Defending Royal Supremacy and Discerning God's Will in Tudor England (St Andrews Studies in Reformation History)

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Defending Royal Supremacy and Discerning God’s Will in Tudor England

To Mom, Dad, and Alecia for support of my educationl journey

Defending Royal Supremacy and Discerning God’s Will in Tudor England DANIEL EPPLEY

© Daniel Eppley 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Daniel Eppley has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401–4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Eppley, Daniel Defending royal supremacy and discerning God’s will in Tudor England. – (St Andrews studies in Reformation history) 1. Saint German, Christopher, 1460?–1540 2. Hooker, Richard, 1553 or 4–1600 3. Church of England – History – 16th century 4. Royal supremacy (Church of England) 5. Reformation – England 6. Church and state – England – History – 16th century 7. England – Church history – 16th century I. Title 274.2’06 ISBN 978–0–7546–6013–2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Eppley, Daniel. Defending royal supremacy and discerning God’s will in Tudor England / Daniel Eppley. p. cm. – (St. Andrews studies in Reformation history) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978–0–7546–6013–2 (alk. paper) 1. Royal supremacy (Church of England) – History of doctrines –16th century. 2. Discerment (Christian theology) – England – History of doctrines –16th century. 3. Saint German, Christopher, 1460?–1540. 4. Hooker, Richard, 1553 or 4–1600. I. Title. BX5157.E67 2007 283’.4209031–dc22 2006100550 This book is printed on acid free paper Printed in Great Britain by MPG Books, Bodmin, Cornwall

Contents A Note on the Sources

vii

Preface

ix

Introduction

1

1 The Henrician Supremacy and the Definition of Doctrine

5

2 Defending Royal Supremacy apart from the Definition of Doctrine

19

3 Christopher St German: Defending Royal Supremacy over the Definition of Doctrine

61

4 The Elizabethan Supremacy and the Admonition Controversy

143

5 Richard Hooker: Royal Supremacy over the Definition of Doctrine Reaffirmed

163

Conclusion

223

Bibliography

227

Index

239

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A Note on the Sources Primary sources are cited in the most readily available edition known to the author. In quotations, the spelling and punctuation of the edition cited will be reproduced with the following exceptions: errata from the end of the sixteenth-century editions have been incorporated, abbreviations (except for ‘&’) have been expanded, and obvious misprints have been corrected, all silently; slashes (/) and commas are both rendered as commas without differentiation. The preface of Hooker’s Lawes and Cartwright’s Replye as reproduced in the Parker Society Edition of Whitgift’s Works are printed primarily in italic typeface with roman typeface used for emphasis; in quotations, this has been reversed, standardizing these texts with the rest of the works cited.

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Preface It is my pleasure to have to opportunity to thank the people without whom this study would not have reached its final form. The manuscript began as a PhD dissertation in the University of Iowa Department of Religious Studies, and I am indebted to the faculty there, particularly my adviser, Ralph Keen, and Dwight Bozeman. In the six years of reshaping the text I have incurred further debts. My research was enriched by attending two seminars, one funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the other funded by the Lilly Endowment, Inc. through the Seminars in Christian Scholarship Program at Calvin College. The NEH seminar, entitled ‘John Calvin and the Transformation of Religious Culture’, was led by Karin Maag and Ray Mentzer in 2004, and was hosted by the H. Henry Meeter Center for Calvin Studies at Calvin College. The SCS seminar, entitled ‘Liturgy and Politics: Is the Church a Polis?’, was led by William T. Cavanaugh in 2006. I had the opportunity to use the excellent facilities at Calvin again thanks to a Meeter Center Research Fellowship in 2005. (I would be remiss if I did not also thank the Meeter Center and SCS staff who made the summers immensely enjoyable for my family and me as well as highly productive.) In addition, my research was supported by a Sam Taylor Fellowship from the United Methodist Church Board of Higher Education and Ministry, a research fellowship from the KIVA Exes Association of McMurry University, Dr Ralph Turner and the Texas Methodist Foundation through the Turner Distinguished Professor of Religious Studies Chair, and the McMurry Faculty Development Fund. Thanks for research support is also due to Verna Ehret, who helped me stay in touch with the resources at the University of Iowa library, and to Terry Young, who took care of several years’ worth of interlibrary loan requests. My thought has been enriched by participation in the informal gathering of Hooker scholars that meets annually at the Sixteenth Century Studies Conference, including Torrance Kirby, John Stafford, Egil Grislis, Rudolph Almasy, Lee Gibbs, and David Neelands. Tom Mayer and Egil Grislis graciously agreed to read over the manuscript and offered helpful suggestions. Robert Pace and Philip LeMasters also commented on portions of the manuscript, and Patty Duett helped with checking quotations. Finally, this work would have been impossible without the loving support of my wife, Alecia, and our children, Julianne, Michael and Jacob. Daniel Eppley

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Introduction At least since the Apostle Peter’s response to the Sanhedrin, as Acts 5 tells it, that followers of Christ must obey God rather than men, the definition of Christian orthodoxy and orthopraxis has been a social and political as well as a theological issue. When the Roman Emperor Constantine began to promote Christianity in the fourth century, he also assumed a prominent role in shaping Christian teaching. In the eighth century, Charlemagne’s father, Pepin, parlayed a papal pronouncement regarding the right ordering of political affairs into a palace coup issuing in the Carolingian dynasty. Centuries later, Pope Innocent III claimed authority to arbitrate European diplomacy the basis of the injunction in Matthew 18 that disputes between Christians should be taken to ‘the church’ for resolution. Also at least since Peter’s defiance of the Sanhedrin, interpretations of God’s will propounded by Christian individuals and communities have been used to legitimate disobedience of and even rebellion against political and religious authorities. Bishop Athanasius defied a fourth-century Emperor on the basis of his conviction that the latter supported an erroneous Christology. In the twelfth century, Valdes, a merchant turned mendicant, came to believe that he was called to preach the gospel. When church officials ordered him to stop preaching, he refused, and his efforts led to the establishment of a counter-church. The sixteenth century in particular is well-known for the political disruption that religious convictions could foment. As summarized by A.S. McGrade: The political history of the Reformation was not neutral background to an essentially separate spiritual process, but itself bore spiritual meaning. Conversely, the period’s spiritual warfare about biblical interpretation and ecclesiastical authority had momentous political implications, ranging from the coercive imposition of Roman Catholic or Protestant belief to the overthrow of established royal authority by assassination, insurrection, or invasion.1

England is no exception to this generalization regarding religion and politics in Reformation Europe. Rarely if ever has there been a time in the history of England during which issues surrounding the definition of Christian doctrine and the determination of the divine will posed more of a threat to unity, order and stability than the Tudor-Stuart period. In addition to the general instability to which religious ferment gave rise in 1 A.S. McGrade, ‘Introduction: Book VIII’, in W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 6 (Binghamton, NY, 1993), p. 343.

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sixteenth-century Europe, assumption by the civil authorities of leadership of the English Church in the 1530s rendered them directly responsible for religious policy and made them a primary target of dissatisfaction with the Church. Because much opposition to government policies during this period was based solely or partly on a perception that the authorities were not acting in accord with the divine will, effective defence of the English Church and of royal supremacy over the Church required that the issue of the discernment of God’s will be addressed. Unless polemicists defending the royal supremacy and the established Church took steps to ensure that the faith was defined in a manner compatible with official policy, there was little hope of securing the orderly and peaceful England unified behind obedience to its prince for which these defenders worked. Despite the importance of the definition of doctrine, the majority of defences of royal supremacy penned in Tudor England did not adequately address hermeneutical issues. Most defences of Henry VIII’s and Elizabeth I’s Churches, while allowing the Petrine principle of prior obedience to God, failed to safeguard against false understandings of God’s will being used to underwrite disobedience of the Church authorities. Consequently, they left the ecclesiastical authorities vulnerable to resistance that would be legitimate even according to the standards laid down by the Church’s defenders themselves. This study will focus on two ideologists who are exceptions to this generalization. My purpose is to show that the Henrician lawyer Christopher St German (c.1460–1541) and the Elizabethan churchman Richard Hooker (1554–1600) rendered the condition that one must obey God before human law moot for English Christians by claiming for the authors of human law the authority to pronounce definitively regarding God’s will. Consideration of St German’s defence of order and obedience in Church and realm begins with a chapter providing an overview of the Henrician Reformation, paying special attention to the assumption by the civil authorities of the power to define doctrine in the late 1530s and 1540s. A second chapter briefly assesses defences of royal supremacy penned by William Tyndale (c.1494–1536), Stephen Gardiner (c.1495–1555), and Thomas Starkey (c.1498–1538), highlighting the hermeneutical principles outlined by each author as well as the forms of resistance to royal policy that each defender recognized as legitimate. Our attention will then turn to St German’s defence of the royal supremacy. St German is known for his determination that the royal supremacy over the Church be exercised by the Crown in Parliament, not the Crown solus. What has not been sufficiently appreciated is the fact that St German stands out among defenders of the Henrician supremacy because of his claim that the king in Parliament, as the voice of the community of Christians in England, is

INTRODUCTION

3

authorized to definitively pronounce regarding God’s will. Consequently, as envisioned by St German, obedience to the Crown is in all circumstances commensurate with obedience to God’s will. The study will then shift to consideration of Richard Hooker’s efforts to ensure obedience and order in the Church by claiming for the Church’s royal governor authority to define as well as defend the faith. As with St German, Hooker will be placed in context, in this case the Elizabethan Church, with special attention to claims made regarding the definition of doctrine. Hooker’s more specific ideological context is the challenge raised against the Elizabethan Church by Presbyterian critics. Consideration of his work will thus be preceded by an assessment of John Whitgift’s (1530/31–1604) earlier efforts to win Presbyterian acquiescence to the Church authorities. When we turn our attention to Hooker, the focus will again be on hermeneutics and the relationship between ensuring that God’s will is correctly discerned and ensuring that obedience is rendered to the Crown in Parliament in ecclesiastical affairs. Like St German, Hooker provides a hermeneutic that identifies the Crown in Parliament (with, he adds, Convocation) as the highest authority in the determination of Christian truth. Consequently, Hooker reaches the same conclusion as had St German regarding the responsibility of English Christians to subordinate their own understandings of God’s will to the interpretation of God’s will propounded by the Church authorities. While the result is similar, Hooker’s approach to the issue is more theologically sophisticated than St German’s, employing a rationalist and consensus-based hermeneutic as the foundation of his claim that the Crown in Parliament with the Convocation should be recognized as the authoritative interpreter of God’s will. The willingness of St German and Hooker to claim for the Crown authority over the discernment of God’s will sets them apart from other Tudor defenders of royal ecclesiastical supremacy. By effectively addressing this important issue, they are able to consistently argue that in practice English subjects can never legitimately refuse to obey the commands of the Church authorities on the basis of conscience. This, in turn, allows Hooker and St German to fashion defences of royal ecclesiastical supremacy that ensure order in Church and realm by reconciling obedience to God with obedience to the Church authorities.

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CHAPTER ONE

The Henrician Supremacy1 and the Definition of Doctrine During the 1530s there was a momentous shift in the manner in which religious affairs in England were governed. Whatever powers medieval English kings had enjoyed over the Church in England, they always exercised these powers as, in theory at least, the partner of the pope who was in some sense head of the universal church. Henry VIII’s Reformation accomplished an unprecedented transfer of ecclesiastical authority in England from the pope to the king. The king was, Parliament declared, to be recognized as the Supreme Head of the Church of England, the source of all spiritual as well as temporal jurisdiction within the realm. In the process of assuming the position at the apex of English ecclesiastical affairs, Henry took on a tremendous array of new powers, including control of the institutional, judicial and financial affairs of the Church in England. In none of these areas was royal influence in any sense new. By 1500, the filling of bishoprics was virtually always in accord with the royal will. While papal approval was required for the consecration of the new bishop, this was essentially always forthcoming, and at any rate the king always held veto rights regarding the appointment of bishops because he could revoke the temporalities of the see. In matters of ecclesiastical law the situation was similar, limited royal power in theory but wide royal powers in practice. While the Convocations of the clergy of Canterbury as well as York had the right to assemble without the king’s permission and to make laws without his assent, in fact they essentially never did either, instead assembling only when a royal writ summoned them and acting in accord with the instructions of royal agents. Statutes of praemunire enacted over the course of the fourteenth century forbade appeals from English Church courts to Rome in some cases, and during the reign of Henry VII theorists even went so far as to assert that Church laws were 1 The overview of the Henrician reformation that follows is dependant on a number of sources including particularly the following: A.G. Dickens, The English Reformation, second edn (University Park, PA, 1991); G.R. Elton, Reform and Reformation: England, 1509–1558 (Cambridge, MA, 1977); John Guy, Tudor England (Oxford, 1988); Felicity Heal, Reformation in Britain and Ireland (Oxford, 2003); Richard Rex, Henry VIII and the English Reformation (New York, 1993); Leo Solt, Church and State in Early Modern England, 1509–1640 (New York, 1990); Christopher Haigh, English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors (Oxford, 1993); Peter Marshall, Reformation England, 1480–1642 (London, 2003).

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not to be recognized as valid in England if they conflicted with the laws of the realm. Financially, by 1500 the Crown had been stanching the flow of revenue to Rome for centuries, with the result that at the beginning of the reign of Henry VIII the majority of Church taxes were directed to royal rather than papal coffers. The repudiation of papal authority in England is thus in one sense the culmination of long-standing trends within the English Church, but it was a step of such magnitude as to rightly be understood as effecting a fundamental change in the nature of the royal office. In the medieval disputes between popes and kings regarding the ordering of the English Church, the problem was to determine how much influence each player was to wield, but prior to the 1530s the utter exclusion of papal power was not attempted, let alone accomplished. This was, however, precisely what Henry VIII and his reforming Parliaments did accomplish. Exclusive royal authority over the appointment of bishops was claimed in 1534 when Parliament mandated procedures for the filling of bishoprics according to which the king presented to the persons holding traditional privileges of appointment the name of the candidate whom they were to choose. Consecration followed election upon the king’s instruction, explicitly without any reference to the will of the pope in the matter.2 The changes of the 1530s also cut off entirely the payment of monies from the English Church to Rome. If by 1500 there was little ecclesiastical money flowing to Rome from England, by 1540 there was none, and in 1540 the stoppage of cash flow was a matter of principle rather than an expedient adopted to augment the royal treasury. The judicial affairs of the English Church witnessed a similar shift from royal limiting of papal prerogatives to exclusive control by the civil authorities. Appeals within ecclesiastical courts were no longer brought ultimately to the pope, but rather to a commission under the royal jurisdiction, and Henry also gained authority over dispensations from Church laws. Additionally, the royal supremacy included power to perform ecclesiastical visitations to correct all errors and heresies that ‘by any maner spirituall auctoryte or jurisdiccion ought or maie lawfullye be reformyd’.3 The Act for the Submission of the Clergy made what was standard practice a matter of policy, forbidding the bishops to assemble in Convocation without being summoned by the king or to issue any new canons or ordinances without royal approval. The same act empowered the king to appoint a commission to review existing canons with authority to declare void, with the king’s assent, any canons it deemed worthy of abolition.4 As Leo Solt summarizes, by 1540 the Crown enjoyed exclusive authority over ‘the appointment of bishops, regulation of the 2 3 4

25 Henry VIII. c. 20. 26 Henry VIII. c. 1. 25 Henry VIII. c. 19.

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Church courts, approval of canon law, taxation of the clergy, visitation and discipline of the clergy (including the monasteries), and the seizure and administration of ecclesiastical property’.5 The radical character of the legislation of the 1530s is perhaps most clearly reflected in the vesting of the king with authority over the definition of doctrine. Within the areas of ecclesiastical life discussed above, the shift in Henrician religious policy is momentous enough, but it is a shift from shared authority to sole royal authority. Regarding doctrine, on the other hand, even as medieval kings and popes squabbled over matters of finance and jurisdiction, the clerical estate’s supremacy in the judgement of heresy and definition of doctrine went unchallenged. In contrast to the medieval situation, throughout the later 1530s and into the 1540s a series of royal proclamations and parliamentary acts claimed and embodied the authority of the Crown and Parliament to determine what was to be considered orthodoxy in England. Solt summarizes the novelty of the arrangement of the Henrician Church, highlighting the newfound power of the ruler to define as well as defend orthodoxy: During the crucial years of the early 1530s, when the king wrested the independence of the English Church from the authority of the pope, Henry had not wanted to handle matters of heresy [or] change doctrine … After the Act of Supremacy, however, the king became deeply involved in [both] of these aspects of the Church’s spiritual life … Although Henry recognized the pope’s supremacy in matters of heresy as late as 1534, within five years he and Parliament had defined heresy anew. Medieval English kings had neither written lengthy books on the sacraments of the Church nor issued formularies of theological belief. Henry accomplished the latter with a group of declarations in the late 1530s and early 1540s.6

Royal involvement in the enforcement of orthodoxy was not entirely novel; medieval English kings had played a role in the detection and suppression of heresy, including a statute of 1401 that made official the responsibility of the secular authorities to execute heretics convicted in ecclesiastical courts.7 Nevertheless, there was something fundamentally different about the role of the Crown in the suppression of heresy after the mid-1530s. Prior to this time, whatever the role of the civil authorities may have been regarding the punishment of heresy, the role of judging what constituted heresy belonged to clerics. From the twelfth century until the reign of Henry VIII, there was never any doubt that the power to define the faith belonged to ecclesiastical officials, however large the role of the English civil authorities may have been regarding the defence of the faith. Under 5

Solt, Church and State, p. 25. Ibid., p. 40. John Guy notes that the authority of the pope to interpret scripture was not officially repudiated until 1536: Guy, Tudor England, p. 136. 7 2 Henry IV. c. 15. 6

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Henry VIII the Crown retained its responsibility to defend the true faith with coercive force, but also claimed the power to define the content of the faith that it would defend as true. The gradual assumption of the power to judge heresy by the government during the 1530s can be traced through official statements. The Act in Restraint of Appeals (1533) included a two-fold distancing of the civil authorities from the authority to determine heresy. First, while prohibiting appeals to Rome from English ecclesiastical courts in cases involving wills, marriage and divorce, or religious offerings, the act did not prohibit appeals to Rome in heresy cases. Second, the act recognized the independent judicial authority of the English clergy. Indeed, a stated purpose of the act was to defend the system of English Church courts against outside influence because it was ‘sufficiente and mete of it selffe, without the intermedlyng of any exterior personne or personnes, to declare and determyne all suche dubtes and to administre all suche offices and dueties as to their rommes spirituall doth apperteyne’. Thus the highest courts of appeals within the ecclesiastical judicial system were identified as those of the archbishops, with appeals involving the king to be settled in the upper house of Convocation.8 With the passage of the Act for the Submission of the Clergy (1534), however, all of this changed. The jurisdiction of the ‘Byshop of Rome’ in matters of heresy as well as in all other matters was declared null and void within England. Rather than limiting the appeals restrained from going to Rome to certain cases, the 1534 act declared that … no maner of appeales shalbe had … to the Byshop of Rome nor to the See of Rome, in any causes or matters happenyng to be in contencion and havyng theire commensement and begynnyng in any of the Courties within this Realme or within any of the Kynges domynyons of what nature condicion or qualitie soever they be of.

The act further ended the brief tenure of the archiepiscopal court as the highest ecclesiastical court of appeals by allowing for appeals from the courts of the archbishops to the king’s court of chancery, thus bringing the trying of heretics as well as all other Church court proceedings under the ultimate jurisdiction of the king.9 Royal authority to dispense from ecclesiastical law was also claimed based on the assumption that the king could determine when dispensations ‘may be graunted without offendyng the Holy Scriptures and lawes of God’.10 The Act of Supremacy, in addition to recognizing Henry as the Head of the Church and all of its institutions, decreed that Henry should have 8 9 10

24 Henry VIII. c. 12. 25 Henry VIII. c. 19. 25 Henry VIII. c. 21.

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… full power & auctorite … to visite represse redresse reforme ordre correct restrayne and amende all suche errours heresies abuses offences contemptes and enormyties what so ever they be, whiche by any maner spirituall auctoryte or jurisdiccion ought or maie lawfullye be reformyd repressyd ordred redressyd correctyd restrayned or amendyd, moste to the pleasure of Almyghtie God the encrease of vertue yn Chrystis Religion and for the conservacion of the peace unyte and tranquylyte of this Realme.11

As the 1530s closed, any distinction between the authority of the Crown to punish heresy and its authority to define heresy had been obliterated. The Act for Abolishing Diversity of Opinions of 1539, often referred to as the Six Articles, ‘imposed doctrine by the sole authority of the King in Parliament’.12 Identifying the twin responsibilities of the English Church’s royal Head as the promulgation of true doctrine and the maintenance of unity, the act put forward the official teachings of the Church of England on a variety of disputed matters including transubstantiation, the validity of communion in one kind ‘by Gods lawe’, whether clergy may marry ‘by the lawe of God’, and ‘whether privat masses stonde with the lawe of God’.13 The next year the Act Concerning Christ’s Religion affirmed that any pronouncement of the English clergy confirmed by the king ‘in and uppon the matiers of Christes religion and christen faith and the laufull rites ceremonies and observations of the same’ was to be ‘fully beleved obeyed observid and perfourmed’ by all subjects.14 In 1542, the Lord Chancellor informed Parliament of their king that ‘The Almighty’ had ‘anointed him with the oil of sapience above his fellows’, a sapience clearly reflected ‘in the perfect knowledge of the Word of God’.15 A year later the Act for the Advancement of True Religion affirmed that in the interest of preserving the true faith, the king was authorized to ban all pernicious books and also … to ordeyne and establisshe a certaine forme of pure and sincere teaching, agreable with Goddes woorde and the true doctryne of the catholicke and apostolicall Churche, wherunto men maye have recourse for the true decysion of soome such contraversies as have in tymes past and yet doo happen and aryse amonges them.16

The same act established as the standard of orthodoxy ‘that doctryne whiche sithens the yere of our Lorde a thousande fyve hundred and 11

26 Henry VIII. c. 1. Dickens, The English Reformation, p. 143. Dickens also discusses the ambiguous role of Convocation in the Henrician Church in the 1530s, pp. 143–4. 13 31 Henry VIII. c. 14. 14 32 Henry VIII. c. 26. 15 Stanford Lehmberg, The Later Parliaments of Henry VIII, 1536–1547 (Cambridge, 1977), p. 141. 16 34&35 Henry VIII. c. 1. 12

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fourtie is or at any tyme … shalbe set foorthe by his Hieghnes’ with the appropriate subscription. Any ecclesiastic who taught contrary to this standard was, after refusal to abjure or a third offence, to be ‘deamed and adjudged an heretyke’ with the associated penalties.17 The doctrine set forth by Henry since 1540 to which the act referred was contained in A Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christian Man, often referred to as the King’s Book, written under the guidance of the king and passed by Convocation earlier in 1543. It professed to teach what every Christian must know regarding faith, and included expositions of the Creed, the Ten Commandments, and the Lord’s Prayer. In-depth investigation of the question of why it was thought necessary for the Crown to claim authority to define doctrine is beyond the scope of this study, but a few comments are in order. The explanation attributed to Henry by the statutes was that he claimed the power to define doctrine in order to ensure that his subjects were taught the true faith. While this was surely to some extent propaganda, it should not be entirely discounted. Henry did have a real interest in theology, and the identification of Henry with such Old Testament champions of true religion as David and Josiah was more than mere cant. Richard Rex avers that many of Henry’s religious policies can best be understood as attempts to fulfil the role of Old Testament monarch into which he cast himself.18 It seems that, whatever other factors may have played roles, a genuine concern for the promotion of what he took to be Christian truth was partially responsible for Henry’s interest in claiming power over the definition of doctrine. A second possible motivating factor was the diplomatic flexibility the Crown gained when it acquired the power to define doctrine. In the sixteenth century, issues of doctrinal agreement or disagreement played an important role in diplomacy. In such a setting, the advantage for Henry of the doctrinal flexibility that accompanied the authority to define doctrine is clear. The possibility that England might adopt a more Lutheran doctrinal position was a crucial element in English negotiations with the Lutheran princes to form an alliance, while the conservative Six Articles give the impression of having been formulated with an eye toward reassuring Emperor Charles V and the French king, Francis I, that, despite the break with Rome, Henry and his kingdom were still essentially orthodox.19 While personal piety and diplomatic concerns played their roles in leading the civil authorities to claim power over the definition of doctrine, it seems that the civil authorities also recognized that claiming this power was necessitated by the very assumption of the royal supremacy. In other 17

34&35 Henry VIII. c. 1. Rex, Henry VIII and the English Reformation, pp. 29, 105, 173–4; see Heal, Reformation in Britain and Ireland, pp. 133–4. 19 Heal, Reformation, pp. 134–7. 18

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words, even had matters of theology not mattered to Henry personally or as a tool of diplomacy, the assumption of power over the definition of doctrine would nevertheless likely have followed in the wake of Henry’s takeover of ecclesiastical affairs in England. As Franklin Baumer states, power over the definition of doctrine ‘was the logical conclusion, the last step of the Henrician Reformation, and one to which Henry was perhaps driven to make his Supremacy something more than mere theory’.’20 Assumption of power over the definition of doctrine was necessary because of the new sources of opposition to which the Crown became susceptible when it took on the headship of the Church. The Church’s royal Head became a target of criticism and even active opposition when his policies were deemed to be unorthodox or detrimental to the faith. This problem is only exacerbated during times of doctrinal disagreement within a church, and in England the 1530s was such a time. Henry provided his subjects with vernacular scriptures in order to promote a kingdom united in its obedience to God’s law and the king, but the hopelessly unrealistic nature of this expectation is clear in hindsight: Henry’s Reformation had eroded too many old mental landmarks by trespassing on the ancient liberties of the church, by breaking the taboo of sacrilege that protected ecclesiastical property, and by condemning traditional pieties as idolatry and superstition. Opening the Bible to a people thus disoriented was an invitation to dissent which was readily accepted in many quarters.21

Rather than promoting religious unity, making the Bible available inspired English reformers, in turn amplifying conservative opposition already being voiced against religious innovation within the realm. In a country so divided on religious issues, it was impossible for the king to accommodate his ordering of the Church to the views of his subjects (even had Henry wanted to allow public opinion to set the course for doctrinal policy) because his subjects, and even Henry’s councillors, could achieve no consensus regarding what was the true faith. Whatever religious policy he chose to promote, the new Head of the Church of England would inevitably face challenges from zealous reformers or disgruntled conservatives, and often enough from both factions. From a political perspective, perhaps the ideal solution would be to avoid the issue all together and simply claim authority over the institutional affairs of the Church without meddling with doctrinal matters. In fact, no such clear distinction is possible between power over institutional church affairs and authority over doctrinal matters. While Henry and his agents did not take active roles in promulgating formularies of the faith 20 Franklin Le van Baumer, The Early Tudor Theory of Kingship (1940; reprint, New York, 1966), p. 31. 21 Rex, Henry VIII and the English Reformation, p. 132.

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until later in the 1530s, authority to pronounce regarding God’s will and to authoritatively interpret scripture is already implicit in many of the powers claimed prior to the promulgation of official formularies of the faith. The Act in Restraint of Appeals, as noted above, did not deny the authority of the pope to judge heresy, but it did declare that any papal excommunications or interdictions the act might spawn were to be ignored by both the laity and the clergy.22 The problem with this half-way position is that by commanding English subjects to disregard papal censures, the act clearly implied either that subjects were to subordinate concern for their eternal well-being to their loyalty to the laws of the realm, or that such papal censures would not impact a Christian’s eternal fate. Had he been asked, the pope would certainly have declared either of these opinions heretical. Indeed, the royal supremacy with its concomitant repudiation of papal primacy was itself a doctrinal innovation: ‘By claiming that he was rescuing the English church from the evil of papal usurpation, Henry was consciously asserting what had previously been heresy.’23 In contrast to the ‘medieval consensus on papal headship of the Church’,24 the Act for the Punishment of Heresy declared that papal primacy was ‘not approved & confirmed by holy scripture’ and ‘was never commenly accepted or confirmed to be any lawe of God or man within this Realme’. Consequently to denounce it was not to be considered heresy.25 As long as the definition of doctrine remained beyond the power of the king, it also remained beyond his power to claim the exclusive allegiance of his subjects in religious affairs. On the contrary, each subject would be free, and indeed obliged, to resist Henry on every point of policy that did not concur with the subject’s understanding of orthodoxy. Such opposition was not only a theoretical possibility but also a reality in Henrician England. The opening chapter of G.R. Elton’s Policy and Police provides an overview of the wide array of religious opinion in England in the 1530s, and concludes that ‘Any thought that the political and doctrinal changes [of the 1530s] were simply and silently absorbed by the people must be forgotten … There was a real problem facing the King and his advisors, a real problem of disaffection, disobedience and disturbance.’26 If the English populace would not spontaneously recognize the validity of government-sponsored ecclesiastical reforms, perhaps they could be intimidated into acting as if they accepted them. To some extent they could 22 23

24 Henry VIII. c. 12. E.W. Ives, ‘Henry VIII’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004),

p. 532. 24

Rex, Henry VIII and the English Reformation, p. 33. 25 Henry VIII. c. 14. 26 G.R. Elton, Policy and Police: The Enforcement of the Reformation in the Age of Thomas Cromwell (1972; reprint, Cambridge, 1985), pp. 44–5. 25

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be, and to some extent they were. A wide array of pressures and measures were employed with varying degrees of success to silence, eliminate, or reduce to outward conformity those who did not spontaneously accept the legitimacy of Henry’s ecclesiastical policies.27 In 1531, the Canterbury Convocation was bullied into accepting the king as the ‘Supreme Head’ of the English Church under threat of praemunire. In doing so, the bishops agreed to accept Henry’s authority over the Church only so far as ‘the law of Christ allows’, a condition that J.J. Scarisbrick calls a ‘saving clause in response to the royal demand for recognition of [ecclesiastical] overlordship’, inasmuch as the bishops construed as far as the law of Christ allows to be ‘not very far at all’.28 In contrast, imperial ambassador Eustace Chapuys judged the condition to be of little consequence; the king could determine what it meant in practice, and no one would argue with him.29 The examples of Bishop and then Cardinal John Fisher and former Lord Chancellor Thomas More, however, show that some English subjects were willing to oppose their king when they considered royal policies to be contrary to God’s will. These examples also show that coercive enforcement of acquiescence to the royal will could be costly for the government. Fisher’s and More’s executions on charges of treason were a public relations disaster, met with shock and horror, and official efforts to justify the deaths did little to improve Henry’s image. Even among modern commentators, it is still asserted that ‘the barbarous act of executing “the saintliest bishop in christendom” … contributed in no small way to settling the reputation of Henry VIII as the most contemptible human specimen ever to sit upon the throne of England.’30 International embarrassment was not the only risk attendant upon a failure by the civil authorities to guard against dissent from royal policies based on prior obedience to God’s will. In an age in which heresy was intimately linked to sedition in the popular imagination and national unity in matters of religion was considered an indispensable bulwark against rebellion and anarchy, concern for order in Church and realm demanded that steps be taken to convince subjects to acquiesce to the will of the English Church’s new Supreme Head. The spectacle of early sixteenth-century Germany, torn apart by the Peasants’ Rebellion and religious strife, drove 27 Regarding the means employed and their effectiveness, see Elton, Policy and Police, chapters 5–9. 28 J.J. Scarisbrick, ‘Fisher, Henry VIII and the Reformation Crisis’, in Brendan Bradshaw and Eamon Duffy (eds), Humanism, Reform and the Reformation: The Career of Bishop John Fisher (Cambridge, 1989), p. 158. 29 Recorded by Richard Marius in Thomas More: A Biography (New York, 1984), p. 379. 30 Brendan Bradshaw, ‘Bishop John Fisher, 1469–1535: The Man and his Work’, in Brendan Bradshaw and Eamon Duffy (eds), Humanism, Reform and the Reformation: The Career of Bishop John Fisher (Cambridge, 1989), p. 15.

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home the dangers of disobedience to the established authorities. Evidence of the precariousness of peace and order in the realm was supplied not only by foreign examples but also by domestic disturbances including the most serious internal threat faced by a Tudor monarch, the rising in northern England known as the Pilgrimage of Grace. The Pilgrimage showed both the speed with which order could be lost and also the role that religion could play in drawing subjects away from obedience. Whatever other interests may have played parts, disaffection with the religious policy of the central government was a primary motivating factor prompting the uprising: Its imagery was religious; the rebels called themselves ‘Pilgrims’, they carried banners of the Five Wounds of Christ and invoked God’s grace and defence of Holy Church in their marching song. They demanded the rooting out of heresy, the restoration of recently dispossessed monks and nuns to their convents, an end to the despoliation, and even the renunciation of the recently asserted royal headship of the church.31

Rebellion in the north was only the most serious manifestation of discontent with royal policy that simmered among some factions within England throughout the 1530s and beyond. Elton provides an extensive (although as he notes by no means exhaustive) survey of the many instances of disobedience, disunity and disorder in southern England.32 Political, economic, social, and personal conflicts had their roles to play in the disturbances, but it is clear that the achievement of religious concord would have been a significant step in the direction of peace, and it is far from obvious that the northern counties would have broken out into open rebellion had subjects been convinced of the orthodoxy of the central government’s religious policies. As well as protecting against internal strife, a nation unified in obedience to its king was also believed to be necessary for protection against foreign invasion. The king’s divorce and the break with the Roman Church set Henry in opposition to both emperor and pope, and the executions of More and Fisher exacerbated problems in England’s foreign relations: Henry and his ministers saw foreign hostility as the gravest threat to England’s new-found imperial status. The abiding fear of the anger of Charles V, and of the danger that he might bury his differences with Francis I and launch a crusade against the heretic English, resonates through the 1530s and was not wholly buried in the 1540s.33

31 C.S.L. Davies, ‘Popular Religion and the Pilgrimage of Grace’, in Anthony Fletcher and John Stevenson (eds), Order and Disorder in Early Modern England (Cambridge, 1985), p. 58. 32 Elton, Policy and Police, chap. 3. 33 Heal, Reformation in Britain and Ireland, p. 135.

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Such concerns underscored the need for a nation unified behind its king in heart and mind. Particularly upsetting were the instances in which English subjects were driven by dissatisfaction with royal policy to encourage foreign intervention. Embassies doing just that by Henry’s expatriate cousin Reginald Pole to the emperor and French king infuriated Henry and concerned his counsellors although they ultimately came to nothing. Refugees were not the only ones inviting imperial intervention to defend the honour of God and pope. According to Chapuys, in 1533 Fisher issued a call to Charles V to invade England and depose its king. For Fisher, such action was justified by the necessity of rendering obedience to God before any earthly potentate whose commands were contrary to God’s will.34 In light of such risks, it is understandable that ‘The twin dangers of imperial invasion and domestic rebellion under papal sanction offered a prospect which shaped home and foreign policy for most of the 1530s.’35 Domestic policy included government efforts to convince subjects that allegiance to England’s new religious order was not only prudent but also righteous. This study focuses on these efforts, particularly the defenders of royal supremacy who cut to the heart of the matter and sought to remove all possibility of religiously based resistance to royal policies by persuading Christians in England that opposition to royal religious policy was invalid in principle. The laws of the realm regulating religion were to be obeyed, these theorists argued, not only when the Crown happened to support doctrines that the individual believed to be orthodox but invariably because the authorities were to be recognized as the divinely ordained standard of Christian orthodoxy. According to theorists of this type, resistance to the religious policies of the government would by definition be invalid because the religious determinations of the Crown, as the highest authority in matters of Christian belief and practice, would be self-validating. Convincing subjects that it was God’s will that they accept the determinations of the Church’s royal Head even when they did not personally perceive the godliness of those determinations was the obvious solution to producing stable religious concord under the royal supremacy – if only it could be accomplished. Biblical and historical precedents played a key role in much of the literature associated with efforts to legitimate royal power over the Church, including the power to enforce religious orthodoxy. They figured prominently in the ‘Collectanea satis copiosa’, a collection of documents compiled in 1530 by government agents, and in Edward Foxe’s 1534 tract, De Vera Differentia regiae potestatis et ecclesiasticae, et qvae sit ipsa veritas ac virtvs vtrivsqve. These texts catalogued historical and legal precedents drawn from the Old Testament and the ancient and medieval 34 35

Scarisbrick, ‘Fisher, Henry VIII and the Reformation Crisis’, pp. 156–7, 160–63. Rex, Henry VIII and the English Reformation, p. 20.

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Church intended to demonstrate that kings, particularly English kings, were entitled to a supremacy over their churches akin to that enjoyed by David, Constantine and other godly rulers. Such precedents served the propagandists well, and, for those inclined to accept the supremacy, were virtually all that was needed to seal the case that the Crown ought to assume responsibility for the ordering of the Church within the realm. The Collectanea seems to have played a role in convincing Henry himself of the legitimacy of the royal supremacy, and the Act in Restraint of Appeals justified itself with the assertion that ‘by dyvers sundrie olde autentike histories and cronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed that this Realme of Englond is an Impire, and so hath ben accepted in the worlde, governed by oon Supreme heede and King having the Dignitie and Roiall Estate of the Imperiall Crowne of the same.’36 If the intention was to justify the divinely ordained power and responsibility of the king to order ecclesiastical affairs and defend (rather than define) the faith, supporters of royal supremacy were on more or less firm ground when using these precedents. The precedents could be used to construct a reasonable case in support of the authority of the king to order ecclesiastical affairs within the realm and to enforce orthodoxy. Old Testament kings, including luminaries like David and Solomon, had exercised such power. The example of Josiah, cleansing his realm of idolatrous shrines, images and priests, promulgating and enforcing the Mosaic law,37 was, as contemporaries realized, a particularly appropriate model for Henry’s view of his role as Head of the Church. When propagandists shifted their focus from the Old Testament to ecclesiastical history, the case was less clear-cut, but it was still possible to outline a convincing argument. A thirteenth-century account of the mythical second-century King Lucius provided a royal rather than a papal origin of Christianity in Britain, and the source even included a supposed letter from Pope Eleutherius identifying the king as the vicar of God and affirming his authority to legislate for both regnum and sacerdotium.38 Emperor Constantine had taken a leading role in religious affairs, including calling and presiding over the Council of Nicea; Justinian had promulgated laws for the suppression of heresy and impiety as well as regulating the institutional, financial and ceremonial affairs of the Byzantine Church. When the more ancient authority exercised by these rulers was viewed 36 24 Henry VIII. c. 12. See Graham Nicholson, ‘The Act of Appeals and the English Reformation’, in Claire Cross, David Loades, and J.J. Scarisbrick (eds), Law and Government under the Tudors: Essays Presented to Sir Geoffrey Elton Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge on the Occasion of his Retirement (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 19–30; Alistair Fox and John Guy, Reassessing the Henrician Age: Humanism, Politics and Reform, 1500–1550 (Oxford, 1986), pp. 157–63. 37 2 Kings 22–23. 38 Fox and Guy, Reassessing the Henrician Age, pp. 157–9.

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as paradigmatic, it was plausible to argue that later papal power over the Church was mere usurpation and thus rightly eliminated. If, however, the intention was to secure for the Crown authority to define, not merely to defend, doctrine and to convince subjects that they are unquestioningly to submit to the royal vision of orthodoxy, then bare citation of biblical and historical precedents was of dubious value. For every David recorded in the Old Testament there was an Ahab, the stories surrounding whose impious policies legitimated and even demanded disobedience to royal pronouncements contrary to God’s will. While supporters of government religious policy were equating Henry’s activities with the likes of David and Josiah, opponents of royal policy had long since discovered the value of negative biblical precedents. In a 1520 sermon, Fisher had identified Henry with Herod Agrippa who suffered a gruesome death as divine retribution for his blasphemous arrogance.39 Worse still from the perspective of those seeking to defend the supremacy, by appealing to biblical examples opponents of royal policy could often cast themselves in the roles of some of the Bible’s greatest heroes. When Fisher later implied that Henry was playing the role of another Herod in his pursuit of divorce, he implicitly placed himself in the role of John the Baptist defending the sanctity of marriage.40 William Peto not only decried Henry’s divorce plans but also assumed the role of Elijah when he warned that should the divorce proceed, dogs would lap up Henry’s blood as they had that of Ahab.41 When biblical precedents set the standard, even defenders of royal supremacy were bound to recognize that royal policy could deviate from the divine will and to set limits on the obedience owed to the prince. While Henry may not have dwelt on it, subjects who viewed him as a latter-day David knew of the Hebrew king’s reputation as an archetype of the repentant sinner as well as a model of regal strength and piety,42 and no less a proponent of the royal supremacy than Edward Foxe conceded that God must be obeyed before the king. Citing Nebuchadnezzar, Foxe acknowledged that when kings established ungodly laws the pious and faithful thing to do was to disobey such laws.43 Similarly, if precedents from the history of the ancient Church provided a more or less reliable foundation for royal authority to defend the faith, 39

Acts 12. Eamon Duffy, ‘The Spirituality of John Fisher’, in Brendan Bradshaw and Eamon Duffy (eds) Humanism, Reform and the Reformation: The Career of Bishop John Fisher, (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 219–22; see Matthew 14. 41 Guy, Tudor England, p. 125; see 1 Kings 21. 42 John King, ‘Henry VIII as David: The King’s Image and Reformation Politics’, in Peter Herman (ed.), Rethinking the Henrician Era: Essays on Early Tudor Texts and Contexts (Urbana, IL, 1994), pp. 85–6. 43 Edward Foxe, De Vera Differentia regiae potestatis et ecclesiasticae, et qvae sit ipsa veritas ac virtvs vtrivsqve (London, 1534), pp. 44–44v. 40

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they were less helpful as bases for royal authority to define the faith, and worse than useless if the intention was to convince subjects that it was God’s desire that they bend their wills to royal policy in the face of private scruples. If Constantine and Justinian served well as models for royal authority over ecclesiastical affairs and the enforcement of orthodoxy, Roman emperors such as the fourth-century Arian sympathizer Constantius II demonstrated with equal clarity the danger of blindly aligning oneself with whatever theological position the civil authorities may happen to support. However much legitimacy historical precedents may have lent to claims that Christian rulers are authorized to formulate laws enforcing orthodoxy, the heroic refusal of Constantius’ antagonist Athanasius to compromise his beliefs demonstrated that opposition, not acquiescence, was the proper response to a heretical ruler who abused his office by attempting to subvert true doctrine. In short, while precedents were effective tools of propaganda to inspire those already convinced of the orthodoxy of Henry’s agenda as Head of the Church, they were of little value in convincing critics, especially those who recognized Henry’s authority to regulate spiritual affairs and promote the true faith but claimed that in fact he was abusing his power by promoting heresy. To refer to Henry as Josiah or Constantine was to assert rather than to provide evidence that Henry’s policies were orthodox and thus invited rather than forestalled opposition from those who preferred to equate Henry’s policies with the policies of Ahab or Constantius. Not only did biblical and historical precedents strain under the load when called on to justify royal absolutism or the authority of the king to define as well as defend the true faith. Many theorists explicitly dedicated to defending royal supremacy over the Church placed limits on the obedience subjects should render to the king, and they made these limits practically effective by withholding from the prince the authority to define doctrine. This is true of the two most famous Henrician proponents of royal supremacy, William Tyndale and Stephen Gardiner, both of whom refused to claim for the king authority over the definition of doctrine and both of whom consequently placed strict limits on the obedience due to the king as Head of the Church. It is also true of a third prominent defender of royal supremacy, the humanist Thomas Starkey.

CHAPTER TWO

Defending Royal Supremacy apart from the Definition of Doctrine William Tyndale William Tyndale was an Oxford (and perhaps also Cambridge) educated linguist and theologian. He is best known for his production of the first translation of the New Testament and Pentateuch into English from their original languages, a translation that was in large part adopted by the compilers of the King James Bible. Around 1523, Tyndale approached the Bishop of London, Cuthbert Tunstall, with a proposal to translate the Bible into English. When Tunstall proved unreceptive, Tyndale emigrated to the Continent where he set to work on an independent translation, publishing in 1526 an English New Testament that was smuggled into England. Later that year Tunstall and other English bishops undertook the burning of Tyndale’s translation of the New Testament, asserting that it was riddled with errors and promoted heresy. Remaining on the Continent, Tyndale published a translation of the Pentateuch, scriptural commentaries, a revised edition of his New Testament, and several other works. In 1535, Tyndale was arrested in Antwerp, and about sixteen months later he was executed as a heretic.1 Apart from his Bible translations, Tyndale’s most influential work is The Obedience of a Christian Man, a text printed in 1528 in the wake of the German Peasants’ Revolt with the stated purpose of proving false accusations that the evangelical doctrines emerging on the Continent fomented rebellion.2 While the text was declared heretical and banned in England on several accounts, including a persistent championing of Lutheran doctrinal positions and a virulently anti-clerical vein running throughout, it also presents a vision of royal authority over realm and Church that was influential throughout the 1530s.3 Henry VIII is anecdotally said to have read and approved heartily of the Obedience, and the reason for the popularity of the ideas put forward in the Obedience during the Henrician reformation is not far to seek. With an eye firmly focused on exonerating 1 This and all of the other biographical sketches in this work draw from the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004). 2 William Tyndale, The Obedience of a Christian Man, David Daniell (ed.) (New York, 2000), p. 26 (hereafter ‘Obedience’). 3 David Daniell, William Tyndale: A Biography (New Haven, CT, 1994), pp. 242–3.

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the reformers of charges of sedition, Tyndale consistently and repeatedly emphasizes that the Bible presents the king, be he good or evil, as the vicar of God, and he underscores the duty of all persons, whether lay or ordained, to submit to royal authority. Citing the testimony of Paul and Christ as well as the example of David in his relationship with Saul, Tyndale concludes that God hath made the king in every realm judge over all, and over him there is no judge. He that judgeth the king judgeth God and he that layeth hands on the king layeth hand on God, and he that resisteth the king resisteth God and damneth God’s law and ordinance. If the subjects sin they must be brought to the king’s judgment. If the king sin he must be reserved unto the judgment, wrath and vengeance of God.4

Far from Protestant doctrine and access to scripture being spurs to rebellion, Tyndale asserts, ‘it is the bloody doctrine of the Pope which causeth disobedience, rebellion and insurrection. For he teacheth to fight and to defend his traditions and whatsoever he dreameth with fire, water and sword and to disobey father, mother, master, lord, king and emperor.’5 Not only do papal policies condition Christians not to balk at bloodshed and insurrection, they also undermine princely authority by seeking to remove the clerical caste from under the power of the prince where God has placed them (along with all other people). Rather than seeking exemption to sin with impunity, ‘With good living ought the spirituality to rid themselves from fear of the temporal sword, and not with craft and with blinding the kings and bringing the vengeance of God upon them and in purchasing licence to sin unpunished.’6 Sentiments of this type have underwritten a traditional view of the Obedience as a document that leaves little to want as a defence of royal absolutism in both Church and state, and as an ideal instrument for promotion of unqualified obedience to the king. Richard Duerden argues that Tyndale’s perception of the royal office is decisively shaped by his understanding of absolute divine sovereignty reflected in the doctrine of justification by faith alone: Tyndale’s doctrine of obedience [to the prince] serves as a political analogue of justification; both doctrines provide relief from overwhelming or indeterminable responsibility. The Christian relies on the justice of God to take care of all that the Christian cannot, because of the corruption of his nature and the inordinate demands of the law. The principle of obedience to ruler temporalizes

4 5 6

Obedience, pp. 39–40. Ibid., p. 29. Ibid., p. 41.

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this spiritual and eternal subjection; one acknowledges an almost unlimited subjection to a very much reduced set of earthly authorities.7

Duerden does note that subjection to the king is only almost unlimited, but there is a tendency to downplay the practical significance of this caveat. David Daniell emphasizes that in the Obedience Tyndale focuses on the condition of the king before God and constantly reminds rulers that they are ‘under the religious and moral duty to act in accordance with God’s law’. Nevertheless, Daniell asserts, such rhetoric only goes so far: ‘The difficulty, of course, is that the monarch won’t act according to the Law of God and nothing can be done about it – a difficulty inherent in the whole doctrine of non-resistance.’8 It seems, however, that there was rather a lot that could be done about royal failures to rule in accord with God’s will, and the conditions Tyndale places on the obedience subjects owe to their rulers reflected both in the Obedience and in his life clarify why the Henrician Church required a more thoroughgoing defence of royal supremacy in religious affairs than Tyndale provides. While Tyndale denounces active resistance to royal policies, he is equally clear that, as the king is God’s vicar, so his authority is naught when opposed to the divine will. Thus Tyndale comforts afflicted English Protestants with the assurance that their possession of God’s spirit is confirmed if they can ‘patiently obey evil rulers in all thing that is not to the dishonour of God’,9 and he holds up the examples of ‘Peter, Paul and of all the other Apostles’, who ‘obeyed all worldly authority and power usurping none to themselves, and taught all other to fear the kings and rulers and obey them in all things not contrary to the commandment of God’.10 Tyndale summarizes his vision of the royal office and how Christian subjects ought to relate to their prince: I showed you of the authority of princes, how they are in God’s stead and how they may not be resisted do they never so evil, they must be reserved unto the wrath of God. Neverthelater if they command to do evil we must then disobey and say we are otherwise commanded of God: but not to rise against them.11

While these conditions on obedience can be read as mere cant that Tyndale did not expect his readers to take seriously, it seems that they play a much more important role in his understanding of royal power. Duerden, emphasizing the parallels between the king and God in Tyndale’s thought, 7 Richard Duerden, ‘Justice and Justification: King and God in Tyndale’s The Obedience of a Christian Man’, in John Dick and Anne Richardson (eds), William Tyndale and the Law (Kirksville, MO, 1994), p. 71. 8 Daniell, William Tyndale, p. 242. 9 Obedience, p. 54 (emphasis added). 10 Ibid., p. 104 (emphasis added). 11 Ibid., p. 181.

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argues that ‘the king is also [in addition to being an instrument of God] an analogical God, himself giving people trials and delivering them.’ In particular, ‘Evil kings and tyrants signify the God of the law, an angry God and a law of fear.’12 While there is merit in this view, and Tyndale perhaps does emphasize parallels between God and king, Tyndale also keeps clearly in mind that in some cases ‘It is not like in the kingdom of the world and in the kingdom of God and Christ.’13 The differences between the angry God and the tyrant king must be borne in mind. The tyrant is very much not like the God of the law in the sense that the God of the law is not vengeful or evil per se, but only appears so from the perspective of a sinful humanity burdened with a law of righteousness that in itself is good and holy but appears to make inordinate demands because of the corruption of human nature. Failure to obey the divine law is in all points a testimony to the weakness of fallen humanity, not an indictment of God’s law. With respect to the tyrant, on the other hand, laws that he introduces are by nature wicked, in the sense of contrary to justice and/or in the sense of contrary to the dictates of the divine law. Consequently, in contrast to human failure to obey the divine law, refusal to obey the laws of a tyrant can often be commendable and even required of Christians. As Bruce Boehrer has noted, Tyndale’s condition that one obey the king in all things except when he commands contrary to God’s will ‘is an enormous “except”’.14 Placing Tyndale’s doctrines in the context of the English Reformation, it is noteworthy that the principle of obedience to God before the king that Tyndale champions was also the basis of Fisher and More’s refusal to acquiesce to royal demands. Indeed, Tyndale calls for an even more active opposition to royal policy than that offered by More. Not only does Tyndale endorse obedience to God before the prince, he also points out that when commanded to act contrary to the divine will by the prince one must not merely disobey but must also make rulers aware that they are violating God’s will. In Tyndale’s words, people must ‘disobey and say we are otherwise commanded of God’.15 Tyndale himself practised non-compliance to ungodly laws as well as legitimating it in theory, and he actively encouraged others to do so. It is, of course, widely known that Tyndale’s publication of an English New Testament with the intention of distribution in England was a violation of 12

Duerden, ‘Justice and Justification’, p. 76. Obedience, p. 144. In this case Tyndale is pointing out discrepancies between the worldly and heavenly realms to undermine arguments from analogy supporting invocation of the saints. 14 Bruce Boehrer, ‘Tyndale’s The Practyse of Prelates: Reformation Doctrine and the Royal Supremacy’, Renaissance and Reformation, 10/3 (1986): 261; see 259–63, 270–72. 15 Obedience, p. 181 (emphasis added). See Boehrer, ‘Tyndale’s The Practyse of Prelates’, p. 262. 13

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the laws of the realm, as was his emigration out of England without royal permission. These are not Tyndale’s only publishing activities subversive of royal policy. Anne Richardson rightly notes that ‘Writing The Practice of Prelates [Tyndale’s 1530 tract criticizing, among other things, Henry’s impending divorce] … was downright civil disobedience’,16 a disobedience that ‘stands to Tyndale’s early works [including the Obedience] as does praxis to theory’.17 Such defiance of royal policy is difficult to reconcile with a traditional reading of the Obedience as a statement of royal absolutism. When, however, the limitations that Tyndale places on Christian compliance to the prince are appreciated, his actions can be understood as exemplars of the conditional obedience that he champions among subjects. In addition to himself obeying God before the king, Tyndale also admonishes his readers to do the same in particular as well as general terms. The Obedience has been referred to as a ‘classic of civil disobedience’,18 and the reason why is manifest on the first page of the preface to the text. Following a greeting modelled on the New Testament epistles, Tyndale encourages his readers: ‘Let it not make thee despair neither yet discourage thee O reader, that it is forbidden thee in pain of life and goods or that it is made breaking of the King’s peace or treason unto His Highness to read the word of thy soul’s health.’19 Explicitly noting that possession and reading of scripture is illegal and indeed treasonous by English law, Tyndale nevertheless encourages Englishmen to continue to acquire and read scripture because it is essential to their spiritual development. This general exhortation is followed in the body of the text by further encouragement for law-breakers. A large section of the preface is dedicated to demonstrating through theological arguments and a host of biblical citations that the suffering that is likely to follow upon possession of scripture is commonplace among the experiences of the godly, and indeed is itself a means to and a sign of a right relationship with God.20 The remainder of the text is thickly laced with biblical citations, quotations and paraphrases, and these are augmented by admonitions that readers confirm or expand upon Tyndale’s arguments by reading scripture for themselves. Advisements such as ‘Read the eleventh chapter to the Hebrews for thy consolation’, ‘This mayest thou see Matthew 18 and I Corinthians 5 and 2 Corinthians 2’, and ‘If thou wilt see more of this matter look in Deuteronomy and there shalt thou find it more largely entreated’,21 are 16 Anne Richardson, ‘William Tyndale and the Bill of Rights’, in John Dick and Anne Richardson (eds), William Tyndale and the Law (Kirksville, MO, 1994), p. 28. 17 Boehrer, ‘Tyndale’s The Practyse of Prelates’, pp. 259–60. 18 ‘Editors’ Preface’, in John Dick and Anne Richardson (eds), William Tyndale and the Law (Kirksville, MO, 1994), p. ix. 19 Obedience, p. 3. 20 Ibid., pp. 4–11. 21 Ibid., pp. 5, 127, 174.

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typical. Such admonitions are hardly remarkable, except that each of them is calling on readers to break the laws of the realm. Not only does Tyndale disobey ungodly laws of the realm and encourage others to do so, he also voices stalwartly his opposition to royal policies (or potential policies) deemed contrary to God’s will and warns kings of the dire consequences that will follow upon failure to bow to God’s will. His most celebrated denunciation of royal policy is found in The Practice of Prelates, but the Obedience also contains a great deal of advice, often accompanied with stern warnings, to kings who would manage their realms in a godly fashion. Tyndale follows a critique of clerical immunity from secular courts with the caution ‘that no king hath power to grant them [clerics] such liberty: but are as well damned for their giving, as they for their false purchasing.’22 Similarly, the practice of secular powers carrying out punishments against those convicted by ecclesiastical officials is denounced with a stern warning: ‘The king cannot, but unto his damnation, lend his sword to kill whom he judgeth not by his own laws. Let him that is accused stand on the one side and the accuser on the other side and let the king’s judge sit and judge the cause, if the king will kill and not be a murderer before God.’23 Mutatis mutandis, the unshakeable opposition of Fisher and More to the Henrician reformation was clearly consistent with Tyndale’s principle of obedience to divine before human authority. Would Tyndale have condoned even more active opposition to royal policy along the lines of the Pilgrimage of Grace? Certainly active resistance against the king’s person was anathema for Tyndale, but we must also consider how he feels about the person who, like the Pilgrims claimed to be, … were thoroughly persuaded that it were not lawful to resist his king, though he would wrongfully take away life and goods: yet might he think that it were lawful to resist the hypocrites and to rise, not against his king: but with his king to deliver his king out of bondage and captivity, wherein the hypocrites hold him with wiles and falsehood, so that no man may be suffered to come at him, to tell him the truth.24

The context of this statement suggests strongly that Tyndale does not recognize such risings as legitimate, and later he cautions the masses that if kings will not reform clerical abuses, ‘then ought the commons to take patience and to take it for God’s scourge and to think that God hath blinded the king for their sins’ sake and commit their cause to God.’25 This may, however, not reflect the totality of Tyndale’s attitude toward active opposition against wicked royal advisers in defence of the king. Rudolph 22 23 24 25

Ibid., p. 182. Ibid., p. 106. Ibid., p. 29. Ibid., p. 184.

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Almasy has argued that in The Practice of Prelates Tyndale speaks with a number of ‘voices’26 that have conflicting views about the legitimacy of rebellion against the civil authorities and their miscreant advisers. One voice addresses Henry VIII counselling him to throw off the tyranny of the English prelacy, but providing no grounds to justify a rising by the masses against the established authorities, however tyrannical. At the same time, Almasy argues, there can be heard another voice considering with equanimity the possibility of a rebellion against not only churchmen but also the civil authorities who too long have suffered prelates to lay waste the land, a voice perhaps even encouraging insurrection. Needless to say, this voice runs counter to Tyndale’s ‘official’ position regarding rebellion, but it could for all that potentially have had an impact (an impact perhaps more and perhaps less consciously intended) in spurring English subjects to rise.27 It is possible that a similar interplay of voices is at work in the Obedience. While Tyndale does not openly promote rebellion even in defence of the king to rid him of evil advisers, much in his text suggests that such an event may be the only hope for the English king and nation. Discussing Practice, Almasy points out that for all of Tyndale’s admonitions to subjects to remain subject, ‘It is important not to underestimate the vividness and frequency (and the political thrust) of Tyndale’s portrait of the English people as victims of both a corrupt ecclesiastical establishment and a misled ruling class.’28 A similar statement could be made regarding the Obedience, a text that is also filled with examples of the wickedness of the prelacy and their responsibility for absolutely all of the ills of the nation: ‘[T]hey [clerics] have robbed all realms, not of God’s word only but also of all wealth and prosperity, and have driven peace out of all lands.’29 Such monumental clerical wickedness leads to the inevitable conclusion that … there is no mischief or disorder, whether it be in the temporal regiment or else in the spiritual whereof they are not the chief causes and even the very fountain and springs and as we say, the well head, so that it is impossible to preach against any mischief except thou begin at them or to set any reformation in the world except thou reform them first.30

26 Almasy treats the text by picturing Tyndale on an oratorical stage and ‘listens’ to the different languages of the ‘roles’ Tyndale plays. Rudolph Almasy, ‘Contesting Voices in Tyndale’s The Practice of Prelates’, in John Dick and Anne Richardson (eds), William Tyndale and the Law (Kirksville, MO, 1994), p. 1. 27 Almasy, ‘Contesting Voices’, pp. 1–10. 28 Ibid., p. 8. 29 Obedience, p. 51. 30 Ibid., p. 186.

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If such reformation of the clergy is to be brought about, however, the king is certainly in no condition to lead it. The prelates, as part of their plan to dominate heaven and earth, have seen to this: … they gave themselves to the Emperor and kings and so long ministered their business till they have also put them out of their rooms and have got their authorities from them and reign also in their stead: so that the Emperor and kings are but vain names and shadows, as Christ is, having nothing to do in the world. Thus reign they in the stead of God and man and have all power under them and do what they list.31

To ensure that they remain dominant at court and over the realm the prelates have also secured the king against the possibility of reform: If any of the nobles of the realm be true to the king and so bold that he dare counsel him that which should be to his honour and for the wealth of the realm, they [prelates] will wait a season for him (as men say), they will provide a ghostly father for him … If any faithful servant be in all the court, he shall have twenty spies waiting upon him, he shall be cast out of the court, or (as the saying is) conveyed to Calais, and made a captain, or an ambassador, he shall be kept far enough from the king’s presence.32

Prelates have even turned the king’s sword to uses against his own authority: So that now if any man preach God’s word truly and show the freedom and liberty of the soul which we have in Christ, or intend to restore the kings again unto their duties and right and to the room and authority which they have of God, and of shadows to make them kings in deed, and to put the world in his order again: then the kings deliver their swords and authority unto the hypocrites to slay him. So drunk are they with the wine of the whore.33 Ye [prelates] tread them [kings] under your feet and lead them captive and have made them your bond servants to wait on your filthy lusts and to avenge your malice on every man contrary unto the right of God’s word. Ye have not only robbed them of their land, authority, honour and due obedience which ye owe unto them, but also of their wits, so that they are not without understanding in God’s word only but even in worldly matters that pertain unto their offices, they are more than children.34

Given the lamentable bondage of the king, stumbling drunken on the wine of Babylon to his own damnation, is it too much to discern in the Obedience a voice (perhaps more or perhaps less consciously) exhorting the people, especially the nobility who have been excluded from their usual lines of influence by clerical machinations, to rise in an effort to free 31 32 33 34

Ibid., p. 73. Ibid., p. 95. Ibid., p. 135. Ibid., p. 103.

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the king from clerical domination so that he may rule as God intended? Perhaps that is reading too much into the text, but Tyndale’s anticlerical tirades could certainly spur into armed rebellion others less averse to using active resistance to liberate the king. Even if Tyndale did not foment active resistance against the authorities, however, the passive disobedience that he explicitly recommends in the case of ungodly commands would seriously compromise the authority of the prince over the Church and jeopardize order in the realm. We have already noted that Tyndale himself broke the laws of the realm and denounced royal policy when he perceived it to be contrary to God’s law. It is important to emphasize that his vision of Christian obedience is wholly consistent with such actions; Christian obedience as understood by Tyndale could legitimate disobedience in a wide array of civil as well as ecclesiastical affairs. Tyndale’s understanding of the importance of orthodoxy places ecclesiastical order in a very precarious position and is at odds with the authority over the institutional affairs of the Church that Henry claimed in the 1530s. In the Obedience, Tyndale argues that because preaching in accord with the word of God alone validates one as a true minister, ‘if the preacher’, regardless of the agency by which he is authorized to preach, ‘preach false: then whosoever’s heart God moveth, to the same it shall be lawful to rebuke and improve the false teacher with the clear and manifest scripture, and that same is no doubt a true prophet sent of God’.35 In Practice, Tyndale grants true Christians acting collectively as the Church even more authority over ecclesiastical affairs. If a minister … err from the word, then may whomsoever God moveth his heart, play Paul, and correct him. If he will not obey the scripture, then have his brethren authority by the scripture to put him down, and to send him out of Christ’s church among the heretics, which prefer their false doctrine above the true word of Christ.36

Clearly Tyndale’s sentiments are a far cry from the understanding of royal power over the appointment, discipline and removal of ministers adopted by Henry as Head of the English Church. In addition to right belief, Tyndale also emphasizes that a Christian life issues in holy living. Orthopraxis manifests itself in two ways – obedience to those to whom God has made one subordinate is crucial, but so also is love of neighbour: ‘[I]f thou canst patiently obey evil rulers in all thing that is not to the dishonour of God: and when thou hurtest not thy neighbours, then art thou sure, that God’s spirit worketh in thee and that thy faith 35

Ibid., p. 136. William Tyndale, The Practice of Prelates, Parker Society Edition, vol. 43, Henry Walter (ed.) (Cambridge, 1849), p. 251. 36

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is no dream nor any false imagination.’37 Love of neighbour manifests itself not only in individual acts of charity, but also in a concern for what can accurately (if anachronistically) be called ‘social justice’ issues. Landlords are instructed not only to treat their tenants compassionately and adjudicate disputes between tenants justly, but also to behave justly themselves in relating to their tenants, particularly in issues involving land rights: Let Christian landlords be content with their rent and old customs not raising the rent or fines and bringing up new customs to oppress their tenants: neither letting two or three tenantries unto one man. Let them not take in their communes neither make parks nor pastures of whole parishes. For God gave the earth to men to inhabit, and not unto sheep and wild deer.38

Similarly, Tyndale says that he and his colleagues preach against more than merely the sorts of evils one would expect to hear opposed in evangelical sermons (the hypocrisy and false doctrine of papists and the more general sins of ‘covetousness, lechery, extortion, usury, simony and … the evil living both of the spirituality as well as the temporality’). They also call for social reform, preaching ‘against enclosings of parks, raising of rent and fines, and of the carrying out of wool out of the realm’.39 Because the will of God requires not only orthodox teaching and belief but also a life lived in accord with charity, it seems that the parallel to opposition to the false preacher would also validate speaking out, as Tyndale himself does, against unjust practices. Furthermore, it also seems that just as a Christian is not to embrace false doctrine simply because the person authorized to preach espouses it, so a person should not support unjust social institutions simply because they are established by the civil authorities. Even if active resistance to royal authority and agents is ruled out, the door is open to a host of socially disruptive acts of disobedience to laws deemed by individual Christians to be incongruous with charity or justice. Consider, for example, enforcement of the laws of the realm by royal agents. We have already noted that Tyndale believes the law of God requires that one refrain from harming others, but he does not mean that one is thereby forbidden from punishing by the authority of the magistrate. At the same time, Tyndale is also clear that royal authorization does not absolve Christians of guilt should they punish persons known to be innocent, even when authorized to do so by the prince. The Obedience advises magistrates that they may not punish godly persons with impunity, even when following the instructions of the clergy who are responsible for

37 38 39

Obedience, p. 54. Ibid., p. 62. Ibid., p. 107.

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distinguishing between the godly and the ungodly. ‘Be learned [in God’s word],’ Tyndale warns princes, … lest the hypocrites [priests] bring the wrath of God upon your heads and compel you to shed innocent blood: as they have compelled your predecessors to slay the prophets, to kill Christ and his Apostles and all the righteous that since were slain. God’s word pertaineth unto all men as it pertaineth unto all servants to know their masters’ will and pleasure.40

It is likely that Tyndale would require subjects to take a similarly relativistic attitude toward inflicting punishments at the command of the king, especially in situations like England in which the king was acting as the hangman of the clergy. This suspicion is confirmed by the manner in which Tyndale limits the punishment of evil-doers that can legitimately be inflicted at the behest of the prince. ‘[A]gainst this law, “Love thy neighbor as thyself,”’ he clarifies, ‘I may obey no worldly power, to do aught at any man’s commandment unto the hurt of my neighbour that hath not deserved it, though he be a Turk.’41 Certainly a subject suffering prosecution for opposing ungodly royal policies ‘hath not deserved’ punishment, and consequently the excuse of following orders would not exonerate subjects acting as agents of the king if they carried out punishments against people condemned for opposing heretical teachings endorsed by the king. Additionally, Tyndale’s attitude toward God’s will and social justice opens the door to any number of civil offences being deemed in accord with God’s will and thus requiring that a Christian not enforce laws of the realm against such offences. Once again, while active rebellion against the Crown is ruled out, the Christian disobedience of royal commands contrary to God’s will that Tyndale demands could seriously compromise the prince’s ability to enforce laws and consequently the peace and order of the realm. The threat that Tyndale’s evangelical vision of the royal supremacy holds for a monarch seeking to rule under its auspices is dramatically heightened by Tyndale’s understanding of the definition of doctrine. Because any command contrary to God’s law is to be disobeyed, and vocally disobeyed, the question of who determines what is contrary to God’s law is crucial for the peace and unity of the realm. The answer that Tyndale provides to this question can hardly be seen as comforting for the ruler. Procurement of the Bible in the vernacular for the English people was the goal of nearly all that Tyndale did, an obsession that reflects his conviction that Christians have the capacity to discern divine truth for themselves if they have access to scripture. He defends this belief at length in the preface to the Obedience 40

Ibid., p. 105. William Tyndale, A Pathway into the Holy Scripture, Parker Society Edition, vol. 42, Henry Walter (ed.) (Cambridge, 1848), p. 26. 41

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on the basis of biblical examples and common sense, arguing, for example, that among diversity of religious opinions which one is correct must be discerned using ‘God’s word which only is true. But how shall I that do when thou wilt not let me see the scripture?’42 Similarly Tyndale asks ‘Why doth Christ command the scripture to be preached unto all creatures, but that it pertaineth unto all men to know them?’43 It is true for rulers as it is for all Christians that when religious views are assessed, one ‘ought to believe nothing without a reason of the scripture and authority of God’s word’.44 Neither elaborate training nor a clerical title is necessary for a person to reach a proper interpretation of scripture. Rather, the teachings of scripture are ‘manifest and open’,45 ‘clear and manifest’,46 and consensus among true Christians is a readily obtainable ideal. What is necessary for a proper understanding of God’s word is a sincere desire for truth and the guidance of the Holy Spirit: ‘For as they [the scriptures] came not by the will of man, so may they not be drawn or expound after the will of man: but as they came by the Holy Ghost, so must they be expounded and understood by the Holy Ghost.’47 Supernatural guidance is especially visible in circumstances in which sound teachers are lacking. In such circumstances, Tyndale promises, ‘if any man thirst for the truth, and read the scripture by himself desiring God to open the door of knowledge unto him, God for his truth’s sake will and must teach him.’48 The subjectivity of interpretation to which such a hermeneutic leaves one open is further reflected in the fact that each individual Christian is identified as endowed with the Spirit and thus as qualified not only to expound the Bible for him or herself in the absence of sound teachers, but also to use scripture to distinguish between sound and unsound teachers. Certainly Tyndale presents himself as a trustworthy and even authoritative guide to the exposition of scripture, yet he does not hesitate to subordinate his own teachings to the individual Christian’s reading of God’s word. Following his recapitulation of the errors perpetrated by Fisher in a sermon against Luther, Tyndale challenges his reader: ‘Whatsoever thou art that readest this, I exhort thee in Christ, to compare his [Fisher’s] sermon and that which I have written and the scripture together and judge.’49 This is a restatement of the power to judge that Tyndale has already granted his readers in the prologue. ‘Prepare thy mind therefore,’ he writes, ‘unto 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

Obedience, p. 20; see pp. 15–25. Ibid., p. 97. Ibid., p. 179. Ibid., p. 96. Ibid., p. 136. Ibid., p. 169. Ibid., pp. 21–2. Ibid., p. 189.

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this little treatise and read it discreetly and judge it indifferently, and when I allege any scripture, look thou on the text, whether I interpret it right.’50 Tyndale follows this exhortation with interpretive guidelines that are elaborated at much more length in the penultimate chapter of the book.51 These efforts to guide individuals’ biblical interpretations seem, however, incapable of reining in the subjectivity that his understanding of the working of God in the lives of Christians has authorized. After all, the primary guide in the interpretation of scripture must be the Holy Spirit, the author of scripture. Consequently, Tyndale should expect readers to follow not only his interpretations, but also his interpretive rules only so far as they feel the prompting of the Spirit calling them to do so. As Stephen Greenblatt points out, in Tyndale’s mind the will of God revealed in scripture is intuitively known by Christians: … a Christian does not need elaborate training to understand God’s word; he seizes upon it, by instinct, for his very survival. Tyndale thus is able to reject the mediation of the Church and its tradition; the individual has sufficient means within his own conscience to grasp the truth of God’s word as revealed in Scripture.52

This interpretive standard leads to especially troubling consequences when one considers obedience to the prince and the order of the realm. Far from unquestioning acquiescence to the royal will in all civil and ecclesiastical affairs, Tyndale’s vision of a kingdom of Christians is one in which each subject is constantly measuring royal policy against the word of God and obeying or disobeying the former in accord with his or her own determinations of God’s will. The ruler of such a realm should not be surprised to find subjects refusing to obey and even speaking out publicly against the laws of the realm. The ruler should also be ready for royally appointed Church officers to be publicly reproved and even excluded from their churches if they fail to satisfy their flocks’ standards of orthodoxy. Outside of the churches, subjects can be expected to disobey and publicly denounce laws of the realm enforcing ‘unjust’ property rights and any royal policies deemed to be calling on subjects to allow harm to befall any person ‘that hath not deserved it’. Efforts to quash such dissent through coercion would only be as effective as the king himself was at convincing his agents that activities contrary to the laws of the realm were not ordained by God’s law. Especially troubling from the perspective of the king must be the open-ended nature of the potential opposition that Tyndale sanctions with his authorization of each individual Christian reading the Bible under 50

Ibid., p. 30. Ibid., pp. 156–80. 52 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago, IL, 1980), p. 99. 51

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the guidance of the Holy Spirit to determine which of the king’s preachers, policies, commands and condemnations are in accord with God’s will as revealed in scripture. Indeed, Tyndale’s hermeneutic ultimately opens the door even to armed rebellion inasmuch as, while Tyndale does not commend uprisings aimed at liberating the king from tyrannical advisers, he does not provide biblical support for this position. That others might find biblical support for the contrary view is clearly a possibility. Worse still, although Tyndale does cite biblical evidence to demonstrate the iniquity of rebellion against the king’s person,53 he would be hard pressed using the interpretive principles he has outlined to dissuade any Christian who felt that the Holy Spirit endorsed a contrary reading of the biblical witness.54 While Tyndale’s vision of royal supremacy erected on a biblical foundation may have played a role in inspiring the architects of Henry’s takeover of the English Church, his understanding of the responsibilities of the Christian subject and of the definition of doctrine place far too much beyond royal authority to secure unity and order in Church and realm. This should not be particularly surprising inasmuch as Tyndale does not bill the Obedience as a defence of royal supremacy but rather as an explication of the obligations of Christians. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that the best-known officially sponsored defence of Henry’s supremacy, Stephen Gardiner’s De Vera Obedientia Oratio [Oration of True Obedience], also left the Henrician Church susceptible to disobedience and disorder. As with Tyndale’s vision of the royal office, so with Gardiner’s, the vulnerability centres on the obligation of subjects to obey God before the king, coupled with an understanding of the definition of doctrine that places the authority to discern God’s will outside of the royal office. Stephen Gardiner Born about 1497, Cambridge-educated as a doctor of both civil and canon law, and Bishop of Winchester (1531–51, 1553–55), Stephen Gardiner spent his career in government service. Although in 1532 he opposed government efforts to undermine the legislative independence of ecclesiastical officials, penning the Southern Convocation’s response to the House of Commons’ ‘Supplication against the Ordinaries’, he eventually reconciled himself to the new order. Gardiner believed that schism did not inevitably lead to heresy, and following the establishment of the royal supremacy over the 53

Obedience, pp. 36–40. Douglas Parker discusses the tension between Tyndale’s authorization of the individual Christian to interpret scripture and his efforts to lead readers to a ‘proper’ interpretation of the Bible: Douglas Parker, ‘Tyndale’s Biblical Hermeneutics’, in John Day, Eric Lund, and Anne O’Donnell (eds), Word, Church, and State: Tyndale Quincentenary Essays (Washington, DC, 1998), pp. 87–101; see also Almasy, ‘Contesting Voices’, p. 2–3. 54

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Church he endeavoured to ensure that the authority of the king was used to defend traditional dogma. Imprisoned during the reign of Edward VI for his opposition to Protestant Edwardian religious policies, he emerged under Mary Tudor to assume the Lord Chancellorship. He played an important role in orchestrating the return of the English Church to the papal fold before his death in 1555. From the perspective of this study Gardiner is noteworthy especially for his 1535 tract in defence of the royal supremacy, De Vera Obedientia Oratio,55 a treatise that ‘struck the key note of Henry’s Reformation’.56 Like Tyndale’s reflections on the office of the king, Gardiner’s vision of the royal supremacy has traditionally been presented as calling on subjects to render unquestioning obedience to the king in all matters. In J.A. Muller’s words, in De Vera Gardiner argues that ‘Scripture sets no limits whatever to a subject’s obedience to his king. If royal commands are contrary to God’s will, it is the king giving them, not the subject obeying them, who will be judged of God.’57 Also as with Tyndale, this absolutist characterization of De Vera has been called into question; consideration of the text reveals why. Consistent with his opposition to Protestant teaching, Gardiner develops in De Vera the concept of obedience in contrast to faith alone.58 He argues that true obedience – obedience rendered to the commandments of God and for God’s sake – is the key to blessedness.59 Faith and obedience are so deeply intertwined according to Gardiner that any effort to separate them is misguided, ‘for faith requires obedience, which is to say that we, acknowledging the will of God in Christ … should through the same Christ our lord both believe in obeying and obey in believing.’60 Christ himself is the ultimate model of obedience to God, making Christians righteous through his obedience that overcame the alienation of humanity from God brought about by Adam’s disobedience. Because of Christ’s submission to God, people can ‘truly be made alive in Christ by virtue of obedience’.61 55 Stephen Gardiner, De Vera Obedientia Oratio, in Pierre Janelle (ed.), Obedience in Church and State: Three Political Tracts by Stephen Gardiner (1930; reprint, New York, 1968) (hereafter ‘De Vera’). 56 Richard Rex, Henry VIII and the English Reformation (New York, 1993), p. 24. 57 J.A. Muller, Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction (1926; reprint, New York, 1970), p. 61. As will be discussed below, Muller is aware that such sentiments do not accord with Gardiner’s mature reflections regarding the obedience owed by Christian subjects to sovereigns. 58 C.D.C. Armstrong, ‘Stephen Gardiner’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, p. 435. 59 De Vera, p. 158. 60 Ibid., p. 74. Translations from the Latin are based loosely on the 1553 translation included in Obedience in Church and State, taking into account Janelle’s corrections of the translation. 61 Ibid., p. 76. See pp. 76–8.

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Gardiner’s focus on obedience dovetails with his defence of royal supremacy through his claim that a Christian is required to obey not only God, but also God’s vicars. Citing biblical texts including Romans 13, 1 Peter 2, and Titus 3, Gardiner affirms that a Christian must obey ‘all those to whom God has commanded one to be obedient for his sake’, including first and foremost the king.62 Gardiner expands royal jurisdiction to include the Church by emphasizing that the realm of England and the Church of England are essentially identical in terms of membership. Consequently, the king, by divine mandate head of the realm, is ipso facto head of both.63 In naming Henry the Head of the English Church, Parliament had not claimed any new power for him, but had merely authorized him to use the title in order ‘to have the power pertaining to a prince by God’s law more clearly expressed.’64 As presented by Gardiner, when God established the king as Head of the Church, this did not merely mean authorizing him to rule over clergy as well as laity in temporal affairs; the responsibilities of a Christian ruler include caring for the souls as well as the bodies of his subjects. Citing historical and biblical testimony and precedent, Gardiner contends that the claim that princes should care for the bodies of Christians and clergy for their souls is a ‘blind distinction full of darkness’.65 Rather, Christian kings and clergy each have a role to play in shepherding souls to heaven – kings using the authority God granted them over temporal matters (including administration of the institutional and financial aspects of the Church and the coercive enforcement of orthodoxy) and clergy using their divinely ordained authority to preach and administer the sacraments. While the breadth of authority over Church and realm claimed for the king in De Vera is sweeping, what we may call the depth of royal power is more limited than Muller acknowledges. Rather than claiming absolute authority for the king, Gardiner ‘was clear that obedience to any requirement contrary to God’s will was not true obedience’.66 Just as any command of a master to his servant contrary to the will of the king is by nature void inasmuch as both master and servant are bound to obey the king, all must obey God before the king ‘that it may appear that we have obeyed all for God’s sake, but none without him, still less in opposition to him’.67 Even when Gardiner states that scripture places no limits on a king’s authority over his subjects, he notes that in thus speaking scripture

62

Ibid., pp. 86–90; quotation at p. 86. Ibid., pp. 92–8, 114. 64 Ibid., pp. 90–92. 65 Ibid., p. 104. 66 Glyn Redworth, In Defence of the Church Catholic: The Life of Stephen Gardiner (Oxford, 1990), p. 67. 67 De Vera, pp. 88–90. 63

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‘has preserved entirely intact the obedience due to God, lest we should heed the word of any mortal against God’.68 Because God’s will circumscribes the obedience due to the king, order in the realm necessitates that a clear standard of God’s will be available. Gardiner claims that such a standard is available, the word of God contained in scripture. Those seeking to distinguish between the teachings of God and of man are admonished to ‘take it as certain that the words of God that are contained in the holy scripture by the declaration of the holy spirit report to us the most certain word of God in order that we may thereby understand and learn his will.’69 De Vera itself exemplifies the principle of biblical primacy, clearly subordinating historical precedent to biblical authority70 and claiming scriptural support for the exclusion of papal jurisdiction from England and the establishment of royal supremacy over the Church.71 Henry, Gardiner claims, has recently shown himself to be subject to scripture inasmuch as ‘the judgment of God’s word … unto which all men ought to be obedient without delay’ dictated that he divorce Catherine.72 As seen in discussing Tyndale’s Obedience, however, identification of scripture as the standard of God’s will does not secure the king against opposition. To this must be joined a hermeneutical criterion ensuring that scripture will not be misinterpreted in a manner derogatory to royal authority or contrary to the laws of the realm. De Vera, however, does not provide such a criterion, and indeed has little to say about the interpretation of scripture at all. Often Gardiner argues as if interpretation is a non-issue because of the inherent clarity of scripture. At least with respect to royal and papal authority, ‘God speaks plainly in the holy scriptures both of the old and of the new testament.’73 On other occasions he acknowledges the necessity of divine aid in providing insight into the true interpretation of scripture,74 but he does not follow up on this line of thought nor consider ways in which the prompting of the Holy Spirit can be distinguished from false insights.75

68

Ibid., p. 98. Ibid., p. 82. 70 Gardiner emphasizes the subordination of historical precedent to biblical authority when discussing papal authority, and he acknowledges it when citing historical precedents in support of the royal supremacy. See ibid., pp. 112, 116, 126–8. 71 Regarding the exclusion of papal authority, see ibid., pp. 124–36. 72 Ibid., p. 86. 73 Ibid., p. 106. 74 Ibid., pp. 70–72. 75 Janelle speculates that Gardiner does not address the issue because ‘Catholic tradition seemed to him so clear and evident as to need no definition’: Obedience in Church and State, p. lxiii. 69

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From the perspective of order in the English Church, the obvious problem with appealing to the supposedly clear teachings of scripture to justify and limit the royal supremacy is that people of widely divergent religious opinions were all convinced that scripture clearly taught the doctrines they espoused. Similarly, appeal to divine guidance as an interpretive standard is of little objective value in light of the fact that people of widely divergent opinions were convinced that they were led to their different beliefs by God’s Spirit, a fact of which Gardiner was certainly aware as a result of his role in heresy trials such as that of John Frith in 1533.76 In addition, opposition to the Crown based on prior obedience to God is implicitly validated by Gardiner’s appeal to scriptural example to justify royal supremacy over the Church. Having cited the authority of Old Testament kings over the religious affairs of the ancient Israelites, Gardiner asserts that in contrast to human beings and their teachings: God is constant … In God’s matters that is always true which one example has shown to be true, so as to prove the supreme power and authority of princes the example of Hezakias alone which is registered in God’s book and commended to us might have sufficed.77

Unfortunately for the order of the realm, scripture could also provide examples of all manner of socially disruptive behaviour by godly subjects, including disobedience and public condemnation of laws and rulers considered impious. A consideration of Gardiner’s career points to the conclusion that he is sincere in his declarations limiting obedience to the king by obedience to God. In 1532, the lower house of Parliament produced the ‘Supplication against the Ordinaries’, a document that included an attack on the independent legislative power of the English clergy. Gardiner incurred the displeasure of his sovereign when he penned the response of the Southern Convocation to the ‘Supplication’, defending the liberty of the Church. Glyn Redworth has cogently argued that far from being a case of Gardiner misreading the royal will, the situation was rather that he was standing in defence of what he believed to be God’s will in defiance of his prince. As evidence Redworth points to ‘Winchester’s firmness and persistence. He refused to drop his opposition even after it was clear for all to see where Henry’s sympathies lay.’78 Consideration of what finally did induce Gardiner to acquiesce to the ‘Supplication’ also sheds light on his understanding of who has authority to define doctrine. His willingness to oppose Henry over this matter 76

Muller, Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction, pp. 52–3. De Vera, p. 130. 78 Redworth, In Defence of the Church Catholic, p. 36. See also Muller, Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction, pp. 47–8. 77

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demonstrates that he does not recognize the Crown (solus or in Parliament) as the highest interpreter of God’s will. Regarding whom Gardiner does understand to be so authorized, his response to the ‘Supplication’ protests that the English clergy ‘take our authority of making of laws to be grounded upon the Scripture of God and the determination of Holy Church, which must also be a rule … to try the justice and righteousness of all laws, as well spiritual as temporal;’79 consequently, this authority could not be revoked by any authority save the Church. What Gardiner means by ‘the Church’ is clarified by the fact that when Convocation (with Gardiner absent) accepted to the demands of the Supplication, Gardiner quickly submitted himself to the new order. Commenting on this episode, Redworth elucidates Gardiner’s conception of the authority of the Church to define doctrine by contrasting it with More’s. While More looked to the universal Church to define the essentials of the faith, for Gardiner: … vague notions of Christendom carried no weight: [as an envoy to the pope] he had seen with his very eyes the degradation into which the papacy had fallen, and his already extensive knowledge of renaissance diplomacy assured him that there was no fraternal bond among the Christian princes of Europe. Christendom in any papal or unitary sense was a faint abstraction. Since it could not command it could not be obeyed. The Church in England, however, was a different matter. It was the congregation of all the faithful which he saw around him and which he had vowed to serve. If the English Church’s view of what could be surrendered to the Crown differed from his, then he must accept that his view of divine law was in error. At the very least his conscience was discharged.80

By the mid-1540s, Gardiner seems to have rethought his views on the locus of authority to which Christians should turn for the definition of doctrine. In his 1546 tract, A Declaration Of Svch true articles as George Ioye hath gone about to confute as false, Gardiner still refers to ‘the church’ as the standard of orthodoxy, but he identifies the voice of the Church as the consensus of the Church fathers. Because of the difficulty and obscurity of scripture, he now argues, individual Christians should not trust their own fallible interpretations but rather should seek guidance to understand the Bible. True guidance is to be found in the consensus of the fathers and the traditions of the Church in which God has always preserved the true understanding of scripture. Although he concedes that the fathers individually are fallible and thus must be employed with some caution, 79 Henry Gee and William Hardy (eds), Documents Illustrative of English Church History (London, 1921), p. 157. 80 Redworth, In Defence of the Church Catholic, p. 43; see Rex Pogson, ‘God’s Law and Man’s: Stephen Gardiner and the Problem of Loyalty’, in Claire Cross, David Loades and J.J. Scarisbrick (eds) Law and Government under the Tudors: Essays Presented to Sir Geoffrey Elton, Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge, on the Occasion of his Retirement (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 71–2.

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Gardiner nevertheless affirms that they were specially guided by the Holy Spirit and thus ‘their consonaunce and agrement togither in the matter of doctrine where they agre, may leade vs to considre the more certaynly the truth in scripture.’81 Following Henry’s death in 1547, during the reign of Edward VI, the English Church moved in a decidedly Protestant direction, and Gardiner’s conservative religious convictions came to be out of step with official policy. In this context, he struggled to define for himself the essentials of the faith and to clarify the line between obedience to God and obedience to the sovereign. Much can be learned about his understanding of the obedience due to the civil authorities as well as his beliefs regarding the definition of doctrine from a consideration of his response to Edwardian religious policies. In defending the late Henrician religious settlement (elaborated in the King’s Book, propagation of doctrine contrary to which Parliament forbade in 1543), Gardiner appeals to the sovereignty of statute. ‘And thus I have hard the lerned men of the Commen Law say,’ he writes to the Privy Council in 1547, ‘that if any, althogh he be deputed by the King, do, in execution of spirituall jurisdiction, extend the same contrary to any Commen Law or act of Parliament, it is a premunire both to the judge and the parties, althogh it be done in the Kings Majesties name.’82 It would be a mistake, however, to infer from such appeals that Gardiner believes that parliamentary endorsement renders a belief binding on the Christian conscience. Rather, it seems that Gardiner appeals to statute in mid-1547 because at that time statute was nearer what he considers pure Christian truth than the innovations of the Edwardian reformers. In defending the King’s Book Gardiner certainly does not limit himself to legal arguments. He emphasizes that the King’s Book is valid not only because sanctioned by Parliament, but primarily because its teachings are in accord with Christian truth as expressed in the Bible. Writing to Cranmer in 1547, Gardiner expresses incredulity at a statement by Cranmer that Henry was ‘seduced’ into accepting the King’s Book. He reminds Cranmer that they had both accepted the King’s Book while Henry was alive, ‘Al which I thinke your Grace wold not have doon, if ye had not thought the booke to have conteyned truth.’ Had Cranmer believed the book false, ‘I ought to 81 Stephen Gardiner, A Declaration of svch true articles as George Ioye hath gone about to confute as false (London, 1546), pp. 22v–23, 43v–46v; quotation at p. 45v. See Muller, Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction, pp. 129–30. 82 J.A. Muller (ed.), The Letters of Stephen Gardiner (1933; reprint, Westport, CT, 1970), p. 370 (hereafter ‘Letters’). The sovereignty of statute is a recurring theme in Gardiner’s appeals against the Homilies in 1547, Letters, pp. 361–400. See Redworth, In Defence of the Church Catholic, pp. 260–61; Muller, Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction, pp. 162–4; Franklin Le van Baumer, The Early Tudor Theory of Kingship (1940; reprint, New York, 1966), pp. 188–9.

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thinke your Grace wold not, for al the princes christened, being soo high a bishop as ye be, have yelded unto [it], for obedire oportet Deo magis quam hominibus [one ought to obey God before human authority].’83 Gardiner appeals not only to the principle of obedience to God before the civil authorities, but also to a Christian’s, or at least a bishop’s, responsibility to warn rulers pursuing ungodly policies: And as often as your Grace shall say he [Henry] was seduced, you shall more touch your selfe then him, in that ye told hym not so in his life; to the intent he might have rather followed the trewth, then in religion, with the danger of his own soul and the souls of others, to suffer hym to be seduced.84

Gardiner himself certainly was loath to see the authorities seduced into what he believed to be false doctrine, and his efforts to keep them from being misled illustrate clearly his reliance on scripture as interpreted by the fathers as the standard of Christian truth. In another letter to Cranmer from 1547, Gardiner expounds scripture at length in an effort to demonstrate the congruity of the teachings of the King’s Book on justification with Christian truth.85 Writing to the Privy Council in opposition to a government-sponsored homily teaching that the doctrine of justification by faith alone is an essential point of Christian orthodoxy, he argues that the homily not only disregards the laws of the realm and implicitly condemns Henry of heresy, but also contravenes the teachings of scripture.86 Gardiner then continues, supplementing appeals to the public approbation of the King’s Book and scriptural exegesis with patristic testimony, in an effort to demonstrate that those who oppose solafideism ‘the lawes of God mainteyne, and the lawes of the realme also’, and he notes that while the latter are subject to the will of the authorities, the former ‘of his nature is immutable’.87 Gardiner even expresses a willingness to contravene the laws of the realm and join Cranmer in teaching contrary to statute if the archbishop can provide patristic evidence to warrant his views. Writing to Lord Protector Somerset regarding the Book of Homilies, Gardiner notes that the homily on salvation ‘teacheth the clere contrarye to the doctrine established by thacte of Parliament.’ Nevertheless, he avers that in a conference with Cranmer, ‘I made this offer, to yeld them for that homilie [the ‘homilie of salvation’], if they coulde thenne tel me of oon old wryter that teachith as thomilie doth.’88

83

Letters, p. 300. Ibid., p. 301. 85 Ibid., pp. 339 ff. 86 Ibid., pp. 362–3. 87 Ibid., pp. 362–5; quotations at p. 365. 88 Ibid., pp. 382, 397. On Gardiner’s prioritization of divine law over human law during Edward’s reign see Pogson, ‘God’s Law and Man’s’, pp. 75–81, 87. 84

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As the Edwardian reformers revolutionized the English Church by means of statute beginning in late 1547 with the repeal of the Act authorizing the King’s Book, Gardiner’s response confirms that he did not believe absolute obedience to Crown or Parliament to be a divine mandate. As a prisoner in the Tower in 1549, when offered the possibility of royal clemency if he would promise conformity to the Prayer Book recently endorsed by Parliament, Gardiner refused to promise compliance: ‘Since it was the law of the land, he would, he said, honour it like an obedient subject, or willingly suffer punishment.’89 When enjoined by the Council in 1550 to subscribe a set of religious articles without what he considered due opportunity to review them, Gardiner again proved unwilling, protesting that ‘if a king command that which is contrary to the commandment of God, the subject may not do as he is commanded, but humbly suffer; which is my case, who could not with my conscience do as I was required.’90 Given statements of this type, it is not surprising that both of Gardiner’s foremost modern biographers express confidence that had he ever been required to endorse a law directly contravening a doctrine he felt was essential, Gardiner would have defied the laws of the realm.91 Indeed, Lord Protector Somerset probably was not speaking entirely ironically if in early 1549 he truly did respond to men suing for Gardiner’s release from prison that ‘it was for their master’s interest to be kept in the Tower, for he would, if released, surely disagree with certain laws recently passed in Parliament and thereby get himself into trouble!’92 Whatever respect he had for the determinations of civil authorities, Gardiner did not believe them to be the ultimate standard of orthodoxy or worthy of absolute obedience. As was the case with Tyndale, Gardiner’s belief that obedience is due to God before any mortal, coupled with his refusal to recognize the Crown (solus or in Parliament) as authorized to define doctrine, is the Achilles’ heel of his efforts to ensure acquiescence to royal policy in the English Church. No more than Tyndale can Gardiner defend absolute obedience to the prince: For Gardiner, as well as the reformers, recognized a law in matters of religion ultimately superior to the law of the land. This they both called ‘God’s law,’ but by it they meant different things. With the reformers it was Scripture interpreted by the enlightened individual; with Gardiner it was Catholic tradition.93

The vision of royal supremacy over the Church presented in De Vera and reflected in Gardiner’s life leaves obedience and order in jeopardy by 89 90 91 92 93

Muller, Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction, p. 184; see also p. 189. Ibid., p. 193. Ibid., p. 298; Redworth, In Defence of the Church Catholic, pp. 260, 266–7, 288–9. Muller, Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction, p. 183. Ibid., p. 298.

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justifying resistance on the part of those whose understandings of Christian orthodoxy are irreconcilable with English law. Before considering St German’s work, it will be helpful to examine another commissioned defence of the royal supremacy, this one by the humanist Thomas Starkey. Although written after most of St German’s published works, Starkey’s defence is in a sense an ideologically transitional work between Tyndale and Gardiner on one hand and St German on the other. Starkey’s defence reflects an awareness of the problems to which the definition of doctrine can give rise and an effort to address these problems, but one that ultimately comes up short from the perspective of ensuring obedience to the Crown and order in the English Church. Thomas Starkey Born about 1498, Starkey was Oxford educated and spent ten years between 1523 and 1534 on the Continent, primarily in Italy and often in the company of the king’s cousin Reginald Pole, studying in preparation for a career in the royal service. Returning to England in 1534, Starkey soon fulfilled his ambition of attaching himself to the royal court. He was employed by Thomas Cromwell, primarily as a gatherer of intelligence from Italy and a liaison between the government and Pole. A loss of royal favour that befell Starkey in 1536, largely as a result of Pole’s literary attack on Henry, proved temporary, but his loss of Cromwell’s confidence was more enduring. By 1537, Starkey’s career was at a virtual standstill. Frustration over the failure of his political ambitions was exacerbated by growing disillusionment regarding the commitment of the Henrician government to social and political reforms that had been high on Starkey’s agenda for some time. Despite a handful of royal appointments, in 1537 and 1538 he drifted toward opposition. He died of natural causes in 1538, thereby narrowly escaping potential indictment on charges of treason.94 Today Starkey is best known for his ‘Dialogue between Pole and Lupset’, a work calling for a thoroughgoing reform of England’s social and political institutions, probably completed in the early 1530s but not published during his lifetime. In this work, he outlines his vision of an oligarchic English state under the leadership of a king (ideally an elected king) whose power is curtailed by councils comprised of nobles. Starkey believes the nobility to be by nature fit and destined to rule England, but he acknowledges that the current nobility are badly in need of education and training to equip them to fulfil this calling. The work was intended for an 94 Currently the definitive study of Starkey’s life and thought is Thomas Mayer, Thomas Starkey and the Commonweal: Humanist Politics and Religion in the Reign of Henry VIII (Cambridge, 1989).

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aristocratic audience, in particular Pole, whom Starkey hoped to induce to take up a central position in the reformed English state.95 This discussion will focus on Starkey’s less famous published work, An Exhortation to the people, instructynge theym to Unitie and Obedience (1536). Rather than a call for reform, the Exhortation is an effort to ensure the quietude of the English state and Church by inducing subjects to obey the civil authorities. Rather than being addressed to the elites of the nation, the intended audience of the Exhortation is identified as the ‘simple’ and ‘unlearned’ English masses. Despite his later drift into opposition, Starkey’s Exhortation is in no way inferior to the tracts of Tyndale and Gardiner in its vehemence that subjects are obliged to obey their king as Head of the Church. In fact, Starkey excels the polemicists considered so far in the degree to which he seeks to safeguard the prince against opposition founded on obedience to God before the king. Like Tyndale and Gardiner, Starkey acknowledges that any command of the king contrary to the essentials of Christian orthodoxy or orthopraxis must be disobeyed by subjects and identifies scripture as the highest standard of Christian truth, but in contrast to them Starkey takes measures to ensure that the essentials of the faith are not defined in a manner that might justify opposition. Whereas Tyndale’s Obedience authorizes the scripture-reading Christian individual to determine the essentials of the faith, and De Vera, apart from its consideration of whether papal primacy is obligatory, essentially leaves the issue of biblical interpretation unaddressed, Starkey’s Exhortation presents a clear vision of the foundational teachings of Christianity outlined in the Bible and thus seeks to place strict limits on the circumstances that could validate disobedience of the prince by Christian subjects. The heart of Starkey’s effort to empower the king over ecclesiastical affairs is a strict limiting of the essentials of the faith. The content of the gospel indispensable for salvation Starkey repeatedly asserts to be minimal. Orthodoxy has been definitively and exhaustively defined by the Council of Nicaea at which ‘the summe of our feythe, conteynynge suche poyntis as be necessary to euery mannes saluation, was reduced vnto certayne artycles, and so propowned … in the common Crede to all chrysten nations, as a thynge sufficient to be had in hart and mynde of all men, without ferther enserche or inquisition.’96 With the essentials of 95 The Dialogue is available in a modern edition: Thomas Starkey, A Dialogue between Pole and Lupset, T.F. Mayer (ed.), (London, 1989). 96 Thomas Starkey, An Exhortation to the people, instructynge theym to Unitie and Obedience (1536; reprint, New York, 1973), sig. B3v (hereafter, ‘Exhortation’). The Exhortation will be cited by signature; the pages are numbered, but the sequence is occasionally erroneous and in some places hopelessly muddled. In providing his own lists of things essential to the faith Starkey avoids controversial points. A typical list of essentials includes only Nicene Christology (‘Christ to discende from the bosome of his father, to

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Christian orthodoxy limited to acceptance of the Nicene Creed, Starkey identifies all other aspects of Christian practice and belief as adiaphora, things indifferent, that are not in themselves necessary either to affirm or to repudiate in order to find salvation. Explicitly identified as adiaphora are most points in dispute among English Christians including papal primacy, monasticism, pilgrimages, veneration of images, praying to the saints, prayers for the dead, fasting, the observance of holy days, and belief in purgatory.97 As Starkey summarizes: … rytes, customes of the churche, & traditions, ecclesiastical lawes and decrees, & brefely al thynges besyde the gospel and doctrine of god receiued among christen nations … be not of necessite to be receyuyd, and as the gospell necessary to our saluation, nor to them of necessitie we are euer bounden, vnder peyne of damnation, but as tyme and place requyreth by common authorytie, in euery countrey and dyuers polycie, they maye suffre abrogation, and maye be altered and moued by the pleasure and common consent of the holle, in euery churche & nation, where they be receyued.98

Some adiaphorists limited things essential for salvation in order to promote freedom of the individual conscience and the autonomy of mature Christians.99 Starkey, however, puts his adiaphoristic ideas to a very different use. Regarding the vast realm of adiaphora Starkey emphasizes two points. First, beliefs and practices are not to be despised simply because they are not among the essentials of the faith. The true life

be made man for mannes redemption’), recognition of some sort of presence of Christ in the sacraments (‘the mysteries of Christe by his sacramentes to faythfull myndes to be communed’), and acknowledgement of an essential role for faith in salvation (‘fayth and truste in hym [Christ] and in his promyses to be sufficient for mannes saluation, the workis of man ciuile without faythe, not to be of power to serue to mans iustifycation’): Exhortation, sig. L3–L3v. Starkey’s understanding of the relationship between faith, works and salvation is not as sola fideist as the last passage may suggest; as Starkey later clarifies, the faith in Christ that brings people to salvation is ‘the faithefull loue, that we muste beare to that heed [Christ], euer obedyente to walke in outwarde workes, accordynge to his commaundement, whiche with loue we must do’: Exhortation, sig. Q1; see also K4v. Rightly applied, faith alone really means faith active in love, and this certainly does lead to salvation, but ultimately ‘it is nother our fayth, be it neuer so great, nor yet our workes, be they neuer soo many, that can deserue our saluation, it is the mere goodnes and mercy of god, which shalbe our saluation’: Exhortation, sig. Y2. By formulating his understanding of the relationship between faith, works and salvation alternately in ways that would appeal to evangelicals and in ways that would appeal to conservatives, Starkey suggests that the differences between these groups are merely semantic and that all Christians hold to the same basic soteriology: that salvation is conveyed by God’s grace to Christians who receive that grace by means of a living faith that expresses itself through love. 97 Exhortation, sig. U1–Y1. 98 Ibid., sig. U1. 99 Bernard Verkamp, The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 1554 (Athens, OH, 1977), pp. 38–40.

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of a Christian is inward, hidden and spiritual,100 but this does not mean that outward circumstances are unrelated to a true Christian life. Charity is an inward matter, a matter of the will that ultimately God alone can judge, yet in most circumstances a truly charitable will in fact issues in outward works of love.101 Similarly, while acceptance of the faith is an inward thing, people are so constituted that outward actions are natural expressions of faith and outward things can be very useful in facilitating faith. Many people, Starkey reminds those who would do away with all ceremonies, are such that ‘withoute somme exterior and outwarde sygnes and ceremonies, their simplicitie coulde neuer be lad to true religion, nor of god to conceyue the diuinitie.’102 Consequently, … this is a certayn and sure truth, that ceremonies we muste haue, rytes and customes, all maye not be lefte, the whiche be so conuenient menes to induce rude & symple myndes, to memory, & to the conceyuyng of the mysteries of oure relygion, that if they were vtterly wyped away, vndoubtedly it shulde not be longe, before ye shulde se, of very religion the vtter ruine and decaye … Wherfore all ceremonyes, & al other thynges besyde that, whiche in the gospell is expressed, vtterly to condemne as pernicious to Christis religion, is flatte foly, folyshe arrogancy, & a plain pestilent opinion.103

While no particular outward forms of religion (with the exception of the sacraments) are essential to the faith, it is necessary to have some outward aspects of religious life. The question then is, how should it be determined which outward forms are employed in each church? This brings us to Starkey’s second point regarding adiaphora: indifferent beliefs and practices are to be regulated by the government authorities in each Christian nation. Starkey adopts the traditional threefold distinction between ‘thynges worldly & politike, and thinges whiche hange of the necessite of nature, and of the scripture and gospell of god’,104 that is to say, between things ordered by human, natural and divine law. Things indifferent are, by definition, not ordered by natural or divine law, and Starkey draws the logical conclusion that such matters must therefore be counted among ‘thynges worldly & politike’ and be regulated by human laws. ‘[C]eremonies in the church, customs & rites ecclesiastical,’ and all aspects of religious life … besyde the groundes of the Scrypture, are eyther by common counsaylle decreyd, concernynge thynges indifferente, orels by longe custome receyuyd by common assent: ye and all suche thynges as be of our forfathers by tradition taken, al suche I say to be in the power of princis, & of them whiche in euery 100 101 102 103 104

Exhortation, sig. E3v. Ibid., sig. Y1, Y2v. Ibid., sig. G4–G4v. Ibid., sig. U1–U1v. Ibid., sig. F3.

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countrey or nation, be in hie authoritie, to alter, refourme, and abrogate, when time and place gyueth occasion, and the nature of the thinges require the same.105

In England, those in ‘hie authoritie’ are the king in Parliament, the formulators of all human laws, and the natural locus of authority to delineate rules for the community regarding matters of religious adiaphora. The obvious alternative to empowering the civil authorities to regulate adiaphora is to allow each Christian to accept or reject indifferent practices on an individual basis, but this approach is anathema to Starkey because it cuts out the very heart of Christian living. In addition to the essentials of Christian doctrine noted above, Starkey also acknowledges one essential element of Christian orthopraxis, the exercise of charity. The primary manner in which Christians express charity is through the establishment and maintenance of unity within a community. Starkey opens his Exhortation (following a preface dedicated to the king and an introduction to the reader) with a consideration of the ‘felicity’ for which human beings are created. The attainment of such eternal happiness rests, Starkey declares, … in faythfull loue and charitable vnitie. This testifieth our master him selfe, in his gospel by his own worde, commaundynge vs aboue al other thing in this charitable vnitie, to be coupled and knytte togither, none otherwyse than he is with the eternall father in diuinitie. To the which agreeth all the processe of the doctrine of Paule, the trew interpretour of the mynde of Christe, who euer exhorteth vs, as we be membres of one body coupled to our heed Christe, so with faythful loue of him to lyue to gether in this charitable vnitie, which is the ende as he saith of al preceptes and lawes, as the thynge wherin standeth the perfection of a christen mynde.106

Re-emphasizing his point Starkey asks, ‘how may they receyue the lyght of the spirite, whiche be in spirite so diuided? vndoubtedly by no mene: for there Christ doth not reigne no more than light in darknes doth shyne, where as is nother concorde peace nor vnitie, wherein is grounded al christen policie.’107 Unity among Christians is key to the exercise of charity; uniformity in matters of religion is essential for unity. Certainly the unity of heart that Christ requires of believers is an internal, spiritual matter that could, in theory, survive among diversity of practice. In fact, however, human nature is such that uniformity in outward practice is indispensable for the promotion and conservation of spiritual unity.108 Speaking of the two 105

Ibid., sig. T1–T1v. Ibid., sig. C4v. 107 Ibid., sig. D2v. 108 Christian unity requires only uniformity in matters indifferent within each nation. International Christian unity could be preserved merely by agreement in the essentials of 106

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aspects of human life, the one ‘heuenly spirituall and godly, the other ciuile, natural, and worldely’,109 Starkey uses the essential connection between them to highlight the need for uniformity within Christian nations: [T]houghe these .ii. lyues of their owne nature be distincte and dyuers … yet in vs christen men, they in one must perfitly agree, they must consent, and in the perfyte couplynge therof resteth the conseruation of this spirituall vnitie, the whiche of necessitie dothe require in common policie a certayn consent and sure agrement.110

Uniformity in matters of adiaphora, or ‘polyticall’ unity, is maintained through obedience to the civil authorities in all matters of adiaphora; indeed it is ‘nothing els but a concorde, agrement and a consent of all them whiche be in one polyce, to the receyuynge and puttynge in vse suche lawes, constitutions, and ordynances, as by polityke wyttes are deuysed’.111 When all within a realm conserve the essentials of the faith and in all other matters obey the civil authorities, Starkey cannot conceive how animosity could arise between Christian subjects:112 [I]f we forme our consciences with the knowledge of thynges, indifferently weyinge them as they be in their owne nature, puttynge discrete difference betwyxt such thynges as be of necessite, and suche as hange in worldly polycye, euer beinge obedient to al suche thynges as be ordeyned by common counsell and authorite, whereas they euidentely repugne not to the groundes of scripture and thinges of necessitie to our saluation … we shal vndowtydly auoyde all suche diuision as latelye by corrupt iudgement was entrynge amonge vs, & by loue and charitie coupled together, we shal amonge our selfes both restore and conserue this heuenly vnite, the very trewe foundatin o & grounde of Christis religion, and of all good and iust polycie.113

Not only is unity necessary for eternal salvation, it is also crucial for the worldly well-being of communities and their members: ‘For as moche as all good polycye is euer grounded vppon concorde and vnite, vpon the whiche as vpon the sure and onely durable foundation, all politike order is edified, al ciuile constitutions be ordeyned and stablyshed.’114 Thus the ‘heuenly vnite’ that ideally joins Christians is ‘the very trewe foundatin … & grounde’ both ‘of Christis religion, and of all good and iust polycie’.115 the faith and recognition that in matters of adiaphora realms can legitimately differ. Indeed, contrary to papal pretensions, such differences are necessary for the Church in each realm to function well because different orderings of adiaphora are appropriate to people of different temperaments and in different circumstances: ibid., sig. S2v–S3v. 109 Ibid., sig. K3v. 110 Ibid., sig. L1–L1v. 111 Ibid., sig. R4v. 112 Ibid., sig. Y4v. 113 Ibid., sig. Z2v–Z3. 114 Ibid., sig. H4–H4v. 115 Ibid., sig. Z2v–Z3.

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Citing the example of the German Peasants’ Rebellion, in which ‘for lacke of prudente respecte to the conseruation of this vnitie, manyfestly hath succeded ruine of the common polycie and wonderfull confusion’, Starkey calls on English subjects to take appropriate measures so that ‘we maye therby the better, auoydynge the dissolution of the vnitie spiritual, without al confusion of policie annexed therto, as membres of one body knytte to one heed, here in this lyfe inioye common quietnes, and hereafter eternal felicite’.116 The indispensability of spiritual unity and its precondition political unity, founded on correct discernment of the essentials of the faith and obedience to the prince in all matters of adiaphora, evokes from Starkey lamentations that upon his recent return to England he found a nation of Christians divided from each other and from their king under the influence of two misguided attempts at religious living: The first I may call a superstitious blindnes, the whiche by longe processe of time, is roted in our stomakes vnder the pretence of religion: The seconde me semeth may wel be called an arrogant blyndnes, whiche lately is growen in here among vs, by lyghtnes of iugement, contrary to all religious opinyon, and Christen ciuylitie.117

The victims of the former falsely believe that things indifferent, for example, papal primacy, are essential to the faith and consequently defy laws of the realm enacted to amend indifferent aspects of the Church as circumstances require.118 Even worse are the arrogant who judge some or all indifferent things to be so antithetical to the Christian faith that their removal from the Church is essential; as a result, these refuse to obey laws mandating indifferent practices that would, if well applied, enhance the religious lives of English Christians.119 The existence of either group within a Christian nation compromises obedience to the king and with it the exercise of charity. When both are afoot, mutual enmity replaces mutual love rendering the living of a truly Christian life nearly impossible.120 Those who arrogantly or superstitiously refuse to conform to the royally mandated standards of orthodoxy and orthopraxis in matters of adiaphora not only oppose God’s will indirectly by undermining the unity of the Church, they also act contrary to the example of Christ himself and to the direct commands of God. Christ is exemplary in his obedience to the civil authorities in matters of adiaphora,121 and, Starkey chastises his readers, ‘by the lawe of god, ye are straytely bounden’ to obey ‘all 116 117 118 119 120 121

Ibid., sig. H4v, K2. Ibid., sig. E2. Ibid., sig. E4v–F3. Ibid., sig. F3v–G1. Ibid., sig. G3v. Ibid., sig. N3v.

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suche thynges as by common authoritie eyther are or shall be receyued’.122 Indeed, first among the bitter fruits of superstition and arrogance in England that Starkey lists is ‘disobedience to the princely authorite, to the whiche by goddis lawe straytely all trewe subiectes are bounden’.123 The deaths of Fisher and More, although lamentable, are entirely just from whatever perspective they are considered because these men allowed blind superstition to lead them to ‘disobedience to princely authoritie, and to lawes authorysed by common counselle and good policie, to the obedience wherof, we are bounden by the lawes of god and nature, so long as they stande in full strength and power, with no repugnancy vnto the same’.124 Indeed, the importance of unity and its sine qua non obedience to the civil authorities leads Starkey to argue that subjects are bound to obey even pernicious laws as long as those laws do not command actions directly contrary to the fundamental laws of God or nature. Christ himself instructed his disciples to obey all laws not directly contrary to his teachings ‘though hit [the law] were contrarye to their owne priuate profytte, plesure, and quietnes, ye or contrary to a worldly rightwisenes’.125 Subjects are called to obey, not assess, laws, and thus as long as they do not contravene the essentials of the faith, even civil laws that ‘to your iugementes appere euyll, and contrary to good polycie’, ought to be obeyed because ‘by pacience and meke obedience, you shall tourne the same thinges to your own good and inward felicite.’126 On account of the importance of unity in a Christian community and the importance of obedience to the civil authorities to maintain unity, Christians are bound not only by civil penalties, but also ‘vnder peine of damnation’127 to obey all laws of the realm ordering religious as well as secular affairs: ‘For to the obedience of princis and all other commen orders and politike we are bounde, after they be ones receyued, by goddis owne worde and commaundement. And suche thinges as by their own nature be indifferent, are made therby to our saluation necessary.’128 Statements of this type must not, however, be read as calls for absolute obedience to the civil authorities. W.G. Zeeveld asserts that for Starkey, ‘The voice of parliament had become the voice of God’,129 a claim that can be misleading if taken in the wrong sense. Starkey does invest the Crown in Parliament with the authority to render laws that are to be obeyed 122

Ibid., sig. T2. Ibid., sig. G2–G2v. 124 Ibid., sig. E2v. 125 Ibid., sig. B3. 126 Ibid., sig. T2. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid., sig. B4v. Regarding this aspect of Starkey’s thought, see Verkamp, The Indifferent Mean, pp. 41–2, 50–51, 171. 129 W.G. Zeeveld, Foundations of Tudor Policy (Cambridge, MA, 1948), p. 155. 123

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unconditionally, but they are authorized to exercise this authority only over those aspects of life that are not regulated by natural or divine law. This is certainly a very broad field in Starkey’s mind, but a limited field none the less. While vast tracts of civil and religious life are not regulated by natural or divine law and are thus subject to the will of the civil authorities, Starkey never lets his readers forget that human laws addressing matters already commanded or prohibited by God are to be obeyed only to the extent that they are consistent with the divine will. The most forceful statement that Starkey makes calling for obedience to the civil authorities appears near the end of the Exhortation: And euer haue you this in mind, that to all such thynge as is decreed by common counsell and authoritie here in our nation, you that be vnlerned and ignorant, not hauyng your conscience formed with lyght and knowlege, you I saye are bounden by the lawe of god therto of hart to gyue obedience, the which shall be to you euer a iust defence, wherby you shall auoyde all blame and damnable reprofe, bothe before man here in polycie, and before god hereafter whan you shall comme to counte before his maiestie.130

Taken in isolation this passage seems to call for royal absolutism and unquestioning obedience according to which it is the king commanding, not the subject obeying, who is responsible for breaches of natural or divine law committed by subjects in obedience to the prince. Placed in its context, however, the power claimed for the civil authorities by this passage, while extensive, is not absolute. First, the law that Starkey is here calling for subjects to obey without scruple or question is the establishment of the prince as Supreme Head of the English Church and the concomitant rejection of papal authority in England.131 Thus the issue on which subjects are being told to unquestioningly obey the civil authorities is a matter that Starkey has spent dozens of pages demonstrating is not among the essentials of the faith.132 That his call for unquestioning obedience applies only to matters, such as papal primacy, that are indifferent Starkey then demonstrates in the statement that immediately follows the above quotation. Obedience, not assessment, of the law establishing the royal supremacy is appropriate, Starkey argues, ‘For you that be vnlerned ar not bounden to serche with curiositie the controuersie of lawes, but euer in all suche as be not playne and euydently contrarye to goddis commaundemente, you are bounden to conferre your iugementes to theirs, whiche be in authoritie, and beare rule in common polycie.’ Consequently, the best way to end division in England over papal supremacy is by ‘puttynge discrete difference betwyxt such thynges as be of necessite, and suche as hange in worldly polycye, euer beinge obedient to al suche thynges as be ordeyned by common counsell 130 131 132

Exhortation, sig. Z2–Z2v. Ibid., sig. Z1–Z2. Primarily, ibid., sig. L4v–S4v.

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and authorite, where as they euidentely repugne not to the groundes of scripture and thinges of necessitie to our saluation’.133 Statements relativizing the authority of the prince are not the exception, but rather form a consistent theme throughout the Exhortation. In outlining the order of obedience that Christian subjects owe, Starkey begins: And first this is sure, that in all kynde of polycies among christen nations, the worde of god must be of chiefe authoritie, that muste haue therin the firste place and preeminence. Wherfore if any thynge be decreed contrary to that, by any worldly policie, it must be vtterly abrogate and boldely disobeyed with al constancy.134

This condition that human laws are to be obeyed only so long as they are ‘to goddis worde nothynge contrarye’,135 is often recalled by Starkey, forming an unflagging, if subdued, counterpoint to his mantra of absolute obedience to the civil authorities in all matters indifferent. Given his dedication to obedience to God before king, it seems that Starkey’s exoneration of subjects acting in accord with the laws of the realm is not intended to remove the responsibility to obey the law of God before human laws. Rather, it must be intended to exonerate subjects of any guilt they might be thought to incur through obeying laws of the realm that, while not directly contrary to God’s word, are not the most auspicious for fostering the temporal or eternal well-being of the realm. While Starkey defines many aspects of Christian practice and belief as indifferent, not all adiaphora are equally indifferent. He recognizes that many beliefs and practices, while not strictly necessary for salvation, can be of great assistance in the living of a Christian life. Thus prayer to and veneration of the saints, although not a ‘thyng to the whiche we are bounden by the expresse commaundement of god’, is ‘amonge christen men a thynge of great conueniency to be receyued’ as an aid to piety and virtue.136 Alternatively Starkey argues that papal headship over the entire Church is not only a matter of adiaphora, but also is not conducive to the well-being of the Church in the sixteenth century.137 This being the case, policy decisions could be unwise and even a hindrance to the faith without being contrary to an essential of the faith, and it is laws of this type that Starkey forbids subjects to disobey. This is so perhaps because Starkey assumes his audience not to be sufficiently learned in matters of policy to be able to judge what decisions are prudent, and perhaps also because the division and disorder in the realm that follow upon disregard of civil laws are more pernicious than a human law regulating adiaphora could 133 134 135 136 137

Ibid., sig. Z2v (emphases added). Ibid., sig. B4v. Ibid. Ibid., sig. X2v–X3. Ibid., sig. S2v–S3v.

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be. It is from responsibility for any harm following upon the observation of unwise laws regulating adiaphora that Starkey exonerates subjects, not from the duty to obey God before man in the essentials of the faith. Because Starkey requires that subjects disobey laws of the realm contrary to the will of God, once again, as with Tyndale’s and Gardiner’s visions of the royal supremacy, the paramount issue facing the English Christian is the interpretation of God’s will. Starkey accepts the notion that scripture is the ground of Christian truth in which the things required for salvation are discernible. In contrast to the pagan philosophers who discerned God’s will only indirectly through the application of human reason: … the lyne of our [Christians’] obedience is reasone it selfe, the verye worde and sonne of God by Christe to vs declared, the wylle of god in his scriptures opened. By this lyne and rule we must square our affection, to this al, reason and affection of man set apart, we muste be obedient, to this we must gyue faythe, sure truste, and also confydence.138

Because scripture is the highest source of insight into God’s will, it is also the highest standard of Christian conduct to which all owe obedience. Discussing the order of obedience that ought to be observed by Christians, Starkey opens by saying: And first this is sure, that in all kynde of polycies among christen nations, the worde of god must be of chiefe authoritie, that muste haue therin the firste place and preeminence. Wherfore if any thynge be decreed contrary to that, by any worldly policie, it must be vtterly abrogate and boldely disobeyed with al constancy.139

Of course, identifying scripture as the highest standard of Christian truth merely begs the question of who is to interpret scripture, a point that is not lost on Starkey: Wherfore here perauenture you wyl say, that obedience to goddis word is required: no man douteth, no man is ignoraunt therof, but whiche is goddis worde, and the trewe sense therof, vnto the whiche we oughte for to be obediente, here lyeth the doubte, this is not vnto all menne playne: for somme menne herein saye one thynge, and some saye an nother, in so moche, that we knowe not to whiche sense & to what thyng we shulde gyue our obedience, and whether we shulde rather be obediente to generall counsaylle, or to our princis authoritie.140

Having noted the issue of interpretation and its relationship to obedience, however, Starkey then quietly avoids addressing the issue. Instead, he turns his attention to the authority of princes over matters of adiaphora. In this

138 139 140

Ibid., sig. B1v. Ibid., sig. B4v. Ibid., sig. B1v–B2.

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discussion, he assumes only a very limited core of essentials of the faith but does very little to validate this assumption.141 Despite his identification of scriptural interpretation as an important issue, Starkey often argues as if the meaning of scripture is intuitively obvious to all readers because of the text’s clarity: For the gospell is a doctrine of simplicitie, and nothinge but faythfull charitie, a doctrine so manifeste and playne, that if it were as easye to fulfyll and put in effect, as it is to conceyue and to vnderstande, I thynke there is no manne so rude, nor no manne by nature so ignoraunt, but he myghte attayne to the hyghest mysteries, and to the hyghest knowledge necessarye to the saluation of manne conteyned therin.142

Applying this principle, Starkey asserts that the heresies of the early Church were not due to the obscurity of scripture; rather … though the scripture of god be neuer so manifest & ful of pure simplicitie, yet whan it cam to subtyl wittes, more curious & more desirous of fame, than studious of the truth, and of Christis glory, there was in the sentence therof, some colour of contrariete, & moch apperynge obscuritie.143

Similarly, in his extensive assessment of papal primacy, Starkey continually harps on the clarity with which the ideas he puts forward are taught in scripture. He asserts that the ‘manifeste doctrine’ of Christ supports his views while only ‘lyghte’ and ‘feble coniectures’, ‘wekely’ and ‘febly founded’, support pro-papal interpretations of scripture.144 Nevertheless, such appeals to the inherent clarity of scripture cannot resolve Starkey’s dilemma of securing the prince against disobedience based on prior obedience to God. Starkey is the first to admit that … though this doctrine [the teachings of scripture] be neuer so playne and full of simplicite, neuer so clere and manyfest of it self, yet it is by the curiositie of our masters and teachers therof, nowe of late yeres so obscured and hydde, so cloked with subtyl interpretation, so mangled by contrarye exposition, that many of vs nowe be in greatte perplexitie, moche dowbtynge of the truthe therof, vtterly ignorant of the grounde and foundation of the same. For where as the chiefe maisters and teachers haue preched and write, contrary one to an other, howe shuld ignorant and simple myndes conceiue any grounde and sure stey, wherto they myghte leane for succour and comforte? Howe shoulde they fynde any certayne truthe therin?145

141 Ibid., sig. B2–B4. Starkey claims that his understanding of essentials is drawn from the Council of Nicaea, but, as will be discussed below, he does not claim for general councils power to interpret the Bible authoritatively. 142 Ibid., sig. I2v. 143 Ibid., sig. R1v–R2. 144 Ibid., sig. P1v. 145 Ibid., sig. I3.

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Whether because of the nature of scripture or because of its abuse by interpreters, Starkey ultimately concedes that in many cases ‘argument oute of scrypture drawen, wherin lyeth moche controuersie’ needs supplementation or authorization in order to be convincing.146 Because of the difficulty in determining the true meaning of scripture in conjunction with the eternal stakes involved in discerning things necessary for salvation, it is not difficult to imagine that many would have trouble heeding Starkey’s call to his readers not to be concerned about the interpretation of scripture. Controversies regarding interpretation of scripture, Starkey points out, ‘for the moste parte be, concernynge thinges indifferent, and seldome of suche, whiche be necessarye to mannes saluation. Wherefore their controuersyes therin oughte to trouble you nothinge atte all.’147 While Starkey’s point is that most disagreements among biblical interpreters do not concern things essential to salvation, the disturbing counterpart to this claim is the acknowledgement that some matters of controversy do regard things necessary for salvation. With one’s eternal fate in the balance, even a small amount of uncertainty could be expected to trouble Christians more than ‘nothinge atte all’ and in fact might understandably trouble them rather a lot. This problem is also inherent in Starkey’s identification of the requirements of the faith as being ‘conteyned in the gospel expressely, or deduced of the same surely’148 inasmuch as the certainty of a deduction is very much in the eye of the beholder. Despite the need for a standard of scriptural interpretation to resolve uncertainty regarding Henrician religious policy, Starkey fails to clearly identify such a standard. Often Starkey writes as if such authority is to be wielded by the general council, but he does not consistently follow through with this position. Starkey chastises those who reject interpretations of scripture ‘commonly receiued’ in general councils: For to this succedeth in a maner the ruine of scripture it selfe, the authoritie wherof declared to man comonly, hangeth moch vpon generall counsell. For though the truth of goddis worde dependethe nothynge vppon the iugement of man, yet the declaration therof, to the face of the worlde, hangeth moche theron … In so moche that if dyuers nations shulde dissente in the groundes of scripture, and in the interpretation therof, refuge shoulde we haue none conuenient to chrystian policie, and mete to conserue the polyticall vnitie, yf frome generalle counsayle we shoulde take awaye all order and direction, and to that gyue no obedience at all.149

Thus heresy is not to be ascribed to persons or communities, ‘excepte they slyppe from the manyfeste groundes of scripture in the gospel expressed, 146 147 148 149

Ibid., sig. P2. Ibid., sig. B4 (emphasis added). Ibid., sig. L3v. Ibid., sig. H1–H1v.

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or in generall counsayle receiued by interpretation’.150 Consistent with this position, Starkey is careful to point out that the pope’s position as head of the Church was established ‘not by authoritie of the generall counselle, but onely of the emperour’ as convenient to the situation of the Church at that time.151 Given sentiments of this type one might expect to find in the Exhortation calls for a general council to resolve disputes over the interpretation of scripture in the sixteenth century. Starkey, however, does just the opposite. Assuming unity among Christian nations concerning the essentials of the faith, Starkey chastises councils for issuing pronouncements regarding non-essential matters that should be subject to the authority of the prince: [F]or as moche as the decree of prince in thinges indifferent, byndeth vs vnder peine of damnation, as scripture dothe commande and testifie, the power in counsell generalle concernynge the same, byndeth vs onely by the waye of exhortation, for as moche as therto is gyuen none other authorite, we ought rather to gyue obedience in such thinges to princely authoritie here in our nation, than to suche thinges as be propouned by general assemble and congregation.152

The fact that the general council has authority to expound the essentials of the faith from scripture does not mean that all teachings of the council are to be recognized as essentials of the faith. Rather, assuming the prior definition of the essentials of the faith with which he has been working, Starkey relegates all pronouncements of general councils addressing other aspects of religious life to the realm of advice that the civil authorities may heed or ignore as they see fit. Individuals can safely ignore such precepts ‘tyl they be confirmed by princely power and common counsell’,153 and must never obey them contrary to the laws of the realm. While perhaps useful in an advisory capacity, the pronouncements of a general council are necessary only in those situations in which the essentials of the faith are unknown or denied. Because this is not, Starkey is confident, the situation in England, the English Church has no need of general councils. ‘[T]his I dare say and boldly to you affirme,’ Starkey writes in the concluding pages of the Exhortation: … that all be it we neuer hereafter knowe nother pope nor cardynall, no nor yet here of counsel generall of all christian nations, yet may we, liuynge togyther in faythfull loue & charitable vnite, lighted by the spirit of god and his heuenly doctrine, hangynge onely vpon his benefyte, passe this lyfe in mooste pure and perfyte christianitie.154 150 151 152 153 154

Ibid., sig. T1. Ibid., sig. R2v. Ibid., sig. T2–T2v. Ibid., sig. C1v. Ibid., sig. Z5v.

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Starkey’s reference to English Christians being ‘lighted by the spirit of god’ suggests an alternative interpretive authority. On occasion Starkey’s language is reminiscent of Tyndale’s, seeming to refer to the divine guidance of the individual Christian as the most certain source of insight in biblical interpretation. God, Starkey writes: … hath promysed surely to gyue the lyght of truthe to all them, whiche demaunde it mekely … [I]f we with mekenes and humilitie, faythful loue and charitie, seke out the true sense of goddis worde diligently, we shal surely it fynde, and suche lyght therof receiue, that though we neuer here of pope nor cardynall, nor yet of counsell generall, yet shall not we be destitute of suche truthe and lyght as is necessary to our saluation.155

Again, lamenting the lack of ‘ryght knowlege and conuenient obedience’ in the English Church, Starkey nevertheless expresses hope because ‘the infinite goodnes of the diuine power neuer leueth such hartes desert without succour and helpe, whiche with feruent desyre and sure affiaunce, faithe, and truste annexed therto, diligently seke and inserche therby to haue the knowledge of truthe and honestie.’156 Starkey comes close to turning this hermeneutic to the service of obedience to the civil authorities, but he does not follow through. In the Exhortation’s penultimate page he asserts that assurance of divine guidance in the understanding of God’s will is … expressed by the mouthe of our mayster Christe in his gospelle, who surely promyseth this to euerye multitude gathered togyther in his name, & to euery faithfull congregation, that whan so euer they assemble to gyther for his glory, with perfite faith and truste in hym, with charitie demaundynge lyght of truthe to passe this lyfe withal to his pleasure and honour, they shall neuer lacke knowledge of suche thynge, which shalbe necessary to their saluation, they shall neuer lacke grace to defend them from all suche thynge as shall lede them to euerlastyng damnation.157

Such sentiments could be turned in favour of an argument that the civil authorities define doctrine because of Starkey’s assumption that Parliament, at least in some sense, speaks for the community of Christians in England. This is exemplified by Starkey’s belief, in contrast to Gardiner, that the Act of Supremacy not only declared, but actually authorized Henry as Supreme Head of the English Church. This is, in Starkey’s eyes, unremarkable: ‘For what strangenes is this, a hole congregacyon and perfyte, as this is of our nation, to electe and chose theym a heed polytike with free libertye, whiche may with his hyghe wysedome directe and redresse all suche thynges as pertayne vnto christian polycye?’158 155 156 157 158

Ibid., sig. C3–C3v. Ibid., sig. K2. Ibid., sig. Z5v. Ibid., sig. Z1v.

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Starkey, however, does not use Christ’s promise to provide guidance to every Christian congregation as a basis on which to claim for Parliament authority to interpret scripture. Rather, he quickly returns to his earlier focus on the responsibility of the individual Christian to follow the Spirit’s guidance to divine truth. Immediately following his reference to Christ’s promise to be with the Church collectively, Starkey concludes: Wherfore most christian people, seinge that the benefyt of god is so open vnto vs, and the lyght of his holy spirite so common, that no man is excluded from it, but he onely that so wyll … let vs not suffre our selfe by any pestilent & diuellyshe dyuision lose the infinite benefite of Christis passion: but let vs with one fayth in hym in perfyt concorde & vnitie with sure truste and hope hange vppon him as vppon the only hede of al christianitie.159

Despite this exhortation to each Christian individual to follow Christ’s guidance, Starkey’s consideration of the definition of doctrine does not claim for all Bible interpreters equal authority. Rather, he clearly distinguishes two groups of English Christians. On one hand are ‘them that be vnlerned’, to whom the Exhortation is chiefly addressed and for whom ‘scrupulous and exact knowlege of thinges conteyned in goddis scriptures, is nothinge so necessary to induce them to obedience, as is mekenes and humilitie, whiche is … the chiefe way, wherby they maye attayne to the trewe sense of goddis worde and doctrine’.160 On the other hand are those ‘lerned in scripture’, to whom Starkey offers different advice. ‘I wold’, Starkey avers, … counsel euery man lerned in scripture, whose conscience is troubled with any scruplosite conceiued by any thing decreed by commen authorite, here in our countrey, wel to wey the thing, wherwith he is troubled, with diligent examination therof, whether it be vpon a ground necessary to mans saluation, or els vpon a thing indifferent: & aboue al to be ware, & diligently to take hede, that nother by authorite of man, processe of time, nor contrary custom, he suffre not him self so to be blinded, nor deceiued by simplicite, that he with right iugement can not ponder goddis word indifferently.161

Starkey in fact goes so far as to concede that in discerning God’s will there are some ‘which be of great lernyng, to whose wysedome the thinges are better knowen than they be vnto me’.162 Starkey’s concession that the learned ought to define doctrine for themselves and his avowed willingness to give place to their interpretations are, however, expressed in much the same spirit as his authorization of the general council to interpret scripture. He views the rights and responsibilities of the learned as circumscribed within the limits of an 159 160 161 162

Ibid., sig. Z5v–Z6. Ibid., sig. B3. Ibid., sig. C2. Ibid., sig. K3.

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already determined orthodoxy that it is their responsibility to reiterate. Just as he castigates general councils for pronouncing regarding affairs that he considers adiaphora, Starkey also berates the masters and teachers of Christ’s doctrines, as ‘vnwyse maysters, foolysshe teachers of relygion,’ and ‘vndiscrete preachers of the gospell of god’ when they stray from his vision of orthodoxy and superstitiously teach the necessity of things indifferent, or arrogantly condemn them as antithetical to the faith.163 Once again, however, this is simply to beg the question of how the essentials of the faith are determined. The ministers whom Starkey scolds are (at least some of them presumably) among the learned in doctrine to whom Starkey acquiesces. However, such acquiescence is revealed here to be conditional upon the teacher agreeing with Starkey’s understanding of orthodoxy. Having conceded to the learned authority to interpret scripture and even admitted their superiority to himself in this matter, Starkey’s efforts to ensure compliance with royal policy are compromised especially by the failure of some among the learned, as Starkey himself notes, to accept that only Nicene orthodoxy and obedience to the prince are necessary for salvation. Lamenting the dangers of superstition and referring to Fisher and More, Starkey recalls the sorrowful events that led ‘suche men, so notable, bothe of vertue and lernynge, as by common fame, some of them were reported to be, whiche lately haue suffred, so sturdely to stycke in a manyfest superstition … For it appered to them’, he clarifies, ‘to pertayne to the religion of Christe, by necessitie the byshop of Rome amonge al christen nations, to haue suche superioritie, as of many yeres he hathe, abusynge their pacience, vsurped vppon them.’ Indeed, Fisher and More were devoted to papal primacy ‘as it had ben an article of the fayth’, and convinced ‘that such a heed shuld be stablyshed by the word and doctrine of Christe, here in his churche of necessytie’. As a consequence, they were tragically willing to suffer death in defence of papal authority.164 That Starkey appears to overestimate More’s understanding of papal primacy is secondary to the fact that Starkey, by claiming that virtuous and learned men believe papal primacy to be an essential of the faith, is inviting readers to question his own conclusions regarding what scripture ‘manifestly’ teaches. The tension between Starkey’s claim that individual Christians, or at least individual learned Christians, are authorized to determine the essentials of the faith and his assertion that the essentials of the faith are clearly recognized by all is also reflected in his consideration of papal power. For all of his protestations that it is obvious that scripture does not support papal primacy as a thing necessary for salvation, Starkey devotes a large section of his Exhortation to arguing just that, implicitly placing the reader 163 164

Ibid., sig. I2. Ibid., sig. E2v, L4v.

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in the position of judge over the interpretation of scripture.165 Remarkably, his arguments on this point include claims that, for all Starkey’s insistence that they are obviously true, do not seem likely to resonate with readers. For example, he sweeps away an entire testament worth of potential papal prooftexts by claiming that the Old Testament, although rightly called ‘the scripture of god, and his very lawe’, is no longer authoritative for Christians.166 That such a position wipes away precedents in support of the divine right of kings to rule the Church is unremarkable inasmuch as Starkey bases Henry’s headship of the Church on his appointment by Parliament, not God. From the perspective of demonstrating the obvious validity of Starkey’s anti-papal arguments, however, the claim is more problematic. Discounting the Old Testament in its entirety is an extreme position that, as Thomas Mayer notes, ‘left Starkey with little more than some of the Anabaptists and Spiritualists for company, at least so far as the contemporary relevance of the Old Testament went’.167 This is hardly an auspicious start to a line of reasoning designed to show that the case against papal primacy is not only true but obviously true. Another example of a problematic interpretive point within his case against papal primacy is the claim that Christ provides an example ‘teachynge vs neuer to dispyse, nor to be disobediente to suche thynge as by common authoritie is commonly receyued’, citing as one example that ‘he [Christ] kept the sabbot daye.’168 The synoptic gospels, however, appear to emphasize that Christ condoned disregard of the norms of his community regarding observance of the Sabbath by his disciples.169 Such disputable claims are especially troublesome for Starkey’s case because his goal is not merely to support a position but to convince readers that all contrary views are manifestly nonsensical. Starkey’s recognition that disobedience of the civil authorities is legitimate if those authorities seek to enforce laws contrary to the will of God means that to secure obedience and peace within the realm he needs to outline procedures to ensure that subjects understand God’s will in an appropriate manner. Instead of providing a locus of authority to ensure that God’s will is defined so as to not contradict the laws of the land, Starkey directs subjects to the Bible to find God’s will and encourages them to interpret the Bible in accord with its ‘manifest’ sense. To underwrite order in the realm, however, such an approach requires a consensus among Christians regarding the interpretation of scripture that Starkey’s Church lacked. One need not question whether Starkey himself truly believed that 165 166 167 168 169

Ibid., sig. M4v–Q2v. Ibid., sig. M4v–N1. Mayer, Thomas Starkey and the Commonweal, p. 222. Exhortation, sig. N3v. Mark 2 and parallels.

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scripture teaches that only adherence to the Nicene Creed coupled with obedience to the civil authorities is necessary for salvation. The hermeneutic he endorses in the Exhortation empowers subjects, especially the learned, to judge for themselves whether this reading of scripture is valid. Starkey’s Exhortation represents an advance over the defences of royal supremacy presented by Tyndale and Gardiner from the perspective of safeguarding the realm against disorder arising from obedience to God before the king. De Vera claims primacy for scripture in defining orthodoxy, but then largely ignores the issue of scriptural interpretation beyond claiming that royal supremacy is and papal primacy is not supported by scripture, leaving English subjects to their own devices to determine the acceptability of other royal religious policies. Tyndale positively admonishes subjects to read scripture and define doctrine for themselves, and he exhorts them to reject anything incompatible with what they find in scripture. Starkey, by contrast, writing as if the essentials of the faith are clearly known, exhorts subjects not to oppose royal policy over any issues save a very small core of Christian essentials that neither Henry nor any foreseeable English ruler could be expected to contravene. Despite this advance, the success of Starkey’s effort to de-legitimize opposition to royal policy requires that all accept his definition of the essentials of the faith. Starkey presents himself as authorized to define doctrine on the grounds that scripture is the highest standard of Christian truth and his views correspond to the manifest teachings of scripture. His authority is, however, based solely on the claim that his views correspond to the correct understanding of scripture. Starkey does not claim that readers are required to give way to his pronouncements except to the extent that they find his arguments convincing. Although he masks rather than emphasizes it, Starkey also ultimately concedes to the individual Christian authority to determine when the prince is acting contrary to God’s will and to follow or oppose royal policy accordingly. As long as no clear and objective authority is identified to define doctrine, it is left an open question whether the civil authorities or More and Fisher were in the right. If Fisher’s and More’s opposition to royal policy was not in defence of true Christian doctrines, then the civil authorities were in the right to punish them as threats to the stability of the realm and perhaps even as promulgators of heresy. If, on the other hand, the beliefs of More and Fisher did accord with Christian truth, then they were in the right and thus worthy of imitation because they rendered obedience to God before their king. What was needed to secure obedience and order in the Church was an understanding of the definition of doctrine that identified a locus of doctrinal authority certain to declare in accord with the laws of the realm. Christopher St German seeks to supply such an understanding of the definition of doctrine by identifying scripture as the source of Christian

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truth and the Crown in Parliament as the authoritative interpreter of scripture. By claiming for the civil authorities power to define doctrine, he endeavours to remove the possibility of opposition based on prior obedience to God, to consolidate royal dominion over English subjects, and to ensure peace in the realm and an orderly reformation of the English Church.

CHAPTER THREE

Christopher St German: Defending Royal Supremacy over the Definition of Doctrine A lawyer of the Middle Temple, Christopher St German was born about 1460 and died in 1541. Although he did not publish his first work until he was nearly seventy years old, St German was a productive writer during the last decade of his long life. He was in the habit of publishing anonymously which has created additional labour for scholars, but recently John Guy and Richard Rex have argued persuasively for St German’s authorship of all of the texts discussed below.1 Many of St German’s literary efforts, and the portion of his writings upon which the current study will focus, address issues of Church–state relations in Tudor England. Throughout these works St German pursues a twofold agenda. First, he seeks to validate the authority of the king in Parliament over virtually all aspects of English ecclesiastical life, with the exception of the preaching and sacramental functions of the clergy. Second, he endeavours to spur the civil authorities into action to rectify what he feels are abuses within the English Church, highlighting the discord and ensuing danger to the temporal and eternal well-being of English subjects to which the abuses give rise. The works considered in this study fall into three categories. First, the Doctor and Student dialogues are a series of works staged as portions of an ongoing dialogue between a doctor of divinity and a student of the laws of England. The ‘First Dialogue’ of Doctor and Student was published in 1528 in Latin; an English translation by St German was published in 1531 (all of St German’s works except the 1528 ‘Dialogue’ were published in English). The ‘Second Dialogue’ of Doctor and Student was published in 1530, and was followed in 1531 by ‘A Little Treatise Called the New Additions’. The ‘First Dialogue’ outlines the basic principles upon which the laws of England are grounded, argues for the legislative precedence of parliamentary authority over all matters involving property or privilege (whether of laymen or of clerics), and provides a series of test cases showing the application of these principles. The ‘Second Dialogue’ and ‘New Additions’ supply additional test cases, shifting the focus more 1 John Guy, Christopher St German on Chancery and Statute (London, 1985), pp. 16–18; Richard Rex, ‘New Additions on Christopher St German’, a paper presented at the Sixteenth Century Studies Conference, 27 October 2002.

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squarely onto the authority of Parliament over the affairs of the Church and matters traditionally thought of as subject to ecclesiastical law. The second group of works comprises the books published by St German in his dispute with Thomas More. St German published A treatise concernynge the diuision betwene the spirytualtie and temporaltie in 1532 or 1533, precipitating a feud between himself and More. More attempted a confutation of the Division in his Apology (1533), to which St German responded with Salem and Bizance (1533); More rejoined with The Debellation of Salem and Bizance (1533), and St German rebutted with The Addicions of Salem and Byzance (1534). In these works, the second and third of which are staged as a dialogue between two Englishmen named ‘Salem’ and ‘Bizance’, St German continues the themes that occupied him in the Doctor and Student dialogues. The primary difference is one of tone and urgency. The works of controversy with More tend to be more openly anticlerical, laying blame for the division that has arisen between the laity and the ordained almost (although not quite) entirely on abuses perpetrated by the clergy. These works also emphasize more strongly than Doctor and Student the harm done to the realm and the dire need for Parliament to use its legislative power to reform English ecclesiastical life. The final category of St German’s works considered in this study includes several works published after passage of the Act of Supremacy in November 1534. These works are A treatyse concerninge the power of the clergye, and the lawes of the Realme (1535 or perhaps late 1534), An answere to a letter (1535), A treatise concernynge diuers of the constitucyons prouynciall and legantines (1535), and A Treatise concernynge generall councilles, the Byshoppes of Rome, and the Clergy (1538). The Power of the Clergy and An Answer address again the authority of the Crown in Parliament over ecclesiastical affairs and emphasize the need for ecclesiastical reform, this time from the perspective of exploring and defending the authority of the king as Supreme Head of the Church of England. An Answer also includes extensive discussions of papal authority in England and the interpretation of scripture. Constitutions Provincial is the culmination of St German’s earlier polemics calling for reform of Church laws by Parliament. Precise ecclesiastical laws or customs that usurp parliamentary authority are cited and detailed recommendations are given regarding how Parliament should rectify troubles arising from these laws. General Councils is an investigation of the composition and authority of a valid general council, liberally sprinkled with denunciations of papal abuses relative to general councils.

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St German’s claim that the Crown in Parliament is authorized to define doctrine and its role in defending the Henrician supremacy have been noted, but have not heretofore been investigated in depth.2 Instead, scholars have generally concentrated on other aspects of St German’s work. First, attention has focused on St German as an extreme example of more generally held views on Church–state relations. In the early 1530s, many in England were lamenting perceived clerical abuses and calling on the Crown and/or Parliament to provide relief. St German is notable for his thoroughness both in terms of consistency in claiming that all aspects of Church life involving property or privilege fall under the authority of the king in Parliament and in terms of the extensive argumentation he provides to legitimate parliamentary authority over ecclesiastical affairs in England.3 A second issue that has exercised students of St German recently is the question of his relationship to the government authorities in the 1530s. Some aspects of this relationship are clear, but others have been topics of debate. Regarding the facts of the case, St German’s widely known contacts with the government during the 1530s include the following. In 1534, he was approached by a coterie of government propagandists but declined to cooperate with them for unspecified reasons that he had apparently previously expressed to Thomas Cromwell. In 1536, he was singled out by the leaders of the Pilgrimage of Grace as one of the principal heretics whose errors were corrupting the realm. In 1537, Cromwell obtained his opinion on the formulary The Institution of a Christian Man. On the basis of such evidence, it has been argued that St German’s contact with the government during the 1530s was negligible.4 Recently, however, Guy has argued convincingly that while St German retained his independence as a scholar, he did move within government circles in the early 1530s. This conclusion is based on the following evidence. First, Guy identifies St German as the author of a parliamentary draft from 1531 calling for ecclesiastical reforms similar to those advocated in the ‘New Additions’, as well as social reform. Second, Guy points out that all of St German’s tracts published from 1531 to early 1534 were published by 2 See, for example, J.W. Allen, A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (1928; reprint, London, 1957), pp. 164–8; Alistair Fox and John Guy, Reassessing the Henrician Age: Humanism, Politics and Reform, 1500–1550 (Oxford, 1986), pp. 205–10; Franklin Le van Baumer, The Early Tudor Theory of Kingship (1940; reprint, New York, 1966), pp. 66, 74–7. 3 See, for example, ‘Christopher St. German (?1460–1540/1)’, in J.B. Trapp (ed.), The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol. 9, (New Haven, CT, 1979), pp. xliv–lii; Fox and Guy, Reassessing the Henrican Age, pp. 97–108; Baumer, The Early Tudor Theory of Kingship, pp. 65–77, 156. 4 G.R. Elton, Policy and Police: The Enforcement of the Reformation in the Age of Thomas Cromwell (1972; reprint, Cambridge, 1985), pp. 173–4.

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Thomas Berthelet, the king’s printer whose primary occupation during this time was printing material supplied to him by the government. Finally, there is the ruse by which More feigned ignorance regarding the authorship of the Division and Salem and Bizance. Guy argues that a man in More’s position cannot have been ignorant of the identity of the author, and he finds in a passage of the Debellation an oblique reference indicating that More knew his opponent’s identity. This bears on the relationship between St German and the government because, when More resigned the Lord Chancellorship in 1532, he promised not to meddle in affairs of state again, and his life depended on his keeping, or at least appearing to keep, that promise. By feigning ignorance of its author, More could pretend that he did not realize that the Division was produced by one working so closely with the government as St German, and he could thereby defend himself against a charge of meddling in politics. Guy’s conclusion is that prior to 1534 St German was acting as an independent scholar with occasional access to the inner circles of government (especially around 1531) who made his work available to the government for publication following its completion. After 1534, St German distanced but did not entirely divorce himself from official policymakers, his continuing contact being reflected in the opinions offered relating to The Institution of a Christian Man noted above, as well as two unpublished manuscripts, cited by Guy, that St German submitted to Cromwell in 1537.5 The final issue on which students of St German have focused is his understanding of the relative powers of king and Parliament over the Church. Guy argues that it was an awareness that his views on this matter did not coincide entirely with government policy that led St German to hold himself at arm’s length from official policy after 1534. While St German was happy to exalt royal power in the interest of undermining clerical pretensions and promoting the subordination of canon law to English law, his support for royal authority over the Church was not unbounded. He clearly rejected the notion that the king had any right to exercise the potestas ordinis at a time when Henry himself had not unequivocally abandoned the possibility of claiming it. Of more enduring importance was his belief that royal power over the Church is only to be exercised by the Crown in Parliament, not the Crown solus.6 Because he limits royal authority by Parliament, St German has traditionally been portrayed as a man who places restrictions on the king’s authority over the Church. ‘Where Tyndale and Gardiner saw in the king God’s vicegerent on earth who must be obeyed “without one syllable of exception”, the lawyers [including St German] soberly defined 5

Guy, Chancery and Statute, pp. 19–55. Ibid., pp. 38–44; Baumer, The Early Tudor Theory of Kingship, pp. 56–62, 140–52, 163–7, 184–5. 6

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the prerogatives which the king might exercise according to law.’ The previous chapter has highlighted that Tyndale and Gardiner did not call for absolute obedience to the will of the king but rather limited the obedience due to the king as Head of the Church by the condition that only laws consistent with the law of God were to be obeyed. Indeed, each of these men showed by his actions as well as his words that he did not believe royal authority to be absolute. By contrast, St German, by claiming for the Crown in Parliament authority to define doctrine, ultimately removes from the civil authorities any constraint imposed by the condition that God must be obeyed before human authorities and outlines a vision of Church– state relations that would have ensured obedience, order and unity in the English Church. It is not my intention to deny that St German restricted the royal prerogative by requiring that the king act through Parliament, but rather to emphasize the absoluteness of the powers over the Church claimed by St German for the Crown in Parliament. There is an important change in St German’s writings about the time of the promulgation of the Act of Supremacy. The change is not directly related to Henry’s assumption of the title of Supreme Head on Earth of the Church of England; indeed St German is at pains to point out that The kyng, by that he is recognysed by the parliamente to be the supreme heed vnder god vpon erth, of the church of Englande, hath as I take it no newe power gyuen him in any thinge but that lyke as before that recognisyon made, he had all such power ouer his subiectes spirytuall and temporall, as to a kyng belongeth by the lawe of god: so after the seyde recognisyon, he had the same power without alteration, & none other but that.8

In particular, St German emphasizes that by this title Henry assumed no authority that Christ gave to his apostles and disciples, which is to say authority over things that are ‘mere spirituall’: the power to consecrate, the power of absolution, and the power of ordination.9 The authority claimed for Henry by the title, the authority that belongs to kings by the will of God, is authority to order ‘mixt thynges’ ‘that haue ben called in tyme paste thynges mere spirytuall, & be nat so in dede’.10 Included in the partial list of such powers that St German supplies are: power to order the institutional affairs of the Church, power to ensure that priests are not negligent in ministering to the spiritual needs of the people, power over 7 Baumer, The Early Tudor Theory of Kingship, pp. 184–5. Baumer acknowledges that these extreme formulations do not accurately reflect the more considered views of Tyndale and Gardiner who in fact limited obedience to the king by the condition that he only be obeyed when not issuing orders contrary to God’s law: ibid., pp. 125–6, 139–40. 8 Christopher St German, An answere to a letter (1535; reprint, New York, 1973), sig. A3 (hereafter ‘Answer’). 9 Ibid., sig. A3v–A4. 10 Ibid., sig. A7v, A6.

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Church finances, power to legislate in a wide array of matters involving property and privilege including adultery, simony, usury, tithes, perjury, and so on.11 The essential change that occurs in St German’s writings on the proper ordering of Church–state relations after 1534 is that he directly addresses the fact that even power over such ‘mixt thynges’ as he and Parliament claimed for Henry was not universally conceded to be consonant with God’s will revealed in scripture, and needed to be defended as such. In the Doctor and Student dialogues and the works related to his controversy with More, St German generally assumes that his readers will recognize that the authorization of king and Parliament to order ecclesiastical affairs is God’s will. He does not discuss the interpretation of scripture passages claimed to authorize the clergy to order temporal affairs, nor does he address biblical texts that some interpreted as claiming for the Church and its property immunity from royal jurisdiction or regulation. Rather, he seems to understand his task relative to the ecclesiastical supremacy as being to advise the civil authorities regarding aspects of religious life in which reform is needed as well as to demonstrate to English subjects the need for reform of the ordering of English religious life to curtail abuses perpetrated by vindictive, greedy and slothful clergy. Nearly absent from these works is any attempt to prove the consonance with scripture of royal involvement in Church affairs in general or of particular ecclesiastical reforms undertaken by the government. After late 1534, St German treats seriously the possibility that resistance to the course taken by the civil authorities vis-à-vis the Church may not simply be based on greed or cultural inertia, but may be based on sincere convictions that the civil authorities are acting contrary to the dictates of scripture. It is the means by which St German addresses this challenge, culminating in his argument that the Crown in Parliament is the divinely authorized interpreter of the will of God, that will occupy centre-stage in this chapter. Before addressing this issue directly, it will be helpful to provide some background by considering St German’s legal theory, especially his understanding of the role of human and divine law in the ordering of the lives of Christians, as reflected in his works published prior to late 1534. The Nature and Role of Human Law In his first and best-known surviving work, Doctor and Student, St German begins his discussion of the laws of England with an overview of the laws that govern the universe, in particular the laws that govern the lives of people. He presents a fourfold division among the laws that govern human 11

Ibid., sig. A4v–A5, A6–A7.

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lives that will be recognized by persons familiar with medieval thought. The primary law that governs human existence and indeed all of existence is the eternal law, the plan in accord with which God structures and guides reality to its appointed end and the foundation of all other laws. This law is, however, not directly accessible to humans in this life and so God has made it manifest by three means: the law of reason, the law of God, and human law.12 Citing authorities including Aristotle, Paul and the fifteenth-century conciliarist Jean Gerson, St German identifies the law of reason (or ‘lawe of nature of resonable creature’) as the standard of right and wrong action that can be discerned from the eternal law by the application of reason. The law of reason teaches many precepts, some of them foundational and widely known, for example, that good is to be done and evil avoided, or that one should treat others as one would like to be treated; from these first principles follow other principles by necessary deduction. The law of reason also manifests that many actions are licit although not necessary, such as defending one’s property or person against an illicit power. The commands of the law of reason are unconditionally binding on all persons; they are consonant with the law of God and with all valid human laws and consequently must always be observed. Any human laws not in accord with the law of reason are by definition invalid and not to be observed.13 The second means by which the dictates of the eternal law are made manifest to people is the law of God. The law of God is distinguished from the law of reason and human laws by two things. First, it is revealed by God directly; second, it reveals the things that must be done or avoided for the attaining of eternal life. Because of this second condition, not all divinely revealed laws are strictly speaking precepts of the law of God. For example, the moral laws of the Old Testament, as well as the ‘lawe of the Euangelystis’ qualify as laws of God because they are not only revealed by God, but also instruct people in the things necessary for salvation. By contrast, many laws revealed by God in the Old Testament are not precepts of the law of God properly so-called because they were ordained to further the worldly, not the eternal, well-being of the Jews. Many ecclesiastical laws ordering political and institutional affairs ‘should be reckoned as human law rather than divine’ for the same reason.14 There are three degrees of divine law. First are precepts revealed by God directly and ‘written in the Bible and especially in the Gospels delivered 12 T.F.T. Plucknett and J.L. Barton (eds), St. German’s Doctor and Student (London, 1974), pp. 9–11 (hereafter ‘Doctor and Student’). Quotations will be from St German’s 1531 translation of the original Latin text; regarding the relationship between the translation and the original, see the introduction to Doctor and Student, pp. xvi–xix. 13 Doctor and Student, pp. 13–19. 14 Ibid., pp. 21–3.

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by Christ’. Often, however, the Bible stands in need of interpretation for its truths to be drawn out, and so in the second degree ‘are placed those divine laws which are only deduced as self-evident consequences from the foregoing’. Finally, In the third degree are placed divine laws deduced from the preceding by the successive declaration of the Apostles and others equivalent to Holy Scripture, such as decisions of the Church which in matters of faith are believed to be ruled by the Holy Spirit and to be infallible, although in matters of fact they may err.15

All of these ‘degrees’ ultimately derive their authority from scripture, and they differ primarily in the extent to which each can be directly derived from the text of scripture. Those precepts clearly and unambiguously stated in scripture hold the first degree of authority followed by precepts deduced so obviously from such statements that all can easily discern that they follow from the direct text of scripture. Relegated to the third of these descending degrees of authority are precepts deduced from scripture but taught there so obscurely that divinely inspired interpreters are needed to draw them out. The sole primacy and unique authority of scripture in determining the content of the divine law is again affirmed in the ‘New Additions’. When discussing whether tithes are ordained by the divine law, St German argues that the giving of the tenth part (as opposed to some other portion) … is by a lawe of the chyrche and not by the lawe of god, oneles it be taken that the lawe of the chyrche is the lawe of god, as it is somtyme taken to be, but not appropryatly nor immedyatly, for that is taken appropryatly to be the lawe of god that is conteynyd in scrypture that is to say: in the olde testament or in the newe.16

Human law is the final means by which the dictates of the eternal law are made known. This is the standard of right and wrong derived by wisdom from precepts of the law of reason and the law of God. While the purpose of human law is to direct those subject to it toward the same ends to which they are directed by the laws of reason and of God, namely temporal and eternal well-being, it is necessary for a number of reasons. First, many of the precepts of the law of nature or the law of God are not obvious to those lacking in wisdom or training. Consequently, it is necessary for those who are wise and learned in the dictates of the laws of reason and of God to illuminate these for others so that all may live in accord with righteousness and justice. The difficulty of discerning the dictates of the laws of reason and God is especially pronounced when addressing questions taking into account the detailed circumstances of specific communities, and so an 15 16

Ibid., p. 23. Ibid., p. 302.

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important function of human laws is to tailor the more general precepts of God and reason to the needs of a community, ensuring that justice is done in particular cases. Finally, human laws are needed because the laws of reason and of God do not furnish punishments and rewards in this life. Unfortunately, however, such coercion is necessary to restrain the wicked, and so human laws must be ordained to supply it, making certain that the penalties and rewards are appropriate to ‘the necessytie of the tyme, and … the dysposycion of the people’. In addition to being based on the laws of God or reason, to be valid a human law must also be promulgated by one authorized to rule the community. The precepts of wise men are merely advisory and do not bind community members unless those men are authorized to rule the community.17 Because derived from the laws of God or reason, valid human laws are to be respected as ultimately derivative of the eternal law of God itself, and indeed in a very real sense human laws are dictated by God ‘for lawes made by man, that hathe receyued therto power of god be made by god’.18 Human law is presented by St German as the means chosen by God to establish precepts to govern the particulars of each community that could not be ordered by general precepts equally binding on all people in any circumstances. Thus human laws ordering particular matters for a community carry divine authority no less than human laws that reinforce direct commands of the laws of God or reason. Of special importance is St German’s claim that the institution of private property is not a dictate of the law of reason but was instituted for the sake of convenience when the community of humanity had grown to the point where common ownership was deemed to be no longer practicable.19 Consequently, the authority of human laws over matters involving private property is especially extensive. By means of human law, … it apperyth who hath right to landes & goodes, and who not: for what so euer a man hath by suche lawes of man he hath ryghtwyslye. And what so euer is had agaynst suche lawes is vnryghtwyslye had. For lawes of man not contrary to the lawe of god, nor to the lawe of reason muste be obseruyd in the lawe of the soule, and he that dyspyseth them dyspyseth god & resysteth god.20

Because of the role of human laws in the divine ordering of human life, … knowledge of English law and its grounds is essential for the good direction of conscience in this realm. For as it says in Exodus, xx.17: ‘Thou shalt not covet they neighbour’s house, nor his ox, nor his ass’ &c. without saying what is or is not my neighbour’s house or thing, it is English law that says which house or thing is mine, and which my neighbour’s. It is in human law, duly 17 18 19 20

Ibid., pp. 15–17, 27–31; quotation at p. 29. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 19. Ibid., p. 29.

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constituted, that justice concerning the possession of lands and the ownership of chattels is made plain, and whatever is possessed in accordance with those laws is justly possessed, and what it held against them is unjustly held.21

By claiming for human law authority over all matters involving property, St German is able to accomplish one of his primary tasks, the removal of clerical abuses by taking from the clergy all independent authority to legislate in matters related to property and privilege. Possession of property, whether the property be held by priests or by laymen, is a temporal matter subject to human law: And yf any man wyll saye be not all the goodis of the Churche spyrytuell For they bylonge to the spyrytualytie and leed to the spyrytueltie, we answere that in the hole polytycall conuersacyon of the people, there be some specyally deputed and dedycate to the seruyce of god, the which most specially as by an excellencie are called spyrytuell men as relygyous men ar. And other though they walke in the way of god. Yet neuertheles bycause theyr offyce is most specyally to be occupyed aboute suche thynges as pertayne to the common welth, and to the good ordre of the people, they be therfore called seculer men or lay men, neuertheles the goodes of the fyrste may no more be called spyrytuel, then the goodis of the other for they be thynges mere temporall and kepyng the body as they doo in the other. And by lyke reason lawes made for the polytycall ordre of the Churche be called many tyme spyrytuell, or the lawes of god. Neuertheles it is but vnproprely: and other be called Cyuyle or the lawe of man. And in this poynt many be oft tymes deceyued, and also deceyue other the whiche Iuge tho thyngis to be spyrytuell, the whiche all men knowe be thynges materyall & carnall.22

Consequently, all of the financial and institutional affairs of the Church, as temporal matters, are subject to the legislative authority of the Crown in Parliament. Any legitimate power the clergy might have to make laws regulating such affairs is by necessity at the grant of Parliament, a grant that may be rescinded. Large portions of Doctor and Student are occupied with test cases demonstrating that few affairs of the English Church do not touch on rights of property, attempting thereby to prove that virtually all affairs of the English Church (with the exception of the declaration of Christian truth and the performance of the sacraments) are subject to the civil authorities. Three examples will suffice to demonstrate St German’s principles in action. As a first example, St German’s student asserts on this basis … that the parliment may assigne all the trees and gresse in church yardes either to the persone, to the vicar, or to the parysshe, if they se cause. For thoughe hit be hallowed grounde, yet the freholde therof, the trees, and herbes are thynges temporall, as they were before the hallowynge.23 21 22 23

Ibid., pp. 3–5. Ibid., pp. 23–5. Ibid., p. 323.

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In a second example regarding the coercive punishment of heresy, when the doctor objects … that as yt belongeth onely to the chyrche to determyne heresyes, that so it belongeth to the chyrch to determyne what punysshement he [a heretic] shall haue for his heresye excepte deth whiche they maye not be iuges in, but yf the chyrch decre that he shall therefore forfet his goodes me thynketh that they be forfet by that decre,

the student responds, Nay veryly for they be temporall and belonge to the iugement of the kynges courte and I thynke the ordynarye myght haue set no fyne vpon none impeched of heresye tyll yt was ordeyned by the statute of Henry the fourth that he may set a fyne in that case yf he se cause, and then the kynge shall haue that fyne as in the sayde statute appereth.24

As a third example, the student asserts that If there were a scisme in the papacye, who were ryghtwyse pope, the kynge in his parlyament, as the hyghe soueraygne ouer the people, whiche hath not onely charge on the bodies, but also on the soules of his subiectes, hath power for the quietenes and suretie of his realme to ordeyne and determyne, who shall be in this realme holden for rightwyse pope, and maye commaunde that no man spirituall nor temporall shall name any other to be pope, but hym that is so auctorysed in the parlyament: ne sue to any other as pope, but onely to hym.25

This final passage also reflects St German’s awareness that the extensive authority he claims for the civil authorities over ecclesiastical affairs empowers them to profoundly shape the spiritual lives of their subjects. This authority must be exercised wisely, as kings will one day answer to God for the spiritual as well as the temporal well-being of those committed to them. Despite its broad scope, the authority of human law is not absolute. Rather, ‘euery mannes law must be consonant to the lawe of god. And therfore the lawes of prynces, the commaundementes of prelates, the statutes of commynalties, ne yet the ordynaunce of the Churche is not ryghtwyse nor oblygatorye, but it be consonant to the lawe of god.’26 Neither is the authority of human law absolute over all temporal matters or all matters involving property because some aspects of these 24

Ibid., p. 243. Ibid., p. 327. On the authority of human law over all temporal aspects of the Church and for more examples of application of the principle, see Guy, Chancery and Statute, pp. 20–22. 26 Doctor and Student, p. 29. This condition that a valid human law must be consistent with the laws of God and reason is restated several times throughout St German’s discussion of laws and continues to resurface throughout his writings. See ibid., pp. 15, 19, 21. 25

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are determined by the laws of reason and of God.27 For example, in the discussion in ‘New Additions’ of the power of Parliament over tithes, St German holds that the civil authorities have the power to order tithes, but he does not claim that because tithes are a matter of property they can be ordered in absolutely whatever manner the civil authorities see fit. Rather, St German asserts that ‘it be groundyd vpon the lawe of reason that a man sholde gyue some reasonable porcyon of his goodes temporal to theym that mynystre to hym thynges spyrytuall, for euery man is bounde to honour god of his proper substaunce’, and he affirms that the law of God also obliges Christians to support those who minister to them in spiritual things.28 Thus it is requisite of the human laws governing tithes, if they are to be valid, that they must be ordered to ensure that the needs of the clergy are met. At the same time, it is not obligatory that Christians pay precisely one-tenth of their income for the support of the clergy because, St German argues, ‘I can not se howe it can be groundyd by the law of god or by the law of reason that the tenth parte sholde be payd for tythe & non other porcyon.’29 Because the circumstances of communities vary widely, no one set rule can be established by the divine law or the law of reason to determine what portion of the goods of the laity ministers should receive for their support in all communities: ‘[I]t folowyth persueantlye that yt belongyth to the lawe of man, to assygne thys porcyon or that as necessytye shall requyre for theyr [the clergy’s] sustenaunce.’30 As understood by St German, many areas of Christian life are included in this region in which human laws, although limited by the dictates of the divine law regarding what they can render legitimate, are indispensable for a proper understanding of the obligations the divine law lays on Christians. Most actions impacting the goods or person of another prescribed or prohibited by the divine law are in need of clarification by human laws, and these human laws are in turn limited in what they 27 St German does position himself to argue that absolutely no human law regulating matters of property can be considered contrary to the law of reason by asserting that the institution of private property itself is not prescribed by the law of reason at all but rather is based only on a human ordinance promulgated at a time when the population increased to the point that common possession was no longer practical: ibid., p. 19 This being the case, no person would have a right to any private property by the law of reason and human law would be absolutely binding in conscience regarding all matters of possession: ibid., pp. 33–5. Such a radical conclusion is difficult to sustain, however, and St German is never wholly comfortable with it despite its usefulness to his efforts to champion the authority of the Crown in Parliament. See ibid., pp. xxiv–xxviii. It is not clear that such an argument would wholly free human laws regulating property from restraints imposed by dictates of the law of God revealed after the institution of private property inasmuch as God’s law does, as discussed in this paragraph, establish laws ordering matters involving property. 28 Ibid., pp. 300–301. 29 Ibid., p. 300. 30 Ibid., p. 304.

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can render lawful by the dictates of the divine law. The giving of alms is ordained by the law of God and consequently ‘yf it were ordayned that noo almesse shuld be gyuen for no necessytie that custome and statute were voyde.’ Nevertheless, human law is responsible for ensuring that alms be distributed in a way that is not detrimental to society as a whole because human authorities are in a position to tailor the rules regulating almsgiving to the particular circumstances of the community. Thus, while human law cannot legitimately prohibit the giving of alms altogether: … the statute made in the .xxiii. yere of kynge Edward the thyrde, wherby it is ordayned that no man vnder payne of Imprysonement shall gyue any almesse to any valyaunt beggers that may well laboure, that they may so be compellyd to laboure for theyr lyuynge is a good statute, for it obseruyth the intent of the lawe of god.31

Similarly, Though symonie and vsury be prohibite by the law of god, yet that proueth not, that princis may not therfore hold ple therof, for takyng away of an other mannes goodes, and also periurye be prohibyte by the lawe of god, and yet princes holde plee therof, and thoughe Symonye and vsurye be prohibite by the lawe of god, yet it is not declared by the lawe of god, what is symonie, and vsery and what not. And it semeth, that princis takyng to them spirituall men, as theyr counsailours, maye doo that well ynough.32

The laws of God and reason, while often in need of particularization by human law, have priority over human law. Thus, although the aspects of a human law that reinforce divine precepts may be difficult to disentangle from the merely human particularizing elements of the law, the distinction is crucial. For example, regarding the jurisdiction of the Church courts over matters such as adultery, it is certainly not the case, as St German makes one of his interlocutors claim, that ‘it is all to one effecte, whether it [the jurisdiction of the clergy over particular cases] be by the lawe of god, or by the lawe of man.’ Rather, the basis of clerical jurisdiction is of crucial importance because ‘if they haue it only by custome, it may with a cause be taken fro theym … And yf it were by the lawe of god: then it might in no wyse be altered.’33 Because of the limitations imposed by the divine law and the law of reason, St German must qualify his assertion regarding the ‘absolute’ authority of Parliament over all property within the realm: [T]he parlyamente hathe an absolute power, as to the possessyon of all temporall thynges within thys realme, in whose handes so euer they be, 31

Ibid., p. 41. Christopher St German, The Addicions of Salem and Byzance (1534; reprint, New York, 1973), p. 46v (hereafter ‘Additions’). 33 Ibid., pp. 36–36v. 32

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spyrytualle or temporalle, to take theym from one manne, and gyue theym to an other, wythoute any cause or consyderacyon. For yf they doo it, it byndeth in the lawe. And yf there be a consideracion, that hit byndethe in lawe and conscience.34

On one hand, all determinations of Parliament concerning temporal matters, whether the determinations are just or not, are binding on English subjects ‘in the lawe’; one must either obey them or suffer the penalties established by Parliament. On the other hand, only those determinations of Parliament in accord with justice bind in conscience. Indeed, divine law or the law of reason may obligate a subject to disobey a law of the realm if it is contrary to the law of God or of reason. For example, parliamentary laws governing mortuaries (which are temporal and thus properly ordered by human laws ‘thoughe they were claymed by spyrytualle menne’) are binding in law and conscience because they ended unjust and unrighteous clerical abuses that gave rise to disorder within the realm.35 Yet, were Parliament to unjustly demand that a man hand over his possessions to his neighbour, he would not be obligated in conscience to obey (although he might be compelled to do so and would have no legal recourse). This principle is already put forward in the ‘Second Dialogue’ in which St German makes his doctor assert (with no objection from the student) that … yf yt were ordeynyd by statute that one man sholde haue a nother mannes lande and noo cause ys expressyd why he sholde haue yt, in that case thoughe he myght holde the lande by force of that statute, yet he coulde not holde yt in conscyence without there were a cause why he sholde haue yt.36

This also, presumably, means that if Parliament were to demand that community members not support the temporal needs of their spiritual ministers, subjects would be bound in conscience to disobey the law because both the divine law and the law of reason require that Christians support their ministers. The Issue of Defining Doctrine Raised For all of his attention to the authority of human laws, St German concedes that human laws contrary to God’s law are invalid and not binding in

34 Christopher St German, A treatise concernynge the diuision betwene the spirytualtie and temporaltie, in J.B. Trapp (ed.), The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol. 9 (New Haven, CT, 1979), p. 194 (hereafter ‘Division’). 35 Ibid., p. 194. 36 Doctor and Student, p. 287.

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37

conscience. It is therefore striking that in St German’s polemical works published prior to the promulgation of the Act of Supremacy there is little effort to justify either the vast powers claimed for the civil authorities over the Church or specific ecclesiastical laws as consistent with the dictates of scripture. Only a few scriptural references are scattered throughout the ‘Second Dialogue’ and the ‘New Additions’ of Doctor and Student, either in support of the laws of the realm or as the bases of objections that must be addressed, and discussions of their proper interpretation are generally brief.38 The exception is St German’s consideration of tithes in the ‘Second Dialogue’. Here he discusses biblical passages from First Corinthians, Galatians, Luke, Genesis and Matthew, and offers interpretations claiming that taken as a whole the scriptural mandate regarding the support of clergy is as he has stated: adequate maintenance must be provided by the community, but precisely what percentage of the income of parishioners this entails is variable depending on the circumstances of the community.39 Scriptural arguments are even less consequential in St German’s polemics over the next few years, A treatise concernynge the diuision betwene the spirytualtie and temporaltie, Salem and Bizance, and The Addicions of Salem and Byzance. In these texts biblical citations become scarcer, and the few citations that are provided have no essential bearing on St German’s arguments. No discussion of scriptural passages or their interpretation is provided dedicated to proving the legitimacy of the extensive powers claimed over ecclesiastical affairs for the king and Parliament or of specific human laws regulating ecclesiastical affairs.40 This dearth of scriptural references ought not to be taken as implying that St German has abandoned his belief that the Bible is the definitive source of the divine law. In The Additions of Salem and Bizance, he affirms that among the points on which clergy and laity agree is the affirmation that ‘al men be bound to beleue scripture, that is to say, the olde testament & the newe, and to folowe it as a thyng most necessary to our saluation.’41 Still less does St German call into question his earlier contention that 37 The role of the law of reason in limiting royal authority is also significant, but the remainder of this study will be focused on the law of God. 38 See Doctor and Student, pp. 188, 190, 288, 290, 295, 296, 320, 333. 39 Ibid., pp. 300–302. St German may have been prompted to return to the foundations when discussing this topic by the long-running debate that had surrounded it in England. Regarding the debate, see ibid., pp. lx–lxvi. 40 Scripture is cited: to highlight the responsibility of the clergy for vices among the laity (Division, p. 182; Christopher St German, Salem and Bizance, in John Guy, Ralph Keen, Clarence Miller and Ruth McGugan (eds), The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol. 10 (New Haven, CT, 1987), p. 331 (hereafter ‘Salem and Bizance’)); when calling into question More’s character (ibid., p. 346); to emphasize clerical failures in virtue (ibid., p. 353; Additions, p. 13v); to provide evidence for the imminent demise of Islam (Salem and Bizance, pp. 384–7); and to demonstrate that the apostles are saved (Additions, p. 27). 41 Ibid., p. 62.

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human laws must be in accord with the divine law to be valid. Throughout these works it is St German’s assumption, occasionally made explicit, that the powers he claims for the civil authorities and the manner in which the current regime has ordered ecclesiastical affairs must conform to the divine law. This is formulated as an assertion in the ‘Second Dialogue’ of Doctor and Student: ‘it can not be thought that a statute that is made by authorytye of the hole realme, as well of the kynge & of the lordes spyrytuall & temporall as of all the comons, wyl recyte a thynge agaynst the trouth,’ defined in this context as dictates ‘groundyd by the law of god or by the law of reason.’42 The same point is reiterated as a concession in the Division when discussing the authority of civil courts to try clerics: ‘[I]f it could be sufficiently proued, that it is ayenste the law of god, to put pristes to answer before lay men … I suppose verily that than … the kynges grace, & all his realme, wolde with good wyll conforme them self to it, but that was neuer sufficiently proued, as farre as I haue herde.’43 St German concedes that the validity of dictates of the Crown in Parliament ordering the affairs of the Church rests on conformity to the divine law. Prior to late 1534, however, he does little to defend the Church against disobedience of statutes ordering ecclesiastical affairs based on prior obedience to God’s will as revealed in scripture. With the exception of his biblical justification of laws governing tithes in the realm, he generally seems to assume that the burden of proof in such matters rests on the shoulders of opponents of the newly assumed government prerogatives; assertions that the laws of the realm are contrary to the divine law are generally shrugged off. St German complains that ‘many curates, nat regardynge the kynges statute in that behalfe [annulling mortuaries], perswade theyr parysshens, whan they be sycke, to beleue that they can nat be saued, but they restore them as moche as the olde mortuarie wolde haue amounted to.’ Certainly, if the contention that salvation is impossible without the payment of mortuary fees were true and scripturally grounded, it would qualify mortuaries as a thing necessary for salvation, but St German merely dismisses the claim, asserting rather than arguing that ‘the Curates that by that meanes get any recompence, by gyfte, or by quest, are bounde in conscience to restytucyon. For he is deceyued in his gyfte or bequest. For it procedeth nat of a free libertie, but vppon that vntrue infourmacyon.’44 In order to show that the repeal of mortuaries binds in conscience as well as in law, St German even details the reasons why the order of the realm necessitates their removal. Because the mortuaries and the perceived greed of clergy in collecting them cause

42 43 44

Doctor and Student, p. 300. Division, p. 199. Ibid., pp. 193–4.

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… great diuision and grudge betwyxte theym [the laity and the clergy], whiche broke the peace, loue, & charitie that shuld be betwene the curate and his parysshens, to the greate vnquietnes of many of the kynges subiectes, as well spirituall as temporall, and to the great daunger and perylle of theyr soules. For these causes the said mortuaries be adnulled by parlyament, as well in conscience as in the lawe.45

Nevertheless, the disunity that has arisen on account of mortuaries only justifies their removal if they are not, contrary to clerical claims, divinely mandated for salvation. If mortuaries were ordained by the law of God, human laws abolishing them would certainly not bind in conscience, however many problems might arise from abuses associated with them. Indeed, if mortuaries were prescribed in scripture, Christians would be obliged in conscience to disobey human laws eliminating them. In such a case human laws could not legitimately eliminate mortuaries, although they would have the authority to reform abuses associated with mortuaries. At the time of the writing of the Division, however, St German does not seem to appreciate that some people may support mortuaries not out of covetousness, but out of a sincere belief that they are divinely ordained as necessary for salvation. Consequently, in his efforts to justify the removal of mortuaries he does not even attempt to refute arguments, scriptural or otherwise, put forward by those who claim that mortuaries are mandated by God and thus cannot legitimately be annulled. Throughout his controversy with More, St German is content to challenge opponents of the regime to prove their criticisms, rather than offering evidence in support of royal ecclesiastical policy: And if master More can shew any lawes, that haue ben made by parliament, concernyng the spiritualtie, that the parliament had none auctoritie to make, or wher at the spiritualtie or the people haue iust cause to complaine: it wyl be wel done that he shewe them. And verily as me semeth, charitie shulde compell hym to do it, seinge that he is lerned in the lawes of the realme, as he is.46

Regarding clerical immunity from prosecution in civil courts, St German repeatedly, and in increasingly strident tones, challenges the clergy to prove that such immunity is ordained by the divine law. In the ‘New Additions,’ he notes that … if there be offence in them, that execute the common lawe therin [by arresting clerics], that is a greatte meruayle, that spirituall men haue done no more to refourme hit, then they haue done: and if there be no offence therin, than were it good, that hit were so openly knowen, that all scrupulositye of conscience myghte be auoyded.47

45 46 47

Ibid., pp. 194–5. Salem and Bizance, p. 371. Doctor and Student, pp. 326–7.

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In the Division he castigates clergy for claiming without proving that clerical immunity is divinely ordained. They have ‘reportid openly, & that somtyme in open sermons, that such puttyng to answer of pristes before lay men is prohibited by the law of god’, but ‘if it be as they say, that it is ayenst the lawe of god … than great defaut is in them, that they haue done no more to refourme it than they haue done, for clering the conscience of so many people, as than daily offend therby.’48 This challenge is repeated in Salem and Bizance. St German asserts: … that all the spirituall men of this realme are specially bounde in conscience to gether them selfe togyder, to se whether they can proue it sufficiently by authorite of scripture, that it is ageynste the lawe of god, that priestis shulde be putte to answere before laie men or not. And if they canne proue, that it is ageinste the lawe of god: I doubte not but that the kingis grace, and all the realme wil gladdely agree thervnto withoute ferther resistence. For who wolde worke directly ayenst the lawe of god? I truste no man. And if it can not be proued, that their pretence therin is grounded vpon the law of god, but vpon a singular loue and affection to them selfe, and that they haue fortified & meynteyned the same by lawes and decrees of the churche, whiche the churche had none authoritie to make, ne that were neuer accepted in this realme for lawes: then it wil be righte good and expediente, that they charitably reuoke that pretence of their fre wil: & that they be ouer that prohibited vpon greatte peynes, that thei shal not any ferther make that pretence.49

In none of these contexts, however, does St German consider the biblical texts commonly cited to support clerical immunity, neither criticizing interpretations supporting clerical immunity nor offering what he would consider proper interpretations. The increasing stridency of St German’s call for clergy to prove clerical immunity from civil courts or stop claiming it is matched by an apparent increase in his awareness of the importance of laws of the realm conforming to divine law, but an awareness that has not yet reached the point of directly wrestling with biblical interpretation. In The Additions of Salem and Bizance, the issue of conformity to the divine law is raised more frequently than in the Division or Salem and Bizance, but still in general rather than particular terms. In The Additions of Salem and Bizance, St German affirms that it is crucial to know whether the jurisdiction of the spiritual courts over ‘fornication, auoutrie, and suche other’ is grounded on the customs of the realm or on the law of God. If grounded on custom, the jurisdiction may be revoked by Parliament, but ‘yf it were by the lawe of god: then it might in no wyse be altered.’50 Revisiting the issue of tithes, St German complains against clergy making pretence that the tenth part belongs to priests by the law of God and, disregarding his own earlier 48 49 50

Division, p. 198. Salem and Bizance, p. 381. Additions, pp. 35v, 36v.

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efforts, laments that ‘though somme question be nowe lately risen, whether the tenth parte be due by the lawe of god or not, no man indeuoureth hym selfe to sette the matter in a clerenes.’ In order to ease unrest arising from tithe disputes, the statute of Silva Cedua, ‘whiche is taken by many spirituall men to be ageynst the lawe of god: wolde be sene, and if it be ageynste the lawe of god, then it wold be broken, and if it be not, then it wolde be confyrmed, and ferther be prohibite that none vppon a peyne shal say so herafter’.51 Similarly, … yf it can be proued, that the clergie haue auctorite of god to canonise a saint, and that they be all heritikes, that beleue it not, it must be obeyed, our lorde forbeade it shulde be otherwyse. But if it can not be proued, that they haue that auctoritie by the lawe of god, but that they haue hit onely by a custome and sufferaunce of Princis, thenne the reasonynge of hit shall doo good to cause the matter be knowen as it is.52

In the early 1530s, St German increasingly acknowledges the importance of perceived contrariety to God’s will as a source of disobedience of statutes ordering ecclesiastical affairs. Such acknowledgement is reflected in St German’s treatment of the authority of the king over the coercive punishment of heretics. The issue is first raised in the ‘Second Dialogue’ where in response to the doctor’s claim that because it is a matter of heresy, the Church should be able to set the penalty, the student simply asserts that such coercive corrections ‘be temporall and belonge to the iugement of the kynges courte’.53 In the Division, St German presents a more elaborate call for royal control over the prosecution of heresy in a discussion covering over four pages in the modern edition.54 In these two chapters St German highlights clerical abuses, potential abuses and perceived abuses involved in the trying of heretics, and calls for reform of the manner in which heresy trials are conducted to be led by the civil authorities: And it wyll be ryghte expedient, that the kynges highnes and his counsaylle loke specyally vpon this matter [the manner in which heresy trials are conducted], and nat to ceasse, tylle hit be brought to more quietnes than it is yet, and to se with great diligence, that pride, couetise, nor worldly loue be no iudges [in heresy trials], nor innocentes be punysshed, ne yet that wylfull offenders go nat without dewe correction.55

In this discussion, however, St German makes no effort to justify this imposition of royal authority over the ecclesiastical courts other than the earlier voiced opinion that the punishment of heretics involves coercion 51 52 53 54 55

Ibid., pp. 14–14v. Ibid., pp. 25–25v. Doctor and Student, p. 243. Division, pp. 188–193 (about six pages, front and back, in the original edition). Ibid., p. 193.

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and also the assertion that clerical abuses related to heresy trials threaten the peace of the realm and the temporal well-being of subjects.56 By The Additions of Salem and Bizance, St German moves beyond efforts to convince the reader of the need for reform to detailed explanations showing that the king determining how and even whether a heretic is punished in property or person does not encroach upon authority rightly exercised by the clergy. In a discussion covering about sixteen pages, front and back, St German relies on extensive argumentation and an array of statutory evidence to demonstrate that the king’s power over the coercive punishment of heresy includes not only the responsibility to punish those handed over to him by the clergy for correction, but also to determine whether a person should be punished as a heretic and, if so, whether the level of punishment set by the clergy is appropriate. St German also argues that, if the king is convinced in conscience that a person does not deserve punishment, or such extensive punishment, for heresy, he is bound not to enforce the punishment. Indeed, he can compel the bishop to remit any coercive punishment that the latter might be inclined to administer. If, for example, a ‘heretic’ is convicted for teachings that, while contrary to the teachings of the Church, are not strictly heretical because they involve matters over which the rightful jurisdiction of Church law does not extend, or if compelling evidence comes to the king that a person is convicted on the testimony of false witnesses, or if a person rightly convicted of heresy has done what could reasonably be expected to reconcile himself to the Church and the bishop nevertheless has withheld reconciliation, in each of these cases the king has not only the right but the responsibility to see the one wrongly incarcerated released from prison.57 Bizance, who often plays the antagonist to St German’s views in these dialogues, objects that ‘yf the kynge take vppon hym to trye the greatnes or lyttelnesse of the offence by his lawes, than he taketh vpon hym the keys of the churche.’ Salem, speaking for St German, responds: ‘if the kynge wold … take vpon him to make the absolution hym selfe: then myghte hit be sayde, he medled with the keyes.’ Later Salem again clarifies, ‘the lettynge oute of prisone of one that is excommunicate, hurteth not the keys, for that he shalbe accursed styll, when he is out of prison, as he was fyrste: and all that the kyng dothe therin, is to see, whether he may with conscience kepe the party any lenger in prison or not.’58 Spiritual judges may assign a certain bodily or pecuniary penance on a sinner as a condition of reconciliation with the Church, but if the party refuses the penance and rather chooses to remain unreconciled, the Church

56 57 58

Ibid., p. 191. Additions, pp. 36v–53. Ibid., pp. 39v, 42v.

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cannot compel him to it. In fact, so nearly may the king’s laws touch the power of the keys in excommunication without offending them that the king may compel the bishop to absolve a heretic, as long as the king does not pretend to absolve the heretic himself.60 Significantly, even as St German defends royal authority over the trying and punishing of heresy by emphasizing the need for reform of heresy trials and the responsibility of the king to determine who will be coercively punished as a heretic, he does not take the crucial final step needed to demonstrate the validity of royal authority relative to heresy. He does not attempt to refute directly claims that scripture authorizes the clergy to oversee the conduct of heresy trials or that scripture demands that the king coercively punish all persons identified by the clergy as heretics. As part of his increasing preoccupation with demonstrating the validity of royal ecclesiastical policies, St German’s works prior to the Act of Supremacy also provide evidence of mounting concern for the interpretation of scripture and with it the determination of the divine law. His growing perception of the importance of showing that the powers he claims for the civil authorities do not contravene the dictates of the divine law leads St German to take an increasingly restrictive view of the authority of the clergy to interpret the Bible and define the things necessary for salvation. In St German’s initial discussion of the divine law in the ‘First Dialogue’ of Doctor and Student, ‘the church’ is identified as the divinely empowered, infallible judge of the proper interpretation of biblical passages. By the term ‘church’ in this passage he seems clearly to mean the clergy or the ecclesiastical hierarchy inasmuch as he turns immediately to a discussion of canon law, implying that the authors of this are the same ‘church’ that he has just empowered to expound scripture.61 The ‘New Additions’ also reflects a conviction that the clergy are responsible for the authoritative interpretation of scripture. St German discusses the case of Naitanus, a king of the Picts who was seeking resolution of controversies regarding the proper determination of the date on which Easter ought to be observed. He inquired of Saint Colfride and received in response a letter ‘declaryng vnto hym by many auctorities of scripture, the very due tyme of kepynge of Ester’. Upon receiving the response, Naitanus … thanked almyghtye god, that had sente hym suche a gyfte out of the countreye of Englande. And it is nat to thynke, that he dyd thus, intendyng to gyue sentence therin by his owne auctoritie, for that belonged nat to hym,

59

Ibid., p. 41. Ibid., pp. 39v, 51v. The power to command absolution belongs to the king perhaps because the stigma of excommunication carries with it significant temporal disabilities; see ibid., p. 51. 61 Doctor and Student, p. 23. 60

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but he dyd hit to knowe the trouthe, and that he myghte thervpon shewe his fauoure to the better parte.62

Rather than endeavouring to explain away the apparent authority of a churchman over scriptural interpretation, St German emphasizes it, and he does so to the explicit detriment of royal authority over the definition of doctrine. Clerical authority over the definition of doctrine is confirmed in the discussion of tithes in the ‘Second Dialogue’. The doctor objects that ‘it is not conuenyent that lay men sholde argue the lawes and the decrees or constytucyons of the chyrche.’ The student responds: ‘In that that belongyth to the artycles of the fayth I thynke the people be bounde to byleue the chyrche, for the chyrche gaderyd to gyder in the holy goost can not erre in such thynges as belong to the catholyke fayth.’63 In this context, as a response to the question of whether laymen may interfere in ecclesiastical affairs, it seems clear that St German once again identifies the clergy, in distinction from the laity, as ‘the church’ whose determinations regarding matters of the faith carry the authority of the guidance of the Holy Ghost and are binding on Christians. The rest of St German’s response, however, already reflects why this approach to the interpretation of the scripture will ultimately prove untenable for his project of justifying royal control over the English Church. After conceding that the laity are bound to believe the clergy in ‘artycles of the fayth’, the student continues: … but where the chyrche [again meaning the clergy] makyth any lawes wherby the godes or possessyons of the people may be bounde, or by thys occasyon or that maye be taken fro theym there the people may lawfully reason whether the lawes byndyth theym or not for in suche lawes the chyrche may erre and be deceyuyd and deceyue other eyther for syngularytye or for couetyce or for some other cause,

and this is why laymen learned in the laws of the realm must investigate Church laws to ensure that they do not contravene the laws of the realm.64 We have already seen, however, that this sharp distinction between laws regulating essentials of the faith and laws regulating temporal matters is untenable. Indeed, in the discussion from which this citation is drawn, St German has already conceded that support of the bodily needs of the clergy by the laity is irrevocably ordained by the divine law. Thus belief in the necessity of ensuring such provision would qualify as an article of the faith among Christians, and such a belief, if it is sincere, will necessarily be expressed in actions. Consequently, St German’s claim that laymen ought to determine a reasonable level of support for the clergy depending on 62 63 64

Ibid., p. 329. Ibid., p. 309. Ibid.

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the circumstances of the community would be invalidated if the clergy, claiming the guidance of the Holy Ghost, were to claim that the Bible mandates as a thing necessary for salvation not only support for the clergy, but support for the clergy at a rate of 10 per cent. St German has already shown that in his view scripture does not lay down such a precise law regarding tithes, but he does not deny that in principle it could, and after all, he is simply a layman who has conceded that in determining what is necessary for salvation the final word belongs to the clergy. St German’s works throughout the early 1530s reflect a growing awareness of the problems associated with the view that clergy authoritatively interpret the Bible and thus define orthodoxy even though it is not until 1535 that he reaches the point of repudiating the power of the clergy to authoritatively interpret the Bible and replaces it with an authority that guarantees the consistency of authoritative interpretations of the divine law with the laws of the realm. In his controversy with More, St German does not deny that the clergy are the authoritative discerners of God’s will, but when he concedes this power it is not whole-heartedly. In the Division, when discussing whether laymen may inquire into heresy, St German merely concedes for the sake of argument without clearly affirming or denying that ‘though it were so, that the temporall men maye nat iudge, what is heresie and what nat, yet they may, as it semeth, by theyr owne auctoritie inquere of it, and enforme the ordinarie, what they haue founde.’65 Similarly, the claim that ‘it belongeth to the clergi to declare, what is the lawe of god, and what not’, is placed in the mouth of Bizance, who often presents views at odds with St German’s own, and is neither affirmed nor denied by St German’s mouthpiece, Salem.66 In fact, one of the major sources of strife between laity and clergy in England St German identifies as the claim by ‘spirituall rulers … that theyr auctoritie is so hygh, and so immediatly deriued of god, that the people are bounde to obeye them, and to accepte all that they do and teache, withoute argumentes resistence or grudgyng ayenst them’.67 In the works of controversy with More, St German also qualifies his earlier claim that the clergy are guided by the Holy Ghost in their deliberations over the divine law. St German still agrees … that in the congregation of the clergie, to goddes honour graciously gathered to gether: the good assistence of the spirite of god, accordynge to Christis 65

Division, p. 190. Additions, p. 46v. 67 Division, p. 180. This is not, St German clarifies in response to More, to claim that no part of the authority of clergy is immediately derived of God, but simply to point out that Christians are not obliged to accept without question every clerical pronouncement, especially those regarding the authority and privileges of the clergy: Salem and Bizance, pp. 373–6. 66

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promise, wyl be as verily present and assistent with them, as it was with his blessed apostels, yf they ordre them selfe in mekenes and charitie and put al their truste in god, as the apostels dydde.

The guidance by the Spirit is not, however, guaranteed to the clergy unconditionally: But if they wyll truste in their owne wyt and in worldly policie: then may they lightely lese the spirite of god. And whether it were so at the making of the lawes, which maister Moore speketh of concernyng heresie or not, I can not tel: but this I wil sey, that if they were not good and reasonable in them selfe at the first making, that they were neuer made by the assistence of the spirite of god.68

Perhaps most significant is St German’s claim that the quality of the pronouncements of the clergy indicates whether they are made with the guidance of the Spirit. This necessitates a locus of authority to judge whether clerical interpretations of the divine law are ‘good and reasonable’ and thus worthy of claiming divine sanction. By the end of The Additions of Salem and Bizance, St German has not yet identified this locus of authority, the final arbiter in the interpretation of scripture and the definition of doctrine, but his rhetoric points to public opinion, the common sense of the English populace, as the judge of the quality of clerical interpretations of God’s law. For example, the fact that ‘the kingis grace, and all the realme’ have not acquiesced in clerical claims to immunity from lay courts is taken as a sign that the clergy have thus far failed to ‘proue it sufficiently by auctorite of scripture, that it is ageynste the lawe of god, that priestis shulde be putte to answere before laie men’.69 It is not taken as a sign of stubbornness or disorder on the part of the king and realm. In his reconsideration of tithes in The Additions of Salem and Bizance, St German continues to speak of the clergy as having responsibility for clarifying the divine law, but this is not taken as implying that their pronouncements regarding the dictates of the divine law are necessarily to be believed. Thus if ‘spirituall men’ intend to maintain that the statute Silva Cedua is contrary to God’s law, they should not expect the laity to simply accept their authoritative word for it, but rather they ‘are specially bounde to doo that in them is to put such thynges out of argument, and to set suche matters in suche a cleretie, that it shall appere, that they wolde not take one peny of the people for theyr spirituall ministration more then they oughte to doo of ryghte’.70 In The Additions of Salem and Bizance, the constraint of clerical authority over the definition of doctrine is carried farther, and several themes that will come to play key roles in St German’s polemic after the 68 69 70

Salem and Bizance, p. 376. Ibid., p. 381; see also Division, p. 198. Additions, p. 14v.

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Act of Supremacy make their first appearance. Here he forcefully reiterates that even the unanimous teachings of the clergy are not a sure guide to the dictates of the divine law, saying that ‘if all the clergie of christendome wolde prohibite … any article of the law of this realme, that is not against the law of god nor the law of reson: that prohibition shuld not be of effect in this realme.’71 Consequently, lest the king … be enforced to gyue credence to spiritual men in maters concernyng their iurisdiction ageynst his owne. It is not therfore conuenient for any man to say, that lay men ought not to reson the power of the churche. For if it dimynishe the right of the crowne, waste the substaunce of the realme, prohibite the laboure or lyuynge of the people, they may well speake of it. And also ar bounde to speake of it, specially they that be lerned in the lawes of the realme.72 Also it semeth to be right expedient, that certayne articles … be gathered to gether, and that preachers be commaunded, that in euerye sermon, they shall moue the people to fulfylle them, as nygh as god shall gyue them grace: and suche other also as the parlyament shall thynke conuenient … And one of the said articles, as it semeth, may be this, that the preacher diligentlye instructe the people, what warkes beste please god: and also to instructe them, in what order they ought to be done.73

It is crucial to note, however, that all power claimed for the king in these passages is as the defender of the faith, not the definer of the faith. While the clergy cannot prohibit any law of the realm unless it is contrary to God’s law, this is in no sense a response to those who would claim that some laws of the realm are contrary to the divine law and thereby invalid whether declared to be so by the clergy or not. The Additions of Salem and Bizance also sets the stage for upcoming works by emphasizing the authority of scripture, and St German even provides some hints pointing toward its authoritative expositor. Thus one point of religion on which clergy and laity could agree in the troubled 1530s was ‘that al men be bound to beleue scripture, that is to say, the olde testament & the newe, and to folowe it as a thyng most necessary to our saluation.’ Along with this, he stresses that the clergy are not the sole expositors of scripture. Indeed, ‘the diuersite that is betwixt them [the clergy and the laity] therin standeth specially in this poynte: The clergie pretende, that they onely ought to declare scripture to the laye menne, and that they oughte to folowe theyr teachynge and declaration therin, and not to expounde it them selfe.’74 In fact, the laity have no need for the clergy to expound scripture for them because Christians ‘haue suche a law, that is to say the law of Christ, that if we wyl with mekenes study howe we 71 72 73 74

Ibid., p. 58. Ibid., p. 60v. Ibid., pp. 66v–67. Ibid., pp. 62–62v.

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myght come to the true knowlege of it, we shall pleynly se in it the true conclusions of al thinges that be necessarye to our saluation’. If the clergy labour to withhold the scriptures from the laity: … it coude not be thought to be bicause the truth will not appere by it, for in dede as they knowe best, all truth apereth in it. And therfore if they shulde resiste to haue it come to perfite knowlege, it were lyke that they dydde it for feare that it shulde appere therby, howe far theyr maner of lyuyng nowe in these dayes varieth fro it, than that they shulde doubt that the trouth wold not appere by it.75

In The Additions of Salem and Bizance St German also establishes a principle that will become foundational to his claim that the Crown in Parliament is authorized to interpret the Bible. In discussing the liberty of the church, St German points out that this is not equivalent to the liberty of the clergy: ‘For it is no more their libertie then it is the libertie of al the people of Englande. For al the people of Englande make the churche of Englande.’76 The importance of this definition of ‘the church’ to the interpretation of the Bible will not be clearly drawn out until An Answer appears, but it can be glimpsed already when one recalls that in Doctor and Student St German asserts that the determination of the dictates of the divine law is under the authority of ‘the church’. In Doctor and Student, the context clearly shows that by ‘church’ he means the clergy. By 1534, the sole authority of the clergy to interpret scripture has been undermined, while nevertheless leaving untouched the assertion that ‘the church’ authoritatively defines doctrine. With this new definition of ‘the church’, all that St German needs is to find an authoritative spokesperson for ‘al the people of Englande’, and this spokesperson, acting on behalf of the Church, will have the power to promulgate binding interpretations of scripture. The Additions of Salem and Bizance also introduces, however, a competing definition of ‘the church’ and thus also a competing locus of authoritative interpretation of the Bible. In discussing the canonization of saints, the issue of orthodoxy comes to the fore because only the orthodox can be canonized. The discussion elicits the following considerations from Salem regarding the determination of doctrine: … that the churche maye not erre in thynges that be of the faithe, I take it to be vnderstonde, where any great dout ryseth concernynge the faith. And that, that dout is commytted to the churche: wherby I vnderstonde mooste proprely the generall Counsayle, that they then may not erre. And therto I can ryghte well agree. For it is not to thynke, that our lorde that is the very truthe, wolde leue his people without a dewe meane how to come to knowlege of the truthe.77

75 76 77

Ibid., pp. 32–32v. Ibid., p. 49v. Ibid., p. 24v.

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The authorization of the general council to determine matters of the faith has the added advantage of ensuring uniformity of belief among Christians. Thus while Salem argues that canonization rightly belongs to the authority of princes (and should be reclaimed by princes on account of clerical abuses), in order to avoid … variances betwixt the countreyes, when one wolde take one as holy and blessed, and the other not … it were moste conuenient, that it [canonization] shulde be done at a generall counsayle. And that princis and their ambassadours shoulde be therin iudges, takyng the spiritualtie as their counsaylours in that behalfe.78

This passage also provides insight into whom St German understands as wielding authority at a legitimate council, an issue upon which he will expand in later works. The authority of a general council could be especially valuable at this ‘daungerous tyme’ of strife within Christendom, and thus the clergy should before all others be … dylygent callers on to haue a generall counsaill … to determyne, what power the clergie ought to haue, by the lawe of god, and what by custome or by graunte of princis, and what not. And that they wolde be contented to renounce all suche auctorite as the sayd counsail shuld thynke expedient to be renounsed.79 And if suche a generall counsayle were gathered, it is no doubte, but that they wolde holly agree, that the clargie shoulde haue all the power and auctoritie that was gyuen to them of Christe. For they might not take it fro them if they wolde.80

By 1534 and the publication of The Additions of Salem and Bizance, St German has claimed broad powers for the Crown in Parliament over religious affairs in England and called relentlessly on those authorities to use their powers to quiet strife between clergy and laity in England in the interest of the eternal as well as the temporal well-being of persons on both sides. By this time, however, St German has done little to demonstrate that the Crown in Parliament is properly authorized to exercise the powers he calls on them to assume. Of course, St German consistently states that such power rightly belongs to the civil authorities, and he affirms that they would never remove from clerics any powers or possessions to which the clergy are entitled by God’s law. At the same time, as the paucity of scriptural citations in the works through The Additions of Salem and Bizance shows, St German makes little effort to convince those who believe that stripping clergy of authority to which they are entitled by scripture is precisely what Henry and Parliament have been doing. During the span from the end of 1534 until 1538, by contrast, St German publishes three works in which close attention is paid to the scriptures, their interpretation, and especially 78 79 80

Ibid., pp. 26v–27. Ibid., pp. 29v–30. Ibid., p. 32v.

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the way they could be used to legitimate the ecclesiastical policy pursued by the king and Parliament in the 1530s. The Issue of Defining Doctrine Engaged In A treatyse concerninge the power of the clergye, and the lawes of the Realme, published in late 1534 or early 1535, almost synchronously with the promulgation of the Act of Supremacy, St German puts forward a defence of royal supremacy on a par with the defences provided by Tyndale and Gardiner from the perspective of biblical justification of the royal supremacy. No longer content to merely assert the conformity of royal policy to the divine law, in this work St German pays close attention to scripture and its interpretation in an effort to demonstrate that royal supremacy over the Church is biblically mandated and also to show that particular royal policies regarding ecclesiastical affairs are consistent with God’s revealed will for the Church. Even a cursory reading of the Power makes it clear that there has been an important change in St German’s approach to defending royal supremacy. The text begins with a brief introduction reiterating the essential relationship between royal and clerical power; so deeply are they intertwined that the true extent of one cannot be known without investigating the other. St German then continues the argument begun in earlier texts that the Crown in Parliament is authorized to order all temporal affairs of the realm related to the Church, and indeed is duty bound to maintain and conscientiously exercise that authority to promote the worldly as well as the eternal well-being of English subjects. The powers claimed are similar, but the assumption that the validity of the powers is self-evident has been replaced with a sustained effort to demonstrate the consistency of St German’s vision of the royal supremacy with the dictates of scripture. The first three chapters consist of biblical citations in Latin with English translations, the intention of which is to prove, in the words of the first and third chapter headings: ‘that kinges and princes haue theyr auctoritye immediatly of god. And that honour and obedience ought to be gyuen to them’, and ‘that kynges and princes in tyme past haue ordered thynges that some men call spirituall’.81 The final chapter includes a justification of the authority of laymen, such as St German himself, to interpret the Bible, and the penultimate chapter examines a series of biblical texts typically cited to demonstrate that the clergy are authorized by God directly to exercise authority over both spiritual and temporal affairs in Christian realms, 81 Christopher St German, A treatyse concerninge the power of the clergye, and the lawes of the Realme (London, 1534/1535), sig. A2–A7 (hereafter ‘Power’).

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showing that, when properly interpreted, the texts do not authorize the clergy to exercise temporal jurisdiction. In between, a number of royal ecclesiastical policies are investigated, often with an eye to demonstrating their conformity with the divine will as revealed in scripture. St German’s collection of biblical verses in support of royal supremacy includes a number of Old Testament citations, primarily from Psalms, Proverbs and the historical books. Many of the verses credit God with immediate control over the determination of who rules the realm. Others attribute to God even more direct control over the course of politics such as Proverbs 21 (‘As diuisyons of waters are in the handes of our lorde, so is the herte of a kynge in the hande of our lorde and whyther soeuer he wyll he shall bowe it’82). For good measure, St German includes passages of biblical advice exhorting kings to rule justly and wisely. From the New Testament, the classic exhortations to obey one’s prince, Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2 are naturally included, as is Christ’s statement from Luke 22 that ‘Kinges of the people haue power ouer them.’83 In the third chapter St German focuses on biblical verses that show the divine will regarding the extension of royal authority over things that ‘some men’ call spiritual. Old Testament passages are cited recording how the godly kings David, Solomon and Jehoshaphat ordered the financial and institutional affairs of the ancient Israelite priests. St German also includes a passage from Genesis showing that the goods and lands of the ancient Egyptian priests were subject to the will of pharaoh and his agent Joseph, perhaps intended to show that the law of reason also ordains royal authority over ecclesiastical affairs.84 82

Ibid., sig. A4v. Ibid., sig. A2v. 84 Ibid., sig. A5v–A7. A similar citation is used to show that support of ministers is ordained by the law of reason: Doctor and Student, p. 300. St German’s new awareness of the importance of demonstrating the consistency of the royal supremacy with the dictates of scripture is also reflected in Constitutions Provincial. This text does not focus on biblical interpretation and can be understood as the culmination of St German’s calls for parliamentary reform of clerical abuses. Nevertheless, even in such a text St German pauses to present a scriptural justification of royal authority over the temporal affairs of the church. ‘It is resyted’, he informs his readers, among the constitutions of the Church ‘[t]hat lay men be forboden, as well by the lawes of god as of man, to ordre and dyspose the churche goodes: by the which terme churches goodes, spirytuall men vnderstande, as well landes and tenementes, as chatels personels. And I suppose, that there is no lawe of god that dothe prohibyt laye men to dyspose and determyne the right of landes and goodes of the church: but that it most properly apperteyneth to theym, and nat to the clergye. And that semeth to appere. Luc. xii. Whan our lorde refused to deuide the enheritaunce bytwexte the two brethern. And it is to suppose, that as he refused to medell with the iugement of suche temporall matters him self, that he wolde his appostels and discyples, to whom the clergye be successours shulde doo the same. And as it semeth he wolde also that the Emperour that tyme beinge, and his lawes shulde doo it and nat he’: Christopher St German, A treatise concernynge diuers of the constitucyons prouynciall and legantines (London, 1535), sig. E5–E5v. In his 83

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It is noteworthy that all of the biblical references in the first three chapters are provided without commentary; St German apparently feels confident that each passage so clearly supports his position that no explication is needed. This reliance on the ‘plain text’ of scripture is consistent with St German’s presentation of the basic rules of biblical interpretation in the Power. He identifies as his primary hermeneutical rule the claim that the literal sense is decisive in scriptural disputes. St German’s discussion of clerical immunity from royal courts reflects both his preference for the literal sense as well as his new focus on defending his position with biblical evidence. The first several pages of his discussion of clerical immunity echo earlier considerations from the Division and the Salem and Bizance dialogues. While the ancient laws of England call for the trying of clerics in royal courts, the clergy, through pretence that this is contrary to God’s laws, have established a custom of clerical immunity. Clerics, however, have not gratefully accepted this concession, but under pretence of divine sanction have agitated for even more preferential treatment than the laws and customs of the realm endorse. St German then points out that the clergy have not offered compelling proof of their assertions from the law of God: ‘And if ther be no suffycyent proufe, that it is against the lawe of god, than the custome of the realme is good, to put them to answere vpon.’85 In contrast to his earlier works, however, in the Power St German moves beyond asserting that the clergy have not proven clerical immunity to show that their efforts to do so are flawed, and flawed precisely because they misunderstand or ignore the literal sense of scripture: And where dyuers spyrituall men haue in tyme past made pretence as well in open sermons, as in other communycatyons, that it is agaynste the lawe of god to put preestes to aunswer before laye men. And for profe therof haue layde this texte. Nolite tangere christos meos. [Psalm] ciiii [modern numbering, 105]. That is to saye, Touch nat my annoynted, which they applye only to prestes. It is apparant that it is no lytteral exposycion, for after the letter of the seyd texte. It maye as wel be applyed to kynges, yea, and to euery christen man, as to prestes. And after saynte Augustyne, and saynte Hierome, there is no sence of scrypture suffycyente to proue an argument but only the lyterall sence.86

Again emphasizing the importance of the literal sense, in the eighteenth chapter St German considers a series of proofs for clerical authority over both spiritual and temporal affairs, the sixth of which is the argument in which the light of the sun and moon referred to in Genesis 1 is taken works of controversy with More, St German assumes the authority of Parliament to reform ecclesiastical laws ordering temporal affairs if they are sources of division or contrary to the laws of the realm. In Constitutions Provincial, however, he goes beyond this to demonstrate that the civil authorities are authorized to order the temporal affairs of the Church by the will of Christ as expressed in scripture. 85 Power, sig. B2v–C1, quotation at sig. C1. 86 Ibid., sig. C1–C1v.

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as symbolizing the spiritual and temporal powers. The light of the sun is compared to the power of the clergy, and the light of the moon is compared to the power of the temporal authorities, both in the sense that lunar light is less than and in the sense that it is derived from the light of the sun. St German responds: That exposicion wherby the spiritualtye is compared to the sonne, and the temporaltye to the mone … is no lytterall exposicion, and there is no sence of scripture suffycient to proue an argument by but only the lytterall sence. And so that … reasone is of small effecte to proue that the clergye haue both powers, for it may as lyghtly be denied as affermed.87

Despite such statements extolling the primacy of the literal sense of scripture, St German does not in all cases rely merely on the literal words of the text to arrive at a true understanding of the Bible. Rather, the intent of the speaker must be determined, and it is not so much what the speaker literally says, as what the speaker literally intends that is decisive. To determine the speaker’s intent, several interpretive tools can be employed. First, context must be considered. For example, taking context into account it is clear that the passage from Luke 22 in which the apostles say to Christ, ‘here are two swords’, and he responds, ‘it is enough’, does not mean that Christ willed the clergy to control both the temporal and the spiritual swords. The context, in which Christ is warning his disciples of difficult times ahead, shows that the disciples were pointing out that they had two swords with which to defend themselves. However, Christ, knowing that he was to die soon, responded, ‘it is ynough. As though he had sayd, those two swerdes suffyce and be ynough to defende me fro deth aswell as many thousand of swerdes shulde do, for I that accordyng to the wyl of my father wyl wylfully suffre deth for man loke for no defence of swerdes.’ Once the context is taken into account, St German believes, it is clear that this interpretation best reflects … the intente why he sayd of the two swerdes, it is ynough, & nat to sygnyfye therby that thappostelles shuld haue both powers spirituall and temporal, and if it shuld be taken to be ment so, it shulde nat be by a litterall sence, & after Saint Augustyn and saynt Hierome, it is onely of the lytterall sence of holye scripture that a suffycient argument may be taken, & so we thynke those wordes to bere but a small effecte any thynge to abate the power of princes.88

Another key to discerning the intention of a biblical speaker is consistency with the rest of scripture. Some claim that when in Matthew 18 Christ told his disciples ‘What so euer ye bynde vpon erthe shalbe bounde in heuyn, and what so euer ye lose vpon erthe, shalbe losed in heuen’, he meant by those words that 87 88

Ibid., sig. G6v. Ibid., sig. D3–D3v.

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… his disciples & their successours shulde haue power to make lawes, wherby princes and their subiectes shulde be bounde, and that therfore the power of princes after the commynge of Christe was abated euyn by the lawe of god. To that it may be answered that holye scrypture is nat to be expounded onely after the lytterall sence of the texte, that it is written in, but after other textes of scrypture concerning the same matter. And they to be so construed and declared, that there be no contraryositie in theym, as vndoutedly there is nat, if they be well and truly vnderstande.89

Because ‘there be dyuers auctorityes of Scripture, wherby it appereth that oure lorde neuer intended by his commyng in to this world to take any power fro princes, but that they shulde haue lyke power ouer their subiettes after his commyng as they hadde before’,90 Matthew 18 cannot be interpreted in such a way as to derogate from the power of princes. Also, Christ in John 20 is recorded as saying to his disciples … as my fader hath sent me, I sende you. And certayne it is that the very intente, why Christ was sente by his father into the worlde nexte to our redemption, was to teche & preche the truth, and to fulfyll the wyll of his father in mekenesse, pacyence, sufferaunce, & such other, and to enduce the peple through his example and doctryne, to dispyse this worlde, & to desyre the worlde to come.91

Christ here clearly sent his apostles to be teachers and preachers as he was, not to be like princes or take power from princes, and Matthew 18 must be construed in a manner consistent with this commission. In determining Christ’s intentions regarding the power of the clergy, St German also employs an interesting piece of quid pro quo reasoning: [T]he same text what soeuer ye binde, &c. to one intent, is construed accordynge to thentent of the maker, that is to say of oure mayster Christe, & nat onely accordyng to his wordes for his intent was that suche auctoritie as he wold his disciples shuld haue therby: shulde go to their successours to the ende of the worlde, and yet his wordes streche onely to the apostels selfe.

Because opponents of clerical power grant more than Christ actually said regarding who may exercise the power in question, it is only reasonable that supporters of clerical power be more modest regarding the extent of that power: [H]is [Christ’s] wordes in that behalfe shall be taken to streche to their [the apostles’] successours, and than syth his entent shalbe construed more largely 89

Ibid., sig. C4v–C5. Ibid., sig. C7. Passages cited to show that Christ did not intend to lessen the power of princes are Luke 20 and Matthew 22 (render unto Caesar) and John 18 (my kingdom is not of this world). Christ’s refusal to be made a king or divide an inheritance and his choice of a life of poverty also show that he clearly intended to take no power from princes: ibid., sig. C7–C8. 91 Ibid., sig. C8–C8v. 90

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than his wordes streche vnto as to the contynuaunce of their auctorite, why than shall nat his intent be construed more strayte than his wordes sounde vnto, for declaryng what auctorite he wolde his discyples shulde haue … ?92

When all of these factors are taken into account, it is clear that Matthew 18 must be interpreted in a way that does not compromise the power of Christian princes. Such being the case, it seems that in Matthew 18 Christ only … gaue them [the apostles] auctoritie therby, to seperate euyll men for their offences, fro the communyon of the good people, & to commaunde the good people also to eschewe theire company, & to make absolution therof agayne. &c. Whiche be great powers and maye do gret good if they be charytably put in executyon.93

A further interpretive tool for discerning the intention of the speaker is that in all cases it is to be assumed that neither Christ nor any other authoritative scriptural voice would command anything unreasonable or unduly troubling to worldly order. Thus in Luke 6, when Christ instructs his followers not to try to retrieve anything that is stolen from them, the text cannot be taken simply as it stands: ‘[I]f that texte shulde be onely taken accordyng to the sence of the same text withoute anye further decleratyon therof, than all propertie were put awaye, and lawes and iustyce concerninge goodes shulde nothing be regarded, wherby the hole commenwelth shulde be distroied.’ Because of the troubling consequences of taking the passage literally, it is necessary to look to other texts for aid in reaching a more reasonable interpretation: ‘And therfore that it was nat thentente of our maister Christ, that the seyde wordes shulde be so vnderstande, it appereth by the wordes that he sayde Mat. xix. Non facies furtum. Thou shalte do no thefte.’ Because Christ here forbids the unlawful taking of goods from one person by another, he cannot will that … he that they were taken fro ought nat by iustyce to aske them [his goods] agayne. But rather that his [Christ’s] wordes shulde gyue occasyon to him that the goodes were taken fro, to prepare himselfe to suffre the wronge as in his herte, and to do nomore for the reuengynge of the seyde wrongfull takynge, than shulde be expedyent to reforme him that dyd the wronge, and to feare other that they shulde nat do lyke offence. And to that intente charitye wyll that the owner shall aske his goodes agayne.94

Another passage from Matthew 18, in which Christ counsels anyone who is offended by a brother and cannot be reconciled by any other means to ‘shewe it to the chyrche’ for a decisive judgement on the matter, is used by some to support the contention that ‘the clergye haue auctorytie by 92 93 94

Ibid., sig. C6–C7. Ibid., sig. D1–D1v. Ibid., sig. C5–C5v.

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the gospell to here all causes that shulde be shewed vnto them by any maner of complaynt.’ Thus they misconstrue the passage as empowering the clergy to serve as judges in all cases; they reason that because ‘the gospell commaunded to shewe the offence to the chyrch, & sheweth nat in what cases that it shall therfore be vnderstande in all cases, and that bycause it is sayd, shewe it to the chyrche, that it was mente thereby that it shulde be shewed to the clergye.’95 St German refutes this interpretation by recalling the definition of ‘the church’ introduced in The Additions of Salem and Bizance: ‘To that [the above interpretation] it maye be answered that by that worde chyrche is nat vnderstande only the clergye, for they vndoutydly make nat the chyrche, for the hole congregation of Christen people maketh the chyrche.’96 He then applies the reasonableness criterion to show that in fact this passage, rightly interpreted, affirms the authority of English law over all temporal matters: And bycause the hole people of christendom can nat be gathered togyder, so that they may haue such matters shewed vnto them all: therfore it can nat be taken that our lorde ment that it shuld be shewed to al the people, for he commaunded nothyng but that may well & resonably be obserued: And therfore whan it is sayd shewe it to the chyrch. It is to be vnderstande therby, that it shall be shewed vnto them that by the lawe & custome there vsed haue auctorite to correct that offence And therfore he that in this realme wyll gyue charytable monycyon to his neyghbour that offendeth in suche a thynge as the kynge by his lawes & custome of his realme may lawfully punysshe, and he wyll nat yet amende. Wherfore he sheweth it to the kynge or to his iuges, or to his iustyces of peace in the contrey, or other offycers that after the lawe & custome of the realme may reforme it. He hathe therin right well fulfylled the gospell.97

Not only St German’s understanding of the meaning of ‘church’, but also the criterion of biblical consistency shows that ‘tell it to the church’ cannot reasonably be construed to mean that civil suits are to be tried before the clergy. ‘[I]t shulde seme,’ St German points out, … to make a repugnauncy in scripture. If it coulde be proued that our lorde gaue auctoritie to his appostles & discyples to make lawes, that shulde take any power fro kynges. For it is sayde. Psal. ii. … O ye kinges vnderstande ye: and be lerned that iuge the worlde: by whiche wordes it appereth that kynges iuge the worlde. And howe coulde that be trewe if the appostles & discyples of Christ & their successours shuld haue auctorite to make lawes generally to bynde princes and their people: And scripture is alway true.98

A new concern to prove the consistency of Henrician ecclesiastical policies with the divine law is also reflected in St German’s discussion of tithes and 95 96 97 98

Ibid., sig. D3v–D4. Ibid., sig. D4. Ibid., sig. D4–D4v. Ibid., sig. D5–D5v.

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the authority to regulate them. We have noted that tithes is one of the very few topics regarding which St German attended to biblical evidence to support his claims prior to the publication of the Power. In the Power, he revisits the issue of tithes, and, although the discussion of tithes is shorter in the Power than in Doctor and Student, the later text strengthens the basic arguments of the earlier from the perspective of offering scriptural proof, eliminated is the discussion of more precise legal issues surrounding payment of tithes that dominates the discussion in Doctor and Student. The shift in focus from presenting the details of royal policies relative to tithes to convincing subjects of the validity of those policies is reflected in two ways. First, in Doctor and Student, the authority of John Gerson is introduced by the doctor of divinity as supporting the opinion that a 10 per cent tithe is a dictate of the divine law, but his saying is reinterpreted to show that in fact he did not believe that a tithe of precisely 10 per cent is due by the law of God. In the Power, however, when the authority of Gerson is cited, he is presented as an unambiguous supporter of the view that ‘The payenge of tythes to prests is by the law of god so that they therwith maye be susteyned, but to assygne this porcyon or that, or to chaunge it into other rentes, is by the lawe posytyue, that is to say, by the lawe of man.’99 Secondly, in his discussion in Doctor and Student, relying on the traditional division of Old Testament laws into moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, St German notes that the paying of the 10 per cent tithe among the Jews was according to ‘the law of god in the olde testamente callyd the Judycyals’.100 In the Power, he clarifies the significance of the law of a 10 per cent tithe being a judicial precept. He explains that … if it be sayde that the tenthe parte amonge the Iewes in the olde lawe, was a lawe of god, & that therfore it ought to be obserued, among cristen men as other morall lawes be. Yt may be answered, that payeng of the tenth parte for tythes is no morall lawe, and therfore it cessed whan the passyon of Christe was fully preched & knowen amonge the people as other Iudicyalles and Ceremonialles dyd.101

Not only are judicial and ceremonial aspects of the Old Testament law abrogated with the passion of Christ, one also must be careful in applying Old Testament precedents to ensure that changing circumstances have not rendered the precedent invalid. For example, some cite Deuteronomy 17 in which the Jews are instructed to settle disputes by allowing the priests to act as judges to show that ‘syth prestes in the newe law be of no lese auctorytie and power than preestes of the olde lawe were &c. that they 99 100 101

Ibid., sig. A8v. Doctor and Student, p. 301. Power, sig. B1–B1v.

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ought to haue no lese auctorytye and power than the other hade, but rather more’. In fact, however, the higher dignity of Christian priests, because it is spiritual dignity, proves the opposite of what it is alleged to prove: ‘And therfore for the highnes of their auctoritye in spirituall thynges, the iugement & orderynge of temporall thinges is the more vnconuenyente for them.’ The difference in authority between priests of the old and new law is confirmed by the apostles themselves who in Acts 6 are reported to have eschewed ministering at tables because it … thoughe it were a right charitable dede, was vnmete for their offyce which stode specyally in preachyng and teching and in prayer and contemplacyon, and other ghostly counseyls and ministracyons to the people. How far vnmete is it than for their successours to take vpon them as it were a dede of highe perfectyon, to iuge betwixt cause and cause, tytle and tytle, as well of landes & tenementes, as of goodes and catales.102

With these interpretive tools – the primacy of the literal sense and the importance of adhering to the literal intent (not merely the words) of the text, the necessity of consistency among biblical teachings, the requirement that passages not be construed as demanding anything ‘unreasonable’, and the distinction between binding and non-binding laws of the Old Testament – St German defends interpretations supporting Henrician policies and refutes claims that scripture opposes the Henrician supremacy in principle or in practice, focusing primarily on denying biblical bases for temporal authority among the clergy. We have already seen several of his arguments undermining clerical claims to temporal authority. To these can be added the eighteenth and penultimate chapter of the Power in which St German considers a flurry of citations claimed by some to prove clerical authority, showing that in each case the authority claimed by the clergy over temporal affairs is not in fact supported by scripture. Because in 1 Corinthians 2 it says that the spiritual man judges all things, supporters of clerical authority reason that this must mean that the clergy have jurisdiction over temporal as well as spiritual matters. St German, however, explains that by ‘spiritual man’ Paul means a person who follows the judgement of the Spirit, and such a person judges all things truly – judging spiritual goods to be true and abiding, while judging worldly things to be vain, deceitful and fleeting. By this standard, it is clear that by ‘spiritual men’ Paul does not mean clerics since many of them are less ‘spiritual’ in this sense than many lay Christians.103 When later in the book (1 Corinthians 6) Paul says that ‘ye shall iudge aungels’, this does not mean that because the clergy will judge angels they are clearly authorized to judge mere temporal matters. Rather, Paul addresses the statement to ‘the churche of god that 102 103

Ibid., sig. G7v–H1. Ibid., sig. G4–G4v.

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is at Corinth’, which is to say all of the Christians at Corinth, not merely the clergy. Furthermore, by judging the angels Paul means ‘that they shall approue the sentence of god gyuen vpon angels good & bad, as euery good crysten man shal’.104 Finally, in Luke 10 Christ says to his seventytwo disciples ‘He that hereth you, hereth me’, and because this is said generally, and not limited to specific matters, then the clergy, as successors of these disciples, are to be obeyed in all things, temporal and spiritual, as Christ himself would be. However, the context clearly shows that by thus speaking Christ meant only that when the disciples speak and act as Christ himself spoke and acted, that the words and example can be as salvific as if Christ himself had been present: Furthermore it is nat lyke that the meanynge of our lorde was by those wordes that his discyples shulde haue both powers spirituall and temporall: for if he had entended so, he wolde nat haue sent them forth so poorely as he dyd … and bydde them to lyue of their prechynge.

The true meaning of Christ’s words, contrary to the exposition given by some clergy, is that … whan preachers preche the gospell truely vnto the people & declare vnder what maner the kingdom of heuen may come vnto them, that they be than reuerently & deuoutly to be herd. But if they pretende to haue by that text or any other: more worldly honour power, or rychesse, than our master Christ lefte vnto them, than the people ar nat bounde to obey theym in that pretence.105

While the bulk of the defence of royal supremacy is occupied answering opponents citing biblical sources, St German also addresses historical arguments intended to demonstrate the independent authority of the clergy in secular matters. As with his examination of scriptural sources, the new emphasis in the Power on demonstrating rather than merely asserting the inadequacy of opposing arguments is obvious. To refute the argument that bishops have a right to judge temporal affairs because the emperors Theodosius and Charlemagne authorized them to do so, St German emphasizes three points. First, with echoes of the preamble to the Act in Restraint of Appeals in the background, St German reminds his readers that ‘the kinges grace here [in England] knoweth no superiour vnder god.’ Consequently, laws enacted by Theodosius, Charlemagne, or any other foreign potentate have no binding authority over the English king. Secondly, St German reminds his readers that while England might be an ‘empire’ led by a king answering to no other ruler save God, that ruler is still bound to act in accord with properly enacted laws. This being the case, ‘if the kinges grace made such a graunte to his bysshops in this 104 105

Ibid., sig. G5–G6. Ibid., sig. H4v–H6v.

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realme, that they might holde ple of Temporall thynges, the graunte were voyde, for it were agaynst his lawes.’ Finally, St German points out that there is no reliable proof that the laws in question ever really were enacted by the emperors at all.106 Another historical argument, this one claiming blanket temporal authority for the clergy, holds that while temporal authority originally belonged to the emperors, this authority was taken from them because of their sin and translated to the clergy. While granting that many of the emperors did abuse their power, especially by mistreating early Christians, St German denies the consequence that therefore the power they once held has been translated to the clergy. Despite the sins of some emperors, … why they, or their successoures shulde therfore lese the right of the Empier which was gyuen to them by god. There is no reason, for though some of them were euyll, the successoures might be good: as vndoutedly many of theym haue ben. And some tyme an euyll man is suffered of god, for the proufe of good men, & ouer that admytte that they wer worthy to be depriued for their offences fro the right of the Empier. Yet why that right shulde be translated to the churche, it wyll be harde to proue it by reason … For it is no dout but that the emperours receyued nat the emprye of the Clergye, wherfore it semeth that that reason is but of lytell strength to proue that both powers, that is to say spiritual and temperal shulde be in the clergy.107

Once the claims to temporal authority among the clergy have been refuted, the legitimacy of royal supremacy over temporal ecclesiastical affairs follows. Because the clergy have no independent claim to coercive authority, if the Parliament were to reform or even annul statutes providing for the coercive punishment of excommunicants, the keys of the Church would not be offended.108 It also shows that if a person is excommunicated for disobeying Church laws ‘that be agaynste the kynges lawes and his prerogatyue’, he can suffer no temporal punishment for this ‘crime’, and in fact if the bishop refuses to absolve him upon command from the king, the bishop ‘offendeth agaynst the kynge and his lawes right greuously for denyenge the absolucyon’.109 A proper understanding of the true basis of any legitimate temporal authority the clergy might hold also makes it apparent that Lucius, the first Christian king of the Britons, and Ethelbert, the first Christian king of Englishmen, lost no authority after their conversion to the faith: [T]ruth it is that after they and theyr people were conuerted, they might nat compel their people to forsake the christen faith whiche they had receyued ne to do any thinge agaynste the christen fayth, but that was no bondage vnto 106 107 108 109

Ibid., sig. G6v–G7v. Ibid., sig. H1v–H2. Ibid., sig. E3v–E5. Ibid., sig. E8v–F1.

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them ne abatynge of their power, but a great lybertye and fredome in god. Wherby they & their people were deliuered fro the bondage of infidelitie that they were in before their conuersion.110

For example, because the authority to order holy days is temporal, if a pagan king were to accept the faith on condition that he not be compelled to observe any holy days introduced by the Church authorities, he should be accepted on that condition. Citing the Genesis creation account, St German affirms that Christians are bound by the law of God to maintain one day in seven as a holy day of rest for prayer and contemplation: … yet we suppose that the Sondaye that is now vsed amonge crysten men, might be chaunged to another daye in the weke by princes and their people … For it is but by the lawe & ordynaunce of man that the Sondaye is kepte on this daye as it is nowe kepte amonge christenmen, for among the iewes it was kepte on the saturday.111

While the power to order holy days belongs to the secular authorities, oftentimes clergy were allowed to arrange matters regulating holy days both on account of the esteem in which the holy fathers were held among the people and also because princes were distracted by what were believed to be more pressing issues. Over time, however, the clergy and even many among the laity have come to believe that the authority to regulate holy days belongs to the clergy by the law of God, leading to arrogance among the clergy, the mistreatment of royal subjects, and consequently grudges between the clergy and laity: [W]herfore nowe that such grudges be knowen princes be bounden to knowe their own power and omyttynge other thinges that be nat for the tyme so necessary for the comenwelth, ar bounde also to put to their handes for reformacyon, and nat to cesse tyll they haue brought such maters to a good quietnesse. If a particular holy day ‘be thoughte hurtfull to the commen welthe, and rather to encrease vyce than vertue, or to gyue occasyon to pride rather than to mekenesse … the parlyament hath good authorite to reforme it.’112

It also is apparent to St German that the trying of matters involving tithes in Church courts is only by the authority of a custom of the realm, not of the law of God, inasmuch as both to set the appropriate level of tithes and to enforce their payment coercively is the prerogative of the civil authorities:113

110 111 112 113

Ibid., sig. C4–C4v. Ibid., sig. D6v–D7v. Ibid., sig. E1–E1v. Ibid., sig. F1–F4.

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And it is no dout but that the parlyament maye with a cause take that power [over tithes] fro them [the clergy], and might also haue done lykewyse before it was recognysed by the parlyament, and by the clergye that the kynge was the heed of the church of Englande, for he was so before that recougnicion was made: as all other cristen princes be in theire owne realmes ouer all their Subiectes spirituall and temporall.114

Finally, St German’s claim that the clergy are not authorized by the law of God to wield temporal authority entails that in cases involving matters of property, prestige, or jurisdiction, when ecclesiastical prescriptions are not consistent with the laws of the realm, all who order their lives in accord with the dictates of Church laws err in conscience.115 In fact, among the most important faults of the clergy is their ignorance of the laws of the realm which causes them to unintentionally mislead others: [S]ith the knowlege of the lawes of the realme is in many cases necessarye to all men in this realme for the clere orderyng of conscyence and for gyuynge of true counsell to the people: It is a great defaute in many of the clergye, that they haue endeuored themselfe no more to haue knowlege therof than they haue don.116

In addition to refuting arguments in support of the divinely ordained temporal authority of the clergy, in the Power St German also revisits the central theme of his earlier works, the inconveniences that arise from clerical usurpation of temporal authority. He addresses this topic, however, from a much more solid position, having explicitly argued that clerical authority is not divinely ordained. In the seventeenth chapter St German investigates, in the words of the chapter heading, ‘What shulde cause the hyghest comen welth now in these daies’. The answer is that the well-being of the people would be best served if, having come together in ‘louynge pease and concorde’, all Christian kings and princes would … consyder what highe power & auctorite they haue receyued of our lorde ouer his people, & how strayt accompte they haue to make therfore herafter, and that they wolde thervpon with all dilygence fro tyme to tyme put that power in execucyon to the honoure of god and welth of the people.

To encourage them in this, they ought to have biblical passages that emphasize the powers and responsibilities of kings: Playnly and truly expounded and declared vnto them, and dilygently to folowe the same … And if the seyd textes be wel vnderstande, it wyll appere therby, that the high iugemente is in princes, and that it lyeth in princes to appease all varyaunces and vnquyetnesse that shall ryse amonge the people, by what occasion soeuer it ryse spyrituall or temporall. 114 115 116

Ibid., sig. F4. Ibid., sig. F4v–F8v. Ibid., sig. H7v–H8.

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Investigation of such texts will also show that in declaring Henry the Head of the Church of England the Parliament granted him no authority that was not already his by the law of God. Because kings … haue nat heretofore commenly ben lerned of theym selfe to knowe their owne power in all thynges to them commytted by god. It is therfore expedyent that they haue trewe, iuste and indyfferent counseyle, as well spyrituall as temporall, the whiche as minysters vnder them, maye fro tyme to tyme declare theire power vnto them … settyng alway truthe before their eyen, with the faithe and obedyence that they are bounde to bere vnto their prince, specyally concernynge the power and auctoritye that he hathe receyued of god, for mynistracyon of Iustyce vnto his subiectes, and for kepynge of them in peace and quyetnesse.117

By exercising their rightful temporal authority, St German reminds princes, they can foster not only the temporal, but also the eternal well-being of their subjects. In particular, because clergy will not likely voluntarily renounce the temporal authority they have usurped: All christen princes are bounde in conscyence as well for the helth of the soules of all spirytuall mynysters as of all other people that they haue taken charge of, to remoue the occasyons that haue caused theym to set theymselfe so fully to the medelynge of Temporall thynges as many of theym haue done in tyme paste.118

Of course legitimization of the royal supremacy does not obligate subjects to unquestioning obedience of Henry’s ecclesiastical policy. St German never rescinds his earlier claim that all human laws, including those ordering the Church, must be consistent with the dictates of the divine law to be worthy of obedience. The authority that comes with royal supremacy over the Church has inherent within it the responsibility to use that authority to the glory of God. In addition, if the king abuses his power over the Church, subjects are bound in conscience to disobey royal commands and seek to thwart, by their passive resistance, royal policies perceived to be ungodly. We have already seen that the necessity of conforming to the dictates of the divine law qualifies St German’s claim that in accepting the faith the pagan kings Lucius and Ethelbert lost none of the authority over temporal affairs that they enjoyed prior to conversion. It is true of all pagan kings that … after they were conuerted to the chrysten faythe, [they] hadde as full power to kepe their people in peace and quyetnes as they had before they were cristened. And that they maye auoyde al thyngs that might breke their peace or bringe vnquietnesse amonge their people, by what occasyon so euer it shulde happen to ryse, so that they offende nat the crysten faith that they haue receyued.119 117 118 119

Ibid., sig. G1–G2v. Ibid., sig. H4. Ibid., sig. D6.

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This is not a new constraint on their authority that kings accept on converting to the faith because even pagan rulers are accountable to God when they offend the faith by persecuting Christians or outlawing Christian practices. Christians are required to disobey the dictates of any ruler, pagan or nominally Christian, who forbids Christians to do or confess something essential to the faith. While this is not a new limit, it is a limit none the less, and qualifies any claim St German may make of absolute royal authority over the Church. St German scatters references to this limitation on the manner in which the civil authorities may legitimately exercise their power throughout the Power. For example, ‘though tythes be called spyrituall, yet they be in dede temporall: as all goodes be in whose hands soeuer they come. And so the parliament hath full power to ordre them, so that the lawe of god be nat broken by their ordre.’120 Similarly, one day in seven ‘all crysten men be boude to kepe holi by example of our lorde, which in the seuenth day rested frome all workes that he had made.’121 Any decree of the civil authorities requiring subjects to work continually and not leave aside one day in seven for prayer and contemplation would not bind in conscience, and, because it would be contrary to the divine law, Christians would be obliged to disobey it. Finally and generally, ‘it is no dout but that such power as the clergye hath by the immediat graunte of Christ, the kynge ne his parlyament can nat take it from theym thoughe they maye order the manner of the doynge.’122 The limitations that St German notes on the exercise of the royal supremacy clarify why he undertakes the task of biblical interpretation to demonstrate the consistency of royal policy with the divine law and to refute arguments that scripture claims temporal authority for priests. At the same time, the rules that St German lays down for biblical interpretation shed light on the question of why he ultimately feels driven in An Answer to claim for the Crown in Parliament the authority to define doctrine. In part, St German might feel compelled to look for a means to provide a blanket justification of the consistency of royal policy with the divine will because every command of the king must be measured against the dictates of the divine law, and there were simply too many royal policies for St German to provide scriptural justification of each individually. In addition, the interpretive tools provided in the Power leave far too large a role for subjectivity in determining the meaning of biblical passages to supply any real hope of their application leading to unanimity among English Christians. St German’s basic appeal to the ‘literal sense’ opens the door to subjectivity and variety in biblical interpretations. What is binding, 120 121 122

Ibid., sig. B1. Ibid., sig. D7–D7v. Ibid., sig. I1.

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after all, is not the literal words of the scripture but the literal intent of the speaker or author, and when determining the perceived intention of a passage, the prejudices of each interpreter can be expected to play a role. The qualification of consistency between biblical passages is of little help when one subjectively interpreted passage is measured against another, and St German’s claim that an interpretation must be rejected if it suggests that Christ or the biblical authors are making what the reader considers ‘unreasonable’ demands aggravates rather than ameliorates problems of subjectivity and bias among interpreters. This situation is exacerbated by an additional interpretive tool that St German provides in An Answer. Here he introduces the universal or ‘common’ practice of the Church as a standard of what scripture must have meant to teach, even when this does not coincide precisely with the literal sense of the biblical text. According to the literal sense of Matthew 26 and Luke 22, at the last supper Christ authorized only the apostles to consecrate bread and wine, and thus it seems that … none shuld haue power to consecrate but only the apostels & their successors, which most properly be taken to be bisshops than shuld al inferyor prestes whiche be comenly taken to be successors to the .lxxii. discyples haue no power to consecrate. & yet the comen experyence sheweth that all prestes do consecrate. And they do wel therin, for they be prestes aswel as the apostels were. & so it is conuenyently to be taken, that thintent of our maister christ was that all prestes shulde do it.123

When the apparent literal sense of scripture can be overridden by even the common practice of the Church, the task of finding a proper interpretation will include discerning the universal practice of the Church and determining whether it is valid. This standard of interpretation either plays directly into the hand of St German’s clerical opponents, or is utterly subjective. If obedience and order are to be secured in the English Church, the need for an objective standard of biblical interpretation that is certain to be consistent with royal policy is plain. What is also plain, however, is that by the end of the Power St German has not yet claimed interpretive authority for the king in or out of Parliament. The Power reiterates an assumption that has been implicit, and occasionally explicit, in St German’s works stretching back to Doctor and Student. In defending the Edwardian statute of Silva Cedua, St German asserts that ‘it is nat to thynke that the kinge and his lordes spyrituall & temporall and the comens that were at that parliament wolde haue ben so farre ouerseen, to haue made a statute againste the lawe of god.’124

123 124

Answer, sig. E2. Power, sig. B1.

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Similarly, in the Power, the a priori assumption must be that trying clerics in civil courts is legitimate: For it is nat to presume, that so many noble princes and their counseyle, ne the lordes, and the nobles of the realme ne yet the Comons gathered in the sayde parlyamente, wolde fro tyme to tyme, renne in to so great offence of conscyence, as is the brekynge of the lawe of god. And if ther be no suffycyent proufe, that it is against the lawe of god, than the custome of the realme is good, to put them to answere vpon.125

This presumption in favour of the Parliament is still far from claiming that the civil authorities are the highest standard of biblical truth. This claim merely places the burden of proof on opponents of royal policies; it does not mean that such proof could not be forthcoming. This presumption in favour of the legitimacy of what is decreed by the civil authorities may explain in large part why St German does not immediately seek to justify the royal supremacy on a scriptural basis; he initially feels that responsibility for providing arguments rests with his opponents. This presumption also explains why, when St German does engage in scriptural exegesis in the Power, it is predominantly negative, seeking to refute pretended proofs against royal policy, rather than seeking to positively confirm the validity of royal policies from scriptural evidence. Despite the presumption in favour of royal policy, opponents not convinced by St German’s exegetical arguments would still feel themselves obligated to defy royal policy on those points where they feel they have proof that the civil authorities are acting in a manner contrary to God’s will. In the final chapter of the Power, St German provides an extended discussion intended to justify the authority of lay Christians to interpret scripture. ‘[I]t hath ben a great defaute in many of the Clergye,’ St German claims, … that they haue pretended, that it hath nat ben conuenyent for laye men to treate of the power of the clergye, ne to reason what be the keyes of the church, ne to touche the power of the making of their Canons, or to treate which be resonable and which nat: for that right specyally belongeth to princes and their counsell to loke vpon: for if they shuld be driuen to beleue the iugement of the clergye in thinges concernynge the honour, power, & iurisdyccion of the clergye agaynst their owne, they might happely be disceyued: for the more power that the clergy hath in temporall thinges the lesse is the power of princes, & therfore they that be lerned in the kinges lawes, ar specyally bounde before other to know the power of the kynge and his parlyament. For howe can they knowe that the lawe that they haue lerned is to be ministred amonge the people, If they knowe natte whether the kynge by whose auctorite it is ministred, haue power to commaunde the ministracyon of it.126

125 126

Ibid., sig. B8v–C1. Ibid., sig. H8–H8v.

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Lay Christians, especially civil lawyers, have a special responsibility to investigate the teachings of scripture to determine truly what the authority of the king is and how far it extends: Moreouer it is no defaulte in lerners of the lawe to pretende ignoraunce in high doutes of scripture that parteyne nat to the lernynge of the lawe, but to pretende ignoraunce in the power of the kinge and his parlyament or of the clergy which be the thinges that most specyally parteyne to the approuynge or dysaprouynge of that they haue taken in hande to lerne is a gret defaut.127

Finally, because clergy have taken it upon themselves to issue binding pronouncements regarding temporal affairs, … why shulde nat leye men, and specyally those that be lerned in the lawes of realmes and countreys serche whether the reasonynge and determynacyon therin procede vpon an indifferency & accordyng to the trouth or vpon a synguler couetice of them selfe, and if they ought nat nor might nat do so, than might the clergy happely binde laye men to that they ought nat to do in many cases.128

While claiming that the laity are authorized to interpret the Bible, the above arguments stop well short of claiming for the Crown in Parliament the power to offer authoritative biblical interpretations. Attention here is focused on legitimizing the investigation of biblical texts and clerical pronouncements by students of English law, not by the king and Parliament themselves. This is consistent with St German’s call, noted above, to princes to give heed to learned and impartial advisers, lay as well as clerical, to instruct them regarding the true extent of their power. More importantly, what St German claims for lawyers here is not supreme interpretive authority, but rather the right to investigate scripture for themselves. Their interpretations, he claims, deserve to be heard, especially when addressing issues relating to temporal authority. St German cannot yet claim for the Crown in Parliament the power to pronounce interpretations of scripture that are binding in conscience because, as presented in the Power, scripture validates nothing but temporal authority for the king, that is, the authority to regulate material goods and coercively enforce laws. While this authority extends over all temporal matters, however closely related to spiritual affairs, and carries with it the responsibility to exercise it in a manner that furthers spiritual ends, the power itself extends only over the material goods and bodies of subjects. The discernment of the true sense of the Bible, however, is not a temporal matter inasmuch as divine truth is immaterial. While the payment or nonpayment of tithes may be a temporal matter, the belief that tithes are valid or invalid is spiritual, and similarly with all other aspects of Christian practice 127 128

Ibid., sig. I1–I1v. Ibid., sig. I1v–I2.

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mandated by the divine law. Giving of tithes, keeping of the sabbath, even partaking of the sacraments may all be at least partially temporal matters, but the conviction that such practices are divinely mandated is spiritual, internal, or, to use St German’s favourite term, ‘ghostly’. While St German claims for the king extensive and in coercive terms exclusive authority to defend Christian truth, it is nevertheless merely authority to defend, not to define, the truth. St German clarifies for subjects whose standard of orthodoxy they must respect if they would avoid coercive punishment in this life, but he leaves open the question of whose interpretation is binding in terms of expounding the beliefs necessary for salvation. The closest St German comes to asserting that the Crown in Parliament defines doctrine on the basis of temporal authority, indeed, the closest it seems he can come to such an assertion, is claiming for the civil authorities the authority to regulate the content of preaching within the realm. This power is claimed on the basis of the king’s obligation to use his temporal authority to help shepherd his subjects to salvation by suppressing heretical preaching and also by putting an end to preaching that claims undue authority for the clergy. The latter may not be strictly heretical, but the strife that it engenders threatens the souls of Englishmen. The king is also responsible for regulating preaching on the more strictly temporal basis that the strife and discord within the realm caused by some preachers is a threat to the well-being of subjects. In the Division, St German calls on the Convocation and Parliament to cooperate in the regulation of preaching,129 but in the Power’, the regulation of preaching is identified as a legislative matter without mention of Convocation. Having demonstrated that the statute Silva Cedua is not contrary to the divine law, St German concludes his discussion by offering advice to the authorities. ‘And therfore’, the legitimacy of the statute having been proven, ‘if it were prohibyted, that it shulde nat herafter be lawfull for any man, to saye that the sayde statute is agaynst the lawe of god. It is very like that it shuld cause great quyetnes herafter betwene the Curattes and their parysshons in many places in this realme.’130 It is crucial, however, that St German offers this advice only after proving (at least to his own satisfaction) that the statute is not contrary to the divine law. Parliament’s monopoly on coercive force gives it the authority to determine what preaching reaps rewards and what preaching reaps punishments in this life, not authority to pronounce regarding what teachings, beliefs, or practices will garner eternal rewards. St German claims for the Crown in Parliament only temporal authority by the time of publication of the Power, but the stage is set for the claim propounded in An Answer that the civil authorities also possess a power that is not simply temporal, the power to authoritatively define 129 130

Division, p. 186. Power, sig. B1v.

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doctrine. In the midst of his justification of the investigation of scripture by civil lawyers, St German makes a comment in passing regarding the authority of Parliament. ‘Also’, he points out, ‘he that knoweth nat that the parlyament of Englande hathe power by the hole church of England can nat fully knowe the power of the parlyament.’131 St German makes this claim with no supporting argumentation, perhaps because he feels none is needed. There is nothing controversial or even surprising in this claim if the ideas put forward by St German earlier have been accepted. Given the standard legal fiction that the Parliament speaks on behalf of the entire community of English subjects, to claim for Parliament the authority of the English Church one need only recall that St German has identified the Church of England as the community of Christians in England. St German assumes that, because practically every English subject is also a Christian, the Church of England is, in terms of persons, equivalent to the realm of England. This being the case, by speaking for the community of English subjects, Parliament could easily take on also the authority to speak for the English Church. St German does not at this point draw out the implications of this aspect of the nature of Parliament, but the implications are there to be drawn out. He has already noted that the right to authoritatively interpret scripture belongs to the entire Church, not to the clergy alone. By identifying Parliament as the voice of the Church of England, St German has positioned himself to make the claim, explicated fully in An Answer, that the Crown in Parliament is authorized to propound binding interpretations of scripture. The Issue of Defining Doctrine Resolved In many ways An Answer repeats claims made in St German’s earlier tracts; in other ways it expands on earlier arguments to cover new ground. The opening chapters discuss recent actions of Parliament regarding the authority of the king and of the pope over the English Church. The first assures readers that in claiming power as Head of the Church of England for Henry Parliament did not contravene the law of God or infringe upon the clerical monopoly on sacramental power. The second chapter addresses the same issue from the opposite perspective, arguing that the authority of ‘the bysshop of Rome’ over the English Church, ‘was onely by the power & law of man, & nat by the immediat power of god’.132 Furthermore, the human law that empowered the pope to act as head of the church meant only to claim that he was the ‘heed of all churches’ in the sense of being ‘heed of all bysshops and prestes’, and not in the sense of being ‘heed of the 131 132

Ibid., sig. H8v–I1. Answer, sig. A8.

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vnyuersall churche of Christ, that is to saye, of the whole congregation of all christen people’.133 Any additional authority claimed by popes in times past was simply usurped. Furthermore, parliamentary statutes renouncing this usurped authority in England are in accord both with the divine law and with the human laws governing legitimate papal power inasmuch as even in England ‘that name of heed of all bysshops remayneth yet vnto him [the Bishop of Rome] nat taken away bi any statute.’ The acts regarding royal power merely claim … that the kyng shall be supreme hed vnder god vpon erth, of the churche of Englande, wherby is vnderstande that he ought to haue suche power in this realme ouer his subiectes spiritual & temporal, as to a kyng belongeth by the lawe of god … & with that it may well stande, that one may be hed bisshop & minister in thynges mere spirituall ouer the same people … And … it shulde seme that he shulde thereby haue this preemynence, to haue the hyghest seate aboue all other bysshoppes. And if he wolde preache, that he ought to haue the place before all other, as is sayd before, & these preemynences & other lyke remayneth yet vnto him, if he cam into this realme for ought that the parliament hath don.134

St German proceeds in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters to discuss particular matters relating to the English Church, canonization and veneration of saints, abuses associated with the Mass, granting of pardons and absolutions, and restitution, clarifying issues and calling for reformation of abuse where present. The seventh chapter addresses directly the issue that has been moving to the fore in St German’s work for several years: ‘Who hathe power to declare & expounde scrypture, and whose declaracyon we be bounde to folowe and whose nat’.135 This is the final step in the progression we have been tracing in St German’s thought regarding the justification of policies adopted by the Henrician government and defended by St German. The need to address the question of the definition of doctrine is highlighted again in the fifth chapter, ‘Of pardons and absolutions’.136 The discussion arises because papal practices associated with granting of pardons and making of absolutions are contrary to the desires of Christ, and because ‘so great couetyse hath ben shewed therby, that gret grudges and murmures haue rysen by occasyon therof in many countreys and that nat without great cause.’137 One cause of the troubles St German identifies as a situation in which ‘the successours of Pe[ter] haue only taken vpon them to execute that power by waye of grauntyng of pardons, as though 133 134 135 136 137

Ibid., sig. B1–B1v. Ibid., sig. B3–B4. Ibid., sig. F6. Ibid., sig. D3v. Ibid., sig. D4.

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the power had ben graunted onely to Peter & his successors.’ This in spite of the fact that Christ granted the power of binding and loosing to Peter in the name of all of the apostles, an intention made explicit in Matthew 18 in which Christ says the same words as were before spoken to Peter to all of the disciples generally.138 In fact, the sharing of this power among all of Christ’s disciples and consequently among all bishops is confirmed ‘by wytnesse of the lawe, that is called the popes owne law’, a claim that St German confirms with citations from papal law.139 St German goes further, claiming that in Matthew 18, when the power of binding and loosing is granted to the disciples, it is unclear whether this indicates the twelve apostles, the seventy-two disciples, or both. If the first, the power belongs to all bishops; if the last, it belongs to all priests as well as bishops; in neither case is it the prerogative of Peter and his successors alone.140 Worse still, popes have not only monopolized the power of absolving from sin, but have expanded it to claim new powers not granted by Christ to Peter or anyone else, particularly the power to absolve in advance from future sins.141 Given these papal abuses, the responsibility of Christian princes is clear; they must enforce a reformation of the manner in which absolutions are handled to ease grudges and strengthen the spiritual lives of their subjects: And if euery preest haue suche power [to absolve] of god, as I thynke verily he hath as well as any bysshop: than it semeth that it were good that they shuld be commaunded to vse that power herafter by way of absolucyon frely, to the ease & conforte of the people, & they nat to be dryuen to go to any bysshop for it.142

This discussion bears the marks of following upon the Power in that St German not only claims that limiting the power to absolve to the pope is contrary to scripture, he also provides biblical citations to support his claim and interpretive guidance to ensure that these passages are properly understood. We have seen that one interpretive rule applied by St German is that Christ would not command anything unreasonable or unseemly. Consequently, when the literal sense, or one possible literal sense, seems to make unreasonable demands, another, more reasonable interpretation must be provided. ‘And it is apperant’, St German explains … that if the successours of Peter shulde onely haue power to graunt suche pardon, & that onely for offences done before the graunte, that than that graunte shulde delyuer but fewe from payne for their synnes: in comparison of the multytude of christen people: for euery penytent maye nat incontynent after 138 139 140 141 142

Ibid., sig. D4–D5. Ibid., sig. D4v. Ibid., sig. D5–D5v. Ibid., sig. D8–D8v. Ibid., sig. D7.

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his repentance go to Rome fro so farre countreys & aske pardon there for their offences passed. And therfore it semeth that our lorde whiche is all goodnesse, wolde nat make a graunt that shuld serue to so lytel a purpose as that shulde do, but that it shulde streche more at large amonge the people, wherfore as I suppose the seyd graunt shal stretch aswell to the successours of all the apostles & discyples: that is to say aswell to all bysshops & prestes as to the bysshops of Rome.143

This interpretation is confirmed by the example of the power to consecrate the Lord’s Supper in which the words of scripture taken in their plain sense indicate that this power should belong to bishops only, but the universality of acceptance of the belief that this power is shared by all priests shows that it was Christ’s intent to grant the power to all priests. If in this case, in which the literal sense is even more clearly against priests having the power in question, ‘why than shal it nat be taken to be his [Christ’s] entente that he wolde, that whatsoeuer any preest losed vpon erth, shuld be losed in heuen aswel as any bisshop.’144 The argument proceeds beyond the approach taken in the Power inasmuch as St German acknowledges that he cannot discuss all of the biblical passages that might be called upon to support different positions and that alternative interpretations of the texts he has cited may be proposed by opponents. As importantly, he addresses this possibility by counselling dissenters to take their case to Parliament for a hearing. If Parliament finds the dissenters’ arguments convincing, it can be assumed that the laws of the realm will be ordered to reflect this; if not, then the position should be abandoned by the dissenters, and if they will not do so willingly, they should be compelled to abandon it: And if any man wyll pretende that there be other auctorities for grauntyng of pardons than these that I haue before rehersed, or that wyl pretend that bysshops onely haue that power & noon but they, & that they may aswell graunt pardon before the offence to put awaye the payne for the sinne that shalbe commytted after the graunt aswell as before: It wyl be well done that his reasons be herd in the parlyament. And if his reason and the prouf thervpon seme suffycyent, than to folowe it: And if nat I thynke verily that the parlyament is bounde in conscyence to commaunde all preestes to execute that power frely fro henseforth to the ease and conforte of all the people without takynge any thynge for it.145

In other words, the judgement of Parliament is identified as being in practice the standard against which the legitimacy of biblical interpretations should be measured.

143 144 145

Ibid., sig. E1–E1v. Ibid., sig. E2–E2v. Ibid., sig. E2v–E3.

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Such a claim requires justification, and St German is quick to supply it. Defence of the claim that the Crown in Parliament is the highest hermeneutical authority is the subject of the seventh chapter entitled ‘Who hathe power to declare & expounde scrypture, and whose declaracyon we be bounde to folowe and whose nat’.146 St German begins his discussion by admitting that it is beyond his power to address the topic as it ought to be addressed, but he adds that he must publish his thoughts on the topic because it is simply too important to ignore. In contrast to his earlier works in which he ignores issues surrounding proof of his positions or relies on providing what he feels to be compelling biblical proofs to support his positions, St German here recognizes and even emphasizes that many people’s understanding of scripture is determined not solely by their own reading of the text, but by an interpretive authority. This being the case, all sides recognizing the supreme authority of the divine law, and assuming that the scripture properly interpreted is the ultimate source of insight into the divine law, the question of what interpretive authority is to be heeded becomes crucial: ‘[F]or there be fewe maters as I take it that moore requyreth to be playnely touched & declared than that doth: ne that wolde do more good nowe in this daungerouse tyme, than that wold do, if it were set in a clere & in an vpright way.’147 St German begins his discussion by distinguishing between several types of biblical passages. First are … some textes of scrypture that be so open & playne in them selues that euery man is bounde to gyue full credence vnto them: for the lytterall sence is the playne exposytion in it selfe … And so it is in the moost parte of all the Scrypture, both of the old testament and new. But yet there be some other textes in Scrypture whiche be nat so euydente and playne, as those and manye other be, and yet if they be truly vnderstande, accordynge to the mynde of the maker, that is to say, of our maister Christe, the lytterall sence of them is as true as the other that be moste playne.148

St German recognizes the need that lay Christians have for guidance regarding texts of the latter type, and he counsels them to seek the advice of clergy: [I]t wer good for him that wer in dout in those cases or other lyke, as be concernynge scrypture to aske counsell of some of the clergye that as he thynketh be suffycyently lerned in scrypture, lyke as it is conuenyent in doutes of Physyke to aske counsell of doctonres of Phisyke, or in doutes of the temporall law to aske counsell of them that be lerned in the temporal law And if he in any dout of scrypture aske counsell of such clerkes as he thynketh be suffycyently lerned in scrypture, & they instruct him other wyse than the true vnderstandynge of 146 147 148

Ibid., sig. F6. Ibid., sig. F6–F6v. Ibid., sig. F6v–F8.

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the scrypture is, yet that suffyceth for him, so it be nat dyrectly agaynst the lawe of reason: for that all men are bounden to knowe. But syth they of the clergye haue auctorite by the gospell to preache the gospell, they ar more bounden to knowe the gospell than any other.149

Several aspects of this claim are important in this context. First, St German emphasizes that the place of the clergy relative to the interpretation of scripture is not one of authority, but one of responsibility. In fact, the laity are put in the initial position of judging the clergy, and are advised only to give heed to clerics whom they deem to be ‘suffycyently lerned in scrypture’. More directly, the authority of the clergy to preach the gospel carries not a special power to define doctrine, but a special burden of responsibility to know doctrine, and the comparisons chosen by St German are telling. A physician’s job is to know what is healthy and advise patients accordingly, but he certainly cannot make poison healthful, and if he says that poison is healthful he fails in his responsibility as a doctor. A lawyer must know the law but does not legislate, and if he were to advise those who come to him to act in accord with what he would like the law to be rather than in accord with what the law actually is, he fails in his responsibility. The role of the clergy as the divinely commissioned teachers of the divine law is in this respect similar to the role of the prince as the divinely ordained defender of the true faith as outlined in the opening chapter of the Power. The king as the defender, not the definer, of the faith is given the responsibility to promote the true faith through the use of various forms of temporal power, but this does not necessarily mean that he has infallible insight into the content of the true faith nor that his laws are to be followed blindly. Similarly, the clergy as the proclaimers, not the definers, of the true faith are not infallible. St German explicitly notes that when a Christian seeks advice regarding a biblical interpretation from a cleric, he may be instructed ‘other wyse than the true vnderstandynge of the scrypture is’. He goes on to assert that not even the unanimous agreement of the clergy regarding an interpretation is to be taken as authoritative. Regarding passages in which the literal sense captures Christ’s intention, ‘if all the clerkes of the worlde wold make any exposytion to the contrarye therof: no man were bounden to beleue them. And they for that exposytion were worthy to be disseuered fro the company of al faithfull people.’150 In short, the true interpretation of scripture judges the orthodoxy of the clergy; the clergy do not authoritatively determine the true interpretation of scripture. The authority of the clergy regarding scriptural interpretation is thus clearly conditional, but even this strictly limited authority does not extend to all passages of scripture. In addition to the distinction he draws between ‘open & playne’ passages and others that require further interpretation to 149 150

Ibid., sig. F8v–G1. Ibid., sig. F7.

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discern the true meaning, St German draws a further distinction. ‘[T]here be some other texttes in the scrypture that concerne the auctoritie, power, iurisdiction and rychesse of bysshops & prestes,’ he points out, and, after citing a handful of examples, he continues … & if a man were in dout vpon these textes, what power iurisdiction possessions or lyberte the clergy ought to haue by the seyd texts: or whether such acts & laws as haue ben made bi princes & their people concernyng suche thynges were to be obeyd: or suche other lyke. Many men thynke that it were natte the most surest way to aske counsell therin of the lerned men in the clergi, onles it were of some singuler elect men that through speciall grace, haue sequestred their mynds fro the loue of all worldly honour & riches: for the affection to such worldli pleasures haue blynded the iugement of many of them so sore, that they haue thought, that the mayntenaunce of the honour of the clergye hath ben a mayntenaunce of the honour of god. And so as it were vnder a pretence to maynteyne the honour of god haue dyspleased god & maynteyned their owne honour & rychesse, farther than the seyde textes, or anye other parte of scrypture wyll warrant them to do.151

St German clearly agrees with the ‘many men’ who question the reliability of the clergy when their honour or riches are in question, and he also is sceptical whether many ‘singuler elect’ clergy are to be found. Regarding the interpretation of such texts, consequently, the guidance of the clergy ought generally not even to be sought. Thus far St German has clearly addressed the second issue raised by the chapter title – whose exposition of scripture one is not bound to follow is clearly identified as the clergy. While it is often wise for laymen to seek clerical guidance regarding scriptural interpretation, their judgements are not authoritative and consequently not inherently binding. When a question arises regarding the interpretation of biblical texts addressing the wealth and power of the clerical estate, priests cannot even be trusted in this advisory role and guidance must be sought elsewhere. Up to this point, however, the chapter has provided little positive insight regarding biblical interpretation. The distinctions that St German makes among passages do not in themselves provide any hermeneutical guidance. Noting that there are passages in which the plain sense fully captures the intention of the biblical author is of no assistance when the essential interpretive question of which passages fall into this category is left unaddressed. Similarly, distinguishing passages that concern clerical wealth and power from those that do not is of little help in determining essential Christian doctrines because St German has previously noted that some dictates of the divine law, for example, the necessity of lay Christians meeting the worldly needs of their ministers, bear directly on the wealth of the clergy. This prevents him from simply asserting that any interpretation that renders a scriptural 151

Ibid., sig. G1–G2v.

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passage addressing the wealth or status of the clergy as a command of God is not a valid interpretation. If the divine law demands that clergy be supported financially, then other aspects of the worldly status of the priesthood could be divinely ordained. God could have decreed that clerics were immune from the jurisdiction of secular courts or that the clergy had ultimate authority over both the temporal and the spiritual ‘swords’, and St German denies both of these claims not on principle but because neither claim is supported by what he considers a valid scriptural interpretation. This leads back to the question with which the chapter begins: where can concerned Christians turn to find ‘binding’ interpretations of scripture? Of course, a primary concern of St German’s in answering this question is to identify an interpretive authority independent of the clergy, lest their often biased opinions be recognized as binding, and this he accomplishes in the opening portion of the chapter. With this done, however, an alternative authority is needed. As his works from the early 1530s clearly show, St German is a man far too enamoured of order, harmony, unity and the binding laws that produce and safeguard these to support the locus of authority championed by many sixteenth-century reformers, including Tyndale. Predictably, as will be detailed below, St German identifies only a strictly circumscribed role for the conscience of the individual Christian in recognizing the true faith. In sixteenth-century England, the obvious candidate for any religious authority denied to belong to the clergy and assumed not to belong to the individual Christian was some combination of the king and/or Parliament. Given St German’s political predispositions, one could predict the Crown in Parliament would be his preferred locus of authority. This is also a locus of authority that has the advantage of consolidating the authority to define and defend doctrine in one body, eliminating the possibility of order-threatening incongruities between two competing authorities. This being the case, it is not surprising when St German, having shown who does not wield interpretive authority and turning to the question of who does, opens with an investigation of royal authority relative to scriptural interpretation. He begins by presenting his definitive defence of the authority already claimed for the king as defender of the faith and regulator of preaching in the interest of public order. St German collapses all of the distinctions between biblical texts that he outlined previously and claims regulatory authority over the promulgation of interpretations of any biblical passages for the prince: I thynke that if anye doute ryse vpon any text of scrypture, be it playne or nat playne concernyng the fayth or morall lyuing of the people or nat: orels the honour, lyberty, & ryches of the clergye, or any other thyng whatsoeuer it be. if there fall any varyance or vnquyetnesse thervpon amonge the people: as if one doctoure or many, & some of the lay people be of one opinyon therin: & other of another opinyon, & thervpon dyuersyties of opinyons & vnquyetnesse

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amonge the people doo ryse, that in all these cases, kynges and princes shalbe iudges, & haue power to pacyfye all suche vnquyetnesse.152

Citing the second Psalm, St German argues that princes are divinely ordained to ‘iudge the worlde’: And if it be sayd that by those wordes, Iuge the worlde, that kinges and princes must iuge onely vpon temporall thynges: as vpon the bodyes, landes & goodes. And nat vpon any thyng that apperteineth to the soule: trewly that is a right great erroure, for it wolde bringe the people in belefe, that the successours of the apostles & discyples of Christ haue only cure of soules & nat kynges & princes.153

In claiming for princes ‘cure of soules’, he is not reversing his position in the first chapter in which kings are sequestered from spiritual authority and granted only temporal authority. Rather, he is emphasizing that kings have a responsibility to use their status as vicars of God wielding temporal power to further spiritual ends.154 The authority of the king over his subjects is analogous to the authority of a master over his household. Consequently, … it is no dout, but if a prince suffre his people wylfully breke the lawes of god, or the lawes of his realme and se them nat corrected accordyng to his lawes but that he offendeth god right highly thereby as euery man shall do, that willyngly & wylfully suffreth his seruantes breke the law of god without correctyon, whan he may well correcte them.155

Furthermore, all Christians are commanded to use whatever means they have at their disposal to promote the moral and orthodox living of their neighbours: … and syth euery man hathe a charge of his neyghbour, it must nedes folowe that a kynge hath a more speciall charge ouer his subiectes: & that he is specyally bounden to prohibyt all thinges as nigh as he can wherby his subiectes spirytuall or temporall might haue occasion to breke the lawes of god.156

The authority of kings and priests differs not in that one is responsible for the care of Christians’ bodies and goods while the other is responsible for the care of their souls. Rather, both are responsible to promote the spiritual well-being of the Christians entrusted to their care; they differ in the powers they are given to promote spiritual health. The clergy do so through the application of spiritual means, while princes do so through the application of temporal and coercive means: ‘[T]he charge of the clergy 152 153 154 155 156

Ibid., sig. G2v–G3. Ibid., sig. G3. This claim is present already in the ‘New Additions’: Doctor and Student, pp. 327–30. Answer, sig. G3–G3v. Ibid., sig. G3v.

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is to mynister the sacramentes to the people and to preche & teche them howe to please god & kepe his commaundementes: & if they be neglygent & do nat so, kynges & princes ar bounden to commaunde them to do it.’157 In fact, one doctrinal teaching that ought to be prohibited by the king in England is the claim that princes do not have ‘cure and charge’ over the souls as well as the bodies of Christian subjects because such claims ‘nourisshe & engendre gret pride’ among the clergy.158 In addition to having direct responsibility for promoting the spiritual health of souls subject to him by enforcing laws against false preaching, St German also reasserts that the king’s responsibility for the bodily wellbeing of subjects and for defending them against the indirect harm that can come to souls in situations of conflict demands that kings have power to regulate preaching: [F]or a further prouf that princes may pacify all maner of vnquietnes that may rise among their people by any maner of occasion spirituall or temporall. It is sayde Exo. vi. a wyse kynge is the stablenesse of his people: wherof it foloweth, that if the vnstablenesse come by occasyon of any exposycion of scrypture, be it by doctours, prechers, or any other, that kynges haue power to stable them. And of that it foloweth also that if any man wyll preache in such maner that it is lyke to make vnquietnesse among the people that the prince maye prohybit him of that prechyng: for he that hath auctoritie to remoue an vnquyetnesse present: hath auctorite to preuent occasions wherby such vnquietnesse might happen to folow after amonge his subiectes.159

In all of this discussion, however, St German is still considering royal authority only from the perspective of temporal power. As the divinely ordained locus of all temporal authority within the realm, the Crown has tremendous power and therefore tremendous responsibility to care for the eternal well-being of English subjects. Through his control of Church finances and institutional affairs the prince can ensure that preaching and sacraments are readily available, and his monopoly on coercive force empowers him to ensure that priests perform their functions properly as well as make certain that lay Christians do not shirk their spiritual responsibilities, for example, by enforcing laws regulating the payment of tithes. Royally ordained human laws also have religious roles, clarifying for particular circumstances and ensuring the proper application of divine laws regulating matters such as tithes or restitution of goods.160 In more 157

Ibid., sig. G3v–G4. Ibid., sig. G4. 159 Ibid., sig. G4–G4v. 160 In the sixth chapter of An Answer St German provides an extensive investigation of what the dictates of English law are regarding in what cases restitution is due. It is crucial, he claims, that spiritual ministers have some knowledge of the laws of the realm regarding restitution so that they can correctly guide those who come to them for advice regarding what restitution ought to be made and to whom in particular circumstances ‘for in many cases it 158

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directly doctrinal matters, the temporal authority of the king empowers him to attach coercive penalties to excommunication and to coercively punish the teaching of heresy. All this, however, the king is authorized to do as defender of the faith, not definer of the faith, and St German never rescinds his earlier statements limiting royal authority over the Church and particularly over preaching by the condition that in all things if the king acts contrary to the divine law such acts are illegitimate, and impious royal commands must not be obeyed by Christian subjects. The king’s temporal authority is, after all, as the vicar of God, and certainly a vicar who acts contrary to the will of his lord must be disobeyed in favour of the will of the lord. In the seventh chapter of An Answer, St German reiterates his earlier claim that the king with Parliament has authority to make any law he wills ‘so that the lawes that he maketh be nat agaynste the lawe of God, nor the lawe of reason’.161 In short, if St German is going to effectively ensure order in the realm and obedience by Christian subjects of the laws ordering religious affairs in England by claiming for the civil authorities the power to determine what interpretations of scripture are binding in conscience, he must claim this power not on the basis of the king’s position as the vicar of God in temporal matters, but on some other basis. In fact, such an alternative basis of authority is at hand in the form of St German’s claim made near the end of the Power that the Parliament speaks with the authority of the Church of England: [A]ll men agree that the catholyque churche maye expounde scrypture: & if the clergy can proue that they be the catholyke churche, than it belongeth to them to expounde it. But if the emperours, kynges & princes, with their people, aswell of the clergye as of the lay fee make the catholique church and the clergye but a parte of that church: than may the emperoure, kynges & princes with their people expounde it. But for as moche as the vnyuersall catholique people can nat be gathered togyther to make suche exposycion, therfore it semeth that kynges & princes whom the people haue chosen & agreed to be their rulers & gouernours, and which haue the whole voyces of the people, maye with theire counsell spirytuall & temporall make exposycyon of such scripture as is doutfull, so as they shall thynke to be the true vnderstandyng of it, and none but they, & that theire subiectes be bounden euen by the lawe of god to folowe their exposycion for the goodnesse of oure lorde is suche that he wyll nat leue his people in suche doutes but that they maye haue some meanes whereby they maye come to the knowlege of the trouth so as shalbe necessarye to their saluatyon if they wyll dyspose them to it, and that is by obedyence to their princes whom god hathe appoynted to haue rule ouer them, as is afore sayde.162

canne natte be knowen without them [the laws of the realm]: where restitucyon ought to be made and where nat’: ibid., sig. E4–E4v. 161 Ibid., sig. G6; see also sig. B3, B6. 162 Ibid., sig. G4v–G5v.

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This claim is consistent with St German’s earlier assertion that Parliament speaks for the English Church because the power exercised by the Crown in England, as St German immediately points out, is not ‘a kyngely gouernaunce’ but ‘a kynglye and a polytyke gouernaunce’, according to which the king … maye make no Lawe to bynde his subiectes without their assent … And this power hathe the kynges grace in this Realme: where he by assente of his lordes spirytuall and temperall: and of his commons gathered togyther by his commaundement in his parlyamente maye make lawes to bynde the people And of those laws there nedeth no proclamation, bicause they be made by all the people, for the parliament so gathered togyther … representeth the estate of al the people within this realme, that is to say of the whole catholyque churche therof. And why shuld nat the parlyament than whiche representeth the whole catholyke churche of Englande expounde scrypture rather than the conuocacyon whiche representeth onely the state of the clergy[?]163

The roles of the king in the Church as defender of the faith and as definer of the faith are fundamentally different in their bases as well as in the powers exercised. The king is defender of the faith by direct divine commission. The power to define doctrine, however, belongs to the ruler only derivatively and, if you will, accidentally. He is authorized to define doctrine only if and when he is acting as spokesperson for a community of Christians. The authority of the Crown in Parliament over doctrinal affairs, then, rests on the fact that the persons who appoint the English Parliament and on whose behalf the Parliament speaks happen to all be Christians. Thus the Crown in Parliament, as spokesperson for the community of English subjects, is also spokesperson for the community of Christians in England, which is to say for the English Church. By identifying the Crown in Parliament as the highest hermeneutical authority, St German at a stroke eliminates any bases from which subjects could argue that they are unable to act in accord with the ecclesiastical policies of Henry and his Parliament. St German assumes that anyone who objects to official policy as at odds with an essential tenet of the faith would base the objection on a scriptural interpretation, and the civil authorities themselves issue binding pronouncements on what scriptural interpretations are to be accepted as valid by English Christians. English Christians are not forbidden to read the Bible for themselves and to form judgements regarding its interpretation, but if at any time such an individual interpretation seems to suggest that a policy of the Church is not in conformity with scripture, ‘It wyl be well done that his [the individual Christian’s] reasons be herd in the parlyament. And if his reason and the prouf thervpon seme [to Parliament] suffycyent, than to folowe it.’164 163 164

Ibid., sig. G5v–G6v. Ibid., sig. E2v.

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Subjects are not excluded from working for reform of the English Church, but all such efforts are to be pursued through the proper channels of the king in Parliament. If the authorities find one’s argument convincing, it can be assumed that they will institute the appropriate reforms; if not, the subject must assume that the interpretation is mistaken and conform to the dictates of the authorities. Obviously, such an understanding of the definition of doctrine would be of tremendous use to the civil authorities seeking to consolidate their power over the Church and to ensure obedience, conformity and order within the English Church and realm. There is, however, a concern that must be addressed before St German can expect this understanding of the definition of doctrine to win general acceptance: what is to become of the doctrinal unity of the universal Church? If the spokespersons for each Christian nation are authorized to issue binding pronouncements regarding the interpretation of scripture, an easily foreseeable consequence is that there will be several different ‘orthodoxies’ and the doctrinal unity of the universal Church will be disrupted. This issue can be considered from an institutional perspective by observing how St German addresses claims that the civil authorities within each Christian country are not authorized to define doctrine because this power rightly belongs only to the general council, a locus of authority that could speak for all Christians in the universal Church and provide a locus of doctrinal authority that would answer St German’s objections against a papal or clerical monopoly on the definition of doctrine while still preserving the unity of the faith. The issue can also be considered from the soteriological perspective of English Christians concerned for their eternal well-being. This concern arises because if the Crown in Parliament in England is authorized to define Christian truth then the authorities in other churches are also authorized to promulgate potentially different but equally authoritative understandings of Christianity. For English subjects anxious about their salvation this raises an urgent question: how can one be confident that the doctrine taught by the English authorities can be affirmed without fear of damnation when contrary, equally authoritative standards of orthodoxy are promulgated by the spokespersons for other Christian communities? Unless a compelling answer to this question can be provided, the order of the English Church that St German works so hard to defend is in serious jeopardy. The General Council and the Definition of Doctrine Regarding the authority of the general council, we have already seen that in The Additions of Salem and Bizance St German identifies the council as the authoritative voice of the universal Church having authority to settle

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disputes over doctrine. The authority of the general council is addressed in more detail in the final known published work of St German, A Treatise concernynge generall councilles, the Bysshoppes of Rome, and the Clergy. In this short tract of eight chapters, St German begins by considering the authority of kings and princes because the authority and nature of a true general council cannot be understood without a proper understanding of the royal office. This chapter consists of a series of citations of Old and New Testament texts, the purpose of which is to demonstrate (apparently for those who have not read the Power) that kings have their authority by the immediate grant of God and that their authority extends over all institutional, financial, judicial, proprietary and coercive affairs relating to the churches and the exercise of religion within their realms. Over the next three chapters, St German outlines briefly the powers that clergy have by the law of God, essentially the power to preach and perform the sacraments, and then expounds at some length on false powers claimed by the clergy, especially the Bishop of Rome. Ministrations of the clergy that are theirs merely by custom or human law but claimed as theirs by the divine law are listed, including judicial and institutional authority, as well as authority over virtually all ceremonial aspects of worship. The fourth chapter then catalogues powers usurped by Bishops of Rome and other bishops and priests to which they have no right either by divine or by valid human laws. Primary among these are claims by the Bishop of Rome to absolute authority over institutional Church affairs as well as claims that the Bishop of Rome has all spiritual and temporal power, including the power to depose princes. Also among the false claims is that … they [Bishops of Rome] and the clergye make the churche, and that such a churche as may not erre: and that they haue auctoritie to expounde and declare the doubtes of scrypture: and that all men are bounde to stand to that declaration … They pretende also, that they maye make lawes: and that all temporal lawes muste gyue place to them.165 And all these pretences, and many mo here omitted, whiche the people haue bene instructed in tyme paste to be trewe, be not only vntrewe, but also many of theym be heresye, and be directly agaynste scripture, and none of them can be affermed ne made perfite by custom prescription vse ne by acceptance of the people: for they be vntrewe doctrines.166

Discussion of the usurped powers of the clergy and in particular of the Bishop of Rome leads St German to discussion of the nature and authority of general councils because

165 Christopher St German, A Treatise concernynge generall councilles, the Byshoppes of Rome, and the Clergy (London, 1538), sig. B3–B3v (hereafter ‘General Councils’). 166 Ibid., sig. B4.

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… amongest other thynges the greatest hynderaunce of the true doctryne of the gospell, and of the perfection of all christen religion, & the increasynge of heresies and vntrue doctrines, haue growen by reson of these pretences folowynge: That is to saye, that the bysshop of Rome shuld be heed of the vnyuersall churche: and that he shuld haue power to sommon general councilles: and that byshoppes and pristes shuld only haue the voices in them: & haue power to expounde the doutes of scripture. And I entend now bryfely as I canne, to touche some thynge of generall councylles: and fyrste I wyll speke of suche catholyke generall counsayles as be appoynted to by kepte by the lawe of god: and then of suche councylles as haue ben kepte in tyme paste, by the power of the byshops of Rome.167

In the fifth chapter, St German turns to a discussion of ‘By what auctorite the catholyke generall councilles fyrste began, and what power they haue’.168 Regarding the origins of general councils, he argues that in leaving a testament providing for the order of the Church, Christ took into account the various circumstances in which Christians would find themselves and ordered matters appropriately for each set of conditions. In this regard there were two general sets of conditions, the first stretching from … the tyme that folowed immediately after his [Christ’s] passyon, whan the churche was in the begynnynge, and in maner as in her infancye, to the tyme that kynges and prynces were conuerted: whiche by thauctoritie that they had receyued of god ouer his people, myght take rule and gouernaunce therof: The other tyme was from the sayd time that kynges and prynces were conuerted, to the ende of the worlde.169

Interpreting Christ’s words to Peter in Matthew 16 (‘whatsoever you bind’, and so on) as applying to all of the apostles and as being spoken provisionally until the time of the conversion of magistrates, St German concedes that in the first era of the Church, institutional, financial and ceremonial ecclesiastical affairs were ordered by the apostles alone. Later, as the community of believers grew, the apostles joined with the ‘seniours of the peple’ in councils that acted in the name of the whole Church, as recorded in Acts 15 and 21.170 Following the conversion of princes to the faith, however, they assumed power to ensure that the Church was properly ordered: ‘[W]hen kynges and pryncis were conuerted to the faythe, then the power, to see the saide testament of Christe to be duely executed, was deuolute to kynges and princis, as heedes and rulers ouer the people.’171 This is confirmed, St German argues, by Matthew 18: ‘What so euer ye bynde vppon erthe, shall be bounden in heuen: for tho wordes Christ speke to the disciples, 167 168 169 170 171

Ibid., sig. B4–B4v. Ibid., sig. B4v. Ibid., sig. B5 (mislabelled as C5)–B5v. Ibid., sig. B5v–B6v. Ibid., sig. B7.

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and to all the people there beinge presente in the name of the vniuersal church and that texte is the verye grounde and warrante of the kepynge of all catholyke generall councilles.’172 The authority to call general councils belongs by the will of Christ not to the Bishop of Rome, but to the entire community of Christians, or their leaders speaking on their behalf. Another crucial question about general councils, in addition to who ought to call them, is who ought to participate in them and, particularly, who ought to wield authority within them. St German has already addressed this issue in the seventh chapter of An Answer. Immediately after claiming for Parliament authority to expound scripture, St German declares, … & ouer that me thinketh that no man ought to pretende that at a generall counsell anye other shulde be iuges but kynges & princes & suche as they wyll appoynte vnder them to bere voyces therin: seynge that they haue the power & voyce of the whole people of christendom, which is the catholyque churche as is sayde before.173

This sentiment is confirmed in General Councils by St German’s contention that it is false and even heretical to affirm that ‘byshoppes pristes and other of the clergye, aughte to haue the voices in suche [general] councilles, and none but they.’174 To justify the authority of laity in a general council, St German appeals to what he has by now clearly adopted as his standard definition of the Church, the community of all Christians: [T]he bysshoppes of Rome haue in tyme past, as heedes of the vniuersall churche, taken vpon them, to summon and appoynt generall councils, as they haue called them, and to commande kinges and princis to obey that sommons, and to assiste theym therein. but yet when kynges & princes haue done soo: [neither] they, ne any other by their appoyntemente, ne yet any lay manne shulde haue in the sayde councilles any voyces, but bysshoppes, priestes, and religious, and other of the clergie onely. For they haue pretended, that they make the vniuersall churche, and that such a churche as may not erre. And surely to say, that byshops and pristes, make the vniuersall churche, is a great erroure: for the vniuersall church is the congregation of all faithefull people, and not onely of the bysshops and priestes.175

Some time after first asserting this definition of the Church and resting crucial aspects of his vision of the royal supremacy on it, St German now seeks to demonstrate the validity of this definition of the Church. He does so by appeal to scripture, claiming that it was of the Church as the congregation of faithful people that … saint Paule speke, Ephes. v. whanne he sayde, that for his churche Christe gaue hym selfe: and no man wylle say, that Christ gaue hym selfe only for the 172 173 174 175

Ibid., sig. B7. Answer, sig. G6v. General Councils, sig. B3; see also sig. B4v. Ibid., sig. C5–C5v.

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clergie. Also saint Paule spekynge of the particular churche of the Corinthians saith thus … I haue espoused you, to gyue your selfe a chaste virgin to one manne, that is Christe. And by those wordes, a chaste vyrgine, he vnderstandeth the vniuersal churche of the Corinthians, and not onely of the clergie there.176

For further confirmation of this definition of the Church, St German also notes that it is the definition acknowledged by ‘the byshops of this realme … for they right well and catholikely haue confessed in their boke, called the Institution of a christen man, in the title of matrimonie, that the congregation of al faithfull people maketh the vniuersall churche.’177 The necessity of a valid general council being called and led by kings and princes can also be deduced from practical considerations relating to the purpose of a council. St German points out that many of the abuses in most urgent need of being addressed in a general council are errors introduced by the clergy themselves, often regarding matters of clerical wealth and authority concerning which the clergy cannot be trusted to judge indifferently: And by reasone of the said pretences, that the byshops of Rome shulde be supreme heedes of the vniuersall churche, and that they might summon a general councill, as they haue callid it, to reforme the churche, as they haue pretended … in heed and membres, & in faith & maners, vnderstandyng by that worde heed, the byshoppe of Rome: and by that worde membres kynges and princes, and theyr people: they haue brought in many gret perillous errours and abusions, as well to the hurte of theyr owne soules, as of all the people. And ouer that, for mayntenance of theyr own honour, power, riches, libertie, and suche other, haue made lawes directely agaynst scripture, agaynst the power of kynges and princes and theyr lawes, and also agaynste all trouthe and charitie, and whereof they hadde noo power to make any lawes and canons, but onely that they toke vpon them to do it by the vsurped powers before rehersed. And nowe lette euery manne in his owne conscience iuge, whether it be an indifferent waye of Iustice, that the byshoppe of Rome and the clergie shulde be in these mattiers iudges, to redresse the sayde abusions, heresyes, and vntrewe doctrynes, brought in by them selfe, & by their predecessoures, and whyther they wolde be dilygente to abbate their accustomed vsurped honor, power, riches, libertie, and suche other, as in this worlde be thinges ryght delectable and plesant, specially if the councill be kepte, where they haue worldly power: I doubte not, but that there be som of the clergie, that wolde put therto right greatte diligence: but to fynde many of them, I thinke it wold be very hard.178

Thus St German reaffirms what he had already pointed out in An Answer: I thynke verily that generall counsels shall do lytell good tyll christen princes wyl knowe their owne power & the auctorite that they haue receyued of god ouer his people, and that they set the clergy in such power as they ought to 176 177 178

Ibid., sig. C5v–C6. Ibid., sig. C6. Ibid., sig. C6–C7.

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haue by the lawe of god without diminisshing of it in any maner: & to se also that they haue no more but as shall be thoughte expedyent for the comen welth, & also for the helth of their owne soules & of the people.179

As will be discussed below, the contrast between valid councils in which kings and princes, as spokespersons for their communities, take leading roles and the gatherings that for centuries had been called general councils is not lost on St German. Turning to a consideration of the powers that general councils are authorized to exercise, St German is adamant that the general council has no right to infringe on the authority granted by God to kings, that is to say absolute authority over all temporal affairs within their realms. The defence of the faith in terms of coercively enforcing laws against heresy or impious living is solely the responsibility of kings: For it is sayd Eccle. v. the kynge commaundeth the hoole countrey, as his subiette: and therfore, if any man shulde punysshe in the realme of an other prynce, any of his subiectes, withoute his commaundement, it shulde be againste the foresayde texte. Wherfore the sayde texte, Math. xviii. which was spoken to the vniuersall churche, as is sayde before, is to be vnderstand thus, what so euer ye bynde vppon erthe, not offendynge scripture, ne the power that is gyuen to kynges by the lawe of god, shal be bounden in heuen. For certayne it is, that the intent of Christ was, neuer to speke any thynge againste scripture, neither of the olde testamente, ne of the new.180

A corollary to the claim that kings exercise exclusive authority over the means of coercive enforcement is that coercive correction of the king is the prerogative of no human power but of God alone, and St German does not shy away from this conclusion: And ouer that, if a christen kynge lyued agaynste scripture, to the hurte of his owne soule, and to the yuell example also of all his subiectes, the general councill might declare, that he lyued againste scripture, and against the lawe of god: but correction they myght none do, ne his subiectes might nothing do therin: but only pray to almightye god for his amendement.181

While the general council does not exercise coercive authority in any form, it does have a role in the ordering of Christian lives. This role is to declare the true exposition of scripture and discern the essentials of the faith, and this is to be done by a general council because only a general council can guarantee the unity of the faith: [T]o speke somewhat of the power of the catholyke generall councils, that I haue spoken of before, I thynke veryly, that the power of them standeth mooste principally to declare the trewe catholyke fayth, accordynge to the rules and 179 180 181

Answer, sig. G6v–G7. General Councils, sig. B8–B8v. Ibid., sig. B8v–C1.

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groundes of scripture: and to declare also, what is to be iuged to be agaynste scripture, and what not: and to expounde the doubtes therof: and also to determine, what bokes are to be obeide and taken as bookes of scripture, and what not. For all chrysten people muste agree in one faythe and in one god.182

This emphasis on the importance of Christian unity, and the role of the general council in securing it, is not new in the thought of St German. As early as The Additions of Salem and Bizance St German raises the issue of unity in his discussion of the authority of kings and princes to canonize saints. Bizance objects that ‘If one prince auctorised one as a saint, yet perauenture an other prince wold not so accept hym, and so it might happen to make variances betwixt the countreyes, when one wolde take one as holy and blessed, and the other not.’ Salem responds that ‘therfore it were moste conuenient, that it shulde be done at a generall counsayle. And that princis and their ambassadours shoulde be therin iudges, takyng the spiritualtie as their counsaylours in that behalfe.’183 Matters of canonization and who is considered a saint are not essentials of the faith, such that even one who wrongly denies a canonized person to be a true saint is not to be accounted a heretic, but uniformity among Christians is desirable even on this point. How much more important is unity regarding the essentials of the faith is reflected in General Councils. We have already seen St German affirm that Christians must agree in one faith, and he later reaffirms that ‘in one faythe and in one hoole and full assente vpon scripture, and vpon the expositions therof, all christen people muste of necessitie agree, as I haue sayd before: and to that intent onely it shulde seme that Christ ordeyned generall councilles.’184 Of course, St German continues to emphasize that the determinations of the general council carry no coercive authority, but he does so in the context of conceding to the council the power to define doctrine, if not to coercively defend it: ‘[I]f any lawe be vsed agaynste scripture, the generall councill may declare, that it is so: but the correction and refourmation in that behalfe, they muste commytte to kynges in euery countreye, and to theyr lawes.’185 Again, … the generalle councille, laufully gathered according to scripture, may declare, what is heresie, and whatte not. And I thinke also, that by these wordes, Dic ecclesiae, & si ecclesiam non audierit, sit tibi sicut ethnicus & publicanus, They may put a man to aunswere before them vpon the heresie: and so may not euery byshop, ne yet all the clergie togyther. Howe be it the generall councill maye not thervpon do correction. For al the correction pertaineth to kynges and princis, as I haue sayd before.186 182 183 184 185 186

Ibid., sig. B7v. Additions, pp. 26v–27. General Councils, sig. C3. Ibid., sig. C1–C1v. Ibid., sig. C2–C2v.

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In addition to ensuring that councils do not usurp the coercive authority prescribed by the divine law to be the prerogative of the civil authorities, St German also attempts to defend the legislative authority of princes over matters not essential to the faith. This attempt, however, reveals a problematic aspect of the power that he claims for the general council to authoritatively interpret scripture. He argues that while a general council is authorized to declare what is heresy and what not, its authority does not extend over matters other than the essentials of the faith. Consequently, … yf the generall councille decreed, that the yongest sonne shuld enherite in this realm: or that all entayles made of landes, shulde be voide: Or that the clergie shuld haue a iurisdiction, and make proces of excommunication againste euery man, that breke any of their decrees, all were in vayne: for it were agaynste the prerogatyue of kingis and princis in euery realme: and also against scripture, whereby kynges haue their power, as is said before. Wherfore that general councill hath therin no auctoritie.187

Regarding matters not among the essentials of the faith, the general council may issue decrees, but these are to be understood merely as suggestions, binding only in the sense that they clarify how a Christian life may be well-ordered in particular circumstances. Such decrees must give place to contrary human laws: [T]houghe the apostels & seniours, Act. xv. by auctoritie of the said texte, Matth. xvi, Quodcunque; ligaueris. &c. decreed, that the peple shuld abstayne, a suffocatis & sanguine, whiche pertayned not meerelye to the faythe, for the meate was laufulle: and neuerthelesse the chrysten people were than bounden to obey the decree: Yet yf the kynges, vnder whom the christen people were than subiectes, vpon a reasonable cause had commaunded them to haue eaten suche meate, they ought in conscience to haue obeyed his commandement. For the eatinge shulde not haue ben against the faith, and that decree was not made, but onely for a frendly communyon and companienge togither of the gentyles and iewes in the beginning of the churche.188

Placing such a limitation on the power of the general council is, however, problematic because the issue of what is to be considered a matter ‘of the faith’ is left undetermined. In fact, power to define what is ‘of the faith’ has previously been placed in the hands of the general council itself as the ultimate authority in the interpretation of scripture. The only way that the laws of Christian kingdoms ordering temporal affairs can be effectively safeguarded from infringement by the determinations of general councils would be if it were argued that no temporal affairs are essentials of the faith. We have seen, however, that St German does identify some beliefs impacting temporal affairs as being among the essentials of Christianity; this position is not denied, but rather reaffirmed in General Councils. 187 188

Ibid., sig. C1. Ibid., sig. C1v–C2.

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Again highlighting the authority that remains for princes over all nonessential matters relating to the exercise of religion within their realms, he asserts that … the orderynge of all ceremonies, of fastynge dayes and holy dayes, excepte the. vii. day onely, of sensynges, and of all the ceremonious apparell at masse, matyns, and euen songes, and of al other lyke: be vnder the power of kynges and prynces, according to their lawes, and not of the generall councilles. For they be not commaunded by scripture, ne pertayne not merely to the faithe: but haue ben brought vppe for the beautifieng of the ministrations vsed amonge the people, and to stire them the rather to deuotion.189

Of special importance for the present consideration is the exception that St German notes of the necessity of a seventh day being kept as a holy day. The reason general councils can decree that Christians must observe one day in seven as a holy day and that their decree on this point binds in conscience is because in doing so they are asserting an essential of the faith decreed in scripture. Similarly, a council could presumably issue a decree binding in conscience that Christians must support the bodily needs of their ministers, a principle that, as has been seen, St German concedes to be dictated by scripture. If, however, the general council is authorized to expound scripture, why could the council not decree that Christians are, for example, bound to support their clergy at a rate of 10 per cent precisely? If it be objected that such a matter is under the authority of kings and princes, the council could counter that in fact such a belief and the accompanying practice is dictated by scripture and provide an authoritative interpretation to demonstrate that it is. Similarly, if the general council were to decree that Christians are bound by the dictates of scripture to observe not only one day in seven, but Sunday (or Saturday) precisely as the day set aside for worship and provide a scriptural interpretation to support the claim, who could gainsay them? The case is the same regarding clerical jurisdiction, and indeed all aspects of Christian life, including institutional affairs such as papal headship of the universal Church and even papal authority vis-à-vis general councils. While such determinations of the council would carry no coercive weight in this life, if the Church is the ultimate hermeneutical authority and if a valid general council is the highest source of insight into the judgments of the universal Church, it would be assumed that Christians are bound in conscience to obey the teachings of a general council even in the face of human laws to the contrary. Such authorization of the council would extend as far as the council itself declared that it should extend based on its interpretation of scripture.

189

Ibid., sig. C2v–C3.

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A similar understanding of the authority of a general council is reflected in a 1537 manuscript by St German found among Cromwell’s papers, ‘Dyalogue shewinge what we be bounde to byleve as thinges necessary to Salvacion, and what not’. As summarized by Guy, the manuscript presents a call for a general council convened by Christian kings and princes to clarify the canonical status of apocryphal books and to expound scripture to foster uniformity in the Church and clarify the teachings of the faith. Guy sees this as an abandonment of St German’s earlier position that ‘scripture would be best expounded in England by the king and parliament.’190 In St German’s published reflections on the general council, however, it is not so clear that the earlier position is repudiated. While the 1537 manuscript and General Councils may emphasize the authority of a valid general council, in the published work St German is at pains to ensure that royal authority over the English Church is not compromised by an invalid general council dominated by the pope. He stresses that the conciliar authority discussed is claimed only for a valid general council, a council called by princes, ordered by princes, and at which princes or their personally chosen delegates hold the highest positions. The authorization of such a council to interpret scripture is consistent with the fundamental principle underlying the authority of princes to define doctrine expressed in An Answer that ‘kynges & princes whom the people haue chosen & agreed to be their rulers & gouernours, and which haue the whole voyces of the people, maye with theire counsell spirytuall & temporall make exposycyon of such scripture as is doutfull.’191 Interpret this passage as applying individually to each Christian ruler, and it is a restatement of the claim made in An Answer that the Crown in Parliament authoritatively interprets scripture. Interpret it collectively of all Christian kings and princes, and one has the hermeneutical principle of General Councils that a valid general council called and presided over by kings and princes is the highest interpretive authority. Because of the influence that Christian rulers would wield at a valid general council, the danger such a council would pose to individual princes is minimized. Certainly a general council could propound a binding interpretation of scripture demonstrating that the Bishop of Rome is the rightful head of the universal Church with absolute authority to order all institutional, financial and ceremonial ecclesiastical affairs. A council could issue such an interpretation, but as long as Henry VIII, not to mention other Christian princes, takes a leading role in shaping the decrees of the 190 John Guy, ‘The Later Career of Christopher St. German (1534–1541)’, in John Guy, Ralph Keen, Clarence Miller and Ruth McGugan (eds), The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol. 10 (New Haven, CT, 1987), pp. 408–414 (quotation at p. 414); Guy, Chancery and Statute, pp. 48–53; see also Fox and Guy, Reassessing the Henrician Age, pp. 218–20. 191 Answer, sig. G5.

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council, it is highly unlikely that it would actually do so. If Henry did not play such a role at the council, the danger of the council proffering such an interpretation might increase, but then the council would no longer be general and its decrees would no longer carry any weight in England. It would be better for obedience and order in the realm, of course, if St German were to reassert the authority of the Crown in Parliament to pronounce binding interpretations of scripture, removing all chance of incongruity between the will of God and the laws of the realm. In practical terms, this is what St German ultimately does, negating the authority of the general council to interpret scripture and sending English subjects back to the Crown in Parliament to discover the true interpretation of the Bible. This is accomplished, first, by noting that no valid general council was going to meet in the foreseeable future and, second, by claiming that in the absence of guidance from a valid general council, authority to propound biblical interpretations binding on the consciences of English Christians devolves to the Crown in Parliament. Concluding the seventh and penultimate chapter of General Councils, St German summarizes his thoughts on the nature and value of a valid council: And as for the gatheringe of suche a free catholyque generall councill, to be gathered by kynges and princis, as I haue saide before, it is not to be douted, but that euery christen prince by the generall bonde of charitie, to the honour of god, and to the helthe as well of his owne soule as of the soules of all his subiectes, wherof he hath taken moste special cure and charge before any other: and for the mayntenance also of the vnitie of faithe in Christis churche: wyll fro tyme to tyme, as nede shall require, charitably agree, that suche catholyke generalle councilles, as be before rehersed, shulde be gathered, and to see that suche personnes haue the voyces therin, as shall be thought mooste indifferente. And if there were a generall councill thus gathered, by auctoritie of kynges and princis, I thinke it wolde doo more good at one syttyng, then many of the generall councylles that haue ben kept in tyme paste by auctoritie of bysshops of Rome, and of the clergie, haue done in many yeres. For the more pitie is, they vnder the colour of reformation, haue maynteyned right great abusions, and vntrewe doctrines, whiche of lykelyhode they of them selfe wyll neuer reforme: but our lorde of his goodnes may reforme them, whan it pleaseth hym.192

St German’s statement that ‘it is not to be douted’ that Christian princes will put aside their differences and come together for the glory of God and the well-being of Christian souls in a general council to reform the Church ‘as nede shall require’ seems to be more a prescription for hope than a practical guideline for expectation. Perhaps St German hopes that, once all Christian princes become as aware of their true responsibilities as is the English king, they will be stirred to join together in such a council to 192

General Councils, sig. D3–D4.

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effect a reformation of the Church catholic. Be that as it may, St German is aware that despite the crying need for Church reform, a valid council has not been held for some time, and only an invalid, papal council is in the offing: [T]he byshop of Rome hath nowe of late summoned a councyll to be holden after the old fashion: And if he shuld shew him self outwardly to do it for a reformation, & inwardly intende to maynteyne forthe the old abusyons, it shoulde be in hym to great a faute & enormitie to be suffred. And therfore it is to think, that he knowith many of the clergy, that wyll helpe forthe his good purpose therin. Howe be it thoughe his intent be neuer soo good in this matter, yet if ignorance do not excuse, I thinke verily, that he, and all that haue moued hym to summon it, haue fallen therby into a ryght great heresie, for the causes before rehersed … Wherfore I wyll say thus farre, concerninge the said councill, that as many kynges and princis, as knowe the said text, Ecclesiastes. v. and other textes lyke, wherby it appereth euidentely, that the high power, and the high commandement of the worlde, restith in kinges and princes, and that none hath auctoritie vnder god to commaunde theym: and neuer the lesse wyl appere at the sayd councill, that they agree, that the bysshoppe of Rome is heade of the vnyuersalle Churche, and so assente to the saide herysye, and be maynteyners and partteakers of it: and that they also renounce and forsake therby the power, that they haue receyued of god ouer his people, and that they disable them selfe therby to reforme the abusions, errours, and heresies, which through the craftes & sleightes of the fende, haue ben brought into the worlde, againste the trewe doctrine of Christe and of his gosspel, and also againste thensamples of holy faders in the primitiue churche, and wherof there is no truste of refourmation, oneles kynges and princis shortly put to their handes.193

Here St German emphasizes not only the invalidity of the proposed papal council but also the culpability of Christian princes who, by aiding and abetting in such a council, renounce their divinely ordained authority and ‘disable them selfe therby to reforme the abusions, errours, and heresies’ of the Church. In part, it seems that the intention of General Councils is to demonstrate the value of a valid general council and to inspire Christian leaders to organize one. Such a council, while to some degree mitigating the authority of the English Crown over doctrinal matters, would still leave Henry VIII and other Christian rulers with considerable control over the interpretation of scripture. An additional intention of General Councils is to distinguish between a true general council and a papally controlled pseudo-council. St German is clear that a valid council is not being planned and may well not be held in the foreseeable future. This is important because by doing so St German directs English subjects to look to the Crown in Parliament for guidance interpreting the Bible. This is the interpretive authority identified

193

Ibid., sig. C7–C8v.

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as the one to which Christians should turn in the absence of a valid general council.194 The identification of the Crown in Parliament as the secondary standard of doctrinal truth to which Christians should look in the absence of a valid general council is first vetted by St German in the second chapter of An Answer in which he considers papal power. In this chapter, St German addresses a number of issues relating to the authority of Church councils and the nature of Christian orthodoxy, issues that stand in a crucial relationship to his understanding of the authority of the Crown in Parliament over the definition of Christian doctrine. The issue of conciliar authority arises in this chapter because the Bishop of Rome’s authority as head of the universal Church is based on the determination of a general council. By this title, St German argues, the council meant to claim for the Bishop of Rome only that he should sit in a place of pre-eminence at all meetings of bishops and that he should have the prerogative of preaching before all others should he wish to do so: … & if any man wyll say that he [the Bishop of Rome] ought therby to haue & vse also the power of a bisshop in mere spirituall things as in gyuyng of ordres, makynge of prests, makyng of excoimcacions & absolutions, & such other in all places wher he shuld come, aswel without his owne dyocyse as within: to that it may be answered, that if the generall counsell whereby Rome was made hed of al other churches, had entended that the bisshop of rome shuld haue had the power of a bisshop vniuersally in all other bysshops diocyses through cristendome, that than the seyd general counsel wold haue expressed openly that power, and wold also haue reuoked the counsell of Nycene, which appoynted the bisshop of Rome to his diocise and that in all other prouynces, that honoure shulde be kepte to euery church. But forasmoch as the seid generall counsell dyd nat so, it semeth that it intended that the counsell of Nycene shulde stande in effecte: & that the bysshop of Rome shuld styll kepe him to his diocise as he dyd before, hauynge only by that name such preemynence at the generall metynge of bysshops, as before appereth in whose diocyse soeuer they mette.195

194 Concluding his assessment of St German’s 1537 manuscript, Guy notes the ‘sheer impracticalities’ of St German’s call to reform the Church and preserve the unity of the faith by means of a general council, and he suggests that St German’s decision not to publish reflects his own awareness that the scheme was unrealistic (Guy, Chancery and Statute, p. 52; ‘The Later Career of Christopher St. German (1534–1541)’, pp. 413–14). Assuming this is accurate, it seems that St German spent the time between the preparation of the 1537 manuscript and the publication of General Councils reflecting on how to voice his hopes for a conciliar solution to the religious turmoil of the 1530s while defending the Crown against the usurpations of a false council. Others in England in the 1530s were combining hopes for a true general council called by Christian rulers with rejections of a papally-dominated council. See W.B. Patterson, ‘Hooker on Ecumenical Relations: Conciliarism in the English Reformation’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), pp. 288–91. 195 Answer, sig. B4–B4v.

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This passage reveals St German’s conviction that the decrees of a general council can be revoked by later councils. His claim is not that the later council could not revoke a determination of Nicaea, simply that it did not, and the implication is that the later council could have revoked a dictate of the former had the delegates seen fit to do so. St German has more to say about the council at which the Bishop of Rome was recognized as the head bishop of Christendom and why Parliament has not run afoul of it in recognizing Henry as the supreme head of the English Church: [W]han Rome was made heed of all other churches … it is vncertayne what princes were warned to be at that counsell, & what nat. And if any Prince or Countrey were nat warned to be there, than that counsell bounde nat that prince, and no man can iuge for certayne that the kynge of this realme that tyme beynge had suche warnynge … And if this realme were nat bounde by the seyde generall counsell to accepte Rhome as hedde of all churches bycause it had no warnynge: but hath by custome assented to it, than is that custome the thynge that shuld bynde this realme to it, and nat the generall counsell, and than it is no doute if the parlyamente see a hurte folowe to the comen welthe, by that custome but that they maye: yea, and are bounde of iustyce to redresse it.196

Two things are noteworthy about this argument. First, for St German the issue is whether or not the prince and realm of England are ‘bound’ by the pronouncement of the council. The question is: what does St German mean by ‘binding’ in this case? Applying the statements made in General Councils, he cannot mean coercively binding because the judgements of Church councils carry no coercive authority. It seems he must mean binding in conscience, but if this is the case then it would mean that St German believes the council to have pronounced Roman headship of the Church to be ‘of the faith’, an essential doctrine of Christianity. Because the sole authoritative source of essential Christian teachings is the scripture, in saying that the council ‘bound’ Christians to accept papal headship he seems to mean that the council propounded an authoritative interpretation of the Bible to that effect.197 Combining these insights with his earlier recognition 196

Ibid., sig. B7–B7v. As discussed above, any attempt by a general council to issue binding decrees regarding institutional, financial, judicial, or ceremonial affairs is ‘in vayne: for it were agaynste the prerogatyue of kingis and princis in euery realme: and also against scripture, whereby kynges haue their power’, unless in making the decree the council is promulgating a dictate of scripture: General Councils, sig. C1. The council of Acts 15 did issue a binding decree regarding what meats were to be eaten by Christians, but St German is at pains to point out that Christians’ responsibility to obey this decree was conditional upon there not being an opposing decree from the civil authorities. Also Christians were bound to obey the decree only because they were bound to maintain peaceful and harmonious relations with fellow Christians as far as possible: General Councils, sig. C1v–C2. This being the case, it seems clear that the authority wielded by the council of Acts 15 to order the lives of 197

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of the authority of a later council to negate the decree of an earlier council, one sees that, according to St German, Christian orthodoxy is relativistic. The interpretation of scripture that Christians are ‘bound’ to believe can and does vary from time to time, and one is obligated to believe only those ‘truths’ that have been certified to one by an authoritative exposition of scripture. Christians living prior to the Council of Nicaea would be in no sense bound to accept Roman headship of the Church. Christians living from the time of the Nicene Council until the revocation of the dictates of Nicaea by a later council would be bound to believe in Roman headship as defined at the Council of Nicaea. Christians living after a later council had revoked the teachings of Nicaea on the point of Roman authority would be bound in conscience to accept papal headship or not as determined by the later council. Orthodoxy, defined as what one is obligated to believe in order to obtain salvation, changes with time, as general councils reveal more fully the meaning of the scriptures and amend the pronouncements of earlier councils as necessary. A second noteworthy feature of the discussion of the council that affirmed papal headship is that although the council is referred to as a ‘general’ council, it is clearly not ‘general’ in the sense of representing or speaking for the universal Christian Church. St German’s point is that at least some English Christians were not represented at this council, yet the fact that it did not comprise all of the Christians in the universal Church does not compromise the legitimacy of the council. Neither does the fact that the council in question did not speak on behalf of the universal Church undermine its authority with respect to those who were represented at the council. The authority of the council is limited only in the sense that it is not binding for those Christians not represented. With regard to those Christians represented, however, it seems clear that they are as tightly bound by the determinations of the council as they ever were by decrees of a truly general council. St German argues that ‘if any Prince or Countrey were nat warned to be there [at the council], than that counsell bounde nat that prince’, the implication being that if a realm’s ruler is notified of and present at a council then Christians of that realm are ‘bound’ by the resolutions of the council. This council is empowered to authoritatively interpret scripture, but only those Christians present or represented at the council are obliged for the health of their Christians in essentially indifferent things to maintain peace and harmony was provisional in the absence of Christian kings who are divinely ordained to have authority in such matters. In St German’s eyes, the position of the king makes him uniquely able to discern the needs of the community regarding matters left indeterminate by the divine law (such as the precise level of support provided to the clergy or the number of holy days that ought to be recognized in addition to the seventh day), and for this reason kings are divinely ordained to exercise this authority, not the general council. The exception, of course, is with regard to matters (such as the keeping of one day in seven as a holy day) defined as essential to the faith by scripture.

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souls to accept the council’s interpretations. Once again, the relativistic nature of St German’s conception of orthodoxy comes to the fore. Just as the standard of orthodoxy, defined as what one must believe to attain salvation, varies with time, it also varies with place and circumstance. Contemporary Christians living in different communities and subject to different councils are bound in conscience to different orthodoxies, and their actions and beliefs are to be judged according to different standards depending on what has been authoritatively promulgated to them as the true interpretation of scripture. This brings St German far along the path to authorizing Parliament to define doctrine because Parliament is essentially a national council speaking for the entire community of Christians in England. If a truly general council cannot, for whatever reason, meet, then Christians are authorized to gather in smaller regional or national councils to provide doctrinal guidance for their community. This is especially the case if the determination of an earlier council on a point of doctrine turns out to be pernicious. Such is the case in England with regard to the decree on papal primacy over the Church. Immediately following his argument that the English are not bound to accept Roman primacy over the Church because they were not represented at the council that affirmed it, St German argues that even if they were once bound by that council, they are not irrevocably bound: Also, though it were admytted that this realme hadde warnynge and were therefore bounde by the seyd generall counsell as other realmes were: yet for as moche as a generall councell shulde be holden at certayne tymes appoynted by the lawe to redresse wronges done to the people. And it is well knowen throughe christendome: that popes in tyme paste haue delayed suche generall counseyls, further than the lawe wold this many yeres. Therfore if the wronges done by popes, shulde nat be reformed before a generall counsell, the people mighte be longe greued, and haue no helpe of longe tyme: and there is no reason why they shuld susteyne wronge any one daye specyally by him that dyfferreth the meanes whereby they might haue remedye. And therefore the parlyament hath good auctoritye to remoue such wronges in this realme: and so haue all other Realmes that be in lyke maner greued as this realme was.198

The closing words of this passage also confirm the limitations on the authority of regional or national councils. St German acknowledges that the churches of other realms are empowered to renounce papal primacy. He does not claim that the renunciation of that authority by the English Church relieves Christians in other countries of their responsibility to accept papal primacy. The English Parliament is authorized to repeal the obligation (if there ever was one) of English Christians to accept papal primacy, but all Christians bound by the earlier council to accept papal 198

Answer, sig. B7v–B8.

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primacy and not represented by the English Parliament must wait until a council at which they are represented revokes those doctrines before they are no longer bound to accept papal primacy. The decrees of the English Parliament carry no authority over Christians in other realms. The clerical and especially papal abuses catalogued in General Councils are, St German laments, in desperate need of reform. If the true, biblical power of the clergy were made known, … it wolde vndoutedly appere, that the bysshops of Rome and the clergy haue vnder the colour of the law of god, claymed many mo thinges, thenne it gyueth vnto theym: and whiche hathe benne in theym a right greatte offence, and hath ben also one of the greattest occasyons, wherby the charitie, peace, and quietnes amonge the people haue ben broken, and the puritie of Christes doctrine, in maner broughte into a hole ceremoniall fashion of lyuing, after the deuyce and doctrine of the clergie. And if suche thynges were reformed, it is very like, that trouth whiche is God hym selfe, and his trewe doctrines wolde shortly after appiere in the worlde, and boldelye shewe theyr faces throughe all christen realmes.199

Tremendous harm is being done to the bodies and souls of Christians, and there is no hope of reformation from a general council held under the authority of the pope. Ideally, St German would have the reformation of the Church and the authoritative clarification of misunderstood biblical texts overseen by kings and princes collectively at a valid general council that would not only free Christians from clerical tyranny but would also preserve the unity of the faith. Lacking such a general council, however, St German calls on English subjects to recognize the authority of their representatives, the Crown with Parliament, so that they can effectively curb clerical pretensions and fulfil their role as the best guides to true doctrine available in the absence of a valid general council. St German answers the threat posed by a general council as an opposing locus of authority compromising the power of the Crown in Parliament over the Church not by denying the authority of the council, but by affirming the authority of a genuine council and then denying that there is a true general council available to fulfil this role. Indeed he uses the authority of church councils itself to claim for Parliament, as a national Church council, the authority to interpret scripture in the absence of a valid general council. Thus when St German speaks of the authority of Parliament, it is in contrast to the authority of the English Convocation, not the authority of a true general council: ‘And why shuld nat the parlyament than whiche representeth the whole catholyke churche of Englande expounde scrypture rather than the conuocacyon whiche representeth onely the state of the clergy[?]’200 The English Parliament has, for English Christians, the 199 200

General Councils, sig. D8–D8v. Answer, sig. G6v.

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authority to interpret scripture and to issue decisions that are binding in conscience, the authority that a valid general council would have, if one were possible. The Scrupulous Conscience and the Definition of Doctrine Consideration of St German’s understanding of the authority of Church councils and the definition of Christian orthodoxy also goes far toward answering the more practical concern outlined above of scrupulous English Christians concerned for their salvation who ask: how can I be confident that the doctrine taught by the English authorities can be affirmed without fear of damnation when different but equally authoritative standards of orthodoxy are promulgated by the rulers of other realms? We have seen that St German considers the doctrinal determinations of Church councils primarily from the perspective of binding or not binding. With regard to the highest authority in the definition of orthodoxy available in England, the national Church council that is the Crown in Parliament, St German does not promise absolutely accurate insight into divine truth, but merely an interpretation of scripture to which one can adhere without fear for one’s soul. After identifying Parliament as the highest interpretive authority in the English Church, St German assures his readers that … the goodnesse of oure lorde is suche that he wyll nat leue his people in suche doutes but that they maye haue some meanes whereby they maye come to the knowlege of the trouth so as shalbe necessarye to their saluatyon if they wyll dyspose them to it, and that is by obedyence to their princes whom god hathe appoynted to haue rule ouer them.201

Salvific, not absolutely correct, insight into divine truth is promised to Christians who adhere to the teachings of this divinely ordained standard of biblical interpretation. Because they are bound only by the teachings of councils at which they are represented, English Christians need not concern themselves with the doctrinal formulations issued by the representative bodies of Christians living in other nations, formulations that are binding only on the Christians of the nations in question. When considering Christian orthodoxy and beliefs necessary for salvation, St German thinks in terms of what one is obligated by one’s circumstances to believe. This attitude is evident long before St German considers the details of doctrinal formulation and is still reflected in General Councils. In the Division, while decrying the harshness with which many among the clergy pursue heresy, St German notes:

201

Ibid., sig. G5v (emphasis added).

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… a commen opinyon among doctours, that none is an heretike for that onely that he erreth, but for that he defendeth opynatyfelye his errour. And therefore he that erreth of simplicite, may in no wyse be sayd an heretyke. And summa rosella, in the tytle hereticus in principio, sayeth: that a man may erre, and meryte therby: and he putteth this example. If a symple vnlerned man here the preachynge of his bysshop, that preacheth happly agaynst the faithe, and he beleueth it with a redy mynde to obey: this man meriteth, and yet he erreth: but that is to be vnderstonde where ignorance excuseth. Than it semeth, that it is nat ynough to proue that a man is a heretike, for that he hath holden opinions ayenste that the church teacheth, ne that he oughte nat to make any purgation nor abiuration for it: for that that he hielde in suche case was nat his faythe, but the faythe of the churche was his faythe, though happly he were nat than fully auysed of it.202

This opinion is affirmed in An Answer in which, as noted above, St German advises Christians seeking truth to consult with members of the clergy whom they think learned in matters of doctrine. Such inquiry will not necessarily provide insight into the truth, but it will relieve the sincere seeker of truth of culpability for false positions held on account of such consultations.203 A just God does not hold Christians accountable for false beliefs held innocently and with a willingness to be reformed. Similarly, God will ensure that some means is available to every sincere seeker to discover the beliefs necessary for salvation. An Answer explains that when those responsible for teaching saving truth fail in their duty and no authoritative pronouncement of the Church is available to resolve a question of the faith, God will intervene directly to provide salvific knowledge: [I]f a man be in doute vpon any thynge concernynge scrypture as is sayde before, and he hathe no counsell to instructe hym therin, or els if there be counsell, the counsell varyeth amonge them selfe as is said before. And princes haue no tyme yet to determyne the mater. Than it is good that he so beyng in dout lyfte vp his herte to god, and aske counsell of him: and if he do so, vndoutedly our lorde wyll so helpe him and assyst him therin, that he shall nat erre, ne be disceyued … And if we do so we may trust verily that his helpe and counsell wil neuer fayle vs, but wyll bring vs to the knowlege of that that is necessarye for vs.204

Christians are first to look to those responsible for teaching God’s will; if these prove unsatisfactory, Christians should heed the king in Parliament as explicator of scripture to gain insight into God’s will. When this guidance is not available, God will intervene directly, enlightening individual Christians to ensure that they have access to true knowledge of ‘that that is necessarye’ for their well-being. 202 203 204

Division, pp. 191–2. Answer, sig. G1. Ibid., sig. G8v–H1v.

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In addition to general statements regarding the relativistic principle that God judges the orthodoxy of different Christians by different standards according to the opportunities they have had or been denied to gain accurate insight into divine truth, St German provides specific examples of the principle in action: [S]aynt Aidan, whan he helde the wronge parte of kepynge of Eester was no heretyke, and some saye that saynt Chadde was of the same opynyon as saynte Aydan was, whiche in lyke wyse was no heretike, for theyr desyre was to knowe the truthe: and therefore it is nat redde that they made eyther purgacyon or abiuracion, ne yet the abbot Ioachym, whiche neuertheles erred, for he was redy to submytte hym to the determynacyon of the chyrche, and therfore he was neyther holden as an heretyke, ne compelled to abiure.205

This principle also allows St German to affirm the sanctity of Thomas Beckett without conceding that his position on royal ecclesiastical authority is valid. In The Additions of Salem and Bizance, Salem says: I knowe no man that sayth, but that saynt Thomas of Caunturbury is a blessed saynt in heuen: but parauenture there be some, that doute, what were the very articles, whervpon kyng Henry the second, and he varied. And happely some wyl say, that he dyd more ageinst the kynges prerogatiue, than he ought to haue done, but though he dyd so in dede, yet that moueth me but lytel to thinke, but that he was and is a holy man, and a blessed saynt. For if he thought in his conscience, that rightwisenes and truthe bounde hym to do that he dyd, as I suppose verily it dyd, it suffised to hym. For ignorance may excuse, but onely agaynste the lawe of god, & the lawe of reson.206

While St German’s position regarding the law of reason is here more lenient than it will be in An Answer, his position on the divine law is consistent. Throughout his polemics he holds that ignorance excuses false belief among those who sincerely seek truth from the sources available to them. Living in an age when clerical and especially papal pretensions and usurpations had obscured the true nature of royal power, Becket may have denied the prerogative of civil courts to handle cases involving presentments of benefices: ‘And if sainct Thomas resisted it, he resisted the truth. Howe be it that prouethe not, but that he is yet neuer the les a right holy and blessed sainct, as I haue said before.’207 Notwithstanding his holiness, the opposition of Becket to a royal policy does not indicate that this policy was contrary to God’s will. Having listed several ecclesiastical laws regarding institutional and jurisdictional affairs, St German continues, ‘though the truth were that saint Thomas resisted these articles al that he coulde, and that he is yet neuertheles canonised as a saint, that proueth nothyng those 205 Division, p. 192. St German also mentions the excused mistaken belief of Aidan regarding Easter in ‘New Additions’: Doctor and Student, pp. 328–9. 206 Additions, p. 53v. 207 Ibid., p. 56v.

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articles to be vnlaufull. For yf he in his conscience thought them vnlaufull, that suffiseth to hym.’208 Despite the leniency with which St German judges Becket, he is aware that the excuse of ignorance can be abused. In General Councils, St German argues that by usurping the authority to convene a council the Bishop of Rome is guilty of heresy, and he furthermore asserts that with regard to the issue of who has authority to convene a council it is difficult to claim ignorance as an excuse: Howe be it thoughe his [the pope’s] intent be neuer soo good in this matter [of convening a council], yet if ignorance does not excuse, I thinke verily, that he, and all that haue moued hym to summon it, haue fallen therby into a ryght great heresie, for the causes before rehersed. And it wyll be very harde to proue, that ignoraunce of the lawe of god shulde excuse any manne, specially them that are moste bounde to haue knowledge of it.209

Becket, living in the dark ages of the ascendancy of papal pretensions, could be excused on account of ignorance for underestimating royal authority in ecclesiastical affairs. Sixteenth-century clergy, living in a time when the truth about royal power is proclaimed, will be held to a higher level of accountability for their beliefs. Living in a realm in which Parliament has openly declared the power of the king over the Church, clergy who deny this power must either be obstinate in their resistance of the truth or culpably ignorant because responsible before all others to keep themselves informed regarding the divine law. Although he identifies the clergy and the individual Christian conscience as guides to doctrinal truth in addition to the determinations of Church councils such as the English Parliament, St German establishes clearly that the determinations of councils take priority over each of the other loci of interpretive authority. Regarding conscience, as he explicitly says, the authority of the individual Christian to interpret scripture applies only when ‘princes haue no tyme yet to determyne the mater’.210 Regarding the clergy, because the office of the priest is merely to teach the true faith while the office of the council is to authoritatively define what doctrine ought to be taught as the true faith, Christians are obligated to give credence to the determinations of a council over the teachings of a cleric. Christians who innocently and trustingly accept the doctrines of those instituted for the purpose of teaching the divine law, or who listen to their consciences for guidance in the interpretation of scripture, are not to worry that guilt or punishment will follow should they be the victims of false teachers or insights. This does not, however, apply to subjects 208 209 210

Ibid., pp. 57v–58. General Councils, sig. C7v. Answer, sig. H1.

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informed that a national, regional, or general council has determined the matter in question in a manner contrary to the teachings of the cleric or the leanings of their consciences. English Christians who reject teachings endorsed by Parliament are guilty of holding beliefs contrary to what they are bound to believe by authority of the national council that provides the soteriologically binding standard of orthodoxy for English Christians in the absence of a valid general council. When Henry VIII was proclaimed Head of the English Church, the intention was, in part, to co-opt the loyalty that religion inspires for the state. Because, however, Christianity demands that the primary loyalty of believers remain with God, the assumption of this power opens the English authorities to potential opposition on new fronts from Christian subjects who judge official religious policy to be failing to accord with God’s will. Tyndale, Gardiner and Starkey are unwilling or unable to secure the king against opposition based on prior obedience to God; St German, however, outlines an approach to religious truth that underwrites obedience to the prince and order in the realm regardless of the judgements of individual Christians regarding the validity of royal religious policy. By identifying the Crown in Parliament as the ultimate arbiter of what English Christians are bound to accept as religious truth, St German provides a vision of the supremacy of the civil authorities over the Church that ensures obedience and order in England. The possibility that a statute must be disobeyed because contrary to the divine law is negated by his identification of the source of human laws as the locus of authority empowered to promulgate binding interpretations of scripture. The king ruling a realm ordered in accord with St German’s ideal could expect nothing but acquiescence on the part of his Christian subjects regarding any command he might issue in conjunction with Parliament ordering the affairs of the realm. The awkward implication of this teaching that there are as many Christian truths as there are Christian regimes is ameliorated by establishing what might be called a ‘legalistic’ understanding of orthodoxy. According to such an understanding, the emphasis is placed not on the accord between a belief and objective reality but rather on the accord between a belief and what an individual is bound to believe to obtain salvation. Consequently, the standard of orthodox belief could be expected to vary among people depending on the experiences of each. To my knowledge, little information is available that could serve as a basis for assessing the influence of St German’s understanding of biblical interpretation. The few relevant known facts include the following. The Doctor and Student dialogues were widely read in St German’s lifetime, and the Division had gone through five editions by 1535.211 By the end of 1536, St German was known well enough for the leaders of the Pilgrimage 211

Guy, Chancery and Statute, pp. 19, 36.

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of Grace to include him among Protestant luminaries such as Luther and Tyndale as one of the heretics whose errors Henry ought to extirpate from the realm.212 While we lack a means of directly assessing the readership of St German’s later works, Guy is probably right in his speculation that ‘St German’s influence upon his public, well established by 1531 thanks to the triumphant success of Doctor and Student, must have been considerable.’213 Also, as noted above, while it is true that after 1534 St German distanced himself somewhat from government circles, he nevertheless remained in contact with Cromwell.214 It seems likely that Cromwell and other highly placed individuals knew St German’s later published works, including An Answer, and it is thus possible that his ideas influenced the Henrician legislation (noted in the first chapter of this study) that claimed authority to elucidate God’s law for English Christians. The influence of St German’s exegetical thought on later defenders of royal supremacy is also difficult to gauge. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Protestant defenders of the Elizabethan royal supremacy were reluctant following the reign of Mary Tudor to claim for the Crown in Parliament authority to define doctrine. By and large, the defenders of the Elizabethan Church present a royal supremacy in which resistance is a real possibility by withholding supreme hermeneutical authority from the Crown either solus or in Parliament. Richard Hooker, by contrast, does claim for the Supreme Governor of the Elizabethan Church (in conjunction with Parliament and Convocation) authority to propound binding interpretations of scripture. At present, this author is unaware of evidence that will shed light on what, if any, influence St German’s hermeneutical arguments had on Hooker’s thought. Hooker knew and used Doctor and Student,215 but this does not necessarily mean that he was familiar with St German’s less famous works. St German’s hermeneutics may have been known to Hooker directly or indirectly and may have provided a starting point for his argument that the Crown in Parliament is authorized to interpret scripture; alternatively, Hooker may have arrived at this determination independently of St German.

212

Ibid., p. 45; ‘The Later Career of Christopher St. German (1534–1541)’, pp. 404–

405. 213

Guy, Chancery and Statute, p. 55. Ibid.; see also pp. 8–9, 45–54; ‘The Later Career of Christopher St. German (1534– 1541)’, pp. 405–17. 215 Lee Gibbs, ‘Introduction: Book I’, in W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 6 (Binghamton, NY, 1993), pp. 96, 102; W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker (Cambridge, MA and Binghamton, NY, 1977–1998), vol. 3, p. 486, vol. 6, p. 1077. 214

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CHAPTER FOUR

The Elizabethan Supremacy1 and the Admonition Controversy Our focus now shifts from consideration of the defence of royal supremacy in Henrician England to the defence of Elizabeth Tudor’s supremacy over the English Church. Following Henry’s death in 1547, the Crown passed to his nine-year-old son, Edward VI. During the six years of Edward’s reign, his protectors and the Parliament used the machinery of the royal supremacy to move England in a more decidedly Protestant direction liturgically and doctrinally than Henry had allowed. Edward’s death in 1553 brought the staunchly Romanist daughter of Henry to the throne. During her reign, Mary employed the machinery of the royal supremacy to turn back the clock, working through Parliament to repeal the Henrician statutes that had severed England from the Roman fold and restoring papal primacy in the English Church. Following Mary’s death, Elizabeth ascended to the throne in 1558 and worked through her first Parliament to once again renounce papal authority over the English Church and establish a royal supremacy over the Church that was similar to that exercised by Henry VIII. The Elizabethan Act of Supremacy that re-established the position of the prince over the Church did so by reviving several Henrician statutes repealed under Mary. Revived were Acts cutting off the flow of appeals and money to Rome, removing the papacy from the consecration of English bishops, and reaffirming the submission of the clergy to the Crown. The Henrician Act of Supremacy was not revived, but essentially all of the authority granted to the Crown in that Act was reclaimed for the monarch. Rather than accepting Elizabeth as the ‘Supreme Head’ of the English Church, spiritual 1 The overview of the Elizabethan Reformation and the Presbyterian movement that follows is dependant on a number of sources including particularly the following: A.G. Dickens, The English Reformation, second edn (University Park, PA, 1991); John Guy, Tudor England (Oxford, 1988); Felicity Heal, Reformation in Britain and Ireland (Oxford, 2003); Leo Solt, Church and State in Early Modern England, 1509–1640 (New York, 1990); William Haugaard, Elizabeth and the English Reformation: The Struggle for a Stable Settlement of Religion (Cambridge, 1968); Claire Cross, The Royal Supremacy in the Elizabethan Church (London, 1969); Susan Doran, Elizabeth I and Religion, 1558–1603 (New York, 1994); Peter Marshall, Reformation England, 1480–1642 (London, 2003); Patrick Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement (Berkeley, CA, 1967); William Haugaard, ‘Introduction: The Preface’, in W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 6 (Binghamton, NY, 1993), pp. 1–37.

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and temporal officers were required instead to declare their acceptance in conscience ‘that the Quenes Highnes is thonelye supreme Governour of this Realme and of all other her Highnes Dominions and Countreis, aswell in all Spirituall or Ecclesiasticall Thinges or Causes as Temporall’. While this exchange of titles does seem to have portended a less direct form of exercising leadership of the Church than that favoured by her father, the same Act nevertheless claimed the same scope of royal authority over the Church for Elizabeth as the Act of Supremacy had claimed for Henry. Parliament established … That suche Jurisdictions Privileges Superiorities and Preheminences Spirituall and Ecclesiasticall, as by any Spirituall or Ecclesiasticall Power or Aucthorite hathe heretofore bene or may lawfully be exercised or used for the Visitacion of the Ecclesiasticall State and Persons, and for Reformacion Order and Correccion of the same and of all maner of Errours Heresies Scismes Abuses Offences Contemptes and Enormities, shall for ever by aucthorite of this present Parlament be united and annexed to the Imperiall Crowne of this Realme.2

As explained by the royal Injunctions of 1559 for the benefit of those administering the oath affirming the queen’s supremacy in the Church: ‘nothing was, is, or shall be meant or intended by the same oath to have any other duty, allegiance, or bond required by the same oath, than was acknowledged to be due to the most noble kings of famous memory, King Henry VIII, her majesty’s father, or King Edward VI, her majesty’s brother.’3 The prerogative of the Crown in Parliament to not only punish heresy but to define what was to be considered heresy was affirmed by the statute indirectly when it forbade that its pronouncements be ‘adjudged at any time hereafter to be any Error Heresie Scisme or Scismaticall Opinion’. This same authority was immediately thereafter stated directly when the Act forbade royal agents from judging … anny Matter or Cause to bee Heresie but onelye suche as heretofore have been determined ordred or adjudged to bee Heresie by thaucthoritee of the Canonicall Scriptures, or by the first fowre generall Councelles, or any of them, or by any other generall Councell wherin the same was declared Heresie by thexpresse and playne woordes of the sayd Canonicall Scriptures, or suche as hereafter shall bee ordredd judged or determined to bee Heresye by the Highe Courte of Parlyament of this Realme withe thassent of the Clergie in their Convocacion.4

2

1 Elizabeth I. c. 1. Henry Gee and William Hardy (eds), Documents Illustrative of English Church History (1896; reprint, London, 1921), p. 438. 4 1 Elizabeth I. c. 1. 3

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This formulation clearly invalidated any sort of arbitrary doctrinal canons emanating solely from the will of the prince, but it just as clearly claimed very broad authority for the Crown in Parliament with the Convocation to determine what doctrine would be enforced as true within the realm. The recognition of the primacy of scripture, while more than a legal fiction, almost certainly imposed few limits on the actual exercise of the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament over doctrine. Just as the Henrician clergy had saved face in the early 1530s by accepting Henry as their head only so far as the law of Christ allowed, so Elizabeth’s Parliament affirmed their loyalty to God before human authorities by making scripture the primary measure of heresy. Just as, however, in the 1530s the crucial question had been how far does the law of Christ allow a prince to be recognized as the head of a church, so at Elizabeth’s ascension the question was not should scripture be an authoritative standard in the determination of heresy, but rather should scripture be the sole authoritative standard in the determination of heresy, and scripture as interpreted by whom. Whether Parliament was here claiming for itself with Convocation an authority to define doctrine independently of scripture or merely the authority to offer binding interpretations of scripture, the practical consequences are similar. Given the range of interpretations to which scripture is and was susceptible, the latter power claimed virtually as much authority over the definition of Christian doctrine for the Church authorities as the former: the Crown in Parliament with the Convocation determined what was to be prosecuted as heresy in England. The authority of the Crown in Parliament with the Convocation to order matters of doctrine is reflected most clearly in the promulgation of the Thirty-Nine Articles, the principal doctrinal formulary of the Elizabethan Church. The articles were formulated by Convocation in 1563 and authorized with some changes by the queen; in 1571 a formulation of the articles more akin to that approved by Convocation in 1563 was reaffirmed by the bishops, approved by the queen, and given legislative sanction by Parliament. By the early 1570s, the doctrine, liturgy and polity of the Elizabethan Church had been established by Acts of Parliament; after this time the Church was defended against innovation by the queen. Because of the authority exercised by the Crown in Parliament vis-à-vis the Church, the task of ensuring obedience and order in Elizabethan England involved the definition of Christian truth just as had the same task during Henry’s reign. On this front the task of the Elizabethan defenders was, however, made more difficult by the intervening reign of Mary Tudor. One thing that sets St German’s defence of royal supremacy apart from his contemporaries is his determination to argue that the Crown in Parliament supplies the locus of authority to which subjects should bind their consciences even to the extent of deferring to the determinations of the Crown in Parliament

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over their own perceptions of God’s will. This principle was rendered problematic for Elizabethan Protestants by the fact that the Crown recently had, in their eyes, so clearly failed to enforce truly Christian teaching. Not only had the monarch rejected true religion, she had succeeded in leading Parliament to reject it along with her; England had returned to the papal fold in accord with prescribed legal and constitutional channels. To committed Protestants this indicated that Parliament had contravened God’s will, and indeed the fallibility of the Crown in Parliament when seeking to discern God’s will was affirmed by Elizabeth’s own Act of Uniformity. This Act reimplemented, with some variation, the form of worship authorized late in the reign of Edward VI, but it began by noting that the form of worship authorized by Parliament under Edward had been repealed by Parliament during Mary’s reign, ‘to the greate Decaye of the due Honour of God and discomforte to the Professoures of the Truthe of Christes Religion’.5 Parliament as an institution here admits that the forms of worship it endorses can be and have been detrimental to the ‘Honour of God’. In such circumstances, the majority of the defenders of the Elizabethan supremacy chose not to revive St German’s claim that the Crown in Parliament is authorized to define as well as defend Christian truth.6 It is also, perhaps, not coincidental that Richard Hooker, who did revive St German’s claim, was not yet five years old when Mary died and thus would have had little personal memory of her reign. Placed as it is in the context of the Act of Uniformity, Parliament’s admission that as an institution it had failed to properly defend the honour of God also highlights the recognition by Elizabethan Christians that matters relating to the outward ordering of worship and the administration of the sacraments are not completely indifferent; they can be structured in ways offensive to God. As it turns out, criticism of the Elizabethan Church among those who believed that the Church needed to continue farther down the path of reformation centred on matters associated with worship and the institutional structures of the Church. Assaults against the Elizabethan Church came from both Roman Catholic polemicists and so-called ‘Puritan’ critics. The latter asserted that the English Church was only partially reformed and needed to complete the transformation from a false to a true church that had begun with the repudiation of Rome. The remainder of this study will focus particularly on Richard Hooker’s defence of the Church against challenges from ‘Presbyterian’ Puritans, above all Thomas Cartwright, who argue that to complete its reformation, the English Church needs to reform its liturgy 5

1 Elizabeth I. c. 2. St German’s claims for the Crown in Parliament are not strictly invalidated by such an eventuality. He argues that reliance upon the determinations of the Crown in Parliament in matters of religion will ensure that one’s beliefs are salvific, not necessarily correct. 6

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(purging it of elements corrupted by usage within the Roman Church) and reform its polity (replacing the episcopal with a Presbyterian polity). In the course of his defence, Hooker claims hermeneutical authority for the Crown in Parliament similar to that claimed by St German. Both men claim for the magistrate, as leader of the Church, authority to not only defend the faith but also to define a standard of Christian truth binding in conscience. Hooker’s defence is itself the culmination of efforts to defend the Elizabethan Church against Presbyterian opposition in what has come to be known as the Admonition controversy.7 Consequently, before considering Hooker’s work, this chapter will examine the defence of the Church articulated by John Whitgift in the Admonition controversy. This will set the stage for our examination of Hooker’s defence, especially by highlighting Whitgift’s failure to identify a hermeneutical principle that would exclude disobedience to the Crown based on prior obedience to God’s will. The Admonition Controversy The Act of Uniformity was open-ended regarding the ‘Ornamentes’ of the churches and of ministers, explicitly noting that its provisions were to be in force only ‘untill other order shalbe therin taken by thaucthorite of the Quenes Majestie withe the advise of her Commissioners appointed and aucthorised under the Greate Seale of Englande for Ecclesiasticall Causes, or of the Metropolytan of this Realme’.8 The royal Injunctions of 1559 provided such order, commanding, among other things, … that all archbishops and bishops, and all other that be called or admitted to preaching or ministry of the sacraments, or that be admitted into any vocation ecclesiastical, or into any society of learning in either of the universities, or elsewhere, shall use and wear such seemly habits, garments, and such square caps, as were most commonly and orderly received in the latter year of the reign of King Edward VI.9

Because this injunction commanded ministers to wear vestments similar to those worn by papal priests, it was not acceptable to many Elizabethan clergy, especially those who had experience in Continental churches during the Marian exile. Distinguishing apparel for ministers in general was suspect as it seemed to reassert the existence of a separate clerical caste, calling into question the Protestant notion of the priesthood of all believers. Furthermore, the ‘rags of popery’ required by the Injunctions 7 Rudolph Almasy, ‘The Purpose of Richard Hooker’s Polemic’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 39/2 (1978): 251–70. 8 1 Elizabeth I. c. 2. 9 Gee and Hardy, Documents Illustrative of English Church History, p. 432.

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were corrupted by idolatrous use in the papal Church and were a sore temptation to weak consciences inclined to slip back into papal idolatry. In the mid-1560s, Elizabeth complained to her Archbishop of Canterbury, Matthew Parker, about failure on the part of many clergy to wear the prescribed clerical garb and charged him with bringing recalcitrant ministers into conformity with the law. With the queen’s tacit approval, Parker sought to ameliorate the consciences of Puritan ministers by relaxing the requirements somewhat, but he continued to demand the use of a surplice by all ministers. Several ministers, including more than thirty London clergy, found even the relaxed requirements unacceptable and consequently suffered suspension. A foreshadowing of this ‘vestments controversy’ can be discerned in the Act of Uniformity and the 1559 Injunctions. It has already been noted that, in the preamble to this Act, Parliament acknowledged that the order of worship can be formulated in such a way that it is derogatory to God’s honour and that it is possible for a form of worship enjoying parliamentary sanction to dishonour God. The wording of the royal Injunctions also suggests that the authorities anticipated that vestments might be a sore point with some clergy. The injunction mandating use of vestments took the unusual step of including an explanation that in requiring the vestments they were ‘not thereby meaning to attribute any holiness or special worthiness to the said garments’, and also added a scriptural justification ‘but as St. Paul writeth: Omnia decenter et secundum ordinem fiant. I Cor. 14’.10 Dissenting clergy, however, had their own interpretations of scripture, as well as their own views on whose reading of scripture, theirs or the authorities’, should take precedence. The majority of Puritans who opposed vestments did not claim that such clerical garb was expressly forbidden by scripture, but rather made the more nuanced case that vestments were contrary to the general guidelines provided in scripture for Church order, in particular Pauline injunctions regarding the use of things tainted by idolatrous association and the importance of not giving offence. Ambiguity regarding the interpretation of scripture left the Church authorities unable to win the conscientious obedience of many ministers to the orders established by the Crown in Parliament. Dissatisfaction with vestments soon spilled over into dissatisfaction with the liturgy and polity of the Elizabethan Church. The 1559 Act of Uniformity had established the Second Edwardian Prayer Book with a few changes as the only acceptable order of worship. This was the same Prayer Book that had been rejected by some Marian exiles along with the use of Edwardian vestments in favour of forms of worship and administration of the sacraments more in keeping with the liturgies of Continental Reformed Churches. Acceptance of Reformed liturgy among Marian exiles had often 10

Ibid., p. 432.

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been accompanied by the adoption of a Reformed Presbyterian polity. In addition, the bishops’ role in the vestments controversy convinced some Puritans that in England the episcopacy itself was a hindrance to the establishment of a truly Reformed Church. In 1571, efforts in Parliament to eliminate vestments and remove objectionable ceremonies from the Prayer Book failed, and in 1572 Parliament refused to legalize Puritan non-conformity to the Act of Uniformity. Soon thereafter, An Admonition to the Parliament was published; it called for thoroughgoing reform of worship in the English Church and advocated the abolition of episcopacy and its replacement with a Presbyterian polity. This appeal built on ideas expressed in 1570 by the then Lady Margaret chair at Cambridge University, Thomas Cartwright. In lectures on Acts, Cartwright declared the constitution of the primitive Church to be normative for all time and to provide a standard according to which the hierarchical, episcopal polity of the Elizabethan Church stood condemned. In the controversy that followed the publication of the Admonition, Cartwright elaborated the principles enunciated in the Admonition and defended them against criticisms levelled by John Whitgift. Born about 1530, Whitgift attended Cambridge where he was able to avoid scrutiny during Mary’s reign despite his adherence to Protestantism. Under Elizabeth, he established himself as a staunch opponent of the papacy and as a man with a high regard for hierarchical authority in matters of Church order. By 1570, he held the post of Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, and had been elected Vice-Chancellor of the University, in which capacities he played a central role in depriving Cartwright of his chair in 1570 and his fellowship in 1572. Whitgift responded to the Admonition on behalf of the established Church with An answere to a certen Libel intituled, An admonition to the Parliament (probably published in late 1572, with an expanded edition published in 1573). Cartwright’s defence of the Admonition was entitled A Replye to an ansvvere made of M. Doctor VVhitgifte. Agaynste the Admonition to the Parliament (1573). Whitgift replied with The Defense of the Aunswere to the Admonition, against the Replie of T.C. (1574), in response to which Cartwright published a two-part Second Replie (1575 and 1577). Whitgift did not respond. The Admonition controversy is traditionally viewed as a conflict between the Presbyterian Cartwright’s insistence that all aspects of the Church are to be ordered according to precepts provided by scripture, and the conformist Whitgift’s claim that scripture does not provide guidelines for the regulation of some aspects of the Church. Regarding such indifferent matters, Whitgift argues, it is the place of the individual Christian to conform to the commands of the Church authorities and in particular the godly magistrate as leader of the Church. Cartwright is convinced that the legitimacy of all matters, including matters indifferent, must ultimately be

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adjudicated by scripture because even adiaphora must be framed in accord with general precepts provided in scripture. Whitgift, however, defines matters indifferent as anything regarding which no scriptural directive is available, and consequently he asserts that in matters indifferent it is, by definition, impossible for a command of the Church authorities to be contrary to God’s word. Thus disobedience to Church laws propounded by the Christian magistrate cannot be based on conscientious objection but must instead be simple obstinacy. This characterization is largely accurate, but it misleadingly presents the conflict between Cartwright and Whitgift as a conflict between the omnicompetence of scripture supported by Cartwright and a circumscription by Whitgift of the authority of scripture. On the contrary, it seems that the controversy is best understood as being not essentially about the extent of biblical authority but rather as being a controversy between different interpretations of what the Bible requires of Christians. Clearly the Admonition controversy is about the interpretation of scripture in one fundamental sense. Cartwright reads scripture as requiring some things of a true Church that Whitgift construes scripture as leaving indifferent. In particular, Cartwright argues that the polity advocated by Presbyterians is presented in scripture as binding on all true Churches while Whitgift interprets the Bible as leaving matters of polity within the realm of adiaphora. In addition to drawing the line between essentials and adiaphora in different places, Whitgift and Cartwright also differ regarding their understandings of how matters of adiaphora are to be ordered. Cartwright argues that in matters indifferent all aspects of the Church are to be framed in accord with general precepts provided in scripture. This belief Cartwright derives from his reading of Romans 14. Paul concludes that ‘whatsoever is not of faith is sin’, and Cartwright adds, … but faith is not but in respect of the word of God; therefore whatsoever is not done by the word of God is sin. And, if any will say that St Paul meaneth there a full persuasion … that that which he doth is well done, I grant it. But from whence can that spring but from faith? and how can we persuade and assure ourselves that we do well but where as we have the word of God for our warrant?11

He then outlines four scriptural principles in accord with which things indifferent must be ordered: (1) that they do not offend any, especially the godly; (2) that all be done ‘in order and comeliness’; (3) that ‘all be done to edifying’, and (4) that all be done to the glory of God. Because scripture 11 John Ayre (ed.), The Works of John Whitgift, D.D., 3 vols, Parker Society Edition, vols 46–8 (Cambridge, 1851–3), vol. 1, p. 190 (hereafter ‘Whitgift Works’) Whitgift’s Defense includes within it both his own earlier Answer and Cartwright’s first Reply; all three works are thus most easily accessible in the Parker Society edition of Whitgift’s Works from which citations of all three are taken.

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provides such rules, even aspects of the Church regarding which there are not particular injunctions ‘are not left to any to order at their pleasure, or so that they [merely] be not against the word of God; but even by and according to the word of God they must be established, and those alone to be taken which do agree best and nearest with these rules before recited’.12 Cartwright furthermore argues that application of the Pauline principles in matters of adiaphora takes priority over obedience to the magistrate: Considering it being a flat commaundement off the holy gost, that we absteine from thinges in their owne nature indifferent, if the weake brother should be offended: no autoritie ether off church, or commenwealth, can make yt voide … [In such matters] we may obey no further vnto the magistrate, then the same wil agree with the glory off God, and saluation off our brethren.13

Whitgift, by contrast, calls on Christian subjects to put aside assessment of Church laws regulating adiaphora and simply obey the magistrate in all things indifferent. M.E.C. Perrott argues that a fundamental weakness of Whitgift’s case is his failure to provide a standard by which the wisdom of ecclesiastical laws regulating things indifferent can be assessed, a standard that can elicit from 12 Whitgift Works, 1:195. Regarding Cartwright’s ‘scripturalism’ and qualifications on this label, see M.E.C. Perrott, ‘Richard Hooker and the Problem of Authority in the Elizabethan Church’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 49/1 (1998): 39–45; Peter Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker (London, 1988), pp. 14–15; Almasy, ‘The Purpose of Richard Hooker’s Polemic’, pp. 262–8. 13 Thomas Cartwright, The second replie of Thomas Cartwright: agannst Maister Doctor Whitgites second answer, touching the Churche Discipline (1575), pp. 403–4 (emphasis added) (hereafter ‘Second Reply’). The case is not so clear cut, however. Cartwright notes that ‘certain things may be tolerated and borne with for a time; which, if they were to be set in and placed, could not be done without the great fault of them that should place them,’ and he elsewhere includes a citation acknowledging that ‘the Minister, as also other subiectes, might, in some case, vuith good conscience obey that, vuhich the Magistrate can not vuith so good a conscience command’: Whitgift Works, 1:176; Thomas Cartwright, The rest of the second replie of Thomas Cartvurihgt [sic] agaynst Master Doctor Vuhitgifts second ansvuer, touching the Church discipline (1577), p. 250 (hereafter ‘Rest of the Second Reply’). It seems that what is necessary is a weighing of the benefits and liabilities of observing or not observing a particular injunction, and Cartwright himself has a difficult time deciding where to draw the line, for example, on the issue of vestments. In the Reply he argues that the vestments ministers are required to wear are contrary to general scriptural guidelines for ordering adiaphora and claims that ‘if a man were assured to gain a thousand by doing of that which may offend, or cause to fall one brother, he ought not to do it’: Whitgift Works, 2:59. In the Rest of the Second Reply, however, he affirms that wearing the vestments is acceptable if the alternative is to suffer deprivation: Rest of the Second Reply, pp. 262–3. Cartwright acknowledges that this judgment might seem contrary to his former position and claims that if he made any statement that could be construed as contradicting the position laid out in the Rest of the Second Reply, ‘yt is meet that yt [the earlier judgment] fal, that the truth may haue the vpperhand’: Rest of the Second Reply, pp. 263–4.

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Presbyterians conscientious obedience to the laws of the English Church regulating such matters. Perrott notes that Cartwright accuses Whitgift of approaching adiaphora in a way that necessitates the existence of an extrabiblical standard of right behaviour that determines how adiaphora should be ordered. Cartwright further implies that this standard must be human reason. Whitgift, however, refuses to take the bait and endorse reason as a standard for ordering matters indifferent. Rather, ‘Whitgift sought to refute Cartwright’s scripturalism but made no explicit indication that he wished to set up reason as an alternative authority to regulate church law.’ This then allows Cartwright to argue … that Whitgift’s position failed to show how [non-essential] ecclesiastical orders could be objectively assessed since he did not set out an independent authority by which positive law was to be regulated. From this perspective, Whitgift was unable to answer the question of how unedifying orders could be detected or removed if the church authorities were not vigilant and chose to retain them.14

This criticism of Whitgift assumes, however, the validity of Cartwright’s characterization of Whitgift’s position, an assumption that does not seem to be warranted. Cartwright does accuse Whitgift of an implicit reliance on human reason in addition to God’s word for ordering the Church, but in so doing Cartwright misrepresents Whitgift’s position. In fact, Whitgift is as thoroughly scripturalist as Cartwright in his understanding of the ordering of all aspects of the Church, including adiaphora. Whitgift believes that scripture alone is authoritative for Christians, providing both specific guidance regarding essentials of the faith and a general precept according to which Christians can discern how God wills them to act in matters of adiaphora. Whitgift explicitly confirms (‘neither do I deny’) that ‘nothing ought to be done in the church, or in the life of man, contrary to the word of God, or not according to the true intent and meaning of the same.’15 Whitgift and Cartwright do not differ on the issue of whether scripture provides general guidelines to order adiaphora; they differ regarding what general guidelines scripture provides. The controversy is thus about the interpretation of the Bible, not the authority of the Bible. Each author puts forward scripture as the only authority to which appeal can be made to justify any aspect of the Church, but they differ in what they see scripture requiring. The general rule for ordering matters of adiaphora that Whitgift finds in scripture is obedience to ‘the church’ whose ‘judgment [in matters of 14

Perrott, ‘Richard Hooker’, p. 43. Whitgift Works, 1:191. Immediately after charging Whitgift with an implicit reliance on reason, Cartwright notes that Whitgift acknowledges that scripture contains guidelines to order all of Christian life, accusing him of inconsistency on this point. Second Reply, pp. 56–7. 15

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adiaphora] … is to be preferred before any private man’s opinion and imagination’.16 Later Whitgift clarifies that the authority of ‘the church’ to issue binding regulations in matters of adiaphora means, in Christian commonwealths, primarily the authority of the prince to regulate such matters, because ‘when there is a christian magistrate God hath appointed it [the church] to be subject to him’:17 When I say that ‘the church hath authority to appoint ceremonies,’ I speak generally of all states of the church, as well under persecution as under a christian magistrate, not secluding but including the christian magistrate, as the chief and principal governor of the church committed to him next under God; for I do not speak of a christian magistrate as you and the papists would have me, to wit, as of Julius Caesar, Alexander, or Nero; but I speak of him as one appointed by God to govern, not only in the commonwealth, but in the church also.18

The traditional portrayal of Whitgift as a champion of obedience to the prince in all indifferent matters is correct, but this does not mean that he denies Cartwright’s basic principle that all aspects of the church must be ordered in accord with general precepts provided by scripture. On the contrary, Whitgift stresses that ‘obedience to magistrates in … indifferent things hath manifest grounds in scripture.’19 Turning Cartwright’s phraseology back on him, Whitgift claims that ‘The Lord’s order is kept,’ when due obedience is given to the civil magistrate, and other that be placed under him, to govern the church of God. For of this we have express mention to the Rom. xiii., 1 Tim. ii., 1 Pet. ii.; and it is confirmed by the examples of the old church under Moses, Josua, David, Salomon, Jehosaphat, Ezechias, Josias, and all other godly kings and judges … Wherefore it is you that disturb and seek to overthrow the order of government appointed by God.20

Cartwright’s challenge to Whitgift to identify a standard by which orderings of adiaphora that are acceptable to God can be distinguished from orderings that are unacceptable is misdirected because Whitgift already has indicated such a standard, one endorsed by scripture itself: … if such [indifferent] things may be appointed in the church, not being expressed in the word of God, but depending upon this general rule: ‘Let all things be done decently and in order,’ 1 Cor. xiv., then surely the magistrate hath authority in such matters to appoint what shall be thought unto them most convenient, so that it be not repugnant to the word of God.21 16 17 18 19 20 21

Whitgift Works, 2:589. Ibid., 3:182. Ibid., 3:312–13. Ibid., 2:4–5; the indifferent matter in question is wearing the surplice. Ibid., 3:275–6. Ibid., 3:510–11.

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It is not every private man’s part to define what is order and comeliness in external matters being indifferent, but is proper to them only to whom God hath committed the government of his church; whose orders and laws (not being against the word of God) whosoever doth disobey, disobeyeth both God and the prince.22

The possibility that individuals would be authorized to question the validity of Church laws regulating adiaphora is, for Whitgift, unthinkable because contrary to biblical injunctions to do all things in an orderly fashion and to obey the prince in all matters indifferent.23 The qualification noted above, that royal commands are binding only if not contrary to the teachings of scripture, Whitgift takes seriously; royal authority is absolute only regarding adiaphora. He agrees with Cartwright that in matters determined by scripture the prince may only legitimately enforce what scripture already decrees. Consequently, subjects are not bound to obey royal ordinances contrary to the teachings of scripture; rather, they are bound to disobey such impious pseudo-laws. Whitgift readily acknowledges that Christ instructed his followers ‘not so to depend upon men, as though it were not lawful to break their decrees, or to decline from their authority; for there is one only Father, Lord, and Master, to whom we are so bound, that by no means we may decline at any time from his precepts’. Consequently, acquiescence by individuals to the orders of their Churches is conditional on consistency with God’s word as Whitgift repeatedly notes.24 Certainly in Whitgift’s mind the prince has authority to determine what views will be coercively defended as Christian truth, but this does not imply authority to define a standard of Christian truth binding in conscience. ‘The continual practice of christian churches (in the time of christian magistrates), before the usurpation of the bishop of Rome’, Whitgift claims, ‘hath been to give to christian princes supreme authority in making ecclesiastical orders and laws, yea, and that which is more, in deciding of matters of religion, even in the chief and principal points.’25 The closing clause could 22

Ibid., 2:50. Whitgift does recognize the importance of the Pauline injunctions (at least some of them) for the ordering of adiaphora, but they are to serve as guidelines for the Church authorities in the ordering of adiaphora not as standards by which Christian subjects assess Church laws. The rule that all be done decently and in order ‘is a rule prescribed by the apostle to the church, whereby she must direct her orders and government; not to every private person, to pick a quarrel to disquiet the church’: ibid., 1:197; see also 2:58. In matters indifferent, uniformity within the Church is more important than the absolutely best ordering, and consequently in such matters the harm caused by nonconformity would always outweigh the potential good. Whitgift also allows that in matters of adiaphora left undefined by their Church individuals are to apply the general Pauline injunction to avoid offence of the weak when determining how to act: ibid., 2:5. 24 Ibid., 1:168–9; see, for examples, ibid., 2:50, 589; 3:510–11. 25 Ibid., 3:306. 23

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be read as endorsing the authority of the prince to issue interpretations of scripture that are binding in conscience, but the context clarifies that what Whitgift means is that princes can issue coercive laws regulating all aspects of the Church, even its confessions of faith. That Whitgift does not hold the determinations of the prince to be binding in conscience (except to the extent that they either order matters of adiaphora or reinforce essentials of the faith) is confirmed by his readiness to acknowledge that nominally Christian princes have supported heretical teachings on account of which they were rightly disobeyed by their Christian subjects. Explicating his claim that different polities are appropriate for the Church in different circumstances, Whitgift refers to the example of the apostolic Church and also adds a more recent example: The gospel and the church was in queen Mary’s time here in England; but it was persecuted, not ‘established,’ not maintained, not allowed of, nor professed by the public magistrate, and the laws of the land; and therefore of necessity a great difference betwixt the government of it then, and the government of it now; the outward shew of it then, and the outward shew of it now; the placing of ministers then, and the placing of them now.26

For Whitgift, the pagan emperors under whom the apostles lived were essentially no different from the heretical queen under whom his compatriots had suffered. Despite the fact that Mary considered herself a Christian, the godly living under her were compelled to disobey her commands and even erect a true Church not subject to her authority. This example demonstrates that for Whitgift disobedience of royally endorsed ecclesiastical laws may be required if those laws contravene essential tenets of the faith.27 Because of this qualification on royal authority, Whitgift explicitly concedes that the Presbyterians are right to defy the established Church if they are interpreting the demands of scripture correctly. Regarding the authors of the Admonition he asserts, ‘The truth and necessity of those things, for the which they contend, rest as yet in trial. Surely, if they be matters “necessary to salvation”, then is there some just cause of breaking the peace of the church for them; but, if they be matters of no such weight, then can you not excuse either yourself or them.’28 26

Ibid., 1:391. Because, Whitgift argues, the English Church is under the rule of laws to which all have indirectly assented in Parliament, the a priori assumption should be in favour of Church laws, and the burden of proof is squarely on those who question the validity of the Church: ibid., 2:233–4, 239–42, 573; 3:331–2. Nevertheless, this does not require that the individual Christian is bound in conscience to conform to all rightly enacted Church laws. The restoration of papal primacy under Mary had been effected through all of the proper legislative channels but was nevertheless rightly defied by English Christians in obedience to God’s will. 28 Ibid., 1:41. 27

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Regarding the Presbyterians’ claim that the reform of the English Church was a ‘deformed reformation’, Whitgift again acknowledges the primacy of scripture in the debates: ‘I confess that it is no reformation, except it be agreeable to the word of God. The controversy is, what part of it is agreeable to the word of God, and what is not; also, what it is to be agreeable to the word of God.’29 The centrality of scripture to Whitgift’s defence of the established Church means that an effective response to the challenge posed by the Admonition and its supporters demands that he demonstrate that the interpretations on which his defence is built are valid and those of critics are invalid. Whitgift needs to prove, first, that he, and not Cartwright, is interpreting the Bible correctly in saying that the Bible does not include matters of polity among the essentials of the faith. He also needs to demonstrate that his principle for ordering matters indifferent is authentically biblical and that his opponent’s principles are not. It is at this point that Whitgift’s defence breaks down. Defence of the Church against Presbyterian agitation requires the identification of an objective standard of scriptural interpretation (ideally a standard set by the Church authorities) to which Whitgift can appeal to underwrite his interpretations of scripture. Whitgift, however, fails to provide such a standard, and this failure renders it impossible for him to coherently argue that his opponents are compelled to accept the interpretations of scripture on which his defence of the Elizabethan Church rests.30 Rather than presenting an objective interpretive standard, Whitgift identifies the highest interpretive principle as the unverifiable subjective judgement of the individual Christian under the direct guidance of the Holy Spirit. While Whitgift does not emphasize the role of the Spirit in the interpretation of scripture, he clearly acknowledges it as crucial. Responding to Cartwright’s claim that ‘the reading of the holy scriptures is nothing so fruitful as the preaching of them [with exposition]’, Whitgift remarks: Both the reading and the preaching of the scriptures is necessary; and the one [reading] in divers respects as necessary, and in some respects more necessary, than the other [preaching]. For the scripture is the rule to discern and judge sermons and preachers by: Christ willeth to ‘take heed of false prophets,’ Matt. vii.; which cannot be done without the diligent reading of the scriptures … St Paul, Gal. i., willeth them to ‘hold him accursed that shall preach any other 29

Ibid., 1:93. The point here is not to assess whether the Puritans would have been convinced by Whitgift’s arguments but rather to assess how effectively his arguments could secure order in the Church if they were accepted. Even if the Puritans had accepted Whitgift’s fundamental principles, these would not have compelled them to acquiesce to the present Elizabethan ecclesiastical order. In fact, Puritans did accept the fundamental principles that Whitgift endorsed, and it was precisely these principles (as applied by the Puritans) that legitimated dissent from the established Church. 30

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gospel unto them;’ which they cannot do without that knowledge which God doth give unto them by reading of the scriptures.31

Two points are noteworthy in this response. First is the importance Whitgift places on the individual Christian’s direct exposure to scripture to enable discernment between true and false doctrine. Second is his reference to the ‘knowledge which God doth give unto [Christians] by reading of the scriptures’. This could be interpreted as referring merely to God ‘giving’ knowledge in the sense of providing scripture as a comprehensive statement of things necessary for salvation, but it seems that Whitgift also has in mind a more direct divine interaction with the individual believer in the reading and interpreting of scripture. Responding to Cartwright’s claim that ‘preaching and interpreting’ are more effective to inflame the hearts of hearers than simple reading of God’s word, Whitgift asks: What is this else but together with the papists to condemn the scriptures of obscurity, as though all things necessary to salvation were not plainly and clearly expressed in them? I grant you that every man understandeth them not; for it is the Spirit of God that openeth the heart of man both to understand the scriptures read and preached.32

Commenting further on the distinction between reading and preaching, Whitgift adds, ‘To read the scriptures is not to preach or teach, in respect of him that readeth, but in the respect of God’s Spirit, which thereby worketh knowledge in the heart of the reader or hearer.’33 In fact, ‘no right and true interpretation of the scripture is to be counted man’s, though it be written, read, or preached by man; for the Spirit of God is the author of it; and man is but the instrument.’34 Scripture is essential for the guidance of the Church, but it is of no use apart from the additional aid of the Spirit; ‘he only which is ruled and governed by the Spirit of God hath the true knowledge of the mysteries of God, and is able to discern the truth from falsehood.’35 Furthermore, Whitgift recognizes that God’s Spirit works not only proper understanding of scripture, but also assurance within the individual of the Spirit’s presence and inner working. Criticizing the authorization of bishops to exercise coercive force, Cartwright expresses concern regarding the holding of civil offices by Church officials. He fears that if ecclesiastical officials have ‘the word in one hand and the sword in the other’, people ‘should not be able to judge so well in their consciences of the mighty operation of the word of God in them. For they might doubt 31 32 33 34 35

Ibid., 3:340–41. Ibid., 3:36–7. Ibid., 3:39. Ibid., 3:344. Ibid., 1:374.

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with themselves whether the fear and outward shew of the minister carried some stroke with them in believing the word.’ Whitgift responds that such concern is spurious because the internal testimony of the Spirit is not so easily mistaken by the godly: [N]o man that is truly converted by the preaching of the word can doubt but that God, by the working of his Spirit, through the ministry of his word, hath wrought that good in him, though by external means (as fear of punishment, and such like) he was first, as it were, enforced to hear the word, and to keep himself in order.36

Not surprisingly, Whitgift downplays the subjectivity of scriptural interpretation. He provides hundreds of quotations intended to prove that his position is in accord with the Church fathers and leading lights of the Reformed tradition. In matters of controversy, he asserts, the judgements of such godly and learned men ought to carry much more weight than the opinions of Presbyterian agitators.37 The consensus of the reformers and fathers does not, however, provide an objective standard of interpretation to which Whitgift demands that true Christians subordinate their own readings of scripture. For all of his castigation of Cartwright for failing to give due credence to the judgements of godly and learned authorities, Whitgift concedes that the fathers and leading reformers can and do err.38 This naturally leads to the concession that when they err the true Christian must disregard their teachings and hold to the true faith. For example, Whitgift reproves Cartwright’s ‘disdain’ for Augustine’s authority, saying that ‘although “the best earth bringeth forth some weeds”, yet the good fruit must not for the weeds’ sake be refused.’39 Cartwright’s point, however, is not that all teachings of the fathers must be rejected on account of the occasional ‘weeds’, but rather that their fallibility renders the authority of the fathers conditional, a point with which Whitgift concurs.40 ‘That which cometh from so good and learned a man [Augustine] is the rather to be believed’, Whitgift counsels, but only ‘so long as it is not repugnant to the word of God’.41 Whitgift also recognizes the fallibility of the wise and learned among the reformers. He readily grants the lack of a consensus among leading reformers on issues and the right of the individual Christian to decide which is to be followed when they disagree. His understanding of the

36

Ibid., 3:436–7. Ibid., 2:357, 495. 38 This is in addition to the problem that discernment of the ‘consensus’ of godly writers is itself subjective. 39 Ibid., 1:224–5. 40 Ibid., 1:173. 41 Ibid., 1:225. 37

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authority of Calvin is exemplary. Regarding a citation by Cartwright of Calvin to support an interpretation of scripture, Whitgift writes: I reverence M. Calvin as a singular man, and worthy instrument in Christ’s church; but I am not so wholly addicted unto him, that I will contemn other men’s judgments that in divers points agree not fully with him, especially in the interpretation of some places of the scripture, when as, in my opinion, they come nearer to the true meaning and sense of it in those points than he doth.42

Thus Whitgift is perfectly willing to oppose the authority of scripture rightly understood to the authority of Calvin if Calvin can be construed as supporting his opponents’ position. Noting that at one point the Admonitioners changed a citation supporting their arguments from an appeal to scripture to an appeal to Calvin’s commentaries on scripture, Whitgift chides: Belike, because the scriptures themselves do not sufficiently prove your assertion, therefore you would have us to leave them, and to rest upon Calvin’s interpretation; which is nothing else but to prefer man’s judgment before the word of God, or to give M. Calvin authority to conclude that which is not determined by the scripture.43

The fathers and leading reformers are helpful guides to the interpretation of scripture, but their teachings are fallible and consequently their authority is to be respected only so long as they conform to the dictates of scripture rightly understood. Because he accepts the internal, self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit as the ultimate source and standard of a right understanding of scripture, Whitgift also concedes the foundational claim of the Presbyterians that the subjective insight of the individual Christian under the guidance of the Holy Spirit is the highest criterion of a correct biblical interpretation.44 This makes it impossible for him to offer compelling evidence against the Presbyterian case and undermines his arguments in favour of obedience 42

Ibid., 1:436 (emphasis added). Ibid., 3:483. Whitgift goes on to argue that the Presbyterians ‘abused’ Calvin; in fact he does not support their position on the point in question. 44 Regarding the subjectivity of Presbyterian exegesis and the importance of the unauthenticatible guidance of the Holy Spirit, see the Second Admonition in which it is asserted that the arguments of the first Admonition are so clearly grounded on God’s word that only those deceived by the devil or from whom God has withheld his ‘light’ refuse to accept them: ‘A Second Admonition to the Parliament’, in W.H. Frere and C.E. Douglas (eds), Puritan Manifestoes: A Study of the Origin of the Puritan Revolt with a Reprint of the Admonition to the Parliament and Kindred Documents, 1572 (1907; reprint, New York, 1972), p. 90. Similarly, Cartwright expresses his hope for Whitgift ‘that you will not willingly shut your eyes against the truth, that, if the Lord vouchsafe to open it unto you, you kick not against it’ in order to preserve status, wealth, and so on: Whitgift Works, 3:464–5. See Donald McGinn, The Admonition Controversy (New Brunswick, NJ, 1949), p. 112. 43

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to the Church authorities. He accuses Cartwright of improperly abridging the queen’s authority, ‘for, if they command you any thing wherein you intend not to obey, you may say … that it is against your ‘conscience.’’45 Yet Whitgift himself acknowledges that ‘the meaning of the apostle [in Romans 14] is that we should do nothing against our conscience, nothing but that which we do believe not to displease God, not to be against his word or commandment.’46 If he intends to observe Paul’s injunction as understood by Whitgift, how could Cartwright ignore his conscience in order to comply with royal commands? Of course this only applies in the case of a rightly informed conscience, but Whitgift’s hermeneutical principles provide no objective means of distinguishing between scruples based on valid interpretations of scripture and scruples based on false interpretations. Whitgift’s subjectivism does not stop him from appealing to the ‘reasonableness’ of his interpretations over against Cartwright’s. He portrays Cartwright as perversely refusing to see what scripture manifestly teaches and chastises Cartwright for making scripture a ‘nose of wax’, twisting it to accord with his own preconceived notions.47 By contrast Whitgift is confident that he has built a convincing case, affirming at one point, ‘I think the places in the scripture before alleged so manifest for the proof hereof, that no man reading the same can anything doubt of this matter’,48 and claiming to base his views on biblical evidence ‘such as admitteth no other interpretation’.49 From the subjective interpretive perspective that he endorses, however, no sincerely held interpretation can be proven false. A Christian who feels led by the Spirit to an interpretation of scripture in accord with Cartwright’s must, on Whitgift’s own principles, hold to that interpretation no matter how many opposing arguments or human authorities can be mustered to the contrary. Any human authorities cited against what the supposedly Spirit-guided Christian perceives scripture to teach could only be wrested or mistaken; apparently reasonable arguments to the contrary could only be specious, a temptation. Having conceded that each individual Christian under the guidance of the Holy Spirit is for him (or even her) self the ultimate standard of biblical interpretation, Whitgift can offer no proof of the validity of the Elizabethan Church, merely explication of why he personally believes it to be valid; any reader who feels drawn by the Spirit to concur with Cartwright’s (or any other) reading of scripture is duty bound so to do whatever arguments or authorities Whitgift can amass to the contrary. 45 46 47 48 49

Whitgift Works, 1:82. Ibid., 1:193. Ibid., 3:33, 157, 163. Ibid., 1:334. Ibid., 3:275.

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After the Admonition Controversy In the event, the Presbyterian movement continued through the 1570s and into the 1580s. In these decades, there were repeated attempts in Parliament to reform the Church in accord with the wishes of Puritans, including the establishment of Presbyterianism, all of which attempts were frustrated by the queen. Concurrently, there emerged within the English Church the practice of holding ‘prophesyings’ that would come to be seen as a grassroots threat to the polity of the Church. The prophesyings originated as meetings of ministers, at which laity were sometimes in attendance, for discussion of scripture and improvement of preaching skills. Such meetings were active in many parts of southern England by the 1570s with the support of lay patrons and often even the backing of local bishops. The queen, however, was unenthusiastic about critical discussion of religious issues by clerical and lay Puritans and distrustful of any religious activity not provided for in the 1559 settlement. She ordered Archbishop of Canterbury Edmund Grindal to suppress the prophesyings. Believing them to be useful for the improvement of preaching, Grindal refused to suppress them, upon which refusal Elizabeth suspended him from office in 1577 and herself ordered her bishops to eliminate prophesyings. Despite these efforts, some Puritan ministers continued to meet clandestinely well into the 1580s for mutual edification and to discuss issues such as which aspects of the Prayer Book were tolerable and which were not. Some Presbyterians saw in these meetings an embryonic Presbyterian polity in which ministers met to make decisions and manage their own affairs without the interference of the bishop, and they undertook to develop these meetings into a Presbyterian system that would reform the English polity from the bottom up. Following Grindal’s death in 1583, Whitgift was named Archbishop of Canterbury. He quickly undertook a campaign to eradicate Puritan nonconformity and criticism of the Church among clergy. He demanded that all clergy subscribe to articles stating, among other things, that the Book of Common Prayer and the Church’s episcopal hierarchy contained nothing contrary to God’s word. Faced with hundreds of clerical suspensions for refusal to comply with his demands as well as a storm of protests and pressure from Puritan-inclined councillors, he compromised the requirements, thereby isolating more radical Puritans from the moderates. Most of the original non-subscribers were indeed willing to meet the less stringent requirements, and in the end only a handful of ministers suffered deprivation for refusal to subscribe. At the same time, Whitgift oversaw ecclesiastical reforms that undermined Puritan claims that the established Church was corrupt. In 1588–89, a series of scurrilous pamphlets appeared under the pseudonym Martin Marprelate attacking Whitgift and other English

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bishops. Despite their disavowal by moderate Puritans, these attacks allowed the authorities to portray all Puritans as dangerous subversives, a portrayal supported by evidence of the covert Presbyterian movement that was discovered during searches for the secret press responsible for the Marprelate tracts. The Marprelate controversy, the ensuing discovery of the Presbyterian underground, and the deaths of leading Puritan sympathizers at court provided a favourable setting for Whitgift to move forcefully against the Presbyterians. Several leading Presbyterians, including Cartwright, were brought before the High Commission in 1590 and Star Chamber in 1591. While Cartwright and his fellows escaped conviction, their spirit was broken; the Presbyterians caused the bishops no further trouble during Elizabeth’s reign. Against this backdrop, Richard Hooker entered the lists on behalf of the Church and authored a more compelling call for conformity to the Elizabethan Church than that provided by Whitgift.

CHAPTER FIVE

Richard Hooker: Royal Supremacy over the Definition of Doctrine Reaffirmed Born in 1554 and Oxford educated, Richard Hooker enjoyed the patronage of John Jewel, the most prominent of the first generation of defenders of the Elizabethan Church. In 1585, Hooker was appointed Master of the Temple in which post he shared a pulpit with Walter Travers, an ally of Cartwright and proponent of Presbyterianism. Following a public clash with Hooker, Travers was suspended from his post by Whitgift in 1586. In 1591, Hooker resigned the Mastership to focus on his writing and became Subdean of Salisbury and Prebendary of Nethavon, livings joined to that of Boscombe where he was instituted as Rector. In 1595, he became Rector of Bishopsbourne where he and his family lived until his death in 1600. Hooker’s Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie was projected as a defence in eight books of the Elizabethan Church against Puritan detractors. The preface and first four books were published in 1593 in coordination with efforts to promote legislation targeting Protestant non-conformity in Parliament;1 the fifth book was published in 1597. While it appears that the final three books were substantially finished before Hooker’s death, the completed forms are not known to have survived. Incomplete drafts of these books were published after Hooker’s death, the sixth and eighth books in 1648, and the seventh in 1662.2 The influence of Hooker’s Lawes on the shape of the religious tradition that has come to be known as Anglicanism,3 controversy regarding the 1 William Haugaard, ‘Prelude: Hooker after 400 Years’, Anglican Theological Review, 84/4 (2002): 875–7; ‘Publishing History: The First Five Books of the Lawes’, in Georges Edelen (ed.), W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA, 1977), pp. xv–xvi, xix; William Haugaard, ‘Introduction: The Preface’, in W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 6 (Binghamton, NY, 1993), pp. 27–37, 59–62. 2 W. Speed Hill, ‘Richard Hooker in the Folger Edition: An Editorial Perspective’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), pp. 4–6; ‘Textual Introduction: The Three Last Books’, in P.G. Stanwood (ed.), W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 3 (Cambridge, MA, 1981), pp. xiii–lxxv. 3 William Haugaard, while noting that the Church of England has no Luther or Calvin, asserts that ‘many Anglicans understand Hooker’s role in the development of the theological temper of the Church of England and its daughters to be quite unique.’ Haugaard, ‘Prelude:

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nature and consistency of Hooker’s views on a number of issues, and disagreement regarding how his theology relates to sixteenth-century Protestant thought (particularly the Reformed tradition)4 have led to vigorous debate issuing in many studies. This introduction will focus on providing a brief overview of recent studies assessing three aspects of Hooker’s thought germane to the topic of the relationship between the interpretation of scripture and obedience to the leaders of the English Church: (1) Hooker’s understanding of the royal ecclesiastical supremacy; (2) issues related to the grasp of Christian truth by the individual, including Hooker’s hermeneutics and understanding of assurance, and (3) Hooker’s understanding of the relationship between the visible and invisible Church. The relationship of Hooker’s views on royal supremacy over the Church to the teachings of the magisterial reformers including Calvin has been addressed by W.J. Torrance Kirby. Rather than seeing Hooker as the

Hooker after 400 Years’, pp. 874–5. Other studies repeat this judgement. Rory Fox says that Hooker ‘has been looked upon as almost a founding father of Anglicanism’: ‘Richard Hooker and the Incoherence of “Ecclesiastical Polity”’, The Heythrop Journal, 44/1 (2003): 43; Peter Lake refers to ‘Hooker’s emergence, after 1660, as one of the founding fathers of “Anglicanism”’: ‘Business as Usual?: The Immediate Reception of Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 52/3 (2001): 456. See also Nigel Atkinson, Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason: Reformed Theologian of the Church of England? (Carlisle, 1997), pp. ix–x; John Gascoigne, ‘Church and State Unified: Hooker’s Rationale for the English Post-Reformation Order’, and ‘The Unity of Church and State Challenged: Responses to Hooker from the Restoration to the Nineteenth-Century Age of Reform’, The Journal of Religious History, 21/1 (1997): 23–34, 60–79; Conal Condren, ‘The Creation of Richard Hooker’s Public Authority: Rhetoric, Reputation and Reassessment’, The Journal of Religious History, 21/1 (1997): 35–59; John Booty, ‘Hooker and Anglicanism’, in W. Speed Hill (ed.), Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works (Cleveland, OH, 1972), pp. 207–39. Hooker continues to be appealed to in order to shed light on contemporary issues facing Christians, particularly Anglicans. See, for example, Atkinson’s study including the foreword by Alister McGrath; David Stancliffe, ‘Proem’, in Philip Secor, Richard Hooker: Prophet of Anglicanism (Toronto, 1999), pp. vii–viii; John Stafford, ‘Scripture and the Generous Hermeneutic of Richard Hooker’, Anglican Theological Review, 84/4 (2002): 915–28; Don Compier, ‘Hooker on the Authority of Scripture in Matters of Morality’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), pp. 251–9; Edmund Newey, ‘The Form of Reason: Participation in the Work of Richard Hooker, Benjamin Whichcote, Ralph Cudworth and Jeremy Taylor’, Modern Theology, 18/1 (2002): 1–9, 18–22. 4 For examples of texts discussing opposite sides of the issue of whether Hooker is rightly considered a ‘Reformed’ theologian, see Peter Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker (London, 1988), pp. 145–239 and W.J. Torrance Kirby, Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist (Aldershot, 2005), chs. 2, 5, 6. An overview of the debate is provided by Nigel Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology: A Study of Reason, Will, and Grace (Oxford, 2003), pp. 4–11. See also Lee Gibbs, ‘Richard Hooker: Prophet of Anglicanism or English Magisterial Reformer?’, Anglican Theological Review, 84/4 (2002): 958–9.

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proponent or prophet of an ‘Anglican’ religious identity mid-way between Protestantism and Catholicism, Kirby argues that Hooker’s defence of royal ‘headship’ of the English Church is waged from solidly within the Protestant tradition. Hooker’s argument is founded on a theological critique of objections voiced by Thomas Cartwright against royal ‘headship’ of the Church, and is intended to show that such objections are based on views incompatible with received Christian orthodoxy and the soteriological and ecclesiological teachings of the magisterial reformers.5 The compatibility of Hooker’s ecclesiology with Protestant orthodoxy is also emphasized by Kirby in a later essay surveying more generally Hooker’s defence of the ordering of the Elizabethan Church. ‘In short’, Kirby argues, ‘it is the apologetic intent of the Lawes to demonstrate beyond doubt that the entire edifice of the Elizabethan Settlement is grounded upon the mutually acknowledged principles of reformed doctrinal orthodoxy.’6 In the same collection of essays, however, Arthur Monahan argues that the constitutional foundation of Hooker’s political thought is best viewed as derivative of medieval scholasticism. He asserts that Hooker is ‘more “Counter-Reformation” than protestant reformer in his political thinking’.7 Despite different emphases, however, these readings of Hooker are not necessarily incompatible. Kirby and Monahan are considering different aspects of Hooker’s thought; Monahan investigates Hooker’s views on the basis of royal authority while Kirby focuses on his understanding of its breadth. In addition, Monahan by his own assessment takes a very narrow view of what qualifies as ‘Reformation political thought’ in his essay.8 The basis of royal authority presented in the Lawes and Hooker’s constitutionalism have been considered in some depth. The similarities between this aspect of Hooker’s thought and arguments put forward in the sixteenth century supporting resistance and rebellion are noted by Monahan and others, as are the differences.9 Rather than turning his constitutionalist arguments to defence of resistance, Peter Lake and A.S. McGrade have pointed out that Hooker employs them to support his 5 W.J. Torrance Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy (Leiden, 1990). 6 W.J. Torrance Kirby, ‘Richard Hooker as an Apologist of the Magisterial Reformation in England’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), pp. 219–33 (quotation at p. 224). 7 Arthur Monahan, ‘Richard Hooker: Counter-Reformation Political Thinker’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), pp. 203–17 (quotation at p. 217). 8 Ibid., p. 204. 9 Ibid., pp. 205–206, 210, 212, 215–16; J.P. Sommerville, ‘Richard Hooker, Hadrian Saravia, and the Advent of the Divine Right of Kings’, History of Political Thought, 4/2 (1983): 231–6; W.D.J. Cargill Thompson, ‘The Philosopher of the ‘Politic Society’: Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker’, in W. Speed Hill (ed.), Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works (Cleveland, OH, 1972), pp. 43–7.

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vision of royal ecclesiastical authority limited not only by divine law and natural law but also by the laws of the English Church formulated by the Crown in Parliament with the Convocation.10 Hooker’s constitutionalism puts him at odds with the majority of Tudor defenders of royal supremacy who emphasize theocratic arguments, and it also runs counter to a royal tendency toward ecclesiastical absolutism in late Elizabethan England.11 At the same time, it is argued that Hooker employs his constitutionalism to provide a more secure defence against the types of threats posed by Presbyterians to order in the Church than is supplied by theocratic arguments.12 Finally, as discussed below, Hooker’s constitutionalism is an important element in his efforts to outline a hermeneutic that ensures that scriptural misinterpretations do not foster disobedience of the ecclesiastical authorities and consequent disorder in the Church. Issues related to Hooker’s hermeneutics have provided fertile ground for recent scholarship. In a series of articles Egil Grislis has elucidated Hooker’s understanding of the manner in which God empowers Christian reason in the context of the faithful community to overcome the sinful condition of fallen humanity and gain insight into the true meaning of scripture.13 Several other studies have added to the insights of Grislis. Nigel Voak and Nigel Atkinson discuss Hooker’s reliance on grace-empowered reason for biblical interpretation in the context of debate over Hooker’s Reformed pedigree,14 and W. David Neelands presents the empowerment of 10 Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, pp. 197–213; A.S. McGrade, ‘Introduction: The Three Last Books and Hooker’s Autograph Notes’ and ‘Introduction: Book VIII’, in W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 6 (Binghamton, NY, 1993), pp. 244–6, 346, 356–9, 364–75. 11 Regarding theocratic emphases in other defences of royal supremacy, see Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, pp. 62–4, 97–101, 202–203, 209–12; McGrade, ‘Introduction: Book VIII’, pp. 342–3; regarding tendencies toward absolutism in the late Elizabethan Court, see McGrade, ‘Introduction: Book VIII’, pp. 364–9; John Guy, ‘The Elizabethan Establishment and the Ecclesiastical Polity’, in John Guy (ed.), The Reign of Elizabeth I: Court and Culture in the Last Decade (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 132–3. 12 I argue this point in ‘Royal Supremacy: Lawes Book VIII’, in W.J. Torrance Kirby (ed.), A Companion to Richard Hooker (Leiden and New York, 2007). 13 Egil Grislis, ‘The Role of Consensus in Richard Hooker’s Method of Theological Inquiry’, in Robert Cushman and Egil Grislis (eds), The Heritage of Christian Thought: Essays in Honor of Robert Lowry Calhoun (New York, 1965), pp. 64–88; Egil Grislis, ‘The Role of Sin in the Theology of Richard Hooker’, Anglican Theological Review, 84/4 (2002): 881–96; Egil Grislis, ‘The Assurance of Faith According to Richard Hooker’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), pp. 237–49; Egil Grislis, ‘The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker’, in W. Speed Hill (ed.), Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works (Cleveland, 1972), pp. 159–206; Egil Grislis, ‘The Anglican Spirituality of Richard Hooker’, Toronto Journal of Theology, 12/1 (1996): 35–45; see also Stafford, ‘Scripture and the Generous Hermeneutic of Richard Hooker’, pp. 918–28. 14 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 74–8, 227–39; Atkinson, Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, pp. 92–4, 110.

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reason by grace as an aspect of Hooker’s view that grace perfects nature.15 Hooker’s understanding of ‘reason’ in comparison to other conceptions of rationalism is explored by William Bouwsma and Debra Shuger.16 Brian Vickers argues that as a rhetorician Hooker generally eschews emotional appeals in favour of rational argumentation.17 Also noteworthy is work done by Grislis and W. Speed Hill regarding Hooker’s recognition that even when empowered by grace human reason remains human and thus fallible when interpreting scripture. In contrast to unrealistic Puritan claims to provide absolute assurance that one’s reading of scripture is correct, Hooker seeks a relative but attainable certitude when discerning God’s will.18 Finally, as will be discussed below, a distinction between the visible and invisible Churches is important in Hooker’s defence of the authority of the Crown in Parliament over the English Church. Recently, however, several studies have called attention to the fact that this clear distinction between the two aspects of the Church is not all that Hooker has to say on the topic. Also important is the close connection that he sees existing between the visible and invisible Churches. In Lake’s words, for Hooker ‘incorporation of the believer into that mystical body which was the invisible church was linked directly to his entry into the visible church. Incorporation into the one society led to incorporation into the other.’19 Attention has also been drawn to the centrality of the sacraments and common prayer in Hooker’s ecclesiology as the means by which the visible and invisible Churches are united as members of the former are taken up into a supernatural society, joining as the mystical body of Christ through common union with Christ. The ecclesiological ramification is that

15 W. David Neelands, ‘Hooker on Scripture, Reason, and “Tradition”’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), pp. 80–81, 85–9. 16 William Bouwsma ‘Hooker in the Context of European Cultural History’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), pp. 48–52; Debora Shuger, Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, Politics, and the Dominant Culture (Berkeley, CA, 1990), pp. 26–37, 41–5. 17 Brian Vickers, ‘Public and Private Rhetoric in Hooker’s Lawes’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), pp. 97–134. 18 W. Speed Hill, ‘Doctrine and Polity in Hooker’s Laws’, English Literary Renaissance, 2/2 (1972): 180–193; Grislis’ work cited above, particularly ‘The Assurance of Faith According to Richard Hooker’, pp. 245–7 and ‘The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker’, pp. 169–70, 186. See also Compier, ‘Hooker on the Authority of Scripture’, pp. 254–8; M.E.C. Perrott, ‘Richard Hooker and the Problem of Authority in the Elizabethan Church’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 49/1 (1998): 49–52; Atkinson, Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, pp. 91–2, 98–101. 19 Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, p. 180.

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For Hooker, the visible, public worship of the church – its liturgy, prayers, and sacraments – creates a ‘societie supernaturall’ structured along a vertical axis and mediated by ‘Angels of entercorse and comerce betwene God and us’ … The visible mystical body is a ‘societie of soules’ bound not by … ‘horizontal comradeship’ but by vertical communion. And these vertical relations make possible the incorporation of the simpler sort and their betters into a single community, one unified by something more than the yoke and bridle of jurisdiction.20

Building on the insights provided by earlier studies of Hooker’s work, primarily in the areas cited above, the current investigation will consider Hooker’s efforts in the Lawes to guard the English Church against disobedience and disorder arising from misreadings of scripture. Hooker’s Lawes and Presbyterian21 Hermeneutics Hooker addresses the Lawes to ‘them that seeke (as they tearme it) the reformation of Lawes, and orders Ecclesiasticall, in the Church of ENGLAND’, and identifies his goal as being to win their conscientious obedience to 20 Debora Shuger, ‘“Societie Supernaturall”: The Imagined Community of Hooker’s Lawes’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community, (Tempe, AZ, 1997), pp. 320–21. For discussion of Hooker’s sacramentology and his understanding of the relationship between the visible and invisible churches, see John Booty, ‘Introduction: Book V’, in W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 6 (Binghamton, NY, 1993), pp. 189–204; Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, pp. 176–82; Shuger, ‘‘Societie Supernaturall’’, pp. 315–24; Bryan Spinks, Two Faces of Elizabethan Anglican Theology: Sacraments and Salvation in the Thought of William Perkins and Richard Hooker (Lanham, MD, 1999), pp. 109–58; W. David Neelands, ‘Richard Hooker on the Identity of the Visible and the Invisible Church’, in W.J. Torrance Kirby (ed.), Richard Hooker and the English Reformation (Dordrecht, 2003), pp. 99–110; W.J. Torrance Kirby, ‘Angels Descending and Ascending: Hooker’s Discourse on the “Double Motion” of Common Prayer’, in W.J. Torrance Kirby (ed.), Richard Hooker and the English Reformation (Dordrecht, 2003), pp. 111–29; Charles Irish, ‘“Participation of God Himselfe:” Law, the Mediation of Christ, and Sacramental Participation in the Thought of Richard Hooker’, in W.J. Torrance Kirby (ed.), Richard Hooker and the English Reformation (Dordrecht, 2003), pp. 165–84; Egil Grislis, ‘Reflections on Richard Hooker’s Understanding of the Eucharist’, in W.J. Torrance Kirby (ed.), Richard Hooker and the English Reformation (Dordrecht, 2003), pp. 207–23; Bruce Kaye, ‘Authority and the Interpretation of Scripture in Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity’, Journal of Religious History, 21/1 (1997): 96–8. 21 The term ‘Presbyterian’ will be used to refer to Hooker’s opponents rather than ‘Puritan’ inasmuch as it is the former (particularly Thomas Cartwright) to whom Hooker primarily responds in the Lawes: Rudolph Almasy, ‘The Purpose of Richard Hooker’s Polemic’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 39/2 (1978): 251–70. As Patrick Collinson points out, however, Hooker does occasionally address (without differentiation) more extreme opponents of the Church: Patrick Collinson, ‘Hooker and the Elizabethan Establishment’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), p. 170.

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22

these laws. In order to achieve this goal Hooker endeavours to prove two things to be true of English Church laws. First, he seeks to prove that obedience of English Church laws regulating matters of ecclesiastical adiaphora is incumbent upon members of the English Church. This aspect of Hooker’s defence has been addressed by M.E.C. Perrott. Recall that in the course of the Admonition controversy Thomas Cartwright challenges John Whitgift to concede that his understanding of Church order necessitates reliance on human reason to provide a standard by which to measure ecclesiastical laws regulating adiaphora. While Whitgift, as discussed above, does not accept this challenge, the challenge is taken up by Hooker who acknowledges that reason provides a standard according to which the propriety of Church laws regulating matters of adiaphora can be assessed. Perrott points out that when viewed in this way reason could provide a standard to be used by private individuals to assess the quality of Church laws. Hooker, however, in accepting reason as the standard in accord with which matters left undetermined by scripture are to be ordered, strictly limits the subversive potential of such reliance on reason by subordinating subjective, private judgements of what is ‘reasonable’ to public determinations.23 Hooker’s rationalist arguments in favour of obedience to ecclesiastical laws regulating adiaphora outlined by Perrott begin from the point at which Hooker has answered the Presbyterian claim that all aspects of the Church must be ordered in accord with scriptural injunctions. Before he can expect of Presbyterians obedience to ecclesiastical laws on the basis of the rationalist arguments highlighted by Perrott, Hooker must convince readers of the legitimacy of relying on an extra-biblical authority to order some aspects of the Church. To safeguard the Church against disobedience of the authorities fuelled by biblical misinterpretation, Hooker must not only discredit the more extreme notion that scripture provides a detailed blueprint dictating precisely how all aspects of the Church are to be arranged. He also must disprove the more moderate Presbyterian claim that scripture demands that individual Christians assess Church laws regulating adiaphora according to general principles provided by scripture and render obedience accordingly. 22 Richard Hooker, Of the Lawes of Eccesiasticall Politie, in W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, vols 1–3 (Cambridge, MA, 1977–81) Preface.Title (1:1); Preface.1.3 (1:2–3); Preface.7.1 (1:34) (hereafter ‘Lawes’). Citations of the Lawes will use the traditional book, chapter and section divisions originated by John Keble in his edition of the Lawes; on the rare occasions on which Keble’s divisions differ from those of the Folger Edition, citations will follow the Folger Edition. Book, chapter and section references are followed by references to the Folger Edition by volume and page in parentheses. References to Hooker’s other works will cite volume and page in W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, vols 4–5 (Cambridge, MA, 1982–90) (hereafter ‘FLE’). 23 Perrott, ‘Richard Hooker’, pp. 44–59.

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In addition to clearing ideological space for an authority apart from scripture in the ordering of some aspects of the English Church by refuting the Presbyterian claim that all aspects of the Church must be ordered in accord with biblical mandates, Hooker must also safeguard obedience in the Church against another type of misreading of the Bible. Even if critics of the established Church would grant that not all ecclesiastical affairs must be ordered in accord with more or less precise scriptural directives, they would not have granted, nor would Hooker have desired them to grant, that no aspect of the Church is to be ordered in accord with scriptural mandates. Certainly with regard to points concerning which the Bible does provide binding instructions, the Church must act in accord with those instructions. Consequently, a second point of controversy involves the interpretation of particular passages in scripture to discern what God’s word does command in the Church. For example, the Presbyterian claim that the Church of England must order its outward forms in accord with the orders adopted by other Reformed Churches is based in part on a biblical interpretation purporting that Paul required the maximum possible uniformity among Churches ‘in their indifferent ceremonies’ and furthermore commanded that in such matters the Churches reformed later must conform their orders to those of earlier-reformed Churches. The first assertion is derived from Paul’s injunction to the Corinthians that they ought to take up offerings for the poor on Sunday rather than some other day because he has so ordained in other Churches. The second principle also is supported by Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians in which Paul ‘pincheth the Corinthes, that not being the first which received the Gospell, yet they would have their severall maners [different] from other Churches’.24 In order to refute the claim that the Church of England is duty bound to conform to the orders adopted by other Reformed Churches, Hooker needs to convince his readers that Cartwright’s interpretation of Paul on this point is faulty; he needs to provide hermeneutical guidance. The hermeneutical question is especially important, Hooker argues, because of the dangers inherent in the Presbyterians’ understanding of the role of the Bible in the Church and their manner of interpreting the Bible. In addition to holding that scriptural guidance is to be decisive in all ecclesiastical determinations, Hooker’s opponents also assert that the ultimate standard of biblical interpretation is the individual Christian under the direct guidance of the Holy Spirit. In the preface to the Lawes, Hooker points out the radically disruptive consequences of such an understanding of the relationship between the individual Christian and the Church. Having pointed out several ways in which the reforms within the English Church demanded by Presbyterians would be disruptive, Hooker concedes that such assertions on his part are unlikely to carry much weight with his 24

Lawes, IV.13.1 (1:327–8), quoting Cartwright.

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opponents. They have been brainwashed so that they can no longer read the scriptures aright: And assuredly the very cause which maketh the simple and ignorant to thinke they even see how the worde of God runneth currantly on your side, is that their mindes are forestalled and their conceites perverted before hand by being taught, that an Elder doth signifie a layman admitted onely to the office of rule or governement in the Church; a Doctor one which may only teach and neither preach nor administer the Sacramentes … that by mysticall resemblance mount Syon and Jerusalem are the Churches which admit, Samaria and Babylon the Churches which oppugne the said forme of regiment … and the rest: as if purposely the holy ghost had therein ment to foresignifie, what the authors of admonitions to the Parliament, of supplications to the Councell, of petitions to her Majestie, and of such other like writs, should either doe or suffer in behalfe of this their cause.25

Consequently, when the manifest problems with their discipline are raised, … against all these and the like difficulties your answere is, that we ought to search what things are consonant to Gods will, not which be most for our owne ease; and therefore that your discipline being (for such is your errour) the absolute commaundement of almighty God, it must be received although the world by receiving it should be cleane turned upside downe; herein lyeth the greatest daunger of all.26

The Presbyterian approach to scripture is especially dangerous because it closes adherents off from any wholesome admonition and correction: … if once they have tasted of that cup, let any man of contrarie opinion open his mouth to perswade them, they close up their eares, his reasons they waigh not, all is answered with rehearsall of the words of John, We are of God, he that knoweth God, heareth us, as for the rest, ye are of the world, for this worlds pomp and vanitie it is that ye speake, and the world whose ye are heareth you. Which cloake sitteth no lesse fit on the backe of their cause, then of the Anabaptists, when the dignitie, authoritie and honor of Gods Magistrate is upheld against them.27

The comparison with the Anabaptists is not accidental, nor is the later comparison to the fanatic William Hackett.28 Hooker’s point is not to allege that Presbyterians support the errors of the radicals to whom he compares them, but simply to indicate that the Presbyterians do share with these groups the same unstable and therefore dangerous approach to scripture. Because of the radically subjective approach to scripture employed by Presbyterians, there is no way of knowing what positions 25 26 27 28

Ibid., Preface.3.9 (1:16–17). Ibid., Preface.8.5 (1:41–2). Ibid., Preface.3.14 (1:19). Ibid., V.Dedication.6 (2:4).

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they will eventually come to embrace. After all, because they approach biblical interpretation in the same way, it is as true of the Presbyterians as it is of the Anabaptists that ‘When they and their Bibles were alone together, what strange phantasticall opinion soever at any time entred into their heads, their use was to thinke the Spirit taught it them.’29 After providing an overview of Anabaptists errors, Hooker explains: … my purpose herein is to show that when the minds of men are once erroniously perswaded that it is the will of God to have those things done which they phancie, their opinions are as thornes in their sides never suffering them to take rest till they have brought their speculations into practise: the lets and impediments of which practise their restles desire and studie to remoove leadeth them every day forth by the hand into other more dangerous opinions, sometimes quite and cleane contrarie to their first pretended meanings: so as what will grow out of such errors as go masked under the cloke of divine authority, impossible it is that ever the wit of man should imagine, till time have brought foorth the fruits of them: for which cause it behooveth wisdome to feare the sequels thereof, even beyond all apparant cause of feare.30

Because he recognizes that misinterpretation of scripture is at the heart of Presbyterian resistance to the Church, Hooker makes it a central aim of his polemic to champion an alternative hermeneutical principle in opposition to Presbyterian subjectivism. The locus of interpretive authority he outlines needs to be objective and needs to be in conformity with the teachings of the Church authorities. As will be outlined below, an interpretive standard meeting these criteria is indeed identified by Hooker. Before outlining how Hooker arrives at such a hermeneutic, consideration of his views on royal supremacy over the Church is in order. Royal Ecclesiastical Supremacy This assessment of Hooker’s polemic will start with an overview of his defence of royal supremacy before focusing on the manner in which he seeks to ensure that scripture is properly interpreted. This overview of Hooker’s defence of royal supremacy over the English Church begins with his understanding of the nature of the Church.31 The justified and sanctified 29

Ibid., Preface.8.7 (1:44). Ibid., Preface.8.12 (1:49). Discussing this material W.D.J. Cargill Thompson refers to Hooker’s ‘smear tactics’, but this does not mean that the comparison, at least as Hooker presents it, is inaccurate: Cargill Thompson, ‘The Philosopher of the “Politic Society”’, pp. 14–15; see Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, 235–8; Grislis, ‘The Role of Consensus in Richard Hooker’s Method of Theological Inquiry’, p. 82; Collinson, ‘Hooker and the Elizabethan Establishment’, pp. 169–70. 31 Regarding Hooker’s ecclesiology in relation to his polemics and in comparison to Presbyterian ecclesiology see Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, pp. 59–91; Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, pp. 34–7, 40–42, 160–62. 30

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elect of God form the ‘Church of Christ which we properly terme his body mysticall’. This is the Church invisible, of which Christ alone is the head and concerning which ‘our Lord and Saviour hath promised, I give unto them eternall life, and they shall never perish.’32 Membership in this Church is clearly known to God but cannot be discerned with certainty by mortals.33 There is also a second Church, the visible Church, whose members are unified ‘by reason of that one Lorde whose servantes they all professe them selves, that one faith which they al acknowledge, that one baptisme wherewith they are all initiated’.34 One crucial difference between the visible and invisible Churches is that the visible Church is a species of human society. Hooker asserts that the universal community of Christians is ‘devided into a number of distinct societies, every of which is termed a Church within it selfe. In this sense the Church is alwaies a visible society of men’, and like all human societies the Church cannot survive without harmony and order among its members.35 Furthermore, while all societies require peace to endure, in the Church the need for concord also rests on divine mandate. The Christian God is a God of peace, unity and order, and thus division in the Church is offensive to God.36 As a society of people brought together in the name of the God of peace and harmony, the visible Church needs structure and guidance so that internal order can be maintained, and so that it can serve as an effective vehicle of salvation. The most important source of guidance for the Church is, naturally, the will of God. Hooker agrees with his Presbyterian opponents that God’s will is to be obeyed in all aspects of ecclesiastical life, but he disagrees with their further assertion that the Bible is the only means by which God’s will is made known: ‘For as they rightly maintaine, that God must be glorified in all thinges, and that the actions of men cannot tend unto his glorie, unlesse they be framed after his law: So it is their error to thinke that the only law which God hath appointed unto men in that behalfe is the sacred Scripture.’37 This should not, of course, be taken as implying that Hooker denies the need for laws revealed by God in scripture to lead fallen humanity to salvation. The ultimate end of human beings is union with God, to which end the only means that nature teaches is the performance of good works.38 Because, however, no person can attain salvation in this way, God provides ‘a way which is supernaturall, a way which could never have 32

Lawes, III.1.2 (1:194–5). Ibid., III.1.2 (1:194–5). 34 Ibid., III.1.3 (1:196); see also III.1.4–6 (1:196–8). 35 Ibid., III.1.14 (1:205–206). 36 Ibid., Preface.6.3 (1:31–2); Preface.6.6 (1:33–4); Preface.9.4 (1:53); V.10.1 (2:46). 37 Ibid., I.16.5 (1:138); see the first and second books generally, especially I.15.4 (1:132– 4); I.16.7 (1:140–42); II.1.2–4 (1:145–8); II.8.5–7 (1:188–92). 38 Ibid., I.11.2–5 (1:111–18). 33

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entered into the heart of man as much as once to conceive or immagine, if God him selfe had not revealed it extraordinarilie’.39 The scriptures are a perfect guide in things essential to salvation, and consequently the visible Church is eternally bound by scriptural dictates regarding ‘matters of fayth, and in generall matters necessarie unto salvation’. Other aspects of Church life, by contrast, are not ordered by scriptural precepts and thus with regard to such matters there is room for flexibility and diversity among Churches.40 Rather than looking to scripture to order such matters, one must look to other laws under which God has placed humanity, in particular (1) the natural law discerned by human reason, and (2) human laws. Indeed, to fail to recognize the authority of these other laws ‘were to confound the admirable order, wherein God hath disposed all lawes’.41 This error led Presbyterians into the grave sin of abusing scripture and falsifying divine evidence by claiming that the Bible teaches precepts not truly found therein.42 Regarding the former of these laws (hereafter referred to as the ‘law of nature’43) Hooker states: Law rationall therefore, which men commonly use to call the law of nature, meaning thereby the law which humaine nature knoweth it selfe in reason universally bound unto, which also for that cause may be termed most fitly the lawe of reason: this law, I say, comprehendeth all those thinges which men by the light of their naturall understanding evidently know, or at leastwise may know, to be beseeming or unbeseeming, vertuous or vitious, good or evill for them to doe.44

This law enables even non-Christians to ‘learne in many things what the will of God is’45 and is essential for Christians as well because the sufficiency of scripture as a guide to salvation is not absolute but presupposes knowledge of the natural law:46 ‘It sufficeth therefore that [the law of] nature and scripture doe serve in such full sort, that they both joyntly and not severallye eyther of them be so complete, that unto everlasting felicitie wee neede not the knowledge of any thing more then these two, may easily furnish our mindes with on all sides.’47 39

Ibid., I.11.5 (1:116); see I.11.5–6 (1:115–19); I.14.3 (1:127–8). Ibid., III.2.2 (1:208–209); IV.2.3–4 (1:278–80); see also Preface.4.4 (1:23–4); V.4.3 (2:31); VII.5.8 (3:166–8). 41 Ibid., I.16.7 (1:142). 42 Ibid., III.5.1 (1:214–15). 43 Regarding Hooker’s naming of this law, see Lee Gibbs, ‘Introduction: Book I’, in W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 6 (Binghamton, NY, 1993), pp. 102–103. 44 Lawes, I.8.9 (1:90); see I.8.3–9 (1:83–90). 45 Ibid., I.8.3 (1:84). 46 Ibid., I.14.1 (1:124–6). 47 Ibid., I.14.5 (1:129). 40

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The divine law and the law of nature alone do not, however, meet all of the needs of the Church. Even when both of these laws are taken into account there are vast tracts of Christian life that comprise things indifferent that God neither forbids nor commands. As with Starkey, a key aspect of Hooker’s defence is to limit things essential for salvation and then claim for the Church authorities power over matters of adiaphora. Hooker circumscribes the essentials of the faith, claiming that ‘things absolutely unto all mens salvation necessarie, eyther to be held or denied, eyther to be done or avoyded … are not onely set downe, but also plainely set downe in Scripture: so that he which heareth or readeth may, without any great difficultie, understand.’ 48 ‘Neither can I finde’, Hooker asserts, ‘that men of soundest judgement have any otherwise taught, then that articles of beliefe, and thinges which all men must of necessitie doe to the end they may be saved, are eyther expresly set downe in scripture, or els plainely therby to be gathered.’49 In the matters in controversy between the English Church authorities and the Presbyterians, it is especially important to note ‘the difference betweene matters of perpetual necessity to all mens salvation, and matters of Ecclesiasticall politie: the one both fully and plainly taught in holy scripture, the other not necessarie to be in such sort there prescribed’.50 Because of the clarity of God’s teachings regarding essentials of belief and practice, dispute regarding God’s will in a particular matter is itself strong evidence that the matter in question does not concern something necessary for salvation. This limitation of essentials leaves a wide array of non-essential aspects of ecclesiastical life including the ordering of ceremonies associated with Christian worship, the establishment of holy days, the institutional ordering of the Church, and generally ‘whatsoever doth by way of formality and circumstance concerne any publique action of the Church’.51 Most importantly, all of the criticisms raised against the Elizabethan Church by Presbyterian detractors are identified as concerning indifferent matters.52 Because of the existence of this vast realm of adiaphora, the needs of the Church are not entirely filled by the directives revealed in scripture and the law of nature. Where standards of conduct are left undefined, life in society, including a society like the visible Church, inevitably gives rise to contention and confusion, and thus there is need for additional laws framed by human wisdom and enforced by human agents to maintain peace and order:53 48

Ibid., Preface.3.2 (1:13); see V.22.14 (2:102–103). Ibid., III.10.7 (1:244–5). 50 Ibid., III.11.16 (1:263). 51 Ibid., III.11.20 (1:268); see III.7.4 (1:218–19); III.10.7 (1:244–5); V.65.3–5 (2:302– 305); V.71.7 (2:377–9). 52 Ibid., III.1.1 (1:194); IV.1.1 (1:273); V.4.3 (2:31). 53 Ibid., I.10.1–11 (1:95–106); III.11.14 (1:261). 49

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The law of nature and the law of God are sufficient for declaration in both, what belongeth unto each man separatly as his soule is the spouse of Christ, yea so sufficient that they plainly and fully shewe whatsoever God doth require by way of necessarie introduction unto the state of everlasting blisse. But as a man liveth joyned with others in common societie and belongeth unto the outward politique body of the Church … No man doubteth but that for matters of action and practise in the affayres of God, for the manner of divine service, for order in Ecclesiasticall proceedinges about the regiment of the Church there may be oftentimes cause very urgent to have lawes made.54

If the Church suspended its human laws and … did give everie man license to followe what him selfe imagineth that Gods spirit doth reveale unto him, or what he supposeth that God is likelie to have revealed to some speciall person whose virtues deserve to be highlie esteemed, what other effect could hereupon ensewe, but the utter confusion of his Church under pretense of beinge taught, led, and guided by his spirit [?]55

Thus the Presbyterian programme of removing all of the ‘orders, lawes, and constitutions in the Church’ devised by human authority, if successful ‘would peradventure leave neither face nor memorie of Church to continue long in the world, the world especially being such as now it is’.56 Consequently, ‘God being author of peace and not of confusion in the Church, must needs be author of those mens peaceable resolutions, who concerning these things, have determined with them selves to thinke and do as the Church they are of decreeth’;57 in fact, properly enacted ecclesiastical laws ‘God himself doth in such sort authorize that to dispise them is to dispise in them him.’58 The need for human laws in the Church makes manifest the need for an institutional structure to create and enforce those laws. Hooker thus demonstrates the necessity of polity, but not the need for any particular type of polity; it still remains for him to refute the Presbyterian claim that ‘unto no Civill Prince or Governour there may be given such power of Ecclesiastical Dominion as by the Lawes of this Land belongeth unto the Supreme Regent thereof.’59 Scripture, Hooker asserts, does not provide explicit guidance on this point: ‘As for supreme power in Ecclesiasticall affayres, the word of God doth no where appoint, that all kinges should have it, neither that any should not have it.’60 To address this issue Hooker thus turns to a consideration of the locus of authority that nature empowers to formulate laws governing societies: ‘[T]he lawfull power of making 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Ibid., VIII.6.4 (3:389). Ibid., V.10.1 (2:46). Ibid., II.7.1 (1:175). Ibid., Preface.6.6 (1:34). Ibid., VIII.6.9 (3:395). Ibid., VIII.Title (3:315). Ibid., VIII.3.1 (3:335).

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lawes to commande whole politique societies of men belongeth’, he claims, ‘properly unto the same intire societies.’ Because a visible Church is also a society, ‘the true originall subject of power also to make church lawes is the whole intire body of that church for which they are made.’ Consequently, ‘nature it self doth abundantly authorize the Church to make lawes and orders for her Children that are within her.’61 The authorization of the community as a whole to formulate laws does not, however, mean that every community member must personally consent to each law. Rather, one’s assent to a law could be given in one’s place by representatives ‘As in parliaments, councels, and the like assemblies’, and one is subject to laws and rulers if their authority is based on appointment by one’s ancestors.62 To demonstrate that the monarch is the rightful head of the Church of England, Hooker points out that in England the community that authorizes the prince to exercise civil dominion is identical with the community that authorizes the prince to exercise ecclesiastical dominion. Crucial to this effort is his very inclusive definition of the membership of the visible Church. ‘[B]ecause the onlie object which seperateth oures from other religions is Jesus Christ,’ Hooker reasons, we should consider all … them which call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ to be his Church … That which separateth therefore utterlie, that which cutteth of cleane from the visible Church of Christ is plaine Apostasie, direct deniall, utter rejection of the whole Christian faith as farre as the same is professedlie different from infidelitie.63

On this basis, schismatics, heretics and all manner of evil-doers are recognized as members of the Church as long as they continue to profess the lordship of Christ: Albeit … heresies and crimes, which are not actually repented of and forsaken, exclude quite and cleane from that salvation, which belongeth unto the misticall body of Christ; yea, they also make a separation from the visible sound Church of Christ; altogether from the visible Church neither the one nor the other doth sever.64

Recalling the breadth with which he defines Church membership, Hooker notes that in England the Church and the state are essentially identical in terms of membership.65 Thus, he asserts, it is entirely appropriate that this community (as both Church and state) determines who has authority over religious as well as civil affairs. Authority over the making of ecclesiastical

61 62 63 64 65

Ibid., I.10.8 (1:102); VIII.6.1 (3:386); see also VIII.3.1 (3:333–6). Ibid., I.10.8 (1:102–103). Ibid., V.68.6 (2:349, 352); see also III.1.4–11 (1:196–203). Ibid., III.1.13 (1:204–205); see III.1.7–13 (1:198–205); V.68.6 (2:348–52). Ibid., VIII.1.2 (3:317–20).

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laws has been granted by the community to representatives who speak for the entire Church: the Crown Parliament with the Convocation: The Parlament of England together with the Convocation annexed thereunto is that wherupon the very essence of all goverment within this kingdome doth depend. It is even the bodie of the whole Realme, it consisteth of the King and of all that within the Land are subject unto him for they all are there present either in person, or by such as they voluntarily have derived their very personall right unto.66

Thus Hooker asserts that the laws of the English Church ‘are not by any of us so taken or interpreted as if they did receive their force from power which the Prince doth communicate unto the Parlament or to any other Court under him’. On the contrary, English Church laws receive their binding force ‘from power which the whole body of this Realme being naturally possessed with hath by free and deliberate assent derived unto him that ruleth over them’. Consequently, ‘our [human] lawes made concerning religion do take originallie their essence from the power of the whole Realme and Church of England then which nothing can be more consonant unto the lawe of nature and the will of our Lord Jesus Christ.’67 Because it speaks for the Church of England as well as the realm, ‘The Parlament is a Court not so meerly temporall as if it might meddle with nothing but only leather and wooll.’68 Regarding the power of the prince in particular in religious affairs, … in a free Christian state or kingdome where one and the self same people are the Church and the Commonwealth, God through Christ directing that people, to see it for good and weightie considerations expedient that their Soveraigne Lord and Governour in causes civill have also in Ecclesiasticall affayres a supreme power, forasmuch as the light of reason doth lead them unto it, and against it, Godes own revealed law hath nothing; surely they doe not in submitting them selves thereunto any other then that which a wise and religious people ought to doe.69

The laws of England grant the prince authority termed ‘spirituall dominion or supreeme power in Ecclesiasticall affaires and causes’ which means that ‘within their own precinctes and territories they have authoritie and power to command even in matters of Christian Religion, and that there is no higher, nor greater, that can in those causes over-command them.’70 Royal authority entails not only the ‘power of maintayning lawes made for the Church regiment and of causing them to be observed … [but also]

66 67 68 69 70

Ibid., VIII.6.11 (3:401). Ibid., VIII.6.11 (3:405). Ibid., VIII.6.11 (3:401–402). Ibid., VIII.3.5 (3:355–6). Ibid., VIII.2.1 (3:332).

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71

principallitie of power in making them’. Thus ‘no Ecclesiasticall lawe [is to] be made in a Christian Commonwealth without consent as well of the laitie as of the Clergie but least of all without consent of the highest power.’72 By explaining their necessity and showing that they have been properly established, Hooker legitimates the human laws ordering the Elizabethan Church. This argument assumes, however, that the human laws ordering the Church either reinforce dictates of higher laws or order matters of adiaphora, and it is in this vein that his references to unconditional obedience being due to Church laws are to be taken. In matters determined by the law of nature or the divine law, obedience to the human laws that order the Church is conditioned by prior obedience to God’s laws. Human laws, ‘must be made according to the generall lawes of nature, and without contradiction unto any positive law in scripture. Otherwise they are ill made’, and unworthy of obedience.73 Regarding the foundational claim of the Presbyterians in particular, Hooker concedes that ‘if indeed there have bene at any time a Church-politie so set downe, the change whereof the sacred scripture doth forbid, surely for men to alter those laws which God for perpetuitie hath established, were presumption most intollerable.’74 Because Church laws are to be obeyed only when they do not contradict the divine law, to secure order Hooker needs to address the issue of determining what scripture requires of a true Church. Hermeneutics Notwithstanding the importance of other laws, Hooker, as much as his Presbyterian opponents, recognizes the divinely inspired scriptures as the highest standard for Christians: ‘For many inducements besides scripture [that is, natural law or human laws] may lead me to that, which if scripture be against, they all geve place, and are of no value; yet otherwise are strong and effectuall to perswade.’75 In religious affairs, ‘what scripture doth plainelie deliver, to that the first place both of creditt and obedience is due; the next whereunto is whatsoever anie man can necessarelie conclude by force of reason; after these’ and only after these, ‘the voice of the Church succeedeth.’76 Because of the primacy that he affords to the scriptures, 71 Ibid., VIII.6.14 (3:411). For other powers entailed in this headship, see ibid., VIII.5.1– 2 (3:381–5); VIII.7.1–5 (3:413–18); VIII.8.1–7 (3:421–30). 72 Ibid., VIII.6.7 (3:393). 73 Ibid., III.9.2 (1:237); see also III.7.2 (1:218); III.8.3 (1:221); III.9.3 (1:238); V.8.5 (2:40); VIII.8.3 (3:423–4) 74 Ibid., III.11.1 (1:247). 75 Ibid., II.5.7 (1:165). 76 Ibid., V.8.2 (2:39).

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Hooker’s defence of Elizabethan Church laws necessarily includes efforts to ensure that the Bible is properly interpreted. Hooker addresses this issue in part by pointing out that the struggle between the established Church and the Presbyterians is not a struggle of human authority against biblical authority. In fact, both sides claim scriptural support, and the real question is which side is interpreting scripture correctly: For although scripture be of God, and therfore the proofe which is taken from thence must needes be of all other most invincible; yet this strength it hath not, unlesse it avouch the selfe same thing for which it is brought … But for the most part, even such as are readiest to cite for one thing five hundred sentences of holy scripture; what warrant have they, that any one of them doth meane the thing for which it is alleaged?77

Hooker agrees with the Presbyterians that the key to a proper interpretation of scripture is the aid of the Holy Spirit, but he emphasizes that not all claims to the guidance of the Holy Spirit are to be accepted as valid: ‘Dearely beloved saith S. John, Give not credit unto every Spirite.’78 This warning is given because it is often not clear whether persuasions thought to be of divine inspiration are really produced by God’s spirit and not by an evil spirit. Thus, one must consider ‘how the testimony of the spirit may be discerned, by what means it may be knowen, lest men thinke that the spirit of god doth testifie those things which the spirit of error suggesteth’.79 True testimony of the Holy Spirit could be recognized by sure signs. On rare occasions (such as the apostles), the Spirit enlightens people by special revelation, but such inspiration is always unambiguously validated by a concomitant special empowerment to perform miracles. The far more common means by which the Spirit guides people is by empowering their reason to discern the will of God. Christians confronted with a claim to supernatural insight are thus to believe the claimant only if it can be demonstrated that the Spirit is behind the pronouncements by means of miraculous signs or by sound rational arguments.80 The Presbyterians produce no miraculous signs, and thus ‘It is not therefore the fervent earnestnes of their perswasion, but the soundnes of those reasons whereupon the same is built, which must declare their opinions in these things to have bene wrought by the holie Ghost, and not by the fraud of that evill Spirit which is even in his illusions strong.’81 In this manner, Hooker claims that, in all but the most extraordinary circumstances, reason, empowered by the Holy Spirit, is the highest standard to which Christians should turn 77 78 79 80 81

Ibid., II.7.9 (1:184–5). Ibid., Preface.3.10 (1:17). Ibid., III.8.15 (1:232). Ibid., IV.14.2 (1:337–8); V.10.1 (2:46–7). Ibid., Preface.3.10 (1:18).

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when assessing interpretations of the Bible: ‘[A]lbeit the spirit lead us into all truth and direct us in all goodnes, yet bicause these workings of the spirit in us are so privy and secret, we therfore stand on a plainer ground, when we gather by reason from the qualitie of things beleeved or done, that the spirit of God hath directed us in both.’82 This is not to detract from the scriptures; ‘we do not add reason as a supplement of any maime or defect [in scripture], but as a necessary instrument, without which we could not reape by the scriptures perfection, that fruite and benefit which it yeeldeth.’83 ‘That which by right exposition buildeth up Christian faith, being misconstrued breedeth error: betweene true and false construction, the difference reason must shew.’84 As Nigel Voak points out, by making reason the arbiter of biblical interpretation Hooker shifts the argument to a ground of his own choosing and one on which he has an advantage.85 Having identified reason as the highest hermeneutical authority, Hooker continues to press his advantage throughout the laws, both denying the validity of Presbyterian claims in general terms and offering particular examples of instances in which Presbyterian appeals to scripture and criticisms of the established Church have no rational basis. Regarding the former, a few exemplary passages will suffice. Hooker begins the Lawes by confessing: ‘that before I examined your sundrie declarations in that behalfe, it could not settle in my head to thinke but that undoubtedly such numbers of otherwise right well affected and most religiouslie enclined mindes, had some marvelous reasonable inducements which led them with so great earnestnes that way.’ After having thoroughly examined the Presbyterians’ arguments in support of reform, however, … there was in my poore understanding no remedie, but to set downe this as my finall resolute persuasion, Surely the present forme of Churchgovernment which the lawes of this land have established, is such, as no lawe of God, nor reason of man hath hitherto bene alleaged of force sufficient to prove they do ill, who to the uttermost of their power withstand the alteration thereof. Contrariwise, The other which in stead of it we are required to accept, is only 82

Ibid., III.8.15 (1:233). Ibid., III.8.10 (1:227). 84 Ibid., III.8.16 (1:233). The role of grace-empowered reason in Hooker’s hermeneutics has been discussed. See Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 74–8, 227–39; Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, 151–3; Grislis, ‘The Role of Sin in the Theology of Richard Hooker’, pp. 891–5; Grislis, ‘The Assurance of Faith According to Richard Hooker’, pp. 246–7; Grislis, ‘The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker’, pp. 177–9, 192–5. 85 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, p. 239. Vickers argues that as a rhetorician Hooker generally eschews emotional appeals in favour of rational argumentation: Vickers, ‘Public and Private Rhetoric in Hooker’s Lawes’, pp. 97–134. For varying perspectives on the place of the occasional emotionally intense passages of the Lawes, see ibid., 134–45 and A.D. Cousins, ‘Playing with Reason: Aspects of Hooker’s Rhetoric in Lawes I–V’, Journal of English and Germanic Philology, 97/2 (1998): 177–89. 83

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by error and misconceipt named the ordinance of Jesus Christ, no one proofe as yet brought forth whereby it may cleerely appeare to be so in very deede.86

In the eighth book, he likens Presbyterian efforts to show that entitling the prince ‘Head’ of the Church is inappropriate to … the wonted practizinge of welwillers upon their freindes in the panges of death, whose manner is even then to putt smoke in their nostrilles and so to fetch them againe althoughe they knowe it a matter impossible to keepe them living. The kinde affection, which the favourers of this labouring cause beare towardes it, will not suffer them to see it dy althoughe by what means they should be able to make it live they doe not see.87

Concluding his introduction to the fifth book, Hooker notes that if reason is the standard, then the authenticity of Presbyterian claims that God wills the reforms for which they call is highly questionable at best: … in as much as if it [their program] did come of God and should for that cause prevaile with others, the same God which revealeth it to them, would also give them power of confirminge it unto others, either with miraculous operation, or with stronge and invincible remonstrance of sound reason, such as whereby it might appeare that God would in deed have all mens judgmentes give place unto it; whereas now the error and unsufficiencie of theire argumentes doth make … against them a stronge presumption, that God hath not moved theire hartes to thinke such thinges, as he hath not inabled them to prove.88

In addition to broadly condemning the irrationality of Presbyterian attempts to defend their position, Hooker examines particular claims made by Presbyterians and the scriptural or other evidence on which they base these claims. He repeatedly seeks to establish the weakness of Presbyterian ‘demonstrations’ of the validity of their position and the strength of the arguments in favour of existing Church orders. In the second book, for example, Hooker discusses several biblical texts as well as citations from the fathers that Presbyterians claim support their position that scripture is the sole rule of all human actions. In each case, Hooker argues that Presbyterians have misconstrued the text, and he offers counterinterpretations that better capture the true meaning of the text. Considering the Presbyterian argument that Paul commanded all things to be done for the glory of God and that this necessitates that all actions be performed in obedience to dictates provided in scripture, Hooker emphasizes that … scripture is not the onely lawe whereby God hath opened his will touching all things that may be done, but there are other kindes of lawes which notifie the will of God, as in the former booke hath beene prooved at large: Nor

86 87 88

Lawes, Preface.1.2 (1:2). Ibid., VIII.4.9 (3:376). Ibid., V.10.1 (2:46–7).

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is there any law of God, whereunto he doth not accompt our obedience his glorie.89

In the third book, Hooker sifts scripture passages alleged ‘To prove … that the will of Christ was to establish lawes so permanent and immutable that in any sort to alter them cannot but highly offend God.’90 First, it is argued that because Moses established perpetual laws of government for the Jewish Church, surely Christ would not leave Christian Churches with any less complete guidance, lest he be accounted less faithful than Moses. In response, Hooker attacks the notion that if Moses propounded unalterable laws and Christ alterable laws, then Moses must be accounted more faithful with the absurd parallel conclusion that because Solomon erected an immovable temple to God while Moses established only a movable tabernacle, therefore Solomon was more faithful than Moses, ‘which no man indued with reason wil think’.91 Consequently, an individual’s establishment of a comprehensive unalterable law of Church government is not to be taken as the measure of that individual’s faithfulness to God. Similarly, the Presbyterian claim, that if God did not provide comprehensive laws to govern the Church he would have favoured it less than the Jewish Church, is answered by asserting that God’s favouring of the Christian Church does not demand that he provide it with every advantage enjoyed by the Jewish Church, just as God’s favouring of humanity over other beasts does not mean that humans enjoy the advantage over animals in every aspect of natural endowment. He furthermore lays out the absurd (as he assumes his readers will agree) and dangerous direction in which this line of thought would lead if followed to its logical conclusion: But if such kinde of reasoning were good, might we not even as directly conclude the very same concerning laws of secular regiment? … God gave them [the Jews] lawes of civill regiment, and would not permit their common weale to be governed by any other lawes then his owne. Doth God lesse regard our temporall estate in this world, or provide for it worse then for theirs? To us notwithstanding hee hath not as to them delivered any particular forme of temporall regiment … Wee see then how weake such disputes are, and how smally they make to this purpose.92

Hooker then continues with similar efforts to undermine the validity of Presbyterian interpretations intended to substantiate their claims.93 In the fourth book, he examines the claim that the Church of England is duty bound to conform to other Reformed Churches in matters of adiaphora because Paul commands uniformity with other Churches of the 89 90 91 92 93

Ibid., II.2.2 (1:149). Ibid., III.11.2 (1:247) Ibid., III.11.2 (1:247) Ibid., III.11.3–4 (1:248–9). Ibid., III.11.5–11 (1:249–58).

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Corinthians regarding the day on which collections are to be gathered. Placing the quotation in its context, however, Hooker seeks to demonstrate that ‘the reason which he [Paul] yeeldeth of this order taken both in the one place and the other, sheweth the least part of his meaning to have beene that, whereunto his wordes are writhed.’94 Virtually the entire fifth book is an effort to supply ‘just and reasonable causes’95 for the orders of the English Church and thus to demonstrate that any rational assessment will conclude that the established Church is an effective conduit of divine grace and that the legally prescribed liturgical practices and conventions truly foster the salvation of souls. Because he believes that most favourers of the Presbyterian cause have been misled rather than persuaded by sound arguments, Hooker concludes his preface by exhorting his opponents, … to reexamine the cause yee have taken in hand, and to trie it even point by point, argument by argument, with all the diligent exactnes yee can; to lay aside the gall of that bitternes wherein your mindes have hitherto overabounded, and with meekenes to search the truth. Thinke yee are men, deeme it not impossible for you to erre: sift unpartiallie your owne hearts, whether it be force of reason, or vehemencie of affection, which hath bread, and still doth feede these opinions in you. If truth doe anie where manifest it selfe, seeke not to smoother it with glosing delusions, acknowledge the greatnes thereof, and thinke it your best victorie when the same doth prevaile over you.96

Hooker is confident that Presbyterian arguments do not even approximate disproving the validity of the orders of the Elizabethan Church and indeed by their very weakness seem to affirm it. Nevertheless, he is an astute enough student of human nature to realize that to secure order in the Church something needs to be done to curb the subjectivism surrounding what passes for a ‘reasonable’ argument. All too often people are moved more by affection than reason: For ther are divers motives drawing men to favour mightily those opinions wherein their perswasions are but weakly setled; and if the passions of the mind be strong they easily sophisticate the understanding, they mak it apt to believe upon very sclender warrant and to imagine infallible truth where scarce any probable show appeareth.97

Because of the power of fondness for an opinion to subvert the intellect, Hooker warns ‘that when mens affections doe frame their opinions, they are in defence of error more earnest a great deale, then (for the most part) sound believers in the maintenance of truth apprehended according to the nature of that evidence which scripture yeeldeth.’98 Such is particularly the 94 95 96 97 98

Ibid., IV.13.5 (1:330). Ibid., V.1.1 (2:16). Ibid., Preface.9.1 (1:51–2). Ibid., V.Dedication.5 (2:3–4). Ibid., Preface.3.10 (1:17).

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case with favourers of the Presbyterian cause who in general ‘never did nor could so consider [the relevant evidence] as to be therewith wholly carried’. Rather, ‘certaine generall inducements are used to make saleable your [the Presbyterians’] Cause in grosse; and when once men have cast a phancie towardes it, any slight declaration of specialties will serve to lead forward inclinable and prepared mindes.’99 Because of the subjectivity and consequent lack of agreement regarding what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ argument, there is little hope of resolving the contentions rending the English Church by providing arguments that all parties involved find compelling. For this reason, it is necessary to seek a different means to agreement. To identify this means, Hooker claims that ‘nature, scripture, and experience it selfe, have all taught the world to seeke for the ending of contentions by submitting it selfe unto some judiciall and definitive sentence, whereunto neither part that contendeth may under any pretense or coulor refuse to stand.’100 To restore peace and order in the Church it is necessary that English subjects submit ‘unto some definitive sentence’ as the standard of a reasonable interpretation of the Bible.101 Consideration of the standard to which Hooker directs those who would discover the dictates of reason can begin with his discussion of the means by which human reason determines the standards of the natural law regarding good and evil: ‘[O]f discerning goodnes there are but these two wayes; the one the knowledge of the [first principle] causes whereby it is made such, the other the observation of those signes and tokens, which being annexed alwaies unto goodnes, argue that where they are found, there also goodnes is … .’ While the former of these is the most certain, it is ‘so hard that all shunne it’, especially ‘considering how the case doth stand with this present age full of tongue and weake of braine’.102 In such circumstances, the best course of action is for community members to look for the signs of proper use of reason: Signes and tokens to know good by, are of sundry kinds: some more certaine and some lesse. The most certaine token of evident goodnes is, if the generall perswasion of all men do so account it … Wherefore although we knowe not the cause, yet thus much we may know, that some necessary cause there is, whensoever the judgements of all men generally or for the most part runne one and the same way, especially in matters of naturall discourse … The generall and perpetuall voyce of men is as the sentence of God him selfe.103

99 100 101 102 103

Ibid., Preface.3.5 (1:15). Ibid., Preface.6.1 (1:29). Ibid., Preface.6.Title (1:29). Ibid., I.8.2 (1:82–3). Ibid., I.8.3 (1:83–4).

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This highlights another important aspect of Hooker’s assertion that the Parliament, including the prince as its leading member, speaks for the entire community of Christians in England. Community-wide assent is the most certain sign available of concurrence with the dictates of right reason; because the Crown in Parliament with the Convocation speaks for the English Church as well as the realm, their determinations can be assumed to be in accord with the dictates of reason, whether they are judging regarding what the law of reason teaches or what a reasonable interpretation of scripture entails. The propriety of assuming that the Crown in Parliament judges in accord with reason when ordering the Church is explicitly asserted by Hooker in the seventh book, in his defence of the practice in the English Church of investing bishops with civil authority. In this chapter, he examines several biblical passages and precedents brought forward to ‘urge the necessity of making always a personal distinction of these two [civil and ecclesiastical] Powers’. Hooker responds in his wonted manner by providing counter-interpretations of key biblical texts, by offering counter-examples from scripture to undermine Presbyterian claims, by demonstrating that the Presbyterians’ arguments lead to conclusions that they themselves are loath to embrace, and by placing the texts in their historical contexts to elucidate the authors’ true meanings.104 Finally, Hooker concludes by noting that even if his opponents do not find his arguments convincing, they are bound to recognize the wisdom of those who determined that in England it is fitting for bishops to exercise a degree of civil authority. It is not always obvious to the simple why the authorities order the Church as they do: Herein therefore we must remember the axiome used in the Civil Laws, That the Prince is always presumed to do that with reason, which is not against reason being done, although no reason of his deed be exprest. Which being in every respect as true of the Church, and her Divine Authority in making Laws, it should be some bridle unto those malapert and proud spirits, whose wits not conceiving the reason of Laws that are established, they adore their own private fancy, as the supreme Law of all, and accordingly take upon them to judge that whereby they should be judged.105

In addition to authorizing the Crown in Parliament as spokespersons for the entire Christian community in England, Hooker furthermore argues that deference is rightly given to the consensus of the wise and learned regarding the dictates of reason, even in matters of religion. Granting to his opponents that human wits lacking the special aid of the Holy Spirit are utterly bereft of all hope of judging aright the things of God, Hooker asks:

104 105

Ibid., VII.15.9–14 (3:236–41, quotation at p. 237). Ibid., VII.15.15 (3:241–2).

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But whom God hath indued with principall giftes to aspire unto knowledge by, whose exercises, labours, and divine studies hee hath so blest, that the world for their great and rare skill that way, hath them in singular admiration; may we reject even their judgement likewise, as being utterly of no moment?

He responds that ‘For mine owne part, I dare not so lightly esteeme of the Church, and of the principall pillers therein.’106 Consequently, while the Church authorities are not to be followed in case they should deny the manifest teachings of scripture: … surely if a question concerning matter of doctrine were proposed, and on the one side no kind of proofe appearing, there should on the other be alleaged and shewed that so a number of the learnedest divines in the world have ever thought; although it did not appeare what reason or what scripture led them to be of that judgement, yet to their very bare judgement somewhat a reasonable man would attribute, notwithstanding the common imbecilities which are incident into our nature.107

The contrary opinion regarding the authority of those learned in matters of religion embraced by Presbyterian agitators is not only mistaken, but dangerous: Which opinion being once inserted into the minds of the vulgar sort, what it may growe unto God knoweth. Thus much we see, it hath alreadie made thousandes so headstrong even in grosse and palpable errors, that a man whose capacitie will scarce serve him to utter five wordes in sensible maner, blusheth not in any doubt concerning matter of scripture to thinke his own bare Yea, as good as the Nay of all the wise, grave, and learned judgements that are in the whole world. Which insolency must be represt, or it will be the verie bane of Christian religion.108

In England, the Convocation speaks on behalf of those learned in matters of religion,109 and thus in calling on English Christians to heed the opinions of the wise and learned in religion Hooker is admonishing them to treat determinations endorsed by Convocation with the respect they deserve. Hooker’s call for individual Christians to heed the voice of the Church when seeking a reasonable interpretation of scripture has been noted. As Grislis phrases it, ‘Sound reasoning, according to Hooker, needed a sound context; it was in the Church where grace enabled reason to transcend the narrow limits of individual finitude and sinfulness.’110 Nigel Atkinson 106

Ibid., II.7.4 (1:179). Ibid., II.7.5 (1:180–81). 108 Ibid., II.7.6 (1:183). 109 Ibid., VIII.6.1 (3:385). 110 Grislis, ‘The Anglican Spirituality of Richard Hooker’, p. 38; see also ‘The Role of Consensus in Richard Hooker’s Method of Theological Inquiry’, pp. 82–7; ‘The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker’, pp. 168, 179–82, 193–6; ‘The Assurance of Faith According to Richard Hooker’, pp. 247–8; ‘The Anglican Spirituality of Richard Hooker’, pp. 37–40. 107

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concurs that in Hooker’s view the individual Christian seeking to follow the guidance of the Holy Spirit when interpreting scripture is obligated to reflect ‘not just on what the Holy Spirit seemed to be saying to them as an individual, but on what the Spirit had led the whole Church to see and understand in a particular text’.111 However, the importance of this point for Hooker’s efforts to ensure obedience and order in the Church has not been fully appreciated. Because he identifies reason as the standard of biblical interpretation and the Church authorities, the Crown in Parliament with the Convocation, as the voice of reason, Hooker is able to argue for unqualified obedience to Church laws by claiming that the same people who formulate laws governing the Elizabethan Church authoritatively determine when scripture sanctions opposition to such laws. Hooker replaces St German’s assertion that the Church defines doctrine and that ‘the Church’ in this sense means the entire community of the faithful in England speaking through the Crown in Parliament with an elaborate discussion of the human quest to discern God’s will as revealed in scripture through divinely aided rational investigation and a prudent judgement that the determinations of the majority, especially a majority including those learned in religion, are far safer guides to the dictates of reason than the intuitions of private individuals. While his arguments are more elaborate, Hooker’s conclusion is similar to St German’s. As such, he faces a problem similar to that faced by St German: he fails to safeguard the unity of faith of the universal Church. Presumably the authorities in England are neither more rational nor more qualified to discern divine truth than the leaders of other Churches. If the English Crown in Parliament with the Convocation is authorized to define Christian truth, then representative leaders of other Churches are also authorized to promulgate potentially different but equally authoritative understandings of Christianity. In order to ensure acquiescence to the laws ordering the Church of England, Hooker, like St German before him, needs to convince scrupulous English consciences to obey those laws despite reservations based on private scruples or the determinations of other Christian bodies, including especially other Reformed Churches to which the Presbyterians pointed. Addressing the Tender Conscience Assessment of the arguments by which Hooker seeks to convince scrupulous consciences of their duty to obey the English Church authorities can begin by noting two aspects of his thought that soften the impact of the variety of authoritative doctrinal formulations that is likely to arise when the civil 111

Atkinson, Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, p. 110.

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authorities define doctrine. First, because Hooker holds that things essential to salvation are generally plainly laid out in scripture, disagreement among Churches itself provides strong evidence that the matter in question is not essential for salvation inasmuch as it is apparently not clearly taught in scripture. However, emphasizing the clarity of most essentials of the faith is not in itself a sufficient response to the scrupulous conscience. Hooker elsewhere concedes that his claim is only that the essentials of the faith are ‘for the most part’ plainly taught in the Bible,112 and he explicitly notes that there are some things to which Christians are bound by God’s law concerning which not all agree – things ‘whereunto divine lawe bindeth us, but yeat in such sorte that men are not thereof on all sides resolved’.113 Points on which the English Church differs from other Churches are likely, but not certain, to be matters of adiaphora. There is a second aspect of Hooker’s understanding of the definition of orthodoxy that further softens the impact of a variety of confessions among Churches. While teaching that reason is the primary means by which God guides human beings in the interpretation of scripture and that the determinations of the civil authorities, as the voice of reason, override private interpretations of scripture, Hooker nevertheless acknowledges that even when empowered by the Spirit no human individual or group can serve as an infallible guide in the determination of truth, including a true interpretation of the Bible. Thus consensus, even a consensus including those learned in religion, is not an infallible guide to religious truth: I grant that proofe derived from thauthoritie of mans judgement is not able to worke that assurance which doth grow by a stronger proofe, and therfore although ten thousand generall Councels would set downe one and the same definitive sentence concerning any point of religion whatsoever; yet one demonstrative reason alleaged, or one manifest testimony cited from the mouth of God himself to the contrary, could not choose but overweigh them all; in as much as for them to have beene deceived it is not impossible.114

Because all human authorities are fallible, ‘the publike approbation given by the body of this whole Church unto those things which are established, doth make it but probable that they are good.’115 As explained by Grislis, when Hooker speaks of ‘proving’ one’s interpretation correct ‘Hooker meant a complex intellectual venture which was to be undertaken with great care. He assumed that there would be risks and that even at the best there would remain a margin of error. Hence the assurance thus gained,

112 113 114 115

Lawes, Preface.3.2 (1:13). Ibid., I.10.14 (1:110). Ibid., II.7.5 (1:180); see also I.8.3 (1:83); Perrott, ‘Richard Hooker’, pp. 52–9. Lawes, Preface.6.6 (1:33).

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while authentic, would not be absolute.’116 Hooker seeks a relative, but attainable certitude in contrast to the Puritans’ desire for a certitude that is absolute but not realistically attainable. Hooker’s approach is that Rather than despising that which God has offered by way of assurance, we should accept our creaturely limitations and proceed by the best light available to mortal beings. By spurning this sparse but sufficient fare, the Puritans set up the unattainable standard of ‘great certaintie.’ And by thus removing the only support available, they only plunge persons into ‘anguish and perplexitie,’ berating themselves for lacking the strong faith which could surely remove all doubts.117

Hooker’s identification of divinely empowered reason and its voice the Church authorities in Christian nations as the best, but a fallible, guide to divine truth implies that the search for a full understanding of God’s will is open-ended. Consequently, variety among Churches is understandable, the result of a situation in which each community is following the lead of God’s Spirit toward a fuller grasp of the meaning of scripture at its own pace.118 Such an approach is, however, wanting in its psychological impact on Christians concerned with their eternal fate. Confidence that the Church authorities will reach a better understanding of God’s will in the future provides little incentive to obedience for subjects convinced that they will be damned if they conform to the erroneous teachings of the Church authorities in the present. Hooker does have more effective arguments to reconcile obedience of the Church authorities with concern for one’s eternal well-being. These arguments centre on an effort to convince subjects that divine judgement will follow upon disobedience of the authorities, not upon obedience of them, even in cases in which the individual believes that the authorities are in error. A natural correlative of Hooker’s recognition that the best resources available for discerning Christian truth are fallible is a theology that leaves room for divine leniency toward well-intentioned but erring Christians. An appreciation of divine leniency is at hand for Hooker as he writes the Lawes, being the position he lays out in sermons from the 1580s. In these sermons, Hooker puts forward an understanding of the beliefs necessary for salvation according to which God is in some cases willing to save even persons guilty of holding heretical beliefs as long as those persons hold to the ‘foundation’ of the faith.119 Answering charges stemming from his speculation that ‘God … was mercifull to save thowsandes of them [pre-Reformation Catholics] though 116

Grislis, ‘The Assurance of Faith According to Richard Hooker’, p. 245. Compier, ‘Hooker on the Authority of Scripture’, p. 258. 118 Neelands touches on the progressive nature of the Church’s grasp of divine truth as understood by Hooker: ‘Hooker on Scripture, Reason, and “Tradition”’, pp. 93–4. 119 FLE, 5:133–4. 117

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they lyved in popish supersticions in asmuche as they synned ignorauntly’,120 Hooker stresses that because Rome does not directly deny the foundation of the faith, it is possible that many Romanists confessed heretical doctrines on account of ignorance, not obstinately, and thus they were not excluded from the possibility of salvation. ‘We muste’, Hooker claims, ‘putt a difference betwuene them which erre of ignoraunce reteyning nevertheles a mind desirous to be instructed in the truth and them which after the truth is laid open persiste in stoberne defence of theire blyndnes.’121 The difference is that while the stubborn are almost certain to be damned, the merely ignorant could be saved despite their heretical errors. Ultimately, Hooker declares, ‘we have to doe with a mercifull God, rather to make the best of that little which we hold well, and not with a captious sophister which gathereth the worst out of every thinge, wherein we err.’122 It is worth noting that on this point Hooker is asserting something akin to St German’s understanding of the beliefs necessary for salvation – it is not so much being right in one’s beliefs as a sincere desire to be right that determines one’s eternal fate. Hooker’s characterization of God as eager to find reasons to save has its parallel in St German’s writings as well. Reflecting on the vigour with which Church officials persecute heretics, even those guilty only on account of ignorance, St German expresses his hope that ‘our lorde be more mercyfull to our soules, than so greuously to punysshe vs for euery lyght defaut’.123 For Hooker, as for St German, ‘necessary for salvation’ is a phrase that applies to different beliefs and practices in different circumstances. In situations in which the incongruity of a position with the foundation of the faith has been demonstrated, adherence to that belief is damnable. If, however, a teaching is not expressly contained in scripture and has not been proven to be contrary to the foundation of the faith, then error in regard to that doctrine is not culpable, or at least not damnably so, a point that Hooker explicitly affirms: The heresie of freewill [once it had been demonstrated to be incongruent with scripture] was a milstone about the pelagians neckes: shall we therefore gyve sentence of death inevitable againste all those fathers in the greek church which being misperswaded died in the errour of freewill? Of those galathians [in 120

Ibid., 5:118. Ibid., 5:142–3; see also 161. Richard Bauckham points out that Hooker was not unique among English Protestants in putting forward the possibility that some in the preReformation Church were saved despite living in popish superstitions: ‘Hooker, Travers and the Church of Rome in the 1580s’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 29/1 (1978): 42–7. 122 FLE, 5:162; see Grislis, ‘The Role of Sin in the Theology of Richard Hooker’, pp. 887–9. 123 Christopher St German, A treatise concernynge the diuision betwene the spirytualtie and temporaltie, in J.B. Trapp (ed.), The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol. 9 (New Haven, CT, 1979), p. 192. 121

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Paul’s letter] therefore which firste were justefied and then deceyved, as I can see no cawse why as many as dyed before admonition, mighte not by mercye be saved even in errour, so I make no doubte but as many as lyved tyll they were admonished, found the mercye of god effectuall in converting them from theire erour lest any one that is Christes should perishe.124

In the sermon, he argues that holding false beliefs is in some circumstances not a bar to salvation. In the Lawes, Hooker goes beyond this claim and asserts that divine wrath is instead kindled by failure to accept the doctrinal formulations of one’s Church authorities. Consideration of this issue leads us back to Hooker’s emphasis on the importance of peace within the visible Church. We saw that concern for the orderliness of the English Church underwrites Hooker’s authorization of the Church to formulate laws regulating matters of adiaphora. Such laws would be of little value for the promotion of unity and peace if subjects could disobey them any time they felt qualms about the orthodoxy of a law. Because it undermines the tranquillity and stability of the Church, disobedience of Church laws must be undertaken with great care and only when the dissenter has compelling, not merely probable, evidence that the law is impious. Otherwise to disobey Church laws is an affront to God as well as a threat to the Church. Citing Romans 13, Hooker reminds his readers: The publique power of all societies is above every soule contayned in the same societies. And the principall use of that power is to give lawes unto all that are under it, which lawes in such case we must obey, unlesse there be reason shewed which may necessarily enforce that the law of reason or of God, doth enjoyne the contrarie. Because except our owne private, and but probable resolutions be by the lawe of publique determinations overruled, we take away all possibilitie of sociable life in the worlde. A plainer example whereof then our selves we cannot have. How commeth it to passe that we are at this present day so rent with mutuall contentions, and that the Church is so much troubled about the politie of the Church?125

Divine leniency toward subjects accepting heretical beliefs in obedience to the Church authorities is necessary because acquiescence to fallible Church authorities is indispensable for the peace of the Church. What St German implies, Hooker makes explicit – in the interest of order God positively wills that subjects act against their own judgements when unable to persuade Church officials to alter laws they find offensive. ‘[I]n litigious and controversed causes’, Hooker writes, ‘the will of God is to have them [dissenters] doe whatsoever the sentence of judiciall and finall decision shall determine, yea, though it seeme in their private opinion to swarve utterly from that which is right.’ Hooker makes this claim, moreover, immediately after acknowledging that 124 125

FLE, 5:143. Lawes, I.16.5 (1:139); see Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, pp. 212–13.

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God was not ignorant that the Priests and Judges, whose sentence in matters of controversie he ordeined should stand, both might and oftentimes would be deceived in their judgement. Howbeit, better it was in the eye of his understanding, that sometime an erroneous sentence definitive should prevaile, till the same authoritie … correct or reverse it, then that strifes should have respit to growe, and not come speedily unto some ende.126

This is a remarkable claim, and the passage in which it is made warrants detailed consideration. In the fifth chapter of the preface to the Lawes, Hooker takes up Presbyterian calls for a public disputation regarding the ordering of Church laws, and after considering the mechanics of such a conference moves on in the sixth chapter to consider the results of such a conference. Fearing that his opponents will not accept a contrary judgement but rather will continue to dispute until each is personally persuaded that the ordering of the Church is valid, Hooker points out that in the interest of bringing differences of opinion to peaceable conclusions God has ordained means for the settlement of disputes. In ancient Israel, such determinations were delivered by ‘the Priests of the Levites’, and the New Testament Church provides a parallel example for Christians in the form of the Jerusalem council that issued an authoritative and contention-ending judgement regarding the observances with which Gentiles coming into the Church were to be burdened. ‘Are ye’, Hooker asks his opponents, ‘able to alleage any just and sufficient cause wherefore absolutely ye should not condescend in this controversie to have your judgements overruled by some such definitive sentence, whether it fall out to be given with or against you, that so these tedious contentions may cease?’127 Hooker continues: Ye will perhaps make answere, that being perswaded alreadie as touching the truth of your cause, ye are not to harken unto any sentence, no not though Angels should define otherwise, as the blessed Apostles owne example teacheth; againe that men, yea, Councels may erre; and that, unlesse the judgement given do satisfie your minds, unlesse it be such as ye can by no further argument oppugne; in a word, unlesse you perceive and acknowledge it your selves consonant with Gods word, to stand unto it not allowing it, were to sinne against your own consciences. But consider I beseech you first as touching the Apostle, how that wherein he was so resolute and peremptorie, our Lord Jesus Christ made manifest unto him even by intuitive revelation, wherein there was no possibilitie of error. That which you are perswaded of, ye have it no otherwise then by your owne only probable collection, and therfore such bold asseverations as in him were admirable, should in your mouthes but argue rashnes. God was not ignorant that the Priests and Judges, whose sentence in matters of controversie he ordeined should stand, both might and oftentimes would be deceived in their judgement. Howbeit, better it was in the eye of his understanding, that sometime an erroneous sentence definitive should prevaile, 126 127

Lawes, Preface.6.3 (1:31). Ibid., Preface.6.2 (1:30–31).

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till the same authoritie perceiving such oversight, might afterwardes correct or reverse it, then that strifes should have respit to growe, and not come speedily unto some ende. Neither wish wee that men should do any thing which in their hearts they are perswaded they ought not to doe, but this perswasion ought (we say) to be fully setled in their hearts, that in litigious and controversed causes of such qualitie, the will of God is to have them doe whatsoever the sentence of judiciall and finall decision shall determine, yea, though it seeme in their private opinion to swarve utterly from that which is right: as no doubt many times the sentence amongst the Jewes did seeme unto one part or other contending, and yet in this case God did then allowe them to doe that which in their private judgement it seemed, yea and perhaps truly seemed that the lawe did disallow. For if God be not the author of confusion but of peace, then can he not be the author of our refusall, but of our contentment, to stand unto some definitive sentence, without which almost impossible it is that eyther we should avoyd confusion, or ever hope to attaine peace. To small purpose had the Councell of Jerusalem bene assembled, if once their determination being set downe, men might afterwards have defended their former opinions. When therefore they had given their definitive sentence, all controversie was at an ende. Things were disputed before they came to be determined; men afterwards were not to dispute any longer, but to obey. The sentence of judgement finished their strife, which their disputes before judgement could not doe. This was ground sufficient for any reasonable mans conscience to build the dutie of obedience upon, whatsoever his owne opinion were as touching the matter before in question. So full of wilfulnes and selfeliking is our nature, that without some definitive sentence, which being given may stand, and a necessitie of silence on both sides afterward imposed, small hope there is that strifes thus far prosecuted, will in short time quietlie ende.128

Having established the priority of authorized public determinations over the individual conscience, Hooker reminds readers that such a determination has already been made and is embodied in the ecclesiastical laws of the English Church.129 He then continues: As for the orders which are established, sith equitie and reason, the law of nature, God and man, do all favour that which is in being, till orderlie judgement of decision be given against it; it is but justice to exact of you, and perversnes in you it should be to denie thereunto your willing obedience. Not that I judge it a thing allowable for men to observe those laws which in their hearts they are stedfastly perswaded to be against the law of God: but your perswasion in this case ye are all bound for the time to suspend, and in otherwise doing, ye offend against God by troubling his Church without any just or necessary cause. Be it that there are some reasons inducing you to think hardly of our lawes. Are those reasons demonstrative, are they necessary, or but meere probabilities only? An argument necessary and demonstrative is such, as being proposed unto any man and understood, the mind cannot choose but inwardly assent. Any one such reason dischargeth, I graunt the conscience, and setteth it at full libertie. For the publike approbation given by the body of this whole Church unto those things which are established, doth make it but probable that they 128 129

Ibid., Pref.6.3 (1:31–2). Ibid., Preface. 6.5 (1:33); see Preface. 5.2 (1:27–8).

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are good. And therefore unto a necessary proofe that they are not good, it must give place. But if the skilfullest amongst you can shewe that all the bookes ye have hitherto written be able to afford any one argument of this nature, let the instance be given. As for probabilities, what thing was there ever set downe so agreeable with sound reason, but some probable shewe against it might be made? Is it meete that when publikely things are receyved, and have taken place, generall obedience thereunto shoulde cease to be exacted, in case this or that private person led with some probable conceipt, shoulde make open protestation, I Peter or John disallow them, and pronounce them nought? In which case your answere will be, that concerning the lawes of our Church, they are not only condemned in the opinion of a private man, but of thousands, yea and even of those amongst which divers are in publique charge and authoritie. As though when publique consent of the whole hath established any thing, every mans judgement being thereunto compared, were not private, howsoever his calling be to some kind of publique charge. So that of peace and quietnes there is not any way possible, unlesse the probable voice of everie intier societie or bodie politique overrule all private of like nature in the same bodie. Which thing effectually proveth, that God being author of peace and not of confusion in the Church, must needs be author of those mens peaceable resolutions, who concerning these things, have determined with them selves to thinke and do as the Church they are of decreeth, till they see necessarie cause enforcing them to the contrarie.130

At first glance, all of this may seem to have little to do with the interpretation of scripture and the definition of doctrine, exemplifying instead the thesis already demonstrated by Perrott that in matters of adiaphora the determinations of the Church expressing the findings of public reason are to take precedence. From one perspective, this certainly is the case, but it must be remembered that in Elizabethan England, what scripture determines to be adiaphora and what not was as important a bone of contention as the manner in which adiaphora was to be ordered. Among the Jews, Hooker points out, God allowed what the divine law ‘did disallow’ when it was done in accord with the pronouncements of the authorities following a failed attempt to bring about reform. Similarly, the Council of Jerusalem, while ordering matters of adiaphora in its determination that Gentiles entering the Church must refrain from things strangled, and so on, was also addressing matters essential for Christians by its determination that other Jewish rites, for example, circumcision, were not among those essentials. Indeed, the situation is parallel to that of the determinations of the Elizabethan Church inasmuch as the Jerusalem Council declared circumcision, which some had held to be necessary for all Christians, not obligatory while the English Church had determined that the Presbyterian polity, which some held to be necessary for a true Church, was not obligatory (as well as not appropriate in England). The Jerusalem Council and its determination put an end to claims that a matter 130

Ibid., Preface. 6.5–6 (1:33–4).

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was required by God’s law, so should the determinations of the authorities in England.131 ‘Neither wish wee’, Hooker assures his Presbyterian readers, ‘that men should do any thing which in their hearts they are perswaded they ought not to doe, but this perswasion ought (we say) to be fully setled in their hearts.’ Valid opposition to Church laws must not be based on ‘meere probabilities’, but rather must rest on ‘reasons demonstrative’, and according to Hooker, ‘An argument necessary and demonstrative is such, as being proposed unto any man and understood, the mind cannot choose but inwardly assent.’ Surely such an incontrovertible argument would convince the Church authorities, and Presbyterian dissent is thus invalid because in Hooker’s eyes it is impossible to be fully convinced of the truth of any belief rejected by the Church authorities. Even if one happens to be correct on a particular point and the authorities are wrong, subjectively one’s conviction cannot be strong enough to warrant disobedience with such a heavy piece of counter-evidence in the balance. Thus the burden of proof regarding the propriety or impropriety of ecclesiastical affairs clearly lay with the Presbyterian agitators: For in all right and equitie that which the Church hath received and held so long for good, that which publique approbation hath ratified, must cary the benefite of presumption with it to be accompted meete and convenient. They which have stoode up as yesterday to chalenge it of defect, must prove their challenge.132

By ‘prove’, he means to the satisfaction of the Church authorities. When unable to convince the authorities to accept their position Hooker admonishes his Presbyterian readers, ‘your perswasion … ye are all bound … to suspend, and in otherwise doing, ye offend against God by troubling his Church without any just or necessary cause.’ Presbyterians should be all the more uncertain of the veracity of their cause when the Church authorities are left unconvinced by their interpretations of scripture inasmuch as … the guiftes and graces [of God’s Spirit] doe so naturallie all tende unto common peace, that where such singularitie is, they whose hartes it possesseth ought to suspect it the more, in as much as if it did come of God and should for that cause prevaile with others, the same God which revealeth it to them, would 131 There is no implication in this context that the Jerusalem Council’s pronouncements were any more worthy of obedience than the pronouncements of the English Church authorities. In another context Hooker emphasizes the difference in authority between this and later councils: ‘[I]n as much as the Councell of Jerusalem did chance to consist of men so enlightned [by the extraordinary aid of the Holy Spirit] it had authoritie greater then were meete for any other Councell besides to challenge, wherein no such kinde of persons are,’ ibid., VIII.6.6 (3:392–3). 132 Ibid., IV.4.2 (1:286).

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also give them power of confirminge it unto others, either with miraculous operation, or with stronge and invincible remonstrance of sound reason, such as whereby it might appeare that God would in deed have all mens judgmentes give place unto it.133

Thus Hooker brings together an appeal to the superior rationality of the Church authorities and a concern for ecclesiastical order to answer the question of why Presbyterians should acquiesce to the laws of the English Church even when their consciences and the examples of other Churches lead them to suspect that the English Church is contravening God’s law. Hooker replies that English Church laws carry special weight with them as English subjects because, having solicited for reform of the laws, they can be certain that both sides of the issue have been considered by the officials of the Church. Consequently, they have clear evidence that their arguments are not ‘necessary and demonstrative’, inasmuch as they left Church officials unconvinced. Such is the case perhaps because the issue is not essential to the faith (as Hooker claims is the case with the majority of matters in the Presbyterians’ dispute with the Church), and thus a demonstrative argument from scripture exclusively validating the position of either the English Church or the foreign Churches revered by Presbyterians simply does not exist. In such circumstances, of course, the duty of the subject to obey the English Church authorities in matters indifferent comes to the fore. Alternatively, the differences between the English Church and foreign Churches may have arisen, for all English subjects know, because in other Churches only one side of the issue has been given serious consideration. Having raised for the consideration of the Church authorities their interpretations of scripture, Presbyterians could be certain that in England both sides of the debate have been considered. Furthermore, English subjects are bound to suspend their claims and disregard the judgements of other nations regarding God’s will if the English authorities cannot be persuaded of the legitimacy of their position because failure to act in accord with the determinations of other Churches does not disrupt the peaceful unity of their Church. Alternatively, failure to conform to the laws of one’s own church undermines peace and thus offends God, the ‘author of peace and not of confusion in the Church’. Because the Church authorities, while not infallible, are far more likely to be correct in their reading of scripture than the dissenting individual, despisers of Church laws are very likely doubly guilty. In addition to certainly being culpable before God on account of disordering the Church, they are also probably culpable on account of obstinately holding heretical views. Those who obey Church laws are certain of acting in accord with God’s will in at least one way by maintaining order in the Church. They 133

Ibid., V.10.1 (2:46–7).

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are also far more likely to be following the truly orthodox path and if misled are assured of divine leniency. This being the case, the ‘definitive sentence’ issued by the Church authorities ought to be ‘ground sufficient for any reasonable mans conscience to build the dutie of obedience upon, whatsoever his owne opinion were as touching the matter … in question’ before the issuing of a definitive sentence. By addressing the issue of biblical interpretation, Hooker renders illegitimate private opposition to Church laws based on prior obedience to the will of God. The individual Christian is allowed to seek God’s will as revealed in the Bible, but conclusions reached in this way are always to be brought to the bar of the Crown in Parliament with Convocation. When an individual’s interpretation of the divine will is contrary to a law of the Church, the interpreter is to appeal to the proper authorities to alter the law in question. If dissenters cannot convince the authorities to accept their understanding of God’s will, then they must assume that the spirit of error, not the Holy Spirit, has planted the idea in question and abandon it. After all, ‘in litigious and controversed causes … the will of God is to have them [dissenters] doe whatsoever the sentence of judiciall and finall decision shall determine, yea, though it seeme in their private opinion to swarve utterly from that which is right.’134 Appreciation of the necessity of acquiescence to the judgement of the Church authorities on the part of Christians who find themselves rebuffed when seeking reform of laws believed to be contrary to scripture provides a new perspective on Hooker’s understanding of authority. Hooker famously qualifies the authority of the Church by stating that ‘what scripture doth plainelie deliver, to that the first place both of creditt and obedience is due; the next whereunto is whatsoever anie man can necessarelie conclude

134 Hooker does not immunize the Elizabethan Church against challenges to the legitimacy of aspects of its doctrine and worship, but he seeks to ensure that reform is always carried out through the proper channels. See ibid., Preface.5.2 (1:28). ‘If any genuine reformation of the Church should be needed – a possibility that Hooker does not rule out – then it should proceed from within the hierarchy of the Church’: Grislis, ‘The Role of Consensus in Richard Hooker’s Method of Theological Inquiry’, p. 87; see also Charles Watterson Davis, ‘“For conformities sake”: How Richard Hooker Used Fuzzy Logic and Legal Rhetoric against Political Extremes’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), p. 344. Hooker’s vision of the governance of the Church includes a larger role for Parliament and Convocation than is typical of conformist thought and, perhaps, than would have been appreciated by the monarch. This reflects Hooker’s ‘intention to transform the Elizabethan political establishment in the course of justifying it’: A.S. McGrade, ‘Introduction: Book VIII’, p. 378, see pp. 366–70; see also Philip Secor, Richard Hooker: Prophet of Anglicanism (Toronto, 1999), pp. 313–14; Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, pp. 208–12; John Gascoigne, ‘Church and State Unified: Hooker’s Rationale for the English Post-Reformation Order’, pp. 28–9; Guy, ‘The Elizabethan Establishment and the Ecclesiastical Polity’, pp. 132–3.

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by force of reason; after these the voice of the Church succeedeth.’135 Discussing Hooker’s views on authority, Voak elaborates the hierarchy of authority as being, in descending order of importance: 1. Doctrines found in Holy Scripture ‘by expresse literall mention’. 2. (a) Doctrines deduced from Holy Scripture by demonstrative reasoning; and (b) Natural laws and mere natural spiritual facts deduced by demonstrative reasoning. 3. Probable reasoning and tradition licensed by a society such as a Church. 4. Private probable reasoning and tradition.136

This is accurate as far as it goes, but from the perspective of ensuring obedience in the Church and order in the realm it leaves far too many loopholes justifying disobedience. As Voak states it, ‘the authority of a Church with regard to ecclesiastical laws is abrogated if a person can offer a demonstrative argument either from natural or divine law which proves them to be wrong.’137 These loopholes are closed, however, by Hooker’s assertion that any argument regarding the interpretation of scripture or natural law that does not convince the Church authorities patently fails the test of ‘demonstrative reasoning’. Thus in practice (if not in theory) he places the determinations of the Church above the second level of authority, leaving the Crown in Parliament free to legislate the affairs of the Church as they see fit without fear of legitimate resistance providing they do not directly contravene what scripture teaches ‘by expresse literall mention’. Hooker’s advocacy of the English Church authorities as judges of what constitutes a deduction by ‘demonstrative reasoning’ from nature or scripture (Voak’s Level 2) is reflected again near the close of the fourth book of the Lawes. Here he admonishes persons seeking amendment of supposedly unacceptable Church laws: If we have neither voice from heaven that so pronounceth of them, neither sentence of men grounded uppon such manifest and cleare proofe, that they in whose handes it is to alter them may likewise infallibly even in hart and conscience judge them so; upon necessitie to urge alteration [of church laws] is to trouble and disturbe without necessitie.138

Discussing this passage, Voak rightly notes, ‘Thus only Holy Scripture (whether through its express meaning or through infallible interpretation by demonstrative reasoning) or demonstrative reasoning by itself (from natural first principles) can compel a Church to remove a long-held 135

Lawes, V.8.2 (2:39). Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, p. 263; see pp. 256–64; Lawes, II.7.5 (1:179–81); II.7.9 (1:184–5). 137 Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, p. 258. 138 Lawes, IV.14.2 (1:338). 136

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tradition.’139 In this passage, however, Hooker also directs readers to a standard by which they can measure whether their arguments truly are demonstrative: do those with the authority to alter Church laws judge one’s reasons to be demonstrative? Do the persons ‘in whose handes it is to alter them [Church laws]’ ‘in hart and conscience judge’ one’s claim to be ‘grounded uppon … manifest and cleare proofe’? That Hooker here establishes the Church authorities as the arbiters of what constitutes a ‘demonstrative’ reason drawn from scripture is clarified by placing the passage in context. The fourth book of the Lawes addresses Presbyterian complaints that the English Church’s polity is ‘popish’ and ought rather to be modelled on Continental Reformed Churches. In the thirteenth chapter, Hooker considers arguments that the English Church ought to cast its outward form in matters of adiaphora according to the examples of the Reformed Churches. What is noteworthy about the Presbyterian case for alteration of Church laws in matters of adiaphora, at least as summarized by Hooker in this chapter, is that it presents the English Church’s conformity in matters of adiaphora with Churches reformed earlier to be a thing necessary. The Presbyterians cite no less an authority than Paul to prove that all true Churches ought to be as uniform as possible and that the Churches that were reformed first ought to take precedence over Churches reformed later in establishing customs, all other things being equal.140 That is to say, Hooker presents the Presbyterian case as operating at the level of reasons drawn from scripture to demonstrate the necessity of change (Level 2.a in Voak’s scheme). The argument does not operate at Voak’s Level 1 because Paul does not expressly command that the Elizabethan Church conform to other Reformed Churches. Rather, the Presbyterians deduce the requirement of such conformity from Paul’s words. Presbyterians cite Paul’s statements to prove not merely that the English Church is failing to adopt the most prudent course with regard to ceremonies, but rather ‘the Church of England is greevously charged with forgetfulnesse of her dutie, which dutie had beene to frame her selfe unto the patterne of their example, that went before her in the worke of reformation.’141 Hooker seeks to undermine the claim that Paul demands uniformity among true Churches in matters of adiaphora directly by offering counter-interpretations of the Pauline texts cited,142 but he supplements these arguments by indicating an arbiter in the dispute to whom Presbyterians should conform their judgements even if they find Hooker’s exegesis wanting.

139 140 141 142

Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, p. 262. Lawes, IV.13.1 (1:327–8). Ibid., IV.13.1 (1:327). Ibid., IV.13.5, 9 (1:330–31, 334–5).

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Hooker’s authorization of the Crown in Parliament to determine what scripture does or does not leave as a matter of adiaphora is also reflected in the nearer context of the passage cited above. The fourteenth chapter concludes the fourth book with a consideration of the process by which the reformation of the English Church has been carried out. Following an exhortation that change of laws ought to be pursued with caution because frequent alteration of human laws undermines public respect for them, Hooker continues: Notwithstanding we doe not denie alteration of lawes to be sometimes a thing necessary, as when they are unnaturall, or impious, or otherwise hurtefull unto the publique communitie of men, and against that good for which humaine societies were instituted. When the Apostles of our Lord and Saviour were ordained to alter the lawes of heathnish Religion receaved throughout the whole world; chosen I graunt they were (Paul excepted) the rest ignorant, poore, simple, unschooled altogether and unlettered men; howbeit extraordinarily indued with ghostly wisedome from above before they ever undertooke this enterprise, yea their authoritie confirmed by miracle, to the ende it might plainely appeare that they were the Lordes Ambassadors, unto whose Soveraigne power for all flesh to stoope, for all the kingdomes of the earth to yeeld them selves willingly conformable in whatsoever should be required, it was their dutie. In this case therefore their oppositions in maintenance of publique superstition against Apostolique endevours, as that they might not condemne the waies of their auncient predecessors, that they must keepe Religiones traditas, the rites which from age to age had descended, that the ceremonies of Religion had beene ever accompted by so much holier as elder, these and the like allegations in this case were vaine and frivolous. Not to stay longer therefore in speech concerning this point wee will conclude, that as the change of such lawes as have bene specified is necessary, so the evidence that they are such must be great. If we have neither voice from heaven that so pronounceth of them, neither sentence of men grounded uppon such manifest and cleare proofe, that they in whose handes it is to alter them may likewise infallibly even in hart and conscience judge them so; upon necessitie to urge alteration is to trouble and disturbe without necessitie. As for arbitrarie alterations, when lawes in them selves not simply bad or unmeete are changed for better and more expedient; if the benefit of that which is newly better devised bee but small, sith the custome of easines to alter and change is so evill, no doubt but to beare a tollerable soare is better then to venter on a daungerous remedie.143

From the perspective of this study, what is most important about the context is that it clarifies that when Hooker indicates the Church authorities as the highest arbiters of whether sufficiently compelling reasons have been given for a change in Church law, he means this in relation to all types of challenges to Church laws, whether the laws are accused of being ‘unnaturall, or impious, or otherwise hurtefull unto the publique communitie of men’. Arguments that the laws of the English Church violate natural law (are unnatural), or the divinely revealed law 143

Ibid., IV.14.2 (1:337–8).

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(are impious), as well as claims that the laws of the Church regulating matters of adiaphora are not optimal (are otherwise hurtful), all must come before the bar of the public authorities. If the arguments are found wanting by those authorities, the challengers in each case must assume themselves to be in error lest they risk divine opprobrium by disturbing the Church for no good reason. This is confirmed by Hooker’s choice of the apostles as exemplars inasmuch as their challenge to the religion of the Roman Empire was not merely that Roman religion was poorly ordered in matters indifferent, but rather that it was discordant with essential aspects of the divinely revealed true religion. Accusations that the Church is misordered in matters essential are to be taken seriously only if accusers provide miraculous confirmation and/or compelling arguments (thus the ‘simple’ apostles were supplied with ‘ghostly wisdome from above’ as well as power to work miracles so that ‘it might plainely appeare that they were the Lordes Ambassadors’). Presbyterians manifestly lack miraculous confirmation, and their efforts to show by demonstrative reasoning that scripture supports their cause are considered deficient by the best-qualified judges. As a result, none are obliged to take their arguments seriously. Indeed, they are obliged to cease their opposition. Rejection of their arguments by the Church authorities does not absolutely prove that the Presbyterians’ belief that scripture requires uniformity among Reformed Churches is wrong. It does, however, prove that the evidence in its favour is not compelling. Consequently, their arguments can be assumed probably to be wrong, and even if they are correct God will be lenient toward any who misunderstand scripture on this point, just as God was to the Greek fathers, who died believing in free will prior to the incongruity of this belief with scripture being demonstrated. Indeed, God can be expected to be more lenient to English Christians in error (if such it is) on this point than toward those who destroy the peace and unity of the Church over a belief about which they cannot reasonably be certain. After all, Hooker affirms, ‘in all things then are our consciences best resolved, and in most agreeable sort unto God and nature setled, when they are so farre perswaded as those grounds of perswasion which are to be had will beare.’144 Presbyterian arguments on the points at issue must not be compelling inasmuch as they were rejected by the Church authorities, and a truly demonstrative argument could hardly fail to win their assent. Presbyterian interpretation of scripture is therefore at best private probable reasoning (Voak’s Level 4) not deduced from scripture by demonstrative reasoning (Level 2.a). As an instance of private probable reasoning, the Presbyterian case is subordinate to public probable reasoning (Level 3). As such, the Presbyterian case cannot properly bear the weight of a great

144

Ibid., II.7.5 (1:180).

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deal of assurance, certainly not enough assurance to justify disturbing the peace of the Church. Assurance and Ecclesiology Presbyterian ecclesiology poses an additional challenge to Hooker’s efforts to win conscientious obedience to the laws governing the Church of England. Assessing this challenge and his response will require that we delve into another aspect of Hooker’s understanding of assurance and more deeply into his ecclesiology. The ecclesiology championed by Cartwright in the Admonition controversy limits membership in the visible Church to persons who demonstrate clear signs of grace. This allows Cartwright to place more confidence in the consensus of Christians than could Whitgift whose ecclesiology, like Hooker’s, acknowledges the inclusion of manifest sinners within the visible Church. Whitgift, for example, is struck by the dangers of allowing the election of ministers by congregations inasmuch as ‘the church is full of hypocrites, dissemblers, drunkards, whoremongers, &c.; so that if any election were committed to them, they would be sure to take one like to themselves.’ Cartwright, however, is adamant that in the Church … there be no drunkards nor whoremongers, at least which are known: for either upon admonition of the church they repent … or else they are cut off by excommunication (if they continue stubborn in their sins), and so are none of the church, and therefore have nothing to do in the election of the minister of the church.145

For Whitgift, the visible Church … remained always an inextricable mixture of the godly and the profane, the elect and the reprobate. It was precisely the presence of these inevitable corruptions which rendered necessary the external regiment of the church … as a structure of coercive offices and chains of command emanating from and culminating in the person of the Christian magistrate.

For Cartwright, by contrast, the visible Church as it is meant to be, purified of open sinners, could function as ‘a self-governing godly community’.146 Hooker’s constitutionalism commits him also to a view of the visible Church as a more or less self-governing community, and this would seem to leave his arguments vulnerable to objections arising from Presbyterian ecclesiology. Thus far, Hooker has argued for the necessity of individual 145 John Ayre (ed.), The Works of John Whitgift, D.D., 3 vols, Parker Society Edition, vols 46–8 (Cambridge, 1851–53), vol. 1, p. 382; see pp. 382–8; Thomas Cartwright, The second replie of Thomas Cartwright: agannst Maister Doctor Whitgites second answer, touching the Churche Discipline (1575), p. 146. 146 Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, pp. 28–37 (quotations at p. 34).

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Christians seeking to discern God’s will revealed in scripture within the context of the Church and submitting their singular understandings to the collective judgment of the Church. Read in the context of the exclusive ecclesiology of the Presbyterians, however, this would equate to the empowerment of something akin to the Presbyterians’ proposed general synod to pronounce authoritatively regarding the interpretation of scripture.147 It certainly would not lead to recognition of the authority of the Crown in Parliament with the Convocation speaking on behalf of Hooker’s inclusive Church community to interpret scripture. This issue is more pressing in light of Hooker’s recognition that only true Christians endued with special grace possess rational capacities enabling them to understand scripture aright. The need for special assistance from the Spirit to be able to employ reason correctly in order to grasp Christian truth is reflected several places in the Lawes. Hooker notes that when the authority of scripture was called into question by ‘Infidels or Atheists’, the Church fathers ‘being often constreined to shew, what warrant they had so much to relie upon the scriptures, endevored still to maintein the autority of the books of God by arguments such as unbeleevers them selves must needs thinke reasonable, if they judged therof as they should. Neither’, he furthermore claims, ‘is it a thing impossible or greatly hard, even by such kind of proofes so to manifest and cleere that point, that no man living shalbe able to deny it, without denying some apparent principle such as al men acknowledge to be true.’148 Similarly, when the ‘ignorant’ and ‘simple’ apostles set forth to preach the gospel, they were ‘extraordinarily indued with ghostly wisedome from above’ and ‘their authoritie confirmed by miracle, to the ende it might plainely appeare that they were the Lordes Ambassadors, unto whose Soveraigne power for all flesh to stoope, for all the kingdomes of the earth to yeeld them selves willingly conformable in whatsoever should be required, it was their dutie.’149 Despite, however, the demonstrative arguments of the fathers in support of the authority of scripture and the wisdom and miracles of the apostles, many rejected the arguments of the former as well as the evidence provided by the latter, the presumptive reason being a lack of rational capacities divinely empowered to judge aright regarding Christianity. Elsewhere, Hooker explicitly acknowledges that persons bereft of special grace are unable to grasp plain 147 Regarding the Presbyterian position on the resolution of disputes by a hierarchy of synods culminating in a ‘Synode of all churches’, see ‘A Second Admonition to the Parliament’, in W.H. Frere and C.E. Douglas (eds), Puritan Manifestoes: A Study of the Origin of the Puritan Revolt with a Reprint of the Admonition to the Parliament and Kindred Documents, 1572 (1907; reprint, New York, 1972), pp. 94, 107–109 (quotation at p. 109). 148 Lawes, III.8.14 (1:231–2); see also II.4.2 (1:153) in which Hooker asserts that Christians have ‘a demonstration sound and infallible’ to prove that the ‘Scriptures of God are sacred, and that they have proceeded from God’. 149 Lawes, IV.14.2 (1:337–8).

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matters of Christian truth even when instructed in them. Aspects of divine truth, he notes, could not be discovered, ‘nor though they be shewed, can ever be approved without the speciall operation of Gods good grace and spirit’. Lack of this special grace explains, for example, the pagan Festus’ rejection of Paul’s testimony in Acts 25–6.150 It is not immediately clear that membership in the visible Church ensures possession of this special assistance of the Spirit. Hooker acknowledges that his inclusive definition of ‘church’ means that some nominal Christians are members of the visible Church but not the invisible. After all, he declares that the membership of the visible Church includes ‘impious idolators, wicked heretiques’, and others rightly called, ‘the imps and limmes of Satan, even as long as they continue such’. These sinners are not members of the ‘mysticall bodie’ of Christ and even are ‘hatefull in the sight of God himselfe, and in the eyes of the sounder partes of the visible Church most execrable’, although their membership in the visible Church continues as long as they profess the bare essentials of the faith.151 All of this could be taken as implying that some (many?) members and even leaders of the Church of England lack the grace necessary to use reason aright in matters of the Christian faith. If enough Church authorities are, notwithstanding their membership in the visible Church, not true Christians, this would seem to mean that they are not among the persons empowered to judge aright regarding matters of the faith. If so, their interpretations of scripture would inevitably be flawed even following wholesome admonition, and the individual Spirit-guided Christian would seem bound to oppose their determinations when they differed from his or her own reading of God’s word. In fact, Hooker presents this attitude as a staple of Presbyterian polemic; they seek to convince the overcredulous that ‘it is the speciall illumination of the holy Ghost, whereby they discerne those things in the word, which others reading yet discerne them not.’152 Hooker’s response to this challenge is multi-layered. In part, his reply involves a consideration of assurance – both assurance regarding the accuracy of one’s interpretation of scripture and also assurance of one’s possession of the Spirit’s guidance. His reply is also, in part, founded on ecclesiology and his conception of the relationship between the visible and invisible Churches. Beginning with hermeneutical assurance, Hooker takes steps to ensure that when the determinations of the Church authorities differ from those of the individual Christian, even a Christian confident of his or her own possession of divine assistance, such difference is not taken as evidence that the authorities lack the Spirit’s aid. While supernatural 150 Ibid., III.8.6 (1:223); see also ibid., III.8.18 (1:234–5); Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 227–8. 151 Lawes, III.1.7–8 (1:198). 152 Ibid., Preface.3.10 (1:17).

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support is crucial for a correct understanding of scripture, one’s possession of such aid is not, as noted above, a guarantee that one’s interpretations will be correct. Hooker takes occasion to point out that many authentic Christians (and even a council) erred in the Donatist controversy, showing that doctrinal error is not conclusive evidence of exclusion from membership in the invisible Church and lack of the Spirit’s aid.153 Another example of persons Hooker categorizes as sincere Christians and thus presumptive bearers of divinely empowered reason who nevertheless err in their interpretation of scripture are his Presbyterian opponents, whose general sincerity Hooker does not question. He acknowledges that in the debate over the Church’s laws ‘On both sides the end intended betwene us, is to have lawes and ordinances such, as maie rightlie serve to abolish superstition and to establish the service of God with all thinges thereunto appertaininge in some perfect forme.’154 Nevertheless, he holds Presbyterian interpretations of scripture to be seriously flawed. Hooker’s refusal to claim that those who possess the Spirit cannot err regarding the interpretation of scripture enables him to invite his opponents to accept their own fallibility without calling into question their status as authentic Christians. It also calls on Presbyterians to extend this charitable attitude to others rather than immediately labelling all who differ from them false Christians bereft of the Spirit’s guidance. In addition to challenging Presbyterian claims to absolute assurance regarding the interpretation of scripture, Hooker also addresses Presbyterian claims regarding assurance of possession of the Spirit. Assurance in this sense can be a source of disorder in the Church because Presbyterians convinced that they are members in good standing of the invisible Church and led by the Spirit might understandably be less likely to follow the dictates of possibly reprobate Church authorities over the guidance of their own consciences. Hooker addresses this issue not by denying the possibility of a degree of assurance regarding one’s status vis-à-vis God but rather by outlining a basis of assurance that underwrites acceptance of the determinations of the Church authorities. Discussion of this topic will centre on three statements made by Hooker regarding assurance of possession of the Spirit. In a sermon from the 1580s, Hooker argues that true Christians can know of their election through an examination of their hearts and their behaviour. Advising his listeners of the advantages of discerning whether they are or are not true children of God, Hooker exhorts, ‘Judge thy selfe. God hath left us infallible evidence, whereby we may at any time give true and righteous sentence upon our selves. We cannot examine the harts of other men, we may our owne.’ The evidence of election that Hooker summarizes includes love of one’s brethren, faith 153 154

Ibid., III.1.9 (1:200–201). Ibid., V.4.3 (2:31).

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in Christ, taking joy in one’s saviour, and despising ‘the pride of life, and pompe of this world.’155 As phrased in Voak’s summary of the sermon on this point, ‘Those who have behaved virtuously, and evince a true faith in Christ, demonstrably have the Spirit, and are therefore elect.’156 Similarly, in the fifth book of the Lawes, Hooker asserts that when Christians partake of the Eucharist in the Church: … we so receyve the guifte of God, that wee knowe by grace what the grace is which God givethe us, the degrees of oure owne increase in holines and vertue wee see and can judge of them, wee understande that the strengthe of oure life begun in Christe is Christe, that his fleshe is meate, and his blood drinke, not by surmised imagination but trulye, even so trulie that throughe faithe wee perceive in the bodie and bloode sacramentallye presented the verye taste of eternall life, the grace of the sacramente is heere as the foode which wee eate and drinke.157

By judging ‘the degrees of oure owne increase in holines and vertue’ and particularly by participating in the sacraments of the Church, a Christian can gain confidence of a right relationship with God.158 The basic sentiment on assurance expressed in the sermon on Jude and the fifth book might, however, seem to be at odds with a passage from the preface to the Lawes in which Hooker castigates Presbyterians for hubris in their relations with other Christians, a hubris based in part on a misguided certainty of possession of the Spirit. Immediately after a passage implying that Presbyterians are misguided by ‘that evill Spirit which is even in his illusions strong’ rather than the Holy Spirit into embracing their position on polity, Hooker continues: After that the phancie of the common sort hath once throughlie apprehended the Spirit to be author of their perswasion concerning discipline, then is instilled into their hearts, that the same Spirit leading men into this opinion, doth thereby seale them to be Gods children, and that as the state of the times now standeth, the most speciall token to know them that are Gods owne from others, is an earnest affection that waie. This hath bred high tearmes of separation betweene such and the rest of the world, whereby the one sort are named The brethren, The godlie, and so forth, the other worldlings, timeservers, pleasers of men not of God, with such like.159

The apparent inconsistency between Hooker’s promise that a reasonable degree of assurance is available to Christians (in the Jude sermon and the fifth book) and his condemnation of the Presbyterians’ assurance (in the preface) is resolved by consideration of the bases on which each type of 155 156 157 158 159

FLE, 5:28–9. Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, p. 243. Lawes, V.67.1 (2:331). See Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 247–8. Lawes, Preface.3.10–11 (1:18).

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assurance is built. In the sermon and the fifth book, the standard by which Christians are called to judge their status in relation to God is virtuous behaviour, including availing themselves of the means of grace in the Church. In the preface, the Presbyterians are condemned not because they seek signs of their status as true Christians, but rather because they believe that the ‘speciall token’ of God’s favour is ‘an earnest affection that waie’, meaning by ‘that waie’, toward the Presbyterian movement. As judged by Hooker, however, adherence to the Presbyterian movement is a sign that one is failing to act virtuously, in particular by troubling the Church without just and necessary cause. Thus the Presbyterians are condemned for precisely the same reason that a confident but worldly person would be condemned by Hooker’s Jude sermon: for failing to behave virtuously and for failing to discern that such behaviour is a sign of contrariety to God. It is not confidence of God’s favour in general, still less confidence based on awareness of virtuous behaviour, that Hooker condemns in the preface. Rather it is the particular foundation, itself contrary to true virtue, on which Presbyterians build their confidence. Thus Hooker presents his approach to discerning Christian truth as a remedy for consciences troubled by the unreasonable demands of the Presbyterians: When bare and unbuilded conclusions are put into their mindes, they finding not themselves to have therof any great certaintie, imagine that this proceedeth only from lacke of faith, and that the spirite of God doth not worke in them, as it doth in true beleevers; by this meanes their hearts are much troubled, they fall into anguish and perplexitie: wheras the truth is, that how bold and confident soever we may be in words, when it commeth to the point of tryall, such as the evidence is which the truth hath eyther in it selfe or through proofe, such is the hearts assent thereunto, neither can it be stronger, being grounded as it should be.160

Because absolute assurance of the validity of the Presbyterian position is incompatible with the evidence supporting that position, those who exhibit such certainty indicate thereby that their assent is not ‘grounded as it should be’, and thus such assurance can never be a sign of God’s favour. Conversely, people who cannot find within themselves assurance regarding the Presbyterian scheme should take heart because their uncertainty, rather than a sign that they are bereft of the Spirit’s aid, is an indication that their thinking is ‘grounded as it should be’, and to that extent they are manifesting evidence of the Spirit’s assistance. Hooker agrees with his opponents that a degree of confidence of God’s favour can be gleaned by self-examination, but he turns this to support participation in the established Church by making partaking of the sacraments in the Church

160

Ibid., II.7.5 (1:180).

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a source of assurance. At the same time, he denies that adherence to the Presbyterian cause is a sign of possession of the Spirit.161 Hooker’s understanding of the role of the sacrament in assurance leads to consideration of his ecclesiology. The distinction, noted above, between the visible and the invisible Churches is not Hooker’s only word regarding ecclesiology. While the distinction between the visible and the invisible Churches is, in Hooker’s eyes, valid and important, it must not be allowed to obscure the equally crucial relationship between visible institutional Churches, including the Church of England, and the mystical communion of saints on earth. Recently attention has been drawn to Hooker’s identification of the Christian Church as not merely a visible society nor as simply an invisible, mystical union of souls to Christ. Rather, Christ’s body, the Church, is at the same time both. It is a ‘visible mysticall bodie’,162 a ‘supernaturall societie’.163 In society as such, people are joined to ‘men simplye considered as men’; in a Church members are united to ‘God, Angels, and holie men’.164 The Church, the ‘body of Christ’, like Christ, ‘has two natures – one divine, the other human. Whilst the Church is twofold, it is not two Churches, just as Christ, who is both divine and human, is neither two Christs, nor two persons.’165 ‘[I]ncorporation of the believer into that mystical body which was the invisible church was linked directly to his entry into the visible church. Incorporation into the one society led to incorporation into the other.’166 Thus Hooker ultimately ‘identifies “the church” neither with Elizabeth’s ecclesiastical polity nor with the invisible and inward operations of grace.’ Rather he ‘posits an empirical association (a “visible bodie”) structured by non-empirical (“mysticall”) relations’.167 The link between these two aspects of the Church is forged by the role of the sacraments and common prayer as means of grace that incorporate believers into the invisible Church. These elements come to the fore in the fifth book in which Hooker details how the prayer and sacramentcentred liturgy of the Elizabethan Church provides a context in which Christians worship God truly, grow in grace and holiness, and ultimately find salvation. Baptism and the Eucharist in particular are identified not merely as signs or symbols of divine favour but as effective means through which God actually communicates grace. More than this, the ‘Sacraments go beyond commerce [between God and individuals] … to participation, 161 This interpretation is in contrast to Voak’s argument that Hooker’s statements on assurance are inconsistent: Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, pp. 241–51. 162 Lawes, V.24.1 (2:111). 163 Ibid., I.15.2 (1:130–31). 164 Ibid., I.15.2 (1:131). 165 Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy, pp. 74–5. 166 Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, p. 180. 167 Shuger, ‘‘Societie Supernaturall’’, p. 320.

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being instruments for the union of the soul with God.’168 In Hooker’s words: … wee take not baptisme nor the Eucharist for bare resemblances or memorialls of thinges absent, neither for naked signes and testimonies assuringe us of grace received before, but (as they are in deed and in veritie) for meanes effectuall whereby God when wee take the sacramentes delivereth into our handes that grace available unto eternall life, which grace the sacramentes represent or signifie.169

Hooker’s ‘five-point consensus statement’170 of core Eucharistic teachings focuses on the sacrament as a means through which God effectively works redemption and sanctification in communicants. ‘Take’, Hooker counsels regarding Eucharistic disputes, … that wherein all agree and then consider by it selfe what cause why the rest in question should not rather be left as superfluous then urged as necessarie. It is on all sides plainely confest, first that this sacrament is a true and a reall participation of Christ, who thereby imparteth him selfe even his whole intire person as a mysticall head unto everie soule that receiveth him, and that everie such receiver doth thereby incorporate or unite him selfe unto Christ as a mysticall member of him, yea of them also whom he acknowledgeth to be his own; secondly that to whome the person of Christ is thus communicated to them he giveth by the same sacrament his holie spirit to sanctifie them as it sanctifieth him which is theire head; thirdly that what merit force or vertue soever there is in his sacrificed bodie and blood, wee freely fullie and whollie have it by this sacrament; fourthlie that the effect thereof in us is a reall transmutation of our soules and boodies from sinne to righteousnes, from death and corruption to immortalitie and life; fiftlie that because the sacrament being of it selfe but a corruptible and earthly creature must needes be thought an unlikely instrument to worke so admirable effectes in man, wee are therefore to rest our selves altogether upon the strength of his glorious power who is able and will bringe to passe that the bread and cup which he giveth us shalbe trulie the thinge he promiseth.171

It may be noted that participation in the sacraments of the Church is not an infallible sign of election, nor even that the recipient is in possession of grace. Hooker acknowledges that ‘all receyve not the grace of God which receive the sacramentes of his grace’; rather the sacraments are ‘markes wherebie to knowe when God doth imparte the vitall or savinge grace of Christ unto all that are capable thereof’.172 As seen in his discussion of the interpretation of scripture, however, Hooker is comfortable dealing 168

Booty, ‘Introduction: Book V’, pp. 190–91. Lawes, V.57.5 (2:247). 170 Grislis, ‘Reflections on Richard Hooker’s Understanding of the Eucharist’, p. 217. 171 Lawes, V.67.7 (2:335–6). 172 Ibid., V.57.4, 57.3 (2:246, 245); see Daniel Eppley, ‘Richard Hooker on the Unconditionality of Predestination’, in W.J. Torrance Kirby (ed.), Richard Hooker and the English Reformation (Dordrecht, 2003), p. 73. 169

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in categories of relative rather than absolute certainty. As Lake phrases it, the Presbyterians’ ‘misguided search for personal certainty about their own status as members of the elect’ is, in Hooker’s eyes, an aspect of their ‘search for the chimera of final certainty or assurance on issues which were inherently unresolvable in this life’, a search that ‘could only lead to doubt and despair’.173 While questioning calls for infallible certainty regarding one’s status in relation to God, Hooker does believe that a reasonable level of assurance is available to all who live virtuously and partake of the sacraments in the Church. This is reflected in Hooker’s claim in the fifth book that a reasonable level of assurance regarding the possession of grace is available to Christians by means of participation in the Eucharist.174 What is most important for our consideration of the trustworthiness of the Church authorities is that such relative certainty can be applied by individuals not only to themselves but also to their fellow Christians. Emphasizing the importance of the sacraments, Hooker notes that the Apostle Paul assumed that all those who had not undergone baptism were reprobate. In the course of this discussion, he also points out the positive corollary: When thapostle sawe men called to the participation of Jesus Christ, after the Gospell of God embraced and the sacrament of life received, he feareth not then to put them in the number of elect sainctes, he then accompteth them delivered from death and cleane purged from all synne … So that by sacramentes and other sensible tokens of grace wee may boldly gather that he, whose mercie vouchafeth now to bestowe the meanes, hath also longe sithence intended us that whereunto they leade.175

The presumption that those who partake of the sacraments receive the benefit of them is the basis on which Hooker is able to counsel personal confidence of salvation, but it also cuts the other way: ‘Just as we are to presume our salvation from our hope that we will be saved, even though we cannot have assurance of it … so we are to presume that all the baptised are of the elect, even though there is no certain sign that they are.’176 If partaking of the sacraments provided a solid enough foundation for Paul to build a presumption that others were elect, is it not reasonable for Presbyterians to do the same with regard to the status of the Church authorities? Some of the Church authorities may hypocritically be professing without truly believing the essentials of the faith, but the fact that they do profess and 173

Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, pp. 178–9. Lawes, V.67.1 (2:331). 175 Ibid., V.60.3 (2:256); see also Hooker’s affirmation that baptism provides a reasonable foundation on which to build an assumption that a baptized child is among the elect: ibid., V.64.3 (2:296). 176 Neelands, ‘Richard Hooker on the Identity of the Visible and the Invisible Church’, p. 105; see also p. 109. 174

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avail themselves of the ecclesiastically mediated means of grace creates a strong presumption that they are at least currently in possession of grace and are quite likely to be among the elect.177 Hooker’s sacramentology thus provides a foundation for his position articulated in the third book that ‘If we professe as Peter did, that we love the Lorde, and professe it in the hearing of men, charitie is prone to believe all thinges, and therefore charitable men are likely to thinke we do so, as long as they see no proofe to the contrary.’178 Only the most uncharitable of persons would suspect the spiritual status of not only one or a few but of the majority of Church authorities inasmuch as they do partake of the means of grace. While the authorities might lack the Spirit’s assistance and thus be incapable of judging scripture aright, their partaking of the sacraments means that the most reasonable (not to mention charitable) course is to assume that they are in possession of the Spirit’s aid. From Hooker’s perspective, another possible justification of non-compliance to Church laws is seen to lack the certainty that alone renders disobedience licit. The General Council, the Papacy and Hermeneutics Presbyterians were not, of course, the only ones challenging the legitimacy of the Elizabethan Church. In a recent assessment, Rory Fox argues that ‘Hooker’s ecclesiastical polity is muddled, incomplete and quite simply incoherent’ because his understanding of authority either proves nothing against the Presbyterians or proves equally against the Church of England in favour of the papal Church.179 Consideration of whether Hooker’s Lawes is internally consistent provides an opportunity to address the remaining issue of Hooker’s understanding of the hermeneutical authority of a general council. We have seen above, and Fox notes, that a key element of Hooker’s response to Presbyterian opposition is an appeal to scripture reasonably interpreted. This, however, is merely to beg the question of what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ interpretation. In order to answer this, Hooker turns to an appeal to authority, the importance of acquiescence to which rests in large part upon the importance of peace and unity within the Church. Fox indicates the English bishops as Hooker’s chosen authority,180 which, as discussed above, is correct when augmented by the representatives of the lay contingent of the English Church, the 177 Neelands raises the possibility that ‘for Hooker, grace was apparently offered and, for a time, taken up, wider than the circle of the elect’: ‘Richard Hooker on the Identity of the Visible and the Invisible Church’, p. 108. 178 Lawes, III.1.2 (1:195); see also V.49.2 (2:203). 179 Fox, ‘Richard Hooker and the Incoherence of “Ecclesiastical Polity”’, pp. 43–57 (quotation at p. 57). 180 Ibid., pp. 53–4.

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Crown in Parliament. By identifying an objective interpretive authority, Hooker provides a sound response to Presbyterian critics of the English Church, but he does so, Fox argues, only at the ‘high price of conceding exactly the points which were at dispute with Roman Catholic thinkers’.181 Roman Catholic polemicists were using precisely the same appeals to the importance of peace and unity to demand acquiescence on the part of the English Church to the authority of the pope and/or the Council of Trent. ‘If pushed’, Fox conjectures, ‘Hooker might well have justified Anglican resistance to the council of Trent by suggesting that Roman Catholics are guilty of grave theological errors … But was not that precisely the Puritan defence against Hooker … ?’182 Fox seems correct in asserting that Hooker would undermine the very argument that he raises against the Presbyterians should he reject the determinations of Trent simply as wrong. Consequently, our consideration of Hooker’s hermeneutics will conclude with a discussion of his views regarding papal authority and the Council of Trent in relation to the interpretation of scripture. Beginning with papal authority, it is important to recall that, as shown above, Hooker does not argue that just any authority is to be accepted as the standard of scriptural interpretation. Rather, as he makes his appeal to authority Hooker retains his focus on the importance of a reasonable interpretation of scripture and champions the authority he believes most likely to judge in accord with reason. Certainly, Hooker surmises, the collective wisdom of a Christian community is far more likely than the wisdom of an individual to lead to a reasonable interpretation of scripture. In the Lawes, the individual in question is the dissenting Presbyterian, but the argument would apply equally to any individual, including the pope, unless it were shown that the individual is authorized to speak on behalf of an entire community. Hooker is quite certain that the pope is not so authorized, at least not with respect to the English Church. Understandably given its context and intention, the Lawes does not focus on the issue of papal authority over the English Church, but the topic does receive some attention. The primary justification that Hooker provides for his rejection of papal supremacy over the English Church is that such supremacy does not concur with the sovereignty that each church community has by nature over its members: The greatest agentes of the Bishop of Romes inordinate Soveraigntie strive against no one pointe with such earnestnes as against this that Jurisdiction (and in the name of jurisdiction they also comprehend the power of dominion spirituall) should be thought originally to be the right of the whole Church

181 182

Ibid., pp. 55–6. Ibid., p. 56.

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and that no person hath or can have the same otherwise then derived from the bodie of the Church.183

While Christians are bound in conscience to be subject to those placed in authority over them by their church, ‘such usurpers … as in the exercise of their power doe more then they have been authorized to doe cannot in conscience binde any man to obedience.’184 Consequently, Presbyterians owe subjection to the rightly established English Church authorities, but no one in England owes subjection to the usurped authority over the English Church claimed by the papacy. Putting the issue in terms of Voak’s hierarchy of authority, because the pope has not been authorized by English Christians to speak on behalf of the English Church, his teachings are merely personal opinions (Voak’s Level 4). As such, they are to be obeyed only to the extent that the individual Christian finds them convincing and that they are not contradicted by a higher authority such as the laws governing the English Church. As a representative body of the Church, the Council of Trent would seem to be a more difficult authority for Hooker to coherently ignore. The Council might even seem, according to Hooker’s principles, to be more likely to judge in accord with reason than the English Parliament, being representative of the entire Christian community. It also would be capable of promoting Christian unity on a universal, not merely a national, scale. Hooker, however, is quite clear that the Council of Trent does not have binding authority over English Christians, and he can easily argue from the principles outlined above that the Council of Trent is, from the perspective of English Christians, a less binding authority regarding the discernment of God’s will than the English Crown in Parliament with the Convocation. Hooker has several opportunities to reflect on the authority of Trent in the eighth book as part of his consideration of the authority of the English Crown in Parliament with the Convocation to make laws for the English Church. From Hooker’s perspective, a primary weakness of Trent is that the Council did not include the voices of the laity in its deliberations, and thus its pronouncements embody the wisdom of only one estate within the Church. Both Christ and nature, however, concur in teaching that the true original subject of power to formulate binding laws over members of a Church is the entire Church as a whole.185 Hooker argues that it is ‘Against all equitie’ for people to be bound by human laws that they have not approved either directly or indirectly through representatives. Consequently,

183 184 185

Lawes, VIII.6.2 (3:386). Ibid., VIII.6.9 (3:400). Ibid., VIII.6.1 (3:385–6); VIII.6.3 (3:387–8).

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… till it be proved that some speciall lawe of Christ hath for ever annexed unto the Clergie alone the power to make Ecclesiasticall lawes, we are to hold it a thing most consonant with equitie and reason that no Ecclesiasticall lawe be made in a Christian Commonwealth without consent as well of the laitie as of the Clergie.186

Hooker goes on to note that King Philip of Spain placed limits on the implementation of the decrees of Trent within his territories and asks, ‘what reason was there but that the same authoritie which limited might quite and cleane have refused that Councel?’ Consequently, ‘Who so alloweth the sayd act of the Catholick King for good and lawfull must graunt that the Canons even of generall Councells have but the force of wise mens opinions concerning that wherof they treate till they be publickly assented unto where they are to take place as lawes.’187 Because in England public assent to the decrees of Trent has been withheld, the determinations of that council have the status only of ‘wise mens opinions’ among the English. Certainly Hooker recognizes that ordained Christians, as experts in the divine law and matters of religion, ought to take a leading role in the determination of ecclesiastical issues, but he also is convinced that the collective wisdom of the entire Church is more trustworthy as a guide to a reasonable ordering of the Church than the judgements of any one constituency within the Church:188 The most naturall and religious course in making of lawes is that the matter of them be taken from the judgment of the wisest in those thinges which they are to concerne. In matters of God, to sett downe a forme of publique prayer, a solemne confession of the Articles of Christian fayth, rites and ceremonies meet for the exercise of religion, it were unnaturall not to think the Pastors and Bishops of our soules a great deale more fitt then men of secular trades and callinges. Howbeit when all which the wisdome of all sortes can doe is done for devising of lawes in the Church it is the generall consent of all that giveth them the forme and vigor of lawes without which they could be no more unto us then the Counseles of Physitions to the sick, well might they seem as wholesome admonitions and instructions but lawes could they never be without consent of the whole Church; which is the only thing that bindeth each member of the Church to be guided by them … thus to define of our own Churches regiment, the Parlament of England hath competent authoritie.189

While it is appropriate for clerics to take the lead in formulating ecclesiastical policies, their determinations do not have binding force on Christian consciences ‘till they be publickly assented unto where they are 186

Ibid., VIII.6.7 (3:393). Ibid., VIII.6.8 (3:395). 188 See ibid., VIII.6.7 (3:394) in which Hooker points out that if the clergy are allowed to formulate Church laws on their own, human nature makes it likely that they will abuse the authority to their own advantage. 189 Ibid., VIII.6.11 (3:403–404). 187

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to take place as lawes’.190 In contrast to councils in which only clerics are represented: The Parlament of England together with the Convocation annexed thereunto is that wherupon the very essence of all goverment within this kingdome doth depend. It is even the bodie of the whole Realme, it consisteth of the King and of all that within the Land are subject unto him for they all are there present either in person, or by such as they voluntarily have derived their very personall right unto.191

Thus, ‘our [English] lawes made concerning religion do take originallie their essence from the power of the whole Realme and Church of England then which nothing can be more consonant unto the lawe of nature and the will of our Lord Jesus Christ.’192 That Christ and the law of nature ordain such a system is consonant with the importance of maximizing the likelihood that reasonable ecclesiastical laws are formulated. Not only does involving all estates in the legislative process vitiate any one estate’s efforts to enact self-serving laws, but also the rationality of clerically formulated laws is confirmed when they win the assent of the entire Church community. Another objection that Hooker’s hermeneutics would allow him to voice concerning Trent and its authority over English Christians is the fact that the English Church was not represented at the Council. Thus the Council of Trent, despite its claims to the contrary, was simply a regional council and as such its authority is as limited as the authority of other representative bodies of regional Churches, including the Crown in Parliament with the Convocation in England. As discussed above, English subjects who fear that the laws ordering their Church are in error have the opportunity to call for those laws to be reviewed by the authorities. Thus with regard to English Church laws, scrupulous English consciences can rest assured that both sides of the argument have been considered. Not having been present at Trent either directly or by representation, the English cannot have the same level of certainty regarding the validity of its pronouncements. There is an important difference, at least in Hooker’s eyes, between a claim that the decrees of Trent are, in Fox’s words, ‘unscriptural, unhistorical, and are proposing theological views and practices which are … utterly wrong’,193 and similar accusations being made against the laws of the English Church by Presbyterians. The decrees of Trent, formulated by the clerical estate alone, are mere admonitions that no one is per se bound in conscience to obey, and indeed if one has good reason to think they are erroneous, one is bound in conscience to disobey them. The laws of the English Church, however, being formulated by the properly 190 191 192 193

Ibid., VIII.6.8 (3:395); see also VIII.6.12 (3:406–407). Ibid., VIII.6.11 (3:401). Ibid., VIII.6.11 (3:405). Fox, ‘Richard Hooker and the Incoherence of “Ecclesiastical Polity”’, p. 56.

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ordained authorities enjoy the status of fully effective laws and thus are binding in conscience on members of that Church, as Paul and Peter make clear in scripture.194 Furthermore, the decrees of Trent or any other clerical coterie, while not to be dismissed too lightly, do not enjoy the highest level of evidence available that they are formulated in accord with reason. The ecclesiastical laws of the English Church, on the other hand, being approved by the clerical and lay estates, are, objectively considered, more likely to be in accord with reason and thus take precedence over the decrees of Trent where there is conflict. Again placing the issue in terms of Voak’s hierarchy of authority, the laws of the English Church operate at Level 3, probable reasoning licensed by a society such as a Church, while the decrees of Trent operate at Level 4, private probable reasoning. It is entirely consistent for Hooker to refrain from acquiescing to the Level 4 determinations of Trent while nevertheless demanding that Presbyterians submit their private judgements to the Level 3 authority of the English Church. Hooker’s admonition to his Presbyterian opponents that in defying the laws of the Church they are behaving irrationally could not be turned by Catholic polemicists against Hooker with any force. Hooker reprimands Presbyterian resistance to English Church law as follows: ‘A lawe is the deed of the whole bodie politike, whereof if ye judge your selves to be any part, then is the law even your deed also. And were it reason in things of this qualitie to give men audience pleading for the overthrow of that which their own verie deed hath ratified?’195 He thus places his opponents in the position of either denying the legislative authority of Parliament in general, or of accepting that Parliament speaks for the community of English Christians when these are considered as the Church as well as when they are considered as the state. Because Hooker is entirely comfortable offering a blanket denial of the authority of Trent over English Christians in a way that very few English Presbyterians were comfortable categorically denying the authority of Parliament, Roman Catholic opponents could not convict Hooker with arguments that he uses against the Presbyterians. Hooker’s accusation that Presbyterian agitators are offensive to God because they inappropriately violate the peace of the Church could also have been effectively countered had it been turned back on the English Church by Roman Catholic detractors. Hooker emphasizes the need for concord in the visible Church, but in doing so he focuses on regional and national churches rather than the universal Church. Because, as noted above, the visible Church is a human society, Hooker argues that ‘For preservation of Christianitie there is not any thing more needfull, then that such as are of the visible Church have mutuall fellowship and societie 194 195

See Lawes, VIII.6.9 (3:397–401). Ibid., Preface.5.2 (1:27–8).

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one with another.’ In referring to the visible Church as a society in need of unity and thus a degree of uniformity, however, Hooker clarifies that ‘In which consideration as the maine body of the sea being one, yet within divers precinctes hath divers names; so the Catholike Church is in like sort devided into a number of distinct societies, every of which is termed a Church within it selfe.’ Consequently, ‘a Church, as now we are to understand it, is a societie, that is, a number of men belonging unto some Christian fellowship, the place and limites whereof are certaine.’ Each of these ‘severall societies of Christian men, unto everie of which the name of a Church is given with addition betokening severaltie, as the Church of Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, England, and so the rest, must be indued with correspondent generall properties belonging unto them, as they are publique Christian societies.’ Because within each society the preservation of peace, unity and mutual fellowship is essential, ‘of such properties common unto all societies Christian it may not be denied, that one of the verie chiefest is Ecclesiasticall Politie.’196 Uniformity, the concord it promotes, and the polity that ensures it are essential to each individual regional or national Church, not to the universal Church. Emphasizing the acceptability of diversity among national Churches, Hooker continues by noting that just as the necessity of speech to all people does not imply the necessity of a universal language, so ‘the necessitie of politie and regiment in all Churches may be helde, without holding anie one certayne forme to bee necessarie in them all.’197 This is not to deny that Hooker considers international institutional and doctrinal unity among Christian nations an ideal.198 In the first book of the Lawes he notes that Whether it be for the finding out of any thing whereunto divine lawe bindeth us, but yeat in such sorte that men are not thereof on all sides resolved; or for the setting downe of some uniforme judgement to stand touching such thinges, as being neither way matters of necessitie, are notwithstanding offensive and scandalous when there is open opposition about them; be it for the ending of strifes touching matters of Christian beliefe, wherein the one part may seeme to have probable cause of dissenting from the other; or be it concerning matters of politie, order, and regiment in the Church; I nothing doubt but that Christian men should much better frame them selves to those heavenly preceptes which our Lorde and Saviour with so great instancie gave as concerning peace and unitie, if we did all concurre in desire to have the use of auncient councels againe renued, rather then those proceedinges continued which either make all

196

Ibid., III.1.14 (1:205–206). Ibid., III.2.1 (1:207). 198 See W.B. Patterson, ‘Hooker on Ecumenical Relations: Conciliarism in the English Reformation’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Tempe, AZ, 1997), pp. 283–6, 294–5. 197

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contentions endlesse, or bring them to one onely determination and that of all other the worst, which is by sword.199

Despite the advantages that a true general council would bring to the universal Church, and despite the fact that in the past councils truly and effectively served that purpose, under current circumstances councils could not fulfil their true purpose. General councils were ‘most highly esteemed of, til pride ambition and tyrannie began by factious and vile endevors to abuse that divine invention unto the furtherance of wicked purposes’.200 In the eighth book, Hooker once again considers the issue of variety among Churches, acknowledging that ‘Dissimilitude in great thinges is such a thing which draweth great inconvenience after it, a thing which Christian religion must alwayes carefully prevent.’ Nevertheless, … the way to prevent it is not as some doe imagin the yeelding up of supreme power over all Churches into one only Pastors handes, but the framing of their goverment especially for matter of substance every where according to the rule of one only law to stand in no lesse force then the law of nations doth to be received in all kingdomes … This shall cause uniformitie even under severall dominions without those wofull inconveniences wherunto the state of Christendome was subject heretofore through the tyrannie and oppression of that one universall Nimrod [the pope] who alone did all.201

Until such time as a true council can be held to formulate such a law, Hooker advises that each Church maintain as closely as it can what it perceives to be God’s will, ‘and commend the just defence therof unto God, even as Judah did when it differed in the exercise of religion from that forme which Israel followed’.202 Hooker also touches on the authority of councils in the fourth book. Responding to Presbyterian calls for the maximum possible uniformity of ceremonies among reformed Churches, Hooker points out that while his opponents refer to a decree of the Council of Nicaea requiring such uniformity, this example actually makes against them. The example of Nicaea shows … that in things indifferent, what the whole Church doth thinke convenient for the whole, the same if any part doe wilfully violate, it may be reformed and inrayled againe by that generall authoritie whereunto ech particular is subject, and that the spirit of singularitie in a few ought to give place unto publike judgement; this doth clearely enough appeare, but not that all Christian Churches are bound in every indifferent ceremonie to be uniforme: because where the whole hath not tyed the partes unto one and the same thing, they

199 200 201 202

Lawes, I.10.14 (1:109–110). Ibid., I.10.14 (1:109). Ibid., VIII.3.5 (3:355). Ibid., VIII.3.5 (3:355).

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being therein left ech to their owne choyce, may eyther do as other do or else otherwise, without any breach of dutie at all.203

Because no binding determination has been given in such matters, the Church of England is free to choose whether or not to follow the examples of the Continental Reformed Churches. If uniformity is to be had among Churches, ‘the best, the safest, the most sincere and reasonable way … [is] the verdict of the whole Church orderly taken, and set downe in the assembly of some generall councell’, not the mutual imitation called for by Presbyterians, in which ‘the later [reformed] Churches and the fewer should conforme themselves unto the elder and the mo.’204 Recognizing that a ‘generall assembly’ of Churches could mandate uniformity in matters left undetermined by scripture, Hooker counsels that in the absence of such a council, the best route is for each Church to be content with its own ceremonies and charitably to assume that in other Churches things are regulated in the ways most fitting for them.205 Hooker holds that universal uniformity among Christian Churches, while desirable, is not essential to the maintenance of charity among Christians,206 and thus diversity of practice among nations is not fatal to the faith. Conversely, diversity of doctrine and practice within an individual Church is potentially fatal to that Church. Hooker furthermore argues that universal uniformity in matters of belief and practice is not at present a realistic goal without sacrificing the method of legislating sanctioned by Christ and nature and bearing the greatest potential for ensuring that ecclesiastical laws are actually in accord with the dictates of scripture. Conversely, within the Church of England, uniformity in matters of belief and practice can be attained by observing laws formulated according to the method that has the greatest probability of formulating Church laws that actually accord with God’s will. Measured by Hooker’s standards, refusal to recognize the validity of the decrees of the Council of Trent is neither unreasonable nor fatal to the Church; Presbyterian failure to recognize the validity of the laws governing the English Church, however, is both unreasonable and potentially fatal to the Church in England. Thus Hooker’s refusal to recognize the hermeneutical authority of the Council of Trent is entirely consistent with his call for English subjects to abandon their own readings of scripture when these are at odds with the interpretations accepted by the English Church authorities. Like St German, Hooker recognizes the hermeneutical authority of a legitimate 203

Ibid., IV.13.7 (1:332). Ibid., IV.13.8; IV.13.9 (1:332–3). 205 Ibid., IV.13.9; IV.13.3; IV.13.10 (1:335, 329, 335–6). 206 This assumption is perhaps based on a belief that it is less detrimental to charity for an individual to be at odds regarding matters of belief and practice with persons of foreign nations whom one rarely or never sees than it is to be at odds with one’s near neighbours. 204

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general council, but he also takes steps to ensure that a council that fails to meet his standards of validity does not usurp authority over the English Church. Because no valid general council is available to guide English Christians in their discernment of God’s will, Hooker leaves Elizabethan Christians with an intentionally stark hermeneutical choice. On one hand, he presents the Presbyterian hermeneutic as radically subjective, chaotic, prone to faction and all too likely to end in error. On the other hand, affording the proper respect to the judgements of the Church authorities regarding the interpretation of scripture provides English Christians with an objective hermeneutical standard that fosters peace and community, unifying the English Church in confessing a faith that enjoys the highest degree of certainty available that it is in accord with eternal truth. On one hand is a Presbyterian hermeneutic that invites individuals to read the Bible for themselves but then abandons them to their own devices in judging the validity of their readings. On the other is a hermeneutic that invites English Christians to read their Bibles in dialogue with the Church community, holding to and promoting their own interpretations, but only so long as those interpretations can reasonably be considered tenable. To Hooker, the wise and godly choice, the choice that fosters the well-being of the Church of England and the souls it comprises, is clear.

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Conclusion In Tudor England, peace, unity, order and stability were highly valued. Supporters of royal supremacy linked these qualities to the return of the realm to a purportedly divinely ordained structuring of society founded on the rendering of due obedience by all estates within the realm to the prince as leader of the Church. Over the course of the 1530s (and again under Elizabeth), the Crown and Parliament legislated out of existence papal ‘usurpations’ and claimed for the civil authorities a monopoly over the legitimate exercise of temporal power in England. The institutions, finances and disciplinary structures of the English Church were subjected to royal control, and the long-standing royal responsibility to punish heresy was transformed into an authorization to decide which beliefs and practices would be tolerated or promoted as orthodox and which would be punished as heretical. Even as this thoroughgoing monopolization of authority over the Church by the civil authorities was effected, however, defenders of the new supremacy hesitated to claim for the Crown an absolute monopoly on the loyalty of English subjects. Unable to envision a ruler beyond the possibility of error in discerning the divine will, and unwilling to renounce the prior obedience that Christian subjects owe to God before human authorities in case of conflict, royal supremacists as diverse as William Tyndale, Stephen Gardiner, Thomas Starkey and John Whitgift are united, first, in claiming that Christian subjects must disobey royal policies that contravene the divine will and, second, in identifying a locus of authority other than the Crown or Parliament as the definitive standard of Christian truth. This study has focused on two defenders of royal supremacy who clearly discerned that obedience to the Church authorities and order in the realm were not to be secured unless the divided loyalties of English subjects to their divine and human rulers could be reconciled. Christopher St German and Richard Hooker seek to eliminate the possibility of legitimate disobedience to the laws of the realm on the basis of prior obedience to God. Neither theorist attempts to discredit the notion that obedience is due to God before human Church authorities. Rather, they seek to negate the possibility of conflict between the commands of the authorities and the perceived commands of God by calling on subjects to subordinate their own construals of God’s will to the interpretations rendered by the Crown in Parliament. Each author also recognizes the necessity of propounding a basis of royal authority that justifies its expansion over the definition of

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doctrine. The traditional notion of the prince as the divinely appointed vicar of God over all temporal matters embraced by most defenders of the supremacy, including St German, is not sufficient to legitimate the authority of the Crown to definitively pronounce regarding God’s will. The punishment of heresy was a recognized temporal matter, and a strong argument could be (and was) made that the determination of what views are to be coercively punished as heretical is also temporal. The discernment that a belief or practice actually is contrary to God’s will, in contrast, seems clearly to be a spiritual matter. Consequently, the ruler’s divinely ordained status as vicar of God in all temporal affairs does not provide a reason for English Christians to look to the prince as the authoritative guide to a true interpretation of scripture. Royal hermeneutical authority that is binding in conscience, if it is claimed, must rest on another foundation. St German claims hermeneutical authority for the Crown in Parliament by distinguishing a twofold basis of royal authority. While, St German argues, the king’s empowerment as Head of the English Church in all temporal matters is a divine mandate, the authority of the Crown in Parliament over the definition of doctrine rests on their nature as the spokespersons for the community of Christians living in England, the English Church. Hooker adopts a similar approach to justifying royal authority over the definition of doctrine. Jettisoning the notion that the English prince is divinely ordained to govern the Church, Hooker bases all royal ecclesiastical authority on delegation from the community. Like St German, he uses the position of the Crown in Parliament as the voice of the English Church to claim for the civil authorities hermeneutical primacy. Arguing for a rationalist approach to the interpretation of scripture, Hooker identifies communal consensus as the best evidence available of the congruity of a belief with the dictates of reason. Consequently, the Crown in Parliament with the Convocation, as the voice expressing the collective wisdom of the English Church, is authorized to declare a standard of orthodoxy that binds English Christians in conscience as well as coercively. To ameliorate concerns regarding the diversity of ‘orthodoxies’ that can be predicted to issue from such a hermeneutic, and to reconcile absolute obedience to the Crown in Parliament with the Church authorities’ hermeneutical fallibility, both St German and Hooker outline a relativistic soteriology. According to both men, salvation is predicated upon a sincere effort to align oneself with eternal truth rather than adherence to a strictly defined, exclusively salvific, set of beliefs and practices. St German and Hooker also embrace the corollary to this position that the standard of orthodoxy to which sixteenth-century English Christians are bound on pain of damnation is not soteriologically binding on Christians of other times and places. By addressing the issue of orthodoxy in this manner, St German and Hooker are able to present a coherent vision of royal

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ecclesiastical headship that reconciles individual concern for salvation with virtually uncompromised obedience to the English Crown in Parliament as leaders of the Church. By highlighting this aspect of St German’s and Hooker’s thought, it is my intention to raise at least as many questions as are answered. The possibility that Hooker learned to claim hermeneutical authority for the Crown in Parliament from St German may reward further study. Hooker knew Doctor and Student, he cites it in his notes, and the editors of the Folger Edition assert that it ‘almost certainly influenced the structure and content of Book I’.1 Of course, Hooker’s knowledge and use of this immensely popular work does not necessarily mean that he was familiar with St German’s less well-known books. Insight into whether or not he was could add to our understanding of the sources that shaped Hooker’s thought. Turning from sources to influence, a valuable complement to the current study would be studies investigating what, if any, impact Hooker’s understanding of the authority of the Crown and Parliament to pronounce definitively regarding God’s will had on succeeding generations. Finally, it is my hope that this study will enrich current discussions of authority in the Church by calling attention to this aspect of Tudor religious thought. From the highly individualistic perspective of the twenty-first century, St German’s and Hooker’s call for English Christians to subordinate their readings of scripture to the determinations of their Church speaking through the Crown in Parliament appears to lead to ‘a frighteningly absolutist monarchy in which the claims of individual Christian conscience … were set at nought’.2 At the same time, I believe that Hooker is correct in judging that a thoroughly subjective hermeneutic not only destroys community but also increases the likelihood of wellintentioned, sincere Christians falling into error. Hooker invites English Christians to engage actively in the search for religious truth, but he also calls on them to abide by the judgements of the Church authorities as the highest court of appeal. In so doing, he provides one possible solution to the problem of balancing the responsibility the individual Christian has for his or her own religious identity against the dangers of division and error that are heightened when discernment of religious truth is thoroughly subjective. Conversations aimed at discerning the proper relationship between authoritative standards and the insights of individual believers in the search for religious truth are ongoing within Christian communities. It

1 W. Speed Hill (gen. ed.), The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker (Cambridge, MA, and Binghamton, NY, 1977–98), vol. 3, p. 486; vol. 6, pp. 96, 102, 1077 (quotation at vol. 6, p. 96). 2 Quoted from the anonymous reader’s report assessing a version of this manuscript submitted for publication.

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is hoped that this study can contribute to such conversations by bringing into them some sixteenth-century Christian perspectives.

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Index absolution 98, 108−9 absolutism 20, 23, 33, 40, 49, 166, 225 abuses, clerical 24−6, 61−3, 66, 70, 74, 79, 87, 109, 123, 135 Act for Abolishing the Diversity of Opinions see Six Articles Act for the Advancement of True Religion 9 Act Concerning Christ’s Religion 9 Act for the Punishment of Heresy 12 Act in Restraint of Appeals 8, 12, 16, 97 Act for the Submission of the Clergy 6, 8 Act of Supremacy Elizabethan 143−4 Henrician 7−9, 55, 88, 143−4 Act of Uniformity 146−9 adiaphora 43−7, 50−51, 57, 149−55, 169, 175, 179, 183, 189, 192, 195, 200−202; see also ‘indifferent’ matters Admonition controversy 147−60, 169, 203 adultery 73 Ahab, King 17−18 Aidan, St 138 Almasy, Rudolph 24−5 almsgiving 73 Anabaptists 171−2 angels, judging of 96−7 Anglicanism 163−5 anti-clericalism 19, 27, 62 apocryphal books 128 Aristotle 67 assurance available to Christians 206−11 Athanasius 1 Atkinson, Nigel 166, 187−8 Augustine, St 158 Ayre, John 150, 203 Baptism 209, 211 Baumer, Franklin 11, 64–5

Becket, Thomas 138−9 Berthelet, Thomas 63–4 The Bible authority of 35, 37, 42, 51, 68, 85, 149−52, 170, 179−80, 204 different types of extract from 111−12 interpretation of 12, 35, 39, 51−60, 68, 81−93, 102−5, 111−19, 124−39, 145, 148−60, 170−72, 179−82, 188−90, 195−9, 204−6, 213, 221, 224 literal sense and literal intent of 90−93, 96, 102−3, 109−12, 199 translation of 11, 19, 22−3, 29−30 see also Old Testament binding resolutions on doctrine 133−6, 141, 153−5, 214 bishops appointment of 5, 7 civil authority exercised by 186 Boehrer, Bruce 22–3 Book of Homilies 39 Booty, John 209–10 Bouwsma, William 167 Bradshaw, Brendan 13 Calvin, John 158−9, 164 canon law 5−8, 61−4, 67, 81−2, 154−5, 169, 176−89, 193−201, 206, 216−17, 220 canonization 86−7, 108, 125 Cartwright, Thomas 146, 149−65, 169−70, 203 Catherine of Aragon 35 ceremonies, religious 44−5, 175, 220 Chapuys, Eustace 13, 15 charity 44−5, 220 Charlemagne, Emperor 97 Charles V, Emperor 10, 14−15 The Church breadth of membership 177 definition of 86, 107, 122−3, 188, 205

240

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nature of 37, 172−3, 203, 209; see also visible and invisible Churches in relation to the English Parliament 117−18, 134−6, 140−41, 178, 186, 217 Church courts see ecclesiastical courts Church-state relations 65−6 circumcision 195 civil disobedience 23, 27−8, 58 clerical immunity from secular courts 24, 77−8, 84, 90, 104, 114 Colfride, St 81 Common Law 38 ‘common practice’ of the Church 103 Compier, Don 190 conscience 3, 37−8, 74, 105, 114, 127, 132, 136−41, 147−55, 160, 168−9, 188−9, 194, 202−8, 216, 224−5 freedom of 43 Constantine, Emperor 1, 16, 18 Constantius II, Emperor 18 constitutionalism 165−6, 203 conversion of kings 101−2, 121 Convocation of the clergy 3, 5−10, 13, 37, 106, 135, 141, 145, 166, 178, 186−8, 198, 204, 214, 216, 224 Cranmer, Thomas 38−9 Cromwell, Thomas 41, 63−4, 128, 141 Crown in Parliament 2−3, 59−66, 70, 76, 86−8, 102−19, 128−41, 145−8, 166−7, 178, 186−8, 198−204, 212−16, 223−5 Daniell, David 21 David, King of Israel 89 Davies, C.S.L. 14 ‘defender of the faith’ role 118 ‘demonstrative reasoning’ 199−204 deposition of monarchs 120 Dickens, A.G. 9 divine law 67−90, 94−5, 100−120, 126, 138−9, 173−6, 179, 189, 195−202 divine right of kings 58 Doctor and Student dialogues 61−2, 66−76, 81−2, 86, 95, 103, 140−41, 225 doctrine, definition of 7−12, 17−18, 29, 32, 36−7, 40−41, 56,

59−60, 65, 82−6, 102, 106−8, 112−14, 118, 145−7, 188, 195, 223−4 and general councils of the universal Church 119−36 and the scrupulous conscience 136−41 Donatist controversy 206 Duerden, Richard 20−22 Easter, date of 81−2 ecclesiastical courts 6−8, 73, 99; see also canon law ecclesiology 165−8, 203, 205, 209 Edward VI 33, 38, 40, 103, 143–8 Egyptian priesthood 89 Eleutherius 16 Elijah 17 Elizabeth, Queen 141, 143, 145, 148, 160−61, 209 Elton, G.R. 12, 14 essentials of the faith 53−4, 57−9, 82, 102, 113, 124−7, 132, 152, 155−6, 175, 189, 197, 205, 211 Ethelbert, King 98, 101 Eucharistic teachings 209−11 excommunication 12, 98, 117 fathers of the Church 37−9, 158−9, 204 Festus 205 Fisher, John 13−15, 17, 22, 24, 30, 48, 57, 59 Fox, Rory 212−13, 216 Foxe, Edward 15, 17 Francis I of France 10, 14−15 free will, doctrine of 202 Frith, John 36 Gardiner, Stephen 2, 18, 32−41, 51, 55, 59, 64−5, 88, 140, 223 Gee, Henry 37, 144, 147 general councils of the Church absence of 219−21 authority and influence of 124, 128−34, 212 nature and value of 129−30 possible invalidity of 129−31 revocation of decrees of 131−2, 135 Germany 13−14, 47, 69

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Gerson, Jean 67, 95 grace 166−7, 204−5, 208−12 Greenblatt, Stephen 31 Grindal, Edmund 161 Grislis, Egil 166−7, 187, 190, 210 Guy, John 61−4, 131, 141 Hackett, William 171 Hardy, William 37, 144, 147 Heal, Felicity 14 Henry VIII 5−17, 19, 25, 27, 36−41, 55, 58, 64−5, 87−8, 96, 101, 118, 128−32, 140−41, 143 divorce of 17, 23, 35 heresy, suppression of 7−9, 12−19, 32, 36, 39, 53, 59, 63, 71, 79−83, 106, 117, 130, 136−41, 144−5, 191−2, 197, 223−4 hermeneutics 2−3, 30, 32, 35, 55, 59, 111, 113, 118, 127−8, 141, 147, 160, 166, 170−72, 179−81, 205, 213−25 Herod Agrippa 17 Hill, W. Speed 167, 225 holy days, ordering of 97, 127, 175 Holy Spirit 30−32, 35−8, 68, 82−4, 156, 159−60, 170, 180, 186, 188, 198, 205 Hooker, Richard 2−3, 141, 146−7, 162−225 hubris 207 human laws 68−77, 108, 116, 120, 126−7, 140, 174−9, 201, 214

justification by faith alone 20, 39 Justinian, Emperor 16, 18 The King’s Book 10, 38−40 Kirby, W.J. Torrance 164−5, 209 Lake, Peter 165−7, 203, 209, 211 law see canon law; divine law; human laws; nature, law of; reason, law of lawyers, rights and responsibilities of 105, 112 Lehmberg, Stanford 9 liturgy 148−9, 209 Lucius, King 16, 98, 101 Luther, Martin 30, 141 Lutheranism 10, 19 McGrade, A.S. 1, 165−6 marriage of the clergy 9 Mary, Queen 141, 143, 145, 155 Mayer, Thomas 41 miracles 180, 202, 204 Monahan, Arthur 165 moonlight 91 More, Thomas 13−14, 22, 24, 37, 48, 57−9, 62−6, 77, 83 mortuaries 74−7 Moses 183 Muller, J.A. 33−4, 38, 40

ignorance as an excuse for false belief 137−9, 191 ‘indifferent’ matters 150−56, 170, 175; see also adiaphora Innocent III, Pope 1 Ives, E.W. 12

Naitanus 81−2 nature, law of 174−6, 179, 185, 199−202, 216 Nebuchadnezzar 17 Neelands, W. David 166−7, 211 neighbour, love of 27−9 Nicaea, Council of 16, 42, 57, 131−3, 219 Nicene Creed 43, 58−9

Janelle, Pierre 35 Jehoshaphat 89 Jesus Christ 47−8, 56−8, 91−7, 109, 121−2, 154, 173, 177−8, 183, 207, 216 Jewel, John 163 Jewish Church 183, 193−5 John, St 180 John the Baptist 17 Joseph 89 Josiah 16−18

obedience to God, the Church and the Crown 3, 18, 20−23, 27, 31−42, 47−51, 59, 119, 140, 152−4, 159−60, 169−70, 178−9, 188, 190, 199, 223 Old Testament, authority of 58, 67, 89, 95−6 orthodoxy legalistic understanding of 140 relativistic nature of 133−8 standards of 7−18, 27, 31, 40−43,

242

INDEX

47, 56−9, 86, 106, 112, 131, 165, 197−8, 223 orthopraxis 27, 42, 45, 47 pagan rulers 101−2, 155 papal authority 5−8, 12−17, 20, 35, 37, 42, 47−50, 54, 57−9, 107−10, 119−23, 127−35, 139, 143, 146, 213−14, 223 pardons, granting of 108−9 Parker, Matthew 148 Parliament authority of 61−3, 73−4, 106−10, 217 relationship to the English Church 117−18, 134−6, 140−41, 178, 186, 217 see also Crown in Parliament Paul, St 67, 96−7, 148−51, 160, 170, 182−4, 200, 205, 211, 217 penance 80−81 Pepin, King 1 Perrott, M.E.C. 151−2, 169, 195 Peter, St 108−9, 122−3, 212, 217 Peto, William 17 Philip II of Spain 215 Pilgrimage of Grace 14, 24, 63, 140−41 Pole, Reginald 15, 41−2 power clerical 88, 92−100, 115, 120, 124−6, 135 regal 88, 93, 102, 112, 115−16, 139, 178 praemunire 5, 13, 38 Prayer Book 148−9, 161 preaching clergy’s authority for 112 improvement of 161 need for 156−7 regulation of 106, 116 precedents, biblical and historical 17−18, 29−30, 34−6, 95, 186 Presbyterianism 3, 146−88, 193−221 priesthood of all believers 147 property rights 69−72 ‘prophesying’ 161 public opinion 84 punishment for false belief 139−40, 190−91 need for 69 unjust 28−9

Puritanism 146−9, 161−3, 167, 190, 213 rationalism and rationality 169, 197 reason, law of 67−9, 72−4, 85, 89, 117, 138 ‘reasonableness’ criterion for biblical interpretations 93−4, 109, 160, 169, 181−90, 213, 217, 221, 224 rebellion, incitement to 25−9, 32 Redworth, Glyn 34, 36−7 reform ecclesiastical 66, 119, 129−30, 146−7, 156−61, 170, 181−2 social and political 28, 41−2, 62−3 Reformed Churches, practices of 170, 183, 188, 200, 220 Rex, Richard 10–12, 15, 33, 61 Richardson, Anne 23 sabbath observance 99, 102, 106, 127 sacramemts of the Church 209−12 St German, Christopher 2, 59−141, 145−7, 188, 191−2, 220−25 saints, canonization of 86−7, 108, 125 salvation, beliefs necessary for 190−92, 224−5 Scarisbrick, J.J. 13 scholasticism 165 scripturalism 152 scripture see (The) Bible sedition 13, 19−20 Shuger, Debora 167−8, 209 Six Articles 9−10 social justice 28−9 solafideism 39 Solomon, King 89, 183 Solt, Leo 6−7 Somerset, Duke of 40 soteriology 165, 224 Starkey, Thomas 2, 18, 41−59, 140, 175, 223 subjectivity in spiritual matters 102−3, 156−60, 169, 172, 184−5, 225 sunlight 90−91 supernatural insights 180 Supplication against the Ordinaries 32, 36−7 taxation 6−7

243

INDEX

temporal authority of the clergy 96−102, 157, 186 of kings and civil authorities 101, 105−6, 112, 115−17, 223−4 Theodosius, Emperor 97 Thirty-Nine Articles 145 tithes 68, 72−83, 94−5, 99, 102, 105−6, 116, 127 Travers, Walter 163 Trent, Council of 213−17, 220 Tunstall, Cuthbert 19 Tyndale, William 2, 18−33, 40, 42, 51, 55, 59, 64−5, 88, 114, 140−41, 223 tyrants 22 unity and uniformity, religious 45−8, 54, 87, 119, 125, 128, 135, 170, 200−202, 213−14,

218−20 ‘universal practice’ of the Church 103 Valdes 1 Vestments controversy 147−9 ‘vicar of God’ status 115, 117, 224 Vickers, Brian 167 visible and invisible Churches 167−8, 173−7, 203−6, 209, 217−18 visitations 6−7 Voak, Nigel 166, 181, 199–200, 207, 214, 217 Whitgift, John 3, 147−62, 163, 169, 203, 223 Zeeveld, W.G. 48

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St Andrews Studies in Reformation History Editorial Board: Bruce Gordon, Andrew Pettegree and Roger Mason, St Andrews Reformation Studies Institute, Amy Nelson Burnett, University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Euan Cameron, Union Theological Seminary, New York and Kaspar von Greyerz, University of Basel The Shaping of a Community: The Rise and Reformation of the English Parish c. 1400–1560 Beat Kümin Seminary or University? The Genevan Academy and Reformed Higher Education, 1560–1620 Karin Maag Marian Protestantism: Six Studies Andrew Pettegree Protestant History and Identity in Sixteenth-Century Europe (2 volumes) edited by Bruce Gordon Antifraternalism and Anticlericalism in the German Reformation: Johann Eberlin von Günzburg and the Campaign against the Friars Geoffrey Dipple Reformations Old and New: Essays on the Socio-Economic Impact of Religious Change c. 1470–1630 edited by Beat Kümin Piety and the People: Religious Printing in French, 1511–1551 Francis M. Higman The Reformation in Eastern and Central Europe edited by Karin Maag John Foxe and the English Reformation edited by David Loades The Reformation and the Book Jean-François Gilmont, edited and translated by Karin Maag The Magnificent Ride: The First Reformation in Hussite Bohemia Thomas A. Fudge

Kepler’s Tübingen: Stimulus to a Theological Mathematics Charlotte Methuen ‘Practical Divinity’: The Works and Life of Revd Richard Greenham Kenneth L. Parker and Eric J. Carlson Belief and Practice in Reformation England: A Tribute to Patrick Collinson by his Students edited by Susan Wabuda and Caroline Litzenberger Frontiers of the Reformation: Dissidence and Orthodoxy in Sixteenth-Century Europe Auke Jelsma The Jacobean Kirk, 1567–1625: Sovereignty, Polity and Liturgy Alan R. MacDonald John Knox and the British Reformations edited by Roger A. Mason The Education of a Christian Society: Humanism and the Reformation in Britain and the Netherlands edited by N. Scott Amos, Andrew Pettegree and Henk van Nierop Tudor Histories of the English Reformations, 1530–83 Thomas Betteridge Poor Relief and Protestantism: The Evolution of Social Welfare in Sixteenth-Century Emden Timothy G. Fehler Radical Reformation Studies: Essays presented to James M. Stayer edited by Werner O. Packull and Geoffrey L. Dipple Clerical Marriage and the English Reformation: Precedent Policy and Practice Helen L. Parish Penitence in the Age of Reformations edited by Katharine Jackson Lualdi and Anne T. Thayer The Faith and Fortunes of France’s Huguenots, 1600–85 Philip Benedict

Christianity and Community in the West:Essays for John Bossy edited by Simon Ditchfield Reformation, Politics and Polemics: The Growth of Protestantism in East Anglian Market Towns, 1500–1610 John Craig The Sixteenth-Century French Religious Book edited by Andrew Pettegree, Paul Nelles and Philip Conner Music as Propaganda in the German Reformation Rebecca Wagner Oettinger John Foxe and his World edited by Christopher Highley and John N. King Confessional Identity in East-Central Europe edited by Maria Crăciun, Ovidiu Ghitta and Graeme Murdock The Bible in the Renaissance: Essays on Biblical Commentary and Translation in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries edited by Richard Griffiths Obedient Heretics: Mennonite Identities in Lutheran Hamburg and Altona during the Confessional Age Michael D. Driedger The Construction of Martyrdom in the English Catholic Community, 1535–1603 Anne Dillon Baptism and Spiritual Kinship in Early Modern England Will Coster Usury, Interest and the Reformation Eric Kerridge The Correspondence of Reginald Pole: 1. A Calendar, 1518–1546: Beginnings to Legate of Viterbo Thomas F. Mayer Self-Defence and Religious Strife in Early Modern Europe: England and Germany, 1530–1680 Robert von Friedeburg

Hatred in Print: Catholic Propaganda and Protestant Identity during the French Wars of Religion Luc Racaut Penitence, Preaching and the Coming of the Reformation Anne T. Thayer Huguenot Heartland: Montauban and Southern French Calvinism during the French Wars of Religion Philip Conner Charity and Lay Piety in Reformation London, 1500–1620 Claire S. Schen The British Union: A Critical Edition and Translation of David Hume of Godscroft’s De Unione Insulae Britannicae edited by Paul J. McGinnis and Arthur H. Williamson Reforming the Scottish Church: John Winram (c. 1492–1582) and the Example of Fife Linda J. Dunbar Cultures of Communication from Reformation to Enlightenment: Constructing Publics in the Early Modern German Lands James Van Horn Melton Sebastian Castellio, 1515-1563: Humanist and Defender of Religious Toleration in a Confessional Age Hans R. Guggisberg translated and edited by Bruce Gordon The Front-Runner of the Catholic Reformation: The Life and Works of Johann von Staupitz Franz Posset The Correspondence of Reginald Pole: Volume 2. A Calendar, 1547–1554: A Power in Rome Thomas F. Mayer William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1572–1584 K.W. Swart, translated J.C. Grayson The Italian Reformers and the Zurich Church, c.1540–1620 Mark Taplin

William Cecil and Episcopacy, 1559–1577 Brett Usher A Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots A Critical Edition and Translation of George Buchanan’s De Jure Regni Apud Scotos Dialogus Roger A. Mason and Martin S. Smith Music and Religious Identity in CounterReformation Augsburg, 1580–1630 Alexander J. Fisher The Correspondence of Reginald Pole Volume 3. A Calendar, 1555–1558: Restoring the English Church Thomas F. Mayer Women, Sex and Marriage in Early Modern Venice Daniela Hacke Infant Baptism in Reformation Geneva The Shaping of a Community, 1536–1564 Karen E. Spierling Moderate Voices in the European Reformation edited by Luc Racaut and Alec Ryrie Piety and Family in Early Modern Europe Essays in Honour of Steven Ozment edited by Marc R. Forster and Benjamin J. Kaplan Religious Identities in Henry VIII’s England Peter Marshall Adaptations of Calvinism in Reformation Europe Essays in Honour of Brian G. Armstrong edited by Mack P. Holt John Jewel and the English National Church The Dilemmas of an Erastian Reformer Gary W. Jenkins Catholic Activism in South-West France, 1540–1570 Kevin Gould

Idols in the Age of Art Objects, Devotions and the Early Modern World edited by Michael W. Cole and Rebecca E. Zorach Local Politics in the French Wars of Religion The Towns of Champagne, the Duc de Guise, and the Catholic League, 1560–95 Mark W. Konnert Enforcing Reformation in Ireland and Scotland, 1550–1700 edited by Elizabethanne Boran and Crawford Gribben Philip Melanchthon and the English Reformation John Schofield Reforming the Art of Dying The ars moriendi in the German Reformation (1519–1528) Austra Reinis Restoring Christ’s Church John a Lasco and the Forma ac ratio Michael S. Springer Catholic Belief and Survival in Late Sixteenth-Century Vienna The Case of Georg Eder (1523–87) Elaine Fulton From Judaism to Calvinism The Life and Writings of Immanuel Tremellius (c.1510–1580) Kenneth Austin The Cosmographia of Sebastian Münster Describing the World in the Reformation Matthew McLean