Functionalism vs. Rational Choice?: Some Questions concerning the Rationality of Choosing One or the Other

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Functionalism vs. Rational Choice?: Some Questions concerning the Rationality of Choosing One or the Other Johannes Berger; Claus Offe Theory and Society, Vol. 11, No. 4. (Jul., 1982), pp. 521-526. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0304-2421%28198207%2911%3A4%3C521%3AFVRCSQ%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1 Theory and Society is currently published by Springer.

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FUNCTIONALISM VS. RATIONAL CHOICE?

Some Questions Concerning the Rationality of Choosing One or the Other

JOHANNES BERGER and CLAUS OFFE

Jon Elster's plea for methodological individualism consists, first, of a critique of the functionalist paradigm, and, second, of an advanced variety of game theory as a methodological alternative. For only after functionalists have been convinced of the poverty of their own creed are they likely to move to the camp of game theorists. Although Elster addresses Marxists, the methodological problems he discusses involve a much broader controversy that is certainly not restricted to Marxist social scientists. Unfortunately his sweeping critique of functionalism, including its recent Marxist applications, remains far from convincing, and in spite of the potential helpfulness of game theory it has a limited reach because "social structures" remain irreducible to individual acts of decision. Whatever the outcome of this timely debate that Elster has helped to start with so much competence and enthusiasm, it should not be restricted to method. It should not leave out, as Elster tends to, the substantive and "structural" determinants of societies that, in the last instance, we must refer to when deciding about the appropriate methodology of analyzing them scientifically. Methodological debates remain unsound so long as they remain strictly methodological. At the center of his critique of functionalism, Elster argues that a need does not create its own fulfillment. We do not wish to quarrel with this statement, which is not exactly novel. The question is whether it actually, as Elster seems to argue, implies such a devastating critique of the functionalist paradigm as a whole. Any sophisticated functionalist would gladly grant that the function of an institution or a pattern of behavior is not, by itself, a sufficient cause for the existence of the institution or pattern in question. Functionalist arguments remain fruitful even if they do not pretend to arrive at causal

Department of Sociology, University of Bielefeld

explanations. Thus, N. Luhmann surprisingly but plausibly suggests that we reverse the relationship of "functionality" and "causality." In his view, functional relations are no longer a special subcase of causal relations, but causal relations a subcase of functional ones. This variety of functionalist analysis starts with identifying a systemic problem - e.g., of stability - the solution of which would be made possible by a number of institutions and their corresponding functions, which, in relation to this problem, are therefore functionally equivalent. The concept of "functional equivalence" separates functionalist argumentations from causal explanation.' We are no longer interested in "what causes X," but in opening up a range of alternatives that would open up equivalent solutions to problem A, of which X is only one. The question thus becomes: "what alternative arrangements could perform the same function as X and could thus be considered functionally equivalent?" To be sure, this mode of functionalist analysis is not yet very popular even among functionalists, and is therefore not the main target of Elster's attack. But whatever Luhmann's intentions, does it not demonstrate the potential usefulness of functionalist arguments for a Marxist social science? Elster attacks a number of functionalist-Marxist theories of the state, particularly those promoted by the recent publication in English of German articles translated and enthusiastically prefaced by J. Holloway and S. P i c c i o t t ~ . ~ This promotion of the thought of the school of "capital logicians" - German Marxists who wrote in the early 1970s, most of whom, apparently, would not like to be identified with their former work any longer - unfortunately represents, with much delay, only one side of a debate that from the beginning suffered from a considerable lack of methodological sophistication. (And none of these authors would ever have dreamt of being labeled "functionalist".) The deficiencies of their work have been thoroughly analyzed by various scholar^.^ Apart from such subtleties, which cannot have escaped the attention of a multilingual scholar such as Elster, what is the essence of such a statement as: "The state (or certain state institutions or policies) has the function of maintaining the conditions of capital accumulation"? This statement does not provide, without any further qualification and empirical investigation, a causal explanation for the genesis and reproduction of these institutions and policies. It focuses on capital accumulation as a problematic condition of stability, and it establishes a heuristic framework of comparison within which functionally equivalent solutions of this problem can be identified. Because these solutions cause further systemic problems, a secondary framework for further solutions is created, and so on. The unity of functionalist theory consists in the underlying reference-problem. In this sense, functionalism is an "analytical technique, which is reiterated

through consecutive level^."^ To discover the mode of functioning of systems, to analyze interdependencies of subsystems, to conceptualize self-regulating mechanisms, to distinguish between functions and dysfunctions, as well as between latent and manifest functions, functionalist arguments appear t o be indispensable for social analysis, even if, as Elster reminds us, causal conclusions about the genesis are unjustified on the basis of imputed functions alone. Elster fails to take into account that even functionalist explanations can be logically consistent, provided that a number of methodological caveats are observed. Under certain social arrangements, the function of an institution, both of which would have to be sufficiently specified, can in fact lead to the creation of that institution. This, for instance, would be the case if the function has been foreseen by strategic actors who have reasons and means to create such institutions and no reason to rely on functionally equivalent solutions. Obviously, in this case a functionalist perspective becomes intertwined with the intentional one, and the functionalist bird's-eye view is combined with the worm's-eye view of actorcentered social analysis. Even in the "mixed" case, the heuristic value of the functionalist approach is evident and can hardly be substituted for by a perspective that exclusively concentrates on the actor. We simply fail to see the advantage in setting functionalist and methodologically individualist methods so sharply in opposition to each other. Contrary to Elster, we consider them complementary. Not even Elster imposes an unqualified ban on functionalist explanations in the social sciences. He touches on the question whether and to what extent specific social structures can be methodologically treated as equivalent to biological systems, for which no one would hesitate t o concede the legitimacy of functionalist approaches. To the extent, however, that social arrangements can be compared to biological selection mechanisms, as is certainly possible in the case of market competition, functionalist explanations in the strict sense (that is, without any actor-related qualifications) appear to be perfectly admissible. Here, we find ourselves in surprising agreement with Elster himself, who remarks in passing: "To the extent that the main functional paradigm invokes teleonomy, as in the explanation of market behavior through a natural selection model of competition between firms, there can be no objection to it." So much having been said, it appears to be the obvious next step to pursue the question: To what extent some specific social formation, e.g., capitalism, lends itself to functionalist explanations because of its "quasibiologicality". And obviously, at this point social methodology would have to shift grounds and enter the realm of social analysis itself - a task that Elster, perfectly in line with the objectivism of non-Marxist methods, wishes to avoid.

We see no reason t o deny that game theory can be of great help in analyzing abstract structures of social interaction. But the same could be said for almost every method, from cybernetics to hermeneutics. So long as the inherent limitations of such methods are observed, and so long as some argument is provided to support the adequacy or correspondence between the methods and the object under investigation, there can be no problem. Thus, game theory does have its limited uses, and one of the accomplishments of Elster's article is that he lays out the basic principles of game theory, which Marxists often meet with undue suspicion. What is at issue is not the usefulness of game theory but its limitations. Elster attempts t o demonstrate the fruitfulness of applying game theory to the analysis of class struggle and class solidarity. This presupposes that social classes can be conceived of as strategic actors. We do not wish here to take the opposite position, namely the "structuralist" one. Under certain historical conditions, it may make a lot of sense, as Przeworski has convincingly argued, to think of "class position" not as the ultimate determinant, but, to the contrary, as the outcome and result of class action.' But this remains to be demonstrated on the level of sociological theory, rather than by assumption about the one and only "correct" method. Thus, rather than being a "methodological" controversy, we suggest that the structuralismindividualism dimension is a historical one: some social formations might be more adequately analyzed within the individualist "action" framework, whereas others require a more "structuralist" approach for their adequate understanding. What Elster refers to as "structuralism" seems to be equivalent to the view that all actors and actions are completely determined by objective "places" or positions. To the extent that this view is correct, in a given society, game theory is clearly not applicable. But such a conception of structuralism is more a caricature than an adequate account of the epistemological position of, e.g., Althusser. For Althusser, the principal point seems to be exactly the demonstration that structural "over-determination" - to use his paradoxical nomenclature - conditions degrees of freedom that might appear to be a result of incomplete determination. It is only when class action is not perfectly determined by objective structures that game theory can be put to use. This usefulness does not, however, indicate that, in explaining class struggle, game theory is superior t o such alternatives as those that focus on structural constraints. Again, the explanatory power of game theory does not reside in its methodological virtues, but in social structures that may or may not lend themselves to an understanding in game-theoretical terms. The problem can be easily illustrated by using the case that Elster draws on himself, namely incomes distribution. In perfect competition models, incomes distribution must be understood functionally, that is, without any reference to strategic

action. The question reduces t o whether perfect competition models remain adequate for an understanding of economic reality, or whether competition has become so imperfect that strategic actors and actions must provide access to an understanding of incomes distribution. But like most protagonists of a specific method, Elster prefers to be a "pure" methodologist - to eliminate those social phenomena that condition the validity of one particular method from the methodological debate. Logically, the game starts only after the actors have been constituted, and their order of preferences has been formed as a result of processes that cannot themselves be considered as part of the game. Instead, such limits as the resources available to the actors, their learning capacity, their priorities, and the payoffs of alternative modes of strategic behavior must be accounted for in a conceptual framework other than that of "rational ~ h o i c e " .In ~ this sense, relying exclusively on game theory amounts to eliminating important constituents and preconditions of the game not only from the methodological, but also from the sociological agenda; and that certainly is a high price to pay for methodological purity, for social scientists in general and for Marxists in particular. Apart from the possibility of viewing actors and structures asmutually determinative, we would follow E. Schlicht7 and argue that there are even cases in which adequate explanations can be conducted without any reference to "individualistic" categories of actors and actions. This point can be illustrated by drawing a demarcation line between micro- and macroeconomic theory. Whereas microeconomics analyzes economic phenomena by focusing on rational choices, macroeconomics focuses on lawful relations among such economic aggregates as income, employment, and inflation. The important point is that the latter so far have not been successfully reduced to the f~rmer.~ To be sure, macrorelations cannot be thought of without presupposing actors (such as investors or consumers), but that misses the point: Actors simply are absent from the macrorelations themselves. There exists a "hiatus" between micro- and macrorelations; hence, both can and must be methodologically isolated from each other. An example for such nonreducible laws is the neoRicardian formulation of an inverse relation between the rate of profit and real wages - a formulation that is highly significant for a Marxist economic analysis. One can well take the position that not a single one of the "laws of motion" of the capitalist mode of production formulated by Marx would hold true if tested against the economic experience of modern capitalism. But even if so, we would have no reason to substitute a mode of analysis based on the rational choice paradigm; for Elster fails to demonstrate how it could possibly replace the repudiated theory.

NOTES 1. N. Luhmann, "Funktion und Kausalitat," in Soziologische Aufklarung (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1972), 14. 2. J. Holloway and S. Picciotto, eds., State and Capital. A Marxist Debate (London: Edward Arnold, 1978). 3. K. Erdmenger, J. Esser, and W. Fach, "Das historische Defizit der materialistischen Staatstheorie," University of Konstanz, Fachbereich Politische Wissenschaft, Diskussionsbeitnige 8 (mimeo), 1977. K. Koch, "The New Marxist Theory of the State, Or the Rediscovery of a Structural-Functionalist Paradigm," paper prepared for delivery at the Moscow Congress of the International Political Science Association, August 1979, Utrecht State University. C. Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State. Class rule and the Political System - On the Selectiveness of Political Institutions," in K. von Beyme, ed., German Political Studies, 1 (1973), 31-57. C. Offe and V. Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State," New German Critique, 6 (1975). C. Offe, "Further Comments on Miiller and Neusiiss," Telos, 25 (1975), 99-1 11. 4. Luhmann, 20. 5. A. Przeworski, "Proletariat into a Class: The Process of Class Formation from Karl Kautsky's The Class Struggle to Recent Controversies," Politics andsociety, 1 (1977), 343-401. 6. For an attempt to relate "the logic of collective action" to class positions see C. Offe and H. Wiesenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action - Theoretical Notes on Social Class," Political Power and Social Theory, 1 (1980), 67- 1 15. 7. E. Schlicht, Grundlagen der okonomischen Analyse (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1977). 8. J. Berger, "Intersubjektive Sinnkonstitution und Sozialstruktur. Zur Kritik handlungstheoretischer Ansatze der Soziologie," Zeitschrift fur Soziologie, 7 (1978).

Theory and Society 1 1 (1982) 521-526 0304-2421/82/0000-0000/$02.75 o 1982 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company

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Theses on the Theory of the State Claus Offe; Volker Ronge New German Critique, No. 6. (Autumn, 1975), pp. 137-147. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0094-033X%28197523%290%3A6%3C137%3ATOTTOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

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