, and Jmieson, P e v D. A I - ~ Q C and ~ D&: Civil War Military Tactks a d the fauthm Heddage. University of zildbama Press, 1982, Military Arzalys6 of the C;"EuilWar (An Antholagy bg the E d i ~ r sof "'MilitaqAg~irg'q. Millwood, NY, 1977. Moore, John G. ""Mobilii~and Strateo in the Civil War." Military Afairs 64 (1960), Cih77. Modson, fames L., Jr. 2% Besl School in the W r U : West Point, the Pre-Ci432'1 Wgr Years, 18=_7866. Kent State University Press, 1986. , ""Educating the Civil War Generals: West Point, 183&1861.'" M i l h r y Aflairs (September 19741, 10%-l1l . MoseXey, Thornas Vernun. ""Evolution of the Ame~canCivil War Xnfmtry Tac~cs." Ph-L),disse&ation, Universiv of North Carolin% 1967, Munden, Kenneth, and Beers, Henry Putney. ?'hUnion: A Gude Fg&ral Archiws Relating ta tke Ciuil War. Washington, DC, 1986. Naisawatd, L. Van Loan. Grape and Culnzistgr: The S-tory of t b F k l d Adillery of till@ A m y of the Potomac, 1861-1865. Oxford Unhersity Press, 1 W . Nesmith, Vardell Edwards, Jr. "'The Quiet hradignn Change: Evolution of the Field ktiUery Doctrine of the United Sbtes, 1861-1905." l?h,P)*d i s s e ~ t i o n ,Duke University, 1977, Q'Connor, Richard. Hood: Caoalkr General. New York, 1949, . T h m s : Rack aJ1Chickamuga. New York, 1948. OBeiaI Records (O.R.): The War vf tha RgbeWh: A Cornpilath 4 t h %&I Beeor& of the Union a d Confedera& Amies. 128 vols. Washington, DC, 1885. Piatt, Donn. General Gorge H, Thorn&: A Cdliz'caE Bbgraphy. Cineinnati, 1893. Pobl, j m e s W. "The Influence of Antaine Henri die Jarnini on Winh"eXd Seott's Campaign in the Mexican War." Southwc;is&m QuaemIy 77 (1973), 85110. Pratk, Fketcfier. EEeven an@&: S t d i m in Aw*an Comwnd, New York, 1949. -. Ordeal by Fire. New York, 11935, Stantmz: Uwoln"S~ecrel@q of War. Weswort, CT,1970, Rogers, J. L. The Giail War Bal-tleg af Ckkkanzaaga and Chmwoga, Ghattanoog4 TN, 1942. Ropes, John Godman, T h A m y in the Ciail War. Vol. I'V: The A m y un&r B q e . New York, 18%. . "Pe Stoq of the Ciail War. Part f X: The Campaigm of 1862, 3 vols. New York, IEt98. Rosecrans, Wilharn S- " f i e Campaign for CI-tattanoap.'"C~ntu.ury Magazine (May 18871, 130-1%.

262

Selected Bibliography

Royster, Charles. The Destnictiw War: Wlliam Tecum;fe/zSlzprrrmn, Stonewall Jacksun and $fie An~m:carzs.?dew York, 1991. Scaife, William R. HoodXampaigrz for rennessee. Gdar~ta,1986. Schutz, WaHaee J., and T r c n c q , Walter N. &andoned by Lincoln: A Mihtary Biography r?f General John Pope. University of IXIinois Press, 1996. Seitz, Don C. Braxtan Brag: Gemral of the Confedermy, Colurntria, SC, 1924. Selby, John. Sbnewall Jackson as Milil;ary Commander, Princeton, NJ, 1%8. Sheman, Williarn T. Memuirs of General Wiltiam ?: Shemmn. Vol. X I. New York, 1875. Smith, John C, The liig!~~ ofthe fidleral Amny at Ghickarwaga, Chicago, 1894. Smith, Page. &deal by Fiw. 5 vols. Vol. V. New York, 1982, Sorrel, C. Moxley. Recollections clfa Confgderate Sta8 O@cer, ed, Bell Imine Wiley. jackson, TN, 1958. Stackale, Edward J. Frmn Cedar Mountain to Antietam. ZIZarrisburg, PA, 1993. , 'Generdship in the Civil War." Military Afajrs (Summer 1960), 57-67. Stede, Matthew Fomey. Arnerz'ean Campaigw. 2 vols. Washington, BC, 1951. Stephens, Miehaef W. "haming from Civil Mrar Battles," Ma~rzeCows Gazezte (June 1988), 27-29. fkvensun, Paul. liVar Casning in History: The Amerz"car2 Cioil War. New York, 1990, Stout, L. H. Remdniscerzees of General Braxtorg Bragg. E-lattiesburg, M S, 1942, Sword, Witey, E&~cc? m Angq Wind: 1'hConfi?deracy"st Hunah: Sj~rz'ngHill, Frankhn and Rbmhaille. New York, 1992. Taggad, Joseph. Biographical Sketchs of the Emnineat Asm-rican Pat&ts. Kanslrts City, MO, 1907. J. "3tonewaEI""Jksun's S$wnadorzh Tanner, Robert C , Stonewall in the VizlEey:11112 Valky Campa.ign, Sprtng 18tT2, Garden City, NV, IY7Ci. Tharngson, Ceorge Bapor. "CM! War Sipals." M i l i w Agairs 18 (1954), 18%2Q1, Tucker, Glenn, Chickamuge: Bbody Pfattle in the m s t . XndianqaXis, 1961. Turchia, John B, Chickumugu. Chicago, 1888. Turner, Ceorge Riehard, Vktory Ro& thcs Raib: The Strategic Pkwe of the Railroads. in the C2'oil War, lndianapafis, 1953, Vandiver, Frmk E. M i g h ~Stonewail2. New York, 1957. . Rebel Bras: The G"onfe&rate C o r n m d Sys&m. Louisiana State Universiw Press, 1956, Van Home, Thornas B. History of the A m y o$ the Cmbehzzd. 2 vols. Vol. 11. Gincinnati, 1875. , The L,@ $Major-General Gewgg H. l"honuls, New York, 1882. Wade, Pirthur P. "Roads to the Top-An Analysis of General-Officer Selection in the Uxlited Stares A I ~ I 178%1898." ~, MiliiSaq Aflairs. (December 19761, 157-163. Waper, ArtErur L. "Hasty Intrenchments in the War (IT Secession." In Papers c?j' the Military Hktorical Society of Mmsac!zmetts, Vol. XITI, 129-1 53, Boston, 1923, 189S1914, Warner, Ezra J, Generah in Blue: Lizjes of t h Unim Commanders. buisiana State University Press, 19M. -. Generals dn Gray: fiues Confedemte Commanders, Louisiana State Universiw Press, 1959. Wed, f e&. General Jam- hngstreeg, the Confideracy" s o s t Cantrouers.sialSoldierA Biogrizphy. New York, 1m3.

Selected Bibliography

263

West P ~ i ~Atlm l t of A m ~ c a ntlrars, f 68SJ900, Vol. 1. Edited by trincent j.Esposito. New York, 1959, E. V, Those Fatal Gemrals. Part Washington, MY, 1936. Wheeler, Riehard. We Knew Stunemall Jaehm. New York, 1977. Willfistms, Kenneth P. Limoln Finds a General: A Militaq S t d g of the Cidl War. 5 vols. Vol. V. New Yark, 1959. WilXiams, "S. Harry (ed,).Military Arr~lgsbofthihe Ciuil War:An Anthabgy by the Editors of Military Aflairs. Millwood, Nk', 1977. -------. "The MiXitq hadership of Naeh and South." In David Herbert DanaId (ed.), VGPhy t h North Won the Civil Wm. huisiana State University Press, 19W. . "The Retrtm of Jomini-Some noughts on Recent Civil War Wl-Iting." MiEihry Aflalrs 39 (December 1975), 204-206. Wilson, James Hadson. U d e r the Old Fhg. 2 vols. V d , 11, West-pod, CT, 19"7. Wise, f ennings Cropper. The b g A m of Lee: The I-i&&.ry of t h AdiFleq o f t h A m y c$ Mo~thernVirgdnb. Oxford Universily Press, T959. Waodwsrd, 6. Vann (ed.). Mary Che8nut"siuiE War, Yde University Press, L981, Woodwoeh, Steven E. Jeflerson Davis and His Generals: The F~ilureof C~nfe&rate Gomrrtlld in the West. Universib P m s of bnsas, 1990. Wyeth, John Allan. T h t De&E F~wesi:Lye of General Nuthan Bedfmd Forrest. h u isima State Universiw Press, 1959. Westrate,

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Index Alexander the Great, 235 ALexanderk Bridge, Ca., 148 Alpine, Ca., 108 Andrews, Rchard S., 65, 19 anti-Brag bloc, 115-1 17, 184 Appakfiians, Mtn. Range, 87, 93 ARC Study: Art and Requirements of Command, 26 Amy of Northern Virginia, 114, 115, 198, 241 y of Tennessee, 85, 81, 113, l f 5, 117, 127, 131, 158, 184, 185, 191, 193, 105, 197, 199, 222, 2215,225, 229 b l y af the Cumberland, 85, 87, 92-94, 160, 105, 154, 182, 184 A m y o f Virginia, 43, 50, 51, 99 Atlanta, Ga., 87, 103, 107, 111, 178, 191, 193, 195, 200 atitaqw cj&bwd~nte, 17 Augur, Christapher C., 59-61, (i345, 713 Austr+Pmssian War, 6 Baird, Absdom, 150, 159 Banks, Nathanief P,, 5, 7, 43, 46, 48-453, 55, 56, 59, 61-66, 7S80, 23% 2238 Bannettss Ford, b., 50, 51 bataillot2 cumd, 16, 186, 244 Beatty, John, 102, 103 Beautmont, Roger A,, 27

Beanregard, Pierre G. T,, 113, 116, 120, 1217, 193, 196, 200, 225, 22"7 229 Becke, A. F., 16 Ben& Stephen Vineeat, 36 Bismarck, Otto von, 7 Bond, Frank S., 16-4, 168, 169, 182 B r d e y , Omar, 244 Brag& Brmton, 85,87, W ,92, 93, 100, 103, 105, 107, 108, IlO, 111, L13-131, 146, 148, 149, 151-S-156,158, 159, 162, 163, 167, l69--171, 174, 175, 1'17-186, 200, 239, 240 Brmeb, hwrence O,, 66, 67, 18 Brannaxl, John M,, 150,158, 159, 16% 165, 1719173 Breekinridge, John C,, 116, 117, 151, 158 EZ~dgeprt,d a , , 94, 105 Buckner, Simun B., 113, 114, 148, 151, 153, 162, 185 h e l l , Don Carlos, 100, 12c128, 130 Buena Vista, battle of, 121-123, 129, 16.5, 239 Buford, John, 46 Bumside, Ambrose E., 87, 92, 93, 103, 113, 114

266

Index

Cedar Mountain, Va,, 40, 51, 53, 55, 61, 62,7%76, TWO, 236, 237 Cedar Run, Fa., 53, 56, 61 Chalmers, James R,, 221, 2% Chandler, David C-., 77 CbarlottesvilXe, Va,., 46 Chattahoochee River, 195 Chattanooga, Ca., 87 Chattanooga, Tenn., 87, 90, 9%94, 100, 103, 105, 187, 108, 110, 111, 313, 114, 127, 130, 148, 151, 15S155, 168, 169, 174, 115, 177-181, 184, 187, 193, 195 Cheatham, Benjiamin F., 148, 152, 158, 185, 201, 203, 221, 222, 224, 242 Chesnut, Jarnes, 185 Chickamauga, batde of, 97, 105, 129, 150, 162, 165, 171, 183, 199, 200, 238, 239, 241 Ghichmauga Greek, Ga., 108, 145, 14% 150, 178 Cineinnati, Obia, 98 CIark, Mark W., 244 Clausewitz, Carl van, 27, 235,245 CIeburne, Palxiek R,, 116, 117, 151, 158 Gold Haribor, battle of, 243 Colin, jean L. A., l 6 Columbia, Tenn., 201, 203, 225, 228 Connolly, *rhomasL., 224 Corinth, Miss., 99, 126, 127 c o p s dtam8e, 16, 243 Cozzcns, Peter, 153, 155, 171, 184 Crane, Stephen, 22, 26 C r a d s h Springs, Ga., 145,146 Cradord, Samud W., 51, 53, 56, 5W6, 76, 77 Crittenden Lane, 40, 104, 105, 107, 108, 118, 145, 146, 151, 154, 155, 159, 160, 164, 173, 179, 186 Culgeper, Va., 5, 33, 38, 5 M 2 , 62, 7'4, 75, 79 Cumberland Mountains, 94

Ddron, Ga., 101, 111, 178 Dam, Charles A,, 95, 184 Davis, Jeffersoxz, 31, 111, 113, 114, 116, 117, 122, 124, 225, 130, 156, 184, 185, 191, 19%1@6,199,225, 227, 240, 241

Uavis, Jcgerson C. (Gen.), 155, 164, 167, 168, 182 Davis"s Ford, Tenn., 201 Decherd, Tenn., 92 Dethdck, EXans, 24, 26 drill manuals, 10, 14, 22 Dry VaXley road, Ga,, 151, 154, 168, 170, l 78 Duck River, 201 Bug Gap, Ga., 108

Early, Jubd A., 39, 40, 5740, M, 65,75 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 244 EIk River, Tenn., 92 Elting, John R,, 12 EweII, Richard S., 34, 35,38, 40, 42, 55, 57, 74, 75, "7, 80 Fayetteviffe, Tenn., 92 Finley, Moses l., 21 Florence, Ala., 197 Foote, Shelby, 167, 168 Forrest, Nathan B., 131, 150, 171, 174, 175, 178, 181, 196, 200, 201, 220, 225, 229

Franc+Prussi;m Ww, 6, H Frankfin Pike, Tenn., 224 FranMin, Tenn., 203, 228, 230 Fredericksburg, Va., 46, 51 Freeman, Doudas Surrthalil, 75, 80, 241 Fremantle, Arthur J. L., 131 Fuller, J. F. C., 17" Cadsen, Ala., 194-L96 Cadeld, Jaxnes A., 102, 154, 155, 159, La,164, 168, 173, 180, 182 Carnett, Themas S., 58, 59, 64, 77 Gate Cat Cedar Morrntain), 48, 4% Gates, Willirzm, 120, 121 C e a ~John > W., 59, 63, 65, 66, 78 Cet~sburg,battle of, 93, 103, 111, 114, 162, 163, 198, 241, 243 Cordon, George H,, 51,53,61,M, %,76 Cordonsviille, Va., 4, 46, 7'3, 79 @and tactics, 16, 186 G r ~ e d eAmbe, 15, 16 Cranger, Curdon, 90, 104, 145, 146, 349, 155, 159, 173, 174

index Grant, Ulysses S., 22, 85, 87, W , 95, 117, @Qt 101, 103, 126, 130, 165, 184, 196, 228,242, 243 Creene, Gcczrge S,, 59, 63, '76 Guntersville, Ma., 196

Halieck, Henry Wager, 46, 87, 90, 93, 102, 103, 130, 174, 242 Halmers, James R., 221 Hardee, bVilXiarn J., 116, 117, 126, 193, 198, 200 Har~suff,George L., 92, 93 Hatch, John P,, 46 Hendersan, G. F. R., 80 Hill, Ambrose Powelt, 3W5, 38, 57, 59, 61, 65, 75, 78 Hill, Daniel Harvey, 37, 151, 152, 156, 158, 181, 185, 186 Hindmtm, Thornas C., 149, 151, 362, 16'7, 171, 184, 186 Mistopr of the Art of War, within the gamework of poEitica1 histov, 24 Hood, John B., 148, 149, 151-153, 162, 167, 191, 19S201, 203, 220-222, 224, 225, 227-232, 246242 Hooker, Joseph, 119 Wioud~,Alfred L., l69 IIutier twtics, 14 Wutier, 6skm van, 14 Iuka, Miss., 99 Ja&sor~,Thornas J. (StonewalX), 3, 4, 7, 31, 33, 35-31, 40, 42, 49, 53, 55, 5159, 61, 62, M-, 73-75, 7?-8a, 98, 198, 236,237 John Brow's Body, 36 Johnsan, Bushrod R., 149, 150, 152, 162, 167, 171 Jobnson, Richard, 151, 159 fohnston, Albert S., 126, 127, 198 Johnston, Joseph E., 31, 90, 114, 117, 127, 191, 199, 200, 241 Jomini, Antoine Henri, 12, 29, 79, 113

Keegan, John, 24 Kellogg, Sanford C,, 164, 182 Kelly Field, Ga,, 145, 149, 150, 155, 158

267

Kenrzesaw Mountain, battle of, 244 Kersbaw, Joseph B., 171 Itafayette, Ga., I08 bfayette Road, Ca., 145, 149, 15.1, 155, 163, 167 hmers, Wiffiam M*, 95 LW, E. Mclver, 152, 162, 167, 175 hwrenceburg, l"enn., 20X Lee, Roberr E., M, 31, 33, 38, 43, 46, 73, 75, 111, 114, 127, 152, 196, 198, 224, 241, 243 h e , Stephen D., 201, 222, 224 Lee and Cordon" Mills, Ga., 108, 145, 146, X49 Liberty Mills, Va., 51 Liddell, St. John R., 148, 151 Lincoln, Abr&arn 4 W 8 , 87, 93, 130, 184, 237 finear system, IQ linear tdcties, 9, 10, 14, 22 LittXe Washington, Va,, 46, S1 bngstreet, james, 537, 114, 349, 152153, 158, 162, 163, 167, 16S171, 173, 175, 18&183, 185, 108, 199 bokout Mountain, Ga., 174, 181, 187 MacAdhur, Douglas, 244 Madison Court: House, Va,, 50 M&an, Alfred Thayer, 10 M&an, Dennis Wart, 10, 12, 9&98, 105, 113, 119, l80 Major" Schwf House, Va., 55 Nailchester, Tenn,, 92 Mal-ietla, Ca., 195 Marshall, Louis (Colonel), 5, 52, fi2 nwsse dkbordante, 17 McCfetlan, Ceorge B., 3, 4, 38, 43, 45, 99, 178 McCook, Alextlnder M., 104, 105, 107, 106, 110, 145, 146, 151, 154, 155, 159, 160, 164, 168, 173 McCmk, Daniel, 145, 149 MeDczwell, Irvin, 43, 46, 51, 62 Mekrlandk Gap, Ca., 154, 168, 174 Mchws, hfayette, 151, 162 Mcr-lernare's Cove, Ca., 108, 146, 152, 153, 178, 186

268

Index

MeMinnville, Tenn., 92 MeWhiney, Grdy, 130, 131, 240 Mexican FVar, 9, 98 Mlinv, Robert H. C., 145, 149 Missionay Ridge, Ga., 108, 154, 168, 174, 178, 181, 184, 187 MitcInelX, 3R;obert B,, 145 Moltke, Helrntlth von, 7, 230 Mohson, J m e s L., 96, 97 Mudreeshoro, Tenn., 87, 1W, 115, 116, 129, 221, 229 Napoleon, 15, 57, 77, 101, 113, 127, 159, l&0,232,243 N q d e o n Club, at West Point, 97 Napafeonie batde, 17, 80, 186 Napaleonie Wars, 6, 14, 15, 80, 81, 105 biiawleon's Maims, 16, 27, 80 Nashville, Tenn,, 87, 193, 195, 201, 221, 222,224, 22&232, M2 Nclshville and Chatknooga Railway, 94 Negjey, James S., 108, 155, 15&1CiO, 163, 168, 269, I l l , 178, 186 Ormge Court House, Va,, 34, 35, 38 Orange-Culpepec hi$way, 40, SS, 57, 59, 7% Ord, Edward Q. C., $39 Ordinance of 1791, 15 Palmer, John M,, 145, 151, 159 Palmetto, Ga., 191, 196, 227 Patton, Gorge S,, 2 4 Peach Orchard Hill, Tenn., 224 Peninsula, in b.,3 P e w i l l e , battle of, 115, 116, 228, 129 krshing, John J., 244 Pigeon Mounbin, Ga., 108, 110, 146 Pi~sburghhnding, Tenn,, 126 PoXk, banidas, 116, 117, 148, 149, 151153, 156, 158, 162, 163, 171, 174, 178, 181, 184, 1135 I)oIybiu:us, 242 Pond Spring, Ga., 110 Pope, John, 3, 5, 38, 43, 45, 46, 50, 51, 53, 6143, ?&E,71, 79, 97,99 Preston, Sally Buehanan, 198, 200 Preston, William, 151, 162

Price, Sterling, 9f3 Prince, IXenry, 59, 60,63, 65, 66, 78

Pulaski, Tenn., 201 Rapidan River, Va., 35, 50, 51, 79 Rapidan Station, b.,50 Rappahannoek River, 45, 50 The Red Badge c?f Cwrage, 22 Reed's Bridge, Ca., 108, l10,145,149,l;i"6 Resaca, Ca., 108 Reynolds, Joseph l., 159, 164, 165, 167, 173 Rich Mountdin, brz~leof, 99 Richmond, V&,,3, 4, 85, 114 rifle, 9 riAe fire, 20, 123 rifle revolution, 9, 10 riAed musket, 9 RinggaId, Gas, 108 Roheds, Benjamin S., 53, 56, 75 Rohrison, Beverley H., 38 Ranald, Charles A., M, 65,67, 77 Rosecrans, WIXham S,, 85, 87, 90, 92, 93, 95, 97-103, 105, 107, 108, 110, 113, 116, 118, 13L,145, 146, 14%151, 153155, 158-XW, 16S165, 168, 168, 173, 175, 1"i"-186, 238,239, 241, 242 Rassvilie, Ca., 145, 151, 154, 155, 168, 169, 173, 174 Rousseau, bvelI H,, 94 Santa h n a , Antonio Lopez de, 121, 122 Savannh, Ca., 195 Schofield, fahn M., 201,224, 22&231 Seddon, J m e s A., 111, 118 SeminoZe War, X20 SheEbpifle, Tenn,, 90 SheElmound, Tenn,, 105 Skenandoah Vdley, 45,448 Sherihn, Philip H., 155, 159, 160, 164, 167, 168, 182 Sheman, Wiliiarn T., 85, 97, 120, 121, 123, 125, 191, 19S196, 227, 228, 243 Sbiloh, battle of, 126, 127 Sigel, Franz, 43, 46, 51 Smi&, Andrew j., 222, 224 Smith, Kirby, 127, 128 S p e v i l l e , Va., 46, 51

Index

Spring Hill, Tenn., 208, 228, 242 Stanley, David S,, 90, 104, 101 Sbnton, Edtxrin M*, 87, 93, 94, 102, 103, 1% Starling, Lyne, 1% Steedman, James B., 145, 149, 173, 221, 222 Stendhal (Marie Wenri Beyle), 22 StevenTsCap, Ca., 108 ftevenson, Afa., 94 Stewart, Alexankr P,, 151, 162, 163, 167, 281,203, 221, 222 StilweXf, Joseph W., 244 Stones River, battle of, 87, 100, 129, 165 sun mar?^ of the Art of Wdr Oornini), 12 Taliafemo, A. G,, 64, 65, 77' Talidcmo, WBIiam B., 58, 59, 62, 64, 75, 78 Taylor, Z a e h a ~ 122-1124, , 129 Tedford"s Ford, Ga., 148, 151 Tennessee River, 9%94, 100, 103, 105, 107, 126, 131, 175, 177-179, 186, 200, 225, 228, 229 Texas Brigade, Hood"s, 198 Thomas, Edwsilrd L,, 59 Thomas, George H., 97, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 120, 121, 145, 146, 149-151, 154, 155, 159, 164, 16X 1173, 178, 180, 184, 186, 195, 196, 198,209,201,220222, 225, 227-231, 242 Tolstoi, Leo N., 22 Trentan, Ca., 105 Tucker, Glcnn, 169, 180 Tullahoma, Grin., 87, W, $32,94, 100, 103, 131, 179,238

'FupeXo, Miss., 225 Turclnin, john B., 164 Tuscum'bia, Aa., 197, 199, 200

Valley Head, Ga., 105 Van Cleve, H. P., 145, 155, 158, 171 Van GreveId, Martin, 23-0 Van Darn, Earl, 99, X60 Vicksburg Miss., 87, 90, 93, 103, 111, 114 Vi~lia8sFam, Ga., 149 Virginia M i l i h r y Institute, 80, 98 Walker, W, H. T., 148, 150, 151, 158 Walface, Leuris, f 22 Wartrace, Tenn., 90 Waterloo, Va., 46, 51 West Point, 10, 9SQ7, 119, 180, 185, 197, 238, 239 western concentration bloc, 1X 1, 11%115 Wheeler, foseph, 131, 178, 195, 1% Widiow Glenn's house, 150, 154, 163, 165, 168 Wilder, John T,, 148 WiXliams, Mpheus S,, 60, 61, 63,76 Wilsan, James H., 201, 221, 224, 225, 229 Winder, Charles S., 34, 35, 38, 41, 57, 58,622, M,74, 75,113 Wood, Thornas J,, 108, 145, 155, 160, 16%1CilS, 867, 171, 182, 183, 222, 225 Mloodwofih, Steven. E,, 198, 200 World Was 1, 6, 231, 244 World W;ar 11, 15, 245

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About the Author

W. J. WOOD is a retired U.S. A m y Eieutenant carone1 whose backgrotlnd inc1udr;s not only professional authorship but also combat experience in World War II and the Korean War, a decade spent in professional war gming for weapons systems an&sis at the A m y Msterief Command, and a lifetime study of miXitav history. The combination of these yuatifierx-tions has made him wellsuited to study the ax-i of command. He is the author of ~ & T S and Bat;~bs (3984) and BagEes of the ReooEuti~naryWar (1990).